THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF VAIŚEṢIKA SOTERIOLOGY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CANDRĀNANDA'S VṚTTI

IONUT MOISE
WOLFSON COLLEGE
MICHAELMAS TERM, 2017

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy,
Faculty of Theology, University of Oxford

Supervisors
Prof. Gavin D. Flood, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford
Prof. Christopher Minkowski, Oriental Institute, University of Oxford

Examiners (19th June 2018)
Prof. Sashi Prabha Kumar, Sanchi University of Buddhist-Indic Studies, Sanchi, India
Dr Jessica Frazier, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford

for Elena Leucă
first teacher, godmother, and life-long friend
1962-2017

DECLARATION

I, candidate Ionut Moise, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 99, 900 words in length (except title pages and acknowledgements) has been written by myself, and that it is the record of work carried out by myself under the supervision of Professors Gavin D. Flood and Christopher Minkowski, and in collaboration with others as acknowledged.

I have read and understood the University's disciplinary regulations concerning conduct in examinations and, in particular, the regulations on plagiarism. □

I have read and understood the Education Committee's information and guidance on academic good practice and plagiarism. □

The thesis I am submitting is entirely my own work except where otherwise indicated. □

It has not been submitted, either partially or in full, either for this Honour School or qualification or for another Honour School or qualification of this University (except where the Special Regulations for the subject permit this), or for a qualification at any other institution. □

I have clearly indicated the presence of all material I have quoted from other sources. □

I have clearly indicated the presence of all paraphrased material with appropriate references. □

I have acknowledged appropriately any assistance I have received in addition to that provided by my supervisors, Professors Gavin D. Flood and Christopher Minkowski. □

I have not copied from the work of any other candidate. □

I have not used the services of any agency providing specimen, model or ghost-written work in the preparation of this thesis. □

I agree to retain an electronic copy of this work until the publication of my final examination result, except where submission in hand-written format is permitted. □

I agree to make any such electronic copy available to the examiners should it be necessary to confirm my word count or to check for plagiarism. □

Candidate's signature:

……..

Date:

……..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration iii
Table of Contents iv
Short Abstract vi
Extended Abstract vii
Style Guide xii
Abbreviations xiii
Acknowledgements xiv

Ch. 1. Introduction to Vaiśeṣika Studies and Indian Soteriology 1
1.0. Introduction 1
1.1. Soteriology: Definition 2
• Soteriology in Theology 4
• Soteriology in Classical Era 9
• Soteriology in Classical Indian systems 15
1.2. Vaiśeṣika Scholarship: Shortcomings 18
• Austrian School: Hard Naturalist View 19
• French School: Positive soteriology 23
• German school: Philology and Textual criticism 25
1.3. Argument 27
1.4. Objective & Relevance 30
1.5. My Method (comparative/thematic, not 'philological') 31
1.6. Three Vaiśeṣika traditions (Sūtrapāṭha, Bhāṣya, and Independent) 33
1.7. Conclusion 36

Ch. 2 Candrānanda's Vṛtti (Presentation) 38
Part I
2.0. Introduction 38
2.1. Candrānanda's Vṛtti (VSc) 39
2.2. MSS on VSc 40
2.3. Synopsis of VSc (Baroda ed. 1961) 42
2.4. Author & Date of VSc 68
Part II
2.5. Sūtrapāṭha 71
2.6. MSS of Sūtrapāṭha 72
2.7. New MSS on Sūtrapāṭha 74
2.8. Date of Sūtrapāṭha 77
2.9. Textual problems 78
2.10. Conclusion 80

Ch. 3. Comparative Soteriology (Nāstika and Āstika) 82
3.0. Introduction 83
3.1. Jaina 82
3.2. Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣika 87
3.3. Nyāya 93
3.4. Sāṃkhya 98
3.5. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā 106
3.6. Vedānta 113
3.7. Conclusion 119

Ch. 4. The Nature of Vaiśeṣika Soteriology 121
4.0. Introduction 121
Part I: Static Dimension
4.1. Brahmāloka. A State of Liberation? (VSc 1.1.2) 122
• Abhyudaya (VS 1.1.2; 6.2.1; 6.2.9; 10.20) 126
4.2. Destruction of Body (vyapahataśarīra) (VSc 1.1.1) 129
• Body and Eschatology (5.2.14; 6.2.18; 10.7-10) 134
4.3. Absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 1.1.2; 1.1.6; 5.2.20) 139
• 'Cognition' (Buddhi/ Jñāna) 147
• 'Pleasure' (Sukha) and 'Pain' (Duḥkha) 149
• 'Desire' (Icchā) and 'Aversion' (Dveṣa) 151
• 'Effort' (Prayatna) 153
• Saṃskāra 155
• Dharma and Adharma (Adṛṣṭa) 159
Part II. Dynamic Dimension
4.4. Doctrine of Action (Karman, Kriyā) 176
4.5. Saṃsāra and Jīvana 182
• Body and Cosmogony (VSc 5.2.19 & VSc 6.2.18) 187
4.6. Mokṣa/Niḥśreyasa 194
4.7. Conclusion 200

Ch. 5. The Function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology 203
5.0. Introduction 203
5.1. Ātman ('ātmā jñātavya') (VSc 10.21) 206
• The General Qualities of ātman (sāmānyaguṇa) 216
• The Characteristic marks of ātman (liṅga) (VSc 3.2.4) 229
• Self and Salvation in Vaiśeṣika traditions 232
5.2. 'Gnostic' Methods of Liberation 235
• 'Discrimination' (parijñāna) (VSc 1.1.6; VSc 9.28; VSc 10.21) 242
• Theories of knowledge (sannikarṣa, yogipratyakṣa, ārṣajñāna) 246
• Means of Knowledge (pramāṇa) 248
• Objects of Knowledge (padārtha and dravya) 254
• Ārṣajñāna (VSc 9.28) 258
5.3. Yoga 260
5.4. Vairāgya (VSc 1.1.1; 1.1.6; 10.21) 272
5.5. Conclusion 278

Ch. 6. Final Conclusions 280
6.1. Ontological Conclusions 280
6.2. Epistemological conclusions 283
6.3. Inter-textual and Intra-textual conclusions 286
6.4. Further Questions 287

Bibliography 289

Title:
The Nature and Function of Vaiśeṣika Soteriology with particular reference to Candrānanda's Vṛtti

Ionut Moise
Wolfson College
Michaelmas Term, 2017

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy,
Faculty of Theology, University of Oxford

SHORT ABSTRACT

Argument. This thesis describes and examines, from a theological and comparative philosophical perspective, one of the most important topics in Indian philosophy: the nature and function of liberation; the topic is centred on Candrānanda's Vṛtti (VSc), the oldest available Sanskrit commentary on the Vaiśeṣika system to date, a system which represents a quasi-empirical, proto-scientific philosophical school that engaged in making a synthesis between both ontology and metaphysics, religion and science. The method the Vaiśeṣika system employs is to offer a clear-cut picture of the world in six categories; by that it aims to offer a response to human liberation (niḥśreyasa), a major issue with ontological, existential, philosophical, and religious implications. As to its significance and originality, Vaiśeṣika has been hailed by scholars as an old and influential philosophical system, an influence comparable to Pāṇini's grammar (Thakur, 1961). It has been regarded as beneficial for the study of other śāstras. Its worldview is holistic, pluralistic, proto-scientific, yet metaphysical, in that it acknowledges both the permanence and impermanence of matter and substance. This view lies at the interface of the discourse between religion and science. The current thesis is comparative philosophical, and has the advantage of rendering into English major portions of a fundamental text not fully translated before. It also looks at a major topic (niḥśreyasa), marginalised by Western scholars of Indology who accepted too easily Frauwallner's sweeping remarks on Vaiśeṣika's lack of original metaphysics and soteriology. During my research, I came across another major Vaiśeṣika commentary, not translated into English (Vādīndra's Vyākhyā) which presents an accurate view of the Vaiśeṣika tenets. Since its publication (Darbhanga 1957), as well as that of VSc (Baroda 1961), our understanding of Vaiśeṣika has changed considerably, and for the benefit of Vaiśeṣika students, their translation into English is increasingly a must.

Title:
The Nature and Function of Vaiśeṣika Soteriology with particular reference to Candrānanda's Vṛtti

Ionut Moise
Wolfson College
Michaelmas Term, 2017

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy,
Faculty of Theology, University of Oxford

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The Argument. The title of the current thesis is 'The Nature and Function of Vaiśeṣika Soteriology with particular reference to Candrānanda's Vṛtti'. Whenever in this research I refer to 'Vaiśeṣika's soteriology', I have in mind two levels of inquiry. 1) the 'nature' of the ontological liberated state, the terminus point (niḥśreyasa); and 2) by 'function', I refer to the means (mostly epistemological and gnostic) by which that state is achieved, chiefly by 'dharma' which is, as both VSc 1.1.6 and VSc 10.21 reckon, the sum of the followings concepts: a) dharma as 'teaching', or vaiśeṣikaguṇa (VSc 1.1.2); b) parijñāna, the discernment of the nature of the six categories; c) doṣa ('seizing' impurities in objects, through knowledge, and the avoidance of them); d) vairāgya (detachment from doṣas and their objects); e) 'ātmā jñātavya' (the knowledge of the self and the sacred phrases associated to it, e.g. upāsanam). The structure of my argument is determined by the textual evidence which VSc provides. As such, in this thesis I aim to prove that as far as Sūtrapāṭha of Kaṇāda is concerned, soteriology is not incompatible with the empirical and proto-scientific outlook of the system, and more importantly VSc provides an older and more accurate view on the system than PD (of Praśastapāda), and describes indeed the doctrine of salvation (niḥśreyasa) in several important passages. This thesis offers a detailed picture of such a doctrine, based primarily on VSc, and when the tenets are blurry I shall propose a 'reconstruction' with references from other Vaiśeṣika commentaries, or by contrast, from texts of rival Indian philosophical systems (āstika and nāstika). I also argue that although the outlook of Vaiśeṣika is a combination of theoretical proto-physics, philosophy, and metaphysics, and explains the world as formed primarily by substances (plus other categories), in this cosmological representation, the system discusses the existential and ontological nature of the self and the liberation from this representation. The salvation of the self (ātman, soul) in Vaiśeṣika is ultimately meta-cosmic, and meta-gnostic, in that neither the world nor cognition would ultimately form part of the state of soul's liberation (niḥśreyasa/mokṣa). It is purely an ontological state, where the substance ātman would subsist, without absorption, in its original form where compositional transformation such as the formation of a new body no longer takes place.

The theological term I chose ('soteriology') suggests that the current research aims to elucidate a theological topic within Vaiśeṣika by comparison with other classical philosophical systems, from India and the West; hence the rationale behind the

terminological and conceptual comparisons made in the first and third chapters. One of the most important findings in the text on which I focused, and which preserves a good deal of the ancient features of the founder of the system (Kaṇāda), is that Candrānanda supplies a synthesis between two different kinds of soteriology (abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa), which, as Olivelle pointed out, were opposite to each other. In VSc, the path of devotion (e.g. upāsākrama VSc 10.21) is not incompatible with the path of knowledge (niḥśreyasa). This synthesis that Candrānanda makes, may be read already in the sūtra 1.1.2 where dharma is the 'common concept' (bhāva) that leads man to both abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. Dharma has many meanings in many contexts, but in this particular context, we assume it to mean the Vaiśeṣika system itself, which has ontological, ethical, religious, existential and liberating force. This is not something new; such a synthesis might be encountered in Bhagavad-Gita too. But it is important to note, given the empirical physicalistic orientation of the system, how the existential and ontological questions intertwine within one single system. The case Vaiśeṣika makes is that philosophical-existential questions spring forth from a scientific ontological inquiry. Thus, such an old reflection, I think, may bode well upon the modern philosophical reflection, where philosophy is triggered, challenged, and sometimes marginalised by the overwhelming popularity of sciences within academia.

Significance and Originality. Though my primary contribution is in the field of comparative philosophy, the significance of this thesis pertains also to both Indology, and Indian philosophical thought. My contribution is a thorough analysis of an un-translated Sanskrit text, Candrānanda's Vṛtti (seventh to tenth century AD). The Vṛtti whose editio princeps was published at Baroda in 1961 is the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary available at present, and its importance has been already highlighted by both Indian (e.g. Thakur, Jambūvijayaji) and Western scholars (e.g. Wezler, Isaacson, Halbfass). For the study of Indian philosophy, the discovery of VSc represents a breakthrough. The text contains a reliable version of the founding text (Sūtrapāṭha of Kaṇāda), whose reliability is confirmed, as Thakur shows, by many references to it in other systems such as Nyāya; (e.g. Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika etc.), and Jaina (e.g. Mallavādin's Nayacakram). The implication my thesis advances is that VSc presents to us a more accurate view on the original Vaiśeṣika doctrine, than any other commentary, say Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda (c. 6th AD), or Upaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra (15th AD). As a full English translation of VSc does still not exist, this text seems to be not widely studied among Indology students. I do possess a full translation of VSc, but due to space limitation I have not included within present dissertation. As to the contribution to scholarship, by this I wish to fill a gap, and offer another look at the system's soteriology, which in the West (e.g. the Austrian school of Eric Frauwallner) has been seen as a later artificial addition, and not forming an essential part of the original tenets. My argument show, that a thorough analysis on Candrānanda's commentary contradicts such a view. A starting point of this reflection was stimulated to me by research of the French school of Indology, represented by Houben, and Biardeau. Like these latter scholars, this thesis aims to show that in Vaiśeṣika ontology leads ultimately to metaphysical questions like the existence after death, the dissolution of body, and that there is no point in assuming an insurmountable incongruity between philosophy, religion, and science. This is a highly attractive topic for any theological reflection that engages with science and philosophy, and Vaiśeṣika offers a real platform towards that.

Summary by Chapters. From the structural point of view, the thesis will be organised on three main levels: 1) a methodological section will include a comparative and textual analysis describing the thesis' argument, namely what soteriology amounts

to within biblical, theological, Greek classical, and Indian classical systems (first and third chapters); this section will also include a philological and synoptic thematical presentation of Candrānanda's Vṛtti (second chapter); 2) an ontological section on the 'Nature of Soteriology in Vaiśeṣika' (fourth chapter); and 3) an epistemological section on the 'Function of Soteriology in Vaiśeṣika' (fifth chapter). More simply, from a thematic point of view the thesis's argument is deployed in two large sections, one ontological (the nature of soteriology) and the other epistemological (the nature and function of knowledge in Vaiśeṣika), and this is because in Vaiśeṣika, soteriology (mokṣa) is a doctrine that builds upon two major pillars, one ontological, the other epistemological. At any rate, my dissertation draws comparisons between different Vaiśeṣika commentators (particularly Vādīndra, Candramati, Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Vyomaśiva) and Naiyāyika (e.g. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara), as well as between rival schools that resemble, refer or refute the Vaiśeṣika's tenets (Sarvāstivāda, Jaina, Sāṃkhya, Prābhākara's Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta). The comparison will contain only key passages and their respective soteriological doctrine which Vaiśeṣika might resemble. The chapters are to be presented as follows.

Ch. 1. Introduction to Vaiśeṣika Studies and Indian Soteriology. The chapter seeks to explain the title and its terminology. My research question is a theological inquiry, and the aim is to settle from the very beginning what soteriology means in the field of early theology, classical Greek philosophy, and by comparison, to what extent we can talk about soteriology in Vaiśeṣika, and Indian philosophy. A survey of these shows that it is the Gnostic soteriology that most resembles that of Indian classical systems. The emphasis on knowledge, as well as on the divine ontological nature of the soul (homology) which some Gnostic sources propound, proves that a comparison between Western and Indian classical soteriology can be conceptualised most effectively via the 'gnostic movement'. At the textual level, the chapter presents a discussion on Vaiśeṣika soucres from Kaṇāda's VS to Vādīndra's VSv, and the way in which the commentators have been read by the Western scholarship. It is within this secondary literature that my argument and contribution lies; in that it wishes to differently assess Vaiśeṣika, namely through the argument that the system had, from its inception, a doctrine of soteriology, not in contradiction with the overall scientific method of the system. I also stress that my methodology is not philological, but philosophical comparative, inspired by the project started by Wilhelm Halbfass.

Ch. 2 Candrānanda's Vṛtti (Presentation). Since my thesis is based on and starts from one single text (VSc), this chapter seeks to provide a textual reading of the editio princeps edited by Jambūvijayaji at Baroda 1961. I discuss the MSS on which this edition had been based, other MSS on which Isaacson and Ruzsa have improved it upon. From my part I present a series of five new MSS on the Sūtrapāṭha text that I have photographed at Wai, Mysore, Bombay, and Madras, and represent my contribution to the reconstruction of the 'independent transmission' (Wezler, 1982) of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. Since Sūtrapāṭha presents us with a number of philological problems, in this chapter I propose to highlight the importance of a second important commentary, Vādīndra's Vyākhyā (short and long version, respectively), again not available in English, whose gloss sheds new light on both the early and the later history of Vaiśeṣika. Both texts are of a paramount importance and should be translated in the near future. My thesis however, focuses only on Candrānanda's Vṛtti.

Ch. 3. Comparative Soteriology (Nāstika and Āstika). The third chapter is a logical continuation of the previous two; it aims to 'reconstruct' from external sources, and rival texts, sūtras, or doctrinal tenets of Vaiśeṣika which have been preserved in the polemical writings of competing schools, āstika, and nāstika. This is a tremendous research in itself, and is something to be worked out in separate research. Here I am concerned with the inherited relationship, if any, of their respective worldviews. The chapter shows that in some aspects, like ontology, Vaiśeṣika is closer to some systems (Vaibhāṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā of Prabhākara) in other instances, like the function of soteriology (epistemology), it is closer to Jaina, Sāṃkhya, and Vedānta. As to the nature of liberation, Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) presents us with a rather unique form of liberation, where the soul is depleted by its cognitive faculty and related specific qualities (vaiśeṣikaguṇa); liberation is the eternal (nitya) and non-composite state of ātman (vibhu), and is realised by a radical shift from the 'individualised state' (vyavasthā) of the self (VSc 3.2.16), to its all-pervasive state (vibhu).

Ch. 4. The Nature of Vaiśeṣika Soteriology. By the 'Nature of Soteriology', in this chapter I refer to the final and non-returning state of the liberated state, niḥśreyasa. Here I distinguish between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. I analyse different terms that illustrate such difference, for example concepts like Brahmāloka, Varuṇaloka, with a variety of embodied selves that inhabit these, all of which fit into the category of abhyudaya (worldly welfare). As can be seen, the cosmology and eschatology of Vaiśeṣika is highly influenced by that of the Vedas. Though the sūtra 1.1.2 sets niḥśreyasa and abhyudaya together under dharma, the former however, is something different; it is the state of self depleted of vaiśeṣikaguṇas; I have analysed separately, each one of these nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas, with evidence extracted mainly from the VSc commentary itself, rather than the secondary literature. Though in VSc we do not have evidence of a doctrine on a 'subtle body', this chapter also looks into the extent to which the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas might have represented a 'psychological self' or 'subtle body'. We know that in Sāṃkhya the 'subtle body' is associated with a set of 'thirteen subtle elements' (SK 40-41); therefore I inquire if Vaiśeṣika had had an equivalent view on this. The separate analysis of each one of these vaiśeṣikaguṇas as well as the nature of concepts like jīvana, janma, jantu, and saṃsāra, explain the embodied and the nature of ātman in Vaiśeṣika. Since ātman is an eternal and all-pervasive substance, its relation with a 'subtle body', and the extirpation of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, explain better the final state of liberation (niḥśreyasa/mokṣa).

Ch. 5. The Function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology. The chapter is built upon a series of fundamental soteriological themes listed by Candrānanda in both glosses 1.1.6 and 10.21. These constitute signposts for the presentation of the fifth chapter. The steps to be followed for achieving liberation are predominantly gnostic: 1) the knowledge of the self, as an ontological and cosmological entity ('ātmā jñātavya'). Vaiśeṣika has a rather scientific or mechanical view of the self, because it sees it as a pure substance devoid of vaiśeṣikaguṇas. Though yoga might appear at first to play a psychological role in the abolition of sukha and duḥkha, here it is discussed in terms of techniques of breathing (vāyunigraha VSc 5.2.17), and plays a fundamentally intellectual role with the goal of enhancing the knowledge of categories, which is a prerequisite to salvation (VSc 1.1.16). In this chapter I present, one by one, practical means by which soteriology is worked on: it is mainly through knowledge of the following: 1) ontology, that is the essence of the world's constituents (gnosis), through Yoga and 'detachment' (vairāgya) from

objects and their 'impurity' (doṣa), as well as a certain 'meditation' on self (upāsana); and 2) epistemology, in which ordinary (sannikarṣa, yogipratyakṣa), and extraordinary (ārṣajñāna) forms of knowledge are discussed. The predominant instrument to obtain salvation is knowledge (parijñāna).

Chapter 6: Conclusions. Finally the last chapter deals with the list of conclusions reached as a result of reading and translating a series of key passages from Candrānanda's Vṛtti. The importance of Candrānanda is that he managed to create, through few key concepts (dharma, and yoga) a synthesis between knowledge and devotion, between the nivṛtti and the pravṛtti paths. Through dharma, VSc brings together abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa, not as opposite factors, but on the contrary, as complementary, as they can be worked out together through the medium of dharma, knowledge, and yoga. One final conclusion is that soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is built upon two major pillars, ontology and epistemology.

STYLE GUIDE

Referencing: In both footnotes and bibliography I used an abbreviated form of Oxford referencing with author's surname, year, and date (e.g. Halbfass, 1980, p. 268), and no brackets for year. For English, I have used English grammar and spelling (e.g. realise, instead of realize).

Transliteration: All Sanskrit is in roman transliteration. I have not followed the convention of putting them in italics. Whenever I have referred to a particular Sanskrit term in brackets, I have opted for the 'stem form' of MW Dictionary (e.g. for karma, karman); when I have not done so, I gave a portion of the quotation. I have also used Sanskrit terminology in a more colloquial fashion ('theory of karma', or the plural form, e.g 'dravyas'), not least because such concepts are already consecrated within scholarship. I gave all terminological translations in brackets (e.g. dravya - 'substance') and I do not claim to provide a definite translation, as implied by 'Gloss' provided throughout. Sometimes I have analysed terms without even supplying a translation for these (e.g. saṃskāra), as I consider their English rendering debatable. More generally, the diacritics of the Sanskrit authors and works referred to therein are those of the Bodleian Libraries Catalogue (SOLO) and Karl Potter's Encyclopaedia.

For the Buddhist and Jain section, whose sources are in Pāli and Prakrit, I have relied on scholars' terminology cited, yet, I have sought to provide as much as possible the equivalent term in Sanskrit. My expertise deals only with Sanskrit sources. In the first chapter which dealt with biblical, patristic, and Greek sources, I have preferred using Greek. For the sources of New Testament, I have used Nestle-Aland Revised 28th Edition (online), for the patristic sources I used the dictionaries referred to in the bibliography, while for the Greek philosophical references, I have used The Loeb Classical Library, via LSJ (Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (online).

Candrānanda's Vṛtti. Finally, this thesis is based on the transliteration of a critical edition made by the Hungarian scholar Ferenc Ruzsa (academia.edu). However the shortcoming of his feat is that he worked on the 1982 edition, which Isaacson recommends to be avoided as it contains a sprinkle of new misprints; hence in all my work I have relied on Jambūvijayaji's first edition (1961), which I have described, and quoted throughout. The textual critical apparatus of VSc is thus based on the philological work of these brilliant scholars, who are in the best position to supply a new critical edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtras for the future.

ABBREVIATIONS [1]

ABK L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, (French trans. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, 1980.
ABORI Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
ADGL A Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament and other early Christian literature. Arndt, W. F. Danker, 2000.
ALMOIB Alphabetical List of Manuscripts in the Oriental Institute, Baroda.
AS Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques. Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaiśeṣika, 1994.
Car Caraka Saṁhitā.
CSPM Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakṛti Manuscripts, Ahmedabad.
DE Chant. Dictionnaire Étymologique. Chantraine, 1980. Vol 2.
DP Daśapadārthaśāstra of Candra, H. Ui ed. 1917.
GIP Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie by Frauwallner, Erich / **HIP** (for English trans.)
GOS Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
GRETIL - Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages.
HSPCIC History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization.
IBS Indological and Buddhist Studies.
IBS Indological and Buddhist Studies, Vol. in Honour of Professor J.W. Long.
JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JGJKSV Journal of the Gangānātha Jhā Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetham, Allahabad.
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy.
JOIB Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda.
Kir Udayana's commentary on PD.
PGL A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Lampe, G. W. H. 1961 for all Patristic references in the section Theological soteriology (online).
Loeb. The Loeb Classical Library (online) (For section on 'Soteriology in Classical Era. ch. 1).
LSJ A Greek-English Lexicon. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, Eds. Revised by H. S. Jones print. 1968; & (online).
LXX Septuagint. Rahlfs/Hanhart. Eds. (online).
LXX, The Septuagint (online).
MW Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary (online).
Mysore N.D A New Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, vol. 10. 1984.
NK Śrīdhara's commentary on PD.
NTG Novum Testamentum Graecae. Nestle-Aland 28th ed. (online).
OHHAP The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.
PD Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya
SII Studien zur Indologie unt Iranistik
Trav. Uni. Su: Index of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum. Vol. 5. 2000.
VIJ Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal.
VS Sūtrapāṭha of VSc (with attempted reconstruction from the 'independent transmission').
VSc gloss of Candrānanda's Vṛtti, GOS, 136.
VSi Il Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Di Kaṇāda. Trans. Leonardo V. Arena
VSś The Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇāda, trans. Gough, A.E.
VSv Vādīndra's Vyākhyā. Darbhanga 1957.
Vyo Vyomaśiva commentary on PD.
Wai D. II Descriptive catalogue of MSS Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍaḷa, Wai.
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.

[1] For another list of abbreviations, especially on the primary sources, see the Bibliography.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first thanks are due to my supervisor Prof. Gavin D. Flood, who believed in me more than I did myself, and whose sustained encouragements lead this research to this point. Then, Prof. Christopher Minkowski kindly agreed to take me on board and introduce me to the sources of Sanskrit literature and various philological matters. During my ten-month research in India, I had the fortune to read the commentary with excellent Indologists: Dr Ganesh Thite, Prof. Pradeep Gokhale, and Pandit Devadatta Patil. Short advice has been offered by Harunaga Isaacson and Jan Westerhoff; I have learned a lot from the critics of my own research Prof. Alexis Sanderson and Dr. James Benson, and from the kind assistance of Dr. Rembert Lutjeharms and Prof. Leonardo Vittorio Arena. Though I acknowledge their support, all shortcomings in this thesis are totally mine. Scholarships. I wish to thank the following trusts for the immense financial support: Erasmus Mundus, Spalding Trust, and Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Crewdson Trust, Wolfson College, to name just a few. Private Benefactors. Last but not least, this thesis was made possible due to tremendous support offered by most wonderful landlords: Revd. Canon Hugh Wybrew, Tom Leach, Belinda Coote, as well as godly friends who helped me, time and again, to cover the living expenses: Marios Choudary, Cătălin Chimerel, and Matthieu Naett. A token of gratitude I owe to Jacquie Rawes and Carol Summers from the Special Learning Institute. They helped me to think in English and produce clarity in print.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO VAIŚEṢIKA STUDIES AND INDIAN SOTERIOLOGY

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The current chapter seeks to introduce, explain, and critically assess the ancient and modern literature on Vaiśeṣika darśana, one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy.[2] The title of this thesis - 'The Nature and Function of Vaiśeṣika's Soteriology with particular reference to Candrānanda's Vṛtti' (VSc) - contains several concepts that address questions related to the nature of Vaiśeṣika soteriology: 1) What does 'soteriology' stand for in the context of Indian philosophy more generally, and in Vaiśeṣika, more specifically? 2) What is the place of VSc within Vaiśeṣika source-literature and scholarship, and why has this been chosen as gauge to evaluate the soteriological doctrine of the system? 3) What does the term 'nature' designate, and does its 'function' refer to? Each question will be subsequently treated within one chapter.[3] As will be shown, the chapters deal with comparative, philological, ontological, and epistemological aspects of the Vaiśeṣika system in general, and Candrānanda's Vṛtti, in particular.[4] The general method is comparative, and throughout this thesis I seek to engage the early Vaiśeṣika soteriological doctrine with parallel concepts within the broad spectrum of Indian philosophy (nāstika and āstika systems), as well as outside it

[2] Thakur, 1961, Introd. VSc, pp. 1-3.

[3] First and third chapters (comparative); second chapter philological (VSc presentation); fourth chapter ontological (the 'nature of Vaiśeṣika soteriology'); and the fifth chapter epistemological ('method and function of liberation' lays much emphasis on knowledge).

[4] The specific focus is the Candrānanda's Vṛtti (seventh to tenth century AD), un-translated into English, editio princeps, Baroda, 1961. Portions of it have been discussed, and translated in various articles by Nozawa, Wezler, Isaacson, Halbfass, and Houben.

(Patristic, Gnostic, and Classical Greek), as shown by this very first chapter. The period covered is the second half of the first millennium AD, the timespan within which VSc composition falls. I shall look at Candrānanda as contemporary to a series of outstanding śāstric classical literature formulated in the 'Patristic-Sūtra period' (325 to 800 AD) and developed after.[5] In the following, I propose to clarify what 'soteriology' signifies in the context of religious studies and Indian philosophy, by drawing some terminological and conceptual distinctions between the two worldviews, 'Indian' and 'European',[6] and similarly wish to fill gaps within Vaiśeṣika studies, left or dismissed by inadequate assumptions made by Indologists.

1.1. SOTERIOLOGY: DEFINITION

As the method of this thesis is comparative, I shall begin with Paul Masson-Oursel for whom the soteriological knowledge in Indian philosophy is two-fold: on the one hand, it is ontological, and on the other epistemological.[7] The ontological section inevitably leads us to inquire what is meant in the present title by 'the nature of soteriology', and since this study fits into the boundaries of a 'theology and religion department', it needs to respond the question of the meaning of soteriology as applied in the Indian philosophical context. From the start I should point out that soteriology as understood in Classical Mediterranean context is different from that of Vaiśeṣika, though some interesting similarities can be traced, hence the rationale of the following comparative section. Within the field of the 'Study of Religion', the term 'soteriology' is known as 'salvation'. As Flood puts it, 'all religions have arguably a doctrine of salvation that claims

[5] Franco, 2013, p. 23, though I favour the periodisation of Plott et. al. 1989.
[6] I use the terms not in their modern cultural sense, but rather geographically. The Indian subcontinent and the Mediterranean world of classical Greece, respectively, represent the spatial locus where both Theology and Gnosticism thrived.
[7] Masson-Oursel, 1923, p. 169.

that the human condition of death and suffering can be overcome'.[8] Within Indian traditions, Vaiśeṣika, alongside systems like Jaina and Buddhism, show explicit yearnings for a doctrine of salvation; their commentarial literature packs debates related both to the means, as well as the state of liberation. In philosophical and religious studies however, 'soteriology' is a concept charged with rather Greek and Christian theological implications. The task of this section is to explain the term 'soteriology' in the context of Vaiśeṣika and classical Indian thought, by drawing first an outline of the 'denotations' which the concept possesses in other fields such as Theology, Greek classics, and Gnosticism. As I will show, the problem of 'salvation' in Vaiśeṣika (niḥśreyasa, mokṣa) is considerably different from 'soteriology' expounded in Christian theology; but instead, is closer to soteriologies of a gnostic and Eleatic kind.[9] Soteriology in Vaiśeṣika does not acknowledge a form of 'reconciliation' with God, by which the soul might unite 'homologically' with the Higher Soul (as in Gnosticism or Vedānta).[10] Even in terms of ethics - that is to say the 'function of soteriology' - Vaiśeṣika remains still far off, since the 'prescribed actions', (āhnika VSc 6.2) lead only to abhyudaya ('welfare'), which is more of a temporary form of 'worldly salvation', rather than the radical disembodied form of soteriology to which, in Indian philosophy, mokṣa points. In Vaiśeṣika, soteriology (niḥśreyasa/mokṣa) is exclusively a state of soul stripped of any of its nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas, which keep the soul attached to body, matter, and cosmos. On the other hand, in Christian theology, soteriology is based fundamentally on the Incarnation of

[8] Flood, 2016, p. 623.

[9] Within Vedic cosmogony, Hiraṇyagarbha (the 'golden semen', VSc 1.1.3) or Brahman (PD 57) is that by which Maheśvara ('tat') renders the creation of the 'subtle universe' (Rg. Veda 10.121). Vaiśeṣika does not imply a 'soteriology' arbitrated by an 'external mediator' comparable to Christ, as the Saviour; one aspect in which these soteriologies might relate is in the 'injunctions of the Lord' and adṛṣṭa, the latter mediated by Īśvara (PD 2; 57); yet adṛṣṭa has no soteriological role, but a saṃsāric one. Salvation, in both VS and VSc is produced in the absence of adṛṣṭa and theism.

[10] On 'homology', and 'deification', see Litwa, 2015, pp. 427-447. Because of this missing point, Śaṅkara (8th AD) would label Vaiśeṣikas as 'semi-nihilists' (BSB 2.2.18).

God (in Christ), therefore lays much emphasis on body, embodiment, and its transformation in Heaven, or after Parousia, but never on its complete extirpation, as in Vaiśeṣika. In other words, while Vaiśeṣika's soteriology points to a return of the soul in its quiescent state, or as in Vedānta, its merging with the 'Supreme Soul' (Paramātman; Brahman), in Christianity soteriology presupposes the transformation of man into 'the divine likeness', lost by Adam's fall, but rendered back by Christ's Incarnation.[11] The nature of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is static (end of karma) whereas in Christianity it is a 'continual becoming' (dynamic).[12]

SOTERIOLOGY IN THEOLOGY[13]

As expected, 'soteriology' is a Western Greek theological term, therefore this section must clarify its meaning before applying it to Indian systems. Here the emphasis I lay is on the difference between Western and Indian soteriology, and wish to avoid confusion and better apply the term to Vaiśeṣika. The modern theological doctrine of 'soteriology', 'salvation' in English language, comes to be associated with a variety of other terms: 'atonement' (bring humanity into unity with God), 'redemption' (from sin, death, and evil), 'reconciliation' (with God through the Son), as well as terms borrowed from Greek such as 'kenosis' (the self-empting of God) or 'soteria' (whence 'soteriology') which means 'safety'.[14] In the New Testament, for instance, we have the present infinitive active of 'σῴζειν' ('to save') (Heb. 5.7), which derives originally from the stem adjective

[11] Gross, (1938), 2002, p. 269.
[12] Paul 2 Cor. 3.18, talks about a state of contemplation of the 'Image' that implies a continuous transformation from glory to glory (ἡμεῖς …τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν). It is therefore not a static, but a dynamic contemplative state.
[13] Theology (Christian) here is presented non-denominationally; I look at its early soteriology as formulated in the phase of Christianity, in the Greek patristic and post-patristic era up to John of Damascus (8th AD); this coincides with Plott's periodisation of 'Patristic Sūtra period' (1989, vol. 2), time in which Vaiśeṣika developed.
[14] Schneider, 2009, p. 46.

'σῶς' (Attic dialect),[15] which when it refers to persons means 'safe', 'sound', 'alive' and 'well',[16] while when it refers to events it signifies 'safe', 'secure', 'certain'.[17] One possible way to scale down the complex terminology derived from 'σῶς' is to distinguish between objective and subjective soteriology. On the one hand, subjective terminology refers to a person like Christ as 'saviour' 'σωτήρ', and on the other, to an objective soteriology referring to the transcendental state of 'salvation' (σωτηρία),[18] or, as the Greek Lexicon renders, a 'way or means of safety'.[19] Here subjective refers to the dynamic and practical character of salvation that derives from Christ (the becoming process into His Likeness), while the objective character of soteriology is purely ontological, theoretical and static with no effect for liberation (to believe in Christ, as a realised static subject). In the biblical theology of NT, the objective salvation cannot be dissociated from the subjective one (St. James 2. 14-26). Yet, as I will show, liberation in the Vaiśeṣika system is the reversal of these two concepts; what in Vaiśeṣika is considered ontological, theoretical and static liberation, where the self seeks to find its original nature, in theology it is only the starting point for the salvation which begins from the ontological concept of the self as originally made in the 'Image of God'. Theology speaks of a journey of the self from a static to unceasing dynamics (the eschatological becoming of the self), whereas Vaiśeṣika (because of the theory of karma) takes the opposite journey of the dislocation of the embodied self from its dynamic composite nature, to its static non-composite nature (mokṣa).

Regarding the subjective, dynamic, or 'the function of soteriology', the biblical, apostolic, patristic and post-patristic Christian theology develops a soteriology in close

[15] Trans. 'healthy and safe' ('sain et sauf, en bonne santé'), DE Chant., vol. 2, p. 1084.
[16] LSJ s.v. σῶς (A) I.
[17] LSJ s.v. σῶς (A) II. 2.
[18] ADGL s.v. σωτηρία 2.
[19] LSJ s.v. σωτηρ-ία (A) 2.

relationship with the 'theology of Image' (Gen 1.26-27) and its equivalent 'The Logos' (John 1.1), both of which embodied in Christ and his Incarnation. For St. Paul, soteriology is Christocentric;[20] the soteriological state implies a 'life in Christ' (ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός) (Gal. 2.20),[21] the acquisition of the 'mind-set' (φρονεῖτε) of Christ (Phil. 2.5),[22] towards the aim of acquiring an incorruptible life (I Tim 6.16),[23] all of which represent a new creation of man (2 Cor. 5.17; Eph. 2.4-10). The language of creation in Christ obviously refers to the 'theology of the Image' with roots in the book of Genesis 1.26-27, where Adam was created 'after the Image and likeness of God' (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν).[24] On this basis, both apostolic and patristic eras abound in theologies explaining this; the restoration of the 'image' (εἰκόνα) lost by Adam is achieved in Christ (in Baptism),[25] while the 'likeness' (ὁμοίωσιν), is an ongoing process of 'participation in the divine nature' (ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως) (2 Pet. 1.3-4). This Christocentric terminology would give rise to the teaching of 'deification' (theosis) articulated further by Irenaeus of Lyon,[26] and Athanasius of Alexandria.[27] This soteriology of 'theosis', where the mediator is the Christ as 'Imago Dei',[28] would not, however, be understood by all, and everywhere the same. In the Alexandrian school, for instance, there appeared to be among the Christians a tendency to see the question of mediation in rather gnostic terms. Clement of Alexandria says that 'the human νοῦς is the image of the image' (Strom. 5.14),[29] while Origen implies that

[20] Gross, 2002, p. 82.
[21] Gal. 2.20: … ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός. NTG (Nestle-Aland 28th ed. print & online).
[22] NTG, Phil. 2.5. Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. See also Gal. 4.19; Rom. 6-7.
[23] On 'soteriology as life', Rom. 6.4,11.
[24] LXX, 1.26.
[25] Epiphanius of Costantia, On Adam and Christ, Sermon on Holy Saturday (via PGL).
[26] Irenaeus's Epideixis 22(767); Ad Haers 3.19 (via PGL).
[27] Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 54.3. 'theosis' is further discussed in other Church Fathers: Clement of Alexandria Com. Gosp. Mark 10.17-31; Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 29; Maximus the Confessor, Questiones ad Thalassium 22 (via PGL).
[28] Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 1.3 (via PGL).
[29] However, Clement (Paed. 1.12) describes deification in terms of θεοποιεῖν which means 'make into gods, deify' , and 'make divine' , respectively (see LSJ s.v. A. I. II).

salvation is 'the restauration of human νοῦς into its original 'divine' state'.[30] In the patristic era, this gnostic view was seen as replacing the mediating role of Christ which would subsequently fuel debates, later settled in the ecumenical councils. Christian theology, and its emphasis on the subjective soteriology ('incarnational', 'humanist', and 'holistic') is much different from the dualistic soteriology (body versus soul) which classical Gnosticism, and surprisingly Vaiśeṣika - and to a certain extent Sāṃkhya's soteriology - are generally characterised.

Another dimension of theological soteriology is the 'objective' one, a corresponding concept to the 'nature of soteriology' in Vaiśeṣika. The question of the 'nature' of soteriology, (or soteriontology as Halbfass calls it), is an ontological issue; in order to define it one might request the help of Aristotle. In his Metaphysics (Book Δ. 4), 'nature' is identified with the term φύσις,[31] and defined as that which has five characteristics. 1) the genesis of growing things; 2) a part (or seed) from which growth begins; 3) the internal principle of movement in natural (not accidental) objects; 4) the fundamental matter out of which the object exists is unchangeable, and 5) essence is not dissociated from its form.[32] The ontological discussion is taken up again by Aristotle in his Physics II.1, where he clarifies that for something to be, it must exist naturally and not by accident, and must have a 'principle of motion'.[33] Thus, in both Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle defines φύσις (nature) as 'principle of motion', and it is in this very sense that soteriology will be outlined in this thesis. The dynamics of salvation in

[30] Gross, 2002, translates νοῦς as mind and its faculties: LSJ s.v. νῶ A. 1. (mind); A. 2. (to have sense, be sensible). νοῦς must be the mark of a strong gnostic influence on Origen; As will be discussed, the shift from a person as mediator to a gnosis as mediator-factor of salvation, is a concept of gnostic origin, and bears striking similarities with the role of jñāna in Vaiśeṣika, and more generally with Indian philosophical śāstras.

[31] See LSJ s.v. φύσις A. IV 1. In Philosophy: 1. 'nature as an originating power'; 2. 'elementary substance'; 3. 'concrete, the creation, 'Nature'. Originally, from φύω, see DE Chant, pp. 1233-35.

[32] Ross trans. of Arist. Meth. 1924, pp. 295 (essence of things must have a principle of movement in themselves qua themselves); Warrington trans. Arist. Meth. 1956, pp. 8-9, the response of Aristotle to Empedocles is that 'nature' is the attribute of things which are composed of matter and form (e.g. bronze is the nature of a statue).

[33] Arist. Ph. 192b20 (trans. Ross, 1936, p. 349).

theology discussed in the patristics' section implies thus an ongoing process, a 'participation in the divine nature' (2 Pet. 1.3-4), a 'deification' (theosis), which the Church Fathers of the first millennium identified as soteriology, or salvation. The 'objective' dimension of soteriology in theology never stays at its static dimension, because moves self from the state of 'Image' to the stage of 'likeness of God' which is ultimately an infinite process; it involves a participation in a communion both with Christ and people believing in him. The view of the Christian community as 'the body of Christ' (σῶμα Χριστοῦ) was articulated by Paul (I Cor. 12.27; Gal. 2.20), and developed further in the twentieth century by Henri de Lubac ('sacramentum').[34] Finally, soteriology in Theology is holistic as it extends through its 'extra sacramental grace' to all the 'people of God'.[35] On the contrary, in Indian philosophy, and Vaiśeṣika, soteriology is generally 'individualistic',[36] and the soteriology state is static, not dynamic, since action produces composite world and suffering.

From the theological soteriology discussed, the question that comes to the fore is the extent to which the soteriology, as stated in this thesis' title, amounts to the 'nature and function of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology'. There are considerable differences between the two. First, soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is dualistic and excludes the possibility of action, matter, and body as participating in the final stage of liberation; on the opposite side, the subjective and objective Christian theological soteriology of the patristic era maintains a process of transformation, or 'deification' of the human person: body and soul. Soteriology is a 'state of incorruptibility' (1 Cor. 15:53).[37] Second, soteriology,

[34] E.g. de Lubac, Catholicism, 1938; See also Corpus Mysticum, 1944, which develops a 'Eucharistic theology of the church'.
[35] 'Extra sacramental grace' and 'people of God' are attributed to Karl Rahner. After Second Vatican Council, the soteriology of the catholic church became more holistic (see encyclicals: 'Lumen Gentium', and 'Gaudium et Spes')
[36] Here I refer to Vaiśeṣika, but there are others 'absorption kind of soteriologies' where the self loses its identity in a bigger entity (Brahman).
[37] On salvation that includes both soul and body, see Athanasius, Apoll. 1.15; Origen Fr. 36 in Jo; 2 Clem 20.5 (210) speaks clearly about 'bodily immortality'.

particularly that absolute form of soteriology (niḥśreyasa) has in Vaiśeṣika a fixed dimension, a state from where there is no-return into a new body, and world. In both Johannine and Pauline theology, soteriology is an 'ongoing process'; though realised in Christ, it is yet to come in a future life where the knowledge of the disciples will undergo transformation 'from glory to glory' (John 17.24; 2 Cor. 3:18). Third, from an ontological perspective, namely the Aristotelian 'principle of motion' as applied to the self, in Vaiśeṣika we see nowhere near a change or transformation of the soul (ātman) per se, chiefly because the doctrine of ātman in Indian philosophy is very different from that of patristic theology (where the soul is not pre-existent, but created 'ex-nihilo'). In Vaiśeṣika, soteriology is ontological, for it is concerned with the return of the ātman to 'its origin' and 'permanent', 'non-composite' essence; in theology on the other hand, final salvation of the self has a clear transformative eschatological dimension, in which both soul and body participate. The differences between the two views are large, both substantially and ontologically. For closer forms of soteriology, the comparative scholar must nevertheless look elsewhere, particularly into the religious and philosophical currents of the Ancient Greece, such as Orphism and Classical Gnosticism.

SOTERIOLOGY IN CLASSICAL ERA

The nature and function of soteriology in Vaiśeṣika cannot therefore be read in a biblical or patristic theological sense. I use the term in relation to more remote soteriologies that resemble, or possibly, relate to Vaiśeṣika's 'salvation of the self'. A closer soteriology is that encountered in the Orphism of the Classical (6th to 4th BC) and Hellenistic period (4th BC to 1st AD). The general meaning of 'soteria' in Greek Classical philosophy is that of 'deliverance', 'preservation', and varies according to the type of literature in which it

is employed: 'safe return' in epics,[38] 'recovery' in medical literature,[39] 'thanks-offering' in drama,[40] while interchangeably in philosophy and history, the meaning refers to 'saving' from death in a circumstance like for instance war.[41] But a more precise meaning to soteriology is to be found in Orphism, one of the mystery cults of Classical Era, which had a considerable influence on both Pre-Socratics of Ionian and Elean type, and which presents also an interesting similarity with gnostic movements which fuelled by contra-distinction the development of the patristic and post-patristic theology. Orphic soteriology draws closer to the soteriology encountered in Indian philosophical systems for several reasons. First, in Orphism the soul is eternal, and divine, whose bondage is the soul's 'imprisonment in body', while salvation is the return to its 'original state';[42] second, in Orphism as well as Vaiśeṣika, soteriology is highly dualistic and presupposes, in the soteriological state, a sharp separation between body and soul. Though in Theology, 'salvation' is mediated by a person, in Orphism, on the other hand, the role of mediation is de-individualised; or, if a 'means' exists, then like in Vaiśeṣika, that 'means' or 'medium' is self-centred, or is the gnosis, or the powers of the self, not a tertiary factor comparable to a god. Indeed, in Orphism like in Vaiśeṣika, gods, though creators of cosmos, have no power to liberate the soul.

Orphism is 'essentially a religion of salvation';[43] and for the reconstruction of its soteriology, the internal witnesses (Orphic corpus - 'theogony', 'hymns', and 'catabasis' texts), as well as the external witnesses, Plato and Aristotle,[44] might give us clues on which particular sense 'soteriology' should be read, whenever discussed in relation to

[38] Aeschylus' Persae 508 ch. 203; 'keeping safe', 'preservation', in Herodotus 4.98 (via LSG).
[39] Hippocrates, Aph 7.37; 'wholesome' in Galenus 9.574; 14.248; 'on the way to recovery' Aetius Medicus 5.51 (via LSG).
[40] 'Thanks-offering for deliverance' in X. Antigona, 3.2.9; 5.1.1 (via LSG).
[41] Plat. Laws 1.647b; 'survival' Plat. Prot. 321b (via LSG).
[42] Gross, 1938, p. 24.
[43] Boulanger, 1940, p. 69; quoted by L. J. Alderink, 1981, p. 56.
[44] Among which Derveni papyrus (4th century BC) is a most important finding (Betegh, 2004).

Vaiśeṣika, and Indian philosophy, more generally. Indeed, Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is not a 'theological soteriology' as such. It is religious (from whence this comparison to Orphism), and ontological too (from whence comparison with both classical Greek philosophical and 'gnostic' terminology which represent a 'case in point' for clarifying soteriology in an Indian context). This is more so the case, as in an overall comparative look over the soteriology of 'Indian philosophy', Orphism, Pre-Socratics, and Gnosticism,[45] we see a prevailing and marked tendency towards a 'dualistic anthropology' where soul is of a different nature, and origin than body, therefore its salvation would consist of complete separation between the two.[46] The choice of the schools selected here is not arbitrary. This thesis begins from the conjectures, which, well before Said's Orientalism publication (1978), both Zaehner (1961) and West (1971) made as regards the influence which the Persian religious cast of Magi of Media (north-western Iran; Achaemenid Empire) exerted upon Ionian Greek philosophy.[47] The main features of Orphic 'dualistic soteriology' are described by passages in Plato for instance, where body is seen as 'a prison' (Plat. Crat. 400c; Plat. Phaedo 62b), or 'a tomb' (Plat. Gorg. 493a), in which body a pre-existent soul was placed, to expiate the sin of having killed Dionysus. In some of Plato's works (e.g. Laws 701cd), allusion is made to the 'myth of Dionysius' where the souls of Titans, after having killed the Dionysius-child, are condemned to a purification, with a series of 'transmigrations'.[48] The orphic soteriological dualism, according to Gross, originates with the myth that shows the composite character of human as being formed by 'an element titanique, violent,

[45] Obviously, not all systems of Indian philosophy are included here; for instance, Vedānta is rather monistic when it comes to assert the nature of reality. The broad comparative views should be taken cautiously also in the case of Pre-Socratics, and Classical Gnosticism.
[46] On dualistic anthropology as related to the soteriology, Boulanger, 1940, p. 71; Alderink, 1981, p. 58.
[47] The difference between Zaehner and West pertains only to periodization for the migration of Magis in by the Aegean shores.
[48] Gross, 1938 ed. p. 24. The theory of transmigration, however is strongly opposed by Alderink, 1981, p. 56, who points that Orphism, differently from Pythagoreans, did not have transmigration, but instead 'a journey of the soul', which is a theme of a great circulation both in Gnosticism and Zoroastrian literature (e.g. Ardā Wīrāz nāmag, 'Book of the Just Wīrāz').

antidivin' on the one hand, and 'an élément dionisiaque, ou divin', on the other.[49] As a result, soteriology involves several themes, such as 'penalty' (Plat. Laws 12.959c), 'requital and penance' (Plat. Gorg. 523b), or 'judgement after death (Plat. Gorg. 523-527), 'atonement' or 'restauration of the souls' (Plat. Gorg. 523b), and 'remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice by mean of sacrifice' (Plat. Rep. 2.364e).[50] As for the nature of body, (called 'tomb', 'prison') the orphic soteriology sees the mixture of soul with body as 'a contamination', and 'obstacle' in the way of achieving freedom and liberation.[51]

Indeed, following Zaehner and West thesis, one can notice further dualisms, either ontological-epistemological, as among the Eleatics,[52] or simply ethical-soteriological, as in the Orphic corpus as attested by external witness such as Plato and Pythagoras.[53] The Stranger of Elea, the main character in the Plato's Sophist, talks about the 'art of discrimination' (διακριτικήν) which implies a notion of 'division' (διαιρετικά) (Plato's Sophist 226c); as becomes explicit from the dialogue, such division is of two kinds, as well as a form of 'purification' (καθαρτικὸν) (226e).[54] In fact, 'purification' itself is of two kinds, that of 'animate bodies', and that of 'inanimate bodies' (227a).[55] There are also other types of dualistic purification, such as between soul, and body (227c), two kinds of evil in the soul (227d), or two kinds of ignorance, corresponding to two kinds of instruction (229b). Though Eleatics' intellectual ontological method was holistic ('to unite under one name all purifications of everything else'), the aim was to create

[49] Gross, 1938, p. 24.
[50] For all translations: see LSJ (Perseus Digital Library - online).
[51] Alderink, 1981, p. 62.
[52] Fowler, 1921, p. 123.
[53] Edmonds, 2004, p. 102; on orphic poems ascribed to Pythagoreans and the influence of the orphic myths on Plato, Frutiger, 1930, p. 260; Zeller, 1888, p.163.
[54] Plat. Soph. 226e.
[55] With regard to the animate bodies division, a further sub-division is made between those impurities, which are within bodies, and those, which are outside bodies. Plato's Sophist 227a.

dichotomy ('to keep them separate from the purification of the soul').[56] This method of 'ontological purification' has a heavy intellectual connotation, comparable with Vaiśeṣika's vairāgya.[57] Besides, the aim of keeping all entities separated from the soul seems to acquire an ethical, and arguably a soteriological dimension. Both aspects, the 'intellectual method' and the 'aim of separation' relate to the concept of catharsis, a classical philosophic concept, which I associate with the soteriology propounded by Vaiśeṣika. Now we know that, in Vaiśeṣika, soteriology is radical; it implies the removal of the nine qualities of the soul (vaiśeṣikaguṇa), which are those that relate it to the body. On the other hand, catharsis involves, quite similarly, 'elimination of emotions';[58] or at least 'a dianoetic enlightenment'.[59] Catharsis is a very complex concept in that it has several sets of meaning: 1) 'intellectual;'[60] 2) 'emotional or psychological',[61] and 3) 'medical'.[62] Though it has been discussed by Aristotle in connection with tragedy (The Poetics 6, 1449 b 26), the Eleatics are those whose holistic understanding come closest to Indian soteriology chiefly because purification, has, in both Vaiśeṣika and Eleatics, ethical-soteriological implications as well as ontological-philosophical ones. To conclude, however varied catharsis might be, all its dimensions (intellectual, psychological, artistic, medical) interrelate to each other, all of which point towards an ethical-soteriological dimension: purification. Yet, the holistic connotation of catharsis remains dualistic, as Plato's The Sophist shown, for the soul is that which must be removed from any form of 'contamination', and mixing with 'matter', because matter is

[56] Plat. Soph. 227c, μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα συνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει (trans. H.N. Fowler, Loeb ed. 123).
[57] The term καθαρτικὸν as used by the Stranger of Elea, should refer to catharsis (κάθαρσις). In Classical Greece, it is used as 'cleansing from guilt or defilement', 'purification', Hdt.1.35, Pl.Cra.405a; 'clarification', "φυσικῶν προβλημάτων" Epicur. Ep. 2p. 36U. (See LSJ A 2).
[58] Zeller, 1897, p. 309.
[59] Zeller, 1897, p. 309.
[60] Zeller, 1897, p. 312, describes Aristotle's purification as a 'mental alleviation' and as a 'species of healing'.
[61] Brunius, 1966, p. 64.
[62] For Zeller, 1897, p. 313, catharsis represents a purgation of the body from injurious matter.

the cause of impurity. Like in Vaiśeṣika, and Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda, whatever is mixed remains, as a result, doomed to bondage (as in Orphism), and transmigration (the Pythagoreans).

Resembling Orphism, Gnosticism (or 'gnosis') is 'a religion of salvation'.[63] To understand the complexity of the 'gnostic frame of mind', one must go to sources, and see its main traits.[64] A vast movement, which pervaded three continents in classical and post-Classical era, the gnosis thrived in Egypt (Corpus Hermeticus), Israel (Dead Sea scrolls), Platonism, and Neo-Platonism, within Christianity (Nag Hamadi library), Islam (Kitab al Miraj 'The Book of the Ascension'), Persia (The Cologne Mani Codex), and, given Mani's travels, possibly in India and China.[65] There are several features that characterise gnosis. As far as the soteriology goes, only two need to be mentioned; first, a marked dualism within theism, world, and anthropology; and second, a strong emphasis on 'gnosis' itself (knowledge).[66] Both dualism and gnosis have direct repercussions on the way in which soteriology functions. There is a whole variety of gnostic movements, hence slight variations of soteriologies; but if we are to take The Gospel of Thomas as a comparative gauge, we would then see that what salvation means is not the 'deification' (theosis) as propounded in John's Gospel, Paul's Letters, and the early Church Fathers. It does not claim a doctrine of 'likeness', that presupposes a becoming or transformation of the self. Salvation in Thomas' Gospel is ontological and is described more in terms of 'homology', or identity of the soul with the 'soul of god', it is 'soteriology of gemination',[67] in which both soul and god are two sides of the same

[63] Rudolph, 1977, 1983, p. 113. Wilson translates 'redemption', but as discussed, 'salvation' and 'redemption' are both soteriological terms.
[64] Pearson, 2007, pp. 12-15, gives a comprehensive list of defining features, among which 'soul is of a divine origin'; a dualistic worldview where soul is 'imprisoned in body and cosmos'.
[65] The apocalyptic literature (with the concept of journey of the souls) is a reliable indicator to trace the gnostic movement from Orphism, via Manicheism, up to India and China. For Gnosticism in China see Duyvendak's article, 1952; BeDuhn, 2009; and Seddon, 1998.
[66] Pearson, 2007, p. 12.
[67] Litwa, 2015, p. 427.

coin.[68] In other words, salvation is the ontological discovery of the true nature of the soul ('know thyself') similarly to the way in which the same phrase runs in both Vaiśeṣika ('ātmā jñātavya') (VSc 10.21) as well as the pre-Socratics (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) (Plato's Protagoras 343b).[69] By comparison with other soteriologies discussed so far, theological, Orphic, Eleatic, in defining the current thesis' title Gnosticism presents perhaps the closest conceptual terminological clarification of what soteriology may mean in Vaiśeṣika. Soteriology is the realisation of the very nature of the soul: eternal, divine and incorruptible. Soteriology is ontology of the self. In Vaiśeṣika, soul (ātman) is one of the nine substances; it is an all-pervasive and eternal dravya (such as 'time', or 'space'), but differently from manas, (which albeit eternal, is atomic in dimension). Like in gnosis, salvation of the soul in Vaiśeṣika represents the return to an original pre-cosmogonic state, before any embodying and mixing with cosmic matter take place.

SOTERIOLOGY IN CLASSICAL INDIAN SYSTEMS

This thesis starts from the presupposition already indicated by Karl Potter, that 'Indian philosophy' (to which category Vaiśeṣika belongs), is a 'science of liberation' (mokṣaśāstra).[70] Indeed, alongside the concept of ātman, - a seed of discord concept in the intellectual debate between āstika and nāstika systems,[71] - the concept of liberation

[68] Pearson, 2007, p. 12

[69] Pausanias' 'Description of Greece' (Book X, 24, 1-2)(Perseus-online) attributes the celebrated maxims to the Seven Sages (Cleobulus of Lindos, Solon of Athens, Sparta Quilon, Bias of Priene, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Periander of Corinth).

[70] Potter, 1986, p. 9: 'My own choice is to define 'Indian philosophy' as the science of liberation, mokṣaśāstra […] the science of liberation forms a part of the science of living with śāstra, and a recognition on all sides that mokṣaśāstra is the supreme science of living, albeit not for everyone at any moment in time'. For a different view on soteriology and/in Indian philosophy: Krishna, D. 1996; Chattopadhyaya, D.P. 1980.

[71] By orthodoxy of the Indian systems, scholars refer specifically to the systems' allegiance to the Vedas, as authoritative; āstika schools: Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā Vedānta etc.; while nāstika: Buddhism, Jains, Ājīvika, Cārvāka etc.

of ātman occupies a chief role. The soteriological terminology employed by these systems, either āstika and nāstika, varies a lot, and comes into different compounds:[72] mokṣa, niḥśreyasa, mahodaya[73](Vaiśeṣika); vimukti, mukti, jīvanmukti (Advaita);[74] svargādiprāpti (Mīmāṃsā);[75] apavarga,[76] kṣaya,[77]duḥkhanivṛtti (Nyāya); citiśakti,[78] kaivalya,[79] (Yoga); nirvāṇa, nirodha, atmeccheda (Bauddha systems); svarūpapratiṣṭhā,[80] svarupāvasthāna (Sāṃkhya); atyantikopavarga,[81] ūrdhvagati,[82] (Jaina); cittasamtiti,[83] purvacittanivṛtti,[84] cittanutpadana,[85] ātmahāni;[86] śivatvaprapti (Śaivism).[87] This is by no means an exhaustive list, because in the quotations offered by Nyāyakośa, consecrated terms such as niḥśreyasa or mokṣa, are expressed in various forms, with compounds illustrating either the function or the characteristics of the soteriological term: 'removal of all pain' (sarvaduḥkhaprahāṇam), 'removal of birth' (janmāpāya), 'removal of pain'(duḥkhapāya) and so on. Although each system has its own specific semantic soteriological terminology, there is yet a great deal of terminological overlapping

[72] For a more expanded soteriological terminology: Nyāyakośa, p. 409-14 (within niḥśreyasa entry); p. 659 (for mokṣa entry) and p. 655 (for 'mukti' entry).
[73] Praśastapāda's PD 1: praṇamya hetum īśvaraṃ muniṃ kaṇādam anv ataḥ / padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ.
[74] Śaṅkara's com. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.1.3-6; see also Vidyāraṇya's Jīvanmuktiviveka.
[75] Svarga commonly translated as 'heaven', Kumar, 2013, p. 104.
[76] Apavarga usually used in Nyāya, see Nyāyakośa, niḥśreyasa entry. Ganesh Thite translates apavarga as a compound of prefix 'away' (ap) and 'exclusion' (varga) ; while Gokhale translates it with that which 'outside varga' class', that is to say the 'liberation' (caturvarga, mokṣa) which has been added as a goal to the trivargas (artha, dharma, kama).
[77] kṣaye (in locative): 'destruction (of earlier actions)', used in sense of liberation from (earlier actions) see Gautama's NS 1.1.2.
[78] citiśakti (power of knowledge' equivalent to mokṣa); See YS 4.34 above.
[79] kaivalya translatable with 'alooness','absoluteness', 'onlyness' (Ganesh Thite). Used frequently in the Yoga system (but not only): puruṣārthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citiśaktir iti (YS 4.34).
[80] svarūpapratiṣṭhā could be translated as: 'residing (of the self) in its own original form'; while in svarūpasthitireva , the particle 'eva' makes it: 'residing (of the self) only in its own original form'.
[81] atyantikopavarga translatable with 'extreme removal' (Ganesh Thite).
[82] urdhvagati used in relation with non-designated propounders (kecit). By 'upward going', we may infer the soteriological going of the soul upward, which may have been the case in some Jain traditions.
[83] cittasamtiti 'the continuation of consciousness', as state of the liberated soul. Again, the quote does not mention who is supporting this view (pare).
[84] Pūrvacittanivṛtti the retirement of earlier citta, again which is another view of an unspecified group.
[85] cittanutpadanam: 'non-arising (of a next) consciousness'.
[86] Ātmahāni liberation as a 'loss of self', 'devoid of self'.
[87] For a more expanded soteriological terminology Nyāyakośa, 1928, p. 409-14.

between the systems, when they use these terms. One brief, but general observation with regard to the soteriological terminology, at least as is noticed at a glance in the Nyāyakośa's quotes, is that liberation ('niḥśreyasa') is often described in negative terms, which demonstrate that liberation corresponds to the 'nivṛtti path' of Indian philosophy.[88] Although, there is a 'positive path to liberation' (pravṛtti),[89] which entails 'injunctions' (vidhi), the final liberation, however, particularly in Vaiśeṣika, is 'negative in ambit'.[90] Liberation is described often with the help of adjectives (or past participles) and nouns with meanings of 'separation', 'division', 'removal', 'destruction', to name just a few: 'separation' (virahā); 'loss' (dhvasta); 'removal' (apāya); 'dissociation' (viprayoga); 'destruction' (kṣaya); 'dividing' (vicceda); 'non-arising' (anutpatti); 'withdrawal' (nivṛtti); 'avoidance' (parihāra), and 'termination' (avadhi). As I will show, in Vaiśeṣika, the final stage of liberation is a radical one, where ātman is divested of its specific qualities (vaiśeṣikaguṇa), and dwells in its own pristine form, before any 'atomic transformations', like the formation of 'body' (śarīra), and 'cosmos' (bhuvana) take place. As to the shape of the doctrine of liberation, in the śāstric literature, mokṣa stays on two pillars: on the one hand 'adṛṣṭa' ('doctrine of karma'),[91] and on the other, saṃsāra ('rebirth').[92] The tripartite framework (with mokṣa at the top) is clearly outlined in both classical Indian thought,[93] as well as in modern Indologists of the Western (Halbfass and Potter), and Indian sort (Rajendra Prasad). Indologists that look more closely at the Sanskrit texts, however, tend to discuss soteriology (mokṣa), in connection with karma and saṃsāra,

[88] Potter, 1980, p. 267.
[89] On the difference between the two paths (pravṛtti and nivṛtti) Matilal, 1986, p. 19.
[90] Kumar, 2013, pp. 104-5.
[91] Following Halbfass, 1980, in this study I have used 'doctrine of karma', but also interchangeably 'karmic retributive theory' which is more telling as it involves adṛṣṭa, which is identified in PD as dharma and adharma (the two sides of one coin: adṛṣṭa).
[92] Saṃsāra has different meaning in different systems; K. Potter, 1980, p. 252 discusses 'rebirth' of 'subtle body' in Advaita; while Halbfass, 1980, p. 268, identifies 'transmigration' as a translation of saṃsāra. Both karma and saṃsāra have problematic and controversial origin.
[93] See all the contributions in Doniger, ed. 1980.

both of which are variously interpreted in different systems.[94] This tripartite soteriological framework I shall have in mind when developing further my argument.

1.2. VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOLARSHIP: SHORTCOMINGS

Any scholar that wishes to familiarise themselves with the literature of Vaiśeṣika, has for the start several aids, in the bibliographical guidelines of Kaviraj (1961), Matilal (1977), Potter (1977), Hotta (1993), and Thakur (2003). Most of them aim to name and describe the sources we have on Vaiśeṣika system, offering even partial translations or summaries of the Vaiśeṣika sources (particularly Potter and Thakur). Among these, Thakur (2003), is the most substantial and recent contribution.[95] These are a good start, in that they present topically views on the system, but for a full grasp of the system one should nevertheless go into the Sanskrit sources as deeply as possible, and reconstruct philologically the Sūtrapāṭha text, to offer fresh views on the history of the system. In this respect, Wezler, Isaacson, and Ruzsa, are a good starting point. My approach to the system however, is of course different, as I look at Vaiśeṣika from a philosophical comparative angle. As such, I have seen often, within the scholarship, rather general treatments of Vaiśeṣika, or insufficiently grounded studies on Vaiśeṣika's primary sources, among which, strikingly enough, the commentary of Candrānanda is still neglected.[96] The interest in Vaiśeṣika has been worldwide, with interests related mainly to the system's scientific aspects, such as atomism.[97]Here I shall scrutinise only those

[94] For this tripartite framework, see Donniger ed. 1980, particularly articles of Potter, Halbfass.
[95] From now on, I shall refer to this work, as Thakur 2003, as it contains valuable information on both Candrānanda's Vṛtti synopsis, as well as the whole of Vaiśeṣika literature. Many of Thakur articles available elsewhere have been collected, expanded, and re-published here.
[96] Works that analysed Vaiśeṣika as joined with Nyāya, but have not used much, or at all, the VSc 1961 Baroda edition: Prabhu 2014, Gajendragadkar, 1988.
[97] Worldwide scholarship on Vaiśeṣika, including Japan (Ui, Nozawa, Honda, Miyamoto and Honda), India (Jambūvijayaji, Thakur, Kumar, Shastri, Mishra, and Chemparathy), Russia (Lysenko, and Stcherbatsky), Bulgaria (Gradinarov), Austria (Frauwallner, Preisendanz, and Franco), Netherlands

studies that have appraised the soteriology of the system, either by denying its original place in the system (Faddegon, Frauwallner, Wezler and Halbfass),[98] or by taking into the loop only metaphysical themes such as ātman, or adṛṣṭa. Regarding the soteriology of the system, I have seen two major 'school of thought'. One is the 'Austrian school' represented robustly by Frauwallner, whose expanded treatment on Vaiśeṣika is still influential,[99] and the other school, towards which my thesis argument inclines, represented by philological insights of Houben, whose soteriological inquiry is based on the French comparative school of thought of Biardeau and Masson-Oursel. This school's soteriological views on Vaiśeṣika, complemented by contributions from the Japanese school, like that of Miyamoto, or Adachi, all represent the basis of this thesis argument.

AUSTRIAN SCHOOL: HARD NATURALIST VIEW

A valuable article published in Asiatische Studien by Jan Houben (1994),[100] raises some interesting points regarding both the diachronic methodology, and the soteriology of Vaiśeṣika as appraised by Frauwallner, particularly in his 'Geschichte der indischen Philosophie' (1953, 1956).[101] Among the views Houben criticises, we name the broad classification of Indian philosophy in two, world-soul,[102] and natural-philosophical

(Isaacson), Germany (Wezler), Hungary (Ruzsa), France (Houben, Biardeau, and Masson-Oursel), Italy (Arena), Switzerland (Bronkhorst), the United Kingdom (Keith, and Matilal) and the United States (Halbfass).

[98] With the exception of Halbfass, who initially took Frauwallner and Wezler views as correct, but gradually distanced himself from their radical conclusions; at any rate Halbfass' interest in the soteriology of Vaiśeṣika is quasi non-extant.

[99] Watson, 2003, (and Preisendanz with whom he read) look at Vaiśeṣika diachronically, and emphasise the evolution of its doctrines, e.g. ātman.

[100] Houben's article in AS, 1994, see bibliography.

[101] Trans. Bedekar, 1973; we shall refer only to the second volume, where Vaiśeṣika section occupies one-hundred eighty pages.

[102] Frauwallner, 1953, p. 268, 192f; trans. 1973 vol. 1. p. 211, 152f.

orientation,[103] respectively, as well as the denial of the original soteriological doctrine in Vaiśeṣika. As far as the doctrine of ātman goes, the difference between the two is that, while the first was monistic and characterised by the doctrine of a 'world-soul' (Brahman), in the latter, the doctrine of a multitude of individual souls dominates (pluralistic).[104] The transition between the two was due the adoption into the system of a series of conceptual additions, such as adṛṣṭa which 'spoiled the scientific orientation of the system'.[105] As the argument runs, the adoption of substances like diś (space), kāla (time),[106] the six padārthas,[107] god, and liberation, took place by the middle of the first millennium, chiefly as a result of religious movements which influenced Vaiśeṣika.[108] Consistent with his textual critical and historical analysis, Frauwallner adds that the beginning sūtras which contain soteriological commitments, have also been added into the system, and selects from Praśastapāda what might have been the original opening sūtras of the Sūtrapāṭha.[109] This indeed is a startling conclusion from the great Indologist, mainly because Praśastapāda's digest (saṃgraha) is not even a commentary on the Sūtrapāṭha; Praśastapāda, known in the commentarial literature as the reformer of the system itself, amended and enriched the system.[110] As both Halbfass, but mainly Houben show, the additions discussed by Frauwallner are impossible if we accept that Praśastapāda is later than Diṅnāga, and Diṅnāga later than Bhartṛhari.[111] Houben challenges Frauwallner's assumptions with Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā (MBhD)

[103] Frauwallner, 1953, p. 268; trans. 1973, vol. 1, p. 211.
[104] Watson and Preisendanz speak about an inverse evolution, from the plurality of the self to oneness of the self.
[105] Houben, 1994, p. 714.
[106] Frauwallner, 1956, pp. 114-115; trans. vol. 2. pp. 78-79.
[107] Frauwallner, 1956, pp. 186-197; trans. vol. 2, pp. 133-141.
[108] Houben, 1994, p. 715.
[109] 'yad [iha] bhāvarūpam, tat sarvam abhidhāsyāmi /abhidhāsyāmaḥ/ mayopasamkhyātavyam' (via Houben, 1994, p. 715).
[110] One may look for parallel developments, for instance in the innovative approach of Prabhākara within Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā tradition.
[111] Houben, 1995, p. 48.

1.2.7, which reproduces the opening sūtra of VS (dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ iti), which means that the current sūtra VS 1.1.1 as preserved by VS of Candrānanda's Vṛtti is not likely to be a late interpolation made by Praśastapāda, because Bhartṛhari, who lived before Praśastapāda, does refer to it.[112] The argument of 'opening sūtras added later' is disputed by Wezler too, who though he agrees with the soteriological conclusion of Frauwallner, yet paradoxically he notices that the textual grounds on which his anti-soteriological stances are based on 'other texts' than the VSc of Candrānanda or VSv of Vādīndra (in both long and short versions).[113] In other words, Wezler agrees with Frauwallner's argument but disagrees with his evidence.

The second weak point in Frauwallner's argument is conceptual. He sees, as positivist philosophers would do, an incompatibility between soteriological concerns and scientific ontological questions; he associates liberation with theism, the latter introduced into the system by Praśastapāda. However, this is not the case in Vaiśeṣika. The absolute soteriology of Vaiśeṣika has nothing to do with god (Īśvara), since it is a state outside the world, while the world is ruled by Brahman. Indeed, Frauwallner reads early Vaiśeṣika with 'positivist biases',[114]or as Wezler, and Halbfass note, of a classicist with fascination for the Greek ideal of 'pure philosophy', which often equates the Classical Greek thought with the Indian classical one.[115] Indologists usually engage seriously with sources and provide strong evidence in support; but Frauwallner's sweeping conjectures are due to Greek classical biases and presumptions rather than

[112] Halbfass, 1986, p. 857, via Houben, 1994, p. 716.
[113] Wezler, 1982, p. 647. Although Frauwallner wrote a book review on Candrānanda's Vṛtti, he still does not consider fully its Sūtrapāṭha. Thakur, 2003, p. 131, informs that Mallvadin (c. 550 AD), quotes sūtra VS 9.12, which is traceable only in VSc, therefore its Sūtrapāṭha must be the oldest we have.
[114] The influence of the Vienna-Circle positivist school in Frauwallner's methodology should also be considered.
[115] via Houben, p. 716; see also Halbfass, 1986, p. 857. Miyamoto (1996, p. 52) draws the attention to such a trend: 'we should pay more attention to the sūtras which expound transmigration and final release…We should be careful not to impose the trends of natural philosophies in ancient Greece onto those in India'.

evidence.[116] Besides, Frauwallner does not seem to draw a sharp distinction between an absolute, not-religious liberation (mokṣa) and a cosmic one (svarga, abhyudaya). A comparison with Jainism shows that liberation in Vaiśeṣika is ontological, or 'materialistic';[117] the soteriological distinction would have been more suitable to a positivist assumption. We should point out that his second volume of 'History of Indian Philosophy' (Geschichte) was published in 1956, five years before Muni Jambūvijayaji's critical edition of Candrānanda's Vṛtti, but he does not seem to have revised his views when his Geschichte was translated in English in 1973. A revision of it, in the light of VSc and its Sūtrapāṭha (Jambūvijayaji 1961 edition), would have had a different impact on the subsequent Vaiśeṣika scholarship and its scholars (Wezler), who continue to revere his appraisal of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology as the best available.[118] As my thesis argues, the development is quite the opposite, Vaiśeṣika wishes from the very start to free its scientific orientation from its own scientific world-view and heads towards an abstractisation of thought with concepts like adṛṣṭa; its project fails with the re-Brahmanisation of thought as undergone by Praśastapāda. All philosophical schools, with the exception of Mīmāṃsā, have this tendency, towards an escapist solution but still using a Vedic scientific frame of mind. The goal is completely different and contradicts the orientation, yet their method remains scientific. They want to transcend the ritualistic science by rescinding science itself.

[116] Wezler, 1982, p. 647; on the classical Greek philosophical bias, see the last lines of page 672.
[117] Houben 1994, p. 720; Biardeau, 1964, p. 243; Masson-Oursel, 1925, p. 344.
[118] The problematic statement of Wezler, 1982, p. 645: 'it might be that the outcome of the examination of all the MSS of the VS does not add substantially to what we already know about the transmission of the work. Most probably what has been said by Frauwallner [in WZKSO, VI, 1962, p. 184] will still remain valid'.

The French school sees the origins of Vaiśeṣika and its soteriology in a different light. Set alongside Jainism, Vaiśeṣika, according to Biardeau and Masson-Oursel, belongs to an ancient worldview where scientific naturalistic inquiry is not antithetic to soteriological concerns, because liberation itself is materialistic, that is to say freedom from matter.[119] One example provided is Jainism which advanced throughout time many scientific doctrines, particularly in the zone of biology, but whose soteriology does not include theism.[120] Houben in the article mentioned earlier, has articulated the position of both Biardeau and Masson-Oursel, and contributes even further with philological evidence from Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā (MBhD) which shows that the beginning of Sūtrapāṭha as now preserved is not an addition such as the Austrian school conjectures, but pre-existed Praśastapāda. Houben had deconstructed Frauwallner's argument, on methodological grounds, proposing another method than the diachronic or 'genetic' one undertaken by Frauwallner and Wezler. He propounds the need for a comparative (or synchronic) reading of Vaiśeṣika sources, yet not neglecting the philological acumen of the diachronic method necessary for that.[121] Beginning with Madeline Biardeau's work (*Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la Parole dans le Brahmanisme classique,* 1964), which criticises Faddegon's separation between soteriology and scientific inquiry in Classical Indian thought,[122] - a separation, which Frauwallner too follows - , she adduces the argument of Jaina tradition whose atomic theory and scientific view on reality is co-extensive with the question of liberation. In other words,

[119] See earlier footnotes and references.
[120] On a possible origin between the two systems, see Thakur 2003, p. 131.
[121] This comparative method had been attempted even by philologically-minded scholars such as Isaacson; see his article on yogipratyakṣa published in 1993, which aims to complement a previous philological article on the same topic, by his teacher Wezler (1982). See further Houben, 1994, p. 744, f. 43.
[122] Biardeau, 1964, p. 243, the passage criticised is Faddegon, 1918, p. 12.

Biardeau, differently from Faddegon and Frauwallner, does not see an opposition between the ontological, scientific questions of Vaiśeṣika, and soteriology. Therefore, the thesis of the genesis of the system as completely detached from soteriological questions is untenable. As mentioned, her views are a continuation of the comparative philosopher Masson-Oursel, who in an article on atomism that looked at the Jaina tradition,[123] saw a closer resemblance and a mutual concordance between liberation and a scientific atomic view on cosmos.[124] Like Masson-Oursel, Biardeau sees in Vaiśeṣika and Jainism, a 'science of the Absolute' ('un positivisme de l'absolu'),[125] concerned with liberation,[126] where atomism is inseparable from religious thought.[127] Houben does nothing but to advance the comparative views stated by his predecessors, and finds (in Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari) textual evidence that disproves Frauwallner's naturalistic orientation of early Vaiśeṣika. Whatever ritualistic orientation Vaiśeṣika may have had, it is certain that its soteriology is not theistic, but rather possessed a 'physicalistic and mechanistic view of liberation'.[128] If that is so, the Vaiśeṣika's view of liberation was not singular in the landscape of early Indian thought. Houben declares that such an idea of salvation, as a process in which not only the soul, mind and body play the leading part, but also many other cosmic processes such as the substances,

[123] Masson-Oursel, 1925, pp. 342 – 368.
[124] Biardeau, 1964, p. 243, states the source of her views as coming from Masson-Oursel, 1925, p. 243 note 3: 'plus pertinentes me semblent les remarques de Masson-Oursel: 'Les explications physiques ont toujours conserve chez eux un caractère très archaïque, et font partie intégrante de la notion de salut. La raison en est simple: esclavage et délivrance sont à leurs yeux des processus matériels'. For more, see Masson-Oursel, 1925, p. 344; and Masson-Oursel, 1941, p. 9: 'ce réalisme archaïque était un positivisme de l'absolu plutôt qu'une métaphasique; il tenait pour coordonnées plutôt que subordonnées, les diverses stratifications de l'être'.
[125] Biardeau, 1964, p. 242: 'On posera donc ici que le Vaiśeṣika est un système de pensée essentiellement religieux ; très diffèrent sans doute du Vedānta, moins centré sur la Révélation védique proprement dite que sur des courants religieux peut être variés; théistes ou non, en tout cas faisant sa place au personnage du yogin et reconnaissant la valeur de ses expériences'.
[126] Masson-Oursel, 1925, p. 344: 'Their physical explications have always conserved a very archaic character, and they are an integral part of the notion of salvation. The reason for this is simple: bondage and liberation are in their eyes material processes'.
[127] Masson-Oursel, 1925, p. 344: 'atomisme en particulier semble inséparable d'un system religieux'.
[128] Houben, 1994, p. 731.

attributes and actions are involved, can be encountered in Jainism, as well as in some Brahmanic and Upaniṣadic accounts of travels of the soul. The doctrine of liberation should be seen in scientific terms. Vaiśeṣika sees soul as a cosmic substance, among others; therefore, liberation is a substantialist and cosmological event.

GERMAN SCHOOL: PHILOLOGY AND TEXTUAL CRITICISM

The influence over scholarship which Frauwallner's Geschichte, and its soteriological view on Vaiśeṣika endures to this day. For many Western scholars, soteriology occupies an inappropriate place within the system; at any rate such an influential view had been further propounded by Indologists like Wezler and Halbfass, both of whom arguably being the most established Western Vaiśeṣika students to date. Halbfass, for instance, who looked at many doctrines of Vaiśeṣika, but not soteriology, seems to take for granted Frauwallner's appraisal of Vaiśeṣika, and hails him as the scholar to whom 'we owe the most penetrating and reliable analysis of the Vaiśeṣika system'.[129] Like Frauwallner, Halbfass too approves the precedence of the scientific naturalistic orientation over the soteriological in the early phase of the system, and likewise sees an incongruous relation between science and the question of liberation.[130] Yet later on, he disapproves of Frauwallner's radical stance of an 'entirely un-soteriological orientation' of Vaiśeṣika,[131] but he rejects it only in its extreme form. That was sufficient to discourage any treatment of the 'soteriontological state' in Vaiśeṣika.[132] The major characteristic of the German school on Vaiśeṣika was a judicious technical-philological

[129] Halbfass, 1991, p. 314; Halbfass 1986, p. 857, becomes gradually sceptical of Frauwallner's ideas, and sees in his work a marked influence of his Greek classicist's background on the reading of Indian thought.
[130] On 'soteriology not at home in Vaiśeṣika', Halbfass 1992, p. 314f.
[131] Halbfass, 1986, p. 857; cf. 1988, pp. 157-158 and 1992, p. 76.
[132] See this term in Halbfass, 1992, p. 234.

research. We must mention other important names, which have made important emendations, observations on additional MSS readings, all of which paved the way towards a forthcoming critical edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtras. These include first the Jaina savant Muni Jambūvijayaji,[133] and Anantalal Thakur,[134] both of whom have shed new light on the system with alternative MSS reading, and new untranslated published editions, that provide variant readings on VS. Among the Western scholars, Wezler is perhaps the best known within the German school. He looked into Vaiśeṣika early tenets, and sought to reconstruct an 'independent transmission' of Sūtrapāṭha;[135] a task subsequently entrusted to his student Harunaga Isaacson who carried it out in his doctorate research.[136] Starting from there, in the course of my doctorate research I too have attempted to undertake such a task, with six new MSS on Sūtrapāṭha.[137] Now with the publication of the 'New Catalogus Catalogorum' vol. 32, where the 'Vaiśeṣikasūtras' entry has been finally described, we are in the position of at least inventorying all MSS available, a task which is ongoing in my research. Perhaps the most valuable work so far is that of the Hungarian scholar Ferenc Ruzsa who took the trouble to consult all the MSS discussed and described by Isaacson in his thesis, and used by Jambūvijayaji. The critical edition made by Ruzsa represents the starting point of my critical apparatus I have provided in the footnotes throughout this thesis.[138] He nevertheless used the second edition of VSc published by Baroda in 1985, which contains, as Isaacson shows, further editorial misprints. Finally, within German school we should mention Thakur's major editorial achievements of two commentaries on VS, Vādīndra's Vyākhyā ('short

[133] Editor of VSc Baroda 1961.
[134] Editor of Vādīndra's VSc 1957 (short version) and KSN 1985 (long version) both at Darbhanga, Mithilā.
[135] He even consulted MSS in Malayalam. See Wezler 1982 article, who appeals for an urgent reconstruction of the 'independent transmission' of VS; (this is different from what I call in this thesis 'independent tradition', which includes DP and SP).
[136] Isaacson, PhD, 1995, un-published, personal communication.
[137] Most of these MSS preserve the Sūtrapāṭha in the Mithilā version (of Upaskāra).
[138] Ruzsa is perhaps in the best position to publish a critical edition of Candrānanda Vṛtti.

version' 1957) previously known as 'anonymous'; and its 'long version' Kaṇādasūtranibandha (1985), both of them published at Darbangha.[139] Together with Candrānanda's Vṛtti, Vādīndra's Vyākhyā (early thirteenth century) are the two gems in reconstructing Sūtrapāṭha tradition.[140]

1.3. ARGUMENT

My argument is that there is, and there was from very early stages such a thing as Vaiśeṣika soteriology, grounded as it were on a solid ontology, whose evidence we have in both Sūtrapāṭha, and Candrānanda's Vṛtti. Against the prevailing view of a 'purely naturalistic system with no much scope for liberation',[141] the current thesis proposes to take a close reading of Candrānanda's Vṛtti, and describe its 'doctrine of salvation' which is built, as in other systems (Jainism) upon a solid metaphysical and ritualistic-ethical framework. While paying attention to various textual critical and philological problems posed by the text (addressed by Wezler, Isaacson, and Ruzsa), my aim is to render into English passages which explain the relatively 'early' soteriological framework of the system (seventh to tenth century AD).[142] As both Western,[143] and Indian scholars discuss, [144] mokṣa[145] in Indian thought, is intimately connected with two complementary

[139] Though initially published as an anonymous gloss, in an article published in 1960 (in JOIB, 1960, vol. x, no 1), Thakur clarifies that VSv is the same with Vādīndra's Kaṇādasūtranibandha (KSN). See VSv ('anonymous commentary') Darbhanga, 1957; represents alongside VSc, a major document for Vaiśeṣika system (both of which not yet translated into English).

[140] Both VSc and VSv surpass in importance Śaṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra, as they present Vaiśeṣika doctrine even before Navya-Nyāya changes took place into the system.

[141] Frauwallner, 1994, p. 37. Frauwallner's view on Vaiśeṣika has been influential within Austrian and German schools, including Halbfass, though some of scholars have questioned the insufficient evidence of Frauwallner's appraisal; yet very few scholars plunged into Vaiśeṣika's soteriology.

[142] On the date of VSc, see Aklujkar, 1970.

[143] Contributors in Doniger, ed., 1980, particularly Halbfass' article, p. 268

[144] As Rajendra Prasad 1989, p. 210, put it, mokṣa comprises three themes, or 'beliefs', ('karma theory', 'transmigration', and 'liberation') which 'none can be completely dissociated from the other two'.

[145] Thus, here I argue that mokṣa in Vaiśeṣika is closely related with two further concepts: 1) adṛṣṭa; and 2) the question of matter (mahābhūta), where the body (śarīra) is composed of atoms (paramāṇu), whose

concepts: 1) 'theory of karma', which comes in the garb of adṛṣṭa; 2) 'rebirth' (saṃsāra), caused by a series of vaiśeṣikaguṇas such dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18), and able to produce further embodiments in different worlds, Varuṇaloka (VSc 4.2.3), or Brahmāloka (VSc 1.1.2).[146]

Another aspect of my argument is that the nature of soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is gnostic and dualistic. Though VS 1.1.2, for instance, uses two apparently soteriological terms, one 'positive' (abhyudaya),[147] and the other 'negative' (niḥśreyasa),[148] the dualism lies somewhere else, in the sharp distinction that Vaiśeṣika drew between 'composite' and 'non-composite', between embodied and disembodied, between eternal and non-eternal, between ātman and śarīra. This dualistic framework is based upon solid textual evidence drawn from VSc, as well as from āstika and nāstika parallel systems described in the third chapter. I shall also bring into discussion modern Indian philosophical scholarship on the topic.[149] One symptomatic example of a dualistic frame of mind that pervades the whole of Indian classical thought is the dialectics, or better put, the tension between 'two very broadly acceptable norms of life: the 'path of activism' (pravṛtti) and the 'path of renunciation' (nivṛtti)'.[150] Indeed, in the context of Vaiśeṣika system one could see from the very beginning, in the soteriological sūtra of 1.1.2 (yato'

subsequent formation and dissolution are due to the karma ('action') and certain 'predispositions' (saṃskāra) all caused by an 'unseen power' (adṛṣṭa). The liberation of the self would be its freedom from action (karma) either physical, mental or ethical. It is symptomatic that mokṣa is discussed in the āhnika of karma (VSc 5.2).

[146] VSc does indeed reference to such 'worlds' (loka) and their respective dwellers that is 'bodies' (śarīra) composed of different atoms that differ according to their own specific dharma, see VSc 4.2.

[147] Gokhale informs that abhyudaya 'has nothing to do' with the radical liberation niḥśreyasa represents. It refers to 'success' in this world and in other words as well, but not liberation. (Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21 February 2016).

[148] Matilal 1986, p. 19, speaks about the 'pravṛtti path' (positive) and 'nivṛtti path' (negative).

[149] Feuerstein, 1980, p. 32: 'philosophies of being': 1) sanghatavāda (e.g. Śūnyavāda Buddhist for which world is voidness (śūnyatā); Vijñānavāda Buddhist, world is merely a cluster of ideas), and 2) arambhavāda (e.g. Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Jain, Cārvāka and Ājīvika schools, for which world is a combination of 'entities'); 'philosophies of becoming': 1) vivartavāda systems that describe reality as 'illusory modification' (e.g. Advaita Vedānta), and 2) pariṇāmavāda schools according to which the evolution of the world is substantially 'transformative', like in Sāṃkhya, Yoga and some other Vedānta schools.

[150] Matilal 1986, p. 19; Doniger ed. 1980 (most of its studies).

bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ) that a two-fold soteriological framework is proposed: niḥśreyasa and abhyudaya, though joined by dharma, the two are dissimilar in scope. Abhyudaya represents a Vedic form of 'soteriology'; but what represents Vaiśeṣika doctrine of salvation is in fact niḥśreyasa. Here, Matilal's 'positive path' equals abhyudaya that closely relates to the ethics described in VSc 6.1.4-13, or in āhnika 6.2., or VSc 9.24-25, and VSc 10.20. As for the 'path of renunciation' (nivṛtti) one could identify in it niḥśreyasa, since it is a radical and negative form of liberation that implies 'absence of contact' and 'absence of adṛṣṭa' (VSc 5.2.20), 'detachment' ('vairāgya' as in VSc 10.21), or withdrawal of mind from senses (VSc 9.13). In the following sections on the nature and function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology, there will be many references to these two different 'soteriological paths' and with the Candrānanda commentary I substantiate how these two correspond with abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa, respectively.

As for the 'function of soteriology', that is to say the means (sādhana) by which ātman may achieve the 'soteriontological state', there are at least two important passages (VSc 1.1.6 and VSc 10.21) that summarise the nature of liberation (niḥśreyasa). In a gloss related to karma-padārtha (VS 1.1.6), Candrānanda states that 'dharma is cause' (dharmahetu) which leads 'to the attainment' (sādhye) of 'liberation' (niḥśreyase); such liberation is achieved by a correct knowledge, or a 'true discrimination' (satyāṁ parijñānaṁ) between the six padārthas, their similarities and similarities; which subsequently results in seeing doṣas in objects, and detachment (vairāgya) from them.[151] A similar listing on the means of liberation we encounter in VSc 10.21, where in addition to 'parijñāna', and 'vairāgya', other theological, spiritual and metaphysical aspects, seem to be mentioned in relation to niḥśreyasa. 1) The acknowledgement of Bhagavān Īśvara as the authority for the āmnāya texts; 2) the necessity of knowing ātman ('ātmā

[151] On VSc 1.1.6, see Synopsis of VSc; trans. Nozawa, 1992. p. 99.

jñātavya');[152] 3) the knowledge of the 'reflection upon' self (upākrama), and other similar (Upaniṣadic) phrases (ityādivākya), all of which render the 'attainment' (adhigama) of liberation, possible. From the start we shall point out that the final state of liberation (niḥśreyasa) for Vaiśeṣika is ātman devoid of vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 1.1.2); it is an irreversible, and 'non-blissful state'.[153] As long as heaven contains pleasure (svargādisukhaṁ, as per Vādīndra's VSv 1.1.2), ātman, Śrīdhara argues, remains susceptible to pleasure and pain therefore heaven, called abhyudaya by Vādīndra (1.1.2), cannot be liberation.

1.4. OBJECTIVE & RELEVANCE

The main objective of this current study is to bring a contribution to the study of comparative philosophy, in relation to classical Indian thought and its relevance within the fields of both comparative philosophy and religious studies. There are some striking similarities between the 'Indian classical Gnosticism', a term that I wish to coin here, and Mediterranean classical Gnosticism. On the other hand, within Indological studies, my study wishes to render into English large portions of Candrānanda's Vṛtti in view of a future annotated English translation. The commentary is fundamental to any Vaiśeṣika student, and surprisingly, it is still largely unknown and unstudied, both in India, and the West,[154] chiefly because an English translation is not extant. Within comparative philosophy and religion Vaiśeṣika represents a system that, in the classical era, combined

[152] The phrase 'ātmā jñātavya' refers to the discussion on ātman from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4.3.2-6.
[153] On the non-blissful state of liberation, see NK p. 610; also, Vādīndra differentiates this state from 'heaven' (svarga) in VSv 1.1.2 yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ / VSv: abhyudayaḥ svargādisukhaṁ / niḥśreyasaṁ muktiḥ / tayoḥ siddhiḥ utpattiryataḥ / utpattimataḥ kāraṇa sambandha sambandhyāvyabhicārād yata ityuktam / svargāpavargāvasmat pratyakṣa aniṣṭa guṇatvāvantara jāti rahita guṇajanyau janimattvāt / yadittham tattathā / yathā patanam / tathā cemau / tattasthā.'
[154] When in India with an Erasmus scholarship (December 2015-October 2016), I had surprisingly noticed that Nyāya scholars were still not familiar with this text; nevertheless, the tutorials with them on this text proved to be immensely fruitful.

ontology with metaphysics, scientific worldview, and ritual at the same time; it is an intellectual system of a 'naturalistic' kind, a theoretical 'philosophy of science'. The ontological input that Vaiśeṣika has is something that modern Indian and Western philosophy needs to take into account if it wishes to form the theory of an interdisciplinary and global world philosophy. Indeed, the science of being and the realistic framework of Vaiśeṣika, I should think, is the way forward in tomorrow's philosophical studies.

1.5. METHOD (COMPARATIVE/THEMATIC, NOT 'PHILOLOGICAL')

Before proceeding, a few methodological and thematic clarifications. This work will not be constructed from a historical perspective, hence it will not aim at establishing a history of the Vaiśeṣika system nor a fixed translation of VSc; it is not philological and textual critical either (though I have raised many of its problems and brought forth a new reading based on MSS I uncovered in India).[155] The flaws in the historical diachronic method of Frauwallner, which produced problematical assumptions as highlighted by Houben, as well as the general ahistorical 'doxographic' approach of Indian scholars on the study of Indian philosophy itself is something which this current thesis has taken into consideration.[156] The method I employ is comparative, and the contribution of this work is comparative philosophical, it aims to be a continuation of similar works similar produced by the French school (Masson-Oursel, Biardeau, Houben), but more

[155] There was a reprint of VSc (in 1982) but as Isaacson proved, it contains several new editorial misprints; therefore readers should refer to 1961 edition.

[156] Dasgupta, 1922, vol. 1, pp. 62-63, is sceptical about the prospect of chronology, history, and historiography in Indian philosophy; Halbfass, 1988, p. 349, also remarks that 'Indian authors continue to emphasise that it would be inappropriate to apply Western historical and chronological method to the presentation of the Indian material'. Yet non-historicity has been seen in India rather a strength, not a weakness', Halbfass, 1988, p. 350. But there are even Western scholars who revised critically the historical method; e.g. Löwith 1949.

importantly by Halbfass, whose studies on Vaiśeṣika ontology are a firm starting point. This is not to say that philological and textual critical data are not taken into account; in fact, at many points, I have referred to the critical apparatus brought forth by Isaacson and Ruzsa. Yet my thesis is conceptual and presents the soteriological doctrine and complementary concepts in relation to similar concepts in parallel Indian systems. Therefore, the method I employ is comparative, or as Houben might call it, synchronic, which is complementary to the textual philological one.[157]

The structure of my argument will chiefly be shaped on two broad levels: one is ontological (hence the chapter on the nature of soteriology) and the other is epistemological (developed in the chapter on the function of soteriology). I argue, beginning from the presumption of Masson-Oursel's insightful analysis, the soteriological knowledge is shaped on two levels, an ontological approach (knowledge of the categories), and an epistemological approach, which emphasises an authentic method of evaluating it (epistemology).[158] The key passages will be displayed through a philosophical and textual analysis, with which soteriology would be classified in two sections: on the one hand those relating to 'the nature of the soteriology' (the state of the liberated ātman) (e.g. VSc 1.1.2 & 5.2.16-20), while on the other, passages related to 'the function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology' (e.g. VSc 1.1.6 & 10.21). In order to understand the two sides of soteriology, one needs to take into consideration, contextually, the two antithetical concepts, abhyudaya, and niḥśreyasa.

[157] Houben: 1994, p. 743, and f.42: 'if insufficient attention is paid to synchronic connections, diachronic explanations lose their force'.
[158] Masson-Oursel, 1923, p. 169.

1.6. THREE VAIŚEṢIKA TRADITIONS (SŪTRAPĀṬHA, BHĀṢYA, AND INDEPENDENT)[159]

Unlike other Indian philosophical systems, the transmission of mūla-text (VS) is relatively poor chiefly because, as the list of 'lost Vaiśeṣika tracts' shows, from the very beginning of the system, various Bhāṣya commentaries outnumbered those glosses (e.g. VSc) that kept close to commenting upon the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda. Rāvaṇa's Bhāṣya, and Ātreya's Bhāṣya are much older than Praśastapāda' PD (which is a digest rather than a commentary on the sūtras), and these prove that there have been at least two commentrial traditions of Vaiśeṣika.[160] Furthermore, Ui who in 1917 translated from Chinese an unusual Vaiśeṣika tract (Candramati's Daśapadārthaśāstra), mentions not only that Kaṇāda the founder of the system lived long before Buddha, but also in early stages there were 'eighteen different Vaiśeṣika schools'.[161] Sukla in his article 'The Vaiśeṣika Schools' (1970) takes that assertion for granted and states that the different categories inserted from Sūtrapāṭha in the commentaries shows that there were different methods of sūtra interpretation, separated from each other by the way in which particular sūtras were divided and interpreted.[162] He also speaks of several different sūtra-traditions: Mithilā,[163] Bengal, Southern, and Gujarat (Jaina); unfortunately, he does not substantiate with evidence his assertions for the list of traditions mentioned. The number of schools mentioned by him must be, nevertheless, taken with caution, even though the probability of more than two exegetical schools exists. One example is Daśapadārthaśāstra and Saptapadārthī, which both increase the number beyond the six padārthas. Those who wish to acquaint themselves with the literature of early and later

[159] Thakur, 1963a, pp. 186-8.
[160] Jaina works distinguish between two Vaiśeṣika traditions, see Somadeva's Yasástilaka ch. VIII, and IX; Bhāskaranandi's Vṛtti (com. on Umāsvāti's Tattvarthadhigamasūtra) 1.1, pp. 2-3.
[161] Sukla, 1970, p. 154.
[162] Sukla, 1970, p. 154.
[163] e.g. the version of Śaṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra.

Vaiśeṣika sources must consult Thakur's *Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System* (2003).[164] In contrast with the rather eclectic development of Vaiśeṣika traditions offered by Matilal (1977),[165] here I have followed Thakur's who sees the transmission of Vaiśeṣika down to us, in three channels: those following sūtras, those following Praśastapāda, and the Lakṣaṇa works (like Udayana's' Lakṣaṇāvalī and Sivāditya's Saptapadārthī).[166] This latter channel, I argue, must incorporate the DP of Candramati, a bold commentary, preserved only in Chinese, and which introduces into the system four new padārthas (sāmānya-viśeṣa, abhāva, śakti and aśakti). To this threefold classification, Wezler however seems to trace another tradition, which he calls 'independent transmission' of VS, which may be 'older and more valuable than that of the Maithili version'.[167] Judging from the material on Vaiśeṣika available so far, one can say that we have three commentarial traditions plus one 'independent transmission of Sūtrapāṭha only', which still awaits further reconstruction from the list of MSS published by Madras University, in 2013, volume 32 of The New Catalogus Catalogorum; there, the 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra' entry (pp. 64-68) gives an extensive list of MSS, (preserved in thirty-one different locations), thus more than 'sixteen' of which Thakur knew in 1963.[168] The following table represents the history of the early history of the Vaiśeṣika system.

[164] See bibliography. Many of its sections were previously published in separate articles; I recommend a comparison between these and this compendium shortened henceforth here: 'Thakur, 2003'.
[165] Wezler, 1982, p. 643.
[166] Śivāditya's work is a rather late commentary written by a Jaina pundit (Jinavardhanasūri, 15th century). I used the two editions (Adyar, 1932, and Ahmedabad, 1963). Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī, a commentary on the Sūtrapāṭha, to be distinguished from Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī, which is a gloss of PD of Praśastapāda.
[167] Wezler, 1982, p. 643.
[168] Thakur 1963a, p. 187.

Table 1. Early Vaiśeṣika commentarial traditions

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRA OF KAṆĀDA[169]
(SŪTRAPĀṬHA = VS)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Lost tracts[170]
Vākya[171]
Kaṭandī Bhāṣya[172] & Rāvaṇa's Bhāṣya[173] (possibly the same)[174]
Bhāṣyakāra Ātreya's Vṛtti[175]
Praśastamati's Ṭīkā[176]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">18 VAIŚEṢIKA TRADITIONS[177]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">TĀRKIKA VAIŚEṢIKAS[178]</td><td>SAIDDHĀNTA VAIŚEṢIKAS</td></tr>
<tr><td>SŪTRAPĀṬHA</td><td>BHĀṢYA</td><td>INDEPENDENT[179]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Candrānanda's
Vṛtti[180](VSc) (com. VS)
(c. 7-10th AD)</td><td>Praśastapāda's
Padārthadharmasaṃgraha[184]
(PD) (c. 6th AD)</td><td>Candramati's
Daśapadārthaśāstra[187]
(DP)
(5th-6th AD)</td></tr>
</table>

[169] Another name to have in mind when looking for Vaiśeṣika MSS is Prācīnavaiśeṣikamahāsūtra, about which Vādīndra informs that it was composed by Lord Śiva himself; this could represent the basis for Vaiśeṣikasūtra which, as the tradition has it, was equally taught to Kaṇāda by the Lord, manifested in the form of an owl. Thakur, 2003, p. 135.

[170] Thakur, 2003. pp. 132-7, mentions a list of the earliest commentaries on Kaṇāda's Sūtrapāṭha, older than Candrānanda's Vṛtti, but unfortunately, most of these are lost: Vākya (lost commentary referred to by Mallavādin's Nayacakra - sixth century), Kaṭandī (lost); Rāvaṇa's Bhāṣya (lost), Praśastamati's Ṭīkā and Bhāṣyakāra Ātreya's Vṛtti (mentioned by Vadidevasūri's Syadvādaratnākara).

[171] Mallavādin's Nayacakra p. 51; 516. Thakur, 2003, p. 165.

[172] Jayanta's Nyāyamanjarī, vol. 2, p. 184, criticises this Kaṭandī, see Thakur 2003, p. 165, f. 2. It is twice referred to by Mallavadin, according to Simhasuri's Nyāyagamanusarini, p. 498 (references relate to VS 9.12, and theory of asatkāryavāda). Thakur, p. 167, f. 6.

[173] Murārimiśra's Anargharāghava (kavyamala), 235: Rāvaṇa king of Lanka (from Rāmāyaṇa) styles himself as 'well-versed in the Vaiśeṣika- Kaṭandī'. Padmanabhamisra's Kiraṇāvalībhaskara, p. 12, says that 'a bhāṣya' was written by Rāvaṇa.

[174] Sastri, 1929, pp. 1-5.

[175] VSc of Candrānanda quotes a 'Vṛttikāra' (VSc 9.18; and VSc 9.21), but Thakur is not sure whether this is the same as Vṛtti of Ātreya's Vṛtti. Vādīndra's Kaṇādasūtranibandha quotes, Thakur says, 'as many as twenty times the views of Ātreya's Vṛtti , all exposed by Thakur pp. 125-130; also Vadidevasūri's Syadvādaratnākara p. 945, refers to Ātreya's Vṛtti, quotes and criticises VS 1.1.14 and 1.1.16.

[176] Mallavadin criticises extensively this Ṭīkā of Praśasta (a commentary on a certain Bhāṣya), NAA p. 461; DANC, p. 512, 517; see Thakur, 2003, p. 166, f. 19.

[177] Ui. in his Introduction to Daśapadārthaśāstrī (DP) based on Chinese sources informs about the existence of about eighteen Vaiśeṣika schools; but this is a rather symbolic number over which we come across in Sāṃkhya and Buddhist schools as well. For the number of Vaiśeṣika schools see Śukla's article 1970, pp. 153-9.

[178] Tārkika Vaiśeṣikas (laid stress on knowledge and were influenced by Nyāya), and Saiddhāntas Vaiśeṣikas (worshipers of Śiva, stress on śraddha, and focus more religiously on preserving the Sūtrapāṭha tradition), see Handiqui, 1949, p. 184.

[179] According to my own classification (slightly different from Thakur's), the 'independent tradition' is represented by Candramati's Daśapadārthaśāstrī (6th AD), and Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī (9th AD). It is recognisable by the bold attempt to introduce new padārthas into the system. On Vaiśeṣika Schools: Śukla, 1970, pp. 153-159; Suzuki, 2010, pp. 174-5.

[180] I refer to the Baroda edition 1961; its description in the second chapter of this thesis.

[184] Published numerous times; I used Bronkhorst ed., while for translation Jhā 1916.

[187] Preserved in Chinese only and published the first time by Ui. 1917. Miyamoto re-edits it in 1996 with a Sanskrit reconstruction of the Chinese version. I have used Miyamoto, since my expertise deals with Indian philosophy, as preserved in Sanskrit only.

Sena Court MS (12 AD) Śrīkaṇādasūtravṛtti[181] Vādīndra's[182] Vyākhyā (VSv com. VS)[183] & Kaṇādasūtranibandha (KSN com VS), (com. VS) 13thAD	Vyomaśiva's (Vyo) Vyomavati[185] (com. PD) (c. 900 AD) Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī[186] (NKD), (com. PD) (c. 991 AD) Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī (Kir) (com. PD)(c. 11 AD)	Śivāditya's[188] Saptapadārthī (SP) Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī[189] (Lkṣ) (c. 11 AD)

1.7. CONCLUSION

The chapter has dealt primarily with defining the thesis' title and the concept 'soteriology', as understood in the classical era, in the Subcontinent and the West (Mediterranean world). The comparison between ancient and modern meanings of the term shows that soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is closer to gnostic and Greek analogous classical concepts, and a distant if not opposite concept to the soteriology as understood in theology. The term is of a Greek origin, but in the Indian classical context it should be understood in completely different way; soteriology in India is not theistic, as the

[181] Palm leaves MS (Maithili and Newari scripts) dated from colophon by Thakur, before 1118-19 (the death of King Vallāla of the Sena Dynasty of Bengal). A good description of it with sūtras of the ninth and tenth Sūtrapāṭha, see Thakur, 2003, p. 138-142 (in the comparative List of VS, Nozawa shorted it with 'T').

[182] Vādīndra wrote several important tracts, of which we mention only Kaṇādasūtranibandha (or simply Nibandha). In my thesis, I refer only to Kaṇādasūtranibandha and Vyākhyā. The latter (VSv) was initially published as belonging to an 'anonymous' commentator (Darbangha 1957); though Vādīndra commented upon both Bhāṣya and Sūtrapāṭha tradition, his views incline towards those of the Sūtrapāṭha. Scholars who edited some of Vādīndra works (Telang and Jhā) agree on the time and location of activity of this author: the Yadava king Singhana (Śrīsiṃha) of Devagiri Fort (c. 1210-47 AD). See Thakur, 1960, p. 22; Thakur 2003, p. 132, f. 1; Isaacson PhD, 1995, p. 1-4, situates Vādīndra activity in Daulatabad (location of Devagiri Fort, North-West Maharashtra), and the date, between 1230-1250 AD.

[183] Vyākhyā is not to be confused with a larger commentary on Sūtrapāṭha called Kaṇādasūtranibandha, of which Thakur says is the 'magnus opus' of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra; for a description of Vādīndra works see Thakur 2003, pp. 132-137.

[185] It is the oldest commentary on Praśastapāda's PD; Matilal confirms this, via Udayana who says that Śrīdhara 'mentions Vyomaśiva with respect' 1977, pp. 68-69. For Vyo, I used Varanasi ed., 1982-83, and Rāmānujan 1979 (PhD, Mysore).

[186] Published extensively with Praśastapāda' PD, readers should first refer to Vyomavati which is the earliest commentary on PD, Matilal, 1977, p. 68-69.

[188] Sivāditya was ruthlessly criticised by Vādīndra in his Mahāvidyāvidyambana. For Saptapadārthī, I used the editions of Adyar, 1932, and Ahmedabad, 1963.

[189] Darbhanga edition of 1963.

term is used largely in Greek epic literature as well as in theology; on the contrary, in India it carries meanings that are ontological existential, rather than religious or theological. This confusion has mislead some Indologists of a classical background (Frauwallner, Wezler), who read Vaiśeṣika and, perhaps the whole of Indian philosophy, through the lenses of Greek classical philosophy. With a fresh view of Vaiśeṣika primary sources, here I wish to change the way we look at Indian classical systems, using a synchronic, comparative philosophical method, borrowed form Masson-Oursel, Biardeau, and Houben. The method and the programmatic steps described in the development of this present argument will be developed, (chiefly on three and two levels respectively).[190] I have also offered a primary view of the early sources, with lost and published works on Vaiśeṣika. The current thesis focuses exclusively on Candrānanda's Vṛtti, the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary available, whose description I offer in the following chapter. A much-necessary English translation of it is a project of the near future.

[190] The three conceptual levels refer to the three dimensions of soteriology in the Indian systems (mokṣa, theory of karma, and saṃsāra) while the two levels are strictly referring to Vaiśeṣika (ontological and epistemological).

2.0. INTRODUCTION

There is a large consensus among the scholars that Candrānanda's Vṛtti (VSc for gloss; VS for Sūtrapāṭha), is the oldest extant Vaiśeṣika commentary, and, as Isaacson states, the Sūtrapāṭha (VS) it contains is 'quite probably the earliest one now available'.[191] Though an older sūtrapāṭha could still be reconstructed from an 'independent transmission of Vaiśeṣikasūtras',[192] this chapter argues that before new major MSS are uncovered, it is yet too early to doubt the fullness and reliability of VS as preserved in VSc. In tracing Wezler's 'independent transmission of Sūtrapāṭha', and after looking at five new MSS which I have personally seen and photographed at Wai, Mysore, Bombay, and Madras, I too came to conclude, with Thakur, that the MSS we have on Sūtrapāṭha, present largely the Mithilā version (Śaṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra). After Vaiśeṣika's amalgamation with Nyāya (eleventh century AD), it seems that, with the exception of Vādīndra's Vyākhyā ('short' and 'long versions') and Śaṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra, the Vaiśeṣika system was transmitted through a list of sūtras, usually appended to MSS preserving the Nyāya, and Jain tracts; this is for instance the case of MSS from Baroda and Ujjain, both of which are a 'Sammelhandschrift'. In this chapter, I aim to complement Kaviraj, Thakur and Isaacson's scholarship on both VSc and Sūtrapāṭha, and I should like to provide a thematic synopsis, not a philological one. One such synopsis was given by Thakur 2003, but it is rather eclectic as it presents the themes of Sūtrapāṭha with glosses extracted from almost all early Vaiśeṣika commentarial

[191] Isaacson, PhD, 1995, p. 140.
[192] This project that Wezler propounds, aims to trace an even earlier Sūtrapāṭha than that offered by VSc.

traditions, and beyond, and overlooks key portions of Candrānanda's gloss (e.g. VSc 10.21). The synopsis I offer here focuses on Candrānanda's thought. As for Sūtrapāṭha, briefly discussed in the second part of this chapter, I have brought into discussion parallel passages which confirm that Candrānanda's version of VS is as old as the second century AD.

2.1 CANDRĀNANDA'S VṚTTI (VSC)

The Vṛtti whose *editio princeps* was published at Baroda in 1961 by the Jaina savant monk Muni Jambūvijayaji is the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary available at present,[193] and its publication represents a landmark in Vaiśeṣika studies; its importance has been highlighted numerous times by both Indian (e.g. Thakur, Jambūvijayaji) and Western scholars (e.g. Wezler, Isaacson, Halbfass).[194] Though republished in 1982, the edition of 1961 should be used first as it is better and does not contain the misprints of the second one (1982).[195] The 1961 edition provides a more reliable mūla text (Sūtrapāṭha), so much so that since then it has replaced scholars' reliance on the VS preserved by the late commentary of Śaṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra (VSs), which gave an inflated version of the Sūtrapāṭha, as well as a late interpretation of the mūla text (Navya-Nyāya).[196] The reception of this commentary among Vaiśeṣika students is poor, partly because a fully annotated translation has not yet been published in English.[197] Moreover, to my own

[193] The edition of Baroda Oriental Institute, 1961 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series no 136) is the printed edition I use, only.
[194] I refer primarily to Isaacson's ground breaking textual critical work, his PhD thesis, "Materials for the study of Vaiśeṣika system', 1995, while Ferenc Ruzsa has provided a transliteration for the whole Vṛtti with multiple notes providing MSS variations (his web-page on: academia.edu).
[195] I have had this edition in my own hand, at Wai, but here I rely on Isaacson's expertise, 1995, p. 355.
[196] This is not always the case. There are still scholars even in India who keep on referring to Upaskāra as the main primary sources for Vaiśeṣika (e.g. Gajendragadkar, 1988).
[197] One interesting exception is the Italian translation of Arena, 1982 (VSa); but he translates only the sūtras; while for Candrānanda's commentary, he provides his own summary and commentary.

surprise, there are still Indian scholars these days who are not familiar with the commentary itself, partly because historical terms like 'earliest' are perhaps of not much relevance to them.

2.2. MSS ON VSc[198]

When Jambūvijayaji published the edition of 1961, he used only two MSS.[199] He probably did not know that each one of those two MSS, has a further copy, one preserved at Pune (the MSS library of Bhandarkar Institute), and the other MS has a copy preserved at Ujjain. Thus, there are five extant MSS on VSc, classified in two groups: those of a Jaina Devanagari Script and those of Śāradā script. Here, I only wish to list the MSS which have been used, and already described by Jambūvijayaji (J_1, $Ś_1$, marked in the edition with 'P' and 'O'), and the additional three MSS (J_2, $Ś_2$, $Ś_3$) which have been laudably collated and compared by Isaacson and Ruzsa.[200] The table I offer here gives a detailed description of all MSS on VSc; for a full description see Thakur's introduction to Baroda edition 1961, their respective MSS catalogues, but more

[198] The Jain savant Muni Jambūvijayaji took an interest in Vaiśeṣika while he was working on Nayacakra of Mallavādin. He saw in the text he was revising that there were many Vaiśeṣika sūtras, which could not be found in the then extant Sūtrapāṭha of Śaṅkaramiśra (fifteenth century AD). Intrigued by the sūtras present in the Nayacakra, Jambūvijayaji decided to trace their origin. From Jaisalmer, he received a MS from the collection of Muni Puṇyavijayajī, which proved of great value due to many different sūtras it contained. Jambūvijayaji thus became the scholar responsible for the editio princeps of the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary, and his edition was improved by Isaacson and Ruzsa collated and compared three additional MSS of various scripts, as follows: MS no 1831h (Śārāda script) from Baroda Oriental Institute, which in the footnotes of 1961 Baroda edition is designated with the siglum 'O'. A similar MS at Baroda Oriental Institute bears the number 403 and is from about 1875-76. It is also in Śārāda script and has 33 folia (size 26.5 + 17cm). A final MS of the Scindia Oriental Institute, Ujjain, No 4635, contains first the Tarkasaṁgraha text and the commentary (Tarkadīpikā), followed by the Sūtrapāṭha beginning on folio 22r15 and ending on folio 35r.106.

[199] Thakur Introd to VSc 1961.

[200] Puṇyavijayajī edits VSc in 1982, but as Isaacson warned, the text 'has been reset' due to 'a sprinkling of new misprints added', p. 144, f14. Isaacson (PhD) provides only a portion of a proposed Devanāgarī critical edition (without translation) of VSc (1.1 to 2.1 including). His represents a good beginning of what the whole of the edition might look like; while the Hungarian Indologist Ferenc Ruzsa carried on the same task for the whole of VSc (in roman transliteration). Since my work is not textual critical or philological, nor am I fully equipped to compete with their technical competence, I shall henceforth refer to their philological reading of the MSS.

importantly Isaacson's doctoral thesis, pp. 145-7. Though still improvable, the Baroda 1961 edition is quite reliable, it is as Isaacson showed 'a most impressive achievement, an example of scholarship of a rare order'.[201]

Table 2. MSS on Candrānanda's Vṛtti

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">J_1</td><td colspan="2">J_2
(copy of J1)[202]</td><td>$Ś_1$</td><td>$Ś_2$</td><td>$Ś_3$</td></tr>
<tr><td>J1s
'PS'
[203]

Js</td><td>J1
'P'

Jac</td><td>J2s</td><td>J2</td><td>('O')</td><td>No alternative symbol</td><td>No alternative symbol</td></tr>
<tr><td>VS</td><td>VSc</td><td>VS</td><td>VSc</td><td rowspan="2">'Sammelhandschrift' MS; our Vṛtti is contained within f6r – f41v

Śāradā script

41 folios</td><td rowspan="2">Single

Śāradā script

33 folios
Size: 26.5x17cm</td><td rowspan="2">'Sammelhandschrift' (after Tarkasaṁgraha with Tarkadīpikā gloss, Vṛtti follows contained within f22r15 - f35r)

Śāradā script

35 folios</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Jaina Devanāgarī script

34 folios
Size: 23.0x8.3cm</td><td colspan="2">Jaina Devanāgarī script

20 folios
Size: 18.5x31.5cm</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Ahmedabad
(L.D. Institute)

Most probably uncatalogued yet.[204]

13th -14th century: Jambūvijayaji</td><td colspan="2">Pune
(BORI)

No. 99
(of 1873-74)</td><td>Baroda
(OI)

No. 1831h
(year : 'not very old' Thakur)
Undated</td><td>Pune
(BORI)

No. 403
(of 1875-76)
Undated</td><td>Ujjain
(SOI)
No. 4635

(Date: Tuesday September 11th, 1888)[205]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">J

When all these Jaina Devanāgarī MSS agree between them</td><td colspan="3">Ś

When all Śāradā MSS agree between them</td></tr>
</table>

[201] Isaacson, 1995, p. 140.

[202] Isaacson, 1995, p. 148; Ruzsa, 2010, p. 173.

[203] Puṇyavijayajī in his VSc edition 1961, marks the first part of MSS (contains Sūtrapāṭha only) with PS, whereas the second part contains the sūtras again within commentary, with 'P'. For a description of Vaiśeṣika MSS of the Vṛtti, see Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakṛti Manuscripts, Ahmedabad, 1963, pp. 18-24.

[204] Jambūvijayaji informs that the MS was donated to Baroda Institute by its owner, Muni Shri Puṇyavijayajī.

[205] Dated by Prof Yano from colophon, (Isaacson, 1995, p. 147, footnote 19).

Jaina Devanāgarī MSS J1s and J2s refer to the separate sūtrapāṭha portions of J1 and J2;	Note: Ruzsa's shortenings Śāradā MSS ac, pc, Ś1, Ś2, Ś3

The focus of this chapter however is to trigger interest for any Vaiśeṣika student in the thematic content of the system, and also to show how Vaiśeṣika soteriology fits into the broader picture of the system. The soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is gnostic, centred primarily on padārthas, which are the categories that must be grasped. This is broadly speaking the teaching of dharma. Thakur's contention is that 'dharma' from the opening sūtras (VS 1.1.1-2) refers to 'padārthadharma'.[206] That is to say, 'dharma' is the key concept that stands between the liberation (moksa), the world (ontology), and its categories of knowledge (epistemology). As such, like knowledge (buddhi/jñāna) is only a means by which liberation is obtained, which at a certain point, would be nevertheless disregarded with all other vaiśeṣikaguṇas. After all, both knowledge and dharma are not ontologically part in the soteriological state.

2.3. SYNOPSIS OF VSC (BARODA ED. 1961)

I shall provide the following thematic table in which I hope to show the dominant preoccupation of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra with certain topics. A clear-cut differentiation between the themes of adhyāyas might not be possible, because each section (āknika/adhyāya) discusses more than one theme. There is a great deal of overlapping; themes and arguments being continuously intertwined. In VSc 9 for instance, one cannot say that it is all about epistemology, as various topics crop up in, such as

[206] Thakur, Introd. to VSc 1961, p. 3.

asatkāryavāda, yoga, ātman, śabda-pramāṇa, smṛti, svapna, and saṃskāra). It all binds together. For another synopsis of Sūtrapāṭha, one may refer to Thakur (2003), but his presentation is eclectic and neglects certain key soteriological passages of Candrānanda. My synopsis presents exclusively Candrānanda's view on Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

The edition presents itself in several sections. Immediately after the first pages, we see Jambūvijayaji's Sanskrit eulogy (samarpaṇa) to his guru followed by an English forward by B.J. Sandesara (pp. vii-x). A Sanskrit summary of the contents (niṣayānukrama) (pp. 11-14) follows, as well as a Sanskrit bibliographical list of works used (pp. 15-17). Furthermore, an English bibliographical list with abbreviations (pp. xix-xxi); an Introduction (prastavana) in Sanskrit by editor Jambūvijayaji (pp. 1-16), a series of photocopies from the MSS used (Jaina Devanagari and Śāradā, Sanskrit and Tibetan scripts); the English introduction of Anantalal Thakur (pp. 1-23); the Sanskrit text of VSc with variant reading of 'P' and 'O' MSS, and the emendation by the editor (pp. 1-76); a Sanskrit comparative Appendix (in ten pariśiṣṭas) between VS and VSv ('short' and 'long version'), and VSs (pp. 77-224);[207] a new Sanskrit comparative Appendix (navam pariśiṣṭa) (pp. 225-226), a section on MSS variations in Sanskrit (vṛddhipatrakam) (pp. 227-234); an Errata (in English) (pp. 235-237), and a hand-written photocopy of the Tibetan sources discussed under the first pariśiṣṭa (pp. 153-219). A swift survey over the whole of VSc content can be made with the summary given by Jambūvijayaji (pp. 11-14). Here I provide a table with the main concepts classified by adhyāya and āhnika.

[207] The seventh section in this pariśiṣṭa (pp. 153-219) contains an English presentation of the Tibetan sources adduced in support of the reconstruction of the VS. I have not had the chance to dwell on this aspect here.

Table 3. Themes and topics in VSc by āhnika

Dravya				Karma	Guṇa				
VSc 1	VSc 2	VSc 3	VSc 4	VSc 5	VSc 6	VSc 7	VSc 8	VSc 9	VSc 10
1.1 Sādharmya Vaidharmya	2.1 Mahābhūtas	3.1 Ātman	4.1 Nitya Anitya	5.1 Karma Śarīra	6.1 Dharma	7.1 Guṇas paramāṇu Ākāśa Ātman Manas Diś Kāla	Jñāna	Asatkāryavāda + Anumāna + Yogipratyakṣa + Vidyā + Avidyā	Sukha Duḥkha Saṁśaya Nirṇaya Śruti Smṛti + Niḥśreyasa
1.2 Sāmānya + Viśeṣa	2.2 Kāla Diś Śabda	3.2. Manas + Jñāna	4.2 Mahā bhūtas + Śarīras	5.2 Karma, Adṛṣṭa, Manas Yoga Mokṣa	6.2 Cātur-āśrama; vaiśeṣika -guṇas; Mokṣa	7.2 Guṇas: Sāṃkhya Paratva Aparatva Saṃyoga Vibhāga + Sāmānya			
Differentiation between dravya and padārtha		Soul	Bodies	Liberation	Ethics	Theory of Knowledge; Forms of knowledge; Epistemology;			

VSc 1.1 (twenty-nine sūtras)

VSc begins with a discussion between a Brahmin and a distinguished teacher whose name is Kaṇabhakṣa.[208] The Brahmin requests some clarification on a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8.12.1), and asks about the means for the removal of pleasant and unpleasant affections, the meaning of dharma, its characteristic marks, as well as the purpose, and the person fit to acquire it, the means by which that is achievable (1).[209] A

[208] This is one of the names of Kaṇāda; others include: Ulūka, Kaṇābhuj, and Kāśyapa.

[209] According to VSc 1.1.1, the 'moral prerequisites' expected from the pupil are: 1) 'detachment' (vairāgya); 2) 'ability to ask questions' (prajñākathā); 3) 'maturity', 'intelligence' (paripāka); VS: athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ / VSc 1.1.1: kasya cid brāhmaṇasya vedābhyāsavaśena vyapagatakalmaṣasyedaṁ pratibabhau: 'aśarīraṁ vāva santaṁ priyāpriye na spṛśata' (Ch. Up. 8.12.1) iti / tata idaṁ vākyam ālocya Kaṇabhakṣaṇam ājagāma / tato'bhyuvāca bhagavann / anena vākyena vyapahataśarīrasya kṣemasādhanatā kathyate tad ucyatāṁ ka upāya iti / tato munirabhyuvāca: dharma iti / tato jagāda brāhmaṇaḥ: ko dharmaḥ kathaṁ lakṣaṇaḥ kānyasya sādhanāni kiṁ prayojanaṁ kāṁś ca pratyupakaroti ity / atha ebhyaḥ praśnebhyo'nantaraṁ dharmavyākhyānapratijñāyām atha śabda ānantaryamabhidhatte / ataḥ śabdo 'pi vairāgyaprajñākaṣāyaparipākādikāṁ śiṣyagatasampadaṁ hetutvenāpadiśati yasmādayaṁ śiṣyo guṇasampadā yuktaḥtato'smai praśnebhyo'nantaraṁ dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.

short explanation about the difference between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa is given (2),[210] as well as the divine authorship of the Vedas (3), the list of nine dravyas (4),[211] and the list of the seventeen or twenty-four guṇas (5).[212] According to Candrānanda, the number of categories is six (6).[213] Since the knowledge of the six padārthas is paramount to produce dharma, which leads to absolute liberation (niḥśreyasa), the whole āknika is concerned with listing and discussing briefly the categories by two epistemological procedures: 1) 'drawing similarities' (sādharmya) (7), and 'dissimilarities' (vaidharmya) (8-16). Within vaidharmya, the characteristics of dravya (14),[214] guṇa (15),[215] and karma (16) follow. Common cause (17-19; 29) and common effect (22-28) are equally taken into consideration. The importance of this āhnika is that it shows not only the nature of soteriology but also the function, or the ontological method of inquiry the Vaiśeṣika system advances, by which, once doṣas are revealed, detachment from these becomes a must, after which the obtainment of dharma that leads to niḥśreyasa is obtained (6).

---

[210] VS 1.1.2: yato'bhyudaya niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ / VSc: yāgadevatāpūjādikriyāṇām ājyapuṣpādi nirvartyānāṁ tadaiva vinaṣṭatvād uttarakālaṁ phaladānāśakter yasmād dhetor abhyudaya niḥśreyase bhavataḥ sa 'dharma' iti boddhavyaḥ / abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣu ceṣṭaśarīraprāptiḥ anarth'oparamaś ca / niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ.

[211] VS 1.1.4: āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṁ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi / VSc: dravyatvābhisambandhād dravyāṇi / pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī / evam eva abādisaṁjñāḥ / navaiva dravyāṇi nādhikāni ity evam artham iti śabdaḥ.

[212] VS 1.1.5: rūpa rasa gandha sparśāḥ saṅkhyā parimāṇāni pṛthaktva saṁyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ / VSc: ete saptadaśa kaṇṭh'oktā rūpādayo guṇāḥ caśabdasamuccitāś ca gurutvadravatvasnehasaṁskāradharmādharmaśabdā gṛhyante / ete yathāvasaram uttaratra vakṣyante.

[213] VS 1.1.6: utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṁ prasāraṇaṁ gamanam iti karmāṇi / VSc: etāny eva pañca karmāṇi draṣṭavyāni / gamanagrahaṇāt bhramaṇarecanādīnāṁ grahaṇaṁ / evam uddiṣṭāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇi / tad anuṣaṅgāt sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api vakṣyante / evaṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñānaṁ viṣayadoṣadarśanadvāreṇa vairāgyotpattau satyāṁ niḥśreyase sādhye dharmahetuḥ / abhyudaye sādhye dharmahetutvaṁ punar amīṣāṁ 'same yajet' eti pṛthivyāḥ 'adho'ṁbūni nayatītyādi yathāsvam anyeṣāṁ dravyāṇāṁ / guṇānāṁ tu kṛṣṇam ālabhet ety ādi / karmaṇāṁ tu 'vrīhīn avahantītyādi / vijñāta sādharmya vaidharmyāṇāṁ ca dravyādīnām abhyudayaniḥśreyasa hetutvāt sādharmyaṁ tāvat kathayati.

[214] VS 1.1.14: kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam / VSc: utkṣepaṇādikaṁ karma kriyā. yathāsambhavaṁ yasmin yatsamavāyena vartate tat kriyāvat anyatrākāśakāladigātmabhyaḥ / guṇā rūpādayo yatra yathā sambhavaṁ vartante tad guṇavat / ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ih'eti yataḥ sa samavāyaḥ sa yasyāsti tat samavāyi kāraṇaṁ ca tad eva, samavāyino vā kāryasya kāraṇam / tatra kṣityādīni trayāṇāṁ dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṁ samavāyikāraṇam, ākāśādīni guṇānāṁ, mano'ntyāvayavidravye guṇakarmaṇām.

[215] VS 1.1.15: dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṁyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.

Among all padārthas, dravyas are paramount. They are related to both abhyudaya (on their knowledge depends the performance of a series of rituals and sacrifices) and niḥśreyasa (ātman is subject to liberation). In both cases, dharma, which is the teaching of this ontology, represents an important tool.[216]

VSc 1.2 (eighteen sūtras)

This āknika deals with the Vaiśeṣika's metaphysics, particularly with two more padārthas, 'universality' (sāmānya) and 'particularity' (viśeṣa); after a brief discussion of the precedence of cause before effect (1-2), the VS and VSc deal with the category of 'universality' and 'particularity' both of which depend on 'cognition' (buddhi) (3). Within sāmānya, the ontological category of existence (bhāva) is defined as universal, only (4).[217] It seems that sāmānya, and viśeṣa are two categories that explain the nature of the three preceding padārthas; 'substanceness' (dravyatva), 'quality-ness' (guṇatva), and 'action-ness' (karmatva) are both universals and particularities (5). An 'ultimate particularity' (antyaviśeṣa) is also discussed (6). 'Being' (sattā), which is not a separate padārtha, nor a dravya, karma, or guṇa, is that from which the notion of 'existence' ('sat sat') arises (7-11). After another explanation of dravyatva, guṇatva, karmatva (12-17), this āhnika ends with the doctrine of the 'unity of existence' (eka bhāva) (18).

[216] Vaiśeṣika is an orthodox system, rooted in the ritual as well as in the Upaniṣadic and Vedic textual tradition; many references occur in VSc (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.12.1 in VSc 1.1.1. and a series of others like within gloss VSc 1.1.6).

[217] VS 1.2.4: bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva / VSc: bhāvaḥ sattā sāmānyam eva triṣvapi dravyādiṣv anuvartamānatvān na viśeṣaḥ.

VSc 2.1 (twenty-eight sūtras)

As stated in its introductory line, the programme of this āhnika is to 'differentiate' (vaidharmya) between various substances (mahābhūtas), and the relationship with their guṇas, namely 'earth' (pṛthivī) (1); 'water' (ap) (2); 'lustre' (tejas) (3), 'wind'(vāyu) (4); 'ether' (ākāśa) (5; 20) and their defining 'marks' (lakṣaṇa) such as 'fluidity' (dravatva) (6), or 'touch' (sparśa) (9). Various opponents' views (VSc 15; 16; 20; 21; 23) are exposed and rejected. Though śabda is not mentioned in the list of the guṇas (VS 1.1.5), in VS 2.1.16 however, it is said to be a guṇa of substances such as ākāśa. As in the case of bhāva (which again appears in (28) śabda is a guṇa not mentioned by Kaṇāda's classification. In fact, Kaṇāda's Sūtrapāṭha did not specify a fixed number of categories as his commentators, (Candrānanda and Praśastapāda) would do later; it could well be that they were 'categories of knowledge' intrinsic, or subsumed within padārthas, or dravyas.

VSc 2.2 (forty-three sūtras)

An extended āhnika, this represents a continuation of 'discrimination' (vaidharmya), begun by the previous āhnika, with a particular focus on dravyas like kāla, diś, and ākāśa and on specific characteristic of qualities such as 'touchiness' ('sparśavadviśeṣaguṇa') mentioned in the introductory line of the first sūtra.[218] There are other 'characteristics of qualities' discussed such as 'hot' (uṣṇa)(2), 'smell' (gandha)(3), 'coolness' (śīta)(5), not usually mentioned in the list of guṇas. Similarly, certain characteristic marks (liṅga) of

[218] The 'specific qualities' enunciated in VS 1.1.5 should not to be confused with the 'specific marks of qualities' such as hotness, coolness and so on, expressed as abstract nouns.

substances such as 'time' (kāla) (6; 8; 11), 'wind' (vāyu) (7), and 'direction' (diś) (12-18) are also discussed. But the second part of this āhnika (from 19 onwards) turns to more epistemological topics such as 'doubt' (saṁśaya)(19), which arises from vidyā, and avidyā (23),[219] or śabda which, as maintained by Candrānanda is a non-eternal entity (29; 42-43);[220] Vaiśeṣikas' view on śabda is refuted most probably by Mīmāṃsā critics (38-41).

VSc 3.1 (fourteen sūtras)

The third adhyāya deals mainly with the substance 'soul' (ātman), whose reality is being proved in the first āhnika with a description of inferential proban and pseudo-probans. One way by which Candrānanda proves it is by 'differentiation' (vaidharmya) between 'sense-objects' (indriyārtha) (1) and the 'sense-organs' (2). These are established (prasiddha) to be different from each other. For example, here 'sense-object' is śabda, whereas 'sense-organ' is 'ear' (śrotra) (VSc 3.1.2).[221] Based on the differentiation between 'senses' and 'objects', Candrānanda postulates the existence of a 'knower to be inferred beyond these" (paro grahītātmānumīyate).[222] The soul, not the senses, is the 'grasper'

[219] VS 2.2.19: sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṁśayaḥ / VSc: sthāṇupuruṣayorūrdhvatāṁ sāmānyaṁ paśyan viśeṣahetūn pāṇyādikoṭarādīnapaśyan smarati ca viśeṣān, ataḥ saṁśayaḥ 'kim ayaṁ sthāṇuḥ syāt puruṣo na vā' iti / sa dvividhaḥ bāhya ābhyantaraś ca / bāhyo'pi dvividhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ apratyakṣaś ca / apratyakṣe tāvat / VS 2.2.20: dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭam / VSc: prāpto manuṣya ity ukte 'kim imaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ paśyeyam adṛṣṭam iti śravaṇamātrādeva saṁśayaḥ / pratyakṣe tu / VS 2.2.21: dṛṣṭaṁ ca dṛṣṭatvat / VSc: samprati dṛṣṭvā puruṣaṁ tam eva dṛṣṭamālocayataḥ kim ayaṁ mayā dṛṣṭapūrvaḥ kadācidutādṛṣṭa iti saṁśayaḥ / VS 2.2.22: dṛṣṭaṁ yathā dṛṣṭaṁ ayathā dṛṣṭaṁ ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt / VSc: ādau kuntalī devadatto dṛṣṭaḥ madhye muṇḍaḥ, tṛtīyasyāvasthāyāṁ kuntalī / caturthyāmālāpādibhiravagato ārūpamātreṇa ca saṁdhyādau kim ayaṁ kuntalī syād uta muṇḍo vā iti saṁśayaḥ / pūrvasūtre'nekārthā'nusmṛteḥ saṁśayaḥ anena tu ekārthe viśeṣānusmaraṇāt / ābhyantaras tu / VS 2.2.23: vidyāvidyātaś ca saṁśayaḥ / VSc: vidyā samyagjñānam avidyā mithyājñānaṁ / daivajñena śubhamādiṣṭaṁ satyam abhūt dvitīyam asatyaṁ tṛtīyasyām avasthāyāṁ saṁśayaḥ kim ādyāvasthāvat satyam uta dvitīyāvasthāvad asatyam iti / evaṁ kathitaḥ saṁśayaḥ.

[220] VS 2.2.29: guṇasya sato'pavargaḥ karmabhiḥ sādharmyam / VSc: karmabhir asya punar, guṇabhūtasyā'pi sādharmyam apavargo vināśaḥ, utpattyanantaram agrahaṇād vināśo 'numīyate.

[221] VS 3.1.2: indriyārtha prasiddhir indriyārthebhyo'rthāntaratve hetuḥ / VSc: grāhyāṇām arthānāṁ śabdādīnāṁ y'eyaṁ prasiddhiḥ tayā ca śrotrādīnāṁ karaṇānām anayāindriyārthaprasiddhyā ebhyo grāhyagrahaṇebhyo indriyārthebhyaḥ paro grahītātmānumīyate.

[222] VS 3.1.3: so'napadeśaḥ / VSc: grāhyagrahaṇaprasiddhyākhyo grahītṛsadbhāve yo hetur uktaḥ so'napadeśaḥ, akāraṇam ity arthaḥ / kim ātmakalpanayā / katham indriyāṇi grahītṛṇy eva na bhavanti.

(grahītṛ) of the objects (VSc 2, 3). Like in VSc 2.2, here too, we have some objections to this view expressed (3; 7) and it is for this very purpose that Candrānanda offers a list of ten logical relations (of which eight are inferential probans) on which Vaiśeṣika's epistemology is based and which serve the purpose of proving the existence of soul (8).[223] There is also a discussion about several types of 'non-established' (aprasiddha) 'contradictory' (virodha) or 'invalid arguments' (anapadeśa) (10), a 'doubtful reason' (sandigdha) based on a non-existing (asat) cause (11), and 'uncertain reason' (anaikāntika) (12).[224] Towards the close of this āknika, VSc explains the existence of soul through a categorisation of what is commonly called 'ordinary knowledge' (jñāna), produced out of a 'four-fold contact' (catuṣṭayasannikarṣa) (13).[225] Ātman is also proved from 'inclination' (pravṛtti) and 'disinclination' (nivṛtti) of the body (śarīra); the motions in the body prove that, what ultimately exists is a different grasper of perception, identified as the soul (14).[226]

VSc 3.2 (seventeen sūtras)

The two main subjects of this āhnika are ātman and manas. The proofs for the existence of ātman derive from the theory of 'knowledge' (jñāna), which is produced through the contact 'sannikarṣa', between 'ātman', 'indriya' and 'indriyārtha' via the mediating role of 'manas' (1). The mark that proves the existence of manas is not only the contact

[223] Among which, the third proban (ekārthasamavāyi) is two-fold (kārya kāryāntara; kāraṇa kāraṇāntara), while the virodhi proban is four-fold. See section on epistemology (fifth chapter of this thesis).
[224] VS 3.1.12: viṣāṇī tasmādaśvo viṣāṇī tasmād gaur iti ca / VSc: ayaṁ padārtho'śva iti sādhye viṣāṇitvaṁ viruddham aśvaviparyayeṇa viṣāṇitvasya vyāpteḥ / 'ayaṁ padārtho gaur' iti sādhye viṣāṇitvamanaikāntikaṁ sādhyaviparyayābhyāṁ vyāptatvāt […].
[225] VS 3.1.13: ātm'endriya mano'rtha sannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat / VSc: catuṣṭayasannikarṣād yadutpadyate jñānākhyaṁ karyam tad anyad dhetvantaram ātma jñāpakam asti iti / jñānasya samavāyi kāraṇāpekṣitvaṁ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat […].
[226] VS 3.1.14: pravṛttinivṛttī ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam iti / VSc: pratyagātmeti śarīraṁ / śarīre pravṛtti nivṛttī dṛṣṭe ātmānam anumāpayataḥ / śarīraṁ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitaṁ hitāhita pravṛtti nivṛtti mattvād ghaṭavat.

between objects, senses, and ātman, but also because of the 'manifestation' and 'non-manifestation' of knowledge (jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca) (1).[227] Twelve 'physical marks' (ātmaliṅgāni) for the existence of the embodied ātman are described (4),[228] against which an objection is raised (6), on the grounds that a 'seen mark' (dṛṣṭaliṅgam), like 'breathing' (prāṇa), cannot prove the existence of ātman, at most it can be proved only 'on the basis of tradition' (āgamikaṁ)(8). Candrānanda counters this view with the argument that the 'ahaṁ' concept is real because, although in apposition with wind, it is however, different from it as well as different from entities like 'earth', and so on (9).[229] The āknika continues with a series of epistemological arguments, by which Candrānanda responds and refutes the opposite views raised against Vaiśeṣika's tenets on the nature of ātman, and its number (10-17).[230]

---

[227] VS 3.2.1: ātm'endriyārtha sannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam / VSc: ātm'endriyārthānāṁ sannikarṣe yad abhāvājjñānaṁ na bhavati yad bhāve ca bhavati tad manaḥ / evaṁ jñān'otpattyanutpattī manaso liṅgam / guṇāḥ saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva saṁskārāḥ.

[228] VS 3.2.4: prāṇāpānanimeṣ'onmeṣa jīvana manogatīndriyāntara vikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś c'ety ātmaliṅgāni / VSc: prāṇāpānanimeṣ'onmeṣā manogatiś ca prayatna kāryatvād ātmano liṅgam. jīvanam adṛṣṭa kāryatvāt indriyāntaravikārāḥ smṛtiprabhavatvāt sukhādayo guṇatvāt / tiryakpavanasya vāyor dehasthitasya yat prāṇāpānakarma tat prayatnakāryam śarīraparigṛhīta vāyuviṣayatve sati vikṛtatvāt bhastrāparigṛhītavāyukarmavat / nimeṣ'onmeṣa kriyā'pi prayatnakāryā nimeṣ'onmeṣakriyāśabdavācyatvāt dāruyantranimeṣ'onmeṣakriyāvat / manasā saṁyoga ātmano'dṛṣṭāpekṣo jīvanam śarīra vṛddhyādi tat kāryaṁ api jīvanam śarīraṁ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitaṁ vṛddhikṣatabhagna saṁrohaṇanimittatvāt jīrṇagrhavat / indriyāntaraṁ prati manaso gamanaṁ manogatiḥ prayatnakāryā abhimata pradeśa sambandha nimittatvāt, pelakakriyāvat, sā hi dārakaprayatnakṛtā / rūpālocana saṁskāra vyaktirasasmaraṇa prayatna manaḥ kriyā rasana manaḥ sambandha rasanavikārāṇāṁ pūrvasya pūrvasya kāraṇatvāt utpattiḥ, jñaptis tu vaiparītyena uttar'ottarasmāt pūrvasya pūrvasya smaraṇenātmānumīyate / na smṛtirindriyāṇāmanyena dṛṣṭe'rthe'nyasya / na śarīrāvayavasyāvasthābhedena bhidyamānatvāt / 'devadattasya rūparasagandhasparśapratyayā ekānekanimittāḥ 'mayā' iti pratyayena pratisandhānāt, kṛasaṇketānāṁ bahūnāmekasmin nartakībhrūkṣepe yugapadanekapratyayavad' (Nyāyavārtika 1.1.20) iti Uddyotakaraḥ.'

[229] VSc 3.2.9: aham iti śabdena kṣityādivibhinnātmadravyaviṣayeṇa ekādhikaraṇyāt 'ahaṁ prāṇādimān ahaṁ sukhavān' iti / tasmāt prāṇādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam.

[230] / nanu / VS 3.2.15: sukha duḥkha jñāna niṣpatty aviśeṣād aikātmyaṁ / VSc: yathā salliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvastath' aiva sukha duḥkha jñānānāṁ niṣpattyaviśeṣād viśeṣeliṅgābhāvāc caikātmyaṁ / n'aitat. Note the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas in VSc 3.2.17: tasya guṇāḥ buddhi sukha duḥkhecchā dveṣa prayatna adṛṣṭa saṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ.

VSc 4.1 (fourteen sūtras)

The analysis of substances goes into a more subtle and atomic level. In judging the 'permanent' (nitya) character of substances, VSc discusses the existence of atoms, which are eternal, and their knowlegde is equally important. Candrānanda deals with a two-fold kind of epistemology enunciated in the opening line,[231] namely 'comprehensibility' (upalabdhi), and 'non-comprehensibility' (anupalabdhi),[232] as referred to the existence of atoms (1-5), their triads (6-8)[233] and guṇas (9-14). After a brief definition of 'permanence' (nitya) (1),[234] a whole section on 'upalabdhi' follows (2-6).[235] This is the first epistemological part of this āhnika, in which the knowledge of effects (kārya) which are impermanent (2-3), contrasts with the impermanent character of causes (4). Avidyā is the 'impossibility' (abhāva) of grasping atoms beyond senses. But in the second part (7-14),[236] both Sūtrapāṭha and Vṛtti deal with anupalabdhi of 'atoms' (paramāṇu) (7), or guṇas like 'number' (saṅkhyā), 'dimension' (parimāṇā), 'separateness' (pṛthaktva), 'conjunction' (saṃyoga), 'disjunction' (vibhāga), 'farness' (paratva),[237] and 'nearness'

[231] Introductory line to VSc 4.1.1: evaṁ dravyāṇyuktvā nityatvam upalabdhyanupalabdhī ca teṣu kathayati prasaṅgād anyat.
[232] Ganesh Thite (personal communication) translates upalabdhī with 'obtainment', and anupalabdhī with 'non-obtainment'; other options can be 'perception', 'non-perception', 'recognition', and 'non-recognition', respectively.
[233] VS 4.1.8 rūpa saṁskārābhāvād vāyāvanupalabdhiḥ / VSc: satyapi anekadravyavattve mahattve ca rūpākhyasya saṁskārasyābhāvād vāyāvanupalabdhiḥ…
[234] VSc 4.1.1: adravyavattvād ity anena yat sat kāraṇa rahitaṁ tan nityam uktaṁ paramāṇvādi.
[235] VS 4.1.2: tasya kāryaṁ liṅgam / VSc: tasya paramāṇvāder indriyair agṛhya maṇasyāpi śarīramahābhūtādi kāryaṁ liṅgam / yataḥ / VS 4.1.3: kāraṇabhāvāddhi kāryabhāvaḥ / VSc: yasmāt kāraṇebhyastantvādibhyaḥ paṭādi kāryam utpadyate, ataḥ kāryasya kāraṇapūrvakatvāt kāraṇasya kāryaṁ liṅgaṁ / VS 4.1.4: anityam iti ca viśeṣapratiṣedhābhāvaḥ / VSc: yathā khalu 'sarvaṁ kāryam anityam' ity ucyate tad anena nityatvasya viśeṣapratiṣedhena kāryaviṣayeṇa kiṁcit kāraṇaṁ nityam iti jñāyate / VS 4.1.5: avidyā ca / avidyā agrahaṇam atī'ndriyatvena paramā'ṇūnāṁ, tad apy anityatvaṁ nivārayati / adṛśyamane hy arthe tadgatam anityatvaṁ kena gṛhyeta eta / tasmān nā'nityatā vaktuṁ śakyā / upalabdhiḥ katham iti cet / VS 4.1.6: mahatyaneka dravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ / VSc 4.1.6: mahattvaparimāṇasamavāyini dravye samavāyikāraṇadravyabahutvād rūpāc ca śuklā'der jñānaṁ bhavati.
[236] With the exception when upalabdhī is proved through 'inherence' (samavāya)
[237] 'Remotness' (trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27); 'priority' (trans. Halbfass, 1992, p. 208).

(aparatva)[238](12).[239] The rationale behind such description is to establish whether or not things can be known, or whether things have form, or can be perceived by eye (13).[240] Things that have 'form' (rūpa) make knowledge possible (6), while things without form are not observable by eye (13). This is the case in 'ordinary knowledge'. However, there are other things of an atomic form which would be known only by forms of 'extraordinary knowledge' as mentioned by VSc 9.28.

VSc 4.2 (nineteen sūtras)

From the knowledge of atomic substances (in VSc 4.1), this āhnika takes the reader to the knowledge of dravyas (mahābhūtas) which congregate to form various cosmic 'bodies' (śarīra), the main topic of this sub-chapter. It deals with the 'perception' (pratyakṣa) or 'non-perception' (apratyakṣa) of mahābhūtas, because not all mahābhūtas are graspable. Śarīra forms out of five elements (pañcātmakaṁ), of which only three are perceptible (1). VSc 4.2 offers a picture of the whole of Vaiśeṣika's cosmology: the discussion runs from the atomic mahābhūtas to 'concrete bodies', which are 'composite'. These bodies are of many sorts: according to their substantial composition, of earth, water, and so on (3), according to the 'variety of regions' (anekadeśa), and their atomic composition, to which these belong to (4),[241] according to their own 'specific dharma' (5), their 'particular effect, function' (kārya) (6), which as a result bear a specific 'name'

[238] 'Proximity' (trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27); 'posteriority' (Halbfass, 1992, p. 208).
[239] VS 4.1.12 saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni saṁyoga vibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi / VSc: rūpī'ti viśiṣṭaṁ rūpi ten'opalabdhi yogyena rūpiṇā samavāyād etāni cākṣuṣāṇi sva sāmānya viśeṣebhyaś ca / kutaḥ.
[240] VSc 4.1.13: yasmād rūparahiteṣu mahatsu dravyāntareṣu sthitāni na jñāyante.
[241] VSc: 4.2.3 ātmasaṁyogas tvavipratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām / VSc: ātmaśabdena svarūpaṁ. svarūpeṇapañcānām api bhūtānāṁ parasparasaṁyogo na pratiṣidhyate śarīreṇa ārambhakatvena / pārthive śarīre jalādīni saṁyogīni na samavāyīni / jalādibhir ayonijam eva śarīram ārabhyate varuṇalokādau.

(samākhyā) (7-9).[242] These śarīras are compounded from different types of atoms, which birth composition determines the different regions in which these will dwell (Varuṇaloka for water (3), Aṅgiras' world for fire (7-8); as the Vedas inform, there are also bodies 'not born of womb', such as 'moths' (śalabha)(6), 'the sensorial body of the moon' and 'aqueous body' (9).[243]

VSc 5.1 (eighteen sūtras)

The fifth adhyāya deals largely with 'action' (karma), which is the third Vaiśeṣika's padārtha as mentioned in VSc 1.1.6. In the first āhnika, action is two-fold: caused by effort ('prayatna') (1-12), and not caused by effort (13-18), both of which may, or may not concern ātman.[244] Action is triggered by a certain 'conjunction' (saṃyoga), and there are several kinds of such actions: 'hand-action' (1),[245] 'pestle-action' (musalakarma)(2), 'stroke' (ābhighātā) (3),[246] 'soul-related-action' (6),[247] 'inertia' (gurutva)(7), 'impulse' (nodāna) (8-9),[248] 'throwing up' (udasana) (10),[249] womb-child-action' (dārakakarma)

[242] This refers to the type of birth of bodies: for example bodies not born out of womb, VSc 4.2.7: aṅgārebhyo jāto'ṅgirā ity evamādisamākhyābhāvād manyāmahe santyayonijāni.
[243] VSc 4.2.9: candramā manaso jātaḥ (presumably Rg Veda 10.90) ity ādikāc ca vedaliṅgāt santyayonijāḥ śarīraviśeṣāḥ / evaṁ jalādiśarīram ayonijam eva / pārthivaṁ tu yonijam ayonijaṁ ca.
[244] Ātman being all-pervasive cannot have action, cannot move. Here I am referring to volition (prayatna) which engages the embodied self with the external world.
[245] VS 5.1.1: ātma saṁyoga prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma.
[246] VS 5.1.3: abhighātaje musalakarmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇaṁ hasta saṁyogaḥ / VSc: vegavad dravyasaṁyogo'bhighātaḥ ulūkhalābhighātād utpanne musalasy'otpātanakarmaṇi akāraṇaṁ hastamusalasaṁyogaḥ pūrvaprayatnasyābhighātād vinaṣṭatvāt, 'utpatatu musaladravyam' itīcchāyābhāvāt prayatnāntarasyābhāvaḥ saṁyogasya ca guṇakarmārambhe sāpekṣakāraṇatvāt prayatnarahito hastamusalasaṁyogo na kāraṇam utpatanasya.
[247] VSc 5.1.6: ātmeti śarīraikadeśaḥ, yathā c'aitad apratyayaṁ haste musale ca karma tathaiva hastāvayava saṁyogād hasta gata vegāpekṣād hast'otpatanakāle'vayave tasmin na pratyayaṁ karma jāyate.
[248] VS 5.1.9: prayatnaviśeṣānnodanaviśeṣaḥ / VSc: 'atr'edaṁ kṣipāmi' īti icchāviśeṣajaḥ prayatna utpanno hastāder dravyasya dravyāntareṇa saṁyogaṁ nodanākhyaṁ janayati.
[249] VS 5.1.10: nodana viśeṣād udasana viśeṣaḥ / VSc: dūradeśapreraṇ'ecchāviśiṣṭāt prayatnāj jāto nodanaviśeṣo dūradeśakṣepaṇaṁ karoti.

(11),[250] 'spreading' (visphoṭana) (12), 'falling-during-sleep action' (13),[251] 'grass-action' (tṛṇakarma) (14), 'gem-thief-action' (15),[252] 'arrow-action' (16), and 'saṃskāra-action' (18).[253]

VSc 5.2 (twenty-eight sūtras)

VSc 5.2 contains the soteriological doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, an event that takes place among other cosmological actions such as 'earth-action' (pṛthivyāṁ karma) (1), adṛṣṭa, which the cause of other cosmic actions such as 'earthquake' (2),[254] 'water-action' (3-12),[255] 'crops-action' (4).[256] Other actions are 'fluidity' (dravatva) (5), 'ray-wind action' (nāḍyāvāyusaṃyoga) (6), 'pushing' (nodana) (7), 'water-tree action' (vṛkṣābhisarpaṇa) (8), 'freezing' (saṁghāta) and 'melting' (vilayana) (9), 'sky-water action' (divyāsu) (10), and 'thunder-action' (stanayitnu) (12).[257] Other cosmic actions enumerated are those between 'earth-water-wind' (13), the action of the 'upward flaming of fire', the 'action

[250] VSc 5.1.11: […] tad ātma śarīraika deśa saṁyogāj jīvana pūrvaka pūrvaka prayatnāpekṣād bhavat īti sapratyayam.
[251] It refers to gurutva: VS 5.1.13: prayatnābhāve gurutvāt suptasya patanam / VSc 5. 1. 13: śarīra vidhāraka prayatnābhāve suptasyāṅgānāṁ patanaṁ gurutvād bhavati tadābhisaṁdher abhāvāt.
[252] VS 5.1.15: maṇi gamanaṁ sūcy abhisarpaṇam iti adṛṣṭa kāritāni / VSc: maṇīnāṁ taskaraṁ prati gamanaṁ sūcīnāṁ cā'yaskāntaṁ prati dharmādharma kṛtam ity arthaḥ.
[253] VS 5.1.16: iṣāv ayugapat saṁyogaviśeṣāḥ karmānyatve hetuḥ / VSc: nodanād ādyaṁ karma saṁskārād bahūni karmāṇī'ṣāvutpadyante / ekasmiṁstu karmaṇi prathameṇ'aivākāśa saṁyogena vinaṣṭatvāt karmaṇa uttarasaṁyogavibhāgā n'otpadyeran tasmādiṣāvanekaṁ karma / VS 5.1.17: nodanādādyamiṣoḥ karma karmakāritāc ca saṁskārād uttaraṁ that'ottaram uttaraṁ ca / VSc: jyāśara saṁyogaḥ prayatnāpekṣo jyāgata vegā'pekṣo vā nodanam tata ādyamiṣoḥ karma nodanāpekṣaṁ saṁskāraṁ karoti nirapekṣaṁ tu saṁyogavibhāgau / tataḥ saṁyogād vinaṣṭe karmaṇi nodane vibhāgād vinivṛtte ādyakarmajasaṁskāra uttaramiṣau karma karoti, tath'ottaramuttaraṁ paunaḥpunyenety arthaḥ / VS 5.1.18: saṁskārābhāve gurutvāt patanaṁ / VSc: sparśavaddravyasaṁyogena saṁskāravināśād gurutvaṁ tat patana karma karoti.
[254] VSc 5.2.2: yat khalu viruddha kriyavāyusaṁyogāt sarvasyāḥ pṛthivyāḥ kampādi karma prajānāṁ śubhāśubha sūcanāy'otpadyate tat sarveṣām eva śubhāśubhasūcanād viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭa kāritaṁ.
[255] VS 5.2.3: apāṁ saṁyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam / VSc: vidhāraka vāyvabhrasaṁyogābhāve'pāṁ gurutvāt patana karma bhavati.
[256] VSc 5.2.4: sasyānāṁ smṛddhaye vināśāya vā sarvajanānām adṛṣṭena janitaṁ patanakarma adṛṣṭakāritam ucyate.
[257] VS 5.2.12: apāṁ saṁyogād vibhāgāc ca stanayitnuḥ / VSc: meghā'śaniśabdas stanayitnuḥ / viruddhadikkriyābhyāṁ vāyubhyām apāṁ preryamāṇānāṁ taraṅgabhūtānāṁ parasparābhighātākhyāt saṁyogāc ca śabdaḥ / ekenāpi prakupitena vāyunā vyavacchidyamānānām apāṁ vibhāgāc ca śabdaḥ.

of wind' (obliquely, zigzag), the 'first action of atoms', or the 'first action of mind' (14). On a more metaphysical level, other actions mentioned are 'mind-action' on which yoga focuses on (15-17),[258] 'body-action' (kāyakarmaṇā) (18), actions triggered by adṛṣṭa within works (kārya) like 'eating', 'drinking', 'going away', or 'going near' (19),[259] and realisation of mokṣa (20).[260] After the list of actions (physical and metaphysical), the meaning of 'darkness' (tamas) (21-22),[261] as well as the doctrine of the motionless character of all-pervasive substances like 'space' (diś), 'time' (kāla), 'ether' (ākāśa) and ātman (23-28)[262] are given too. The fifth adhyāya is of a particular importance in understanding the soteriology of ātman, the theory of karma, and saṃsāra. Defined in a chapter on karma, mokṣa is to be read as being brought about at the moment when ātman is separated from all cosmological 'relation' (saṃyoga), which subsequently triggers action ('theory of karma').

[258] VSc 5.2.15-18: to be discussed in the section on Yoga (fifth chapter of thesis). VS 5.2.15: hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātaṁ / VSc: yathātmasaṁyoga prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma, tathātma manaḥ saṁyogāt prayatnān manasaḥ karma / etat sadehasya karma, tatra jāgrata icchādveṣapūrvakāt prayatnāt prabodhakāle tu jīvanapūrvakāt / yataḥ saṁyogoyogaḥ sa ca karmakāryaḥ'ato yogāṅgaṁ karma yogamokṣau ca karmādhikāro'py ucyete / VS 5.2.16: ātm'endriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambhaḥ / VSc: yato hetor ātm'endriya mano'rthasannikarṣo jñānakāraṇatvena sukhaduḥkhe janayatiatastadanārambhaḥ tasya sannikarṣasyā'nārambho'nutpattirucyata iti / tathā hi / VS 5.2.17: ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ / VSc: yadā hy ātmani mano'vasthitaṁ n'endriyeṣu tadā catuṣṭayasannikarṣasyānārambhāt tat kāryayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor abhāvarūpo vidyamānaśarīrasya ātmano vāyunigrahāpekṣa ātmano manasā saṁyogo yogaḥ / yogāṅgaṁ prāṇāyāma karma kiṁ n'oktam / VS 5.2.18: kāya karmaṇātma karma vyākhyātaṁ / VSc: ihā'tmaśabdena vāyuḥ yathātmasaṁyogaprayatnābhyāṁ haste karma tathātmavāyusaṁyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāpāna karma.

[259] VS 5.2.19: apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśita pīta saṁyogaḥ kāryāntara saṁyogāś c'ety adṛṣṭa kāritāni / VSc: maraṇakāle pūrvaśarīrād manaso niḥsaraṇam apasarpaṇam śarīrāntareṇābhisambandho manasa upasarpaṇam, śukraśoṇitāt prabhṛti garbhasthasya mātr'opayuktenānnapānena nāḍyanupraviṣṭena sambandho'śitapītasaṁyogaḥ, kalalārbuda māṁsa peśī ghanaśarīrādibhir ekasminn eva saṁsāre ye saṁbandhāste kāryāntara saṁyogāḥ tānyapasarpaṇādīnyadṛṣṭenaiva kriyante, na prayatnena.

[260] VS 5.2.20: tadabhāve saṁyogābhāvo'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ / VSc: evaṁ rūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādi nimittasyādṛṣṭasyābhāve jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥsaṁyogasyābhāvo'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ.

[261] VS 5.2.21: dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād bhāsābhāvamātraṁ tamaḥ / VSc: vināśitvena nityair dravyair vaidharmyād amūrtatvasparśatva prakāśavirodhair anityadravyair vaidharmyān na dravyaṁ tamaḥ / na ca guṇaḥ karma vā āśrayā'nupalabdheḥ / tasmāt prakāśasyābhāvamātraṁ tamaḥ / kuta etat?

[262] VS 5.2.23: dikkālāvākāśaṁ ca kriyāvadbhyo vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi / VSc: ākāśa kāla diśo 'mūrtāḥ kriyāvataḥ pṛthivyāder amūrtatayā vaidharmyān niṣkriyāḥ, 'ca' śabdādātmā'pi niṣkriyaḥ.

VSc 6.1 (eighteen sūtras)

This adhyāya returns to guṇas of which dharma and its religious-ethical implications represent a chief topic, as the introductory line shows.[263] It is a guṇa with important relevance to both ethical and religious problems as well as the Vaiśeṣika cosmology, and Candrānanda in VSc counts it among the vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 1.1.5; 3.2.17) and guṇas.[264] Dharma is predominantly the subject of both āknikas of the sixth adhyāya. The discussion of Vedas as a 'composition', 'creation' (racanā) by Bhagavān Maheśvara makes it an 'authoritative pramāna' because of the ethical injunctions contained in the Śāstras (1). In this āhnika, three forms of knowledge are distinguished. First, the knowledge of the common people (asmad vijñānaṁ); second, knowledge able to grasp only the present things (vartamānāvyavahita sambandhārtha viṣayaṁ); and third, god's knowledge, which is beyond our sense-organs. The ethics, to which the second āhnika alludes in VSc 6.2.2, are built on the authority of the Vedic texts. Various ethical prescriptions and restrictions are discussed, 'almsgivings' (dadāti) (4), 'accepting' (pratigraha) (5), 'fellowship'[265] (samabhivyāharaḥ) with good Brahmins (8), or restrictions of fellowship with impure Brahmins (9). Further ethical explanations are prescribed with regard to violence (hiṁsā) (10),[266] or 'impure conversation' with non-

[263] Candrānanda agrees with Praśastapāda, by recognising dharma as a guṇa of the self: karmāṇi vyākhyāya guṇā vyākhyāyante / tatra dharma ādau vyākhyāyate / śāstrādau tasy'oddiṣṭatvāt ('having explained the actions, now qualities will be described; here dharma will be explained first, as this is intended by the śāstra'). The orthodoxy of Vaiśeṣika is here proved by its allegiance to the Vedas whose injunctions are a 'means' (sādhana) of soteriolgical knowledge (tasya vaidiko vidhiḥ sādhanaṁ; vedasya satyatā kuta iti cet yataḥ… see VSc 6.1.1)

[264] For the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, see VSc 3.2.17: tasya guṇāḥ buddhi sukhaduḥkh'ecchādveṣa prayatnādṛṣṭa saṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ. Like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda also recognises in adṛṣṭa two vaiśeṣikaguṇas: dharma and adharma VSc 1.1.5.

[265] A literal translation might be 'bringing together', 'companionship', which could include feeding and speaking with the Brahmins.

[266] VS 6.1.10: duṣṭaṁ hiṁsāyāṁ / VSc: parasya hiṁsāyāṁ śārīramānasa duḥkharūpāyāṁ pravṛttaṁ duṣṭaṁ jānīṣva / hiṁsāśabda upalakṣaṇam, yataḥ.

qualified persons (11),[267] prescriptions, or restrictions in relation to purity of 'space', 'time', 'knowledge' and 'behaviour' (13). In addition, there is a moral classification of Brahmins according to their 'moral quality' (viśiṣṭa), and Candrānanda differentiates between hīna ('inferior') (14), sama ('mediocre') (17), and viśiṣṭa ('qualified') (18) types of Brahmins.

VSc 6. 2 (nineteenth sūtras)

The second āhnika is a continuation of the discussion on dharma enunciated in VSc 6.1, and deals with specific types of dharma, mainly drawn from the śruti and smṛti texts, which are prone to lead to abhyudaya. These are of three kinds: 1) performances (prayoga) prescribed, or seen in the Vedas (dṛṣṭa); 2) actions whose 'purpose is mentioned' (dṛṣṭaprayojanāna) in those texts; and 3) actions whose 'purpose is not seen/mentioned' in the sacred texts (dṛṣṭābhāva) (1). Candrānanda discusses, one by one, twelve forms of ritualistic actions which may lead to dharma: abhiṣecana, snāna, upavāsa, brahmacarya, gurukulavāsa, vānaprastha, yajña, dāna, prokṣaṇa, diṅ-niyama, nakṣatra-niyama, mantra-niyama, and kāla-niyama (2).[268] These rituals correspond and differ according to the four 'stages of life' (āśrama); they are also classified two-fold: when performed 'with break' (upadhā) they lead to adharma, when performed 'without

[267] VS 6.1.11: samabhivyāhārato doṣaḥ / VSc: kṛtamahāpātakasya saṁbhāṣaṇamātrād eva doṣeṇa yujyate, kimuta bhojanādinā iha samabhivyāhāraḥ saṁbhāṣaṇaṁ, pūrvatrāśīrvādaḥ.

[268] VS 6.2.2: abhiṣecan'opavāsa brahmacarya gurukulavāsa vānaprasthya yajña dāna prokṣaṇa diṅnakṣatra mantra kāla niyamāś cā'dṛṣṭāya / VSc: viśiṣṭa deśa kālāpekṣeṇāmbhasā yaḥ śarīrasya saṁyogastad abhiṣecanaṁ snānaṁ / naktaṁ dinaṁ vāso niyamapūrvo'nāhāra rūpa upavāsaḥ / brahma śabdenātmā, brahmaṇi caraṇaṁātmamanasor yaḥ saṁyogaḥ stryādiparihārarūpo brahmacaryam / vijñānādyarthino gurūparicaryāparasya tad gṛheṣu vasanaṁ gurukulavāsaḥ / śāstravidhinā gehāniḥsṛtyāraṇyaṁ prasthito vānaprasthaḥ, tasya karma vānaprasthyaṁ / yajñaḥ pākayajñādayaḥ / dānaṁ suvarṇādi dānamabhaya dānaṁ ca / prokṣaṇaṁ sandhy'opāsanādi / diṅniyamādayo'nye viśeṣāḥ / diṅniyamaḥ 'prāṅmukho'nnāni bhuñjīta'/ nakṣatraniyamaḥ 'kṛttikāsvādadhīta' / mantraniyamaḥ 'devasya tv'eti nirvapati' / kālaniyamaḥ 'vasante brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta' / evam etat sarvaṁ dṛṣṭa prayojanatiraskāreṇa prayujyamānaṁ dharmāya sampadyata iti.

break' (anupadhā) they lead to dharma (3). Within their respective categories, explanation of 'defect' in a situation (bhāvadoṣa), for instance 'hypocrisy' (abhisandhi) (4-5), definition of 'purity' (śuci) and 'impurity' (aśuci) (6-8) are also given. The āhnika contains also an objection to the role of 'effort' in ritual performance,[269] to which VSc responds that without 'effort' (prayatna) there is no performance of yoga, and no abhyudaya (10-11).[270] There is a turning point with sūtra 12, where dharma turns out to be conductive to liberation (niḥśreyasa). Though as a vaiśeṣikaguṇa dharma can act as a bondage upon the self, here both VS and VSc describes it as dependent upon a chain of affections, 'pleasure' (sukha), 'passion' (rāga) (12-13; 16), 'satisfaction' (tṛpta) (14)[271] all of which seem to determine a 'particular birth' produced from a 'particular passion' (16). Inclination' (pravṛtti), which might probably be related to 'effort', is produced by 'desire' (icchā) and 'aversion' (dveṣa), and produces subsequently a 'collection' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma (17),[272] which, because of other two guṇas saṃyoga and vibhāga would lead to the emergence of a redundant 'jantu' a process called birth (janmākhya) (18).[273] It seems that the collection of dharma and adharma is triggered by a chain of

[269] The objection is VS 6.2.9: ayatasya śucibhojanād abhyudayo na vidyate yamābhāvāt / VSc: ayatasya viśiṣṭa prayatnarahitasya śucimāhāraṁ yadṛchayo'payuñjānasyābhyudayo nāsti viśiṣṭasyābhisaṁdher abhāvāt.

[270] On the importance of Yoga and soteriology, VS 6.2.10: vidyate cā'narthāntaratvād yamasya / VSc: na prayatnavyatirekī yamaḥ prayatnābhāve sarvasyāḥ kriyāyā abhāvāt vidyate śucimāhāramupayuñjānasya prayatnaḥ / yadi prayatnaḥ pradhānaṁ vināpi yogādinābhyudayaḥ syāt / n'aitat / VS 6.2.11: asati cābhāvāt / VSc: asati yogādyanuṣṭhāne na prayatnamātrasya bhāvād abhyudayaḥ, kriy'opadeśavaiyarthyāt / idānīṁ niḥśreyasa hetuṁ dharmam āha / VS 6.2.12: sukhād rāgaḥ / VSc: stryādiviṣayajanitāt sukhād eva rāgo vardhate.

[271] VS 6.2.13: tanmayatvāt / VSc: yair yair asya sukhahetubhiḥ śarīraṁ bhāvitaṁ tanmaya ivāste / tataptanmayatvād rāgaḥ / kiṁ ca / VS 6.2.14: tṛpteḥ / VSc: yadā tṛpto bhavati tadāsya tṛpti nimitto rāgo bhavati śarīrapuṣṭeḥ / kiṁ ca / VS 6.2.15: adṛṣṭāt / VSc: apūrvadṛṣṭeṣvanupakārakeṣu ca kasyacid rāgo jāyate' atrādṛṣṭa eva kāraṇam / kiṁ ca / VS 6.2.16: jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣaḥ / VSc: yathā tiraścāṁ tṛṇādibhojane evaṁ jātiviśeṣād api rāgaḥ / sukhā'dibhyo rāgaḥ duḥkhā'dibhyo dveṣaḥ / tataḥ /

[272] VS 6.2.17: icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ / VSc: icchāpūrvikā dharme pravṛttiḥ, anyena dhanamadādabhibhūtasya vā dveṣapūrvikāpi grāmakāme'ṣṭy ādau / adharme'pī'cchā pūrvikā paradārādiṣu dveṣa pūrvikā / evaṁ dharmādharmayoḥ sañcayaḥ.

[273] VS 6.2.18: tataḥ saṁyogo vibhāgaś ca / VSc: saṁcitau yadā dharmādharmau bhavataḥ tadā śarīrendriyaiḥ saṁyogo janmākhyo bhavati kṣīnayoś ca tayor maraṇakāle viyogaḥ / punarapyābhyāṁ dharmādharmābhyāṁ śarīrādisaṁyogo vibhāgaś c'ety evam anādir ayaṁ ghaṭīyantravad āvartate jantuḥ / etad viparītakrameṇo'ucyate, tathā hi.

guṇas and vaiśeṣikaguṇas. The last sūtra (19) concludes that mokṣa has been explained, and should further be understood within the discussion of karma and ātman,[274] an obvious reference to VSc 5.2.20.

VSc 7. 1 (thirty-two sūtras)

In the seventh adhyāya the major topic of discussion is guṇa, some of which have already been explained (7.1-3). The first āhnika deals with various guṇas in relation to various mahābhūtas and the question to which it responds is whether guṇas are permanent or not. The impermanent nature of guṇas is determined by nature of mahābhūtas, which can be impermanent too, due to their composite character (4);[275] as guṇas reside in mahābhūtas, their production and dissolution depends on the state of these dravyas-mahābhūtas. Another section of this āhnika deals with the nature of guṇas like 'colour', 'taste', 'smell' and 'touch' in the dravya-mahābhūta 'earth'. Sparśa is not permanent because its support (āśraya) is not permanent either (4). The impermanence of 'earth' (pṛthivī), refers to the composite state of earth (compounded by paramāṇus), and the state of an earthly product, like the pot (ghaṭa) which is prone to 'destruction' (vināśa). In the second part however, (6-18) the question of permanence and impermanence of qualities is shifted towards atoms (paramāṇu). The nature of qualities like colour, taste, and touch is discussed in relation to substances like 'water', 'fire', and 'air' (7-8); when discussing the mahābhūtas 'water', 'fire', and 'wind', Candrānanda looks at the state of their atomic composition (8-10).[276] Thakur (2003), whose synopsis I have consulted for

[274] VS 6.2.19: ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ / VSc: ātm'eti manaḥ, manaḥkarmasu 'tadabhāve saṁyogābhāvo'prādurbhāvaś ca sa mokṣa' iti mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ.
[275] Candrānanda quotes the sūtra 1.1.15 as one which elucidates the relationship between dravya and karma. If the ordering of the Sūtras was correctly made by Baroda 1961 edition, here Candrānanda must refer in fact to 1.1.16 (karmalakṣaṇa) not 1.1.15 (guṇalakṣaṇa).
[276] On atoms: VSc 7.1.6-10; 15-18; 26.

this āhnika, classifies 9-13 as dealing with the 'origination of the first five qualities'. Qualities are born of heating, hence they are not co-eternal with substances, because substances pre-exist the qualities (12).[277] The question of 'permanence' (nitya) seems to be coeval with 'understanding' (anupalabdhi) of dimension (15-31). 'Eternal' (nitya) is whatever is 'atomic' (aṇu) or 'gross'/'large' (mahat) (15).[278] Universal concepts like 'magnitude' (mahattva) and 'smallness' (aṇuttva) are also considered (21-23). 'Knowledge' (vidya) is defined as whatever exists (sambhāva), whereas 'ignorance' (avidya) is defined in terms of 'non-existence' (asambhāva) (27).[279] The third part, finally (28-32), deals with the dimension of various substances such as ākāśa, which is of an 'extreme greatness' (paramamahattva) (28), and more importantly that of soul, which is 'exceedingly big' (paramahān) (29).[280] Manas is atomic and Candrānanda defines its function as non-simultaneous, thus sequential (30).[281] Time too is 'all-pervasive' (vibhu) (32).

VSc 7. 2 (thirty-one sūtras)

In this āknika, four sections can be distinguished: The first part is orientated towards analysing further guṇas such as pṛthaktva (1-14). In order to explain it, both VS and VSc put forward a discussion of other 'conceptual categories': 'oneness' (ekatva) (1), 'smallness' (aṇuttva) and 'grossness' (mahattva) (4), saṃyoga (10) and vibhāga (11-12),

[277] This doctrine is important because ātman in its liberated state is divested from its own vaiśeṣikaguṇas.
[278] Atom is eternal because is circular (parimaṇḍalya) (VSc 7.1.26)
[279] This could raise the question whether for the Vaiśeṣikas, vidyā is the science of everything which so daringly both Vyomaśiva's Vyomavati p. 47, and Kir GOS, p. 148, put forward.
[280] VS 7.1.28: vibhavād mahānākāśaḥ / VSc: vibhavād mūrtadravyaiḥ samāgatair gacchataḥ saṁyogāt paramamahattvam ākāśasyāsti iti gamyate / VS 7.1.29: tathātmā / VSc: ākāśam ivātmāpi paramamahān draṣṭavyaḥ / asamāsau dikkālāvapi mahāntau.
[281] VSc 7.1.30: vibhavasyābhāvād manaso'ṇutvaṁ jñānāyaugapadyāc ca. By 'sequential', I refer to the mind process as taking place in a chain of causation. Being atomic, the mind must receive each time, from the senses, new information, but in order, not simultaneously.

which are explained in juxtaposition to further characteristics as 'small' and 'gross' (12).[282] The second part (15-24) is epistemological. Though śabda is not listed among the seventeen guṇas (VS 1.1.5), in Vaiśeṣika's theory of language it is disconnected from 'meaning' (artha) (19).[283] This section presents and rejects some opposing views,[284] and supplies Vaiśeṣika's theory of semantics according to which meaning is established by 'mutual agreement' (sāmayika) (24). Other qualities discussed are 'priority' (paratva) and 'posteriority' (aparatva) (21-24), which have both a temporal and spatial connotation (25-27). The third part (29-31), shifts back to a discussion of another category: 'inherence' (samavāya) (29),[285] a padārtha with which Candrānanda explains how guṇas are inherent in dravyas (e.g. cloth inherent in threads). The āhnika ends by discussing the ontological concepts of 'existence' (bhāva) (30), and 'suchness'(tattva) (31).[286]

[282] VS 7.2.12: saṁyogavibhāgayoḥ saṁyogavibhāgā'bhāvo'ṇutvamahattvābhyāṁ vyākhyātaḥ / VSc: yutasiddhyabhāvān n'aitau sta ity arthaḥ / VS 7.2.13: karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ / VSc: yutasiddhyabhāvān na saṁyoga vibhāgavanta ity arthaḥ / VS 7.2.14: yutasiddhyabhāvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ saṁyogavibhāgau na vidyete / VSc: kāryakāraṇayoḥ paraspareṇa saṁyogavibhāgau na vidyete yathā ghaṭakapālayoḥ, yutasiddhyabhāvāt / yutasiddhirdvayor anyatarasya vā pṛtag gatimattvam sā ca nityayoḥ yutāśrayasamavetatvaṁ cānityayoḥ yathā ghaṭapaṭayoḥ tvagindriyapārthivaśarīrayoś ca / na ca ghaṭakapālayoḥ yutāśrayasamavāyaḥ ghaṭasya teṣveva samavetatvāt.

[283] VS 7.2.15: guṇatvāt / VSc: ākāśasya guṇatvāc ca śabdo nārthena saṁbadhyate / VS 7.2.16: guṇe ca bhāṣyate / VSc: guṇe ca rūpaṁ rasa ity ādiṣu prayujyate kriyāyāṁ ca, na ca guṇakarmaṇāṁ guṇaiḥ saṁbandhaḥ / VS 7.2.17: niṣkriyatvāt / VSc: arthasaṁyoge sati śabdo'rthaṁ prāpnuyāt niṣkriyatvāc ca guṇasya gamanābhāvaḥ / VS 7.2.18: asati nāstīti ca prayogāt / VSc: arthasaṁyoge sati śabdaḥ 'asati' abhāve 'nāsti' īti na prayujyeta / na hyasatā saṁyogaḥ / tasmāt saṁyogasyābhāvāt / VS 7.2.19 śabdārthāv asaṁbaddhau / VSc: nanu ca.

[284] VS 7.2.20: saṁyogino daṇḍāt samavāyino viṣāṇāc ca / VSc 7.2.20: saṁyogisamavāyibhyāṁ daṇḍaviṣāṇābhyāṁ daṇḍiviṣāṇinoḥ pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ / asti ca śabdādartha pratyayaḥ, tasmād asyāpi sambandho'stīti / n'aitat.

[285] VS 7.2.29: ih'eti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ / VSc: guṇādayaḥ samavāyino dravya / ataḥ samavāyaṁ kathayati ih'eti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ pratyaya utpadyate 'iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ' iha ghaṭe rūpādayaḥ, iha ghaṭe karma' iti samavāyaḥ / kārya kāraṇa grahaṇasy'opalakṣaṇatvāt 'jāter vyaktau viśeṣāṇāṁ ca nitya dravyeṣu samavāya' ity uktaṁ bhavati.

[286] VS 7.2.30: dravyatvaguṇatva karmatva pratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ / VSc: yath'aika dravyavattvān na dravyaṁ bhāvo guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇa evaṁ samavāyo'pi / VS 7.2.31: tattvaṁ c'eti / VSc: yathā salliṅgāviśeṣādeko bhāvastathā 'iha' liṅgāviśeṣādekaḥ samavāyo vṛtti rahito nityo niravayavaś c'eti.

VSc 8 (seventeenth sūtras)[287]

The eighth, ninth and tenth adhyāya deal with Vaiśeṣika's epistemology. Since 'knowledge' (buddhi; jñāna), is a cognitive faculty, a guṇa (as per VS 1.1.5), its nature is impermanent, as it is caused by substances, such as ātman and manas (2). This āknika presents the Vaiśeṣika's theory of knowledge (or perception) which is explained primarily in relation to the substances, an aspect that shows the capital role of dravyas in the ontological and epistemological structure of the system (1).[288] As Nozawa describes, this āhnika has a three-fold structure. The first part (1-3) is an introduction dealing with knowledge, which Candrānanda says, is produced from a 'contact' (sannikarṣa) between dravyas (1-2),[289] yet not in relation to guṇas, which are not in contact with the sense-organs, therefore perceptually not knowable (3).[290] Buddhi here refers to that form of 'perceptual knowledge' (as in VS 3.1.13) which engages both manas and ātman, being as they were causes for the production of knowledge (2).[291] The second part (4-13) deals with the objects of perception, namely the first three padārthas: dravya, guṇa, and karma. Candrānanda distinguishes between 'dravya padārtha' as knowable through a direct contact with the sense-organs, and guṇa and karma padārthas, which are known through samavāya ('inherence' with the conjunct, which is dravya)

[287] A presentation of the eight adhyāya, see Nozawa's article 1993a.

[288] Preceding line: buddhir idānīṁ nirūpyate / VS 8.1: dravyeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam / VSc: ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ madhyād dravyeṣv eva jñānaṁ vyākhyātaṁ, yath'otpadyate sannikarṣāt, na tu guṇādiṣu / tasya

[289] VS 8.2: mana ātmā ca / VSc: mana ātmā ca jñānasya kāraṇaṁ vyākhyātam / idānīṁ guṇādiṣu jñānam āha; (On four-fold contact that produces perceptual knowledge, see also VSc 3.1.13).

[290] VS 8.3: jñānanirdeśe jñāna niṣpattiruktā / VSc: yataḥ indriyasannikarṣeṇa jñāna niṣpattiruktā guṇādīnāṁ c'endriyeṇa sannikarṣo nāsti ityatastvidānīṁ jñānam ucyate.

[291] VS 8.1: dravyeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam / VSc: ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ madhyād dravyeṣv eva jñānaṁ vyākhyātaṁ yath'otpadyate sannikarṣāt, na tu guṇādiṣu / tasya / VS 8.2: mana ātmā ca / VSc: mana ātmā ca jñānasya kāraṇaṁ vyākhyātam / idānīṁ guṇādiṣu jñānam āha / VS 8.3: jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā / VSc: yataḥ indriyasannikarṣeṇa jñānaniṣpattir uktā, guṇādīnāṁ c'endriyeṇa sannikarṣo nāsti ity atastvidānīṁ jñānam ucyate teṣām asannikarṣe vijñānaṁ yataḥ.

(4).[292] It seems that knowledge of 'dravya padārtha' is the basis on which the whole edifice of 'theory of perception', or 'knowledge' is based.[293] Such epistemological discussion extends over other padārthas as well: 'generality' (sāmānya), which does not possess another generality; and 'specificity' (viśeṣa) which does not possess its own specificity (5). It is only dravya (tata eva), that which has 'generality' and 'specificity'. The knowledge of the three basic categories depends (āpekṣate) on another two categories: sāmānya and viśeṣa (6). The knowledge of the three categories dravya, guṇa, and karma, seems to depend on the knowledge of dravya (7). Thus, dravya is the foundation of Vaiśeṣika ontology, even though the Vṛtti mentions that there is no rule that dravya category 'should be first' (8).[294] 'Inherence' (samavāya) is defined in comparison to cause and effect, and in relation to 'specifier' (viśeṣaṇa) and 'specified' (viśeṣya) (9). Between dravyas and between the first categories, there is no cause-effect relationship (10-11). In the same context manas is described as atomic (aṇutva) and therefore, the chain of thought would be a line of minute details being produced 'in sequence' (jñānānāṁ krameṇāpi). The example given is the phrase 'gauḥ śuklā gacchatī', where cow is a dravya, 'śuklā' is a guṇa and 'gacchatī' is a karma; although they are produced in sequence, Candrānanda says that there is no cause-effect epistemological relationship between them (11).[295] Other examples are given to explain the various relations between 'near things' (sannikṛṣṭa) and 'distant things' (viprakṛṣṭa) (12), or between 'seen things' (loc. dṛṣṭeṣu) and 'unseen things' (loc. adṛṣṭeṣu) (13). The third part of this adhyāya

[292] VSc 8.4: …tasmād guṇakarmasu saṁyukta samavāyāt jñānaṁ

[293] Nozawa, 1993a, p. 1155.

[294] VS 8.8: guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇa karmāpekṣaṁ na vidyate / VSc: guṇe guṇakarmmaṇorabhāvāt karmaṇi ca guṇakarmanimittaṁ guṇakarmasu jñānaṁ na bhavat īti / dravyādau jñānasya pūrv'otpattāv aniyamaḥ.

[295] VS 8.11: tathā dravyaguṇakarmasu kāraṇāviśeṣāt / VSc: gauḥ śuklā gacchatī īti ca dravyaguṇakarmasu jñānānāṁ krameṇāpi jāyamānānāṁ na kāryakāraṇabhāvo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatābhāvād ity asya pūrv'oktasya kāraṇasyāviśeṣāt / ato dravyajñānaṁ na guṇakarmabuddhyoḥ kāraṇaṁ guṇakarmabuddhī api na parasya kāraṇaṁ.

(14-17) deals with sense-organs (artha). These are proved in a 'consequential manner': for example, each of the sense-objects corresponds to a sense-organ, which subsequently corresponds to the five mahābhūtas, out of which an object is produced. The sense-organs have a 'fixed function' (pratiniyata) in accordance to the specific elements (15).[296] An example is given in the sūtra 16 where earth is connected with smell and nose, through inherence;[297] and also in sūtra 17 where there is a relationship between form, touch, and colour which correspond to substances like water, lustre, and wind.

VSc 9 (twenty-eight sūtras)[298]

The subject of inquiry in this adhyāya is 'inference' (anumāna). I shall classify this āhnika in three sections. The first part inquires into the nature of reality (1-12). Asatkāryavāda doctrine comes into the first sūtra and its gloss. 'Sat' ('real') is not extant prior to its actual production (prāg utpatter asat) because there is no 'function' (kriyā), 'quality' (guṇa) and 'designation' vyapadeśa (1). 'Sat' ('real') refers to an effect that came into being 'sadbhūta' (2), and it is defined by comparison with 'asat' (non-real); the difference between them being that, 'sat' has kriyā, guṇa, and vyapadeśa, whereas 'asat' does not (3).[299] In the continuation of this, 'asat' ('non-real') is also defined (4-10). It is with the help of logical and epistemological reasoning that the 'non-real' is proved: these refer to

[296] VSc 8.15: … evam indriyāṇyapi pratiniyatabhūtakāryāṇi.

[297] VS 8.16: bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne / VSc: gandhajñānaṁ ghrāṇaṁ tasmin nārabdhavye pṛthivī kāraṇaṁ bhūyastvāt śarīrāpekṣayā tu bhūyastvaṁ / bhūyastvaṁ ca ghrāṇe pṛthivyāḥ pādādināgandh'opalabdhyabhāvāt / gandhavattvāc ca yataś ca svasamavāyinā gandhena ghrāṇ'endriyaṁ gandham abhivyanaktyatastasya gandhavatī pṛthivy eva kāraṇam bhūtāntarāṇi tu saṁyogīni svalpāny eva.

[298] For a translation of VSc 9.1-12, see Halbfass, 1992, pp. 242-46.

[299] VS 9.2: sad asat / VSc: sadbhūtaṁ ca kāryaṁ pradhvastam uttarakālam asad eva, na satastirodhānaṁ kriyāguṇa vyapadeśābhāvād eva / madhye tu / VS 9.3: asataḥ sat kriyāguṇavyapadeś[ā]bhāvād arthāntaraṁ / VSc: pradhvaṁsāt pūrvamutpatter uttarakālamasato 'rthāntarabhūtaṁ vastu 'sat' ity ucyate kriyāguṇavyapadeśānāṁ bhāvāt.

'differentiation' (5), to absence of the perception of a past thing (6),[300] negative terms like 'āghaṭa', 'ago', 'adharma' (7), absence of different meaning (9), special and temporal entities (10), universality (11) or logics (12).[301] In the second part of the ninth adhyāya, we have yogipratyakṣa (13-17), a superior form of 'yogic perception' produced out of a specific contact (saṃyogaviśeṣa) between manas and ātman (13).[302] Like ātman, other dravyas are proved through such type of contact (14), but categories like guṇa and karma are known through inherence (16). The third and last part (18-28) deals with various forms of knowledge. 'Laiṅgika' form of knowledge (18),[303] 'testimony' (śabda) (19).[304] 'Reason' (hetu), 'pretext' (anapadeśa), 'mark' (liṅga), and 'efficient cause' (nimitta), are considered synonymous (20-21). The production of 'remembrance' (smṛti) is caused by saṃskāra, and a 'particular relation' between manas, and ātman (22).[305] Similar causes

[300] VS 9.6: asaditi bhūtapratyakṣābhāvād bhūtasmṛtevirodhi pratyakṣatvāc ca jñānaṁ.

[301] VS 9.12: sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na / VSc: sattvāsattvayor yugapad viruddhatvān na sadasat kāryaṁ kāraṇe / tasmād asad eva.

[302] Preceding line of VS 9.13: pratyakṣaparokṣaviṣayatvād yogipratyakṣaṁ pratyakṣānumānayor madhye vyākhyāyate / VS 9.13: ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṁyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam / VSc: āhṛtya viṣayebhya indriyāṇi tebhyaś ca mana ātmany eva yadā samādhīyate tadā yogajadharmāpekṣādātmāntaḥ karaṇasaṁyogād viśiṣṭāt tatra bhavatāṁ svasmin na ātmani jñānaṁ pratyakṣam utpadyate / VS 9.14: tathā dravyāntareṣu / VSc: pratiṣiddhātmasaṁyogeṣu vyāpakadravyeṣvātmanā saṁyukteṣu apratiṣiddhātmasaṁyogeṣu ca paramāṇvādiṣu ubhābhyāṁ saṁyukteṣu jñānam utpadyate / kiṁ ca / VS: 9.15: ātm'endriya mano'rthasannikarṣāc ca / VSc: sūkṣma vyavahita viprakṛṣṭeṣu artheṣu teṣāṁ catuṣṭayasannikarṣād api pratyakṣaṁ jāyate / tathā'smadādipratyakṣeṣu / VS 9.16: tat samavāyāt karmaguṇeṣu / yathā'ntaḥ karaṇa saṁyogād dravyā'ntareṣu jñānam utpadyate tath'aiva tad dravya samaveteṣu karma guṇeṣu jñānam utpadyate / yathā ca catuṣṭaya sannikarṣāt sūkṣmā'diṣvasmat pratyakṣeṣu ca jñānaṁ tath'aiva tatsamaveteṣu guṇakarmasu jñānam utpadyate saṁyukta samavāyāt / VS 9.17: ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu / yathātmamanaḥ saṁyogāt svasmin na ātmani ca vijñānaṁ that'aiva tat svātmasamaveteṣu sukhā'diṣu jñānam utpadyate / yogipratyakṣaṁ vyākhyāya anumānaṁ vyācaṣṭe.

[303] VS 9.18: asy'edaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇam sambandhy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam / VSc: asy'edam iti sambandhamātraṁ darśayitvā 'kāryaṁ kāraṇam' ityādinā viśinaṣṭi / 'kārya kāraṇa' grahaṇena samavāyimātr'opalakṣaṇājjātyāder api grahaṇaṁ, 'sambandha' śabdena saṁyogino grahaṇam dhūmā'deḥ / anyad vyākhyātaṁ saṁyogyādisūtre / tatra 'evaṁ vidhaprasiddha saṁbandhaḥsyairthakadeśam asandigdhaṁ paśyataḥ śeṣānuvyavasāyo yaḥ sa liṅga darśanāt saṁjāyamāno laiṅgikam' iti vṛttikāraḥ.

[304] VS 9.19: etena śābdaṁ vyākhyātaṁ / VSc: yathā kāryādi smṛti savyapekṣam anumānaṁ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārthaṁ ca tathaiva śābdaṁ saṁketa smṛty apekṣaṁ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyā'rthaṁ ca / ato'numānen'aikayogakṣematvādanumānamev'ety uktaṁ bhavati.

[305] VS 9.22: ātma manasoḥ saṁyoga viśeṣāt saṁskārāc ca smṛtiḥ / VSc: agnyarthino dhūmadarśanaṁ yad utpannaṁ tad apekṣād ātmāntaḥ karaṇa saṁyogād viśiṣṭāc ca bhāvanākhya saṁskārād 'yatra dhūmas, tatrāgnir' iti smṛtir utpadyate.

produce 'dream' (svapna), and 'subconscious' (svapnāntika) (22-23).[306] It seems that a 'specific dharma' plays a role in dream functions (24).[307] 'Ignorance' (avidya) and 'impure knowledge' (duṣṭa jñāna) can arise because of certain 'impurities' (doṣa) in the embodied ātman, and because of an 'influence' (saṃskāra) (25-26).[308] The opposite of it is the 'pure knowledge' (aduṣṭa vidya) (27),[309] on which Candrānanda sadly does not expand; he only says that it is of two forms (pratyakṣa and anumāna). He nevertheless discusses two unusual forms of knowledge, ārṣa, and siddhadarśana, both produced from a 'particular dharma' (28).[310]

VSc 10 (twenty-one sūtras)

The last adhyāya continues to deal with the system's epistemology, and though an eclectic chapter, here I attempt a classification of it. The first part (1-3) deals with a series of binary guṇas such as sukha and duḥkha which inhere in ātman (1);[311] sukha and

306 VS 9.23: tathā svapnaḥ svapnāntikaṁ ca / VSc: uparat'endriyasya pralīna manaskasyāntaḥ karaṇen'aiva jñānaṁ svapnaḥ, svapne'pi svapnajñānaṁ svapnāntikaṁ, tad ubhayaṁ pūrvapratyayāpekṣād ātmamanaḥ saṁyogaviśeṣād bhāvanāsahāyāt utpadyate.

307 VS 9.24: dharmāc ca / VSc: ananubhūtārthaviṣayam api svapnajñānaṁ śubhāśubhasūcakaṁ dharmāt ca śabdādadharmāc c'eti / jāgratas tu.

308 VS 9.25: indriyadoṣāt saṁskārāc cā'vidyā / VSc: vātādidoṣeṇ'opahat'endriyasya pūrvarajatānubhavajanitāt saṁskārād ātmamanaḥ saṁyogāc ca viśiṣṭādadharmāpekṣād tasmiṁs 'tad' iti jñānaṁ yathā śuktikāyāṁ 'rajatam' iti / anadhyavasāyo yathā dākṣiṇātyasy'oṣṭradarśane / VS 9.26: tad duṣṭa jñānaṁ / VSc: yad etat saṁśayaviparyayā'nadhyavasāyasvapnalakṣaṇaṁ, tad duṣṭamapramāṇam iti.

309 VS 9.27: aduṣṭaṁ vidyā / VSc: yad aduṣṭaṁ pratyakṣā'numānā'khyaṁ, tad 'vidy' ety ucyate.

310 VS 9.28: ārṣaṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca dharmebhyaḥ / VSc: tatra yalliṅga nirapekṣam atītānāgata vartamāneṣu dharmādiṣv atīndriyeṣu granthair anupātteṣu devarṣīṇāṁ yat prātibham utpadyate vijñānaṁ laukikānāṁ kadā cid eva 'śvo me bhrātā āgantā, hṛdayaṁ me kathayatī' ity anavadhāraṇa phalaṁ kevalaṁ tarkeṇa nīyate tad ārṣam ity ucyate / añjana rasāyanādisiddhānāṁ tu sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṁ yadvādivyāntarikṣādi nimittebhyaḥ prāṇināṁ dharmādharma vipākaparijñānaṁ tat siddhadarśanaṁ / tac ca pratyakṣānumānābhyāṁ na bhidyate, ārṣaṁ bhidyata iti varṇayanti / tad etad ārṣaṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca viśiṣṭād dharmād ātma manaḥ saṁyogāc c'otpadyate.

311 VS 10.1: ātma samavāyaḥ sukha duḥkhayoḥ pañcabhyo'rthāntaratve hetus tad āśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyaḥ / VSc: ātmany eva yaḥ samavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayor asau pañcabhyaḥ kṣityādibhyastadāśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyo gandha rasa rūpa sparśebhyo arthāntaratve hetuḥ anya guṇānām anyatrāsamavāyāt / ātmasamavāyaś c'aitayor ahaṁkāreṇ'aika vākyabhāvāt.

duḥkha relate to aniṣṭa ('desired') and aniṣṭa (undesired) things (2).[312] There is also an elucidation of the difference between 'doubt' (saṁśaya) and 'conclusion' (nirṇaya) (3-4).[313] The second part takes up the discussion of pratyakṣa explained through various types of argument; buddhi (an equivalent term for pratyakṣa) is explained as being produced through cause-effect relationship, or between a 'specifier' (viśeṣaṇa), and a 'specified' (viśeṣya) (5-6), or between 'dependence' (sāpekṣa), and 'non-dependence' (anāpekṣa) (7),[314] or explained through the concept of 'destruction' (vināśa) of body limbs, a section relevant to body, and eschatology (8-10).[315] Buddhi is also proved in relation to inherence and contact (12-18). Finally the third part concludes with the restatement of soteriology, based on several assumptions already discussed in previous adhyāyas. 1) The inferential type of knowledge (laiṅgika pramāṇa) by means of which inference has been explained (19).[316] 2) The Vedic prescriptions, 'seen' or 'unseen', in

[312] Though Candrānanda does not mention aniṣṭa in its gloss, we may assume that aniṣṭa refers to duḥkha. VS 10.2: iṣṭāniṣṭa kāraṇa viśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ sukhaduḥkhayor arthāntara bhāvaḥ / VSc: stryādikāraṇajanyaṁ sukhaṁ / viṣā'dikāraṇajanyaṁ duḥkhaṁ / parasparaviruddhe ca sukhaduḥkhe, anyo'nyavināśen'otpatteḥ / ato anayoḥ bhedaḥ n' aikatvam ekā'rtha samavāyāt.

[313] VS 10.4: tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa laiṅgikābhyāṁ jñānābhyāṁ vyākhyātā / VSc: yatha smṛtimata ātmānaḥ pratyakṣam liṅgāṁ dṛṣṭā aprataykṣe jñānaṁ utpadyate that'aiva sāmānyamātradarśanāt smṛtimato viśeṣaṁ jijñāsor agṛīte viśeṣe 'sthāṇuḥ puruṣo va' iti jāyate saṁśayaḥ / yathā ca bhūtārthasaṁbandhavaśenā 'ayam evaṁbhūto'rtha' iti pratyakṣam utpadyate that'aiva viśeṣasambandhavaśenā nivṛtte saṁśaye 'idam evaṁbhūtam' iti nirṇayo jāyate.

[314] The simile used by Candrānanda is the 'threads' (tantu) which symbolise their interdependence form each other in a piece of cloth; the simile is used to express also the relations of precedence and successiveness (VS 10.7: tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo 'napekṣebhyaś ca / VSc: …yathā cotpattau evaṁ vināśe'pi prayatnānantar'otpattīnāṁ ghaṭādidravyāṇāṁ vināśa 'abhūt' iti pratyayasya 'bhūtapratyakṣābhāvāt' (VS 9.6) ity ādinā kathitatvāt. idānīṁ pāriṇāmike śarīrādau kathyate. tatra vinaṣṭe.)

[315] VS 10.8: abhūdityabhūtāt / VSc: abhūtād vinaṣṭād ity arthaḥ. / pāṇipādagrīvādīnavayavān vibhaktānupalabhya vinaṣṭādasamavāyikāraṇāt saṁyogad vinaṣṭe kārye 'abhūt kāryaṁ śarīrākhyam' iti jāyate buddhiḥ / vinaśyati punaḥ / VS 10.9: sati ca kāryāsamavāyāt / VSc: sati saṁyoge ca śabdād asati ghātakādi vināśakāraṇa vyāpāre'pi keṣāṁcid grīvādyavayavānāma nivṛtte saṁyoge vibhāgāc ca pāṇyādīnāṁ vinivṛtte kāryasya śarīrāderasamavāyād vināśakāraṇāghrātatvena pracalitatvād vinaṣṭāvinaṣṭa saṁyogālocanena 'kāryaṁ naśyati' iti jñānaṁ utpadyate / anye tu 'abhūt kāryam' iti vyācakṣate, tadayuktaṁ tadabhiprāyeṇaiva kāryasya vinaṣṭatvāt / eṣā ca buddhiḥ / VS 10.10: ekārtha samavāyiṣu kāraṇāntareṣu darśanād ekadeśa ity ekasmin / VSc: śarīrādau kvacid ekasmin na arthe pāṇyādayo'vayavāḥ samavāyina upalabdhāḥ athāsyasya teṣu ekadeśabuddhir utpannā idānīṁ tad vibhajya vibhaktānupalabhya etasminn ekadeśiny 'abhūt kāryam' iti jñān'otpattiḥ.

[316] VS 10.19: laiṅgikaṁ pramāṇaṁ vyākhyātam / VSc: laiṅgikaṁ paro'kṣam ucyate, 'bhaviṣyatī' ity ādi kāryāṇāṁ yenāvagamyate tad anumānaṁ vyākhyātaṁ.

the āmnāya texts (20),[317] and 3) a restatement of Vaiśeṣika theism, with at least 'four stages' by which niḥśreyasa can be realised (21).[318] For a more simplified synopsis of all adhyāya in both VSc and VS, I present here with an alternative thematic table which I hopewill be of more use.

Table 4. Major Subjects in VSc

Ontology	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Psychology	Ethics	Physics
1.1	7.1	4.1	3.1	6.1	5.1
1.2	7.2	4.2	3.2	6.2	5.2
2.1		8			
2.2		9			
		10			

2.4. AUTHOR & DATE OF VSC

About the author of VSc, we know very little.[319] From the internal evidence, like that given by the colophon of VSc, we know the name of the author which is Candrānanda, and the etymology of his name designates the emphasis on knowledge of his doctrine. 'Candra', whose masculine noun designates 'moon', while its adjectival form means 'glittering', 'shining', must illustrate the gnostic and philosophical allegiance of the author, as 'moon' in the Indian thought represents the 'mind'.[320] The simile used here resembles the author's name with moon, whose name Candrānanda bears. A somehow

[317] VSc 10.20: śrutau smṛtau ca dṛṣṭānām dṛṣṭasya prayojanasyābhāve prayogo'bhyudayāya dharmāy'ety arthaḥ / tasya cāmnāyāt samādhigama uktaḥ / āmnāyasya ca siddhaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ.

[318] VS 10.21: tad vacanādāmnāya prāmāṇyam iti / VSc: tanubhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ tatpraṇayanāc cāmnāyasya siddhaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ / 'iti' śabdaḥ samāptyarthaḥ / evaṁ dravyādīnāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñānād vairāgyadvarenajñān'otpatteḥ 'ātmā jñātavya' ity ādi vākyebhyaś c'opāsākrameṇa vijñānāvāpter niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.

[319] I have little to add on Candrānanda as author; yet, differently from Isaacson's conjectures (PhD 1995), here I aim to discuss only the colophon and the probable location of VSc composition.

[320] Grimes, dict. p. 102. It also represents 'that subtle structure within the body that oozes the nectar of immortality'.

problematic translation could mean that knowledge comes from the author himself, and spreads over the cosmos, as the moon acts as clearing out the darkness in the night. It is not a knowledge that comes as an inspiration from cosmos (like revelation in Christianity), but quite the contrary, it is the author himself who is being praised as the bestower of this cosmic and cosmological knowledge (Vaiśeṣika system).

Colophon: jagato'[321]syānandakaraṁ vidyāsarvayāḥ[322] sad'aiva yaś candram /
āndayati sa vṛttiṁ candrānando vyadhāt[323] etāṁ.[324]

Gloss: like the moon produces bliss always in the night of knowledge /
Candrānanda composed this vṛtti to delight the moon.

The New Catalogus Catalogorum gives information of a certain Candrānanda 'writer on medicine and medical lexicography', and 'son of Ravinandana, and grandson of Mahānandana, whom, according to the genealogy of Dhallaṇa, was originally from Kaśmīr.[325] Regarding the location of his activity, Isaacson states that the indications we have (Śārāda script MS, and Abhinavagupta's reference to Candrānanda)[326] point clearly to Kaśmir, though as he says, his remarks are 'not conclusive'.[327] Although, I have no objection to the location and the date of Candrānanda postulated by Isaacson, I do have few reservations regarding Isaacson's 'impression' of Candrānanda's commentary as

[321] jagato: all; jāgato Jac
[322] The older MS (siglum 'P' or 'J'), however, reads 'vidyāsarvayāḥ' for which I have opted here; Baroda MS (siglum 'O' or 'Ś') reads 'vidyāyāḥ sarvathā'. VSc 1961 provides 'vidyāśarvaryāḥ' which might complicate the reading; but Ruzsa, who used 1982 ed. makes a conjecture with 'vidyāsavayāḥ' (metre, requires āryā).
[323] etāṁ: J; kaścit Ś
[324] etāṁ: J; kaścit Ś
[325] NCC, 1971, vol. 6, pp. 355-6.
[326] Isaacson 1995, p. 141, (via Shah, 1957, 7) refers to Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarshinī of Utpaladeva with commentary by Abhinavagupta.
[327] Isaacson, 1995, p. 141.

being 'deeply influenced by Praśastapāda', not least because his assertions are grounded on secondary literature (e.g. Nozawa), rather than a direct comparative reading with PD.[328] Indeed, a certain doctrinal relationship with Praśastapāda has been often too much emphasised by scholars, such as Nozawa, who in his translation of the first two adhyāyas provides extensive comparative footnotes with PD, and later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, through the lenses of which Candrānanda is read. The case I make, however, is that though Candrānanda might have been contemporary with Praśastapāda, he does present an older and more traditional view on Vaiśeṣika doctrine, for the following reasons. 1) The number of vaiśeṣikaguṇas in VSc is smaller (nine) than in PD (sixteen). 2) The role of god is not so extensively emphasised in the cosmogony and eschatology of Vaiśeṣika; Candrānanda for instance, ascribes adṛṣṭa as the cause for the formation of the world, the gloss VSc 5.2.14 does not mention about god as manipulating adṛṣṭa; though it is true, both VSc 1.1.3 and VSc 10.21 acknowledge Bhagavān Īśvara as the creator of cosmos. 3) The religious affiliation of Candrānanda is Brahmanic, not explicitly Śaivist, whereas Praśastapāda is Śaivist; this may confirm the existence of various schools in Vaiśeṣika, in the second half of the first millennium. 4) Candrānanda provides definitely an older version of Sūtrapāṭha, and of the system than Praśastapāda. The hypothesis which we can launch is that, even if Candrānanda may not have been earlier than Praśastapāda, it is beyond doubt that his brevity and more conservative exegesis is older and more reliable than the Praśastapāda's innovative approach. As for the date of VSc, Aklujkar has dated VSc between the seventh and tenth century AD. The 'terminus post quem' for Candrānanda is 600 AD, on the grounds of a reference he makes in VSc 3.2.4, to Uddyotakara's Vārttika. The 'terminus ante quem' is the tenth

[328] Isaacson, 1995, f. 7 on p. 141, who relies here on the reading of Werba, Chemparathy, Frauwallner, rather on his own comparative readings.

century. Aklujkar says that Helārāja quotes from VSc,[329] whereas Isaacson identifies another reference to Vaiśeṣika in the Abhinavagupta's commentary on Īshvarapratyabhijñāvimarshinī of Utpaladeva (tenth century AD). The importance of Candrānanda's commentary however resides not in the time, but rather in the ancient view of the system he presents, as well as in the integrity of the Sūtrapāṭha it supplies.

PART II

2.5. SŪTRAPĀṬHA

There are two major assets that VSc (ed. 1961) presents. One is the very early date of the commentary itself, and the second the Sūtrapāṭha, which contains seven different sūtras 'nowhere quoted in the entire philosophical literature'.[330] These 'new' sūtras are VS 2.2.33 (abhāvāt.); VS 5.2.4 (tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam); VS 7.1.6 (guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt); 7.2.2 (tayor nityatvānityatve tejaso rūpasparśābhyāṁ vyākhyāte); 7.2.3 (niṣpattiś ca); 7.2.22 (tathā pratyayābhāvaḥ); 7.2.23 (saṁbaddhasaṁbandhāt iti sandehaḥ).[331] So far, VS of Candrānanda stands the test of time; in comparing VS with 'A' (Ahmedabad MS), Isaacson confirms that A is 'clearly closer to VS' (shortened 'C').[332] Before Isaacson's new MSS readings, we knew from Thakur about sixteen MSS, most of which reproduced the Mithilā version (of Upaskāra). New ones ('A' and 'T') studied by Isaacson, as well as the recent publication of a new volume of the New Catalogus Catalogorum,[333] give new locations of MSS on

[329] Aklujkar, 1970, p. 340. Vergiani, 2016, p. 547.
[330] Thakur, 2003, p. 131.
[331] Ruzsa offers a different emendation than Thakur (sambaddha: Ś1, Ś3; saṁbandha JS, J, Ś2; cet: all; cat JS). Here I offer Thakur 2013 version, p. 131.
[332] Isaacson, 1995, p. 256.
[333] Finally published in 2013 NCC vol. 32.

Vaiśeṣikasūtras, whose rendering might bode well for new interpretations of Vaiśeṣika's tenets. With my current research, I have began the task to inventorying all of them, and a descriptive list is currently in progress. Starting from 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra entry', I am also mid-way in collecting all descriptions of Vaiśeṣika Sūtrapāṭha MSS which are currently extant.

2.6. MSS OF SŪTRAPĀṬHA

In 2013, the University of Madras finally published volume XXXII of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* (henceforth NCC), which reached the letter 'v' and provided the MSS entry for 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra'. So we can finally find various locations where MSS on the mūla text could be, some of which have already been visited and explored by scholars (at Trivandrum, Pune, Jodhpur, Darbangha).[334] Beginning from the textual-philological evidence provided by Isaacson (PhD), here I should describe briefly the Sūtrapāṭha MSS, which I have been able to look at, plus my own MSS contribution, which I have photographed during the research trip to India. To my knowledge, three scholars before myself have looked at MSS containing Sūtrapāṭha alone.[335]

[334] For 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra' entry, see NCC vol. XXXII, p. 65-68. I say 'could', because some MSS are almost impossible to obtain, even though they are mentioned in NCC. Two MSS (140 and 183), for instance, are mentioned in the entry; these are supposed to be in the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālā of Rajapur (South Maharashtra). When I visited the site, the young pundits had no knowledge of any (hand-written) list of the MSS, which obviously they should have possessed. All MSS (presumably not yet classified) were preserved in about twenty big bags in the roof of the main building. The pāṭhaśālā belonged most probably to the Vedānta tradition, because many MSS I looked at, randomly, belonged to that tradition and were not very old (paper, eighteen and nineteenth century approximately).

[335] I should add Ferenc Ruzsa, though he looked at improving VSc Baroda edition, who took into consideration only the MSS related to VSc, not to VS.

1) Gopinath Kaviraj (1929)[336] informs about 'an apparently very old manuscript (undated) of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, from a private collection in Benares'. This MS (henceforth 'Be') contains several differences from the Sūtrapāṭha of Upaskāra. It is still not published, and, as per 1995, Isaacson could not trace its location.[337]

2) Anantalal Thakur is by far the scholar who has looked most extensively over Vaiśeṣika MSS, but sadly, he does not give a detailed description of these. In an article published in 1963,[338] he informs of having 'collated the sūtra-readings from six printed editions and sixteen Manuscripts preserved in different Manuscripts Libraries'.[339] Among them, Thakur also informs, 'two'[340] that have been used for the publication of Vyākhyā (Darbangha 1957) and of Vṛtti (Baroda 1961).

3) Harunaga Isaacson, in his PhD thesis, brings further contributions by consulting two additional MSS containing Sūtrapāṭha alone, and provides a 'diplomatic edition' for each one of them, as well as a 'tentative reconstruction of the presumed hyparchtype of both, followed by an attempt at evaluation'.[341] This MSS are: 1) Ahmedabad MS (henceforth 'A'). It is a 'Sammelhandschrift' (a collated MS consisting of several heterogeneous MSS, in this case the Nyāyasūtra first, second Sūtrapāṭha of Vaiśeṣika, and then Nyāyavatara, a Jaina treatise on logic).[342] 2) A second MS is from Trivandrum

[336] Kaviraj, 1929, pp. 71-76. I have not consulted this article. Here I rely on Isaacson description, 1995, p. 200.
[337] MSS in private collections are very hard to consult. From my own experience (in Udupi and Shravanabelagola), I was not permitted any access to MSS, nor even basic preliminary information about these.
[338] Already quoted: by Thakur, 1963a.
[339] Thakur, 1963a, p. 187.
[340] Isaacson points out that three, not two, MSS have been used for the two edition mentioned (Darbhanga 1957 and Baroda 1961), because Baroda edition 1961 is based on two MSS, see Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 201.
[341] Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 202.
[342] For description, Isaacson 1995, PhD, p. 205.

(henceforth 'T'). A palm-leaf manuscript, it represents an independent recension and is located in the Kerala University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum (no 22615). Like 'A', 'T' also contains Nyāyasūtra without commentary.[343]

2.7. NEW MSS ON SŪTRAPĀṬHA

Finally, this thesis takes into consideration new MSS, and begins from a first-hand reading of five new different MSS (paper) which contain Sūtrapāṭha only, collected by Ionut Moise from Wai, Mysore, Mumbai and Madras. These are not old, (*post ante quem*: eighteen century, approximately); all of them well preserved. These are as follows:

1) Prajñapāṭhaśāḷā Maṇḍaḷa (Wai, South Maharashtra). I have photocopied three MSS no: 6108, 6109, and 6110.[344] I shall mark them as follows: W_1 (6108), W2 (6109), W_3 (6110). When there is agreement in the MSS collation, I shall refer to these as 'W'. All of these present more or less the Sūtrapāṭha version of Upaskāra with its adhyāyas, classified in further two āknika each (which is not the case with VSc where the last adhyāya 8, 9, 10 have no āknika-division). They all begin with a religious salutation ('Śrī Ganeśāya namaḥ': W_1, W_3, and 'śrīmad sadgurucaranābhyāmānamaḥ' W_2). They are preserved and wrapped in used newspaper (Marathi) on which another serial number is given. The sūtras are separated by simple and double slashes (/). Each āknika is marked, and a reader before me highlighted each one of those signposts with pencil : W_1 (paper) is 25.3 x 9 size, Devanagari script, 4 folios with approximately 13-15 lines per page, 51 letter per line, it is complete, in good readable condition, and the year provided by Wai

[343] For a MS description of what Isaacson describes as 'T', see PhD, 1995, p. 258; or MSS Catalogue: Trav. Uni. Sup. 1988, Vol. 5 Bhaskaran, pp. 103-105 (a calatogue he could not consult).
[344] See further description in MSS Catalogue (Wai D. II) pp. 776-777.

MSS catalogue vol. II (p. 777), is 1813. W_2 (paper) hand writing is slightly bigger, in Devanagari script, 30.5 x 10.7 size, 4 folios , 12 lines per page, 45 letters per line, it is complete, good condition, not dated, but judging by the size and writing style it could be the same age or perhaps slightly earlier, end of the eighteenth century. Among the three Wai MSS, this looks the most 'archaic'. W_3 like all the other two is entitled 'Vaiśeṣikasūtrani' on the newspaper cover, (Devanagari script) paper, 24.2 x 12.6 size, 7 folios with 10 line per page , 47 letters per line , it is complete and in a wonderful condition, with very tidy handwriting. The best preserved among the three, it has no date, but possibly is from the nineteenth century. Like all others, this MS provides the Upaskāra version of the Sūtrapāṭha. The catalogue lists another MS (no 6111, with 119 folios) which presents the Vaiśeṣikasūtras with Upaskāra commentary, but since my goal was to trace back only the 'independent transmission' of VS, I have not taken a photocopy.

2) Oriental Research Institute Mysore. From a large collection of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika MSS, I have selected only MS no. E 37153 (alternative no: C 4416/1).[345] I shall refer to it with 'M'. It bears the title 'Vaiśeṣikasūtram' and the author (not the scribe) is 'Kaṇādaḥ'. Paper with Devanāgarī script, 32 x 10 size, 9 folios with approximately 48 letters per line. It is complete and in good condition. Like 'W', 'M' seems to give the Sūtrapāṭha version of Upaskāra (split in the exactly the same āknika as others). It begins with a salutatory devotional greeting (Śrī Ganeśāya namaḥ'). The writing is small, with pencil highlighting after each āknika. Sūtras are separated by a simple slash, and only rarely by double slash.

[345] MSS Catalogue (Mysore N.D. vol. X), pp. 608-9.

3) Royal Asiatic Society of Bombay presents us with a slightly different version of the Sūtrapāṭha (henceforth 'B'). In this MS some sūtras are not separated by slash (/) e.g. VS 6.2.18. Here we deal with an older MS, dated 1715 Śake, in Sanskrit (Sk.), no 1934 (but in Velankar's Catalogue no. 1059); it has 9 folios, on paper and is preserved at Asiatic Society of Bombay in the collection of Bhau Daji Collection (BD – 30/4).[346] One interesting addition in Sūtrapāṭha is that it does not follow the Sūtrapāṭha of Śaṅkaramiśra, as it omits to mention 'padārthānāṁ' from VS 1.1.4.

4) Madras. Governmental Oriental Manuscripts Library. Finally, this is most probably a twentieth century MS, and I have photocopied it from the Governmental MSS Library of Madras, yet I will not count it among the Sūtrapāṭha MSS discussed because it is more of a digest of Vaiśeṣika tenets. I shall refer to it as 'C'. The title it bears is 'Vaiśeṣikavastunirṇayaḥ' by an author Nṛsiṃha, it is paper Devanagari script, it is complete and bears two numbers: 20432 and R 3092b (accession and serial), the latter being the one that is inscribed on the front page. It is a 'Sammelhandschrift' (composite manuscript) and as a result collated in the shape of a 'book-note', not on separate folios like all others.[347]

Note: As a concluding remark, and based on my fresh efforts to bring something new, I must point out with Thakur and Isaacson, that, with meagre exceptions, the majority of these sūtras of these MSS present us with Mithilā version (of Śaṅkaramiśra). Nonetheless, one should still keep an eye on the possibility of a 'few interesting exceptions'.[348]

[346] MSS Catalogue (Ed. Meena Vaishampayan, 2012) p. 140.
[347] MSS Catalogue (part 2, ed. V. Vidyavicaspati), 2015, p. 771.
[348] Isaacson, 1995, p. 202.

The list represents only a beginning of an inventorying project of all the descriptions of Sūtrapāṭha MSS. Now, with the publication of NCC, volume 32, we are in the position to undertake such a task, which is only the beginning for a forthcoming critical edition. The researcher however must be warned that some of the MSS are to be found in 'Sammelhandschrift', therefore he/she should look up for MSS at various different sections in the catalogues; other traditions could have preserved the Vaiśeṣika sources for different reasons either to combat its tenets or to profitably make use of its doctrine, as Jaina scholars did.

2.8. DATE OF SŪTRAPĀṬHA

The main contention upheld by Frauwallner and the Austrian school has been the many additions the Sūtrapāṭha suffered in the course of time. It has been repeatedly maintained, even after the publication of VSc and its Sūtrapāṭha (1961), that the opening sūtras, as well as those sūtras related to mokṣa, did not exist in the original version of VS,[349] and that they are a later addition to VS. More recently, this view has been challenged by scholars from the French and Japanese schools,[350] showing that the ancient form of VS we have in VSc, is not unreliable. Houben for instance, shows that Bhartṛhari (fifth century AD) who chronologically preceded Praśastapāda (sixth century), does indeed refer to the beginning sūtras of all known versions of the Sūtrapāṭha (dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti).[351] On the doctrine of the dimension of the

[349] Wezler, 1982, pp. 663-674.
[350] Nozawa seems to be an exception within Franco-Japonese school; according to him the doctrine of all-pervasive character of the soul is a late addition in Vaiśeṣika; he goes as far as to say that the whole of the seventh chapter of VS is a later addition', Nozawa, 1981, pp. 464-5.
[351] Houben, 1994, p. 718, informs that Mallvadin c. 550 AD, quotes a sūtra VS 9.12 which is traceable only in the Sūtrapāṭha of Candrānanda, therefore its Sūtrapāṭha must be the oldest we have.

soul, which changed in the early phase of the history of the system, Adachi points that these changes must have taken place very early, because Āryadeva's Catuhśataka (the ninth chapter) (c.225 and 250 AD) rejects the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the activity in the eternal and all-pervasive soul, and reproduces accurately the sūtras 7.1.28-29 from Sūtrapāṭha. Furthermore, in relation to this, VS 5.2.18-20, are sūtras which prove that both mokṣa and saṃsāra, are old concepts in the Vaiśeṣika system, and that those sūtras had existed in the Sūtrapāṭha at least from the same time.[352] In textual studies, the external evidence discussed by Adachi and Houben represent a solid proof for dating MSS. If Houben and Adachi are both right, then we have reason to suppose that the opening sūtras (VS 1.1.1-3), the soteriological sūtras (VS 5.2.18-20), as well as the ones on the all-pervasive ātman (VS 7.1.28-29), all of which are fully preserved by Candrānanda's commentary, are sufficient ground for the conjecture that most portions of Sūtrapāṭha we have are as old as the second century AD. This confirms once more the date of Jacobi on VS, which he supposes to be 'as old as, or rather somewhat older than Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasūtra'.[353] Hence, the date of some of the sūtras, the one we rely on for the doctrine of soteriology, could be as early as 200 AD, or even earlier.

2.9. TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

Although the style of VS and VSc is simple and straightforward, with a medium level of difficulty in translation, while the grammar and syntax do not pose major problems for translation,[354] the 1961 edition and its Sūtrapāṭha, as Thakur says, are based on MSS

[352] Adachi, 1994, p. 659.
[353] Jacobi, 1911, p. 29, dates NS and BS composition between 200 and 450 AD.
[354] Working on this translation I came to the same conclusion as Isaacson does, 1995, p. 156: 'the text is on the whole far less problematic than Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary, dealt with in the previous part: the language is simpler, the thought less convoluted and the textual transmission somewhat less defective'.

which 'abound with scribal mistakes'.[355] These have been dealt skilfully by Jambūvijayaji in the footnotes where he provides variant readings, and since then more work has been done by Isaacson, which compared the variant reading of VS of other MSS, 'A' and 'T', respectively.[356] Since the materials on which they are based are rather poor, critical editions are always problematic.[357] Since I am not fully trained in manuscriptology, nor is my method of research philological-historical, I should like to leave the 'section of textual problems' in the hands of more skilfull scholars such as Isaacson and Ruzsa, who would take the trouble to compare the VS with other newly discovered MSS. Isaacson comes up with findings which are 'interesting exceptions'.[358] As far as this research goes, my contribution is to provide variant readings from the Sūtrapāṭha MSS I have photocopied and read throughout my trip to South India.[359] I shall mention them only in passing, throughout this thesis, in the footnotes, only. In doing this, I have tried to follow the desideratum of Wezler and Isaacson, hoping to unearth new Vaiśeṣika tenets, and reconstruct a full picture of a possible 'independent transmission' of the Sūtrapāṭha.[360] Despite difficult textual readings, as for instance VSc 5.2.14, fortunately the 1961 Baroda edition, is a good one; in the words of Isaacson, the 'MSS affiliations of Vaiśeṣika are easily determined and clear-cut; a fact that is indicative of a rather slender transmission, i.e. one with a relatively small number of manuscripts, and freedom from contamination. It should be noted in this connection that the manuscripts can be associated with a rather limited geographical area beyond which we have no evidence

[355] Thakur, Introd. VSc, 1961, p. 1.
[356] For a reading of VSc, commentaries see Ruzsa's critical ed., who looked over all five MSS available. See table, under MSS on VSc section.
[357] Thakur, 1963, and Wezler's article on yoga, 1982.
[358] Isaacson 1995, part III of this PhD, pp. 200-300.
[359] Although I have undergone a similar inquiry, by consulting five new MSS (plus one), which I found and photographed at Wai, Mysore, Madras and Bombay, yet, none of them provides a substantially different reading of the Sūtrapāṭha, particularly regarding those sūtras related to soteriology.
[360] Wezler, 1982, p. 643. Isaacson, 1995, p. 300 'the search for Sūtrapāṭha Manuscripts remains, in my view, among the most urgent priorities'.

that Candrānanda's commentary ever spread'.[361] Indeed, though Thakur says that none of the available versions of the sūtra-text is 'absolutely correct', still he recognises that Candrānanda offers 'a better text generally'.[362] Nonetheless, any Vaiśeṣika scholar is required to look up at the sources and must provide alternative MSS readings, as these could shed new light on our system's doctrine. For the present thesis, these alternative versions will be restricted only to Sūtrapāṭha that refer to the soteriology of the system.

2.10. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have provided a thematic overview of VSc and its MSS preservation for the Baroda edition 1961. Though great a deal of textual critical work has been done so far by Jambūvijayaji, Thakur, Nozawa, Honda,[363] Isaacson, and Ruzsa, a new critical edition of VSc remains a desideratum. This is more even so the case, as Jambūvijayaji did not take into consideration for his edition the publication of three extant VSc MSS: J_2 (J2s, J2) and $Ś_2$, both of them from BORI, as well as another MS from Ujjain ($Ś_3$). Among these, the most important however, remains J_1 with its own two parts (J_{1s} and J_1), which has been dated to be as old as the thirteen century. It belonged to the eminent Jain scholar Muni Shri Puṇyavijayajī. All my critical textual observations will be made on the basis of their reading of such MSS, while for the Sūtrapāṭha I shall bring into the discussion reading variations of my own newly photographed MSS, described under section earlier. Whatever the variations might be, it is unlikely they can change substantially the current argument of this thesis or the soteriological passages already

[361] Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 148.
[362] Thakur, (1963) p. 188 (reproduced in Thakur, 2003)
[363] I could not find Honda's valuable study 'A reading in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras' (1990) mentioned by Isaacson; instead, I have been able to trace Nozawa's 'Comparative Table of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras' (1982) which proved very useful for the variations offered between the sūtras of Candrānanda, Vādīndra, Sena Court, and Śaṅkaramiśra.

extant in the current edition. I shall now proceed to describing Vaiśeṣika's soteriology, its nature and function, drawing parallels inside and outside the system's commentarial tradition.

CHAPTER 3. COMPARATIVE SOTERIOLOGY (NĀSTIKA AND ĀSTIKA)

3.0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I seek to offer a comparative look at the doctrine of liberation of some rival systems of thought, with a selection of texts formulated roughly in the 'Patristic-Sūtra period' (325 to 800 AD).[364] The reason for such a comparative study is that such texts offer important information on Vaiśeṣika, whenever these systems quote, refute, interpret, or reinterpret the Vaiśeṣika system. Besides, such data complements the many textual-philological problems discussed in the previous chapter; a comparative viewing of the soteriology of other systems gives a clearer view of the Vaiśeṣika system itself, as it illustrates, through contrast and comparison, the place of the system within Indian philosophy, but also possible underling affiliations of Vaiśeṣika with these systems. The difficult preservation of Sūtrapāṭha (ignored, distorted or inflated by early and later commentaries like PD and VSś) can therefore be 'reconstructed' from parallel philosophical systems, which, as Houben and Adachi showed, indicate not only the approximate the age of the system, but also important parts of its doctrine. In this chapter I seek to give a comparative picture of the soteriology of some Indian philosophical systems, (āstika and nāstika), with a particular focus on what is the actual nature of the liberation in these systems. By contrast with the previous chapter where stress was laid on the textual and philological issues, here the method I employ is philosophically comparative.

[364] The sūtra texts are earlier, so the period I cover includes sources earlier and later than the dates mentioned. The period is a guideline and highly approximate.

3.1. JAINA

One system which Vaiśeṣika resembles in terms of ontology is Jaina; but the similarities are also in the zone of epistemology, where for example the dualistic question of matter and spirit encountered in Vaiśeṣika prevails in Jainism too, where alongside mokṣa, Jīva and Ajīva are one of the seven 'categories' (tattva)[365] enumerated by Pūjyapāda (SAP 1.4).[366] The role of ajīva as a category is problematic. In Sarvārthasiddhi 1.4[367] Pūjyapāda states that 'ajīva is opposed to the nature of the soul'; perhaps its role is only to help distinguish it from the category of jīva itself,[368] in which case the category of ajīva would not be an ontological category, but only subservient to that of jīva. As Jain translates, 'the soul is mentioned first in the sūtra, and the 'non-soul' is mentioned next as it is of use to the soul' (SAPp. 1.4).[369] Jīva and Ajīva are two categories which go together specifically because, as in Sāṃkhya's dualism, the confusion, and intermingling between the two leads to bondage. In Jainism bondage is set in connection with the doctrine of 'karmas' or 'karmic matter' which are 'minute particles' of a 'material' kind (SAPp 5.19) which contaminate the pure nature of jīva;[370] hence the necessity to distinguish between what is ontologically pure (e.g. jīva) and impure (e.g. ajīva). Since jīva suffers 'bondage' caused by the influx (āsrava) of auspicious and evil karmas, the distinction must be made. This influx which causes bondage (SAPp. 1.4), depends on the intensity of 'desire', 'intention', and 'power'.[371] This dualism of the self can be encountered in Candrānanda

365 'Tattva' in Pūjyapāda's commentary on SAP 1.2, means 'a substance as it is', (trans. Jain, ed. 1960, p. 4).
366 According to SAP 1.4: jīvājīvāsravabandha saṃvaranirjarāmokṣastattvam, these are: (1) Living; (2) Non-living; (3) Influx of karmas; (4) Bondage of karmas; (5) Stoppage of karmas; (6) Shedding of karmas; (7) Liberation.
367 Sarvārthasiddhi, henceforth shortened with SAP for sūtras, and SAPp for gloss of Pūjyapāda.
368 Trans. Jain, 1960, p. 7.
369 Jain, 1960, p. 7.
370 Krishan, 1997, p. xii.
371 A reference to Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra 6.6, via Krishan, 1997, p. 41.

too where discrimination between the six categories leads to seeing the doṣas in the objects (viṣayadoṣadarśana) (VSc 1.1.6).[372] The process of 'differentiation' between jīva from ajīva is a complex one, chiefly because karmas' taxonomy is complex. SAP 8.3 says that bondage is of four kinds: according to the nature, duration, fruition, and quantity of karma; from their subsequent divisions, we only refer to SAP 8.6, where karmas are those that obscure the five kinds of knowledge ('sensory', 'scriptural', 'clairvoyance', 'telepathy', and 'omniscience').[373] If karma obscures knowledge, on which mokṣa depends (SAP 1.1),[374] it follows that the elaboration of karma is fundamental to the soteriology of the Jaina system. The 'theory of karmas' is central in Jaina traditions, and is comparable with Vaiśeṣika's 'doctrine of dharma and adharma', whose accretion creates change, bondage, and biological life.

Regarding the nature of liberation in Jainism, we see sharp differences from both Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, for which liberation is not spatial; it is rather an ontological state (siddha) of the self.[375] Jaina texts speak of liberation in terms of 'locus' (siddhaloka, siddhaśilā, ālokākāśa) which, as Handiqui explains, is the 'absolutely void empty abode of nothingness'.[376] But there are also questions as to whether such liberation is a fixed or a dynamic state; another definition of Jaina soteriology is 'liberation as a permanent upward moment' of the soul (nityodhvagamana mukti),[377] which expresses only the characteristic of a jīva engaged in liberation. Though it is the liberation from all the impurities of the world, and from all karmas, agaist which jīva undergoes un 'upward

[372] Yuktidīpikā (YD 88, 5; see also 87, 23) says about the Vaiśeṣikas that they borrowed their theism from the Pāśupatas. Chemparathy 1965, p. 146. Now we know how much was laid by the by Śaivists on mala, and purification from them. Praśastapāda and Candrānanda acknowledge Maheśvara as their supreme god.
[373] Trans. Jain, 1961, p. 221.
[374] SAP 1.1: samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamargaḥ.
[375] Jain, 1960, p. 51, f. 1.
[376] Handiqui, 1949, p. 134
[377] Handiqui, 1949. p. 134. Alongside a refutation of Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā work NMM 2.2.116 adds, 'satat'ordhvagamanādayastu dūrāpāstāḥ teṣāmaparapuruṣārthatvasya spaṣṭatvāt'; which may be a reference possibly to Jaina, where salvation is the upward movement of the soul into the siddhaloka.

movement' (jīvasya satato'rdhvagamanaṁ), yet, once jīva reaches the highest point of the world (lokāgra), it will eventually 'remain stationary there'.[378] As Shāh explains, the liberation state (siddha) should be understood as that where 'one has reached the top of the world'; it is the end of the 'principle of motion' (dharmāstikāya).[379] As in VSc 5.2.19, where the 'action of mind' plays a saṃsāric role in the emergence of a new body (prādurbhāva), in the Jaina system too, action is incompatible with the final state of liberation. Hence liberation is a fixed state, a locus which constitutes the journey's end of jīva, the 'end of the stream of worldly existence'.[380] Liberation is individualistic (kārttikeyānuprekśā) as it concerns only the singular jīva.[381] It is a purgative process, or 'the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul)' (SAPp 1.4), and a pure state of jīva free from karmic particles (karma), and its incapacity to acquire new ones. It is an irreversible state, in which soul is purified from karmic matter, and is dissociated from body, its passions, and evil thoughts. Unlike Vaiśeṣika where the soul in the mukti state is completely insensitive and unconscious, in the Jaina system the soul enjoys attributes like jñāna ('infinite consciousness'; 'perfect knowledge'), 'luminosity', 'power', 'brilliance', and 'absolute freedom'.[382]

Function. Almost all Jaina early tracts agree on the role of knowledge in liberation. Kundakunda (2 AD),[383] Samanthabhadra (2 AD),[384] and Pūjyapāda (5 AD),[385] talk about a 'perfect form of knowledge' (samyagdarśana), with a form of 'discrimination' that goes

[378] Shāh, 1967, p. 16.
[379] Shāh, 1967, p. 16
[380] Shāh, 1967, p. 18; 'But the souls that reach the siddhaśilā, have reached their journey's end and reside there permanently in perfect calm, bliss and happiness'.
[381] Trans. Bond, 1986, p. 46.
[382] Handiqui, 1949, p. 126.
[383] Kuṇḍakuṇḍa's Samayasāra mentions samyakdrsti (SSk 202), via Johnston, 1995, p. 283.
[384] Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā (AM 10.96) speaks of bondage as being caused by the slightest ignorance, and mokṣa caused by minutest ignorance (Shāh, ed. Ahmedabad, 1999).
[385] SAP 1.1: right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct constitute the path to liberation.

into the minutest detail (AM 10.96). The multiple classifications which, for instance Akalaṅka's Rājavārtikka (7th AD) develops, demonstrate the importance of the soteriological goal.[386] The terms used are samyagdarśana, or samyagdṛṣṭi. Bondage, largely explained in the eight chapter of both Tattvārthasūtra and Sarvārthasiddhi,[387] and the tenth chapter in Āptamīmāṃsā, it is caused by 'ignorance' (AM 10.98). The cosmos resembles an 'ocean of existence',[388] and is the locus of bondage, hence the knowledge of the reality (tattva) is crucial to liberation. The 'path of liberation' (mokṣa mārga) is enunciated from the beginning of Pūjyapāda's tract (SAP 1.1); and is explained with three jewels of Jainism: 1) 'faith' (darśana); 2) 'knowledge' (jñāna); and 3) 'conduct' (cāritra), all of which must be 'perfect' (samyak). Amongst these, samyagdarśana (a form of 'tattvic knowledge'), seems to be within the soteriological scheme, the highest and most important of all. This is informed by omniscience, which is the mark of the liberated jīva. The order in which liberation is achieved is dependent by the order of the seven 'tattvas' (SAP 1.4); jīva must escape the influx of contaminating karmas (āsrava), the intermingling of soul with karmas (bandha), must dissociate the karmic matter from the soul (saṁvara), as well as stop further karmas entering in (nirjarā). Soteriology is a 'gradual purification',[389] and as such, it entails 'knowledge' (jñāna), and 'conduct' (cāritra). Though all of them are important, it is only after the 'apprehension of tattvas' that liberation is acquired.[390] There are considerable differences between Jaina and Vaiśeṣika soteriology, but a point in which they may resemble is the nature of the soul divested of all karmic matter; yet cognition in the 'siddha' state does not disappear as in Vaiśeṣika,

[386] Like Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra, RVa 8 deals with the theory of karma and bondage. The elaborate classifications, lists, and subdivisions characteristic of Jaina system, can be seen RVa 8.1.12 where 'three hundred sixty-three 'perverse faiths' in the world' are mentioned'.

[387] SAP 8.1 gives five causes of bondage: 1) wrong faith; 2) non-abstinence; 3) negligence; 4) passions; and 5) activities. See also Tattvārtharājavārtika of Akalanka 8. (Trans. Jain, 1998)

[388] Gatha 23.73, p. 53; see Śrī Mahāvīra Vacanāmṛtam; though cosmos is 'without beginning' (anādi), it will nevertheless reach the end (Vaidya, 1967, p. 53).

[389] In Vaiśeṣika (VSc 1.1.6) such purification is from doṣas.

[390] Samyakdarśana also called 'right faith'.

and in this respect, the latter presents us with a far more radical form of liberation, closer perhaps to some of Buddhist realistic schools (Sarvāstivāda), in which the liberated soul resembles a pure entity, eternal and non-composite.

3.2. SARVĀSTIVĀDA VAIBHĀṢIKA

In this section, we are concerned only with Vaibhāṣika's doctrine on liberation, identified in a 'non-composite' entity called (apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha). The questions of 'composite' and 'eternity' relate to each other, in both Vaiśeṣika and Vaibhāṣika; both are systems with a 'pluralistic'[391] and 'atomistic'[392] worldview, because these scale down the reality to ultimate quantifiable 'existents' ('dharma' in Sanskrit; 'dhammā' in Pali).[393] In Vaiśeṣika the ultimate 'reals' are 'antyaviśeṣas' (VS 1.2.6): 'ultimate factors of individual identity and reside exclusively in the eternal, non-composite substances';[394] in Vaibhāṣika, on the other hand, the ultimate 'real', or 'existent' is 'dharma' ('element').[395] Abhidharmakośa classifies these in two groups, some are 'impure' (sāsava) and others 'impure' (anāsava) (AK 1.4a), or, as Collins translates, entities 'with and without corruptions'.[396] As to their form and nature, they can be 'affective states', 'intentional actions', 'sense desires', 'desire for existence', 'ignorance', and 'false view', to name just a few.[397] According to AKB's classification, the total number of dharmas is seventy-five

[391] Stcherbatsky, 1927, calls Buddhist Sarvāstivāda 'a system of the most radical Pluralism'; elsewhere this worldview is identified as 'sanghatavāda', Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 60.
[392] Lysenko, 2016 (article in Russian, available on academia.edu), developed an atomistic approach in the Buddhist Abhidharma schools: 'atoms' and 'dharmas', are close concepts that illustrate an atomic frame of mind.
[393] Collins, 2010, p. 88.
[394] For translation of antyaviśeṣa, see Halbfass, trans. p. 72., 115; In Vaiśeṣika, viśeṣa is two-fold: 1) ultimate viśeṣa (antyaviśeṣa) (VSc 1.2.6) and 2) sāmānyaviśeṣa (specific universal)(VSc 1.2.11).
[395] Trans. Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 41.
[396] Collins, 2010, p. 187, f. 129 (Pali terminology).
[397] ABK1.4ab: sāsravānāsravā dharmāḥ saṃskṛtā mārgavarjitāḥ / sāsravāḥ āsravās teṣu yasmāt samanuśerate (from Gretil ABK, A. Haldar, ed. 1975 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 8); for translation of Vasubandhu Bhāṣya, G.L. Sangpo, ed. 2012).

in total, out of which seventy-two are saṁskṛta ('conditioned'; 'impermanent'), while three of them are asaṁskṛta ('unconditioned'; 'permanent').[398] We shall not dwell much on the classification of the first category (saṁskṛta dharmas),[399] although, as in Jaina's doctrine of karmas, the systematisation of all entities (tattva) can explain the problem of bondage, which in Vaibhāṣika, is caused by their 'composite', and 'impure character' (AK 1.8a).[400] Their 'corruption' or 'impurity' is explained by their 'aggregate' state (skandha) and mixture with 'conflict' (saraṇa), and 'suffering', 'origin', 'world', 'afflicted views', and 'existence': (duḥkhaṃ samudayo loko dṛṣṭisthānaṃ bhavas ca te) (AK 1.8b).[401] The 'impure nature' (sāsava) is equally due to their 'attachment', 'clinging' (upādāna)[402] to life, which causes the state of bondage. From the two categories of 'existents', the composite elements (saṁskṛta dharma) are the elements of bondage, because they create biological life. It follows that, similarly to the extirpation of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas in Vaiśeṣika, the liberation in Vaibhāṣika is to 'single out' any of the saṁskṛta dharmas, and 'suppress them one after another'.[403] Vaibhāṣika's Nirvāṇa is described in terms of absolute annihilation (nirodha) of saṁskṛta dharmas, after which the knowledge of asaṁskṛta dharma follows.[404] Here the role of 'discrimination' (pravicaya)[405] is paramount; it is a method of 'picking out of elements, one by one';[406] elsewhere it is described as a method (upāya) of 'converting all uttpatti-dharmas into

[398] Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 79.
[399] The 72 saṁskṛta dharma are classified in 5 aggregates (skandha) as follows: 1st skandha (11 rūpa-dharma); 2nd skandha (1 vedana-dharma); 3rd skandha (1 saṁjñā-dharma); 4th skhanda (58 saṃskāra-dharma); 5th skhanda (1 vijñāna-dharma).
[400] ABK 1.8.abcd: ye sāsravā upādānaskandhāste saraṇā api / duḥkhaṃ samudayo loko dṛṣṭisthānaṃ bhavaśca te (trans. Sangpo, p. 212: when [the conditioned factors] are impure, they are appropriative aggregates/ [impure factors] are also called endowed with conflict; [impure factors] are also (1) unsatisfactoriness, (2) the origin, (3) the world, (4) the locus of the afflicted views, (5) existence.
[401] Trans. Sangpo, 2012, p. 213.
[402] Trans. Collins, 2010, p. 187, 556.
[403] Stcherbatsky 1923, p. 40-41.
[404] Stcherbatsky 1923, pp. 43-4.
[405]ABK 1.3 : dharmāṇāṃ pravicayamantareṇa nāsti/ kleśānāṃ yata upaśāntayebhyupāyaḥ
[406] Trans. Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 41.

anutpatti-dharmas' (AKB 1).[407] As Vaiśeṣika (and to a certain extent Sāṃkhya too), Vasubandhu shows that such soteriological method is primarily 'gnostic' since he mentions that such 'teaching' (sāsana)[408] is not obtained by 'virtue' (prabhāva) of the 'supernormal accomplishments' (ṛddhi) or by the 'granting of boons' (varapradāna).[409] As Stcherbatsky puts it, in Sarvāstivāda dharma-theory is a 'doctrine of salvation'.[410] Indeed, both AK and AKB discuss liberation in relation to the set of asaṁskṛta-dharma (or asaṅkhata-dhamma, Pali), particularly the two nirodha.[411] There are three asaṁskṛta-dharmas in total (ākāśa, pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, and apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha).[412] According to Vasubandhu, Nirvāṇa equates to pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha.[413] However, this is not to say that apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha is not part of soteriology; in fact, the latter is higher than the former, at least from a Vaiśeṣika perspective where cognition is not a soteriological guṇa that should exist in the final soteriological state; and I think that Vaibhāṣika maintains an absolute form of liberation somewhere closer to Vaiśeṣika's. The presence of these two soteriological 'non-composite dharmas' shows one prevalent intriguing fact among the Buddhist sects, namely a dualistic soteriology, expressed with a dualistic epistemology.[414] The difference between pratisaṅkhyā and apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha is that the former implies a cognitive process of 'deliberation'[415] and 'disconnection',[416]

[407] Trans. Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 40.
[408] Collins, 2010, p. 282, 'dispensation of the Buddha', 'body of knowledge'.
[409] AKB 1 (Sangpo ed. 2012, p. 205).
[410] Stcherbatsky, 1923, p. 41.
[411] Collins, 2010, p. 175, uses interchangeably the 'un-unconditioned element with Nirvāṇa'.
[412] AK 1.5cd: ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśamanāvṛtiḥ; AK 1.5.a-d: anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpyasaṃskṛtam / ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśamanāvṛtiḥ.
[413] AKB 6ab, trans. Sangpo, p. 209; (AKB 2.57, p. 655).
[414] The difference implies degrees of superiority. In Vaiśeṣika we have abhyudaya which is qualitatively different, as well as yogipratyakṣa, and catuṣṭayasannikarṣa which are different forms of cognition; in Buddhissm, we have Nirvāṇa with residue and Nirvāṇa without residue; śrāvaka path and bodhisattva path.
[415] AKB 6ab (as Sangpo translates) glosses that 'pratisaṅkhyā' means a 'specific kind of understanding' (prajñāviśeṣa).
[416] 'Disconnection' (visaṃyoga) mentioned also in AKB 57d, p. 654; AK 1.6ab: pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak.

(pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak AK 1.6ab), while the latter does not. These are two terms, which might be equivalent to the soteriological terms we encounter in VSc 1.1.6: 1) parijñāna (vide: 'prajñāviśeṣa' in AKB 1.6ab); and 2) vairāgya (vide: visaṃyoga AKB 1.6.ab). Though Vaiśeṣika distinguishes between accurate and inaccurate, natural and supernatural forms of knowledge, in the final state of the liberation, cognition as with Vaibhāṣika's apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, disappears altogether. The kārikā does not give an explicit definition of what Nirvāṇa is, but Vasubandhu glosses that pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha entails a process of 'cessation', 'destruction' of (saṁskṛta dharmas) which are defiled (AK 1.3);[417] as in Vaiśeṣika, the soteriological process is negative and dualistic, with the same degree to which their respective ontology is. Stcherbatsky explains that the list of 'saṁskṛta dharma' is a list of 'impure elements' (sāsrava), because of their tendency towards 'wandering into the ocean of existence' (bhavārṇava) (AK 1.3), or in the 'prison of conditioned existence' (bhavacāraka).[418] Being 'made', or 'composite' (saṁskṛta, saṅkhāra),[419] these dharmas remain susceptible to various sorts of cosmic 'attachments', 'composition', 'flows', 'commotions', 'turmoil', 'cyclical life', all of which produce defilements. Indeed, 'action' (karma) (of mind), caused by adṛṣṭa, is for Candrānanda not only a factor involved in the 'composition of a body' (VSc 5.2.19), but it explains also how mokṣa is achieved (VSc 6.2.19). On the other hand, in Vaibhāṣika, asaṁskṛta-dharmas are immune to such changes, therefore considered 'pure' (anāsava, Pali) for that very reason. Apart from ākāśa, the two nirodhas are a key-concept for the understanding of Vaibhāṣika soteriology which, as in Vaiśeṣika (and Advaita), lies on purely ontological grounds.

[417] AK 1.3: dharmāṇāṃ pravicayamantareṇa nāsti kleśānāṃ yata upaśāntaye 'bhyupāyaḥ / kleśaiś ca bhramati bhavārṇave 'tra lokastaddhetorata uditaḥ kilaiṣa śāstrā.
[418] Collins, 2010, p. 230.
[419] Collins, 2010, p. 138-39.

Another comparison refers to the soteriological method of Vaiśeṣika, namely through discernment, or deliberation, of the ultimate reals, and has the purpose of extirpating the vaiśeṣikaguṇas and setting the soul free from these. In Vaibhāṣika's case, though, this system has no doctrine of soul, 'deliberation' (dharmapravicaya) aims at removing kleśas (AKB 1.3. p. 207),[420] through the extinction of all saṁskṛta dharmas. Their place would be subsequently replaced by the three eternal and non-composite asaṁskṛta dharmas. This has two major implications: one ontological and the other soteriological. Soteriology is the cessation of all impure, or composite elements (e.g. body), it presupposes a thorough grasp of dharmas (their intrinsic nature and function), but not all of them can be suppressed by dharmapravicaya. Some of them are indeed suppressed 'one by one' (pṛthak pṛthak) by 'discriminative cognition',[421] and they are replaced by 'blank element' (pratisaṅkhyā nirodha).[422] The remainder, Stcherbatsky says, are supressed by mystical 'concentration' (bhāvanāheya).[423] Like Vaiśeṣika (VSc 5.2.16-20), where the role of yoga is paramount in furthering the knowledge of dravyas (including ātman), in Vaibhāṣika the knowledge of the dharmas (pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha), which is made through meditation,[424] aims to destroy, and prevent, any future factors that might bring new life (apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha).[425] AK 1.6cd defines apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha as 'the absolute hindering of the arising of future factors'.[426] This represents a striking similarity with the Vaiśeṣika term 'aprādurbhāva' used in the context of mokṣa (VSc 5.2.20) which defines mokṣa in terms of the 'non-emergence of a further body'

[420] On Vaiśeṣika's aim to remove doṣas from objects, through knowledge: VSc 1.1.6.
[421] Scherbatsky, 1923. p. 42 translates here pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha as 'cessation by wisdom'.
[422] Scherbatsky, 1923. p. 42.
[423] Sangpo translates concentration with 'cultivation'.
[424] Stcherbatsky, 1927, p. 4.
[425] In Vaiśeṣika, yoga is a tool to grasp the soteriological knowledge that includes first and foremost the knowledge of ātman.
[426] AK 1.6 cd: utpādātyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisaṃkhyayā ('a different type of cessation, which consists of the absolute hindering of the arising [of future factors] is called cessation not due to deliberation) trans. Sangpo, p. 210.

(aprādurbhāva). Quite similarly, Vasubandhu's gloss on AK 1.6.cd talks about it in similar terms: apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha is the 'absolute hindering (ātyantavighnabhūta) of the arising of future factors'.[427] In distinguishing the two nirodhas, we note that Sarvāstivāda gave cognition a role to play in pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, while in apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha he does it not, since that is the ultimate dharma from whence no further life, cognition, and manifestation would be possible. As a result, Vaibhāṣika's liberation consists of an entity, not void, ontologically real, but which is an 'entity devoid of cognition', that is to say, apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha.[428] There is no doubt that as regards this ontological view on liberation Vaibhāṣika resembles Vaiśeṣika. We cannot tell which one has influenced the other, but it may be that as far as soteriology is concerned, both Vaibhāṣika and Vaiśeṣika seem to share from the origin a common world view. Liberation is for both a pure ontological state devoid of cognition.

[427] AKB 1.6 cd 'this cessation is called thus because it is obtained, not by the 'deliberation' (pratisaṅkhyā) of the truths, but by the deficiency of the cause and 'conditions or arising' (pratyayavaikalyāt), trans. Sangpo, p. 210.
[428] Scherbatsky, 1927, p. 44.

3.3. NYĀYA

Among the orthodox systems (āstika), Nyāya is the system which Vaiśeṣika most resembles, both in terms of ontology and soteriology. These are two systems that complement each other, which will lead to their amalgamation beginning with Udayana. It is only the different emphasis that sets them apart. The brief soteriological doctrine mentioned by Candrānanda in VSc 1.1.6, is more explicitly elaborated, in clear cut stages by NS 1.1.2. The focus is not on the true knowledge of categories, but is rather on the dissociation from false knowledge; Nyāya's soteriology is achievable though the removal of 'false knowledge' (mithyājñāna) as follows: 1) removal of doṣas; 2) removal of pravṛtti (activity); 3) the removal of janma ('birth'); 4) all of which remove duḥkha ('suffering'); 5) once duḥkha has been removed, 'liberation' (apavarga) is achieved (NS 1.1.2).[429] The expression 'uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyāt' explains that the removal process is performed 'in sequence', each step following immediately after the other, in the exact order as stated.[430] Each step seems to imply the removal of the preceding one. Another striking difference in emphasis from Vaiśeṣika, is Nyāya's stress on pain (duḥkha),[431] clearly articulated in NS 1.1.21-22 where liberation (apavarga; vimokṣa) is the 'absolute freedom from that' (tadatyanta), duḥkha being designated by 'tad': bādhanālakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham / tadatyantavimokṣaḥ apavargaḥ. VSc seems to agree with this order of soteriological stages,[432] and Candrānanda's contribution is that he adds several more

[429] NS 1.1.2: duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ; and compare to VSc 1.1.6.

[430] Trans. Chattopadhyaya and Mrinalkanti, ed. 1967, vol. 1. p. 26.

[431] NS 1.1.21: bādhanālakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham / NS 1.1.22: tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ. (Gretil transliteration; Chattopadhyaya ed. p. 85, renders it with 'vādhanā').

[432] Places where VSc agree with NS are as follows: for doṣa: VSc 1.1.6; for pravṛtti: VSc 6.2.17 where pravṛtti is related to the karmic retribution theory of dharma, and adharma; for janma: VSc 5.2.20 where śarīrāprādurbhāvasya stands for non-production of body; for duḥkha: the introductory line to 6.2.17, where duḥkhas stand in relation to adversity, both of which are vaiśeṣikaguṇas (as per VSc 3.2.17) which must be absent in the mokṣa state (VSc 1.1.2 third line).

components such as: 1) parijñāna (VSc 1.1.6) - a different kind of knowledge than Gautama's' mithyājñāna; 2) vairāgya (detachment from those doṣas and their objects (viṣaya) (VSc 1.1.6), while in VSc 10.21, a series of injunctions like the 'knowledge of ātman' (ātmā jñātavya) which could involve the practice of yoga (as per VSc 5.2.16-17);[433] and 3) upāsākrama, which indicates that intellectual meditation is related to both yoga and mokṣa, as indicated in several instances by Candrānanda (VSc 5.2.15; 5.2.22).[434]

A more elaborated exposition of the steps in which liberation come about we get from a later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretic work Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra (c. 1275 AD).[435] As in NS and NSB, apavarga is in Nyāya's epistemology the twelfth 'object of knowledge' (prameya). In the process described by Kesavamiśra, there appear to be twelve stages: 1) complete (samasta) knowledge of all tattvas and padārthas, based on śāstras; 2) grasping the doṣas in the objects; 3) loss of attachment to these; 4) desire for liberation; 5) meditation; 6) knowledge of the true nature of the soul; 7) getting rid of defects and suffering; 8) performing actions without attachment; 9) yogic understanding of past dharma and adharma; 10) the exhaustion of the effect of previous karma; 11) the disappearance of body; 12) the non-appearance of another body which means the disappearance of all contact (sambandha) with the twenty-one forms of duḥkha. Thus, apavarga is described as the terminus point of the dissolution of body and its contact with the twenty-one forms of pain.[436] The enumeration of these steps, which comes

[433] To be read contextually from the introductory line to VSc 5.2.16 (where yoga and mokṣa are analysed together) to VSc 5.2.17 and where yoga has the power to uproote duḥkha. Candrānanda adds also the phrase 'ity ādi vākyebhyaśca' which implies that other Upaniṣadic phrases like it, may be included in the 'soteriological practice'.

[434] See Synopsis to VSc. The clear connection between yoga and mokṣa is already in the introductory line to VSc 5.2.16. In fact, VSc both yoga and mokṣa are discussed in section of karma, which shows that Vaiśeṣika soteriology is eminently physical and ontological.

[435] Iyer, ed. 1979, p. 221-222. Trans. Jhā 1967, p. 84.

[436] TB 19.127 b: sa punarapavargāḥ kathaṃ / ucyate / śāstrādvidita padārtha samasta tattvasya viṣaya doṣa darśanena viraktasya mumukṣoḥ dhyāyino dhyānaparipākavaśāt sākṣātkṛtātmanaḥ kleśa hīnasya niṣkāma karmānuṣṭhānā danāgata dharmādharma vanarjayataḥ pūrvopāttān dharmādharma pracayaṁ yogaprabhāvāt viditvā samāhṛtya bhūñjānasya pūrva karma nivṛttau vartamāna śarīrādivigame' pūrva

within a soteriological section (apavargavicāra), just at the very end of 'prameya' chapter, stands in direct relation to the explanation of what liberation consists of, namely the elimination of the twenty-one forms of suffering, which are: body (śarīra), six sense-organs (saḍindriya); six object-organs (saḍviṣayā); six-cognitions obtained through the organs (saḍbuddhya); pleasure and plain (sukha, duḥkha).[437] Like VSc 1.1.6, and NS 1.1.2, the true knowledge of entities is co-extensive with the total removal of 'deficiencies' (doṣa), and the 'separation' (vairāgya) from them, is necessary to apavarga. These stand in relation to body, which is also considered an obstacle to liberation. Here again, we see the dualistic frame of mind which we encounter in Sāṃkhya and Jaina systems too, which dualism emphasises knowledge (of world's constituents), and propounds a sharp separation (nivṛtti path) of pure soul from the polluting matter. The method is both epistemological and ontological, where the knowledge of categories, their composition, and true intrinsic nature would include an ethical or soteriological dimension.

Another aspect related to liberation is the question of birth (janman), which in NS 1.1.2 is seen as intimately related to suffering. It seems that 'janma' implies duḥkha; whatever is born is subject to suffering, that is to say janma is the cause of duḥkha.[438] While discussing 'rebirth' (pretyabhāva) (NS 1.1.19), Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya (NSB) acknowledges the reoccurrence of the body (deha),[439] while NSB 1.1.22 explains liberation in terms of 'relinquishing' (hāna) of present and future birth of body.[440] It is not sufficient to extinguish only the birth of a body, but according to Nyāya soteriology, it is vital to extinguish the factors, or causes of the re-occurrence of another life.

śarīrābhāvādekaviṃśati duḥkha sambandho na bhavati kāraṇābhāvāt / yo'yaṃeka viṃśati duḥkha hāniḥ so' apavargaḥ / (trans. S.R. Iyer, ed. 1979, p. 221-222).

[437] Trans. Gajendragadkar and Karmarkar, 1934, p. 220.

[438] Tarkavāgīśa in his Elucidation, see NS, 1967 ed., p. 27.

[439] NSB 1.1.19: punarūtpattiḥ punardehādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ.

[440] NSB 1.1.22 upāttasya janmano hānam, anyasya cānupādānam.

Uddyotakara considered this double-fold soteriological extinction, and sees that one single undertaking is not sufficient to reach the final liberation; as a result, he systematises two forms of liberation: an 'immediate' one (aparam), and a 'distant', 'highest' (param).[441] Tarkavāgīśa glosses that 'aparam' liberation for Uddyotakara is jīvanmukti and follows immediately after the realisation of ontological knowledge (tattvajñāna), a stage in which the body contains still accumulated dharma and adharma; 'para' liberation on the other hand is negative in ambit because it destroys mithyājñāna with tattvajñāna.[442] The two-fold character of soteriology reminds us of the difference between the two non-composite soteriological dharmas of Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda: 1) cognitive 'pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'; and 2) the non-cognitive apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha. It seems that soteriology was seen in two stages, one being inferior to the other; cognition - in Sarvāstivāda, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika, - is like a 'residue', a 'guṇa' of biological life, of body, which one needs to get rid of.[443] The whole process of birth and its cessation, presupposes the same for cognition which must close in the liberated state: apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha (Vaibhāṣika), apavarga (Nyāya), and niḥśreyasa (Vaiśeṣika), are all relevant equivalents.

Finally, the question of bliss in the state of liberation (mukta) is denied by both Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya (NSB) and Uddyotakara's Vārttika in the long gloss to NS 1.1.22. NSB contains a long refutation of some opponents' view according to which there is 'manifestation' (abhivyakti) of bliss; both commentators reject such a view on the grounds that abhivyakti involves 'cognitive awareness' (saṃvedana).[444] Now, we know that for Vaiśeṣika, and - most probably Nyāya mean the same by abhivyakti, - awareness

[441] NS (ed. 1967-1976), vol. 1, p. 27.
[442] NS (ed. 1967-1976), vol. 1, p. 27.
[443] In NSV 3.2.24, Uddyotakara speaks of the final cognition which is destroyed when there are no causes such as dharma and adharma, for its continuation (trans. Tripāthi, ed. 1983).
[444] Trans. Grimes, dict. p. 278.

or cognition, is a vaiśeṣikaguṇa that characterises the embodied ātman, which is under the bondage of janman;[445] or, to maintain the assumption of an eternal body is an 'illogical pramāna' (pramāna-viruddha), and an 'absurd reasoning' (upapatti-virūddha).[446] Body entails also sense-object perception, feelings, desire for pleasure and therefore bliss, and to maintain the existence of an eternal body, or 'subtle body' (sūkṣmaśarīra),[447]that would mean the occurrence of feelings in the mukti state. Naiyāyikas reject bliss in the soteriological state, as well as all manifestations that come with a subtle body (NSB 4.2.45).[448] In relation to the manifestation of body, NSB 1.1.20 uses a term which we encounter only once in VSc 9.28.[449] This is vipāka ('fruition', 'resultant', 'ripening'),[450] which in Vātsyāyana relates to the production of sukha, duḥkha, and karman, all of which are the 'results' (phala) of pravṛtti and doṣa (NS 1.1.20).[451] 'Action' (karman), seems to lead to pleasure and suffering, and as VSc 6.2.18 states, they engage in the formation and manifestation of body. In both Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, only body can have action, not soul (which is vibhu). To conclude, liberation (apavarga) is the stoppage of the chain of causations, the continuous 'movement' (karman), beginning at the cognitive level, that ultimately produces birth, body, and affections.[452]

---

445 Trans. Grimes, dict. p. 90.

446 NSB 1.1.22: upapattivirūddham iti cet samānam / dehādīnāṃ nityatvaṃ pramāṇavirūddhaṃ. The editors, p. 89, translate 'upapattivirūddha' with 'absurdity' while 'pramāṇavirūddha' as utterly illogical'; yet I have chosen a differing wording here.

447 On Advaita's 'subtle body 'and its transmigration, Potter, 1980, pp. 252-4.

448 NS 4.2.45: tadabhāvaścāpavarge / NSB tasya / buddhinimittāśrayasya śarīrendriyasya dharmādharmābhāvādabhāvo 'pavarge.

449 VSc 9.28: dharmādharmavipākaparijñānaṁ tat siddhadarśanaṁ.

450 Trans. Grimes, dict. p. 346.

451 NS 1.1.20: pravṛttidoṣajanito 'rthaḥ phalam / NSB sukhaduḥkhasaṃvedanaṃ phalam / sukhavipākaṃ karma duḥkhavipākaṃ ca.s

452 Though both Vātsyāyana and Candrānanda are very cryptic in explaining it, we must nevertheless admit that the 'theory of karma' explains the operation of bondage: the 'inclination' (pravṛtti) towards doṣa causes the 'ripening' (vipāka) of sukha and duḥkha, dharma and adharma. The presentation of Candrānanda in the āhnika VSc 6.2, shows clearly the impact of dharma and adharma, as due to pravṛtti ('activity'), in relation with icchā and dveṣa (VSc 6.2.17), the latter being previously connected with a particular passion (VSc 6.2.16), resulted from satisfaction (VSc 6.2.14); both passion and satisfaction are rooted in sukha (VSc 6.2.12). In other words, sukha produces a chain of affections, which ultimately leads to the 'ripening' (vipāka) of activities, and subsequently to the 'collection' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma; within which, both 'rebirth' and 'theory of karma' are altogether explained (VSc 6.2.19).

3.4. SĀṂKHYA

In the 'dualistic soteriologies' of Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, and Sāṃkhya, it is often the case that the eternity of an entity is determined by its composite or non-composite nature.[453] Whatever is eternal must be non-composite; because 'composition' is prone to change, decay and destruction, of which the embodied self (śarīra) is an example.[454] According to the Vaiśeṣikas, as long as ātman is in contact with matter, or made of parts, it remains subject to 'change' (karma) and 'transmigration' (saṃsāra). It seems that Sāṃkhya follows a similar view, but with the difference that its cosmology rests on satkāryavāda theory, according to which effect pre-exists before its production (SK 9).[455] Sāṃkhya's cosmology and epistemology is 'representationalist' in that the reality of a thing is established on the 'mental form' of the perception itself, not the object itself.[456] The nature of reality is worked out not from the reality itself, as in Vaiśeṣika, but from consciousness, a cosmological-epistemological view that draws Sāṃkhya closer to Advaita.[457] Since composition is a recurrent theme in the doctrine of bondage, the concept of Puruṣa, its nature, original state, and composition with Prakṛti, is

[453] Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21 February 2016.

[454] For Mīmāṃsākas, see Pārthasārathi's Śāstradīpikā, p. 130, quoted in Bhatt, 1989, p. 11. In Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika, the composite character of the 'embodied self' (śarīra), made of body and vaiśeṣikaguṇas

[455] SK 9: asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam. In Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, effects are real products and cannot pre-exist before their production (asatkāryavāda). Halbfass discussed the difference between the two theories and plays down their difference: asatkāryavāda is just 'a different type of substantialism and externalism'. 1992, p. 28.

[456] The epistemology of Sautrāntika, Advaita, and Sāṁkhya is 'with form' (sākāravāda); in the opposite camp (Jaina, Vaibhāṣika, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsakas) epistemology is 'without form' (nirākāravāda).

[457] Sāṁkhya advocates pariṇāmavāda (transformation of reality); while Advaita, vivartavāda (modification of reality).

important;[458] both explain the very idea of 'liberation' (kaivalya), which is a soteriological state of separation or 'isolation'[459] from such a compositional status quo.

The theory of bondage in Sāṃkhya begins with buddhi,[460] which due to its double-orientation, sattvic and tamasic, creates a mixture between puruṣa and prakṛti. 'How' these come together is unexplained by SK, but as Larson clarifies, SK articulates only 'why' they are together and 'what happens' when they are together.[461] Whatever the bondage is, puruṣa can never be or become bonded, ontologically speaking. SK 62 explains that it is only the prakṛti that binds.

SK 62: tasmānna badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaścit /saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ.[462]

Hence we need to see bondage as happening under the workings of buddhi (its impact on puruṣa), and within the 'theory of guṇas' (the characteristics of prakṛti), from which the manifest cosmos, mental and physical, emerge.

---

458 By contrast, Prakṛti is unconscious, ever-changing (it evolves from avyakta into vyakta under the influence of the sattva, rajas, and tamas), Puruṣa on the other hand, is pure consciousness, and inactive. As SKg 11 states, Prakṛti possesses guṇas, while Puruṣa does not (triguṇaṃ vyaktamavyaktaṃ cāguṇaḥ puruṣaḥ) (11.1); For other points of dissimilarity between vyakta and avyakta on the one hand, and puruṣa on the other; see the whole of context: triguṇaṃ vyaktamavyaktaṃ cāguṇaḥ puruṣaḥ / aviveki vyaktamavyaktaṃ ca vivekī puruṣaḥ / tathā viṣayo vyaktamavyaktaṃ cāviṣayaḥ puruṣaḥ / tathā sāmānyaṃ vyaktamavyaktaṃ cāsāmānyaḥ puruṣaḥ / acetanaṃ vyaktamavyaktaṃ ca cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ sukhaduḥkhamohāṃścetayati saṃjānīte tasmāccetanaḥ puruṣa iti / prasavadharmi vyaktaṃ pradhānaṃ cāprasavadharmī puruṣo nahi kiñcit puruṣāt prasūyate / (SKg 11.1), see trans Esnoul, p. 19.

459 Larson, 1969, p. 13-14.

460 Buddhi (or mahata) is the first evolute of prakṛti and has eight forms; interestingly enough, those are separated in two groups (each one corresponding to puruṣa and prakṛti); four of them are sāttvika (dharma, jñāna, virāya 'non-attachment', aiśvarya 'supernatural power'), while the other four are tamasa (adharma, ajñāna, aviraga, anaiśvarya). Buddhi, is thus the seed of bondage-production, and no wonder why knowledge in Sāṃkhya plays such a predominant role in liberation (SKg 44.3) (SKg 44.3) kiṃca jñānena cāpavargaśca pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ tena nimittenāpavargo mokṣaḥ tataḥ sūkṣmaṃ śarīraṃ nivartate paramātmā ucyate), while bondage is defined in terms of ignorance (SKg 44.3) viparyayādiṣyate bandhaḥ ajñānaṃ nimittaṃ sa caiṣa naimittikaḥ prākṛto vaikāriko dākṣiṇikaśca bandha iti).

461 Larson, 1969, p. 186.

462 Trans. Larson, 1969, p. 187. 'Nothing therefore, is bound, nothing released, likewise anything transmigrates, and only prakṛti in its various forms transmigrates, is bound, and is released'.

SK 20: tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvadiva liṅgam / guṇakartṛtve'pi tathā karteva bhavatyudāsīnaḥ.[463]

In this passage the first line explains 'the association happening because of the unconscious (prakṛti) and consciousness (puruṣa) associations', while the second line, 'the emergence of the indifferent 'udāsīna' (bhavatyudāsīnaḥ) is because of the activity of the three sets of guṇas' (tattva, rajas, and tamas). As to what these guṇas are, Larson talks about these not in terms of 'entities' per se, but as 'characteristics' of mūlaprakṛti, which 'pervades', or 'subsists' the manifested world.[464] It follows that the twenty-five tattvas can be classified under three 'guṇic' categories: sattva, rajas, and tamas.[465] This classification in three types of guṇas explains how bondage generates namely by different tendencies of the evolutes.[466] Sen Gupta defines 'guṇas-stuff' as 'that which creates the ceaseless flow of modifications and complexities'.[467] Cosmos in Sāṃkhya is explained with the 'theory of modification' (pariṇāmavāda) and asatkāryavāda (no new effects, everything pre-exists), but also explained with a theory of guṇas.[468] The manifested world, the evolution of prakṛti (from avyakta to vyakta), and 'ignorance' (viparyaya),[469] represent the doctrine bondage of puruṣa. On the question of how puruṣa

[463] Trans. Larson 1969, p. 188: 'because of the proximity (or association) the unconscious one appears as if characterised by consciousness', 'the emergence of the indifferent one (bhavaty udāsīnaḥ) is because of the activities of the three guṇas'.
[464] Larson, 1969, p. 175.
[465] On the classification of the sixteen tattvas (SK 25-27); on the twenty-five tattvas (SKg 44.3; SKg 64; 69).
[466] Larson, 1969, p. 176; Sen Gupta 1964, pp. 2-3, though I am a bit puzzled by 'substances' in defining the guṇas as 'feeling substances' ; the three sets of guṇas have the capacity to produce three different feelings in our mind'.
[467] Sen Gupta, 1964, p. 3.
[468] There is a correlation between the atomic theory and the doctrines of karma and guṇa; all three stem from cosmogonic ideas of the early Vedic and Purāṇic thought. The formation of new bodies (VSc 5.2.14) begins with the first action of earth atom (pṛthivyādiparamāṇuṣu ādyaṁ), as well as with first action of manas (cā'dyaṁ karma) and would result into the creation of bodies endowed with specific guṇas.
[469] SK 46-51, talks about 'five varieties of viparyaya', Larson, 1969, p. 211.

'binds', - though puruṣa is not essentially active, - the answer should be sought in buddhi, which lies at the interface between puruṣa and prakṛti, or, between 'pure consciousness' and 'cognition'; its ambivalent implications (in tamas and sattvas respectively) (SK 23),[470] explain the rise of bondage.[471] Another aspect of bondage is the 'subtle body' (sūkṣmaśarīra) which belongs to the sphere of prakṛti, and which only in its absence, liberation of puruṣa is realised (SK 55).

MOKṢA/APAVARGA. The main terms employed by Sāṃkhya to determine the nature of liberation are 'apavarga' (SK 44), 'vimokṣa' (SK 56, 57, 58), and 'kaivalya' (SK 68), while Gauḍapāda's gloss uses mokṣa too (SKg 44; 69).[472] Like Vedānta, Sāṃkhya distinguishes soteriology in two ways: liberation in this life (SK 65-67),[473] and after death (SK 68).[474] Among these, the latter is obtained only after the separation from body is 'complete' (aikāntikam) and 'endless' (ātyantikam). In both types of soteriology however, the dualistic frame of mind prevails; it entails the separation between two fundamental principles puruṣa and prakṛti, or between 'pure consciousness', and buddhi, respectively. As Furtado notes, the view has roots in older sources such as MB 12.187 or Br Up. 2.4.3, where for instance Yājñavalkya is reported as having separated the material reality

---

[470] SK 23: adhyavasāyo buddhirdharmo jñānaṃ virāga aiśvaryam / sāttvikametadrūpaṃ tāmasamasmādviparyastam.

[471] One of the characteristics of puruṣa, consciousness, makes it extremely vulnerable to the influence of 'cognition' (buddhi) which is one of the 'evolutes' (tattva) of prakṛti, and which corrupts puruṣa's pure consciousness. The unawareness of this fine line between consciousness and cognition is called 'aviveka' (Bhatt, 1989, p. 14.); because of it, puruṣa gets entangled into bondage and it can now feel sukha, duḥkha, and moha, which inevitably leads it to bondage.

[472] The topic of liberation occurs in Gauḍapāda's commentary in other places too: SKg 50, 56-58, 66-67, 69.

[473] SK 65: tena nivṛttaprasavāmarthavaśātsaptarūpavinivṛttām / prakṛtiṃ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavadavasthitaḥ svasthaḥ / SK 66: dṛṣṭā mayetyupekṣaka eko dṛṣṭāhamityuparamatyanyā / sati saṃyoge 'pi tayoḥ prayojanaṃ nāsti sargasya / SK 67: samyagjñānādhigamāddharmādīnāmakāraṇaprāptau / tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāccakrabhramavaddhṛtaśarīraḥ.

[474] SK 68: prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvātpradhānavinivṛttau / aikāntikamātyantikamubhayaṃ kaivalyamāpnoti.

from the spiritual ātman.[475] Regarding the nature of the state of liberation during life-time, this is defined by Gauḍapāda with the simile of puruṣa as a 'spectator' (prekṣaka) of prakṛti (SKg 65), like the spectator in a theatre play views an actress on the stage (yathā raṃgaprekṣako 'vasthito narttakīṃ paśyatiḥ).[476] The state is purely ontological, in Aristotle's terms, being-qua-being, the residing of the self in itself (svasthaḥ svasmiṃstiṣṭhati svasthaḥ svasthānasthitaḥ). On the other hand, prakṛti, in this soteriological state, ceases to be productive (nivṛttaprasavāṃ), or as SKg states, retires and vanishes after the view of the state of Puruṣa.[477] This state is obtained through 'perfect knowledge' (samyakjñāna) but due to previous saṃskāras its body subsists: aṃskāravaśāccakrabhramavaddhṛtaśarīraḥ (SK 67).[478] As Gauḍapāda explains in his gloss to SKg 68, final liberation however is only after the destruction of body:

SKg 68: dharmadharmajanitasaṃskārakṣayāt prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānasya nivṛttau aikāntikamavaśyamātyantikamanantarhitaṃ kaivalyaṃ kevalabhāvānmokṣa ubhayamaikāntikātyantikamityeva viśiṣṭakaivalyamāpnoti

As stated earlier, the terms which designate final liberation are kaivalya and mokṣa, and correspond to one of the two forms of jñāna announced in SK 23, and which Furtado translates as 'internal knowledge', that is the knowledge of the self itself.[479] Like in Vaiśeṣika (vidya and avidya), Sāṃkhya recognises two forms of knowledge, which have

[475] Furtado, 1992, p. 173.
[476] SKg 65: tena viśuddhena kevalajñānena puruṣaḥ prakṛtiṃ paśyati prekṣakavat prekṣakeṇa tulyamavasthitaḥ svastho yathā raṃgaprekṣako 'vasthito narttakīṃ paśyatiḥ svasthaḥ svasmiṃstiṣṭhati svasthaḥ svasthānasthitaḥ.
[477] SKg 66: raṃgastha iti yathā raṃgastha ityevamupekṣaka ekaḥ kevalaḥ śuddhaḥ puruṣastenāhaṃ dṛṣṭeti kṛtvā uparatā nivṛtā; trans. Esnoul, 1964, p. 74.
[478] SKg 67: yadyapi pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ samyak jñānaṃ bhavati tathāpi saṃskāravaśāddhṛtaśarīro yogī tiṣṭhati.
[479] Furtado, 1992, p. 177, discusses SK 23.

different roles in the attainment of liberation; one is 'external',[480] which comprises the knowledge of the Vedic corpus, and the śāstric literature; this however may not be soteriological as it gives only the power to differentiate between good and evil. The second knowledge called 'internal', is an ontological par excellence which is the realisation of the very nature of puruṣa and prakṛti, resulting in 'the process of becoming good'.[481]

FUNCTION. For the two kinds of soteriology, there correspond two types of knowledge (jñāna).[482] Thus, SK 23 seems to speak of a knowledge which is sāttvika and one known as tāmasa, which Gauḍapāda identify as 'internal' (abhyantara) and 'external' (bāhya), respectively.[483] The difference between them is considerable, the external knowledge which comprises the knowledge of Vedas, as mentioned may not lead to liberation, while the internal one, which consists of the ontological knowledge of the nature of puruṣa as distinct from prakṛti (with sattva, rajas, and tamas guṇas), is that which brings salvation. One may point out the similarity of this two-fold classification, Candrānanda's VSc 9.28 where ārṣajñāna, the 'intuitive knowledge of ṛṣis', encountered also among 'common people' (laukika), is distinguished from siddhadarśana, a kind of 'occult knowledge' that uses specific substances to enhance its powers. In order to explain the function of Sāṃkhya soteriology, one needs therefore to dwell exclusively on the 'internal knowledge' (sattvikam, abhyantara) or, as Vacaspatimiśra calls it in Tattvakaumudi (TKv 64), the 'very pure' knowledge (viśuddha). Such knowledge is said to be devoid of doubt

480 Furtado, 1992, p. 177.
481 It is the interpretation given by Furtado, 1992, p. 177, on SKg 23.
482 SKg 23, gives three synonyms for jñāna: 'illuminated' (prakāśa), 'understanding' (avagama), and 'perception' (bhāna). Both SK 13 and SKg 13, associated prakāśa with sattvas (sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakaṃ ca yadā sattvamutkaṭaṃ bhavati tadā laghūnyaṅgāni buddhiprakāśaś ca prasannatendriyāṇāṃ bhavati /)
483 As Furtado states, 1992, p. 177, the difference between them is that between scientific knowledge (tāmasa) and salvific knowledge (sāttvika), or like that between 'knowing good', versus 'becoming good' knowledge.

and error.[484] Soteriological knowledge is thus 'sattvic knowledge', or 'ontological knowledge', it is intuitive (like ārṣajñāna in VSc 9.29), and internal, a knowledge centred primarily on the very nature of puruṣa, made 'from the perspective of puruṣa'.[485] It is the 'knowledge of the self about itself' as being radically different from anything else, including 'subtle body' (sūkṣmaśarīra).[486] It is this latter static knowledge, to which Gauḍapāda refers when SKg 44 says that 'the knowledge that produces liberation (apavarga) is the knowledge of the twenty-five tattvas, after which the subtle body disappears':

SKg 44: kiṃca jñānena cāpavargaśca pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ tena nimittenāpavargo mokṣaḥ tataḥ sūkṣmaṃ śarīraṃ nivartate paramātmā ucyate.[487]

The twenty-five tattvas occur in many places throughout Gauḍapāda's gloss on SK.[488] The knowledge is identified as 'study, analysis' (abhyāsa)[489] of tattvas, that distinguishes puruṣa from tattvas. The bondage seems to be the opposite of that, namely the cognitive confusion of identifying puruṣa with these tattvas. Moreover, the 'knowledge of tattvas' (tattvābhyāsa) seems to help puruṣa to isolate from identifying itself even with statements such as 'I am not and I am not becoming', 'this body is not mine because I am one thing, and [body] is another thing…':

[484] Tattvakaumudī, ed. 1896, p. 107.
[485] Furtado, 1992, p. 180.
[486] On sūkṣmaśarīra see SKg16, 42, 44, 51-52, 55, 62.
[487] Trans. Esnoul, 1964, p. 56.
[488] SKg 4-5, 17, 22, 44, 51, 55,
[489] via Larson, 1969, p. 223.

SKg 64: evamuktena kramena pañcaviṃśatitattvālocanābhyāsādiyaṃ prakṛtirayaṃ puruṣa etāni pañcatanmātrendriyamahābhūtānīti puruṣasya jñānamutpadyate nāsti nāhameva bhavāmi na me mama śarīraṃ tadyato'hamanyaḥ…[490]

The epistemological method here is clearly that of differentiation which, is by far the most developed in the first two adhyāyas of Candrānanda's VSc. Finally, like VSc 10.21, in SK too, we have summarised the whole teaching of the treatise. Just before the colophon (SK 70-72), SK 69 informs that the knowledge handed down by the sage (paramaṛṣina), and given for the sake of puruṣa [on whose knowledge, we may add, liberation depends, SKg 69],[491] contains three aspects: 1) 'existence' (sthita), 'origination' (utpatti) and 'dissolution' (pralaya). To conclude, the soteriological knowledge expounded by Sāṃkhya is an ontological knowledge par excellence; and that is the case in all ontological enumeration of Vaiśeṣika system, in which Kaṇāda's dravyas (VS 1.1.4), and Candrānanda's padārthas (VSc 1.1.6), are important objects of inquiry.

[490] Trans. Esnoul, 1964, p. 73.

[491] SKg 69: puruṣārtho mokṣastadarthaṃ jñānamidaṃ guhyaṃ rahasyaṃ paramarṣiṇā śrīkapilarṣiṇā samākhyātaṃ samyaguktaṃ yatra jñāne bhūtānāṃ vaikārikāṇāṃ sthityutpattipralayā avasthānāvirbhāvatirobhāvāś cintyante vicāryante yeṣāṃ vicārāt samyak pañcaviṃśatitattvavivecanātmikā sampadyate saṃvittiriti.

3.5. PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ

Though Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is a realistic school of thought, rather than ontology, it is epistemology (theory of perception) and the doctrine of the self, two areas where this tradition resembles Vaiśeṣika. In this section the main inquiry is focused on Prābhākara, and the school he generated, and the extent to which his views on perception, self, and liberation resemble Candrānanda. In his doctoral thesis on the Prābhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Jhā states that as regards liberation there does not appear to be much difference between Kumārila and Prābhākara's tenets.[492] Now we know that Prābhākara, a commentator almost contemporary with Candrānanda, takes a more innovative approach within his tradition which inevitably sets him in a controversy with the more popular Kumārila, against whose doctrine he writes two commentaries, a concise one called Laghvī (or Vivaraṇa) and an extended one Bṛhatī (called Nibandhana).[493] Their respective soteriology, and specific emphasis they lie (either on karma, or the nature of soul), recalls the difference between Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣikasūtra, respectively.[494] Kumārila stresses the elimination of sukha in liberation state (as NS does), while Prābhākara 'the singularity of the soul in its own form after all its specific qualities have been destroyed' (VSc).[495] They also differ on the nature of the state of the soul in liberation, which soul according to Kumārila possesses an inactive

[492] Thesis (PhD), University of Allahabad, 1911. Republished with Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978.
[493] The difference between Kumārila and Prābhākara is proved also by the debate that existed between them. Kumārila writes two commentaries on ŚB, and Prābhākara responds by writing two commentaries on ŚBh as well (a short one Laghvī (apparently first written), and a long one Bṛhatī (in response to Kumārila), Garge, 1952, p. 9. After Jhā's pioneering work on Prābhākara, there has been a disagreement between scholars as to which of the Prābhākara's commentaries, Śālikanātha refer to. Jhā 1911, says Vivaraṇa is Bṛhatī; but Chintamani (1933) has shown from other sources, that Vivaraṇa is Laghvī (whence Śālikanātha's Dipasikhapañcikā) and Nibandhana is Bṛhatī (whence Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala); to which view Raja agrees, 1936 (Intro. to Bṛhatī p. 17).
[494] While Nyāya's stress is on the elimination of the twenty-one forms of pain, Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, focuses on the elimination of self's vaiśeṣikaguṇas.
[495] See Introduction p. L, and p. 214-15, in Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭapāda's Mānameyodaya (NMM).

cognitive faculty (in potentiality), while according to Prābhākara the liberated soul lacks any form of such cognition, much like Vaiśeṣikas' doctrine. The difference shows the striking similarity of Prābhākara's soteriology to Candrānanda's (VSc 1.1.6). Potter places Prābhākara's writing activity around the beginning of the eighth century,[496] while that of Candrānanda in the middle of the ninth century AD.[497] The internal evidence of VSc however, shows that Candrānanda must have been closer to earlier doctrines, like that of Praśastapāda's PD (530 AD) and Candramati's DP (550 AD).[498] Therefore, another reason for a comparison between Prābhākara and Candrānanda begins from the presupposition that such commentators could well have been contemporary. In this section, we look at Prābhākara's soteriology, which resembles Candrānanda's, both in terms of the doctrine of self (ātman composed of specific qualities), 'theory of knowledge', as well as the 'nature of liberation'.

Prābhākara's takes up the soteriological discussion in Bṛhatī (one of his commentaries on Śābara's' Bhāṣya), subsequently developed by Śālikanātha's independent commentary Prakaraṇapañcikā (Pañcikā).[499] He discusses niḥśreyasa in places where Śābara does it too.[500] There are two main reasons why this 'soteriology' expounded by Prābhākara is close to Vaiśeṣika: first, Prābhākara sees the nature of the self (as a mere 'esse', 'sat')[501] a separate entity from its guṇas. He distinguishes himself from Kumārila for whom, soul is not only a 'substratum of cognition'[502] and 'object of

[496] Potter, Encyc. Vol 1, p. 125, dates him around 700 AD.
[497] Potter Encyc. Vol 1, p. 194, dates him around 850 AD. Though with a question mark '?', I am a bit surprised that Potter puts at the same time as the much more sophisticated Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamanjarī (approx. 870 AD) Although, it is rather surprising that Candrānanda, whose style is rather simple, is 'contemporary' to the sophisticated Nyāya work of Jayanta's Nyāyamanjarī
[498] On Candrānanda's familiarity with Praśastapāda's PD, Thakur, Introd. 1961, VSc, p. 105; 110; see Nozawa 1993, footnotes.
[499] See earlier footnote on Prābhākara's commentaries on ŚBh.
[500] We take for instance some of these passages, which come from the Madras edition of 1934.
[501] Jhā 1911, p. 81.
[502] Kumārila commentary on ŚV, Ātmavāda, 110.

'I' cognition',[503] but also it is of the nature of pure consciousness.[504] The difference between the two commentators stems from Prābhākara's 'theory of triple perception' (tripuṭipratyakṣavāda) according to which cognition is an adventitious quality of the soul, alongside the five senses, manas, and body, all of which are external to the soul. The perception process works similarly in Vaiśeṣika (VSc 9.15). Prābhākara distinguishes three main factors: 1) the nominative agent (the soul; kartā); 2) the accusative or objective factor (karma), and 3) the cognition factor (kriyā).[505] Both soul and object (which are not self-luminous) depend on cognition itself (which is self-revealed).[506] In Candrānanda, on the other hand, we have a similar theory under the designation of 'caturārthasannikarṣa' (VSc 3.2.1; 5.2.16, 9.15), which stems from the same composite view of self which Prābhākara maintains. Curiously, both Candrānanda and Prābhākara accept the same number of dravyas; and both reject with the same kind of argument tamas as a possible additional substance.[507] In this cosmological framework, ātman is accounted among substances, and 'cognition' (buddhi) is, as in Vaiśeṣika, explained as being produced neither by ātman, nor by manas separately, but only by 'contact' between manas and ātman. This contact is what produces buddhi, sukha, duḥkha and other specific qualities of ātman.[508] If, as Jhā rendered the liberation in Prābhākara being the existence of the soul 'as a mere 'esse', 'sat', it then follows that whatever is not intrinsic to this 'esse', is discarded altogether with the 'other special

[503] Kumārila commentary on ŚV, Ātmavāda, 126; Śāstradīpikā, p. 101.
[504] Kumārila commentary on ŚV Ātmavāda, 73; References are from Jhā, 1911, p. 80. The view is closer to Vedānta.
[505] Compare, Jhā, 1911, p. 78 and Bhatt, 1989, p. 59. As for the cognition, there seems to be a difference between samvit and jñāna.
[506] Bhatt, 1989, p. 59.
[507] Tamas is not a substance, but only the absence of light, see VSc 5.2.21. Jhā, 1911, pp. 143-45, draws his information from Prakaraṇapañcikā, (section 'prameyaparayana'); for 'categories' he says to rely on Sarvasidhantarahasya.
[508] Jhā, 1911, p. 92.

qualities of the ātman'.[509] Narayana's NMM, which is a Bhaṭṭa tradition commentary, refutes such view on liberation as follows:

NMM 2.2.116: etena sakalabuddhyādiviśeṣāguṇavilaye satyātmanaḥ svarupavasthanāṁ mokṣa iti prābhākaramatamapi nirasthaṃ veditavyam sukha vilayādapuruṣārthatvasya tulyatvāt.[510]

The passage draws attention chiefly because the compound used 'sakalabuddhyādiviśeṣāguṇavilaye' announces the 'total' (sakala) 'dissolution' (vilaya) of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas, such as 'buddhi' and so on (-ādi). Destruction of vaiśeṣikaguṇas is a core doctrine in Vaiśeṣika soteriology. The startling similarity with Candrānanda is when Prābhākara talks about soul as having eight (or nine) vaiśeṣikaguṇas, in exactly the same order laid down by VSc 3.2.17: buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, adṛṣṭa (dharma and adharma), and saṃskāra.[511] Further possible reciprocal influences between Prābhākaras and Vaiśeṣikas could be encountered in another commentary as well; Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala (RJ), one of the two commentaries on Prābhākara's Bṛhatī (BR), shows acquaintance with Candrānanda's VSc.[512] Within the discussion of mind

[509] Jhā, 1911, p. 93, does not supply any reference to where this comes from, but in his bibliography p. 18, he mentions that for Prābhākara (Bṛhatī) and Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala, he has used MS, the former coming from Asiatic Society of Bengal, while for the second he mentions nothing more than: 'MS with present writer'.

[510] Trans. Raja and Sastri, p. 214: 'by this, it must be understood, there is refuted the doctrine of the followers of Prābhākara that there is release when the soul remains in its own nature, after all specific qualities like knowledge, etc., are destroyed; because if there is destruction of happiness, the defect of being other than a human goal is common.' NMM 2.2.116 also adds: 'satat'ordhvagamanādayastu dūrāpāstāḥ teṣāmaparapuruṣārthatvasya spaṣṭatvāt'; which may be a reference possibly to another system, like Jaina, where salvation is an upward going to the soul.

[511] Jhā, 1978, p. 76; he does not provide the original Sanskrit quotations for its presentation, nor accurate references, but offers only a presentation directly from a MS reading which he consulted and presented on p. 18. Presumably the Bengal MS on Prābhākara's Bṛhatī I-1.

[512] Here I use Benares, ed. 1929.

functioning, Śālikanātha quotes twice Kaṇāda's Sūtrapāṭha, sūtra 4.1.12,[513] and 5.1.1, respectively.[514] The most striking similarity is Prābhākara's doctrine on soul, which is seen as 'cogniser' (bhoktā), and understood as being different from body (the 'abode of experience'), different from sense-organs (which are instruments of experience), different from objects of experience (internal and external), and different from perception (buddhi). In presenting Prābhākara's doctrine on soul, Jhā does not provide, however, any passage from the MS which he consulted.[515]

THE FUNCTION OF SOTERIOLOGY. In his study on Prābhākara, Jhā presents the function of soteriology in six stages.[516] Shastri takes a similar view, but with a corrigenda that Kumārila, unlike Prābhākara, accepts bliss in the liberation state, in a latent form of consciousness.[517] The passage to which they both refer is from Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanāthamiśra, and like VSc 10.21 and 1.1.6, describes liberation in stages. In the school of Prābhākara, these stages are: 1) Disgust (udvijati) from the sukha of the world of saṃsāra. 2) Realisation of sukha as mixed with duḥkha. 3) The striving for liberation (mokṣāya uttiṣṭhate). 4) Ending performance of acts that are prohibited (niṣiddha), or those producing desire (kāma). 5) Exhausting dharma and adharma previously stored, by undergoing experiences resulting from them. 6) Destruction of the 'abode of experience' by the knowledge of ātman, the practice of self-control (e.g. brahmacarya), and the observance of injunctions which the Scriptures prescribe. The liberation

513 Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala (Benares, 1929), p. 76 (VS 4.1.12: saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktva saṁyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi).
514 Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala (Benares, 1929), p. 77. (VS 5.1.1: ātma saṁyoga prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma)
515 Jhā, 1911, p. 78. In some of the characteristics of the soul, Prābhākara agrees with Kumārila, on account of the eternality of soul, its distinctness from body, sense organs, buddhi (ŚV Ātmavāda, 7;147).
516 Jhā, 1911, p. 18, Defective referencing; for Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇapañcikā Jhā uses the Benares edition (Caukhambā-Saṁskṛta granthamālā) (possibly from 1904). For Prābhākara he provides a direct description of a MS from the Asiatic Society of Bengal).
517 Shastri, 1923, p. 190.

excludes any return of the soul into the world, or the emergence of another body. The passage that informs about such stages is the following:

Prakaraṇapañcikā, 8, 931-32: 'yaḥ khalu sāṃsārikebhyo duḥkhebhya udivgnaḥ, tadanuṣaṅgaśabalebhyaśca sukhebhyo 'pivigataspṛho, mokṣāya uttiṣṭhate, sa tāvadbandhahetubhūtebhyo niṣiddhebhyaḥ pratyavāya hetubhūtebhyaḥ, kāmyebhyo 'bhyudayasādhanebhyaś ca nivartamānaḥ san, utpannapūrvau dharmadharmau bhogenakṛtvapi kṣayaṁ nayaṅ, śammadama brahmacaryādikāṅgopabṛṃhitena ātmajñānena, na ca punarāvartate ity apunar āvṛttaye coditena, niḥśeṣakarmāśayaṃ nāśayanam mucyate'.[518]

Now if we look over Candrānanda's commentary we see that the stress he places is more gnostic, and dualistic, as regards the soteriological quest. In VSc 1.1.6 for instance, he speaks about the 'true discrimination between the six categories' (evaṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānaṁ VSc 1.1.6), as a prerequisite to niḥśreyasa, and he draws a distinction between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. There are some common points: what Śālikanātha identifies as 'destruction of the abode of experience' may be what VSc 5.2.20 identifies as 'destruction of body' (śarīrasyāprādurbhāva). Moreover, Śālikanātha ascertains the 'knowledge of ātman' (ātmajñāna), as much as Candrānanda does in VSc 10.21 ('ātmā jñātavya'). The difference however, is that VSc does not seem to equate the ascetical practices such as 'self-control', 'brahmacarya', and so on, directly with mokṣa. As Candrānanda discusses in VSc 6.2.1-2, all the Vedic prescriptions ('dṛṣṭa', 'dṛṣṭaprayojanāna', 'dṛṣṭābhāva'),

[518] Shastri, 1923, refers to Prakaraṇapañcikā, possibly Benares edition 1904 p. 156-157; Here I rely however on Gretil transliteration (Śālikanāthamiśra: Prakaraṇapañcikā, with Jayapuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa commentary) and Shastri quotation, 1923, p. 189.

relate to abhyudaya, which, in both Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā context, refers to Brahmāloka (VSc 1.1.2), and 'svarga' (ŚB 6.1.1-2), respectively. The asceticism relates also to the 'theory of karma', to which Śālikanātha alludes (utpannapūrvau dharmadharmau bhogenakṛtvapi kṣayaṁ nayaṅ). Candrānanda also talks about a 'collection' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma, which triggers the return (āvartate) of another body (punar apy ābhyāṁ dharmādharmābhyāṁ śarīrādi saṃyogo vibhāgaś c'ety evam anādir ayaṁ ghaṭī yantravad āvartate jantuḥ) (VSc 6.2.17-18). For Prābhākaras, however, liberation comes only after the exhaustion of the karmic residue produced by the previous actions, which Candrānanda does not seem to explain; for the latter, the distinction between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa is sharp; here we see two soteriologies with two different destinations. They do agree, however, that as far as liberation is concerned, there is no 'return of body' in mokṣa. We must conclude by saying that the pioneering work of Gangānātha Jhā on Prābhākara opens new perspectives on research with regard to the nature of soteriology in both Candrānanda and Prābhākara. Their doctrine of the self, their epistemology, as well as the nature of the liberated self, shows a striking similarity between the two realistic schools.[519] While further description of Prābhākara soteriology needs to be done, it can be assumed that his doctrine on liberation is closer to Vaiśeṣika's than to Kumārila,[520] and it is probable that mutual influences could well have taken place between Vaiśeṣikas and Prābhākaras.

[519] Garge, in his work on Śābara's Bhāṣya, 1952, p. 13, sees a view on self 'more or less like that of the realistic and pluralistic schools, such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika',

[520] As for Kumārila, the synthesis between mokṣa and svarga rings some bells with the synthesis which Candrānanda himself makes with dharma, a concept key for the obtainment of both abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa.

3.6. VEDĀNTA

According to Karl Potter, the approximate date of Śaṅkara's activity is the beginning of the eight century AD;[521] while that of Candrānanda the middle of the ninth century.[522] Several times the Vedānta system engaged polemically with the Vaiśeṣika. A survey of these passages is useful for the reconstruction of the Vaiśeṣika system. Another reason for a Vedānta comparison is the mere exegetical exercise to learn from contrasting views, rather than similarities. Their sharp difference could often shed new light on the understanding of their respective ontology, and soteriology. One such difference is the uncompromising ontological pluralism regarding the nature of the world (reality), where Vaiśeṣika differs sharply from Advaita Vedānta, for the latter school the world being an 'illusion' (māyā, avidya).[523] The only real ontological entity that exists is 'one' par excellence, that is to say Brahman, only. As far as reality is concerned, we have on the one hand a system that acknowledges a hard realistic pluralism (Vaiśeṣika), and on the other, a monistic idealism (Advaita Vedānta). Yet, when it comes to soteriology, Advaita seems to draws closer to Vaiśeṣika, particularly because, similarly to Vaiśeṣika, the nature of the state of liberation is pure and naked. Both systems acknowledge an ontological form of soteriology. Soteriology, as Halbfass puts it, is not 'a becoming' which involves 'action' (karman), and 'transformation' (pariṇāmavāda), nor something to be brought about, but in Advaita Vedānta is only 'the nature and being of Brahman' (BŚB 1.1.4).[524] This ontological view on the state of liberation, not necessarily on the doctrine of soul, is also encountered in Vaiśeṣika. The task of the self is to come to the 'awareness' of

[521] Approx. 710 AD according to Potter Encyc. Vol. 1, p. 127.
[522] Approx. 850 AD, see Potter Encyc. Vol 1, p. 194.
[523] Śaṅkara does not deny the reality to the world; but he just points out of its illusory characteristics; illusion can be translated with superimposition; world is an aggregates of convoluted things, hence is like an illusion.
[524] Halbfass, 1992, p. 45, n 73.

this very ontological truth of the nature of ātman, that Brahman is ontologically indistinct from Ātman, and the only reality that exists.[525] In the gloss to BS 2.3.50, Śaṅkara discusses Vaiśeṣika's doctrine on plurality of the selves, according to these are both 'many' (bahu) and 'all-pervasive' (vibhu), even though these are 'mere substances and unintelligent in themselves' like 'jars' and 'stools' (sati bahutve vibhutve ca ghaṭakuḍyādisamānā dravyamātrasvarūpāḥ svato 'cetanā ātmanastadupakaraṇāni cāṇūni manāṃsyacetanāni).[526] More importantly however is Śaṅkara's account of Vaiśeṣika's liberation, which he describes as 'the absolute non-origination of the nine qualities' (teṣāṃ navānāmātmaguṇānāmatyantānutpādo mokṣa iti kāṇādāḥ). In both cases, the doctrine of the plurality of selves and the state of liberation, Śaṅkara's gives an accurate picture of Vaiśeṣika's doctrine, and agrees with Candrānanda's doctrine expounded in VSc 3.2.17, and VSc 1.1.2. In this section, I attempt to provide a brief outline of Śaṅkara's doctrine of liberation, which like Vaiśeṣika, seems to be what Halbfass calls 'soteriontology'. Between the two systems, there are considerable differences, such as the cognitive versus non-cognitive state of the liberated self (which in Advaita it is called Brahman); this current comparative section will eventually clarify Vaiśeṣika's soteriology.

One striking soteriological similarity with Vaiśeṣika is Śaṅkara's 'doctrine of aggregates' which Thibaut says is eight-fold (BŚB 2.4.6),[527] and which appears to closely resemble the 'doctrine of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas' of Candrānanda (VSc 1.1.2; 3.2.17). The

[525] This definition comes closer, or perhaps should be read on the lines of Aristotle's ontology of 'being qua being'.

[526] Trans. Thibaut, BŚB 2.3.50, 1896 ed. vol. 2, p. 69. (sati bahutve vibhutve ca ghaṭakuḍyādisamānā dravyamātrasvarūpāḥ svato 'cetanā ātmanastadupakaraṇāni cāṇūni manāṃsyacetanāni / tatrātmadravyāṇāṃ manodravyāṇāṃ ca saṃyogānnavecchādayo vaiśeṣikā ātmaguṇā utpadyante / te cāvyatirekeṇa pratyekamātmasu samavayanti sa saṃsāraḥ / teṣāṃ navānāmātmaguṇānāmatyantānutpādo mokṣa iti kāṇādāḥ).

[527] Thibaut in BŚB vol. 2, n 1, p. 83. As in the case of prāṇas, the number is problematic; therefore, following the exegetic method of Śaṅkara stated in BŚB 2.4.6, p. 80, the higher number has to be accepted.

group of eight aggregates are: 1) prāṇas (seven or more); 2) subtle elements (five); 3) organs of 'intellect' (buddhi) (five + five); 4) organs of action (five); 5) manas (with its functions); 6) avidyā (māyā); 7) kāma (desire); and 8) karma (works that depend on 'false knowledge' BŚB 4.1.19).[528] The major relevance of this action of aggregates is that they explain the problem of bondage; in fact, these are being discussed under the same context. The organs of actions such as utsarga, viharaṇa, have major implications in the eighth group of aggregates (karma), while 'begetting' (anda) has major implications in the seventh group of aggregate of desire (avidyā, māyā) which the latter category is held responsible for the 'modification' (vivarta) of the world due to ignorance and illusion. As in the case of grahas, which are 'bonds by which individual self is tied' (BŚB 2.4.6), the organs of actions keep the self in bondage too. Now we know that in the presence of action, soul cannot escape saṃsāra.[529] While commenting on Br Up. 3.2.13, he explains that bondage consists of 'senses and their objects', called grahas and atigrāha (tatra karmaprayuktasya graha atigrahasaṃjñakastha indriyaviṣayātmakasya bandhanasya pravṛttiḥ iti karmāśrayatā uktā).[530] The context is that which clarifies the 'elemental composition' of the body made of three mahābhūtas (VSc 4.2) and its transmigration into another body composition. Thus, the question of aggregates relates closely to the question of 'body composition' and its subsequent transmigration or decomposition. As Potter shows, in order to explain the 'law of karma', and transmigration, Śaṅkara's Advaita lays much emphasis on the 'subtle body'; thus, the knowledge of the group of

[528] Karma may refer more broadly to the law of karma, or 'aggregates of works' which produce attachment, clinging, and return to the world (presumably transmigration) as per Br Up. 4.4.6. (Olivelle, ed. 2008). The number of each one of these is problematic, but that should not carry much weight in the current discussion; what matters is that the individual soul (kṣetrajña) is 'tied' with some of these aggregates, or 'bonds of grahas' ('graspers' such as 'hand' etc., Br Up. 3.2.8). Śaṅkara seems to include them in the group of such aggregates (BŚB 2.4.6. p. 83). 'Grahas' refer to senses and organs, as well as prāṇas, such as 'out-breath', 'in-breath' (corresponding to smell), or mind-graha and its 'atigrāha', desire.

[529] Śaṅkara makes it clear in BŚB 4.2.6; See Potter 1980.

[530] Trans. Thibaut, p. 369. The discussion of bondage is in the context of discussing the second groups of aggregates the five elements mahābhūtas, of which the types of śarīras are composed, as per VSc 4.2.

aggregates constitute the ontological knowledge of the soul from non-soul. The aggregates have been classified in such a way as to differentiate soul from non-soul, so that the awareness of the only true-reality that exists ('Brahman is Ātman'), may be finally realised and dwelled upon. When completed, the state of mokṣa is reached.

SOTERIONTOLOGY. The state of soteriology in Advaita is an ontological one (identity of Brahman). As such, the question of the nature of reality, cosmos, in relation to the nature of Brahman, becomes in Advaita a recurrent epistemological concern. To maintain the reality of both is a nonsense, since, as Śaṅkara's non-dualism puts it, there is nothing beyond Brahman that ultimately exists. Yet, avidyā, or māyā, designations for the world, do not mean that Advaita is not a realistic school; as long as Advaita recognises the single reality of Brahman, Advaita remains a 'realistic' school, hence the importance of existence and ontology within the system. Like Vaiśeṣika, the ontological classification of the group of aggregates discussed earlier serves in Advaita a soteriological agenda.[531] The ontology becomes soteriology (soteriontology), and, as a result, I shall outline in the following section the main ontological characteristics of the liberation state; it represents also an aspect in which Śaṅkara differs greatly from Candrānanda. Grounded on the Upaniṣads (e.g. 'This Self is Brahman', Br Up. 2.5.19), Śaṅkara uses Ātman and Brahman interchangeably (BŚB 1.1.4). The ontology of liberation is stated in many passages, of which we select the gloss BS 1.1.4 that clarifies from the start what liberation is: 'mokṣa is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure' (nityāśuddhabrahmasvarūpatvānmokṣasya).[532] Therefore, the nature of the Ātman is to be free from the imagination of the impermanence of release, free from avidyā, free from doṣas of non-eternal things, and mokṣa is of the nature of the eternally free self:

[531] That is also the case in Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda as shown in a separate section.
[532] Thibaut, p. 33.

ato 'vidyā kalpita saṃsāritva nivartanena nitya muktātma svarūpa samarpaṇān na mokṣasyā nityatva doṣaḥ.[533]

Liberation is inherently and ontologically part of the self. It is not a 'becoming', but rather the return to the state of being. It is not a process achievable through ceremonial works, but on the contrary, it is realised through the knowledge and awareness of being (doctrine of the self), and nature of things (ontology, reality). As such, the state of mokṣa (mukti) has the following characteristics: 1) Mokṣa is the state of Ātman as one with Brahman (BŚB 1.1.1);[534] at this stage, the 'embodied self' has lost the eight-fold aggregates (BŚB 2.4.6, p. 83); 2) It is an eternally and essentially disembodied state of ātman (ata' mokṣākhyamaśarīratvaṃ nityamiti siddham) (BŚB 1.1.4);[535] 3) ātman is eternally free from anything; (nityamuktātmasvarūpasamarpaṇānna).[536] 4) Mokṣa is a state of self where suffering does not exist (BŚB 2.2.10);[537] 5) it is the separation/differentiation (vilakṣaṇa) from the fruits of action (evānuṣṭheyakarmaphalavilakṣaṇaṃ) (BŚB 1.1.4);[538] 6) Mokṣa is cessation of all bondage BŚB 4.4.2.[539] 7) Mokṣa is separated from time, space, and special causes.[540] 8) Mokṣa is the bliss of Brahman (BŚB 1.1.19), bliss being the very nature of the self.[541]

---

533 Thibaut, p. 32.

534 BŚB 1.1.1: sarvasyātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ /sarvo hyātmāstitvaṃ pratyeti, na nāhamasmīti. Here Śaṅkara proves the existence of ātman and Brahman as present in all people who are conscious of the existence of 'I'. Trans. Thibaut, p. 14; See also BŚB 2.2.10. This argument is used by Candrānanda too in VSc 3.1.

535 Trans. Thibaut BŚB, vol. 1, p. 28.

536 Trans. Thibaut BŚB 1.1.4, vol. 1. p. 32; freedom being a 'quality of the self' (svātmadharma), BŚB 1.1.4, vol. 1, p. 33.

537 BŚB, vol. 1. p. 378.

538 BŚB, vol. 1, p. 28.

539 BŚB, vol. 2, p. 406.

540 BŚB, vol. 2, p. 356.

541 Br Up. 3.9.28; Taitt Up. 2.8; the question of bliss may be related to the metaphor of mokṣa is like reaching the sun (vol. 1, p. 232); that Brahman is bliss see also BŚB vol. 1, p. 65, 67, 75; or that bliss is the nature of soul (vol. 1, p. 168).

From the brief outline here, the chief characteristic of Advaita's mokṣa is that the individual soul realises an absolute identification with Brahman, a state that represents its own ontological nature. This presupposes that no matter, no body, nor even an aggregated, or concrete form of the self, would survive in the mukti state. The ontology in Advaita is hierarchical.[542] Cosmos seems to be a 'generative convolution' deriving from the ultimate generator Brahman, therefore the scope of the individual self is to go back to its pre-genetic state. The individual self mingles, or get confused with a cosmos, and acquires as a result an aggregated 'subtle body' composed, as in Candrānanda (VSc 4.2), of three elements: fire, water, and earth (BŚB 3.1.4). These elements, which compose the subtle body, as well as other groups of aggregates, represent soul's 'bondage' in a convoluted world of māyā and avidyā. Bondage is thus better named as 'intellectual confusion', rather than temporal bondage of the individual self; therefore, liberation cannot depend on space, time, or other 'special causes', like fruits of actions usually do: na ca deśakālanimittāpekṣo mokṣaḥ karmaphalavat bhavitum arhati (BŚB 4.1.13). In order to liberate itself, the self needs to appeal to knowledge. Some similar views, on both the nature of the soul and liberation, are echoed in Sūtrapāṭha too, which preserves both the doctrine of the all-pervasive soul (VSc 7.1.28-29), and that of the individual size (VSc 3.2.16). Like Advaita, liberation in Vaiśeṣika is a return to the original ontological state of soul, but with the difference that such return to its vibhu state, is not complete identification, but rather relocation. Like the vaiśeṣikaguṇas, the individuality of the self is adventitious only, therefore not permanent, which means that

[542] The cosmology of Advaita is vertical, somehow similar to Sāṃkhya's: the five mahābhūtas originate in a hierarchical manner: earth originates from water (BŚB 2.3.12; Taitt Up. 2.1.; Br Up. 1.2.2); water originates from fire (BŚB 2.3.11; Kh Up, 6.2.3; Taitt Up, 2.1), fire originates from air (BŚB 2.3.10; Taitt Up. 2.1), and air originates from ether (BŚB 2.3.8), which ether is dissolved into the Brahman (BŚB 2.3.14) or subordinated to soul (BŚB 2.4.10); by contrast, soteriology follows the route from the most concrete to the most subtle of the existence of ātman.

ātman in Vaiśeṣika is an all-pervasive substance located temporarily within a body until its mokṣa is fully realised.

3.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have drawn some comparisons with several soteriologies of āstika and nāstika systems, which Vaiśeṣika resembles. It occurs throughout that Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Jaina, have a dualistic understanding of soteriology, where soul must separate radically from the contamination of matter. These must have a very remote, if not a common origin, either Upaniṣadic or Śramaṇic. In terms of methodology, I have looked at Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda whose method analysis of world's constituents in 75 dharmas, is akin to Vaiśeṣika's. There are possible mutual Kaśmirian influences here; Vaibhāṣika were realists and had, like the Vaiśeṣikas, a tripartite ontology ('composite' and 'non-composite' dharmas, with ākāśa in the middle). DP of Candramati, has been preserved only in Chinese, and it might well have been possible that the Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas took a genuine interest in Vaiśeṣika. There is also a strikingly similar doctrine of the liberated soul in Prābhākara, most possibly a contemporary of Candrānanda. It is worth inquiring further, how Prābhākara arrived, quite differently from its tradition, at the doctrine of the liberated soul devoid of buddhi and specific qualities. Finally, we found in Śaṅkara's' Bhāṣya a wealth of information on Vaiśeṣika's doctrine. All in all, the role of epistemological discrimination is paramount. There is little doubt that in Indian philosophy, soteriology lays on two big foundations: epistemology and ontology. Though we may conclude that such systems were gnostic as their emphasis on epistemology was widespread, in Vaiśeṣika's case, knowledge seems to have

only a functional, not a final role; once mokṣa is attained, both knowledge (jñāna) and cognition (buddhi) disappear together with the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas.

4.0. INTRODUCTION.

In his major study on Vaiśeṣika,[543] Halbfass, to whom we owe the most insightful reading of the system, leaves the problem of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology open.[544] While referring, only in passing, to Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism, he mentions 'soteriontology', a term that designates a specific kind of soteriology, whose nature and function lies in a deep inquiry into the ontology of reality, which, if we are to shift the investigation onto Vaiśeṣika grounds, it is primarily the substance ātman understood as a different entity from all other world's constitutents. Such a state, and the whole of its ontological framework, centres on the 'nature of being' (sattā, tattva), that is ātman, as a permanent substance, at the expense of the Vedic ritualistic and theological questions exemplified by abhyudaya, that seems to play a lesser role within Vaiśeṣika's theory of salvation. The current chapter focuses on the ontological soteriology of Vaiśeṣika, namely the state of liberation, as well as the nature of the liberated self. It also focusses on whether Vaiśeṣika, and particularly its earliest extant commentary (Candrānanda's Vṛtti), had a soteriology, and to take up the soteriological question unanswered by Halbfass; it also aims to provide a closer soteriological reading of both Sūtrapāṭha of Kaṇāda (VS) and Candrānanda commentary (VSc) starting from the textual-critical state of sources updated by Isaacson and Ruzsa. Yet, the methodology I apply belongs to Halbfass, it is a thematic, textual, and comparative philosophical inquiry of a theological

[543] Halbfass, On Being and What There Is, 1992. See bibliography.
[544] In the epilogue of his work, Halbfass 1992, p. 234, explains: 'exploring the role and significance of 'negative ontology' and 'soteriontology' in the Indian tradition, and its search for non-representational, non-conceptual, non-possessive ways of thinking, has not been the purpose of this study'.

theme (salvation), but not necessarily philological as was the case with Isaacson and Ruzsa's research. Since the topic is 'the nature of Vaiśeṣika soteriology' the ontological questions related to the 'state', 'being', and 'manifestation' of the self, will lead us to concentrate on the ontology of the system, rather than on its highly problematic theology, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

PART I: STATIC DIMENSION

4.1. BRAHMĀLOKA. A STATE OF LIBERATION? (VSC 1.1.2)

While explaining dharma as a means to soteriology, Candrānanda draws, in VSc 1.1.2, a line of separation between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. The difference between the two is that the former represents a 'space' (loka) devoid of calamities, an affective place in which one 'wishes to obtain another body', presumably the body of Brahmāloka. This state is abhyudaya (abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣu c'eṣṭaśarīraprāptiḥ anarth'oparamaś ca). Loka, if Candrānanda used it in a Vedic way, has several usages, such as 'room', 'open space', 'safety', 'well being', 'position', or 'special sphere'.[545] Yet the question is whether in VSc Brahmāloka represents a static or dynamic place, from where there is no saṁsāric return, of which Praśastapāda says, it happens.[546] Candrānanda does not seem to be clear on this matter, not least because he presents dharma as a connector of the two, in which case there is the question as to whether Brahmāloka and abhyudaya is, as in Advaita, a place where there is no return, but an identification. One should therefore must look

[545] Gonda, 1966, pp. 25-32.

[546] PD 318: aviduṣo rāgadveṣavataḥ pravartakāddharmāt prakṛṣṭāt svalpādharmasahitāt brahmendra prajāpati pitṛmanuṣyalokeṣv āśayānurūpair iṣṭaśarīrendriya viṣayasukhādibhir yogo bhavati / tathā prakṛṣṭād adharmāt svalpadharmasahitāt pretatiryagyonisthāneṣv aniṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayaduhkhābhir yogo bhavati / evaṁ pravṛttilakṣaṇād dharmād adharmasahitād devamanuṣyatiryaṅnārakeṣu punaḥ punaḥ saṃsārabandho bhavati. Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 599.

for clues and connect the dots in disparate passages. One is the definition of mokṣa in the same gloss, according to which it is in the 'form of absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas' (VSc 1.1.1). In VSc 3.2.17, Candrānanda finally provides the list of these nine guṇas,[547] which have a general affective and mental characteristic, common to an embodied state of self. Prayatna and icchā correspond to 'desire' (of outerword body), which are characteristic of the abhyudaic state of Brahmāloka. Once the two passages are synchronised, the logical inference from VSc becomes simpler, Brahmāloka is an affective state, and since it contains a body (śarīra) as VSc 1.1.2 states, it is therefore incompatible with mokṣa, which is a state of complete absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas. The view of the difference in degree and quality between Brahmāloka (or abhyudaya) and mokṣa (niḥśreyasa) is an old one, and reminds one of the Upaniṣadic versus Vedic path of liberation. Moreover, the difference is reconfirmed by a later Vaiśeṣika commentary as well, in Vādīndra's Vyākhyā (thirteenth century AD) which distinguishes between a 'heavenly pleasurable state' (svargādisukhasukha) identified with abhyudaya, and a liberated state (mukti), called niḥśreyasa.[548] Indeed, both VSv 1.1.2 and VSc 1.1.2 agree that abhyudaya is the Vedic svarga, and Brahmāloka, respectively. The addition, which Vādīndra supplements, is the reference to sukha in the heaven, whereas Candrānanda more in tune with Naiyāyikas, is concerned only with the 'removal of calamities', for which the 'desire to obtain body in Brahmāloka' (abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣu c'eṣṭaśarīraprāptiḥ anarth'oparamaś ca), might be a solution. Whatever might be the case, Brahmāloka has

[547] VSc 3.2.17: tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkh'ecchādveṣaprayatnādṛṣṭa saṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ. Like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda also recognises in adṛṣṭa two vaiśeṣikaguṇas: dharma and adharma VSc 1.1.5.

[548] Here the gloss, VSv 1.1.2: yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ / VSv: abhyudayaḥ svargādisukhaṁ / niḥśreyasaṁ muktiḥ / tayoḥ siddhiḥ utpattiryataḥ / utpattimataḥ kāraṇa sambandha sambandhyāvyabhicārād yata ityuktam / svargāpavargāvasmat pratyakṣa aniṣṭa guṇatvāvantara jāti rahita guṇajanyau janimattvāt / yadittthaṃ tattathā / yathā patanam / tathā cemau / tattasthā.' (The commentary Vādīndra's Vyākhyā (VSv) is preserved in two versions: 1) 'extended version' (Mss GOML, Madras); and 2) 'short version' edited by Thakur at Darbhanga in 1957, this text represents alongside VSc, a major document for Vaiśeṣika system (both VSc and VSv are not translated into English).

therefore a Vedic and cosmological connotation, and corresponds most probably to 'svarg' (heaven);[549] the particle '-ādi' (etc.) might point to the existence of other worlds as well. Candrānanda mentions in VSc 4.2.3 Varuṇaloka too; it is in one āhnika that classifies bodies (śarīra) in multiple regions (anekadeśa) according to their atomic composition (VSc 4.2.4). Presumably, between such bodies there is a classification that distinguishes these according to their specific dharma (VSc 4.2.5). This gradation relates in both Candrānanda and Vādīndra, to the question of dharma, which must imply a theory of transmigration, or bondage. In VSv 6.2.16, for instance, Vādīndra glosses that the 'bonds of body' (śarīrādibandha), are preceded by dharma and adharma which in their turn are preceded by rāgaviśeṣa.[550] It seems that the bodies are classified in a cosmological hierarchy according to their material composition, each body is made of atoms corresponding to the respective world that it inhabits (anekadeśāḥ paramāṇavaḥ) (VSc 4.2.4); 'aqueous body' in the Varuṇaloka (VSc 4.2.3), Aṅgiras' body made of carbon (VSc 4.2.7),[551] or Brahmāloka (VSc 1.1.2).[552] This is similar to the Vedic cosmology, where one can see a clear gradation of heavenly realms ranging from the 'intermediate space' (antarikṣaṁ) to the 'celestial light' (jyotis), say AV 4.11.3, in VSc too, one can see a classification of bodies according to several criteria, such as their 'atomic composition' (VSc 4.2.3), their 'birth region' (deśa) (VSc 4.2.4), their 'dharma' (VSc 4.2.5), their 'function' (kārya) (VSc 4.2. 6), their 'term' (samākhyā) (VSc 4.2.7), or their specific 'name'

[549] Not to be confused with 'div-', which is the created sky by gods (RV 10.121.9). For a larger discussion on 'svarg': Gonda, 1966, p. 73, f. 2.

[550] Obviously, when Isaacson refers to '-ādi' as designating apūrva (Vādīndra's VSv, p. 98), he translates it with Candrānanda in mind, namely VS 6.2.16 (where 'raga' varies according to each 'jāti') and VSc 6.2.17 where dharma and adharma are preceded by icchā and dveṣa. Isaacson provides a different numbering from Thakur edition (1957): VSv 6.2.16: rāgaviśeṣaprayuktadharmādharmābhyāmapūrvaśarīrādibandhaḥ.

[551] The group of Aṅgiras priests occurs in Rig Vedas (where they are called for instance 'sons of heaven' 3.53.7), but also in Upaniṣads, where they are described as the possessors of the two-fold knowledge handed down to them from Brahman via Atharvan; according to their instruction given to Śaunaka the lower knowledge consists of Vedas and Vedāṅgas sciences, while the higher knowledge consists of imperishable or eternal things Mu. Up. 1.1. (Olivelle, 1996, p. 268; 406).

[552] Vādīndra (VSv 6.1.3) talks about Brahmins created in the beginning of the world, as well as about knowledge of 'brahmahood' (brāhmanatvādijñāna) obtained from the God's favour, trans. Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 83.

(saṁjñā) (VSc 4.2.8). Candrānanda makes the classification of bodies in the context of a discussion of body formation, which can be womb-born, and not-womb born (pārthivaṁ tu yonijam ayonijaṁ ca), of which not-womb born are made of atoms (VSc 4.2.4). The most probable indicator that Brahmāloka is an equivalent to the Vedic svarga, is the reference to 'sacrifice' (yāga) and 'ghee' (ājya) by Candrānanda in VSc 1.1.2, where he mentions various sacrifices and devotional injunctions (yāgadevatāpūja, ājyapuṣpa).[553] As Atharva Veda (AV) 9.5.17 illustrates, heaven, often portrayed as 'gods' dwelling place', is achievable through the performance of sacrifices.[554] As for the state of the 'removal of calamities' (anarth'oparama), this may well be equivalent to a positive state where qualities such as duḥkha, and dveṣa, are no longer felt. However superior Brahmāloka appears, this state remains under the auspices of 'positive' qualities; this however is not liberation, because as VSc 1.1.2 explains, niḥśreyasa is the exclusive 'state of ātman' (samadhyātmana), in the form (rūpa) of total absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas.[555] Abhyudaya and its correspondent Brahmāloka, which is a 'positive' and 'spatial' soteriological concept, involving body, and an affective state, is far from being niḥśreyasa, which is 'negative in ambit'.[556] The latter involves only the existence of pure ātman, divested of all its vaiśeṣikaguṇas, which keeps it entangled in saṃsāra. For Vaiśeṣikas ātman is ultimately a dravya (one among the nine as per VS 1.1.5) which can only subsists eternally in a purely ontological state.

---

[553] On VS 1.1.2 and gloss, see Synopsis to VSc.

[554] AVŚ 9.5.17a: yénā sahásraṃ váhasi yénāgne sarvavedasám / AVŚ 9.5.17c: ténemáṃ yajñáṃ no vaha svàr devéṣu gántave. Here I rely on Gonda's rendering, 1966, p. 76, hence I assume that abhyudaya is an 'achievable place' (loka); VSc does not specify more as to whether Brahmāloka is the supreme state of liberation. Most probably, Vaiśeṣika remains faithful to the Vedic cosmology in that it accepts a whole hierarchy of cosmic layers, or 'heavens' (as AV 4.14.3 does). The difference between abhyudaya as a place of heaven and niḥśreyasa, as a state of the self completely removed from sense-objects, affective states, and bodies, proves that liberation is the transcendence of all spatial and embodied stages.

[555] Here the preposition 'ādhi' from the compound prādi-bahuvrihi 'adhyātmano' might be translated 'with respect to the self' or 'concerning the self'. In other words, mokṣa refers primarily to the soul, which has the form of vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo; see Whitney pp. 511-12, section 1310b.

[556] Kumar, 2013, p. 105.

- ABHYUDAYA (VS 1.1.2; 6.2.1; 6.2.9; 10.20)[557]

Abhyudaya is a much boarder concept than Brahmāloka, the latter being just a result of the many aspects which the former concept entails. VSc 1.1.2 defines abhyudaya as comprising of at least three aspects: 1) removal of calamities (anarth'oparama), 2) the desire to obtain body (iṣṭaśarīraprāpti), and 3) Brahmāloka. Its usage throughout VSc relates generally with the pravṛtti path, which entails ethical and ritualistic acts, prescribed by the smṛti and śruti texts. As VSc 6.2.1 and 10.20 state, these are classified into three broad classes, according to their effects and scope not always mentioned in the texts: 1) dṛṣṭa (their scope is mentioned in smṛti and śruti texts); 2) dṛṣṭaprayojana (purpose not mentioned), and 3) dṛṣṭābhāva (motive not mentioned). VSc 6.2.2 provides a list of twelve different rituals, stages of life, and prohibiting rules, all of which acts leading to adṛṣṭa;[558] these are karmic workings subsumed under what is commonly understood by the term abhyudaya: 'mundane elevation', 'success', 'worldly prosperity' (Thite),[559] either in the 'present world', or 'future worlds'. [560] The relationship with adṛṣṭa puts abhyudaya at odds with niḥśreyasa. The distinction drawn by both Candrānanda and Vādīndra,[561] shows most arguably that abhyudaya is not only a lesser state, but that

[557] It appears seventeen times, four times in the Sūtrapāṭha (VS 1.1.2; 6.2.1; 6.2.9; 10.20), and thirteen times in Candrānanda (gloss to 1.1.2 (twice)/ gloss 1.1.6: fourth and eight line/ gloss 6.1.8 first line/ 6.1.9 first line/ 6.1.13 : first line/ 6.1.14: third line/ gloss 6.2.1: first line/ gloss 6.2.9: first line/ 6.2.10: third line/ 6.2.11: first line/ 10.20: first line).

[558] I shall discuss these in the section related to adṛṣṭa, for VSc 6.2.2, see Synopsis to VSc.

[559] Trans. Prof. Dr. Ganesh Thite (audio file, personal communication, January-April 2016, at BORI, Pune).

[560] Gokhale says that this term is not concerned with liberation as expressed by niḥśreyasa; though Gokhale says that abhyudaya includes 'prosperity in this world and other worlds', plausibly other svargas. (Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21 February 2016).

[561] The difference between abhyudaya ('svarga' in VSv 1.1.2; Brahmāloka VSc 1.1.2), and niḥśreyasa, comes up in VSv which like VSc follows closely Sūtrapāṭha tradition. Vādīndra (VSv 1.1.2) gives a bit more detail on what abhyudaya entails: 'heavenly pleasure' (abhyudayaḥ svargādisukhaṁ); this comes as a clarification in the Vaiśeṣika commentarial tradition where abhyudaya, at least in VSc, implied only 'desire of body', and 'removal of calamities'. Like VSc, VSv 1.1.2 also identifies mokṣa with niḥśreyasa (niḥśreyasaṁ muktiḥ). He also explains the sūtra by stating that 'siddhi' is produced in relation to these two (tayoḥ). The connection between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa is rooted on the argument of causality,

in fact is not liberation at all; it is niḥśreyasa, not abhyudaya, which is synonymic with mokṣa (VSc 1.1.2).

The function of the abhyudaya in Vaiśeṣika system chiefly relates to the ethics of the system, which for the most part concern the four-fold social structure (varṇāśramadharma) of the Hindu society, mentioned in VSc 6.2.3. Acts, rituals, duties, and their performance, are classified into two broad categories; on the one hand 'anupadhā category', whose acts should be performed 'without break' and ' purity of intention' (VSc 6.2.5), and on the other hand 'upadhā acts' which are not conductive to dharma, because they are performed with a form of 'internal impurity' (aśuci), 'break', or 'failure' (VSc 6.2.4). Candrānanda gives throughout the sixth adhyāya an elaborate discussion about situations in which abhyudaya fails to be achieved; one is for instance the case of a 'lack of restraint' (yamābhāva) when there will be no abhyudaya regardless of whether the individual eats pure food (VS 6.2.9: ayatasya śucibhojanād abhyudayo na vidyate yamābhāvāt). In addition, abhyudaya does not occur when feeding or conversing with an impure Brahmin (VSc 6.2.9: saty apy āśīrvādādivacane duṣṭaṁ brāhmaṇaṁ bhojayitvābhyudayo na prāpyate),[562] or even in slightest contact with anything that is 'impure' (duṣṭa), be it a person,[563] act of violence,[564] or intention.[565] In spite of the restrictions that the Vaiśeṣika's ethics involve, abhyudaya remains by far a pravṛtti path, one that presupposes action, or 'tendency' (pravṛtti) towards what is pure, only (VSc

'because of the constant connection with the cause' (sambandhyāvyabhicārāt). The argument shows that 'siddhi' lies in relation to both soteriological terms, and, given the sūtra, it must be seen like dharma, the means by which both abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa are achievable. The difference between (svarga/abhyudaya, and apavarga/niḥśreyasa) is further developed in gloss VSv 1.1.2 within the discussion of 'janimattvā' ('birthability'), which seems to explain the difference between being possessed by ātman, possessed by guṇas (guṇatva), or devoid of guṇas (rahita guṇajanya).

[562] Trans. VSc 6.2.9: 'there is no abhyudaya for the [man who is not] restrained in respect of the rules, even if [he] eats pure food' (personal translation).

[563] According to VSc 6.1.13-14, Brahmins can be morally speaking of several types: hīna, sama, viśiṣṭa, and dhārmika: 'inferior', 'mediocre', 'qualified', and 'virtuous'.

[564] VSc 6.1.10: śarīramanasaduḥkharūpayam ('physical or mental violence').

[565] VSc 6.2.5: 'Intention of hypocrisy' (abhisanderdhamba).

6.1.13), which inevitably presupposes 'avoidance' (apravṛtti) of whatever is impure (VSc 6.1.14). As Candrānanda explains sūtra 6.1.13 (viśiṣṭe pravṛttiḥ), the meaning of abhyudaya is the pravṛtti towards Brahmins which are 'qualified' (viśiṣṭa) with a series of qualities related to 'time', 'region', 'knowledge' and 'walk', which are presumably the twelve prescriptions mentioned under VSc 6.2.2, or those not mentioned (VSc 6.2.1), but referred for instance under VSc 1.1.6.[566]

There are three main aspects where abhyudaya is distinguished radically from niḥśreyasa. First, the worldly orientation of abhyudaya, which engages rituals, even 'sacrifices' (yaga), - yet, most probably not of a harmful sort (VSc 1.1.2)[567] as that might contradict VSc 6.1.10. 'Success', 'exaltation'[568] is attainable through rituals. Second, the ethics, range from the subtle level of mental intention up to external or social levels, where 'invitations',[569] 'companionship' (samabhivyāhāra) (VSc 6.1.8), or 'blessings' (āśīrvādā) from inappropriate persons are forbidden. From these two aspects, a third one derives naturally, that of affective or psychological state that characterises abhyudaya concept. The definition of mokṣa enunciated in VSc 1.1.2 (niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣika guṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ)[570] comes in contradiction with abhyudaya, because the latter presupposes the workings of 'effort' (prayatna), or such effort, being a vaiśeṣikaguṇa cannot be part of the absolute state of liberation, which transcends, in a negative way (nivṛtti path), the human 'body' (śarīra), its 'affective faculties' (vaiśeṣikaguṇas) and 'wondering' (saṃsāra), the 'worlds' (loka, deśa), but more

566 For gloss VSc 1.1.6, see Synopsis to VSc.
567 VSc 1.1.2: mentions 'sacrifice' (yāga), and 'ghee' (ājya) presumably referring to a particular sacrifice for the obtainment of a body in Brahmāloka. Niḥśreyasa may not involve such sacrifice, but only devotional acts, which involve flowers (puṣpa) or devatāpūja, or 'meditation' (upāsana).
568 Abhyudaya translated with 'exaltation', may also refer not only to the worldly feelings of joy felt from a particular achievement, but on a different level of existence, may refer to a spatial 'upgrade' such as achieving a better place in a higher heaven, as the Vedic and Vaiśeṣika cosmology accepted.
569 Thakur, 2003 reads samabhivyāhara in VSc 6.1.11 as 'invitation'.
570 adhyātmano: J; apy ātmano Ś; vaiśeṣika: J; vaiśeṣikā Ś1, Ś2, Ś3pc; vaiśiṣikā Ś3ac

importantly the ethics, which represents the ground of the doctrine surrounding abhyudaya. Indeed, giving the ephemeral character of abhyudaya, ethics have only a relative value in Vaiśeṣika, limited to a social and cosmic level. In the state of mokṣa however, they do not seem to acquire any further relevance, since the state and nature of final liberation is complete 'renunciation' (nivṛtti), of everything that engages with society and the world.[571] The shortcoming of abhyudaya for soteriology is that, its goal is precisely the opposite of mokṣa's, namely to maintain, generate, and reproduce, in conjunction with adṛṣṭa (VSc 6.2.2), the good functioning of society and cosmos. Abhyudaya, and its conjoint adṛṣṭa, is thereof the state of saṃsāra and continuous actions (VSc 6.2.18), while the end of it would be simply mokṣa (VSc 6.2.19).

4.2. Destruction of Body (vyapahataśarīra) (VSc 1.1.1)

The problem of suffering and the necessity or non-necessity of body occurs from the very beginning of Candrānanda's Vṛtti (VSc 1.1.1), where the question is addressed by a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad ('aśarīraṁ vāva santaṁ priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ'), which claims that feelings of pleasure and pain cannot touch one who has no body (Ch. Up. 8.12.1). In other words, it raises the question of whether the overcoming of suffering can be achieved in the unembodied state of ātman. Incidentally, this is the very view of Vaiśeṣika' soteriology, where we have no trace of a jīvanmukti, and where suffering and body are inter-dependent concepts while its anthropology is dualistic, in that it separates ātman from body, birth, and saṃsāra (VSc 5.2.17-20). Among the passages, which treat the issue, VSc 5.2.15-20[572] are of a particular importance, as they discuss the body's

[571] Ethics are only a starting point in niḥśreyasa, (prerequisites); in abhyudaya however, they represent the goal itself.

[572] For VSc 5.2.15 to VSc 5.2.20 see Synopsis of VSc, and discussion of Yoga and Mokṣa (fifth chapter).

relationship with adṛṣṭa, which is instrumental in the formation of the human 'embryo' (VSc 5.2.19). There seems to be a correlation between the birth of śarīra and its destruction, or more broadly between the Vaiśeṣika view on cosmogony and eschatology. Mokṣa, as VSc 5.2.20 states, is the non-production (aprādurbhāva) of a further body: śarīrasyāprādurbhāva. In Sūtrapāṭha, ātman, is listed as the eight among the nine cosmic dravyas (VS 1.1.4), and depending on its various states of subsistence, is devoid of action (VSc 5.2.23), but when in contact with guṇas (presumably in the embodied state), it eventually clings to action (VSc 1.1.14).[573]

The usage of 'śarīra' throughout VSc is extensive;[574] it occurs in various compounds (apahataśarīra, śarīraprāpti, pratiśarīra, śarīraparigṛhīta, śarīrābhidhāyaka, and śarīravācaka), while once it is part of a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.12.1, as earlier discussed.[575] The extensive use is naturally the continuation of the discussion between a Brahmin pupil and Kaṇabhakṣa described VSc 1.1.1-2, triggered by several questions around the Upaniṣadic quote regarding the suppression of the positive and negative afflictions (priyāpriye) in a man without a body (vyapahataśarīra). As Kaṇabhakṣa says, all these are achievable, by means of dharma.[576] VSc 1.1.1 gloss seems to elucidate, from the start, Candrānanda's position as regards the state of the liberated ātman, which is

[573] That explains the contradiction between Sūtrapāṭha 1.1.14 that says that dravya is possessed by kriyā, and Candrānanda VSc 5.2.23 that states that ātman too is devoid of kriyā (niṣkriyā). Sūtrapāṭha did not include ātman perhaps because originally its states were not sharply delimited, or simply because its nature as (embodied and disembodied) was taken for granted.

[574] It occurs at least fifty-six times in VSc, twice in Sūtrapāṭha (3.2.14; 5.2.17) and for the rest, more than once in the gloss of many of these. The gloss in which śarīra occurs is: VSc 1.1.1-2; VSc 2.1.23,25; VSc 3.1.14 (twice); VSc 3.2.3; VSc 3.2.4 (four times); VSc 3.2.10-14 (several times in each one of these); VS 3.2.14; VSc 4.1.2; VSc 4.2.1,3-6; VSc 4.2.9; VSc 5.1.13; VSc 5.2.14 (three times); VS 5.2.17; VSc 5.2.17, 19-20 (several times). VSc 6.1.10; VSc 6.2.2, 13-14, 18; VSc 7.2.14; VSc 8.16; VSc 10.7-10.

[575] This quote raises questions on the liberated state of an ascetic (santaṁ) in a disembodied state (aśarīraṁ). Nozawa (1993 p. 98) translates the quotation with 'pleasure and pain alike do not touch a man, living without a body'; trans. Olivelle, 1998. p. 175: 'Joy and sorrow, however, do not affect one who has no body'.

[576] For VS 1.1.1 and gloss, see Synopsis of VSc.

namely that of the soul 'stripped of śarīra' (apahataśarīra);[577] this is a stage of 'fulfillement' (sādhanā)[578] to obtain 'kṣema' which in this context designates 'final emancipation', 'peace', 'tranquillity'.[579] It seems that Candrānanda accepts the Upaniṣadic view on liberation after the dissolution of body, namely after death. Moreover, in VSc, there are other situations in which 'body' (śarīra) is as follows: 1) śarīra is subject to karma, because body is, as VSc 2.1.23 puts it, 'substratum' (ādhāra) of action (śarīrādeḥ karmādhārasya);[580] 2) 'body' is the locus of certain guṇas such as sukha, and so forth (VSc 2.1.25).[581] Since sukha is also one of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the ātman mentioned by Candrānanda in VSc 3.2.17, therefore it can be assumed, on the basis of comparative readings with (VSc 1.1.1-2), - where 'body removal' represents a prerequisite to attain mokṣa, - that alike śarīra, sukha too is a major hindrance to liberation. 3) 'Śarīra' possesses 'inclination' (pravṛtti), and 'disinclination' (nivṛtti) towards things that are 'beneficial' (hita) and 'non-beneficial' (āhita) (VSc 3.1.14); this passage is meant in fact to infer and prove the existence of the embodied ātman starting from the characteristics (liṅgas) of body;[582] 4) each embodied ātman possesses an atomic manas (ekaṁ manaḥ pratiśarīraṁ) (VSc 3.2.3).[583] 5) 'Body' is the mark of jīvana (biological life) and as such is capable of aging (śarīravṛddhyādi tatkāryam api jīvanam);

[577] Here a small variation between Jambūvijayaji 1961, edition: vyapahataśarīrasya; and Ruzsa emendation (vyapahataśarīratvasya): vākyena vyapahata: Ś1, Ś2; vākyenavyapagata Ś3; vākyenāpahata J, Ed; śarīra[tva]sya: conjH; śarīrasya all.
[578] Apte, dict. p. 1666.
[579] Apte, dict. p. 63.
[580] Liberation is a motionless state. As long as the self, through the medium of body, is subject to motion liberation cannot be realised. Here the whole of śarīra term context: VS 2.1.23 saṁyogādabhāvaḥ karmaṇaḥ / VSc: bhittyādinā sparśavaddravyeṇa śarīrādeḥ karmādhārasya saṁyogād niṣkramaṇaṁ nivartate na tvākāśābhāvāt tasya sarvagatatvāt tatrāpi bhāvaḥ.
[581] The simile 'guṇa of śarīra' comes to support a different discussion on the VS 2.1.25: ye khalv ātmaguṇas te sukhādaya ivāntaḥ śarīram upalabhyante. (The quality of self like 'pleasure' and so on is perceived within body).
[582] For VS 3.1.14, see Synopsis of VSc.
[583] When the sūtra speaks of manas being one, it refers to it as being one in every single body, and also as 'functioning' in succession (once at the time) not simultaneously. VS 3.2.3: prayatnāyaugapadyājjñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṁ manaḥ / VSc: bahuṣu kāryeṣu jñeyeṣu ca yugapat prayatnā jñānāni vā na prādurbhavantī'ty ataḥ prayatna jñānāyaugapadyād ekaṁ manaḥ pratiśarīraṁ mūrtamasparśaṁ niravayavaṁ nityamaṇu āśucārīti.

it is caused by adṛṣṭa which creates the contact (saṃyoga) between manas and ātman (manasā saṃyogaḥ ātmano'ṣṭāpekṣo jīvanam); it is presumably situated in the embodied ātman which possesses 'volition' (śarīraṁ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitaṁ) (VSc 3.2.4).[584] 6) Śarīra is 'different at different stages of growth'.[585] 7) In the context of epistemology, śarīra is designated by 'ahaṁ-śabda' only when combined with soul, because is situated in apposition (aikādhikaraṇyāt) (VSc 3.2.9).[586] 8) Śarīra is a product of 'material composition' (śarīramahābhūta) (VSc 4.1.2);[587] body is made of earth (VSc 4.2.1),[588] but it is indirectly 'mixed' with other 'fundamental elements' (mahābhūta) too, such as water (jala), and so on (VSc 4.2.3).[589] 9) There a many kinds of 'bodies', some of which are not womb-born, such as those in Varuṇaloka, which are composed of different atoms according to the cosmic region (deśa) where they are found (VSc 4.2.4).[590] There are also bodies not made of 'semen' (śukra), nor 'blood' (śoṇita), but rather produced because of some 'specific dharmas' (dharmaviśeṣā) (VSc 4.2.4-5).[591] Others are the 'body of insects' (śalabha) (VSc 6.2.6), the bodies 'born of coal' (jāto'ṅgirā) (VSc 4.2.7), or the 'body of the yogis', seen as existing priot to the beginning of the world (VSc 5.2.14,17),[592]

---

584 This sūtra refers generally to the inferential liṅgas of soul; for VSc 3.2.4 see Synopsis of VSc.

585 VSc 3.2.4: … na śarīrāvayavasyāvasthābhedenabhidyamānatvāt.

586 VS 3.2.9: aham iti śabda vyatirekān nāgamikaṁ / VSc: aham iti śabdena kṣityādivibhinnātmadravyaviṣayeṇ'aikādhikaraṇyād 'ahaṁ prāṇādimān ahaṁ sukhavān' iti / tasmāt prāṇādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam. The adverb 'nanu ca' indicates a response to an opponent who denies that the word ahaṁ refers to soul; propounding that but it refers only to body. The sūtras 3.2.9 to 14, present a series of opposite views against the Vaiśeṣikas, to which he respons in VSc 3.2.14, that ahaṁ-śabda refers only to soul, not body, because the word 'I' is used only by oneself, not by others (…śarīravācakatve tu yathā śarīraṁ dṛṣṭvā tatra devadattaśabdaṁ prayuñjate tadvad imam api prayuñjīran. na tvevaṁ. tasmān na śarīre. ātmavṛttitve tu parairaprayogaḥ…).

587 See Synopsis of VSc.

588 VSc 4.2.1: kṣityādipañcakena śarīrārambhe trayāṇāṁ pratyakṣatvād dvayor apratyakṣatvād yathā tadvata [tad-vartī: J; tattanto Ś1, Ś2; tattantoḥ Ś3] saṁyogo'pi apratyakṣa evaṁ śarīramapratyakṣaṁ syāt pratyakṣāpratyakṣair ārabdhatvāt (Ruzsa, p. 40).

589 VSc 4.2.3 … pārthiveśarīre jalādīni saṁyogīni na samavāyīni

590 VSc 4.2.3 …jalādibhir ayonijameva śarīramārabhyate varuṇalokādau.

591 VS 4.2.4 anekadeśapūrvakatvāt / VSc: anekadeśāḥ paramāṇavaḥ tair ārabhyate jalādiśarīraṁ na śukraśoṇitābhyām / tacca. / VS 4.2.5 dharmaviśeṣāt / VSc: dharmaviśeṣāpekṣāḥ paramāṇava eva śarīram ārabhante na śukrādi / kathaṁ hi puṇyavatāṁ śukrādimayaṁ śarīraṁ syāt / itaś ca.

592 Unliberated bodies of yogis whose existence is somewhere in a limbo, Doniger 1980, p. 5.

bodies that form in the womb (kālalārbudamāṁsapeśīghanaśarīra) (VSc 5.2.19),[593] bodies (doer or receiver) 'filled with violence' (VSc 6.1.10),[594] bodies filled with 'passion' (raga) and satisfaction (tṛpta) (VSc 6.2.13-14),[595] or 'sensual body' (śarīrendriya) which undergoes separation, and 're-birth' (so-called-birth: janmākhya) at the time of death because of the fatidic 'storage' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18).[596] In describing śarīra Candrānanda compares the body and skin with 'pot' and 'cloth' (VSc 7.2.14; VSc 10.7), a canonical simile often used in epistemological debates.[597] Like earth (pṛthivī), body has 'smell' (gandhavat) and 'amplitude' (bhūyastva) (VSc 8.16);[598] and finally, body is composite by nature (avayavin) which means that is prone to 'destruction' (vināśa), or separation (VSc 10.7-10). From everything described so far, one general conclusion is that body, interchangeably discussed with ātman, is a composite entity, made of atoms, and as such, it cannot participate in mokṣa. As Pradeep Gokhale puts it, in Vaiśeṣika everything that has parts is subject to destruction; by contrast, non-composite entities such as paramāṇus and disembodied ātman are atomic and vibhu, respectively, and as such are eternal because, giving the atomic theory of Vaiśeṣika's cosmology, their non-composite character does not allow them to become extinct. In Vaiśeṣika, eternal entities are either atomic or all-pervasive.[599]

[593] See footnote above, and Synopsis of VSc.
[594] Body is not here the subject; 'śārīramānasaduḥkharūpāyāṁ' refers in fact to a particular type of violence, related to body, or mind. VS: 6.1.10 duṣṭaṁ hiṁsāyāṁ / VSc: parasya hiṁsāyāṁ śārīramānasaduḥkharūpāyāṁ pravṛttam duṣṭaṁ jānīṣva / hiṁsāśabda upalakṣaṇam.
[595] See Synopsis of VSc.
[596] See Synopsis of VSc.
[597] See Synopsis of VSc.
[598] For VSc 8.16 see Synopsis of VSc.
[599] Gokhale (Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21 February 2016).

BODY AND ESCHATOLOGY[600] (5.2.14; 6.2.18; 10.7-10)

The destruction of the body, as well as the problem of death and afterlife all put forward the question of eschatology in Vaiśeṣika, which is primarily concerned with 'immortality' rather than 'rebirth'.[601] Indeed, as Doniger pointed out, the primary concern of the Vedic thought was not 'rebirth', but the 'repeated death' (punarmṛtyu), and the performance of death rituals aimed at keeping the soul in heaven.[602] The theological term eschatology as applied to brahmanical traditions has only a partial semantic overlapping with the Christian usage; it should be taken not soteriologically as in Christianity, but only as far as it describes the doctrine of momentary interruption in the succession of life-bodies for an individual experiencing rebirths.[603] As we shall see, soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is quite the opposite of eschatology, understood as a more complex form of saṃsāra. It is a concept that developed from a more primitive doctrine of 'rebirth eschatology', which undergoes a process of 'ethicisation',[604] and becomes what we have now as 'karmic eschatology'.[605] The latter concept is most probably the eschatology we have in classical Vaiśeṣika. Within 'karmic eschatology', Obeyeskere distinguishes several sub-divisions. 1) Theory of 'saṃsāra' (pan-cosmic),[606] as different from apparently similar terms such

[600] An umbrella term of several theories and doctrines, each one with its own sub-divisions. Within transmigration for instance (not to be confused with 'rebirth eschatology') Obeyesekere notices at least two variations: 1) individuals that are barred from human reincarnation, and 2) rebirth in the world of humans. pp. 145-46.

[601] This is the case at least with Upaniṣadic eschatolgy, Borman, 1990, p. 20.

[602] Doniger, 1980, p. 3-4 (based on Knipe's anthropological research as acknowledged in footnote).

[603] Knipe, 2008, pp. 172-3.

[604] Obeyesekere, 1980, p. 147.

[605] 'Rebirth eschatology' is associated with transmigration onto other spheres of existence. Obeyesekere, 1980, p, 145-46.

[606] Obeyesekere includes in saṃsāra (the cycle of endless continuity) all living things. However, the view is problematic for Praśastapāda who does not include the insects among śarīra group; they are included in viṣaya group. Transmigration of humans happens according to Candrānanda in relation to śarīra (VSc 4.2), in which sense the term of saṃsāra is used (VSc 5.2.19).

as 'transmigration',[607] 'rebirth' (human rebirth),[608] and which differ from each other according to the cosmological layers of the new adopted existence, as well as the type of 'body' in which soul dwells. 2) Theory of karma, which predominantly has an ethical dimension in which ātman's existence is pre-determined by ethics of past actions, dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.17-19). 3) A doctrine of salvation (nirvāṇa, mokṣa), which varies from a school to another. To these we may add the atomic theory,[609] which explains the nature of cosmos, of the body, and implicitly the place of the ātman in both pre-birth and post-birth states.[610] Eschatology has more to do with bondage of the self, which is body, and its atomic composition, that forms as a result of a contact between manas and ātman, which Candrānanda calls jīvana (jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥ saṃyoga) (VSc 5.2.20). Eschatology in Vaiśeṣika is a broader concept than saṃsāra, but a lesser category of thought than mokṣa, because it does not offer a solution to the class of individual souls that 'are barred from human reincarnation', (VSc 5.2.14).[611] If eschatology involves death, it would then involve also decomposition, dissolution, and destruction. The dissolutive process of body happens in relation to saṃyoga discusseed in VSc 10, in the context of the nature of matter, theory of reality, and doctrine of asatkāryavāda, according to which the effects are real products from their causes, not pre-existent in them. In discussing a 'past entity' (abhūta) (VSc 10.8), Candrānanda designates body as being an effect (abhūt kāryaṁ śarīrākhyam), therefore prone to decay and destruction which takes place when saṃyoga between the body parts mentioned (pāṇi; pāda; grīvā) is destroyed (VSc 10.9). In Candrānanda, the dissolution process does

[607] Obeyesekere, 1980, p. 145-46.
[608] Obeyesekere designates by 'rebirth theory' only the theory that discusses the rebirth in humans (1980, p. 145).
[609] On atomic theory, see section on 'body and cosmogony'.
[610] Praśastapāda for instance talks about the original state of atom, and soul, and eschatology in the section sṛṣṭisaṃhāraprakaraṇam (PD 57-59) where the diminution of adṛṣṭa is coextensive with the destruction of cosmos.
[611] Doniger 1980, p. 5.

not appear theistic as it does in Praśastapāda,[612] but explains it only with adṛṣṭa, with no higer operation from the side of Brahman. Committed to asatkāryavāda theory, Candrānanda's argument is that destruction refers here to the effect, or product, which is the body. Both Vaiśeṣika soteriology and eschatology function on the very idea, on the destruction of the effects, of the body and its vaiśeṣikaguṇas. In VSc 10.10, a further clarification is given, that body exists only when the parts are not separated; if its parts are separated, then body is to be considered non-existent (abhūta).[613] 'Disjunction' (vibhāga) is in this way explained as vināśa. Here we have once again restated, but in a different way, Vaiśeṣika's theory of asatkāryavāda: the effect does not exist prior to its cause; in this case, body, which is an effect, is not essentially part of the ontological pre-birth state of ātman.

Eschatology refers to the journey after death (hence the name of rebirth eschatology) in higher or lower worlds, but in Vaiśeṣika we seem to have some souls which dwell in a kind of suspended state. Śrīdhara says that after the destruction of one cycle, souls and atoms stay in their isolated state; souls however are 'permeated with the faculties or tendencies left upon them by their previous good and evil deeds'.[614] These must be presumably not liberated, as we see in VSc 5.2.14. Indeed, the view of eschatology, life after-death in Indian thought precedes that of bondage therefore there must be a precedence of liberation state before any later developments took place, such as the rebirth, and saṃsāra. As it comes out from the texts, soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is individualistic eschatology, in the sense that it takes fully place only after the death

[612] In Praśastapāda it is the desire of Brahman that stimulates dissolution and operates over adṛṣṭa. PD 57: saṃjihīrṣāsamakālam śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānām sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛttinirodhe. Trans. Jhā 1916, p. 109: '…and simultaneously with this desire, there comes about a cessation of the operations of the unseen potential tendencies of all souls that are the causes of their bodies, sense organs and gross elements'.

[613] Here MSS differ from the reading offered by Jambūvijayaji ed. 1961, but Ruzsa signals out in the Śāradā MS tad-vibhaktān: Ś; (footnote 7, p. 87)

[614] Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 114.

(maraṇakāla), and after the dissolution of its 'biological life' (jīvana), as well as its 'psycho-physical stuff' (vaiśeṣikaguṇa). Pravṛtti, which is the natural tendency of any embodied ātman, and functions through desire and aversion, seems to be produced by dharma and adharma, and in connection with saṃyoga and vibhāga (VS 6.2.18). Dharma and adharma create a 'storage' (sañcita) which presumably is transmissible; the question of body's 'disintegration' occurs with the term 'disintegration' (viyoga): kṣīnayoś ca tayor[615] maraṇakāle viyogaḥ ('and the separation of the body at the time of death is due to the diminishing of the two') (VSc 6.2.18). This disintegration is only momentary because the storage of dharma and adharma come in contact with the formation of another body and its specific qualities (punar apy ābhyāṁ dharmādharmābhyāṁ śarīrādisaṃyogo vibhāgaś c'ety evam anādir ayaṁ ghaṭīyantravad āvartate jantuḥ).[616] However, the eschatology we trace, and to which both Candrānanda and Praśastapāda refer, is that of no return or that where there is no motion and change. It is in the absence of eschatology and its cosmogonic and cosmological processes (bhāva), all of which have a dynamic and volative manifestation. The soteriological gloss VSc 6.2.19, speaks of the absence of bhāva, a verb that, unlike sattā, has dynamic connotation.[617] Therefore, the complete 'disappearance of body-birth' (aprādurbhāva) presupposes the absence of the action of manas too.[618]

Also related to eschatology another aspect that comes into play is the cosmogonic impact of adṛṣṭa that sets the cosmic motions, on the one hand, and the yogis' power

[615] By 'the two' (dual pronoun 'tayor'), Candrānanda refers to the 'collection of dharma and adharma', which shrink (kṣīna) at the time of death.
[616] apy: J,Ś2; om Ś1,Ś3; dharmābhyāṁ: J,Ś2,Ś3ac; dharmabhyāṁ Ś1,Ś3pc; ayaṁ: all; aya Ś2; yantravad: Ś; yantrayad J(?).
[617] Halbfass, 1992, p. 22.
[618] See Synopsis of VSc. And further discussion on mokṣa and niḥśreyasa section

to arrest the influence of adṛṣṭa, on the other.[619] The eschatological gloss VSc 5.2.14, comprises, to use Obeyesekere's designation, the 'rebirth eschatology', and testifies to the cycles which ātmans and yogis undergo at the turn of the cosmic cyclical process, in the 'beginning' (sargādau), and at the end (kalpanta), respectively. The gloss informs about a category of 'ātmans whose body has been destroyed' (vinaṣṭaśarīrāṇāmātman);[620] about their fate, Candrānanda says that at the beginning of a new cosmic era (sargādau), they will be neither first action of earth atoms, nor will be any action of mutual approaching of such atoms (paramāṇu), which make possible the formation of a new body. These category of selves presumably are those ātmans, which are stuck into a limbo, an intermediate non-soteriological state, of which Doniger speaks.[621] Their suspended, uncertain state must be due to adṛṣṭa, or the law of karma, which has an ethical dimension in that it determines the journey, and the state of the ātman because of previous deeds. The gloss does not mention of any storage (sañcita) that caused them to be such. Another category of selves mentioned, at the 'end of era' (kalpānte), is the yogis who have reached some particular 'cosmic states' (bhūmi).[622] The indeclinable comparative particle 'tathā' shows that the commentator likens their suspended, fix state, to those stuck in the limbo mentioned.[623] In the yogis' case however, their eschatological state is due to the yogic practice, whose manas, by effort 'remains exceedingly fixated' (vyatiricyāvatiṣṭhamāna) presumably into the soul as VSc 5.2.17 would explain.[624] As a

[619] The action of manas has been previously highlighted by Candrānanda in VSc 5.2.14, a passage discussed above, and in which, yoga is a soteriological tool that prevents the 'formation/ manifestation/ appearance' of new body (prādurbhāva), at the beginning, or at the time of dissolution of the world.
[620] śarīrāṇām: all; śarīrāṇāṁs Ś2; ātmanāṁ: J, Ś1, Ś3pc; ātma<ṇāṁ>nāṁ Ś2; ātmano Ś3ac.
[621] Doniger 1980, p. 5.
[622] On bhūmi as 'spheres of existence' (classified in three groups), Collins, 1998, p. 297-98. One of the three groups 'refined bhūmi' (rūpāvacara) contains meditation levels.
[623] Doniger 1980, p. 5, talks about a 'limbo' (different from saṃsāra) where those souls without offsprings are stuck. Compare to the two categories of unsaved souls from VSc 5.2.14.
[624] 'avatiṣṭha' may be also translated by 'to be absorbed in'; in this way Yoga hinders the workings of the adṛṣṭa, and the formation of a further body, both at the end of era, but also in the embodied ātman (VSc 5.2.16-17); The definition of yoga from VSc 5.2.17 refers to the 'contact' between mind and soul, and the extirpation of sukha and duḥkha through yoga; about the contact of manas with a new body, and its relation to the formation of body in the womb see VSc 5.2.19.

result, there will be neither further connection (sambandha) with a new body, nor first atomic action of manas (that would trigger body formation). Note here that yogis obtain this state not by the karmic retribution of adṛṣṭa, but as the gloss clearly expresses, through 'effort' (prayatna) of the manas (prayatnena manaḥ śarīrād vyatiricyāvatiṣṭhamānānāṁ sargādau navaśarīrasambandhāya manasa ādyaṁ karma na bhavet). Yet, in both categories of individuals stuck in the heavily limbos ('vinaṣṭaśarīrāṇām ātmanāṁ', and 'labdhabhūmīnāṁ yogināṁ'), we seem to have an account of the presence of the impact of adṛṣṭa, but also of the absence of it. The use of 'adṛṣṭādṛṭa' which is the the compound of adṛṣṭāt (ablative) + ṛṭe ('without') implies that all these motions, and states of the individual selves 'are attended by, or 'depend on adṛṣṭa'; in other words, without adṛṣṭa, these do not happen. Liberation in Vaiśeṣika, however, implies the absence of adṛṣṭa (VSc 5.2.20), as well as absence of all other specific qualities of the self.

4.3 Absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 1.1.2; 1.1.6; 5.2.20)[625]

In this sub-section, I propose to inquire into what Candrānanda means by 'vaiśeṣikaguṇas', which are these, their number,[626] and how do these relate to the 'soteriontological state' of ātman. In dealing with Vaiśeṣika, I came to see that the system, from one corner to another is driven by a 'substantialist' view of cosmos, where dravya-padārtha plays a chief role in both the ontological framework of the system, as

[625] Vyomaśiva, the earliest commentator of PD speaks about nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas; VSc agrees with that number since he uses interchangeably adṛṣṭa (VSc 3.2.17) with dharma and adharma (VSc 1.1.5).

[626] Though in VSc 3.2.17 there are eight, VSc must agree with Vyomavati which mentions nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas. Candrānanda in VSc 1.1.5 puts dharma and adharma (which must be equivalent to adṛṣṭa) in the list of seventeen guṇas. In relation to them Vyomaśiva says that the 'final release (mokṣa) is a prosperous state when the nine qualities of the self are annihilated'. Hence, in both traditions we have the following list: buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, adṛṣṭa (or dharma and adharma) and saṃskāra. Trans. of Vyomavati by Varadachari, in Potter. Encyc. Vol 2, 1977, p. 427.

well as its epistemology. From the start, Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is seen as the freedom of ātman (as a substance) from the cosmic bondage created by vaiśeṣikaguṇas,[627] all of which keep the soul entangled in the saṁsāric cycle of rebirths.[628] Liberation is the state of pure soul. The qualities called 'vaiśeṣikaguṇas' in VSc 1.1.2 are as Kumar acknowledged, attached to the cognitive faculty of the self (e.g. buddhi); but buddhi also is a vaiśeṣikaguṇa, hence it too must extinguish in mokṣa state.[629] Candrānanda does not mention the number nine when he lists the vaiśeṣikaguṇas in VSc 3.2.17;[630] but glossing on the sūtra - which adduces the scriptural argument as grounds for the doctrine of the plurality of the souls – he says that according to Vaiśeṣika, the qualities that are 'specific in each soul', are buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, adṛṣṭa,[631] and saṃskāra. There is no particle '-ādi', therefore the number should be settled to nine. His list however, is much different from Praśastapāda's, who counts sixteen specific qualities,[632] in which number he includes, curiously, śabda,[633] as well as guṇas that are specific to 'corporeal' (mūrta) entities (rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, gurutva, dravatva, sneha, as per PD 84, and 'non-corporeal' (amūrta) entities such as 'cognitive faculty' (bhāvanā), as per PD 85. The difference in the number of vaiśeṣikaguṇas in PD is because he probably

---

[627] On 'mental bondage' see passages on 'recollection', 'dream', avidyā, saṃskāra; whereas karmic bondage would imply obtainment of a new śarīra, avidyā, 'collection' of dharma and adharma, Brahmāloka, all of which are works of abhyudaya. On these, I shall discuss in the section of function of soteriology.

[628] On saṃsāra, compare VSc 5.2.19 with VSc 6.2.18.

[629] Kumar, 2013, pp. 27-28, but this is a reading provided by PD rather than VSc. Such a view on liberation would put Vaiśeṣika at odds with other āstika schools, such as Vedānta, which accused Vaiśeṣika of semi-nihilism (Śaṅkara's gloss BSB 2.2.18), while positioning it closer to other nāstika schools like Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣika. Further possible comparisons could be drawn with Prābhākara, where cognition seems not to be active in the liberated state.

[630] VS 3.2.17: śāstra sāmarthyāc c'eti / VSc: 'grāmakāmo yajeta svargakāmo yajeta' ity ato'pi śāstrasāmarthyād nānā ātmānaḥ / tasya guṇāḥ buddhi sukha duḥkha icchā dveṣa prayatna ādṛṣṭa saṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ / anye tu saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāgāḥ.

[631] Elsewhere in VSc 1.1.5 includes dharma and adharma among the additional seven guṇas; I think Candrānanda agrees with other Vaiśeṣika commentaries PD and CD according to which, these refer to adṛṣṭa.

[632] According to PD 89: rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, sneha, sāṃsiddhikadravatva, buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, dharma, adharma, bhāvanā, śabda. Trans. Jhā 1916 p. 212.

[633] In PD śabda is a quality that belong to both immaterial entities (PD 85), and a vaiśeṣikaguṇa (PD 89). Srīdhara glosses that śabda is exempted from the list of guṇas of immaterial entities.

takes into account the guṇas that refer to other substances too, such as earth, out of which the body is formed, while Candrānanda discusses only the vaiśeṣikaguṇas that refer possibly to a 'subtle body' or 'psychological self' (VSc 3.2.16-17). If we compare the two lists, we may conclude that the smaller list of the two given by Praśastapāda[634] is that which corresponds to the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas of VSc 5.2.17; this indeed is not only closer to the definition of guṇas of the amūrta type (PD 85), but also to PD 359, where Praśastapāda uses the epithet 'ativāhikaśarīra' in relation to the workings of dharma and adharma, which must be referring to a psychological, minute, or transmigratory 'subtle body'. This raises the question as to whether Candrānanda maintained, somehow similar to Praśastapāda and the Purāṇas or Sāṁkhya, the existence of 'subtle body', which does not turn into ashes, because is 'swifter than wind'.[635] As we shall discuss, saṃskāra, one of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas, has indeed sub-qualities called vega, and bhāvanā,[636] both of which play a role in the transmission of 'memory', which is an erroneous form of knowlegde that causes the bondage of the self.

At the epistemological level, the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas could be classified in two groups: 1) those, which are known through perception;[637] and 2) those, which are known

634 Both Candrānanda (VSc 3.2.17) and Praśastapāda (PD 86) do agree on the number, and identity of the 'common qualities' of the soul (saṅkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṁyoga, vibhāga), they should not be confused with sāmānyaguṇas, the common qualities of all substances (PD 90).

635 Praśastapāda (PD 359) refers to an entity 'ātivāhikaśarīram' which can literary be translated as 'that body which has gone beyond', used in relation to the dynamic capacity of manas to form another body, under the workings of dharma and adharma (trans. Thite). PD 359: 'tataḥ śarīrād bahir apagataṃ tābhyām eva dharmādharmābhyāṃ samutpanen'ātivāhikaśarīreṇa sambandhyate. tatsaṃkrāntaṃ ca svargaṃ narakaṃ vā gatvā'śayānurūpeṇa śarīreṇa sambadhyate. tatsaṃyogārthaṃ karmopasarpaṇam iti.' Kumar, 2013, p. 90, identifies in this term the 'subtle body'. See also Apte, dict. p. 322; Doniger 1980, p. 16, f34-36.

636 Both vega, and bhāvanā are enumerated by Praśastapāda in his list; vega is a quality of the mūrta entities PD 84 (in Candrānanda is a quality of mind, which can move), bhāvanā, on the other hand is a quality of the amruta type PD 85.

637 Kumar, 2013, pp. 27-28, a reference to PD 93. See also VSc 1.2.3 which clearly speaks of 'inclusive cognition' (anuvṛtti buddhyapekṣa) a reference to the general forms of knowledge and an 'exclusive cogntion', (vyavṛtti buddhyapekṣa) a reference to minute things and a more advanced form of knowledge which these require. See Nozawa's article 1994.

through inference.[638] Among the 'mental perceptive' ones, we mention some of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas, because they belong to a four-fold cognitive process (between objects, senses, manas and ātman): intellect (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), and effort (prayatna).[639] In Kaṇāda's Sūtrapāṭha only seventeen guṇas were originally listed, but their number has been subsequently extended to twenty-four in the commentaries of Candrānanda's Vṛtti (VSc), Vādīndra's Vyākhyā, Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya (PD) and Candramati's Daśapadārthī (DP). Here I provide a concise comparative table of the guṇas:[640]

Table 5. List of guṇas in Early Vaiśeṣika

GUṆAS	
Kaṇāda (VS 1.1.5)	
colour (rūpa) taste (rasa) odour (gandha) touch (sparśa) number (saṅkhyā) dimension (parimāṇa) separateness (pṛthaktva) conjunction (saṃyoga) disjunction (vibhāga) posteriority (paratva)[641] priority (aparatva)[642]	intellect(buddhi) pleasure (sukha) pain (duḥkha) desire (icchā) aversion (dveṣa) effort (prayatna)

[638] Gurutva, dharma, adharma, and saṃskāra are imperceptible, therefore proved by anumāna, Kumar, 2013, p. 27.
[639] Praśastapāda considers vaiśeṣikaguṇas to be nine, see Kumar, 2013, p. 27.
[640] The table focusses only on the vaiśeṣikaguṇas, at the stage when the Vaiśeṣika system was not merged with Nyāya.
[641] Trans. Kumar 'remoteness', p. 27, I have favoured here Halbfass trans. 1992, p. 208f, 214.
[642] Trans. Kumar 'proximity', p. 27.

Candrānanda (VSc 3.2.17)	Praśastapāda (PD 89)	Candramati (DP 12)
vaiśeṣikaguṇa: buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, adṛṣṭa, saṃskāra[643]	vaiśeṣikaguṇa: rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, sneha, dravatva,[644] buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, dharma, adharma, bhāvanā, śabda	24 guṇas same as VSc 1.1.5[645]
sāmānyaguṇa (VSc 3.2.17) saṅkhyā parimāṇa[646] pṛthaktva[647] saṃyoga vibhāga + 7 additional guṇas (VSc 1.1.5) gurutva dravatva sneha saṃskāra dharma adhrama śabda	sāmānyaguṇa (PD 90) saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāga paratva aparatva gurutva dravatva vega	
Vādīndra (VSv 1.1.5) 24 guṇas (same order and number as VSc 1.1.5)		

While drawing a distinction between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa, Candrānanda describes briefly the ontological state of liberation (mokṣa) in these terms:[648]

[643] Trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27, 'impression', but other possible translation, are 'tendency', 'latent impetus'
[644] Trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27, 'liquidity'.
[645] The similarity with Candrānanda is particularly striking, both in terms of order, and number; we may supposes that Candrānanda follows a tradition older than Praśastapāda. Ui, 1917, says that DP is older that PD, therefore Candrānanda provides an older Vaiśeṣika doctrine than Praśastapāda.
[646] Trans. Kumar 'magnitude', 2013, p. 27.
[647] Trans. Kumar 'severalty', 2013 p. 27.
[648] For VSc 1.1.2, see Synopsis of VSc.

VSc 1.1.2: abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣu c' eṣṭaśarīraprāptiḥ anarth'oparamaś ca. niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ.[649]

Gloss 1.1.2: abhyudaya is the removal of sorrows, and obtaining a desired body in Brahmāloka and other lokas; niḥśreyasa is mokṣa in the form of the self being devoid of [its] vaiśeṣikaguṇas.

Among the two, it is the second line regarding mokṣa, or niḥśreyasa, that which summarises the state and nature of the liberated ātman (adhyātman),[650] which is exclusively an ontological state of ātman devoid of all specific qualities (vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpa). There are two terms in this gloss that might suggest that absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas refers to an 'ontological state' of ātman: first 'rūpa', and second, 'adhyātman'. Rūpa is a neuter noun which could be rendered with 'form', 'appearance', 'manner', 'nature', 'character'; but, if taken as suffix (-rūpa) it could signify 'consisting of'. 'Adhyātma', on the other hand, is a prepositional compound (Whitney, 1310b), and can be rendered into English as 'relating to the soul, or self'.[651] A more speculative reading can be that rūpa (form) might indicate that ātman can exist, or can possess other forms as well, such as the embodied form, as I will discuss in the section on ātman. Thus, in Vaiśeṣika, we do have at least two states of soul (embodied and disembodied),[652] but the 'soteriontological state' would be only that of the soul divested from body, and vaiśeṣikaguṇas, including cognition (buddhi); it is the restauration of the

[649] lokeṣu c'eṣṭa: Ś; lokeṣv iṣṭa J,Ed; adhyātmano: J; apy ātmano Ś; vaiśeṣika: J; vaiśeṣikā Ś1, Ś2, Ś3pc; vaiśiṣikā Ś3ac.
[650] Whitney, 1981, p. 512, 1310 b. translates the prepositional compound 'adhyātma' with 'relating to the soul or self'.
[651] Whitney, 1891, p. 511.
[652] VSc discusses other states of ātman: prabodhakāle, sargādau, jāgrata, etc., which will be discussed throughout.

primeval state of Vaiśeṣika cosmology where substances existed separated (VSc 5.2.14), including ātman.

Another occurrence of 'vaiśeṣikaguṇa' term, though in an epistemological context (VSc 10.12-18), is gloss VSc 10.18, which explains how cognition (buddhi) works, mainly through inherence (samavāya) and contact (saṃyoga). VSc 10.18 lists other vaiśeṣikaguṇas such as sparśa, and uṣṇa, rather puzzling because neither of them is in the nomenclature of the guṇas described in the list of seventeen, and twenty-four guṇas, respectively (VSc 1.1.5), or among the vaiśeṣikaguṇas of VSc 3.2.17. One explanation for such a variation is the Vaiśeṣika's type of argument, where concepts (sub-guṇas) derive from each other, in a generative manner. Their method of knowledge is inference (anumāna), which explains why further vaiśeṣikaguṇas, like uṣṇa, are not mentioned in the list of guṇas (VS 1.1.5 nor in its gloss), but they do nevertheless occur as subsumed in under the main, or bigger qualities. In Candrānanda for example, saṃskāra encompasses sub-qualities such as vega and bhāvanā, not listed in the initial list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 3.2.17), but they do occur later in Praśastapāda (PD 84-85).[653] Put it differently, the list of guṇas in Vaiśeṣika is not exhaustive, since can include, from dravyas down to atoms, an infinite number of sub-guṇas (antyaviśeṣa). Furthermore, with the theory of asatkāryavāda, which acknowledges the possibility of new effects, new vaiśeṣikaguṇas can be known through 'contact-with-inherent' relationship, like a small guṇas belonging to a bigger guṇa.[654] In VSc 10.18, for instance, apart from the two well-

[653] In Praśastapāda a similar generative development of the guṇas; uṣṇa is not mentioned among the list of twenty four guṇas (as per PD5) but later in the section of tejanirūpanaprakaraṇam, uṣṇa is said to belong to sparśa only (uṣṇa eva sparśaḥ) (PD 43).

[654] The viśeṣa padārtha (and the endless 'antyaviśeṣa' implied, to be known by yogis) is a category which might opens the development of the systems' epistemology and ontology to an infinite number of sub-categories and particularities. Vyomaśiva's Vyomavati (vol. 1, p. 21), and Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī (GOS, p. 148) talk about an ambitious intention of 'enumerating everything in the world that has the character of being', Halbfass, 1992, p. 69.

known major relationships, saṃyoga (between dravyas) and samavāya (between a dravya and guṇa), Candrānanda discusses the subtle relationship of the 'contact-with-inherent' (saṁyukta-samavāya).[655] It is perhaps because of this new type of contact, that, when Praśastapāda later on speaks about the features of guṇas, he says that they have also 'guṇatvābhisambandha' ('association with attributeness'),[656] which means that a quality having the characteristic of 'being in association' with another quality, can be subsequently considered a guṇa, or vaiśeṣikaguṇa. This generative inferential type of knowledge, confirms that their number can be infinite,[657] for whose knowledge, a superior form of cognition is assumed, yogipratyakṣa. This cognition has a major role to play within the soteriology of the system, and for that purpose, in the following section buddhi will be discussed first. Since some of the specific qualities stay in an interdependent relationship (VSc 6.2.17-18), these will be discussed in pairs, and are related to others; icchā (desire) for example, attracts 'opposite' vaiśeṣikaguṇas such as dveṣa, dharma, adharma (VSc 6.2.17).[658] On the other hand, prayatna ('effort' required in yoga context VSc 6.2.11) plays a role in yoga, abhyudaya, and niḥśreyasa. Yet, none of such specific qualities, buddhi, nor prayatna, has a lasting value, because as VSc 1.1.2 says, the 'soteriontological state' of ātman is the absence of them. Once vaiśeṣikaguṇas are extirpated, including buddhi, ātman finds its own, fixed, irreversible and eternal dwelling in the state of 'mokṣa'. Instead of treating the guṇas as standing on their own,

[655] The gloss exemplifies three kinds of contact however: 1) Fire- heat = inherence relationship; 2) Ātoms–fire = contact relationship; 3) Ātoms - heat = contact–with-inherent relationship.

[656] Kumar, 2013, p. 26 mentions about four features of the guṇas (sādharmya). (PD, p. 227): rūpādīnām guṇānām sarveṣām guṇatvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvam nirguṇatvam niṣkriyatvam.

[657] A reference to antyaviśeṣa whose number is infinite and knowable only to a supernatural form of knowledge: yogipratyakṣa (VSc 9.13-17) or ārṣajñāna (VSc 9.28); Halbfass, 1992, p. 273; Narain, 1976, p. 230.

[658] The list of guṇas should be understood in pairs. Icchā presupposes dveṣa, and dharma presupposes adharma (VSc 6.2.17). Sukha presupposes duḥkha (VSc 6.2.16). As for the remaining jñāna (interchangeably used with buddhi) and prayatna, they play a mediator role in both yoga and mokṣa (VSc 6.2.16-17).

in the following I give a presentation of these with an emphasis on how they interrelate among them, or with the self.[659]

'COGNITION' (BUDDHI/ JÑĀNA)

The main role of 'knowledge' (jñāna) of the categories in relation to soteriology is to discern between the natures of two fundamental padārthas: dravya and guṇa. So far, we have discussed a list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, but buddhi is the most important of all, since the grasping of all other vaiśeṣikaguṇas, doṣas, in view of their extirpations, depends on its functions, and subsequently lead to ātman's liberation. As far as the ontology of ātman is concerned, buddhi translates as 'cognition', which according to Candramati is two-fold: 'perception' and 'inference' (DP 38-39). It is not to be confused with other terms, such as jñāna, or vidyā, that designate a broader epistemological concept like 'knowledge', though sometimes Candrānanda uses them interchangeably; as Kumar notes, early Vaiśeṣika seems not to distinguish between 'knowledge'[660] and 'cognition'.[661] There are many places in VSc where cognition (jñāna and buddhi) occurs, but for the sake of ontology, we dwell on three aspects only: 1) its production (3.2.1; 5.2.16); 2) related to other guṇas (particularly sukha and duḥkha) (5.2.16-17 and 10.1); and 3) related to mokṣa (6.2.19). Jñāna/buddhi is not only a guṇa among the seventeen enumerated by VS 1.1.5, but also a mark (liṅga) of manas;[662] and together with all other

[659] For a presentation of the categories, see Kumar 2013; additionally, one may look at the summary of VS of Thakur, 2003; yet, his summary does not always take Candrānanda's Vṛtti into account; see for example the shortcomings of the important soteriological gloss VS 10.21.
[660] It is highly probable that 'knowledge' in this broad epistemological sense as we have it in English refers in Vaiśeṣika to sādharmya, vaidharmya, tattvajñāna, and other similar terms as such.
[661] Kumar, 2013, p. 28: 'It is noteworthy in this regard, that cognition, which is not different from knowledge according to Vaiśeṣika, is stated to be internally perceptible like the other five specific attributes of the self'.
[662] For VSc 3.2.1, see Synopsis of VSc.

vaiśeṣikaguṇas is an 'instrumental cause' (nimittakāraṇa).[663] The presence or absence of jñāna (jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca) is the main epistemological proof of the existence of mind; its existence or absence depends on the way in which the contact (sannikarṣa) with ātman and 'senses' (indriya) and their respective 'objects' (artha), take place. The production of 'ordinary knowledge' is possible when this sannikarṣa takes place; elsewhere it is called 'catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa'.[664] Because buddhi relates to sannikarṣa, it remains therefore prone to perceive or be subject to sukha and duḥkha, which is a hindrance to liberation; and that is why VSc 5.2.16 and 17 underline the importance of 'their exclusion' (tadanārambha) within the context of yoga.[665] While sannikarṣa is responsible (jñānakāraṇatvena) for the production of sukha and duḥkha, the soteriological role of yoga would be to suppress it (anutpatti). As VSc 5.2.17 clarifies, sukha and duḥkha vanish once the splitting of contact is made, namely through the ability of yoga to withdraw the mind from senses (negative dimension); there is also a positive dimension, by which yoga unites mind with the soul only, through a breath-restraint technique (vāyunigraha). In other words, buddhi has a dual implication; one is negative which derives from the cognitive process itself, where soul attaches with the impure external world. The mental process of 'ordinary knowledge'[666]produces knowledge sequentially and as such connects ātman with the external world, therefore attachment and suffering; the second implication is positive, in that buddhi, which is helped by a particular 'dharma born of yoga' (yogajadharma) through yoga practice can alleviate, overcome or extirpate sukha and duḥkha. Both Candrānanda (VSc 5.2.17) and Vādīndra (VSv 5.2.14) agree with this view.

---

[663] VSc: 1.1.7 buddhi sukhaduḥkh'ecchādveṣa prayatna dharmādharmau bhāvanā nimittakāraṇam.
[664] For 'catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣā', see also VSc 3.1.13; 5.2.17; 9.15-16.
[665] see Synopsis of VSc.
[666] The dimension of mind is atomic, and as such it seems that buddhi operates in succession like the atoms in compositions, hence not simultaneously. See chapter on Function of Soteriology, section on epistemology.

'PLEASURE' (SUKHA) AND 'PAIN' (DUḤKHA)

The problem of 'suffering' (duḥkha) and its transcendence is raised from the very beginning by VSc, and is fuelled primarily by the question raised by a Brahmin pupil around a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.12.1 (aśarīraṁ vāva santaṁ priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ); the quote claims to offer release from 'pleasant' (priyā) and 'unpleasant' (apriya) affections in the embodied state. Although duḥkha is not as much elaborated as in the Nyāya system (which differentiates between twenty-one forms of pain), in Candrānanda it is often presented conjointly with sukha, while Sūtrapāṭha lists the two among the seventeen guṇas (VS 1.1.5).[667] More precisely, both sukha and duḥkha are specific qualities of ātman (VSc 3.2.17) and occur differently in different individuals (anyasya sukhādiyoge'nyasya tadabhāvādanayā vyavasthayā nānā ātmānaḥ) (VSc 3.2.16).[668] For Candrānanda this variation in occurrence is the proof for the existence of many souls, an argument adduced against the opponent's doctrine of the oneness of the self stated in the sūtra and gloss of VSc 3.2.15. Vaiśeṣika is a staunch realistic school, whose doctrine of asatkāryavāda maintains the reality of the effects, Candrānanda sees duḥkha and sukha as real ontological concepts (VSc 10.1)[669] which are not to be confused with the substratum in which they reside.

---

667 The discussion of duḥkha (and sukha) is taken up again in VSc 10.1-2 where Candrānanda argues (perhaps against a Buddhist opponent) that beings (bhūtāni) are full of suffering and pain. There is a radical difference between substances and the qualities residing in them, and such confusion would not be made between duḥkha and mahābhūtas. Candrānanda's point is that, because sukha duḥkha are different from the five elements, they are qualities, and as such, they are subjective to self (ātmasamavāyaśc'aitayorahaṁkāreṇ' aikavākyabhāvāt) and do not possess objective reality. For VSc 10.1-2 in Synopsis of VSc.

668 'nyasya: Jac,Ś1pc,Ś2,Ś3; nyasyu Ś1ac(?); nanyasya Jpc (? nya is marked with two strokes above, na added at the margin, both by an alien hand; cf. 1.1.21.C, note ad na svā'śraye)/ vyavasthayā: Ś2; vyavasthāyā J; vyavasthā Ś1,Ś3 / ātmānaḥ: Jpc, Ś1, Ś2, Ś3pc; ātmanaḥ Jac, Ś3ac.

669 The opposing view is that things (bhūtāni) are full of sukha and duḥkha, making them objective concepts,

tathā hi sukhaduḥkhamohamayāni bhūtānīty āhuḥ / tad ayuktaṁ / VS: 10.1: ātmasamavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ[670] pañcabhyo[671]'rthāntaratve hetus tadāśrayibhyaś[672]ca[673] guṇebhyaḥ[674] / VSc: ātmany eva yaḥ samavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayor asau pañcabhyaḥ kṣityādibhyas tadāśrayibhyaś[675] ca guṇebhyo gandharasarūpa[676]sparśebhyo arthā'ntaratve hetuḥ / anya[677]guṇānām[678] anyatrāsamavāyāt;[679] ātmasamavāyaś c'aitayor[680] ahaṁkāreṇ'aikavākyabhāvāt.[681]

Gloss: some say that 'beings are full of sukha, duḥkha, and delusion'[682] / this is not so / VS 10.1: the inherence of pleasure and pain in ātman is the reason for the difference between the five (mahābhūtas) and the qualities (that have these) as their substratum / VSc: in the ātman itself there is the inherence of pleasure and pain, and that is the reason for the difference between the earth and so on, and the qualities residing in these as their substratum such as form, colour, taste, touch / because other qualities are not inherent elsewhere, and these two (pain and pleasure) are inherent in ātman, and are one and the same concept with ahaṃkāra.

The passage shows that in spite of the inherence, guṇas such as pleasure and pain are different realities from their substratum; therefore, neither essentially nor ontologically

[670] sukhaduḥkhayoḥ: JS; sukhayoḥ J (eye skip sukha – duḥkha).
[671] From this point on we have the mss Ś again.
[672] tadāśrayibhyaś: JS, Ś1pc(?) 2; tadāścayityaś J; tadāśriyibhyo Ś1ac(?); tadātrividhebhyo Ś3 (emendation)
[673] ca: JS, J; om Ś (-bhyo).
[674] guṇebhyaḥ: all; guṇetyaḥ J. (bhy – ty can be similar both in Śāradā and in this Devanāgarī)
[675] tadāśrayibhyaś: J; om Ś (eyeskip ādibhyas – āśrayibhyaś).
[676] rasarūpa: J; rūparasa Ś.
[677] anya: J; atra Ś (tra and nya can be similar in Śāradā)
[678] guṇānām: all; guṇonām Jac.
[679] anyatrā 'samavāyāt: J; anyatrāsamavāyaḥ: Ś1, Ś3; anyatrasamavāyaḥ Ś2.
[680] c' aitayor: J; cettayor Ś (emendation).
[681] vākyabhāvāt: J; vākyābhāvāt Ś (see VSc 3.2.14).
[682] Apte dict. p. 1293, 'mohaḥ' refers to 'delusion of mind which prevents one from discerning the truth'. In this case, it could refer to the confusion between soul with pleasure and pain; that is to say, the confusion between substances and qualities.

part of their substratum. In the case of ātman, which is a substratum, its liberation is freedom from such 'inherent contacts', which brings it into bondage, connections, and further compositions which imply action. VSc 6.2.19 says that mokṣa is explained in action. By that, Candrānanda refers to the action of the manas (ātmeti manaḥ) which inevitably affects the soul. These actions are explained with reference to terms like 'aprādurbhāva' and 'saṃyogābhava',[683] terms which both occur in the soteriological gloss VSc 5.2.20, in the absence of which the 'janman' no longer exists. Aprādurbhāva refers most probably to the absence of the body itself, but also to any 'conjunction' and 'disjunction', which collect dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18), and subsequently produce new bodies. As long as saṃyoga functions, the chain of vaiśeṣikaguṇas constitutes the fuel for the production of various 'tendencies' (pravṛtti) (VSc 6.2.17).[684] It is therefore necessary that saṃyogābhāva, which is the 'absence of conjunction' between manas and indriya, should take place. Liberation is a nivṛtti path, not only towards sukha and duḥkha, but more importantly, against all primary causes and contacts from the chain of guṇas, and vaiśeṣikaguṇas.

'Desire' (icchā) and 'Aversion' (dveṣa)

From the start, we should note the difference in use between icchā and dveṣa, both connected with two corresponding vaiśeṣikaguṇas: dharma and adharma; between them, there is a causative relationship; the term 'pūrvikā' shows the relationship of dependence between pravṛtti, icchā, and dharma. VSc 6.2.17 speaks of a certain

[683] For VSc 6.2.19 See Synopsis of VSc.
[684] These 'tendencies' may not be necessarily positive; for VS 6.2.17, see Synopsis of VSc.

'inclination' (pravṛtti) of dharma and adharma, which is preceded, by icchā and dveṣa.[685] Presumably, it refers to the fact that certain impure feelings like desires and aversions, produce positive dharma or negative adharma, which will eventually store (sañcita) somewhere into the self. We remind in passing that the main theme discussed in VS 6.2 is ethics (dharmic injunctions as related to abhyudaya). In this context there seems to be a relation of interdependence between dharma and adharma and other vaiśeṣikaguṇas; various intentions, desires and aversions, inclination towards acts such as desire for 'adultery' (paradāra), 'avarice', or 'pride of money' (dhanamada), all of which are preceded by 'aversion' (dveṣa), and subsequently produce adharma (adharme'pīcchāpūrvikā paradārādiṣu dveṣa pūrvikā)(VSc 6.2.17).[686] The gloss VSc 6.2.18 concludes by stating that there is a 'collection' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma; that shows that Candrānanda agrees with Praśastapāda when he identifies in adṛṣṭa a two-fold guṇa, dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.17). As Halbfass noted, in 'sañcita' we must see a 'conceptual framework of the theory of karma and saṃsāra';[687] adṛṣṭa is also a closer Mīmāṃsā concept to apūrva (VSc 6.2.15), an aspect that requires further research. Although dharma and adharma have not been listed by Kaṇāda in the list of guṇas (VS 1.1.4), but only icchā and dveṣa, both Candrānanda and Praśastapāda, assign dharma and adharma into their guṇa list. The relationship which Candrānanda draws between icchā/dveṣa and dharma/adharma, respectively, should be seen not ontologically, or mutually derived, but rather in the context of the 'retributive theory of karma', where dharma and adharma are both produced and accumulated (sañcita) as a

[685] Trans. Thakur 2003, p. 90: 'activity in merit or demerit has for its antecedents, desire, and aversion.' While discussing 'inclination' (pravṛtti) towards dharma', Candrānanda says that it is preceded by 'desire' (icchā): icchāpūrvikā dharma pravṛttiḥ (VSc 6.2.17).
[686] For full paragraph, see Synopsis of VSc.
[687] Halbfass, 1980, p. 284.

result of the 'purity' (śuci) of pravṛtti, icchā, or other ritualistic actions, with ethical dimensions.

'EFFORT' (PRAYATNA)[688]

Icchā (desire) should not be confused with prayatna, a vaiśeṣikaguṇa commonly translated as 'effort'.[689] In the Sūtrapāṭha, prayatna is discussed in three places: 1) it is said to be a guṇa among the seventeen (VS 1.1.5); 2) similarly to jñāna, it has the characteristic of being 'non-simultaneous' (VS 3.2.3); and 3) it is, alongside icchā, one of the marks (liṅga) to prove epistemologically ātman's existence (VS 3.2.4).[690] Apart from the passages where prayatna is discussed as not being responsible for various physical or cosmological karmas (VSc 5.1.3-4), VSc discusses prayatna in relation with ātman. There are several types of prayatna, which can be classified roughly in two: 1) non-volitional, and 2) volitional.[691] Among the non-volitional ones, we could probably mention abhighāta ('striking back') produced by 'pestle' (musala) when it is in contact with 'wooden mortar' (ulūkha) (VSc 5.1.3). It refers to the 'going up' (utpanna) of the pestle, a physical reaction that occurs after the 'disappearance' (vināśa) of prayatna.[692] This physical action can be considered non-volitional, because it is not caused by prayatna, as there is no 'will' involved in performing it (itīcchāyābhāvāt). As for the volitional type of prayatna we mention, first, the 'specific act of pushing' (nodanaviśeṣa), known also as 'impulse' (VSc 5.1.9), which as Candrānanda says it is produced out of a

[688] See also VSc 3.2.3 (prayatna is not simultaneous);
[689] Kumar, 2013, p. 81, translates it with 'initiative' and 'enthusiasm'; or 'volition', Nozawa, 1993, p. 102.
[690] There are other ways in which prayatna is discussed (e.g. VS 5.1.13) but mentioned only as complementary to the main discussion; for example in order to prove gurutva, Kaṇāda describes that by denying prayatna.
[691] That is the case with Praśastapāda's PD, p. 638.
[692] see Synopsis of VSc.

particular desire (icchā).[693] The affiliation between prayatna and icchā continues in VSc 5.1.10, where another type of push, the 'impetus' (preraṇā) of throwing far away (dūradeśa) is stated to be a result of a particular icchā.[694] This shows the difference between icchā and prayatna, the former being minute, or a specific aspect (viśeṣa) of the later, while prayatna is a more general and perhaps more abstract kind of guṇa of the ātman. As discussed throughout this section, it is common that guṇas have sub-guṇas subsumed into each other, even though these are all effects and impermanent entities.

The second aspect of prayatna to mention, as a volitional type of guṇa related to soteriology, is the relationship it has with body and mind. VSc 5.2 is an āhnika that deals more generally with the 'theory of karma', particularly that 'action' in which ātman (embodied or disembodied) is involved. VS 5.2.15, compares the 'action of hand' with the 'action of mind', on which Candrānanda glosses that, what this 'hand-action' entails is a 'connection' (saṃyoga) between ātman and prayatna. The same connection takes place in 'mind-action', and as the gloss elucidates, it refers to yoga.[695] Indeed, in yoga, the positive approach of abhyāsa emphasises 'effort' very much; in VSc 6.2.11 it is closely part of yoga. Effort is also a vaiśeṣikaguṇa characteristic to the embodied state of the soul (etat saṁdehasya karma), and in this respect, VSc 5.2.15 speaks about two kinds of prayatna: 1) prayatna preceded by icchā and dveṣa (that of the self in the awakened state (jāgrata); and 2) prayatna 'preceded by life' (jīvanapūrvaka), which takes place at the time of the awakening (prabodhakāla). The difference between the two is that while the first prayatna leads to bondage or the formation of a new body (because jīvana as in VS 3.2.14 is one of the liṅgas of the embodied ātman),[696] the second form

[693] see Synopsis of VSc.
[694] see Synopsis of VSc.
[695] see Synopsis of VSc.
[696] Jīvana preceded by life, refers to the embodied self in VSc 5.1.11-12. The term jīvana as referring to the embodied ātman is used in VSc 5.2.20, as well.

of prayatna must refer to Yoga. In any case, the prayatna-ātman connection, as well as the work of action (karmakārya) is an essential part of Yoga but plays an indirect role in relation to both mokṣa and duty (karmādhikāra). By karmādhikāra, Candrānanda means probably the ethical duties of dharma, described in VSc 6.2., in which context it says that prayatna combined essentially with yoga leads to abhyudaya and eventually niḥśreyasa (VSc 6. 2.11-12). Without prayatna, abhyudaya is impossible (VSc 6.2.10-11). One last remark is that, although the work of action and the saṃyoga between prayatna and ātman are said to relate to both yoga and mokṣa (VSc 5.2.15), nevertheless, both action and prayatna would have to vanish in the soteriological state. 'Tadanārambhaḥ' of VS 5.2.16, refers not only to the extirpation of sukha, duḥkha, and the four-fold contact, but also to the action between prayatna and ātman, (VSc 5.2.15) as well as adṛṣṭa, of which the latter plays a role in both cosmogony and the formation of new bodies (VSc 5.2.14). As a concluding remark, we may point out that a possible difference between icchā-guṇa and prayatna-guṇa is that while the former has a 'corporeal connotation' (referring to śarīra), the latter prayatna, seems to be more internal, as it plays a role in yoga (vāyunigraha) and its severance from the soul within the cognitive process (catuṣṭayasannikarṣa).

SAṂSKĀRA

One more important vaiśeṣikaguṇa (VSc 3.2.17),[697] not enumerated by Kaṇāda in VS 1.1.5 is saṃskāra ('latent impetus', 'residue'), a term with multiples connotations, hence difficult to translate, but more importantly for the soteriology discussed in the present chapter, related intimately to the function of the 'atomic manas', ātman and buddhi. In

[697] VSc 3.2.17: tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkh'ecchādveṣaprayatnasaṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ

VSc, saṃskāra emerges as generic term for specific physical and mental functions, or sub-guṇas such as 'velocity' (vega),[698] and 'creating energy', or 'mental impression' (bhāvanā).[699] Praśastapāda associates it with 'elasticity' (sthitisthāpaka) as well, but Candrānanda seems not to mention this sub-guṇa. In the Vṛtti, saṃskāra emerges about twenty-two times, out of which four times in the Sūtrapāṭha alone (VS 4.1.8; 5.1.17, 18; 9.25).[700] In the additional list of the guṇas, Candrānanda listed it next to dharma and dharma (VSc 1.1.5). It is listed among the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas that are considered 'efficient cause' (nimittakāraṇa) (1.1.7); when in the form of 'velocity' (vega), it is considered to be both efficient and 'non-inherent cause' (ubhayathākāraṇa) (VSc 1.1.7); it is produced (kārya) of karma (VSc 1.1.13). Saṃskāra is also considered to be among the other (anye tu) guṇas of dravyas such as pṛthivī (VSc 2.1.1), āp (VSc 2.1.2), tejas (VSc 2.1.3), or vāyu (VSc 2.1.4). It is the 'expression of effect',[701] (saṁskāravyakti) as standing in the 'chain of production' (pūrvasya pūrvasya kāraṇatvāt utpattiḥ) of 'form', 'memory of taste', 'volition', 'action of mind' (VSc 3.2.4).[702] Most importantly, saṃskāra is in the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the self (VSc 3.2.17).[703] If we take adṛṣṭa, as Praśastapāda did, to signify a two-fold guṇa (dharma and adharma), we must then summarise that the number of vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the self, for Candrānanda and Praśastapāda is nine in total: buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, dharma/ adharma (or adṛṣṭa), and saṃskāra. In one place saṃskāra is alongiside saṃyoga and vibhaga, an 'effect produced by action' (VSc 1.1.13) yet plays a different role from

[698] VSc 1.1.7, 12, 18; VSc 5.1.3, 5-6, 8, 14, 17; VSc 5.2.1; VSc 10.17.
[699] Trans. Thite (audio file, personal communication) and Kumar, 2013, p. 81.
[700] Saṃskāra emerges in VSc 1.1.5, 12-13; VSc 2.1.1,2,3,4; VSc 3.2.1, 4, 17; VSc 4.1.8; VSc 5.1.16; VSc 5.1.17,18; VSc 9.22; VSc 9.25.
[701] In some contexts, saṃskāra is used in the sense of an effect 4.1.8. In any case, saṃskāra produces something new.
[702] For VSc 3.2.4 see Synopsis of VSc. These are produced in an order of cause and effect, where knowledge is produced in a 'reversed order' (viparīta) because each later thing in this list causes the knowledge of the earlier one.
[703] See Synopsis of VSc.

saṃyoga and vibhāga (VSc 5.1.17); in another place, it is produced by the 'action of arrow' (VSc 5.1.16). It is also associated semantically with bhāvanā (VSc 9.22), and finally with the 'flaws' of ātman (doṣa), which alongside adharma, explain the doṣas of the embodied ātman that cause defective forms of knowledge (duṣṭa jñānaṁ) (VSc 9.25).

In relation to soteriology, saṃskāra plays two important roles: 1) in relation to karma theory; and 2) in relation to ātman's cognitive faculty, on which liberation of the self depends. The former aspect (saṃskāra-vega) is physical, due to its role within the physics of the cosmos,[704] in which context vega seems to be presented like a sub-guṇa of saṃskāra, as shown earlier. From Praśastapāda's PD to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṁgraha (TS) (a later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika digest), saṃskāra is defined in three varieties: vega ('velocity'), bhāvanā ('mental impression') and 'sthitisthāpaka' (elasticity), yet, in VSc, as mentioned earlier, only two of these are mentioned (vega and bhāvanā). Vega is also listed among the guṇas that are so-called 'ubhayathā kāraṇam' (both efficient and non-inherent cause) (VSc 1.1.7). It plays a role in the production of action, which action is explained as created from a conjunction between 'speed' (vega), and 'cotton ball' (tūlā) (VSc 1.1.18). It explains the 'striking' (abhighāta) of 'pestle' (musala) with 'wooden mortar' (ulūkha) (VSc 5.1.3; 5.1.5). These physical explanations are extended over the self too; for instance, the speed of hand (VSc 5.1.6) like 'pushing' (nodāna) is explained as being a specific contact between prayatna, and vega (VSc 5.1.8). In short, one of the aspects of saṃskāra is speed, though it can roughly be translated as 'velocity', the characteristic of ātman to be involved in cosmic actions that involve 'repetition' and 'change'. Referring to the mechanical connotation of saṃskāra, Lapani translates it as 'la poussée résiduelle', a sort of force meant to explain or realise the continuation between two disconnected points, in a similar manner to which, in

[704] Vega is discussed in VSc about eleven times: VSc 1.1.7, 12, 18; VSc 5.1.3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 17; 5.2.1, 10.17.

linguistics for example, sandhi has the role of liaising the phonemes.[705] The mobile character of saṃskāra might play a role in the stream of consciousness, which leads to further movements of the manas into a new body.

The other sub-guṇa (sub-division) of saṃskāra is bhāvanā,[706] which differently from vega, engages in cognitive faculties of ātman. One intriguing passage is VSc 9.22, which discusses the production of memory (smṛti); the sūtra explains that memory is produced because of two factors: 1) because of a saṃyoga between ātman and manas; and 2) because of saṃskāra.[707] The gloss explains that when one is 'desirous of fire' (agnyarthino) in that case the vision of smoke is produced (dhūmadarśanaṁ) as well, because of the two factors stated already in the sūtra: 'ātman-manas connection' and a 'specific bhāvanā', which bhāvanā in this case, is saṃskāra (viśiṣṭāc ca bhāvanākhyasaṁskārād); the two appear to be synonyms. Saṃskāra in this context is produced because of the 'reminiscence' of a 'mental impression' (bhāvanā). What is then bhāvanā? Saṃskāra has in VSc two meanings, one is physical as discussed earlier, and the other is mental. In both cases its meaning seems to be that of a 'fluctuating energy', connecting perception (of smoke) and inference (of fire); and gives an explanation for the production of memory, as well as for the production of dream and 'other related oneiric aspects' (svapnaḥ svapnāntikaṁ ca).[708] Bhāvanā is at work not only in the awakened state of ātman, but also when the mind is 'calm' (pralīna), or when the 'senses are stopped' (uparat'endriya), an allusion to the state of dream. As the gloss indicates, the contact between manas and ātman is preceded and made 'with' something (-saha), and dependent on something (pūrvapratyayāpekṣād). To conclude, saṃskāra must have

[705] For the comparison of saṃskāra with sandhi, Kapani, 1992, p. 298.
[706] Places where bhāvanā emerges are not many, but relevant enough to place it in the zone of cognition and karma theory: VSc 1.1.7 (casual factor of memory) and 9.22, called to be synonymous, or an off-shoot of saṃskāra), or 9.23 is said to be 'instrumental' (saha) in producing knowledge of svapna and svapnāntika.
[707] See footnote above.
[708] For VSc 9.23 see Synopsis of VSc.

a mediating role in both physical-cosmological actions described above, and more importantly, in the cognitive faculties of the self. In Vaiśeṣika, the soul is the substratum of knowledge, and the presence of such intermediate entities might explain the flow of atomic mind into a new body, a doctrine that is quite vaguely described in VSc 5.2.19.

DHARMA AND ADHARMA (ADṚṢṬA)

Dharma is a notoriously difficult term to interpret, and like in other traditions, (Abhidharma,[709] Vedic, and Dharmaśāstra)[710] it acquired in time, and in different textual contexts, various meanings. That is the case in VSc too, where a whole variety of usages ranging from ritualistic (VSc 6.2.1-2) to the most subtle psychological, such as that 'fine quality born of yoga' practice (yogajadharma VSc 9.13), show the richness and problems of systematising the synonymy of the term. Among the different meanings acquired in VSc, a few could be mentioned. 1) Dharma (in opposition to adharma), a guṇa among the twenty-four (VSc 1.1.5; 7). 2) 'Teaching instrument' (instrumental case) leading to niḥśreyasa (VS 1.1.2; VSc 1.1.6; VSc 6.2.11). 3) 'Teaching instrument' leading to abhyudaya (VS 1.1.2; VSc 10.20). 4) Ethical, āśramic and ritualistic implication (VSc 6.1.4-6; VS 6.1.15, VSc 6.2.17-18). 5) Type of 'yogic dharma' (yogajadharma) (VSc 9. 13). 6) 'Collection' (sañcita) of dharmas/adharma associated to the 'doctrine of karma' (VSc 5.1.15; VSc 6.2.18; VSc 9.28). 7) 'Teaching' of śruti and smṛti texts and their injunctions (VSc 6.1.1; VSc 10.19-20). 8) 'Corpus of teaching' (VS 1.1.1). 9) The teaching about Īśvara, who is the authority on which āmnāya texts lay (VSc 1.1.3). 10) Related to 'knowledge of true nature of padārthas' (VSc 1.1.6), or to things 'small', 'hidden', and 'remote' (VSc 9.28). 11) 'Defining characteristic' (VSc 2.1.7-8; VSc 3.1.7; VS 4.2.5; VSc

[709] Two broad usage dharma as 'law' and dharma as 'factor', Cox, 2004, p. 543.
[710] For dharma and its relation with maintenance of cosmos, Warder, 1971, p. 275-6.

9.8). 12) 'Mental category' sometimes related to saṃskāra, or involved in connecting ātman with manas (VSc 9.24-25; 9.28). Like in the case of other traditions, as Buddhism,[711] in Vaiśeṣika too one must see at least two major broad usages of the term, one general that refers to a form of 'teaching' and a more specific designation, that of a 'factor', or guṇa.[712] The usage of dharma in Sūtrapāṭha (VS 1.1.2) shows the relation to these usages that VSc does. Indeed, the term emerges in all Sūtrapāṭha versions of Candrānanda (VSc), Vādīndra (VSv), Sena Court (SC), and Śaṅkaramiśra (VSś), and in the same contexts. Dharma is 'teaching' (VSc 1.1.1; VSv 1.1.1; VSś 1.1.1), 'soteriological medium' (VS 1.1.2, all), 'quality of particular cosmic body' that is to say it determines the cosmic layer (presumably 'bhūmi') of the body to be reborn (VSc 4.2.5; VSv 4.2.7; VSś 4.2.7),[713] 'quality preceded by icchā and dveṣa' (VSc 6.2.17; VSś 6.2.14),[714] a trans-empirical entity demonstrated within a syllogistic discussion on asatkāryavāda (all),[715] and 'quality produced by manas ātman contact' (VSc 9.24; SC, VSs 9.29).[716] As shall be seen, the difference between the usages of dharma by Sūtrapāṭha (of Kaṇāda) and Vṛtti (of Candrānanda) is not significantly great. The two readings agree on the two commonly accepted shades of meanings, 'factor', and 'teaching'.[717] These might have been from the very beginning used interchangeably. Yet, scholars like Bronkhorst, who looked at the Sūtrapāṭha from a diachronic perspective, have talked about a

[711] Cox, 2004, p. 543.

[712] VSc 1.1.5 lists dharma and adharma among the seven new guṇas, which correspond to adṛṣṭa as listed by PD (1.5) (Bronkhorst crit. ed. p. 1-2). . It appears mentioned fourthy-eight times, either independently or jointly, in VS 1.1.1-2; 4.2.5; 6.1.15; 6.2.17; 9.8; 9.24; 9.28; and extensively within the gloss of the following sūtras: 1.1.3, 5-7; 2.1.8; 3.1.7; 4.2.5; 5.1.15; 6.1.1, 4-6, 15; 6.2.1-3, 11, 17-18; 9.8, 13, 24-25,29; 10.19-20.

[713] A slight variation between Candrānanda and Vādīndra, which both offer the same reading (dharmaviśeṣāt), while Śaṅkaramiśra gives: dharmaviśeṣāc ca.

[714] VSc 6.2.17: icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ; Vādīndra does not have. Śaṅkaramiśra reading: icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmapravṛttiḥ.

[715] All the same: etenāghaṭo 'gaur adharmaś ca vyākhyātaḥ. As Halbfass 1992, p. 245 explains, the three examples given by the sūtra here (non-pot, non-cow, and non-dharma) correspond to the three states: conscious, non-conscious, and trans-empirical.

[716] Except Vādīndra (VSv), the reading in both VSc, and VSs is the same (see Nozawa comparative table).

[717] For dharma as 'teaching' and 'doctrine', Kṛṣṇa in The Gītā, 9.2-3; 14.

'replacement' of the old meaning of dharma ('teaching') with that of the dharma as a 'quality' of the soul, even before Praśastapāda.[718] Indeed, Candrānanda lists dharma and adharma in the additional list of seven new guṇas appended to the list of seventeen as of VSc 1.1.5.[719]

VSc 1.1.5: ete saptadaśa kaṇṭh'oktā rūpādayo guṇāḥ ca'śabdasamuccitāś ca gurutva[720] dravatva[721]snehasaṁskāradharmādharma śabdā gṛhyante.

Gloss 1.1.5: have been uttered here, these seventeen qualities 'form' and so on; because of the 'ca-word' [other qualities] are also included: weight, fluidity, viscidity, saṃskāra, dharma, adharma, śabda.

So it is in this very sense that dharma concerns Vaiśeṣikas soteriology. Enumerated next to adharma, as well as saṃskāra, dharma is for Praśastapāda one of the 'unperceptive', and 'supra-sensuous'[722] which is 'destructible by the ultimate experiencing of the last item of happiness' (atīndriyo'ntyaduḥkhasaṃvijñānavirodhī).[723] Here 'experience' refers to the 'exhaustion' (virodhi) of the effects of actions, which is a sort of karmic residue which 'ripens' (vipāka) somewhere in self. It may well be that the 'storage' takes place in saṃskāra, which, as we see has two sub-qualities in VSc, vega, and bhāvanā. Yet, it seems that Candrānanda does to seem to recognise that 'fruits' (phalam) of a sacrificial action can produce fruits at a later time. The locus classicus of dharma as a teaching is the gloss

[718] Bronkhorst, AS 1994, p. 739.
[719] See Synopsis of VSc.
[720] gurutva: all; guru Ś3
[721] dravatva: J; dravatve Ś
[722] According to Praśastapāda PD 308 (dharma) and PD 317 (adharma)
[723] PD 308: dharmaḥ puruṣaguṇaḥ / kartuḥ priyahitamokṣahetuḥ atīndiryo'ntyasukhasaṃvijñānavirodhī. Jhā 1916, trans. p. 583.

to VS 1.1.2., which is the response to the question stated in VSc 1.1.1 (ko dharma ity āha), namely what is dharma and its relationship with abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa.

VS: 1.1.2 yato'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ / VSc: yāgadevatāpūjādi[724]-kriyāṇām ājya[725]-puṣpādinirvartyānāṁ[726] tad'aiva[727] vinaṣṭatvād[728] uttarakālaṁ phaladānāśakter[729] yasmād dhetor abhyudayaniḥśreyase[730] bhavataḥ sa dharma iti boddhavyaḥ.[731]

Gloss VS 1.1.2: dharma is that from which there is obtainment of abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa / VSc: because actions such as 'sacrifice', 'oblation to god', and so on, which are brought about with 'ghee' and 'flowers' and so on, are destroyed at the very time of their execution, and because they are unable to give [karmic] results at a later time, therefore, dharma is that [mediating element] from which[732] abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa arise, so one should understand.

There are at least two intriguing, if not controversial, facts in this gloss. One is the absence of the theory of karma, or the inefficiency of rituals within the sacramental (Vedic-brahmanic) doctrine, and second the problematic relationship between dharma and niḥśreyasa that Candrānanda draws. Since dharma is a vaiśeṣikaguṇa, which is stored

[724] pūjā'di: J; pūjāti Ś
[725] ājya: Ś; ājyā J
[726] nirvartyānāṁ: J; nivartyānāṁ Ś
[727] tad' aiva: J,Ś2; kadaiva Ś3; katadaiva Ś1
[728] vinaṣṭatvād: all; niṣṭatvād Ś3
[729] dānā'śakter: Ś1,Ś3; dānāsakter J; dānāśaktor Ś2
[730] niḥśreyase: J; niḥśreyasau Ś
[731] boddhavyaḥ: J,Ś3; bodhavyaḥ Ś1,Ś2 (loss of gemination)
[732] Dual nominative.

somewhere in the self, it cannot become a soteriological factor.[733] To avoid such contradiction, the only interpretation of dharma in this context, is not 'factor'[734] (vaiśeṣikaguṇa), but rather dharma taken in the very broad sense, that of a 'teaching' about abhyudaya and mokṣa; the latter, as the gloss runs, is the absence of dharma (as vaiśeṣikaguṇa). In VSc dharma is a concept of synthesis between two different soteriologies, and represents a substitute to the necessity of rituals, which in most of the cases have precise targets, like 'removal of calamites', or 'the desire to obtain body in the world of Brahman', all of which are the business of abhyudaya.[735] These do not solve completely the problem of liberation, because liberation is devoid of any form of desire, such as icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, and so forth.[736] The gloss mentions also two kinds of items: 'sacrificial' (yāga, ājya),[737] and 'devotional' (devatāpūja, puṣpa),[738] which may correspond to each of the two soteriologies mentioned: abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. Gokhale talks about devotional aspect as beneficial to liberation too, and the possibility that niḥśreyasa may be helped by action like devatāpūja which imply flower offerings.[739] Indeed, in VSc 6 Candrānanda does not draw a sharp distinction between 'dharma that leads to abhyudaya' (VSc 6.2.2.) and 'dharma that leads to mokṣa' (VSc 6.2.11-19). As my thesis argues, Candrānanda's commentary belongs to a movement synthesis which

[733] Candrānanda VSc 1.1.2, agrees with Śrīdhara who says that dharma is not 'a potency residing in the action performed' (Jhā trans. p. 585) Śrīdhara, 1977 ed. p. 660: yo dharmah sa puruṣasya guṇo na karmasāmarthyanityarthah; Heilebettel, 2010, p. 32.
[734] Cox, 2004, p. 543.
[735] Gonda 1966, p. 153 speaks about this difference when says that mokṣa is 'a wholly different plane of existence', radically different from 'svarga' (which in VSc corresponds to abhyudaya).
[736] See discussion on the difference between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa in the Brahmāloka, mokṣa sections.
[737] Devatāpūja, puṣpa, are devotional acts that may be incorporated by nivṛtti path as well (Gokhale, personal communication).
[738] Gokhale says that it may well be that when the nivṛtti path that has as finality niḥśreyasa could still involve some devotional acts. The synthesis argument I put forward is that dharma is both tool and effect; it has both a universal value, as well as particular. When it has the particular value, it refers to it as kārya (effect) or as guṇa of something bigger (Dharma, as universal).
[739] Gokhale (Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21 February 2016).

characterised the Gupta period and after.[740] Dated second half of the first millennium AD, VSc belongs to a period which drew a synthesis between pravṛtti (dharma of abhyudaya) and nivṛtti (dharma of yoga, and mokṣa), and the gloss of VSc 1.1.2, should be read in this way, namely how two soteriologies were unified within a single 'doctrine of dharma'. As we shall see throughout VSc, dharma contains a whole variety of meanings, both of pravṛtti and nivṛtti kind, which have the goal to yoke the pair of opposite soteriologies, abhyudaya, and niḥśreyasa.[741]

ETHICAL DIMENSION. Another dimension of the dharma concept is ethical, largely developed into the sixth adhyāya (VSc 6), where practical, ritual, or ethical implications are taken into consideration, which represents the pravṛtti path of ways in which actions, bring forth abhyudaya,. In VSc 6, we see two broad categories of dharma discussed: 1) from VSc 6.1.1 up to VSc 6.2.11 a doctrine of dharma as related to abhyudaya, which I call 'externalist'; and 2) an 'internalist' form of dharma which beings about liberation (VSc 6.2.11-19). In between the two sections, a brief discussion on yoga, confirms the hypothesis of this thesis that both 'yoga' and 'dharma' represent concepts of synthesis between the two opposite soteriologies, and ultimately between the two apparently conflictual paths: pravṛtti versus nivṛtti.[742] Thus in VSc 6 we must accept at least two broad 'aspects of dharma',[743] which correspond to ritual, on one hand, and knowledge (or gnostic) on the other hand; a classification in which absolute liberation refers only

[740] On the date of Mahābhārata, (between 400 BCE and 400 CE), Mann, 2012, p. 16.
[741] See all articles in Doniger, ed. 1980 (Karma and Rebirth) and Matilal, 1986. In VSc the 'path of activism' (pravṛtti) includes rituals, sacrifices, and offerings (e.g. abhyudaya), and the 'path of renunciation' (nivṛtti) includes an in-depth form of knowledge of the 'true nature of categories' (Vaiśeṣika's padārthas), which requires ultimately vairagya (with or without yogajadharma), 'discrimination' (parijñāna) and finally, absolute liberation from body, vaiśeṣikaguṇas, and doṣas (VSc 1.1.6).
[742] Larson, 1980, talks about the social character dharma, which, I here identify with dharma. Dharma, like in Buddhism, acquires in Hindu śāstras like Vaiśeṣika a role of synthesis.
[743] Wezler, 2004, p. 630 says that there must have been a 'radical difference' between Vedic and Dharmaśāstric understandings of dharma.

to the latter one, where dharma has a more guṇic, or internalist connotation, as described with the theory of karma (VSc 6.2.17-19). However, there are other sub-divisions of dharma too. Within the 'externalist category', one can see the following: 1) A 'Vedic 'dharma' as prescribed by the Vedic injunctions (śāstrā'dau tasy'oddiṣṭatvāt tasya vaidiko vidhiḥ sādhanaṁ) (VSc 6.1.1). 2) An 'ethical dharma', where offering (dadāti) (VSc 6.1.4) and 'accepting' (pratigraha) (VSc 6.1.5)[744] must be performed only after proper knowledge (buddhipūrvo) of the 'recipient',[745] who should be a qualified (viśiṣṭa) Brahmin (not sama, or hīna).[746] 3) 'Scriptural dharma' whose intentions (prayoga) in the śruti and smṛti texts, are often explicitly made (e.g. dṛṣṭanaṁ; dṛṣṭaprayojana) or non-explicitly made (e.g. dṛṣṭābhāva) (VSc 6.2.1).[747] 4) 'Ritualistic dharma', whose twelve actions the Sūtrapāṭha says lead to adṛṣṭa, while VSc says that they lead to dharma (VSc 6.2.2). 5) Similarly 'social dharma' (cāturāśramya) (VSc 6.2.1-5), or the four stages whose performance is expected to be 'without break' (anupadhā), and which requires removal of doṣas such as 'hypocritical intention' (abhisaṁdher dambhādirahitatvam anupadh'ety arthaḥ) (VSc 6.2.4), as well as to be performed with purity (śuci) (VSc 6.2.6-8). This latter one can be classified as 'intentional dharma', because the 'purity' (śuci) and 'impurity' (aśuci) depend on a particular intention (VSc 6.2.5-8), which shows that dharma moves from its externalist ritualistic aspect to a more internal aspect. Dharma operates from the most concrete to the most subtle injunctions.

[744] 'Feeding food to impure Brahmins' (VSc 6.1.8-12).
[745] Knowledge of the difference between various recipients of charity (VSc 6.1.13-15). The āhnika contains also various prescriptions on the duties of Brahman in critical situations (e.g. life-threat versus suicide VSc 6.1.16-18).
[746] 'Sama' is the medium, mediocre;'Hīna' is the inferior Brahmin.
[747] See also VSc 10.19-20. Some of the positive and negative injunctions, which are mentioned by VSc, are twelve in number, as discussed elsewhere.

GUṆIC DIMENSION (DHARMA AND ADHARMA) (VSC 6.2.12-19). A final aspect of dharma is the internal dimension acquired in VSc 6.2.11 up to 19. After the gloss VSc 6.2.11, where abhyudaya is interwined with yoga, Candrānanda goes on to discuss a different kind of dharma, one that leads to niḥśreyasa (idānīṁ niḥśreyasa hetuṁ dharmam āha). Contrary to what might be expected, dharma discussed here, however, is not that which is born of yoga practice (yogajadharma),[748] but like VS 6.2.17 shows, is a guṇa which together with adharma accumulates (sañcita) in the 'sentient organism' (jantu), causing repeated births (VSc 6.2.18). In the second āhnika, Candrānanda describes a different dharma, which I identify as guṇic, because it is associated with adharma, as well as other vaiśeṣikaguṇas such as icchā, dveṣa (VS 6.2.17), or remotely caused by sukha (6.2.12). The 'storage' which is caused by dharma and adharma, represents the doctrine of rebirth and explains how various subtle psychological affections (sukha, raga, tṛpta) (VSc 6.2.12-16), as well as some vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the self (icchā, dveṣa, dharma, adharma, etc.) (VSc 6.2.17-19) cause bondage. The explanation is in the collection of dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18), more generally, but more specifically in the negative role adharma has on the soul. Adharma is another guṇa enumerated in the list of twenty-four in Candrānanda (VSc 1.1.5), Praśastapāda (PD 5) and Candramati (1.3.12). It is conjoint with dharma, but differently from it carries a generally negative impact on the physical, ethical, and religious manifestations of the self.[749] One example of such negative consequences which adharma has (as guṇa conjoint with its counterpart dharma), is 'storage' or 'collection' (sañcita) produced by its capacity to join and disjoin in order to produce a new birth of a body (jantu) (VSc 6.2.18). Candramati also confirms this when he says that adharma is that which produces

[748] For yogajadharma see Hiltebeitel, 2010, p. 32, on the basis of Kath Up. 1-2, which mentions about a 'subtle dharma' gained by a certain yogic meditation.
[749] Scholars translated adharma with 'violation of cosmic religious law', Index, in Doniger. ed. 1980, p. 331.

'undesired' (aniṣṭa) things like body, (with its characteristics), pain, and erroneous cognition (ko' dharmaḥ yo' niṣṭaśarīrādi duḥkha mithyājñāna hetur ātmasamaveta eka dravyaḥ kārya virodhī sa evā dharma ity ucyate) (DP 1.3.58).[750] Apart from 'undesired' things (aniṣṭa), Praśastapāda uses even a more grim term 'pratyavāya', which Jhā translates as 'sin'; hence, in this context, 'sin' would be as Candramati identifies: śarīra, duḥkha, and mithyājñāna. In the soteriological perspective, adharma must be extinguished, perhaps what Praśastapāda wishes to express with 'antyaduḥkhasaṃvijñānavirodhī' (the feature of adharma as being 'destructible by the cognition of the last item of pain),[751] is in fact the theory of karma, according to which the residual traces left behind by any action, must be completely exhausted before liberation takes place. The term 'saṃvijñāna', which Jhā translates as 'cognition', may have here the meaning of 'ultimate experience' as it refers to the total, or last (antya) destruction of dukkha. As a guṇa, adharma, like dharma, are 'counterproductive' (virodhī). The destruction of adharma is in Candramati two-fold: one is psychological, and the other intellectual. Adharma is destroyed by its effects, pain (psychological dimension) and erroneous cognition (intellectual dimension) (DP 2.8.173).[752] So we have two situations, on the one hand in DP 1.3.58 it says that adharma causes body, pain an erroneous knowledge, and on the other hand in DP 2.8.173, adharma is destroyed by these very effects, namely pain and erroneous cognition. The destruction follows a reversed drive (from effects to cause) as compared to the route of the production (that goes from cause to effect); hence we assume that the atomic theory in Vaiśeṣika follows the same pattern. In the case of adharma destruction which has also an intellectual connotation, Candramati says that all cognition (sarvam jñāna) is destroyed by its effect,

[750] Miyamoto, 1996, p. 176. Among other features of adharma, DP talks about dharma as inherent in soul (presumably as a vaiśeṣikaguṇa), it has one dravya as its substratum, and can be destroyed by its effect.
[751] Jhā, 1916, p. 598.
[752] Trans. Miyamoto, 1996, p. 195.

'impression' (saṃskāra) (174), while saṃskāra itself being a cause of 'recollection' (smṛti) is destroyed by pain (184). Between vaiśeṣikaguṇas we need to see not only a joining chain of causation, but also a chain of destruction. Candramati says that desire and aversion can destroy their own causes (e.g. pleasure, and pain) (178), while the internal effort is an effect (of desire and aversion) and destroys its own causes (180). The chain of causation from the most subtle to the grossest vaiśeṣikaguṇa is the way in which liberation functions too, as shown in VSc 6.2.11-19. There is a whole hierarchy of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, both cosmogonic, and eschatological that shows the convolution and involution of cosmology, as well as soteriology.

Table 6. Chain of causation among vaiśeṣikaguṇas

Evolution (Cause produces effect) Candrānanda VSc 6.2.11-19.	Devolution (Effect destroys Cause) Candramati's DP
pravṛtti causes icchā, dveṣa VSc 6.2.18	prayatna destroys icchā, dveṣa 183
icchā & dveṣa cause dharma, adharma[753] VSc 6.2.17 adṛṣṭa causes rāga VSc 6.2.15 saṃyoga & vibhāga cause sañcita (dharma and adharma) and janma ('biological body') VSc 6.2.18	sukha & samyagjñāna destroy dharma 172 duḥkha & mithyājñāna destroy adharma 173
sukha causes rāga VSc 6.2.12	icchā & dveṣa destroy sukha, duḥkha 178
tanmaya causes rāga VSc 6.2.13 tṛpta[754] causes rāga VSc 6.2.14 jātiviśeṣa[755] causes rāgaviśeṣa VSc 6.2.16	sukha destroys saṃskāra 184 smṛti destroys saṃskāra 185

[753] According to Candramati, DP 1.3.58, both dharma and adharma cause śarīra, duḥkha, and mithyājñāna.

[754] 'Satisfaction' (tṛpta) is defined in terms of śarīrapuṣṭa, which refers to 'wealth, prosperity'.

[755] Within Vaiśeṣika theory of karma, presumably there is a relation between jativiśeṣa and the differentiation that VSc 4.2 makes on account of different bodies which varied according to specific dharma (VSc 4.2.5), or specific effect (VSc 4.2.6); there does not appear to be a direct relation between beings of the various cosmic regions (VSc 4.2.4) and a particular passion (VSc 6.2.16).

By contrast to dharma, ('activity towards maintenance of the world'),[756] which has a cosmological importance, adharma is just the opposite of it, because it represents the 'violation of cosmic religious law'.[757] The evolution of either the psychological self ('subtle body') or cosmos depends, with a greater extent, on the dialectics between the two, for which we often have designated the term 'adṛṣṭa', generally translated with 'unseen', 'invisible',[758] and which occurs in Sūtrapāṭha and VSc several times (5.1.15; 5.2.2; 5.2.4; 5.2.8; 5.2.14; 5.2.19; 6.2.1; 6.2.15; 8.13).[759] Both Candrānanda and Praśastapāda use adṛṣṭa to designate two vaiśeṣikaguṇas, 'merit' (dharma) and 'demerit' (adharma).[760] Although adṛṣṭa causes the birth of cosmos and the embodied selves (hence it affects the soteriology of ātman), it is yet understood to carry a rather 'fateful' influence, sometimes translated as 'destiny'.[761] As Halbfass noted, the complex use of adṛṣṭa in Sūtrapāṭha exemplifies the 'encounter of cosmology, philosophy of nature, and categorial analysis with soteriological ideas, and the attempt to explicate and justify within its own conceptual framework the theory of karma and saṃsāra'.[762] Moreover, the addition of dharma and adharma to the original list of the seventeen guṇas epitomises Praśastapāda's attempt to merge 'physics' with soteriology.[763] Yet, I argue here that Vaiśeṣika's synthesis took already place even before dharma and adharma induction into the system, namely through adṛṣṭa itself, as well as the substantialist view

[756] Glucklich, 1994, p. 3, 9, translates dharma with 'order'; and translates adharma with 'chaos', though for the latter he says it is only conceptually chaotic or unlawful; Both relate to pravṛtti path VSc 6.2.17, and because of saṁyoga and vibhāga, these determine the formation of new body. See, Cox, 2004, p. 543.
[757] Trans. Index in Doniger, ed. 1980, p. 331.
[758] Halbfass, 1980, p. 284.
[759] There are instances, however, in which the term designates a completely other meaning than the karmic adṛṣṭa here discussed; it is used epistemologically VSc 8.13 where it refers to seen and unseen objects; in VSc 2.1.10 which the touch has unseen marks; in VSc 2.2.20 the external form of doubt is two-fold, 'perceived' (dṛṣṭa) and 'non-perceived' (adṛṣṭa).
[760] Trans. Halbfass, 1980, p. 284. See DP 1.3.58. 'Adharma is the cause of body pain, and erroneous cogntions'; trans. Miyamoto, 1996, p. 176.
[761] Thakur, 2003, p. 90.
[762] Halbfass, in Doniger ed. 1980, p. 284.
[763] Halbfass, in Doniger ed. 1980, p. 285.

of the system itself, where the soul, as a substance bonded by its vaiśeṣikaguṇas, is trapped in cosmic composition, which is regulated by adṛṣṭa. As in the case of dharma from sūtra 1.1.2, which carries the connotation of a doctrine, adṛṣṭa too, has in Sūtrapāṭha a broad cosmic meaning, and only in the later commentarial tradition would acquire ethically driven sub-meanings. One should read Sūtrapāṭha as a cryptic text whose terminology contains broad semantic possibilities, whence the task of the commentarial traditions (Sūtrapāṭha, Bhāṣya, and Independent) is to unveil its meanings.

Adṛṣṭa has in VSc at least two broad usages, one ontological, the other soteriological. The ontological usages are also sub-classified in cosmogonic where adṛṣṭa is that invisible force which at the beginning of era (kalpānta) causes the first action of atom to form the matter, or the first action of the manas, or the upward and sideway movements of the wind (VSc 5.2.14). In addition, adṛṣṭa causes the atomic manas to move out of a body and enter into a new body through its mixture with things eaten and drunk, a way that explains the saṁsāric flux through which manas makes possible transmigration at the atomic level (VSc 5.2.19). In the light of this gloss, Candrānanda must have accepted, to a certain extent, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad view on the third path (Yama's world), where the transmigration of the 'subtle body' (sūkṣmaśarīra) passes through different cosmic levels, by the medium act of eating.[764] But there are considerable differences, namely that in VSc it is manas which is atomic and movable, not soul which is vibhu, and there is no definite answer as to whether Candrānanda maintains the idea of a 'subtle body'.[765] The medium of the movement of atomic manas is food, and this idea, as Potter shows is common in both Yoga and Advaita, and is

[764] Potter, 1980, p. 252 (from Ch Up. 5.10).

[765] Later in this chapter, I have launched the hypothesis that what transmigrates is saṃskāra, and together with it the series of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas, all of which are an equivalent of the concept of 'subtle body' that is able to create the biological body called jīvana.

worked out by Candrānanda too in VSc 5.2.19. Adṛṣṭa is here an 'unseen cosmic law' by which both Sūtrapāṭha and VSc explain the circulation of water into the trees (sap) in an ascending manner (abhisarpaṇa), even against the law of gravity (VSc 5.2.8). But Candrānanda charges adṛṣṭa with ethical implications too. VSc 5.2.4 explains the abundance of crops and their destruction (sasyānāṁ samrddhaye vināśāya vā), and the amount of water necessary, being bestowed by adṛṣṭa, perhaps as reward, or punishment, of peoples' merit or demerit (sarvajanānām adṛṣṭena janitaṁ).[766] Here 'sarvajanānām adṛṣṭena' implies the moral flaws of the people against which adṛṣṭa acts as an ethical retribution for the disturbances created by peoples' wrongdoing. Thakur says that Vaiśeṣikas could explain the mechanics of the rainfall (due to the 'weight' of clouds in the absence of air-cloud connection), but could not account for the way in which air-cloud connection did not happen; the only explanation given in this latter case was adṛṣṭa.[767] The moral explanation of the abundance of crops, and the amount of rainfall should be read in the light of the previous discussion that described the calamity of earthquake. This, as VSc 5.2.2 indicates, is caused by the 'auspicious' and 'non-auspicious' factors (śubhāśubhasūcana) of all people,[768] and by a 'specific adṛṣṭa' (viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭa) in which refers to adharma, that inauspicious quality of the self of which Praśastapāda says is 'conductive to sin and undesirable results' (ahitapratyavāyahetur).[769] Indeed, Ayurvedic texts such as Caraka Saṁhitā identify adharma (translated by Weiss with 'unrighteousness') as cause of war, seasons, winds, water-disruptions as well as

[766] See Synopsis of VSc.
[767] As Halbfass, 1980, p. 289 states, adṛṣṭa was postulated as an explanation ('gap filler') for cosmic laws, in lack of other explanations; the fact they call it adṛṣṭa invisible must also indicate the concept itself was not fully clear even for them.
[768] See Synopsis of VSc. Trans. Thakur 2003, p. 77: 'good or bad fortune of the people' and says that 'this earthquake is specially produced by destiny' as it indicates 'the fortune of all people'.
[769] Trans. Jhā 1916, p. 598.

social devastations (Car 3.3.5, 20-23).[770] The text informs about another concept prajñāparādha (Car 3.3.19), which 'nurtures' both adharma and 'asat-karman' (translated by Weiss as 'bad karma').[771] A possible translation of adharma could be 'misfortune' which acts as a magnet, in attracting evil forces such as the invasion of Rākṣasas and other demons.[772] That kind of interpretation of adharma and adṛṣṭa must have been accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas too. Candrānanda for instance, mentions in VSc 5.1.15 that adṛṣṭa (dharma and adharma) is cause of the 'movement of a gem towards the thief' (maṇīnāṁ taskaraṁ prati gamanaṁ […] dharmadharma kṛtam ity arthaḥ).[773] Though his gloss is brief, we can assume between the lines that the gem movement towards the thief refers to the 'particular karma' (namely adharma) which the thief possesses, whose self-control is submitted to a dominant inertial cosmic law, which determines him to steal (successfully). Prayatna, one of the specific qualities of ātman is here not mentioned; instead adharma does, which in this context and others mentioned above carries predominantly a fateful, inauspicious character; no wonder that Thakur, who knew the Vaiśeṣika system so well translates it as 'destiny'.[774]

From the cosmological and fateful role of adṛṣṭa discussed so far we shall now go on to a second broad usage which adṛṣṭa has, namely soteriological, in which case it is closely associated with the negative impact it has primarily on ātman, both at its inception when it acquires a new body (navaśarīra) (VSc 5.2.14), as well at the time of death (maranakala) (VSc 5.2.19); it is also involved in functions such as dream (VSc 9.24), or extraordinary 'forms of knowledge', such as ārṣa (VSc 9.28), or at psychological level , causing 'passion' (raga) (VSc 6.2.15). Both the birth of a new body (VSc 5.2.14)

[770] Weiss' article on Caraka Saṁhitā, 1980, p. 114: together with 'bad karma' (asat-karma), they are both 'nurtured by prajñāparādha'
[771] Car 3.3.19 via Weiss, 1980, p. 114.
[772] Weiss, 1980. pp. 114-15.
[773] see Synopsis of VSc.
[774] Thakur, 2003. p. 77.

and the conception and formation of the foetus (garbha) from its most subtle stage of śukra (semen), to the most concrete (śarīra), - all of which constitute the saṁsāric process, - are being made under the influence of adṛṣṭa, and not through volition (VSc 5.2.19). Though adṛṣṭa seems to affect many such developments, it affects ultimately only the mind, which being atomic, mixes with atoms of food and drink eaten and drunk by the person previously engaged in the conception process. It is manas itself which is being affected and moved by adṛṣṭa; the way in which the all-pervasive soul occurs in another body is a question not answered by Candrānanda. Soul, which in Vaiśeṣika is a dravya, is all-pervasive in dimension, and as such, it cannot move; hence what moves would be only the atomic mind, which presumably carries the set of vaiśeṣikaguṇas which constitute the 'subtle body' in Vaiśeṣika.[775] As Potter says, in Yoga system, the vāsanās (whose equivalent in Vaiśeṣika would be saṃskāra and the residual recollections formed by past bodily experiences) gather within that individual's citta.[776] This view explains VSc 5.2.19, which accounts for the way in which manas travels from a body to another.[777] It is a doctrine backed by Praśastapāda too who says that adṛṣṭa, by which he means 'the set of dharma and adharma set into activity' is that which causes manas to separate or go out from a body (apasarpaṇa), and go inside (upasarpaṇa) another body.[778] Both actions are influenced by adṛṣṭa, and cause 'bondage' (saṃsāra). If we compare the usage of adṛṣṭa in Sūtrapāṭha, with that of Candrānanda and Praśastapāda, we would note that the former uses adṛṣṭa in a more general and cosmic sense, while in the latter two commentators, we have clearly formulated by the seventh century AD a theory of karma, as both commentators distinguish two elements in adṛṣṭa, dharma, and

[775] See section 4.5. Saṃsāra and Jīvana of this thesis, where I address the relationship between jīvana, and the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas.
[776] Potter, 1980, p. 244.
[777] On saṃsāra see all articles, in Doniger, ed. 1980.
[778] PD 358, and Jhā, 1916, trans. p. 647: in both cases the action of manas is caused by adṛṣṭa

adharma. Only the dialectics between dharma (generally positive) and adharma (negative) provide a comprehensive conceptualisation for the effects of an action, within ritual, social or ethical doctrines.

The impact of adṛṣṭa on both cosmos and the embryological formation of ātman, in its embodied state, shows its fatidic role which has within the system. There is a large difference between the saṁsāric passage of VSc 5.2.19, and the soteriological passage of VSc 5.2.20 as regards the liberation of the self. The former accounts for how adṛṣṭa causes the formation of the saṁsāric body, while the latter for how mokṣa presupposes, on the contrary, the non-emerge (aprādurbhāva) of a new body, as well as the absence of contact between manas and ātman which creates jīvana. Jīvana and śarīra are different terms, and it will be worth inquiring whether jīvana is formed not by matter as śarīra is, but by something intermediate, equivalent to a 'subtle body'. At any rate, mokṣa is the absence and uprooting of all these entities, and if sūtra 5.2.20 is an old and natural continuation of 5.2.19, and not just an addition, it could mean that liberation is the radical destruction of adṛṣṭa, and its governing powers, as it represents a developing factor of body formation (prādurbhāva). Since most of vaiśeṣikaguṇas are 'specific qualities' and intimately related to the law which governs them (adṛṣṭa), and because these belong most probably to the individual embodied self, they must be left outside soteriological questions (VSc 1.1.2). The importance of dharma, adharma and adṛṣṭa in this section, has not only soteriological implications, but also shows how slippery and flexible Sanskrit concepts can be, as they pervade radically different fields of knowledge; one example shown in this thesis is how ontology (here physics) overlaps with ethics and soteriology, and the example is the concept dharma, which in adṛṣṭa version relates to physics, while in dharma version relates to ethics, and psychology.

Given that the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas are 'specific', because of their 'specifications', or 'conditions' (vyavasthā) in different (nānā) selves, presumably embodied, we must nevertheless address the question as to why Candrānanda did not include in the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 3.2.17), other specific qualities such as, gurutva, śabda, introduced in VSc 1.1.5, which qualities could characterise the state of body. Praśastapāda provides a very lengthy list of sixteen vaiśeṣikaguṇas (PD 89), but Candrānanda is more conservative (only nine). The comparison between VSc 3.2.17 with PD 89 is revealing. The first hypothesis is that by the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas Candrānanda refers to a different kind of embodied ātman, possibly a 'subtle body' which does not have gurutva, nor rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, sneha, and so on, all of which are included by Praśastapāda (PD 89). Candrānanda, on the contrary, introduces in the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, subtle guṇas like dharma and adharma, but not gurutva. All these three are supplementary guṇas, introduced later. A second supposition, which is the more forthright, is that the list of Candrānanda refers only to ātman, whereas Praśastapāda's designates sixteen vaiśeṣikaguṇas (PD 89), that refer to the specific qualities of all dravyas, not only ātman. Finally, a third hypothesis is that, given the generative character of the Vaiśeṣika ontological system, the vaiśeṣikaguṇas introduced later are not, after all, mere innovations to the system. The present thesis argues for an 'anti-nominalist theory', or that by which the Vaiśeṣika system uses what I identify to be a 'generative terminological ontology', where concepts, be they dravyas or guṇas, are universals in themselves. In the Sūtrapāṭha, terms, such as dharma, yoga, ātman, are being used in the broadest sense from the very beginning of the history of the system (Sūtrapāṭha); yet such terms subsume in themselves homonyms with various different shades of meaning. The term saṃskāra, an important vaiśeṣikaguṇa, for instance is a case in point. In Sūtrapāṭha, saṃskāra is used generally, but it contains from the beginning of its usage, the variety of

meanings which were developed only later (vega, bhāvanā, or sthitisthāpaka),[779] all of which correlate with 'predispositions' (vāsanā), or 'inclinations' (pravṛtti). The same semantics apply with adṛṣṭa, called 'apūrva' in VSc 6.2.15, or dharma and adharma in VSc 1.1.5. The majority of terms in Vaiśeṣika, I argue, are originally substantialist and anti-nominalist; and that applies to the system's conceptualisations, which comprise initially a basic meaning, but subsequently unfolds its further hidden meanings.

PART II. DYNAMIC DIMENSION

4.4. DOCTRINE OF ACTION (KARMAN, KRIYĀ)[780]

As many scholars have shown, the 'theory of karma' tightly connects with two other conceptions, 'transmigration' (saṃsāra), and 'final release' (mokṣa); together they constitute three dimensions of Vaiśeṣika soteriology.[781] Indeed, in both Sūtrapāṭha and VSc, karma is often discussed in the same contexts in which liberation is treated (yogamokṣau ca karmādhikāro'py ucyete) (VS 5.2.16).[782] Another passage is gloss 1.1.6, in which, after enumerating the six padārthas, Candrānanda talks about liberation, and the difference that exists between niḥśreyasa, and abhyudaya, the latter covering ritual actions, hence the relevance of karma-padārtha within its ritualistic framework, as well

[779] On the third sub-guṇa of saṃskāra, Praśastapāda's PD 302: saṃskāras trividho vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaś ca.
[780] With 'doctrine of action', I am particularly interested in the way in which substances, primarily the embodied ātman, have action, and how this karma-category influences their nature and manifestation.
[781] Miyamoto, 1996, p. 34; and Prasad, 1989, p. 210.
[782] The fifth adhyāya (āhnika VSc 5.1 and VSc 5.2) gives an account of the cosmic-physical, and psychological soteriological aspects in which adṛṣṭa works, and where ātman is involved.

as within its soteriology (where action is negated). The doctrine of karma, which is the third Vaiśeṣika padārtha (karma, kriyā) represents, as sūtra 6.2.19 says, the key to understanding mokṣa:

VS 6.2.19: ātmakarmasu mokṣo[783] vyākhyātaḥ / VSc: ātm'eti manaḥ manaḥ karmasu tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo[784] prādurbhāvaś[785] ca sa mokṣa iti mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ.

Gloss: VS 6.2.19: mokṣa has been explained earlier [in the section] about actions[786] and ātman / VSc: the 'soul' [refers to] mind; mokṣa is when there is absence of mind-actions, when there is absence of saṃyoga, and when there is absence of production [of birth, prādurbhāva]; thus mokṣa is explained.

In this gloss, 'karmasu' (locative plural) seems to play a major part in understanding both the nature and function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology; while in the abhyudaya, karma plays a positive role (pravṛtti path), in niḥśreyasa however, karma, with its conceptual offshoots (dharma, adharma, adṛṣṭa, sañcita, saṃsāra), represents a serious obstacle to achieving final deliverance. Niḥśreyasa, that is to say the path of nivṛtti, - recognisable by vairāgya (VSc 1.1.1, 6; 10, 21), - requires from the contender certain 'special prerequisites' (viśeṣaguṇa) like 'intelligence' and so on, - and it is the only path to liberation.[787] Another observation is the meaning which ātman in this present case has; it refers to manas (VSc 6.2.19), while in a previous section, the same term refers to vāyu (VSc 5.2.18). In

[783] karmasu mokṣo: all; karmamumukṣur Ś3
[784] 'bhāvo: J; bhāve Ś
[785] 'prādurbhāvaś: all; pradurbhāvaś Ś1
[786] Atmakarmasu, locative plural.
[787] Bruce-Long, 1980, p. 60 talks about nivṛtti path as 'the religion of inaction' which in MBh (Aśvamedhaparvan section), those who adhere to this discipline would expect to become endowed with intelligence, faith, and courage. The 'intelligence' (note once more the emphasis on knowledge) is a prerequisite viśeṣaguṇa in VSc 1.1.1 too.

Sūtrapāṭha, ātman is a broad generic term, in which case, we should see its occurrence in VSc as multifarious, in terms of both meaning, and actual ontological states, of ātman subsistence and manifestation. To translate ātman with 'soul' is a misleading choice;[788] as I will show, Candrānanda uses ātman in many instances in the sense of 'embodied self', in which case ātman is endowed with action and endowed with vaiśeṣikaguṇas; but to ascribe the all-pervasive 'soul', 'transmigration' (saṃsāra), 'rebirth' (punarjanman), and karma is problematical, indeed. The volatile semantics of ātman, can be seen in the usage of other important terms such as dharma which, in Sūtrapāṭha and VSc, designates 'generic teaching' (VSc 1.1.1-2) as well as 'factor', 'quality' (vaiśeṣikaguṇa) which affects ātman's liberation (VSc 4.2.5; 6.2.17; 9.8; 9.24). In a similar manner, we should read karma-padārtha, defined in VS 1.1.6 as being of five movements: 'upward' (utkṣepaṇa), 'downward' (avakṣepaṇa), 'contraction' (ākuñcana), 'expansion' (prasāraṇa), and 'locomotion' (gamana).[789]

VS 1.1.6: utkṣepaṇam[790] avakṣepaṇam[791] ākuñcanaṁ prasāraṇaṁ gamanam iti karmāṇi.

Gloss: VS 1.1.6: 'upward movement', 'downward movement', 'contraction', 'expansion', 'going', these are the actions.

However, in VSc 2.1.12 karma is also associated or used interchangeably with 'kriyā' (act, effect), a noun derived from verbal root kṛ-.[792] Vādīndra's Vyākhyā explains that,

[788] Miyamoto 1996, p. 3, for instance, translates ātman as soul, a rather confusing rendering, specifically within the context of transmigration.
[789] 'locomotion', trans. Halbfass, 1992, p. 73.
[790] utkṣepaṇam: all; tatkṣeṇam Ś2.
[791] avakṣepaṇam: JS, J; apakṣepaṇam Ś.
[792] In VSc, 2.1.12 kriyā is synonymous for the category of motion, Halbfass, 1922, p. 220. See Miyamoto translation p. 35 of VSv gloss to 1.1.14 of Vādīndra's Vyākhyā.

differently from karman which means 'deed', kriyā designates 'production and destruction';[793] in other words, karma/ kriyā padārtha can have, depending on the situation, both a verbal as well as a nominal function. In this light, sūtra 1.1.14 (which says that dravyas are possessed by kriyā),[794] and its apparent clash with 5.2.23 (which says that some dravyas are inactive, niṣkriyāni) is to be better understood with a different rendering of the possessive suffix '-vat' (neuter accusative singular of the possessive suffix 'vant') from VS 1.1.14. Since karma-padārtha mentioned earlier is both nominal and verbal in character the suffix'-vat' may not be rigidly taken only in the sense of nominal way, but rather in both ways. Action plays on two fronts: 1) 'object-padārtha' as per VS 1.1.6, in which case dravya (namely ātman) is object (actively, as the doer of kriyā) in which case ātman causes activity or change, or is capable of exerting influence. 2) action as subject itself (kriyā) as per VS 2.1.12, in which case ātman (like vāyu therein described) is the sufferer of action, in which case it is influenced, acted upon, or affected by some external force, cause, or agency (e.g. adṛṣṭa); in this case the suffix '-vat' is meaningful. The same apparent contradiction exists as regards the ātman. While discussing dravyas (diś, kāla, ākāśa) which are an exception from the rule of substances 'possessed by action' (VS 1.1.14), Sūtrapāṭha uses the viśeṣa type of argumentation and says in sūtra 5.2.23, that because these are different from things that have action, therefore diś, kāla, and ākāśa are niṣkriyāni (devoid of action). Candrānanda adds in this gloss, that niṣkriyā characterises ātman too;[795] which makes sense, since in other sūtras ātman resembles ākāśa in dimension (mahan) (VSc 7.1.28-29). Yet there are other places in VSc which ātman seems to be having action, and this misunderstanding arises because

[793] Trans. Miyamoto, 1996, p. 35. See VSv (Dharbahnga ed, p. 6 gloss to 1.1.15) the reader should be advised the numbering of VSv is problematic, as Isaacson has shown, as some of the sūtras are contained in the gloss itself. For help, one should use the Nozawa's comparable table.
[794] For VSc 1.1.14, see Synopsis of VSc.
[795] For 5.2.23, see Synopsis of VSc.

of unsuitable translations of ātman as soul. Besides, we should see ātman as having many states of subsistence, in which case karma plays a part.[796] Candrānanda does not always explicitly draw a sufficient line between the 'embodied' versus 'disembodied' state of ātman.[797] Here I argue that such ambiguity refers to the ambiguity with which Candrānanda uses ātman, sometimes referring to ātman as soul (amūrta), other times to ātman embodied (mūrta, śarīra) in which case it is possessed by vaiśeṣikaguṇas and subject to bondage (saṃsāra) and karma, and kriyā. One of the ambiguities is raised by the sūtra 5.2.23 which does not mention soul in its lists of 'motionless' (niṣkriya) all-pervasive dravyas (diś, kāla, ākāśa). However ambiguous Sūtrapāṭha might be, Candrānanda includes ātman among all-pervasive dravyas, in both VS 5.2.23[798] and 1.1.14, respectively.[799] We need to assume, that since VSc is akin to Praśastapāda thinking,[800] action cannot pertain to all-pervasive dravyas, but only to corporeal ones, those that can suffer disintegration and re-composition;[801] in fact Vādīndra's VSc 1.1.5 glosses kriyā as referring to the changing character of 'production and destruction'. [802] On the other hand, the nature of soul being pervasive, and not compounded of parts, does not amount to such actions (kriyā), such as the production or destruction of the body. Here I assume that the ambiguities can be sorted out better, if we think of ātman not only in terms of binaries of individual and supreme, many or one, limited or all-pervasive, but more importantly, ātman needs to be seen as disembodied versus

[796] See the sate of ātman discussed in the section of ātman.
[797] In VS 1.1.14, for example, we have the definition of a substance, as follows: dravya is that which possesses (three lakṣaṇa): kriyā, guṇa, and samavāyakāraṇa.
[798] see Synopsis of VSc.
[799] see Synopsis of VSc.
[800] Thakur says that VSc shares many of PD tenets (Introd. VSc, 1961). Isaacson locates VSc composition in Kaśmīr, which is the same area as Praśastapāda's activity. They both belong to Vaiśeṣika, but differ in following different Vaiśeṣika commentarial traditions (Ui, following the chronicle of Kwei-ci, informs of eighteen Vaiśeṣika schools, 1917, p. 8). Vergiani (footnote, 54, p. 547) informs that it is Aklujkar 1970, p. 340 the first who signals that Helārāja's acquaintance with the work of Candrānanda, whose activity must have been Kaśmīr (Isaacson 1995, pp. 141-142).
[801] Kumar, 2013, p. 121.
[802] Miyamoto, 1996, p. 35.

embodied, in which case it has action, while disembodied, it is eternally motionless. Candrānanda acknowledges them both.

Once the problem of the karma of the ātman is solved, then the state of liberation becomes clearer too. In fact, between karma/kriyā on the one hand, and adṛṣṭa (dharma and adharma) on the other, there is a close relationship. The gloss VSc 1.1.2, for instance, postulates 'dharma' as a concept lying between ritualistic actions and effects. There appears to be two sets of actions, some related to abhyudaya, others related to niḥśreyasa, because their effects are destroyed at the same time with their production, therefore dharma is a doctrine that replaces the old Vedic 'merit transfer'.[803] It is also discussed in the context of karma and order; as Renou, de Smet and Koller argue, dharma is in fact a reworking of the ancient doctrine of Ṛta.[804] In fact, many Vaiśeṣika scholars often translate adṛṣṭa as 'invisible', another designation for a law that works 'very mysteriously'.[805] However, there are cases in which, Thakur for instance translates it as 'destiny',[806] a rather fuzzy concept in the Indian scientific literature, even more so because ancient texts do not provide a satisfactory definition of it, or because simply it is presented as something whose mechanics is hard to explain. One such intricate questions we pose could be where was the 'storage place' of dharma and adharma located? How do these two influence the 'birth of a new body'? Did VS and VSc maintain the existence of 'subtle body'?

---

[803] Doniger, 1980, p. 3.

[804] On Ṛta as 'cosmic order' and 'ethical order', see Renou, 1953, p. 17-18; Koller, 1972, p. 135; de Smet, 1977, p. 53; as well as the interpretation of adṛṣṭa in VSc.

[805] In parallel literatures, such as Mahābhārata, 'previously accumulated dharmas' refer to 'destiny' (daiva) (MBh 13.6.7). In fact, many scholars, when they do not translate adṛṣṭa as 'invisible', they tend to translate it as 'destiny', particularly because the ancient texts do not provide a satisfactory definition of it, or because simply it is presented as something 'working very mysteriously', see Gītā 4.17; Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on YS 2.13 'karma is mysterious and not easily discernible' and Milindapañha 4.4.1 says that karma vipāka is 'unthinkable' (acintyā).

[806] Krishan, 1983, p. 210 renders 'destiny' for 'daiva' as per MBh 13.6.7, and discusses it in relation with the 'previously accumalted karmas'. In VSc 6.2.16 this 'accumulation' refers to dharma and adharma. Thakur 2003, p. 80, sometimes translates adṛṣṭa from VSc and VSś as 'destiny'.

4.5. SAṂSĀRA[807] AND JĪVANA

One of the most problematic concepts within Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is saṃsāra, mentioned only once (VSc 5.2.19), and possibly hinted in few other places (VSc 5.2.14 and VSc 6. 2.18). The problem in conceptualising it stems from the very doctrine of ātman, which, as many scholars note, changed throughout the history of the system. Usually, substances that are all-pervasive (diś, kāla, ākāśa, ātman) (VSc 5.2.23), cannot be subject to action, therefore cannot move from one body to another. If this is so, what then is that which moves or transmigrates in ātman in saṁsāra? The short answer to this question seems to be given by VSc 5.2.19 where manas appears to be that which transmigrates from movements such as apasarpaṇa ('going away'), upasarpaṇa ('going in', or 'near'), namely through the conjunctions with things 'eaten' (aśita), and 'drunk' (pita), presumably atomic, as is the manas itself.[808] Vaiśeṣika's cosmology builds mainly upon the atomic theory, according to which matter is composed of mahābhūtas, which ultimately are compounded by atoms bearing 'ultimate characteristics' (antyaviśeṣa). The process of saṃsāra therefore, should happen at the atomic level.[809] 'Aśitapītasaṃyoga'

[807] The substratum of all nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas (which have a motional nature) is the embodied self. In this chapter I seek to explain the relationship between these and the pure self; saṃsāra implies movement, which presumably resides into the volatile nature of some vaiśeṣikaguṇas like saṃskāra-vega ('speed of predispositions'). The process is both dharmic (adṛṣṭa), and intellectual as in VSc 5.2.19 where manas not the soul moves into the formation of another body.

[808] Praśastapāda confirms that manas moves because of adṛṣṭa: PD 358; see Jhā trans. p. 647. VSc 5.2.19 for instance gives an account of the formation of body from the stage of semen and blood to the stage of a 'solid body' (gaṇa), 'embryo' (garbha). The actual engine behind these stages is adṛṣṭa, which also in the moment of death (maraṇakāla) takes manas from a previous body (pūrvaśarīrān) and connects it with another body (śarīrāntareṇābhisambandho) through nāḍi.

[809] Saṃsāra is articulated by Candrānanda in 5.2.19 in the following manner: the transfer of manas takes places at the very atomic level, both in the beginning of the foetus but also at the beginning of each era, when various 'cosmic worlds' (three to fourteen 'bhuvanam', Apte, dict. p. 1202) subsists in an atomic, non-composite state, and when some souls expect rebirth into a new material composition (VSc 5.2.14). Candrānanda says that 'sambandha' with śarīra 'begins' (prabhṛti) from the state of 'semen' and 'blood' (śukraśoṇitāt), which is of the 'measure' (mātra) of an 'embryo' (garbha). It is also mentioned, that a particular dravya, possibly manas, 'enters through the vein' (nāḍyanupraviṣṭa), and that it comes into contact with whatever is 'consumed' (upayukta), 'eaten' (ānna) and 'drunk' (āpāna). This contact is called: sambandho'śitapītasaṁyoga, which takes place thoughout the stages of the embryonic formation: kālala,

from sūtra 5.2.19 refers to the connection between manas with (the atoms of) food and drink which subsequently 'conjoins with others entities' (kāryāntarasaṃyoga), such as 'semen' (śukra), 'blood' (śoṇita) which 'brings forth' (prabhṛti) the 'foetus' (garbha) of a mother's womb. Manas enters through a 'vein' (nāḍī), which is the carrier of the blood, and which in Indian classical thought, is the channel through which the 'subtle body' or the 'subtle physiology' of the body circulates.[810] In Vaiśeṣika, this 'subtle physiology' must be identified with the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas which have their locus in manas. The saṁsāric process includes not only the 'retreating' of manas (apasarpaṇa) from a certain locus, its 'conception through a vein' (nāḍyanupraviṣṭena), or 'entrance' (upasarpaṇa) into the garbha,[811] but also various stages of development of garbha itself, ranging from kalala, arbuda, māṁsa, peśī, ghana, all of which constitute stages of growth corresponding to the old Vedic rites of passage.[812] The conceptual problems of saṃsāra can be overcome only if we admit that the Vaiśeṣikas maintain an all-pervasive size of the soul (like ākāśa); yet the problem arises because Vaiśeṣika seems to maintain both the all-pervasive character of ātman (VSc 7.1.28-29), and the individual size (VSc 3.2.16), because as Candrānanda argues, each soul has individual characteristics, therefore it must be different, and plural (VSc 3.2.16-17).[813] In both Sūtrapāṭha and VSc we seem to have both views expressed, and Candrānanda must have maintained both oneness and

arbuda, māṁsa, peśī, and ghaṇa. These saṃsāric or embryonic stages of the body, as well as the contact or mind and soul with other works (kāryāntarasaṁyogāḥ) are done by adṛṣṭa only, and not by volition.

[810] Samuel, 2013, p. 5.

[811] On two 'rites of passage' (saṃskāras), when the 'individual is transferred' either into the ovum, or into the world at the moment of birth, see Obeyesekere, 1980, p. 144.

[812] Gonda, 1980, p. 365, defines saṃskāras as 'regular physiological and social events in man's cycle (birth, puberty etc)'; compare this with the evolution of stages of the foetus (VSc 5.2.19), and with various social stages and religious duties as per VSc 6.2.1-3.

[813] If it is limited in size, it can obviously move, thus reincarnate, but if it is all-pervasive then it cannot move. Adachi, 1994, p. 659, and Nozawa, 1981, pp. 464-5, say that VSc 5.2.19-20 contained originally the movement of soul from one body to another, not mind.

plurality of the ātman, rather than the hypothesis launched by scholars as to the evolution of the size of ātman, from 'thumb-sized soul'[814] to 'omnipresent'.[815]

Another passage, which hints at the saṁsāric process is the gloss VSc 6.2.18; it is not certain whether the process refers to ātman; the subject of 'conjunction' and 'disjunction' dharmic processes therein described is the 'being' (jantu) which 'returns' (āvartate) like a 'pot-machine' (ghaṭīyantra) (VSc 6.2.18).[816] Ātman, as dravya, is not mentioned and the omission may be voluntary. Janma ('birth')[817] and jantu in VSc 6.2.18, are both produced because of a particular saṃyoga; on the one hand, janma is caused by a saṃyoga with body and senses, and on the other hand, 'the returner being' (jantu) is caused because of 'conjunction' and 'disjunction' of body with its physiological and psychological contents (śarīrādisaṃyogo vibhāgaś c'ety). In both cases, the subsequent emergence of saṃyoga and vibhāga is caused by the karmic collection of dharma and adharma.[818]

[814] In the Purāṇic literature the subtle body is called jīva (Doniger, 1980, p. 16); the thumb-sized soul of Vaiśeṣika of which Watson and Preisendanz describe, may refer to the minute, embryonic, and transitive 'embodied soul' as Aitareya Upaniṣad 4.2.3 describes; my conjecture is that there is a confusion within scholarship between a subtle body (e.g. jīva) which can be of a small dimension (e.g. the thumb-sized) and ātman, which is one, and all-pervasive.

[815] On the unity and plurality of the soul as an early doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, Miyamoto 1996, p. 15. If the Vaiśeṣikas were originally Proto-Vedantins, as Miyamoto infers, then their system must have included the existence of a subtle body that transmigrates. I have not fully identified what a subtle body may be in Vaiśeṣika, but the set of nine Vaiśeṣika may be an equivalent to that concept. While talking about theory of karma in Advaita Vedānta, Potter 1980, p. 249, talks about 'bits of equipment' (gross body, with sense organs and action organs, manas, ahaṃkāra, buddhi, saṃskāra, and anuśaya which are of three kinds: prāradbhakarman, sañcitakarman, sañcīyamānakarman); some of which determine the direction of the subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra).

[816] In building his argument on the 'formation of body', Candrānanda brings forward several times the simile of a pot (ghaṭa), because similarly to the body, a pot is made of atoms of earth. In VSc 6.2.18, body is like a 'pot-gadget' (ghaṭīyantravat) which is used repeatedly and which returns (āvartate) as a 'living being' (jantu). Candrānanda's choice for the pot-simile (yantra) is here meant to express the repeatability of the body, its saṃsāric process.

[817] Thakur 2003, p. 90-91.

[818] Āhnika VSc 6.2 describes what appears to be a chain of causation from the affective level (vaiśeṣikaguṇa), down to the general ones (sāmānyaviśeṣa) e.g. through saṁyoga, and vibhāga.

VSc 6.2.18: saṁcitau yadā[819] dharmā'dharmau bhavataḥ tadā śarīr'endriyaiḥ[820] saṃyogaḥ janmākhyo bhavati, kṣīnayoś ca tayor maraṇakāle viyogaḥ / punar apy[821] ābhyāṁ dharmādharmābhyāṁ[822] śarīrādisaṃyogo vibhāgaś c'ety evam anādir ayaṁ[823] ghaṭīyantravad[824] āvartate jantuḥ.

Gloss: VSc 6.2.18: when there is an accumulation of dharma and adharma, then there is conjunction of body and senses, and this is what is called janma, and when these two (dharma and adharma) are reduced, the separation (from body and senses) takes place at the time of death; moreover, the 'being' returns again endlessly like a [Persian] wheel of pots of water, [because of dharma and adharma], there being a conjunction and disjunction with the body.

Both 'janman' and 'jantu' refer to a life process and the entity behind this. In another place (VSc 5.2.20), Candrānanda mentions also jīvana, which must be slightly different from janma; yet what jīvana shares in common with both janma and jantu, is the contact (saṃyoga) which all three enact. Jīvana is the contact of manas and ātman, janma is the contact (of sañcita) with body and senses, jantu is the contact (and disjunction) with the body and the set of its physiological apparatus. Now we know that in Vaiśeṣika, saṃyoga is a conjunction that applies only between two dravyas, or it refers to the relationship between two distinct entities; if that is the case, jīvana, janma or jantu, because they are engaged in a saṃyoga kind of relationship, must all refer here to another kind of being,

819 yadā: J,Ś2; om Ś1, Ś3.
820 śarīr'endriyaiḥ: J; śarīraindriyais Ś2; śarīrairindriyaiḥ Ś1, Ś3.
821 apy: J, Ś2; om Ś1, Ś3.
822 dharmābhyāṁ: J,Ś2,Ś3ac; dharmabhyāṁ Ś1, Ś3pc.
823 ayaṁ: all; aya Ś2.
824 yantravad: Ś; yantrayad J (?)

or entity, not guṇa.[825] Could these be referring to a 'subtle body', similar yet not identical with ātman? If no subtle body could be proven would it be appropriate to see in the set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas an equivalent concept to the 'subtle body'? Yet, some clues to the psychological and physiological dimensions of jīvana may also be found in Praśastapāda. In PD 358, he says that jīvana 'has for its auxiliaries dharma and adharma' (jīvanasahakārinor dharmadharmayor), on which its existence depends; when these become exhausted, jīvana becomes deprived of effort too, which subsequently leads to the stoppage of breathing.[826] This is the process of death; here jīvana is a form of life to which Praśastapāda relates a series of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, such as dharma, adharma, and prayatna. Jīvana exists also because of a contact between manas and ātman, which depends on dharma and adharma. The relationship between the psychological and physiological functions of jīvana is shown in the section 'prayatnaprakaraṇam'; here Praśastapāda says that jīvana engenders prayatna, and two other vaiśeṣikaguṇa, icchā and dveṣa, but it carries also the upward and downward breathings, and at the time of waking up, it connects manas with ātman.[827] We have more remote hints on jīvana in PD 119, in the section 'rasaprakaraṇam', where taste (rasa) is the cause of jīvana. Both psychological and physiological functions are confirmed by Candramati.[828] The contact between the two sets of characteristics, physiological and psychological, seems to be made because of the contact between ātman, manas, and prayatna. As DP 219 says, internal effort is preceded by jīvana and the connection with ātman

[825] Inherence on the other hand applies to the relationship between dravya and guṇa.

[826] PD 358: yadā jīvanasahakārinor dharmādharmayor upabhogāt prakṣayo 'nyonyābhibhavo vā tadā jīvanasahāyayor vaikalyāt tatpūrvakaprayatnavaikalyāt prāṇanirodhe saty… trans. Jhā 1916, p. 647.

[827] PD 295 gives a description of prayatna, with its off-shoots, samārambha and utsāha, and is of two kinds: proceeding from jīvana, and proceeding from desire and aversion; trans. Jhā 1916, p. 562: prayatnaḥ saṃrambha utsāha iti prayāyāḥ / sad vividho jīvanapūrvaḥ icchādveṣapūrvakaś ca / tatra jīvanapūrvakh suptasya prāṇāpānasantānaprerakaḥ prabodhakāle cāntahkaraṇasyendriyāntaraprāptihetuḥ.

[828] DP 152, where jīvana is the cause of life activity, prayatna, it is assisted by icchā and dveṣa, and is cause of saṁyoga between ātman and manas.

(jīvanapūrvakaprayatnātmansaṃyoga). As far as saṃsāra goes, jīvana must in Vaiśeṣika be the state of psychological and physiological self which is attached to the desire, and effort in order to live a biological life. Liberation would thus be the cessation of karmic action (adṛṣṭa) as well as the desire of ātman.[829] It is clear from the presentation of all early Vaiśeṣika commentaries (VSc, PD and DP) that jīvana is attached to most of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas: icchā, dveṣa, dharma, adharma (PD 295), prayatna (PD 358; DP 152, 219), as well as to physiological functions, biological growth (PD 119), breathing of the body (DP 152; PD 295, 358). They are connected through the subtle contact between ātman and manas, the place where all the reproductive process begins. Cosmogony begins and is co-extensive with manas.

BODY AND COSMOGONY (VSC 5.2.19 & VSC 6.2.18)

If in the previous section, the soteriology was discussed through the lenses of what in Vaiśeṣika appears to be 'bondage' (saṃsāra), or the cyclical journey which that 'subtle body' (the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas) takes, in this section we are concerned with the way in which the cycle is uprooted. Cosmogony, as Halbfass says, is together with soteriology of being and grammatical reflection, one of the three large aspects of Vaiśeṣika ontology.[830] Hence, we are interested in cosmogony, only insofar as to understand the pre-cosmogonic state of ātman, which represents the soteriology of ātman. In other words, salvation is not eschatology, or a transformation with further actions of becoming, but quite the opposite of it, namely the restoration of the pre-cosmogonic

[829] PD 57: saṃjihīrṣāsamakālam śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānām sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛttinirodhe. Jhā 1916, p. 109: 'and simultaneously with this desire, there comes about a cessation of the operations of the unseen potential tendencies of all souls that are the causes of their bodies, sense organs and gross elements'.
[830] Halbfass, 1992, p. 37.

existence of ātman. That state is, what Halbfass calls 'the transcendent unity of being', a 'soteriontological' state of ātman. Cosmogony dwells on two pillars: the atomic theory, with which Vaiśeṣikas explains cosmogony, and asatkāryavāda, which is an ontological-epistemological theory, that maintains the reality of the effects, and guṇas. Both of these have direct epistemological relevance for the soteriology of the system, which consists of cause (ātman as a substance), and effects (vaiśeṣikaguṇa). The compositional nature of the body is what creates the living being called jīvana, and as such is prone to saṃsāra (VSc 5.2.19),[831] whereas liberation begins with the fissure of the contact between manas and ātman (VSc 5.2.20). Body is an effect, and as a result is analysed within the doctrine of asatkāryavāda, presented in VSc 10.7, with several similes such as 'pot' (ghaṭa), 'thread' (tantu), that show the relation of interdependence of concepts like 'dependence' (sāpekṣa) and 'non-dependence'(anāpekṣa), as well as various causal-cosmological relations such as 'production' (utpatti) or 'destruction' (vināśa).[832] Cosmos and composition, action and contacts, as well as the reality of effects, are indeed hurdles which ātman must overcome, if it is to reach liberation. There are five mahābhūtas in Vaiśeṣika; four of them (pṛthivī, āp, tejas, vāyu) are compositional in character, because they are composed of atoms, plus ākāśa, which is a 'vacuum'. The atomic theory is however constructed only around the four main mahābhūtas, which must be read in the order that goes from the most subtle to the most concrete, an order in which the creation of cosmos takes place: 'wind' (vāyu), 'water' (ap), 'fire' (tejas), 'earth' (pṛthivī). Contrary to 'gross-to-subtle eschatological process', cosmogony takes places in reverse, from the most subtle level (atoms of vāyu) to the most concrete ones (atoms of pṛthivī). Śrīdhara

[831] On body and cosmogony, see VSc 5.2.19.
[832] Here the succession of time and space, is expressed in relation to the simile of threads (tantu), which likewise shows the interdependence between concepts.

explains that through the atomic theory (via the process of dyads, and triads),[833] by which the subtle vāyu (in atomic composition) makes atoms coalesce and create bigger atomic configurations, creating a 'Gross-Air'.[834] Once gross air is obtained, it becomes the fertile ground, (perhaps the substratum) for the formation in the same atomic configuration, of subtle, and then 'Gross-Water' (called 'Great Reservoir'). Śrīdhara also mentions that it is from the 'Gross-Water', that the configuration of earth from atomic level to gross level emerges (Solid Earth), and configuration of fire (Great Mass of Fire) that take place. The incompatibility between fire and water is worked out by adṛṣṭa, which is the cosmic agency that makes it possible for these two opposite substances to co-exist despite their conflicting nature. In addition, from atoms of fire and earth, Maheśvara creates the Great Egg.[835]

Candrānanda's' cosmogony is mainly described in the fifth adhyāya,[836] while the second āhnika deals primarily with the action of mahābhūtas.[837] And it is in this very section that both mokṣa and yoga are discussed, which makes sense given that karma, like adṛṣṭa and other karmic injunctions, plays a major role in the birth, development, and maintenance of cosmos, which represents the case in which the embodied ātman is discussed. Saṃsāra and rebirth are problematic concepts, because given the nature of ātman (all-pervasive and devoid of action), it cannot be bonded. As discussed in the previous section, it is the psychological set of properties (janma, jantu, jīvana, and manas) which fit into the framework of action, not ātman. When talking about atomic

[833] Two atoms form a dyad, three dyads form a triad, and four triads form a quadrat. Eschatology is the reversal of this formation-process, the dissolution of the coalescence process, from the grossest largest atomic configuration to the smallest.

[834] Jhā, 1916, p. 114. It appears that all substances have at least two states of subsistence: subtle (atomic) and gross (mūrta); most probably ātman is the same.

[835] Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 116. See VSc 1.1.3.

[836] Fifth adhyāya (VSc 5) begins with this line: evam-ukteṣu dravyeṣu guṇān ullaṅghyā'lpa-vaktavyatvāt karmāṇy abhidhatte. tatra (ullaṅghyā: all; vallaṅghyā Ś2; karmāṇy: J; karmaṇy Ś; tatra: J; yatra Ś)

[837] Second āhnika (Vsc 5.2) begins with the line: ādhyātmikeṣu tatsambandheṣu ca karmāṇy uktvā mahābhūtakarmāṇi vyācaṣṭe (sambandheṣu: J, Ś2; sambaddheṣu Ś1, Ś3; ca: J; om Ś; mahā: all; maya Ś2 (hā – ya similar in Śāradā).

cosmogony the sūtra 5.2.14 explains that both fire and wind movements, presumably their atomic composition, as well as the 'first action of manas' are effected by adṛṣṭa.

VS 5.2.14: agner ūrdhvaṁ[838] jvalanaṁ vāyoś ca tiryak pavanam aṇumanasoś[839] cā'dyaṁ[840] karm'ety adṛṣṭa[841]kāritāni / VSc: agner adhasthāne[842] tiryag vā gamane pacyamānasyābhasmī[843]-bhāvas syāt; apāṁ[844] tathā vāyor[845] atiryag gamane pūyamāna[846] -dravyāṇām pavanā[847] bhāvaḥ; agneś cā prabodhaḥ[848] vinaṣṭaśarīrāṇām[849] ātmanāṁ[850] sargādau pṛthivyādiparamāṇuṣu ādyaṁ[851] paraspar'opasarpaṇakarma na syāt; tathā labdhabhūmīnāṁ yogināṁ kalpānte[852] abhisandhāya[853] prayatnena manaḥ śarīrād vyatiricyā[854]'vatiṣṭhamānānāṁ[855] sargādau navaśarīrasambandhāya manasa ādyaṁ karma na bhavet adṛṣṭād ṛte / tasmād[856] agner ūrdhvaṁ[857] jvalanaṁ, vāyoś ca tiryak pavanam, aṇūnāṁ c' opasarpaṇa[858]karma manasaś cādyaṁ karma etāni prāṇinām adṛṣṭakāritāni.

Gloss VS 5.2.14: the upward burning of fire, the oblique blowing of wind, and the first motion of atoms and mind, [these] are caused by adṛṣṭa / VSc: fire would stay or move

---

838 agner ūrdhvaṁ: Ś; agnerūrddha Jpc; agnesūrddha Jac; agnetūrddha JS; agnerūrdhva Ed
839 pavanam, aṇu-manasoś conj. Ed (unmarked); pavanamanumanasoś JS; pavanacaṇḍamanasoś J; pavamānamanasoś Ś
840 cā 'dyaṁ: J; codyaṁ JS; cādye Ś2; cācye Ś1; cavācye Ś3
841 karm'ety adṛṣṭa: JS,J,Ś2; karmebhyo dṛṣṭa Ś3; karmabhya dṛṣṭa Ś1ac; karmebhya dṛṣṭa Ś1ac.
842 adhas sthāne: Ś; avasthāne Jed.
843 pacyamānasyā 'bhasmī: J; paśyamānasyabhasmī Ś1,Ś2,Ś3pc; paśyamānasyabhāvaḥ Ś3ac(?)
844 apāṁ: Ś; apāṁvā JpcEd; apaṁvā Jac
845 vāyor: all; vayor Ś1ac.
846 pūyamāna: all; pūryamāna Ś3.
847 pavanā: J; evanā Ś (Śāradā pa and initial e are similar; or perhaps -ṇāṁpa- → -ṇāpe- → -ṇāme-)
848 'prarodhaḥ: Ś1; prabodhaḥ J,Ś2,Ś3pcEd; dho Ś3ac.
849 śarīrāṇām: all; śarīrāṇāṁs Ś2.
850 ātmanāṁ: J,Ś1,Ś3pc; ātma<ṇāṁ>nāṁ Ś2; ātmano Ś3ac.
851 ādyaṁ: J; ādye Ś.
852 kalpā'nte: J, Ś3; kalpānto Ś1,Ś2
853 abhisandhāya: all; abhisaṁtvāya Jac
854 vyatiricyā: all; vyatiricyamā Ś1ac
855 'vatiṣṭhamānānāṁ: Ś1,Ś2; 'vatiṣṭamānānāṁ J,Ś3
856 tasmād: J,Ś2; tasād Ś1; tamasād Ś3
857 agner ūrdhvaṁ: Ś; agnetūrddha J(?); agner ūrdhva Ed
858 opasarpaṇa: J; opasarpaṇaṁ Ś

sideways, the thing cooked would not change into ashes, similarly, the wind would not move horizontally, and there would be no kindling of fire for the substances to be purified / In the case of the selves that had lost their bodies, at the beginning of a new creation of the world, there would be no first action of the atoms of earth, and so on, or their mutual approaching / similarly, the yogis at the end of the world, who have attained cosmic layers,[859] having steadied their mind by effort to continue [in those states], at the beginning (of a new) creation, there would be no first motion of mind that connects [those yogis] with a new body, all of these would not happen without adṛṣṭa; therefore, the upward blowing of fire, and the oblique blowing of wind, as well as the mutual motion of atoms, and the first motion of manas, all these are also done by adṛṣṭa in the case of 'living beings'.[860]

In Sūtrapāṭha, there is no explicit mention of Īśvara as the creator of cosmos; yet Candrānanda interprets 'tad' from sūtra 1.1.3 (tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam),[861] restated in 10.21,[862] as referring to Hiraṇyagarbha and Maheśvara, respectively. Yet the cosmogonic gloss VSc 5.2.14, states that adṛṣṭa is that which is the instrumental cause in the movement of atoms, and the mind, while Praśastapāda adds more to this doctrine, namely the intervention of the creator Brahman within the workings of adṛṣṭa. The term used by him for cosmogony is sṛṣṭi,[863] which designates the 'creation of the world', by the will of Brahman who at the end of a hundred years, wishes to 'reabsorb' (saṃhāra), and 're-create' (sṛṣṭi) the world (PD 57). We must also point out the symbolism behind

[859] On 'levels of existence' (bhūmi) in Buddhism, here a possible common origin with Vaiśeṣika, Collins, 1998, p. 297.
[860] Jhā, 1916, p. 114, translates 'prāṇin' with 'living being'; while Apte dict. 2003, p. 1128 (printed revised ed.) with 'a living creature', 'sentient being'.
[861] In U, V, BhV: āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam.
[862] KVs 10.21: tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam iti (U, S āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam).
[863] Apte dict. (online) renders sṛṣṭi as the creation of the world; letting loose; giving away.

these two terms which relate to the very function of human body when engaged in yogic breathing techniques: 'inhalation', as referring to dissolution of the cosmos,[864] and, 'exhalation' as referring to the action of creation of cosmos.[865] When Brahman reabsorbs all creation, then the working of adṛṣṭa cease to operate.[866] Whatever may be the case, cosmogony is not creation ex nihilo, since Brahman as Praśastapāda puts it, proceeds an absorption and exhalation of the cosmos, from things that pre-exist already. The phrase 'saṃsārakhinnānām sarvaprāṇinām' refers to all those beings, which wander in 'distress' (khinna). It follows that adṛṣṭa loses its binding power when Brahman intervenes with the creation of cosmos; does ātman have within the cosmological and soteriological framework a comparable role to what Brahman represents in Praśastapāda's cosmogonic myth? VSc 5.2.14 does not seem to share the same view with Praśastapāda. It provides a different account of yoga, and shows instead the cosmogonical powers of adṛṣṭa as well as its impact on individuals whose body has been destroyed (vinaṣṭaśarīrāṇām ātmanāṁ),[867] or on yogis' manas (which is exceedingly fixed).[868] In both cases, adṛṣṭa is that which triggers the 'first action' (ādyaṁ karma) of earth-atoms that creates the body (of the selves devoid of śarīra), or the first action of the mind (of yogis). Both categories are presumably not liberated, since they stay under the influence of adṛṣṭa (na bhavet adṛṣṭadṛṭe). They need further bodies to exhaust the karmic residuum, but in this gloss (VSc 5.2.14), they cannot transmigrate. We conclude by

[864] Apte dict. (online) other translations of the eschatological term 'saṃhāra' are: contraction, compressing, binding together.

[865] On the other hand, sṛṣṭi has cosmogonic meanings: letting loose, letting go, emission, offspring. In both cases, we need to see them as equivalent to the breathing techniques.

[866] PD 57: ihedānīm caturṇām mahābhūtānām sṛṣṭisaṃhāravidhir ucyate / brāhmeṇa mānena varṣaśatānte vartamānasya brahmaṇo'pavargakāle saṃsārakhinnānām sarvaprāṇinām niśi viśrāmārtham sakalabhuvanapater maheśvarasya saṃjihīrṣāsamakālam śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānām sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛttinirodhe sati (See trans. Jhā 1916, p. 108-9).

[867] These kind of selves do need to acquire a new body, in order to expiate the karmic residue, and hence to obtain salvation. It seems that adṛṣṭa obstructed their way to such goal.

[868] These yogis have attained layers (bhūmi), probably through some merit; these two probably are not saved, since their mind relies on effort, which is a vaiśeṣikaguṇa, hence cannot be part of mokṣa.

stating that adṛṣṭa plays a major role in both saṃsāra and cosmogony.[869] If cosmos and its motions are caused by adṛṣṭa, in liberation, however, these are all abolished, since as VS 5.2.20 states, mokṣa occurs when the cause of all these (adṛṣṭa) is absent. 'The non-existence of conjunction and non-existence of manifestation is mokṣa'.[870] Now, we know that for Candrānanda (VSc 3.2.17) adṛṣṭa is a double fold collection of dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18), and is one of the ātman's vaiśeṣikaguṇas (VSc 3.2.17) hence the liberated state of ātman referred in VSc 1.1.2, and, VSc 5.2.14, must imply absence of body. Liberation, in Vaiśeṣika, is not jīvanmukti, but occurs only after extinction of body, the extirpation of ātman's vaiśeṣikaguṇas, and adṛṣṭa. The obtainment of a dharma born out of yoga (yogajadharma) does not suffice it either; the gloss VSc 5.2.14 shows that even in the case of yogis, it is still possible to be un-liberated while being a yogi. The cause probably of their bondage, is the mixture with prayatna, which involves 'practice' (abhyāsa) one of the two poles of any form of yoga.[871] The soteriological yoga is in the aspect of vairāgya, it is dualistic, and obstructs cosmogony. Liberation, through such yoga, is in both Praśastapāda's myth and later Yogavāsiṣṭha a way to absorb the cosmos within the Brahman, and ātman respectively. Indeed, yoga is not only the destruction of some vaiśeṣikaguṇas (sukha, and duḥkha, VSc 5.2.16-17), but more importantly the transcendence of cosmos and cosmogony, with all that it entails. This implies an encapsulation of the cosmos inside the soul' as Brahman does in Praśastapāda myth. As Chenet says, 'décréation yogique de la cosmogonie conduit à la délivrance'.[872]

---

[869] In terms of cosmogony, adṛṣṭa causes cosmological actions of agni, vāyu, and āp; as VS 5.2.14 speaks, the 'upward flaming of fire', the 'oblique blowing of wind', and about the 'first action of mind' (all caused by adṛṣṭa). For bondage, see translation of VSc 5.2.14 that shows that both the formation of body of the unliberated selves and the steadiness of the unliberated yogis' mind, are dependent on adṛṣṭa.

[870] Trans. Thakur, 2003, p. 82.

[871] Feuerstein, 1980, p. 72, 78.

[872] Chenet 1999, vol. 1, p. 348, refers to Yogavāsiṣṭha passages which see yoga as an attempt to transcend the cosmos absorbing it into the vastness of soul (see Brahman's absorption of cosmos PD 57) See Yogavāsiṣṭha 2.17.49; the whole cosmos is inside the yogi (YV 5.73.3-6), or inside his mind (YV 6b 144.27-28), via Chenet vol. 1. p. 347-48.

4.6. MOKṢA/ NIḤŚREYASA[873]

The rationale behind the whole discussion about cosmogony (the dynamic aspect of soteriology) is that it reveals the very nature of liberation. Soteriology, Halbfass suggests, is the reversal of cosmogony.[874] In order to understand it, one must go back to Vaiśeṣika's ontology, which builds upon a substantialist view of cosmos, formed by nine dravyas, which are eternal and can subsist in different states, composite and non-composite. In this respect, the case of ātman, one of the nine major dravyas, is symptomatic.[875] To begin with, the etymology of niḥśreyasa[876] designates already something essential about the meaning and nature of the soteriological and pre-cosmogonic state. Its nature is 'negative in ambit'.[877] The term is a compound of the prefix 'niḥ-' (which may be translated with 'gone away') and the comparative 'śreyas' ('better'), which comes from the adjective 'praśasya' meaning 'praiseworthy', 'good', 'excellent'. Niḥśreyasa, thus can be taken as being a prepositional compound ('prādi-bahuvrīhi'),[878] and its translation would be somewhere near to 'that better than [or out of which] nothing exists' (Ganesh Thite).[879] In other words, what the term niḥśreyasa designates is a superlative 'form of liberation' which is unparalleled by any other

[873] Mokṣa is mentioned eight times, twice in Sūtrapāṭha (VS 5.2.20 and 6.2.19), and six times in the commentary (gloss 1.1.2: third line/ 5.2.15: fourth line/ 5.2.20 second line/ 5.2.22: third line/ 6.2.19 twice in first line). Niḥśreyasa: in VSc it appears seven times, once in a sūtra (VS 1.1.2), and six times within Candrānanda's commentary (gloss to 1.1.2, second and third line/ gloss 1.1.6: fourth and eight line/ gloss 6.2.11: second line/ gloss 10.21: third line).

[874] Halbfass, 1992, p. 233.

[875] Eternal in Vaiśeṣika is referring to the non-composite character of a substance; versus the Western thought where it designates a temporal meaning.

[876] Niḥśreyasa appears in VSc seven times, one in VS 1.1.2 and six times within Candrānanda's commentary: sūtra 1.1.2; and gloss of 1.1.2 (second, and third lines), 1.1.6 (forth and eight lines), 6.2.11 (second line), and 10.21 (third line). It occurs also in Nyāyasūtras of Akṣapāda Gautama (NS 1.1.1) and more generally in later Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya commentators: Praśastapāda (PD 1.2), Udayanāchārya (Kiraṇāvalī 9), Annaṁbhaṭṭa (Tarkasaṁgrahadīpikā), Śaśadhara (Nyāyasiddhāntadīpaḥ 24), Laugākṣi Bhāskara (Tarkakaumudī 21) but also in Manusmṛti (12, 104), See Nyāyakośa, 'niḥśreyasa' entry, pp. 409-14.

[877] Kumar, 2013, p. 104-5.

[878] Tubb, 2007, p. 131.

[879] Trans. Tithe (audio file; personal communication, 3rd March 2016).

designation, say abhyudaya. Another etymological interpretation is given by Pradeep Gokhale, who gives two interpretations, derivations, of the term niḥśreyasa: 1) niḥśreyasa taken in the sense of 'extreme śreyas', in almost the same as Ganesh Thite suggests; something outside of which (niḥ-) nothing superior exists; and 2) niḥśreyasa translated as something which is 'beyond whatever pleasure may exists'. Gokhale takes into consideration three categories of the comparative śreyas: a) preyas ('pleasure, agreeable'); b) śreyas ('better' , 'superior than') and c) niḥśreyasa ('beyond pleasure', beyond śreyas'). Gokhale's interpretation however raises at least two further implications: one is whether this 'beyond pleasure' implies in niḥśreyasa, a state of the embodied self, or disembodied; and, second, whether 'beyond pleasure' refers to an insentient state where pleasure itself is transcended. His 'transcendental interpretation' however, comes somehow closer to another soteriological term, used in Nyāya, namely apavarga (NS 1.1.2), a term which, in Nyāya, is synonymous to mokṣa. Etymologically, 'apavarga' designates 'outside varga', or 'outside class', and it was used as an addition to the trivarga (artha, kāma, and dharma) to which, later on, mokṣa was appended. Mokṣa is synonymous to apavarga. Ganesh Thite, however, gave it a philological twist. Apavarga is a compound of the particle 'ap' ('away') and varga ('exclusion').[880] The interpretation derived from such an unusual translation would be, according to Thite, that niḥśreyasa is the liberated state where 'action has kept away/excluded'. Both apavarga and niḥśreyasa refer to a state of the self, which is in a way outcast from any social, religious, or cultural class, as well as different from any goal that the ancient trivarga (artha, kāma, and dharma) may impose. The concept of liberation in Candrānanda is therefore transcendental, it functions as a goal of life open to anyone who must nevertheless fulfil certain moral and intellectual criteria, and who is committed

[880] Trans. Thite (audio file, personal communication, 11th March 2016).

to addressing the existential question of suffering in the ātman (embodied) (VSc 1.1.1). The short answer to this quest is the doctrine of the self, and cosmos, both of which constitute the whole doctrine of Vaiśeṣika. The main features of niḥśreyasa and mokṣa in Candrānanda's Vṛtti are as follows.

The first characteristic of liberation in Candrānanda is absolute separation of soul from psycho-physiological qualities of the ātman (vaiśeṣikaguṇas); there are nine such 'specific qualities' (VSc 3.2.17), most of them of a psychological nature; these have been treated, each one, in the section on the static dimension of the soul. It is not certain whether they represent a concept as close to a 'subtle body', but we can still note among them some, such as saṃskāra, which seem to have a 'migratory nature', chiefly because of its two off-shoots: 'speed' (vega), and 'memory' (bhāvanā) (VSc 1.1.7).[881] Knowledge of the precise nature of entities is a form of purity without which niḥśreyasa is impossible. Parijñāna is the most superior form of knowledge in Vaiśeṣika, and a prerequisite to salvation (VSc 1.1.6), but is something which ultimately must be renounced, since it is a cognitive faculty close to a vaiśeṣikaguṇa (buddhi). The term for renunciation is vairāgya. It is not clearly how this chain of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas migrate, but we may suppose, on the basis of their inter-dependence shown in āhnika VSc 6.2, that they are drawn by buddhi, which is able to store memory, and its 'mental traces', which obscure right knowledge (VSc 9.22-16). This view is common in the Indian philosophical schools, such as Yoga, where the 'storage place' is citta itself.[882] Besides, in Vaiśeṣika it is manas that which migrates from the body (VSc 5.2.19), and if saṃskāra is a guṇa of manas, then the migrating manas takes with it the whole set of nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas. It is for this very reason that pure and precise knowledge plays such a

[881] Trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 81, bhāvanā: 'creating energy', 'mental impression'.
[882] Potter, 1980, p. 244.

major role within the soteriology of the system. It has a catharsis or purgative effect (vairāgya).

The second characteristic of the state of liberation is the uprooting of any 'biological body' (jīvana), or 'compositional state of ātman' (śarīra), as well as any future likelihood of birth (janma) (VSc 6.2.18). The different usages of ātman in different contexts (sometimes identified with manas, other times with vāyu), show not only the volatile connotation of the term, but also the various states of its ontological subsistence.[883] Ātman in mokṣa, Candrānanda says in VSc 5.2.20, is the absence of the first (anādi) movements (apasarpaṇa/ upasarpaṇa) of 'contact' (saṃyoga), and 'absence of the emergence of body' (śarīra aprādurbhāva), all of which being caused by adṛṣṭa. The 'composite self' takes place because of all these motions, contacts that ultimately lead to the 'emergence' (prādurbhāva) of the 'biological being' (jīvana). Candrānanda says that mokṣa occurs only in the absence of all these processes, including the absence of the contact between manas and ātman (VSc 5.2.20).

VS 5.2.20: tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo[884]'prādurbhāvaḥ[885] sa mokṣaḥ / VSc: evaṁ rūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādinimittasyā[886]'dṛṣṭasyābhāve jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥ saṃyogasyābhāvo'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ[887] sa mokṣaḥ.

[883] See section 5.1 on Ātman.
[884] saṁyogā'bhāvo: all; saṁyogābhāvau Ś2
[885] prādurbhāvaḥ: all; prādurbhāvaśca JS (gloss)
[886] apasarpaṇā'dinimittasyā: all; apasarpaṇādīnimittasyā Ś3ac
[887] 'nyasya ca śarīrasyā 'prādurbhāvo yaḥ: J; nyapyaśarīrasyādurbhāvaḥ Ś2; nānyaśarīrasyādurbhāvos Ś1; nānyaśarīrasya prādurbhāvo Ś3ac; nānyaśarīrasya prādurbhāvaḥ Ś3pc

Gloss VS 5.2.20: mokṣa is in the absence of adṛṣṭa,[888] the absence of saṃyoga,[889] [and] the absence of manifestation [of body][890]/ VSc: in the absence of adṛṣṭa which is the instrumental cause of beginningless motion of 'form', the absence of the contact of manas and self, which [contact] is called jīvana, and the non-emergence of a body, [all these] are mokṣa.

It seems that the contact between manas and ātman, which elsewhere is spoken of as a 'four-fold cognition' (catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa), is being denied its soteriological role; on the contrary, it is called jīvana, perhaps because cogntion itself is seen as something producing biological life, pain and bondage. Yoga is only half way through mokṣa; as VSc 5.2.17 states, it removes only the pain and pleasure. Though yoga separates manas from senses, it fixates manas to the soul. We conclude and say that yoga has only some intellectual compensations, aimed at alleviating pain or obtaining higher knowledge; but because in yoga, ātman remains in contact with manas, this situation represents a bonded state as VSc 5.2.14 states that even yogis from the upper 'cosmic layers' (bhūmi) can be trapped under the fatidic influence of adṛṣṭa. Mokṣa is therefore a state where neither contact, nor composition that comes after as a result, can exist.

The third feature of mokṣa is that it represents a state, which is extra-spatial, extra-cosmic. The gloss VSc 1.1.2 draws a sharp distinction between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa; that is to say it situates beyond the state of the bhūmi layers discussed under VSc 5.2.14. Different from abhyudaya, which is a form of 'success', or 'upgrade' into this world or another better world (VSc 5.2.14, āhnika VSc 4.2), niḥśreyasa is merely an

[888] 'tat' from 'tadabhāve' stands here for adṛṣṭa which was the subject of all the actions discussed in the previous sūtra 5.2.19. Thakur, 2003, p. 81.
[889] Thakur, 2003, p. 81 says that saṁyoga refers to the connection between manas and ātman which is called jīvana.
[890] The gloss clarifies that aprādurbhāva refers to the 'non-manifestation of the body' (śarīrasyā 'prādurbhāvo)

ontological state, which has the 'form', or 'appearance' (rūpa) of a 'state of bhāva'. This bhāva, which elsewhere Kaṇāda says is only a 'universal concept' (VSc 1.2.4), is presumably the ātman in its vibhu state, like ākāśa (VSc 7.1.28-29). It is an ontological state of the self divested of all its vaiśeṣikaguṇas; the use of particle 'adhi' in the compound 'adhyātmano', points explicitly to ātman as the subject of this soteriological state.[891] In the gloss of VSc 1.1.2, one important phrase seems to summarise such a permanent state: niḥśreyasamadhyātmano vaiśeṣika guṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ. The translation of this line summarises niḥśreyasa which is presented as synonymic to mokṣa: 'salvation is liberation in the form of the ātman devoid of (its) vaiśeṣikaguṇas'.[892] The absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas shows that the self must find the form of its pure existence, either pre-cosmognic or post-echatologic. At any rate, the substance soul remains outside any spatial and temporal realm, because it no loger has the 'bits of equipment' (the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas) which usually engage the embodied self to suffer physical transformations (e.g. 'growth of body' VS 3.2.4) nor can acquire a better body to inhabit a better world (VSc 5.2.14).

Finally, the fourth characteristic of the liberation state is the complete annihilation of the 'law of karma', both cosmic, and ethical; it is symptomatic that in the passages that explain liberation (VSc 1.1.6; VSc 5.2.14-20; VSc 6.2.17-19), almost all discuss the matter in the context of karma, either as a padārtha, or a motion of manas, or a process of conjunction or disjunction between the vaiśeṣikaguṇas.[893] In VSc 6.2.18-19 for

[891] '-adhi' is a preposition that means 'over'. It is used in a prepositional compound, a governing compound possibly, to mean, 'with respect to the self' 'concerning the self'. Whitney pp. 511-12, section 1310 b.

[892] I have again presented, translated, and discussed this passage in the section 4.3 of this thesis.

[893] The cycle take places also because of two guṇas, saṃyoga and vibhāga (VS 6.2.18), which are 'common qualities' (sāmānyaguṇa), and influence the transformation and action of other dravyas well. As discussed, liberation however occurs chiefly because of the disappearance of the saṃyoga between manas and ātman (VSc 5.2.2); it is a view confirmed by Vādīndra, which discusses the bonds of body in the gloss on a sūtra on saṃyoga (VSv 6.2.16), while liberation discussed in relation to a sūtra on vibhāga (VSv 6.2.17).

instance, a certain cyclical process is first described with the simile of a 'pot' that returns continuously to the source of water, in a manner of a Persian wheel of pots. The gloss refers presumably to the atomic mind that attaches to a new 'living organism' (jantu) in the cycle of births and rebirths, until it reaches the final state of mokṣa.[894] VSc 6.2.18-19 do not mention manas, but the short gloss of VSc 6.2.19 sends us to VSc 5.2.20 from where it takes a portion for quoting. VSc 6.2.18-19 refers clearly to the 'theory of karma' or 'karmic retribution theory' because of the mention it makes to storage (sañcita) of dharma and adharma (VSc 6.2.18), in the absence of which mokṣa is eventually obtained (VSc 6.2.19).[895] In both VSc 6.2.19 and VSc 5.2.20 'tadabhāva' refers to adṛṣṭa, which is a 'force' with both ethical and physical implications for the self. The anihiliation of karma implies that liberation is static, and as a result, it is opposed to any change, process, or psychological fluctuation; as both Candrānanda (VSc 1.1.2; and 1.1.6) and Vādīndra (VSv 6.2.17) confirm, neither pleasure nor desire, or dharma, can be part of the state of mokṣa, chiefly because these are dichotomic and fickle vaiśeṣikaguṇas, that move interchangeably (from sukha to duḥkha, from icchā to dveṣa, and so on). Hence, we need to see niḥśreyasa as a static, meta-motion, meta-spatial, and meta-psychological state, where there is neither body, nor change, nor contact with object of any pleasurable state, as VS 5.2.20 makes it clear.

4.7. CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, I have looked at two main dimensions of the problem. In the static dimension, I concentrated on the nature of the liberated ātman, which is a substance devoid of vaiśeṣikaguṇas. In order to respond fully to the question of the

[894] See section 4.5 on saṃsāra.
[895] See VSc 6.2.19 discussed in section 4.4 of this thesis.

nature of Vaiśeṣika soteriology, I had to analyse each of the nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas, separately. Each one of these nine qualities stays in a relation of interdependence; they represent the 'bits of equipment', which are attached to the soul, to manas and their related cognitive functions (e.g. buddhi, saṃskāra).[896] They are by nature motional, as opposed to the soul which is vibhu and niṣkriyā. What moves is not ātman, a view of self that may be close to Vedānta's; yet Vaiśeṣika acknowledges also an individuality of ātman, because of its vaiśeṣikaguṇas and antyaviśeṣas. Liberation state is the return from a dynamic state to a static, universal, and all-pervasive one, where there is a complete annihilation of all vaiśeṣikaguṇas that transforms the original nature of ātman into composite and dynamic entity. Yet the problem of plurality of the selves appears to contradict the all-pervaise nature of the soul. The peculiarity of the doctrine of the self in Vaiśeṣika is that it maintains both an infinite numerical plurality of the self - because of its various specificities (antyaviśeṣa) - as well as the eternal and universal all-pervasive nature of the self which is again infinite.[897] Liberation is the ontological state where an unlimited plurality of self ('numerical identity') meets the very universal nature of the self (generic identity). It is also a meta-cosmic, meta-individualist, meta-gnostic, and meta-ethical state because all spatial-corporality, individuality, ethical qualities (dharma) and knowledge (buddhi) of ātman, lose their ontological function in mokṣa. The second part of this chapter had to deal with the ways in which the nature of ātman is drawn into a composite state (saṁsāra) by various factors such as adṛṣṭa, or contact (saṃyoga) to

[896] Śrīdhara says that one of saṃskāra's sub-guṇas (vega) belongs only to the five corporeal substances (the four mahābhūtas plus manas, and does not exist in 'other substances', Jhā p. 1916, p. 572. The other sub-guṇa bhāvanā is a property of the soul, Jhā, 1916, p. 573. Also 'elasticity' (sthitisthāpaka) subsists in tangible substances. Cognition says Śrīdhara, p. 574, is produced in chain, being preceded by impression as the first cognition. In Vaiśeṣika cognition is atomic and successive; it does not function in a simultanoues manner (except perhaps the intuition ārṣa). Cognition of this kind that produces memory possibly causes the chain of vaiśeṣikaguṇas to migrate.

[897] Halbfass, 1992, p. 273 speaks of two forms of identity of dravyas, one 'permanent numerical identity' and a 'generic identity'; both of which co-exist syncronically because of the concept of antyaviśeṣa that expands beyond time and number.

manas and ātman. The chapter dealt with karma too, and by this with the factors of birth, cosmogony, eschatology, and transformation, which I have contrasted with mokṣa (release from birth), and yoga, which is a preliminary form of eternalism, leading to the realisation of ātman. However, the route this chapter took was to proceed from the static state of ātman (ontology) to the dynamic state (hence discussion on saṃsāra and jīvana) of which only the former represents the nature of early Vaiśeṣika's soteriology.

5.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed the problem of 'action' within the nature of soteriology. It has also underlined that the state of liberation is incompatible with any form of karma, as well as the composite nature of ātman mixed with vaiśeṣikaguṇas and for that matter, the nature of soteriology is a pure ontological state of soul, devoid of such features. In the current chapter, the discussion will shift towards the function of soteriology, that is to say the gnostic methods of liberation that comprise: 1) the realisation of the very nature of ātman (ontological approach); 2) the role of jñāna within soteriology (epistemological approach); and 3) the practice of yoga (the soteriontological approach).[898] In the continuation of the previous section, this chapter proposes through an ontological and scientific inquiry on the nature of the self, to look at the function of soteriology which works primarily with the 'stoppage of karma' which affects the soul. In a way, this chapter goes from 'change' (dynamic aspect) to 'being' (static aspect), a reversal of the previous one that went from the being (static) to change (dynamic aspect). In fact, soteriology in Vaiśeṣika is the opposite of the salvation of Christian theology (a process of continual becoming); it is specifically an 'involution process' that starts from the 'becoming' stage (embodied) and ends into the quintessential, original state, of ātman, a dravya as a pure being. This explains ātman's depletion of its composite nature, such as body, affections, and vaiśeṣikaguṇas. This chapter deals with this doctrine in

[898] The chapter on 'the nature of soteriology' moved from 'existence' (being) to 'change' (becoming), while the function of soteriology chapter deals with the reverse process: how the self must obstruct karma and find its permanent static state; liberation is worked out from 'change' to 'being'. Soteriology is the arrival at the ontological stage of being, while becoming is the entanglement of the self into bondage.

three stages, all of which focus on the importance of 'gnosis',[899] in the functioning and obtainment of liberation: 1) knowledge of the self; 2) nature of knowledge; and 3) yoga and vairāgya (both of which are intellectual attitudes). From these three, one can see the importance of knowledge and epistemology, which in this chapter prevails. In short, it is through knowledge that the functioning of Vaiśeṣika's salvation works.

First we should start with the gloss on VS 10.21, where by the mention of the 'knowledge of the obtainment' (vijñānāvāpter, vijñānāvāpti), Candrānanda indicates a list of components necessary for the obtainment of niḥśreyasa; the gloss displays a 'can do approach', where 'vijñānā' indicates a kind of 'how-to-method' form of science.

VSc 10.21: tanu[900]-bhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ[901] tatpraṇayanāc[902] cāmnāyasya siddhaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ / 'iti' śabdaḥ samāptyarthaḥ / evaṁ dravyādīnāṁ sādharmyavaidharmya[903]-parijñānād vairāgya[904]-jñān'otpatter 'ātmā jñātavya' ityādi[905] vākyebhyaś c'pāsākramena[906] vijñānāvāpter[907] niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.[908]

[899] The current thesis argues that Vaiśeṣika, and more generally Indian philosophy, has its own form of Gnosticism, different yet similar to classical Gnosticism, with which I dealt briefly in the introductory chapter.
[900] em. Ruzsa tatra. I have nevertheless, decided to stay on Jambūvijayaji reading: 'tanu'.
[901] Ruzsa: bhuvanā'dikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaras: J; bhuvanā _ i (10 dots) Ś2; bhuvanā (16 dots) Ś1; bhuvanā (13 dots) Ś3.
[902] praṇayanāc: Ś1, Ś2; pra <ya> ṇayanāc Ś3; praṇayannāc J.
[903] vaidharmya: Ś; vaidharmma J.
[904] vairāgya: Ś; vairāgyadvāreṇa: J.
[905] ādi: Ś; ādinā J.
[906] Jambūvijayaji prefers the oldest MS reading (upāsākramena): 'by falling upon', by 'meditating on' phrases like 'you should know the soul'. Jambūvijayaji provides in footnote two more variant MS readings: one from Baroda MS (marked with 'O'): ity ādi vākyebhyaśc'opākrameṇa vijñānāvāpti niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ; and Puṇyavijayajī MS (marked with 'P'): ity ādināvākyebhyaśc'opāsākrameṇa vijñānāvāpterniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ; (see also Ruzsa readings: opāsā-krameṇa: J, Ś2; opākrameṇa Ś1, Ś3).
[907] vijñānā'vāpter: conj Ed 1961; vijñānāvyāptir Ś2; vijñānāvyāpte J; vijñānāvyāpti Ś1, Ś3pc; vijñātāvyāpti Ś3ac.
[908] niḥśreyasā: all; niḥsrayasā Jac; One possible translation is: 'Āmnāya texts are established as authority because they are executed by him, Bhagavān Īśvara which is known to be the producer of body, and the world, which are his effects'.

Gloss VSc 10.21: 'body, cosmos, are known to be the works of Bhagavān Īśvara, and because he composed the āmnāya texts, [these āmnāya texts] are established as authoritative / the word 'iti' [in the sūtra 10.21] means that [this statement] is concluded / Hence, because of the discrimination between the differences and similarities of substances and the arising of knowledge by means of 'detachment', and through obtaining discernment by a 'course of contemplation'[909] on statements such as 'the self should be known', and so on, one gains liberation'.

Explanation: The gloss contains two parts. The first is chiefly a gloss on the theistic sūtra 10.21 which was initially discussed in a similar way in VSc 1.1.3. Like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda also acknowledges the creation of the world by god, and the authority of śabda-pramāṇa derived from that, for as cosmos is, the āmnāya texts are also composed by god. The second part however looks like a soteriological conclusion and presents liberation as achievable through 'discrimination' (parijñāna) and 'discernment' (vijñāna). With the grammatical exegesis of 'iti śabda', Candrānanda offers his own soteriological concluding remarks (samāptyartha). To sum up, VSc 10.21 contains several doctrines such as: 1) the theology of Īśvara, as creator of bodies and cosmos (tanu bhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ);[910] 2) theistic epistemology grounded on āmnāya texts (tat praṇayanāc ca amnāyasya siddhaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ);[911] 3) knowledge of dravyas, and the method of discrimination (parijñāna) of their similarities and dissimilarities (sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānād); 4) 'detachment' (vairāgya);[912] 5) the

[909] The choice made by Jambūvijayaji 'upāsākrama' (in 1961 ed.) seems to be fitting, as 'upāsana' in this particular context must be a form of meditation, which has more in common with the nivṛtti path of salvation, rather than with worship (as upakrama might suggest). Apte, dict. p. 439 upakramati: 'beginning, 'commencement'.
[910] tatra J; tattva Ś; tanu em. Ed (unmarked); bhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaras: J; bhuvanā _ i (10 dots) Ś2; bhuvanā (16 dots) Ś1; bhuvanā (13 dots) Ś3; (according to Ruzsa reading, p. 89).
[911] In PD 288, āmnāya is the sacred tradition followed by the ṛṣis.
[912] vairāgya Ś; vairāgyadvāreṇa: J (gloss) (Ruzsa, ibid, p. 89).

knowledge of ātman to be known' ('ātmā jñātavya'); and 6) 'discernment' (vijñāna) obtained by a 'meditation' (most probably 'upāsana') on scriptural phrases such as 'soul must be known' ('ātmā jñātavya' ityādi vākyebhyaśc'opāsākrameṇa). The components, or the steps enumerated here represent the whole soteriolgical doctrine which, once acquired, brings forth liberation (niḥśreyasa). Since the knowledge of the dravyas (in which ātman belongs) is mentioned, we should start with the knowledge of the self itself, which is, within the soteriological framework, the locus of knowledge, and the most important of all substances. Like all other dravyas, the process of knowledge of the self implies a judicious two-fold analysis (sādharmya and vaidharmya) (VSc 1.1- VSc 2.2). As such, with the phrase 'ātmā jñātavya', self becomes both the subject, and object of all epistemological inquiry.

5.1. ĀTMAN[913] 'ĀTMĀ JÑĀTAVYA' (VSC 10.21)[914]

The dichotomy between dravya and guṇa, which characterises the Vaiśeṣika system, applies also in the relation between ātman and manas, on the one hand, and ātman and its guṇas, on the other.[915] Among the nine dravyas, ātman refers primarily to its pre-embodied state, where substances exist in a separate form (either atomic, or all-pervasive).[916] When in this work I refer to 'disembodied soul', I discuss concepts like

[913] Ātman occurs about ninety-one times in VSc, out of which twenty-seven times within Sūtrapāṭha. A comparable table of all dravyas' occurrence shows that ātman is by far the most extensively dravya discussed in VSc. With certain few exceptions, where prefix 'ātma-'is used as a reflexive pronoun, (e.g. VSc 1.1.9), the term is discussed at length in many different contexts such as: 1) ātman is subject to opponents' criticisms (VSc 3.1.7; VSc 3.2.6, 15); 2); it is discussed as the embodied self (VS 3.1.14; VSc 5.1.6); 3) more importantly for soteriology, it is devoid of actions (niṣkriya VSc 5.2.23); or, involved in 'four-fold perception' (VSc 3.1.13), and yogipratyakṣa (VSc 9.12). It appears for instance in: VS 1.1.4; 2.1.25; 3.1.13-14; 3.2.1,4; 3.2.13,15; 4.2.2-3; 5.1.1,4,6; 5.2.16-18; 6.1.7,17-19; 8.2; 9.13,15,17, 22; 10.1, and their subsequent gloss, as well as in other sūtras' gloss not mentioned here

[914] Participle future: 'the self should be known'.

[915] By guṇas of ātman we distinguish two categories: specific guṇas (which keep souls in bondage) and common guṇas (general characteristics of the souls).

[916] See Table 7 of dravyas, in this chapter.

'soul' or 'ātman', while when I mention the 'embodied soul', I usually designate the generic term 'self'. Because self, not mind, is the cognitive substratum of knowledge, the problem of proving and perceiving soul becomes difficult, specifically because manas in Vaiśeṣika is an 'un-conscious organ' that acts only like a 'sensorial mediator' and transmits the external information from the senses and their objects to its cognitive locus: ātman. The English translation of manas as 'mind' is therefore not quite accurate.[917] On the other hand, since ātman and buddhi are different entities (one is eternal dravya, the other impermanent guṇa), the contact of ātman with buddhi is again problematic.[918] In Vaiśeṣika's soteriology, ātman represents the chief topic of investigation. Being an eternal dravya, the essence of ātman in its original state is that of a complete absence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, therefore lacks a saṁsāric or subtle body.[919] Candrānanda provides in VSc 3.1, several arguments for the existence of the soul, and uses for that purpose 'inference' (anumāna), one of Vaiśeṣika's two means of knowledge (pramāṇa).[920] In short, the 'argument' (hetu) runs as follows: because the senses and their objects are non-graspable or unconscious faculties, and because they are different from each other, therefore 'another grasper' (paro grahītā) should be inferred.

(preceding line) evaṁ digantānāṁ vaidharmyam uktvātmānam upakramate / VS 3.1.1 prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ / VSc: śabdādayo yasmād guṇādisvabhāvāḥ[921] prasiddhāḥ,[922] tebhyaś c'endriyāṇi[923] / ata idānīm / VS 3.1.2: indriyārthaprasiddhir

[917] Bhatt, 1989, p. 166.
[918] Bhatt, 1989, p. 383.
[919] The view is quite similar to the outlook taken by other systems such as Sāṃkhya, where the discriminative knowledge has the purpose of separating 'the material stuff', from the 'pure consciousness', trans. Edeltraud, 2006. In YD, p. 14.
[920] Narain, 1976, p. 229, says that the soul can be inferred as VSc 3.1 discusses, yet in VSc 9.13 shows that perception too can be a valid pramāṇa to prove the self; yogis are able to perceive the self through ātmapratyakṣa.
[921] guṇādisvabhāvāḥ: J; guṇādvisvabhāvāḥ Ś.
[922] prasiddhāḥ: Ś; siddhās J.
[923] endriyāṇi: all; endriyāni Ś1

indriyā'rthebhyo[924]'rthāntaratve[925] hetuḥ / VSc grāhyāṇām[926] arthānāṁ śabdādīnāṁ y'eyaṁ prasiddhiḥ tayā ca[927] śrotrādīnāṁ karaṇānām,[928] anayā indriyārthaprasiddhyā ebhyo grāhyagrahaṇebhyo[929] indriyārthebhyaḥ[930] paro grahītā[931] 'tmānumīyate.

Gloss: thus, having explained the differences between the substances up to diś, [now] he undertakes [the inquiry of] the self/ VS 3.1.1: the objects of the sense organs are well-established / VSc: because śabda and so on are established to have the nature of quality, and so on, and from them their sense organs; therefore now [he says] / VS 3.1.2: because the sense objects are established to be different from sense organs, this difference is proved to be the reason for another thing / VSc: the proof of objects of senses which can be grasped, that is of sound and so on, by that same proof [one establishes] the sense-powers hearing and so on, and by that proof of the sense-powers and their objects, something beyond them, the self, [which is] beyond graspable and grasping activity, sense-powers, and sense-object, is inferred.

Explanation. One of the characteristics of the Vaiśeṣika system is its propensity towards differentiation of categories, especially between dravyas and guṇas. The system's originality and contribution to Indian philosophy is evident with viśeṣa, its fifth padārtha. The inferential argument used here is a 'vaidharmic mode of reasoning', with which Candrānanda infers the existence of the soul, as the ultimate grasper of the

924 indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyā: all; iṅdri[…]ārtha[…]asiddhiriṅdri[…]; JS (but, iṅdriyārthaprasiddhiriṅdriyā J2S)
925 'rthebhyo'rthāntaratve: JS, Ś1pc, Ś23; rthebhyo[…]ratve Ś1ac; rthebhyārthāṅtaratve J.
926 grāhyāṇām: all; grāhyanām Ś3
927 tayā ca: J; tayā Ś
928 karaṇānām: J; kāraṇānām Ś
929 grahaṇebhyo: J; grahaṇepi Ś
930 'rthebhyaḥ: J,Ś2,Ś3pc; rthebhyo Ś1pc(?) 3ac(?); rthebhya Ś1ac(?) – or Ś1 may be rthebhyaḻ
931 grahītā: J, Ś1pc (?) 2; grahīt or grahītī Ś1ac; grhītā Ś3.

cognitive process, by eliminating other options, through a process of analytic dissection. Āhnika VSc 3.1, for instance uses logic to refute a rival argument leveled against the doctrine of existence of the soul expressed in VSc 3.1.3. Candrānanda's main contention is that sense organs and manas are not conscious (VSc 3.1.4), therefore cannot be considered 'cause', as the opponent states in VSc 3.1.3. Instead, the soul must be the ultimate perceiver of the cognitive process. In VSc 3.1.13, Candrānanda defines soul as the 'inherent cause' of knowledge, while knowledge is an effect of the 'four-fold contact'. In this contact, soul is the ultimate perceiver. In other words, the cognitive process presupposes, or depends on the soul who is not only the ultimate grasper in cognition (VSc 3.1.13) but also the doer of 'activities' (pravṛtti) and 'inactivities' (nivṛtti) of the body (VSc 3.1.14):

VS 3.1.13: ātm'endriya[932]mano'rthasannikarṣād yan[933] niṣpadyate tad anyat[934] / VSc: catuṣṭayasannikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānākhyaṁ[935] tad anyad: hetvantaram[936] ātmajñāpakam asti iti / jñānasya samavāyikāraṇāpekṣitvaṁ kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat / VS 3.1.14: pravṛtti nivṛttī[937] ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe[938] paratra liṅgam iti[939] / VSc: pratyagātm[940] eti śarīraṁ[941] / śarīre[942] pravṛtti nivṛttī dṛṣṭe ātmānam anumāpayataḥ[943] / śarīraṁ prayatnavatā 'dhiṣṭhitaṁ[944] hitāhitapravṛttinivṛttīmattvād[945] ghaṭavat.

---

[932] Ātm'endriya: JS, J, Ś2, Ś3; ātmendriyārtha Ś1ac (eyeskip); ātmendriyartha Ś1pc (careless deletion)
[933] yan: JS, Ś2, Ś3; ya Ś1; yā J.
[934] anyat: Ś; anyaṁ JS, J.
[935] jñānā'khyaṁ: Ś; jñānākhyaṁ kāryaṁ J (gloss)
[936] anyad: dhetvantaram: conjEd (unmarked); anyaddhetaṁtaram J (could be anyadvetaṁtaram); anyadvetaram Ś3; anyatventaram Ś1, Ś2.
[937] nivṛttī: all; na vṛtti Ś1.
[938] ātmani dṛṣṭe: all; ātmanirdṛṣṭe Js ac.
[939] iti: J, Ś1, Ś2, Ś3pc; om JS,Ś3ac.
[940] pratyagātm: Ś; anyathātm J.
[941] śarīraṁ: Ś; śarīra J.
[942] śarīre: Ś; śarīra J.
[943] anumāpayataḥ: Ś; anumāpāyataḥ J.
[944] dhiṣṭhitaṁ: Ś1,Ś2; dhiṣṭitaṁ J,Ś3.
[945] nivṛttimattvād: all; nivṛttisattvād Ś2.

Gloss VS 3.1.13: whatever is produced is different [from all of these] because of the contact between manas, objects, senses, and ātman / VSc: from the four-fold contact, what is produced is called jñāna, [and] that is something different [from the four-fold contact]; this is another logical argument that makes known the soul, because knowledge is dependent on an inherent cause, just as the pot is produced [and dependent on an inherent cause] / VS 3.1.14: predilection and disinclination [which] are produced in the individual self are marks of something else / VSc: 'pratyagātma' refers to body/ predilection and disinclination are seen in the body, [and these] cause us to infer ātman [in the following inferential way]: just like the pot, the body is inhabited [or 'dependent'; adhiṣṭhita] by the same thing that makes an effort, [because it] is full of predilection and disinclination of the beneficial and non-beneficial.

Explanation. The argument for the existence of the self made by āhnika VSc 3.1 is an inferential one, which means that because soul is the perceiver, others people cannot perceive the 'I', but they can only infer it from the way in which the production of knowledge takes place, from objects, senses via manas, to the soul (the four-fold-contact). Another inferential type of argument for the existence of the self, we have in āhnika VSc 3.2, where a series of physical and psychical marks (liṅga) prove the existence of the self:

VS 3.2.4: prāṇāpānanimeṣ'onmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś c'ety ātmaliṅgāni.[946]

[946] For VSc 3.2.4 gloss, see Synopsis.

Gloss VS 3.2.4: 'exhaling',[947] 'inhaling',[948] 'closing-eye', 'opening-eye', 'biological life', 'mind-movement', 'changes in different sense-organs', 'pleasure', 'pain', 'desire', 'aversion', and 'volition', are the marks of the self.

Explanation. Such proof however is not convincing. VSc 3.2 presents a series of counter arguments raised by opponents;[949] here I shall focus chiefly on Vaiśeṣika's own arguments adduced in support of its doctrine of the self. As a result of the series of twelve liṅgas of the self presented in VSc 3.2.4, as well as the doctrine of the eternality and substantiality of the self explained in VSc 3.2.5, the commentary preserves three counter arguments that reject Vaiśeṣika's doctrine of the self. Briefly, these arguments of the opponents can be listed as follows: 1) 'no-breath argument' (VSc 3.2.6); 2) 'no-general mark argument' (VSc 3.2.7); 3) 'tradition argument' (VSc 3.2.8).[950] The main dilemma which the opponent faces is that the 'special connection between soul and breath, and pleasure, and so on,' is not seen (na tathā prāṇādi sukhādisambaddho'yam ātmeti jñānaṁ jāyate), therefore Vaiśeṣika's argument cannot prove satisfactory from the liṅgas, the existence of the self.

'AHAṀ-BREATH APPOSITION ARGUMENT' (VSC 3.2.9)

One counter-argument of Vaiśeṣika is given in VSc 3.2.9,[951] and could be summarised as the 'ahaṁ-breath apposition argument' by which Candrānanda infers the existence of

[947] Grimes dict. p. 239, prāṇa: 'breathe forth'.
[948] Grimes dict. p. 48, apāṇa: 'breathe downwards'.
[949] Two Japanese's scholars have attempted to reconstruct, on the basis of VSc 3.2, the debate between Vaiśeṣika and Mādhyamika (Nozawa, 1991), Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta (Honda, 1994).
[950] Honda 1994, p. 708 suggests that these arguments come from Vedānta side.
[951] Honda, 1994, pp. 707-9, reads VSc 3.2.9 as an argument of Mīmāṃsā; however, here, I have read it as an argument maintained by Vaiśeṣika.

soul from the existence of breath; in other words, breath and ahaṁ are used in 'apposition' or 'collocation' (aikādhikaraṇa). Indeed, that also is the case in the context of yoga practice (VSc 5.2.17-18), where by the word ātman, Candrānanda designates wind-breath itself (ihā'tmaśabdena vāyuḥ VSc 5.2.18). As the VSc 3.2.9 argument runs, both pleasure and breath belong to the same substratum (the 'I'), therefore whenever there are sentences like 'I have breath' or 'I have pleasure', the word 'I' refers to the ultimate substance which is the soul. Thus, the argument for the existence of the soul is not just from tradition, but also from this very experience of ahaṁ.

VS 3.2.9: ahaṁ iti[952] śabdavyatirekān nāgamikaṁ[953] / VSc: ahaṁ iti śabdena kṣityādivibhinnātmadravya[954]viṣayeṇaikādhikaraṇyād ahaṁ[955] prāṇādimān[956] ahaṁ sukhavān iti / tasmāt prāṇā'[957]diliṅgatvān nāgamikam.[958]

Gloss VS 3.2.9: the 'ahaṁ' is not [only proved] from sacred tradition / VSc: because the word 'ahaṁ' which refers to the dravya self as something different from earth and other dravyas is used in apposition with breathing and so on, in sentences like 'I breathe', 'I am happy', therefore the proof of the self in not [merely] scriptural, because it is based on inferential marks like breath'.

In the following gloss (VSc 3.2.10) Candrānanda describes a further opposing argument which seems to ascribe the role of breath and pleasure to the body not the soul (VSc

[952] aham iti: all; ahaṁ Ś1ac.
[953] nāgamikaṁ: JS,J; nāgāmikaṁ Ś
[954] vibhinnātmadravya: em Ruzsa; bhinnātmadravya J, Ed 1982; vibhinnādravyatva Ś2; vibhinnādravitva Ś1, Ś3.
[955] ahaṁ: Jpc, Ś2, Ś3; ihaṁ Jac; a āhaṁ Ś1.
[956] prāṇādimān: Ś2 (em. Ed 1982, unmarked); prāṇādivān J; pramāṇādimān Ś1; pramāṇā (end of line) mān Ś3.
[957] prāṇā: J, Ś2; pramāṇā Ś1, Ś3.
[958] nāgamikam: em Ed (unmarked); nāgāmikam: all.

3.2.10). With a certain extent, Candrānanda agrees with that, that is the body of Devadatta moves not the soul (in second line of VSc 3.2.11), since as stated in VSc 7. 1.28-29, soul, likewise ākāśa is all-pervasive in dimension (vibhu). Yet it seems that Candrānanda argues for a paradoxical kind of argument, called 'doubful' (sandigdha); what follows is a series of three main counter-arguments with which Candrānanda responds to those of the opponents presented so far. These are: 1) 'sandigdha argument' (VSc 3.2.12); 2) 'otherness argument' (VSc 3.2.13) and 3) 'self-consciousness argument' (VSc 3.2.14). In the following I propose a brief account for each one of these.

'SANDIGDHA ARGUMENT' (VSC 3.2.12)

This paradoxical argument (sandigdha) is presented as a doubtful or ambivalent contention. Candrānanda elucidates that what Sūtrapāṭha means by sandigdha is the 'semantic collocation' (aikārthādhikaraṇa) of the word Devadatta as referring to both body and soul (the latter designated by the 'I' of Devadatta). Sandigdha in this context, may be better translated with 'indistinctness' of the usage, when applied to both body and soul. This has been shown also in another place VSc 5.2.18, where the action of body refers to the breathing technique called prāṇāyāma, when body, breath, and soul are conjoined. Soul is said 'to be in motion' only when in relation to body (kāya) not in its own essential nature. This distinction between the 'embodied self' and 'disimbodied soul' does not seem to have been understood by the opponent, undoubtedly because of the ambivalence of the word ātman, which sometimes is used for wind, other times for the embodied self, and other times as designating the ultimate substance, the soul.

VS 3.2.12: saṁdigdhas[959] tū'pacāraḥ / VSc: devadattaśabdenaikārthādhikaraṇatvād yo'yam upacāro'haṁśabdasya śarīre[960] sa saṁdigdhaḥ,[961] kiṁ śarīrasyātm'opakārakatvād[962] ahaṁśabda ātmābhidhāyaka[963] upacaritaḥ[964] uta[965] mukhyatayā śarīrasyābhidhāyaka iti na śarīrā'tmanor ahaṁśabdasya niścayaḥ.

Gloss VS 3.2.12: 'but the usage [as a proof] is doubtful/ VSc: because 'ahaṁ' can be used in apposition with the word 'devadatta' the usage of the word 'ahaṁ' in connection with body is doubtful /[966] Does 'ahaṁ' refer to the soul used [figuratively about the body] because the body is auxiliary to the soul, or does it refer chiefly to the body? Because [of this question] there is no clear determination whether 'ahaṁ' refers to soul or body'.[967]

'THE OTHERNESS ARGUMENT' (VSC 3.2.13)

The second argument ('the otherness argument' of VSc 3.2.13) resembles very much that expressed in VSc 3.2.9, and with a certain extent VSc 3.2.14.[968] This is a logical-

[959] saṁdigdhas: all; sandhigdhas Ś2.
[960] śarīre: all; śaśīre Ś2.
[961] saṁdigdhaḥ: all; sandhigdhaḥ Ś2(?).
[962] opakārakatvād: J; opakaraṇatvād Ś.
[963] 'bhidhāyaka: all; bhidhā(end of line)ka Ś1.
[964] upacaritaḥ: all; upa<i>caritaḥ Ś2ac.
[965] uta: J,Ś2 (?); tata Ś1,Ś2 (?); tato Ś3 (emendation).
[966] Honda, 1994, pp. 708-9. Vaiśeṣika does not admit perception as a means of knowledge to prove the existence of the soul; the system admits only inference as mentioned in 3.2.4, linga being an inferential mark.
[967] The expression used 'na śarīrā'tmanor ahaṁśabdasya niścayaḥ', may not necessarily imply that Candrānanda does not accept 'ahaṁ' as a proof, as Honda, 1994, p. 709 maintains. Instead, I read the passage as a 'paradoxical type of argument' that counters the exclusivist view of the Mīmāṃsākas, for whom the notion of 'I' is the only proof of the soul, not also the inference of the soul from 'ahaṁ' as VSc seem to do.
[968] Candrānanda provides a further argument in VSc 3.2.14, which states that the notion of 'I', though it is applied to the individual soul, not body, still it cannot be perceived by us (na tadīyo'haṁkāro 'smābhiḥ). As Thakur, 2003, p. 64, reads this gloss, the word 'I' is usable and recognisable only by the person possessing it; it cannot indicate another soul', because is usable only individually. In other words, here we deal with a self-conscious argument, a subjective type of argument.

philological argument by which Candrānanda means to say that in terms of language, the designation we ascribe to the word ahaṁ refers to something other than body (ātmanyārthāntare ahaṁśabdaḥ pratyakṣaḥ); if it referred body, the logical argument runs, then the word 'I' would be used by everybody (sarvaiḥ prayujyeta). In short, the 'distinctiveness of 'I' word has a strictly individual usage, and never for something else, say body, or someone else, say another individual. As the gloss explains, 'pratyag' refers to ātman not body (paratra), and we know that 'pṛthaktva' is one of the sāmānyaguṇas of the ātman,[969] which applies to any individual soul.

VS 3.2.13: ahaṁ iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntarapratyakṣaḥ / VSc: pratyagātmanīty ātmani[970] paratr'eti śarīre[971]/ yady ahaṁśabdaḥ śarīra[972]vacanaḥ syād, evaṁ sati tasmin piṇḍe[973] devadattaśabda iva sarvaiḥ prayujyeta[974] / na tvevam, ata ātmani[975] arthāntare ahaṁśabdaḥ[976] pratyakṣaḥ.

Gloss VS 3.2.13: because 'ahaṁ' is used in connection with the individual soul and because [its use as a word] is absent elsewhere, there is direct perception of the other things / VSc: 'pratyagātman' refers to soul, [and] 'paratra' refers to body/ if the word 'ahaṁ' were to refer to the body, then in that case the word will be used by everybody about this particular physical specimen, just as everybody calls this specimen

[969] Kumar 2013, p. 24, lists fourteen guṇas of the soul out of which five are common or general (saṅkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṁyoga, and vibhāga).
[970] ātmanī 'ty ātmani: J; ātmani Ś (eyeskip).
[971] śarīre: J; śarīraṁ Ś.
[972] śarīra: all; śarīraṁ Ś3.
[973] piṇḍe: Ś; piṇḍā J.
[974] prayujyeta: J; prayujyate Ś.
[975] ātmani: Ś; ātmāny J.
[976] śabdaḥ: J; śabda Ś.

'Devadatta'/ but this is not so / therefore, the word 'ahaṁ' constitutes a direct means of knowledge with reference to the soul as a thing different [from the body].[977]

The 'otherness argument' makes use of the vaidharmic reasoning, which Vaiśeṣika employs in shaping its own doctrine through differentiation. The emphasis is on the sharp, but fine line of difference that exists between pure soul (ātman) and self (embodied ātman). This mode of reasoning seems to be ground for the doctrine, of the number of plurality of the soul. Since there is difference of bodies, each one which specific knowledge of self consciousness (e.g. Yajñadatta, and Viṣṇumitra VSc 3.2.14), there follows the doctrine of a specific nature of the soul. From a logical-epistemological debate, we shall now pass on to the ontology of the self, which comprises two sections: 1) its general guṇas; and 2) physical and psychological characteristic marks.

THE GENERAL QUALITIES OF ĀTMAN (SĀMĀNYAGUṆA)

Kumar lists about 14 guṇas of the ātman.[978] From a soteriological point of view, we shall classify them in two: on the one hand, nine vaiśeṣikaguṇas, which are cause for bondage (and with which we have dealt with in the chapter on 'the nature of soteriology'); and on the other hand, five general attributes (sāmānyaguṇas) which are, saṅkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṃyoga, and vibhāga. In this section, I offer an outline of these five latter guṇas, and how these (differently from the vaiśeṣikaguṇas which typify the embodied

[977] Honda, 1994, p. 709 concludes that the word ahaṁ' is not a proof for the existence of soul; but this might be a hasty conclusion, because śabda plays an inferential role in the epistemology, not necessarily perceptive, as Honda propounds. See VSc 9.19 for which śabda, testimony, is only a kind of inference, and inference is dependent on recollection of the effect.
[978] Kumar, 2013, p. 24.

self) characterise the ontological character of the pure liberated soul, in a non-composite, and dis-embodied state.

NUMBER (VSC 3.2.16). We shall start with number (saṅkhyā), which based on Sūtrapāṭha 3.2.15-16, had been debated by both commentarial traditions, and modern scholars to be either one, plural or both. After a series of counter-refutations discussed above, at the end of āhnika VSc 3.2, Candrānanda deals with the 'plurality of soul' (nānā), deduced from the 'variation' (vyavasthā) of feelings of pleasure and pain in each ātman (VSc 3.2.16). The argument is built upon the previous ones stated in VSc 5.2.12, 13, 14, where the notion of 'I' applies to any single self-consciousness, not to everybody (Yajñadatta, Viṣṇudatta, etc). The non-difference of pleasure and pain production and the 'oneness of the self' (here possibly a Vedānta position), to which the counter-argument refers in VSc 3.2.15, is not something with which Vaiśeṣika agrees, therefore Candrānanda provides the following doctrine of the plurality of the soul:

VS: 3.2.16 nānā vyavasthātaḥ[979] / VSc: anyasya sukhādiyoge'nyasya[980] tadabhāvād anayā vyavasthayā[981] nānā ātmānaḥ[982]

Gloss VS 3.2.16: because [soul] is plural, [therefore] is diverse / VSc: because one [individual] is connected with pleasure, and so on, other [individual] is not connected [with pleasure], indicates that souls are diverse and plural.

[979] vyavasthātaḥ: all; vasthātaḥ Ś3ac (haplology);
[980] nyasya Jac, Ś1pc, Ś2, Ś3; nyasyu Ś1ac(?); nanyasya Jpc.
[981] vyavasthayā: Ś2; vyavasthāyā J; vyavasthā Ś1, Ś3.
[982] ātmānaḥ: Jpc,Ś1,Ś2,Ś3pc; ātmanaḥ Jac, Ś3ac.

Explanation. The main idea of this gloss is to present the doctrine of soul in two points: soul exists not only in the 'state of plurality' (nānā),[983] but also 'in different states' (vyavasthā).[984] Souls are not all the same, but each of these has a fixed separate identity. It is the contention which Candrānanda raises against the opponent's view of the oneness of the soul (VSc 3.2.15), and he backs his doctrine on four important grounds. 1) The souls are different because the experience of pleasure and pain is specific (vyavasthā), and varies in each and every single individual; e.g. one can experience pleasure, but another may not. 2) The second reason is given on the basis of authority (sāmarthya) of scriptures (śāstra), which describe a variety of wishes expressed by different persons, e.g. 'some person wishes village', other wishes to 'sacrifice for heaven' (VSc 3.2.17). 3) The desire (kāma) for heaven is not necessarily one of the guṇas of the self, but it is here equivalent to icchā or perhaps prayatna, because Candrānanda offers a third reason for the multiplicity of souls, with listing the eight vaiśeṣikaguṇas (or nine if we count adṛṣṭa as compounded by dharma and adharma) which are different in each soul. 4) Finally, Candrānanda says that, besides vaiśeṣikaguṇas, which demonstrates the plurality of souls, the other five guṇas (saṅkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṃyoga, vibhāga) prove plurality of souls too, because it shows that there are souls that have specific qualities and those that have general qualities. Now, for the number of souls, one may agree to be 'many' (nānā) which does not exclude the possibility of an infinite number, in which case it may be said that ātman in Vaiśeṣika is numberless.[985] Here the gloss to VSc 3.2.17:

[983] Trans. Apte, dict. p. 887.
[984] Trans. Apte, dict. p. 1513; yet Kumar, 2013, p. 24 translates vyavasthā with 'law of individual retribution'.
[985] The view is attributed by Halbfass, 1992, p. 275, f. 25 to Śrīdhara's NK. The doctrine is seen as an 'implicit concession' which the Vaiśeṣikas made to Advaita Vedānta ontology. Halbfass also concludes that by the concept of 'ultimate particularity' (viśeṣa) the idea of number (enumeration) loses its meaning and applicability; in other words, the question of limit (number) becomes thus unlimited (infinite). The numeric identity becomes generic identity.

VS 3.2.17: śāstrasāmarthyāc[986] c'eti[987] / VSc: grāmakāmo yajeta, svarga[988]kāmo yajet[989] - ety ato'pi śāstrasāmarthyān, nānā ātmānaḥ[990] / tasya guṇāḥ[991] buddhisukhaduḥkh'ecchādveṣa[992]prayatnādṛṣṭasaṁskārā[993]vaiśeṣikāḥ[994] / anye tu saṃkhyāparimāṇāpṛthaktvāsaṃyogāvibhāgāḥ.

Gloss VS 3.2.17: [this doctrine of multiple soul] is also based on the authority of śāstras / VSc: one who desires village should perform a sacrifice; one who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice, because of the authority of the śāstras [and these injunctions show that] souls are many; the specific qualities [of self] are: cognition, pleasure, pain, volition, aversion, effort, adṛṣṭa [dharma and adharma], saṁskāra / but the other qualities are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction.

Explanation. It is not the scope of the current thesis to trace the development of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the self, and the changes which occurred throughout. Yet, there are in the doctrine of ātman some conundrums which if unsolved can contradict the very notion of saṃsāra, in which the chief question is who moves out from body at the time of death: soul or mind? (VSc 5.2.19). If it is soul, then is this soul 'one' in number, hence all-pervasive (in which case it cannot move), or is it many? If souls are many, how can it be all-pervasive at the same time (VSc 7.1.28-29)? Who is it which moves at the time of transmigration: the all-pervasive soul, or the individual souls? Scholars have

[986] sāmarthyāc: all; sāmarthyac J.
[987] c' eti: all; ca JS.
[988] svarga: Ś; sarva J.
[989] yajet': all; yajat Ś1.
[990] ātmānaḥ: Ś1, Ś2, Ś3pc; ātmanaḥ J, Ś3ac.
[991] guṇāḥ: J; guṇā Ś1, Ś3; guṇa Ś2.
[992] dveṣa: Ś; dveya J.
[993] saṁskārā: J; saṁskāra Ś.
[994] vaiśeṣikāḥ: all; vaiśiṣikāḥ Ś1ac.

explained those problems with several historical presuppositions that relate to the evolution of the Sūtrapāṭha throughout ages, and Vaiśeṣika commentaries seem to provide divergent interpretations on the sūtra 3.2.15 (sukhaduḥkhajñāna niṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmyaṁ),[995] which Candrānanda glosses as an opposing view. Praśastapāda acknowledges only the plurality of the souls, while he ignores discussion of the sūtra on 'unity of the soul'.[996] If we take the Sūtrapāṭha as separate from the commentary and assume that sūtras preserve only Vaiśeṣika tenets, then the 'oneness of the soul' (aikātmyaṁ) from sūtra 3.2.15 must rather refer to the 'unicity of each self experience', than to an ontological entity. The subject that runs through the whole of epistemological debate of VSc 3.2 is primarily the 'oneness of experience of self' in each single body, not the ontological nature of the 'self itself'; for this reason, Sūtrapāṭha uses nānā (indecl., 'diverse', 'different'), and vyavasthā (f. 'state', 'fix condition') in the production of sukha and duḥkha (in any single body, which is the subject of the previous sūtra). Hence, sūtras 3.2.15-17 must have been part of the the original Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the plurality of souls.

Miyamoto speaks of a stage when the system acknowledged both 'unity' (as per VS 3.2.15), and 'plurality' of the souls (VS 3.2.16), and I think his appraisal is accurate. To this view, I should only add that the passage, which may prove that, is VS 7.1.28-29 where soul's dimension (vibhu) resembles ākāśa's. Further comparisons with other dravyas, might prove that soul can exist in both atomic state (nitya) and composite (anitya). In other words, Sūtrapāṭha does accept implicitly the oneness of the soul,

[995] Miyamoto, 1996, pp. 16-18 has dealt satisfactory with these by providing quotes from other commentaries too, as well as a critical overview on scholarship. My argument agrees with Miyamoto: Early Vaiśeṣika acknowledged both unity and plurality of the soul.

[996] As shown by Miyamoto, 1996, p. 7. 'Unity of the soul' (one soul per each body) should be distinguished from Vedānta's 'oneness of the soul' (only one soul, and rejection of plurality of souls).

because soul, like other dravyas can subsist in different states (vyavasthā).[997] Hence we must not necessarily postulate a time when the system acknowledged only plurality of the self.[998]It is well possible that substances that are all-pervasive, such as soul, can have an 'infinite numerical identity' on the basis of the doctrine of antyaviśeṣa and vaiśeṣikaguṇas that 'individulise' the all-pervasive soul.[999] Another way to explain the 'oneness' of the soul (aikātmyaṁ) mentioned in VS 3.2.15, is in the light of Vādīndra's Vyākhyā (VSv 1.1.18) where as Isaacson pointed out, the commentator presents God as a 'kind of soul'.[1000] Indeed, Vādīndra identifies in Īśvara or Parameśvara (Śiva) 'another soul' (VSv 6.1.7),[1001] which view might be a development of Candrānanda's comparison of ākāśa with soul, which soul, likewise ākāśa is extremely large (vibhu) (VSc 7.1.28-29). Though VSc gloss does not refer to another kind of soul, say god, we need to assume that the nature of ātman is both 'plural' (VS 3.2.16), and 'one' in each body (VS 3.2.14). Souls are many and one at the same time; in the latter case is vibhu, while in the former it has a specific body experience. Further light comes from even later texts such as the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika digest of Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṁgraha (TS 17) which confirms the two kinds of soul, one called 'jīva', the other 'paramātman'.[1002] With 'paramahan' (Īśvara), referred to in TS, we might see a second kind of soul described by Vādīndra too. Overall, the doctrine of the number of the soul is more a matter of the states of the soul, rather than ontologically distinct. Ontologically, soul has in Vaiśeṣika's texts, both

[997] In connection with the doctrine of soul, Miyamoto, 1996, p. 8 talks about a linkage between early Vaiśeṣika and proto-Vedānta, and draws some paralles with bhedābheda ('being different yet the same').
[998] Scholars maintaining both unity and plurality of souls: Deussen, Strauss, Dasgupta, Ui; scholars maintaining only plurality of souls: Keith, Radhakrishnan, Frauwallner (see Miyamoto, 1996, p. 16-17).
[999] Halbfass' appraisal on viśeṣa category, 1992, p. 273.
[1000] Isaacson PhD, 1995, p. 85.
[1001] Isaacson PhD, 1995, p. 32. As Bronkhorst notices the omnipresent soul has a theistic connotation, 1996, pp. 281-94.
[1002] TS 17: jñānādhikaraṇam ātmā / sa dvividhaḥ paramātmā jīvātmā ca / tatreśvaraḥ sarvajñānaḥ paramātmaika eva / jīvātmā pratiśarīraṁ bhinno vibhur nityaś ca / Bodas, trans. 1974 ed. p. 134: 'The soul is the substratum of knowledge. He is two-fold, human, and supreme. Of these, the Supreme Soul is the all-powerful, omniscient God, devoid of pleasure and pain. The Human Soul is different in each body and is all pervading and eternal.'

a manifestation of 'oneness', and of 'plurality' at the same time which should not be seen as a contradiction in terms. The question that remains is whether in the liberation state, souls would merge into one single soul, as in Vedānta, or whether these will all dwell in a separate, plural state, alongside all another dravyas.

PARIMĀṆA (VSC 7.1.28). The question of the 'oneness of the soul' raised by VS 3.2.15,[1003] interpolates with the doctrine of the size, or 'dimension' of the soul (parimāṇa). If the soul is one in number, it then must be all-pervasive too (VSc 7.1.28-29). As in the case of number, the doctrine of soul-dimension has changed throughout the transmission of Sūtrapāṭha. Here, two schools of interpretation, Japanese and Austro-Germanic, seem to agree that there had been a time when the size of ātman was 'definite' or 'even small'. The Austro-German school represented chiefly by Frauwallner, Preisendanz, Wezler, and Watson,[1004] distinguish three stages in the evolution of this doctrine.[1005] 1) A stage when the soul has a 'thumb-sized' dimension (aṅgūṣṭhamatra puruṣa), resides in heart (Kath Up. 6.17), and directs the body as a charioteer.[1006] 2) A stage when the size of soul is body-sized, because the sensation feels in all parts of the body.[1007] 3) A stage when soul dimension is omnipresent, because of the acceptance of adṛṣṭa into Vaiśeṣika doctrine.[1008] According to these scholars, such doctrinal development is curious; while the self grows greater in dimension, the mind acquires a smaller dimension, and replaces

[1003] The 'oneness of the soul' is a notion to be distinguished from 'unicity of soul experience' in each single body (as per VS 3.2.15).
[1004] Adachi, 1994, p. 653, f. 1. (according to Wezler 1982, p. 654; Preisendanz 1989, p. 153; Frauwallner 1956: 61-62, 73, 95-105; Watson 2003, p. 12-14).
[1005] Austro-German school takes for granted Frauwallner's appraisal of Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Watson bases his views on Vaiśeṣika beginning with him, though with a word of caution, he is aware that Frauwallner does not substantiate fully his assertions on the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika. See Watson, 2003 (Vaiśeṣika section).
[1006] Watson, 2003, p. 12.
[1007] Preisendanz, 1989, p. 153-4
[1008] Watson, 2003, p. 14. Praśastapāda lists the seven additional guṇas incorporating within adṛṣṭa, dharma and adharma (PD 5, Bronkhorst. ed. pp. 1-2); Vṛtti follows the same list of guṇas where dharma and adharma are listed separately from adṛṣṭa (VSc 1.1.5)

and explains the migratory entity within saṃsāra. The role of the soul as the 'charioteer of body' in the Upaniṣads, gives room to the role played by manas in VSc 5.2.4, which under the influence of adṛṣṭa (possibly saṃskāra) leads the self to further embodiments.[1009] Miyamoto counters Frauwallner's exclusivist doctrine of plurality;[1010] indeed the latter's views are said to be highly speculative for two main reasons. First, Frauwallner does not provide sufficient evidence from the sources for such a development; second, he begins from the presupposition that Vaiśeṣika had no concern for metaphysics, nor a doctrine of paramātman (or Brahman), or of a soul as an all-pervasive substance.[1011] On the contrary, the sūtras 7.1.28-29, which resemble ākāśa dimension with soul, do prove just the opposite of what Frauwallner had thought, that soul was from the beginning seen as both plural (because of different sensual experiences VSc 3.2.15-16) and, ontologically all-pervasive, just like ākāśa (VS 7.1.28-29). Adachi though might agree that the 'infinite' dimension of ātman is an innovation, yet he maintains that the insertion of VS 7.1.28-29 in Sūtrapāṭha had been made at a very early stage (approx. 225-250 AD), because Aryadeva's Catuhśataka knows and refers to VS 7.1.28-29.[1012]

Apart from a dyacronic way of looking at the evolution of doctrine of the self, an intra-textual, synchronic and comparative method may be attempted, by namely looking at the dimension of ātman, in various textual contexts; yet, even at a later stage, say Candrānanda's times, one can spot many puzzles, because the commentator does not always mention which kind of ātman, embodied or disembodied, he refers to. It is rather

[1009] Nozawa, 1981, p. 460-462 (in Japanese, discussed by Adachi 1994, p. 659) says that the VSc 5.2.18-20, originally discussed soul as moving out of body, not mind as Candrānanda has it now in VSc 5.2.19.
[1010] Frauwallner's assumptions on the number of soul in Vaiśeṣika are labelled as 'a mistake', and criticised by Nozawa 1970, and Miyamoto, 1996, p. 18.
[1011] Honda 1994, in AS, pp. 708-9, takes a similar position and says that 'we do not see any trace of an all pervading highest soul in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.'
[1012] Adachi 1994, p. 656-58 talks also about the doctrine of the mobility of the soul had changed before the middle of the fifth century AD. The relevance of this doctrine to soteriology is because transmigration is implied only if self has a limited dimension; an all-pervasive substance cannot move.

the task of the reader to resolve the conundrum. When, for instance, Candrānanda compares soul with ākāśa in VSc 7.1.28-29, his gloss is too brief, and leaves the impression that self is vibhu, or 'very big' (paramahan),[1013] but here with all probability we should read ātman as referring to a disembodied soul, for it is not possible that an embodied ātman is vibhu. Another reason for such an interpretation is that in the whole of VSc 7.1, the topic of discussion is the 'permanent' (nitya) and 'impermanent' (anitya) character of guṇas (in relation to dravyas).[1014] As Gokhale says, the eternal (non-destructible, non-composite) character of a substance is interconnected with its dimension; if a dravya is infinite in size, or atomic, then it is indestructible and permanent (nitya), but if it is made of parts it is destructible.[1015] Given that in Vaiśeṣika dimension is an indicator to the eternal character of an entity, as Gokhale says, we need to assume that by vibhu Candrānanda refers in the context of VS 7.1.28-29 to the disembodied ātman, the pure soul, whose dimension is all-pervasive dravya, different from the embodied ātman which can be subject to an 'impermanent existence' (saṃsāra). The difference between disembodied soul and embodied soul becomes clear if we differentiate between the different states of a dravya, which can be atomic, or 'concrete' (mūrta). The same with ātman, which in VSc is discussed both as embodied and disembodied. Since number and dimension are general guṇas of the self, they can have as a result very flexible usages in VSc, as they refer not only to one dravya, but to many dravyas.

[1013] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1014] The āhnika discussed 'dimension' of various entities too (ranging from atomic to all-pervasive).VSc 7.1 mentions various forms of dimension as follows: 'greatness' (mahatva, 7.1.21-22), 'length' (dīrghatva) and 'shortness' (hrasvatā) (7.1.23), 'circular' (parimaṇḍalam, 7.1.26), 'all-pervasive' (vibhu, 7.1.28), and 'atomic' (aṇu, 7.1.30).
[1015] Personal communication, audio file. Pune, 21 February 2016.

PṚTHAKTVA (VSc 3.2.13). VSc 4.1.12 defines pṛthaktva as a guṇa which inheres only in substance, and which has form (rūpa), and is seen by the eye.[1016] As such, pṛthaktva can refer chiefly to the embodied self, the state in which soul acquires characteristic marks, physical and psychical. In several places (VSc 3.1.14; 3.2.13), Candrānanda uses 'pratyagātman'[1017] ('the individual soul') to designate the specificity of the 'embodied ātman' (or body), and its distinction from soul, which is logically inferred, because of the distinction between them. We find the compound with comparative connotation in Kath Up 2.1.1 too, where it has the purpose of singling out the ātman from another comparative term, and this is the sense in which Candrānanda uses it too. In VSc 3.1.14 for instance, pratyagātman refers to body, whose visible actions (either nivṛtti, or pravṛtti), lead us to infer an ultimate cause, soul, behind them, an entity possessed with 'effort' (prayatna) behind which actions either 'beneficial' (hita), or 'non-beneficial' (ahita), pravṛtti or nivṛtti are made (VS 3.1.14). Another usage of pratyagātman is made in VSc 3.2.13, but this time it refers to soul. Body is designated with paratra. The interchangeability of the term is dictated at the discretion of the author, depending on where the subject is. In this case, the subject-matter discussed is the epistemology of the notion of 'I', rejected by the opponent. As I showed in a previous section, Candrānanda in VSc 3.2.13 makes the semantic difference (pratyagātman īty ātmani paratreti śarīre),[1018] between the identity of different bodies (propounded by opponent in VSc 3.2.10-11) and the unique conscious of 'I', which demonstrates the existence of an entity other than the body, which is the soul. As sūtra 3.2.13 says, the 'word ahaṁ' is used in connection with soul.

[1016] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1017] Ātman m., as pratyagātman 'the individual soul' as per Kaṭh.2.1.1 (trans. Olivelle, p. 235: 'the good is one thing, the gratifying is quite another, their goal are different, both bind a man'). Grimes dict. p. 246: 'the self whose existence is understood only by turning one's vision inward, the indwelling spirit.
[1018] For VSc 3.2.13 see previous section.

The two different meanings which Candrānanda ascribes to pratyagātman, sometimes with regard to body, other times in relation to soul, show the volatile character of the term used in VSc, a fact which makes the gloss difficult. A similar case is the use of the term ātman which, in at least two instances designates the body or a part of the body, and not the soul as such. VSc 4.2.3 for instance, explains that the word ātman refers to the form it takes in relation to the five elements, which are in mutual contact.[1019] It refers to the contact of the very 'own essence' (svarūpa) of the five mahābhūtas. It may be here understood as a reflexive pronoun 'own' (sva) form, of the five mahābhūtas. Another case is VSc 5.1.6, where the meaning of ātman designates 'a part of body' (ātm'eti śarīraikadeśaḥ).[1020] These cases in which various meanings of pṛthaktva and ātman appear showed the elusive character of this guṇa and its problematic definition. It is certainly a guṇa of ātman, and as long as ātman is identified properly in context, the meaning of pṛthaktva becomes clear too. Another possible gloss of it would be 'separateness', 'distinctiveness', and in Vaiśeṣika categorisation, distinctness, separateness, mostly related to the embodied ātman; it is due to the varieties of experience (e.g. sukha, duḥkha) which any single individual soul undergoes (see Kaṇāda and Candrānanda use of nānā and vyavasthā). In short, pṛthaktva, perhaps an offshoot of the viśeṣa category,[1021] characterises the soul: the 'differentness' of souls derives from the 'differentiation' of different guṇas: 1) such as the experience of sukha and duḥkha which is different in different persons; 2) or from guṇas, be they vaiśeṣikaguṇas, or other guṇas as per gloss VSc 3.2.17.[1022]

[1019] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1020] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1021] Narain, 1976, p. 215.
[1022] See Synopsis of VSc.

SAṂYOGA & VIBHĀGA (VSC 5.2.17). Within the soteriological context conjunction (saṃyoga) emerges in sūtra 5.2.20, where among other things, it is said that mokṣa is produced only in the 'absence of saṃyoga'. As a guṇa of ātman, saṃyoga's workings must be, like all other vaiśeṣikaguṇas, extinguished.[1023] The definition of mokṣa which VS 5.2.20 supplies (tadabhāve saṃyogā'bhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ) is referred again in VSc 6.2.19,[1024] and in both cases, mokṣa involves a cessation of contact and action. Though it is a guṇa of all-pervasive substances like time (VSc 2.2.6) and space (VSc 2.2.12),[1025] saṃyoga seems to be associated with processes of birth, emergence or manifestation; and here we must see the theory of karma at work (VSc 6.2.19). As such, saṃyoga cannot be intrinsically related to the disembodied soul, which is vibhu, hence devoid of action, but only related to the embodied soul. Among the many places where saṃyoga occurs in VSc, we shall look only at those where it associates itself with 'disjunction' (vibhāga). In sūtra 1.1.5, both saṃyoga and vibhāga are mentioned in a dual form, in the list of seventeen guṇa and continues to appear as such in many other sūtras and in Candrānanda's commentary as well.[1026] When Sūtrapāṭha defines what guṇas are, he says that the marks of the guans are that: 1) reside in dravyas; 2) do not posses (another) guṇa; and 3) they do not cause (further) saṃyoga and vibhāga.[1027] The third characteristic is again in VS 7.2.12, which states that conjunction and disjunction do not have conjunction and disjunction,[1028] or in VS 7.2.14 which says that if there is absence

[1023] As in the case of pṛthaktva, one may well ask the question as to why Kaṇāda did not insert saṁyoga (and vibhāga) in the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas.
[1024] See exegesis of VSc 6.2.19 and VSc 5.2.20 in section 4.4. Doctrine of Action.
[1025] Vibhāga is a guṇa of ākāśa (VSc 2.1.5) of time (VSc 2.2.6) and of diś (VSc 2.2.12). Grimes, dict, p. 116-17, says that 'diś' (or 'dik', 'special direction') is an all-pervasive dravya, and composed of atoms. See Apte dict. p. 814.
[1026] In addition and different from Arena's index (VSi), here I provide a list of places where the terms emerge together, and refer to the guṇas from the list of seventeen (or twenty-four): in sūtras 1.1.5, 15, 16, 19, 23, 28; 2.2.36; 4.1.12, 5.2.12; 6.2.18; 7.2.12, 14. Within Candrānanda commentary 'saṁyogavibhāgau' are mentioned in: VSc 1.1.12,13, 15, 19; 2.1.1, 2, 3, 4, 5; 2.2.6, 12; 3.2.1, 17; 5.1.16, 17; 6.2.18; 7.2.13, 14.
[1027] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1028] See Synopsis of VSc.

of saṃyoga and vibhāga, there will be absence of cause and effect due to absence of yutasiddhi ('un-connectedness').[1029] The absence of cause or the separation between cause and effect lays at the heart of mokṣa, which is a state of radical elimination of any further formation of the body, as VSc 5.2.20 makes clear. The cause is adṛṣṭa, and with its elimination, there will be instant elimination of saṃyoga and vibhāga. In the context of VSc 5.2.20, saṃyoga refers to the absence of connection between mind and soul (ātmamanaḥsaṃyogasyā'bhāvo) as caused by adṛṣṭa, in which case they refer to the karmic influences of the mind, the 'mental residue' (saṃskāra), rather than the positive role of yoga, which on the contrary, implies a contact between mind and soul for the elimination of sukha and duḥkha (VSc 5.2.17).

Like dharma and adharma (commonly known as adṛṣṭa), saṃyoga and vibhāga also are two guṇas which, in VSc, seem to relate to both cosmic and psychological processes. The discussion about 'thunder' (stanayitnu) in 5.2.12 for instance, explains the role that saṃyoga and vibhāga play. The sound of thunder (śabda) is produced when there a conjunction of mutual striking (parasparā'bhighātā'khyāt saṃyogāc chabdaḥ) of waters in the form of waves set in motion by winds, but it is also produced because of the separation of waters agitated by winds (ekenā'pi prakupitena vāyunā vyavacchidyamānānām apāṁ vibhāgāc chabdaḥ).[1030] The context for the workings of saṃyoga and vibhāga is that of the cosmic impact which adṛṣṭa has. Moreover, in āhnika VSc 6.2, there is yet another context in which saṃyoga and vibhāga work, an ethical one, where again adṛṣṭa seems to cause the emergence of saṃyoga between dharma and adharma, with another body as described in VSc 6.2.18.[1031] The reason why saṃyoga

[1029] Thakur 2003, p. 101 translates this sūtra with 'inasmuch as there is non-existence of un-connectedness (yutasiddhi) conjunction and disjunction in an effect and its cause do not exist.
[1030] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1031] A more expanded discussion on dharma in section 4.3 and 4.5, where I deal with the karmic 'storage' (sañcita) as per VSc 6.2.17-18.

and vibhāga emerge is because of the karmic law; they are triggered by the previous existence of dharma and adharma (adṛṣṭa), caused in turn because of previous icchā, dveṣa, desire of heaven, or desire for performing iṣṭa rituals, and because of other sins like being full (ghana) of intoxication (mada). All these actions seem to stock a 'collection' (sañcita) of dharma and adharma, which subsequently determines a new transmigration. It is clear from VSc 6.2.18 that the two guṇas, therein discussed, explain the 'theory of transmigration' (saṁsāra) in Vaiśeṣika system. They do relate soul with manas, in the yogic process, but also relates soul with the storage of dharmas; they are real entities, which form part of the theory of causality, and law of karma. There are intermediate entities, which draw the link between the soul and matter, and explain the way in which the formation and manifestation of body takes place; it is also the reason for which neither Kaṇāda nor Candrānanda insert them in the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas.

THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF ĀTMAN (LIṄGA) (VSC 3.2.4)

In this section on the knowledge of ātman, a fundamental doctrine in Vaiśeṣika soteriology (VSc 10.21), we have so far dealt with the epistemological arguments posed by the opponents, and Candrānanda's response, as well as dealt with the general guṇas of the ātman. To conclude the doctrine of ātman, we shall describe here the marks of the soul, from which the existence of the ātman can be proved; they are twelve different such liṅgas, listed and explained by Candrānanda in the gloss 3.2.14, and can be classified in two groups: physiological and psychological. Though VSc proves soul mainly through inference and its implicit probans,[1032] some of the marks of the soul seem to be, in a

[1032] The programme of the third adhyāya is to list the inferential proofs for the existence of ātman. Its first āhnika begins with discussion of the difference between soul and sense objects, but two objections are raised (VS 3.1.3, and 3.1.7); the response to these is the list of inferential probans given in VSc 3.1.8 which will be discussed in the epistemological section of this dissertation.

sense, perceptible, in that they can be visible to the naked eye. These are as follows: 1) 'exhalation' (prāṇa); 2) 'inhalation' (apāna); 3) 'closing of the eyelid' (nimeṣa); 4) 'opening of the eyelid' (unmeṣa); 5) 'living' (jīvana); 6) 'motion of mind' (manogati); 7) 'growth of body' or, 'different changes in [its] sense organs' (indriyāntaravikāra); 8) 'pleasure' (sukha); 9) 'pain' (duḥkha); 10) 'desire' (icchā); 11) 'aversion' (dveṣa); and 12) 'effort' (prayatna). The importance of such marks in the soteriology of the system should be sought more generally in the gnostic framework of Vaiśeṣika where a differentiation between ultimate reals and the many modifications of matter which obscure knowledge, between self and non-self, or the overcoming of suffering stated in VSc 1.1.1 is fundamentally important. On another level, it may well be the case that before any 'soteriological practice' is undertaken, such as yoga, the novice (kasyacid brāhmaṇa) should know how to control some of them (prāṇa, apāna) through vāyunigraha (VSc 5.2.17), or must know how to extinguish them (jīvana, manaḥ saṃyoga, VSc 5.2.20; sukha, duḥkha VSc 5.2.16). Prāṇa, apāna, nimeṣa, unmeṣa, and manogati, of which Candrānanda says they are effects of volition (prayatna), are all concepts fully explained in yoga practice. Among the psychological liṅgas, we may list, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, manogati. In the list of physical liṅgas, there are prāṇa, apāna, nimeṣa, unmeṣa, and indriyāntaravikāra.

One particular liṅga which causes some problems in translation is jīvana, which in the list, may be situated somewhere at the interface of the two categories, physical and psychological. It is commonly translated as 'life', 'existence', 'mode of life',[1033] most probably biological, because Candrānanda explains it in VSc 5.1.11, next to the movement of the foetus which is due to a conjunction between a part of body and soul (ātmaśarīr'aikadeśasaṃyoga), and dependent on effort, which in turn is preceded by

[1033] MSS: Jīvanam adṛṣṭa J; jīvenamadṛṣṭa Ś1; jīvenas adṛṣṭa Ś2, Ś3.

jīvana.[1034] This part of the body (śarīraikadeśa) may be buddhi, 'consciousness', which as a vaiśeṣikaguṇa of the soul cannot pervade the whole of its substratum, which is the soul.[1035] As Adachi shows, guṇas such as saṃyoga, vibhāga, śabda as well as other guṇas do not pervade their substratum (dravya), because they are simply 'adventitious'.[1036] It is not totally clear what jīvana is, but from the places where it occurs (VSc 5.1.11, 12, 15, 20) it seems that it involves a particular conjunction. VSc 5.2.20 says that a conjunction between ātman and manas means or is called jīvana (jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥsaṃyoga); in the absence of jīvana and adṛṣṭa, mokṣa is attained.[1037] Jīvana is birth, most probably the birth of a new body at the time of 'awakening' (prabodhakāla). In VSc 5.2.11, it seems that jīvana precedes prayatna, and contacts of various kinds such as ātman and manas (VSc 5.2.15) or contact between body and soul (VSc 5.1.11), or ātman and hand (VSc 5.1.12), but it also precedes specific qualities of the soul such as between icchā and dveṣa (VSc 5.2.15) or prayatna (VSc 5.2.12, 15). In other words, jīvana that is to say biological life, is explained through various contacts that take place at the physical and psychological level, it triggers the formation of body, and further saṁsāric life. Mokṣa as VSc 5.2.20 puts it is the absolute disappearance of body, and other contacts (like that between ātman with manas), as well as the disappearance of adṛṣṭa which seems to cause the formation of foetus (VSc 5.2.19). The rationale behind an exhaustive knowledge of the essence and manifestation of ātman is that, in this way the difference between the physical and psychological marks of the self is sharply drawn in order to single out the real soul from its physical and psychological components. Similarily, this exclusive and

[1034] This action is conjoined with effort too, see VSc 5.1.12.

[1035] Adachi, 1994, p. 656 confirmed by PD of Nyāyakandalī (102) and PD of Kiraṇāvalī (112) as well as Candramati DP 54 (Ui 1917, p. 111). The way in which Adachi reads VSc 5.2.19 is that, originally Vaiśeṣika maintains a definite size of the soul, in which case it was movable; when the body moves, the portion of the soul with which the body is connected also moves'.

[1036] Adachi, 1994, p. 658.

[1037] See Synopsis of VSc.

clinical approach is employed with the knowledge of all dravyas too, that must be known in order to be separated from their doṣas (VSc 1.1.6). In this section I argue that the doctrine of ātman presupposes the same: disappearance not only of the vaiśeṣikaguṇas of ātman, but also of the physical and psychical marks of the embodied ātman. The doctrine of the soul throughout the fifth adhyāya carries the same scope: the identification of the self, its separation (purification), and its salvation from the birth of a new saṁsāric body (VSc 5.2.19).

SELF AND SALVATION IN VAIŚEṢIKA TRADITIONS

The doctrine of soul, discussed so far, is a doctrine of salvation. As a result, every effort should be made to reconstruct it as fully as possible. Apart from the textual critical approach applied in the third chapter ('Introduction to Candrānanda's Vṛtti'), in which the importance of Candrānanda's Vṛtti and the necessity for a critical edition have been highlighted, in this section I propose to shed further light on the doctrine of soul and salvation, but from parallel passages, of three different Vaiśeṣika commentarial traditions.[1038]

DOCTRINE OF THE SELF. There seems to be agreement between Candrānanda and Praśastapāda on the main arguments in the defence of the soul doctrine. In PD, we find expounded at least four main arguments, which are equivalent to those discussed by VSc 3.1, and VSc 3.2, respectively.[1039] For instance, PD proves the soul from actions such as breathing, and so on, and from the utterance of 'I', and also few more fine nuances to his doctrine. Soul, Praśastapāda argues, because it is subtle and imperceptible, can be

[1038] See first chapter of this thesis.
[1039] Sjödin, 2016, pp. 84–110.

known through inference from the perception of śabda.[1040] The argument is instrumental in that it presupposes a doer behind action or entities such as śabda. In the cognition of śabda, we must infer a cogniser, which is the soul.[1041] The whole section on the doctrine of ātman (ātmaprakaraṇam) develops the same type of argument, in which soul is step by step identified as the 'agent doer' (kartṛ).[1042] After a series of negative arguments (that ātman cannot be identified with body, sense organs and manas), Praśastapāda brings forward several similes which soul resembles: 'charioteer' (rathakāra),[1043] 'blower of wind-pipe' (bhastrādhmāpayiteva),[1044] 'puller of a pulley' (dāruyantraprayokteva), 'master of a house' (gṛhapati),[1045] a 'boy throwing a ball' (pelakapreraka)[1046] or with a 'person looking into two windows' (ubhayadarśī kaścid eko).[1047] In other words, the soul represents in each case the agent behind each one of the actions mentioned: the 'blowing of wind in the pipe' (vāyau bhastrādhmāpayiteva), 'winking up and down' (nimeṣonmeṣakarmaṇā), the 'healing of the broken wounds' (vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇa), and the 'throwing of the balls', (pelakapreraka), respectively. In glossing over Praśastapāda's arguments on the self, Vyomaśiva (Vyo) talks about the existence of the souls in trees. VSc 5.2.8 mentions that the going up of

---

1040 Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 152. (PD 76: tasya saukṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupalabdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samādhigamaḥ kriyate).

1041 Both VSc and PD insert śabda in the list of the twenty-four guṇas.

1042 PD 17: vāsyādīnām karaṇānām kartṛprayojyatvadarśanāt śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate.

1043 Potter Encyc. Vol 2, 1977. p. 286; on 'charioteer' PD 78, p. 15; trans. Jhā 1916, p. 153: PD [78] śarīrasamavāyinībhyām ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyām pravṛttinivṛttibhyām rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātā'numīyate, prāṇādibhiś ceti.

1044 PD 78: śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva.

1045 Potter Encyc. Vol 2, 1977. p. 286 (see sphōṭana and dagdasya in VSc 5.1.12), Potter Encyc. Vol 2, 1977. p. 286 translates with 'doctor' but Jhā 1916, p. 153 'the master of a house repairing it' (dehasya vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇādinimittatvāt gṛhapatir iva).

1046 Here Jhā translates rather prudishly PD 78, which actually refers to the sexual stimulation of testicles.

1047 PD 78: śarīrasamavāyinībhyām ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyām pravṛttinivṛttibhyām rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātā'numīyate prāṇādibhiś ceti / katham / śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva / nimeṣonmeṣakarmaṇā niyatena dāruyantraprayokteva / dehasya vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇādinimittatvād gṛhapatir iva / abhimataviṣayagrāhakakaraṇasambandhanimittena manahkarmaṇā gṛhakoṇeṣu pelakapreraka iva dārakaḥ / nayanaviṣayālocanānantaram rasānusmṛtikrameṇa rasanavikriyādarśanād anekagavākṣāntargataprekṣakavad ubhayadarśī kaścid eko vijñāyate.

the water in trees (vṛkṣopari) is an effect of the impact of adṛṣṭa; but is silent about a probable similarity between trees and ātman, as Vyomaśiva does.[1048]

DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. Praśastapāda describes the doctrine of saṃsāra in PD 318,[1049] and the doctrine of soteriology in PD 319. By comparison with Candrānanda whose emphasis was laid mainly on doṣa, knowledge and yoga practice, Praśastapāda's doctrine of liberation propounds some very curious prerequisites, such as for the postulant to be first born into 'a pure family' (viśuddhe kule jātasya). Another is the emphasis on the removal of dharma and adharma, as well as affections such as raga, dveṣa, and so on;[1050] it is interesting to notice that Praśastapāda discusses mokṣa within the section of guṇas, just before the chapter on karma, while both Candrānanda and Candramati in the section on karma. Obviously, mokṣa relates to the karmic law (VSc 5.2). Candramati for instance, while explaining the 'first action in body' mentions the 'non-material cause' of the body, which is a 'connection with soul and internal effort (prayatna) preceded by desire (icchā), and impression (saṃskāra)' (DP 211-212).[1051] Those are vaiśeṣikaguṇas and explain the functionality of body in relation to soul.

[1048] About the souls having desires, Potter draws a parallel with Vṛkṣāyurveda, Potter, Encyc. Vol. 2, 1977, p. 437. In the context of avidyā (VSc 9.25), Candrānanda discusses how the categories of Ayurveda, such as vāta (wind, etc) affect the senses, or cause through saṃskāra, 'false knowledge' (avidyā). This is explained as a result of doṣa, which as 1.1.6 states is an important aspect to be taken into consideration and erased in the soteriological process.

[1049] PD 318: aviduṣo rāgadveṣavataḥ pravartakād dharmāt prakṛṣṭāt svalpādharmasahitāt brahmendraprajāpatipitṛmanuṣyalokeṣv āśayānurūpair iṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayasukhādibhir yogo bhavati / tathā prakṛṣṭād adharmāt svalpadharmasahitāt pretatiryagyonisthāneṣv aniṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayaduhkhābhir yogo bhavati / evam pravṛttilakṣaṇād dharmād adharmasahitād devamanuṣyatiryaṅnārakeṣu punaḥ punaḥ saṃsārabandho bhavati. Trans. Jhā p. 1916, p. 599.

[1050] PD 319: jñānapūrvakāt tu kṛtād asaṃkalpitaphalād viśuddhe kule jātasya duhkhavigamopāyajijñāsor ācāryam upasaṅgamyotpannaṣaṭpadārthatattvajñānasyājñānanivṛttau viraktasya rāgadveṣādyabhāvāt tajjayor dharmādharmayor anutpattau pūrvasaṅcitayoś copabhogān nirodhe santoṣasukham śarīrapariccheḍam cotpadya rāgādinivṛttau nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ paramārthadarśanajam sukham kṛtvā nivartate / tadā nirodhāt nirbījasyāt manaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ / punaḥ śarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavadupaśamo mokṣa iti. Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 601. Compare also with VSc 6.2.18 (where sañcita of dharma and adharma explain the law of karma).

[1051] DP 211: tatra śarīra karaṇām ādyasyecchā pūrvakāv ātma saṁyoga prayatnāv asamavāyi kāraṇam / 212: dvitīyādīnāṃ ca saṃskāro' samavāyi kāraṇam.

But Praśastapāda explains liberation in another way as well; the expression 'soul becomes seedless' (nirbījasyātmana), by which it means the incapacity to produce other body; mokṣa is a process to extinguishing the fire and the burning of the fuel of jīvana, or any possibility for new biological life, which constitutes 'the repeated equipment with bodies and organs': punaḥ śarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavadupaśamo mokṣa iti. Vyomaśiva explains in much the same way as Candrānanda the 'final release (mokṣa) as a prosperous state when the nine qualities of the self annihilate'.[1052] As for this 'equipment' both Candrānanda and Vyomaśiva provide the following list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas: buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, adṛṣṭa (or dharma and adharma) and saṃskāra. We end by raising a question as to why the Vaiśeṣikas did not include in their list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, 'form' (rūpa), 'taste' (rasa), 'odour' (gandha), 'touch' (sparśa) and 'weight' (gurutva), given that the soteriological doctrine includes the dissolution of body (VSc 5.2.20 and PD 319). The dissolution of the body presented in all Vaiśeṣika soteriological accounts, brings us to the conclusion that Vaiśeṣika did have a gnostic-dualistic understanding of both anthropology and liberation; there was no scope for jīvanmukti in early Vaiśeṣika. Absolute liberation, is only after the demise of the body together with all its qualities and psychological 'predispositions' (saṃskāra).

5.2. 'GNOSTIC' METHODS OF LIBERATION

There is a whole range of terms regarding the 'gnostic path' of Vaiśeṣika's liberation (niḥśreyasa);[1053] some of which have a functional-methodological character within Vaiśeṣika's soteriology: parijñāna, sādharmya, vaidharmya, samyagjñāna (VSc 2.2.23),

[1052] Varadachari in Potter Encyc. 1977, p. 427.
[1053] Elsewhere in this paper, I talked about the 'path of nivṛtti', negative path of liberation. Here I call it also 'gnostic path' (as opposed to the ethical, ritualistic path of abhyudaya).

pratipadyeta;[1054] others refer to the objects of knowledge: tattva,[1055] sattā;[1056] while others refer to the cognitive-epistemological faculties of mind: buddhipūrva, asmadbuddhi, jñāna, upalabdhi, sannikarṣa, pratyakṣa, and manas. Though 'knowledge' in Vaiśeṣika is a specific quality of the self (buddhi), it is sometimes used interchangeably with jñāna (VSc 9.26-27), but in gloss VSc 1.1.1, Candrānanda seems to identify it with dharma. Dharma is here the whole and the key 'doctrine', a soteriological knowledge structured in a system (Vaiśeṣika philosophy), which claims to be able to remove the likes (pria) and dislikes (apryia) of a 'santaṁ', while still living in body. The introductory discussion between a Brahmin and Kaṇabhakṣa described therein (VSc 1.1.1),[1057] presents several important programmatic features regarding the Vaiśeṣika system and its soteriological aims: 1) the 'remedy' (upāya); 2) 'marks' (lakṣaṇa); 3) 'instrument' (sādhana); and 4) the 'purpose' (prayojana) to whom (the knowledge of dharma) is 'beneficial' (prati + upakāra). The Brahmin pupil asks about the 'soteriological method' in relation to a line from Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8.12.1), which indicates the lack of pain and pleasure in a/the disembodied state of an ascetic (santa).[1058] The answer Kaṇabhakṣa gives the pupil is that such a state is achievable by means of dharma (tato munirabhyuvāca 'dharma' iti). The next sūtra reaffirms that, by pointing to the relevance which dharma has for soteriology: yato'bhyudaya niḥśreyasa siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ (VS 1.1.2). Before launching an inquiry into what specifically dharma means for Candrānanda, and more generally Vaiśeṣika's soteriology, we need to indicate that such knowledge (dharma) is imparted

[1054] On 'pratipadyeta': VSc 7.2.22; VSc 9.21.
[1055] For tattva, see also VS 2.1.28; 2.2.8; 2.2.14; VSc 4.1.14; VS 7.2.31.
[1056] Sattā (or 'sat') see: VS 1.1.7; VSc 1.2.4 (sattā is bhāva); VS 1.2.6-12; VSc 1.2.18; VS 2.2.30; 8.5-6, 14; VS 9.2, 3-4, 6.
[1057] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1058] Jambūvijayaji gives only partially the respective quote; here in full: 'tathā cetanasyaivāvidyānimittayoḥ śarīratve sati priyāpriyayorapahatirnāstītyuktvā tasyaivāśarīrasya sato vidyāyāṃ satyāṃ saśarīratve prāptayoḥ pratiṣedho yukto 'śarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśata iti 'Ch. Up. 8.12.1 (Gretil transliteration).

only to a pupil endowed with certain 'ethical qualities' (śiṣyagatasampadaṁ) out of which only three are specified: 1) 'detachment' (vairāgya); 2) 'questioning ability' (prajñākathā); 3) 'intelligence' (paripāka), and unspecified others (+ '-ādi').[1059] In another place, Praśastapāda states that only after being born into a 'noble family' (presumably Brahmin), one can possess the proper 'longing to find out the means for the absolute removal of pain'.[1060] At any rate, the means for removal of pain, and the method of liberation stated in VS 1.1.2, is not a ritualistic or charitable enterprise, but rather a gnostic path (nivṛtti path), whose 'remedy' is dharma. As VSc 1.1.6 explains, 'dharma hetu' is the 'discernement' (parijñāna) of the six categories and the separation from their doṣa. In short, the method of liberation in Vaiśeṣika is 'intellectual and ontological purification of the self', and as such, is a prevailing dualistic separation of knowledge in two broad sections, vidyā and avidyā,[1061] which correspond to 'pure' and 'impure' forms, respectively. In VSc 2.2.23, for instance, Candrānanda defines vidyā as 'exact knowledge' (samyagjñāna), while avidyā as 'false knowledge' (mithyājñāna),[1062] while in the ninth adhyāya there is another similar dualistic epistemology, which separates knowledge in two: 'valid, or pure knowledge' (aduṣṭa jñānaṁ) (VSc 9.27), on the one hand, and 'invalid knowledge' (duṣṭa vidyā) (VSc 9.26), on the other. The gloss states that aduṣṭa knowledge is called also vidyā, and comprises of two main forms: pratyakṣa and anumāna, within which, various other forms are comprised:

VS 9.27: aduṣṭaṁ vidyā / VSc: yad aduṣṭaṁ pratyakṣā[1063]numānākhyaṁ tad vidyety ucyate.

[1059] VSc 1.1.1 speaks also about Brahmins whose sins are removed by the repeated practice of Veda (vedābhyāsavaśena)
[1060] Trans. Jhā, 1916, p. 601. See PD 319.
[1061] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1062] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1063] pratyakṣā: em Ed 1982 (unmarked); pratyakhyā J (reflects a modern pronunciation of kṣ).

Gloss VS 9.27: the flawless is right knowledge / VSc: whatever is not defective, called [either] inference [or] perception that is said to be vidyā.

Vidyā. Candrānanda underlines in VSc 1.1.6, not merely discrimination, but more importantly a 'true' (satya) knowledge of the six categories, hence what matters the most for liberation in this epistemological section is the presentation of the pramāṇas (and their offshoots) that produce valid, or true forms of knowledge (vidyā). Moreover, the forms of knowledge that lead to invalid knowledge (thus being an obstruction against soteriology), should therefore be equally known, but only so as to be avoided. As VSc 9.27 states, 'valid knowledge' (vidyā) is two-fold, 'perception' (pratyakṣa) and 'inference' (anumāna). Among the two, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa seems to have a certain pre-eminence, in that it can subsume both 'natural knowledge' (sannikarṣa), as well as well as 'yogic knowledge' (yogipratyakṣa), and 'extraordinary knowledge' (ārṣajñāna). Inferential cognition according to Candrānanda, on the other hand, can be of several types: 1) śabda pramāṇa (VSc 9.19); 2) upamāna (VSc 9. 21); 3) smṛti (VSc 9.22), and 4) laiṅgika (VSc 9.18; VSc 10.19). We shall discuss them in the appropriate sections.

Avidyā. On the other hand, Candrānanda distinguishes also a false form of knowledge (VSc 4.1.5; VSc 9.26),[1064] and its systematisation is equally important for the soteriological quest because it explains the doṣa in the senses and objects, which obstructs the realisation of exact knowledge necessary for mokṣa. As VSc 1.1.6 clarifies, knowledge implies detachment from the doṣa in the objects.

[1064] As per gloss VSc 9.26: 'impure' (duṣṭa) or 'invalid knowledge' has four 'apramāṇa': 1) 'doubt' (saṁśaya); 2) 'error' (viparyaya); 3) 'irresolute cognition'/'non-recognition' (anadhyavasāya); and 4) 'dream' (svapna). (VS 9.26. tad duṣṭa jñānaṁ / VSc yad etat saṁśaya viparyayā'nadhyavasāya svapna lakṣaṇaṁ tad duṣṭam 'apramāṇam' iti.

VS 9.26: tad[1065] duṣṭa[1066]jñānaṁ / VSc: yad etat saṁśaya viparyayā'nadhyavasāya svapnalakṣaṇaṁ tad[1067] duṣṭam[1068] apramāṇam iti.

Gloss: VS 9.26: that is false knowledge / VSc: whatever knowledge is characteristised by 'doubt', 'reversed knowledge', 'non-recognition', [and] 'dream', [that] is false, which means not a true means of knowledge.

Saṁśaya. A fair description of 'doubt' appears within VS 2.2.19 up to 2.2.23,[1069] which contains mostly an objection related to the substance diś; sūtra 2.2.19 defines doubt as 'no perception of specific characteristic, perception of generality, and because of the remembrance of a specific detail'. Candrānanda explains that in the case of a general stare at a 'man' (puruṣa) and a 'pillar' (sthanu), if there is no discerning of its specificities such as 'hand' (pāṇi) and 'cavity' (koṭara), then the knowlegde produced is only a reconstruction of such a gaze, from memory of a fragment or specific detail; the knowlegde produced as a result is a 'doubt-knowledge' because it comes in the forms of questions, such as: 'what could that be, a pillar, or a man?'. Doubt according to Candrānanda is two-fold: 1) external (which is either imperceptible as per VSc 2.2.20; or, perceptible as per VSc 2.2.21); and 2) internal doubt described in VSc 2.2.23 (which arises from vidyā and avidyā).[1070] Viparyaya which may be rendered as 'twisted', 'inverted', 'perverted knowledge', is a term most commonly encountered in doctrinal

[1065] tad: J; ta JS (loss of gemination)
[1066] duṣṭa: JS; ṣṭaṁ J; duṣṭaṁ em. Ed (unmarked)
[1067] tad: em. Ed (unmarked); ta J (loss of gemination)
[1068] duṣṭam: em. Ed (unmarked); duṣṭaṁm J.
[1069] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1070] VSc 2.2.23 describes three conditions in which this vidyā and avidyā knowledge are: 1) situation when a fortune-teller's prediction of an auspicious event comes true; 2) situation in which this very prediction does not come true; and 3) a third situation when there is a doubt about whether there is true or not in the first and second situation enumerated. Trans. Nozawa, 1993, p. 109.

debates, and in Vaiśeṣika is another form of avidyā, or impure knowledge. It may refer to an inferential but 'invalid type of argument' (anapadeśa) (VS 3.1.10-11), or to an inferential 'contradictory proban', one of the four 'virodha-probans' described in VSc 3.1.8. After presenting a list of valid inferential probans, Candrānanda discusses within VSc 3.1.10 to 12, a number of logical pseudo-reasons: 'invalid argument' (anapadeśa) (VSc 3.1.10), based on a 'doubtful' (sandigdha) and 'non-existing' (asat) cause (VSc 3.1.11). Furthermore, in VSc 3.1.12, we have demonstrated an instance which explains an 'uncertain reasoning' called anaikāntika. The clue is the simile of horns and cows, where the term is used twice in order to explain that horness is not necessarily the sign of the cow, because horns can be encountered in other species than cow.[1071] Candrānanda explains that a 'doubtful' and 'uncertain reasoning' arise because of drawing, - from a certain mark (horn) - a false generalisation in order to define a particular object or being (cow, horse or rabbit). From the context, we understand that this happens because of a 'concomitant rule' (vyāpti) which goes against a logical horn-horse association (aśvaviparyaya). If we compare the VSc 9.26 where a contradiction (viparyaya) is a form of impure knowledge with the use of the same term in VSc 3.1.12, we come to the conclusion that, like doubt, viparyaya is a form of knowledge that uses opposition, inversion, and ambivalence, that would generate various erroneous logical conclusions. Between 3.1.1 and 3.1.12 Candrānanda lists a series of pseudo-probans, in which viparyaya should be seen as a false type of knowledge because it uses a far-fetched kind of inference, which is not grounded solidly on the relationship between cause and effect. As VSc 3.1.9 states, a proban is valid only after a cause has been previously established (prasiddha pūrvakatvād apadeśasya). Thakur says that an unrelated reason cannot be a valid mark;[1072] in this context, viparyaya is in a way an unreasonable reason.

[1071] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1072] Thakur, 2003, p. 59.

Anadhyavasāya is another form of invalid knowledge mentioned in VSc 9.26. We have it briefly explained in VSc 9.25, where it is defined as 'the non-recognition of a person who cannot distinguish between a 'southerner' (dākṣiṇā) and a 'camel' (uṣṭra), when he sees them (anadhyavasāyo yathā dākṣiṇātyasy' oṣṭradarśane). The non-recognition here is explained in Ayurvedic terms, and in relation to a doṣa in the senses, 'influences, or predispositions' (saṃskāra), in relation with the contact between the mind soul from a previous perceptual experience, and in relation to a specific dharma, which affect (upahata) the three doṣas in the body (vāta, kapha, and pitta).[1073] In other words, knowledge has a medical and somatic implication in Vaiśeṣika, in that it affects at the very subtle level the very structure of composition of the body and its proper functionality; whence knowledge of dravyas is paramount. Finally, the last form of invalid knowledge for soteriology is svapna, mentioned in VSc 9.23-24. Both Sūtrapāṭha and VSc distinguish two forms of dream: one called svapna, produced when the senses are 'stopped' (upareta), and the mind is 'calm' (pralīna), but there is also a 'consciousness in dreaming' (svapnajñānaṁ svapnāntikam)[1074]which as Candrānanda glosses, is produced from a specific saṃyoga between manas and ātman, and depended on earlier experience with the assistance of bhāvanā.[1075] As VSc 9.24 explains, this consciousness in dream can be of two kinds: auspicious and inauspicious, according to the dharma and adharma. The role of the law of karma is obvious here, and svapna cannot constitute therefore a valid form of knowledge, since it stays under the influence of vaiśeṣikaguṇas such as bhāvanā (an offshoot of saṃskāra), dharma, and adharma. Following the pupil's questions on method addressed in VSc 1.1.1, to obtain dharma, in this section, I propose

[1073] Candrānanda mentions only 'wind' (vāta), but the particle '-ādi' must infer that he refers to all three. VSc 9.25.
[1074] Trans. Thakur 2003, p. 114.
[1075] See section on saṃskāra; also Synopsis of VSc.

to look over some aspects of Vaiśeṣika epistemology, on the theory, method, means, and objects of knowledge in Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

DISCRIMINATION (PARIJÑĀNA) (VSC 1.1.6 ; VSC 9.28 ; VSC 10.21)[1076]

In places where Candrānanda discusses the method of Vaiśeṣika's epistemology, one term that re-occurs is parijñāna (pari- √ jñā). The term is a compound of the adverbial prefix 'pari' ('very', 'very much', 'excessively'),[1077] and the neuter noun 'jñāna' (higher knowledge),[1078] and designates 'discrimination',[1079] of what exists (tattva).[1080] The gloss VSc 1.1.6 confirms the etymology given by the dictionary because it designates a knowledge which distinguishes between the difference (vaidharmya) and similarity (sādharmya) of the six categories of Vaiśeṣika system.[1081] The gloss' aim is to explain the actions (karma-padārtha), but the most important concept here is parijñāna, which is the 'cause of dharma' (dharmahetu). So it is from this highly discriminative knowledge that dharma and subsequently niḥśreyasa is obtained. Between parijñāna and dharma there is a strong relation of interdependence.

[1076] Hence the importance of 'sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñāna'. Among the many categorisations of dravyas, I favour the one which differentiates between 'composite' and 'non-composite' ones, for it explains ātman as composite (when embodied) and non-composite when is devoid of vaiśeṣikaguṇas:
[1077] Apte dict. p. 976.
[1078] MW dict. p. 426.
[1079] Trans. MW dict. p. 594: 'perception' 'thorough knowledge', 'ascertainment', 'experience', and 'discrimination'.
[1080] Though Candrānanda does not use tattvajñāna (as Sāṁkhya does), what he prefers instead is parijñāna; also, the ontological term 'tattva' occurs in several sūtras, and refers mainly to the 'nature of substances' (VS 2.1.28 ākāśa; 2.2.8 kāla, 2.2.14 diś; guṇas VSc 4.1.14; or tattva as in the nature of inherence (VS 7.2.31).
[1081] We have a similar discriminative procedure in Praśastapāda where the 'knowledge of the true nature of reality', the process of 'discrimination' (parijñāna) between dravyas (eternal), from guṇas (transitory), is crucial; Praśastapāda has a very similar view to Sāṁkhya for which knowledge of tattvajñāna is 'discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa' which implies also sādharmya and vaidharmya (YD, p. 34; SK 8: Dravya guṇa karma sāmānya viśeṣa samavāyānām ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharmya vaidharmya tattvajñānam niḥśreyasa hetuḥ) (Jhā's trans. p. 13).

VSc 1.1.6: evaṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñānaṁ viṣayadoṣadarśanadvāreṇa vairāgyotpattau satyāṁ niḥśreyase sādhye dharmahetuḥ.[1082]

Gloss 1.1.6: thus, a true discrimination between the six padārthas, their similarity and dissimilarity, which [subsequently] results into seeing doṣas in objects, and detachment from them is the cause of dharma which leads to liberation.

The sādharmya refers to the epistemological method of grasping the 'common characteristic' in the padārthas, whereas the vaidharmya refers to the 'differential characteristic' of these.[1083] The space allocated to them by Candrānanda is strikingly unequal, but revealing; vaidharmya is the most developed and shows that parijñāna, is largely a vaidharmya-driven-project that emphasises differentiation, rather than similarity. Parijñāna resembles other interrelated concepts, such as vairāgya and yoga, both of which play equally a dissociative role within both Vaiśeṣika's epistemology and soteriology. Sādharmya, on the other hand is used only six times, out of which once in a sūtra: VS 2.2.29 and gloss, VSc 1.1.6 (three times), VSc 10.21. Sādharmya, alongside vaidharmya are epistemological causes (hetu) to abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa; the following gloss (VSc 1.1.7) demonstrate how these work; when he looks into the first three padārthas, (dravya, guṇa, karma), Candrānanda explains that these possess common 'characteristics' such as 'existence' (sat), 'non-eternity' (anitya), 'substantiality' (dravyavat), 'effect' (kārya), 'cause' (kāraṇa) and 'universal-differentia' (sāmānyaviśeṣa).[1084] Moreover, sādharmya is adduced again in VSc 2.2.29 in order to

[1082] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1083] Kumar, 2014, pp. 93-93, though her definitions are generally drawn from later commentaries: Praśastapāda (PD 16), and Śaṅkaramiśra (VSś 1.1.4).
[1084] Trans. Nozawa, 1993, p. 99. The Sūtrapāṭha explains 'grosso moddo' the common characteristics (sādharmya); when for instance it says that dravya are non-eternal, Candrānanda explains that there are some exceptions (ether + ādi, etc.), together with which we should read kāla, diś, ātman, and manas.

compare the similarity of śabda as 'a guṇa' with karma. While refuting a view, possibly Mīmāṃsā, which ascribed śabda an eternal character, Candrānanda argues that since śabda is 'similar' to karma, it must have a moment of destruction, called here 'apavarga'.[1085] Finally, the vaidharmya method of inquiry emerges in VSc 10.21 used in exactly the same way as VSc 1.1.6, where sādharmya (alongside vaidharmya) constitute two fundamental ways of discriminating knowledge (parijñāna) of categories.[1086]

On the other hand, vaidharmya ('differential characteristic') surfaces with much broader use throughout the whole of the commentary: VSc 1.1.6-8, 10, 14, 17; VS 1.1.21-22 and gloss, VSc 2.1.1, 22; VS 2.2.31 and gloss; VSc 3.1.1; VS 5.2.21 and gloss, VS 5.2.23 and gloss; VSc 7.1.2 and gloss; VS 9.12; VSc 10.21. With a small exception (in VSc 1.1.7 where sādharmya is the focus), the first āhnika of VSc 1 deals mostly with the 'vaidharmic' investigation of the substances, where Candrānanda goes into deeper and more minute detail, regarding the nature of substances, and their intrinsic relationship. For instance, there are some substances, not all (ākāśa etc.), which are 'inherent-cause' (samavāyakāraṇa), and can produce a substance different from their own (samavāyikāraṇāni dravyāṇi svātmavyatiriktaṁ kāryadravyam ārabhante); this is the case of only those substances which can exist in parts (VSc 1.1.8). Substances like ākāśa, being all-pervasive, hence non-composite, cannot come into this vaidharmic classification. A similar 'generative relationship' occurs among guṇas, which can further produce guṇas different from their own (VSc 1.1.9). This rule does not apply within karma-padārtha (VSc 1.1.10). Further investigations are in VSc 1.1.14, a gloss according to which one of the marks of dravya is to be possessed by motion (kriyāvad). This is not

[1085] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1086] See Synopsis of VSc.

the case with all substances, as ākāśa, kāla, diś, and ātman are all an exception from the sūtra-definition.[1087]

A major epistemic role that vaidharmya plays (alongside sādharmya) is that it can establish not only the nature of entities (ontology), the 'permanent' (nitya) and impermanent (anitya) character of entities, but as VSc 5.2.21 glosses, it also proves if 'darkness' (tamas) exists, or not (logics).[1088] Vaidharmya has clearly implications in both ontology and the logics of the system, used in a rather a syllogistic manner, because the argument given is that darkness cannot be considered another dravya because: a) it is different from permanent substances; b) because has no touch; c) because has no concreteness; d) because is opposite to light. The syllogistic manner in which 'vaidharmya' is here, shows two broad aspects prevalent in theVaiśeṣika system: its crude realism in accepting only demonstrable dravyas, and on the other hand, its turn into logics, and familiarity with Nyāya, where deduction, inferential logics, and negation are valid proofs and methods of knowing. With vaidharmya and sādharmya, VSc proves the validity of both ontological and speculative arguments. A similar syllogistic demonstrative method is adduced when an important characteristic (niṣkriya) of substances like ākāśa, kāla, diś and ātman is defined (VSc 5.2.23). The argumentative approach is rather dualistic. When Candrānanda describes dravyas, he distinguishes these into ones that have corporeality (murtva), and those that have no corporality (amurtva). A similar syllogistic and dualist argumentation is in VSc 9.12, where a differentiation between 'sat' and 'asat' is adduced in support of Vaiśeṣika's doctrine of

[1087] For VSc 1.1.14, See Synopsis of VSc. Other details pertaining to the way in which dravya, guṇa, karma categories can be common cause in relation to each other, or other qualities discussed in VSc 1.1.17-20. Yet karma-padārtha (though is a cause to saṁyoga and vibhāga) cannot be a cause to other karmas or dravyas (VSc 1.1.21). Conversely, some substances can also be 'common-effect' (kāryasāmānya) of other substances (VSc 1.1.13), but karma cannot be common effect because is not inherent in all substances (e.g. ākāśa) (1.1.14). The second adhyāya (VSc 1.2) develops even further, through the vaidharmya of lakṣaṇas of substances, the relationship between substances and their specific qualities; while the second āknika focuses on qualities, and their own relationship with substances. See Synopsis of VSc.

[1088] See Synopsis of VSc.

asatkāryavāda. Effect cannot exist in the cause, simultaneously. Real and unreal cannot exist simultaneously, as they are different from each other.[1089]

Furthermore, the discriminative knowledge (sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñāna) (VSc 1.1.6) has most and foremost a soteriological scope, in that it targets the two most fundamental padārthas (guṇas and dravyas), and the difference between them. As VSc 8 shows, dravya padārtha is the most important category within the 'theory of knowledge' (jñāna), and as such, liberation consists in the total separation of vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the soul (VSc 1.1.2). Such 'discrimination' (parijñāna) relates also to ethical dimensions of the system; differentiation acts as an intellectual purification from ignorance (avidyā) which as VSc 9.25 shows infects the functioning of the body; through saṃskāra, doṣa affects the body and its senses, and causes avidyā (ignorance) (VSc 9.25-26), and bondage. Such preoccupation with the ultimate reals, among which dravyas are the most important, explains the original cosmological orientation of the Vaiśeṣika system.[1090] Among dravyas, parijñāna aims to grasp the nature of ātman, which represents one of the fundamental categories stated and discussed in the ātman section.

THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE (SANNIKARṢA, YOGIPRATYAKṢA, ĀRṢAJÑĀNA)

Valid or soteriological knowledge has three theories of knowledge in Candrānanda: 1) 'ordinary' (sannikarṣa),[1091] 2) 'yogic' (yogipratyakṣa),[1092] and 3) 'intuitive' (ārṣajñāna).[1093] As far as the knowledge of the categories goes, the cognition of dravyas depends on a particular relation between ātman and manas (dravyeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam / mana

[1089] Synopsis of VSc.
[1090] Vaiśeṣika's major preoccupation with dravyas, explains the original cosmological orientation of Vaiśeṣika; Halbfass, 1992, p. 92.
[1091] See section on pratyakṣa.
[1092] See section of yoga.
[1093] See section of ārṣajñāna.

ātmā ca) (VS 8.1-2). In the eight adhyāya, the theory of knowledge (jñāna) which is primarily a theory of perception, explains how dravyas are perceived (through sannikarṣa) (VSc 8.1), or how guṇa and karma padārthas are perceived (through saṁyukta-samavāya) (VSc 8.4). The definition of jñāna, presumably a soteriological knowledge, is based on the six padārthas (VSc 8.1. and 1.1.6), is also focused primarily on the knowledge of dravyas, not of the guṇas (na tu guṇādiṣu) (VSc 8.1), the latter (guṇas) being secondary and depending on the knowledge of the former (dravyas).[1094] Candrānanda argues that the most important of all the six padārthas are dravyas. The whole gloss shows the hierarchical importance, which Vaiśeṣika ascribes to the knowledge of dravya, a category which represents an inherent cause, for the production of knowledge of the other two categories, guṇas and karma (VS 8.4), as well as the cause for sāmānya, and viśeṣa categories (VS 8.5). In the theory of knowledge, the key term is sannikarṣa, which is, as Nozawa says, a kind of 'sambandha' (either saṃyoga, or samavāya).[1095] It has broadly speaking two sides: perception and inference (plus one supernatural form of intuition). Vaiśeṣika's basic theory of ordinary knowledge is that of a 'four-fold contact',[1096] in which a certain link between ātman, manas, senses, and objects is established. Liberation takes place only when the latter two (senses and objects) have been removed - in which case knowledge vanishes-, while the former two (manas and ātman) join, as in the yoga practice. Mokṣa is the extirpation of the cognitive process.

[1094] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1095] Nozawa, 1993b, p. 1156. Saṁyoga usually is a connection that takes place only between two dravyas, while samavāya between a dravya and a guṇā.
[1096] See this discussion in the section of pratyakṣa.

In addition to the binary methodological discrimination stated in VSc 1.1.6 (sādharmyavaidharmyaparijñāna), Candrānanda develops even further Vaiśeṣika's epistemology and acknowledges two broad epistemological 'instruments of knowledge' (pramāṇas): 'perception' (pratyakṣa) and 'inference'(anumāna). A closer look at VSc shows that within each one of these, there are other 'sub-pramāṇas' included (within pratyakṣa: sannikarṣa, yogipratyakṣa, ārṣajñāna; while within anumāna: śabda, upamāna, smṛti, laiṅgikam). The exact number of independent pramāṇas would become a subject of debate among parallel commentarial traditions; what for Candrānanda is a section of pramāṇa (e.g. śabda, upamāna, and smṛti), would be for Udayana an independent pramāṇa (upamāna, śabda).[1097] Candrānanda discusses pramāṇas in VS 9.20, which gives a list of its synonyms, as well as in VSc 9.21 which explains how upamāna, and other pramāṇas too (+ādi) are equally considered instruments of knowledge, even though Candrānanda underlines that pramāṇas are only two (evaṁ dve eva pramāṇe).

PRATYAKṢA. Within VSc, 'perception' is found to be a major pramāṇa (VSc 8), which has other 'sub-pramāṇas' or 'forms of knowledge' (pramā) subsumed into it.[1098] Within pratyakṣa we can distinguish several forms, as follows: 1) catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa (VS 3.1.13;[1099] 5.2.17; 9.16-17); 2) sannikarṣa (jñāna) of the six padārthas (VSc 8.5-9);[1100] 3) pratyakṣa-laiṅgikam (VS 10.4); 4) smṛti (Vs 2.2.19; 9.6, 22);[1101] 5) siddhadarśana (VSc

[1097] Besides pratyakṣa and anumāna, Prābhākaras accept other pramāṇas such as: śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti (presumption); while Kumārila adds abhāva. See table of pramāṇas in NMM, 1975, p. xxxvii.
[1098] Like Candrānanda, here, I use 'forms' as synonymous to 'pramāṇas', because his commentary tries to subsume the forms of knowledge in pratyakṣa and anumāna pramāṇas respectively.
[1099] As Nozawa 1993a, p. 7 shows, VS 8.4 seems to be incompatible to 3.1.13 whose theory of perception arises from sannikarṣa of sense organs and object.
[1100] Nozawa discusses the textual problems of eight adhyāya, ibid.
[1101] Smṛti, usually a sub-pramāṇa of anumāna, in VSc 2.2.19, is 'perceptual 'form of 'external doubt'. Doubt is an invalid form of knowledge (avidyā) and is two-fold: perceptual and non-perceptual. See section on avidyā.

9.28) and 6) yogipratyakṣa (VSc 9.12). Both pratyakṣa and anumāna share in common the laiṅgikam and smṛti sub-pramāṇas. Within the concept of catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa (four-fold-contact) manas plays a particularly important role.[1102] It has the following roles: 1) With soul, manas is considered cause of knowledge of dravyas (VSc 8.2); 2) It is unconscious, because it is only a cognitive instrument that carries the perceptual-information from senses and objects, up to the soul. 3) It is eternal, and atomic (VS 7.1.30), thus prone to karma and adṛṣṭa, hence prone to transmigration (5.2.14).[1103] Yet, the substratum of all knowledge 'consciousness' (buddhi/jñāna) is the soul (VSc 3.1.13).[1104] Insofar as knowledge is vital to liberation, mind plays a major role in knowledge of categories (particularly dravyas VSc 8.1-2), yoga and mokṣa (VSc 5.2.16-20), but at the same time constitutes a hindrance to that, when its contact with ātman produces avidyā (VSc 9. 25). Saṃskāra, for instance, which is one of the eight guṇas of manas, alongside doṣa, and viśiṣṭādadharma, produces avidyā (VSc 9.25) and non-recognition (anadhyavasāya).[1105] The passage on yoga also demonstrates how catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa functions in relation to manas. Differently from soul (VSc 1.1.14) which is motionless, manas is prone to action and seems to have a two-fold route, either towards senses (9.13), or towards soul (VSc 5.2.17). When manas mixes with the senses, then sukha and duḥkha arise (VSc 10.1), which creates a situation of bondage. When, however, manas withdraws from senses, and instead fixes itself in the soul, then sukha and duḥkha disappear (VSc 5.2.17), and mokṣa is rendered possible (VSc 5.2.20). In addition to catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa (VSc 3.2.13), Candrānanda discusses yet another type of perceptual knowledge (buddhi), through an indirect type of contact (sannikarṣa), and

[1102] For use of manas see: (VS 1.1.4; 3.1.13; 3.2.1,3-4; 5.2.14-17; 7.1.30; 8.2; 9.13,22)
[1103] See earlier discussion in the footnotes
[1104] Soul is the inherent cause of knowledge:
[1105] See Synopsis of VSc.

as shown in previous section, draws a line between the knowledge of dravyas and knowledge of guṇas.[1106] The latter are known through 'saṁyukta-samavāya'.[1107] Saṁyukta-samavāya is an inferential type of sannikarṣa produced in contact with a guṇa, which guṇa is inherent in the sense organs (e.g. contact with blue colour inherent in the sense of sight).[1108] The difference in perception between dravya and guṇas shows that dravya are the fundamental reals to be known and on dravya the foundation of all Vaiśeṣika epistemology is built on; dravyas are called in sūtra 8.4 'the cause of causes' (dravyaṁ kāraṇaṁ kāraṇakāraṇaṁ).[1109]

Within pratyakṣa-pramāna, another form of knowledge is 'memory' (smṛti) (VSc 2.2.19; 9.6; 9.21-22). Kumar distinguishes between 'modes of knowledge' (pramā) and 'means of knowledge' (pramāna). In Vaiśeṣika commentarial tradition there is a difference between earlier tenets of Vaiśeṣika (VSc and PD) which regard smṛti as pramā, and later Vaiśeṣika like (NL) which upgraded smṛti from 'pramā' to the status of independent 'pramāṇa'.[1110] The evolution of the place of smṛti is a case in point for how the history of Vaiśeṣika developed. In VSc, smṛti is not always a pramāna for a valid (soteriological) knowledge. We can thus distinguish two utilities of smṛti: one beneficial to soteriology (VSc 9.22), and other detrimental, in which latter case, saṃskāra creates in the cognitive process a 'latent potency' called bhāvanā (9.23-26). Yet, it is also used in the ontology of the 'asat', where the non-existence of an entity is proved because the recollection of a thing is no longer perceived (VS 9.6).[1111] In most of the cases however,

[1106] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1107] Saṁyukta-samavāya is a different type of sannikarṣa, because the guṇas and karmas (differently from dravyas) are not near (asannikṛṣṭeṣu) to the perceptual sense-organs (c'endriyeṇa sannikarṣo nāsti, VSc 8.3-4).
[1108] Grimes dict. p. 280.
[1109] On dravya, Kumar, 2013, pp. 14-25.
[1110] Nyāyalīlāvatī of Vallabhācārya, 2nd ed. 1991, p. 621.
[1111] See Synopsis of VSc. Trans. Halbfass, 1992, p. 244: 'the cognition 'unreal' (arises) because the perception of a past entity is no longer there, because of the recollection of (this) past entity, and because there is perception of something that contradicts (its continued existence)'.

memory relates to vaiśeṣikaguṇas, such as saṃskāra-bhāvanā, which creates non-valid and non-soteriological forms of knowledge (avidyā), such as doubt (saṁśaya VS 2.2.19),[1112] or various psychological factors such as svapna, svapnāntika (9.23), adharma (VSc 9.24), or doṣa in the senses (VSc 9.25). All these ultimately lead to duṣṭa jñāna (9.26), and bondage.

ANUMĀNA (9.18; 10.4; 10.19). The second pramāṇa is 'inference', a concept largely used in logics, and in VSc particularly discussed in the ninth and tenth adhyāyas. Inferential cognition, according to Candrānanda, can be of several types: 1) 'testimony' (śabda pramāṇa) (VSc 9.19); 2) 'analogy' (upamāna) (VSc 9. 21); 3) 'memory' (smṛti) (VSc 9.22),[1113] and 4) 'inferential marks' laiṅgikam (VSc 9.18; VSc 10.19). Anumāna shares in common with pratyakṣa an 'inferential form of knowledge' (laiṅgikam), and a distinction between 'pratyakṣa-laiṅgikam', and 'anumāna-laiṅgikam' must be made, as both indicate reciprocally a knowledge obtained based on the other. In the case of anumāna, fire (cause) cannot be inferred without first seeing of smoke (effect), because smoke is inherent in fire. Both fire and smoke are 'connected in collocation' (ekārthasamavāyi), in which case samavāyi is a 'sambandha' between smoke and fire. VSc 9.18 explains laiṅgikam inference as the seeing of the 'characteristic marks'; while the 'generalities' (jati) are understood only when the knowledge of cause-effect is grasped.[1114] Laiṅgikam is again discussed in the context of an elucidation of some differences between 'doubt' (saṁśaya) and 'decision' (nirṇaya) (VSc 10.3-4), and is an 'inferential knowledge' based on previous perception. The knowledge drawn only from recollection and only from seeing generality creates doubt, but the certainty of

[1112] Synopsis of VSc.

[1113] We point out here the śruti and smṛti texts on which Vaiśeṣika ethics are founded have as a basis the authority of scriptures. Vedas are 'authoritative knowledge' (tasya vaidiko vidhiḥ sādhanaṁ) (VSc 6.2.1-7). Though śruti and smṛti text prescribe actions of pravṛtti kind, see also VSc 10.21 where dharma relates to abhyudaya.

[1114] see Synopsis of VSc

knowledge (nirṇaya) is brought about by a connection of perception with details, or when 'particularity' is grasped (viśeṣasambandhavaśena) (VSc 10.4).[1115] As the gloss states, doubt is removed only by this kind of 'exhaustive form of perception'. In this respect, we see how Vaiśeṣika found necessary to postulate the necessity of viśeṣa padārtha, which is the category of knowledge of the minutest form, the knowledge of the ṛṣis.

Within the context to anumāna-pramāṇa, Candrānanda develops several other epistemological relational criteria (probans): 1) those that refer to causality (as discussed in VSc 9.18) where the question of relations such as 'connection' (sambandha), or 'identical inherence' (ekārthasamavāya) with regard to cause (e.g. fire) and effect (e.g. smoke), or to 'liṅga' and 'liṅgin' (NK: 511), must be fully grasped. 2) Second, those that refer to the 'inferential type of knowledge' (laiṅgikam) which as both Nozawa and Schuster pointed out, categorise its inferential liṅga in three classes: a) dṛṣṭaṁ liṅgāṁ; b) adṛṣṭam liṅgam; c) sāmānyatodṛṣṭam.[1116] In connection with causality, or relations, Candrānanda presents in VSc 3.1.8 eight different types of inferential relations (probans). They are displayed in a section where the soul has to be inferentially proved from its marks, since it cannot be perceived directly, except in yogipratyakṣa. The relationship between 'designator' and 'designated' is an essential criteria to understand the type of relations in epistemology because many of the arguments are grounded on such probans. As per VSc 3.1.8, these inferential, or relational probans are as follows: 1) saṃyogi (e.g. smoke-fire relation); 2) samavāyi (e.g. horns–cow relation); ekārthasamavāyi is two-fold: 3) kāryaṁ kāryāntarasya (e.g. colour-touch relation) and 4) kāraṇaṁ kāraṇāntarasya (head-foot relation); and virodhi-probans which is four-fold: 5)

[1115] see Synopsis of VSc.

[1116] For further details on whether adṛṣṭalingam and dṛṣṭaṁlingam are the same kind of liṅga see Nozawa, 1991, which is a response to more expanded discussion by Schuster's article 1972.

abhūtaṁ bhūtasya; 6) bhūtam abhūtasya; 7) abhūtam abhūtasya; 8) bhūtaṁ bhūtasya. In VSc we can note the presence of three types of liṅga: 1) 'perceived marks' (dṛṣṭaṁliṅga) (VS 2.1.8; 2.1.15-19; 3.2. 6-8); 2) 'unperceived marks' (adṛṣṭaliṅga) (VS 2.1.10); and 3) 'general seeing' (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa)[1117] (VS 2.1.16; 2.2.6; 3.2.7; 9.8). Their precise meaning remains, however, ambiguous.[1118] By comparison to saṁyukta-samavāya with which guṇas and karma are known (VSc 8.4), sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is defined as 'an inference based on non-caused uniformity'.[1119] If it is non-caused, it means that it is not a direct type of liṅga either; in which case it is analogous to the way in which saṁyukta-samavāya functions, namely through logical mediation. An inquiry into the role of the two would probably shed new light on how these explain the 'generative' Vaiśeṣika epistemology and its ambition to enumerate all that exist.[1120]

Śabda. Another example of generative epistemology - closely related to the proban 'kāryaṁ kāraṇam' (VSc 3.1.8) - is the development of a third form of means of knowledge, different from both pratyakṣa and anumāna: śabda pramāṇa (VSc 9.19),[1121] whose authority derives from having been uttered by Īśvara (VSc 1.1.3; 10.21). In VSc 9.19, the gloss explains it by comparison to inference and says that is dependent on 'recollection' (smṛti) (yathā kāryādi smṛti savyapekṣam anumānaṁ) and 'sematic agreement' (saṇketa). Both śabda and anumāna pramāṇas are concerned with concepts related to the three times, and the things beyond senses. These common concepts which they share, make Candrānanda somehow conclude that śabda pramāṇa is part of anumāna (ato 'numānen'aikayogakṣematvād anumānam ev'ety uktaṁ bhavati). Śabda

[1117] In VSc 9.8 Candrānanda says that 'seeing from the general' is how one is able to know something non-existent (asat), see Schuster, 1972, p. 351.
[1118] Briefly discussed by Nozawa's paper, who instead, looks for them in some Chinese and Tibetan versions of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti. As regarding the types of liṅgas, Nozawa shows that there is a great deal of disagreement between scholars (Frauwallner, Schuster, Matilal, and Wezler).
[1119] Grimes, dict. p. 271.
[1120] Halbfass, 1992, p. 69 (from Vyomavati 1983 ed. vol. 1, p. 21)
[1121] See Synopsis of VSc.

pramāṇa is also implied in the soteriology of VSc 10.21, because it is related to the acknowledgement of Īśvara, which is an epistemological authority, but also because it relates to the śruti and smṛti texts which provide injunctions necessary for acquiring the lesser soteriology: abhyudaya (VSc 6.2.1 and VSc 10.10).

OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

PADĀRTHA (VSC 8). As mentioned in both soteriological passages of VSc 1.1.6 and VSc 10.21, the object of soteriological inquiry (parijñāna) are the six padārthas, among which, dravya is chief.[1122] The categories, such as dravyas, are 'reals' (tattva/sattā), and as far as soteriology goes ātman is epistemologically, the most important of all, for two reasons: it is ātman (not manas) which is the substratum (āśraya) of knowledge and perception; and 2) ātman is the subject of liberation. Within epistemology, the mediating role of manas is influential in the whole of the cognitive process; but in soteriology, soul (ātman) is paramount. Without the two (ātman and manas) the discrimination of padārtha, and dravyas is impossible (VSc 8.1-2). Before outlining Candrānanda's epistemology, we need to name and clarify the precise number of padārthas, as well as drawing attention to some textual critical problems. In Sūtrapāṭha neither the number (usually six) nor the term 'padārtha' itself occurs. Following Wezler's imperative call to reconstruct Sūtrapāṭha from an 'independent MSS Tradition' that transmits the Sūtrapāṭha without commentary, throughout my research I too have looked at some mūla texts which differ from PD,[1123] transmit and comment only on the original Sūtrapāṭha of Kaṇāda (VS,

[1122] Kumar, 2013, pp. 14-16.

[1123] Neither PD, nor DP presents an accurate picture of Sūtrapāṭha's commentarial tradition. VSc seems to be akin to many of PD tenets, but it differs from all by providing a close commentary on Sūtrapāṭha.

VSc, VSś).[1124] Among them only VSś 1.1.4 (of Śaṅkaramiśra) provides a sūtra which mentions 'padārtha', while all the others go on straight into the enumeration of dravyas. It is well-known that Śaṅkaramiśra's mūla text contains many late inflations and additions (e.g. Navya-Nyāya). VSś 1.1.4 is an unusually long sūtra,[1125] bearing some similarities to PD,[1126] in comparison with which he adds some parts (e.g. 'dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt'), and omits others (e.g. 'ṣaṇṇāṁ'). Both VSś and PD do mention knowledge of padārthas in relation to which liberation is granted. One interesting exception we find in Bombay MS (B),[1127] which I have purchased from Asiatic Society of Bombay. The reading which this MS provides (B 1.1.4), misses both 'padārtha' and 'ṣaṇṇāṁ' concepts that occur in all others MSS on the Sūtrapāṭha.[1128] It becomes clear that throughout the history of Sūtrapāṭha the number six is a controversial one, and it continues to be so with PD's innovations (approx. 6th AD) which fixed the number at six. Moreover, the list is further expanded to seven padārthas (+ abhāva) by SP,[1129] or ten padārthas (+ 'potentiality' (śakti); 'non-potentiality' (aśakti); 'commonness-cum-differentiae' (sāmānyaviśeṣas); and 'non-existence' (abhāva) by DP.[1130] A closer look at VSc shows that such 'innovations' after all, may not be innovations at all. Sattā/ bhāva (existence) from VSc 1.2.4, for instance, is discussed as a kind of sāmānya, (also the

---

[1124] Before that, we need to establish the most reliable version of Sūtrapāṭha (Kaṇāda's sūtras): Candrānanda's Sūtrapāṭha (VS), Vādīndra's Sūtrapāṭha (VSv), Śaṅkaramiśra's Sūtrapāṭha (VSś). We thus need to follow a textual critical method here.

[1125] VSś 1.1.4 dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt dravyaguṇakarmasāmānya viśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam

[1126] PD 2: dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñānam niḥśreyasahetuḥ.

[1127] See its description in the section 'New MSS'.

[1128] B 1.1.4 dharmaviśeṣaprasūtāt dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ sādharmya vaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam. The difference between 'sattā' (a kind of 'distinct universal' residing in the categories dravya, guṇa, and karma, see Lakṣaṇāvalī, S. Jhā, ed. 1963; DP 2.4) and 'astitva' resides in all six padārthas; PD 11); (Halbfass, 1992, trans. 'istness' and 'objectivity').

[1129] Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī adds 'abhāva' as the seven padārtha (SP 3).

[1130] Candramati's Daśapadārthī (DP) (preserved in Chinese only) introduces four new padārthas: 1) 'causal efficacy' or 'potentiality' (śakti) (DP 1.8); 2) 'lack of causal efficacy' or 'non-potentiality' DP 1.9 (aśakti); 3) 'limited universal' or 'commonness' (sāmānyaviśeṣa) DP 1.10; 4) 'absence' or 'non-existence' (abhāva) which is of five kinds, see DP 1.11, p. 101; trans. Hattori, (in Ui, 1917, p. 275). See also DP 2.7-10. (For translation I have used both editions: Ui 1917, and Miyamoto 1996).

fourth Vaiśeṣika padārtha), though it is never listed as a separate padārtha, or separate dravya.[1131] A similar example is with the pramāṇas, which Candrānanda says are only two in number (evaṁ dve eva pramāṇe) (VSc 9.21); in VSc 9.19 however, several nuances are added: anumāna is said to be dependent on memory (smṛti) of effects; while testimony (śabda) is said to be dependent on 'memory' (smṛti)[1132] and 'semantic agreement established by people' (saṇketa).[1133] The gloss points out also that 'comparison' or 'analogy' (upamāna) and others means of knowledge (+ādi) are included in those two (evam upamādīnām antarbhāvaḥ), despite the fact that their number is fixed at two. The VSc gloss leaves the impression that smṛti, śabda, and saṇketa are part of one and the same pramāṇa, namely anumāna. Hence it may well be the case that the expansion of guṇas, and padārthas has been made on the same 'generative principle': ideas were self-enclosed, and self-understood, sealed off within the original presentation for Sūtrapāṭha; the task of commentators has been to unveil the hidden and unsaid meaning of it, sometimes by expanding the list of both guṇas and pramāṇas.[1134]

DRAVYA. Dravyas, and in particular ātman, are in the soteriological and ontological schema of the Vaiśeṣika system the most important categories of thought. Ātman undergoes different stages of existence: 'non-composite' (VS 1.1.4), 'composite' or 'embodied' (sadeha VSc 5.2.15; with vaiśeṣikaguṇas, and senses VSc 9.25), 'awaken' (jāgrata) (VSc 5.2.15; 9.25);[1135] 'svapna' and 'svapnāntikaṁ' (VSc 9.23),[1136] or even 'yogic' (samādhi VSc 9.13). Ātman is a chief dravya, because is both the congiser of knowledge

[1131] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1132] 'Memory' (smṛti) is considered part of anumāna (anumānāṅgaṁ smṛtir ucyate) in VSc 9.21.
[1133] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1134] It is also true that innovations have always been part of the commentarial traditions.
[1135] Prabodhakāla state is when the soul is preceded by jīvana VSc 5.2.15 and may also be added here, since it marks the beginning of the embodied and saṃsāra state of ātman.
[1136] Svapna is the 'state of sleep' when the mind is 'calm' (pralīna); while svapnāntikaṁ is the 'sub-conscious state' (VSc 9.23).

as well as the object of knowledge itself to be known. The knowledge of the first three fundamental padārthas (dravya, guṇa, and karma) is not mere ontology for the sake of knowledge; as 1.1.6 shows, the knowledge of their categories has ethical and ritualistic implications too. Rituals have fixed rules (niyama), and fixed order (krama) for their performance; the knowledge of these is highly beneficial to ritual performance and abhyudaya, while the 'knowledge of ātman' is beneficial to niḥśreyasa (VSc 10.21). The duties, prescribed or not (VS 6.2.1), made with the substances, involve inevitably the knowledge of guṇas, and karma (action and timings), hence their knowledge is equally important (VSc 8. 10-11). Vaiśeṣika's theory of knowledge and most of post-Candrānanda epistemology was determined by the system's ritualistic and soteriological necessities, hence the importance of dravyas in Vaiśeṣika.

Table 7. List of Substances in Early Vaiśeṣika

<table>
<tr><td colspan="9">DRAVYA (1.1.4)[1137]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pṛthivī
Earth

2.1.1
5.2.1-2
7.1.4,10</td><td>Ap
Water

2.1.6-7
2.2.5
5.2.3,9
7.1.8</td><td>Tejas
'Lustre'[1138]

2.1.3
2.2.4
5.2.13
7.1.8</td><td>Vāyu
'Air'[1139]

2.1.4,10
2.1.27
7.1.8</td><td>Ākāśa
'Ether'[1140]

2.1.26-28
7.1.28</td><td>Kāla
Time

2.2.6-9</td><td>Diś
'Space'

2.2.12-15</td><td>Ātman
'Soul'

3.2.4-5
3.2.15-17
7.1.29</td><td>Manas
'Mind'

3.2.1-3
7.1.30</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">nitya (in 'aṇu', 'paramāṇu')
&
anitya (in composite, e.g. ghaṭa, avayavin)</td><td colspan="4">nitya
omnipresent (7.1.18-32)
no form (5.2.23)
no action (1.1.14)</td><td>nitya
&
aṇu
&
parimaṇḍala
7.1.26</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="9">real ('sat' 1.1.7)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="9">possess guṇas (1.1.14)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="9">possess kriyā ('action') (1.1.14) they can generate other dravyas (1.1.8)
(except ākāśa, kāla, diś, ātman: see VSc 1.1.14)
Effects does not pre-exist in its material cause (asatkāryavāda)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="9">inherent-cause (samavāyakāraṇa) (1.1.14)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">'Composite'
('non-eternal')</td><td colspan="5">'Non-composite'
('eternal')</td></tr>
</table>

[1137] For an exhaustive list of references, I shall provide a Synopsis. Here only basic references.
[1138] Trans. Thite: lustre; it seems that 'lustre' is more generic and broad than fire.
[1139] Halbfass translation 'air', but others scholars 'wind'.
[1140] Gokhale translates it with 'vacuum'. (Personal communication, audio file. Pune, 21 February 2016).

ĀRṢAJÑĀNA (VSC 9.28)

In the completion of the soteriological 'gnostic' means of knowledge therein described, by which categories can be grasped we shall end Vaiśeṣika's epistemological section with ārṣajñāna, a 'supernatural' or 'extra-ordinary' form of knowledge, often translated as 'intuition'. Though VSc 9.28 says that it is not different from both pratyakṣa and anumāna pramāṇas (tac ca pratyakṣānumānābhyāṁ na bhidyate),[1141] ārṣajñāna bears some particular supra-temporal, supra-sensual characteristics, for it transcends senses and time, as well as the extant knowledge preserved in the granthas. Candrānanda discusses ārṣajñāna next to siddhadarśana, translated as 'occult or magical knowledge'.[1142] The context of these forms of knowledge is immediately after the discussion of a whole series of aspects related to both 'invalid', 'impure' (duṣṭa jñānaṁ 9.26) and 'pure' (aduṣṭa 9.27) knowledge. It is not clear from gloss VSc 9.28 which kind of category siddhadarśana fits into, duṣṭa or aduṣṭa; but from the gloss we note that the main characteristic of siddhadarśana is a 'spatial', 'dimensional', and 'biological' form of knowledge, enhanced by some artificial tricks like 'chemical medicine' (rasāyanā) and 'eye-powder collirium' (añjana). Moreover, siddhadarśana entails the knowledge of the 'ripening' of the dharma and adharma (dharmādharmavipākaparijñānaṁ); by vipāka we must recognise a reference to the doctrine of karma, resembling the 'sañcita' of dharmas as per VSc 6.2.18.[1143] From the main features of siddhadarśana and the reference to vipāka, we may perhaps be entitled to raise the question as to whether siddhadarśana verus ārṣajñāna differentiation may correspond to the difference between abhyudaya

[1141] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1142] Lysenko, 1998, in AS, p. 101. The mention of siddha-knowledge is considered just after several types of 'valid forms of perception' had been listed (yogipratyakṣa 9.13; 'ordinary' 9.15; and inferential (9.18-22), as well as 'invalid forms of knowledge' (e.g. dream 9.23).
[1143] See Synopsis of VSc.

and niḥśreyasa, where abhyudaya, as we discussed is a 'worldly' inferior soteriology; in it siddhadarśana seems to play a role. Niḥśreyasa however, is very different from abhyudaya, as much as the difference between ārṣajñāna and siddhadarśana (ārṣaṁ bhidyata iti varṇayanti), where the latter seems to contain a spatial, dimensional or cosmic knowledge. At any rate, neither of the two should be confused with yogipratyakṣa, which is a superior form of perception that plays a role in the soteriological-cognitive process of the categories. The forms of knowledge discussed in the ninth adhyāya, duṣṭa and aduṣṭa, ārṣajñāna and siddhadarśana, represent with the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception, only extraordinary types of knowledge; not pramāṇas.

Candrānanda defines ārṣajñāna in much detail; he states that such form of knowledge 'does not depend on liṅga' (yalliṅganirapekṣam), by which he means that it is different from both perception, and anumāna, both of which use characteristics marks.[1144] As in the Bhāṣya commentarial tradition, ārṣajñāna is an 'extraordinary', 'intuitive', and 'supra-rational' form of knowledge.[1145] To summarise it, VSc 9.28 gives ārṣajñāna several defining features. 1) It is not depended on liṅgas (therefore is neither inferential, nor perceptual).[1146] 2) It is 'concerned with past, present and future things' (e.g. use of locative). 3) It is 'concerned with dharma and other entities' (+ādi) (by '+ādi' used here we may assume that he refers to dharma, as one of the seven additional guṇas listed in VSc 1.1.5, or perhaps to 'dharma born of yoga practice' as per VSc 9.13). 4) Ārṣajñāna is 'concerned with things beyond-senses', therefore it is a supra-sensual, non-

[1144] A final note on yoga and its difference from ārṣajñāna, is that both of them seem to claim to locate the mind in an ultimate real that is the soul, and remove it from sense-objects. In VSc 9.28 ārṣajñāna is the knowledge of the dharma etc. and is also beyond senses (dharmā'diṣv atī'ndriyeṣu), whereas 9.13 says that with the help of dharma produced of yoga practice, mind can withdraw from senses, and situate itself into the soul, only. A comparable 'aversion' for sense perception, but caused by vaiśeṣikaguṇas like sukha and duḥkha, is restated in VSc 5.2.16.

[1145] Ārṣa: a distinct category of knowledge (vidyā), which is not generated from either a process of perception, a process of inference or verbal testimony but is a separate pramāṇa in itself.

[1146] As VSc 9 points out, inference is a pramāṇa based principally on perception. There cannot be inference, and recollection of a thing never experienced before.

perceptual form of knowledge. 5) It is concerned also with things not mentioned in the granthas, hence is different from śabda-pramāṇa. 6) It belongs to godly sages (devarṣinan). 8) It is a 'science' (vijñāna) born of 'intuition' (ārṣa). 9) It is encountered 'only sometimes' (kadācid eva) among 'worldly people' (laukika). 10) It is produced only by guess, speculation, or 'logics' (tarka). 11) Arṣajñāna is a knowledge born of 'non-ascertainment' (anavadhāraṇam).[1147] Among all these features, one that strikes us particularly is the accessibility of such knowledge to both 'laukika' and 'devarṣīṇān' categories of people. It is a form of 'Upaniṣadic knowledge' to which the soteriological gloss VSc 10.21 alludes too, when says that if one wishes to obtain the science of liberation, meditation on phrases such as 'ātmā jñātavya' is required. We can arguably say that, like other concepts (dharma and yoga), ārṣajñāna too is a concept that fashions the synthesis between pravṛtti and nivṛtti, two conflicting tendencies in Indian philosophy, and Candrānanda's Vṛtti seems to belong fully to such a movement.

5.3. YOGA

Candrānanda discusses yoga practice in three different textual locations: VSc 5.2.15-18 (in relation to mokṣa), VSc 6.2.11 (in relation to abhyudaya), and VSc 9.13 (in relation to a particular form of knowledge, yogipratyakṣa).[1148] In the Sūtrapāṭha, however, it occurs only once (VS 5.2.17), and is a sūtra over which Wezler casts doubt about its genuine place within the original tenets of Vaiśeṣika system.[1149] Among such contexts

[1147] 'Anavadhāraṇam' a term used in YS 4.20 as well. For VSc, see Synopsis of VSc.

[1148] Referring to Praśastapāda, Lysenko, 1998, p. 112, casts doubt on whether yogipratyakṣa possesses 'la capacité libératrice'; and sees in yoga an 'augmentative' role for the cognitive faculties of man to understand better the categories.

[1149] Wezler, 1982, p. 669 speculates that the addition of 'yogipratyakṣa' into the system was, among others, to 'get an additional weapon of defence', an epistemological tool by which Vaiśeṣikas aimed to prove the correctness of their doctrine against opponents.

where yoga occurs, VSc 5.2.15-18 sets yoga and mokṣa in a dual compound, by which Candrānanda seems to infer that there is a correlation between the two.[1150] We must also note that both mokṣa and yoga are treated in an adhyāya which clearly deals with the third Vaiśeṣika category karma-padārtha, a positioning that makes sense if we take into consideration that a 'theory of salvation' is to be understood in the key of a 'theory of karma'. As pointed out by scholars, a theory of salvation in Indian thought comprises two other aspects: karma and rebirth.[1151] Moreover, there are also textual indicators that Candrānanda's gloss refers to yoga as a 'form of practice': the preceding line to 5.2.16 speaks of karma as being a 'limb' (aṅga) of yoga (above VSc 5.2.16), while a few lines below that, he speaks of a technique of 'breathing-control' (vāyunigraha VSc 5.2.17) on which depends the union of mind with soul.[1152] This and the question above sūtra 5.2.18 (yogāṅgaṁ prāṇāyāma karma kiṁ n'oktam), as well as 'yogādyanuṣṭhāna' mentioned in gloss 6.2.11, all witness to the fact that Vaiśeṣika used Patañjali's yoga for its gnostic and soteriological purposes, at least in the limbs of prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, and dhyāna. Here we shall look over the above-mentioned relevant passages on yoga, with a gloss and explanation of them.

VS 5.2.15: hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātaṁ / VSc: yathātmasaṃyoga prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma, tathātma manaḥ saṃyogāt prayatnān manasaḥ karma / etat sadehasya karma, tatra jāgrata icchādveṣapūrvakāt prayatnāt, prabodhakāle tu jīvanapūrvakāt / yataḥ saṃyogoyogaḥ sa ca karmakāryaḥ'ato yogāṅgaṁ karma yogamokṣau ca karmādhikāro'py ucyete / VS 5.2.16: ātm'endriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt

[1150] In this section, I propose to look at the extent to which a connection between yoga and mokṣa, can at all be drawn, since both terms are jointly discussed (yogamokṣau) twice: first in VSc 5.2.15 (fourth line); and second in VSc 5.2.22 (third line).
[1151] See all studies published in Doniger, ed. 1980.
[1152] See Synopsis of VSc.

sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambhaḥ / VSc: yato hetor ātm'endriya mano'rthasannikarṣo jñānakāraṇatvena sukhaduḥkhe janayatiatastadanārambhaḥ tasya sannikarṣasyā'nārambho'nutpattirucyata iti / tathā hi / VS 5.2.17: ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ / VSc: yadā hy ātmani mano'vasthitaṁ n'endriyeṣu tadā catuṣṭayasannikarṣasyānārambhāt tat kāryayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor abhāvarūpo vidyamānaśarīrasya ātmano vāyunigrahāpekṣa ātmano manasā saṃyogo yogaḥ / yogāṅgaṁ prāṇāyāma karma kiṁ n'oktam / VS 5.2.18: kāya karmaṇātma karma vyākhyātaṁ/ VSc: ihā'tmaśabdena vāyuḥ yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṁ haste karma tathātmavāyusaṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāpāna karma /

Gloss. VS 5.2.15: 'mind-action' is explained by the 'hand-action' / VSc: such as action-in-hand is because of a connection between volition with soul, similarly, there is 'mind-action' from a conjunction of soul-mind-volition, which is the 'action of a body' [embodied soul]; while the 'awakened-state' is from a volition preceded by desire and aversion, yet, at the 'time of awakening', it is preceded by life.

Explanation. We have included this passage because several vaiśeṣikaguṇas are being discussed (icchā, dveṣa, prayatna); the passage continues the discussion of the previous sūtras' gloss (VSc 5.2.14, which explains the formation of body under the influence of adṛṣṭa). Here, three states of self are mentioned: 1) 'embodied state' (sadehasya karma); 2) 'waking state' (jāgrata); and 3) 'awakening state' (prabodha).

Gloss. VS 5.2.16 (introductory line): as yoga is connection, and because is the 'work-of-action', and 'action is part of yoga', yoga and mokṣa are specified in [the same] section / VS 5.2.16: the non-occurrence [as well the occurrence of] pleasure and pain are

because of the contact between soul-mind-senses-object / VSc 5.2.16: the production of sukha and duḥkha are caused by knowledge, which is caused by the contact between soul-mind-senses-object; 'anutpatti' is stated to be the non-occurrence of the [four-fold] contact.

Explanation. First, the introductory line seems to explain that in order to understand yoga and mokṣa, one needs to understand how action relates to yoga. It is clearly a sign that yoga here is a practice that targets action; now we know that in the presence of action no liberation can take place. It seems that yoga can arrest the function of action; the sūtra 5.2.16 is a bit confusing because of 'tad anārambhaḥ', but it is only because of Sūtrapāṭha's brief and sophisticated syntax, which a reader needs to sense. The gloss on VSc 5.2.16 explains in a quite redundant way, that the sūtra is about two aspects: one is the production of suffering and pain caused by knowledge (jñāna) which is in the form of the perceptual contact between soul, senses, mind, and external object; while the second aspect tells just the opposite, that the non-occurrence of sukha and duḥkha is the non-occurrence of such contact; As it comes out, jñāna which in VSc 9.11-12 does not seem to be different from buddhi, is cause of sukha and duḥkha, hence bondage.

Gloss. thus he says VS 5.2.17: yoga is that which, when the mind stays in the soul, sukha and duḥkha are becoming non-existent in that which has a body / VSc 5.2.17: indeed, when the steady-mind is in the soul and not in the senses, then there is non-occurrence of a four-fold contact; the result of these two [situations] is in the form of the absence of pleasure and pain, yoga is the conjunction between mind and soul, which depends on a breathing technique in ātman with a real body.

Explanation. The sūtra clarifies that yoga fixates mind into the soul (locative), and puts an end to suffering and pain, even in an embodied ātman. Hence, we assume that such yogic practice had immense powers to alleviate pain, as long as mind can withdraw from the perceptive external world. Hence, for Candrānanda yoga is bringing the atomic mind, into the enclosure of the soul; in other words, mind should cease its functioning with the external world namely with senses, and the four-fold contact. The result of such a unification (saṃyoga) of mind and soul depends on a breathing technique called vāyunigraha, which must relate to the fifth limb of Patañjali's Yogasūtra 2.54.[1153]

Gloss. (Introductory line VS 5.2.18), Why is the action of prāṇāyāma not mentioned as part of yoga? / VS 5.2.18: the action of soul is explained by the action of body / VSc: here, the word ātman refers to wind-breath; such as there is action-in-hand because of a conjunction of volition with soul, similarly, there is a conjunction between ātman, air, and volition [and this] is the action of prāṇāyāma.

Explanation. The sūtra and its gloss certifies indirectly that the previous gloss of VSc 5.2.17 deals with pratyāhāra which includes the withdrawal of the mind from the senses; but since there is also mention of vāyunigraha, the gloss VSc 5.2.18 explicates that 5.2.17 referred implicitly to prāṇāyāma, because vāyu referred to the embodied ātman, which is possessed of prayatna. The gloss uses the simile of 'hand-action-contact' and compares it with' ātman-vāyu-saṃyoga' to demonstrate that in either case, prayatna, (a vaiśeṣikaguṇa of the embodied ātman), is involved in both breathing and body actions, and conjunctions. Here we need to see a testimony for yoga as being a form of practice and as VSc 6.2.11 states, beneficial to acquire success (abhyudaya):

[1153] YS 2.54: svaviṣayāsaṃprayoge cittasvarūpānukāra ivendriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ

(Objection) yadi prayatnaḥ pradhānaṁ vināpi yogādinābhyudayaḥ syāt / n'aitat / VS 6.2.11 asati bhāvāt / VSc: asati yogādyanuṣṭhāne na prayatnamātrasya bhāvād abhyudayaḥ, kriy'opadeśavaiyarthyāt / idānīṁ niḥśreyasahetuṁ dharmam āha /

Gloss: objection: if volition is so important, then there will be abhyudaya even without yoga etc / No, this is not so / VS 6.2.11: if there is absence [of yoga], there will be absence of bhāva [abhyudaya] / VSc: if there is no 'practice of yoga' etc., and only volition, there will be no abhyudaya [and such] fallacy is meaningless / Now [he] explicates dharma which leads to niḥśreyasa.

Explanation: VS 6.2.11 and gloss, responds to an objection raised most probably by a student that stresses the role of volition and downplays the role of yoga for the achievement of abhyudaya. The passage is important as it confirms that yoga in Vaiśeṣika is a practice employed not only for the purpose of mokṣa, but for the purpose of abhyudaya too; likewise dharma, yoga seems to be a universal concept that is beneficial both in this world (abhyudaya) and outside it (mokṣa). In either case, the concepts point to the knowledge and its soteriological potencies. In the ninth adhyāya, where the general topic deals with forms of knowledge (e.g. anumāna), a specific kind of knowledge (yogipratyakṣa), seems to be two-fold. It is not clear from the text whether Candrānanda distinguishes two forms of yogipratyakṣa, as Praśastapāda does (yukta and viyukta).[1154] From the whole passages that deals with yogipratyakṣa (VSc 9.13-17),[1155] we offer for gloss only VSc. 9.13.

[1154] PD 241, see trans. Lysenko, 1998, pp. 91.-92.
[1155] See Synopsis of VSc.

(preceding line) pratyakṣaparokṣaviṣayatvād yogipratyakṣaṁ pratyakṣānumānayor madhye vyākhyāyate / VS 9.13 ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam / VSc: āhṛtya viṣayebhya indriyāṇi tebhyaś ca mana ātmany eva yadā samādhīyate tadā yogajadharmāpekṣādātmāntaḥ karaṇasaṃyogāt viśiṣṭāt tatra bhavatāṁ svasmin ātmani jñānaṁ pratyakṣam utpadyate.

Gloss. (preceding line) yogipratyakṣa is direct perception of the nature of things and is explained [as being] both perceptual and inferential / VS 9.13: because of a particular contact of soul and mind [taking place] in the soul [there arises] perception of the soul.[1156] / VSc: after withdrawal of the senses from objects, and the mind from them [senses], when mind only is in the samādhi,[1157] then another specific connection of [mind with] soul is caused, which depends on 'yogajadharma'; the production of perceptual knowledge happens in the very locus of ātman.

Explanation. The introductory line explains that what sūtra conveys is a special form of knowledge, achieved by yogis. The use of the genitive dual in the introductory line (pratyakṣānumānayor) might mean that, like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda acknowledges a two-fold character of yogipratyakṣa. There is also an epistemological argument at stake here, namely whether soul is the perceiver of itself, or perceived by someone else, say manas.[1158] For the time being, we shall engage only with the aspect of the relationship between yoga, and mokṣa, namely the question as to whether yogipratyakṣa has the role to enhance the 'soteriontological' knowledge of categories, on which liberation depends.[1159] According to VS 1.1.2 dharma is that which leads to both abhyudaya and

[1156] For this sūtra translation, see Wezler, 1982, p. 665-6.
[1157] Eliade translates samādhi with 'enstasy', 1946, p. 93.
[1158] Discussed by this thesis in the section 5.1., where proofs on the existence of the self are presented.
[1159] Lysenko, 1998, p. 112.

niḥśreyasa; while for a link between yoga and dharma, VSc 9.13 and VSc 9.28, seem to offer some interesting clues. In one place, VSc 9.13, there is a mention of a particular dharma born of yoga (yogajadharma), and in another place 'viśiṣṭadharma' (VSc 9.28), in both cases, dharma being said to occur because of a connection between mind and soul. While in VSc 9.13 it refers to dharma produced by yoga practice, in VSc 9.28, dharma refers to a particular quality of the ārṣa and siddha kinds of knowledge. Whatever may the case yoga is certainly a tool by which the production of knowledge can be enhanced (VSc 9.28),[1160] or as in VSc 5.2.17, it can incarcerate the mind into the soul. So far, it appears that yoga plays a soteriological role, albeit indirect, which applies only to the cognitive faculties of the self, where it seems yoga joined by prayatna (VSc 6.2.11),[1161] and a 'breathing technique' (vāyunigraha), is able to fixate the atomic mind into the soul (VSc 9.13). Once the mind engrains itself into soul, it loses its natural capacity to move (karma). Now we know from VSc 5.2.19 that it is the mind under the influence of adṛṣṭa which triggers the formation of another body, and saṃsāra; but in next gloss VSc 5.2.20 Candrānanda says that mokṣa is the non-emergence of body, and the absence of the contact between mind and soul (jīvanākhyasyātma manaḥ saṃyogasyābhāvo'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ). Hence, on the one hand we have the role of yoga that connects mind with soul (VSc 9.13), and on the other hand mokṣa, which is the absence of the contact between mind and soul (VSc 5.2.20). While both yoga and mokṣa annihilate 'action of mind',[1162] and 'the first action of mind' (ādyapasarpaṇa), respectively, they nevertheless differ in respect to the saṃyoga between mind and soul, which yoga establishes in order to annihilate the mind's motions and

[1160] VSc 9.28: tad etad ārṣaṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca viśiṣṭād dharmād ātma manaḥ saṁyogācc'otpadyate.
[1161] Prayatna is not mentioned in the gloss on yoga, but in VSc 6.2.11 it says prayatna only is unable to lead to abhyudaya. The gloss seems to acknowledge that yoga is necessarily linked to prayatna, both relating to abhyudaya.
[1162] Here I refer explicitly to VSc 9.13 where manas stays in the soul only, which implies a form of 'stillness of mind'; the particle 'eva' (only) I take to be here the arresting of its movement outside ātman.

perceptions, while in mokṣa the same contact disappears altogether with śarīra and everything called jīvana. The difference between the two is that yoga refers only to practice within the embodied self, while mokṣa is an ultimate state of the disembodied self. Though yoga annihilates the role of mind, as well as some of vaiśeṣikaguṇas like sukha and duḥkha, yet, because of keeping the 'mind-soul-contact' in place, it is unable to be a final step to liberation,[1163] but only to alleviate some vaiśeṣikaguṇas of the self. As per definition of VSc 5.2.20, we shall conclude that Candrānanda does not seem to talk about a salvation of a Jīvanmukti kind. Yoga thus is not directly a soteriological state, but plays only an ontic and cognitive role within the embodied self.

FUNCTION OF YOGA. The textual evidence we have from VSc gives us clues as to the relevance of yoga in the soteriology of the system, as well as the existence of a particular practice, which the Vaiśeṣikas must have followed. Thus, in VSc 5.2.17-18 the use of vāyunigraha, (vāyu synonym for ātman), is most probably a proof of prāṇāyāma; in fact, VSc 5.2.18 hints precisely to 'yogaṅga', in which we should see one of the limbs of Patañjali's Yogasūtra.[1164] Pratyāhāra, which according to YS 2.54 is the 'withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects', is clearly indicated in VSc 9.13 and VSc 5.2.17 where the 'withdrawal of senses from objects, and of the mind from senses' are spoken of. In addition, VSc 9.13 speaks of a state of mind fixated in the soul only (mana ātmany eva yadā samādhīyate) must be equivalent of the state of concentration of the mind into the soul (samādhi). There are certainly other practical aspects of yoga, not mentioned

[1163] However, annihilating sukha and duḥkha, which yoga does, is not yet liberation because mokṣa is a much more radical state. VSc 5.2.20 expresses mokṣa in negative terms: it is the state when the cognitive contact between mind and soul is no longer present, when jīvana no longer takes place, nor the emergence of a body. Perception, like mind, and the whole of Vaiśeṣika's epistemology have only an instrumental role, because liberation for Candrānanda is transcending all of it. Yoga is not only enhancing cognition, as Lysenko noted, but in VSc it seems to remove, in the embodied state of ātman, some of the self's vaiśeṣikaguṇas like sukha and duḥkha; it, also takes place in the absence of 'ordinary cognition' (catuṣṭayasannikarṣa).

[1164] The sūtra explains that, what in this context designates ātman, is the embodied self, and VS 5.2.18 says, the action of ātman refers to the action of the 'body' (kāya).

explicitly in VSc 5.2.17 and 9.13. The particle '-ādi' from yogādyanuṣṭhāna (VSc 6.2.11) leaves room to speculate that yoga, being a practice (anuṣṭhāna) must have involved other limbs from Patañjali's Yoga; VSc second āhnika abounds with restrictive rules of conduct (niyama) which are deemed to bring forth abhyudaya. In addition, brahmacarya, one of the five components of 'yama' limb of Yoga (YS 2.30) is mentioned in the list of VS 6.2.2, and gloss. Like all other twelve actions (in VSc 6.2.2), yoga practice is a dharmic action in the sense that it can produce a particular yogic dharma (yogajadharma).[1165] What is the dharma born of yoga? The 'specific dharma' occurs twice, once in VSc 9.13 and a second time in 9.28. In the latter case it said that both ārṣa and siddha forms of knowledge are said to be produced from a 'specific dharma' out of a mind-soul conjunction (viśiṣṭād dharmād ātma manaḥ saṃyogācc'otpadyate). Presumably this dharma has an enhancing gnostic implication, not necessarily soteriological. Yoga refers to the working of mind and the acquisition of knowledge, rather than to soteriology directly. Since dharma (which is one of the two sides of adṛṣṭa) is an effect of yoga it cannot lead to mokṣa. VSc 5.2.14 explains that the liberation of the yogis comes into effect only after the primordial action of mind is annihilated at the beginning of a 'new cyclical era' (sargādau), which annihilation averts the formation of new saṁsāric body.

A second important role of yoga relates most probably to the knowledge of the self which as VSc 10.21 states, is one of the prerequisites to niḥśreyasa (ātmā jñātavya). The substratum of such knowledge is the self itself: tatra bhavatāṁ svasmin ātmani jñānaṁ pratyakṣam (VSc 9.13). This self-knowledge of the self about itself (svasminnātmani) is caused by two things: 1) a different and specific kind of mind-soul-conjunction; and 2) it is a knowledge produced by a specific 'yogic dharma'

[1165] NK too mentions a particular dharma acquired by the practice of yoga (Jhā. ed. 1916, p. 596 in section on 'dharmalakṣaṇa', PD 308-16). In NK, the dharma of yoga is in the context of knowledge of self and cessation of all pain.

(yogajadharma).[1166] It appears that yogajadharma obtains the perception of the self. Now we know that dharma has many shades of meaning in VSc, but in this context yogajadharma must be, at least indirectly a soteriological dharma, to which both VS 1.1.2 and VSc 6.2.12-19, allude. There is a lot of soteriological ambiguity regarding both dharma and yoga, not least because both concepts imply actions of an ethical, religious and cosmic nature; or action is an obstacle towards mokṣa.[1167] On the one hand, dharma is at the service of abhyudaya and bondage because of the dynamics of adṛṣṭa (dharma and adharma) and on the other hand, both VSc 1.1.2 (yato'bhyudaya niḥśreyasa siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ) and VSc 6.2.12 (idānīṁ niḥśreyasahetuṁ dharmam āha) talk about a dharma that leads to niḥśreyasa. As we shall argue later on, both yoga and dharma in VSc undergo a re-interpretation, with the scope to bridge and merge opposite concepts: both ethical and soteriological.

Conclusion. The usage of yoga by Candrānanda looks as though yogipratyakṣa was primarily a practice, which targeted the mind-soul connection. This has a two-fold implication: on the one hand the realisation (through inference or perception) of the nature of 'I' (VSc 3.2.4, 9), and on the other hand, a psycho-ethical implication, namely the elimination of at least two vaiśeṣikaguṇas, sukha and duḥkha (VSc 5.2.17). In relation to this latter implication, yoga occurs again in the context of a series of yamas and niyamas of VSc 6.2. It is not coincidental that in both VSc 5.2 and VSc 6.2 both yoga and mokṣa are discussed. Yoga as discussed in VSc seems to prove that Candrānanda

[1166] Faddegon 1969, p. 294 talks about two branches of Vaiśeṣikas, one that admits direct perception of ātman (VSs 9.1.11), and the other denying it (VSs 8.1.2); his views however are grounded on Śaṅkaramiśra's Sūtrapāṭha.

[1167] As long as manas inclines towards objects and senses outside the soul, mind becomes attachable, and able to mix with a new garbha, and a new body, a process called life (jīvana) by Candrānanda. As VSc 5.2.19 states, manas is the one which moves (upasarpaṇa, apasarpaṇa), and that which produces a new anatomical life, through the contact which it establishes with the sense-objective world. Mokṣa would be the complete non-emergence of the body, but more importantly, the total absence of these contacts which motional mind establishes. Liberation is the abolition of motion; it is a motionless state of self.

was acquainted with Pantañjali's aṣṭāṅga.[1168] VSc 6.2 is one āhnika predominately concerned with prescriptions and restrictions related to forms of purity (śuci VSc 6.2.6.) and impurities (aśuci VSc 6.2.7). They can also be internal (related to the vaiśeṣikaguṇas as VSc 6.2.12-17) and external (related to rituals and four stages of life VSc 6.2.2-8), or made 'with interruption' (upadhā) or 'without interruption' (anupadhā). Yoga binds with several practices, in which internal and external purification play a role. In the school of yoga, there is a similar psycho soteriological objective. As Whicher notes, it is 'purity' (śuddhi) of the metal sattva, in which yoga would be purification of the mind from its 'binding influence of the guṇas'.[1169] As in VSc 1.1.2 where liberation is the absence of guṇas, similarly in YSB 3.50, kaivalya is when the guṇas of the mind 'recede to un-manifest state and brings about their complete separation from puruṣa, which is liberation';[1170] in VS 3.2.17, on the other hand, we have enumerated eight (or nine) vaiśeṣikaguṇas, which the soul must extirpate. A further striking similarity is that the second part of soteriology in both Vaiśeṣika and Yoga darśanas, the liberated state, is defined in YS 4.34 as: 'the abidance of the sentient spirit in its own nature' (kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā),[1171] while in VSc 1.1.2 it is defined as 'ātman's subsistence in its own nature' (adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo).[1172] In each case, ātman gets rid of the binding influence of their respective guṇas, and reaches instead an absolute pure state. In Yoga, this entails not only an ethical dimension but applies chiefly at the mental level,[1173] while in Vaiśeṣika, at the cosmic level soul, divested of all vaiśeṣikaguṇas, finds liberation in pure, separated state. The separation of the entities between dravyas from

[1168] YS 3.50: tadvairāgyād api doṣabījakṣaye kaivalyam. In YS 3.50, Patañjali speaks of 'seeds of evil' (doṣabīja) and their required destruction.
[1169] Whicher, 2005, pp. 601-630.
[1170] YS (Calcutta, ed. P.N. Mukerji. p. 370); and also YS (Gangānātha Jhā, 2nd ed. Adyar, 1934) Gangānātha Jhā identifies 'guṇas of mind' as manifested in the form of 'karmic residue', 'impediments' and 'fruitions'
[1171] YS 4.34: puruṣārthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citiśaktir iti.
[1172] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1173] Whicher, 2005, p. 608.

their guṇas represents the corner stone of the whole of Vaiśeṣika's epistemology. To conclude the role of yoga in Vaiśeṣika soteriology is two-fold. First cognitive, as yoga entails manas–ātman-contact; where it meets the soteriological requirement stated in VSc 10.21 'ātmā jñātavya', (VSc 3.2.9 proof of ahaṁ); and 2) ethical (and dissociative), where yoga acts as a means to liberation, and separates ātman from the senses (VSc 9.13), in which case, ātman is a dravya, while senses are equivalent to the vaiśeṣikaguṇas like dharma, adharma, icchā, and dveṣa (VSc 3.2.17). This separation has an ontological and mental or even social implication, because vairāgya is both internal, as well as external, as we shall see in the following section.

5.4. VAIRĀGYA (VSC 1.1.1; VSC 1.1.6; VSC 10.21)

As shown in the previous section, yoga in VSc entails a certain practice, either external or internal, and because it is engaged in action, it cannot be a direct instrument to soteriology, because as VSc 5.2.20 states, mokṣa is a state of complete disappearance of any action (even the first action of mind), of adṛṣṭa (dharma and adharma), of 'life' (jīvana), 'body' (śarīra), and 'contact' (between ātman and manas). Yet, alongside its 'practice aspect', which corresponds to abhyāsa (YS 1.13; 3.10), another complementary facet related to yoga is vairāgya, which is mentioned by Candrānanda in several places (VSc 1.1.1; 1.1.6; 10.21). Yoga (of Patañjali) is dualistic, hence two aspects relate to it: one is abhyāsa defined by YS 1.13-14, with 'practice', 'exercise',[1174] which is an aspect

[1174] tatra sthitau yatno 'bhyāsaḥ / YS 1.13 / sa tu dīrghakālanairantaryasatkārāsevito dṛḍhabhūmiḥ YS 1.14; it also defined by Feuerstein 1980, p. 79 as 'repetition habit'. Singh, 1970, I, 108, talks about abhyāsa as a process of 'canalisation, re-conditioning, actualisation of the One', while vairāgya as 'a process of de-conditioning by breaking the associations between motives and goals …' (via Feuerstein, 1980, p. 78.)

which encompasses most of the eight limbs of Patañjali YS,[1175] most possibly it is to such a form of 'yoga practice' that Candrānanda refers throughout the second āhnika of VSc 6. All the practices systematised by the eight limbs of Patañjali's YS are classified in two groups: some control the body (yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra), other master the mind (dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi).[1176] But there seems to be also another dualistic understanding of abhyāsa: an abhyasa which is 'a practice of the cessation of presented ideas' (saṃprajñāta-samādhi) and another which is 'an ultra-cognitive enstasy' (asaṃprajñā-samādhi) (YS 1.17-18).[1177] Another important aspect of yoga is 'dispassion' or 'detachment' (vairāgya),[1178] which in Candrānanda is mentioned quite independently from the passages where 'yoga of action' was discussed (VSc 5.2.17; 9.13); which means that what vairāgya signifies for Vaiśeṣikas, it is something different from the 'abhyāsic' aspect of yoga discussed so far.

USAGES OF VAIRĀGYA IN VSC. If yoga (except samādhi) represents a form of action (anuṣṭhāna), vairāgya according to some scholars, is the second complementary aspect in yoga.[1179] In VSc however, there is no explicit reference that such would be the case, as it is not treated next to, or under the treatment of yoga. The contexts in which vairāgya occurs in VSc are 'ethical' (VSc 1.1.1), 'gnostic' (VSc 1.1.6) and 'soteriological' (VSc 1.1.6, 10.21). As known, in YS, vairāgya has, a two-fold typology: 'lower' (social,

[1175] Including, to a certain extent, samādhi, (the eight āṅga of YS of Patañjali: 1) 'restraints' (yama), 2) 'observances' (niyama) ; 3) 'posture' (āsana); 4) 'control of vital airs' (prāṇāyāma); 5) 'withdrawal' (pratyāhāra); 6) fixation (dhāraṇā); 7) 'contemplation'(dhyāna); and 8) 'concentration' (samādhi).
[1176] Pai, 2007, p. 118.
[1177] YS 1.17: vitarkavicārānandāsmitārūpānugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ / YS 1.18: virāmapratyayābhyāsapūrvaḥ saṃskāraśeṣo 'nyaḥ. On the basis of YS 1.17-18, scholars like Feuerstein see in abhyāsa a twofold categorisation as corresponding with the two types of vairāgya.
[1178] Trans. Feuerstein, 1980, p. 80.
[1179] Feuerstein, 1980, p. 78 (see also Singh, and Joshi).

ritualistic) and 'higher' (gnostic and soteriological).[1180] As per VSc, though a concept independent from yoga, it is used in the sense of a supreme form of vairāgya, the Upaniṣadic sense of detachment brought about by knowledge.[1181] This may well correspond with both VSc 1.1.1 and 1.1.6. Vairāgya is a term encountered often in the ascetic literature, and carries different meanings. First, it should be distinguished from the fourth āśrama ('renunciation', saṃnyāsa). While renunciation is a stage of life (āśrama), a social strata (only implicitly alluded in VSc 6.2.3), vairāgya is, on the other hand, a qualifying 'specific guṇa', which as VSc 1.1.1 shows, is one among the three 'prerequisites', which the Brahmin pupil must be endowed with (śiṣya guṇa sampadaṁ), before any Vaiśeṣika knowledge is imparted.[1182]

VSc 1.1.1: ataḥśabdo'pi vairāgya prajñākathāparipākādikāṁ śiṣyaguṇasampadaṁ[1183] hetutvenāpadiśati / yasmādayaṁ śiṣyo guṇasampadā yuktaḥ tato'smai praśnebhyo'nantaraṁ dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ

Gloss VSc 1.1.1: moreover, the word 'thus' indicates that the causation of (dharma) is [granted] to whoever is endowed with special qualities such as 'detachment', 'ability to discuss', 'intelligence', and so on / and because [the pupil] is endowed with specific qualities, after these questions, we shall explain dharma [to him].

[1180] This corresponds well to YS 1.15: dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñā vairāgyam / YS 1.16: tat paraṃ puruṣakhyāter guṇavaitṛṣṇyam. Vidyāraṇya's Jīvanmuktiviveka 64, speaks of a two-fold detachment: 'intense' and 'very intense', (Olivelle 1993, p. 171).

[1181] Trans. Olivelle, 1992, p. 79: 'a renouncer who does not pursue knowledge is a false renouncer', see also Olivelle (2011) who distinguishes two kinds of vairāgya, according to the goal to which they aim: path of heaven (through rituals), and path to liberation (though knowledge).

[1182] Only three guṇas are here mentioned in VSc 1.1.1 ('detachment' vairāgya; 'ability to ask questions' prajñākathā; 'intelligence' paripāka); but the particle '-ādi', must indicate others not mentioned now, or perhaps mentioned in other contexts such as VSc 6.2.2).

[1183] Ruzsa emendation (despite Mss which reads 'gata': Ś; 'guṇa' J); he prefers śiṣyagatasampadaṁ. However, I have followed Jambūvijayaji's reading.

Explanation. It is only after such social virtues, or prerequisites, have been fulfilled that 'dharma teaching' can be imparted. The setting in which vairāgya is mentioned is a schooling one, and the gloss VSc 1.1.1 provides a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.12.1, which fuelled the question which drove the tract's composition.[1184] Vairāgya, to which the gloss alludes, is a virtue quality requested from anyone that seeks dharma or liberation; in other contexts it is 'a necessary condition for renunciation' (saṃnyāsa).[1185] The pupil raises the question about suffering starting from this Upaniṣadic line, but its response will be dealt with fully only in VSc 6.2.17-19. A further passage where vairāgya is mentioned is the gloss VSc 1.1.6, used within a gnostic and soteriological discussion:

VSc 1.1.6: evaṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ[1186] padārthānāṁ sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānaṁ viṣaya doṣa darśana dvāreṇa vairāgyotpattau satyāṁ niḥśreyase sādhye dharma hetuḥ.[1187]

The compound 'vairāgy'otpatta' ('production of vairāgya') must be referring to the other (para) and more superior 'form of detachment' as described by YS 1.16,[1188] which leads to mokṣa (mokṣāśrama).[1189] Gloss VSc 1.1.6 seems to draw a sharp line between abhuydaya and niḥśreyasa, and vairāgya is associated with the latter in order to designate the detachment from abhyudaya which requires 'earth-related sacrifice', 'water oblation', 'immolation of black animal', 'threshing of rice', which as YS 1.15 indicates it represents only a 'lower renunciation' because of the desire involved; but as Olivelle puts it, these

[1184] See Synopsis of VSc.
[1185] Olivelle, 2006, p. 177 (assertion on the following Upaniṣads: Jāb Up. 64; Mai Up. 116; Npu Up 149, PhpUp 278)
[1186] Ruzsa: ṣaṇṇāṁ: all (also J2); ṣaṣṇāṁ J.
[1187] For a translation, see section 5.2 on Discrimination (Parijñāna).
[1188] If it had referred to the kind of detachment of worldly activities, as VSc 6.2.1-3 does, then vairāgya should have been associated in 1.1.6 with abhyudaya (worldly success); but it is not.
[1189] Olivelle, 1993, p. 177. Indeed, the reason why saṃnyāsa is not mentioned in VSc 6.2 (but only 'cāturāśramyam') is because mokṣa is being discussed at the end of that āhnika (VSc 6.2.19) was indeed like in Manu's case the 'fourth āśrama'.

do not lead to absolute liberation.[1190] Like abhyāsa, vairāgya too can be two-fold,[1191] or as Olivelle talks, can have 'different levels of detachment', which determine different classes of (Brahmin) renouncers. In VSc 6.1, there are at least four such types of 'ascetics' mentioned: 'medium' (sama), 'inferior' (hīna), 'qualified' (viśiṣṭa), and 'virtuous' (dhārmika) (VS 6.1.15), as well as those opposite them (viruddhāna), whose companionship must be avoided (VSc 6.1.9-16). Like VSc 4.2, which contains a cosmology in 'several layers' (anekadeśa) (VSc 4.2.4), each one has its particular dharma (VSc 4.2.5), and hence such forms of 'renunciations' must be numerous. This kind of social and ascetical hierarchy may be very different from vairāgya, which is a profound 'mental disposition' translating into 'indifference', 'detachment', 'disgust', and 'loathing' from everything that constitutes saṃsāra.[1192] As VSc 1.1.6 explains, vairāgya follows a gnostic process of the true knowledge of categories, which knowledge reveals the doṣa in the objects, and precedes immediately the liberation state.

Finally, vairāgya fits in again within the doctrine of liberation in VSc 10.21,[1193] a gloss that presents a précis of all the doctrine of liberation, in which theology of the system (Īśvara), cosmology (bhuvana, tanu), epistemology (āmnāya, pramāṇam, parijñāna, jñāna), psychology and metaphysics (ātmā jñātavya) of Vaiśeṣika, are all adduced to back up the possibility of acquisition (adhigama) of niḥśreyasa. Vairāgya relates here directly to a gnostic and intellectual process. Jñāna, the 'true knowledge of the essence of the substances brings to the individual knower an attitude of 'detachment' against the external world, and the impure elements. This separation must concern

[1190] For achieving the final goal the complete renunciation of rites is Olivelle, 2011, p. 181-82.
[1191] Vidyāraṇya's Jīvanmuktiviveka 64, Olivelle, 1993, p. 171. Bṛhat Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad (BSaU 272) a later Upaniṣad (fourteen century AD), draws the same distinction between the two types of soteriology: 'people are bound by rites, and liberated by knowledge; wise ascetics therefore do not perform rites', trans. Olivelle, 1992, p. 256.
[1192] Olivelle, 1993, p. 177.
[1193] VS 10.21: tadvacanād āmnāya prāmāṇyam iti: because of 'that' (tad stands for God) the sacred texts (āmnāya) are authoritative. For the whole gloss and its translation, see the intoduction of this chapter.

primarily the soul, on which mind should ultimately 'fall upon', 'focus', or 'meditate' (upāsana, upakrama). The knowledge of the difference between substances and qualities, and of all other padārthas, reveal doṣa in the objects and the world, out of which the soul must detach and separate (VSc 1.1.6). Separation, renunciation, detachment refer not only to the mental level, but also at the ontological level between categories, particularly between dravyas and guṇas. Release is in both Yoga and Vaiśeṣika context a detachment from guṇas.[1194] Though vairāgya is distinguished from the state of renunciation,[1195] in the ascetic literature such as Bhartṛhari's Vairāgyaśataka, it is subsumed under mokṣa (BSB 91). In Vaiśeṣika bondage is created by vaiśeṣikaguṇas, hence mokṣa would be their absence (VSc 1.1.2); in Yoga system a similar aim of knowledge is to separate the mind 'from the binding influence of the guṇas including buddhi-sattva'.[1196] The way in which Patañjali uses the term guṇas in YS 4.34 might be comparable but not identical with Vaiśeṣika's guṇas (as per VS 3.2.17); in the case of YS, 'guṇas' refer to those qualities of mind which keep puruṣa mingled with prakṛti ('prakṛti identifications').[1197] Here the importance of detachment (vairāgya) comes into play: to create a form of emptiness (abhāva) of any present and future guṇas of puruṣa, to counteract guṇas, and separate the mind from these, and the relocation or ontological realisation of the self.[1198] This is quite similar to yoga's withdrawal of mind from the senses, and its fixation into the soul, as Candrānanda has it in VSc 5.2.17. On the other hand, Vyāsa's Bhāṣya identifies guṇas with the cause and effect (of bondage); kaivalya

[1194] YS1.16: tat paraṃ puruṣakhyāter guṇavaitṛṣṇyam.
[1195] The forth āśrama is not explicitly mentioned by Candrānanda in VSc 6.2 but since sūtra 6.2.3 mentions four āśramas, we assume that is about 'saṃnyāsa'; It seems that VSc is a tract which rose at the time when the fourth āśrama was still in debate (it is possible that its origin is Upaniṣadic or Śramaṇic).
[1196] The three set of guṇas, which belong to mind, are Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. Though Sattva appear to be the most pure, vairāgya implies the eradication of them and their seeds (bīja) as well: tadvairāgyād api doṣabījakṣaye kaivalyam (YS 3.50), via Whicher 2005.
[1197] Whicher, 2005, p. 623.
[1198] Trans. Jhā (YS, 1934), p. 263: 'the abidance of the sentient spirit in its own nature'.

is nothing but the isolation of puruṣa from these guṇas, which keeps citta in contact with 'intellect' or with 'matter'.[1199] The separation between citta and guṇas in YS seems to be two-fold as expressed in YSB 1.16.[1200] Vyāsa draws a distinction between vairāgya (YS 1.15) and paravairāgya (YS 1.16); the former, a lower form of detachment, while the latter a superior one. In addition, the former has an ethical, and social dimension (detachment from women, food, drinks, power, etc.),[1201] while the latter has a gnostic, ontological and soteriological dimension. In this form of vairāgya, knowledge as discrimination plays a major role, which renders kaivalya and vairāgya close and related concepts.[1202]

5.5. Conclusion

The chapter dealt at length with three soteriological methods of liberation: 1) the knowledge of ātman, 2) knowledge of categories, and 3) yoga practice. All of them have fundamentally a gnostic orientation, whence the emphasis on the epistemology in this section. To summarise, the method of obtaining liberation is knowledge, and this entails theoretical (doctrine of ātman and all other categories, and doctrine of knowledge) and practical steps for its achievement (yoga and vairāgya). Among them, the theoretical aspect (parijñāna) is dominant. In both VSc 1.1.6 and 10.21 Candrānanda provides a summary of the whole doctrine of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology, and such soteriological

[1199] Both P.N. Mukerji and G. Jhā translate refer to guṇas as 'cause and effect' (of bondage), p. 263, 452: puruṣārthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citiśaktir iti).

[1200] YS 1.15 dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñā vairāgyam / YS 1.16 tat paraṃ puruṣakhyāter guṇavaitṛṣṇyam / YSB 1.16 … tad dvayaṃ vairāgyam / tatra yad uttaraṃ taj jñānaprasādamātram / yasyodaye sati yogī pratyuditakhyātir evaṃ manyate prāptaṃ prāpaṇīyaṃ, kṣīṇāḥ kṣetavyāḥ kleśāḥ, chinnaḥ śliṣṭaparvā bhavasaṃkramaḥ, yasyāvicchedāj janitvā mriyate mṛtvā ca jāyata iti / jñānasyaiva parā kāṣṭhā vairāgyam / etasyaiva hi nāntarīyakaṃ kaivalyam iti.

[1201] Olivelle, 2011, p. 55; 77 (women and food restrictions), and for the old dualistic separation of dharma in pravṛtti and nivṛtti, p. 58 (Mānava Dharmaśāstra 12.88-91).

[1202] In YS 3.50 vairāgya implies a destruction of the seeds of evil, not only of the guṇa themselves: tadvairāgyād api doṣabījakṣaye kaivalyam.

knowledge comprises the following aspects: 1) the knowledge of the true nature of the six padārthas and of their difference and similarity (ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānaṁ) of which, dravya and guṇas are particularly important padārthas in soteriology; 2) the knowledge of the self (ātmā jñātavya); 3) the knowledge of doṣa in objects (viṣayadoṣadarśana); 4) complete 'detachment'(vairāgya) from objects, and their doṣas. I have identified in these two latter aspects, the yoga practice, which Candrānanda accepted into the system. Both the doctrine and the method of liberation in Vaiśeṣika are highly dualistic because it separates self from matter, and separates the soteriological knowledge itself in multiple dualities such as 'pure' (vidyā) versus 'impure' (avidyā) knowledge, sādharmya versus vaidharmya, ārṣajñāna versus siddhadarśana, yoga versus vairāgya, abhyudaya versus niḥśreyasa. Though a pluralistic system, Vaiśeṣika's soteriology bears close similarities with dualistic soteriologies of ancient India, such as Sāṃkhya and Jaina, as well as with classical Greek gnostic philosophical systems (Eleatics, and Orphism) which I briefly discussed in the introductory chapter.

Chapter 6. Final Conclusions

This thesis presented the nature and function of Vaiśeṣika soteriology from several perspectives, comparative (first and third chapters), textual (second chapter), ontological (fourth chapter), and epistemological (fifth chapter). It sought to present a picture of a doctrine as it was in the second half of the first millennium AD, a period from which the fundamental text of Candrānanda's Vṛtti dates. As such, the method was largely comparative, and did not aim to establish the history of Vaiśeṣika sources. It presented some lines of thought which exhibit marked similarities with gnostic soteriologies, an area that might contribute to a future project on cross-cultural comparative philosophy. There are several conclusions which this research puts forward: Vaiśeṣika soteriology can be summarised in a few concepts as meta-cosmic, meta-individualist, meta-gnostic, and meta-ethical, because all spatial-corporality, individuality, ethical qualities (dharma) and knowledge (buddhi) of ātman, lose their ontological existence in mokṣa.

6.1. Ontological Conclusions

The main argument of the current thesis, is to demonstrate the case which both Sūtrapāṭha and VSc make from the very beginning, that there is such a thing as Vaiśeṣika 'soteriontology'. The term, which I have encountered at Halbfass, is unexplained by the scholars, and more generally by the Vaiśeṣika scholarship. In this concluding chapter, I wish to list the findings and observations at which I have arrived in the course of my research.

1) First, Vaiśeṣika is a substantialist, realistic system of thought, and its soteriology is deeply ontological; the liberated ātman, being seen as a dravya, depleted of its vaiśeṣikaguṇas (vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ) (VSc 1.1.2; 3.2.17). Such a state entails not only the destruction of body (as in the section 'Body and Eschatology' as per VSc 5.2.14; 6.2.18; 10.7-10), but also the impossibility of the emergence of a 'new birth' (as discussed in 'Body and Cosmogony' section, substantiated by VSc 5.2.19 & VSc 6.2.18).

2) Second, the nature of soteriology is dualistic, because it acknowledges the 'separation' (viyoga) between substance and quality, between soul and body, between non-composite (ātman) and composite (śarīra), between 'eternal' (nitya) and 'non-eternal' (anitya). The dualism can be noticed at the epistemological gnostic level too, where two methods of inquiry, sādharmya and vaidharmya, seek to discern between similarities and dissimilarities between padārthas, where dravya is a chief category. In the first two adhyāyas of VSc, vaidharmya is the most developed method of all; and we know that the soteriological dualism represents also the separation from the role of saṃyoga, which takes place between ātman and manas.

3) Vaiśeṣika doctrine of liberation is meta-cosmic; by which soul exists outside any cosmic level, any 'outer-world' (e.g. Brahmāloka, Viṣṇuloka), or 'heaven' (svarga). As such, Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is not Vedic, but purely ontological, that is to say the pure existence of self as being. We must underline the unchangeable character of such a state, in which the law of karma ceases to operate. Soul is no longer under the influence of biological life (jīvana), neither under a 'composite body' (jantu) that returns like a pot (VSc 6.2.18), nor contained by a changing world (saṃsāra).

4) Meta-gnostic. Although knowledge either as a 'capacity of perception' (buddhi) or 'objective data' (jñāna), plays a major role in the obtainment of salvation as it has a purgative role for the ātman to detach itself from doṣas (vairāgya), in the final ontological state, Vaiśeṣika has no room for it as an ontological quality of the self. Buddhi, together with all other eight vaiśeṣikaguṇas, disappears completely; both Candrānanda and later commentators are consistent in denying bliss, in any form, - gnostic or otherwise – in the mukti state. At the cognitive level, where 'ordinary perception' is a four-fold contact (saṃyoga) between ātman, manas, indriya, and ārtha, soteriology takes place gradually, in which context yoga and vairāgya, both of which intellectual practices, help to detach the soul from senses and objects. Yoga is not a direct, but only an indirect means to liberation, in that it cuts manas from senses, and objects (the external world). Even though manas concentrates on ātman in a state of samādhi, yet, soul is still 'bound' by manas and cognisance; as the difficult gloss VSc 5.2.14 seems to infer, even yogis, and souls depleted of bodies, can remain 'unsaved', stuck as they were, in a limbo.

5) Meta-ethical. The lack of buddhi in liberation brings inevitably under question, the problem of ethics. It seems that for Vaiśeṣika, ethics are concerned with dual notions: 'beneficial' (hita) and 'non-beneficial' (āhita), 'suffering' (sukha) and 'pain' (duḥkha), 'desire' (icchā) and 'aversion' (dveṣa), all of which are overcome in the final state of liberation. Meta-ethics situate the debate beyond the binary notions, therefore vairāgya, is a 'radical detachment' from any choice that is fuelled by icchā and prayatna. Vairāgya is a state of stillness, absolute indifference, and untouchability. Doṣa, commonly translated as 'impurity', has no ethical, or moral connotation of our perception of 'sin' (which may be rather applicable to adharma). It represents the ontological confusion of

entities, brought about by their composite character. The ethical implication is not moral, but rather intellectual. Liberation is an ontological state of entities, of the 'pure' ātman itself, as dravya, from whence the Upaniṣadic injunction of contemplation of ātman.

6.2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

The second major feature of the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika's soteriology is the way in which the self mixes with the 'changing world' (saṃsāra). As the fourth chapter discussed in its second part (dynamic dimension) liberation is achievable only when the relationship with body and cosmogony ends, both of which stay in close relationship to jīvana, janma, and jantu. The changing world, that is to say the 'path of pravṛtti', ('activity' VSc 6.2.17), is therefore an obstruction on the way to liberation, the 'path of nivṛtti'. Although between the two there is a sharp distinction, yet Candrānanda softens the tone as to their corresponding antagonisms. The 'compromise' he finds is in the 'concept of dharma' which in VSc designates not only two vaiśeṣikaguṇas with bonding impact, (dharma and adharma VS 6.2.17-18) but also the 'Vaiśeṣika doctrine itself', which claims to offer solutions for the obtainment of both abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa (VS 1.1.2).[1203] Candrānanda's Vṛtti belongs to a post-Gupta era, and undergoes a doctrinal synthesis, as unanimous response against the Buddhist threat. Therefore, the emphasis is on knowledge (of dharma) rather than on activity (pravṛtti). Salvation, freedom, and 'condition of truth' (ontology) are fundamentally speaking, 'existential questions', which

[1203] Soteriological synthesis between the two, there seems to be, not a separation as Olivelle put it, but rather a smooth synthesis. Speaking about the 'new world' portrayed in the Upaniṣadic era, Olivelle states that 'liberation is meta-ritual', not only ineffective but 'in fact, a cause of human bondage and suffering'. Yet, in VSc 6.2.2, sacrifice has more of a positive connotation than the Vedic ritualistic one, which Olivelle had in mind. In the gloss, Candrānanda clarifies what he means by yajña, namely 'giving' (dāna): yajñaḥ pākayajñādayaḥ / dānaṁ suvarṇādidānam abhayadānaṁ.

were at the heart of the competing schools, āstika and nāstika, and which had repercussions not only over social, political, identity and intellectual debates of the subcontinent, but also far reaching implications over the religious, philosophical and existential thought in the second half of the first millennium AD. Knowledge and epistemology of the ontological categories was the method par excellence to achieve liberation; it included several aspects:

1) The knowledge of the true nature the six padārthas and of their difference and similarity (ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānaṁ) – dravya and guṇa were particularly important padārthas in soteriology. The prevailing method was to discern, differentiate, and dissociate (vaidharmya) the composite things from the non-composite world constituents. It is a gnostic path, though in its goal would become, as I discussed in the nature of soteriology, meta-gnostic, since knowledge is transcended together with cosmos.

2) The knowledge of the self ('ātmā jñātavya') was paramount in the above-mentioned schema of differentiation, and because of its composite and embodied nature, ātman was prone to multiple eschatological embodiments (saṃsāra). The knowledge of the self is co-extensive with the knowledge of reality and cosmos; ātman is a substance, which finds its liberation in its solitary, non-composite state divested of vaiśeṣikaguṇas including cognition itself. Although cognition plays a soteriological role, it would eventually exhaust itself. As long as conjunction and disjunction exist, cognition, since it depends on such contact, (saṃyoga) would keep ātman in relation to the external sense objective world (saṃsāra) (VSc 6.2.18).

3) The nature of knowledge in Vaiśeṣika is predominantly dualistic, and negative, in that it seeks doṣa in objects (viṣayadoṣadarśana), in view of their extirpation. The world is full of suffering partly because doṣa can cause ailments in senses, 'tendencies' (saṃskāra) which as a result can compromise the purity of knowledge itself. The cause of bondage is wrong or 'impure knowledge' (avidyā).

4) Complete 'detachment' (vairāgya) from objects and their doṣas is for Vaiśeṣika a desideratum (VSc 1.1.6); that is even more applicable for those who are in pursuit of niḥśreyasa. It is the path of nivṛtti, where knowledge has a dissociative impact on the ātman, because it creates a split within the self between its ontological nature (ātman as dravya) and its phenomenological nature (ātman with vaiśeṣikaguṇas).

5) Finally, yoga does not clearly appear from VSc to be a means to liberation, not least because in the gloss 5.2.14, the yogis, through their effort, can still be susceptible to the saṁsāric influence of adṛṣṭa. As known, the two aspects of yoga are vairāgya and abhyāsa, and VSc 5.2.14 refers to the latter. Yoga is a performative act (yoganuṣṭhāna) (VSc 6.2.11), and its function involves several guṇas, such as a 'yogic dharma' (yogajadharma) (VSc 9.13), 'effort' (prayatna) (VSc 5.2.14), as well 'contact' (saṃyoga) (VSc 9.13; 5.2.17), which 'contact' is a serious obstruction in the soteriological state. However, yoga has another aspect as well (vairāgya) by which ātman separates itself from the sense-objective world. When Candrānanda discusses yoga and mokṣa jointly (VSc 5.2.15-16; 5.2.22), he does it in order to establish a synthesis between the path of pravṛtti and the path of nivṛtti. The relationship is highly problematic, but the concept of yoga becomes an outlet to depressurise the tension between the two.

6.3. INTER-TEXTUAL AND INTRA-TEXTUAL CONCUSIONS

Inter-textual. Throughout the current thesis, I sought to offer an inter-textual comparative look over the category 'soteriontology'. The systems I have analysed offered interesting similarities, which might demonstrate the kinship of an ancient dualistic soteriology, which Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā of Prābhākara, and Jaina traditions share in common. By that, I mean the separation of pure ātman from the contamination with matter. In terms of the method of salvation Vaiśeṣika is akin to Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣika, a Buddhist realistic school of thought, whose ontological classification of seventy-five dharmas, resemble Vaiśeṣika's. Mutual influences, particularly in the area (Kaśmīr) where the two schools thrived, could represent material for further research. In Candrānanda, dharma acquires different meanings; as far as soteriology goes, dharma usually carries the meaning of 'factor', (a vaiśeṣikaguṇa); but we also see that the Sūtrapāṭha (1.1.1-3) takes dharma in a more synthetic way, one comparable with 'contemporary texts' like Gītā, or Rāmāyaṇa. Like yoga, whose role of synthesis had been underlined, Candrānanda uses dharma to coalesce conflicting 'soteriologies' (abhyudaya versus niḥśreyasa) and different 'paths of action' (pravṛtti versus nivṛtti). The two-fold aspect of dharma, noticed in VSc, however, shows the attempt of Candrānanda to reconcile two old tendencies: Vedic (ritualistic) and Upaniṣadic (gnostic).[1204] Dharma is not only the teaching of the Vedas, but also the extension of them, 'the summa of all true knowledge, whether contained in the Vedic texts or not', which for the Vaiśeṣikas is the Vaiśeṣika system itself.

[1204] The 'conflict' had already existed within the Vedic tradition itself; Heesterman, 1978: pp. 80-95 shows a conflict between Vedic 'unresolved paradoxes' (centred on sacrifices) and 'positive cosmology' (e.g. Viśnusmṛti), p. 91. Potter 1980, p. 266, recognises the dualistic tendencies of the Vedic tradition. Kumar, 2013, referring to a later stage of Indian thought, says that the two aspects are in fact integrally related to each other and are two stages of the same path to liberation'; this is very much the case once the synthesis of dharma took place in Vaiśeṣika system (VSc 1.1.2).

Intra-textual. Within the Vaiśeṣika studies, and Indian philosophy, the publication of VSc at Baroda in 1961 represents a milestone. The publication of NCC volume 32, which offers an expanded list of Vaiśeṣika MSS, calls for the urgent task of collecting and publishing of a critical edition based on these MSS. The current thesis represents a starting point and a call for such an urgent task on the part of philologists. The Vaiśeṣika system, and its sources, continues to be generally ignored by scholars and students, partly because a complete English translation does not exist; such translation has been done throughout this research and an annotated translation of VSc is ready for publication. For space limitation, I have delayed such a task; the readers should refer instead to the thematic synopsis I have provided in the second chapter. The next step forward is the descriptive list of all these MSS (a task which I have partially completed) and the acquisition of a photocopy for all of them. Though the VSc of Candrānanda is good enough to be relied upon, the necessity of collecting all the MSS of Sūtrapāṭha as mentioned in NCC, and the reconstruction of an 'independent transmission' of VS, is an urgent task.

6.4. Further Questions

The comparative methodology with which I proceeded in this current research has kindled several questions, which might open new research perspectives. One of these is a comparative philosophical inquiry on terms like vairāgya and catharsis, one from the side of Indian philosophy, the other from the Greek classical thought (Aristotle's Poetics). Have these two terms similar ethical (purgative), or intellectual connotations, that share a similar worldview, or are they just completely different terms? In a Heideggerian vein, Hans Jonas sees a series of analogies across the ages, between

modern philosophical Existentialism and the gnostic movement of the Greco Roman ancient world. Could it be that a similar project be undertaken to encompass the Greek classical and mediaeval Indian thought? Is there any similarity between the gnostic movement and the Indian systems? What is the notion of freedom, and destiny, contingence and necessity, in their respective worldviews? An inquiry into such questions, the current thesis argues, can start with ontology that has the potential to engage with both scientific and existential questions, all across cultures, and times, old and new. What is such 'comparative ontology' about? Moreover, what kind of 'agenda' should such a project take? Theological, philosophical, purely scientific? Could Indian philosophy, or more specifically Vaiśeṣika's ontology, complement our Western ontology? Is there any room for comparative philosophy, with ontology as its centre? Is the ancient model of Vaiśeṣika's ontology, relevant theoretical approach for a fresh philosophy of science, and an interdisciplinary research between science and religion, humanities and sciences? Yet, the current research did not aim to respond to such questions, but wished only to begin with them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

THE VEDAS AND UPANIṢADS

Rig-Veda. Trans. Ralph T.H. Griffith. 1896. (Online) available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rigveda/rvi02.htm

The Rig Vedas (input by H.S. Ananthanarayana & W. P. Lehman) (Gretil, online)

The Upaniṣads. Trans. Olivelle, P. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008.

The Bhagavad-Gita: with a commentary based on the original sources. Zaehner, R. C. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

VAIŚEṢIKA

VS
Sūtrapāṭha of Candrānanda's Vṛtti (as contained primarily by Candrānanda's Vṛtti; it also incorporates a series of MSS which transmit Sūtrapāṭha alone. See their description in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

VSc
Vaiśeṣikasūtras with Candrānanda's Vṛtti. GOS, 136. Baroda; Oriental Institute. 1961. (Both editions can be accessed at: Weston Library (Ind. Sansk. Ser. D. 1/136), and Oriental Institute, Oxford (508 Gae/136).

VSv
Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous commentary. A. Thakur ed. Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute. 1957.

Nozawa
'A Comparative Table of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. Nozawa, M. ed. Numazu College of Technology, in NII Electronic Library Service. 1982: 75-93.

VSi
Il Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra Di Kaṇāda. Introduzione, testo, traduzione, commento, lessico per Leonardo V. Arena. Urbino: Universita Degli Studi di Urbino. 1982.

VSś
Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda (with the commentary of Śaṅkaramiśra and extracts from the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa. Trans. Nandalal Sinha. Allahabad: The Panini Office Bhuvaneswari Arama. 1911.

The Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇāda, with comments from the Upaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra and the Vivṛitti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, Trans. Gough, Archibald Edward. Benares: E.J. Lazarus 1873.

DP
Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārthaśāstrī of Candra, Thomas, F.W. ed. Trans. H. Ui. London: Royal Asiatic Society. 1917. (Sanskrit reconstruction from a Chinese translation)

DP
Keechi Miyamoto. The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1996. (Contains an English trans. of DP; All my quotations are from this edition).

PD
Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṃgraha. Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya: a complete word index to the printed editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya. Bronkhorst, J. & Ramseier, Y. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1994. (All my references are from this edition).

Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda with the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara Translated by Mahamahopadhyaya Gangānātha Jhā, Benares: Medical Hall Press. 1916.

NK
Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara. In Jhā ed. 1916. See PD.

Nyāyakandalī. A Commentary on Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with three sub-commentaries. Vadodara: Oriental Institute. Jetly, J.S. ed. 1991.

Vyo
Vyomavati of Vyomaśivācārya. Varanasi: Sampurnanad Sankrit Vishvav Idyalaya Press. Sastri, Gaurinath ed. 1983.

Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali. In An Indian Rational Theology. G. Chemparathy, ed. Vienna: Gerold & Co. 1972.

Kir
Praśastapādabhāṣyam: with the commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Jetly, J. S. ed. GOS 154. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1971.

SP
Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī. Ed. Gurumurti, D; Radhakrishnan, S. Madras: Theosophical Pub. House. 1932.

Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī with commentary of Jinavardhanasūri. Jetly, J. S. ed. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology. 1963.

Lkṣ
Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Jhā, Śaśinātha; Keśavakāśmīri Bhaṭṭācārya. eds. Darbhanga: Mithilāvidyāpīṭhapradhānena. 1963.

Vṛttikāra
Candrānanda quotes from Vṛttikāra (VSc 9.18; and VSc 9.21), but Thakur, 2003 is not sure whether this is the same as Vṛtti of Ātreya's Vṛtti.

Vādīndra's Kaṇādasūtranibandha, 'as many as twenty times the views of Ātreya's Vṛtti

Ātreya's Vṛtti, Vadidevasūri's Syadvādaratnākara: 945, refers to Ātreya's Vṛtti, quotes and criticises VS 1.1.14 and 1.1.16.

Ruzsa
Candrānanda's commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra by Ferenc Ruzsa. Critical edition of all MSS [available at: https://elte.academia.edu/FerencRuzsa].

Ruzsa 2010
Two MSS of Candrānanda's Vṛtti on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and the Errors of the Copyists. In Johannes Bronkhorst & Karin Preisendanz eds. From Vasubandhu to Caitanya. Studies in Indian Philosophy and Its Textual History. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. 2010: 173–183.

Isaacson PhD
Isaacson, Harunaga. Materials for the Study of the Vaiśeṣika system. (Doctorate Thesis submitted at Rijksuniversiteit te Lieden. 1995.

EXTERNAL WITNESSES ON VAIŚEṢIKA SOURCES

MBhD
Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari. Critically edited by Palsule, Gajanan Balkrishna. Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1985-1991.

Viṣṇubhaṭṭaviracitā Anargharāghavapañcikā. The commentary of Viṣṇubhaṭṭa on the Anargharāghava of Murāri; critical edition, Harinarayana Bhat B.R. ed. Pondichéry: Institut français de Pondichéry. 1998.

Kiraṇāvalībhāskaraḥ of Padmanābhamiśra.[1205] Kaviraj, Gopinath ed.
Benares: Government Sanskrit Library. 1920.

NYĀYA

NS
Gautama's Nyāyasūtra & Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya: along with a free and abridged Trans. of the Elucidation by Phanibhūsana Tarkavāgīśa; Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad; Gangopadhyaya, Mrinalkanti eds. Calcutta, Indian Studies: past & present. 1967-1976, vol. 1.

[1205] Padmanabhamisra's Kiraṇāvalībhaskara, 12, says that 'a bhāṣya' was written by Rāvaṇa.

The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. Trans. Mahāmahopādhyāya Satiśa, Allahabad: Sudhindranātha Vasu. 1913.

NSV
Nyāya Sūtras with Vātsyāyana's commentary. Trans. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya. Calcutta: Indian Studies. 1982.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamāñjarī. Trans. J.V. Bhattacharyya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1978. Vol. I.

TB
Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra, trans. A.B. Gajendragadkar and R.D. Karmarkar. Eds., Poona: Aryabhushan Press. 1934. (I have also used Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra S.R. Iyer, ed. 1979 and Jhā ed. 1967).

Tarkavāgīśa's Elucidation
Tarkavāgīśa's Elucidation in NS. 1967 ed. op.cit.

TS
Tarkasaṁgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Athalye, Yashawant Vasudev ed. & Bodas, Mahadev Rajaram trans. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974.

Nyāyalīlāvatī of Vallabhācārya. Śāstrī, Harihara ed. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1927-1934.

Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Jhā, Śaśinātha ed. Darbhanga, 1963.

Jayanta's Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamāñjarī: the compendium of Indian speculative logic. Bhattacharyya, Janaki Vallabha ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.

MĪMĀṂSĀ

ŚB
Śabarabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmi. Ed. Jhā, Ganganatha. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1933-36.

ŚV
Ślokavārttika Kumārila with Ślokavārtika Sūtras. Trans. Gaṅgānātha Jhā. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press. 1909.

ŚVK
Kumārila's commentary on ŚV (in ŚV, Jhā ed. 1909).

BR
Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra. Ed. S. K Ramanatha Sastri. 5 vol. Madras: Madrapurīyaviśvavidyālayaḥ. 1934-1967.

Pañcika
Prakaraṇapañcika of Śālikanātha. Padurangi, K.T. ed. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 2004.

Śāstradīpikā of Pārthasārathimiśra. Ed. Drāviḍa, Lakṣmaṇaśāstrī. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. 1913-1916.

NMM
Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭapāda's Mānameyodaya. An elementary treatise on the Mīmāṁsā. Ed. Kunhan Raja, Chittenjoor; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre. 1975.

RJ
Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimala in 'Bṛhati: a commentary on Śabarabhāṣya'. Ed. A. Cinnasvāmiśāstrī. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1929-1933.

ŚVM
Śālikanātha's Vyākyārthamātṛkā. In Sarma, Rajendra Nath. ed. Verbal knowledge in Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication. 1990.

SĀṂKHYA

YD
Yuktidīpikā: the most significant commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā. Critical edition by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998.

The Yuktidīpikā. A reconstruction of Sāṃkhya Methods of Knowing. Aachen: Shaker Verlag. Harzer, Edeltraud ed. 2006.

Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya (translated from the Sanskrit by H.T. Colebrooke; also the bhāṣya or commentary of Gauḍapāda, tr. and illustrated. by H.H. Wilson. Bombay: Tookaram Tatya. 1887. (Gretil, online).

SK
Sāṃkhyakārikā. Les stropes de Samkhya avec le commentaire de Gauḍapāda. Trans. Anne-Marie Esnoul. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 1964.

SKg
Gauḍapāda's commentary on SK, 1964.

Tattvakaumudī. An English Trans. with the Sanskrit text of the Tattvakaumudī Sāṃkhya of Vācaspatimiśra. Jhā, Gaṅgānātha, ed. Bombay: Theosophical Publication Fund. 1896.

YOGA

The Yoga Darśana comprising the sūtras of Patañjali with the Bhāṣya of Vyasa trans. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, 2nd ed., Adyar, Theosophical Publishing Houses, 1934.

The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: a new translation and commentary Patañjali. Feuerstein, Georg ed. Folkestone: Dawson. 1979.

VEDĀNTA

BS
Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Trans. Apte V.M. Bombay: Popular Book Depot. 1960.

BŚB
The Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Thibaut, G. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1890-1904.

Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāraṇya. Subrahmanya Sastri, eds. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre. 1978.

JAINISM

SAP
The teachings of Lord Mahāvīra. Śrī Mahāvīra Vacanāmṛtam. Shah, Dhirajlal Tokershi. ed. Mahāvīra. Bombay: Śrī Mahāvīra Vacanāmṛta Pracāra-Samiti. 1967.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa. Samayasāra (The Soul-Essence). The Sacred Books of the Jains. Vol. 8. Trans. & Introduced by Rai Bahadur J. L. Jaini. 1930.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa's Samayasāra. The Nature of the Self (with commentary of Amritachandra. Chakravarti, A. ed. 1st ed. Banaras: Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kashi. 1950.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa. Niyamasāra (The Perfect Law). Salvation through self-discipline. Jain, Jagdish P. ed. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. 2005.

AM
Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an authority: along with English translation, introduction, notes, and Akalaṅka's Sanskrit commentary Aṣṭaśatī
Samantabhadrasvāmī. Śāha, Nagīna Jī. ed. Ahmedabad: Jagruti Dilip Sheth. 1999.

RVa
Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra of Samantabhadrasvāmi. Jain, Champat Rai, ed. Bijnor: The Jaina Parishad Publishing House. 1931.

Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti. A study of Tattvārthasūtra with bhāṣya: with special reference to authorship and date. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. 1982.

Tattvārtharājavārtika of Akalaṅka. In Jaina karmology: English Trans. with notes on chapter eight of Tattvārtharājavārtika of Akalaṅka: royal semi-aphorismic explanatory on reals on Tattvārthasūtra (treatise on reals. of Ācārya Umāsvāmi. Trans. Jain, N. L. Pārśvanātha Vidyāpīṭha. 1st ed. Varanasi: Parshvanath Vidyapeeth. 1998.

SAP (for sūtras)
Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi (in Jain, S. A. ed. 1960)

SAPp (for gloss)
Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi (in Jain, S. A. ed. 1960)

Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Śrīmallavādisūri with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Simhasūri. GOS 116. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1952.

Simhasūri's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī. In GOS 116. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1952.

SSB
Akalaṅka. Svarupa-sambodhana. The enlightened vision of the self. Goyal, Devendra Kumar & Prasad, J.S. Jagdish eds. New Delhi: Radiant Publisher. 2005.

HSDS
Haribhadrasūri. Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya. A Compendium of six philosophies
Trans. Murty Satchidananda, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers. 1986 [1957].

BUDDHISM

AK
Abhidharmakośa (de la Vallée Poussin, 1923)

AKB
L'Abhidharmakośa de Vāsubandhu. Trans. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris: Paul Geuthner. 1923.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vāsubandhu. Trans., and annotated, Gelong Lodrö Sangpo, Introd. Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti, vol. 1-4. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Press. 2012.

Nāgārjuna. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay. Trans. Inada, K. Kenneth ed. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press. 1970.

Dk
Abhidharma-Dhātukāya-Padaśāstrā (Treatise on the groups of Elements). Trans. Swati Ganguly. Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers. 1994.

Vāsubandhu's Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi. Chatterjee, K.N. & Sthiramati Dharmapala eds. Kishor Vidya Niketan. 1980.

Jñānaprasthāna of Kātyāyanīputra (retranslated into Sanskrit from Chinese Version of Hiuan Tsang by S.B. Sastri) vol. 1. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1955.

MMK
Madhyamakāvatāra of Candrakīrti. Trans. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, vol. 3-4. Louvain: Neudruck der Ausgabe. 1907-1912.

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. Trans. & Introd. Inada, Kenneth K. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970.

Entretiens de Milinda et Nāgasena traduit du pâli, présenté et annoté par Édith Nolot. Paris: Gallimard. 1995.

Kathāvatthu. Points of Controversy. Taylor, Arnold C. ed. & Trans. Aung S.Z. and Davids. R. London: The Pāli Text Society. London: Pali Text Society; Boston. 1979.

CHINESE CHRONICLES

I-Ching. Chinese monks in India. Biography of Eminent Monks who went to the Western World in Search of the Law during the Great T'ang dynasty Introd. & Trans. Latika Lahiri, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1986.

Travels of Fah-Hian and Sung-Yun. Buddhist Pilgrims from China to India Trans. & Introd. Samuel Beal, London: Trübner & Co. 1869.

A Record of Buddhistic kingdoms: being an account by the Chinese monk, Fa-hien, of his travels in India and Ceylon (A.D. 399-414) in search of the Buddhist books of discipline. Legge, James, ed. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. 1998.

MSS CATALOGUES, ENCYCLOPAEDIA & DICTIONARIES

An alphabetical index of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Chennai, by Vidyasagara Vidyavacaspati & Subrahmanya Sastri, part 2. Chennai, 2015.

NCC[1206]
New Catalogus Catalogorum. Vol. 32. Madras. 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra entry': 2014: 65-68.

A Catalogue of the Manuscripts and Printed Pothis at the Royal Society of Mumbai. Meena Vaishampayan ed. 2012: 140.

Apte Dict.
Apte, Vaman Shivaram. The practical Sanskrit-English dictionary. Revised and enlarged edition. 3v. Poona: Prasad Prakashan. 1957-1959. (online).

ALMOIB
An Alphabetical List of Manuscripts in the Oriental Institute Baroda. Raghavan Nambiyar Śiromaṇi, ed., vol. 1. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1942.

Grimes Dict.
Grimes, J. A Concise dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1996.

Brill's Encyclopaedia of Hinduism. Jacobson, Knut A. ed. vol. 3. Leiden: Brill. 2011.

CSPM
Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakṛti Manuscripts. Munirāja's Śri Punyavijayaji's Collections. Part 1. Compiled by Muniraja Sri Puṇyavijayajī. Ambalal: Shah ed. Ahmedabad: Institute of Indology. 1963.

[1206] For all MSS Catalogues abbreviations I used those made NCC, vol. 28: i-lxxxiv. (e.g. Mysore N.D. vol. 10. : 608-9, can be found there as well as Trav. Uni. Su: Visalakshi ed. Vol. 5. 2000.

Encyclopaedia of Hinduism. Cush, D., Robinson, C., York, M. eds. London: Routledge. 2011.

Encyclopaedia of Jainism, Singh, N.K. ed. Vol. 1. Delhi: Anmol Publications Ltd. 2001.

Potter Encyc.
Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The tradition of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa. Vol 2. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Potter, K ed. 1977. (all volumes, as mentioned in footnotes).

Thakur 2003
Thakur, Anantalal. ed. 2003. Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System. In D.: Chattopadhyaya ed. History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization vol. 2, part 4. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilisations.

HSPCIC
History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, 2003. vol. 2, part 1 & 4. Delhi: Chattopadhyaya, D.: ed. Centre for Studies in Civilizations.

LXX
Septuaginta (Greek Edition). Alfred Rahlfs, and Robert Hanhart eds. (online)

MW dict.
An English-Sanskrit dictionary by Monier-Williams. Nataraj ed. Springfield, VA: Nataraj Books. 2006 (online).

Nyāyakośa. Jhāḷkīkar, M. B. ed. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1928.

Wai D. II: 1970: 776-777. (Descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts: Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍaḷa collection, edited by Jośī, Lakshmaṇaśāstrī; Prajñapāṭhaśāḷā Maṇḍaḷa (Wai, India).

Whitney, William Dwight. A Sanskrit Grammar. Leipzig. &c. 1879, 1891.

LSJ
Liddell & Scott Lexicon - Perseus Digital Library - Tufts University (online). For all references to Greek Classical philosophical sources.

Greek Lexicon of New Testament and Early Christian Literature. Arndt, William F. & Danker, Frederick W eds. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1957) 2000.

ALMOIB
An alphabetical list of manuscripts in the Oriental Institute, Baroda. Compiled by Śiromaṇi, Nambiyar Raghavan. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1942.

CSPM
Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts: Muniraja Sri Punyavijayaji's collection / Edited by Ambalal P. Shah. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Institute of Indology. 1963

GOMLM
An Alphabetical Index of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. Kuppuswami Sastri, S., & Subrahmanya Sastri, P. P. ed. 2015.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Adachi, Toshihide. On the size and mobility of the ātman in the early Vaiśeṣika. In AS 48 (1994): 653-663.

Aklujkar, Ashok. 1970. 'Candrānanda's Date', In JOIB 19 1969/1970: 340-341.

Alderink, L. J. Creation, and Salvation in Ancient Orphism, Chico, California: American Philological Association. 1981.

Amma, Visweswari. Udayana and his Philosophy. Delhi: Nag Publishers. 1985.

Anacker, S. Seven Works of Vāsubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1994.

AS
Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques. Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaiśeṣika. Hong Kong, Bronkhorst, J. ed. 1994. XLVIII, 2.

Austin, J.L. How to do things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975.

Bagchi, C. 'Foreword' in Jñānaprasthāna of Kātyāyanīputra (op cit).

Balcerowicz, Piotr. 'What exists for the Vaiśeṣika'? In Balcerowicz ed. Logic and Belief in Indian philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010: 241-250.

Bana, Bashour ed. Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. New York: Routledge. 2014.

BeDuhn, Jason. New light on Manichaeism: papers from the sixth International Congress on Manichaeism, organized by the International Association of Manichaean Studies. International Conference on Manichaeism (6th : 2005 : Flagstaff, Ariz.). Leiden; Boston: Brill. 2009.

Betegh, Gábor. The Derveni papyrus: Cosmology, Theology, and Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bhaduri, Sadananda. Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1947.

Bhatt, G. 'Mīmāṃsā as a Philosophical System: A survey'. In R.C. Dwivendi ed. Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1994: 3-26.

Bhatt, Govardhan. The basic ways of knowing: An in-depth study of Kumārila's contribution to Indian epistemology. 2nd rev. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1989.

Bhattacharya, R. Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. London: Anthem Press. 2011.

Bhattacharyya, Gopikamohan. Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism. Calcutta: Sanskrit College. 1961.

Biardeau, Madeleine. Théorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le Brahmanisme Classique. Paris: Mouton & Co. 1964.

Black, Brian. The Character of the Self in Ancient India. Priests, Kings and Women in the Early Upaniṣads. New York: State of New York University Press. 2007.

Bond, James W. Suffering: The Jaina Perspective. In Tiwari ed. 1986.

Borman, William. The other side of death: Upaniṣadic eschatology. Delhi : Sri Satguru Publications. 1990.

Boulanger André. In Mémorial Lagrange. Paris: J. Gabalda & Ecole Biblique et Archéologique Française. 1940.

Bronkhorst, J. 'God's Arrival in the Vaiśeṣika System'. JIP, 24:3. 1996: 281-94.

Bronkhorst, J. Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism. Leiden: Brill. 2011a.

Bronkhorst, J. ed. Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques. Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaiśeṣika. Hong Kong, XLVIII, 2. 1994.

Bronkhorst, J. Karma and Teleology. A problem and its solutions in Indian Philosophy. Tokyo: The International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies. 2000.

Bronkhorst, J. Language, and Reality. On an Episode in Indian thought. Leiden: Brill. 2011b.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 'Once again Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 3.1.13'. In AS 1994: 665-82.

Brunius, Tedius. Inspiration and Catharsis: the interpretation of Aristotle's The poetics VI, 1449 b 26. Uppsala: Uppsala University. 1966.

Bulcke, C. The Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Its Origins and Early Development. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1947.

Burton, David. Emptiness Appraised. A critical Study of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy. Richmond, Surrey: Courzon. 1999.

Chakrabarti, Kisor. 'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Universals'. JIP, 3. 1975: 363-82.

Chakraborti, Haripada. Pāśupata Sūtras with Paňchārtha Bhāṣya of Kaundinya. Calcutta: Academic Publishers. 1970.

Chandra, Pratap. Metaphysics of Perpetual Change. The Concept of Self in Early Buddhism. Mumbai: Somaiya Publications Ltd. 1978.

Chatterjee, A. K. A Comprehensive History of Jainism. From the earliest Beginnings to 1000 AD, vol. 1. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd. 2000.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. Cārvāka/Lokāyata. An Anthology of Source Materials. Calcutta: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 1990.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. Indian Philosophy. A Popular Introduction. Delhi: People's Publishing House. 1964.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. Lokāyata. A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism. Delhi: People's Publishing House. 1959.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. Science and Society in Ancient India. Calcutta: Research India Publication. 1977.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. What is Living, and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: People's Publishing House. 1976.

Chau, B. The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1999.

Chemparathy, G. An Indian Rational Theology. Vienna: Indologisches Institut des Universität. 1972.

Chemparathy, G. L'Autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Louvain La Neuve: Centre d'Historie des Religions. 1983.

Chemparathy, G. The Testimony of the Yuktidīpikā concerning the Īśvara doctrine of the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas. In WZKS. 9. 1965: 119-46.

Choong, Yoke Meei. 'Nirvāṇa and Tathatā in the Early Yogācāra Texts: The Bodhisattva's Adaptation of the Śrāvaka-Path' in JIP, 41. 2013: 79-109.

Collins, Steven. Nirvāṇa and other Buddhist felicities: utopias of the Pali imaginaire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.

Collins. Steven. Nirvāṇa, Concept, Imagery, Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010.

Coseru, Christian. 'Naturalism and Intentionality. A Buddhist Epistemological Approach'. In Asian Philosophy 19, 3. 2009: 239-64.

Coulianu, Ioan Petru. Psychanodia, Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1983.

Cox, Collet. Disputed dharma, Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. 1995.

Cox, Collet. 'From Category to Ontology: The Changing role of Dharma in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma'. In JIP 32. 2004: 543–597.

Dasgupta, S. A. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol.1. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1922, 1988.

Dasgupta, S. Indian Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1962.

Dasgupta, S. Natural Science of the Ancient Hindus. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Press. 1987.

Dessein, Bart. 'The Existence of Factors in the three time periods'. In Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung, Vol. 60, 3. 2007: 331–350.

Dhammājoti. Kuala Lumpur. Introduction to Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya of Vāsubandhu, op. cit. 2012.

Dhammājoti. Kuala Lumpur. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. 3rd rev. ed. Hong Kong: Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong. 2007.

Dhirajlal Shah, The teachings of Lord Mahāvīra. Śrī-Mahāvīra vacanāmṛtam. Bombay: Śrī Mahāvīra-Vacanāmṛta-Pracāra-Samiti. 1967.

Dixit, K.K. Early Jainism. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. 1978.

Doniger O'Flaherty, Wendy. ed. Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1980.

Doniger O'Flaherty, Wendy. Karma and Rebirth in the Vedas and Purāṇas. In Karma and Rebirth 1980: 3-37.

Dravid, N.S. 'Anomalies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of Self'. In Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 12, 1. 1995: 1–12.

Drees, William B. Religion, Science, and Naturalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.

Duerlinger, J. Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons. Vāsubandhu's Refutation of the Theory of the Self. London: Routledge Curzon. 2003.

Dundas. Paul. The Jains. London: Routledge. 2002.

Duyvendak J. J. L. Tao Te Ching: The Book of the Way and its Virtue. London: J. Murray. 1954.

Dwivendi, R. C. ed. Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1994.

Edmonds, Radcliffe G. Myths of the underworld journey: Plato, Aristophanes, and the "Orphic" gold tablets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004.

Eliade, Mircea. Techniques du Yoga, 3rd ed. Paris, Gallimard. 1948.

Esnoul, Anne-Marie. Introduction. In Les strophes de Samkhya avec le commentaire de Gauḍapāda. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 1964. (SK)

Faddegon, Barend. The Vaiśeṣika System described with the help of the oldest texts. Amsterdam: Johannes Müller. 1918.

Feuerstein, Georg. The philosophy of Classical Yoga. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1996 [1980].

Flood, Gavin. 'Salvation'. In The Oxford Handbook of Study of Religion, Stausberg, Michael & Engler, Steven eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016.

Flood, Gavin. The Truth Within. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Fowler, H.N. Introduction. Plato's Sophist (Loeb. ed) Cambridge: MA. 1921.

Franco, Eli. eds. Periodization and historiography of Indian philosophy (14th World Sanskrit Conference 2009: Kyoto, Japan). Wien: Sammlung de Nobili, Institut für Südasien. 2013.

Franco, Eli & Preisendanz, K. eds. Beyond Orientalism. The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass, and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 1997.

Frauwallner, E. 'Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram'. In Studia Indologica, Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel, Bonn. 1955.

GIP

Frauwallner, E. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1993.

Frauwallner, E. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. Trans. V.M Bedekar, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1973.

Frauwallner, E. Introduction. In Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Ācārya Sri Mallavādin Ksamasramana, 1-6. Bombay: Sri Jain Ātmanand–Bhavnagar. 1966.

Frauwallner, E. On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vāsubandhu. Rome: MEO. 1951.

Frauwallner, Erich. 'Der ursprünglische Afgang der Vaiśeṣika-Sutrem'. In E. Frauwallner. Nachgelassene Werke I. Wien. 1984: 35-41.

Frauwallner, Erich. Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie. Salzburg: O. Müller. 1953-56.

Frauwallner, Erich. Posthumous Essays. Trans Jayandra Soni. New Delhi; Aditya Prakashan. 1994.

Frazier. J. 'Introduction: The Importance of Thinking Inside the Box' In Frazier J. ed. Categorisation in Indian Philosophy, Thinking Inside the Box, Farnham: Ashgate. 2014: 1-10.

Frutiger, Perceval. Les mythes de Platon: étude philosophique et littéraire. Paris: F. Alcan. 1930.

Furley David J. ed. Pre-Socratic Philosophy, vol. 1. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1970.

Furley, David. The Greek cosmologists, The Formation of the Atomic theory and its earliest critics, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987.

Furtado, Vincent Gabriel. Classical Sāṃkhya Ethics: a study of the ethical perspectives of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikās. Würzburg: Echter. 1992.

Gächter, Othmar. Hermeneutics and language in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: a study in Śābara Bhāṣya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1983.

Gajendragadkar, Veena. Kaṇāda's doctrine of the padārthas, i.e. the categories. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. 1988.

Ganeri, Jonardon. The Concealed Art of the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007.

Gangopadyaya, Mirnal Kanti. Indian Atomism. History and Sources. Calcutta: K.: Bagchi & Co. 1980.

Garge, Damodar Vishnu. Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A study. Poona: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute. 1952.

Garrett, Brian. What is this thing called metaphysics? Oxford: Routledge. 2006.

Gethin, Rupert. 'He Who Sees Dhamma Sees Dhammas: Dhamma in Early Buddhism'. In JIP Vol. 32 2004: 513-542.

Glasenapp von, H. The Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy. Bombay: The Trustees Bai Vijibai Jivanlal. 1942.

Glucklich, Ariel. The sense of adharma. New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press. 1994.

Gokhale, Pradeep. Tutorials (Personal communication, audio file: DM 670221, Pune, 21st February 2016).

Gonda, J. Loka: World and heaven in the Veda. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche U.M. 1966.

Goudriaan, Teun. The Pluriform Ātman from the Upaniṣads to the Svacchanda Tantra. In WZKS 36. 1992: 163-86.

Gross, Jules. La divinisation du chrétien d'après les pères grecs; contribution historique à la doctrine de la grâce. Thesis. University of Strasbourg. 1938.

Hacker, Paul. 'Dharma in Hinduism', JIP 2006, 34: 479-497.

Halbfass, 'Nachgelassene Werke. I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen by Erich Frauwallner', In JAOS 106, No. 4 (Oct. – Dec) 1986: 857-858.

Halbfass, W. 'Karma, Āpurva, and Natural Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of Saṃsāra'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 268-302.

Halbfass, W. 'Remarks on the Vaiśeṣika Concept of Sāmānya'. In J. Tilakasiri ed. Anjali. Papers on Indology and Buddhism. Peradeniya: University of Ceylon, 1970: 137-51.

Halbfass, W. Conceptualizations of 'Being' in Classical Vaiśeṣika. In WZKS 19. 1975: 183-98.

Halbfass, W. India and Europe. An Essay in Understanding. New York: State University of New York Press. 1988.

Halbfass, W. On Being and What There Is. New York: State University of New York Press. 1992.

Halbfass, W. The Vaiśeṣika concept of guṇa and the Problem of Universals. In WZKS 24, 1980: 225-38.

Halbfass, W. Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian Thought. New York: State University of New York Press. 1991.

Handiqui. K. K. Introduction. In Somadeva's Yasástilaka and aspects of Jainism and Indian thought and culture in the tenth century, Sholapur: Jaina Saṁskṛti Saṁrakshaka Sangha. 1949.

Hara, Minoru. Pāśupata Studies. Vienna: De Nobili Institute. 2002.

Harold Coward. 'Kumārila's theory of word meaning in relation to the Sphoṭa theory of Bhartṛhari'. In Dwivendi, R. C. ed. Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994: 215-219.

Harzer, E. Introduction. In The Yuktidīpikā. A reconstruction of Sāṃkhya Methods of Knowing. Aachen: Shaker Verlag. 2006.

Hattori, Masaaki. Praśastapāda and Dignāga. A Note on the Development of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of Anumāna. In WZKS 16. 1972: 169-80.

Hawthorn, John. Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Claredon Press. 2006.

Hayes, Richard. Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.

Heesterman, J.C. 'Veda and Dharma'. In Doniger O'Flaherty eds. The Concept of Duty in South Asia. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 1978: 80-95.

Heidegger, Martin. Aristotle Metaphysics tome 1-3. On the Essence and Actuality of Force, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1995.

Hiltebeitel, Alf. Dharma. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2010.

Hermann, Jacobi. 'On the dates of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras'. In Journal of the American Oriental Society, 31. 1911:1-29.

Honda, Megumu. 'Did the early Vaiśeṣika admit the notion of 'I' as a means to prove the existence of the soul?'. In AS, 48 1994.

Houben, Jan E. M., and Sheldon Pollock. 'Theory and Method in Indian Intellectual History'. In JIP, 36. 2008: 531–532.

Houben, Jan. 'Liberation, and Natural Philosophy in Early Vaiśeṣika. Some Methodological problems'. In AS 2, 1994: 711-48.

Houben, Jan. The Saṃbandha-samuddeśa (chapter on relation) and Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language: a study of Bhartṛhari Saṃbandha-samuddeśa in the context of the Vākyapadīya, with a translation of Helārāja's commentary Prakīrṇaprakāśa. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 1995.

Huntington, C. W. The Emptiness of Emptiness. An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 2007.

Isaacson, Harunaga Isaacson, 'Yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) in early Vaiśeṣika'. In SII 18, 1993: 139-160.

Isaacson, Harunaga. Materials for the Study of the Vaiśeṣika system. Doctorate Thesis submitted at Rijksuniversiteit te Lieden. 1995.

Isaacson, Harunaga. Notes on the Manuscript Transmission of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and its earliest commentaries. In AS XLVIII, 2. 1994:749-79.

Jain, J. Studies in Early Jainism. New Delhi: Navranj. 1992.

Jain, N. L. In Jaina Karmology: Trans. with notes on chapter eight of Tattvārtharājavārtika of Akalaṅka: royal semi-aphorismic explanatory on reals on Tattvārthasūtra. Pārśvanātha Vidyāpīṭha. 1st ed. Varanasi: Parshvanath Vidyapeeth. 1998.

Jain, S. A. Reality. Calcutta: V. S. Sangha. 1960.

Jaini, Padmanabh. S. 'Karma and the Problem of Rebirth in Jainism'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 217-240.

Jawaharlal, G. Studies in Jainism. As Gleaned from Archaeological Sources. Delhi: Harman Publishing House. 2006.

Jhā, Gaṅgānātha. The Prābhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Thesis (Ph. D., University of Allahabad, 1911). Republished with Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1978.

Jhā, Shaktidhar. Aspects of Brahmanical Influence on the Jaina Mythology. Delhi: Bharat Bharati Bhandar. 1978.

Jhā, V.N. Introduction. In Keechi Miyamoto ed. The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1996.

Jhā. Gaṅgānātha. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its sources. Benares: Banaras Hindu University. 1942.

Jhāveri, Indukala H. 'The Concept of Ākāśa in Indian Philosophy'. In R.N. Dandekar, ed. ABORI, vol. 37, Poona: Bhandarkar Institute Press. 1956.

Johnson, W. J. Harmless souls: karmic bondage and religious change in early Jainism with special reference to Umāsvāti and Kuṇḍakuṇḍa. PhD. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1995.

Joshi, K. S. 'On the Meaning of Yoga'. In Philosophy East and West. 15. 1. 1965: 53-64. (quoted by Feuerstein, 1980, op. cit)

Kajiyama, Yuichi. 'Realism of the Sarvāstivāda School'. In Leslie S. Kawamura eds. Buddhist thought and Asian civilization: essays in honour of Herbert V. Guenther on his sixtieth birthday. Emeryville, California: Dharma Publishing. 1977.

Kane, Robert. ed. Free Will. Oxford: Blackwells. 2012.

Kapani, Lakshmi. La notion de saṃskāra dans l'Inde brahmanique et bouddhique. vol. 1. Paris: Édition-Diffusion de Boccard. 1992.

Katre, S.M. Introduction to Indian textual Criticism. Poona: Deccan College, 1954.

Kaviraj, G. 'Some variants in the readings of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras'. In Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Studies 7. 1929:71-76.

Kaviraj, Gopinath. Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature. Calcutta: Indian Studies. 1961.

Keith, A. B. Indian Logic, and Atomism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1921.
Keith, Berriedale. A Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1923.

Kirk G.S. 'Popper on Science and the Pre-Socratics': Mind, 69. 1960: 318- 39. Reprint. In Furley and Allen, Studies in pre-Socratic philosophy. Vol. 1. The beginnings of philosophy. vol. 1. 1970: 154–77.

Knipe, David M. Hindu Eschatology. In Walls, Jerry L. ed. The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008.

Koller, John M. 'Dharma: An Expression of Universal Order'. In Philosophy East and West, Vol. 22, No. 2 Apr., 1972: 131-144.

Krishan. Yuvraj. The doctrine of Karma. Its origin and Development in Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist, and Jaina Traditions. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1997.

Krishan. Yuvraj. 'Karma Vipāka'. In Numen Vol. 30, 2, 1983: 199-244.
Krishna, Daya. Indian philosophy: a counter perspective. Delhi : Oxford University Press. 1991.

Krishna, Daya. The nature of philosophy. Calcutta : Prachi Prakashan. 1955.

Kumar, S. 'Early Vaiśeṣika: The concept of Categories in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.' In Frazier J. ed. 2014: 89-100.

Kumar, S. Self, Society, and Value: Reflections on Indian Philosophical Thought. Delhi: Vidyanidhi Prakashan. 2005.

Kumāra, Śaśiprabhā. Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian philosophy: on knowing and what is to be known. London: Routledge. 2013.

Kurt Rudolph. Gnosis: the nature and history of an ancient religion. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1983.

La Vallée Poussin, Louis de, L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas et des barbares, Grecs, Scythes, Parthes et Yue-tchi. Paris: E. de Boccard. 1930.

Larson Gerald James. Karma as a 'Sociology of Knowledge' or 'Social Psychology' of Process/Praxis. In Doniger ed. 1980: 303-316.

Larson, Gerald James. Classical Sāṃkhya: an interpretation of its history and meaning. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1969.

Leslie S. Kawamura eds. Buddhist thought and Asian civilization: essays in honour of Herbert V. Guenther on his sixtieth birthday. Emeryville, California: Dharma Publishing. 1977.

Litwa, David M. 'I Will Become Him': Homology and Deification in the Gospel of Thomas'. In Journal of biblical Literature. 134, 2. 2015: 427-447.

Long, Bruce J. 'The Concepts of Human Action and Rebirth in the Mahābhārata'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 38-60.

Löwith, Karl. Meaning in history. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1949.

Lubac, Henri de. Catholicism: les aspects sociaux du dogme. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. 1938.

Lubac, Henri de. Corpus Mysticum: Essai sur L'Eucharistie et l'Église au Moyen Âge: étude historique. Paris: Aubier 1944.

Lysenko, Victoria. 'Atomistic approach in the Buddhist Abhidharma schools: atoms and dharmas'. In Russian. (academia.edu). 2016.

Lysenko, Victoria. 'Atomistic mode of thinking as exemplified by the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy of Numbers'. In AS 48/2, 1994: 781-806.

Lysenko, Victoria. 'La connaissance suprarationelle chez Praśastapāda'. In AS LII. 1, 1998: 85-116.

Lysenko, Victoria. 'La doctrine des atomes (aṇu, paramāṇu) chez Kaṇāda et Praśastapāda. Problems d'interpretation'. In JA 284, 1996, 137-158.

Mann, Richard D. The rise of Mahāsena: the transformation of Skanda-Karttikeya in North India from the Kuṣāṇa to Gupta empires. Leiden: Boston: Brill, 2012.

Mario de Caro ed. Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press. 2004.

Masson-Oursel, Paul. Esquisse d'une historie de la philosophie Indienne. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Gauthier, 1923.

Masson-Oursel, Paul. L'Atomisme Indien. Revue Philosophique de la France et de L'Étranger, 99. 1925. 342-68.

Masson-Oursel, Paul. Le Fait Métaphasique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1941.

Matilal, B.K. 'On the Universality of Suffering'. In Tiwari, ed. 1986.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 1977.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Perception. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1986.

McDermott, James. 'Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 165-192.

Megumu, Honda. 'Did the early Vaiśeṣika admit the notion of "I" as a means to prove the existence of the soul?' In AS 1994: 707-9.

Minkowski, C. 2008. 'The Study of Jyotiśāstra and the Uses of Philosophy of Science'. In JIP 36: 587–97.

Mishra, U. Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Allahabad: Allahabad Law Journal Press. 1936.

Miyamoto. K. The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1996.

Moore A.W. The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. Making Sense of things. Cambridge University Press. 2012.

Muir J. Original Sanskrit Texts. Vol. 4. London: Trübner & Co. 1863.

Müller. Max. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1912.

Nagel, Thomas. Mind and Cosmos. Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. 2012.

Narain, H. Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology. Vol 1. Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan. 1976.

Narain, H. Facets of Indian Religious-Philosophic Identity. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan. 1983.

Nozawa, M. 'Inferential marks in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. In Sambhaṣa 12, 1991: 25-38.

Nozawa, M. 'Theory of Perception in the 8th Adhyāya of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra'. In JIBS, 41, 2, 1993a: 1151-56.

Nozawa, Masanobu. "Vaishêshika ni okeru shôji ni tsuite (The Vaiśeṣika Theory of Metempsychosis" Nihon-bukkyö-gakkai Nenpö (The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association. 46, 1981: 459-472.

Nozawa, Masanobu. 'On the Vaiśeṣikasūtras 1.2.3'. In AS. 1994: 833-44.

Obermiller, Eugene. Nirvāṇa in Tibetan Buddhism. Delhi, India: Classics India Publications. 1988.

Obeyesekere, Gananath. 'The Rebirth eschatology and Its Transformations: A Contribution to the Sociology of Early Buddhism'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 137-164.

O'Donovan, Leo. A World of Grace: An Introduction to the Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 1995.

Oetke, Claus. 'Controverting the ātman-controversy and the query of segregating philological and non-philological issues in studies on eastern philosophies and religions. Comments on Some remarks of J. Bronkhorst.' SII, 18. 1993: 191-212.

Oldenberg, H. The Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1991.

Olivelle, P. Ascetics, and Brahmans. Studies in Ideologies and Institutions, London: Anthem Press. 2011.

Olivelle, P. ed. Dharma: Studies in its Semantic and Cultural, and Religious History. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2009: 92-96.

Olivelle, P. Explorations in the Early History of the Dharmasastra, in Between the Empires. Oxford University Press. 2006.

Olivelle, P. The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992.

Organ, T.W. The Self in Indian Philosophy. London: Mouton & Co. 1964.

Pai G.K. Yoga doctrines in Mahāpurāṇas. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 2007.

Papineau, David. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 1993.

Pearson, Birger A. Ancient Gnosticism: Traditions and Literature. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. 2007.

Pérez-Remón, Joaquín. Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. 1980.

Peri, Sarveswara Sharma. 'Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Denial of Creation and Dissolution of the World'. In Dwivendi, R. C. ed. Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994: 53-78.

Perrett, Roy W. Epistemology. London: Garland. 2001.

Plofker, Kim. Mathematics in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2009.

Plott John & Dolin James Michael. Global history of Philosophy Global History of Philosophy: The Patristic-Sūtra period, Vol. 3. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2000.

Pollock, Sheldon. 'Is there an Indian Intellectual History? Introduction to Theory and Method in Indian Intellectual History', JIP, 36. 2008: 533-42.

Pollock, Sheldon. The Language of the Gods in the Word on Men. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2006.

Popper K. 'Back to the Presocratics'. In Furley ed. 1970: 130-131.

Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959.

Potter Karl. 'Suffering in the Orthodox Philosophical Systems: Is there any?' in Tiwari, ed. 1986.

Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India's philosophies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1963.

Potter, Karl. H. 'The Karma Theory and Its Interpretation in Some Indian Philosophical Systems'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 241-267.

Prabhu C. S. R. The physics of Vaiśeṣika. Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara Vedic University. 2014.

Prasad, Jwala. History of Indian Epistemology. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd. 1987.

Prasad, Jwala. Indian Epistemology. Lahore: Motilal Banarsidass. 1939.

Prasad, Rajendra. Karma, Causation, and Retributive morality: conceptual essays in ethics and meta-ethics. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. 1989.

Prashad, B. S. A Comparative Study of Jainism and Buddhism. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. 1982.

Pratt, James Bissett. Naturalism. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1939.

Preisendanz, K. 'On ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Vision'. In Berliner Indologische Studien, 4/5. 1989: 141-213.

Preisendanz, Karin. 'Text, Commentary, and Annotation: Some reflections on the Philosophical Genre'. JIP, 36. 2008: 599-618.

Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, A.C. eds. A Source book in Indian philosophy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1957.

Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. Vol II. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1926.

Ramanujam, S. A study of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy with special reference to Vyomaśivācārya. Mysore: Mysore University Press. 1979.

Ram-Prasad C. 'Knowledge, and Action II: Attaining Liberation in Bhatta Mimamsa and Advaita Vedānta'. In JIP 28, 2000: 25-41.

Reat, Ross, N. The Origins of Indian Psychology. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press. 1990.

Renou, Louis. Religions of Ancient India, London, The Athlone Pless. 1953.

Ricoeur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Trans. John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981.

Rocher, Ludo. 'Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmaśāstras'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 61-89.

Rouse, Joseph. How Scientific Practices Matter. Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2002.

Ross, W. D. Aristotle's Metaphysics: A revised text. 2 vol. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1924.

Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 1998.

Śāha, Nagīna Jī., Collection of Jaina philosophical tracts, Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1973.

Samuel, Geoffrey. 'General Introduction'. In Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West. 2013: 1-10.

Sandesara, B. J. Foreword. In Candrānanda's Vṛtti. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 136.

Sastriar, Kuppuswami. 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: Origin and Development'. In S.S. Janaki (ed., Mm. Professor Kuppuswami Sastri Birth-Centenary Commemoration Volume. Madras: The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute. 1981: 104-118.

Sastriar, Kuppuswami. 'Rāvaṇa Bhāṣya'. In The Journal of Oriental Research, Madras 3, 1929: 1-5.

Schneider, Christoph ed. Soteriology and Eschatology. Tallaght, Ireland: Priory Institute. 2009.

Schuster, Nancy. 'Inference in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. In JIP, 1. 1972: 341-395.

Seal, Brajendranath. The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1915.

Seddon, Richard. Mani: his life and work: transforming evil. London : Temple Lodge. 1998.

Sen Gupta, Anima. Essays on Sāṃkhya and other systems of Indian philosophy. Kanpur: M. Sen. 1964.

Shah, N. Jainism. The World of Conquerors. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. 1998.

Shankaranarayanam, S. History of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Darśanas (AD 300-1000. Main Currents. In History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, vol. II, part 1 & 4. D: Chattopadhyaya ed. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations. 2003.

Sharma R.N. Introduction. In Śālikanātha's Vyākyārthamātṛkā, 1987.

Shastri, Dharmendra Nath. Critique of Indian Realism. A Study of the Conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga School. Delhi: Agra University. 1964.

Shastri, Pashupatinath. Introduction to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Calcutta, 1923.

Shields, Christopher 'Being qua Being', In Ch. Shields ed. The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oxford University Press. 2012: 342-71.

Shivkumar, M. The Doctrine of Liberation in Indian Religion. With special Reference to Jainism. Delhi: Manoharlal Publishers Ltd. 2000.

Shukla, Karunesha. 'The Vaiśeṣika Schools'. In VIJ 1970: 153-59.

Shuster, Nancy. 'Inference in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras'. In JIP vol. 1, 1972: 341-61.

Sider, Theodore. ed. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 2008.

Siderits, M., Tillemans T., and Chakrabarti A. eds. Apoha. Buddhist nominalism and human cognition. New York: Columbia University Press. 2001.

Simons, Peter. 'Metaphysics in Analytic Philosophy'. In Robert Kane ed. Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell. 2012: 709-28.

Simons, Peter. Metaphysics in Analytic Philosophy. In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Michael Beaney ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 709-28.

Singh, L.A. Yoga Psychology: Methods and Approaches. Varanasi. 1970.

Singh, S. Sarvāstivāda, and its Traditions, University of Delhi. Department of Buddhist Studies, 1994.

Sinha, Jadunath. Indian Psychology. Perception. London: Kegan Paul. 1934.
Sjödin Anna-Pya 'The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: Ārṣajñāna in Praśastapādabhāṣya, Nyāyakandalī and Vyomavati' JIP 40. 2012: 469-88.

Sjödin, Anna-Pya. 'Understanding ātman in Praśastapādabhāṣya with the readings of Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara'. In The Journal of Hindu Studies, Vol. 9, 1. 2016: 84-110.

Skinner, Q. Visions of Politics. Regarding Method, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002.

Skorupski, Tadeusz. 'The Buddhist Permutations of Consciousness.' In Esoteric Buddhist Studies: Identity and Diversity. 2008: 155-170.

De Smet, Richard. A Copernican Reversal: The Gītākāra's Reformulation of Karma. In Philosophy East and West, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan., 1977: 53-63.

Sōgen, Yamakami. Systems of Buddhistic Thought. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press. 1912.

Stcherbatsky, T. La Théorie de la connaissance et la Logique chez les Bouddhistes Tardifs. Trans. I. Manziarly. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner. 1926.

Stcherbatsky, T. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the meaning of the Word 'Dharma'. London: Royal Asiatic Society. 1923.

Strawson, Paul. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some varieties (The Woolbridge Lectures, 1983). London: Methuen. 1985.

Sukthanakar, V.S. 'Prolegomena', in The Mahābhārata, (critical ed. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 1933: i-cx.

Suzuki, Takanori. 'Text, Context and Author's Invention: Two frames of reference in the Vaiśeṣika school', in Toshihiro Wada ed. Indian Philosophy and Text Science, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2010: 157-82.

Taber, J. A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology. Kumārila on Perception. Curzon: Routledge. 2005.

Tachikawa, Musashi. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1997.

Tamanan, Venkata, K. Nāgārjuna Philosophy. As Presented in the Maha-Prajñāpāramitā-Sāstra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 1966.

Thakur 2003

Thakur, A. 'Textual problems of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. In Journal of the Bihar Research Society 49, 1963a: 186-8. (Republished in Thakur 2003).

Thakur, Anantalal ed. Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System. In D.: Chattopadhyaya (ed., History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization vol. II, part 4. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilisations. 2003.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'Introduction'. In VSc Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1961.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'Kaṇāda: Āstika or Nāstika'. In Journal of the Gaṅgānātha Jhā Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 32: 1976: 121-36.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'Śālikanātha–The Vaiśeṣika'. In Journal of the Oriental Institute, 29.1-2, 1969: 46-52.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'Studies in a fragmentary Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti'. In JOIB, 14, 2-3, 1965: 330-3.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'The Problem of the Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya'. In R.N. Dandekar (ed., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Congress of Orientalists. New Delhi, January 4-10, 1964, Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune. 1969: 489-493.

Thakur, Anantalal. 'Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System'. In VIJ 1, 1963:78-86.

Thite, Ganesh. Tutorials (audio files, personal communication, January-April 2016, at BORI, Pune).

Tiwari, Kapil N. Suffering. Indian perspectives. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1986.

Tiwary, Mahesh. 'A Note on the pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'. In S. Singh, ed. Sarvāstivāda and Its traditions, Delhi University, Delhi. 1994.

Toshihide, Adachi. 'On the size and mobility of the ātman in the early Vaiśeṣika'. In AS 1995: 653-64.

Tripathi, Bashishtha Narain, Indian view of spiritual bondage. Varanasi: Aradhana Prakasha, 1987.

Tubb, Gary A. Scholastic Sanskrit. New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2007.

Ui. H. 'Introduction' to Daśapadārthaśāstrī Ui. ed. 1917.

Umakant: Shah. 'A Reference to Bhāṭṭa Candrānanda by Abhinavagupta'. In Sambodhi. 4, 1. 1975: 7-8.

Vasupal, N. ed. Facets of Jainism. Chennai: University of Madras. 2005.

Vergiani, Vincenzo. Helārāja on Omniscience, Āgama, and the Origin of Language (due for publication, personal communication).

Warder, A.K. Dharmas and Data, JIP 1971: 272-295.

Warren. H.C. Buddhism in Translation. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 1896.

Warrington, John. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Introduction by David Ross. London & New York : Dutton, 1956.

Watson, Alex 'The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇāha's Middle Ground between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness Moments' JIP. 42, 2014: 173-193.

Watson, Alex. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments against the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. Thesis, D.Phil. University of Oxford, Faculty of Oriental Studies. 2003.

Weiss, Mitchell G. 'Caraka Saṃhitā on the Doctrine of Karma'. In Doniger ed. 1980: 90-115.

West, Martin. Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique, applicable to Greek and Latin texts. Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner. 1973.

Westerhoff, J. Ontological Categories, Their Nature, and Significance. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.

Wezler Albrecht. 'Dharma in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstras'. In JIP 32 (5-6) 2004: 629-654.

Wezler, A. 'A Note on Concept adṛṣṭa as used in Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. In B. Datta ed., Aruna-Bharati: Prof. A.N. Jani Felicitation Volume. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1983: 35-58.

Wezler, Albrecht. 'Remarks on the definition of 'Yoga' in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras'. In IBS. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982: 643-686.

Wezler. A. 'Towards a Reconstruction of the Indian Cultural History; Observations and Reflections on the 18th and 19th century Indology'. In SII 18, 1993: 305-30.

Whicher, Ian. 'The Liberating role of Saṃskāra in Classical Yoga'. In JIP, 2005, 33: 601-630.

Wiley, K. L. Historical Dictionary of Jainism. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. 2004.

Williams Donald C. 'On the Elements of Being II'; In Michael Tooley ed. The Nature of Properties. Nominalism, Realism and Trope Theory, New York: Garland Publishing, 1999: 227-248.

Zeller, Eduard, eds. Aristotle, and the earlier Peripatetics. London: Longmans, Green. 1897.

Zeller, Eduard. Plato and the Older Academy. London: Longmans, Green. 1888.