
BORDERLANDS AND FATHERLANDS: 'FOREIGN' SOLDIERY IN THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 1576-1618



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List of Abbreviations

HAStK……..Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln
HHStAW……Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden
LAV NRW OWL……..Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Ostwestfalen-Lippe
LAV NRW R……Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Rheinland
LAV NRW W……...Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen

Abstract

This thesis analyses the use and abuse of 'foreign' soldiers in the political rhetoric of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle between 1576 and 1618, exploring what the categorisations applied to such men can tell us about warfare and identity in the Holy Roman Empire and beyond. It argues that the Imperial approach was characterised by nuance, flexibility, and constructive ambiguity, which allowed the region to avoid being drawn deeper into conflicts to which there was no military solution. A key reason for its success was that – despite a profusion of patriotic language denouncing foreign threats – when it came to translating rhetoric into political practice, troops were judged primarily by their profession rather than their origins. As a result, the region's engagement with soldiers featured more continuity than either radical reform or destabilising decline.

These points are demonstrated using analysis aimed at three different levels of the Reich's constitutional order: the Empire as a whole, local territorial principalities, and – crucially – the regional Imperial Circles which connected the other two. In Part I, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreis* is examined as a forum for discussion, as a military employer in its own right, and as a borderland area alongside the neighbouring Burgundian Circle. In Part II, three representative case studies drawn from individual Circle Estates highlight in greater depth the ways in which local authorities and commentators learned to adapt successfully to the presence of outside forces. Finally, Part III describes how Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's experiences played out within the formal and informal networks which bound together the entire Reich.

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After four years of reading metaphorical descriptions of warfare, it is inevitable that I have occasionally lapsed into viewing my DPhil as a gruelling campaign in a foreign land, and as such I am immensely grateful to all those who have helped me to survive it in (more or less) one piece. I would particularly like to thank the AHRC and Pembroke College for being generous paymasters of this expedition; the library and archive staff in Duisburg, Detmold, Münster, and Oxford for supplying me with plentiful reams of ammunition; all the participants in Lyndal Roper's early modernist workshops for their sound tactical advice; conference organisers in Cambridge, Zagreb, Leicester, KCL, Göttingen, and the GHIL for offering me billets at their events; Kaoutar Ghilani, Mira Dumbalska, and Hannah McIntyre for reinforcing me when things were tough; Olivia Durand and Cillian Brophy for being excellent companions during the long siege of Covid-19 lockdowns; Jan Tattenberg for being a good comrade in all things; my family for boosting my morale on innumerable occasions; and my supervisor Peter Wilson for being an extraordinarily capable, responsive, and patient commander. Finally, I would like to thank Rosa Stolper for giving me something to fight for.

Introduction

Wars of conquest are invariably accompanied by wars of words, and the conflicts which ravaged the lower Rhineland in the late sixteenth century were no exception. Of all the archetypes pressed into rhetorical service during these debates, one character has the potential to be of particular interest to the historian: the figure of the foreign soldier. As his French-speaking Huguenot troops ravaged the duchy of Berg during the Cologne War in 1583, the Protestant commander John Casimir took pains to refute claims that his men were outsiders, arguing that "so were they mostly settled in Lorraine, and therefore in the Empire. And if they should be taken for foreign soldiers, so must His Imperial Majesty first rightly look at the opposition, who made a start to this with the introduction of foreign Spanish, Italian, Albanian and other peoples."[1] For their part, his Catholic opponents claimed that their forces could not be foreign either, as their soldiers were in the pay of the Imperial Elector of Cologne and had been loaned to him by magnates possessing the "foremost hereditary offices and fiefs" in the Electorate.[2] Already we get a sense of divergent and potentially contradictory criteria for defining of a foreign soldier – someone who was not resident within the Holy Roman Empire versus someone who was not in service to the local prince – and the discourse of the period is rich in these and many more competing categorisations.

This thesis addresses the question of how, and with what consequences, soldiers in the Holy Roman Empire were classified as 'foreign' in the decades before the Thirty Years' War. By

[1] Quoted in Michael of Aitzing, *Rerum vaticiniis accomodata historia: Das ist eine hystorische beschreibung oder relation deß so sich zuggetragen hat von anfang her ordenlich continuirt biß auff nun ablauffendts jar 1584. Sampt notturfftiger applicierung der zeit figuren und propheceyen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1584), pp. 410-11; for a very similar argument deployed by one of John Casimir's comrades, see *Abtruck der Defension Martin Schenken von Beyneck / Churfürstlichen Cölnischen bestelten Feldtmarschalcks an die Churfürsten des H. Rö. Reichs vnnd dero Gesandten auff iüngst verschiener versamblung zu Speyer abgangen darinnen die erdichte Papistische Calumnien wegen eroberung der Statt Bonn wider ihn ausgangen abgeleint werden* (Erfurt: John Beck, 1588), fol. 3^{v}.

[2] Quoted in Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln: Meist aus der Quellen des Stadt-Archivs*, 5 vols (Cologne: L. Schwann'schen Verlagshandlung, 1863-80), V (1880), p. 114.

examining the region under the protection of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Imperial Circle, it aims to contribute to wider debates concerning the functioning of the Reich as a peacekeeping order, the development of patriotic identities, and the transformation of the early modern military. Specifically, it argues three main points. First, it strengthens the case for the viability of the Empire and the Augsburg Peace by showing how narrow institutional assessments of the Circles' failure overlook their achievements in creating a successful culture of coexistence. Second, it demonstrates that while patriotic rhetoric was an important component of contemporary politics, its practical impact was actually quite limited; in particular, demonisation of the foreign 'other' was a weak force compared to fears about soldiers of all kinds. Third, it casts doubt on narratives of radical changes in warfare, highlighting patterns of continuity in the relationships between political and military actors.

i) The Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle and Imperial Peacekeeping

Each of these three points will be threaded throughout what follows, but we can begin by unpacking some of the practical and historiographical context behind each of them in turn. The Holy Roman Empire is often depicted either as a single unwieldy monster, or a patchwork rug of a thousand tiny statelets speckling an unreadable map.[3] However, during the early modern period there was an additional dimension to its structure: the *Reichskreise* or Imperial Circles, regional associations in which member territories met to coordinate the security and administration of the realm.[4] Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was one of the six original Circles founded in 1500 as part of the *Reichsreform* movement to pacify and stabilise

[3] Burghart Schmidt, 'Mappae Germaniae: Das Alte Reich in kartographischen Überlieferungen der Frühen Neuzeit' in *Imperium Romanum – irregulare corpus – Teutscher Reichs Staat: das Alte Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der Historiographie*, ed. by Matthias Schnettger (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2002), pp. 3-25.
[4] For overviews of the *Kreis* system, see Winfried Dotzauer, *Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806): Geschichte und Aktenedition* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998); *Reichskreis und Territorium: Die Herrschaft über der Herrschaft? Supraterritoriale Tendenzen in Politik, Kultur, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Ein Vergleich süddeutscher Reichskreise*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000); *Reichskreise und Regionen im frühmodernen Europa: Horizonte und Grenzen im spatial turn*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst and Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011).

the Empire, and went through several changes during the subsequent decades; in particular, many of its western extremities were transferred to the neighbouring Burgundian Circle (one of the four additional *Kreise* set up after the original founding) by treaty in 1548. Nonetheless, by the late sixteenth century it still stretched from the Wadden Sea in the north to the Ardennes in the south, encompassing dozens of Imperial Estates.

Among these, the leading members were the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg (a dynastic conglomerate which also incorporated the counties of Mark and Ravensberg, plus the lordship of Ravenstein) and the prince-bishopric of Münster, with both their rulers holding the position of *ausschreibender Fürst* or co-director prince.[5] In addition, the princes of Jülich-Cleves-Berg usually occupied the role of *Kreisoberst* or Circle Colonel, although the long-lived Duke William V occasionally laid aside the title, and after his death in 1592 it eventually passed to the lower-ranking Count Simon VI of Lippe. The colonel had overall responsibility for the security of the *Kreis* and for leading its forces in battle, and was assisted by a small number of additional office-holders attached to the Circle, including a treasurer and a lieutenant.

Those of the Circle's Estates which did not hold one of its permanent positions could still participate in its running via assemblies known as *Kreistage*. These were summoned by the co-director princes in response to a particular crisis or request from the Kaiser, and resembled a miniature Imperial Diet in which delegates discussed policy issues before issuing a concluding edict. The *Kreistage* possessed the power to levy taxes on the Circle's members (according to fixed contribution ratios designed to reflect the wealth of each territory),

[5] For the operation of the *ausschreibende Fürst* office, see Benno Rode, *Das Kreisdirektorium im Westfälischen Kreise von 1522-1609* (Münster: Münsterische Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung, 1916); see also Harm Klueting, 'Reichskirche und Reichskreise – Geistliche Reichsfürsten in exekutiven ämtern der Kreise' in *Reichskreise und Regionen im frühmodernen Europa: Horizonte und Grenzen im spatial turn*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst and Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 101-22.

although mechanisms for enforcing these fiscal demands were limited. Unlike at the Reichstag, the Estates were not divided into separate colleges according to their status, and thus polities of various different types negotiated together. Some were self-governing Free Imperial Cities such as Aachen, Dortmund, and Cologne, the last of these constituting one of the Empire's largest cities and a regional hub for trade and publishing. Others had ecclesiastical governments, including the prince-bishoprics of Liège, Paderborn, Osnabrück, and Minden, and the autonomous abbeys of Essen, Werden, Corvey, and Kornelimünster. Finally, there were numerous secular aristocratic fiefs, including both Imperial Counties and lesser lordships. Their roster was continually shifting in accordance with the vagaries of inheritance and legal disputes, but the most important in this period were the counties of East Frisia, Oldenburg, Hoya, Bentheim-Tecklenburg, Nassau-Dillenburg, Sayn, and Wied.

In addition to the local territorial boundaries between its member Estates, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was also shaped by larger dividing lines within the Empire's physical, religious, and political landscapes. Geographically, it straddled the border between the level expanse of the North European Plain and the more varied terrain of the Upper Germany; much of the Circle's west and north was dominated by the flat lower reaches of the Ems, the Weser, the Meuse, and (most importantly of all) the Rhine, whereas the south-east contained areas of wooded hills such as the Westphalian Sauerland and the Wetterau. In terms of religious confession, it was also a highly diverse environment. Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist regimes were all present in numbers, as well as several confessional arrangements that defied easy categorisation; for instance, the nominally Catholic ecclesiastical territories of Osnabrück and Minden were largely dominated by Lutherans, while the beliefs of William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg sometimes seemed as mixed as those of his heterogenous domains.[6]

[6] Susanne Becker, *Zwischen Duldung und Dialog: Wilhelm V. von Jülich-Kleve-Berg als Kirchenpolitiker* (Bonn: Dr. Rudolf Habelt, 2014); Eckehart Stöve, 'Via Media: Humanistischer Traum oder kirchenpolitische Chance?

Politically, historians have deemed it a "borderline" case, which does not fit neatly into conceptual divides between the Reich's periphery and its heartland regions where Imperial institutions were most active.[7] Nonetheless, despite its important position at the nexus of several fault lines in the Empire's make-up, the amount of scholarship devoted to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle has traditionally been small (particularly compared to the better-documented south German *Kreise* of Swabia and Franconia).[8] It retains this low profile even in the latest research; for example, in a newly released monograph specifically devoted to regional alliance politics in the Empire and the Netherlands, it receives only two single-line mentions.[9]

All these factors and others combine to make Lower-Rhine-Westphalia a highly valuable test case for certain assumptions about the workings of the early modern Empire. Recent

Zur Religionspolitik der vereinigten Herzogtümer Jülich-Kleve-Berg im 16. Jahrhundert', *Monatshefte für Evangelische Kirchengeschichte des Rheinlandes*, 39 (1990), 115-33; Johann Friedrich Gerhard Goeters, 'Die Reformation in Jülicher Land', *Monatshefte für Evangelische Kirchengeschichte des Rheinlandes*, 17 (1968), 44-69; Antje Flüchter, '„Ich bin gut bergs catholisch, aber nicht wie die kölnische": Auswirkungen der Konfessionalisierung auf die Gemeinden in Jülich-Berg (und Kleve-Mark)" in *Der Jülich-Klevische Erbstreit 1609: Seine Voraussetzungen und Folgen*, ed. by Manfred Groten, Clemens von Looz-Corswarem, and Wilfried Reininghaus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2011), pp. 305-36.

[7] Johannes Burckhardt, 'Wer hat Angst vor den Reichskreisen? Problemaufriss und Lösungsvorschlag' in *Reichskreise und Regionen im frühmodernen Europa: Horizonte und Grenzen im spatial turn*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst and Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 39-60 (p. 48); Johannes Burckhardt, *Deutsche Geschichte in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 55; Hanns Hubert Hofmann, 'Reichsidee und Staatspolitik: Die Vorderen Reichskreise im 18. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte*, 33 (1970), 969-85 (p. 972); Alison Anderson, *On the Verge of War: International Relations and the Jülich-Kleve Succession Crises 1609-1614* (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999), p. 5; Peter Moraw, *Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung: Das Reich in späten Mittelalter* (Munich: Ullstein H.C., 1989).

[8] The sum total of secondary works devoted to Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's pre-1618 history is as follows; Andreas Schneider, *Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Kreis im 16. Jahrhundert: Geschichte, Struktur und Funktion eines Verfassungsorgans des Alten Reiches* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1985); Gerhard Benecke, 'The Westphalian Circle, the County of Lippe, and Imperial Currency Control' in *The Old Reich: Essays on German Political Institutions 1495-1806*, ed. by James Vann and Steven Rowan (Brussels: Éditions de la librairie encyclopédique, 1974), pp. 129-47; Paul Casser, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis' in *Der Raum Westfalen*, ed. by Hermann Aubin and Eduard Schulte, 6 vols (Münster: Reimar Hobbing, 1931-87), II (1934), pp. 33-70; Helmut Neuhaus, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis – eine Region der Frühen Neuzeit?', *Westfälische Forschungen*, 52 (2002), 96-110; Rode, *Das Kreisdirektorium*; Hans-Joachim Behr, 'Die Exekution des Niederrheinisch-Westfälischen Kreises gegen Graf Johann von Rietberg', *Westfälische Zeitschrift*, 128 (1978), 33-104; Hans-Joachim Behr, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis um 1560' in *Geschichtlicher Handatlas von Westfalen*, 3 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1975-94), II (1982).

[9] Christopher Close, *State Formation and Shared Sovereignty: The Holy Roman Empire and the Dutch Republic 1488–1696* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 119, 121.

generations of historians have pushed back against earlier negative judgements of the Reich as a dysfunctional anomaly destined for self-destruction, arguing that for most of its history it was an idiosyncratic but surprisingly effective polity. As part of this, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg has received positive re-assessments, which have challenged the view that it was an inherently flawed settlement which merely postponed the inevitable confessional conflagration that was the Thirty Years' War.[10] Nonetheless, whilst the initial success of the peace has been increasingly acknowledged, there remains uncertainty about exactly when and why it started to break down, with many historians identifying turning points in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.[11] Moreover, as the emphasis on internal contradictions has diminished, the role of external destabilising factors has come under more scrutiny; for example, Horst Rabe describes the penetration of the Empire by the "confessionally-oriented politics of European alliances" as having wrecked its equilibrium from the 1580s onwards, while Johannes Arndt suggests that the violent overspill of the Eighty Years' War ended the peace in the Rhineland by 1582 at the latest.[12] Interrogating the ways in which Lower-Rhine-

[10] Mattias Pohlig, 'The Peace of 1555 – a failed settlement?' in *The Ashgate Companion to the Thirty Years' War*, ed. by Olaf Schröder and Peter Asbach, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 193-204; Martin Heckel, 'Politischer Friede und geistliche Freiheit im Ringen um die Wahrheit: Zur Historiographie des Augsburger Religionsfriedens von 1555', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 282:2 (2006), 391-425; more pessimistic assessments are still represented in recent historiography, however, for which see Armin Kohnle, 'Augsburger Religionsfrieden 1555' in *Handbuch Frieden im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit / Handbook of Peace in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Irene Dingel, Michael Rohrschneider, Inken Schmidt-Voges, Siegrid Westphal, and Joachim Whaley (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020), pp. 837-56 (pp. 849-55).

[11] Marc von Knorring, 'Der „Friedenssichernde" Reichsdeputationstag zwischen Augsburger Religionsfrieden und Dreissigjährigem Krieg: Eine Bilanz' in *Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Das Heilige Römische Reich und Europa, Festschrift für Maximilian Lanzinner*, ed. by Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2013), pp. 93-106 (p. 110); Axel Gotthard, *Der Augsburger Religionsfrieden* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2004), p. 386; Axel Gotthard, '„Macht Hab Ehr, Einen Bischof Absusezen": Neue Uberlegungen zum Kölner Krieg', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung*, 82 (1996), 270-325; Robert von Friedeburg, *Self-Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany 1530-1680* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 92.

[12] Horst Rabe, *Reich und Glaubensspaltung: Deutschland 1500-1600* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), p. 391; Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die* Niederlande *1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), p. 31; see also Georg Schmidt, 'Teutsche Kriege: Nationale Deutungsmuster und integrative Wertvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Reich' in *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandskonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. by Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 33-61 (p. 43); Johannes Burckhardt, 'Konfessionsbildung als europäisches Sicherheitsrisiko und die Lösung nach Art des Reiches' in *Sicherheit in der*

Westphalia coped – or failed to cope – with incursions that threatened to ignite conflict within its borders is thus essential to assessing the durability of Imperial systems for maintaining public peace.

The *Kreis* is thus key, and this thesis aims to go beyond the institutional approach which has tended to characterise existing scholarship on the Circles. Previous *Kreis* historiography has focused on organisational mechanics (and particularly the struggle to develop effective fiscal capabilities), but has paid less attention to the Circles' other important function as a forum for dialogue which shaped patterns of legitimacy and loyalty.[13] If we are to fully assess Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's contribution to the stability of the Empire, we need to understand more about how Circle actors conceptualised their own place within the Reich and how they articulated this in relation to threatening outsiders.

ii) Identity, Patriotism, and the Fatherland

Unpicking the identities of early modern people is a difficult task, and potentially even an impossible one; Valentin Groebner suggests that it is an anachronism to speak of such individuals possessing a singular self-defined 'identity', and that we should refer only to 'identification', a process that was always the co-product of external perspectives.[14] Whilst

Frühen Neuzeit: Norm – Praxis – Repräsentation, ed. by Christoph Kampmann and Ulrich Niggemann (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013), pp. 181-90 (p. 187).

[13] In addition to the scholarship on the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle cited above, there has been some legal-constitutional analysis and a number of theses tackling its participation in seventeenth century conflicts in institutional terms. See Helmut Gabel, 'Beobachtungen zur territorialen Inananspruchnahme des Reichskammergerichts im Bereich des Niederrheinisch-Westfälischen Kreises' in *Das Reichskammergericht in der deutschen Geschichte: Stand der Forschung, Forschungsperspektiven*, ed. by Bernhard Diestelkamp (Cologne: Böhlau, 1990), pp. 143-72; Hubert Salm, 'Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635-1650' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Bonn, 1986); Karl Haberecht, 'Geschichte des Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Kreises in der Zeit der französischen Eroberungskriege 1667-1697' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Bonn, 1935); Kurt Arnold, 'Geschichte des Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Kreises in der Zeit des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges 1698-1714' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Bonn, 1937).

[14] Valentin Groebner, *Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe,* trans. by Mark Kyburz and John Peck (New York: Zone Books, 2007), pp. 26-27; see also Axel Gotthard, *In der Ferne: die Wahrnehmung des Raums in der Vormoderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007).

remaining aware of the inherently unstable nature of their subject matter, historians have nevertheless tried to make generalisations about patterns of allegiance in this period, and the extent to which men and women identified themselves with larger units such as nation, state, and fatherland. Much late-twentieth-century historiography was consumed by arguments over when exactly these concepts took shape (the battle between primordialist and modernist theorists of nationalism's origins being particularly fierce) but the debate has moved on.[15] Rather than waging a binary struggle over whether or not the various objects of modern patriotic sentiment 'truly' existed in an earlier era, it is generally more helpful to analyse the period-specific nuances of how – and to what – previous generations applied the language of patriotism. Thus, in the twenty-first century there has been lively discussion among scholars of the Holy Roman Empire concerning where precisely the main focus of fatherland rhetoric was directed: at the Reich itself, or its component territories?

Building on Georg Schmidt's vision of the German-centric "*Reichstaat*" or Empire-State as a more cohesive polity than has commonly been assumed, Alexander Schmidt's analysis of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discourse champions the dominance of Imperial patriotism.[16] Drawing on a range of printed sources from across the Reich, he suggests that in this period a thriving public sphere established the Empire as a fatherland or *patria* every bit as worthy of reverence as the classical republics.[17] In contrast, another school of thought –

[15] For the core theoretical texts of the debate, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1983); Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); for applications in the German context, see Heinz Schilling, 'Nation und Konfession in der frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte Europas: zu den konfessionsgeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen der frühmodernen Staatsbildung' in *Nation und Literatur im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Klaus Gaber (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1989), pp. 87-107; Horst Möller, *Fürstenstaat oder Bürgernation: Deutschland 1763-1815* (Berlin: Siedler 1989), pp. 46-51; *Nationalismus vor dem Nationalismus?* ed. by Eckhart Hellmuth and Reinhard Stauber (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998); Wolfgang Hardtwig, 'Von Elitebewußtsein zur Massenbewegung: Frühformen des Nationalismus in Deutschland 1500-1840' in *Nationalismus und Bürgerkultur in Deutschland, 1500-1914: ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1994), pp. 34-54.

[16] Georg Schmidt, 'Teutsche Kriege', pp. 33-61; Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich 1555-1648* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

[17] Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt*, pp. 4-5.

most forcefully advocated by Robert von Friedeburg – argues that when Imperial subjects spoke of their fatherland, they overwhelmingly identified it with smaller political units. In his view, the fatherland was primarily a product of power struggles between princely governments and subordinate local Estates, who characterised their principality as a *patria* in order to bolster its status or justify resistance in its name.[18] The most recent study of fatherland rhetoric featuring the early modern Rhineland also follows this line, with Christel Romein using the example of mid-seventeenth-century Jülich to suggest that patriotism was firmly centred around opposition to tyranny in small principalities.[19]

The clash of theories concerning the early modern fatherland's location has been exacerbated by disputes over the evidential base, with each camp accusing the other of selective use of sources. Advocates of the 'small fatherland' model argue that the Schmidts have neglected local perspectives by drawing only from publications marketed at the whole Reich, whilst Alexander Schmidt suggests that Friedeburg's conclusions are skewed by his reliance on documents with a purely provincial audience.[20] Generalising from the output of a single layer of the Imperial hierarchy certainly risks propagating partial views (Romein in particular adopts the perspective of the Estates she writes about, to the point of castigating the dukes of Jülich for failing to "listen to the patriots who had the best interest of the fatherland at heart", and accepting the nobility's rhetoric as something they "ardently believed in and consistently

[18] Robert von Friedeburg, ''Lands' and 'Fatherlands': Changes in the Plurality of Allegiances in the Sixteenth-Century Holy Roman Empire' in *Networks, Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries 1300-1650*, ed. by Robert Stein and Judith Pollmann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 263-82 (pp. 278-81); see also Dieter Mertens, 'Nation als Teilhabeverheißung: Reformation und Bauernkrieg' in *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandskonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. by Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 115-34 (pp. 17-18).

[19] Christel Annemieke Romein, *Protecting the Fatherland: Lawsuits and Political Debates in Jülich, Hesse-Cassel and Brittany 1642-1655* (Cham: Springer, 2021), pp. 2-4, 13, 192.

[20] Robert von Friedeburg, 'Rezension zu Schmidt, Alexander, Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich (1555-1648)', Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 36:2 (2009), 342-44 (p. 344); Axel Gotthard, 'Vormoderne Lebensräume: Annäherungsversuch an die heimaten des frühneuzeitlichen mitteleuropäers', Historische Zeitschrift, 276:1 (2003), 37-73 (p. 49 n. 3); Romein, *Protecting the Fatherland*, pp. 32-33; Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt*, p. 7.

applied"), but there is a third way.[21] This thesis aims to break out of the trap by using sources with both local-territorial and Empire-wide contexts, and – crucially – supplementing them with records from the Imperial Circles, which formed the intermediate stratum of the Reich's political order.

Considering the regional perspective of the Circles is especially valuable, given that even historians who emphasise the balanced coexistence of Imperial and territorial patriotisms have often espoused a kind of simplified dualism, in which the Empire is defined by the polarised vertical relationship between princes and Kaiser.[22] By examining the *Kreise*, in which participants collaborated as nominal equals rather than as lords and vassals, we can gain insight into the lateral ties which also bound the Empire together. It is also notable that both main camps contesting the scope of fatherlands within the Empire have positioned themselves within the history of political thought, drawing on the Cambridge School methodologies of Pocock and Skinner to interrogate humanist conceptions of monarchy and republicanism.[23] The Circle archives provides a useful complement to such perspectives, because their records focus firmly on action rather than theory. Their content is often formulaic and bureaucratic, and does not make explicit the intellectual reasoning behind their categorisations, but it is all the more important to tease out the assumptions underpinning their approach to identification and belonging. This process can aid our understanding of how discourses of identity impacted the day-to-day practice of Imperial politics, particularly when

[21] Romein, *Protecting the Fatherland*, p. 67.
[22] Michael Stolleis, 'Public Law and Patriotism in the Holy Roman Empire' in *Infinite Boundaries: Order, Disorder, and Reorder in Early Modern German Culture*, ed. by Max Reinhart (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1998), pp. 11-34 (pp. 12-14); Martin Wrede, *Das Reich und seine Feinde: Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischen westfälischem Frieden und Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2004), p. 4; Burckhardt, 'Konfessionsbildung', p. 185.
[23] Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt*, p. 11; Robert von Friedeburg, ''Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriot*ismus*: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert' in *'Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Robert von Friedeburg (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), pp. 7-54 (pp. 21-34).

applied to a single concrete issue: security policy formulated to address the problem of foreign soldiers in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia.

iii) Warfare and Soldiering in the Augsburg Peace Era

As the foregoing has suggested, this thesis follows a balanced methodology which seeks to combine the strengths of political and cultural history; that is, it supplements institutional approaches to the Empire's workings with scrutiny of language and rhetoric, whilst also using non-literary sources and applied examples to anchor discourse analysis in practical reality. Putting soldiering at the centre of this project is helpful for several reasons. Soldiers formed a distinctive social group within early modern society, enabling a bounded study which does not get lost in sweeping generalisations. Highly mobile and multinational, the challenge they posed to Imperial systems of categorisation and control allows us to witness those systems tested to their limit. Furthermore, there are some significant gaps in current coverage of the Empire's military history which this project can help address.

Fritz Redlich must be credited with first carving out a significant area within Germany's military historiography – hitherto dominated by Prussia and the World Wars – for the study of early modernity.[24] In subsequent decades, there has been a boom in scholarship on the era's conflicts, but the strongest emphasis remains on the golden age of Landsknecht warfare in the early sixteenth century and on the Thirty Years' War.[25] The years in between these periods have been given less attention, and interpretations remain heavily influenced by the historiography of the Military Revolution, which regards the era's defining development as

[24] Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964-65).

[25] Key overviews of soldiering life in the period include Hans-Michael Möller, *Das Regiment der Landsknechte: Untersuchungen zu Verfassung, Recht un Selbstverständnis in deutschen Söldnerheeren des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner 1976); Reinhard Baumann, *Landsknechte: ihre Geschichte und Kultur vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994); Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994).

the classically inspired breakthrough in drill technique pioneered by the Orange-Nassau dynasty in the Netherlands.[26] This change has in turn been linked to a wider transformation of European warfare, with Landsknechts and other free companies of fighters losing their autonomy and becoming integrated into state power structures.[27] However, the importance of this trend has been challenged by revived scholarly interest in mercenaries, which has cast doubt on the ability of early modern governments to meaningfully control or find alternatives to military contractors.[28] In order to assess whether a major shift truly took place, this thesis will look at examples drawn from the Orange-Nassau family's own backyard in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, situating changes to professional soldiering within the context of a wider ecology of militia reform projects, civic watches, and other security measures.

Moreover, if historians are to provide comprehensive account of the relationship between soldiers and political authorities, this requires a firmer grasp on the terminology which the latter used to classify the former. There is no shortage of historiography looking at culture and identity among Landsknechts, but it has primarily concentrated on topics such as gender, depictions in art, and experiences of violence.[29] Meanwhile, Peter Wilson has noted the lack

[26] Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy', *Journal of Military History*, 71:2 (2007), 331-72; in a sense, this represents the continued dominance of an even earlier school of thought, as Hans Delbrück was already hailing the world-historical importance of this breakthrough in the early twentieth century. See Hans Delbrück, *History of the art of war within the framework of political history*, trans. by Walter Renfroe, 4 vols (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975-85), IV (1985), pp. 155-73.

[27] Erik Swart, 'From "Landsknecht" to "Soldier": The Low German Foot Soldiers of the Low Countries in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century', *International Review of Social History*, 51 (2006), 75-92.

[28] David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Sikora, ''Söldner – historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus'', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 29:2 (2003), 210-38; Séan Erwin, 'A War of One's Own: Mercenaries and the Theme of Arma Aliena in Machiavelli's Il Principe', *British Journal for the History of Philosophyi,* 18:4 (2010), 541-74.

[29] Matthias Rogg, '"Wol auff mit mir, du schoenes weyb": Anmerkungen zur Konstruktion von Männlichkeit im Soldatenbild des 16. Jahrhunderts', in *Landsknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger: Militär, Krieg und Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel*, ed. by Karen Hagemann and Ralf Pröve (New York: Campus, 1998), pp. 51-73; Matthias Rogg, *Landsknechte und Reisläufer: Bilder vom Soldaten: ein Stand in der Kunst des 16 Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002); Katherine Bond, 'Mapping Culture in the Habsburg Empire: Fashioning a Costume Book in the Court of Charles V', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 71:2 (Summer 2018), 530-79.

of scholarship using the techniques of New Military History to interrogate soldiers' identity in terms of territorial allegiances.[30] Stefan Xenakis has attempted to trace the backgrounds of soldiers fighting in Franconia during the earlier sixteenth century, and Peter Burschel has done similar work for Lower Saxony, but their assessments could be usefully supplemented by work drawn from the important military theatre of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia during the era of the Augsburg Peace.[31]

iv) Chronology

Before outlining the structure of the argument in detail, a key point should be noted; the main body of the thesis will not take the form of a chronological narrative but will work its way through different levels of the Imperial constitution, picking out specific relevant themes as it goes. Therefore, I will first give an overview of the period's main military events in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, which will provide the essential background context for everything that follows.

The period covered by this project encompasses the reigns of Holy Roman Emperors Rudolf II and Matthias, beginning in 1576 and ending in 1618. This scope has been chosen for reasons suggested above; despite theories that the third quarter of the sixteenth century marked the point at which the Empire's peacekeeping mechanisms started to disintegrate, detailed coverage of the period is still fairly sparse compared to that of the preceding and subsequent decades. During these years, the chief – though by no means only – source of military threats to Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was the ongoing Eighty Years' War between the kings of Spain and rebels in the Netherlands. This broke out in the late 1560s as a

[30] Peter Wilson, 'Imperial Defence Integration Through Military Co-operation?' in *Die deutsche Nation im frühneuzeitlichen Europa: Politische Ordnung und kulturelle Identität?* ed. by Georg Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2010), pp. 15-34 (p. 25).
[31] Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland*, p. 145-65; Stefan Xenakis, *Gewalt und Gemeinschaft: Kriegsknechte um 1500* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), pp. 48-53.

consequence of Philip II's attempts to crack down on Calvinist iconoclasts and restive local nobility, but soon drew in wider networks of pro- and anti-Spanish forces from across Western Europe.[32] Initially, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's main role had been as an exporter of violence westwards, with leading rebel William 'the Silent' of Orange using the Circle territory of Nassau-Dillenburg as a springboard for his failed invasion of the Low Countries in 1568.[33] By the point at which our analysis begins, however, the overspill of the conflict was also leading to frequent military incursions in the other direction.

A leading point of concern in the late 1570s was Maastricht (a city traditionally ruled as a condominium by the prince-bishop of Liège and the duke of Brabant) where conflict between citizens and rival German and Spanish factions within Philip's garrison culminated in unpaid mercenaries pillaging the town in October 1576.[34] Although only tenuously connected to the *Kreis*, Maastricht's misfortunes threatened the traditional neutrality of the surrounding Liègois lands, notably when the city was once again besieged and sacked by Spanish forces in 1579, prompting rebel troops to occupy parts of the nearby countryside in July 1580.[35] These developments caused Prince-Bishop Gerard to make repeated appeals to the Circle, and to warn that he was unable to pay his dues. Meanwhile, various leading figures in the Holy Roman Empire stirred the pot with their attempts to intervene politically in the conflict. In 1577 a group of Dutch Estates had offered the governorship of the Netherlands to

[32] For more detailed overviews of the Eighty Years' War, see Graham Darby, 'Narrative of Events' in *The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt*, ed. by Graham Darby (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 8-28; Anton van der Lem, *Revolt in the Netherlands: The Eighty Years War 1568-1648*, trans. by Andy Brown (London: Reaktion Books, 2018).
[33] Volker Press, 'Wilhelm von Oranien, die deutschen Reichsstände und der niederländische Aufstand', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 99 (1984), 677-707 (pp. 685-86).
[34] Beatriz Santiago Belmonte, 'The year of the Furies: military correspondence around the Sack of Antwerp (1576)' in *Early Modern War Narratives and the Revolt in the Low Countries*, ed. by Raymond Fagel, Leonor Álvarez Francés, and Beatriz Santiago Belmonte (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), pp. 56-73 (pp. 65-70).
[35] William Stanley Macbean, 'Neutrality and Neutralisation in the Sixteenth Century – Liège', *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, 2.1 (1920), 98-103 (p. 103).

Archduke Matthias, Emperor Rudolf's younger brother; he accepted this position against the will of Philip, but struggled to exert authority over the fractious rebel coalition. The Austrian Habsburgs' mediation efforts led to a series of peace talks held in the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian city of Cologne, where Imperial negotiators suggested a compromise in which Protestantism was to be permitted in Holland, Zeeland, and Bommel only. The rebels made further demands which were not accepted, causing this *Kölner Pazifikationstag* to break up without agreement in December 1579.[36]

In the early 1580s, the Eighty Years' War threatened to become even more international, as the rebel provinces took the decision to abjure Philip altogether and seek a replacement abroad. Their initial hope was placed in Francis, Duke of Anjou and Alençon, who replaced Matthias as the figurehead of the rebel cause. The involvement of a French prince and his troops in the Dutch conflict alarmed many Lower-Rhine-Westphalians, provoking fears of a Valois plot to conquer the western Reich. Nonetheless, before any such threat could be realised, Alençon's regime fell apart following a failed bid to take Antwerp in January 1583. A greater military danger was posed by Philip's choice as governor-general, Prince Alexander Farnese of Parma, who commanded the forces loyal to Spain (known as the Army of Flanders) with considerable skill. Under his generalship, Groningen was conquered in 1580, bringing the war close to the north-western frontiers of the Circle and prompting the Dutch to blockade the East Frisian port of Emden in response.[37] Parma's men were also active around the city-state of Aachen, where in 1581 Protestants had controversially gained ascendancy in the town council.[38] In March 1582 the Aacheners forcibly expelled some of his

[36] Thomas Becker, 'Der Kölner Pazifikationskongress von 1579 und die Geburt der Niederlande' in *Frühneuzeitliche Friedensstiftung in landesgeschichtlicher Perspektive*, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider (Vienna: Böhlau, 2020), pp. 99-118.

[37] Andrew Pettegree, *Emden and the Dutch Revolt: Exile and the Development of Reformed Protestantism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 218-19.

[38] For the background narrative of the long running 'Aachener troubles' between adherents of rival confessions in the city, see Walter Schmitz, *Verfassung und Bekenntnis: Die Aachener Wirren im Spiegel der kaiserlichen*

troops from the nearby manor of Kalkofen, but they would continue to fear Spanish military interventions in their affairs for decades to come.[39]

The next major crisis did not emanate from the west, but from the very heart of the Rhineland itself. The Electorate of Cologne was not part of the Circle (along with Mainz, Trier, and the Palatinate, it formed its own Electoral Rhenish *Kreis*), but its scattered collection of dominions was embedded within, and largely enveloped by, Lower-Rhine-Westphalian lands. Thus, when a civil war erupted within the Electorate in 1583, its neighbours were inevitably hit hard.[40] The cause of the conflict was the decision of Gebhard Truchsess, who had been Cologne's archbishop and elector-prince since 1577, to marry his lover and convert to Calvinism. The Peace of Augsburg withheld the 'right of Reformation' from rulers of ecclesiastical territories, who were supposed to step down from their worldly and spiritual offices if they became apostates, but this *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum* was contested by some Protestants.[41] Gebhard thus refused to abdicate and instead tried to establish a form of bi-confessional tolerance within his fief, prompting the Catholic-dominated cathedral chapter to revolt and acclaim the Wittelsbach Ernest of Bavaria as a rival Elector.[42] Ernest had already been appointed bishop of Liège, and in 1585 was to obtain the see of Münster also, further enmeshing Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in the ensuing civil conflict.

Politik 1550-1616 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983); Thomas Kirchner, 'Katholiken, Lutheraner und Reformierte in Aachen 1555-1618' (unpublished doctoral thesis, RWTH Aachen, 2013).

[39] Max Lossen, *Der Kölnische Krieg*, 2 vols (Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 1882-97), II (1897), p. 14.

[40] Thomas Becker, 'Der Alltag des Krieges: Das Rheinland im Kölner Krieg' in *Krieg und Kriegserfahrung im Westen des Reiches 1568-1714*, ed. by Andreas Rutz (Göttingen: V&R, 2016), pp. 121-39.

[41] Reichstag Communique issued at Augsburg, 25 September 1555, *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg*, ed. by Rosemarie Aulinger, Erwein Eltz, and Ursula Machoczek (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2009), pp. 3109-10.

[42] Harm Klueting, 'Freistellung der Religion: Zwischen Reservatum Ecclesiasticum und Religionsfreiheit – Gebhard Truchseß von Waldburg (1547 – 1601) in anderer Sicht' in *Standfester Glaube: Festschrift für JFG Goeters, ed. by Heiner Faulenbach* (Cologne: Rheinland-Verlag, 1991), pp. 95-128.

The first and most intense phase of the Cologne War lasted between June 1583 and April 1584, and centred on a siege of the main Electoral residence at Bonn by pro-Bavarian troops. Gebhard's Calvinist allies raised an army in the Palatinate and attempted to relieve the town, only to withdraw without success in December 1583; both their advance and their withdrawal took them through the south-eastern portions of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, occasioning confrontations with peasant militias in Berg and Nassau-Dillenburg.[43] Further fighting had taken place just across the river from the city-state of Cologne, which attempted to negotiate with both sides as they strove for possession of the monastery at Deutz. Following the fall of Gebhard's fortresses at Godesberg and Poppelsdorf, Bonn's garrison mutinied and yielded to Ernest of Bavaria on 29 January 1584.[44] The latter's forces then marched on Gebhard's last remaining significant powerbase, the duchy of Westphalia, which was swiftly overrun.[45]

By this point, Gebhard had been forced into exile in the Netherlands, and it seemed as if the contest was over. However, fighting broke out again at several points in the following years as the conflict increasingly blurred into the ongoing Eighty Years' War, and at every juncture Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was caught in the crossfire. On 10 May 1585, the rebel stadtholder

[43] *Außschreiben Vnser Johann Casimirs Pfaltzgraffen bey Rhein Hertzogen in Beyern etc. Darinnen die vrsachen außgeführet werden warumb wir vns inn jetzige Kriegß Expedition zu rettung deß wider den Land vnd Religionfriden betrangten Hochwürdigen Fürsten vnd Herrn Herrn Gebharten Erwhelten vnnd Bestettigten Ertzbischoffs zu Cöllen deß heiligen Römischen Reichs durch Italien ErtzCantzlers vnd Churfürsten, Hertzogen zu Westphalen vnd Enger etc. Auch handhabung schutz vnd schirm vnserer waren Christlichen Religion Augspurgischer Confession vnd Teutscher Nation Freyheit wider deß Papsts zu Rom einbrechende Tyranney nottranglich vnd durch ordenliche Vocation begeben* (n.p.: n. pub., 1583); *Bonnische Newe Zeitung / darinn klar vnd eigentlich beschrieben / alle Handlnng / was sich hat zugetragen zwischen den zweyen Bischoffen zu Cöln / etc. Sampt erklerung der Belegerung vnd eroberung des Schlos Godissbergs / vnd des Verretherlichen vnd trewlosen vnnöhtigen auffgebens der Stadt Bonn* (Nicholas Heinrich: Oberursel, 1584).

[44] Potthoff, Tanja, ''... ein solches Nest, deme man wider alles verhoffen weder mit groben noch klainen geschütz nichts abgewynnen khann': die Belagerung der Burg Godesberg im Jahre 1583' in *'...Wurfen hin in Steine / Grôze und niht Kleine ...': Belagerungen und Belagerungsanlagen im Mittelalter*, ed. by Olaf Wagener and Heiko Laß (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 189-203; *Kurtze relation, was massen die Meuterey vnnd Vnerhörte Verrhäterey schändtlich Vbergebung der Statt Bonn und lieferung des Herren Obersten Herrn Carlen des Heyligen Römischen Reichs Erbtruckses Freyherrn zu Walpurg Herrn zur Scheer und Trauchperg etc. auch andern Befelchshabern sich zugetragen* (Cologne: John Knuver, 1584)

[45] Gerhard Kleinsorgen, *Tagebuch der Truchsessischen Wirren im Herzogtum Westfalen 1583/84*, ed. by Alfred Bruns (Brilon: Podszun, 1987), pp. 246-51.

Adolf of Neuenahr-Moers seized the Electoral town of Neuss by *coup de main*, and in Gebhard's name garrisoned it with Dutch, English, and German troops.[46] It soon became a base from which to harass Rhine traffic and strike at Catholic targets, and the battle of raid and counter-raid escalated in the coming months. In Spring 1586, Protestant freebooters marched across Berg and Mark (pursued by the Army of Flanders) whilst on an expedition to plunder the duchy of Westphalia, and on 3 July a trade convoy travelling to Cologne from the duchy of Jülich was massacred by pro-Bavarian troops at Junkersdorf.[47] Eventually, Ernest called in aid from Parma, whose forces stormed Neuss and left it in ruins on 25 July, before continuing down the Rhine to occupy Adolf's county of Moers and besiege the Rheinberg fortress, Gebhard's last toehold in the Electorate.[48]

Nonetheless, this was not sufficient to end the threat of violence, and some Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates began to take their own aggressive countermeasures; in August 1587 the burghers of Cologne arrested Ernest's Antwerp-born military commissar, Hieronymus Michiels, and had him tried and beheaded for complicity in marauding. Nor was Parma's victory at Neuss sufficient to quash the Truchsessians once and for all. In December of that same year, the mercenary commander Martin Schenk recaptured Bonn for Gebhard in another surprise attack, prompting a second siege and further depredations in the surrounding

[46] Helmut Gilliam, *Die Bedeutung der Kölner Krieges für die Stadt Neuss* (Neuss: Schriftenreihe des Stadtarchivs Neuss, 1968).

[47] *Viererley warhafftige Zeitung so sich in diesem 1586. jar zugetragen hat. Die erste von der Stadt Graff an der maß in Brabandt wie sie belegert und sich den zweyden sturm ergeben und waß weiters darauff erfolget. Von der gar festen stad Venlo in Gellerland wie die selbige sich auch ergeben alles kuertzlich beschriben. Die dritte von der Unchristlichen unerhoerten erschrecklichen und tirannischen moerderey so geschehen ist zu Junckersdorff bey Coelln uber die Guelchische connoy oder geleydt. Die vierdte Zeitung. Von der Belaegerung eroeberung pluenderung und grosser blutuergiessung so sich in der stad Neuß zugetragen im Ertzstifft Coelln* (Cologne: Nicholas Schreiber, 1586).

[48] *Gründlicher und warhafftiger bericht wie die löbliche Statt Neuß im Erzstifft Cöln von den Hertzogen in Bayern, Bischofen zu Lüttich etc. und seinem spanischem anhang sey belegert worden, und was sich innerhalb der Belägerung vornehmlich hat zugetragen, allen frommen zum besten geschrieben durch einen, der selber mit and dabey gewesen und zugesehen* (Arnem: William Gansen, 1586); *Gründtliche Und Warhafftige newe Zeytung Von der Belagerung und erschröcklichen Blutuergiessung so zu Neuß geschehen ist unnd wie dieselbige Statt eingenommen geblündert unnd verbrand worden auch was sich ferner darbey hat zu getragen geschehn den sechs unnd zwezigisten Tag des Monats July Im Jar 1586* (Augsburg: Josias Wöhrli, 1586).

area.[49] The Army of Flanders marched through the duchy of Jülich in order to aid Ernest once more, looting as it went, and foraging besiegers engaged in clashes with locals at Solingen and elsewhere.[50] Only after Bonn yielded again in September 1588 and Rheinberg finally capitulated in February 1590 was the battle for the Electorate decisively resolved in Ernest's favour.

The conclusion of the Cologne War removed an important source of instability from the Rhineland, but this and other areas of the Circle continued to face sporadic threats in the early 1590s. Reports emerged of mutineers, bandits, and long-range raiders taking prisoners for ransom, even in relatively sheltered Westphalian territories such as Lippe, Osnabrück, and Paderborn, and more distant conflicts also exerted an influence on troop movements.[51] The *Kreis* lay between key Protestant recruiting grounds in north-east Germany and the battlefields of the French Wars of Religion, and in July 1591 Christian of Anhalt passed through with an army destined to aid Henry IV.[52] Meanwhile, the renewed threat of the Ottomans on the Empire's south-east border increased Rudolf II's demands for troops, and the Circle itself mustered contingents who would march through Lower-Rhine-Westphalia en route to Hungary in the early phases of the Long Turkish War. The Circle's challenges were further exacerbated by generational change; in 1592 death removed its *Kreisoberst* and

[49] Felix Hauptmann, *Die Ueberrumpelung Bonns am 22 December 1587* (Bonn: Hauptmann, 1888); *Warhafftige Zeitung von der belägerung und einnemung der statt Bonn sampt der schanntzen. Welcherley gestalt die Spannischen sy ein bekommen haben den XXV. September anno 1588. und was sich dar vor verlauffen unnd zu getragen hat seindt der Belegerung mit scharmützelen schlagen und andern sachen* (Cologne: Nicholas Schreiber, 1588).
[50] Peter Krause, *Belagert, Erobert, Geplundert: Siegburger Kriegszeiten von 1583 bis 1714* (Siegburg: Franz Schmitt, 1998), p. 30; Friedrich Küch, 'Die Lande Jülich und Berg während der Belagerung von Bonn 1588' in *Zeitschrift des Bergischen Geschichtsvereins*, 30 (1894), 213-52.
[51] Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlände*, p. 109; Lutz Hatzfeld, 'Wehrpolitik und Heeresreform: Zur Kriegsführung der Nassau-Oranier im 16. Jahrhundert', *Nassauische Annalen*, 67 (1956), 119-43 (p. 138).
[52] Michael of Aitzing, *Nova Novem Mensium Historica Relatio. Das ist / Ein Newe Historische Beschreybung der Gedenckwurdigen Händel vnnd Geschichten / so sich von Eingang dieses Jahrs in Franckreich / Engellandt / auch Nider vnnd Hochteutschlandt / Dergleichen In Hungern / Behemb / Polln / Turcken / vnd an andern orten Europae / die negsten IX. Monat zugetragen vnnd verlauffen / biß auff den 21. tag dieses ablauffenden monats Septembris 1591* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1591), pp. 6-7.

leading political figure, William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg.[53] His son John William was mentally ill and incapable of strong leadership, and it took some time to settle on Count Simon VI of Lippe (a learned and diplomatic figure who had the Kaiser's confidence, although he lacked a sizeable territorial base of his own) as a replacement Circle Colonel.[54]

Above all, it was renewed escalation from the belligerents in the Netherlands that generated new danger for the *Kreis*. The Dutch rebels (now known as the United Provinces of the Netherlands) had taken advantage of Philip II's distractions in England and France to stabilise their new republican political system and embark on a process of military reorganisation, and during the 1590s they went on the attack. The brunt of this offensive took place within the Low Countries, but as its fortunes improved the republic also had greater latitude to secure its eastern flank by intervening in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. In March 1595 the inhabitants of East Frisia's principal town rose up against Count Edzard II in the 'Emden Revolution', and subsequently the Dutch were able to install their own garrison there in exchange for protecting the burghers against their (increasingly nominal) feudal overlord.[55] Then in 1597 the republic moved against the Rhineland strongholds retained by Spain after the Cologne War, with Dutch forces marching upriver to take Rheinberg and Moers.[56] The Spanish counterstroke was not long in coming, and it proved highly destructive.

[53] For overviews of William V's life, see Günter Bers, *Wilhelm Herzog von Kleve-Jülich-Berg 1516-1592* (Cologne: Jülicher Geschichtsverein, 1970); Erwin Fuchs, *Wilhelm V: Glück und Unglück des Herzogtums Jülich-Kleve-Berg* (Jülich: Verlag des Jülicher Geschichtsvereins, 1993).
[54] For John William's illness, see Erik Midelfort, *Mad Princes of Renaissance Germany* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), p. 102 ff; for Simon VI's prior service as an Imperial envoy, see Simon VI of Lippe, 'Des Grafen Simon VI. zur Lippe Tagebuch über eine Gesandtschaftsreise zu dem Herzog von Parma und nach den Niederlanden 1591-2' ed., by Ludwig Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Lippische Mitteilungen aus Geschichte und Landeskunde*, 4 (1906), 44-82.
[55] Pettegree, *Emden and the Dutch Revolt*, pp. 222-23.
[56] Jonathan Israel, 'Garrisons and Empire: Spain's Strongholds in North-West Germany 1589-1659' in *Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries, and the Struggle for World Supremacy 1585–1713*, ed. by Jonathan Israel (London: Hambleton 2003), pp. 23-44 (pp. 29-30).

In the autumn of 1598, a sizeable detachment of the Army of Flanders under Admiral Mendoza moved into Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in order to strike back at the Dutch. Not content with retaking Rheinberg once more, they also overran a succession of German towns including Orsoy, Rees, Alpen, Broich, Gennep, Kalkar, and Emmerich. Near the last of these, the invaders murdered a prominent member of Berg's Protestant nobility – Wirich VI of Daun-Falkenstein – and massacred several of his servants, sparking local anger which only grew as weeks went by and the Spanish forces did not depart.[57] Finding his route of advance blocked and desiring to spare the exhausted territories of the Spanish Netherlands from further burdens, Mendoza had chosen to grant his unruly troops winter quarters in the occupied Rhineland rather than withdraw back west. The 'Spanish Winter' of 1598-99 saw the invaders fan out across much of the region in order to extort supplies, causing severe disruption for local inhabitants.[58] Some towns were targeted because of their pro-Dutch Protestant leanings (such as Wesel in the duchy of Cleves, which in December was compelled to pay heavy contributions to the Spanish and accept a Catholic restoration), but several ecclesiastical territories (such as Münster and the abbeys of Essen and Werden) were also hit hard.

In response to the persistent presence of the Army of Flanders, the Empire began deploying retaliatory measures. The Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreis* began negotiations with its Upper Rhenish and Electoral Rhenish counterparts, with the object of marshalling an army to expel their unwelcome guests by force. Meanwhile, Kaiser Rudolf II lodged diplomatic protests and

[57] Jacob Friedlieb, *Historicae Relationis Continvuatio. Das ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung / was sich seithero verschiener Herbstmeß abgelauffenen 1598 Jahrs biß in jetzigen Monat Aprilen angangenen 1599. jahrs in der Christenheit / als Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / Vngern / Schweden / furnemblich aber in den respectiue Fürstenthumben vnd Stifftern / Cleeff / Münster / Cölln / vnd darumbhero denckwurdiges so woll in Kriegs als andern sachen zugetragen* (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1599), p. 13.
[58] Historiography on the Spanish Winter is very scanty, particularly in English. For brief overviews, see Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlande*, pp. 124-28; Peter Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War*, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 146-7.

placed the occupying troops under Imperial ban, although this achieved little immediate result and Archduke Albert (to whom Spain had delegated sovereignty over the Netherlands, alongside his wife Infanta Isabella) simply declared himself unable to control the marauding soldiery. The Circles pressed ahead with their mobilisation plans, recruiting Lower Saxony and Swabia into a five-*Kreis* alliance that in March 1599 resolved to fund a force of over 20,000 men. This army duly began mustering in the vicinity of Essen in July, and was subsequently successful in forcing the Spanish to withdraw from Emmerich and Orsoy. However, its punitive campaign ground to a halt outside the town of Rees, where the Army of Flanders had installed a mixed garrison of Spanish, Irish, and Walloon units. The forces of the *Kreise* placed it under siege, but struggled to maintain their discipline and supply lines, and on 7 September mutinies among large sections of the besieging army brought the campaign to an untimely end. The fighting did at least exert some kind of deterrent effect, and the Army of Flanders refrained from deploying sizeable forces in the region for several years afterwards. Nonetheless, the attempt to drive out Mendoza's men had fallen short of its aims, and the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle was not able to replicate the scale of this mobilisation again before the Thirty Years' War.

Hitherto, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia had been heavily affected by the overspill of conflicts in the neighbouring Burgundian and Electoral Rhenish Circles, but had not been the belligerents' principal target. That changed as the first decade of the seventeenth century wore on and competition intensified between rival claimants to the succession in Jülich-Cleves-Berg.[59] By this point, it was clear that the duchies' ailing ruler – John William – was incapable of producing an heir, but it was not clear who should inherit his sprawling

[59] For a brief English-language overview of the Jülich-Cleves-Berg succession dispute, see Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire,* 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I, p. 424-27; for longer narratives, see Anderson, *Verge of War*; Heinz Ollman-Kösling, *Der Erbfolgestreit um Jülich-Kleve: ein Vorspiel zum Dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Regensburg: S. Roderer, 1996).

territorial possessions. His La Marck family had been granted the right to hand down its holdings as a single bloc and in the female line if necessary, but the precise terms for doing so were contested by the various dynasties into which his sisters had married; the Hohenzollern Elector of Brandenburg argued that the descendants of the eldest female heir should inherit, whereas the counts palatine of Neuburg made the case that it should be the eldest male among the distaff lines. Despite their rivalry, when John William died these two principal claimants were persuaded to forego armed conflict and agree terms for a joint occupation of the duchies (pending a final resolution of their dispute) in the Treaty of Dortmund on 10 June 1609. The prospects for a peaceful solution initially looked fair, as the Spanish and Dutch had just agreed a Twelve Years' Truce and were reluctant to jeopardise the peace by interfering. However, opposition arose from an unexpected quarter; the Emperor's cousin Leopold, bishop of Passau and Strasbourg, persuaded Rudolf to condemn the treaty and proclaim him administrator of the duchies instead. Leopold duly arrived in the fortified town of Jülich and prepared to resist the two 'Possessing Princes' of Brandenburg and Neuburg.

A standoff now ensued, but it was the princes who had the will and the support to prosecute the affair to a successful conclusion. Drawing on allies from England, the United Provinces, France, and the recently formed Protestant Union, they assembled a sizeable army in order to besiege Jülich. In contrast, neither Spain nor the Bavarian-dominated Catholic League were willing to start a war to save Leopold, and Rudolf's own position remained weak following the seizure of Habsburg hereditary lands by his ambitious younger sibling Matthias during the 'Brothers' Quarrel'.[60] Bourbon monarch Henry IV's assassination on the eve of the

[60] For the ultimate inability of either the League or the Union to sustain a climate of confessional militancy, see *Union und Liga 1608/09: konfessionelle Bündnisse im Reich, Weichenstellung zum Religionskrieg?* ed. by Albrecht Ernst and Anton Schindling (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2010).

campaign further eased the possibilities of a wider international conflict. The allied forces converged on Jülich from multiple directions (an Anglo-Dutch army under Prince Maurice marched up the Rhine to meet Anhalt's Protestant German force outside the town in late July, before being further reinforced in August by a contingent that had marched north from France) and induced it to surrender on 1 September 1610.[61] Having decisively defeated Leopold, the coalition dispersed, leaving a small Dutch garrison in the citadel of Jülich.

The conflict appeared over, but as with the Cologne War, unresolved tensions had the tendency to break out into fresh violence. On this occasion, the problem was exacerbated by growing political and religious friction between the co-rulers of the United Duchies. At the time of the first intervention, both Possessing Princes had been Lutherans, but in 1613 John Sigismund of Brandenburg became Calvinist, while Wolfgang William of Neuburg converted to Catholicism and concluded a marriage alliance with the Bavarian Wittelsbachs. The pair were further divided by their strategy for dealing with local disputes; in 1612, the city-state of Cologne appealed to Matthias (who had just succeeded Rudolf as Holy Roman Emperor) to impede their projects for a fortified entrepot at Mülheim, prompting a disagreement over the correct response.[62]

In this climate of increasing mistrust, the Dutch decision to reinforce their garrison in Jülich in May 1614 was interpreted by Wolfgang William as an attack on his position, and he appealed to his new co-religionists for aid. Troops from the Army of Flanders under General

[61] *Warhafftige newe Zeitung / Darinn Kürtzlich angezeigt wird / welcher gestalt die gewaltige Vestung Gülich erobert worden. Sampt den Artickeln deß mit dem Gubernator / Befehlhaberen vnd Besatzung getroffenen Vertrags. Darbey auch gefügt ist ein kurtzer Außzug deß Vertrags / so zwischen beyden im Stifft Straßburg kriegenden theilen gemacht worden* (Cologne: Servatius Erffens, 1610); Guido von Büren, 'Die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen am Niederrhein infolge des Jülich-Klevischen Erbfolgestreites aus der Perspektive von Stadt und Festung Jülich' in *Der Jülich-Klevische Erbstreit 1609: Seine Voraussetzungen und Folgen,* ed. by Manfred Groten, Clemens von Looz-Corswarem, and Wilfried Reininghaus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2011), pp. 177-201.

[62] Anderson, *Verge of War*, p. 142.

Ambrosio Spinola duly moved into the United Duchies in August, marching via Aachen where they pressured the citizens to restore the dominance of the Catholic faction. This invasion force succeeded in securing the duchy of Jülich and the towns of Wesel and Xanten in Cleves, before its advance was stymied by local resistance at Rees and reinforcements moving from the United Provinces to head it off. A general clash between Spinola's men and the Dutch was avoided, and in November the two sides instead brokered the Treaty of Xanten. Whilst nominally only a provisional arrangement until the rightful claimant could finally be identified, this *de facto* partition deal allotted Jülich and Berg to Wolfgang William and gave Cleves, Mark, Ravensberg, and Ravenstein to the Hohenzollern Elector.[63] The peace terms also envisioned a withdrawal of the Spanish and Dutch garrisons, but mutual distrust and a desire to hang onto strategic footholds meant that this largely failed to materialise in the years to come. By 1618, therefore, the presence of troops from outside the Circle in significant parts of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia showed no sign of ending.

v) Structure of the Project

The remainder of the thesis will be divided into eight chapters grouped within three parts. Each part addresses a different level of the Holy Roman constitutional order, a format which will allow the reader to compare how key concepts manifested in different contexts and provide a cross-sectional analysis of the Empire's workings. Part I addresses the *Kreis* itself and its central administrative organs.

Chapter I consists of a detailed analysis of the language used to categorise soldiers in the correspondence, edicts, and records of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle. It explores the

[63] For the terms of the peace, see Henry Peacham, *A most true relation of the affaires of Cleve and Gulick as also of all what hath passed this last summer, since the most excellent and victorious prince, Maurice of Nassau, tooke the field with his armie, encamping before Rees in Cleueland: and the losse of Wesel, taken in by the Marques Spinola: vnto the breaking vp of our armie in the beginning of December last past. 1614. With the articles of the peace, propounded at Santen* (London: W. Stansby, 1615), pp. 17-19.

difficulties contemporaries faced in identifying and classifying military groups, and the range of options open to them when doing so. Particular attention will be paid to the label 'foreign' and its relationship with the concept of 'fatherland', which was not always antithetical; at times, the notion of a 'floating fatherland' unmoored from specific geography could produce surprising overlaps. By supplementing detailed readings of the sources with some quantitative information about how terminology varied with time and circumstances, the chapter will shed light on emerging trends across the period and contribute to larger debates about the effect of military reforms.

Having outlined the rhetorical framework within which foreign soldiers were discussed, the thesis will then cover the practicalities of how the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreis* categorised and organised its own troops during key incidents such as the Spanish Winter of 1598-99. This will be covered in Chapter II, which will question the traditional view that the Circle's cardinal flaw was its failure to raise sizeable forces. Instead, we will see that the nature of the security dilemma and the weakness of patriotic sentiment made the situation impossible to resolve with military force.

Given that the Circles were never intended to operate in isolation, it is important to consider inter- as well as intra-*Kreis* dynamics. Chapter III looks at Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's relationship with the Burgundian Circle and evolving beliefs about whether or not this neighbour constituted 'foreign' territory. It argues that the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates saw the frontier with the whole Burgundian Circle (not just the rebel Dutch provinces) as an important outer rampart of the Empire, and constructed a form of borderland identity in consequence. The scope of this borderland was shaped by geographical factors, most notably the Rhine, and did not cover the entirety of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. Nonetheless, it was important to ideas about security and belonging.

Part II of the thesis goes into greater detail at the level of Circle's individual Estates, allowing for more fine-grained analysis of specific topics in a local context. It consists of three separate case studies, each based on a single territory. The territories have been chosen to provide a representative mix of governmental systems (one city-state, one small county, and one large composite princedom) and confessional allegiances (one Catholic, one Protestant, and one mixed). The chapters in Part II are not narrative overviews of how the relevant polity interacted with foreign soldiers, but focus on a single facet of this interaction to illuminate issues of importance to the wider thesis.

Chapter IV covers the county of Nassau-Dillenburg and the role of xenophobia in its *Landesdefension* project. This project has long been held up as the model for proto-nationalist military reform, based on a rhetorical contrast drawn between the figures of the foreign mercenary and the patriotic militiaman. The chapter will show that although such rhetoric was indeed rife, the former made such an effective bogeyman primarily because of his professional status, and not because of his foreign origins. By going beyond the reformers' theoretical texts and looking at their policy in practice, it will also demonstrate that the counts of Nassau-Dillenburg exploited flexible definitions of the foreign to augment their defence forces with recruits from far and wide. Ultimately, they adapted their vision to incorporate a symbiotic (rather than merely confrontational) relationship between different martial archetypes.

Even in cases where local defence failed and territories ended up dominated by garrisons from abroad, attitudes were not always characterised by hostility. Chapter V covers the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg in the years following their succession crisis, and will address the specific issue of long-term military occupation. The efforts of the Estates to define and exclude foreign soldiers can be understood as part of a local struggle for office and

power, and consequently it is not surprising that they faded with time. If we look beyond modern dichotomies of resistance and collaboration, we can see that everyday relationships between occupied and occupier were not generally viewed within the framework of a foreign yoke.

Part II concludes by considering cases in which local attitudes to soldiers' foreignness occasionally went beyond tolerance and became active celebration. Chapter VI looks at the commentariat in the Free Imperial City of Cologne, who often undermined civic authorities' condemnations of military threats with their backing for explicitly foreign forces. Examination of private chronicles and the output of the nascent news industry (most notably the work of Michael of Aitzing) reveals that support for these troops was not merely an example of confessionalism trumping patriotism. Sometimes these men were celebrated precisely *because* they came from distant and different nations, not despite of it.

Having delved into local detail in order to highlight specific issues, in Part III the thesis starts to draw these threads together and build towards larger conclusions. This will be done by examining related concepts at the level of the Empire as a whole.

Chapter VII considers the relationship between the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreis* and wider familial and constitutional networks within the Reich. It will address the argument that a process of hostile dynastic takeovers crippled the Circle's efficacy by making its key members subservient to foreign rulers, and counterbalance this with instances of how such changes anchored the region deeper within the Imperial peacekeeping system. By looking at key summits in 1582 and 1586, it will demonstrate that there was no disastrous turning point in the Empire's development at this juncture.

Finally, Chapter VIII considers where the invasions of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia fit into pan-Imperial public discourse concerning nations at war. It will examine stereotypes about the martial attributes of different national groups, including in the writings of self-confessed foreign soldiers themselves. This will reinforce the point that the innate differences between peoples were of lesser importance than the divide between military and civilian society, leading many people to envision complementary rather than conflictual relationships between troops of different nations.

vi) Note on Terms

Given the importance of nuances in language to the central questions of this project, it is essential at the outset to provide some brief clarifying notes about my own approach to terminology and related matters. When it comes to proper names, many of the people and places discussed have multiple monikers in different linguistic traditions, and there is no wholly neutral method of choosing between them. Some scholars prefer to use the language of the modern state with which each individual or territory is most closely associated, but this method involves an element of subjective judgement and retrojection of later national boundaries that does not suit this project very well.[64] Therefore, I have preferred anglicised forms wherever possible (hence the first prince of Orange-Nassau is William rather than Wilhelm after his German origins, Guillaume after his French principality, or Willem after the Dutch state he helped found), or if none are available, whichever variant is the established standard in modern English (hence Liège rather than Luik or Lüttich). The names of post-1800 scholars cited as secondary sources have not been anglicised, however, and are given as

[64] Susan Broomhall and Jacqueline van Ghent, *Gender, Power and Identity in the Early Modern House of Orange-Nassau* (London/New York, Routledge 2016), p. xii.

they appear on their works. In the bibliography, all names appear as printed in the relevant work.

Where it is necessary to use technical terms or short passages of untranslated source material from other languages, I have indicated these using italics. Nonetheless, normal typography has been maintained for foreign loanwords that have become firmly incorporated into the English language; hence *Kreisoberst*, *Dienstherr*, and *patria*, but Kaiser, Reich, and Landsknecht. A few specific titles have been permanently capitalised to avoid confusion with their more common English meanings (e.g. Elector to mean *Kurfürst* rather than a generic voter, and Estates to mean *Stände* rather than landed property), but otherwise they have been rendered in lower case unless preceding an individual's name. All translations are my own unless indicated in the text.

Even dates cannot be given in a wholly impartial fashion, since the Gregorian Calendar was first proclaimed by the papacy in 1582, and its adoption was a matter of confessional controversy. Not all Rhineland territorial governments implemented it at once (for example, the last official day of the Julian calendar was 2 November 1583 in Jülich, 3 November 1583 in the Free Cities of Aachen and Cologne, and 1 July 1584 in the duchy of Westphalia, whilst some Protestant regimes did not embrace calendar reform until well after our period) and many individuals continued to use the 'old style' in their writings.[65] For clarity and consistency, I have attempted to standardise all dates in the main text by using the Gregorian system throughout. However, in order that references might be followed up accurately, dates

[65] For details, see Friedrich Ginzel, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie,* 3 vols (Leipzig: J.G. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1906-14), III (1914), pp. 266-79.

in footnote citations copy the usage in the original texts. During the period under discussion, the Gregorian calendar was ten days in advance of the Julian.

PART I:
THE CIRCLE



Figure 1: The Imperial Circles

Chapter I: The Terms of Kreis Debate

The Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle was many things, but in the first instance it was a forum for discussion and debate. Before any policies could be formulated or actions taken, the various member-Estates had to communicate with each other and set the terms of the issue at hand. Studies of the *Kreis* thus far have paid little attention to the language of these communications, which tend to follow certain formulaic patterns and lack the detailed metaphors or long-form reasoning of debates conducted in the printed sphere. Nonetheless, they formed a key component of the day-to-day administrative workings of the region, and these very formulae shed important light on the governing norms of its political culture. In particular, examining the terminology of the *Kreisarchiv*'s sources helps us to understand in depth how local actors approached the perpetual problem of how to relate to military groups whose identities were complex, controversial, and open to challenge. The following chapter will serve to introduce the key characteristics of discourse around these groups, beginning with an analysis of the available terms for identifying soldiers before narrowing its focus to the key categories of the 'foreigner' and his supposed antithesis, the 'fatherland'.

i) Identifying Troops: Terminology and Trends

Before discussing nuances in language used by *Kreis* sources to classify soldiers, it is important to acknowledge the practical obstacles their writers faced when making any kind of identification at all. News about troop movements was mediated through complex networks of cross-border correspondence, and political actors often had to base their assessments on second-, third-, and fourth-hand sources. One letter of 1591, for example, supplied the steward of Freudenberg with details of a nearby military force to be forwarded to his lord the count of Nassau-Dillenburg; in turn, the author (an official in the Imperial knightly territory of Crottorf) had heard the news from officials in the duchy of Berg, who had heard it from

Duke William 'the Rich' of Jülich-Cleves-Berg.[1] Given such chains of Chinese whispers, it is not unsurprising that uncertainty persisted over the true nature of the troops in question. "Although it is stated in the report, that they are French and English," the writer adds in a postscript, "there is nonetheless intelligence circulating that they are Spanish men."[2]

Such problems were compounded when troops had cause to deliberately obscure their own identities, as they frequently did when raiding or engaged in other activities of a covert or controversial nature. One contemporary commentator noted the propensity of Moers's Spanish garrison to carry out plundering expeditions disguised as their Dutch opponents at times when the latter were also marauding in the area.[3] In response, Lower-Rhine-Westphalian governments frequently issued edicts designed to eliminate deception and confusion. However, mechanisms for enforcement were often lacking, as in the case of a 1601 ordinance requiring soldiers to always use their real names when registering for billets in Jülich.[4] Other obstacles to clear identification included troops' frequent changes of allegiance (a certain Captain Langhaar achieved particular notoriety for his flexible loyalties, prompting one news pamphlet to accuse him of switching "so often from one side to the

[1] William Dreysbach to the Steward of Freudenberg, 24 January 1591, Detmold, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Ostwestfalen-Lippe [hereafter LAV NRW OWL], L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 22^{r}. Furthermore, William the Rich (by this point an elderly invalid) must have originally got this information from scouts or officials, and at the other end of the chain, the letter seems at some point to have been forwarded further to Lippe, in whose archive this copy now resides.

[2] William Dreysbach to the Steward of Freudenberg, 24 January 1591, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 22^{v}.

[3] William Riephan, *Kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschreibung gewisser Neuwen Zeittungen vnnd Geschichten / welche sich von vorgangner Ostermeß / biß auff ietzig Herbstmeß / dises ietztlauffent 96. Jars / In Osterreich / Vngaren / Böhem / Poln / Hispanien / Franckreich / Schweden / Dennmarck / Hoch vnd Niderteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wider begeben vnd zugetragen. Mit Anzeig der Engelländer Armada oder Fluth / wie dieselbe nach Hispanien zugesägelt / vnd was sie alda verricht. Item / Was der Hochwürdigst / Durchleuchtigst / Hochgeborner Fürst vnd Herr / Herr Albert / deß Römischen Stuel Cardinal / vnd Ertzhertzogen zu Osterreich / x. Kön Mayt. zu Hispanien verordneter Gubernator der Niderlanden / x. für Stätt vnd Flecken / in kurtzer zeit inbekommen Auffs kürtz beschriben* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1596), p. 40.

[4] 'Ordinance concerning in what manner the hired cavalry and foot soldiers are to behave towards the subjects, insofar as they must stay with them, regarding provisions in the principality of Jülich', 1601, Duisburg, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Rheinland, [hereafter LAV NRW R], AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 2, fol. 477^{r}.

other, first Spanish, then for the States [General], then for himself"), and of course the sheer diversity of regional, social, and religious backgrounds found among their ranks; the latter was only exacerbated by their habit of forcibly recruiting locals as labourers and engineers, meaning that that the line between soldiers and civilians was also blurred.[5]

The foregoing is not meant to imply that officials were entirely reliant on hearsay and soldiers' own self-identification when trying to make judgements. Imperial legislation (such as the *Exekutionsordnung* of 1555) did in fact make provision for a system of documentation; namely, the passports which were issued to soldiers.[6] Despite their name, these documents differed substantially from modern passports, in that their primary purpose was not to confirm the citizenship of the bearer but to record service history instead.[7] Soldiers were issued with such paperwork when leaving their unit for a temporary spell, or when the unit itself was disbanded. They then used the passports as evidence of their honourable conduct and legitimate dismissal when dealing with officials – including both civilian magistrates and prospective military employers – who might otherwise take them for vagabonds.[8] For example, in 1594 a group of twenty-one raiders captured by local authorities near Deutz were

[5] William Riephan, *Kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschribung gewisser Neuwen Zeittungen vnd Geschichten / welche sich von vorgangner Herbstmeß / biß auf ietzige Ostermeß / dises ietzlauffendt 96. Jars / In Osterreich / Vngaren / Böhem / Poln / Hispanien / Franckreich / Schweden / Denmarck / Hoch vnd Niderteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wider begeben vnd zugetragen. Mit Anzeig deren Acord vnd verträge sampt einuerleibten Artiucln so wol die Statt von Embden / als auch Statt vnnd Schloß Cammerich belandgend. Alles auffs kurtzest Beschrieben* (Cologne: Henry Neteßheim, 1596), pp. 38-39; Register of complaints from Liège, n.d. [1579], LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 56, fol. 126^{v}.

[6] Horst Carl, 'Landfriedensbrecher und „Sicherheitskräfte": Adlige Fehdeführer und Söldner im 16. Jahrhundert' in *Sicherheit in der Frühen Neuzeit: Norm – Praxis – Repräsentation*, ed. by Christoph Kampmann and Ulrich Niggemann (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013), pp. 273-87 (p. 285).

[7] Valentin Groebner, *Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe*, trans. by Mark Kyburz and John Peck (New York: Zone Books, 2007), p. 251.

[8] For the most detailed overview of the usage of military passports, see Jan Willem Huntebrinker, '„Gartknecht" und „Passport": Zum Problem von Mobilität, Zugehörigkeit und Kontrolle (15.–17. Jahrhundert)', *Working Papers des Arbeitskreises Policey/Polizei in der Vormoderne*, 14 (2007), 16-31.

able to secure their freedom by producing passports which identified them as soldiers of the States General on a mission to pursue merchants from the Spanish Netherlands.[9]

Nonetheless, passports had obvious limitations as a source of information about soldiers. The documents commonly referenced the unit the bearer had served in and its origins, but they provided few details about the background of the individual himself. They were also vulnerable to being tampered with, falsified, and misused; the military writer Adam Junghans warned officers against affixing their official seal to passports, as one never knew "what villainy could be achieved with a sealed pass certificate."[10] He also noted that commanders could exercise their discretion over whether or not to grant a soldier suspected of misconduct a passport.[11] This was a useful deterrent (troops denied a reference by their current superior would find it harder to find employment later) but it also meant that the men most likely to commit atrocities were also the least likely to possess documentary evidence that could be used to link them to military units.

In some cases, then, the scanty information available about soldiers limited the terms that could be used to describe them. In one incident of 1614, for example, local authorities in Jülich-Berg had to describe a fugitive trooper only as a "Walloon", since he was of "unknown name and quality" and his supposed commanding officer denied having any record of his

[9] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis* (1588-97), fol. 385ʳ < https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Decrepitudinis/Liber_Decrepitudinis.htm>.
[10] Junghans of the Olnitz, Adam*, KriegesOrdnung / zu Wasser vnd Landt. Kurtzer vnd Eidentlicher Vnderricht / aller Kriegshändel / so geübet werden / Sampt nützlichen darbey angezogenem Bericht deren Kreigeßbestallung / ober vnd niederer Empter vnd Befelechen zu feldt vnd in Besatzungen / auch Malefitz / Spieß vnd Standtrecht / sampt dem Artickelsbriff / Auch einem kurtzen Vnderricht / wie man mit Arkoley vnd groben Geschütz vmbgehen / vnd mit mancherley Fewerwerck gegen dem feinde gebrauchen soll / Den ankommenden / hoch vnd niedern Befelchhabern / Kriegßleuten / vnd sonsten ins gemeinen Landtsknechten / auch allen Büchsenmeistern zum guten / in Druck geben. Durch Adam Jungkhanß / von der Olnitz. In dem Feldtläger vor der Statt Neuß / Anno 1586. in ider Schantzen zu Gnadenthal / beschrieben* (Cologne: Nicholas Schreiber, 1589), p. 196.
[11] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 196.

service.[12] In many other cases, however, a wider array of options remained open, and the choices made by *Kreis* sources shed an interesting light on how soldiers were perceived. In brief, when describing a group of soldiers operating in the area, observers had six main ways to identify them (a) by using a demonym, either national or regional e.g. German or Hessian (b) by making reference to their *Dienstherr*, the ruler in whose service they were currently employed e.g. the king of Spain or the States General of the United Provinces (c) by making reference to the commanding officer of their unit (d) by making reference to the town or fortress where they were currently garrisoned (e) by talking in terms of factions or side, commonly grouping them with their enemies as "both warring parties' troops" (f) by describing them as foreigners. The last of these approaches will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection, but for now we will focus on the usage and context of the other labels.

It is important to note that these identifiers were not mutually exclusive, as they were commonly combined with each other and with additional descriptors which added value judgements or further information. For example, one document of 1603 referred to the "States of the United Provinces' disaffected royal troops of various nations" ["*Unyrten Prouincien Staten alterirten koniglichen verschiedener Nationen kriegsvolcks*"], while another of 1591 complains of the "troops newly raised under the name of Duke Maurice of Saxony on behalf of His Royal Majesty of Spain" ["*vnder nhamen Hertzog Mauritzen von Sachßen in behueff der Kon: W: zu Hispanien, newlich beworbener kriegßleuthe*"].[13] The latter example points to the complexity that could exist even within the categories listed

[12] Report from Gottfried Barken, 20 August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 62^{r}.
[13] Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to Emperor Rudolf II, 3 October 1603, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 5, fol. 22^{v}; Stadtholderate of Münster to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 27 August 1591, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fol. 395^{r}.

above, for in this case both Maurice of Saxe-Lauenberg and Philip II of Spain could be considered *Dienstherren* on different levels.

Where narrower descriptions were used, only occasionally do we receive information about why these particular terms were chosen. In his account of the Cologne War, the chronicler Herman of Weinsberg explains to his readers that "I have named the men of… Elector Ernest the Bavarians, as he was born in Bavaria," but more official documents rarely include this kind of explicit reasoning.[14] Sometimes the logic behind a particular descriptive format is fairly transparent; for example, a report listing members of "marauding squadrons" active in Lippe in 1591 includes any and all details known about its subjects (for instance, it lists "John Spuen… from Halle who has a red beard" and "Dietrich of Meuser whose father is a bastard from Varendorf"), presumably to make them easier to identify and apprehend.[15] However, in most cases the writer's motives remain speculative, and historians must contextualise their language within broader patterns before they can make arguments about what these motives could have been.

A truly rigorous statistical analysis of the evidence is impossible within the scope of the current project, as the sources are so wide-ranging in format, authorship, content, and purpose that to attempt a weighting for all such variables would be a fool's errand. Nonetheless, by keeping a tabulated record of groups of soldiers mentioned within *Kreis* sources and including certain data about each such group (namely the terms used to describe the soldiers,

[14] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis* (1578-88), fol. 412^{r} <https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Senectutis/Liber_Senectutis.htm>. Note that here what appears to be a demonym denoting the origin of the troops – 'Bavarian' – is revealed to be a reference only to the birthplace of their *Dienstherr*, illustrating the flexibility and range of potential meanings inherent even in one-word descriptions. Weinsberg is well aware that there are many other ways to construe the identity of these troops, referring to them elsewhere as "the Bavarians, who are also named the Spanish or the Parmense" (after the duke of Parma). See Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis*, fol. 563^{r}.

[15] List of bandits' names, 22 March 1591, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fols 56^{r-v}.

the status and confession of the party describing them, whether the source treats the soldiers as friendly or hostile, and the year), it is possible to give a small measure of quantitative force to generalisations that would otherwise be purely anecdotal. Over two hundred mentions of soldiers in the *Kreisarchiv* have been recorded in this way, and analysis suggests a few broad points. Firstly, of all the various potential means to identify soldiers listed above, identification by *Dienstherr* was plainly the most popular, being used in a little under half of recorded cases. Next most popular appears to be by demonym, which was used in slightly under a third of instances, with national demonyms used markedly more often than regional ones. The other options – identification by garrison, commander, or faction – were of lesser importance, with none being used in more than a sixth of cases. The second point to emphasise is that these patterns differed very little by religious confession. Both Catholic and Protestant writers identified soldiers using (in descending order of frequency) *Dienstherr*, demonym, and commander, with the only difference being whether faction or garrison was in fourth place. Given the small numbers involved, this deviation is likely to be statistical noise.

On this note, it is also important to highlight certain terms that were not used to describe or identify soldiers in these sources. The most glaring omission here is religious confession itself; despite the salience of denominational divides in many areas of late sixteenth century society, and the fact that most of the conflicts of this era were in some sense wars of religion, references to 'Protestant troops' or 'Catholic troops' are conspicuous by their absence. This is also the case for more loaded expressions for rival religious identities, such as 'papist', 'heretic', or '*Geuzen*' (the last of these – literally meaning 'beggar' – was first applied pejoratively to Calvinist rebels in the Low Countries, and came to be used as both a badge of pride and a broader label for anti-Spanish Protestants in the region). The lack of sectarian name-calling suggests that participants in *Kreis* discussions were more interested in resolving conflicts at a political level than they were in scoring rhetorical points. It may also indicate

that military professionals were still seen as relatively non-confessionalised, and autonomous from the causes in which they were employed.

These patterns remained broadly constant across the period under discussion, but it is also important to consider the potential for terminology to change over time, and any resulting implications. Here we need to examine not only the language used to characterise soldiers, but the very word 'soldier' itself. Several historians have claimed that the turn of the seventeenth century saw an important linguistic shift, as the term 'Landsknecht' fell out of favour and was replaced with '*Soldat*' as the main German word for military personnel. Erik Swart suggests that this development reflected the decline of autonomy and egalitarianism for common troopers, and the rise of state control.[16] This accords with Peter Burschel's assessment, though the latter also emphasises that Landsknecht was as much an ethnic term as a professional one, arguing that the increasing use of *Soldat* (a loanword from Romance languages) symbolised the subordination of Germanic martial traditions to Spanish and Italian influences.[17] He cites the former Landsknecht and baroque poet Hans William Kirchhof, who in 1601 lamented that "In former times mercenaries had worth / They were turned into the Landsknecht… / Then *Soldat* comes and drives him out / And this sounds like the foreigners."[18]

There may be some merit to these interpretations, but analysis of the source base throws doubt on the idea that a significant linguistic shift from Landsknechts to *Soldaten* actually took place at the end of the sixteenth century. In fact, the term Landsknecht had already fallen

[16] Erik Swart, 'From "Landsknecht" to "Soldier": The Low German Foot Soldiers of the Low Countries in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century', *International Review of Social History*, 51 (2006), pp. 75-92 (pp. 75-76).
[17] Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), p. 15.
[18] Quoted in Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland*, p. 39 n. 82. The specific term for foreigners which Kirchhof used was '*Welsch*', the connotations of which are explained below on p. 50.

out of common use some time before this, and it was effectively absent from *Kreis* documents even in the 1570s. It continued to appear occasionally in printed sources that took a more intellectual or artistic approach to warfare (such as the 'New Landsknecht's Song' printed in 1584 to provide a rhyming update on the events of the Cologne War), but as a practical term to denote troops, it was an archaism long before 1600.[19] Indeed, other research suggests that its usage had been fairly narrow even during the Landsknechts' heyday. Stefan Xenakis notes that in the earlier sixteenth century 'Landsknecht' was primarily a humanist label rather than a term with active military usage, and appeared in only 3% of his archival sources referencing soldiers from this era.[20]

Evidence is also scanty for a dramatic rise of *Soldat* as a loanword in this period. The term was already employed in German-language sources during the 1570s, and although it seems to have become somewhat more frequent in subsequent decades, this reflects a fairly gentle increase; in the *Kreis* sources analysed for the first half of the period 1576-1618, slightly under one sixth of soldiers are referred to as *Soldaten*, whereas in the second half of the period, this figure rises to slightly over one quarter. Even after 1600, it was employed significantly less frequently than *Kriegsvolk*, which remained the dominant term for soldiers throughout the entire period researched here.

When it was used, it is not clear that the word *Soldat* had particularly strong connotations of either foreign influence or new standards of military discipline. If *Soldaten* were associated with tighter control and regulation by state authorities, we might expect *Kreis* sources (written from the perspective of government officials who had a vested interest in seeing

[19] *Newe Zeyttung auß Coelln: Ein frisch newes landtknechts lied vom Coellnnischen krieg unnd wie die statt bonn auffgeben ist worden etc. inn deß Lindenschmidts thon zusingen* (Cologne: Andreas Röschlin, 1584).
[20] Stefan Xenakis, *Gewalt und Gemeinschaft: Kriegsknechte um 1500* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), pp. 53-54.

soldiers restrained) to deploy the term as a positive signifier. These sources were indeed slightly more likely to use it to describe troops who were on the same side as themselves; a quarter of all soldiers mentioned in the sampled documents were from friendly or allied forces, but this rises to just under a third if we only consider those referred to as *Soldaten*. Nonetheless, this is a fairly weak correlation, and if we look specifically at documents which mention both friendly and hostile troops, the writers were just as likely to label as *Soldaten* the group which they opposed as they were to use it for the group they supported.[21] Moreover, although it is true that the term was originally imported into German from Italian, it very quickly seems to have lost its alien connotations. It was common practice in this period for German sources to italicise words and names that were associated with Romance languages (for example, even the Latin-derived term '*Nation*' could receive this treatment, as could the German-born but Spanish-educated prince Don John of Austria), but *Soldat* was not made typographically distinct in this way.[22] Furthermore, the *Kreis* sources sampled provide no indication that the term was disproportionately used to denote troops who were identified as foreign.

[21] Sources where 'good' *Soldaten* are contrasted with 'bad' troops denoted with another noun include: Count Arnold III of Bentheim-Steinfurt-Tecklenburg-Limburg to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 11 April 1584, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fols. 145^{r-v}; Mayor, Council, and Jurors of Aachen to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 5 February 1591, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fols. 304^{r}-309^{v}; Electoral Cologne's proposals for common defence, 1607, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 35, fols. 5^{r}-14^{v}. Sources where the relationship is vice versa include: Report from Count Simon VI of Lippe, 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 1.1, fols. 102^{r}-107^{v}; Mayor and council of Wesel to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 27 November 1600, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 1.2, fols. 163^{r}-165^{v}; Council of Cleves to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 30 July 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fols. 91^{r}-97^{v}.

[22] John Textor, *Naßawische Chronick / In Welcher des vralt: hochlöblich: vnd weitberühmten Stamms vom Hause Naßaw / Printzen vnd Graven Genealogi oder Stammbaum: deren geburt / leben / heurath / kinder / zu Friden: vnd Kriegszeiten verzichtete sachen vnd thaten / absterben / vnd sonst denckwürdige Geschichten: Sampt einer kurtzen general Nassoviae: vnd special: Beschreibung der Graf: vnd Herschaften Naßaw-Catzenelenbogen* (Herborn: Christopher Raaben, 1617), p. 6; Instructions of Bishop Gerard of Liège to *Kreistag* envoys Henry of Flatten and Dr Goddart Taxuis, 16 February 1578, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 55, fol. 83.

Thus, claims that linguistic changes provide evidence for a dramatic shift in the status of soldiers at the turn of the seventeenth century appear to be overstated. This remains the case if we widen our focus beyond the term *Soldat* and look at other potentially telling indicators. If military units were becoming increasingly viewed as extensions of the state – as opposed to autonomous formations – it would be reasonable to expect this to be reflected in the language used to describe them. However, although there was a slight drop in soldiers being referenced using 'practical' identifiers (i.e. their commanding officer, or the place they were currently garrisoned) in the second half of the period 1576 to 1618, the usage of identifiers which referenced governments and territories (i.e. their *Dienstherr,* a demonym, or a belligerent political faction) remained steady across the decades in question.

Indeed, the general picture generated by these sources is one of stability; the terminology used to describe soldiers in *Kreis* discussions did not undergo any violent shifts during these years. Some change over time can be detected, of course, such as a mild decline in 'national' demonyms (e.g. German, English) and a rise in 'regional' ones (e.g. Hessian, Saxon) which might support the idea that in the run up to the Thirty Years' War the Empire's subjects came increasingly to identify with smaller territorial princedoms rather than larger bodies like the Reich. This remains difficult to substantiate, however, and of possibly greater significance is the fact that both forms of demonym remained markedly less popular than identifying troops by their *Dienstherr*. In these times, military identities and allegiances remained essentially personal, and did not generally imply membership of more abstract territorial collectives. It is noteworthy that (in at least some cases) demonyms could effectively function as shorthand for a relationship with a *Dienstherr* anyway, rather than as indicators of citizenship or place of birth; one petition to the Circle made reference to the troops of "the king of Spain's commissioned colonels, Adolf lord of Schwarzenberg and Philip of Bentinck" before later

referring to the same pair as the "Spanish colonels," demonstrating that some soldiers were denoted as Spaniards to reflect their current employment status rather than their origins.[23]

Given the uncertainty that characterises how *Kreis* sources talk about soldiers, and the lack of either strong partisan divides or dramatic shifts in language, it might be tempting to conclude that such descriptions have little to tell us about political culture in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. However, in many ways it is this consistent balanced vagueness which holds the key to the Circle's approach; namely, one of constructive ambiguity. At this juncture, it is useful to consider not only the occasions when soldiers were mentioned, but also when they were deliberately left out. Throughout the period, it was very common for *Kreis* documents to attribute the bloodshed on Lower-Rhine-Westphalian soil not to specific groups or individuals, but to generic "*Kriegswesen*," *"Kriegswirren,"* and *"Unruhe*" (warfare, chaos of war, and turmoil), or to the metaphoric fires of conflict. This had the effect of de-anthropomorphising the sources of violence, making it akin to a natural disaster rather than the fault of defined actors. Of course, at times such language might be used without much thought, but often it is difficult to deny that a deliberate rhetorical strategy was being employed. In his summons to the *Kreistag* of 1590, William the Rich managed to spend an entire page talking in detail about the effects of soldiers' depredations without ever once mentioning human involvement, instead making adroit use of the passive (e.g. talking about "ways in which the captured towns and castles might be regained" without referring to who had captured them) to avoid levelling any accusations.[24]

[23] Mayor and council of Cologne to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 22 October 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fols 79^{r}-81^{v}.
[24] Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 18 July 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, p. 9^{r}.

Ultimately, he and other leading *Kreis* members understood that the functioning of the Circle as a multi-confessional joint enterprise depended on it being able to discuss responses to threats without getting mired in finger-pointing and partisan disputes. Thus, even the practical obstacles to identifying soldiers could prove useful on occasion. Later in 1590, his fellow *ausschreibender Fürst* Ernest of Bavaria condemned "various persons who give themselves out to be soldiers" and were at large in the princedom of Liège; alluding to possible mistaken identities in this way allowed him to rebuke the Spaniards without publicly accusing his powerful neighbour Philip II of complicity.[25] Similarly, in 1591 William condemned a group of marauders "who call themselves men of the States General" and pledged to resist such "defilers of the streets, wherever they arrive and whatever semblance they adopt."[26] In a complex political environment in which most Lower-Rhine-Westphalian actors had ties to one belligerent faction or another, it was recognised that accurately identifying soldiers was less important than finding ways to talk about them without jeopardising the possibility of consensus.

ii) The 'Foreigner' Label

We can now look more narrowly at the application of the label 'foreign' to soldiers in *Kreis* sources, although it must be said that this label still covered a broad spectrum of nuance. By far the most common way to designate someone as foreign was to refer to them as '*fremd*' or a '*fremder'*, but other overlapping terms existed, and even this word had a range of potential meanings which cannot be captured by a simple one-to-one English translation. Most pertinently, the German word '*fremder*' refers to a broader category of outsiders or unfamiliar individuals than its anglophone equivalent, and in some circumstances is better rendered as

[25] Proclamation of Ernest of Bavaria, 28 November 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fol. 204^{r}.
[26] Proclamation of Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 9 March 1591, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 46^{r}.

'stranger' rather than 'foreigner'. This of course increased the flexibility of its usage, and made it more likely that it could be applied to individuals identified with other towns and localities rather than only those identified with other states or nations.[27] In some cases, the different aspects of the term's meaning could mesh in ambiguous ways. When in 1579 the Palatine Elector wrote to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreisoberst* to warn him of "the *frembden* French troops" massing around Basel for a suspected voyage down the Rhine, he was presumably commenting on the soldiers' foreign connections, but he may also have been referencing the fact that they were unknown strangers whose identity and purposes were currently obscure; much of the rest of his description concerns his struggle to find out more about them, as "one has no further information concerning whither they intend to go, or to whom they are responsible, other than what can be outwardly observed."[28] A further meaning of '*fremd*' is 'alien' in the sense of something peculiar and off-putting, which official documents frequently deployed in the formulation '*es kommt uns fremd vor, daß…*', meaning 'it seems strange to us that…'. Context made it unlikely that these usages could be mistaken for a literal reference to foreigners, but the potential overspill of negative connotations is apparent.

Other terms used to designate someone as a foreigner included '*Ausländer'* (literally 'outlander') and '*Ausheimische'* (literally 'out-of-home-er'). At times, these could be strung together to provide reinforced emphasis, as when William the Rich condemned the Army of Flanders' occupation of Maastricht by calling for the withdrawal of "outlander foreign troops

[27] Detlev Pleiss even suggests that "*fremdes kriegsvolk*" in the seventeenth century could be defined as "everyone who engaged in war and was not known to the locals from childhood", which may push this to extremes. Detlev Pleiss, 'Bodenständige Bevölkerung und fremdes Kriegsvolk: Finner in deutschen Quartieren 1630-1650' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Åbo Akademi University, 2016), p. 20.

[28] Elector Louis VI of the Palatinate to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 1579, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 56, fol. 188^{r-v}.

[*außlendische frembde kriegsuolck*]."[29] A further term with strong overtones of otherness is '*Welsch*', a pejorative descriptor for various non-Germanic peoples of Celtic or Romance-speaking origin (which shares common ancestry with the English demonym for Britons living west of Offa's Dyke). The exclusion of Germans from this category obviously made it a more specific one than some other labels, but it too could be flexibly applied. A notable case of this is Don John of Austria, governor of the Spanish Netherlands for part of this period. As previously noted, *Kreis* sources tended to italicise his name to indicate his association with Romance languages, and when Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoys went to negotiate with him in 1577, they reported that it was "deemed advisable to deliver our petition in the French language, as the lord governor understood no German."[30] Nonetheless, in his written response to the Circle, Don John (who had left the Empire for Spain aged only seven) was happy to express hopes that a peace would allow "the Spanish and other *Welsch* troops to be removed out of all these lands, and withdraw."[31] By using it to describe troops under his command but not himself, he seems to have defined *Welsch*-ness in terms of ancestry rather than language, and toned down its derogatory connotations.

It is thus apparent that the various labels for foreign troops were not monolithic, but it is still important to consider how and to whom they were applied by the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates. One initial point is that they were used almost exclusively to refer to forces that were judged hostile. As we will later observe, certain sources from the period could sometimes be actively celebratory in their treatment of military outsiders, but in their official documents the Circle's governments do not seem to have gone quite this far. When they mentioned foreign

[29] Instructions for envoys to meeting of Circle delegations, 2 March 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fol. 338^{r}.
[30] Report from Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoys to Don John of Austria, 12 January 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fol. 23.
[31] Don John of Austria to the Electoral Rhenish, Lower-Rhine-Westphalian, and Upper Rhenish Circle Colonels, 16 February 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fols 2^{r}-3^{v}.

troops in their public proclamations, it was to issue edicts against them, such as a 1587 exhortation that "the outlandish and foreign soldiery be kept away from this Circle and its poor, distressed subjects."[32] Clearly, to be designated foreign in this way was an additional black mark alongside any misdeeds of which the troops were accused.

The second point to consider is that those troops who were designated foreigners were largely those associated with powers from outside the Empire. Although, as we have seen, it was quite possible to consider anything from a different Imperial territory or town to be foreign, this type of usage was rare in *Kreis* communications at least. In internal correspondence with their subjects, the Circle's princes felt able to use the term more broadly; for instance, in 1585 William the Rich wrote to his councillors in Duisburg requiring them to keep a register of all "*frembden*" residing in the city's inns and not to admit "suspect persons and foreign soldiers" who might have ties to a belligerent power.[33] This measure seems to be concerned with the threat of soldiers as strangers rather than soldiers as invaders of the Empire, but when writing in his capacity as *Kreisoberst* he appears to have been more restrictive. That is not to say that ethnic Germans could not be classed as foreign, but this usually required them to have some sort of link with an acknowledged external power, such as those he condemned in the same year for being recruited using "foreign French military commissions."[34] Thus, the Circle's sources appear to support a Reich-centric rather than territory-centric model of primary

[32] *Kreistag* communique issued at Cologne, 2 May 1587, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 54, fol. 200^{r}; for analysis of the rhetoric of 'poor subjects' in this period, see, Peter Blickle, 'Untertanen in der Frühneuzeit: Zur Rekonstruktion der politischen Kultur und der sozialen Wirklichkeit Deutschlands im 17. Jahrhundert', *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 70 (1983), 483-522 (pp. 494-95).
[33] Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to councillors at Düsseldorf, 8 August 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5031, fol. 6^{r}.
[34] *Kreistag* summons, 20 May 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX.61, fol. 261^{v}.

allegiance, albeit one in which military service to a *Dienstherr* could supersede an individual's geographic origins as a criterion for categorisation.

Nonetheless, it would certainly be oversimplistic to conclude that *Kreis* politics operated on a straightforward assumption that 'foreign' could be equated with 'non-Imperial'. One illustrative case concerns the complaints made to the Circle by the prince-bishopric of Liège in 1579. In this document, Bishop Gerard recapped twelve years' worth of incursions into his territory by (among others) "thirty banners of Scottish musketmen", "forty banners of Frenchmen", and numerous contingents of Spaniards.[35] What is particularly interesting is that among all these varied descriptions, the only time foreigners are directly mentioned is in his lament about plundering during "the withdrawal of the foreign soldiers (which took place according to the Pacification) through the county of Lohn, the see of Liège, Franchimont, and Stavelot."[36] This must be a reference to the Pacification of Ghent, an arrangement of November 1576 whereby the rebel and loyalist provinces of the Habsburg-ruled Netherlands agreed to work together to combat mutinous marauders from the royal armies. Specifically, they pledged "to drive out of the land… the Spanish soldiers, and other aliens and foreigners [*andere uuytheemsche ende vrempde*]."[37] It is thus noteworthy that, despite having various opportunities to describe the pillagers of his lands as foreigners, the only context in which the prince-bishop actually did so was the expulsion of outsiders by the Habsburg Netherlands, a political body of which he himself was not a part. Nor was he the only Lower-Rhine-

[35] Note that 'banner' is a translation of *Fähnlein* (more literally rendered 'little flag'), a ubiquitous German-language term for military units larger than a squadron and smaller than a regiment. The closest equivalent in English or Romance-language systems of military organisation would be 'company', but I have preferred to use 'banner' in order to distinguish the term from the loanword 'compagni' or 'compagnei', which did also appear in German sources.

[36] Register of complaints from Liège, n.d. [1579], LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 56, fol. 124^{r}.

[37] *Klein plakkaatboek van Nederland: Verzameling van ordonnantiën en plakkaten betreffende regeeringsvorm, kerk en rechtspraak (14e eeuw tot 1749)*, ed. by Anne Siberdinus de Blécourt and Nicolaas Japikse (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1919), pp. 113-17.

Westphalian to seemingly adopt similar criteria for foreigners on occasion; in 1585 Jülich-Cleves-Berg *Kreis* envoys were instructed to raise concerns about those who "introduced foreign nations such as the English, Scots, and Irish into the Netherlands and brought them to this Circle's borders."[38]

These cases feed into a third point to consider, which is perhaps the most important of all. Namely, *Kreis* sources simply did not explicitly identify soldiers as foreign very often. Among the sample analysed, less than one in ten of the documents referring to soldiers made use of terms such as '*fremd*', '*ausländisch*', or '*Welsch*' to describe them. This is despite the fact that the majority of the troops described within these documents had connections to a non-Imperial power (principally the kingdom of Spain and the United Provinces of the Netherlands: for more on their non-Imperial status, see Chapter III), which meant that they could be designated as foreigners even according to the narrower criteria that prevailed in *Kreis* discourse. It may also appear somewhat counter-intuitive, given that in many cases these documents were written expressly to condemn the actions of the soldiers and to request the support of neighbouring Estates against them. Why, then, did *Kreis* sources not deploy this rhetorical weapon more frequently, especially when part of the Circle's raison d'être was to oppose military incursions into the Empire?

Ultimately, this reticence indicates that calling hostile troops foreigners was of only limited usefulness within the specific context of Circle interactions. It was a way of criticising those troops, true, but the appeal of patriotic xenophobia was not yet strong enough to make it a particularly strong motivator. In other regions where recent history had produced a sharper sense of grievance against overseas overlords, it worked better as a rallying cry; this may

[38] Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg's instructions to *Kreistag* envoys, n.d. [1585], LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 62, fol. 23^{r}.

explain why some rhetoric attacking foreign soldiers seems to have seeped into Lower-Rhine-Westphalia from the Netherlands. Moreover, the fact that it was not more widely adopted may reflect Circle actors' reluctance to employ arguments and epithets with a track record of divisive use by belligerent powers. For instance, in a pamphlet justifying his military campaign to secure the archdiocese of Cologne, Gebhard Truchsess tried to goad neighbouring *Kreise* into action by castigating his opponent's "introduction of foreign troops for unprecedented impious disrespect of all Imperial Constitutions, and also of the Electoral Rhenish and other *Kreisobersten*"[39] In response, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle seems to have been wary of rising to the bait. It is noteworthy that, during a three-*Kreis* summit to address the war between Gebhard and his rival, delegates of the Upper Rhenish Circle (which was more uniformly Protestant and pro-Gebhard) condemned a Catholic unit as "a foreign troop [that has] fixed its foot in the Holy Empire" only to find that the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoys were unwilling to echo their rhetoric and deflected the discussion into a procedural question instead.[40]

In place of frequent and aggressive labelling of soldiers as foreigners, Lower-Rhine-Westphalian sources fell back once again on more ambiguous language. Rather than point the finger at particular units or individuals, they often preferred to talk not of 'foreign soldiers' but of more nebulous 'foreign powers' or 'foreign dangers'. For instance, a 1603 petition to the emperor by the Circle Estates asked for his aid in protecting "members belonging to the Holy Empire from unjust foreign threats" and in restraining "both warring parties", without

[39] *Warnungsschrifft Vnser Gebharts von Gottes gnaden / erwöhlten vnd bestetigten zu Ertzbischoffen zu Cöllen vnd Churfürsten / Hertzogen zu Westphalen vnd Engern / &c an vnsere gehorsame Capitulare / Landstände / Graffen / Ritterschafft / Stätte / Angehörige vnd Vnderthanen / wider die vermeine vnbefügte fürhabende / etlicher vnser vngehorsamer Capitularen Newe Wahl / eines ander Ertzbischoffs vnd Churfürsten zu Cöllen / Auch Relaxation vnnd ledigzehlung vns ordentlicher weiß geleister pflicht vnd Eyd / sampt angeheffter Protestation* (Strasbourg: Nicholas Wiriot, 1583), p. ii^{r}.

[40] Minutes of the summit of the Upper Rhenish, Electoral Rhenish, and Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circles, 22 February 1583, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 54, fol. 143^{v}.

specifically identifying any soldiers as foreign.[41] A similar distinction runs through a complaint by the prince-abbot of Werden to an *ausschreibender Fürst* the following year. In this missive, he complains about the "mutinous Spanish troops" who have robbed his territory of eight hundred Reichsthaler, "the majority of which has been received by foreigners, whilst another part has fallen to the soldiers."[42] Here, the foreigners are not explicitly the soldiers themselves (for all that they are Spaniards, or at least possessors of Spanish commissions), but rather a separate, unidentified group who are profiting at Werden's expense. Being deliberately vague on this point allowed an Imperial Estate to invoke the trope of needing aid to resist external attack, without getting drawn into thorny definitional questions. This approach had the effect of splitting the issue of foreign incursions into two related problems: a shadowy prospect of foreign influence, and the practical challenge posed by marauding troops on the ground.

The evasiveness of the *Kreis* sources when it comes to discussing the foreign character of soldiers may at times feel frustrating, even cowardly, but it reflects a strategic logic that was fundamentally sound. In the late sixteenth century, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was religiously divided and geographically exposed. Its members' territories were interspersed between several warzones contested by powers whose resources outstripped their own, and any escalation of hostilities would inevitably cause mass collateral damage. It was in those members' interests, therefore, to communicate avoiding language that would raise the political temperature and risk dividing the *Kreis*. Thus, troops were classed as foreigners only

[41] Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to Emperor Rudolf II, 3 October 1603, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 5, fol. 23^{r}.
[42] Prince-Abbot of Werden to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 2 October 1604, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 5, fol. 281^{r}.

sparingly, and in circumstances that would emphasise by contrast the things the Estates shared (such as Reich membership).

Finally, part of the reason why *Kreis* observers did not prioritise labelling soldiers as 'foreign' may simply have been a lack of confidence that native soldiers would behave any differently. In the instructions for Jülich-Cleves-Berg's *Kreistag* delegates in 1578, they are asked to discuss the "marches, plundering, robbing, and daily outrages [of] not only the German but also the foreign troops led here." [43] In this instance, the German and non-German soldiers are plainly viewed as two separate groups, and only the latter are labelled as foreigners, but it's of no great importance as they both engage in the same atrocities and are to be dealt with in the same way. This reflects a more general belief that the inherent incorrigibility of all soldiers was enough to override their other allegiances. In the incident discussed earlier, Don John rebuffed the *Kreis* envoys' request to restrain the Spaniards under his command by arguing that "one knows all too well, how soldiers and men of war care to employ themselves in such situations" and he "could do no miracles", meaning that "not alone the Germans, but other nations too, yes indeed the Spanish themselves could not be spared."[44]

iii) Locating the Fatherland

Anti-outsider rhetoric relies not only on condemning the 'other', but also on defining something for these hate-figures to be outside. Therefore, an alternative way to approach the problem of categorising foreign soldiers is to look not at the soldiers themselves, but at their supposed antithesis: the fatherland. In comparison to the linguistic diversity used to describe

[43] Instructions for Jülich-Cleves-Berg envoys to the *Kreistag* at Essen, 21 June 1578, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 55, fol. 163^{r}.
[44] Report from Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoys to Don John of Austria, 12 January 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fols 233^{r}-242^{r}.

the *fremd*, *ausländisch*, or *ausheimisch*, the terminology used to denote a territorial space with which the speaker identified themself was more limited and stable. Terms for 'motherland' and 'homeland' did not gain widespread currency in German (the latter's closest equivalent is *Heimat*, which has slightly different connotations and only featured heavily in political rhetoric in later centuries), meaning that sources are dominated by the word '*Vaterland'* and – to a much lesser extent – its Latin cognate '*patria*'.[45] However, this does not necessarily make things simpler, as the single word 'fatherland' contains sufficient ambiguity to have vexed scholars for generations.

As described in the main introduction, historians tracing the development of patriotic rhetoric have disagreed quite sharply about where exactly this fatherland was located in the imaginaries of early modern people. Those using sources with a pan-Imperial audience have tended to emphasise that the Reich itself was the primary fatherland of its subjects, whereas those using archival records from local Estates have contended that this role was held by the Empire's component territories. Consensus remains elusive, but the latter view tends to be more firmly established in existing literature. Even some scholars who have worked primarily on Empire-wide pamphlet sources still back the more localised version of the fatherland, such as Peer Schmidt, who breaks with the views of Georg and Alexander Schmidt on this issue. [46] Moreover, the most detailed exploration of the issue has been carried out by Axel Gotthard, who acknowledges the term's wide range of potential usages (noting that it could be used to refer to "the world in general or even something which isn't supposed to exist") but nonetheless concludes that "for the vast majority of pre-modern people the fatherland was clearly small-scale", and claims that his experience of early-seventeenth-century sources

[45] For more on *Heimat*, see Alon Confino, *The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory 1871-1918* (London: University of Carolina Press, 1997), and below at p. 68.
[46] Peer Schmidt, *Spanische Universalmonarchie oder „teutsche Libertet": Das spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001), p. 269.

suggests that those using it to denote a "particular Imperial territory" outnumber "a dozen- or a hundred-fold" those using it to denote the Reich.[47]

Kreis sources cannot overturn this claim entirely, since they represent only one portion of the vast body of documents in which appeals to the fatherland may be found. However, their origin in the grey area between the domains of the princes and of the emperor does make them particularly valuable; the primary audience to which their writers were beholden was neither strictly confined within a single princedom, nor spread across the entirety of the Reich. It is thus noteworthy that – in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia at least – their evidence mainly serves to counter the 'small fatherland' model endorsed by Gotthard, Friedeburg, and others. Simply put, in cases where *Kreis* sources mention a fatherland which can be securely identified, it is almost always either the Holy Roman Empire or Germany.

Sometimes, of course, the target audience of the document may still have proved decisive in this identification; in 1584, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates likely evoked "common peace, welfare, and prosperity for the whole fatherland of the German nation" when appealing for aid against military incursions because they were writing to Rudolf II, whose responsibility it was to think in these terms.[48] *Kreisoberst* Simon presumably had similar motives when he promised to protect "our common fatherland of the laudable German nation" in a 1597 letter to the same emperor about Turkish incursions, and in any case, a narrower definition of fatherland would not have been able to encompass both Westphalia

[47] Axel Gotthard, 'Vormoderne Lebensräume: Annäherungsversuch an die heimaten des frühneuzeitlichen mitteleuropäers', Historische Zeitschrift, 276:1 (2003), 37-73 (p. 54-58). For further supporting views, see Winfried Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates 1564-1619* (Cologne: Bermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1973), p. 238.
[48] Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to Emperor Rudolf II, 30 April 1584, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 166^{r}.

and the Ottoman frontier.[49] Nonetheless, the 'large fatherland' idea makes an appearance even in documents with a purely regional focus. For instance, when William the Rich appealed for aid against troops in Spanish service who were pillaging Jülich in 1590, the co-princes of East Frisia wrote back pledging their support for "the defence of the fatherland, the good order of this Circle, and the salvation of the common subjects."[50] From context, the fatherland they are referencing must be a larger unit such as the Empire or the nation, as the other potential *patria* shared by Jülich and Frisia – Lower-Rhine-Westphalia itself – is included as a separate point in the list instead. This model of the *Kreis* as a subdivision of a greater fatherland is mentioned even more explicitly in one of Simon of Lippe's letters from 1609, in which he requested a meeting to discuss the Jülich-Cleves-Berg succession crisis and preserve the "welfare of the beloved fatherland and thereunder this Circle."[51]

In light of this evidence, should we therefore conclude that Lower-Rhine-Westphalians regarded Germany, and not its territorial components, as their true fatherland? Unsurprisingly, such a conclusion would be premature. The records in the *Kreisarchiv* challenge the view that the 'small fatherland' model was overwhelmingly predominant, but plenty of documents supporting such a model can still be found in the region's other collections of sources. Although there are exceptions, in general when the internal correspondence of Jülich-Cleves-Berg mention a *patria*, it is no bigger than the United Duchies' composite polity, and sometimes no larger than "this princedom Berg, the common fatherland."[52] Similarly, even the few square miles of the *Reichstadt* Cologne could be a

[49] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Emperor Rudolf II, 10 June 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 76, fol. 71^{r}.
[50] Counts Edzard II and John II of East Frisia to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 106^{v}.
[51] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Chancellery and Council of Jülich, 28 March 1609, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 8, fol. 9^{r}.
[52] Düsseldorf Town Magistrates to Brandenburg Commissioners in Jülich, 8 April 1615, LAV NRW, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 125, fol. 5^{r}; for an example of such where the fatherland appears to be the combined United Duchies, see Proclamation of Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to his Subjects, 9 March 1591, LAV

fatherland in the imaginings of its rulers; in the Watch Ordinance of 1583, the civic authorities repeatedly exhorted the population to defend a "*Vatterlandt*" which did not appear to extend beyond the town walls.[53]

Thus, the primary value of the *Kreis* evidence is not that it transforms our understanding of where Lower-Rhine-Westphalians located their 'real' fatherland, but that it casts doubt on whether such a thing existed at all. If the same actors can be found drawing the boundaries of their *patria* in very different ways according to context, it suggests that a definitive ruling on whether the Empire or the princedoms was viewed as the archetypal fatherland will always remain elusive. Instead, it is more useful to interrogate the ways in which fatherland rhetoric was valuable to participants in contemporary political debates, which may help to explain the origins and consequences of its deployment.

To begin this process at the most basic level, it must be stressed that whenever the fatherland appears in *Kreisarchiv* records, it is almost invariably associated with actions rather than attributes. The sources do not spend time describing the fatherland in terms of its beauty, its natural resources, its topography, or anything which might serve to anchor it to a sense of physical space. Nor are they interested in fleshing out its character via more metaphorical means. It is noteworthy that despite the obvious gendered subtext of the term '*Vaterland*', no effort is made to anthropomorphise the fatherland and associate it with particular human

NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 46^{v}; for an example where the fatherland does appear to be a larger unit – large enough, at any rate, to incorporate the other Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates – see Jülich Councillors in Bentheim to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 15 December 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 179^{v}.

[53] *Newe Gemeine Wachtordnung, wie sie ein Erb. Rath des heiligen Römischen Reichs Freyer Statt Cölln Reformierter gestalt auffgericht vnd hinfüre zuhalten geboten* (Cologne: Maternus Cholinus, 1586) 2§16, 4§18; outsiders trying to charm the town government could also express the same view, as one pamphleteer seeking to influence their stance on religious toleration did when he referred to them as "fathers of the fatherland" in Jeremias Homberger, *Christliche trewhertzige vermanung an die edlen achtbarn weisen Herren Burgermeister unnd Rath der alten und hochlöblichen Reichstatt Cöllen am Rhein das sie dem reinen Evangelio unsers heylands Jesu Christi raum geben wöllen* (Lauingen: Leonard Reinmeichel, 1582), p. 28.

qualities, masculine or otherwise; the figure of 'Deutscher Michel' would not begin his career as the male personification of Germanic simplicity and insularity until well into the Thirty Years' War.[54] Indeed, in this earlier period, the fatherland is generally evoked without any adjectives or additional description at all. The only exceptions to this are the adjectives '*lieb'* (beloved) and '*gemein*' (shared/common), which are commonly deployed alongside it. This is indicative of the most fundamental meaning which Circle documents ascribe to the fatherland: namely, they understand it as something which both writer and reader have an obligation to care about, and which is currently being threatened. *Kreis* actors are constantly acknowledging their duty to rescue the fatherland from dire peril, exhorting others to do the same, and expressing concern for its welfare, without feeling the need to elaborate further. In this way, it is defined not by what or where it is, but by what is being done to it, and what must be done for it.

If we examine a series of examples in a little more detail, we can understand more clearly the rhetorical purposes behind treating the fatherland not as a place, but as a sense of shared crisis. This will also further illustrate why the Empire, not the territories, generally suited these purposes better in a *Kreis* context. The most straightforward use for invoking the *patria* was to frame a basis for solidarity with a neighbour whom one was asking for help. A classic example of this was Count Enno of East Frisia's attempt to summon aid from his fellow Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates in order to expel Dutch marauders threatening his coasts in 1599, casting his net methodically wider as he implored them to act for "the salvation of our

[54] *Der Teutsche Michel. Dos ist / Ein newes Klaglid / und Allamodisch A. B. C. : Wider alle Sprach-Verderber / Zeitungschreiber / Concipisten unnd Cancellisten / welche die alte Teutsche Mutter-Sprach / mit allerley frembden / Lateinischen / Welschen und Frantzösischen Wörtern / so vilfeltig vermischen / verkehren und zerstören / daß sie ihr selber nit mehr gleich sihet / und kaum halber kan erkennet und verstanden werden* (Innsbruck: John Gäch, 1638); for the intersection of gender and patriotic rhetoric in this era, see Paul Münch, 'Die 'Obrigkeit im Vaterstand': Zu Definition und Kritik des 'Landesvaters' während der frühen Neuzeit', *Daphnis*, 11:1 (1982), 15-40.

county, the Westphalian Circle, and the whole Holy Roman Empire and the common fatherland of the German nation."[55]

At the same time, it should be noted that fatherland rhetoric had more flexible usages beyond simply in calls to arms. Indeed, on occasion it could also be deployed as a way to wriggle out of answering such appeals; for example, in 1589 the abbot of the tiny ecclesiastical principality of Kornelimünster told William the Rich that previous *Kreis* meetings had deemed the problem of marauding too severe for Lower-Rhine-Westphalia to handle alone, and that therefore he did not see the point of contributing to countermeasures unless other Circles also "took on this arduous and highly serious business for… the welfare of the Holy Empire's fatherland."[56] By using an expansive definition of *Vaterland* to suggest that the crisis was the joint responsibility of all the Empire's loyal sons, in this instance he sought a way to kick the issue upstairs and justify his own inaction in the short term. Taking a slightly different tack, in the following year Prince Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel acknowledged a request for military aid to fight off "invading foreign troops" in Jülich-Cleves-Berg, proclaiming his desire "to provide proper support, and leave nothing lacking for the defence of the common fatherland."[57] However, he complained that in this case the planned muster was too short-notice for his men to make the journey, admonishing William for not taking into account his needs and those of "similarly far-off Estates."[58] By framing the mission as service rendered to a mutual fatherland, rather than a duty owed to Jülich-Cleves-

[55] Instructions from Count Enno III of East Frisia for envoys to the Herford *Kreistag*, 1 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 251^{v}.
[56] Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Kornelimünster to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 24 December 1589, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 26^{v}.
[57] Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 3 November 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 134^{r}. Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was not part of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle, but Henry had also received part of the county of Hoya in 1582, when it was partitioned among the Welfs following the extinction of its native line. He was therefore writing with regard to these lands, which were part of William's Circle.
[58] Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 3 November 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 134^{v}.

Berg in and of itself, he could justify demanding a greater say in how the operation was to be conducted (and an opt-out if this was not done to his liking).

It is evident from the foregoing that the *Vaterland* was chiefly evoked in circumstances where one party faced an external military threat, serving as a means to give a broader circle of actors an investment in addressing this danger. However, it could be used to support rather than oppose the actions of soldiers, provided that those soldiers were allies and the *patria* was generously defined. In 1599, Prince-Bishop Dietrich of Paderborn was concerned about the large numbers of Hessian and Lower-Saxon troops (who might be considered foreigners in other circumstances) massing in his territory in preparation for the Rees expedition, but reconciled himself to their disruptive presence with the argument that "this is a shared enterprise and is being carried out for the salvation of the German nation's fatherland."[59]

Two further examples will illustrate the extent to which fatherland rhetoric was instrumentalised as a tool to sell particular proposals to particular audiences. In 1605, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle made another of its periodic attempts to negotiate with the two belligerents in the Eighty Years' War, seeking to persuade them to withdraw from *Kreis* territory. The letter they sent to Archduke Albert, co-sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands, made sure to reference "our beloved fatherland of the German nation", presumably hoping to draw forth some fellow-feeling from the recipient, who hailed from the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs and had lived in German-speaking lands until the age of eleven.[60] The letter

[59] Bishop Dietrich IV of Paderborn to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 17 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 321^{r}.
[60] Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to Archduke Albert VII of Austria, 14 October 1605, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 6, fol. 100^{r}.

they sent to the Dutch States General, whilst being the same in most particulars, omitted this reference entirely.[61]

As well as showing how fatherland rhetoric could be tailored to the background of individuals, this instance also points to its applicability across confessional boundaries. This is important, in that it undercuts the claim frequently put forward by historians that such rhetoric was overwhelmingly the preserve of Protestants and not of Catholics. This view has been held by scholars on both sides of the 'small/large fatherland' debate; Alexander Schmidt suggests that the *Vaterland* chiefly existed as a tool of Protestant propaganda, whilst Robert von Friedeburg states that Catholics were prevented from developing a strong sense of loyalty to a *patria* by their prior attachment to universalist visions of Christendom.[62] Meanwhile, Philipp Soergel has identified a strain of Counter-Reformation-infused religious patriotism that arose in the Catholic territories of Bavaria and Austria during this period, but says that it was not found outside the Empire's south-east.[63] Yet in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, a pan-German fatherland appears to have been cited by and for Catholics without hesitation. As we have already seen, both Tridentine stalwarts such as Dietrich of Paderborn and irenic moderates like William the Rich made recourse to it on occasion. The choice of whether or not to do so seems to have been driven by expediency; hence, in the example above, the

[61] Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to States General of the United Provinces, 14 October 1605, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 6, fols 102^{r}-103^{v}.
[62] Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich 1555-1648* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 421, 425-27; Robert von Friedeburg, ''Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriot*ismus*: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert' in *'Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Robert von Friedeburg (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), pp. 7-54 (p. 51).
[63] Philip Soergel, 'Religious Patriotism in Early-Modern Catholicism' in *'Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Robert von Friedeburg (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), pp. 91-104 (pp. 103-04).

Catholic Archduke Albert was encouraged to think of the fatherland whereas the Protestant regents of the rebellious Dutch provinces were not.

One of the region's most famous Catholic figureheads during this era was of course Ernest of Bavaria, holder of a slew of bishoprics and co-director prince of the Circle. One of his appeals to the fatherland further demonstrates how it was available to all as a rhetorical tool, and could be used as such quite cynically. In mid-1599, as other members of the Circle mobilised to deal with the fallout of the Spanish Winter, his government wrote to the assembled *Kreis* delegates asking for military support against "foreign, alien troops" serving the Dutch, saying this was necessary "for the maintenance of the common fatherland."[64] The territory he specifically wanted help for was the duchy of Westphalia – an appanage of the Electorate of Cologne which he admitted actually "belong[ed] to the Electoral Rhenish Circle" and not the Westphalian one – meaning that an appeal to a broader fatherland was useful as a basis for establishing a mutual link between the hard-pressed Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates and a fiefdom outside their collective purview.[65] The questionable sincerity of Ernest's patriotism was shown by his demand that if troops were indeed assigned to protect his duchy, their "assembly in such regions as do not belong to the Westphalian Circle should in no way be permitted."[66]

Plainly, the flexibility of patriotic rhetoric enabled the Elector's attempt to have his cake and eat it; according to his definition, duty to the fatherland compelled his *Kreis* colleagues to help his lands outside the Circle, but did not compel those lands to accept the burden of

[64] Ernest of Bavaria to officers and envoys of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates in Münster, 22 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fols 348^{r}, 350^{r}.
[65] Ernest of Bavaria to officers and envoys of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates in Münster, 22 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 350^{r}.
[66] Ernest of Bavaria to officers and envoys of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates in Münster, 22 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 350^{v}.

allowing the helpers to muster there beforehand. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that such obvious self-serving selectivity cheapened the *Vaterland*'s value as intellectual currency. Certainly, Ernest's supporters threw the term around lightly enough; for instance, in 1591 the pro-Bavarian publicist Michael of Aitzing praised the Elector as an outstanding "father of the fatherland" after he requested the removal of the cows which the garrison of Bonn had been allowing to graze in his subjects' gardens.[67] If one could be lauded as the acme of patriotism merely for asking soldiers to move a few farm animals, it is scarce wonder that fatherland discourse did not have a transformational impact on *Kreis* debates.

So far, we have seen that the attraction of the *patria* as a concept in Circle discourse stemmed largely from its elasticity. It could be hailed or ignored depending on the needs of the moment, and its parameters could also be tailored accordingly. Generally, defining those parameters as roughly the same as those of Germany or the Empire was most useful to *Kreis* actors, which explains the prevalence of the 'large fatherland' in their records. Nonetheless, we can go further. So far, we have confined ourselves to examining instances where the scale of the fatherland is spelt out or clearly implied, but it is important to note that this was not always the case. Georg Schmidt (although broadly supportive of the 'large fatherland' model) has drawn attention to some sources in which the *Vaterland* seems to become wholly untethered from geography, cases in which "this values-based fatherland is not spatially defined."[68]

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[67] Michael of Aitzing, *Historica Novem Mensium Relatio: Das ist / Ein Historische beschreibung der merchlichen vnd Gedenckwurdigen Geschichten / so sich die negsten neun Monat / nicht allein ihm Heyligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nacion / vnd dem Vhralten Ertzstifft Cölln / Sonder auch Ihm Niderlandt / Franckreich / Engellandt / Poln / Hungern vnd Behaymb. darzu in Italien / Hispanien / vnd andern Königreichen / Herzogthummen / Graff / vnnd Herrschafften zugetragen / vom Junio des 1590 Jahr an / biß auff ietzt Ablauffendts Monat Marty dises gegenwurtigen Jars nach Christi Geburt 1591 Durch Michaeln Erzinger auß Osterreich* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1591), p. 28.

[68] Georg Schmidt, 'Teutsche Kriege: Nationale Deutungsmuster und integrative Wertvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Reich' in *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandskonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. by Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 33-61 (p. 47).

Such instances are not lacking from the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian region, as is demonstrated by the correspondence of one of the Circle's most active members, Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg. In one letter, he praised the conduct of Christian of Anhalt as "together with the lord of Touraine and others... loyal to the common fatherland."[69] It is not easy to pin down what fatherland the two can have had in common, however, since Anhalt was a German prince whilst Touraine was a French Huguenot nobleman who at this point had no dynastic or territorial connection to the Reich even at its most expansively defined. In the count's later missive to his son John VII, the fatherland strays even further from existing polities on the ground and into the realms of universal abstraction, as he writes "we co-religionists are all members of one body, whose head is the Lord Christ, therefore everyone who is a Christian, whether he is of high or low estate, a highlander or a Netherlander, French, English, or *of whichever nation he wills*, must take on with such seriousness as if it threatened his own neck those far-reaching matters concerning our fellow believers, the church of God, and the fatherland."[70] The idea that Christians of quite literally all nations could owe allegiance to the same unspecified fatherland stands starkly at odds with the vision of the *patria* as a territorially bounded entity used to define an in-group and an out-group.

Sources in the *Kreisarchiv* are more constrained by diplomatic formulae than the familial correspondence of the Circle's leaders, and such expansive musings do not appear in quite the same way. Nonetheless, there are no shortage of examples in which the fatherland invoked appears to be unknowable or contradictory. In 1589, the Circle Lieutenant Otto of Bylandt-Rheydt wrote to William the Rich about whether his health permitted him to

[69] Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg to Prince Christian I of Anhalt-Bernburg, 7 June 1591, in *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau: series 2*, ed. by Groen van Prinsterer, 5 vols (Utrecht: Kemink, 1857-61), I (1857), p. 164.
[70] Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg to Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 12 August 1594, in *Archives ou Correspondance… series 2*, I, p. 284. Emphasis mine.

command an upcoming campaign, stating his intention never "to deny in any way the duty to the salvation of the fatherland that is urged by your princely grace."[71] The location of this fatherland is opaque; Bylandt-Rheydt was a subject of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, and it is impossible to disentangle his position as a vassal writing to his overlord (in which capacity his fatherland appears to be within the bounds of the United Duchies) from his position as a junior Circle officer writing to a senior one (in which capacity his fatherland appears larger). Similarly, in 1607 another of the Duchies' nobles wrote of his desire to do "what the dear fatherland's dire need requires" in a letter which also references his family's obligations to Jülich-Cleves-Berg, the Electorate of Cologne, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle, and the kingdom of Spain, without making any move to clarify which (if any) of these entities the fatherland should be identified with.[72]

What was the purpose of allowing the characterisation of the *patria* to slip its remaining moorings to a definite sense of place, turning it into a 'floating fatherland' without a single locus? One answer is suggested if we look comparatively at the nineteenth century, and a concept which came to occupy a similar role in that period: the *Heimat*. Alon Confino suggests that this term – which is not readily translatable, having many of the connotations of both the English 'hometown' and 'homeland' whilst being perhaps more abstract than both – came to hold particular value in national discourse precisely by virtue of its vagueness. By using deliberately generic imagery to evoke the *Heimat* (such as imagined cityscapes designed to look like everywhere and nowhere), Germans of this era drew upon its "indeterminate nature, people, and locality" to rally each other round a vision of what they

[71] Otto of Bylandt-Rheydt to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 26 November 1589, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 13^{r-v}.
[72] William of Neuenahr to Jülich-Cleves-Berg Council, 3 May 1607, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 6, fol. 278^{r-v}.

held dear that was broad enough to accommodate everyone.[73] Interestingly, Confino draws a direct contrast between *Vaterland* and *Heimat* during his period of study, saying that "Fatherland and nation, which brought to mind Germany's border, territorial integrity, and political or military system, represented Germany as something fixed [whereas] *Heimat*… was, in contrast, infinitely adaptable."[74] This may well be the case for the nineteenth century, but it seems that in the era of the Augsburg Peace the fatherland had yet to take on such rigidly defined associations, and thus was able to serve as a conveniently malleable object of affection. Only later would the *Heimat* replace it in this role.

iv) Conclusion

As we have seen, the linguistic terrain in which arguments about soldiers took place was complex, and it is often necessary to spend time unpacking the specific connotations of individual terms and phrases. Nonetheless, our analysis has yielded more than just a jumble of different definitions, since some general trends emerge clearly from the noise. First, we can say that the terms of *Kreis* debate were fairly stable during the years 1576-1618, and that neither of the major linguistic divides theorised by historians (a split between Protestants and Catholics, and a split between the earlier and later parts of the period) seem to be borne out by the sources. Second, we can say that Circle actors generally preferred to define terms such as 'foreigner' and 'fatherland' with reference to the Empire or Germany rather than to the *Reich*'s component territories, although this appears to represent a contingent rhetorical strategy and not a binding declaration of allegiance. Third, we can say that one of the most seemingly frustrating and inexplicable features of Circle discourse – namely, its frequent forays into vagueness, hedging, and omission – was a feature, not a bug. Ultimately, the *Kreis*

[73] Confino, *Nation as Local Metaphor*, pp. 164-68, 184-89.
[74] Confino, *Nation as Local Metaphor*, p. 185.

worked as a forum for fruitful debate because it embraced the value of constructive ambiguity.

The cumulative effect of these observations is to reinforce a crucial wider lesson about the political culture of the Circle, and by extension the Empire itself. On the evidence above, the decades before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War were not uniformly characterised by polarisation and rancour in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. Although the pressure of outside incursions was keenly felt, this did not manifest in the Circle's members splitting into rival confessional thought-worlds, exchanging faith in the *Reich* for fealty to territorial states, or abandoning attempts to find common ground with each other. Instead, they maintained a sophisticated toolkit of rhetorical techniques which allowed them to discuss serious military problems and partisan disagreements without descending into outright schism. In doing so, they drew on the wider traditions of Imperial political culture in the Augsburg Peace era, which – as Martin Heckel has observed – were characterised by adroit evasiveness concerning the definitive meaning of terms like 'religious freedom' and 'reform', permitting multiple interpretations to coexist without conflict.[75] This was achievement enough, but it is now time to look more closely at what happened when the Circle went beyond debating the problem of foreign soldiers, and started trying to articulate practical solutions.

[75] Martin Heckel, 'Politischer Friede und geistliche Freiheit im Ringen um die Wahrheit: Zur Historiographie des Augsburger Religionsfriedens von 1555', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 282:2 (2006), 391-425 (p. 421); Martin Heckel, 'Konfessionalisierung in Koexistenznöten: Zum Augsburger Religionsfrieden, Dreißigjährigen Krieg und Westfälischen Frieden in neuerer Sicht', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 280:3 (2005), 647-90 (p. 668).

Chapter II: The Kreis as a Military Actor

Soldiers were not simply an external problem for the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle to confront. The *Kreis* could also be a military actor in its own right – either by itself or in co-operation with its neighbours – meaning it had to take decisions about if, when, and who it should recruit for its own units. This has not escaped the notice of historians who have written on Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and indeed, has often played the lead role in their analysis. The capacity to raise forces to defend the Reich has been treated as the yardstick by which the Circle's success or failure as an institution is to be judged, and in general those scholarly judgements have been harsh. Winfried Dotzauer gives a typical assessment of the *Kreis* in this period as crippled by "military incapability" and consequently facing a "truly existential threat" from the spread of confessional violence.[1] Several historians identify the successful armed confiscation of the rebellious noble John of Rietberg's fief in 1567 as the high point in the Circle's history, after which it declined into "military powerlessness" and therefore irrelevance.[2]

The purpose of this chapter is not to overturn such judgements wholesale, but to suggest that a slightly different frame of reference is needed to assess the Circle's value. Although the

[1] Winfried Dotzauer*, Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806): Geschichte und Aktenedition* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998), p. 304; for similar sentiments, see Andreas Schneider, *Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Kreis im 16. Jahrhundert: Geschichte, Struktur und Funktion eines Verfassungsorgans des Alten Reiches* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1985), pp. 228-29; Paul Casser, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis' in *Der Raum Westfalen*, ed. by Hermann Aubin and Eduard Schulte, 6 vols (Münster: Reimar Hobbing, 1931-87), II (1934), pp. 33-70 (pp. 47-51); Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1998), pp. 97-138; Benno Rode, *Das Kreisdirektorium im Westfälischen Kreise von 1522-1609* (Münster: Münsterische Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung, 1916), pp. 103-04; Albrecht Luttenberger, *Kurfürsten, Kaiser und Reich: Politische Führung und Friedenssicherung unter Ferdinand I und Maximilian II* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern 1994), p. 428.

[2] Hans-Joachim Behr, 'Die Exekution des Niederrheinisch-Westfälischen Kreises gegen Graf Johann von Rietberg 1556-1566', *Westfälische Zeitschrift*, 128 (1978), p. 108; Hans-Joachim Behr, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis um 1560' in *Geschichtlicher Handatlas von Westfalen*, 3 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1975-94), II (1982); Helmut Neuhaus, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis – eine Region der Frühen Neuzeit?', *Westfälische Forschungen*, 52 (2002), p. 108.

Kreis did indeed have a weak track record at mobilising substantial forces, closer analysis suggests that – in the context of the volatile circumstances it faced – this was not always a bad thing. There is not sufficient space to discuss every instance of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia acting (or failing to act) as a military *Dienstherr* across several decades, so two particular case studies have been chosen. These illustrate the point by showing the Circle's recruitment at its most seemingly successful, and the problems such success brought with it. They will also serve to develop themes introduced in the last chapter, showing if and how 'patriotic' rhetorical categories and anti-foreigner sentiments were deployed when the *Kreis* was engaged in literal military deployments.

i) The *Kreis* Expedition to Hungary in 1596

Most academic coverage has focused on the mobilisation of Lower-Rhine-Westphalian forces to defend the Circle's home territory, but it is worth noting that this was not their only military function. For much of the period under consideration, the Holy Roman Empire was embroiled in the Long Turkish War which was being waged against the Ottoman Empire by the Austrian Habsburgs, principally in the Hungarian theatre.[3] Although Hungary was outside the Reich and not part of any *Kreis*, the Circles had a part to play in the war effort. Beginning in 1594, Rudolf II sought to supplement the *Türkensteuer* levies he had been granted by the Reichstag (which in themselves were quite substantial) with additional funding requests made directly to the *Kreise*; this resulted in grants of some 12 million Gulden, of which perhaps 7-8

[3] The Long Turkish War is somewhat lacking in comprehensive single-volume overviews, but for general information see Winfried Schulze, *Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen vnd gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1978); Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der „Lange Türkenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II. 1593–1606* (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993); Peter Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War*, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 76-103.

million actually made it into his coffers.[4] The Circles also supplied help in the form of men as well as money, and Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was no exception.

Historians have frequently been surprised by the scale of Imperial support for the Habsburg anti-Turkish endeavours, and have sought explanations for why many territories seemed more willing to contribute to a conflict fought beyond the Empire's borders than to the defence of their own doorsteps. Joachim Whaley states that "the apparent willingness with which these taxes were granted is remarkable", and must reflect an emergent sense of responsibility for the Reich's collective interests (aided by the self-interest of some princes, who saw the *Türkensteuer* as a Trojan horse to weaken their subjects' resistance to taxation).[5] Other scholars, such as Alexander Schmidt, foreground the specific role of fatherland rhetoric in enabling Germans of all backgrounds to pull together in defence of their *patria*.[6]

This phenomenon can be observed in the writings of some Lower-Rhine-Westphalian leaders, notably a letter sent to *Kreisoberst* Simon of Lippe in 1596. In it, the administrator of Osnabrück and Verden (Philip Sigismund, a Lutheran Welf) reported that the emperor's recent demand for 500 mounted arquebusiers for the Hungarian front would burden his subjects grievously, but that love for "the common fatherland of the German nation" drove him to contribute anyway.[7] Nonetheless, he demanded that if Lower-Rhine-Westphalia were to supply this unit to the Kaiser, only "experienced troops from this praiseworthy Circle's native-born subjects (whose youth and manhood the Estates know and possess good

[4] Fabian Schulze, *Die Reichskreise im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Kriegsfinanzierung und Bündnispolitik im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), pp. 70-1.
[5] Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire,* 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I, p. 355, see also p. 409.
[6] Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: politische Diskurse im Alten Reich* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 247-8; Antonio Liepold, *Wieder den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens: Die Rolle des niederen Adels in den Türkenkriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: Pieter Lang, 1998), pp. 310-14, 407-13.
[7] Administrator Philip Sigismund of Osnabrück and Verden to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 12 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 95^{v}.

witnesses thereto) should be appointed and accepted as leaders, and thus no foreigners [*außheimische*] should be preferred, which would shame and diminish the age-old laudable name of the manful Germans and this Circle."[8] Keen to reinforce the point, he added that the campaign against "the bloodthirsty archenemy, the Turk" required Lower-Rhine-Westphalia to uphold its reputation in the eyes of the emperor and neighbouring Circles, and as such "we on behalf of our see will give our vote to none other than domestic and native-born German subjects (which may be found qualified), and cannot at all consent to any foreign [*frembde*] nation."[9] This argument shows Imperial patriotic rhetoric could be strongly stated and also somewhat complex, with two interconnected faultlines between natives and outsiders being evoked in support of one another. In Philip Sigismund's view, the war was a contest between German virtue and Turkish barbarism (the first fault line, at a national level), meaning that honour demanded Lower-Rhine-Westphalia send its own sons rather than men born elsewhere (the second, regional, fault line).

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that such sentiments were the universal norm among Philip Sigismund's fellow *Kreis* members, or that they were decisive in determining how the Circle's recruitment was to be conducted. The specific vehemence of demands that foreign soldiers be excluded from service in 1596 owed something to events of the previous year, in which cavalry under the command of Adolf of Schwarzenberg had passed through Westphalia while bound for the Hungarian front. At that time, the civic authorities of Soest had compared their forced requisitioning and other misconduct unfavourably with Spanish

[8] Administrator Philip Sigismund of Osnabrück and Verden to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 12 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fols 95^{v}-96^{r}.
[9] Administrator Philip Sigismund of Osnabrück and Verden to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 12 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 96^{r}.

troops who had troubled the region in 1586, whilst the nearby count of Waldeck accused them of being "for the most part un-German Walloons and Spaniards" themselves.[10]

Fears of a repeat performance during the next expedition to Hungary thus seem to have led to a spike in anti-foreigner sentiment among Estates that had been affected, but not everyone took these concerns deeply to heart. In April 1596, *Kreisoberst* Simon of Lippe wrote to various princes of the Circle confirming arrangements for the upcoming campaign and seeking to reassure them that the excesses of "Schwarzenberg's riders" would not reoccur; however, the reasons he gave for confidence were primarily practical ones (he claimed that this time the soldiers would be well-paid, few in number, and supplied with provisions in advance) rather than patriotic ones concerning the exclusion of foreigners.[11] He did state that Philip Sigismund's demands had been met and all four commanders of the cavalry companies would be "native-born noblemen and inhabitants of this Circle", a significant concession.[12] However, the draft version of this letter has also been preserved and reveals that this reference to their origins was only inserted as a later addendum to the original text, suggesting that it was not a core part of Simon's message to his worried neighbours.[13] It is unlikely to have placated all their concerns in any case; the prince-abbot of Corvey had already noted that the presence of "several of the emperor's ordained commissioners" alongside the troops in 1595 had failed to prevent them from ravaging Westphalia, and he

[10] Mayor and council of Soest to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 18 May 1595, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fols 451^{r}-452^{v}; Count Francis III of Waldeck to Landgrave Maurice of Hessen-Kassel, 8 June 1595, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 595^{v}.
[11] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey and others, 26 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fols 111^{r}-112^{v}; see also a letter from Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates to Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey, 29 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 136^{r-v}, which reassures the abbot that troops passing through his land will be led by "native-born German subjects", but spends more time laying out the details of how they will purchase their supplies on the open market rather than confiscating them from his subjects.
[12] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey and others, 26 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 111^{r}.
[13] Draft of letter from Count Simon VI of Lippe to Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey and others, 26 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 296^{r}.

complained bitterly about having the muster-ground for the new expedition located in his territory.[14]

A more detailed look at how the Circle actually went about recruiting its five hundred horsemen further illustrates the relatively minor role that anti-foreigner sentiment played in practice. The force was split into four companies, each with their own commander and under the overall direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Jobst of Fürstenberg (whom the authorities in Münster had already recommended for *Kreis* military service, making no reference to his origins but merely praising him as an "experienced and manful soldier").[15] These four officers were the only individuals who were required to be subjects of the Circle, and their commissions imposed no requirement to grant local men preferential treatment when filling the rest of the roster, instead stating that the officers' ability "to make themselves ready with suitable and able-bodied men [shall be] in all things free and unhindered."[16] There is some indication that the men were expected to be German (the treasurer's envoy accompanying the soldiers on their journey to Hungary was instructed by the Circle to report on "other nations present in the Christian camp", implying that the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian contingent would be from a single nation), but this is slight.[17]

Indeed, the primary and overriding criterion that made men suitable for recruitment in this way seems always to have been military experience. Even those Westphalian Estates who had suffered from Schwarzenberg's troop transit did not lose sight of this reality; Paderborn drew

[14] Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey to Landgrave Maurice of Hessen-Kassel, 24 May 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 293^{r}.
[15] Letter of recommendation to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 1 November 1594, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 340^{r-v}.
[16] Patent for recruiting cavalry commanders, 29 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 129^{r}.
[17] Instructions for the Circle *Pfennigmeister*, 30 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 158^{r}.

a sharp contrast between "practised and tested troopers [and] subjects or country folk unexperienced in war", warning that "should one undertake to resist the former with the latter, there is little to be achieved save only sending the subjects to the slaughterhouse."[18] Thus, when recommending one of their watch-masters for a place on the expedition, the civic leaders of Aachen thought it worthwhile to allude to the emperor's need for "brave, steady men from this place" but only after mentioning that he was "raised and educated from his youth among the wars of our neighbours" in the Netherlands; military experience abroad was prioritised over evidence of undiluted home-grown loyalty.[19] Another important consideration – particularly for cavalrymen – was whether recruits had their own mount, armour, and equipment, something which the *Kreisoberst* was instructed to ensure by the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates.[20]

Ultimately, the muster-lists for the 1596 expedition bear out the suspicion that – when raising men to serve the emperor in the Circle's name – *Kreis* leaders took a minimalist approach to fulfilling Philip Sigismund's request for native-born champions of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's German honour. It is of course impossible to be certain about the origins and allegiances of the ordinary troopers, as personal information such as their birthplace is not recorded in these or other records (a fact which in itself demonstrates that policing a separation between natives and outsiders was not a major concern). Nonetheless, going by their names alone, we can come to some rough estimates about the composition of the force sent to Hungary in 1596.[21] Of those soldiers who have identifiable toponymic names, only

[18] Report from Brakel to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 20/30 March 1595, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 8, fol. 510^{r}.
[19] Mayor, Jurors, and Council of Aachen to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 6 June 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 409^{r}.
[20] Instructions of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates for Count Simon VI of Lippe, 30 April 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 179^{r}.
[21] The calculations for all the following are based on Muster Roll of Jobst of Fürstenberg, 24 June 1596, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. III 84, fols 1^{r}-3^{v}; Register of Horsemen from All Four Banners, 1596, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv,

52% can be linked to places within Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. The majority of the remainder – some 29% of the total – have names that connect them to other German-speaking parts of the Holy Roman Empire, but that still leaves another 19% who appear to have come from elsewhere. Within that, the majority were linked to the neighbouring Low Countries, which could conceivably be claimed as part of the Holy Roman Empire or even of Germany. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that most Lower-Rhine-Westphalians did not think of them as such during this period (for detailed discussion of which, see the next chapter), and in any case several individuals had toponyms connecting them with places where this claim would have been especially tendentious, such as the county of Flanders (historically part of the French kingdom) and Honelles in Francophone Hainaut. Additionally, a small handful of troopers had names that hint at clearly non-Germanic origins, such as "Henry de Welsche" and "Jacob Polack". We can thus conclude that the five hundred cavalry hired by the Circle in 1596 were not mostly Walloons and Spaniards as some had feared, but nor were they a pure force of local recruits; around half seem to have hailed from outside Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and a non-trivial portion possessed only tenuous credentials to be considered Germans at all.

Aside from the main point that the Circle was not averse to hiring soldiers who could be considered foreign under various definitions, the muster rolls from 1596 also hint at some other patterns in recruitment policy. Collectively, the territories of the United Duchies accounted for nigh on a third of all cavalrymen with identifiable toponyms, and no other Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estate came close to matching their participation levels; Jülich alone accounted for 18%, whereas the highest proportion hailing from a Circle Estate not ruled by John William was the 3% linked (somewhat surprisingly) to Aachen. This suggests

Akten), Nr. III 84, fols 4^{r}-9^{v}; Muster Roll of Dietrich Freitag, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fols 506^{r}-507^{v}.

that the lands of the La Marcks remained fully integrated into the Circle's affairs even after the *Kreisoberst* title passed out of the dynasty's hands. After Jülich, the individual Imperial territory that contributed the largest portion of the force was in fact Electoral Cologne, whose subjects made up 10% of the total. This further reinforces the primacy of practicalities over political loyalties when it came to recruitment; the men of a territory which was geographically entwined with the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle but constitutionally distinct from it were apparently signed up at higher rates than 'native-born' subjects of the Circle.[22]

In the event, even the limited attempts to ensure local leadership of the *Kreis* expedition did not set an especially encouraging precedent. Neither this nor any of the other measures taken to prevent troops from misbehaving were successful at protecting the population of Corvey from depredations; Simon was forced to apologise for the muster dragging on beyond the appointed date, and the prince-abbot complained at length about soldiers violently driving innkeepers out of their homes and beating his officials.[23] In subsequent years, further Lower-Rhine-Westphalian attempts were made to aid the Kaiser, but military experience continued to trump patriotic credentials as a qualification for participation. When recommending his sons for command of an expedition in 1597, Count Edzard of East Frisia did call them "German soldiers", but only in the context of a statement that they were available because the king of Spain had "no need for German soldiers currently".[24] Their service in the Army of

[22] For the ongoing military entanglement of Electoral Cologne and Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, see Lahrkamp, Helmut, 'Kölnisches Kriegsvolk in der ersten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges', *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 161 (1959), 114-145 (p. 137); Hubert Salm, 'Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635-1650' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Bonn, 1986), pp. 86-86, 166-67.

[23] Draft from Count Simon VI of Lippe to Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey, 12 June 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fol. 456^{r-v}; Prince-Abbot Dietrich of Corvey to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 21 June 1596, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 9, fols 493^{r}-495^{v}.

[24] Count Edzard II of East Frisia to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 22 April 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 76, fol. 53^{r}.

Flanders (and in France) was an asset, not a problem. Enthusiasm for participating in the Long Turkish War faded with time, and by 1605 the Circle was regretfully informing the emperor that collecting funds for his campaigns would be prioritised behind raising money for the Circle's own defence.[25]

The fact that these priorities had often been reversed up until that point is, as historians have noted, surprising. Nonetheless, the greater willingness to raise troops for service against the Turks than for service at home may be explicable not only in terms of patriotic sentiment, but also in terms of an important practicality. Namely, troops sent to Hungary would spend a much shorter period on Lower-Rhine-Westphalian soil, and as such would be less of a burden on the Circle's subjects. The keenly felt nature of this burden can be observed from a second case study: the mobilisation of a multi-*Kreis* force to defend the Rhineland in 1599.

ii) The 'German Autumn' of 1599

The basic chronology of the crisis of 1598-99 has already been set out in the introduction, but it is worth reiterating that it represents the most serious incursion of the Eighty Years' War onto Lower-Rhine-Westphalian territory. Some 24,000 troops under Admiral Mendoza passed through the Lower Rhine region and parts of the Münsterland in a bid to outflank the Dutch Republic, and much of this force remained stationed there for several months. Their seizure of winter quarters in this manner has ensured that the episode's common name remains the 'Spanish Winter', but the peak of the violence actually occurred during the summer and early autumn of 1599. In response to the incursion, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian, Electoral Rhenish, Upper Rhenish, Lower Saxon, and Swabian Circles had eventually agreed upon a joint military reaction at a five-*Kreis* summit in March. They

[25] Extract from Lower-Rhine-Westphalian delegates' answer to Imperial commissioners, 1 April 1605, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 34, fol. 90^{v}.

undertook to raise nine Roman months' worth of funding for a force of around 20,000 men (the core of which would be 6,000 Brunswick and 5,000 Hessian troops), which would be deployed to expel the Army of Flanders from its remaining footholds on Imperial territory.[26] This army did not see action until August and September, when attempts were made to retake Emmerich, Orsoy, Rheinberg, and Rees.

Historians have noted the patriotic rhetoric which swirled around the multi-*Kreis* mobilisation. For example, Johannes Arndt quotes a manifesto issued by several Protestant princes participating in the campaign, which fumed that "among the Germans of old it was a totally unheard of thing, that foreign potentates should indulge themselves by practising defiance, wickedness, wantonness, and greed upon the same."[27] Yet, once again, one does not have to probe very deeply to find evidence that undermines the framing of the expedition as an anti-foreigner crusade. While formulating the plan of action for the five-*Kreis* alliance, the Circles' representatives did invoke martial customs "of the praiseworthy old Germans", appealing to their example in an effort to promote good discipline among the troops.[28] Nonetheless, their optimism that the soldiers would behave was primarily founded in the claim that the "troops shall be bound to the Holy Empire with an oath", a formulation which highlighted the soldiers' contractual relationship to a *Dienstherr*, not the ties of birthplace or ancestry.[29] Moreover, attempts to exclude those who were not *Reich* natives from command were explicitly considered, but failed to be adopted as policy. Representatives complained that Brunswick wanted to appoint Oliver of Tympel (who hailed from the Brabantine

[26] The importance of inter-*Kreis* co-operation to the enterprise has sometimes been forgotten. See for instance Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 14, which attributes the raising of the entire force to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle.
[27] Quoted in Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlände*, p. 127.
[28] Planning document from the meeting of five Circles, 1 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 78r.
[29] Planning document from the meeting of five Circles, 1 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 79r.

nobility) to take charge of the artillery, pointing out that he "was not resident in the Holy Empire [and] among the Holy Empire's inhabitants many qualified and suitable persons can be found."[30] However, these objections were not sufficient to outweigh Tympel's long record of service in the United Provinces and France, and he did in fact receive the Artillery Master position with its monthly salary of 1,200 florins. Thus, in 1599 even the fairly limited exclusion of outsiders which the 1596 expedition had upheld (i.e. reserving senior positions for *Kreis* subjects) was not repeated.

The personnel lists of Tympel's units further underline the multinational recruitment behind the multi-*Kreis* expedition. Here he is listed as "Monsieur Olivier von Tempel", with both the French title and the fact that his first name is italicised (which, as discussed previously, was the standard orthographic method of denoting *Welsch* loanwords and names) indicating that no attempt was made to conceal his outsider status.[31] Although a sizeable majority of those under his command appear to have originated in the Empire, there are also several men listed with italicised names that mark them out as non-Germans, such as "Jacques Despontin", "Antoni Antonius", and "Raphael de Oldem [Oldham?], Englishman."[32] The much greater scale of the army mobilised by the Circles in 1599 compared to the 1596 expedition means that it is not possible to analyse a detailed breakdown of the entire force, particularly as the accuracy of the lists was hotly contested; the rolls for Tympel's contingent became embroiled in a legal wrangle over back-pay, in which his opponents claimed that many individuals had been either falsely included or unfairly left off.[33] Nonetheless, the patents under which the

[30] Planning document from the meeting of five Circles, 1 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 75^{v}.
[31] Ordinance concerning personnel and pay for the artillery, 8 August 1599, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 32^{r}.
[32] Ordinance concerning personnel and pay for the artillery, 8 August 1599, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fols 32^{v}-35^{r}.
[33] Plea in Tympel case to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 24 June 1604, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 42^{r}.

army was recruited again indicate that experience, not a specific origin or allegiance, was what the planners sought. The commission issued to Alexander of Vehlen to raise a Lower-Rhine-Westphalian infantry regiment required him to hire "good, practised soldiers" led by "suitable, well-qualified persons", and set out the precise ratio of musketeers to melee-fighting *Doppelsöldner*, but nothing further was stipulated about the kind of men he was to enlist.[34] Indeed, the document's patriotic content did not extend beyond a general invocation of the imperilled fatherland's welfare.[35] Commissions issued for the raising of cavalry companies were similar, and Simon's instructions to the various Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates who were organising troop contingents asked only for "good, able-bodied riders and soldiers" without further specifics.[36]

Returning once more to Tympel, his example indicates another way in which the Circle's recruitment practices could enmesh it in affairs abroad. Since the artillery commander had many financial and legal connections in the United Provinces, once arguments over his back-pay deteriorated into a protracted stalemate which *Kreisoberst* Simon was slow to resolve, Tympel's widow threatened to bring her suit before the courts in Holland and pursue the case there as well.[37] This close entanglement of Imperial and Dutch affairs is symbolic of the extent to which even the 'German' elements of the five-*Kreis* mobilisation drew heavily upon connections with the United Provinces. This interrelationship has not generally been remarked upon by previous scholarship (Nicolette Mout, for instance, confines her discussion

[34] Patent for an infantry regiment, 13/23 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fols 58^{r}-59^{r}.
[35] Patent for an infantry regiment, 13/23 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 57^{v}.
[36] Copy of commission for a cavalry company, 12/22 June 1599, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 44^{r-v}; Patent for recruiting a cavalry company, 12/22 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fols 54^{r}-55^{r}; Count Simon VI of Lippe to Circle Estates supplying troops, 14/24 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 39^{r}.
[37] Annotation to plea in Tympel case to Count Simon VI of Lippe, 24 June 1604, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 42^{r}.

of it to noting that a formal deal whereby the Republic would subsidise the expedition did not materialise), but should not be wholly surprising.[38] Despite periodic protestations that the campaign was aimed against evildoers from both sides of the Eighty Years' War, the focus of the *Kreise* was squarely on ousting the remnants of Mendoza's army, and in consequence there was a fair degree of overlap with the goals of the Dutch war effort.

This overlap also manifested in terms of personnel. For example, Philip of Hohenlohe-Langenburg played a prominent role in the campaign as field marshal of the contingent under Brunswick's direction; he was also one of the Dutch rebels' most long-standing officers, having fought in their service since the early 1570s, and he still claimed the title of lieutenant-general of Holland and Zeeland.[39] Another example from slightly lower down the ranks is that of John Tetlingen, who testified that he had "served the Lord States [General] as a captain and gentleman of the artillery for several years, and was called from the siege of Zaltbommel [to] the Rees campaign" in which he "loyally served… Lord Simon."[40] Given that the siege of Zaltbommel took place in rebel-held Gelderland between 15 May and 22 July 1599, Tetlingen's transfer from Dutch to Imperial service took place only once the campaign season had been underway for several months, and shows that the 'Dutch' army which fought the Spanish in the Netherlands and the 'German' army which fought the Spanish in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia were at least partly comprised of the same people. Thus,

[38] Nicolette Mout, 'Die Niederlande und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert 1512-1609' in *Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?* ed. by Volker Press and Dieter Stievermann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 143-68 (p. 165).

[39] 'List of princely persons, colonels, and cavalry commanders accompanying the troops in Imperial pay', 30 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 79, fol. 633^{r}; for details of Hohenlohe's actions in summer 1599, see Report of Councillors at Xanten to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 31 August 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fols 519^{r}-521^{v}; for an overview of Hohenlohe's career, see Renaat Vanheusden, 'Graaf Filips van Hohenlohe (1550-1606)', *Het Verbond: Grensverleggend tijdschrift voor Vlaams-Nederlandse samenwerking*, 22:2 (2010), 16-32.

[40] Testimony of John of Grour (known as Tetlingen), 26 July 1609, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 128^{r}.

even as the Netherlands was breaking away from the Imperial orbit, the Circles' mission to redeem German honour still involved drawing heavily on their remaining links to the Low Countries.

It is therefore apparent that the conflicts of 1599 were not, in practice, a battle between local defenders and foreign invaders. The former also incorporated various elements which could be considered foreign by several metrics, and there were many among the latter who might claim to be natives (Mendoza's garrison in Emmerich, for instance, consisted of four banners of Germans).[41] The question still remains, however, of how successful the Rees campaign actually was at protecting Lower-Rhine-Westphalia from attack. The expedition of 1599 undoubtedly represents the high point of *Kreis* military organisation in the region, and might indeed be considered the upper bound of the force it was feasible for the Circles to mobilise in any given situation. Historians who believe that the failure of the *Kreis* system in this period was fundamentally a failure to organise sufficient defensive forces might therefore be expected to regard the events of 1599 as a bright exception to the gloomy rule. This is, broadly speaking, Arndt's position; he suggests that the deployment was a strong deterrent against further large-scale deployments of Spanish troops in Westphalia, albeit one that was not maintained.[42] Other scholars have been less complimentary about the enterprise, however, and see the failure to take Rees and the subsequent mutiny as evidence that the *Kreise* were not credible entities at all. This view is encapsulated by the comments of Geoffrey Parker, who describes the entire experience as "totally unsuccessful" adding that "it was this débâcle, more than anything else, that initiated the headlong creation of separate territorial armies in

[41] Jacob Friedlieb, *Historicae Relationis Continvuatio. Das ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung / was sich seithero verschiener Herbstmeß abgelauffenen 1598 Jahrs biß in jetzigen Monat Aprilen angangenen 1599. jahrs in der Christenheit / als Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / Vngern / Schweden / furnemblich aber in den respectiue Fürstenthumben vnd Stifftern / Cleeff / Münster / Cölln / vnd darumbhero denckwurdiges so woll in Kriegs als andern sachen zugetragen* (Cologne: William Lützenkirchen, 1599), p. 29.
[42] Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlände*, p. 128.

the early years of the seventeenth century, for by that time the supra-territorial institutions of the Empire had become all but ineffectual."[43]

There is an element of truth in both stances (though the territorial standing armies which Parker cites did not arise until after the Thirty Years' War), but both are hobbled by their assumption that the best litmus test of the *Kreis* system was its ability to organise a strong military response to foreign incursions.[44] I would argue that – measured according to these terms – the Circles did indeed fail in 1599, but that this failure is not inherently damning because such a response could not have provided a viable long-term solution anyway. The Rees campaign did end badly, but even if the town had been recaptured, the cost would probably have still exceeded the benefits. For those lands stuck next to the Eighty Years' War, it was not possible to fight fire with fire without leaving more people burned than before.

This becomes clearer when we look more closely at the progress and consequences of the campaign. First, it should be acknowledged that in the initial phases of the enterprise there were undoubtedly some hopeful signs. As early as April, one report spoke promisingly of "infantry on the move, particularly from the noble prince and lord of Hessen, whose stately host is already advancing along with the Saxon, Brunswick, and Margraviate troops, so that a powerful force is coming together."[45] Even the rumour of this army was enough to provoke a certain degree of anxiety in Brussels, and in May the acting governor of the Spanish

[43] Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 14.
[44] In fairness to Arndt, in another article he does briefly suggest that "the greatest value of [Circle] units lay on the level of symbolic communication". See Johannes Arndt, 'Der Niederrhein zwischen dem niederländischen Aufstand und dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg' in *Der Jülich-Klevische Erbstreit 1609: Seine Voraussetzungen und Folgen*, ed. by Manfred Groten, Clemens von Looz-Corswarem, and Wilfried Reininghaus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2011), pp. 163-76 (p. 171).
[45] Copy of a report from Immenhausen, 12 April 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 62^{r}.

Netherlands lobbied the Circles to turn their guns on the Dutch instead.[46] Making the Army of Flanders petition the *Kreise* rather than vice versa was a positive step, and once the campaign got underway, the clearing of Orsoy and Emmerich of their Spanish garrisons demonstrated that the Circle army was by no means wholly toothless. Nonetheless, it was not long before the essential contradictions of the enterprise began to pull it apart.

Already in May, Simon had voiced concerns that the arrival of the allied *Kreis* forces in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia would be counterproductive, because the Circle's Estates were unwilling to send forth their own troops if that would mean leaving their domains unprotected from the newcomers.[47] Indeed, some territories who had initially promised to send men went on to backtrack on their commitments, citing changed circumstance and the need to defend their own borders from emergent threats.[48] Meanwhile, in places that were defended or liberated by the Circles' forces, the cry swiftly went up that the frying pan had merely been exchanged for the fire. Emmerich had suffered grievously under the Army of Flanders' occupation, but not long after the Mendoza's forces withdrew, the civic authorities were already sending anguished complaints about the disturbances caused by Hohenlohe's men and their unreasonable demands for billets and weaponry.[49]

These concerns deepened with time, and the supposedly 'German' character of the Circles' forces was scant reassurance for those affected; councillors in Jülich-Cleves-Berg began worriedly sharing reports about the movements of threatening units, and the fact that these

[46] Instructions for the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoy to the summit at Hoya, 27 May 1599, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 37, fol. 18^{r}.
[47] Count Simon VI of Lippe's instructions for Casper of Herigen's mission to Ernest of Bavaria, 10 May 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 100^{r-v}.
[48] Mayor, council, and jurors of Aachen to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 2 July 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fols 139^{r}-140^{v}.
[49] Correspondence record concerning Emmerich, 22 September 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fols 542^{r}-547^{v}.

were allied "German troops" made little difference to their anxieties.[50] Indeed, some jettisoned the notion of a common German endeavour altogether in favour of a more narrowly defined patriotic vision, and began openly considering demands to send "the Brunswickers back to their fatherland" before they could do more damage.[51] This does not prove that the crisis caused a lasting transition from Imperial to territorial loyalties; as was seen in the previous chapter, it was quite normal to adjust the fatherland's imagined parameters to suit the rhetorical needs of the moment. Nonetheless, it highlights the essential fragility of patriotism as an organising principle for a military campaign. In the event, sending the soldiers home was beyond anyone's capacity, and reports from early October paint a damning picture of the consequences. By this point, the army had begun "to behave as nothing other than enemies" to the local people, it had splintered into roving bands scattered as far afield as Oldenburg, and its erstwhile commanders were reduced to hapless cat-herders, trying to second-guess the deserters' movements and mitigate the spread of violence and disease.[52] The 'Spanish Winter' that had paralysed Westphalia had been succeeded by a 'German Autumn' that was scarcely less destructive to the region's inhabitants.

The problem was not necessarily that the army lacked patriotic spirit, but that patriotism in this period was too inherently fissile to bind an army together. For instance, many soldiers on the campaign did demonstrate German pride, yet they associated this with valiant service abroad rather than defence of a homeland. For example, one officer distanced himself from his men's actions during the mutiny, denouncing "this execrable example, not worthy of the knightly German name" and claiming that he had exhorted the troops to display instead

[50] Councillors at Düsseldorf to John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 27 September 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fol. 554^{r-v}.
[51] Constantine Francot to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg and council, 29 September 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fol. 581^{r}.
[52] Councillors at Düsseldorf to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 3 October 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fol. 612^{r}; Report on military activities, 6 October 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fols 628^{r}-630^{v}.

"steadfastness, manliness, obedience, and patience the whole time, as if we were in the Netherlands."[53] In his mind, the natural setting for Teutonic martial virtue was the battlefields of the Eighty Years' War upon which many of his men had already fought, not Lower-Rhine-Westphalia.

In consequence, we should not be surprised that the permeable boundary between the forces of the *Kreise* and the States General worked both ways in 1599. By October, it was already being reported that several "common captains and officers had suggested that they would like to go to the [Dutch] States and join their service", along with the troops still under their control.[54] Not all of the rank and file were willing to go along with this, but it points to another of the inherent dangers of large-scale *Kreis* mobilisations. By bringing large numbers of soldiers into the region who could not be kept in service indefinitely, the Circles were providing a convenient source of recruits for the belligerents who had caused the problems in the first place. This would have been the case even if the campaign had been victorious and the troops had been dismissed in an orderly manner; the men had to go somewhere after being discharged, and it is likely that many would have taken up the obvious opportunities for employment in the Low Countries.

The 1599 campaign cannot be said to have been a success in terms of deterring future incursions into Lower-Rhine-Westphalian territory. Already in 1600, a group of the Circle's Estates were wearily contemplating new schemes to deal with fresh instances of "the longstanding misdeeds and arrogance of the neighbouring soldiers", this time with the

[53] Quoted in Gerhard Oestreich, 'Der römische Stoizismus und die oranische Heeresreform', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 176.1 (1953), 17-43 (p. 32).
[54] Report on military activities, 6 October 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fol. 628^{r}.

tentative idea of establishing a defensive buffer zone between the Meuse and the Rhine.[55] The response was muted, with some local elites citing bad memories of the Brunswick forces and expressing a firm desire that they should "not be attacked and burdened with these troops" again.[56] The chief legacy of the 'German Autumn' was a strong sense among those who had participated in it that such cures were worse than the disease.

iii) Conclusion

We can thus see that the mobilisation of 1599 was a failure, but not one that is straightforwardly attributable to the insufficient war-making capacities of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. The core problem was rather the intractable circumstances in which the region found itself. In effect, the *Kreis* was caught on the horns of a dilemma that was not resolvable by military force. The Circle was located next to an ongoing conflict of sufficient size that it could not be contained without entering a full-scale war footing, but the cost of doing so would rapidly outweigh the benefits. The two belligerents who were behind most of the incursions into Lower-Rhine-Westphalia were simply too strong to be resisted without a great and hazardous effort. The composite Spanish Monarchy was at the height of its reach and power, drawing on the riches of several continents to sustain the largest standing army Europe had seen in centuries. The Dutch rebels' domains were smaller, but the survival of their cause depended on their willingness to mobilise all available resources, including their alliances with England, France, and beyond. Unlike them, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia did not have to regard the Eighty Years' War as a life-or-death battle, and Maximilian Lanzinner is right to observe that "military operations of the Circles made little sense, because they would

[55] Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to Bailiff of Sparenberg and Linberg, 18 December 1600, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 2, fols 415^{v}-417^{v}.
[56] Bailiff of Sparenberg and Linberg and *Landschreiber* of Ravensberg to Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 31 December 1600, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 2, fol. 428^{r}.

have given lopsided benefit first to Alba, then later Orange, and thereby had an utterly polarising effect. In any case Circle contingents were militarily too weak to prevail against large mercenary hosts."[57] Moreover, the era is rich in examples of military mobilisations which drifted from their original strategic purpose and became self-perpetuating extortion rackets.[58] Campaigns to purge the *Kreis* of the Eighty Years' War's side-effects thus possessed a kind of quicksand logic; the more violently the Circle's members struggled to escape from the conflict, the more they risked being sucked in.

These points are not purely retrospective explanations of why Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was not in a position to achieve its objectives by raising regiments. They were also made repeatedly at the time by leading *Kreis* members of divergent confessions, backgrounds, and temperaments, whose criticisms helped to ensure that such mobilisations were the exception, rather than the rule. In 1590, co-Director Prince Ernest of Bavaria penned a telling critique of a plan for a 15,000 strong army to defend the Circle's borders from the latest overspill of Hispano-Dutch antagonism. Such a force, he observed, was only scheduled to remain in service for six months, but "one may not know how long the war – which is already in its twentieth year – will continue between the two parties."[59] If the troops were disbanded after half a year but the conflict continued, then the Circle would once again find itself vulnerable to the belligerents thereafter, and what's more would be viewed with new "embitterment" after having wielded force against them. But if the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian army was not dismissed, this would effectively mean committing to an open-ended occupation of the Circle's territory by a sizeable defensive force, whose presence would constitute an

[57] Maximilian Lanzinner, *Friedenssicherung und politische Einheit des Reiches unter Kaiser Maximilian II 1564 - 1576* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1993), p. 518.
[58] David Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War' in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. by Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 227-53.
[59] Ernest of Bavaria to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 10 July 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 95, fol. 2^{r}.

unsustainable burden on the populace. His conclusion was that "what may follow from this in the end [is that] the affected lands will be troubled, attacked, and overwhelmed by their own men, more than by the foreigners."[60]

Ernest was well known for his self-serving rhetoric, but his observations here were astute, and he was not alone in making them. One prince who could not be accused of merely concocting excuses for his own inaction was John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg, who led one of only two Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates which actually contributed troops for the defence of the Circle in 1590 (a scaled-down force had eventually been commissioned by the *Kreistag*, but Ernest's reservations won out in practice, as most members found excuses not to send men to the muster).[61] Yet even he came to many of the same conclusions as his Wittelsbach neighbour. In a detailed memorandum of 1603, he attacked the idea of hiring a defensive force to guard the frontiers of the Circle, pointing out the many flaws inherent in such a policy. For one thing, he noted "the Circle's border [is too] extensive, with more than twenty places to garrison".[62] If anything, this was an underestimate. The boundary between Lower-Rhine-Westphalia and the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands was well over seven hundred miles long (far longer than the front lines dividing the latter's royal- and rebel-held zones), and the nature of the conflict meant that some of the threats it produced came from other directions entirely; in August 1591, for instance, the *Kreis* attempted to take countermeasures against a force marching from Lower Saxony to join the king of Spain's

[60] Ernest of Bavaria to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 10 July 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 95, fol. 2^{r-v}.
[61] See, for example, Stadtholderate of Münster to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 23 October 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fols 85^{r}-86^{v}, in which the rulers of Münster complain that they are too hard-pressed to contribute at present; for details of the mobilisation of troops by Nassau-Dillenburg (and Sayn, the other contributor), see Bailiff Caspar Lap of Altena to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 19 November 1590, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 66, fol. 124^{r-v}. Together their contingent amounted to 120 infantry and 30 cavalry.
[62] Nassau-Dillenburg's proposals for *Kreis* defence, 29 January 1603, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 4, fol. 180^{v}.

service.[63] The static Spanish garrisons which were attacked in the 1599 campaign were a relatively easy target, but normally a defensive force would be confronted with a range of mobile troop columns and raiding parties across a vast and porous frontier zone. A combined *Kreis* army was an unwieldy tool with which to police such dangers.

John VI's other criticisms echoed Ernest's concerns, whilst adding more besides. He was fearful that once the troops were dismissed, the warring powers would simply begin "to sing the old song" again by resuming their provocations.[64] In this they would be aided by the former soldiers of the *Kreis*, who would either run amok or join the belligerents' service and fuel further phases of the conflict. Even while the men were still nominally "Circle troops", however, they would nonetheless oppress the local subjects. For as long as they were there, "the Circle would be a third enemy alongside the other two, with its hands around our throat."[65] John's comments were especially pertinent since – as we have seen – the *Kreis* was not willing or able to restrict its recruitment to those who had a homeland at stake, and even those soldiers who might claim a German identity often had additional loyalties or backgrounds which affected their reliability. In the context of the time, patriotism was simply not the kind of force which could restrain military professionals from being a danger to local populations. Calling in an army to deal with marauding was thus the policy equivalent of swallowing a spider to catch a fly.

Of course, we might then ask whether the Circle had any point at all, if it could not offer a military solution to the troubles which brought misery to many thousands of its subjects. Yet

[63] Postscript to the *Kreistag* communique issued at Cologne, October 1591, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 54, fol. 271^{v}.
[64] Nassau-Dillenburg's proposals for *Kreis* defence, 29 January 1603, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 4, fol. 180^{v}.
[65] Nassau-Dillenburg's proposals for *Kreis* defence, 29 January 1603, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 4, fols 180^{v}-181^{r}.

the cautious responses of Ernest and John VI suggest one possible answer to this question. Each of these men had strong connections to the rival causes in the Eighty Years' War and both were leading figures in their militant confessional movements; the Spanish had helped the former gain his Electorate, and the latter was enmeshed by family ties which had seen him serve for a time as one of the rebels' stadtholders.[66] Yet despite these abundant connections to the war, both ultimately stepped back from the brink of involving their polities wholeheartedly in the struggle.[67] The Circle, as an alternative political context – another option for framing their identity and allegiances, one which bound them to their neighbours of varying confessions rather than to their kinsmen and co-religionists who were waging war – played some part in allowing them, and others like them, to do this. Its cumbersome multipolar structure made it ill-suited for efficient military mobilisations, but this could be an advantage when the alternative was dangerous escalation.[68] It is of course true that the consequence was letting low-level raiding continue with no prospect of a final resolution; plainly, the *Kreis* fell a long way short of offering perfect security. Nonetheless, the same was true of other political formations which suffered chronic marauding in their borderland regions (such as the Anglo-Scottish borders, the Russo-Polish frontier, and the Austro-Venetian maritime boundary in the Adriatic), and this is not generally taken as proof of their

[66] Friedrich Edelmayer, *Söldner und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II im Heiligen Römischen Reich* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2002), pp. 144-46; Günther von Lojewski, *Bayerns Weg Nach Köln: Geschichte der bayerischen Bistumspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1962), p. 418; Rolf Glawischnig, *Niederlande, Kalvinismus und Reichsgrafenstand 1559-1584: Nassau-Dillenburg unter Graf Johann VI* (Marburg: NG Elwert, 1973).

[67] The contrast between John VI's espousal of militant Calvinism and his reluctance to involve his county in confessional conflicts has puzzled some historians. See Menk, Gerhard, '„Qui trop embrasse, peu estreind": Politik und Persönlichkeit Graf Johanns VI von Nassau-Dillenburg 1580-1606', *Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte*, 7 (1981), 119-57 (p. 144-45).

[68] For examples of regional associations which did manage to wage war more consistently in this period, to the long-term detriment of their cohesion, see Alexander Jendorff, 'Reichskreis- versus Regionalpolitik? Überlegungen zu Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten des regionalen Politikmanagements in der Mitte des Alten Reiches' in *Reichskreise und Regionen im frühmodernen Europa: Horizonte und Grenzen im spatial turn*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst and Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 251-82 (p. 261); Christopher Close, 'City-States, Princely States, and Warfare: Corporate Alliance and State Formation in the Holy Roman Empire (1540–1610)', *European History Quarterly*, 47:2 (2017), 205-28 (pp. 211-22).

fundamental irrelevance. In any case, to regard the Circle's performance as a military actor as the only metric for its value as an institution is to misunderstand both its nature and that of the situation it faced.

Chapter III: Overlapping Circles – Lower-Rhine-Westphalia as a Burgundian Borderland?

The historiography of borders and borderlands has grown exponentially over the last few decades, but there are still certain subjects which have remained outside its own expanded frontiers. Among these is the boundary which divided the Burgundian and Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circles. This is unfortunate, as such a topic has the potential to contribute usefully to wider debates within the field, which has become increasingly interested in a comparative approach that broadens the subdiscipline beyond its lingering lopsided focus on the westwards expansion of the USA.[1] Within the smaller body of historians working on the borderlands of the early modern German-speaking world, there has been a similar move to look beyond the Habsburg-Ottoman *Militärgrenze* (which has traditionally monopolised attention) in search of transnational similarities and alternative case studies.[2] The western edges of the Holy Roman Empire offer particularly fruitful possibilities for research, notably at the turn of the seventeenth century when they are recognised as a "transitional area" caught between a number of interlocking European conflicts and between zones of strong and weak Imperial authority.[3] Even at the time, their inhabitants were already thinking comparatively about their relationship to other frontiers, with the Estates of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian

[1] For a good summary of borderlands historiography, see Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, 'On Borderlands', *The Journal of American History*, 98:2 (2011), 338-61; for more global or comparative approaches, see Boaz Atzili, *Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel, 'Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands', *Journal of World History*, 8 (1997), 211–42; Ira William Zartman, 'Introduction: Identity, Movement, and Response' in *Understanding Life in the Borderlands: Boundaries in Depth and in Motion*, ed. Ira William Zartman (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), pp. 1-39.

[2] Luca Scholz, 'Protection and the Channelling of Movement on the Margins of the Holy Roman Empire' in *Protection and Empire: A Global History*, ed. by Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow, and Bain Attwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 13-28; William O'Reilly, 'Fredrick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis, Orientalism, and the Austrian Militärgrenze', *Journal of Austrian-American History*, 2:1 (2018), pp. 1-30; Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer, 'Einleitung' in *Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Das Heilige Römische Reich und Europa, Festschrift für Maximilian Lanzinner*, ed. by Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2013), pp. i-xxvii, (p. xxv).

[3] Alison Anderson, *On the Verge of War: International Relations and the Jülich-Kleve Succession Crises 1609-1614* (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999), p. 5.

Kreis complaining to the emperor that their situation should be placed on equal footing to that of the Hungarian border and "the helping hand offered not only against the [Turkish] archenemy every time, but also in… other enforcements and expeditions."[4]

Bringing the *Reichskreise* into the discussion is particularly important. Leading borderland historians Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett identify three key weaknesses of recent scholarship in the field, born of a drive to overcompensate for the flaws of earlier frontier history focused on the nation-state: a loss of broader perspectives in favour of microhistorical approaches, a neglect of the role of violence in favour of studying coexistence only, and a continuing inability to escape the "Manichean" centre-vs-periphery model (albeit with the perspectives reversed).[5] Using Imperial Circles as a key unit of analysis can circumvent all of these by maintaining a broad regional coverage, investigating the bloodshed which the *Kreise* existed to contain, and inserting a middle level between central state and borderland subjects.[6]

Considering them can also shed light on other historiographical issues. The slow transition towards borders being neatly plotted linear demarcations of separate states – as opposed to broad strips of territory at the limits of a ruler's authority – was in its early stages in Europe during this period, though historians disagree over the timelines involved, and over the relative importance of politics, law, religion, language, and physical geography along the

[4] 'Firm and justly grounded causes why the princes and Estates of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle are not to be held to the delivery of the aid approved at Augsburg in anno 82 and Regensburg in anno 94', 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 76, fol. 223^{v}.

[5] Hämäläinen and Truett, 'On Borderlands', p. 349-50.

[6] Some promising work has been done specifically on *Kreis* borders, albeit mainly focussed on the eighteenth century. Karl Härter, 'Die Reichskreise als transterritoriale Ordnungs- und Rechtsräume: Ordnungsnormen, Sicherheitspolitik und Strafverfolgung' in *Reichskreise und Regionen im frühmodernen Europa: Horizonte und Grenzen im spatial turn*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst and Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 211-50 (pp. 228-35); unfortunately, they appear only fleetingly in the most recent comprehensive studies of Imperial borders, for which see Andreas Rutz, *Die Beschreibung des Raums: Territoriale Grenzziehungen im Heiligen Römischen Reichs* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2018), pp. 243-44; Luca Scholz, *Borders and Freedom of Movement in the Holy Roman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 31, 33-34.

way.[7] Analysing the border between Burgundy and Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in these terms yields two key findings. First, that inhabitants of the latter ascribed the frontier between the two Circles particular importance by presenting it as the frontier of the Empire itself, although they stopped short of imagining their *Kreis* to be a unified border bulwark of the Reich. Second, that their spatial imagining of the border problem remained rooted in material topography, although this did not always neatly line up with other forms of boundary.

i) Burgundy and its Borderlands

'Burgundy' remains one of the most complex and chimerical labels in the historical geography of Europe, and the Burgundian Circle is probably its most under-studied variant; as a brief illustration of this, Norman Davies devotes a chapter of his work *Vanished Kingdoms* to meticulously cataloguing the various different incarnations of Burgundy through history, but if one follows up the solitary footnote about the Circle, the only reference to be found is to Wikipedia.[8] Such coverage as it has received is usually confined to mentions within more general works on the *Reichskreise* or the wider western Empire.[9] Hence, whilst plenty of research has been devoted to the rise of patriotic separatist identities in the northern Netherlands, the role of the Circles in contemporary understandings of the region's borders is

[7] For a brief summary of some of the historiography, see Axel Gotthard, 'Vormoderne Lebensräume: Annäherungsversuch an die heimaten des frühneuzeitlichen mitteleuropäers', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 276:1 (2003), 37-73 (pp. 42-44); Peter Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History* (London: Penguin, 2016), p. 249.

[8] Norman Davies, *Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-Forgotten Europe* (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 749 n. 117; the general lack of research on the Circle has also sometimes led historians to get its founding date wrong by several decades, for an example of which see Antoon Janssen and Peter Nissen, 'Niederlande, Lüttich' in *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung: Land und Konfession 1500-1650*, ed. by Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler, 7 vols (Munich: Aschendorff, 1991-97), III (1991), pp. 200-35 (p. 207).

[9] Winfried Dotzauer, *Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806): Geschichte und Aktenedition* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998), pp. 390-440; Nicolette Mout, 'Die Niederlande und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert 1512-1609' in *Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?* ed. by Volker Press and Dieter Stievermann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 143-68; Frank Hirschmann, 'Landesbewußtsein im Westen des Reiches? Die Niederlande, die Rheinlande und Lothringen' in *Spätmittelalterliches Landesbewußtsein in Deutschland*, ed. by Matthias Werner (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2005), pp. 223-64 (p. 244).

rarely considered.[10] This lack of scholarly interest is not entirely without foundation. The Burgundian *Kreis* is generally assumed to have been largely a legal fiction designed to shield the Habsburg possessions in the Low Countries from interference by Imperial constitutional mechanisms, and it is true that the administrative elements that gave a Circle institutional life – *Kreistag* assemblies, Circle officials, coinage commissions, and so on – were absent here.[11] Nonetheless, it remained a space formally incorporated within the *Kreis* system, and that makes its perception in the eyes of its neighbours of historical interest.

The ambiguity around the Habsburg-Burgundian Netherlands' relationship to the Reich pre-dated the formal creation of the Burgundian Circle in 1512; in Erhard Etzlaub's pioneering '*Romweg*' maps, mistakes were made in depicting the extent of the land under Habsburg control, its eastern boundary shifted markedly between the 1500 and 1501 editions, and the shading of the entire area made it appear separate from the Empire of which it was still theoretically a part.[12] The issue became increasingly complex as the Habsburgs took further steps to carve out favourable exceptions to Imperial law for their possessions in the Low Countries, most notably in the Burgundian Treaty of 1548 which exempted the Circle from

[10] Judith Pollmann, 'No Man's Land: Reinventing Netherlandish Identities, 1585-1621' in *Networks, Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries 1300-1650*, ed. by Robert Stein and Judith Pollmann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 241-61; John Hutchinson, 'Bringing the study of warfare into theories of nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 24:1 (2018), 6-21 (pp. 10-11); Olaf Mörke, 'Das Erbe des „Wilhelmus": Ein niederländisches Modell der heroischen Monarchie?' in *Die Inszenierung der heroischen Monarchie: Frühneuzeitlichen Königtum zwischen ritterlichen Erbe und militärischer Herausforderung*, ed. by Martin Wrede (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2014), pp. 334-357.

[11] Yves Hubrecht has recently challenged the idea of total Burgundian disengagement from the political institutions of the Empire, but only for the eighteenth century when the Austrian Habsburgs inherited control of the southern Netherlands. Yves Huybrechts, 'Zwischen Fremdheit und Nähe: Die österreichischen Niederlande und das Heilige Römische Reich Zur politischen Integration eines „fernen" Reichsstandes' in *Belgica – terra incognita? Resultate und Perspektiven der Historischen Belgienforschung*, ed. by Sebastian Bischoff, Christoph Jahr, Tatjana Mrowka, and Jens Thiel (Münster: Waxmann, 2016), pp 14-23.

[12] Uta Lindgren, 'Die Kartographie des Alten Reiches' in *Reichstädte in Franken: Verfassung und Verwaltung*, ed. by Rainer Müller, 2 vols (Munich: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 1987), I, pp. 56-65 (p. 56); for a reproduction of the 1500 edition, see Ute Schneider, *Die Macht der Karten. Eine Geschichte der Kartographie vom Mittelalter bis heute*, 2nd edn (Darmstadt: Primus, 2006), p. 22; for the 1501 edition see Erhard Etzlaub, *Das seyn dy lantstrassen durch das Romisch reych von einem kunigreych zw dem andern dy an Tewtsche land stossen von meilen zw meiln mit puncten verzaichnet* (Nuremberg: George Glogkendon, 1501).

the jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber Court [*Reichskammergericht*], whilst also transferring to its control the remaining Habsburg-ruled territories in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia.[13] Following the outbreak of anti-Spanish resistance in 1566, the slow emergence of the Dutch Republic in the northern half of the Circle (a process which was far from complete by 1618) added a further problematic dimension to the thorny question of how to classify the border between the Burgundian *Kreis* and its neighbour. Was it the outer frontier of the Reich, or simply an internal boundary between two of the Kaiser's provinces? Could it be both in different areas, or something else entirely? Did it actually matter much at all?

There is a vein of historical thought which suggests the border was indeed lacking in relevance, drawing on Peter Sahlins's hugely influential study of the Franco-Spanish Pyrenean border and its argument that political frontiers meant less to early modern people than divisions between various kinds of jurisdiction (namely legal, fiscal, ecclesiastical, and economic) which rarely mapped neatly onto state boundaries.[14] These overlapping spheres of responsibility undoubtedly existed in the Burgundian-Westphalian case. Although the border between the two *Kreise* did mark something of a watershed in terms of legal jurisdictions – in that only one was exempt from Imperial Chamber Court writs, as stated above – this was often subverted; despite governing a Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estate, Adolf of Moers was able to shrug off a *Reichskammergericht* mandate against his military actions in the Circle in 1586 by claiming that he was acting in his alternative capacity as a Dutch stadtholder.[15]

[13] Robert von Friedeburg, ''Lands' and 'Fatherlands': Changes in the Plurality of Allegiances in the Sixteenth-Century Holy Roman Empire' in *Networks, Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries 1300-1650*, ed. by Robert Stein and Judith Pollmann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 263-82 (p. 267); for a good general introduction to the disputes over the Habsburg Netherlands' membership of the Empire before the Dutch Revolt, see Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), pp. 32-41.
[14] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 54.
[15] Plea of Adolf of Neuenahr Concerning the Mandate of the Imperial Chamber Court, 3 March 1586, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 90, fols 111^{r}-133^{v}.

Fiscally, both remained subject to Reich taxation, from which the Habsburg emperors were unwilling to exempt any of their subjects.[16] Ecclesiastically, Philip II's episcopal reform of 1559 did bring the boundaries of Circles and Catholic bishoprics into near-alignment by removing Burgundian territories from the dioceses of Liège and Cologne, but an agreement of 1585 set the boundary between the Dutch and German Calvinist *Gemeinde* running right through Lower-Rhine-Westphalia along the River Meuse, and in practice inhabitants living in the vicinity of the border continued to pick and choose religious doctrines and authorities relatively freely.[17] Economically, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia struggled and largely failed to insulate itself from the wave of poor-quality coinage flooding it from the west in consequence of the Burgundian Circle's non-ratification of the Imperial Coinage Ordinance of 1559, and its Estates also had frequent cause to complain of Dutch and Spanish tolls being levied without regard to political boundaries.[18]

It is thus tempting to conclude that the border between the two Circles was so thoroughly blurred and porous as to mean little to contemporaries. This is indeed the lesson drawn by Winfried Dotzauer from his brief consideration of the matter, namely that "the entrenchment of foreign troops in the [Lower-Rhine-Westphalian] Circle's territory could not be prevented under the prevailing circumstances, particularly because the borders between the unclearly

[16] Nicolette Mout, 'Core and periphery: the Netherlands and the Empire from the late fifteenth to the seventeenth century' in *The Holy Roman Empire 1495-1806: A European Perspective*, ed. by Robert Evans and Peter Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 203-15 (p. 208).
[17] Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln: Meist aus der Quellen des Stadt-Archivs*, 5 vols (Cologne: L. Schwann'schen Verlagshandlung, 1863-80), V (1880), p. 323; Raingard Esser, ''Local baronios' in a contested border region: history, hagiography and politics in Upper Guelders in the seventeeth century' in *Frontiers, states and identity in early modern Ireland and beyond: Essays in honour of Steven G. Ellis*, ed. by Christopher Maginn and Gerald Power (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2016), pp. 188-204 (p. 193); Rudolfine Freiin von Oer, 'Münster' in *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung: Land und Konfession 1500-1650*, ed. by Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler, 7 vols (Munich: Aschendorff, 1991-97), III (1991), pp. 108-29 (p. 124); Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 385.
[18] Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen, "Exclusis Westphalen et Burgundt': Zum Kampf um die Durchsetzung der Reichsmünzordnung von 1559', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 20:2 (1993), pp. 189-203.

defined Burgundian Circle… and the Westphalian Circle, which in theory confined itself entirely to Imperial soil, were made impossible to oversee by enclaves and exclaves, genealogical connections, and overarching feudal allegiances particularly of the smaller Estates in the border zones."[19]

Yet the border did matter to the rulers of the *Kreis*, and it mattered chiefly because they felt it to mark the limits of the Reich. Writing to the emperor in 1597, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates described their Circle in no uncertain terms "as an outer wall of the Holy Empire" which served to shield the rest of the Kaiser's domains from the chaos in the "Lower Burgundian lands".[20] When discussing incursions from Burgundian territory, the Estates which abutted the *Kreis* boundary took care to stress that violations of their frontier represented an invasion of the Empire from outside. For example, the government of Jülich-Cleves-Berg attacked the Army of Flanders for crossing their borders with a "host of Burgundian troops of all nations", condemning "such marching forth out of one land into another" and demanding a retreat that would constitute a withdrawal "from the Holy Empire's soil and ground."[21] Meanwhile, Liège complained that an earlier occupation of minor landholdings on the border by Philip II's troops constituted an attempt "to take them from the Empire and this Circle."[22] What is interesting is that this kind of rhetoric was fairly constant across the period, and could be deployed (as in the examples just cited) against the

[19] Dotzauer, *Deutschen Reichskreise*, p. 306. Note this rather undermines the point he makes elsewhere – and which was discussed in the previous chapter – that Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's troubles were the result of "military incapability."

[20] 'Firm and justly grounded causes why the princes and Estates of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle are not to be held to the delivery of the aid approved at Augsburg in anno 82 and Regensburg in anno 94', 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 76, fols 226^{r}, 223^{v}.

[21] Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to Emperor Rudolf II, 15 July 1605, LAV NRW, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 2434, fols 1^{r}-5^{v}.

[22] Report from Liège and Stavelot to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Envoys and Councillors, 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 395^{r}; for another example of a clear distinction being drawn between Imperial and Burgundian territory, see Mayor, Council, and Jurors of Aachen to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 5 February 1591, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fol. 305^{r}.

Spanish regime in the southern Netherlands as well as the nascent republican one in the north. For all the dramatic changes it eventually produced in world history, the emergence of the United Provinces did not substantially alter the status quo in the places where it abutted the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle.

If, therefore, there was a relatively widespread understanding that the western boundary of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Kreis* marked the limits of the Reich, it is worth asking to what extent its members developed a conception of the Circle as a frontier region. Winfried Schulze suggests that during the same period the varied Austrian territories' experience of guarding the other end of the Empire led them to forge a common sense of themselves as a bulwark of Christendom, and Georg Schmidt describes a similar process working to create a "border mentality" in those parts of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia that were part of the Wetterau alliance of Protestant counts.[23] Could this mentality have extended to the entire Circle? There are, indeed, some signs of a borderland consciousness emerging that envisaged a distinct role for Lower-Rhine-Westphalia as the Empire's western gatekeeper. Military officials connected to the *Kreis* began to make plans for "standing defence" of the border, and to express concerns that other Circles in the interior of the Reich "which are far distant from these lands" would never truly understand Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's situation.[24] The drawn out nature of the conflict encouraged the development of this settled mindset, which even hopes for peace did little to disrupt; as early as 1577, *Kreis* envoys were fretting that because fighting had been concentrated "on the borders of the Burgundian lands", a treaty would not

[23] Winfried Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates 1564-1619* (Vienna: Bermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1973), p. 237; Georg Schmidt, *Der Wetterauer Grafenverein: Organisation und Politik einer Reichskorporation zwischen Reformation und Westfälischem Frieden* (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1989), p. 144.
[24] Memorandum of Marshals Reuschenberg and Schenkens, 3 June 1592, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 69, fols 93^{r}-94^{r}.

improve the situation as unemployed soldiers would simply cross into Lower-Rhine-Westphalia and perpetuate the violence.[25]

Nonetheless, it would ultimately be unwise to claim that the entire Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle came to function as a defensive borderland which positioned itself as the Reich's western shield. Although at times the *Kreis* presented itself to outsiders in this way in order to gain support (such as in the 1597 letter to Rudolf II discussed above), internally there was more nuanced picture. Part of this was the lack of a specific borderer culture. Other European frontier populations acquired the reputation of being hardy warrior societies, such as the Croatian Uskoks, the lords of the Irish Pale, or the Gascons in south-west France, but this stereotype was not generally applied to Lower-Rhine-Westphalia; interestingly, the role of foreign troops (this time as hired mercenaries rather than hostile raiders) may have served to inhibit the rise of a caste of armed border nobility that could have given the region a more distinctive character.[26]

Another important element was sub-regional divides within the Circle. Certain Estates were particularly keen to claim the mantle of a border outpost; the city-state of Aachen described itself to other Estates on various occasions as "this border and frontier town" which was "lying at the end of the Empire", whilst the united ecclesiastical states of Liège and Stavelot-Malmedy proclaimed themselves "to be the outer walls of the Empire", co-opting the same language used elsewhere to describe the *Kreis* as a whole.[27] Moreover, when making internal

[25] Instructions for Envoys to *Kreisdeputationstag*, 2 March 1577, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fol. 338^{v}.
[26] Rhys Morgan and Gerald Power, 'Enduring Borderlands: the Marches of Ireland and Wales in the Early Modern Period' in *Frontiers and Identities in Europe*, ed. by Steven Ellis and Raingard Eßer (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2009), pp. 101-28 (p. 113); David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), p. 97.
[27] Mayor, Council, and Jurors of Aachen to Circle Estates, 2 July 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 139^{r}; Representatives of Aachen to Circle Representatives, 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 371^{v}; Report

deliberations, the Circle's organs were often happy to concede special status to certain members in these positions. In 1583 a *Kreistag* assembly legislated for financial support to the "Circle's princes and Estates sitting on the borders", whilst in 1597 Estates which were the "most troubled, ruined, and bordering onto the Burgundian lands" were granted fiscal leniency and promises of aid.[28] Another document narrowed down these categories somewhat, specifically listing Münster, Liège, Stavelot-Malmedy, Jülich, Cleves, Oldenburg, Bentheim, and East Frisia as "princes and Estates sitting on the border".[29] This list perhaps gives a sense of how political factors could shape understandings; despite its location abutting the duchy of Guelders in the Burgundian *Kreis* and its embrace of a frontier town identity, Aachen was omitted, very likely because of a longstanding dispute between its Protestant council and the Circle's leading prince, William the Rich of Jülich-Cleves-Berg.[30]

ii) Soil and Water

Nonetheless, just because physical geography did not dictate every facet of a borderland's character does not mean it was not important. This is a point which has perhaps become a little obscured in historiography that focuses on borders as abstract, jurisdictional entities and plays down the role of natural frontiers. When contemporaries attempted to visualise the border, it was to the landscape that they turned. Describing the frontier to the emperor, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates explained that "the borders of this Circle with the Lower Burgundian lands stretch from across the Meuse to Brabant and from there to the Rhine and

from Liège and Stavelot to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Envoys and Councillors, 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 396^{r-v}.

[28] *Kreistag* Communique issued at Duisburg, 28 October 1583, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 59, fol. 248^{r}; Memorandum on Circle Financial Affairs, 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 71, fol. 732^{v}.

[29] Concept of Letter to Emperor Rudolf II, 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 435^{v}.

[30] The other main outlier here is the county of Oldenburg, which was not directly adjacent to Burgundian Circle territory on land. It is likely that it was included because of the activities of Dutch and Spanish pirates in the Weser, for which see Scholz, 'Channelling of Movement', p. 17.

so on until the Weser over a hundred miles away, between many considerable towns, houses, and fortifications, so that in addition to the guarding of the open land they all have great need of a garrison and must be truly occupied."[31] Note the prominence of natural features over man-made ones (all the rivers are named whereas none of the settlements are), a characteristic which may have been characteristic of *Kreis*-level descriptions. When parts of the same border were described in terms of a boundary between individual territories rather than between Imperial Circles, the broad sweep of the landscape disappears and artificial landmarks became more important; for example, Münster's representatives lamented how their prince-bishopric "borders in so many places with the princedom of Guelders and the county of Zutphen, in particular with many fortresses".[32] Nonetheless, it is clear that both sources were written in the language of practical topography, driven by the strategic need to anticipate military incursions from outside.

Another important element binding concepts of the frontier to concrete geography was the rhetoric of "Imperial soil" or *Reichsboden* (sometimes "Imperial ground and soil" or *Reichs Grund und Boden*). We have already encountered a description of this being violated by the *Kreis* border crossing of Spanish soldiers, and such rhetoric was rife any time contemporaries had cause to discuss encroachments by foreign solders.[33] To an extent, Imperial soil was an

[31] 'Firm and justly grounded causes why the princes and Estates of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle are not to be held to the delivery of the aid approved at Augsburg in anno 82 and Regensburg in anno 94', 1597, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 76, fol. 226^{r-v}.
[32] Instructions for Münster's *Kreis* Envoys, 4 June 1589, Münster, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen [hereafter LAV NRW W], B 001 (Fürstbistum Münster, Landesarchiv - Akten), Nr. 17 d, fol. 76^{v}.
[33] For examples, see Michael of Aitzing, *Nova Novem Mensium Historica Relatio. Das ist / Ein Newe Historische Beschreybung der Gedenckwurdigen Händel vnnd Geschichten / so sich von Eingang dieses Jahrs in Franckreich / Engellandt / auch Nider vnnd Hochteutschlandt / Dergleichen In Hungern / Behemb / Polln / Turcken / vnd an andern orten Europae / die negsten IX. Monat zugetragen vnnd verlauffen / biß auff den 21. tag dieses ablauffenden monats Septembris 1591* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1591), p. 7; Jacob Friedlieb, *Historicae Relationis Continvuatio. Das ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung / was sich seithero verschiener Herbstmeß abgelauffenen 1598 Jahrs biß in jetzigen Monat Aprilen angangenen 1599. jahrs in der Christenheit / als Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / Vngern / Schweden / furnemblich aber in den respectiue Fürstenthumben vnd Stifftern / Cleeff / Münster / Cölln / vnd darumbhero denckwurdiges so woll in Kriegs als andern sachen zugetragen* (Cologne: William Lützenkirchen, 1599), p. 30.

intangible symbol of victimhood, invoked chiefly as a metaphoric victim of trespassers' trampling feet. Yet it did (literally) ground frontier discourse in something palpable, and gave the *Kreis* border a more physical dimension in the collective imagination. This is shown by the way in which it was connected to specific settlements and used to connote practical ideas of distance as well as just abstract notions of territorial intrusion; for instance, leaders in Nassau fretted "that Spanish troops do not cease from the taking of towns on Imperial soil, and that they come ever nearer to us."[34] Circle edicts attempting to expel freebooters from the Empire's turf may have been honoured more in the breach than the observance, but they gave further material substance to the invisible line dividing the *Kreise*, in that it was often ordered that such edicts should be publicly posted at intervals along the border.[35]

Of course, the role of the natural world in shaping spatial imaginings of borders was not limited to the soil alone; it also encompassed water. Therefore, before moving on, it is worth devoting some consideration to the region's largest river, the Rhine. Recent scholarship on the history of waterways has seen a turn away from political geography and towards ecological studies, following (as with borderland historiography) a series of American exemplars.[36] The most influential twenty-first-century work on the Rhine has been done by Mark Cioc, whose view of the river's role as a potential border is instructive; he suggests that it "has never served well as a frontier", particularly in the era of the Old Reich when it was dominated by the toll points of "innumerable little states that made a journey down the river a web of border crossings" between each other rather than any larger territorial unit.[37] His view

[34] Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen to the Treasurer of Siegen, 7 December 1598, LAV NRW W, E 401 (Fürstentum Siegen, Landesarchiv - Akten), Nr. 14, fol. 62^{r}.
[35] *Kreistag* Communique issued at Cologne, 30 April 1584, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 237^{v}.
[36] Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller, 'Rivers in History and Historiography' in *Rivers in History: Perspectives on Waterways in Europe and North America*, ed. by Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), pp. 1-10 (p. 7).
[37] Mark Cioc, *The Rhine: An Eco-Biography 1815-2000* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), pp. 9, 48.

that the river served better as a thoroughfare for trade, religion, and warmaking than as a boundary is complemented by the opinions of other scholars, who have stated that the pre-modern Rhine was too shifting and unreliable to constitute a useful political border, and that it was more of a springboard for expansion than a barrier to it.[38] Thus, with the exception of the delta (the role of which in the split between the southern and northern Netherlands has long been studied), the Rhine in this period has been of little interest to historians of border identities.[39]

To an extent, this does reflect common-sense realities. The Rhine was never coterminous with the boundary between the Burgundian and Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Reichskreise*, instead bisecting both. Yet even if it never constituted the actual *Kreis* frontier, there are grounds for thinking that (in the southern half of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia at least) it did constitute a kind of Rubicon separating the border zone abutting the Burgundian Circle from the more secure lands to the east. In its administrative response to the attacks emanating from Burgundy, the Circle was sometimes willing to use the river as an internal dividing line; when reassessing *Kreis* taxation in the wake of minor territorial losses, a separate commission was established for each bank of the Rhine.[40] Although its members did not regard the river as marking the limits of the Reich, they were sensitive that others might try to do so; after the Valois duke of Alençon was given control over the rebellious Dutch provinces, envoys of Liège warned the Reichstag that the French would inevitably use the opportunity to push their

[38] David Blackbourn, '"Time is a violent torrent": Constructing and Reconstructing Rivers in Modern German History' in *Rivers in History: Perspectives on Waterways in Europe and North America*, ed. by Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), pp. 11-25 (p. 17); Andreas Rüther, 'Flüsse als Grenzen und Bindeglieder: Zur Wiederentdeckung des Raumes in der Geschichtswissenschaft', *Jahrbuch für Regionalgeschichte*, 25 (2007), 29-44 (p. 39-40).

[39] For the most famous work on the division of the Netherlands, see Pieter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555–1609*, 2nd edn (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966); for a summary of subsequent debate, see Henk van Nierop, 'Alva's Throne: Making Sense of the Revolt of the Netherlands' in *The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt*, ed. by Graham Darby (London: Routledge. 2001), pp. 29-47 (pp. 29-32).

[40] *Kreistag* Communique issued at Cologne, 29 July 1586, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX.62, fol. 415r.

own borders towards the Rhine.[41] Living on its left bank thus meant dwelling in a vulnerable zone, whereas those Estates on the right bank were less exposed. Although, as we have seen, authorities in Nassau were concerned by Spanish moves onto Imperial soil, they sought to use the river as a kind of natural security cordon to keep the threat contained on the river's far bank, entering a formal alliance with several neighbouring counties (both Protestant and Catholic) in 1588 designed to use co-ordinated diplomacy and mutual support to ensure that the "advancing foreign, alien troops and others may be held on the other side of the Rhine."[42] Schmidt may have erred slightly when he ascribed a border mentality to the Wetterau counts, therefore; they were aware of a borderland which served as the front line against Spanish aggression, but they wanted to keep half a mile of water between themselves and it.

Even mercenary soldiers themselves seemed to regard the Rhine as an important psychological barrier. One report on German troops serving the United Provinces in Guelders noted that they "complained about being so far from Imperial soil and [sought to] move back over the river", saying that they "wished to make for Germany."[43] Maria Baramova is exaggerating somewhat when she says that in this period "the great European rivers Rhine and Danube circumscribed the space containing the German identity", but she is right to conclude "the desire to determine the outer borders of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation also led to an elevation of topographical features" (even if empire and nation

[41] 'Submission of the see of Liège (Bishop Ernest) concerning the 2nd article (Netherlands)', in *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, ed. by Josef Leeb, 2 vols (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), II, pp. 784-85.
[42] Communique issued at Lülsdorf, 24 February 1588, LAV NRW R, AA 0012 (Kurköln VII), Nr. 24, fol. 17r; Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen to Count Louis William of Nassau-Dillenburg, 20 March 1601, in *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau: series 2,* ed. by Groen van Prinsterer, 5 vols (Utrecht: Kemink, 1857-61), II (1858),
p. 74.
[43] Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg to Prince William I of Orange, 11 July 1579, in *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau: series 1*, ed. by Groen van Prinsterer, 9 vols (Leiden: S et J Luchtmans, 1835-47), VI (1839), p. 641.

were rarely synonymous).[44] With the mercenaries' ambiguous implication that the lands between the Rhine and the Burgundian Circle were in some sense not, or only partially, German, we see that the river did have significance as a marker between zones of settled and ambiguous identities.

iii) Linguistic Borders

Before moving on, it is important to consider a final kind of potential boundary running through the region: namely, a linguistic border between German-speaking and non-German-speaking spheres. Language has always loomed large in discussions of national identity, and some historians have highlighted the importance of long-running linguistic divides to conflicts in the Lower Rhine area. Claudius Sieber-Lehmann suggests that the Burgundian Wars of a century prior helped consolidate a sense of German nationhood in the Empire's western reaches, rooted in resistance to domination by "foreign tongues" and drawing stark contrasts between Teutonic and *Welsch*-speaking *Sprachräume*.[45] Nicolette Mout highlights how, after turning Charles the Bold's inheritance into the basis for the Burgundian Circle, the Habsburgs also flirted with the idea of using language as a way to partition the region; notably, in 1531 Charles V secretly gave his brother Ferdinand responsibility for "affairs of the High German nation and language", paving the way for the later division between the dynasty's Austrian and Spanish branches.[46] Speech patterns were again invoked to shape the carve-up of the Burgundian legacy in 1552, when Caspar Hirschi notes that Protestant princes offered the Valois monarch Henry II possession of various "non-German-speaking" towns,

[44] Maria Baramova, 'Border Theories in Early Modern Europe' in *Europäische Geschichte Online* (Mainz: Institut für Europäische Geschichte, 2010), p. 6 <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/baramovam-2010-en URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2010092137>

[45] Claudius Sieber-Lehmann, *Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus: Die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 186-88, 283-308.

[46] Quoted in Mout, 'Niederlande und das Reich', p. 148.

including the erstwhile Lower-Rhine-Westphalian city of Cambrai, as a reward for supporting their rebellion.[47]

Nonetheless, attempts to outline linguistic frontiers between nations unsurprisingly had to contend with various other ways of conceptualising territory, and we should not overemphasise their significance. Their limited power is emphasised by the way in which even those who cited them usually felt the need to contradict or qualify them in some way. Going back to the example given by Hirschi, although the rebellious princes did reference language as an excuse to give away certain towns, the original source makes clear that Henry II would only hold them "as a vicar of the Empire", denying that linguistic ties were enough to supersede a city's historic allegiance to the Reich.[48] Meanwhile, Alexander Schmidt notes that the humanist chronicler Jacob Schopper proclaimed the boundaries of Germany to be coterminous with the area in which German was spoken, yet also with the area of the ten *Reichskreise*, which was not at all the same thing.[49] Notably, at one point he declared that "men are not distinguished by their languages, but by their virtues."[50] For these reasons, Peter Wilson has suggested that early modern German identity was not confined by linguistic borders, but was primarily the product of a shared political context.[51]

[47] Caspar Hirschi, *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 105.
[48] Signeur de Fresse to Henry II of France, 16 October 1551, quoted in Jean-Daniel Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands: documents et commentaires 1545-1557', *Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte*, 10 (1982), pp. 229-301 (p. 259).
[49] Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich 1555-1648* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 136; for a description of similar contradictions in Cochlaeus, see also Georg Schmidt, 'Integration und Konfessionalisierung: Die Region zwischen Weser und Ems im Deutschland des 16. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 21 (1994), 1-36 (pp. 5-6).
[50] Jacob Schopper, *Neuwe Chorographia vnd Histori Teutscher Nation. Das ist: Warhaffte eigentliche vnd kurtze Beschreibung / der alten hochlöblichen Teutschen / vnserer Branherren erster ankunfft / herkommen / auffnemen vnd vermehrung / dero Namens vrsprung: Von Ihren herlichen Kriegß thaten* [etc] (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Schmidt & Sigmund Feyerabend, 1582), p. 253.
[51] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 255.

If we are looking for more specific examples of language's role on Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's frontiers, the salient case that demands addressing is that of the prince-bishopric of Liège. Indeed, the ecclesiastical territory formed something of a literal salient, as it jutted out from the rest of the *Kreis* into the surrounding Walloon lands of the Burgundian Circle, and like them, it was predominantly Francophone. Given its location, its language, and its ultimate fate as part of Belgium, historians have often tended to treat it as something apart from the rest of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia; Joachim Foerster refers to its "unique position" outside the main Wittelsbach ecclesiastical union, while Janssen and Nissen's gazetteer of territories associated with the early modern Reich lists it alongside the Netherlands as the subject of a joint chapter.[52] Its links to the Low Countries were also highlighted in sixteenth-century writings, such as a 1585 pamphlet by Philips of Marnix warning the German princes that Liège had already been reduced to vassalage by the Spanish, whom he also accused of causing the Burgundian Circle to scandalously neglect its duties toward the Empire.[53]

However, when looked at as a whole, what is striking is that the sources on Liège's relationship with Circle and Empire make almost no reference to its unusual linguistic status as a French-speaking member of a predominantly Germanic association. Moreover, rather than being culturally detached from the rest of the *Kreis*, under Bishop Gerard of Groesbeeck it was one of the more active member Estates, to the extent that neighbours occasionally worried that its envoys were driving the whole Circle's agenda.[54] His successor Ernest of Bavaria doubled down on this position; rather than seek accommodation with the French, he had his envoys denounce them, while his fellow Imperial Estates were hyperbolically

[52] Joachim Foerster, *Kurfürst Ferdinand von Köln: Die Politik seiner Stifter in den Jahren 1634-1650* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1976) p. 2; Janssen and Nissen, 'Niederlande, Lüttich', pp. 200-35.
[53] Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlande*, p. 250.
[54] Councillors at Düsseldorf to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 12 January 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten),), Nr. IX 53, fol. 196v.

informed that "not only all neighbouring Electors, princes, and lords along the Moselle, Rhine, and Meuse, but also the whole Holy Empire and indeed all Christendom [depends on our] see remaining in the Holy Empire as its outer wall [*vormauer*], obedient and closely connected, and not falling into foreign hands."[55] Nor was a willingness to embrace a borderland identity as defenders of the Empire confined to the prince-bishops, as the wider Liègois elite generally reacted to threats by loudly reiterating their membership of the Reich and entitlement to its protections. Thus, in 1592, the nobility, clergy, and burghers united to jointly protest against military incursions from the United Provinces, claiming these "were wholly against their privileges and freedoms, given that the land of Liège belongs to the Empire."[56]

These trends become even more marked when compared to other linguistically similar areas of the Reich. In particular, Liège had several points in common with the duchy of Lorraine, which was also a Francophone territory at the westernmost extremities of the Empire. As we have seen at the beginning of this project, those who made use of their military services had reason to reaffirm the Lorrainers' status as non-French Imperial subjects.[57] Nevertheless,

[55] 'Submission of the see of Liège (Bishop Ernest) concerning the 2nd article (Netherlands)', in *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, ed. by Josef Leeb, 2 vols (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), II, p. 785.

[56] Michael of Aitzing, *Recens Historica Rerum Intra Sex Menses in Europa Gestarum Relatio. Daß ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung der Gedenckwürdigen Geschichten vnd Händlen / so sich die negsten sechs monat hero zugetragen. Zuwissen was sich in Franckreich / Ostereich / Vngern vnnd Beheymb / Frießlandt / auch in Italien / Teutschlandt vnd Poln: sonderlich aber vmb Straßburg / den Rheinstrom / vnden vnd oben /vnd sonst allenthalben durch EUROPA verloffen / biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Septembris Anno 1592. Mit außführlicher erzellung / wie es mit abschaffung der Königlichen besatzung / in Bonn / Neuß vnd Rheinberck gehalten worden* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1592), p. 42.

[57] For another statement of this, see Michael of Isselt, 'De bello Coloniensi, libri quatuor. Hoc est, rerum ab electione gebhardi truchsesii archiepiscopum Coloniensem, usque ad recuperatam ab Ernesto duce Bavariae eius successore, Westphaliam, tota dioecesi gestarum, vera et succincta narratio. Ex ipsis archiuis, autographis, fidelique eorum, qui rebus gestis interfuerunt narratione transcripta. Et vivis praecipuorum locorum imaginibus illustrata, cum indice locupletissimo' in *Religionsgeschichte der Colnischen Kirche unter dem Abfal der zweien Erzbischöfen und Churfürsten Herman Grafen von Wied und Gebharden Grafen von Truchses, aus der lateinischen Beschreibung des Arnold Meshovs und Michael von Isselt zum erstenmal ins Teutsche übersetzet, wie auch allerhand nützlichen, theils historischen, theils critischen, theils theologischen, moralischen und philosophischen Anmerkngen reichlich versehen*, 2 vols (Cologne: Francis Balthasar Neuwirth, 1764), II, p. 67.

Lorraine's place in the Holy Roman sphere was rather more open to question than that of Liège, not least because it did not regularly participate in the *Kreis* gatherings (it was nominally a member of Upper Rhenish Circle) which were an important marker of belonging within the Imperial community, and Bishop Ernest himself singled out the Lorrainers for their "foreign mores" and unhealthy entanglements with the French Wars of Religion.[58] This indicates that language alone was not an especially reliable indicator of where the borders of solidarity and shared identity were seen to lie, with political considerations generally remaining uppermost.

Of course, all this is not to say that Liège's position in a geographical and linguistic grey area had no influence whatsoever on the prince-bishopric's relationship with foreign soldiers. Its reports to the Circle are more likely to describe troops using loanwords from Romance languages; for instance, they might refer to invading "cavalry" [*caualry*] instead of the "horse" [*Ross*] or "riders" [*Reiter*] preferred in the German of the time.[59] More importantly, its inhabitants also exploited ambiguities of identity to carve out a potentially lucrative position on the cusp of the Eighty Years' War. Ernest of Bavaria helped to establish the bishopric – and particularly the town of Spa, from which English derives its word for health resorts – as something of a neutral recuperation zone for Army of Flanders' officers, and as a useful location for negotiations with Parma.[60] Meanwhile, the city's firearm industry boomed

[58] Summary of negotiations at Hamboch between the Duke William V of Bavaria and Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 12 August 1582, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 1994, fols. 6^{r}-7^{r}; Konrad Amann, 'Der Oberrheinische Kreis im Wandel', in *Reichskreis und Territorium: Die Herrschaft über der Herrschaft? Supraterritoriale Tendenzen in Politik, Kultur, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Ein Vergleich süddeutscher Reichskreise*, ed. by Wolfgang Wüst (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000), pp. 335-47 (p. 336); Martin Wrede, *Das Reich und seine Feinde: Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischen westfälischem Frieden und Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2004), p. 331 n. 32; Richard Morris, *Court Festivals of the Holy Roman Empire, 1555–1619: Performing German Identity* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020), p. 196.

[59] Register of complaints from Liège, n.d. [1579], LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 56, fol. 124^{v}. The word 'cavalry' entered Germanic languages via French and Italian.

[60] Michael of Aitzing, *Zuwissen / was wunderbärliche / gedenckwierdige / seltzame sachen oder geschichte / sich zugetragen / vnd (die negsten sechs monat hero) biß auf den 19. tag Septemb. 1589. So wol / In Franckreich vnd Engellandt / als im Niderlandt Ertzstifft Cölln / Westphalen / Teütschlandt / Poln / Hungern vnd*

in this period, enriching individuals like the 'Liègois Croesus' John Curtius, who benefitted from the fact that weaponry's origins could be as difficult to trace as that of soldiers. Claude Gaier notes that the town's gunmakers made a point of not stamping their products with their names or a logo of the town, so that purchasers could pass them off as their own manufactures, and that national signifiers were used in opaque ways; when documents record production of "Dutch muskets", for instance, it is not clear whether this refers to guns ordered by Dutch buyers or fake knock-offs of Dutch designs.[61]

In general, these points highlight that the linguistic dimensions of the Empire's western borderland were more nuanced than a stark divide between German-speaking and non-German-speaking areas. The Burgundian Circle had fallen beyond the pale not because it lay outside a German nation defined by its tongue, but because (unlike Liège) it no longer contributed to the Reich's system of public peace. Meanwhile, differences between languages could sometimes be less important than those within them, including the ever-present gap between the society of soldiers and that of non-combatants. After all, as one contemporary put it "a different German belongs to the pulpit, [since] the theologian talks and deals with God's word in one manner… and a colonel, captain, or commander talks to his troops and soldiers in quite another."[62]

Böheimb: auch anderßwo / gleich in Italien / Hispanien / vnd durch gantz Europa / noch weiter verlauffen (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1589) p. 82; Michael of Aitzing, *Continuatum Historicae Relationis Svpplementvm. Daß ist Ein Historische beschreibung oder Weittere Relation / was Gedenckwierdige / seltzame sachen / sich bey vnsern betrübten vnnd gefärlichen / letzten zeyten / zugetragen Sonderlich Ietzt in Franckreich / Denmarck vnd Engellandt / Frießlandt Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / Wie auch in Hungern / Behaimb / Poln / Hispanien / Italien vnd sonst allenthalben / Als im Ertzstifft Cölln / in Westphalen / Gulich / Cleuen vnd andern Hertzogthummen verlauffen. Vom Negstuerschienen monat Martio / biß auff den 21. tag Septembris gegenwartiges Jahrs 1590* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen), p. 77; Aitzing, *Recens Historica… biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Septembris Anno 1592*, p. 11.

[61] Claude Gaier, *Four Centuries of Liège Gunmaking,* trans. by F.J. Norris (London: Sotheby Parke Bernet, 1976), pp. 36, 39-41.

[62] John Textor, *Naßawische Chronick / In Welcher des vralt: hochlöblich: vnd weitberühmten Stamms vom Hause Naßaw / Printzen vnd Graven Genealogi oder Stammbaum: deren geburt / leben / heurath / kinder / zu Friden: vnd Kriegszeiten verzichtete sachen vnd thaten / absterben / vnd sonst denckwürdige Geschichten:*

iv) Conclusion

When dealing with entities as nebulous and multifaceted as 'Burgundy' and 'borderlands', concrete categorisations are inevitably hard to come by. Nonetheless, the foregoing has hopefully demonstrated a relatively solid core amidst the shifting boundaries of territory and language. In their interactions with each other and higher authorities, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates generally stuck to the line that the Burgundian Circle was beyond the Empire, and that troops crossing the *Kreis* border from west to east were thus violating a significant political frontier and (illegally) entering the *Reichsboden*. This held true whether the accused were in the pay of the king of Spain or the Dutch States General, and whether the accusers were Protestant or Catholic. Such an opinion may appear controversial, given that the Burgundian *Kreis* was still connected to the Empire by many legal ties, as well as bonds of religion and culture, but for the purposes of opposing 'foreign' soldiers the Lower-Rhine-Westphalians held to it.

Some of the theoretical strains in doing so, however, may help to explain why a unified 'border mentality' comparable with that of the Austrian Estates remained fairly under-developed; at times the Circle presented itself as the solid outer rampart of the Reich, but often it was willing to delegate the role of border watchmen to a smaller string of territories along the Circle's western edge. This area was perhaps the true frontier zone, possessing certain exemptions and rights singling it out for special status, and perceived as a place of danger where boundary-breaking intrusion was a constant possibility. Perhaps inevitably, its extent was not fixed, and political rivalries could lead it to be imagined differently. Nonetheless, geographical concepts shaped it to a considerable degree. Just as notions of Imperial soil and frontier strongholds helped solidify the idea of a coterminous Reich-*Kreis*

Sampt einer kurtzen general Nassoviae: vnd special: Beschreibung der Graf: vnd Herschaften Naßaw-Catzenelenbogen (Herborn: Christopher Raaben, 1617), p. 15.

border, so did the river Rhine play an important part in shaping Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's internal boundary. In the south of the Circle, to be left of the Rhine was to be a place of exception, belonging to the *Kreis* but permanently in the shadow of its Burgundian neighbour. In short, a borderland.

PART II:
THE TERRITORIES



Figure 2: Territories of the North-Western Empire, 1618

Chapter IV: Nassau-Dillenburg and the Balance between Mercenaries and Militia

Although debates about what precisely constitutes modernity remain controversial within military history, scholars have generally been content to classify the feudal levies of the High Middle Ages as 'medieval' and the standing national armies of the late seventeenth century and beyond as 'modern'. The greater difficulty, however, lies in attempting to determine where the two predominant troop-types of the period c.1450-1650 – mercenaries and militiamen – fit onto this spectrum. Broadly speaking, the kind of narrative order imposed depends on whether a historian identifies professionalism or patriotism as the key hallmark of a modern army. If professionalism is highlighted as a key point of continuity between mercenaries and state regulars, scholars tend to class part-time militia soldiers as a traditionalist force ultimately superseded (for good or ill) by those who fought for a living.[1] On the other hand, others emphasise the ideologies of patriotism and government control linking militias and national armies, and have thus interpreted militia movements of the early modern period as harbingers of the disciplined modern militaries and forces of citizens-in-arms which supplanted the rootless warbands of the condottieri; this latter view is particularly prevalent among studies of the militia reforms which swept Germany at the turn of the seventeenth century, above all those enacted by the House of Orange-Nassau and connected with that dynasty's remodelling of the professional military in the Netherlands.[2] The

[1] David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480-1560* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), p. 151; David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 100; Herman Uviller and William Merkel, *The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 45; Ann Tlusty, *The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany: Civic Duty and the Right of Arms* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 2, 32; Lois Schwoerer, *'No Standing Armies!': The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 12–15.

[2] Hideo Shinpo, 'Zur verfassungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung des Landesdefensionswesens', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 19.3 (1992), 341-58 (p. 346); Martin Schennach, *Tiroler Landesverteidigung 1600-1650: Landmiliz und Söldnertum* (Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag Wagner, 2003), p. 155; Karl Demandt, *Geschichte des Landes Hessen* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1959), p. 11; Hans Ehlert, 'Ursprünge Des Modernen Militärwesens: Die Nassau-Oranischen Heeresreformen', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 38:2 (1985), 27–56; Gerhard Oestreich,

following chapter addresses the question of what this militia reform project can tell us about the use and abuse of foreign soldiers in contemporary military discourse.

By taking measures to regularly muster and train his subjects according to the latest standards of drill, weaponry, and organisation, Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg was among the first to implement the ideas for local defence forces put forward by Machiavelli, Leonard Fronsberger, and Lazarus of Schwendi, whilst his son John VII's tireless work to enhance, codify, and publicise this new strategy promoted Nassau's militia (known as the *Landesdefension* or *Landrettung*) as a model that was widely imitated elsewhere.[3] The dynamic of tension between the figures of the 'patriotic militiaman' and the 'foreign mercenary' has long been recognised as a key element of the legitimation which the reformers constructed for their scheme. This antagonism was rooted in the civic humanist tradition from which John VI and VII drew, stretching back to Machiavelli's famous comparison of "disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal" mercenaries with the security of relying on one's own arms for protection.[4] Subsequent advocates of local militias embellished the theme: Schwendi claimed that "the foreign hired men are never so loyal, obedient, and prepared as the subjects"; the Bavarian Hans Albert of Sprinzenstein warned of mutiny and expense as the lot of those who hired outsiders rather than training their own

'Graf Johann VII. Verteidigungsbuch für Nassau-Dillenburg 1595', *Nassauische Annalen*, 69 (1958), 135-55 (pp. 135–36).

[3] For Fronsberger, see Leonard Fronsberger, *Fünff Bücher Von Kriegß Regiment und Ordnung, wie sich ein jeder kriegßman inn seinem Ampt vnd beuelch halten soll / vnd was zü anfang eines Kriegs züerwegen vnnd zübetrachten sey / auch von allerley Beuelch vnd ämpter / vom höchsten biß auff das niderst / was eines yeden Herren oder Pottentaten / als General Oberster / Kriegßräht / Musterherren / Commissarien / Pfennigmeyster / Oberster Feldtprofoß / Profandt vnd Quartiermeister / deßgleichen Herold / Schreiber / Vnd wz in ein Zeüghauß gehört zü einem Feldtzug zügebracht* (Frankfurt am Main: David Schöffel, 1555), p. 118^{v}; Leonard Fronsberger, *Von Kayserlichem Kriegßrechten Malefitz vnd Schuldhändlen, Ordnung vnd Regiment, sampt derselbigen vnd andern hoch oder niderigen Befelch, Bestallung, Staht vnd ämpter, zu Rossz vnd Fuß* (Frankfurt am Main: George Raben, 1565), p. 228^{r}; for Machiavelli and Lazarus of Schwendi, see below.

[4] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by George Bull (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 40; for analysis of this and his more detailed comments in *The Art of War*, see John Pocock, *The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition*, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003), pp. 176-203.

peasants; whilst Maurice 'the Wise' of Hesse-Kassel complained that next to local troops, "in comparison foreigners [fight] with neither such seriousness nor such eagerness, as for them it has nothing to do with that which is dearest to them, but only with winning money".[5] The counts of Nassau-Dillenburg developed such rhetoric perhaps further than any other commentators, and Jan Huntebrinker has traced in several of John VII's writings the treatment of mercenary society as an entire "counter-order" [*Gegenordnung*], invoked as the epitome of everything the new *Landesdefension* was reacting against.[6]

Nonetheless, Huntebrinker and other scholars who have noted reformers' antagonism towards foreign mercenaries stop short of asking who, precisely, was designated as such.[7] This imprecision is not without wider ramifications. Knowing who was excluded from the *Landesdefension* – and why – has a bearing on the extent to which we can categorise it as a step towards a modern state army. In the absence of sustained consideration, historians have tended to assume that the remodelled militia functioned primarily as a tool to reinforce sovereignty at the level of individual territories (traditionally identified as the engine of modern state-building in Germany, as opposed to the more feudal, universalist structures of the Reich), and we would consequently expect the 'foreigners' demonised by *Landrettung*

[5] Lazarus of Schwendi, *Kriegsdiscurs von Bestellung deß Gantzen Kriegswesens und von den Kriegsämptern* (Frankfurt am Main: Andreas Wechels Erben, 1594), pp. 29–30.; Hans Albert of Sprinzenstein, 'Hans Albrecht von Sprinzensteins discurs wie er die 1000 welchse Schützen eillendts ins Landvolck bringen, Von Bevestigung der Frontir, das Landvolckh zu Whör geübtzemachen [etc.] Und dann von neuer defenssion ordnung des Obern und Nidern Bayrn', in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens,* 5 vols (Munich: C.H Beck, 1935-41) III.2 (1939), pp. 42-6 (p. 43); Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Kassel, 'Vorschriften des Landgrafen Moritz von Hessen für die Landesdefension vom 1. Oktober 1600', in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens,* 5 vols (Munich: C.H Beck, 1935-41) III.2 (1939), p. 77.
[6] Jan Huntebrinker, *'Fromme Knechte' und 'Garteteufel': Söldner als soziale Gruppe im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Constance: UVK, 2010), pp. 332–41.
[7] Gerhard Oestreich, 'Zur Heeresverfassung der deutschen Territorien von 1500 bis 1800: Ein Versuch vergleichender Betrachtung' in *Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung: Festgabe für Fritz Hartung*, ed. by Richard Dietrich and Gerhard Oestreich (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958), pp. 431-45 (p. 422); Shinpo, 'Bedeutung des Landesdefensionswesens', pp. 346–47; Tlusty, *Martial Ethic*, p. 13; Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, III.2, p. 17.

advocates to be anyone outside the immediate subjects of the territorial prince in question.[8] Often this was so, and analysis of the main theoretical texts of the reformers indicates that foreign soldiers were usually contrasted with territorial subjects. Yet, as we shall see, paying attention to the wider context of these discussions and to the practical implementation of militia reform demonstrates that Nassau-Dillenburg's authorities were willing to use more elastic definitions of foreigners that were strongly shaped by attachment to the Empire and the German nation. Moreover, when we probe more deeply into the arguments which reformers used to advocate replacing foreign mercenaries with local militias, we can see that the modern-sounding emphasis on patriotism and state control was less important than it might appear; often the reformers made a scapegoat of the foreign mercenary less because he was an outsider than because he was a professional, and where they did object to foreigners, these concerns were driven more by practical and financial worries than by beliefs about loyalty and identity. Ultimately, the links between the militia project in Nassau-Dillenburg and the rise of standing state armies can be shown to be tenuous at best.

i) Who were 'Foreign Mercenaries'?

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that the militias envisioned by the reformers were to be organised by governments of individual Imperial Estates. Consequently, when those authors referred to foreigners in their writings, they commonly meant anyone who was not a subject of those governments. For instance, in the text *Motives with Which to Make the Subjects Willing and to Instruct Them in Defensive Work* (the most famous manifesto for the *Landesdefension*, circulated to allied princes beginning in 1596), John VII contrasted

[8] Winfried Schulze, 'Die deutschen Landesdefensionen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert' in *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Johannes Kunisch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986), pp. 129-49 (pp. 129–33); Winfried Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates (1564 - 1619)* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1973), p. 237; Sebastian Schmidt, *Glaube - Herrschaft - Disziplin: Konfessionalisierung und Alltagskultur in den Ämtern Siegen und Dillenburg 1538-1683* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), pp. 213-15; Gerhard Papke, *Von der Miliz zum stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen im Absolutismus [1648-1789]* (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1979), p. 78.

"foreign soldiers" [*frembde soldaten*] with his "subjects" [*vnderthonen*], who would prefer to fund "their fellows" in a militia instead of outsiders, and he argued that "one must not worry that the subjects will betray their own fatherland or leave it in the lurch, for they will lay down their bodies and lives for it, much more readily than foreigners."[9] This juxtaposition of foreign soldiers with subjects of Nassau appeared elsewhere in the defensive manual for Nassau-Dillenburg from which the *Motives* text originated – the *Verteidigungsbuch* – and also in the detailed preamble to the 1595 foundation treaty of the *Landrettungsverein* agreement which allied the county's militia with that of its neighbours from the Association of Wetterau Counts.[10] Having attacked at length the dangers of hiring foreign mercenaries, the preamble concluded with the same contrast between these outsiders and territorial subjects, stating that the signatories "can hold themselves in good readiness and security much more and better with their country folk and subjects [*landtvolck vndt vnderthanen*] than with foreign contracted troops [*frembten angenhommenen Krigs volck*]".[11]

However, although language of this kind appears to use the hate-figure of the foreign mercenary primarily to bolster patriotism and sovereignty at a territorial level, we should not neglect evidence that the dichotomy between natives and foreigners did not always map neatly onto the boundary between subjects and non-subjects. Although the treaty of 1595 at times contrasted foreigners with subjects, it also acknowledged the contested nature of the 'foreign' and rejected a narrowly territorial approach, complaining that other Imperial Estates

[9] Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Motives with Which to Make the Subjects Willing and to Instruct Them in Defensive Work', n.d., Wiesbaden, Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden [hereafter HHStAW], 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 923, fol. 9^{r-v}; for a published version of this text, see Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Landesdefensionordnung des Grafen Johann des Mittleren von Nassau-Siegen um 1596: Motiven wie die underthonen zue dem defension werckh willig zu machen und zu underweisen' in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens*, 5 vols (Munich: C.H Beck, 1935-41), III.2 (1939), pp. 47-76.

[10] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, fol. 19^{v}.

[11] 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fol. 10^{v}.

ignored the entitlement of Nassau and its allies to military aid from the Reich. This meant opposing these neighbours' claims that they should not have to "burden themselves with foreign matters [*frembten sachen*] (as they term them)".[12] Here the idea of the various territories of the Empire as foreign to one another was raised but explicitly criticised, and the militia movement was placed not within a narrative of territorial state-building but of ties to the looser order of the Reich. The same thinking pervaded an earlier attempt at a militia alliance in 1588, which justified a union of *Landrettungswerke* under a range of Imperial legislation requiring resistance to "intruding foreign powers" from outside the Empire.[13]

The tendency to think beyond territorial borders was particularly strong when writings on the *Landesdefension* moved from more abstract calls for reform to discussing specific practical matters of implementation. As an example, when the *Verteidigungsbuch* laid out plans for sourcing the necessary personnel to train and lead Nassau-Dillenburg's militia, its definitions of a foreign soldier shifted somewhat. A list of named individuals was proposed as potential captains of militia units, and the way in which this was broken down into different categories is noteworthy. As we might expect, the column entitled "foreign captains" was distinct from that listing "Nassau captains" and included individuals whose names indicate they were Germans from other Imperial Estates such as Mainz and Strasbourg, rather than from outside the Empire.[14] However, there was also a third column for "captains from the Palatinate", belying a simple division between subjects and foreigners; service to Nassau-Dillenburg's close ally in the Palatine Electorate could apparently exempt one from classification as a foreigner, even for those whose origins lay in the most tenuous borderlands of the Reich (one

[12] 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fols 5^{v}–6^{r}.
[13] Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg and Count Conrad I of Solms-Braunfels to Wetterau counts, 25 January 1588, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 379, fol. 1^{r}.
[14] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, fols 20^{v}, 22^{r}.

man on this list was specifically identified as having been born in Brussels).[15] Moreover, when considering how to obtain particular specialists and craftspeople to support the militia, a flexible approach was employed which prioritised Nassau subjects where the necessary skills were locally available (such as for quartermasters and surgeons), but identified nearby territories as sources of men with rarer expertise (such as Electoral Cologne for mining engineers); particularly, when it came to recruiting master gunners, the text advised that the most experienced men were to be found working in the Netherlands, but that within this pool a certain Master Noll and Master Heinrich were to be preferred, on the grounds that "because these men are German, they are to be acquired rather than foreigners".[16] Rather than rigidly enforcing the exclusion of those who were not their subjects from their vision of a patriotic militia, it thus seems that Nassau-Dillenburg's reformers were willing to modulate their definition of who counted as a foreign soldier in order to accommodate the need for certain skills, and to reflect their ties to the German nation, the Empire, and favoured Estates within it.

ii) Criticism of 'Foreign' vs Criticism of 'Mercenary'

The argument that the patriotism of the militias outweighed their unprofessionalism to make them a forerunner of military modernity weakens further when we scrutinise the 'foreign mercenary' stereotype more deeply and break it down into its component parts. Contemporaries and historians have tended to deploy this term as a single unit, and indeed it was generally assumed that when one spoke of foreign soldiers one was speaking of mercenaries, and vice versa. The 1595 *Landrettungsverein* agreement, for instance, introduced the militia's antithetical counterparts simply as "salaried troops" [*besoldeten*

[15] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, 21r.
[16] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, 24r.

Knechten] without any reference to their origins, before going on to refer to them as "such foreign folk" [*solch fremdt volck*].[17] However, as Michael Sikora reminds us, the mercenary's twin attributes as a foreigner and a hireling did not always neatly coincide, and categorising someone as a mercenary in early modern discourse was as much a moral as a factual judgement.[18] It is legitimate to ask, then, to which aspect of foreign mercenaries' dual identity did the Nassau-Dillenburg reformers primarily object: their outsider status, or the fact that they fought for a living? Historians have tended to foreground passages (including several quoted above) in which reformers attacked mercenaries' lack of patriotic attachment to their masters, but in fact criticism often focused more sharply on the idea of fighting for pay.

Having picked out wages rather than foreignness as the first attribute by which to describe the rivals of the militia, the 1595 accord proceeded to articulate a list of criticisms which for the most part applied equally to all professional mercenaries regardless of their origins or allegiance; these included the financial drain of paying their salaries, the difficulty of organising and hiring them in time to respond to incursions, and the fact that they were dangerous once demobilised because they did not have livelihoods to which they could return.[19] The latter point did segue into a comment about how in battle the "indigenous" [*Inheimische*] men were "much more enthusiastic than the foreign soldiers [*außlendische soldaten*], who have nothing to lose in the land", but this standard trope of subjects' superior motivation to defend their homes was not developed in detail, and in general the document

[17] 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fol. 7^{r-v}.
[18] Michael Sikora, 'Söldner: Historische Annäherung an Einen Kriegertypus', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 29:2 (2003), 210-38 (pp. 210–12).
[19] 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fols 7^{r}-8^{r}.

was light on such rhetoric and avoided appeals to the fatherland.[20] Other proposals for territorial defence often included patriotic or anti-foreigner language as something of an afterthought. One sketch of a *Landrettung* alliance listed the ability to repel "foreign nations" only sixth on a list of potential benefits of which the first was in fact the chance to help "threatened foreign co-religionists" [*außlendische betrangten religions verwenten*], whilst in another draft proposal words like "patriot" and "fatherland" were tacked onto existing sentences in the margins or above the line; the fact that such terms were later additions does not mean that they were unimportant, since it was clearly felt that plans would derive additional legitimacy from their insertion, but it does suggest that the concepts they represented were not the planners' fundamental priority.[21] Moreover, other reports voiced clear opposition to using the militia structures as a basis for more professionalised units; a memorandum attacking proposals for retaining a standing troop of 1,000 horsemen argued that even though "one must use… vassals and [militia] recruits" [*Lehenleutte vnd außzugk*] to provide manpower for such a force, if billeted permanently on the peasant population the cavalry would "wretchedly despoil our poor subjects more than the enemy would, be they so well-regulated as one could wish".[22] The implication was that even local subjects, if turned into full-time soldiers, would fall prey to the same vices attributed to foreign sell-swords.

It is thus apparent that the foreign mercenary made a convenient bogeyman primarily because he was a mercenary rather than because he was foreign. Furthermore, in places where the attacks did focus on drawbacks specifically associated with foreigners, these also featured a

[20] 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fol. 18^{r}.
[21] 'Proposal for a *Landrettung* in the Currently Looming War and Danger of Persecution', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 379, fol. 79^{v}; 'What Is to Be Considered Further and Principally for the Sake of This Place in Connection with the Merciless Spanish Soldiers and Warfare Currently in the Empire', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 470, n.p.
[22] 'A Well-Meaning Reflection, on How to Behave in Dangerous Affairs', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. Z 1356, fols 61^{v}–62^{r}.

heavy dose of economic pragmatism that sometimes overshadowed patriotic rhetoric. In his proposals for a militia in Prussia, John VII invoked a form of simple mercantilism, arguing that when the government spends on militias instead of mercenaries, "the money stays in the land, which otherwise would be carried off by foreigners", echoing an anonymous tract on German military affairs copied into the Nassau archives which argued that when states "wage their wars with hirelings or mercenaries... [and] pay these men, this money is taken out of the land by the foreign soldiers".[23] Further pragmatic arguments put forward against hiring foreigners in this and other documents include the difficulty of feeding the extra mouths if outsiders are imported as protection, and even the suggestion (which does not say much for local Nassau cuisine) that "the indigenous people are used to bad food and drink" and so will be easier for quartermasters to satisfy.[24] Again, the kind of arguments used to oppose importing mercenary manpower cast doubt on the idea that the militia reform project substantially furthered territorial aspirations at the expense of Imperial loyalties. At a meeting of the adjutants of the *Landrettungsverein* alliance convened to debate the Spanish invasion of 1598, John VII and his fellow officers debated proposals for a professional garrison to be hired as a defensive measure, but the proposal was defeated by a majority of delegates; however, the minutes show that their objections did not stem from determination to reject external manpower and place trust in native militiamen, but rather from fiscal prudence and a preference for a more traditional strategy of negotiation and appeals to Imperial organisations

[23] 'Short Discourse Concerning the *Landrettung* in Prussia', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 925, fol. 170^{r}; 'A Christian Reflection, Also a Means to Prevent the Turk's Invasion of Christendom', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 379, 52^{v}; for the background to John VII's engagement with Prussian models, see Christian Krollmann, *Das Defensionswerk im Herzogtum Preussen*, 2 vols (Berlin: Franz Eberhardt & Co, 1904-9), I (1904), pp. 68-72.

[24] 'Short Discourse Concerning the *Landrettung* in Prussia', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 925, fol. 170^{r}; 'Brief Memorandum or Comparison of a Neighbourly Defensive Aid, *Landrettung*, Correspondence, or Constitution', 6 March 1595, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fol. 8^{v}.

for aid. "The garrison is still unnecessary at the moment", as one officer put it, "as it is a matter for the Circle".[25]

iii) The Rejection of National Archetypes

Going further, we can call into question the broader idea that replacing mercenaries with militiamen represented a shift from a cosmopolitan worldview that paid little attention to soldiers' origins to one that sought to compartmentalise and classify different peoples according to local or national archetypes. The belief that the itinerant lifestyle and shifting loyalties of early modern swords-for-hire made them the antithesis of later collective categories is enduring; Wolfgang Reinhard sees the Orange-Nassau reforms as a drive to supplant drifting mercenary bands lacking a "national core" with a forerunner of Borussian patriotic militarism, whilst David Parrott highlights the "individualism and assertiveness" of mercenaries which he believes humanist reformers sought to crush in favour of conformity and group identity.[26] Yet this risks neglecting a fundamental aspect of the Renaissance military marketplace, namely that mercenary culture was underpinned by a discourse which prized certain peoples as natural-born warriors innately fitted for combat. This comparison of the inherent martial characteristics of different populations pervaded sixteenth-century writings, extending all the way up to the most loftily theoretical; Thomas More's 'Utopia' delegated the foreign campaigns of his fictional commonwealth to the Zapoletes, a Swiss-like

[25] Minutes of the Adjutants' Meeting at Herborn, 20 October 1598, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. G 273, fol. 52^{v}.

[26] Wolfgang Reinhard, 'Humanismus und Militarismus: Antike-Rezeption und Kriegshandwerk in der Oranischen Heeresreform', in *Krieg und Frieden im Horizont des Renaissancehumanismus*, ed. by Franz Worstbrock (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora VCH, 1986), pp. 185-205 (pp. 185–86); Parrott, *Business of War*, p. 96; Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, III.2, p. 7.

race of mountain dwellers whose rugged hardiness and willingness to fight for the highest bidder made them an ideal source of expendable mercenary manpower.[27]

In contrast, the thinkers behind the *Landesdefension* movement explicitly sought to confront these stereotypes. The neo-Stoic scholar Justus Lipsius, whose antiquity-inspired ideas of discipline provided a key intellectual plank of the Orange-Nassau reforms, advocated for the rejection of foreign troops by attacking the common belief that "it is better to pass over Domestic men and recruit Mercenaries from some warlike nation" who were fitted for battle by their climate and other natural factors; instead, Lipsius claimed, men from any part of Europe could be made into equally effective fighters through appropriate training.[28] He did maintain that the "fatherland" (*patria*) of recruits was an important criterion for selecting them, yet his definition of fatherland here was not tied to either national or territorial identity, but rather to the urban-rural divide within polities; advancing the proposition "that under fatherland the place is understood where the person in question is born or brought up", he then argued that the fatherland which produced the best fighters was the countryside, whereas towns reared weaker men.[29]

John VI and his son did not adopt every aspect of Lipsius' theories (they showed little interest in discriminating against townsmen when enlisting militiamen, preferring to recruit as broadly as possible), but they were undoubtedly in agreement with the idea that training, and

[27] Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. by George Chatterton Richards (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2010), pp. 100–101; see also Potter, *Renaissance France*, pp. 132–33; Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: sozialgeschichtlichen Studien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), pp. 150–52; Claudius Sieber-Lehmann, *Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus: die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 296–99.

[28] Justus Lipsius, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, trans. by Jan Waszink (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004), p. 573.

[29] Lipsius, *Politica*, pp. 581–83; note that Lipsius was in any case rather sceptical about the value of 'amor patriae', which he warned had the potential to lead to civil war. See Hans Blom, 'Patriots, contracts and other patterns of trust in a polyarchic society: the Dutch 17th century' in '*Patria' und 'Patrioten' vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Robert von Friedeburg (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), pp. 193-213 (p. 198).

not national or regional traits, was the key determinant of a man's fighting ability.[30] John VII repeatedly made the point that by birth foreign mercenaries were "just as much peasants as [my subjects] are", implying that troops the world over began from the same starting point and only military experience and training might differentiate them.[31] Even the infamous Swiss, he wrote, were merely "simple farmers and milkmaids when they are at home".[32] In his *Discourse on the Current German Warfare*, he lamented German soldiers' ill-discipline and penchant for drinking, whoring, and quarrelling, asking "why should not the Germans [manage] equally well without such comforts as do the Spanish, French, and Italians, who are by nature much more hot-tempered than the Germans?"[33] In this instance learned habits trumped natural disposition, and John VII's proposed solution – a well-drilled militia along classical lines – also referenced the common qualifications for warfare shared by all men, stating that the Germans "who have understanding, hearts, eyes, and fists just as the Romans" should be equally capable of defending themselves as citizen-soldiers.[34]

Nor was there a noticeable campaign to project an image of the denizens of Nassau as born warriors. Commissioned to produce a hagiographic account of John VII's Nassau, John Textor made a few customary nods to the strength and hardiness of the population, but his section on "the practice of war and bravery" neglected praise of hereditary fighting prowess

[30] See for example 'Commission for Lieutenant-Colonel Bergkoth', 19 February 1616, HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. J 623 c, fol. 65^{v}.
[31] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, fol. 19^{v}; Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Short Discourse Concerning the *Landrettung* in Prussia', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 925, fol. 170^{r}; Gunter Thies, *Territorialstaat und Landesverteidigung: das Landesdefensionswerk in Hessen-Kassel unter Landgraf Moritz (1592-1627)* (Darmstadt: Hessischen Historischen Kommission Darmstadt und der Historischen Kommission für Hessen, 1973), p. 33.
[32] Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Motives with Which to Make the Subjects Willing and to Instruct Them in Defensive Work', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 923, fol. 7^{v}.
[33] Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Discurs daß itzige teutsche kriegswesen', in *Die Heeresreform der Oranier: Das Kriegsbuch des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen*, ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Wiesbaden: Historischen Kommission für Nassau, 1973), pp. 309-23 (p. 311).
[34] John VII, 'Itzige teutsche kriegswesen', p. 322.

and natural-born courage in favour of a detailed account of the "monthly target practice… general musters… and habitual military exercises" that were presented as the secret to the county's success.[35] Rather than paving the way for the triumph of compartmentalisation over cosmopolitanism in military thinking, the Nassau reforms challenged a pre-existing discourse of national martial traits with an ideology of nurture over nature designed to allow lessons to be generalised across places and periods.

iv) Conclusion

The belief that the rhetorical figure of the foreign mercenary was harnessed to a reform programme that foregrounded patriotism as a motor towards military modernity can thus be shown to be unfounded. Nonetheless, we should not therefore leap to the conclusion that militias were a throwback or a dead-end, and that mercenaries represented the sole line of continuity to the future; indeed, sometimes we need to step back and regard the entire rhetoric of antithetical rivalry between the two systems with suspicion. As some historians have noted, the mercenary and the militiaman in the early modern era often represented two sides of the same coin and had a complementary rather than competitive relationship.[36] John VII himself was quite clear that his criticism of mercenaries did not mean he intended the *Landesdefension* to replace them in duties beyond those of everyday local defence.[37] As we have seen, he was happy to advocate the hiring of mercenaries in certain circumstances, and indeed he employed the services of substantial units of Walloon troops during the crisis of the

[35] John Textor, *Naßawische Chronick / In Welcher des vralt: hochlöblich: vnd weitberühmten Stamms vom Hause Naßaw / Printzen vnd Graven Genealogi oder Stammbaum: deren geburt / leben / heurath / kinder / zu Friden: vnd Kriegszeiten verzichtete sachen vnd thaten / absterben / vnd sonst denckwürdige Geschichten: Sampt einer kurtzen general Nassoviae: vnd special: Beschreibung der Graf: vnd Herschaften Naßaw-Catzenelenbogen* (Herborn: Christopher Raaben, 1617), p. 28.

[36] Michel Hochedlinger, 'Der gewaffnete Doppeladler. Ständische Landesdefension, Stehendes Heer und „Staatsverdichtung" in der frühneuzeitlichen Habsburgermonarchie', in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740: Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas*, ed. Petr Maťa and Thomas Winkelbauer (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), p. 227; Schennach, *Tiroler Landesverteidigung 1600-1650*, p. 17.

[37] Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, 'Motives with Which to Make the Subjects Willing and to Instruct Them in Defensive Work', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 923, fol. 10^{r}.

Spanish Winter.[38] The relationship between mercenaries and militia reforms could even go beyond being simply non-antagonistic to a kind of symbiosis; in one section of the *Verteidigungsbuch*, John VII felt able to advocate the use of "two hundred good *Welsch* soldiers" to defend Siegen, since the presence of armed and trained subjects alongside this garrison would protect the count and counteract the mercenaries' proclivity for betrayal.[39] Ultimately, the complex and sometimes antagonistic relationship between the twin archetypes of mercenary and militiaman in places such as Nassau-Dillenburg cannot be easily slotted into a hierarchical progression from medieval to modern, and must be understood on its own terms as a distinctively early modern phenomenon.

[38] Textor, *Nassawische Chronick*, 132; see also Declaration of Count John VI of Nassau-Dillenburg, n.d., LAV NRW W, E 401 (Fürstentum Siegen, Landesarchiv - Akten), Nr. 14, fol. 19^{r}.
[39] 'How in an Emergency the Town and District of Siegen Should Be Defended with God's Help against the Enemy's Power for a Half-Year', n.d., HHStAW, 171 (Altes Dillenburger Archiv, Akten), Nr. K 1541, fols 15^{v}, 17^{v}–18^{r}.

Chapter V: Foreign Military Occupation in the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg

Hitherto, we have primarily discussed interactions with foreign soldiers as a transient occurrence, framed by the raids, route marches, and seasonal campaigns which locals often conceptualised using metaphors of fire, plague, and other brief but devastating experiences. However, there was of course another way in which the people of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia had contact with troops from abroad; namely, via the activity of semi-permanent garrisons engaged in a military occupation. The most important case of this was the enduring presence of units in Dutch and Spanish service on the soil of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, occasioned by the succession crisis in 1609 and lasting until long after the end of our period. The following chapter will examine this phenomenon in more detail, looking at ways in which the establishment of a settled occupying force affected local people's understandings of – and relationship to – the 'foreign' in a military context.

'Occupation' is a term shaped (and often distorted) by at least two forms of hindsight, particularly when employed in connection with the German-speaking world. First, it has the connotation of being lasting but ultimately time-limited. In retrospect we know that certain regimes created by conquest did not become permanent, and as such class them as occupations, but to the people who lived through them this outcome may have been far from obvious; for instance, for most of its duration the 'Habsburg occupation of Württemberg 1519-34' appeared to be simply 'the beginning of the Habsburg era in Württemberg'. Indeed, for German-speakers of the sixteenth century the word '*Okkupation*' itself had not yet acquired this sense of medium-term duration, nor was it yet clearly delineated from a range of other terms connected with violent acquisition of possessions (which included *Besatzung*,

Besetzung, *Inbesitznahme*, *Unterwerfung*, and *Unterjochung*) or given a settled meaning within the laws of war.[1]

Second, the concept of occupation is strongly associated with European experiences during the World Wars, which tend to dominate both popular perceptions and existing academic literature on the subject.[2] Even when one discusses pre-1914 cases in which Germans were the occupied rather than the occupiers, the Third Reich's legacy is ever-present, for historians have become wary of reproducing the condemnations of foreign rule or '*Fremdherrschaft*' (particularly associated with historical memory of Napoleonic garrisons) which became a rallying cry of nationalists in the 1930s.[3] This may explain why post-war scholarship on early modern occupations tends to approach them primarily with an administrative focus on assessing the occupiers' governmental strategies, thus avoiding potentially emotive issues such as culture and identity.[4] Where such issues have received consideration, this has generally been limited to studying the effect of an occupation on patterns of confessional belief.[5]

[1] Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge, 'Militärische Besetzung vor 1800 – Einführung und Perspektive' in *Die besetzte res publica: Zum Verhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten von Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge (Berlin: Lit, 2006), pp. 11-25 (p. 18).
[2] Meumann and Rogge, 'Militärische Besetzung', p. 11; Heinhard Steiger, '"Occupatio bellica" in der Literatur des Völkerrechts der Christenheit "Spätmittelalter bis 18. Jahrhunderts' in in *Die besetzte res publica: Zum Verhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten von Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge (Berlin: Lit, 2006), pp. 201-40 (pp. 216-21).
[3] Meumann and Rogge, 'Militärische Besetzung', pp. 12-13, 18; Hermann-Dieter Müller, *Der Schwedische Staat in Mainz 1631-1636: Einnahme, Verwaltung, Absichten, Restitution* (Mainz: Stadt Mainz, 1979), pp. 1-2. The term *Fremdherrschaft* does nonetheless still appear in some twenty-first-century works, for instance Gundula Bavendamm, 'Besatzung: Funktion und Gestalt militärischer Fremdherrschaft', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 62 (2003), 196-204.
[4] Horst Carl, *Okkupation und Regionalismus: Die preussischen Westprovinzen im Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1993), pp. 3-6; Cornelis Lammers, 'Occupation Regimes Alike and Unlike: British, Dutch and French Patterns of Inter-Organizational Control of Foreign Territories', *Organization Studies*, 24:9 (2003), 1379-1403; Müller, *Schwedische Staat*, pp. 90-189.
[5] Holger Berg, *Military Occupation Under the Eyes of the Lord: Studies in Erfurt during the Thirty Years War* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); Anna Egler, *Die Spanier in der Linksrheinischen Pfalz 1620-1632: Invasion, Verwaltung, Rekatholisierung* (Mainz: Selbstverlag der Gesellschaft für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 1971).

Previous research into the seventeenth-century occupations of Jülich-Cleves-Berg is no exception to these trends, and shares a reluctance to engage with ways in which occupations could be considered 'foreign'. The most important work has been done by Michael Kaiser, who has written extensively on the Dutch presence in Cleves-Mark during the Thirty Years' War and afterwards.[6] His primary focus is on the triangular balance of power between the nominal Hohenzollern lords, the local Estates, and the States General, with the thesis that the 'pre-arranged' character of the latter's invasion allowed for an unusually harmonious relationship between occupier and occupied. He nonetheless rejects the idea that this had anything to do with cultural or neighbourly sympathies between Cleves-Mark's population and the Dutch, instead arguing that it was the United Provinces' success as a military-political protector that demonstrated its fitness to be the de facto *Landesobrigkeit* (lawful authority) in the eyes of the ruled.[7] This is contrasted with Spanish garrisoning of towns in the region, which was generally experienced as "oppressive *Fremdherrschaft*" whose overthrow was celebrated.[8]

Kaiser's work raises valuable ideas, but a full appraisal requires a more detailed look at the period 1609-18. These early years of the occupation differed significantly from the later phases which have attracted most of his attention, in that the Hohenzollern family were still taking a more active role in administering Cleves-Mark (through the personal presence of

[6] Michael Kaiser, 'Temps de l'occupation – temps de la liberté: les territoires du duché de Clèves et du comté de La Marck sous l'occupation des Provinces-Unies' in *Les ressources des faibles: neutralités, sauvegardes et accommodements en temps de guerre*, ed. by Jean-François Chanet and Christian Windler (Rennes: Rennes University Press, 2010), pp. 241-60; Michael Kaiser, 'Auf dem Weg zur Selbstregierung: Die Landstände von Kleve und Mark in der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs' in *Dynamik durch Gewalt? Der Dreißigjährige Krieg (1618-1648) als Faktor der Wandlungsprozesse des 17. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider and Anuschka Tischer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), pp. 175-203; Michael Kaiser, 'Die Vereinbarte Okkupation: Generalstaatische Besatzungen in brandenburgischen Festungen am Niederrhein' in *Die besetzte res publica: Zum Verhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten von Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge (Berlin: Lit, 2006), pp. 271-314.
[7] Kaiser, 'Vereinbarte Okkupation', pp. 290-1.
[8] Kaiser, 'Vereinbarte Okkupation', p. 280.

first the Brandenburg Elector's brother and then his son as governors), and the relative stability of Dutch rule could not yet be contrasted with the chaos of the Thirty Years' War. The use of archival sources from localities across the entirety of Jülich-Cleves-Berg can also round out Kaiser's picture, which bases its coverage of these early years rather heavily on chronicles written in the duchies' most militantly Calvinist and pro-Dutch town, Wesel.[9]

A new approach may also help reconcile differences between Kaiser's work and more general scholarship on the succession crisis and the ultimate fate of the United Duchies. The narrative of the conflict's events was set out in the introduction and will not be repeated here, but in most cases the story of Jülich-Cleves-Berg during this era is treated as one of a promising state nipped in the bud by foreign influences, as age and insanity prevented the La Marck dukes from resisting waves of marauders taking advantage of their weakness, culminating in full-scale invasions and partition by outsiders.[10] Volker Seresse analyses the political language of this period, concluding that attempts by local actors to build a unifying patriotic lexicon were thwarted by the new rulers who had very different understandings of key concepts like 'commonwealth' and 'fatherland'.[11] Another scholarly work on the topic is simply entitled *Cleves: A Destiny Unfulfilled*.[12]

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[9] *Geusen und Spanier am Niederrhein: Die Ereignisse der Jahre 1586-1632 nach den zeitgenössischen Chroniken der Weseler Bürger Arnold von Anrath und Heinrich von Weseken*, ed. by Klaus Bambauer and Hermann Kleinholz (Wesel: Selbstverlag des Stadtarchivs Wesel, 1992).

[10] Alison Anderson, *On the Verge of War: International Relations and the Jülich-Kleve Succession Crises 1609-1614* (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999), pp. 226-32; Wilhelm Janssen, 'Kleve-Mark-Jülich-Berg-Ravensberg 1400-1600' in *Land im Mittelpunkt der Mächte: Die Herzogtümer Jülich-Kleve-Berg* (Kleve: Boss, 1984), pp. 17-40 (pp. 34-35); Karl Sallmann, 'Organisation der Zentralverwaltung von Jülich-Berg im 16. Jahrhundert', *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Niederrheins*, 17 (1902), 35-97 (p. 64); Oliver Becher, *Herrschaft und autonome Konfessionalisierung: Politik, Religion und Modernisierung in der frühneuzeitlichen Grafschaft Mark* (Essen: Klartext, 2006), p. 50; Andreas Mühling, 'Obrigkeit und „Secterei": Politik und Religion in Jülich-Berg im 16. Jahrhundert', *Monatshefte für Evangelische Kirchengeschichte des Rheinlandes*, 58 (2009), 13-26 (p. 19).

[11] Volker Seresse, 'Schlüsselbegriffe der politischen Sprache in Jülich-Berg und Kleve-Mark um 1600' in *Der Jülich-Klevische Erbstreit 1609: Seine Voraussetzungen und Folgen*, ed. by Manfred Groten, Clemens von Looz-Corswarem and Wilfried Reininghaus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2011), pp. 69-81 (pp. 76-80).

[12] Abraham Glezerman and Michael Harsgor, *Cleve, ein unerfülltes Schicksal: Aufstieg, Rückzug und Verfall eines Territorialstaates* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985).

Seresse is certainly correct that concepts and categories are crucial; however, a reassessment demonstrates that – in the case of Jülich-Cleves-Berg – the story is not simply one of a communication breakdown paralleling the duchies' division by the imposition of alien rule. Instead, this chapter will show a more complicated picture, in which local actors drew on a long tradition of using the rhetorical figure of the foreign soldier in flexible ways to suit various different political and personal objectives. The establishment of the occupying regime was more contested than Kaiser suggests, but objections to the new military presence made surprisingly little reference to its foreign character, and time erased further the distinctions between garrisons and locals in both halves of the divided composite policy.

i) Foreign Soldiers in Domestic Political Rhetoric

Although objections to foreign soldiers loom large in the political rhetoric of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, it is worth noting that their appearances in the role of bogeymen had a long history of being linked to internal power struggles within the duchies, rather than serving as simple expressions of anger and xenophobia. Already in 1590 the duke's government used the excuse that "foreign troops had entrenched themselves in his territory without his knowledge or permission" to levy 'Geleitsgeld' charges on merchants travelling along his roads to pay for armed escorts.[13] As Luca Scholz has recently noted, such charges could act as an important revenue stream for rulers in this period, as well as a means of demonstrating one's authority over a contested stretch of territory.[14] Foreign soldiers as scapegoats could also be used to legitimate resistance to authority. In one incident from 1588, the notoriously independent-minded citizenry of Wesel found a convenient excuse to close their gates to an

[13] Quoted in Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln: Meist aus der Quellen des Stadt-Archivs, 5 vols* (Cologne: L. Schwann'schen Verlagshandlung, 1863-80), V (1880), p. 289.
[14] Luca Scholz, 'Protection and the Channelling of Movement on the Margins of the Holy Roman Empire' in *Protection and Empire: A Global History*, ed. by Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow, and Bain Attwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 13-28.

unwelcome visitor, the son of Duke William the Rich. Observing his bodyguards, "those from Wesel thought to themselves and then complained and said, they perceived Spaniards and other foreigners, who perhaps did not belong to the court. If his princely grace were to come as a duke of Cleves and with subjects, they would know to show him all obedience."[15] Thwarted, the young prince rode off again.

One of the most important ways in which foreign soldiers were pressed into rhetorical service concerns the decades-long struggle by the local aristocracy to secure a form of *Eingeborenenrecht*, that is the recognition that only they could hold political office and that the dukes could not bring in favourites from other territories.[16] This was a means of protecting their own status and prosperity against interference from above. In this vein, the Estates reminded the ducal authorities in 1592 "that these lands' true subjects are privileged, that at all time the government and offices in the land will be occupied and served by native property-holding subjects, and no foreigners."[17] This long campaign bore fruit in that same year when the *Regimentsordnung* or government ordnance setting out the workings of Jülich-Cleves-Berg's political administration included in its fifteenth and sixteenth articles a right of preferment for subjects of the United Duchies when it came to political appointments.[18] There

[15] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis* (1588-97), fol. 90^{v} < https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Decrepitudinis/Liber_Decrepitudinis.htm>.
[16] For a list of officer-holders in the duchy of Cleves during this era, see Joseph Oppenhoff, 'Die klevischen Räte in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts', *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 91 (1911), 129-35; for a similar campaign in Münster, see Schafmeister Karl, 'Herzog Ferdinand von Bayern Erzbischof von Köln als Fürstbischof von Münster 1612-1650' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Wesftalichen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster, 1912), p. 32.
[17] Michael von Aitzing, *Replicata Mensium Aliguot Relatio Historica. Daß ist / Ein Continuirte Beschreybung der Geschichten / Händlen / vnd veränderungen / so sich vom September negstuerschienen / vnd was zuuor / so wol in Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / als Vngern / Poln / Schweden vnd andern Königreichen vnd orten / durch Europam zugetragen / biß auff jetzt abluaffendes monat Aprils 1593. Vnnd insonderheit / Was sich nach absterben beyder / deß Hertzogen Wilhelm von Gülich / vnd Alexandri deß Hertzogen von Parma in den Niderlanden vnd sonst vor der Käy. M. vnd dem König von Hispanien / auch newlich zu Pariß vnd Straßburg verloffen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1593), p. 34.
[18] Design for a *Regimentsordnung*, 7-11 December 1592, in *Die Jülich-Kleve-Bergischen Hof-, Hofämter- und Regimentsordnungen 1456/1521 bis 1609*, ed. by Brigitte Kasten and Margarete Bruckhaus (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2015), pp. 654-55.

was no particular reference made to military matters, but it is interesting that the seventeenth article made reference to the high debts incurred as a result of damages inflicted by rampaging soldiers serving the Dutch and Spanish in the nearby Eighty Years' War.[19] By placing this damning comment about invading soldiers directly after the articles excluding foreigners from high office, the structure of the document was designed to reinforce the message that outsiders were dangerous and thus tar by association immigrant competitors for preferment.

The key question that followed on from this, of course, was how precisely to determine who was a foreigner to be excluded from positions of power. The Jülich-Cleves-Berg Estates attempted to draw a line at those not native to ducal territories, but they recognised the potential for ambiguous cases, and article 16 stipulated that "if there is any dispute in future over whether someone who is serving in an office or command is to be deemed a subject or a foreigner, nothing shall be undertaken against him, but the dispute shall with the gracious foreknowledge of the prince be decided and resolved by the established common council of each place."[20] The defining of a foreigner was thus a power which local elites attempted to reserve for themselves, but not entirely successfully. In his formal response to the Jülich-Cleves-Berg policies, Emperor Rudolf II wrote that although he agreed with the principle of preferential treatment for subjects, he thought it would be a shame if able and qualified candidates were excluded from service; he therefore claimed the right to adjudicate on all cases where an attempt was made to unseat an office-holder on grounds of their foreign background.[21] Thus, even some years before the succession crisis brought outside military intervention in Jülich-Cleves-Berg to the forefront of political discussion, there was a

[19] *Regimentsordnungen*, p. 655.
[20] *Regimentsordnungen*, p. 655.
[21] Imperial *Rezess*, 16 March 1595, in *Regimentsordnungen*, p. 692.

tradition of using control over the labelling of foreigners and the extent of their rights as a proxy in larger battles over status.

These issues intensified as conflict loomed and the raising of new military units expanded the opportunities for martial career advancement. At the outbreak of war in 1609, the Estates of Jülich-Berg sent proposals to both Possessing Princes requesting "that the obedient inhabitants of the land should be put forward for military and other offices according to their quality, and preferred to foreigners, with the merciful consideration that in this the subjects can be more trusted and relied upon to seek alone the benefit and welfare of the beloved fatherland."[22] This argument about local subjects' superior dependability as patriotic stakeholders could have been taken straight from the pages of a Nassau *Landesdefension* treatise, but was rather undermined by the request that followed immediately afterwards. Specifically, the Estates also wanted four men from their ranks to be appointed as special commissioners with powers to monitor the rapacity and disorder of the newly raised forces; this suggests that their confidence in the true-hearted devotion of local officers' troops was in fact rather low, and that their primary motivation for excluding non-subjects was not a genuine fear of foreigners' unreliability but rather a desire to secure more offices for themselves. [23]

As for the princes themselves, military exigency tended to trump such concerns, and in most cases they seem to have decided that bringing in allies from abroad was more important than respecting the wishes of the local nobility. This trend became particularly acute in 1614 once

[22] Memorandum of Jülich-Berg Estates concerning raising of 3000 infantry, 1609, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 109, fol. 12^{v}.
[23] Memorandum of Jülich-Berg Estates concerning raising of 3000 infantry, 1609, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 109, fols 12^{v}-13^{r}; for a comparable case of patriotism playing second fiddle to careerism among aspirants to office in sixteenth-century Württemberg, see Kenneth Marcus, *The Politics of Power: Elites in an Early Modern State in Germany* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2000), p. 173.

both the Army of Flanders and the forces of the United Provinces had signalled their willingness to take up garrison duties on a large scale, and several local units found themselves begging for another contract after being displaced by troops under Spinola or Prince Maurice.[24] The Estates appeared to have obtained a recognition of their rights in the Treaty of Xanten, which gave them the power to nominate officers who would hold Jülich and Düsseldorf with men "raised in the said Land, without admitting any stranger amongst them".[25] These and related provisions very quickly became a dead letter, however, as it became apparent that neither the Spanish nor the Dutch were intending to withdraw.

With the balance of power shifted against them, the duchies' traditional elites had to find other strategies to put forward their claims for preferment, and straightforward anti-foreigner rhetoric began to lose currency. For instance, one petition of 1614 concerned Tonnies Bille of Ravensberg, whose allies among local notables recommended him for military promotion by highlighting (rather than downplaying) his connections to the occupying armies, noting that he had served in the Eighty Years' War and used his contacts to supply the Ravensbergers with information about threatening troop movements.[26] Under the pressure of sustained conflict, battlefield experience and foreign friends thus became more important credentials than claims to be a trueborn subject. In some cases, the Estates also shifted their objectives from trying to exclude non-native soldiers from office to requesting that they swear oaths of

[24] Soldiers quartered in Ketwich to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 2 August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II),), Nr. 2849, fol. 8^{r-v}.
[25] Henry Peacham, *A most true relation of the affaires of Cleve and Gulick as also of all what hath passed this last summer, since the most excellent and victorious prince, Maurice of Nassau, tooke the field with his armie, encamping before Rees in Cleueland: and the losse of Wesel, taken in by the Marques Spinola: vnto the breaking vp of our armie in the beginning of December last past. 1614. With the articles of the peace, propounded at Santen* (London: W. Stansby, 1615), pp. 18-19.
[26] Knights' deputies of Ravensberg to Elector George William of Brandenburg, 16 May 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 126, fol. 1^{r}; Bailiff of Brockhagen to Elector George William of Brandenburg, 4 May 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 126, fol. 3^{r}.

allegiance to the duchy's subjects as well as its prince(s), although these suggestions were rejected as slights against ducal authority.[27]

This last point makes clear that questions about the allegiance and identity of soldiers did not become entirely irrelevant; rather, the peculiar conditions of the joint occupation of Jülich-Cleves-Berg after 1609 shifted the debate from its focus on whether or not a recruit was a subject of the United Duchies (i.e. who his *Landesherr* was) to a new emphasis on determining whom he was presently serving (i.e. who his *Dienstherr* was). The fact that both Possessing Princes theoretically shared authority over the occupying forces whilst frequently working against one another and relying on troops paid by Dutch or Spanish governments made determining the true chain of command a complex and controversial question. This is illustrated by a dossier on the Jülich Citadel incident of 5 May 1614, one of the crucial flashpoints which reignited conflict within the duchies. The author – Lieutenant Arnaudi – related how Governor Pithan secretly opened the gates to a force of "foreign soldiers", only to deflect his subordinates' accusations of treason with the cry "holla, holla, soldiers, stop this, for these are our friends and not our enemies, they are in the service of both their princely graces". Arnaudi refused to accept this, however, continuing to refer to the newcomers as "foreign men" and describing how other witnesses had heard their accomplices shouting "long live Brandenburg, surrender you Neuburger soldiers".[28] He then relayed other reports suggesting that the attackers were sent "by the command of the king of England and the United Provinces", and condemned Pithan for his hypocrisy in letting them in after having earlier warned against the danger of the citadel coming "into foreign hands."[29] The

[27] Response to demands of the Mark Estates, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 109, fol. 16^{v}.
[28] Report copied by Sebastian Wolff, 15 May 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 20^{v}.
[29] Report copied by Sebastian Wolff, 15 May 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 21^{r}-22^{v}.

fact that Arnaudi himself spoke no German and had to have the entire report translated from French was apparently no bar to him making these criticisms.[30]

The succession crisis and the semi-permanent presence of rival occupying garrisons thus re-shaped the discourse within Jülich-Cleves-Berg, rendering a categorisation of 'foreigners' in opposition to native-born subjects less useful, and making the identity of soldiers' paymasters a more important criterion for branding them as invaders. One thing that did not change, however, is that rhetorical attacks on foreign soldiers remained rooted in internal political battles, in which the soldiers themselves were often proxies for the real targets (a rival applicant for office or a competing dynastic claimant). This makes it all the more important that we also look beyond the relationship between princes and Estates, and consider the opinions of those outside the nobility and senior government circles; this includes civic officials in towns and villages, and the mass of ordinary people whom they represented. Their views become clearer when we analyse the relationship between soldiers and civilians on a more quotidian level.

ii) Co-operation and Conflict in Day-to-Day Interactions

Another way in which the retrospective influence of twentieth-century experiences complicates study of early modern occupations is the moral charge added to ideas of 'resistance' and 'collaboration', which are often viewed as binary options representing the epitome and the antithesis of patriotism respectively.[31] In either case, the paradigm is of an asymmetric relationship in which civilians either submit to an overbearing foreign power or fight back against the odds. As we shall see, subjects across Jülich-Cleves-Berg worked both

[30] Report copied by Sebastian Wolff, 15 May 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 18^{v}.
[31] For a discussion of what 'resistance' actually meant in early modern German thought, see Robert von Friedeburg, *Self-Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany 1530-1680* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 117-22.

with and against the garrisons established in their territories, but only rarely portrayed their actions as part of a narrative of foreign domination. As elsewhere, it was the fact that garrisons were comprised of soldiers that mattered most, and the fact that these soldiers could be classed as foreign was of secondary concern. Nor were the civilians invariably acting from a position of weakness; indeed, in certain circumstances they had the upper hand over the occupiers.

Co-operation between forces from within and without the United Duchies was apparent right from the beginning of the succession crisis. In June 1609, with the last La Marck only a few months dead, the Estates of Jülich-Berg met in Düsseldorf to agree defensive measures against the approach of the Possessing Princes (who had just agreed to temporarily share control over the duchies in the Treaty of Dortmund), only to be swiftly undermined by the ordinary citizens of the town opening the city gates to the princes' men. Nonetheless, it is not clear that enthusiasm for the incoming regime was the motive for this insurrection; what seems to have triggered it was a desire to disarm the two-hundred-strong garrison installed by the Estates in the city, which the burghers evidently felt to be a greater threat to their wellbeing than the prospect of rule by Brandenburg and Neuburg.[32]

The cost and impracticality of alternatives to foreign garrisons continued to drive co-operation with the occupiers thereafter, even by those charged with providing this alternative. Some nobles obtained writs of exemption which placed their manors under the protection of local *Landschützen* levies rather than occupying garrisons, but Anna Egler has noted the difficulty of actually enforcing writs of this kind, and this was certainly the case in Jülich-Cleves-Berg.[33] For instance, one nobleman wrote to complain about Jacob of Heyden, who

[32] Anderson, *Verge of War*, p. 36.
[33] Egler, *Die Spanier*, p. 82.

was leading a detachment of twelve *Landschützen* tasked with guarding Angermund House but opted to leave the drawbridge lowered when a unit of professionals came demanding billets.[34] The levies justified their deal with Captain Mario's troops by saying that their own role was pointless when their paymasters had not supplied them with sufficient powder and shot; Wolfgang William then agreed with their assessment by describing their presence as an "unnecessary" expense and permitting them to be permanently replaced by Mario's men.[35]

Wolfgang William was at pains to deny that the move was designed to strengthen his own position vis a vis Brandenburg (Captain Mario was theoretically in service to both Possessing Princes), but in general it appears to be part of a pattern whereby intensifying competition between the dynastic claimants increased opportunities for local subjects to bargain with the occupiers on their own terms. A merchant from Cologne reported to the Hohenzollern governor, George William, that troops loyal to Brandenburg were struggling to take possession of several villages and houses in Berg and that in one case "the inhabitants continue to receive nine of [Wolfgang William]'s soldiers, and wish to defend the same."[36] In this instance, the local residents appear to have made a choice about which of the occupying powers to accept as protectors, and the occupiers' lack of resources (highlighted by the merchant's concern about unpaid debts elsewhere in the same letter) made it difficult to contest this openly.[37] In general, their choice of loyalties seems to have been designed to serve their own practical interests. One English officer commended local peasants in Cleves for supplying Prince Maurice's forces with information about the Rhine dykes' vulnerability

[34] Rutger Fleck to Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg, August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 125, fols 44^{r}-45^{v}.
[35] Rutger Fleck to Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg, August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 125, fols 44^{v}-45^{r}; Memorandum of Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg's response to Dietrich Syburg of Angermund, 10 August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 69^{r}.
[36] Supplication of John Kortt concerning Captain Hartzfelt, 13/23 October 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 132, fol. 100^{r}.
[37] Supplication of John Kortt concerning Captain Hartzfelt, 13/23 October 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 132, fol. 100^{v}.

to Spanish sabotage, but this act of co-operation had an obvious benefit for the farmers whose lands were at risk of being flooded.[38]

If we move our attention from collaboration to resistance, it should first be noted that the two were not always antithetical. The most fiercely xenophobic denunciations of occupying garrisons generally came from the pens of the rival princely governments, who were themselves responsible for inviting in external military intervention. Most of these denunciations tended not to acknowledge this potential hypocrisy, making their arguments rather weak.[39] For example, in 1614 Wolfgang William accused Brandenburg of having led "foreign troops into these lands" and condemned the occupation of Jülich citadel by "a greater number of soldiers from all nations", without explaining what made these particular invaders foreign in a way that his own Spanish allies were not.[40] Some years later, he would still insist that the original sin which had split the Possessing Princes was Brandenburg's decision to garrison Jülich with "foreign outlanders".[41] Meanwhile, George William tried to rally the people of Ravensberg to his side by drawing a favourable comparison with Jülich-Berg under Wolfgang William's rule, "the example before your eyes of neighbours under an unbearable foreign yoke".[42] Again, there was no particular attempt to explain why the regime of a Spanish-backed Danubian prince was more alien than that of a Dutch-backed Baltic one.

[38] Peacham, *A most true relation*, p. 11

[39] In contrast, Jülich-Cleves-Berg's earlier rulers had been careful to defend themselves using definitional arguments. For example, in the 1580s Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg countered accusations that he allowed "foreign troops onto Imperial soil" by playing up Philip II's Burgundian titles to claim that "the king of Spain… is not a foreign potentate but an associate and member of the Empire".

[40] Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg to the Estates of Cleves, 17/27 August 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 132, fol. 51^{v}.

[41] Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg to the Council of Cleves, 29 February 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 132, fol. 126^{v}.

[42] Elector George William of Brandenburg to Ravensberg deputies, 4 July 1615, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 186, fol. 10^{r}.

It is of course possible that – even in the absence of persuasive arguments – the people of Jülich-Cleves-Berg could have regarded one occupier as more foreign than the other. Michael Kaiser suggests as much when he contrasts consensual Dutch rule with opposition to Spanish "*Fremdherrschaft*", but a closer look at Jülich-Berg shows that the picture across the United Duchies was actually quite uniform. Local inhabitants did come into conflict with occupying forces and voice strenuous objections to their presence, but only rarely on the grounds that the garrisons were foreign. Very often, oppressive soldiers were not labelled as foreigners at all. In late 1614, a local official reported on an atrocity carried out against a widow's household near Wilzhelden by "Don Dego with his quartered company of cavalry and Captain Francois"; however, neither he nor any of the five villagers who gave witness statements identified the Army of Flanders' troops as anything other than "riders", "soldiers" or "warriors".[43]

In cases where complainants did identify occupying forces as outsiders, they did not generally make much rhetorical capital out of this. The citizens of Euskirchen criticised the town's Walloon garrison and requested its withdrawal, but passed over cultural differences quickly ("only a few are experienced in the German tongue") in order to focus on charges of horse theft, extortion, and the reckless starting of fires.[44] Sometimes, troops were divided into foreign and native categories only to make the point that their behaviour was equally bad; a petition from the district of Miselohe told Wolfgang William that residents were being oppressed "just as much by the indigenous troops of your princely grace" as by "the royal [Spanish] troops".[45] On occasion, the comparisons drawn were even favourable to the

[43] Reinhard of Metternich and John Nesselradt to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 29 December 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2850, fols 16^{r}-19^{v}; Reinhard of Metternich to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 20 December 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2850, fols 23^{r}-25^{v}.
[44] Mayor and citizens of Euskirchen to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2850, fols 44^{r}-45^{v}.
[45] Petition of subjects from Miselohe District, 1615, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 115^{r}.

outsiders. When the town of Düren in Jülich was asked to pay for the upkeep of a German occupying unit's horses, the civic authorities complained that "to our knowledge this is not allowed or experienced in any towns that receive garrisons from the Spanish or the States General."[46]

Overall, the point that comes across clearly is that when the subjects of the United Duchies came into conflict with foreign soldiers, it was primarily because they were soldiers and not because they were foreigners. The practical impact of feeding and housing a large garrison whilst dealing with the troops' misdeeds was such that, in comparison, any patriotic indignation at foreign dominance was a minor concern. This was the case in Cleves-Mark just as much as in Jülich-Berg, as shown by the townsfolk of Kalkar in Cleves when they demanded that the Possessing Princes refrain from "stationing or allowing the stationing of troops, regardless of under whom or in whose name they may [serve]."[47] Most people simply wanted the soldiers out, regardless of where those soldiers had originally come from. That the gulf between the armed and the unarmed was the most intractable factor in communication problems is further illustrated by an incident near Opladen in 1615. After some English troops attempted to claim billets without the proper paperwork, the local Lutheran pastor was chosen to negotiate with their colonel (Sir Griffin Markham, a Catholic exile) as he was "experienced in the French language".[48] He went forth "holding his breviary in his hands and requesting communication", but got no further than the soldiers' outermost picket before being driven off with blows and musket shots; ultimately, language problems and religious differences could be overcome, but when one side consisted of weapon-wielding

[46] Mayor, Jurors, and Council of Düren to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 21 October 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fols 20^{r}-21^{v}.
[47] Proclamation of Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg concerning Kalkar, 26 September 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0058 (Kleve-Mark, Akten), Nr. 132, fol. 78^{v}.
[48] John of Nesselradt to Jülich-Berg Council, 4 January 1615, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2850, fol. 57^{r}; for more about Markham's military career on the Continent, see Maurus Lunn, 'Chaplains to the English Regiment in Spanish Flanders, 1605-06', *British Catholic History*, 11:3 (1971), 133-55 (pp. 142-4).

professionals and the other did not, the latter had no sure means to bridge the divide. Note also that when the villagers complained about this violence, they did not use the lexicon of patriotic resistance but rather that of plain moral justice, saying "they offend against us, though we do not offend against them at all."[49]

We should not, of course, assume that locals were always the hapless victims of the occupiers. One source from the early days of the occupation records the begging of "some poor soldiers [who] still wish for a daily meal from the citizens", which hardly paints a picture of ruthless domination.[50] On many occasions when the two groups clashed, civilians came out on top. Sometimes this was achieved by playing the occupying powers off against one another, as when the Calvinists of Wesel thwarted a Spanish religious crackdown by lobbying the Dutch occupiers of nearby Emmerich and Rees to threaten tit-for-tat retaliatory measures.[51] At other times, no outside assistance was required. In the duchy of Jülich, the jurors of Keyenberg condemned to death three of Spinola's troops who been caught thieving, with the only one able to secure a pardon being a boy from a nearby village who had character references from his mother and public officials.[52] This case also indicates how soldiers from far afield were often at a relative disadvantage to those serving closer to home, for although these documents did not stress his local background (instead they emphasised that he "had not been long in military service", as if professional soldiering was inherently corrupting), the ready availability of relatives and contacts who could provide legal support was an advantage which men from more distant regions did not possess.[53] Relying on locals

[49] Reinhard of Metternich to Jülich-Berg Council, 29 December 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 107^{v}.
[50] Petition from representatives of Munstereiffel, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 66^{v}.
[51] Jonathan Israel, 'Garrisons and Empire: Spain's Strongholds in North-West Germany 1589-1659' in *Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries, and the Struggle for World Supremacy 1585–1713*, ed. by Jonathan Israel (London: Hambleton 2003), pp. 23-44 (p. 34).
[52] Report for Jülich-Berg Councillors, 4 October 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fols 78^{r}-83^{v}.
[53] Report for Jülich-Berg Councillors, 4 October 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 78^{v}.

for knowledge also put newcomers at risk. Elsewhere in Jülich-Berg, a Franconian captain serving with the occupying garrison complained how a local rival officer, Philip of Berg, had poached some of his best men through a swindle, saying that "I as a foreigner believed his sworn word" but now "through me his company is strengthened without great cost with good German soldiers".[54]

Having sketched out the occupation's basic dynamics, it remains to consider the specific effects of its long duration. Even early on, pessimism that the Treaty of Xanten could deliver on its promises for a mutual withdrawal was widespread, and plans were mooted for making a long-term troop presence sustainable. One anonymous memorandum asked Wolfgang William to implement a system whereby soldiers would be allowed to requisition supplies using promissory notes, which civilians could later redeem from the treasury. This would obviate the need to pay troops in cash that they might gamble away, and thus "the householder and countryman, who is at the same time a subject of the land, remains untroubled and unharmed, and the soldiers would be less compelled to rob and grasp after the poor man."[55] This kind of thinking envisaged a clear distinction between local subjects and (by implication foreign) soldiers, but in fact the proposals were not widely taken up, and these boundaries began to blur somewhat as the occupation went on.

This is illustrated by a lengthy complaint about the Düsseldorf garrison's activities submitted by the town authorities in mid-1616.[56] The soldiers' protracted presence meant they had begun to play a role in the city's economic life, and even reshape its physical fabric through an extensive fortification programme (which had caused chaos when a sergeant redirected a

[54] Supplication of William Schwert of Ansbach, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2848, fol. 38^{r-v}.
[55] Memorandum to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 14 December 1614, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 93^{r}.
[56] Mayor and council of Düsseldorf to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 27 May 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5005, fols 11^{r}-14^{v}.

millstream the wrong way).[57] The burghers also feared the soldiers were bringing "a greater number of wives and children", which raised the spectre of them becoming fully fledged settlers and thus competitors with indigenous craftsmen.[58] Such fears were echoed by inhabitants of other towns, such as Solingen where locals protested that the garrison troops "necessarily come with wives and children, and must practise their trades, and namely those that ought to practise and spread their trades elsewhere".[59] The extent to which the soldier-civilian and foreigner-native boundaries were shifting is shown by the Düsseldorfers' particular complaint that "many houses used for billeting of cavalry and soldiers are being made free for unknown foreigners (who are listed on no muster rolls, and nor are they in fighting service)."[60] Here we can find a direct attack on a group of foreigners, but they are specifically distinguished from the garrison soldiers who are subletting rooms to them. Indeed, the latter are not described as foreign at any point during the document. The beginning of this habit also indicates a certain shift in the attitude of the occupiers; an earlier letter from one of their officers defended the practice of hanging onto the income from billets vacated by troops redeployed elsewhere, suggesting that a long-term presence in the city had taught the Düsseldorf garrison to think of certain houses as 'theirs'.[61]

More generally, the experience of Düsseldorf exemplifies the way in which civilians in the United Duchies were wary of soldiers, and wary of foreigners, but rarely combined these critiques into a single patriotic counterblast against foreign military occupation. As time went

[57] Mayor and council of Düsseldorf to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 27 May 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5005, fol. 13^{r}.
[58] Mayor and council of Düsseldorf to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 27 May 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5005, fol. 12^{v}.
[59] Mayor and council of Solingen to Jülich-Berg council, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 2849, fol. 49^{v}.
[60] Mayor and council of Düsseldorf to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 27 May 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5005, fol. 11^{v}.
[61] Jost Herman of Ellen to Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg, 18 March 1616, LAV NRW R, AA 0031 (Jülich-Berg II), Nr. 5005, fol. 9^{r-v}.

by, their grievances against the garrisons did not disappear, but they did take on new and slightly milder forms as the soldiers' lifestyles changed. Complaints about arson and murder decreased, whereas those about fraud and unfair competition increased. Meanwhile, disruptive as the occupiers' fortification projects undoubtedly were, they also opened up employment possibilities for locals on a scale beyond anything foreign militaries had previously been able to offer.[62] Thus, insofar as there was a tension between collaboration and resistance, the balance shifted somewhat towards the former. This represents the failure of princely denunciations of 'foreign' enemy troops to gain purchase outside the inner circles of power.

iii) Conclusion

Although the primary focus of this chapter has been on Jülich-Cleves-Berg, it is worth briefly noting that the United Duchies' experiences formed part of a larger picture, and that similar trends can be observed elsewhere in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. The most pertinent case is that of the county of East Frisia, where from 1595 onwards a series of Dutch garrisons defended the rebellious city of Emden from the territory's overlords, who in turn made frequent recourse to Spanish aid.[63] Ambiguities concerning troops' employment and allegiance fuelled this controversy, though (as in Jülich-Cleves Berg) these controversies had a limited audience. For example, in 1599 Count Enno III took pains to denounce Dutch invaders whilst dissociating himself from the plundering officer Jacob Thomas, who claimed to be acting with a commission from the Spanish king.[64] Local civic authorities were more interested in locating Thomas' stolen goods than in determining whether or not his commission was

[62] Kaiser, 'Vereinbarte Okkupation', p. 284.
[63] For details and background of this conflict, see 'Ostfriesland' in *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung: Land und Konfession 1500-1650*, ed. by Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler, 7 vols (Munich: Aschendorff, 1991-97), III (1991), pp. 162-80; Andrew Pettegree, *Emden and the Dutch Revolt: Exile and the Development of Reformed Protestantism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
[64] Instructions from Count Enno III of East Frisia for the Herford Kreistag of 1 May 1599, n.d., LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 253^{r}.

genuine, however, and their investigations uncovered various examples of how the garrison had built up a network of commercial contacts during its stay; these included a local tailor named Erbert Schneider who bought fabric pilfered from soldiers' billets and turned it into clothes.[65] Although East Frisia's circumstances differed from those of the United Duchies in several ways (the county was smaller, remained under the rule of a native dynasty, and had inherited a distinctive Frisian political culture which set it apart from the rest of Germany), many of the same phenomena and indeed personnel were involved in both occupations; a sizeable contingent of the Spanish army that occupied Jülich-Berg in the 1610s was commanded by Enno III's younger brother Christopher.[66]

We are thus in a position to round out and build upon previous historiography's partial picture of early modern occupations in the region. The occupation of Jülich-Cleves-Berg clearly altered its inhabitants' relationship with foreign soldiers, but it is important to note how this change took different forms for different social groups. The long-term presence of occupying forces weakened the potential for individuals to be defined and excluded as foreigners on grounds of not being native to the United Duchies. For those able to participate in political debates such as that over the *Eingeborenenrecht*, therefore, arguments based around an individual's present allegiance to a *Dienstherr* became more important (mirroring the preoccupations of the troops themselves). Meanwhile, for those interacting with the occupiers on a more day-to-day level, these definitional questions did not have a great impact. Here, the main trend was for the establishment of settled garrisons to generate new forms of conflict and – increasingly – co-operation between civilians and soldiers.

[65] Record of dealings between Jacob Thomas and certain citizens of Emden, 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 80, fol. 282^{v}.
[66] For East Frisian political culture, see Bernd Kappelhoff, *Absolutistisches Regiment oder Ständeherrschaft? Landesherr und Landstände in Ostfriesland im ersten Drittel des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, 1982), pp. 10-14.

Nonetheless, there are also ways in which the experiences across Jülich-Cleves-Berg were quite similar. The use of patriotic rhetoric varied by social status, but even where it did appear, it seems to have been quite superficial; objections to foreign military occupation were rooted in practical concerns about preferment and expense, and not in deeply held fears for the honour and inviolability of the United Duchies. This calls into question the narrative of the duchies as being on the path to statehood before being suddenly wrenched apart by an influx of outside influence. In fact, the effects of the occupation were often more ambivalent, and in many cases natives found ways to adapt their ideas and hold their own. Moreover, if foreign soldiers were a cause for concern primarily because they were soldiers, not because they were foreign, then it is unsurprising that the experience of living alongside them lessened certain tensions. When troops ceased to be wandering marauders and turned into semi-permanent neighbours, the gulf between the worlds of the military professional and the sedentary citizen shrank.[67] The preceding sources from Jülich-Berg allow us to challenge Michael Kaiser's suggestion that Spanish occupation was seen as unpleasantly alien in a way that Dutch occupation was not. Nonetheless, he is quite right to say elsewhere (as he does in a more general observation on the early-seventeenth-century relations between soldiers and civilians) that "to a large extent, the population perceived the mercenaries as all the same. Primarily, they were soldiers; in whose service they were appeared of secondary importance."[68]

[67] Ralf Pröve, 'Dimension und Reichweite der Paradigmen „Sozialdisziplinierung" und „Militarisierung" im Heiligen Römischen Reich' in *Institutionen, Instrumente und Akteure sozialer Kontrolle und Disziplinierung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa*, ed. by Heinz Schilling (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), pp. 65-85 (pp. 81-84).

[68] Michael Kaiser, 'Die Söldner und die Bevölkerung: Überlegungen zu Konstituierung und Überwindung eines lebensweltlichen Antagonismus' in *Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Stefan Kroll and Kersten Krüger (Hamburg: Lit, 2000), pp. 79-120 (p. 118).

Chapter VI: The Commentariat of Cologne and the Rhetoric of Favouring Foreign Soldiers

When it came to foreign soldiers, the Free Imperial City of Cologne was in two senses the most important spectator in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. First, as a walled city-state which never came under siege in this period and controlled no meaningful hinterland (unlike the *Reichstädte* Aachen and Dortmund, which both possessed modest extramural territories) it was almost unique among *Kreis* Estates in that it never had to endure an uninvited military presence on its own territory. Second, as the home of the Empire's largest printing industry at the time and the region's most important hub for education and information, Cologne was particularly well-placed for its inhabitants to observe and comment upon events in the surrounding area.[1] This chapter will examine foreign soldiers through the perspectives of Cologne's commentariat, with a focus on the often surprisingly sympathetic approach that emerges from non-governmental sources.

As a starting point, consider a dispute which arose among the *Reichstadt*'s citizens at the end of March 1588. Cavalry from the Army of Flanders had been sighted in the nearby duchy of Berg, and it was rumoured that they might attack and pillage the town of Bensberg. A local eyewitness recorded the "different opinions" this news provoked in the city. "Many sided with the *Welsch* against their neighbours, the Bergish, saying that the latter were devoted to the Beggars and [Bonn's Protestant garrison] and set themselves against the troops, so therefore it was right that they should suffer somewhat. Now these were the Catholics, who

[1] For Cologne's printing industry being the Empire's largest, see Wilfried Enderle, 'Die Buchdrucker der Reichsstadt Köln und die catholische Publizistik zwischen 1555 und 1648' in Köln als Kommunikationszentrum: Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen Stadtgeschichte, ed. by Georg Mölich and Gerd Schwerhoff (Cologne: DuMont, 1999), pp. 167-82 (p. 167); for a general overview of the industry's reportage of conflict, see Johannes Arndt, 'Köln und die Medienproduktion zum spanisch-niederländischen Krieg 1566 bis 1648', in *Köln und die Niederrheinlande in ihren historischen Raumbeziehungen (15.-20. Jahrundert)*, ed. by Dieter Geuenich (Pulheim: Rheinland-Verlag, 2000), pp. 339-53.

sided with the pope, the clergy, and the Spanish. The others said the Bergish had acted like true neighbours, in that they resisted the foreign robbing men in order to help and shelter one another and to protect the fatherland, and they should be praised, for they were right and did well. And these were those, who also called themselves Catholic, and yet did not side with the pope and the clergy."[2]

On the face of it, this tells a clear-cut story about the split loyalties at play in debates over soldiers who were acknowledged to be foreign. On the one hand, there was patriotic sentiment, which encouraged solidarity between moderates of all religions and condemnation of alien intruders. On the other hand, there was confessional zealotry, which worked to override local ties and justify the presence of foreign troops provided they were co-religionists battling heresy. The existence of this tension cannot be denied, but further analysis suggests that we cannot posit too strong a dichotomy along these lines. In fact, several sources demonstrate that opposition to foreigners was not a consistent force that could only be overruled by still greater opposition to rival denominations. In fact, the foreign character of troops in the surrounding region was often downplayed by urban commentators, and sometimes actively embraced.

This is at odds with the view which tends to emerge from more official sources. The city of Cologne in this era claimed imperial immediacy (and thus independence from the secular control of the Electorate of Cologne, whose de facto capital was in fact Bonn) and was ruled by a council drawn primarily from the elite class of wealthy patricians. This urban elite was heavily engaged in long-distance commerce, and consequently had a particular interest in keeping the region's roads and rivers free of marauders so that merchants could maintain

[2] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis* (1588-97), fol. 29^{r} <https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Decrepitudinis/Liber_Decrepitudinis.htm>.

trade links with their Hanseatic partners and elsewhere. If we look at this period from the perspective of urban authorities, therefore (and it is precisely this perspective which tends to dominate modern scholarship on the *Reichstadt*), the figure of the foreign soldier unsurprisingly looms large as a source of instability and impoverishment.[3] In 1583 the council bemoaned the presence of "more foreign troops arriving around our town and therefore the growth in unceasing damage, danger, and ruination", and over subsequent years would continue to complain to anyone who would listen about the "unbearable expenses" arising from nearby conflicts which meant that "all necessary commerce foundered and was fundamentally ruined."[4] Nonetheless, we must take this depiction of unmitigated catastrophe with a pinch of salt, and not only because the councillors were often invoking it in order to justify evading financial contributions of one sort or another. The sensitivity of the patricians' fortunes to disruptions in trade routes made them inclined to paint warfare as uniformly disastrous whereas in fact the economic damage was spread unevenly across various sectors and individuals, and some may have in fact found ways to work with foreign soldiers and to profit from the presence of invading armies in the vicinity.

Throughout the period troops from all sides sought and obtained permission to resupply in the city, producing a boom for local dealers in provisions, weapons and other military stores; even the most universally execrated aggressors of the period, the forces of Admiral Mendoza, made use of Cologne as a place to trade for provisions during the Spanish Winter.[5] Many of

[3] See for example Christian Bartz, *Köln im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Die Politik des Rates der Stadt 1618-1635* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), which uses the minutes of the city council as its sole archival source.
[4] Cologne Council to Duke William V of Bavaria, 5th August 1583, Cologne, Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln [hereafter HAStK], 20A (Briefbücher Ältere Serie), Nr. A103, fol. 97r-v; Cologne Council to Emperor Rudolf II, 15 May 1585, HAStK, 20A (Briefbücher Ältere Serie), Nr. A104, fol. 41r; Cologne Council to the Electors, 15 November 1586, HAStK, 55 (Actus et Processus), Nr. A31, fol. 252r.
[5] Jacob Friedlieb, *Eyzingeri Historica Continvatio. Daß ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung der Geschichten / so sich im H. Römischen Riech / Teutscher Nation. Item in Franckreich / Engellandt / Turcken / Hungarn / Poln vnd Schweden / auch sonst allenthalben durch Europam zugetragen / Von Fastmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses ablauffenden Jahs 1598* (Cologne: William Lützenkirchen, 1598), fol. 47v; this role would be continued for generations to come, for which see Michael Kaiser, 'Waffen, Geld, Soldaten: Köln und die Kriegswirtschaft' in

these supplies were purchased with the proceeds of soldiers' plundering sprees, meaning that a lot of the wealth stripped from the countryside of the *Reichstadt*'s neighbours by foreign soldiers did not simply disappear off to Spain or England but found its way into the streets of Cologne. The council did take some measures to try and curb this practice by reissuing legislation from 1572 which ordered the watch to prevent stolen goods from being allowed through the city gates, and on one occasion offered to restore any items which Bergish peasants could prove had been looted from them.[6] It remains doubtful that many peasants were able to make good on this opportunity, however (not least because several raids left no-one alive to reclaim their pillaged property), and the fact that it was deemed necessary to reiterate prohibitions on accepting plunder suggests that the authorities found it difficult to prevent citizens from cashing in on their neighbours' misfortune. Historians of *Policey* decrees are now somewhat wary of assuming that reissuing edicts automatically implied that their previous enforcement was a failure, as the poor state of early modern record-keeping often meant that laws were simply lost or forgotten down the generations, but in this case forbidding the same thing three times within sixteen years does lead us to suspect a recurring phenomenon.[7]

Cologne's role as a centre of artisanal expertise also meant that certain skilled individuals were in a position to benefit from demand amongst the belligerents. A detachment of the Army of Flanders which marched across Jülich-Berg in 1588 under the prince of Chimay

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Köln in unheiligen Zeiten: Die Stadt im Dreißigjährigen Krieg, ed. by Stefan Lewejohann (Cologne: Böhlau, 2014), pp. 93-101

[6] 'Do not bring stolen goods into the city', 18 August 1572, HAStK, 14 (Edikte 16.-19. Jh), Nr. A1, Edikt 95; *Newe Gemeine Wachtordnung, wie sie ein Erb. Rath des heiligen Römischen Reichs Freyer Statt Cölln Reformierter gestalt auffgericht vnd hinfüre zuhalten geboten* (Cologne: Maternus Cholinus, 1586) 3§48; 'Do not bring in stolen goods', 7 September 1588, HAStK, 14 (Edikte 16.-19. Jh), Nr. A1, Edikte 98-99; Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis* (1578-88), fol. 420^{r} < https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Senectutis/Liber_Senectutis.htm>.

[7] Jürgen Schlumbohm, 'Gesetze, die nicht durchgesetzt werden: ein Strukturmerkmal des frühneuzeitlichen Staates?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 23:4 (1997), 647-663; Achim Landwehr, 'Die Rhetorik der „Guten Policey"', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 30:2 (2003), 251-87.

petitioned the council for the loan of a master mason, and although on that occasion the deal was refused on political grounds, it seems that other craftsmen did find employment in the rival camps; John Casimir's heterogenous Protestant army sought a "suitable meister" in Cologne to re-forge some of his artillery in 1583, and in 1585 we hear of a certain *Wallmeister* from the city serving the Bavarians in Bonn, where his attempt to profit yet further by selling the town to the enemy led to his execution.[8] Above all, printers and publishers collectively did well out of reporting on martial events, which helped drive the city's production of newsbooks and chronicles during the years of greatest military activity around the city (the Cologne War period 1583-9) to the highest levels of any seven-year span in the entire Augsburg Peace era.[9]

i) Herman of Weinsberg and his Context

The opinions expressed in these works will be discussed shortly, with a particular focus on the writings of the prolific author Michael of Aitzing, but for the time being it is worth devoting some attention to another important individual in the city's nascent historiographic tradition. Herman of Weinsberg was the source of the earlier anecdote which began this chapter, and ranks as the most thorough recorder of the city's affairs in the late sixteenth century. Throughout his adult life he kept an exhaustive record of his personal experiences and events in his hometown, compiling a magnum opus known generally as his *Gedenckbücher* or the *Buch Weinsberg*. He himself was a minor member of the patrician

[8] Memorandum of Count Palatine John Casimir of Simmern for Hans Oswald of Affenstein, 16 May 1583, in *Briefe des Pfalzgrafen Johann Casimir mit Verwandten Schiftstücken*, ed. by Friedrich von Bezold, 3 vols (Munich: M. Rieger'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1882-1903), II (1884), p. 111; Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln: Meist aus der Quellen des Stadt-Archivs*, 5 vols (Cologne: L. Schwann'schen Verlagshandlung, 1863-80), V (1880), pp. 200-1.

[9] Calculated with the aid of the Universal Short Title Catalogue; <http://ustc.ac.uk/index.php> (accessed on 01 November 2018). The figures for different seven-year periods are as follows; 1555-1561 = 0, 1562-1568 = 14, 1569-1575 = 47, 1576-1582 = 70, 1583-1589 = 101, 1590-1596 = 90, 1597-1603 = 50, 1604-1610 = 51, 1611-1617 = 46. These are rough figures which do not take into account the nuances of classifying individual works, but still serve to indicate the particularly high journalistic print output of the Cologne War period.

class who served periodically as a member of the ruling council, but his written views cannot be said to embody a government perspective. Indeed, he actively disavowed civic-minded patriotism as a motive for taking up his pen, stating that although "I have now served my fatherland, my parish, and friends truly for many years… [I] devote this work and writings more to the honour and advantage of [my] house than to the common good of this city Cologne."[10] Perhaps the clearest proof that these texts did indeed embody a private rather than a public standpoint is that he never attempted to publish them in any form, instead keeping his journals secret as part of an elaborate personal project to create a dynastic and literary legacy to be passed on via his heirs.

If Weinsberg was not a mouthpiece for the government, nor should we confuse him with the voice of the common man. Newer scholarship has become increasingly aware of the uniqueness of his perspective; the very quality that makes him such an informative source, namely his fanatical obsession with recording his thoughts for the sake of his posterity, also makes him unrepresentative of the mass of private citizens who felt no such compulsion.[11] Nonetheless, given this heightened fixation with blood ties and wariness towards outsiders, it is perhaps even more striking that he is largely uninterested in using foreign origins and allegiances as grounds for complaint against soldiers. He mentions 'foreigners' incessantly, in reference to his attempts to regulate whether his property could fall into the hands of strangers after his death, but is sparing in applying the term to military affairs. An example of this is his lengthy account of a skirmish fought in May 1588, in which Cologne's citizens helped to protect a mercantile convoy from attack by Chimay's troops as it crossed the duchy of Jülich. He frequently described the assailants as "*Welsch*" but did not elaborate on their

[10] Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis*, fols 143^{v}-144^{r}.
[11] Matthew Lundin, *Paper Memory: A Sixteenth Century Townsman Writes his World* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 6.

foreign status or use it demonise them further. Instead, the only people explicitly labelled as "foreigners" were in fact the innocent traders who were rescued.[12]

Also illuminating is his treatment of the related issues of immigration and watch reform. This period saw a major overhaul of Cologne's city watch, beginning in 1583 in response to the threat of invading forces operating nearby, following principles that are in many ways comparable with the militia reforms being enacted contemporaneously in Nassau-Dillenburg; in both cases, the territorial government sought to codify the duties of the population to contribute to local defence, to improve standards of conduct of men on duty, and to reinforce its own control over these forces at the expense of other political actors (rural landholders in the case of John VI's county, tradesmen's associations known as *Gaffeln* in the case of the city).[13] By this point, Cologne had also become a key destination for thousands of migrants, predominantly refugees from the Low Countries fleeing the violence associated with the Dutch Revolt.[14] The Calvinists among them formed a vocal Protestant minority within the city which alarmed the traditional Catholic elite, and in 1585 the council took steps to expel those regarded as "suspect foreign persons", including anyone whose martial skills made them particularly dangerous such as the "young warrior" Joachim Broech.[15] In its ordinance establishing the remodelled city watch, the council showed similar nervousness about immigrants bearing arms; although the formal duty to contribute to defence was extended to all male "citizens and inhabitants" and thus encompassed residents born elsewhere, district captains were forbidden from recruiting "foreigners who have so recently within six, seven, and eight years made their home in Cologne, or who are suspicious in another way", and

[12] Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis*, fol. 43^{r}.
[13] For the background to this reform, see Paul Holt, 'Die Bürgermusterung in Köln vom Jahre 1583', *Beiträge zur Kölnische Geschichte / Sprache / Eigenart*, 2 (1917), 228-41.
[14] Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1998), p. 193-94.
[15] Quoted in Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln*, V, p. 442.

specific provision was made for "people of certain foreign nations and tongues or other citizens and inhabitants… particularly the foreigners" to buy their way out of active service.[16]

Weinsberg himself was not above hostility to recent arrivals, positing a division of the citizens of Cologne into a hierarchy of three groups; the first was the governing class, the second was the "born, inherited, or old common citizens", and "the third however are simple inhabitants, new residents, arriving foreign people, who alone busy themselves with their businesses and trade and care neither for the town, the *Gaffeln*, nor the common good, nor do they take care to relate to them as more than foreigners."[17] Nonetheless, his experience as a captain in the town watch points to ways in which the remodelled defence force could in fact be a means for integration of foreigners rather than exclusion. In 1591 he wrote an obituary of one Dr Theodore Offenberg, who had been the master of coin for Weinsberg's unit during his captaincy, and of whom he says "because I had good fellowship and communication with him at that time, we were both well satisfied with each other."[18] What is interesting is that Offenberg is described as having been born in Cleves then raised and educated in France, which according to Weinsberg's criteria would make him a foreigner and not one of the trueborn citizenry; furthermore, the chronicler makes no effort to play down his former subordinate's outlandish attributes, noting instead that "he spoke the Clevish language, so that he could not get by well in German." The fact that this was no bar to Offenberg being accepted into the watch and described as a worthy comrade suggests that being regarded as a foreigner was not incompatible with being accepted as a defender of the city.

[16] *Newe Gemeine Wachtordnung*, 1§2, 1§20, 1§9; similar provisions existed in other *Reichstädte*, for which see Joachim Ehlers, *Die Wehrverfassung der Stadt Hamburg im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1966), pp. 91-92.
[17] Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis*, fol. 257^{r-v}.
[18] Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis*, fol. 222^{r}.

Ultimately, perhaps Weinsberg's strongest indication that he did not regard a person's geographical origins or territorial allegiance as fundamental to their identity is a famous passage of self-description, in which he sets out to record every aspect of his life and attributes right down to the appearance of numerous individual body parts and items of clothing, yet nowhere sees fit to articulate his sense of selfhood in terms of a particular fatherland or allegiance.[19] Nor can his relaxed approach to foreigners be attributed to overriding Tridentine internationalism; he was a staunch religious moderate himself, and in the same passage sums up his philosophy as that of the golden mean, "medium tenuere beati."[20] As has already been established, his perspective was a singular one that cannot glibly be generalised, but other evidence nonetheless suggests that he was not alone in his reluctance to target people on the basis of their being foreign. For example, opposition to Dutch refugees in Cologne did not always stem from xenophobia. Johannes Arndt makes the point that, among the clerics and scholars associated with the city university, pressure to expel the migrants was attributable less to a desire to be rid of foreigners than a wish to attract more of them; the academics hoped that banishing Philip II's enemies would encourage him to lift the ban on his Burgundian subjects studying outside the Spanish Netherlands.[21]

Even the council's remonstrations against marauding soldiers could follow a similar pattern at times. Perhaps its most serious cause for complaint arose in mid-1604, when troops serving the United Provinces targeted the town during artillery practice (claiming, rather unconvincingly, that they had not realised their cannon were loaded), killing a civilian. The civic authorities naturally sent a stern protest to the States General, but they chose not to

[19] Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis*, fol. 32^{r}-39^{v}.
[20] Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis*, fol. 39^{r}.
[21] Arndt, *Reich und die Niederlande*, p. 193.

castigate the offenders as alien interlopers; instead, the only foreigners in their account were actually victims, since they deemed the bombardment particularly grievous for targeting a gate where there was a "great inwards and outwards traffic of foreign persons and inhabitants".[22] Furthermore, as in Nassau-Dillenburg, the government of the *Reichstadt* also proved uninterested in patriotic preferment when recruiting technical specialists for its defence. When engaged in a military build-up in response to the disturbances wracking Jülich-Cleves-Berg in 1610, the council dismissed eight mining engineers from Liège for demanding excessive wages, only to hire replacements from still further afield in Antwerp.[23]

The preceding discussion of the sources has given an indication that of the relatively nuanced range of sentiments towards foreign soldiers which existed in Cologne, and shown that confessional lesser-evilism was not the only force acting against patriotic opposition to their presence. This impression is reinforced by another illustrative incident recorded by Weinsberg, which will serve to conclude this section. Beginning in April 1583, a rumour arose in the city that the clergy was secretly amassing armed men and hiding them in ecclesiastical buildings in preparation for a coup and massacre of Protestants. This sparked a mass panic, which partisans of Elector Gebhard Truchsess tried to inflame with rhetoric targeted at foreign soldiers; Gebhard's commander John Casimir explicitly instructed one of his agents to promote whispers that the hidden forces were "Spanish troops" bent on conquering the city for Philip II.[24] What is interesting, however, is that xenophobia seems to have had little traction in the arguments taking place in Cologne. In his account of the crisis, Weinsberg does not identify the supposed secret army as anything other than "soldiers,

[22] Cologne Council to States General of the United Provinces, 24 August 1604, HAStK, 20A (Briefbücher Ältere Serie), Nr. A118, fol. 34^{r}.
[23] Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln*, V, p. 514.
[24] Count Palatine John Casimir of Simmern to Hans Oswald of Affenstein, 6 May 1583, in Bezold, *Briefe des Pfalzgrafen*, II, p. 110.

cavalry and infantry", whereas it is the source of the rumour who is explicitly marked out as a "foreign Landsknecht" named Peter of Ryssa.[25]

By basing their witch-hunt on the word of an outsider and his associates – a motley group drawn from both sides in the Cologne War, including those who had served the Catholic militant Salentin of Isenburg – the worried citizens hardly set the issue up as a straightforward clash between patriots and invaders, or even between confessions.[26] In fact, concerns over social order and the balance of power within the city seem to have been paramount; as Weinsberg noted, the key drivers of the campaign were the *Gaffeln*, who saw the threat as part of their long-term struggle against the city's wealthy clerical establishment.[27] When the council eventually succeeded in quelling the rumour and decided to silence Ryssa's gang through execution, it could have tried to turn the tables and cast them as foreign malcontents; instead, it chose to treat them like rogue citizens and charged them (on dubious legal grounds) with "treason against the *patria*", apparently reasoning that a renegade would be more repellent than an interloper to the populace.[28]

ii) Foreign Soldiers According to the News Industry

Similar themes emerge from texts produced by commentators writing more explicitly for a commercial audience. In considering the treatment of foreign soldiers by Cologne's print industry, I will predominantly focus on the works of pioneering author Michael of Aitzing. Aitzing is a well-known figure to scholars, partly for his works of historical reportage on the Eighty Years' War (which featured the first iconic 'Leo Belgicus' image of the Netherlands),

[25] Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis*, fol. 400^{v}.
[26] Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln*, V, p. 148.
[27] For the background to this struggle, see Bernhard Ruthmann, 'Die Konfessionalisierung im bergischen Land und in der Stadt Köln im Spiegel kammergerichtlicher Prozesstätigkeit' in *Drei Konfessionen in einer Region: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Konfessionalisierung im Herzogtum Berg vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Burkhard Dietz and Stefan Ehrenpreis (Cologne: Rheinland Verlag, 1999), pp. 197-227 (pp. 219 ff).
[28] Minutes of Cologne Council, HAStK, 10B (Ratsprotokolle 1396-1798), Nr. A34, fol. 63^{r}.

but principally for developing the *Meßrelation* format of regular biannual newsbooks, which has often been regarded as a forerunner to the modern newspaper. Most analysis has therefore been within the field of media history, seeking to analyse Aitzing's intentions and methods in order to accurately position his *Meßrelationen* within the emerging field of print journalism, and to assess his impartiality as a reporter. Historians remain divided on the latter point, with some such as Rosseaux and Behringer emphasising his moderate irenicism and even-handed treatment of Protestants, whilst others such as Glüer, Schnurr, and Körber see his work as filled with implicit and explicit support for militant – even millenarian – Catholicism.[29]

Examining the contents of his publications to assess their treatment of identity and allegiance in reference to potentially foreign soldiers can shed some light on the way commercial commentators approached these issues. In particular, it is illustrative of a perhaps under-appreciated trend for contemporary pamphleteers to tone down opposition to foreign soldiers, and in some cases to actively celebrate the multinational diversity of armies operating in and around Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. First, it should be noted that although he resided in Cologne from 1581 to 1591 and published all his major works through the Kölner printing house of Gottfried of Kempen, Aitzing's personal perspective was not necessarily representative of public opinion in the Free City, albeit for different reasons to that of Weinsberg. He had settled there following extensive time spent in Brussels, was connected to the court of Archbishop-Elector Ernest, and was explicit in identifying "my beloved

[29] Ulrich Rosseaux, 'Die Entstehung der Messrelationen: Zur Entwicklung eines Frühneuzeitlichen Nachrichtenmediums aus der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung des 16. Jahrhunderts', Historisches Jahrbuch, 124 (2000), pp. 97-123 (pp. 107-9); Wolfgang Behringer, *Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), pp. 311-12; Juliane Glüer, *Meßrelationen um 1600: eine neues Medium zwischen aktueller Presse und Geschichtsschreibung* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 2000), pp. 116-17, Esther-Beate Körber, 'Das Selbstverständnis Michaels von Aitzing nach dem Zeugnis seiner deutschen Messrelationen', *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte*, 15 (2013), 5-27 (pp. 5, 12); Eva-Maria Schnurr, *Religionskonflikt und Öffentlichkeit: Eine Mediengeschichte des Kölner Kriegs 1582 bis 1590* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), pp. 147-48.

fatherland" to be his birthplace in Austria.[30] Nonetheless, even this itinerant background was in some ways in keeping with the city's character; as already noted, Cologne at this time was an international entrepot of merchants, diplomats, and refugees, and the printmaking trade was dominated by non-citizen migrants such as the famous illustrator Francis Hogenberg.[31] Moreover, Aitzing's successful pursuit of a wide reading public for his work shows that his views were of more than merely individual significance.

Given this cosmopolitan context, perhaps we should not be surprised that Aitzing's approach to foreign soldiers was markedly less hostile than historiography might lead us to expect. One of the most striking examples of this is the foreword to the September 1588 edition of his *Meßrelationen*, which contains a lengthy dedication to Don Manrique de Lara, an officer serving King Philip II of Spain, who had been involved in the Army of Flanders' attack on Bonn four years earlier.[32] Historians have previously noted this dedication to a foreign soldier without really commenting on the reasons behind it, which at first glance appear rather opaque.[33] De Lara was not high-ranking enough to be an obvious potential patron, nor was he even currently active in Germany, and as a Spaniard who had invaded Reich territory he was

[30] Michael of Aitzing, *Historica Novem Mensium Relatio: Das ist / Ein Historische beschreibung der merchlichen vnd Gedenckwurdigen Geschichten / so sich die negsten neun Monat / nicht allein ihm Heyligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nacion / vnd dem Vhralten Ertzstifft Cölln / Sonder auch Ihm Niderlandt / Franckreich / Engellandt / Poln / Hungern vnd Behaymb. darzu in Italien / Hispanien / vnd andern Königreichen / Herzogthummen / Graff / vnnd Herrschafften zugetragen / vom Junio des 1590 Jahr an / biß auff ietzt Ablauffendts Monat Marty dises gegenwurtigen Jars nach Christi Geburt 1591 Durch Michaeln Erzinger auß Osterreich* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1591), p. 26.

[31] Cornel Zwierlein, 'Kommunikationsräume und Erinnerungsräume in Migrantenmilieus: Exil- und Kriegserinnerung im Köln des 16. Jahrhunderts' in *Europäische Errinerungsräume*, ed. by Kirstin Buchinger, Claire Gantet, and Jakob Vogel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009), pp. 119-31 (p. 127); Ramon Voges, *Das Auge der Geschichte: Der Aufstand der Niederlande und die Französischen Religionskriege im Spiegel der Bildberichte Franz Hogenbergs ca. 1560–1610* (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

[32] Michael of Aitzing, *Historica postremae relationis appendix. Das ist ein histoerische vervolgung der Geschichten und haendel so sich seithero des monats Martii noch ferner zugetragen. So wol umb das Ertzstifft Coelln und bonn: als auch im Niderlandt, Franckreich, Teutschlandt und sonst an andern orten biß auff den 15. Tag jetzt ablauffenden monats Septembris. 1588* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1588), p. ii^{r-v}; for further details of de Lara's service in the region, see Casper of Fürstenberg, *Die Tagebücher Kaspars von Fürstenberg*, ed. by Alfred Bruns, 2 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1985-7), I (1985), pp. 184-5.

[33] Schnurr, *Religionskonflikt und Öffentlichkeit*, p. 148.

a rather controversial choice.[34] Part of Aitzing's motivation must have been desire to demonstrate his own loyalty to the Counter-Reformation cause (in line with Glüer, Schnurr, and Körber's assessment of his partisan sympathies) but confessionalism in itself offers an insufficient explanation; there were plenty of local German Catholic champions he could have picked.

What is interesting is that rather than seeking to downplay or deny de Lara's outsider status, Aitzing embraces it and weaves it into his programme for the entire publication. He does this via a literary device of linking the areas that the *Meßrelation* will report on with episodes from de Lara's personal history; Aitzing says he will discuss events in Spain "where your grace was born", in Italy where de Lara once commanded twenty banners of infantry, in the Holy Roman Empire where de Lara recruited four thousand soldiers to fight the Ottomans at Tunis, and so on.[35] The timing of the dedication is also significant. This particular edition was important in that it was the first to be clearly conceived of as part of a continuing sequence, and historians have noted that it was around this time that Aitzing expanded his focus from events in and around Cologne and Aachen to an attempt at genuinely pan-European coverage.[36] They have not really elaborated on why and how this shift took place, but the de Lara dedication offers clues. Aitzing concludes that if de Lara were to return to Bonn (which had once again fallen into Protestant hands), the siege would swiftly be concluded and the

[34] The Protestant preacher John Northausen had already published a sensationalised account accusing de Lara of trying to forcibly convert him to Catholicism after his capture at Bonn, and of throwing him in the Rhine when he refused. See John Northausen, *Erbermliche aber warhaffte vnnd Instrumentirte anzeig vnnd beschreibung / was nach der Verrätherischen auffgebung der Statt Bonn der Bischoff zu Lüttig / durch seine befelchhabere gegn einem frommen Kirchendiener da selbst fürnemmen lassen* (n.p.: n. pub., 1584), pp. 8-16; for more context behind this incident see Jobst Reller, *Die Anfänge der evangelischen Militärseelsorge und Soldatenfrömmigkeit* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2021), p. 204, though note the date of this incident is misattributed to 1586.

[35] Aitzing, *Historica postremae relationis… biß auff den 15. Tag jetzt ablauffenden monats Septembris. 1588*, p. ii^{r}.

[36] Körber, 'Selbstverständnis Michaels von Aitzing', pp. 9-11; Schnurr, *Religionskonflikt und Öffentlichkeit*, pp. 145-46; Behringer, *Zeichen des Merkur*, pp. 313-14

emperor's mandate against the occupiers fulfilled.[37] By choosing a cosmopolitan Spanish officer to be the symbol of both his ambitious chronicling project and an Imperial peace restored by outside intervention, Aitzing positioned his work in opposition to rhetoric which demonised foreign soldiers and sought to close off Germany and the Empire from military events elsewhere.

This line of thinking was a consistent one in Aitzing's news publications. The next issue of the *Meßrelationen* was dedicated to another prominent figure in Spanish military service, Prince Alexander Farnese of Parma, whilst further praise of de Lara was shoehorned into the foreword of the March 1591 edition, and he was happy to highlight the multinational composition both of the Army of Flanders and of Spanish Habsburg backing generally.[38]

It is true, of course, that he was not uniformly positive about the deeds of Philip II's troops, and often he had cause to criticise individual incidents of plundering. Certainly, he should not be characterised as a blindly partisan cheerleader for the hosts of Spain. Nonetheless, Aitzing often put the most direct criticisms of using foreign soldiers into the mouths of hostile

[37] Aitzing, *Historica postremae relationis… biß auff den 15. Tag jetzt ablauffenden monats Septembris. 1588*, p. ii^{v}.

[38] Michael of Aitzing, *Appendicis historicae relationis appendix: Das ist ein weythere historische veruolgung der händel und Geschichte / so sich ferner haben zugetragen / Biß auff den jetzt ablauffenden April. 1589. Mit der wunderbaerlichen veränderung / so sich nit allein in Franckreich erhebt: sondern auch in der Türckey / in Engellandt / in Hoch vnd Nieder Teutschen Landen / Polen / Hispanien / Hungern vnd Böheimb / mercklich auch vmb das Ertzstifft Cölln / verlauffen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1589), n.p.; Michael of Aitzing, *Historica Novem Mensium Relatio: Das ist / Ein Historische beschreibung der merchlichen vnd Gedenckwurdigen Geschichten / so sich die negsten neun Monat / nicht allein ihm Heyligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nacion / vnd dem Vhralten Ertzstifft Cölln / Sonder auch Ihm Niderlandt / Franckreich / Engellandt / Poln / Hungern vnd Behaymb. darzu in Italien / Hispanien / vnd andern Königreichen / Herzogthummen / Graff / vnnd Herrschafften zugetragen / vom Junio des 1590 Jahr an / biß auff ietzt Ablauffendts Monat Marty dises gegenwurtigen Jars nach Christi Geburt 1591 Durch Michaeln Erzinger auß Osterreich* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1591), n.p.; Aitzing, *Historica postremae relationis… biß auff den 15. Tag jetzt ablauffenden monats Septembris. 1588*, p. 111; Michael of Aitzing, *Annalis Rervm Gestarvm Historia. Das ist / Ein Historische Relation, Gedenckwierdiger sachen / so ietzt ablauffendes Jahr 1594. vnnd ein wenig zuuor / sich zwischen Christen vnd Türcken / auch Catholischen vnd Vncatholischen / allenthalben zugetragen. Sonderlich / In Franckreich / Hispanien / Vngern vnd Behem / Poln / Schweden vnd Dennmarck / Italien / Schotlandt: Im H. Röm. Reich Teutscher Nation / vnd Niderlandt hin vnd wider verloffen / biß ayff ietziges Monat Septembris 1594* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1594)p. 53.

figures, and rarely lets them pass unchallenged. For example, he attributed to an English chancellor a speech about the "danger if we recruit foreigners for warfare in our land", but made the Englishman add "if we however regard the king of Spain, although he is never served by one nation alone, so has he means nonetheless."[39] If managed correctly, a multinational army could be effective; Aitzing was more interested in mocking the Protestants for their inability to do so than in attacking the use of outside military help as a general principle. In a similar vein, he reported that Henry IV of France had plans "to help himself with his Frenchmen alone, and certainly not to trust the foreigners, who are alone concerned with gold", and implied a comparison with events in Germany by directly following this with a promise to report on "what is negotiated or achieved at Frankfurt to drive the foreign soldiers from Imperial soil."[40] Context suggests, however, that his primary purpose was to highlight the inability of the Protestant coalition to work together and trust each other, in comparison to the good relations among Catholics.

Where Aitzing had grounds to levy personal criticisms against foreign soldiers, it is notable that this failed to translate into general statements of their inferiority. A key case of this is his coverage of the campaign in the 1590s to expel the garrison left in Bonn by the Army of Flanders. Being himself resident in Bonn during these years, Aitzing was able to report in exhaustive detail on the difficulties caused by unruly soldiers, who clashed incessantly with their officers, the townspeople, and the local authorities until eventually replaced by a force

[39] Aitzing, *Appendicis historicae relationis appendix… Biß auff den jetzt ablauffenden April. 1589*, p. 52.
[40] Michael of Aitzing, *Relationis Historicae supplementum Daß ist / Ein Historische / vernere Erzellung / der seltzamen vnnd hochwichtigen sachen / welche sich ietzt der zeyt / insonderheit zwischen dem König von Nauarra / vnd den zusammen verbundtnen Catholischen in Franckreich / verloffen. Auch So wol in Engellandt / Schottlandt / vnd Dennmarck / als in Hispanien / vnd sonst andern örten Europae zuwissen im Heiligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nation / Niderlandt / Königreich Poln / Hungern vnd Beheimb / Ertzstifft Cölln / Frießlandt / Geldern / Westphalen / sambt andern dergleichen Landtschafften vnd Prouincien / zugetragen. Vom Negstuerschienen Augusto an / biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Aprilis / gegenwürtiges Jars 1590* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1590), p. 50.

of "newly arriving men from Germany" in direct service to Elector Ernest.[41] Yet Aitzing did not use this is an opportunity to castigate outsiders more widely, instead highlighting the misdeeds of the German contingent among the original garrison, complaining of evil "soldiers' customs, particularly of the Germans, who have from themselves and other nations put forth many examples" of bad conduct.[42] As for their replacements, being regarded as less alien did not make them any more trusted in the long run; Aitzing went on to accuse the new garrison of causing the same problems, saying they followed the mutinous "example of the royal [Spanish] troops" and were feared to be conspiring with "certain foreign troops" who were lurking outside the gates.[43] Ultimately, in 1595, they too were replaced.[44] It could of course be argued that they themselves were still foreigners in a sense, since Ernest had obtained permission from his Estates to recruit officers "whether they be resident subjects or not" and several of them indeed hailed from outside the Electorate, but in this passage and elsewhere Aitzing clearly portrays them as an alternative to the "foreign soldiers" of the former garrison.[45] In his eyes, Bonn's experience seems to have confirmed the impression

[41] Michael of Aitzing, *Replicata Mensium Aliguot Relatio Historica. Daß ist / Ein Continuirte Beschreybung der Geschichten / Händlen / vnd veränderungen / so sich vom September negstuerschienen / vnd was zuuor / so wol in Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / als Vngern / Poln / Schweden vnd andern Königreichen vnd orten / durch Europam zugetragen / biß auff jetzt abluaffendes monat Aprils 1593. Vnnd insonderheit / Was sich nach absterben beyder / deß Hertzogen Wilhelm von Gülich / vnd Alexandri deß Hertzogen von Parma in den Niderlanden vnd sonst vor der Käy. M. vnd dem König von Hispanien / auch newlich zu Pariß vnd Straßburg verloffen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1593), p. 20.
[42] Michael of Aitzing, *Recens Historica Rerum Intra Sex Menses in Europa Gestarum Relatio. Daß ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung der Gedenckwürdigen Geschichten vnd Händlen / so sich die negsten sechs monat hero zugetragen. Zuwissen was sich in Franckreich / Ostereich / Vngern vnnd Beheymb / Frießlandt / auch in Italien / Teutschlandt vnd Poln: sonderlich aber vmb Straßburg / den Rheinstrom / vnden vnd oben /vnd sonst allenthalben durch EUROPA verloffen / biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Septembris Anno 1592. Mit außführlicher erzellung / wie es mit abschaffung der Königlichen besatzung / in Bonn / Neuß vnd Rheinberck gehalten worden* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1592), pp. 13, 17.
[43] Michael of Aitzing, *Historica Relationis Continuatio. Das ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung der vornembsten Händeln / so sich in Vngarn wieder den Türcken / In Frankreich wider den König von Nauarrra / Im Niderlandt zwiscen den Königischen vnd Holländern. Vnd sonst durch gantz Europa / als in Hispania / Teutschlandt / Burgundia / Engellandt / Frießlandt / vnd Geldern / x. durch das gantze Jahr zuegetragen. Vom Monat Septembris 1594 bis auff den September jetz ablauffenden Jahrs 1595* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1595), pp. 76-80.
[44] Aitzing, *Historica Relationis Continuatio… bis auff den September jetz ablauffenden Jahrs 1595*, pp. 102-3.
[45] Aitzing, *Recens Historica Rerum Intra Sex Menses… biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Septembris Anno 1592*, p. 83; for the origins of their commanders, see Aitzing, *Replicata Mensium Aliguot Relatio Historica… biß auff jetzt abluaffendes monat Aprils 1593*, pp. 21-24.

that when soldiers erred, it was because of bad habits ingrained in their profession and easily transmitted between nations, and not primarily because they were outsiders.

Nor was Aitzing's reluctance to make foreign status a key ground for criticising soldiers unique or even unusual among his contemporaries in the news publishing scene. This circle formed a rather fractious group, prone to attacking one another for perceived inaccuracies, and the extent of their animosities has sometimes gone underestimated. Körber suggests that Aitzing refrained from criticising the news periodicals of Conrad Löw despite the latter appropriating his crowned snake sigil, but in fact the Austrian made a vehement critique of this plagiarism in the introduction to one of his *Meßrelationen* before going on to append further complaints about false reporting.[46] The identity of foreign soldiers was among the potential topic of dispute; for instance, in 1595 Aitzing attacked his Protestant rival from Frankfurt, Francus, for claiming that French soldiers had been involved in seizing a town in Liège when Aitzing believed the offenders were in fact Dutch.[47] Given the extent of their personal and partisan disagreements, it is therefore striking that within the Free City of Cologne even commentators of different stripes could still agree that a soldier's origins were less important than his conduct.

One example of this is the chronicler William Riephan, who followed a more moderate and anti-Habsburg line than Aitzing and defended Francus from the Austrian's attacks, but nonetheless did not make much of the foreign identity of troops in Spanish or Dutch service when criticising their actions in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia.[48] Indeed, in the foreword to his

[46] Körber, 'Selbstverständnis Michaels von Aitzing', p. 7; Aitzing, *Historica Relationis Continuatio… bis auff den September jetz ablauffenden Jahrs 1595*, p. A2^{r}.
[47] Aitzing, *Historica Relationis Continuatio… bis auff den September jetz ablauffenden Jahrs 1595*, p. A2^{v}.
[48] William Riephan, *Kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschribung gewisser Neuwen Zeittungen vnd Geschichten / welche sich von vorgangner Herbstmeß / biß auf ietzige Ostermeß / dises ietzlauffendt 96. Jars / In Osterreich / Vngaren / Böhem / Poln / Hispanien / Franckreich / Schweden / Denmarck / Hoch vnd Niderteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wider begeben vnd zugetragen. Mit Anzeig deren Acord vnd*

first *Meßrelation*, he portrays military recruits from closest to home as posing the greater threat, lamenting that if a householder "says something to one of his servants or youths and punishes them justly, they threaten him and run off that very hour to the wars, coming back later with a squad of debauched knaves, and if they don't burn him out of house and home they take him captive."[49] This fear that the social order was fundamentally threatened by allowing recruitment of soldiers from a domestic (in every sense of the word) background chimed in with the common concerns of citizens about such prodigal sons; for example, in December 1594 it was rumoured in town that the freebooters who had once again burnt down Deutz monastery whilst en route to France included an embittered stepson of the abbot among their number.[50]

Other pamphleteers went further, and not only avoided demonising wandering mercenaries but actively romanticised them instead. These include the anonymous author behind the *New Landsknecht's Song* of 1584, who reported on the events of the Cologne War through the medium of a ballad celebrating the ideal of the "free warrior" who displayed martial valour and bowed to no-one.[51] It is true that pro-Catholic writers were generally more willing to set aside objections to foreign military intervention than pro-Protestant ones, who were more closely wedded to the tradition of 'German liberties' and opposition to pan-Christian Habsburg ambitions. However, we should be wary of positing a sharp divide between

verträge sampt einuerleibten Artiucln so wol die Statt von Embden / als auch Statt vnnd Schloß Cammerich belandgend. Alles auffs kurtzest Beschrieben (Cologne: Henry Neteßheim, 1596), p. Aii^{v}.

[49] William Riephan, *Svpplementvm Epitomes. Das ist / kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschreibung / deren glaubwürdigen Händeln vnd Geschichten / diewelche sich in Franckreich / Oesterreich / vnd Königreich Polen / Hoch vnnd Niederteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wieder in Sechs Monaten begeben vnnd zugetragen: nemmlich vom Monath Aprilis vnd Ostermeß / dieses 93. Jahrs / biß auff ietzige Herbstmeß vnd ablauffenden Monats Septembris / ietzt gemelten Jahrs. Vnnd Pacification vnd Stilstandts Articulen / diewelche in Frankcreich zwischen dem König von Nauarra vnnd der S. Liga endtlich beschlossen / vnd am 1. Augusti zu Pariß vnd S. Dioniß publiciert / vnd abgeblasen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1593), p. Aii^{v}.

[50] Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis*, fol. 402^{v}.

[51] *Newe Zeyttung auß Coelln. Ein frisch newes landtknechts lied vom Coellnnischen krieg unnd wie die statt bonn auffgeben ist worden etc. inn deß Lindenschmidts thon zusingen* (Cologne: Andreas Röschlin, 1584), p. 9.

supporters of a universalist Roman Church and of a proto-nationalist Reformation. Polemicists writing about Cologne could and did praise the multinational character of Protestant military forces, as in the 1583 report *Newe Zeitung aus Cöllen* which commented proudly on how Palatine forces operating near Bonn featured "five hundred French musketeers" and "four thousand musketeers and pikemen of all nations."[52] This mirrors the comments of the anonymous Catholic pamphleteer who in 1588 praised the force besieging Bonn as "a lordly and brave soldiery… of Spaniards, Italians, French, and Germans", with diversity being portrayed in both cases as a sign of strength and broad-based support.[53]

iii) Conclusion

Collectively, these examples cast doubt on theories which see confessional extremism as the only force able to supersede suspicion of foreign soldiers. On several occasions during this period, the commentariat of Cologne embraced troops not simply despite the fact that they came from different and distant nations, but rather because of it. This conclusion is important, because – taken together with the findings of our previous case studies – it is a further blow against the idea that the pre-1618 Reich was crippled by competing identity-based hatreds. It is not the case that local political culture was defined by zero-sum clashes between militias and mercenaries, collaborators and resistors, moderates and zealots, or Protestants and Catholics, in which dwindling space remained for an overlap of views. Instead, Lower-Rhine-Westphalians of all faiths and territories appeared to have approached these issues primarily through a flexible, pragmatic lens; instead of having their stance on foreign soldiers

[52] *Newe Zeitung aus Cöllen: Wahrhafftiger Bericht / vom Cölnischen Kriege / betreffendt die Augspuraische Confession / so der erwehlte Ertzbischoff Gebhart Churfürst / etc. angenommen vnd vertheidigt / vnd darüber ensetzet / auch einen andern Chorbischoff / als den Hertzog Ernestum aus Beyern / an seine stedte von den Papisten erwehlet / vnd wie starck sie zu beiden theilen zu Felde liegen / vnd was allda gehandelt / etc.* (Erfurt: John Beck, 1583), p. 2.

[53] *Warhafftige Zeitung von der belägerung und einnemung der statt Bonn sampt der schanntzen. Welcherley gestalt die Spannischen sy ein bekommen haben den XXV. September anno 1588. und was sich dar vor verlauffen unnd zu getragen hat seindt der Belegerung mit scharmützelen schlagen und andern sachen* (Cologne: Nicholas Schreiber, 1588), p. 7.

determined by the rigid ideological frameworks of religious doctrine, humanist theory, or patriotic xenophobia, they judged troops primarily by their behaviour and lifestyle, and by what would safeguard their own practical interests. At times, this meant they could advocate co-operation with armies from abroad as the best means of furthering security and prosperity. Above all, however, it predisposed them towards caution and the pursuit of peace.

PART III:
THE EMPIRE



Figure 3: The Holy Roman Empire, 1610

Chapter VII: Formal and Informal Linkages within the Empire

Having examined the function of 'foreign soldier' rhetoric both at the level of the *Kreis* and that of its component territories, we can now take a step back and consider a broader perspective. This is essential, as the Circles were never supposed to function as self-contained political units, nor even in tandem with their immediate neighbours. They were always envisioned as part of the wider system of the Empire's public peace, and must be assessed within the pan-Imperial context that shaped them. Of course, it is outside the scope and intention of this thesis to attempt a full analysis of foreign soldiers and their treatment across the breadth of the Reich during several decades. Nonetheless, examination of a couple of key issues will serve to illustrate and further develop some of the points which we have already observed in more local surrounds. What can Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's experience tell us about the functioning – successful or otherwise – of the Reich as a whole?

Recent analyses of the public peace [*Landfrieden*] have emphasised its deep roots stretching back into the medieval period, and that it was sustained not only by political institutions of enforcement but also by varied cultural and social constructs.[1] In line with this approach, the following chapter will analyse the intersection of military and dynastic outsiders in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and whether they affected its participation in the communal life of the Empire. Specifically, it will examine the arrival of princely houses from outside the Circle, and how this played out at two key meetings of the Imperial Estates in 1582 and 1586

[1] Duncan Hardy, *Associative Political Culture in the Holy Roman Empire: Upper Germany, 1346-1521* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Mattias Fischer, *Reichsreform und „ewiger Landfrieden": Über die Entwicklung des Fehderechts im 15. Jahrhundert bis zum absoluten Fehdeverbot von 1495* (Aalen: Scientia, 2007); Wayne te Brake, *Religious War and Religious Peace in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 58-63; Irene Dingel, Michael Rohrschneider, Inken Schmidt-Voges, Siegrid Westphal, and Joachim Whaley, 'Einleitung' in *Handbuch Frieden im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit / Handbook of Peace in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Irene Dingel, Michael Rohrschneider, Inken Schmidt-Voges, Siegrid Westphal, and Joachim Whaley (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020), pp. xv-xxxii (pp. xv-xvi).

(chosen because they featured some of the most extensive discussion of armed incursions into Lower-Rhine-Westphalia and because they took place on either side of the 1585 Bavarian takeover of Münster, allowing us to observe the effects of this event). These case studies can serve to challenge the narrative that the Reich was undermined by the rise of larger territorial conglomerates which swallowed up minor Estates and hollowed out collegiate institutions. In fact, the Circle's position within the Empire's formal peacekeeping order – exemplified by the Reichstag – was often strengthened by its engagement with informal familial networks.

i) '*Überfremdung*' and '*Entfremdung*': Crises for the Empire?

Alongside legal and constitutional factors, another way in which the Circle was embedded in the wider Empire was through the manifold personal connections linking elites. Many of these were family ties, which the vicissitudes of inheritance could develop into personal unions between territories from disparate parts of the Reich. According to some scholars of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, therein lay the origins of a catastrophe. Chapter V examined the consequences of the most infamous case of this – the disputed succession in Jülich-Cleves-Berg – but some view this as a merely one instance of a broader and more insidious trend. Indeed, Winfried Dotzauer suggests that the entire Circle's decline had begun with the union of Münster and Electoral Cologne decades earlier, as once potentates from outside the *Kreis* had begun to obtain territories within it, "the central problem going forwards was the inner '*Überfremdung*' of the Circle."[2] This analysis closely mirrors that of Helmut Neuhaus, who sees the arrival of Wittelsbachs (albeit dated slightly earlier to Ernest's accession in Liège) as the beginning of a process whereby more and more of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia fell into the hands of outside rulers who were uninterested in the Circle as an institution and primarily

[2] Winfried Dotzauer, *Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806): Geschichte und Aktenedition* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998) pp. 15, 298.

used their acquisitions to bolster their own interests elsewhere.[3] Georg Schmidt is slightly more optimistic about the resilience of the *Kreis*, but he too notes the extinction of the male line in territories such as Bentheim-Tecklenburg, Spiegelberg, Rietberg, Hoya, and Diepholz as a critical "genealogical-demographic" factor affecting the region's relationship to the Reich.[4]

At this point it is worth pausing to focus more closely on the word *Überfremdung* – used by both Neuhaus and Dotzauer – which I have left untranslated. Indeed, a one-word translation is not really feasible; meaning literally 'over-foreigning', it carries connotations of being overwhelmed by a flood of people or influences from abroad. Having become a key component of anti-immigrant rhetoric, in 1993 the term was voted *Unwort des Jahres* by the Society for the German Language, which explained that this "seemingly harmless word" was invariably subject to a "racist reinterpretation" and used to provide cover for "the most unsophisticated xenophobia."[5] Its application to Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in academic literature thus seems a little odd, especially given that it does not appear in any sixteenth-century sources. Its usage for this purpose, however, dates back a fair way; in 1934, Paul Casser wrote that "it will be easy to work out how the *Überfremdung* from outside was a turning point in the affairs of the Circle Estates, which fundamentally transformed the inner

[3] Helmut Neuhaus, 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis – eine Region der Frühen Neuzeit?', *Westfälische Forschungen*, 52 (2002), 96-110 (pp. 100-101).
[4] Georg Schmidt, 'Integration und Konfessionalisierung: Die Region zwischen Weser und Ems im Deutschland des 16. Jahrhunderts' in Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 21 (1994), 1-36 (pp. 18, 27); see also Johannes Arndt, *Das niederrheinisch-westfälische Reichsgrafenkollegium und seine Mitglieder 1653-1806* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1991), which deploys related arguments in a slightly later period, suggesting that the organisation of Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Imperial Counts was hamstrung for a long while by the membership of intrusive princes.
[5] 'Überfremdung' in *Unwort des Jahres* (Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache) <https://web.archive.org/web/20160214231724/http://www.unwortdesjahres.net/index.php?id=29> [accessed 13 January 2021]; for a more recent example of political controversy around the term, see 'Angebliche E-Mail: Schrieb Weidel über „Buergerkriege durch Ueberfremdung"?', *Tagesspiegel*, 10 September 2017, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/angebliche-e-mail-schrieb-weidel-ueber-buergerkriege-durch-ueberfremdung/20305550.html> [accessed 13 January 2021].

structure of the Circle and considerably weakened their association's fitness for purpose."[6] It should also be easy to work out that there may be some issues with resurrecting terminology used in 1930s Germany to blame the region's historic troubles on foreign influence. I do not mean to suggest that Dotzauer and Neuhaus intended to resurrect Casser's milieu along with his argument, but the thorny linguistic context of *Überfremdung* does at least offer a good starting impetus to reassess their reasoning.

This reasoning states that Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's ability to defend the Reich from foreign soldiers was weakened by the arrival of foreign lords, who undermined regional and Imperial solidarity by subsuming lesser Estates into princely blocs headquartered elsewhere. Such a model fits well with the wider narrative of territorial state formation sapping the Empire's strength during this period. However, there are indeed grounds to doubt that the arrival of new management in Lower-Rhine-Westphalian territories was invariably detrimental to the Circle's interests. Unions like these were of course the norm throughout what John Elliott has famously called the "Europe of composite monarchies".[7] Though contemporaries might oppose specific candidates for the succession, they were perfectly capable of discussing the base concept of 'foreign' lordship without hostility; for instance, Herman of Weinsberg calmly related how Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland had passed "without male heirs to foreign lords" as justification for making provisions for a non-relative to inherit his own estate.[8]

In any case, the dynastic connections between Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates and external rulers presented opportunities as well as risks.[9] One such benefit was that it gave

[6] Paul Casser 'Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis' in *Der Raum Westfalen*, ed. by Hermann Aubin and Eduard Schulte, 6 vols (Münster: Reimar Hobbing, 1931-87), II (1934), pp. 33-70 (p. 37).
[7] John Huxtable Elliott, 'A Europe of Composite Monarchies', *Past and Present*, 137 (1992), 48-71.
[8] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Senectutis* (1578-88), fol. 83^{v} <https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Senectutis/Liber_Senectutis.htm>.
[9] It should also be noted that the traffic was not all one way. Dynasties based in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia had at times been able to inherit lands elsewhere, as when the La Marcks were able to install a cadet line in the

neighbouring princes a formal stake in the welfare of the *Kreis*, and new means to reproach them when they acted to harm it. In 1609, troops pledged to the Welf prince Ernest II of Lüneburg caused disturbances in the Westphalian county of Ravensberg. The *Kreisoberst* Simon of Lippe's rebuke was strengthened by the fact that Ernest was not merely an outsider beyond his jurisdiction, but had inherited parts of Diepholz and Hoya; as such, Simon could warn him that "as a member belonging to this Circle, you will not wish your hitherto constantly observed peacefulness to change."[10] Nor was it invariably the case that being incorporated into larger dynastic units led Estates to neglect their responsibilities to the Circle. Both Diepholz and Hoya had contributed to the *Kreis* expedition in 1599, when some more independent and traditionally activist members such as Sayn did not.[11] In addition, having connections to some of the Empire's larger princedoms gave the Circle a slightly larger recruitment pool to draw upon for key offices; one of the Circle's problems was that it lacked sizeable secular territories other than Jülich-Cleves-Berg, and Simon himself had initially turned down the *Kreisoberst* position in 1577 because of worries that Lippe could not afford the job's expenses.[12]

Above all, a key advantage of the Empire's dynastic networks was that they gave Lower-Rhine-Westphalians various informal means to supplement their formal diplomacy within the Empire. Scholarship of the Jülich-Cleves-Berg succession dispute is dominated by its violent

duchy of Nevers. See Ronald Asch, '„Lumine solis": Der Favorit und die politische Kultur des Hofes in Westeuropa' in *Der Zweite Mann im Staat: Oberste Amtsträger und Favoriten im Umkreis der Reichsfürsten in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Michael Kaiser and Andreas Pečar* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), pp. 21-38 (p. 30).

[10] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Duke Ernest II of Brunswick-Lüneburg, 7 May 1609, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 8, fol. 36^{v}; for the Welf inheritance, see Wilhelm Kinghorst, *Die Graffschaft Diepholz zur Zeit ihres Überganges an das Haus Braunschweig-Lüneburg: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Graffschaft Diepholz in sechzehnten Jarhundert*, 2nd edn (Diepholz: Günzel, 1912).

[11] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Circle Estates supplying troops, 14/24 June 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 81, fol. 39^{v}.

[12] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle Estates, 11 January 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fols 79^{r}-80^{v}.

end, but it is often forgotten that both major claimants spent years before 1609 peaceably courting the favour of their future subjects. Philip Louis of Neuburg was particularly keen to demonstrate his usefulness. He repeatedly badgered his native Bavarian Circle (a region which, were it not for dynastic connections, would have little reason to feel directly affected by threats to the Rhineland) to follow his example and meet its financial contributions to Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and at times worked together with the rival Hohenzollern claimant to extend this lobbying to Upper Saxony.[13] He also sought to pass along useful information to the Westphalians, though this may have been of lesser utility (he promised to keep them informed about peace negotiations in the Netherlands, but it is not clear what he could have told them about this topic they did not already know or would not have found out soon themselves).[14] Nonetheless, the Circle seemed to appreciate his aid and was keen to make more use of it; at the *Kreistag* of 1595, the Estates resolved to seek his support for obtaining relief from Imperial taxes, since he had "at all times shown himself most gracious and helpful in the furthering of this Circle's affairs."[15]

Other potentates were also targeted who had holdings in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia and important positions in the Imperial hierarchy elsewhere. When writing to Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to smooth over an armed clash on the borders of Münster, Simon observed that the duke was "a notable member of the praiseworthy Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle on account of the county of Hoya" and could "thus direct matters and

[13] Count Palatine Philip Louis of Neuburg to Jülich-Cleves-Berg Council, 16 March 1596, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 99, fols 5^{v}-6^{r}; Count Palatine Philip Louis of Neuburg to Jülich-Cleves-Berg Council, 14 May 1596, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 99, fols 20^{v}, 21^{r}; Petition of Neuburg envoy Alex Moroldt, 18 September 1599, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 82, fol. 525^{r}.
[14] Count Palatine Philip Louis of Neuburg to Jülich-Cleves-Berg Council, 16 March 1596, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. X 99, fol. 4^{v}.
[15] *Kreistag* Communique issued at Duisburg, 18 February 1595, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 54, fol. 313^{v}.

help to ensure that we… do not [lose] power and force in other neighbouring Circles."[16] Even courtesy titles could be useful. Duke Adolf of Holstein-Gottorp's claim to be "count of Oldenburg" was strictly theoretical (in practice it was ruled by a cadet branch of his family), but the Lower-Rhine-Westphalians were happy to indulge it when lobbying him in his capacity as *Kreisoberst* of the Lower Saxon Circle.[17]

Of course, the crux of the *Überfremdung* argument does not concern the lesser counties snapped up by the Welfs, or even the division of the United Duchies, but the rise of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs in the 1580s. Following Ernest of Bavaria's accession as prince-bishop of Liège in 1581, his conquest of Electoral Cologne in 1583-84, and the further acquisition of Münster in 1585, Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's most important ecclesiastical territories were amalgamated into an ecclesiastical union which also included the sees of Hildesheim and Freising and as such spanned four different *Kreise*. Cologne was its highest-ranking component, meaning that this bloc of territories would be centred in the Electoral Rhenish Circle rather than Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and of course Ernest was considerably influenced by his elder brother William's Bavarian duchy. It is thus reasonable to ask whether the Wittelsbachs' episcopal empire-building hindered and unbalanced the Circle's development. After all, Münster held the co-directorship of the *Kreis*, and under Ernest's predecessor Gerard of Groesbeeck, Liège had been one of its more activist members (to the point that some commentators expressed concern in 1577 that the Liègois had been able largely dictate the conduct of Lower-Rhine-Westphalian envoys at multi-Circle meetings).[18] Could the Wittelsbach capture of these important Estates have replaced the Circle's healthy

[16] Count Simon VI of Lippe to Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 11 October 1608, LAV NRW OWL, L 41 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälischer Reichskreis), Nr. 35, fols 186^{r}-187^{v}.
[17] Duke Adolf I of Holstein-Gottorp to Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 19 February 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fols 303^{r}-305^{r}.
[18] Councillors at Düsseldorf to Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, 12 January 1577, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fol. 196^{v}.

relationship with the rest of the Empire with one skewed by narrow dynastic and (given Bavaria's identification with Counter-Reformation causes) confessional interests?

Before we can address this topic in more detail, it is worth considering another related issue. Contemporary sources did not make reference to *Überfremdung*, but they did deploy another term that concerned foreign influence on the relationship between Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates and the Reich: *Entfremdung.* Generally translated as 'alienation' or 'estrangement', in the western borderlands it was repeatedly used to stir up fears that certain areas would be permanently lost to the Empire. Earlier chapters have discussed this proposition in relation to the Burgundian Circle, but areas of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia were also depicted as at risk. In 1576, Groesbeeck complained to the *Kreis* that the actions of "disobedient Spanish rabble" threatened to deprive Liège, the Circle, and the Empire of valuable possessions such as Maastricht, unless firm action was taken to ensure that "that which is estranged [*entfrembdt*] is again brought in hand."[19] His claims were somewhat tendentious, since Liège had only ever had a part-share in Maastricht via a condominium with Brabant, but his language successfully evoked the spectre of ancient possessions becoming suddenly alien. The danger was both practical and political; in another complaint two years later, the bishop warned that if Maastricht "could be alienated [*entfrembdt*] from us, and come unjustly into other hands" this would not only threaten the commerce of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia "on account of its nearness and the roads", but would also constitue a grievous "truncation… for the Holy Empire."[20]

[19] Petition from Liège, 11 December 1576, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 53, fols 51^{r-v}, 52^{r}.
[20] Instructions from Bishop Gerard of Liège to *Kreistag* envoys Henry of Flatten and Dr Goddart Taxuis, 16 February 1578, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 55, fol. 84^{r}.

In addition to its varied consequences, secession had various supposed causes. First, and most obvious, there was the fear that outright conquest by outsiders could rip lands away from the Empire. Exposed border districts such were obviously the most vulnerable, but more significant Imperial Estates were also deemed to be at risk; in 1583 the Kaiser himself expressed anxiety that "our city and that of the Holy Empire, Cologne, will be seized by enemies through all manner of secret schemes and attacks and taken away from the Empire."[21] Second, there was concern that certain territories might be deliberately given away by their owners into the hands of a foreign power. The most perennial target for these suspicions was East Frisia, which at times flirted with both Spanish overlordship and membership of the United Provinces, and in 1585 Count Edzard received a warning from William the Rich not "to cut himself off from this Circle but to remain by the same, and to make applications to no-one other than the same."[22] Third, and perhaps most interesting, was the idea that even if neither outside conquerors nor the local prince wanted a territory to leave the Empire, it might still be forced to do so by circumstances outside its control. In 1587, John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg told the Bavarians that because his father's duchies were struggling "to contribute to the Empire any longer, it is to be feared that they might therefore be driven from the Empire by the belligerent parties."[23] In this way, he drew on a model of the Reich as a political order constituted by mutual rights and obligations; if a territory was so damaged by war that it could not meet those obligations, there was a risk that it might fall into a state of de facto secession.

[21] Emperor Rudolf II to the Electors of Mainz, Trier, and the Palatinate, 3 September 1583, quoted in
[22] Instructions from Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to *Kreistag* envoys, 2 June 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 61, fol. 272^{r}.
[23] Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to Duke William V of Bavaria, 8 December 1587, in *Landtagsakten von Jülich-Berg 1400-1610*, ed. by Georg von Below, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: L. Voss & Cie, 1895-1907), II (1907), p. 798.

We have seen in the first part of this thesis that Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's western frontiers were a porous and flexible borderland zone, and one with wider psychological importance. If these boundaries could be actively redrawn by secession, this seems to point to the weakness of *Kreis* and Reich, and symbolise an Empire in retreat. Nonetheless, it is not clear that warnings of imminent *Entfremdung* should always be taken at face value. As with so much of contemporary discourse about foreign dangers, they must be understand as part of a rhetorical culture rife with arguments made tactically rather than sincerely. In the case of East Frisia, some scholarship has suggested that overtures to Madrid and the Hague were not serious, and that the county's rulers always saw the Empire as a better long-term bet.[24] The Free City of Aachen may have acted in a similar fashion, repeatedly warning that it was struggling against the odds to remain "subject to the Holy Empire's constitutions and ordinances… and not His Royal Majesty of Spain's neighbouring hereditary lands."[25] Despite this, the Spanish armies never acted on repeated opportunities to annex the town, and in general neither belligerent in the Eighty Years' War tried to absorb Lower-Rhine-Westphalian territory; as described in the previous chapter, they might carry out long-term occupations if it suited their strategic purposes, but the very success of these operations obviated the need for outright land-grabs. The Circle thus learnt to treat warnings of forced secession with scepticism, and in 1595 a *Kreistag* warned Aachen that its protestations would not excuse it from contributions towards the Kaiser's levies, for the town "has… always remained an Estate of the Empire and this Circle."[26]

[24] Georg Schmidt, 'Integration und Konfessionalisierung', p. 29.
[25] Mayor, Council, and Jurors of Aachen to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates, 5 February 1591, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 68, fol. 305^{r}. Note that membership of the Empire and being part of the Spanish Burgundian lands are here implied to be mutually exclusive, something which was legally dubious but (as we have seen) fits the prevailing consensus that the *Kreis* border formed the outer limit of the Empire.
[26] *Kreistag* Communique issued at Duisburg, 18 February 1595, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 54, fol. 322^{r}.

Moreover, concerns about *Entfremdung* should be set alongside evidence that in some cases the threat of violence motivated borderland territories to get closer to the Empire rather than further from it. The Reich was imperfect as a protective system, but for smaller territories it did at least offer some potential for assistance in maintaining their autonomy; Matthias Schnettger has noted that this could make membership appealing even to the most independent-minded communes in northern Italy.[27] Consequently, it is unsurprising that the ravages of "Spanish troops" in 1577 moved Agnes of Bylandt to write to Circle leaders dispelling any doubts that her "lordship of Raesfeld is undoubtedly subject to the Holy Empire and therefore has always justly enjoyed its help and support."[28]

Thus, when it considering the issue of foreign lordship, both the *Überfremdung* cited by modern historians and the *Entfremdung* cited by contemporary petitioners do not seem to have been inherently devastatating to the relationship between Circle and Empire. Nonetheless, to consider these and related problems in more detail, it is useful to look closely at a key instance of this relationship playing out. Our case study will be that most pan-Imperial of institutions, the Reichstag.

ii) The Diet of 1582

The bishopric of Liège's formal submission to the Augsburg Reichstag of July and August 1582 spelt out the alarming backdrop against which the meeting of the Imperial Estates was taking place. "The duke of Alençon, who has been elected as stadtholder of the Spanish Netherlands," Bishop Ernest warned, "will according to the art and nature of the French advance ever further and spread the borders of the French territory ever closer towards the

[27] Matthias Schnettger, *"Principe Sovrano" oder "Civitas Imperialis"? Die Republik Genua und das Alte Reich in der frühen Neuzeit 1556-1797* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2006), p. 628.
[28] Agnes of Bylandt to Electoral Rhenish, Lower-Rhine-Westphalian, and Upper Rhenish Estates, 22 January 1577, LAV NRW R, X 53, fol. 206^{v}.

Rhine, as is shown clearly and without shame by many books already in print, in which the old French border between the Meuse and Rhine and thus the best part of the Holy Empire is covered and displayed."[29] In the event, the rule of Alençon (Henry II of France's youngest son, also known as the duke of Anjou) as would-be sovereign of the rebel Dutch provinces would collapse in early 1583 without any dramatic conquests. Nonetheless, it provided a brief high-point of French influence on the borders of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and an interesting moment in the long-running debate over foreign threats to the Circle.[30]

The *Kreis* was not a Diet participant in its own right, but was able to make its own submission to the meeting, which requested pan-Imperial support for a defensive force until the conflict in the Netherlands was over. The dangers of secession loomed large in the document's rhetoric. The Circle's inability to fund such a force itself was partly blamed on the fact that "honourable princely Estates such as Guelders, Utrecht, and other lordships were taken away from the same" by the Burgundian Treaty of 1548, and the prospect was raised that further lands could be forced to submit to the belligerents.[31]

Urgent though this sounded, when being discussed in a pan-Imperial context affairs in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia had to be weighed alongside other regional theatres of interest. The various troubled borders of the Empire tended to slot into a hierarchy of priorities, with the south-east (i.e. Habsburg lands threatened by the Ottomans) taking top spot, and the north-

[29] 'Submission of the see of Liège (Bishop Ernest) concerning the 2nd article (Netherlands)', in *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, ed. by Josef Leeb, 2 vols (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), II, pp. 784-85. Note that the claim that Alençon was elected Stadtholder is incorrect. He was instead offered the sovereign title 'Defender of the Liberty of the Low Countries' by the States General, and subsequently claimed the duchy of Brabant and the county of Flanders. His position was contested by the rebel states of Holland and Zealand and those loyal to the Spanish Habsburgs.

[30] The English also took a keen interest in the *Reichstag* and attempted to influence it via their diplomatic contacts. See David Gehring, *Anglo-German Relations and the Protestant Cause: Elizabethan Foreign Policy and Pan-Protestantism* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 256-58.

[31] 'Submission of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle concerning the 2nd article (Netherlands) to the emperor and Imperial Estates', in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, II, pp. 782-83.

west below it but still ranking higher than the north-east (i.e. Livonian territories threatened by Muscovites, Poles, and Swedes).[32] In 1582 there was also some brief discussion of the south-western border, specifically the bishopric of Basel (threatened by the city-state of the same name, and Bern) and its alliance with the Catholic Swiss cantons.[33] Sometimes there were attempts to tie these multiple sources of danger into a single overarching conspiracy; the Salzburg delegation warned that if the Dutch succeeded in inviting the French into the Reich, they "would grasp after the sceptre of the Empire, move the Turks against the Empire, and also make use of the Swiss."[34] Yet this rhetoric still observed a kind of hierarchy; the Salzburgers quipped that the French monarch "might call himself 'most Christian', but would more rightfully be named 'most Turkish'", indicating that the Ottomans were still held up as the ultimate standard of villainy against which other enemies would be measured.[35]

In other cases, delegates tried to climb the ladder of priorities by arguing for the importance of their own region and the irrelevance of others. Brandenburg attempted to claim that the conflagration in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia was solely a problem "for those sat next to the fire", and to get its own border with Poland brought into consideration; "the Westphalian Circle looks for help," was the sceptical refrain, "yet no-one knows how the Netherlandish war will be ended. Brandenburg is also not secure from Poland."[36]

[32] For Livonia's long-term struggle to attain a high priority, see Josef Leeb, 'Supplikationen als Konflikte auf dem Reichstag: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Konfliktregulierung durch Reichsversammlungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts' in *Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Das Heilige Römische Reich und Europa, Festschrift für Maximilian Lanzinner*, ed. by Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2013), pp. 117-54 (pp. 138-39); Jason Lavery, *Germany's Northern Challenge: The Holy Roman Empire and the Scandinavian Struggle for the Baltic 1563-1576* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
[33] 'Material accompanying the 4th article of the proposition (recuperation): Imperial correspondence to the see of Basel', in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, II, pp. 820-22.
[34] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 9 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, I, p. 506.
[35] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 9 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, I, p. 506.
[36] Minutes of the Council of Electors, 27 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 307; Minutes of the Council of Electors, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582*, I, p. 317.

With Imperial unity at risk of splintering, invocations of *Entfremdung* and other foreign perils had a part to play in maintaining forms of wider solidarity. The delegation from Worms was moved by Alençon's rise to comment "one must defend against the Netherlands – and also not less on the French frontiers – just as much as in Hungary."[37] Among Rhineland Estates, the spectre of the old Gallic foe linked Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's troubles with their own, and gave them greater weight to balance against the Ottoman danger. In this way, the rhetorical threat of foreign lordship could be used to build regional identities beyond a single *Kreis*. Dynastic connections could go further and create networks of common interests across the Empire. It is noteworthy that Bavaria also pronounced it unreasonable to demand greater "contributions to the Turkish matter…because no lesser danger is shown by the Netherlands, and greater expenses for the Empire will grow from the same."[38] Here Munich explicitly placed the threat to the north-west on a par with the threat to the south-east, despite being located much closer to the latter. Only its family connections to the Wittelsbach bishop in Liège gave it a stake in the former.

Various informal aspects of the Reich system thus helped to give Lower-Rhine-Westphalia a receptive audience for its complaints. The utility of Imperial membership is further underlined by the fact that both Alençon and Philip II attempted to claim it for themselves; far from seeking to establish their lands' separation from the Empire, they both sought Diet representation on behalf of the duchy of Brabant so as to attack their opponent for *Entfremdung* of Reich territory. In the event, Alençon came off the worse from this exchange, as the Imperial Estates chose to refuse his envoys a hearing. Some of their reasoning for doing so sheds interesting light on the perennial anxieties over identification. During the debate, the Elector of Trier stated that "one could well listen to a Turk as a Turk, or a Jew as

[37] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 474.
[38] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 2 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 486.

a Jew. If he came as an Alençon, he would also be given a hearing as an Alençon, but not in other guises."[39] To be a Turk, as we have seen, was regarded as a byword for wickedness; nonetheless it was preferable to negotiate with such a devil in his own shape, than with a prince claiming a false identity.

Accepted as representing the legitimate duke of Brabant, Philip II's envoy Don Guillén de San Clemente nonetheless did not have it all his own way. For all that the Diet formally endorsed the claim of the Spanish Netherlands to be a part of the Empire, the discussions frequently betray the fact that they were treated as de facto separate entity. For instance, the Württemberg delegation asked for better intelligence on whether "Alençon's men wish to attack the Empire."[40] Given that by this point Alençon's troops were ensconced across large areas of the Burgundian Circle, theoretically this question was nonsensical as the Empire had already been attacked. Yet for practical purposes the border remained where the Bavarian delegation placed it while endorsing the proposals for armed force "on the frontier": at the western edge of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia.[41]

Nicolette Mout nonetheless presents the 1582 Reichstag as a defeat for Lower-Rhine-Westphalia and a victory for San Clemente, suggesting that he used this de facto separation to dissuade the Imperial Estates from interfering in the Netherlands' conflict.[42] However, his key argument was that the Empire in fact *ought* to get involved in order to reverse the armed seizure of Cambrai by "Alençon and other foreign nations", which would otherwise allow the

[39] Minutes of the Council of Electors, 3 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 325.
[40] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 480.
[41] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 9 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 505. The fact that the envoys could say this during the same speech in which they had explicitly said of the Spanish Netherlands that "this land belongs to the Holy Empire" further underlines the gulf between theory and practice.
[42] Nicolette Mout, 'Die Niederlande und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert 1512-1609' in *Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?* ed. by Volker Press and Dieter Stievermann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 143-68 (p. 164).

ever-greedy French to "penetrate ever more onto the Empire's soil" and alienate more of the emperor's fiefs.[43] Cambrai had once been a Lower-Rhine-Westphalian member before passing into Philip's hands along with the rest of the Circle's former western territories. Nonetheless, the Estates were reluctant to accept its sudden return to the fold, with the *Reichstädte* reminding Rudolf that "the city of Cambrai has long ago been withdrawn from the Empire and the college of honourable Imperial Free Cities… without being under the jurisdiction or constitutions of the Empire."[44] The spectacle of polities attempting to claim membership of the Reich and its Circles, but being turned away, suggests that any depiction of the Empire as a failing organisation which offered little to its members is oversimplified.

Yet what could the Empire concretely offer Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in this instance? The Circle had in fact no intention of becoming actively involved in the Eighty Years' War, so the Diet's firm opposition to a military intervention was no loss. What had been requested was funds for a defensive force to man the border. If the other Estates were somewhat reluctant to grant this, this does not necessarily imply a defect in the Imperial system. Uncritically swallowing every demand from the Circles might hinder more than help, especially since (as was established in Chapter II) the policy of hiring soldiers to ward off incursions had several flaws. Some of these were articulated by the Elector of Trier when he argued that although such a force would be very expensive; "those who are out to rob will just aim for a place where the watch is not, and it is to be feared that no less chaos will ensue, because such a watch will be soldiers."[45] An anti-raiding force could not be everywhere at once, and in any

[43] 'First submission of the Burgundian envoys concerning the 2nd article (Netherlands) to the Electors', in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* II, pp. 787-88.
[44] 'Resolution of the College of Imperial Cities concerning the Kaiser's reply to the 2nd article (Niederlande)' in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* II, pp. 787-88.
[45] Minutes of the Council of Electors, 8 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 339.

case was liable to cause trouble wherever it went. The delegation from Bonn summed up the military *Zugzwang* neatly, saying "to do nothing is hard; to take action is harder."[46]

Discussion of troops inevitably brings us back to the rhetoric of foreign soldiers, and the role that it played alongside that of foreign lords allegedly responsible for *Überfremdung* and *Entfremdung*. In truth, this role was relatively small, though still important in what it tells about patterns of categorisation. Compared to intra-territorial or *Kreis* communications, Reichstag sources are even less inclined to go into detail about the makeup of military units threatening Lower-Rhine-Westphalia; these units populate the background of the discussion, but at this level the identity and allegiance of princes mattered more than that of pikemen. Sometimes they appeared separately alongside their foreign masters as nondescript minions, as when Mainz condemned the possibility of unrest from "Frenchman and soldiers."[47]

Where more specific discussion of soldiers and their classification occured, it tended not to be in the context of foreign troops invading Germany, but vice versa. An important side-issue debated at Augsburg was a counter-proposal for the Kaiser to issue a ban on enlisting with the rebels in the Netherlands, which was naturally opposed by various pro-Dutch Protestants claiming it infringed their 'German liberty' to engage in military service abroad. The debate was partly shaped by the ambiguous relationship between Germany and the Empire. The Austrian delegation proposed both "to call off the German troops" and to ask the Swiss Confederation to withdraw its men too; treating these two groups as separate suggests an idea of Germany that was limited to the Empire's de facto political bounds and not ethno-linguistic in nature.[48] Similarly, the bishopric of Würzburg backed the call, arguing that "this matter concerns no foreigners, but rather the Empire. If German freedom should now be used

[46] Minutes of the Council of Electors, 26 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 296.
[47] Minutes of the Council of Electors, 8 August 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 342.
[48] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 476.

against the Empire, that would be a strange freedom."[49] With conflict between Germany and the Reich presented as oxymoronic, the two were implied to be the same. This strengthened the claim of the Empire's political embodiments – Kaiser and Reichstag – to regulate German freedoms.

Meanwhile, Jülich was broadly supportive of the idea but did not want it to detract from the main Lower-Rhine-Westphalian plan for a Reich-funded defence force. Its delegation couched the issue not as a fundamental contradiction of rights, but as a pragmatic response to a problem, noting that it was by "the German officers, principally Hohensaxe and others, that the greatest and most damage is done."[50] The specific individual mentioned – John Philip of Hohensaxe – was in fact born and buried in the Swiss Confederation, meaning his identification as a German complicated a strict conflation of Teutonic and Imperial identities.[51] Hessen, which was firmly against any restriction on Dutch service, went further and listed Germany and the Reich as complementary but distinct entities, saying that such bans were "hitherto unheard of in the Empire and against German freedoms."[52] Many other princes agreed, and drafted a memorandum which added to this by referencing the (decidedly un-German) duke of Alençon's claim to control an Imperial Estate.[53] Putting a bit of rhetorical daylight between German-ness and the Holy Roman Empire as a polity helped to portray German freedoms as an inherent birthright rather than something subject to legal

[49] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 478.
[50] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 479.
[51] This was not the last time that Hohensaxe's identity was to cause some confusion. In 1746 his corpse was stolen from its crypt in Vorarlberg by Catholic peasants, who were convinced by its remarkably well-preserved state that it must belong to a holy man. When they later discovered that Hohensaxe had been a staunch Calvinist, the body was returned.
[52] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 31 July 1582, in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* I, p. 481.
[53] 'Draft special resolution by the Lutheran Estates of the Council of Princes concerning the response of the Imperial Estates to the 2nd article (Netherlands)', in *Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582,* II, p. 803.

interpretation. In such ways could the linguistic nuances of certain military identities affect the development of security policy.

In the end, the divisive ban on enlistment was shelved and the defence force plan continued to be discussed. Despite their reasonable concerns, the collective Estates did not reject the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian request out of hand, and did in fact grant a subsidy of two Roman months to fund a modest military deterrent. The actual implementation of this tax was another matter, but the 1582 Reichstag had at least shown how the relationship between Kreis and Empire could be broadly constructive. This was only partially to do with the content of the legislation it produced; also important was the mass of ceremonial, personal, and rhetorical connections that such events generated. The Empire was a system that depended on shared hierarchies of legitimacy, and the inherent procedural questions raised by a Diet (such as who could attend, or even the order in which delegates could vote; the Jülich delegation spent the best part of a day in a standoff with Mecklenburg over the latter issue) meant it could create norms of institutional culture even if nothing was said or agreed upon at all. Of course, a great deal was in fact said, and the discussions offered ample opportunities for Estates to share ideas and trade favours with their rhetorical postures. These gave an added dimension to the bonds of kinship and common interest that united Estates from many different regions, acting alongside the more legalistic structures of the Reich constitution. In 1582, neither *Entfremdung* nor so-called *Überfremdung* had prevented the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle from playing its part in this complex ecosystem.

iii) The *Reichsdeputationstag* of 1586

We have sketched out some of the relationships anchoring the *Kreis* within the Imperial system, but it still remains to answer the main charge of Neuhaus and Dotzauer's argument about the deleterious effect of incoming lords. In 1582, the late-sixteenth-century wave of

takeovers by 'foreign' houses had only extended to Liège, but by the time of the next major pan-Imperial gathering at Worms in 1586, Hoya, Diepholz, and Münster had also been added to larger dynastic blocs. The last of these was the most crucial, particularly as it was absorbed into the Wittelsbach composite ecclesiastical polity that now included Electoral Cologne. Its ruler Ernest of Bavaria was still fighting to fully subdue this prize, meaning that Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's largest spiritual Estate and the Circle's co-directorship were now in the hands of a man whose war was currently the main source of destabilising incursions across the region. Surely the Circle's capacity to defend the Empire against foreign soldiers would be severely impacted by this conflict of interest?

Ernest of Bavaria has already made several appearances throughout this project, as is inevitable for a figure of such pervasive influence. He owed greater debts to Munich, Brussels, and Rome than to anyone in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, and in the absence of his own high principles was happy to borrow those of the Counter-Reformation. Yet in a sense this did not matter overmuch. First, because the *Kreis* system had evolved to accommodate princes of diverse and divergent ideologies without giving them reason to come into conflict. Second, because he was not actually in charge of Münster at all.

Although the cathedral chapter had consented to make him bishop in 1585 following John William's return to worldly life, day-to-day control of the see – and, crucially, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian *Ausschreibeamt* – was reserved for a Münster-based stadtholderate.[54] This was not held by an individual, but rather a small council of grandees, including two

[54] Plenipotentiary Warrant of Ernest of Bavaria, 23 July 1586, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX 62, fol. 371^{r}; for more detail of the political situation in Münster following Ernest's accession see *Die Gegenreformation in Westfalen und am Niederrhein: Acktenstücke und Erläuterungen*, ed. by Ludwig Keller, 9 vols (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1881-95), II (1887) p. 263 ff; *Die Protokolle des Geistlichen Rates in Münster 1601-1612*, ed. by Herbert Immenkötter (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), p. 2 ff;

chapter members, two local magnates, and two councillors.[55] Ernest sometimes gave them instructions for how to handle Circle business, but they felt able to disregard them if needed. For example, in 1587 they dismissed as "unnecessary" his suggestion to send an embassy to Jülich-Cleves-Berg before an upcoming *Kreistag*.[56] Even this small degree of Wittelsbach influence was diminished in practice, as the other co-director monopolised most of the office's functions during this period; Jülich-Cleves-Berg summoned all the remaining *Kreistage* of the 1580s, and prior consultation of Münster was also deemed "unnecessary" on occasion.[57] The separation between Ernest's territories of Liège and Münster (and the supremacy of the latter as far as *Kreis* hierarchy went) was underlined by official Circle documentation. In contrast to other composite polities, the two sees had their delegates listed seperately in the the official register of participants at the end of each *Kreistag* communique, and only those of the Stadtholderate appeared in the co-director's place at the head of the page.[58]

A similar principle applied to the union between both territories and the prince-archbishopric of Cologne. Although the Electorate was the most prestigious of Ernest's possessions, this did not mean that his Lower-Rhine-Westphalian sees were taken over by a wave of newcomers from Bonn. If anything, the reverse was true; a number of Ernest's Liègois

[55] It is perhaps worth noting that following the death of John William in 1609, for a brief period the effect of 'foreign' domination was to leave both co-directorships under the de facto control of local regency councils. See Councillors at Münster to Councillors at Jülich, 23 April 1609, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. VIII 8, fol. 10^{r}; it is also significant that, according to Ronald Asch, the default position for ecclesiastical principalities was to function as "small aristocratic republics in disguise" anyway. See Ronald Asch, 'Noble Corporations and Provincial Diets in the Ecclesiastical Principalities of the Holy Roman Empire ca. 1648-1802' in *Realities of Representation: State Building in Early Modern Europe and European America*, ed. by Maija Jansson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 93-111 (p. 98).

[56] Report of the Stadtholderate on Certain Propositions of the Elector, in *Gegenreformation in Westfalen*, II, p. 312.

[57] Duke William V of Jülich-Cleves-Berg to his Councillors in Düsseldorf, 18 June 1586, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX.62, fol. 330^{r}.

[58] For instance, see *Kreistag* communique issued at Cologne, 17 December 1585, LAV NRW R, AA 00629 (Niederrheinisch-Westfälisches Kreisarchiv, Akten), Nr. IX.62, fols 237^{r}-238^{r}.

subjects (such as Carl Billehe, Arnold of Bocholtz, and Herman of Linden) succeeded to high office in the Electorate, causing some discontent among the latter's elite.[59] Meanwhile, Ernest himself spent a lot of time in the western see, whose leisure facilities – including the eponymous Spa – were doutbtless attractive compared to the war-ravaged Electorate.[60] Herman of Weinsberg commented disapprovingly that "my lord of Cologne lay in Liège, and let everything happen that the foreigners committed in the archbishopric."[61] Having an Elector with a strong stake in the Circle was in many ways a great boon for Lower-Rhine-Westphalia, which had never before had a voice in that most exclusive of chambers, the *Kurfürstenrat*.

In the end, the best measure of the Wittelsbach takeover's effect on Circle and Empire is to compare the 1582 Diet of Augsburg with the 1586 *Reichsdeputationtag* at Worms, which tells us something about the results of the takeover in the interim. The objective of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalians at this gathering was partly to secure access to their promised two Roman months, which had not yet been paid in full. In this they were both successful and unsuccessful; the Estates present voted to send them the outstanding amount within four months, yet in 1598 the Westphalians would still be chasing up some of this unpaid money.[62]

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[59] Leonard Ennen, *Geschichte der Stadt Köln: Meist aus der Quellen des Stadt-Archivs,* 5 vols (Cologne: L. Schwann'schen Verlagshandlung, 1863-80), V (1880), p. 310; Edith Ennen, 'Kurfürst Ferdinand von Köln (1577-1650): Ein rheinischer Landesfürst zu Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges', *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 163 (1961), 5-40 (p. 7).

[60] In fairness to Ernest, he also seems to have used Spa as a diplomatic asset, using it as a place to meet senior Army of Flanders officers whom he offered a chance to recuperate from illness and injury on neutral ground. Michael of Aitzing, *Zuwissen / was wunderbärliche / gedenckwierdige / seltzame sachen oder geschichte / sich zugetragen / vnd (die negsten sechs monat hero) biß auf den 19. tag Septemb. 1589. So wol / In Franckreich vnd Engellandt / als im Niderlandt Ertzstifft Cölln / Westphalen / Teütschlandt / Poln / Hungern vnd Böheimb: auch anderßwo / gleich in Italien / Hispanien / vnd durch gantz Europa / noch weiter verlauffen* (Cologne: Gottfried of Kempen, 1589), p. 82.

[61] Herman of Weinsberg, *Liber Decrepitudinis* (1588-97), fol. 53^{v} <https://www.weinsberg.uni-bonn.de/Edition/Liber_Decrepitudinis/Liber_Decrepitudinis.htm>.

[62] Marc von Knorring, 'Der „Friedenssichernde" Reichsdeputationstag zwischen Augsburger Religionsfrieden und Dreissigjährigem Krieg: Eine Bilanz' in *Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Das Heilige Römische Reich und Europa, Festschrift für Maximilian Lanzinner*, ed. by Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2013), pp. 93-106 (p. 111); Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die*

As a further downside, controversies over these payments placed under strain the Imperial networks of some Circle members, notably the Free City of Cologne. The town's delegates were pressured by their fellows from the *Städtekurie* (including from Nuremberg, the only other urban polity invited to Worms) to abandon their support for further tax rises, and by resisting this pressure soured relationships with the college of cities for several years.[63] Nonetheless, their decision to side with the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian position against that of the other *Reichstädte* shows that Circle solidarity had hardly been killed off by the turbulence in the city's neighbourhood.

Solidarity did not mean lockstep on every point, and in the Council of Princes Münster disagreed with the other two Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Estates present over what the money could be used for. The bishopric's envoys were not entirely reading from a Counter-Reformation script (as they showed by demanding reparations from Ernest's Spanish ally), but did suggest that it would be "not against German liberties" to fund a siege of his Truchsessian enemies' stronghold at Neuss.[64] In contrast, the delegations from the *Reichstadt* Cologne and Jülich argued that "this help is not intended for this, and therefore it is not to be done" and that the troops should be used "solely for defence and not for offence."[65] Aided by Protestant Estates, who were not enthusiastic about granting the money at all, the more moderate majority of the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian representatives succeeded in pushing through their view that the funding would be released but only for defensive purposes. Thus the compromise culture promoted by Imperial institutions helped to support Lower-Rhine-

Niederlande 1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), p. 81.

[63] Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen, *Die Stadt Köln und die Reichsversammlungen im konfessionellen Zeitalter: ein Beitrag zur korporativen reichsständischen Politik 1555-1616* (Cologne: Kölnischer Geschichtsverein, 1990), pp. 193-96, 200.

[64] Minutes of the Council of Princes, 17 February 1586, *Deutsche Reichstagsakten: Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichsdeputationstag zu Worms 1586*, ed. by Thomas Fröschl (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), p. 472.

[65] *Reichsdeputationstag zu Worms 1586*, pp. 457, 473.

Westphalia whilst preventing its more partisan members from embroiling it in further conflicts. Using networks beyond the Circle, the Estates were able to contain the impact of dynastic newcomers and ensure that no one faction could predominate. Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's success at remaining above the fray was symbolised by having a passage inserted into the final communique – despite objections from hardliners on both sides of the confessional divide – stating that the Circle was to be lauded and helped "because it has given no cause to such highly burdensome unrest, has kept to neutrality and in these and other circumstances proved itself dutiful towards the Empire."[66]

iv) Conclusion

Overall, it is not hard to spot the many imperfections and flaws in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's relationship with the wider Empire. The practical support the *Kreis* could expect from regions outside its immediate vicinity was minor, and depended on the vagaries of chance and personal connections. Nonetheless, there is very little evidence to suggest that this relationship was made dysfunctional in the late sixteenth century by a hostile takeover of 'foreign' lords. Those outsiders who sought to steal away *Reich* territories from the Empire were largely rhetorical bogeymen; Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's main losses had been in an earlier generation – when lands had been given to the Burgundian Circle to go their own way – and now the border had largely ceased to move. It could still be unstable, of course, and incursions of soldiers provided the motor for so much of the political life of the region. Yet for all that they were a violent burden, as long as all-out involvement in war was avoided, they were not an existential threat. Nor were the outsiders who came from elsewhere in the Empire to inherit Lower-Rhine-Westphalian lands. Dynastic handovers brought change and sometimes turmoil, but they also provided new opportunities to strengthen the informal web

[66] 'Answer of the Estates to the Complaints of the Westphalian Circle', 25 February 1586, in *Reichsdeputationstag zu Worms 1586*, p. 744.

of contacts that bound the region to the rest of the Empire. From the level of individual Estates to that of the Circle to that of the Empire itself, these bonds kept the system's innumerable elements working together as an ungainly but living whole.

Chapter VIII: National Characters and Contradictions

Shortly after beginning his treatise on war, Adam Junghans paused to remind his dedicatees that "I as a foreigner and a poor soldier was for over two years keeper of the muster list for [your] Westphalian banner of High German troops."[1] This short half-sentence reminds us of two useful points. First, it reinforces once again the complexity and multi-layered nature of the identities that could be assigned to military units; in the space of a few words, Junghans' company is linked to a nebulous demonym (High German, a category whose boundary with Low German could be drawn anywhere between the Rhine delta and the Alpine foothills), an equally vague place-name (Westphalia, which could be a region, a Circle, and a duchy in a different Circle), and a varied assemblage of *Dienstherren* (his dedicatees, whom he elsewhere lists as "the bailiff of Electoral Cologne and other ruling councillors appointed by the Westphalian knighthood and Estates").[2] Second, it reminds us that foreign soldiers might be self-identified as well as classified by other people, and that sometimes they committed their own thoughts to paper.

Although this thesis has necessarily focussed on the reaction to foreign troops in a *Kreis* setting (rather than on the experience and self-fashioning of the troops themselves), as this final section seeks to understand the Circle within its broader context, it is important to briefly consider alternative perspectives. Thus, this chapter will assess how Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's troubles fit into discussions about security in the wider Reich, drawing on the

[1] Adam Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung / zu Wasser vnd Landt. Kurtzer vnd Eidentlicher Vnderricht / aller Kriegshändel / so geübet werden / Sampt nützlichen darbey angezogenem Bericht deren Kreigeßbestallung / ober vnd niederer Empter vnd Befelechen zu feldt vnd in Besatzungen / auch Malefitz / Spieß vnd Standtrecht / sampt dem Artickelsbriff / Auch einem kurtzen Vnderricht / wie man mit Arkoley vnd groben Geschütz vmbgehen / vnd mit mancherley Fewerwerck gegen dem feinde gebrauchen soll / Den ankommenden / hoch vnd niedern Befelchhabern / Kriegßleuten / vnd sonsten ins gemeinen Landtsknechten / auch allen Büchsenmeistern zum guten / in Druck geben. Durch Adam Jungkhanß / von der Olnitz. In dem Feldtläger vor der Statt Neuß / Anno 1586. in ider Schantzen zu Gnadenthal / beschrieben* (Cologne: Nicholas Schreiber, 1589), p. 8.
[2] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 6.

views of both soldiers and civilians who wrote with an Empire-wide public in mind. This will be done by examining four publications produced by writers with a military background, including three soldiers' manuals and a diary-memoir, representing both adherents of traditional mercenary culture and devotees of reformist ideas. This will be followed by a typical sample from two other genres in which we might expect to find fixed ideas about national character: academic texts celebrating the German nation, and popular pamphlets denouncing Spanish perfidy. In each case, the aim is to examine the relationship between war and nationhood, and understand how the martial virtues and vices of different populations were conceptualised.

Such analysis illustrates that, while not every aspect of *Kreis* discourse was mirrored in other sources, some key commonalities can be observed. Writers of different professional and confessional backgrounds might address soldiering in varying ways, yet they tended to eschew fixed national hierarchies in favour of more flexible (and at times contradictory) models of categorisation in which practicality usually trumped patriotism.

i) The Military Perspective

Junghans' treatise – the *KriegesOrdnung zu Wasser vnd Landt* – is a helpful starting point for such an analysis. Compared to other military manuals of the period, it has not received much attention from historians, perhaps because its author lacked elevated origins or goals. Hailing from Meissen in Saxony, Junghans was a middle-ranking professional soldier who never attained high command or political influence, and wrote no other works of significance. In keeping with his position as keeper of the muster list for his unit, Junghans devoted much of his text to providing templates of everyday pieces of military paperwork such as commissions and passports, and rarely advanced theories of grand strategy or tactical innovation. Hence, scholars have generally restricted themselves to mining the text for snippets of factual

information about army life, rather than enquiring into the author's larger worldview or sense of identity.[3] Nonetheless, there is value in escaping the better-known canon of humanist military reformers to consider less illustrious perspectives, particularly as Junghans had direct experience of warfare that affected Lower-Rhine-Westphalia; his book was inspired by his experiences fighting for Ernest of Bavaria during the Cologne War, and he claimed to have written it in the trenches outside Neuss in 1586. Moreover, he explicitly considers the question of national character in a chapter entitled "the true form, uniqueness, and nature of certain nations in war."[4]

On first reading, any thesis which Junghans hopes to propound in this chapter of his book is obscured by jarring contradictions. At times he positions himself as a German patriot with an attitude of blanket xenophobia towards outsiders, warning that "all foreign nations only scream 'cruci, cruci, mordio, mordio' over Germany, and gnash their teeth like ravening wolves who hope and pray to bathe in German blood."[5] Yet at others he relates the "more favourable" relationships between Germans and Spaniards, including light-hearted anecdotes of their joking conversations in camp.[6] Elsewhere, he decries the influence of soldiers from abroad, lamenting that Germans have picked up sinful habits now that they "mix themselves so gladly with foreign nations, and also fall into foreign costume and conditions."[7] Yet he also holds up non-German fighters as virtuous models for emulation, noting that "the *Welsch*,

[3] For example, see Volker Bach, 'Markets for Mercenaries: Supplying Armies in Sixteenth-Century Germany' in *Food & Markets: Proceedings of the Oxford Symposium on Food and Cookery 2014*, ed. by Mark McWilliams (London: Prospect Books, 2014), pp. 35-43 (p. 42); Jan Willem Huntebrinker, '„Gartknecht" und „Passport": Zum Problem von Mobilität, Zugehörigkeit und Kontrolle (15.–17. Jahrhundert)', *Working Papers des Arbeitskreises Policey/Polizei in der Vormoderne*, 14 (2007), 16-31 (p. 28-29); Nikolas Funke, 'Containing Confessional Conflict in the Military: The Holy Roman Empire before 1650' in *Cultures of Conflict Resolution in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Stephen Cummins and Laura Kounine (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2016), pp. 127-50 (p. 138).
[4] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 196-201.
[5] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung,* p. 201.
[6] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung,* p. 199.
[7] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung,* p 198.

Walloons, Spaniards, Swiss, Zeelanders, English, and other peoples have a vocation and are famed soldiers, for I must confess – and I have been among and around them during this whole Cologne War – that these nations are the right folk for war, and have a fine comradeship among each other, such that they avoid drunkenness and blasphemy and hold each other for brothers."[8] All of these statements are jumbled together within the space of a few pages.

In the face of these inconsistencies and wild swings in tone, it is tempting to simply dismiss Junghans as a self-refuting irrelevance. However, this would be a missed opportunity. It is true that he was not a systematic thinker and that his views were impressionistic, but this hardly makes him a worthless source. Instead, he illustrates the important fact that much contemporary discourse about nations did not adhere to orderly academic categories, but was primarily anecdotal and emotive. Indeed, as we will see, more scholarly and methodical writers could also exhibit this at times; a core function of early modern national identities was their ability to be rapidly reshaped and redefined in order to fit the mood of the moment. Furthermore, Junghans' split approach can be partially explained by reference to a larger paradox within his own sense of identity. On one level, he was a loyal German writing about outsiders in his country, but simultaneously he was also a self-confessed 'foreign soldier', who was bound to those outsiders by the professional ties of his calling.

Indeed, one thing that comes across strongly throughout Junghans' book is the gulf that separated the civilian and military milieus. In a notable passage, he set out a vision of the soldier as a figure apart from society, existing in diametric opposition to the domestic norms of family, household, and community. "Where one hires soldiers," he warned, "one should know that no doctors, magistrates or other god-fearing people come running, but rather a

[8] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung,* p. 198.

horde of wicked ruffians from all nations, and strange folk who leave behind wife, child, livelihood and all, to follow the wars and everything which Father and Mother don't want to follow. They must follow the calfskin which is stretched over the drums until one brings them into a field battle or a storming, where some thousands lie on the field, shot and stabbed like the fattened swine."[9] The vision of soldiers as paradigmatic outsiders, almost like vagabonds or migratory animals, competes with and often outweighs more geographically rooted allegiances throughout the text. For instance, in one of his templates for a provost's commission Junghans committed the signatories "to defend land and people and save our fatherland, to support God's word and Christendom… with such a crowd of men from all lands and nations."[10] The 'fatherland' being protected here could hardly be a concrete and bounded entity, when within the same sentence he described the men obliged to defend it as having no homeland or nationality in common.

The overriding strength of Junghans' attachment to his professional identity is most clearly evident in passages where he discussed civilian militias. In his final chapter on national character, one of the complaints he made about Germans is that they had become too soft to defend themselves, since each man would "rather sit by the oven in winter and in the shade during summer… than sit by his house with good defences and military equipment."[11] Yet elsewhere in the text he rejected at length the idea that arming local subjects could be a serious military strategy. "Never again should a commander desire or undertake to wage war using common country people, who have wives, children, house, and home", he argued, adding "it may be true that a farmer hits just as hard as a soldier, but which soldier can point to a town which has been stormed by farmers?"[12] Since peasants and townsfolk were of "less

[9] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 16-17.
[10] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 87.
[11] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 201.
[12] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 25.

than no use in war", and requiring them to be constantly on guard deprived the land of workers, he recommended that productive subjects stick to generating taxes while the authorities enlist as soldiers "wicked lads, vagrants, and similar rabble who have nothing to lose but their necks and their lives."[13] This romanticised image of the soldier as wandering scoundrel plainly owes much to the Landsknecht tradition, which he continued to champion against the kind of reforms put forward by advocates of the *Landesdefension*.

With all this in mind, Junghans' contradictory attitudes to troops of different nations start to become more explicable. At times he was thinking primarily like a German patriot, and fretted about the contamination of his country's character by those who "befriend Spaniards and the *Welsch*… and torment poor folk worse than the Turks."[14] At other times, he was thinking primarily like a career Landsknecht, and extended a certain professional respect to his colleagues in the multinational world of itinerant soldiering. As we have seen in Chapter IV, stereotypes about the inherent martial abilities of various populations were a feature of traditional mercenary culture, and it is in this context that Junghans understood their virtues and vices. Nonetheless, his ideal was not a hierarchical model which privileged 'superior' warrior peoples, but a complementary system in which different national contingents kept one another in check and balanced out each other's weaknesses. When discussing the management of military camps, he insisted "that no nation be preferred to another, when they are all soldiers equally", and that nations should keep watch jointly because their rivalry will ensure mutual scrutiny and "often hinders mutiny and treachery."[15] Furthermore, he quoted approvingly a Spanish captain who quipped during the siege of Neuss that "if he could only

[13] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 25-26.
[14] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 200. Note the rather convoluted process of national transmutation described here; by imitating the Spaniards and other foreign Christians, the xenophilic Germans are made comparable to another kind of hostile foreigner, the Turks.
[15] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 147.

stop the Germans from drinking and the Spaniards from whoring, and the *Welsch* from grabbing whatever they could get, he would be able to cope with all his soldiers."[16] Underlying Junghans' critique of various nations' soldiers was thus a kind of exasperated affection, and the suggestion that – for all their flaws – together they were more than the sum of their parts. In this, he found an echo in texts such as Petrus Canisius' Jesuit primer for soldiers, which drew on Tacitean tropes not in order to vaunt the supremacy of Teutonic arms, but to emphasise how ancient Germanic warriors "lived in a modest and friendly fashion with foreigners."[17]

Some of the same themes emerge from the works of other professional soldiers who served in and around Lower-Rhine-Westphalia. Notwithstanding his Protestant background, Stuttgart-born Burkhard Stickel also fought for Ernest of Bavaria in the Cologne War (first indirectly as an officer in Carl of Arenberg's contingent of the Army of Flanders, then directly as commander of a unit recruited by Salentin of Isenburg) and detailed some of his experiences in writing.[18] Eschewing Junghans' periodic flights of fancy, Stickel's account of the campaign in his autobiography is clipped and factual, and he does not overtly engage in speculation about issues of identity or national character. Nonetheless, the categories he uses to describe people he meets shed light upon his worldview, as do some of his general attitudes towards soldiers and civilians. Stickel is interested in the origins of his fellow

[16] Junghans, *KriegesOrdnung*, p. 199.
[17] Petrus Canisius, *Kriegsleüt Spiegel, Das ist Warhaffte beschreibung eines Christlichen Kriegsmanns, Wie er in allem seinem Thun nachfolgen solle dem herrlichen Ebenbild Sanct Moritzen, so zur zeit des Kaisers Maximiani Oberster Feldhauptmann gewesen auch S. Gereons, S. Thyrsen, S. Vrsen, S. Victors vnnd anderer seiner Thebaischen Kriegßleuthen, welliche im Walliserland, zu Cölen, zu Trier, zu Solothurn, vnnd anderswo, wegen ihrer Dapfferer Bestendigkeit im Christlichen Glauben, die selige Martyrkron erlanget haben. Allen frommen Christen, insonderheit aber Feldobersten, Hauptleuthen, Bevelchshabern, vnd gemeinen Soldaten, zur auffmunderung wider alle Christenfeind Ritterlich zu kempffen, nutzlich zulesen fürgestellt, Durch Herrn Petrvm Canisivm, der Societet Iesv Theologum mit sonderem Fleiß beschrieben vnd in Truck verfertiget* (Fribourg: Abraham Gemperlin, 1596), p. 84.
[18] For a brief summary of his life, see Wilhelm von Heyd, 'Stickel, Burkhard', in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, 56 vols (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1875-1912), XXXIII (1893), pp. 170-71.

troops, and national demonyms are the primary identifiers he uses to describe his allies and enemies; for example, he repeatedly refers to one pro-Truchsessian unit as "Dr Beutterich and his Frenchmen", and relates a mission undertaken alongside "Captain Nicolo Basta and Captain Biast, who each had a banner of cavalry, and were Albanians."[19] These labels are deployed neutrally, without any attempt to highlight membership of a foreign nation as a negative attribute. Not even a skirmish between "two companies of Germans and some Swiss" by the rock of Drachenfels – later made a shrine to romantic German nationalism by its association with Siegfried and the *Nibelungenlied* – could rouse him to a display of patriotic sentiment.[20]

Stickel's greater usage of national demonyms to describe military units – compared to the *Kreis* sources analysed in Chapter I – may conceivably reflect the salience of certain practicalities in soldiers' perspectives. Whereas the Circle's statesmen had strong reasons to classify troops by who was politically responsible for them (i.e. their *Dienstherr*), those who actually rubbed shoulders with these troops in the field might notice more 'national' features such as language and dress. Nonetheless, Stickel was certainly not incapable of using other forms of categorisation, and often switched between registers in a familiar contradictory-seeming fashion. For example, at one point he refers to the force under Arenberg's command as "Spanish troops", despite having listed its composition a few pages earlier as ten companies of Germans and twenty of Walloons; evidently their service to Philip II could provide them with a form of Spanishness on occasion.[21] As an even more striking incidence

[19] Burkhard Stickel, 'Burkhard Stickel's Tagebuch seiner Kriegs- und anderer Verrichtungen auf dem europäischen Festlande, im Mittelmeere und in Afrika von 1566-1598', ed. by E.V. Kausler*, Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde*, (1866/68), 302-424 (pp. 364, 366-69, 373). Note that Biast and Basta – like the latter's more famous namesake, Giorgio Basta, who also served in the Cologne War – were members of the South Italian Arbëreshë minority, who had fled across the Adriatic during the Ottoman conquests, rather than inhabitants of what we would call Albania today.
[20] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 371.
[21] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', pp. 370, 362.

of this, in an earlier passage detailing his Mediterranean campaigns during the 1570s, he actually refers to "we Spaniards" who were fighting in the king's fleet.[22] There is no suggestion that he was keen to swap his German and Württemberger roots for Spanish ones (his gravestone celebrated his return after this naval campaign "home to his fatherland", and he spent the last part of his career as a military official in his native duchy), but plainly he could contemplate multiple framings of his identity.[23]

In contrast with these complex categorisations of military men, civilians appear in Stickel's narrative largely as an undifferentiated mass. Regardless of whether he is serving in the Rhineland, the Low Countries, or France, the locals he encountered are usually described as "farmers" [*Bauren*] without any further details or qualifiers.[24] Furthermore, his attitude towards them is broadly contemptuous. He is quite open about the wasteful plundering in which he and his men engaged, writing that in 1583 "we were stationed for a good while in the villages around Bonn, and achieved nothing, other than ruining the farmers and the land."[25] On a later occasion, after his scouting party was ambushed at Rommerskirchen and briefly held for ransom, Stickel attempted to extort monetary compensation from the town's mayor by threatening that unless he paid up, "we would persecute him with murder and arson."[26] Stickel was equally barefaced about threatening princes as well as burghers; after being warned by Ernest of Bavaria's government to restrain his troops from harassing the

[22] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 346.
[23] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 314.
[24] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', pp. 362, 366, 368, 369, 379, 398.
[25] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 362.
[26] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 366. The upshot of this was that "he sent to us the district magistrate of Grevenbroich, a little town belonging to the duke of Jülich, and agreed a day when he would come and settle with us at Cologne… which cost the farmers five hundred gulden, of which a good sixty gulden were used up in the tavern." This incident is revealing in that it provides a glimpse of the complex local networks employed to deal with marauders, with one town utilising a mediator from a second town and a neutral meeting-place in a third to negotiate with marauders. In addition, the fact that a fair chunk of the booty was immediately spent in a Cologne inn reinforces the point made in Chapter VI that some civilians managed to profit from plunder of their neighbours.

local population, he responded that they should be given their back-pay immediately, or else "we will pay ourselves, for I still have several barrels of powder and good honest men with me."[27]

Thus, Stickel comes across even more strongly than Junghans as someone who valued solidarity within his profession above solidarity within his people (however they are defined). This is not to say that he was unaware of, or indifferent to, divisions between nations; indeed, for him they were highly useful markers to navigating military society. It is simply the case that a more important dividing line was the one that cut him off from the peasants and paymasters whom he regarded principally as a source of revenue.

On some level, of course, we would expect such attitudes from unrepentant professional mercenaries. However, it is significant to note that even ex-soldiers who were sympathetic to reformist ideas often displayed similar conflicted thinking. Having served extensively in Charles V's wars along the Empire's western borderlands, Hans William Kirchhof became one of the period's more learned commentators on warfare, and in 1602 published a treatise on military affairs entitled *Militaris Disciplina*. He was hostile to excessive reliance on non-native troops, and in a chapter on "what to consider when choosing officers" he asked rhetorically "what is the need for a prince and lord to keep without purpose foreigners and outlanders… in his service?"[28] Nonetheless, when warning "that the majority of outlanders" prove loyal to a prince "no further or longer than his gold lasts", he was careful to qualify this critique with the caveat that "I do not speak of all, when many upright and steady men are to be found, to whom I am not referring."[29] He also displayed awareness of the complexity of

[27] Stickel, 'Tagebuch', p. 375.
[28] Hans William Kirchhof, *Militaris Disciplina,* ed. by Bodo Gotzkowsky (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1976), p. 18.
[29] Kirchhof, *Militaris Disciplina*, pp. 18-19.

soldiers' often peripatetic allegiances, noting that a soldier's employer ought to categorise them by "where or under which lordship they are resident, or where they mostly tend to stay."[30] Plainly, he recognised that an officer's loyalties were not fixed at birth and could be reshaped by experience; indeed, experience was key to his worldview, since he listed a man's expertise and service record as even more important criteria by which to judge him. For Kirchhof, an individual's worth as a proven veteran had the potential to outweigh the circumstances of their origins.

Furthermore, when Kirchhof discussed specific examples of foreign armies' conduct, he was quite often complimentary. He reserved particular plaudits for the "highly regarded and praiseworthy former kings in France" and the generous severance pay they gave to soldiers, whilst making several other positive references to French methods of military organisation.[31] Kirchhof's special respect for French martial customs may have been shaped by his nostalgic perspective; his military service had taken place decades before the publication of his book, and he cited precedents chiefly from the era when Valois monarchs had contended with Charles V for the leadership of Christendom. In some ways, this made him closer to Landsknechts of an even earlier generation (such as Wilwolt of Schaumburg, whose 1512 memoir began by lauding the noble battlefield rivalry of France and Germany, claiming that "these two lands before all other nations possess the same banners and fight in the vanguard, and both in advance and retreat they are closest to the enemy") than to his contemporaries in the early 1600s, when France was still struggling to escape the shadow of civil war and Spanish supremacy.[32] However, the fact that similar views were still circulating in print in the

[30] Kirchhof, *Militaris Disciplina*, p. 18.
[31] Kirchhof, *Militaris Disciplina*, pp. 187, 71-72, 78, 92, 128, 179.
[32] *Die Geschichten und Taten Wilwolts von Schaumburg*, ed. by Adelbert von Keller (Stuttgart: Literarischen Vereins, 1859), p. 4. It should be noted that Wilwolt of Schaumburg's vision of dual hegemony shared by the two branches of the Frankish people was likely shaped by his Franconian origins. The existence of these sentiments suggests that Georg Schmidt may be wrong to say that there was no notion of an arch-rivalry between France and Germany in the sixteenth century. See Georg Schmidt, 'Teutsche Kriege: Nationale

new century shows that there was no decisive break with older ideas, and that the culture of Landsknechts and *Landesdefensionen* could often coexist.

Moreover, it remains the case that even thoroughly up-to-date adherents of the reformist school also accepted the need to learn from other nations. Like Kirchhof, the military engineer William Dilich (born 1571) spent part of his career working for Landgrave Maurice 'the Wise' of Hesse-Kassel, who was heavily influenced by Nassau-Dillenburg's militia projects. Dilich's *Kriegsbuch* of 1607 was a fairly dry and doctrinaire restatement of John VI's theories, and contained boilerplate patriotic rhetoric about how "an indigenous man always takes better care of his natural-born lord, his dear fatherland, his parents, wife, child, relations, property, and goods than does a hireling and a foreigner."[33] Yet it also advised using certain equipment and tactics explicitly modelled on those of "the foreign nations", including weapons that were "hitherto not much in use by the Germans, although they are highly necessary and held to be particularly useful by the Spanish and the [Dutch] States, indeed also the Turks themselves, plus the old Macedonians and Roman soldiers."[34]

Dilich also strayed into well-worn ambiguities when it came to actually defining the foreign soldiers whose deployment he wished to prevent. In one key passage, he lamented that men "who are not born Germans wish to enter service and be employed, from which may follow all manner of diminution and disadvantage for the German nation; thus, henceforth no person of a foreign nation, who is not resident in the Empire or the lands under its protection, should

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Deutungsmuster und integrative Wertvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Reich' in *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandskonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. by Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 33-61 p. 37; nonetheless, France was not to establish itself as the definitive *bête noire* in the German public sphere until the late seventeenth century. See Martin Wrede, *Das Reich und seine Feinde: Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischen westfälischem Frieden und Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2004) p. 349 ff.

[33] William Dilich, *Kriegsbuch / darin die Alte und Neue Militia eigentlich beschrieben und alle Krigßneulinge / Bau vnd Buchsenmeistern / zu nutz vnd gutter anleitung in Druck geben vnd verfertiget* (Kassell: William Wessell, 1607), p. 13.

[34] Dilich, *Kriegsbuch*, pp. 167, 292.

be allowed to lead German troops" by the Circle Colonels.[35] In the space of this single sentence, two separate and somewhat contradictory conceptions of the unacceptably foreign are advanced: one based on non-German birth, and the other based on residency outside the Holy Roman Empire and its protectorates (a piece of phrasing which gestures towards a wide swathe of borderland without ever systematically delineating it). This glaring vagueness hints at the true value of such rhetoric, which was not to set out watertight criteria for the exclusion of individuals, but rather to evoke a broad and flexible notion of the foreign which could be tailored to suit the reader's needs.

An examination of texts inspired by soldiers' experiences on the Empire's western frontiers thus reinforces the overwhelming importance of practical concerns. These texts made frequent use of national categories, but not within a framework that preached inherent German superiority or indelible enmity between peoples. Instead, there was an emphasis on making the best use of different groups' skills and attributes, and balancing the fatherland's interests with the professional respect due to fellow members of the multinational military milieu. At times this led to an embrace of contradictory forms of identification, which is only to be expected from authors who had a foot in two different camps (or rather, one foot in an army camp, and the other outside it).

ii) The Civilian Perspective

Despite the gulf which separated professional soldiers from the rest of society, some similar attitudes abound within other works that addressed security issues for an Empire-wide audience. It is understandably infeasible to discuss every piece of literature from across the Reich which mentioned foreign soldiers. However, we can get a sense of how pervasive utilitarian approaches to national character were by examining works where we might expect

[35] Dilich, *Kriegsbuch*, p.165.

to find the opposite view: humanistic celebrations of Germany, and pamphlets promoting the 'Black Legend' of Spanish villainy.

In places, the Deventer-born scholar and illustrator Matthias Quad's *Teutsche Nation Herligkeit* ["Splendour of the German Nation"] seems to advocate a view of nationhood which is much more stable and systematic, being based on fixed hereditary allegiances. In one passage, he laments that "since the time that so many foreign nations of Englishmen, Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Italians (I will not name the Hungarians, Poles, Lithuanians, Swedes, and Danes, as they are for the most part descended from Germans) have taken root here in Germany, their children and grandchildren in time have become seen as true and hereditary Germans following the emigration and extinction of their neighbours. And therefore it happens (for nature always exerts its secret influence) that among those accounted Germans there are many who are so very devoted to the Italians, or the French, or the Spanish and other nations, so that they would regard it as a blessing if they and their whole fatherland fell under the yoke and servitude of the same."[36] According to this view, the problem of collaboration with foreign invasions was attributable to immigrant cuckoos in the German nest, whose ancestral loyalties could not be erased by time and cultural assimilation. Quad's family tree of nations may look somewhat unfamiliar (later generations of Germans would have been perplexed by the assertion that they were closer kin to the Poles and Hungarians than to the English), but this kind of xenophobic rhetoric seems to match well with 'modern' nationalist theories.

[36] Matthias Quad of Kinkelbach, *Teutscher Nation Herligkeit: Ein außführliche beschreibung des gegenwärtigen alten / vnd vhralten Standts Germaniae, nemlich ihr erstes auff komen / zunemen / vnd jetzige gelegenheit der Regierung vnd Herrshung / Stett / Policey / Kirchenstandts / Flecken / Schlösser / Dörffer / Fruchtbarkeit der Velder / Berge / Wäld / Flüß / vnd Lachen* (Cologne: William Lützenkirchen, 1614), p. 26.

However, it must coexist with a rather different explanation for the same phenomenon. A few pages later, Quad says of the German rural population that "the greatest evil which presses upon them is that not only are they not protected by anyone (yes, not even their own lords) during the wars, but where they gladly would and could defend themselves at their own risk and expense, this is wholly forbidden by their officials. Often in the lands of Jülich and Cologne the farmers must look on as their houses and homes are plundered, even as they must pay contributions to the lords as thanks for their faithful protection. Therefore, things have now gone so far that the farmers themselves run to war, one man to the Spanish and the other to the States [General], and after a month they help to plunder their own villages and property."[37] In this version of events, those who aided and abetted foreign invaders of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia were not driven by inborn propensity to treason after all, but by dire circumstances that left them with no other option. Here again we see a juxtaposition of two competing ways to categorise populations: one where the main divide is between various national descent-groups, and one where the key boundary is between soldiers and their victims (who may, in desperation, cross it to become soldiers themselves).

Chauvinism and expediency also exist side by side in Jacob Schopper's *Neuwe Chorographia vnd Histori Teutscher Nation*. A subsection of this sprawling compendium of German customs deals with the nation's martial character, which in the main is depicted in glowing terms. Mining classical histories for precedent, the Swabian theologian lauds the Germans' unchanging battlefield prowess, claiming that they are stronger than other nations, that their women fight as well as other countries' men, and that they have proven their dominance by ruling the Roman Empire for longer than the "*Welsch*" ever managed.[38] Whilst

[37] Quad, *Teutscher Nation Herligkeit*, p. 30.
[38] Jacob Schopper, *Neuwe Chorographia vnd Histori Teutscher Nation. Das ist: Warhaffte eigentliche vnd kurtze Beschreibung / der alten hochlöblichen Teutschen / vnserer Branherren erster ankunfft / herkommen /*

acknowledging that the Germans have occasionally been defeated, he attributes their enemy's victories to underhand strategies rather than superior bravery. Nonetheless, his elaboration of this point is interesting, for he adds that "if the Germans were so cunning and swift as the foreign nations, then there would be no people under Heaven who would be above them in war. But it is seldom that everything that belongs to one people also belongs to another. And therefore I hear that in the wars against the Turks the Germans and the Spaniards are often deployed together, because one is best suited to the first advance, and the other to reinforcement and tenacious defence."[39] This vision of different countries' contingents combining to cancel out each other's weaknesses shows that national archetypes could complement one another as well as compete, and has a direct parallel to Junghans' musings on multi-ethnic armies.

Of course, other sources focused specifically on disharmony between Spain and Germany, and one genre in which we might expect a firm and consistent stance on national character is the pamphlets which drew the Imperial public's attention to atrocities committed by Spanish troops. Yet even here blurred lines and conflicting characterisations dominated. The *Hispanischer Arragonischer Spiegel* of 1599 began by promising its readers that it would reveal "what the Spanish manner and nature [is]," yet did so by relating the actions of an army (the force that invaded Lower-Rhine-Westphalia in 1598) which on the next page it described as "30,000 men on horse and foot from various nations."[40] We might simply chalk

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auffnemen vnd vermehrung / dero Namens vrsprung: Von Ihren herlichen Kriegß thaten [etc] (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Schmidt & Sigmund Feyerabend, 1582), pp. 254-56.

[39] Schopper, *Neuwe Chorographia vnd Histori*, pp. 258-59.

[40] *Hispanischer Arragonischer Spiegel, Darin mit gutem grund der warheit / abgebildet / zu was ende vnd effect / das ietzige Spanische Kriegsvolck (So in dem Westphalischen Creiß / auff des heiligen Reichs grundt vnd bodem sich noch an ietzo enthelt / vnnd mehr dann der Feind Christliches nahmens jemals gethan / daselbst herumb Tyrannisirt) sein vornehmen eigentlich gerichtet / Daß nemblich / sie zu würcklicher volnstreckung des zu Brüssel gemachten gemeynen Rahtschlusses / vorhabens seyn vnderm Schein die Staden zubekriegen / alle gute ordnung vnd policy / mit auffhebung der Religion vnd Landfriedens vmbzukehren / vnnd mit gewaltsamer einführung der Spanisch Inquisition, eine newe Kirchen Reformation vnd Reichsverfassung in Teutschland ihres gefallens / anzustellen. Dabey zubefinden I. Key. Kay. acht erclerung vnd anderer Chur vnnd Fürsten*

this up to imprecision, but elsewhere the pamphlet's author was quite diligent about recording the nuances of soldiers' allegiances (for example, by being careful to list "six marksmen responsible to the duke of Jülich" separately from men in the same garrison pledged to the duke's vassal Wirich of Daun-Falkenstein).[41] We are therefore left with the suspicion that the Spanish "nature" being discussed was in fact partly nurture, as troopers from explicitly multinational backgrounds could be rendered Spanish (just like Burkhard Stickel) by serving a *Dienstherr* based in the Escorial.[42]

The elision of Spanish-born and Spanish-aligned groups is evident in other pamphlets also. The 1616 publication *Spannische Sturmglock / Vnnd Teutsches Warnglöcklein* featured on its title page the claim that "the Spanish have set out with great warlike power circle-wise around the Lutherans and Calvinists," before stating a few pages later that "the Hispanicised [*die Spanniolisirten*] have now overrun and surrounded the [Protestant] co-religionists circle-wise with armed power."[43] The language is almost identical, but the way that Spanish-

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vnterschiedene schreiben / so wohl auch des Spanischen Obersten vnd desselben Gesandten erclerung vnnd werbung: Ietzo newlich dem ehrliebenden Teutschen Leser / deme des Vatterlands heyl vnd wohlfart angelagen / zur trewhertzigen warnung vnnd fleissigem nachdencken / in Truck verfertiget (n.p.: n. pub. 1599), pp. 3, 4; for more information on the text, see Gerhart Hoffmeister, 'Hispanischer Arragonischer Spiegel (1599): Zur Spanischen Gefahr am Rhein und der literarischen Tradition der Leyenda Negra in Deutschland', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 62:2 (1981-82), 195-206.

[41] *Hispanischer Arragonischer Spiegel*, p. 5; for clarification of Wirich's exact status as an 'Unterherr' within Berg, see Harm Klueting, 'Protektoren des Protestantismus: zum religionspolitischen Einfluss protestantischer Grafen im bergischen Land im 16. Jahrundert' in *Drei Konfessionen in einer Region: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Konfessionalisierung im Herzogtum Berg vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Burkhard Dietz and Stefan Ehrenpreis (Cologne: Rheinland Verlag, 1999), pp. 229-88 (p. 240-41).

[42] Peer Schmidt, *Spanische Universalmonarchie oder „teutsche Libertet": Das spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001), pp. 241, 243.

[43] *Spannische Sturmglock / Vnnd Teutsches Warnglöcklein / Das ist: Ein Extract / aller vnd ieder gewissen ankommen Zeitungen / vnd glaubwürdigen Berichten / die vor augenschwebendte (über Teutschlandt angestellte seltzame) Kriegsgefahr betreffendt: Wie dieselbe zum höchsten kommen / vnd nummehr betens zeit vorhanden / vnd höchlich von nöhten: Vor eins. Darbey ein sonderliches Bedencken / weil die Spannische / Circkelweiß mit grosser Kriegsmacht vmb die Lutheraner vnd Caluinisten / bey erwünschter ietziger Gelegenheit außzurotten / sich auffmachen: Ob die Evangelische so leichtlich dem Spannischen Joch sich ergeben / vnd vnterwerffen / oder nach eusserstem irem vermögen defendirn weden: Vors ander. Zum dritten welcher theil vermuhtlich (auß gewissen vmbständen) den Sieg behalten / vnd ob ein / oder der ander theil succumbirn vnd vndenligen / was der Siegende / vnd verluftigte theil / vor Großmächtigen nutzen vnd vortheil / auch Schaden vnd verlust dabon wagen bringen / vnd haben werde. Trewhertzig vnd wolmeynendt zu Warnung geschrieben* (n.p.: Parnassischen Truckerey, 1616), p. 2; for a condensed summary of the text, see Gerhart Hoffmeister,

influenced Germans have been directly substituted for straightforward Spaniards points to a fluid continuum of identity. Much of the remainder of the pamphlet is devoted to lambasting these pro-Spanish German Catholics for preferring outside military help over a *Landesdefension*-style militia, and the usual tropes about the superior reliability of subjects compared to outsiders are fully in evidence. Nonetheless, the anonymous author follows the precedent set by John VI and other reformers by emphasising that superior training, rather than inborn advantages, will make the difference, concluding that the militias will prevail even though "I don't want to say that by nature one German may resist two Spaniards or Italians."[44] As so often, the key dichotomy emphasised is that between soldiers and subjects, rather than between Germans and non-Germans.

iii) Conclusion

One final exemplar of these trends comes from the Circle's self-proclaimed edge, the *Reichstadt* Aachen. A pamphlet of 1614 purported to draw the Imperial public's attention to the scandal of the city's recent capture by Spinola, but (for all that his name appeared in block capitals on the frontispiece) the general and his men featured in only a subordinate role.[45] At one point they were likened to "hungry wolves," but instead of railing against the innate perfidy of Spaniards, Italians, or other non-Germans, the text noted the plundering

'Spannische Sturmglock' (1604) [sic] und ‚Spanischer Curier' (1620): Zur Verbreitung der Leyenda Negra in Deutschland', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 61:2 (1979), 353-68 (pp. 353-9).

[44] *Spannische Sturmglock*, p. 9; the pamphlet is unattributed, but the author is clearly connected with or identical to the Hamburger politician Vincent Möller, as many of the same passages appear in his longer work Vincent Möller, *Wolmeinender / Warhaffter Discurs, Warumb vnd wie die Römisch-Catholischen in Teutschland sich billich von Spaniern vnd Jesuiten absonderen / vnd ihrer selbsten bey disen itzigen hochgefehrlichen zeiten wohl warnehmen sollen vnd können / damit nicht das Vatterlandt / vnd die selbsten / andern zum raub gerahten / noch sie sich deßwegen bey sich selbsten ein böß gewissen aufladen / vnd bey den nachkommenden ein vnaußlöschlichen schmachnahmen vber den hals ziehen Durch einen Trewhertzigen Teutschen Catholischen gestalt / vnd numehr allen alten Catholischen Teutscher Nation zu sonderlicher warnung / auß lieb gegen das Varterlandt in druck gefertiget* (n.p.: n. pub., 1615).

[45] *Warhaffte vnd Beständige Erzehlung / Welcher massen des H. Reichs Stadt vnd Könglicher Stuel Aach / am 25/5 Tag Augusti des 1614 Jahrs / durch den Herrn MARQUIS AMBROSIO di Spinola ingenommen vnd besetzt worden / Auch was sich sonsten alda von gemeldte tag biß vff den 14/4 tag Septembris begeben* (n.p.: n. pub., 1614).

carried out by occupying forces under the German counts of Emden.[46] Meanwhile, the sharpest criticism was saved for the Catholic residents of the town, with the author relating that when the defenders' own mercenaries were forced to evacuate, "many citizens and young men who had taken service with these four companies and wanted to leave with them were wickedly received with blows at the city gate, although mostly from vengeful Papist fellow citizens and not from the soldiers."[47]

The partisan pamphleteer does not wish to attribute the Catholics any motives beyond "implacability and hunger for revenge", but in the burghers' punches we can perhaps once again detect the gulf that often yawned wider than the division between nations and confessions.[48] By electing to leave their homes and throw their lot in with the professional soldiers, the young exiles had severed their last link with the respectable civilian world and rendered themselves an enemy to those who remained behind. From now on, they would join Junghans in the horde of wicked ruffians from all nations.

[46] *Könglicher Stuel Aach*, p. 9.
[47] *Könglicher Stuel Aach*, p. 9.
[48] *Könglicher Stuel Aach*, p. 11.

Conclusion

Hunting foreign soldiers through the sources can sometimes give historians an empathy for those who had to pursue them in real life; it is a never-ending task, hampered by contradictory evidence, scanty resources, and the occasional malicious deception, with no definitive resolution to the problem in sight. Nonetheless, by drawing together all the threads running through the three layers of the Imperial constitution and the three parts of this thesis, it is possible to make some substantive points about the overall role of such troops in Lower-Rhine-Westphalian politics. Furthermore, we can consider what this means for wider issues in modern historiography.

First, we can say that debates over foreign soldiers illustrate the breadth of patriotic rhetoric in the pre-1618 Holy Roman Empire, whilst simultaneously calling into question its depth. Historians looking for the prehistory of nationalism in Germany are right to note the wide currency of concepts such as 'fatherland' and 'nation', but in searching for the main locus of patriotic loyalties, they have sometimes missed the point that this currency could not buy very much in practice. The additional perspective of *Kreis* sources (alongside purely territorial and purely Imperial ones) lends some weight to Alexander Schmidt's argument that the Reich itself was understood as a true *patria* and was not superseded in this regard by princely states. This was reinforced by several Circles Estates positioning themselves as borderland entities, manning the vulnerable outer perimeter of the Empire against dangers emanating from the lapsed Burgundian Circle. Nonetheless, the chief value of xenophobic denunciations of 'foreign' military threats was not that they succeeded in consolidating the fixed identities of an in-group versus an out-group – they were used too broadly and nebulously for this – but that their very flexibility allowed multiple actors with different interests and perspectives to read what they wanted into the resulting Rorschach blot.

In consequence, the role of military patriotism in shaping concrete policies was limited. Time and again, we have seen that when push came to shove, the people of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia saw armed men first and foremost as soldiers, and as foreigners or countrymen a distant second. Thus, attempts to exclude non-natives from *Kreis* military forces were very limited in scope, since the practical value of battlefield experience outweighed the limited benefits of choosing men whose patriotism could not be trusted to restrain them from plundering anyway. Similarly, even in Nassau-Dillenburg – long held up as an exemplar of the humanist-inspired campaign to purge foreign mercenaries – reformers were abundantly aware that their local militias could only complement and not replace professional troops. Meanwhile, in both occupied Jülich-Cleves-Berg and neutral Cologne, civilians learned to tolerate and work alongside soldiers from far afield, and sometimes even celebrated them for their varied origins.

The second key conclusion which arises from all of this is that the Empire continued to function fairly effectively as a peacekeeping system in the second half of the Treaty of Augsburg era, albeit in slightly different ways than we might expect. Analyses of the *Kreise* which focus on their fading capacity to raise troops for frontier defence miss out on an essential aspect of the security situation; when confronted by sources of violence with an open-ended duration like the Eighty Years' War, which manifested across a vast borderland region, there was no military solution which did not threaten to cause more problems than it solved. As crises such as the 1599 'German Autumn' show, such interventions tended to impose heavy fiscal burdens only to replace one kind of pillagers with another. Thus, the fact that the Circles and supporting Imperial institutions such as the Reichstag had only limited success at raising forces to fight against 'foreign soldiers' on the Empire's north-western border is both true and of second-order importance.

The real value of the Empire was as a complex system of interconnecting linkages, both formal (such as the Circle and Reichstag meetings) and informal (such as the dynastic networks of marriage and inheritance creating trans-regional composite polities), underpinned by a shared political culture which focused on compromise and accommodation. The various rhetorical formulae which *Kreis* Estates used to discuss military threats helped grease the wheels of this system, for instance by allowing raids to be discussed as quasi-natural phenomena without assigning partisan blame, or by allowing the identities of perpetrators to remain deliberately obscured. This helped Reich politics to act as a massive shock-absorber for diffusing the political strains of the era, which otherwise threatened to set members of different confessions, regions, and families against one another. The very inefficiency of the *Kreise* as vehicles for military mobilisation made them useful as mechanisms for dampening tension, with activist parties forced to seek consensus at various levels of the Imperial hierarchy rather than ploughing ahead with confrontational policies. This provided time for passions to cool and, in some cases, allowed problems to resolve themselves before precipitate actions could inflame them.

Thus, it is notable that large-scale warfare was avoided during the period under discussion, despite several incidents happening in and around the Circle which seemed to hold all the ingredients for general civil conflict. The Cologne War, the Spanish Winter, and the Jülich-Cleves-Berg succession crisis all involved militant confessionalised alliances with connections to wider European fault lines, but in each case the participation of Lower-Rhine-Westphalian members was muted and temporary, with none of the Circle's princes directly taking up arms against each other. The failure of Lower-Rhine-Westphalia's rulers to protect their subjects from many incidences of looting and aggression during the Augsburg Peace era is sobering, but pales in comparison to the widespread carnage of the French Wars of

Religion or the Thirty Years' War. Constructive ambiguity was preferable to clearly drawn battle lines.

A third conclusion concerns patterns in military life itself, which have been shown to exhibit more continuity than change. Neither the reports of observers in the Circle governments nor the writings of military theorists and soldiers themselves bear out the idea of a fundamental transformation in martial identities during this period. There was no major linguistic shift from the free-wheeling Landsknechts of a bygone era to the regimented '*Soldaten*' of future nation-states, and reforms such as the *Landesdefension* project were more incremental than transformative in their reshaping of troops' loyalties. For the most part, throughout these decades soldiers remained what they had always been: distrusted outsiders, more defined by their occupational society than their geographic origins. National affiliations formed part of their worldview, but this was more a reflection of old mercenary traditions (which often held that armies benefitted from shrewd use of complementary peoples, rather than the innate superiority of German arms) than a harbinger of modern patriotic militaries, and they were beset with contradictions. Despite its close proximity to a supposed fulcrum of the Military Revolution in the Netherlands, there was no decisive shift in attitudes to war apparent in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia during the decades leading up to 1618.

The historiography of the Empire in the early seventeenth century continues to be divided between those such as Heinz Duchhardt and Axel Gotthard, who see the period as an escalating series of crises enabled by inherent flaws in earlier peace settlements, and those such as Johannes Burkhardt who stress more contingent and short-term causes of conflict.[1] Taken together, the arguments in this thesis support the latter model; in Lower-Rhine-

[1] Axel Gotthard, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: eine Einführung* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2016); Heinz Duchhardt, *Der Weg in die Katastrophe des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: die Krisendekade 1608–1618* (Munich: Piper, 2017); Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Krieg der Kriege: eine neue Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2018).

Westphalia at least, the Reich seems to have been able to endure endemic pressures and frequent flashpoints without an irreversible slide towards general war. More broadly, these conclusions also reinforce the challenge that has been made to narratives of confessionalisation and state formation, which hold that Europe in this period was inexorably riven by a growing gulf between increasingly aggressive and well-consolidated religious groupings and polities (the latter of which, within the Empire, are usually identified with territorial princedoms).[2] As we have seen, in Lower-Rhine-Westphalia differences between Protestant and Catholic attitudes to security questions were minor, mechanisms existed to contain their more vehement disagreements, and foreign ties could be formed independently of confessional bonds. Furthermore, the Reich's territorial balkanisation was mitigated by the limited prospects for centring patriotism exclusively on princely states, and by the thoroughly transnational sources of military power. If confessional strife could be durably contained even in one of Europe's most religiously heterogenous areas, and if state formation was a struggle to implement even on the most modest and manageable scale, then the inevitability of these trends elsewhere seems even more open to doubt.

Of course, this study cannot single-handedly resolve broad debates, and further exploration of the issues raised here would add to the weight of its conclusions. As mentioned previously, in addition to the well-studied Ottoman *Militärgrenze* and the north-western frontier analysed here, there were additional Imperial borderlands in the north-east and south-west which have

[2] For an overview of Reinhard and Schilling's confessionalisation theory, its relationship to state formation, and the recent challenges to it, see Ute Lotz-Heumann, 'Confessionalization' in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter-Reformation*, ed. by Alexandra Bamji, Geert Janssen and Mary Laven (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 33-53; for a classic statement of the confessionalisation thesis, see Wolfgang Reinhard, 'Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment', Catholic Historical Review, 75 (1989), 383-404; for works with particular relevance to our region, see Gregor Horstkemper, '„Wie ein zartt ding es um das gewissen sey": Konfessionsfragen in den Beziehungen zwischen Hessen und Jülich-Kleve-Berg in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts' in *Konfessionalisierung im Herzogtum Berg*, ed. by Burkhard Dietz and Stefan Ehrenpreis (Cologne: Rheinland-Verlag, 1999), pp. 153-82; Howard Hotson, *Commonplace learning: Ramism and its German ramifications, 1543-1630* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 83-84.

been even more neglected, both in modern historiography and in the calculus of priorities at the time. Research into foreign soldiers along the Empire's Baltic fringes during the late sixteenth century could prove valuable, particularly if given a comparative angle; it would be useful to compare *Reichskreise* such as Lower-Rhine-Westphalia with loosely similar regional entities such as the Livonian Confederation.[3] This might also be extended to encompass the Swiss cantons and the possibility of more peaceful shifts in allegiance, building on previous work which covers their complex relationship with the Reich in the earlier part of the sixteenth century.[4] Finally, one more regional grouping which might be usefully incorporated into this framework is the collected possessions of the Bohemian Crown. These lands formed the only complex of territories that participated heavily in Imperial politics without being part of a Circle, and it is tempting to make speculations based on the fact that they were also the area where confessional tensions finally broke loose to trigger the Thirty Years' War.

This conflict of course forms the coda to the period studied in this thesis, and must encourage some cautious moderation in the conclusions maintained here. For all of the Empire's successes in handling the issue of foreign soldiers, it did ultimately become the epicentre of a highly destructive Europe-wide conflict; clearly, it would be foolish to maintain that it was a system without serious weaknesses. Nonetheless, the preceding chapters have hopefully hinted at ways in which it was not preordained that this should happen, and that the demise of the compromise culture embodied by the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle was not the

[3] Some steps have been taken in this direction. See Peter Claus Hartmann, *Regionen in der frühen Neuzeit: Reichskreise im deutschen Raum, Provinzen in Frankreich, Regionen unter polnischer Oberhoheit: ein Vergleich ihrer Strukturen, Funktionen und ihrer Bedeutung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994); Dennis Hormuth, 'Border Region and Propaganda: Livonia as a Bulwark of Christianity in the Sixteenth Century' in *Frontier and Border Regions in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Raingard Eßer and Steven Ellis (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2013), pp. 139-56.
[4] Tom Scott, *The Swiss and their Neighbours, 1460-1560: Between Accommodation and Aggression* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Thomas Brady, *Turning Swiss: Cities and Empire, 1450-1550* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

product of inherent flaws in the Augsburg era's politics. Nonetheless, even if the descent into war was not ultimately prevented, some respect is due to the Lower-Rhine-Westphalians who avoided it for generations in the face of desperate circumstances. Peace, even if it does not last forever, is no mean thing.

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— *Historica Novem Mensium Relatio: Das ist / Ein Historische beschreibung der merchlichen vnd Gedenckwurdigen Geschichten / so sich die negsten neun Monat / nicht allein ihm Heyligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nacion / vnd dem Vhralten Ertzstifft Cölln / Sonder auch Ihm Niderlandt / Franckreich / Engellandt / Poln / Hungern vnd Behaymb. darzu in Italien / Hispanien / vnd andern Königreichen / Herzogthummen / Graff / vnnd Herrschafften zugetragen / vom Junio des 1590 Jahr an / biß auff ietzt Ablauffendts Monat Marty dises gegenwurtigen Jars nach Christi Geburt 1591 Durch Michaeln Erzinger auß Osterreich* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1591)

— *Historica postremae relationis appendix. Das ist ein histoerische vervolgung der Geschichten und haendel so sich seithero des monats Martii noch ferner zugetragen. So wol umb das Ertzstifft Coelln und bonn: als auch im Niderlandt, Franckreich, Teutschlandt und sonst an andern orten biß auff den 15. Tag jetzt ablauffenden monats Septembris. 1588* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1588)

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— *Historica Relationis Continuatio. Das ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung der vornembsten Händeln / so sich in Vngarn wieder den Türcken / In Frankreich wider den König von Nauarrra / Im Niderlandt zwiscen den Königischen vnd Holländern. Vnd sonst durch gantz Europa / als in Hispania / Teutschlandt / Burgundia / Engellandt / Frießlandt / vnd Geldern / x. durch das gantze Jahr zuegetragen. Vom Monat Septembris 1594 bis auff den September jetz ablauffenden Jahrs 1595* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1595)

— *Historica Rerum Intra Septem Menses in Europa Gestarum Relatio: Das ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung / deren Gedenckwirdigen sachen / so sich die nägsten VII. monat / durch gantz Europa, hin vnd wider zugetragen / biß auff jetzt ablauffendts Monat Martii 1592. Damit die wurckung / vnd Operation der Erschrecklichen vier Finsternussen / welche sich am Himmel / zwo an der Sonnen / vnd zwo an dem Mon ertzeigt recht in diese 7. Monat mit einander eingefallen / bewiesen wirdt. Insonderheit / Mit dem Todt zweyer Römischen Bapst als Gregorii 14. vnd inocentii 9. Der gleichen auch Mit dem Todt zweyer Chur vnd Fursten / als Christiani des Churfursten von Sachsen / vnd Hertzog Johan Casimiri des Pfaltzgrauen / welche balt auff einander geuolgt / vnd all vier gestorben seindt* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1592)

— *Niderländische Beschreibung in Hochteutsch und historische weißgestelt auffden Belgischen Löwen der Subenzehen Prouintzen deß gantzen Niderlandts Was sich darinnen zugetragen hat com Jar 1559 biß auff gegenwürtiges 1584 Jar by Michaëlem Eyzingerum Austriacum* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1584)

— *Nova Novem Mensium Historica Relatio. Das ist / Ein Newe Historische Beschreybung der Gedenckwurdigen Händel vnnd Geschichten / so sich von Eingang dieses Jahrs in Franckreich / Engellandt / auch Nider vnnd Hochteutschlandt / Dergleichen In Hungern / Behemb / Polln / Turcken / vnd an andern orten Europae / die negsten IX. Monat zugetragen vnnd verlauffen / biß auff den 21. tag dieses ablauffenden monats Septembris 1591* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1591)

— *Postrema relatio historica, das ist, die Leste historisch Beschreybung, zuwissen, Was sich nit allein im Niderlandt und Ertzstifft Cöllen-als vmb Bonn, und derselben Belegerung-sonder auch in Engellandt, Franckreich, vnd Teutschlandt. Item in Poln, vnd andern orten zugetragen. Die negstuerschinen funfzehen monat, nemblich biss auff Jetztablauffenden April 1588* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1588)

— *Recens Historica Rerum Intra Sex Menses in Europa Gestarum Relatio. Daß ist / Ein Historische Beschreibung der Gedenckwürdigen Geschichten vnd Händlen / so sich die negsten sechs monat hero zugetragen. Zuwissen was sich in Franckreich / Ostereich / Vngern vnnd Beheymb / Frießlandt / auch in Italien / Teutschlandt vnd Poln: sonderlich aber vmb Straßburg / den Rheinstrom / vnden vnd oben /vnd sonst allenthalben durch EUROPA verloffen / biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Septembris Anno 1592. Mit außführlicher erzellung / wie es mit abschaffung der Königlichen besatzung / in Bonn / Neuß vnd Rheinberck gehalten worden* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1592)

— *Relationis Historicae supplementum Daß ist / Ein Historische / vernere Erzellung / der seltzamen vnnd hochwichtigen sachen / welche sich ietzt der zeyt / insonderheit zwischen dem König von Nauarra / vnd den zusammen verbundtnen Catholischen in Franckreich / verloffen. Auch So wol in Engellandt / Schottlandt / vnd Dennmarck / als in Hispanien / vnd sonst andern örten Europae zuwissen im Heiligen Römischen Reich Teutscher Nation / Niderlandt / Königreich Poln / Hungern vnd Beheimb / Ertzstifft Cölln / Frießlandt / Geldern / Westphalen / sambt andern dergleichen Landtschafften vnd Prouincien / zugetragen. Vom Negstuerschienen Augusto an / biß auff ietzt ablauffendes monat Aprilis / gegenwürtiges Jars 1590* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1590)

— *Replicata Mensium Aliguot Relatio Historica. Daß ist / Ein Continuirte Beschreybung der Geschichten / Händlen / vnd veränderungen / so sich vom September negstuerschienen / vnd was zuuor / so wol in Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / als Vngern / Poln / Schweden vnd andern Königreichen vnd orten / durch Europam zugetragen / biß auff jetzt abluaffendes monat Aprils 1593. Vnnd insonderheit / Was sich nach absterben beyder / deß Hertzogen Wilhelm von Gülich / vnd Alexandri deß Hertzogen von Parma in den Niderlanden vnd sonst vor der Käy. M. vnd dem König von Hispanien / auch newlich zu Pariß vnd Straßburg verloffen* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1593)

— *Rerum vaticiniis accomodata historia. Das ist eine hystorische beschreibung oder relation deß so sich zuggetragen hat von anfang her ordenlich continuirt biß auff nun ablauffendta jar 1584. Sampt notturfftiger applicierung der zeit figuren und propheceyen* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1584)

Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau: series 1, ed. by Groen van Prinsterer, 9 vols (Leiden: S et J Luchtmans, 1835-47)

Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau: series 2, ed. by Groen van Prinsterer, 5 vols (Utrecht: Kemink, 1857-61)

Außschreiben Vnser Johann Casimirs Pfaltzgraffen bey Rhein Hertzogen in Beyern etc. Darinnen die vrsachen außgeführet werden warumb wir vns inn jetzige Kriegß Expedition zu rettung deß wider den Land vnd Religionfriden betrangten Hochwürdigen Fürsten vnd Herrn Herrn Gebharten Erwhelten vnnd Bestettigten Ertzbischoffs zu Cöllen deß heiligen Römischen Reichs durch Italien ErtzCantzlers vnd Churfürsten, Hertzogen zu Westphalen vnd Enger etc. Auch handhabung schutz vnd schirm vnserer waren Christlichen Religion Augspurgischer Confession vnd Teutscher Nation Freyheit wider deß Papsts zu Rom einbrechende Tyranney nottranglich vnd durch ordenliche Vocation begeben (n.p.: n. pub., 1583)

Bonnische Newe Zeitung / darinn klar vnd eigentlich beschrieben / alle Handlnng / was sich hat zugetragen zwischen den zweyen Bischoffen zu Cöln / etc. Sampt erklerung der Belegerung vnd eroberung des Schlos Godissbergs / vnd des Verretherlichen vnd trewlosen vnnöhtigen auffgebens der Stadt Bonn (Nicolaus Heinrich: Oberursel, 1584)

Briefe des Pfalzgrafen Johann Casimir mit Verwandten Schiftstücken, ed. by Friedrich von Bezold, 3 vols (Munich: M. Rieger'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1882-1903)

Canisius, Petrus, *Kriegsleüt Spiegel, Das ist Warhaffte beschreibung eines Christlichen Kriegsmanns, Wie er in allem seinem Thun nachfolgen solle dem herrlichen Ebenbild Sanct Moritzen, so zur zeit des Kaisers Maximiani Oberster Feldhauptmann gewesen auch S. Gereons, S. Thyrsen, S. Vrsen, S. Victors vnnd anderer seiner Thebaischen Kriegßleuthen, welliche im Walliserland, zu Cölen, zu Trier, zu Solothurn, vnnd anderswo, wegen ihrer Dapfferer Bestendigkeit im Christlichen Glauben, die selige Martyrkron erlanget haben. Allen frommen Christen, insonderheit aber Feldobersten, Hauptleuthen, Bevelchshabern, vnd gemeinen Soldaten, zur auffmunderung wider alle Christenfeind Ritterlich zu kempffen, nutzlich zulesen fürgestellt, Durch Herrn Petrvm Canisivm, der Societet Iesv Theologum mit sonderem Fleiß beschrieben vnd in Truck verfertiget* (Fribourg: Abraham Gemperlin, 1596)

Copia Svpplicationi Eine Erbarn Hochweisen Raht dero Freyer ReichsStatt Cöllen am Rhein / durch die Confessionisten der Augspurgischen Confession / so man die Lutherischen nennet / vnnd inngesessene vereydte Bürger gemeldter Statt / den 8. Junii Anno 1582 Presentiert vnd vbergeben (n.p.: n. pub., 1582)

Deutsche Reichstagsakten: Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichsdeputationstag zu Worms 1586, ed. by Thomas Fröschl (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994)

Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1582, ed. by Josef Leeb, 2 vols (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007)

Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg, ed. by Rosemarie Aulinger, Erwein Eltz, and Ursula Machoczek (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2009)

Dilich, Wilhelm, *Kriegsbuch / darin die Alte und Neue Militia eigentlich beschrieben und alle Krigßneulinge / Bau vnd Buchsenmeistern / zu nutz vnd gutter anleitung in Druck geben vnd verfertiget* (Kassel: Wilhelm Wessell, 1607)

Etzlaub, Erhard, *Das seyn dy lantstrassen durch das Romisch reych von einem kunigreych zw dem andern dy an Tewtsche land stossen von meilen zw meiln mit puncten verzaichnet* (Nuremberg: Georg Glogkendon, 1501)

Friedlieb, Jacob, *Eyzingeri Historica Continvatio. Daß ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung der Geschichten / so sich im H. Römischen Riech / Teutscher Nation. Item in Franckreich / Engellandt / Turcken / Hungarn / Poln vnd Schweden / auch sonst allenthalben durch Europam zugetragen / Von Fastmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses ablauffenden Jahs 1598* (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1598)

— *Historicae Relationis Continvuatio. Das ist / Eine Historische Beschreibung / was sich seithero verschiener Herbstmeß abgelauffenen 1598 Jahrs biß in jetzigen Monat Aprilen angangenen 1599. jahrs in der Christenheit / als Hispanien / Franckreich / Hoch vnd Nider Teutschlandt / Vngern / Schweden / furnemblich aber in den respectiue Fürstenthumben vnd Stifftern / Cleeff / Münster / Cölln / vnd darumbhero denckwurdiges so woll in Kriegs als andern sachen zugetragen* (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1599)

— *Nova Historicae Relationis Continvatio. Eigentliche vnd kurtze Historische beschreibung allerhand denckwurdigen sachen / die sich in Vngern / Teutschlandt / Franckreich / Italien / Hispanien / Engeland / vnd Niederland seit hero verschiener Franckfurter Herbstmessen / abgewichenen 97. jars / biß auff diese Fastenmeß / vnd ietz noch lauffenden Monat April. Anno 98. begeben vnd zugetragen. Sampt angehenckter kurtzer Erzehlung / dero durch Hollender vor jahren / fürgenommener / vnd vnlengst volbrachter Schiffart in Ost Indien / fast lüstig / vnd lüstig zu lesen* (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1598)

Fronsberger, Leonhard, *Fünff Bücher Von Kriegß Regiment und Ordnung, wie sich ein jeder kriegßman inn seinem Ampt vnd beuelch halten soll / vnd was zü anfang eines Kriegs züerwegen vnnd zübetrachten sey / auch von allerley Beuelch vnd ämpter / vom höchsten biß auff das niderst / was eines yeden Herren oder Pottentaten / als General Oberster / Kriegßräht / Musterherren / Commissarien / Pfennigmeyster / Oberster Feldtprofoß / Profandt vnd Quartiermeister / deßgleichen Herold / Schreiber / Vnd wz in ein Zeüghauß gehört zü einem Feldtzug zügebracht* (Frankfurt am Main: David Schöffel, 1555)

— *Kriegßbuch dritter theyl. Vom schantzen unnd befestunngen umb die feldt laeger auffzuwerffen und zu schlagen: auch vom Ritter unnd reutter rechten sampt derselben bestallung und feldt ordnung: item der alten Teutschen auch der mitternaechtigen unnd anderer frembden voelcker kriegß ordnung, sitten und gebraeuch: alles mit augenscheinlichen schoenen figuren gezieret* (Frankfurt am Main: Martin Lechler, 1573)

— *Von Kayserlichem Kriegßrechten Malefitz vnd Schuldhändlen, Ordnung vnd Regiment, sampt derselbigen vnd andern hoch oder niderigen Befelch, Bestallung, Staht vnd ämpter, zu Rossz vnd Fuß* (Frankfurt am Main: George Raben, 1565)

Fürstenberg, Kaspar von, *Die Tagebücher Kaspars von Fürstenberg*, ed. by Alfred Bruns, 2 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1985-7)

Die Gegenreformation in Westfalen und am Niederrhein: Acktenstücke und Erläuterungen, ed. by Ludwig Keller, 9 vols (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1881-95)

Die Geschichten und Taten Wilwolts von Schaumburg, ed. by Adelbert von Keller (Stuttgart: Literarischen Vereins, 1859)

Geusen und Spanier am Niederrhein: Die Ereignisse der Jahre 1586-1632 nach den zeitgenössischen Chroniken der Weseler Bürger Arnold von Anrath und Heinrich von Weseken, ed. by Klaus Bambauer and Hermann Kleinholz (Wesel: Selbstverlag des Stadtarchivs Wesel, 1992)

Gewisse vnnd Gründtliche Newezeitnng / aufz dem Niderland / was sich begeben vnd verloffen hat im 83. Jar im vergangenen Sommer die erste zeitung auß der Stadt Bonn (Schweinfurt: Valentin Kröner, 1584).

Graminaeus, Theodorus, *Beschreibung derer Fuerstlicher gueligscher etc. hochzeit so im jahr Christi tausent fuenffhundert achtzig fuenff am sechszehenden Junii und nechstfolgenden acht tagen zu Duesseldorff mit grossen freuden Fuerstlichen triumph und herrligkeit gehalten worden* (Cologne: Theodoor Gras, 1587).

Gründlicher und warhafftiger bericht wie die löbliche Statt Neuß im Erzstifft Cöln von den Hertzogen in Bayern, Bischofen zu Lüttich etc. und seinem spanischem anhang sey belegert worden, und was sich innerhalb der Belägerung vornehmlich hat zugetragen, allen frommen zum besten geschrieben durch einen, der selber mit and dabey gewesen und zugesehen (Arnem: Wilhelm Gansen, 1586).

Gründtliche Und Warhafftige newe Zeytung Von der Belagerung und erschröcklichen Blutuergiessung so zu Neuß geschehen ist unnd wie dieselbige Statt eingenommen geblündert unnd verbrand worden auch was sich ferner darbey hat zu getragen geschehn den sechs unnd zwezigisten Tag des Monats July Im Jar 1586 (Augsburg: Josias Wöhrli, 1586).

Hispanischer Arragonischer Spiegel, Darin mit gutem grund der warheit / abgebildet / zu was ende vnd effect / das ietzige Spanische Kriegsvolck (So in dem Westphalischen Creiß / auff des heiligen Reichs grundt vnd bodem sich noch an ietzo enthelt / vnnd mehr dann der Feind Christliches nahmens jemals gethan / daselbst herumb Tyrannisirt) sein vornehmen eigentlich gerichtet / Daß nemblich / sie zu würcklicher volnstreckung des zu Brüssel gemachten gemeynen Rahtschlusses / vorhabens seyn vnderm Schein die Staden zubekriegen / alle gute ordnung vnd policy / mit auffhebung der Religion vnd Landfriedens vmbzukehren / vnnd mit gewaltsamer einführung der Spanisch Inquisition, eine newe Kirchen Reformation vnd Reichsverfassung in Teutschland ihres gefallens / anzustellen. Dabey zubefinden I. Key. Kay. acht erclerung vnd anderer Chur vnnd Fürsten vnterschiedene schreiben / so wohl auch des Spanischen Obersten vnd desselben Gesandten erclerung vnnd werbung: Ietzo newlich dem ehrliebenden Teutschen Leser / deme des Vatterlands heyl vnd wohlfart angelagen / zur trewhertzigen warnung vnnd fleissigem nachdencken / in Truck verfertiget (n.p.: n. pub. 1599)

Homberger, Jeremias, *Christliche trewhertzige vermanung an die edlen achtbarn weisen Herren Burgermeister unnd Rath der alten und hochlöblichen Reichstatt Cöllen am Rhein das sie dem reinen Evangelio unsers heylands Jesu Christi raum geben wöllen* (Lauingen: Leonhard Reinmeichel, 1582)

Isselt, Michael von, 'De bello Coloniensi, libri quatuor. Hoc est, rerum ab electione gebhardi truchsesii archiepiscopum Coloniensem, usque ad recuperatam ab Ernesto duce

Bavariae eius successore, Westphaliam, tota dioecesi gestarum, vera et succincta narratio. Ex ipsis archiuis, autographis, fidelique eorum, qui rebus gestis interfuerunt narratione transcripta. Et vivis praecipuorum locorum imaginibus illustrata, cum indice locupletissimo*'* in *Religionsgeschichte der Colnischen Kirche unter dem Abfal der zweien Erzbischöfen und Churfürsten Herman Grafen von Wied und Gebharden Grafen von Truchses, aus der lateinischen Beschreibung des Arnold Meshovs und Michael von Isselt zum erstenmal ins Teutsche übersetzet, wie auch allerhand nützlichen, theils historischen, theils critischen, theils theologischen, moralischen und philosophischen Anmerkngen reichlich versehen*, 2 vols (Cologne: Franz Balthasar Neuwirth, 1764), II

Johann VII von Nassau-Siegen, 'Landesdefensionordnung des Grafen Johann des Mittleren von Nassau-Siegen um 1596: Motiven wie die underthonen zue dem defension werckh willig zu machen und zu underweisen' in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens*, 5 vols (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1935-41), III.2 (1939), pp. 47-76

— 'Discurs daß itzige teutsche kriegswesen' in *Die Heeresreform der Oranier: Das Kriegsbuch des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen,* ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Wiesbaden: Historischen Kommission für Nassau, 1973), pp. 309-23

— *Krijgskundige aanteekeningen van Johan den Middelste van Nassau*, ed. by Jan Willem Wijn (Utrecht: Kemink, 1947)

Die Jülich-Kleve-Bergischen Hof-, Hofämter- und Regimentsordnungen 1456/1521 bis 1609, ed. by Brigitte Kasten and Margarete Bruckhaus (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2015)

Junghans von der Olnitz, Adam, *KriegesOrdnung / zu Wasser vnd Landt. Kurtzer vnd Eidentlicher Vnderricht / aller Kriegshändel / so geübet werden / Sampt nützlichen darbey angezogenem Bericht deren Kreigeßbestallung / ober vnd niederer Empter vnd Befelechen zu feldt vnd in Besatzungen / auch Malefitz / Spieß vnd Standtrecht / sampt dem Artickelsbriff / Auch einem kurtzen Vnderricht / wie man mit Arkoley vnd groben Geschütz vmbgehen / vnd mit mancherley Fewerwerck gegen dem feinde gebrauchen soll / Den ankommenden / hoch vnd niedern Befelchhabern / Kriegßleuten / vnd sonsten ins gemeinen Landtsknechten / auch allen Büchsenmeistern zum guten / in Druck geben. Durch Adam Jungkhanß / von der Olnitz. In dem Feldtläger vor der Statt Neuß / Anno 1586. in ider Schantzen zu Gnadenthal / beschrieben* (Cologne: Nikolaus Schreiber, 1589)

Kirchhof, Hans Wilhelm, *Militaris Disciplina*, ed. by Bodo Gotzkowsky (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1976)

Klein plakkaatboek van Nederland: Verzameling van ordonnantiën en plakkaten betreffende regeeringsvorm, kerk en rechtspraak (14e eeuw tot 1749), ed. by Anne Siberdinus de Blécourt and Nicolaas Japikse (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1919)

Kleinsorgen, Gerhard, *Tagebuch der Truchsessischen Wirren im Herzogtum Westfalen 1583/84*, ed. by Alfred Bruns (Brilon: Podszun, 1987)

Kurtzer aber Wollgegründter Special bericht / von dem vermeinten Interesse, dessen sich das Chur: und Fürstliche Hauß Sachsen / bey den Gülchischen / Cleuischen und andern darzu gehörigen Fürstenthumben / Graff: und Herrschafften berühmet. Entgegen gesetzt / den dreyen vnderschiedtlichen Schrifften / so das verschienen 1609 vnd

dieses jetzt lauffenden 1610 Jahrs / vnder dem nahmen einer Information, Deduction, vnd Apologiae durch offenen Truck hin: vnd wider / inner: vnd ausserhalb des Heil. Reichs spargirt worden. Durch einen Liebhaber der Warheit zu meniglichs nachrichtung vnd wissenschafft in Truck gegeben (Cologne: Matthäus Schmidt, 1610)

Kurtze relation, was massen die Meuterey vnnd Vnerhörte Verrhäterey schändtlich Vbergebung der Statt Bonn und lieferung des Herren Obersten Herrn Carlen des Heyligen Römischen Reichs Erbtruckses Freyherrn zu Walpurg Herrn zur Scheer und Trauchperg etc. auch andern Befelchshabern sich zugetragen (Cologne: Johann Knuver, 1584)

Kurtzer Vnd warhafftiger Begriff vnd inhalt newer zeitungen / auß Franckreich / Italien / Hispanien / Oesterreich / Hungeren / Böhem / Polen / Engellandt / Nieder vnd Hochteutschland / wie es such begeben vnd zugetragen hat Vom 13. Martii an biß auff den ietztlauffenden Monats Septembris / 1593. Imgleichen Wie Graff Wilhelm vnd Graff Philips von Nassaw mit ihrem vnterhabenten Kriegsvolck in Frießlandt gezogen seyn. Ferners Was massen Ferdugo auch mit seiner macht herentgegen gestercket hat (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1593)

Kurtzes Bedencken von dem noch schwebenden Cölnischen Handel. Psalm 94. Du HERR wirst ja nimmer eins mit dem schädlichen Stul / der das Gesetz vbel deutet. Sie rüsten sich wider die Seel des Gerechten / vnd verdammen vnschuldig Blut. Aber der HERR ist mein schutz / Mein Gott is der hort meiner zuuersicht. Vnd er wird ihnen ihr vnrecht vergelten / vnd wird sie vmb ir boßheit vertilgen / der HERR vnser Gott wird sie vertilgen (n.p.: n. pub., 1588)

Landtagsakten von Jülich-Berg 1400-1610, ed. by Georg von Below, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: L. Voss & Cie, 1895-1907), II (1907)

Lipsius, Justus, 'A comparison of the Romane manner of warre, with this of our time; ovt of the end of the fifth booke of Ivstvs Lipsivs, De Militia Romana', trans. by John Bingham, in *The historie of Xenophon containing the ascent of Cyrus into the higher countries. Wherein is described the admirable iourney of ten thousand Grecians from Asia the Lesse into the territories of Babylon, and their retrait from thence into Greece, notwithstanding the opposition of all their enemies. Whereunto is added a comparison of the Roman manner of warres with this of our time, out of Iustus Lipsius* (London: John Haviland, 1623)

— *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, trans. by Jan Waszink (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004)

Mauritz von Hesse-Kassel, 'Vorschriften des Landgrafen Moritz von Hessen für die Landesdefension vom 1. Oktober 1600' in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens*, 5 vols (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1935-41) III.2 (1939), p. 77

Machiavelli, Niccolò, *The Prince*, trans. by George Bull (London: Penguin, 2003)

Missiue Des Durchleuchtigen vnd Hochgebornen Fuersten vnd Herrn / Herrn Wilhelm Landgraffen zu Hessen / etc. Schreiben an Key. May. vnsers allergnedigsten Herrn / wegen des Cölnischen Kriegs handels / Bischoffen Gebharts Churf: etc. vnd des Ehrwirdigen Thum Capitels zu Cöln / anlangent / die Augspurgische Confession / vnd den Ehestand des Bischoffs / auch vermanung zu gemeinem Frieden / Welches alles in

dem grossen Auschreiben des Bischoffs Gebharts Churfürsten / etc nicht gedacht / vnd zu finden / etc. (Cologne: n. pub., 1583)

Möller, Vincenz, *Wolmeinender / Warhaffter Discurs, Warumb vnd wie die Römisch-Catholischen in Teutschland sich billich von Spaniern vnd Jesuiten absonderen / vnd ihrer selbsten bey disen itzigen hochgefehrlichen zeiten wohl warnehmen sollen vnd können / damit nicht das Vatterlandt / vnd die selbsten / andern zum raub gerahten / noch sie sich deßwegen bey sich selbsten ein böß gewissen aufladen / vnd bey den nachkommenden ein vnaußlöschlichen schmachnahmen vber den hals ziehen Durch einen Trewhertzigen Teutschen Catholischen gestalt / vnd numehr allen alten Catholischen Teutscher Nation zu sonderlicher warnung / auß lieb gegen das Varterlandt in druck gefertiget* (n.p.: n. pub., 1615)

More, Thomas, *Utopia*, trans. by George Chatterton Richards (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2010)

Newe Gemeine Wachtordnung, wie sie ein Erb. Rath des heiligen Römischen Reichs Freyer Statt Cölln Reformierter gestalt auffgericht vnd hinfüre zuhalten geboten (Cologne: Maternus Cholinus, 1586)

Newe Zeitung aus Cöllen: Wahrhafftiger Bericht / vom Cölnischen Kriege / betreffendt die Augspuraische Confession / so der erwehlte Ertzbischoff Gebhart Churfürst / etc. angenommen vnd vertheidigt / vnd darüber ensetzet / auch einen andern Chorbischoff / als den Hertzog Ernestum aus Beyern / an seine stedte von den Papisten erwehlet / vnd wie starck sie zu beiden theilen zu Felde liegen / vnd was allda gehandelt / etc. (Erfurt: Johann Beck, 1583)

Newzeitung aus Cöllen, Warhafftiger unnd gründtlicher Bericht / Wie es itzt zu Bonn / und zu Cöllen / auch der Zustand zwischen den Luterischen und Catholischen, und wie der Hertzog Casimirus ist im fullen Anzügen und helt den Musterplatz zu Sigem / auch wie der Herr Truxes das Sedtlein [sic] Deutz darin 400 schöne Gebew verbrand / und das Kloster eröbert / welches alles darumb geschehn / dz sich der Feind nicht darin auffenthalten möchte / weil ers danns starck besetzer / vnd befestiget / solches alle einer hohen F. Person Deutschlandt durch einen grossen Herrn N. N. zugeschrieben / der liebe Gott helffe ferner mit Gnaden / etc (Cologne: n. pub., 1583)

Newe Zeyttung auß Coelln. Ein frisch newes landtknechts lied vom Coellnnischen krieg unnd wie die statt bonn auffgeben ist worden etc. inn deß Lindenschmidts thon zusingen (Cologne: Andreas Röschlin, 1584).

Newzeitung aus Cöllen: Warhafftiger vnnd gründtlicher Bericht / Wie es itzt zu Bonn / vnd zu Cöllen / auch der Zustand zwischen den Luterischen / vnd Catholischen / vnd wie der Hertzog Casimirus ist im fullen Anzügen vnd helt den Musterplatz zu Sigem / auch wie der Herr Truxes das Sedtlein Deutz darin 400 schöne Gebew verbrand / vnd das Kloster eröbert / welches alles darumb gewchehn / dz sich der Feind nicht darin auffenthalten möchte / weil ers dann starck bezetzet / vnd befestiget / solches alles einer hohen F. Person Deutschlandt durch einem grossen Herrn N. N. zugeschrieben / der liebe Gott helffe ferner mit Gnaden / etc. (Cologne: n. pub. 1583).

Northausen, Johann, *Erbermliche aber warhaffte vnnd Instrumentirte anzeig vnnd beschreibung / was nach der Verrätherischen auffgebung der Statt Bonn der Bischoff*

zu Lüttig / durch seine befelchhabere gegn einem frommen Kirchendiener da selbst fürnemmen lassen (n.p.: n. pub., 1584)

Peacham, Henry, *A most true relation of the affaires of Cleve and Gulick as also of all what hath passed this last summer, since the most excellent and victorious prince, Maurice of Nassau, tooke the field with his armie, encamping before Rees in Cleueland: and the losse of Wesel, taken in by the Marques Spinola: vnto the breaking vp of our armie in the beginning of December last past. 1614. With the articles of the peace, propounded at Santen* (London: W. Stansby, 1615)

Die Protokolle des Geistlichen Rates in Münster 1601-1612, ed. by Herbert Immenkötter (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972)

Quad von Kinkelbach, Matthias, *Teutscher Nation Herligkeit: Ein außführliche beschreibung des gegenwärtigen alten / vnd vhralten Standts Germaniae, nemlich ihr erstes auff komen / zunemen / vnd jetzige gelegenheit der Regierung vnd Herrshung / Stett / Policey / Kirchenstandts / Flecken / Schlösser / Dörffer / Fruchtbarkeit der Velder / Berge / Wäld / Flüß / vnd Lachen* (Cologne: Wilhelm Lützenkirchen, 1614)

Riephan, Wilhelm, *Kurtzer Begriff vnd Inhalt / ettlicher Neuwer Zeittungen / dero vornembsten Händeln vnd Geschichten / diewelche sich von vorgangener Herbstmeß deß 96. Jahrs biß auff ietzige Ostermeß dieses ietztlauffenden Jahr deß 1597. in den Königreichen Vngern / Böhaimb / Franckreich / Engellandt / Poln / x. Hoch vnd Niederteutschlandt / vnnd dort durch gantz Europa begeben vnd zugetragen haben. Fernerß Wie vnnd warumb sich ettliche Tausent Bauren im Vngerlandt / vnnd vmbligenden Gräntzen zusamen versamlet / zur wehr gegriffen / vnd gegen Ihre Obrigkeiten empöret / auffgelehnet / vnnd ettlich Schlöß vnd Flecken eingenommen haben. Item. Von der Schlacht / so zwischen den Spanischen / vnnd dero zusammenverbundenen Niderländischen Stenden Kriegßuolck bey Tournhaut begeben vnnd zugetragen / kurtzlich beschrieben* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1597)

— *Kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschribung gewisser Neuwen Zeittungen vnd Geschichten / welche sich von vorgangner Herbstmeß / biß auf ietzige Ostermeß / dises ietzlauffendt 96. Jars / In Osterreich / Vngaren / Böhem / Poln / Hispanien / Franckreich / Schweden / Denmarck / Hoch vnd Niderteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wider begeben vnd zugetragen. Mit Anzeig deren Acord vnd verträge sampt einuerleibten Artiucln so wol die Statt von Embden / als auch Statt vnnd Schloß Cammerich belandgend. Alles auffs kurtzest Beschrieben* (Cologne: Heinrich Neteßheim, 1596)

— *Kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschreibung gewisser Neuwen Zeittungen vnnd Geschichten / welche sich von vorgangner Ostermeß / biß auff ietzig Herbstmeß / dises ietztlauffent 96. Jars / In Osterreich / Vngaren / Böhem / Poln / Hispanien / Franckreich / Schweden / Dennmarck / Hoch vnd Niderteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wider begeben vnd zugetragen. Mit Anzeig der Engelländer Armada oder Fluth / wie dieselbe nach Hispanien zugesägelt / vnd was sie alda verricht. Item / Was der Hochwürdigst / Durchleuchtigst / Hochgeborner Fürst vnd Herr / Herr Albert / deß Römischen Stuel Cardinal / vnd Ertzhertzogen zu Osterreich / x. Kön Mayt. zu Hispanien verordneter Gubernator der Niderlanden / x. für Stätt vnd Flecken / in kurtzer zeit inbekommen Auffs kürtz beschriben* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1596)

— *Svpplementvm Epitomes. Das ist / kurtze Warhaffte / vnnd Eigentliche Historische beschreibung / deren glaubwürdigen Händeln vnd Geschichten / diewelche sich in Franckreich / Oesterreich / vnd Königreich Polen / Hoch vnnd Niederteutschlandt / auch sonsten hin vnnd wieder in Sechs Monaten begeben vnnd zugetragen: nemmlich vom Monath Aprilis vnd Ostermeß / dieses 93. Jahrs / biß auff ietzige Herbstmeß vnd ablauffenden Monats Septembris / ietzt gemelten Jahrs. Vnnd Pacification vnd Stilstandts Articulen / diewelche in Frankcreich zwischen dem König von Nauarra vnnd der S. Liga endtlich beschlossen / vnd am 1. Augusti zu Pariß vnd S. Dioniß publiciert / vnd abgeblasen* (Cologne: Gottfried von Kempen, 1593)

Schopper, Jakob, *Neuwe Chorographia vnd Histori Teutscher Nation. Das ist: Warhaffte eigentliche vnd kurtze Beschreibung / der alten hochlöblichen Teutschen / vnserer Branherren erster ankunfft / herkommen / auffnemen vnd vermehrung / dero Namens vrsprung: Von Ihren herlichen Kriegß thaten / vielfältigen verruckungen in andere Länder / so sie fast biß zu dieser zeit / nicht allein in Europe / sonder nauch / in Asia vnd Africa mannlich Vollbracht. Beneben verständtlicher erklärung der jenigen Landschafften / Stätt / Flecken x. so sie zu mehrmalen eingenommen / erbauwet vnd bewohnet: Auch wie dieselben auff heutigen tag gennenet werden. Mehr / von der Alten Teutschen Sitten / Gebräuchen / Statuten / Gesatzen / Statt vnd LandtRechten: Iren Tugenden / Würden vnd Hohheiten / derowegen sie je vnd allweg zu Kriegß vnnd Friedens zeiten hoch berühmpt: Item / wie das Römische Keyserthumb an sie gelanget: Auch durch was mittel vnnd gelegenheit der hochlöbliche Raht vnnd Würde der Sieben Churfürsteb bey ihnen angeordnet. Endtlich was vermeinter Religion die erste Teutschen in der Heydenshcafft zugethan gewesen: Wie sie demnach vermittelst der Heyligen Apostel vnd irer Jünger Prediften zum Christen Glauben bracht worden: Ferner wie der Römischen Bäpstischen Kirchen Religion / Gewalt vnnd Ceremonien bey ihnen vberhandt gewonnen: Vnnd wie deßwegen allzeit Spaltungen gewesen: Biß letzlich die Reformation der Kirchen vnd Religion vorgenommen vnd ins werck gericht. Allda den zu gleich der mancherley Secten / so damals entstanden vnd jetzo zu vnser zeit im schwang gehen / kurtze erzehlung / zusampt derselben auß Gottes Wort grüdtlicher widerlegung miteingeführet wirdt* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Schmidt & Sigmund Feyerabend, 1582)

Schwendi, Lazarus von, *Kriegsdiscurs von Bestellung deß gantzen Kriegswesens und von den Kriegsämptern* (Frankfurt am Main: Andreas Wechels Erben, 1594)

Simon VI von Lippe, 'Des Grafen Simon VI. zur Lippe Tagebuch über eine Gesandtschaftsreise zu dem Herzog von Parma und nach den Niederlanden 1591-2' ed., by Ludwig Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Lippische Mitteilungen aus Geschichte und Landeskunde*, 4 (1906), 44-82

Spannische Sturmglock / Vnnd Teutsches Warnglöcklein / Das ist: Ein Extract / aller vnd ieder gewissen ankommen Zeitungen / vnd glaubwürdigen Berichten / die vor augenschwebendte (über Teutschlandt angestellte seltzame) Kriegsgefahr betreffendt: Wie dieselbe zum höchsten kommen / vnd nummehr betens zeit vorhanden / vnd höchlich von nöhten: Vor eins. Darbey ein sonderliches Bedencken / weil die Spannische / Circkelweiß mit grosser Kriegsmacht vmb die Lutheraner vnd Caluinisten / bey erwünschter ietziger Gelegenheit außzurotten / sich auffmachen: Ob die Evangelische so leichtlich dem Spannischen Joch sich ergeben / vnd vnterwerffen / oder nach eusserstem irem vermögen defendirn weden: Vors ander. Zum dritten welcher theil vermuhtlich (auß gewissen vmbständen) den Sieg behalten / vnd ob ein /

oder der ander theil succumbirn vnd vndenligen / was der Siegende / vnd verluftigte theil / vor Großmächtigen nutzen vnd vortheil / auch Schaden vnd verlust dabon wagen bringen / vnd haben werde. Trewhertzig vnd wolmeynendt zu Warnung geschrieben (n.p.: Parnassischen Truckerey, 1616)

Sprinzenstein, Hans Albrecht von, 'Hans Albrecht von Sprinzensteins discurs wie er die 1000 welchse Schützen eillendts ins Landvolck bringen, Von Bevestigung der Frontir, das Landvolckh zu Whör geübtzemachen [etc.] Und dann von neuer defenssion ordnung des Obern und Nidern Bayrn', in Eugen von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens*, 5 vols (Munich: C.H Beck, 1935-41) III.2 (1939), pp. 42-6

Stickel, Burckhard, 'Burkhard Stickel's Tagebuch seiner Kriegs- und anderer Verrichtungen auf dem europäischen Festlande, im Mittelmeere und in Afrika von 1566-1598', ed. by E.V. Kausler, *Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde*, (1866/68), 302-424

Der Teutsche Michel. Dos ist / Ein newes Klaglid / und Allamodisch A. B. C. : Wider alle Sprach-Verderber / Zeitungschreiber / Concipisten unnd Cancellisten / welche die alte Teutsche Mutter-Sprach / mit allerley frembden / Lateinischen / Welschen und Frantzösischen Wörtern / so vilfeltig vermischen / verkehren und zerstören / daß sie ihr selber nit mehr gleich sihet / und kaum halber kan erkennet und verstanden werden (Innsbruck: Johann Gäch, 1638)

Textor, Johann, *Naßawische Chronick / In Welcher des vralt: hochlöblich: vnd weitberühmten Stamms vom Hause Naßaw / Printzen vnd Graven Genealogi oder Stammbaum: deren geburt / leben / heurath / kinder / zu Friden: vnd Kriegszeiten verzichtete sachen vnd thaten / absterben / vnd sonst denckwürdige Geschichten: Sampt einer kurtzen general Nassoviae: vnd special: Beschreibung der Graf: vnd Herschaften Naßaw-Catzenelenbogen* (Herborn: Christopher Raaben, 1617)

Viererley warhafftige Zeitung so sich in diesem 1586. jar zugetragen hat. Die erste von der Stadt Graff an der maß in Brabandt wie sie belegert und sich den zweyden sturm ergeben und waß weiters darauff erfolget. Von der gar festen stad Venlo in Gellerland wie die selbige sich auch ergeben alles kuertzlich beschriben. Die dritte von der Unchristlichen unerhoerten erschrecklichen und tirannischen moerderey so geschehen ist zu Junckersdorff bey Coelln uber die Guelchische connoy oder geleydt. Die vierdte Zeitung. Von der Belaegerung eroeberung pluenderung und grosser blutuergiessung so sich in der stad Neuß zugetragen im Ertzstifft Coelln (Cologne: Nikolaus Schreiber, 1586)

Warhaffte newe Zeitung Von Etlichen Scharmützen / Stürmen vnnd Streit, so sich nemlich inn dem Ertzstifft Cölln verlauffen vnd zugetragen hat / daybey vermelt / von der auffgebung der Statt Bonn. Im Thon: Wie man den Lindenschmide singet (Cologne: n. pub., 1584).

Warhaffte vnd Beständige Erzehlung / Welcher massen des H. Reichs Stadt vnd Könglicher Stuel Aach / am 25/5 Tag Augusti des 1614 Jahrs / durch den Herrn MARQUIS AMBROSIO di Spinola ingenommen vnd besetzt worden / Auch was sich sonsten alda von gemeldte tag biß vff den 14/4 tag Septembris begeben (n.p.: n. pub., 1614)

Warhafftige newe Zeitung / Darinn Kürtzlich angezeigt wird / welcher gestalt die gewaltige Vestung Gülich erobert worden. Sampt den Artickeln deß mit dem Gubernator /

Befehlhaberen vnd Besatzung getroffenen Vertrags. Darbey auch gefügt ist ein kurtzer Außzug deß Vertrags / so zwischen beyden im Stifft Straßburg kriegenden theilen gemacht worden (Cologne: Servatius Erffens, 1610)

Warhafftige vnd eigentliche beschreibung / von der Geburdt / Leben vnd Sterben des Prinzen von Oranien / Graff Wilhelm von Nassauw / so Mörderischer weiß / in seinem Losament oder Gemach durch gifftige Kugeln Verrhäterischer weiß erschossen ist worden. Darneben wirt auch angezeigt / mit was pein vnd Marter / diser thätter / Balthasar Serack / zu Delfft in Holland / vom leben zum Todt gebracht worden. Weitters wirdt hierinn auch angezeigt / was sich zwischen Gebhart / Truchsessen / vnd Hertzogen in Bayern / vn Stifft Cölln begeben vnd zu getragen (Cologne: Johann Bussemacher, 1584)

Warhafftige Zeitung von der belägerung und einnemung der statt Bonn sampt der schanntzen. Welcherley gestalt die Spannischen sy ein bekommen haben den XXV. September anno 1588. und was sich dar vor verlauffen unnd zu getragen hat seindt der Belegerung mit scharmützelen schlagen und andern sachen (Cologne: Nikolaus Schreiber, 1588)

Warhaffttige Zeyttungen / Von der Belegerung / vnnd eynemung / der Statt Neuß / inn Ertzstüfft Cöln/ Wie die selbig ist geblindert / vnd von jhren eygnen Kriegsleutten abgebrandt worden / auch was sich fehrner von dem 26.tag an / biß auff den 29.tag Julij / daselbst zugetragen hatt (Augsburg: Josias Wöhrli, 1586)

Warnungsschrifft Vnser Gebharts von Gottes gnaden / erwöhlten vnd bestetigten zu Ertzbischoffen zu Cöllen vnd Churfürsten / Hertzogen zu Westphalen vnd Engern / &c an vnsere gehorsame Capitulare / Landstände / Graffen / Ritterschafft / Stätte / Angehörige vnd Vnderthanen / wider die vermeine vnbefügte fürhabende / etlicher vnser vngehorsamer Capitularen Newe Wahl / eines ander Ertzbischoffs vnd Churfürsten zu Cöllen / Auch Relaxation vnnd ledigzehlung vns ordentlicher weiß geleister pflicht vnd Eyd / sampt angeheffter Protestation (Strasbourg: Nikolaus Wiriot, 1583)

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