The Beginnings of Wisdom:

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper on Theology and the End of Higher Education



David M. Williams
Keble College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity 2025

Table of Contents

Abstracts 8

Abbreviations 13

Note to the Reader 14

Introduction 15

1. The Questions Stated 17
2. Some Preliminary Definitions 20
3. Methodology and Overview 24

I. Friedrich Schleiermacher: The Idea of the Modern Secular University 36

1. The objects of theology: What do theologians know? 38
   - 1.1. The direct object: Religious experience 40
     - 1.1.1. Religious virtuosi 43
     - 1.1.2. Religion for the rest of us 45
     - 1.1.3. 'Religion,' religions, and religion's cultured despisers 47
   - 1.2. The indirect object: The Whence of our being 53
2. What kind of knowledge is theology? 56
   - 2.1. What makes 'theology' theological? 56
   - 2.2. What makes theology 'scientific'? 58
     - 2.2.1. What makes 'science' scientific? 60
     - 2.2.2. Theology as a positive science 67

3. How should theology relate to other knowledges? 69

3.1. Philosophy: Theology's 'lord' 70

3.2. What can theologians teach us? 73

4. What is the university for? 75

4.1. The idea of the modern research university 78

4.1.1. The ultimate unity of science and the philosophical university 78

4.1.2. The unity of teaching and research 84

4.1.3. The intrinsic value of science 88

4.1.4. Academic freedom: *Lerhfreiheit und Lernfreiheit* 89

4.1.5. Student Self-cultivation: *Bildung* 93

Conclusion 95

II. John Henry Newman: The Catholic Idea of a University 97

1. The development of Newman's doctrine 99

2. Where to begin?: Newman's theocentric ontological foundationalism 103

3. What kind of knowledge is theology? 111

3.1. What makes 'theology' theological? 111

3.1.1. Theology's object: What (or Whom) do theologians know? 117

3.1.2. Natural religion 119

3.1.3. Epistemic anthropology: Newman as epistemological naturalist 121

3.1.4. Theological knowing: *Ordo cognoscendi* 126

3.2. What makes theology 'scientific'? 128

3.2.1. Unscientific theologies: Liberalism and Rationalism 130

3.3. What makes 'science' scientific? 137

3.3.1. What science isn't: Rationalism and Evidentialism 140

4. How should theology relate to other knowledges? 145

5. What is the university for? 153

5.1. An educational *philosophia perennis*? 154

5.1.1. The unity of Truth: Teaching 'universal knowledge' 156

5.1.2. The primacy of teaching, the necessity of research: The university principle and the collegiate principle 158

5.1.3. 'Philosophical knowledge' as its own end 161

5.1.4. The collegial formation of 'gentlemen' 164

5.1.5. Intellectual freedom: 'Elbow-room' 167

5.2. Nature and grace 168

Conclusion 171

III. Abraham Kuyper: The Reformed Idea of a Free University 173

1. Kuyper's two conversions 174

1.1. Parting ways 178

1.2. *Palingenesis* 179

1.2.1. Two kinds of people 181

1.2.2. Common grace 183

2. What kind of knowledge is theology? 185

2.1. What makes ‘theology’ theological? 186

2.2. What makes ‘science’ scientific? 187

2.2.1. Systematic (or ‘encyclopaedic’) and ‘subjectively realist’ 188

2.2.2. Methodologically pluralist 189

2.2.3. Fiduciary and incomplete 190

2.3. What makes ‘theology’ scientific? 192

2.3.1. Incompleteness and faith 192

2.3.2. Methodology 194

2.3.3. ‘Subjective realism’ and encyclopaedism 195

3. How should theology relate to other knowledges? 196

3.1. Theology as metaepistemology 198

3.1.1. The ontological primacy of the Logos 199

3.1.2. General revelation 200

3.1.3. Science as created organism 201

3.1.4. The *imago Dei* as humanity’s ability to know 201

3.2. The ‘higher sciences’: Theology, Law, and Medicine 203

3.3. The natural sciences 205

3.4. The humanities 207

4. What is the university for? 208

4.1. The ‘sphere’ of scholarship and the sovereignty of God 209

4.2. Structural pluralism and the sphere of scholarship: Free universities 212

4.2.1. ‘The Secret of Genuine Study’ (1889) 213

4.2.2. 'The Goal of Genuine Study' (1900) 219

4.3. Worldview pluralism and the sovereignty of God: Christian scholarship 226

Conclusion 231

IV. What Kind of Knowledge is Theology? 233

1. Varieties of religious experience, ways of 'believing again' 237

2. How can we rationally 'believe again'? EEF versus TOF 242

2.1. Schleiermacher: Religion within the bounds of feeling and reason? 243

2.2. Newman and Kuyper: Reason within the bounds of religion? 247

2.2.1. Problems with Classical Foundationalism 250

2.2.2. Internalism versus Externalism, *de jure* versus *de facto* objections 252

2.2.3. Ordinary religion 255

2.3. The persistence of pluralism 256

3. What makes 'theology' theological? 259

3.1. Schleiermacher: The practical science of 'God-consciousness' formation 260

3.2. Newman and Kuyper: The science of God 262

4. What makes theology 'scientific'? 265

4.1. Schleiermacher: *Theologie* as *positive Wissenschaft* 270

4.2. Newman and Kuyper: Theology as a 'science' 272

4.3. What makes 'science' scientific? 275

4.4. What makes 'religion' religious? 278

5. Stories of Everything: Theology as metanarrative criticism? 279

Conclusion 283

V. How Should Theology Relate to Other Knowledges? 287

1. Premodern Christianity: What difference did it make to the liberal arts? 289

2. Modernity: Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper… 298

2.1. Should theology make a difference to the other arts and sciences? 299

2.2. Can theology help reintegrate our knowledges? 307

3. Postmodernity: What difference could theology make now? 310

Conclusion 316

VI. What is the University For? 320

1. The end and principles of higher education 321

1.1. Wisdom for wisdom's sake 323

1.2. The complex unity of truth and the metarationality of wisdom 325

1.3. The unity of teaching and research 326

1.4. Intellectual freedom 327

1.5. The formation of students and scholars 332

2. Can the modern secular university do without theology? 334

Conclusion 344

Conclusion 346

1. The end of the university: The beginnings of wisdom 346

2. The liberal Protestant option: The idea of the modern secular$_2$ university 349

3. The traditionalist option: The idea of the modern confessional university 352

4. The upshot: The 'dialogical pluralist' option 356

5. The idea of theology in a (post)modern secular$_3$ university 359

5.1. Liberal learning: Seeking wisdom for wisdom's sake 360

5.2. Multidisciplinary integration: Reconciling all things 360

5.3. Pedagogy: Teaching the beginnings of wisdom 361

5.4. Liberal liberal learning: Secular$_3$ intellectual freedom 363

5.5. Cultivating academic communities of character 363

6. Common Grace, Common Grounds: Christian Hope for the Modern Secular University's Future 364

Bibliography 366

Abstracts

Short Abstract:

What role should theology play in the modern university? This dissertation argues that theology is not merely a legacy discipline of a bygone era but remains essential to the university's pursuit of wisdom. Engaging the work of three nineteenth-century thinkers—Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Henry Newman, and Abraham Kuyper—who each helped shape or found new universities, the project explores how theology can function as an orienting discipline for the academy.

Through a comparative analysis of these figures, the dissertation traces diverging conceptions of theology's epistemological foundations and academic legitimacy. Schleiermacher's model, grounded in practical ecclesial utility and an Enlightenment epistemology (here termed 'Egocentric Epistemological Foundationalism'), ultimately redefines theology as ecclesial know-how rather than a truth-seeking science. In contrast, Newman and Kuyper defend theology as a rational, coherent discipline in its own right, capable of participating in and guiding the broader intellectual work of the university ('Theological Ontological Foundationalism').

The dissertation also engages with the modern demarcation problem in the philosophy of science, showing that rigid boundaries between science, religion, and philosophy are historically contingent and philosophically unstable. Drawing on recent work in epistemology, theology, and higher education criticism the project affirms that theology—properly construed—

retains the capacity to serve as a discourse that orients other fields toward unified knowledge and metadisciplinary wisdom.

Long Abstract:

This dissertation addresses a central and contested question in the philosophy of education and theology: What is the role of theology in the modern university? While theology once occupied the position of *regina scientiarum* in the medieval and early modern university, the rise of modernity, secularization, and disciplinary specialization has deeply challenged theology's institutional legitimacy. The result is that in most contemporary universities, theology has either been relegated to the margins or excluded altogether.

This project offers a theological and philosophical response to this crisis by arguing that theology remains a legitimate and even necessary part of the university's intellectual life—especially in its role as an orienting discipline capable of guiding the pursuit of wisdom across the disciplines. It does so by engaging three key nineteenth-century thinkers: Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Henry Newman, and Abraham Kuyper, all of whom were both prominent theologians and university founders. Each developed a distinct vision for the relationship between theology and the university, and each engaged fundamental questions about what theology is, what science is, how knowledge should be structured, and what the university is for.

The dissertation is divided into two main parts: First, Chapters I-III expound Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's perspectives on three analytic questions: 1) What kind of knowledge is theology? 2) How should theology relate to other knowledges? 3) What is the

university for? Here the dissertation introduces a typology, borrowed from Paul Tyson, to distinguish two competing epistemological paradigms: Egocentric Epistemological Foundationalism (EEF) and Theological Ontological Foundationalism (TOF). Schleiermacher exemplifies EEF by rooting theology's credibility in subjective religious experience, and then reconstructing Christian doctrine as the internal grammar of pious consciousness. His theology thus becomes primarily ecclesial and practical—a kind of know-how for church leaders, not a truth-oriented, public science. In contrast, both Newman and Kuyper operate from a TOF paradigm: they begin with the givenness of divine revelation and defend theology as a rational, truth-seeking discipline capable of participating in and guiding the wider university project.

Second, Chapters IV-VI comparatively and critically analyze Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's accounts of theology, theology's relationship to other knowledges, and the purpose of the university. These chapters explore the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science—the challenge of defining what counts as a 'science' and what does not. Drawing on contemporary philosophers like Lee McIntyre, Naomi Oreskes, and Michael Gordin, it argues that attempts to fix clear boundaries between science and nonscience are historically and philosophically unstable. The dissertation highlights how Newman and Kuyper anticipated this insight, arguing that no single scientific method unites all the sciences, and that theology, like other disciplines, engages in rational, evidence-based inquiry. Schleiermacher's rejection of theology as a *reine Wissenschaft*—pure science—is thus shown to rely on contestable modern assumptions about knowledge, method, and institutional utility.

Chapters V-VI address theology's potential role as a metadisciplinary or orienting discipline—that is, a discipline that provides the university with coherence, purpose, and an

account of the whole. Both Newman and Kuyper insist that without such an orienting discipline, the university risks fragmenting into a disconnected cluster of specialties, each pursuing knowledge for its own sake but lacking integration or clear direction. Theology, properly understood, articulates the ultimate questions—the existence of God, the nature of the human person, the meaning of truth and justice—that underlie all academic inquiry, even if only implicitly. Kuyper's vision of worldview-oriented scholarship and Newman's insistence on the unity of knowledge converge in affirming theology's capacity to unify and direct the intellectual life of the university toward wisdom.

The dissertation also engages with recent developments in epistemology and theology (e.g., Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology, Cavanaugh's critique of 'religion', and postliberal theology's rejection of Enlightenment foundationalism) to support its constructive thesis. It concludes by arguing that the marginalization of theology is not a necessity dictated by epistemology or institutional neutrality, but the result of specific ideological commitments embedded in modern academic structures. Thus, the dissertation makes the following scholarly Contributions:

1. Typological innovation: Tyson's TOF vs. EEF distinction provides a novel framework for analyzing how Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's theological epistemologies relate to secular academic standards.
2. Historical synthesis: The juxtaposition of Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper offers a rare triangulation of Protestant liberal, Catholic, and Reformed approaches to university formation and the first comparative analysis of Newman and Kuyper's educational outlooks written in English.

3. Interdisciplinary integration: The dissertation bridges theology, philosophy of science, and educational theory in order to defend theology's institutional and intellectual credibility.
4. Theological retrieval: It retrieves premodern and early modern understandings of theology as *scientia* in order to critique the narrow empiricist assumptions of the contemporary academy.
5. Constructive proposal: It affirms a vision for Christian scholarship in which theology serves not merely as a confessional enclave, but as a formative, truth-seeking discipline at the heart of the university.

In sum, this dissertation contends that theology must be reclaimed not as a vestige of premodern dogmatism, but as a rational, tradition-rooted, and truth-oriented discipline capable of reorienting the university toward its highest end: the pursuit of wisdom.[1]

[1] The abstracts above were created with the help of ChatGPT but have been revised and corrected by the author.

Abbreviations[2]

AK:CR	Bratt, ed., *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader*
AK:MCCD	Bratt, *Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat*
APVS	Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*
BO	Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study*
CCFS	Mariña, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher*
CF	Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*
D&A	Newman, *Discussions & Arguments*
DCD	Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*
Dial	Schleiermacher, *Dialectics*
Ess.	Newman, *Essays Critical & Historical*
EST	Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*
GA	Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*
ICE	Schleiermacher, *Introduction to Christian Ethics*
iGA	Lash, introduction to Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*
IU	Newman, *The Idea of a University*
JHN	Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography*
LoC	Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism*

[2] Full references to the editions and translations of Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's work will be found in the **Bibliography**. Works most commonly cited are referred to by the abbreviations. All references will be internal to the text, following Harvard's inline citation conventions.

LD	Newman, *Letters & Diaries*
LoJ	Newman, *Lectures on Justification*
NR	*http://www.newmanreader.org/*
NTh	Ker, ed., *Newman the Theologian: A Reader*
OG	Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre*
OR	Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*
OT	Schleiermacher, "Occasional Thoughts on German Universities," *RORU*
PN	Newman, *Philosophical Notebooks*
RORU	Menand, Reitter, and Wellmon, eds., *The Rise of the Research University: A Sourcebook*
RPU	Newman, *Rise and Progress of Universities*
US	Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford*

Note to the Reader

For the reader's convenience, throughout the dissertation I have **bolded** cross-references internal to the text to highlight how my analyses and judgments of Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's thought in **Chapters IV-VI** are grounded in my expositions of their thinking in **Chapters I-III**.

Introduction

The idea for this dissertation arose out of my experiences as a Christian lay chaplain for graduate students at three major secular research universities: North Carolina State University, New York University (NYU), and the University of Oxford. One experience which provoked me to undertake this project occurred in 2016, when I received a grant from the John Templeton Foundation and Fuller Theological Seminary's Science & Theology for Emerging Adults Ministries (STEAM) project. The grant supported my developing a programme to mentor Christian PhD students in the natural sciences at NYU. Inspired by the work of Sir John Polkinghorne, we sought to bridge faith and science by cultivating 'Polkinghornian apologists'—scientists who could articulate their faith to fellow scientists and explain science to fellow Christians.

For two years, I met weekly with Christian PhD students in neuroscience, genetics, biophysics, and microbiology at NYU's Sackler Institute to explore faith-science integration and host dialogues with non-religious colleagues. These students were well-versed in scientific techniques but had little exposure to theology, philosophy, or the history of science. Thus, they were vulnerable to both the mythology of the supposed 'conflict' between science and religion and to the pretensions of 'scientism'. Their limited training in 'research ethics' focused primarily on compliance with the law and professional standards without considering larger questions regarding the impact of their research on the common good. Many experienced deep intellectual isolation and found few resources in either church or university settings to help them make sense of their dual identities as Christians and scientists. I began to realize that the challenge they faced

was not simply one of faith and science, but more deeply rooted in questions about knowledge, the university, and religion's place within the academy. In sum, these students—all of them brilliant, intellectually curious, and deeply faithful—lacked a basic acquaintance with the disciplines needed to locate their specialisations on a broader intellectual map and to coherently integrate their faith with their scientific work.

Their non-religious colleagues were similarly unread in the philosophy and history of science and theology. They, too, lacked the necessary background knowledge to assess where their own ideas originated, or the philosophical and moral presuppositions and implications of their research. Most intuitively took ontological naturalism, moral constructivism, and the incompatibility of 'science' and 'religion' for granted. But they could neither account for their confidence in these philosophical intuitions nor reconcile them with their deepest intuitions about meaning, goodness, and beauty. Weaving together one's intuitions and intellectual commitments into a coherent worldview and corresponding way of life was as problematic for these non-religious students as for their Christian colleagues.

I could tell similar stories from my ministry among Christian law, business, social science, engineering, and humanities students. Many of them experienced a sort of spiritual schizophrenia—what my friend Mary calls 'a crisis of relevance'—in which their academic work and their Christian faith seem disconnected from or even antithetical to each other. My experience as a chaplain left me with the question: If, for the foreseeable future, Christians will study and teach in secular research universities, what do they need to do so faithfully and well?

In time I realized that the challenge these students faced was deeply rooted in questions about the nature of knowledge, theology's place within the academy, and the very purpose of

the university. This dissertation explores those underlying questions, specifically, how theology, understood as a domain of knowledge, relates to the structures, ideals, and epistemic assumptions of the modern university.

1. The Questions Stated

The central question of this dissertation sets the paradigm: What is the proper role of Christian theology—i.e., theological education, discourse, debate, and research—in the modern secular university? Correlatively, the question may be stated with an eye to the vocation of the Christian theologian: What is the responsibility of the Christian theologian to the modern secular university? Answering this question may provide insight that can be applied more generally to Christians who are at work within the secular university.

To ask after the 'proper role' of Christian theology in the modern secular university is to seek something prescriptive, not merely descriptive. Roles and vocations of any sort involve norms, responsibilities, virtues, and judgments. That is, they demand some qualities, dispositions, and actions for their fulfilment and preclude others. They also invite judgments as to whether the roles have been fulfilled adequately or not. Thus, to ask after the *role* of theology or the *vocation* of the theologian is to embark on a fundamentally normative inquiry, not a merely descriptive one. It is to set out the parameters of what theology ought and ought not to be and do, how it is to be evaluated, and what kinds of discourse even qualify as theology, properly speaking, at all.

In the medieval and early modern university, theology traditionally played a magisterial role as *Regina Scientiarum*. The religious worldview that the theologians expounded and explored framed the institutional life of the pre-modern university in countless ways—in the confessional requirements of students and faculty, mandatory chapel services, graces before meals, the clerical ordination of the faculty, the very architecture of the institution, the illustrations in the textbooks, and so on. This now 'discarded image'—to borrow C.S. Lewis's (2013) phrase—was the cultural consensus of pre-modern Christendom and so framed *all* Western social life to one extent or another. The modern era's rising tide of ideological and religious pluralism, scientific reductionism, and societal secularization washed away that cultural consensus and, consequently, sharply called theology's traditional, culturally hegemonic institutional role into question.

In the eyes of most academics today, theology has fallen from its historically lofty station as higher education's Medieval capstone discipline to being Modernity's stumbling stone, a discipline lacking sufficient epistemic warrant or practical value to merit a place in contemporary academe at all. For the modern theologian, then, the question could not be more urgent: Should theology still be understood as integral to the modern university? If so, how? Why? Or is theology, at best, incidental or, at worst, antithetical to the project of modern higher education as its contemporary cultured despisers suppose?

Any answer to this question will assume some conception (or misconception) of what theology is, of theology's relationship to other forms of knowledge, and of the nature and purpose of the university. Thus, our central question inevitably raises three subsidiary questions: First, what kind of knowledge is theology? Second, how should theology relate to other

knowledges (i.e., arts and sciences)? Third, what is the (modern secular) university for? Throughout this dissertation, these three subsidiary questions will comprise the analytical grid which will guide the exploration of my central question of theology's role in the modern secular university.

To limit the scope of my enquiry, however, I do not attempt to treat any of these questions exhaustively, but rather representatively. I train my analysis on three major theologian/educationists—Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Henry Newman, and Abraham Kuyper—who exemplify influential, living, higher educational traditions. These thinkers' theological and educational projects represent different strategies for weathering Modernity's gale-force winds of change. As we shall see, some of these strategies conflict, but others complement each other. This dissertation seeks to distil what Christian theologians can learn from them as we attempt to faithfully and wisely address the educational challenges facing Christian students and scholars today.

Thus, through critical dialogue with these three eminent theologian/educationists, this dissertation focusses on questions of normative theological ethics—questions of what we *should* do considering what we *should* believe about theology and higher education. Accordingly, the genre of this dissertation is theological ethics rather than intellectual history or historical theology, and its central arguments are for theological and ethical prescriptions, not merely historical descriptions. To make these central arguments, I must make preliminary historical and exegetical arguments about how best to understand my historic interlocutors. Rowan Williams expresses well the purpose of the historical aspects of my argument:

> …[History] is a set of stories we tell in order to understand better who we are and the world we're now in; as a written affair, it is never just a catalogue of things

> that happen to have happened. It is bound to be making judgements about the importance of what it deals with, and often—always?—has some element of moral judgement not far below the surface. We start telling the story to get a better definition of who we are or of what the subject is that we're describing: history helps us define things. (2005, p.1)

I include historical storytelling to help 'define things'—the university, liberal education, theology, *scientia*, *Wissenschaftsideologie*, 'sphere sovereignty', and so on—and to define *ourselves*—clarifying our theological and intellectual instincts and the stakes of various approaches to theology, scholarship, and higher education—precisely in order, then, to stake some normative claims about these things.

2. Some Preliminary Definitions

First, it may be helpful to define 'modern secular university.' As to 'modern' or 'modernity', Gerard Loughlin (1997, p.43) writes: 'Different writers locate the decisive point differently—the point at which the modern began to arrive—though all are agreed that it had fully arrived with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.' The dawn of modernity brought with it what historians (e.g., Vidler, 1961; Hobsbawm, 1996) have called an 'Age of Revolution' (1789-1848 by Hobsbawm's reckoning), a period marked by the dramatic political, economic, and intellectual upheavals of the American, the French, and the Industrial revolutions which reshaped nearly every aspect of Western culture. 'Modernity', then, refers to the cultural condition which has prevailed for the last two centuries and more in the West due in part to the influence of the Enlightenment and the wave of revolutions that followed.

This cultural transformation was catalysed by the West's absorption of the Enlightenment's critique of Christianity as oppressive, divisive, and irrational. Modernity, as Colin Gunton (1993, p.123) explains, 'can be understood as the era which arises out of Christendom by making against its predecessor a charge of hypocrisy: that its freedom is a cloak for tyranny, its creed a pretext for the suppression of the authentic human quest for truth.' Thus, the modern cultural condition is characterised for traditionally orthodox Christians by (self-)doubt and, for unbelievers, by suspicion towards Christendom and its creed. As Paul Tyson (2022) recently stated, for the better part of a thousand years the Christian gospel, as classically summarized in the creeds, had underpinned Christendom as its 'true myth' and Christian theology served as Christendom's natural 'first truth discourse'. But in the nineteenth century, Western intellectual culture underwent a 'remarkable reversal' in which the natural sciences, which had been birthed out of Christian theological assumptions, displaced Christian theology as society's prevailing 'first truth discourse' (ibid, pp.31, 190). This relatively sudden, tectonic, nineteenth-century intellectual shift, Tyson argues, was itself the culmination of a larger movement which had been set in motion by early modern voluntarists and nominalists that had gathered momentum through the religious fractures of the Reformation and the Enlightenment's sweeping reappraisals of all that Western culture had hitherto thought it had known. This larger movement amounted to a shift in Western intellectual culture away from what Tyson calls 'theocentric ontological foundationalism' (TOF) toward 'egocentric epistemological foundationalism' (EEF). Tyson (ibid, pp.32, 191) writes: 'TOF places the Being of God as the locus of the intelligible cosmos and the ground of valid human knowledge. Faith in God is hence the foundation of valid philosophical, scientific, moral, and theological insight and truth.' TOF subsists in several

Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox varieties but is commonly grounded in an epistemically basic faith commitment to the truth of historic creedal Christian orthodoxy.[3] Contrary to TOF, Tyson defines EEF as the 'view according to which the locus of knowledge is the human knower', and according to which '[the] knowledge of the human knower is the only valid foundation for truth' (ibid, pp.32, 185). The ambition to re-found Western science and culture upon an egocentric epistemological basis, as opposed to a theocentric ontological one, is a quintessentially modern project.

The West's shift into modernity almost immediately touched off a revolution in higher education. Timothy Bahti (1987, p.438, as quoted in Peters and Barnett) writes:

> Standard histories of the university distinguish the 'older' and modern versions according to a chronology that is familiar from other such histories as the history of literature, the history of industrialization and modernization (urbanization, rationalization, etc.), and the history of warfare. Somewhere between the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, the model at hand changes: whether the opposition is (neo)classical/romantic, early capitalist/high capitalist, or manual/mechanized, the switch is made, the revolution occurs, and we are all henceforth *post—postromantic*, postrevolutionary, postfeudal—which is to say *modern*. With respect to the university, the opposition is medieval/modern, the place is Germany and the time is the end of the eighteenth century.

The felt force of the criticism of Christianity was a major factor, but not the sole cause, of the twilight of the medieval and the dawn of the modern university.

'Secular' will denote, unless otherwise indicated, what Charles Taylor denominates as 'secular$_3$': the *de facto* cultural condition 'of contested belief, where religious belief is no longer axiomatic' as it was in, say, the Medieval and Renaissance periods (Smith, 2014, p.142; Taylor, 2007, pp.2-4). Taylor distinguishes this condition from 'secular$_1$'—the 'more "classical" definition

[3] Following C.S. Lewis (2001), we might call this 'mere Christianity'; or, following Thomas Oden (1992), we might call it 'classical' or 'consensual Christianity.'

of the secular' which distinguished, for example, 'religious' from 'secular' orders of Catholic priests—and 'secular$_2$', the 'more "modern" definition of the secular as *a*religious—neutral, unbiased, "objective"—as in a 'secular" public square', (Smith, 2014, p.142; cf. Taylor, 2007, p.2). While 'secularism$_2$' still underpins 'secular*ist*' policies (e.g., France's *laïcité*) and 'secular*ization* theory', and looms large in popular imagination and parlance, Taylor and other philosophers have argued that its would-be objective, areligious neutrality is, at best, conceptually incoherent. Rather, the West inhabits a 'secular$_3$' age, according to Taylor. The 'secular$_3$' cultural condition of doxastic pluralism 'fragilizes' religious belief for even the most committed adherents. 'In the face of different options, where people who lead "normal" lives do not share my faith (and perhaps believe something very different), my own faith commitment becomes fragile—put into question, dubitable' (Smith, 2014, p.141). This fragilization of belief in transcendent realities, in turn, creates a cultural pressure towards 'immanentization', '[the] process whereby meaning, significance, and "fullness" are [increasingly] sought within an enclosed, self-sufficient, naturalistic universe without any reference to transcendence' (Smith, 2014, p.141). In 'a secular age' such as ours, the 'immanent frame' looks increasingly like a safer existential bet than disputed notions of transcendence and, so, gradually comes to dominate the entire moral and imaginative horizon for modern, secular$_3$ people. My concern in this dissertation is with the challenge presented to Christian theologians by 'secular (i.e., secular$_3$) universities', meaning non-confessional universities—institutions which do not officially recognize themselves as representing, requiring, espousing, or championing any religious outlook. Such secular universities may, like the University of California or University College London, purport to be officially secular$_2$ institutions, or, like the University of Oxford or Duke University, they may not.

Regardless, secular universities of either sort tend to reinscribe the pressures towards immanentization, fragilization, and religious marginalization/privatization inherent in the secular$_3$ cultural condition writ large.

Subsequently, the task of defining the noun, 'university,' will be one of the central occupations of the dissertation as a whole and the theme of the dissertation's penultimate chapter.

3. Methodology and Overview

This dissertation comparatively and critically analyses Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's theologies of higher education utilizing the three analytic questions outlined above. Chapters I-III expound Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Henry Newman, and Abraham Kuyper's accounts of theology's place in the university. Each chapter is devoted to one theologian and situates its subject within his historical and theological context, and then poses the following analytical questions: 1) What kind of knowledge is theology? 2) How should theology relate to other knowledges? and 3) What is a university for?[4]

Chapter I focuses on Schleiermacher's major theological works—*On Religion*, *The Christian Faith*, and the *Brief Outline*—as well as his foundational text for the University of Berlin, *Occasional Thoughts on German Universities in the German Sense*. Drawing on Tyson's

[4] Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper also address questions regarding the Church's relationship to the universities they sought to found (see especially *OTUGS*, Ch.IV; *IU*, I.iix-ix; *LoC*, III, V). However, because the goal of this study is to apply these thinkers' insights to the modern secular university rather than confessional institutions, these important ecclesiological questions necessarily fall outside the scope of this dissertation.

terminology, I argue that Schleiermacher sought to ground both theology and higher education in an EEFoundation, mistakenly believing it offered a more secure intellectual basis for both.

Regarding question 1), Schleiermacher aimed to shield theology from post-Enlightenment (especially post-Kantian) scientific critique by redefining it as a practical or applied science (*positive Wissenschaft*) serving ecclesial needs, rather than as a pure science (*reine Wissenschaft*) establishing and expanding a field of real knowledge. Accordingly, he located theology's primary object in religious experience—individual or communal—rather than in God's objective self-revelation, and he saw theology's role as curating that experience.

Though committed to EEF and the rising *Wissenschaftsideologie*, Schleiermacher also recognized its limits. He emphasized human dependence and contingency, concluding that EEF could never secure the intellectual autonomy it promises. He acknowledged that true objectivity eludes such beings; the best we achieve is dialectical intersubjectivity. Moreover, he saw that we interpret experience through evidentially underdetermined and rationally undecidable 'intuitions of the infinite.' These intuitions vary—atheist, pantheist, theist—and EEF cannot adjudicate among them. Schleiermacher thus glimpsed the limitations of the post-Enlightenment *Wissenschaftsideologie*, even as he sought to reconcile the church and academy to it. Nevertheless, guided by his own romantic, pantheistic 'intuition of the infinite', he remained committed to reshaping modern Christianity and higher education on the same epistemological foundation he shared with religion's cultured despisers.

As for question 2), Schleiermacher maintained that theology, as a positive science, must align itself with the pure sciences of the philosophy faculty to count as truly 'scientific.' He designated philosophy as theology's 'lord' or 'governess' (*Herrin*). I argue that Schleiermacher

framed theology this way to preserve its position within the university. But in doing so, he compromised theology's relevance to the broader scientific discourse, rendering his strategy ultimately unsustainable.

As to question 3), Schleiermacher envisioned the university as a dialectical community dedicated to a unified and comprehensive science (*Wissenschaft*) pursued for its own sake, to the integration of teaching and research, to academic freedom to teach and to learn (*Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*), and to students' self-cultivation (*Bildung*). His model significantly reshaped modern higher education, and some of its features endure. Yet, the centripetal ideals of his system have not held: late-modern society's centrifugal forces have gradually unraveled many of the very elements Schleiermacher hoped to unify. Chapter VI will explore why.

Chapters II and III show that Newman and Kuyper eyed many of the same cracks and limitations in the Modernist project that Schleiermacher saw, but by contrast, they were able to see through and beyond the pretensions of Modernism. Both Newman and Kuyper bucked the intellectual fashion of the day to uphold what Gerard Loughlin (1997, p.41) has called 'the old news that is forever new', the church's 'ancient postmodernity'. They both rejected the ascendent EEF paradigm and sought to shore up theology and higher education's traditional theocentric ontological foundation (TOF) against the rising tide of modern skepticism. In Tyson's terms, Newman and Kuyper both contended for Christian creedal orthodoxy as epitomizing the 'true myth', and for historically orthodox Christian theology as our proper 'first truth discourse'.

This defense of TOF originated from their different traditional standpoints. While John Henry Newman did not self-identify as a Thomist *per se*, nevertheless, as a Roman Catholic theologian he approached questions of theology and higher education from what Tyson identifies

as an essentially 'Aristotelian/Thomist epistemic anthropology' marked by '[a] confidence, shared by Aristotle and Aquinas, in natural knowledge and logic as viable pathways upon which the human knower can travel toward metaphysical and theological truth' (Tyson, 2022, pp.104, 183). Kuyper's Neo-Calvinist approach to theology and higher education assumes more of what Tyson identifies as an 'Augustinian epistemic anthropology', 'according to which inherited original sin makes true knowledge of any type—without special divine grace—inherently unachievable' (ibid, pp.103, 183). However, despite their differing anthropological priors, Newman and Kuyper's shared Christian commitment to TOF in the teeth of the ascendent modernist EEF yielded overlapping and complementary theological and educational visions.

Chapter II examines Newman's *Idea of a University* alongside its lesser-known companion, *The Rise and Progress of Universities*, and Newman's broader corpus. Regarding question 1), I argue that Newman's account of theology as 'the science of God' is best understood against his broader accounts of 'science' and 'knowledge' in his *University Sermons*, *Essay on Development*, and *Grammar of Assent*. Newman rejects post-Enlightenment Evidentialism, particularly Locke's version, and other forms of EEF in favour of a Catholic TOF rooted in the Augustinian and Anselmian tradition of *fides quaerens intellectum*. He sees theology as a 'deductive science' by which the Church gradually explicates God's historic self-revelation. Newman distinguishes 'natural theology' from the 'physical theology' of Deists and Rationalists, endorsing a 'natural theology' consonant with his Catholic TOF.

On question 2), Newman argues that theology is integral to the university's mission of teaching 'universal knowledge' and plays an architectonic role in students' forming a 'connected

view' of reality. His understanding of theology's relationship to other arts and sciences is further illustrated by several occasional university lectures.

Respecting question 3), when set against the pre-modern model of liberal arts education, Newman's vision of the university as a 'natural' institution of 'liberal learning' is deeply traditional yet not retrograde. Considered alongside *Rise and Progress* and his organisation of the Catholic University in Dublin, it becomes clear that Newman was not as opposed to professional education, research, and academic freedom as is sometimes assumed. Like Schleiermacher's idea of the German research university, Newman's idea of the university sought a unified and comprehensive field of knowledge for its own sake, a unity of teaching and research embracing both of what he called the 'collegiate' and 'university' principles of higher education, intellectual 'elbow room', and the moral and intellectual cultivation of students into 'gentlemen'.

Chapter III examines Abraham Kuyper's theological and educational writings, focusing on his *Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology*, his writings on 'common grace' and science, his Stone Lectures, and his addresses to the Free University of Amsterdam, but drawing on his wider corpus, as well. Regarding question 1), Kuyper, like Newman, affirms that theology is a science seeking to understand God according to God's self-revelation, and he rejects the post-Enlightenment EEF that demands provability from any purported knowledge. Kuyper, too, is a Christian TOFoundationalist, standing within the Anselmian tradition, albeit with a Calvinist and post-Kantian inflection. As a Calvinist, he stresses theological fallibilism and the need for theology to be *semper reformanda*—always reforming itself to reflect divine revelation. Concerning question 2), Kuyper rejects Roman Catholicism's nature/grace dichotomy, instead interpreting human cultural goods (art, science, morality, commerce, etc.) as gifts of 'common grace' that

preserve and develop humanity despite the Fall. Within this frame, theology bears on all cultural spheres by illuminating their relationships to Christ, their sovereign creator and ultimate telos. On question 3), Kuyper views higher education as a gift of 'common grace'. A distinct cultural 'sphere' aimed at cultivating human wisdom, education should be structured organically according to the good it serves. Accordingly, higher learning must be subject only to the persuasive authority of Truth and protected from coercive encroachments by Church, State, or cultural fashion. In a pluralistic culture, Kuyper's conception of higher education requires safeguarding universities' freedom from governmental or ecclesiastical control, and respecting 'worldview pluralism', allowing diverse communities to organise educational institutions and programmes according to their convictions.

Chapters IV-VI turn from exposition to comparative and critical analysis, putting Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's views on theology's role in higher education into conversation with each other and with more recent developments in the epistemology of theology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, and higher education criticism. Each of these chapters centres on one of the dissertation's focal questions: the nature of theological knowledge (Chapter IV), the relationship between theology and other knowledges (Chapter V), and the nature and purpose of the university (Chapter VI). My aim in these chapters is to retrieve their strongest insights for thinking about theology's role in the modern secular university today.

Chapter IV, 'What Kind of Knowledge is Theology?,' brings our three interlocutors' thought to bear on the question of how theology might address the modern secular university's need for a viable 'story', 'metanarrative', or, as Neil Postman says, 'god' to orient and justify its work. I contend that Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper agreed that, in order to pursue its

defining sapiential purpose, the university needs to maintain an ongoing, rigorous practice of metanarrative criticism, discourse, and debate. However, whereas Newman and Kuyper would reckon such discourse to be fundamentally theological, as it pertains to the character of ultimate reality, Schleiermacher reckoned it to be philosophical and limited theology's remit to the curation of the Church's religious affections.

I grant that Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's respective intellectual outlooks were understandable given their different life experiences and epistemic situations. However, I contend that Schleiermacher's strategy of protecting Christian piety against Enlightenment critique by reestablishing it on an EEFoundationalist basis (and within the bounds of Enlightenment reason and Romantic feeling) was both unworkable and misguided. Unworkable, because Schleiermacher could never plausibly reconstruct historic Christianity without the premises upon which Christian piety had been historically developed, namely, God's supernatural self-revelation to Israel and in Christ. Misguided, because, as Newman and Kuyper both argued and subsequent philosophers of religion (particularly proponents of 'Reformed Epistemology') have shown, many of the Enlightenment critiques of historic Christianity's reasonableness themselves rested on false premises.

Finally, I argue that, in light of the persistence of the 'demarcation' problem in the philosophy of science, Newman and Kuyper's interrogation of modern demarcations of science that exclude theology appear quite prescient. Schleiermacher's uncritical embrace of the then ascendent *Wissenschaftsideologie* and its attendant restrictive demarcation theory, by contrast, appears relatively naïve, and his definition of theology as *merely* a practical science appears unnecessarily epistemically modest. I contend that Newman and Kuyper's rebuttals against

modernist epistemologies, their insistence upon the intellectual propriety of seeking understanding from the standpoint of Christian faith, their defense of more capacious demarcations of science, and their inclusion of theology in the roster of the sciences have all proven defensible in the light of the failures of 'Classical Foundationalism,' the development of Reformed Epistemology, and the persistence of 'the demarcation problem' in the philosophy of science. In light of all this, traditional theological outlooks like those championed by Newman and Kuyper can and should play a vital role in reviving the secular university's self-reflective practice of metanarrative discourse, criticism, and debate.

Chapter V, 'How Should Theology Relate to Other Knowledges?,' brings Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper into conversation with the epistemic fragmentation and disciplinary siloing now endemic in the modern secular university. I argue that all three agreed that a commitment to the unity of truth and the 'encyclopaedic' task of seeking to form a coherent, 'connected' 'worldview' was integral to the work of higher education. However, by relegating theology to the practical sciences, Schleiermacher effectively sidelined theology from the scholarly pursuit of intellectual consilience. Newman and Kuyper, however, upheld the Christian tradition's historic conviction that the unity of truth was 'hidden' *in* Christ and that theology—as a practice of metanarrative discourse and debate—not only relates to all the various arts and sciences but has a key role to play in our discernment of the ways the various arts and sciences relate to each other. I argue that the university's privileging of the EEF embraced by Schleiermacher has not led to greater intellectual consilience but has instead exacerbated the university's epistemic fragmentation and that the modern secular university has much to gain from a metanarrative discourse that takes seriously traditional TOFoundationalist outlooks like Newman and Kuyper's.

Finally, Chapter VI, 'What Is The University For?,' then turns to address the common diagnosis given by many contemporary education critics that the modern secular university suffers from an acute, perhaps fatal, lack of direction. I argue that, despite their deep disagreements about the nature and implications of theology, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper were broadly agreed that the university's core defining purpose was the cultivation of wisdom through teaching and research. Moreover, building on the work of Mark William Roche (2017), I argue that they also broadly agreed that for the university to pursue it's defining sapiential purpose it must uphold at least five principles: 1) that wisdom is valuable for its own sake; 2) that Truth is unified and, therefore, the pursuit of wisdom requires the integration of our knowledges; 3) that teaching and research must be somehow held together; 4) that the pursuit of wisdom requires intellectual freedom; and 5) that higher education requires not only the information of the intellect but the formation of intellectual virtues. I argue that, while they differed significantly over many of the nuances, their broad agreements on the university's central purpose and core educational principles are highly significant when contrasted with the contemporary university's disorientation.

I conclude that Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper largely agree that the university's defining task is the cultivation of wisdom but fundamentally differ over *the beginnings of wisdom*. Proverbs identifies two 'beginnings of wisdom': first, the ardent pursuit of wisdom or insight as an end in itself (4:7), and second, 'the fear of the Lord' or 'knowledge of the Holy One' as itself a form of insight necessary to wisdom's cultivation (9:10). The division between Schleiermacher's EEFoundationalist approach to theology and education and Newman and Kuyper's TOFoundationalist approaches is a fundamental division over the second beginning's relationship

to the first. These two approaches yield two very different ideas of the university and of theology's role within it. Schleiermacher's liberal Protestant approach yielded a secular university in which theology was marginalized, while Newman and Kuyper's traditionalist approaches yielded confessionalist visions of the modern university for which theology was integral.

While the liberal Protestant project and the secular research university have come to predominate, Newman and Kuyper exposed some of this approach's epistemological limitations and weaknesses and staked out visions of self-consciously confessional scholarship which have proven extremely fruitful and durable even in the predominantly secular environment of the modern research university. Moreover, all three would agree that, whether we call it 'theology' (as Newman and Kuyper did) or 'philosophy' (as Schleiermacher did), discourse and debate about ultimate realities, foundational narratives, and horizons of meaning are not incidental but integral to higher education, especially in our current pluralistic context of theological dissensus and diversity. Universities in which such discourse and debate are lacking or marginal have become unmoored from their defining sapiential purpose.

Seeking a third way, I draw on threads from all three of my interlocutors to argue (following Nicholas Wolterstorff) that Christian theologians and scholars seeking to navigate the modern secular university should 1) contest the assumption that academic reasoning must move 'from rational consensus in basis to rational consensus in results', 2) honor the role that pre-theoretical fiduciary frameworks play in shaping all learning and scholarship for religious and irreligious students and scholars alike, and 3) nurture a culture of 'dialogical pluralism' in which students and scholars of diverse faiths seek mutual and common understandings while respecting each other's differences. Doing so would open new possibilities for restoring higher

education to its original sapiential purpose by reviving a genuinely *liberating* liberal arts education and genuinely *theological* theology *within* the modern secular university.

This project represents the first comparative analysis of Abraham Kuyper's theological and educational vision with either Friedrich Schleiermacher's or John Henry Newman's, and, therefore, the first exploration of the significant resonances (as well as dissonances) between them. Earlier studies (e.g., Kelsey, 1993; Higton, 2012) have explored the relationship between Schleiermacher's vision for the University of Berlin and Newman's for the Catholic University in Dublin, or have focused on Kuyper alone (Kobes, 1993; Wolterstorff, 2004; van Deursen, 2008; Heslam, 1998; Bartholomew, 2017, Ch.11). Bringing these three figures' visions into conversation with each other around these questions of theology's role in the university and the challenges facing higher education today, aided by up-to-date scholarship and newly available primary sources (see especially **Ch.III.4., p.207** below), surfaces both the deepest fault lines and interconnections between them. Most centrally, it highlights the fundamental divide between Schleiermacher's EEFoundationalist stance and Newman and Kuyper's TOFoundationalist stances, and Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's shared vision of the university as a sapiential institution with an inbuilt integrative ('encyclopedic') intellectual task.

Moreover, it becomes clear for the first time that Newman and Kuyper made structurally similar critiques of modernist pretensions to epistemological foundationalism and religious neutrality, of overly narrow definitions of science, and of the modern university's marginalization of theology. This comparative analysis also shows that Newman and Kuyper made similar cases for the legitimacy of seeking scholarly understanding from the standpoint of faith and were both

precursors to the development of Reformed Epistemology in twentieth-century analytic philosophy of religion, all points which have been either unnoticed or underexplored.

Finally, this comparison shows that, despite standing in different traditions, Newman and Kuyper's educational visions significantly overlap in their emphases on the principled development of Christian thought in response to changing epistemic and cultural circumstances, their prioritization of theological principles over doctrinal shibboleths for the sake of Christian intellectual freedom, their repositioning of theology vis-à-vis the other sciences not as their 'Queen' but as *primus inter pares*, their insistence upon patience as a key Christian intellectual virtue when facing new apologetic and theological challenges, and their conceptions of higher education as requiring the inculcation of a virtuous intellectual ethos. Before this study, these commonalities have not been documented and they warrant greater attention from those of us committed to the project of Christian higher education.

I. Friedrich Schleiermacher
The Idea of the Modern Secular University

When Wilhelm von Humboldt invited Schleiermacher to join the planning committee for his new university in Berlin—built around a vision of achieving a truly 'scientific education' (*wissenschaftlich Bildung*)—some German intellectuals had already disputed whether theology should have *any* role in higher education.[5] In the 18th century, professors at the Universities of Halle and Göttingen had questioned theology's traditional preeminence as 'queen of the sciences'. Christian Thomasius contended that the hierarchical arrangement of the faculties was devised by the medieval papacy to keep society under the Pontiff's thumb. Christian Wolff had argued that the philosophical faculty demanded respect as a higher faculty (*eine obere Facultät*) commensurate with theology, law, and medicine, rather than as a mere propaedeutic. J.D. Michaelis further proposed that philosophy was more vital to the university than the theology faculty. Göttingen's professor, Christoph Meiners, even speculated in his *Ueber die Verfassung und Verwaltung deutscher Universitäten* (1801-2) that someday philosophy would supersede theology as 'the queen of the sciences'.[6] Even Schleiermacher's fellow cofounder of the soon-to-be University of Berlin, the atheistic philosopher J.G. Fichte, had suggested that the theology faculty could be dissolved without loss, as whatever was 'scientific' (*wissenschaftlich*) in theology could be better handled by historians, philosophers, and philologists (Howard 2006, p.165).[7]

[5] **Ch.I.1-3.** builds upon material I first developed as part of my MPhil thesis (see Williams, 2020b).
[6] On this history and these sources, see Howard (2006), pp.121-29; see too, Menand, Reitter, and Wellmon (2017).
[7] As Zachhuber observes, 'Fichte, in his proposal for the new university, rejects a faculty of theology largely because he denies its internal coherence', a point which Schleiermacher largely concedes by locating theology's *raison d'être* in its practical purpose rather than in any internal logic inherent in theology's subject matter (Zachhuber, 2013, p.15).

Immanuel Kant, however, cast the longest shadow over the deliberations about what shape Berlin's new university should take. Kant had been censored in 1794 by Prussia's Minister of Justice and supervisor of the state's Department of Religious Affairs, Johann Christoph Wölner, for having (allegedly) used his philosophy 'to undermine and destroy many of the most important and fundamental doctrines of the Holy Scriptures and Christianity' in his *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*. Kant compliantly refrained from addressing religious matters until Wölner was sacked, at which point Kant aired his grievances regarding restrictions of academic freedom, publishing a series of essays in 1798 entitled *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (*The Conflict of the Faculties*).

Kant focused on the conflict between the philosophical and theological faculties, bemoaning the latter's interference with the work of the former as inappropriate and counterproductive. While the so-called higher faculties of theology, medicine, and law played crucial utilitarian functions in society, they depend upon the philosophical faculty for reliable knowledge. For science's sake, philosophy must be free to follow evidence and reason (*Vernunft*) wherever they might lead (Kant, 1992, pp.23-29).

The philosophy faculty's function vis-à-vis the three higher faculties, says Kant, 'is to monitor (*kontrollieren*) them and, in this way, be useful to them, since truth (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the utility the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance' (ibid.). Kant was concerned that philosophy be neither 'driven away or silenced'. All he asks is for the philosophy faculty 'merely to be free, as it leaves others free, to discover the truth for the benefit of all the sciences and to set it before the higher faculties to use as they will.' Kant was willing to 'grant the theology faculty's proud

claim that the philosophy faculty is its handmaid.' He added, however, 'the question remains, whether the servant is the mistress's *torchbearer* or *trainbearer*?' (ibid., p.45)

When in 1808 Humboldt invited Schleiermacher to help establish a new Prussian university founded upon the ideals of the German Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), the following questions therefore loomed large: What kind of knowledge is theology? Is it sufficiently scientific (*wissenschaftlich*) to warrant a place in a modern university? If theology is a science, how does it relate to the other sciences? How should the theology faculty relate to the other faculties? And, finally, what is the university for in the first place?

1. Religious Experience: What do theologians know?

As a young seminarian, Schleiermacher fell under the spell of Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment critics of religion and confessed to his father he no longer believed the historic Christian doctrines of the incarnation and atonement.[8] Schleiermacher never returned to his father's more traditional Moravian faith,[9] but he remained personally pious and a deeply committed churchman. Schleiermacher (as quoted in Vial, 2013, p.7) described his pious Moravian upbringing as having awakened him 'to the consciousness of the relations of man to a

[8] I owe the details of Schleiermacher's biography to the overviews found in Vial (2013, pp.4-23) and Gerrish (1984, *passim*), both of whom rely primarily upon Wilhelm Dilthey's untranslated biography, *Leben Schleiermachers* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1870).

[9] This much is clear from a reading of his treatments of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement in *CF* §§92-105 and 84. Regarding the former, Schleiermacher rejected the traditional dual natures Christology of Chalcedon in favor of an account based on Jesus's being so entirely motivated by his uniquely heightened God consciousness that 'every original activity belongs solely to the divine, and everything passive to the human' (*CF,* §97.3). See discussion in Mariña (2005, pp.151ff). On the latter, see discussions in McGrath (1998, pp.342ff), and Wyman (2005, pp.129ff).

higher world', and as having nurtured 'that mystic tendency… which has been of so much importance to me, and has supported and carried me through all the storms of skepticism.' Schleiermacher concluded 'that after all that I have passed through, I have become a Herrnhuter [Moravian] again, only of a higher order.' Being a Moravian of a higher order, for Schleiermacher, meant retaining pietism's deep emotional attachment to transcendent reality, while eschewing traditional faiths' formulaic rigidity. In his *Speeches,* he recounts how such experiential religion had sustained him through the theological deconstruction he had undergone during his seminary days:

> Religion helped me when I began to examine the ancestral faith and to purify my heart of the rubble of primitive times. It remained with me when God and immortality disappeared before my doubting eyes. (*OR*, I, p.8)

Such affective religion is the more durable and valuable stuff that remains after Enlightenment criticism burns away the rudimentary, irrational dross of traditional faith. Being a Moravian of a higher order meant fixing one's heart upon what Schleiermacher took to be the heart of religion while setting religion on a higher plane, that of religious *feeling*, beyond the reach of Enlightenment critique generally and Kant's critiques in particular. Theology, then, for Schleiermacher, is about understanding and fostering the religious feelings that sustain and orient us.

Thus, a theology, says Schleiermacher, serves a community demarcated by a characteristic God-consciousness, a distinctive intersubjective religious experience, by helping that community understand what it is they are experiencing, how they experience it, and who they are as a particular faith community (*BO,* §1, p.1). Christian theology, accordingly, explores

the experience of Christian piety. Likewise, Islamic theology explores the Muslim religious experience, and Buddhist theology explores what it is like to traverse the eightfold path.

'Theology', for Schleiermacher, is not primarily talk *about God*, rather it is talk about the experiences of 'piety' or 'religion' native to particular religious communities. The task of *Christian* theology, therefore, 'is to endeavor both to understand the nature of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other modes of faith and to understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in relation to all the other activities of the human spirit' (*BO,* §21, p.10).

Schleiermacher's conception of theology anticipated what would become the field of comparative religions but with the crucial difference that Schleiermacher takes the emic perspective of various faith communities not merely as interesting anthropological phenomena, but as genuine windows onto the transcendent 'Whence' of our being.[10] That is, Schleiermacher believes we can learn about God *indirectly* through exploring our and others' experiences of the divine.[11]

1.1. The Direct Object: Religious Experience

[10] On Schleiermacher's role in the rise of 'Religious Studies,' see D'Costa (2005, pp.16ff). Kuyper anticipated these developments (which were already quite progressed in late 19th century Holland), identifying Schleiermacher as their chief progenitor (cf., *EST*, §63).

[11] Schleiermacher himself never makes this distinction in so many words. For Schleiermacher, the direct and indirect objects of theology are distinct but so conceptually entangled it can be difficult to tell at times when he has left off talking about one and started talking about the other. I make the distinction here and have organized my study as I have purely for heuristic purposes.

In his *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, Schleiermacher advances an apologetic for what we might call 'mere religion'.[12] The first of his *Speeches* concludes by summarizing the claims he intends to expound over the following four: 'What I assert and what I should like to establish for religion include the following,' he writes. 'It springs necessarily and by itself from the interior of every better soul, it has its own province in the mind in which it reigns sovereign, and it is worthy of moving the noblest and the most excellent by means of its innermost power and by having its innermost essence known by them'[13] (*OR*, I, p.17). As Theodore Vial importantly notes, many interpret Schleiermacher to be attempting an epistemological end-run around the barrier Kant erected between our concept-laden experience, on the one hand, and the preconceptual thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) on the other, claiming to have found direct access to transcendent reality through the religious affections (Vial, 2013, pp.61-2).[14]

George Lindbeck, in his typology of theological styles, categorizes Schleiermacher as the paradigmatic 'experiential-expressivist' (Lindbeck, 2009, p.2). Premodern theologians (and many contemporary conservatives) worked from within a 'cognitive-propositionalist' viewpoint which

[12] In contrast to his later expressly theological work, in this book he uses the term 'theology' only once, disparagingly, with specific reference to the sorts of 'scholastic' and 'metaphysical' systems which had left him and his audience (religion's cultured despisers) cold (*OR*, I, p.13). Nevertheless, in substance and in argument structure, this early work mirrors much of what Schleiermacher will say in his later dogmatics. The *Speeches*, then, are a work of theology in an apologetic mode, making the case to his fellow German intellectuals for being open to experiential religion as one can find it only within the life of a historical religious community, what Schleiermacher calls 'positive religion'.

[13] Note that 'religion', in Schleiermacher's sense, is enjoyed only by 'every *better* soul' (my italics). While in some ways Schleiermacher has a relatively high anthropology in comparison to figures like Augustine and Calvin, his optimism about humanity is far from uniform: Like the Gnostics before him, Schleiermacher thinks religious sensibility to be the possession of only a spiritually sensitive few.

[14] Vial cites, for example, Wayne Proudfoot, who claims specifically that 'Schleiermacher's conception of religion…was intended as a response to Kant's critiques.' Kant, of course believed that we did have direct access to the transcendent in both the facts of human freedom and of reason, although neither of these is sufficient to ground the elaborate forms of religious life that Schleiermacher sought to defend. Schleiermacher wanted more of religion than what could subsist 'within the limits of reason alone'. For all of this, it should be noted that Schleiermacher never mentions Kant by name anywhere in the *Speeches*.

'emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities.'[15] Lindbeck shows little sympathy for this view, devoting most of his book instead to weighing the relative merits of what he calls 'experiential-expressivism' against his own 'cultural-linguistic' view of religion. 'The origins of [the experiential-expressivist] tradition in one sense goes back to Kant,' says Lindbeck, 'for he helped clear the ground for its emergence by demolishing the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the earlier regnant cognitive-propositional views' (ibid., pp. 6-7). Thus Schleiermacher, according to Lindbeck, 'interprets doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations' such that 'religiously significant meanings can vary while doctrines remain the same, and conversely, doctrines can alter without a change of meaning' (ibid., p.3). Lindbeck elaborates:

> The general principle is that insofar as doctrines function as nondiscursive symbols, they are polyvalent in import and therefore subject to changes of meaning, or even to a total loss of meaningfulness…There is thus at least the logical possibility that a Buddhist and a Christian might have basically the same faith, although expressed very differently. (ibid.)

Schleiermacher uses language that can readily be interpreted in this way—e.g., in his speaking of religion's common grounding in 'the intuition of the infinite' in his *Speeches* (e.g., *OR*, II, pp.22-4) and of Christianity's common grounding with Islam, Judaism, Hellenistic polytheism and so on in the 'feeling of absolute dependence' (*schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*) in *The Christian Faith* (e.g., §4, p.12).

[15] On this account of religion, doctrines are essentially propositions that are inherently translatable, that can be unproblematically abstracted from their native systems, and that are simply either true or false. On this view there is no difficulty in conducting a straightforward, apples-to-apples comparison of, say, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim views of the afterlife and in declaring one to be objectively true while the others are objectively false.

Vial rejects Lindbeck's experiential-expressivist interpretation, however, arguing that Schleiermacher's approach more closely approximates Lindbeck's own 'cultural-linguistic' account, in which 'emphasis is placed on aspects in which religions resemble languages together with their correlative forms of life and are thus similar to cultures (insofar as these are understood semiotically as reality and value systems–that is as idioms for the constructing of reality and the living of life)' (Lindbeck, 2009, pp. 3-4; cf. Vial, 2013, pp.67ff).

However, *pace* both Lindbeck and Vial, neither a simple experiential-expressivist interpretation nor a simple cultural-linguistic interpretation quite describes Schleiermacher's system *in toto*, as it includes both experiential-expressivist and cultural-linguistic elements. Together these supply Schleiermacher's theories of religious origins and of ordinary religion, respectively, both of which determine the kinds of knowledge possible in relation to religion and delimit the places religion can conceivably occupy within modern *Wissenschaft*.

1.1.1. Religious Virtuosi

For Schleiermacher there are basically two kinds of people: There are those (exceedingly) rare religious geniuses who spontaneously generate religious culture and language and whose relationship to the transcendent is precisely described in terms of 'experiential-expressivism'. Then there are the rest of us, the religious hoi polloi who inhabit the religious traditions to which the geniuses occasionally give rise. For the rest of us, the 'cultural-linguistic' account most aptly

describes our relationship to religion, as our experiences of the transcendent are mediated through a complex of language and practice into which we are socialized.[16]

Schleiermacher's theory of religious genius with its corresponding theory of the ordinary religionist has two key aspects. The first concerns what we might call his bipolar anthropology. 'Each human soul,' Schleiermacher writes, 'is merely a product of two opposing drives', corresponding roughly to the *vita contemplativa* (or, perhaps, put in Lindbeck's terms, the experiential), which stands back from the world taking it all in, and the *vita activa* (the expressivist), which moves out into the world creatively reshaping it by force of will[17] (*OR,* I, p.5).

The second is the supposition that 'religion' is primarily transmitted through these religious virtuosi who manage a sort of equilibrium between the two poles. These rare individuals are so attuned to transcendence as to attain unique and powerful religious insights whilst also being so capable of creatively and compellingly communicating their visions as to give rise to religious traditions. Paradigmatic examples of such figures are the Buddha, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed.[18] Transcribing Schleiermacher's theory of religion in Lindbeck's terms, then, I

[16] This division might, at first, sound elitist, but Schleiermacher sees himself as defending the religion of ordinary people against religion's 'cultured despisers'. As Brian Gerrish observes, 'In making his case against rationalist and speculative theologies, he refused to admit that his faith was any different from the faith of other Christians including unspeculative and unphilosophical Christians. As his open letters to his friend Friedrich Lücke (1791-1855) make clear, the only difference of "order" he could admit in the church was a matter not of faith but of the ability to explicate and awaken it' (Gerrish, 1984, p.25).

[17] Klemm interprets the two poles of Schleiermacher's anthropology in terms of 'universality' and 'particularity' (Klemm, 2005, p.255). However, Schleiermacher does not use this terminology himself and the language he does use underscores the traits of certain personality types more than the dynamics attending differing metaphysical outlooks. I have opted for an interpretation which better conveys the analogy between Schleiermacher's account of major religious figures and Romantic conceptions of artistic genius.

[18] It is important to bear in mind that for Schleiermacher the religious virtuosi's insights, while they require creativity to be communicated, are not creations *ex nihilo* or *de novo* by the virtuosi themselves. God genuinely reveals insights to these virtuosi who are but receivers of them and conduits for them to others. He writes:

> Therefore at all times the deity sends people here and there in whom both tendencies [the active and the contemplative] are combined in a more fruitful manner, equips them with wondrous gifts, prepares their way with an all-powerful word, and employs them as translators of its will and as mediators of what would otherwise remain eternally separated. (*OR*, I, p.6)

suggest that 'experiential-expressivism' better describes Schleiermacher's theory of religious innovation than his theory of religion generally.

1.1.2. Religion for the Rest of Us

Lindbeck's 'experiential-expressivist' concept is unconvincing as an account of Schleiermacher's theory of ordinary religion. First, *contra* Lindbeck, Schleiermacher does not account all religious expressions as equal. Rather, he espouses a hierarchy of religions in which some do more justice to the infinite than others. Second, like Lindbeck, Schleiermacher thinks the differences between most people's intuitions of the infinite are informed by cultural-linguistic factors in their social environments, particularly the cultural-linguistic factors of the religious traditions into which they have been socialized or apprenticed. 'In religion there is, of course, a mastership and a discipleship', says Schleiermacher (*OR*, III, p.58). These considerations suggest that, while 'experiential-expressivism' may aptly describe the religion of the occasional mystic genius, for the remainder, religion is more like a language to be learned or a culture to be inculcated. Thus, Lindbeck's 'cultural-linguistic' account describes Schleiermacher's understanding of ordinary religion better than does his concept of religious 'experiential-expressivism'. To this extent, at least, Vial offers the better reading of Schleiermacher.

Thus, these virtuosi function as mediators between the rest of humanity and the divine. But Schleiermacher hoped for a day when religious virtuosi will no longer be necessary, when all people would enjoy the spiritual equipoise which makes direct insight into the divine possible. 'May it yet happen that this office of mediator should cease and the priesthood of humanity receive lovelier definition!' (*OR*, I, p.8) Until that day, however, the vast majority of humanity catches glimpses of the divine only as they are refracted through the religious traditions and communities to which these religious geniuses give rise. We will explore this side of Schleiermacher's religious thought in the next section's discussion of theology's indirect object, God.

This point is obscured, however, by Schleiermacher's identification of the 'intuition of the infinite' as being 'the highest and most universal formula of religion on the basis of which [one] should be able to find every place in religion, from which [one] may determine its essence and its limits' (*OR*, II, p.24). Does not Schleiermacher's choice of the word 'intuition' suggest that he has in mind a sort of *preconceptual*, *prelinguistic* grasp of 'the infinite'? No.

As Vial observes, far from using 'intuition' as a way to circumvent Kant's gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal (i.e., 'things in themselves' apart from observation and things as they appear to us), 'intuition' (*Anschauung*), in fact, is Kant's own term for 'a *representation* of the sort which would depend on the presence of an object' (Kant, 2004, p.33 as quoted in Vial, 2013, p.68, my italics). As Vial demonstrates, Schleiermacher explicitly uses 'intuition' in this Kantian sense. He nowhere claims intuition to grasp God-in-Godself. Schleiermacher writes, rather, '[What] you thus intuit and perceive is not the nature of things, but their act upon you. What you know or believe about the nature of things lies far beyond the realm of intuition' (*OR*, II, p.25). Vial (2013, p.68) concludes: 'Schleiermacher does not think that, by intuiting something, we pierce the Kantian veil and have direct contact with a thing-in-itself.' Consequently, the direct object of theological inquiry is not God-in-Godself (to which we have no epistemic access) but our *experiences of* (what we take to be) God, our own intuitions of the infinite which are shaped by our respective religious linguistic-enculturation—unless, of course, one happens to be a spiritual virtuoso.

Finally, it must be noted that according to Schleiermacher there is an inherent, ineliminable ambiguity in our experiences of the infinite such that some of the most elemental questions of religion—e.g., whether God is distinct from nature or not, whether God is personal

or not, and so on—are fundamentally undecidable. Schleiermacher believes neither that all intuitions of the infinite are experientially identical nor that they can ever be completely preconceptual; in fact, he parses out a taxonomy of three basic, equally valid types of intuitions of the infinite—the personalist (or theistic), the pantheist, and the naturalist—which fundamentally structure every religious experience. Anyone who intuits the infinite will inevitably do so in one of these three ways. These basic conceptual frames then impress themselves upon the socioreligious cultures in which those experiences are elaborated and subsequently shared (*OR*, V, pp.102-04). But because direct, pre-conceptual experience of the infinite is not possible, according to Schleiermacher, there is no way of getting behind one's intuitions *of* the infinite to *the infinite itself* in order to know whether one's intuition is correct, or to be able to decide between intuitions that fundamentally conflict (as they do, for example, between atheists and Christians, or within someone wavering between doubt and faith). In short, the infinite cannot tell us whether our intuitions about it are true.

1.1.3. 'Religion,' Religions, and Religion's Cultured Despisers

Schleiermacher describes religion this way to defend and commend it to his sophisticated, skeptical friends—religion's 'cultured despisers'. As David Klemm argues (2005, pp.252-59), Schleiermacher's apologetic strategy in the *Speeches* is to try to steer a course for himself and his audience between the Scylla of a sophisticated but cold Enlightenment 'natural religion' and the Charybdis of a naïve embrace of a primitive faith. Schleiermacher attempted to preserve the experiential power that uniquely resides in positive religious traditions and their communities

without having to retain a literalistic understanding of their distinctive tenets. To do this, Schleiermacher made three crucial moves.

The first and most important is definitional, describing 'religion' as a genus of transcendent human experience of which 'positive religions', such as Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Hellenistic polytheism, are all species.[19] In this, Schleiermacher stood midway between Enlightenment thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1782) and David Hume (2008) who had already begun to use the word 'religion' to refer (disparagingly) to a category of 'things', and, conversely, earlier theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin for whom *religio* denoted the virtue of giving God His due and the character of Christian piety (cf., Buckley, 2005, pp.3-24).

Rousseau had similarly used the terms 'positive doctrines' or 'religions' to refer to particular culturally conditioned religious traditions purporting to uniquely teach the precise ways in which God (or the gods) wished to be honored. Rousseau thought such positive religions to be inherently intolerant and exclusive. Like many Enlightenment thinkers, Rousseau (1782, p.35) preferred a more broadminded 'natural religion', grounded in universal reason rather than particular (supposedly) divine revelations.

Hume, in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and *The Natural History of Religion*, had undercut the arguments propounded both by proponents of natural religion and Christian apologists alike, defending instead a more plausible genealogy of 'religions' which traced their

[19] This reconceptualization of general religion and positive religions as standing in a genus-and-species relationship to one another, united by a more-or-less common transcendent human experience laid the groundwork for the subsequent eclipse of Theology by Religious Studies in many corners of the academy, a point to which we will return at the end of this chapter. While Schleiermacher was by no means unilaterally responsible for this fateful turn in the history of ideas, he was a significant contributor to it.

psychological origins to our base, nonrational impulses, and their historical roots to primitive superstition.

In his *Speeches*, then, Schleiermacher hoped to reconceptualize religion so as to preserve the experiential vitality felt in particular traditional religious communities whilst accepting the Enlightenment's critiques of such traditions, especially those arising from the Enlightenment's critical historical consciousness.[20] By setting these traditions in a positive (species-to-genus) relationship to a broader category of 'religion' defined as diverse experiences of a common transcendental object, Schleiermacher maintained both the universality sought in 'natural religion' and the emotional vibrancy of traditional religious life without running aground on the common Enlightenment critiques of (positive) religion.

In contrast to Enlightenment constructions of 'rational religion', Schleiermacher's second strategy is to argue that '[religion] does not need the grounding in more or less "speculative" metaphysics that so many philosophical theologians have tried to give it, nor the grounding in morality that Kant proposed as its sole proper basis' (Adams, 2005, p.36). Schleiermacher sharply distinguishes religion from metaphysics, or morals, or any combination thereof (*OR*, II, p.19).[21] Religion is not to be identified with primitive cosmologies, cosmogonies, or codes of behavior. Rather, Schleiermacher identifies the concept of 'intuition of the infinite' as 'the highest and most universal formula of religion on the basis of which [one] should be able to find every place in religion, from which [one] may determine its essence and its limits' (*OR*, II, p.24). Religion,

[20] Zachhuber helpfully cites Jörn Rüsen's analysis of the 'historicization' of modern thought: 'Historians now work on the assumption that a particular story is objectively given in or behind the empirical evidence available to the scholar, and the uncovering of this story is the specific task of the "scientific" historian' (2013, p.7).

[21] In *The Christian Faith,* Schleiermacher argues that 'piety' is not a matter of Knowing or Doing but rather of *Feeling* (*CF,* §3). In his fourth speech, he writes: '[Religion] rejects every moralizing prophet and priest; whoever would proclaim religion should do it purely' (*OR*, IV, p.90).

according to Schleiermacher, 'is the sensibility and taste for the infinite', the essence of which is 'neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling' (*OR*, II, pp.22-23). While these formulae might initially sound rather nebulous, Schleiermacher is in fact not arguing for what we today might call being 'spiritual, but not religious'. As Crouter observes:

> In breaking with natural religion and the Enlightenment's moral-rational interpretations of religion Schleiermacher sides with particularity as the starting point for analysis of religion. Since religion arises within human culture, a denial of historically manifest religion in effect constitutes a denial of humanity. It is shortsighted to pretend that the depth of personal emotion, the joy and despair, the creeds, ritual behavior, and strange or exotic beliefs and practices of religious life can be ignored in an account of the human. (Schleiermacher, 1996, xxxv)

Again, returning to the genus-species relationship between religion and positive religions, Schleiermacher believes religion to subsist at the species level. Just as one cannot find a mammal that is not also a particular *species of* mammal, one cannot experience vital religion except in particular positive communal religious life, say, that of Shintoism, or Catholicism, or any number of ancestral tribal religions. This species-genus relationship between religion and positive religions is implied by Schleiermacher's cultural-linguistic account of ordinary religion: one cannot simply speak or write 'language' in the abstract but only some particular language or another.

Thirdly, Schleiermacher reconceives what he takes to be 'the first and most essential' concepts of religion in Enlightenment-friendly terms:

> What, then, is a miracle?...'Miracle' is merely the religious name for event, every one of which, even the most natural and usual, is a miracle as soon as it adapts itself to the fact that the religious view of it can be the dominant one. To me everything is a miracle….
>
> What is revelation? Every original and new intuition of the universe is one, and yet all individuals must know best what is original and new for them. And if something of what was original in them is still new for you, then their revelation is also one for you, and I advise you to ponder it well….

> What is inspiration? It is merely the religious name for freedom. Every free action that becomes a religious act, every restoration of a religious intuition, every expression of a religious feeling that really communicates itself so that the intuition of the universe is transferred to others, took place upon inspiration; for it was an action of the universe by one on the others….
>
> What are operations of grace? All religious feelings are supernatural, for they are religious only insofar as they are produced directly by the universe; whether they are religious in oneself, each person must judge best. (*OR*, II, pp.48-49)

In these redefinitions, we can see why Martin Kähler, reflecting on the place of the *Speeches* in the history of modern theology, described Schleiermacher as 'the Protestant theologian of the Romantic movement'.[22] Schleiermacher simultaneously respected the Enlightenment critiques of traditional religion whilst relocating the most vital aspects of religion from the realm of reason to the more flexible realm of intuition, feeling, creativity, and freedom.

By disconnecting the power of religious experience from the tenets of specific religious traditions, Schleiermacher discovered a form of piety capable of weathering the Enlightenment critiques. In an autobiographical aside, he writes:

> Religion helped me when I began to examine the ancestral faith and to purify my heart of the rubble of primitive times. It remained with me when God and immortality disappeared before my doubting eyes. (*OR*, I, p.8)

Here it becomes clearer what Schleiermacher intends when he says he aims to show that religion has 'its own province in the mind in which it reigns sovereign' (*OR*, I, 17). If religion is grounded in transcendental, affective experiences and is only incidentally (even if inevitably) related to the

[22] He continues: 'One will have difficulty imagining Schleiermacher without this, but will also not grasp the significance of the Romantic school for the development of theory in the nineteenth century without knowing and recalling that in him a theologian wholly dedicated to the Romantic school exercised the determining influence on theology. His *Speeches* show this relationship not only in their substance, but also in their form.' Martin Kähler, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik in 19. Jarhundert*, quoted in Crouter (Schleiermacher, 1996, vi). The Romantic character of Schleiermacher's conception of religion is made clear in his connection of religion to art: 'Religion and art stand beside one another like two friendly souls whose inner affinity, whether or not they equally surmise it, is nevertheless still unknown to them' (*OR*, III, p.69).

particular linguistic and liturgical forms whereby these experiences are imperfectly poetically mediated, then religious people have nothing to fear from either historical-criticism or sceptical philosophical arguments.

For Schleiermacher, religion, the intuition of the *infinite*, necessarily exceeds all the traditions in which it is manifested. The key metaphysical principle underlying Schleiermacher's religious thought is the traditional theistic maxim *finitum non capax infiniti*: the finite cannot comprehend the infinite. Infinity inevitably exceeds any interpretation (*Auffassung*) or representation (*Vorstellung*) of it. The most natural language for referring to the divine is impressionistic, intimating by way of poetry, metaphor, and suggestive imagery something of what is experienced.

When successful, this first-order religious language does not so much describe matters of theological fact as capture (and stir!) our religious affections and imagination. The theologian may reflect analytically on these experiences, translating this first-order impressionistic language into second-order doctrinal propositions (*Glaubenssätze*). But Schleiermacher's theological framework precludes taking a 'cognitive-propositionalist' approach to theologizing—one which 'stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities' (Lindbeck, 2009, p.16).[23]

Given this account, to what do theologians have *direct* epistemic access? First, theologians have access to their own religious experience, shaped as they are by the cultural-

[23] Lindbeck (ibid.) writes: 'For a propositionalist if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false. This implies, for example, that the historic affirmations and denials of transubstantiation can never be harmonized.' Compare with what Schleiermacher says about those religions on an equal par with one another not relating to each other in terms of true and false (*CF,* §7, p.39).

linguistic milieus of the theologians' religious traditions. That is, the theologian has epistemic access to 'what it is like' to be Christian or Jewish or Buddhist or whatever, and can reflect on both the nature of their experience and what the nature of that experience suggests about its ultimate source.[24] Second, the theologian has direct access to the cultural-linguistic phenomena of positive religions; that is, to the formal and formative language, ritual, and material culture attending other people's religious experiences. Third, by way of methodical, philological and historical research, the theologian has access to the developmental histories of these religious traditions, others' and their own.

1.2. The Indirect Object: The Whence of Our Being

Theology's direct object—religious experience—is not the whole story for Schleiermacher. As Klemm (2005, p.255, my italics) puts it, 'feeling' for Schleiermacher 'is immediate consciousness of how the self is affected *by something*'. Schleiermacher is clear that in religion the 'something' affecting the self is God, the ultimate 'Whence' of our being. Consciousness of this Whence is the 'self-identical essence of piety', and is, by definition, 'the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God' (*CF,* §4, p.12). Put simply, human knowledge *does* touch divine reality, if only obliquely at the singular point of our experience of absolute dependence.

[24] As Philip Merklinger aptly puts it (1993, p.55), Schleiermacher's '*The Christian Faith* is best understood as a phenomenology of the Christian religion.'

Whether Schleiermacher understood this divine reality in Theistic or Pantheistic terms is unclear. In the *Speeches*, the younger Schleiermacher had used the phraseology of 'intuition of the infinite' and 'intuition of the universe' to describe these experiences, perhaps suggesting a more Pantheistic bent. In his *Glaubenslehre,* however, his mind seems split. At points he defends something like the classical theistic conception, arguing that 'God' is not merely a euphemism for the cosmos. He writes:

> …[*This] 'Whence' is not the world, in the sense of the totality of temporal existence*, and still less is it any single part of the world. For we have a feeling of freedom (though, indeed, a limited one) in relation to the world, since we are complementary parts of it, and also since we are continually exercising an influence on its individual parts; and, moreover, there is the possibility of our exercising influence on all its parts; and while this does permit a limited feeling of dependence, it excludes the absolute feeling. (*CF,* §4, p.17, my italics)

Schleiermacher's argument here seems to be that a) if God were identical with the world of which we are part, and b) we have some measure of power over the world, then c) it follows that we have some measure of power over God, and, therefore, d) that our dependence on God is relative rather than absolute. But e) because the experience of God is one of *absolute* dependence, it follows (*modus tollens*) that God must not be identical with the world.

Later, however, he answers the question of whether his understanding of 'piety' (i.e., the feeling of absolute dependence) is compatible with Pantheism, saying: 'To this question an affirmative answer may be given without hesitation, provided that Pantheism is taken as expressing some variety of Theism, and that the word is not simply and solely a disguise for a materialistic negation of Theism' (§9, p.39). Thus, Schleiermacher was primarily concerned to avoid the charge of Atheism which dogged adherents of Substance Monist versions of Pantheism

(commonly associated in his day with the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza).[25] Nevertheless, Schleiermacher admits, the states of mind attending typically Pantheist conceptions of God as 'One' and 'All' 'can scarcely be distinguished from the religious emotions of many a Monotheist', and attempts to distinguish too sharply between the two positions tend to undercut Theistic conceptions of omnipotence and omnipresence (ibid).[26]

What then does Schleiermacher mean by 'God'? Schleiermacher answers that 'in the first instance God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling [of absolute dependence] and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it' (§4, p.17). In short, God is whatever it is we are experiencing when we experience a feeling of absolute dependence. This definition allows one to distinguish more and less adequate accounts when comparing, say, Greek polytheism with Sufi mysticism—the latter being more compatible with feelings of *absolute* dependence than the former. But, ultimately, the sheer feeling of absolute dependence does not enable us to discriminate between a Theistic and a Pantheistic Whence of our existence. We must therefore be content with 'God' being a functional term, a placeholder for whatever it is we feel (whatever it is that is impressing itself upon our consciousness) when we experience religious feelings.

---

[25] Thus, when Merklinger says that Schleiermacher believed that '[m]onotheism, polytheism, even atheism are all articulations of relationship to God', (1993, p.72) this is certainly true of the young Schleiermacher of the *Speeches* (see especially *OR,* V, p.102-4 on 'personalism', 'pantheism', and 'naturalism' as the three basic 'intuitions of the infinite', and *OR,* II, p.24 for the young Schleiermacher's warmer embrace of Spinoza). But by the time he was writing the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher was careful not to appear too friendly towards Spinozism/Atheism.

[26] In favor of a pantheist reading of Schleiermacher is the fact that he was not committed to belief in a *personal* God. After Sack accused him of 'Spinozism' (read 'atheism') in a letter after reading *On Religion*, Schleiermacher defended himself against the charge, writing: 'I have only said that religion does not depend upon whether or not in abstract thought a person attributes to the infinite, supersensual Cause of the world the predicate of personality.' See Blackwell, 'The Antagonistic Correspondence,' as cited in Crouter (Schleiermacher, 1996, xiv). On Schleiermacher's correspondence with Sack, see, too, Gerrish (1984, pp.55-6).

While not admitting any way of directly accessing God-in-Godself apart from the conceptual framing inherent in positive religious experience, Schleiermacher nevertheless believed that true second-order doctrinal propositions (*Glaubenssätze*) about God can be derived from descriptions of positive religious experiences, insofar as they are true *to those* experiences. One can see, perhaps, how such synthetic renderings of what religious experience is *like* and speculations about what these experiences, given what they are like, must be experiences *of*, might amount to being a sort of knowledge. But just what kind of knowledge exactly? And is it the sort of knowledge deserving a place in the university?

2. What Kind of Knowledge is Theology?

Schleiermacher begins his *Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study* by defining theology as being 'a positive science, the parts of which join into a cohesive whole only through their common relation to a distinct mode of faith, that is, a distinct formation of God-consciousness' (*BO,* §1, p.1). The remainder of the *Outline* expounds this definition, unpacking the interrelationships of the three branches of theological study (philosophical, historical, and practical theology). To see how these subdisciplines together comprise a field of study—theology—I must first clarify what Schleiermacher means by calling theology 'a positive science' (*eine positive Wissenschaft*). Both the noun (*Wissenschaft*) and its qualifier (*positive*) require explanation.

2.1. What makes theology theological?

In defining theology as 'a *positive* science', Schleiermacher inextricably ties theology to the practical task of leading the Church.[27] Edward Farley explains:

> In contrast to philosophy, the faculty of pure science, the three higher faculties are described as faculties of "positive science." Here Schleiermacher sides with that long-running tradition (since medieval scholasticism) that acknowledges that theology is not a "pure science." (1994, pp.86-87; cf. Frei, 1992, p.70)

The distinction between positive and pure sciences is one of function: The pure sciences dealt with in the philosophy faculty are concerned solely with the elucidation of truth, whereas positive sciences aim at serving practical social purposes.[28] As Howard explains (2006, p.157):

> The 'positive sciences' roughly correspond to the higher faculties, which unlike philosophy, were not devoted to the pursuit of truth as such, but to the pursuit of the natural ends of human beings: to enjoy felicity after death (theology), to live securely in one's person and property (law), and to enjoy bodily health in the here and now (medicine).[29]

Theology, then, is a sophisticated sort of *know-how*, drawing upon the solid *knowledge of* the various pure sciences—say, philology, metaphysics, or psychology—and applying it to the operations of the Church.[30] However, says Schleiermacher, '[when] the same information is acquired and possessed without relation to the government of the church, it ceases to be theological and devolves to those sciences to which it belongs according to its varied content'

[27] *N.b.*, here Schleiermacher uses the word *positive* in a different sense than in his discussions of *positive Religion*. With reference to 'religion', Schleiermacher uses qualifier 'positive' meaning something like 'assertive' or 'specific'. Whereas with reference to 'science', Schleiermacher uses it in the sense of 'applied'.

[28] Kant assumes this division of labor in *Der Streit*.

[29] *N.b.*, In designating theology as a positive science, Schleiermacher was in agreement with his university colleague and cofounder, Friedrich Schelling.

[30] 'Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) went so far as to declare that Schleiermacher's dogmatics has a *technical* character, in the sense that anyone who masters its contents will understand the dynamics of the religious consciousness and so will possess the 'technical' means to represent it and nurture it', Brian Gerrish notes (1984, p.7).

(*BO,* §6, p.3). It is less the intellectual content than *the use* to which that content is put that makes 'theology' theological for Schleiermacher.[31]

2.2. What makes theology 'scientific'?

What then of the noun in Schleiermacher's formula? If theology's positive function is what makes it theological, what is it that makes theology *wissenschaftlich*? To answer that question, we must review both how theology was previously understood and how the concept of *Wissenschaft* developed in the German Enlightenment.[32]

Farley (1994) traces the usage of the term *theologia* (and its non-Latin or Greek equivalents) from the early Church through Schleiermacher's time and up to the present. According to Farley, while the term *theologia* itself was rarely used in the first eleven centuries of the Church, either in the Greek East or the Latin West, humanitys' knowledge of God was nevertheless the centermost preoccupation among early Christians. In the early Christian centuries, he argues, 'a salvifically oriented knowledge of divine being was part of the Christian community and tradition long before it was named theology' (ibid., p.33). The term *theologia* then acquires wider currency in the Middle Ages. According to Farley (ibid., p.35), from the twelfth through seventeenth centuries, *theologia* came to connote a certain epistemic and spiritual *habitus*, a 'cognitive disposition and orientation of the soul' towards the knowledge (Lat. *scientia*; Gk. *episteme*) of God:

[31] Contrast this view with that of Webster (2015, p.17).
[32] For excellent treatments of this history see Farley (1994) and Howard (2006, chap. 2).

> There were, of course, many debates about this throughout the period: between Thomists and Augustinians, Thomists and nominalists, Catholics and Protestants, Lutherans and Reformed, but the issue turned on what *kind* of knowledge (habit) theology was. And if there is a dominant position, it is that theology is a *practical*, not theoretical, habit having the primary character of wisdom. (ibid.)

Alongside this conception of theology as *habitus,* there emerged in this period cathedral schools and, subsequently, the first universities in which *theologia* also denoted a discipline for rigorous study. With the reintroduction of Aristotelian logic into Western intellectual discourse, persons devoted to cultivating the *habitus* of *theologia* also gave themselves to discovering, debating, and demonstrating the intelligibility of their faith. These new intellectual tools allowed students and scholars to pursue questions of theology with the same degree of methodological rigor with which they would also have puzzled over questions of logic, physics, or astronomy.[33] *Theologia* thus came to be regarded as a *scientia* in the academic sense. Indeed, for Aquinas and others of this period, far from disqualifying theology as a science, the supernatural origin of *sacra doctrina*'s fundamental principles, grounded as they are in *particular* divine revelations given in salvation history, established her as the very queen of all the sciences (Farley, 1994, p. 38).

These conceptions of *theologia* as both a virtuous disposition towards a personal knowledge of God and a demanding field of academic study coexisted more or less stably—although not without tensions—until the cultural and intellectual disruptions of the 18th century and the British, French, and German Enlightenments. Thus, I turn now to the impact of the

[33] Importantly, as parts of the Medieval *Trivium* and *Quadrivium,* these other sciences were propaedeutic to the study of theology. To qualify for admission to academic theological study in the Medieval university, the student had first to achieve a bachelor's degree in the *Trivium* and a master's in the *Quadrivium*. See González (2015, p.46) and Caldecott (2009, p.25).

German Enlightenment, or *Aufklärung*, on German conceptions of theology as an academic science, or *Wissenschaft*.

2.2.1. What makes 'science' scientific?

Schleiermacher accepted the ideal of science or *Wissenschaft* that dominated the German-speaking world of the nineteenth century. Indeed, he strove to ensure that, one way or another, theology comported with it. This was no small undertaking, and Schleiermacher's approach birthed the modern paradigm of theological Liberalism which dominated the West for the next century and more.

Wissenschaft is not easily translated into English, in part because its 'proper' definition has been contested from the 18th century onwards. Before, Wellmon notes, '[in] the German speaking tradition, scholars had almost always used "science" to refer to just one of many "sciences." There was no one science, only various sciences [*Wissenschaften*]' (2015, p.43). Until the 19th century, the term uncontroversially encompassed aesthetic disciplines such as poetry, architecture, painting, dance, etc., then called the 'fine sciences' (*schöne Wissenschaften*).[34] It never referred exclusively to the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*), always including the cultural or human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) within its scope. 'Until the last third of the eighteenth century, the German words for "knowledge" [*Wissen*] and "science" [*Wissenschaft*] were basically synonymous,' writes Wellmon. 'Echoing their roots in ancient medieval concepts

[34] For helpful discussions of these shifts in usage, see especially Howard (2006, pp.27ff) and van Bommel (2015).

such as *episteme* and *scientia*, they both denoted an individual capacity to know' (ibid., p.45).[35]

However, in the late 18th century that began to shift. Wellmon writes:

> Whereas "science" had traditionally connoted an individual capacity or simply a category of knowledge, by 1800 figures such as Fichte and Kant used "science" in the singular [*Wissenschaft*] to refer to a coherent cultural system with its own logic and norms common to all sciences. (ibid., p.43)

Howard writes:

> At this time, *Wissenschaft* came to convey a monistic, totalizing, even Promethean attitude to human knowledge, something that both provided a comprehensive worldview and allowed enquiry into the transcendental principles justifying all systematic method and explanation.[36] (2006, p.28)

Wissenschaft took on institutionalist overtones as it came to mean authoritative knowledge that had been certified by specialized scientists (*Wissenschaftler*) who were masters of their discipline, experts in their field. As Wellmon (2015) shows, the German research university came to be seen as the institution *par excellence* for authorizing and certifying knowledge and for forming persons who were qualified to authorize and certify knowledge claims. *Wissenschaft* came to mean 'authoritative knowledge' and so to be bound up with a particular intellectual ethos and a rationalistically procedural epistemology.

---

[35] The Medieval school theologians 'portrayed knowledge (*scientia*) as a habit [*habitus*], an enduring orientation and dexterity of the soul' (Farley, 1994, p.35). See **Ch.IV.3.** below.

[36] Thus, Anderson (2004, p.57) suggests that 'the function of *Wissenschaft*' was to the train the mind to intuitively grasp the inner, unified meaning of all reality in all its dizzying complexity. It is predicated upon the assumption that there is an ultimate 'unity of knowledge' and that this unity is graspable by the well-developed mind. Hence, he writes:

> *Wissenschaft* embraces all forms of knowledge and enquiry; to convey this a coupling such as 'science and scholarship' is necessary, but misses the point about unity. Indeed, at the highest level academic *Wissenschaft* was seen as only one aspect of a universal truth of which art, religion, and poetry were other manifestations. (ibid.)

In a similar vein, Hans Frei (1992, p.98) defined the concept of *Wissenschaft* as 'the inquiry into the universal, rational principles that allow us to organize any and all specific fields of inquiry into internally and mutually coherent, intelligible totalities; perhaps, if we just watch our language and do not try too hard for lucidity, it may be translated as 'an inquiry into the transcendental principles justifying all systematic method and explanation'.

This ethos brought together two modern impulses which, in the face of an unmanageable surfeit of print media,[37] had begun to pull apart from each other: the rationalist confidence in the mind's ability, in principle, to comprehend all of reality by appeal to reason alone, on the one hand, and the growing suspicion of dilettantism, on the other. The first was a centrifugal cultural force which exploded received wisdom and proliferated competing theories, while the latter was a countervailing centripetal cultural force as people sought a reliable, controlled way to discern wisdom amid the growing superabundance of conjectures, refutations, and raw data. The new *Wissenschaftsideologie* held these forces together in a creative tension which had an epistemological ratcheting effect: As rationalist confidence and reliance on experts grew, and as experts drilled deeper into the details of their domains, the standard for a discipline to be considered *wissenschaftlich* was steadily raised in proportion. The rationalist impulse made certainty the new criterion for *wissenschaftlich* knowledge: One can only know what one can prove from indubitable, universally valid first principles. 'True science', Kant argued, is 'only that [science], whose certainty is apodictic'[38] (Kant, 1911, p.467, as quoted in van Bommel, 2015, p.12). However, because no one can hope to prove all knowledge across all domains for themselves, everyone relies upon others—experts—to certify and authorize knowledge within

[37] Wellmon (2015, pp.65ff) documents the growing anxiety among late-18th century German intellectuals over 'a plague of books' and an 'uncontrollable surfeit of periodicals'.

[38] Here Kant alludes to Aristotelian concept of ἀποδεικτικός classically outlined in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (I, 2.71b16-72b4). It is worth noting that while Thomas Aquinas famously defended the claim that *sacra doctrina* is indeed a *scientia*, he did not think it could meet this rationalist standard either. Instead, Thomas argued that there are two kinds of sciences, those 'which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like' and those 'which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science', as, e.g., music proceeds from mathematical principles (*Summa Theologica*, Ia, q. 1, art. 2). Sacred doctrine is a science in the second sense, Aquinas argues, because it depends upon the higher science of God which exceeds human reason (cf., Geoffrey Turner's [1997]). Kant, Schleiermacher, and the *Wissenschaftsideologie* which emerged in the late-18th-to-early-19th century broke with Aquinas not so much on the matter of there being two kinds of science but on the question of whether there could be a human science which exceeded human reason.

their domains of expertise. The emergent *Wissenschaftsideologie* depended upon social trust in experts who would hold themselves and their knowledge claims to the most exacting epistemic standards, thereby allowing everyone to share their claims to know. Thus, the fundamental structure of the emergent *Wissenschaftsideologie* allowed persons to make second-hand claims to knowledge outside their own domains along the following lines: We know that X, because we trust that the experts have rationally demonstrated that X. In other words, this new conception of *Wissenschaft* would allow modern society to have their EEFoundationalist cake and eat it, too.

Schleiermacher embraced this modern *Wissenschaftsideologie* and its basic EEF outlook, albeit in a significantly chastened form. EEF, as Tyson (2022, pp.32, 185) describes it, is the 'view according to which the locus of knowledge is the human knower', and according to which '[the] knowledge of the human knower is the only valid foundation for truth'. Whatever differences there may have been between, say, Descartes, Kant, Locke, Hume, and Schleiermacher—and, no doubt, there were many—this much they held in common. Schleiermacher articulated his particular version of this EEF paradigm most fully in his 1811 lectures on 'the art of doing philosophy' which were later compiled and published as his *Dialektik*.[39] While most other post-Enlightenment thinkers identified reason as the proper determinant of all else, including religion, for Schleiermacher '[morality] and reason do not as such determine the nature of one's inner religious experience (later: immediate religious self-consciousness)…; the direction rather goes the other way'. This is because the feeling of absolute dependence which Schleiermacher identified as our elemental religious consciousness is not just an occasional or passing experience—like John Wesley's heart being 'strangely warmed'—but is rather our experience of

[39] I rely here on Terrence Tice's (1996) translation and introduction.

consciousness as such. It is the entire experiential manifold within which thoughts occur to us, sensations perturb or delight us, and all our reflection and reasoning takes place. It is the very experience of being a finite, contingent, rational 'I'. Schleiermacher thought it obvious that we are always *patients* before we are rational *agents* and so are always and absolutely dependent upon the infinite beyond and before us, whatever that 'infinite' is. So, if Descartes built his system upon the supposedly bedrock insight that *cogito ergo sum*, then Schleiermacher built his upon a foundational inference from the manifest passivity of our experience to our utter contingency: 'I feel, therefore I am dependent' (*sentio ergo sum dependens*) or perhaps 'I suffer, therefore I am contingent' (*passio ergo sum contingens*).[40]

This starting point led Schleiermacher to a greater appreciation for the situatedness of diverse human rationalities and to argue the need for peaceable rational exchange (Higton, 2012, p.77 and *passim*) between divergent perspectives to home in on the truth ever more approximately, but only ever approximately. Thus, Schleiermacher identifies 'the principles of the art of doing philosophy' as the principles of 'dialectic' (*Dialectic*, p. 3) and conceives of reason—particularly philosophical reason—as inherently social (Higton, 2012, p.77). According to Tice (1996, xviii), for Schleiermacher, the 'term "reason" refers to what is known in common, and ideally in the most fully accomplished way, by all thinkers who have striven to know'. It is not merely social, it is consensual among, at least, the cognoscenti, those who are supposedly in the know—scholars, experts, reasonable people. Similarly, we might say that, for Schleiermacher

[40] For a helpful discussion of the epistemological starting points of Schleiermacher's cofounders, Fichte and Schelling, see Scruton (2002, pp. 164ff). Both attempted in their own ways to build their systems upon the elemental self-consciousness of the 'I', exhibiting further variations on the EEF theme. As we shall see in **Chapters II and III**, subjective religious experience motivates Newman and Kuyper's thinking, too. However, Schleiermacher attempts to build an entire philosophical outlook on the basis of the phenomenon of (religious? contingent? human?) experience simply as such, which is an entirely different kettle of fish.

practically speaking, truth 'is what our peers will, *ceteris paribus,* let us get away with saying', as Richard Rorty (1981, p.176) later famously put it.[41] 'For Schleiermacher, truth, under the real (empirically noticeable) conditions of all knowing, is never absolute in any sense,' writes Tice. 'It is always mixed with some error' (1996, xviii). Thus, Schleiermacher believed that the sort of 'apodeictic certainty' that Kant pointed to as the standard of 'true science' lay beyond human reach and that our science's relationship to reality (or 'being as such,' as Schleiermacher says) is, at best, asymptotic. *Wissenschaft*, for Schleiermacher, is a collaborative game, the aim of which is to bring our thinking ever closer to reality, and dialectic names the fundamental rules of intellectual exchange whereby this game can be successfully played. Thus, says Schleiermacher (*Dialectic*, p.7), 'dialectic can rightly be called the organon of all science'. Nevertheless, as much as Descartes or Kant or Locke, Schleiermacher began with the subjective furniture of the human mind and attempted to work his way up and out to more ambitious knowledge claims from there. Thus far, at least, the structure of his theology and of his philosophy of education clearly exemplifies the EEF paradigm.

It immediately appeared to many that not all hitherto respected intellectual domains could meet the new epistemic standard imposed by the ascendent *Wissenschaftsideologie* and the demands of EEF, and, so, were no longer to be trusted. For instance, Kant profoundly disrupted academia's *status quo* by arguing in his third *Critique* that the so-called 'fine sciences', such as rhetoric and poetry, were not scientific. Based as they were on inherently subjective tastes, not rational argument from universal first principles, to consider them *wissenschaftlich*,

[41] Although Tice (1996, xvi) does not draw a connection with Rorty, I owe the insight of Schleiermacher's similarity to American pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey to him.

Kant thought (2007, §44), was an 'absurdity' (*Unding*). These aesthetic disciplines should be demoted, he argued, from being called the 'fine sciences' (*schöne Wissenschaften*) to the 'fine arts' (*schöne Kunst*). Thus, claims to objectivity in the arenas of beauty and value were undermined. The humanities have labored (and languished) under the allegation of their sheer subjectivity ever since (cf., van Bommel).

Theology, too, was perceived to fall below the new *wissenschaftlich* standard. In the more pluriform, pre-Modern conception of 'science/s', theology had enjoyed, along with medicine and law, the highest status among the 'higher sciences' (*höhere Wissenschaften*) as one of the prestigious 'faculty sciences' (*Fakultätwissenschaften*) of the German universities. Under the new conception of *Wissenschaft*, however, theology's privileged status among the *Fakultätwissenschaften*, and even simply as *wissenschaftlich*, came under sharp scrutiny.[42] Kant convinced many of the unworkability of the classical Theistic arguments, raising questions about how theology could hope to meet the new intellectual standards of *Wissenschaft*, if at all (See Kant, 2007, pp.495-531).

Modern historical consciousness likewise posed a challenge for theology. The problem was not simply that the historical reliability of the Bible was now in question. It was also that, in the emerging *Wissenschaftsideologie*, the historian was supposed to strive for an ideal of methodological neutrality—literally 'presuppositionlessness' (*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*)—in weighing and sifting of historical evidence. In practice, however, this meant the adoption of the

[42] Hence, as Zachhuber observes (2013, p.3), the questions of what theology *is* and how (or whether) it is 'knowledge'—the central questions of this essay—developed *together* within the context of the university: 'The question…whether theology is *scientia*, science, or *Wissenschaft*, while ultimately striving to give something like a self-definition of theology as an intellectual enterprise, has had, historically, its primary purpose in the need to justify and explain the logic of its inclusion, as a discipline, within this very institution.'

sort of methodological naturalism guiding the natural sciences, ruling out *a priori* the historicity of much of traditional, orthodox Christianity's central narrative.[43] Moreover, as Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781) had argued, the '[accidental] truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason' (2005, pp.83-88). Even where Scripture might accurately convey particular historical facts, it is impossible to derive universal, rational truths from those particulars. This widening hermeneutical distance, said Lessing, is 'the broad, ugly ditch which I cannot get across' (ibid.). It is in this context that Schleiermacher claims theology to be a 'positive', rather than a 'pure', science (*BO,* §1, p.1).

2.2.2. Theology as a Positive Science

Like the other positive sciences—law and medicine—theology's legitimacy *qua positive Wissenschaft* derives from serving some genuine practical purpose, and its scientific character derives not from itself (as in the 'pure sciences') but from the informational sources upon which it draws (i.e., the 'pure sciences'). Positive sciences' claims to being *wissenschaftlich* depended upon their meeting two conditions: first, their being devoted to a pressing practical task and, second, their addressing that practical task in the light of what we know from the pure sciences.[44]

[43] Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) is often associated with the *a priori* principles governing this mode of historical-criticism. See discussions in Barton (2007, pp. 44ff) and Harvey (1966, pp.14-15).

[44] Zachhuber aptly summarizes Schleiermacher's argument for the need for theology in the University of Berlin: 'Theology is taught in the university because the public has an interest that this is done well and that church ministers are appropriately trained in the same way it wants doctors with a good medical education and judges with a proper understanding of the law' (2013, p.15). The argument for theology's proper place in the university as a *positive Wissenschaft* is fundamentally a pragmatic argument that could only be made within the context of Christendom.

First, positive sciences marshal the findings of the pure sciences to address the positive sciences' particular appointed ends. In so doing, they relate the various pure sciences to one another in ways that are extrinsic to their principles. As Schleiermacher writes:

> Generally speaking, a positive science is an assemblage of scientific elements that belong together not because they form a constituent part of the organization of the sciences, as though by some necessity arising out of the notion of science itself, but only insofar as they are requisite for carrying out a practical task. (*BO,* §1, pp.1-2)

Second, if theology—*qua* positive science—is to be *scientific*, it must take its *epistemic* cues (as to what we know or can know) from the various states-of-the-arts of the pure sciences. As a positive science, then, theology gets its scientific character secondhand by taking onboard the assured results from the pure sciences, especially from philosophy, philology, and critical history. Theology is only *wissenschaftlich* insofar as it squarely bases its proposals on the deliverances of these purely scientific disciplines.

The practical task of theology, then, is to gather intellectual resources from the pure sciences for the cultivation of pre-existing religious communities, communities characterized by 'a distinct mode of faith' or 'a distinct formation of God-consciousness' (*BO,* §1, p.1). Thus, 'precisely' restating 'the relation set forth in [*BO*] §1' as he understands it, Schleiermacher concludes: 'Christian theology, accordingly, is that assemblage of scientific information and practical instruction without the possession and application of which a united leadership of the Christian church, that is, a government of the church in the fullest sense, is not possible' (*BO,* §5, p.3). Hence, as Schleiermacher declared in the first edition of the *Brief Outline*, 'Practical theology is the crown of theological study' (*BO,* §24, p.12, n). For Schleiermacher, the very same *information*, disconnected from the practical aim of managing the church, ceases to be *theology*

altogether just as biological, chemical, and anatomical information disconnected from the practical aim of cultivating and restoring health ceases to be *medicine* (*BO,* §6, p.3).[45]

3. How should theology relate to other knowledges?

Historian Friedrich Paulsen (1895, p.50 as cited in Howard, 2006, p.166) identifies Schleiermacher's 1808 essay 'Occasional Thoughts on German Universities in the German Sense' as being the 'intellectual charter' of the University of Berlin. In fact, Humboldt only presided over the university's organizing committee for sixteen months before departing that post to become the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, leaving Schleiermacher and the rest to finalize the plans on their own.[46] None of the founders argued that theology should retain its historical preeminence and authority within the new university. Indeed, as previously noted, there were divisions among committee members (notably Fichte and Schleiermacher) over whether theology, as a distinct faculty, should have any place in a *wissenschaftlich* university at all. The committee finally decided against Fichte's secularist policy, drawing up plans essentially along the lines Schleiermacher had sketched in his essay, retaining a tightly circumscribed place for theology.

[45] David Kelsey (1993, pp.15-17) provides a helpful summary of Schleiermacher's account of *Theologie* as a *positive Wissenschaft*, and, thus, as an area of 'professional' education. Kelsey's account would have been helped by noting that for Schleiermacher this involved categorizing theology with medicine and law.

[46] While the university now bears Humboldt's name as the *Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin*, this is only a recent development (1949). It was originally named simply the *Universität zu Berlin* and for most of its early years (1828-1945) it was named the *Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität* after its royal patron. (See Anderson, 2004, p.61; Encyclopædia Britannica, 2024) R.D. Anderson (2004, p. 51) observes that, while '[it] became common in the twentieth century to refer to the "Humboldtian model" of the German university' and to credit Humboldt with the invention of the research university, 'it is clear from recent scholarship that this concept took shape only around 1900, when Humboldt's writings on university reform became known, and that before that his name was seldom cited.'

In the 'Occasional Thoughts', Schleiermacher dramatically reimagined theology's place in the university, reorganizing the university around the pursuit of *Wissenschaft* for *Wissenschaft*'s sake and subordinating theology to the faculty of philosophy. Given the founders' consensus that theology was going to have to be downgraded in order to be granted any place whatsoever in the new university, Schleiermacher's reconceptualization of theology might be understood as an instance of what R.D. Anderson (2004, p.54) calls 'defensive modernization' or 'anti-modern modernization' which is not to say that he did not believe what he wrote. It should also be understood as an implication of Schleiermacher's accounts of the university's central purpose, the nature of *Wissenschaft*, and the epistemic status of theology. If the university's purpose is *wissenschaftlich Bildung* (scientific education), emphasizing the refinement and expansion of pure science, and if theology is merely a positive science, wholly dependent upon the pure sciences for its scientific character, then theology's *de facto* demotion was inevitable. Thus, when the University of Berlin was finally established on Schleiermacher's plan, Howard observes (2006, p.131), 'theology wholly ceased to hold a position of pre-eminence except in symbolic and ceremonial matters.'

Schleiermacher's reconfiguration of theology's place in the university had far-reaching implications in four vital areas: in the allocation of intellectual authority, power, and prestige within the new university; in reshaping notions of academic freedom; in the directions of influence between theology and other disciplines; and in restricting the 'proper work' of theology.

3.1. Philosophy: Theology's Lord

As noted in this chapter's introduction, Kant (1992, p.45) echoed a generation of academics' grumbling about theology's traditionally privileged place as 'queen of the sciences' by sarcastically asking whether philosophy served theology as her '*torchbearer* or *trainbearer*?' Who is leading whom here? As Menand, Reitter, and Wellmon note (*RORU,* p. 46), Schleiermacher, persuaded by Kant, 'held up the philosophy faculty, the equivalent to a modern-day college of arts and sciences, as the center of a university's real authority'. Schleiermacher went further than Kant, however, recognizing that in the sphere of knowledge, the faculty bearing the torch also wears the crown. Philosophy must be more than theology's torchbearer, Schleiermacher argued. Philosophy ought now to be the 'first…and in fact the lord (*Herrin*) of all the others because all members of the university must be grounded in it, no matter to which faculty they belong…. Everyone must first of all be a student of philosophy'[47] (Anrich, 1956, pp.259-60 as quoted in Howard, 2006, pp.168-69).

Importantly, the philosophy *faculty* included more than pure philosophers, being comprised of various subbranches including history, mathematics, philology, and other 'pure sciences.' For Schleiermacher 'philosophy' names the 'systematic spirit' guiding and animating the entire communal project of the university, as distinguished from the individualistic systematizing projects of armchair philosophers (*OT*, p.62). 'Philosophy' names not so much a distinct discipline as a cast of mind: every scholar in whatever discipline in his university was 'to develop a well-defined *philosophical* way of thinking' in order to expand the limits of our

[47] The German word *Herrin* is a feminine word, better translated as 'mistress' (in the sense of a female employer or authority figure). Compare with Tice and Lawler's translation, 'head', in *OTUGS*, p.36 and their explanation in n.38. Perhaps 'headmistress' or 'governess' better captures the intended connotation here?

knowledge, and by means of his researches to produce something 'scientific that is solid and respectable' (*OT*, p.61, my italics). The pedagogical mandate of the university on this model is to induct students into this scientific mode of thought. As Zachhuber (2013, pp.13-14) summarizes: 'The purpose of the university, then, is to impart to young people the very idea of science, the notion of the unity of knowledge in all its diversity.'

For this reason, Schleiermacher and the other founders of the University of Berlin thought it necessary to dethrone theology to secure 'an atmosphere of teaching and learning freedom (*Lehr- und Lernfreheit*)'[48] (Howard, 2006, p.131). The stifling of thinkers like Kant by the church- and state-backed theological faculty made it clear that only in a context of academic freedom could pure science be pursued for its own sake. In contrast to the Anselmian intellectual tradition of *fides quaerens intellectum* that had shaped the medieval universities, faith commitments were now seen as a liability to the advancement of *Wissenschaft*. 'Confessionalism' was downright inimical to it. For scientific integrity's sake, therefore, intellectual authority was redistributed among the various divisions of the philosophical faculty, making each academic specialization sovereign over its own area of inquiry, freeing them to follow reason and evidence unhindered in the quest for 'systematic and scientific knowledge'.

Central to Schleiermacher's vision for the university is his conviction that 'the unity of all knowledge' is, in principle, discoverable, but that such 'systematic knowledge' is necessarily 'a communal project, in which everyone makes a contribution of his own, everyone's aims depend on everyone else's…'[49] (*OT*, p.48). This communal pursuit, on the one hand, depends upon a

[48] For a fuller discussion of *Lehr- und Lernfreheit* at the University of Berlin, see section 4.4.1. below.
[49] For a fuller discussion of the role of the principle of 'the unity of knowledge' in the University of Berlin, see section 4.4.1. below.

division of intellectual labor between academic disciplines in which specialized subfields develop their own methods and expertise. On the other hand, it requires a unified commitment to what Schleiermacher refers to as 'the laws of systematic knowledge' (*OT*, p.60). Schleiermacher never explicitly spelled out these 'laws', but they are roughly the principles which make possible both the systematic analysis and exposition of a given subject area and the incorporation of that subject area into the wider system of scientific knowledge, including the knowledge of all the other sciences.

The significance of this shift is not simply that now 'philosophical instruction is the *basis* for everything that takes place at the university' (*OT*, p.61, my italics). In some sense that had been true of medieval higher education as well, the *trivium* and *quadrivium* having always been propaedeutic for subsequent, advanced studies in law, medicine, and, ultimately, theology.[50] Rather it was that 'philosophy', not theology, was now seen as holding the keys to 'the unity of scholarship'.[51] The unity of truth is not *hidden* in the mind of God. It can, in principle, be traced out by 'philosophy', that is, a dogged commitment among the community of scholars to a sort of methodological rigor disciplined by universal rational principles.

3.2. What can theologians teach us?

[50] See **note 29** above.

[51] Bill Readings (1996, p.66) writes, '[The University of Berlin] is organized by Humboldt according to the rule of speculative philosophy, which both reflects upon positive knowledges so as to find their origin and telos, and seeks to provide the metadiscourse that legitimates and organizes all knowledge. Thus, Schleiermacher contends that the faculty of philosophy is the exterior form which the interior necessity of the University takes on.'

Overturning theology's traditional authority need not to have diminished theology's traditional influence, but in the case of the University of Berlin it certainly did. This owed largely to the positioning of theology as a positive, rather than a pure, science. Theology now simply had to accept the 'assured results' of the pure sciences of the philosophical faculty if theology wished to be considered *wissenschaftlich*. This debasement was reinforced by Schleiermacher's identification of theology's primary object as the subjective, emotive experience of religious communities[52] and his circumscription of theology's singular task as the scientific management of those communities. Within this framework the conversation between theology and the pure sciences is necessarily one-way. Were theology to question the pure sciences' 'assured results', it would no longer be *wissenschaftlich*. Moreover, were theology to shift its attention from ecclesiastical affairs and the training of pastors to asking questions about, say, economics or politics, it would cease to be properly theological, at least on Schleiermacher's definition, having strayed from its proper work as a positive science. Theology so understood and so institutionally positioned could only modernize the church—it could never speak prophetically to the modern world.[53] To colleagues in the philosophy faculty asking of the labours of the faculty of theology,

[52] Hegel skewered Schleiermacher's identification of religion with the feeling of absolute dependence, writing, 'a dog would be the best Christian for it possesses this in the highest degree'. Kuyper potentially echoes this critique in his address 'The Blurring of the Boundaries' (*AK:CR*, p.385). Kuyper regularly references Hegel and Schleiermacher's rivalry, often using them as foils for each other. On Hegel's and Schleiermacher's dispute, see Crouter (1980).

[53] Here I differ somewhat with Zachhuber's assessment (2013, p.17) that Schleiermacher 'creates a space for theology without either forcing it into the straitjacket of a deductive system of universal knowledge or assigning to it a place merely in the domain of private opinion'. By keeping theology and religion 'within the limits of feeling alone' (as Merklinger says) Schleiermacher inadvertently facilitated the privatization of religion. As religious institutions' cultural influence waned and communal religious experience became less common and therefore less *inter*subjective, religious feeling (and theology as the science thereof) inevitably came to be seen as a matter of private *interest*, if not always private *opinion*. On Schleiermacher's definition, theology's 'scientific' status (as a *positive Wissenschaft*) and its legitimacy as a subject for study in the university were tied directly to its perceived public relevance. As the latter diminished, so did the former as a matter of course.

'So what? What difference does any of it make to me and to my work?' the theologian operating within a Schleiermachian paradigm could only answer, 'None whatsoever.'

4. What is the university for?

As we have already seen, in the *Occasional Thoughts* Schleiermacher defended a thoroughly 'philosophical' view of the purpose of the university. Each member of the academy, whatever his discipline, was to treat his discipline 'in a philosophical spirit', understanding both 'the philosophical principles of his science' and the relationship of his science to every other science, and to cultivate the same philosophical spirit amongst his students (*OTUGS*, p.16). This, in a nutshell, is the central purpose of the university. He writes:

> The university thus has to do chiefly with the introduction of a process with guardianship over its first developments; and this is nothing less than a wholly new intellectual[54] process of life. The business of the university, then, is this: to awaken the idea of science in the more noble youths, who are already supplied with many kinds of information, to aid the idea's holding sway over them in the area of knowledge to which each chooses to be especially devoted, so that it will become second nature for them to contemplate everything from the viewpoint of science, to perceive nothing for itself alone but only in terms of the scientific connections most relevant to it, and in a broad, cohesive manner bringing it into a continual relation to the unity and totality of knowledge, so that they may learn to become conscious of the basic laws of science in every thought process and precisely in this way gradually develop in themselves the capacity to investigate, to contrive and to give account. (ibid.)

Fundamentally, that which the university is tasked with teaching undergraduates is not particular subjects per se but rather the art of learning itself, that is, 'the principles and, as it were, the

[54] Here Tice and Lawler note that Schleiermacher uses the term *Geistiger*, and that, therefore, '[the] process is not narrowly intellectual but bears the full sense of spiritual life' (*OTUGS*, p.16, n.18).

fundament [or 'floorplan'] of all knowing (*den grundriß alles Wissens*)' (ibid., p.17). Undergraduate education, according to Schleiermacher, does not aim at helping the student 'to learn *everything*', but rather at their 'learning *how to learn*' (ibid., my italics). This, according to Schleiermacher, is the point of an undergraduate education. 'That is,' Schleiermacher writes, 'only one moment is actually spent at the university, only one act is completed: the idea of knowledge, the highest consciousness of reason, awakens in the person as a regulative principle' (ibid.). To this educational end, Schleiermacher envisioned the University of Berlin as a dialectical community devoted to pursuing a unified and comprehensive science (*Wissenschaft*) for its own sake, to the unity of teaching and research, to academic freedom (both freedom to teach, *Lehrfreiheit*, and freedom to learn, *Lernfreiheit*), and to the self-cultivation (*Bildung*) of students.

Schleiermacher's description of his vision of the aims and principles of the University of Berlin will, I suspect, surprise some readers. Many commentators on higher education, particularly defenders of liberal arts education, identify Berlin's educational legacy with the specialisation and the instrumentalization of higher education, not the instilling of a 'philosophical spirit' in the young and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. For example, in Richard Detweiler's (2021, p.60) telling, 'rather than serving the common good', as, on Detweiler's account, liberal arts education does, the University of Berlin's purpose was

> to strengthen the kingdom [of Prussia] and protect the monarchy through the creation of bureaucrats to run the growing number of state agencies and researchers who would contribute to the economic success of the state. Ideas of breadth of education were replaced by early specializations in primary and secondary school because students needed to begin their higher education with their choice of profession already made…. With this change of purpose and content of study, the educational context also changed, focusing on the mastery of specialized information rather than fostering a learning environment that engaged students in broader intellectual and societal learning. (ibid.)

Anthony Kronman (2007, p.59) similarly suggests that '[the] new German university was organized on a novel assumption…that universities exist primarily to sponsor research, that their first responsibility is to provide the space, books, and other resources that scholars need to engage in the work of producing new knowledge'. In contrast with the liberal arts tradition which 'stressed the continuity of human knowledge from each generation to the next and the capacity of a well-educated mind to grasp it as a whole', Kronman (ibid., p.60) says 'the new [German] ideal of scholarship emphasized the progressive character of human knowledge, which changes and increases over time; the immensity of such knowledge, which makes it impossible for anyone to understand the whole of it and therefore requires specialization; and the importance, as scholarly virtues, of invention and originality, of the ability to upset traditions rather than sustain them.' Detweiler's and Kronman's characterizations of the German research university are not untypical.

There is no doubt that the 'Humboldtian'/Schleiermacherian model of the research university reshaped the landscape of higher education in precisely the ways that Detweiler and Kronman describe, reorienting the university away from broad liberal learning and towards specialization and knowledge production. This shift of focus simply was the lesson that the world took from the University of Berlin. However, as should be clear from Schleiermacher's description above, this was not quite the lesson he intended the new university to teach. Schleiermacher's model did not function in the way that he had hoped, and the University of Berlin's historical impact was not exactly what he had intended.[55] As we shall see, the centripetal forces of Schleiermacher's model did not, in fact, hold, and consequently, the centrifugal forces of late-

[55] King Frederick II's intentions were another matter.

modern society tended to pull apart those aspects of higher education which Schleiermacher had hoped to hold together. The result was that the University of Berlin's legacy and impact diverged quite significantly from the intentions of Schleiermacher and his cofounders.

4.1. The Idea of the Modern Research University

Mark William Roche (2017, pp.31-32) identifies the defining ethos of the German research university as having at least five essential principles. 'Two of them—the unity of knowledge across disciplines and the value of knowledge for its own sake—were strengthened and redefined during the long era of greatness at the German universities,' Roche claims. 'Three of them—the integration of research and teaching, academic freedom, and *Bildung* or self-formation—were *invented* by the Germans' (ibid., my italics). Each of these principles are reflected in the *Grundschriften* of the University of Berlin's founders, but to expound them here I will draw primarily upon Schleiermacher's 'Occasional Thoughts'.[56]

4.1.1. The Ultimate Unity of Science and the Philosophical University

[56] Marek Kwiek (2006, quoted in Peters and Barnett, 2018, xxi), writing in a similar vein, offers a shorter list:

> There are three main principles of the modern university to be found in the founding fathers of the University of Berlin. The first principle is the unity of research and teaching (*die Einheit von Forschung und Lehre*); the second is the protection of academic freedom: the freedom to teach (*Lehrfreiheit*) and the freedom to learn (*Lernfreiheit*); and the third it the central importance of the faculty of philosophy (the faculty of Arts and Sciences in modern terminology)…. Together, the three principles have guided the institution of the university through the 19th century to the 20th century.

The first essential principle of the modern research university was a faith in the ultimate unity of knowledge and, correspondingly, an acceptance of the need to pursue that unity by integrating our various knowledges into a coherent whole. Roche (ibid., p.32) summarizes:

> The first principle [the unity of truth] originated in the medieval idea of the unity of being and knowing and was reinforced by the striving of German idealism for an understanding of the organic relation of all knowledge. It holds that the university should be characterized, first, by the integration of disciplines and the search for not only specialized knowledge but also the relation of the diverse parts of knowledge to one another. This is what animates the pursuit of ever-more simple but comprehensive theories, and this is why the various disciplines—mathematics, science, the social sciences, the arts, and the humanities along with architecture, business, engineering, law, and medicine—are housed within a single institution.

Schleiermacher argues that the aim of instilling 'the scientific spirit' (*der wissenschaftliche Geist*) (ibid., pp.19, 23) in students is the hallmark of the university. 'All those characteristics which distinguish the university from the school on the one side and the academy on the other point to this' (ibid., p.17). Schools (that is, primary and secondary schools) teach disparate elementary subjects (e.g., reading, writing, and arithmetic), 'little concerned about whether each generally fits into some whole.' The academies conduct specialized research, 'elaborating the particular in a completely accurate and exact manner' (ibid.), but they do not teach. Neither schools nor academies engage in *both* teaching and research, much less teaching students *how* to research, and neither attends to the relationships between the various arts and sciences and the challenge of interweaving our diverse knowledges into a coherent worldview. 'In contrast,' writes Schleiermacher, 'at the university one is so concerned about this that in every area one sets above all else, as the most necessary thing, the encyclopedic perspective, the general overview of the scope and cohesive structure of each area, and makes this the foundation of all instruction' (ibid.).

Unlike either schools or scientific academies, the university, according to Schleiermacher, is a distinctly philosophical institution, uniquely tasked with inducting the young into the pursuit of knowledge in the grandest sense. This pursuit involves both the advancement of particular sciences and the integration of these particular sciences into a coherent vision of reality. Hence, on Schleiermacher's account, 'for the university philosophical instruction is the *basis* (*die Grundlage*) of all that is to be carried on there' (ibid., p.18, my italics). Initiating students into this fundamentally human quest involves instructing students in the various liberal arts, traditionally the purview of the Faculty of Philosophy (*philosophischen Facultät*) in German universities, to equip them with the tools of learning. Undergraduate instruction ought to begin with general introductions to a broad range of learning and only subsequently move towards specialisation. 'That is, the most general subject matter is common to all; all begin with this, and only later do they divide themselves within the domain of the particular, as in each person one's distinctive talent is awakened and along with this one's love for that occupation wherein one can especially exercise it' (ibid., p.27). Undergraduates also needed some initiation into philosophy proper, what Schleiermacher calls 'pure philosophy' (*reine Philosophie*) or 'speculation' (*Spekulation*), which is concerned 'with the unity and interconnectedness of all knowledge (*der Einheit und dem Zusammenhang aller Erkenntnisse*) and with the very nature of coming to know' (ibid., p.17). Thus far, Schleiermacher's idea of the university still aligns quite closely with that of the Medieval university which had built its core curriculum around the liberal arts tradition.[57]

[57] Schleiermacher writes of his proposal to retain the traditional four faculties of *Philosophie* (i.e., *artes liberales*), Law, Medicine and Theology, with the first being propaedeutic for the latter three, 'Thus, the entire form of the university mirrors the basic features of the history of universities.' (*OTUGS*, p.34) As Anderson (2004, p.51) notes, recent scholarship has come to appreciate that there exists a greater degree of continuity between the German research university model and the pre-modern university, whereas older studies tended to construe the founding of

As Schleiermacher understood it, 'pure philosophy' is not yet just one thing. That is, philosophy has not yet arrived at the sorts of coherence and consensus to which the 'scientific spirit' is leading us. Thus, under our present epistemic conditions, initiating students into philosophical inquiry necessarily involves introducing students to the many disparate, often mutually incompatible, philosoph*ies* which, over the course of many centuries, various philosoph*ers* have proposed and developed to try to make sense of the world. To 'do philosophy', in Schleiermacher's understanding, is to join a critical *conversation*—or, to use Schleiermacher's preferred term, *Dialektik*—between many divergent perspectives on ultimate Reality. Students, therefore, need to be equipped to understand, assess, and interrogate these diverse viewpoints; to be able to discriminate between them and critically evaluate them, in order to participate constructively in this ongoing conversation. Hence, says Schleiermacher, 'it is a surpassing aim [of university education] that these most elevated of outlooks be communicated, indeed in the most individual manner; thus accounts must also be given of the differences that distinguish these outlooks from similar ones…' (ibid., p.18).

However, we will badly misunderstand Schleiermacher's idea of the university as a fundamentally philosophical institution if we mistake him to be envisioning the university as a prolonged bull session among armchair theoreticians. Rather, he is concerned with the development of a 'philosophical'—that is to say, a comprehensive and integrative—view of all science, including what he would call *der exakten Wissenschaften* or 'the exact sciences' (these would eventually be understood as including logic, mathematics, and *der Naturwissenschaften*,

the University of Berlin as marking more of a radical break with the past and exaggerated Humboldt's role in its design.

'the natural sciences'), on the one hand, and the *Geisteswissenschaften* (what we Anglophones today would call 'the humanities'), on the other. Here we must quote Schleiermacher at length:

> Indeed, the scientific spirit as the highest principle, as the immediate unity of all knowledge, cannot be represented and exhibited for itself alone—in ghostlike fashion—in sheer transcendental philosophy. Unfortunately, many have tried to accomplish this, carrying sundry phantoms and strange concerns into the effort. Probably no more vapid a philosophy is thinkable than one that extracts itself so purely and expects that real knowing, as something lower, should be given or taken from a totally different source. Nor, in all likelihood, could anything with which youth could be mainly occupied in their finest years be more fruitless for science than a philosophy that would offer no definite guidance for future scientific life in all fields but chiefly served to empty the head—already indeed the reputation of mathematics. Only in its lively influence on all knowing does philosophy admit of being presented: only with its body, with "real" knowing, does its spirit admit of being grasped. (ibid., p.19)

Thus, philosophy must be scientifically and culturally informed, as these bodies of knowledge and ways of knowing furnish philosophy with the raw materials with which philosophy must strive to make sense. The university naturally holds lectures to impart information to students, but the information to be imparted is not more of the same type as students received in primary and secondary school: established facts, normal science, settled conventions, received wisdom, and so forth. Rather, university instruction is supposed to be 'philosophical', both apprising students of well-attested verities and practices, and alerting students to the unproven (and perhaps questionable) assumptions, the open (perhaps perennial) questions, and the boundaries (perhaps unmovable) of knowledge in the arts and sciences under consideration. 'The scientific spirit,' Schleiermacher hopes, 'is awakened by [such] philosophical instruction' (ibid.).

> By its very nature, then, the scientific spirit must also try out its own powers and exercise them. This it does by moving out from the center more deeply into particulars so as to inquire, to integrate, to produce something of its own and by its correctness to offer proof of the acquired insight into nature and into the connectedness of all knowledge. (ibid.)

Schleiermacher goes so far as to assert that 'manifestly the authentic university, as it would be formed by the scientific union, is contained solely in the philosophical faculty, and the three others [theology, medicine, and law], in contrast, are specialized schools which the state has either founded or at least…placed under its protection' (*OTUGS*, p.34). Thus, within the academic hierarchy of the University of Berlin, Schleiermacher relegates the 'positive sciences' to a status beneath that of the 'pure sciences' of the philosophical faculty:

> The single faculty of philosophy…alone represents what the scientific union by itself would have established as a university. The other three, in contrast, represent what has arisen on account of a distinctly different kind of need, in face of which the purely scientific direction has an external and subordinate status. (*OTUGS*, p.35)

Thus, Schleiermacher closely guards the border that runs between the 'pure sciences' and 'positive sciences', insisting that the boundary be semipermeable, only ever allowing the former to influence the latter. However, Schleiermacher resists academic territorialism *within* the philosophical faculty because ultimately *reine Wissenschaft* must be assumed to form a unity, and thus, disciplinary boundaries between the various 'pure sciences' are, ultimately, merely heuristic (*OTUGS*, p.38).[58] 'All these fields border on and affect each other at various points, so that there is no lack of opportunities for wandering from one field into the others,' he argues. 'The mutual jealousy of the faculties over their respective fields is something rightly to be thought outmoded and ridiculous' (ibid., p.38). He encouraged cross-disciplinary research and teaching. 'Indeed,' he asks, 'why should a teacher not be allowed to enter the territory of another faculty once in a while?' In Schleiermacher's view, the ontological interrelationships between the subject

[58] Consider Newman's insight that academic disciplines are 'abstractions' from Reality, and that to reify them is to drift into an 'unreal' way of thinking.

matters of the various pure sciences invite, indeed demand, transdisciplinary exploration and interdisciplinary dialogue. Indeed, he believed such dialectic was vital to the university's mission.

To maintain the dialectical character of the philosophy faculty, Schleiermacher proposed two practical countermeasures for resisting the centrifugal forces of scientific specialization: 'First, the philosophical faculty does best to remain a single entity', not breaking down into separate, hermetically sealed departments. Second, he suggested that 'every teacher in any faculty' should also serve as 'a member of the philosophical faculty…even if not exactly in the same way' (ibid., p.38), thereby forcing each teacher to remain engaged with developments in adjoining fields.

4.1.2. The Unity of Teaching and Research

The scientific and philosophical revolutions of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment period were largely facilitated by print media. During this period the most vital intellectual exchanges were conducted not in formal, intra-university disputations but in books, letters, pamphlets, and articles. As the sheer volume of print media grew exponentially (see Wellmon, 2015, Ch.2), and as the intellectual world began to centre increasingly upon publication, the eighteenth century witnessed the Republic of Letters (*Respublica literaria*) pulling away from the university which was still fundamentally an oral and aural institution centred on handing on the deposit of classical knowledge. Many German intellectuals of this period, like their French counterparts, scorned the university as a dilapidated relic and sought alternative avenues for their intellectual pursuits. Here the Enlightenment-era polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) set the trend.

Thomas Albert Howard (2006, p.84) writes, 'Dismissing universities for promoting 'monk-like', tendencies, [Leibniz] was the first major intellectual to reject outright a university position…, thereby setting a precedent among many eighteenth-century scholars of disdaining university life and pursuing the life of the mind elsewhere.' These scholars began setting up learned societies that were dedicated to scientific research such as Berlin's Royal Academy of Science, *Societas Regia Scientarium* (est. 1700). These societies which focussed on advancing science through research and publication, Howard notes, 'served as more than able competitors in attracting money and talent away from the universities' (ibid., p.84).

Schleiermacher and his colleagues understood that, in this rapidly changing intellectual and technological environment, the university would need to be drastically reformed to perform what they saw as its central and traditional function of imbuing future generations with a 'philosophical' and 'scientific spirit'. The 'scientific spirit' that this new university was to instil must expand the boundaries of our knowledge 'moving out from the center more deeply into particulars so as to inquire, to integrate, to produce something of its own and by its correctness to offer proof of the acquired insight into nature and into the connectedness of all knowledge' (*OTUGS*, p.19). To achieve this, the University of Berlin pioneered a radically new pedagogy which fused teaching and research together (Roche, 2017, pp.32-33). This fusion would require teachers to be scholars, lectures to be both personally engaging and engaged with cutting-edge scholarship, and the 'scientific seminar' to take on greater prominence as a central mode of scholarly apprenticeship.

First, university teachers were expected to also be scholars engaged in conducting and *publishing* research that was 'solid and respectable' (*OT*, p.61). They were to 'issue works, not

large comprehensive or revolutionary books but collections of essays which shed light on particular subjects previously unexplored, present the author's discoveries, and critique or bring to light newfound methods,' Schleiermacher urged (ibid., p.15). Such teachers, Schleiermacher contended, would be best positioned and able to spot and cultivate scientific talent among their students.

Secondly, and perhaps most practically, Schleiermacher called for a transformation of the university lecture. Traditionally, Medieval lecturers had read aloud from and commented upon authoritative texts while students busily took down shorthand notes on wax tablets or cheap parchment (Axtell, 2016, p.22). Pupils studying for the *baccalaureus artium* were not required to own copies of such texts, and while such texts were still expensively copied by hand, few students could afford to in any case. However, after the advent of the printing press, authoritative texts, naturally, became more affordable and more available. Consequently, lectures of the Medieval style became redundant as students increasingly had the ability to purchase and study personal copies of now readily available authoritative texts.[59] It took the university centuries to adapt to this new material reality and even in the nineteenth century many institutions continued the old practice, to the chagrin of their students. Against this background, Schleiermacher reimagined the 'art of lecturing' as involving the virtues of 'vitality and enthusiasm', and 'reflectiveness and clarity' (*OTUGS*, p.30). Teachers, in Schleiermacher's view, required more than mere erudition. They must be able to inspire curiosity and 'to make the inspired discourse understandable and

[59] Thomas Carlyle commented upon this shift in his inaugural address to the University of Edinburgh (1866), noting, 'A man has not now to go away to where a professor is actually speaking, because in most cases he can get his doctrine out of him through a book, and can read it, and read it again and again, and study it.' The remainder of his address is a defense of the university as nonetheless having 'an indispensable value in society', despite the information revolution engendered by Gutenberg (O'Hear and Sidwell, eds., 2009, pp.144ff).

effectual' (ibid.). They must be able to communicate vividly, conversationally, almost extemporaneously out of a deep comprehension of their subjects. This deep comprehension, Schleiermacher believed, arose precisely out of being an active scholar. He sharply critiqued the traditional university teacher who lectures in the old style, and who had not contributed to the ongoing work of the academy, 'ignor[ing] the benefit of publication' (*OTUGS*, p.31). Requiring teachers to be active participants in the academy would, in Schleiermacher's theory, facilitate better teaching. But so, too, would regular interaction with students in 'discussion periods (*Konversatorien*) and hours for review and testing' and 'private association with students where actual dialogue predominates' serve to familiarize teachers with their audience and to enhance their teaching (*OTUGS*, p.31).

Thirdly and relatedly, Schleiermacher says that, in addition to lectures, university professors should lead 'scientific seminars' and 'practical institutes' that were 'by their very nature…intended only for a select group', namely, the most advanced students (*OTUGS*, pp.40-41). These seminars were to be spaces devoted to dialogue and debate, to presenting and assessing new research, and to exploring and expanding the outermost limits of our understanding in each discipline. '[These] seminars are institutions whereby the university comes close to the academy, also that these are places where students are to receive guidance in their own attempts to present, in their own studies and investigations into the particulars,' wrote Schleiermacher (*OTUGS*, p.40). They were to be scientific workshops in which teachers and students act as collaborators. The seminar is perhaps the distillation of Schleiermacher's vision of the research university as a 'post-school' (*fortgesetzte Schulen*) and a 'pre-academy' (*voreiligerweise Akademien*) (*OTUGS*, p.19).

4.1.3. The Intrinsic Value of Science

The teaching and advancement of science, according to Schleiermacher, is not of merely extrinsic or instrumental value, a point which he worries is often lost on the state. The patient, dialectical pursuit of a unified science and the cultivation of the 'scientific spirit' are, in his view, intrinsically worthwhile. However, he observes, 'the state all too easily fails to acknowledge the value of this effort' (*OTUGS*, p.10). Because the university depends upon the support of the bureaucratic state and because the bureaucratic state understandably tends only to appreciate and respond to instrumental values, the relationship between the state and the university is bound to be fraught. Schleiermacher observes that 'universities suffer—the longer, the more acutely—from three things' at the hands of the uncomprehending state:

> first, from the state's viewing them as institutions in which the sciences are pursued not for their own sakes but for the sake of the state; second, from the state's misunderstanding and hindering their natural tendency to shape themselves entirely according to the rules that science imposes; and, third, from the state's fearing that if it leaves them to themselves everything will soon wheel around in a circle of fruitless learning and teaching, far distant from life and practice, the desire for practical affairs will be replaced by the pure, disinterested thirst for knowledge, and no one will want to be involved in civil affairs. (ibid., p.22)

Against the state's tendency to treat everything, including the university, as mere means for promoting the limited ends of order, stability, and prosperity, Schleiermacher insisted upon the intrinsic value of *Wissenschaft* and, thus, the inherent value of having a *wissenschaftlich* culture. Science is good *for* and ennobling *of* the life of the nation-state precisely because it is good in itself. Schleiermacher believed that a nation-state that appreciates and supports science for its

own sake cultivates and enjoys a 'higher' national life.[60] Thus, says Schleiermacher, a wise nation will safeguard academic freedom, giving students and scholars the latitude to expand the boundaries of human knowledge.

The suspicion, so common among politicians and bureaucrats, that a university devoted to science for science's sake will only produce indolent intellectuals who are unwilling or unable to do anything useful for the state, is unwarranted, according to Schleiermacher. 'Such things have always been said, and young people have always streamed out of the sages' schools right into the halls of justice and administrative offices to help govern the people,' he writes (ibid., p.23). Indeed, the state has always been capable of attracting and elevating ambitious, pragmatic, and sober-minded people, and such people have never been in short supply. The state has nothing to fear from the universities on that score. Moreover, given that the state was to set the examinations that would certify students to enter their desired professions, would decide upon appointments of particular professors to university chairs, and would control the flow of public funding to the university, the state retained significant control over the new university.[61]

4.1.4. Academic Freedom: Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit

Intellectual freedom was always a key element to the university's vitality. The University of Paris (est. 1150) took root where it did largely because that location stood outside of episcopal

[60] These arguments tend to fall flat for the intellectually tone-deaf. Compare with Bernard Williams's discussion of the impossibility of teaching morality to the convinced amoralist. See, too, Jonathan Haidt on 'moral "taste-buds".'
[61] Indeed, while the French state had a tighter grip on the Napoleonic university and its *grandes écoles*, nevertheless, the Prussian state wielded greater control over the new research university than the Church had over the medieval university.

jurisdiction, allowing the university's scholars to teach, study, and write 'relatively free from control or regulation' (Ferruolo, 1985, p.5 as quoted in Higton, 2012, p.14). 'The ideal of *Lernfreiheit* was in some ways more radical,' notes Anderson (2004, p.58). 'Most educational systems had an ideal of broad, liberal education similar to that of *Bildung*, but usually insisted that this was best achieved by a prescribed mixture of classics, philosophy, and mathematics, taught and examined in the arts or philosophy faculty as a preliminary to the specialized study of the higher faculties.' The concept of *Lernfreiheit* pioneered at the University of Berlin largely abolished such curricular prescriptions, allowing students to study whatever, wherever, and under whomever they pleased.[62] Schleiermacher explains:

> This freedom of students has two aspects to it…: The one aspect is freedom especially in relation to their intellectual occupations, freedom that they enjoy at the university in comparison with the schools from which they come. It means that they are not subject to compulsion of any kind; never will they be forced in any direction, and nothing is closed to them. No one orders them to attend this or that course session; no one can reproach them if they neglect or omit to do their work. There is not control over any of their efforts save what they themselves may give over to a teacher. They know what will be required of them when they leave the university and what kind examinations they will then face; but with what zeal they intend to work toward this goal at any given time, and how uniformly or not they distribute it remains completely up to them. (*OTUGS*, p.50)

Contrary to the typical picture of the University of Berlin as being intentionally designed to funnel students into narrow specialisms, Schleiermacher explicitly described the policy of *Lernfreiheit* as being aimed at allowing students freedom for intellectual and cultural exploration. He urged that a university that prizes specialised research should try to balance that value by also prizing broad learning within the philosophical faculty. Otherwise, Schleiermacher worried, '[the] old abuse of

[62] As Anderson (2004, p.109) notes, the model proposed by Schleiermacher and Humboldt 'meant abolishing the fixed curriculum and all examinations short of the doctorate (which was only realistic where there was something like the German system of state examinations), and relegating preparatory work to the schools.'

having boys in their cradle destined for a particular career is still not eradicated' (*OTUGS*, p.37). To counter the pressure towards premature specialisation, he considered placing some limits on the policy of *Lernfreiheit*, writing, 'All must first of all be students of philosophy [i.e., the liberal arts], and they are this; but in actuality students should not be permitted to study anything else in the first year of their academic career' (*OTUGS*, p.37). But, in the end, he opted in favour of a radical policy of 'student freedom' as being more in keeping with 'the dignity of science'. Thus, he rejected 'even the slightest sign of coercion' as educationally 'ruinous', contending that a 'mechanically scholastic organization' of the university would be inimical to the freedom that the scientific spirit demands (OTUGS, p.52).

Schleiermacher acknowledged the obvious risks that this policy runs, namely, that it grants students 'full freedom to give way to indolence and worthless diversions, and instead of showing a commendable industry they can irresponsibly waste the finest time of their life' (ibid, p.50). In particular, Schleiermacher conceded that granting students such wide berth would license some students to engage in two great evils: indulging in 'a "Philistine" existence' (*Philistinwesen*) and duelling (ibid, p.58).[63] Indeed, while many students succumbed to such insouciance and rowdiness, others made credentialing, rather than learning, their aim, and studied only what they would need to pass the (admittedly rigorous) state examinations for entry into their chosen professions. There was nothing to prevent myopic students from instrumentalizing their education.

[63] Schleiermacher takes a rather blasé boys-will-be-boys attitude to the latter, suggesting that dueling 'is a supremely natural and unavoidable phenomenon' (*OTUGS*, pp.58ff).

However, Schleiermacher argued, these risks are offset by the profound opportunity for self-formation and intellectual exploration that such freedom uniquely offers to students (*OTUGS*, p.51). Giving layabouts license to squander their university years and mercenary *Brotstudenten* ('bread students') the latitude to singularly focus their studies on passing the state's certifying examinations to enter lucrative or prestigious careers was a price Schleiermacher was willing to pay to give intellectually curious and gifted students the ability to pursue their interests unhindered.

Similarly, under the policy of *Lehrfreiheit* the University of Berlin's faculty were granted the freedom to set their own research agendas and to teach what and as they pleased 'without the least fear before the controversies that, under certain circumstances, are simply unavoidable in this field' (*OTUGS*, p.46). Faculty were to be largely free to adopt whatever standpoint, elaborate whatever system, and explore whatever subject they liked. 'All that is required is that there be no public stain upon one's moral reputation and that one is also known to labor in some sector or other of "real" knowing (*des realen Wissens*),' writes Schleiermacher (ibid.). Of central concern to Schleiermacher was to protect the university's independence and basic self-governance against incursions by the state. Thus, he says, 'there has to be an increasingly more exact distinction between what belongs to the inner, domestic life of the institution itself and all that whereby the university of its individual members are regarded only as members of civil society' (ibid., p.48). While Prussia was a monarchy, Schleiermacher argued that the internal logic of the university must be democratic:

> As to the forms under which the university appears publicly and shapes its rules and regulations, by its very nature the scientific disposition of our time is democratic through and through, and there is a vital awareness that all scientific persons are equal as far as intellectual matters are concerned and that the

> business of each one equally and essentially belongs to the whole. Thus, the more free the shaping of polity can be the more democratic will be the result. (ibid.)

The scholar's primary responsibility and accountability should be to his academic peers, not to the state. This was not to deny the legitimacy of the university, for efficiency's sake, being organized hierarchically or even having a state appointed rector. While, in principle, such an organisation can be compatible with *Lehrfreiheit,* Schleiermacher warns that under such arrangements 'true scientific freedom is already endangered'. Such arrangements threaten to 'derogate science to a position of mere servant of the state' (ibid., p.49). The crucial principle to be upheld at all costs to safeguard the scientific spirit of the institution was the equality of the faculty and their right to democratic self-governance with respect to academic affairs. Only scientific experts were competent to judge scientific work, not bureaucrats.

4.1.5. Student Self-Cultivation: Bildung

Students were granted this unprecedented *Lernfreiheit* that they might be liberated to pursue their individual, self-directed, cultural self-formation, or *Bildung*. Granting students free hand to pursue their own interests, explore their own questions, and develop their own abilities amidst an atmosphere of high culture and intense intellectual rigour, it was thought, would produce self-assured, intellectually independent men of genius. It would also free students 'to dare to know' (*sapere aude*), to follow their own reason in pursuit of the Enlightenment project of discerning the epistemic basis and internal logic of all scientific knowledge. Anderson (2004, p.57) writes, 'Individual *Bildung* was a journey in search of this inner meaning [of all knowledge], and for Fichte this made the university a bridge between the human and divine worlds, and "the most important

and most sacred institution which mankind possesses."' Whether Schleiermacher would endorse Fichte's identification of the university as the superlative sacred institution is unclear, but Schleiermacher undoubtedly envisioned *wissenschaftlich Bildung* as playing a sacred, liberative, indeed profoundly spiritual (*geistliche*) role in the lives of individual students and the life of the German nation. He writes:

> …[To] learn in and of itself, whatever that may be, is not the purpose of the university but to know, that memory is not to be crammed in there, nor is understanding merely to be enlarged, but that a whole new life is to be awakened in these young people—a higher spirit—provided that it can. This result, however, cannot be achieved through coercion, never at any time. Rather, the attempt can be made only in an atmosphere supportive of a complete freedom of spirit—in and for itself to begin with, but then particularly among and with other Germans…. Likewise, a person can come to science and to the gaining of knowledge that frees the person from servitude to any authority only in that the effect is created in that person solely by knowledge and by no other means, only in that the power is already assumed to reside within that person which will serve to release the person from servitude to every kind of authority, save insofar as this authority becomes the person's own knowledge and therefore ceases to be authority. (*OTUGS*, p.51)

Jennifer Herdt (2019, p.7) observes that within the vision of *Bildung* at the heart of the University of Berlin, 'Art, literature, philosophy…were heralded as bringers of salvation, as capable of forming a "public" equipped for mature self-government, and a humanity worthy of the name' while 'Christianity was sometimes cast into the role of retrograde… fostering submission to authority, passive acceptance of tradition, and failure to take responsibility for directing one's own life.' From that standpoint, the *Bildung* tradition can easily be interpreted as a fundamentally secularising force. Determining whether to count Schleiermacher among the *Bildung* tradition's secularisers who broke with Christian humanism (e.g., Humboldt, Goethe, Schiller) or among those who saw *Bildung* as developing Christian humanism (e.g., Hegel, Herder) is complicated

(ibid., p.17). In either case, Schleiermacher made students' free self-cultivation core to the university's mission.

Conclusion

My contention is that in setting theology safely beyond the reach of post-Enlightenment scientific criticism, Schleiermacher (perhaps reluctantly) sacrificed theology's relevance *to* the wider scientific community to preserve theology's place *in* it, much as a chess player sacrifices a rook to save his queen. As Vial (2013, pp.85-86) puts it,

> By defining religion as a matter of experience (feeling) rather than a matter of knowing, like natural science and philosophy, or morals, and by defining dogmatic theology as a second-order expression of religious experience, Schleiermacher declares some of the most troubling of these questions [of Enlightenment science, historiography, and philosophy] to be a category mistake. Science and religion have an "eternal covenant," a nonaggression pact, because each uses its own methods to undertake different tasks, tasks that do not overlap.

However, under the terms of this 'eternal covenant' theology's influence was bound to wane as the forces of disenchantment drained the wider culture of the sort of pious sentimentalism that had been theological liberalism's mainstay. This settlement thus smuggles in the makings of a secular cultural milieu in which it is assumed that, as Nicholas Lash (1991, pp.221ff) says, only the scientists can 'tell us what is going on', the politicians decide what to do about it, and, if they are given a seat at the table at all, religious leaders are tasked with selling their communities on the scientists' diagnoses and the politicians' prescriptions.

While in the anglophone world Schleiermacher is more often remembered as the 'father of Modern Liberal theology' than as the architect of the modern research university, Daniel Fallon

(1980, p.36) observes, 'Schleiermacher's model university structure became the basic organizational pattern for all German universities up to the present time.' As German research universities gained in prestige, universities and colleges across Europe and North America emulated them. Within a few generations the theology faculties of many of these institutions became 'religious studies' departments as they applied Ockham's razor to their study of religious communities' experiences and traditions, cutting away the unnecessary supposition of a common transcendent 'Whence' supposedly grounding and binding together these diverse experiences (see D'Costa, 2005, pp.16-20) As scholars of religion found that they had no need of that hypothesis, they increasingly preferred to explain their subjects in immanent terms. Meanwhile, the theology departments of modern research universities were marginalized, having fallen, as Gavin D'Costa (2005, p.19) says, 'from [being] Queen of the Sciences to the laughing stock of the Arts Faculty.'

II. John Henry Newman
The Catholic Idea of a University

The Catholic University of Ireland, founded 18th May 1854 under the rectorship of John Henry Newman, could not attract enough students and donors to continue its operations. In 1909, it was assimilated into the National University of Ireland. Thus, in at least one key respect, Newman's *Idea of a University* was a failure. The Archbishop Paul Cullen of Armagh had invited Newman to deliver the lectures which would be compiled and published as the *Idea* to make the case for a Catholic liberal arts education and to persuade the people of Ireland to enrol their sons at the new university that Cullen sought to establish in Dublin with Pope Pius IX's blessing.

The Pope's new university was to be Rome's answer to the popularity of the secular, non-denominational 'Queen's Colleges' in Belfast, Cork, and Galway among Ireland's Catholic laity. Modelled on the secular, utilitarian University College London (est. 1826), the Queen's Colleges (federated in 1850 as the 'Queen's University') were established in 1845 precisely to be non-sectarian and so were statutorily barred from teaching theology. Because the colleges admitted students regardless of creed, Irish Catholics had an opportunity to receive a higher education there that they had largely been denied previously. Many Catholic laymen welcomed the opportunity, as did some of their clergy on their behalf; however, because the colleges eschewed theology and religious instruction, many Catholic leaders and conservative Protestants denounced them as 'godless'.[64]

[64] For context, see Colin Barr (2003, pp.27-38).

The fact that Newman failed to persuade enough Irishmen to enter the Catholic University does not mean that Newman had failed to make his case. As Newman himself knew all too well, persuasion requires more than cogent arguments, especially if one's hearers are strongly predisposed against them. Such was the case for Newman in Ireland. Irish Catholics had been long denied the opportunities for economic and social advancement attached to higher education and had recently weathered the Great Famine (1845-1852). They understandably had little stomach for the sort of costly and impractical schooling Newman seemed to be promoting. Whatever the virtues of a Catholic liberal education, unless Newman could show that the new Catholic University provided an education that would lead to better jobs and livelihoods for its graduates in the near term, most Catholic laymen would rather take their chances with the cheaper, preprofessional, 'godless colleges'. And that is precisely what they did.

Ultimately, Newman's arguments for the Catholic University's establishment and curriculum were more durable than the university itself. Colin Barr quotes the Irishman Constantine Curran's remark that 'in place of a university Newman "gave us a book." It was, though, "an excellent book"' (2018, p.67). Newman's *Idea* is widely considered a classic defence of liberal arts education,[65] but it also defended theology's place among the sciences of the university.

[65] Sadly, much of the recent literature in the philosophy of education neglects not only Newman but the entire Christian liberal arts tradition (and therefore *most* of the Western tradition). E.g., Nel Noddings' (2016) and John Ryder's (2022) books, both titled *Philosophy of Education*, and Blackwell's *Philosophy of Education: An Anthology*, edited by Randall Curran (2007), leap from Aristotle to Rousseau to Dewey, bypassing most of the liberal arts tradition and skipping Newman altogether. Steven Cahn's (2009) anthology includes one selection from Augustine. Helpful supplements to Curran's and Cahn's anthologies are the anthologies edited by Richard Gamble (2007), Anthony O'Hear and Marc Sidwell (2009), Bruce Kimball (2010), and Ryan Topping (2015), which feature selections from Newman.

Today Newman is regularly treated as an anachronism; a foil for (supposedly) new and improved theories of higher education. Clark Kerr (2001, pp.1-7), for instance, sets up his paean to the modern American 'multiversity' by contrasting it with 'the academic cloister of Cardinal Newman'.[66] Newman's 'beautiful world was being shattered forever even as it was being so beautifully portrayed', says Kerr (ibid., p.3). For Kerr, Newman is a dinosaur whose relevance ended with the meteoric impact of the German research university.

However, Newman's *Idea* was not a eulogy for higher education as it had once been but an argument for what universities *must be* to deserve that label. Newman was casting a vision for Catholic higher learning in the modern era, not repristinating the Medieval university. This chapter explores Newman's theology of higher education, focusing principally upon his *Idea of a University* and his oft-neglected *Rise and Progress of Universities* while drawing upon Newman's wider corpus, especially his Tamworth Reading Room letters, *University Sermons*, and essays *On the Development of Doctrine* and *In Aid of a Grammar of Assent*.[67]

1. The Development of Newman's Doctrine

Continuity and change are vital themes in Newman's life and work. His dictum that 'In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often' (*DCD*, I.1, p.40) ostensibly referred to the organic development of Christian doctrine, but

[66] On Kerr, see **Chs.V and VI** below. Kerr's 'multiversity' is precisely what Newman feared the 'godless colleges' would inevitably become.

[67] As Edward Jeremy Miller (1993, p.109) observes, 'To consider fully Cardinal Newman's views on education is to contemplate nearly everything he wrote and did, for it was he who said of himself, 'from first to last, education, in this large sense of the word, has been my line'".

its autobiographical subtext is obvious. Newman had undertaken the *Essay on Development* to test his last objection to Roman Catholicism: Could the manifest changes in Rome's teaching over the centuries be reconciled with their claim to be the only true tradents of 'the faith that was once for all delivered to the saints'? Newman had lost confidence in the Anglican *via media*'s viability, and the blowback against Tract 90 (published in 1841)[68] had made his prominent position as vicar of St. Mary's University Church untenable. In September 1843 he resigned, under pressure, having come to an unmistakable ecclesiastical crossroads. When Newman began writing the *Essay* in March 1845, he was the erstwhile-Evangelical-turned-leading-Anglo-Catholic-polemicist-turned-outcast. Before finishing, he was received into the Roman Catholic Church (9th October 1845). Newman had obviously changed and changed often, but Newman insisted that these changes were themselves the organic development—the partial perfecting—of the seeds of faith that had been sown in his heart many years before.

Newman had been raised in the Church of England, but, to his recollection, he 'had no formed religious convictions' until he was fifteen (*APVS*, p.23). Indeed, at fourteen Newman had been dabbling in Enlightenment scepticism, reading Thomas Paine's *Tracts Against the Old Testament*, David Hume's *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (particularly Hume's essay 'On Miracles'), and 'some French verses, perhaps Voltaire's, in denial of the immortality of the soul…' (*APVS*, p.25). His slide into adolescent unbelief was arrested by his conversion to evangelical Christianity. 'When I was fifteen, (in the autumn of 1816), a great change of thought took place in me,' wrote Newman of his conversion. 'I fell under the influences

[68] There Newman 'argued that subscription to the 39 Articles was compatible with holding Roman Catholic doctrines like the real presence of Christ in the bread and wine of the eucharist, or prayer for the dead' (Duffy, 2019, p.10).

of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured' (*APVS*, p.25). Newman credited his schoolmaster Walter Mayers with being 'the human means of this beginning of divine faith in me' (*APVS*, p.25). Mayers, who 'himself had only been "converted" two years previously' (Ker, 2019, p.4), introduced the young Newman to several books by Evangelical writers[69] which made 'impressions' upon Newman amounting to an 'inward conversion,' 'of which,' he wrote decades later, 'I am still more certain than that I have hands and feet' (*APVS*, p.25).

Newman gradually abandoned the 'childish imaginations' of his teenage Evangelical years which impeded his eventual embrace of Roman Catholicism (e.g., his identification of the Antichrist with the Pope) (ibid., pp. 25, 27), while other influences from those years made 'deeper' and lasting 'impressions'. It was Scott 'who first planted deep in [Newman's] mind that fundamental truth of religion,' 'faith in the Holy Trinity,' a faith which only grew over time (ibid., p.26). Likewise, Newman writes of the conviction 'that there is the possibility of falling away, and that there is no certain knowledge given to anyone that he is simply in a state of grace, and much less that he is to persevere to the end,' that '[this] main Catholic doctrine of the warfare between the city of God and the powers of darkness was also deeply impressed upon my mind' by reading William Law's *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1729) (ibid.). '[Another] deep imagination, which at this time, the autumn of 1816, took possession of me,' writes Newman, was 'that it would be the will of God that I should lead a single life' (ibid., p.28). Perhaps most importantly, Newman writes that he then 'read Joseph Milner's *Church History*, and was nothing short of

[69] Newman identifies these as William Romaine's *The Triumph of Faith* (1795), Thomas Scott's *Force of Truth* (1779) and *Essays on the Most Important Subjects in Religion* (1793), Thomas Newton's *Dissertation on the Prophesies* (3-vols., 1754-58), and, most importantly, Joseph Milner's five-volume *History of the Church of Christ* (1794-1809).

enamoured of the long extracts from St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and the other Fathers which I found there. I read them as being the religion of the primitive Christians…' (ibid., p.27). In 1850 Newman wrote, 'From that time the vision of the Fathers was always, to my imagination, I may say, a paradise of delight…' (*Diff.* i., pp.370-71 as quoted in Ker, 2019, pp.351-52).

Newman consistently described his 'conversion' as having been affected by a 'personal influence' and as a conversion of his 'imagination' consisting primarily of 'impressions', 'visions', 'deep imaginations', even pleasures and fears. It was less like accepting the conclusion of a syllogism than like falling in love.

In his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*—his memoir of his shifting religious opinions and eventual conversion to Rome—Newman contended that a deeply principled consistency underlay, indeed, *drove* his manifest shifts in theological emphases and ecclesiastical allegiance. Newman wrote the *Apologia* to show that he had always acted with integrity and that his midlife conversion to Rome was not a capricious, radical break with his prior Christian life but rather the flowering of religious seeds—'impressions of dogma'—planted in his youthful evangelical conversion decades before. 'What I held in 1816, I held in 1833, and I hold in 1864,' he wrote (*APVS*, p.61) of his hard-and-fast commitments to 'the principle of dogma', the visible Church, and episcopal polity, concluding, 'Please God, I shall hold it to the end'. Indeed, Newman's corpus evinces considerable conceptual continuity. His later Catholic writings quote liberally and unqualifiedly from his earlier Tractarian works. Newman spent his final decades publishing new editions of his earlier Anglican

writings, usually without major emendations or retractions, often including explanatory prefaces emphasizing the basic consistency of his mind throughout his adult life (Duffy, 2019, p.19).[70]

Both Newman's *Apologia* and *Essay on Development* aimed to show that deep doctrinal integrity is compatible with a great many changes whether over a lifetime or many centuries. Newman argues that often integrity *demands* change with changing circumstances, particularly epistemic circumstances. Both works depended upon the same fundamental hypothesis of principled development to explain how Newman's doctrine and the magisterium's could have changed so dramatically while remaining faithful to their original encounter with revelation.[71]

Many of the core themes of Newman's mature Catholic theology—imagination and reason, implicit and explicit rationalities, personal influences, encounters and impressions, reality and unreality, continuity and change, principles and their development—appear in his later reflections upon his initial Evangelical conversion.

2. Where to Begin?: Newman's Theocentric Ontological Foundationalism

Some late-nineteenth and early twentieth century theologians, troubled by Newman's emphasis on the imagination and religious experience and his decidedly non-Neo-Scholastic depreciation of 'paper logic', dismissed him as a Catholic Schleiermacher (see McInroy, 2018, pp.504-5). So one might expect Newman to sit, with Schleiermacher, on the EEFoundationalist side of the

[70] E.g., in 1872, he reissued both his *Discussions & Arguments on Various Subjects* (comprising writings from 1836-66) and his *Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1843*. In 1877, he issued a third edition of *The Via Media* (originally published in 1834) and his lectures on *The Prophetical Office of the Church* (originally delivered in 1836-37).

[71] Newman never discounted his Evangelical conversion (cf., *LD*, xxxi, p.189; Atkins, 2018, p.191).

ledger. Surely, there is something vaguely Cartesian or Berkeleyan or, at any rate, egocentric-sounding in Newman's claim to have been conscious of 'two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator' (*APVS*, I.2, p.25)?[72]

But the logical structure of Newman's theology and epistemology was clearly TOFoundationalist. The key distinction here is that Newman did not, *à la* EEF, attempt or purport to base his Christian ontological commitments upon arguments from some supposedly surer set of beliefs, whether logical axioms, clear and distinct ideas, sense experience, or what have you. Rather, Newman took his Christian convictions for granted and based his subsequent epistemological, educational, and theological theorizing on the 'definite Creed' that had impressed itself upon his teenage imagination. He stood in the classically Christian, Augustinian/Anselmian tradition of believing *in order to* comprehend, of faith *seeking* understanding, not the Enlightenment tradition of doubt seeking certainty. As Newman famously wrote in his sixth 'Tamworth Reading Room' letter and later reiterated in the *Grammar of Assent*:

> Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. *We shall ever be laying our foundations*; we shall turn theology into evidences, and divines into textuaries. We shall never get at our first principles. Resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking further and further, finding "in the lowest depth a lower deep," till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism. *I would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that Christianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the physical world*. Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith. (*TRR*, VI, p.183 = *GA*, IV.iii, pp.90-91, my italics)

[72] Cf. Newman's claim that, 'strictly speaking, we know little more than that we exist, and that there is an Unseen Power whom we are bound to obey' (*PPS*, I.15, p.125).

Newman denied that Theism or Christianity needed to first establish their epistemic *bona fides* to be rationally believed and brought to bear upon the other arts and sciences. He took God as his first premise rather than his conclusion.

Newman did not oppose the work of Christian apologetics *per se*, only the notion that Christian belief *requires* arguments to be warranted. He regarded 'the Evidences of Religion' or 'the Christian Evidences' as only 'a science *supplemental* to Theology' and as 'necessary *in their place*' (*IU*, I.iii.7, p.52), but he neither identified these with Theology itself nor based Theology upon them. Evidential arguments are buttresses and defences for judgments, theological or otherwise, but not their foundations. Thus, Newman opposed EEF, particularly of the Evidentialist variety advocated by 'Natural Theologians' like Paley and Whately. Such 'Rationalism', in Newman's view, began from an 'anti-dogmatic', 'infidel principle' that inevitably led to theological 'Liberalism'. As we shall see, Newman defended the importance of 'Natural Theology' for the integrity of the university, but Newman did not conceive of 'Natural Theology' either as consisting of proofs of Monotheism from firmer, more basic beliefs, or as a prerequisite for rational theistic or Christian belief.[73] Natural Theology's purpose was 'not proving anything at all about the Supreme Being' but rather '*assuming* His existence' and drawing out the implications thereof (*IU*, I.iii.6, pp.49-50, italics added). Likewise, Newman defined 'Theology' as 'the truths we know about God [whether by Nature or from Grace] put into system', and 'Natural Theology'

[73] Newman also emphatically rejected 'the fashion of the day' which identified 'Natural Theology' with what Newman (somewhat idiosyncratically) called 'Physical Theology'—pseudoscientific arguments from features of the physical world to the existence and attributes of God—which he dismissed as 'a most jejune study' which 'really is no science at all' (*IU*, I.iii.7, p.51). Here Newman seems to have Paley in particular in mind.

as the 'one idea [of God] unfolded in its just proportions, carried out upon an intelligible method, and issuing in necessary and immutable results' (*IU*, I.iii.7-8, pp.52, 55

In describing Theology as 'unfolding' an '*idea',* it should be noted that Newman's 'ideas' are not Descartes' 'clear and distinct ideas' (Moleski, 2000, pp.5-6). Nor are they strict definitions, or self-evident axioms, or checklists of necessary and sufficient conditions. In Newman's usage, 'ideas' are the immediate, pre-theoretical 'apprehensions' of reality which the intellect then seeks to 'unfold' and eventually integrate into 'a connected view'. Beginning from his decidedly Christian standpoint, Newman developed an eclectic epistemology, critically appropriating and creatively combining elements of Romanticism, Empiricism, and Aristotelianism to describe our *de facto* knowledge of God and the world. While rejecting Locke's Evidentialism and Hume's scepticism (Aquino, 2018, p.155), Newman took from the British Naturalist/Empiricist tradition the notion that experiences make 'impressions' on us and that our minds make sense of those impressions by forming 'ideas' (Ferreira, 1986, p.168; cf. Duffy, 2019, p.41). With Hume, Newman identified the 'imagination' as our ideating faculty, but sided with the Romantics in embracing the 'imagination' as the essential cognitive faculty for apprehending reality.[74] Imagination is more than a generator or projector of fantasies. A well cultivated imagination is a capacity for insight and clarity that immediately grasps powerful ideas. Crucially, 'ideas' rarely, if ever, depend upon

[74] For Newman, maintaining 'a poetical view of things' was a Christian duty. (*Ess.* i.9, pp.21-25, quoted in Ker, 2019, pp.31-32). Samuel Taylor Coleridge, e.g., had similarly defined the 'primary IMAGINATION' as 'the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM' (*Biographia Literaria*, XIII, in Coleridge & Jackson [ed.], 2008, p.313; cf., Guite, 2022, Ch.1). Despite reservations about his orthodoxy, Newman cited Coleridge as expressing the same underlying spiritual longings and sensibilities that drove the Oxford Movement (*Ess.* I.vii, pp.268-69) and as having 'his place in the growth and restoration…of Church principles' (*LD*, v., pp.26-27 as quoted in Ker, 2019, pp.115).

arguments for Newman. They are the soil, rather than the fruit, of reasoning, and Newman believed the 'one idea' of God to be perhaps the most fertile idea of all.

Newman took this singular 'idea' of classical Monotheism to be a *global* and *perennial* phenomenon (*IU*, I.iii.9, p.56). It has been 'understood indeed at one time and place better than at another, held here and there with more or less of inconsistency', but 'still, after all, in all times and places, where it is found, [it is] the evolution, not of half-a-dozen ideas, but of one' (*IU*, I.iii.8, p.55).[75] Nowhere in Newman's soaring exposition of the 'idea' of God in Natural Theology does he suggest that Theistic belief should be based upon arguments. Instead, he showcases an 'idea' which had captured the imaginations of people around the world and down the ages. Newman held that this 'idea' could be immediately apprehended, understood, and rationally believed. If true, it can be *known* with or without arguments supporting it.

As Stephen Grimm (2001) has argued, Newman would agree with the contemporary philosophical school of so-called 'Reformed Epistemologists' who, in Alvin Plantinga's terminology, argue that theistic belief is as 'properly basic' as, say, our belief that human beings have minds and are morally responsible agents. That is, belief in God is epistemically 'warranted' with or without justifying arguments.[76] It need not be based upon more elemental beliefs. Rather, it properly ranks among the beliefs which form the basis of all our reasoning.

[75] For a recent powerful articulation of a similar perspective on the power and ubiquity of Theism, see David Bentley Hart (2013).

[76] Indeed, Newman contends that theistic belief is (in Plantinga's terms) as 'properly basic' as our belief in other minds, or human volition, or human moral agency (*IU*, I.iii.5). Like them, it is rational to hold whether it can be demonstrably proven or not, and, like them, if true, its rejection would massively distort our understanding of almost every other field. Newman's argument in *IU*, I.iii.6 bears a striking resemblance to Plantinga's in *God & Other Minds* (1967). For further discussion of similarities between Newman's epistemology and the 'Reformed Epistemology' of Plantinga and Wolterstorff, see Stephen Grimm (2001) and Gerard Hughes (2009, pp.210ff).

Grimm (2001) argues that 'Newman and Plantinga [potentially] part ways…with respect to the basicality of specifically Christian belief'. Grimm (2001, p.514) believes Newman was of two minds about Christianity's need for evidential support. He reads Newman's saying that 'it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain that I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it', that is, with 'an accumulation of various probabilities' (*GA*, X, §2, p.319-20) as suggesting that Newman based his Christian beliefs upon 'a preponderance of evidence'. But all Newman says is that, *if* he were obliged *by an interlocutor* to *give* a reason for the hope within him, *then* he would prefer to offer a probabilistic, cumulative case argument rather than attempting the sorts of deductive 'proofs' then popular amongst Catholic Neo-Scholastics. But Newman does not suggest that *his own* belief in Christianity rests on a cumulative case argument any more than his beliefs in his own nativity and mortality do. Newman here likens Christian belief to commonsense beliefs which are rational to hold without proof. Indeed, it is often *irrational* to demand formal proof for such beliefs, whether formal or informal.

Thus, Newman wrote about the evidence for Christianity, but not in an Evidential*ist* way. Newman conceives of evidence as playing confirmational rather than a foundational role vis-à-vis Christian belief and, indeed, of warranted beliefs generally. 'Evidences in general are not the essential *groundwork* of Faith, but its *reward*; since Wisdom is the last gift of the Spirit, and Faith the first' (*US*, XIV, p.294). For Newman, reasoning takes a fiduciary and abductive form: One first stakes one's inquiry or one's life upon a hunch or view, based upon one's (imaginative) impressions. Then, from that point of view, one develops auxiliary hypotheses that will be corroborated and enriched ('rewarded') with evidence of various kinds or not. Whether one

abandons one's initial hunch when facing strong evidential headwinds will depend upon the strength of the initial hunch's grip upon one's imagination. If one cannot imagine the world otherwise, no amount of counterevidence will overturn it. If, however, one can imagine alternative possibilities, counterevidence can induce one to reconsider one's initial view.

But not all evidence is evident to everyone. Newman consistently distinguished between the personal reasons we have for our beliefs and the reasons we can articulate to others. The former involves 'the original process of reasoning'—what he calls 'Implicit Reason'—while the latter is 'the process of investigating our reasonings'—'Explicit Reason' (*US*, XIII.9, pp. 258–59). As Newman puts it, 'all men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason' (ibid.). I may believe I'm ill based on symptoms like pain or vertigo without being able to provide the clinical data a doctor requires to diagnose me as ill. A farmer might know a crop won't thrive in a certain patch yet struggle to explain why. In short, one's reason for believing a proposition *p* may be strong, while the reasons one can offer another—especially someone sceptical or unfamiliar with the context—may be quite weak. Newman believed the Christian's personal, implicit reasons for belief are strong whereas the explicit arguments one might present in defence of that belief are weaker, yielding at best 'an accumulation of various probabilities'.

Newman argued that believers rightly accord articles of faith an 'antecedent probability' alongside other commonsense presumptions, and should treat them 'as we are accustomed to treat other alleged facts and truths and the evidence for them, such as come to us with a fair presumption in their favour' (*DCD*, III.i.2, p.101). This means giving articles of faith the benefit of the doubt, much like we do with our senses, memory, or reason despite occasional conflicts.

> Such are of every day's occurrence; and what is our behaviour towards them? We meet them, not with suspicion and criticism, but with a frank confidence. We do

> not in the first instance exercise our reason upon opinions which are received, but our faith. We do not begin with doubting; we take them on trust, and we put them on trial…. We prove them by using them, by applying them to the subject-matter, or the evidence, or the body of circumstances, to which they belong, as if they gave it its interpretation or its colour as a matter of course; and only when they fail, in the event, in illustrating phenomena or harmonizing facts, do we discover that we must reject the doctrines or the statements which we had in the first instance taken for granted. Again, we take the evidence for them, whatever it be, as a whole… and we interpret what is obscure...by such portions as are clear... we bear with these in proportion to the strength of the antecedent probability...with apparent objections...deficiency in comprehensiveness... provided their claims on our attention are considerable. (*DCD*, III.i.2, p.101)

On this epistemological policy, religious beliefs are treated as innocent until proven guilty—not as doubtful until proven true.

As he explained in a letter to Charles Meynall, Newman's central purpose in writing the *Grammar* was 'to show that a given individual, high or low, has as much right (has as real rational grounds) to be certain, as a learned theologian who knows the scientific evidence' (*iGA*, p.2). The *Grammar*'s prescript, a saying of St. Ambrose's, precisely expresses its chief premise: *Non in dialecticâ complacuit Deo salvium facere populum suum* [Not by dialectics did it please God to save His people]. Newman consistently *began* from the 'facts' of salvation and revelation, and theorized from there (*à la* TOF), instead of prescribing epistemological protocols for establishing salvation and revelation's factuality (*à la* EEF):

> If Revelation has always been offered to mankind in one way, it is in vain to say that it ought to have come to us in another. If children, if the poor, if the busy, can have true Faith, yet cannot weigh evidence, evidence is not the simple foundation on which Faith is built. If the great bulk of serious men believe, not because they have examined evidence, but because they are disposed in a certain way,—because they are "ordained to eternal life," this must be God's order of things. Let us attempt to understand it. Let us not disguise it, or explain it away. It may have difficulties; if so, let us own them. Let us fairly meet them: if we can, let us overcome them. (*US*, XII.12, pp.231-32)

Newman assumed that the simple, unargued faith of ordinary Christians is epistemically warranted, and the *Grammar* was the culmination of Newman's decades-long endeavour to explain how this could be. In both the *University Sermons* and the *Grammar*, Newman articulates a decidedly non-Evidentialist religious epistemology, arguing that Christian faith *can* be defended with probabilistic arguments but does not *require* such arguments to be warranted.

3. What kind of knowledge is theology?

The *Idea*'s first four discourses defend theology's status as a genuine 'branch of knowledge' and its relationship to 'other knowledge' (i.e., the other arts and sciences). 'Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge,' Newman argued, claiming that 'Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place [in University Teaching] as Astronomy' (*IU*, I.ii.9, p.40).[77] He premised his defence of theology's place in university curricula upon the claim 'that Theology *is* a science, and an important one' (*IU*, I.ii.1, p.26). Newman defined 'Theology' as 'the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth and call it geology' (*IU*, I.iii.7, p.52). Thus, for Newman, what makes 'theology' theological is the object of its inquiry, God, while what makes 'science' scientific is the systematization knowledge.

3.1. What makes 'theology' theological?

[77] Newman contends that both revealed knowledge and natural scientific knowledge enjoy the same sort of warrant (e.g., *GA*, VIII, §2, p.252).

In Schleiermacher's terms, Newman identifies 'Theology' as a 'pure science,' a systematic knowledge of some object or aspect of reality. Newman held that because theology is concerned with God—the ultimate source and end of all things—it is a science with far-reaching practical, moral, and metaphysical implications. Thus, theology has wide-ranging applications, but it is not a mere 'positive' or 'applied' science as Schleiermacher thought. For Newman, theology proper is a *basic* science, and, like all basic sciences, theology is defined, and its *modus operandi* is determined by the nature of its object: God's self-revelation.

Revelation is not reducible to a system of propositions. As a revelation, 'Christianity is a history supernatural, and almost scenic: it tells us what its Author is, by telling us what He has done' (*D&A*, p.184). Christianity is the ongoing divine drama whereby God characterizes Himself to us. Correspondingly, we, as *dramatis personae*, respond to Him in an irreducibly complex way, for, as a response, 'Christianity is at once a philosophy, a political power, and a religious rite' (*PVM*, p.250). None of these dimensions of Christianity are self-contained or self-referential, but rather all respond to aspects of the fathomless reality of God.

Theology, for Newman, systematically expounds the 'facts' or 'truths' of God's self-revelation.[78] As William J. Abraham (2018, p.308) explains, for Newman, 'divine revelation is an immediate datum of experience that is more vivid and forceful than the ideas generated in reflection,' and is also 'ontologically real, existing in its own right and not constituted by human discourse or convention; indeed, divine revelation is ontologically prior to its reception and

[78] While Newman often speaks of theology and philosophy as 'systematic', he also described those rational processes of systematization as being rather *ad hoc* in actual practice (see *US*, XIII, p.263).

articulation.' As Newman put it, 'As prayer is the voice of man to God, so Revelation is the voice of God to man' (*GA*, X.1, p.314).

Newman held that Christian theology is properly based upon a divinely revealed, ecclesially-mediated, *dogmatic* TOFoundation—the Church's authoritative witness to the gospel—rather than the sort of bespoke, do-it-yourself EEFoundation popularised by the Enlightenment. In *Development* (VII.i, §3.1, p.336), for instance, Newman defines theology 'as that continuous tradition and habit in the Church of a scientific analysis of all revealed truth'. The data upon which this tradition reflects, builds, and theorizes are 'revealed truths' embraced by faith, not the deliverances of a supposedly independent faculty of 'Reason'. Rather, says Newman, 'Reason…is subservient to faith, as handling, examining, explaining, recording, cataloguing, defending, the truths which faith, not reason, has gained for us, as providing an intellectual expression of supernatural facts, eliciting what is implicit, comparing, measuring, connecting each with each, and forming one and all into a theological system' (ibid.). Revelation constitutes theology's proper basis. Reason plays a receptive, constructive, and critical role in theology, not a foundational one.[79] Faith is itself 'a reasonable process'—a form of 'implicit reason'—that is 'not necessarily founded on investigation, argument, or proof', i.e., 'explicit reasoning' (*US*, XIII, p.262). Thus, writes Newman, '[the] first step in theology is investigation' into the claims that God's self-revelation makes upon us (*DCD*, VII.i, §3.2, p.337), rather than second-guessing the warrants of revelation in a Rationalist or Evidentialist mode. Faithful reason

[79] As J.H. Walgrave (1960, p.95) observes: '"Reason" [primarily] means, for Newman, any act by which the mind passes from the knowledge of one thing to that of another. The essence of reasoning, then, is its mediative character, the drawing of conclusions from premises.' Walgrave cites the *Grammar*, pp.293-337 (= VII, §2) as evidence. Walgrave notes that Newman uses the term 'reason' in several other senses, including a pejorative sense (ibid., pp.95-96). Wherever necessary I will try to specify the sense in which Newman deploys the term.

works out the implications of revelation and reconciles them with each other and with the rest of our knowledge.

Resisting the religious scepticism then fashionable among European intellectuals, Newman held that faith in revelation yields rational, foundational religious knowledge. Indeed, we can have *specific knowledge* of God as the Church's 'definite Creed' (*APVS*, p.25) is received by the imagination, understood by the intellect, confirmed by the conscience, and embraced by the will. Whereas Schleiermacher rested religious knowledge on the relatively thin basis of one's 'feeling of absolute dependence' (**Ch.I.1.**), Newman believed that our first 'impressions' of God could include the Church's thick, detailed, dogmatic descriptions of God.

This specific, personal knowledge—'faith'—involves a 'real apprehension' of 'unseen' realities, an entire 'invisible world' of truths that demand 'unqualified assent,' whether they are rationally demonstrable or not.[80] In this respect, 'faith' resembles many commonsense assumptions we use to make sense of the world. Bernard Dive (2018) shows that, for Newman, imagination is the hermeneutical faculty—the faculty of 'seeing as'—underlying not only faith but every intellectual and practical activity. Reality impresses itself upon the imagination, creating 'real apprehensions,' as we see, hear, or interpret *x* as *y*. Such seeing-as always involves interpreting the visible in terms of the unseen. Nicholas Lash (*iGA*, p.13) notes that:

> [For] Newman, the structure of that personal knowledge of God revealed in Christ which is the fruit of living, active, self-committing faith, has certain common features with the structure of our common-sense knowledge of empirical reality. This…way of knowing: engaged, experiential, prereflexive, is…"imaginative."

[80] See *PPS* IV.13, 'The Invisible World'. The 'invisible world' with which Newman is primarily concerned, 'which the eyes reach not unto, but faith only,' consists of God, the souls of the dead (and, for that matter, of the living), angels, and the rest of the supernatural (ibid., pp.861-63). But he notes, too, that the animal world and many dimensions of social reality are, in a sense, 'invisible'—or at least inscrutable—to most of us as well (ibid., pp.863-64).

Newman insists it is hard to imagine 'mental facts, of which we have no direct experience.' To 'believe what we cannot understand,' belief must entail an 'imaginative apprehension' of divine mystery. Faith's challenge, as Newman put it, is to ask: 'Can I believe as if I saw?' (ibid. quoting *GA*, V, §1, pp.95-6)

Newman began developing this understanding of faith as Gestalt—or *seeing as*—well before writing the *Grammar*. Dive (2018, pp.40ff) notes that in an 1830 sermon on 'Faith and Obedience,' Newman called faith a 'practical perception of the unseen' (*PPS*, III.6, pp.534ff). He later described faith as an imaginative apprehension of Scripture 'as' the Word of God:

> [Faith] keeps steadily in view that Christ speaks in Scripture, and receives His words as if it heard them, as if some superior and friend spoke them, one whom it wished to please; not as if it were engaged upon the dead letter of a document…. (*PPS*, II.13, pp.242)[81]

Similarly, in his 1838 *Lectures on Justification*, Newman defined faith as 'the mind's perception or apprehension of heavenly things, arising from an instinctive trust in the divinity or truth of the external word…' (*LoJ*, XI, p.252; cf. Dulles, 1994, pp.84–87). In short, faith is the act of seeing-and-hearing-as: seeing Jesus as the Christ, the Logos, and the world as His dominion; hearing the Scriptures as God's word. It is a hermeneutical, aesthetic, and existential stance.

Faith, then, for Newman, is a matter of believing *as if* one saw. Faith does not come in degrees, nor in fits and starts. One sees-as and believes as a settled 'habit, a state of mind, lasting and consistent' (*PPS*, III.vi, p.535), or one doesn't, full stop. 'I cannot believe by halves: either I have faith, or I have it not' (*Mix*., pp.216-17). Such definite faith, says Newman,

> is the gift of God, and not a mere act of our own, which we are free to exert when we will…. It is quite distinct from an exercise of reason, though it follows upon it…. Faith is not mere conviction in reason, it is a firm assent, it is clear certainty greater

[81] Cf., Dive (2018, p.44).

> than any other certainty; and this is wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone. (*Mix.*, p.224, as quoted in Hütter [2020, p.106])

God enables faith when the divine reality declared in the gospel and defined in the creeds impresses itself upon one's imagination *qua* divine reality, confronting the will, pricking the conscience, and demanding assent.

Theology, then, for Newman, is the work of faith—*seeing-as*—seeking rational understanding, striving to form what he calls 'a connected view or grasp of things' (*IU*, p.8). It begins with an imaginative, pre-theoretical, 'poetic' vision of God and moves toward a reflective, theoretical (and practical), and systematic understanding of God and all things in God—though always provisionally and partially. Newman describes this process thus:

> …the mind which is habituated to the thought of God, of Christ, of the Holy Spirit, naturally turns with a devout curiosity to the contemplation of the object of its adoration, and begins to form statements concerning it, before it knows whither, or how far, it will be carried. One proposition necessarily leads to another…; then some limitation is required; and the combination of these opposites occasions some fresh evolutions from the original idea, which indeed can never be said to be entirely exhausted. This process is its development, and results in a…body, of dogmatic statements, till what was an impression on the Imagination has become a system or creed in the reason. (*US*, XV.20-21, pp.329ff = *DCD* I.ii.9, pp. 52-53)

Crucially, for Newman, the believer's imagination is impressed not merely with doctrinal propositions, but with the reality of God Himself. 'As God is one, so the impression which He gives us of Himself is one,' he writes. 'It is the vision of an object… Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are designed to express, and which alone is substantive' (ibid.). This one divine reality, refracted through gospel and creed as light through a prism, is what impresses itself on the believer. That impression propels and shapes theology's internal logic and developmental trajectory (cf. *US*, XV, p.331 = *DCD*, I.ii.9, p.53; Ker, *NTh*, p.38).

3.1.1. Theology's object: What (or Whom) do theologians know?

Newman's confidence in the possibility of real religious knowledge is not an overconfidence in our ability to comprehend the divine. He consistently emphasizes that God's reality infinitely exceeds human understanding, making a full systematization of divine knowledge impossible. Revelation offers genuine light, but only partially. Newman describes 'what Theology teaches about God' as 'a doctrine… so mysterious as in its fulness to lie beyond any system, and in particular aspects to be simply external to nature, and to seem in parts even to be irreconcileable [sic] with itself, the imagination being unable to embrace what reason determines' (*IU*, I.iii.7, p.53). Paradox and ineffability are unavoidable. He writes:

> Theology begins, as its name denotes, not with any sensible facts… but with the Author of nature,—with the one invisible, unapproachable Cause and Source of all things. It begins at the other end of knowledge… It unfolds and systematizes what He Himself has told us of Himself; of His nature, His attributes, His will, and His acts. (*IU*, II.iii.1., p.200)

Reason tethers the imagination to divine reality, but that reality infinitely exceeds both. 'Who shall give method to what is infinitely complex and measure to the unfathomable? We are as worms in an abyss of divine works,' Newman writes (*US*, XIII, p.269). Thus, theology is for Newman a disciplined attempt to think systematically about what ultimately defies full human systematization.

God transcends all finite language, imagery, or categories, including those used in His own self-revelation. Newman thus rejected both the univocity of being assumed by rationalist theologians (e.g., the Oriel Noetics) and fundamentalist literalism, which treats revelation not as 'the abyss of God's counsels, with its dim outlines and broad shadows,' but as 'a flat, sunny plain,

laid out with straight macadamised roads' (*LG*, 80 as quoted in Ker, 2019, p.335). For Newman, revelation illuminates divine mystery but never exhausts it:

> No revelation can be complete and systematic, from the weakness of the human intellect; so far as it is not such, it is mysterious…. A Revelation is religious doctrine viewed on its illuminated side; a Mystery is the selfsame doctrine viewed on the side unilluminated. Thus, Religious Truth is neither light nor darkness, but both together... Revelation…is not a revealed system, but consists of a number of detached and incomplete truths belonging to a vast system unrevealed… (*Ess*. i.31–34, 36, 95–96, 41–42, as quoted in Ker, *NTh*, pp.15–16)[82]

This fragmentary nature of revelation results both from divine wisdom—revealing only what benefits humanity—and human finitude, which cannot fully grasp the infinite. God accommodates His communication to human cognitive limits and cultural contexts. Newman thus describes 'the words of inspired Scripture as imperfect and defective'—not in themselves, but due to 'the medium it uses and the beings it addresses':

> It uses human language, and it addresses man; and neither can man compass, nor can his hundred tongues utter, the mysteries of the spiritual world…. Inspiration…necessarily lowers what is divine to raise what is human. (*US*, XIII, p.268)

Therefore, Scripture speaks not univocally, but analogically:

> Almighty God has condescended to speak to us so far as human thought and language will admit, by approximations, in order to give us practical rules for our own conduct amid His infinite and eternal operations. (*US*, XIII, p.269)

Newman called the recognition of the real but fragmentary and accommodated nature of divine revelation the principle of theological 'economy' (see Ian Ker's introduction, *NTh*, p.12). As Geertjan Zuijdwegt explains, 'For Newman, economy did not mean…that we know nothing of God's being but only his effects. Rather, it meant that what we know of God—whether it pertains

[82] Thus, wrote Newman: 'If by speaking of the Gospel as clear and intelligible a man means to imply that this is the whole of it, then I answer, "No; for it is also deep, and therefore necessarily mysterious"' (*Ess*. I.ii., p.40). Rowell summarizes: 'To speak of Christianity as Revelation implies, rather than denies, that it is also a mystery' (1983, p.65).

to his being or his actions—is always partial and limited' (2018, p.208). This 'economy' is a theological virtue—a proper reserve grounded in the awareness that theological language is always analogical and incommensurate with its divine referent. The theologian must be humble, restrained in speculation, and modest in systematizing divine *revelata*.

> Now the great practical evil of method and form in matters of religion,—nay, in all moral matters,—is obviously this:—their promising more than they can effect. At best the science of divinity is very imperfect and inaccurate, yet the very name of science is a profession of accuracy. (*US*, XIII, p.266)

Thus, Newman insisted the theologian must guard against 'leading the mind to mistake system for truth, and to suppose that an hypothesis is real because it is consistent' (ibid.). Moreover, she must neither feign nor demand more precision than her subject matter permits—a caution which Newman says applies to all sciences (cf., *US*, XIII.21).

3.1.2. Natural Religion

Newman held that humanity possesses a rudimentary natural knowledge of God even prior to receiving divine revelation, and that *natural religion* is the cultural expression of that knowledge.

> And so in the intellectual, moral, social, and political world, Man, with his motives and works, his languages, his propagation…is from Him. Agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life, are His gifts. Society, laws, government, He is their sanction…. He 'enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.' His are the dictates of the moral sense, and the retributive reproaches of conscience. To Him must be ascribed the rich endowments of the intellect, the irradiation of genius, the imagination of the poet, the sagacity of the politician, the wisdom (as Scripture calls it), which…now manifests itself in proverb or in parable…. All that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it

> perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him. (*IU*, I.iii.7, pp.54–55)[83]

This natural knowledge explains, for Newman, 'the phenomenon, admitted on all hands,' that 'a great portion of what is generally received as Christian truth… is to be found in heathen philosophies and religions' (*Ess.*, II.xii., p.231). He argued that from the beginning, the Moral Governor of the world 'scattered the seeds of truth far and wide,' and these have taken root 'as in the wilderness… wild plants indeed but living.' So too, while the philosophies and religions of humanity are not directly divine, they 'have their life in certain true ideas' (ibid., pp.231–232).

All such truths belong to God and, therefore, to His Church. Thus, the Church must maintain a critically receptive posture toward 'the schools of the world' by:

> claiming to herself what they said rightly, correcting their errors, supplying their defects… and thus gradually… enlarging the range and refining the sense of her own teaching. (ibid., pp.231–232)

Natural knowledge, then, is a legitimate resource for theological reflection. Newman affirmed that, even after Christ's coming, the Church remains 'a treasure-house…casting the gold of fresh tributaries into her refiner's fire…stamping upon her own…a deeper impress of her Master's image' (ibid., p.233).

Conscience and natural reason are, for Newman, the wellsprings of all religious imagination, including *natural religion* (Merrigan, 2009, pp.50–51). In conscience, the real presence of a morally demanding God is sensed despite the apparent absence of moral order in the brutal, seemingly random course of Nature. Thus, Newman saw *natural religion* as

[83] See the discussion of this passage in Merrigan (2009, p.52).

humanity's instinctive response to the paradox of divine hiddenness and the demands of conscience:

> What strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is, His absence (if I may so speak) from His own world. It is a silence that speaks…. Why from the beginning of time has no one uniform steady light guided all families of the earth...? Why is it possible without absurdity to deny His will… His existence…. He is specially 'a Hidden God;' and with our best efforts we can only glean… some faint and fragmentary views of Him. I see only a choice of alternatives…:—either there is no Creator, or He has disowned His creatures. (*GA*, X.1, p.309)

Humanity's search for God, then, is driven by the tension of being vulnerable to a seemingly indifferent world while also sensing moral accountability to a higher power. For Newman, a 'burdened conscience'—our 'true informant'—'solves the world's mystery,' offering 'the true answer to each of these antagonist questions:—it pronounces… that God exists… and… that I am alienated from Him' (ibid., pp.309–10). For Newman, his sense that the cosmos is governed by a mysterious, morally demanding transcendence is the foundation of natural religion and is accurate so far as it goes.

3.1.3. Epistemic Anthropology: Newman as Epistemological Naturalist

As a TOFoundationalist, Newman grounded the *ordo cognoscendi* in his Christian understanding of the *ordo essendi*, particularly his theological anthropology. His epistemology rested on a theocentric view of human knowing (Merrigan, 2009, p.187), emphasizing ontological facts about both the knower and the known. Newman saw humans as inherently theocentric, drawn to the transcendent, with conscience and holy longings testifying to divine presence (ibid.). He argued

that we are both *homo religiosus* and *homo theologicus*, naturally reflective and inevitably theologizing, even in disbelief.

Thus, epistemologically, Newman stood squarely within the British Naturalist tradition (Ferreira, 1986). He insisted on anchoring epistemology in psychological reality to avoid 'unreal talk' (*GA*, §1, p.273; cf., Aquino, 2019, p.382), and criticized Lockean Evidentialists and Cartesian Rationalists for relying on impractical 'paper theories' that ignored psychological reality. Their emphasis on explicit reasoning neglected imagination, implicit reasoning, and the personal nature of thought. Though Newman never systematically outlined his psychology, six interrelated elements shape his epistemology: human will and divine grace, imagination and intellect, and conscience and judgment (the illative sense).

Will & Grace

For Newman, faith is a supernatural gift, but humans are morally and intellectually responsible agents, never merely passive. In the *Grammar*, he emphasized that rational and moral agency distinguishes us from 'inferior animals' (*GA*, IX, §1, pp.273–74). Humans are 'emphatically self-made,' developing their nature through choices (ibid.). Reality presses on the imagination, conscience judges within, and self-making can become self-unmaking when we distort imagination, dull conscience, and resist truth.

Newman recognized that intellectual options are limited by epistemic circumstances; we are responsible to the light available to us (*ECH*, I, pp.274–77). Consequently, people of goodwill

may sincerely disagree on theological, moral, or ecclesiastical matters based on differing experiences and situations.

The deeper problem lies with those who knowingly reject truth. Newman observed that thinkers vary in openness to religious evidence, not because evidence is hidden but because of personal disposition (Moleski, 2000, p.27; *GA*, X, §2.3, pp.329–30). Reasoning always stems from 'first principles' and 'presumptions,' which, unlike *a priori* truths, reflect a personal orientation toward reality and revelation. Newman stressed that we bear full responsibility for these foundational beliefs (ibid.).

Imagination & Intellect

Newman saw the reciprocal relationship between theology and religion as rooted in the psychological interplay between intellect and imagination. In the *Grammar*, he explained that both faculties are involved in every mental act (*GA*, V, p.93; Moleski, 2000, p.20). Imagination presents the 'raw materials' of knowledge, while reason works in abstractions (Pickering, 2022, p.97). 'Real apprehension' comes through impressions on the imagination; 'notional apprehension,' through abstract intellection. As Newman noted, 'real assents' influence life far more than mere notions (*GA*, IV.ii, p.76).

Thus, imagination is vital for personally knowing reality, not merely for creativity. However, reason remains essential: it organises imaginative impressions into coherent knowledge (*IU*, I.v.6, p.84), allowing us to assimilate and infer new insights (*DCD*, V, §3, pp.195–99). Yet most knowledge begins poetically rather than scientifically, with poetic apprehension

receding as science progresses (*R&P*, pp.386–87; Taylor, 1998, pp.35–36). Religion, for Newman, is born of imaginative apprehension; theology systematizes it.

The imagination, then, is the more fundamental faculty, motivating both our will and reasoning. But it is fallible. Strong impressions do not guarantee truth (*GA*, IV.ii, p.80). Imaginative failures, as with societal blindness to the evil of slavery or the modern rejection of the miraculous as inconceivable, show that imagination can mislead, supplying false 'first principles' for reasoning (*GA*, IV, §2.3, p.78; *LD*, xxx, pp.159–60; Ker, 2019, pp.729–30).

Moreover, imaginative impressions must align with one's background beliefs to warrant assent. Mere vividness is insufficient; coherence and accumulated probabilities are needed (*GA*, IV.ii, pp.80–81; Ker, 2019, p.352). However, Newman also emphasized that a mere 'assemblage of probabilities' devoid of such 'brilliancy' or 'distinctness' of impression amounts to no more than 'paper logic' and 'notional apprehensions' that cannot carry deep conviction. While 'real assent' does not directly cause action, its vivid imaginative images stir affections and passions, indirectly motivating practice (*GA*, IV.iii, pp.86–87).

Miseducated imaginations distort reasoning, leading to the obstinacy of some empiricists whose imaginations mistake nature's regularity for inviolable natural law (Muller, 2015, pp.43–44; *GA*, IV.ii, pp.80–81). Thus, for Newman, cultivating the imagination through education is crucial. A miseducated imagination can cripple reasoning by inoculating people to cogent arguments.

Conscience & Judgment

For Newman, assent is followed by evaluation: conscience judges action, and the *illative sense* judges thought. Conscience is a psychologically basic element of self-consciousness, alongside memory, sensation, and reasoning (Abraham, 2018, p.307). Indeed, Newman thought that moral awareness is inherent in self-awareness (*PN* ii:43; Merrigan, 2009, p.48).

Conscience, the 'Aboriginal Vicar of Christ', speaks with divine authority and is not reducible to private opinion (*Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, pp.247–49). It connects creature to Creator (*GA*, V, §1, p.106), engraving an image of God as moral Governor on one's psyche (*GA*, V, §1, p.101; Merrigan, 2009, pp.48–49). By grace, conscience enables the 'real apprehension' of revelation qua revelation as the words of Scripture and Tradition resonate with this internal moral tuning fork.

Yet conscience requires cultivation. It can be dulled, misinformed, or falsely troubled (*US*, IV, pp.59, 66; Aquino, 2019, p.377). Thus, Newman emphasized that conscience reflects, but is distinct from, divine communication (Aquino, 2019; Pattison, 1991).

The 'illative sense,' Newman later wrote, is 'a grand word for a common thing' (Letter to Charles Meynall, 17 November 1869 as quoted in Moleski, 2000, p.1; Grimm, 2001, p.512), that is, 'the reasoning faculty,' a 'branch' of judgment which, 'in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty' (*GA*, pp.17, 283, 269). It is the 'implicit reasoning' behind the premonitions and hunches which drive all formal theorizing and explicit reasoning (cf., Ker, 2019., p.622). It is 'the conscience of the intellect, i.e., that self-reflexive aspect of the reasoning mind which questions, evaluates, and guards the integrity of its own reasoning process' (Moleski, 2000, p.2). Newman identifies it as the intellective aspect of Aristotle's φρόνησις (Ker, 2019, p.622; *US*, XIII.8, p.257). The illative sense assesses when cumulative evidence warrants assent, even absent

formal proof, enabling one to rationally navigate 'a world of facts' that demand unqualified assent and yet are not strictly provable (*GA*, IX, §1, p.272). Like conscience, the illative sense can be cultivated or corrupted, and its proper formation is essential for higher education.

3.1.4. Theological knowing: Ordo Cognoscendi

Newman's theological epistemology is a thick description of how we actually come to know God and extend that knowledge through reason, rather than a prescription for how we ought to seek rational certainty. He observed how psychology shapes our thinking, assuming that genuine knowledge is often possible without strict proof.

Newman rejected the standard post-Enlightenment *modus operandi* of EEF, which prescribes an epistemic hygiene regimen of avoiding credulity and accepting only demonstrable certitudes. Instead, Newman reverse engineered an account of the *ordo cognoscendi* describing 'the actual conditions under which cognitive agents move from a particular grasp of things to a more comprehensive vision' (Aquino, 2012, p.24). Whereas EEF demands that first we must doubt all we can, believing only what cannot be doubted and what can be inferred from the indubitable, Newman set out a radically Catholic vision of what we know and how we know it.

Newman thought about epistemology as a convinced Christian, working backward from the *ordo essendi* implied by the Gospel, Catholic tradition, and personal religious experience. In the *Tamworth Reading Room* letters and later in the *Grammar*, he summarized the natural epistemic sequence: 'First comes knowledge, then a view, then reasoning, and then belief' (*D&A*, p.182 = *GA*, IV.iii, p.89). When it comes to Christian doctrinal beliefs, these begin in a properly

basic knowledge of Christian truth as the gospel impresses itself upon one's imagination, stimulating one's intellect and inspiring confidence (*DCD*, II.i., p.55).

Newman found Descartes' method of radical doubt itself highly dubious: '[Universal doubt] is of all assumptions the greatest', implying 'a definite habit of mind,' and involving 'a system of principles and doctrines all its own' (*GA*, IX, §3, p.294; cf. Aquino, 2012, p.24). Instead of Cartesian scepticism, Newman embraced a principle of credulity: it is *prima facie* reasonable to begin by believing unless we have specific reason to doubt (Aquino, 2012). We accept sense impressions, intuitions, memories, and testimonies unless experience disproves them. 'If we discover errors along the way, we discard them and modify our claims' (Aquino, 2012; citing *GA*, IX, §3, p.294). But pre-emptively purging the mind of unproven beliefs leads not to certainty but to irrational scepticism.

Knowledge, for Newman, is living and active. It demands integration into a larger, meaningful whole (*IU*, I.v.6, pp.84–85). Primordial 'knowledge' arises from reality making impressions on one's imagination. Such impressions deepen or weaken to the extent that they are successfully inhabited.

Such visceral knowledge touches the heart, not just the intellect, and tends to outweigh weaker, 'notional' beliefs. Thus, vivid, affective knowledge often trumps 'paper logic': 'No one…will die for his own calculations; he dies for realities' (*D&A*, p.182 = *GA*, IV.iii, p.89). Logical rigor alone rarely persuades. The heart is reached through imagination: by events, persons, history, and testimony. 'Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us,' (ibid.). Newman's own conversion involved personal influences and direct 'impressions of dogma' gripping his imagination and intellect.

Religious knowledge, Newman argued, rests 'satisfied' on the 'plain, categorical truths of revelation,' drawing spiritual nourishment from them without always demanding intellectual consistency (*GA*, V, §3, p.127). Theology, by contrast, reflects the intellect's impulse to examine, compare, and systematize those truths into a coherent science (ibid.).

3.2. What makes theology 'scientific'?

'[T]heological science,' Newman writes, is 'the exercise of the intellect upon the credenda of revelation,' and while 'not directly devotional,' it is 'natural, excellent, and necessary' (*GA*, V, §3, p.127).

> It is natural, because the intellect is one of our highest faculties; excellent, because it is our duty to use our faculties to the full; necessary, because unless we apply our intellect to revealed truth rightly, others will exercise their minds upon it wrongly. Accordingly, the Catholic intellect makes a survey and a catalogue of the doctrines contained in the *depositum* of revelation, as committed to the Church's keeping; it locates, adjusts, defines them each, and brings them together into a whole. Moreover, it takes particular aspects or portions of them; it analyzes them, whether into first principles really such, or into hypotheses of an illustrative character. It forms generalizations, and gives names to them. All these deductions are true, if rightly deduced, because they are deduced from what is true; and therefore in one sense they are a portion of the *depositum* of faith or *credenda*, while in another sense they are additions to it…. (ibid.)

Newman argued that theology is epistemically on par with other sciences. 'Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge,' he claimed, adding that 'Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place [in University Teaching] as Astronomy' (*IU*, I.ii.9, p.40). Theology qualifies as a science because it is grounded in real, personal knowledge of God through nature and revelation and proceeds by drawing principled, systematic inferences from that knowledge.

Theology, like other sciences, is grounded in genuine knowledge, and its valid inferences carry the same kind of warrant—'moral certitude'—as in other fields. As with science, so too with doctrine, Newman argues. He sees doctrinal development and criticism as sciences that trace the logical implications of seminal ideas. In *The Development of Christian Doctrine*, Newman repeatedly compares doctrinal development to scientific discovery. To explain why a genuine implication of revelation might surface only later, he draws an analogy to the physical sciences, where long-known principles (e.g., in geometry) take on new meaning when applied to novel phenomena (e.g., in mechanics or optics) (*DCD*, IV, p.123). Such insights emerge over time through trial and error, yielding fresh discoveries from familiar truths and thereby expanding knowledge.

Newman also drew an analogy between doctrinal and mathematical discoveries. While mathematical reality is unchanging, our knowledge of it has expanded through extrapolation from long-understood principles. Similarly, Newman argued that theological doctrines develop according to fixed religious principles, much like mathematical equations unfold from fixed mathematical laws (*DCD*, V.ii, pp.178–79). Though theology is far less exact than mathematics, Newman did not see this as disqualifying it as a science. Its inexactitude reflects the nature of its object—the partial revelation of divine mysteries—not any methodological flaw. Still, this imprecision means that theological development is inevitably complex and often contentious.[84]

Unlike his Neo-Scholastic contemporaries, Newman recognized that doctrinal development does not unfold through neat, stepwise logic but through a contingent and often messy historical process shaped by ecclesiastical debate, cultural recontextualization, meeting

[84] On this inexactitude, see *US*, XIII.21.

apologetical challenges, and other accidental circumstances.[85] His first major insight was that this contingency posed no threat, so long as developments remained faithful to their originating idea. When a great 'living idea' interacts with the vicissitudes of history and shifting cultural contexts, Newman wrote, 'it changes with them in order to remain the same' (*DCD*, I.i.7, p.40). For Newman, such development is not a flaw but evidence of vitality.

Newman's hypothesis that doctrines can—and sometimes must—change to maintain their identity in new contexts is a theory of *principled development*. A continuous 'dogmatic principle,' he argued (ibid., pp.360ff), drives doctrinal development, while 'Councils and Popes are the guardians and instruments...not that principle themselves….' As McCarren notes, in Newman's view, 'there is a sense in which principles even claim priority over specific doctrines' (2009, p.126). As we shall see, Newman's idea of principled development applies not only to Christian dogma but also to doctrines such as Liberalism, Rationalism, and the idea of a university.

3.2.1. Unscientific Theologies: Liberalism & Rationalism

Newman critiqued both continental *Rationalism* and British *Liberalism* as twin expressions of the 'anti-dogmatic' (i.e., EEFoundationalist) antitheses to his own TOFoundationalist principles. In opposing the Rationalism and Liberalism gaining traction among the British intelligentsia,

[85] McCarren notes (2009, p.119) that Newman first glimpsed (without quite grasping) the historical contingency of doctrinal change in his first book, *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, recognizing that particular missionary and apologetic encounters with pagans and theological confrontations with heretics forced the Church to render 'its authoritative judgment on the point in dispute' and to systematize her doctrines. But, says McCarren, at that point Newman 'did not go so far as to postulate development.'

particularly his Whig contemporaries, Newman also rejected the *Wissenschaftsideologie* that had inspired Schleiermacher and the founders of the University of Berlin.

Newman commented directly on Schleiermacher's thought only once—in a postscript to *Tract 73*, 'On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion,' published in February 1836, two years after Schleiermacher's death (Tract 73, pp.241ff). Newman was responding not to Schleiermacher himself—whom he almost certainly never read (Duffy, 2019, p.3)—but to a glowing review of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* in *The Biblical Repository*. The review praised Schleiermacher's effort to chart a path 'beyond' Athanasian and Sabellian views of the Trinity grounded in religious experience and tempered by post-Enlightenment rationality. Newman dismissed Schleiermacher's liberalism as 'spurious Christianity'; another 'melancholy evidence' that 'a serious doctrinal error is coming as a snare over the whole of the Protestant division of Christendom,' stemming from 'an attempt of the intellect to delineate, philosophise, and justify that religion (so called) of the heart and feelings, which has long prevailed' (Tract 73, p.241).

Newman diagnosed this 'serious doctrinal error' as *Rationalism*, interpreting Schleiermacher's theology as a prime example. In Newman's view, Schleiermacher had erred by introducing rationalistic principles into revealed religion. When he expanded *Tract 73* in his *Essays*, Newman defined 'Rationalism' as 'a certain abuse of Reason; that is, a use of it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted.' He wrote:

> To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the standard and measure of the doctrines revealed; to stipulate that those doctrines should be such as to carry with them their own justification… And thus a rationalistic spirit is the antagonist of Faith; for Faith is, in its very nature, the acceptance of what our reason cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon testimony. (*Ess.*, I.ii., §1, pp.31–32)

Newman rejected the Procrustean rationalism behind both the German research university model and the theological revisionism inspired by Schleiermacher. He and the Tractarians saw this Rationalism as emblematic of the new German theology[86] and the broader religious and political 'Liberalism' then gaining ground in England—an outlook the Oxford Movement opposed. [87]

Thus Newman regarded Schleiermacher's 'spurious Christianity' as Rationalism's natural fruit (ibid.). Without naming Schleiermacher directly, Newman later lamented the 'state of Lutheranism' in 1845 as embracing 'a sort of philosophical Pietism' that led to 'various theories of Pantheism.' He pointed to 'the religious professions of the new Evangelical Church of Prussia'—where Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* had become a core text—as typifying this trend (*DCD*, V.iv.4, p.193; *CF*, xxii). Newman's reading of Schleiermacher's theology[88] was admittedly second-hand and imprecise. Still, his critique of the new German theology as a 'philosophical Pietism' shaped by religious feeling (e.g., Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence'), governed by Enlightenment Rationalism (*Wissenschaftsideologie*), and tending toward Pantheism, was accurate in its broad contours (cf., **Ch.I.1.2.)**.

Newman consistently linked the principles of Liberalism to the misapplication and overextension of reason in the name of intellectual freedom. In the *Apologia* he wrote: 'Now by

[86] See, e.g., E.B. Pusey's *Historical enquiry into the probable causes of the rationalist character lately predominant in the theology of Germany* (1828).

[87] Newman, following Hugh Rose, believed the Whigs were importing French and Germanic ideas into Britain, and he interpreted both Rationalism and Liberalism as developments of the same 'anti-dogmatic principle', a fundamentally egotistic antiauthoritarian attitude which logically terminates in atheism (cf., *APVS*).

[88] The 'tendencies' that Newman discerned in Schleiermacher's theology and the propositions that Newman associated with Liberalism are essentially the same. It seems clear that Newman perceived in Schleiermacher's 'Rationalism' the very same anti-dogmatic (i.e., anti-creedal) tendency or principle that he perceived in 'Liberalism' (cf., *APVS*, n.A, pp.252ff with Tract 73).

Liberalism, I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which… thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place' (*APVS*, p.254).

He continued:

> Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are…beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine…the truth and value of propositions which rest…on the external authority of the Divine Word. (ibid.)

Newman memorably called such overreaches 'usurpations of reason' (*US*, IV).[89] He observed:

> No one can deny to the intellect its own excellence… the question is merely this, whether it be not limited in its turn, as regards its range, so as not without intrusion to exercise itself as an independent authority in the field of morals and religion. (*US*, IV.3, p.57)

While he doesn't use the terms 'Liberalism' and 'Rationalism' in this sermon, these were Newman's usual labels for such intellectual overreach.

In his *Essay on Development*, Newman defined theological 'Rationalism' as 'the exercise of reason instead of faith in matters of faith'—reason overstepping its bounds and encroaching on faith's epistemic domain. He vividly illustrated such encroachment in *Tract 73*. Compare his scathing portrait of 'the Rationalist' with the propositions listed in the *Apologia*'s endnote on 'Liberalism':

> The Rationalist makes himself his own centre, not his Maker; he does not go to God, but he implies that God must come to him.… Our private judgment is made everything…and consulted as the arbiter of all questions…. Nothing is considered to exist except as our minds discern it.… The notion of half views and partial knowledge,…of truths faintly apprehended and not understood,…in a word, the idea of Mystery is discarded." (NR, *Tract 73*)

[89] In this Anglican sermon Newman blames 'the usurpations of Reason' overtaking post-Enlightenment Europe on the Protestantism's bucking of Rome's 'legitimate authority' (*US*, p.69).

As with 'Liberalism', Newman condemned the exaltation of private judgment, the dismissal of mystery, and the reduction of reality to what fits the individual's mental grasp.

Newman believed Schleiermacher 'tended' to reduce 'the one object of the Christian Revelation' to 'stir[ring] the affections, and sooth[ing] the heart' (ibid.). In the *Apologia*, he links such religious sentimentalism to 'Liberalism', condemning it as spiritual evasion: '[Religion], as a mere sentiment,' he wrote, 'is to me a dream and a mockery' (*APVS*, p.61). For Newman, 'Liberalism' and 'Rationalism' are overlapping categories, both rooted in a post-Enlightenment epistemology that begins in doubt, demands certain proof, and ends in a religion that is at once skeptical and sentimentalist. He saw British Liberalism and German Rationalism as sharing a common intellectual origin.

Newman was not alone in associating Liberalism with the rising influence of post-Enlightenment continental ideas, especially German rationalism.[90] As L.W.B. Brockliss notes, 'With the Whigs largely in power from 1830, demands that Oxford, and Cambridge where necessary, be pulled into the modern age began to be heard in Parliament' (2016, p.329). Whig critics often portrayed Oxbridge as outdated, explicitly contrasting them with the Germanic research ideal and the University of Berlin.

Newman describes 'Liberalism' and 'Rationalism' in terms that clearly, if distantly, echo the *Wissenschaftsideologie* behind the founding of the University of Berlin and Schleiermacher's

[90] Newman owed most of his knowledge of German theology to associates such as Hugh Rose and his fellow Tractarian E.B. Pusey. Both had studied in Germany. In Newman's most extensive work on religious epistemology, the *Grammar*, he nowhere engages with Kant, Wolff, or Schleiermacher, despite their influence over nineteenth century thought and their relevance to his project in that work. He knew *of* them (see, e.g., *DCD*, p.193), but had not *read* them. In fact, the only German writers Newman mentions (in passing) in the *Grammar* are Martin Luther (*GA*, p.198) and Newman's contemporary, Johann von Döllinger (*GA*, p.363), whom he seems to have read in English translation.

view of theology as a *positive Wissenschaft* (cf. **Ch.I.2.2.1**). Consider Newman's 4th proposition in the appendix on *Liberalism*—'No one can believe what he does not understand,' and 'It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had brought home to him by actual proof'—alongside Kant's dictum that only apodictically certain knowledge qualifies as science, and Schleiermacher's elevation of philosophy as *Herrin* of all sciences, including theology. Likewise, Newman's 6th proposition—'No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the way of scientific conclusions'—mirrors Schleiermacher's view that theology, as a *positive Wissenschaft*, must be shaped by but must not shape the conclusions of 'pure science' (cf. **Ch.I.3.2.**).

Newman alleged that Protestantism's foundation on 'private judgment' leaves it theologically unequipped to resist Liberalism. By the 1840s, he held the stark view that 'there are but two alternatives, the way to Rome, and the way to Atheism: Anglicanism is the halfway house on the one side, and Liberalism… on the other' (*APVS*, p.186). Anglicanism, for Newman, reflected inconsistent adherence to the principle of dogma, while Evangelicalism (despite appearances) clung inconsistently to an 'anti-dogmatic principle.' Protestantism, he argued, traded Catholicism's dogmatic principle—implicit faith in a magisterially defined creed—for 'private judgment', unleashing the epistemic chaos of 'Liberalism'. Writing to a Catholic layman in 1841, Newman stated:

> Are you aware that the more serious thinkers among us… regard the spirit of Liberalism as the characteristic of the destined Antichrist?... Antichrist is described as the ἄνομος, as exalting himself above the yoke of religion and law. The spirit of lawlessness came in with the Reformation, and Liberalism is its offspring. (*APVS*, p.177)

Protestantism, he believed, would always be at the mercy of the 'energy of human scepticism,' as the principle of private judgment demands certain proof—yet such certainty is nowhere to be found.[91]

Evangelicals denied that rejecting Catholicism led to skepticism, claiming instead to have grounded their faith on the firm foundation of the Bible. But Newman argued that their primitivist appeals to *sola Scriptura* were no match for Enlightenment rationalism, 'that universal solvent' (*APVS*, p.219). 'A book, after all,' he wrote, 'cannot make a stand against the wild living intellect of man.' Determined sceptics, beginning with a hermeneutic of suspicion, will always find reasons to doubt Scripture. 'Experience proves surely that the Bible does not answer for a purpose for which it was never intended,' Newman observed—the Bible was not written to defend itself against every challenge (ibid.).

Nor was Scripture meant to be a self-explanatory doctrinal manual for the uninitiated. Newman held it was 'self-evident as soon as stated, to those who have at all examined the structure of Scripture,…that the sacred text was never intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove [i.e., test or verify] it,' and that to learn doctrine, 'we must have recourse to the formularies of the Church; for instance the Catechism, and to the Creeds' (ibid., pp.29–30). The Bible can corroborate doctrinal claims arising within the tradition, but the Bible alone cannot decide doctrinal questions for us. Newman explains:

> Every theology has its difficulties; Protestants hold justification by faith only, though there is no text in St. Paul which enunciates it, and though St. James

[91] In 'The Usurpations of Reason', Newman offers a fuller exposition of his allegation that the Reformation bears responsibility for the rise of 'Rationalism' and 'Liberalism' (*US*, IV, p.69). For more recent articulations of this allegation against Protestantism, see Brad Gregory (2015) and Charles Taylor (2007).

> expressly denies it… Every creed has texts in its favour, and again texts which run counter to it: and this is generally confessed. (ibid., p.92)

Scripture underdetermines doctrine, leaving Protestants and Liberals to decide for themselves. For Newman, separating Scripture from the Church's living, infallible interpretive tradition is like breaking off the sword of the Spirit's hilt. Without a faith-informed hermeneutic disciplined by dogma, the Bible can mean nearly anything to sectarians—and almost nothing to sceptics.

Newman believed that making private judgment and human reason the ultimate authority inevitably led to the mutilated theology of Liberalism. He expressed this view in a poem written during his 1833 tour of Italy, depicting Liberalism's reduction of Christianity to mere morals and sentiment as a 'presumptuous' 'halving' of the gospel (*Verses on Various Occasions*, 83, 'Liberalism'). Liberals, he wrote, 'in heart,/ At best, are doubters whether it be true,/ The theme discarding, as unmeet' for those who fancy themselves 'Statesmen and Sages.' Newman saw the same presumption at the root of all Protestantism, not just Liberalism, and ultimately left the Church of England for Rome to embrace what he saw as the full, Apostolic gospel.

3.3. What makes 'science' scientific?

Newman observes that when people exclude 'private views' on various subjects whether their own or others', 'to be dropped [from the university curriculum], it is plain they consider such to be opinions, and nothing more, however dear, however important to themselves personally; opinions ingenious, admirable, pleasurable, beneficial, expedient, but not worthy of the name Knowledge or Science' (*IU*, I.ii.2. p.28). Every university operates upon the basis of some theory of demarcation between knowledge and non-knowledge (fantasy, private opinion, superstition,

pseudoscience, mythology). This theory is often implicit and unargued, especially in secular institutions which have an interest in maintaining both the illusion that its demarcations are self-evident and a facade of religious or philosophical neutrality.

To expose these demarcation theories, Newman poses a dilemma: either something is known about 'the Supreme Being' or it is not.

> [If] a University be…a place of instruction, where universal knowledge is professed, and…Religion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable…either…Religion is very barren of real knowledge, or…one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted…. [The advocate] of such an institution…must own, either, that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being, or that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not. (*IU*, I.ii.1, p.26)

If one claims that nothing is known about God—despite centuries of theological and philosophical reflection—she must explain why those convictions do not qualify as knowledge. That is, she must articulate and defend her theory of demarcation's criteria for distinguishing knowledge from non-knowledge. Newman argues this is harder than many secularizers acknowledge:

> I cannot so construct my definition of the subject-matter of University Knowledge, and so draw my boundary lines around it, as to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at Universities, and to exclude the science of Religion. For instance, are we to limit our idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our senses? Then we exclude ethics; by intuition? we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics. Is not the being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by the suggestions of our conscience? (*IU*, I.ii.3, p.29)

In practice, secular academics say to theologians that appeals to the senses, intuition, testimony, abstract reasoning are illegitimate for thee but not for me. Yet if those secular definitions of science are inconsistent, Newman challenges us to ask: What truly makes a discipline 'scientific'?

Newman argued that humans are born evaluators and organizers, and that 'Science and Philosophy… are nothing else but this habit of *viewing*… the objects which sense conveys to the mind, of throwing them into system, and uniting and stamping them with one form' (*IU*, I.iv.3, p.60). For Newman, science is not defined by a uniform methodology, but by the effort to systematically understand diverse experiences of reality. All 'departments of thought', including 'religion', are shaped by 'that real connexion between science and its subject-matter' (*US*, XV, pp.327–28). In other words, the nature of an object determines how it can be known. Citing Aristotle, Newman remarks, 'it is the same fault to demand demonstration of an historian as to be content with probabilities from a mathematician' (*LD*, p.119, as quoted in Lash, *iGA*, p.8).

> An iron rod represents mathematical or strict demonstration; a cable represents moral demonstration, which is an assemblage of probabilities…. A man who said, 'I cannot trust a cable, I must have an iron bar,' would, *in certain given cases*, be irrational and unreasonable. (*LD*, 21, p.146, quoted in Lash, *iGA*, p.16)

Thus, the methods and modalities of microbiology will differ from those of mathematics due to the ontological differences between paramecia and integers, and so it goes, too, in theology. 'Why should not there be that real connexion between science and its subject-matter in religion, which exists in other departments of thought?,' Newman asks (*US*, XV, pp.327–28).

Newman also observed that no science is comprehensible without prerequisite background knowledge, often highly specialized, nuanced, or even tactile (ibid.). 'And, indeed,' he asked (ibid.), 'what science is open to every chance inquirer? which is not recondite in its principles? which requires not special gifts of mind for its just formation?' Mastery of a science involves practices that train the mind to understand a particular object or field—internalizing its principles, learning its tradition, and acquiring a feel for it. This kind of 'epistemic fit'—as William Abraham and Frederick Aquino call it (2021, p.1ff)—is hard won. Those who cultivate it are in a

different epistemic position than those without it: they can know things not immediately or universally obvious. Thus, for Newman, science involves the cultivation of epistemic habits.

3.3.1. What Science Isn't: Rationalism and Evidentialism

Throughout his career, Newman challenged widespread misconceptions of science that discounted or distorted traditional religious perspectives. His main targets were what he termed 'Rationalism', 'Liberalism', and forms of what philosophers now call Evidentialism. Newman treated these as a family of related ideas, and his critiques of them share strong similarities, despite differing emphases. These parallels stem from a shared underlying 'anti-dogmatic' or 'infidel principle' that Newman believed lay at the root of their errors. This principle—which I, following Paul Tyson, refer to as EEF—makes 'the human knower,' rather than God, the 'locus of knowledge,' treating human knowledge as 'the only valid foundation for truth' (Tyson, 2022, pp.32, 185).

EEF comes in many varieties depending on which beliefs one takes to constitute an adequate epistemic basis from which to make sound inferences, and what sorts of inferences—deductive, inductive, probabilistic, abductive—one accepts as conferring epistemic warrant. While this paradigm was elaborated as an Idealist *Wissenschaftsideologie* in Germanic contexts, in Newman's British context EEF typically took an Evidentialist form. Aquino (2012, p.19) explains:

> The basic claim of this version of evidentialism is that one is rationally entitled to believe that *p*, if and only if one possesses full understanding of *p* and demonstrative proof of *p*. Religious beliefs that fail to meet these criteria are simply matters of opinion and sentiment. If one cannot render sufficient reasons for believing that *p*, one is not entitled to claim *p* as rationally acceptable.

W.K. Clifford (1879) classically summed up Evidentialism's ethos: 'It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.' In nineteenth century England, religious skeptics and believers alike embraced Evidentialism. It was often opposed to Catholic 'superstition' as a distinctly *Protestant* mode of seeking a 'reasonable' faith. Newman rejected EEF generally and Evidentialism as unreal, un-catholic, indeterminate, and logically incomplete epistemic strategies.

First, Newman rejected the post-Enlightenment assumption—common among Evidentialists, Rationalists, and other EEFoundationalists—that one can only know what one can prove, calling it 'unreal'. He termed this the '*à priori* method of regarding assent in its relation to inference,' and argued that this theory 'cannot be carried out in practice' (*GA*, VI, §1, p.136).[92] It holds that 'assent cannot rise higher than its source,' so if inference in concrete matters is conditional, then assent must be too (ibid.).[93] But Newman contended that 'real assent', which guides our actions, often cannot come in degrees; action requires 'unconditional assent'.[94] In real life, we must act as if others have minds, the future will resemble the past, we have duties—regardless of whether these have been or can be proven. To act, we must assent unconditionally to many unproven—and often unprovable—propositions (ibid.).

[92] Newman distinguishes 'assent' from 'certitude' (cf., *GA*, VII.). Newman thought his prioritisation of 'assent' over 'certitude' was the *Grammar*'s key insight, the 'open sesame' of the entire subject (cf., Ker, 2019, pp.619-20; Lash, *iGA*, pp.7ff).

[93] Newman attributed this view to John Locke. Deciding whether Newman's interpretation and criticisms of Locke were accurate or fair is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Ferreira (1986, p.2) thinks they were not, while Aquino (2018, pp.154ff) suggests that they were.

[94] Newman argues that Locke's prescriptions are divorced from human psychological reality and so consign all actual human beings, Locke included, to irrationality. 'He takes a view of the human mind, in relation to inference and assent, which to me seems theoretical and unreal' (*GA*, VI, §1, pp.139-40).

Evidentialism's epistemic strategy is unlivable, as we must constantly act on beliefs that cannot meet its strict standard of proof.[95] Such Evidentialism remains, as Newman puts it, a mere 'paper' theory, an 'abstract' exercise—ultimately 'unreal.'[96] 'None of us can think or act without the acceptance of truths, not intuitive, not demonstrated, yet sovereign,' he writes. 'If our nature has any constitution, any laws, one of them is this absolute reception of propositions as true, which lie outside the narrow range of conclusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is tethered; nor has any philosophical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a day' (*GA*, VI, §1, p.150). For Newman, it is an inevitable psychological fact that we begin reasoning from unargued first principles.[97] We must accept human reasoning as it actually and invariably operates—not as we might wish it could.

Newman makes the above points with reference to the ordinary, quotidian intellections of all people, but his argument obviously bears upon modes of religious believing: If we cannot rationally demand inferential proof for many of our ordinary day-to-day beliefs, why should we think it rational to demand such proof for our specifically religious beliefs?

While Newman assumes or presupposes the truth of Christianity from the outset of his arguments, he is not a hard fideist who rejects apologetic argumentation in principle. He defends

---

[95] Given Evidentialism's manifest impracticability, Newman reckoned avowed Evidentialists to be self-deceived. Hence, Newman wrote to his friend William Froude, a self-styled Evidentialist, 'I do not believe, and never will believe, that in the bottom of your mind you really hold what you think you hold' (*LD*, 19, p.259 as quoted in *iGA*, p.3).

[96] In calling an idea 'unreal,' Newman's objection is fundamentally psychological and practical. Here Newman stands squarely within the British Naturalist tradition (Ferreira, 1986; Aquino, 2018, Ch.8).

[97] E.g.,

> If you trace back your reasons for holding an opinion, you must stop somewhere; the process cannot go on forever; you must come at last to something you cannot prove, else life would be spent in inquiring and reasoning, our minds would be ever tossing to and fro, and there would be nothing to guide us. No man alive, but has some First Principles or other. (*The Present Position of Catholics in England*, p.256 as quoted in Merrigan 2009, p.206)

the superiority of Christianity's explanatory, moral, and spiritual power over against other worldviews. If one must begin from *some* set of first principles or presumptions, then, Newman argues, Christian faith provides a better starting point for life and thought than do other perspectives. But, as opposed to Evidentialism, Newman denies that Christian belief must be based on evidence and arguments to be warranted. Evidence is the reward, rather than the basis, of faith in the truth.

Second, Newman rejected EEF/Evidentialism as un-Catholic—both because it implies that few can know much of anything and because the Catholic tradition could not survive, much less inspire martyrdom, on sufficient evidence alone. Unlike the Evidentialists, Rationalists, and Liberals he opposed, 'dogma' was always 'the fundamental principle' of Newman's religion. He stated his TOFoundationalist position as follows:

> That belief in Christianity is in itself better than unbelief; that faith, though an intellectual action, is ethical in its origin; that it is safer to believe; that we must begin with believing; that as for the reasons of believing, they are for the most part implicit…; that they consist…rather of presumptions and ventures after the truth than of accurate and complete proofs; and that probable arguments, under the scrutiny and sanction of a prudent judgment, are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain, and turn to the most important uses. (*DCD*, VII.i, §2.1-3, pp.326-28)

Newman contrasted his position with the Lockean Evidentialist 'principle that doctrines are only so far to be considered true as they are logically demonstrated' (ibid.). On his reading, Locke forbids faith as a personal principle of conduct unless 'reasons [are] accurately drawn out and serviceable for controversy.' But Newman countered that this philosophy excludes all but 'the educated few… clear-headed… practised intellects… with leisure and wise friends' (ibid.). Worse, it lacks moral power: 'Were it generally received, no great work ever would have been done for

God's glory and the welfare of man.… [Calculation] never made a hero' (ibid.). Newman insisted that 'Catholics, ancient as well as modern,' absolutely rejected such Evidentialist demands (ibid.).

Third, while Newman held that mounting evidence can require 'unconditional assent', he rejected Evidential*ism* because evidence alone underdetermines rational belief. There is always a gap between what we can strictly prove and what we should believe. Though this gap cannot be eliminated, Newman argued it can be bridged by a rational judgment that 'the limit of converging probabilities' supports a given conclusion (*iGA*, p.17). One need not circumnavigate Great Britain to rationally believe it is an island (*GA*, *VI*). Most people reasonably accept this on testimony though testimony cannot constitute proof. But, in fact, demanding demonstrative proof in such cases is irrational. The natural sciences, Newman noted, rely on this same trust (*DCD*, III.i.3, pp.101–2), as scientists must depend on others' work and cannot 'rigidly test' every accepted result themselves.

Finally, Newman rejected EEF/Evidentialism on the grounds that even the most rigorous proofs rest on unprovable first principles. He wrote, 'however full and… precise our producible grounds… however clear and tangible our evidence, yet… there must ever be something assumed ultimately which is incapable of proof, and without which our conclusion will be as illogical as Faith is apt to seem to men of the world' (*US*, XI, pp.212–13). In all reasoning, Newman held, people proceed 'on grounds which they do not, or cannot produce…or could not prove to be true…which they take for granted' (ibid.). For example, 'we trust our senses, and that in spite of their often deceiving us,' and we 'rely implicitly on our own memory' and reason, despite their fallibility, and without requiring prior proof of their reliability (ibid., pp.213–14). We give these faculties the benefit of the doubt, presuming an 'antecedent probability' that they are more

reliable than not. Rather than living in Cartesian doubt, we assume their trustworthiness unless proven otherwise. As Newman put it, 'we must assume something to prove anything, and can gain nothing without a venture' (*US*, XI, p.215).

4. How should theology relate to other knowledges?

Newman held that Truth is a unified whole or a system wherein each of its various parts and dimensions inform one another, and that excising religious knowledge from 'the circle of universal science' inevitably throws the entire system into 'confusion' (*IU*, I.iii.6, pp.50-51). Imagining knowledge as a Roman arch, Newman saw religious knowledge as its cornerstone and theological knowledge as its keystone. Remove either and the entire structure will crumble into epistemic disarray. Thus, for Newman, theology and other knowledges clearly bear upon each other.

Having defended theology as a science on par with any taught in the university, Newman offered 'a philosophical answer' to the practice of teaching secular knowledge in the lecture hall while relegating religious knowledge to 'the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour' (*IU*, I.iii.1, p.41). This faulty 'division of labour' rested on two Liberal principles: first, that 'No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the way of scientific conclusions,' and second, that 'Christianity is necessarily modified by the growth of civilization, and the exigencies of times' (*APVS*, p.260). While Schleiermacher sacralized this division as an 'eternal covenant' between theology and the sciences at the University of Berlin, Newman rejected it as a tacit denial of religion's relevance to reality and theology's legitimacy as a science.

Newman's core argument against separating theology from the other arts and sciences begins with the claim that *Truth*—'the object of Knowledge'—is ultimately unified, such that no truth can be wholly isolated from another (*IU*, I.iii.2, p.41). For Newman, 'truth means facts and their relations' (ibid.). It is not an agglomeration of disjointed datapoints, but:

> All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another. (ibid.)

The various sciences, then, are merely 'partial views or abstractions' of a single subject-matter: the vast, interconnected whole of reality (*IU*, I.iii.2, pp.42–43). For Newman, relationships are as fundamental as the things themselves; nothing is intelligible apart from the web of relations that defines it.

Newman argued that there are no standalone sciences, for at least two reasons. First, every science relies on postulates that belong to other disciplines. For example, Newtonian physics—or any natural science—'requires the admission of certain metaphysical postulates… that what happened yesterday will happen to-morrow; that there is such a thing as matter, that our senses are trustworthy, that there is a logic of induction, and so on' (*IU*, I.iii.3, p.44). Without these assumptions, 'the science of physics would remain hopelessly on the stocks… and never could be launched into the sphere of fact' (ibid.). In short, every science borrows foundational assumptions from others.

Second, Newman argued that sciences must limit and correct each other, as the principles of one may have little explanatory power over the subject matter of another. Newtonian physics, for example, cannot explain 'capillary attraction,' just as chemistry cannot account for human behavior (ibid., pp.44–45). Pursuing a science in isolation leads to error and intellectual

arrogance; scholars' 'scorning all principles and reported facts which do not belong to their own pursuit… without aid from any other quarter' (ibid.). Newman maintained:

> All the sciences come to us as one… each separately is more or less an abstraction, wholly true as an hypothesis, but not wholly trustworthy in the concrete… needing the support and guarantee of its sister sciences… none can safely be omitted, if we would obtain the exactest knowledge possible of things as they are…. (*IU*, I.iii.6, p.51)

Lacking a sense of the whole built up by an acquaintance with a range of sciences, specialists may overestimate their discipline's reach, while others—like students of literature or music—may undervalue their field's unique contributions.

But what of theology? Newman argued that if the goal of liberal learning is to grasp Truth as fully as possible, 'then granting Theology is a real science, we cannot exclude it, and still call ourselves philosophers' (*IU*, I.iii.4, p.46). Since Truth is 'one large system or complex fact,' excluding theology necessarily weakens our overall grasp of it.

'But what, in matter of fact, are [theology's] pretensions, what its importance, what its influence upon other branches of knowledge, supposing there be a God…?,' asked Newman. 'Has it vast dimensions, or does it lie in a nutshell? Will its omission be imperceptible, or will it destroy the equilibrium of the whole system of Knowledge?' (*IU*, I.iii.6, p.51). Newman argued that if God exists, it would be hard to imagine a fact that could be more important to understanding reality aright.

As a thought experiment, Newman urged listeners to imagine a university that bracketed from all theoretical consideration the fact that rational minds, through human actions, can affect matter, shaping the course of the material world—explaining all of history and culture without reference to thought or choice, relying only on physics and chemistry (*IU*, I.iii.5, pp.47–48). While

such a restriction might yield some insights, it would mostly produce reductivism and just-so stories, not a genuine advancement of knowledge. Newman's point is that excluding human rational agency from our view of the world would seriously distort scientific theorizing. And since God's existence and action are far more momentous than human agency, then *a fortiori*, excluding God from scholarly consideration would be even more distortive—*if* God indeed exists and acts (*IU*, I.iii.6, pp.49–51).

Newman devoted the rest of Discourse III to making a strong general case for including theology, especially natural theology, in the university's curriculum. To understand how he saw theology's specific relevance to individual arts and sciences, however, one must turn elsewhere, particularly the second half of the *Idea*—Newman's 'Occasional Lectures and Essays' on 'University Subjects'—and the *Grammar*.

Newman believed God had scattered 'seeds of truth' throughout all cultures, some of which matured into genuine philosophical and religious insights. For Newman, all truth is God's truth, and the Church has a duty to gather and incorporate wisdom wherever it is found:

> St. Augustine tells us that there is no false teaching without an intermixture of truth; and it is by the light of those particular truths, contained respectively in the various religions of men,…that we pick our way…into the One Religion which God has given, taking our certitudes with us, not to lose, but to keep them more securely, and to understand and love their objects more perfectly. (*GA*, VII, §2, p.201)

Whether in ancient Pagan writings or modern non-Catholic thought, Newman welcomed truth from any quarter, once properly sifted. He believed such insights revealed something of God and creation and could be assimilated into Catholic doctrine as it developed. This principle, he thought, applied to natural science as much as to natural religion. Accordingly, Newman urged Catholics to remain open to insights from all sources.

E.g., Newman maintained that 'there can be no real collision between [Physical Science] and Catholicism' (*IU*, I.ix.3, p.152), since 'Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each other' (ibid.). Newman gladly granted that the natural sciences have their own integrity which natural intellects can discern unaided by grace. Thus, Newman claimed:

> There is no crying demand…for our acquisition of a Catholic Euclid or a Catholic Newton. The object of all science is truth;—the pure sciences proceed…from principles which the intellect discerns by a natural light, and by a process recognized by natural reason; and the experimental sciences investigate facts by methods of analysis or by ingenious expedients, ultimately resolvable into instruments of thought equally native to the human mind. If then we may assume that there is an objective truth, and that the constitution of the human mind is in correspondence with it, and acts truly when it acts according to its own laws; if we may assume that God made us, and that what He made is good, and that no action from and according to nature can in itself be evil; it will follow that, so long as it is man who is the geometrician, or natural philosopher, or mechanic, or critic, no matter what man he be, Hindoo, Mahometan, or infidel, his conclusions within his own science, according to the laws of that science, are unquestionable, and not to be suspected by Catholics…. (*IU*, II.ii, §2.1, pp.180-81)

In *principle*, Newman saw no reason 'why the chair of Astronomy in a Catholic University should not be filled by a La Place, or that of Physics by a Humboldt.' (*IU*, II.ii, §2.1, p.181).

In practice, however, Newman only hired devout Catholics. With *actual* non-Catholic professors—not 'mere abstractions' or the ideal 'type of the imaginary bookworm'—'religious opinion…cannot fail of influencing *in fact* the school, or society, or polity in which it is found; though in the abstract that opinion is one thing, and the school, society, or polity, another' (ibid., §2.2, pp.182-3). Even in the natural sciences, Newman believed anti-Catholic biases could subtly distort a scholar's work.

E.g., Newman recognized the danger that the natural sciences might mistake their explanatory power for omnicompetence or philosophical self-sufficiency. He accepted Francis

Bacon's view that religious and scientific explanations should remain distinct, warning that 'if we mix them, we shall spoil both' (*IU*, I.ix.3, p.153). Thus, Newman saw it as legitimate for 'physical science' to be 'in a certain sense atheistic [i.e., methodologically naturalistic], for the very reason it is not theology' (ibid., p.154). However, the success of this methodological naturalism often leads people to mistakenly embrace full-blown ontological naturalism.

For Newman, this danger was no reason to pit science against Catholicism. Instead, Catholic theology should make scientists more patient with paradox and mystery, and less inclined to reduce all phenomena to monocausal explanations. Creation exists in the Creator, who, 'though One, is a sort of world of worlds in Himself,' whose attributes may be grasped in their 'elementary form[s],' but each of which 'is the object of an inexhaustible science' and cannot be fully reconciled with the others without paradox (*IU*, II.iv.3., p.222). The Catholic scientist should affirm 'that there is nothing irrational in submitting to undeniable incompatibilities,' called 'apparent' only because, if real, they could not co-exist (ibid.). Thus, when 'religious writers, jurists, economists, physiologists, chemists, geologists, and historians' encounter apparent conflicts, they should 'go on quietly…in their own respective lines…with full faith in the consistency of that multiform truth…in a generous confidence that they will be ultimately consistent' (ibid., p.224). Such tensions need not be forced into premature resolution.

The Catholic scientist should also be patient with apparent contradictions between contemporary science and Catholic dogma.

> He is sure…that, if anything seems to be proved by astronomer, or geologist…in contradiction to the dogmas of faith, that point will eventually turn out, first, *not* to be proved, or, secondly, not *contradictory*, or thirdly, not contradictory to any thing *really revealed*, but to something which has been confused with revelation. And if, at the moment, it appears to be contradictory, then he is content to wait…

> knowing that error is like other delinquents; give it rope enough, and it will be found to have a strong suicidal propensity. (ibid., p.225)

Meanwhile, Newman urged Catholic scientists to: (1) hold firmly to dogma while remaining flexible on secondary doctrines; (2) be patient with apparent 'collisions' between science and faith; and (3) support 'the independence of philosophical thought,… investigations, speculations, and discussions,' if not 'formal teaching' (ibid., p.228). For Newman, such freedom reflected not doubt but a deep confidence in the truth of Catholic dogma.

A useful case study in Newman's approach to integrating 'other knowledge' with theology is his view on Darwinian evolution. Newman 'could not see why evolution… was incompatible with the doctrine of creation' (Ker, 2019, p.624). In a private letter, he wrote: 'It does not seem to me to follow that creation is denied because the Creator, millions of years ago, gave laws to matter' (*LD* xxiv, p.74, as quoted in Ker, 2019, p.624; *US*, xxxix). He saw no contradiction between the Bible's claim that Adam was made from dust and Darwin's theory of human descent from pre-human primates. Since 'the Bible also said that all men are created from dust' (Ker, 2019, p.624), Newman suggested these could be compatible rather than conflicting descriptions, one biological, one poetic.

Whatever the solution to these tensions, Newman was in no rush to resolve the apparent conflict between evolutionary biology and Catholic doctrine. 'If [the educated Catholic] has one cardinal maxim in his philosophy,' he wrote, 'it is, that truth cannot be contrary to truth; if he has a second, it is, that truth often seems contrary to truth; and… a third… that we must be patient with such appearances' (*IU*, II.iv.3., p.221). He believed that 'fuller investigation' would eventually resolve such conflicts (*LD*, xxiv, p.74). Since the Church often took centuries to address theological puzzles, why should this case be different? In the *Grammar*, Newman affirmed that even if

contradictions appeared 'more direct,' he would not 'give up my certitude in that truth which on sufficient grounds I determined to come from heaven' (*GA*, VII, §2, pp.206–7). Rather than hastily throwing together a stopgap apologetic, Newman trusted that 'philosophical discoveries cannot really contradict divine revelation' (ibid.) and embraced cognitive dissonance. He believed that such intellectual irritation would inspire the deeper thought and debate needed for healthy doctrinal development.

Oddly, Newman's comfort with natural reason's reading of the 'Book of Nature' (physical science) did not extend to its reading of the 'Book of Man' (literature). Given the Fall, 'if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature,' he argued. 'It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man' (*IU*, I.ix.7, p.158). For Newman, studying literature meant engaging the classics—Greek, Roman, English, or otherwise—which reflect the artistry, insight, and especially the spiritual character of their authors and cultures, both good and bad.

Newman believed Catholics must study classical literature to understand their cultural heritage, develop writing skills, and refine taste. However, he cautioned that such literature should not be expected to be spiritually or morally edifying. Whatever its *literary* value, he judged it 'bad' when 'weighed in the balance of truth and morality' (*IU*, II.ii, §3.4, p.190).

> It cannot be otherwise; human nature is in all ages and all countries the same; and its literature, therefore, will ever and everywhere be one and the same also. Man's work will savour of man; in his elements and powers excellent and admirable, but prone to disorder and excess, to error and to sin. Such too will be his literature… with all its richness and greatness, [it] will necessarily offend the senses of those who, in the Apostle's words, are really "exercised to discern between good and evil." (*IU*, II.ii, §3.4, p.191)

Newman saw such literature as a source of natural goods and pagan virtues—but not as a means of grace. This conviction limited what Newman could imagine for a Catholic literary criticism.

While the natural sciences continue to develop and can be shaped by Catholic influence, classical literature is fixed; its pagan and often anti-Catholic character cannot be undone. Catholics may write new works that could one day become classics, but they cannot alter the nature of those already written. Believing non-Catholic literature to be morally and religiously deficient, Newman hoped his university would foster 'a Catholic school of writers' who would 'serve their generation… promote the interests of religion… and edify their brethren,' even if their works did not endure (ibid., pp.198–99). Despite admiring the literary quality of English prose in his time, Newman feared that 'we have well-nigh seen the end of English Classics' (*IU*, II.ii, §4.4, p.198), leaving English literature permanently dominated by Protestant and anti-Catholic voices. Still, he longed for a new tradition of English Catholic literature to be born.

5. What is the university for?

Newman premised his defense of theology's place in the university on the claim: 'A University…by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge…' (*IU*, I.ii.1, p.25).[98] While he sometimes played rhetorically on the Latin homonymy between 'university' and 'universe' (both

[98] In a private correspondence with several of his friends, Newman outlined the central argument of his discourses on the Catholic University of Dublin as follows:

1. The direct object of a University *as such*, is to teach *all* knowledge.
2. The subject matter of *faith* comes into the idea of 'all knowledge'.
3. Therefore a University *must*, cannot help, as such, teaching the faith and nothing else.
4. Therefore it does *directly*, virtute Universeitatis suae, teach and inculcate Catholic expression, feeling, fact, etc etc. and leaven all instruction with Catholicism. (*LD* xv.134 cited in Barr, 2018, pp.55-56)

universitas), Newman did not rely on faulty etymology. His footnotes show he knew the word *universitas* originally denoted the institution's status as a guild (likewise the word *collegium*), not its scope of instruction. Instead, he based his definition on the university's original title as a *Studium Generale*, or 'School of Universal Learning' (*RPU*, Ch.II, p.6). He wrote:

> [In] its simple and rudimental form, it is a school of knowledge of every kind consisting of teachers and learners from every quarter…. [A] University seems to be in its essence, a place for the communication and circulation of thought, by means of personal intercourse, through a wide extent of country. (ibid.)

Newman contended that the university's defining aim was to cultivate 'a philosophical habit of mind,' a 'discipline and refinement of intellect'—in a word, '*wisdom*'. He famously called those who achieved this kind of 'mental culture' '*gentlemen'*.

5.1. An Educational Philosophia Perennis?

The basic contours of Newman's philosophy of education were cemented during his years as a fellow at Oriel (1822–1845). As an undergraduate, Newman earned a reputation for precocity and brilliance but faltered under pressure during final exams in 1820, receiving a disappointing fourth in Classics. He revived his academic career in 1822 by winning a prestigious fellowship at Oriel, then Oxford's most academically serious college. Newman considered his election 'the turning point of [his] life' (*AW*, p.63, as quoted in Ker, 2019, p.18).

Given his abysmal undergraduate marks, Newman owed his election to Oriel to the 'courage' of its then provost Edward Copleston (served 1814-1828), a champion of liberal education. Copleston later pointed to the young Newman 'as the outstanding justification of the college's policy of discouraging the kind of technical expertise encouraged by more conventional

examinations in favour of real intellectual distinction and originality' (Ker, 2019, pp.18-19). Newman ever after advocated Copleston's liberal educational philosophy, prizing learning as an end rather than a mere means to career advancement.[99] Thus Newman wrote of his philosophy of education, 'Many changes has my mind gone through: here it has known no variation or vacillation of opinion…' (*IU*, I.i.2., p.16).[100]

For Newman, the elemental idea of a university—a local body devoted to the common pursuit of 'universal knowledge'—had been discovered by the Greeks and developed by the Romans (*RPU*, chs.4-9) before being assimilated and adapted by the Christian tradition. Liberal education's core principle—namely, 'that Knowledge is, not merely a means to something beyond it…but an end,' Newman argued, 'is both intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of mankind' (*IU*, I.v.2, pp.78-79). Indeed, this 'philosophy of Education…is founded on truths in the natural order' (*IU*, I.i.2., p.16), not the peculiar conventions of Western culture. Thus, it is 'catholic', representing an educational *philosophia perennis*.

Newman's educational vision rested on at least five core principles: The unity of Truth, the priority of teaching over research, the intrinsic value of 'philosophical knowledge,' the morally formative character of education, and the need for intellectual freedom. Newman's principles overlap with Schleiermacher's (**Ch.I.4.1.**) but differ at several key points.

[99] Newman's indebtedness to Copleston is reflected in that *IU*, I.vii.7 is essentially an extended quotation of Copleston's *Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford* (1810).

[100] The continuity of Newman's educational outlook is abundantly witnessed by the fact that *IU*, I.vi.4, pp.95ff quotes extensively from *US*, sermon XIV, 'Wisdom, as Contrasted with Faith and with Bigotry' (originally preached in 1841).

5.1.1. The Unity of Truth: Teaching 'Universal Knowledge'

Like Schleiermacher, Newman sought to cultivate in students a sense of and instinct for the fundamental unity of truth. Liberal education, wrote Newman, trains and forms the intellect 'to have a connected view or grasp of things' (*IU*, p.8). It cultivates in students' minds 'Science and Philosophy,' which, wrote Newman, 'in their elementary idea, are nothing else but this habit of *viewing*…the objects which sense conveys to the mind, of throwing them into system, and uniting and stamping them with one form' (*IU*, I.iv.3, p.60).

Universities teach 'universal knowledge' to elevate students above the sort of shallow opinionation that Newman derogated as mere 'viewiness' (*IU*, pp.8-9).[101] Newman contrasted this sort of surfacy editorializing with the rigorous discipline of genuine liberal learning, noting that 'the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony', typically by studying Grammar and Mathematics (*IU*, p.9).

> Let him once gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not know, and I conceive he will be gradually initiated into the largest and truest philosophical views, and will feel nothing but impatience and disgust at the random theories and imposing sophistries and dashing paradoxes, which carry away half-formed and superficial intellects. (ibid., pp.9-10)

[101] Newman diagnosed 'viewiness' as a disease—a sort of incontinence of the mouth or the pen—brought about by life in an oversaturated media environment. 'An intellectual man, as the world now conceives of him, is one who is full of "views" on all subjects of philosophy, on all matters of the day,' wrote Newman. 'It is almost thought a disgrace not to have a view at a moment's notice on any question from the Personal Advent to the Cholera or Mesmerism' (*IU*, pp.8-9). One can only imagine what Newman might have thought about our present-day, post-truth, social-media-addled culture, but we can be confident that he would have thought discriminating, liberally educated intellects (which are always inherently valuable) to be urgently needed.

The aim of liberal education is not simply breadth, but penetrative perceptivity, the ability to tell the difference between '*unreal*' idle talk and genuine insight, to discern truth from falsehood, and to see the deep unity of Truth behind, beneath, within the myriad truths with which reality confronts us.

Newman's preferred word for the work of discerning the one Truth underlying the many truths learned, taught, and studied in the university was 'Philosophy.' He wrote:

> Philosophy, then, is Reason exercised upon Knowledge; or the Knowledge not merely of things in general, but of things in their relations to one another…. It never views any part of the extended subject-matter of knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing lead to every thing else; it communicates the image of the whole body to every separate member, till the whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them their one definite meaning. Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall to mind their function in the body, as the word creation suggests the idea of a Creator, as subjects that of a sovereign, so in the mind of a philosopher, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions, individualities, are all viewed, not in themselves, but as relative terms, suggesting a multitude of correlatives, and gradually, by successive combinations, converging one and all to their true centre. (*US*, XIV, p.291)

This ultimate unity of the arts and sciences was, of course, for Newman a corollary of monotheism (*IU*, I.v.1., p.76). Tillman (2015, pp.20-21) summarizes Newman's view thus: 'Unified by and anchored in the whole of God's creation, each science, each discipline, discloses a fundamental aspect of that reality: living things, poetic beauty, political structures, ethical responsibilities, and so forth.'

Thus, liberal education was to teach students how to 'view' reality's different 'aspects' in concert so as to approximate an understanding of the 'complete circle of knowledge' (Tillman,

2015, p.20) and to develop that mental equanimity which Newman associated with 'gentlemanliness'.

Narrow specialization, Newman warned, breeds moral and intellectual myopia and, with it, volatility. 'Men, whose minds are possessed by some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in their pursuit of it, and are startled or downcast on finding obstacles in the way of it; they are ever in alarm or in transport' (*US*, XIV, pp.291-92). 'Whether it be held by the humanities or the natural sciences, the disciplined perspective taken must needs be singular and true to its unique methodology, itself an entire manner of viewing, yet always obliged to remember that it is but one of the many ways of looking at reality' (Tillman, 2015, p.21). Liberal learning, in Newman's view, nurtures this sense of the irreducibly complex unity of Truth and a respect for the unique but limited light that each art or science sheds upon it.

5.1.2. The Primacy of Teaching, the Necessity of Research: The University Principle & the Collegiate Principle

Newman's idea of the university prioritized teaching. A university is to be 'a place of teaching universal knowledge' and 'its object is…the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement.… If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students…' (*IU*, p.3). Like Schleiermacher, Newman held that 'literary and scientific "Academies"' are 'more suited to act as instruments of stimulating philosophical inquiry, and extending the boundaries of our knowledge, than a University,' and so

recommended a 'division of intellectual labour between Academies and Universities' (*IU*, p.5). Newman wrote:

> To discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He, too, who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers is unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new. The common sense of mankind has associated the search after truth with seclusion and quiet. The greatest thinkers have been too intent on their subject to admit of interruption; they have been men of absent minds and idiosyncratic habits, and have, more or less, shunned the lecture room and the public school….I think it must be allowed on the whole that, while teaching involves external engagements, the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement. (ibid., pp.5-6)

Schleiermacher insisted on uniting teaching and research by recasting higher education as an apprenticeship unto specialized research. Newman, by contrast, held that teaching and research stand in inevitable tension with each other, and that research must be intentionally subordinated to teaching. Otherwise, research will eclipse teaching, and the university will drift from its defining telos as an *educational* institution.

However, as we have seen repeatedly in this chapter, Newman loved dynamic tensions. Newman contended that higher education at its (Oxonian) best holds together two distinct works in creative tension, the intellectual work he dubbed 'the University principle' and the personally formative work he dubbed 'the College principle' (*RPU*, Ch.XIX).

> A University embodies the principal of progress, and a College that of stability; the one is the sail, and the other the ballast; each is insufficient in itself for the pursuit, extension, and inculcation of knowledge; each is useful to the other. A University is the scene of enthusiasm, of pleasurable exertion, of brilliant display, of winning influence, of diffusive and potent sympathy; and a College is the scene of order, of obedience, of modest and persevering diligence, of conscientious fulfilment of duty, of mutual private services, and deep and lasting attachments. The University is for the world, and the College is for the nation. The University is for the Professor, and the College for the Tutor; the University is for the philosophical discourse, the eloquent sermon, or the well contested disputation; and the College for the catechetical lecture. The University is for theology, law, and

> medicine, for natural history, for physical science, and for the sciences generally and their promulgation; the College is for the formation of character, intellectual and moral, for the cultivation of the mind, for the improvement of the individual, for the study of literature, for the classics, and those rudimental sciences which strengthen and sharpen the intellect. The University being the element of advance, will fail in making good its ground as it goes; the College, from its Conservative tendencies, will be sure to go back, because it does not go forward. (ibid., pp.228-29)

Evincing some Oxbridge pique, Newman concluded that 'a University seated and living in Colleges, would be a perfect institution, as possessing excellences of opposite kinds' (ibid.). Newman thought 'naked Colleges' divorced from the intellectual rigors of 'the University principle' to be an 'evil' (*RPU*, p.229), tending to devolve into intellectually indolent country clubs, just as 'naked Universities' tend to become morally deformative hothouses of academic careerism.

Colin Barr (2018, p.64) observes that 'those who read only the *Idea* while ignoring Newman's other Dublin writings' regularly mistake him to be denying any place for research within the university.[102] But Newman did no such thing. Barr writes (ibid.):

> In fact, he intended the Catholic University of Ireland to be what would now be called a research university: he hired prominent, research-active faculty, and excused several from all but the lightest teaching obligations; he founded a journal, *The Atlantis*, as an outlet for his faculty's research, especially in the sciences; he prioritized the purchase of experimental equipment, hoped to build a hospital, and began to create a museum; he dreamed of research centres and a university press; he supported efforts to research and preserve Irish historical manuscripts. Newman saw no incompatibility between undergraduate teaching and academic research.

So, tension, yes, but not incompatibility. As Tillman observes (*RPU*, lxxi), 'In his Introduction to the first number of the *Atlantis*, Newman states unequivocally that it is a *duty* of professors to

[102] E.g., David Kelsey (1993) parrots this common misconception, writing: 'Nothing could be more contrary to the nineteenth-century research university model of excellent schooling than Newman's exclusion of research and professional schools from a university.'

publish.' Moreover, Tillman notes (ibid., lxxii): 'In order to attract distinguished professors to the Catholic University and to provide for their particular needs as professors, Newman established what he called "institutions", which, he said, "have their value intrinsically, whether students are present or not"' (cf., Davies, 2012, pp.13-15; Higton, 2012, p.92).

Thus, Newman believed that the university should support the conduct of research but that such research was secondary and ancillary to the university's central work of teaching. The research conducted within the Catholic University served to attract top minds to the professoriate, to enhance and enliven the intellectual discourse of the school, to elevate the academic prestige of both the institution and the Church that it serves, and, of course, to advance knowledge. But the work of research ought not distract from the university's defining educational purpose.

5.1.3. 'Philosophical Knowledge' as Its Own End

The university's 'main purpose,' argued Newman (*IU*, I.v.1, p.77), is to inculcate in students a 'philosophical habit' of mind; a mind that 'apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little'. Such a 'philosophical habit' inevitably involves the communication of the particular arts and sciences to be related, grounded, expanded, weighed, as well as an appreciation of such

knowledge as being 'capable of being its own end' and, so, as 'worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does' (*IU*, I.v.2, p.78; I.v.7, p.85).[103] Newman argued:

> Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it is true also of that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values. (*IU*, I.v.2, p.78)

Against the modern, industrial, technocratic tendency to instrumentalize everything, Newman urged that 'Knowledge…is, not merely a means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of certain arts into which it naturally resolves, but an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake' (ibid.). 'Liberal' or 'Philosophical' knowledge is capable of simply being *enjoyed* and contributes to human flourishing.

It can, however, also be *used*. Newman argued that autotelic goods can also bring instrumental benefits. 'I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number' (ibid., p.119). While Newman insisted upon the autotelic value of liberal learning, he did not believe this to preclude there being a role for professional education within the university. 'In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine,' wrote

[103] Newman had earlier argued that what differentiated mere 'knowledge' from 'wisdom', 'philosophy', or 'enlargement of mind' was precisely the ability to form a 'connected view' of the whole. Mere knowledge, he wrote,

> though a condition of the mind's enlargement…is not that very thing which enlarges it.… This enlargement consists in the comparison of the subjects of knowledge one with another.… It is not the mere addition…but the change of place, the movement onwards, of that moral centre…to which…our knowledge…gravitates.… A philosophical cast of thought… implies a connected view of the old with the new; an insight into the bearing… of each part upon every other.… It is the knowledge… of their mutual relations. It is organized, and therefore living knowledge. (*US*, XIV, p.287)

Newman (*IU*, I.vii.6, p.118). Indeed, he defends the place of professional education within the university on precisely the same grounds that he defended the teaching of theology: The university 'teaches *all* knowledge by teaching all *branches* of knowledge, and in no other way' (ibid.). Newman by no means opposed the teaching of specialized or professional subjects, only the sort of specialization that would teach those subjects in isolation, artificially abstracted from the wider complex of knowledge of which they are parts. He wrote:

> I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education. (ibid.)

Newman's notion that the University Professor 'will just know where he and his science stand' mirrors Schleiermacher's ideal of the 'scientific spirit' which seeks to comprehend each science's place within the whole (cf., **Ch.I.5.1.1.**). Both Newman and Schleiermacher held that the university should teach specialized professional disciplines, but must do so in a way that fosters a keen awareness in the specialist of her discipline's philosophical assumptions (and the objections and alternatives to them), its theoretical and practical limitations (relative to other disciplines), and its contingent historical formation. If Plato longed for philosopher-*kings*, both Schleiermacher and Newman thought the university should cultivate philosopher-*professionals* in every field. Thus, Newman envisioned the Catholic university as beginning 'with two years of liberal education from 16 to 18, aimed at the human being and the citizen, which can then be

followed by two years of professional training from 18 to 20' (Higton, 2012, p.98), all within the intellectual community of the College and under the watchful guidance of one's tutors.

Newman rejected the sort of Utilitarian*ism* that then governed University College London and Ireland's 'Godless' colleges without scorning utility altogether. Mike Higton (2012, p.93) rightly argues, Newman articulates a vision of higher education that 'holds together' both intrinsic and instrumental values, both autotelic and practical goods, 'not in tension or in contradiction…but in a strict hierarchy'. Higton summarizes:

> Newman first insists that intellectual formation is an end in itself, regardless of its utility. He second describes the natural diffusiveness of that good—not introducing some end other than intellectual formation, but giving that end a social aspect. He third discusses the higher utility that flows from this good: its tendency to aid in the formation of stable social and individual life. (ibid., p.96)

Newman held that liberal intellectual formation 'will teach students to 'fill any post with credit' (p. 154 [p. 178]), 'to fill their respective posts in life better' (p. 7 [p. xii]) and provide them with 'a faculty of … taking up with aptitude any science or profession' (p. 11 [p. xviii]). Thus, Newman argued that liberal learning is both good in itself and also good for society generally, individual sociality, and even professional success. But, crucially, first things (intellectual formation) *must* be put first and, in this case, be valued for their own sake, if these subordinate educational goods are to follow consistently. Indeed, Newman contended that it is both philosophically incoherent and academically self-sabotaging to prioritize the subordinate, societal and utilitarian goods of liberal learning over the primary good of intellectual formation itself.

5.1.4. The Collegial Formation of 'Gentlemen'

Famously, Newman's term for a person possessed of this 'Philosophical habit of mind' is 'gentleman'. Newman argued that liberal education is not the preserve of armchair theoreticians but 'the sort of education which is necessary for the man of the world, the statesman, the landholder, or the opulent gentleman…' (*IU*, p.7). For most people, Newman argued, liberal education 'makes itself felt in the good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candor, self-command, and steadiness of view, which characterize it' (*IU*, p.8). A 'gentlemanly,' 'philosophical habit of mind' itself tends to stabilize, balance, and fortify the mind and the character of the one who possesses it, argued Newman (*US*, XIV, p.292). Thus, a philosophically oriented liberal education is not merely intellectually informative, but personally formative, shaping one's *character* by developing one's *mind*. The university, in short, is to help students grow up intellectually and morally.

As we have seen (**Ch.II.5.3.2.**), in Newman's schema such characterological formation is centrally the 'Collegiate' dimension of the university's work. It is nurtured by the 'personal influence' of one's tutors[104] as well as one's regular and rigorous intellectual intercourse with one's peers in the context of a common life. Newman honed his understanding of the purpose of college life and of the work of tutors during his days as a fellow at Oriel when he recast the tutor's role as pastoral as well as pedagogical. 'For Newman, university was a place of transition from boyhood to adulthood and therefore entailed responsibilities for the maturing individual, as well as greater freedom,' Shrimpton explains (2014, p.27). 'While providing an emancipatory experience, college life brought with it the baggage of rituals, disciplinary restrictions, spatial constraints, domestic requirements, academic duties, a daily timetable, and shared living, all of

[104] On the importance of 'personal influences', see *US*, V.

which served a formative purpose'. Newman never wavered in his commitment to this vision of collegiate formation and subsequently sought to implement it at the Catholic University of Dublin.

Schleiermacher's goal of instilling a 'scientific' or 'philosophical spirit' is not so very different from Newman's conception of liberal education as cultivating a 'philosophical habit of mind'. However, his policy of *Lernfreiheit* amounted, in Newman's view, to a fundamental rejection of the 'Collegiate principle' and, therefore, to a dereliction of the university's morally formative role. Newman thought the German model of 'naked Universities' was an educational 'evil', (*RPU*, pp.228-29) and was deeply troubled by Germany's growing influence over higher education both abroad and in England.[105] He worried that such an education which gave free reign to both scholars' and students' professional ambitions, undisciplined by a commitment to teach a rigorous, well-rounded curriculum in the context of collegial intellectual exchange, was liable to deform the scientific enterprise, students' characters, and the culture writ large.

Newman spoke of the end of liberal education as being the 'enlargement' of students' minds, a quality which goes beyond mere information. Such 'enlargement' is sapiential. Mere knowledge, however vast, is not tantamount to Wisdom (*US*, XIV, p.288). For Newman, 'Philosophy' is 'Reason exercised upon Knowledge,' involving 'some analytical process, some sort

[105] The attraction and influence of Germany's new *wissenschaftlich* educational ideal was felt across the Northern hemisphere almost from the University of Berlin's very founding. As William Axtell writes, 'Beginning slowly in the 1810s and accelerating throughout the century, ambitious American academics and would-be scholars regarded Germany as mecca where they found the best tonic for America's weakness in higher education' (Axtell, 2016, p.225). Berlin's allure was likewise felt in Britain. As L.W.B. Brockliss (2016, p.329) observes: 'A number of Oxford dons from the mid-1820s had found their way to Germany to look at the Humboldtian university, and had returned thinking that Oxford was as antediluvian as one of Buckland's fossils.' From that time and throughout the 1830s, Whigs in parliament and Liberal dons in the University began agitating for reforms aimed at bringing Oxford into the modern (i.e., the *Humboldtian*) era.

of systematizing, some insight into the mutual relations of things' (*US*, XIV, p.290). A head full of disordered 'knowledge' does not qualify as an education in Newman's book.

Importantly, just as Newman held teaching to be compatible with research and liberal learning with professional education, Newman also held that such gentlemanly knowledge, while defined by its breadth, is compatible with specialization (cf., *GA*, IV.i.2, p.62). Indeed, to be *both* a gentleman *and* a specialist, to possess *both* liberal *and* useful knowledge, would seem to be not only possible in Newman's schema but preferable.[106]

5.1.5. Intellectual Freedom: 'Elbow-room'

Despite his objections to the German policies of *Lern- und Lehrfreiheit* and to Liberalism's rationalizing, overreaching, 'false liberty of thought', Newman nevertheless held that 'Liberty of thought is in itself a good' and is essential to the idea of a university (*APVS*, p.254).[107] 'Great minds need elbow-room, not indeed in the domain of faith, but of thought,' Newman insisted (*IU*, II.iv.7., p.231), 'And so indeed do lesser minds, and all minds'. Intellectual freedom, according to Newman, is integral to the university's educational purpose.

---

[106] Possessing such gentlemanly breadth has the advantage of helping to prevent the specialist from confusing her mastery of one subject with omnicompetence. Newman comments upon such confusions here:

> It is almost proverbial that a hard-headed mathematician may have no head at all for what is called historical evidence. Successful experimentalists need not have talent for legal research or pleading. A shrewd man of business may be a bad arguer in philosophical questions. Able statesmen and politicians have been before now eccentric or superstitious in their religious views. It is notorious how ridiculous a clever man may make himself, who ventures to argue with professed theologians, critics, or geologists, though without positive defects in knowledge of his subject. (*GA*, VIII, §3, p.267)

[107] Note that Newman's proposed remedy for Liberalism's bad arguments was never censorship but, rather, good *counterarguments*. While rejecting Liberalism, Newman never fell into *il*liberalism.

For Newman, liberal education must be *liberal* both in that it seeks wisdom as an autotelic, not merely an instrumental, good but also in that the wisdom it seeks cannot be found when reason, imagination, and inquiry are cramped. 'Unless [the scholar] is at liberty to investigate on the basis, and according to the particularities, of his science, he cannot investigate at all' (*IU*, II.iv.7., p.230). Scientific investigation requires the freedom to ask questions, venture hypotheses, pursue lines of reasoning and evidence, chase down rabbit trails; to try, fail, try again, fail better. 'No one can go straight up a mountain,' wrote Newman, 'no sailing vessel makes for its port without tacking' (ibid.).

Making the Catholic University intellectually roomy enough to foster a 'brotherhood of the mind' capable of forming boys into gentlemen required, Newman believed, maintaining an overarching air of liberality (*RPU*, p.43). Disciplinary heavy-handedness and dogmatic illiberalism might keep students behaviourally and theologically in line for a time, but it would, in the long run, stifle the sort of mature intellectual life that a university must cultivate to be worthy of the name.

5.2. Nature and Grace

As we have seen, Newman's theology turns on his understanding of the subtle interplay between nature and grace, and this point holds true of his thinking about higher education as well. Higton summarizes:

> The relationship between nature and grace is twofold, for Newman. On the one hand, grace supports nature: it steadies and secures the achievement of natural ends. On the other, grace goes beyond nature: it takes one further than one's

> natural capacity could, however completely it fulfilled its innate potential. (2012, pp.98-99)

Newman contends that *essentially* the university is a natural institution aimed at natural ends, but that the university depends upon grace, as imparted by God through the Church, for its *integrity*. Thus, secular or pagan institutions can qualify and function as universities, but they cannot achieve the utmost ideal of the university apart from the ministrations of grace through the Church. Newman identifies several channels of grace whereby the Church steadies, stabilizes, and strengthens the life of the university. Chief among these channels is the provision of revealed doctrine that is otherwise inaccessible to the natural intellect but is, nevertheless, vital to understanding the world and the various arts and sciences aright. 'If the Catholic Faith is true, a University cannot teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach Catholic theology' (*IU*, I.ix.1, p.149).

Newman believed that the 'cultivation of mind' that comes with liberal education was a natural, autotelic good, but he did not believe it to be a panacea for our fallen human condition. Only God's grace can save us from ourselves. Newman contended that 'science, knowledge, and whatever other fine names we use, never healed a wounded heart, nor changed a sinful one…'; that it 'leaves man where it found him—man, and not an Angel—a sinner, not a Saint' (*D&A*, pp.170, 171). Hence, Newman regularly insisted that the university as such should not aim or pretend to do that which it cannot do in any case lest it perpetrate a fraud.

Nevertheless, Newman clearly preferred the natural gentility of liberal learning over untutored barbarism: Better cultivated natural morality than feral, fallen human nature. Thus, liberal education is an intrinsic (but limited) good, whether it leads the learned to salvation or not. As Newman emphasized in the *Idea* (I.v.9., p.89):

> Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another. Good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility…. Liberal education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind…these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge: they are the object of a University.

For all Newman's cautions about the moral impotence of Knowledge, and his insistences that, properly speaking, the university's 'object is…intellectual, not moral' (*IU*, p.3), the gentlemanly ideal that Newman sets forth in the *Idea* as the end of liberal learning is no mere intelligence quotient but is manifestly a moral ideal, albeit a sub-Christian one. Newman does not commend liberal education for promoting sheer braininess as such, but rather a sort of intelligence that is magnanimous, generous, patient, and just. Despite his earlier formulation which sharply distinguished knowledge from virtue, Newman's descriptions of the gentleman clearly sketch a portrait of moral and intellectual virtue. However, Newman sees these virtues as the fruit of natural morality, not the fruit of the Spirit (cf., Higton, 2012, p.103).

As Mary Katherine Tillman (2015, pp.238ff) points out, Newman's most-quoted description of the 'gentleman' summarized not his own vision of 'gentlemanliness', but rather Lord Shaftesbury's (*IU*, I.viii.10, pp.145ff). Newman articulated his own vision of Christian gentlemanliness in his Oratory papers which differed markedly from the sort of secular gentility that mere liberal education tends to effect. Whereas the Shaftesburian, secular gentlemen 'never inflicts pain', makes 'every one at their ease', and so on,

> a Christian gentleman may well be required to cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast, to take the initiative in action, to be angry rather than tranquil in the face of wrong-doing,…and so forth. And certainly the Christian gentleman knows both the range and the limits of reason more accurately than does Shaftesbury's gentleman philosopher. The intellectual habit of faith always trumps the solely philosophical habit of an educated mind. (Tillman, 2015, pp.244-45)

The merely '*philosophical* habit of an educated mind' is but a shadow of the Christian wisdom in its fulness, which Newman had described in 1841:

> Wisdom is the clear, calm, accurate vision, and comprehension of the whole course, the whole work of God; and though there is none who has it in its fulness but He who "searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of" the Creator, yet "by that Spirit" they are, in a measure, "revealed unto us." And thus, according to that measure, is the text fulfilled, that "he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged by no man." Others understand him not, master not his ideas, fail to combine, harmonize, or make consistent, those distinct views and principles which come to him from the Infinite Light, and are inspirations of the breath of God. He, on the contrary, compasses others, and locates them, and anticipates their acts, and fathoms their thoughts, for, in the Apostle's language, he "hath the mind of Christ," and all things are his, "whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world or life, or death, or things present, or things to come." Such is the marvellousness of the Pentecostal gift, whereby we "have an unction from the Holy One, and know all things." (*US*, XIV, p.293)

Newman believed this sort of wise Christian gentlemanliness—a sort of sanctified sophistication—to be central to the calling of an Oratorian priest. In his Dublin discourses, Newman refrained from setting forth this positive Christian ideal of gentlemanliness as the aim of Catholic liberal education, most likely because he wanted to avoid overpromising to the bishops and his Catholic audience. The cultivation of *Christian* gentlemanliness is beyond any university's competence, Catholic or not. It is the result of God's prerogative of grace, not nature. It cannot be generated by any earthly curriculum.

Conclusion

It has been argued that John Henry Newman was a TOFoundationalist standing in the British Naturalist tradition, and that he opposed Schleiermacher, Locke, Hume, and many other modern thinkers on the grounds that they evinced an 'unreal', 'anti-dogmatic', EEFoundationalist

approach to thinking about God, humanity, and the world. Newman, instead, held that Christians' religious 'apprehensions' of God—their 'impressions of dogma'—constitute a genuine, properly basic kind of knowledge. For Newman, theology is the principled reflection upon that basic knowledge and is, properly speaking, a 'science' on an epistemic par with physical and social sciences. As a coequal science, Newman saw 'theology' and 'other knowledge' as 'bearing' on each other in a variety of ways. Most importantly, theology, because it deals with ultimate reality, 'bears' on other knowledge in an ontologically structural way, shaping the way we understand the relationships between all the other arts and sciences. Given this understanding of theology, Newman, held theology to be integral to the sort of 'liberal education' the university is supposed to inculcate, the end of which is instillment of 'a philosophical habit of mind' which is both capable and desirous of forming 'a connected view' of things.

III. Abraham Kuyper
The Reformed Idea of a Free University

'Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over *all*, does not cry: "Mine!"' ('Sphere Sovereignty', *AK:CR*, p.488).[108] This oft-quoted line marked the climax of Abraham Kuyper's address inaugurating the *Vrije Universiteit* Amsterdam on 20th October 1880. Kuyper's wide-ranging career—as Reformed pastor, theologian, political organizer, journalist, Prime Minister, and university founder—was driven by the conviction that Christ's Lordship should shape every area of life and thought. He expressed this comprehensive Christian vision from the earliest days of his career:

> If christianity [sic] is to be a leaven in our national life, then the judge too, the physician too, the statesman too, the person of letters too, the philosopher too, must let the light of Christ shine on the substance and tenor of his science. (quoted in van Deursen, 2008, p.5)

To advance this comprehensive Christian vision, Kuyper and his allies founded a full university—with faculties of arts and sciences, law, medicine, and theology[109]—tasked with teaching and research shaped by distinctively 'Reformed principles', aiming to influence culture from a consistently Calvinist perspective.

This chapter unpacks the inner logic of Kuyper's holistic Calvinist worldview and approach to higher education. He strongly opposed the marginalization of Christian theology in modern

[108] **Ch.III.1-3.** builds upon material I first developed as part of my MPhil thesis (see Williams, 2020b).
[109] Fully realizing this vision took time, as the Free University initially struggled to find suitable candidates to fill out the faculties. Nevertheless, this was the original intention (van Deursen, 2008, p.5).

academic and cultural life, which he traced to modern redefinitions of theology that, in his view, contributed to the decline of traditional Reformed Christianity in Dutch society. Since Schleiermacher had deeply influenced Kuyper's main ecclesiastical rivals—the Ethical and later Modernist schools popular among the elite—Kuyper closely and critically engaged Schleiermacher's redefinitions of theology and faith.[110] His defense of confessionally Reformed theology and its scientific (*wetenschappelijk*) character directly opposed the ascendant Modernist *Wissenschaftsideologie* driving Schleiermacher's revisionist project. In contrast to Schleiermacher, Kuyper confronted the Modern concept of science head-on, championing the integrity and relevance of traditionally Reformed Christianity.

1. Kuyper's Two Conversions

Like Schleiermacher, Abraham Kuyper was a pastor's son following in his father's footsteps professionally while cutting his own path theologically and spiritually. Kuyper's father was an undogmatic moderate in the national Church vexed by his son's eventual rejection of both Modernism and moderation first to embrace staunch Calvinism and then to lead a secession movement (Bratt, 2013, p.17ff).

The younger Kuyper studied divinity under the influential systematician Joannes Henricus Scholten (1811-85) at the University of Leiden in the theological landscape which Schleiermacher dramatically altered a generation earlier. Scholten pioneered Modernist theology in the

[110] Despite his criticisms, Kuyper's ecclesiology was deeply influenced by his reading of Schleiermacher (cf., *AK:MCCD*, p.174). At least thus far, Kuyper meets Barth's (2001, p.413) demand for the would-be critic of Schleiermacher: 'Anyone who has never loved here,…may not hate here either'.

Netherlands (*AK:MCCD*, p.28), fostering at Leiden a 'spirit of absolute antisupernaturalism of the German idealistic kind' (TenZythoff, 1987, p.102). The young Kuyper adored Scholten and thrilled at Scholten's openly denying Jesus's bodily resurrection (*AK:CR*, p.6). Kuyper later described his Leiden years thus:

> [Upon] entering the academic world, I stood without defense or weapon against the powers of negation, which robbed me of my inherited faith before I knew what was happening. My faith was not deeply rooted in my unconverted, self-centered soul and was due to wither once exposed to the scorching heat of the spirit of doubt. Not that I ever completely fell for positivism or atheism, but of the old treasure I retained nothing! (*AK:CR*, p.47)

Dissatisfied with the aridity of modern scepticism, Kuyper turned to 'the emerging ethical school in Dutch theology, which sought to find a via media between Scholten's modernism and the strict confessionalism of those who had seceded [from the *Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk*]' (Bartholomew, 2017, p.19). Kuyper traces the 'ethical' school's lineage to Schleiermacher too. 'Kuyper's theology during his doctoral studies can best be described as Unitarian with pronounced Calvinist and moralist accents' (Bratt, 2013, p.26). The young Kuyper denied Christ's deity and the doctrine of the atonement outright, and doubted the soul's immortality and the Gospels' historicity (ibid.). During this period, despite aspiring to be a pastor and theologian, Kuyper rarely attended church. He disdained the rituality of ecclesial life, which he associated with unthinking superstition.

In his twenties, Kuyper underwent two 'conversions' that redirected him from Modernism toward orthodox Calvinism. The first was sparked when Kuyper's fiancée, Johanna, gave him Charlotte Yonge's 1853 *The Heir of Redclyffe,* a novel of the Oxford Movement, which John Henry Newman had helped lead (Bratt, 2013, p.38). The novel's protagonist, Philip—a cocky academic prodigy, much like Kuyper at the time—converts to Anglo-Catholicism when his pious cousin,

Guy, dies after nursing Philip through illness. Philip's repentance and conversion, and Yonge's depiction of the Anglican burial liturgy moved Kuyper deeply. Bratt writes:

> Put simply, Kuyper had experienced a religious conversion. He was not yet a Calvinist, nor for the moment a theologian; it was enough to be a Christian with an engaged heart. He started going to church again and looked forward to taking the Lord's Supper. Small wonder that he came to rank *Redclyffe* 'next to the Bible in its meaning for my life'. (2013, p.39)

Though Kuyper later criticized 'Puseyism and Ritualism' in the Church of England (*LoC*, p.16), he acknowledged the Oxford Movement's role in renewing his appreciation of the Church—not as a voluntary association (*à la* Schleiermacher), but as the divinely appointed *Mother* of believers (*à la* Calvin) (Bratt, 2013, pp.52ff).[111]

Kuyper's second 'conversion' occurred during his first pastorate in rural Beesd. Like Schleiermacher among the Moravians of Gnadenfrei, the young Reverend Kuyper underwent a spiritual transformation through his engagement with his staunchly Calvinist parishioners. Unlike Schleiermacher, however, Kuyper's experience did more than buoy him through 'the storms of skepticism'—it led him to doubt his Modernist doubts and ultimately reclaim the historic, confessionally Reformed faith for the modern world.

As Kuyper tells it, he encountered several 'malcontents' in Beesd who doubted his orthodoxy and dismissed his academic pedigree. Initially, he dismissed them as 'cantankerous, proud eccentrics who "make life miserable for every minister"' (*AK:CR*, p.55). But he could not ignore them. 'Thus, with a trembling heart that befits a young minister who has to face such fires, I knocked in the course of my visitations on the doors of these "fanatics" too' (ibid.). Though not

[111] Cf., Kuyper (2013); Bratt (2013, Ch. 9); Bartholomew (2017, Ch.6). Kuyper knew of the Oxford Movement and Pusey, but never mentions Newman.

warmly received, he wrote, 'these simple, if somewhat irritated, souls did not repel me.' He was soon drawn in:

> For here, I realized, was more than mere routine. Here was conviction. Here the topics of conversation went beyond the nice weather…. Here was interest in spiritual matters. Moreover, here was knowledge. With the meager Bible knowledge I had picked up at the university I could not measure up to these simple folk. And not just knowledge of the Bible but also of a well-ordered worldview, be it of the old Reformed type. At times it seemed as if I were back in the classroom hearing my talented professor Scholten lecture about the 'doctrine of the Reformed Church', though with reversed sympathies. (ibid.)

He found their heartfelt, down-to-earth faith magnetic. To their surprise—and his—he kept returning. They began praying 'for his entire conversion to Christ' (de Vries, *LoC*, vi). Their prayers were effective:

> [T]heir faithful loyalty became…the rise of the morning star of my life. I had been apprehended…. In their simple language they brought me [the Word of reconciliation] in the absolute form in which alone my soul can rest. I discovered that the holy Scripture does not only cause us to find justification by faith, but also discloses the foundation of all human life, the holy ordinances which must govern all human existence in Society and State. (Kuyper, as quoted in de Vries, *LoC*, vi)

Unlike Schleiermacher, who reinterpreted his Moravian roots through Enlightenment rationalism, Kuyper reinterpreted Modernity itself through the lens of this simple faith.[112] Schleiermacher became a Moravian of 'a higher order'; Kuyper became the vanguard of Neo-Calvinism.

[112] Indeed, Kuyper's Calvinism may have given him the necessary critical distance from his own modernist milieu to be the first to identify it as such. As Bartholomew (2017, p.22). observes: 'Kuyper was perhaps the first to use *modernism* in its implied sense of modernity.' He cites Malcolm Bull (1992, pp.22-23), who writes, 'If, for the sake of clarity, we take the modern era to include at least the period from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, we can define modernity in terms of the social conditions of life in the West during that period, and modernism as the positive cultural response to the experience of modernity. It is perhaps easiest to start with modernism, which must, of necessity, already contain an implicit definition of modernity.' Bull argues that the first usage of *modernism* in this sense is to be found in the field of theology, citing Kuyper's 1871 address, 'Modernism: A Fata Morgana in the Christian Domain' (see *AK:CR*, pp.87ff) as potentially the first instance.

1.1. Parting Ways

For Schleiermacher, what the Christian experiences *as* redemption in Jesus Christ is ultimately a conceptually pliable, indefinite experience of the same 'Whence' of our being which a Buddhist, Hindu, or atheist experiences as nirvana, Moksha, or 'wonder'. Ordinary people's experiences of transcendence conform to whatever socially constructed objects their religious traditions *lead* them to anticipate. While the interpretation of such experiences differs depending on the religious tradition into which their recipient has been socialized, these transcendent experiences are, *de facto*, *of* the same thing whether they recognize it or not. For Schleiermacher, laypeople who cling to narrowly literalistic understandings of their religious experiences do not really know what they are saying.

Kuyper, by contrast, takes the Christian's experience of what he calls *palingenesis* (literally 'genesis again') to be an actual experience of regeneration. Kuyper 'deliberately' chose 'the Greek word [*palingenesis*] because in Scripture it covers both personal rebirth (Tit. 3:5) and the re-creation of heaven and earth (Matt. 19:28)' (*AK:CR*, p.398). Unlike Schleiermacher's constructivist conception of religious language and experience, Kuyper's biographer James Bratt describes Kuyper's faith as a 'subjective Realism' because what the Christian experiences as *palingenesis* really is a proleptic manifestation of the new creation (*AK:CR*, p.441; cf. 2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15). Kuyper's subjective Realist starting point—interpreting his and his coreligionists' personal experiences of *palingenesis* as definite proleptic instances of real, cosmic *palingenesis*—yields far-reaching metaphysical and epistemological implications. Here Kuyper parts ways with Schleiermacher.

Kuyper's concept of *palingenesis* rejects ontological naturalism outright, and radically breaks with the antisupernaturalist spirit of his age. It holds that the world, as the contingent creation of an almighty Creator, is open to divine direction (and miraculous redirection) and awaits full eschatological renewal. Thus, Kuyper opposed the metaphysical assumptions behind 19th-century materialist reductionism, methodological naturalism, and historical criticism.[113] However, the epistemological implications of his starting point extend well beyond a mere openness to supernatural explanations. These require fuller exposition before exploring our central questions about theology and higher education.

1.2. Palingenesis

Kuyper's concept of *palingenesis* entails what he calls 'the antithesis' between Christian and non-Christian thought. Human *palingenesis* is fundamentally reparative, implying that apart from it, humans exist in a state of disrepair (*EST,* §55, p.155). Following Calvin, Kuyper held that the Fall affected not only morality but also cognition—what the Reformed tradition calls the *noetic effects of sin*.[114] Calvin (*Institutes*, II.2.12, p.270) affirmed that post-Fall, 'enough of reason remains to distinguish man from brute beasts,' yet reason is 'choked with dense ignorance' and cannot function effectively. Sin impairs our thinking—distracting, distorting, and biasing us—while also diminishing our awareness of our intellectual limits. Though God implants in us an

[113] Kuyper fundamentally rejected historical-critical scholarship, alleging that 'the biblical criticism of the present day deprives the church of her *theology*…robs her of her *Bible*' and 'consigns her to the embraces of the worst, because intellectual, kind of clericalism' (Kuyper, 1904, pp. 410-42, 666-88). Cf., Bartholomew (2017, pp.77-89).
[114] On this doctrine, cf. Moroney (2000 and 1995).

innate 'awareness of divinity' (*divinitatis sensum*), fallen humanity 'smothers or corrupts' this knowledge 'partly by ignorance, partly by malice' (*Institutes*, I.1.3–4, pp.43–51). This corrupted knowledge of the Creator, in turn, distorts our grasp of creation, at least generally if not in every detail.

As a Calvinist, Kuyper believed the Fall caused humanity to lose an innate insight into the natural world. 'In our present state,' he wrote, 'we can find out about things only by observation and analysis, but in paradise it was not so.… God brought the animals to Adam and… Adam perceived their nature… [and] gave them names at first sight' (*AK:CR*, p.450). Kuyper saw this naming as more than arbitrary labeling: '[The] passage makes sense only if… Adam, directly penetrating to the essence of each animal, expressed his insight in a name that corresponded to that essence' (ibid.). He believed this insight once extended to all of nature but was lost in the Fall.

> Without sin… science would have had a completely different course… built with an immediacy we can scarcely imagine.… To Adam, science was an immediate possession; for us it is bread we can eat only in the sweat of our minds, after hard and strenuous labor. (ibid., p.451)

The epistemic problem of the Fall is not merely the loss of natural insight into things, but, as Kuyper argues, the loss—or suppression—of the big picture that gives coherence to our multiplex experience of the world. 'We see the parts and pieces,' he wrote, 'but no longer have an eye for the style of the temple, no longer can guess at its architect, and so can no longer understand the temple of creation in its unity, origin, and destiny' (ibid., p.450). We may get the details right, but our overall worldview will be wrong. The true effects of the Fall on human cognition are only fully revealed from the vantage point of a mind renewed by *palingenesis*.

1.2.1. Two Kinds of People

Not everyone undergoes this cognitive and spiritual transformation. Kuyper, citing 1 Corinthians 2:11–15, argued that there are two kinds of people—'natural' and 'spiritual'—operating from fundamentally different epistemic perspectives (*AK:CR*, p.459). He described 'the antithesis' between believing and unbelieving thought:

> What the one calls science, Scripture…calls foolishness; conversely, the wisdom of the world laughs at what we call science.… [How] can we hold from a Christian standpoint that our science and that of the world must be one? How can we escape the division of the scientific enterprise into two well-defined groups? And how can we avoid the proposition that the cause lies in the differing condition of the subjects, as one lives from the consciousness of the unregenerate world and the other from the renewing of our spirit which only radical conversion affords? (ibid., p.458)

Kuyper unpacks this theme further in his *Encyclopedia*:

> There are two sorts of people…. The difference between these two groups can briefly be designated by the word *Palingenesis*, in so far as this implies, first the abnormal character of that which has not undergone this palingenesis, and, on the other hand, the gradual growth into normality again of what exhibits itself as fruit of this palingenesis. (*EST*, §55, p.155)[115]

Thus, Kuyper saw two kinds of psychology generating two kinds of science: one shaped by the unredeemed mind's confusion, the other by a renewed mind awakened to divine realities. 'If you agree that the Kingdom of God…rules our entire world-and-life-view,' Kuyper declared, 'then…only those who have received the inner enlightenment of the Holy Spirit are able to get a view of the whole…in harmony with the truth and essence of things' (*AK:CR*, p.458).

[115] Note that Kuyper did not believe the epistemic restoration of *palingenesis* to be a simple *fait accompli* at the moment of one's conversion. Rather, it initiates 'the gradual growth into normality again…'. As Richard Mouw (2011, p.63) observes, 'Kuyper was honest enough about himself to know that the antithesis was still a presence in his own inner being.'

This epistemological division, Kuyper argued, challenges a core Enlightenment assumption: that rationality must be rooted in the universal (*allgemeingültig*) rather than in particular perspectives. This assumption, he claimed, functioned as an article of faith among the Enlighteners—'be it only faith in one axiom' (*AK:CR*, p.457). Consequently, Christian scholars influenced by this view felt pressured to exclude their faith from scientific inquiry or even to abandon it altogether (ibid.). But orthodox Christianity is deeply particularist, grounded in the incarnation of God as the man Jesus, among the particular people of Israel, in a specific time and place—Palestine under Pontius Pilate. Calvinists further hold that this good news reaches individuals only through the Holy Spirit's transformative internal testimony, or *palingenesis*, which Kuyper saw as essential to true understanding.[116]

Thus, Kuyper argued that the Enlightenment's belief in a supposedly universal and neutral rationality is itself an article of faith—no less than belief in the virgin birth. The German Enlightenment's ideal of scientific 'presuppositionlessness' (*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*), especially in historiography and philology, was illusory. Everyone begins from some point of view, relying on assumptions, impressions, and unprovable first principles. Long before Postmodernism, Kuyper recognized that foundationalism—the idea that knowledge must rest squarely on indubitable truths—was untenable. Despite Modernists' pretensions to neutrality and universal rationality, they had not, in fact, escaped the Anselmian pattern of *fides quaerens intellectum.* Far from building their worldview from the self-evident ground up, Kuyper contended, Modernists were devotees of *another* faith seeking a *different* understanding. Modernists proceeded based on unproven and often unprovable first principles held in faith, just like

[116] Cf., Calvin, *Institutes*, I.7; *Confessio Gallicana* 4; *Canons of Dordt*, Articles 5-7.

everyone else. Christians, therefore, need not apologize for beginning scientific inquiry from a biblical perspective. Kuyper writes:

> Scripture knows nothing of *allgemeingültigkeit* [universality], as if truth were only that to which all must agree…. On the contrary, Scripture clearly declares that the wisdom and the knowledge that the world derives from its own principles stand directly *opposed* to true science, and that the difference between the wisdom of the world, which is foolishness to God, and the science that holds true for Him comes from the difference in spirit in the investigating subject. (*AK:CR*, p.457).

Insisting on universal accessibility of reasons is not neutral—it is to take sides in the conflict between two antithetical standpoints.

In summary, for Kuyper, *palingenesis* creates a new epistemic situation for the Christian by revitalizing cognitive faculties damaged by the Fall. It enables believers to know truths otherwise inaccessible to minds untouched by the Spirit's restorative and revelatory grace. Before examining how this Reformed view of special epistemic grace shaped Kuyper's understanding of science and higher education, we must first consider how he saw grace operating more broadly among both Christians and non-Christians.

1.2.2. Common Grace

Kuyper's doctrine of common grace counterbalances his doctrine of antithesis. In the modern world, Kuyper notes, 'we confront a science that has arisen out of the world under the rule of sin and yet may boast of results from which sin's darkening is virtually absent.' Despite sin's distortions, the non-Christian world still discerns and produces genuine insight. 'We can explain this,' Kuyper writes, 'only by saying that, while sin has continued to spread decay, common grace has entered in to bind and temper its operation' (*AK:CR*, p.448).

Despite the Fall's noetic effects, Kuyper argued that God continues to graciously govern the world, bestowing creativity and insight on both the righteous and the wicked, and drawing forth truth, beauty, and goodness from all people. 'If God is sovereign, then his Lordship must remain over all life and cannot be closed up within church walls or Christian circles,' Kuyper wrote in the *Voorwoord* to his three-volume work on the doctrine (*AK:CR*, p.166). 'The extra-Christian world has not been given over to Satan or to fallen humanity or to chance' (ibid.). Through common grace, God preserves and upholds His purposes even in a world marred by sin.

Kuyper affirmed the classical Christian tradition of 'plundering the Egyptians', recognizing all truth, beauty, and goodness as belonging to God and edifying for His people, regardless of who first discovered or expressed it (cf., **Ch.V.1.**). 'The names of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have constantly been honored by Christian thinkers,' he noted. 'And no one can deny that these days a rich science is blooming in the fields of astronomy, botany, zoology, physics, etc.' Kuyper concluded, 'Although conducted almost exclusively by people who are strangers to the fear of the Lord, this science has produced a treasure of knowledge that we as Christians admire and gratefully use' (*AK:CR*, p.448 = *W&W*, pp.52–53).

By affirming common grace, Kuyper and his followers could value the real achievements of non-Christian culture and learning whilst remaining alert to the fundamental antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought. 'Thus,' Kuyper wrote, 'we confront the fact that a science has arisen outside the Christian church which has produced true essential knowledge on the one hand but…a worldview utterly opposed to the truth of God's Word on the other' (*AK:CR,* p.448 = *W&W*, p.53). As Richard Mouw (2011, p.71) noted, by holding the doctrines of antithesis and common grace in creative tension, 'Kuyper integrated the positive and negative aspects of

fallen humanity into a single perspective.' This allowed Kuyper to stake out a principled yet non-parochial Calvinism, intellectually and politically responsive to the challenges of modernity, heeding Paul's exhortation to 'test everything; hold fast what is good' (1 Thess. 5:21).

Palingenesis, antithesis, and common grace shape every aspect of Kuyper's theology, including his approach to higher education.

2. What kind of knowledge is theology?

Kuyper argued that the core problem with Schleiermacher's 'psychologic-empiric' reconceptualization of theology is that it is not truly theological, since 'the certainty that the object of this science remains the same is altogether wanting' (*EST*, §56, p.161). Drawing on both the classical etymology of θεολογία (from Plato, Aristotle, Lucian, and Plutarch) and its historical use by the Church Fathers and Medieval Doctors, Kuyper insisted theology must mean knowledge or discourse about God (ibid., §§56–57, pp.161–70). But Schleiermacher's definition, he contended, shifts theology's subject from God to religious experience and redefines theology as 'an aggregate of disparate sciences,' loosely united by the phenomenon of the Church (ibid., §63, p.220). Such a 'theology', Kuyper maintained, is not about God but rather curating communal religious experiences.

Kuyper, in contrast to Schleiermacher, defined theology not by its ecclesiastical use but by its transcendent Object. He saw theology as intellectually connected to all other sciences because its Object—God as God has revealed Himself—is related to every other object of study as Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer, and Judge. Kuyper defined theology as:

> that science which has the revealed knowledge of God as the object of its investigation, and raises it to 'understanding'. Or… that logical action of the general subject of regenerated humanity by which, in the light of the Holy Spirit, it takes up the revealed knowledge of God into its consciousness and from thence reflects it. (*EST*, §61, p.210)

Thus, theology is regenerated humanity's principled reflection on divine revelation in Christ and Scripture. And because 'every square inch' of creation falls under Christ's Lordship, theology is relevant to every domain of life and learning.

2.1. What makes 'theology' theological?

For Schleiermacher, theology is theological only insofar as it trains future clergy to lead communities united by 'a distinct formation of God-consciousness.' As a positive science, it is subordinate to the 'pure sciences' and limited in scope to the personal and communal piety of the church.

Kuyper argued against Schleiermacher that uncritically borrowing second-hand knowledge from other disciplines to serve ecclesiastical aims does not constitute a coherent science. 'An agglomerate is never organic,' he wrote, 'it is the opposite of organic, and is never made organic by any unity in the purpose of your studies' (*EST*, §94, p.420). Kuyper maintained that such a piecemeal theology lacks principled coherence with the disciplines it relies on. By defining theology as a collection of departments unified only by service to the Church, Schleiermacher 'abrogated theology and her organic existence in the organism of the sciences' (ibid.). This approach rendered theology incapable of critique, reducing it to a passive appendage of the 'pure sciences', irrelevant to the university's broader intellectual project. Kuyper

concluded that Schleiermacher's definition, rather than securing theology's place in the university, ultimately undercut it—leading to theology's marginalization and the diminishing academic role of religious study itself (cf., *EST*, §94, p.420–21).

Kuyper believed Schleiermacher's attempt to preserve theology's *wissenschaftlich* status under the dominant *Wissenschaftsideologie* ultimately failed. Rather than trying to succeed where Schleiermacher had not, Kuyper rejected that ideology altogether, proposing instead a conception of science both more realistic and more amenable to traditional conceptions of theology as a science. To understand why Kuyper saw theology as a full science capable of contributing to human knowledge alongside other disciplines, we must first explore his understanding of what makes *wetenschap* scientific in the first place.

2.2. What makes 'science' scientific?

Kuyper's central aim in his *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology* was to clarify 'the relationship of theology to the University' (*EST*, §96, p.428). More broadly, the goal of encyclopedia, he said, is 'an analysis and synthesis of all sciences together, taken as one organic whole' (§20, p.26). He noted, 'The plan of a Theological Encyclopedia does not admit an exposition of the principles of the "doctrine of science"; but neither will it do to describe the nature of Theology as a science, until the conception of 'science' is determined' (§37, p.42). Kuyper therefore began with the terms, concepts, and interrelations of 'encyclopedia,' 'science,' 'methodology,' and 'knowledge.' These foundational chapters justify theology's status as a pure science and its role among the other sciences. Kuyper defined *wetenschap* as follows:

> [Science] presents itself to us as *a necessary and ever-continued impulse, in the human mind to reflect within itself the cosmos, plastically as to its elements, and to think it through logically as to its relations; always with the understanding that the human mind is capable of this by reason of its organic affinity to its object.* (§39, p.59)

Kuyper thus portrayed *wetenschap* as systematic, 'subjective realist' (per Bratt), methodologically pluralist, externally grounded, and always incomplete.

2.1.1. Systematic (or Encyclopaedic) & Subjectively Realist

Kuyper saw science as arising from the deep human 'need' to bring 'a certain order into the chaos of its knowledge, not arbitrarily, but agreeably to a distinguishing principle that forced itself upon it' (*EST*, §13, p.18). This need awakened the sense that a cosmic order underlies the apparent chaos of our experience (ibid.). Kuyper called the conviction that we can and should discern this order 'the root-idea of Encyclopaedia as such' (§14, p.19). This belief drives us to analyse and synthesise fragments of knowledge into coherent patterns—sciences—with the goal of integrating them into a unified system called encyclopaedia.

According to Kuyper, encyclopaedic analysis and synthesis involves tracing the interrelations among all objects of knowledge and the genuine sciences. These must be presumed organically related as aspects of a coherent reality for science to be meaningful. Kuyper defined general 'knowledge' as unsystematized but warranted true beliefs (§16, pp.20–22; cf., §20, p.26). 'Science is distinguished from general knowledge by the fact that science puts the emphasis upon the order in that knowledge,' he wrote. 'Science is systematic, i.e. it is knowledge orderly arranged' (§16, p.20). Thus:

> Science is not the sum-total of what A knows… or what A, B and C know…. No, science works organically, i.e.,…the thirst for knowledge lies in human nature; that within certain bounds human nature can obtain knowledge; that the impulse to devote oneself to this task, together with the gifts which enable one to work at it, become apparent of themselves; and that in the realm of intellectual pursuits these coryphaei of our race, without perceiving it…go to work according to a plan by which humanity at large advances. (§38, p.45)

This master 'plan' is the mind of God, who comprehends all things and their relations. Our knowledge is the ectype of God's archetype: fallible, partial, and derivative, whereas God's is infallible, complete, and original.[117] Truth is grasped as we think God's thoughts after Him. Kuyper was a realist in believing objective truth can be known, and a subjective realist in holding that finite, fallen humans only know it imperfectly.

2.1.2. Methodologically Pluralist

The scientific task of systematizing knowledge, Kuyper argued, must be carried out 'plastically as to its elements' (*EST*, §39, p.59). That is, scientific methodologies must align with the ontologies of their respective objects. Kuyper rejected any single, procrustean method for all sciences, since each object of study is structured by its own 'plan' of 'elements' and internal logic. Different kinds of objects, he maintained, require methods suited to their unique constitution. One of encyclopaedia's central tasks is to discern how various knowledges are formed and how they interrelate to form coherent sciences. 'Methodology…must specialize itself,' Kuyper wrote, and

[117] Kuyper's relational ontology and theistic-idealist metaphysics underpins his conceptions of encyclopaedia and epistemology in which human science fallibly, partially, cooperatively, and gradually traces out God's own understanding of the objects and relationships which constitute reality. Cf., *EST,* §39, pp.47-59.

since each department's method is governed by its relation to the whole, 'Encyclopaedia takes up into itself this special Methodology' (§19, p.25).

This methodological pluralism rests on Kuyper's commonsense insight that different kinds of objects impress themselves upon subjectivities in ways organically tied to their natures and ours.[118] The human being, Kuyper observed, is a 'microcosm.' 'The human soul stands in organic relation to the human body, and that body stands in every way organically related to the several kingdoms of nature round about us' (§39, p.48). We are animal, vegetable, mineral—sometimes even rational. Thus, we are constituted to receive and understand a broad range of physical, psychical, spiritual, and logical realities. Yet these spheres interact with us and with each other in diverse ways (cf., §39, p.50).

These human 'microcosms' possess an inborn 'affinity' with the pluriform reality outside themselves. This affinity enables them to think and speak more or less truly about that reality—provided they respect its pluriformity in their inquiry. However, this affinity cannot be proven; it must be presupposed. As a result, our science requires external warrant and must always remain incomplete.

2.1.3. Fiduciary & Incomplete

[118] Kuyper devotes *EST,* §42 to the necessary methodological differences between the 'spiritual sciences' (what Anglophones call 'the humanities' and Germans called *Geisteswissenschaften*) and the 'natural sciences' (*Naturwissenschaften*). The former necessarily depend upon the *testimony* of the (personal) objects of their study because we have no other way of accessing the interiority of another's consciousness, whereas the latter depend primarily upon observation and inference.

As chemist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi (1958, 1966) would say, Kuyper embraced a fiduciary view of knowledge over against the dominant *Wissenschaftsideologie* of his time. He recognized that science always operates within a 'framework of commitment' (Polanyi) and rests on fruitful yet ultimately unprovable assumptions held in something like faith. As Kuyper puts it, 'A proof proves only what it proves definitively and conclusively,' while all else is derived 'from elsewhere; and this source of certainty is the very point in question' (*EST*, §46, p.91). Kuyper calls this 'other source' *faith*, arguing that it is 'the only source of certainty, equally for what you prove definitely and conclusively by demonstration' (ibid.). This position laid the foundation for the work of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who, drawing on Kuyper, developed what is now known as 'Reformed Epistemology' in analytic philosophy of religion (**Ch.IV.1.3.**).

Kuyper recognizes that all rational argumentation begins from premises that cannot themselves be derived by rational argument. Yet, accepting such premises on 'faith' is not a *sacrificium intellectus* but the necessary precondition for any reasoning at all. For science to begin, we must trust that logic and mathematics are valid, the future will resemble the past, an external world exists and is knowable, and our faculties are generally reliable.[119] These cannot be proven without circularity. Thus, Kuyper writes:

> There is no objection, therefore, to the use of the term faith for that function of the soul (ψυχή,) by which it obtains certainty directly and immediately, without the aid of discursive demonstration. This places faith over against 'demonstration'; but not of itself over against knowing. This would be so, if our knowledge and its content came to us exclusively by observation and demonstration, but…this is not so. (ibid.)

[119] On the role of such presuppositions in the natural sciences, see Del Ratzsch (2000).

For Kuyper, 'faith' names what we believe immediately and non-discursively—beliefs that are not the conclusions of reasoning but its necessary starting points.

For Kuyper, science is inevitably incomplete in two ways.[120] First, there is always more to learn and integrate into the broader scientific system or *encyclopaedia*—a view he shared with Schleiermacher, Humboldt, Fichte, and other architects of the research university and *Wissenschaftsideologie*. Second, science is incomplete because its foundational premises—the starting points of all reasoning—cannot be proven and must be taken on something like faith. For both atheists and Christians, science is ultimately a matter of *fides quaerens intellectum*—faith seeking understanding. The 'apodictic certainty' Kant demanded of science is a philosophical illusion, as all understanding begins in trust, and trust always entails epistemic risk.

2.2. What makes 'theology' scientific?

Kuyper clearly considers theology a science on epistemic par with other sciences. To see how theology, as Kuyper defines it, meets his own criteria for *wetenschap*, we briefly examine it in light of the five features of science from the previous section.

2.2.1. Incompleteness & Faith

[120] Kuyper does not use this term. I take it from the mathematician Kurt Gödel whose 'incompleteness theorem' demonstrated the impossibility of a complete systematization of logic and mathematics. Gödel showed the impossibility of a mathematical or logical system that is *both* totally coherent *and* has a complete set of axioms. To have a system in which you can develop proofs, you must limit the number of possible axioms which you admit into the system's axiomatic base. But once the limits of the system's axiomatic base are fixed, there will be true propositions which are impossible to prove within the system. See Gödel (1992).

Kuyper argued that any realistic account of science must acknowledge that all worldviews and sciences begin from premises held in faith. This epistemic incompleteness is universal. Therefore, the Christian's belief in and theological reflection upon the 'revealed knowledge of God,' though grounded in unprovable faith-based premises, are not thereby disqualified as knowledge or science.

But neither does that fact automatically qualify them as knowledge or science. So how might Christian belief in foundational revelation be warranted as knowledge and a basis for scientific inquiry? Here Kuyper invokes *palingenesis*. Following standard Calvinist doctrine, he held that human fallenness has noetic as well as moral consequences, obscuring our *sensus divinitatis* and deeper insight. In *palingenesis*, these impaired faculties are partially restored, prompting the recipient to exclaim, 'I was blind, but now I see!'

Non-Christians may reasonably ask for arguments and evidence, but they cannot consistently demand that Christians meet a higher epistemic standard than they apply to their own basic beliefs. If God has indeed revealed Himself, as Christians claim, then Christian theologians and scholars are rational and warranted in beginning from that belief, even without proof.[121] Whether God has so revealed Himself is a legitimate point of debate—but Christians need not prove their faith's truth to be entitled to their viewpoint. If non-Christian scholars aren't required to prove their first principles, why should Christians be?

[121] Regarding the role of arguments for God's existence in theology, Kuyper writes:

> …Theology does not at first demonstrate that there is a God; but it springs out of the overwhelming impression which, as the only absolute existing One, God Himself makes upon the human consciousness, and finds its motive in the admiration which of itself powerfully quickens the thirst to know God. Though Theology may be permitted to seek after proofs for the existence of God, by which it may open the eyes of those half-blind, it cannot itself start out from doubt, nor can it spend itself in the investigation of religious phenomena, or in the speculative development of the idea of the absolute (*EST,* §58, p.171).

2.2.2. Methodology

Kuyper rejects imposing a rigid, uniform methodology across all sciences, insisting instead that each method must suit its object. What, then, of theology? 'If the idea of Theology lies in the knowledge of God,' Kuyper writes, 'an entirely peculiar character flows from this…which distinguishes it from all other knowledge' (*EST*, §59, p.175). When studying sub-human objects like beetles or equations, the investigator 'directs his course' by independent judgment (ibid.). But in theology, which seeks knowledge of 'Him to whom man and all creation owe their origin, existence, and consciousness,' the investigator 'stands…beneath the object,' wholly dependent on what God chooses to reveal of Himself—His purposes, character, and thought (ibid.).

Such epistemic dependence is not completely unique to theology. As Kuyper notes, 'all personal life remains a closed mystery to us as long as he whose life this is does not himself disclose it to us' (ibid.). Much of the humanities, Kuyper argues, similarly rely on the testimony of their subjects and others. For instance, writing a biography depends not on analyzing the subject's bodily remains but on his or her letters, diaries, and the accounts of contemporaries. The extent to which we grasp the subject's mind depends on his/her self-awareness and willingness to reveal him/herself. In this light, Kuyper insists, 'the knowledge of man presents already the entirely sufficient analogy for the knowledge of God.… [You] cannot know him…except he himself disclose the mystery of his inner being' (ibid.). Therefore, if God is personal, theological study must focus on what God reveals of Himself—above all, in Scripture, according to the Reformed tradition.

Kuyper argues that whatever we might infer about others based on analogy with our own experience is impossible with God: 'Standing before God you do not find an analogy in your own being to His Being, because He is God and you are man' (§59, p.176). Any analogical judgment is questionable because God is *sui generis*. 'Let it not be said, that an infinite number of things are manifest and knowable of God, in the works of creation, in history, and in the experiences of our own inner life', says Kuyper, 'for all this leads to a certain knowledge of God, only when God has begun to reveal Himself to me as a God' (§59, p.177). Our theological judgments must be calibrated by special revelation. Thus, Kuyper invokes Calvin's image of Scripture as spectacles through which theologians can see God and God's world rightly (§63, p.217). In our fallen state, natural revelation alone is insufficient without God's clearer special revelation. 'Natural theology', says Kuyper, 'is and always will be the natural pair of legs on which we must walk, while special revelation is the pair of crutches, which render help, as long as the weakened or broken legs refuse us their service' (ibid.).

2.2.3. Subjective Realism & Encyclopaedism

The fallibilism that applies to all knowledge applies to theology as well. While Kuyper affirms the truth of revealed knowledge, the theologian remains fallible in interpreting it. 'For now we see through a glass, darkly,' as Paul says (1 Cor 13:12). Our theological concepts help us know God and our world in relation to Him, but we only 'know in part'. Kuyper, like Paul, looks forward to the End 'when God shall be "all in all,"' special revelation ceases, and the goal of revelation is fulfilled—restoring our Edenic knowledge of God (*EST*, §63, p.217; cf. 1 Cor 15). Until then, we

rely on special revelation, aware of the fragility and limits of our current theological grasp. The theologian must speak truthfully from a standpoint of subjective realism and, consequently, with deep epistemic humility.

Finally, Kuyper saw theology, like all sciences, as an encyclopaedic task: organizing what we know from various sources about various objects into a coherent whole. Like any science, it involves determining how one thing relates to another, assessing the bearing of different kinds of knowledge on each other. In short, to explore Kuyper's view of theological encyclopaedia is to ask how theology fits among the sciences taught and researched at the university.

3. How should theology relate to other knowledges?

While theology, for Kuyper, has implications for every field, it holds no authority to censure or censor scholars in other disciplines. He rejects the medieval idea of theology as queen of the sciences with others as her handmaids (*EST*, §95, p.422). Instead, Kuyper insists that each specialist must respond only to the 'irresistible impulse of his own conviction' (ibid.). He writes:

> So far…as the jurist, the medicus, etc., finds data in revelation which bear not on the way of the knowledge of God, but immediately on his department, he must determine for himself what influence one and another shall exert upon his own investigation. Now we speak of course of the jurist, the philologist, etc., as he should be, i.e., as standing within the pale of palingenesis, and as a Christian bending his knee before the majesty of the Lord and of His Revelation; not being limited by Revelation, but enriched and enlarged by it, seeing what otherwise he would not see, knowing what otherwise would be hidden from him. (ibid.)

Each Christian scholar, deeply grounded in their own field, must reflect critically in light of revelation—separating the wheat of common grace from the chaff of antithesis—speaking to and

hearing from other disciplines. A staunch advocate of intellectual freedom, Kuyper affirms that this task must ultimately be undertaken personally and freely.

Nevertheless, Christian scholarship is inevitably and irreducibly corporate, with each science relying on insights from others.[122] Theology, in this collaborative project, is not queen of the sciences but *primus inter pares*. No discipline serves merely as a trainbearer for another. Each subject, studying its own object by the method suited to it (e.g., deduction for logic, calculation for mathematics), holds a torch for the others, contributing to their mutual illumination—including theology.

While Kuyper believed theology must stay in constant dialogue with other sciences, he also emphasized theology's fundamental *independence* within the 'organism of science.' Thus, Kuyper described theology as 'a science which has a single common object (*objectum univocum*), [which] arises from a single common principle (*principium univocum*), and develops itself after a method of its own' (*EST*, §94, p.421). Against Schleiermacher's account of theology as a subordinate *positive Wissenschaft*, Kuyper insists theology 'cannot be subordinated, either under the natural, juridical, philological, or medical sciences' but must be *coordinated* with them (ibid.). 'Theology is not isolated in the organism of science', Kuyper urges. 'It is united with it in an organic way. Communication, avenues of approach, and points of union extend to all sides' (*EST*, §95, p.421).

[122] Kuyper thought all scholarship is partially shaped by what he called 'the subjective factor'. Every scholar approaches their work from a limited, fallible point of view, needing correction and supplementation from other points of view. 'For this reason', says Kuyper, 'science in its absolute sense is the property of no single individual' (*EST*, §49, p.119).

The work of interdisciplinary communication and coordination between theology and her sister sciences—'theological encyclopaedia'—is ongoing, as all sciences (theology included) develop in divergent, convergent, or parallel ways. Each discipline depends on others for insights beyond its own scope. 'As the theologian applies results furnished by logic, but is thereby no creator of logic himself, so the jurist, philologist, medicus and naturalist must deal with the results of theology without themselves being thereby theologians' (*EST*, §95, p.422). Theology contributes best by preserving its independence and focusing on its distinctive task: methodically expounding 'the revealed ectypal self-knowledge of God' in relation to humankind (§95, p.421). In doing so, theology offers revelation-informed responses to fundamental worldview questions—What is humankind? Is ultimate reality personal? Are values constructed or discovered? Theology makes its vital contribution to human science only by remaining rigorously theological, focused on God's self-revelation as its central object of inquiry, and remaining engaged with the wider world of scholarship.

3.1. Theology as Metaepistemology

But how, specifically, did Kuyper envision this relationship of mutual illumination between theology and the other arts and sciences playing out? Kuyper offered his most detailed account of Reformed theology's relationships to and the bearing of Christian religious commitments upon specific arts and sciences in a series of articles written from 1895 to 1901 in *De Heraut* that were eventually published in 1905 in a short volume entitled *Wisdom & Wonder: Common Grace in Science & Art*.

There Kuyper sets out a Christian metaepistemology—a theological account of science's ontological foundations—emphasizing the metaphysical and redemptive-historical preconditions of human knowledge. Viewed through our vertical relationship with the Creator and our horizontal relations with fellow creatures, Kuyper locates the human pursuit of 'wisdom and wonder' in science and art within a Trinitarian metaphysics and the overarching biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and consummation.

We have already seen how Kuyper saw the vertical and horizontal axes intersect in the individual knower through common grace and palingenesis (see §1.2). In *Wisdom & Wonder* Kuyper focuses more on the vertical axis. Kuyper grounds his metaepistemology in three interconnected truths:

> (1) God's thoughts exist eternally in full clarity;
>
> (2) God embedded those thoughts in creation; and
>
> (3) God created humans in His image with the capacity to grasp, reflect on, and systematize those thoughts (pp.41–42).

These three truths, he argues, form the essential ontological conditions for human knowledge: without this *ordo essendi*, no *ordo cognoscendi* is possible. We now examine each in turn.

3.1.1. The Ontological Primacy of the Divine Logos

Kuyper roots his account of this first truth in Proverbs 8:22–31 and John 1:1–4 (pp. 37–38), noting the canonical connection between them. John, Kuyper suggests, identifies the wisdom of Proverbs with the Logos, through whom all things were made. This *Logos*—God's wisdom—exists

eternally in and as God, not as a created or secondary being. ‘In the Lord our God exists an independent divine thinking, which did not arise within him from out of created things, but preceded the creation of all things.’ The world, then, is not the source of divine thought but its product: ‘He does not think because he created, but he created after having thought’ (p. 36).

Consequently, God's decrees must not be seen as responses to an independently existing nature (ibid.). Rather, the order of creation arises solely from God's own mind. Scripture affirms this by declaring that no one has instructed or counseled Him says Kuyper, citing Romans 11:34, 1 Corinthians 2:16, and Isaiah 40:13 (ibid.). ‘[The] thinking was entirely independent and original in God, from which…proceeded the decree, and from this decree the world proceeded, just as even now all the history of the world likewise proceeds’ (pp. 36–37). Thus, Kuyper maintains, the eternal, generative Word is the ontological ground of all created order and its intelligibility.

3.1.2. General Revelation

From these biblical premises, Kuyper concludes that ‘the divine thinking must be embedded in all created things,’ so that ‘nothing in the universe…fails to express…the thought of God’ (p. 39). The rationality of creation both reflects and depends on the rationality of the Creator; to understand the world is, in part, to understand the mind of God. ‘The whole creation is nothing but the visible curtain behind which radiates the exalted work of this divine thinking,’ Kuyper writes, and ‘all of creation…constitutes one rich, integrated revelation of what God in eternity thought and established in his decree’ (ibid., pp. 39–40).

3.1.3. Science as Created Organism

Kuyper writes, 'Science belongs to the creation' (pp. 34–35); it is *part* of what God originally called 'very good' (Gen 1:31). 'Without sin there would be no state, and…no Christian church, but there would have been science,' he argues. Like marriage and family—also prelapsarian institutions—science would have existed even without the Fall, though it has been profoundly altered by it (pp. 35–36). Thus, science originates in creation itself and holds a God-given calling independent of both state and church. God ordered the relationship between rational human knowers and the intelligible creation so that He might be known, in part, through it.

3.1.4. The Imago Dei *as the Human Ability to Know*

'This independent position of science rests in the creation of humanity according to God's image,' Kuyper argues (p. 36). Once creation is shown to be rationally ordered according to God's thinking, the only question is whether humans are capable of reflecting that thinking. Scripture, Kuyper notes, answers affirmatively: all people are created in God's image (ibid.). Thus, the Reformed tradition confesses that original humanity—by nature, not through superadded grace—was endowed with holiness, righteousness, and *wisdom*.[123] This included the God-given capacity to uncover and grasp the divine thoughts embedded in creation. Kuyper reads the *imago Dei* in strongly intellectualist terms: it is the human capacity to think God's thoughts after Him. 'This capacity...was not added as something extra, but belongs to the foundation of human

[123] Cf., Calvin, *Inst*., I.xv.3-4, pp.186-90.

nature itself,' Kuyper writes. 'The moment human beings employ this capacity for reflecting the thoughts of God from creation, science arises' (p. 41).

From the fact that God created His image 'male and female', Kuyper concluded that the diversity of human aptitude and talent originates in creation and is essential to human nature. No individual, he argued, reflects the image of God in full; rather, only the totality of human talent and genius together can encompass the fulness of God's thought (p.43). Thus, the capacity to think God's thoughts after Him is not borne individually but corporately and knowledge is inherently communal.

Rejecting the image of the lone genius, Kuyper emphasized that science is cumulative and traditional:

> [Science] comes into its own only when we extend it to our entire race down through the ages, and in the combination of the talents bestowed upon all the various persons. It is not so that merely one individual brain, or one individual genius, or one individual talent has been equipped to understand the fullness of the Word in creation, but all of them together have the goal of making this apprehension possible among people. (p.42)

No one sees or knows it all; we rely on the insights of predecessors and peers. Thus, Kuyper writes, '[Science] arises from the fruit of the thinking, imagining, and reflecting of successive generations…and by means of the cooperation of everyone' (p.43).

Kuyper likens science to a temple built without a blueprint or coordinated effort:

> Each one quarries his own little stone… another removes that stone, refashions it… each person constructs science as he thinks right.... Yet through this confusion… a temple emerges, displaying the stability of architecture. (ibid., p.45)

Despite scholars' conflicting methods, interests, and worldviews, consensuses emerge and science progresses. These mysterious scholarly convergences, Kuyper insists, are not accidental but the result of divine providence:

> [This] labor was led and directed unseen by an Architect.... God himself developed his own plan, created the talents, and directed the labor…so that what he wanted [science] would become a reality. (ibid., p.46)

Science, then, is both a human discovery and a divine revelation—a gift of God, unfolding according to his design by common grace.

The ultimate purpose of science, Kuyper insists, is doxological. 'This system of human reflection', he writes, 'is a unique creature of God, with a calling to fulfil a task assigned to it by God himself', namely, 'the magnifying of his holy name' (p.49). In Kuyper's Calvinist view, every creature exists to glorify God, each in its own way—and so too with science. By God's grace, science traces the divine Wisdom manifested in creation, the very 'Wisdom or the Word [who] possessed personal eternal existence in God, and is truly God himself' (p.49).

3.2. The 'Higher Sciences': Theology, Law, and Medicine

Given this metaepistemological framework, Kuyper warns that 'science fails as soon as it attempts to penetrate from the observable to the spiritual background of reality, and from the acquired data proceeds to attempt to build an entire construct' without reference to God (p.91). Science that draws solely on sources available within what Charles Taylor calls 'the immanent frame' will inevitably produce a distorted worldview, mistaking immanently accessible parts for the whole. Kuyper saw this tendency most clearly in modernist intellectuals' drift toward reductive naturalism and scientism.

Thus, for Kuyper, two hallmarks differentiate Christian scholarship from secular scholarship: First, the Christian scholar draws on both special revelation and her field's data to

shape her worldview and conclusions. Second, she resists reductive naturalism and scientism, knowing that reality extends beyond the immanent:

> Everything comes down to ensuring that God's complete independence from the world is confessed, and also ensuring that the independence of spirit from matter is resolutely maintained. To that end, resistance is mounted against the inclination to subject the spiritual sciences (*geestelijke wetenschap*) to the method of the natural sciences. (ibid.)

Thus, a Christian metaepistemology prevents the humanities—'the spiritual sciences'—from being subsumed by the natural sciences and protects the integrity of the university's traditional 'higher sciences'—theology, law, and medicine—against being hollowed out.

Modernist tendencies toward immanentization and scientistic reductionism are especially damaging to theology and must be firmly resisted by the Reformed theologian. Kuyper warns that once theology is severed from the authority of God's Word, it no longer combats error but becomes a means of spreading it in ever-new forms (ibid., pp. 98–99).

Kuyper perceives a similar dynamic at play in the field of law: when jurisprudence is detached from God and His Word, it loses its foundation. Without divine grounding, legal scholars must appeal to tradition or society's fluctuating sense of justice, which Kuyper likens to 'the waters of a flowing stream,' eroding any stable concept of justice (p.99). Rejecting Enlightenment social contract theory, Kuyper argued in his Stone Lectures that authority cannot arise from people or majorities, since history often proves minorities right (*LoC*, p.82). Instead, he affirms two Calvinist convictions—sin made government necessary, and all authority ultimately comes from God's sovereignty—as integral to the legal field (ibid.). Kuyper held that a Calvinist jurisprudence, moored to a durable, Biblical understanding of justice, would serve as 'the source

and stronghold' of constitutional liberties for all citizens whereas a liberal jurisprudence based in the ideals of the Enlightenment would ultimately undermine them (*AK:CR*, pp.279ff).

Kuyper similarly cautioned that medicine becomes dangerous when it ignores the soul and reduces people to mere bodies, treating vitality as a product of matter alone (*W&W*, p.99). This reductive view strips suffering of its sacred meaning, discounts preparation for death, normalizes suicide, detaches sensuality from moral limits, and dismisses prayer for the sick as childish (ibid.). In contrast, Christian medical practice must respect moral boundaries, focus on restoring health, and remain attuned to patients' spiritual needs—realities that medicine alone cannot address.

3.3. The Natural Sciences

For Kuyper, sin's noetic effects weigh more heavily on sciences where 'the subjective factor' plays a larger role—namely the humanities and social sciences—than on the natural sciences. The fallenness of human cognition, he argues, 'wouldn't be so bad if science were based exclusively on observation and experience, if consciousness were nothing but a mirror reflecting the world around us' (*AK:CR*, p.451). Some sciences, like mathematics or chemistry, might largely operate on brute facts, relatively unaffected by moral confusion. But higher sciences—medicine, law, and especially theology—involve greater degrees of interpretation: not just *seeing that* but *seeing as*. They require extrapolation, evaluation, and synthesis, guided not only by observation and logic but also by values, purposes, intuitions, and unprovable first principles. 'The darkening of sin thus

does not concern the knowledge of details but science in its higher and more noble conception,' Kuyper concludes (ibid., p.450).

Thus, despite his concerns about ideological scientism, Kuyper was relatively less anxious about the natural sciences themselves, believing that their subjective elements would eventually be corrected by observation and experimentation (*W&W*, p.99). The data would ultimately challenge flawed theories. Still, he warned that natural science was increasingly encroaching on life's deepest questions. Its evolutionary theory, treating human life as the product of cells and atoms alone, denied divine creation and the *imago Dei*, thus undermining human dignity (ibid.). Kuyper's concern mirrors Newman's critique of reason's overreach—treating natural explanations as ultimate ones—and anticipates Plantinga's (2012) warning about illegitimately slipping from the sciences' appropriate commitment to methodological naturalism to embracing ontological naturalism. This slide, Kuyper argued, allows natural science to dominate all other disciplines and stand in principle against Christian faith (*W&W*, p.100).

Kuyper outlined his nuanced views on the most controverted scientific subject of his day—Darwinian evolution—in an 1899 rectorial address at the Free University (see 'Evolution,' *AK:CR*, pp.403ff). As James Bratt notes, Kuyper notably avoids literalist interpretations of Genesis, flood geology, or theological polemics. Instead, he identifies areas of compatibility between evolutionary theory and Christian—especially Calvinist—convictions. Kuyper welcomes, 'affirmatively, without reservation,' the idea that creation may have unfolded through long evolutionary processes and 'by one species producing another' (ibid.). His critique targets the disciplinary overreach of figures like Spencer and Haeckel, where science abandons its proper bounds and leaps to philosophical conclusions. For Kuyper, Christian scientists and

theologians alike must resist the unwarranted extrapolation of a naturalistic worldview from the natural sciences and the imposition of that worldview upon the other arenas of thought and inquiry.

3.4. The Humanities

Kuyper believed philosophical naturalism and the application of scientific methods caused particular harm to the humanities. In philology, for example, he critiques theories of the origins of language that mirror evolutionary biology, portraying early humans as uttering animal-like sounds that only evolved into language over centuries (*W&W*, p.100). While not denying linguistic development *per se*, Kuyper insists Christians remember that 'in the beginning was the Word' (John 1:1). Human language, however it developed, originates in God. Because creation was spoken into being by God's Word, language can correspond to reality and speak truth (ibid).

> On the subject of history, Kuyper laments that within the modern secular academy
>
> > every notion that the history of the human race is arranged around the cross of Golgotha as its midpoint, designed this way by God's ordination that ought to be respected, is gradually being destroyed. In its place we get a perspective of history that explains the entire course of things on the basis of purely material and psychological causes. (p.100)

While Kuyper doesn't specify what additional causes Christian historians should include, he frequently appeals to divine providence—especially in events favoring the Reformed—and often writes as a historical Idealist, believing both that ideas shape history and that history moves with a progressive, purposeful trajectory.

Kuyper writes that academic philosophy, having largely discarded revelation, often builds grand worldviews on mere theoretical assumptions (p.100). His objection is not to philosophical inquiry itself but to its tendency to overreach, turning conjecture into comprehensive systems opposing the Christian confession (ibid.). While Kuyper values careful induction and deduction, absolutizing these methods as the be-all and end-all of knowledge makes them antagonistic towards the knowledge of God and Procrustean beds for knowledge. Instead, he argues that all theorizing, religious or irreligious, begins as *fides quaerens intellectum*—faith seeking understanding—and that Christian philosophy can and should start from faith in the gospel and a basic trust in our cognitive faculties, not radical (and ultimately insurmountable) doubt.[124]

Finally, Kuyper turns to Classics. Consistent with his theology of common grace, Kuyper argues that if Greek literature has corrupted the youth, 'the evil lies not in this classical study itself, but in the wrong use non-Christian perspectives have made of such study' (p.100).[125] *How* exactly, he does not say. Nevertheless, Kuyper regarded classical study as vital to higher education, which is why one of the first faculty he appointed at the Free University was a professor of classics (van Deursen 2008, p.23).

4. What is the university for?

The main contours of Kuyper's Christian philosophy of higher education have been clearly expounded for English readers by Nicholas Wolterstorff (2004, p.199ff), Wayne Kobes (1993),

[124] For a fuller treatment of Kuyper's view of philosophy see Bartholomew (2017), Ch.9.
[125] The studies of modern literature and languages was not yet considered an academic subject.

Peter Heslam (1998), and most recently, Craig Bartholomew (2017, Ch.11). These studies relied primarily on the English translations then available—Kuyper's 'Sphere Sovereignty' address, *Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology*, and *Lectures on Calvinism*. However, several key texts have only recently been translated and thus have received little if any attention in anglophone treatments of Kuyper's educational thought. Kuyper's *Wisdom & Wonder: Common Grace in Science & Art* articulates his Christian metaepistemology and its implications for scholarship, while several addresses to students, faculty, and trustees of the Free University of Amsterdam elaborate his vision for that institution and for pluralism in Dutch higher education. These newly available texts provide Kuyper's most direct statements on higher education and will fill out our picture of Kuyper's educational philosophy, shedding new light on 1) Kuyper's account of the autotelic value of learning, 2) the Christian academic ethos Kuyper sought to inculcate at the Free University, 3) Kuyper's account of the defining principles of confessionally Reformed scholarship and 4) Kuyper's (often misunderstood) understanding of the relationship between the Christian academic's apologetic and scholarly tasks.

4.1. The 'Sphere' of Scholarship and the Sovereignty of God

Kuyper chose to use the inaugural address for the Free University of Amsterdam (*Vrije Universiteit*) to outline the most seminal concept of his public theology: *Soevereiniteit in eigen kring*, typically rendered 'sphere sovereignty' but more literally 'Sovereignty in the Distinct Spheres of Human Life' (Bacote, 2005, p.61). According to Richard Mouw (2011, p.23), this difficult Dutch phrase 'has the sense of each sphere having its own unique or separate character'.

Vincent Bacote (2005, p.61) summarizes, 'Kuyper's objective [in this address] was to argue for a form of pluralism in society rooted in God's sovereignty and the structure of creation itself.' In explaining this key concept of his 'social ontology' (Bratt, 2013, p.133), Kuyper blends mechanical, geometrical, organic, and social metaphors:

> One may refer to the parts of this great instrument as wheels, spring-driven on their own axles, or call them spheres, each filled with its own exciting life-spirit—the name or circumference is drawn with a firm radius from the center of a specific principle; the apostolic 'every man in his own order', (I Cor. 15). Even as one speaks of a 'moral world', a 'scientific world', a 'world of commerce', and a 'world of art', so one might speak with even more justification of 'a circle' of the moral, 'a circle' of the domestic, 'a circle' of the social life, each with its own domain, and because each constitutes its own domain with its own Sovereign within the limits of that domain. ('Sphere Sovereignty', *AK:*CR, p.467)

Kuyper envisioned society as 'an infinitely structured organism', in which individuals exist only within groups, and the whole expresses itself through these groups.[126] These naturally emerging, interrelated socio-cultural spheres carry out distinct tasks, each with a divinely appointed role in human flourishing.

'What Kuyper meant by a "sphere" is pretty much what we have in mind when we talk about a person's "sphere of influence",' explains Richard Mouw (2011, p.23). 'It is an arena where interactions take place, and where some sort of authority is exercised.' Kuyper's concept, says Mouw, highlights familiar patterns of cultural interaction—family, business, art, university, church, state—each intended by God to fulfill its own distinct role in creation. As Bacote (2005, p.62) puts it, each realm—politics, art, education—operates according to its own 'laws of life'.

[126] Despite Kuyper's use of mechanical metaphors to describe the interrelationships among the spheres here, subsequent thinkers in the Kuyperian tradition (e.g., Herman Bavinck, Herman Dooyeweerd) have preferred organic metaphors. Bartholomew (2017, pp.142-3) notes that 'the spheres are constantly in interaction with one another so that *symbiosis* is a good word for describing their relationship. In the Kuyperian tradition the word that has come to be used for this is *enkapsis*, referring to "structural interlacements which can exist between things, plants, animals, and societal structures".'

Institutions and individuals flourish only by discerning and respecting the unique principles governing each sphere, rather than imposing the logic of one onto another.

While Kuyper framed his 'social ontology' in terms of God's comprehensive sovereignty, its practical aim was to safeguard the freedom of the arts, sciences, business, civic groups, and religious communities to operate according to their own principles. He 'postulated discrete, autonomous spheres of human life as if to replicate the separation and balance of powers on the ontological level' (Bratt, 2013, p.132). If the artistic or business sectors went astray, that was between them and God. No other sphere—especially Church or State—had the authority or competence to forcibly correct them. This vision of distinct spheres standing independently and directly *coram Deo* underpinned Kuyper's public theology and his political project to liberate religious minorities—including conservative Calvinists and Roman Catholics—to form churches, parties, civic groups, and schools according to their own convictions.[127]

To understand how Kuyper's concept of 'sphere sovereignty' shaped his educational vision and justified founding the Free University, it is crucial to distinguish two kinds of pluralism—structural and worldview—and how each influenced his philosophy.[128] Harry Van Dyke (1998, pp.506–7) clarifies:

---

[127] Kuyper is often mistaken for a sort of Calvinist establishmentarian. But Kuyper did not seek to impose his own brand of Reformed Christianity as the official faith of the Netherlands. Kuyper recognized that traditionalist Calvinists like himself were in the minority and would be for the foreseeable future. His Antirevolutionary political party was from the start a coalition party made up of religious minorities, primarily traditionalist Calvinists and Roman Catholics, who sought the freedom to educate their children in accordance with their own religious traditions (cf., Bratt, 2013; Bacote, 2005).

[128] Gordon J. Spykman (1992, p.66ff) and Albert M. Wolters (2005, Ch.5) frame this distinction in terms of 'structure' (or 'form') and 'direction'. Kuyper did not use the terms 'worldview pluralism' and 'structural pluralism', but I think they do clarify his arguments.

I disagree with Peter Heslam (1998, pp.159-60), who rightly discerns that Kuyper deploys the of 'sphere-sovereignty' with reference to both to the sovereignty of distinct cultural spheres and to the autonomy of diverse socio-religious subgroups but wrongly believes these two usages to be incompatible. Distinct, yes. In tension, sometimes. But logically irreconcilable, no.

> Structural (or ontological) pluralism…is anchored in sphere sovereignty as laid down by the Creator, whereas worldview (or confessional) pluralism derives from differences in humans' response to the Creator…. Kuyper's case for a university free of church and state (structural pluralism) coincided with his defense of Christians to own and operate such a university bound to the Word of God (worldview pluralism). But the twin arguments must not be telescoped.

Kuyper thus had two related aims. First, structural pluralism: education should be free from state interference, recognizing the university as a sovereign institution within its own sphere. Second, worldview pluralism: Christians had the right to run confessional institutions in a society increasingly hostile to Reformed faith (Bacote, 2005, p.62). Structural pluralism defended the university's independence from Church and State; worldview pluralism justified founding a self-consciously Reformed university—and allowed for institutions rooted in different worldviews (ibid.).

4.2. Structural Pluralism and the Sphere of Scholarship: Free Universities

Kuyper named the *Vrije Universiteit*—the 'Free University'—thus because he wanted it '*free* from both ecclesiastical and political control' (Mouw, 2011, p.42; cf. Kobes, 1993, p.243), free to flourish within its own sphere. The name reflected his strong structural pluralism, which distinguished the scholarly sphere from others like religion, government, commerce, and family. It also marked the university as 'an opposition school', resisting the state-imposed secularization of Dutch universities.[129] Kuyper opposed state-enforced faux 'neutrality' in education because it

[129] Bratt (2013, p.118) explains the act of parliament which provoked Kuyper and his allies to found a new university:

> The 1876 Act was a modernizing measure on several fronts. By turning the theology faculties at state universities into departments for the 'neutral' or 'scientific' study of religion as a human phenomenon, the Dutch government pioneered the discipline of religious studies around the world. Simultaneously, it authorized the national Reformed church to fill (and fund) collateral

curtailed the freedoms of thought, speech, and association central to the university's pursuit of truth.

Gordon Spykman (1992, p.135) helpfully described the cultural project implicit in Kuyper's 'sphere sovereignty' using the Biblical narrative of Creation, Fall, Redemption, and Consummation. He argued that participating in Christ's redemptive work involves 'redirecting' social and cultural forms deformed by sin toward their proper end in Christ and 'reforming' them accordingly. While Kuyper didn't use this exact terminology, it effectively captures the core logic of his concept of 'sphere sovereignty'.

Kuyper describes the centre (i.e., the unique principle) and the fixed radius (i.e., the 'laws of life' demanded by that unique principle) of the 'sphere of scholarship' in two convocation addresses he delivered to the students at the Free University while serving as rector in 1889 and 1900, to which we now turn.

4.2.1. 'The Secret of Genuine Study' (1889)[130]

chairs at the universities to train clergy. It upgraded the Amsterdam gymnasium to university status to expand access to higher education.

In the first two provisions, the influence of Schleiermacher's educational philosophy was readily apparent. Traditional Protestants and Catholics worried that the Act would hollow out the theological faculties and further liberalize the clergy. However, the Act also 'authorized any private party to found its own institution so long as it provided at least three faculties and an endowment of 100,000 guilders ($40,000 US)' (ibid.). This last provision gave Kuyper and others the opportunity they needed to set their own course.

[130] Hereafter, 'Secret'. First published as *Scolastica, of 't geheim van echte studie* (Amsterdam: J.A. Wormser, 1889). English translation and annotation by Harry Van Dyke in Kuyper (2019, pp.97ff).

The first address describes 'the nature of study', 'the *disciplina scolastica*' ('Secret', p.100) that devotion to the university's proper cultural project—the communal, transgenerational pursuit of the truth—requires.

Kuyper identifies the community inhabiting this intellectual pattern of life as the *res publica litterarum*, 'the entire republic of letters', 'that distinctive sphere in society which indeed centers on the university yet pervades the country with young men who thirst after knowledge and with men of learning who illumine our towns and villages like bright stars' ibid.). Though the phrase is commonly associated with the French Enlightenment, Kuyper ties it to the older tradition of liberal learning that birthed the university. In the time of the Synod of Dordt, he writes, all who pursued scholarship or classical education were seen as '*a separate life-sphere*', living by '*a distinctive principle*' and called by God to a special task (pp.100–101). As with other 'spheres', this one is governed by a defining principle—in this case, the pursuit of truth—and, accordingly, authority in this sphere is derived from and belongs to possessors of *insight*—what Kuyper elsewhere calls the 'sovereignty of genius' (*LoC*, p.95). The primary relationship in this sphere is that between teacher and student, which Kuyper, citing Proverbs 2:1–7, compares to that between parent and child. Teachers impart wisdom; students are to develop and pass it on.

Originally, the university was not a *universitas scientiarum* (a community of sciences) but a *universitas docentium et discentium*—a corporate body of teachers and learners, forming a commonwealth that transcended states and empires ('Secret', pp.101–2). Kuyper feared that modern emphasis on research and individual achievement was eroding the fundamentally social nature of the scholarly life and the ethos needed to sustain it.

Kuyper claimed the scholarly community and modern university had been led astray by 'young men whose object was not the study itself,' but who sought the prestige associated with academic life and infiltrated 'our sacred garden like veritable parasites' (p.102). This, he argued, touched off a three-fold decline: loss of academic freedom, opposition to God, and finally, a focus on mere exam-passing (ibid.). Consequently, the university had become more about securing power, prestige, and privilege than pursuing truth. As he put it, the academy 'lost its native impulse, tore up its charter, and put itself in the service of the state, so that *Scolastica* dissolved into *Politica*.'[131] Worse, many scholars turned against faith, and university life was reduced to mere job preparation (ibid.). Echoing Schleiermacher's critique of *Brotstudenten* and Newman's of Utilitarianism, Kuyper condemned those who treated education merely as a career tool:

> [Those] who supposedly are devoting themselves to academic studies but who have only one goal in mind: once and for all, and as quickly and cheaply as possible, to be done with bookish learning. They are parasites.... [Their] only goal is to acquire a steady position and a guaranteed salary. (ibid., pp.102–103)

He challenged Free University students to confront a deeper question: '*What should be the goal of university study and the goal of living and working in the sacred domain of scholarship?*' (p.103).

Kuyper reminds his students that the chance 'to have the opportunity of studying' and to escape the 'drudgery of society' is 'an inestimable privilege' and a gift from God (ibid.). It is not grounds for self-congratulation or self-promotion. In God's economy, scholarship is a vocation of equal dignity with those who labour 'by the sweat of their brow' in 'the world of nature,' whether 'on farm or factory, at lathe or anvil, in shop or office' (p.103). The 'real man of science,' Kuyper

[131] On the German state's expropriation of higher education, see Howard (2006, Ch.4).

says, 'does not look on [manual labour] with contempt,' but recognizes that such work 'should really have been his lot too' (ibid.).[132] If one is called to 'knowledge work' instead, that is by God's prerogative. The implication: study and scholarship are to be humble acts of 'service' rendered 'as to the Lord' (Ephesians 6:7).

Here Kuyper's argument takes a Christological turn. Citing the opening of John's Gospel, he notes that 'God created, in addition to the world of nature…, a world of thoughts; for all creation contains *Logos*'. This 'world of thoughts' is the scholar's domain. Kuyper explains:

> Now, the deeper meaning of this Logos is only disclosed to us through the revelation of God's mystery.… [There] is not only a creation but also a Logos in the creation, and man, created in the image of God and therefore a logical creature, has the capacity and the calling to use his logical thought to reflect on this Logos which shines in all creation. And this, students, is the beautiful, exalted, sacred task of science. (ibid., p.103)

Thus, the rationality of the created order and the human capacity to trace it out are the ontological preconditions of science—both grounded in the Creator's own Rationality, the Logos. Kuyper argues that the world was made to be understood, so that through human inquiry, God's Logos might be known and glorified:

> It is for God's honor that there should be scholarship.… His thought his Logos in the *kosmos*, must not remain unknown and unexamined. He created us as logical beings in order that we should trace his Logos, investigate it, publish it, personally wonder at it, and fill others with wonder…. Without scientific research that treasure remains hidden.… [The] nonscientific person treads on the soil of God's creation until the man of science discovers the mine of knowledge, opens it up, descends into it, and searches there for silver, to bring out the gold of God's thoughts. (p.104)

In line with the liberal tradition defended by Newman, Kuyper observes that science and scholarship are not strictly necessary to human subsistence and suggests that their greatest value

[132] Cf., Michael Sandel (2020).

is not instrumental. Instead, Kuyper identifies science as bearing three interrelated intrinsic benefits: 'it brings to light the hidden glory of God; it gives you joy in the act of digging up the gold that lies hidden in creation; and it grants you the honor of raising the level and well-being of human life' (p.104).[133]

For Kuyper, the scholar's task is to think God's thoughts after Him—to align our ectypal understanding of creation with God's archetypal knowledge as Creator. Thus, the unbelieving scholar distorts reality when he claims his discoveries as his own and treats science as existing 'outside God, apart from God, in opposition to God…' (p.105). Secular academia furthers this distortion by opposing its hypotheses to divine revelation and promoting the false notion—embraced by many modern believers and unbelievers alike—that 'men of faith' must avoid science (ibid.). In response, Kuyper and his colleagues founded the Free University of Amsterdam to awaken a deeper Christian engagement with learning, 'to get derailed science back on its God-given track and to refute the lie that faith hates science' (p.106).

For Kuyper, the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian worldviews necessitates distinctively Christian scholarly institutions. Yet this antithesis does not require rejecting the results of non-Christian scholarship entirely or withdrawing from the shared truth-seeking task of the global *res publica litterarum*. While Christians must pursue research by their own principles within their own institutions, '[at] the same time', Kuyper insists, 'we need to be encouraged not to disdain the scholarship of others but together with others to contribute to mankind's great scholarly task, provided only that it can do so in its own institution' (ibid.).

[133] Citing Calvin, Kuyper similarly identifies the threefold intrinsic purpose of the 'Liberal Arts' as being 'to glorify God, to ennoble human life, and to give pleasure' in his Stone Lectures (Heslam, 1998, p.211 citing *LoC*, p.153). Kuyper would probably analyze all autotelic goods in this way.

One entailment of Kuyper's view of the scholarly vocation is that it cannot be fulfilled merely 'by studying and cramming for exams' but must be rightly motivated. True scholarship demands a particular ethos among students and scholars. Kuyper likens the scholarly community to a great army corps and urges students to align their 'aspirations and intentions' with scholarship's larger mission (ibid., p.106). The true scholar must be driven not by ego or ambition, but by scholarship's threefold end: uncovering God's hidden glories, delighting in discovery, and elevating of human life. 'Every man of learning should be fired with a zeal to battle against the darkness and for the light' (ibid., pp.104–5). Such religious motivation, Kuyper held, compels Christian scholars to rigorous intellectual integrity. 'After all,' he wrote, 'the man of science does not play fast and loose with the facts, but it is granted him to track down the gold of God's thoughts, the gems of divine wisdom, a labor that requires real discernment' (ibid., p.110).

Those with genuinely scholarly aims adopt a distinct moral stance and form a particular community of character, the *scola*. For students, this stance is incompatible with blandishing professors 'to avoid difficulties at exam time', cutting academic corners, or mocking peers for their 'bookishness' (ibid.). Such behaviours degrade academic communities and must be rejected. In contrast, Kuyper concludes his address by commending six scholarly virtues: collegiality, civic-mindedness, plainspokenness, hygiene, orderliness, and elegance.

Kuyper ends with two soaring theological claims: first, that learning is a distinct 'cultural' or 'life-sphere' immutably ordered by the Creator; and second, that the Christian sees this sphere as one over which God is sovereign and to which the student or scholar is called (p.113). The Christian scholar must remember that God 'has ordained your life for this order, this sphere, this academic world, and woe betide you if you stop your ears to this call or resist it' (p.114). The

proper response is to live humbly in accord with the divine ordinances that sustain the learned life.

4.2.2. 'The Goal of Genuine Study' (1900)[134]

Kuyper delivered his second commencement address at the Free University as a complement to his first, this time exploring the question: What is the point of scientific study—seeking or finding? ('Goal', pp.116–17). He affirms the thrill of intellectual pursuit, acknowledging that study itself can be deeply pleasurable (pp.117–18). 'I have no intention of disputing the delights of seeking after truth,' he says, calling it a gift of God's common grace. He even suggests that true academic progress begins when study becomes a joy in itself, no longer driven by deadlines but pursued for the pleasure it brings (p.118).

Nevertheless, says Kuyper, 'Seeking should be in the service of finding' which is the 'ultimate purpose of seeking' (ibid., p.119). 'Delight in searching is priceless, and without it you won't succeed; but finding must be the goal and motive and therefore the main thing above all, for science that seeks truth' (ibid.).

Kuyper highlights three contrasts between scholars who prefer seeking to finding the truth and scholars who seek truth to find it:

> If for you the pleasure of seeking truth surpasses the possession of it, then you cause to be lost what is not lost; then you will seek again what others have found long ago; and then you will rather grope in darkness than open your eyes to the light of revelation that has been given us. If on the other hand you seek only in order to find, you will take care not to lose what you already have; you will no

[134] Hereafter, 'Goal'.

> longer seek what was found long ago; and you will gratefully accept what is thrown into your lap without ever having to search for it (pp.120-21).

These contrasts reflect differing intellectual postures toward common sense, tradition, and revelation: the aimless seeker rejects them, while the truth-seeker preserves them.

These attitudes of truth-seeking scholarship towards common sense, tradition, and divine revelation, says Kuyper, underpin the 'threefold starting point' for the Free University, namely, the 'immediate pronouncements of one's consciousness' (common sense), 'the guiding principles of the Calvinist worldview' (tradition), and 'the answers that God's word offers for the great questions of life' as epitomized in the Apostles' Creed (revelation) (ibid., p.126). From thence the Reformed Christian student or scholar proceeds in his or her studies.

The University's Threefold Scientific Task

Kuyper continued his address by outlining the scholarly task in terms of his 'threefold starting point'. Science, he argued, must fulfill the university's threefold calling: 'first, to establish; second, to deduce; and third, to systematize' (p.126). He explained:

> Science is to establish the wealth of truth that we acquire either immediately or by induction. Next, it is to deduce from these firm data the implications for our present life and our current state of consciousness. And finally, science is to take this wealth of truth and its implications and bring them into coherence, to raise them into a system. (ibid.)

Though Kuyper didn't elaborate on the second and third tasks here, he focused on the first: 'establishing the wealth of truth from which we proceed' (ibid., p.127). This was aimed at countering the key charge from modernist critics—that the Free University was guilty of crude fideism, arbitrarily certifying 'unproven assumptions' and merely parroting dogma (ibid.).

In response, Kuyper contends that Reformed Christian scholarship is far from a thoughtless rehashing of Calvinistic clichés. While the Reformed may not offer definitive proofs for their foundational perspective—nor, he notes, can anyone—they do rigorously examine their standpoint and argue for its reasonableness.

Kuyper insists that taking the Reformed faith as one's intellectual standpoint involves humble confidence, not blind acquiescence. The Reformed doctrines of the Fall, Total Depravity, and sin's noetic effects demand a self-conscious Fallibilism regarding both oneself and the Reformed tradition. 'We confess, more than other schools, that false lines have been drawn across our immediate consciousness by the darkening effect of sin', Kuyper writes. 'Thus the allegation is simply ludicrous that we believe having a firm starting point excuses us from examining it more closely' (ibid.). The 'antithesis' runs through every heart and tradition. Reformed scholarship, therefore, demands humility and a commitment to be *semper reformanda*.

The Reformed tradition, as a historical phenomenon, is still developing. 'Or do people think that the Reformed worldview has been slipped into our hands in a secret document, ready to hand and fully worked out?' asks Kuyper. 'Is Calvinism in its rise and flowering not a historical phenomenon which just like any other configuration in history has to be mined from the sources?' (ibid.). Like any intellectual tradition, Calvinism evolves gradually over generations—tracing its inner logic, correcting errors, drawing out implications, and addressing new questions. But this ongoing development does not make it any less scientific.

For Kuyper, neither the Reformed tradition nor the Bible provides a readymade grand unified theory. 'Here too it is an altogether false idea that Scripture offers a ready confession and a cut-and-dried catechism for life', he writes.

> What Scripture reveals can only be established after thorough study. And although belief in the truth of Scripture is a fruit of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, which is surer than anything else, *knowledge* of Scripture and its contents can only be the fruit of study and research (ibid.).

Hence, Kuyper concludes, 'Confidence in our consciousness needs psychological study; our Calvinist standpoint needs historical study; the revelation of our God needs biblical study. This is all the more important since by far not all Christian thinkers reach the same conclusions as we do, either now or in former centuries' (ibid., p.128).

The Christian Scholar and the Apologetic Task

Kuyper argues that proper confidence in one's standpoint does not excuse the Reformed scholar from responding to objections raised by skeptical or antagonistic non-Christians. As members of the *res publica litterarum* and public intellectuals in a pluralist society, Christian scholars must sometimes defend the faith.[135] The pursuit of truth and the call to love one's disbelieving neighbour require readiness to respond to critique:

[135] Kuyper famously differed from the Princeton theologian B.B. Warfield on matters of apologetics and epistemology. Warfield, along with his colleagues Charles and A.A. Hodge, embraced the Scottish 'commonsense realism' of Thomas Reid (1710-1796) as their epistemic starting point, and with it an Evidentialist approach to apologetics. They held that beliefs could only be warranted by good arguments from sound evidentiary bases in 'commonsense' beliefs. Kuyper countered that Christian faith itself forms a legitimate basis from which to begin one's reasoning, regardless of whether the Christian has arguments for her belief ready-to-hand. On Kuyper and Warfield's disagreement, see Heslam (1998, pp.186ff). Kuyper is often mistaken to have rejected the project of apologetics outright.

> Science and scholarship is a common human endeavor, and he who shuts himself up within his own circle without ever having it out with those who think otherwise leaves the refreshing stream and ends up in a stagnant bog. We have to engage the objections of those who oppose us on principle and attack their notions that we deem false—attack them, not in bitter hatred, but from love of those who are misled by them. (ibid., p.128)

Thus, for both intellectual integrity and Christian charity, apologetics is necessary. Kuyper, however, cautions Christian apologists to maintain perspective and offers three reasons for approaching the task with moderation.

Firstly, while necessary, the apologetic task is secondary. 'So long as our strength is so little and so much still needs to be done to build our own house, we shall concentrate our energies first on the positive, deductive, and systematic investigation of our principles' (ibid.). Kuyper reminded Christian scholars that their primary duty lies in establishing their standpoint, developing its implications, and integrating insights from various sciences into a coherent system. Overcommitting to apologetics, he warned, distracts from this foundational work. 'If you rush to spend all your time as an apologist, you will always lose influence, you will be mostly disappointed by a poor reception and a poor outcome, and you will have your studies dictated to you by your opponent.… You will be tied down by an unproductive series of ad hoc arguments' (ibid.).

Secondly, said Kuyper, 'we refuse to waste our energy refuting for the umpteenth time what has so often been refuted already. Many of the objections raised against us are worn-out theses that have been fully answered long ago' (ibid., p.129). Publicly rehearsing these long-established arguments and counterarguments is of very limited benefit.

Thirdly, highlighting the role of presuppositions, Kuyper noted that

> by far the majority of these objections are inferences from contrary premises that are governed by a philosophical idea. Now, it is always fundamentally unscientific

> to wage the battle in the area of inferences so long as the starting premises have not been thrashed out. (ibid.)

This is not to evade the apologetic task but to engage it at the appropriate level. '[Where] the fundamental premises are at issue we too have to join battle. A scientific school that declines to give account of itself commits suicide' (ibid.).

Academic Freedom for Christian Scholarship

Kuyper's call for Christian scholars to engage publicly, apologetically, and collegially with non-Christian peers in the *res publica litterarum* might seem, at first glance, to conflict with the founding of a distinctly Christian university, separate from broader public institutions. He concluded his lecture by addressing this tension through a final trilogy of arguments for Reformed Christians establishing their own university, all centered on his understanding of academic freedom.[136]

First, although state universities claimed religious neutrality, in reality, 'only one school of thought has set the tone for many years' (ibid., pp.129–30). Reformed scholars, therefore, needed institutions that guaranteed them the freedom to pursue Reformed scholarship.

Second, Kuyper argued, 'the university also aims to form and mold its students', and pedagogically, it is incoherent for an education to praise something as true on Monday and condemn it as false on Tuesday (p.130). Reformed students have a right to seek a consistently Reformed pedagogy.

[136] Kuyper makes a similar argument in *W&W* (pp. 101-2).

Third, Reformed teachers, scholars, and administrators need freedom from constant contestation of their basic Christian standpoint. They require an institution where first principles are shared. 'Every rationalist wants to put you in the dock,…and in the absence of proof that in his eyes is complete, he will contest your right to hold your conviction' (ibid., p.130). Yet, as Kuyper stressed, the epistemic gap between Christians and non-Christians renders such proof impossible. Thus, the fundamental disagreements between Christian and unbelieving scholars which bear directly upon their research and teaching, will simply be irresolvable.

Yet, as a minority, Reformed scholars are unfairly expected to prove their 'standpoint' by skeptical colleagues who could not meet that demand themselves. No one requires proof of their own standpoint (ibid., pp.130–31), and so Christian scholars are expected to defend their basic convictions before being allowed to work while secular colleagues who enjoy majority status get a pass. This dynamic makes meaningfully Reformed scholarship impossible in a nominally neutral but effectively secularist institution. Hence, Christians unwilling to compromise on foundational beliefs need institutions of their own.[137]

Thus, Kuyper concluded his account of higher education by defending academic freedom as essential to its true end. For any epistemic community to pursue 'the goal of genuine study'—the shared search for truth from a distinct perspective, especially a minority one—it must be free to assemble, teach, learn, and research without constantly having to defend its first principles.

[137] As a political leader Kuyper upheld a principled pluralism and worked to ensure that all Dutch communities—Catholics, Protestants, and Modernists alike—enjoyed these freedoms. See Bratt (2013), Bacote (2005, pp.56-57, 84), and Naylor (2019, xiv-xx).

Whether pursued by Calvinists, atheists, or others, Kuyper held that scholarship always requires academic freedom, intellectual virtue, and a steadfast commitment to truth. These created ordinances should govern scholarly institutions, whatever their worldview.

4.3. Worldview Pluralism and the Sovereignty of God: Christian Scholarship

If scholarship aims at teaching and learning truth and depends on shared academic freedoms and intellectual virtues, what difference does Christian faith—specifically Reformed faith—make to the work of Christian scholars and schools? We now turn to Kuyper's account of Christ's impact on the academic enterprise: its first principles, implications for the arts and sciences, and its metaepistemological presuppositions.

In 1899, Kuyper addressed the Association of Higher Education on a Reformed Basis with the pressing question, 'How can a university be Bound to the Word of God?' controversy over this issue had already caused the resignation of the Free University's first law professor, Alexander Frederik de Savornin Lohman (1837–1924), who preferred the looser formulation that the Reformed scholar be only 'bound to the word of God'.[138] Kuyper and his colleagues found this inadequate, arguing that true fidelity required grounding the scholar's commitment within the Reformed tradition. The faculty adopted a syllabus of 'Reformed principles,' tasking professors to discern the distinctly Reformed principles for their respective fields from Calvinism's history, theology, polemics, cultural impact, 'and its reading of reality as created,

[138] On the complicated political and personal dimensions of 'the Lohman affair', see Bratt (2013, pp.236ff) and van Deursen (2008, pp.50ff).

fallen, and recreated' (Naylor & Van Dyke, 2019, p.71). This was not a rigid Biblicism but a serious, constructive approach to Reformed thought in the modern era. Lohman, favoring a more ecumenical view, never accepted the proposal and resigned in 1895. To clarify the university's stance, Kuyper delivered his address 'Bound to the Word', offering his definitive statement of what distinctly Reformed scholarship involved.

In this address, Kuyper aimed 'to go behind Scripture to God himself' ('Bound', p.73). Rejecting pantheist notions of an impersonal deity, he defined 'God' as a self-conscious, personal Being and 'the word of God' as God's communications to human consciousness (ibid.). Being bound to the word of God, then, involves responding to God's multifaceted speech through nature, history, reason, and conscience (p.75). Kuyper emphasized that this broader understanding of revelation is not novel, citing the Belgic Confession's (Art. 2) affirmation of 'a twofold word of God: a word of God in creation, and a word of God supplementing creation' (p.76).

Kuyper describes God's first word as communicated through 'the creation, preservation, and government of the universe,' which serves as 'a most elegant book' in which all creatures reveal 'the invisible things of God, even his everlasting power and divinity' (p.75). However, due to the Fall's threefold effect—darkened minds, weakened will, and corrupted desires—a second, special revelation was needed to 'supplement the general revelation in nature…teach us to read the book of nature again, and open up the way for us to be reconciled to God' (ibid., p.76). This second revelation is Scripture.

Kuyper argued that Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anabaptists, and Calvinists define both the content and function of Scripture differently, rendering the bare phrase 'I stand on the basis

of Scripture' effectively meaningless: '[With] reference to the formal questions regarding the relation (1) of Scripture to nature, and (2) of Scripture to the Apocrypha, tradition, councils, and "inner light," the sole reference to Scripture tells you absolutely nothing and leaves everything undecided and uncertain' (p.78). Therefore, Kuyper insisted, 'Something more needs to be said'—namely, where one stands on the relation between the Testaments, the Apocrypha and tradition, and the 'inner light' (p.77). He urged commitment to 'the Reformed principles,' which clarify not only the authority of Scripture but also one's stance toward other interpretive authorities (ibid.). Since the Free University aimed not merely at private devotional reading but at working out Scripture's public implications, Kuyper argued for a 'fundamental, coherent, and praxis-oriented knowledge' of its content (p.79). He thus turned from questions of relative authority to hermeneutics.

Protecting his right flank, Kuyper begins his discussion of biblical interpretation by rejecting simplistic Biblicist views that treat Scripture as merely 'a law code' (ibid.). 'Anyone who is at all knowledgeable…will reject this approach as totally antiquated and useless; professionals do not take it seriously,' he asserted. Scripture, he explains, 'rarely offers definitive pronouncements' and consists largely of history, poetry, lament, prophecy, and culturally conditioned laws. 'When you compare one isolated text with another you repeatedly run into contradictory statements, and we are reminded of the saying that the devil can quote Scripture for his purpose' (ibid.). Kuyper concludes that this 'juridical' approach ironically imposes readers' preconceptions on the text rather than submitting to its real character (ibid.).

Against the Roman Catholic view that Scripture must be interpreted through magisterial pronouncements, and the Anabaptist reliance on 'inner light', Kuyper upholds the Reformed

principle that biblical interpretation should be 'subject only to reverent scholarly inquiry, provided always that such inquiry be free' (p.80).[139] This does not mean adopting a supposedly 'objective' or 'presuppositionless' stance. Rather, the Reformed assume Scripture to be divine revelation and therefore expect it to disclose 'a system' reflecting God's wisdom, not 'a jumble of unconnected parts' or 'chaotic confusion' (ibid.).

A Christian's best approximation of Scripture's system is their 'life- and worldview,' and the foundational points of such a view are one's 'first principles (beginselen)' (ibid., pp.80–81). Thus, he says, we must speak of 'Catholic, Lutheran, Anabaptist, Reformed, and Ethical principles' and corresponding worldviews (ibid., p.81).[140] While Kuyper insists these worldviews are ultimately incompatible, he does not dismiss non-Reformed believers as pseudo-Christians. Instead, he acknowledges the inevitability of pluriformity within the people of God and urges humility, recognizing 'that others may have part of the truth and a portion of the power that we are unable to grasp' (ibid.).

Turning to the impact of worldviews on higher education, Kuyper notes that 'both during the Middle Ages and in the age of the Reformation it was simply assumed that a university had a confessional basis' (p.87). But since the 1876 Act,[141] Dutch universities were officially prohibited from such explicit commitments (p.88). In practice, however, this did not ensure neutrality.

---

[139] Cf., e.g., *WCF*, Ch.1, Art.7.

[140] Kuyper contrasts these durable worldviews with the novel 'philosophical schools' of the nineteenth century: Kantians, Hegelians, Herbartians, Fichteans, Darwinists, or Pessimists. '[Each] of these schools propagates a system that is supposed to help us understand the world and how it functions' (ibid.). However, such 'philosophical schools' are not 'principled worldviews' (ibid.). While the latter are socially embodied traditions, the former are merely intellectual constructs ('paper theories' as Newman would say).
N.b., Kuyper's conception of 'worldview' is more particularistic than that of the evangelical apologist James Sire (2020; 2015).

[141] Cf., **n.126**.

Instead, universities became implicitly anti-confessional, favoring apostates over believing scholars. Kuyper concluded that universities were not neutral but effectively 'bound to the religion of unbelief' (ibid.). He argued that every university inevitably operates from some worldview, with corresponding assumptions about alternatives.

Building on this insight, Kuyper offers three arguments for why a university must operate from an explicit, shared confessional basis. First, he describes the university as 'a workshop of science and scholarship' whose goal is to uncover 'real states of affairs and the true order of things'—in short, to seek truth (ibid.). Yet, Kuyper argues—perhaps his clearest articulation of his 'subjective realist' epistemology—that truth can only be pursued from a particular point of view. This perspectival starting point applies not only to individuals but to faculties and universities as well, since 'a faculty is really a group of men who collaborate in investigating one part of the great field of academic learning, and a university is a combination of faculties who together aim at investigating the whole field' (ibid., p.89). For such cooperation to succeed, scholars must 'proceed from the same fundamental conviction' (ibid.).

Secondly, Kuyper argues that professional training—whether for doctors, lawyers, or clergy—requires unity of perspective: 'A student must become acquainted with all sorts of schools and theories, but he has to learn to critically evaluate them in terms of a unified viewpoint' (p.89). Finally, Kuyper notes that private funding for a free university depends on shared conviction. Public universities, he warns, often allow the state to appoint professors, meaning only those aligned with the dominant worldview are chosen, leaving minority convictions unrepresented (pp.89–90). For religious minorities to find support for their own institutions, they must present benefactors with a coherent and compelling vision.

Kuyper concludes by enumerating four charges given to a professor of the Free University:

1. He is to solemnly declare that the Reformed fundamental conviction is also his.[142]
2. He is to investigate which leading ideas in the area of research assigned to him were historically derived from the Reformed principles.
3. He is to vindicate with the authority of God's word in nature and Scripture the Reformed principles and the lines drawn from them, or else to correct them if they are at variance with that word.
4. He is to carry forward the lines from the past into the spiritual struggles today. (ibid., p.92)

This address marks Kuyper's final effort to articulate his vision of confessional academic freedom. Building a truly confessional university, he argued, requires balancing two often competing freedoms: the right of religious communities to maintain institutions grounded in their beliefs, and the right of scholars within those institutions to examine and develop those beliefs. Just how that balance is to be struck within any such institution will inevitably be a matter of recurrent debate. Kuyper sought to navigate this tension by rooting the university in the Reformed tradition's adaptable first principles, rather than enforcing rigid boundaries.

Conclusion

Abraham Kuyper was convinced that 'Christ is *the* miracle'—that in the resurrection, God broke into the natural order to renew and redeem all creation (*AK:CR*, pp.389–90)—and that this transformative event had implications for every 'square inch' of human life. Believing he had personally experienced this redemptive work—*palingenesis*—Kuyper broke with the Schleiermachian modernist theology he had absorbed at Leiden. He challenged the dominant

[142] Throughout this lecture Kuyper assumes that the Three Forms of Unity—the Heidelberg Catechism (1563), the Belgic Confession (1561) and the Canons of Dort (1619)—classically and authoritatively articulate 'the Reformed fundamental conviction'.

academic paradigm and the growing spirit of cultural 'disenchantment' (Weber), offering instead an alternative vision of theology and higher education that, despite the continued dominance of the research university model, has proven more resilient and fruitful than his Modernist critics expected.

IV. What Kind of Knowledge is Theology?

The Art and/or 'Science' of 'God-Talk'

The educationist and cultural theorist Neil Postman (1996, Ch.1) provocatively argued that schools cannot do without 'gods'.[143] By 'gods'—always lowercase—Postman meant *narratives*, or, better, *metanarratives*: stories that make sense of who we are, what we do, and why we do it (ibid., p.5). 'For school to make sense, the young, their parents, and their teachers must have a god to serve, or, even better, several gods. If they have none, school is pointless' (ibid., p.4). In other words, students, faculty, parents, politicians, and the public have all bought into some story which makes sense of paying tuition, doing homework, attending lectures, funding research, building institutes, etc.. The story may encourage a certain kind of career, or the noble advancement of a field of knowledge, or the education of the citizenry. But without some such story, universities would be a thing of the past.

The question that troubles Postman is whether the 'gods' of contemporary university life are 'gods that may serve' or lifeless idols; whether the stories are good, true, or compelling, or hollow or flatly false. In terms of logical priority, having a coherent answer to the questions—*Why study (this but not that)?* or *Why teach (this but not that)?* or *Why research (this but not that)?*—depends upon having a *story* wherein such activities make sense—a metanarrative. In short, Postman's 'gods' are the ends we pursue and the stories that supposedly make those

[143] Sections of this chapter engaging Postman (1996) and Kronman (2007) build on work I first developed in an MPhil essay (Williams, 2020a).

pursuits intelligible. Postman argues that many of the story-gods in today's academic pantheon (e.g., Technology, Economic Utility, Consumerism, Multiculturalism, the American Experiment) are clearly false, shortsighted, dehumanizing, or otherwise unsatisfactory. Postman worries that if we cannot find a better story, our academic institutions will continue to bow down to gods that we don't really believe in.

One of the central questions haunting higher education today is the putatively elementary question, 'What is the university for?' One reason modern secular universities struggle to answer this seemingly basic question is that, as a rule, such institutions tend to be deeply uncomfortable with real 'god-talk'—discussions about ultimate commitments, concerns, and horizons of meaning. In Jean-Francois Lyotard's (1984) terms, modern universities have become wary of the very *grands récits* or 'metanarratives' they depend upon to legitimate themselves.[144] Consequently, as Anthony Kronman (2007) puts it, 'our universities and colleges have given up on the meaning of life.' The trouble is that the meaning of education—especially *higher* education—*depends upon* our conception of the meaning of life. As Postman (1996, p.7) writes: 'Without a narrative, life has no meaning. Without meaning, learning has no purpose. Without a purpose, schools are houses of detention, not attention.' Thus, one of the challenges plaguing contemporary university life is that its lack of any disciplined academic discourse for interrogating and evaluating its own metanarratives has left it teleologically adrift, such that the basic question of 'What are universities for?' has become all but impossible to answer.

[144] Lyotard (1984, xxv) suggests that 'this very postmodern moment…finds the University nearing what may be its end, while the Institute may just be beginning.'

As Postman (1996, p.4) observes, pre-modern universities had 'a god to serve', namely, '*the* God, who is supposed to have created the world and whose moral injunctions as presented in sacred texts have given countless people a reason for living and, more to the point, a reason for learning.' Such pre-modern universities also had a disciplined discourse for interrogating and debating ultimate commitments and grand narratives, for re-orienting students' lives towards an ultimate horizon of meaning, that is, for 'god-talk,' *theology*. Neither Postman nor Kronman advocate recentering the modern university on '*the* God' of traditional Christianity, but both see the need for modern universities to reengage with ultimate questions about the purposes of life and learning if they are to remain 'universities' at all.[145] But can such 'god-talk' be seriously engaged in in a modern academic setting? What can we really know or say about ultimate reality? What kind of knowledge (if any) does such discourse deal with? Is 'theology' even the right label for such 'god-talk'?

With these questions in mind, the aim of this chapter is to retrieve the most vital aspects of Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's conceptions of theology with an eye to articulating a Christian theology of theology for the modern, secular$_3$/pluralistic university. Section 1 identifies the ways in which their respective religious experiences influenced, and the Romantic movement inflected their conceptions of personal religious knowledge and theology as an intellectual discipline, noting several sensibilities that they shared despite their fundamental differences in theological epistemology. Section 2 evaluates their basic approaches to religious knowledge. I

[145] Both Postman and Kronman underestimate the degree of dissensus that the pre-modern university tolerated. *Disputatio* was at the heart of the pre-modern university's theological practice and, while there was consensus around creedal orthodoxy, pre-modern universities facilitated robust debate across important theological divides: Scotists versus Thomists versus Augustinians, Nominalists versus Realists, etc.

argue that Schleiermacher's strategy of 'defensive modernization'—reconstructing Christianity from our most basic 'feeling of absolute dependence' up—was understandable given his experience and milieu, but unworkable as a strategy for seeing the Christian tradition through the challenges posed by Modernity. In short, historic Christianity cannot plausibly be rebuilt on such an 'experiential-expressivist' basis. I then argue that Newman and Kuyper's critiques of EEF and their more traditional, TOFoundationalist approaches to religious epistemology have been substantially vindicated by the success of twentieth-century developments of their ideas by analytic philosophers of religion. In particular, the primary developers of 'Reformed Epistemology'—who were influenced by both Newman and Kuyper—have shown that if Christianity is true (*de facto*), then Christian faith can be held rationally (*de jure*) with or without supporting arguments or proofs. That is, if true, then Christian belief is 'properly basic', warranted, and, therefore, a genuine kind of knowledge. Moreover, it is the sort of knowledge one can rationally reason *from*, and not simply a conclusion one must reason *to*. Sections 3 and 4 then evaluate the ways Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's approaches to religious knowledge inform their definitions of theology, their decisions as to whether to consider theology a 'science' or not, and their ideas about what constitutes a 'scientific' field in the first place. Finally, section 5 contends that all three thinkers saw the need for a vibrant, rigorous practice of metanarrative criticism and debate at the heart of the university. Whether one conceives of such metanarrative discourse and debate as *Philosophie* but not *Theologie*, as Schleiermacher would have, or as (philosophical) theology, as Newman and Kuyper might have, will depend on how one's personal experience has shaped one's pre-theoretical 'intuition of the

infinite'. But, regardless, all three saw such intellectually rigorous metanarrative discourse (or 'god'-talk) as vital to the life of the university.

1. Varieties of Religious Experience, Ways of 'Believing Again'

Frederick Buechner (1970, p.3) once observed:

> At its heart most theology, like most fiction, is essentially autobiography. Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, Tillich, working out their systems in their own ways and in their own language, are all telling us the stories of their lives, and if you press them far enough, even at their most cerebral and forbidding, you find an experience of flesh and blood, a human face smiling or frowning or weeping or covering its eyes before something that happened once. What happened once may be no more than a child falling sick, a thunderstorm, a dream, and yet it made for the face and inside the face a difference which no theology can ever entirely convey or entirely conceal.

As a teenage boarding school student clandestinely reading Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment critics of Christianity, Schleiermacher concluded that his army chaplain father's traditional, supernaturalistic faith could not withstand their critique. But Schleiermacher still found Jesus personally compelling, Moravian piety moving, and the world mysteriously and transcendently beautiful. Behind his extensive project of modernizing theological revisionism is his long attempt to explain himself to himself and others.

The teenage Newman, too, fell under the spell of Enlightenment criticism reading Thomas Paine and David Hume. But Newman's adolescent skepticism was overcome when he experienced an idiosyncratic evangelical conversion, being captivated by a vision of the ancient Church and a clear 'impression of dogma' as true, good, and beautiful. A modern man with a religious imagination shaped more by the Fathers than by either the Reformers or Thomas

Aquinas, much less the Enlightenment, Newman was a misfit practically wherever he went, including Pius IX's increasingly ultramontane and Neo-Scholastic Roman church. Not until he was made a Cardinal and the 'cloud' of suspicion over him was lifted did he, at last, feel accepted and at home. So much of what he wrote can be read as his attempts to secure his place in the communities and institutions in which he found himself by reshaping them to suit his fundamentally Patristic image of God.

As a cocky undergraduate Kuyper fell under the spell not of Kant or Hume but of the liberal theological anti-supernaturalist revisionism—inspired in part by Schleiermacher—then sweeping through Dutch academia. But Kuyper, too, underwent an atypical evangelical conversion when an Anglo-Catholic romantic novel pricked his conscience, convicted him of his intellectual pride, and captured his imagination with a compelling portrayal of Christian self-sacrifice and traditional, liturgical Christianity. As a young pastor, Kuyper was again shocked to discover that his simple but staunchly conservative Calvinist parishioners had a firmer grasp on theology than he did with his newly-minted doctorate. Kuyper became his parishioners' pupil, rediscovered the power of classically Reformed Christianity, and ever after was a defender of Calvinism's relevance to the modern world and of the dignity of 'the little people'.

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's responses to these seminal experiences set the courses of their lives and of their thought. Despite their manifest differences, they held some vital things in common: All three saw themselves in what Schleiermacher described as an 'immediate existential relationship' with God (*OG*, p.40) and Newman described as an immediate awareness of 'two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator' (*APVS*, I.2, p.25). Kuyper's philosophy of 'sphere sovereignty' animated his respect for

the sanctity of the individual's immediate relationship to God (e.g., *LoC*, I, pp.22, 31). Whereas Schleiermacher described our consciousness of this relationship as our 'feeling of absolute dependence' upon the 'Whence' of our being, Newman and Kuyper understood this consciousness—conscience –as our sense of moral accountability to a holy, just, inescapable, and *personal* God. But amidst a modern culture that was reducing all of reality to immanent and natural causes while explaining away such experiences as mere projections, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all rested their existential weight on their deep but intermittent senses of a transcendence that was nearer to them than their own breath.[146]

In short, all three were 'modern believers' in the sense that they chose some version of Christian faith amidst 'the emergence of open unbelief as an intellectually viable and socially acceptable option in the nineteenth century' (Lundin, 2009, p.4). As Roger Lundin (ibid., p.7) writes: 'To be a modern believer is to recognize that in the deepest personal sense, belief is optional; whatever a person is able to accept and affirm he or she is also free to reject and deny.' All three, each in his own way, chose to 'believe again' having thoroughly absorbed and grappled with the modern critique of Christianity. As W.H. Auden (citing G.C. Lichtenburg) observed, 'there is… "a great difference between believing something *still* and believing it *again*"' (ibid., p.4). As Lundin argues, '[in] one form or another, all of us today are what Robert Langbaum calls "romanticists"' (2009, p.7). To be a 'romanticist' in Langbaum's sense is not so much to be defined by 'this or that political, philosophical, religious or even aesthetic commitment', but to be marked by 'the subjective ground of his commitment, the fact that he never forgets his commitment has

[146] Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*, 3.6.11.

been chosen' (ibid., pp.7-8). All three chose to believe in transcendence in the teeth of an immanentizing intellectual culture.

They were also, in one way or another, Roman*tics*. All three agreed that our most basic consciousness of reality—including God's reality—is *poetic*, that poetry is insight's native language, and that the more sophisticated our theoretical articulations of the faith are, the more remote they become from the religious consciousness that initially inspired them. On one level, this sensibility reflects their shared inheritance in the Christian theological tradition which had always recognized the necessarily analogical (i.e., metaphorical) nature of our theological language. But on another level, this sensibility reflects the fact that all three were, to one degree or another, influenced by Romanticism. This Romantic influence is reflected in their literary outputs as well as their philosophical outlooks: Schleiermacher and Newman wrote fiction (e.g., *Christmas Eve Celebration*; *Loss & Gain*) while Newman and Kuyper wrote poetry (e.g., *The Dream of Gerontius*; '*Voor mij, één zucht beheerscht mijn leven*' [My life is ruled by but one passion]). Schleiermacher, of course, is remembered as *the* theologian of German Romanticism (**Ch.I.1.1.3.**) and a member of the Jena Circle. Newman's debt to Wordsworth and especially Coleridge is readily discernible (see Barr and Skinner, 2018, p.404; Prickett, 2018, pp.578ff). Kuyper, shaped as he was by the *Réveil* (Bolt, 2001, p.47), held that the poet's true gift was not just expression but *insight*, an ability to *discern* unseen truths beneath the veil of the visible world as well as to communicate them. Moreover, Kuyper and the subsequent Neo-Calvinist tradition's reliance on organic language to describe God's mode of creating and relating to creation, the interrelationships of creatures, the nature of the Church, and more, all reflect the influence of

the Romantic movement on Neo-Calvinism (see Brock and Sutanto, 2022, pp.9-10).[147] Organic metaphors played an equally prominent role in Newman's account of doctrinal development. But the point to be underscored here is that all three understood 'believing again' in a modern, rapidly secularizing age to involve more than elaborating a theological theory. It required exercising a countercultural Christian imagination to inhabit an entire alternative world, complete with a distinct way of life and its own internal logical and organic structure. These were all lessons taken from Romanticism.

Lastly, all three agreed, too, that modern, secular people were far more 'religious' than they often realized and sought to remind moderns that they had also chosen their commitments, even if not always consciously. At its heart, almost all 'secular' philosophy is essentially autobiography too. Part of Schleiermacher's genius was his observation that the atheist's 'intuition' that the 'infinite' is nothing but cold, impersonal nature is no less of a 'religious' intuition than the intuition that the cosmos is created and sustained by God or identical with the divine (as in theism or pantheism). Indeed, Schleiermacher and Newman share the conception of 'religion' as a 'poetic' apprehension, 'impression', or 'intuition' of ultimate reality ('the infinite' or 'the Absolute' in Schleiermacher's parlance), and that the *irreligious* are guided by such visceral, poetic intuitions just as much as the devout are. Kuyper, likewise, insisted that 'Modernism' was itself a particular 'life-system'—a distinct way of relating humanity, God, and the world to each other—built upon contingent and questionable 'principles', and not a

[147] When Kuyper talks about 'world-and-life-views' as 'life-systems' in *LoC*, the kinds of *systems* he is imagining are more *organic* than mechanical.

religiously neutral standpoint (*LoC*, pp.9-12, 23-24). Thus, modern secularity is not *non*religion but a particular *kind* of religiosity in Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's reckoning.

Despite these significant similarities between our interlocutors, their different experiences and choices led them to adopt drastically different modes of 'believing again' in the modern world, building their theological outlooks and their lives on drastically different foundations: Newman and Kuyper on divinely revealed ontological foundations (TOF), Schleiermacher on the foundations of Enlightenment 'Reason' and supposedly universal human experiences (EEF). The choice—or the *divergence*—between these two intellectual starting points is an inherently existential one, as one's personal experience inevitably shapes one's perspective. Each rested on what they intuitively thought would provide the surest basis for life and thought given their formative experiences. But as with any building, the shape and substance of one's foundations delimits what can plausibly be built upon it, and some foundations make for sturdier and grander edifices than others. It is to a comparative analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these edifices that we now turn.

2. How Can We Rationally 'Believe Again'? EEF versus TOF

When Anselm of Canterbury, writing between 1077 and 1078, subtitled his magnum opus, the *Proslogion*, 'faith seeking understanding' (*fides quaerens intellectum*), he famously crystalized a theme that had been present in mainstream Christian thought since at least the patristic period. For the first four centuries, mainstream Christian thought proceeded upon the basis of a revealed theocentric ontological picture of the world rather than upon the egocentric epistemological

basis of inferences from sense experience, or aspects of consciousness, or individual's intuitions. And whereas EEFoundationalists tend to treat unaided human reason as a *regulative* faculty—as the final court of appeal for truth claims—ancient Christians generally treated reason as a critical *receptive* faculty; a capacity for receiving such things as revelation, sense experiences, or testimonies, and then reconciling them to one another to form a coherent conception of the world. The traditional word for reason's reception of revelation is 'faith' (Greek: πίστις; Latin: *fides*). Whereas Newman and Kuyper self-consciously took their bearings from this traditional Christian TOFoundationalist paradigm, Schleiermacher chose the EEFoundationalist *Wissenschaftsideologie* then dominating Germany's post-Enlightenment intellectual scene as his guideline. We turn now to an evaluation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these basic outlooks as starting points for Christian theology.

2.1. Schleiermacher: Religion within the Bounds of Feeling and Reason?

While Schleiermacher began from the standpoint of someone who fundamentally accepted the Enlightenment critique of historic Christianity while still retaining his affections for the tradition, he *sought* to adopt the supposedly universal, pre-theoretical, human 'feeling of absolute dependence' (*allgemeine Abhängigsgefühl*) as his intellectual and theological starting point. In short, rather than starting from inherited dogmas, he sought to theologize as an EEFoundationalist.

EEF seeks to begin from an objective, universalizable standpoint from which one can work out an epistemically secure understanding of the world. But, as we have seen, Schleiermacher

clearly saw EEF's limits and understood that some perspectival pluralism and particularity were ineliminable, including formally irresolvable differences in people's fundamental religious outlooks. Thus, he defined philosophy—the 'Lord' of the sciences—as the art of deliberation between conflicting perspectives in common pursuit of 'the Absolute': *Dialektik*. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Schleiermacher from trying to begin from a universalistic view from nowhere to pursue a universal *wissenschaftlich* consensus.

Whereas Newman and Kuyper's experiences induced them to theologize based on a fundamental trust in the Church's witness to God's objective self-revelation, Schleiermacher took our subjective religious consciousness to be a *firmer* (egocentric epistemological) foundation for Christian theologizing than the theocentric, ontological claims of the Scriptures. Thus, Schleiermacher sought to arrive independently at essentially Christian conclusions relying on his own deductions from his subjective religious consciousness, but he resisted beginning where Christian theology had traditionally begun, with the apostolic witness to the risen Christ.

In trying to articulate a Christian theology grounded in personal 'intuitions of the infinite'—a 'religion within the bounds of *feeling* alone' (Merklinger)—Schleiermacher was also attempting to articulate a religion which fit safely within the bounds of Enlightenment *'Reason'*, lest Christianity be ruled irrational by its cultured despisers. Indeed, it was largely for this reason that Newman deemed (what he knew of) Schleiermacher's approach to the Trinity to be a textbook case of 'Rationalism' (**Ch.II.3.2.1.**). Despite having only second-hand knowledge of Schleiermacher's trinitarianism, Newman identified the principal difference between their theological epistemologies and, perhaps, the principal weakness in Schleiermacher's theological project. Schleiermacher describes the Trinity as 'the coping-stone of Christian doctrine' (*CF*,

§170.1, p.739),[148] but, consistent with his egocentric epistemological starting point, he believes the doctrine must be reestablished for modern Christians not upon the basis of God's objective self-revelation in Christ, but upon the basis of 'the Christian self-consciousness.' Schleiermacher contended that this introspective (EEFoundationalist) mode of establishing the doctrine of the Trinity would furnish the orthodox doctrine with a *sturdier* basis than would exegetical appeals. For instance, says Schleiermacher, appeals to John's prologue fail to convince because the prologue is entirely open to an Arian interpretation (*CF*, §170.2, pp.739-40).[149] Other Biblical texts traditionally adduced in support of the orthodox (Athanasian) doctrine of the Trinity could be interpreted equally well along Sabellian lines, he argues (*CF,* §172, p.750). Schleiermacher insisted that the Church only felt the need to develop a Trinitarian doctrine much later in her history, 'only after the distinction [between God-in-Christ and God *per se*] had been eternalized and made antecedent to the union [of God with Christ]', and that 'of such a need there is in John no trace whatever, which means that he was not on the way to the doctrine of the Trinity as we have it' (*CF*, §170.2, p.740). Schleiermacher denies that Scripture itself provides any impetus or support for orthodox Trinitarianism.

Schleiermacher concedes, too, that the idea 'of an eternal distinction within the Supreme Being' is not a datum of our religious self-consciousness, insisting that from there 'it never could emerge' (*CF* §170.2, p.739). Indeed, it is hard to see how our religious self-consciousness could possibly discern any such distinction if it is not even capable of discriminating between Theism,

[148] On one level, this declaration problematizes the typical 'neo-orthodox' allegation that Schleiermacher gave the doctrine of the Trinity short shrift. On another level, it does not address it, as Schleiermacher tries to approach the Trinity phenomenologically whereas the 'neo-orthodox' tended to treat the Trinity as an ontological reality from which to make sense of our experience.

[149] Strikingly, this is the sole reference to Arianism in *The Christian Faith*. Equally strikingly, Schleiermacher does not count Arianism among the heresies that Christology must avoid (*CF,* §22; cf. *ICE*, pp.54-57).

Pantheism, and Naturalism with any confidence. All of this reinforces the impression that Schleiermacher conceives of God as a silent, impersonal 'Whence' of being rather than as the God of Abraham who makes promises and issues commands, who from eternity has never been without a Word, and who has spoken definitively in, through, and *as* Jesus of Nazareth. It is altogether unclear how such an EEFoundationalist approach could ever arrive at anything like historically orthodox Trinitarianism or a Chalcedonian Christology.

Nor is it clear how such an EEFoundationlist approach, built from one's subjective 'feeling of absolute dependence' up, could ever explain the actual contours of the Christian tradition. This point was well made by Karl Barth, who was by turns sympathetic to and sharply critical of Schleiermacher. In the postscript to his 1923-24 Göttingen Lectures on Schleiermacher's theology he wrote:

> … I can see no way from Schleiermacher…to the chroniclers, prophets, and wise ones of Israel, to those who narrate the story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, to the word of the apostles—no way to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the Father of Jesus Christ, no way to the great tradition of the Christian church. For the present I can see nothing but a choice. And for me there can be no question as to how that choice is to be made. (1982, pp.271-72)

It is easy to see how one might begin with historically orthodox Christianity, whittling it down, doctrine by doctrine, until one arrives at a bare 'feeling of absolute dependence' or a profound (but vague) 'intuition of the infinite'. But it is very difficult to see how one might plausibly work one's way up from such profoundly vague experiences to a specific affirmation of the Apostles' Creed. In Lindbeck's terminology, Schleiermacher's 'experiential-expressivist' theory of religious origins is implausible as an account of specifically *Christian* origins. It is impossible to explain the emergence of the historic 'cultural-linguistic' specificities of ordinary Christian religion—whether witnessed in the documents of the New Testament or in the subsequent literature and liturgies

of the ancient Church—solely in terms of the impression Jesus' spiritual virtuosity might have made on His disciples. Consequently, Schleiermacher's EEFoundationalist attempt to reconstruct Christianity using only the materials of subjective (or intersubjective) experience renders the connection between such pious feelings and their specific traditional expressions extremely tenuous.

Another consequence of Schleiermacher's 'defensive modernization' was a privatization and interiorization of Christian piety impossible to square with the apostolic witness.[150] This contrast between faith and reason—which Schleiermacher advocated as an 'eternal covenant' between religion and science—has underpinned what John Milbank has termed 'the Liberal Protestant metanarrative' ever since, and which has, according to Nicholas Lash, become the 'organizing narrative' of modern culture more broadly (see **Ch.VI.2.**). For some, these sorts of tradeoffs are a small price to pay to be able to reasonably 'believe again' under modern conditions. For Newman and Kuyper, however, not only did the price of such religious modernization seem too high, but they also suspected that this project of such modernization to be itself a bill of goods, and, so, they didn't buy it.

2.2. Newman & Kuyper: Reason within the Bounds of Religion?

For Newman and Kuyper, God is decidedly *not* inarticulate. Christianity just *is* revelation. Revelation is a '*fact*', and in it we hear the voice of God. We hear God's voice echoed in our

[150] Oliver O'Donovan argues that Schleiermacher's 'romantic theology bequeathed us a wholly unbiblical contrast of faith and reason, in place of the New Testament contrast of faith and sight' (1994, p.78).

conscience. We see something of his power and divine nature reflected in nature and something of His character reflected even in fallen human cultures. In revelation, we not only receive information about God but encounter God Himself. For both Newman and Kuyper, God speaks to us in our consciences and our inborn *sensus divinitatis* in the Spirit-guided teaching of the Church (the Roman Catholic Church according to Newman, the church catholic according to Kuyper), in Scripture, and superlatively in the person of Jesus Christ. We have revealed knowledge of God, not mere impressions or intuitions; divinely established 'facts,' not mere hunches. Crucially, Newman and Kuyper did not arrive at these convictions through a supposedly neutral process of detached reasoning. Rather, these beliefs are some of the fundamental presuppositions that shaped all their thinking after they were arrested by the gospel, albeit under very different circumstances.

Both Newman and Kuyper unabashedly began their theorizing from their standpoints as convinced Christians: Newman as one who had experienced an 'inward conversion' of which he was 'more certain' 'than that I have hands and feet' (*APVS*, p.25); Kuyper as one who was 'apprehended' by the unadorned, plainspoken witness to the 'Word of reconciliation' in the lives of ordinary Christians which he ever after regarded as an experience of *palingenesis* (*LoC*, vi). Thus, in their own ways, Newman and Kuyper began theologizing as TOFoundationalists, building upon the particularities of Christian revelation as understood within, mediated by, and received from their respective traditions.

This aspect of Newman and Kuyper's theological epistemologies has received a fresh articulation and defense in the philosophical outlook that has come to be called 'Reformed

Epistemology' (hereafter, RE).[151] Pioneered by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Alvin Plantinga, over the last forty years RE has transformed the field of Anglo-American Philosophy of Religion, requiring grudging respect even from philosophers who ultimately reject it. Indeed, RE has contributed to a renaissance of philosophical theology by freeing Christian philosophers from being overconcerned with developing arguments defending theism and Christianity and allowing them instead to confidently explore wider questions about the philosophical articulation and implications of theism and Christianity. As Craig Bartholomew (2017, p.263) notes: 'At the heart of Reformed epistemology is the Kuyperian insight that one can be thoroughly rational in taking belief in God as properly basic in one's scholarship.' In fact, Kuyper's theological epistemology significantly shaped Wolterstorff and Plantinga's development of RE.[152] Both philosophers grew up in the Dutch, Neo-Calvinist denomination of the Christian Reformed Church of North America (CRCNA). Both studied and later taught at the denomination's flagship school, Calvin College (now Calvin University), with Wolterstorff graduating in 1953 and Plantinga in 1954. As Wolterstorff recounts in his (2019) memoir, Kuyper's influence powerfully shaped both the denomination and the college as well as Plantinga and Wolterstorff themselves.[153] I suggest that RE represents a surprising point of convergence between and vindication of Newman and Kuyper's thought on religious epistemology.

[151] Stephen Grimm (2001) and Sandra Menssen and Thomas Sullivan (2007, pp.7-10) note the similarity between Newman's outlook and that of Reformed Epistemologists.

[152] Kuyper's theology also influenced the 'Reformational philosophy' of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) and D. Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) which has contributed considerably to Neo-Calvinist thought about politics and culture. However, Reformational philosophy's impact on the philosophical guild more broadly has been negligible. For a helpful discussion of this sub-tradition, see Bartholomew (2017, pp.253-60).

[153] In addition to the works of Plantinga and Wolterstorff, the seminal works of 'Reformed Epistemology' include those of William P. Alston (1991) and Kelly James Clark (1990).

Plantinga and Wolterstorff launched the RE movement with *Faith & Rationality* (1983), a seminal collection of essays which challenged the 'metaepistemology' they called 'Classical foundationalism' (hereafter, CF). CF is the common assumption that to be rational, religious belief needs to be based upon arguments or evidence. In that volume's lead essay, Plantinga explicitly cited Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck, and Barth (pp.72, 88-89) as exponents of the epistemological position that Plantinga, Wolterstorff, et al set out to defend: That religious beliefs could be properly basic (i.e., could rationally be held non-inferentially as parts of one's epistemic base or foundation). As Bartholomew summarizes, **CF** allows that only the following kinds of beliefs can be properly basic:

> 1. Self-evident beliefs; that is, beliefs that are seen to be true simply by understanding them. 2+1 = 3 is an example of a self-evident belief….
> 2. Incorrigible beliefs; that is, beliefs that one could not be mistaken in holding.
> 3. Some CFs have held that beliefs formed on the basis of sense experience are basic. (Bartholomew, 2017, p.262; cf. van der Kooi and van den Brink, 2017, pp.163-64)

Such 'basic' beliefs, on CF, are 'foundational'; they 'do not require arguments or evidence for them to be held rationally' (ibid., p.261). The rest of our beliefs, to be warranted, must be believed based on our properly foundational beliefs (ibid., pp.261-62). In short, 'Basic beliefs do not require evidence, while nonbasic beliefs do' (ibid). The sort of Evidentialism that Newman criticized was recognizably a variety of CF as was the *Wissenschaftsideologie* embraced by Schleiermacher.

2.2.1. Problems with Classical Foundationalism

Newman rejected naïve Evidentialist versions of CF on the grounds that such conceptions of epistemic warrant suffer from an infinite regress problem.[154] To be consistent, they require proofs of proofs and evidence for supporting evidence *ad infinitum*. Newman contended that consistently reasoning in this way is impossible and so no one *lives* by this epistemological policy. CF, in Newman's terms, is utterly 'unreal,' a mere 'paper' theory, at best. Ultimately, said Newman, everyone begins their reasoning from 'first principles', some of which are indubitable but many of which are disputable; intuitions, instincts, impressions, 'implicit reasons' which are unproven and often unprovable. Moreover, the act of reasoning does not consist in an interminable chain of proofs of proofs but, rather, is fundamentally an act of subjective judgment (that is, of 'the illative sense'). There is no one-size-fits-all epistemic foundation from which Evidentialists or other types of Classical Foundationalists can require everyone to reason.

Newman's critique of CF relied primarily on this infinite regress argument and on CF's general 'unreality'. But, as advocates of RE have shown, CF is plagued with many more problems. In his book, *Reason within the Bounds of Religion*, Nicholas Wolterstorff (1984) catalogues two sets of difficulties with CF. The first has to do with 'explaining what constitutes justification of theory by foundation' (pp.35ff). Some overly restrictive standards of justification (e.g., deductivism) make it impossible to accept universal claims about physical objects (e.g., 'all swans have wings' or 'all humans are mortal') as warranted. Slightly looser standards (e.g., probabilism) rest upon assumptions (e.g., the uniformity of nature) which are neither 'self-evident' nor 'incorrigible' and so cannot defensibly be counted amongst one's properly basic beliefs.

[154] On Newman's infinite regress argument, see Ferreira (1986, pp.154-56).

CF's second set of difficulties has to do with 'finding enough propositions to belong to the foundation' (pp.46ff). Even if someone were to devise a workable foundationalist theory of epistemic justification, there are too few self-evident or 'incorrigible' beliefs to build upon. Sense perceptions, appearances, intuitions, testimonies, memories—all are subject to doubt, and none can be corroborated or corrected except by appeal to other equally dubitable beliefs. Thus, little of what we ordinarily think of as knowledge (e.g., that I am sitting at my desk, am 42 years old, am married) and even less of what we tend to think of as 'science' lies within epistemic reach of CF. Thus, the fruit of CF is not surer knowledge but radical scepticism.

In sum, as Plantinga (2000, p.436) put it: 'Such Christian thinkers as Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Kuyper…recognize that there aren't any certain foundations of the sort Descartes sought—or, if there are, they are exceedingly slim, and there is no way to transfer their certainty to our important nonfoundational beliefs about material objects, the past, other persons, and the like.' To Plantinga's list of Christian's who saw through the CF project, I would add Newman.

2.2.2. Internalism vs. Externalism, De Jure *vs*. De Facto *Objections*

The CF challenged by RE is a variety of EEF, as CF too places 'the locus of knowledge' in 'the human knower', namely in the knower's self-evident and incorrigible beliefs and in those beliefs which are inferentially derivable therefrom. EEF assumes what Alvin Plantinga calls 'Internalism'. 'The basic internalist idea,' Plantinga (1993b, p.5) explains, 'is that what determines whether a belief is warranted for a person are factors or states in some sense internal to that person'. Internalism requires that these factors or states be *epistemically* internal to the subject or

cognizer. Plantinga contrasts Internalism with Externalism which allows that some warrant-conferring conditions for beliefs might themselves lie beyond our conscious awareness and may not be epistemically accessible to us at all.

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all believed in 'the sociality of reason', and held that rational exchange is necessary to greater understanding. However, unlike Schleiermacher, neither Newman nor Kuyper thought rational exchange was sufficient to foster greater understanding. Kuyper, for instance, held that all claims to knowledge require an (tacit, often unacknowledged) act of faith because we must trust that these epistemic externalities cooperate with and do not vitiate our understanding of the world. In Kuyper's language, we must trust that the human mind has 'an organic affinity with its object' if truth is to be at all accessible to us. Hence, Kuyper rejected EEF's wholesale Internalism, acknowledging that any understanding of epistemology must allow for some degree of Externalism.

Kuyper held that the 'organic affinity' between the human mind and the rest of creation (which preconditions our knowledge of creation) was an aspect of humanity's being made in the *imago Dei*. Following Calvin, Kuyper also held that we are created with an innate *sensus divinitatis* whereby we know something of our Creator as well. Our knowledge of both creation and God have been partially impaired by the 'noetic effects' of the Fall, argued Kuyper, but through the healing, clarifying ministrations of the Holy Spirit, we can come to see God for who He is in the truth of the gospel. Kuyper called this operation of the Spirit *palingenesis* to underscore its restorative dimensions, but Calvin called it *internum testimonium Spiritus Sancti* to underscore its certificatory role vis-à-vis the gospel. Of course, the internal experiences that Kuyper identified with the *sensus divinitatis* and the *internum testimonium Spiritus Sancti* only give rise to

warranted true beliefs if Christianity is, in fact, true. That is, they depend on a whopping epistemic externality. However, if Christianity is true, then such beliefs would be warranted in a basic, non-inferential way. Christians would thus believe in God and the gospel rationally whether they had arguments for these elemental religious beliefs or not.

The essentially Kuyperian position outlined above receives a rigorous philosophical articulation and defense in Alvin Plantinga's magisterial *Warranted Christian Belief* (2000), where he dubbed this basic view 'the extended Aquinas/Calvin model' (hereafter the 'A/C model'), having found precedent for it in the writings of both Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin.[155] I suggest it may be dubbed the extended Aquinas/Calvin/Newman/Kuyper model, and, indeed, Plantinga explicitly draws upon both Newman (pp.97, 454-55) and Kuyper (pp.423, 436, 489) at key points in his argument.[156] There is good reason to think of something like this model as being the classical paradigm for relating faith to reason within the Christian tradition.

The upshot of Plantinga's (2000) argument is that for the critic of Christianity to impugn the *rationality* of Christian belief *de jure*, she must adduce an argument for the falsehood of Christianity *de facto*. Plantinga writes:

> Among objections to Christian belief, we can distinguish between *de facto* objections and *de jure* objections, i.e., between those that claim that Christian belief is false (*de facto* objections) and those that claim that Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any rate unjustifiable, or rationally unjustified, or irrational, or not intellectually respectable, or in some other way rationally unacceptable (*de jure* objections). (ibid., p.135)

[155] Here is further reason to identify this basic view with mainstream Christian tradition. As Plantinga (2000, p.170) notes, 'anything on which Calvin and Aquinas are in accord is something to which we had better pay careful attention'.

[156] Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, and especially Jonathan Edwards all come into Plantinga's argument as well.

Here we might think of the scholar who claims to be agnostic as to whether Christianity is true (*de facto*) but insists that, true or not, Christian belief is unwarranted (*de jure*) and is irrelevant to or inappropriate to bring into serious academic consideration. However, if Christianity is true, Plantinga argues, then both generally theistic and specifically Christian belief are warranted in a properly basic way and so should be brought to bear upon the Christian's theorizing wherever it is relevant.[157]

2.2.3. Ordinary Religion

One implication of Plantinga and Wolterstorff's analyses is that the Christian scholar does not need to adduce arguments for Christianity to be well within her intellectual rights to think Christianly in any subject area to which she sets her mind. But not only the Christian scholar. Another implication of RE is that the faith of ordinary Christian believers can be perfectly rational whether they can muster arguments for their faith or not. Typically, as Cornelis van der Kooi and Gijsbert van den Brink (2017, p.163) explain:

> when people believe in God, it is not because they first of all studied the epistemological foundations for their faith and then came to the correct conclusion by a logical process. We have faith long before we try to test its foundations; we first believe mostly on the testimony of people whom we have usually found to be credible. For instance, our (grand)parents, our pastor, or our teacher in the first grade. In combination with certain faith experiences and interpretations, this experience suffices for most people. They do not embark on a study of the trustworthiness of the sources of the revelation of their faith but live in accordance with the faith that has spontaneously presented itself through the faith community.

[157] One implication of Plantinga's argument is that the sceptic who wants to show Christian faith to be irrational or unwarranted needs to show that Christianity is in fact untrue, not simply that it is unproven.

The contribution of Plantinga and Wolterstorff is that they 'have convinced many that, from the perspective of epistemology…, there is nothing amiss with this manner of believing' (ibid).

Thus, RE amounts to a vigorous defense of Newman and Kuyper's basically positive views of the epistemic status of laypeople's faith, as well as of the classical Christian paradigm of *fides quaerens intellectum*.[158] Schleiermacher's constructivist, 'cultural-linguistic' construal of ordinary religion may well still be true, but only if the classical paradigm is fundamentally false. That the classical paradigm is false is something Schleiermacher assumes rather than argues, having absorbed the skeptical arguments of Kant and traditional Christianity's other 'cultured despisers'.

2.3. The Persistence of Pluralism: Rational Exchange Amid Fundamental Differences

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all understood that we inevitably approach the world from different standpoints, 'intuitions of the infinite', 'first principles', 'presumptions', 'worldviews' and that 'reason' is less something that we possess individually than something we must *do* together by engaging in what Schleiermacher called 'the art of dialogue' (*Kunst der Gerprächsführung*).'[159] While they all ultimately agreed that none of us theorizes from a neutral standpoint and that pluralism will always be with us, none of them were wholesale relativists. Each believed that some perspectives were more cogent, more satisfying, more explanatorily powerful than others.

[158] See especially Newman's 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine' and Kuyper's constant defense of the faith of the 'little people' (*de kleine luyden*) against the disparagement of skeptical elites.
[159] Cf., Sarah Schmidt (2024, pp.137ff).

However, Newman and Kuyper differed with Schleiermacher over the epistemic status of our nonconsensual beliefs. For Schleiermacher, we only know what we can all come to agree on, I can only claim to *know* what I can prove to others, and, consequently, I must consign my 'religious' beliefs to the realm of mere 'feeling'. Newman and Kuyper, by contrast, held that I can genuinely know more than I can prove, and that religious faith is a fundamental form of knowledge even if it is not universally accepted. For Schleiermacher, religion is an experience *about which* I can theorize from a scientific standpoint while for Newman and Kuyper religion is itself a standpoint *from which* I can theorize scientifically. The logic of Schleiermacher's position pushes religious minorities to privatize their beliefs while the logic of Newman and Kuyper's pushes them to integrate their beliefs with their other knowledges.

Schleiermacher believed that through the process of dialectical exchange our thinking would gradually approach consensus and so come to more closely approximate 'the Absolute'. He assumed, however, that for the time being fundamental perspectival differences would be a persistent feature of university life. Moreover, Schleiermacher identified multiple dividing lines which would be constants of 'religious' life. First, he held that there were two kinds of people: the rare religious virtuosi whose insight and eloquence can generate religious cultures, and the rest of us, the religious plebs who must inhabit the traditions that the virtuosi generate. Second, the virtuosi, too, could differ in their fundamental 'intuitions of the infinite' (e.g., *OR*, II, pp.22-4). Third, Schleiermacher believed in a sort of 'regeneration' (or 'conversion') that results from 'the quiescent self-consciousness, looking at itself reflected in thought and finding a consciousness of God included there' (*CF*, §107, p.479). Correspondingly, he maintained a belief in the noetic effects of sin: 'sin invariably brings with it a diminution of God-consciousness, and

therefore of the divine impartation [of peak God-consciousness in Jesus Christ]' (*CF*, §169, p.735). Together, these fundamental differences practically guarantee that religious pluralism would be a persistent feature of the human condition.

Newman argued that there are often asymmetries in our epistemic situations that mean that I can *have* more reasons for believing than I can readily *give* to others who are not similarly epistemically situated, especially skeptical others. And, as we have seen, both Kuyper and Newman held that Christian faith could constitute genuine knowledge even without supporting rational arguments (**1.2.** above). Newman and Kuyper refused to discount traditional Christian faith as genuine knowledge and theology as genuine science simply because they could not convince many of their peers of either. Thus, they accepted a chastened view of what rational argument could achieve. Newman and Kuyper both held that rational argument is often powerless to resolve fundamental perspectival differences between disputants.

For Kuyper, the Spirit's work of *palingenesis* partially heals fallen humanity's distorted inborn *sensus divinitatis*. Therefore, there are fundamentally two kinds of people: those who have been 'born again' and know the good shepherd's voice, and those who have not and do not. The former see Jesus for who He is and believe, while the rest do not. Like Newman, Kuyper held that everyone's thought arises from the matrices of 'first principles' (*beginselen*) or core convictions which form our 'world*views*' and shape our thought and action. This holds as much for non-Christians as for Christians. But the experience of *palingenesis* creates a fundamental asymmetry between the epistemic situations of the Christian and the non-Christian. Thus, 'Scripture knows nothing of *allgemeingültigkeit*, as if truth were only that to which all must agree,' he argued. 'On the contrary, Scripture clearly declares that the wisdom and the

knowledge that the world derives from its own principles stand directly opposed to true science, and that the difference between the wisdom of the world, which is foolishness to God, and the science that holds true for Him comes from the difference in spirit in the investigating subject' (*AK:CR*, p.457). Both Newman and Kuyper expected orthodoxy to be the minority view in many contexts but denied that this constituted a reason for barring religious considerations from bearing on other subjects.

3. What Makes 'Theology' Theological?

Newman and Kuyper's self-consciously traditional accounts of theology as the 'science' of God likewise diverge sharply from Schleiermacher's more modest account of *Theologie* as a mere *positive Wissenschaft*. Having embraced the modernist *Wissenschaftsideologie* and its underlying EEF, Schleiermacher rejected the idea that *Theologie* was a *'*pure' or basic 'science' providing demonstrable knowledge of a discrete object. Instead, Schleiermacher reduced *Theologie* to a sophisticated, even technical sort of *know-how* that applies knowledge drawn from the *'*pure sciences' (e.g., philology, metaphysics, psychology) to the practical work of 'church leadership' (*Kirchenleitung*) which he understood to be the curation and cultivation of the sorts of 'god-consciousness' (*Gottesbewusstsein*) which draw and bind ecclesial/religious communities together.

In contrast, Newman and Kuyper, despite their obvious differences, both argued that theology is a true science on a par with the 'hardest' of the natural sciences. Science, they argued, is simply the methodical, rational systematization of knowledge (**Ch.IV.3**), and theology is the

science (of our knowledge) *of God*. Newman and Kuyper both understood theology to have been made possible by God's decisive self-revelation in Jesus Christ as witnessed by the Scriptures, brought home to our hearts by the Holy Spirit, and attested to by the Church down the ages. While Newman's categorical but creative (and, perhaps, reluctant) embrace of the Pope's infallibility stands in marked contrast to Kuyper's 'critical reception' of Reformed orthodoxy, both understood theology to be a progressive science, gradually unfolding the meaning of God's self-revelation in Christ over many generations through the oftentimes labyrinthine and contentious deliberations of the Church.

3.1. Schleiermacher: The Practical Science of 'God-Consciousness' Formation

Schleiermacher's chief justification for theology's continued inclusion among the university's faculties was that society (and therefore the state) has an interest in religious life being scientifically ordered just as it has an interest in medicine and law being scientifically ordered. Religion can obviously bear on public life in wholesome or damaging ways, and so Schleiermacher suggested that, as part of its responsibility to promote the commonweal, the university has a duty to cultivate a vital religion that keeps within its proper limits—that is, within 'Reason' and within 'feeling'. It is chiefly when religion exceeds these limits that it goes dangerously wrong.

Schleiermacher's account presupposes a conception of 'revelation' not as God's personal self-communication but rather as human intuitional ingenuity before an inscrutable infinite (**Ch.I.2.1.4.**). A 'revelation' for Schleiermacher is simply a new human insight into transcendence—a religious 'Eureka!' moment. Nothing more. On Schleiermacher's account

(**Ch.I.2.2.**), the 'Whence of our being' is awesome but inarticulate, majestic but mute. It requires the religious virtuoso to bring it to speech, poetry, hymnody, liturgy, confession, but 'the Absolute' does not (cannot?) speak for itself. Schleiermacher's 'infinite' requires us to make of it what we will, based ultimately on our own strongest intuitions. Our ultimate 'Whence' might be the Creator and we His creatures, or the One and we its emanations, or Nature and we its accidental byproducts. But the 'Whence' cannot tell us which. Before this silent infinitude it is ultimately impossible to adjudicate between Atheists', Theists', and Pantheists' mutually contradictory intuitions of what this cosmic 'Whence' most likely is and how we should relate to it (**Ch.I.2.1.3.**). Under these circumstances, the most we can hope to do is to nurture, preserve, explore, express, and elaborate those intuitions of the infinite—those forms of religious consciousness—that we personally and communally have found to be most salutary. Indeed, Schleiermacher argues that this is precisely what theology, construed as a *positive Wissenschaft*, is supposed to do for religious communities.

As should be clear, Schleiermacher does not begin from a neutral or universal standpoint. Not everyone believes God is silent. Newman and Kuyper certainly did not. Thus, underlying the divide between Schleiermacher, on the one hand, and Newman and Kuyper, on the other, on the question of the proper definition of 'theology' are fundamentally different ideas about what we know of God and how we know it. Conceptions of what 'theology' *is*, Christian or otherwise, are always motivated by pre-theoretical answers to certain basic questions: Who or what is 'God' or ultimate reality or 'the ground of being'? Can we know anything of God, and if so, how? If God is personal, has God revealed anything of Him or Herself to us? If so, what has He revealed and how has He revealed it? If God has revealed Himself to us, is that self-revelation immediately

comprehensible, or does it require some sort of preparation or authoritative interpretation to be understood? Our pre-theoretical answers are often inarticulate 'intuitions' or 'impressions' shaped by our experiences (**Ch.IV.1.**) before we can even formulate such basic questions.

3.2. Newman & Kuyper: The Science of God

For both Newman and Kuyper, theology begins from a posture of receptivity towards revealed knowledge. They take divine revelation as a given—or, better, as *gift* (**Ch.IV.1.2.**). This epistemic receptivity enables a greater degree of ontological confidence than is possible for thinkers who, like Schleiermacher, were wedded to the post-Enlightenment EEF at the core of the modern *Wissenschaftsideologie*. Proceeding on this fiduciary basis allows theology to be more than ecclesial shoptalk (i.e., how to scientifically curate the Church's 'God-consciousness') more than mere god-talk-talk (i.e., discourse about what others have said about God). It allows theology to be God-talk; to be discourse about the character, identity, action, and even nature of God, and all things in the light of God.

As Newman put it, 'by Theology, I simply mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system….' (*IU*, I.iii.7, p. 52). Likewise, Kuyper defined theology as 'that science which has the revealed knowledge of God as the object of its investigation and raises it to "understanding"'[160] (*EST*, §61, p.210). Both assume that theology proceeds from our properly basic or foundational knowledge of God's self-revelation to the work of organizing that

[160] Recall that 'understanding' for Kuyper is to systematically relate our diverse knowledges to one another. See **Ch. IV, 3.3.1.**

knowledge into a coherent understanding of who God is and the rest of reality in relation to Him. That is, what makes a discourse theological is not its use but rather its *object*: God as God has revealed Himself.

Indeed, Kuyper argued that God's self-revelation in Christ both informed the *content* of Christian theology and reshaped Christian *definitions* of theology. As Kuyper noted (*EST*, §57, pp.162-3), the compound words θεολογία, θεολόγος, θεολογείν and their relatives are found in Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Lucian, and other ancient writers but occur nowhere in Scripture.[161] In his *Encyclopaedia*, Kuyper meticulously traced the Church's gradual adoption and development of θεολογική language from their various pagan usages, through the transformations of the patristic period, to the dawn of the Middle Ages, all in response to God's redemptive self-revelation in Christ. He summarized his lengthy discussion thus:

> First the word was adopted from the pagan usage to indicate a speaking of the things that pertain to the gods or God, whether materially, as declarations of divine affairs, or simply formally, as speaking with dignity and with a certain unction. In the conflict about the divine nature of Christ the still living Grecian language-consciousness began to use the term θεολογείν actively in the sense of calling one God, and thereby θεολογία obtained gradually the significance of the confession of the Deity of Christ. Since the Christological conflict speedily assumed a Trinitarian character, and the confession of the Trinity hinged upon the acknowledgement of the Deity of Christ, Theology began gradually to be interpreted in the sense of the mystery of the Divine Essence as Trinitarian. And finally, by Theology there began to be understood that which is revealed to us concerning this mystery, since to this extent only we can deal with this mystery. At the point of history when the supremacy of the Church was transferred from the East to the West, and the living word θεολογία was lost in the dead barbarism *Theologia*, this Latin term was understood to mean the revealed knowledge of the mystery of the Threefold Being of God, and by no means a prosecution of Theological departments of study. (*EST*, §57, p.166)

[161] Kuyper cites Plato's *Republic* II.379a, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* X.6 (= 6.1026a) and *Metereology* II.1, but provides no specific citations for Lucian and Plutarch.

At the very heart of these lexical transformations are the New Testament's astounding material claims about God and Jesus. The apostolic gospel of the Word made flesh so reshaped Christians' use of θεολογική, language as to fundamentally change its meaning. For Christians, θεολογία, no longer connoted talk of the many, contingent, little 'g' 'gods' of paganism but rather talk of the capital 'G' God who is ultimate reality, the furthest horizon of meaning, the ground of all being, truth, beauty, and goodness. Thus, unsurprisingly, the reception history of the New Testament and the development of Christian theology's grammar and vocabulary—including the term θεολογία, itself—are deeply entangled.

In context, Kuyper's remark about theology not having been historically understood as 'a prosecution of Theological departments of study' was a parting shot at Schleiermacher. He initially embarked on his review of the Christian adoption and adaptation of θεολογική, language precisely in this section of his *Encyclopaedia* to show that Schleiermacher's 'psychologic-empiric line' departs drastically from historic Christian usage[162] (*EST*, §57, pp.161, 166). Schleiermacher's wariness about identifying theology as a 'pure' or basic science, and his reluctance to identify Christian theology too closely with historic Christological or Trinitarian orthodoxy, stemmed from his conviction that our elemental 'consciousness of absolute dependence' before an otherwise mute, underdetermined infinitude marks the unsurpassable horizon of theological reflection.[163] Newman and Kuyper could grant that Schleiermacher's account describes well our epistemic

[162] For Schleiermacher, what makes '*Theologie*' theological is not its object or its intellectual content per se, but rather *the use* to which that content is put. A discourse or inquiry is theological if it is intended to help cultivate a community's 'distinct formation of God-consciousness'. Theology is, in short, ecclesial shoptalk (**Ch.I.3.1.**). Schleiermacher formulated this ontologically chaste definition of theology precisely to reconcile the academic discipline of theology to the strictures of the then-ascendent post-Enlightenment *Wissenschaftsideologie* (**Ch.I.3.2.**).

[163] In Schleiermacher's conclusion to *The Christian Faith* (§170-72), he argues that the doctrine of the Trinity must be rethought from the ground up, the ground here being not God's objective action in Christ but the contours of the Christian's religious self-consciousness.

situation *apart from revelation*. But the Christian's epistemic situation is, in fact, quite different, having gratefully received God's self-revelation. Thus, Newman and Kuyper alike maintained that 'theology' is a science based not on our subjective or collective religious consciousnesses but on our knowledge of God's self-revelation.

4. What Makes Theology 'Scientific'?

Schleiermacher also parted with Newman and Kuyper over the question of whether theology was a 'science' and, if so, of what kind. In one sense, this was a very old question. Famously, it was the second question addressed in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*,[164] but Thomas was by no means the first to raise it. Peter Abelard (c.1079-1142) considered *theologia* a rigorous *disciplina* but not a *scientia* as he held that *scientia* is based upon empirical knowledge of sensible objects, but *theologia* is not. Theology, rather, is based upon faith (*fides*) and convictions (*existimatio*), not knowledge (*cognitio*). For this reason, William of Auxerre (d.1231) thought that to call *theologia* a *scientia* was to blasphemously reduce God to a finite object and to demean theology. Similar concerns were voiced by Richard Fishacre (c.1200-1248), and others (see Pannenberg, 1976, pp.228-35; Turner, 1997, pp.464ff). But the meanings of both key terms of the debate, *theologia* and *scientia*, were in flux throughout the medieval period—as they would again be throughout the nineteenth century—and the development of their definitions and demarcations were deeply entangled with each other.

[164] More precisely, Thomas asks whether *sacra doctrina* is a *scientia* rather than *theologia*. (*ST*, I, Q.1, Art. 2.)

In classical Latin usage, *scientia* had colloquially meant simply knowledge, intelligence, expertness, or skill. But in the medieval period *scientia* increasingly took on a narrower, more Aristotelian[165] definition which associated it with 'causal knowledge' (Wallace, 1972-74, vol. I, p.6, as cited in Moleski, 2000, p.130). Wallace explains:

> *Scientia est cognition per causas*. It was precisely on this basis that they differentiated *scientia* from other forms of knowledge: science was concerned with causes, whereas other types of knowing were not. To have scientific knowledge was to know perfectly, *scire simpliciter*, to know that something is so because it could not be otherwise than this, in turn, because of the causes that make it be as it is. Thus, the early understanding of science—from which the modern notion grew—was that it must be concerned with a search for causes. And the explanations for which science was ultimately searching, from its beginnings among the Greeks to the seventeenth century were causal explanations. (ibid.)

Scientia was the sort of objective knowledge of necessary and sufficient conditions that finite, fallible knowers could confidently pin down for themselves solely by the right use of reason. 'Early thirteenth century theologians like William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales and Bonventure were not convinced that theology was a science in the strict Aristotelian sense,' writes Wolfhart Pannenberg (1976, p.231). They instead preferred to call theology *sapientia*, for 'they thought this term united the theoretical and practical sides of theology in a striving towards the good' (ibid., p.232; cf. Turner, 1997, pp.466ff)

[165] Wallace explains:

> The superior kind of knowing that he [Aristotle] calls science (*epistēmē*) can only be achieved by one who can successfully identify the cause (*aitia*) that makes a fact (*pragma*) be what it is: he must know the cause from which the fact results, as the cause of the fact and no other, and accordingly the fact cannot be otherwise. Causes thus function for Aristotle as reasons or explanatory factors that make scientific knowing possible…. To proceed scientifically, for Aristotle, is essentially a matter of putting questions to nature, and his detailed analysis centers around the way in which such questions may be asked. (Wallace, 1972-74, vol. I, p.11, as cited in Moleski, 2000, pp.130-31)

But the term *theologia* was also evolving, particularly with respect to its epistemic connotations. As Pannenberg (1976, p.228) explains,

> ancient theology—in the west particularly under the influence of Augustine—thought of itself as wisdom in contrast to related sciences' knowledge of the world…. But this began to change in the twelfth century, and by the thirteenth, with the foundation of the first universities, the change was capable of definition. From then on theological wisdom was also thought of as a science in the Aristotelian sense, and indeed as the highest science.

Thus, before the time of Thomas Aquinas, *theologia* was predominantly identified with personal kinds of knowledge: '*intellectus, sapientia, prudentia* and maybe *ars*', writes Geoffrey Turner (1997, p.468). But this was not enough for Aquinas, who 'tried to show that theology was a speculative, theoretical science in the Aristotelian sense because theoretical knowledge is an end and therefore of higher value than practical knowledge which is directed towards other ends' (Pannenberg, 1976, p.232). Both sides of this debate maintained 'the primacy of faith' for theology and the utmost value of theology, but they differed over 'whether theology was also a science in the Aristotelian sense of producing conclusive knowledge from self-evident first principles,' writes Turner (1997, pp.467, 468). In short: *Scientia*, by definition, is demonstrable (*demonstrativa*), but is *theologia*? Aquinas's elegant solution to this question (*ST*, I, Q.1, Art. 2.) was to argue that *sacra doctrina* was, indeed, *scientia*, but in a very special sense: just as lower sciences like music and physics depend upon principles learned from higher sciences like mathematics and geometry, so theology depends upon principles learned from the highest 'science', namely, the mind of God (*scientia dei*) insofar as God reveals Himself to us in sacred Scripture. 'Hence,' writes Thomas, 'just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.' From those revealed first principles, further theological knowledge can and should be logically and

conclusively demonstrated. Thus, Aquinas was able to reckon theology an intrinsically valuable, theoretical science while still inhabiting the classical *fides quarens intellectum* paradigm.

Aquinas's perspective gained widespread popularity, but by no means universal acceptance. Richard of Mediavilla, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham maintained that theology was a practical and not a theoretical science, as did Martin Luther and many Protestants after him (Pannenberg, 1976, pp.232-35). As Edward Farley (1994, p.31) explains, from this debate there arose 'two fundamentally different premodern senses of the term [*theologia*]', each associated with different kinds of knowing, but both associated with traditions of theological education and reflection:

> First, theology is a term for an actual, individual cognition of God and things related to God, a cognition which in most treatments attends faith and has eternal happiness as its final goal. Second, theology is a term for a discipline, a self-conscious scholarly enterprise of understanding. In the former sense theology is a habit (*habitus*) of the human soul. In the latter it is a discipline, usually occurring in some sort of pedagogical setting. The ambiguity, the double reference and genre of the term *theology* does not originate with theology itself, the church and its teachers. It is the outcome of a similar ambiguity and double reference occurring in the language of human "science" in premodern Western philosophy. (Farley, 1994, p.31)[166]

The onset of modernity did not resolve these ambiguities, but it certainly shifted them in two key ways.

First, between the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, the 17th and 18th centuries saw a dramatic reshuffling of epistemic concepts generally and of conceptions of 'science' in particular. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) jettisoned the Aristotelian conception of

[166] David Kelsey (1993) identifies these two 'ideal types' of theology with 'Athens,' on the one hand, and 'Berlin,' on the other. However, as the above discussion suggests, the conception of theology as 'a discipline, a self-conscious scholarly enterprise of understanding' belongs as much to 13th century Paris as it does to 19th century Berlin.

scientia as deductively demonstrable knowledge of material, efficient, formal, and final causes in favor an inductive method focused on observations of empirical—i.e., material and efficient—phenomena. René Descartes (1596-1650) doubted all that was dubitable to reestablish the entire structure of knowledge upon self-evident beliefs and deductive reasoning. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), another Rationalist, demanded that all assertions, especially religious assertions, be logically demonstrated 'on irrefragable grounds or principles' (as cited in Hettche and Dyck, 2024). David Hume (1711-1776) consigned to the flames any work—especially of 'school metaphysics or divinity'—lacking 'abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number' or 'any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence'. It cannot be overemphasized that these shifts away from medieval conceptions of *scientia* were decidedly not shifts from lax modes of thinking to modes that were tighter, sharper, stabler, and better defined. Rather, it was a lurch away from an insistence upon a rigorous form of deductive reasoning from commonsense first principles into a great unknown. Ironically, confidence in modern 'science' grew even as what counts as 'knowledge', much less 'science', was in question. So, for all the bravado with which various modern German writers opined about modern science (*Wissenschaft*), their conceptions of what modern science *is* kept changing. Thus, Zachary Purvis (2016, p.82) writes:

> Some historians have distinguished between early (1790s-1830s) and later (post-1830s) senses of *Wissenschaft*. Idealist expressions on the 'totality of science' (*Ganzeit der Wissenschaft*) marked the earlier conceptions, which underwrote the elaborate systematic and historical constructions of Christianity and the study of theology for Schelling and Schleiermacher. Later in the nineteenth century, *Wissenschaft* shed its grandiose idealist shell for a more limited definition in terms of empirical rigour, professional and disciplinary specialization, and objectivity and neutrality, morphing into 'that majestic phrase—*wissenschaftliche Objectivität*'….
>
> This later sense of *Wissenschaft* embraced the 'absence of presuppositions' (*Voraussetzunglosigkeit*), championing 'presuppositionless' (*voraussetzungslos*) historical or empirical research….

In his lecture on 'Science as a Vocation', Max Weber (2004) went so far as to argue valuelessness and meaninglessness were corollaries of the universal disenchantment and rationalization that define the modern scientific project.

Second, under the pressure of Enlightenment-era critiques of theological knowledge, many modern Christian thinkers abandoned the traditional TOFoundationalist paradigm of *fides quarens intellectum* in favor of EEFoundationalist approaches to theology that could reconcile with Enlightenment conceptions of reason as regulative and autonomous (rather than receptive and theonomous). Some sought to circumscribe 'religion within the bounds of mere reason' (Kant), while others sought to reestablish traditional Christian conclusions solely based on 'natural theology' (e.g., Paley) rather than on the (theocentric ontological) foundation of faith in divine revelation which had traditionally underpinned Christian theologizing.

4.1. Schleiermacher: Theologie *as* Positive Wissenschaft

Standing near the beginning of the modern transformations in conceptions of 'science', Schleiermacher absorbed the then-fashionable nationalistic, philosophically idealist vision of 'science'—*Wissenschaftsideologie* 1.0, as it were. In Schleiermacher's version of this philosophy of science, to be a 'pure science' (*reine Wissenschaft*) an academic discipline must strive for complete objectivity through intellectual exchange (*Dialektik*) between scholars and disciplines, appealing only to publicly available evidence and universal experience.[167] In such a rigorously

[167] Hence, Schleiermacher held that, ultimately, only subjects that could fall under the headings of 'physics' (= the natural world) and 'ethics' (= history and culture) could be studied as 'pure sciences' (Vial 2013, pp.33-46).

dialectical scholarly community, interdisciplinary intersubjectivity and consensus are a reliable index of objective truth, Schleiermacher argues. Thus, functionally, *Wissenschaft* is what scholars can demonstrate to their most skeptical and intellectually scrupulous peers. But before century's end, the totalizing dreams of philosophical idealism collapsed, and the interdisciplinary scientific enterprise fractured into myriad disciplinary siloes. *Wissenschaftsideologie* 1.0 was replaced by *Wissenschaftsideologie* 2.0 which itself was replaced a generation later.

Theologie, in Schleiemacher's view, could not meet *Wissenschaftsideologie* 1.0's standard of 'pure science'. It could only be considered 'scientific' in the subordinate sense of being a practical science (*positive Wissenschaft*). *Theologie* is scientific (*Wissenschaftlich*) only insofar as it properly applies the findings of the 'pure sciences' to the organizational life of the church. At first blush, it might seem that Schleiermacher's conception of theology as a practical rather than a theoretical science aligns with the older tradition of viewing theology as *sapientia* rather than a *scientia*: Schleiermacher has simply sided with William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure against Thomas Aquinas in this longstanding disagreement.

But this would be a mistake. All these premodern theologians, whether they thought of theology as a *scientia* or not, nevertheless agreed that whatever kind of knowledge theology is, it arises from a revealed knowledge *of God*. Schleiermacher broke with this traditional consensus by identifying the object of theology not with God's self-revelation, per se, but with the scientific nurture of religious consciousness. While he writes of 'revelation' and 'faith,' Schleiermacher redefines these traditional terms in utterly immanentized, naturalized, and internalized ways (Dulles, 1994, pp.78-79), centering his theology not on divine revelation but on human interiority. He did this, in part, because he thought he could thereby establish theology on a firmer

foundation—namely, the indisputable fact that there are communities formed around particular forms of religious consciousness—than the shaky epistemic basis of claims of divine revelation (which, recall, Schleiermacher had abandoned in his teens). Hence, Schleiermacher's apologetic strategy, writes Dulles (1999, p.211), is not 'to sell Christianity by sugarcoating it: he is revising Christianity to make it something that he as a man of his times can personally accept.' This move represents a decisive break with rather than a development of the Christian tradition.

4.2. Newman & Kuyper: Theology as a 'Science'

By way of contrast, Newman and Kuyper both affirmed the Thomist branch of the tradition, insisting that theology is 'the science of God'. Indeed, Newman managed to grasp both branches of the tradition and integrate them into a creative synthesis with his distinction between 'religion' and 'theology'. For Newman, 'religion' names that personal knowledge of God arising from encountering the revelation of the mysteries of the incarnation and the Trinity.[168] Here we may have a 'real', if limited, apprehension of God. Such apprehension is poetic, sapiential, and irreducibly personal knowledge. 'Theology', for Newman, names the notional, abstract, 'scientific' knowledge of God which we can and, under certain circumstances, *must* deduce from our more basic religious knowledge. This, in Farley's terms, is 'theology' as 'a discipline, a self-conscious scholarly enterprise of understanding.' Crucially, for Newman, these two modes of knowing about God, the real/poetic/religious and the notional/scientific/theological, cooperate as two moments in the single, virtuous, hermeneutical spiral of ecclesial and personal doctrinal

[168] For Newman, these encounters are mediated to us by the Church, Christ's Body.

development. The basic, vivid, and visceral, 'religious' knowledge of God furnishes 'presumptions' and 'first principles' from which we 'scientifically' work out further 'notional' doctrinal implications through rigorous deduction and vigorous ecclesiastical debate. This process is often necessitated by apologetic, missiological, and historical challenges to the Church's witness. As the Catholic Church converges upon (often hard won) doctrinal consensuses, these doctrinal consensuses can themselves become aspects of our basic 'religious knowledge' by dint of *fides implicita* in the Church's magisterial authority. Thus, doctrinal developments can, in turn, legitimately give rise to further doctrinal developments. Hence, we can have vivid, basic, 'religious' 'impressions of dogma' which include articles which were only held 'implicitly' or 'notionally' by earlier generations of Christians. Thus, Newman was able to organically relate the sapiential and scientific threads of the tradition in a single coherent account of doctrinal development.

Kuyper defined theology as 'that science which has the revealed knowledge of God as the object of its investigation, and raises it to "understanding,"' or, alternatively, as 'that logical action of the general subject of regenerated humanity by which, in the light of the Holy Spirit, it takes up the revealed knowledge of God into its consciousness and from thence reflects it' (*EST*, §61, p.210). As ever, Kuyper emphasized the Holy Spirit's role in so renewing fallen humanity's cognitive capacities as to enable the regenerate to 'see' the invisible God, the world, and themselves in 'the light that the Holy Spirit kindles on the candelabra of Scripture' (*AK:CR*, p.400). As with Newman, this renewed 'sight' gives rise to faith, that is, to a properly basic (i.e., unproven but rational) belief in God's self-revelation, upon which we are epistemically dependent for theological knowledge. For Kuyper, all science is communal, traditioned, and cumulative, and

theology is no exception. And, theology, like any science, involves the threefold scholarly task of 'establishing' the first principles of our properly basic knowledge (in this case, knowledge of God), 'deducing' their implications, and 'systematizing' those implications by labouring to bring them into a coherent unity with our knowledge of other fields (Kuyper, 'Goal,' p.126). Thus, for Kuyper, theology's work is not complete until it has been woven together with the rest of our personal, practical, and scientific knowledge into a vital, comprehensive 'world-and-life-view' which is not simply to be affirmed but inhabited.

An obvious point of disagreement between Newman and Kuyper has to do with the status of doctrinal developments that have been officially sanctioned by the Roman magisterium: Are they sacrosanct or are they fallible? Newman argued that: 'A development, to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the principle with which it started' (*DCD*, V.ii.3, p.181). On one level this principle seems commonsensical: a true doctrinal development cannot saw off the branch it sits on by denying the antecedent doctrines from which it was derived. However, Newman goes so far as to claim:

> A true development, then, may be described as one which is conservative of the course of antecedent developments being really those antecedents and something besides them: it is an addition which illustrates, not obscures, corroborates, not corrects, the body of thought from which it proceeds; and this is its characteristic as contrasted with a corruption. (ibid., V.vi.1, p.200)

Here he goes beyond defending the concept of doctrinal development *per se* and instead shades into a theory of the infallibility of the Roman Catholic magisterium.[169] Kuyper, of course, held the

[169] Newman seems unwilling to consider the possibility that the principles he identifies as implicit in the gospel might be rightly maintained but that the Church might have occasionally erred in its doctrinal extrapolations from them, thus requiring doctrinal reform precisely according to those principles (cf., *DCD*, VII.i, §6.1). I do not see how to square Newman's insistence upon the magisterium's infallibility with his account of the contingency of 'the development of dogmatic theology' as 'wrought out and carried through under the fiercest controversies, and amid the most fearful risks' (*DCD*, XII.4, p.439), as approaching the truth indirectly and gradually, 'tacking' back and forth

Reformed view that all post-apostolic synods or councils 'may err; and many have erred', and so 'are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice' (*WCF*, XXXI.3), and that the theologian has a permanent duty to reform the Church's doctrine according to the Scriptures (cf., e.g., 'Bound', p.92).

Questions of ecclesial authority aside, both Newman and Kuyper, as opposed to Schleiermacher, embraced the tradition's limited consensus in conceiving of theology as being a genuine knowledge of God based upon supernatural revelation and received by faith. However, while both Newman and Kuyper counted theology a 'science', neither of them conceived of theology as a *scientia* in the narrow Aristotelian sense. Rather, in a modern context in which the meanings of the terms 'science', *wetenschap*, and *Wissenschaft* were in flux, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all conceived of 'science'/*wetenschap*/*Wissenschaft* more broadly and in distinctly modern terms—Schleiermacher in idealist (but almost pragmatist) terms of the dialectical overcoming of the gap between subject and object, Newman in (almost Bayesian) terms of the accumulation of probabilities, and Kuyper in (almost idealist) terms of the organic unfolding of God's self-revelation in history. Central to the disagreements over theology's status as a 'science' were disagreements over what science is in the first place and, crucially, what theology's role should be in deciding that question.

4.3. What Makes 'Science' Scientific?

like a sailboat (*IU*, II.iv.7., p.230); as exaggerating thus and overcorrecting so but, in the end, approximating the truth ever more closely. For Newman's *a priori* argument for the plausibility of God granting us an infallible magisterium, see *APVS*, pp.219-20.

Newman and Kuyper insisted that theology is indeed a science on par with widely recognized sciences such as astronomy or economics. Schleiermacher, however, denied that *Theologie* constitutes a *reine Wissenschaft*, preferring to limit theology's epistemic claim to being a sort of ecclesial know-how. Thus, Schleiermacher categorized theology with law and medicine as a *positive Wissenschaft* that applies 'pure' scientific knowledge to practical social needs.

The challenge of specifying just what makes 'science' *scientific* and of drawing the line between science and nonscience is what philosophers of science call 'the demarcation problem'. In a culture that prides itself on 'following' or 'trusting the science', it may come as a surprise that there should be such a problem. Surely, we understand very well what science is, and what differentiates it from, e.g., 'religion' or 'philosophy'? But the fact is that, after more than two centuries of puzzlement, demarcation continues to vex philosophers of science. Lee McIntyre (2019, p.28) warns that 'the project of trying to solve the problem of demarcation is hamstrung unless we can specify precisely what it is that we are trying to define (science, nonscience, pseudoscience, or unscience) and…there has as yet been no definitive answer to that.'

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present a review of the debate over scientific demarcation,[170] but three points should be noted: First, as Michael Gordin (2021, p.1) says, the demarcation debate 'has to date eluded resolution', and, indeed, '[there] are good reasons to think that it will remain a puzzle' (ibid.).

Second, most philosophers of science now agree (see, e.g., McIntyre 2019, p.10; Oreskes, 2021, pp.6-7) that attempts to identify some 'one-size-fits-all "scientific method"' as demarcating

[170] For helpful reviews of this debate see especially Imre Lakatos's lectures on scientific method in Motterlini (1999, pp.20-112). See, too, McIntyre (2019, Ch.1), Oreskes (2019, Ch.1), and Pannenberg (1976, Ch.1).

science from other modes of discourse and inquiry fail, a point which both Newman and Kuyper presciently and repeatedly made (e.g., *US*, IV; *IU*, I.iv.2, p.60; II.iv.7., p.230; *EST*, §19, p.25; §39, p.59).

Third, as Lee McIntyre observes (2019, p.73), practically every demarcation theory faces the problem of *exclusivity*, on the one hand, and the problem of *inclusivity*, on the other. If we define science too strictly (e.g., by restricting 'science' to disciplines using repeatable experiments), then we will rule out disciplines that others would reasonably consider to be sciences (e.g., palaeontology, macroeconomics, cosmology). Define it too loosely, McIntyre (ibid.) warns, and 'we run the risk of permitting all sorts of random empirical inquiries into the pantheon of science', including even just ordinary methodical labours like 'plumbing and TV repair'. Newman seems to have had precisely this dilemma in mind when he wrote:

> I cannot so construct my definition of the subject-matter of University Knowledge [i.e., science], and so draw my boundary lines around it, as to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at Universities, and to exclude the science of Religion. For instance, are we to limit our idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our senses? Then we exclude ethics; by intuition? we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics. Is not the being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by the suggestions of our conscience? (*IU*, I.ii.3, p.29)

From Newman and Kuyper's standpoint, Schleiermacher's demarcation of *die Wissenschaften* is too exclusive (and not only because it rules out theology),[171] whereas Schleiermacher would see theirs as far too inclusive.

[171] McIntyre is far more concerned about the problem of inclusivity than he is about exclusivity. Because of this McIntyre (pp.73ff) takes care to say that 'the scientific attitude' is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of being a science, lest a quotidian activity like looking for one's lost car keys (in which one empirically tests various theories of where the mislaid keys might be by looking for them there) qualify as a science.

Crucially, there is no neutral standpoint from which to decide between relatively exclusive demarcations of 'science' (e.g., Schleiermacher's) or relatively inclusive demarcations (e.g., Newman and Kuypers). This is because, as Gordin (2021, p.14) explains '[all] demarcation criteria…are built inductively out of specific cases, and therefore cannot hope to cover the whole waterfront of possibilities.' If one has reason to count theology or economics or history as cases of 'science', then one will have reasons to inductively devise different demarcation criteria than one will if one has excluded those studies from one's cases *a priori*.

4.4. What Makes 'Religion' Religious?

As we have seen (**Ch.IV.1.**), Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper also discerned that, like the concept of 'science', the concept of 'religion' has its own demarcation problems. Indeed, they all suggested, in their own ways, that human beings are always and inevitably religious, and that supposedly 'non-religious' or 'secular' people, ideas, and institutions are more 'religious' than is often recognized. If being oriented by a pre-theoretical 'poetic' 'intuition of the infinite' or a faith-based 'world-and-life-view' makes a person, idea, or institution 'religious', then, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper would argue, all people, ideas, and institutions are 'religious'. Their intuitions on this score have received support in recent years from, e.g., Jonathan Jong (2015), William Cavanaugh (2009), Alister McGrath (2021), David Dark (2016; 2022), James K.A. Smith (2009; 2014), and others.

Jong (2015) highlights a dilemma facing attempts to define what constitutes a 'religion' that is formally identical to the dilemma facing demarcations of 'science': the choice between

overly inclusive and overly exclusive demarcations. On the one hand, overly narrow definitions of 'religion' (e.g., as systems of practice and belief centered on the existence and character of supernatural beings) face what Jong calls 'the Buddhism Problem', that is, that such definitions exclude phenomena that we would typically understand to be religious. On the other hand, overbroad definitions of 'religion' (e.g., as ritualistic social practices which help communities to make shared meaning) face 'the Football Problem', that is, that such definitions include phenomena which would typically be regarded as nonreligious. William Cavanaugh (2009, pp.57-122) makes a similar argument and concludes that in modern discourse 'religion' connotes irrationality whereas 'secular' connotes rationality. In modern discourse, argues Cavanaugh, 'religion' is not well defined because it functions primarily as a loose term of opprobrium rather than as a real descriptor. The term's function is centrally to delegitimate particular traditional discourses and to dismiss their role in public discourse.

Newman and Kuyper followed this line of argument more consistently than did Schleiermacher. For Newman and Kuyper, 'worldviews' such as 'Modernism' or 'Liberalism' were themselves 'religious' outlooks and, therefore, fair game for theological critique. But Schleiermacher, despite recognizing that atheists as much as theists operate out of a 'religious' 'intuition of the infinite', awkwardly restricted the range of theology's critical engagement to intra-ecclesial concerns.

5. Stories of Everything: Theology as Metanarrative Criticism?

Both Newman and Kuyper understood theology as a sort of *metanarratological* science. They saw that, at a fundamental level, the Christian gospel is the story of God's self-revelatory redemption of the whole world. As the New Testament scholar C. Kavin Rowe (2020, p.3) observes:

> At its origins, Christianity's surprise was a person, Jesus the Messiah, crucified and raised. To receive this surprise and rebroadcast it, the earliest Christians discovered that they had to tell the story of everything.[172]

As TOFoundationalists, Newman and Kuyper self-consciously thought about themselves, their world, and God from within this Christocentric drama—this 'story of everything'—into which they found themselves swept up. For them, all other true stories are but subplots within the gospel's overarching metanarrative and have their significance within its horizons of meaning. Correspondingly, they thought of theology as the study of that metanarrative and its implications.

Thus, Newman both grasped the basic narrative structure of the New Testament and was grasped by it. He argued that underlying the occasional writings of the New Testament and the Church's subsequent dogmatic systems is 'a history supernatural, and almost scenic' that 'tells us what its Author is, by telling us what He has done' (*D&A*, p.184).[173] Indeed, here Newman seemed to have anticipated twentieth- and twenty-first century scholarship's rediscovery of the New Testament's basic narrative dynamics.[174] For Newman, salvation consists in us being

[172] Similarly, N.T. Wright (1992, pp.41-42) suggests that 'the whole point of Christianity is that it offers a story which is the story of the whole world', and, consequently, Christian theology must be conceived of as 'public' truth.

[173] Newman's emphasis on God as the 'Author' of this 'history' and not just its protagonist is crucial. God is, of course, one of the *dramatis personae* in 'the Grand Story', but to treat God as just one character among others within the story is to reduce God to creaturely status.

[174] First, there is the ever-present narrative substructure of the New Testament's (and therefore Paul's) writings—the 'history supernatural'. Second, there is theme of God, the 'Author's' uniquely storied identity: Richard Bauckham (2008; cf. Bruno, Lee, and Schreiner 2024, Ch.2) has forcefully argued that Paul's letters manifest an early high Christology by including Jesus in the God of Israel's unique identity precisely by attributing to Jesus God's distinctive acts of creation and salvation (i.e., Jesus enacts God's distinctive roles as creator and savior of the world). Similarly, Richard Hays and Beverly Gaventa (eds. 2008) have co-edited a collection of essays exploring Jesus's narrative identity throughout the New Testament canon.

'incorporated' into Christ and Christ recapitulating His life, death, and resurrection in us by His Spirit. That is, we are saved by our inclusion in the story of salvation and by the story's recapitulation (in miniature) in us (e.g., *PPS*, V.x., pp.1047-48; *LoJ*, VIII.6, p.195).

Kuyper tended to speak of Scripture being structured by an underlying 'system' rather than an underlying *narrative*, and of 'world-and-life-views' rather than *stories*. This has led some to worry that the 'worldview' discourse characteristic of the Kuyperian tradition evokes an unhelpfully 'static picture' and has a too much of a '"packaged" feel' (Mouw, 2011, p.93). Nevertheless, Kuyper's thought is more self-consciously storied than his trademark 'worldview' discourse might initially suggest. For one thing, as might be expected of the father of Neo-*Calvinism*, Kuyper held a providentialist view of history and regularly described historical trends and events in (grandiose) terms of an unfolding grand narrative (cf., Bolt, 2001, p.13).[175] He believed the arc of history is long but it bends towards freedom in Christ.[176] Crucially, Kuyper held that 'the history of the human race is arranged around the cross of Golgotha as its midpoint' (*W&W*, p.100), and his thought was marked by a pervasive eschatological thrust as witnessed especially by his emphasis upon '*palingenesis*' as both personal regeneration and the ultimate renewal of creation. Building upon this eschatological emphasis and its tacit narrative logic, subsequent Neo-Calvinist biblical scholars like Klaas Schilder and Herman Ridderbos pioneered the 'redemptive-historical school' of interpretation (Bartholomew, 2017, pp.92ff)[177] while Neo-Calvinist theologians like Albert Wolters (1988), Gordon Spykman (1992), and Cornelius Plantinga

[175] On several occasions, Kuyper was accused of being a Hegelian in Calvinist's clothing.
[176] According to Bolt (2001, p.14), this led Kuyper to the view that: 'The American experiment in ordered liberty…is holy, the providentially destined "end of history."'
[177] Kuyper's younger contemporary, the Princeton theologian Geerhardus Vos, is best read as an early adopter of this interpretive approach.

(2002) have construed the Christian worldview narratively as a four-act drama of creation, fall, redemption, and consummation. In short, subsequent Neo-Calvinists have tended to see a deep narrative substructure in Kuyper's Calvinist 'worldview' of 'cosmological principle' (*LoC*, I, p.22); an entire world *history* more than a 'static picture'.

By contrast, Schleiermacher's (egocentric epistemological) foundational narrative is more like what Jim Holt (2013) calls 'an existential detective story'. We awaken to find ourselves cast into a mysterious infinitude and absolutely dependent upon we know not what. It falls to us to puzzle out what this enigmatic, mute 'Whence' of our being might be and just how we can best authentically live together considering our total dependence upon it. Accordingly, the best we can do is work and live out the implications of our varied 'intuitions of the infinite'. Thankfully, some artistic and religious virtuosos have blazed trails of insight and authenticity, presenting 'deity' to those of us 'who normally grasp only the finite and the trivial' (*OR*, I, p.7; cf. Charles Taylor, 1989, p.378). For Schleiermacher, Jesus of Nazareth embodies the very apex of such religious virtuosity,[178] and so Schleiermacher counts himself a Christian. But Schleiermacher also saw himself as someone who had shrugged off the residual 'rubble of primitive times' from his 'ancestral faith', namely, the doctrines of incarnation and atonement that were so fundamental to the New Testament writers.[179] Nor does Schleiermacher's eschatology (i.e., Schleiermacher's

[178] Although, Schleiermacher entertained the possibility that Jesus and Christianity might have peers or equivalents (*CF,* §7, pp.33ff). Christianity should still be preferred to its hypothetical equivalents, he argues, but not on the grounds that it is 'truer'. As Zachhuber observes (2013, p.12), some of Schleiermacher's contemporaries and successors took him to be an Idealist who never completed his argument for the absoluteness of Christianity. However, it seems from the *CF* that Schleiermacher did not see Christianity as singularly absolute: Christianity sits atop the hierarchy of positive religions, but not exclusively so. Schleiermacher here allowed that Christianity shares this uppermost echelon of religious consciousness with at least a few 'equivalent' faiths, even though he thought Christianity did so as first among equals.

[179] Strikingly, the historic doctrines of incarnation and atonement which Schleiermacher abandoned in his teens were precisely the doctrines which gripped the teenage Newman (*LD*, xxxi, p.189).

predictions about the natural course of history) embrace the New Testament's thoroughly Jewish hope of a future bodily resurrection and renewed creation (see Adams, 2005, p.46). Their foundational narratives—their 'stories of everything'—could not be more different; the New Testament writers' being apocalyptic, theocentric, and ontological and Schleiermacher's being egocentric and epistemological.

Conclusion

For roughly the first ten centuries of the Church's history, Christian theologians sought to understand God, God's world, and ourselves from within a comprehensive Christocentric story, and to build their worldviews and their lives upon this TOFoundation. Expressed in different ways (e.g., *credo ut intelligam*; *fides quaerens intellectum*), this basic intellectual paradigm guided the mainstream Christian theological tradition from its Apostolic beginning onward and only began to fray with the onset of modernity. While pre-modern theologians differed over whether *theologia* is *scientia* (some thinking *scientia* to be beneath theology, others deeming theology to be the very queen of the sciences), all agreed that theology *rests upon* and *is* genuine knowledge of God which should orient all else that we think, say, and do.

Enlightenment thinkers like Hume and Kant attacked this pre-modern Christian outlook, demanding that claims to knowledge be reestablished upon an EEFoundation and 'science' be strictly delimited to knowledge which can be so established. Under this new epistemic regime theology was regularly denied being a form of knowledge at all, much less a 'science'. Friedrich Schleiermacher, unnerved by the Enlightenment's critique of historic Christianity and inveigled

by the *Wissenschaftsideologie* of his day, sought to preserve a place for the discipline of *Theologie* within the new, pluralistic, post-Enlightenment *wissenschaftlich Universität* by strictly limiting theology's scope to the *wissenschaftlich* nurturance of the Church's religious affections, using all the latest discoveries from the *real* sciences (i.e., the *reine Wissenschaften*). In so doing, Schleiermacher broke with the classical tradition of Christian theology because he could no longer affirm that tradition's accounts of who God is and how God is known. Schleiermacher's revisionism was understandable given his personal experience and his historical milieu. But his experience was not universal, nor was his response to the onset of modernity the only rational option.

As it turns out, John Henry Newman and Abraham Kuyper's counterarguments against post-Enlightenment EEFoundationalism and modern, anti-theological demarcations of 'science' have proven eminently defensible. Newman's and Kuyper's arguments anticipated and inspired the development of the important analytic philosophical school of Reformed Epistemology, led by Plantinga and Wolterstorff, who have shown that: 1) Classical/Egocentric Epistemological Foundationalism is untenable; and 2) if Christianity is true, then Christian belief is warranted in a properly basic way. The implication of this development has been that the TOFoundationalism which underpinned the pre-modern Church's tradition of robustly theological Christian theology is thoroughly defensible and remains an intellectually viable, indeed, essential starting point for Christian thought across the disciplines.

Moreover, if, as Newman and Kuyper both argued, such theology is (or can be) a form of well-founded knowledge, then accounts of 'scientific' demarcation which exclude theology (e.g., Schleiermacher's definition of *reine Wissenschaft*) need not worry us too much. As Newman

argued, such anti-theological demarcations cannot be rendered coherent without excluding other crucial forms of academic knowledge which many scholars intuitively deem to be sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology, mathematics, theoretical physics). There are other equally plausible accounts of scientific demarcation on which theology would plausibly qualify as a 'science', especially if Christianity is true. Indeed, Newman and Kuyper's inclusive definitions of 'science' are themselves still defensible today. Moreover, as Newman and Kuyper both suggested, scientific demarcation theories that exclude theology are not intellectually neutral or objective but rather rest on presuppositions—which are themselves a form of faith—which Christians have good reasons to reject. Thus, from Newman and Kuyper's standpoint, Schleiermacher's theological revisionism broke with the mainstream of the Christian tradition for fundamentally unsound reasons.

As Postman and others have argued, universities cannot do without some orienting and legitimating 'story of everything', cannot do without 'gods'. But most modern secular universities have lost the art of 'god'-talk: the art of identifying, debating, assessing, and considering the various competing metanarratives which steer, sway, and structure our institutions and our lives. This loss owes in part to Schleiermacher's marginalization of the discipline of Christian theology as merely a 'practical science'. Newman and Kuyper, however, show why Christian theologians ought not acquiesce to such marginalization and how Christian theology might help the university retrieve the vital practice of 'god-talk' by urging a reckoning with the challenges of scientific demarcation, the persistence of perspectival pluralism, the failure of Classical/Egocentric Epistemological Foundationalism, and the enduring intellectual potency of Christian perspectives. Indeed, armed with the insights of Newman and Kuyper, Christian theologians can

play a significant role in reviving the sort of metanarrative discourse, criticism, and debate that the university will need to regain its sense of purpose.

V. How Should Theology Relate to Other Knowledges?

From Grand Narratives to Transdisciplinary Wisdom

The question of how theology should relate to other knowledges is one part of the question of how our various knowledges might be coherently fitted together into what Newman called a 'connected view', Kuyper called a 'world-and-life-view', and Schleiermacher called 'the most necessary thing, the encyclopaedic perspective'.[180] One surprising aspect of modernity has been that over the last three centuries these sorts of integrative questions have become *more* vexing rather than less. C.P. Snow (1998, vii-viii) famously bemoaned the 'mutual suspicion and incomprehension' between the two distinct cultures of the sciences and the humanities. But the obvious schism between the humanities and the sciences is but the beginning of academia's divides: 'quants' versus 'quals', 'analytics' versus 'continentals', 'theoreticians' versus 'experimentalists', etc. There is no discipline untouched by such epistemic fractionalization, and the challenge of integrating the various knowledges and knowledge cultures of our institutions, our academic disciplines, and our ordinary lives into a coherent worldview and way of life is as deep a problem for secular people as it is for theologians. Indeed, it is deeper.

[180] As Alister McGrath (2019, pp.14-15) has recently written:

> The exploration of the relation of science and theology offers a case study in both interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, which many now regard as a necessary response to the growing fragmentation of knowledge, the increasing disconnection between the academy and wider culture, and a wider concern to grasp a bigger picture of reality than one intellectual standpoint or academic discipline can offer. Such concerns lie behind recent integrative projects, such as Roy Bhaskar's critical realism, Ken Wilber's integral theory, Edgar Morin's *pensée complexe*, and E.O. Wilson's concept of consilience. Yet any such undertaking has to come to terms with the notion of 'multiple situated rationalities', and its implications for any form of dialogue or synthesis.

Intellectual fragmentation and disciplinary siloing have been growing features of modern university life for at least a century. Whereas the unity of *scientia* and of *Wissenschaft* were prized by both the Medieval and the first modern research universities, by the end of the nineteenth century the centrifugal forces of modernity had utterly disaggregated intellectual life into disparate sub-disciplines. By mid-century, Robert Maynard Hutchins, first president and then chancellor of the University of Chicago (1929-1951), lamented that his institution had become but 'a miscellany of schools and departments "held together by a central heating system"' (Delbanco, 2012, p.92). In the 1960s, Clark Kerr (2001, pp.28-29), then President of the University of California, suggested that we abandon altogether the pipedreams of a quest for a unified field of knowledge as part of the university's mission. We should accept the fact that the university has, in fact, become a 'multiversity', which Kerr described as nothing more than 'a mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money', and 'a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking'.

A 1986 article from *The New York Times* assessing the state of higher education in America described the modern university as 'a vast but unfocussed institution' (Fiske, 1986). The article quoted Frank Rhoades, then president of Cornell University, as saying:

> We're in a period of great fragmentation…. There is almost no common commitment among faculty members, except to their academic discipline, and there is no agreement as to how we should shape the curriculum or explore the map of human experience. There is a great churning going on.

The modern university not only lacks a common 'knowledge culture', it lacks the institutional means, will, or imagination to cultivate one. Alasdair MacIntyre (2009, p.16) describes well where we have come to:

> To whom then in such a university falls the task of integrating the various disciplines, of considering the bearing of each on the others, and of asking how each contributes to the overall understanding of the nature and order of things? The answer is "No one," but even this answer is misleading. For there is no sense in the contemporary American university that there is such a task, that something that matters is being left undone. And so the very notion of the nature and order of things, of a single universe, different aspects of which are objects of enquiry for the various disciplines, but in such a way that each aspect needs to be related to every other, this notion no longer informs the enterprise of the contemporary American university.

The loss of a 'common commitment' among academics is at least as endemic in European universities as in American universities. However, as MacIntyre notes, not many academics are even sensible of the loss. Indeed, Kerr *celebrated* the advent of the 'multiversity'.

In contrast to the disciplinary siloing of the modern secular university, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all believed the common pursuit of 'the encyclopaedic perspective', of 'the unity and interconnectedness of all knowledge' (Schleiermacher), a 'connected view' (Newman), a cogent 'world-and-life-view' (Kuyper) to be essential to the university's integrity and purpose. They agreed on the necessity of the 'encyclopaedic' task despite their sharp disagreements over theology's role in it. The aim of this chapter is to comparatively analyze Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper's accounts of theology's relationship to other knowledges along two axes—first, the relationship between theology and particular disciplines, and second, theology's role in relating the various disciplines to each other—with an eye to bringing their thought to bear on the contemporary university's epistemic and disciplinary disintegration.

1. Premodern Christianity: What difference did it make to the liberal arts?

Overall, ancient Christianity was ambivalent about the classical tradition of liberal learning. On the one hand, they had a 'story of everything' that led them to expect to find common ground with their neighbours. On the other hand, the same foundational narrative (as well as bitter experiences of persecution) also led Christians to expect hostility from Graeco-Roman culture.

But, as Henri-Irénée Marrou (1956, p.320) summarizes, the general tenor of the Patristic tradition was neither uncritical embrace nor wholesale rejection but ambivalence. Perhaps nobody exhibited this ambivalence more vividly than Jerome. In his *Letter to Eustochium,* Jerome famously relates his nightmare about coming to his final judgment and being condemned by the Judge (Christ, the Lord) for being 'a follower of Cicero and not of Christ. For "where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also."'[181] Upon waking Jerome resolved to 'read the books of God with zeal greater than [he] had previously read the books of men' (*Letter to Eustochium*; *Ep*., XXII; *TGT*, p.208). Nevertheless, his later works remain replete with classical references—old habits die hard—and his *Letter to Magnus, an Orator of Rome* (*Ep*., LXX; TGT, pp.208-11), written more than a decade after his nightmare is a theological defence of the Christian use of pagan literature and learning. Deploying a metaphor (learnt from Philo of Alexandria[182]) that would later play a major role in the Medieval university's ranking of the sciences, Jerome declares his desire 'to make that secular wisdom which is my captive and my handmaid (*ancilla*)', 'a matron of the true Israel'.[183] Jerome observes that Moses, the prophets, Solomon, and the Apostle Paul all cited passages from Gentile literature. He similarly points to the earlier Church Fathers' effective use of pagan sources for apologetical purposes. He closes by contending that, for intellectual honesty's sake,

[181] A word of warning, perhaps, to *all* of us bibliophiles.
[182] See 'On Mating with the Preliminary Studies,' III (TGT, p.157). See discussion in Hadot (2002, pp.255ff).
[183] https://www.patrologia-lib.ru/patrolog/hieronym/epist/epist03.htm

Christians *cannot* ignore Gentile literature, 'for almost all the books of all these writers…are extremely full of erudition and philosophy'.

In practice, ancient Christians generally exercised a sort of cautious, critical cultural reception, reforming and redirecting whatever they could in accord with their new Christocentric foundational narrative. They did not accept any aspect of the surrounding culture wholesale. Everything had to be recontextualized within the story of Jesus, the Christ who had been crucified and raised by the God of Israel.[184] As both Origen[185] and Augustine[186] put it, ancient Christians ought to 'plunder the Egyptians', reclaiming, refining, and recasting whatever truth, goodness, or beauty they find in the surrounding culture for God's people and purposes. Similar sentiments were shared by Basil the Great,[187] Gregory Nazianzen,[188] and Jerome, such that we can confidently say that the critical embrace of liberal learning was central to the mainstream of ancient Christian philosophy of education.

But the intellectual project of the ancient Church was not simply the integration of faith with the liberal arts, but also the integration of the various knowledges, the arts and sciences, in Christ our Wisdom (I Cor 1:24, 30). The idea that the cultivation of wisdom is the true end of the arts and sciences was a commonplace in pre-Christian παιδεία, as was the conviction that truth

[184] Hence, the various Graeco-Roman subcultures were 'misdirected' towards idolatrous ends and so were fundamentally opposed to Christianity (Marrou, 1956, pp.319-20). Classical learning would have to be 'redirected' and accordingly 'reformed' to accord with Christian teaching. Generally, Christians did *not* do this by trying to edit and sanitize pagan literature but by leaving the texts as they were and re*reading* them from a Christian standpoint.
[185] Origen, 'A Letter from Origen to Gregory, Bishop of Caesarea'; *TGT*, p.177.
[186] Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, II.40-42; *TGT*, pp.225-227.
[187] See especially Basil's sermon 'To Young Men, on How They Might Derive Profit from Pagan Literature,' (*TGT*, p.183). Basil cites classical authorities throughout. In his funeral oration, Gregory Nazianzen praises Basil's erudition in all the liberal arts, specifically mentioning Rhetoric, Astronomy, Geometry, Dialectic, and Medicine. He concludes by saying of Basil, 'his galleon was laden with all the learning attainable by the nature of man…' ('Funeral Oration on the Great St. Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia'; *TGT*, p.190).
[188] See especially Gregory's 'Funeral Oration on the Great St. Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia' (*TGT*, pp.188ff

is unified. But Christians radically transformed that tradition of thought by identifying wisdom with the crucified and risen Christ. Having identified Jesus with the divine wisdom by which God creates and sustains the world (Prov 8; John 1; I Cor 8; etc.), Christians drew the staggering but unavoidable inference that in Christ the unity of truth is at once concealed and revealed. As Rowan Williams (2018) put it, Christ is 'the heart of creation'.[189] And if 'in Him all things (τα πάντα) hold together' (Col 1:17), then it necessarily (if mysteriously) follows that ultimately, somehow in Christ 'are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Col 2:3). Thus, when Christians received and reimagined the παιδεία, tradition's vision of cultivating human wisdom through the symphonic study of a range of arts and sciences, they naturally redirected that vision Christologically and reformed the practical implementation of it accordingly.

Clement of Alexandria clearly exemplifies this reimagination of the various arts and sciences as cohering in Christ. Clement contends that the gospel enables us to begin reintegrating diverse knowledges which, under paganism, tended (in his view) to *dis*integrate. Clement (*TGT*, p.172) argues that 'philosophy, Greek and non-Greek, has made of eternal truth a kind of dismembering, not in the legends of Dionysus but in the theological understanding of the eternal Word', and that 'If anyone brings together the scattered limbs into a unity, you can be quite sure without risk of error that he will gaze on the Word in his fullness, the Truth.' When Clement argues for the unity of the diverse truths of the various liberal arts, he describes them as coinhering not in an abstract *principle* or *idea* but in a singular *person*: the Son of God (ibid., p.174). Hence, to Clement's mind, it was completely natural for the catechetical school that he

[189] In addition to Williams (2018), this unitive dimension of the Christian gospel has been helpfully explored by Colin Gunton (1992; 1993).

led in Alexandria to teach sciences and mathematics alongside scriptural interpretation and the fine arts (ibid., pp.171-72; González, 2015, p.6).[190] His pedagogy reflected his Christocentric ontology: All things hold together in Christ.

Clement's greatest pupil, Origen, likewise redirected the liberal arts Christ-ward, re-forming them around the single reality of 'Christianity'. In so doing, Origen is not instrumentalizing the arts but reorienting them to their true telos according to his Christocentric ontology. Hence, Origen (ibid., p.177) urged Gregory, Bishop of Caesarea:

> …to extract from the philosophy of the Greeks what may serve as a course of study or a preparation for Christianity, and from geometry and astronomy what will serve to explain the sacred Scriptures, in order that all that the sons of the philosophers are wont to say about geometry and music, grammar, rhetoric, and astronomy, as fellow-helpers to philosophy, we may say about philosophy itself, in relation to Christianity.

In sum, the arts and sciences only come into their own when they come together to illuminate and be illuminated by the word of God in Christ. Augustine similarly held that, to realize their true and common end, the arts and sciences must be used for the enjoyment of God in Christ. Here we clearly see the medieval Christian tradition of seeing the liberal arts as *ancillae theologia* germinating.[191]

As this Christian sapiential tradition took its classic form in the early Middle Ages, the vision of Wisdom as uniting and coordinating the liberal arts took on greater definition while the

[190] John McGuckin (2017, p.191) notes that the view that Clement headed up '*the* catechetical school' in Alexandria has fallen out of favour. Rather, says McGuckin: 'It is far more likely that he was master of a private philosophical school, at a time when several other Christian philosophers (many of them Gnostics) were also teaching in the city.' Regardless, through his influence upon Origen and others, Clement's teaching made an indelible mark on Eastern Christianity.

[191] Origen did not treat philosophy, much less Christianity, as an armchair activity but as a way of life. As Gregory Thaumaturgus (*TGT*, p.179) put it, Origen induced people unto a 'philosophical' way of life, but 'he pointed the exhortation by deeds before he gave it in words', and 'he ever exhibited (in himself) …the pattern of the wise man'. For Origen and the Fathers who were influenced by him, learning was for 'philosophy' and philosophy was for living.

patristic identification of Christ with Wisdom receded to the background. It was Charlemagne's adviser, Alcuin of York (c. 735-804), who first coined the terms *trivium* and *quadrivium* (Thomas, 2013, pp.6-7), but liberal education had been organized into the core curriculum of *septem artes liberalia* since at least the time of Cassiodorus (c. 485-c. 585).[192] Cassiodorus played an influential role in developing the monastic and cathedral schools of this period by 'found[ing] a monastery on his estate at Vivarium, modelled perhaps on Benedict's community at Monte Cassino' in which 'monks labored to learn Scripture, the Church Fathers, and the liberal arts' (*TGT*, p.228). In this community, Cassiodorus established a rigorous and influential program of studies for ecclesiastical leaders which he outlined and defended in his treatise *Institutions of Divine and Secular Letters—Institutiones Divinarum et Saecularium Litterarum,* published sometime in the 550s. González writes:

> In that program, he affirmed the traditional curriculum of classical letters, in which, after the very first studies where one learned to read, write, and sing Psalms, studies were divided into two sections: the *trivium*—that is, the three main roads…. Traditionally these three arts or fields of knowledge were grammar, astronomy, and rhetoric. But by now the study of these three arts was mostly directed to ministerial and pastoral tasks. Thus, grammar was understood in a wider sense than it is today, for it included also an introduction to classical and patristic writings, as well as principles for the interpretation of those writings and of scripture. Astronomy was employed mostly to determine the feasts and various observances in the religious calendar. And rhetoric was directed to the "four ways"—which included logic, arithmetic, geometry, and music. And then, on the basis of this knowledge, one would turn to the field of "scripture"—which actually included all theological studies—as well as some practical aspects of pastoral tasks. (2015, p.25)

[192] In *Retractiones* 1.6, Augustine describes his plan to compose *The Books of Disciplines* in seven volumes expounding seven liberal arts in the following order: grammar, music, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, and, interestingly, philosophy (rather than astronomy). However, Augustine does not speak of the selection of seven liberal arts as a settled convention, nor does he order them along the customary Medieval lines of the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*.

In his *Institutes*, Cassiodorus cites Cyprian, Lactantius, Victorinus, Optatus, Hilary of Poitiers, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and 'many other "of the innumerable Greeks"' (*Institutes,* I.xxviii.4; *TGT*, p.233) as precedents for his adaptation of the humanistic tradition. He was careful to acknowledge 'that knowledge is not found in letters alone, but that God gives complete wisdom "to everyone according as he will" [1 Cor 12:11]', and that 'many illiterate men come to true knowledge and perceive the right faith by heavenly inspiration…' (*Institutes,* I.xxviii.2; *TGT*, p.232). However, he is equally careful not to short-change liberal learning, gratefully received as a gift of God, as an indispensable means for cultivating wisdom in the Church:

> [The] holy Fathers have not decreed that the study of secular letters should be rejected either, since to a considerable degree it is by this that our minds are equipped to understand Sacred Scripture. But if, with the support of divine grace, we seek knowledge of these matters seriously and reasonably, not in order to find in secular letters hope of advancement, but so that passing through them we should be eager to deserve useful and redemptive wisdom from the "Father of Lights". (*Institutes* I.xxviii.3; *TGT*, p.233)

Through both his writings and his school's example, Cassiodorus influenced subsequent Medieval educationists such as Alcuin of York and Hrabanus Maurus (c. 776-856 CE), who was revered as the *Paeceptor Germaniae* seven centuries before Philip Melanchthon was (González, 2015, pp.34-35).

More important than tracing the precise lines of Cassiodorus's influence is the observation of just how typical his philosophy of education was within the Christian tradition up to the emergence of the first universities. The same pedagogical pattern of seeking divine wisdom was common among the monastic and cathedral schools of the early Middle Ages, and it formed the universal, basic pattern for what became the Bachelor of Arts curricula in universities from the twelfth century to the nineteenth. The key point to bear in mind is that these institutions

were implicitly structured to advance this Christian humanistic ideal of liberal learning and to unite the several liberal arts in their single, coordinative, sapiential telos.

This unitive aspect of the pre-modern Christian sapiential imagination is well illustrated by the depiction of *Philosophia et septem artes liberales* (philosophy and the seven liberal arts) in the 12th century *Hortus Deliciarum*, 'The Garden of delight' (see Figure 1 below)—a Medieval encyclopaedia[193] of sorts. David Smith and Susan Felch (2016, p.190) describe the illustration as follows:

> Wisdom, Lady Philosophy, sits serenely in the house she has constructed, a house that resembles the beautiful rose windows illuminating medieval cathedrals. Beneath her are Socrates and Plato, the acknowledged masters of secular learning, but the scroll in Wisdom's hands puts the work of these classical philosophers into its proper context. Quoting Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 1:1, it reads, "All wisdom comes from God; only the wise can do whatever they desire." Around Wisdom are arrayed the seven liberal arts (beginning at the top and going clockwise: grammar, rhetoric, logic, music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy). Each stands gracefully inside a pillared arcade, and these together visually depict Proverbs 9:1: "Wisdom has built her house; she has set up its seven pillars." Excluded from the rose window, but still included in the compendium of knowledge, are four representatives of the "impure poets" who invent fictitious tales.
>
> The three heads in Lady Philosophy's crown represent the classical division of philosophy into ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Seven fountains of wisdom flow from her body.

Philosophia, as depicted in the *Hortus Deliciarum*, is inherently inter-/cross-/multi-/trans-disciplinary. It is the ability to skilfully coordinate and deploy these diverse rationalities in appropriate circumstances to proper ends to good effect.

[193] i.e., a compendium of knowledge.




Figure 1. Philosophia et septem artes liberales *(Philosophy and the Seven Liberal Arts), as illustrated in the* Hortus deliciarum *by Herrad of Landsberg.*[194]

[194] Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31438342

While the *Hortus Deliciarum* does not explicitly identify Christ as the sapiential axis around which the arts of knowing turn, as Clement did, nevertheless, the relationship between Philosophy and the liberal arts is clearly oriented by the Biblical foundational narrative. In addition to the invocation of Scripture (Ecclesiasticus 1:1) on Philosophy's scroll, Smith and Felch (ibid.) note that:

> The inscription on her right reads, 'The Holy Spirit is the inventor of the seven liberal arts,' and is followed by a list of their names. This links the classical liberal arts with the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit as found in Isaiah 11:2-3: wisdom, understanding, right judgment, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear of the Lord.

Moreover, the very figure of *Philosophia* at the centre of the diagram hearkens to the feminine depiction of Wisdom in Proverbs 8-9, a key Christological text for the Fathers. Within this Medieval imaginative schema, while pupils must learn the seven liberal arts before being able to study the science of theology (or law or medicine for that matter), these arts coordinate with one another to generate wisdom in the student because they have a common ontological source in the life of God. While the formal study of *theologia* would come last in the Medieval student's education, the entirety of his education rested both implicitly and explicitly upon the TOFoundational narrative received in the Christian revelation and passed down through the tradition of the Church.

2. Modernity: Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper on Theology and Other Knowledges

How did Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper regard the Christian tradition's pre-modern, transdisciplinary vision of wisdom and of theology's foundational role in it? To understand their varied assessments of that traditional vision's viability in the modern era, we pose the following

questions: '*Should* theology make a difference to the other arts and sciences?' and, if so, 'What difference should theology make?'; and 'How might theology bear on "the encyclopaedic task" of reconciling our knowledges with each other?'

2.1. Should Theology Make a Difference to the Other Arts and Sciences?

Schleiermacher is best read as having abandoned the traditional Christian intellectual project of *fides quarens intellectum* and as adopting instead an Enlightenment conception of universal rationality. In so doing, Schleiermacher sought to embrace the genuine insights of the broader culture while abandoning the idea of theology's critical role in evaluating, interpreting, and contextualizing those insights. In a sense, he represents a return to a sort of pre-Christian, Socratic (or Platonic) mode of pursuing knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) for its own sake through rigorous dialogue but without reference (and certainly without deference) to the traditional 'story of everything' which had oriented Christian reflection for centuries. Unsurprisingly, Schleiermacher declared: 'Plato is indisputably the author whom I know best and with whom I have almost coalesced' (quoted in Lamm, 2024, p.18). Indeed, Schleiermacher drew his inspiration for his dialectical approach to *Philosophie* and *Wissenschaft* directly from Plato's dialogues (cf., ibid., pp.15-16). But by sequestering religion's influence 'within the bounds of feeling alone' (as Merklinger says), Schleiermacher broke with the mainstream of Christian tradition by surrendering Christian theology's critical function in Christian thought, ceding that role to modern *Philosophie*.

Newman and Kuyper, on the other hand, represent clear attempts at developing the *fides quarens intellectum* tradition. Newman, too, sought to 'plunder the Egyptians', holding that the fact of precursors to Christian beliefs and practices among 'heathen philosophies and religions' does not delegitimate those practices and beliefs as pagan but, rather, dignifies those philosophies and religions as being partially aligned with the truth (*Ess*. II.xii., pp.231-32). If God has indeed made the world through His Word and by His Word He has enlightened all of humanity to one extent or another, then we ought to expect to find such precursors, thought Newman. While Newman typically refers to God-given seminal insights as '*natural* religion', he is clear that by this phrase 'it is not…meant that any religious system has been traced out by unaided Reason', 'because we know of no time or country in which human Reason *was* unaided' (*US*, II.5, p.17). Thus, what Newman calls 'nature' is precisely what Kuyper calls 'common grace'. Likewise, Kuyper, citing John's prologue and Proverbs 8 (*W&W*, p.36-38; *EST*, §39, p.59), argued that science's very possibility rested on all things having been created through the divine Wisdom/Word and 'the creation of humanity according to God's image', thereby creating that 'organic affinity' between God, humanity, and the world that enables 'the human mind to reflect within itself the cosmos,… and to think it through logically as to its relations'. While the Fall disrupted that 'organic affinity', nevertheless, Kuyper held that the divine Wisdom/Word, 'the true light', continues to 'enlighten everyone' to one extent or another by common grace, thereby making possible both natural science and natural theology.

Where Newman and Kuyper differ from Schleiermacher most clearly is on the question of whether theology can or should have any 'bearing' on Christian thought in other disciplines. Schleiermacher thought it should not, whereas Newman and Kuyper both thought it must. Thus,

Newman held that if theology is a genuine science and if 'all the sciences come to us as one' (*IU*, I.iii.6, p.51), then it necessarily 'bears' on 'other knowledge' and 'other knowledge', in turn, 'bears' upon theology. Kuyper, too, held that science forms an organic whole and that, if theology is truly a science, it must, as far as possible, be '*coordinated*' with her sister sciences (*EST*, §94, p.421). 'Theology is not isolated in the organism of science,' Kuyper urges. 'It is united with it in an organic way. Communication, avenues of approach, and points of union extend to all sides' (*EST*, §95, p.421). Notably, both Newman and Kuyper held that to faithfully work out the implications of Christianity for the various arts and sciences required a particular scholarly *ethos*.

From a theoretical standpoint, Newman and Kuyper both acknowledged that theological beliefs would have more immediate implications for some sciences than others. Hence, Newman held that, 'There is no crying demand' for 'a Catholic Euclid or a Catholic Newton' because the natural sciences tend to self-correct (*IU*, II.ii, §2.1, pp.180-81). But Newman held that insofar as the humanities are the study of human nature, a Catholic approach to the humanities calls for an entirely new literature because pagan literature cannot but present us with fallen humanity and, therefore, yield a distorted humanism (*IU*, I.ix.7, p.158; II.ii, §3.4, p.190-91).[195]

Kuyper suggested that sin's noetic effects bear more heavily upon sciences in which 'the subjective factor' plays a greater part (the humanities and social sciences) than in the natural or more purely formal sciences (e.g., chemistry, logic, mathematics). The fallenness of human cognition 'wouldn't be so bad if science were based exclusively on observation and experience, if consciousness were nothing but a mirror reflecting the world around us', Kuyper argued (*AK:CR*,

[195] Newman's stark dualism on this point is perplexing. Given Newman's openness to Pagans having genuine insight into God, why should he not expect them to have genuine insights into humanity?

p.451). Kuyper suggested that for those sciences which narrowly focus on just the facts, our fallen confusion over values need not be a major impediment. But higher sciences—particularly medicine, law, and especially theology—involve both observation and interpretation; not simply seeing but seeing *as*. They involve extrapolating, evaluating, and synthesizing observations into understandings, programs, and schools of thought, organizing our understandings towards certain ends. Such activities require accounting for more than what empirical observation or bare formal logic can supply, including values, purposes, intuitions, hunches, and unproveable first principles. 'The darkening of sin thus does not concern the knowledge of details but science in its higher and more noble conception', Kuyper concludes (ibid., p.450). But, as we have seen, Newman and Kuyper were not simply concerned with how Christian faith might be integrated with discrete scholarly disciplines but also with how the Christian faith might integrate our various knowledges, scholarly and otherwise, into a coherent or 'connected' 'worldview', and both thought such integration bears more directly on the higher and social sciences and humanities than on the exact and natural sciences.

Moreover, both Newman and Kuyper described faithful scholarship as requiring a certain ethos which, in the long run, they expected to be epistemically advantageous. Their conceptions of a Christian scholarly ethos overlapped significantly, and they seem to have agreed on at least five characteristics as being fundamental to it.

First and foremost, against the modernist impulses towards utilitarianism and pragmatism and the more recent postmodern impulse to treat scholarship as a tool of social

justice activism,[196] Newman and Kuyper insisted that Christian scholarship must be singularly *truth*-oriented. For Newman, knowledge is an intrinsic, not merely an instrumental good (*IU*, I.v.2, p.78). Likewise, for Kuyper, *knowledge* of the *truth* is 'the *goal* of genuine study' ('Goal,' pp.119ff), not searching for searching's sake nor avant-gardism for avant-gardism's sake. Consequently, for Kuyper, the Christian scholar's commitment to the truth requires being receptive of the truths learnt from common sense, tradition, and revelation and conceiving of her task as establishing, deducing, and systematizing knowledge as far as they can. Artificially limiting knowledge to that which can be strictly proven is distortive and dehumanizing. Newman defends roughly the same position, albeit from a Roman Catholic point of view.

Second, Newman and Kuyper both insisted against modernity's penchant for reductivism and myopic specialization that Christian scholarship must be holistic. Newman argued powerfully that consistent adherence to the gospel's theistic ontology requires Christian scholars to resist the modern pull towards reductive materialism—the desire to treat material explanations as though they were total (see especially *IU*, I.iii.5, pp.47-48). Similarly, for Kuyper this meant that in all disciplines Christian scholars must ensure 'that God's complete independence from the world is confessed', 'that the independence of spirit from matter is resolutely maintained', and 'that resistance is mounted against the inclination to subject the spiritual sciences (*geestelijke wetenschap* [i.e., *die Geisteswissenschaften* or the humanities]) to the method of the natural sciences' (*W&W*, p.91). Instead, as Newman put it, the various arts and sciences must be mutually 'adjusted' to one another, taking each other into account within the big ontological picture

[196] On this recent development and its consequences, see especially Jonathan Haidt (2016), Stanley Fish (2008), and Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay (2020).

painted by Christian theology, lest they exceed their true explanatory limits and 'usurp' each other's proper roles in the economy of knowledge. Hence, for Newman, the goal liberal education is to enable the student to form 'a connected view' (*IU*, I.v.2, p.78) and the scholar to 'know where he and his science stand' relative to the other arts and sciences (*IU*, I.vii.6, p.118). Kuyper mounted a similar argument in defining the scholarly enterprise as being inherently 'encyclopaedic' (*EST*, §39, p.59).

Third, both Newman and Kuyper maintained that Christian scholars must be *open* to truth from any quarter, giving credit wherever credit is due. Both recognized that God has scattered 'seeds of truth' or 'common grace' throughout all cultures, including the rapidly secularizing culture of modernity. Consequently, Christian scholars must be generous towards their rivals, recognizing that 'there is no false teaching without an intermixture of truth' (*GA*, VII, §2, p.201) and that, therefore, for honesty's and charity's sakes we must ever seek the good, true, and beautiful in every discipline, discourse, school, or theory, however deeply it might be buried. Like Newman, Kuyper urged his followers 'to be always mindful of the fact that others may have part of the truth and a portion of the power that we are unable to grasp' ('Bound,' p.81). For Kuyper, this meant recognizing 'genius' as 'a *sovereign* power' and 'a gift of God' to be honoured in whomever it is encountered (*LoC*, p.95).

Fourth, Newman and Kuyper urged that Christian scholars should be deeply and abidingly confident in the truth of the gospel. For Newman, such confidence allows Christian scholars to be exceedingly patient with paradox, apparent contradiction, and unresolved puzzles. Newman took a long view, allowing that some apparent conflicts between the sciences can take generations or even centuries to resolve, and some may not be resolvable at all this side of the

eschaton. Until such time as a clear resolution emerges, a proper confidence in the gospel should enable the Christian scholar to calmly entertain a range of possibilities and not hanker to short-circuit the process. For Kuyper, this confidence meant the Christian scholar should not feel obliged to answer every criticism or every sceptic, lest he allow himself to be 'tied down by an unproductive series of ad hoc arguments' ('Goal,' p.128). Rather, the Christian scholar should regard the task of apologetics as a much lower priority than that of unapologetically pursuing their own research programme from a Christian point of view.

Fifth, Christian scholarship must be nuanced, sharply distinguishing between Christian orthodoxy's principles and the contestable doctrinal outworkings of those principles; and likewise distinguishing between solidly settled science, intellectual fads, and the many gradations in between (cf., *IU*, II.iii.7, p.209). Both held that Christians should resist the temptation to treat every doctrinal controversy like an existential threat to the faith, as though it struck at Christianity's core principles. Both Newman and Kuyper took Christian faith to be properly basic and embraced the mainstream Christian intellectual tradition's *fides quarens intellectum* paradigm (**Ch.IV**). But beyond that, both Newman and Kuyper suggested that in the modern era the Christian scholarly project of 'coordinating' theology with our other knowledges must, above all, be grounded in a capacious, flexible understanding of Christianity as an organically developing tradition nurtured by a Christian scholarly *ethos*. Thus, instead of prescribing doctrinal shibboleths, both Newman and Kuyper sought to preserve their respective doctrinal traditions' integrity by identifying the fundamental 'principles' (or *beginselen*) guiding their organic development (and reformation). Thus, Newman (*DCD*, VII.i, §1.3, p.324-26) anchored legitimate doctrinal developments in the principles implicit in the miracle of the Incarnation while Kuyper

('Bound') oriented Reformed scholarship by identifying Reformed Christianity's vital, guiding principles. Newman and Kuyper's subtle, organic conceptions of Christian orthodoxy as a vital, principled tradition rather than an ossified traditionalism allowed them to entertain creative ways of incorporating the new discoveries of historical critical Biblical scholarship (particularly regarding the Pentateuch) and Darwinian evolution, then riling the ecclesiastical scene, into their thought.

Finally, both Newman and Kuyper held that intellectual freedom is vital to the work of Christian scholarship. As Newman said, 'great minds need elbow-room'. For both this meant that Christian scholars must enjoy freedom from both undue ecclesiastical interference and state interference. Indeed, for both, securing a space where Christian scholars could pursue their research from a Catholic or Reformed perspective unencumbered required them to establish new institutions. Likewise, for both, it was essential to the scholarly enterprise to embrace methodological pluralism, granting the Christian scholars within those institutions the latitude to pursue their inquiries by the most apt methods. 'Unless [the scholar] is at liberty to investigate on the basis, and according to the particularities, of his science, he cannot investigate at all,' wrote Newman (*IU*, II.iv.7., p.230). Interference from the Magisterium was liable to undermine the intellectual enterprise, Newman thought, and his 'Letter to the Duke of Norfolk' sought to embrace the new declaration of Papal infallibility while also staving off Papal overreach into the sciences.

In his concept of 'sphere sovereignty', Kuyper sought to articulate a full-blown theoretical framework for both preserving Christian academic freedom and carrying forward the Christian tradition of reimagining, redirecting, and reforming our arts and sciences in light of the gospel.

For Kuyper, a cultural domain (or 'sphere') honours Christ's universal sovereignty by orienting itself towards a legitimate good and advancing by means of the domain's nature and limits. In this endeavour, the Christian practitioner is responsible only to God and primarily to that good which constitutes that sphere's divinely appointed end. She is wise to confer with faithful theologians to aid her discerning apt means to legitimate ends, but theologians have no authority over any other sphere, nor do they always have the requisite insight into that sphere to offer much concrete guidance. Ultimately, it falls to the Christian practitioner or scholar in a particular field or discipline to discern what shape faithfulness to Christ must take within that sphere.

2.2. Can Theology Help Reintegrate Our Knowledges?

Schleiermacher retained the vestiges of the Christian tradition's vision of transdisciplinary wisdom in his insistence upon the organic unity of all knowledge and the necessity of cultivating an 'encyclopaedic perspective' and a 'scientific' or 'philosophical spirit' in all students. He insisted that scholars conduct and publish specialized research (*OT*, p.61) but also insisted on cultivating a 'philosophical' scholarly ethos which would not be satisfied with the sort of piecemeal understanding that burrowing ever more deeply into one's hyper-specialization tends to produce. Hence, the 'scientific spirit' Schleiermacher envisioned would expand the boundaries of our knowledge, striving to understand something of all subject areas from their first principles to their final synthesis (*OTUGS*, p.19).

However, Schleiermacher traded the Christian tradition's confidence in its divinely revealed TOFoundational narrative for an EEFoundational narrative; the traditional Christian

pilgrimage of 'faith seeking understanding' for an 'existential detective story'.[197] Thus, he still sought the unity of the *Wissenschaften* but without any initial assurance as to where it would be found. Thus, Schleiermacher took his basic intellectual bearings not from any divine revelation but from a dialectical process which he trusted to bring us ever closer to that total truth—the Absolute—in which the plurality of realities is ultimately united.

Schleiermacher effectively treated theology as incidental to the unification of the sciences, moving it from the centre of the university's life to the periphery. In an act of 'defensive modernization' aimed at preserving some place for theology within an otherwise secular institution, Schleiermacher designated *Theologie* as a *positive Wissenschaft*. Hence, he established a one-way street between theology and other knowledges, a semipermeable barrier in which influence, ideas, and questions were allowed to flow from the 'pure sciences' (*reine Wissenschaften*) to theology, but never from theology to the 'pure sciences'.[198] *Theologie* was to abdicate her historic throne as queen of the sciences and accept *Philosophie* as her new 'Lord' (*Herrin*). Indeed, 'confessionalism' (*Konfessionalismus*) of any kind was to have no place in the new *wissenschaftliche Universität*. Schleiermacher hoped that this new knowledge regime would eventually secure the unification of the sciences upon an EEFoundation. Instead, it led to the fragmentation of theological study into mutually uncomprehending subdisciplines and to 'the disappearance of theology as wisdom and theology as discipline (science) from the theological

[197] To borrow a phrase of Jim Holt (2012).
[198] Hence, H. Richard Niebuhr (2001, pp.93ff) was basically right to identify Schleiermacher with the 'Christ of culture' type.

school—the disappearance, that is, as the overall unity and rationale of theological study' (Farley 1994, p.44).[199]

Newman, on the other hand, held tightly to the tradition which Schleiermacher had turned on its head. Newman celebrated the 'the Seven Liberal Arts' as forming 'a definite school of intellect…, founded on ideas and methods…of the highest and truest character' (*IU*, II.i.4., pp.172-73) and was committed to cultivating in students a sense of and instinct for the fundamental unity of truth on explicitly monotheistic grounds (*IU*, I.v.1., p.76). Liberal education, wrote Newman, trains and forms the intellect 'to have a connected view or grasp of things' (*IU*, p.8) by teaching students how to 'view' reality's different 'aspects' in concert to approximate an understanding of the 'complete circle of knowledge' (Tillman, 2015, p.20). Newman held that theology played an indispensable role in completing this 'circle of knowledge'.

Kuyper, too, believed that knowledge formed an organic unity which theology—or more precisely, *revelation and regeneration*—allows us to begin to see. In our fallen state, Kuyper argued, the deep coherence and internal relationships of the organism of science are now largely opaque to us. Divine revelation and our regeneration (or *palingenesis*) by the Holy Spirit begin to restore that holistic sight which can see God's cosmos amid the chaos of fallen human experience. For Kuyper, theology is the study of God's self-revelation from the standpoint of a renewed mind. While strictly speaking theology, so defined, only directly pertains to the nature, character, and (speech-)acts of God, it necessarily has implications for all other sciences as they deal with diverse aspects of God's creation. So understood, theology is a necessary aid to the

[199] Schleiermacher's defenders rightly point out that this result was never his intention. Intended or not, this fragmentation is widely recognized as being a consequence of the liberal theological project (see Kelsey, 1993; Farley, 1994).

project of 'encyclopaedia' which Kuyper defined 'as an analysis and synthesis of all sciences together, taken as one organic whole' (*EST*, §20, p.26).

Indeed, for Kuyper, this 'encyclopaedic' dimension of theology—the recognition of its bearing upon all things—is fundamental to its character *qua* theology. Kuyper (*EST*, §94, p.420) argued that by designating theology as only a *positive Wissenschaft*, Schleiermacher had not only reduced theology to an *ad hoc* 'aggregate' of knowledges from other disciplines repurposed to serve ecclesial aims but had also cut off theology's organic relationship to the other arts and sciences. If theology is deprived of its critical metanarratological function, it ceases to coordinate the other sciences and to even cohere as a discipline.

These three proposals represented different strategies for negotiating both the spectacular rise of religious and cultural pluralism in post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment Europe and of organizing the explosion of new knowledges in that time.[200] Schleiermacher believed his strategy was necessary to create an atmosphere of intellectual freedom and scientific rigor in the university, while Newman and Kuyper sought to preserve spaces for Christians to freely engage in teaching, learning, and scholarship in every discipline—not just theology—in accord with their Christian convictions. However, for both Newman and Kuyper it was essential to balance theology's relevance to every field of human inquiry and endeavor with the arts and sciences' methodological independence and integrity.

3. Postmodernity: What Difference Could Theology Make Now?

[200] On the latter, see especially Wellmon (2015).

Given modernity's doubts about the viability of traditional Christianity, historically orthodox Christian perspectives have proven surprisingly fruitful for academic research over the last several decades. Indeed, in a revised (2021, pp.365ff) edition of his classic, *The Soul of the American University*, the historian George Marsden details what over the last thirty years has been 'a renaissance of Christian academia'. This has been a 'varied, multifaceted, and uneven "renaissance"', to be sure, says Marsden (2021, p.388), but a renaissance, nonetheless. The historian Mark Noll, whose 1994 book *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind,* diagnosed the underlying causes of evangelical anti-intellectualism, by 2013 could cautiously celebrate 'hopeful signs' of a turnaround. Most recently, in the 2022 edition of *Scandal*, Noll has likewise asked whether 'an evangelical intellectual renaissance [was] underway'. While a scandalous anti-intellectualism fueled by the corrupting influences of political partisanship still mars much of popular American evangelicalism, there has arisen a generation of evangelical intellectuals and scholars doing serious and seriously Christian scholarship of the highest caliber.

Much of this 'renaissance' owes to what Marsden (1987, p.14, cited in Bartholomew 2017, p.31) once called the 'triumph…of…Kuyperian presuppositionalism in the evangelical (academic) community'. Embracing a broadly Kuyperian approach to learning and scholarship freed many evangelical scholars from wasting precious time and energy on rearguard apologetics or trying to 'prove' Christianity to focus instead on confidently pursuing their own research programs from within their own 'worldviews'. However, while Kuyperianism has played a significant role in

catalyzing this 'renaissance', the 'renaissance' is by no means limited to the Reformed or evangelical worlds.[201]

The discipline of philosophy provides perhaps the most striking example of the revival of serious Christian scholarship. Schleiermacher thought that securing the university's intellectual freedom required dethroning and cordoning off *Theologie* as a subordinate *positive Wissenschaft* and crowning a strictly non-confessional *Philosophie* as 'lord' of the sciences. As the German university ideal gained influence, so, too, did the compartmentalization of theology and the prioritization of secular rationality. Consequently, as the atheist philosopher Quentin Smith (2001, p.196) observes: 'By the second half of the twentieth century, universities and colleges had been become in the main secularized.' However, over the last half century, philosophy guided by historically orthodox theological convictions has proven to be far more potent than Schleiermacher had thought possible.[202] In an article chronicling 'the desecularization that evolved in philosophy departments since the late 1960s', Smith (ibid.) writes: 'The secularization of mainstream academia began to quickly unravel upon the publication of [Alvin] Plantinga's influential book on realist theism, *God and Other Minds*, in 1967.'[203] As we have seen, Plantinga stands in the Kuyperian tradition and his work on 'Reformed Epistemology' drew directly from Kuyper's thought. The result has been a sea change in the philosophical guild. Smith estimates

[201] E.g., the collections edited by Jacobsen and Jacobsen (2004); Crisp, Davies, D'Costa, and Hampson (2012); Ream, Riggs, and Pattengale (2012); Lundin (2013); and especially the Roman Catholic collection edited by Piderit and Morey (2012). One might also consult the online Global Faculty Initiative, convened by Terry Halliday and Donald Hay (2024), which engages leading Christian academics from research universities around the world in explorations of Christian theology's relevance for their scholarly disciplines.

[202] On these developments, see especially Quentin Smith (2001, pp.196ff), and Nicholas Wolterstorff (2011; 2019).

[203] Wolterstorff (2011, p.257) writes that Plantinga's 'book played a decisive role in changing the main topic in analytic philosophy of religion from religious language to the epistemology of religious belief' and that the latter 'has continued ever since to be a major topic within analytic philosophy of religion'.

'today perhaps one-quarter or one-third of philosophy professors are theists, with most being orthodox Christians' (ibid.). While many theist and Christian philosophers do not work in the philosophy of religion or philosophical theology, it is highly significant that these subfields have undergone an extraordinary revival over the last several decades, engaging some of the best philosophical minds writing today and generating a highly sophisticated body of scholarship. Smith notes, 'there are now over five philosophy journals devoted to theism or the philosophy of religion', that are 'overflowing with submissions from leading philosophers' (ibid.).

Smith regards these developments as an 'embarrassment' for philosophy and thinks it unimaginable that such overtly Christian scholarship could gain similar traction in other fields (ibid., pp.196-97). Smith might be surprised to hear that Marsden and Noll think a 'renaissance' of Christian scholarship is underway across the board of academic disciplines, but this owes, in part, to Smith's unimaginatively narrow conception of 'theistic' scholarship as either arguing *for* theism or rejecting methodological naturalism. Thus, Smith writes,

> …theists in other fields tend to compartmentalize their theistic beliefs from their scholarly work; they rarely assume and never argue for theism in their scholarly work. If they did, they would be committing academic suicide or, more exactly, their articles would quickly be rejected, requiring them to write secular articles if they wanted to be published. (ibid., p.197)

Smith's narrow conception is wrong on at least two counts: First, as we have seen, both Newman and Kuyper held 'methodological naturalism' to be perfectly appropriate to most academic disciplines and did so on *theological grounds*. Second, as Kuyper put it, theology connects with the world of scholarship *organically* in a *variety* of ways (*EST*, §95, p.421). Thus, in the 1980s and '90s, Christian historians such as Noll, Marsden, Nathan Hatch, Grant Wacker and others bucked the scholarly trend of ignoring religious beliefs as a significant factor influencing people's actions

and, thereby, the course of history. Christian natural scientists such as Simon Conway-Morris, Owen Gingerich, John Barrow, and Frank Tipler have explored the ways in which the cosmos appears to have been finely tuned to allow for the evolution of life as we know it. Christian sociologists such as Christian Smith, Michael Emerson, and Elaine Howard-Ecklund have explored questions that concern religious communities (e.g., What is the state of religious life among emerging adults? What do most scientists believe about God? Why do racial divisions persist among religious communities?) but which are deprioritized (i.e., ignored) by secular sociologists. Examples like these could be multiplied, but the key point is that none of these scholarly approaches aims to prove God's existence or invoke miraculous explanations, but it is hardly the case that Christian scholars pursuing such lines of inquiry have 'compartmentalize[d] their theistic beliefs from their scholarly work' as Smith suggests. Their theological commitments might lie deep in the background of their projects, but they have not simply bracketed or screened them out. Indeed, Christian convictions have informed recent scholarship in an endless variety of ways, and Newman and Kuyper's conviction that Christian theology and other knowledges might be fruitfully brought to bear on each other has proven to be perfectly viable in the modern and 'postmodern' eras.

If the traditional paradigm of faith-seeking-understanding remains viable, so, too, does the project of correlating our various knowledges together in God. Indeed, the successes of Reformed Epistemology, Christian philosophy, and historically orthodox Christian scholarship more broadly over the last fifty years raise two points with which Schleiermacher never really reckoned.

First, Schleiermacher never really grappled with the possibility that traditional Christianity might not just be an elaborate expression of our feeling of absolute dependence but might also be descriptive of reality. Schleiermacher was an incredibly generous and capacious thinker, and his dialectical approach to philosophy as the scholarly community's practice of seeking truth through rational exchange bespeaks a considerable openness to different perspectives. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher took it for granted that traditional Christian orthodoxy was fundamentally nonrealistic. But the 'renaissance' of Christian scholarship witnessed in recent decades suggests that this assumption is unsafe and that intellectual honesty requires some measure of openness to traditional religious perspectives as live existential and intellectual options. That is, outlooks informed by thick 'impressions of dogma' deserve a seat at the dialectical table just as much as outlooks oriented by thin 'intuitions of the infinite' do.

Second, in treating naturalism, pantheism, and theism as standing on an epistemic par, Schleiermacher never really reckoned with just how much of a difference these 'intuitions of the infinite' can make to *how* the various *Wissenschaften* can be united. If, for example, one intuits that the 'Whence' of our being is a nonrational, impersonal materiality, then much of the *Geisteswissenschaften* deal not with the 'deep down things' of the real world but with epiphenomenal human fantasies, inventions, and projections. As Newman put it, the significance of such theological questions does not fit 'in a nutshell' and cannot simply be cordoned off to the realms of 'the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour'—it has to do with the architecture both of reality itself and, therefore, of all knowledges. Schleiermacher did not see what Max Weber saw only too clearly: that 'rationalizing' a world along materialist lines entails its utter 'disenchantment' and the dissolution of all values, including the supposedly intrinsic value of

knowledge itself. Within such a world, truth might be unifiable, but it would be a rump truth when compared to the fulsome, humanistic vision of truth enabled by the Christian tradition's Trinitarian ontology. Not all 'intuitions of the infinite' are created equal, and some have far greater explanatory power than others. Newman powerfully underscored this point with his description of the explanatory distortions that result when the sciences adopt a false picture of the world that excludes the reality of rational agency (**Ch.II.3.3.2.**). Rather than uniting our knowledges in a coherent 'connected view', such false 'intuitions of the infinite' become Procrustean beds, discarding or discounting some vital knowledges while overstretching others to fill the explanatory gaps.

Conclusion

How, then, should 'theology' relate to other knowledges? Much depends, of course, on how one defines 'theology' and how one regards the religious beliefs upon which 'theology' is based. If, like Schleiermacher, one regards religion as fundamentally a matter of pious sentiment and defines 'theology' as merely a practical science for serving the needs of a particular religious community, then theology is decidedly intellectually downstream from the other arts and sciences. But if, like Newman and Kuyper, one defines 'theology' as a full-fledged science among the sciences that is built upon and extending genuine knowledge, then theology naturally relates to other knowledges as a coequal conversation partner but with one catch. Because theology is the science of the ultimate reality—God—in which all the arts and sciences live and move and have their being, it necessarily touches on and is touched by all of them, and it describes the

ultimate context in which the other arts and sciences relate to each other. In a unique way, theology explores the ultimate horizons of possibility and meaning for the rest of our scientific endeavors.

Whichever definition one adopts, the question of theology's relationship to other disciplines is closely related to the contemporary problem of disciplinary fragmentation and the question of how our various arts and sciences fit together. Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper agreed that higher (i.e., liberal) learning involves earnestly pursuing this question of coherence. Indeed, they all held that seeking to form a 'connected' 'world-and-life-view' in a 'philosophical spirit' and being equipped to do so is a *sine qua non* of a liberal education. But they differed over 'theology's' role in this search: Schleiermacher treated theology (the practical science of curating religious communities) as incidental to it while Newman and Kuyper insisted that theology (the science of systematizing and applying divinely revealed knowledge) is integral.

In taking their respective positions, Schleiermacher rejected, and Newman and Kuyper maintained, a longstanding tradition of Christian thought. From very early on, Christians based their pursuit of wisdom on the Christocentric ontological foundational conviction that 'all things have been created through [Christ] and for Him, and in Him all things hold together' (Col 1:16-17). To be sure, they understood that to know Christ is to know 'God's mystery' (2:2), a mystery exceeding all human comprehension. But it is one thing to seek wisdom without knowing this 'mystery' and a very different thing to seek wisdom in the confidence that somehow 'all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' are 'hidden' in Christ (Col 2:3). By pursuing this latter mode of inquiry, premodern Christians developed a tradition of 'faith seeking understanding' wherein all truth was to be gladly received as God's truth and our various knowledges were to be

understood in the context of God's grand story of reconciling all things to Himself through the risen Christ (1:19). Over the course of the Church's first millennium this tradition developed a vision of transdisciplinary wisdom and, accordingly, an interdisciplinary mode of cultivating it through a theologically grounded teaching of the liberal arts.

Shaken by Enlightenment thinkers' criticisms of Christianity, Schleiermacher and many other modern thinkers rejected the Christian tradition's 'faith seeking understanding' paradigm and the TOF upon which that paradigm rested. Instead, Schleiermacher sought to reestablish Christian piety on an EEFoundationalist basis of universal human experience and universal rationality. Secular philosophy, not theology, would now be the 'lord' of the sciences and provide the north star of our pursuit of the 'encyclopaedic task'. The result of this reestablishment project, however, has been epistemic fragmentation rather than consilience. Indeed, modern theology itself has tended to break apart into mutually uncomprehending subdisciplines.

Newman and Kuyper instead opted to counter the Enlightenment's challenge to Christianity, calling into question the EEFoundationalist model of rationality upon which the challenge was premised. They held the Church's traditional TOFoundationalist pursuit of understanding from the standpoint of faith to be viable under modern conditions and sought to articulate a nuanced ethos of Christian intellectual engagement for an age of rapid-fire discovery, invention, communication, and cultural change. To the surprise of some, the sort of nuanced 'faith seeking understanding' paradigm that Newman and Kuyper defended has borne considerable scholarly fruit over the last half century across the spectrum of academic disciplines but particularly (and perhaps ironically) in the field of philosophy. This surprising 'renaissance' of Christian scholarship suggests that the 'faith seeking understanding' paradigm is not only a viable

mode of engaging with various scholarly disciplines but also a potentially viable path for reconciling our various knowledges to each other in a coherent ‘world-and-life-view’.

VI. What is the University For?
Seeking Wisdom Together

In recent decades higher education critics have urged that the modern secular university is in desperate need of redirection and reformation, though there is no consensus on how. Many have diagnosed the modern secular university as suffering from a chronic, if not terminal, condition of aimlessness. Books and articles now abound with ominous titles such as *The Moral Collapse of the University*, *The University in Ruins*, *Education's End*, *The End of Education*, *The Decline of the Secular University*, *American Higher Education in Crisis?*, *The Last Professors*, 'The Slow Death of the University,' 'The End of the University,' 'Academe's Extinction Event,' etc. Others, such as *The Closing of the American Mind*, *The Coddling of the American Mind*, and *The Abandoned Generation*, argue that contemporary higher education is failing the young. Such writers allege that universities and colleges are cultivating 'excellent sheep' (Deresiewicz, 2014), instilling 'excellence without a soul' (Lewis, 2012) and generally corrupting the youth.

The focal question pressed by most of those worried that the university is on its last legs is precisely the question of higher education's purpose or *telos*: What is the university or college for?[204] These writers contend that universities have veered off course, that there is a profound misalignment between universities' proper work and their current modes of operation. Derek Bok (2006, p.58) is both typical of the genre and surely correct when he writes: 'Any useful

[204] See, e.g., Stefan Collini, *What Are Universities For?* (2012); chapter 1 of Delbanco (2012) and chapter 5 of Deresiewicz (2014), both titled 'What is College For?'; chapter 3 of Bok, simply titled 'Purposes'. Both Kronman, *Education's End* (2007), and Postman, *The End of Education* (1996), play off the two senses of the word 'end' as connoting either purpose, on the one hand, or demise, on the other, to underscore what they see as being at stake in the debate over higher education's *telos*.

discussion of undergraduate education must begin by making clear what it is that colleges are trying to achieve.' How faculty, administrators, and students answer that question, whether explicitly or only tacitly, has obvious implications for how they will understand the proper scope, subjects, and practices of higher education; for evaluating the university's various activities; for deciding who should be admitted to universities and who should graduate from them, etc. Here Bok (ibid.) cites W.B. Carnochan's diagnosis: 'Lacking adequate criteria of purpose, we do not know how well our higher education works in practice or even what working well would mean.' The result of this teleological deficit, the 'funeral dirge' writers tell us, is that the university is now morally and intellectually adrift.

This chapter aims to bring Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper into critical dialogue with each other and with current higher education criticism to identify insights pertinent to the contemporary university's aforementioned disorientation and to theology's role in correcting it.

1. The End and Principles of Higher Education

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper did not share the sense of disorientation afflicting contemporary observers and inhabitants of the university. While they proposed different reforms to modernize the university, they were united in maintaining the historic understanding of the university's central purpose as the cultivation of wisdom through teaching and research. As Pope Gregory IX wrote in 1231 in a bull addressed to the masters at the University of Paris, the university was to be 'wisdom's special workshop'.[205] As Osmo Kivinen and Petri Poikus (2006,

[205] *Parens scientiarum*, quoted in Axtell (2016, p.v).

p.201) have compellingly argued,[206] this sapiential purpose must be understood as 'the *prima facie* function' of the university, having shown that *without exception* every university charter for the last 900 years has explicitly cited the cultivation of knowledgeable, wise, and virtuous leaders as the primary justification for the university's establishment (ibid.).[207]

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper saw themselves as upholding this tradition at a moment when it was endangered. Schleiermacher envisioned the cultivation of 'a philosophical spirit' (*philosophischen Geist*) in students of every discipline as the distinctive purpose of the university in contrast to the merely informative purpose of the schools and the purely scientific purpose of the academies. Similarly, Newman contended that the natural end of a university—a *Studium Generale*—was to cultivate a 'discipline and refinement of intellect', '*wisdom'* in its students. For Kuyper, the true end of university study is to train students to 'trace' God's '*Logos* in the *kosmos*', 'investigate it, publish it, personally wonder at it' ('Secret', p.103); 'to track down the gold of God's thoughts, the gems of divine wisdom' (ibid., p.110). While each of them envisioned their respective universities as serving different communities (Schleiermacher, Germany; Newman, the Roman Catholic Church generally and the Catholics of Ireland in particular; Kuyper, Holland's traditional Calvinists) and representing different religious or philosophical outlooks, all were agreed on the university's basic sapiential purpose.

Moreover, compared with the confusions of the contemporary educational scene, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper broadly agreed to a significant extent on the following

[206] Kivinen and Poikus (2006, pp.195-96) base their argument on an exhaustive study of all extant university charters 'from the year 1224 to 1999'. Their data set includes 225 university charters for universities on all six continents (ibid, p.183).
[207] Notably, the University of Oxford has neither charter nor founder but arose organically and haphazardly.

principles (adapted from Roche [2017, pp.31-32]) as necessary to the maintenance of the modern university's sapiential mission: 1) the prizing of wisdom as an autotelic good; 2) a commitment to the unity of truth; 3) a commitment to the unity of teaching and research; 4) a commitment to the personal formation of students and scholars; and 5) a commitment to intellectual freedom. Of course, the devil is in the details, and several differences in their articulations of these principles have proven extremely consequential for the modern (and now postmodern) university.

1.1. Wisdom for Wisdom's Sake

In contrast to the profoundly philosophical visions of higher education set forth by Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper, the modern secular university is, in the main, a strikingly *unphilosophical* institution. Ernest Boyer (1987, p. 283) described this slide well when he observed that 'what today's college is teaching most successfully is competence—competence in meeting schedules, in gathering information, in responding well on tests, in mastering the details of a special field', the skills that make for employability and upward mobility in today's global marketplace. 'But technical skill, of whatever kind,' Boyer notes, 'leaves open essential questions….' He continues:

> *Education for what purpose? Competence to what end?* At a time in life when values should be shaped and personal priorities sharply probed, what a tragedy it would be if the most deeply felt issues, the most haunting questions, the most creative moments were pushed to the fringes of our institutional life. (ibid.)

Harry Lewis (2007), Dean of Harvard College from 1995 to 2003, describes the modern university's chief educational 'product'—mere technical or professional competence, devoid of

any deeper moral meaning—as 'excellence without a soul'. Indeed, as Anthony Kronman (2007) so memorably put it, 'colleges and universities have given up on the meaning of life'.

Against this trend toward narrowly instrumentalist education, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper held that cultivating wisdom is an autotelic good and the university's ultimate *raison d'être*. Such 'philosophical knowledge', as Newman put it, is 'capable of being its own end' (*IU*, I.v.2, p.78) and, so, is 'worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does' (I.v.7, p.85). Schleiermacher likewise held the pursuit of a unified science in a 'philosophical spirit' to be intrinsically worthwhile, even if 'the state all too easily fails to acknowledge the value of this effort' (*OTUGS*, p.10). Kuyper identifies such scholarly pursuit of the truth as inherently beneficial in that 'it brings to light the hidden glory of God; it gives you joy in the act of digging up the gold that lies hidden in creation; and it grants you the honor of raising the level and well-being of human life' ('Secret,' p.104).

None of them denied the importance of professional training or career preparedness. All of them worked to establish universities with dedicated professional schools, notably for law and medicine. But they were united in holding that the cultivation of wisdom is first and foremost an intrinsic good, and that, secondarily, wisdom is of course good *for* professional life, personal life, church, state, and society, too.

On this point of consensus, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper provide a much-needed counterpoint to 'the greater part of public discourse about universities at present' which, Collini (2012, x) observes, 'reduces to the following dispiriting proposition: universities need to justify getting more money and the way to do this is by showing that they help to make more money'. This proposition is so dispiriting because it cannot withstand a moment's reflection:

money is so obviously a means and not an end. To treat moneymaking as the ultimate point of reference for higher education is to fundamentally set students and the university itself adrift.

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper called for the university to be a philosophical institution, one which probed and taught students how to probe such deeper questions of purpose and value. Newman and Kuyper saw theology as integral to that philosophical project, but Schleiermacher's conception of *Theologie* (while personally significant for *him*) was institutionally tangential to it.

1.2. The Complex Unity of Truth and the Metarationality of Wisdom

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper upheld the liberal arts tradition's vision of wisdom as a sort of metarationality encompassing, coordinating, and drawing upon the diverse rationalities governing our several disciplines (**Ch.V.2.**). Newman and Schleiermacher alike held that the university can and should encourage students to specialize but not without also gaining a broad education, and, crucially, learning one's specialism in a way that fosters a keen awareness of its philosophical assumptions, its theoretical and practical limitations, its relationship to other disciplines, and its contingent historical formation. All three saw this broad but deep, multidisciplinary learning as vital to the cultivation of wisdom.

Some might dismiss the sorts of broad-based, philosophically oriented education that Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper advocated as an antiquated luxury. But, in principle, the transdisciplinary wisdom they saw as a defining characteristic of a well-educated person is as

important and as *practical* today as it ever was.[208] Crucially, neither Schleiermacher, nor Newman, nor Kuyper discounted the value of specialization. For them, it was a question of when students ought to specialize and to what extent if the university is to develop *wise* specialists.[209]

Schleiermacher, of course, differed from Newman and Kuyper over divine revelation's contribution (or lack thereof) to the pursuit of such wisdom and theology's place in the disciplinary pecking order. But that divide, as significant as it is, should not occlude the significant commonality between them on the necessarily integrative character of the scholarly pursuit and cultivation of wisdom.

1.3. The Unity of Teaching and Research

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all agreed that to cultivate wisdom over the course of multiple generations, the university must work to preserve a creative tension between teaching and research. Both Schleiermacher and Newman insisted that what distinguished the university from the scientific academies was precisely the university's twofold cultivation of wisdom through both teaching and research as opposed to the scientific academies' singular pursuit of new knowledge. Kuyper similarly emphasized a university must be both '*universitas scientiarum*, a community of the sciences' and '*universitas docentium et discentium*, a community of teachers and learners united in a single corporate body' ('Secret', pp.101-2). Schleiermacher was perhaps

[208] For empirically based studies showing broad, liberal education's relative advantages over narrowly specialized, preprofessional tertiary education, see especially Malamud (2010), Epstein (2019), and Detweiler (2021).
[209] Of course, under Schleiermacher's policy of *Lernfreiheit*, no one could prevent students who were so inclined from hyperspecializing and many did. But this was not Schleiermacher's preference.

the most bullish about the ideal of university *professors* being both master teachers and masters of the *wissenschaftlich* craft, fully engaged in the academy's 'joint effort' of advancing the sciences (*OTUGS*, p.14).[210] Newman's description of the 'university' and 'college' principles was perhaps more realistic about the inherent tensions involved in maintaining such a dual focus. But none of them underestimated the difficulty of accomplishing this task since the precise traits that characterize great researchers often make for subpar teachers and vice versa. Moreover, teaching and research are motivated by different incentives. Nevertheless, all agreed that the university's work of the intergenerational cultivation of wisdom demands the maintenance of this creative tension and warned especially against the neglect of teaching for the glamour and thrill of discovery.

Just *how* the university is supposed to preserve this balance is a practical question which each of these theologian-cum-university founders resolved differently.[211] Nevertheless, *that* the university must somehow strike this balance to be true to its defining purpose was a point of consensus among them.

1.4. Intellectual Freedom

[210] As Johannes Zachhuber has argued, Schleiermacher himself admirably lived out his own lofty educational ideal (2024, pp.101ff).

[211] It is striking that of the three only Newman—who is often misread as antagonistic towards research—hired faculty members who had no formal teaching responsibilities but were only expected to pursue their research and to participate in the university's common life. Schleiermacher, perhaps surprisingly given the lore about Berlin's fervour for research, seems to have been less comfortable with any such a division of labour between university teachers and researchers.

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper agreed that the cultivation of communal wisdom requires an atmosphere of free rational exchange and held that intellectual freedom is essential to the university. However, they differed significantly in their accounts of what such freedom requires, particularly as it relates to religious students and scholars.

Schleiermacher asserted that students and faculty need complete *Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit* to pursue their preferred line of teaching, research, and study, and abolished religious confessional requirements for both the student body and the faculty. Schleiermacher insisted that the university's internal logic be entirely democratic and free from interference from either the church or the state (*OTUGS*, pp.48-49). However, when coupled with the definition of theology as an applied science subordinate to the 'pure sciences' and a form of professional training catering to a pious subset of society, this account of academic freedom tended to marginalize religious outlooks and their attendant religious communities.

If Schleiermacher's conception of academic freedom was democratic, resisting control by a heavy-handed elite, then Newman and Kuyper's were liberal, ensuring the rights of confessional, philosophical, and political minorities to freely teach, study, research, publish, organize, and build institutions in alignment with their distinctive perspectives. In so doing, both Newman and Kuyper sought to develop accounts of academic freedom which would create space for authentically Catholic or Reformed teaching, learning, and research without being simply assimilated into the wider modern (secularizing) academic culture. In addition, they allowed Catholic and Reformed students and scholars the latitude to think creatively, innovate, discover, and even *reform* the communions they represent.

Thus, Newman required the faculty of the Catholic University of Ireland to be Catholic and not 'to teach anything contrary to Religion' (Barr, 2003, p.206). Moreover, Newman maintained that 'Ecclesiastical authority, not argument, is the supreme rule and appropriate guide for Catholics in matters of religion' (*IU*, I.i.4., p.19). But in matters of scholarship Newman held that students and faculty must be allowed intellectual 'elbow-room' to probe deeply and to think expansively and creatively (*IU*, II.iv.7., p.231). 'Unless [the scholar] is at liberty to investigate on the basis, and according to the particularities, of his science, he cannot investigate at all,' wrote Newman (ibid., p.230). Newman worried that interference from the Magisterium was liable to undermine the intellectual enterprise, and his 'Letter to the Duke of Norfolk' sought to stave off Papal overreach into the sciences and preserve as much 'elbow-room' as possible for himself and others. Moreover, 'Newman did not impose religious tests on his students' (Sullivan, 2018, p.541). He insisted that for 'a University' to perform its essential task of cultivating 'a philosophical habit of mind' it must be a 'liberal' learning environment, 'a place for the communication and circulation of thought, by means of personal intercourse' (*RPU*, Ch.II, p.6). To that end, Newman approached student discipline with a very light touch.

Ultimately, students at the Free University were free to believe what they liked, provided they behaved according to university standards (see **Ch.VI.1.5.** below). However, Kuyper strongly discouraged the earliest students at the Free University from following lectures at nearby state universities. This was even the case for the Free University's law students who, in the early days

'could not be certified to practice law or sit on the bench unless [they] also took examinations at a public university'.[212]

Moreover, Kuyper required the faculty of the Free University to uphold the principles of Reformed Christianity. Kuyper had tried to articulate these principles in a way that would give faculty a wide berth while also solidifying the institution's Reformed confessional identity. Nevertheless, there were clearly limits, and faculty deemed insufficiently tethered to those principles (e.g., Lohman) were subject to dismissal. But to rightly understand how these limits fit in Kuyper's philosophy of academic freedom, one must look at them through the lens of Kuyper's concept of 'sphere sovereignty'.

Kuyper insisted upon respecting the various spheres' autonomy for them to unimpededly pursue their proper, divinely appointed ends by apt means in accord with their nature. Kuyper held that neither the Church nor the State had any business telling scholars or scientists what lines of inquiry to pursue or what conclusions to reach. In the domain of the sciences, 'sphere sovereignty' meant having the freedom to relentlessly pursue 'truth' as the 'goal of genuine study' ('Goal') and respecting 'genius' as both 'a *sovereign* power' and a 'gift from God' (*LoC*, p.95). The sphere of science must be guided by rational persuasion, not coercion. That said, Kuyper also believed that the freedom necessary to the advance of science must also allow communities to form schools, universities, departments, and associations to pursue science from their particular worldviews. Importantly, Kuyper championed this freedom for confessional communities besides his own (e.g., Catholics, Jews, Anabaptists), developing a model of Calvinist

[212] This problem was not resolved until 1905 when Kuyper was able to change the law as Prime Minister, passing his Higher Education Act (cf., van Deursen, 2008, pp.27-28).

political liberalism that was self-aware about Calvinism's minority status and intent on doing for others whatever Calvinists wanted done for themselves.

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all insisted that scholars must enjoy freedom from undue interference from either the Church or the State and that it was essential to the scholarly enterprise to grant scholars the latitude to pursue their inquiries by whatever methods they deemed most apt. However, Schleiermacher's policy of academic democratization and secularization, in effect, marginalized theology as an academic discipline and privatized confessional perspectives as inquiries and methods informed by minority religious perspectives could not gain a hearing in the wider, secularizing academic culture. For Newman and Kuyper intellectual freedom meant securing a space where Christian scholars could openly pursue their research from a Catholic or Reformed perspective unencumbered. In an academic landscape that was increasingly dominated by the Berlin model, this required confessionally committed communities to establish new independent institutions in order to have sufficient 'elbow-room' to pursue their own academic agendas.

In the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Christian students and scholars in secular research universities have likewise regularly needed to establish and rely upon independent mediating institutions to be able to freely pursue religiously informed lines of inquiry and study. These mediating institutions–journals, scholarly societies, conferences, study centres, student associations, and so on—have been vital to the project of Christian scholarship in a number of disciplines, and, so, theologians who believe in that project have a stake in the health and survival of those institutions.

1.5. The Formation of Students & Scholars

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all understood higher education to be a personally formative endeavour, involving the inculcation of a scholarly ethos among faculty and students alike. But they differed widely in their approaches to student discipline and formation.

While Schleiermacher championed a self-directed model of self-cultivation (*Bildung*) in which students enjoyed complete freedom to follow their interests (*Lernfreiheit*), he also insisted that faculty model the utmost intellectual honesty, rigor, and curiosity. Within this framework, students were socialized into Berlin's demanding academic ethos primarily by working alongside (e.g., in research seminars) and trying to emulate the faculty they most admired who served as intellectual and ethical exemplars. (Students also had to pass the state's unforgiving qualifying examinations to enter their desired professions.) Schleiermacher understood well that such a hands-off approach to student discipline and formation meant a considerable number of students would adopt a hard-partying *Philistinwesen*, but he thought this a small price to pay to liberate the student body's men of genius to achieve great things.

Both Newman and Kuyper waxed eloquent about the character required for faithful scholarship, but they approached students' character formation very differently. For Newman, the 'philosophical habit of mind' that should characterize the Christian 'gentleman' and scholar is marked by 'good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour, self-command, and steadiness of view' (*IU*, p.8). Newman sought to impart these virtues to his students as the ballast required to not be 'blown about by every wind of doctrine' while navigating the intellectual and cultural tumults of the modern era. Importantly, Newman saw 'personal *influence'* as the key to

students' moral and intellectual formation and sought 'to discipline by means of influence and exhortations rather than by rules and regulations' (Barr, 2003, p.145).[213] The chief difference between Newman and Schleiermacher on this score was that Newman assigned each student a tutor who substantially directed their students' studies and served in a pastoral role rather than giving students the free rein they enjoyed in Berlin.

Kuyper was the most regimented of the three. He identified collegiality, civic-mindedness, plainspokenness, hygiene, orderliness, and elegance as necessary scholarly virtues (**Ch.III.4.2.1.**) and intended for faculty to instil these characteristics in students, not in an authoritarian way but rather in a spirit of 'reciprocity' and intellectual camaraderie. Nevertheless, early on the Free University adopted rules marking out 'punishable behaviors' including 'mocking the sacred; disrespecting someone placed above them in the university; neglecting their studies; incurring debts; drunkenness; visiting café-chantants; and furthermore, all behaviors that could scandalize the university or have a pernicious influence on their fellow students' (see van Deursen, 2008, p.31). Notably, no one forced students to enrol in the Free University. The students who were subject to these rules had volunteered, often at great cost, to study there precisely *because* the university sought to uphold a Calvinist outlook *and* moral ethos.

Throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, different university systems approached students' character formation and discipline differently. But from the upheavals of the late 1960s to until very recently, secular universities became exceedingly uncomfortable with the idea that they might have any responsibility for shaping students' character except, perhaps, in the narrow sense of socializing them into a professional ethos. As

[213] On Newman's 'liberal' approach to student discipline, see Barr (2003, pp.144-47) and Shrimpton (2014, Ch.6)

David Hoekema (as quoted in Willimon and Naylor, 1995, p.51) summarized it, university leaders abandoned their role as standing *in loco parentis* ('in place of parents'), bearing responsibility for students' personal and moral maturation, and instead adopted the attitude of '*non sum mater tua*' ('I'm not your mama'), leaving students to their own devices.[214] But, as Willimon and Naylor (1995, p.31) observe, the reticence of faculty and administrators to take responsibility for students' moral formation hardly means that the university ceases to be a formative institution:

> Students do not walk into a vacuum when they arrive as new members of the university community. They are subtly but powerfully initiated into a distinct culture—a culture that mitigates against serious and sustained intellectual engagement by students.

Willimon and Naylor call this distinct culture the '"We work hard, we play hard" mentality,' which 'fosters a rather rowdy, carefree, anti-intellectual image of the "perfect" college student' (ibid.). 'At its worst, it means that our students are engaged in activities that not only do not contribute to the academic mission of the university but actually work against that mission by trivializing the time they spend here' (ibid.). In short, the modern secular university's abandonment of moral education as a dimension of higher education has diminished our sense of the university's purpose.

2. Can the Modern Secular University Do Without 'Theology'?: Ends, Principles, and Metanarratological Criticism[215]

[214] On the modern university's 'dismantling of moral education', see especially Perry Glanzer (2022) and Julie Reuben (1996).

[215] This sections builds on work I first developed in an MPhil essay (Williams, 2020a).

If, as Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper suggest, the university's purpose is cultivating wisdom, what role does theology play? Is it integral, as Newman and Kuyper thought, or incidental, as Schleiermacher thought, or antithetical, as many secular$_2$ thinkers seem to believe? Everything depends on how we define 'theology'.

Postman (1996, p.5) claims that schools cannot do without 'gods', the *narratives* or, better, *metanarratives* whereby we make sense of who we are and what we do. Having disavowed the God-story which originally oriented and underwrote medieval universities, the modern secular university still needs a 'god' to serve but struggles to find one fit for purpose. Thus, Postman (p.20) observes: 'In this century, new gods have rushed in to replace the old, but most have had no staying power.'

Postman probes a series of contemporary academe's 'god'-candidates—Technology, Economic Utility, Consumerism, Multiculturalism—exposing their false promises, their shallowness, their dependence on doublethink, their antisocial tendencies, and their metaphysical groundlessness. While these values may be legitimate goods, as '*gods*' serving as ultimate grounds and horizons of meaning, they fail. Thus, Postman proposes 'gods' he deems more serviceable; stories he considers sufficiently true and capacious to justify studying, teaching, and researching. But Postman's proffered 'gods' share many of the same weaknesses as the gods he rejects.

My purpose here is not to critique Postman's proposals but only to note that 1) no university should embrace any such proposals uncritically, and 2) criticism of such metanarrative proposals is inevitably a form of theological discourse, 'god-talk'. My question, then, is: If schools cannot do without 'gods' (metanarratives) but are liable to embrace false or inadequate 'gods',

can universities do without theology? That is, can universities afford to do without an ongoing, good-faith, self-critical discussion about our dominant metanarratives and their rivals? Can universities afford for students, scholars, and administrators to be unprepared to engage in serious 'god-talk'?

Jean-François Lyotard similarly diagnosed the university as suffering a 'legitimation crisis' resulting from widespread 'incredulity toward metanarratives' (1984, xxiv). Lyotard is not always read as a higher education critic, but *The Postmodern Condition*—originally commissioned by the *Conseil des universités du Québec* reporting on the impacts of technology on the sciences—was a broadside against the very idea of 'the university'. Lyotard argued that the welter of new information, technologies, and information technologies and the collapse of 'foundationalism' has rendered the idea of the university incoherent. Thus, 'To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and the university institution which in the past relied on it' (ibid., xxiv). To legitimate the university *qua* university requires a '*grand* narrative' (a *grand recít*, often translated 'metanarrative'); little narratives (*petits recíts*) will not do. Indeed, an institution purporting to cultivate all knowledge—the arts and humanities, as well as the physical and social sciences—for wisdom's sake requires a 'story of *everything*'. But, says Lyotard (ibid., xxiii), 'Judged by the yardstick of science, the majority of [such narratives] prove to be fables,' and the taller the tale, the more suspect. Consequently, 'The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal' (ibid.).

As Craig Bartholomew (2017, p.125) rightly notes, 'the postmodern view—that there is no grand story—is itself a whopper of a grand story' and vulnerable to critique. Nevertheless,

Lyotard's main point was that modernity itself has undercut precisely those metanarratives that could plausibly legitimate the university traditionally understood. Thus, in Lyotard's (ibid., xxv) analysis, the 'postmodern' moment is a legitimation crisis which 'finds the University nearing what may be its end, while the Institute [i.e., sites of hyperspecialized, technical, preprofessional training or narrow research aims] may just be beginning'. Without some 'grand narrative' that can tie all our disparate knowledges, disciplines, and inquiries together into a single project, the historic concept of the university as a place of general education in pursuit of transdisciplinary wisdom inevitably loses its plausibility.

While he did not speak of 'gods' or 'grand narratives', Clark Kerr likewise saw that without any singular 'end' or 'purpose' to orient it, the university becomes a 'multiversity'—a sort of aggregate of 'institutes'. Kerr thought this plurality of ends and diffusion of projects was a fact of life to be accepted, indeed, celebrated, not a condition to be lamented or cured. Thus, in 1963 Kerr (2001, pp.28-29) declared:

> The ends are already given—the preservation of the eternal truths, the creation of new knowledge, the improvement of service wherever truth and knowledge of high order may serve the needs of man. The ends are there; the means must be ever improved in a competitive dynamic environment. There is no single "end" to be discovered; there are several ends and many groups to be served.

For Kerr, the great discovery of the multiversity is that it thrives without any singular orienting 'idea' of higher education's aims. Thus, multiversities need not excessively worry about self-justification so long as the *business* of education is good. The competing purposes and interests within the multiversity, if adequately funded and properly managed, need not pull the institution apart and may even create fruitful dynamic tensions. Thus, the multiversity can safely remain a sort of teleological Rorschach test. It can be 'for' whatever you like so long as the institution itself

is competently administrated and well financed, and so long as those operating within the institution—competing, teaching, publishing, studying, coaching, researching, etc.—are incentivized to do so with 'excellence' according to whatever standards might be demanded within their respective departments or faculties or guilds.

However, the student unrest of the late 1960s shook Kerr's faith in both the self-evidence of the multiversity's value and the supposed givenness of its 'ends'. Kerr later acknowledged that in the face of student radicalism, the cultural consensuses he previously took for granted had collapsed, exposing the need for a vigorous debate over the multiversity's purposes and values if such institutions are to thrive:

> To the extent that universities are a generating force for new ideas and for critical commentary on the status quo, they are more likely to fulfill this role where Absolute confronts Absolute, where thesis meets antithesis, where one culture contests another…. (ibid, pp.105-6)

However, Kerr does not specify how the 'multiversity'—a mere 'mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money' (ibid., p.20)—is supposed to facilitate such a contest of 'Absolutes' when its incentive structures militate against such deliberation.

Thus, for the university to maintain a sense of its purpose it *needs* a vital, ongoing conversation between its metanarrative—its 'god'—and the various goings on in its several departments. Traditionally the university discipline in which 'Absolute confronts Absolute', where competing conceptions of ultimate reality and 'stories of everything' were unpacked, assessed, and debated, was theology.[216] But Schleiermacher thought scholarly deliberation

[216] Aquinas's *Summa* illustrates well the sort of exchange (*disputatio*) that formed the heart of not just the discipline of theology but of the university itself. See Axtell (2016, pp.25-28) on the practice of *disputatio* in the Medieval university.

between competing 'Absolutes' was not the job of *Theologie* but of *Philosophie*, the 'art' of rational exchange.[217] However, Schleiermacher never anticipated that 'pure philosophy' itself would succumb to the disciplinary balkanization toward which the modern university gravitates, abandoning the project of unifying the *Wissenschaften* (cf. MacIntyre, 2009, pp.17-18). With hindsight it is easy to see how Schleiermacher's *Wissenschaftlich* research university was almost bound to devolve into Kerr's modern unphilosophical 'multiversity' given its inbuilt incentive structures, but from the standpoint of the early nineteenth century this possibility was hardly obvious.

Despite their marginalisation of theology, Berlin and the research universities it inspired clearly had 'gods'/'metanarratives' orienting their activities. Schleiermacher's conception of theology exemplifies what John Milbank (1990, pp.94-95) calls 'the liberal Protestant metanarrative', the modern reconceptualization of Christianity as achieving 'the separating out of the religious-value sphere as a purely private matter to do with the will rather than the intellect'. By subordinating *Theologie* to the 'pure sciences', Schleiermacher strictly limited its remit to the management of that peculiar voluntary association called the church. Indeed, Schleiermacher went so far as to say that 'what has universal rational significance must also be valid for all human beings. Christian theology, however, is true only for Christians' (*ICE*, p.41). *Theologie* was useful to religious institutions but not necessarily descriptive of ultimate reality.

Thus, Schleiermacher reinforced what Nicholas Lash (1996, pp.221-22) describes as 'the organizing narrative' underlying the 'attitudes and assumptions at the very heart of the

[217] For Schleiermacher, 'Philosophical theology is a "critical discipline" that starts from a place "above" Christianity' (Brandt, 2024, p.355). It is not an activity arising out of Christian commitment but a supposedly neutral way of analysing, conceptualizing, and evaluating Christian piety.

imaginative project of the "modern" world'. The story goes 'something like this: it is the duty of scientists to find out what is going on, of parliamentarians to develop public policy in the light of the scientists' conclusions, and of spiritual leaders to persuade people so to modify their values and preferences as to facilitate the smooth implementation of policies designed by the politicians at the scientists' behest.' Central to this narrative, Lash observes, is the typically 'modern' assumption that 'what is called "religion", though it may serve public purposes, has more to do with private feeling than with public truth' (ibid.). Supposing that 'religion' is a matter of personal feelings and private opinions, we should naturally expect the direction of influence between 'religion' and the sciences to be one-way: what we *know* on the basis of science should shape our personal opinions, 'religious' or otherwise, not the other way around. Clearly recognizable in this 'modern' socio-cultural pecking order is Schleiermacher's subordination of theology, a mere 'practical science', to the 'pure sciences' of the philosophy faculty.

This 'organizing narrative' retains a deep, visceral hold upon the imaginations of many in academia who still think of 'modernity' as 'an "age of reason" emerging from and overthrowing an "age of faith"' (Hart, 2009, p.33). For those within this narrative's grip, traditional metanarratives (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam) are deemed 'religious' and marginalized as nonrational and fundamentally fideistic (indeed, superstitious), while immanently framed 'gods' (e.g., Economic Utility, Technology, Multiculturalism, Democracy) are considered sufficiently rational to compete for influence over the 'multiversity'. However, Newman and Kuyper give us strong reasons to reject demarcations of 'scientific' discourse that discount 'religious' discourses on the grounds that they have a fiduciary basis. Newman and Kuyper both show that all intellectual discourses rest on some fiduciary basis or another, and,

therefore, that being 'faith-based' is not a meaningful criterion for distinguishing well-founded discourses from unfounded ones. Moreover, definitions of 'religion' aimed at demarcating 'religious' activities from 'secular' ones face a dilemma between overly inclusive versus overly exclusive definitions of 'religion' like that faced by 'scientific' demarcation theories. The consequence of these incoherencies is that the various 'secular' 'gods' are rarely seen for what they are—objects of devotion—and are insulated from challenges from the older 'gods', those traditions that have been blackballed as 'religious'. Those engaged in debates about and between the 'secular' 'gods' rarely recognize that they are, in fact, engaged in a sort of 'God-talk'. Meanwhile, despite its incoherences, the 'god' of 'Modernity'—the metanarrative held in common by Schleiermacher, Kerr, Postman, and even Lyotard—stands above the fray, largely unchallenged within debates about the nature and purpose of the university.

Schleiermacher absorbed this emergent 'modernist' metanarrative and, consequently, adopted a strategy of subordinating *Theologie* to more properly *wissenschaftlich* discourses to preserve a place for *Theologie* within the modern, *wissenschaftliche Universität*. To salvage what he loved about Christian religion—namely, *the feel of it*—Schleiermacher radically broke with Christianity's traditional pattern of relating the gospel to thought, learning, and culture broadly speaking. Indeed, Schleiermacher's redefinition of theology made it practically impossible (even verboten) for Christian doctrine to interrogate any other science at all.

Newman and Kuyper were equally shaped by the modern moment but rejected this 'modernist' metanarrative, arguing that what Kuyper called 'Modernism' (e.g., *AK:CR*, pp.87ff) and Newman called 'Liberalism' (e.g., *APVS*, pp.252ff) is itself a sort of dogmatism vulnerable to theological critique. If this is so, then any serious conversation about the university's ends in

which 'Absolute confronts Absolute' requires more than a debate between the several demigods—the narratives—that the high god of 'Modernity' admits into the official tournament of ideas. It requires a debate in which historic Christianity (and Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) is interrogated but also takes its turn cross-examining the 'modern' metanarrative itself.

Neither Schleiermacher, Newman, nor Kuyper defended theology's traditional *magisterial* (i.e., queenly) role of dictating to the other arts and sciences what questions they can ask or what conclusions they may draw. Seeing intellectual freedom as necessary to the pursuit of wisdom, all three accepted that with such freedom some measure of dissensus and error is inevitable. They also understood that theologians, being fallible themselves, should not police other people's thoughts. Thus, Schleiermacher demoted theology from 'Queen of the sciences' to a mere practical science subordinate to the pure sciences. Newman and Kuyper demoted theology to *primus inter pares* among the sciences. *Primus*, because of the ultimacy of theology's claims and the extent of its implications but *inter pares* because theological acumen does not automatically confer insight into the intricacies of other disciplines. Thus, Christian theology's proper work vis-à-vis the other arts and sciences is to humbly enter conversation with them, interrogating their assumptions and exploring their implications in the light of revelation. Both Newman and Kuyper made robust cases for the necessity of theology's playing this deliberative role in the life of the modern Catholic or Reformed Christian university.

To play this deliberative role within a modern pluralistic university, Christian theology (God-in-Christ-talk) must contend with rival 'god'-talks and converse with other disciplines. Within a modern milieu in which many (mistakenly) presume that any rational position will be provable, Christian theology will initially appear to be the weakest of academic disciplines, being

based on unprovable, culturally particular—indeed, positively *peculiar*—claims to divine revelation. But Christian theologians dare to expound the gospel of Jesus's death and resurrection as the climactic moment in 'the story of everything' with the confidence that 'the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men' and that in the long run this story will be more satisfactory than rival metanarratives. Economic Utility, Science, Technology, Liberalism, and even Modernism all turn out to be lousy 'gods' precisely because they are existentially, morally, and intellectually unsatisfying. They especially fail as patron deities of the university.

For Newman and Kuyper and the religiously confessional universities they founded, orienting their institutions and students towards a satisfying '*why*' to live and study for—God—was relatively straightforward. But in a pluralistic institution such as Schleiermacher's University of Berlin or today's modern secular university, all '*why*'s' are (in principle) open to doubt and contestation. So orientating students and scholars requires making the university, as Schleiermacher rightly saw, an institution committed to the pursuit of wisdom precisely through sustaining and inducting students into a rigorous debate over the nature of wisdom. Whether one calls this debate over the purpose of life and education 'theology' or 'philosophy' or something else is not as important as *that it happens*.

Insofar as contemporary secular universities facilitate any such academic engagement with ultimate questions, it is done on the institutions' margins. Such considerations do not steer the ship, and, consequently, universities have become philosophically rudderless, blown about by every wind of funding if not doctrine. But what an institution *is* is largely a function of what it *is for*—their sense of purpose and direction—and institutions cannot long preserve their identity

once their sense of purpose is lost. Thus, Willimon and Naylor write (1995, p.60); 'Our problem is that we have tried to have a university without arguing about what a university is, what we want out of ourselves, who we expect our students to grow up to be, what we expect them to give to the world.' Of course, it is one thing to ask the question 'What is the university for?' and quite another to satisfactorily answer it in as pluralistic and contentious a context as ours. The question is often tabled because consensus on it seems unreachable. As Willimon and Naylor (1995, p.62) put it: 'Lacking any statement of who we are, we are fearful that the debate would merely reveal our deep divisions and throw the entire institution into centrifuge.' But if that is the case, it would seem that for modern secular universities to recover their sense of purpose, they desperately need to recover the art of engaging with ultimate questions, the practice of serious 'god-talk', that is, of *theology*.

Conclusion

While many critics of higher education today warn that the university has lost the clarity of purpose necessary to orient and evaluate itself in a principled and coherent way, Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper were crystal clear about the university's *raison d'être*: the cultivation of wisdom in society's leaders. They broadly agreed that for the university to pursue this traditional purpose it must uphold key principles: valuing academic wisdom as an end (not merely a means), seeking the complex unity of truth, maintaining the integration of teaching and research, protecting intellectual freedom, and forming students' character as well as informing their minds. While they disagreed significantly over how best to pursue this purpose and uphold these

principles, their broad agreements are, in light of today's dissensus, perhaps at least as important as their differences.

Yet this sapiential purpose and these educational principles fit more naturally within some metanarratives than others. A pluralistic university, faced with a dizzying array of worldviews—each offering its own version of wisdom—requires a method for interrogating and evaluating these outlooks if it is to recover and maintain its bearings as a wisdom-oriented institution. Whether one regards the rigorous exploration of competing metanarratives (what Postman calls 'gods') as the work of 'philosophy' (as Schleiermacher would) or 'theology' (as Newman and Kuyper would) will depend on how one defines theology, science, and, more fundamentally, one's own pre-theoretical worldview. These questions are themselves religiously loaded; there is no neutral standpoint from which to settle them. But for the university to become again a place where wisdom is cultivated and pursued, it is more important that a culture of metanarrative criticism be fostered than that it be labeled theology or philosophy. That said, genuine engagement requires that traditional religious metanarratives—Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism—be given a seat at the table alongside their so-called secular counterparts, such as Technology, Social Justice, and Economic Utility.

Conclusion

> The beginning of wisdom is this: Get wisdom, and whatever else you get, get insight. (Proverbs 4:7)
>
> The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is insight. (Proverbs 9:10)

We return, at last, to this dissertation's overarching question: What is the proper role of Christian theology—i.e., theological education, discourse, debate, and research—in the modern secular university? And correlatively, how might our answer to that question inform our understanding of the Christian theologian's responsibility to the modern secular university? To gain some purchase on these large questions, I have brought three seminal modern theologian/educationists—Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper—into critical conversation with each other and with more recent writing on theological epistemology, the philosophy of science, and higher education criticism. From the foregoing expositions and comparative analyses, several insights have emerged that may elucidate these questions.

1. **The End of the University: The Beginnings of Wisdom**

First, the central disagreement between Schleiermacher, on the one hand, and Newman and Kuyper, on the other, can be summarized as a difference over what we might call 'the beginnings of wisdom.' The beginnings of wisdom, according to the Book of Proverbs, are twofold: one must prize and ardently seek wisdom and insight to really find them (4:7), and one must be awed by the knowledge of Israel's God (9:10).

As to the first 'beginning', Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper broadly agreed that wisdom is an end in itself; that its pursuit is an intrinsic, self-justifying good; and that prizing it so is a condition of acquiring it. They agreed, moreover, that the university's defining purpose is to cultivate wisdom by seeking new knowledge through research and instilling the beginnings of wisdom in students through liberal learning. They agreed, too, that the university inculcates the distinctly studious sort of wisdom envisioned within the liberal arts tradition, a sort of harmonic multidisciplinary intelligence or metarationality that is both an intrinsic and a social good. In stark contrast to the present discord and disorientation over the purpose of the university, these points of consensus among these theologian educationists are significant.

However, when it comes to wisdom's second 'beginning', Newman and Kuyper fundamentally disagreed with Schleiermacher as to where theology—'the knowledge of the Holy One'—fit into the modern university's work of cultivating wisdom. Building upon the work of Paul Tyson, I have described their disagreement in terms of the fundamental cleavage between Schleiermacher's Egocentric Epistemological Foundationalism and Newman and Kuyper's Theocentric Ontological Foundationalism. For Schleiermacher, knowledge of God—'the Absolute', or the 'Whence' of Being—may well be the end of our quest for wisdom, but it is not the beginning. Indeed, *Theologie* is incidental to that quest, being a mere 'practical science', epistemically downstream from the 'pure sciences'.

For Newman and Kuyper, however, the knowledge of God is foundational to the pursuit of wisdom and, therefore, to the very mission of the university. For Newman, 'poetic' 'religious' knowledge of God is the cornerstone of the great arch of the sciences and a 'scientifically' articulated 'theological' knowledge of God is its keystone, without which all our knowledges

inevitably fall into disorder. Likewise, for Kuyper, theology plays an indispensable role in developing the 'organism' of science, and particularly to discerning the architecture of the sciences. Newman and Kuyper's TOFoundationalism carries on the ancient Christian tradition of *fides quaerens intellectum*. But Schleiermacher, unable to affirm that older tradition, set out to reestablish the Christian religion upon a (supposedly) firmer EEFoundation and within 'the bounds of reason' and 'feeling'.

Importantly, *both* Schleiermacher's attempt at reconstructing Christianity in an EEFoundationalist mode and Newman and Kuyper's reclamation of TOFoundationalism were equally *modern* modes of believing, or, as Auden says, of 'believing *again'*. As I noted in my **Introduction (pp.2-3**), the dawn of modernity is best understood as a crisis of confidence in Christendom's creed, the foundational narrative out of which the university with its sapiential telos was initially imagined. This modern condition has brought about what Charles Taylor calls 'a secular age' in the sense that religious beliefs—foundational narratives and their horizons of meaning—are not excluded as such but rather are deeply contested.

Within this context of metanarrative contestation, moderns have struggled to find an alternative story that can sustain that original vision of the university as an institution for the cross-disciplinary cultivation of wisdom. Thus, without an adequate orienting foundational narrative, the university's pursuit of wisdom has come to lack a north star from which to take its bearings. Hence, the institutional disorientation identified by so many higher education critics today is a predictable consequence of the university's having been cut loose from its metanarrative moorings. Schleiermacher's EEF and Newman and Kuyper's TOF represent two potent options for approaching the modern university's metanarratival upheaval.

2. The Liberal Protestant Option: The Idea of the Modern Secular$_2$ University

Given his experience and his moment in history, Schleiermacher's Nehemiah-like attempt at reconstructing Christian theology from the (experiential) ground up while fending off its 'cultured despisers' is both understandable and inspiring; however, from Newman and Kuyper's standpoints, Schleiermacher's strategy of basing all of theology on ecclesial intersubjectivity[218] rather than on God's objective self-revelation was clearly unworkable as a strategy for retrieving Christian orthodoxy—not that this was Schleiermacher's precise aim.

Despite its ingenious reconfiguration of traditional theological vocabulary, by Newman and Kuyper's lights, the antisupernaturalistic version of Christian piety that Schleiermacher envisioned bore little resemblance to historic Christian orthodoxy. A clear example is Schleiermacher's approach to the Trinity to which Newman objected so strenuously. Newman's diagnoses of Schleiermacher's theological epistemology as a 'rationalistic' 'attempt of the intellect to delineate, philosophise, and justify that religion (so called) of the heart and feelings'

[218] McCormack (2002, p.160) argues:

> Far too many interpreters of Schleiermacher speak quite simply of his dogmatics as though it were the result of a fairly straightforward attempt to "read" doctrines off of the Christian's religious self-consciousness in the present moment. But that is a fairly drastic oversimplification.
>
> "Dogmatic theology," Schleiermacher says, "is the science which systematizes the doctrine prevalent in a Christian Church at a given time." The central aim of this definition is the overcoming of the purely individual. The subject-matter with which dogmatic theology works is not "individual opinions and views" — even if the opinions and views in question be those of the theologians carrying out the exercise. Dogmatic theology is not "private confession" or an individual performance-piece. The subject-matter with which dogmatic theology works consists in the shared expressions by means of which religion is communicated in a church.

If McCormack is right, then Kuyper's critique of Schleiermacher's 'psychologico-empiric line' of theologizing misreads Schleiermacher in an overly individualistic way. Even still, reading Schleiermacher as, if you like, an Intersubjective Ecclesio-centric Epistemological Foundationalist does not close the gulf between his position and the versions of TOF maintained by Newman and Kuyper. Nor does it explain why Schleiermacher only operated with this ecclesio-centric epistemology in his theology while maintaining a resolutely EEFoundationalist stance in his broader philosophical work (see, e.g., his *Dialectic* and *Lectures on Philosophical Ethics*). It is not hard to see that EEF was more basic to Schleiermacher's overall worldview.

resulting in a 'sort of philosophical Pietism' verging on Pantheism were basically correct. Moreover, to the extent that Schleiermacher courted pantheism, Arianism,[219] and Sabellianism, his epistemology led him to entertain positions which Newman and Kuyper deemed well beyond the pale on dogmatic grounds. This is not to say that Newman and Kuyper were obviously right and Schleiermacher obviously wrong, only that their positions were fundamentally irreconcilable.

Orthodox or not, Schleiermacher's account of Christianity as an elaborate cultural expression of the Church's 'feeling of absolute dependence' has serious weaknesses which Newman, Kuyper, Barth, and many others have pointed out. It signally fails, e.g., as a theory of Christianity's historical origins, explaining few if any of the tradition's particular contours. But one might well leave behind the specifics of Schleiermacher's theological account while retaining his conviction that Christianity, if it is to have a future, must be describable and defensible on an EEFoundationalist basis.

For Schleiermacher, embracing EEF required a significant reorganization of the university's historic disciplinary hierarchy. *Philosophie* was no longer a 'handmaid of theology' (*ancilla theologiae*) as the Medievals and Reformers held, but *Herrin* ('lord,' 'headmistress' or 'governess') of the sciences. *Theologie* was no longer 'queen of the sciences' (*regina scientiarum*), nor even a 'pure science' (*reine Wissenschaft*), but merely a 'practical science' (*positive Wissenschaft*), aimed at facilitating the limited work of 'church leadership' (*Kirchenleitung*), catering to a pious subset of the wider society. Within this disciplinary hierarchy, *Theologie* is only scientific insofar as it relies on the findings of the 'pure sciences', and the communication

[219] McCormack (2002, p.158) acknowledges that Schleiermacher's conception of the God-world relationship 'makes an incarnation as understood in traditional terms a frank impossibility.' Whether or not Schleiermacher was right on this score, his account would have been unacceptable for Newman and Kuyper for this reason alone.

between the two is decidedly unidirectional. The 'pure sciences' have massive implications for theology, but theology has nothing to say to the 'pure sciences'.[220] It must be remembered that some of Schleiermacher's cofounders (e.g., Fichte) maintained that *Theologie* should have no place whatsoever in Berlin's new *wissenschaftlich Universität*, and Schleiermacher surmised that, under the circumstances, accepting this tightly circumscribed role for theology was probably the price of admission.

This disciplinary reorganization was predicated on Schleiermacher's embrace of a *Wissenschaftsideologie* which demarcated the sciences as including only those disciplines that aspire to an ideal of methodological neutrality—literally 'presuppositionlessness' (*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*)—and could, in principle, demonstrate their conclusions to anyone. Schleiermacher held that 'the scientific disposition of our time is democratic through and through' and so sought to establish the university as a neutral arena in which scientific knowledge was authorized by scholars' ability to persuade their peers, regardless of their religious (or nonreligious) persuasions. Schleiermacher did not even try to argue that theology could meet this standard. Indeed, traditional religious influences on scholarship were especially to be eschewed. Even in theology, 'confessionalism' (*Konfessionalismus*) was deplored as having only deleterious effects on scholarship.

The educational model pioneered at the University of Berlin proved incredibly influential, and the modern secular research university as we know it today traces directly to the proposals outlined by Schleiermacher, Humboldt, Fichte, et al. This model has come to dominate the higher

[220] Here we see the beginnings of what Lash (1996, pp.221-22) called the 'organizing narrative…of the imaginative project of the "modern" world' and Milbank (1990, pp.94-95) calls 'the liberal Protestant metanarrative' (**Ch.VI.2.**).

educational landscape, as all the most powerful universities today are research universities. Importantly, the model's marginalization of theology as fundamentally a professional discipline and a practical science, and its delegitimising of religious influences on teaching and scholarship, have tended to make such institutions functionally secular$_2$, that is, excluding religious reasoning.

Newman and Kuyper argued that this idea of the modern secular$_2$ university was inconsistent. The ideal of methodological neutrality was unrealistic: everyone and every science begins from some set of unproven and unprovable 'presumptions' or 'first principles'. Indeed, a hierarchical organization of the *Wissenschaften* placing *Theologie* at its outermost periphery (or excluding it altogether) was anything but neutral or 'presuppositionless'. In fact, Newman and Kuyper argued, the demarcations of the sciences which exclude theology cannot be maintained consistently without excluding sciences that secular$_2$ scholars tend to deem legitimate. As I have argued in **Ch.IV.**, subsequent developments in epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion have by and large vindicated Newman and Kuyper's criticisms on these points.

3. The Traditionalist Option: The Idea of the Modern Confessional University

Newman and Kuyper's experiences set them on intellectual trajectories radically different from Schleiermacher's. Whereas Schleiermacher had been 'supported and carried' by a 'mystical tendency' 'through all the storms of skepticism' following his embrace of modern critiques of traditional Christianity, Newman and Kuyper experienced conversions to traditional forms of Christianity which led them to doubt the validity—or, at any rate, the significance—of such modern critiques.

Consequently, Newman and Kuyper both adopted what we have been broadly describing as a TOFoundationalist approach to thinking about God and everything else, taking their traditional religious beliefs as being divinely revealed and properly basic. In so doing, they were carrying on what had been the longstanding, predominant pre-modern Christian tradition of *fides quaerens intellectum*. Against modern pretensions to neutrality, Newman and Kuyper argued that everyone begins thinking from some set of 'presumptions', some 'world-and-life-view' or another. Against modern dismissals of Christian beliefs as irrelevant to science, Newman and Kuyper argued that, in fact, questions of faith have far-reaching implications for the arts and sciences, especially for the arts' and sciences' relationships *to each other*. Against modern suggestions that new discoveries—whether in biology (e.g., Darwinian evolution), comparative religions, textual criticism, geology, etc.—undermined Christian belief, Newman and Kuyper counselled patient discrimination, trusting that all truth would *ultima facie* be compatible with Christian revelation and that untruth would eventually be unmasked as such. In the meantime, Newman and Kuyper urged, Christian scholars and students should seek to form 'a connected view' or a coherent 'world-and-life-view' by bringing Christian theology and the other disciplines to 'bear' on each other in mutually illuminative ways.

Accordingly, Newman and Kuyper argued that theology is a 'science' or *wetenschap* on an epistemic par with other generally recognized sciences. Both made the case that a science's methodology is determined by the nature of its object and that there is no one-size-fits-all methodology for all sciences. Given the nature of God, theology's dependence upon divine revelation is perfectly reasonable. In **Ch.IV.4.** I showed that Newman and Kuyper's arguments about the nature of science anticipated key aspects of the ongoing debate over the problem of

scientific 'demarcation' in the philosophy of science, and that their 'inclusive' definitions of 'science' as the establishment, expansion, and systematization of knowledge remain defensible today.

In **Ch.IV.** we saw that in the twentieth century Newman and Kuyper's basic TOFoundationalist outlook was powerfully rearticulated and defended by American analytic philosophers advocating what has come to be called Reformed Epistemology. These philosophers were led by two of Kuyper's heirs, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Alvin Plantinga, who explicitly pointed to Kuyper as an inspiration for their approach. Plantinga also drew explicitly from Newman at key points. Developing arguments which had been anticipated by both Newman and Kuyper, these philosophers first showed that Classical Foundationalism—a species of EEF which deems rational only indubitable beliefs or beliefs validly derived therefrom—is an invalid and unworkable epistemological strategy. Second, they argued compellingly that if historically orthodox Christianity is true, then, by dint of humanity's inborn *sensus divinitatis* and the illumination of the *internum testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, it is rational to believe that it is true with or without supporting arguments. On this account, Christian belief is properly basic and can rationally serve as a standpoint to reason *from* just as well as being a conclusion to be reasoned *to*. RE has proven extremely influential, opening the door for Christian scholars in any number of disciplines, but especially philosophers, to confidently engage any number of issues from a Christian perspective.

Moreover, in **Ch.V.** we took stock of the recent resurgence of religiously informed and engaged scholarship (Ream and Glanzer, 2007), including the surprising 'renaissance' of Christian scholarship (Marsden, 2021; Noll, 2022) and especially the 'de-secularization' of the philosophical

guild under the influence of Kuyper's heirs, Wolterstorff and Plantinga (Smith, 2001; Wolterstorff, 2009; 2011; 2019). It is not too much to say that we are witnessing a moment when the modern secular$_2$ university is becoming a postmodern secular$_3$ university or even a postsecular university. It is *post*modern in that, while it is no less haunted by the Enlightenment critiques of Christendom, it is now equally haunted by the failure of modernity to provide a better story and, indeed, by the horrors into which many post-Christian ideologies (e.g., Communism, National Socialism) have led us. It is secular$_3$ (or postsecular) rather than secular$_2$, in that religious frameworks are regaining a hearing in institutions which had for decades self-consciously excluded or marginalized them, and neither religious nor irreligious frameworks of any kind can be simply taken for granted: all are contested, optional, dubitable. Believing scholars and students are not typically believers 'still', in Auden's sense, but have chosen to believe 'again' against modernity's critical headwinds. But unbelieving scholars and students now face an academy in which some of the brightest minds in any discipline not only believe in some traditional faith but have also fruitfully brought that faith to bear on their scholarship. In such a context, unbelievers and disbelievers have reason both to doubt their doubts and to take religious frameworks and scholarship seriously.

In short, the basic perspective championed by Newman and Kuyper in the nineteenth century has borne significant fruit in the twentieth and twenty-first. For Newman and Kuyper, staking out spaces for such self-consciously Christian learning to take place required establishing private, confessionally Christian universities: the Catholic University of Dublin and the Free University of Amsterdam. These universities were hardly Medieval throwbacks. They were committed to research, professional education, engagement with contemporary debates and

recent discoveries, and the teaching of new modern disciplines like botany, geology, and English literature. On these scores and more they were thoroughly modern institutions. But they were intentionally confessional universities, encouraging students and scholars to approach all their studies from Catholic or Reformed principles. In recent years we have seen that scholarship based on these principles can survive and even thrive in secular institutions, as well.

These strengths notwithstanding, Newman and especially Kuyper failed to articulate a vision for Christian engagement with the secular university. Newman, at least, demonstrated some imagination for such engagement in his short-lived attempt to establish a Catholic college or hall at the University of Oxford (see Ker 2019, ch.15), amounting to one confessional institution (Catholic) within another (Anglican). But Kuyper's educational writings fixated narrowly on the project of establishing a distinctively Reformed university and do not directly address the possibility or challenge of developing a distinctively Reformed mode of engaging with the secular university. This is lacuna in Kuyper is even more surprising given the significant attention he devoted to developing a vision for Reformed engagement with the pluralistic public square in the arenas of politics and the arts. To harvest the insights of Newman and Kuyper to articulate a vision for engaging the modern secular university will require an exercise of imaginative theological synthesis that moves beyond them both and would require another dissertation to do it adequately. Here I can only gesture towards some of the ways in which these insights might be reoriented towards such an engagement.

4. The Upshot: The 'Dialogical Pluralist' Option

On each of the following points Newman and Kuyper have been vindicated over against Schleiermacher: 1) traditional Christian belief can stake a defensible claim to being properly basic**;** 2) theology, as the systematic study of accounts of ultimate reality (God), can stake a defensible claim to being a science (or at least a legitimate scholarly enterprise); 3) EEF fails to achieve the universalism to which it aspires; 4) some degree of religious, philosophical, and cultural perspectival diversity are ineliminable facts of intellectual life; and 5) self-consciously traditionally religious (i.e., 'confessional') scholarship is demonstrably capable of matching secular scholarship in terms of rigor of argumentation and explanatory power. Whether we personally incline more to Schleiermacher's EEFoundationalist approach or to Newman and Kuyper's TOF, how should these points reshape our conception of what the modern secular university and academic discourse can and should be?

As Mike Higton (2012) showed, Schleiermacher and Newman conceived of university reasoning as inherently social: it is always a matter of people of diverse perspectives giving and considering reasons from and for their respective points of view in pursuit of a common understanding. Kuyper, I have argued, took a similar view, rejecting the myth of neutrality and maintaining that all reasoning proceeds from some contestable 'world-and-life-view' or another. However, whereas Schleiermacher conceived of properly academic reasoning as appealing only to universally shared reasons and universal experiences, Newman and Kuyper insisted that some particularities were both salutary and ineliminable.

They agreed that everyone's thinking about the world starts from some pre-theoretical viewpoint—a body of beliefs, intuitions (Schleiermacher), presuppositions (Kuyper),

presumptions (Newman), inclinations and aversions shaped by one's experiences, social location, and overall epistemic circumstances—which inevitably informs their actions and theorizing. Many of these presuppositions/presumptions are necessary to navigate the world but are ultimately unproven or unprovable, strictly speaking. Always included among these pre-theoretical presumptions are our 'intuitions of the infinite' (Schleiermacher), our imaginative 'impressions' or 'apprehensions' (Newman) of ultimate reality as either impersonal or personal, benevolent or cold, familiar or strange. These impressions may be exceedingly vague (e.g., a sheer 'feeling of absolute dependence' *à la* Schleiermacher) or quite specific (e.g., 'impressions of dogma' *à la* Newman), depending upon one's personal experience, and they may be relatively stable throughout one's life or they might change and change often.

Whether one's life experience has led one to be a TOFoundationalist or an EEFoundationalist, at this point it has become clear that the sort of explicitly confessional, TOFoundationalist scholarship envisioned by Newman and Kuyper is proving far more potent than Schleiermacher and his cofounders ever could have expected. In the contemporary scholarly landscape, therefore, an honest EEFoundationalist must recognize that she has colleagues whose 'intuitions of the infinite' are more traditional than her own, that those convictions may be eminently defensible, *and* that they can enrich their scholarship. Thus, as Nicholas Wolterstorff (as quoted by Peter Schuurman, 2019) has argued, secular universities should embrace 'dialogical pluralism':

> Instead of assuming one can, and insisting that one should, strip off all one's particularities of perspective and engage in academic learning as a generic human being, moving from rational consensus in basis to rational consensus in results, I propose that we acknowledge that we have no option but to enter as who we are, human beings with shared faculties but ineradicably particularist perspectives. We enter as feminists, as Christians, as Jews, as African-Americans, as gays, as

> agnostics, as atheists, or whatever. And we then engage each other as much as possible with the goal of arriving at consensus on the truth of the matter under consideration, recognizing, what is in any case obvious, that whereas sometimes we succeed in achieving consensus, often we fail. (cf., Wolterstorff, 2019)

For a university to embrace 'dialogical pluralism' necessarily involves dropping $secular_2$ interdictions against religious and other particularist perspectives and forms of reasoning in favour of a simple acknowledgement of culture's $secular_3$ state of play. On this much, at least, EEFoundationalists and TOFoundationalists should be able to agree.

5. The Idea of Theology in a (Post)Modern $Secular_3$ University

Finally, what might all this mean for our conception of theology's role in the modern secular university? As we have seen (**Ch.VI.1.**), Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper all conceived of the university as a distinctly *philosophical* institution, the core purpose of which is the cultivation of wisdom. While Schleiermacher differed with Newman and Kuyper over the precise nature and role of theology in the university's sapiential work, all three agreed to a considerable degree on the importance of upholding the intrinsic value of wisdom, pursuing the unity of knowledge, balancing teaching and research, protecting intellectual freedom, and cultivating students' character to the success of that work. Of course, within that broad agreement they also differed over significant details, particularly when it came to points on which religious/philosophical differences bear most directly (e.g., whether protecting intellectual freedom requires tolerating religious reasoning or excluding it; how conceptions of human nature and freedom inform our understandings of character formation).

Insofar as Christian theologians have a stake in the pursuit of wisdom and have knowledge that is vital to that pursuit, they have both a stake and a role to play in helping the modern secular university succeed in its sapiential purpose. Namely, given the foregoing analyses, theologians should uphold the following principles:

5.1. Liberal Learning: Seeking Wisdom for Wisdom's Sake

For wisdom's sake, theologians should join Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper in resisting the wholesale instrumentalization of higher education and should contend for wisdom as an intrinsic good and a sufficient justification for learning. This is not to deny either the obvious value of professional training or the legitimacy of universities' preparing students for careers. Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper gladly embraced professional education as part of their universities' purpose, but none of them thought fostering professional technical proficiency sufficed as the university's primary or defining purpose.

5.2. Multidisciplinary Integration: Reconciling All Things

For wisdom's sake, theologians should resist disciplinary siloing and premature specialization and should champion higher education's 'encyclopedic task' and, consequently, the integration of faith and learning. If the pursuit of an 'encyclopedic perspective' (Schleiermacher), 'a connected view' (Newman), or a coherent 'world-and-life-view' (Kuyper) is integral to the pursuit of wisdom, then students and faculty must be equipped and pressed to work out the implications of their most basic convictions and to consider how their various knowledges hang together. Moreover, if wisdom is for life and life is not a 'kind' but a 'wicked' learning environment, then cultivating

intellectual 'range' is as important as cultivating special expertise (Epstein, 2019). For TOFoundationalist theologians, be they followers of Newman or Kuyper or others, theology has an obvious part to play in this integrative sapiential project, as it interrogates and elaborates the implications of the competing 'stories of everything' within which we seek to make sense of our several arts and sciences and deploy them wisely.

5.3. Pedagogy: Teaching the Beginnings of Wisdom in Secular$_3$ Universities

For wisdom's sake, theologians should work to move what Boyer (1987, p.283) calls 'the most haunting questions' from the 'fringes of our institutional life' to its centre. There are numerous ways in which universities might do this considering the insights of Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper underscored in this dissertation and that respect the 'dialogical pluralism' proper to secular$_3$ institutions.

First, religious studies should be pursued in a way that recognizes that Modernity, with its rationalizing and immanentizing logic, does not constitute a 'neutral ground' from which the great traditions are studied objectively but is itself a particular tradition that is eminently susceptible to critique (David Ford, et al., 2005, Part I). A *theological* religious studies in which great traditions meet on 'mutual ground' where people of diverse faiths seek mutual understanding (cf. ibid., Part II) and are explored as live intellectual and existential options would be both more appropriate to a genuinely liberal learning environment (Nord, 2010) and truer to the state of play in debates about religion. Indeed, as Smith (2001) grudgingly conceded, in the very academic arena in which religious claims are most intently and rigorously explored, debated,

and analysed—the philosophy of religion—religious perspectives have to date had better arguments than have varieties of atheistic materialism.

Second, Anthony Kronman (2007), Zena Hitz (2020), and Roosevelt Montàs (2022) have recently championed 'great books' curricula, such as the Yale Directed Studies course, Columbia's Core Curriculum, Harvard's General Education programme, and the St. John's College BA as a vital way of inducting students into 'the great conversations' about the Big Questions through seminars on enduring works of philosophy, literature, history, and politics. Such courses, if taught in ways that take religion seriously, can be extraordinary models of the sort of liberal learning that is so needful today.

But, third, more compressed and less circuitous curricular options are available as well: The recent popularity of the year-long 'God and the Good Life' course at the University of Notre Dame (cf., Sullivan, Blaschko, 2022) and Yale's semester-long 'Life Worth Living' course (cf., Volf, Croasmun, McAnnally-Linz, 2023), both of which have drawn thousands of undergraduates, demonstrate the hunger among students for an education that does not just train them for careers but orients them towards wisdom and prepares them for lives of purpose.

While none of these suggestions would cure all that ails the modern secular university, any of them would be a step in the right direction.

5.4. <u>Liberal</u> Liberal Learning: Secular$_3$ Intellectual Freedom

For wisdom's sake, theologians should resist illiberalism in all its forms in higher education and insist upon a genuinely *liberal* approach to liberal arts education (cf. Joseph Clair in Bilbro, et al., 2023, pp.63ff). The main forms of illiberalism undercutting the university's pursuit of wisdom are

Secularism$_2$, dogmatic 'Progressivism', and anti-intellectual Pragmatism. Against these, theologians should champion free speech, free inquiry, and a dogged commitment to the pursuit of truth. The principles set forth in the University of Chicago's Kalven Report (1967) remain a good baseline for preserving the university as an arena in which 'the tournament of narratives' (as Ream and Glanzer [2007, p.2] put it) can be conducted fairly (on this point, see especially Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt [2019]). However, there is an urgent need for theologians to articulate a clear, theologically grounded account of intellectual freedom for Christians engaged in the institutional life of the secular university. While Newman and Kuyper offer significant resources for developing such an account (see **Ch.VI.1.4.**), such a positive Christian vision for intellectual freedom in the pluralistic academy will necessarily go beyond them both to specify the principles and limits of such freedom.

5.5. Cultivating Academic Communities of Character

For wisdom's sake, theologians should support the rights of religious, philosophical, and political minorities to form voluntary associations around shared commitments, be they moral, religious, political, or otherwise. As John Inazu (2018) and others (e.g., Lukianoff and Haidt, 2019; Alan Kors and Harvey Silverglate, 1998) have amply documented, a significant manifestation of institutional illiberalism in today's universities has involved discrimination against traditionally religious student groups precisely due to their ethical commitments (especially when it comes to their sexual ethics). In liberal institutions which cannot prescribe any moral frameworks beyond those necessary to preserving the institution's educational mission, the freedom of academic

subcommunities to voluntarily commit themselves to cultivating distinct forms of character is essential.

6. Common Grace, Common Grounds: Christian Hope for the Modern Secular University's Future

Schleiermacher, Newman, and Kuyper alike saw the university as an institution full of promise and longed to see its core 'idea' realized afresh for the emerging modern era. All three understood that such a fresh realization would necessarily be, in many respects, very different from the original Medieval idea of a university and would inevitably be hard won. But they all saw its realization as well worth fighting for. They were deeply invested in university's reform not so much out of a disdain for universities as they then were as out of hope for what universities might yet be. This dissertation has been similarly motivated by my own deep love for the university, particularly the various secular universities of which I have had the privilege of being a part over the last twenty-four years, and my hope that they might thrive.

While Newman and Kuyper believed that their own moments required establishing confessional institutions and that the fullness of Christian higher learning could not be realized outside of such an institution,[221] their thought can nevertheless offer reasons for gratitude and hope to the Christian student or scholar who must, for whatever reason, make their way in the modern secular university. Newman and Kuyper both remind us that, however overtly

[221] It remains an open question whether the *fullness* of Christian higher learning can be realized *by* such institutions either, this side of the eschaton.

'antithetical' to the gospel they may be in some respects, such institutions are nevertheless ripe with 'seeds of truth', Egyptian gold, 'common grace' to be cultivated, mined, refined, and celebrated. Newman and Kuyper remind us, too, that when we reason together with our non-Christian colleagues, human reason (as Newman says) is never 'unaided' (*US*, II.5, p.17). The Spirit of Wisdom goes before us, by 'common grace' beckoning us all to a common knowledge of Truth in all its profundity and unity and providing us with common grounds upon which we can fruitfully seek understanding together from our many faith-based standpoints. Christian students and scholars may expect to meet difficulty and opposition in the modern secular university, but they should also expect to meet God already at work there in their fellow students, teachers, colleagues, disciplines, and institutions, and should prayerfully, patiently, joyfully, gratefully, hopefully, and wisely seek out ways to co-labor with Him *and them* for wisdom's sake.

Bibliography

Abraham, W.J., and Aquino, F.D. (eds.), 2021. *The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adams, R.M.M., 2005. 'Faith and religious knowledge' in *The Cambridge Companion to: Friedrich Schleiermacher*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 35–52.

Anderson, R.D., 2004. *European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Anrich, E., 1960*. Die Idee der deutschen Universität und die Reform der deutschen Universitäten*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aquino, F. D. (2012) *An Integrative Habit of Mind : John Henry Newman on the Path to Wisdom*. DeKalb, IL: NIU Press.

Atkins, G., 2018. "Evangelicals" in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Axtell, J., 2016. *Wisdom's Workshop: The Rise of the Modern University*, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Bacote, V., 2005. *The Spirit in Public Theology: Appropriating the Legacy of Abraham Kuyper*, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers.

Ballor, J. & Flikkema, M. (eds.), 2015-19. *Abraham Kuyper: Collected Works in Public Theology*, 12 volumes. Bellingham: Lexham Press.

Barr, C., 2003. *Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-1865*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

Barr, C., 2018. "Ireland" in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barr, C., and Skinner, S., 2018. "Political and Social Thought" in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barth, K., 2001. *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century : Its Background & History*, London: SCM.

Barth, K. & Ritschl, D., 1982. *The Theology of Schleiermacher : Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Bartholomew, C., 2017. *Contours of the Kuyperian Tradition: A Systematic Introduction*, Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.

Barton, J., 2007. *The Nature of Biblical Criticism*, Louisville, KY ; London: Westminster John Knox Press.

Bauckham, R., 2008. *Jesus and the God of Israel : God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's christology of divine identity*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Berkouwer, G.C., 1962. *Man : The Image of God*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Bilbro, J., Hooten Wilson, J., Henreckson, D. (eds.), 2023. *The Liberating Arts: Why We Need Liberal Arts Education,* Walden, NY: Plough Publishing House.

Bloom, A., 1987. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Blumenstyk, G., 2020. *American Higher Education in Crisis? : what everyone needs to know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bok, D. C., 2008. *Our Underachieving Colleges : A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They Should be Learning More*. Princeton, NJ ; Princeton University Press.

Bolt, J., 2001. *A Free Church, A Holy Nation: Abraham Kuyper's American Public Theology*, Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Bouyer, L., 2011. *Newman: His Life and Spirituality*, San Francisco, CA : Ignatius.

Brandt, J.M., 2024. "Christian Ethics" in Dole, A. et al. (eds.) (2024) *The Oxford Handbook of Friedrich Schleiermacher*. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bratt, J.D., 2013. *Abraham Kuyper : Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat,* Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Brennan, J., and Magness, P., 2019. *Cracks in the Ivory Tower: The Moral Mess of Higher Education*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Brock, C.C. and Sutanto, N.G., 2022. *Neo-Calvinism: A Theological Introduction*, Bellingham, WA : Lexham Press.

Brockliss, L.W.B., 2016. *The University of Oxford: A History*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Bruno, C.R., Lee, J.J.R., and Schreiner, T.R., 2024. *The Divine Christology of the Apostle Paul : Retrospect and Prospect*, Downers Grove, IL : IVP Academic.

Buckley, M., 2005. "The Study of Religion and the Rise of Atheism," in Ford, D.F., Quash, B. & Soskice, J.M. (eds.), 2005. *Fields of faith : theology and religious studies for the twenty-first century*, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Buechner, F., 1970. *The Alphabet of Grace*, San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins.

Bull, M., 1992. "Who Was the First to Make a Pact with the Devil?," *London Review of Books* (May 14): 22-23.

Caldecott, S., 2012. *Beauty in the Word: Rethinking the Foundations of Education*, Tacoma, WA : Angelico Press.

Caldecott, S., 2009. *Beauty for Truth's Sake: On the Re-Enchantment of Education*, Grand Rapids, MI : Brazos Press.

Calvin, J., Battles, F.L. (trans.) & McNeill, J.T. (ed.), 1960. *Calvin : Institutes of the Christian religion*, Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press.

Clark, K., and Jain, R.S., 2021. *The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Philosophy of Christian Classical Education*, Third Edition, Camp Hill, PA : Classical Academic Press.

Coleridge, S. T. & Jackson, H. J. (ed), 2008. *Samuel Taylor Coleridge : The major works*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Collini, S., 2012. *What are universities for?* London: Penguin.

Crisp, O.D., et al., 2012. *Christianity and the Disciplines: The Transformation of the University*, London : Bloomsbury.

Cross, F.L. & Livingstone, E.A., 2005. 'Moravian Brethren'. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Crouter, R., 1980. 'Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-Sided Debate'. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 48(1), pp.19–43.

Dawson, C., 1961. *The Crisis of Western Education*, Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press.

D'Costa, G., 2005. *Theology in the Public Square : Church, Academy, and Nation*, Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwells.

Delbanco, A., 2012. *College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be*, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Deresiewicz, W., 2014. *Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite & the Way to a Meaningful Life*, New York : Free Press.

de Ridder-Symoens, H. (ed.), 1992. *A History of the University in Europe: Volume I: Universities in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

de Ridder-Symoens, H. (ed.), 1996. *A History of the University in Europe: Volume II: Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

de Vries, J.H., "Introduction," to Kuyper, A., 1931. *Lectures on Calvinism*, Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Dilthey, W., 1870. *Leben Schleiermachers*, Berlin.

Dole, A.C., Poe, S.M., and Vander Schel, K.M., eds., 2024. *The Oxford Handbook of Friedrich Schleiermacher*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Donoghue, F., 2018. *The Last Professors : The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Duffy, E., 2019. *John Henry Newman: A Very Brief History*, London: SPCK.

Dulles, A., 1999. *A History of Apologetics*, San Francisco, CA : Ignatius Press.

Dulles, A., 2002. *John Henry Newman*, London : Continuum.

Eagleton, T. (2015) "The Slow Death of the University". *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. 61 (30).

Encyclopædia Britannica (2024) *Humboldt University of Berlin*. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Humboldt-University-of-Berlin (Accessed: 14 February 2023).

Epstein, D., 2019. *Range : How Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World*, London : Macmillan.

Evans, C.S., 1996. *The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith : The Incarnational Narrative as History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fallon, D, 1980. *The German University : A Heroic Ideal in Conflict with the Modern World,* Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press.

Farley, E, 1994. *Theologia : The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological* Education, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.

Ferreira, M.J., 1986. *Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fichte, J.G., 2017. "A Plan, Deduced from First Principles, for an Institution of Higher Learning to Be Established in Berlin, Connected to and Subordinate to an Academy of Sciences," in Menand, L., Reitter, P. & Wellmon, C. (eds.), 2017. *The rise of the research university : a sourcebook*, Chicago.

Fichte, J.G., 1988. *The Purpose of Higher Education*, trans. Jorn K. Bramann, Mt. Savage. : Nightsun

Fish, S., 2008. *Save the World on Your Own Time*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Ford, D.F., 2007. *Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and Learning in Love*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ford, D.F., Quash, B., and Soskice, J.M. (eds.), 2005. *Fields of Faith: Theology and Religious Studies for the Twenty-first Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frei, H.W., Hunsinger, G. & Placher, W.C., 1992. *Types of Christian Theology*, New Haven ; London: Yale University Press.

Gamble, R.M. (ed.) 2007. *The Great Tradition: Classic Readings on What it Means to be an Educated Human Being*, Washington, DC : Regnery Publishing.

Gerrish, B.A., 1984. *A Prince of the Church : Schleiermacher and the Beginnings of Modern Theology*, London: SCM.

Glanzer, P.L., Alleman, N.F., and Ream, T.C., 2017. *Restoring the Soul of the University: Unifying Christian Higher Education in a Fragmented Age*, Downers Grove, IL : IVP Academic.

Glanzer, P.L., 2022. *The Dismantling of Moral Education: How Higher Education Reduced Human Identity*, Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield.

Global Faculty Initiative (2025) *Global Faculty Initiative*. Available at: https://globalfacultyinitiative.net/ (Accessed: 21 May 2025).

Gödel, K., 1992. *On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems*, New York: Dover Publications.

González, J.L., 2015. *The History of Theological Education,* Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.

Gordin, M.D., 2021. *On the Fringe: Where Science Meets Pseudoscience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Griffiths, P.J., 2009. *Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar*, Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press.

Guite, M., 2022. *Lifting the Veil: Imagination and the Kingdom of God*, Norwich : Canterbury Press.

Gunton, C., 1992. *Christ and Creation: The Didsbury Lectures 1990*, Eugene, OR : Wipf & Stock.

Gunton, C., 1993. *The One, the Three, and the Many: God, Creation, and the Culture of Modernity*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Habiger Institute for Catholic Leadership, 2020. *The Heart of Culture: A Brief History of Western Education*, Providence, RI: Cluny Media.

Hadot, P., 2002. *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

Hart, D.B., 2009. *Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies*, New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

Hart, D.G., 2013. *Calvinism: A History*, New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

Harvey, V.A., 1966. *The Historian and the Believer : The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief*, Philadelphia: Westminster.

Hauerwas, S., 2007. *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God*, Oxford : Blackwell Publishing.

Hays, R. and Gaventa, B.R. (eds.), 2008. *Seeking the Identity of Jesus : A Pilgrimage,* Grand Rapids, MI ; Eerdmans.

Helm, P., 1997. *Faith & Understanding*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Herdt, J.A., 2019. *Forming humanity : redeeming the German Bildung tradition*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Heslam, P.S., 1998. *Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper's Lectures on Calvinism*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Hettche, M. and Dyck, C., 2024. "Christian Wolff", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/wolff-christian/>.

Higton, M., 2012. *A Theology of Higher Education*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hitz, Z., 2020. *Lost in Thought: The Hidden Pleasures of an Intellectual Life*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. J., 1996. *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.

Hoekema, A.A., 1986. *Created in God's Image*, Grand Rapids : Carlisle: William B. Eerdmans ; Paternoster.

Howard, T.A., ed., with Noll, M.A. and Turner J., 2008. *The Future of Christian Learning: An Evangelical and Catholic Dialogue*, Grand Rapids : Brazos Press.

Howard, T.A., 2006. *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University*, Oxford University Press.

Hughes, G., 2009. 'Conscience,' in Ker, I., and Merrigan, T. (eds.), 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Hume, D., 2008. *Dialogues and Natural History of Religion*, Oxford World's Classics, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Hütter, R., 2020. *John Henry Newman on Truth & Its Counterfeits: A Guide for Our Times,* Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press.

Inazu, J., 2016. *Confident Pluralism : Surviving and Thriving Through Deep Difference*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Jacobsen, D., and Jacobsen, R.H., 2004. *Scholarship & Christian Faith: Enlarging the Conversation*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Jaeger, W., 1961. *Early Christianity and Greek Paidea*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Joustra, J.R., and Joustra, R.J. (eds.), 2022. *Calvinism for a Secular Age: A Twenty-First Century Reading of Abraham Kuyper's Stone Lectures*, Downers Grove, IL: IVP Acacemic.

Kant, I., 2007. *Critique of Judgment*, Oxford World Classics, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Kant, I., & Kemp Smith, N. (trans.), 2007. *Critique of Pure Reason Second Edition*, London : Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

Kant, I. & Gregor, M.J. (trans.), 1992. *The Conflict of the Faculties* = Der Streit der Fakultäten, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Kant, I. & Hatfield, G.C., 2004. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will be able to Come Forward as Science : with selections from the Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I., Wood, A.W. & Di Giovanni, G., 1998. *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kay, A., 2019. "Academes Extinction Event: Failure, Whiskey, and Professional Collapse at the MLA." *The Chronicle of higher education*. 65 (33), B6-.

Kelsey, D.H., 1993. *Between Athens and Berlin : The Theological Education Debate*, Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans.

Ker, I., and Merrigan, T. (eds.), 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Ker, I., 2019. *John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ker, I., ed., 1990. *Newman the Theologian: A Reader*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kerr, C., 2001. *The Uses of the University*. 5th ed. Cambridge, MA. ; Harvard University Press.

Kimble, B.A., 1986. *Orators & Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education*, New York, NY : Teachers College Press.

Klemm, D., 2005. Culture, Arts, and Religion. In *The Cambridge Companion to: Friedrich Schleiermacher*. Cambridge University Press.

Kobes, W., 1993. "Sphere Sovereignty and the University: Theological Foundations of Abraham Kuyper's View of the University and Its Role in Society". Retrieved from https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/ faculty_work/1169

Kors, A.C., and Silverglate, H.A., 1998. *The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses*. New York : The Free Press.

Koyzis, D.T., 2019. *Political Visions & Illusions: A Survey and Christian Critique of Contemporary Ideologies*, 2nd Ed., Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.

Kronman, A.T., 2007. *Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life*, New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

Kuyper, A., 2017. *The Antithesis Between Symbolism and Revelation*, London: Crossreach Publications.

Kuyper, A. & Bratt, J.D. (ed.), 1998. *Abraham Kuyper : A Centennial Reader*, Grand Rapids, MI. : Carlisle: Eerdmans ; Paternoster Press.

Kuyper, A., 2019. 'Bound to the Word' in Naylor, W. and Van Dyke, H. (eds.), 2019. *On Education: Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology*, Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press: 67-97.

Kuyper, A., 2019. 'The Goal of Genuine Study' in Naylor, W. and Van Dyke, H. (eds.), 2019. *On Education: Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology*, Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.

Kuyper, A., de Vries, J.H. (trans.), & Richards, B.C. (ed.), 1980. *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology : Its Principles*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House.

Kuyper, A., 1931. *Lectures on Calvinism*, Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Kuyper, A. (1921) *Poems* in: *Gedenkboek ter herinnering aan het overlijden van Dr. A. Kuyper en de sprake die daarbij uit de pers voortkwam*. Amsterdam: W. ten Have, pp. [4], 59, 94, 155. Available at: https://sources.neocalvinism.org/kuyper/?ka_num=1921.03 (Accessed: 21 May 2025).

Kuyper, A., 2013. *Rooted & Grounded : The Church as Organism and Institution*, Grand Rapids, MI: Christian's Library Press.

Kuyper, A., & de Vries, J.H. (trans.), 1904. "The Biblical Criticism of the Present Day", *Bibliotheca Sacra* LXI, no. 243: 410-42, 666-88

Kuyper, A., 2019. 'Scholarship: Two Convocation Addresses' in Naylor, W. and Van Dyke, H. (eds.), 2019. *On Education: Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology*, Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press: 98-133.

Kuyper, A., 2019. 'The Secret of Genuine Study' in Naylor, W. and Van Dyke, H. (eds.), 2019. *On Education: Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology*, Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.

Lamm, J.A., 2024. 'Plato' in Dole, A. et al. (eds.), 2024. *The Oxford handbook of Friedrich Schleiermacher*. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lash, N., 1996. *The Beginning and End of 'Religion',* Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Lash, N., 1979. Introduction to *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Lessing, G.E., & Nisbet H.B. (trans. & ed.), 2005. On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power. In *Lessing: Philosophical and Theological Writings*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Levenson, J., 1993. *The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism : Jews and Christians in Biblical Studies*, Louisville : Westminster-John Knox.

Lewis, C.S., 2001. *Mere Christianity*, San Francisco, CA : Harper Collins.

Lewis, C.S., 2013. *The Discarded Image*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, H. R., 2007. *Excellence Without a Soul : Does Liberal Education Have a Future?* New York: Public Affairs.

Lindbeck, G., 2009. *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* 25th Anniversary Edition, Louisville, KY : Westminster John Knox Press.

Loughlin, G., 1997. 'The basis and authority of doctrine,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41–64.

Lukianoff, G., and Haidt, J., 2018. *The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure*, London : Penguin.

Lundin, R., 2009. *Believing Again: Doubt and Faith in a Secular Age*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Lundin, R. (ed.), 2013. *Christ Across the Disciplines: Past, Present, Future*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Lyotard, Jean-François, 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

MacIntyre, A., 1988. *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Notre Dame, IL ; University of Notre Dame Press.

MacIntyre, A., 2009. *God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition*, Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield.

Mariña, J. (ed.), 2005. *The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mariña, J., 2005. "Christology and Anthropology in Friedrich Schleiermacher," in Mariña, J. (ed.), 2005. *The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mariña, J., 2008. *Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Marrou, H.I., 1956. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin Press.

Marsden, G.,1998. *The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marsden, G., 1987. "The State of Evangelical Christian Scholarship," *Reformed Journal* 37 : 14.

Marsden, G., 2021. *The Soul of the American University Revisited: From Protestant to Postsecular*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

McCarren, G.H., 2009. 'Development of doctrine,' in Ker, I., and Merrigan, T. (eds.), 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

McCormack, B., 2002. 'What Has Basel to do with Berlin?' *The Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, Vol. 23, issue 2, pp.146-73. Accessed 21 May, 2025. https://archive.org/details/princetonseminar2322prin/page/146/mode/2up?view=theater

McGrath, A., 1998. *Iustitia Dei : A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, 2nd Ed.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGrath, A., 2019. *The Territories of Human Reason: Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple Rationalities*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

McGrath, F., 1951. *Newman's University: Idea and Reality*. London : Longmans, Green, & Co.

McGuckin, J.A., 2017. *The Path of Christianity: The First Thousand Years*. Downers Grove, IL : IVP Academic

McIntyre, L., 2019. *The Scientific Attitude: Defending Science from Denial, Fraud, and Pseudoscience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Menand, L., Reitter, P. & Wellmon, C. (eds.), 2017. *The Rise of the Research University : A Sourcebook.* Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Menssen, S., and Sullivan, T.D., 2007. *The Agnostic Inquirer: Revelation from a Philosophical Standpoint*. Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Merklinger, P.M., 1993. *Philosophy, Theology, and Hegel's Berlin Philosophy of Religion, 1821-1827*. Albany, NY : SUNY Press.

Merrigan, T., 2009. 'Revelation,' in Ker, I., and Merrigan, T. (eds.), 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Milbank, J., 1990. *Theology & Social Theory : Beyond Secular Reason*. Oxford : Blackwell.

Mitchell, B., 1994. *Faith and Criticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moleski, M.X., 2000. *Personal Catholicisim: The Theological Epistemologies of John Henry Newman and Michael Polanyi*. Washington, DC : The Catholic University of America Press.

Montás, R., 2022. *Rescuing Socrates : how the great books changed my life and why they matter for a new generation*. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Moroney, S., 1995. *The Noetic Effects of Sin: An Exposition of Calvin's View and a Constructive Theological Proposal* : ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.

Moroney, S., 2000. *The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Historical and Contemporary Exploration of How Sin Affects Our Thinking*, Lanham, MD : Lexington Books.

Mouw, R.J., 2011. *Abraham Kuyper: A Short and Personal Introduction,* Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Mouw, R.J., 2012. *The Challenges of Cultural Discipleship: Essays in the Line of Abraham Kuyper*, Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Muller, M., 2015. 'Newman, Imagination, and The Idea of a University,' *Newman Studies Journal*, 12 (1):43-56.

Nagel, E. & Newman, J., 2008. *Gödel's Proof*, Revised Ed., New York, NY: NYU Press.

Naugle, D., 2002. *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Naylor, W. and Van Dyke, H. (eds.), 2019. *On Education: Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology*, Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.

Newman, J.H., 1994. *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, New York, NY: Penguin Classics.

Newman, J.H., 2015a. *Discussions & Arguments*, London : Aeterna Press.

Newman, J.H., 1979. *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Newman, J.H., 1871. *Essays Critical and Historical: Volume I*. London: B.M. Pickering. Available at: https://www.newmanreader.org/works/essays/volume1/index.html (Accessed: 21 May 2025).

Newman, J.H., 1871. *Essays Critical and Historical: Volume II*. London: B.M. Pickering. Available at: https://www.newmanreader.org/works/essays/volume2/index.html (Accessed: 21 May 2025).

Newman, J.H., 1989. *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Newman, J.H., 1997. *Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1843*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Newman, J.H., and Turner, F.M. (ed.), 1996. *The Idea of a University : Rethinking the Western Tradition,* New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

Newman, J.H., 1978. *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*. Edited by I. Ker and T. Gornall. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://digitalcollections.newmanstudies.org/document/bx4705_n5a4_v_01_1978/letters_and_diaries_of_john_henry_newman_volume_1_ealing_trinity_oriel_february_1801_to_december_1826/1978-00-00 (Accessed: 21 May 2025).

Newman, J.H., 1990. 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine' in Ker, I.T. (ed.), *Newman the Theologian : A Reader*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Newman, J.H., 1997. *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press.

Newman, J.H., 2015b. 'The Tamworth Reading Room' in *Discussions & Arguments*, London : Aeterna Press.

Newman, J.H., 2013. *Tracts for the Times*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Newman, J.H., 2015c. *The Via Media of the Anglican Church*, London : Aeterna Press.

Nichols, T., 2017. *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why it Matters*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Niebuhr, H.R., 1951. *Christ & Culture*, New York: Harper Collins.

Noll, M.A., 2011. *Jesus Christ and the Life of the Mind*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Nord, W., 2010. *Does God Make a Difference?: Taking Religion Seriously in our Schools and Universities*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C., 2010. *Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Oden, T., 1992. *Classic Christianity*, San Francisco, CA : Harper Collins.

O'Donovan, O., 1994. *Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics*, Second Ed., Grand Rapid, MI : Eerdmans.

O'Hear, A., and Sidwell, M. (eds.), 2009. *The School of Freedom: A Liberal Education Reader from Plato to the Present Day*, Exeter : Imprint Academic.

Oreskes, N., 2019. *Why Trust Science?*, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Palfreyman, D., & Temple, P., 2017. *Universities and Colleges: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Pannenberg, W., 1976. *Theology & the Philosophy of Science*, London: Darton, Longman, & Todd.

Pattison, R., 1991. *The Great Dissent : John Henry Newman and the Liberal Heresy*, New York : Oxford University Press.

Pelikan, J., 1969. *Development of Christian Doctrine: Some Historical Prolegomena*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Peters, M.A., & Barnett, R, eds., 2018. *The Idea of the University: A Reader, Volume 1*, New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Piderit, J. J. & Morey, M. M., 2012. *Teaching the tradition: Catholic themes in academic disciplines*. 1st edition. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, A. & Wolterstorff, N. (eds.), 1983. *Faith & Rationality : Reason and Belief in God*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Plantinga, A., 1998. "Reformed Epistemology" in Sennett, J.B. (ed.), *The Analytic Theist : An Alvin Plantinga Reader*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Plantinga, A., 1993a. *Warrant : The Current Debate*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, A., 1993b. *Warrant and Proper Function*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, A., 2000. *Warranted Christian Belief*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, A., 2011. *Where the Conflict Really Lies : Science, Religion, and Naturalism,* Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, C., 2002. *Engaging God's World : A Christian Vision of Faith, Learning, and Living*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Pluckrose, H., and Lindsay, J., 2020. *Cynical Theories: How Activist Scholarship Made Everything about Race, Gender and Identity—and Why This Harms Everybody*, London : Swift Press.

Polanyi, M., 1958. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press.

Polanyi, M., 1966. *The Tacit Dimension*, Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press.

Postman, N., 1995. *The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School*, New York : Vintage Books.

Prickett, S., 2018. "Literary Legacy" in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Przywara, E., 1930. *A Newman Synthesis*, London : Sheed & Ward.

Purvis, Z., 2016. *Theology and the University in Nineteenth Century Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ratzsch, D., 2000. *Science & Its Limits : The Natural Sciences in Christian Perspective,* Downers Grove, IL : InterVarsity Press.

Readings, B., 1996. *The University in Ruins*, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

Ream, T.C., & Glanzer, P.L., 2007. *Christian Faith & Scholarship: An Exploration of Contemporary Developments*, Hoboken, NJ : Wiley Periodicals.

Ream, T.C., Pattengale, J., and Riggs, D.L., 2012. *Beyond Integration?: Inter/Disciplinary Possibilities for the Future of Christian Higher Education*, Abilene, TX : Abilene Christian University Press.

Reuben, J.A., 1996. *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Roche, M.W., 2017. *Realizing the Distinctive University: Vision and Values, Strategy and Culture*, Notre Dame, IL : University of Notre Dame Press.

Rousseau, J.-J., 1782. *Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar*. Generic NL Freebook Publisher. *EBSCOhost*, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=2008578&site=eho st-live. Accessed 9 Feb. 2020.

Rowe, C.K., 2020. *Christianity's Surprise: A Sure and Certain Hope*, Nashville, TN : Abingdon Press.

Rowell, G., 1983. *The Vision Glorious: Themes and Personalities of the Catholic Revival in Anglicanism*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Rüegg, W. (ed.), 2004. *A History of the University in Europe, Volume III: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800-1945)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandel, M., 2020. *The Tyranny of Merit: What's Become of the Common Good?* London : Allen Lane.

Schelling, F., 2017. Lectures on the Method of Academic Study. In Menand, L., Reitter, P. & Wellmon, C. (eds.), 2017. *The rise of the research university : a sourcebook*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Schleiermacher, F., & Tice, T.N. (trans. & ed.), 2011. *Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study : Revised Translation of the 1811 and 1830 Editions*, 3rd edition, Louisville, KY : Westminster-John Knox Press.

Schleiermacher, F., & Bowie, A. (ed.), 1998. *Hermeneutics and Criticism*: *And Other Writings*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Schleiermacher, F., 1989. *Introduction to Christian Ethics*, Nashville, TN : Abingdon Press.

Schleiermacher, F., 1988. *The Christian Faith*, 3rd Edition. Oxford : Bloomsbury T&T Clark.

Schleiermacher, F., Tice, T. (ed. & trans.), 2010. *Christmas Eve Celebration: A Dialogue*, Eugene, OR : Cascade.

Schleiermacher, F., 2017. Occasional Thoughts on German Universities in the German Sense. In Menand, L., Reitter, P. & Wellmon, C. (eds.), 2017. *The rise of the research university : a sourcebook*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Schleiermacher, F., Tice, T., and Lawler, E. (ed. & trans.), 2005. *Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense, with an Appendix Regarding a University Soon to be Established*, Lewiston, NY : Edwin Mellen Press.

Schleiermacher, F., & Crouter, R. (trans. & ed.), 1996. *On Religion : Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schleiermacher, F. et al. (1981) *On the Glaubenslehre : two letters to Dr. Lücke*. Chico: Scholars Press.

Schmidt, S., 2024. "Dialectic" in Dole, A. et al. (eds.) (2024) *The Oxford handbook of Friedrich Schleiermacher*. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schuurman, P. (2019) 'Dialogical Pluralism for Secular Universities'. Available at: https://peterschuurman.ca/2019/05/10/dialogical-pluralism-for-secular-universities/ (Accessed: 19 May 2025).

Schwehn, M., 1993. *Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Scruton, R., 2002. *A Short History of Modern Philosophy*, 2nd Ed., London : Routledge.

Shrimpton, P., 2014. *The 'Making of Men': The* Idea *and reality of Newman's university in Oxford and Dublin*, Leominster : Gracewing.

Sire, J.W., 2000. *Habits of the Mind: Intellectual Life as a Christian Calling*, Downers Grove, IL : InterVarsity Press.

Smith, D.I., and Felch, S.M., 2016. *Teaching and the Christian Imagination*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Smith, J. K. A., 2009. *Desiring the Kingdom : Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

Smith, J.K.A., 2014. *How (Not) to be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Smith, J.K.A., 2017. *Awaiting the King: Reforming Public Theology*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

Smith, Q., 2001. The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism. *Philo*, 4(2), pp.195–215.

Somerville, C.J., 2006. *The Decline of the Secular University,* Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Spears, P.D., and Loomis, S.R., 2009. *Education for Human Flourishing: A Christian Perspective*, Downers Grove, IL : IVP Academic.

Spykman, G.J., 1992. *Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Sullivan, J., 2018. "The University," in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sullivan, M., and Blaschko, P., 2022. *The Good Life Method: Reasoning Through the Big Questions of Happiness, Faith, and Meaning*, New York : Penguin Press.

Sutanto, N.G. and Brock, C.C., eds., 2023. *T&T Clark Handbook of Neo-Calvinism*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark.

Taylor, C., 2007. *A Secular Age*, Cambridge, MA : Belknap/Harvard University Press.

Taylor, J.S., 1997. *Poetic Knowledge: The Recovery of Education*, Albany, NT : SUNY Press.

TenZythoff, G.J., 1987. *Sources of Secession : The Netherlands Hervormde Kerk on the Eve of the Dutch Immigration to the Midwest*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Thomas, G., 2013. *Education: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tillman, M.K., 2015. *John Henry Newman: Man of Letters*, Milwaukee, WI : Marquette University Press.

Torrance, T.F., 1987. *God and Rationality*, Edinburgh : T&T Clark.

Turner, G. (1997) 'St Thomas Aquinas on the "Scientific" Nature of Theology', *New Blackfriars*, 78(921), pp. 464–476. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250058.

Tyson, P., 2022. *A Christian Theology of Science: Reimagining a Theological Vision of Natural Knowledge*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

van Bommel, B., 2015. "Between 'Bildung' and 'Wissenschaft': The 19th-century German Ideal of Scientific Education," http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/germanophilia-and-germanophobia/bas-van-bommel-between-bildung-and-wissenschaft-the-19th-century-german-ideal-of-scientific-education#TheKantianturn (accessed 12 February, 2020)

van Deursen, A.T., 2008. *The Distinctive Character of the Free University in Amsterdam, 1880-2005*, Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

van der Kooi, C., and van den Brink, G., 2017. *Christian Dogmatics: An Introduction*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Vial, T., 2013. *Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed,* London : Bloomsbury.

Vidler, A., 1961. *The Church in an Age of Revolution*, London : Penguin.

Volf, M., Croasmun, M., and McAnnally-Linz, R., 2023. *Life Worth Living: A Guide to What Matters Most*, London: Penguin.

Walgrave, J.H., 1960. *Newman the Theologian*, London: Geoffrey Chapman, Ltd.

Wallace, W. A., 1972. *Causality and Scientific Explanation*, Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press.

Weber, M., 2004. "Science as a Vocation," in Owen, D. and Strong, T. (eds.), & Livingstone, R. (trans.), *The Vocation Lectures*, Indianapolis, IN : Hackett.

Webster, J., 2015. "What Makes Theology Theological?" *Journal of Analytic Theology* 3: 17. Web.

Wellmon, C., 2016. *Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University*, Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University Press.

Williams, D., 2020a. *Can and should pluralist universities and colleges give up on the meaning of life?: Examining the debate over the ends of education in intellectually diverse contexts*. MPhil essay. University of Oxford.

Williams, D., 2020b. *Two Ideas of the University: A Comparative Analysis of Friedrich Schleiermacher's and Abraham Kuyper's Theologies of Higher Education*. MPhil thesis. University of Oxford.

Williams, R., 2005. *Why Study the Past?: The Quest for the Historical Church*, London: Darton, Longman, and Todd.

Williams, R., 2018. *Christ the Heart of Creation*, London : Bloomsbury.

Willimon, W.H., and Naylor, T.H., 1995., *The Abandoned Generation: Rethinking Higher Education*, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Wilshire, B., 1990. *The Moral Collapse of the University : Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Wolters, A., 2005. *Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview*, Second Edition, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Wolterstorff, N., 2004. *Educating for Shalom: Essays on Christian Higher Education*, Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans.

Wolterstorff, N., 2019. *In This World of Wonders : Memoir of a Life in Learning,* Grand Rapids, MI : Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Wolterstorff, N., 1976. *Reason within the Bounds of Religion* 2nd Edition, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Wolterstorff, N., 2012. "Then, Now, and Al" in Clark, K.J. & Rea, M. (eds.), *Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind : New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolterstorff, N., 2019. *Religion in the University*, New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

Wood, J.H., 2013. *Going Dutch in the Modern Age: Abraham Kuyper's Struggle for a Free Church in the Netherlands*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Wright, N.T., 1992. *The New Testament and the People of God*, Minneapolis : Fortress Press.

Wyman, W., 2005. "Schleiermacher on Sin" in Mariña, J. (ed.), 2005. *The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zachhuber, J., 2024. "Schleiermacher and the University of Berlin," in Dole, A. et al. (eds.), 2024. *The Oxford handbook of Friedrich Schleiermacher*. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zachhuber, J., 2013. *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Zimmermann, J., 2012. *Incarnational Humanism: A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World*, Downers Grove, IL : IVP Academic.

Zuijdwegt, G., 2018. "Richard Whately," in Aquino, F.D. and King, B.J., 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.