Making a Martyr

Demosthenes and Euphraeus of Oreus (*Third Philippic* 59–62)

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I. The Oreus Narrative

In his *Third Philippic*,[1] a version of a speech he made in an Assembly debate probably in the spring of 341 BC,[2] Demosthenes includes a lively nutshell narrative (9.59–62) of Philip II of Macedon's takeover of the Euboean city of Oreus,[3] an event of the previous year and one which the orator expects his audience to be aware of (9.55).[4] The starring role in the narrative is played by a citizen of Oreus called Euphraeus, who is depicted by Demosthenes as a noble-spirited

[1] Texts: Dilts 1997, 2002, and 2005 are used for Demosthenes and Aeschines throughout. Translations of the *Third Philippic* (Dem. 9) are from Trevett 2011 and of Aeschines from Carey 2000. Other translation sources are given in the notes; unattributed translations are mine.

[2] Dating: Dion. Hal. *Amm*. 1.4 (to 342/1); Cawkwell 1978:52; Sealey 1993:181; Worthington 2013:220.

[3] By the 340s BC the city's primary name: Reber and Hansen 2004:656–658. In some of the evidence used below, its name is Histiaea/Hestiaea.

[4] Dating the takeovers of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus: Brunt 1969:252–253; Cawkwell 1978:66–67; Griffith 1979:546–547; Picard 1979:249; Sealey 1993:141–143, 175, 177; Herrman 2019:255.

champion of his fellow citizens' freedom. Both the passage and Euphraeus' resistance end with the latter's suicide after his imprisonment by the dominant pro-Macedonian faction prior to their betrayal of the city to Philip's forces. Picking up on a similar sequence earlier in the speech (9.11–12), the passage is shaped by Demosthenes to serve as the climactic final example in a chronologically-organized series of three "takeover sequences" from the recent past, the takeover in each case being enabled by Philip's local stooges. First, in 348, Olynthus falls (9.56); then Eretria, in 343–2 (9.57–58, a longer passage); and soon after it is the turn of Oreus (in the longest passage of the three, 9.59–62):[5]

> (59) καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἐν Ὠρεῷ Φιλιστίδης μὲν ἔπραττε Φιλίππῳ καὶ Μένιππος καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Θόας καὶ Ἀγαπαῖος, οἵπερ νῦν ἔχουσι τὴν πόλιν (καὶ ταῦτ' ᾔδεσαν ἅπαντες), Εὐφραῖος δέ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ποτ' ἐνθάδ' οἰκήσας, ὅπως ἐλεύθεροι καὶ μηδενὸς δοῦλοι ἔσονται. (60) οὗτος τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ὡς ὑβρίζετο καὶ προὐπηλακίζετο ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, πόλλ' ἂν εἴη λέγειν· ἐνιαυτῷ δὲ πρότερον τῆς ἁλώσεως ἐνέδειξεν ὡς προδότην τὸν Φιλιστίδην καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ἃ πράττουσιν. συστραφέντες δ' ἄνθρωποι πολλοὶ καὶ χορηγὸν ἔχοντες Φίλιππον καὶ πρυτανευόμενοι ἀπάγουσι τὸν Εὐφραῖον εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ὡς συνταράττοντα τὴν πόλιν. (61) ὁρῶν δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ὠρειτῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ τῷ μὲν βοηθεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἀποτυμπανίσαι, τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ὠργίζετο, τὸν δ' ἐπιτήδειον ταῦτα παθεῖν ἔφη καὶ ἐπέχαιρεν. μετὰ ταῦθ' οἱ μὲν ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ὁπόσης ἠβούλοντ'

[5] On the style of this sequence: Mader 2005:31–32 with n48; Wooten 2008:161–162. Other chronologically-organized evocations of the gradual creep of Philip's influence in Demosthenes' Assembly speeches: Dem. 1.9, 12; 2.6–7; 4.34–35.

ἔπραττον ὅπως ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, καὶ κατεσκευάζοντο τὴν πρᾶξιν· τῶν δὲ πολλῶν εἴ τις αἴσθοιτο, ἐσίγα καὶ κατεπέπληκτο, τὸν Εὐφραῖον οἷ᾽ ἔπαθεν μεμνημένοι. οὕτω δ᾽ ἀθλίως διέκειντο, ὥστε οὐ πρότερον ἐτόλμησεν οὐδεὶς τοιούτου κακοῦ προσιόντος ῥῆξαι φωνήν, πρὶν διασκευασάμενοι πρὸς τὰ τείχη προσῆσαν οἱ πολέμιοι· τηνικαῦτα δ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἠμύνοντο, οἱ δὲ προὐδίδοσαν. (62) τῆς πόλεως δ᾽ οὕτως ἁλούσης αἰσχρῶς καὶ κακῶς οἱ μὲν ἄρχουσι καὶ τυραννοῦσι, τοὺς τότε σῴζοντας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν Εὐφραῖον ἑτοίμους ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν ὄντας τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀποκτείναντες, ὁ δ᾽ Εὐφραῖος ἐκεῖνος ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτόν, ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσας ὅτι καὶ δικαίως καὶ καθαρῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνθειστήκει Φιλίππῳ.

(59) What need is there to speak at length? At Oreus Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus acted for Philip; these men now possess the city, as everyone knew they would, but a man named Euphraeus, who once lived here among us, acted to try to ensure that they would be free and slaves to nobody. (60) This man—and much could be said about the other ways in which he was insulted and treated with contempt by the people—in the year before the city fell charged Philistides and his supporters with treason, since he saw what they were up to. But many men banded together, with Philip as paymaster and controller, and took Euphraeus off to prison, claiming that he was throwing the city into disorder. (61) When they saw this, the people of Oreus, instead of helping the one and cudgeling the others to death, did not get angry with them, but said that Euphraeus deserved his suffering, and were glad about it. Later one party began to act with perfect freedom to ensure that the city would be seized, and started to arrange the deed; and any member of the majority who noticed what was happening kept silent and

> was intimidated, recalling what kinds of things Euphraeus had suffered. They were in such a wretched condition that no one dared speak out, as such an evil drew near, until their enemies had equipped themselves and approached the city walls. At that point some resisted, but others turned traitor. (62) After the city was captured in this shameful and evil way, the one group has been ruling it as tyrants, after exiling some and killing others of the men who at that time had been prepared to protect them and to do all manner of harm to Euphraeus, while the admirable Euphraeus killed himself, thereby demonstrating that he had resisted Philip, acting with justice and honesty, on behalf of his fellow citizens.

Placed where it is, close to the end of the *Third Philippic*, the series of examples which this passage rounds off is intended to crystallize Demosthenes' concerns about how Athens should respond to the threat of Philip as articulated throughout the speech so far, and to alert listeners to the risk that Athens will be the next captured city in the series unless it takes action. This risk is communicated explicitly in the passage that follows (9.63–69), where Demosthenes sets out the reasons why the politicians working for Philip in each city have succeeded, and why they must not be allowed to succeed now. This message has greater impact for being built up to obliquely: Demosthenes has skillfully kept his audience engaged by getting them to trace the pattern for themselves across the trio of "takeover sequences." Also essential is his construction of Oreus, in particular, as a parallel Athens.[6] Euphraeus is fashioned not only as an antitype to his powerful local opponents (and Philip) but also as a mirror for Demosthenes himself.[7] The passage is a

[6] See in particular Herrman 2020:143–146.

[7] Mader 2007a:174–176; Mader 2007b:352–353.

fervent appeal to the Athenian audience not to allow Macedonian influence in Athens (as embodied in those politicians Demosthenes identifies as Philip's supporters, who thus parallel Philistides and his associates in Oreus) to continue deceiving the Athenian *demos* about Philip's ultimate goals. It is also an appeal to the audience not to allow their disinterested, "true" advisers to end up failing as Euphraeus had, even though he had seen what was coming the previous year, and had taken action (9.60). These "true" advisers, of course, are Demosthenes himself (whose ability to foresee events accurately is a key aspect of his political self-fashioning in his Assembly speeches and elsewhere) and (though only by implication) his political allies.[8]

In *On the Chersonese*, delivered by Demosthenes shortly before the *Third Philippic* in early 341,[9] Oreus features as only one of several states Philip has taken over by deceit and infiltration, and its three appearances are all brief: it is mentioned on its own at 8.18 as a recent acquisition by Philip; it appears (but not by name) in a point about Philip's strategic establishment of tyrannies in Euboea, where Demosthenes imagines other Greek states criticizing Athens's failure to act (yet) in these cases (8.35–37, cf. 66); and it is featured again at 8.59 in a quick-fire trio with Pherae and Olynthus. The coverage of Oreus' fall in our passage of the *Third Philippic* is on a different scale, reflecting this speech's more thoroughgoing interrogation of the whole phenomenon of Philip's expansionist activity.[10] It stands out in its trio of examples (and in Demosthenes' Assembly corpus as a whole) for its length and its vivid narrative qualities, and

[8] Demosthenes' rhetoric of foresight: Mader 2005:31–32; Mader 2007b. Allies: Dem. 9.72 (cf. 9.6, 14).

[9] Dating: Dion. Hal. *Amm*. 1.4 (to 342/1); Brunt 1969:253; Cawkwell 1978:52; Worthington 2013:216.

[10] Herrman 2020:140.

has something in common with narrative set pieces in Demosthenes' lawcourt speeches like the famous "news from Elatea" sequence in *On the Crown* (18.169–173). Its paradigmatic impact is increased by its chronological placement, as the most recent of the three takeovers listed.[11] This—as well as the detail that Euphraeus had once lived in Athens (59)—help signal to the audience that this is the example which is most immediately relevant to their situation. It therefore offers a useful means of examining the scope and ambitions of Demosthenes' selection and crafting of his paradigmatic or illustrative material more generally. The Athenian orators' illustrations and examples are often (and productively) discussed in terms of their persuasive intersection with wider popular understandings of the events or persons being featured,[12] but the reconstruction I propose here serves to highlight how the orator could also deploy primarily personal knowledge, packaged in a sufficiently accessible and compelling—if also misleading—way that it could perform the same functions in the argument as versions of more widely known and recognizable material. Demosthenes' fashioning of the Euphraeus example (as I reconstruct it) suggests very great creative latitude for the orator, in this case probably facilitated by patchy Athenian popular knowledge of the precise circumstances of Oreus' fall. The choice of Euphraeus as a projected *alter ego* was not at all obvious: as we shall see, he was a deeply compromised figure to present to an Athenian audience as a democratic paragon and martyr to liberty. This article therefore seeks to identify possible reasons for Demosthenes' decision.

[11] This is marked by τουτοισὶ in 9.12: Herrman 2019:214. On paradigmatic recency: Maltagliati 2020.

[12] See e.g. Clarke 2008:245–303; Steinbock 2013; Grethlein 2014; Kostopoulos 2019; Barbato 2020.

First I assess the likely levels of Demosthenic distortion at work in the passage (sections II–III), and then suggest (section IV) that Demosthenes' compositional decision-making in it is shaped not only by immediate rhetorical exigencies but also (possibly) by bias arising from personal connections between Demosthenes himself, Euphraeus, the city of Oreus, and Demosthenes' political opponents. I conclude (section V) that Demosthenes' decision to use Euphraeus (and Oreus) constituted a challenge to those opponents, and invited contestation—something which, in this relatively brief period of his real political prominence, Demosthenes was actively courting. As our text of the *Third Philippic* is likely to be the product of post-performance revision,[13] I also suggest that broader literary aims—including self-fashioning for posterity—are at work as well. First, I review Euphraeus' historical profile beyond the *Third Philippic*.

II. The Tradition about Euphraeus[14]

Two references in Athenaeus to the *Historical Notes* by the second-century BC historian Carystius of Pergamum[15] tell us why Euphraeus had "once lived in Athens": he was a pupil of

[13] Sealey 1993:233–235; Wooten 2008:167–173; Herrman 2019:20–26, 34–36. Trevett (1996:428–429 and 2011:154–155) sees the speech as an unrevised draft. It is just conceivable that 9.59–62 did not appear (or appear in this form) in the "live" speech; if so, the dynamics I trace must have been shaped solely with subsequent readers in mind.

[14] Key modern treatments are Trampedach 1994:93–97, Natoli 2004:32–40, and Wareh 2012:165–175.

Plato, who had subsequently sent him to the Macedonian court to advise the young king Perdiccas III.[16] (This transaction is the setting for the pseudo-Platonic *Fifth Letter*,[17] where Euphraeus' main commission is framed as helping Perdiccas investigate monarchy's special qualities as a constitution-type: how to practise kingship in a theoretically-aware way, in effect.[18]) Although it is unclear how long Euphraeus spent at Pella, it was apparently long enough to alienate Perdiccas' nobles: in one of Athenaeus' two references to Carystius, we hear not only of Euphraeus' vicious (διάβολος) personality but also of his baleful influence, which apparently became so great that he "acted like a king himself" and "organized life within the king's inner circle so pedantically that it was impossible to have a meal with them, unless you understood geometry and philosophy."[19] Although the regular *topoi* of attacks on Platonists are visible here, and reflect the priorities of this whole section of Athenaeus,[20] there is no particular reason to dismiss the substance of what Athenaeus and Carystius transmit, even if the details and

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[15] *FHG* IV 356–357, FF 1–2, from Ath. 11.506e–f and 508d–e. Doubt about his anecdotes' value: Jacoby 1919:2255, lines 42–44; Brunt 1993:292n29. Treated as a serious historian: Natoli 2004:23–24, 32–33.

[16] Ath. 11.506e–f. Euphraeus is also linked to Plato in Harpocration s.v. *Euphraios*.

[17] Most scholars think the *Fifth Letter* inauthentic, but see Harward 1932:183–184; Scholz 1998:112–113n139. Isnardi Parente (1970:42–43 and 1979:258n33 and 285) suggests that it is an Academy exercise from the period after Euphraeus' death; cf. Wareh 2012:168n87.

[18] [Pl.] *Ep*. 5.321e–322a; Trampedach 1994:93–96.

[19] Ath. 11.508d–e. Translation: Olson 2009 (and below).

[20] Wörle 1981:116; Trampedach 1994:93–97.

inflection can be questioned.[21] The passage ends with Athenaeus' speaker reporting that Euphraeus' influence led to his execution by Parmenion in Oreus "when Philip seized power (Φιλίππου τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβόντος)" (11.508e). There is no suicide here, as there is in Demosthenes, and there is no clear way of telling whose version is right.[22] The looseness with chronology here (i.e. either Athenaeus' or Carystius' failure to note the seventeen-year gap between Philip's accession and Euphraeus' death) invites caution.[23]

Athenaeus' other reference to Carystius tells us that Euphraeus resolved a quarrel between Perdiccas and his younger brother Philip by persuading Perdiccas to grant Philip a tract of land which the latter used to support a military force. Philip then used this force to secure the

[21] As Natoli (2004:23–24 and 32–35) argues; cf. also Griffith 1979:206–208 (with caution), Hatzopoulos 2011:62; Lane Fox 2011a:264. Müller (2016:230–232, with further bibliography at 394nn124, 128) is skeptical about both references to Carystius. Some caution is justified given the appearance of geometry—part of the stereotype of Academic activity promoted by Plato's detractors: Brunt 1993:292, 318 with n74, 320; Sonnabend 1996:53–54 and n87; Roisman 2010:163. However, Natoli (2004:34n74) offers a constructive skeptical rationalization. Carney (2019:79–82, at 81) mentions the possible involvement of Eurydice, Perdiccas' mother, in the court's intellectual activities.

[22] Most scholars favor Demosthenes: Cawkwell 1963:203; Bertelli 1976:285 (though cf. Wareh 2012:172–173); Griffith 1979:518n1, 546–547n3; Isnardi Parente 1979:285n70; Brunt 1993:292; Trampedach 1994:96–97. Wörle 1981:119 favors Carystius. Herrman 2019:255 notes that the two accounts are reconcilable.

[23] Athenaeus' telescoping may be the problem: Wareh 2012:173 (but cf. 167n86).

throne for himself in 359 after Perdiccas' death.[24] Although Athenaeus' speaker expresses uncertainty about this story, its implications are worth noting because they illustrate the highly ambiguous character of our evidence for Euphraeus' activities in general. Putting the two pieces of Carystius together yields a curious scenario where Euphraeus apparently resolved the quarrel in Philip's favor and then Philip responded years later by allowing him to be executed in Oreus *because of* his earlier influence.[25] However, coherent reconstructions are possible. A simple one, and one which harmonizes with Demosthenes, is that Philip may have felt by 342 that Euphraeus' recent anti-Macedonian activity cancelled out his good service some two decades earlier. Another possible reconstruction arises from a closer look at one of Carystius' sources: he plausibly identifies an allusion to the land grant in a passage from a letter of Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy. Whether or not this letter is the very *Letter to Philip* by Speusippus that we possess[26]—it could well be,[27] as our *Letter* not only has a parallel

[24] Ath. 11.506e–f. For interpretation, see note 29 below.

[25] Clarified by ὅθεν (Ath. 11.508e). As Trampedach (1994:97) notes, Philip may have wished to gratify Parmenion (a good candidate for a key court figure whom Euphraeus might have alienated).

[26] Since Bickermann and Sykutris 1928, Speusippus' *Letter to Philip* has normally been regarded as authentic: Isnardi Parente 1980:391–402; Natoli 2004:23–31 (whose translation I use); Wareh 2012:162–195. Frede (2015:27–40) was inclined to reject it; Bertelli (1977, building on 1976) rejected Speusippean authorship but still saw the *Letter* as a near-contemporary Academy document.

[27] Griffith 1979:207; Natoli 2004:148. Note Frede's doubts (2015:31, 33, 38) and Bertelli's (1977:76–83); but on the latter's case, again, see Wareh 2012:165–178.

section but immediately afterwards alludes to differences between Perdiccas and Philip[28]—the aim of this passage of it was transparently to remind Philip of Plato's role (via Euphraeus, directly or indirectly) in the original establishment of his power; Speusippus was responding to reports that Philip was now either badmouthing Plato (Carystius' version) or listening to such criticisms (the version in Speusippus' extant *Letter*). An appeal to Philip made by an Academic author might naturally misrepresent as a way of strengthening Philip what Euphraeus may actually have intended at the time as a way of protecting Perdiccas (or as a pragmatic solution which would keep both brothers happy and/or safeguard some key territory).[29] This consideration would apply whether or not the letter known to Carystius or his source was a genuine product of the 343 or 342 setting assumed by the *Letter to Philip* (and authored by Speusippus)[30]—and reflected, for example, in its tactful omission of Euphraeus' name, as someone hostile to Philip by 343[31]—or instead a piece of later writing intended to evoke such a context. The upshot is that we cannot be sure whether or not Philip would have regarded

[28] Speusippus, *Letter of Philip* 12: "as if Plato had not laid the basis for your rule (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς … κατασκευάσαντος) during the reign of Perdiccas, and had not always been most concerned should anything uncivilized and unbrotherly occur at court."

[29] Attempts to rationalize the politics of the land-grant: Griffith 1979:206–208; Hammond 1979:188; Trampedach 1994:94–95; Hatzopoulos 1996:178–179; Sonnabend 1996:55–56; Scholz 1998:114 and n145; Natoli 2004:35–37, 149–150; Wareh 2012:170. For skepticism about it: Müller 2016:230–231 (with 394n124).

[30] For this date: Bickermann and Sykutris 1928:29–37; Natoli 2004:17, 64–66. Against: Bertelli 1976, especially 287.

[31] Isnardi Parente 1980:397–398; Brunt 1993:292; Natoli 2004:172; Wareh 2012:167.

Euphraeus as an enemy before the latter began his anti-Macedonian activity in Oreus. Consequently, we have no clear way of telling why Euphraeus might have left the Macedonian court whenever he did so (clearly before 343), or indeed whether he did so of his own volition or under positive[32] or negative compulsion.[33]

In order to turn Euphraeus into his own mirror, therefore, Demosthenes had to present as impeccably civically-minded a former mentor/counsellor of an autocrat (possibly two autocrats) and former member of the Academy—aspects which would jeopardize his compelling illustration if revealed to the audience. Demosthenes could not in this context afford to be thought to possess—or at least had to avoid stating or suggesting—admiration for, or close connection with, people who were (or had been) linked to despots or the elite training and networking experience provided by the Academy. The kind of slurs which orators level at pupils of Isocrates,[34] and instances like Aeschines' negative characterization of Socrates in *Against Timarchus* (1.173–175),[35] make clear that as far as public discourse went any such connections

[32] e.g. a commission by Philip to build pro-Macedonian sentiment in Oreus.

[33] The default assumption is perhaps Cawkwell's (1963:203): that Euphraeus returned "disillusioned and out of favor," perhaps on Perdiccas' death and Philip's accession; cf. Griffith 1979:206; Wörle 1981:118; Natoli 2004:40. He may have stayed later, though: there are intriguing hints of Platonic influence during Philip's reign: Hatzopoulos 1996:158–160. By 349/8, the climate at court had apparently changed in a way Euphraeus would surely have found unpalatable: see Dem. 2.17, supported by Theopompus, a disagreeable presence at Pella by 343 or 342 (Speusippus, *Letter* 12–13): *FGrH* 115 FF 162, 224, 225b; cf. 236.

[34] See e.g. Dem. 35.15, 40–41; also [Dem.] 52.14.

[35] See Fisher 2001:319–323.

or associations had to be played down or at least glossed or carefully packaged.[36] Before suggesting why Demosthenes might have gone to this trouble when there were presumably other less compromised public figures in Oreus who could be singled out for praise, other aspects of Demosthenes' strategy in *Third Philippic* 59–62 need to be examined, in particular his construction of Oreus as a traditionally democratic *polis* like Athens.

III. Making the Mirror: Euphraeus' Oreus and Demosthenes' Athens

The mutual reflectivity of Athens and Oreus and Demosthenes and Euphraeus is carefully built up. It seems very likely (not least from a parallel phrase in Demosthenes' late 350s lawcourt speech *Against Aristocrates*) that the reference in our passage to Euphraeus' sojourn in Athens (παρ' ἡμῖν) is designed to imply that this was where Euphraeus picked up his uncompromising approach to civic freedom.[37] Meanwhile, the short-sighted, slow-moving, and easily-led *demos*

[36] Ober 1989:170–173. Note the derogatory oratorical use of σοφιστής ("sophist"): e.g. Lys. 33.3; Dem. 18.276; 19.246; 29.13; Aeschin. 1.125; 2.112; 3.16, 202. See Haake 2009:120–131 and 2020:72–74 on the Academy's "politically dubious and socially exclusive" (73) public image; Isnardi Parente (1970:42) notes the specific risk for Demosthenes.

[37] Dem. 9.59. In *Against Aristocrates*, the Lampsacenes Thersagoras and Execestus kill the despotic Philiscus because they "took a view on tyrants very similar to our own" (παραπλήσια τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν γνόντες περὶ τῶν τυράννων: Dem. 23.142). They are also introduced in a similar way to Euphraeus: ἐν δὴ Λαμψάκῳ τινὲς ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται δύο· Θερσαγόρας ὄνομ' αὐτῶν θατέρῳ, τῷ δὲ Ἐξήκεστος·, "now in Lampsacus there were two men: Thersagoras was the name of one of them, and the other's was Execestus"; cf. 9.59: Εὐφραῖος δέ

of Oreus clearly resembles (in particular in its lethargy) the Athenians of both the *Third Philippic* itself and Demosthenes' other Assembly speeches,[38] unwilling to act until it is too late. The legal terms used of the procedures instituted by Euphraeus against Philistides and of the summary arrest of Euphraeus by his "gang" of opponents (an Athenian oratorical *topos* itself[39]) would also inevitably recall the Athenian equivalents for an Athenian audience (regardless of whether the same terms were in fact used in Oreus).[40] Meanwhile ἀποτυμπανίσαι (perhaps "beat to death"[41]) denotes a grisly fate Demosthenes wishes elsewhere, in similar terms, on Philip's Athenian supporters.[42]

However, these efforts to construct a familiar-looking "parallel Athens" drastically simplify a complex picture. Demosthenes' version does not guarantee that Euphraeus had in any sense attained a leading position in any formal political movement, democratic or otherwise, or any anti-Macedonian group (in the way that Demosthenes himself had by now), or indeed that he

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τις ἄνθρωπος, "but a man named Euphraeus …" In each case this comes immediately before the connection with Athens is made.

[38] Dem. 1.8; 2.22–24; 3.35; 4.8–12, 17, 35–37; 5.2; 6.3, 27; 8.12, 49; 9.75; 10.6–7, 20, 30, 49; 13.20; 14.15.

[39] e.g. Aeschin. 2.178; Dem. 18.322.

[40] The procedures are *endeixis* and *apagoge* (60). The Athenian atmosphere of 9.60 is reinforced by the metaphors χορηγὸν ἔχοντες Φίλιππον and πρυτανευόμενοι ("with Philip as paymaster and controller"): Herrman 2019:253–254; Herrman 2020:143–145; also Mader 2005:32n49 (on συνταράττοντα).

[41] In detail: Cirio 2015.

[42] Dem. 8.61; 19.137.

was even a regular political leader at all; this is something we are left to assume by the contrast with Philistides and the others (59) and by the very fact that he seems to be set up as a mirror for Demosthenes.[43] All that is actually asserted in the passage is that Euphraeus was a principled opponent of Philistides and his associates, was motivated by the will to keep Oreus free, and was not listened to by the *demos*, either at an undefined earlier stage ("much could be said about the other ways in which he was insulted and treated with contempt by the people": 60) or when Philistides and his faction moved against him. That assists Demosthenes' own characterization of himself as a lone, critical outsider voice to whom the *demos* will not listen (but a voice repeatedly validated by events nonetheless).[44] This was an especially useful self-image to cultivate given that he had by 341 attained a leading position and plenty of support both from fellow politicians and from the wider *demos*, and would have been finding it increasingly difficult to present himself as a talented outsider.[45] Constructing a Euphraeus who has been "repeatedly" abused over a long period— as Demosthenes claims to know ("much could be said")—encourages audience members to see in the Demosthenes of 341 the Demosthenes of the *Olynthiacs*, i.e. of the early 340s and earlier: a vigorous external critic, uncompromised by "establishment" associations. But what this image of Euphraeus also cannot help suggesting is that the *demos* of Oreus might have had other reasons to reject him whether he was a regular politician or not. The non-Demosthenic evidence for Euphraeus' career readily supplies a

[43] Trampedach 1994:97; Wareh 2012:173–174.

[44] See especially Dem. 5.4–9, 11–12; cf. 14.24 and 15.6. Self-construction in opposition to an imagined political establishment more broadly: e.g. 3.12–13, 22, 27–32; 4.1, 44; 13.12–14, 20, 31; 15.33–34.

[45] He still places himself outside the imagined main political group: Dem. 8.33–34, 68; 9.19.

possible one: an Academy-trained intellectual who had spent time at the Macedonian court might well be suspect in a democracy, even that of his home city. The question of where his true loyalties now lay would have been a reasonable and valid one for his fellow citizens by 343; there had been prominent examples in other states in the past two decades of the involvement of Plato's pupils either in establishing autocratic regimes or in murdering rulers and thus indirectly ushering in periods of instability or disunity.[46]

Even assuming that Euphraeus could count as a regular political leader, we are hardly obliged to follow Demosthenes as far as believing that he was the *only* prominent individual opposing Philistides and his associates, just as these future "tyrants"[47] (as Demosthenes terms them) should hardly be thought of as the only pro-Macedonian (and/or anti-Athenian) politicians at Oreus either.[48] The existence of some sort of anti-Philistides grouping beyond Euphraeus (and perhaps separate from him) is suggested by the general exile and execution of opponents once Philistides' regime came to power (62: τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς δ' ἀποκτείναντες), and indicated even more clearly by the fact that the internal political troubles in Oreus can be characterized as being on the scale of *stasis* earlier in the *Third Philippic* (12):[49] the implication

[46] Isnardi Parente 1979:289–299; Trampedach 1994:79–92, 111–124. Note Clearchus of Heraclea Pontica, murdered by Chion, another former pupil of Plato, in 353 or 352; Dion's and Callippus' successive coups in Syracuse (mid-350s); and Python and Heracleides' murder of the Thracian linchpin king Cotys in 360.

[47] For Demosthenes' tendentious labelling here: Harris 1995:116; Herrman 2019:219.

[48] Clarke 2021:125, 144.

[49] This instance is partly focalized by Philip, but the echoing of νοσοῦσι ("sick") in νοσοῦντας at 9.50 (where there is no such focalization) makes it clear that Demosthenes is framing Oreus as

of that passage is that opposition to Philistides and his group was more widespread and larger-scale. Moreover, *IG* II/III^3 1, 398 gives us the names of some newly appointed Athenian *proxenoi*, probably from Oreus,[50] and if this inscription is correctly dated to about 348 (or else the 350s),[51] these men (Ampheritus, Heracleodorus, and a third individual) are plausible candidates for membership of a pro-Athenian (and/or anti-Macedonian) group in Oreus, assuming they were still on the political scene in the later 340s. Heracleodorus looks especially plausible if he is the same as (or related to) the Heracleodorus mentioned by Aristotle as pivotal in overthrowing an oligarchic regime in Oreus sometime earlier in the century.[52] Euphraeus' stance, whether pro-Athenian (as Demosthenes implies), and/or anti-Macedonian, or simply pro-independence (on which more below), should in theory have been shared by others, whether formally associated with Euphraeus or not. Demosthenes' strategic motivations in 9.59-62

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a state where *stasis* had struck. The designation of civic division as a νόσος or νόσημα is familiar from elsewhere in Demosthenes (9.39; 18.45; 19.259, 262): Herrman 2019:112–113, 214. See Brock 2013:69–76 and Das 2019 for background.

[50] Knoepfler 1995:326; Knoepfler 2016:145; note, however, Landucci 2013:244n53.

[51] Dreher (1995:193–197) prefers ca. 348, as does Lambert (2006:129 with n50), who also accepts it (with a question mark) in *IG* II/III^3 1.2. After arguing for ca. 375 in 1995, Knoepfler now prefers a 350s date, specifically ca. 357: Knoepfler 2016:141–155, especially 150–155. He accepts that a 348 date is possible, but doubts a late 340s date (for which see Landucci 2013:246).

[52] Arist. *Pol*. 1303a18–20. Picard (1979:239–240), Knoepfler (1995:326; 2016:144–145, 154–155), Dreher (1995:194, 196), Lambert (2006:129n51), and Lintott (2018:73) are all happy to entertain this identification.

sufficiently explain the absence of other anti-Philistides voices here, though: earlier in the speech, he could safely hint at a more substantial opposition, but here his aim is to heighten the dramatic qualities of the passage by concentrating on a single figure who can function as his own personal mirror.

The existence by the late 340s of broad pro-Macedonian (and/or anti-Athenian) and pro-Athenian (and/or anti-Macedonian) political groups—both of which will have included democratic politicians—is clearly plausible for north-west Euboean Oreus, which had historical associations with Athens but was geographically much closer to the Macedonian sphere of influence than the other major Euboean cities.[53] Debates about its international affiliations must have been a staple of fourth-century Oreus' political life; in the previous decade, *stasis* in the Euboean cities between pro-Athenian and pro-Theban groups seems to have played a role in the Theban invasion of the island and the subsequent Athenian expedition which promptly drove them out (357).[54] But, as well as polarized groups, Oreus' political spectrum in the late 340s probably included politicians who advocated a judicious balance in foreign policy: i.e. retaining as far as possible the friendship of both Athens and Macedon. In Demosthenes' passage, though, it is the *demos* who are happy with the status quo; any politicians who champion it (or occupy

[53] Associations with Athens: Reber and Hansen 2004:656–657. Geography: the Athenian envoys used it as a jumping-off point for the north on the first two embassies to Philip in 346 (Dem. 19.155, 163; Aeschin. 2.89), suggesting that this was normal; see Griffith 1979:549; Ryder 2000:76. An Oreus in the wrong hands could be seen (as in Dem. 8.37) as a threat to Sciathus (a key Athenian military base in the mid-century: cf. Dem. 4.32); Clarke 2021:145. Oreus' strategic importance: Picard 1979:234; Stylianou 1998:279.

[54] Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; Aeschin. 3.85.

pragmatic, moderate policy stances more broadly) are invisible—either ignored or tacitly lumped in either with those whose failure to see what was coming led them to mock and sideline Euphraeus, or with the pro-Philip plotters—because what Demosthenes needs is to create a firmly binary image of corrupt agents of Philip versus the lone freedom-fighter. His distortion also probably extends to the dynamics of the wider Euboean political scene: for example, he may well be exaggerating the extent of Philip's influence in Oreus, at least in the early stages of the situation described.[55] Moreover, the internal politics of Oreus in the late 340s also need to be viewed as responsive to the wider tension between the efforts on the part of Callias of Chalcis to build a Euboean League under Chalcidian (i.e. his own) headship—something he was pursuing in concert with Demosthenes certainly by early 341, Aeschines claims—and pro-independence movements in individual Euboean cities.[56] So a range of politicians—not just Philistides and his associates—may, for example, have argued publicly to be allowed to seek Philip's support as a

[55] Philip's influence in Euboea in the late 340s: Brunt 1969:252, 262–263; Cawkwell 1963:200–205; Cawkwell 1978, especially 50–55; Tritle 1993:237–238. For the earlier 340s: Griffith 1979:318–319 and n2; Landucci 2013:234–237.

[56] For Aeschines' claims: Aeschin. 3.85–105, especially 91–105. This passage may well fuse together a number of chronologically disparate elements to serve Aeschines' line of attack, and dating Callias' and Demosthenes' diplomatic activities has therefore proved difficult: Sealey 1993:262–264; Teegarden 2014:59–60n9. Broad scholarly consensus (which I follow) places all or most of the events of Aeschin. 3.91–105 in 342/1: Brunt 1969:255–260; Griffith 1979:545–551; Picard 1979:245–251; Knoepfler 1995:347n144 and 351–359; Landucci 2013:239–247. My main point is not affected, though, if the alternative 343/2 date is right, for which see Cawkwell 1963:210–213; Cawkwell 1978:55–67; Sealey 1993:263–264.

way of deterring Callias, winning a broad base of popular endorsement for this balancing act. Once Demosthenes' compelling narrative of group delusion is confronted with considerations of this type, it becomes much harder to see where Euphraeus might actually have fitted in his city's political spectrum in 343.[57]

Demosthenes' suppression of any political middle ground in Oreus reflects his wider view of the attitude Athens and other Greek states should adopt towards Philip and his supporters in the late 340s, and is a familiar feature of his Assembly speeches of that period: his fellow Athenian politicians' range of attitudes to Philip is typically reduced to a similar stark polarization, with much nuance deliberately suppressed.[58] Moreover, at *Third Philippic* 61 Demosthenes depicts the terrified condition of the ordinary people of Oreus in terms which recall, and may rework, the passage where Thucydides depicts fear taking hold among the Athenian *demos* and its leaders in 411, during the takeover of the state by the Four Hundred: nobody is sure who among them is secretly supporting the oligarchs, and most stay silent

[57] He may even have been pro-Callias: by spring 341 Demosthenes viewed Callias as a friend to Athenian interests (Griffith 1979:547–549; Knoepfler 1995:347, 353), so might have wished to represent a pro-Callias politician as a champion of autonomy, whatever the reality.

[58] See e.g. Dem. 9.2, 6, 14, 37–40, 53–68 especially 64; 10.4, 19, 55–60, 63, 66, 68–70, 75–76; also 6.28–36. *On the Chersonese* begins by alluding to the possibility of genuine alternative viewpoints but gradually merges their holders with those represented as Philip's supporters: see 8.1, 4–10, 18, 23, 27 (clarified at 29), 32 (clarified at 56–58), giving way to starker polarization: 8.20, 40, 52–53, 56–58, 61, 64, 66–67, 68–72; 76. On this technique: Herrman 2020:139–140. Aeschines pithily targets it at 2.8.

(8.66.3–5).[59] If so, Demosthenes radically simplifies the complex Thucydidean picture. What he gives his audience instead is a strictly dichotomized environment where the reason the ordinary people stay silent is because they already know who their new masters are because of Euphraeus' very public arrest:

> Demosthenes 9.61: τῶν δὲ πολλῶν εἴ τις αἴσθοιτο, ἐσίγα καὶ κατεπέπληκτο, τὸν Εὐφραῖον οἷ' ἔπαθεν μεμνημένοι.
>
> … and any member of the majority who noticed what was happening kept silent and was intimidated, recalling what kinds of things Euphraeus had suffered.
>
> Thucydides 8.66.2: ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει …, ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν.
>
> Nobody else now spoke against them, out of fear and also seeing the size of the conspiracy. If someone did speak out, he was immediately killed in some suitable way …, but the people kept quiet, and were so terrified that individuals thought it a positive gain not to suffer some form of violence, even if they stayed silent.[60]

[59] On Thucydides' influence on Demosthenes in general: Canfora 1992:15–25; Yunis 1996:240–241 and n7, 256–257, 268–277; Mader 2007a; Gotteland 2010.

[60] Text: Stuart Jones 1963.

The dichotomy is reinforced by careful polarization by Demosthenes of the identity of key groups in the passage, so that no clear intermediate alternatives to "hero" or "villain" can emerge: a chain of pronouns (τῷ μὲν … τοὺς δ' …; τοῖς μὲν … τὸν δ' …; οἱ μὲν … τῶν δὲ …; οἱ μὲν … οἱ δὲ …; οἱ μὲν … τοὺς …(τοὺς μὲν … τοὺς δ' …), ὁ δ' …) guides the audience through the narrative in a way that encourages easy and intuitive application of positive or negative labels to those involved. For example, when the Macedonians advance to besiege Oreus, Demosthenes does not tell us which people seek to defend the city (οἱ μὲν ἠμύνοντο): while it is clear enough that Philistides and his group are meant by οἱ δὲ προὐδίδοσαν ("others turned traitor"), there is also the possibility that the enormity of the crisis forced others to advocate surrender on purely pragmatic grounds too. But Demosthenes does not want us to think of that: for his purposes, the important thing is that we keep in mind that Euphraeus has been the only citizen of Oreus fully alert to the threat (and powerless to act in person), a sole spiritual defender of the city against a consortium of villains within and without. Likewise, in 9.62, Demosthenes does not tell us exactly who is killed or exiled by the new regime: they are described as τοὺς τότε σῴζοντας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν Εὐφραῖον ἑτοίμους ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν ὄντας ("the men who at that time had been prepared to protect them and to do all manner of harm to Euphraeus"). Are these (some of) the gloating *demos* of 9.61? It seems so, whether we take ἑαυτοὺς ("them") to refer to Philistides and his group or to the *demos* who were taken in by their assurances that they could carry on living a quiet life (cf. 9.64), an alternative sense for σῴζοντας.[61] But were large numbers of the *demos* killed or exiled? Their leaders must be the

[61] Most favor the first alternative: e.g. Sandys 1900:235–236; Trevett 2011:173; Herrman 2019:255. The second I owe to one of *HSCP*'s readers. For a third: Canfora 1992:104–105.

ones primarily referred to here; but the sentence is not over, and Demosthenes does not give us time to reflect that we have had no clear previous indication in the passage of what role the *demos*' leaders played in the public ridiculing and removal of Euphraeus, as opposed to (unspecified) members of the *demos* in general. The headline message that emerges is that Euphraeus himself (like Demosthenes) was the only "true" democratically-minded political leader in Oreus, regardless of whether the *demos* would have thought of him as one of their leaders or not. The whole passage, then, can be read as an exercise in reflecting the basic outline of Oreus' internal circumstances in 343 and 342 without filling in any of the participants' real motivations and so risking distraction from the binary focus on Euphraeus versus the group round Philistides.

A final casualty of Demosthenes' polarization technique is the likely complexity of Oreus' own constitutional profile in the period covered by recent memory. The city was clearly a democracy until 342 and again after 341 (and still in 330),[62] but the preceding decades indicate some turbulence.[63] We hear of a tyranny under Neogenes in ca. 380–378 (ended by the citizens, rallied by Sparta)[64] and also of an oligarchy which had to be dismantled (and *politeia* and democracy introduced) by Heracleodorus, traditionally in 377/6 when Oreus revolted from Sparta with Theban assistance;[65] it shortly afterwards joined the Second Athenian League.[66] It

[62] Aeschin. 3.103. For the 341 liberation, see note 124 below.

[63] Gehrke 1985:73–75; Reber and Hansen 2004:657; Clarke 2021:157.

[64] Diod. Sic. 15.30.3–4; Bertoli 2013:199–202.

[65] Arist. *Pol*. 1303a18–20. The revolt of 377/6: Xen. *Hell*. 5.4.56–57. For 377/6 (or just after) as the traditional date: Knoepfler 1995:330–331 with n87; Knoepfler 2016:151; Lambert

had attached itself to the Thebans by 370 (if not earlier, around 377/6),[67] and contributed to their Mantinea campaign in 362.[68] After Athens's expedition to Euboea in 357 to counter Thebes's invasion of the island, Oreus was probably obliged to re-ally with Athens as other Euboean cities did,[69] and there may well have been constitutional repercussions. Finally, somewhere in the second half of the fifth century or the first half of the fourth must belong the otherwise unattested *dynasteia* involving Charigenes, the father of the Gnosidemus mentioned by Aeschines in *Against Ctesiphon* as a contact of Demosthenes (Γνωσίδημον τὸν Χαριγένους υἱὸν τοῦ

2006:129n51. Gehrke (1985:74 and n5) prefers ca. 395; cf. Reber and Hansen 2004:657. Lintott (2018:73–74) sees Heracleodorus' activity either in the 370s or post-357.

[66] Oreus joins the Athenian League (ca. 375): Knoepfler 1995:324; Rhodes and Osborne 2003:no. 22 line 114, with page 103; Reber and Hansen 2004:657; Bertoli 2013:204. Occhipinti (2020:145–149) prefers 377.

[67] Histiaea/Oreus and Thebes made an alliance sometime in the 370s: Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012:244–250; they favor ca. 377/6, as does Knoepfler (2016:129–130 and n22). If so, it must have been short-lived: Knoepfler 2013:473. Strabo gives Philistides a tyranny after Leuctra (10.1.3), but this is likely to be either incorrect or loosely-phrased: Moggi 1976:352.

[68] Xen. *Hell*. 6.5.23.

[69] *IG* II^2 124 line 16 (Athenian alliance with Carystus, 357/6 BC); Bertoli 2013:214–218; Landucci 2013:230–234; Occhipinti 2020. *IG* II/III^3 1, 399 (decree of Hegesippus on Euboean affairs) has been traditionally associated with *IG* II^2 124 (cf. Occhipinti 2020:149–151), but is now generally dated to the 340s: Dreher 1995:167–173 and 196–197 (preferring 348, as does Lambert in *IG* II/III^3 1.2); Rhodes and Osborne 2003:no. 69; Knoepfler 2016:132–138, 150 (preferring ca. 343). Laursen 2019 argues for 341.

δυναστεύσαντός ποτε ἐν Ὠρεῷ, "Gnosidemus son of Charigenes, who once had power in Oreus": 3.103).[70] So it seems likely that to construct an Oreus which can parallel the Athenian ideal in its "traditional" commitment to democracy, Demosthenes has again simplified a complex picture; as with the broader political situation in Oreus itself, this was a picture whose complexity he was probably well aware of.[71] If his audience knew something about Oreus' fall (9.55), some of them at least will have known whether it was a democracy or not, and roughly what kind of democracy it was, especially if we consider the exposure of many Athenian citizens to Euboean affairs through service in the campaigns of 357 and 348. Demosthenes' simplification was therefore a risky strategy.

IV. Demosthenes' Motivations

Given the obstacles which Demosthenes had to overcome, then, two questions emerge. First: what motivated him to elaborate the Oreus passage in the detail he did, rather than the examples of Olynthus and Eretria? It is true that the Macedonian takeover of Oreus was the most recent of the three, and elaborating the third element in a sequence of three makes good rhetorical sense, but the scale and nature of the elaboration invite us to seek other reasons as well. Second: why

[70] Berve 1967: vol. 2, 674 lists Charigenes as a tyrant, but if he had been, Aeschines' rhetorical aims in this passage would probably have prompted him to say so. The unspecific δυναστεύσαντος suggests that the truth was less exciting: Charigenes could have been part of a narrow oligarchy, for example (cf. Thuc. 3.62.3).

[71] Certainly so if his link with Gnosidemus (Aeschin. 3.103) went back to the previous year; note also his visits to Oreus in 346.

does Demosthenes develop as compromised a figure as Euphraeus as a personal mirror? In this section, I suggest a reason for each (subsections IV.1 and IV.2, the latter falling into two parts). Neither is meant to exclude other possibilities, and they could well have played a mutually productive role in Demosthenes' compositional approach. Both are necessarily speculative given the nature of the evidence. First: depicting the breakdown of democratic government in Oreus at the hands of the men identified as Philip's local supporters may be a means for Demosthenes to launch a particularized attack on one of his main pro-Macedonian opponents—Aeschines—while also identifying him and other opponents via the much more generalized, oblique modes of reference which our evidence suggests were normal enough for formal speeches in the Assembly. Second: although it cannot be proved, it is quite possible that Demosthenes encountered Euphraeus, whether at first or second hand, during the latter's sojourn in Athens and when the young (and intellectually impressionable) future orator seems to have been moving in the right circles. The mirroring we see in the *Third Philippic* then looks like an appropriate response to a situation where Demosthenes wanted to pay tribute to Euphraeus but was required by the context of performance to avoid giving the impression that he had close personal connections, especially personal connections of an intellectual nature, with him or with the Academy. Hence, as we saw earlier, Demosthenes' careful finessing of Euphraeus' reasons for being in Athens. I now look at these possible motivations in turn.

IV.1. Why Oreus?

My first suggestion, then, is that Demosthenes' elaboration of the Oreus narrative as such relates to Oreus' connections with Athenian politics and politicians. Demosthenes had, by the

time of Oreus' capture by the Macedonians, visited the city on at least two occasions, both in 346, while on two Athenian embassies to Philip.[72] The envoys halted at Oreus for some time on the second of these (Aeschin. 2.89). It was probably on one of these visits that Demosthenes spent time at the house of Anaxinus, a man with connections to the Macedonian royal family.[73] Aeschines was on both embassies too, and in 343 he was able to claim that Demosthenes had represented Aeschines' activities in Oreus as purely self-interested ("[Demosthenes] has told you that … I … sat at Oreus with my fellow envoys arranging to get posts as foreign representatives (*proxenoi*)": 2.89). Demosthenes does not in fact mention *proxenia* awards in our text of *On the False Embassy*, but a passage of *On the Crown* (of 330) indicates that Aeschines was certainly a *proxenos* of Oreus (and Eretria) by 341.[74] It is therefore highly likely that on their visits in 346, especially the lengthy second visit, Demosthenes, Aeschines, and their fellow envoys met some

[72] Dem. 19.163 (first); 19.155 (second).

[73] Schäfer 1886:494n1; Worthington 2013:229. In *Against Ctesiphon* (3.223–224) Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of arresting Anaxinus as a spy (and torturing him) while the latter was in Athens on Macedonian court business (late 340s?); cf. Demosthenes' response (18.137).

[74] Dem. 18.82 with Hennig 1997:355–356n2 and Yunis 2001:156. The structure of Dem. 18.81–82 interestingly recalls that of *Third Philippic* 65–66 and 68. I assume a spring-to-summer 341 date (when the Athenian-led expeditions were already in prospect) because Demosthenes describes the public attitude to the Euboean envoys as hostile, and because he uses the temporal marker τότε ("at that time"), which points back to his references to these expeditions at 18.79–80.

of Oreus' leading figures and learned about others.[75] It is equally likely that in 346 these leading men included some of those involved in the 343–342 episode covered in the *Third Philippic*: Philistides and his associates, and possibly Euphraeus himself if he had returned from Pella by then. The *proxenia* award to Aeschines makes it likely that he in particular would have had to deal with prominent politicians like Philistides: the award presumably needed a vote of the *demos* as it did in Athens, and even the *Third Philippic* would suggest that it was influential individuals like Philistides who could help secure that.[76] Indeed, we find Demosthenes claiming in *On the Crown* that Aeschines gave lodging in Athens to envoys from Philistides and from Cleitarchus, the Philip-backed "tyrant" of Eretria (presumably later in 341)—a misleadingly and maliciously spun statement rather than a baseless one, as it was Aeschines' duty as *proxenos* to host envoys from these states.[77]

These suggested connections in turn support the idea that Demosthenes' expenditure of space in the *Third Philippic* on depicting the breakdown of the democracy and capitulation to Philip in Oreus is intended to strengthen the parallel between Oreus in 343 and 342 and Athens in the present, by encouraging audience members to align the pro-Philip element in each of the two cities and so draw the inference that Aeschines and other pro-Macedonians have the potential to be just as dangerous as Philistides and his group, something the next sections of the speech would clarify. This mode of indirect suggestion would suit a speech for the Assembly, a context where speakers often refer to political opponents without naming them: indeed there is

[75] As Knoepfler notes (1995: 343), Aeschines probably met his informant Cleochares of Chalcis on this same journey (2.120).

[76] For background: Mack 2015:92–104.

[77] Dem. 18.81–82; see note 74 above.

only one instance in Demosthenes' Assembly speeches where an opponent is named (and singled out for special attack: 10.70–74). The other six surviving classical Athenian Assembly speech-texts avoid names too,[78] and the wider evidence tends to confirm this as a more general habit, especially in the case of formal expressions of opinion or policy delivered from the *bema* (like the speeches we possess).[79] The non-naming therefore looks like a common strategy, and one that would often make sense rhetorically: consistently failing to name opponents whom the audience could nonetheless identify (or try to identify) would serve to discredit and diminish those opponents' point of view, and in context could help communicate messages (in a variety of tones) about their moral character, policy aims, and qualifications for giving political advice at all: the *Third Philippic* itself is full of warnings to the audience to be on their guard against Philip's local supporters (no names given), who are usually implied to include those opposing Demosthenes.[80] Importantly for us, though, oblique and generalized modes of Assembly

[78] Unnamed opponents: Lys. 28.9; 34.5; [Dem.] 7.45; 17.23–24; Andoc. 2.2–5; 3.1.

[79] Tuplin 1998:302–303n24. Naming in formal speeches from the *bema*: e.g. Thuc. 3.44.3, 47.1, 5 (all Diodotus); Xen. *Hell*. 1.7.17–18, 26 (in special trial-like circumstances); Dem. 19.14 (though note τοιούτους τινὰς there—verisimilitude may not be Demosthenes' aim). In Thuc. 6.16.1 and 6.17.1 Alcibiades names Nicias as a way of countering references Nicias had previously made to him *without* using his name (6.12.2–13.1). The evidence we have for the less formal, faster-moving parts of Assembly meetings (direct debate, reaction, heckling) supports the common-sense assumption that names would appear more often in those parts: e.g. Aeschin. 1.110–111; Dem. 13.12 (hypothetical); 18.143; 19.46.

[80] See the instances in note 58 above.

reference could also act as vehicle for pinpointed personal attack or comment.[81] In Demosthenes' *Second Philippic* of 344/3, for example, reference is made to a joke at Demosthenes' expense made in the Assembly in 346 by "others" (6.29–30). We know from elsewhere that the joke came from Philocrates,[82] but here he is not named, in keeping with Demosthenes' aim to condemn as a collective those politicians who had enthusiastically promoted peace with Philip.

In *Third Philippic* 59–62, therefore, Demosthenes may be rhetorically harnessing audience knowledge of Aeschines' position as a *proxenos* of two Euboean cities—something brought to public attention in the recent Embassy trial of 343, but perhaps reasonably well-known anyway[83]—to suggest the sinister potential relevance to the Athenian *demos* of a situation which at first sight has nothing directly to do with them. Demosthenes' decision to elaborate as his climactic example the loss of freedom and subjugation to Philip of one of the very cities where Aeschines holds a *proxenia* might serve to imply that Aeschines was either an inadequate *proxenos*—in not (apparently) using his influence to encourage more resistance to Philip in Oreus—or a treacherous one (which consequently hints at his potential for subverting his native Athens in a similar way), or both. In sowing doubt about Aeschines' efficacy and/or integrity as a *proxenos*, Demosthenes would be striking at his rival's political identity and good faith as a whole in a way which supported the passage's wider implication that in someone like Aeschines the Athenian audience should see a Philistides-in-waiting. The first sentence shows us both sides

[81] See e.g. Thuc. 4.27.5; 6.12.2 (above); Aeschin. 1.110; 2.52; Dem. 2.28–29; 4.24; 5.10; 6.28–36.

[82] Dem. 19.46 (in a lawcourt context, where names are typically used freely).

[83] Public knowledge of *proxeniai*: Trevett 1999:185; Mack 2015:115n98.

in Oreus taking action (ἔπραττε: 59): Philistides and his associates working to turn the city over to Philip, and Euphraeus working to keep it free: what action, if any, was Aeschines taking?

It is interesting, then, that when attacking Demosthenes in *Against Ctesiphon*, in the Crown trial of 330, Aeschines says nothing at all about any efforts he may have undertaken as a *proxenos* (whether in Athens or beyond) to keep Oreus and Eretria independent and democratic in the late 340s or to argue for their liberation in 341 (and nor do we hear about any anywhere else). At no stage does he say which politicians in Oreus (if any) he favored. Given his exhaustive focus on the events of that decade in this speech, we should probably conclude that any interventions he did make (if he did) had been less than impressive, and/or ultimately unsuccessful, or were upstaged by those of Demosthenes. Instead, Aeschines spends considerable time criticizing Demosthenes' political network-building in Euboea with Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis at the end of the 340s (3.85–105). In particular, he accuses Demosthenes of profiting by the proposal of an Assembly decree in these men's interest, for which service Demosthenes allegedly charged Chalcis, Eretria, and Oreus a talent each (3.103–105).[84] Aeschines capitalizes rhetorically on the fact that his audience would see him as possessing special knowledge about Oreus derived from his *proxenia*, presenting it as a city with uncomplicated democratic credentials (δημοκρατουμένων τῶν Ὠρειτῶν καὶ πάντα πραττόντων μετὰ ψηφίσματος, "Oreus is a democracy and conducts all its business through public decrees": 103). Aiming for an illusion of stability, he simplifies the city's variegated recent constitutional profile even more than Demosthenes had in the *Third Philippic*: by 330, when Aeschines was speaking, Oreus certainly was a democracy again (if under Macedonian hegemony), and it had also been one at the time Aeschines is referring to, probably 341 or soon

[84] Rational explanations in the case of Oreus: Schäfer 1886:491–492; Bertoli 2013:212.

after.[85] But he allows no room here for the palpable, very recent counter-example: the regime run by Philistides and his associates in 342–341. Aeschines then has the court clerk read the decree by which the *demos* of Oreus arranged the payment for Demosthenes (105). He also does everything he can to indicate that the contacts through whom Demosthenes supposedly secured his money were all dubious, anti-democratic figures: Callias in Chalcis, Cleitarchus in Eretria,[86] and in Oreus, as we saw above, Gnosidemus, son of the "once-powerful" Charigenes.

This sequence is clearly (among other things) a way of hitting back at Demosthenes' constant allegations in the 340s (and echoed in *On the Crown*) that Philip was systematically subjugating the mainland Greek states with the help of an international network of traitors who, like Aeschines, were men of influence in their individual cities;[87] but it can also be read as a response to the specific insinuations of *Third Philippic* 59–62 (and perhaps other speeches) against Aeschines himself—and a dynamic, adversarial response where a more defensive one was possible. Aeschines is still interested in *Against Ctesiphon* in framing responses to several topics which had surfaced in Demosthenes' prosecution in the Embassy trial of 343,[88] so there need be no difficulty imagining him also responding to attacks made by Demosthenes in 341,

[85] See note 56 above.

[86] On numerous scholars' dating (note 56 above), Cleitarchus had already been deposed. If so, Aeschines' error could well be deliberate; he could be confident that listeners would not recall the sequence of events clearly eleven years on. See for similar instances Tritle 1993:232–234.

[87] Examples from other Assembly speeches: Dem. 8.40; 10.4–5; from lawcourt speeches: 18.45–49, 61, 294–296; 19.259–267, 295. This rhetoric is echoed by Hyperides in *Against Diondas*: 21 Horváth with Horváth 2014:155–156, 173–176.

[88] Especially the discussion of the Peace of Philocrates (Aeschin. 3.58–75).

even ones made in an oblique way, and especially ones articulated via memorable set pieces like Demosthenes' Oreus passage. Indeed, Aeschines is indirectly targeted in several of Demosthenes' Assembly speeches from the later 340s,[89] and he clearly judged the Crown trial and his prosecution speech against Ctesiphon, with its avowedly broad focus on Demosthenes' career from its beginning (3.54–57), a good opportunity to make a definitive and holistic counterattack.

Aeschines' emphasis on Oreus' democratic credentials (103) seems specifically geared to recapturing rhetorical control of his right to talk authoritatively about Oreus as a *proxenos*—a right (on my reading) usurped and targeted obliquely by Demosthenes in the *Third Philippic* (and perhaps elsewhere)—and if so it synergizes well with his attacks on Demosthenes' status as a *proxenos* of Thebes in this speech.[90] Although he does not mention Demosthenes' Theban *proxenia* as such (presumably because there was no need), he uses his opponent's close connection with Thebes later to attack what he represents as Demosthenes' privileging of Theban over Athenian interests before Chaeronea (e.g. 3.141–147) and his subsequent alleged failure to support the revolt of Thebes properly (3.156, 239–240), leading to the city's destruction by Alexander in 335. Aeschines also focuses plaintive attention on the catastrophic (if, he says, self-inflicted) fate of Athens's "neighbor city" (3.133), followed up later with a lavish passage of multi-levelled *ekphrasis* which encourages his audience to visualize the plight of the Thebans, young and old (3.156–157)—all ultimately Demosthenes' fault, he claims. Oratorical competition may be in the air here too: *Against Ctesiphon* 156–157 echoes, and may respond to,

[89] See the instances in notes 58 and 81 above.

[90] Demosthenes had held this since at least 343: Aeschin. 2.141, 143 with Trevett 1999, especially 185–186; Steinbock 2013:153, 268–271; Mack 2015:114–115.

Demosthenes' similar, and similarly compelling, description in *On the False Embassy* in 343 of the grim reality of the fate of the defeated and destitute Phocians in 346 (19.64–66)—all Aeschines' fault, he claims.[91] Given this kind of context, it makes sense to read Aeschines' passage about Oreus in *Against Ctesiphon* as another clever piece of table-turning, responding both to Demosthenes' "takeover rhetoric" in general and to the *Third Philippic* in particular.

Oreus, therefore, may have had a specific kind of rhetorical potential for Demosthenes as well as general potential for mirroring Athens as a good democratic state. In this it was a safer rhetorical option than Eretria, which also had Aeschines as a *proxenos*. Eretria notoriously failed to maintain democratic regimes for long in the mid-fourth century,[92] and Demosthenes' audience, especially those who had performed military service at the time, would remember its recent period of tyranny under Plutarchus, supported in 348 by an Athenian expedition, with disastrous consequences.[93] Accordingly, Demosthenes is open about how brief Eretria's recent democratic interlude was when he covers it just before the Oreus passage (57–58).

IV.2. Why Euphraeus?

Even if Oreus' value for Demosthenes is accepted, we still need to ask why he does so much with the unpromising Euphraeus. As noted above, there was latitude here because of the

[91] On both these passages: Theon *Progymnasmata* 63 lines 3–13 Patillon; Webb 2009a:114–115, 152–153; Webb 2009b:141–144; O'Connell 2017:128–136 (with 222n40); Westwood forthcoming.

[92] Teegarden 2014:66–67.

[93] In detail: Tritle 1988:76–89. Demosthenes opposed the expedition: Dem. 5.5.

lapse of time since Euphraeus' period in Athens (where he might not in any case have resided for very long): a safe figure, perhaps, to use in front of an Athenian Assembly audience whose chances of remembering him or his Platonic connections would probably be low. That said, nothing obliged Demosthenes to use him, and it would only take one knowledgeable opponent to subvert the illustration by telling the Assembly audience what the allegedly admirable Euphraeus had "really" been like, but Demosthenes goes ahead and uses him anyway. He is committed to this portrayal. I now offer two connected, and tentative, suggested reasons why: first, that Demosthenes may have been in the right circles at the right time to become aware of, or come into contact with, Euphraeus himself when he was in Athens in the 360s, and therefore to have a personal reason to select him for elaboration here in the *Third Philippic*; and, second, that aspects of Demosthenes' portrayal of Euphraeus' fate align suggestively with aspects of Plato's portrayal of Socrates' ill-fated engagement with Athenian political life, inviting the idea that Demosthenes (perhaps with subsequent readers in mind, but also in order to frame the content in a more emotive and compelling way for listeners) may be deliberately shaping the narrative to provide this Academy "alumnus" with an Academy-themed (even heroized) exit.[94]

A tenacious tradition in antiquity identified Demosthenes as a pupil or student of Plato.[95] That is now normally rejected.[96] Although the Academy clearly fostered a distinctive group identity, modern scholarship tends to present personal connection with it as something that could

[94] Perhaps especially necessary if Euphraeus was in fact executed: see note 22 above. Euphraeus' suicide (as presented by Demosthenes) seems to satisfy the conditions specified by Plato's Athenian in Pl. *Leg*. 9.873c.

[95] Pernot 2006:239–248.

[96] Pernot 2006:21–60; see also the scholars in the first of his three lists (27–28).

take a variety of forms and be experienced in a variety of ways (at least by those of a certain social status), pushing against the exclusive view encouraged by ancient sources whose tendency is to systematize.[97] So some degree of exposure to the Academy and its members is plausible for the young Demosthenes,[98] and made likelier by various pieces of circumstantial evidence. The mid-350s certainly find him associated with the family and friends of one of Athens's most renowned generals, Chabrias: a relative of Plato's, according to Philochorus.[99] Demosthenes spoke on behalf of Chabrias' son Ctesippus in *Against Leptines* in 355/4, stating their connection in the proem (20.1)[100] and eulogizing the recently-deceased Chabrias in a lengthy passage which dominates the center of the speech (20.75–87)[101]—and the young Ctesippus' guardian was Phocion,[102] the major contemporary political figure most likely to have had close links to the Academy.[103] Plutarch even carries the improbable detail that Demosthenes was courting

[97] Like the list of Plato's pupils at Diog. Laert. 3.46–47. On Academy access: Lynch 1972:57–58, 61; Brunt 1993:284–285; Dillon 2003:2–13; Haake 2009; Haake 2020:74; see also Aristocles F 2 Chiesara with Chiesara 2001:70.

[98] As Pernot 2006:39 admits, and this is maintained by the scholars in his second list (28–29).

[99] Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 223. This information is deemed reliable by Jacoby (1954:483), Düring (1957:256–258), and Gigon (1962:51), but doubted by Trampedach (1994:135–136). Plutarch instead mentions Academy influence on Chabrias (*Mor*. 1126c): Wörle 1981:55–56.

[100] Kremmydas 2012:178 (though contrast Canevaro 2016:181–183); cf. Din. 1.111.

[101] Westwood 2020:105–11.

[102] Plut. *Phoc*. 7.3–4.

[103] Plut. *Phoc*. 4.2, 14.7; *Mor*. 1126c; Wörle 1981:56–63; Tritle 1988:50–53, 141–145; Trampedach 1994:136–138, 145; Sonnabend 1996:94–95.

Chabrias' widow.[104] It is plausible that Demosthenes had contact with this group of people earlier too, though. In 366/5, when he reached majority and started gaining public notice by prosecuting his very well-connected guardians, Euphraeus was probably still in Athens (as Perdiccas only became king, at least in his own right, in 365).[105] 366/5 was also the year when Chabrias and the leading political orator Callistratus were prosecuted for Athens's loss of Oropus to Thebes. Their trials cast a long shadow in politics and the intellectual world:[106] Diogenes Laertius even (implausibly) puts Plato on Chabrias' defense team,[107] while Plutarch claims that Callistratus' speech in his own defense drew the young Demosthenes to oratory as a career.[108] What is certainly the case is that Demosthenes' speeches of the 350s and later display regard, sometimes high regard, for both Chabrias and Callistratus,[109] and barely-concealed animus

[104] Plut. *Dem*. 15.3; Kremmydas 2012:179; Canevaro 2016:182.

[105] Dating Euphraeus' departure: Sonnabend 1996:48–49 (365/4); Haake 2007:33 (second half of the 360s). Perdiccas' accession in 365, at eighteen: Diod. Sic. 15.77.5; Hammond 1979:185–186. Carney 2019:37–41 makes him king from 368/7 under Ptolemy's regency; cf. Roisman 2010:162.

[106] Arist. *Rhet*. 1364a18–23; 1411b6–10; Hansen 1975:92–93 (no. 83); Sealey 1993:86–88; Hochschulz 2007:151–160.

[107] Diog. Laert. 3.23–24.

[108] Plut. *Dem*. 5.1–5.

[109] Chabrias (beyond *Against Leptines*, though note 20.133): Dem. 4.24; 21.64; 23.171 (pointedly defending Chabrias). 19.287 is less generous. Chabrias' celebrity: Dem. 13.22; 23.198; 24.180. Callistratus: Dem. 18.219; 19.297; 24.135.

against their chief accuser in 366/5, Leodamas;[110] and as late as the mid-340s he was still emphasizing the harshness of the attack on Chabrias by Leodamas' co-accuser Philostratus.[111]

It seems likely, then, that the young Demosthenes either moved in the right circles to come into contact with Euphraeus personally, or admired or had dealings with those with the relevant connections, making it likely in turn that he would become aware of Euphraeus. He may even simply have heard him speak and been impressed.[112] If so, this awareness would supply a good reason on its own both for his decision to heroize Euphraeus in spite of the risk, and for his disinclination to specify the reason for Euphraeus' sojourn in Athens in *Third Philippic* 59: i.e. that he knew exactly what it was but preferred to avoid implying close personal connections with Plato's Academy in an Assembly speech aimed at a popular audience. Furthermore, as suggested above, he may have met Euphraeus in Oreus on one or both of his visits there on the embassies to Philip in 346.

My second suggestion—also tentative—is that there may be signs that Demosthenes is shaping his version of the events that led up to the imprisonment and suicide of Euphraeus in such a way as to recall themes and events relevant to the trial, imprisonment, and execution of Socrates in the Platonic tradition. We need not assume that Demosthenes had read specific Platonic texts in order to be able to claim that he was able to reflect the tradition in the general ways I suggest here. Nor does it seem likely that he was trying to map Euphraeus' death onto Socrates' in a thoroughgoing way: a suicide is not an execution (although Demosthenes' wording

[110] Dem. 20.146–147; Kremmydas 2012:425–427; Canevaro 2016:34, 409–411.

[111] Dem. 21.64.

[112] Egermann 1952:146n87; cf. Pernot 2006:38–39.

does bridge the gap),[113] and the issue is complicated by the fact that Demosthenes' version of it differs from Carystius' (where Euphraeus is executed). But the prison setting (i.e. the death of a principled intellectual while under confinement for a crime he did not commit) may be suggestive in itself.[114] Moreover, there are clear general resemblances between some of Plato's depictions of Socrates' attitude to, and relationship with, the question of good statesmanship (for example in the *Gorgias*, but also in the *Apology*), and Demosthenes' portrayal of his own principled civic contributions, especially in his Assembly speeches and in *On the Crown*.[115] These resemblances might be relevant here too, given that Demosthenes is constructing Euphraeus as a clear political analogue for himself, and presenting Euphraeus' suicide as "a practical proof of the honesty and disinterested patriotism of his opposition to Philip" (62). It therefore seems possible that Demosthenes fashioned the Euphraeus passage not only as a

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[113] Dem. 9.62: ἀποσφάττω (lit. "cut [someone's] throat") occurs in a number of contexts where formal execution is in point: e.g. Thuc. 7.86.2; Lys. 13.78; also [Dem.] 59.103 (though the two different uses there demonstrate the term's range).

[114] It is also interesting that Demosthenes uses καθαρῶς (lit. "cleanly," "purely") of Euphraeus' resistance to Philip. Euphraeus' non-violence toward others (Herrman 2019:256 cf. 242) may well be the primary referent (and probably would be for the Assembly audience), but in Plato's *Phaedo* καθαρός and its cognates help articulate the conditions under which the voluntary separation of soul and body by suicide might be deemed rational for the philosopher (i.e. after personal purification): see *Phaedo* 66d–67d (eight instances of καθαρός-cognates), cf. 61c–62e, with Warren 2001:104–105. καθαρός-cognates appear only twice in Demosthenes' Assembly speeches (here and in an explanation of homicide law at 9.44).

[115] Yunis 1996:153–161, 276–277; Hunter 2012:114–116.

nightmare version of what he himself and his political associates might suffer should their opponents succeed, but also as a way of giving a former pupil of Plato (and possibly someone he knew personally) an exit from public life attended by fitting echoes of the fate of the Academy's intellectual hero.

Any three-way parallel between Demosthenes' Euphraeus, Plato's Socrates, and Demosthenes himself would hinge on the way that each is depicted taking a solitary, principled stand, powered by superior insight, against threats to the civic order: in Demosthenes, against Philip's supporters in Oreus and Athens; in Plato, against bad *demos* decision-making in the mid-400s.[116] Each man is attacked for his efforts by a *demos* who do not understand the benefits he is trying to confer and who listen to wrongheaded or malevolent opposing voices.[117] Possible echoes emerge most clearly in the similar descriptions of a critical event in each case: in Euphraeus' case, his attempt to prosecute Philistides and his associates, followed by his removal from the political scene (behind which lurks the possibility that the same fate will befall Demosthenes); in Socrates' case, his public objection to the proposed collective trial of the Athenian generals accused of abandoning survivors after the sea-battle of Arginusae in 406. This objection mattered because Socrates was on the Council, and his tribe in prytany, at the time of this decision; two (possibly all three) of Xenophon's versions even have Socrates serving as that day's chairman of the *prytaneis* and refusing to put the proposal to the vote, not just refusing to

[116] Particularly bad because it would be followed by defeat in the Peloponnesian War and by the coming of the Thirty (alluded to by Socrates at Pl. *Grg*. 457b–c and followed up at 460d).

[117] Dem. 9.61 for Euphraeus; Pl. *Ap*. 32b for Socrates; see also the "trial of the doctor" theme in *Gorgias*: 464d–e and 521e–522c (directly after Socrates' self-description as Athens's only true living statesman: 521d).

support it.[118] In both Demosthenes and Plato, this event is determinative for the circumstances of the hero's death: Euphraeus will kill himself while still in prison (it is implied), and in Plato's *Apology* Socrates brings up the stance he took in 406 at his trial in 399 as proof of his consistent prioritization of just courses of action over expedient ones—something he admits makes him vulnerable in court now (32a).

There are also similarities in how Demosthenes and Plato describe the critical event happening: just as Euphraeus is hauled off to prison with the blessing of a gloating and vocal *demos* when his principled attempt to indict Philistides and the others rebounds on him (60–61), Socrates in the *Apology* recalls how the *demos* loudly supported his opponents when they threatened to impeach him and haul him off for refusing to join the consensus in the Arginusae affair (32b). In Plato's *Gorgias*, Socrates alludes to the Arginusae affair in a context where his own voluntary detachment from public life is foregrounded;[119] this is something which his interlocutor Callicles later sees as leaving him vulnerable to "being seized and taken away to prison, unjustly accused of some crime" (486a–b)[120] and to subsequent execution due to not knowing how to conduct a good self-defense in court—a clear foreshadowing of Socrates' trial and death (and made even more explicit later in the dialogue: 521b–522e). As with *Apology* 32a, and Socrates' fearless prioritizing of the just course, these moments in the *Gorgias* are framed by a dialogue-wide discussion of what constitutes a good statesman, and here Socrates' provocative claim that he himself is in fact Athens's only true living statesman (521d), despite his studied

[118] Pl. *Ap*. 32b–c; Xen. *Hell*. 1.7.15; *Mem*. 1.1.18, 4.4.2.

[119] Pl. *Grg*. 473e–474a; there may also be an allusion in 516d–e (a similar intervention which succeeded).

[120] Translation: Waterfield 1994.

detachment from politics, finds a loose echo in the language of Demosthenes' own rhetorical self-presentation in his Assembly speeches and in *On the Crown* not only as a true statesman *par excellence*, but also as the only speaker in Athens whose policy has been proved consistently right;[121] this is all even more explicit in the case of Euphraeus in the *Third Philippic*, who really does stand absolutely alone. Another prominent common aspect here is the clear stand taken by Euphraeus and Demosthenes himself (in the Oreus passage and what immediately follows it) and by Socrates in the *Gorgias*, against politicians who merely satisfy the desires of the *demos* without considering their spiritual, moral, and cultural welfare.[122]

The resemblances I have sketched here suggest that Demosthenes may have found aspects of the Platonic tradition about Socrates' political engagements and fate an appropriate thematic template for his Oreus parable if he had a personal reason to concentrate on Euphraeus in particular (rather than somebody else). None of the resemblances I have highlighted requires us to assume any serious level of personal ideological commitment to Plato or Plato's Socrates, or of exposure to Platonic texts, on Demosthenes' part—only a meaningful level of awareness of the Academy's traditions about Socrates' actions in 406 and their relevance to his trial in 399, combined with a personal motivation to compose an appropriate send-off for Euphraeus. Demosthenes may also have had a specific rhetorical motivation, though, as I now suggest.

V. Conclusion

[121] Dem. 5.5; 14.24; 15.6; *Ep*. 2.8; cf. the triumphant 18.173; also 19.302.

[122] Pl. *Grg*. e.g. 503b–c, 515c–517c, 518e–519d. Demosthenes had already explored the same concerns at length, and in terms intriguingly similar to those of Plato's Socrates, in the *Third Olynthiac* (349/8): 3.21–36; Yunis 1996:265–268.

From the points made in sections II–III above, *Third Philippic* 59–62 emerges as a sequence which is very likely to offer a misleading, even a very misleading, picture of Euphraeus himself, of his supposed political role, of the nature of the political alignments prevailing at Oreus in 343 and 342, and of where he belongs within those alignments. Demosthenes may even have finessed the manner of Euphraeus' death; his Euphraeus chooses his own way out rather than waiting to be executed by Parmenion. All this is done in the service of Demosthenes' self-construction, and his construction of Athens: towards the manufacture of an arresting mirror for his own struggle to make his fellow citizens appreciate the danger both of Philip and of his "agents" in Athens, and recognize Demosthenes himself as the true statesman who can resolve the situation if they will only listen to him. In section IV above, I identified two possible reasons why he might have gone to the trouble of creating the tissue of virtuoso misrepresentation that we see in this passage. Each reason may reflect a particular mix of literary and strategic motives and address two types of audience member to differing extents: both members of the live audience who heard something like this speech in 341, and readers studying and enjoying the text in its revised and disseminated form later.

The choice of Oreus itself enables Euphraeus' opponents and Demosthenes' own to be brought into alignment: Aeschines, a *proxenos* of Oreus, has his own specialist territory invaded and occupied; perhaps significantly, he hits back in *Against Ctesiphon*. Although readers would have leisure to extract more meaning from Demosthenes' choice, the allusive attack on Aeschines can also be seen as participating in a strategic tendency towards oblique attack common in formal Assembly speeches, and therefore discernible for listeners too (as other such instances elsewhere in the *Third Philippic* and in other Demosthenic Assembly speeches help to

show). Meanwhile, if we entertain the possibility that Demosthenes is casting Euphraeus, "alumnus" of the Academy, in a quasi-Socratic role (in ways we find reflected in Platonic presentations of Socrates) we can see that this would allow him to reach two audiences. Any Socratic "packaging" allows Demosthenes to generate for *all* Assembly audience members a vivid and pathetic set piece which stands out in its context. But for similarly-equipped listeners, and especially for subsequent readers—who would interpret the Euphraeus passage at leisure and beyond the Assembly context—the cluster might communicate the impression that Demosthenes and Euphraeus not only shared political ideals but also belonged in the same tradition as a figure who had by now been fashioned by Plato, Xenophon, and the Academy as an unstintingly moral operator in public contexts and thus a viable loose parallel for Demosthenes. In revising the *Third Philippic* and perhaps others of his Assembly speeches from the 340s for readers at all, Demosthenes was in the business of building his own legacy as not only the guiding voice but also the moral powerhouse of the Athenian resistance to Philip—the heroic figure we see in *On the Crown*—and for the purpose of communicating this to posterity (rather than for the immediate purpose of persuading an Assembly audience suspicious of over-educated elite politicians) reflections of appropriate aspects of an already lively tradition about Socrates would help to mark his speech texts as complex, lasting intellectual contributions rather than simply a series of practical exercises in statesmanship, aimed at career justification and with limited wider cultural significance. This would remain true regardless of whether Demosthenes' Assembly speeches were disseminated in his lifetime, or of who disseminated them.

What Demosthenes gives his audience(s) is a parallel Athens, a home from home: Euphraeus both is and is not Demosthenes; the Athenian *demos* both is and is not the *demos* of its former cleruchy, Oreus. It is essential that the sequel Demosthenes and all his listeners (and

implied listeners) want for Athens is not the same as the sequel which Oreus suffered: Euphraeus and Oreus are an awful warning, but not yet a reality (9.65, 70). So the gap between Oreus and Athens is critical: in that gap, Demosthenes confides that the Athenians will be able to act against Macedonian encroachment, and thereby sustains a key thread of projected optimism which runs right through the "Philippic" part of the Assembly corpus.[123] The compositional choices made in the Oreus narrative enable him to communicate forcibly that Athens is at a crossroads: it can follow its current course, listen to its pro-Macedonian politicians, and eventually (cf. 9.67) become the latest in the chain of examples of Philip's conquests—a new Oreus—or it can follow Demosthenes' advice and take action to break that chain. In the event, the Athenians chose the latter, voting in the summer of 341 first for an expedition to liberate Oreus, with Chalcidian assistance, and then for a second to liberate Eretria.[124] Both expeditions were successful, and Philistides and Cleitarchus were killed. All this came too late for Euphraeus, but not for Demosthenes, who proposed the decrees that launched the expeditions,[125] and was crowned in Athens for these and other foreign-policy efforts in late 341 or early 340.[126] The policy direction to which the *Third Philippic* belongs was bearing fruit and bringing

[123] Dem. 1.10, 21; 2.9–10, 20, 31; 4.2, 45; 8.47; 9.4–5; 10.23, 31.

[124] The expeditions to Oreus and Eretria: Diod. Sic. 16.74.1; Philochorus *FGrH* 328 FF 159, 160; Charax *FGrH* 103 F 19; schol. *ad* Aeschin. 3.85 (184 Dilts); schol. *ad* Aeschin. 3.103 (222 Dilts); Sealey 1993:261–262; Harding 2006:104–108 (for Philochorus); Teegarden 2014:58–59; Liddel 2020:557–565.

[125] Dem. 18.79, 87; Plut. *Dem*. 17.1; Liddel 2020:559–561.

[126] Dem. 18.83–87; Liddel 2020:565–568. The honors in Oreus misrepresented by Aeschines (3.103) were probably contemporary.

Demosthenes success, and that is important for making conclusions about the Euphraeus passage, in the following sense.

In all the speeches for public contexts which have him as a center of interest, whether as the adviser giving the advice or as a litigant in the trial at hand (and even in some speeches where neither of these is the case), Demosthenes shows a keen interest in persuasive but often discreet presentation of personal models from the Athenian past, from Solon to very recent times—figures who will reflect positively on him and negatively on his opponents.[127] The compelling variation on that habit, applied to another state's very recent past, in *Third Philippic* 59–62 provides good evidence of the versatility and functional potential of sustained paradigmatic narratives as compositional elements and argumentative devices. If the suggestions I made in section IV are entertained, then what we see is Demosthenes using an example whose full significance can only really be grasped within specific contextual parameters (of his own intellectual formation and compositional intentions, or of his ongoing rivalry with Aeschines) to fulfil two aims whose field of application is much wider: first, to shape his public articulation of his views on issues which matter for Athens as a whole; and, second, to give this personal material the starring role in that articulation, rather than material likely to be more familiar to audience members (listeners and readers alike). The likely unfamiliarity of Euphraeus to the Athenian audience makes this possible in the first place, but, as noted above, any of Demosthenes' opponents could intervene and "remind" listeners of Euphraeus' "true" nature. Demosthenes deliberately took on a compromised individual and a problematic model for Athens itself because the rhetorical opportunities outweighed the potential costs. Both Euphraeus and Oreus offered him creative latitude and possibilities, but also staked out a competitive arena for

[127] In more detail: Westwood 2020.

Demosthenes as political orator: a chance to be seen mounting an impressive resistance to any contestation of his chosen examples by opponents that might occur either in this debate or later, perhaps in a public trial. This dynamic mutual contestation of examples by opponents had been a key feature of Demosthenes' and Aeschines' clash in the Embassy trial of 343, and would be again in 330 when they opposed one another in the Crown trial.[128] Demosthenes' appetite for such contestation fits with other aspects of his rhetoric in the late 340s. By the time of the *Third Philippic*, he was politically in the ascendant, challenging political rivals to do their worst; in the *Second Philippic* and *On the Chersonese*, he had challenged and threatened the politicians he claimed were working in Philip's interest.[129] It is therefore possible to read Demosthenes' Euphraeus passage not only as an astutely crafted means to three ends—reflecting Demosthenes' own virtues, commemorating Euphraeus' "martyrdom," and warning the Athenians—but also as a rhetorical gauntlet thrown down to his rivals.[130]

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[128] On contestation in these trials: Hesk 2012:217–226; Westwood 2020:223–327.

[129] Especially Dem. 6.29–36 and 8.52–67.

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