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The continuous Sir Philip Sidney game: a simple model of biological signalling.

Abstract:

An analysis of Maynard Smith's two-player, ESS model of biological signalling, the "Sir Philip Sidney game", is presented. The stable strategies of the players in this game are shown to satisfy the conditions of Zahavi's handicap principle. At equilibrium, signals are honest, costly, and costly in a way that is related to the true quality revealed. Further analysis reveals that the level of cost required to maintain stability is inversely related to the degree of relatedness between the playe...

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Publication status:
Published

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Zoology
Role:
Author
Journal:
Journal of theoretical biology
Volume:
156
Issue:
2
Pages:
215-234
Publication date:
1992-05-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1095-8541
ISSN:
0022-5193
URN:
uuid:43695b95-f805-41e7-a024-a522aefa965a
Source identifiers:
386565
Local pid:
pubs:386565

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