



The Differential Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, 1989-2000: A Constructivist Study of the Foreign Policy Identities of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia

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St. Cross College, University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DPhil in International Relations in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Oxford

24 May 2018

Total word count (excluding appendices and bibliography): 97 230

This thesis is dedicated to my parents

Abstract

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The thesis addresses the puzzle of the differential integration of former communist states in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations between 1989 and 2000. Notwithstanding the predominant universalist-rationalist assumption that the adoption of an institutional-administrative blueprint for reform could lead to convergence between East and West, countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Russia did not converge similarly (or at all) on the West European normative model and framework of international relations.

To account for this divergence, the thesis examines the impact of the culturally-historically informed, Polish, Bulgarian and Russian identities and conceptions of 'Europe' (as opposed to the formal-institutional *transition* from one *system* to another) on the process of foreign policy transformation. The doctoral research employs Constructivism, Social Psychological insights and an interpretivist methodology, drawing on 75 elite interviews.

The main argument states that differential Europeanisation can be understood on the basis of differentiated levels of inclusion and establishment of relations of mutual recognition and belongingness – substantiated by a differentiated extent of ideational affinity (i.e., normative compatibility), which are (re)enacted in the interactive, mutually constitutive process of identification between Self and Other (i.e., between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and (Western) Europe). Three propositions of 'thick', 'ambivalent' and 'thin' Europeanisation are derived from the argument (whereby the comparative benchmark of Europeanisation is an ideal-typical model of European-ness).

Key contributions focus on the development of a refined Constructivist theory and a systematic empirical comparison of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identities. Also, the study's conclusions reinvigorate and reconfirm the importance of the continuity (rather than just constant flux) of culturally-historically shaped patterns of group self-understandings and sub-regional identifications as well as Constructivism's greater plausibility in accounting for the research puzzle than (Neoclassical) Realism through the stipulation of a mutually constitutive relationship between international and domestic factors and between ideational and interest-based considerations.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The thesis sets out to account for the differential levels of Europeanisation of the foreign policy identities of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia in the post-communist period between 1989 and 2000. The introductory chapter lays out the core analytical and methodological approaches that inform the exploration of the process of Europeanisation. The sections that follow below thus first present the main research puzzle, the main argument and research programme; clarify the key concepts, theoretical framework as well as potential (Realist) counterarguments; justify the methodology and methods employed; specify the significance of the doctoral work and its findings; and end with an outline of the structure of the thesis.

Research puzzle, main argument and research programme

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism heralded the beginning of dramatic transformational processes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – i.e., in the countries having formerly constituted the Soviet bloc and the European part of the USSR. These transformational processes encompassed the development of liberal democracy, free market economy as well as integration into and civilizational ‘return to Europe’.

Yet, the diversity in the outcomes of the attempted transformation is striking as CEE states have exhibited different levels of advancement in joining the Euro-Atlantic, liberal-democratic community of nations. In particular, three of those states – Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, have differed among each other in their ability to integrate into European (and more generally – Western) institutional structures by enunciating, implementing and sustaining a domestic and foreign policy based on civilizational belongingness to Europe and shared European values.

So the main puzzle is contained in the observation that despite having had a similar formal-institutional organisation of their internal political, economic and social systems as well as external relations, Poland, Bulgaria and Russia have not transitioned away from these and become Europeanised in a similar way. Indeed, the outcomes have been different notwithstanding the predominant rationalist-universalist academic and policy-making belief that the ‘legacies’ of the past could be overcome through the implementation of a liberal democratic, market economic blueprint for reform that would eventually lead to sameness and the convergence of East and West.

Most conspicuously embodied in Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end-of-history’ argument, this belief held that the collapse of communism inaugurated the end point of humanity’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1989:1, 1992). And following Fukuyama’s assumption, a significant body of the literature on democratic transition treated CEE states as clean slates on which to inscribe a set of institutional-administrative and political-elite behavioural norms that would be conducive to democracy as the end point of political development (Ekiert, 2003; Fish, 2005; Linz, 2000; Linz, Stepan, 1996; Eckstein, 1998; Anderson, Fish, Hanson, Roeder, 2001; Pridham, Lewis, 1996; Higley, Pakulski, Wesolowski, 1998; Dawisha, Parrott, 1997; Kaldor, Vejvoda, 1999). In this view, the past is treated as a ‘legacy’, which represents a de-historicised abstraction of a set of habits and attitudes inherited from the previous regime and which is a structural variable that either acts as a constraint or permissive force in achieving a predetermined outcome (Wydra, 2007:2-3, 6, 18, 24, 34; Whitehead, 2002:3-4).

However, there are at least two problems with such a research strategy. First, the underlying assumption of a law-like unfolding of historical development and a structural necessity, according to which political evolution occurs (from one political *system* or *order*

to another) and where even if some societies do not manage to become liberal democracies, at least they ‘end their ideological pretensions’ of representing a higher form of human organisation, often casts CEE countries as blank slates (Wydra, 2007:41; Fukuyama, 1989:12). This may encourage a sense of ‘normative hegemony’, a positivist approach that strictly separates types of domestic and international systems (on the basis of distinctly measurable rational-institutional characteristics) as well as obliviousness to long-term culturally-historically informed identities and conceptions of ‘Europe’ that are continuously reproduced, re-enacted and constitutive of the process of democratisation and Europeanisation. Second, the overwhelming focus on domestic transition has meant that transformations in the issue area of foreign policy (and particularly in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia) have not been adequately, extensively – or at all – examined by International Relations or area studies scholars, as demonstrated in Chapter 2.

A main research task of the thesis is therefore to account for the diversity in the foreign policy responses of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia to the collapse of formerly similarly established state structures and the international system all three belonged to by considering the ways in which these countries’ elites have interpreted and reacted to dramatic change on the basis of conceptions of nation-state identity. In particular, since a key research guideline is that exiting one system of international relations (the former Soviet bloc) and integrating into another (the Euro-Atlantic family of nations) is not simply a matter of implementing a set of institutional-administrative requirements and demonstrating interest-based behavioural compliance, the study’s objective is to examine how identity (and the ideas of Europe rooted in it) has shaped foreign policy transformation. Hence, the core focus on the Europeanisation of the foreign policy identities of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia between 1989 and 2000.

The main overall argument put forward by the thesis is that differential Europeanisation can be understood on the basis of differentiated levels of inclusion and establishment of relations of mutual recognition and belongingness – substantiated by a differentiated extent of ideational affinity (i.e., normative compatibility), which are (re)enacted in the interactive, mutually constitutive process of identification between Self and Other (i.e., between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and (Western) Europe). Hence, the greater the Other's acceptance and commitment and the greater the Self's normative similarity and identification with the Other, the more such an interaction (defining boundaries of mutuality) will (re)produce conceptions and practices on the part of the Self, which match most closely the ideal standard embodying the values and principles of communal belongingness with the Other.

In brief and translated in the empirical terms of the thesis, differential Europeanisation of foreign policy identity will be shaped by country-specific (Polish, Bulgarian, Russian) constructions of 'Europe', which are differentially conditioned in the interactive process (between (Western) Europe and each of the three states) of establishing the limits and shared affinities of the Euro(-Atlantic) community, and which are benchmarked against an ideal type of European-ness underwriting that community. That is, the character of the interactive process of identification presupposes that the viability, realisation and maintenance of a domestically debated and constructed conception of Europe (constituting a given extent of ideational affinity and desire for belongingness) depends on a corresponding international background that matches this conception in the extent of receptivity, recognition and commitment, thus promoting a given level of inclusivity and shared commonality. Three propositions about 'thick', 'ambivalent' and 'thin' Europeanisation are derived from this argument.

Given that the key research task is to account for differential Europeanisation through an identity-based perspective, and in order to demonstrate the plausibility of the proposed argument, a number of research steps are taken. In particular, the adoption of Constructivism (as the most relevant IR theory to study ideational processes) serves not only the conceptual substantiation and operationalisation of the main argument. Additionally, in following Constructivism, the thesis pinpoints gaps and weaknesses in that theory, which can hamper a concrete empirical and mid-range theoretical exploration of identity construction in a cross-case comparative and interactive manner. Hence, theoretical refinement of Constructivism – as well as understanding differential Europeanisation, form two key purposes of the research programme. Methodologically, the empirical investigation of the hypothesised differences in Europeanisation along three country-cases is devised in such a way as to, first, justify the selection of cases; second, to allow the examination of the role of ideas in foreign policy-making (through a range of within-case analysis methods); and third, to establish similarities and differences among Poland, Bulgaria and Russia on the basis of the structured-focused comparative method. In general, a methodological argument in favour of combining positivist and post-positivist methods is put forward, leading to a ‘middle-ground’ position.

The next section lays out the main conceptual and theoretical standpoints of the study, while the section that follows deals with methodology and methods.

Conceptual clarifications, theoretical framework, alternative and complementary explanations

Conceptual clarifications

A key elaboration is first in order regarding the central concept of ‘identity’. ‘European-ness’ and ‘Europeanisation’ are detailed in the following sub-section as part of the presentation of the theoretical approach of the thesis.

'Identity'

In the most general sense, identity refers to a set of typical characteristics and attributes, which define the outlooks, values, goals and interests of a person or a group. But apart from the internal component, the definition of one's identity also requires an external reference point, a significant Other, comparisons with whom are integral to situating and making meaningful one's own identity. Therefore, identity is relational.

As is much more fully elaborated in Chapter 2, there are two important aspects of the concept of identity that need to be taken into account. The first one relates to the fact that identity has different 'layers' – it can be personal, social, national (which in turn can be civic or ethnic), state, civilizational, imperial. These layers usually feed into each other so that it can be difficult to establish a neat separation, but they can also compete and contradict each other. The thesis argues for the adoption of a broad definition of 'nation-state' identity, which does not foreclose the exploration of the interrelations as well as oppositions between the different layers of identity, whereby the European dimension of identification is constitutive of the national, state and civilizational layers.

The second aspect of the concept relates to the 'referents' of identity – the views of different members or groups of a political community can be examined in order that nation-state identity can be analysed. The political elite, the experts and intellectuals, the media and the journalists, the general public as well as the economic elites can each provide an expression of nation-state identity, although their views are likely to be somewhat distinct due to the influence of their different positions in society. The thesis focuses on the way that the relevant foreign policy decision-makers within the political elite as well as the influential international relations experts define and express their nation's identity because external policy is usually the limited preserve of a top

professional, policy-making circle. However, this focus does not preclude a comparison as to whether the Europeanisation of elite identity has an analogue in other parts of society and whether there are mutual influences and feedbacks.

Theoretical framework

The thesis draws on the International Relations theory of Constructivism, which provides the analytical guidelines to examine how socially constructed rules, norms and ideas shape international politics. Yet, the framework developed in Chapter 2 also aims to fill gaps and address weaknesses in Constructivist theoretical and empirical research. One such gap concerns the disjuncture between ontology/epistemology and history/empirics; i.e., between a strong emphasis on ontological and epistemological theorising and an insufficient concrete empirical and mid-range theoretical exploration of how identities are constructed in an interactive and comparative mode and how these identities in turn affect state behaviour. Related to the aforementioned gap is the very limited number of Constructivist studies, which undertake interactive, empirically-informed examinations of identity and its effects on state behaviour both in CEE and elsewhere around the world. Indeed, there are no systematic comparative investigations of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identities.

To develop these neglected areas of study, the doctoral research first presents its response to Constructivist ontological and epistemological debates by forging an interactive ontological standpoint, according to which identity construction, continuity and change represent the product of the interaction of systemic- and unit-level factors. A case is also made in favour of a middle-ground epistemological position that draws on the insights of ‘conventional’, ‘critical’ and ‘linguistic’ Constructivism, while mounting a critique against both scientific realism’s ‘objectivism’ and expectations of law-like regularity and post-

structuralism's assumptions of perpetual contingency, malleability and fluidity of identity. Then, the framework posits a mid-range theoretical exploration of identity construction in an interactive and comparative manner, drawing on Social Psychological findings about how identity persists or evolves and how identity affects behaviour, as well as further stipulating an ideal-typical model of European-ness aimed to serve as a comparative benchmark of Europeanisation.

In particular, the thesis approaches the concept of 'European-ness' as a value-laden notion that denotes the quality of being 'European' in terms of adhering to a set of norms and principles. These norms and principles are to an important extent commonly shared by Western Europe – i.e., despite the diversity of national traditions, they have emerged as part of the general Western political-historical experience and have been further projected onto CEE after 1989 in the form of a (hegemonic) normative discourse. Moreover, overall CEE representations have been historically continuous in depicting and perceiving Western Europe through a totalised mythical and utopical image, made up of those norms, principles and values.

It should also be noted that the general characteristics of 'European-ness' can be associated with the 'West' more generally, to which the US and Canada also belong. Indeed, the West can be taken to represent an abstract concept referring to a group of countries sharing a similar civilizational code. The formative historical contributions to this code include Greek science and philosophy, Roman law, Christian thought, the Enlightenment, the industrial and democratic revolutions, which – albeit sometimes working in a contradictory fashion, have come to shape the constituent elements of the idea of the West (i.e., liberty, democracy, constitutional government, rule of law, private property, individuality) (Nemo, 2006; Bavaj, 2011; Kurth, 2004; Daly, 2015). Emerging as the most powerful representative of the West particularly after World War II, the US has epitomised Western

civilization's progress and modernity, further cementing an institutional link to Europe through NATO, the notion of the 'Euro-Atlantic' community and agreements stipulating the complementarity and interdependence of the transatlantic partners' roles in European affairs (Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990:6; Helsinki Document, 1992:2; Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995).

So the ideational and institutional closeness between Europe and America (and the predominant conflation of Europe and America into the notion of the West in CEE political imagination) allows studying the impact of the US on the Europeanisation of CEE countries and justifies references in the thesis to the term 'West' and 'Euro-Atlantic community' instead of just 'Europe'. As will be demonstrated in the empirical examinations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the US contributed diplomatically and economically to the Europeanisation of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, depending on the level of American commitment to these countries and the positive or negative valuation accorded to the US in Polish, Bulgarian and Russian strategic culture and identity.

Thus, given the historically-informed commonalities in the Western European understanding, projection and generalised eastern perception of European values as well as given the analytical purpose to posit an overall standard in order to examine Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's Europeanisation, the thesis constructs an ideal-typical model of European-ness. This model draws its main normative positions from the principles stipulated in key national strategic documents and treaties as animating individual West European states' domestic and foreign policies as well as the organisational framework and membership criteria of the major institutions on the continent – the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe. That is, the ideal type is informed by and generalises the principled standpoints of those state- and international institutional entities that can be taken to embody the West European experience.

In brief, the normative features of the ideal-typical model of European-ness include democracy, the rule of law, human rights, tolerance, pluralism, support for civic expressions of nationalism, the free market. The conduct of foreign policy and vision of IR stem from and are expected to safeguard these values along a number of key (yet overlapping and mutually entailing) dimensions linked to the realisation of a *liberal, rules-based international order and politics, the establishment of regionally cooperative relations and integration within the core European organisations* of the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Overall, the thesis posits European-ness as an ideal-typical benchmark, adherence to which can warrant inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community, while the term Europeanisation refers to the dynamic and interactive process between Self and Other that conditions extent of inclusivity and ideational affinity (all of which is justified, defined, clarified and related to the literature on Europeanisation much more extensively in Chapter 2). The examination of Europeanisation is carried out on the level of foreign policy (rather than on the administrative-bureaucratic, economic or social policy level) because the domain of external relations epitomises most conspicuously a nation's identity, place in the world and civilizational belongingness in interaction with significant Others (Hill, Wallace, 1996:8).

Finally, the above-presented theoretical standpoints are further utilised in substantiating and building the author's interactive Constructivist approach through the elaboration of the cultural and psychological dynamics that define the mutually constitutive relationship between the Self and the Other in the process of identification. (In terms of group- rather than personal processes of identification, the Self and the Other are argued to represent collective concepts associated respectively with a nation – Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, and its external point of reference – (Western) Europe and America, where relevant).

Constructivism in the context of rival and complementary theoretical perspectives

The interactive Constructivist approach developed in the thesis is also situated in the context of rival and complementary theoretical perspectives.

As regards the latter, it is clarified how the author's approach can be employed in the examination of foreign policy behaviour by sharing an agent-focused standpoint, while not completely overlapping with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The general similarities between interactive Constructivism and Role theory within FPA are outlined and it is further shown how the weaknesses of Role theory scholarship (linked to conceptual imprecision and tensions in the treatment of the agent-structure relationship) can be remedied through Constructivist insights.

As regards the former, the challenges, which Realism as a rival IR explanatory framework can pose to the theoretical perspective of the thesis, are twofold. First, Neorealists and Neoclassical Realists – together with Neoliberal Institutionalists, who all share an instrumentalist-rationalist viewpoint, maintain that identity and norms figure insignificantly in foreign-policy decision-making (as against power-political, interest-based considerations) only to the extent that they represent intervening variables explaining residual variance (i.e., the unexplained variance which cannot be attributed to specific causes) and serve to facilitate cooperation derived from cost-benefit maximisation of pre-existing preferences (Wohlforth, 2008:133-134; Donnelly, 2000:6-12; Keohane, 1984:65-79). To counter this argument, the thesis argues with Constructivists that preferences, power-maximisation motives and even actors themselves are constituted by norms, intersubjective beliefs and socialisation processes, whereby norms and identities affect action as constitutive rather than causal mechanisms by shaping the context in which decisions are made, limiting the range of available foreign policy options, informing

policy-makers' perceptions and assessments of situations (even only subconsciously rather than in an explicitly articulated way) and serving as a legitimating principle.

The second Realist challenge is contained in the claim that Neoclassical Realism may be better able to explain Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's differential Europeanisation – namely, as the outcome of differential perceptions of threat. Such a counterargument might posit that Poland perceived a serious threat from Russia and as a result it quickly moved into the security orbit of the West through a bandwagoning strategy; the Bulgarian perceptions of threat from Russia were much less strong and consequently Bulgaria lagged behind in terms of its integration with the West, whereas Russia thought of the West as an enemy and therefore adopted balancing strategies. Yet, the thesis responds to this challenge by critiquing Neoclassical Realism's theoretical and conceptual assumptions (whose inconsistencies and contradictions undermine the distinctiveness and determinacy of Realism as a research paradigm) as well as by demonstrating Neoclassical Realism's insufficiency and incompleteness in accounting for the empirical record related to Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy.

Methodology

This section elucidates the main points of contestation between positivist and post-positivist approaches towards the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of the social sciences and then puts forward a middle-ground methodological argument. According to this argument, in the epistemological sense the social sciences differ fundamentally from the exact natural sciences, but if social scientists are not to relinquish any claims to objectivity and generalizability and turn the social sciences into an interesting narrative and story-telling, the methodological guidelines of scientific inquiry (linked to rigorously identifying systematic comparative standards that can yield a degree

of generalisation) should be preserved. The following sub-sections present the concrete choice and combination of methods (i.e., the case study method, within-case analysis and cross-case comparison) aimed at both interpreting the meaning of speech and action within particular contexts and establishing a degree of validity and generalizability. The methodological discussion concludes with a justification for the choice of the particular timeframe of empirical analysis (i.e., the decade of the 1990s).

More specifically, at least two key propositions characterise the positivist approach to the social sciences. The first proposition holds that there is a distinction between facts and values and that ‘facts’ are theory neutral. In philosophical terms, this is an objectivist position that sees objective knowledge of the world as possible, although observations may be subjective. Hence, empirical validation or falsification is the hallmark of ‘real’ social inquiry, which fitted particularly well, for example, into the trend towards behaviourist quantification in the 1960s (Smith, 1996:11-47). Second, the positivist approach contains a powerful belief in the existence of regularities in the social – as in the natural – world, licensing both the deductive-nomological and the inductive-statistical forms of law explanation. In International Relations, this assumption lies at the heart of debates about polarity, stability and cycles in world history (Smith, 1996:11-47; Murphy, 1996:157-160).

On the other hand, strands of social theory sharing a post-positivist orientation (such as interpretivism, critical theory, feminism, post-modernism) have contested the epistemological and methodological implications of equating social phenomena with the natural world (Shankman, 1984:3). One of the most important elements in the post-positivist, interpretive critique is related to the idea of ‘meaning’, derived from Max Weber’s work. For him, it was not sufficient to simply establish regularities of social life because social explanation demands more. To make sense of the observed regularities, it is necessary to understand why people act in the way they do, while the understanding of

motivation has to be further placed in an intelligible and more inclusive social-historical context of meaning (Baert, 2005:5). Moreover, building on Weber's scholarship, subsequent social and political theorists have developed a much more strongly anti-naturalist case. For instance, Wittgensteinians, such as Winch, have insisted that cause and effect relationships do not apply to human action, because instead of causes we talk about reasons for action where reasonableness is a matter of public convention and an action embodies the motive or reason for action (Winch, 1990; Tully, 1988:80; Gadamer, 2013).

Overall, despite subscribing to the interpretivist epistemological critique of positivism and to the focus on meaning and context, the thesis argues that some of the methodological elements of scientific inquiry need to be preserved so as not to turn interpretive analysis into interesting story-telling without any claim to validity and generalizability (which can be particularly the case with linguistic-discursive, post-structuralist modes of social scientific research that can succumb to the relativism of multiple interpretations whose 'truthfulness' cannot be adjudicated as each interpretation comes from a particular perspective on the world). Indeed, Giddens points out that if we fully commit ourselves to hermeneutics, then the tasks of social science seem limited to ethnography – to the hermeneutic endeavour of the fusion of horizons. Such a paralysis of the critical will is as logically unsatisfactory as the untutored use of the natural scientific method in the social sciences (Giddens, 1984:284, 335).

Similarly, Skinner proposes a middle ground for the social sciences. He argues that there is some hope for the retention of generalizability if we begin our analysis by focusing not on the individual action to be explained, but rather on the conventions surrounding the performance of the given type of social action in the given social situation. The vital importance of this methodological injunction relates to the fact that understanding what the established, conventional standards are will help us predict or expect to see these standards

followed in the case of various types of social action within a given culture. In this way, we will not get lost in detail and contextualism that is oblivious to the possibility of generalisation (Skinner, 2002:132-143; Tully, 1988:10, 24, 82).

Therefore, a most plausible research strategy may be to follow Weber's advice to social scientists. He disagreed that the task of sociology was to develop an all-embracing deductive science but at the same time Weber did not concur with the view that the study of the social depends on an unfathomable ability to intuition. Sociology as a science, and indeed all of the social sciences, employs interpretative understanding of social action precisely in order to establish an explanation of its itinerary and effects (Baert, 2005:45).

Case study method

The thesis selects three case studies – Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, since only by examining a number of cases does the impact of factors on the outcomes under investigation come into view in a much clearer way that does not show up in single-case analysis (Mahoney, Rueschemeyer, 2003:320-323; Bennett, Elman, 2006:11). Indeed, the comparative framework allows establishing the differentiated character of the international and domestic dimension of identification, which shape different levels of Europeanisation.

Case selection

What justifies the choice of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia as opposed to other post-communist countries as case studies? The methodological rationale is to choose states, which share significant similarities as well as differences in order to ensure that there is both a common and shared basis for comparison and a disparity of conditions that could illuminate the reasons for the contrasting outcomes and allow drawing empirically rich conclusions about differential levels of Europeanisation. (A starting 'snapshot' of these contrasting outcomes that remains to be further substantiated and interpreted is provided by

the observation that Poland was a trailblazer in the EU and NATO accession process on the basis of its advanced domestic and external transformation, Bulgaria achieved accession status at a much slower pace, showing ambivalence about its civilizational orientation, while Russia is not a member of either the EU or NATO and has engaged in normative contestation with the West).

On the one hand, the similarities between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia stem from long-term cultural-historical developments, which have imparted some commonly shared characteristics to the region of Central and Eastern Europe that all three states belong to and which characteristics distanced CEE from the West in political-cultural terms (Dandolov, 2012; Light, 2003; Wydra, 2000). In particular, the consequences of foreign domination and dependence, the historical development of the state and its disconnection from society, the weak democratic tradition, the lagging process of economic modernisation as well as the implications of communist rule, have been invoked as influences upon the political culture of CEE countries (Keane, 1988; Bibo, 2004; Schöpflin, 1990). As Banac (1992) points out, the features of Central-East European societies created by Leninist rules included the perception of the political realm as something dangerous, which strengthened the insular, privatised quality of social life and stifled the development of social trust and civil society.

Moreover, during the Cold War, Poland, Bulgaria and Russia (as part of the then Soviet Union) conducted foreign policies based on three official principles: competition (but also peaceful coexistence) with the West; socialist internationalism (presupposing unity, friendship and close cooperation among the socialist states); and solidarity (with nations in the Third World fighting for national and social liberation) (Zięba, 2011:2). As opposed to the security community (informed by elite ties, economic interdependence and institutional integration) that gradually developed in the West, the Soviet Union's international relations

were predicated on the need for allies as buffer zones, which were disciplined by Soviet military preponderance. This logic of international relations led to habits of paternalism in Moscow and passivity in the satellites; the totalitarian mentality was manifested in a vision of the world exclusively in friend-enemy distinctions and fostered zero-sum, bilateral rules of behaviour.

On the other hand, Poland, Bulgaria and Russia differ in terms of sub-regional belongingness. That is, each of these three countries can be taken as representative of the three culturally-historically shaped sub-regions of CEE – Central, South-eastern and the former Russian Empire/post-Soviet Europe. Although subject to contested interpretation of boundaries and membership, the concept of Central Europe (encompassing Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) generally denotes certain cultural-political differences from South-eastern Europe (the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania, the former Yugoslav countries) and the former Russian Empire/post-Soviet area (including the Russian Federation and the rest of the post-Soviet republics). Already in mediaeval times, Central Europe forged stronger links to Western civilization through Roman Catholicism, the Latin language and alphabet as well as the emerging practice of self-government and political liberty. All of these formed a political-religious frontier to the Orthodox Christian Slavs, the Cyrillic literary tradition and the despotic Byzantine political habits in the south and Muscovite autocracy in the east (Szücs, 1983; Delanty, 2012).

Also, the three sub-regions were shaped by the respective animating characteristics of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires that dominated them. Habsburg rule bequeathed to Central Europe a tradition of a hard-working and fairly honest bureaucracy that fostered trust in its inhabitants in the respectability of government. Given the legal and practical limits on their authority, the Habsburgs were often forced to compromise with their subject populations, which led to a degree of political modernisation (Becker,

Boeckh, Hainz, Wassmann, 2015:2-3; Subtelny, 1997:88). In contrast, the Ottomans' preoccupation with the supply of revenue and recruits for the army incubated traditions of public ignorance, technological backwardness, local corruption, social injustice and lawlessness, with the subject Christian populations only gaining independence in the late 19th century (Ingrao, 1996). The Russian rulers saw themselves as the sole centres of power and could not envisage the Empire as anything but a unitary entity. While society gradually modernised, the political system remained militantly conservative, focused on the triad of 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality' (Subtelny, 1997:89-91). The Soviet Union further perpetuated the traditions of a centralised state, unaccountable political power and authoritarian attitudes of the population.

These long-term historical trends also fed into the nature of communist rule. The Polish (like the Hungarian and Czechoslovak) form of governance could be termed 'national-accommodative' in that it permitted modest levels of civil rights and elite contestation, informed by the pre-communist tradition of semi-democratic, modernising-industrialising polities. In contrast, the Bulgarian (and Romanian) form of governance had 'patrimonial' characteristics since it stifled dissent and relied on extensive patronage – built as this was on pre-communist authoritarian habits, weak political modernisation and lagging economic industrialisation. Finally, the Soviet system came closest to a totalitarian state, whereby an all-powerful bureaucratic regime governed by a disciplined communist party perpetuated tsarist autocratic traditions of crushing societal opposition (Petrescu, 2010:12; Kitschelt, 1999:23-26).

So the choice of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia is aimed at ensuring 'representativeness' of countries selected from the three sub-regions of CEE to establish if the culturally-historically shaped sub-regional characteristics (informed and refracted through distinctive national-identity prisms as specified in the empirical chapters) and patterns of similarity

and difference are reproduced in the post-1989 contemporary period. Yet, one can also posit the distinctions between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia in terms of the ‘objective’ criterion of capabilities in order to study the alternative explanation that levels of Europeanisation are conditioned by power, size and perceptions of threat. Measured according to such a criterion, Russia is a powerful state having regional clout as well as some global impact, followed by Poland as a middle power and Bulgaria as a small power. In economic terms, Russia ranks 12th in the world as regards GDP, Poland – 23rd, Bulgaria – 77th (World Bank, GDP statistics, 2016). In terms of military strength (based on number and diversity of weapons, natural resources, local industry and available manpower), Russia comes 2nd, Poland – 19th, Bulgaria – 67th (Military Strength Ranking, 2017).

A final note is related to certain characteristics, which may impart distinctiveness to the Russian case but which – the thesis argues, do not make that case incomparable to Poland and Bulgaria, since the points of distinction are intimately related to, embedded in and informed by nation-state identity and understandings of ‘Europe’, i.e., the key dimension for cross-case comparison on the part of countries that share a general pattern of sub-regionally conditioned similarities and differences. In particular, Moscow’s great power identity does indeed affect receptivity to and contestation of ‘standards of European-ness’ on the presumption that a great power should receive respect and special status instead of following others’ normative prescriptions. Yet, aside from entailing assertiveness, protection of sovereignty and demands for respect, the animating normative basis of great power-hood – that also affects corresponding international recognition or rejection of a state’s great power claims, is substantiated by deeply ingrained self-conceptions of civilizational (specifically European) belongingness. That is, a great power may lead by principled exemplariness involving a democratic internal structure and a pursuit of a liberal regional and international order or by projecting and encouraging practices of state capture

and the establishment of transimperial patrimonial ties (Mäkinen, 2013:4; Conley, Stefanov, 2016; Wallander, 2007).

Moreover, as elaborated in Chapter 5, the collapse of the multi-national Soviet ‘empire’ and the ongoing process of nation-building since 1991 marked a deeper identity crisis, whereby the elements of ethnic, civic, nation, state, imperial and civilizational identity were in flux. But this deeper crisis can be argued to be a reflection of the weaker cultural-historical basis for Europeanisation so that the diverse elements of identification were differentially interpreted by the overarching Russian identity groups, whose political-ideational struggles prevented a single-minded commitment to joining the Euro-Atlantic space.

Additionally, the absence of the same extent of institutionalisation as in the Polish and Bulgarian cases (i.e., Russia has never been a prospective or eventually a fully-fledged member of the EU and NATO) stands out as a further distinctive feature of Russian Europeanisation. However, as posited in more detail in Chapter 2, pp. 70-73, the thesis’ conceptual stance that ideas shape and are reflected in institutional forms means that the weakness of formal institutional ties can itself be understood as conditioned by ideational divergencies between Western Europe and Russia. Hence, if one analyses institutions as ideationally embedded rather than self-standing rationalist-instrumentalist phenomena, then the difference between those within and without institutional confines is not a marker of unique incomparability but can still be examined as part of the identity-based axis of comparison.

Finally, Russia represents an additional significant Other for Poland and Bulgaria. Yet and as concluded in Chapter 6, p. 337, although the determination with which these two countries pursued their Europeanisation was to some extent informed by the place that the

Russian Other takes in their national-state identity and conceptualisations about the principled compatibility between Russia and Europe, Moscow nevertheless did not pose an ideational and power-based alternative to the Euro-Atlantic framework for – and retreated from, Central and Southeast Europe (Mangott, 1999). Thus, Western Europe (and the US, where applicable) remained the most significant, relevant and standard-positing Other for Poland and Bulgaria in the process of establishing affinities to European-ness.

Overall, although the above-discussed characteristics of the Russian case contribute to relative distinctiveness, they are also argued to be inseparably linked to and informative with the overarching visions, values and norms inherent in nation-state identity and the understandings of Europe rooted in it. Therefore, the special features do not stand apart from questions of Europeanisation and do not prevent comparisons in ideational terms with Poland and Bulgaria, with whom Russia ultimately shared a general commitment to Europeanisation in the 1990s, an overall perception of Europe along the axes of utopia and threat and a common relationship to the West European model as formative of national consciousness. The conceptual and empirical investigations of these points are further developed in Chapter 2, pp. 61-62, and Chapter 5 (especially the analysis of the identity scene).

Within-case analysis methods

A major methodological challenge is to establish that ideas and identities matter in the process of policy-making, which is addressed through the use of an interpretive framework (providing a thick description of the context wherein foreign policy decisions are deliberated and undertaken), coupled with within-case analysis methods, including discourse analysis, process tracing and the congruence method (whose combination aims to demonstrate whether there is a link between politicians' statements and actions).

Before elaborating on these methods, it should be clarified whose ideas and policies the thesis is examining. Given the subject matter of foreign policy decision-making, special attention is paid to those individuals in the executive branch of power who are responsible for making and implementing a country's external relations – i.e., above all the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and President, as well as the deputies in legislative committees tasked with scrutinising the country's international commitments and actions. The foreign policy-making authority among these seats of power may differ depending on the state's constitutional arrangements.

In Poland and Bulgaria, which are parliamentary republics, foreign policy decision-making rests principally with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Council of Ministers. In both countries, the President is the supreme representative of the state in external affairs and supreme commander of the Armed Forces. But the Polish constitution accords a relatively greater role to the President, as he/she shall act in cooperation with the Prime Minister and appropriate minister in respect of foreign policy, while the Bulgarian constitution stipulates that the President shall only conclude international treaties on a motion from the Council of Ministers. Finally, in Poland – as in Bulgaria, the parliament exercises control over the activities of the Council of Ministers and may appoint investigative committees to examine a particular issue (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997: Articles 95, 111, 126, 133, 134, 146, 148, 149; Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991: Articles 62, 79, 85, 92, 98, 100, 105, 106, 115).

In contrast, Russia can be classified as a federal, semi-presidential republic, where foreign policy-making is concentrated primarily in the hands of the President, who governs and determines the guidelines of external affairs, holds negotiations, signs international treaties, appoints or recalls diplomatic representatives. The government's duty is to

implement the foreign policy line set by the President (Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993: Articles 80, 83, 86, 114).

Moreover, apart from the constitutional stipulations about which members of the executive have the authority to make foreign policy, the debate, formulation and conduct of external relations can also be influenced by the wider political and social context. This context includes party-political attitudes, political culture, popular opinion as well as the impact of politicians, experts, advisors, intellectuals and public figures, who possess political, moral and intellectual authority without necessarily filling in a particular institutional post. Thus, in studying foreign policy, the thesis aims at analysing the subjective and intersubjective context of decision-making – i.e., the individual perceptions and beliefs of particular policy-makers that are situated within and shaped by socially rooted and shared ideational positions.

Interpretivism: discourse analysis with a focus on elite interviews

As already clarified earlier in this section, the thesis subscribes to interpretivism. A key method for the interpretivist framework is discourse analysis, which uncovers meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena (Dunn, Neumann, 2016). To establish intersubjective understandings (rather than contingent, individually idiosyncratic stances), discourse analysis should reconstruct the tacit rules, the shared experience and collective knowledge of social actors by relating texts to context and social practices (Milliken, 1999:10). Hence, the appropriate research strategy includes a thorough review of primary and secondary sources relevant to the topics of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identity, representing a collection of texts constituted as speech, written documents and social practices. These sources encompass the foreign policy-making elites' public statements, speeches, official policy documents, media outlets

and commentaries, the academic literature, political observers' expert analyses. The main task would be to analyse Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's conceptions of European-ness by examining domestic political debates, influenced as they are by the national and international context.

In particular, elite interviewing is a vital method employed for its expected contribution to three interrelated areas of discourse analysis. First, gathering relevant and directly related interview material can serve to further illuminate – i.e., confirm or challenge empirically from a 'hands-on' policy-making and expert lens, the key conceptual and theoretical argument and propositions of the thesis (especially by demonstrating the extent to which levels of Europeanisation were indeed established in the context of mutually constitutive interaction between the external and internal dimension of identification as opposed to interest-based, single-factor (domestic or international) considerations). Second, in the process of shedding light on the specific theoretical concerns of the doctoral study (for whose examination the secondary empirical material is not directly related or comprehensively backed up by interviews), elite interviews can thus be a useful complement that rigorously focuses on local viewpoints for filling gaps and resolving ambiguities in the already available literature (where the predominant area-studies focus on Poland, Bulgaria and Russia speaks to particular issues of their domestic and foreign policies, presenting equivocal and insufficient evidence regarding the question of Europeanisation as conceptualised by the thesis – the overview of the literature is laid out in Chapter 2, pp. 54-59). Third, the interview material should be conducive to the overall enrichment of the empirical exploration by providing nuances of country-based opinion, the local priorities and accents placed on given issue areas, the motivations behind and relationships of influence on a foreign policy course of action and corresponding insight into the inner workings of government when choosing a policy option. Ultimately,

although other primary sources (such as public speeches, strategic documents) also contribute to the backbone of the empirical investigations, the method of elite interviewing can grant a deeper discernment, justification and clarification of specific statements and actions contained in the more original, conversational accounts.

In terms of sampling strategy, the author uses non-probability sampling techniques because random sampling would be hindered by the issue of access (i.e., the impossibility of guaranteeing a fixed positive response rate on the part of designated interviewees) but also because randomness is not essential to the goals of the research. More concretely, the aim is not to make quantified statistical inferences based on closed, structured questionnaires but to obtain qualitative information about specific events and processes, for which one needs interviewees who have had most involvement in or most knowledge about these events and processes, while striving for a degree of representativeness. So the non-probability sampling strategy is ‘purposive’ – i.e., guided by the purposes of the study and the researcher’s knowledge about the population sample. Also, interviewees are chosen on the basis of reputational criteria – namely, how influential and knowledgeable these people are (Tansey, 2007:3, 18, 21).

The author conducted a total of 75 interviews (26 in Poland, 24 in Bulgaria and 25 in Russia – see Appendix III). The overwhelming majority of interviews were tape-recorded and on the record, with the exception of three anonymised interviews in Poland and one anonymised interview in Bulgaria. The conversations were approached on the basis of semi-structured questions that displayed both similarities of formulation among the countries (in order to conduct the cross-case comparison) and differences (to take into account specific national processes, the interviewees’ particular experiences and to be able to follow through novel and unexpected information) (see Appendix IV). The interviews

were carried out in the local language in combination with English, which was necessitated in Poland given the author's less developed Polish language oral skills.

There are two methodological issues of elite interviewing that need to be taken into account. First, as regards access to political post-holders, three different levels of openness of the culture of public debate can be stipulated (which is a methodologically inferred differentiation mapping onto levels of Europeanisation). More specifically, in Russia, the author conducted interviews with public intellectuals (who nevertheless had some involvement in the political process in an advisory role) rather than politicians. Access to the latter was most likely hindered by the closed character of the political system as well as the concrete situation at the time of the fieldwork in 2014, when increasing tensions between Russia and the West turned foreign policy into a sensitive topic of discussion, especially with scholars from Western institutions. In Bulgaria, the author achieved an equal balance of interviews with left- and right-leaning politicians, but did not receive responses from representatives of the MRF and GERB. This can presumably be explained by the hierarchical-authoritarian internal structure and political conduct of these parties (and not by any characteristics of the author, who does not have political affiliations in her home country). In Poland, a wide array of politicians were interviewed without obstacles. Thus, holding constant the author's effort in gaining access to politicians and her public-political neutrality, regularised non-response from the abovementioned groupings can be explained by levels of political openness and freedom of public debate. Lack of interview material is compensated for with official statements and secondary sources.

Second, the elite interviewing method can be subject to problems of reliability, particularly when citing an individual interviewee's rather than generalised interviewees' responses. These problems can arise due to mendacity, error (as a result of lapses of memory or lack of complete knowledge), self-enhancement (spinning a story to present oneself in the best

possible light), concerns with social desirability or simply subjectivity (one's individual or occupational perspective colours unconsciously their recollections). In order to avoid such issues, the technique of triangulation has to be used so that the interview material is compared with and referenced alongside statements made by the interviewee as well as secondary research about the events in which the interviewee was involved to establish consistency between interviews and documents. That is, as long as the interviewee's credentials are sound, the contours of his/her words and actions provided by other primary and secondary sources are held up and no flagrant discrepancies with the historical record and the inter-subjective views surrounding a given foreign policy development are identifiable, then the reliability of the interviewee's account can be ascertained overall. Similarly, in the case of generalisations of interviewees' opinions, one should relate a stance enunciated by a set of interviewees (belonging to a given political-intellectual grouping) to that grouping's stated ideas and background politics to control for instrumentalised misrepresentation and spin of party positions when vested interests are concerned.

Moreover, as discussed below, the discourse analysis of elite interviews and other primary sources is further triangulated by tracing the consistency and congruence between the statement, pursuit and enactment of identity stances.

Process tracing and the congruence method

Despite the primary focus on interpretivism, in order for social science research not to lose its rigour and forgo all claims to some generalizability and validity, there are two strategies that the thesis employs, which aim at establishing causal pathways and allow examining whether professed beliefs inform action (thus going beyond a purely discursive analysis that does not check for the extent to which utterances entail practical policy implications).

First, process tracing is a useful method for the identification of correlations because it traces the process – the intervening steps – by which beliefs influence behaviour. Process tracing seeks to establish how the actors' beliefs influence their assessment of incoming information about a given situation, identification and evaluation of options as well as the choice of a course of action (Khong, 1992:64; Brady, Collier, 2010:103-104).

Second, the congruence method aims at checking for consistency between a policy-maker's beliefs and his/her policy choice and is thus a useful complement to process tracing, focusing on the link between the hypothesised cause and the outcome rather than intervening steps in the process (Khong, 1992:66). In the thesis, the congruence method checks the consistency between the identity stances professed by the relevant decision-makers and the policies adopted.

Cross-case comparison

In order to account for the differential Europeanisation of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia on the basis of an interactive Constructivist analytical framework, the thesis follows the guidelines of structured-focused comparison. As George and Bennett make clear, the method is 'structured' in that the researcher writes general questions reflecting the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case to guide and standardise data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 'focused' in that it deals with certain aspects of the cases examined, guided by a well-defined theoretical goal (George, Bennett, 2005:67).

In particular, the thesis posits an ideal-typical model of European-ness to serve as a comparative benchmark. According to Max Weber's pioneering work on the ideal type, no scientific system is ever capable of reproducing all concrete reality, nor can any conceptual apparatus ever do full justice to the infinite diversity of a particular phenomenon. The

notion of the ideal type is therefore meant to provide an escape from the dilemma between overgeneralising (leading to obliviousness to the unique features of a given phenomenon) and particularising (rendering even contingent generalisations impossible due to a focus on unique characteristics) (Coser, 1977:223-224; Lindbekk, 1992:7). Thus, the ideal-typical analytical approach to European-ness allows the thesis to generalise common normative dispositions in the West (although these may not be consistently espoused and practised, may even be subject to erosion and may have specific connotations depending on distinctive national conceptions of Europe) as well as to gauge Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's ideational affinity to that model between 1989 and 2000 (although 'perfect' conformity cannot be expected even in the most Europeanised case).

In the cross-case comparative research setup, the thesis eschews an approach focused on 'dependent' and 'independent' variables given the interpretive analytical framework, which does not aim to uncover cause-effect, law-like positivist relationships and which ultimately demonstrates that rather than being purely isolatable variables, the 'explanandum' and 'explanans' are mutually constitutive. Yet, the study still preserves the guidelines for a robust research strategy, whose goal is to produce reliable findings, by positing differential outcomes (hence avoiding the selection bias of choosing similar manifestations of a phenomenon) in order to identify the complexity of conditions that can account for the differences in outcomes (or what George and Bennett call 'variation') (George, Bennett, 2005:80). That is, the thesis aims to interpret differential levels of Europeanisation – instead of focusing only on those countries, which were most 'advanced'/'successful' in this process.

Thus, along Barbara Geddes' guidelines, the study steers clear of the selection bias of examining cases clustered at one end of the outcome continuum so that the inclusion of contrasting outcomes controls for making implicit and unfounded assumptions about

causal (or constitutive) relationships in the whole universe of cases (which are relevant to the argument's domain) through an exploration of only those cases that exhibit a similarity among themselves (Geddes, 2003:91-97). This makes for a non-parsimonious, complex theory claiming cautious generalizability to other CEE states, whereby the aim to understand the differential Europeanisation of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia also aspires to some wider validity by demonstrating these countries' respective belongingness to the three culturally-historically framed sub-regions of CEE (as elaborated in the sub-section on case selection in this chapter). So although the unique distinctiveness of the three states (as indeed of any state) means that the observed similarities and differences in the comparative setup will first and foremost apply to those states, their sub-regional representativeness allows making theoretical conclusions about the larger patterns of sub-regional resemblances and contrasts recreated in the post-communist period, as reflected in the propositions about what 'thick', 'ambivalent' and 'thin' Europeanisation entail.

For instance, if one selects the Czech Republic from the sub-region of Central Europe and Romania from the sub-region of South-east Europe, the difference in Europeanisation between them should exhibit similarities to that between Poland and Bulgaria. So despite there being unique processes that characterise Czech and Romanian Europeanisation, there are expected to be regularities due to cultural-historical conditions peculiar to Central- and South-east Europe as well as similarities of European perceptions. Although Russia differs from the rest of the post-Soviet region as a result of its post-imperial status and lingering great-power identity, it might still be possible to reach relevant conclusions about the Europeanisation of other former Soviet countries because of their shared sub-regional domestic and international typicality with Russia.

However, a sequel (in postdoctoral examinations, for example) to the thesis' research of patterns of Europeanisation among Poland, Bulgaria and Russia (which patterns also

substantiate the plausibility of continuously contrasting ideational regularities among CEE's sub-regions after 1989 given the cases' sub-regional typicality) can be based on the further task to demonstrate if such patterns still hold with respect to 'outliers' that may not neatly fit sub-regional categories. For instance, Ukraine and Georgia can be argued to be 'outlying' cases for three reasons. First, these two countries straddle the conflicting and overlapping sub-regional historical, geographical and cultural traditions of Central and Eastern Europe (the Central European and the former Soviet sub-regional heritage in Ukraine's case as well as the former Soviet, South Caucasian, Black Sea, Middle Eastern sub-regional belongingness in Georgia's case) in contrast to the more clearly 'representative' countries of the Central, Southeast and former Soviet regions that Poland, Bulgaria and Russia generally tend to be.

Second, Ukraine and Georgia have demonstrated a strongly determined (although not necessarily consistent) aspiration towards joining the Euro-Atlantic civilizational space, which flourished particularly in the new millennium even in the face of Russian objection leading to a loss of territory and direct military intervention such as the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis that began in late 2013 (MacFarlane, 2012:20; Maksak, Mashtaler, 2017:48). This suggests a potential disjuncture between the direction of the domestic and international dimension of identification, whereby the internal push for Europeanisation – reminiscent of a 'thickly' (or at least 'ambivalently') Europeanised desire for a return to Europe, meets with a European and American reluctance to accept fully Ukraine and Georgia in the Euro-Atlantic cultural and organisational mould – as a 'thin' external commitment to the post-Soviet region would presuppose, albeit more engaging politically and institutionally. This is unlike the cases of the doctoral study, where the degree of European affinity to a given CEE country is matched by a similar national-level enthusiasm for 'returning to Europe'.

Finally, the international context of Ukraine's and Georgia's Europeanisation has been further characterised by Russian great-power assertiveness in the post-Soviet space, where Moscow's regional resurgence has been informed by preferences for 19th-century practices of spheres of influence, use of force and the establishment of organisational alternatives to the EU – i.e., the Eurasian Economic Union. This may warrant the designation of a distinctive international phenomenon of contested 'Otherness' based on a clash of hegemonic visions and projects of integration between Russia and the West. That is, such a phenomenon can be characterised by the involvement of an Other (Russia) that actively interferes in, contests and blocks the process of identification that concerns the Other (Europe) who emanates the ideal-typical value standards underlying the (Euro-Atlantic) community to which the Self (Ukraine/Georgia) wants to be included. In contrast, as indicated earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 6, p. 337, for Poland and Bulgaria Russia represented an additional – but not crucial and overbearingly defiant, Other.

Overall, the most significant consequence of the availability of multiple identifications and the 'atypical' of the post-Soviet region strong impetus for Europeanisation may be the possibility of greater leeway and social creativity in fashioning a foreign policy identity – such as a Central European one for Ukraine and a Black Sea-South-east European one for Georgia, both of which apparently draw Kiev and Tbilisi closer to Europe than the former Soviet markers of identity. This leeway moreover introduces a tension between the reciprocal-mirroring correspondence between Self and Other characteristic of consensually agreed identifications (as in the cases of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia), given the general European hesitation towards Ukrainian and Georgian aspirations for European-ness. Therefore, the question is whether the potential for a more fundamental change in identity (in contrast to a sub-regionally conditioned continuity) can be fulfilled on the basis of a struggle over the renegotiation of identity between Self and Other or whether this potential

will be further constrained by the countervailing influence of the rest of the domestically supported sub-regional identifications, European perceptions of difference and Russian imperial-historical claims on Ukraine and Georgia.

Timeframe of the empirical analysis

The final consideration regarding the procedural-methodological framework of the empirical analysis concerns the justification for the choice of the particular timeline of 1989-2000. The distinctiveness of this decade (from what followed in the 2000s and 2010s) is based on the animating spirit and substantive challenges that characterised Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's foreign policy environment (with the caveat that the analysis of Russian foreign policy starts in 1991 when the official dissolution of the USSR took place).

In particular, as the period immediately following the 'revolutionary' year of 1989, the collapse of bipolarity and communism and the inauguration of wholesale political, economic, nation-building and international transformations, the 1990s were marked by the most strenuous turmoil, flux, uncertainty and crisis, posing the challenge ahead of post-socialist states to work out their civilizational response and belonging. Hence, in these circumstances, domestic debates were distinguished by their vigour, intensity, symbolic-ideational argumentation, while the West was simultaneously defining the boundaries of Europe and differentiating between potential members and outsiders (Stadtmüller, 2000:29; Szczerbiak, 2001:9; Prozorov, 2009:42-52; Mihaylova, 2015, interview).

Thus, as further substantiated in the theoretical chapter, pp. 94-95, and empirical chapters, the special symbolic loaded-ness of the decade (linked to the return to Europe and European unification) in the midst of crisis and flux sharpened to the utmost the domestic and international fervour with regard to Europeanisation and imparted to the 1990s their

distinctive Zeitgeist. However, rather than positing this period as a bounded and completed stage towards a transition's end-point, it should be noted that that was a space of time intimately linked to what had gone on before and what happened after. More specifically, the civilizational orientation worked out in the 1990s at once designated the recreation of national conceptions of Europe (of the long duree), which were further continued and put into practice (while also being modified) in the following periods.

Therefore, it is not proposed that the 1990s were a disjointed temporal slice but that the focus on the decade is justified by the special spirit and challenges of the times so that the particular, 1990s' resolution of the return to Europe question through a given level of Europeanisation in each of the three countries under examination was more concretely substantiated in the 2000s and 2010s, when, however, the symbolic dimension was being subdued, the crisis subsided and some previously suppressed ideational strands re-emerged. So the 2000s/2010s can be explored in future work as a sequel to the 1990s (albeit less acute and urgent symbolically), while the period after 2015 – that is still in the making, may represent a fundamental challenge to ideal-typical European-ness, having benchmarked the process of Europeanisation between 1989 and 2015. That is, Britain's vote to leave the European Union, the populist wave throughout European countries and Donald Trump's election as American President potentially undermine the liberal international order and the cooperative-multilateral-consensual conception of European-ness as pillars of post-Cold War politics and of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Significance of the research

The significance of the research is both theoretical and empirical. As regards the former, the thesis develops a refined Constructivist theory in International Relations that takes a middle-ground ontological and epistemological position, focuses on a mid-range

theoretical exploration of identity construction, continuity and change in an interactive and comparative manner and stipulates how identity affects state behaviour (the gaps and weaknesses that such a refinement addresses in Constructivist research is discussed in more detail in the overview of Constructivism in the next chapter). Moreover, given that a main finding of the thesis is that understanding Europeanisation in CEE may be more plausibly achieved through a Constructivist rather than a Realist perspective, at least two challenges to the Realist paradigm can be mounted. As opposed to Realists' positing the autonomy of the international and the domestic level and their ultimate theoretical commitment to the system's primacy in determining state behaviour (despite introducing variables from the unit- and individual-level of analysis, which results in theoretical contradictions), the doctoral research argues that it is problematic to distinguish the external from the internal as they mutually constitute one another (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016:12, 159; Waltz, 2010:47-58). Also, in contrast to Realism's privileging of material over ideational-subjective factors, the thesis argues that 'reality' is refracted through the perceptual lenses of political elites, who are part of a given culture constituted by Self-Other affinities and whose foreign policy stances demonstrate the influence of identity.

As regards empirical contribution, no study has undertaken a systematic comparative examination of the differential Europeanisation of the foreign policy identity of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia on the basis of extensive fieldwork producing rich and informative interview material. Also, beyond the specific combination of these three countries per se, the comparative work's value lies in addressing the gaps in the theoretical lenses applied to CEE. As argued in the introduction to this chapter and as demonstrated in the review of the literature in Chapter 2, the overwhelming focus of scholarship of transition on domestic transformations towards democracy and a market economy underprivileged the

examination of the foreign policy transformations of post-communist states. And if pursued, such examinations are based on area studies rather than (Constructivist) IR approaches. Moreover, even the literature on Europeanisation – as dominantly and differently conceptualised from the author’s treatment of the issue (and hence not directly and completely applicable to the research puzzle and assumptions of the thesis as made clear in Chapter 2) has somewhat drifted away from the discipline of International Relations. This is reflected in the shift from the study of European integration among states to Europeanisation, whereby the deepening of integration led to the creation of a EU political system that produces decisions and impacts on policies, increasingly investigated within the domain of Political Science (Tonra, 2015). The literature on Europeanisation also features a more limited focus on CEE foreign policy transformations, as clarified in the literature review in Chapter 2, p. 56.

Thus, the key empirical contribution (on its own terms as regards the specific juxtaposition of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and in substantiating the theoretical standpoints of the thesis by at the same time addressing the omissions and weaknesses in CEE scholarship) is comparative but the distinctiveness of the individual, country-based empirical investigations can be found in the analytical framing of these investigations (on the basis of the refined Constructivist theory as opposed to the different conceptual focus in the existing literature explained above) backed up by extensive interview material (clarified in the literature review in Chapter 2).

Overall, the empirical account of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian identity construction suggests that there is a significant degree of continuity of culturally-historically shaped patterns of ideas, group self-understandings and sub-regional identifications. Although the historical continuity of identities may be self-evident rather than innovative, its vindication serves to reinvigorate the challenge to rationalist-Realist perspectives as well as to

revitalise an emphasis on ideational persistence balancing out a prominent social scientific (especially post-modernist) view of the emancipating potential of identities that are constantly fluid, malleable and in flux (Caldas-Coulthard, Iedema, 2010; Howard, 2000:20; McCrone, 1998:47; Dunn, 1998; Powell, 1996:6). Moreover, the conclusion regarding continuity reinforces the importance of historical context when devising theories and policy prescriptions animated by grand narratives of ‘convergence’, ‘democratisation’, ‘liberalisation’ and ‘transition from authoritarianism’. It is also useful for understanding the problems of effectiveness and credibility besetting Europe’s role in the eastern neighbourhood, given that achieving conformity to standards of European-ness there will be conditioned by the extent of European- and nation-level mutual ideational affinities moulded in the long *duree*. Hence, the theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis can contribute to the Constructivist perspective on regionalism, which holds that the cohesion and expansion of a regional order depend on the presence of shared values and understandings, intensity of ties, socialisation and feelings of kinship (as a matter of long-term, mutually constituted continuity) among the units already constituting or attempting to join that order (Fawcett, Hurrell, 1995:38-39, 64-65; Acharya, 2000, 2009; Adler, Crawford, 2002; Buzan, Waever, 2003; Dirlik, 1992; Katzenstein, 2005; Neumann, 1994; Sørensen, 2008).

To sum up, the original contribution of the thesis is first and foremost related to the development of a refined Constructivist theory and the comparison of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identities as situated within and filling the gaps in the relevant literatures on Constructivism, area studies, democratisation and Europeanisation. Additionally, although the focus of the doctoral work on the interactive construction of identity, the continuity and change of identity and the mutual constitution of ideas and interests is part of established avenues for research, their theoretical and empirical

substantiation across three cases serves as a detailed reinvigoration, justification and reemphasis on these issues.

Structure of the thesis

In what follows, there are five more chapters, each devoted respectively to the development of the theoretical framework, the empirical investigations of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identity as well as to the presentation of the comparative conclusions.

Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

As Chapter 1 has made clear, the key purpose of the thesis is to understand the differential Europeanisation of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, given that this difference is not adequately accounted for by rationalist-institutionalist perspectives (whose expectation of a similar convergence with the West is contradicted by the diversity in outcomes) and nor is it systematically examined by International Relations theories. The adoption of the Constructivist theoretical approach to address the research puzzle, however, also pinpoints weaknesses and gaps in existing Constructivist works. Hence, refinement of Constructivism forms a second key purpose of the doctoral work.

Fulfilling the two key purposes is taken up in this chapter and is pursued on the basis of an analytical strategy that reviews, highlights and addresses (ontological, epistemological, theoretical and empirical) debates, shortcomings and gaps in Constructivist studies, which – if unresolved, would particularly hamper a mid-range theoretical, comparative and interactive investigation of identity construction. Moreover, the thesis employs insights from Social Psychology (in order to illuminate the problems of identity continuity and change and of how identity affects behaviour) and develops the concepts of ‘European-ness’ and ‘Europeanisation’ (in order to focus the theoretical analysis on the specific European context). All of these research steps inform the basis of the author’s Constructivist perspective, which is further substantiated by an analysis of the interactive, mutually constitutive quality of the Self-Other relationship. Overall, the aim of the refined Constructivist approach will then be to contribute to theory-building, in general, and to serve as an analytical guideline in corroborating the main argument and directing the empirical investigations, in particular.

The four main sections of the chapter are devoted to the development of the above analytical strategy. The first section defines and discusses the core concept of identity. The second section situates the Constructivist approach of the thesis within the most influential and dominant Constructivist studies and perspectives in order to clarify points of similarity and continuation of intellectual tradition but also to demonstrate how the author's approach fills gaps in and addresses criticisms of Constructivist research. Moreover, it is elucidated how the Europeanisation literature and Social Psychology can enrich and complement an IR Constructivist account of identity. The third section elaborates further the interactive Constructivist approach of the author and posits the main argument and propositions. The final part of the chapter places and defends the merits of this approach within the context of rival alternative as well as potentially complementary theoretical perspectives – i.e., Realism and Role theory in FPA, respectively.

Definition of identity

'Layers' of identity

Identity can refer to personal and social phenomena of various degrees of generality: it is a multi-layered phenomenon and, in an ascending order of generality, identities can be built up from individual to societal (class, gender), national, state, imperial and civilizational. However, it is difficult to establish a neat separation between these layers as they complement, feed into, but can also contradict, each other.

'Personal identity' designates values, motivations and goals that provide a fundamental guidance as to a person's attitudes and actions in distinction to other individuals. 'Social identity' refers to a social category, a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and characteristic features or attributes (Fearon, 1999:4). 'National identity' is a form of social identity whereby the nation is the major reference

category. It is a collective concept, which addresses the ways in which individual communities identify themselves with a national entity, and thus it parallels closely the concept of sovereignty and a unitary state (Krause, Renwick, 1996:25).

Some distinctions can be drawn between 'national' and 'state' identity. To a certain extent, these distinctions result from the different theoretical concerns across the disciplinary fields of Political Science and International Relations. Those scholars concerned with domestic politics and nationalism see identity as 'national', while scholars of foreign policy and international relations emphasise the external dimension of identity (Alexandrov, 2003:4-5). In particular, national identity is generally defined as the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, traditions that compose the distinctive cultural heritage of a nation and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage (Smith, 2009). Thus, national identity is constituted by religion, language, ethnicity, territory, which define a community of fate bound by common historical experiences. Moreover, national identity can be further defined in terms of 'ethnic' or 'civic', depending on whether a greater emphasis is laid on citizenship or ethnic ties as criteria of belongingness. On the other hand, state identity is more 'outward'-oriented since it refers to a state's place in the world and is intimately linked to ideas about the Self and the Other in international relations. Discourses of external threats, which are supposed to rally the nation against foreign hostility, can fulfil the purpose of national unity (oftentimes behind the protective guidance of political forces who view the creation of enemy images as a way of legitimising their hold on power).

On a higher level of generality, one can also speak about 'civilizational' identity, which refers to perceptions of belongingness to a much larger community of nations that share a commitment to common (usually thought to be universal) values, a common religion,

political ideology, social practices and cultural styles. A civilization is also usually characterised by a 'core', which is the creator and represents the full embodiment of those values and traditions, and a 'periphery', whose 'true' belongingness to that civilization may be ambivalent (Malinova, 2012:50). Somewhat similar to civilizational identity is imperial identity, which, however, defines social relations in one political unit.

Yet, these distinctions are not so clear-cut and there is interaction, fusion but also competition and contradiction among the different layers of identity. National and state identities often, if not always, overlap. For instance, national identity is an important source of state identity – it informs ideas about a state's place on the ideological and civilizational map of the world. In turn, the state moulds national identity as many nationalism scholars have demonstrated. Ernest Gellner (2006), Benedict Anderson (2006), Eric Hobsbawm (2012), John Breuilly (1993) have stressed the importance of 'invention' and the 'imagining' of community and traditions in the political process of nation-state formation.

On the other hand, the different layers of identity can also contradict and compete with each other. Traditions of imperial identity may undermine attempts to create national identity; the ethnic and civic components of national identity may clash just like regional and state identities as well as religious belongingness. For instance, in Georgia, state identity may be constructed in the direction of implementing EU norms (such as secularity and protection of gay rights), but such a construction may clash with religious identity, which upholds the influence of the Orthodox Church on social and political life and contains wariness of alternative sexual preferences (MacFarlane, 2002:12; Minesashvili, 2015).

Overall, given the above considerations, according to which identity consists of multiple interacting complementary or competing layers, the thesis adopts a broad focus on nation-state identity (as expressed in foreign policy). This broad focus does not foreclose possible interrelations between the different layers so that the European dimension of identification represents a core constituent of conceptions of national, state and civilizational identity – as demonstrated in the analysis of the identity scene in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia taken up in the respective country-specific empirical chapters.

‘Referent groups’ of identity

The various forms of identity analysed above can be expressed by different groups in a community – by the political elite in their official statements, by society in the form of public opinion, by intellectuals in their writings, by the media as well as the economic elites. The thesis focuses above all on the way that the relevant decision-makers within the political elite as well as the influential international relations experts conceptualise and implement their identity stances. One reason for this choice is that foreign policy – which is the subject of the study’s investigations and which epitomises a shared sense of national identity, traditions, place in the world, interest and aspirations in relation to other states, is for the most part an elite affair (Hill, Wallace, 1996:8). That is, external relations remain the preserve of a small group of decision-makers and experts, who possess relevant diplomatic information (including intelligence) that is not accessible to the populace, which itself tends to be more concerned with socio-economic issues. Moreover, foreign policy-makers participate in European and international fora and become part of an elite network, which can have a significant effect on their identity stances in contrast to the wider public that is not part of such processes. Thus, while the political elite and the experts belong to the broader national-cultural environment and as a result their identity

stances are informed by general popular discourses, it is up to political-intellectual elites themselves to decide when and how to utilise particular identity discourses and to induce innovation in those discourses within the bounds of electoral considerations. However, the observation that political-intellectual elites matter overwhelmingly in the formulation of foreign policy does not preclude the examination of public opinion in order to compare and contrast the ways in which the politicians and the wider public perceive their country's identity.

The interactive Constructivist approach of the thesis situated within key relevant theoretical perspectives

Constructivism

Constructivism involves the claims that material forces have to be understood through the social concepts that define them, that structures and agents mutually constitute each other and that state interests and identity are socially constituted through interactions among states and their social environment. For Constructivists, ideational and normative factors are crucial determinants of international processes and events (Hurd, 2008; Wendt, 1999; Barnett, Finnemore, 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 2001; Kratochwil 1991, 2001; Adler, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996; Reus-Smit, 2009; Risse, Ropp, Sikkink, 1999). Yet, despite subscribing to the aforementioned assumptions, Constructivists disagree on questions of epistemology and ontology, while being subject to further criticisms on theoretical and empirical grounds (mounted by fellow Constructivist researchers and rationalists alike).

In what follows, these differences and criticisms are presented and it is subsequently argued that the author's study can address Constructivist weaknesses and can contribute to the few theoretical and empirically comparative works that examine identity as the interactive product of Self-Other dynamics in CEE (or indeed elsewhere in the world).

Ontological and epistemological differences

One major axis of difference among Constructivists is related to their ontological standpoints and commitments – i.e., Constructivists have disagreed over whether international (system-level) or national (unit-level) factors have primacy in the formation of state identities and interests (thus paradoxically sidelining or taking as ‘given’ the major Constructivist guideline that it is impossible for structure to have effects apart from the attributes and interactions of agents) (Wendt, 1992:15-17; Wendt, 1999:11-23).

Some of the most influential Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt and Martha Finnemore have elaborated a systemic approach. Wendt claims that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and reinforced in accordance with the way actors are treated by significant Others. So the principles of ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘mirroring’ are crucial because the most important thing in social life is how the Self begins to see itself as a reflection of its appraisal by a significant Other (Wendt, 1999:327-335, 346; Wendt, 1992:16, 17). Similarly, according to Finnemore, the starting point of analysis is the international structure because its rules and values create all actors we might consider relevant in international politics – states, firms, organisations, even individuals. State interests and behaviour are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate (Barnett, Finnemore, 2004; Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998; Keck, Sikkink, 1998).

However, ‘unit-level’ Constructivists have criticised ‘systemic’ Constructivists for paying insufficient attention to domestic factors (Katzenstein, 1996; Lapid, Kratochwil, 1996; Hunt, 2009). It is charged that Wendt says next to nothing about actors prior to their interaction and Wendt’s belief in actors as cultural ‘blank slates’ prior to contact prevents him from examining the domestic sources of a state’s identity and international behaviour.

Thus, Katzenstein's and Lapid's and Kratochwil's volumes take the position that the structures of meaning are not simply the result of cultural interaction after the first contact. Rather, each culture brings to the interactions images of itself and others that are prefigured by myths, texts and traditions (Katzenstein, 1996:33-72; Inayatullah, Blaney, 1996:73-75).

Moreover, scholars, who propose a more agent-centric account of the way identities are formed, stress 'Habermasian' logics of argumentation or the role of communicative action in mediating between agents and inter-subjective values in contrast to scholars such as Wendt and Finnemore, who emphasise logics of appropriateness – the constitutive power of structure over interests and behaviour. Kratochwil (1991), Onuf (2013), Reus-Smit (2009), Risse, Ropp, Sikink (1999) argue that norms do not constitute identity or interests in any straightforward or uncomplicated way – in many situations, actors encounter multiple norms of behaviour, open to varied interpretations. So actors engage in argument – they try to figure out in a collective communicative process whether their assumptions about the world are correct or which norms of appropriate behaviour apply.

Finally, holistic Constructivists have attempted to bridge the divide between the international and the domestic in explaining how state identities and interests are constituted (Rae, 2002; Hall, 1999; Koslowski, Kratochwil, 1995; Ruggie, 1998). Epitomised by the writings of John Ruggie, holistic Constructivism sets out to integrate the domestically constituted corporate identities of states and their internationally driven social identities into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order (Behraves, 2011). As Schonberg succinctly explains, for holistic Constructivists, identity emerges first from domestic-level

variables but only becomes meaningful in relationship to the international Other (Schonberg, 2007:15).

The second main axis of difference among Constructivists is linked to epistemology. In general terms, Constructivist research can be differentiated on the basis of a scholar's adherence to positivist or post-positivist epistemological standpoints. That is, positivist Constructivists – such as Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Peter Katzenstein, John Ruggie, Emanuel Adler, maintain that despite being socially constructed and subject to varied understandings and meanings, the international system contains law-like patterns governing social relations that are amenable to generalisation and falsifiable hypotheses (Hurd, 2008:308). On the other hand, for post-positivist Constructivists, including Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, Thomas Risse, social relations cannot be objectively explained and separated into 'causes' and 'effects' since social and political life is not guided by generalizable laws but exists in contingency and flux. Hence, social inquiry has to be concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality and the historicity of knowledge (Hurd, 2008:308).

Moreover, apart from this two-fold overall distinction between positivist and post-positivist Constructivists, the various epistemological orientations within Constructivism have also been labelled more specifically as 'conventional' (or also 'modernist' and 'subjectivist'); 'linguistic' and 'critical' (Adler, 2013; Palan, 2000; Epstein, 2010; Hopf, 1998). The conventional Constructivist approach involves positivist epistemological assumptions (most notably Wendt's Scientific Realism) and draws on phenomenological and sociological perspectives such as Symbolic Interactionism, which is premised on the theory that humans see the world through perspectives that are developed socially and advances a subjectivist, methodologically individualist point of view (Palan, 2000:6-7).

Linguistic Constructivism – exemplified by the works of Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf, subscribes to post-positivist epistemology and follows Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy in arguing that social objects are constituted by the description actors give them and therefore have no existence independent of beliefs, utterances and speech acts. So the crude materialist reality (emerging in Wendt’s theory as ‘brute material forces’) is a hypothetical referent point arising out of the properties of language, which warrants a focus on argumentation, speech acts, communicative action and discourse analysis (Palan, 2000:8; Kratochwil, 1991, 2001; Onuf, 2013; Risse, Kleine, 2009). Finally, critical Constructivism also employs a post-positivist, discursive epistemological perspective but is concerned with a critique of society and power. Drawing on Jacques Lacan’s social theory of identity – which does not view the Self as in harmony with its social environment, critical Constructivist research takes issue with ‘subjectivism’ that does not enquire about the emergence of the subject-as-actor and remains silent on the ways in which identities and ‘systems of truths’ are constructed through power, repression and exploitation (Palan, 2000:11-12; Epstein, 2010:10).

Overall, given the above overview pointing to Constructivist disagreements about ontological and epistemological issues, how can the theoretical approach of the thesis be situated within these debates? As regards ontology, the thesis aims to contribute to ‘holistic’ Constructivist research, with an interactive account of identity formation, continuity and change being developed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

In terms of epistemology, the study forges a middle-ground approach (also elaborated in the methods section of Chapter 1) that employs elements from both positivist and post-positivist philosophical and methodological commitments. Indeed, the author’s analytical perspective draws on the insights of all three forms of Constructivism, while also critiquing them through the middle-ground approach. As with conventional Constructivists, the thesis

recognises the importance of context, multiple meanings and constant (re)constructions of identity but still aims to specify a set of conditions under which one can expect to observe a particular identity, being therefore attuned to identity stability and continuity as well as the ways in which ideational factors inform actions (Hopf, 1998:13). Similarly to critical Constructivists' concern with unmasking power relations in identification processes (whereby the Self is assimilated with the Other, if deemed equal, or is oppressed and excluded, if inferior), the thesis is aware of dynamics of hierarchy and dependence (Hopf, 1998:14-15). However, this awareness does not represent a central research goal of revealing alienation and oppression but is reflected in the 'softer' conclusion that Poland, Bulgaria and Russia are not 'clean slates' on which to inscribe a set of normative prescriptions and which need to be 'normalised' because they have their particular historical experiences that shape identity and pose limits to the possibility of ideational alignment with the West. And as with linguistic Constructivists, the thesis examines the discursive representations of ideational continuity and evolution.

Yet, conventional Constructivism is critiqued on the grounds that Wendt's Scientific Realism, in particular, may not be compatible with the Constructivist approach. Contrary to Scientific Realism's contention that the objective world can be apprehended correctly and measured accurately, the problem that Constructivism (and Wendt himself) raises in a big way is not about the essence of existence and 'things in themselves' but what and how things come to be constituted intersubjectively (Wendt, 1999:110-120; 133; Kratochwil, 2000:17, 24; Epstein, 2010:6).

Also, critical Constructivism's rejection of the possibility or desirability of even a minimal foundationalism as well as the assumption of the perpetual contingency, malleability and fluidity of identities are similarly critiqued. In particular, the thesis demonstrates empirically that an intersubjectively shared meaning and standard of identity conditions a

continuity of ideas and beliefs. Moreover, a critical, post-modernist Constructivist orientation may be theoretically and epistemologically inconsistent. For instance, Epstein claims that a discursive-Lacanian approach avoids the problem of essentialising the state as a pre-social Self in the international arena because it does not presume such a Self and accepts that it may remain forever impossible to demonstrate that a state has a Self. To that end, Epstein distinguishes between a subject-position (i.e., a position within a discourse) and subjectivity (i.e., all that has to do with desire and bodily effects) and argues that this distinction allows focusing solely on subject-positions and suspending questions pertaining to subjectivity (Epstein, 2010:18). Yet, falling back on such a distinction shows that the post-modernist approach cannot maintain its argument about the indeterminacy of the Self without itself relying on essentialised understandings, embodied in the idea of subjectivity.

Finally, as against linguistic Constructivism's preoccupation with discourse treated as constitutive of action, the thesis employs a more sceptical view of the link between speech and action, which link needs to be empirically confirmed (or indeed disconfirmed) through the process tracing and congruence method.

Weaknesses and gaps in Constructivist research

Apart from inter-theoretical debates between Realists, Liberals and Constructivists that feature in rationalist-inspired criticism of Constructivist studies' plausibility in explaining international outcomes given the latter's subjective-ideational rather than objective-materialist assumptions (and which criticism and paradigmatic debates are examined in the final section of this chapter), there has also been an intra-theoretical assessment of the weaknesses of Constructivist research. Indeed, a broadly shared (self) critique among Constructivists – which the thesis also subscribes to and aims to address, is related to the gap between ontology/epistemology and history/empirics; i.e., between a strong emphasis

on ontological and epistemological theorising and an insufficient concrete empirical and mid-range theoretical exploration of how identities are constructed in an interactive and comparative mode and how these identities in turn affect state behaviour (Palan, 2000; Finnemore, Sikkink, 2001; Moravcsik, 2001; Shannon, Kowert, 2012; Epstein, 2010; Zehfuss, 2001; Checkel, 1998; Wiener, 2009).

More specifically, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the ongoing difficulty in identity research is that there is still no agreed-on definition of what is meant by ‘identity’, how researchers can plausibly establish what state identities are, what range of prominent identities may exist in international politics at any particular historical moment, how states with particular types of identities will behave (Finnemore, Sikkink, 2001:9, 21). And according to Moravcsik and Checkel, the reason for the above-described gaps and difficulties is linked to Constructivists’ heavy focus on ontology. That is, Constructivist scholars have spent inordinate time exploring meta-theoretical and ontological distinctions between ‘rational’ and ‘Constructivist’ theories and not enough time developing concrete mid-range theories, deriving hypotheses from them and then testing them rigorously. So the challenge is to address how and why social construction occurs, clearly specifying the actors and mechanisms bringing about ideational continuity or change, the scope conditions under which they operate and how they vary across countries (Moravcsik, 2001:2; Checkel, 1998).

Unless such a theoretical and research strategy is taken up, Constructivist studies will continue to result in what Constructivism has itself contended against – accepting identities and the socialisation of actors as ‘givens’ as well as side-lining the core proposition about the interaction between agents and structures in favour of an exclusive focus on the role of ideas in foreign policy-making and the normative-ideational makeup of the international structure (Moravcsik, 2001:2). Indeed, as Palan asks, if anarchy is what states make of it,

then why have states chosen the particular form of anarchy which they have? Even if we are prepared to accept the view that, for instance, membership of a nation is a social construction, why are there variations in the meaning and practice of such a social construction? The implication of these questions is that meta-theoretical, Symbolic Interactionist accounts of international order cannot provide an explanation of the specificity of an order (Palan, 2000:14, 18). Similarly, Epstein argues that for norm Constructivists, identity tends to be important as the ‘given’ site that holds the micro-foundations of norm dynamics, whereby socialisation features as the process of adding a new norm onto a stable platform of identity (Epstein, 2010:8-9).

Literature overview

The thesis aims to address the above-analysed weaknesses and gaps predominant in Constructivist research by developing a mid-range interactive theory of identity construction, continuity, change and effects on foreign policy behaviour that posits propositions about levels of integration in the Euro-Atlantic community across the three cases of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia over a one-decade timeframe. This sub-section elucidates how the proposed theoretical framework can be situated within and contribute to the limited number of Constructivist studies, which undertake interactive, empirically-informed examinations of identity and its effects on state behaviour both in CEE and elsewhere around the world.

In particular, the four key works authored and compiled by Browning (2008), Telhami, Barnett (2002), Hagström, Gustafsson (2015), Banchoff (1998) explore state identity continuity and change – as the thesis does, as the product of the interaction of international and domestic factors in the concrete cases of Finland, the Middle East, Japan and Germany, respectively. However, in contrast to the middle-ground epistemological stance

of the thesis, Browning analyses Finnish foreign policy identity through a critical, narrative-focused perspective that looks at identities as continuously open to renegotiation and change; while in contrast to this, Telhami and Barnett argue that identity can be treated as a variable that can take on different values and can be accurately measured on some scale. Moreover, none of these studies is simultaneously comparative and examining patterns of identity change and continuity over an extended period of time (Browning does the latter only in the case of Finland, whereas Telhami's and Barnett's volume features separate, stand-alone chapters on Middle Eastern countries).

As far as the region of CEE is concerned, there are no Constructivist studies that analyse comparatively the foreign policy identities of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia (as indeed there is no such comparison in the literature informed by other IR theoretical perspectives or by an area studies approach). Also, those works conducting comparative examinations of a different combination of CEE countries through an identity-based analytical lens tend not to present a Constructivist framework but rather operate within the conceptual confines of area studies (generally eschewing theory-based investigations), focusing on the ways in which the Soviet ideological legacy in foreign policy is dealt with in the post-communist period as against the background of the resurgence of nationalism and the potential appearance of new foreign policy ideologies. Such works include those of Fawn (2003), whose volume explores how Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reoriented from Marxism-Leninism in the direction of a collective identity of nationhood in foreign policy; of Skak (1996, 1992), who examines the impact of the Soviet imperial legacy on the foreign policy traditions of Russia, Lithuania and Hungary and further focuses on rising nationalism as the most powerful form of protest in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (at the time of writing) and Russia; of Burant (1995), who compares Ukraine's and Belarus's development of state nationhood on

the indicator of a foreign policy seeking entry in European institutions and establishing cultural-political distance from Russia.

Furthermore, another set of comparative studies of CEE states also eschewing a Constructivist framework and operating within EU area studies, explores how the process of Union accession and membership affected these states' foreign policy identities as well as how the new entrants' identities have in turn enabled or constrained the ability to contribute to EU foreign policy-making. For instance, Šabič and Brglez (2002) discuss the interplay between the perception of smallness and the concept of national identity during Slovenia's integration in the EU. Smith (2006) shows the ways in which the meanings and practices of themes of national self-assertion and Europeanisation changed within the context of Estonia's post-communist foreign policy and accession to the Union. Tulmets (2014) explores the historically-shaped foreign policy identities of the Czech Republic, Russia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia in order to demonstrate how despite a clear policy oriented towards the West, these states have participated in a differentiated manner in the definition of the EU approach towards the Eastern and South-eastern neighbours. Bossuyt (2014) examines the impact of the CEE members of the EU on the formulation of Brussels' democracy promotion policy towards Central Asia.

Similarly to the state of research in comparative CEE studies, works focusing on single country cases in the region (and in particular on Poland, Bulgaria and Russia) are also primarily conducted within an area studies – rather than a Constructivist perspective on issues of identity. For instance, as regards Poland, a considerable amount of research examines how the historically-informed strategic culture and ideas of nationhood shape Warsaw's foreign policy in the period since 1989: including Sanford (2003), Zaborowski, Longhurst (2003), Longhurst, Zaborowski (2007), Longhurst (2013), Reeves (2010), Osica (2004), Prizel (1998), Chappell (2010), Wawrzyński (2012). In addition, many scholarly

works deal with the more specific aspects of Poland's relations with the eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus), whereby a key theme of investigation is the extent to which the 'burdens' of history are being transcended or continue to affect national identity narratives as well as concrete policies: Zarycki (2004), Klatt (2011), Roberts (2014), Copsey (2008), Cianciara (2008), Eberhardt (2006, 2007, 2008), Adamski (2008), Szeptycki (2010).

In the Bulgarian case, a limited number of studies tend to employ a discursive and critical Constructivist approach in analysing processes of Europeanisation. Dimitrova (2002) demonstrates how the Europeanisation discourse became dominant in Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policies. Nancheva (2012) accounts for whether and how Bulgarian national identity narratives with respect to Macedonia have become Europeanised. Kavalski (2003, 2005, 2007 – with Zolkos) shows how historically-informed identity discourses are invoked in foreign policy formulation and further presents the securitisation of Western norms since the 1999 Kosovo crisis as a process of socialisation based on enforcement and teaching aimed at ensuring rule conformance. Bechev (2004, 2006) explores the regional identity construction of South-east Europe by taking into consideration the 'inside' (or national lens of the SEE countries) and the 'outside' (the West European view of the region). However, other works eschew a Constructivist perspective, instead employing an area studies analytical prism on the Europeanisation of foreign policy identity (Katsikas, 2010, 2012; Ralchev, 2015), a sociological approach to the examination of elite and popular understandings of liberal values (Dawson, 2014) or a historical analysis of the long-term cultural antecedents of Bulgarian foreign policy (Baeva, 1998).

As regards Russia, a few significant studies are informed by Constructivism. Tsygankov (2016) shows how national identity and foreign policy in post-communist Russia are negotiated and constructed as a result of the influence of international and domestic factors. Neumann (1995, 2016) provides a thorough overview of the intellectual and

political debate in Russia about its 'European-ness' over the last three decades as well as three centuries by taking into account the impact of major international events and changes in national leadership. Hopf (2002) focuses on the importance of a significant Other for a country's self-understanding and examines the way in which the Russian Self in 1955 and 1999 constituted itself with respect to three kinds of Others – the historical, internal and external Other. Hopf's edited volume (2008) features examinations of the normative dynamics between Russia and Europe, where Neumann analyses historically the quality of Russia's great-powerness vis-à-vis Europe, Haukkala investigates Russia's status as a norm-taker in the history of Russian-European relations and Medvedev argues that Constructivism – through its focus on the importance of shared values for sustainable cooperation, explains best the difficult relations between Russia and the EU. Morozov (2013) employs a critical Constructivist perspective in presenting Russia as a subaltern empire that engages in the inversion of Western norms.

Yet, the majority of studies focusing on ideational factors in Russian foreign policy making do not operate within a Constructivist (or indeed an IR) perspective. Such studies can be broadly subdivided into five categories. First, some scholars (Gorodetsky, 2003; Light, 2003; Laruelle, 2015) examine the influences of the Soviet imperial legacy on Moscow's foreign policy and the re-emergence of a (nationalist) ideology in the conduct of external relations. A second strand of research has provided a detailed treatment of the longer-term cultural-historical foundations of Russia's post-1991 foreign policy, including Trenin (2007), Legvold (2007), Prizel (1998). Third, other works (Baranovsky, 2000, 2002; Adomeit, 1995; Tsygankov, 2003, 2005; Evans, 2008; Trenin, 2002; Malashenko, 2012) provide a greater emphasis on Russia's contemporary (i.e., post-Soviet) ideational environment – namely, the country's identity crisis and the political elite's views of Russia's internal and external identity, classified into distinct schools of thought. Fourth,

many scholars explore Russia-EU relations not least as conditioned by the clash of visions, identities and normative adherences: Webber (2000), Dragneva, Wolczuk (2012), Gower, Timmins (2007), Prozorov (2006), Allison, Light, White (2006). Finally, a fifth set of works (Zevelev, 2009; Malinova, 2012; Timofeev, 2008; Miller, 2008; Gudkov, 2010) engage in conceptual analysis of the notions of ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘civilization’ in the context of Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The Europeanisation approach

Given the focus of the thesis on the ‘Europeanisation’ of foreign policy, this sub-section elucidates the author’s approach to ‘European-ness’ and ‘Europeanisation’ and then delineates the ways in which this approach compares and contrasts with the general conceptual and theoretical assumptions and empirical emphasis of the wider Europeanisation literature.

More specifically, the sub-section takes up the above task by, first, justifying and defining an ideal type of European-ness; second, laying out indicators and strategies to establish (i.e., ‘measure’) Europeanisation; third, providing clarifications regarding the critical potential contained in researching ‘levels’ of Europeanisation, the return of traditions that can contest an established level of Europeanisation in a given country and the relationship between an ideationally-informed perspective on European-ness and the issue of ‘institutionalisation’; fourth, singling out points of similarity and difference between the author’s approach and the Europeanisation literature.

Justification and definition of an ideal type of European-ness

The thesis constructs European-ness as a value-laden notion – i.e., as being constituted by a set of rules, norms and principles that define what it means to be European in an ideational sense. It is proposed that these rules, norms and principles inform and be

generalised into an ideal-typical model, the justification of whose deployment is underwritten by three overall historical and analytical reasons. Those reasons are elaborated below, followed by a stipulation of the key components of European-ness.

First, the ideal type is not merely an ad hoc construction but is underlined by both longer-term historical developments and post-1989 trends that point to the genealogical emergence of commonalities in Western understandings and projections of European-ness. In particular, the history of international relations in the 20th century speaks to the gradual emergence, acceptance and legal-institutional codification of the norms and practices that have come to be associated with the Euro-Atlantic security community. These include the abolition of secret treaties; reduction in armaments; removal of economic barriers to trade between nations; achieving international legitimacy through collective security, disarmament and adherence to the rule of law and public opinion rather than through alliance politics and balances of power; racial equality; international law; the democratisation of international institutions to give a greater say to small states; protection of minorities; defence planning transparency; supranational integration; American commitment to Europe; transnational human rights advocacy and regionalisation (President Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918; Jackson, 2011:4, 18-19, 23; Shimazu, 2003:4; Dunbabin, 1993:11-13, 17-19; Webster, 2005:10; Jacobson, 1972:7; Cox, Kennedy-Pipe, 2005:13; Leffler, 1996:15, 20; Bowker, Williams, 1988:62-63, 90-93; Davy, 2014:250-252; Thomas, 2005).

Moreover, after the end of communism Western states and international institutions posited these values and norms as criteria to be fulfilled by the CEE countries in the latter's quest for cooperation and integration in the EU and NATO (with their respective accession conditions). Such criteria were akin to standards of European-ness forming an integral part of a West European normative hegemonic project, underwritten by assumptions of the

universalisation of Western liberal democracy and capitalism, which had won over communism, as well as by a normatively selective process that posits certain values and historical experiences as more appropriate, acceptable and defining than others (such as Marxism, fascism and war) (Fukuyama, 1989:1; Arfire, 2011; Haukkala, 2008; Diez, 2013; Medvedev, 2008).

So there is a concrete historical-political basis for the identification of some common features in Western understandings of what it means to be European in domestic and foreign policy terms. And although there is an undeniable diversity among specific Western national traditions in conceptualising Europe and its values (such as different views on the depth and extent of European cooperation as related to national sovereignty, of state intervention in a capitalist economy, of the proper arrangements (presidential, parliamentary, etc.) of distinct visions of democracy), the common denominator of Western understandings becomes especially generalised and reinforced in interactions with Central-Eastern Europe. This is so because the latter has been historically treated as a constitutive Other, whose economic backwardness, authoritarian traditions and insufficient modernisation demarcate a boundary with the progressive, free and prosperous West of the continent (with a further hierarchy of distance from the West being established between Central Europe, the Balkans and the (former) Russian imperial space) (Neumann, 1999; Kuus, 2004).

Second, an ‘ideal’ construction of European-ness also corresponds to overall CEE representations of (Western) Europe. That is, there is a continuous historical perception of Europe as ‘utopia’, taking the contours of a ‘myth’ in political imagination (whereby myth is a form of ideologised narrative attempting to mediate ‘reality’, in which the contingent and differentiated manifestations of a given political phenomenon disappear – so that in the concrete terms of the thesis, the association of modernity, democracy and prosperity with

Western Europe has become a commonly accepted and ideologised appraisal in Central-East European thinking) (Wydra, 2013:4-5; Sakwa, 2008:205). Thus, during communism, 'Europe' was a magical point of attraction, while after 1989 the image of the liberal and rich Western Europe replaced communism's ideological prescription of totality with a vision of totality of a different kind – being tinged with a mix of eschatological hope, haziness and obliviousness to finer differences in normative positions within the West of the continent itself (Wydra, 2013:7). This mythical image of the values Western Europe embodies and projects produced an overall commitment to Europeanisation throughout CEE after the fall of the Berlin Wall, albeit differently applied depending on more concrete national traditions of understanding, rootedness and practice of ideal-typical European values within the country-specific context (Wydra, 2013:9).

Third, apart from the historical reasons for positing European-ness in an 'idealised' and generalised form (given the shared basis of West European value adherences and CEE's own totalised and ideologised perception of what (Western) Europe stands for and represents), from a conceptual-analytical point of view, the provision of a general analytical standard of European-ness can serve as a comparative benchmark for Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's Europeanisation of identity. Indeed, as stipulated in Chapter 1 (pp. 30-31), the ideal type is an analytical-methodological device, which allows carrying out the comparative task by extrapolating general features without, however, expecting 'perfect' reproduction of the features either on the part of those whom the values emanate from, or on the part of those whose affinity with the values is assessed.

Hence, the thesis proposes the examination of European-ness as a historically and analytically informed ideal-typical model, which draws its value-based constitutive elements from the principles stipulated as animating the diplomacy, organisational framework and membership criteria of the state- and international institutional actors, who

embody, share and project the Western European historical-political experience and normative positions (i.e., including individual West European countries, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe). These normative positions can be gleaned from key documents setting out a state's or institution's goals, policy directions and place in the world – such as national security strategies and landmark institutional treaties.

In particular, the major West European states' (and the US's) definition and understanding of themselves as foreign policy actors hinge on the domestic organisation of their societies on the basis of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, tolerance, pluralism, support for civic expressions of nationalism, the free market. The conduct of foreign policy and vision of IR stem from and are expected to safeguard these values along a number of key (yet overlapping and mutually entailing) dimensions. First, the universality of democracy, human rights and international law should be realised within a *liberal, rules-based international order and politics* oriented on multilateralism, interdependence, the renunciation of spheres of influence and balances of power, democracy- and human rights promotion, good-neighbourliness, institutionalised cooperation on the basis of forging close transatlantic security ties and European partnerships (Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, 2014; Strategic Defence Review White Paper of the UK, 1998:12, 17-18; Strategic Defence and Security Review of the UK, 2010; National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of the UK, 2015:10; Defence Policy Guidelines of Germany, 2011:3-4; French White Paper – Defence and National Security, 2013:25-26; White Paper for International Security and Defence, Italy, 2015:33, 35-38; A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World, 2013:3-10; National Security Strategy of the US, 2015:25-28, 2006:7-12, 2000:9).

Second, the values informing the general conduct of international politics should also be specifically reflected *on the regional level* through the establishment of regionally

cooperative, peaceful and friendly relations (in a state's immediate neighbourhood), built on trust, devoid of historical hatreds and embedded in bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements (European Council Summit in Copenhagen, 1993; European Convention on Human Rights, 2010; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995; Partnership for Peace, 1994; Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990; Helsinki Document, 1992).

Third, adherence to and promotion of European values should be ultimately reflected in *integration within the core European organisations* of the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The distinctiveness of debating and conducting foreign policy through institutionalised cooperation is especially centred on the EU (as the most significantly institutionalised cornerstone of European political-economic relations) and is linked to the search for consensus through persuasion, argumentation, cooperation as well as support for the further institutional development of the EU. The reciprocal ability to both 'download' (follow) from and 'upload' (create) foreign policy positions onto the Brussels level is also part of the opportunities for diplomatic cooperation and coordination provided by EU membership/accession status (relevant where the latter has been achieved and as linked particularly to the CFSP) (Davignon Report, 1970; Declaration on European Identity, 1973; Solemn Declaration on the European Union, 1983; Treaty on European Union, 1992:7; European Council Summit in Copenhagen, 1993; European Parliament Resolution, 2008:5-11; European Parliament Resolution, 2009:3-7; Chelotti, 2014:2-7; Moumoutzis, 2011:13).

In the realm of European security and defence underwritten by NATO, integration would presuppose a foreign policy, whereby the achievement of peace encompasses conducting democratic reforms (such as civilian and democratic control over the military); increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets; renouncing the aggressive use of

force and spheres of influence and considering soft security issues (as opposed to zero-sum calculations and an overwhelming focus on hard power and hard security linked to balance of power politics and the creation of military alliances); fostering cooperation on the basis of complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions (including NATO, the EU, the OSCE), bilateral and multilateral undertakings and regional cooperation (Partnership for Peace, 1994; Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995; Membership Action Plan, 1999; Helsinki Final Act, 1975; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990; Helsinki Document, 1992; Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994; Vienna Document, 2011).

Establishing Europeanisation

Having justified and defined the components of an ideal type of European-ness, it remains to be specified how 'Europeanisation' can be evaluated (i.e., 'measured'). In particular, the ideal-typical model of European-ness represents the benchmark of belongingness to the Euro-Atlantic community, designating the values adherence to which can warrant the establishment of the Self's shared commonality with the Other. On the other hand, the term Europeanisation refers to the dynamic and interactive process between the Self and the Other (capturing both the reflexive dimension of the verb – doing something to oneself, as well as the transitive dimension – doing something to others), which conditions extent of inclusivity and ideational affinity. Hence, the benchmark of the process of Europeanisation is the ideal type of European-ness, but the outcome of this process – as the empirical investigations show, can recreate, re-invoke and modify in contemporary circumstances historically-informed national conceptions of 'Europe'. So Europeanisation does not enshrine an assumption of linear progression towards the ideal type, but it is rather expected to reproduce degrees of distance from it by re-enacting levels of inclusivity in the

Euro-Atlantic community, as substantiated by levels of ideational affinity with the values inherent in European-ness.

More concretely, levels of inclusivity and ideational affinity can be established interpretively and relationally across the country-cases on a continuum from the ‘thickest’ to the ‘thinnest’ substantiation and application of European-ness (as elaborated by the stipulation of three propositions of Europeanisation on p. 97). *Inclusivity* would be specifically assessed on the basis of the Other’s commitment and acceptance, which can be discerned in such concrete acts as pace and degree of institutional admittance, diplomatic support and economic assistance offered to a given CEE country. This is so because – as explained in the review of the Social Psychological literature, institutionalisation and allocation represent the tangible consequences of a process of collective identification and categorisation. *Ideational affinity* would in turn be evaluated in convictional, discursive and behavioural terms (i.e., by examining belief commitments and their expression in speech and action). Thus, the ‘thickest’ form of affinity (or normative compatibility) would require the elements of ideational internalisation of ideal-typical values and their corresponding sustained and consistent discursive embeddedness and behavioural manifestation. On the other hand, ‘thinner’ affinity (or normative divergence and contestation) would feature some rhetorical commitment but would lack substantive ideational conviction in and behavioural expression of ideal-typical values, ultimately resulting in contested understandings. In ‘ambivalent’ cases of affinity (or superficial normative compatibility), there is expected to be discursive compatibility but more superficial substantive ideational adherence to the ideal type, which does not amount to the depth, consistency and internalisation of the thicker conceptions, but neither does it amount to the contested meanings of thinner conceptions, overall leading to instrumentalised performativity.

On the whole therefore, the establishment of levels of values-based affinity along the ideational, discursive and behavioural dimension will be explored in the empirical chapters by assessing the genuineness of attachment to ideal-typical values, the consistency, sustenance and (cross-party politically) shared quality of the rhetorical embeddedness of these values and their expression into action (through methodological techniques aimed at interpreting the ideational-discursive context and tracing the link between ideas and actions as well as through the Constructivist analytical guidelines as to how foreign policy behaviour is informed by ideational factors – developed in Chapter 2, pp. 103-104).

For instance, evidence of ideational compatibility with regard to ideal-typical European values embodied in the general international political, regional and integrative-institutional plane would constitute belief commitment to these values, enunciated consistently and determinedly in the discursive construction of ‘Europe’ and the conduct of external relations along this line. That is, the ideational context is expected to frame, direct and circumscribe the tenor, character and orientation of external relations in such a way that international politics would be approached by promoting multilateral, rules-based, cooperative initiatives (towards given states, institutions or particular issue areas); regional relations would be built on the basis of friendly bilateral and multilateral arrangements; while institutionalised integration would take place along EU norms of diplomatic negotiations and behaviour and NATO principles of conducting security policies (including carrying out democratic oversight of the military, renouncing the aggressive use of force in favour of cooperative security). Conversely, contested conceptions would lack the belief commitment and behavioural practice of these values, instead operating on different principles (such as forceful, authoritarian regional and international political outlook and policies that reject the prospect of institutionalised integration); ambivalent

affinity would feature rhetorical and behavioural compatibility mostly devoid of ideational conviction.

How the combined effect of levels of inclusion and ideational affinity can be evaluated in researching particular forms of Europeanisation ('thick', 'thin' and 'ambivalent') is further elaborated in the sub-section dealing with the main argument and propositions (pp. 98-99).

Clarifications

Three clarifications are in order regarding analytical and methodological issues that arise from the definition of European-ness and the strategies of assessment of Europeanisation developed in the previous two sub-sections.

First, the positing of a general standard of European-ness and the expectation of multiple constructions of 'Europe' in the process of Europeanisation is not premised on assumptions of cultural insufficiency, unfulfilled developmental prerequisites and normative 'lack', but on a historically embedded identification (that takes both a Self and an Other to construct), whereby the extent of mutuality, inclusivity and normative similarity produce particular degrees of distance. More specifically, although the projection of European-ness on the part of the West after 1989 has assumed the contours of a normative hegemony that aims to socialise the East into the 'correct' norms (given that their previously communist worldview was discredited), the research process is not underwritten by assumptions of a normatively necessary linear development towards European-ness. Thus, the weak resemblance of ideal-typical values on the part of a national tradition of conceptualising 'Europe' is not a matter of moral opprobrium but of a specific political-historical and cultural process that in itself contains a critical potential. This potential is revealed in the demonstration of the multiplicity of CEE conceptions of Europe, which are formed in relations with the West, limit the possibility of fulfilling the ideal-typical standard of

belongingness (for reasons of identification rather than normative insufficiency) and should be taken into account when de-centering Western Europe's own commonly accepted and dominantly projected views (Onar, Nicolaidis, 2013). Indeed, the recognition of differences can foster greater mutual understanding, reflection and reflexivity instead of an 'overcoming' of those differences.

Second, the expectation of uncovering conceptions of Europe of differentiated distance from the ideal type (reflected in the propositions about 'thick', 'thin' and 'ambivalent' Europeanisation developed later in the chapter) may itself be charged for leading to ideal-typical representations of these conceptions – said to be characteristic of certain countries and obscuring alternative strands of thinking. Yet, as with the ideal type of European-ness, such conceptions should not be assumed to exist in pure and undisputed form, since they will be generalised, hierarchised, ordered and reflected in dominant discourses and practices, promoted by dominant political-intellectual identity groups, in the political process of constructing Europe within a particular timeframe. Moreover, the return of traditions that are in tension or contest the overall, dominantly constructed level of Europeanisation should also be taken into account as reactions, intimately related to that level of Europeanisation. In particular, as the analyses of the identity scenes in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 show, all of the distinct, country-specific, contemporary forms of conceptualising Europe (as modernism and traditionalism in Poland, anti-communism and post-communism in Bulgaria, Liberal Westernism, Pragmatic Nationalism and Fundamentalist Nationalism in Russia) perpetuate historical traditions of identity formation that grapple with the West European model. That is, the model was integral to national consciousness and identity construction, whereby Western values were accepted, assimilated, practiced or criticised, moulded and renounced in nationally specific ways as part of the general CEE representation of Europe along the axis of 'utopia' and 'threat'. Therefore, alternative or

contested meanings ascribed to a given level of Europeanisation will not be independently existing of and unrelated to that level but will constitute a reaction, which is borne out of the dualistic, attractive yet repulsive, aspirational and threatening perception of Western Europe and its values (so that, overall, traditions that differ significantly from the ideal-typical model of European-ness will not be originally ‘stand-alone’ and unconnected to it, but will represent part of the ideational response to it together with all other national traditions of conceptualising and grappling with that model).

Additionally, the establishment of whether the degrees of distance from the ideal type on the part of identified levels of Europeanisation still hold – when contested by alternative traditions, will hinge on a comparative empirical evaluation of the depth and extent of that normative contestation, desire to belong and corresponding international commitment (as to whether, for instance, a thickly Europeanised vision is contested to such a (fundamental) depth and extent that it leads to a comprehensive renunciation of European-ness and belongingness in the Euro-Atlantic community as well as wholesale external marginalisation, similar to thinner Europeanisation, or only to a modified understanding and practice of particular value dimensions and limited international criticism that still preserve a thickly Europeanised character especially in contrast to other countries’ level of Europeanisation). In general, since traditions of conceptualising Europe are co-dependent and coexist within an overall national-intellectual frame, alternative views are not expected to deviate from other traditions to such an extent that they will represent a radical ‘break’ and leap forward or backward as regards Europeanisation, thus keeping the contours of a given level of Europeanisation – particularly cross-country comparatively, despite weakening this level on its own terms.

Finally, the third clarification is linked to the issue of ‘institutionalisation’ and its relationship to the process of identification and an ideational perspective on

Europeanisation. Such a clarification will justify the inference of value positions from institutional setup and membership as well as the empirical investigation of institutionalised arrangements and practices as part of Europeanisation (such as offer of international organisational membership, attendant conditions and domestic institutional factors).

It is argued that ideas and identities shape and are reflected in institutional forms. More specifically, the establishment of relations and boundaries of inclusion or exclusion is crucial to Self-Other, inter-group identification, whereby formally institutionalised membership is a tangible manifestation of inclusivity. Thus, the pace, degree and offer of formalised membership in a given community is vitally determined by views regarding common belongingness and shared values. Indeed, as the Social Psychological analysis in the next sub-section shows, institutionalisation and administrative allocation do not stand apart from but are entailed in the process of identification as the palpable substantive markers and organisational frameworks of the principles and regularised patterns of behaviour of a collectivity and its distinction from out-groups. Hence, the offer of membership and inclusion in culturally embedded institutional forms and practices would represent the rite of passage from the liminal conditions of status uncertainty to acceptance and positive affirmation of mutuality between Self and Other (Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1995).

This conceptualisation of the link between ideas and institutions is therefore in line with sociological and historical (rather than rational-instrumental) institutionalism, which analyses the creation, development and sustenance of institutions as shaped by ideational discursive embeddedness, cultural construction and repeated patterns of interaction that foster normative regularities of behaviour within a cognitively interdependent community (Rosamond, 2000:117-118). On this account, for example, the EU is examined as an

evolving, deeply institutionalised polity held together by the binding power of normative commitment to multi-layered governance structures, pooling sovereignty, legal codification, while ASEAN's (and related East Asian regional institutions') shallower institutionalisation is informed by distinctive norms of consensual decision-making, aversion to legalisation and avoidance of supranational bureaucratic structures (Risse, quoted in Rosamond, 2000:121; Acharya, 2001; Ba, 2005).

Therefore, as opposed to a rationalist view of institutions as intervening variables between actor preferences and policy outputs and an instrumentalist explanation of Europeanisation as rule transfer/institutionalisation (i.e., the transposition of EU legislation in internal institutional forms), determined by the credibility of EU conditionality and domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2005), the thesis takes the position that 'institutions are what states make of them'. That is, the offer of membership, conclusion of agreements and attendant conditions and criteria of entry into international organisations would be guided by levels of identification both on the part of the Other (and its ideational-civilizational reasons for extending membership: Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2004:11, 13, 21-22) and on the part of the Self (who conceives of conditionality as a marker of belongingness). Thus, although institutionalisation can certainly contribute distinctive practical diplomatic, political, economic effects to Europeanisation – whereby, the offer of institutional membership will incorporate a stipulation of formal-objective benchmarks for compliance, conditionality will invoke a calculation of adaptation costs, achieved organisational admission will provide a wider platform for building partnerships and conducting external relations, it is expected that these effects will be ultimately conditioned and circumscribed by identity as well as differentially understood and applied in the process of defining and expanding communal boundaries. Similarly, domestic institutions – linked to party politics, the separation and balance between democratic

arrangements, can affect the consistency, timing of foreign policy conduct and the relationship between political groupings, but such consequences are expected to be enabled, limited and manifested as part of the general political-intellectual frame. Finally, it should be noted that although intra-West European national specificities may lead to the contestation of some institutional practices or to non-participation (as in the case of the UK, Switzerland or Norway, for example, with regard to the EU and NATO), such institutional fluidity is not a reason for exclusion from the category of being 'West European'. This is so given the overarching ideational-historical bond of commonality (already elaborated earlier in the section), despite the presence of specific ideas (about British sovereignty and independence of decision-making, for instance) correspondingly reflected in institutional specificities.

Overall, the above-developed clarification of 'institutionalisation' facilitates two research goals. First, the author draws on international institutional frameworks and treaties in constructing the ideal-typical model of European-ness, given that institutionalisation expresses the normative consensus binding a group of countries into a community. Second, the author will aim to empirically examine the argument that both international and domestic institutional processes and their effects are shaped by ideational factors.

Similarities and differences between the author's approach and the Europeanisation literature

It finally remains to be demonstrated how the above-developed approach to European-ness and Europeanisation differs from but also retains some of the key tenets of the literature on Europeanisation, in general, and Europeanisation in the issue area of foreign policy, in particular. A brief overview of this literature is first in order.

The Europeanisation perspective was originally aimed at the analysis of EU-induced change in the constituent members of the organisation in a variety of policy arenas. The growth of the literature has reflected the institutionalisation of the single market, the advent of the Economic and Monetary Union, market-driven processes such as the regulation of competition as well as enlargement to the East (Bulmer, Radaelli, 2004:1-2). Indeed, in contrast to earlier debates in the field of European studies, which focused on developing theories explaining the very phenomenon of European integration (such as intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, etc.), the deepening and widening of integration in the 1990s shifted research attention onto the impact of European institutions and processes on member states (Börzel, 2003:1-2). The research agendas of scholars of Europeanisation have thus on the whole been underpinned by the goal to stipulate theoretically and examine empirically the extent and scope conditions of the influence of the EU on domestic policies (such as economic, welfare, administrative, external) through conditionality that leads to compliant adaptation, through socialisation that leads to normative evolution or through a combination of both conditionality and socialisation. This ‘top-down’ perspective has, however, been complemented by ‘bottom-up’ approaches, which examine member states not simply as responding to Brussels-level initiatives and processes but as actively shaping those initiatives and processes. The same research assumptions apply to the examination of the Europeanisation of CEE candidate states, as the latter had to take on all the obligations of membership, but with additional prominence of the mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation (given the unilateral policy-inducing monitoring capacity and intensive teacher-pupil persuasive efforts of the EU that went beyond treaty-based threats of sanctions in cases of non-compliance applicable to member states) and without the ability to co-create EU rules and upload policies on the part of candidates prior to admission (Börzel, 2003; Bulmer, Radaelli, 2004; Featherstone,

Radaelli, 2003; Grabbe, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2011; Epstein, Sedelmeier, 2008; Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Whitefield, Rohrschneider, 2009; Olsen, 2002; Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2004; Cowles, Caporaso, Risse, 2001; Kohler-Koch, 2002; Dimitrova, Rhinard, 2005; Terzi, 2005; Trondal, 2004; Beyers, 1998).

As regards analyses of the Europeanisation of the concrete field of foreign policy, Manners and Whitman's pioneering study made the claim that there is a need for a distinctive approach to the examination of EU member states' foreign policy because they undergo a process of concurrence of their stances toward the Union itself and fellow constituent states through membership (Manners, Whitman, 2000:1, 7). Thus, research on the Europeanisation of foreign policy within the EU has placed specific emphasis on the questions of whether and how member (but also candidate) countries experience a convergence of preferences, identities and policies on the strategic and normative provisions contained in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as in the Union's other external positions (such as trade, humanitarian aid, peace-building, conflict prevention) (Allen, 1998; Wong, Hill, 2011; Wong, 2005; Tonra, 2001; Moumoutzis, 2011; Zaborowski, 2002).

More specifically, the Europeanisation perspective expects that convergence with regard to concrete policies and strategic positions will take place since the member state is subject to the constraints, opportunities and influences of the EU, given that being a member of the club means fulfilling the obligations to reason, debate and act in a certain manner (Wong, 2005:146). Indeed, although a sceptical view may charge that the CFSP is conceived as a forum for intergovernmentalism (where nation-states assert their interests and sovereignty), scholars of Europeanisation have argued that through the CFSP countries have also accepted a process that has progressively compromised their scope for independent action. The CFSP operates at a unique nexus between the constituent countries and European

integration and has therefore created a form of symbiosis in which states are increasingly reliant on the efficiency of the collective policy process and this collective policy process itself depends on the political will of the states (which ultimately combines the downloading dimension of adopting policies conceived on the EU level as well as uploading national preferences as common Union strategies) (Tonra, 2001:3). Hence, a convergence of policies entails a situation in which members (as well as candidates) increasingly have (common and coordinated) EU rather than extra-European reference points for foreign policy (Wong, Hill, 2011:12).

And as countries learn to coordinate their positions within a structure consisting of the institutions and the *acquis* of the CFSP and the EU's other external relations, it is expected that there will be normative convergence, i.e. convergence on the normative content of foreign policies. This is so because, as Hill makes clear, European foreign policy is inherently a normative project. European Political Cooperation even before the CFSP included as one of its central goals the expression of moral concern about events in non-democratic states, especially in the Third World. After the end of the Cold War, this concern crystallised into a full-blown paradigm that stresses the importance of democratisation and human rights (Hill, 2002:6). Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that a major objective of common foreign policy is to 'safeguard common values' and 'to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Treaty on the European Union, 1992:7).

Moreover, apart from converging on a consensus on the norms that a common foreign policy should safeguard, the process of coordinating external stances within the EU gives rise to a particular, principled behavioural style. That is, the distinctiveness of debating foreign policy positions at the EU level is related to a focus on negotiations, consensus, dense institutional networks and frequent contacts between officials. As Chelotti's findings

indicate, the veto (i.e., non-cooperative bargaining) is not used very often; in contrast, the search for consensus especially through persuasion, argumentation as well as institutional cooperation is persistent (Chelotti, 2014:2-7; Moumoutzis, 2011:13).

The final aspect that should be considered in relation to studies of the Europeanisation of foreign policy is linked to the mechanism that is theorised as leading to Europeanisation. The ‘adaptational’ model of Europeanisation based on the idea that an institutional misfit between national and European models causes pressures for adaptation typically guided by conditionality is not applicable to the domain of foreign policy. This is so because, as Moumoutzis explains, in policy areas where legally binding instruments are not available at the Brussels level, the misfit between national and EU policy does not produce adaptational pressure and Union policy produces its effects through mechanisms other than conditionality (Moumoutzis, 2011:9). Thus, in the field of external relations, scholars have argued for the importance of researching the mechanism of socialisation, whereby through reiterated interactions national foreign policy-makers become convinced of the appropriateness of the EU way of doing things and internalise behavioural rules (Moumoutzis, 2011:9; Bulmer, 2007; Checkel, 2001; Schmidt, 2002). Wong has claimed that the CFSP is hence not just another venue for rational choice but a critical set of social forces that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others (although of course this needs to be empirically verified as a coordination of positions may still be influenced by instrumental conformance in the expectation of benefits or due to perceived hierarchies of power) (Wong, Hill, 2011:9).

Having laid out the key conceptual, theoretical and empirical research directions of the Europeanisation literature, the sub-section now turns to elucidating points of similarity and difference between this literature and the author’s approach.

First, with respect to the definition, scope and domain of European-ness and Europeanisation, in contrast to the literature, which defines and examines Europeanisation as a phenomenon and process related to the institutional confines of the EU, the thesis provides a broader conceptualisation. In line with the earlier elaboration, the thesis approaches European-ness in terms of a values-based ideal type, which defines what it means to be European in an ideational sense – as comprehended, embodied and projected by a variety of state- and international institutional actors in the West, given politically-historically and analytically informed commonalities of understanding.

Thus, when the ideal-typical justification of European-ness is taken into account, it is no longer necessary to postulate Europeanisation as inextricably and only linked to the EU. Although the Union may be the key institution providing a framework for the governance of political and economic issues on the European continent, other institutions and states – including NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, individual West European countries, the US, also enunciate and practice the values inherent in European-ness.

Hence, this conceptualisation allows the thesis to examine the projection of European-ness in the process of Europeanisation (conditioned by levels of inclusivity and ideational affinity that are (re)reproduced in the identification between the Self and the Other) on the part of a wider array of actors (beyond the EU and reflected in the generalised image of the ‘Other’: pp. 87-88) as well as the acceptance and contestation of European-ness in this process on the part of acceding and non-acceding states alike (given that the EU is not taken as a proxy for all Europe-level developments and non-accession/member status does not preclude examinations of Europeanisation). Second, it also follows that establishing the discursive and behavioural level of ideational affinity with the ideal-typical benchmark would be based on the expectation that a Europeanised foreign policy approach is to be expressed in the general international political, regional and integrative-institutional plane.

That is, institutionalised cooperation centred on the EU – as emphasised by the Europeanisation literature focusing on the normative expectations and diplomatic avenues for cooperation provided by EU membership/accession status, is one aspect to be considered, which however does not exhaust all external political dimensions of European-ness (as conceived and developed on pp. 63-65).

Overall, the author's approach overlaps with the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy to the extent that the EU is analysed as an institution that embodies European values, imparting a normative dimension and specific principles of behaviour to the debate and conduct of foreign policy within the Union framework. Yet, the author's approach diverges from this perspective in arguing that European norms can be epitomised and projected by other actors in the West, can be accepted or challenged by CEE countries (which do not have to be candidates for Union admission) and can be manifested in external conduct in fields other than the CFSP and the overlay of (prospective) EU membership. Indeed, putting forward the thesis' own definition may well be called for by the significant conceptual stretching characterising the state of the Europeanisation literature so that Europeanisation has been criticised for being equated with EU-isation and for ultimately becoming 'all things to all people' (whereby the concept is variously and loosely referred to as governance through bargaining, hierarchy or facilitated coordination, as institutionalisation through rationalist or constructivist pathways, as discourse and as explaining cultural change, policy change, administrative innovation, modernisation) (Radaelli, 2000, 2004:8-15). As Gwiazda argues, the contestability of the term does require and allow for author-specific proposals of conceptual precision (Gwiazda, 2002:6), which also study European-ness and Europeanisation beyond the institutional borders of the EU.

Second, the thesis engages with the mechanism of socialisation (emphasised in the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy) but retains reservations about

socialisation's usefulness when dealing with deeply ingrained views of nation-state identity in large-scale settings involving the national political-intellectual (foreign policy) decision-making elite as opposed to the national administration and representatives to Brussels institutions. (Socialisation can be defined as a process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse and internalise expected ways of thinking and acting characteristic of a group through persuasion, social influence and in the absence of overt coercion (Johnston, 2001:8).

In particular, research has shown that the effects of socialisation are most pronounced in situations, where actors find themselves in novel circumstances and are motivated to analyse new information but have few prior, cognitively anchored beliefs (such as deeply rooted societal views of national identity) that are inconsistent with the socialiser's/persuader's message (Checkel, 1999:8; Dimitrova, Rhinard, 2005:6-10). Moreover, socialisation is likely to work in smaller, confined (rather than large-scale) settings, featuring more extensive and intensive interactions, which change the views held by bounded, heavily involved groups such as national administrators (dealing with EU accession negotiations) and national representatives to EU fora (including the European Parliament, Commission and Council), and which affect smaller, sector-specific policies (Epstein, 2006; Johnson, 2006; Kaminska, 2007:10; Pomorska, 2011:3; Primatarova 2015, Mihaylova, 2015, Krzakała, 2015, interviews).

Yet, even among such officials under the above conditions – as the literature concedes, the consequences of socialisation are most significant in relation to altering debating and behavioural style rather than in terms of persuading or socially influencing deep normative change with regard to core national identity beliefs. That is, despite nuances as to whether actors socialise for instrumental reasons or are subject to normative suasion, the overall evidence from studies of socialisation in European institutions has shown that the level of

embedded-ness in transnational networks, the extent of exposure to EU affairs, the frequency, intensity and duration of interactions with European colleagues, the length of service in the European Parliament, Commission or working groups of the Council of Ministers, generational change, international educational and professional experiences and cultural capital may promote coalition-building habits, mutual trust, a coordination reflex and greater focus on the European interest but do not supercede national identity and considerations by fostering an exponentially more favourable attitude to European integration, the empowerment of supranational institutions such as the Parliament and the Commission, the creation of common foreign policy positions at the expense of core national priorities. Instead, national collective experience, political-cultural factors and party ideology retain their key significance in socialising officials into a particular worldview and attitude to European integration (Best, Lengyel, Verzichelli, 2012; Bigatto, 2007; Beyers, 1998, 2005; Breuer, 2012; Duke, 2005:29-31; Egeberg, 1999; Hooghe, 2005; Howorth, 2010:17-22; Hube, Verzichelli, 2012; Juncos, Pomorska, 2006; Scully, 2005; Trondal, 2004).

Therefore, the thesis expects that even in a dynamic, interactive setting, national decision-makers may not be amenable to comprehensive socialisation, given the examination of deeply ingrained beliefs about nation-state identity and conceptions of Europe on the part of generalised political-intellectual elite opinion in the absence of the same extent of socialising experiences as in the more specific and bounded case of national administrators/negotiators and representatives to Brussels (but which experiences even for the latter groups did not commence in a fully-fledged manner before accession status was agreed in the 1990s and especially after membership was achieved; and which are also expected to produce limited rather than profound effects). However, the process of socialisation is still likely to alter and refine non-fundamental, lower-order, tactical ideas

that are implicated in the contemporary circumstances in which the higher-order images of Self and Other are reenacted. Thus, mutually interactive acceptance and desire for integration, fostering positive reinforcement and identification between Self and Other, are expected to encourage and influence the Self to learn and move towards common positions and shared understandings with the Other – as limited, though, by fundamental belief compatibility or contestation.

Social Psychology

The discipline of Social Psychology is especially relevant to the Constructivist approach of the thesis – given the rich Psychological literature on identity (that also incorporates cognitivist arguments), Constructivism can draw insights and in this way address some of its own conceptual and theoretical weaknesses, as previously outlined in this chapter.

First, as regards Constructivism's problem of understanding and accounting for identity continuity and change, a key finding of Psychological research is linked to the persistence and only very gradual evolution of identities (Abrams, Hogg, Marques, 2005:21; Huddy, Sears, Levy, 2013:10; Burke, Stets, 2009:177; Jenkins, 2008:123). Indeed, habitual thought relieves the burden of effortful information-processing; motivated reasoning urges individuals to preserve their beliefs, oppose challenging views and dismiss the other's side of the argument as far weaker than one's own; while prior beliefs serve as a cognitive anchor that impedes appropriate and efficient updating based on new information not least due to selective attention and aversion to cognitive dissonance (Huddy, Sears, Levy, 2013:10, 13-14; Levy, 2013:311). In terms of social processes on an international scale, the aforementioned cognitive features have informed Image Theory, according to which the beliefs and images that people have of other countries can become assumptions that are so taken for granted that they produce routinised habits that influence perceptions. That is, the

existing image operates as a cognitive schema that not only shapes the interpretation of new information but also affects the search for new information (Herrmann, 2013:338-343).

So as Jenkins argues, individuals will typically use selective perception, tact and sanctions to maintain identifications. If for no other reason, they do this because it is generally easier to maintain an identity than to come up with alternative identifications or definitions of a group or situation. Hence, although change and flux in identities are possible, the persistence and stability of identification is likely to be routine (Jenkins, 2008:123). Moreover, when belief change occurs, it tends to follow the cognitive-consistency tradition of least resistance – i.e., when people are faced with repeated inconsistencies between their belief systems and the world they observe, they first change tactical beliefs about the best means to particular ends. Change in fundamental beliefs is often so psychologically difficult that it is likely to occur only in conjunction with a major disruption in circumstances (Levy, 2013:312).

Second, the ongoing challenge ahead for Constructivists to theorise and specify the ways in which identity affects behaviour (or foreign policy actions in IR terms) can also be addressed on the basis of the Psychological literature. Social Psychologists stipulate that identities are behaviourally consequential in that they frame relations within the social group and with Others. It is a practical matter to synthesise relationships of similarity and difference – i.e., to identify someone could be enough to decide how to treat them (Jenkins, 2008:6, 18).

Thus, in order to belong to a group, it is not enough to claim an identity: one must also perform and actualise it to be accepted and confirmed as a member (Jenkins, 2008:122-123). Especially if people identify strongly with a group, whose norms prescribe certain

actions, then they are more likely to do those things than if they did not identify strongly (Hogg, 2006:124-125). Moreover, identities provide a sense of predictability, anticipation and regularity when dealing with Others. Attribution and stereotyping have a political role in the ‘social exorcism’ of the Other through the dramatisation of differentiation and boundaries. Ambiguity and uncertainty are characteristics of boundaries, hence the need to map them with imaginary precision and to dramatise them ritually (Jenkins, 2008:150-153).

Ultimately, institutionalisation and allocation are some of the most consequential ways in which individuals participate in collective identifications. Institutionalisation contributes to the reproduction of environments of relatively predictable collective behaviour. Indeed, the symbolisation of identity is embodied in very material practices – institutionalised collective forms may be imagined, but they are not imaginary since the practices of people and their products constitute these forms as tangible in space and time (through formal or informal organisation) (Jenkins, 2008:154-158; Hogg, Abrams, Marques, 2005:21). Moreover, identification and allocation are mutually entailed in each other since how one is identified influences what and how much one gets. In this way, administrative allocation represents a process of labelling, in which positive and negative stereotypes of particular categories are applied to individuals or groups, influencing the distribution to them of resources and penalties. Indeed, the moral register that resonates with notions of fairness and justice makes stereotyping appropriate to allocatory decision-making (Jenkins, 2008:192-193).

Overall therefore, the Social Psychological literature can provide important insights on issues of identity continuity and change as well as on how identity affects behaviour. However, there are weaknesses of that literature, which Constructivism itself can address on the basis of its preoccupation with context and meaning. More specifically, the critique

of the reductionism of Social Psychology's individualist premises (whereby social behaviour is explained in terms of asocial intrapsychic cognitive and motivational processes) can be tackled through a greater focus on social interaction and cultural context (Hogg, Vaughan, 2007:23; Shannon, 2012:18). The elaboration of the characteristics and dynamics of the Self-Other relationship in the next section shows how cognitive processes (of identity continuity and change and effect on behaviour) are informed by and situated within social interaction and intersubjectively held ideas, while the empirical chapters of the thesis further present the concrete cultural substantiation of the Self-Other relationship in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia.

Moreover, a key problem with Social Identity Theory (SIT), in particular, is the insufficient examination of the meaning of identity (Huddy, 2013:742). SIT argues that symbolic concerns related to group standing and perceived inter-group status differences are central to the development of in-group cohesion, identity stability or social mobility among groups since the individual's need for positive distinctiveness is taken as a crucial psychological need (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel, Turner, 1979; Huddy, 2013:742). So it is enough for two individuals to know that they belong to the same group for them to favour one individual over another. In this way, what the group stands for – its norms and values, is bracketed out given that the overwhelming emphasis is placed on positive valuation (Epstein, 2010:15). Yet, the theoretical standpoint of the thesis – developed in the subsequent section, suggests that it is not only dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, belongingness and status, that inform the process of identification but also how these are made meaningful by intersubjectively established norms, rules and principles (which can further refine Social Categorisation theory's cognitivist bent, whereby it is one's perceived similarity to the prototypic group member that plays a key role in the development of social identity) (Turner, et al., 1987; Huddy, 2013:741).

Finally, Social Psychology's overwhelmingly positivist reliance on small-scale laboratory experiments means that findings cannot be easily generalised to less 'pure', 'real-life' conditions. Yet, since laboratory results are the basis of theoretical perspectives on social behaviour, these perspectives can inform Constructivist analytical and empirical investigations and thus establish the degree of external validity of Psychological findings (Hogg, Vaughan, 2007:10-11).

The interactive Constructivist theoretical framework of the thesis

The preceding analysis – situating the thesis within key relevant theories and bodies of literature – has yielded five key conceptual-theoretical standpoints shaping the author's approach, summarised as follows.

The first standpoint is related to an interactive ontological assumption, according to which identity construction, continuity and change represent the product of the interaction of systemic- and unit-level factors.

Second, the thesis argues for a middle-ground epistemological position that draws on as well as critiques 'conventional', 'critical' and 'linguistic' Constructivism.

Third, the thesis aims to fill the gap in Constructivist research, occasioned by an overwhelming focus on ontological and epistemological theorising that has resulted in insufficient empirical and mid-range theoretical exploration of how identities are constructed in an interactive and comparative mode and how identity affects foreign policy behaviour.

Fourth, 'European-ness' is posited as an ideal-typical model constituted by a set of norms, values and principles serving as a comparative benchmark for the Europeanisation of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, which differs from the Europeanisation literature's focus on

Europeanisation of member states in particular policy areas within the institutional confines of the EU (and the CFSP in the case of foreign policy primarily on the basis of socialisation).

Fifth, the theoretical approach of the thesis incorporates Social Psychological arguments and findings about the conditions for identity continuity and change as well as about the effect of identity on behaviour, while highlighting the frequently missing analysis of context and meaning in Psychological research.

Building on these ontological, epistemological, theoretical and conceptual standpoints, this part of the chapter aims to further elaborate on the interactive Constructivist framework of the thesis through a detailed examination of the cultural and psychological characteristics and dynamics of the Self-Other relationship, followed by the stipulation of the main argument and three concrete empirical propositions about the conditions for ‘thick’, ‘ambivalent’ and ‘thin’ Europeanisation.

Characteristics and dynamics of the Self-Other relationship

This sub-section aims to elucidate characteristics and dynamics of the Self-Other relationship, which define and affect identity formation, stability and change. The Self-Other relationship is present in both interpersonal and group identification processes. Regarding the latter, collective internal definition represents group identification, while collective external definition is categorisation. As Jenkins puts it, each is an interrelated part of the collective dialectic of identification, whereby neither comes first or exists without the latter (Jenkins, 2008:109-110).

So in group processes the Self and the Other can be understood as collective concepts or signifiers, referring respectively to collective internal group identification and external

categorisation. And even as so generalised on the collective level, Self and Other need not be treated (and blackboxed) as abstract notions equivalent to ‘individuals’ or undifferentiated units with a ready-made outlook. Rather, the various and intricate aspects, processes and developments going on ‘within’ the Self and the Other need to be examined when aiming to establish the ideational perspective of those collectivities. Thus, the Self (that applies to the nation-state as the group or to Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, in particular) could be studied on the basis of the leadership positions in the domestic political debate and process that sanction, shape and inform an identity stance, which is associated with the Self and externalised towards the Other, at any given time. Similarly, the Other’s image (i.e., the Western Other in the thesis, which can be differentiated into the European Other and American Other) can be discerned through those state-level and international institutional processes, events and policies that most significantly influence and frame its collective representation and power projection in relation to the Self within a particular timeline.

As regards the more specific, mutually informative characteristics and qualities of Self and Other that can affect the continuity or change of processes of identification, there are first certain aspects of the Other, which are likely to strengthen the impact of the external dimension on the Self’s identity. One of these aspects relates to critical external events and actions. Translated into International Relations terms, the premise is that international institutional events or state policies, which have a regional and even global significance, are very likely to have an impact on other states by leading to the rethinking of certain self-conceptions or making some identities more salient. Support for this claim is most readily available from Social Psychological identity theories – affect control theory and identity control theory (Berger, 1966:9). Both theories deal with the internal dynamic of selves seeking to restore balance when identities are threatened by external events. In affect

control theory, interactions consist of three important elements – self, other, activity – with affective values reflecting meanings resident in existing culture. If an external event disturbs the affective value of an element, adjustment involves altering one or more of the meanings, and therefore the values of elements – including identities – restoring equilibrium. An identity is re-conceptualised, or another identity becomes more salient, when a disturbance is so great that affective values cannot be brought into line with one another without altering the identity somehow (Stryker, 2008:8-9).

Another important characteristic of the Other, which can affect the Self's identity, relates to power and capabilities – i.e., the importance of the Other is likely to be heightened, the greater its power capabilities since that Other can affect both the identity and power positions of the Self. The Other's economic and political power can easily translate into normative and symbolic power, through which it can confer positive or negative evaluations on the Self. For instance, the line between international society (defined by certain principles and norms) and the hegemony of the capitalist core can sometimes be difficult to draw. Many states in the periphery feel threatened by international societal norms (such as human rights and democracy) that go against their political and cultural identity as well as foreign policy interests and power-political considerations (Lipschutz, 1995:193).

In short, identity formation has a crucial external aspect, as identity only becomes meaningful and arises out of difference. Especially during critical times and events, if a powerful Other confers recognition, appreciation, acceptance, it will facilitate positive self-identification with and positive perceptions of the Other by the Self. But the significant Other can also exclude, insult or sideline the Self, which can accentuate feelings of resentment, opposition and further attempts at self-enhancement.

Furthermore, there are certain characteristics of the Self, which are likely to affect identity stability. First, a liminal situation of internal ideational crisis takes the form of status inconsistency and may result in confusion, disorientation, insecurity and enhanced sensitivity to external factors (Greenfeld, 1992:15). Indeed, liminality refers to in-between periods characterised by contingency, uncertainty and flux because of the dissolution of the established social order, triggered by a sudden event such as war, revolution or the collapse of a whole socio-political system. Liminal situations lead to the dislocation of established structures, the reversal of hierarchies and intellectual confusion (Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1995; Thomassen, 2009).

An identity crisis also sharpens the need for external models, guidance and even imitation so that a methodological focus on strategic calculations becomes rather less useful. As against the assumptions that crisis periods require a focus on actors' choices and strategic decision-making, which is present in much of the 'transition' literature, it can be argued that a sharpened awareness and reactions to outside models and actions becomes paramount (Dobry, 2009:75). Indeed, individuals trapped in a liminal situation cannot follow their 'rational interests' for two main reasons: first, because the structure on which 'objective rationality' was based has disappeared and second, because the stressful character of a liminal period prevents clear thinking. Thus, the search for a solution of the identity crisis involves an escalating process of imitation and hence the greater importance of the example but also behaviour and attitudes of outside actors (Szokolczai, 2009:154). However, the process of comparison with and emulation of these outside actors can give rise to resentment – i.e., hostility and defensiveness towards the perceived external source or benchmark of one's inferiority (Greenfeld, 1992:16).

A second and related aspect to the above points is the need for positive self-identification. SIT posits that people have a basic need to see themselves in a positive light in relation to relevant others. This need for prestige and high status means that in times of crisis, and hence diminished group esteem, social creativity and social change can take place in order that identity can be enhanced in a positive way. Jackson found that members of a negative group attempted to change their group's status by rating an undesirable attribute more positively or rating the group more favourably on other comparative dimensions (Huddy, 2001:10).

Third and related to the above, the importance accorded to the Other in national consciousness can further affect the direction of identity change in periods of crisis that diminish positive esteem. The assumption is that the more important and salient the Other is, the more significant its impact will be in times of identity crisis. But what is the relationship between the Self and the Other?

In the tradition of Hobbes and Machiavelli the foundational political idea is that individual subjects as well as political communities oppose one another in a state of constant competition over interests. For Realists, the logic of security is exclusionist – it proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of the state and in doing so draws boundaries to discipline the behaviour of those within and to differentiate within from without (Lipschutz, 1995:214). Therefore, the Other is conceived as an enemy. However, this need not be the case and one of the first thinkers to redefine the relations of identity and difference was Nietzsche. He argued that the desire for security is manifested as collective resentment of difference – that which is not us, which is not certain and predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection

from the unknown. Hence, the attitude to a 'negative' Other is based on competitive animosity, fear and stereotyping exacerbated by cultural incompatibility.

However, the positive will to power produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference and therefore the Other need not be an enemy but can also be worthy of admiration and praise (Lipschutz, 1995:33-35). Thus, an analysis of identity can be situated within the tradition that emphasises not the struggle for self-preservation but the struggle for the establishment of relations of mutual recognition as a precondition for self-realisation. Recognition is worthless if it does not come from someone whom one views as deserving recognition and whose praise can serve as a confirmation of the Self's worth (Honneth, 1995:xi-xix).

In short, identity definition has a vital internal dimension and is hence crucially linked to the Self's own goals, motivations and values. A situation of identity crisis can lead to confusion, insecurity and a search for models. The need for positive self-identification – threatened by the prospect of a loss of status, can easily turn such confusion into resentment of a significant Other and attempts at positive self-inflation.

Yet, it must be noted that there is rarely an unproblematic and direct understanding of the attitudes and actions of Self and Other. Rather, misperceptions and mutual unintelligibility play an important role in the dynamics of the Self-Other relationship. A major guideline in Social Psychological research about identity is that the internal meaning of a group can be quite different from its meaning to outsiders. Some of the reasons for this include pre-existing stereotypes and cognitive schemas, which affect the intake of new information, as well as group members' attempts to elevate their group's standing by redefining negative identities (Huddy, 2001:18). Therefore, identity as a personal and social psychological phenomenon can be influenced and moulded by cognitive factors such as misperceptions, illusions, negativity bias (the tendency for negative events to have greater effects than

positive events in information-processing, decision-making, learning and memory) as well as affective factors (especially background affective dynamics in the form of subtle intuitions that guide choices, ongoing desires, enduring attitudes and loyalties, deeply held convictions) (Johnson, Tierney, 2014; Hall, 2013).

Overall, the Self and the Other interact in a mutually informative and constitutive manner in processes of identification. This is so because identity arises out of comparisons and contrasts and the need to situate oneself among others – in the case of the state, this is the need to figure out belongingness on the ideological and civilizational map of the world. Indeed, historically, national distinctiveness, language, customs, sensibilities, race, religion, heritage and shared destiny were not accentuated and insisted upon until internationalisation set in train processes of reciprocal national self-definitions (Krause, Renwick, 1996:41-42). As Neumann and Tsygankov make clear, identity does not reside in essential and readily identifiable cultural traits but in relations, and the question of where and how borders towards the Other should be drawn therefore becomes crucial (Neumann, 1995:2; Tsygankov, 2016:15).

Thus, an identity is debated, developed and enunciated domestically, but it can only be enabled, realised and situated on a wider external civilizational map through reciprocal relatedness (co-constitution) to an international conceptual framework of confirmation and recognition. The analysis in this sub-section has further demonstrated how critical external events, differential power capacities as well as internal crises, the need for positive self-identification and the historical importance and embedded-ness of the Other in national consciousness create intersubjective conditions which prominently affect identity construction. Ultimately, the internal and external dimensions of identity are intimately linked in influencing the continuity and change of processes of identification.

In particular, the sources of conflict that may lead to a destabilisation of identity can be external (linked to critical events or actions that induce a discrepancy between situationally self-relevant meanings and the meaning contained in the identity standard – i.e., the ideal-typical model of European-ness in the concrete terms of the research) and internal (linked to identity crisis and liminality). Both of these sources of conflict can be most acute in circumstances of defining boundaries between Self and Other (resulting in the end in integration or exclusion) and can pose a threat to social identity in the form of a loss of status (Burke, 2006:4-5; Burlingame, 2008:23-24). The two social factors inherent in the process of defining belongingness to a new group (i.e., the Euro-Atlantic family of nations) are social support (referring to inclusion efforts, positive affirmation and acceptance on the part of the Other) and need satisfaction (referring to the Self's ability to fulfil needs for positive distinctiveness and relatedness through effort and motivation) (Amiot, Terry, Wirawan, Grice, 2010:3).

Yet, despite these conflicts urging a process of identity change, this change will primarily be directed at making identity verification possible. That is, as the Social Psychological literature suggests, individuals and groups resist significant changes in the content of their identity, instead engaging in strategies that confirm existing identification – such as through selective interaction in terms of choosing partners and situations that do not pose a threat to identity and the display of cues to let others know what the group is and how it should be treated (Burke, 2006:14).

Finally, before the next sub-section clarifies the argument and propositions entailed in the above-discussed framework, a note is first in order that this framework also substantiates theoretically the choice of the 1989-2000 timeline for the empirical analysis. Indeed, the empirical examination of Europeanisation can be most fruitfully conducted over the period

of the 1990s, whose animating spirit and substantive challenges (already generally indicated in Chapter 1, pp. 35-36) exemplified and embodied most prominently the crucial dimensions of the Self-Other relationship (including critical external events and developments as well as an internal liminal situation of identity crisis and the corresponding need to emulate a significant Other and to achieve positive self-identification). The concrete manifestation of those dimensions in the Polish, Bulgarian and Russian context in the 1990s is presented at the beginning of the respective empirical chapters.

Moreover, situating the 1990s in a historically-sensitive frame of ideational continuity and change is important in showing that the distinctive *Zeitgeist* and tasks of the decade did not simply inaugurate a radical break from the past and a clean slate upon which the ‘new’ (i.e., ideal-typical European-ness) could be inscribed, as assumed by transitology. Rather, the peaceful revolutions of 1989 (Thompson, 2004) united past, present and future, containing both a horizon of expectations (whereby the future confronted an absolute limit that could only be anticipated) and historical experience (i.e., the totality that assembled different layers of earlier times) (Wydra, 2015). How the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, continuity and change took place is explored in the empirical chapters, with Social Psychological findings and the analysis of liminal situations after the dissolution of order suggesting the significant persistence of historically-established ideas. Thus, in Wydra’s and Prozorov’s terms, the messianic, post-revolutionary time of the 1990s represented a period of extraordinary condensation of potentialities – a ‘dawn’ of a new temporality and a new national constitutive mythology of European-ness, which were, however, suspended in the aspect of their actualisation, conditioned by the continuing hold of the past as an ‘organism in gestation’ rather than a well-sealed era of bygones (Wydra, 2015; Prozorov, 2009:44, 52).

Main argument and propositions

This sub-section puts forward the main argument and three key propositions (accompanied by four clarifications) as to how an interactive model of Constructivism – developed in the current chapter – can account for the research puzzle.

As stated at the beginning of Chapter 1, the thesis argues that differential Europeanisation can be understood on the basis of differentiated levels of inclusion and establishment of relations of mutual recognition and belongingness – substantiated by a differentiated extent of ideational affinity (i.e., normative compatibility), which are re-enacted in the interactive, mutually constitutive process of identification between Self and Other (i.e., between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and (Western) Europe). Hence, the greater the Other's acceptance and commitment and the greater the Self's normative similarity and identification with the Other, the more such an interaction (defining boundaries of mutuality) will (re)produce conceptions and practices on the part of the Self, which match most closely the ideal standard embodying the values and principles of communal belongingness with the Other.

In concrete empirical terms, differential Europeanisation of foreign policy identity will be shaped by country-specific (Polish, Bulgarian, Russian) constructions of 'Europe', which are differentially conditioned in the interactive process (between (Western) Europe and each of the three states) of establishing the limits and shared affinities of the Euro-Atlantic community, and which are benchmarked against an ideal type of European-ness underwriting that community. That is, the character of the interactive process of identification (elaborated in the previous sub-section) presupposes that the viability, realisation and maintenance of a domestically debated and constructed conception of Europe (constituting a given extent of ideational affinity and desire for belongingness) is

co-constitutively dependent on a corresponding international background that matches this conception in the extent of receptivity, recognition and commitment, thus promoting a given level of inclusivity and shared commonality.

Three propositions about levels of Europeanisation can be posited and derived from this argument. First, the ‘thickest’ (i.e., deep, extensive, substantial) case of Europeanisation of foreign policy identity would be characterised by the interaction of sustained, consistent and wide-ranging Western European commitment, recognition and acceptance of a given CEE country coupled with a broad-based internal political consensus and dominance of reform-minded groups in that country (shaped by a strong cultural-historical tradition of identification and normative compatibility with Europe/the West). On the other hand, the ‘thinnest’ (i.e., shallow, tenuous, insubstantial) case of Europeanisation would be characterised by the interaction of low and inconsistent Western European commitment and acceptance working in conjunction with serious domestic doubts about the desirability of ‘merging’ national identity and social-political practices with those of Europe/the West. Finally, an ‘ambivalent’ (i.e., uncertain, ambiguous) case of Europeanisation is one in which there is both international and domestic ambivalence about how much a country belongs to Europe, but nonetheless this ambivalence is not too strong to prevent the gradual albeit difficult movement towards inclusion and (superficial) normative compatibility, pushed along by the provision of European diplomatic and economic support and the achievement of internal consensus about forging a pro-European foreign policy direction.

Four points of clarification need to be made with regard to the argument and propositions. First, the extent of a country’s Europeanisation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community on the interactive Constructivist model stems from the general dynamics of

inclusion and exclusion that are in turn conditioned by extent and depth of ideational affinity. This is so given the conclusion made in the review of the Social Psychological literature that it is both the mechanisms of acceptance/positive valuation and separation/denigration as well as the meaning and normative standards embodied in these mechanisms that define group boundaries. Hence, assumptions of kinship and shared belongingness are intimately connected to normative, cultural and ideational similarity and affinity.

Second, how can levels of Europeanisation be assessed? Following from the guidelines of evaluation of inclusivity and ideational affinity inherent in the process of Europeanisation on pp. 66-68, a ‘thickly’ Europeanised case would feature a construction of ‘Europe’ characterised by a desire to belong and integrate with West of the continent as well as consistent, sustained and internalised discursive espousal – matched by behavioural manifestation, of the values contained in the ideal type. It would also feature continued and intensive commitment on the part of the Other, expressed in quick and substantial institutional inclusion, diplomatic support and economic assistance, fostering an increased sense of belongingness and status security. On the other hand, a ‘thin’ case of Europeanisation would be one in which the construction of ‘Europe’ only matches the ideal type as a rhetorical overlay, but is devoid of in-depth consistency, internalised ideational substantiation and behavioural manifestation, which can amount to contestation of the values in the ideal-typical model and of the desirability of integration. This would be consonant with a non-committal Other that fails to provide significant diplomatic, institutional and economic support and hence contributes to disappointment and exclusion. Finally, an ‘ambivalent’ case of Europeanisation would combine elements from the aforementioned instances so that the construction of ‘Europe’ would be characterised by discursive enunciation of the values in the ideal type but divergence in substantive

understandings, expressed in the prevalence of imitative performativity rather than either normative internalisation or contestation of these values and shared belongingness. The Other would similarly demonstrate slower and less significant diplomatic, institutional and economic support (but without refraining from such support altogether), thus fostering a mix of encouragement and disappointment.

Third, the interactive, mutually constitutive quality of the Self-Other relationship – elaborated in the preceding sub-section of this chapter, conditions an expectation that in concrete empirical terms domestic and international events, processes and developments work together by reinforcing, complementing, mediating each other, therefore being ultimately co-constitutive. That is, the internal and external mould each other in a dynamic cycle of interactions and mutual feedbacks in fostering a particular outcome of Europeanisation so that each dimension operating by itself is necessary but not sufficient. This approach contrasts with a positivist orientation that would treat ‘interaction’ as the point of intersection between ‘isolatable’, ‘hermetic’ and ‘impermeable’ variables. Yet, in line with the middle-ground methodological argumentation developed in Chapter 1 (pp. 14-17), the assumption of co-constitution (as opposed to clearly separable ‘causes’) does not preclude positing ‘propositions’, which is akin to hypothesis-testing. This is so because even though an analysis may be constitutive, qualitative-interpretive (rather than causal, quantitative-statistical), it can also be guided by and incorporate scientific standards of enquiry, including a rigorous-systematic, cross-case comparative, discursive as well as policy-focused empirical investigation of clearly specified suppositions. Such an investigation can provide a degree of validity and generalizability (rather than simply narration, directed by intuition), while at the same time being attuned to the vital significance of contextualism and to the possibility that further interpretive evidence may be uncovered (thus avoiding the assertion of confident claims to causality and finality of

the data) (Hopf, 2002:29). Therefore, the objective of the empirical task of the thesis is to establish the plausibility of the main argument and propositions on the basis of a combination of methods aimed at thick description and the provision of (tentative) causal pathways and the consideration of alternative, Realist explanations (that would account for differential Europeanisation as the outcome of perceptions of threat, security concerns and distribution of capabilities). However, the study also retains caution with respect to generalizability, cause-effect relationships and law-like patterns.

Fourth, what criteria determine the selection of the particular facets of the internal and external dimension of identification – i.e., the relevant domestic and international developments, contexts and events in which the Self's and the Other's image, attitudes and actions (informing extent of ideational affinity and inclusivity) will be examined in researching levels of Europeanisation? As the relevant sub-section in this chapter stipulates theoretically (pp. 87-95) and as the analyses of the identity scene in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate in country-specific detail, the selection is derived from those intersubjective conditions of the Self-Other relationship, which are theorised to have a pronounced effect on identity construction, continuity and change. More specifically, such conditions include critical external events and developments, over the course of which a significant and powerful Other impacts the Self's identity debates and place in Europe (e.g. EU accession, German and American policies of inclusion/exclusion in the process of defining the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic community). Additionally, in liminal domestic situations of identity crisis and a corresponding search for models, identity verification and positive distinctiveness, the thesis will aim to explore internal political debates and the achievement or derailment of a consensus on Europeanisation among those key policy-makers, intellectuals and political parties (classified into 'identity' groups) that influence the

foreign policy decision-making process, shape the construction of 'Europe' and thus inform (Polish, Bulgarian, Russian) ideational projection.

Constructivism vis-a-vis alternative and complementary theoretical approaches

Having elaborated an interactive Constructivist conceptual and theoretical framework, it remains to be discussed how and why this framework is more plausible than rival IR theories (above all Realism) in accounting for Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's foreign policy transformations since 1989 as well as how the framework overlaps with, enriches but also differs from (potentially) complementary explanations, yet somewhat tenuously related to the IR discipline (such as Role theory in Foreign Policy Analysis).

Constructivism and the Realist challenges

The thesis singles out and responds to Realism (and particularly Neoclassical Realism) as the rival IR theory that offers the most fundamental challenge to the core conceptual-theoretical assumptions of the interactive Constructivist approach, through which the empirical puzzle is illuminated. That is, Realism mounts the most significant critique and dismissal of the independent effect of ideational factors in international relations. And from this critique it follows that Realism can account for Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's differential Europeanisation and integration in the Euro-Atlantic community on the basis of its own conceptual and theoretical apparatus – especially as the outcome of differential perceptions of threat on the part of three countries distinguished by differential size and power capacities (as shown in the justification for case selection on p. 21). Indeed, the different weight of a small, medium and large state in the international distribution of power can be argued to be an easy case for a structural, Neorealist explanation (whereby positional placement according to relative power conditions state behaviour) or to a modified, Neoclassical Realist explanation (whereby states react to internally perceived

and mediated threats and not simply to unproblematically translated systemic constraints alone), and yet – a particularly hard test case for an ideational framework of analysis.

Thus, if the thesis responds convincingly to Realism's pivotal challenges, it will also be able to argue against Liberalism's somewhat more muted criticisms, as the latter perspective allows a greater room for ideas in determining outcomes and for the cooperative, community-building potential of institutions (which are therefore not straightforward epiphenomena of power hierarchies), but it also treats ideas and institutions as part of an instrumentalist-rationalist approach that is shared with Realism.

More specifically, the rest of this sub-section provides further detail to Realist (and where relevant, Liberal) criticisms and demonstrates how these are countered by the thesis. As regards the challenge to the core Constructivist theoretical assumptions, rationalist approaches posit the greater explanatory value of a theoretical emphasis on instrumental-rational behaviour that aims at calculating costs and benefits. Neorealism and Neoliberalism relegate norms and identities to a relatively insignificant role as intervening variables explaining residual variance. According to Neorealists, identities matter only at the discretion of or in the service of a power structure. In Neoliberal Institutionalism, norms and institutions matter to the degree that they affect actor strategies by reducing transaction costs, by identifying focal points for coordinated behaviour and by providing frameworks for productive issue-linkage. The origins of norms and identities are thus limited to the pre-existing preferences of agents and their consequences tend to reflect this constraint (Kratowchwil, 2001:50-55; Wohlforth, 2008:133-134; Donnelly, 2000:6-12; Keohane, 1984:65-79). Even Liberal theory that focuses on domestic politics and allows for state preferences to be determined by societal values and identities still assumes that

once so determined preferences are pursued according to a means-end rational logic. This is said to distinguish Liberalism from ‘non-rational’ theories (Moravcsik, 2010:2, 6).

Yet, for Constructivists, preferences and power maximisation are not fixed in time and content but are constituted as meaningful and given substance to on the basis of actors’ identities, intersubjectively held beliefs and interactions between the agent and the social environment (Hurd, 2008:303). As Kratochwil argues, actors in international relations are themselves constituted by norms so the stability, maintenance and effects of international regimes and power relations are crucially related to the identities of actors (Kratochwil, 2001:57-58). Indeed, as the thesis demonstrates, ‘institutions are what states make of them’ since integration with the EU and NATO was not solely focused on the facilitation of cooperation and the provision of economic benefits – as Neoliberal Institutionalism would have it, but was crucially linked to defining the boundaries of ‘Europe’ – as reflected in a perspective that analyses institutions as culturally and historically embedded (detailed earlier in this chapter: pp. 70-73). Ultimately, following Max Weber’s logic, different types of rationalities (practical, substantive, theoretical, formal) are all socio-cognitive processes, which strive to understand and organise reality and are institutionalised as normative regularities of action within legitimate social and political orders (Kalberg, 1980:16-18).

Moreover, identity does not operate as a causal variable but as a constitutive mechanism that shapes both belief systems and behaviours. As discussed in the review of the Social Psychological literature, identity has very ‘real’ practical consequences in that belongingness to a group entails performativity and institutionalisation of distinctive group norms, while the symbolic dramatisation of difference encompasses attribution, stereotyping and discretionary allocation.

In concrete foreign policy terms, identity informs policy-makers' perceptions and understandings of situations, shapes the foreign policy-making context, limits the available and possible range of courses of action, serves as a justificatory and legitimating principle, guides the treatment of significant Others in international relations and directs internal efforts to confirm and prove belongingness to a community of nations. Ultimately, the author's Constructivist claim that identity is mutually constitutive with interests (whereby interests are derived from identity but also what one believes to be their interests can become their identity) is substantiated when action is broadly congruent with both identity and interests. That is, for a Constructivist approach to foreign policy to be persuasive, it must demonstrate the existence of a broadly shared collective identity in political discourse and action, but also of a broadly shared conception of state interests that are mutually interactive and informative with identity. As Banchoff argues, where the contestation of particulars coexists with broad agreement on the general definition of state interests – and that definition in turn rests on a broadly shared and enduring state identity, Constructivism becomes plausible (Banchoff, 1998:25-27). So in specific circumstances, the generally co-determining relationship between identity and interests can be expressed in such a way that the ideational or strategic-instrumental element can take precedence over the other on the basis of suppression (for example, when tactical accommodation temporarily subdues principled positions) or strengthening (when strategic incentives and domestic interests serve as conditions for the sustainability of a particular vision), with both elements being subject to refraction through cognitive and emotional biases. Yet, this does not invalidate a Constructivist explanation to the extent that there is congruence between state identity, interest and actions in overall policy direction.

Furthermore, the challenge according to which Neoclassical Realism may be better able to answer the empirical puzzle of the thesis, is countered first by critiquing Neoclassical

Realism's conceptual and theoretical assumptions and then by pointing out its insufficiency in explaining Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's Europeanisation. In particular, theoretical inconsistencies and contradictions arise from Neoclassical Realists' aim to enrich Neorealism (by introducing domestic intervening variables as mediating the effects of the system), while maintaining its core assumptions linked to positing a rigid separation between 'autonomous' and 'isolatable' levels of analysis, the ultimate primacy of the system in determining outcomes and an objectivist ontological standpoint.

As Legro and Moravcsik argue, Defensive and Neoclassical Realists invoke state preferences, beliefs, strategic culture, state-society relations and international organisations in order to trump the direct effects of material power and structure. In this way, the core underpinnings of Neorealism are stretched to include assumptions and causal mechanisms from alternative paradigms, albeit with little effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions (Legro, Moravcsik, 1999:2-3). (For statements contradicting the assumptions of the causal primacy of systemic-material variables and objectivist epistemology, see respectively Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016:30, 35, 94, 168 and Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016:106, 107, 108, 122-123). Also, to be determinate, Neoclassical Realism needs to specify exactly what range of foreign policy options are available to states as a result of the operation of systemic variables and then clarify which options will be more likely to be utilised as a result of domestic variables – rather than stating generally that 'international structures have dominant influence over the range of systemic outcomes that are possible' and that 'what outcomes will obtain...will depend on the character of the units and the foreign policies and grand strategies they select' (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016:90).

Moreover, the Neoclassical Realist conception of perceptions of threat is incomplete. Perceptions of threat are shaped not only by aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions, as Stephen Walt argues, but also by culture,

cognition and affect (Walt, 1987:19-27). Social Psychological research demonstrates that the deeply rooted and routinised images people have of other countries become central building blocks in the identification of the threats and opportunities faced in the international system (Herrmann, 2013:338-343). Moreover, fear conditioning may be more permanent than other kinds of learning so that fear lasts longer than the threat and can become a learned response embedded over time (Stein, 2013:382). In international relations terms, fear can thus be taken to represent a culturally-bound perception and internalisation of the threat coming from a significant, negative Other. Therefore, the elements of capabilities and intentions, which are at the centre of threat assessment and the modelling of rational deterrence and other strategies in Realist theory, are not borne out by Psychological research given that the drive for consistency, simplicity and fear-motivated patterns of thought and behaviour impair the processes of rational estimation and assessment of threats (Stein, 2013:371-373).

Finally, it remains to be demonstrated that an interactive Constructivist framework provides a more plausible account of Poland's, Bulgaria's and Russia's differential Europeanisation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. A Neoclassical Realist counter-argument might attempt to answer the research question by claiming that Poland decided to bandwagon with the West very early on after the collapse of communism because of its strong threat perceptions of Russia; that Bulgaria was slower in pursuing a bandwagoning strategy because of less strong fears of Russia, and that Russia itself perceived the West as an enemy and thus decided to balance against it. However, there are a number of problems with this counter-argument – charted out below and examined more extensively in the empirical chapters, which show that a Neoclassical Realist explanation provides an insufficient and incomplete answer to the research question of the thesis.

Most importantly, Neoclassical Realism, like Neorealism, claims adherence to a structural explanation of international politics, which however is unable to account coherently and adequately for both the effects of identity as well as the interactive dynamic between domestic and international factors. Indeed, even if we accept that bandwagoning was Poland's and Bulgaria's motivation, why did the West acquiesce in their demands to be included in NATO and the EU? Arguably, from a realist-rational perspective, it might have been more rational on the part of the West not to antagonise Russia by accepting in its orbit countries from which it gained little in terms of an aggregate enhancement of security, thus re-enacting a great power condominium with Moscow and ignoring the security needs and preferences of smaller states (Kennan, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2014). Moreover, the different timing of the acceptance of different CEE countries into the EU and NATO can to an important extent be accounted for by the fact that these organisations have criteria of domestic transformation (successful transition to liberal democracy and market economy), which serve to inform decisions as to whether a country is ready to be accepted or not. This point demonstrates the importance of the degree of domestic political, societal and economic transformation as conditions that are intimately connected with the desire of a particular country to be integrated in the West and the West's own affinity with, support for and acceptance of that country.

Also, the Neoclassical Realist treatment of perceptions of threat misses crucial elements of the nature of the 'threat' and how exactly it matters in decision-making. In particular, Romania's perception of threat from Russia was much stronger than that of Bulgaria (and on a level similar to that of Poland or the Czech Republic and Hungary) but nonetheless Romania followed the same path of Euro-Atlantic integration as Bulgaria, and not Poland, given the similar combination of international and domestic ideational, political and strategic factors in the Bulgarian and Romanian process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Also,

Russia in the 1990s (and indeed until 2014) – judged by Walt’s four criteria, was not a threatening state to Poland and there was little reason to be concerned that the nationalist trend in Russian politics would produce efforts to restore the Russian sphere of influence in Central Europe (MacFarlane, 1993:18). However, the historical-cultural underpinnings of Polish-Russian relations (namely, the memory of partitioning and subjugation) informed Poland’s representations of Russia as an enemy and aggressor, making Warsaw demand quick accession into NATO and further strengthening of the eastern flank of the Alliance.

Ultimately, as is demonstrated in more detail in the empirical chapters, Neoclassical Realism’s structuralist, materialist and objectivist assumptions fail to account for the foreign policy strategies and choices taken by Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, as these strategies and choices were conditioned by the mutual constitution of the international and domestic dimension as well as of ideas and interests. Indeed, this argument counters other theories that may analyse Europeanisation by privileging the systemic- (Neoliberal Institutionalism) or the domestic level of analysis (domestic version of Liberalism).

Constructivism and the Role theory approach to FPA

Before clarifying how the author’s Constructivist theory shares points of resemblance with, but above all differs from, FPA in general and Role theory in particular, an overview of the main assumptions and objectives of these approaches is first in order.

FPA offers the necessary conceptual tools for a more concrete exploration of decision-making mechanisms since FPA is the study of the processes, effects, causes and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making in a comparative or case-specific manner (Foreign Policy Analysis Journal). Indeed, it is distinguished by being agent-oriented and actor-specific in examining the policy process, whereby those with decision-making authority frame problems, assess policy options, prioritise objectives, formally settle on and

implement a course of action taken with reference to a particular situation (Hudson, 2005:2-3).

An especially relevant to the current thesis explanatory framework within the cognitive/psychological approach in FPA is Role theory. The key concept of 'role' is overall defined as a social position that limits an actor's behaviour in accordance with the expectations and demands that role generates (Barnett, 1993:5). A 'national role conception' refers to the policy-makers' representations of the kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions this state should perform in the international system – as concretely expressed through 'national role performance/enactment', and as circumscribed by 'role prescriptions' (i.e., the shared norms and expectations emanating from the external environment about the appropriate role that Ego should play) (Walker, 1987).

These concepts point to the major theoretical assumptions, as developed by touchstone Role theorists, including Holsti, Wish, Rosenau. As Holsti explains, in the study of foreign policy, the role performance of governments can be explained primarily by the policy-makers' own conceptions of their nation's role in the international system, domestic needs and demands. Generally, the expectations of other governments, international legal norms and sanctions are ill-defined, too flexible or weak compared to those that exist in an integrated society (Walker, 1987:8-10). Therefore, the perceptions and attitudes of the decision-makers become the crucial independent variables in explaining foreign policy (Walker, 1987; Holsti, 1970; Chafetz, Abramson, Grillot, 1996).

Guided by this argumentation, Role theorists have further constructed typologies of the roles that states can play in the international system. For instance, Holsti (1970) identified 17 major roles expressed by states between 1965 and 1967, connecting role conceptions to

different levels of involvement in international politics (Thies, 2009:5). Wish (1980) found out 13 national role conceptions, grouped under the categories of status, motivational orientation and issue area, while Hymans (2006) built his typology on the dimensions of solidarity and status as they key aspects of social comparison (Ifantis, Triantaphyllou, Kotelis, 2015:8-9). Methodologically, Role theorists have predominantly (yet not exclusively) drawn on content analysis, events databases, statistical analysis, with the Comparative Foreign Policy strand being particularly attuned to aggregated, cross-national analyses, correlating national roles to foreign policy along conflict-cooperation dimensions (Thies, 2009:32, Starr, 1988:6; Lantis, Beasley, 2017:14).

Following the above overview, it remains to be elucidated how the author's framework relates to FPA and Role theory. As regards the former, the interactive IR theoretical approach of the thesis is well-placed to bridge the generally established, path-dependent disciplinary division between predominantly 'systemically' concerned International Relations and 'sub-systemically' focused FPA – a gap pioneered by Kenneth Waltz's conception of IR and foreign policy as two separate fields in terms of levels of analysis and complemented by Richard Snyder's parallel positioning and development of FPA on the agentic, decision-making level (so that even studies within either discipline, which have moved beyond a single a level of analysis, overall maintain their respective disciplinary categories, without necessarily engaging with and clarifying the relationship to each other) (Waltz, 2010; Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, 2002; Houghton, 2006:1-3). The author's interactive theory bridges this gap by incorporating the structural and agentic dimension in the process of identification and construction of elite conceptions of Europe, which shape external stances.

Moreover, straddling the overblown disciplinary distinctions of IR and FPA can illuminate the close affinity between international relations and foreign policy, otherwise obscured by stringent academic boundaries (since the general interactions and dynamics between states in the international system have implications for foreign policy decisions, which in turn affect international trends and structures). Indeed, the inseparable association between international relations and foreign policy means that they are not the exclusive research preserve of IR and FPA, respectively (especially when examinations are attuned to multiple levels of analysis). They can be studied by both IR and FPA, which can borrow from each other's theoretical and conceptual assumptions, while retaining their distinctive contributions (i.e., without there being a complete overlap).

Thus, on the one hand, the interactive Constructivist theory of the thesis generally shares FPA's concern with agency and actor-specificity by clarifying who the relevant decision-makers and 'identity' groups are, examining their views and debates and attending to the effects of the domestic political-institutional environment in mediating the construction and expression of a given identity stance (as indicated earlier in the chapter: pp. 70-73). But on the other hand, the specific Constructivist value in studying foreign policy behaviour lies in the provision of a wider treatment and understanding of foreign policy as practices of boundary-drawing between political communities and hence an exercise of situating a state on the international civilizational map (rather than more narrowly defined by FPA as the concrete external actions of a government in bounded cases), thus casting a distinctive light on a state's external conduct. In particular, a Constructivist perspective of foreign policy behaviour studies how (and whether) subjectively and intersubjectively shared conceptions shaping a given ideational-discursive domestic context inform, direct and circumscribe foreign policy options by serving as a conceptual map, cognitive anchor and guide (as more concretely explored in the previous sub-section, pp. 103-104). In short,

this context is expected to frame the overall tenor, character and orientation of external relations as regards the larger questions of identification, integration and belongingness between Self and Other, instead of just focusing on the intricacies and steps of decision-making details and mechanisms of implementation of the specific policies that take place as part of the general ideational-behavioural overlay (as the traditional domain of FPA). That is, the research priorities of FPA as an applied science, micro-analysing processes and outcomes, should not preclude a more generalised perspective and examination of foreign policy, whereby the dominant public-political discursive conceptualisations crucially condition the framework of foreign policy formulation and conduct, upon which framework the diplomatic-bureaucratic apparatus depends for its direction, and which links foreign policy much more closely to the key goals of the state (rather than the procedures and concerns of the concrete execution of those goals) (Chan, 2017).

As regards the relationship between the author's interactive Constructivism and Role theory, there is a general similarity of approach to the extent that the role (i.e., the primarily behavioural manifestation of identity), its individually subjectivist definition and the interaction of external and internal factors are also concerns of the theoretical framework of the thesis. Yet, these foundational positions of Role theory are only partial aspects of identification that the author aims to provide a wider and more rounded treatment to by pointing out and addressing conceptual and theoretical weaknesses through the interactive Constructivist approach (which weaknesses are being increasingly recognised by most recent, contemporary Role theory scholarship as well).

More specifically, one of the key problem areas is related to the neglect of conceptual precision in terms of the difference between a 'role' and an 'identity' (Harnisch, Frank, Maull, 2011:9, 13; Lantis, Beasley, 2017:6; Wehner, Thies, 2014:2). Indeed, such neglect

coupled with the distinct behavioural bent accorded to the definition of a role, the creation of typologies circumscribing the range of roles that can be enacted on the international level and formal-statistical forms of inquiry obscure the context-specific constructions and manifestation of identification, as captured by the concept of identity. The latter contains and unites the socio-cognitive, discursive as well as behavioural element of identification so that it is only when social positions are internalised (as roles refer to behavioural alignment to a social position and purpose) that one can speak of identity. Thus, to say that a state takes the role of and acts like a European power (ally/joiner) or an anti-European power (challenger/competitor), as prescribed by a standard, does not become revelatory enough until one examines the context-specific meanings and various possible expressions imparted to European-ness as part of the Self-Other interactive process of identification. That is, the behavioural aspect of identification should not be disconnected from the internalisation of meaning-formation, which substantiates the performance of an identity and checks against the charge that the role concept can become indistinguishable from instrumentalised conformity (carried out by mask-wearing, image-creating stage actors). Hence, the usage of the overarching term of identity that subsumes the role.

Furthermore, the other key problem area relates to the agent-structure relationship. Although Role theory promises an interactive theoretical pathway (particularly by arguing that states and their leaders seek to enact roles consistent with their domestic context and expectations, while international actors may sanction role-inappropriate behaviour and alter-cast states into different roles (Lantis, Beasley, 2017:17), there are a number of tensions in this approach, which limit the potential contribution of an interactive perspective. More specifically, despite the fact that Role theorists do not dispute the social origins of individual beliefs, they (predominantly) regard the beliefs held by decision-makers as exerting an independent influence on foreign policy behaviour and, therefore,

the individual beliefs of decision-makers are ascribed a great deal of autonomy vis-a-vis their social environment (Houghton, 2006:19; Cantir, Kaarbo, 2016:2). So as it stands, a role-based approach to FPA remains open to the essential thrust of Giddens' criticism that action-oriented approaches of this kind tend to occlude the intimate connection between agents and structures, i.e., that they are unable to give institutions (and other social structures) their proper theoretical due in social and political analysis (Carlsnaes, 1992:12-13). Instead, Constructivism can point to the social roots of individual beliefs and raise attention to the 'situated-ness' of decision-makers in a wider social setting, characterised by intersubjective beliefs and identities.

Moreover, the subjectivist treatment of roles at the expense of intersubjectivity in the domestic domain is paralleled by a similar under-emphasis of the international dimension in the formation of role conceptions (indeed, notwithstanding the prominence of such concepts as role prescriptions and expectations). That is, the focus of Role theorists on the inner experience and perception of individual leaders in defining national role conceptions may overlook the structure of expectations of the wider international environment (i.e., role prescriptions) (Beneš, 2010:12; Barnett, 1993:6-7). It is precisely this structure that an interactive Constructivist framework incorporates theoretically by arguing that states construct their identities through interactions with significant Others.

And, paradoxically, when Role theorists shift their examinations from national role conceptions to their enactment, external factors take on a significant importance in conditioning the range of 'enact-able' national conceptions, whose categorisation into typologies (of ally, bridge, mediator, regional leader, etc.) is much akin to Realist classifications (linked, for instance, to types of status quo and revisionist states (Thies, 2009:5-6, 2012:9; Schweller, 1994; Lantis, Beasley, 2017:17; Cantir, Kaarbo, 2016:14).

Indeed, external factors tend to be equated with material ones (as the performance of decision-makers' role conceptions hinge on the obstacles conditioned by a state's power position in the international system, which is argued to place roles at the intersection of the agentic-ideational and structural-material aspect of IR (Harnisch, Frank, Maull, 2011:26; Wehner, Thies, 2014:4; Thies, 2010).

All of this may well lead to the pre-imposition of roles distributed among states in the international system (and already generally charted out by Realists), therefore foreclosing the exploration of the various manifestations that a given identity makes possible, unduly confining roles to their structural-material determination (despite Role theory's ideational assumptions) and limiting the conceptualisation of the international structure to its material aspects. Instead, rather than pre-specifying a role as a parsimonious label with Realist connotations that reflect positional assignment (such as ally/joiner, peripheral state, competitor/challenger), the thesis provides more extensive values-based indicators of behaviour in line with a construction of Europe, which is defined by both an internal and external ideational dimension, along with the Constructivist assumption that structure is not simply material but depends on the distribution of beliefs and ideas and interactions among states to become meaningful.

Overall, it must be acknowledged that some of the above-analysed core theoretical standpoints and weaknesses of Role theory have been reformulated through the outlined Constructivist insights by the most recent wave of Role theory scholarship. That is, Role theorists have begun to use interpretive methods (Beneš, 2011:8-9; Wehner, Thies, 2014:10-11), role conflict through domestic political contestation is increasingly explored (Brummer, Thies, 2015; Cantir, Kaarbo, 2016) and the importance of the Other's expectations in role conceptions are incorporated (Beneš, 2017; Hermanns, 2013).

However, the usefulness of Role theory to Constructivism has yet to be convincingly demonstrated, particularly given the ongoing shortage of conceptual clarity (in addition to the problems of casting roles into a (somewhat Realist) typological straitjacket and confounding the relationship between ideational and material external factors (Malici, Walker, 2016:8). Indeed, the attempt to show the contribution of the role concept to Constructivism is based on the argument that the role connects identity and action since roles give identity a social meaning. This is said to differ from a Constructivist inability to focus on behaviour because Constructivists treat identity as ‘intrinsic’, agentic and centred on the Self-side of identification at the expense of including the relational interaction with an Other (McCourt, 2012:370-372; McCourt, 2011:1, 22; Wehner, Thies, 2014:14-15). But these statements remain hard to justify given that they rest on a misrepresentation and simplification of Constructivism (and its various strands of analysis of identity), inverting the criticisms mounted against Role theory itself (namely its agentic focus as against domestic intersubjectivity and consideration of international ideational factors).

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has elaborated the main argument and propositions of the thesis as substantiated by an interactive Constructivist theoretical framework that posits a mid-range theoretical exploration of how identities are constructed in an interactive and comparative manner, forges a middle-ground epistemological approach amalgamating elements of conventional, linguistic and critical Constructivism, fills gaps in Constructivist theoretical and empirical research (particularly with regard to CEE). Moreover, the chapter has detailed the author’s approach to Europeanisation and European-ness in relation to the literature on Europeanisation, further drawing on Social Psychological insights about identity continuity and change and about how identity affects behaviour. The theoretical

framework of the thesis has also been situated in the context of rival and (potentially) complementary theories (i.e., Realism and Role theory in FPA, respectively).

The extent to which the propositions of this framework are substantiated empirically forms the subject of investigation of the following three chapters on Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy. These chapters are structured similarly by beginning with an application of the conceptual and theoretical guidelines to the identity scenes in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and subsequently, in line with the analysis of the Self-Other relationship, the chapters first focus on the (separate) effects of the international and domestic dimension of identification on Europeanisation; followed by a section on interaction that brings those dimensions together in demonstrating that Europeanisation is the combined product of internal and external reinforcement, complementarity, co-constitution and mediation; and ending with a discussion of alternative explanations.

Chapter 3 The Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy, 1989-2000

Application of the conceptual and theoretical framework to the Polish case

Before laying out the empirical examination of the Europeanisation of Poland's foreign policy, this chapter first begins by elucidating how the conceptual-theoretical framework of the thesis related to the Self-Other relationship, layers of identity and referent groups of identity is operationalised in the Polish case.

Characteristics of the Self-Other relationship in Poland

As the analysis of the Self-Other relationship in Chapter 2 demonstrates, both the Self and the Other, or the internal and external aspect of identity, are crucial to the process of identity construction and they mutually influence each other.

An important dimension of the internal aspect of identity is linked to liminal ideational crises. At the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, Poland found itself in a liminal situation, which has been perpetuated at least since the Partitions of Poland in the 18th century (by Russia, Prussia and Austria), thus allowing the identification of elements of 'permanent liminality' (Wydra, 2000). That is, starting with the Partitions and continuing with the externally imposed communist system, Polish liminality was manifested in fundamental social discontent, resistance to imperial domination and state authority, utopian visions (whereby the disapproval of the domestic and external order led to taking refuge in collective ideational constructions) (Wydra, 2000:31-56).

The liminal situation has persisted in the post-1989 period, albeit assuming less dramatic forms. Although the achievement of independence, the opportunity to become firmly anchored in the West and to overcome economic backwardness represented an attainable

societal aspiration (suggesting that liminality may finally be transcended), the need to resolve the challenges of internal reforms and European integration marked a process of transformation that was far from certain or accompanied by the carefully planned objectives, pursued by ‘rational’ actors. Rather, this process again bore the hallmarks of liminality, characterised by an authority vacuum, reversals and elimination of distinctions of hierarchy, normative void, reliance on cultural guideposts (as practical experience was missing), a gap between reality and desired endpoint (Wydra, 2000:51). For instance, the emerging, Solidarity-based political elite shared pro-Western views but lacked political experience and expertise, which coupled with the absence of a fully-fledged institutional framework and firmly established party system, enhanced the role of individuals and their intuitive reactions (Osica, 2004:9-10; Eyal, Szelényi, Townsley, 2000).

In addition, imitation, heightened comparisons and the need for recognition from a significant, positive Other are further important features of liminal experiences. For Poland, such a significant and positive Other has been the West and its two ‘faces’ – that of (Western) Europe and the US. As regards Europe, there is on the one hand a strong Polish conviction about Poland being an inseparable part of the cultural-historical developments in the western half of the continent. Indeed, Poland’s (and the Central European region’s) belongingness to Western Europe is shaped by mental-spiritual links and similarity related to a shared religion (at least in its Catholic denomination) and a common cultural and scientific development, influenced by the Enlightenment (Baeva, 1998:2). In this regard, Poland’s adoption of Christianity from Rome in 966, King Sobieski’s victory over the Turks in Vienna in 1683, the 1791 Constitution (which was the first written democratic, European constitution), the traditions of noble democracy, an elected king and the widespread use of Latin among the upper class are some of the landmarks marking Poland’s ‘European credentials’ (Zielonka, Krok-Paszkowska, 2004:9; Rotfeld, 2015,

interview). But on the other hand, the economic and political patterns of Poland's development distanced it from the western half of the continent – namely, lagging industrialisation and modernisation, the dominance of the state administration over economic activities as well as experiences of loss of statehood and imperial domination, bringing about a disconnection of civil society from the political authorities and a belated nation-building process (Baeva, 1998:2).

Therefore, the combination of Poland's 'mental-spiritual' attachment to Western Europe and political-economic distancing from it have engendered a dual perception of Europe as an entity to which Poland belongs but also as a 'standard of civilization' that contributes to an inferiority complex (stemming from repeated attempts at catching up), resentment and the reflex to 'defend' one's indigenous traditions (Baeva, 1998:3). So at least since the 20th century the Polish discourse about Europe has been linked to the notion of 'modernity' and the corresponding recognition of Poland's 'backwardness', associated with belated political, economic and social development (Zielonka, Krok-Paszkowska, 2004:11; Wydra, 2000:83).

Moreover, the US represents the other 'face' of the West as Poland's significant and positive Other. The attitude to America is closely linked to Polish strategic culture, which has been shaped by a number of crucial historical experiences of geopolitical vulnerability, betrayal and defeat, and which is an important formative aspect of Polish national identity. More specifically, the geopolitical dilemma stemming from Poland's location between Russia and Germany – i.e., between two (formerly) imperial, great powers, has been a core security preoccupation throughout Polish history, as these powers divided, suppressed and deprived Poland of its independent statehood (at least until 1989) (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:6, 8-11).

The experiences of World War II added further dimensions to Poland's strategic culture. The alliance of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Britain's and France's appeasement policies and betrayal of Poland at the hands of German aggression, the defeat of Polish forces in 1939 and the failure of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 as well as the Yalta agreement created permanent doubts in Poland about Western Europe's ability and willingness to guarantee Polish national security, led to pessimistic assessments about Poland's own capacity to defend itself and engendered firm opposition to Yalta-style division of spheres of influence and exclusion from European decision-making (Osica, 2004:5-7; Longhurst, 2013:2; Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:11-13). Hence, a crucial conclusion drawn from these dramatic historical experiences was that the US represents the best guarantor of Polish security, which allows Poland to overcome the status of an 'outsider' in European security matters (i.e., excluded from the top decision-making table and left to fend for itself against overwhelming external aggression) and which should therefore be an inseparable part of the European security architecture (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:2-3).

Finally, aside from Europe and America representing positive Others, Poland also has a negative Other in the face of Russia. The 'burdens of the past' in Polish-Russian interactions have moulded antagonistic perceptions on both sides, fed by a dissimilarity in values (engendered by Polish traditions of democracy, plurality, individual conscience, toleration vs. the Russian principles of 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality') as well as competition for power and influence (in the 17th century) and opposition to subjugation and suppression (on the part of Poland between the 18th and 20th century and continuing until now in a less existential fashion) (Davies, 2005:65).

Overall therefore, cultural incompatibility and the acute sense of threat interacted to transform Russia into a negative Other in the Polish national psyche. Additionally, the Polish inferiority complex in relation to the West is thought to be compensated by the feeling of cultural superiority over Russia. That is, historical Polish weaknesses such as backwardness, poverty, corruption, frail civil society should pale into insignificance when compared to the scale of Russian social, political and economic problems, which position the big eastern neighbour as ‘non-Europe’ and shape Western perceptions of Poland as the bulwark that defends the continent from the ‘eastern threat’ (Zarycki, 2004:6, 16).

Moreover, an important dimension of the external aspect of identity is linked to certain characteristics of the Other likely to strengthen its impact on the Self’s identity redefinition in liminal periods. One such crucial characteristic is embodied in the Other’s power capacities – i.e., for Poland, Western Europe has been a positive as well as a more powerful reference point before and after 1989, whose greater capabilities have also been translated into normative power. This normative power has stemmed both from Poland’s cultural identification with Western Europe as well as from the desire to adopt the more advanced and modern forms of European political, economic and social organisation. In the post-1989 period, Poland has retained its role as a norm-taker in the quest to Europeanise itself through the appropriation and implementation of Western models of domestic politics and foreign policy.

Finally, greater normative power and capabilities assume an added importance when manifested in critical events and developments, which can lead to the rethinking of the Self’s identity by confirming, empowering and making some elements of identity more salient than others. In Poland’s case, Western debates and decisions about the EU’s and NATO’s expansion were crucial at a time of liminality since 1989 when Western Europe’s

and the US's level of acceptance could affect significantly the redefinition of Polish post-communist self-conceptions.

'Layers' of identity

As discussed in Chapter 2, 'identity' consists of a variety of interlinked layers. A crucial distinction in the Polish case is that between the 'state' and the 'nation'. The experiences of statelessness, foreign domination, oppressive political authority during the Partitions, the era of the two World Wars and communism have meant that the Polish concept of the nation and nationality developed in fundamental opposition to the state. Even in the post-communist transition the unprecedented degree of compatibility between national aspirations, state sovereignty and a democratic political system has not completely superseded the gap between state and society since adversarial politics and factionalism have contributed to the relative delegitimisation of the political elite (Davies, 2005:9, 22, 131, 448; Dziubka, 2000:61).

Moreover, beyond the general relationship between the state and the nation, one can examine further constituent elements and processes of modern Polish nation-formation related to issues of ethnicity, elite and popular beliefs about the nation. In particular, the development of Polish nationalism can be analysed as a story about the transfer of national identity from the elite to the popular level and about the transition from a multi-ethnic to a homogenously ethnic nation and hence from a commonwealth to a narrower, ethnic-organic conception of the community (Prizel, 1998). Indeed, the failed 1863 Uprising against the Russian Empire, the demise of the *szlachta* (i.e., gentry), the partitioning of the Commonwealth along ethnic lines contributed to the rise of the belief that only an ethno-national self-conception of the Poles could give them sufficient cohesion against the partitioning powers (Davies, 2005:48, 55, 62; Zielonka, Krok-Paszkowska, 2004:10).

As regards foreign policy, the transformation of the constituent elements of Polish national identity has led to a break with the idea of Poland as a great power, possessing a multi-national identity and engaged in a struggle with Germany and Russia. Instead, there has been an acceptance of Poland as a medium-sized European state, a renunciation of a special mission beyond the frontiers of the country to the east (rather, good relations with Russia and the democratisation of the states between Poland and Russia have been promoted) and a focus on those international developments that Warsaw can influence (Prizel, 1998:104, 109-110).

‘Identity’ groups on the level of the political-intellectual elite

Nuances in the way that political elite figures have conceived of Polish national identity since 1989 draw general lines of differentiation among the parties. Thus, one can distinguish between ‘modernists’/‘integrationists’ and ‘traditionalists’/‘isolationists’ (Reeves, 2010; Sanford, 2003; Zaborowski, 2002). The ‘modernist’ view (descended from the historical Polish conception of Europe as ‘modernity’) is characterised by open/receptive attitudes to the ideal-typical model of European-ness based on liberal democracy, the free market, support for institutionalised European integration, regional cooperation with Germany as well as with the eastern neighbours, a liberal international order, a degree of pooling of sovereignty, multilateralism, consensus- and coalition-building in the European arena (Millard, 1996:210; Sanford, 2003:20; Zaborowski, 2002:20). In contrast, the ‘traditionalist’ view (rooted in the historical Polish defensiveness against perceived ‘backwardness’ in relation to Europe) expresses more inward-looking nationalist, Catholic values, favouring a degree of conservative isolation and economic protectionism. Traditionalists tend to emphatically associate European-ness with its core Christian identity component, fear the loss of influence of the Catholic Church (as against

the background of the spread of secularism and the erosion of conservative morality), see Europe as a club of independent states (and hence the pooling of sovereignty and supra-nationalism are resisted), are wary of German domination and attempt to conduct an independent foreign policy (Sanford, 2003:20-21; Zaborowski, 2002:19-20).

In particular, the parties sharing a decidedly pro-integrationist, liberal-modernist stance have included the Democratic Union (UD), the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), the Freedom Union (UW), the Civic Platform (PO) (Millard, 1996:210; Zuba, 2009:7). Moreover, parties of social-democratic orientation have shared a similarly pro-integrationist vision. The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP) renamed into Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in 1999 and the Labour Union party (UP) have supported vigorously Poland's EU membership and espoused a federal model of the EU. However, they have shared the nationalists' fear of exploitation by the economically stronger West (Millard, 1996:211; Zuba, 2009:7). On the other hand, some of the 'traditionalist' parties have included the Christian National Union (ZChN), the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), the Self-Defence party (SRP), the League of Polish Families (LPR), the Law and Justice party (PiS) (Millard, 1996:211; Zuba, 2009:8-10).

However, despite the importance of the general lines of difference between the 'modernists' and the 'traditionalists', some caution is necessary against drawing rigid distinctions between these two identity groups as there are overlaps linked to some commonly shared views across the political spectrum. These common ideas can be traced to the historically-informed strategies worked out in response to the country's problematic geopolitical location in Europe (between Germany and Russia), which are expressed and reframed in contemporary thinking and practice of foreign policy. The different solutions to Poland's geopolitical dilemma provided by the Piast dynasty (the 10-14th century preoccupation with the German threat and a self-contained foreign policy) and the

Jagellonian dynasty (the 14th-16th century focus on the Russian threat, Polonisation of the eastern borderlands, romantic messianism) were later reframed respectively by interwar politicians Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski (Sanford, 2003:11-12). Importantly, the foreign policy thinking of contemporary Polish parties tends to correspond closely with either of these two politicians' visions but there are certain commonly shared standpoints, drawing from both traditions (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:3, 18). Piłsudski's legacy has been preserved through the general recognition of the need to conduct an active Eastern policy, the assessment that Russia poses the greatest security threat to Poland, the goal to secure national independence through assertive external behaviour. However, the fact that ideas linked to romantic messianism, Poland as bulwark of West European Christian civilization and as a great power have subsided, while the vision of the ethnically and culturally homogenous nation has been fully accepted (and indeed practically substantiated) means that elements of Dmowski's thought are also ubiquitous. Finally, informed by the dramatic experiences of World War II, the belief in the US as a crucial external guarantor of Poland's security is overwhelmingly shared by contemporary Polish political parties.

Overall therefore, the conceptual analysis presented in this sub-section will serve as an analytical guidepost in tracing the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy in the empirical sections of the chapter that follow below. That is, parties adhering to the 'modernist' discourse would promote a thick Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy identity, while 'traditionalists' would contest some elements of the ideal-typical model (particularly related to morality and sovereignty), yet without fully derailing Europeanisation given the shared ideational orientation of Polish politicians that recognises Poland's belongingness to Europe to be defended through an active foreign policy.

The Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy, 1989-2000 – the empirical record

The empirical task is carried out through the examination of Poland's external behaviour in the period of 1989-2000. The decade of the 1990s was characterised by specific challenges – including the difficulties related to laying the foundations of the domestic liberal democratic and international pro-Western transformation, which were successfully translated into NATO membership and a clear perspective of EU membership by the end of the 1990s. In comparison, in the new millennium, the need to work out and – have confirmed, a civilizational place in Europe in the midst of a liminal internal situation and an external re-drawing of European boundaries subsided in symbolic and political pre-eminence. Indeed, the focus shifted onto the more mundane process of learning how to be a fully integrated and trustworthy European power, which represented an adjustment from the achievement of formal membership in the Euro-Atlantic community to the substantiation of the quality of this membership, all the while the previously suppressed, 'traditionalist' strand of identification re-emerged in the political arena (as the urgency of having Poland's Europeanised identity accepted by the West was successfully addressed) (Cimoszewicz, 2002:29; Kwaśniewski, 2001; State News Service, 2013; Maass, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015; Pisarski, 2015; Krzakała, 2015; Stemplowski, 2015; Gebert, 2015, interviews).

Overall, the chapter demonstrates that the Polish case fulfils the hypothesised proposition of 'thick' Europeanisation. This is so because of the relatively early and consistent West European (and American) recognition of Poland as belonging to Europe and treatment of the country as a future member of the EU and NATO, constitutive with a strong Polish domestic political consensus on integration in the Euro-Atlantic community on the basis of ideal-typical European values.

The above conclusion is first drawn from an exploration of the separate effects of the relevant events and developments within the international and domestic dimension of identification, followed by an interactive account, positing that the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy identity can be understood in its entirety as the combined and mutually constituted product of the internal and external dimension of identity construction.

The international dimension of identification

The crucial external events and developments, which affected the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy identity in the 1990s included European integration processes, NATO enlargement, strong German and American financial and diplomatic support for Poland's domestic transformation. The overall external institutional and country-specific attitudes and policies (making up the Other's ideational projection) contributed to the thick Europeanisation of Poland by providing positive reinforcement as well as conferring recognition to the 'modernist' foreign policy identity course taken by Warsaw that was in line with the key dimensions of ideal-typical European-ness. This was achieved through a relatively early rhetorical differentiation and inclusion of Poland in Euro-Atlantic arrangements, through the creation of intense bilateral and multilateral institutional links, which served to ensure compatibility with standards of European-ness on the basis of membership criteria. Although there were some initial uncertainties as to the pace and depth of the desirable extension of Euro-Atlantic arrangements to CEE, these ambivalences were not too strong to turn Poland away from its chosen path.

European integration processes

This sub-section focuses on the key European integration processes related to the pivotal institutions on the continent – the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as the

attitudes and policies of Germany as the West European country most politically and economically invested in Poland's Europeanisation with a decisive weight in European integration developments.

The EU

The EU provided Poland with relatively early and positive signals, singling it out (along with other Central European countries) as a frontrunner in membership negotiations (in contrast to Bulgaria's later inclusion in membership talks and Russia's exclusion) and assisting Warsaw politically, economically and diplomatically. Indeed, favourable Western attitudes stemmed from the perception of the Central European states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as 'more European' than South-eastern Bulgaria as well as post-Soviet Russia in that they had Western Christian traditions, could claim deep cultural ties with Western Europe, had more developed economies and were the first ones to overthrow their communist regimes (Thatcher, 1988; Prodi, 2001; Sutton, 2007:317-318; UPI archives, 1989; Wedel, 1998:19-20). However, although the decision to enlarge to Central Europe (and CEE in general) was informed by historical and symbolic reasons based on the West's assumption of 'special responsibility' to overcome the division of Europe (European Council Summit in Strasbourg, 1989:11 and Madrid, 1995:6-7), the pace of the process also depended on negotiating and softening the negative impact from enlargement (such as reduced allocations from the common agricultural policy and the costs of liberalising trade in the sensitive areas of coal, steel, textiles and agriculture) (Piedrafita, Torreblanca, 2004:10, 19). This led to some Polish disappointments with the pace of Western European institutional commitment, but the latter nevertheless developed in a manner that confirmed the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy.

More concretely, the Treaty of Association (or Europe Agreement) was signed in 1991 and it was greeted with approval from the majority of the Polish political elite and society, for whom, as Stawarska argues, the prospect of integration with Western Europe appealed to the imagination, evoking a sense of regaining paradise lost (Europe Agreement, 1991; Stawarska, 1999:4; Koźmiński, 2015, interview). In addition, the conclusion of Association Agreements with Poland as well as the other Central European countries of the Visegrad Group (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia or Czechoslovakia until 1993) represented an important symbolic and strategic gesture, which singled out the Central European states as a distinct group, likely to become integrated with Western European institutions earlier and more quickly than the rest of the post-communist countries (Cottey, 1995:127, 130).

However, the Association Agreement also met with some grievances in Warsaw. The disappointment with the lagging inclusion of Poland in the trading arrangements of the EC and the lack of provision of a timetable for accession prompted President Wałęsa to come up with a proposal for a Central European Trade Initiative (or a smaller, EC-like/EC-bis organisation on the regional level) as a way of addressing the uncertain strategic environment Central Europe found itself in (Jesień, 2015, interview; Terry, 2000:10). Moreover, the Polish reaction to West European uncertainties and delays was not only to criticise the lack of clarity but to persuade the West by presenting in a staunch, determined and consistent manner Warsaw's own vision of what a stable and just European order would look like. This vision centred on integration and the enlargement of existing European institutions to include Poland and the rest of the CEE countries as well as on the renunciation of balances of power, concerts of powers and a Yalta-style international order that disregarded the aspirations and interests of smaller states. Thus, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski (1989-1993) argued that Poland should do everything in its power

to ensure that bipolarism would not be revived, firmly rejecting the idea of European powers regarding the country as a 'grey', 'buffer' or 'neutral' zone in the centre of the continent, which would inevitably lead to the rivalry of powerful states and the reduction of Poland to a foreground serving foreign interests (Skubiszewski, 1994:21, 26). It was similarly reiterated by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski (1993-1995) that the new Europe had to be formed through integration, whereby the gradual expansion of Western structures to the whole continent would lead to a situation when 'the West becomes Europe and Europe the West'. In particular, an expanding EU had to continue developing and promoting consistently the values of democracy, free markets and human rights, while further intensifying political integration (Olechowski, 1995:21, 22, 24).

Much greater certainty was introduced in Poland's bid for EU membership between 1993 and 1994. At the Copenhagen Summit (1993), the EU endorsed its commitment to the eventual accession of CEE countries and spelled out the general membership criteria. In April 1994, Poland submitted its formal application for admission into the Union, while the European Council meeting in Essen (1994) adopted the pre-accession strategy, which set out to involve the candidate states fully in all areas of the EU (including foreign and security policy). These developments were welcomed with an overall positive reception in Poland. Foreign Minister Olechowski argued that his country's 'energetic efforts' to present to the EU the Polish vision of European integration, according to which eastern enlargement would serve to stabilise and deepen European integration on the basis of shared values, helped the EU recognise that the admission of CEE countries was not only the concern of those nations but of the Union itself, thus securing the decision to establish a pre-accession strategy (Olechowski, 1995:23-24).

By 1993-1994, the EU had also recognised Poland's claim to be included in a more substantive manner in the Union's foreign policy dialogue and decision-making

mechanisms. In October 1994, it was agreed that the associate states should participate in EU ministerial meetings on foreign and security policy, which signified that Warsaw could take part in the shaping of the EU's common external policy and express its security concerns, despite not yet being a member of the Union (Cotter, 1995:138; Wizimirska, 1996:208). Another important step with regard to foreign policy cooperation included greater integration of the associated states with the Western European Union (WEU), encompassing first 'enhanced status' within the WEU, agreed in November 1993, and then 'associate partnership', agreed in March 1994, stipulating attendance of weekly working meetings and participation in the peacekeeping missions of the WEU (Cotter, 1995:140).

Such moves towards closer political and foreign policy cooperation were greeted positively in Poland as signs that the country was being included in the West European institutional orbit. Foreign Minister Olechowski argued that the offer to become an associate partner of the WEU was 'symbolic but also concrete. We are going to be involved in the decision-making process and the security structure of the European Union' (Weydenthal, 1994:17). High-profile Polish MPs such as Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Longin Pastusiak, acting as delegates to the Assembly of the WEU, repeated that countries aspiring to EU membership should also participate in the process of shaping the Union's common security policy (Wizimirska, 1996:208).

A new phase commenced between 1994 and 1998, which was focused on the more practically-oriented work of conducting negotiations and monitoring Poland's progress in meeting the accession criteria. The EU's Agenda 2000, published in 1997, designated Poland as a country qualified to be part of the first group of CEE states ready to begin negotiations for accession; the European Commission also prepared an Accession Partnership, which contained a detailed membership programme (Stawarska, 1999:8). As the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration and Head of the Presidential

Chancellery – Danuta Hübner, argued, Poland received the European Commission’s opinion (or *avis*) on the country’s application for EU membership in July 1997 ‘with satisfaction’. The *avis* recognised Poland as a democratic country guaranteeing human rights and a functioning market economy, which was therefore ready to begin negotiations for EU accession (Hübner, 1998:230).

However, there was a declining enthusiasm on the part of West European governments for enlargement due to concerns about the pace of domestic reforms and the implementation of EU standards in Poland and calculations of the costs of enlargement (linked to the reluctance of richer member states to pay more into the EU budget and of the poorer members to share regional development funds) (Terry, 2000:26, 33; Blazyca, Kolkiewicz, 1999:10-11). This declining enthusiasm affected the Polish political elite debate about EU membership in that there was a transition from the proliferation of general, abstract, symbolic-historical arguments for Poland’s belongingness to Europe (and hence for its EU membership) to a more specific, realistic appreciation of the costs involved in the accession process (Kozłowski, 2015; Kuźniar, 2015, interviews; Pridham, 2000:13, 18; Stadtmüller, 2000:29). Moreover, the realistic analysis of such costs (related to the difficulties of adjustment to EU standards in agriculture, heavy industry, banking, labour mobility, sales of land to foreigners) enhanced the prominence of European issues in domestic politics in a negative way. That is, the parties began to politicise the question of *how* (and not of *whether*) Polish EU membership was to be achieved, which was especially exploited by the Euro-sceptics such as the Christian National Union in order to present themselves as being ‘tough’ rather than giving in easily to the EU, as the liberal reformers of the UW ostensibly did (Szczurbiak, 2001:11; Blazyca, Kolkiewicz, 1999:9, 10).

There was a further tendency to turn the debate on the EU into ideological confrontations, for instance between the right-wing representatives of the liberal-conservative coalition of

Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the post-communist SLD, about whether Poland wanted to join a 'Christian' or 'secular' Europe (Szczerbiak, 2001:10). Additionally, as regards more staunchly conservative parties, the Christian-National Union was not completely against Poland's EU membership but highlighted the danger posed to Polish sovereignty and national values, rejecting a federal model of the EU and German expansionism (Stadtmüller, 2000:32; Szczerbiak, 2001:11). Also, an overtly anti-EU party – Polish Agreement, was set up in 1999 on a platform of religious and national conservatism (Szczerbiak, 2001:9-10). Ultimately, the most severe criticism of the EU on ideological grounds came from nationalist-traditionalist circles linked to Radio Maria, the Polish Thought daily as well as conservative parties League of Polish Families and Self-Defence, all of whom called for the preservation of the Christian identity of Europe and opposed the rise of moral relativism (Krok-Paszkowska, Zielonka, 2004:16-17).

Overall, the beginning of substantive negotiations between Poland and the EU infused the domestic political debate and public opinion with greater realism and some Eurosceptic overtones but it should be noted that the overwhelming political consensus on EU membership as Poland's key external and domestic political priority was preserved. The ideational setting was influenced to the extent that the differences between the 'modernists' and the 'traditionalists' (and consequently those who were ready to comply with EU procedures and those who represented a 'tougher' attitude) were emphasised more sharply through the politicisation of the EU factor, with the conservative parties being especially vocal but nevertheless commanding a minority of popular votes.

Germany

As the country possessing significant capabilities and decisive weight within the EU, while also having historically loaded relationships with its eastern neighbours, Germany affected

significantly Polish Europeanisation by facilitating Warsaw's acceptance by the rest of the West European states and thus anchoring Poland firmly within West European institutions.

More specifically, the overall guiding principle of 'reconciliation' in Germany's foreign policy towards those states with which it had conflict-ridden relationships in the past (engendering mistrust and grievances that need to be addressed in order for sustainable cooperation to take place in the present), contains a dual normative-pragmatic dimension. As Feldman points out, the German rendering of the English term 'reconciliation' refers to both an emotional-philosophical and a practical element, expressed respectively in the words 'Versöhnung' and 'Aussöhnung' (Feldman, 1999:2). So the German understanding of 'reconciliation' combines a normative and a pragmatic aspect, whereby dramatic historical experiences of victimhood and war, retained in the living memory and consciousness of the former adversary, can be overcome not through forgetting and downplaying but through constant dialogue that finds its material manifestation, reinforcement and future sustenance in bilateral institutionalised cooperation, further embedded into a multilateral framework (Feldman, 1999:2-5).

This approach on Germany's part is indeed confirmed and further elaborated by Polish and German observers and participants in the process. As Adamski argues, policy motivations related to historical guilt and the corresponding urge to redress past crimes were interlinked with security considerations and a concomitant intensification of political and economic relations in determining Germany's consistent support for Poland's Europeanisation (Adamski, 2015, interview). And according to Ochmann, there was a long-term German strategy based on the assumption of responsibility in CEE, the stabilisation of the eastern border and the transformation of Poland into a strong and predictable neighbour (Ochmann, 2015, interview). Thus, in aiming to address the memory of victimhood and historically-informed lack of trust predominant in Germany's Central

European neighbours (especially Poland), while stabilising their politics, Germany created intensive and special relations with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, singling them out as a distinct group of countries likely to be the first ones to join the EU, further prioritising (rhetorically and through the extent and depth of bilateral links) Warsaw's integration in Europe within this group (Ochmann, 2015, interview).

For instance, Helmut Kohl's November 1989 visit to Poland marked a symbolically crucial step towards deepening reconciliation and laying the foundations for post-Cold War Polish-German cooperation within the framework of European integration. Kohl announced that his visit represented 'a task of European dimensions that is comparable with the French-German reconciliation, without which the process leading to the unification of our part of Europe would not exist' (Wieliński, 2015, interview; Spero, 2004:109). In turn, Prime Minister Mazowiecki maintained that 'the separation of Europe can only be eliminated...if a process of growing economic and cultural cooperation occurs' (Spero, 2004:109).

Another decisive step in bilateral relations but also in Poland's Europeanisation was the signing of the 1991 Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, which enshrined the common aspiration to promote Poland's EU membership (Kuźniar, 2015, interview; Traktat, 1991; Feldman, 1999:17). Foreign Minister Skubiszewski's comment on the signing of the Treaty in Bonn was that 'democratic Poland and a united Germany are the expression of the great changes in Europe. From the Polish point of view, this logical consequence in Europeanisation of foreign policy aims to link Poland to the West' (Spero, 2004:127). Also, to the Polish Parliament, he proclaimed that the agreement laid 'the legal and political foundations of a Polish-German community of interests' (Spero, 2004:128). As an anonymised insider to Polish-German relations has clarified, the concept of 'community of interest' reflected the phenomenon that both

countries could benefit from developments linked to European integration, which created a common interest and a common responsibility for taking these developments further (anonymised participant, 2015, interview). The ‘community of interest’ thus reinforced and lent practical commitment to the vision that was agreed to in the Treaty – namely, a united and free Europe based on minority rights, rule of law, border inviolability and regional cooperation (Spero, 2004:127-128).

Moreover, the establishment of the Weimar Triangle in 1991 among Germany, Poland and France served to multilateralise Germany’s eastern policy, to include Poland in larger European formats (and hence to promote Warsaw’s self-confidence in European international relations) as well as to change France’s ambivalent attitudes to eastern enlargement (Górka-Winter, Posel-Częścik, 2002; Hübner, 1999:223; Krzakała, 2015, anonymised participant, 2015, interviews). As Krzakała has confirmed, cooperation within the Weimar Triangle did contribute to the overcoming of the division of Europe and to Poland’s gradual inclusion into EU structures by raising Warsaw’s reputation in international relations and engendering a greater acceptance of Poland not only in Germany but also in France (Krzakała, 2015, interview).

However, it still needs to be noted that despite Germany’s significant normative-practical contribution to Polish Europeanisation through the overcoming of past wrongs, the historically-informed problematic aspects of the bilateral relationship were not completely resolved, with grievances persisting especially among the ‘traditionalists’. For instance, at the time, Witold Waszczykowski perceived that the position of the Polish minority in Germany was not satisfactorily solved as part of the reconciliation process. According to a German law introduced in the 1940s (Trzcielińska-Polus, 2011), the Poles lost the status of an official minority, which still continued to be the case in the 1990s and created an imbalance. That is, the small German minority in Poland was granted substantial rights

(especially in relation to their language, schooling and culture), whereas the Polish minority in Germany, which is much bigger, does not enjoy such legally enshrined rights (Waszczykowski, 2015, interview). Moreover, as Wieliński maintains, the activities of the descendants of the Germans expelled from Poland after World War II served to sour the spirit of reconciliation (Schmemmann, 1990; Ther, 2006). Although lacking the support of German politicians, they acted aggressively in trying, among other things, to demand compensations for the property they had lost in their former lands (Wieliński, 2015, interview).

Overall therefore, as further elaborated in Chapter 6, pp. 294-306, Polish politicians from both the ‘modernist’ and ‘traditionalist’ identity groups have concurred that once the urgency of reconciliation enabling German support for the thick Europeanisation of Polish identity subsided (especially with the achievement of a firm EU accession perspective), some problematic issue areas (such as the above-mentioned) resurfaced and gained prominence in the late 1990s and the 2000s (Kuźniar, 2015; Waszczykowski, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

The OSCE and the Council of Europe

The OSCE (CSCE until 1995) and the Council of Europe also contributed to the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy in that they disseminated strong norms of liberalisation and democratic accountability to the CEE states and through their organisational authority and reputation could legitimate the actions of Polish governments, thus having the symbolic power to confirm (early on) Poland’s course of domestic and external development on the basis of consensual democracy, human rights and adherence to the key principles of the European security architecture (Steves, 2001:9-10).

As regards *the OSCE/CSCE*, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) enshrined the norms of behaviour to be followed by democratic states in the European regional order, committed the signatories to respect for the rule of law, human and minority rights, market economics as well as to the rejection of the use of force in the resolution of conflicts and border issues, set up an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw and a Secretariat in Prague (Steves, 2001:10; Cottey, 1995:148-149). Poland welcomed these developments as codifying the principles on which the post-1989 European order was to be built (and which Poland itself espoused as part of its vision of European integration), with the establishment of a CSCE body in Warsaw reflecting the recognition of the country's active participation in the Helsinki process (Cottey, 1995:149; Wizimirska, 1996:209-210). Such positive confirmation was forthcoming throughout Poland's engagement with the OSCE in the 1990s. For instance, at the annual session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in 1995, the Economic Committee discussed the report of Senator Kelly who singled out Poland (together with the Czech Republic and Hungary) as a country leading in the economic reforms among former communist states, while the committee dealing with national minorities issues adopted a resolution approving the strengthening of the Warsaw Bureau for Human Rights and Institutions (Wizimirska, 1996:209-210).

Moreover, the CFE Treaty (signed in 1990) together with the CFE 1A agreement, the Vienna Document on CSBMs and the Treaty on Open Skies (all three signed in 1992) were received by Poland as providing new tools for preventing the re-emergence of aggressive military postures and for laying the foundations of a cooperative security system. This was so because the documents provided for reductions in military equipment, constrained force concentrations and codified predictability and openness (Nowak, 1993:3-6).

As regards *the Council of Europe*, in the very early period after the collapse of bipolarity, membership in this organisation was perceived as a first step towards the

institutionalisation as well as symbolic confirmation of Poland's social and cultural ties with Western Europe (Zięba, 2011:4). Early accession, roughly coinciding with the conclusion of the Treaty of Association with the EU, brought greater confidence in Poland that it would be recognised as part of a distinct group of frontrunners (together with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), which would gain membership in the more influential Western organisations such as the EU and NATO, contributing to Poland's return to European civilization both normatively and institutionally (Zięba, 2011:4; Cottey, 1995:127).

However, the diminished prominence of formal security guarantees and deeper institutional-legal binding of the OSCE/CSCE and the Council of Europe reduced their attractiveness to Warsaw, as compared to the EU and NATO. The latter provided both firmer markers of belongingness (based on greater selectivity of the membership base and stricter criteria to ensure norm compliance) as well as much more credible security guarantees through mechanisms enforcing the monitoring and implementation of shared obligations (Cottey, 1995:149-150). As Foreign Minister Skubiszewski maintained, the crucial goals of Polish foreign policy in terms of the European security order included the rejection of domination and deterrence in order to build security on the basis of cooperation among states and international institutions through the highest possible level of coordination and the attainment of collective security. But since the CSCE was a long way off the achievement of such goals, focusing attention on that organisation exclusively could slow down and create setbacks for the Polish policy of joining the Western institutions that could best fulfil these aims (Skubiszewski, 1994:22). And as a participant in the process, Jerzy Nowak has confirmed that since 1991 Polish priorities within the CSCE centred on arms control, confidence-building measures, human rights and conflict prevention to the extent that these could contribute to the stability of the European security

order, but the ultimate security goal was attainment of NATO membership (Nowak, 2015, interview; Nowak, 1997:10-11).

Relations with the US and NATO accession

This sub-section examines the transatlantic influences upon Poland's Europeanisation. It looks at how – given the US's preeminent role in the North Atlantic Alliance, American perceptions and policies affected Poland's Europeanisation especially with regard to issues of security by promoting Warsaw's inclusion in NATO and hence ensuring that Poland conducted its foreign and domestic policies on the basis of NATO security principles. Also, the US played an important role in supporting with financial and technical assistance Poland's internal economic reforms, which accelerated Warsaw's fulfilment of the EU's conditions for domestic transformation. Ultimately, America's diplomatic push to include the CEE states in the Euro-Atlantic family of nations encouraged the West Europeans to similarly proceed with the acceptance of the former communist countries into transatlantic and European institutions.

NATO accession

American perceptions of Poland in the 1990s were based on an understanding and treatment of the country as a 'protégé' in CEE (Zaborowski, Longhurst, 2003). This was informed both by the fact that Poland was a middle-sized European power (and the largest among the former Soviet satellites), representing an island of stability in contrast to the situation further east as well as a 'standard-bearer' of quick and successful internal reforms, thus providing an example to the rest of the post-communist states and resonating with the American democracy-promotion effort in CEE (Zaborowski, Longhurst, 2003:1-2; Önis, 2004:27). However, despite overall receptive attitudes, a gradual evolution in

thinking and policies had to take place before America and its NATO allies could fully sanction Warsaw's accession to the organisation.

The period between 1990 and 1992 was marked by Western uncertainties about the proper security arrangements to be instituted in a changing European landscape (Kozłowski, 2015, interview; Rotfeld, 1990:9). The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991 as a way of promoting dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact adversaries.

These developments met with dual reactions in Poland. On the one hand, during a visit to Germany in March 1992, President Wałęsa proposed to create a NATO-bis organisation, which would represent European military forces composed of units of the former Eastern bloc under the aegis of NATO aimed at the joint prevention of conflicts in Central Europe. This conception reflected Polish disappointment with the slow movement towards NATO expansion and called attention to the strategic isolation of the region and the need to extend the protective space of the Alliance over CEE (Wizimirska, 1996:194-195). But on the other hand, Poland's relations with the NACC subsequently evolved in a way that expanded the range of areas of possible cooperation, deepened Warsaw's political and military ties with America and other NATO members and de facto differentiated Poland (together with Hungary and Czechoslovakia) (Cottey, 1995:143). As a result, Poland was Europeanising its security policy by modernising its armed forces, establishing civilian control over the military and developing transparent military strategies in consonance with those of NATO members (Cottey, 1995:144).

Starting in 1992 until 1994, NATO took encouraging steps towards moving from dialogue on security issues to action and cooperation in the military field in its relations with the CEE states but still without specifying a concrete timetable, criteria and date of a future

NATO entry (Terry, 2000:11; Reisch, 1994:21). Indeed, partly pushed by Central European pressure and the unstable situation in the Soviet Union/Russia, politicians in the US and other Alliance countries (above all Germany) began to slowly develop a consensus about formalising NATO's ties with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In November 1992, American Defence Secretary Richard Cheney asserted that 'eventually we will want to expand NATO', while in March 1993 – as Ochmann underlines, German Defence Minister Volker Rühe was one of the first European politicians to claim that there was no reason to deny prospective EU members the opportunity to accede to NATO (Cottey, 1995:145; Ochmann, 2015, interview). Moreover, as Jerzy Koźmiński – a key decision-maker and participant in Poland's NATO accession process, emphasises, there were two additional significant developments in 1993 with regard to the possibility of NATO enlargement. The first one was related to the publication of a crucial article by Rand Corporation, which for the first time formulated the concept that the North Atlantic Alliance should expand to the east or else risk becoming irrelevant (Koźmiński, 2015, interview; Asmus, Kugler, Larrabee, 1993). The second development, important from the point of view of the internal American political process, was Senator Richard Lugar's speech at the National Press Club, which made him one of the first American officials embracing the ideas expressed in the Rand article and openly proclaiming himself in favour of including Poland in NATO (Koźmiński, 2015, interview). Therefore, Senator Lugar, Defence Secretary Cheney and Defence Minister Rühe led the way in calling for the expansion of the Alliance specifically to Poland (and also the Czech Republic and Hungary), citing its progress towards domestic political and economic transformation and its ability to project an image of relative stability, which NATO had to further ensure with formal security guarantees (Reisch, 1994:21).

The combined result of the above developments was the Clinton administration's proposal of the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP, 1994), which offered CEE states and Russia improvement of the interoperability and compatibility of their armed forces with those of NATO (Cotter, 1995:146).

But the PfP, like the NACC, evoked dual reactions. On the one hand, the programme was greeted with disappointment and frustration at Poland's half-hearted inclusion in the system of Euro-Atlantic security (Reisch, 1994:25). As Koźmiński recalls, the PfP was perceived by him and the rest of the Polish decision-makers as a surrogate and not a vehicle for NATO membership (Koźmiński, 2015, interview). On the other hand, the PfP did contribute to the possibility of closer integration and eventual membership. This was so because the PfP for the first time enshrined NATO leaders' expectation that expansion would likely take place in the future, while Russia's claim to a veto over Alliance decisions and CEE security was rejected (PfP, 1994; Cotter, 1995:147; Clinton, 1994; Koźmiński, 2015, interview). Foreign Minister Bartoszewski recognised the 'enormous significance' of the PfP because it allowed Warsaw to build intensive political and diplomatic contacts, which in turn provided an opportunity for Poland to indirectly join the debate about NATO expansion (Bartoszewski, 1996:13).

The period between 1995 and 1999 finally sealed Poland's efforts to join NATO. In September 1995, the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995) was concluded, which enshrined the clear decision that the Alliance would expand and laid down membership criteria, which overlapped with and reinforced the 'standards of European-ness' established by the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and posed further conditions in the area of defence (Chapter 2, p. 64). Indeed, since Poland's motivation to join NATO was so unflinching, Warsaw saw the fulfilment of membership conditions as crucial to its Europeanisation and acceptance in the Western security system. As Koźmiński and Nowak

specify, the overriding goal of NATO accession provided the ideational cohesiveness and commitment on the part of the domestic political forces in pushing through difficult decisions in compliance with the Alliance criteria – whose substantive implementation was strictly expected by NATO members (Koźmiński, 2015; Nowak, 2015, interviews).

Henceforth, the achievement of NATO membership in 1999 affected Polish policy-makers' security perceptions in a positive way as Poland became part of a broader system of security which ensured credibly the country's defence and structured intra-Alliance relations on the basis of shared values, cooperation and interdependence. A degree of discrepancy nevertheless remained between Western perceptions, informed by a more benign view of the cooperative potential of Russian foreign policy, as compared to Poland's greater concern with planning for negative contingencies and placing NATO infrastructure in CEE (Koźmiński, 2015; Nowak, 2015; Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015, interviews).

America's diplomatic and economic contribution to Poland's Europeanisation

America's contribution to the Polish Europeanisation process was not only limited to the realm of security. As this sub-section demonstrates, the US was also conducive to the diplomatic acceptance of the CEE states in the Euro-Atlantic family and provided direct financial and technical support for Poland's domestic reforms (Koźmiński, 2015; Nowak, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

In particular, there were at least two ways in which the US's promotion of the NATO accession process affected the willingness of the West Europeans to accelerate the European integration schemes. First, NATO enlargement gave an added impetus to EU enlargement through the assumption that European security was indivisible and comprehensive and that as a result NATO and EU expansions should go together. Indeed,

the NATO Study on Enlargement (1995) stated that accession to the Alliance extended to new members the benefits of European integration based on shared liberal democratic values and complemented EU enlargement as a mutually supportive and reinforcing process (Clinton, 1994). Moreover, according to Jerzy Nowak's insights into inner diplomatic workings, a generalisation can be made that the West Europeans were not initially as open to the possibility of NATO enlargement not least because they still looked at CEE states in the early 1990s as enemies of the formerly opposing bloc (despite greater receptivity to the Central European countries). In contrast, the Americans showed quicker acceptance because they perceived Europe as a more cohesive unity and were readier to promote integration with the frontrunners of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (arguably also because the US's relationship with CEE did not require the same depth and extent of political-economic enmeshment as was the case of geographically contiguous countries). Thus,

'Once the Americans were convinced that this (i.e., reforms) could be done and that these countries really mattered to NATO, they were instrumental in convincing their European allies that they should change their negative position...' (Nowak, 2015, interview)

Second, Poland's growing association with NATO over the 1990s facilitated building bilateral links with West European countries. For instance, on the heels of the PfP, in March 1994, Polish Defence Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyk met in Paris with his French and German counterparts for talks about expanding cooperation through the exchange of military experts, the organisation of joint military manoeuvres and the possible inclusion of Polish troops in the Franco-German-Belgian Eurocorps fighting force (Weydenthal, 1994:28).

Furthermore, the Americans provided vital financial and economic assistance for the Polish internal transformation, which affected the success of the country's domestic Europeanisation and hence Western Europe's decisions about how fit Poland was to join European institutions and become part of the Euro-Atlantic community (Wedel, 1998:22, 35-36). For instance, American support contributed crucially to the success of the Balcerowicz Plan (i.e., Poland's shock therapy programme guiding the transition to a capitalist market economy), especially at the very early stages. The US led an international effort to put in place a one-billion dollar IMF stabilisation plan necessary for the introduction of the convertibility of the Polish złota and subsequently for the restructuring of Polish debt. As Koźmiński clarifies – who was on the Balcerowicz team at that time, it was critical to have reserves in dollars in case convertibility led to a run on dollars in Polish banks and hence an economic collapse. Dramatically, three days prior to the introduction of convertibility on 1 January 1990, Poland lacked half a billion, whereby Under Secretary of the American Treasury for International Affairs David Mulford stepped in, ensuring that Poland would obtain the required funds in time (Koźmiński, 2015, interview). Moreover, the US established an Enterprise Fund in 1990 to promote the privatisation of the Polish economy and the development of the private sector in the country, contributing \$240 million of capital (Szeptycki, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015, interviews; Hunter, Ryan, 1998:83-85; Polish-American Freedom Foundation, Annual Report, 2000:2).

Conclusions

The overall international attitudes and policies (making up the external dimension of identification) promoted the thick Europeanisation of Poland so that the gradual process of conferring recognition and acceptance, concretely manifested in early and intensive rhetorical, diplomatic-political, economic support and institutional inclusion served to

confirm Warsaw in its 'modernist' vision of Europeanisation on the basis of a sustained, consistent and intersubjectively shared convictional adherence to the key dimensions of European-ness. Indeed, in response to EU, German, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO and US developments, Poland insistently espoused its view of a European order to be informed by institutional integration, overcoming of the burdens of the past in favour of trust, the renunciation of zero-sum balance of power politics and isolation in the direction of shared and comprehensive security.

Although there were some initial uncertainties as to the pace and depth of the desirable extension of Euro-Atlantic arrangements to CEE (which led to disappointments in Poland and empowered some 'traditionalist' elements on the Polish political scene), these ambivalences were not too strong to turn Poland away from its chosen path or bring about a fully-fledged dominance of the traditionalists with their more nationalist, self-isolating instincts. Instead, external hesitation provided the necessary stimulation for Warsaw to pursue its goal of European integration in an even more determined and persuasively argued manner, which aimed to convince Western Europe and the US of Poland's unquestionable belongingness to European civilization.

The domestic dimension of identification

Apart from the international dimension of identification, the domestic aspect of identity construction was crucially complementary in conditioning Warsaw's European choice as well as its temporal sustenance and practical manifestation. In particular, there was a consistent, intersubjectively shared overall domestic political consensus about the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, based on the recognition of cultural-historical affinity with Western Europe. The consensus determined the dominance of 'modernist' ideas and policies and shaped a strong positive identification with the West (including Western

Europe and the US) as a significant Other, whose praise and acceptance were expected and strived after through a consistent strategy of persuasion. This strategy focused on a reiteration of Poland's ideational belongingness to Western Europe (which had to lead to institutional integration) and on a presentation of the country's success in the post-1989 reform process as further evidence of cultural, political, social and economic compatibility.

And this domestic political consensus persisted despite the fragmented institutional setting and acrimonious party-political struggle. Such ideational unity meant that the identity crisis could be located primarily on the institutional and party political level (i.e., in terms of the need to learn and consolidate the habits and institutional practices of democratic political behaviour) rather than on the level of ideas and consciousness (i.e., a deep-seated disorientation regarding the choice of ideational guideposts for the post-1989 Poland was not present, unlike in Russia and to some extent Bulgaria).

Domestic political consensus

The Polish domestic political consensus, informed by cultural-historical affinity and positive identification with Western Europe, found a concrete foreign policy expression in the country's desire to become integrated in the institutional fora of the Euro-Atlantic community, whose most important elements included EU and NATO membership, as well as establish cooperative regional relations with both the Central European states of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and with the neighbours to the east (Ukraine Belarus, Lithuania, Russia). The consensually-based goal to join the EU and NATO was also coupled with the determination to fulfil the admission criteria of these organisations because of the recognition that Brussels-disseminated norms resonate with Polish national traditions and with the domestically-defined goals of the country to overthrow the heritage of communism through political democratisation, market economy transformation and

foreign policy conduct founded on the rejection of spheres of influence and division on the continent, multilateralism, cooperative decision-making and support for a rules-based liberal regional order. Thus, the thick Polish ideational affinity with European-ness was expressed in normative compatibility, whereby there was a concordant, internalised understanding of and convictional adherence to ideal-typical values on Poland's overall political-ideational level as dominated by the 'modernists'. Yet, it should be noted that the consensus was additionally shaped by interest-based considerations and there was an initial delay in the practical manifestation of consensual ideas due to strategic uncertainties.

More concretely, the author's interviews confirm unanimously the presence of a sustained and internalised identity-informed domestic political and societal consensus in favour of Poland's EU and NATO membership (Kuźniar, 2015; Waszczykowski, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015; Gebert, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015; Pisarski 2015; Rotfeld, 2015; Nowak, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015; Stemplowski, 2015; three anonymised participants, interviews). Polish decision-makers and experts portray the strong pro-European course of development after the collapse of communism as a way of 'coming back home' (with Prime Minister Mazowiecki popularising the idea of 'return to Europe' as the mantra of post-communism), where Poland has always 'naturally' belonged civilizationally and mentally but from where the Poles had been separated and 'kidnapped' by the culturally alien Soviet empire (Kuźniar, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015; Pisarski 2015; Stemplowski, 2015; two anonymised participants, interviews; Kundera, 1984).

Moreover, the deeply held idea of 'return to Europe' informed the strong desire to transform through the fulfilment of the concrete criteria of Europeanisation. Although the Poles' psychological and normative attachment to Europe was shaped by long-term historical memories of Poland's belongingness to European civilization, it was also clear,

as Szeptycki points out, that the country was not returning to the Europe of the 1920s (when Poland was a multi-ethnic republic with great power ambitions) or of the 18th century (i.e., of the end of the aristocratic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) but to the Europe of the late 20th century, which was characterised by democratic political arrangements, market economy, foreign policy cooperation on the European model (Szeptycki, 2015; Nowak, 2015, Koźmiński, 2015, interviews). Thus, the general longing to return to Europe encompassed both the mental-normative and the institutional aspect of integration through sustained domestic and external transformation (Stemplowski, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

Furthermore, another important facet of the consensus concerned Poland's Eastern policy. Polish experts unanimously agree that both the politicians and the public had been reconciled to the loss of the eastern lands by 1989 and had relinquished territorial and imperial temptations in favour of pursuing friendly and cooperative policies towards Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania (Secieru, 2015; Kuźniar, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Eberhardt, 2015; Adamski, 2015, interviews). This was so for a number of reasons, including the fact that Polish intellectuals were strongly influenced by the communist-era, Paris-based, émigrés-inspired *Kultura* magazine thinking on this issue. The émigrés argued that in order for Poland to change its position as part of the Soviet bloc, Warsaw had to hope for the dissolution of the Soviet Union and support the independence and the national identities of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians, in particular (Kuźniar, 2015; Kościński, 2015, interviews; Szczerbiak, 2012:84). Once these nations had become independent, embarking on a process of democratisation, and the Soviet Union had dissolved, Russia would (supposedly) have no other option but to transform into a European power on the example of its neighbouring states (Eberhardt, 2015, interview).

Therefore, the consensual goal to Europeanise Polish foreign policy also rested on a friendly strategy towards the countries to Poland's east through a cooperative regional policy (rather than revisionism), aiming to bring Ukraine, Belarus and possibly Russia to the European fold on the basis of European standards of democratisation and de-imperialisation (Kuźniar, 2015; Jesień, 2015, interviews). Indeed, an internalised transformation in political thinking followed a mutually constitutive relationship between ideas and reality, whereby the influence of *Kultura*-magazine views depended on what Poland stood for (liberal democratic values) as well as on changing material conditions from the quasi-imperial, messianic goals pursued by an ethnically heterogeneous commonwealth to the promotion of cooperative regional relations feasible for a 'normal', middle-sized European power (Kuźniar, 2015; Jesień, 2015, interviews).

The genuineness and intersubjective quality of the consensus was further confirmed by the adherence of the 'post-communists' to the ideas comprising that consensus so that the victory of the SLD in the 1993 elections did not lead to a fundamental reorientation of Poland's foreign and domestic policies. Indeed, as the author's interviews confirm unanimously, by 1993 the SLD had become fully supportive of the pursuit of EU and NATO membership as well democratisation and market economic reforms (Eberhardt, 2015; Pisarski, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015; Adamski, 2015; Gebert, 2015; interviews). This support was induced by the SLD's strong leadership commitment (in the face of the SdRP's first chairman Aleksander Kwaśniewski) to integration in the Euro-Atlantic community and reframing of the SLD's domestic identity as a social democratic formation on the West European model. Such commitment was reinforced by the realisation that the successors of the communist party could only gain legitimacy in an overwhelmingly pro-European and pro-Atlantic society by taking on a 'European' identity and was underscored by a genuine belief in Europeanisation on the

part of the SLD's political figures. As Polish observers have stressed, the majority of these figures were mid-level officials in the Polish communist government, coming from the younger generation that was strongly critical of the 'old guard' and had gained experience in the West, which made them receptive of ideas of democracy, market economy and European integration (Lorenz, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Madej, 2015, interviews; Markowski, 2002:54-58).

Overall, the deeply ingrained ideational convictions related to the overwhelming goal to return to Europe united the Polish political elite. However, there are a number of caveats to be addressed as regards the nature and timing of the domestic political consensus. First, although the consensus was shaped by ideational motives, it was also further informed by the acknowledgement of Poland's geopolitical and economic interests to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community. The Polish desire to integrate in European institutions was to be propped up by the prestige and economic benefits it would acquire as a member of the influential and exclusive Western club consisting of the most developed, democratic countries. Poland's historically-informed threat perception from Russia, the fear of remaining isolated and facing external aggression on its own would be secured by membership in NATO as the most powerful military alliance in the world as well as by the independence and democratisation of Ukraine and Belarus (Kuźniar, 2015; Waszczykowski, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015; Eberhardt, 2015, interviews; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, 2012).

Second, as regards timing, there was initial uncertainty about the most appropriate form of Poland's institutional integration in Europe – i.e., initial hopes were placed on the CSCE as a unifying organisation that could include the USSR as a guarantor of Polish security lest Germany mounted revisionist claims on its border with Poland. This was so due to a delay in the provision of a firm and clear German recognition of the Oder-Neisse border (given

Chancellor Kohl's preoccupation with issues arising out of the collapse of the GDR and the unification of Germany) as well as ongoing negotiations over the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. Yet, once the border question was resolved in the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany and it was agreed in 1991 that all Soviet troops would leave Poland by the end of 1993, Warsaw was free to pursue EU and NATO membership (without potential security threats) (Cottey, 1995:33-36; Nowak, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

The domestic institutional and party-political setting

This sub-section aims to show that the unstable institutional framework (resulting not least from constitutional ambiguities about the delineation of foreign policy-making authority), party fragmentation, frequent changes of government and the acrimonious struggle for power did not pose a fundamental alternative to the internal and external course of Poland's development (Grobowski, 1992:12). This was so because of the overall ideational unity among the otherwise diverse political actors, reinforced by a path-dependent foreign policy-making setting and continuity in personnel (especially in the realm of international affairs).

More specifically, the ambiguity of the Small Constitution about the delineation of external decision-making authority and the significant powers it granted the Presidency encouraged an acrimonious struggle for control of foreign policy (Wizimirska, 1996:191, 193; Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1994:1). President Wałęsa aimed to assume a leading role in Poland's external relations, which put him at odds with the government on a number of issue areas, especially related to Eastern strategy and NATO enlargement (Spero, 2004:76). In particular, while declaring that Warsaw would remain a supporter of united Europe, the President stated that his country would not immediately seek NATO membership. Such a

stance pitted Wałęsa against his strongly pro-NATO and anti-Moscow advisors as well as against Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, who strove for closer relations between Poland and the Alliance (Spero, 2004:79). The conflict was exacerbated further when outspokenly pro-NATO politician – Jan Olszewski, became Prime Minister, accusing the President of sacrificing Polish sovereignty in favour of cooperation with Russia especially in the midst of Wałęsa's proposal of a NATO-bis organisation that took both the government and Poland's European partners by surprise (Spero, 2004:81-82).

However, the pro-Western course of Poland's foreign policy was not revised in any fundamental way, which can be accounted for by the general ideational consensus. Wałęsa did not propose significant alternatives to the foreign policy line pursued by the Foreign Ministry because he also focused his activities on the consolidation of Polish independence and argued that Poland's ultimate sovereign decision was to pursue membership in the EU and NATO (Wizimirska, 1996:193, 194). Thus, Wałęsa shared the Atlanticist orientation of the Olszewski government, but he differed in terms of the analysis of the geopolitical situation and its implications for Poland's NATO membership. Unlike Olszewski's vigorous pursuit of NATO membership as a way of freeing Poland from the Russian sphere of influence, the President was more cautious in pursuing Alliance accession. This was because of the fear of the negative repercussions for Poland in the midst of instability in the East, including the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of conservative views in Moscow, which could interpret Polish membership in NATO as an open challenge (Millard, 1996:214-215).

Overall, the durability and depth of the domestic political consensus was underwritten by shared identity perspectives, propped up by the continuity in personnel in the realm of external relations and the path-dependent logic of the foreign and domestic political foundations laid out by the first Solidarity government. In particular, Krzysztof

Skubiszewski occupied the Foreign Ministry post between 1989 and 1993, during which period of time he had given Polish international relations a sound legal foundation through a system of bilateral treaties in the West and East, involved the country in regional initiatives, secured its acceptance in the international community of democratic nations and succeeded in integrating the interests of the government and the President's office in forging agreement on the strategic direction of foreign policy, even though the opposition on both the left and the right quarrelled over the details of this direction (Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1994:84).

Moreover, continuity in foreign policy was ensured by the PSL-SLD governing coalition's agreement to entrust Poland's Foreign Ministerial post to non-partisan political figures (despite the acrimony between the former communists and the Solidarity-descended anti-communist parties). These figures included Andrzej Olechowski and Władysław Bartoszewski and SdRP member Dariusz Rosati, who were fully dedicated to Poland's Euro-Atlantic course of development (Wizimirska, 1996:197; Hübner, 1999:220).

Conclusions

Overall, the examination of the domestic dimension of identification has aimed to demonstrate Warsaw's broad-based and sustained internal political consensus dominated by 'modernism', which promoted a thick ideational affinity with European-ness on the basis of a firm belief in the cultural-historical similarity between Poland and the West, expressed in the Polish desire for integration in the Euro-Atlantic community and normative resonance with ideal-typical values. The depth and durability of the shared convictions have been underlined by the fragmented institutional setting, which did not lead to a fundamental ideational reorientation.

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Polish discourse

The preceding parts of the chapter analysed separately the effects that the international and domestic level of identification had on the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy, whereas this section brings those levels together, arguing that the single operation of either only the external or internal aspect of identity construction would not have produced the phenomenon of Poland's thick Europeanisation. Rather, the latter was the combined product of the international and domestic dimension. Consonant with this argument, the current section of the chapter focuses on the continuity and change of discursively expressed ideas on the level of the political-intellectual elite through an interactive analytical prism, while the next section presents the concrete policies that followed from these ideas.

International and domestic identification – reinforcement, complementarity, co-constitution

The proposition in the analytical framework of the thesis stipulating what the thickest case of Europeanisation would be is confirmed by the discursive-ideational developments characterising Polish foreign policy in the 1990s. Sustained West European and American recognition of Poland's cultural-historical belongingness to European civilization as well as the West's (relatively) quick commitment to the acceptance and integration of Poland in the Euro-Atlantic institutions reinforced, confirmed and complemented, while being further informed and ultimately co-constituted by the broad-based Polish domestic political consensus. That consensus was shaped by ideational affinity with Europe and was substantiated by the Poles' desire to transform their country internally and ensure its rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations through a determined strategy of persuading the West of Poland's European credentials. So the Europeanisation of Polish

foreign policy identity consisted of the externally sanctioned and internally motivated pursuit of integration, whereby quick and intensive international inclusion interacting with domestic attachment to ideal-typical values produced a sustained, consistent and intersubjectively shared rhetorical embeddedness of and behavioural alignment with (as shown in the next section) the key dimensions of European-ness as regards international and regional politics as well as institutionalised cooperation.

Indeed, Poland's key foreign policy-making figures invariably underlined the significance of the mutual relatedness of international and domestic influences as well as of identity motivations and security concerns in the process of Europeanisation. For instance, Krzysztof Skubiszewski argued that 'the linkage between the state's domestic policy and its foreign policy is unbreakable and decisive for a success of the whole grand design (of returning to Europe)'. The striving for EU membership promoted, harmonised with and at the same time depended on Polish efforts to build political democracy and a market economy, meaning that any major slowdown in internal reforms would undermine the country's European policy and the goal to guarantee Poland a lasting and safe position in Europe (Skubiszewski, 1994:27). Similarly, Skubiszewski maintained that accession to NATO would not only enhance his country's security, but would also provide an important political factor accelerating the Polish domestic reforms, while the goal of the Eastern policy should be the internationalisation of Poland's democratic transformation for the sake of the stabilisation of the East on the basis of respect for democracy (Skubiszewski, 1994:28-29).

In a further allusion to the importance of the interaction of external and internal factors, Dariusz Rosati clarified that 'to ask what are the conditions for preserving European equilibrium and security is more or less the same thing as to ask what are the conditions for the survival of a democratic and sovereign Poland' (Wizimirska, 1996:193; Rosati,

1997:11). Thus in Rosati's view, Poland's and Europe's interests and visions were identical because Warsaw's cooperative policies towards the eastern neighbours would make irrelevant the West's historical dilemma as to whether 'there is any point in 'boys from Virginia' (or wherever in the West) dying once again for Gdańsk', whereas European integration would grant Poland a further guarantee of security as well as provide proof that unswerving adherence to the path of reform, however great the sacrifices, eventually brings tangible rewards in the form of membership in the EU and NATO – i.e., the ultimate confirmation of a country's belongingness to European civilization (Rosati, 1997:12).

Finally, Andrzej Olechowski, Dairusz Rosati and Bronisław Geremek underlined the inseparable connections between the symbolic-ideational and self-interested aspects of Poland's pursuit of EU membership – the EU was seen as a symbol of liberal democratic values, which the country was prevented from developing during communism (although Europe had always been the object of Polish dreams of liberty), but it was also an organisation that could grant Poland specific political and economic benefits (Olechowski, 1995:19-20; Rosati, 1997:9; Geremek, 1999:9).

On the whole, the interaction of the external and internal dimension of identification contributed to the sustainability and continuity of the modernist, liberal-internationalist, integrationist Polish foreign policy discourse focused on the achievement of quick accession to the EU and NATO, the construction of cooperative regional relations (with both Central European countries and the eastern neighbours) and readiness to overcome historically-shaped distrust of and animosity toward Germany (and also Russia). Although conservative elements of the identity discourse resurfaced (especially with regard to a supposed cultural and political threat that the EU represented to the traditional values and sovereignty of Poland as well as the alleged contemporary relevance of the geopolitical challenge that Germany and Russia had historically posed to the country), such elements

remained on the level of public debate, with the main governing parties and the key decision-makers endorsing the modernist view of Warsaw's external relations.

In particular, with regard to the EU, interviews with Polish decision-makers and experts have confirmed the overwhelming importance of the interaction of international and domestic influences in the persistence of the identity discourse in favour of membership (Gebert, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Kuźniar, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015; Pisarski, 2015; two anonymised participants, 2015, interviews). Gebert and Szeptycki maintain that the early provision of a EU membership perspective (based on Western Europe's recognition of Poland as part of European civilization) legitimised both the difficult domestic reforms and the foreign policy direction of the country in political terms, while in technical terms the EU provided Poland with a roadmap of what should be done to carry out the reforms. So internal modernisation and external Europeanisation merged into one single process of EU accession (Gebert, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015, interviews). In this way, the policy of gradual inclusion signalled the acknowledgement of ideational compatibility with Poland's vision of European integration and confirmed Warsaw in its determined pursuit of this vision – based as it was on the rejection of a Yalta-style international order and the extension of the West European security community (animated by liberal democracy, rules-based institutional arrangements, sustained cooperation, consensus and coalition-building). As Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati argued, the expansion of the EU to the countries of its east would create a Europe which would no longer be a Europe 'of divisions, spheres of influence, imperial ambitions, distrust, and balances of terror', making it possible to claim that a continent organised in this way has brought 'moderation, prudence and stability without sacrificing the cause of liberty, justice, and progress' (Rosati, 1997:13-14).

Indeed, the foreign policy identity discourse retained the same general contours from the initial period between 1989 and 1993 when Krzysztof Skubiszewski laid the foundations of Poland's European direction. Subsequent Foreign Ministers, including Andrzej Olechowski, Władysław Bartoszewski, Dariusz Rosati and Bronisław Geremek repeatedly and insistently confirmed the continuity in Polish foreign policy based on a consensus about the key objective of entering the EU and NATO (Skubiszewski, 1994:22; Olechowski, 1995:19-20, 29; Bartoszewski, 1996:9, 17; Rosati, 1997:9; Geremek, 1998:9, 1999:12-13).

Although some opposition to European integration was identity-based (i.e., linked to the cultural threat that the EU posed to traditional Polish, Christian values), the hard-line, anti-EU 'traditionalists' remained a minority voice, with the majority of the conservative-minded politicians acquiescing in Poland's pursuit of EU membership. In particular, unlike the strongly critical, anti-European integration attitude exhibited by Catholic Radio Mariya, led by Jan Łopuszański, and newspaper *Nasz Dziennik* (opposing EU membership on the grounds that the common currency, freedom to purchase land, internationalisation of capital and ownership lead to the wiping out of national communities, moral relativism and the decline of religion), the leader of the conservative AWS – Marek Krzaklewski, argued that his party was in favour of EU membership. The latter would help Poland strengthen its national identity based on belongingness to European civilization, albeit the pursuit of accession had to take place on the basis of a tougher Polish attitude in membership negotiations, especially with regard to agriculture (PAP News Wire, 1998; Polish News Bulletin, 1998; Freudenstein, 2002:12). As Gebert clarifies, the Catholic Church and the peasantry – the two main opponents of European integration, did not actively challenge Poland's bid for membership, especially due to the authority of Pope John Paul II, who strongly endorsed Polish accession to the EU, and due to the realisation on the part of the

farmers that EU membership would be beneficial for them (Czaja, 1999:6; Pielacha, 2004:123). So this opposition was much weaker than the fundamental internal support for the EU, whose joining was seen as the ultimate confirmation that Poland was ‘part of the club’ (Gebert, 2015, interview). Therefore, as Kuźniar clarifies, the question was not about Europe – it was rather about the hardship of the transformation reforms, which were needed in order to meet the EU criteria (Kuźniar, 2015, interview).

Similarly, with regard to relations with Germany, the formation of a ‘community of interests’ and ‘the substantial concurrence of views’ between Bonn and Warsaw about European integration, as Skubiszewski put it, ensured the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy identity, whereby the majority of Polish policy-makers (and the wider public) could overcome their historically-informed fears of Germany and conduct a policy of intensive cooperation based on mutual trust (Skubiszewski, 1994:23). Thus, as the author’s interviewees agree, the progress of bilateral relations in the 1990s, which contributed significantly to Poland’s integration in Euro-Atlantic structures (given Germany’s influential voice in the EU and NATO), was conditioned by German feelings of historical guilt and security motivations and was complemented by the Polish desire to return to Europe, coupled with the evolving perception of Germany as a country that had relinquished imperial ambitions and through which Poland’s road to Europe lay (Kuźniar, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Adamski, 2015; Wieliński, 2015; Ochmann, 2015; Krzakała, 2015; three anonymised participants, 2015; interviews).

Ultimately, upon his receipt of the Charlemagne prize in 1998, Foreign Minister Geremek underscored the key, mutually interactive quality of Polish-German relations, whereby ‘in place of geopolitics there appears an even stronger motivation from...the field of geoculture’, meaning that ‘the economic tie and the political tie found their foundation in the culture and spiritual life of Europe, and the motivation to unify Europe is not fear but

the sense of a common identity' (Geremek, 1999:12). Although problems began to appear by the end of the 1990s (such as growing German reservations about unconditionally supporting Poland given the declining confidence in Warsaw's ability to meet the economic criterion for EU membership as well as additional Polish grievances about the treatment of the minority of Poles in Germany and the activities of German expellees' descendants), they did not fundamentally change the relationship, with the conservative view of the threat emanating from Germany, still remaining in the minority (Cichocki, 2002:172-173).

A final illustration of the continuity of views on Poland's key foreign policy goals as a result of the interaction of the external and internal dimensions of identity construction relates to the issue of NATO membership. The evolution of NATO thinking in the direction of greater acceptance of CEE candidates, spearheaded to a significant extent by American perceptions and policies, singled out Poland as part of a distinct group of states being the first ones to join the Alliance. At the same time this process was itself shaped by Poland's consensually and decisively pursued goal to be included in Euro-Atlantic structures of security, motivated as this goal was by both claims to cultural-historical belongingness and security concerns emanating from the possibility of Central Europe's remaining in a grey zone between the West and Russia. As Polish security specialists confirm, Alliance membership criteria reinforced the standards of European-ness set by the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe and promoted Poland's Europeanisation, whereas the success with which these standards were implemented domestically further affected Western willingness to admit Poland in the Alliance (Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015; Pisarski, 2015; Nowak, 2015, interviews).

Overall therefore, there was a significant continuity in Polish foreign policy identity in the 1990s focused on modernist, liberal-internationalist, integrationist principles, with

conservative right-wing critique remaining on the level of public debate rather than on the level of the decision-makers' general rhetoric and policies.

Externally-driven events and processes mediated by the domestic dimension of identification

Apart from the overall mode of reinforcement, complementarity and co-constitution between the internal and external dimension of identity construction presented above, the current and following sub-sections demonstrate that even strongly impactful international or domestic events and developments do not determine outcomes single-handedly – rather, they are mediated, respectively, by a domestic or international perceptual-political lens.

For instance, West European criticisms in the EU enlargement process were not simply directly translated into disappointments in Poland but also met with a greater determination and an even more active foreign policy strategy of persuasion aimed at convincing Warsaw's European partners that Poland was capable of meeting EU criteria, shaped as this strategy was by a deep-rooted cultural-historical identification with Europe, informing the country's consistently followed ambition to gain membership in European institutions. For example, Brussels criticised Poland's failure to submit adequately documented proposals for the use of PHARE funds and as a result cut off PHARE funding allotted to Poland for 1998. Although this episode fuelled suspicions among the Euro-sceptics in Poland, rather than succumbing to negative reactions, the Polish government acted quickly to address the EU's concerns by restructuring plans for the steel industry and resolving the issue of administrative control of PHARE funding (Terry, 2000:34).

Similarly, the tight scrutiny and strict monitoring of the progress made by NATO applicant states in implementing the accession criteria were received with Warsaw's determination to show quick compliance, shaped by the strong pro-Atlanticist orientation of its strategic

culture. Koźmiński recalls that problematic issues would come up continuously and Polish policy-makers would address them immediately (Koźmiński, 2015, interview). For instance, there were issues linked to Polish exports of defence technology to Arab states, civilian control over the military, Polish-Jewish relations (particularly, the fire in a synagogue in Warsaw in 1997) as well as the case of Colonel Ryszard Kukliński (a Cold War era spy working for the US, who was still not cleared of his life sentence in the mid-1990s, causing much consternation in America). But all of these problems were overcome in a timely and resolute manner by Polish experts and policy-makers (Fischer, 2007; Sasnal, 2015:181).

Domestically-driven events and processes and their influence on the Other's perceptions

In parallel to the argument made above, this sub-section shows that important domestic processes and policies are not necessarily confined to the boundaries of the state and can have an effect (produced inadvertently or purposefully) on external actors' views and actions, while being further refracted through already existing stereotypes.

In particular, despite the pre-existing, historically-shaped, favourably predisposed Western attitudes, there was still initial scepticism at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s about the extent to which Poland could become European on the Western model and overcome the communist heritage (Wedel, 1998:19-20, 57; Greenhouse, 1989). As Kuźniar testifies, at the beginning of the post-communist period, the West Europeans did not consider that Poland had the potential to become European quickly, not least due to the legacy of martial law and the economic crises of the 1980s, which left the Polish economy impoverished and debt-ridden (Kuźniar, 2015, interview). Similarly, Wielński confides that the initial West European scepticism about Poland's ability to become part of united Europe was demonstrated by the fact that at the start of the negotiation of the Association Agreement

with Warsaw, the European Commission dispatched its experts on development and humanitarian aid, which, according to the Poles, indicated the treatment of their country as a Third World state, as underlined by the Polish plenipotentiary for European integration at the time – Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (Wieliński, 2015, interview; Kochanowicz, 2001).

However, domestic-level developments in post-communist Poland affected these sceptical attitudes in a positive direction (Dobbs, 1996). Polish observers confirm that already in 1992-1993 the West European states and the US were impressed by the pace and success of the political-economic transformation as well as the depth and breadth of the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy consensus (Kuźniar, 2015; Szeptycki, 2015; Nowak, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015, interviews). In recounting his experiences as Ambassador to the US, Koźmiński argued that the successful reforms and the strong domestic consensus on foreign policy represented a crucial diplomatic asset that could be used purposefully to prove to American officials that despite the rapidly changing internal party-political and institutional landscape (during the first four years of Koźmiński's tenure as Ambassador, he had to answer to five Defence Ministers, four Foreign Ministers, four Prime Ministers and two Presidents), the Polish economy was growing, while the majority of the politicians and society supported the Euro-Atlantic direction (Koźmiński, 2015, interview).

Ultimately, the positive evolution of Western perceptions of Poland was promoted by the compatibility of visions of European-ness. As then Foreign Minister Olechowski clarified, Polish diplomacy propagated the idea that Poland's presence in European institutions would stabilise and deepen, rather than destabilise and dilute, integration, maintaining that the unification of Europe could only be effective if the EU continued to develop Western values such as democracy, the free market and human rights after expansion (Olechowski, 1995:24).

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Polish foreign policy

This section of the chapter aims to present a focused overview of Polish foreign policy in the 1990s in order to establish through the congruence method that the interactively conditioned, thick discursive-ideational Europeanisation found expression in concrete action. Indeed, as shown below, thick Europeanisation framed the general tenor, context and character of Poland's external relations in such a way as to situate the state on the European civilizational map, guiding the treatment of the Other on the basis of positive identification and pursuit of integration, thus ultimately actualising rather than just claiming a Europeanised identity by approaching international politics, regional relations and institutionalised cooperation through the application of ideal-typical principles. Accordingly, the concluding part of the section discusses how the Constructivist analysis of Warsaw's international behaviour illuminates the circumscription (and inconceivability) of other foreign policy options.

More specifically, consistent with the interaction of initial Western European ambivalences about the future shape of the European order after the end of bipolarity and Poland's cautiousness in openly declaring its Euro-Atlantic ambitions due to uncertainties related to the timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal and Germany's confirmation of its western border with Poland, Polish external relations at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s were first directed towards solving these two problematic issues. Despite some disappointments linked to Chancellor Kohl's equivocation on the border question, especially during his November 1989 trip to Poland, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski's cautious approach yielded positive results. Indeed, Warsaw was included in the penultimate round of the two plus four talks (in stark contrast to the exclusion of Poland from the Potsdam and Yalta summits after World War II in the discussion and resolution of problems crucial to Central

European security), which culminated in the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany of 1990 and the German-Polish Border Treaty of 1990 (Spero, 2004:120-121).

Once united Germany committed itself to the Oder-Neisse border, the Soviet Union ceased being the sole guarantor of Poland's security and Warsaw could pursue with full determination the goal to 'return to Europe'. The agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet forces was signed in October 1991, stipulating that all troops had to leave Poland by the end of 1993 (Cottey, 1995:33-36).

In the still uncertain external circumstances of the late 1980s and very early 1990s, Poland pinned some of its initial hopes on the CSCE/OSCE. However, the absence of formal security guarantees (confirmed at the Paris summit in 1990 by the unwillingness of Western powers to turn the CSCE into a collective security organisation) and the CSCE's ineffectiveness in the Yugoslav conflict in 1991 informed the development of a Polish view of the CSCE as a secondary institution. Thus, henceforth, Warsaw focused its attention on joining the most viable Western institutions – the EU and NATO, while continuing to play an active role in developing the CSCE's role in those areas in which it could promote the European security order – conflict prevention, crisis management, arms control and confidence-building. For instance, when the CSCE Forum on Security Cooperation opened in Vienna in 1992, the Visegrad states established themselves as leading participants, with Warsaw showing particular interest in issues related to the military force structures and readiness levels of its eastern neighbours, which could be conducive to the possibility of regional arms control measures with these states (Cottey, 1995:152).

So since 1990-1991, Poland made clear its key foreign policy goal of gaining membership in the EC/EU, which met with Western Europe's growing willingness to include Poland (as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic) as a frontrunner in the accession process. Some of the milestones in Polish-EC/EU relations were linked to the signing of the EEC-Poland agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation (1989), followed by the Europe Agreement (1991), the gradual inclusion of Polish officials and their Hungarian and Czech counterparts in EC decision-making fora, exemplified by the opportunity provided to Central European foreign ministers to join for the first time a regular meeting of EC foreign ministers in October 1992 and the 1994 agreement among EU first diplomats stipulating the participation of the associate states in the Union's ministerial meetings on foreign and security policy (Cottey, 1995:137-138). Poland submitted its application for membership in 1994 and established in 1996 the Committee for European Integration, which coordinated the activities of the state administration in anticipation of the country's integration in the EU, shaped government policy and produced a National Strategy for Integration, becoming the first programme paper on the tasks to be fulfilled prior to accession to be submitted by any associate state (Hübner, 1998:224, 228). At the European Council Summit in Luxembourg (1997), the EU accepted the Commission's opinion to invite six CEE states – among which Poland, to start accession talks, which were formally initiated in the following year.

The Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy through deeper integration with Western Europe was enhanced by the increasingly close cooperation with Germany based on the mutual Polish-German drive for reconciliation, which found concrete expression in the creation of extensive security and economic ties. Indeed, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel consistently lent preeminent support to Poland's EU and NATO membership goals and consolidated Skubiszewski's

strategy for ever closer cooperation with Germany based on a 'community of interests'(Cichocki, 2002:169-170; Spero, 2004:129-130).

Bilateral ties were thus focused both on regular high-level political consultations among Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (as stipulated in the 1991 Treaty on Good Neighbourliness) as well as on meetings and knowledge exchange among security experts, journalists and scientists. Overall, between 1990 and 2000, Poland and Germany concluded 27 agreements on military and security cooperation (for instance, the 1993 Agreement on Military Cooperation was the first treaty of this kind that Berlin had signed with a former Warsaw Pact member) (Górka-Winter, Posel-Częścik, 2002). Moreover, commercial relations between Poland and Germany also developed dynamically. If in 1989 the two German states accounted for 20.6% of imports and 19.2% of exports for Poland, by 1999 these figures had risen to 25.2% and 36.1%, which made Germany Poland's first and most important trade partner. Finally, Germany provided significant capital investments, retaining the largest share in the Polish banking sector with respect to equity owned by foreign nationals (ranging between 33% and 26% in the latter half of the 1990s) and playing a major role in the insurance sector (Kleer, 2002).

Furthermore, apart from the gradual steps taken by NATO towards the inclusion of CEE states (such as through the NACC and the PfP), Polish officials worked consistently throughout the 1990s in accelerating the accession process and receiving a firm date for membership on the basis of a strategy of persuasion (Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015; Koźmiński, 2015, interviews; Wawrzusiszyn, 2014:4). More specifically, by 1993, Polish officials were pressing hard for their country's NATO membership. Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, deputy Defence Minister Jerzy Milewski, deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Ananicz and Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz warned that old threats were likely to return in the absence of an Alliance membership perspective, including the revival of a

bipolar arrangement in Europe and the potential failure of Polish democratic reforms (Polish News Bulletin, May 1993, October 1993, December 1993). In the mid-1990s, the push for NATO membership continued – on signing the PfP, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak assessed the Partnership as not completely satisfactory but still a promising element of the new European security system, which should culminate in full Polish membership in the Alliance (Polish News Bulletin, February 1994, February 1995). By the end of the 1990s, Poland continued to receive Western support for its bid for NATO membership – as President Kwaśniewski was strongly assured during his 1997 visit to the US, with Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek asserting that Polish NATO membership brought ‘the true end of World War II’ (PAP News Wire, 1997; Associated Press, 1998).

More specifically, as far as the work of the Polish diplomatic representatives to the US was concerned, the strategy of persuasion was actualised in at least three major tasks, as explained by then Polish Ambassador to the US Jerzy Koźmiński. First, the Polish diplomats set about creating a proper image of Poland as a country with a rich history, a pro-Western and pro-American attitude, which had embarked upon a path of radical domestic political-economic changes and successfully sustained that course, thus representing a potential asset to NATO. The second task was to exert pressure through active networking with and lobbying those American institutions and policy-makers who were directly or indirectly influencing the decision about NATO expansion (including the White House, the Department of State, the National Security Council, the CIA, the Pentagon, the US Congress, the media, the opinion-making circles such as think-tanks, academics and influential former politicians, the business and ethnic Polish-American interest groups). The third task consisted in contributing to the American discussions about NATO enlargement from a conceptual point of view by clarifying how the process of Alliance expansion would be situated within the broader security context that encompassed

relations with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. And it was the Polish diplomats' argument that NATO enlargement was one pillar in a broader security complex that included special relations between NATO and Russia enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (so that Moscow's security concerns about being encircled by the Alliance would be alleviated). A parallel NATO-Ukraine council was also to be created, while the ambitions of the Baltic states to join NATO would have to remain temporarily unfulfilled since a big enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as well as the Baltics would be both too costly for the Alliance and too offensive to Moscow (strategically, because Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were neighbours of Russia and, psychologically, because they used to be part of the Soviet Union) (Koźmiński, 2015, interview).

Finally, Warsaw was active in constructing integration initiatives with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as a way of proving to Western European and American observers that Poland shared and operated on the key European principle of regional cooperation, while further attempting to conduct a friendly and cautious policy towards its eastern neighbours of Ukraine, Belarus and also the Soviet Union/Russia in order to stabilise the security environment in the east through democratisation. Thus, the Visegrad summit in 1991 initiated formally the creation of the Visegrad organisation and produced a significant document – the Visegrad Declaration (1991). This document signalled the resolve of the Visegrad states to act together in convincing Western Europe that they were the most Europeanised. That is, the process of Central European regional cooperation was in itself a signal that these countries were willing to put historical disputes behind them, resolve differences peacefully and pursue together EU and NATO membership (Cottey, 1995:132; Spero, 2004:256, 268). In turn, Western Europe's recognition of the special relationship that it was beginning to form with the Visegrad Group was highlighted when the Prime Ministers of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia met together with EC leaders for the

first time in 1991, while at the 1993 Copenhagen summit the EU referred to the Visegrad states as a group, whose cooperation it supported (Cottey, 1995:127, 130, 134).

As regards Poland's Eastern strategy and relations with Russia, in particular, the growing recognition of the fundamental differences in Moscow's and Warsaw's visions of how the European security order should be constructed soured interactions (Fedorowicz, 2007:7; Eberhardt, 2015, interview). The Russian ambition to establish dominance over the domestic and external development of the post-Soviet states conflicted with Poland's goal to democratise Ukraine and Belarus and to promote the European integration of these countries. Moscow criticised Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's proposition to establish a security zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the formation of a Polish-Ukrainian battalion as attempts on the part of Warsaw to undercut Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area by drawing Ukraine into the West (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:65). Ultimately, as Kuźniar has confided, during unofficial meetings, Russian politicians were telling their Polish counterparts that Moscow would not object to Poland's accession to the EU and NATO, especially if Warsaw set aside any dreams of Europeanising Ukraine, which proved to be an unacceptable compromise to the Poles (Kuźniar, 2015, interview).

Thus, regarding Ukraine, on 2 January 1990 Poland became the first country in the world to recognise Ukrainian independence and established full diplomatic relations with Kiev on 8 January 1990 (Fedorowicz, 2007:4-5). Since the mid-1990s, Poland and Ukraine intensified their cooperation, with Warsaw lobbying in favour of Kiev's inclusion in Central European institutions such as CEFTA, which was seen as a first step towards EU integration. In the process of Poland's accession to NATO, Warsaw advocated the creation of closer ties between the Alliance and Ukraine, culminating in the Ukraine-NATO Charter (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:65). However, Poland's vision of Ukraine as a Europeanising state became unsustainable over time (Eberhardt, 2015; Adamski, 2015;

anonymised participant; Kuźniar, 2015, interviews). By the end of the 1990s, Poland and Ukraine were set on divergent paths of development, with Warsaw completing domestic reforms and becoming integrated in NATO and the EU, while Kiev pursued a policy of balancing its relations with Russia and Europe, giving more and more precedence to the former and sliding into authoritarianism (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:65).

Alternative explanations

The final consideration related to the Constructivist framework set out by the thesis to account for the development of Polish foreign policy in the 1990s concerns the question as to whether there existed viable alternatives to the country's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community – i.e., whether in the absence of other feasible options, Poland simply submitted to strategic necessities and external pressures.

For instance, one possible alternative to integration was neutrality, requiring the major powers to respect a neutral country's status, the ability to avoid being drawn into conflicts and the possession of the necessary capabilities to defend one's territory, none of which conditions, however, could be realistically met from Poland's perspective. The highly unstable situation in the Soviet Union, the uncertainties surrounding Germany's recognition of its border with Poland and Central Europe's historical experience (above all the division of spheres of influence on the part of the great powers at Yalta) provided little confidence that the European powers would refrain from domineering and unjust policies towards Warsaw (Cottey, 1995:16-17). Another alternative was reliance on a pan-European security system focused on the CSCE/OSCE but both theory and history suggested that defining an act of aggression and determining whether and how to respond would be hard to achieve in a credible way (for example, a reason why the League of Nations collapsed was that its members failed to agree on whether and how to oppose

aggression). This was so especially given the fact that formal security guarantees and the commitments of member states attached to them were not enshrined in a legally binding manner in the CSCE/OSCE (Cottey, 1995:22). Also, the creation of a Central European regional security system was hardly feasible both because of the limited military and economic capabilities of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (all inherited inefficient armed forces, which needed significant modernisation) and because of little enthusiasm in these countries for the construction of a regional grouping (Cottey, 1995:18, 24; Kuźniar, 2015; Waszczykowski, 2015, interviews).

Therefore, there were indeed no viable options that could ensure Poland's security and prosperity in the post-Cold War period other than entry into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. But as the analysis in previous sections of the chapter has shown, identity, security and economic concerns were nevertheless mutually constitutive, with Poland's strong positive identification with Europe and the US shaping foreign policy behaviour and limiting the range of conceivable courses of action (Kuźniar, 2015; Waszczykowski, 2015; Kościński, 2015; Nowak, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

Chapter 4 The Europeanisation of Bulgarian foreign policy, 1989-2000

Application of the conceptual and theoretical framework to the Bulgarian case

Before the empirical examination of the Europeanisation of Bulgarian foreign policy can commence, this section of the chapter first elucidates how the conceptual and theoretical standpoints developed in Chapter 2 – linked to the characteristics of the Self-Other relationship, the ‘layers’ and referent groups of identity, are applied to Bulgaria’s ideational scene.

Characteristics of the Self-Other relationship in Bulgaria

As posited in Chapter 2, the crucial Self-Other interactive nexus in the process of a state’s identity construction has a number of general characteristics, whose concrete expression in the Bulgarian case is presented below.

The dimension of the Self related to liminal ideational crises has been present in Bulgaria since 1989 (and particularly in the 1990s) in the form of an ideational predicament that has its roots in the country’s history, which points to the persistence of permanently liminal conditions both before and after the collapse of the communist system. On the level of the political elite, political instability, the fluid institutional and party-political environment, the frequently resurfacing discussions about the strength of Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic commitments and the unresolved question about finding a proper grounding for relations with Russia can be attributed to the liminal post-1989 conditions, characterised by the ongoing accumulation of experience, habits and expertise on the part of the governing class to operate within a democratic political environment and in the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical configuration (Sardamov, 2007:3-5).

Yet, the above-described trends have to be placed in the context of a much more long-term existential crisis of identity, induced by frequent and wholesale ruptures in the country's social, political, economic and international environment. In particular, there were three historic ruptures in 1878 (the achievement of independence from the Ottoman Empire and subsequent attempts at integration with Europe), in 1944 (the adoption of communism and firm anchoring in the Soviet sphere of influence) and in 1989 (the democratic transformation and alignment with the West). All of these fundamental changes brought about deep-seated dislocations in the governing political class, ownership of property, societal values and external orientation, which contributed to a sense of status insecurity and a loss of stable normative guideposts (Danov, 2014:9; Avramov, 2007:17-49).

In such conditions of identity crisis, the need for a significant Other that can be emulated and whose recognition can affirm the state in its international role aspirations has been an inseparable element of Bulgaria's permanent liminality. The country's key significant Other is (Western) Europe, which has been perceived both as a utopical, superior form of social, political and economic organisation to be imitated, and as a sometimes hostile, exclusive and distant cultural entity that does not sufficiently appreciate the states in its periphery.

Thus, on the one hand, 'Europe' has been historically synonymous with modernisation, progress and prosperity. This has been so since the national awakening and restoration of Bulgaria's statehood in the 19th century (when Western Europe was used as a template for the organisation of social and political life), during communism (when the West of the European continent remained an idealised, economically prosperous Other in popular imagination) and in the post-1989 period (when another wholesale attempt at Europeanisation in the form of democratisation, marketisation and integration in the Euro-

Atlantic community has been carried out) (Todorov, 1999:6; Katsikas, Siani-Davies, 2010:1-2, 7-8, 11-12; Wydra, 2008:71-72).

On the other hand, the main ideational manifestation of difference and potential exclusion from European civilization is related to the concept of ‘the Balkans’. As Todorova’s study has made clear, a negative image of the Balkans crystallised in the West European consciousness in the 18th and 19th century, whereby if Europe set the standard of civilization and progress, the Balkans were characterised by backwardness, perpetual strife, tribal warfare and resistance to modernisation (Todorova, 2009; Bechev, 2006:7). Such a characterisation of the Balkans has been the result of Western attitudes and stereotypes, which however also mapped onto some ‘objective’ cultural-historical differences (Kuus, 2004). Indeed, having being incorporated into the Ottoman Empire and remaining on the periphery of the great social, political and economic transformations taking hold in Western Europe – such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, which contributed to the development of liberalism, democracy, the rule of law and free market enterprise as core values of the ideal-typical model of European-ness, meant that these values became an imported rather than an organic part of Bulgarian national identity in the process of catching up with the West (Baeva, 2015; Marcheva, 2015, interviews). Hence, in post-1878 independence Bulgaria, the party-political labels of ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ masked a substantive ideational divergence from West European understandings. For instance, the Bulgarian conservatives rejected the ideas of the free market and the non-interventionist state, forming otherwise the core of conservative ideologies in Europe, while the Bulgarian liberals identified with the West on the basis of cultural sympathies but the key liberal idea of support for individual rights and freedoms was transformed into majoritarian populism (Avramov, 2007:326; Crampton, 2007).

Furthermore, apart from Western Europe, Russia is also a significant Other for Bulgaria. The Bulgarians and the Russians share similar languages and the Orthodox Christian religion, while Bulgaria also owed its liberation from the Ottoman Empire to Russian military and diplomatic activities and therefore Russia was central to the very restoration of modern Bulgarian statehood (Rusev, 2005:2-3; Stankova, 2010:45). Nevertheless, Russia has also been perceived as an obstacle to the country's European path of development. Prior to and after the Cold War (when Bulgaria emulated obediently the Soviet social and political model), the majority of the Bulgarian elite and society considered Europe to be the model of modernisation, which was adopted despite the authority of Moscow with its halo of liberator because Russia was perceived as politically and economically backward in comparison with the West (Stankova, 2010:45; Todorov, 1999:7; Katsikas, Siani-Davies, 2010:10-11).

On the whole, (Western) Europe and Russia are key significant Others for Bulgaria, with Europe representing an example of social, political and economic development, while Russia plays an important role in the realm of the Bulgarians' cultural sensibilities and emotional attachments linked to religious, ethnic, linguistic similarities and historical gratitude. These overall positive perceptions (although in relation to different aspects of identification – social, political, economic vs. emotional, cultural) condition an ambiguity about Bulgaria's Western vs. Eastern civilizational (and foreign policy) orientation that at once recognises the Bulgarians' points of resemblance and favourable attitudes to both Europe and Russia, while also acknowledging a degree of difference from both of them. On the one hand, Bulgaria may aspire to liberal democratic, market economic values but, as with other Balkan states, its form of (formerly aggressive) nationalism was born of religious, seemingly primordial ethnic ties and of the memory of past glory rather than of democratic patriotism, attachment to civic rights, liberties, the rule of law and the

accountability of public institutions, prevalent in West European societies. On the other hand, the strongly individualistic dispositions of the Bulgarians and the fact that Bulgaria remains a country of the small land-owner and mobile entrepreneur is hard to square with the more autocratic and collectivist principles of organisation of the Russian state and society. On the level of the political elite, this civilizational ambiguity runs both between the so-called division of 'Russophiles' and 'Russophobes' (with the Russophiles showing greater readiness for foreign policy engagement with Moscow and being more wary of Europe's exclusionary practices, while the Russophobes follow unquestioningly the Western model and leadership, opposing closer political ties with Russia not least due to the latter's imperialistic-authoritarian conduct) and within these two groupings (the Russophiles also accept Europe as a model of modernisation, the Russophobes do not deny the Bulgarians' cultural sensibilities to the Russians) (Atanassov, 2000:55; Abrasheva, 2015, interview).

Finally, the US takes a less historically loaded place as a significant Other in Bulgarian identity given the weak cultural, social and political ties to America prior to 1989 complemented by Cold War-era ideological opposition. Thus, the overall imagery of the US is that of a distant and also admired part of the Western Other. America is regarded for its technological prowess, economic success and freedom, and yet criticised for loss of spirituality, coldness and alienation among the people (as contrasted with Bulgarian warmth and socially harmonious relationships) (Konstantinov, 2013). Moreover, there was little historical basis for embracing the US and NATO as security guarantors after 1989. In Bulgarian strategic culture, Moscow is accorded a special place as a liberator from the Ottoman Empire (and a protector from the superior Turkish army during the Cold War), which is for Bulgaria a political-cultural negative Other and a security threat. In particular, the Ottoman period is represented as 'enslavement', responsible for destroying the

Bulgarian medieval empire, which was at the centre of Orthodox Christian and Slavic religious and literary developments. The assertion of Bulgarian nationalist-independence and territorial claims was the subject of repeated military-diplomatic conflicts with Turkey in the 19th and 20th century (Danova, 2013; Boneva, 2006).

Furthermore, another important dimension of the Self-Other relationship is linked to the capabilities of the Other – i.e., the more powerful it is, the greater its salience and impact on the Self's identity (re)definition. In Bulgaria's case, Western Europe has been immensely more powerful, which, matched by Sofia's striving to catch up economically, politically and culturally with the developed countries on the continent, intensified the Bulgarian receptivity to foreign models, normative guidance and coercive pressure to conform in the 1990s (Todorov, 1999:6).

The process of Europeanisation has also been significantly affected during critical, externally-led events and developments related to the degree of Western support and recognition in the post-communist period of flux in the 1990s, particularly over the course of the decision of whether, how and which CEE states should accede to the EU and NATO. The extent of Bulgaria's inclusion by its European Other has affected the country's readiness to reformulate its worldview along the values animating the ideal-typical model of European-ness.

'Layers' of identity

As posited in Chapter 2, identity is comprised of multiple layers, which can complement or contradict each other – and whose concrete manifestations in the Bulgarian case are presented below.

Similarly to Russian and Polish, the Bulgarian language distinguishes between the terms *narod* and *natsiya*, with the latter referring to the political construction of the nation on the

basis of rights, laws and institutions ensuring the freedom and equality of its citizens (Raichev, 2009). The former concept is more akin to ‘ethnicity’ and a seemingly primordial blood relation among the people, which tends to dominate in the national psyche. As Nancheva clarifies, the narrative of Bulgarian nationhood emerging in the 19th century was rooted in the historical myth of past glory dating back to medieval times and in a story of national unity constituted by the natural bond of ‘brotherhood’ that not everybody can share into (Nancheva, 2012:152-153).

This ideal of national unity has both domestic and international consequences. The proverbial Bulgarian ‘tolerance’ and ‘ethnic model’ refer to peaceful coexistence (as opposed to assimilation considered impossible given that the Turkish and Roma minorities do not share the same blood origins as the ethnic Bulgarians) and the presence of a political party claiming to represent the interests of the ethnic Turks (yet encapsulating and isolating rather than emancipating socially and economically its ethnic electorate) (Nancheva, 2012:154-155; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015; Dimitrova, 2015, interviews). Moreover, the emphasis on blood links has further implications regarding attitudes to the Macedonian national community, which, although living within the boundaries of its own state, is nonetheless considered connected to the Bulgarian nation by virtue of shared blood – the Macedonians are historically framed as ‘brothers’, as members of the primordial ethnos (Nancheva, 2012:155-156).

Another facet forming a key part of Bulgarian nationhood is linked to ‘territory’, which has foreign policy implications. A vital element of Bulgaria’s foreign policy identity and geopolitical self-awareness is related to the country’s central geographical location on the Balkan peninsula that is also interpreted to be the geostrategic and civilizational crossroads between Europe and Asia. An important consequence of this dimension of territoriality encompasses the narrative of victimisation by the great powers, whose conflicting interests

in the Balkans unjustly deprive Sofia of freedom of manoeuvre and subject it to deleterious consequences (i.e., the loss of land). Such discursive victimisation coupled with the memory of betrayal (by Bulgaria's neighbouring allies after the First Balkan War) and defeat (in the Second Balkan and World Wars) serve to shift blame for foreign policy failures to outside culprits and condition passivity in international relations that culminates in a 'satellite syndrome' (Nancheva, 2012:159-160; Kavalski, Zolkos, 2007:12-13). This syndrome is expressed in a reactive conduct of Bulgarian foreign policy, which follows already established agendas rather than contributing to the design and formulation of new ones (Dinkov, 2003; Nikolov, Simeonov, 2009:84; Shopov, 2007).

'Identity' groups on the level of the political-intellectual elite

In Bulgaria, the main ideational opposition especially in the 1990s could be located on the axis of 'post-communism' vs. 'anti-communism' (and to a degree of 'Russophiles' vs. 'Russophobes'), which mapped onto the party-political division between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Although both parties – dominating the political scene until 2001 (when such domination was attenuated as a result of the emergence of centre-right populist parties), were in favour of the European integration of Bulgaria, of good-neighbourliness and institutionalised cooperation, they differed along at least three attitudinal and policy dimensions. The first difference was related to the speed with which the democratic and market economic reforms had to be carried out (the UDF opted for a quick, shock therapy policy, the BSP preferred a gradualist approach). The second difference was in terms of the parties' willingness to bring the country into NATO (which difference began to fade away with the socialists' ideational evolution by 2001 towards the acceptance of the North Atlantic framework of security). Third, the parties differed with regard to the overall determination with which

the pro-Western course of Sofia's foreign policy was pursued (with the UDF favouring a single-minded implementation of the Euro-Atlantic vector, while the BSP attempted to balance relations with Western Europe, the US and Russia). The other influential party in the 1990s (and until today) was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), whose liberal and Euro-Atlantic orientation was overshadowed by the commonly perceived 'ethnic' character of the party, aiming to represent the voice of the ethnic Turks and guarantee their inclusion in national politics (Katsikas, 2012:44-52, 54-58, 70-72).

Overall, the preceding conceptualisation and operationalisation of the ideational scene in Bulgaria will be employed in the following empirical analysis of Sofia's foreign policy, whereby the pace of Europeanisation will be faster and more determined under the influence of the anti-communists, yet remaining generally ambivalent and lacking in sufficient substantive ideational coherence to ideal-typical European-ness under the influence of both the former communists and the anti-communists (as the further elaboration of party positions in the chapter will make clear).

The Europeanisation of Bulgarian foreign policy, 1989-2000 – the empirical record

The empirical analysis centres on the 1990s, when the challenges ahead of Bulgarian foreign policy were related to the arduous process of achieving a consensus on the country's external orientation and receiving corresponding international recognition of that orientation in the midst of an acute identity crisis and normative disorientation (with both of these internal and external challenges being met by the close of the decade). In comparison, the 2000s and 2010s exhibited a continuation with the trends of the previous decade in that foreign policy-makers focused on the (more mundane) tasks of fulfilling the EU and NATO accession criteria and attempting to work out Bulgaria's meaningful contribution after gaining membership in the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. All the while, however, the vigorous and symbolically-loaded domestic debates of the 1990s lost their intensity, the international uncertainty about Bulgaria's European credentials subsided into relative inattention and the country settled into an augmented ambivalence, as political actors with an even more doubtful ideational commitment to – but rhetorically aligned with, ideal-typical values took over key positions of authority (Mihaylova, 2015; Alexieva, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Marcheua, 2015, interviews; Cholova, 2010:3-4; Dainov, 2013; Gocheva, Boncheva, 2012; Sega, 2012; Dempsey, 2014).

Overall, the chapter argues that the proposition of 'ambivalent' Europeanisation is confirmed in the Bulgarian case. Such 'ambivalent' Europeanisation can also be described as 'formalistic' and 'superficial' because on the one hand, the West's tenuous commitment and lack of sufficient economic and diplomatic support produced disappointments among the Bulgarian political class at the country's perceived exclusion. On the other hand, the international ambivalence interacted with similarly ambiguous domestic Bulgarian views and actions, defined by a less strong cultural-historical affinity with the West, greater

contestation of the pro-Western foreign policy course and a more acrimoniously and slowly reached consensus on the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country. As a result, formalistic Europeanisation was produced by the prevalence of situational behavioural normative adaptation in foreign policy coupled with general (yet not always consistently sustained) discursive compliance with European values but mostly devoid of deeply held convictions and ideational internalisation (whereby ‘adaption’ and ‘compliance’ do not simply imply cost-benefit rationalist calculation; rather, civilizational ambivalence conditions the inability to pursue with ideational determination and consistency a given course of behaviour so that imitative performativity proliferates). This was further complemented by Sofia’s uncertainty about how to combine the Western and Eastern dimension of its external relations, which in turn created doubts in the EU and NATO about the sincerity of Bulgaria’s pro-Western course. Yet, neither Western Europe’s and America’s, nor Bulgaria’s ambivalences were too extensive and deep-seated as to prevent gradual Europeanisation, which by the end of the decade had become a commonly agreed upon priority of the state (albeit less robustly and successfully pursued than in Poland).

In substantiating this argument, the impact of the international and domestic dimensions of identification on Bulgaria’s foreign policy are first discussed separately. Subsequently, both of these dimensions are brought together in order to demonstrate that the ambivalent Europeanisation of Bulgarian attitudes and actions can be comprehensively understood on the basis of the interaction of the internal and external aspect of identity construction.

The international dimension of identification

Some of the crucial international events and developments influencing the evolution of Bulgarian nation-state identity included the European integration process and NATO accession, over the course of which the Western Other displayed a greater level of uncertainty and hesitation (as contrasted with more eagerly enthusiastic and affirming policies towards Poland) in recognising Sofia's European prospects. Such uncertainties found a concrete expression in the provision of less extensive, continuous and committed support as measured by the slower pace with which Bulgaria was included in institutionally integrative schemes as well as the more limited diplomatic and economic assistance. All of this created disappointments (among at least the pro-Western part of the Bulgarian political elite), activated historically-informed perceptions of exclusion from Europe on the basis of the Balkans' peripherality failing to meet standards of European civilization and did not contribute to the early establishment of an 'external anchor' for Bulgaria's transformation process (which would have propped up the position of domestic reformers and ensured a degree of irreversibility of European integration efforts through international commitment).

However, the slow steps towards the acceptance of Bulgaria in the Euro-Atlantic family gradually assumed a more determined character so that by the end of the 1990s the EU and NATO granted Sofia a membership perspective (unlike in relations with Russia, where fully-fledged integration never became a serious political prospect). This was positively received in Bulgaria, encouraging, directing and providing a blueprint to the politicians to pursue inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community on the basis of cooperative international politics, good-neighbourly regional relations and institutionalised integration (albeit the insufficient internalisation of these value positions is further revealed in the section discussing the effects of the domestic dimension of identification).

European integration processes

This sub-section of the chapter focuses on the key EU, Council of Europe and OSCE-related developments that both promoted and delayed Bulgaria's Europeanisation.

The EU – differentiating Bulgaria (and Romania) into a class of laggards

Although the EU eventually granted Bulgaria a membership perspective, providing a crucial confirmation of the country's aspirations to be recognised as part of the European family of nations (which process is discussed in the next sub-section), it took the Union much more time to do so than in Poland's case. In particular, Brussels differentiated Bulgaria and Romania into a class of laggards among the CEE states – motivated not only by the 'objectively' measured progress that Sofia and Bucharest were making towards meeting membership criteria. Admittedly, it was indeed the case that Bulgaria and Romania were lagging behind in their domestic reforms (which is analysed in the section on the impact of the domestic dimension), but the EU member states' own historically-informed perceptions and interests regarding these two countries imparted to the 'technical' task of fulfilling conditions a less than 'objective' character.

Thus, in the post-1989 period, the unfavourable West European image of the Balkans (and of Bulgaria as part of the peninsula) endured and was further reinforced by the Yugoslav wars, which perpetuated the view of the Balkans as rife with ethnic strife, violence and fragmentation, making the region dangerous for political entanglements as well as economic investment (Baeva, 2015, interview; Bechev, 2006:7-8; Stankova, 2010:59). The difference between the Western-oriented cultural, religious and economic traditions of Central Europe as opposed to the Byzantine and Ottoman heritage of South-east Europe was also emphasised (Longworth, 1994; Kaplan, 1994; Schrameyer, 2009:80). And as Shikova has clarified, the lack of sufficient familiarity and more comprehensive knowledge

of Bulgaria lent themselves to prejudicial treatment on the basis of the psychological principle that the more unknown something is, the more warily it is approached and the more easily negatively stereotyped it becomes (Shikova, 2015, interview).

Added to (and indeed constitutive with) these Western attitudes were the weaker historical, political and economic ties that key West European states have with Bulgaria, which conditioned a relatively marginal strategic and economic interest in Sofia on the part of the most influential EU countries (such as France and Germany) that could have otherwise sped up the pace of Bulgaria's European integration (the final decision on enlargement is taken by the European Council where member states and their national perspectives are of crucial importance). Indeed, Sofia has not had the intense, if conflict-ridden, relations that have existed between Germany and Poland (as well as the rest of the Central European countries); geographically, Bulgaria is further east from the EU's centre of gravity in comparison to all of the other applicant states (Dimitrov, 2000:11-23). So as Bulgarian experts and policy-makers concur, Sofia lacked an external 'patron', whose special attitude, informed by cultural-historical affinity and density of links, would have motivated consistent diplomatic advocacy and in-depth political and economic support (Minchev, 2015; Nikolova, 2015; Ratchev, 2015; Shopov, 2015; Arndt, 2015; Shikova, 2015; Vigenin, 2015, interviews).

For instance, the German interest in Bulgaria was not as special, wide-ranging and intense as it was in Poland (Ratchev, 2015, interview). The relative lack of familiarity with Bulgaria has led former German Ambassador to Bulgaria – Walter Lewalter, to confess in hindsight that the West Germans were slow to recognise the significance of the dissident movement that was taking shape in the late 1980s (most prominently embodied by the Public Committee for the Ecological Protection of Ruse). This prevented the early creation of contacts with the oppositional forces that could have aided the subsequent democratic

transformation and international visibility of the country (Lewalter, 2009:67; Brahm, 2009:129). Also, former German Ambassador Christel Steffler has argued that Chancellor Kohl's first visit to Sofia in 1994 included many representatives of German business, as Germany was becoming the biggest foreign investor in Bulgaria. Yet, this show of support was modest in comparison to the fact that Kohl's first trip to Poland had already taken place five years before and German investments in the Polish economy were much more significant (Steffler, 2009:107-108). In particular, over the 1990s, Poland became Germany's top trade partner in CEE. In 1999, total Polish-German bilateral trade amounted to DM 51 billion, with the cumulative value of German FDI since the start of the Polish transformation standing at \$40 billion (Małachowski, 2003:19, 21, 24). In stark contrast, in 1999, total German-Bulgarian bilateral trade was DM 2.3 billion, while the accumulated German FDI since 1992 equalled \$401 million (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to Bulgaria, 1901-1999). Overall, South-east Europe received just over \$300 per capita of Western FDI, compared with about \$1200 per capita in Central Europe and the Baltics, during 1989-2000 (Demekas, Herderschee, McHugh, Mitra, 2002).

Hence, by going beyond the examination of EU integration policy based on ostensibly objective criteria, one can take into account the variety of political, economic and ideological motives behind Union (and individual members') policies, which contributed to the partial exclusion and differentiation between the lagging Bulgaria (and Romania) and the more advanced Central European states that would be the first ones to join the Union in 2004 (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003:4). For instance, the exclusionary policies and 'acts of differentiation' that the EU conducted towards Bulgaria and Romania were linked to the refusal to invite them to negotiate accession in 1990, the attachment of a strong special clause on minority rights to Bulgaria's integration prospects in 1992, the decision to decline Bulgaria's and Romania's participation in the Luxembourg European Council,

which itself created the queuing system of enlargement (Arfire, 2011:7-8; Hughes, Gordon, Sasse, 2004:25). These acts of differentiation can be conceptualised as ‘controlled’ or ‘selective’ inclusion, which means that the EU exerted symbolic power not only over the notion of European-ness but also over the political-geographic identity of the Balkans in the 1990s, thus contributing to the normative (re)construction of the sub-regions of CEE – i.e., of the advanced Central Europeans and the Balkan laggards (Bechev, 2006:21; Arfire, 2011).

On the whole, as confirmed by Bulgarian experts, the partial exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania was negatively perceived on the part of the Bulgarian policy-making and intellectual elite, creating disappointments at the country’s side-lining in the European integration process, at the unequal treatment and double standards demonstrated in relation to Sofia, as contrasted with the much more favourable disposition and stronger support that the West provided to the Central European states (Shopov, 2015; Marcheua, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Primatarova, 2015, interviews). Thus, BSP Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov had to remind in 1990 that Bulgaria had made its contribution to the development of European civilization, which should not be forgotten by either Western Europe or the Bulgarians themselves. He further stressed the assets (and not just burdens) that Bulgaria would bring to a re-unifying Europe, including the significant human resources, economic potential, sound infrastructure and a crossroads geographical location connecting Western Europe, the Soviet Union and the Middle East (Lukanov, May 1990).

Moreover, apart from Bulgaria’s irritation over the EC’s delay in approving the trade agreement with Sofia in 1993 (resulting in an estimated 200 million dollar loss in trade revenues), German Chancellor Kohl’s statement that priority would be given to the Central European applicants to the EC was negatively received by the Bulgarian foreign policy establishment. Prime Minister Lyuben Berov reiterated Bulgaria’s aspirations to accede to

all the major European institutions but in the absence of significant Western commitment, the country had to make considerable efforts to revive relations with Russia (Engelbrekt, 1994:108-109).

Also, UDF Prime Minister Ivan Kostov made it clear in 1997 that the principle of a 'level playing field' in EU accession negotiations was of fundamental importance to Bulgaria. He acknowledged that better prepared countries would be able to complete the accession process earlier but the predetermined differentiation of applicants into groups would be demoralising (Kostov, 1997). Similarly, Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihaylova declined to countenance the possibility of even temporarily isolating SEE from the dynamics of integration, deploring the policy vacuum that existed in Western policy-making circles about how to deal with the region. In particular, Mihaylova pointed out that Balkan countries' significance was downgraded, no provision for longer-term political and economic investment was made, with the better part of Western efforts focusing on establishing cooperation structures with Central Europe, all of which – as Ivan Krastev assessed, threatened to turn the Balkans into a land of 'unknown unknowns' (Mihaylova, 1999:2-3; Krastev, 2005:4).

The EU – moving towards Bulgaria's integration

Despite the above-presented Western European ambivalences and partial delay of Bulgaria's entry into the EU, these ambivalences were not so strong as to turn Sofia away from the process of European integration. Indeed, it was generally believed that Bulgaria did belong to European civilization and that it would eventually join the EU, with official documents of the early 1990s including Bulgaria as part of the CEE countries that would be subject to enlargement policy (Lewalter, 2009:66; European Council Summit in Edinburgh, 1992:105-106, in Copenhagen, 1993:13-18, in Madrid, 1995:6-7). Geopolitical

considerations further catalysed the movement towards stronger Western engagement with Sofia.

Thus, the gradual incorporation of the country into European institutional schemes was received positively and encouraged the political elite to persevere in their integration efforts. Initially, Prime Minister Lukanov lauded the Agreement on business and economic co-operation and trade signed in 1990 with the EC as a symbolic confirmation of Bulgaria's political and economic return to Europe (Lukanov, May 1990). Also, although up until mid-1991, it seemed possible that Bulgaria may be left out of the negotiations for an Association/Europe Agreement (unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which signed their respective agreements in 1991), European hesitation was transformed into more decisive action due to political-strategic considerations linked to the attempted coup in Moscow in 1991, the dangers of a resurgent Soviet Union under a more conservative leadership and Yugoslavia's descent into war threatening to destabilise the Balkans. Hence, the EC opened talks with Sofia on the Agreement and the two sides signed it in 1994 (Dimitrov, 2000:8; Papadimitriou, Gateva, 2009:13-14; Katsikas, 2012:92; Europe Agreement between the EC and Bulgaria, 1994).

Moreover, despite the fact that the European Council Summit in Luxembourg (1997) excluded Bulgaria (together with Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) from the first group of applicants that were going to begin accession negotiations in 1998, the European Council changed its policy at Helsinki (1999) when Bulgaria and Romania were also asked to commence accession talks (Dimitrov, 2000:9; Papadimitriou, Gateva, 2009:15; Katsikas, 2012:94). Indeed, it had taken a war (i.e., the 1999 Kosovo conflict) for the EU to finally appreciate the importance of supporting Sofia in its European aspirations and to overcome the relative Western neglect of the region. The European Council decision in Helsinki came right after NATO's military activities in Kosovo, during which Bulgaria had

offered its political and logistical assistance (primarily by opening its airspace to North Atlantic forces and closing it to the Russian ones). It was in the aftermath of the Kosovo operation that British Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged full-hearted support for Bulgaria's EU membership (Dimitrov, 2000:9; Katsikas, 2012:95-96). The speech that Blair delivered at Sofia University in 1999 – in which he categorically stated his conviction that the European Council in Helsinki would have to invite Bulgaria to begin EU negotiations, is generally commemorated by Bulgarian experts and politicians as the first and only open show of patronage for the country's EU integration goals (Minchev, 2015, interview).

Similarly, the 1999 European Commission progress report for Bulgaria, which recommended that the country begin accession talks, was hailed by the Bulgarian political class as a symbolic milestone recognising Sofia's belongingness to the European cultural, political and economic space (European Commission, 1999). Prime Minister Kostov and Foreign Minister Mihaylova acknowledged that Western Europe and the US appreciated Sofia's Euro-Atlantic solidarity, its civilised and consistently followed choice in favour of democracy, civic nationalism and the establishment of good-neighbourly regional relations (Kostov, 1999; Mihaylova, 1999). Mihaylova reiterated that Bulgaria considered the EU the cornerstone of the continent's structures of cooperation with the potential to play a main role in building a united Europe based on the principles of a liberal order (Mihaylova, 1999).

The Council of Europe and the OSCE

Bulgaria's admission into *the Council of Europe* was the first occasion upon which the language of human rights, the protection of minorities and liberal democratic values was introduced in a clear and organised way in the Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy

discourse (Shopov, 2015, interview). As Mihaylova clarifies, due to the fact that Bulgaria was still relatively isolated in the international scene, the Council of Europe became a major reference point for the principled justification of Sofia's external actions, while Catherine Lalumière – the Secretary General of the organisation between 1989 and 1994, was the most frequently cited foreign policy authority among the Bulgarian politicians (Mihaylova, 2015, interview). Thus, former Prime Minister Lukanov turned MP, assured Lalumière that his party (the BSP) had initiated Bulgaria's integration with the Council of Europe led by 'sincere democratic convictions' and the realisation that it was only integration in a united and democratic Europe that would provide the cultural, economic and political anchoring for the Bulgarian internal transformation (Lukanov, August 1992).

As regards *the CSCE/OSCE*, Bulgaria welcomed the signing of the Charter of Paris and the CFE Treaty in 1990 as codifying the principles on which a united, free, stable and peaceful European security architecture would be built, where Sofia could find its rightful place. Lukanov also argued that the CFE Treaty led to an unrivalled breakthrough in the reduction of weapons through a multilateral effort, dispelling a deeply rooted public fear that international disarmament was impossible (Lukanov, November 1990).

However, despite the fact that Bulgaria took part in the discussions on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe and the Charter on European Security, it made sure that these documents would not delay or substitute potential cooperation with the EU and NATO (whose legally binding arrangements and stricter conditions for membership were considered to provide a firmer security and civilizational anchoring in Europe) (Ivanov, Atanassova, 2002:9). Moreover, although the CFE Treaty paved the way for disarmament and a general relaxation of tensions in the Balkans, it also froze strategic regional inequities to Bulgaria's disadvantage. In particular, the Treaty only took into account the quantitative dimension of the regional military balance, whereby Bulgaria

would indeed maintain parity with Greece and Turkey after reductions, but in terms of the quality of equipment Sofia and Bucharest lagged behind Athens and Ankara. Such inequality was further exacerbated by post-communist economic difficulties and the West's increasing weapons transfers to Greece and Turkey to deter potential antagonists in the Eastern Mediterranean – neither of which issues' consequences for Bulgaria were considered by the West (Engelbrekt, 1994:47).

Overall therefore, the Council of Europe and the CSCE/OSCE disseminated liberal democratic, human rights norms in Bulgarian political discourse. Yet, the impact of those organisations was diluted in cases of perceived exclusionary practices (from the EU and NATO) and strategic disadvantage, being further confined much more to the early 1990s – before Sofia had received an EU membership perspective.

NATO accession process

Similarly to EU accession, the inclusion of Bulgaria into NATO integration schemes proceeded slowly not least due to hesitant American views about the strategic relevance of the Balkans to Washington. The war in Kosovo was a key turning point, which alerted the US – as the pivotal power in the Alliance – to the importance of keeping SEE stable and peaceful. As a result, Bulgaria began to be gradually accepted into the North Atlantic system of security, which promoted the state's Europeanisation in terms of growing adherence to norms of good-neighbourliness and democratisation in the realm of military affairs (especially civilian control over the military and defence planning transparency).

NATO – ambivalent commitment to the Balkans

In the absence of strong cultural-historical, political, economic and people-to-people ties between the US and Bulgaria, it was considerations of American national interest and assessments of the strategic relevance of SEE that would push the US's decision to draw

Sofia closer into the transatlantic alliance. And for at least the first half of the 1990s, the Balkan region was thought to be of peripheral significance to Washington's European policy. Although the Clinton administration finally decided to get militarily involved in Bosnia through the deployment of NATO forces in 1995 and contributed to the restoration of peace at Dayton (due to the fact that US international leadership and NATO's credibility were at stake as the war raged on), this relatively growing engagement did not lead to a significant reassessment of American attitudes and interests in relation to the Balkans (where as Secretary of State James Baker declared 'the US did not have a dog in this fight'). In particular, discussions about the necessity of withdrawal, minimal military presence and of Europe taking over responsibility for the region began to take place immediately after the situation in Bosnia began to improve (Daalder, 2002:7-11; Angelov, 2004:3).

Hence in the context of the US's ambivalence about the importance of SEE in America's European policy, there was little readiness for NATO enlargement to the region (Ratchev, 2015, interview). As Solomon Passy has pointed out, the American attitude was not dissimilar to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's blunt assessment of Bulgaria's chances for gaining membership in NATO. At a meeting in 1994, Thatcher reacted to Passy's eagerness for his country's swift admission to the Alliance by recommending to him to forget about the possibility of Bulgaria entering NATO before Poland because the West had surrendered the Poles to Hitler, which had incurred a moral debt to be repaid through speedier Euro-Atlantic integration (Passy, 2015:6).

In this way, sensing the highly likely prospect of being turned down in their bid for NATO membership, Bulgaria as well as other Balkan countries such as Romania demonstrated restraint in demanding that NATO provide an explicit pledge and a timetable for entry. This stood in contrast to the Visegrad states, which continuously called on the Alliance to

make a definite commitment and promise a date for accession, assured as they were in this by Western perceptions of these states as more advanced in their reform process, more culturally but also geographically closer to the core of Europe, thus meeting the Western, and particularly German, interest in security and stability on the eastern borders (Engelbrekt, 1994:42).

NATO – towards Bulgaria's integration

The 1999 Kosovo crisis led to a watershed in Western perceptions of the importance of the Balkans not least because ethnic strife and violence represented a normative threat to the legitimacy of the security community pattern of relations in Europe. Indicative of the growing realisation of this alarming prospect was US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's statement that South-eastern Europe is 'the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free...That vision of a united and democratic Europe is crucial to our security. It cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains divided and wracked by conflict' (Kavalski, 2005:6-8).

And so from that moment on – and as enshrined in NATO's Strategic Concept (1999), the Balkans became integral to the post-1999 European normative and security order. As Kavalski argues, the year 1999 was for the Balkans the equivalent of 1989 for Central Europe. The new order required compliance with Euro-Atlantic normative standards, 'securitised' through a process of socialisation and a functional differentiation between the Euro-Atlantic partners in their socialising roles (the EU as a 'civilian power' and NATO as a hard-power organisation) aimed at constraining and modifying the foreign policies of the Balkan states. Indeed, Günther Verheugen – then European Commissioner for Enlargement, argued that the Alliance had to accept Sofia and Bucharest in order to avoid the difficult situation (of permanent relegation to peripheral exclusion, renewed ethnic

tensions and instabilities) that would result from a double rejection from both the EU and NATO (Kavalski, 2005:6-7; Angelov, 2004:4-7; Pierre, 1999; Ivanov, 2000:15-16; Parvanov, 2000:30-32).

In terms of concrete integration initiatives, prior to 1999 Bulgaria joined the PfP in 1994 and was a founding member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (or EAPC) in 1997, both of which laid the foundations for Sofia's security policy and defence structures reform on the basis of the development of interoperability with the forces of the Alliance, the promotion of transparency in national defence planning and the establishment of democratic control over the military. In a speech on Bulgaria's signing of the PfP, President Zhelio Zhelev hailed the scheme as 'a momentous process that will help democracy strike strong roots in Eastern Europe'. Yet, he did not shy away from making it clear that the PfP was an intermediate goal on the way to Bulgaria's full NATO membership (Engelbrekt, 1994:39).

Hence, the PfP and the EAPC still remained vague about Sofia's accession prospects (Ivanov, Atanassova, 2002:17; Cragg, 1995). Bulgaria's further impetus to Europeanise its security policy, changing away from the 'old' mentality (as expressed in the belief that the military should be a black box impenetrable to outsiders), would take a firmer NATO commitment and stricter guidelines for membership (as concrete markers of Sofia's acceptance by the West), which crystallised in 1999 at the Washington Summit announcing the Membership Action Plan (MAP, 1999; Ratchev, 2014:7; Ivanov, Atanassova, 2002:17; Sotirov, 2000). Bulgarian experts concur that the MAP and the reinforced commitment to enlargement it enshrined by putting into place activities and criteria for fully-fledged membership were crucially important in the realm of values, professional military ethos and the evolution of the communist-era mind-set hitherto informed by a lack of transparency, authoritarian attitudes and bilateralism. In particular,

NATO contributed to the Europeanisation of Bulgarian foreign policy identity by promoting the process of democratisation and transparency of security policies through the required adherence to political and economic liberties, the rule of law, the settlement of ethnic disputes and irredentist claims, peaceful and friendly international relations and the building of consensus (Ratchev, 2015; Dimitrov, 2015, interviews; Ivanov, 2000; Sotirov, 2000).

For instance, in the area of regional relations, security policy had to be based on a more democratic, regionally cooperative plane without historical and ethnic prejudices (Ivanov, 2000:14-18). To that end, the US promoted the establishment of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, fostering political-military cooperation in the Balkans (Ratchev, 2015, interview; Šabič, Freyberg-Inan, 2012:266). Moreover, conforming to NATO standards entailed that the communist-era policy of maintaining a large but insufficiently modernised army had to give way to professionalisation, downsizing and greater efficiency. Defence official Ratchev has explained that at the time he prepared and presented to the politicians a drastic reform plan, whereby out of its 142000-strong army, 1447 tanks, more than 400 ships, hundreds of fighter jets and oversized artillery Bulgaria had to retain only a brigade in order to be in alignment with Alliance criteria (Ratchev, 2015, interview; Military Doctrine of Bulgaria, 1999: Article 93; Agenda 2004).

Overall therefore, the increased Western commitment to Bulgaria's integration in NATO following the Kosovo conflict in 1999 provided significant encouragement to Sofia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations and mobilised the political elite's effort to begin to conduct a security policy guided by the values embodied in the ideal-typical model of European-ness. Moreover, the accelerated process of NATO accession improved Bulgaria's EU integration prospects, impressing upon the Bulgarian political class that EU and NATO membership were inextricably linked. As Primatarova recalls, at a 1998 conference in Germany

organised by the Regional Cooperation Council for the integration of SEE in the Euro-Atlantic space, German politician Gernot Erler said that before Bulgaria had received clear positive signals for its NATO membership and before Sofia had itself declared openly its aspirations towards Alliance accession, the country's EU application did not possess sufficient political weight (Primatarova, 2015, interview).

Conclusions

The examination of the impact of international processes and events (making up the overall ideational projection of the Other) points to the fact that, on the one hand, the ambivalences and relative reluctance that both the EU and NATO demonstrated towards Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration (through delayed institutional inclusion, differentiation into a class of Balkan laggards, less intensive political and economic assistance) contributed to the general disappointment among the Bulgarian political class about their country's lukewarm acceptance back into the fold of European civilization. On the other hand, Western ambivalences gradually evolved towards a greater diplomatic and institutional commitment to Bulgaria's European integration (spurred by geopolitical considerations), which promoted a more consistent discursive and policy-oriented compatibility with ideal-typical support for a liberal international order, peaceful regional relations, democratisation of the military and institutionalised cooperation. Yet, the insufficient internalisation of these values positions is revealed in the next part of the chapter.

The domestic dimension of identification

The domestic dimension of identification also contributed to Bulgaria's ambivalent Europeanisation. This is demonstrated through the examination of the belief systems and organisational features of the two main parties in the 1990s – the BSP (the former

communists) and the UDF (the democratic reformers), as well as of the nature and speed with which an internal political consensus about the country's foreign policy priorities was reached. Such an examination reveals the post-1989 continuation of a cultural-historical tradition, where European norms retained an imported rather than indigenously developed character. This affected both the quality of Europeanisation (due to the UDF's somewhat formulaic rather than substantive promotion of European values) and the speed of Europeanisation in terms of Sofia's firm declaration of its EU and NATO membership goals (due to the BSP's lingering pro-Russian ideological and geopolitical sympathies). Thus, it was only in 1997 – or seven years after the 1989 changes, that the political class reached a consensus about Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic foreign policy direction. The consensus henceforth represented a general discursive overlay common to both the 'post-communists' and the 'anti-communists', but overall normative compatibility with ideal-typical values remained superficial rather than deeply internalised.

In what follows, the ideational setting of the 1990s is analysed first, subsequently complemented by an exploration of the fragmented and unstable institutional landscape, which was enabled by, and in turn reinforced, the general identity malaise in the country. Thus, the crisis was both on the level of fundamental value- and foreign policy orientation as well as on the level of institutions.

The domestic ideational setting

The belief system of the UDF

As Bulgarian experts of various political leanings confirm, despite elements of a genuine democratic-reformist zeal, the overall ideational and organisational character of the UDF points to the fact that the party could not promote a sound, substantive, well-thought out (as opposed to a formalistic, rhetorical and conformist behavioural) vision and practice of

the transformation of the country along the key dimensions of ideal-typical European-ness (Mihaylova, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Burudjieva, 2015; Dimitrova, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015, interviews). This was so for a number of reasons.

In particular, the UDF was not a consolidated, unitary organisation but comprised a multitude of parties and movements, ranging from monarchist to environmentalist, and some of which were descended from pre-communist times such as the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (Baeva, Kalinova, 2011:22; Dimitrov, 2000:3; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015, interview). The presence of the latter had by 1991 led to the marginalisation of the European integrationist discourse in favour of an overwhelming focus on nostalgic memories of an idealised Bulgarian democratic system that had existed between 1878 and 1944, where these parties had been central political players, deprived of such a role by the communists (Dimitrova, 2002:8-9). These memories began to be concretely embodied in revanchist policies (such as the hasty restitution of property) as well as in a single-minded fixation on anti-communism as a main form of political identification. This slogan aimed to discredit and negate the BSP and the communist heritage but without an accompanying future-oriented, substantive vision of what would happen after all things communist had been denounced (Abrasheva, 2015; Marcheua, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Alexieva, 2015, interviews).

The centralisation and establishment of a consolidated, unified party political structure initiated by Ivan Kostov's leadership (1994-2001) on the one hand introduced a much needed ideological and organisational coherence (of the UDF as a right-wing party) but on the other hand sidelined individuals (Gospodinova, 2004), some of whom represented the reformist engines behind the party, on account of their ideational incompatibility with and distance from the closed circle at the top of the party (as related in Nikolay Slatinski's direct experience with this and confirmed by observers) (Slatinski, 2015; Mihaylova, 2015;

Baeva, 2015, interviews). As a result, Petkov clarifies that from his personal meetings with Kostov he could conclude that the UDF of the early 1990s disappeared (in the sense of its animating spirit), as for Kostov the struggle for power meant that economic assets had to be controlled and for that to happen a unified, like-minded party structure had to be created to execute the process of economic accumulation (Petkov, 2015, interview). So the 'radical' (i.e., categorical, uncompromising but lacking in sound substantive ideational underpinnings) course towards economic reform based on accelerated privatisation resulted in the widespread perception (and reality) of the UDF government's (1997-2001) presiding over corruption on a similar scale to their BSP predecessors. Moreover, as Dawson observes, the conspicuous lack of intra-party democracy would warrant the claim that the BSP contained more senior personnel, who were democrats by internal conviction than the UDF (Dawson, 2014:87).

Overall, in an apt presentation of the generalised character of the 'Europeanised' Bulgarian reformer, Avramov argues that the absence of direct contacts with Western Europe before 1989 and hence socialisation in European ideas and political practices (unlike in the Polish case, where west-ward travel opportunities were more readily available, as was a developed democratic opposition to make use of these opportunities) gave rise to 'intuitive pragmatists' and 'superficial liberals'. They conceived of post-communist changes primarily as an antithesis of the old regime but without the substantive understanding of why this was so and what was needed to implement the changes (Avramov, 2007:280).

Thus, the conception of Europe within the UDF was embodied in an economically neoliberal, politically anti-communist set of ideological views, which failed to elaborate more fully on a number of other core aspects of liberal democracy (Dawson, 2014:82). More specifically, the liberalism of the UDF was rooted in economistic visions of the free market that never completely embraced the civic elements of Western liberal philosophy

and practice both in terms of encouraging the development of a participatory, politically educated civic society and with regard to the enunciation of an inclusive, multi-ethnic, civic form of nationalism (i.e., the party did not break convincingly with the exclusivist nationalist positions typical of the communist regime, as expressed, for instance, in the declared refusal to form a coalition government with the MRF as an ‘ethnic’ party in case of victory in the 1997 elections) (Dawson, 2014:82, 87-89). At the same time, as Minchev stresses, the UDF’s insistence on transposing the West European experience on Bulgaria was turned into an uncritical admiration for all things foreign, which lent an abstract, moralising, disciplining character to the Europeanisation effort, whereby all things local were flawed and backward. Yet, this approach structured the party political scene in such a way that positions extolling the virtues of national traditions began to be intertwined with anti-European standpoints (as in the rise of nationalist party ATAKA in the 2000s) (Minchev, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, 2015, interviews; Minchev, 2013:1-2).

In foreign policy terms, ‘radical’ anti-communist change meant maximally breaking away from Bulgaria’s former Soviet-centred international configuration in favour of integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, which, however, became a pronounced foreign policy trend after 1997. Up to that point, the nostalgic-revanchist focus on the past and the absence of well-thought out ideational standpoints not only side-lined a more forward-looking discourse on Europeanisation but also led to ambivalent stances on Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic integration. That is, the UDF denounced the principles of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘socialist internationalism’ as in practice leading to Bulgaria’s complete isolation from the West where borders represented a cordon sanitaire; called for the conduct of a moral foreign policy supporting democratisation around the world and stood for integration in Europe, but it nevertheless favoured a more CSCE/OSCE-centred European international system so that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be

dissolved (UDF electoral platform, 1990). And once the UDF settled on a course towards Bulgaria's membership in both the EU and NATO and the conduct of cooperative regional relations, the imitation of West European behaviour and the goal to prove that 'we are good pupils of the West' represented a lack of self-confidence and a conviction that the greatest evidence of Bulgaria's Europeanisation in the eyes of Western Europe and the US was in the form of unquestioning behavioural obedience (Avramov, 2007:316-317), the focus on which further hampered the process of internalisation of European values (Slatinski, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, interviews).

The belief system of the BSP

If the substance of Bulgaria's Europeanisation was affected by the nature of the ideational character and corresponding organisational features of the UDF, the speed of the process was further slowed down by the tortuous evolution of the BSP's party-political identity. It was only after 1997 that the socialists began to demonstrate fully-fledged acceptance of some of the key tenets of European-ness in the form of moving away from exclusivist nationalist stances, transforming the BSP from a 'communist' into a social democratic party of the West European type, strategically reorientating from the East (Russia) towards integration into the EU as well as NATO and multilateral, consensus-based international relations.

More specifically, up to 1997 the BSP supported Bulgaria's EC/EU membership but it was strongly sceptical of the country's possible NATO accession and sought to keep close ties with Russia and the rest of the post-Soviet states (Lukanov, May 1990; National Assembly Proceedings, 1995:1-2; Dimitrov, 2000:2-3; Katsikas, 2012:44-52). So like their Polish counterparts, the Bulgarian socialists were committed to building up links with the EC/EU, but unlike the SdRP/SLD, the BSP did not think that EU membership was intertwined with

NATO membership (Lukanov, May 1990; Dimitrov, 2000:2-3; Katsikas, 2012:47). All of these positions amounted to the pursuit of a ‘balanced’ and even neutral foreign policy, equidistant from West and East (Georgiev, 2011:49). Indeed, pro-NATO Bulgarian officials saw through these foreign policy formulations the BSP’s lingering Gorbachevian conception of the ‘common European home’ and affinity with post-Soviet Russia’s tendency to promote a pan-European, CSCE/OSCE- rather than NATO-based vision of security on the continent (Ratchev, 2015; Primatarova, 2015, interviews). According to Primatarova’s recollections of her involvement in the foreign policy debates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, up to 1997 BSP officials endowed the term ‘Euro-Atlantic’ with a meaning that encompassed the EC/EU and the CSCE/OSCE but not NATO as primary providers of security, which was a way of incorporating Russia into trans-Atlantic security arrangements. However, such an understanding of Euro-Atlanticism clashed with the Western conception of EU and NATO expansions as interlinked, parallel and reinforcing processes, with the Alliance representing a cornerstone of European security (Primatarova, 2015, interview).

It should be noted, however, that there existed reformist, liberalising tendencies in the BSP prior to and after 1989. As insiders to socialist circles relate, party reformers such as Andrey Lukanov, Ognyan Doinov, Grisha Filipov favoured the initiation of a social democratic political platform (Decree 56, 1989) along the German or Austrian model and preferred relations with the USSR and then Russia to be kept at a level that would not jeopardise Bulgaria’s entry into the EC/EU, also being ready to accept NATO accession as a forerunner of Sofia’s EU membership (Marcheva, 2015; Petkov, 2015, interviews). And this contrasted with the conservative-minded party members such as Alexander Lilov and Zhan Videnov, whose more ideologically rigid views made them sceptical about social democracy and aimed at the preservation of Bulgaria’s sovereignty through cooperation

with the EC/EU and the USSR/Russia in order to counterbalance US imperialism (Katsikas, 2012:48-51).

So it took the shock from the socialist government contribution to and failure to manage the 1996-1997 economic and financial crisis (engulfing the country into a spiral of hyperinflation, food shortages, bank bankruptcies) and the realisation that the Eastern vector in foreign policy was not a viable option (after relations with Russia had sunk to a low following the 1994-1997 BSP government's decline of Moscow's overbearing demand for control over the Bulgarian gas pipeline system) to delegitimise any lingering communist-inherited indoctrination against the free market and cooperation with the West (particularly NATO) (Katsikas, 2012:45-48; Spirova, 2008:10-11; Dimitrova, 2002:10-11).

Thus, Bulgarian experts of both left- and right-leaning persuasions confirm that the BSP renounced the communist principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dominance of state ownership, accepting neo-liberal economic trends (Abrasheva, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015, interviews). Moreover, the party toned down its nationalist stances and focus on state sovereignty in favour of European and SEE regional cooperation processes along standards of democracy and tolerance not least because the socialists could not provide more than rhetorical opposition to Western sanctions and military activities against Yugoslavia's regime with which the BSP shared political ties (given the normative and strategic pressure from the EU and NATO) (Vigenin, 2015; Burudjieva, 2015; Minchev, 2015, interviews). Over the course of the 1990s, the BSP gradually (and grudgingly) overcame its opposition to Bulgaria's NATO membership, which process culminated at the 44th Congress in 2000 when party leader Georgi Parvanov fully affirmed and persuaded the socialists to accept Sofia's course towards Alliance accession. This evolution was conditioned primarily for purposes of legitimisation. Once all alternative foreign policy directions such as 'equidistance' had proven unviable and the

1997-2001 UDF government had initiated the process of NATO integration so that support for Alliance membership began to be shared by two thirds of the Bulgarians by 2001 (Yordanova, Zhelev, 2002:38-44; Bedrov, 2014), the BSP had no other option but to accept NATO accession if it wanted to return to power as a forward-looking party that was not attempting to stop Bulgaria from the achievement of its Euro-Atlantic goals (Dimitrova, 2015; Abrasheva, 2015; Slavkova, 2015, interviews).

The achievement of domestic political consensus

Overall, the UDF's largely performative and opportunistic adherence to West European ideas and the BSP's hesitations about embracing a firm pro-Western direction meant that in the early to mid-1990s Sofia's Euro-Atlanticism lacked a sufficiently deeply-rooted and well-elaborated ideational foundation that could inform a consistent and determined pursuit of Europeanisation. This mirrored the historical trend of 'importing' European principles without the necessary reflexivity and cultural tradition to facilitate ideational internalisation. Hence as Bulgarian experts and policy-makers confirm, it was the catastrophic 1996-1997 economic and financial crisis that served as the overwhelming trigger and motivating factor for Bulgaria's Europeanisation, leading the BSP to reconsider its foreign policy positions and urging the UDF to finally abandon its previously amorphous ideational and organisational structure in favour of a more consistent discourse and policy for Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration (Dimitrova, 2002:13; Slavkova, 2015; Primatarova, 2015; Ralchev, 2015; Burudjieva, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, 2015; Dimitrov, 2015; Nikolova, 2015; Abrasheva, 2015; Minchev, 2015; Ratchev, 2015; Mihaylova, 2015; Lessenski, 2015; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015; Dimitrova, 2015; Marcheva, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Alexieva, 2015; Vigenin, 2015, interviews).

In particular, Ratchev observes that Sofia's consensually-based Euro-Atlantic foreign policy platform did not emerge out of Bulgaria's strongly desired, intentionally pre-planned ideational and strategic choice but was stimulated by the fear that there could be another crisis leading to the collapse of banks, hyperinflation and the drastic impoverishment of the population (Znepolski, 2015:51-59). Thus, EU and NATO membership began to be perceived as a panacea for domestic problems and the loss of capacity to manage them. And if by 1997 Leszek Balcerowicz had completed the shock therapy in Poland so that the Poles had a growing economy and a resource basis on which to build, Bulgaria was starting more or less from a resource-deficient political and economic scratch (Ratchev, 2015, interview).

The domestic institutional and party-political setting

The Bulgarian institutional, party-political environment in the 1990s was characterised by the acrimonious struggle for power between the BSP and the UDF as well as intra-party conflict and fragmentation, contributing to general political instability, fluid government configurations and decision-making incoherence that further confused Bulgaria's European partners about the country's foreign policy course (Burudjieva, 2015, interview).

For instance, the pro-Western diplomatic activity of the 1991-1992 UDF government was marked by poor coordination, whereby the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the President struggled for supremacy, often acting independently of each other. A point of divergence was related to Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov's overwhelming focus of Bulgarian foreign policy on the US (as an ideological counterbalance to the BSP's pro-Russian orientation), which was countered by President Zhelev through his signing of cooperation agreements with France in 1992 and with Russia in the same year (Dimitrov, 2000:4). Moreover in an extreme case of political manoeuvring, Prime Minister Lyuben

Berov (1992-1994) left the post of Foreign Minister vacant for almost half a year. This was so because Berov had to find a candidate that suited both the BSP and the MRF, on whose support his technocratic-branded government hinged (Engelbrekt, 1994:21).

This institutional liminality was more fundamental than in Poland. If the Poles' identity crisis was confined to the challenges of constructing a stable liberal democratic political-institutional landscape, whose foreign policy consequences were contained by the ideationally-bound consensus on European integration, in Bulgaria the crisis was reflected on the level of ideas, which enabled and was in turn reinforced by institutional deficiencies in confusing the country's external orientation (yet, the Bulgarian ideational-institutional predicament was not as deep as in Russia where the unstable organisational and party-political environment went hand in hand with the delegitimation of the process of Europeanisation). So it was only from 1998 onwards (when cross-party consensus on joining the Euro-Atlantic community had been achieved) that institutional structures were established for an administrative coordination of European integration that was not exclusively focused on the Foreign Ministry. Rather, coordination councils were created on the level of deputy ministers and ministers, thus uniting the effort at Europeanisation (Dimitrova, Toshkov, 2007:8-19).

Conclusions

The analysis of the domestic dimension of identification has demonstrated that Bulgaria's ambivalent Europeanisation was conditioned internally by the political elite's shallow affinity to and slower acceptance of European values, whereby the unstable institutional environment blended into the overall ideational crisis. It was only in 1997 that the economic crisis in the country served as a catalyst towards a more sustained consensus (albeit still informed by doubtful convictional adherence) on European-ness based on a

more consistent discursive embeddedness of regionally and internationally cooperative principles as well as membership in both the EU and NATO.

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Bulgarian discourse

The preceding sections of the chapter have focused on the separate examination of the effects that international and domestic developments had on Bulgaria's Europeanisation in the 1990s. This part of the chapter aims to bring these strands of analysis together in order to demonstrate that it is ultimately through the interaction of the external and internal dimension of foreign policy identity construction that Sofia's ambivalent Europeanisation can be fully grasped. So in what follows, the impact of such interaction on discursively expressed ideas is presented first, which is subsequently complemented by an exploration of concrete policies to establish congruence between ideas and actions.

International and domestic identification – reinforcement, complementarity, co-constitution

The hypothesised 'ambivalent' instance of Europeanisation is confirmed in the Bulgarian case. The West's more tentative commitment to Bulgaria's integration in the Euro-Atlantic space (as measured by weaker diplomatic and economic support than Poland was given) was reinforced, complemented and informed by Sofia's own uncertain ideational affinities with the West and difficulties in reaching a domestic political consensus about the country's external orientation. Yet, Western Europe's and Bulgaria's ambivalent identifications with each other were not too deep-seated to prevent an eventual integration but it took the shock of the 1996-1997 financial and economic crisis and the strategic reconsiderations following the Kosovo conflict for Self and Other to move towards closer cooperation. So as Bulgarian experts and decision-makers agree, Bulgaria underwent

ambivalent Europeanisation both because it gained Western European (and American) acceptance and achieved consensus to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic area more slowly and because once it was set on its pro-Western course, it Europeanised more superficially – i.e., on the basis of a general (albeit not always consistent) discursive compatibility and situational behavioural norm compliance, largely lacking, however, a deeply held internalisation of ideal-typical values and a corresponding sustained behavioural manifestation (with the latter being especially demonstrated in the next section) (Slavkova, 2015; Primatarova, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, 2015; Ratchev, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Nikolova, 2015; Vigenin, 2015, interviews).

More specifically, serious Western geopolitical and economic interest in Bulgaria was absent, shaped by the unwillingness and lack of readiness of Western Europe to offer security guarantees and integration prospects to CEE in general and to get entangled in the affairs of Balkan countries – assumed to be descending into age-old enmities with the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Bechev, 2006:18-19; Slavkova, 2015; Primatarova, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, 2015; Ratchev, 2015; Slatinski, 2015, interviews). Indeed, the uncertain Western engagement in the Balkans was feeding into Bulgarian disappointments and was not conducive to pushing forward domestic reforms and external reorientation on the basis of both recognition of cultural-historical belongingness and material incentives.

At the same time, however, ambiguous and non-committal Western attitudes and actions were further informed by Bulgaria's own similarly indecisive and shallow embrace of ideal-typical European-ness. The UDF's lack of political experience, opportunism and vociferous fixation on anti-communist rhetoric matched by the initial propensity to expect the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO as well as the BSP's preference for 'gradualist' economic change and strong attachment to the Eastern vector in foreign policy did not help convince Western Europe and the US of the desirability of

including Bulgaria in integration arrangements (Burudjieva, 2015, interview). Also, as Bulgarian experts concur, the insufficient progress on domestic economic reforms served especially importantly to confirm the EU in its decision not to accept Bulgaria as part of the first wave of CEE entrants (Slavkova, 2015; Primatarova, 2015; Minchev, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Mihaylova, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Alexieva, 2015; Vigenin, 2015, interviews). Domestic economic reforms proceeded slowly, in a piece-meal and often unthoughtful manner. The 1991-1992 UDF government's first economic reforms focused on the restitution of big city property and agricultural land, which led to the destruction of Bulgarian agriculture and the development of a property mafia due to the lack of clarity in or availability of pre-1944 records on ownership and as a result of the fact that agricultural land was divided in such small pieces that export competitiveness was made very difficult (Alexieva, 2015; Petkov, 2015, interviews; Petar Angelov, 2015; Tsanev, 2010:440). Moreover, privatisation took place slowly. In 1993, the output from the private sector still varied between 18% and 37%, while the Parliament had not passed crucial legislation on bankruptcy and the system of taxation (Engelbrekt, 1994:22).

Hence, in the early 1990s, the emerging rhetorical construction based on ideal-typical European-ness failed to become sufficiently substantiated in both ideational and behavioural (and even discursive) terms due to the interactive operation of the internal and external dimension of identification. Thus, on the one hand, Alexander Lilov (BSP) argued that Bulgaria had to take its rightful place in a uniting Europe as a modern, democratic and dynamically developing, civilised country. Europe's recognition of the freedom and fairness of the first democratic elections in 1990 was one proof of the success of this process (National Parliament Proceedings, 1990:3, 5). Moreover, Filip Dimitrov (UDF) linked the end of the totalitarian communist regime with the historic opportunity to finally build a 'normal' Bulgarian state, where democracy, individual liberty, domestic and

external stability and predictability would boost Bulgaria's image in international relations (National Parliament Proceedings, 1991:1-2). Ahmed Dogan (MRF) argued that Bulgaria's Europeanisation encompassed the democratisation of political life as an irreversible process, the transition to a free market economy and the country's integration in the major European institutions, whose fundamental focus on human rights protection should become a model for the equality of all Bulgarian citizen before the law, which would in turn guarantee social peace (National Parliament Proceedings, 1991:3).

However, this rhetoric was not consistently espoused and practiced. For instance, at the beginning of 1993 Bulgaria tried to demonstrate its commitment to international norms by adhering strictly to UN sanctions against Yugoslavia (by enforcing the embargo on Belgrade prohibiting the use of the Danube river for trade or transport) but Berov's government was hoping to get in return security guarantees from the EU and NATO (Engelbrekt, 1994:109). Yet, other than John Shalikashvili's (supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe) praise that Bulgaria had become a well-regarded member of the NACC, Sofia received no further assistance or security guarantees (Engelbrekt, 1994:109; Tashev, 2005:6). But such Western reluctance had also been informed by the fact that Berov did not take practical steps for increasing Sofia's NATO membership prospects, instead speaking of the formation of a 'Slavic arch' uniting Bulgaria, Russia, Serbia and possibly Greece in a common geopolitical orientation based on pan-Slavism and Orthodox Christianity (Engelbrekt, 1994:20; Slatinski, 2012; Sofiyanski, 1993; Dimitrov, 2015, interview).

Similarly, the socialists' vision of Bulgaria's Europeanisation was rather more akin to Gorbachev's 'common European home' than to a firm geopolitical anchoring in the West, accompanied by the application of the values embodied in the ideal-typical conception of European-ness. 'Equidistance' and 'neutrality' in Bulgarian foreign policy were therefore

aimed at the pursuit of balanced relationships with both East and West. Key BSP figures Alexander Lilov, Andrey Lukanov, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski claimed that their government's strategic goals included working towards membership in the EU as well as reviving economic and political relations with the CIS states so that the Bulgarians would be 'finally stepping on our two feet' (National Parliament Proceedings, 1990:5, 1995:1-2; Lukanov, May 1990, March 1992; Capital, 1995, April 1996; Georgieva, 1996:3).

Much greater clarity, decisiveness and cross-party consensus about Bulgaria's Europeanisation (that included observance of regionally and internationally cooperative politics as well as both EU and NATO membership) were achieved through the interaction and mutual reinforcement of the domestic shock experienced from the 1996-1997 financial and economic crisis coupled with the change in Western perceptions about the strategic importance of Bulgaria undergone during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. These two crises served as the complementary internal and external catalysts for Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result, after 1997 the political elite began to enunciate and uphold the achieved consensus. For instance, UDF leader Kostov declared that Bulgaria's salvation lay in the shared national agreement on the country's developmental direction; BSP leader Parvanov affirmed the fundamental consensus that existed about the need for reforms and a Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation (National Parliament Proceedings, 1997:3-6, 11; Minchev, Ratchev, Lessenski, 2002:11).

Foreign Minister Mihaylova argued that the Bulgarian foreign policy agenda was conditioned on the one hand by the unprecedented changes taking place in the international system since 1989 leading to the erosion of dividing lines on the European continent and on the other hand, by the irreversible domestic political and economic changes in Bulgaria, whose successful completion in turn depended on the country's 'civilised' return to the

Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations. She also maintained that Bulgaria was proving its fitness to become an EU and NATO member through its regional policy promoting European patterns of behaviour (such as good-neighbourliness and peaceful cooperation) among the Balkan states, whose incorporation into the European organisations could guarantee the avoidance of conflicts and foster democratic reforms (Mihaylova, 1999).

President Stoyanov expressed his firm conviction that NATO enlargement should be understood above all as a cause, whereby the West had the historic opportunity to make the whole Euro-Atlantic area stable and democratic, complemented by Bulgaria's adherence to the principles of the Alliance such as regional cooperation (Minchev, Ratchev, Lessenski, 2002:13; Stanev, 1998:1).

Yet, it must be noted that even though after 1997 Bulgaria and the West both settled on the course towards Sofia's Euro-Atlantic integration, the Bulgarian case could nevertheless still be characterised as ambivalently Europeanised, as expressed in the situational behavioural and rhetorical compliance with European norms and principles, which was not accompanied by a deep-seated internalisation that would otherwise entail a consistent and sustained application of these norms and principles externally as well as internally (Slatinski, 2015; Arndt, 2015, interviews).

Indeed, Bulgarian experts express the concern that the path-dependent logic of the way in which Europeanisation was initiated in the 1990s made it hard to take up the debate about the quality of the application of European principles (Lessenski, 2015; Dimitrova, 2015; Marcheua, 2015; Shopov, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Alexieva, 2015, interviews). More concretely, because of the dominance of the former communist networks, the inexperience and opportunism of the reformers (who only focused on breaking from the past rather than

gaining an in-depth understanding of the various facets of European-ness) and the fact that the EU provided a general institutional blueprint oblivious to domestic habits and traditions, the political elite depoliticised Europeanisation as a process of implementing European sectoral policies and legislation, while concentrating on deriving personal profit and ill-gotten gains. Hence, no significant steps were taken for the practical substantiation of the rhetorically espoused European values, which would have entailed principled discussions about Bulgaria's meaningful contribution to the EU and NATO, as opposed to the achievement of formalised membership, and about what a long-term strategy of a regionally cooperative policy would look like. And once the European Commission affirmed that the Copenhagen political conditions for joining the Union had been fulfilled (primarily due to the modification of national legislation along Union regulations), all domestic criticism about the substance of the fulfilment of the conditions could be brushed aside (Shopov, 2015; Shikova, 2015, interviews).

Externally-driven events and processes mediated by the domestic dimension of identification

Apart from the above-analysed general mode of interaction between Self and Other, which reinforce and complement each other in the process of identity construction, the current and next sub-section further demonstrate more specifically that even very impactful external or internal events are mediated, respectively, by a domestic or international lens.

Thus, despite the executive's generally compliant foreign policy behaviour (irrespective of political affiliation), external developments were perceived differently on the internal political scene, which demonstrated that there was not a uniform and substantive ideational convergence on European values. An example is linked to the reception of the PfP by the various political actors in Bulgaria. The fact that the Programme did not involve a

commitment to membership and a clear date for accession was not greeted with a general cross-party disappointment as in Poland, but with ‘relief’, especially on the part of the socialists and the technocratic but BSP-supported Berov government. As Ratchev recalls, despite the presence of military and political officials (like himself), who expressed disappointment with the limited scope of the PfP, but nevertheless wished Bulgaria to avail itself of the opportunities in the Programme to modernise its army and develop security cooperation with the West, the government and the BSP were satisfied with the PfP since it did not involve membership and nor did it require radical reforms in the form of lustration, dismissal of generals or a firmer orientation away from Russia to NATO (Ratchev, 2015, interview; Ratchev, 2014:6-7).

Domestically-driven events and processes and their influence on the Other’s perceptions

Apart from the domestic mediation of international events, strongly impactful internal developments are not simply confined to the boundaries of the state but can have wider ramifications by further informing pre-existing external views and stereotypes.

The slow pace of economic reforms, the character of the political actors and the absence of a consensus on a pro-Western foreign policy until 1997 exerted a negative influence on West European and American perceptions of Bulgaria by strengthening historically-shaped views of the country and the Balkan region it belongs to. In this way, the EU’s and NATO’s much more ambiguous and only gradually developing commitment to the Europeanisation of Bulgaria was conditioned by both pre-existing stereotypes as well as their confirmation on the basis of Sofia’s lagging reform impetus. For instance, an overview of the European and American press in the mid-1990s shows the growing Western frustration with Bulgaria’s domestic political and economic condition. *The Economist*, *the Independent*, *the Journal of Commerce (New York)* and *the New York*

Times argued that unlike the rest of the CEE states, which were becoming prospering countries, Bulgaria was getting poorer and less economically and politically free, given the extensive government intervention in the economy, the slow pace of privatisation, the high levels of corruption and the low quality of the rule of law (Capital, November 1996).

Similarly, unflattering impressions of the Bulgarian political scene were shared by successive German ambassadors to Bulgaria in the 1990s, who noted both the historically weaker attachment of the country to the West as well as the inexperience, opportunism and lack of expertise of the post-1989 reformist politicians (Lewalter, 2009:48, 54; Schrameyer, 2009:80; Steffler, 2009:105).

Moreover, as regards NATO, it was not simply Western stereotypes and reluctance to provide a membership perspective to Bulgaria that conditioned the slow pace of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration but also Bulgarian politicians' own actions, which for a significant period of time contributed little to persuading Alliance members of Sofia's own willingness to become a reliable and fully-fledged partner. In a notable article terming the 1989-1997 period in Bulgaria-NATO relations as seven lost years, Jeffrey Simon sounded a warning to the country that while the US would stress that NATO was an open organisation welcoming Bulgaria, the Bulgarians had to understand that membership would only come after consistent policies in favour of integration had become evident. And Sofia hadn't done much in that respect until 1997. Political consensus on Alliance accession was lacking, sustained military reforms had not been initiated, little progress had been achieved in terms of interoperability with NATO, Sofia had not been active in peace-keeping missions (it only began to participate in the IFOR/SFOR mission in 1997 – a year after Poland had joined in) (Simon, 1998:2, 7-8). Indeed, the Bulgarian press acknowledged that then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not mention Bulgaria as a prospective NATO candidate country during his 1996 visit to the Czech

Republic because Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski had chosen to maintain ‘silence’ on Bulgaria’s policy line towards the Alliance (Tosheva, 1996:1).

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Bulgarian foreign policy

In order to establish congruence between identities, rhetoric and concrete policies, the current section presents in a more chronologically focused way the actions that the Bulgarian political elite took over the 1990s. ‘Ambivalent’ Europeanisation framed the tenor of Bulgarian foreign policy in the direction of situational behavioural normative adaptation to European values along the key dimensions of support for a rules-based international order, cooperative regional relations and institutionalised cooperation, whereby greatest alignment was (imitatively) performed when principles-based action was expected by the West and when an internally enunciated pro-Western ideational position needed to be proven behaviourally. Otherwise, the character of foreign policy lurched between civilizational orientations and value-outlooks, given that normative ambiguity prevented a fully-fledged and sustained actualisation of ideal-typical European-ness as well as a more determined pursuit of shared belongingness with the Other.

More specifically, it is demonstrated that the (delayed) achievement of a domestic political consensus was indeed reflected in the greater behavioural consistency with which the 1997-2001 UDF government approached the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration – and as contrasted with the much more ambiguous and inconstant identity positions and policies of the previous governments. Yet, as further clarified in the next sub-section, Bulgaria’s underlying civilizational ambivalence (which only received its pro-Western push due to domestic economic and external strategic catalysts) meant that even the achieved consensus exhibited situational behavioural normative conformance rather than consistent principled internationalisation and sustained practical pursuit.

The first government after the 1989 collapse of the communist regime was formed by the BSP with Andrey Lukanov as Prime Minister (1990). The interaction of the absence of a fully-developed EC and NATO vision about the strategies they would adopt towards the Balkans coupled with the BSP's ideological closeness to a Gorbachevian understanding of the 'common European home', meant that Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration remained a distant and less than actively followed possibility. Although the socialists supported Bulgaria's economic integration with the EC (hence signing the Trade and commercial and economic cooperation agreement with the Community in 1990), they were committed to maintaining close ties with the USSR/Russia, did not view the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a valuable security option and, once this did take place, the government was at a loss about how to produce an alternative security policy. So no serious steps were taken for further integration with the EC and NATO (Tashev, 2005:3-4; Dimitrov, 2000:3; Lukanov, May 1990, March 1992).

The first UDF government (1991-1992) with Filip Dimitrov as Prime Minister engaged in intensive diplomatic activity to compensate for Bulgaria's lag behind the CE states in the process of European integration by securing Bulgarian entry into the Council of Europe in 1992 and negotiating the Association Agreement with the EC in 1992 (Dimitrov, 2000:4).

Additionally, the positive signals coming from the EU about Bulgaria's gradual inclusion in the integration process had a crucial impact on the country's external behaviour, which aimed to conform to Brussels norms and expectations – especially in terms of constructing good-neighbourly, peaceful regional relations in SEE and placing an emphasis on a civic form of nationalism. For example, bilateral ties with Turkey began to continually improve after 1989 as a result of the Bulgarian authorities' decision to ensure the political representation of the Turkish minority by granting the MRF the right to participate in elections (Resolution No 4, 1992; Markov, 2015; Hristov, 2014). This step positively

advanced Bulgaria's minority policies, which led to a rapprochement with Turkey and the conclusion of the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, Cooperation and Security between the two states (1992). The Treaty removed impediments to the establishment of contractual relations between the EC and Bulgaria and as a result Sofia signed the Europe Agreement in 1994 (Bechev, 2009:7).

Moreover, the government's strongly US-focused external orientation bore results in that Washington granted Sofia MFN status and chose to engage the country on issues of human rights and the dismantling of Soviet made SS-20 missiles, rather than regard those issues as obstacles to improved relations (Clyatt, 1993:33, 40, 53). Yet, the US stopped short of providing Bulgaria with security guarantees, which was also reciprocated by the UDF government, as it did not seek NATO membership. Indeed, many of the constituent parties of the Union opposed the idea of Bulgaria's NATO accession – not least because of the expectation that both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance had to be dissolved (Passy, 2015; UDF electoral platform, 1990).

After the UDF government failed to win the confidence vote it had itself initiated at the end of 1992, a technocratic (but politically supported by the BSP and the MRF) cabinet with Lyuben Berov as Prime Minister (1992-1994) was appointed by the Parliament. Consistent with the interaction of the West's more extensive engagement with Central European states, while the Balkan region was being relegated to conflict-resolution efforts, and the BSP-supported government's unwillingness to complete a firm geopolitical orientation to NATO, few decisive steps were taken with regard to Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, in 1993 Sofia and Moscow signed an accord on cooperation between their defence ministries (Engelbrekt, 1994:46). The government did join the PfP in 1994 but did not sanction officially the military doctrine that had been commissioned by former Defence Minister Dimitar Ludzhev (1991-1992) and prepared by officers at the

General Staff of the army (Engelbrekt, 1994:48). As an insider to the process, Ratchev explains that the security concept aimed at a departure from previous foreign policy and military strategies by prescribing active participation in all European integration processes, deepening of cooperation with NATO and the pursuit of relations of good-neighbourliness with other Balkan states (Ratchev, interview, 2015; Ratchev, 2014:6-7).

During the 1995-1997 BSP government with Zhan Videnov as Prime Minister, serious Western doubts about the reformist, pro-European and pro-American credentials of the socialists matched by the BSP's own ideational predisposition for close cooperation with Russia as well as the EU (rather than NATO) amounted to an uncertain and slowly moving process of Europeanisation. The government attempted to maintain an external course of 'neutrality' and 'equidistance', which in practice led to self-isolation (Ratchev, 2015, interview; Georgiev, 2011:49). Bulgaria's European integration assumed a greater priority in foreign policy so that in 1995 Sofia's official application for EU membership was submitted. However, despite the symbolic gesture of submitting the application, the socialists were slow in establishing the institutional mechanisms for coordinating work on EU accession and did not advance the process of transposing Union legislation in domestic politics (Dimitrov, 2000:4; Capital, 1995, April 1996). NATO membership was not a priority but the government did not show open opposition to the Alliance, conscious of the discrediting international effects this would have, and preferring to focus on the exchange of views through the Intensified Dialogue with NATO without taking practical steps towards deeper cooperation (Bonchev, 2002:9; Tosheva, 1995, 1996; Ratchev, 2015, interview).

Following the domestic political consensus that was being forged after 1997 and the EU's and NATO's greater commitment to Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic integration especially after the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the 1997-2001 UDF government with Ivan Kostov as Prime

Minister introduced a greater certainty and determination in the pursuit of Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic orientation. As far as European integration was concerned, in 1998 the government adopted a comprehensive strategy for Bulgaria's accession to the Union, an action programme for the implementation of the strategy and a targeted programme for the transposition of the *acquis* (Dimitrov, 2000:5). In 1999, the Helsinki European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Bulgaria, recognising the government's Europeanisation efforts (Dimitrov, 2000:5).

Significant steps were also taken in relation to Bulgaria's NATO membership. In consonance with President Petar Stoyanov's categorically stated position in favour of Bulgaria's NATO membership at a January 1997 NACC meeting, Kostov continued this policy through the Declaration on National Accord (1997), which stated that NATO membership was a Bulgarian foreign policy priority (Bonchev, 2002:10-11). Yet, the crucial catalyst that sped up Sofia's Euro-Atlantic prospects was the government's policy during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. As tensions intensified, NATO requested unrestricted access to and transit of aircraft through Bulgaria's airspace, which was granted by the government in the April 1999 Agreement between Bulgaria and NATO. Conversely, Sofia turned down Russia's requests for an air corridor to transfer Russian troops as part of Moscow's plans to create its own zone of responsibility in Kosovo (vn.government.bg, Bonchev, 2002:12-16). Henceforth, the government's position on the Kosovo conflict was rewarded with a Membership Action Plan, adopted at the NATO Washington summit in 1999.

Moreover, just as in Bulgaria's relations with Turkey, where historically-conditioned negative attitudes prone to consigning Turkey to the category of an 'eternal' enemy and an exclusivist nationalism posing a danger to the equal treatment of the Turkish minority could derail the process of the Europeanisation towards civic nationalism and regional

cooperation, so too in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, the overwhelming belief that Macedonia is an inseparable part of the blood-bound national community had to be transcended if Sofia was to successfully Europeanise its regional policy. Although Bulgaria became the first country to recognise Macedonia (or FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 1991, the Bulgarian authorities were quick to clarify that the recognition of a Macedonian state did not imply the recognition of a separate Macedonian nation with its own language and identity. The ensuing diplomatic stalemate was overcome through the intervention of the EU and the US, which led to a common declaration upheld by Bulgaria's Prime Minister Ivan Kostov and FYROM's Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski in 1999. It stated that the two countries recognised the official language of the other as the language stipulated by the constitutions of the two states. This in effect meant that Bulgaria implicitly recognised the Macedonian language (Katsikas, 2010:139-140, Bechev, 2009:8). Indeed, receiving rewards for progress in the process of Europeanisation of external behaviour towards good-neighbourliness (i.e., receiving an invitation to begin accession talks) contributed to positive self-enhancement and prompted a rhetorical replacement of the conflict-inducing interpretation of Bulgarian-Macedonian 'brotherhood' with 'friendship' and 'amity' (Slavkova, 2015; Ralchev, 2015; Minchev, 2015, interviews; Nancheva, 2012:188, 215, 228-232).

Nevertheless, beyond rhetorical and behavioural self-inflation shaped by the desire to conform to the EU's and US's expectations, parliamentary debates and statements revealed that the deeply rooted views of Macedonia's place in Bulgarian nationhood that had led to the dispute did not disappear (Nancheva, 2012:235). This was visible both on the right-wing and left-wing end of the political spectrum. Krasimir Karakachanov – leader of nationalist VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation), reminded that signing a joint declaration with Macedonia in both languages did not amount to a

Bulgarian recognition of a separate Macedonian language. He further argued that the recognition of a 'nation' or 'language' was not up for a political debate and interpretation – they either existed or they did not as a matter of fact, which implied an essentialist denial of a separate Macedonian identity (Nancheva, 2012:235-236). Also, the socialists let it be known that the solution of the language dispute represented a 'grave compromise' with Bulgarian national interests and identity (Nancheva, 2012:237).

Finally, another illustration of situational behavioural normative compliance is provided by the fact that although the 1997-2001 UDF government legitimised itself on the basis of a pro-Western discourse, when there was much less West European and American vigilance, Kostov's government behaved more ambiguously (Ralchev, 2015:5). For example, despite the staunch rhetorical promotion of European standards of transparency and the rule of law coupled with opposition to a geopolitical orientation towards Russia, the UDF sold strategic assets of Bulgaria's economy to Russian companies amid charges of corruption – in line with the party's shallow attachment to European-ness. A case in point was the privatisation of oil refinery Neftochim Burgas to Lukoil in 1999 so that up to this day Lukoil-Neftochim represents one of the most profitable businesses in the country and largest contributors to the Bulgarian state budget among privately owned firms (Ralchev, 2015:5; Capital, 2017).

Alternative explanations

The final question that will be considered with regard to the ambivalent Europeanisation of Bulgarian external relations (especially after 1997) is whether there ever existed alternatives to that course of action. Indeed, until 1997 it was believed (especially by BSP politicians and their supporters in society) that there could be alternative foreign policy options for Sofia. Other than the pro-Western orientation, the transformation of Bulgaria

into a 'neutral' bridge between East and West received significant approval among (left-leaning) politicians and intellectuals as it was based on the ideational disposition to cooperate closely with Russia and Western Europe (but without participating in Western military structures that could be directed against Moscow) as well as on the mentality of subordination to Russia in terms of perceptions and political-economic dependencies (i.e., many political figures had been bound to the Soviet Union by dependencies originating from the state security apparatus, which after 1989 were transformed into business relations) (Georgiev, 2011:49; Hristo Georgiev, 2015; Ralchev, 2015, interviews).

Yet, the hypothetical model of neutrality proved hardly feasible both for international and domestic reasons. The loss of the Soviet markets, the economic collapse and strategic decline of post-Soviet Russia, Bulgaria's own devastating economic crisis, lack of strong army and external patron or international arrangements to guarantee Sofia's neutrality made expectations about the country's bridge-building role between East and West strategically and economically unviable (Ralchev, 2015; Baeva, 2015, interviews; Metodiev, 2017). Thus, as Bulgarian experts concur, there were thought to be alternatives to Euro-Atlantic integration but they were never really materially sustainable (Ralchev, 2015; Hristo Georgiev, 2015; Burudjieva, 2015; Dimitrov, 2015; Abrasheva, 2015; Minchev, 2015; Baeva, 2015, interviews).

Overall therefore, the fact that it took the Bulgarians an economic shock as well as an extremely unfavourable regional and international environment to come to the realisation that EU and NATO membership were the only possible and viable foreign policy options for the country speaks to the argument that despite the push for Europeanisation after 1997 congruent with the pro-Western, anti-communist ideational position, the determinacy of the evolved identity remained in question given the underlying civilizational ambivalence of Bulgaria that prevented a single-minded orientation to the West (or indeed to the East).

And this stood in contrast to Poland, where the geopolitical availability of one foreign policy option was reinforced by a genuine, culturally-historically grounded belief in that 'option'.

Chapter 5 The Europeanisation of Russian foreign policy, 1991-2000

Application of the conceptual and theoretical framework to the Russian case

Before proceeding with the empirical analysis of Moscow's foreign policy, the conceptual and theoretical assumptions laid out in Chapter 1 and 2 are defined and operationalised in the Russian case.

Characteristics of the Self-Other relationship in Russia

As elaborated in Chapter 2, there are general aspects of the Self-Other relationship, which warrant an interactive account of identity construction, continuity and change, and which aspects the current sub-section specifies more concretely with respect to Russian identity.

As far as the internal environment is concerned, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly in the 1990s, Russia found itself in a liminal identity crisis. This crisis was occasioned both by the challenging post-communist political, economic and social 'mega-transformation' as well by Russia's historically continuous liminal geographical, geopolitical and ideational situation between East and West (MacFarlane, 1993; Jahn, 2009; Puhle, 2009; Sakwa, 2011). In particular, the end of the USSR meant an abrupt decline in Russia's great-power status in European and world affairs, reviving the Westerniser-Slavophile debate about Russia's European-ness in the search for a redefined international-civilizational place and introducing a nation-building challenge after the collapse of the multi-national Soviet 'empire'. Indeed, Russian intellectuals maintain that identity concerns became crucial during the post-1991 period of extreme flux and that visions of Russian identity were heavily contested – there was no political-elite and societal consensus on what is 'Russia', how it should relate to Europe or to its post-Soviet neighbours (Zevelev, 2014; Trenin, 2014; Medvedev, 2014, interviews).

In this situation of identity crisis, the need for external models as well as comparisons and heightened attention to the behaviour and attitudes of the West – Russia's most significant Other (historically encompassing first Western Europe and then also the US), became even more important. The very beginnings of Russian national consciousness in the 17th and 18th century were linked to the relationship with Western Europe (Greenfeld, 1992:189-275). More specifically, Peter the Great's sweeping onslaught on pre-modern customs in the direction of adopting European cultural, educational, literary, social and economic styles (while instituting autocratic absolutism) gave birth to the torn Russia of the last three centuries – divided between Slavophiles and Westernisers, the legacy of whose vigorous early 19th century debate lives on (Legvold, 2007:83). These intellectual currents grappled with the merits and desirability of introducing the Western European model to Russia. The Slavophiles viewed the West as morally corrupt and rejected Western political, economic and societal trends, including materialism, rationalism, constitutional monarchy, the nation-state. Instead, for the Slavophiles Russia's future lay in a return to nativist principles – of the *sobornost* (organic togetherness) of the peasant commune, bound together by the Orthodox Christian faith and an autocratic government (suited to harmoniously established social relationships) (McDaniel, 1996:17; Pipes, 1995:54-55). The Westernisers, however, rejected autocracy and the claim that Russia was unique, putting strong emphasis on the importance of questions of freedom. They argued that in order for the Russians to prosper, they had to embrace the historical Western path, which served as the model for social, political and economic modernisation, and draw on their own indigenous, democratic traditions (such as *zemskie sobory* and *zemstvo* – or popular councils – that consisted of representatives of the gentry, bourgeoisie and even peasantry to consult the tsar on matters of domestic and foreign policy) (Petro, 1995:30-33, 42; McDaniel, 1996:18).

Therefore, Western Europe is viewed both as a utopical model to be emulated and as a threat to national uniqueness (Gudkov, 2014; Utkin, 2014, interviews). Similar dualistic considerations apply to the US as the other face of the West (particularly since its rise to great powerhood and the beginning of the Cold War confrontation), but with a special reference to issues of status and prestige. That is, American pre-eminence in international affairs became a benchmark against which to measure Russia's (or formerly the Soviet Union's) own power and military might, giving rise to admiration but also resentment as Russian status is perceived to be inferior.

Following from the above is an important characteristic of the Other – in terms of economic, technological progress and international political weight the West has been superior to Russia. Both before and during the post-communist, 1990s period, Russia has been in a weaker power-position (yet resurgent economically and internationally during Putin's second and third presidencies until 2014), which has put it in the role of 'norm-taker' rather than 'norm-maker'. The Russia-Europe relationship has thus been mostly asymmetrical, with the values of the European powers being projected on Moscow (Haukkala, 2008:35-36; Neumann, 1995). Hence, one can expect Russia's sensitivities to Western normative standpoints to be enhanced given the West's greater capabilities that can affect both the identity and power positions of the Russian Self, which strives for affirmation by its significant and powerful Other.

Moreover, added to this are external events which were critical for the conceptualisation of Russian identity in the post-Cold War period. In the early 1990s and the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the way the 'victorious' side – the West, behaved towards Russia could shape both its internal development as well as integration in the Western-centric international system. EU and NATO enlargement were particularly consequential in redefining the civilizational, security and economic borders of the

European continent and were therefore of crucial significance to the configuration of Russia's place in Europe.

'Layers' of identity

As has been posited in Chapter 2, identity has a multi-layered character. This proposition is substantiated in the Russian case, demonstrating the varieties of identities that can coexist within the polity.

With regard to the layer of 'national identity', a vital distinction which needs to be taken into account is that between *rossiyane* and *russkie*, with the former referring to all 'Russians' as a civic identity that includes both ethnic Russian and non-ethnic Russian citizens of the Russian Federation, and the latter only referring to ethnic Russians.

Closely linked to the above distinctions are the concepts of *narod* and *natsiya* (conveying different conceptualisations of the English term 'nation'). *Narod* can be generally taken to mean a big community, comprised of many nationalities, whereas *natsiya* is akin to the Western concept of the 'nation(-state)' and has been problematic and less than widely applied in the Russian context for at least two reasons. First, Miller explains that problems with *natsiya* in the Russian context began with the French Revolution when the 'nation-state' obtained a distinctly political connotation, relating the nation to certain political arrangements – rights, freedoms, equality guaranteed by the constitution of a sovereign political unit. Since then the concept of *natsiya* has been avoided in Russian politics lest it incited national political emancipation from the oppression of the rulers. Instead, the triad of 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality' posited *narodnost* (stripped of its political connotations) as a building block of the empire (Miller, 2008:3-5). Second, *natsiya* has been perceived as entailing correspondence with a given 'ethnos', which would mean the building of a nation-state that encompasses the territories inhabited by ethnic Russians.

This, however, would pose serious challenges to the multi-ethnic composition of the Russian state (Zevelev, 2009:6).

The above discussion of *russkie*, *rossiyane*, *narod*, *natsiya* points to the coexistence of two competing elements in Russian identity – the ethnic and the supra-ethnic/supra-national. The ethnic component – although gathering strength especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has not had a decisive impact on political arrangements and foreign policy. This trend is partly underwritten by the lack of a consolidated national consciousness (*natsionalnoe samosoznanie*), determined by indistinct boundaries between the empire and the Russian ethnic core that characterised both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (Zevelev, 2009:2). So the supra-ethnic/national element of identity has played a very important role in Russian history and has flown into different imperial visions – be it a Slavophile-Orthodox, Eurasian or Soviet empire (Zevelev, 2009:7). These imperial visions differed from the modern Western idea of ‘political morality’ – understood as universal rights and freedoms, civic societal norms and political accountability of the rulers to the ruled. In Russia’s case, the ‘common imperial good’ was defined in terms of ‘great-poweriness’, autocracy and military prowess (Gudkov, 2014:4, 6).

Furthermore, the Westerniser-Slavophile opposition has been at the heart of debates about Russian national-civilizational identity. Importantly, the main issue in the opposition between 19th century Westernisers and Slavophiles as well as their contemporary counterparts is the proper relationship and cultural compatibility between Russia and Europe, rather than discussions about the internal composition of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or today’s Russia (linked to relations and territorial borders between the ethnic-Russians and the non-Russians) (Zevelev, 2009:4).

'Identity' groups on the level of the political-intellectual elite

To categorise political figures and public intellectuals according to their views on Russian identity (descended and borrowing as these views are from the Westerniser-Slavophile debate of the 19th and early 20th century), the thesis follows, but also qualifies, a classification elaborated in broadly similar terms by MacFarlane (1993), Allison, Light, White (2006), Light (2003), Jackson (2003), Prizel (1998), which distinguishes between three groups. The first group is that of the Liberal Westernisers (*zapadniki*), who argue that Russia's identity should be defined as a civic state within the boundaries of the Russian Federation, further informed by the goals of liberal democracy, market reforms and the prioritisation of integration with the West. The Liberal Westernisers are opposed to the nationalist search for a unique Russian 'national idea' that can justify the recreation of an empire in the formerly controlled CIS area. So the Liberal Westernisers relegate relations with the CIS countries to a secondary position vis-à-vis Europe and America (Jackson, 2003:34). Some of the representatives of this group have included Boris Yeltsin, Andrey Kozyrev, Egor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, Alexey Navalny; the Yabloko party, the People's Freedom Party (PARNAS), the Progress Party.

At the other extreme of the identity debate are the Fundamentalist Nationalists (or the conservatives – *pochvenniki*), who understand Russia as a 'Eurasian' power. Eurasianism emphasises Russia's geopolitical and cultural distinctiveness from both the Western and Asian worlds and encompasses authoritarian attitudes of the general population and the leaders, strong state, collectivist values, the Orthodox religion. Correspondingly, the principal foreign policy proposals of the Fundamentalist Nationalists are not centred on cooperative relations with Europe and America. Instead, they want to recreate a Russian empire in Eurasia (i.e., the post-Soviet space), oppose US hegemony and the liberal international order as well as cooperate with the 'East' (China and India) (Jackson,

2003:35). Some of the representatives of this identity stance have been Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Gennadiy Zyuganov, Alexander Prokhanov, Sergey Kurginyan, Alexander Dugin; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), the Communist Party (KPRF).

The third position in the identity debate is espoused by the Pragmatic Nationalists (or the centrists/statists – *gosudarstvenniki/derzhavniki*). They agree with the Fundamentalist Nationalists that the country's former status as a great power should be restored and that Russia possesses elements of a unique, Eurasian identity. The Pragmatic Nationalists also accept the Liberal Westerniser goal of democratisation and cooperation with the West, but wish the transitional process to take Russia's conditions (i.e., collectivist values) into account. The Pragmatic Nationalists hence advocate a unique but non-expansionist foreign policy in the CIS, which would allow Russia to regain its status as a great power without the recreation of empire since cooperation with Europe and America is also considered important (Jackson, 2003:36). Thus, in the Pragmatic Nationalist view, Russia should be a European – but also a great global, power that accepts the importance of democracy, cooperation and integration but nevertheless also places and emphasis on sovereignty, the establishment of a regional sphere of influence and the conduct of vigorously competitive international relations that does not shy away from the aggressive deployment of hard power. Prominent representatives of this group have included Evgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin (until his third term of office when the President's positions evolved closer to the Fundamentalist Nationalists); the United Russia party, A Just Russia (SR).

However, there are some qualifications that have to be made regarding this classification. As is the case with social scientific typologies, there is much more variation than a neat categorisation tends to show. In terms of the category of the Liberal Westernisers, one should note the existence of the sub-category of the 'moderate liberals' or 'democratic pragmatists', who stand for a democratic but strong state and cooperation with the West

based on an equal partnership rather than outright agreement with everything that the West says or does. Some of the representatives of this sub-group have included Vladimir Lukin, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Alexey Arbatov, Sergey Rogov, Nikolay Smelev (Arbatova, 2005:28, Arbatov, 1993:7). Moreover, a key distinction in the Fundamentalist Nationalist group is that between the neo-imperialists and the ethno-nationalists. The neo-imperialists (such as Alexander Dugin) assert that Russia is a multi-ethnic great power that has to, if not restore the state within the previous borders of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire, at least maintain a zone of informal imperial influence. The ethno-nationalists' views (of such figures as Dmitry Rogozin) are based on the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who defined the nation along ethnic lines and envisaged the unification of all ethnic Russians and most eastern Slavs from Ukraine, Belarus and northern Kazakhstan under one political unit (Zevelev, 2014, interview; Zevelev, 2014).

Overall, the classification of political-intellectual groupings facilitates the comparison with the ideal-typical model of European-ness, as it shows that Russia's foreign policy would follow the course of Europeanisation given a predominance of the views of the Liberal Westernisers (whereby, however, the absence of deep-seated normative substantiation and compatible interpretation of ideal-typical values determines the thin quality of Europeanisation, as argued in the empirical examinations in the chapter); it would partly follow this course, while also asserting its value-based and geopolitical distinctiveness in the international arena under the influence of the Pragmatic Nationalists; and it would follow a course opposite to Europeanisation given the predominance of the views of the Fundamentalist Nationalists. But Russian external relations can also be influenced by a combination of these views. For instance, foreign policy can be an expression of the Liberal Westernising vision tending towards the Pragmatic Nationalist spectrum (as in the

second half of the 1990s) or of Pragmatic Nationalism borrowing elements from Fundamentalist Nationalism (as in the period since 2014).

The Europeanisation of Russian foreign policy, 1991-2000 – the empirical record

The empirical analysis focuses on the period of the 1990s when the Russian political scene was characterised by specific challenges related to the virulent debates about the country's foreign policy identity (despite the overall pro-European vector) and to the political-economic chaos, as the West was also trying to work out its stance on Russia's belongingness to the post-Cold War expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community (neither of which challenges was resolved since by the end of the decade Russia and the West had become increasingly mutually disappointed). In comparison, in the 2000s and 2010s, Vladimir Putin's first two terms in office as President (as well as Dmitry Medvedev's Presidency) generally continued the goal of situating Moscow in the European order on the basis of the belief that as an essential element of European civilization Russia had to cooperate with the West, while asserting its cultural and geopolitical distinctiveness. But as Putin reconstituted state authority, the identity crisis subsided (not least due to the President's grip on the identity discourse) and as Europe and America drifted further away from recognising Russia's European credentials, since 2011/2012 the Fundamentalist Nationalist strand of identification received and added impetus so that the Kremlin put forward its alternative interpretation of European-ness, heavily contesting the ideal-typical model (further elaborated in Chapter 6, pp. 297-298) (Busygina, 2014; Melville, 2014; Simon, 2014; Gudkov, 2014; Zevelev, 2014; Trenin, 2014, interviews; Malinova, 2012:77; Morozov, 2008:12, 17, 20; Izvestiya, 2014).

Overall, the chapter argues that the development of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s represented a ‘thin’ case of Europeanisation because of the interactive operation of a low level of commitment and acceptance by the West coupled with a lack of a strong cultural-ideational basis for and domestic political consensus about the European direction of the country. That is, the initial ‘romantic’ period of engagement with the West was beginning to be rethought starting in late 1992 and 1993 through Moscow’s demonstration of greater assertiveness vis-à-vis Western Europe and the US. This foreign policy evolution was enabled by the resurgence of Pragmatic Nationalist views of Russia’s identity as an independent civilization with its own sphere of influence in Eurasia so that there was a weakening of the conception of Russia as a Europeanising state to an increasing focus on Russia as a European, but also a great, Eurasian power.

The chapter begins by examining separately the influence of the international and domestic dimension of identification on Moscow’s external conduct, and subsequently demonstrates how external and internal processes interacted to produce ideational continuity and change, translated into concrete foreign policies.

The international dimension of identification

By the mid-1990s, externally-driven attitudes and events making up the overall ideational projection of the Western Other were perceived in the Russian policy-making circle with disappointment due to Moscow’s exclusion from or at least tenuous and limited acceptance in NATO and EU integration processes, which undermined Russia’s attempts to discursively sustain and substantiate its Liberal Westernising identity as a liberal democratic, regionally cooperative, institutionally integrated state and alluded to the Western treatment of the country as a secondary rather than equal partner. Such perceptions had a significant effect on the domestic balance of power leading to the

disenchantment and marginalisation of the liberals, some of whom migrated to the Pragmatic Nationalist camp (which was becoming the dominant identity stance), and the empowerment of communist and nationalist groups with their Eurasian vision of Russia.

The 'transatlantic' framework of relations

The 'transatlantic' framework of relations, whereby the US is a central and most powerful actor, affected negatively Russia's Europeanisation. The overall American attitude was characterised by the spirit of 'triumphalism', with some US officials (such as Anthony Lake) believing that post-Soviet Russia was a continued incarnation of the West's archenemy, whereas others (such as President Bill Clinton) believed that Moscow could follow a democratic future and become an ally. Yet, the latter group did not extend substantive support to the development of democratic institutions in Russia, instead backing individual leaders (Boris Yeltsin) and side-lining Russia as too weak to be reckoned with in international affairs (Holmes, Cohen, Weinberger, Woolsey, 1999; Conradi, 2017; Lipman, 2014; Cohen, 2001).

Thus, American exclusion of Russia from the NATO enlargement process, the Alliance-led bombing of Yugoslavia that ignored Russian concerns, the insufficient and ill-devised American financial assistance created a perception of Moscow's marginalisation from European security affairs and treatment as a junior partner. As result, the Pragmatic and Fundamentalist Nationalists were empowered at the expense of the Liberal Westernisers so that a gradual opposition developed against America's and NATO's role in European security. There was correspondingly a general disappointment with Europeanisation as Russia remained on the sidelines of the core arrangements underpinning the cooperative security community of the West, which side-lining also represented a denigration of Moscow's special and influential status in European international relations.

NATO expansion

Russia's desire to become America's co-leader and be fully integrated in European security arrangements was disappointed almost immediately. In December 1991, President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to NATO heads of state, informing them that Russia considered applying for NATO membership. Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev further explained that Russia did not deem NATO a threat and was eager to cooperate with it (Adomeit 2007:4). Yet, NATO leaders did not reply. In May 1992, Yeltsin made a plea to George H. W. Bush to conclude a bilateral US-Russia alliance, which was rejected by the American President (Trenin, 2007:71). Moreover, Yeltsin's call to his European and American counterparts not to create new dividing lines on the European continent and plunge it into a 'cold peace' through NATO expansion received a nonchalant reception and it was made clear that it was not up to Russia to set the pace of NATO's expansion (Bovt, December 1994). US officials offered a low-key response to the Russian President's comments. Western European officials also downplayed any harsh implications of Yeltsin's remarks. 'It was very moderate and almost philosophical; it was the minimum that a Russian president would have to say in such a situation', a German diplomat said (Kempster, Murphy, 1994).

Nevertheless, despite pressing ahead with NATO enlargement, President Clinton himself was aware of the adverse consequences that such a policy could have for Russian domestic struggles and hence political-identity configurations. As Strobe Talbott recalls, Russian liberals repeatedly warned of the dangers of expanding NATO. Egor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais regarded NATO enlargement without Moscow's participation as an affront to Russian security interests, a vote of no confidence in Russian reforms and incompatible with the idea of partnership (Talbott, 2003:230). Similarly, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy predicted a hysterical reaction from the Russian political elite and a boost for hard-line communist

Gennadiy Zyuganov and hard-line nationalist-imperialist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As a result, there would be a damaging fall-out on those in Russian politics, who most wanted Russia to be part of the West (Talbott, 2003:301).

The policy that was thought to soften the impact of NATO enlargement on Russian domestic politics was the acceptance of Russia in other Western institutional schemes. President Clinton believed that the Partnership for Peace would permit the expansion of NATO without giving the impression of recreating dividing lines (Talbott, 2003:111). Other measures that were intended to lessen the effect of NATO expansion included Moscow's entry into the G7 and the OECD. Furthermore, the schedule of enlarging NATO itself (after both Clinton and Yeltsin were re-elected) served a similar purpose – to diminish the impact of expansion on Russian domestic politics (Talbott, 2003:217).

However, despite these measures, the issue of NATO enlargement had serious consequences for Russian identity debates. The Partnership for Peace was not a satisfactory 'compensation' for NATO enlargement as it treated Russia 'like the rest' and established relations with former Soviet republics, which was greeted by Moscow with hostility. The NATO-Russia Founding act was similarly unsatisfactory because it fell short of Russian aspirations for a veto on NATO out-of-area deployments or for explicit guarantees that NATO would not forward-deploy nuclear and conventional capabilities in new member states close to Russian borders (MacFarlane, 2001:8-9). As Russian liberals – as well as conservative-minded experts concur in their assessments, the liberals in the administration not only worried that Alliance expansion would strengthen their anti-Western nationalist and communist opponents but were themselves disappointed with the West. Exclusion of Russia from European security arrangements posed questions about the threat to Russian security interests as well as the viability of the liberals' desire for Russia

to belong to the Euro-Atlantic community of nations and the West's sincerity about cooperating with Russia through the creation of equal and indivisible security shared by all European states. And as far as the more conservative elites were concerned, NATO expansion gave them additional ammunition in their push for more anti-Western policies, confirming their claims that the West is hostile to the Russians, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a humiliation inflicted by the US and that NATO was a major military threat to Russia (Baranovsky, 2014; Utkin, 2014; Lipman, 2014; Fenenko, 2014, Shmelev, 2014; Timofeev, 2014; Smirnov, 2014; Kortunov, 2014, interviews).

The bombing of Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav crises of the 1990s, especially the Kosovo crisis, had a very strong impact on the Russian policy-making scene. This was so due to at least two factors, including geopolitical and domestic considerations, whose interpretation were shaped by identity concerns.

First, as regards geopolitical considerations, NATO strikes against Kosovo and the inability of European states to resolve the crisis on their own only served to confirm Russian fears of the establishment of a NATO-centred European and international system of security, from which Russia was excluded (Baranovsky, 2000:4). The Russian reaction against such exclusion was further exacerbated by the Western disregard of the UN and the principles of international law (i.e., the more conservative principle of observance of national sovereignty as opposed to the West-supported norm of humanitarian intervention to protect human rights). The tendency to sideline the organisation and the preferred Moscow stance in favour of the preservation of sovereignty would confirm Russia's isolation from the core states influencing international relations, not least because the

Russian seat on the UN Security Council was considered an institutional symbol of great power-ness.

Thus, the feeling that Russia was being isolated and dismissed as weak in European and international decision-making had a significant effect on Russian politicians' evolving view that Russia should distance itself from the West and play a more assertive role (Yeltsin, 2001:256-257). As a closely involved participant at the time, Lipman points to the 'short-sightedness' of Western policy-makers, who were warned by her and others that recognising the independence of Kosovo without regard for Russian sensitivities on the issue would create a precedent, which Russia would use in the future. Lipman further explains how Moscow's inability to effectively oppose Western actions contributed to a sense of national humiliation. An example of this was the dispatch of a unit to Pristina in 1999 to counter NATO but the unit was too small, badly equipped and had to rely on the 'adversary' for food and water (Lipman, 2014, interview).

Second, the bombing of Yugoslavia raised domestic political concerns. The 'internal' aspect of the Kosovo intervention invoked different interpretations in the West and in Russia. If for the West, the bombing of the Serbs (at least allegedly) was primarily a matter of the protection of the human rights of the ethnic Albanians, in Russia Kosovo was perceived as the 'Serbian Chechnya', thus being linked to fears about Russia's own territorial integrity should intervention become the norm in international relations (Arbatova, 2005:104-105). Also, the Kosovo crisis provoked anti-NATO sentiments intertwined with moral sympathy for Serbia (as religiously, ethnically and linguistically close to Russia and suffering at the hands of the powerful), utilised by the nationalist forces to argue for an anti-Western foreign policy (Torkunov, 2005:283; Baranovsky, 2000:3, 6).

Therefore, the NATO bombings of Kosovo discredited democracy- and human rights-promotion (as they were associated with derogatory treatment and a threat to national territorial boundaries), further contributing to the identity crisis of the Liberal Westernisers, who began to seriously doubt the feasibility of the pro-Western foreign policy direction of the country (Baranovsky, 2000:6). Indeed, Russian experts and participants confirm that the Liberal Westernisers' warnings to the West that military strikes would empower the communists and the nationalists (aiming at dealing a blow to Russia's democratic, pro-European orientation), went unheeded (Tevdoy-Burmuli, 2014; Gudkov, 2014; Utkin, 2014; Lipman, 2014, interviews). For instance, Yeltsin argued that the internal political configuration in Russia depended on the situation in the Balkans. The communists and the nationalists played the Balkan card in order to influence the balance of political forces by asserting that the West not only humiliated Russia but also represented a threat to state integrity through its strategies of democratisation and protection of human rights. He asked 'Wasn't it obvious to the West that the NATO bombing was an indirect strike against Russia?' (Yeltsin, 2001:259-260).

Overall, the geopolitical and domestic repercussions of the Kosovo crisis posed serious doubts as to Russia's belongingness to Europe, its place in European and global security matters, distanced Moscow from the norm of humanitarian intervention (which was gradually gaining important ground in the foreign policy policies of the European states and the US) and further tipped the internal configuration of power towards the conservatives, who contested Russia's European integrationist, liberal democratic vector of development.

American financial assistance

The Clinton administration, more than any European government, tried to influence the internal evolution of Russia through a variety of policies aimed at building democracy and a market economy. Yet, Clinton's policies were subject to dissatisfaction in Russia. The controversial loans-for-shares and voucher privatisation schemes came under severe criticism. The voucher privatisation schemes involved the dissolution of state-owned companies by issuing vouchers for their shares to the company's workforce. Most vouchers, however, were bought by a few people who became very rich from the privatisations (Stent, 2007:420). Moreover, Western aid, which was supposed to facilitate Russia's catching up with the West, turned out far smaller than the Liberal Westernisers had hoped for, and when delivered, it was misspent and thus failed to produce any effect on the lives of the Russians (Prizel, 1998:247). Therefore, the US experiment at democracy- and market economy-building in Russia further contributed to the disappointment with Western policies.

European integration processes

Russia's goal (at least generally rhetorically enunciated) in the 1990s was to become integrated in Europe on the basis of the tenets of European-ness. Yet, attitudes to the EU as a significant facet of the process of Europeanisation varied, influenced by external factors. In the early 1990s, Russia neglected the Union and put an extensive focus on relations with the US as the most powerful state that could legitimise Russia's belongingness to the Euro-Atlantic community (Arbatova, 2005:129). However, Moscow started to pay more attention to the EU due to disappointments in its dealings with the US and NATO. The concluded agreements with the Union marked prospects for the Europeanisation of Russian foreign policy, while also contributing to further disenchantment in Russia about the

degree of the country's acceptance in Europe. Indeed, the overall West European attitude tended to treat Russia as 'becoming like us', which reflected a historically continuous representation of Moscow as a learner in perpetual transition to Europeanisation (Neumann, 1999:111). Yet, as Neumann shows, given that Russia also represents a constitutive Other in European identity (differing on the basis of a despotic political regime, insufficient 'civility' and posing a military threat), it was not thought that Moscow would become a member of European institutions, with the failure of democratic reforms under Yeltsin confirming the image of 'eternal' Russian otherness (Neumann, 1999:65-112; Malia, 1999:1-15). Hence, the differentiation between the EU's *enlargement policy* to CEE and *external relations* to the Russian neighbour (European Council Summit in Edinburgh, 1992:105-106, in Copenhagen, 1993:13-18, in Madrid, 1995:6-7).

In particular, Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was America focused. Legitimation for the 'new Russia' was sought and America as the most powerful nation of the Euro-Atlantic community could best fulfil this role. For instance, as an insider to these processes, Baranovsky explains that Vladimir Lukin, a member of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, summoned experts to discuss Yeltsin's trip to the US in 1991, with the main theme of the discussion revolving around obtaining legitimation for Russia as an actor in international relations. Indeed, during this initial 'romantic' period, not much difference was made among the countries of the West – to have Russia accepted as a member of the 'family' was most important (Baranovsky, 2014, interview).

However, in the second half of the 1990s, the EU began to play a much bigger role in Russian foreign policy for reasons not directly related to the Union itself – it was Russia's disappointment with NATO expansion, the bombing of Yugoslavia and overall US policy of 'unilateral dominance' in European and global affairs. The change of focus away from

an overwhelming reliance on relations with the US became most pronounced when Evgeny Primakov became Foreign Minister in 1996. He perceived the EU as a pole in international relations, which could serve to balance American hegemony (Arbatova, 2005:129). Indeed, heightened attention to the EU was not the result of the deep-seated realisation of the importance of the process of institutionalised cooperation, regional integration or the global advocacy of democracy and human rights, based on soft power and renunciation of the use of force. Rather, the EU was seen as a pole in a multipolar world that could dilute the exclusionary practices of US unilateralism. And such an attitude re-enacted the Russian conceptual affinity to 19th century balance of power politics rather than late 20th century politics of interdependence and integration (Arbatova, 2005:129). Along a similar logic, in October 1997, Boris Yeltsin announced his 'Greater Europe' concept and put forward the initiative to establish a 'troika' dialogue with France and Germany in order to counteract US unilateralism (Menkiszak, 2013:9).

Furthermore, the EU-Russia strategic documents of the 1990s – the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (1994) and the Union's Common Strategy (1999), were most important with respect to political dialogue and symbolism, the institutional channels established for communication and socialisation and the declaration of the existence of common values (Baranovsky, 2002:57; Gower, 2000:76-79). For instance, the PCA (1994:4) stated that the envisaged political dialogue 'shall foresee that the Parties endeavour to cooperate on matters pertaining to the observance of the principles of democracy and human rights', initiating Russia's interaction with the CFSP (Baranovsky, 2002:57). The Common Strategy (1999:1) also asserted that 'the offer of a reinforced relationship, based on shared democratic values, will help Russia to assert its European identity'.

However, there were different underlying visions regarding the extent to which the two parties should be integrated. As Arbatova makes clear, while carrying out negotiations with the EU over the PCA, Moscow was aiming to draw the document closer to an Association Agreement. Yet, the EU tried to restrict the scope of Russia's integration in Europe, justifying this with the fact that Russia was a great power and not just another ordinary European state, which newspaper *Kommersant* interpreted as an excuse. The then deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – Sergei Krylov, disappointedly considered the negotiations over the partnership agreement between the EU and Russia in June 1994 as a 'failure' due to the limited character of cooperation envisaged between the two sides (Arbatova, 2005:130; Bovt, November 1994). Thus, although Russian leaders made references to Russia's desire for EU membership, by 1994 it was becoming clear that integration with the EU would not even be discussed and the most that Moscow was able to get was membership in the Council of Europe (Trenin, 2007:70-71). Russian proposals that the CSCE should be developed into a major institution coordinating European security matters were similarly spurned (Ignatenko, 1994). Further disappointments followed from the intransigence on the part of the West to renegotiate the CFE Treaty limits on military presence and equipment on Russia's southern flank (which Russia deemed necessary for the preservation of national unity given Chechnya's desire to secede) (Bovt, Kalashnikova, 1995).

Indeed, the EU's non-committal attitude to Russia reflected Germany's stance. Despite Chancellor Kohl's close personal ties to Yeltsin (expressed in 'sauna diplomacy') and substantial German government credits (contributing \$52 billion in aid), the possibility of Russian membership in European organisations was never really considered as Berlin advocated EU and NATO expansion, particularly to the Central European states. Overall, the German view was that as the Cold War memory receded, Russia would eventually (but

not in the immediate term) be brought into the Western community of values, just as Germany was after World War II (Turgunova, 2013:27; Erb, 2003:187; Zaborowski, 2006:112-113; Szabo, 2015:61-62).

On the whole, these European developments bred Russian disappointments. Tevdoy-Burmuli has argued that unlike in its relations with the CEE states, as regards Russia the EU did not seriously entertain the prospect of offering membership, which would have otherwise provided an anchor to Russia's European belongingness. The EU strategy and the PCA were characterised by carelessness and a lack of clear vision of what the end result would be (Tevdoy-Burmuli, 2014, interview). Russian experts concur that Brussels proceeded with its enlargement project, which excluded Russia, so that the notion of 'Europe' and the 'EU' became almost identical and the much cherished idea of the pro-Western liberals of 'Russia in Europe' was supplanted by 'Russia and Europe' (Trenin, 2007:72; Miller, 2014; Timofeev, 2014; Utkin, 2014; Morozov, 2014; Tevdoy-Burmuli, 2014; Arbatova, 2014; Kortunov, 2014; Fenenko, 2014, interviews).

Thus, disappointments with the process of European integration were bound to follow since, as Smirnov and Kortunov argued, the relationship between the EU and Russia in the 1990s was built on illusions. One illusion was that Russia would be able to gradually integrate in the European community. But the very fact that the PCA was signed in the 1990s and there is still no other foundational document to build on it is demonstrative enough (Smirnov, 2014; Kortunov, 2014, interviews). Arbatova also clarified that in the early 1990s, EU enlargement was viewed favourably in Russia – as the Russian liberals thought that NATO and EU enlargement were two different processes. However, the high-ranking officials in Brussels and Germany insisted that these two processes were complementary, whereby a negative Russian perception was being formed that Union

enlargement would be replacing NATO expansion as an overwhelming project creating a new reality in all aspects of social, political and economic development (Baranovsky, 2002:129-130). This led to an intense psychological anxiety about a political-cultural and economic abyss that might develop between the EU member states and Russia (Arbatova, 2014; Fenenko, 2014, interviews).

Conclusions

Over the course of the 1990s, externally-driven attitudes and policies exhibited a deep-seated ambivalence towards Russia's European belongingness, providing only limited, non-committal and tenuous diplomatic, institutional and economic support. All of this contributed to internal disappointments about the country's half-hearted acceptance, the marginalisation of the liberals and the empowerment of more conservative groupings. Hence, the emerging Liberal Westernising rhetoric on the desirability of Euro-Atlantic integration could not be sustained and become infused with discursive references to the key dimensions of European-ness, as exclusion bred disenchantment and activated normatively contested understandings of ideal-typical values (including support for non-infringed upon sovereignty, balance of power politics, multipolarity as opposed to integration, multilateralism and institutionalised cooperation). Russia's great-power self-conception was also invoked in cases of perceived slights to the demand for special status, which further diluted the process of seeking liberal interdependence with the Euro-Atlantic community towards assertiveness against American dominance.

The domestic dimension of identification

In addition to the external environment, domestic developments were also formative in the evolution of Russian self-understandings towards Pragmatic Nationalism in the 1990s. In particular, the domestic political consensus on Russia's Europeanisation was not

intersubjectively shared – it only took hold on the level of the Liberal Westernising governing elite, and was vociferously contested by the more conservative politicians. Moreover, the European vector of Russia's foreign policy identity was undermined by the Liberal Westernisers' own understandings of European-ness, which were substantively incompatible with the ideal-typical dimensions of support for a liberal international order, regional cooperation and institutionalised integration, and whose symbolic and practical institutionalisation failed, marking a continuation of the historical tradition of a shallow embeddedness of European values in national consciousness. Also, the domestic institutional and party-political setting created an atmosphere of partisanship and instrumentally-motivated concerns. Although these characteristics were present in Poland and Bulgaria, the institutional crisis in Moscow manifested and further exacerbated the fundamental identity crisis (rather than being contained by generally shared ideational positions in favour of integration with the Euro-Atlantic community).

The domestic ideational setting

A crucial set of internal ideational reasons for Russia's thin Europeanisation were linked to the substantive divergence of the Liberal Westernising views from the ideal-typical model as well as to the deficiencies in the rhetorical-symbolic and practical implementation of those views.

First, Russian liberals' understanding of the EU and NATO was stereotypically- and superficially informed and ultimately differed from the (West European) animating principles of those organisations. Initially, Moscow was convinced that a new European order would emerge without dividing lines but did not realise the value of institutionalised cooperation for building a rules-bound order placing limits on national sovereignty. Since the EU did not include Russia and was an element of the past (of the bygone era of the

Cold War), Russia had no reasons for focusing its foreign policy on such an organisation (Baranovsky, 2002:12-13). Then, as the Union proceeded with its enlargement policies, the whole process of institutionalised integration was dismissed and assessed as driven by economic rather than political considerations. Yet, following disappointments with NATO-related developments (as clarified earlier in the chapter), it began to be thought that apart from building a zone of prosperity, the EU could fit into the broader picture of creating a 'greater Europe', in which Russia would play a prominent role (in contrast to a NATO-centred Europe) (Baranovsky, 2002:126). Yeltsin's 'Greater Europe' concept posited a Europe without dividing lines, where no single state would impose its will on the rest and where all European states would be equal partners united by common democratic principles (Menkiszak, 2013:9-10). The Russian President also warned against forces in and outside Europe which wanted to isolate Russia and place it on an unequal footing, arguing that Europe could build its security without the US (Menkiszak, 2013:9-10; Gornostaev, 1997; Bangersky, Gornostaev, 1997; Miheev, 1997).

What transpires in this concept of 'Greater Europe' is the blending of power considerations and the desire to belong to European civilization (on the basis of differentially understood principles) in that the elite perceived European integration as a way of enhancing Russia's prestige, being included in European affairs, recognised as an equal and rightful part of the European family of nations and having influence on European politics (ideally greater than US influence on Europe) (Yeltsin, 2001:149). However, the West European understanding of European integration differs as it is focused more on a gradual (albeit difficult and sometimes inconsistent) movement towards interdependence and pooling of sovereignty rather than on a (19th century-like) Concert of great European powers seeking to counterbalance US hegemony.

As regards attitudes to NATO, even the Liberal Westernisers harboured significant reservations about the Alliance (Gorskii, 2001:19, 26, 35). In Baranovsky's recollections, most liberals argued that NATO expansion would damage Russia's security interests, its relations with the West and its liberal democratic domestic development. The debates about NATO enlargement even led to the 'migration' of liberals from the Liberal Westerniser camp to the Pragmatic Nationalists, as was the case of Sergey Karaganov and Sergey Stankevich (Baranovsky, 2014, interview).

Utkin and Lipman have clarified that Russian centrists, conservatives as well as liberals were very critical of NATO, not least because of Cold War stereotypes, prejudices and irrational fears. It was a minority view that Russia could benefit from cooperating with the Alliance as for most people NATO represented an unpredictable black box and imaginary monster that stays near Russian borders. Yet, although some realistic security concerns could be derived from NATO's coming closer to Russia's borders with its overwhelming military capabilities as well as lack of clarity and binding agreements regarding the non-deployment of tactical nuclear and conventional weapons and infrastructure beyond the borders of the 16 old member states, Utkin asserts that in rational terms NATO enlargement did not pose an 'objective' threat to Russia (NATO Factsheet, 2016). This was so because without the Alliance, there would be a rise in the defence expenditures and military posturing of European countries, each of them becoming self-reliant in security matters (Utkin, 2014; Lipman, 2014, interviews).

Second, the Liberal-Westernising course towards the integration of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community was further undermined by the conceptual failure to substantiate symbolically and relate the rhetorically enunciated identity of Russia as a European state to

the interpretation of the Russian past as well as to issues of national interests and economic justice.

In particular, Malinova has explained that the liberal political elite did not understand the importance of providing symbolic rootedness to the Liberal-Westernising identity strand in a fundamentally ideationally divided country. So despite the fact that the official discourse of Yeltsin and his team was dominated by the idea of the 'new, liberal democratic Russia', little was done symbolically to support this idea (Malinova, 2014, interview). For instance, there was a lot of ambiguity surrounding Lenin's Mausoleum in the 1990s. One option was for Lenin to be reburied with his relatives in St. Petersburg, which would have completed the deconsecration of that political figure. But the government's inability to decide how to deal with the mausoleum reflected a wider difficulty of interpreting the past in a way that would have provided a symbolic break with Soviet authoritarianism (exemplified by Lenin) as a precondition for uniting around a new set of liberal democratic national symbols (Morrison, 1993:5, 7).

Moreover, the difficulty of establishing liberal democratic ideas as part of the political mainstream was also the result of the failure of the Liberal Westernisers to marry their Europeanising rhetoric with a foreign policy agenda that could (moderately) assert national interests, mistakenly and in an ideological zeal believing that all those who were not Gaidar-type liberals (i.e., uncritically pro-Western and favouring a shock economic therapy), were necessarily Russian nationalist-imperialists (Morozov, 2016). As a result, Trenin and Miller have assessed that the liberals became estranged from the pro-European part of the political class and society, who were favourably predisposed to Europeanisation but nevertheless began to see in uncritical Westernism an affront to positive national distinctiveness (Trenin, 2014; Miller, 2014, interviews).

Particularly with regard to economics, the way that the liberals conducted the economic reforms damaged the whole liberal vision of Russia's internal development and cooperation with the West, as the population associated the painful reforms with the European model, thought to be dictated by the Western powers and carried out by the Russian government. Aside from the 'objective' consequences of the reforms – impoverishment, unemployment, inflation, the problem was not necessarily only in the principle of 'shock liberalisation' itself (as it was also carried out in other CEEs) but in that it was never properly explained to the people. Busygina has stressed that Egor Gaidar and his team did not clarify to the electorate what the economic reforms entailed. Such an attitude was a sign that the Liberal Westernisers did not understand the essence of democracy (importantly constituted by horizontal lines of policy deliberation and accountability of the 'rulers' to the 'ruled') since they wanted to build democracy from above (Busygina, 2014, interview; Nelson, Kuzes, 1995:91-133). Moreover, in their attempt to steer Russia into a course of economic development and 'normality' – i.e., into the 'normal' path of internal modernisation and foreign policy behaviour as a 'normal' European power, the liberals dogmatically ignored the important issue of the negative economic fall-out in the transformation process. As Utkin explains, by arguing that the social and economic costs of moving towards a capitalist system would simply be resolved as a result of the successful application of the Western model, the Liberal Westernisers 'outsourced' the discussion of those problems to the Fundamentalist Nationalists (especially the communists), who employed the rhetoric on social-economic injustice as a way of making their case that Russia should veer away from the European path of development (Utkin, 2014, interview).

In addition to the normative incompatibilities and conceptual deficiencies of the Liberal Westernisers' espousal and practice of European-ness, Russia's thin Europeanisation was

further underwritten by the absence of a broader domestic political consensus on the desirability of the country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. The Fundamentalists (including Zyuganov's Communist Party and Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party) as well as some moderate Liberal Westerniser politicians and oligarchic economic elites became increasingly vociferous and influential critics of government policy.

The end of 1992 and the whole of 1993 illustrate the oppositional forces that President Yeltsin and his team had to come up against. Although the President gained the upper hand in the conflict with Ruslan Khasbulatov, speaker of the Russian Parliament, and Alexander Rutskoi, Vice-President, over the Constitution (culminating in the shelling of Russia's White House of government in October 1993 to forcefully suppress rioting deputies who had occupied the building) and Yeltsin's preferred form of the Constitution (granting the Presidency more powers) was approved, he could still not implement his policies freely (Slater, 1994:22, 25). After the December 1993 Federal Assembly elections, the pro-reformist camp did not fare well enough (taking 35% of the seats in the Duma) and Russia's hard line forces emerged as the winners (together gaining more than 40% of the seats). This ensured a new stalemate in the legislative process (Rahr, 1994:32).

Moreover, another brake on the implementation of Yeltsin's pro-European intentions was the reassertion of power of the conservative institutions from the Soviet period: the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, the gas and oil lobby, the KGB, whose mind-set was based on a confrontation rather than integration with the West. Their agitation in 1992 and 1993 and General Lebed's restoration of the cohesion of the Army could well be understood as a determined attempt at making a political comeback (Duncan, 2007:8). Moreover, the support that the military provided to Yeltsin during the shelling of the White

House further strengthened its position. Concessions to the military leadership included more assertive policies in Russia's relations with the 'near abroad' and official opposition to NATO expansion, as opposed to the declared Liberal Westernising goal of peaceful and non-domineering regional relations and institutionalised security cooperation (Foye, 1994:4). Also, the President abandoned reformist premier Egor Gaidar and appointed previous Soviet gas and oil minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as Gaidar's successor in December 1992. The agreements signed by Yeltsin in Beijing and New Delhi, in late 1992 and early 1993 respectively, on arms trade and joint military production, were testimony to the impact of the military on directing policies away from a primary focus on a cooperative security European order and towards multipolar assertiveness (Adomeit, 1995:25).

The moderate liberals also exercised increasing influence on government stances. As regards domestic policies, the proposals of the main moderate Liberal Westernising parties – the Civic Union and the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), took the middle ground between the radical market economics supported by Russia's Choice and the return to state ownership called for by the Communist Party. In terms of foreign policy, the moderates leaned neither towards seeing Russia as an uncritical ally of the West, nor towards a confrontational and assertive line (Slater, 1994:13). These positions became especially influential as the moderates managed to obtain high posts in the Duma – Valery Bogomolov of the DPR became a deputy chairman of the International Affairs Committee; in the executive, economic portfolios were handed to industrialists close to the Civic Union (Slater, 1994:18). Indeed, in 1993, Deputy Prime Ministers Oleg Lobov and Oleg Soskovets proposed changes to the economic and privatisation programmes, gaining support with Yeltsin to the dismay of the more radical liberals, notably Egor Gaidar (Slater, 1994:18). Organisations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs cooperated with their counterparts in former Soviet republics and lobbied

for strong bilateral and multilateral economic links, which were expected to lead to a renewed Russian primacy in the region (Pravda, 1996:185).

Finally, the economic elites (especially certain oligarchs) played a further role in the hardening of Russian attitudes and policies towards the West. Boris Berezovsky argued that Russia ought to promote the integration of the CIS as a sphere of Moscow's influence at the expense of relations with Europe and America. He worked closely with Foreign Minister Primakov to plan a strategy towards the CIS, strongly opposing NATO expansion (Duncan, 2007:8).

Overall therefore, although Yeltsin and his closest circle of liberally-minded politicians held on to the reins of power, various other groups who were not in favour of Russia's Europeanisation managed to assert their ideas and policy-making priorities (MacFarlane, 1993:12; Foye, 1994:2; Talbott, 2003:190; Yeltsin, 2001:52; 54; Arbatov, 1993:16). The communists and nationalist-imperialists exercised an influence on the general atmosphere of intensifying oppositional discourse and parliamentary action against cooperation with the West; the military and oligarchs – on policies related to the establishment of a more domineering rather than regionally friendly stance towards the CIS; the centrists – on government figures that called for a less determined effort at integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community and applying domestically the Western liberal democratic, free market economic model.

The domestic institutional and party-political setting

A number of facets of the policy-making environment, including Yeltsin's style of rule and the fluid institutional setting, contributed to partisanship, incoherence and instrumental concerns. And unlike Poland and (to some extent) Bulgaria, where the unstable political landscape led above all to policy inconsistency but did not fundamentally weaken the

resolve to Europeanise given the achievement of ideational consensus, in Russia political factionalism and institutional deficiencies further exacerbated the deep-seated ideational uncertainty, contributing to the proliferation of contradictory views and processes substantively incompatible with ideal-typical European-ness, which gradually resulted in the inability to pursue determinedly the discursively enunciated liberal course of integration with the Euro-Atlantic community.

So first, the President's style of rule made it more difficult for the liberal democratic vision of Russia integrated with the West to take hold in the political and societal mainstream. In particular, Yeltsin's team did nothing to create a solid political and institutional foundation for democratic reforms, for instance, by building a political party out of the 'Democratic Russia' movement and cementing a broad coalition of liberal to moderate-centrist parties that would consistently support democratic development and the European integrationist course. Instead, Yeltsin's team relied on the enormous post-August 1991 popularity of the President (i.e., when Yeltsin spearheaded the democratic resistance against the hard line Soviet coup aimed at toppling Gorbachev from power) and counted on the disarray in the communist-nationalist camp (Arbatov, 1993:12-13).

Moreover, Yeltsin created a system of competing factions and through his 'divide-and-rule' strategy tried to ensure that all the major political figures vied for access to him as the 'supreme arbiter'. For instance, the lack of a clear line of authority in the foreign policy sphere contributed to increased rivalry between the Defence and Foreign Ministry over a number of issues (such as NATO and Kosovo) but Yeltsin stood at the top of this rivalry in almost all cases (Larrabee, Karasik, 1997:14). The Presidential Apparatus began to show signs of influence with the appointment of Anatoly Chubais as chief of staff who brought a much needed sense of discipline. But by appointing Sergei Shakhrai (a political opponent

of Chubais) as a deputy head, Yeltsin created a counter-balancing centre of power, which was an attempt to ensure the President's primacy in foreign policy (Larrabee, Karasik, 1997:38, 46).

The lack of institutionalisation, coupled with a divide-and-rule strategy, only served to encourage authoritarian tendencies, which were incompatible with the professed vision of Russia as a Europeanised country. For instance, the new 1993 Constitution granted extensive powers to the President, raising fears among liberal Russian observers that it would encourage authoritarian government (Slater, 1994:25, 28-29; Hoffman, 2011:325-365). As Gromyko observes, Yeltsin's inclination to create a tight circle around himself – the 'family', made it possible for the oligarchic politics and economy to emerge despite the professed goal of Europeanisation (Gromyko, 2014, interview). Indeed, Busygina explains that the authoritarian tendencies were enabled especially by a contraction characteristic of the President – between his commitment to democratisation and integration with the West (which was both rhetorical and intuitively aspired to) and his insufficient understanding of and desire to learn about the conduct of genuine democratic practices of transparency, consensus-seeking and cooperation (in contrast to conflictual assertiveness domestically, regionally and internationally). So Yeltsin called for democracy and European integration but behaved like an authoritarian leader, who was, however, unable to fully assert his power given the strong internal oppositional forces (Busygina, 2014, interview).

The second important facet of the policy-making process was linked to the institutional setting. By dethroning the Communist Party apparatus, the post-1991 institutional democratisation deprived the foreign policy system of its central information-processing, decision-making and monitoring agency and shook up the distribution of power among the Foreign Ministry, the Security Services and the Ministry of Defence. The Presidential

Security Council was also unable to carry out its key role in international affairs, hampered by under-resourcing and political cross-currents. Its broad remit meant that it played only an intermittent part in foreign policy. In the absence of effective central control, and in the new climate of extreme ideological pluralism, bureaucratic rivalries with roots in the Soviet period acquired a more intense character (Larrabee, Karasik, 1997:38). For instance, as head of the Security Council, General Lebed remarked on a visit to the NATO headquarters in 1996 that Russia was ready to cooperate with NATO and would not object to its expansion, but this statement was at variance with Primakov's tougher line (Larrabee, Karasik, 1997:8-9).

Overall therefore, the political-institutional environment not only prevented the consistent conduct of Russian foreign policy but it was intertwined with the gradual erosion of government-level policy-based adherence to Europeanisation.

Conclusions

The Liberal Westernisers' superficial understanding of, normatively incompatible conceptions with and failure to implement symbolically and practically the ideal-typical model as well as the lack of domestic political consensus on Russian foreign policy development – reinforced by the acrimonious and unstable institutional landscape, eroded the possibility for the Europeanised vision of Russia to become consolidated as part of the political mainstream (although the liberals' fragile political predominance nevertheless ensured at least an overall rhetorical attachment to Euro-Atlantic integration).

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Russian discourse

The previous sections focused on the international and domestic developments that separately affected Russian foreign policy identity in the 1990s. Ultimately, the 'pure',

‘isolated’ operation of either only the domestic or international dimension would not have produced Russia’s thin Europeanisation as each aspect contributed and was a necessary but not sufficient condition. So this section focuses on the interactive effects on discursively expressed political elite views, whereas the next section demonstrates how these views were translated into concrete foreign policies.

International and domestic dimension of identification – reinforcement, complementarity, co-constitution

The hypothesised instance of ‘thin’ Europeanisation is confirmed in the Russian case. European and American non-committal, half-hearted and tenuous acceptance of Russia’s credentials for becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic community (expressed in slow and limited diplomatic, institutional and economic support that did not become more decisive at least as in the Bulgarian case) was matched and complemented by Moscow’s own ideational division over the desirability of integration with the West and substantive normative incompatibility with the ideal-typical values, underpinning the possibility of belongingness to the Euro-Atlantic community. As a result, the overall identity rhetoric espoused by the Liberal Westernisers (politically embattled but still retaining the overall reins of power in the 1990s) kept the commitment to Europeanisation, which was, however, not consistent, intersubjectively shared and substantiated by a deeply internalised adherence to European principles, instead gradually incorporating Pragmatic Nationalist views (contesting European-ness even more vigorously, despite still not renouncing the goal of cooperation with the West). In terms of concrete foreign policies, as the next section shows, the interactive dynamics between the domestic and international dimension of identification meant that the pro-European course was briefly followed in the early

1990s but could not be sustained and moved towards Pragmatic Nationalist positions of cultural and geopolitical assertiveness against the West.

More specifically, the key tenets of the official identity discourse of the 1990s were based on the goal of Europeanisation. As an observer and participant in these political developments, Kortunov has clarified that despite the occurrence of some major disappointments in the Russia-West relationship in the 1990s and the fact that Yeltsin was not always consistent in his views and actions, the overall rhetorical and policy trend remained in favour of Russia's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. And this commitment to Europeanisation outlived Yeltsin, reflected in the pro-Western statements especially of the first and second administration of President Vladimir Putin (Kortunov, 2014, interview). Thus, as further confirmed by Russian experts, the identity politics over the 1990s implied that Russia was a new democratic state, which significantly differed from the Soviet Union in terms of political-social organisation, values and foreign policy. The West was a 'natural' ally as Russia changed itself along a European, liberal democratic, regionally and internationally cooperative path (Timofeev, 2014; Malinova, 2014; Shmelev, 2014; Zevelev, 2014; Busygina, 2014; Simon, 2014, interviews). This identity discourse was conspicuously embodied by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. His mantra that Russia should become a 'civilised' country and join the democratic West was accepted both by the emerging free market economic elite and most of the liberally-minded foreign policy intellectuals (Stent, 2007:418). In a series of statements in 1991 and 1992, Kozyrev argued that for the first time Russia found itself in a benign security environment, which would allow it to become a truly European power promoting a liberal international order (Kozyrev, 1992:1-16).

However, although the general official discourse was in favour of Europeanisation, Liberal Westerniser views evolved into a more Pragmatic Nationalist vision of Russia – less hopeful about acceptance by the West and about Russia’s ability to undergo a successful transformation on the ideal-typical model, more aware of the country’s need for a restored great power self-inflation and more assertive in its foreign policy. Russian experts confirm that the liberal democratic, pro-European vision of Russia’s foreign policy began to lose dominance because of the lack of external confirmation and support, on the one hand, and because of conceptual and practical limitations of liberal ideas as well as the acrimonious political struggle feeding into the unstable institutional setting, on the other (Arbatova, 2014; Tevdoy-Burmuli, 2014; Gromyko, 2014; Kortunov, 2014; Melville, 2014; Krickovic, 2014; Shmelev, 2014; Timofeev, 2014; Lipman, 2014, interviews; Trenin, 2007:73). Indeed, the attitudes and policies of the West and the disappointment that they brought about in Russia enabled the resurgence of Pragmatic Nationalists views in foreign policy-making. Accordingly, the arguments that the opponents of the Liberal Westernisers employed in internal politics were linked to the consequences for the country of the actions of the US and Western Europe and the uncritical desire for cooperation with the West at all costs.

In particular, the disappointing developments, especially regarding the economy, undermined the foundation on which the thinking of the Liberal Westernisers was constructed. These developments discredited the adherents of reform and close cooperation with the West and provided grist to the mill of the conservative opposition, charging that the goal of the Western industrialised countries was to ‘plunder’ Russian resources and ‘dictate’ conditions (Adomeit, 1995:23). Kozyrev was accused of conducting a foreign policy that was skewed in favour of the US and hurt Russia’s cultural distinctiveness and geopolitical interests (Goldberg, 1992). Some academic specialists turned Pragmatic

Nationalists, like Georgy Arbatov and Alexey Bogaturov argued that the ‘mindless’ following of the West on the part of the Liberal Westernisers only discredited the West in the eyes of the Russian people (Adomeit, 1995:23; Bogaturov, 1994). Vyacheslav Dashichev, Konstantin Pleshakov, Alexey Vasilev made strong statements about Russia’s vital interests in the post-Soviet area and warned of the dangers for Moscow’s regional primacy following from the equation of Russian policy in the area with that of the US under the banner of friendly regional cooperation (Prizel, 1998:248-253).

Thus, over time the identity debate was characterised by the rise of ideas that posited Russia at the head of the non-West, supported even by liberally-minded policy-makers who had begun to doubt the goal of Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Conscious that Europe was not welcoming Russia with open arms, Presidential adviser Sergey Stankevich opposed the renunciation of a special Russian ‘civilizational mission’, imbuing the country with a far more diversified foreign policy orientation than the single-minded ‘European’ path (Stent, 2007:418; Stankevich, 1992). Vladimir Lukin, the then Russian Ambassador to the US, noted the disillusionment of the elite with the West’s policies, which demanded Russia’s ‘unconditional surrender’. He himself argued that as a result of this, Moscow’s security environment was much less benign than Kozyrev thought and therefore Russia had to re-orient its foreign policy away from an exclusive focus on building a liberal international order with the West and embrace its identity as a Eurasian country working for multipolarity and defence of regional spheres of influence (Lukin, 1992, 2008).

Overall, as Arbatova puts it, ‘Russia’s identity in terms of whether it is Asia or Europe depends on the balance of force between the liberals and the nationalists’ (Arbatova, 2014, interview). And this balance of force can be tipped to one side or another by international

developments so that, as Trenin and Miller clarify, the typical Russian psychological reaction to isolation and estrangement when spurned by Europe as ‘aliens’ is to rediscover Asia (Miller, 2014, interview; Trenin, 2007:73). As a result of this process, the sidelining of the liberals was important in terms of foreign policy identity since the liberals were so dominant in setting the goals of Russia’s internal and external policy in the early 1990s. As an insider to the process, Zevelev has argued that the demoralisation of the Liberal Westernisers was based on the following argument: the Clinton administration started the NATO expansion process, inviting certain countries to join but what about Russia? If the West is honest about its desire to accept Russia as a partner, then it should not create dividing lines (Zevelev, 2014, interview). Hence, the camp of the liberals gravitated towards the centre, an example of which was Presidential adviser to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin – Sergey Karaganov. Karaganov admitted that after 1999 and the bombing of Yugoslavia he gave up all liberal hopes and moved to the centre (Krickovic, 2014, interview; Karaganov, BBC World Lectures).

Yet, liberal ideas became easily eroded also because they were built on weak cultural-historical and conceptual foundations. The European identity was to a certain extent ‘imagined’ and had to be constructed from scratch in some aspects to be truly in line with European values (such as democracy, support for a liberal international order, regional integration, institutionalised cooperation). As Busygina makes clear, Russia imitated the norms of the West, declared itself to be ‘European’ and expected the leading European states to give Russia credit for its ‘European-ness’. So as Russian observers confirm, Russia could only declare that it was a European country but it did not have a deep-seated cultural-historical identification with Europe and was too preoccupied with the conflict between the branches of authority in order to fully implement this ‘European’ agenda

(Busygina, 2014; Smirnov, 2014; Trenin, 2014; Medvedev, 2014; Krickovic, 2014; Gromyko, 2014; Arbatova, 2014, interviews).

Furthermore, in addition to intersubjective views, the views of the key decision-makers also underwent an evolution. As regards the President, Russian observers (including those who had a direct experience with him) have clarified that Yeltsin was not a foreign policy expert; he was not well-versed in issues of international relations and did not have a firm set of well-elaborated convictions about the conduct of a pro-European external course (and perhaps he did not want to lay out such in-depth convictions given Yeltsin's motivation to differentiate himself from his rival Gorbachev's grand visions of international affairs). Rather, the President's foreign policy choices were based on instinct, intuitions and generalised predispositions and conceptions – he sensed that the right direction for Russia in international relations was partnership with the West that could legitimise Russia as an international actor and help it both symbolically and economically take its place among the Euro-Atlantic nations (Gromyko, 2014; Baranovsky, 2014; Kortunov, 2014; Arbatova, 2014; Smirnov, 2014; Trenin, 2014; Medvedev, 2014; Krickovic, 2014; Gromyko, 2014, interviews).

But the views of the President gradually evolved in the 1990s. Yeltsin's hopes for Russia's rapid integration with the West and acceptance as an equal partner were beginning to be replaced by disappointment and bitterness about US hegemony and Russia's exclusion from a rightful civilizational place and equal decision-making in European affairs. In one of the last messages that he sent in the autumn of 1999 from China, he warned Bill Clinton never to forget that Russia was a nuclear power. And this was a very far cry from his early proposals to George H. Bush to accept Moscow as an ally, which could also join NATO. So although Yeltsin did not become an anti-Western politician, he came a long way from

his early enthusiastic pro-Western rhetoric, whereby NATO enlargement and the bombing of Yugoslavia proved to be significant disappointments (Trenin, 2014; Smirnov, 2014, interviews; Yeltsin, 2001:164, 250, 257). Thus, Yeltsin urged Russia and the West to find their way ‘only by engaging in constant political dialogue, not isolation. Isolation cannot be permitted regardless of the circumstances!’ (Yeltsin, 2001:250).

Moreover, Evgeny Primakov inaugurated a period of Russian ‘Gaullism’ or ‘centrism’ in foreign policy by trying to reinstate Russian prestige without reverting to anti-Westernism, while shifting the emphasis from the US to Europe (Arbatova, 2014; Baranovsky, 2014, interviews). Russian experts explain that Primakov’s centrism was about Russian identity in the international arena as a great power, moving away from naïve hopes and illusions about rapid integration with the West (as in the case of Andrey Kozyrev) and instead stressing the pursuit of Russia’s interests in a multipolar world (Zevelev, 2014; Gromyko, 2014; Busygina, 2014, interviews; Primakov, 2005:208-209; Primakov, 1996). Primakov was thus in favour of a Pragmatic Nationalist foreign policy that was oriented not only on cooperation with the West but also on building a regional sphere of influence in the CIS and a multipolar order with Asia’s help (Primakov, 1996). And indeed, as Baranovsky explains, a course of action that was informed by a less idealised focus on Euro-Atlantic partnership, by a greater appreciation of Russian cultural and geopolitical distinctiveness and the limits to Western affinity and degree of acceptance of Moscow actually achieved what no uncritically pro-Western liberal could – the NATO Foundation Act, which put relations between Russia and the West on a constructive path (Baranovsky, 2014, interview).

Overall therefore, the relations between Russia, the US and Western Europe provided the reference point, cognitive map and conceptual framework against which the domestic

power struggle developed. The nationalists became even more vociferous, the liberals – demoralised and disunited, while the preferred identity stance and corresponding foreign policy course of the Pragmatic Nationalists attained dominance in interaction with the effects of the external environment on the Russian polity. Hence, the general commitment to Europeanisation was ideationally diluted as institutionalised integration, regional cooperation and support for a liberal international order were contested and inverted in the direction of great power independence, the preservation of sovereignty, the establishment of spheres of regional influence and multipolarity.

Externally-driven events and processes mediated by the domestic dimension of identification

Although a policy can be driven primarily by external factors, its effect cannot be entirely predictable and is refracted through domestic perceptions. For instance, NATO expansion contributed to Russia's feeling of exclusion from European political and security arrangements, creating the impression of consolidating the 'gains' of the post-Cold War period in a spirit of triumphalism and in disregard of Russian sentiments and interests. But despite the fact that the Russian reactions to NATO enlargement were indeed predictable and even justified, the extent and intensity of these reactions were determined by domestic perceptions. The disproportionate, emotional and highly charged responses (to what hardly amounted to an 'objective' military threat) can be accounted for by the influence of stereotypes and prejudices, inherited from the Cold War (Black, 2000:240; Tsygankov, 2013).

Moreover, despite Russia's strong protests at its exclusion from the process of NATO integration, the Russian vision of what such a process would entail diverged from that of NATO allies – i.e., it is hardly imaginable that Russia would have agreed to wait in the

acceding countries' queue, fulfilling criteria and being monitored for its progress on applying principles it had not shown fond adherence to (such as renunciation of zero-sum forceful postures, democratisation and transparency of the military, cooperative rather than sphere-of-influence policies). As Trenin makes clear, Moscow would have joined NATO only if there had been an invitation and subsequent entry on the initiative of the West in a quick and unconditional process, granting Russia special status (Trenin, 2006:247). Such a view is in stark contrast to the NATO enlargement process, which includes conditionality and monitoring to ensure both military compatibility and socialisation on the basis of NATO institutional culture and the norms embodied in the ideal type. So there was a clash of visions between Russia and the West, which may not have been overcome by the extension of an invitation to Russia to join NATO.

Similarly, despite Moscow's declared commitment to Europeanisation and disappointment at exclusion from the EU's enlargement schemes, there was once more a clash of visions as to the substance of the process of Europeanisation, which clash may not have been resolved by a more inclusive agenda of the Union with regard to Russia. For instance, the Russian desire to join the EU was not matched by a realistic assessment of what it represented as an organisation. As Baranovsky argues, Russian politicians traditionally perceive the EU as one among other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO – i.e., they do not take into account the key specificity of the Union – its supranational character. There was also a lack of professional thinking about what Russia's participation in the EU would mean, especially what domestic adjustments on Russia's part this would entail. Indeed, proponents of accession never even mentioned the *acquis* that any acceding country is obliged to incorporate into its domestic laws (Baranovsky, 2002:32).

Moreover, Primakov's view of the EU as a pole in a multipolar world that could serve as a counterbalance to the US demonstrated that the organisation was perceived along the lines of a 19th century Concert of European powers, rather than a late 20th century union of states gradually pooling their sovereignty to a supranational body. Similarly, Yeltsin's concept of 'Greater Europe' revealed a concern that Russia should not be sidelined in European affairs and should exercise the influence it was due among the ranks of the great European powers.

Thus, Moscow affirmed its commitment to Europeanisation but the substance of European-ness was differently understood in Western Europe and Russia. Russia saw European integration more as a way of enhancing its prestige, being included in European affairs and having influence on European politics without any diminishment of its sovereignty, whereas in the western half of the continent integration meant the gradual (albeit fitful and difficult) process of pooling sovereignty and domestic policy alignment. It also meant the observance of human rights, democracy and incrementally the norm of humanitarian intervention, which proved to have weak foundations in Russia in light of the war in Chechnya, Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies and firm stance in support of non-intervention in the Kosovo crisis.

Domestically-driven events and processes and their influence on the Other's perceptions

Just as externally-driven events cannot have an entirely predictable, independent effect on domestic processes without being modified through domestic perceptual lenses, in a similar way, domestic events influence international views and policies, while being refracted through already existing stereotypes. Thus, by the second half of the 1990s Western European and American leaders' deep-seated ambivalence about the extent of

Russia's cultural-historical belongingness to the Euro-Atlantic space was further conditioned by contemporary Russian developments and actions.

In particular, the domestic political struggle in Russia – the growing influence of the nationalist-communist opposition, raised Western fears of the possibility of such politicians gaining power, which could lead to the restoration of the Tsarist/Soviet empire in some form. As *The New York Times* put it on 12 December 1993, the day of the Duma elections, 'The most dramatic consequence of the Russian vote may not be anything Vladimir Zhirinovsky does, but the shattering of Russia's tenuous image...as an apprentice democracy, virtually a full partner with Western nations' (Rahr, 1994:32). Western observers expressed further bewilderment over the apparent duality of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin's leadership. While many of the policies pursued by Kozyrev were seen as being in accord with Western guidelines, the domineering tone of Russian behaviour toward the 'near abroad' aroused suspicions that Russia was not at ease within its present borders and still constituted a threat to its neighbours (Teague, 1994:11). These suspicions were getting stronger in Western policy-making circles, despite the fact that a Fundamentalist Nationalist, 'neo-'imperial' policy in the near abroad could not have been enacted given resource constraints and the Pragmatic Nationalist decision to 'selectively engage' with the CIS states that Moscow had most influence upon and economic interest in (Jackson, 2003; Kortunov, 1995; Lynch, 2000).

Such fears and suspicions on the part of the West provoked some contradictory responses. On the one hand, afraid of the domestic consequences that assertive Western actions could have on the empowerment of anti-Western forces, the US and the West European states decided to remain silent about a number of domineering Russian foreign policy actions in the post-Soviet space, such as the military and diplomatic intervention in Moldova in mid-

1992 (in support of the pro-Russian secessionists in Transnistria against the central Moldovan authorities), and to acquiesce in Moscow's attempt to link troop withdrawals from the Baltic states to the resolution of violations of the human rights of the Russian minorities in those states (although no evidence of violations was found) (Lynch, 1994:16-17).

However, with time the West adopted a less supportive position. The exodus of reformers from Victor Chernomyrdin's cabinet precipitated a reassessment of the Partnership for Peace. The Clinton administration began to view it as a possible 'protective shield' if Russia slid into fully-fledged authoritarianism. Comments made by administration officials at the 1994 Munich Security Conference revealed a shift away from the previous almost uncritical attitude to Yeltsin. Then US Secretary of Defence William Perry argued that 'the responsibility of NATO is to provide a hedge if they (the Russians) fail to make the right choice' (Mihalka, 1994:8-9). Moreover, stirred by fears of a resurgence in Russian neo-imperialism, the EU began to reconsider its policy of going slow on full membership for the Central and East European candidates. Germany intended to use its turn in the Presidency of the EU in 1994 to press for the faster integration of the CEE countries (Mihalka, 1994:9).

Interaction between the international and domestic dimension of identification – impact on Russian foreign policy

The preceding discussion of the thin Europeanisation of political elite identities has to be complemented by a demonstration of the concrete foreign policies that were taken, which can establish the 'authenticity' of the expressed views – i.e., a correspondence between rhetoric and actions can show that visions about identity mattered in the adoption of policies.

Indeed, the evolving identity discourse (i.e., Liberal Westernism gradually incorporating Pragmatic Nationalist positions) shaped foreign policy as a practice of boundary-drawing, whereby an initially enthusiastic striving for Russia's acceptance as part of European civilization gave way to a stance that belongingness had to be coupled with the expression of cultural and geopolitical national distinctiveness from the West, which guided the treatment of the Other as an exclusionary competitor and not just a friend, thus reducing efforts at actualising the establishment of a shared community between Self and Other. Accordingly, the Liberal Westernising rhetoric was only sustained behaviourally until 1993. Afterwards, as a result of the inability to confirm this course through Western recognition, a deeper liberal understanding and substantiation of ideal-typical values and an internal consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration, external behaviour moved in a Pragmatic Nationalist direction. The latter was based on a mix of continuing commitment to Europeanisation, normative contestation of the key dimensions of European-ness (linked to the support for a liberal international order, regional cooperation and institutionalised integration) and great-power reassertion.

In particular, in the very early 1990s, it appeared that Russia had no interests which would clash with the interests of the West and this approach became associated with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (Trenin, 2007:70). He repeatedly asserted and acted along the line that the West was Russia's 'natural' ally in security matters, while the defence of human rights, democratisation and the establishment of a liberal international order were the ultimate goals of Russia's internal and external development (Kozyrev, 1992:287-293). Yet changes in these policies (as in views) began to be visible in late 1992 and early 1993 due to the first disappointments with the West, the growing strength of conservative groups, the negative economic and social effects of reforms. From then on there was an increasing assertiveness of Russian foreign policy through the second half of the 1990s in

accordance with the Pragmatic Nationalist discourse (Melville, Shackleina, 2005:27-65; Light, 2003:6-7).

First, as regards relations with Europe and the US, already in December 1992, Kozyrev had stunned his European counterparts at the CSCE summit with his statements that Russia was intent on distancing many of its foreign policy stances – on Serbia and the former Soviet space, from those of the West (Kalashnikova, 1994). Thus, Moscow began to adopt more assertive policies contesting the principle of humanitarian intervention, particularly in the conflict in Yugoslavia. This was reflected in Kozyrev's eight-point peace plan of February 1993, which called for a tightening of the arms embargo against the Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and for the imposition of UN economic sanctions on Croatia. Moscow subsequently remained adamantly opposed to the adoption of military measures against the Bosnian Serbs on humanitarian grounds (Adomeit, 1995:13). Also, Russia sent a UN committee overseeing Security Council actions a letter requesting permission to sell natural gas to Serbia and Montenegro for its own 'humanitarian reasons' and engaged in shuttle diplomacy in search of agreements to lift the economic sanctions against Serbia (Lynch, 1994:10-11).

Moreover, Moscow's greater assertiveness in the Yugoslav conflict was part of a larger pattern of growing Russian regional resurgence in CEE, expressed in an opposition to Central-East European countries joining the process of NATO institutionalised cooperation (Lynch, 1994:15). Yeltsin sent a letter to Western capitals on 13 September 1993, where he said that NATO expansion would be illegal under the terms of the international deal that led to the German unification in 1990 (since a (supposed) pledge was given to Gorbachev that the Alliance would not expand beyond Germany) (Mihalka, 1994:3). Kozyrev attempted to counter Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining NATO, arguing in

1993 that CEE had never ceased to be an area of interest for Russia. However, such a stance was notably absent in 1991 and 1992 (Lynch, 1994:14).

Second, the policy change most indicative of the increasing dominance of Pragmatic Nationalist views was related to the assertion of ‘special rights’ (as opposed to non-domineering regional cooperation) in the CIS. In February 1993, Yeltsin maintained that ‘the moment has come when responsible international organisations, including the United Nations, should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region’ (Adomeit, 1995:13-14). This position, however, was in contrast to the prevailing strategy towards the near abroad until 1993 when foreign policy was centred on the West and no explicit and coherent policy towards the near abroad was pursued (Lukin, 1992; Kozyrev, 1994; Primakov, 1996). But more and more figures of the political elite converged on the idea that Russia should have a strategic role in the CIS area, if it was not accepted as a fully-fledged European power (Lukin, 1992; Kozyrev, 1994; Primakov, 1996). The Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrines produced in the period were in line with such Pragmatic Nationalist ideas (Jackson, 2003:55-61).

Of crucial importance to Russia was the stabilisation of the Ukrainian-Belarusian triangle – the ‘heartland’ of the CIS, whose significance was determined not only by geopolitical and economic factors but also by cultural-historical ones, as Russia considered Ukraine and Belarus ‘brotherly nations’, rather than independent states. For instance, at the Massandra Summit in 1993 Moscow tried to force Ukraine to relinquish control over its half of the Black Sea Fleet in return for the cancellation of Ukraine’s debts to Russia (Teague, 1994:10).

Also, Moscow forcefully pursued its interests through military involvement in CIS conflicts (Jackson, 2003:76). Russia intervened in the Moldova-Transnistria conflict,

Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajik conflict in the early 1990s, with the presumed aim being to provoke instability within a republic that was following an independent path and thereby force it back into Moscow's orbit. In particular, Russia was accused of playing one side against the other in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by arming the Karabakh Armenians while at the same time helping the Azerbaijanis (Teague, 1994:10). Moreover, the ceasefire agreement reached in May 1994 marked the culmination of a single-minded Russian effort to wrest the initiative in the Karabakh mediation process from the CSCE, with General Grachev playing an especially prominent role and testifying to the influence that the Russian military had on the direction of the country's CIS policies (Fuller, 1994:13-14).

Overall, all of Russia's interventions in CIS conflicts were consistent with Pragmatic Nationalist views. In the Moldovan case, for example, the consensus over Pragmatic Nationalism suggested that Russia would assert itself cautiously as a great power and precluded Russian military withdrawal from Moldova as well as the disregard of the conflict – courses of action that the Liberal Westernisers suggested. It also made it less likely that Russia would attempt to use military force to impose neo-imperial control over Moldova – an aim of the Fundamentalist Nationalists (Jackson, 2003:175).

Third, as a result of the disappointment with the West and in order to compensate for its weakness in dealing with it, Moscow also decided to contest the establishment of a liberal, rules-based international order defined by the West and to turn towards East Asia. The Russian political elite complained that since the end of the Cold War the US had aggressively expanded its export of arms while applying overt pressure on Moscow to curtail its arms exports to Iran and India. So Russian actions such as the sale of three submarines to Tehran and of cryogenic rocket engines to Delhi were attempts to pursue a

more independent foreign policy and resist the ‘hypocrisy’ of the West (Prizel, 1998:271; Los Angeles Times, 1992).

The Pragmatic Nationalists favoured closer relations with China and, given the weakened position of the Liberal Westernisers, who preferred improved relations with Japan, there was a marked shift toward a better relationship with Beijing. Although initially Russia had signalled its desire to become a partner of Japan (considered a vital ally of the West) and to reach agreement on the status of the Kurile islands (sovereignty over which is disputed between Moscow and Tokyo), in late 1992 and early 1993 it reversed its position. On 9 September 1992, reflecting the policy change, a well prepared visit by Yeltsin to Japan was abruptly cancelled as opposition in Russia to making any concessions to Japan on the islands issue had hardened (Adomeit, 1995:13). In contrast, relations with China began to improve. In 1994, the two states agreed to refrain from participating in a political or military alliance directed against the other party. Moreover, massive Chinese purchases of Russian military hardware and a boost in the cross-border trade in Russia’s Far East further signalled the improvement of relations in the direction of fostering a multipolar order (oriented on the protection of sovereignty and balances of power) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002, Prizel, 1998:295-296).

Alternative explanations

Finally, it remains to empirically demonstrate in the Russian case the Constructivist claim that identity is significant for foreign policy-making in circumscribing the ‘thinkable’ external courses of action and guiding the assessment of interests and deployment of capabilities.

More specifically, an alternative Realist account presents Russia’s growing foreign policy assertiveness since 1993 as a geopolitical shift, whereby Moscow eventually returned to

the Realist tradition of organising its relations with the West on the basis of strategic competition for power and political-military rivalry. An important element in this supposedly timeless, ahistorical geopolitical orientation was the focus on Eurasia (the CIS states) – the space where Russia could advance its great-power interests (Morozova, 2011:10, 15-17; Brzezinski, 1997; Skak, 1996; Clover, 1999).

However, there are at least two problems with this account. First, as the analysis in the preceding sections of the chapter has shown, the delineation of a set of ‘interests’ is inextricably linked to conceptions of national identity – of what Russia is. Thus, in the very early 1990s, the leading government politicians thought that Russian interests coincided with those of the West, which flowed from the vision of Moscow’s pro-Western, liberal-internationalist, democratic identity. Yet, from 1993 onward, Russia’s interests were defined as including the reassertion of power in the CIS and building links with the East in the attempt to establish a multi-polar world order, which was conditioned by the growing political consensus on a Pragmatic Nationalist vision of Russian identity. Hence, ‘Eurasianism’ was constituted as meaningful by a foreign policy identity paradigm that emerged in reaction to exclusionary Western practices as well as the increasing influence of anti-Western groups within the polity. These internal and external processes engendered the need for positive self-inflation, recognition and a form of identification that created spaces for thinking Russia beyond and in spite of Europe (Morozova, 2011:34; Tsygankov, 2003:6).

Second, the above-described reconceptualisation of Russian identity and interests took place despite the fact that a realistic assessment of the country’s military and economic capabilities (which declined dramatically over the 1990s) did not warrant a balancing strategy. Russia’s GDP dropped by 40% between 1991 and 1999, the population was

severely impoverished, state assets were plundered, with the 1998 crisis further pushing inflation to 86% and leading to the collapse of banks and the stock exchange and to the government's default on debt payments (Bracho, López, 2005:5-6). The military was in a similarly critical condition. Shortcomings in finances for training and exercises and the obsolete status of equipment decreased the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and resulted in a mass exodus of professional servicemen. Between 1991 and 2002, 400 000 officers left, while by 1998 only 17% of potential recruits actually fulfilled their conscription, having to work in circumstances of low morale and poor discipline (Haas, 2011:12-13).

Therefore, a particular conception of identity can guide the interpretation of interests in spite of the capabilities in disposal for the realisation of these interests.

Chapter 6

Comparative conclusions

The final chapter of the thesis reiterates in a comparative manner the answer to the puzzle posed in the Introduction as well as the confirmation of the propositions and the viability of the theoretical framework. The empirical evidence presented in the three preceding chapters substantiates the development of a refined Constructivist theory that accounts for levels of Europeanisation on the basis of a mid-range theoretical exploration of identity construction, continuity and change in an interactive and comparative mode by stipulating an ideal type of European-ness as the ideational benchmark underpinning the Euro-Atlantic community.

To elaborate the above-mentioned in more specific detail, each of the following five sections sums up the comparative conclusions in respect of the key theoretical tenets of the research. The latter include the core argument about the Self-Other dynamics that (re)create an extent of Europeanisation (also linked to the ontological position about the interaction of unit- and system-level factors in the process of identity construction; the distinctive intersubjective conditions of the Self-Other relationship, the ‘measurement’ of ‘thick’ ‘ambivalent’ and ‘thin’ Europeanisation and competing national traditions of conceptualising ‘Europe’); the role of ‘Atlanticism’ (i.e., the US as another face of the Western Other) in Europeanisation; the reasons for and modes of identity continuity and change (within the context of the 1990s as placed in a general discussion of temporality, theoretical conditions for change and the empirical possibilities of social creativity that can (or indeed cannot) be derived from the ‘outlying’ cases of Georgia and Ukraine); the greater plausibility of an identity-informed argument as against Realist explanations and the relationship between ideas and instrumental motivations in policy-making; as well as the implications for Europeanisation of Russia’s relative ‘distinctiveness’ from Poland and Bulgaria.

Thick, ambivalent and thin Europeanisation as (re)created by interactive Self-Other dynamics

The three country cases under investigation respectively fulfil the propositions of the theoretical framework focused on thick, thin and ambivalent Europeanisation, which are conditioned by differentiated levels of inclusion and establishment of relations of mutual recognition and belongingness – substantiated by a differentiated extent of ideational affinity. Indeed, the overall mechanism of mutually constitutive interaction between a given extent of international inclusivity and domestic ideational affinity in the process of Self-Other identification exhibits a sustained similarity across the cases in shaping an instance of Europeanisation. Thus, in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, the separate operation of the external and internal dimension of identification was a necessary, but not sufficient condition, as these dimensions interacted and ultimately co-constituted one another. Also, the variety of elements making up the collective image of the Self and the Other cohered in each case.

Overall, in terms of the concrete establishment (i.e., ‘measurement’) of Europeanisation, the interpretive empirical analysis has shown that throughout the 1989-2000 period, the three states maintained among themselves the three different extents of thick, ambivalent and thin Europeanisation. Poland’s visions of Europe matched most closely the model in convictional, rhetorical and behavioural terms, which was encouraged and enabled by consistent and intensive Western support. Bulgaria ambivalently amalgamated gradual rhetorical adjustment and behavioural conformity with substantive ideational and (sometimes) policy-based divergence in the context of more slowly provided and more limited international assistance. Russia’s ideas of Europe quickly evolved from rhetorical acceptance and substantive belief incongruity to normative and behavioural contestation of the ideal-typical model, coupled with corresponding non-committal Western support.

More specifically, *in Poland's case*, the international dimension *conferred recognition on, legitimised, consolidated, encouraged, lent greater salience to the modernist strand of identity; sped up reforms by providing criteria for transformation and practical support; offered timely and decisive institutional inclusion and socialisation; instilled greater trust and a feeling of belongingness*. Or occasionally external influences *failed to give acknowledgement, support and commitment, which bred internal disappointments and empowered the traditionalist strand of identity*. Moreover, the variety of the international elements making up the collective image, attitudes and behaviour of the Western Other *cohered* in an overall pattern of positive identification with, acceptance and inclusion of the Self that facilitated thick Europeanisation. The EU gradually involved Poland in its institutional mechanisms, set conditions for reform and membership; the CSCE/OSCE and the Council of Europe additionally disseminated norms of liberalisation, human rights and democratisation; Germany advocated and accelerated Warsaw's inclusion in the EU; whereas the US further enabled Poland's domestic transformation and NATO membership, with EU and NATO accession developing as parallel and complementary processes.

On the other hand, the domestic dimension *shaped a strong positive identification with the West, sustained a consistent foreign policy strategy of Euro-Atlantic integration through the determined fulfilment of accession criteria and ambition to become an active and respected member of the EU and NATO, or occasionally gave rise to Euro-scepticism and empowered the traditionalist strand of identity*. Similarly with the international aspect, the variety of domestic elements making up the collective attitudinal and behavioural representation of the Self also *cohered* in an overall pattern of conviction in shared civilizational belongingness and deep-seated ideational affinity with the Other. During the 1990s, the historically continuous strong identification with the West was reinforced by party-political consensus on the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration so that even institutional

and party factionalism and fragmentation could not undermine Poland's pro-European direction.

Yet, Poland's thick Europeanisation was ultimately defined by the mutually constituted, externally sanctioned and internally motivated vision and conduct of Polish foreign policy. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the international and domestic dimension interacted by *reinforcing, complementing and co-constituting each other* in the direction of Warsaw's acceptance and integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. In the 1990s, international developments facilitated Poland's inclusion in Western institutions and its domestic transformation, which strengthened the internal Polish political consensus in favour of Euro-Atlantic integration on the basis of sustained and internalised normative compatibility. This in turn further informed Western perceptions in a positive manner, leading to more international political and economic support and more domestic political certainty about Poland's acceptance and the sustainability of its foreign policy orientation. Moreover, even very impactful, externally- or internally-driven events and developments could not have 'pure', independent effects without being subject to *mediation*, refraction and reframing by a domestic or international perceptual and policy prism, respectively.

Overall, thick Europeanisation meant that the conceptions and practices of Europe of the Polish political and intellectual elite *resonated most closely* – through consistent, sustained and intersubjectively shared principled internalisation, rhetorical embeddedness and behavioural commitment, with the values embodied in the ideal-typical model. Such close correspondence was enabled and maintained by Europe's and America's decisive acceptance, manifested in quick and substantial diplomatic support, institutional admittance and economic assistance.

In particular, the above-summarised combination of extensive and intensive domestic ideational affinity and international inclusivity conditioned the dominance and continuity of the Polish modernist, liberal-internationalist discourse. Poland's decision-makers consistently emphasised that the animating principles of their country's foreign policy were those of liberal democracy, respect for human rights, tolerance, a rules-based European and international order focused on institutionalised (especially EU and NATO) cooperation, multilateralism, consensual decision-making as well as the rejection of the use of force and a Yalta-style division of the continent, informed by spheres of influence, balances of power, concerts of powers and bipolarism. In addition, the importance of the achievement of mutual trust, reconciliation and the overcoming of historical conflicts was stressed with regard to relations with neighbours, including Germany, the Central European states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) and the countries further to Poland's east (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia). In terms of the latter, special significance was laid on the renunciation of territorial claims, imperial temptations and fixation on past conflicts in favour of friendly and cooperative regional policies coupled with the promotion of democratisation. In the realm of defence, Polish politicians extolled the virtues of a cooperative system of security, whereby states would adhere to civilian control over the military, transparency of their military planning and budgeting and would loyally and in solidarity follow allied commitments.

The dominant liberal-internationalist discourse also shaped the tenor, character and civilizational orientation of the concrete policies that were undertaken in the 1990s. The rhetorical goals aimed at the assertion of Poland's cultural-historical belongingness and normative affinity with Western Europe were enacted through the sustained pursuit of integration in the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO on the basis of the strict fulfilment of accession criteria providing standards of European-ness; through the

establishment of close ties and intense cooperation with Germany on the principles of reconciliation and trust; and through the conduct of cooperative regional relations with both the Visegrad states and Warsaw's eastern neighbours.

In Bulgaria's case, the international dimension operated ambivalently by on the one hand initially displaying hesitation, uncertainty, reluctance to commit to Bulgarian Europeanisation, partially excluding, delaying Sofia's Euro-Atlantic integration, providing less extensive diplomatic, economic and political support to Bulgaria (than to Poland), which created domestic disappointments and activated historically-informed perceptions of exclusion. On the other hand, international developments worked in such a way as to gradually and eventually grant Bulgaria a membership perspective, promote and provide a blueprint for internal reforms, introduce the discourse of European values, represent an organising framework that widened Sofia's foreign policy-making opportunities in EU fora, all of which encouraged and motivated Bulgaria's Europeanising efforts. Overall, the variety of elements comprising the collective image and behaviour of the Western Other cohered in producing an ambivalent identification with the Self. In the 1990s, the EU and NATO took much more time to commit fully to the inclusion of Bulgaria in Euro-Atlantic structures, differentiated Sofia (and Bucharest) into a class of laggards, demonstrated doubts about the country's belongingness as well as preparedness to join. Indeed, it was a critical event – the war in Kosovo, that catalysed and accelerated the two institutions' readiness to offer membership to Bulgaria. Moreover, Sofia lacked an external patron, with German and American diplomatic and economic support remaining less intense, comprehensive and steady than in the Polish case.

Additionally, the domestic dimension shaped a more uncertain affinity with the West, a weaker attachment to, understanding and cultural rootedness of European norms, a greater contestation of the pro-Western vector of foreign policy, an acrimoniously reached

domestic political consensus, a persisting East-West duality of ideational allegiances and strategic orientation. All of these 'hollowed out' and slowed down the quality and speed of Europeanisation, imparting to that process a performative rather than deeply internalised character. Overall, the various elements making up the collective image and behaviour of the Self *cohered* in the direction of ambivalent identification with the Other. In the 1990s, the UDF's virulently anti-communist rhetoric, insufficiently substantive understanding and inconsistent practice of European values; the BSP's gradually evolving ideological adherence away from exclusivist nationalist positions, the Eastern vector of foreign policy and anti-NATO sentiments; the fragmented and unstable institutional and party-political environment reinforced each other towards a slowly attained domestic political consensus.

Ultimately, it was the *complementarity, reinforcement and mutual constitution* of the international and domestic dimension of identification that produced Bulgaria's ambivalent Europeanisation. In the 1990s, the West only hesitantly began to include Sofia in its institutional arrangements, granting more limited symbolic, diplomatic and economic assistance, thus failing to establish an early and substantial external anchor for Bulgaria's domestic and international transformation. This was complemented and further shaped by Bulgarian political actors' own uncertain identification with the West, lagging political and economic reforms and weaker attachment to the values embodied in the ideal-typical model of European-ness. So the pre-existing stereotypes of Bulgaria's Balkan image and character were confirmed by Sofia's internal politics, which led to lukewarm Western support that in turn exacerbated the Bulgarians' disposition to blame its Western Other for prejudice and purposeful mistreatment, instead of focusing on challenging established assumptions. Finally, the Bulgarian case has also demonstrated that even strongly impactful international or domestic events and developments are *mediated* by an internal or external frame of interpretation, respectively.

Overall, ambivalent Europeanisation meant that the political-intellectual elite's conceptions of Europe *broadly converged* with the ideal-typical model of European-ness, particularly as a rhetorical overlay, but *frequently diverged* in terms of substantive understandings and sometimes in practice, resulting in superficial normative compatibility and situational behavioural adaptation. Such ambivalent adherence to the ideal type was promoted and sustained by the West's own hesitant commitment to Bulgaria's Europeanisation, expressed in slower and less substantial (than in Poland's case) diplomatic support, institutional admittance and economic assistance.

Thus, the interaction of more shallow domestic ideational affinity and international desire for inclusion meant that into the second half of the 1990s the political elite continued to lurch between the post-communist and anti-communist facets of the discourse on Europe before reaching a firmer consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration, with both facets showing a doubtful convictional attachment to the ideal-typical model. The vision of the former communists did acknowledge Bulgaria's cultural-historical belongingness and contribution to European civilization, where it had to find its rightful place following the changes in 1989 through adherence to the principles of democracy, human rights, institutionalised cooperation focused on EC/EU membership, multilateralism and cooperative regional relations. Yet, it took a gradual ideational evolution so that the BSP could move away from exclusivist nationalist positions, opposition to economic neoliberalism, preferences for a close strategic cooperation with Moscow, conceptions of European security inspired by Gorbachevian ideas of the 'common European home' and a view of Euro-Atlanticism that included Russia, was sanctioned by the OSCE but excluded NATO. On the other hand, the anti-communist vision of the UDF centred on political anti-communism, economic neo-liberalism, external breakaway from the Russian sphere of influence and the establishment of a strategic partnership with the US. But the either-or, nostalgic-revanchist bent of this

anti-communism failed to elaborate sufficiently the principles of civic participation, ethnic tolerance, pluralism, sustainable regional cooperation and was still attached to an OSCE- rather than NATO-based European system of security.

It was only after 1997 that the overall Bulgarian discourse began to match more closely the ideal-typical model of European-ness, including the more consistent and broad-based espousal of human rights norms, democratic and market economic transformation, EU and NATO institutionalised integration, cooperative security, civilian control over the military, transparency of national defence planning, regional cooperation, good-neighbourliness, peace and stability in European international relations.

In policy terms, there was a congruence between the pre-1997 lack of consensus on Europeanisation, whereby the political dominance of the BSP meant that their ideational dispositions found expression in an ambivalent pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration and a preference for neutrality, equidistance and balanced relations between East and West. After 1997, the general agreement on Europeanisation was manifested in an external policy of integration in the EU and NATO and regional cooperation. Yet, the UDF's performative-imitative rather than deeply internalised adherence to European norms continued to impart a superficial and situational character to Bulgaria's behavioural commitment to Europeanisation.

In Russia's case, the international dimension operated in an exclusionary manner by *side-lining, isolating, ignoring Moscow, displaying nonchalance, lack of sensitivity to Russian ideational and strategic concerns, treating Russia as a junior partner, dismissing it at times as weak and irrelevant, failing to elaborate a vision for cooperation or to provide significant economic aid*. All of these instilled a perception of the recreation of dividing lines, bred disappointment and disillusionment among the liberals, empowered the anti-

Western political forces, confirmed Russian fears of marginalisation from European affairs and ultimately weakened Moscow's resolve for Europeanisation. Compensatory inclusive schemes and attempts at fostering political dialogue, socialisation, institutionalised cooperation were viewed as insufficient and unsatisfactory as a form of acceptance and confirmation of Russia's Europeanisation. Moreover, the variety of international events and developments making up the collective image of the Western Other *cohered* to produce a more uncertain and non-committal identification with the Russian Self. In the 1990s, the EU and NATO integration processes excluded Russia (i.e., these institutions never granted Moscow membership prospects although alternative schemes for cooperation were devised), while the bombing of Yugoslavia posed further doubts about Russia's normative and strategic belongingness as well as relevance to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Additionally, the domestic dimension shaped a *weak positive identification with the West, made an internal political consensus on the Europeanisation of foreign policy hard to sustain politically and ideationally, laid the foundation for the emergence of normative and regime-institutional developments that contested Europeanisation and called for a geopolitical reorientation to the East.* All of these ultimately culminated in a *principled and strategic incompatibility with the ideal-typical conception of European-ness.* Similarly with the international dimension, the variety of domestic elements comprising the collective representation of the Self *cohered* in an overall pattern of weak affinity with the Western Other. In the 1990s, the conceptual deficiencies of liberal, pro-European ideas and policies, the reassertion of power of political groups with an anti-Western mind-set, Yeltsin's authoritarian style of rule as well as the acrimonious party-political and institutional environment all reinforced each other in the direction of undermining and discrediting Russia's Europeanisation.

Ultimately, Russia's thin Europeanisation was the product of the interaction of the international and domestic dimension of identification, which *reinforced, complemented* and *co-constituted* each other. In the 1990s, Europe's and America's exclusionary practices, marginalisation and denigration of Russia empowered and helped tip the Russian domestic political balance in favour of the Pragmatic and Fundamental Nationalists, whose authoritarian tendencies and anti-Western policy preferences together with the institutional factionalism, incoherence and inconsistency in turn informed European and American perceptions of Moscow's great difficulty in following the path of Europeanisation. Indeed, Yeltsin's and his liberal circle's conceptions of Europe were incompatible with and clashed with those of the West, which resulted in a cycle of misinterpretations. Finally, the Russian case has further demonstrated that even very strongly influential international or domestic events and developments are *mediated* respectively by an internal or external perceptual prism.

Overall, thin Europeanisation meant a general conceptual and practice-based *divergence* from European-ness, ranging in extent in the 1990s from the Liberal Westernisers' *declaratory acceptance* of the tenets of Europeanisation (yet undermined in substance by a Russian liberal vision of European integration that is still distinct from the ideal-typical model) to the Pragmatic Nationalists' *amalgamation* of discursively pro-European positions coupled with normative and behavioural contestation of ideal-typical principles. This fundamental Russian ambivalence was maintained by a similarly non-committal Western attitude, manifested in limited diplomatic, institutional and economic support.

Thus, the official Russian identity discourse retained its overall Liberal Westernising character, according to which Russia was to become a new democratic state, built on the principles of human rights, economic freedom, political democratisation and aspiring for close cooperation and integration with the EU and NATO, for indivisible European

security and the eradication of dividing lines on the continent, given that the Western nations now represented friends and allies rather than enemies. But since 1993, the Liberal Westerniser discourse gradually evolved towards the incorporation of elements of Pragmatic Nationalism with the latter's emphasis on statism, collectivism, great-poweriness, sovereignty and independence in international affairs. In this way, the association of Liberal Westernism with Pragmatic Nationalism and the liberals' own conceptual distinctiveness from the ideal type meant that although the principles of liberal democracy and European integration were accepted in official rhetoric, substantive understanding and practice differed from the ideal-typical model. As opposed to the West European interpretation of European integration as being animated by the values of human rights, soft power, democracy-promotion, economic interdependence, a degree of pooling of sovereignty, rejection of the use of force and spheres of influence in favour of multilateralism, regional cooperation and a rules-based liberal international order, for Russia European integration – as embodied in Yeltsin's concept of 'Greater Europe', had a different connotation. It represented an opportunity for Moscow's inclusion in European affairs as an influential and equal player, for the creation of a Concert of great European powers to counterbalance US unilateralism and a NATO-centred European security, for the establishment of the EU as a pole in a multipolar world. All of this was to be informed by a focus on hard security issues, the maintenance of sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs and the retention of a sphere of privileged interests in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, Russia may have aspired to become a member of the EU and NATO but would not subscribe to the principles of accession.

In policy terms, there was a congruence between Russian views and actions in that the Liberal Westernisers' belief that Russia's interests were identical with those of the West (given Moscow's aspiration to integrate in Europe as a democratic power) was transformed

after 1993 in line with the association between Liberal Westernism and Pragmatic Nationalism. In particular, the greater rhetorical focus on Russian great-powerness, sovereignty and independence was expressed in the reassertion of Moscow's 'special' Eurasian interests (even through forceful military intervention) in the post-Soviet space and in the attempt to create a multipolar world order opposing US hegemony through cooperation with China.

Return of alternative national traditions

The final consideration relates to the question as to whether the hypothesised propositions of a thick, ambivalent and thin level of Europeanisation and their empirical substantiation in the 1990s are valid beyond that decade, especially as alternative national traditions of identification resurface. Although this question should be subject to further investigations with regard to the 2000s and 2010s and is hence out of the temporal scope of the study, a preliminary answer can be outlined.

In particular, the conceptual point that Europeanisation is a dynamic and interactive process, which does not, however, lead to a progressive, linearly evolutionary outcome towards ever-greater integration and ever-growing normative compatibility on the part of CEE states, was empirically confirmed through the demonstrated recreation of historically-informed conceptions of Europe that were generally favourably disposed to Euro-Atlantic cooperation and strove for ideational correspondence at their respective, nationally-specific extents of principled affinity and international confirmation (as the modernist, liberal-internationalist conception in Poland, the anti-communist conception in Bulgaria and the Liberal Westerniser/Pragmatic Nationalist conception in Russia). But apart from modes of thinking that exhibit an overall enthusiastic commitment to a 'return to Europe', in all three countries there can also be a cyclical re-enactment and the achievement of political

dominance of (hitherto suppressed as secondary) ideational traditions that criticise and contest European-ness and the integrative aspiration (such as the conservative identity strand embodied by the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland, the centre-right ambivalently populist strand epitomised by GERB in Bulgaria and the Pragmatic Nationalist conception mixed with Fundamentalist Nationalist positions during Vladimir Putin's Presidency since 2011/2012 in Russia).

These competing and re-emerging Polish, Bulgarian and Russian traditions are laid out, followed by a (preliminary) argumentation as to why even as there is a degree of contestation and disapproval of facets of Europeanisation in all cases, the three levels of differentiation between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia on the basis of levels of international inclusivity and domestic ideational affinity are preserved.

More specifically, in the 2000s and 2010s, the hitherto dominance of the modernist, liberal-internationalist discourse in Poland (whereby conservative distrust of Germany and deep European integration was present but remained politically subordinate) was replaced by the alternate espousal and pursuit of two conceptions of Europe – the modernist-liberal vision of the PO (the Civic Platform) and the traditionalist-conservative vision of PiS (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:17). That is, PO governments adhered to the modernist views of the 1990s (Cianciara, 2008:10; Świeboda, 2007:3; Sikorski, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014; Berdychowska, 2001; Sienkiewicz, 2001; Trzeciak, 2015, Gebert, 2015, Krzakała, 2015, interviews). On the other hand, PiS governments (2005-2007 and since 2015) have set their sights on the purification of the public sphere on the basis of sound moral principles, including anti-communism, left-wing, statist interventionism in economic activities and adherence to traditional Polish values linked to the Catholic religion and patriotism, which entail a conservative view of reproductive practices (such as abortion and in vitro fertilisation), homosexuality, the secularity of the state and national heritage

(Cianciara, 2008:8; Bobiński, 2007:2; Madej, 2015; Trzeciak, 2015; Gebert, 2015; Pisarski, 2015, interviews). As regards attitudes to Europe and European integration, PiS' conservative vision is translated into a wariness of the homogenising and 'corrupting' influence of post-modern European values (such as gay rights) on Polish morality, hence accompanied by a strong attachment to state sovereignty as protecting the moral and political independence of Poland and a sceptical view of deeper European integration (Fotyga, 2008:15; Szczerski, 2005:54-55; Waszczykowski, 2015, interview). PiS' sensitivity to the country's geopolitical dilemma of being situated between the two great and aggressive powers of Germany and Russia has given rise to a suspicious, at times confrontational policy towards Berlin and Moscow, and a favourable attitude to Central European cooperation (in a reference to the 'intersea' concept of the interwar period about the creation of a Central European alliance of states between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas to act as a bulwark against both Germany and Russia) (Szczerski, 2005:49, 62; Waszczykowski, 2016; Wieliński, 2015; Ochmann, 2015, interviews).

Moreover, by the 2010s, in Bulgaria there was a political-ideational shift away from the predominant 'bipolar' political competition between the UDF and the BSP of the 1990s (that maintained supremacy over even more populist-undemocratic habits) to the emergence of populist parties (such as the NDSV and above all GERB). The centre-right populist discourse of Bulgarian foreign policy identity perpetuated the key tenets of the domestic political consensus on the Euro-Atlantic civilizational choice, including an emphasis on liberal democracy, rule of law, multilateralism, good-neighbourliness, institutionalised cooperation and constructive behaviour supportive of deeper European integration (National Assembly Proceedings, 2009, 2014:2; National Security Strategy, 2011:2-3; Sofia Globe, 2014).

However, beneath the rhetorical surface that matches the ideal-typical model of European-ness and external policies compliant with the expectations and initiatives of the West (especially when there is Western normative pressure), the convictions and political practices of the centre-right populists have revealed ideational and behavioural patterns that are even more ambivalently incongruent with European norms (as compared to the UDF and the BSP). These patterns have included forceful, authoritarian governance, illiberal majoritarianism, the conviction that ‘might makes right’ and that political expedience justifies infringements on fundamental civic and economic freedoms. Moreover, the attempt of the populists to amalgamate various societal preferences (pro-Western and pro-Russian ones) has conditioned a dualistic quality of Bulgaria’s foreign policy. In particular, Sofia tries to follow a pro-Western strategic orientation in favour of a liberal regional and international order, act as a loyal EU and NATO member and at the same time maintain intensive political and economic links with Russia, which together with the historically-informed passivity and propensity to ingratiate with external actors, limits the ability to develop a longer-term vision of Bulgaria’s place in Europe as well as to win respect and trust as a dependable, consistent and committed partner (Abrasheva, 2015; Minchev, 2015; Baeva, 2015; Mihaylova, 2015; Zhivko Georgiev, 2015; Marcheua, 2015, interviews; Dainov, 2013).

Additionally, by the late 2000s and especially after 2011/2012, the Russian identity discourse had evolved from the Pragmatic Nationalist declaratory acceptance of Europeanisation in the context of ‘deliberate eclectism’, to the growing contestation of European norms in the ‘sovereign democracy’ rhetoric and the fully-fledged normative challenge to ideal-typical tenets and the proposal of alternative European values in the ‘conservative’ discourse blending Pragmatic and Fundamentalist Nationalist positions (in contrast to the 1990s when Fundamentalist Nationalism was vociferously espoused but was

contained by the dominant Liberal Westernism incorporating centrist stances). A main postulate of the conservative discourse is that Russia is a 'genuine' European power, unlike the countries in the western half of Europe, which have supposedly slipped into a condition of moral, political and economic decay. According to the Russian point of view, Russia is now the only inheritor of the 'true' European traditions typifying Europe 'at its best', which the Moscow elite judges to be the Europe of the 19th century animated by strong state authority, patriotism, traditional family values, religion and the conduct of international relations on the basis of the balance of power and spheres of influence (Putin, 19 September 2013; Izvestiya, 2014; Kortunov, 2014; Lipman, 2014, interviews). Moreover, the conservative identity politics rejects the European concept and practice of 'multiculturalism' because although respect for local cultures has allegedly been a main component in Russian history, such local cultures cannot be allowed to challenge the moral principles of the majority, i.e., the 'Russian' (*russkiy*) ethnic core (Putin, 19 September 2013, 18 March 2014; Izvestiya, 2014). Thus, the foreign policy implications of conservatism entail that while Russia is preserving 'true' European-ness spiritually, geopolitically it is moving towards other centres of power through 19th-century type alliance politics, regional spheres of influence, use of force and zero-sum geopolitical competition through the establishment of a multipolar order (together with China, for instance) as well as the conservative safeguarding of the original UN principles of non-intervention as opposed to more recent developments related to the responsibility to protect (Paterson, 2014; Tetrault-Farber, 2015; Polyakova, 2016; Troitskiy, 2014; Malinova, 2014, interviews).

Given the above presentation of the re-emergence of ideational traditions critical of Europeanisation in all three cases, can the continuing validity of extents of distance between the three propositions of Europeanisation still be ascertained? In answering this,

special attention is placed on Poland in order to point out that despite its flagrant disputes with the EU (most conspicuously over the rule of law), the country can still retain (at least some of) the characteristics of a thick Europeaniser, especially as compared to Bulgaria and Russia. In particular, the ideational resurfacing and political ascendancy of the conservative tradition can be argued to be a reaction, intimately related to the thick (liberal-internationalist, modernist) Europeanisation of the 1990s, thus being borne out of the dualistic, attractive-repulsive, aspirational-threatening conceptualisation of Europe in the Polish national consciousness. But although this conservative reaction did indeed dilute the staunchly determined pursuit of Europeanisation, it may not be able by itself to lead to a radical break and a leap backwards, as it coexists with the modernist strand within an overall national-intellectual frame, which circumscribes the extent of normative contestation. That is, this frame shapes both a deeper historically-conditioned ideational bond holding the national traditions of identification together but it also promotes a degree of contemporary socialisation (even if performative rather than internalised) that prevents a fully-fledged break from thick Europeanisation, especially in comparison to the intensifying Bulgarian ambivalence and Russian proposal of an alternative value-code.

Thus, PiS' conservative political stances have been generally informed by a backlash against the domestic and international facets of the modernist identity approach. The Law and Justice party came to power in 2005, pledging to open a new chapter in Polish post-1989 history by bringing about a 'moral' regeneration in politics and society, drawing on Piłsudski's concept of 'sanacja' (moral renewal), which entailed 'cleaning up' public life by correcting the course undertaken by the modernists. PiS charged that that course involved the elite-led push for democratisation and economic marketisation, which, however, made it possible for the former communists to participate fully in Polish politics and avail themselves of the corruption-ridden environment of the 1990s, hence depriving

the vast majority of the population of the economic benefits of transformation and of viable democratic participation (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:18; Bobiński, 2007:2). Moreover, the deep Western political-ideational and economic penetration in Poland as well as the quick pace of Polish European integration have been criticised by PiS as leading to national humiliation, facilitated by the modernists' fervent desire for the receipt of the West's approval and support. Indeed, the conservative call for asserting sovereignty (as against the liberals' and leftists' readiness to be '*na kolanach*', i.e., on their knees) conveys the idea that only those who do not overenthusiastically await another's confirmation deserve serious treatment and can defend their positive distinctiveness (Bucholc, 2016:6). Similarly, the PiS ambition to renationalise economic assets has constituted a reaction against the post-1989 economic model, whereby the accelerated integration in the West European markets and particularly in the German value chain have contributed to low wages, large shares of foreign capital and a significant dependence on EU subsidies and German economic developments (Buras, 2017:6).

Nevertheless, although these conservative positions on internal political and economic processes and European integration have been shaped by some notional opposition (revealed in the Law and Justice party's attachment to Piłsudski's emphasis on a heroic nation resisting a hostile German-Russian international environment not least by healing the indecisiveness, formalism and divisiveness of parliamentary democracy through the autocratic practices of a charismatic leader (Bucholc, 2016:7), such opposition has not arguably amounted to fundamental renunciation of European-ness but to a critical-assertive discourse and policy that are more reactionary attuned to the elitist, humiliating and threatening features ascribed to the significant depth, extent and quick pace of thick modernist Europeanisation.

In particular, legal changes to the Constitutional Tribunal have been justified by an understanding of the law as an epiphenomenon of the sovereign's will and as subject to the nation's approval (Bucholc, 2016:8-9). Hence, the goal to alleviate the inefficiency and corruption of the judicial system perpetuated by an 'elite and self-serving clique' (which position is at once democratic in trying to make the judicial system timely and justly available to everyone, but is admittedly also authoritarian in that 'what the people want' is to be interpreted by the political authorities) (Radio Poland, July 2017).

In addition, the critique of European-ness is primarily reserved for certain issues of traditional morality (the role of the Church in politics, reproductive rights, national heritage and historical memory) and state sovereignty, whereas support for a liberal democratic international liberal order based on cooperation and equality is not questioned. For instance, Witold Waszczykowski has firmly rejected all attempts on the part of states (such as Russia) to conduct foreign policy through brute force, concerts of powers and divisions into spheres of influence. Instead, a European community of interest should be underpinned by the values forming the heritage of European civilization, which encompass Roman law, Greek philosophy, Christian ethics, rationalism, the common good, respect for human rights (Waszczykowski, 2016).

However, as Waszczykowski has explained, PiS has been skeptical about further European integration not least due to the party's suspicions of humiliatingly domineering intentions on the part of Poland's partners – i.e., linked to the (allegedly less naive) assessment that the EU would become increasingly undemocratically ruled by a few powerful countries (especially Germany, historically-conditioned conservative distrust of which deepened such suspicions) (Waszczykowski, 2015, interview). Indeed, this explanation has been reflected in the conceptual positions developed by foreign policy officials such as Krzysztof Szczerski, who has argued that the twin crises around the EU's failed

Constitutional Treaty and budget for 2007-2013 were the result of a misguided attempt at creating a 'Duchy of Europe' (reminiscent of the German duchies after the Reformation) based on an estate division of power with a clearly dominant centre, a guild-like division of interests, an agricultural nature of the economy, market protectionism and defence against outsiders (Szczerski, 2005:54-55). PiS's proposed solution to keeping the equality and solidarity within the EU has thus been a more wary and assertive safeguard of national sovereignty and the development of Central European cooperation (as a response to 'old' Europe's preference for a multi-speed European integration excluding 'new', post-communist Europe) (Waszczykowski, 2016).

And, in turn, as regards the European reactions to PiS' assertive attitudes and policies, it can be similarly argued that apart from addressing rule of law concerns (as related to changes to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal) and attempting to keep European unity and principles together at a time of a crisis of confidence in the EU, the severity of the reaction (threatening to implement Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union that strips a member state of its voting rights) can be attributed to the higher Western expectations of and affinity to Poland that shaped and were themselves informed by the thick Europeanisation of the country (Radio Poland, 5 January 2016, 10 January, 2016, 27 February 2016; Nougayrède, 2017). That is, the eager acceptance of Warsaw as a frontrunner in Europeanisation in the 1990s has entailed higher external demands on the application of ideal-typical values, and hence a more determined backlash against transgressions, so that Poland's ambition to be an influential EU member state can continue to be recognised if standards of European exemplariness are maintained.

Overall, the argument that the Law and Justice party's criticism of European-ness had a conservative ideational basis that was reinforced by a reactionary stance (compensating the perceived loss of positive national distinctiveness and pride) but did not entail a

fundamental rejection of European-ness also alludes to the shared ideational bond between the modernists and the conservatives (historical antecedents of which bond are laid out in the analysis of the Polish identity scene in Chapter 3). Indeed, there is a shared view between the PO and PiS on the vital importance of the EU and NATO framework for the security and confirmation of the cultural-historical belongingness of Poland to the West, of the establishment of Poland as an equal and respected partner within the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the international liberal order, the need to support the democratisation and independence of the eastern neighbours and to prevent the resurgence of a neo-imperial Russia (or limit the consequences thereof) (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007:88). But the attainment of these goals is subject to much more polarised strategies related to PiS' accentuation of historical grievances and the assertion of national sovereignty through confrontational and unilateral behaviour vs. the PO's more trust-based outlook readier to transcend historically-loaded problems through coalition-building and consensus (Kościński, 2015; Jesień, 2015; Lorenz, 2015; Eberhardt, 2015; Adamski, 2015; Madej, 2015; Gebert, 2015; anonymised participant, 2015, interviews).

Moreover, beyond the shared ideational bond between the modernists and the conservatives, a fully-fledged PiS attack on Poland's thick Europeanisation may also not be viable due to the socialising effects of the wider domestic and international dimension of identification. That is, the reassertion of the liberal-modernist political and societal strand of identity and the West's normative effort to bring Poland into line with the frame of an exemplar of Europeanisation can influence the Law and Justice party to soften its confrontational conservative stances.

For instance, as Kaminska's study demonstrates with regard to PiS' first tenure in power (2005-2007), the attempt to solve the Polish-Russian dispute related to Moscow's ban on the import of Polish meat products by applying a veto on the PCA negotiations between

the EU and Russia in a unilateral manner – i.e., without prior warning of European diplomats in the Commission and Council and in disregard for the cooperative and consensual decision-making culture in European fora, had to be eventually reformulated in alignment with European principles on the basis of persuasive Union normative pressure and domestic criticism (Kaminska, 2014:10, 28, 118-119). In particular, as a result of the brokerage role that the European Commission played during the Polish-Russian dispute and of the positive way in which this was perceived by PiS (Commission President Jose Barroso questioned Russia's motives for continuing the ban on Polish meat, which was viewed by PiS as evidence that Poland was accepted as an equal partner and showed the value of acting in solidarity), by the end of its tenure in power Law and Justice moved in the direction of adaptation to the European culture of consensus. PiS declared that Polish membership in the EU was beneficial in security and economic terms and that Warsaw could benefit from the communitarisation of the CFSP (Kaminska, 2014:123, 135).

Additionally, in a still unfolding domestic political development, the recent cabinet reshuffle during PiS' second tenure in power since 2015 may represent another example of conservative socialisation (even if just for performative image-making rather than substance). As Roman Kuźniar predicated at the time of the interview with the author, a confrontational stance of Law and Justice would once again undergo socialisation towards consensus-seeking and compliance with EU expectations on the basis of critical domestic feedback, given the party's overestimation of Polish society's desire for an assertive policy against European principles and further integration as a counterbalance to the PO's enthusiastic pro-Europeanism (Kuźniar, 2015, interview). Indeed, the new Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has stated his position against doctrinal and dogmatic governance, insisting that Poland is part of the West (Davies, Rankin, 2018; Broniatowski, 2017). And in a concrete move towards moderate conservatism, he dismissed Antoni Macierewicz as

Minister of Defence (who has close ties to the radical nationalist right) and Witold Waszczykowski as Minister of Foreign Affairs (believed to have complicated Warsaw's relations with the EU) (Dudek, 2018). PiS has thus tried to placate the alienated liberal cultural and legal elite and send a positive signal to Brussels (applying strong normative pressure) about the Polish readiness to cooperate on the rule of law dispute (Szczerbiak, 2018; Radio Poland, 2018).

Finally, the preceding argumentation, suggesting the overall preservation of the contours of Poland's thick Europeanisation (on its own terms), becomes especially pronounced in comparison with Bulgaria and Russia. As clarified at the beginning of this sub-section, the former deepened its ideational ambivalence by sustaining a rhetorical and situational behavioural normative compliance with the ideal type, while substantive value incongruence with European-ness has culminated in the construction of a 'police state'. The latter features the coercive use of political authority to repress political parties and businesses, the insidious placement of the judiciary at the service of the government yet without conspicuous formal-institutional changes, thus trailing at 53.8 percentile Poland's 74.5 percentile rank but ahead of Russia's 21.2 percentile position in rule of law observance (Doichev, 2014; Dainov, 2013; Bregov, 2017; Mediapool, 2017; World Bank, 2016). Correspondingly, the ambivalent Western attitude to Bulgaria has continued to find expression in an oscillation between inattention to the country (so that lower European interest and expectations have been satisfied by Sofia's shows of superficial normative performativity unlike heightened sensitivity to Polish transgressions borne out of stronger mutual identification and expectations) and occasionally reemerging European critique of Bulgarian corruption and poverty typical of delayed Balkan development (especially when Bulgaria is thrown into the limelight as in its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2018) (Rankin, 2017; OFFNews, 2018; Barker, 2018). And in Russia's case, thin

Europeanisation has been exacerbated since Putin's third term in office (and catalysed by the Ukrainian crisis) towards the renunciation of Europeanisation, the proposal of alternative, 'genuine' European values, the creation of a fully-fledged authoritarian regime and competition with the West, reciprocated by European and American determination to present a front against Moscow's civilizational and geopolitical challenge (for instance through sanctions, moral opprobrium and military deterrence) (Sokolsky, 2017; Surkov, 2018; Radio Free Europe, 2018). Indeed, admittedly, Russia's thin Europeanisation has been particularly liable to mutual, Self-Other rejection precisely because of the precariousness and practical unsustainability of shallowly rooted rhetorical declarations of shared belongingness.

The American role in the process of Europeanisation

As argued in the Introduction and the Theoretical Framework, some of the ideal-typical characteristics of European-ness can be associated with the US – as another face of the West and a key constituent of the Euro-Atlantic community. So America can impact the process of Europeanisation. In all three cases, this impact is similarly conditioned by three general dimensions: the extent of emotional-ideational attachment and positive or negative valuation accorded to the US in national identity as a significant Other; by the level of American commitment to the Europeanisation of a CEE country; and by the state of relations between Western Europe and America (of complementarity or tension). The difference in outcome among the cases (i.e., of the US being most conducive to Poland's Europeanisation and least to Russia's) depends on the concrete substantive manifestations of these three dimensions.

In Poland's case, the US takes a central place in strategic culture and national identity as a significant Other expected to play the role of a security guarantor. Positive American

reciprocation of this attitude and commitment contributed extensively to Polish Europeanisation in diplomatic, security and economic terms in the 1990s. Yet, some delays and hesitations in US engagement with Warsaw bred disappointments and fears of Poland's exclusion.

In particular, America's attitudes and policies directed at the inclusion of Warsaw in the Euro-Atlantic area and Poland's determined strategy of persuading the US of the symbolic and strategic importance of NATO enlargement to Central Europe reinforced and complemented one another in a unidirectional, consistent manner towards the *confirmation of Polish Atlanticism* and the *fulfilment of Warsaw's Alliance membership aspirations*, which in turn *strengthened and deepened the process of thick Europeanisation*. The latter was so given the conceptualisation and practice of EU and NATO enlargements as interdependent, mutually supportive and reinforcing within the realm of indivisible European security. Thus, participation in NATO schemes (such as the PfP) allowed Poland to *develop bilateral security ties* with Western European countries, contributed to a *feeling of inclusion in European security arrangements* and *provided a blueprint* for the Central European country to implement defence standards (including modernisation of the armed forces, civilian control over the military, transparent military planning). Finally, the US's financial and economic assistance *helped Warsaw fulfil the criteria of domestic economic transformation* as a key EU accession criterion, while American diplomatic support for Poland's Atlanticist aspirations further *convinced* the West Europeans to proceed in a more determined manner with the European integration of Poland and the rest of the Visegrad states.

Moreover, America's facilitating role in Europeanisation is further dependent on the state of relations within the Euro-Atlantic area. Given that Europe and the US shared compatible foreign policy views in the 1990s (such as in consolidating and extending the liberal

international order after the collapse of bipolarity), there was a significant degree of complementarity between Poland's (and indeed other CEE countries') pro-American and pro-European external activities. In contrast, in times of heightened conflict of views and interests between Europe (or at least influential European countries such as France and Germany) and America – as during the Iraq war – Warsaw's strong orientation towards cooperation with the US does not necessarily lead to greater influence, inclusion or prestige in European decision-making. Therefore, despite the fact that Polish officials and experts believe that there is a general compatibility between their country's Atlanticism and European-ness – given the similarity of values as well as economic and strategic interdependence, they have also gradually realised (in the 2000s and 2010s) that such compatibility can be strained in cases of Euro-Atlantic tensions, imposing a dilemma between Poland's pro-European and pro-American loyalties (Waszczykowski, 2015; Lorenz, 2015; Madej, 2015; Pisarski, 2015; Gebert, 2015; Nowak, 2015; Stemplowski, 2015, interviews).

In Bulgaria's case, the US takes a much less central place in national identity and strategic culture than in Poland, representing a distant and admired Other, attitudes and policies towards which tend to remain a function of the Russophile-Russophobe divide. So the Atlantic dimension served to foster Bulgaria's Europeanisation, yet coming up against the limits of substantive ideational change and pro-Russian political elite and societal positions that retain scepticism about a deep engagement with the US and NATO at the cost of 'offending' Moscow's strategic interests.

Thus, after a period of a lack of significant American engagement with and interest in Bulgaria coupled with Sofia's own reluctance to pursue NATO membership in a determined and convinced manner, the Kosovo crisis of 1999 *raised Bulgaria's strategic value to the West*, which together with the achievement of domestic political consensus on

Euro-Atlantic integration, *laid the foundations of the Balkan country's closer association with the Alliance*. Indeed, the prospect of NATO membership promoted Bulgaria's Europeanisation by *reinforcing standards of European-ness*, particularly in the areas of good-neighbourly relations, reform and democratisation of the military. The PfP, MAP and NATO's push for cooperative regional schemes such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative *fostered the democratisation of Sofia's security policy* on the principles of human rights, civilian control over the military, transparent defence planning, the peaceful settlement of ethnic disputes and friendly relations with neighbouring states. Moreover, the accelerated process of Alliance integration facilitated Bulgaria's EU accession by *contributing to the politicians' realisation* that memberships in the two organisations were parallel, interlinked and complementary (as opposed to the BSP's belief that EU membership may not necessitate NATO accession).

Yet, the effectiveness of the Atlanticist dimension in fostering Europeanisation was limited by the less than sustained and consistent American cultural affinity with and strategic focus on Bulgaria. Also, the domestic ideational internalisation of the security principles promoted by NATO remained doubtful as politicians and military officials sought to align Bulgaria formally with NATO standards rather than reform substantively the defence sector in the direction of greater modernisation, efficiency and turn Sofia into a reliable ally. Indeed, the attempt to balance Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic strategic framework with close political-economic ties with Russia amounts to a dualistic foreign policy behaviour, whereby Sofia tries to preserve its pro-Atlantic credentials, while avoiding anti-Russian rhetoric and policies. This is in line with the public's generally favourable attitude to Alliance cooperation but especially when it does not involve anti-Russian stances, given the Bulgarians' cultural-emotional links to Russia and historically-informed view of Moscow as a protector of Sofia's security.

Overall therefore, a conclusion can be drawn that the Europeanisation of Bulgaria's foreign security policy becomes acceptable to all sections of the elite and society in situations of East-West amity, which leads to a complementarity between the Western Other (American and European) and the Russian Other, as was generally the case in the 1990s. In contrast, situations of East-West enmity (as since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis) threaten to strain Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic loyalties, especially when pro-European stances take an anti-Russian character (Vesti, 2014; Rilska, 2014; Novini, 2014; Faktor, 2014; Ralchev, 2015:2). On the other hand, tensions between Europe and America (as during the Iraq war) pose dilemmas to Bulgaria not necessarily because it is torn apart ideationally between the European and American Other (since the latter is not so deeply embedded in national identity) but because of Sofia's strategic and economic priorities. This is so given that the country is co-dependent on the US and NATO for its security and on the EU for economic development (Kavalski, 2005:3; Krastev, 2004).

In Russia's case, the US is a powerful significant Other that represents a reference point for Russia's status, prestige and great-powerhood in international relations. So a recurring cycle of Russian-American interactions and perceptions can be observed, whereby Moscow's desire for Washington's recognition as an equal co-shaper of European (and even global) security arrangements tends to be disappointed as a result of perceived American disrespect and exclusion, which in turn heightens Russian expectations of a joint Russian-European balancing strategy against US hegemony. Yet, the limited feasibility and acceptance on the part of Western Europe of such a strategy leads to Russia's accusations of Europe as dependent on the US, hence to disillusionment with both faces of the Western Other – the American and the European, and an ultimate turn to Russia's Eurasian identity (as a nemesis of the West).

In particular, the interaction of the accelerating process of NATO expansion to CEE, which excluded Russia, and the resurgence of anti-Western groups within the Russian polity that opposed the very existence of NATO *undermined the Russian liberals' willingness* to establish a close partnership with the US and even become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO enlargement and the bombing of Yugoslavia were interpreted by Moscow's policy-makers as *creating dividing lines on the European continent, establishing a NATO-centred European security system* from which Russia was isolated, *displacing Russia from its preeminent strategic position in the post-Soviet space* as well as *diminishing its great-power status*. All of this *discredited democratic values* (due to the growing association of democracy with American ideological and strategic dominance), *undermined the feasibility* of the Liberal Westernisers' pro-Western foreign policy, *contributed to the liberals' identity crisis* and *enabled the rise of Pragmatic and Fundamentalist Nationalist views*. Moreover, disappointment with America led to a *corresponding positive expectation* that the EU would join forces with Russia in counterbalancing US hegemony. Yet, the Russian realisation that EU and NATO enlargements were complementary processes (rather than independent of each other as Moscow hoped), that Western Europe was a strategic ally of and not a competitor with Washington and that Russia and Europe ultimately had different visions of security *further weakened the credibility* of the Liberal Westernisers' orientation towards Europeanisation.

The major conclusion that follows from the above is that the Europeanisation of security policy and a complementarity of the perspectives and policies of the European and American Other can only be acceptable for Russia if based on the Russian conception of an 'indivisible' system of European security (where Russia, the US and the most powerful West European states shape European security in a co-equal manner so that Washington and Brussels not only do not impose their normative standards and security policies on

Moscow but also recognise Russia's own strategic and ideational concerns). Yet, since Western acquiescence into such a system is not forthcoming and Russia can only to a limited extent exploit European-American divisions in times of transatlantic conflict, the Russian reaction is to spurn both Europe and America.

Identity continuity and change

The interactive account of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian identity construction suggests that there is not only or necessarily a change of identities that are fluid, malleable and in flux (as dominantly assumed by post-modernist perspectives on identity, Caldas-Coulthard, Iedema, 2007; Howard, 2000:20) but that there is above all a significant degree of continuity of culturally-historically shaped patterns of ideas, beliefs and representations (both on the part of the Self and the Other), embodied in contemporary identity discourses. In line with the theoretical standpoints of the thesis, identity persistence means that there is a reproduction and re-enactment of long-term, deeply ingrained views. When internal or external sources of conflict destabilise identities, ideational transformation will follow the path of least resistance. Indeed, an identity crisis presupposes that in liminal situations, rationality and even creativity give way to emotional reactions and dependence on pre-existing cultural codes. That is, change is most likely to take place on the level of tactical beliefs and the styles, nuances and accents of belief expression rather than on the level of fundamental beliefs.

Thus, in all three cases, the core, historically continuous content of identification with Europe persisted: Poland, Bulgaria and Russia maintained among themselves the extent of difference in Europeanisation on the basis of (sub-regionally conditioned) conceptions of European-ness. Ideational redefinition took place through Self-Other socialisation that affected the modalities of understanding and expression of certain non-core identity

strands; the varying priorities placed on particular ideas; the relationship among political groups professing a given stance (as some are empowered and others – disempowered) and hence the relationship between identity discourses (with some becoming dominant, while others are marginalised); the colouring of circumstantial attitudinal dispositions (such as growing trust or disappointment).

In Poland's case, the modernist tradition, whereby Europe is seen as a utopical ideal to be attained and as the civilization to which the Poles are bound by mental-spiritual affinity based on a shared religion, similar cultural-scientific development and attachment to common values, was recreated in the context of the 1990s. Following Social Psychological theories of group identity, it can be argued that a liminal, crisis situation as well as strongly impactful external attitudes and behaviour can be sources of conflict, which bring about instability and uncertainty of identification and hence the urge for identity confirmation (Burke, 2006:5). As seen from the Polish case, the identity crisis of the 1990s and the process of joining a new group (i.e., the EU and NATO) evoked a strong motivation to seek the Other's support (which Poland did receive from the West) and achieve need satisfaction referring to positive distinctiveness and relatedness (which Poland also attained through its pro-European foreign policy and domestic reforms) (Amiot, Terry, Wirawan, Grice, 2010:2-3). Yet, in the rush to return to Europe and alleviate the liminal situation, alternative ideational strands were suppressed, while expediency prevented even more substantive openness to deep-seated socialisation and comprehensive attitude change so that conservative critiques of European values resurfaced once the urgency of identity verification subsided.

Moreover, it can be argued that it is the depth and extent of the identity crisis accompanied by a significant Other's reactions to the Self's liminal situation that shapes the impetus for a more substantial redefinition of identity or conversely only a reaffirmation of pre-existing

identities. In particular, after 1989 the crucial challenge ahead of Poland was to ‘return to Europe’, which required the confirmation and actualisation of the Poles’ identification with Western European civilization rather than the creation of something new. The identity crisis therefore remained most acute not in relation to fundamental identity reorientation but to the unsettled institutional and party-political setting, characterised by factionalism, fragmentation, lack of practical experience and habits of democratic cooperation on the part of the political elite involved in an acrimonious struggle for power. Additionally, Western Europe’s representations of Poland exhibited a historically continuous tendency to see Poland and Central Europe in general as much more integral parts of the West than Bulgaria or Russia, which meant that there was an overall match rather than conflict between the Poles’ self-perceptions and the Other’s own perceptions of the Self.

So as a result of the above-analysed Self-Other interactive dynamics limiting a substantive change in the content of conceptions of Europe, the evolution in ideas and identities was amenable to socialisation in the following ways, forms and styles. On the one hand, the support received from powerful, significant Others (Western Europe and the US), the gradual inclusion in EU and NATO arrangements and achievement of ‘insider status’ to those organisations *dispelled historically-informed fears and mistrust*. A belief began to emerge that for the first time at least since the partitions Poland finds itself in a benevolent security environment based on inclusion and allied commitment rather than abandonment, betrayal and occupation. Polish-German bilateral relations underwent an evolution towards greater mutual understanding, trust, cooperation and even forgiveness so that to this day Poles consider Germany to be their state’s closest ally in the EU (Radio Poland, 20 June 2016). However, it should be noted that the reconciliation process is not yet complete, with Polish grievances (particularly pronounced among the traditionalists) persisting especially as conflicting interests and historical problems (such as references in German history

textbooks and public discourse to Nazi death camps on the then territory of Poland as ‘Polish’ camps) remain unaddressed (Radio Poland, 29 May 2017).

Also, inclusion in Western organisations granted Poland greater ideational and institutional opportunities for the *actualisation and practical enactment of the Polish vision of Europe* in concrete domestic and foreign policies (as opposed to mental-cultural affinity with the West in disjuncture with the reality of subordination to outside powers and authoritarian national leaders since the partitions until the end of communism). So the successful liberal democratic, market economic reforms substantiated Poland’s belief about its belongingness to West European civilization, while the historically-informed, Piłsudskian ambition for Poland to be an influential player in international relations was further strengthened in that the growing recognition and inclusion of Warsaw in EU and NATO decision-making fora allowed a gradual overcoming of historical complexes of inferiority and isolation by the Western powers.

In addition, Poland’s closer engagement and deeper enmeshment in the EU accession process *infused attitudes to and views of ‘Europe’ with more realism and less idealism*. For instance, the fulfilment of the technical conditions for Union accession led to an evolution of the Polish domestic political debate from the symbolically-loaded, enthusiastic and abstract aspiration for a return to the liberal and prosperous Europe of the Polish imagination to a more realistic and specific appreciation of the costs and benefits involved in the Europeanisation process.

On the other hand, as opposed to interactive dynamics of inclusion, acceptance and positive identification, (perceived) setbacks in the EU and NATO accession process, relative Western ambivalence and disengagement coupled with domestic-level factionalism and growing conservatism *introduced elements of contestation and shifts in*

Europeanisation. For instance, dissatisfaction with the pace of NATO accession, President Wałęsa's struggle for decision-making supremacy and fears of Poland's potential isolation into a grey zone of Central European insecurity *gave rise to short-lived, alternative ideas* for the creation of EU-bis and NATO-bis organisations to foster cooperation among CEE countries as against integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Moreover, declining West European enthusiasm for EU enlargement coupled with the growing political, economic and social hardships of domestic transformation along Union criteria *empowered* Euro-sceptic politicians, *accentuated* the lines of differentiation among the modernists and the traditionalists and led to the overall *politicisation* of European issues in domestic politics.

In Bulgaria's case, the dynamics of Self-Other interactions have similarly resulted in the reproduction of the long-term culturally-historically shaped ambivalent conceptions of Europe. More specifically, the representation of Europe as a positive and significant Other, symbolising modernity, progress and an advanced social, political and economic model to be emulated (not least through normative imitation) persisted in the post-communist period. This representation was embodied in the society's and all of the political parties' aspiration to rejoin European civilization. On the other hand, the image of Europe as a distant, exclusive, culturally superior and even 'alien' entity – as contrasted with the backward, peripheral, 'aggressive', authoritarian-prone Balkans, also continued to inform Bulgarian views.

So how can the continuity of ambivalence rather than substantive change of historically-shaped ideas of Europe be conceptualised? It can be argued that the identity crisis in Bulgaria was more deep-seated than in Poland, as it concerned not only the institutionalisation of democratic party-political habits and arrangements but also a more significant redefinition of ideational stances to suit the ideal-typical model of European-ness as a condition for joining European institutions. Yet, this redefinition was done in a

performative manner given that a more substantial rethinking of ideas and practices required both a greater external commitment and stronger internal motivation. Instead, weaker social support and Bulgaria's peculiar way of need satisfaction (based on disengagement-oriented rather than task-oriented coping strategies when joining a new group) were conducive to a rhetorical and situationally behavioural adoption of European norms, which also turned out to be enough to gain Bulgaria formal admission in the EU and NATO and hence to provide a degree of positive national identification and self-enhancement (Amiot, Terry, Wirawan, Grice, 2010:2-4).

Indeed, a precondition cited as a factor for social identity change – a prolonged discrepancy between situationally self-relevant meanings and the meanings contained in the identity standard (that can be concretely translated into Bulgaria's self-perception as belonging to European civilization and status as a EU member as against Western Europe's continuing criticisms of Bulgaria's inability to meet standards of European-ness such as being a rule of law state), did not produce change (Burke, 2006:4). This was so because of Bulgaria's distinctive national collective experiences, beliefs and traditions (which Bulgaria aimed to maintain) as well as the Bulgarians' tendency towards negative identity self-ascription leading to resignation rather than spurring change.

Moreover, the urge for European identity confirmation was less strong than in Poland since Europe is not the sole positive, significant Other, whose praise and recognition Bulgaria desires in order to satisfy feelings of belongingness. Rather, Russia is also a positive culturally-emotionally relevant Other, which dilutes the potency of Europe as a reference point of identity.

Yet, the Self-Other interactive dynamic was nevertheless conducive to a socialised evolution of Bulgarian perceptions and practices in a number of ways, forms and styles.

Inclusive Western attitudes and actions matched by a growing domestic political consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration mobilised the efforts of the political elite, provided reassurance and confirmation of Bulgaria's European identity, which ultimately *encouraged norm compliance and foreign policy alignment with the West through the adoption of the Europeanisation discourse and its behavioural consequences*. Thus, a pro-Western normative and strategic course of action began to be pursued more decisively and consistently based as this was not so much on pre-existing ideational foundations but on the *'import' of values, principles and practices* through a process of 'harmonisation on paper' that imparted to these values, principles and practices an abstract and imitative quality.

More specifically, greater external commitment and a more determined internal impetus for Europeanisation shaped evolutionary developments on Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policy scene. Domestically, the UDF's nostalgic revanchism of the early 1990s *gave way to the espousal of European norms in a more organised and comprehensive manner, which however took on an abstract, moralising and performative character since these norms were embraced as part of the post-1989 transformation, lacking in significant substantive pre-1989 ideational antecedents*. As regards the BSP, the consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration *delegitimised* doctrinaire principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist internationalism, while exclusivist nationalist positions and a close strategic focus on Russia were *toned down and de-emphasised*.

In the realm of foreign policy, the process of EU accession *promoted the values of regional cooperation and good-neighbourliness*, which led to a *transformation* of Bulgarian-Turkish relations from enmity to relative amity as well as to the *development of friendly relations and greater rapprochement* with Macedonia on the basis of Bulgaria's rhetorical self-enhancement and the gradual evolution of thinking in the direction of conciliation.

Moreover, NATO accession *fostered the democratisation and reform of the military* and *allowed the development of a conception of security* compatible with European understandings. Finally, the OSCE and the Council of Europe *disseminated* norms of European-ness, which Bulgaria *incorporated* as part of its foreign policy discourse.

On the other hand, European and American (partially) exclusionary, critical or disengaged attitudes and actions coupled with Bulgaria's own lagging internal reforms and ideational ambiguity *enabled the enunciation of alternative foreign policy ideas* (such as neutrality and equidistance as opposed to Euro-Atlantic integration), *created domestic disappointments* at perceived marginalisation and mistreatment and *generated a greater contestation of European-ness*.

In Russia's case, Self-Other interactions similarly resulted in the reproduction, continuity and recurring cyclicity of Russian conceptions of Europe. The Liberal Westernising strand of identity gradually incorporating Pragmatic Nationalist positions (all the while Fundamentalism was reasserting itself) represented the 1990s re-enactment and amalgamation of the Westerniser-Slavophile debate about Russia's identity and dual conceptualisation of Europe – i.e., as a utopia to be emulated and as a threat to national culture, giving rise to an inferiority complex, to be compensated through a reversion to conservative Russian traditions.

So how can the recurring cyclicity (as opposed to substantive change) of Russian conceptions of Europe be accounted for? It can be argued that Russia's identity crisis was much more substantial than that in Poland and Bulgaria, as it involved the most significant challenge of transforming domestic and international normative standpoints as well as institutional arrangements in order to achieve compatibility with the ideal-typical model of European-ness (given Russia's tenuous cultural-historical affinity with Western values and

practices). In the immediate post-Cold War circumstances of uncertainty, loss of status, disorientation and the delegitimation of the internal and external system created by the Soviet Union, Russia engaged in 'imitative' Europeanisation, attempting to follow the only credible model remaining after the end of bipolar confrontation – that of the liberal democratic West. Yet, this attempt proved unsustainable given the weak external confirmation of and internal support for a Europeanised identity that failed to promote need satisfaction (linked to positive distinctiveness and relatedness). Thus, the perceived threat to Russia's national identity on the basis of a loss of status (resulting from the collapse of the Soviet-centric system and the inability to compensate that with integration in the Euro-Atlantic community), enhanced the urgency for positive self-enhancement. The latter could be achieved through an increasing emphasis on the Eurasian, great power strand of Russian identity that accentuated and positively inflated the distinctive characteristics of the in-group (Russia) from the out-group (the West).

Indeed, the prolonged discrepancy between the situationally self-relevant meanings and the meanings involved in the identity standard (i.e., between Russia's conception of itself as an inseparable part of European civilization as against the norms which Europe posits as constituting that civilization and which conflict with Russian views of European-ness) did not result in Moscow's growing adherence to the identity standard but to its contestation. This was so because the identity standard posed a danger to Russia's normative distinctiveness and self-perception as an independent great power (the Russian belief of the potential to achieve equality with the significant Western Other rules out a teacher-pupil relationship in normative as well as strategic matters).

However, despite the significant continuity in the content of Russian ideas, an evolution in the modalities, perceptions and relationship between historically-shaped visions could be observed in a number of ways. For instance, the interaction of domestic ambivalence about

Europeanisation and external exclusionary practices resulted in the *diminishing credibility* and *gradual marginalisation of the liberal vision*, the *resurgence of anti-Western political forces* as well as the *growing pre-eminence and consolidation of Pragmatic Nationalist and Fundamentalist Nationalist views*. Thus, the Liberal Westerniser discourse was increasingly *blended with* and *gave way to* Pragmatic Nationalism.

More specifically, Russia-EU interactions *transformed* the Russian policy-makers' *initially positive attitude to the Union* and *enthusiasm about prospects for cooperation* into a *psychological anxiety* about Moscow's separation from Europe. In particular, Brussels' arrangements for enlargement towards CEE states, excluding Moscow, *enhanced Russia's sense of isolation* from European normative and strategic developments, *increased doubts* about its rightful belongingness to the European family of nations, *reinforced nationalist sentiments*, *provoked opposition* to and contestation of European values, matched by a repositioning of Russia towards Eurasia.

Furthermore, Russia-US/NATO interactions in the context of Alliance expansion and the Kosovo crisis *led to a fall in the favourable assessments of America* (seen especially in the early 1990s by Yeltsin as the key state that could legitimate post-Soviet Russia's place in the international system), *spurred a (short-lived) change of foreign policy focus from the US to the EU*, *fuelled concerns about Moscow's marginalisation from European security developments* and *sharpened the divide between Russia and the West in terms of conceptions of security* (i.e., between Russian views that privilege a policy of balance of power, spheres of influence, emphasis on hard security, rejection of a NATO-centred European security and Western support for a liberal, rules-based European order informed by multilateralism and collective security ensured by NATO).

On the other hand, cooperative and inclusive interactions between Russia and the West *promoted efforts* (albeit with limited socialisation results) *at building a strategic partnership based on common civilizational roots and economic interdependence*, to be further strengthened by *growing trust, institutional enmeshment* and the *creation of networks and channels of communication*.

Overall therefore, the preceding demonstration of the persistence of historically continuous ideational traditions in all three cases over the course of the 1990s (and the re-emergence of alternative strands of identification in the 2000s and 2010s as clarified in the first section of this chapter) points to the cyclical recurrence of foundational ideas about nation-state identity coupled with limited contemporary socialisation (of tactical, lower-order beliefs), which do not entail a deep-seated process of learning of new fundamental positions and a qualitative evolution towards ideal-typical values.

Finally, a question related to the above conclusions can be how – given ideational continuity, the dynamic re-enactment and alternated ascendancy of one tradition of identification over another in policy-making can nevertheless take place. It is argued that such alternation depends on the rotation of power in the domestic political process as enabled by a corresponding international political configuration, overall guided by the spirit of a particular temporal frame and its contemporary circumstantial tasks and challenges. As Wydra explains, the *politics* of identity formation in the 1990s privileged symbolisations representing moves back to European ‘normality’ so that the collapse of communism reinforced a mobilisation of those historical memories from the pre-communist period that tallied with reaching the shores of Western civilization, all the while the West was itself advocating European unification (Wydra, 2007:240). On the other hand, the late 2000s and 2010s facilitated the return of national traditions that could

counterbalance the perceived injury inflicted on national pride and distinctiveness brought about by the enthusiastic, imitation-prone search of Western recognition. And this (recurrent) backlash was promoted by the Other's decreasing self-confidence (linked to the manifold crises in Europe – the Eurozone, refugee, Brexit crisis) and own return to national self-containment as opposed to internationalised projection.

So the past of Poland, Bulgaria and Russia endows their national memories with symbolic representations that can be empowered and drawn upon in accordance with the concrete political tasks and challenges of the times.

Further possibilities for change?

This sub-section is devoted to a (preliminary) overview of the suggestion elaborated in Chapter 1, pp. 32-35, that cases termed as 'outliers' to CEE sub-regional categories may contain a greater potential for fundamental change than Poland, Bulgaria and Russia. In particular, it is proposed that Georgia's and Ukraine's more determined aspiration to join the Euro-Atlantic space and the availability of overlapping (and conflicting) sub-regional traditions of identification to these countries provide a leeway for refashioning foreign policy identity in a more foundational manner (i.e., from thin, post-Soviet to at least ambivalent, South-east European and even thick, Central European Europeanisation). This is likely to take place in a Self-Other process, whereby the internal impetus for change introduces a discrepancy between self-evaluations and the appraisals of the Other, which disjuncture can be addressed through a struggle over the renegotiation of mutual perceptions.

Although this question requires an in-depth empirical investigation, a preliminary assessment of the empirical record points to the idea that the robustness, consistency, sustainability and qualitative substantiation of the struggle over renegotiation may be

hampered by the constraining counterinfluence of domestic and international elements of identification, containing Tbilisi and Kiev in the realm of thin Europeanisation. For instance, the powerful impact of the Christian Orthodox Church that espouses anti-Western, conservative value positions (on multiculturalism, sexuality) in Georgia as well as the Eurasian, pro-Russian and post-Soviet strand of identity and the limited ability to carry out domestic reforms on the basis of European standards of democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine hinder substantively the declared aspiration for integration in the Euro-Atlantic community (Chkhikvadze, 2015:36-37; Jones, 2003; Kakachia, 2014; Wolczuk, 2003, 2004; Lutsevych, 2013; Velychenko, 2007; Lieven, 1999; D'Anieri, 2002; Kuzio, 2002; Prizel, 1998; Proedrou, 2010). Also, the Russian determination to assert its designated sphere of influence in Georgia and Ukraine and the West's weak affinity to these states and corresponding reluctance to provide significant institutional and economic support (despite declared commitments) negatively affect international receptivity to renegotiated change towards thicker Europeanisation (MacFarlane, 2008, 2012:20-23; MacFarlane, Menon, 2014; Allison, 2009; Delcour, Wolczuk, 2015; Dimitrova, Dragneva, 2009; Kasčiūnas et al, 2014; Freire, Kanet, 2012).

Therefore, the Georgian and Ukrainian attempts at social creativity come up against the resistance of internal and external ideational continuities. Social Psychologists have similarly expressed caution about the ability of conflict-inducing aspirational identities to finally lead to a dialogical understanding of inter-group relations, given that social creativity should be placed in the context of the Other's established beliefs about the Self and the wider cultural values, which limit the content used in the reappraisal of the social identity in question (Weinstein et al, 2017:4; Dashtipour, 2009:2; Swann, Bosson, 2008:461).

Overall, the conclusion regarding the continuities of fundamental beliefs about nation-state identity in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and (even potentially and as subject to further investigation) in cases such as Ukraine and Georgia should not be taken as an overly restrictive and deterministic view that dismisses the preconditions for and fulfilment of ideational change. Rather, it has been argued that the theoretical and empirical preconditions for a transformation in identities were present in the ‘revolutionary’ potentialities of the 1990s in all three countries (linked to liminal crises, critical external events, the motivation for achieving positive distinctiveness). However, a crisis in itself does not automatically provide solutions that lead to deep-seated change. Indeed, fundamental aspects of identity refer to the core conceptualisations of the self, establishing meaning, integrity and security, and hence rethinking these aspects is particularly hard and meets with the overwhelming urge for identity verification.

So the resolution of the problem of change may evoke high standards of political morality. Following Szakolczai’s interpretation of Jan Patocka, it can be surmised that the transformation of a collective experience of liminal suffering into a genuine community able to renew itself requires the leadership of a ‘genuine’ elite (a similar argument was also made by Istvan Bibó (2004). Patocka explained that the ‘care of the soul’ conducted among a small circle of politically, intellectually and morally enlightened individuals is the effective answer to a situation of crisis. This Platonic focus on the soul thus starts with the unique potentiality of human beings to break away from their habitual, customary, taken for granted ways when they realise that these ways led them astray into vagrancy, error or stagnation (Szakolczai, 2008:56).

Therefore, a crisis can provoke a reckoning and intensive learning if, instead of being accompanied by the glorification of liminal experiences of suffering, the expectation of a

just reward and effort-saving attachment to pre-existing ideational guideposts, it becomes the starting point to at once a personal and collective conversion process of honest self-reflexivity that leads to the well-educated evaluation of the past and reading of history, the astute assessment of the present, the positing of clear goals for the future based on the overcoming of trauma and sustained international renegotiation (Szakolczai, 2008:56).

Constructivism and alternative explanations

The next comparative conclusion concerns the greater plausibility of a Constructivist – as against a Realist, theoretical framework in accounting for Polish, Bulgarian and Russian Europeanisation. In each of the three cases, Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism provide an insufficient explanation for the trajectory of foreign policy transformation since 1989 and they are ill-suited to solving the puzzle of differential levels of Europeanisation. In contrast, the Constructivist perspective is vindicated as discourse and overall policy direction are congruent with a broadly shared nation-state identity as well as state interests, although in specific instances there can be a contestation of particulars. That is, the mutually constitutive relationship between ideational and interest-based factors may also be expressed in such a way that one factor may take precedence over the other by suppressing, undermining, strengthening or making it sustainable, while both identity and interests can be reframed through cognitive and emotional biases (including deeply rooted desires, preferences, fears and hatreds, strongly held beliefs, excessive optimism, illusions, naivety or negativity bias, tendency to stereotypical attitudes).

In Poland's case and as Chapter 3 has demonstrated, Realist explanations are incomplete and insufficient in accounting for Polish foreign policy. Instead, a more plausible, multifaceted and well-rounded understanding of Warsaw's external relations is provided by what the empirical analysis points out to be the mutual constitution between identity

and interests. Indeed, ideas about Poland's rightful place in the European regional order were not *ad hoc* constructs worked out in response to the strategic challenges of the post-1989 international environment. Rather, these were culturally-historically informed, consistently espoused ideas and identities, whose expression and realisation – suppressed by centuries of foreign domination, dependence and partitions, could finally take place and be enabled by a favourable strategic situation (of a retreating Russia and friendly Germany). In this way, there was a mutually informative conjunction between what was most desirable (the realisation of Poland's identity as part of Western European civilization), possible (joining Western institutions as the only viable foreign policy option) and beneficial (becoming a member of the EU and NATO as conferring strategic and economic gains).

To illustrate more concretely, Poland's vision of Europe animated by the rejection of balances of power and spheres of influence in favour of multilateral cooperation as well as the view that regional relations should be conducted on the principle of the Europeanisation of the eastern neighbours are both informed by the indelible link between power, interests and ideas. In particular, the historical experiences of defeat, lack of capacity to engage in balancing politics, dependence on the will of the great powers have shaped a strategic culture that enshrines a belief in the importance of European multilateralism as both a norm (i.e., what a just and principled European system of international relations should be) and self-interest (i.e., what form of international relations would best guarantee Poland's independence). Polish foreign policy towards the eastern neighbourhood is also based on the assumption that it is the Polish interest, mission and ideational aspiration to expand the space of security and economic stability to the east through Europeanisation. That is, an independent, liberal democratic Ukraine that successfully institutes rule of law and market economic reforms is a vital security interest

since it will represent a buffer zone against Russian expansionism based on authoritarian imperialism and corruption. So security depends on Europeanisation, which is in turn compatible with Poland's own attachment to European values and its belief that Ukraine (and also Belarus) should be assisted in its European development – as the appropriate thing to do.

However, aside from the overall policy direction, in specific instances the relationship between ideas and interests could be expressed in the following ways. Realist power-political considerations, the expectation of political and economic benefits from taking a particular international stance, the lack of sufficient capacities and strength of countervailing factors in a bilateral relationship may *dictate tactical caution, temper ideologies and pose practical limits to the implementation* of visions and ideas. For instance, in the very early period after 1989, Poland exercised caution and refrained from openly declaring its goal to join the EU and especially NATO because of the uncertain international environment. The presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory and the absence of a German confirmation of the border with Poland called for prudence lest Warsaw provoked a Soviet intervention and worsening relations at a time when Poland might need Moscow's protection against irredentist German claims on Polish lands.

Moreover, domestic political-institutional factors (such as factionalism, conflicts over authority, struggles for power, partisanship, political instability, administrative organisation) can affect the *timing, consistency, coordination, determination, sincerity and effectiveness* on the basis of which a particular foreign policy identity is pursued. For instance, in the midst of President Wałęsa's struggle for power and the ambiguous constitutional delineation of foreign policy decision-making authority, Wałęsa's positions on Soviet troop withdrawal, the depth of Poland's ties with NATO and civil-military relations put him at odds with the government, his own advisors and the Sejm. This

discrepancy influenced the timing and determination with which Foreign Minister Skubiszewski could pursue his external course of action and impacted the degree of institutional coordination in the realm of foreign policy.

On the other hand, credible, legally-binding and enforceable formal strategic ties, guarantees of security, political and economic arrangements can be necessary for making a vision of identity *viable, sustainable and irreversible*. Indeed, Poland's enthusiasm about the OSCE and the Council of Europe diminished because other than providing and disseminating strong norms of liberalisation, democracy and human rights through institutional authority and reputation, these organisations could not extend formal security guarantees, legally-binding rules and a firm set of membership criteria ensuring norm compliance both domestically within the state and in members states' interactions.

Finally, cognitive and emotional factors can mould identities and interests by leading to *misperceptions* that can result in *disproportionately strong or weak reactions* on the basis of over- or under-estimating the significance of particular events and developments. For instance, Poland's deeply rooted desire to return to Europe, strongly held belief in its belongingness to West European civilization and historically-ingrained fear and even hatred of Russia shaped Warsaw's determination to join the West and break away from the East. And although Western criticisms and ambivalences did bring about some short-lived Polish disappointments, Poland's desire to transform itself and be admitted in Western institutions trumped dissatisfactions by engendering an even more energetically pursued effort to address EU and NATO criticisms and meet their standards.

In Bulgaria's case, Realist explanations are similarly incomplete and insufficient in accounting for Sofia's foreign policy developments since 1989. An interpretive understanding informed by the mutual constitution of identity and interests casts a more

plausible illumination on Bulgarian external relations. In particular, although the pro-Western option was indeed the only viable foreign policy course of action, following it was based not only on strategic and economic necessity but also on an ideational foundation, embodied by the place that Western Europe takes in national identity as a significant and positive Other. So the swinging of the East-West strategic pendulum in a Western direction had an identity basis in Bulgaria but given that the country's ambiguous and two-pronged affinities make it broadly ideationally compatible with both a pro-Western and pro-Eastern strategic focus meant that the Euro-Atlantic choice was arrived at in a less quick and decisive manner. And once this choice began to be pursued, it led to a situationally behavioural Europeanisation rather than to a deeply internalised normative transformation because the identity ambivalence made a thorough belief change difficult to achieve (and not necessarily desired), instead enabling instrumental adaptation.

To illustrate more concretely, Bulgaria's 'shallow' internalisation of European norms was informed by a weaker cultural tradition of identification with these norms, which was co-dependent with the insufficient level of modernisation and hence weakly developed middle class that can practise those norms. This was also reinforced by the post-1989 vicious struggle for power and strong orientation towards deriving personal political and financial gain from the post-communist transformation that limited a more fundamental ideological debate about the meaning of Europeanisation (Lessenski, 2015; Dimitrova, 2015; Marcheiva, 2015; Shopov, 2015; Slatinski, 2015; Alexieva, 2015, interviews). Additionally, the EU's attitude to including Bulgaria in its institutional arrangements represented a blend of the mutually reaffirming, historically-informed perceptions of the country's Balkan-ness and observations of its lagging cotemporary development, of the more limited diplomatic and economic interests that particular member states had in Sofia (which interests were in

themselves constituted by greater geographical, strategic and ideational distance) as well as of enlargement fatigue, buttressed by institutional path dependence.

However, aside from the overall policy direction, in specific instances the relationship between ideas and interests could be expressed in the following ways. For instance, domestic political, economic interests and strategic considerations can trump the importance of ideas in decision-making by *turning norms and values into a convenient veneer* to the pursuit of pragmatic political and economic goals (as in UDF's Euro-compliant external behaviour masking unprincipled positions favouring the accumulation of power). Or *the emphasis on political-strategic as opposed to norm-based criteria for integration can be shifted* (as in the strategic motivation behind the US's support for Bulgarian entry into NATO, downgrading the significance of Sofia's domestic credentials as a criterion for admission).

Moreover, *institutional and party-political issues* (related to factionalism, struggles for power, government instability, poor administrative coordination) *exacerbated the confusion, inconsistency and ambiguity* of Bulgaria's foreign policy stances – particularly with a reference to Sofia's degree of commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration against the background of close ties to Russia and dualistic East-West affinities.

Yet, strategic incentives and domestic interests can also serve as *conditions for the sustainability of a given norm or vision* and as *catalysts for ideational change*. For example, positive incentives linked to expected benefits (primarily of gaining an EU membership perspective) improved the credibility and sustainability of a Bulgarian foreign policy position favouring good-neighbourly relations with Macedonia. Also, the 1997 economic crisis in Bulgaria served as a catalyst, which spurred the UDF to abandon its previously amorphous ideational and organisational character in order to espouse more

consistently the Europeanisation discourse, while the BSP was motivated to transform its party-political vision towards the acceptance of social democracy and integration with the West (including NATO membership). Similarly, the Kosovo crisis was an important trigger that made the West rethink its strategy towards Bulgaria in favour of the country's more decisive inclusion in the EU and NATO.

Finally, *cognitive and emotional factors can refract both identities and interests, affecting perceptions, the assessment of events and developments and the intensity of reactions*. For example, the 1997 crisis induced a fear in the political class that a similar crisis accompanied by even stronger delegitimation of the political status quo may happen again, which accelerated the achievement of consensus on the desirability of EU and NATO membership.

In Russia's case, Realist theory similarly provides an incomplete and insufficient explanation of Moscow's assertiveness against the West. Instead, a theoretical perspective focusing on the mutual constitution of identity and interests can contribute to a more well-rounded understanding. In particular, Russia's cooperative attitudes and policies in the early 1990s were shaped by identity motivations (linked to the aspiration to construct the country's Europeanised identity on the basis of integration in the Euro-Atlantic community), which also proved to be the most beneficial choice, given that a bandwagoning strategy with the West could bring both economic profit and international political prestige. However, Moscow's growing focus on balancing the West and opposing American unilateralism – gaining ground in the mid-1990s, was not necessarily based on an 'objective' assessment of capacities and potential alliances that warranted a balancing strategy. Rather, a pattern can be observed, whereby as Russian policy-makers' desire for integration and cooperation with Europe and America is disappointed, Russian claims to equality with the West are not recognised and Russia's belief in itself as an inseparable

part of European civilization is ambivalently received and contested through the West's standards of European-ness (which Moscow cannot fulfil), then the Russians spurn the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, perceived offence to Russia's European self-conceptions and great power identity, rather than a definitive shift in capabilities, motivate the state to seek to balance against the West.

However, aside from the overall policy direction, in specific instances the relationship between ideas and interests could be expressed in the following ways. Instrumental calculations can lead to *tactical accommodation that subdues normative visions and ideas* for the sake of *political expediency*, as was the case with Yeltsin's and his liberal circle's adjustment to some of the foreign policy demands of Pragmatic Nationalist and Fundamentalist Nationalist political forces in return for a continued enunciation of the goal of Europeanisation (MacFarlane, 1993:12). Also, the lack of sufficient strategic, material and interest-focused incentives and foundations can *undermine the long-term sustainability of visions and ideas*. For instance, the EU-Russia PCA agreement was limited in its achievements because it was not underlined by concrete mechanisms of practical substantiation or solutions aimed to alleviate Russian concerns for equal treatment and decision-making.

Moreover, institutional factors can affect the *consistency, timing and coherence* of ideational positions, while also having *symbolic implications*. For example, the sectionalism, partisanship and fluidity of the institutional and party-political environment in Russia contributed to a disarray in the Russian foreign policy-making process that exacerbated the ideational divisions through the incoherent espousal of conflicting stances and the creation of an image of unpredictability among Moscow's Western partners. In addition, the institutional exclusion of Russia from deeper integration with the EU symbolised Moscow's growing civilizational separation from Europe.

On the other hand, ideas can represent and develop into *ideologised conceptions disconnected from an appreciation of material capacities and interests*. For instance, in the early 1990s, the liberal view that Russia's interests coincided with those of the West and the proclamation of an 'imagined' Europeanised identity of Russia – expected to be easily achieved and quickly recognised by Europe, overlooked resource constraints that prevented the Russians from transitioning to a market economy and side-lined a realistic consideration of conflicting external objectives and differences of values and interests between Russia and the West.

Finally, cognitive and emotional biases *can reframe identities and interests and produce misperceptions, a distorted assessment of events and processes and a disproportionate intensity of reactions*. In particular, Yeltsin's peculiar conduct of foreign policy – informed by his own intuitions and instincts, prevented the development of a well-thought out international direction, which could have otherwise contributed to a more sensitive approach aiming to understand and address (rather than disappointedly deplore) Western anxieties about Moscow. Also, Russia's deeply rooted prejudices and irrational fears of NATO significantly exacerbated Russian policy-makers' negative perceptions of the consequences of NATO expansion for Moscow's security. On a more general level, Russia's and the West's perceptions of each other led to a cycle of misinterpretation and misunderstanding. In the 1990s, Western Europe and the US had concerns about Russian internal political dynamics, hugely overblowing Moscow's desire and ability to restore a CIS-based empire hostile to the West and therefore did not want to take risks when dealing with Russia (such as integrating it more decisively in the Euro-Atlantic community). But this attitude was interpreted by the Russians as hostility and a clever ploy aimed at subordinating Russia. Thus, there was a problem of interpreting and understanding

correctly the motivation of the actions of the Other, with both sides being prone to the perpetuation of a negativity bias.

Russia's 'distinctiveness'

The final concluding remarks concern the relative 'distinctiveness' of the Russian case – an issue raised in the methodological discussion of Chapter 1. Rather than making Russia incomparable to Poland and Bulgaria (which has been shown not to be so given that all three states share patterns of similarity and difference as part of their sub-regional belongingness, with the same interactive-ideational factors conditioning the extent of Europeanisation), Russia's discreteness has stemmed from and simultaneously reinforced its 'thin' Europeanisation, as reiterated below. Indeed, the establishment of the 'thin' Russian adherence to and practice of the ideal-typical value positions does not cast the country as incomparable to and disconnected from the variety of understandings and manifestations of Europe in CEE. In Russia – as in the other Central and East European states, such understandings have developed historically in a relationship (of assimilation or contestation) to the West European model so that even the elaboration of distinct Fundamentalist Nationalist values denouncing European-ness takes place through a process of resentment (that aims to compensate through positive self-inflation for perceived humiliation and underdevelopment) in respect of Western Europe and its norms (Gudkov, 2014, interview).

More specifically, the strand of Moscow's great power identity added a further element of opposition to and contestation of ideal-typical European-ness on top of the normative differences from the ideal type (related to the weakness of historically-informed Russian ideas and traditions of liberal democracy, market economy, support for a multilateral, liberal, rules-based regional and international order and institutionalised cooperation). That

is, perceived Western non-recognition of Russia as an equal, rather than junior, partner with its own sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and lack of respect for what Moscow considers to be its special geopolitical and normative status (given the understanding that a great power cannot simply be a follower of others' interests as well as values) *complemented, reinforced and enabled ideational divergence by engendering disappointment among the liberal, pro-European politicians, empowering the conservatives and facilitating the latter's attempts at creating an alternative international order based on a distinct values system.*

Also, the collapse of the multi-national Soviet empire *complicated the identity crisis* in Russia (as the former imperial centre), imparting more conflicting elements of identity than in the Polish and Bulgarian cases (and hence a greater polarisation of political-intellectual views – from 'liberal' to 'imperialist'). Of particular importance has been the legacy of lingering imperial consciousness (especially with its pan-eastern Slavic bent) as well as the ethnic Russians remaining outside the borders of the post-1991 Russian state, which have compounded the nation-building process (already made difficult by the distinction between *russkie* and *rossiyane*), created temptations for a neo-imperial and forceful foreign policy aimed at 'protecting' compatriots living abroad and contradicted European norms of good-neighbourliness.

Moreover, the absence of 'institutionalisation' – i.e., the exclusion of Russia from European institutional arrangements *created disappointments with the West* and a *psychological anxiety* about Russian isolation from European civilization, *delegitimised Europeanisation* and *failed to provide an institutional anchor for liberal reforms*. Yet, this does not make Russia incomparable to Poland and Bulgaria given the observation – following Alexander Wendt – that 'international institutions are what states make of them'. That is, institutions obtain meaning and are interpreted as part of ideationally constructed

visions of Europe, whereby the Poles' greater affinity with the ideal type of European-ness contributed to their early calls for inclusion in Euro-Atlantic organisations and advanced the fulfilment of accession criteria. In Bulgaria's case, the firm prospect of EU and NATO membership provided an institutional anchor for reforms, promoted the Europeanisation discourse and the Euro-Atlantic choice but did not resolve the ideational ambivalences of the Bulgarians. And in Russia's case, an offer of accession to the EU and/or NATO could not have been made due to Moscow's understanding of the Union as a pole in a multipolar world order that would balance US unilateralism, its unwillingness and inability to follow European norms (such as consensual international decision-making) and its aversion to external monitoring of normative and legal compliance required of accession states (given Russia's insistence on sovereignty and independence as a great power).

Finally, Russia's presence as an additional 'Other' for Poland and Bulgaria affected the latter countries' Europeanisation, yet without representing an alternative or crucial ideational guidepost to the process of establishing the affinities and boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic community – as benchmarked by the West. In particular, *the Western Other's impact on Europeanisation was strengthened or diluted depending on the positive or negative valuation attributed to the Russian Other* (as already demonstrated in the section on Atlanticism and Europeanisation in this chapter). In Poland's case, Russia is conceptualised as a negative Other opposite to Europe in cultural and security terms, which shaped the decisive Polish embrace of the West and rejection of the East (matched by the West's own weak identification with Moscow). In Bulgaria's case, the recognition of similarities to and differences from both Europe and Russia as well as the tenuous affinity with the US and historical conception of Moscow as a security guarantor have conditioned East-West ambivalences and hence a surface-level rather than substantively supported Euro-Atlantic choice.

Conclusion

Overall therefore, the above-presented comparative conclusions point to the analytical plausibility of a research framework that investigates the differential Europeanisation of the foreign policy identities of former communist states on the basis of a mid-range, comparative, interactive Constructivist theory of identity construction, continuity and change. All three cases demonstrate sustained similarity with regard to the mechanisms of the interaction of the international and domestic dimension of identification, of the ways in which identity persists or evolves, of the role of ideational influences (as against rational power maximisation) in foreign policy conduct. Yet, the cases differ in respect of the substantive manifestations of Europeanisation – i.e., of their conceptions of Europe, which condition three levels of ideational affinity (‘thick’, ‘ambivalent’ and ‘thin’) with the ideal-typical model, matched by three levels of depth and extent of inclusive commitment on the part of the Western Other.

More generally, the persistent impact of culturally-historically informed visions of Europe shows that Europeanisation is not a linear-evolutionary process in which the ‘old legacies’ can be easily and quickly overcome. Rather, the past weighs in on the present so that history repeats itself in contemporary forms. Thus, the formal institutional end of one political regime may obscure the continuity of ideas and identities that affect the viability of the implementation of ‘rationally engineered’ institutions and policies.

Hence, if the West becomes more conscious of, attuned to and embraces the multiplicity of at once nationally specific and sub-regionally conditioned identities of the post-communist states (rather than itself react on the basis of deeply ingrained attitudes) may be conducive to raising awareness of the historicity, diversity and CEE contributions to the idea and practice of Europe. This may also help come to grips with the challenge from within the

West to the liberal democratic, market economic, cooperative-inclusive-multilateral model, whose expected universalisation and ‘timelessness’ conceals its temporal political ascendancy, which may subside if disempowered. Britain’s decision to leave the EU, Donald Trump’s election as President, the multiple crises of Europe (and above all the nationalist-populist trend) have starkly demonstrated that the value dimensions of European-ness (a liberal international order, institutionalised integration, cooperative regional relations) are not incontestable but represent one among other Western traditions, including nationalism, total war, politics of spheres of influence and disengagement from Central-Eastern Europe. Such contestation may swing the pendulum from the ideal of European unification and solidarity – coupled with obliviousness to the particular histories of CEE states, to a retrenchment of the Europeanisation project and the possible reinforcement of the historically-shaped dividing lines of Europe between the Western ‘core’ and the Eastern ‘periphery’.

Appendix I

Alphabetically ordered list of acronyms and initialisms used in the thesis

Note: the abbreviations of certain foreign language words (e.g. political parties) may be based on the commonly accepted initialisation in the corresponding language – Polish, Bulgarian and Russian. Bulgarian and Russian are transliterated

ABM Treaty	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ABV	Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (initials from Bulgarian – <i>Alternativa za bulgarsko vuzrazhdane</i>)
ATAKA	Attack (Bulgarian – <i>Ataka</i>)
AWS	Solidarity Electoral Action (initials from Polish – <i>Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność</i> ; since 1997 – <i>Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy</i> (AWSP) or Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right)
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party (English initials commonly used – <i>Bulgarska komunisticheska partiya</i>)
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party (initials in Bulgarian and English coincide – <i>Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya</i>)
BSS	Black Sea Synergy
CE	Central Europe
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CFE Treaty	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CVM	Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
DM	German mark (initials from German – <i>Deutsche Mark</i>)
EC	European Communities
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	Eastern Partnership
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy,

	CSDP or Common Security and Defence Policy since 2009
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G7	Group of Seven
GERB	Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (initials from Bulgarian – <i>Grazhdani za evropeiskoto razvitie na Bulgariya</i>)
IFOR/SFOR	Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
KGB	Committee for State Security (initials from Russian – <i>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti</i>)
KLD	Liberal Democratic Congress (initials from Polish – <i>Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny</i>)
KPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation (initials from Russian – <i>Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii</i>)
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Russian and English initials coincide – <i>Liberalno-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii</i>)
LPR	League of Polish Families (initials from Polish – <i>Liga Polskich Rodzin</i>)
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MRF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms (English initials commonly used; otherwise in Bulgarian – DPS – <i>Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi</i>)
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDSV	National Movement Simeon II (initials from Bulgarian – <i>Natsionalno dvizhenie Simeon Vtori</i> ; renamed in 2007 into National Movement for Stability and Progress – <i>Natsionalno dvizhenie za stabilnost i vuzhod</i>)
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation

	in Europe
PARNAS	People's Freedom Party (<i>Partiya narodnoy svobody</i>); since 2012 – merger of the Republican Party (<i>Respublikanskaya partiya Rossii</i> – RPR) and the People's Freedom Party into RPR–PARNAS
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PES	Party of European Socialists
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PiS	Law and Justice (initials from Polish – <i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i>)
PO	Civic Platform (initials from Polish – <i>Platforma Obywatelska</i>)
Progress Party	<i>Partiya progressa</i>
PSL	Polish Peasants' Party (initials from Polish – <i>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</i>)
RB	Reformist Bloc (Bulgarian and English initials coincide – <i>Reformatorski blok</i>)
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SdRP	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (initials in Polish and English coincide – <i>Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej</i>)
SEE	South-eastern Europe
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance (initials from Polish – <i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i>)
SR	A Just Russia (initials from Russian – <i>Spravedlivaya Rossiya</i>)
SRP	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (initials from Polish – <i>Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej</i>)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UD	Democratic Union (initials from Polish – <i>Unia Demokratyczna</i>)
UDF	Union of Democratic Forces (English initials commonly used; otherwise – SDS – <i>Suyuz na demokratichnite sili</i>)
UN	United Nations
United Russia	<i>Yedinaya Rossiya</i>
UP	Labour Union (initials from Polish – <i>Unia Pracy</i>)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Freedom Union (initials from Polish – <i>Unia Wolności</i>)
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (initials from Bulgarian –

	<i>Vutreshna makedonska revolyutsionna organizatsiya</i>)
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation
Yabloko	Apple, Russian United Democratic Party (<i>Rossiyskaya obyedinyonnaya demokraticeskaya partiya</i>)
ZChN	Christian National Union (initials from Polish – <i>Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe</i>)

Appendix II

Chronologically ordered lists of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian Presidents and Governments (including Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers) since 1989

Poland

President and supporting party	Term in office
Wojciech Jaruzelski Polish United Workers' Party	31 December 1989 – 23 December 1990
Lech Wałęsa Solidarity Citizens' Committee	23 December 1990 – 23 December 1995
Aleksander Kwaśniewski Democratic Left Alliance	23 December 1995 – 23 December 2000
Aleksander Kwaśniewski Independent	23 December 2000 – 23 December 2005
Lech Kaczyński Law and Justice	23 December 2005 – 10 April 2010
Bronisław Komorowski Civic Platform; Acting President	10 April 2010 – 8 July 2010
Bogdan Borusewicz Civic Platform; Acting President	8 July 2010 – 8 July 2010
Grzegorz Schetyna Civic Platform; Acting President	8 July 2010 – 6 August 2010
Bronisław Komorowski Civic Platform	6 August 2010 – 6 August 2015
Andrzej Duda Law and Justice	6 August 2015 – incumbent

*Source: official website of the President of the Republic of Poland:
<http://www.president.pl/en/president/polish-presidents/>*

Prime Minister's government; political party/parties in power	Foreign Minister	Government's term in office
Tadeusz Mazowiecki Solidarity Citizens' Committee United People's Party Polish United Workers' Party Democratic Party	Krzysztof Skubiszewski 12 September 1989 – 25 October 1993	24 August 1989 – 4 January 1991
Jan Olszewski Centre Agreement		Failed to form a government and resigned
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki Liberal Democratic Congress	Krzysztof Skubiszewski 12 September 1989 – 25 October 1993	4 January 1991 – 6 December 1991

Christian National Union Centre Agreement Democratic Party		
Bronisław Geremek Democratic Union		Failed to form a government and resigned
Jan Olszewski Centre Agreement Christian National Union	Krzysztof Skubiszewski 12 September 1989 – 25 October 1993	6 December 1991 – 5 June 1992
Waldemar Pawlak Polish People's Party	Krzysztof Skubiszewski 12 September 1989 – 25 October 1993	5 June 1992 – 10 July 1992
Hanna Suchocka Democratic Union Liberal Democratic Congress Christian National Union	Krzysztof Skubiszewski 12 September 1989 – 25 October 1993	10 July 1992 – 26 October 1993
Waldemar Pawlak Democratic Left Alliance Polish People's Party	Andrzej Olechowski 26 October 1993 – 6 March 1995	26 October 1993 – 7 March 1995
Józef Oleksy Democratic Left Alliance Polish People's Party	Władysław Bartoszewski 7 March 1995 – 22 December 1995 Dariusz Rosati 29 December 1995 – 31 October 1997	7 March 1995 – 7 February 1996
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz Democratic Left Alliance Polish People's Party	Dariusz Rosati 29 December 1995 – 31 October 1997	7 February 1996 – 31 October 1997
Jerzy Buzek Solidarity Electoral Action Freedom Union	Bronisław Geremek 31 October 1997 – 30 June 2000 Władysław Bartoszewski 30 June 2000 – 19 October 2001	31 October 1997 – 19 October 2001
Leszek Miller Democratic Left Alliance Labour Union Polish People's Party	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 19 October 2001 – 5 January 2005	19 October 2001 – 2 May 2004
Marek Belka Democratic Left Alliance Labour Union	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 19 October 2001 – 5 January 2005 Adam Rotfeld 5 January 2005 – 31 October 2005	2 May 2004 – 31 October 2005
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz Law and Justice Self-Defence League of Polish Families	Stefan Meller 31 October 2005 – 9 May 2006 Anna Fotyga 9 May 2006 – 16 November 2007	31 October 2005 – 14 July 2006

Jarosław Kaczyński Law and Justice Self-Defence League of Polish Families	Anna Fotyga 9 May 2006 – 16 November 2007	14 July 2006 – 16 November 2007
Donald Tusk Civic Platform Polish People's Party	Radosław Sikorski 16 November 2007 – 22 September 2014	16 November 2007 – 18 November 2011
Donald Tusk Civic Platform Polish People's Party	Radosław Sikorski 16 November 2007 – 22 September 2014	18 November 2011 – 22 September 2014
Ewa Kopacz Civic Platform Polish People's Party	Grzegorz Schetyna 22 September 2014 – 16 November 2015	22 September 2014 – 16 November 2015
Beata Szydło Law and Justice	Witold Waszczykowski 16 November 2015 – 9 January 2018	16 November 2015 – 11 December 2017
Mateusz Morawiecki Law and Justice	Jacek Czaputowicz 9 January 2018 – incumbent	11 December 2017 – incumbent

Source: official website of the Premier and ministerial cabinet of the Republic of Poland; official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland:

<https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/people.html>

http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/ministry/polish_diplomacy_archive/former_ministers/

Bulgaria

President and supporting party	Term in office
Zhelyu Zhelev Independent Union of Democratic Forces	1 August 1990 – 22 January 1997
Petar Stoyanov Union of Democratic Forces	22 January 1997 – 22 January 2002
Georgi Parvanov Bulgarian Socialist Party	22 January 2002 – 22 January 2007
Georgi Parvanov Independent Bulgarian Socialist Party	22 January 2007 – 22 January 2012
Rosen Plevneliev Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria	22 January 2012 – 22 January 2017
Rumen Radev Independent Bulgarian Socialist Party	22 January 2017 – incumbent

*Source: official website of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria:
<https://www.president.bg/cat73/Prezidentite-na-Bulgaria/>*

Prime Minister's government; political party/parties in power	Foreign Minister	Government's term in office
Andrey Lukanov Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party Experts	Boiko Dimitrov 17 November 1989 – 22 September 1990	8 February 1990 – 22 September 1990
Andrey Lukanov Bulgarian Socialist Party	Lyuben Gotsev 22 September 1990 – 20 December 1990	22 September 1990 – 20 December 1990
Dimitar Popov Independents Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces Bulgarian Agrarian National Union	Viktor Valkov 20 December 1990 – 8 November 1991	20 December 1990 – 8 November 1991
Filip Dimitrov Union of Democratic Forces Experts	Stoyan Ganev 8 November 1991 – 30 December 1992	8 November 1991 – 30 December 1992
Lyuben Berov Independents Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Lyuben Berov 30 December 1992 – 23 June 1993 Stanislav Daskalov 23 June 1993 – 17 October 1994	30 December 1992 – 17 October 1994

Reneta Indjova Interim government	Ivan Stanchov 17 October 1994 – 25 January 1995	17 October 1994 – 25 January 1995
Zhan Videnov Bulgarian Socialist Party Bulgarian Agrarian National Union	Georgi Pirinski 25 January 1995 – 12 February 1997	25 January 1995 – 12 February 1997
Stefan Sofiyanski Interim government	Stoyan Stalev 12 February 1997 – 21 May 1997	12 February 1997 – 21 May 1997
Ivan Kostov Union of Democratic Forces Bulgarian Agrarian National Union	Nadezhda Mihaylova 21 May 1997 – 24 July 2001	21 May 1997 – 24 July 2001
Simeon Saksoburggotski National Movement Simeon II Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Solomon Passy 24 July 2001 – 16 August 2005	24 July 2001 – 16 August 2005
Sergey Stanishev Bulgarian Socialist Party National Movement Simeon II Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Ivaylo Kalfin 16 August 2005 – 27 July 2009	16 August 2005 – 27 July 2009
Boiko Borissov Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria	Rumiana Jeleva 27 July 2009 – 27 January 2010 Nikolay Mladenov 27 January 2010 – 13 March 2013	27 July 2009 – 13 March 2013
Marin Raikov Interim government	Marin Raikov 13 March 2013 – 29 May 2013	13 March 2013 – 29 May 2013
Plamen Oresharski Bulgarian Socialist Party Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Kristian Vigenin 29 May 2013 – 6 August 2014	29 May 2013 – 6 August 2014
Georgi Bliznashki Interim government	Daniel Mitov 6 August 2014 – 7 November 2014	6 August 2014 – 7 November 2014
Boiko Borissov Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria Reformist Bloc Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (withdrew from the coalition government in May 2016)	Daniel Mitov 7 November 2014 – 27 January 2017	7 November 2014 – 27 January 2017
Ognyan Gerdzjikov	Radi Naidenov	27 January 2017 – 4 May

Interim government	27 January 2017 – 4 May 2017	2017
Boiko Borissov Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria United Patriots	Ekaterina Zaharieva 4 May 2017 – incumbent	4 May 2017 – incumbent

Source: official website of the Premier and the ministerial cabinet of the Republic of Bulgaria; official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bulgaria; news outlets:

<http://www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0034&n=7&q>

<http://www.mfa.bg/pages/250/index.html>

http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=1300356

Russia

President and supporting party	Term in office
Boris Yeltsin Democratic Russia Movement	10 July 1991 – 9 August 1996
Boris Yeltsin Independent	9 August 1996 – 31 December 1999
Vladimir Putin Unity; Acting President	31 December 1999 – 7 May 2000
Vladimir Putin Unity until 2001; then independent	7 May 2000 – 7 May 2004
Vladimir Putin United Russia	7 May 2004 – 7 May 2008
Dmitry Medvedev United Russia	7 May 2008 – 7 May 2012
Vladimir Putin United Russia	7 May 2012 – 7 May 2018
Vladimir Putin Independent All-Russia People's Front	7 May 2018 – incumbent

*Source: official website of the President of the Russian Federation:
<http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/president/presidents>*

Prime Minister's government; political party/parties in power	Foreign Minister	Government's term in office
Boris Yeltsin Independent	Andrey Kozyrev 11 October 1990 – 5 January 1996	6 November 1991 – 15 June 1992
Yegor Gaidar Independent	Andrey Kozyrev 11 October 1990 – 5 January 1996	15 June 1992 – 14 December 1992
Viktor Chernomyrdin Our Home – Russia	Andrey Kozyrev 11 October 1990 – 5 January 1996 Evgeny Primakov 10 January 1996 – 11 September 1998	14 December 1992 – 23 March 1998
Sergey Kiriyenko Independent	Evgeny Primakov 10 January 1996 – 11 September 1998	23 March 1998 – 23 August 1998
Viktor Chernomyrdin Our Home – Russia	Evgeny Primakov 10 January 1996 – 11 September 1998	23 August 1998 – 11 September 1998
Evgeny Primakov Fatherland – All Russia	Igor Ivanov 30 September 1998 – 24 February 2004	11 September 1998 – 12 May 1999

Sergey Stepashin Independent	Igor Ivanov 30 September 1998 – 24 February 2004	12 May 1999 – 9 August 1999
Vladimir Putin Unity	Igor Ivanov 30 September 1998 – 24 February 2004	9 August 1999 – 7 May 2000
Mikhail Kasyanov Independent	Igor Ivanov 30 September 1998 – 24 February 2004	7 May 2000 – 24 February 2004
Viktor Khristenko Independent	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	24 February 2004 – 5 March 2004
Mikhail Fradkov Independent	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	5 March 2004 – 14 September 2007
Viktor Zubkov United Russia	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	14 September 2007 – 8 May 2008
Vladimir Putin United Russia	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	8 May 2008 – 7 May 2012
Viktor Zubkov United Russia	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	7 May 2012 – 8 May 2012
Dmitry Medvedev United Russia	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	8 May 2012 – incumbent
Dmitry Medvedev United Russia	Sergey Lavrov 24 February 2004 – incumbent	8 May 2018 – incumbent

Source: official website of the Premier and the ministerial cabinet of the Russian Federation; official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; news outlets:

<http://government.ru/gov/>

<http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/ministry.nsf/info/01.03.01.01>

http://www.idd.mid.ru/glavy_vneshnepol_ved.html

https://ria.ru/photolents/20120508/636637541_635762213.html

<http://kommersant.ru/doc/2745761>

Appendix III

Alphabetically ordered list of the author's interviewees in Russia, Poland and Bulgaria

Russia: fieldwork conducted as a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, 1 June 2014 – 1 August 2014

Nadezhda Arbatova – interviewed on 7 July 2014 – Head of Department of European Political Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); Director for Policy Studies at the Committee 'Russia in the United Europe' (2001-2007); Director of the Foundation for European Integration; member of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP); representative of Russia in the Association of the French Institute of Higher National Defence Studies

Vladimir Baranovsky – interviewed on 23 July 2014 – Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); member of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, member of the European Security Forum (ESF), Brussels; Vice-President of the Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation; member of the Council of the Russian International Studies Association; Professor at the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)

Irina Busygina – interviewed on 3 July 2014 – Professor of Comparative Politics at MGIMO; Director of the Centre for Regional Political Studies, MGIMO; formerly Head of Division for Regional and Social Problems, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences

Alexey Fenenko – interviewed on 23 June 2014 – Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Associate Professor at Moscow State University

Alexey Gromyko – interviewed on 28 July 2014 – Director of the Institute of Europe; President of the Russian Association of European Studies; Head of the European Programmes Division of the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation; the Russian representative to the NATO-Russia Council Science for Peace and Security Committee; member of the Academic Council for the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister; member of the Global Security and International Relations Section of the Academic Council of the Security Council of the Russian Federation

Lev Gudkov – interviewed on 25 June 2014 – Director of Levada Analytical Centre; Editor-in-Chief of the journal *The Russian Public Opinion Herald*

Andrey Kortunov – interviewed on 9 June 2014 – Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council; President of the New Eurasia Foundation, Moscow; formerly Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies; founder and first president of the Moscow Public Science Foundation

Andrej Krickovic – interviewed on 25 July 2014 – Assistant Professor at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Maria Lipman – interviewed on 23 June 2014 – Senior Author, *Russia Political Insight*; formerly expert with the Society and Regions Programme at the Carnegie Moscow Center; formerly Editor-in-chief of *Pro et Contra* journal; contributor to the *Washington Post*

Alexey Malashenko – interviewed on 16 June 2014 – former Chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Religion, Society, and Security Programme; board member of the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation; formerly Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Olga Malinova – interviewed on 31 July 2014 – Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Scientific Information for the Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor of Comparative Politics at MGIMO; President of the Russian Political Science Association

Sergey Medvedev – interviewed on 10 July 2014 – Professor at the Department of Political Science, Higher School of Economics (HSE); Deputy Dean for International Relations, HSE

Andrey Melville – interviewed on 30 July 2014 – Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Head of the Department of Comparative Politics, HSE; formerly Vice-Rector for Research and Dean of the Faculty of Politics at MGIMO

Alexey Miller – interviewed on 2 July 2014 – Leading Researcher at the Institute of Scientific Information for the Social Sciences at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor of History at the Central European University

Viacheslav Morozov – interviewed on 26 August 2014 – Professor of EU-Russia Studies at the University of Tartu, Estonia

Yulia Nikitina – interviewed on 4 July 2014 – Associate Professor of World Politics and Research Fellow at the Centre for Post-Soviet Studies at MGIMO

Boris Shmelev – interviewed on 22 July 2014 – Director of the Centre for Russian Foreign Policy, Institute of the Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences

Mark Simon – interviewed on 23 June 2014 – Fellow at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Centre of Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Space

Pavel Smirnov – interviewed on 1 July 2014 – Senior Research Associate, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Alexander Tevdoy-Burmuli – interviewed on 9 July 2014 – Associate Professor at the Department of European Integration, MGIMO; expert at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP)

Ivan Timofeev – interviewed on 26 June 2014 – Programme Director at the Russian International Affairs Council; Associate Professor at the Department of Political Theory,

MGIMO; formerly Director of the Centre for Analytical Monitoring, Institute for the Study of International Relations, MGIMO

Dmitri Trenin – interviewed on 3 July 2014 – Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center; formerly Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow and the NATO Defence College in Rome; served in the Soviet and Russian armed forces, delegation to the US-Soviet nuclear arms talks

Mikhail Troitskiy – interviewed on 19 June 2014 – Associate Professor of International Relations at MGIMO; member of the Working Group on the Future of US-Russia Relations; formerly Deputy Director of the MacArthur Foundation, Russia Office

Sergey Utkin – interviewed on 7 July 2014 – Head of the Department of Strategic Assessment, Centre for Situation Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences; Head of the Section on Political Problems of European Integration at the Department of European Political Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Igor Zevelev – interviewed on 27 June 2014 – political scientist; formerly Deputy Director and Head of Department at the Centre for Developing Countries at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); Washington Bureau Chief for RIA Novosti; member of the Valdai Discussion Club; formerly Professor at University of California Berkeley and the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington; Woodrow Wilson Fellow; Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Research Fellow

**Poland: fieldwork conducted as a Visiting Scholar at the Polish Institute
of International Affairs, 1 June 2015 – 1 August 2015**

Lukasz Adamski – interviewed on 19 June 2015 – historian and political scientist at the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding; former analyst and Programme Coordinator for Bilateral Relations in Europe at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (2006-2011); Reporting Officer in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (2014)

Adam Eberhardt – interviewed on 19 June 2015 – Director of the Centre for Eastern Studies; former Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; former Chief Correspondent of the *Polish Press Agency* in Moscow; member of the Polish-Ukrainian Presidential Consulting Committee and the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters

Konstanty Gebert – interviewed on 30 June 2015 – Associate Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; international reporter and columnist for Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*; founder of the Polish Jewish intellectual monthly *Midrasz*; board member for the Taube Centre for the Renewal of Jewish Life in Poland and for the Einstein Forum in Potsdam, Germany; former democratic opposition activist in the 1970s, when he was also an organiser of the Jewish Flying University

Leszek Jesień – interviewed on 15 June 2015 – Associate Professor at the Collegium Civitas University and Head of the Institute of International Relations and Sustainable Development; former advisor on EU affairs to Prime Ministers Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jerzy Buzek; former Secretary of State in the Chancellery of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński

Piotr Kościński – interviewed on 15 June 2015 – Programme Coordinator of the Eastern European Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (2013-2015)

Jerzy Koźmiński – interviewed on 17 July 2015 – President and Chief Executive Officer of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation; former Polish Ambassador to the United States (1994-2000); former Director General of the Office of the Council of Ministers; former Director of the advisory team to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka; former Secretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993-1994)

Marek Krzakała – written response to questions submitted on 2 September 2015 – MP (Civic Platform) in the 6th, 7th and 8th parliamentary term of the Polish Sejm; former Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the Sejm (2011-2015); member of the official delegations to Germany of Poland's President, Marshall of the Sejm and Minister of Foreign Affairs; delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Roman Kuźniar – two interviews on 11 and 29 June 2015 – Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw; former Director of the Department of Planning and Analyses (1992-1994) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Minister Plenipotentiary in the Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations in Geneva (1994-1998); official (1998-2002) and Director (2000-2002) of the

Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (2005-2007)

Wojciech Lorenz – interviewed on 16 June 2015 – Senior Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; civilian specialist in the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan (2013-2014); editor in the Polish Section of the BBC World Service and reporter at the Polish daily newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*

Anna-Sophie Maass – interviewed on 29 June 2015 – European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the European Interdisciplinary Studies Department, College of Europe (Natolin, Warsaw); Honorary Research Fellow at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Manchester

Marek Madej – interviewed on 25 June 2015 – Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw; former Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; Lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy in Warsaw

Jerzy Nowak – interviewed on 7 July 2015 – foreign service official since 1960: delegate at the Polish missions in Dar-es-Salaam (1962-1965), Buenos Aires (1967-1971), New York (Polish UN mission, 1981-1986); Ambassador of Poland to the International Atomic Energy Agency of the UN, to the Office of the UN and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation in Vienna (1992-1997); Ambassador to Spain (2000-2002); Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO and the Western European Union in Brussels (2002-2007); Dean of the North Atlantic Council (2005-2007)

Cornelius Ochmann – interviewed on 14 July 2015 – Director of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation, Warsaw; formerly at the Bertelsmann Foundation (1994-2013); advisor to the German Federal Foreign Office and European institutions on relations with Eastern European countries

Zbigniew Pisarski – interviewed on 6 July 2015 – President of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Warsaw; advisor to the President of Poland on the Strategic Review of National Security; Council of Europe expert on non-governmental organisations in Central and Eastern Europe; Chief Visionary Officer at the European Academy of Diplomacy, Warsaw

Adam Rotfeld – interviewed on 7 July 2015 – Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2015); Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1990-2002); member of the UN Secretary General Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2006-2011) and the NATO Group of Experts (Wisemen Group) on a new Strategic Concept of the Alliance (2009-2010); Co-Chairman of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters (2008-2015); member of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project (2015)

Patrycja Sasnal – interviewed on 8 July 2015 – Head of the Middle East and North Africa Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; Lecturer at the American University in Beirut and the Jagiellonian University, Kraków

Tobias Schumacher – interviewed on 17 June 2015 – Chairholder of the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, European Interdisciplinary Studies Department at the

College of Europe (Natolin, Warsaw); Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University Institute of Lisbon (2010-2012); former Lecturer at the European University Institute, the Dublin European Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Munich University, Université Hassan II Casablanca, Mainz University, Ilia State University (Tbilisi)

Stanislav Secrieru – interviewed on 9 June 2015 – Policy Analyst at the Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels; Senior Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; Partnership for Peace Research Fellow at the NATO Defence College; Study Programme on European Security Research Fellow at the Institute for European Politics in Berlin

Ryszard Stemplowski – interviewed on 21 July 2015 – Professor of Political Theory and Philosophy, Academia Ignatianum in Kraków (2010-2016); Emeritus Professor of International Studies, Jagiellonian University, Kraków; Secretary General of the Sejm (1990-1993); Ambassador to the UK (1994-1999); Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (1999-2004)

Andrzej Szeptycki – interviewed on 3 July 2015 – Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw; member of the Council of the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum

Sergiusz Trzeciak – interviewed on 30 June 2015 – political consultant at Trzeciak Consulting; Chairman of the Sobieski Institute in Warsaw (2006-2008); consultant and trainer at OSCE

Witold Waszczykowski – interviewed on 12 June 2015 – Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2015-); senior expert in the United Nations System Department and the European Institutions Department (1992); Deputy Director of the European Institutions Department (1996) and of the Security Policy Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Permanent Representative of Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance (1997-99); Ambassador to Iran (1997-1999); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005-2008); Deputy Head of the National Security Bureau; MP (PiS) at the 7th and 8th parliamentary term of the Sejm; Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee; delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Bartosz Wieliński – interviewed on 6 July 2015 – journalist at the Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*; 2013 Grand Press winner for best report

And three anonymised interviewees – interviewed on 7 July 2015, 14 July 2015, 30 July 2015

**Bulgaria: fieldwork conducted as a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for
Liberal Strategies, 26 October 2015 – 18 December 2015**

Marchela Abrasheva – interviewed on 19 November 2015 – Regional Director for South-east Europe at TNS BBSS Global Market Research Company

Irina Alexieva – interviewed on 14 December 2015 – Executive Director of the Bulgarian School of Politics ‘Dimitry Panitza’; member of the Scientific Advisory Council of the World Forum for Democracy (Council of Europe); formerly a journalist

Marco Arndt – interviewed on 14 December 2015 – Head of the Office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Sofia (2011-2016)

Iskra Baeva – interviewed on 20 November 2015 – Professor at the Department of History, Sofia University

Tatiana Burudjieva – interviewed on 11 November 2015 – Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Sofia University; MP in the 42nd National Assembly; Director of the political cabinet of Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev (2005-2009)

Dimitar Dimitrov – interviewed on 12 November 2015 – Head of the Department of National and Regional Security, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Security Support, Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Infrastructure at the University of National and World Economy, Sofia

Boriana Dimitrova – interviewed on 1 December 2015 – Managing partner and Head of the electoral and socio-political studies of Alpha Research sociological agency

Hristo Georgiev – interviewed on 10 November 2015 – Chair of the Department of National and International Security at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia; member of Risk Analysis Management Advisory Committee; formerly advisor at the National Assembly, the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence

Zhivko Georgiev – interviewed on 30 November 2015 – Director of Research at Gallup International (Sofia); Lecturer in Sociology at Sofia University; Chair of the Managing Board of the Institute for Social Integration (2002-2008)

Marin Lessenski – interviewed on 30 November 2015 – Programme Director of European policies and civic participation and Programme Manager of EuPI (Initiative for European policies) at the Open Society Institute, Sofia

Iliyana Marcheva-Atanasova – interviewed on 3 December 2015 – Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of History and Director of the Section on Bulgarian History since the Second World War at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; Lecturer at Sofia University

Tanya Mihaylova – interviewed on 27 November 2015 – Director of the Diplomatic Institute at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; formerly legal expert at the Department for

European Integration at the National Assembly; parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002-2005)

Ognyan Minchev – interviewed on 20 November 2015 – Chair of the Managing Board of the Institute for Regional and International Studies; Chair of the Managing Board of Transparency International, Sofia; Professor at the Department of Theory of Politics at Sofia University

Yuliana Nikolova – interviewed on 19 November 2015 – Expert and Director of the European Institute (2002-2009); formerly member of the teams negotiating Bulgaria's accession to the WTO and the EU; Deputy Minister of Industry (1999); Director of the Department of European integration and liaisons with the international financial institutions at the Council of Ministers (2000-2001); Secretary of the Council for European integration of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov (2000-2001); EU funds advisor to Prime Minister Boiko Borissov (2009-2013)

Krastyo Petkov – interviewed on 16 December 2015 – Founder and first Chair of the Confederation of the Independent Syndicalists (1990-1997); MP in the 39th National Assembly; Chair of the United Labour Bloc (1997-2012); Chair of the Managing Board of the Union of Economists in Bulgaria (2012-2016); former Professor at Sofia University

Antoaneta Primatarova – interviewed on 3 November 2015 – Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-1999); Ambassador to the EU (1999-2001); Deputy Chief Negotiator for Bulgaria's EU accession (2000-2001); Programme Director at the Centre for Liberal Strategies; Lecturer at the Diplomatic Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Stefan Ralchev – interviewed on 6 November 2015 – Lead expert at the National Commission for Combating Traffic in Human Beings; Programme Director at the Institute for Regional and International Studies

Valeri Ratchev – interviewed on 25 November 2015 – Expert at the Centre for Security and Defence Management; Ambassador to Iraq (2005-2013); Director of the political cabinet of Minister of Defence Nikolay Mladenov (2009-2010) and of Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolay Mladenov (2010-2013); formerly Deputy Director for Defence Planning at the Ministry of Defence; Deputy Director of the National Security Studies Centre; commanding and staff officer in the Bulgarian Armed Forces

Ingrid Shikova – interviewed on 10 December 2015 – Professor at Sofia University; Director of the Centre for European Research (1995-2001); Director of the Communications Centre of the delegation of the European Commission to Bulgaria (2001-2006); Director of the Department of European Studies at Sofia University (2009-2012)

Vladimir Shopov – interviewed on 3 December 2015 – Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Adjunct Professor in European Politics at the New Bulgarian University and Lecturer at the Diplomatic Institute at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Counsellor at the Bulgarian Mission to the EU (1999-2001); EU Policy and Diplomatic Adviser to the Minister of the Interior (1997-1999); EU Adviser at the British Embassy, Sofia (2002-2003)

Nikolay Slatinski – interviewed on 10 December 2015 – Professor at the Military Academy, Sofia, and at the University of National and World Economy; MP (1990-1994) and Chair of the National Security Committee (1992-1994) at the National Assembly; Head of the Bulgarian delegations to the Assemblies of NATO and the WEU (1992-1994); Secretary for National Security of the President (2002-2007)

Louisa Slavkova – interviewed on 28 October 2015 – Programmes Manager at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Sofia; founding member of the Sofia Platform; advisor to Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolay Mladenov and to caretaker Minister of the Environment Julian Popov (2011-2013)

Kristian Vigenin – interviewed on 17 December 2015 – MP in the National Assembly; Principal Head of Section of foreign policy, European integration and international cooperation of the National Council of BSP; MEP (2007-2011); Vice-President of the Group of the European Socialists, member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the European Parliament; Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013-2014)

And one anonymised interviewee – interviewed on 18 December 2015

Appendix IV

Standardised interview questions

Identity and policy-making

- To what extent do considerations of identity matter in the process of policy-making? If yes, how and why?
- Can one differentiate between different groups on the level of the political-intellectual elite according to their specific views of Polish/Bulgarian/Russian nation-state identity? What are those groups? To what extent do historically conditioned conceptions and debates (linked to traditional-modernist understandings of Europe in Poland, the Russophile-Russophobe divide in Bulgaria, the Slavophile-Westerniser argument in Russia) persist in contemporary politics?

The 1990s

- Which external factors played a role in the process of Europeanisation? What was their effect on views and policies? How did the West perceive Poland/Bulgaria/Russia? Was there a differential perception of those countries? If so, why?
- What facilitated/impeded the achievement of domestic political consensus on Europeanisation? How important were ideational factors? Could you elaborate on the views that the modernists, traditionalists, post-communists in Poland/the BSP and the UDF in Bulgaria/Yeltsin, the Liberal Westernisers, the Pragmatic and Fundamentalist Nationalists in Russia held with regard to Europeanisation? Were these views compatible with the West European model?
- Overall, was it international and/or domestic factors that had the strongest impact on the process of Europeanisation?
- Were there any alternatives to the foreign policy direction taken by Poland/Bulgaria/Russia in the 1990s?

The 2000s/2010s

- How did 9/11/the Iraq war/'transatlantic' security developments affect Polish/Bulgarian/Russian views and prospects of Europeanisation? Were their actions based on ideational motivations and/or a policy of bandwagoning/balancing?
- To what extent and how did EU accession/enlargement impact ideas and practices of foreign policy? Did Poland's/Bulgaria's 'downloading' of EU policies happen due to instrumental adaptation or gradual socialisation? What was the evidence of the socialisation of the Polish/Bulgarian elite within Union structures and the disappointment of Russian politicians following exclusion from enlargement?
- What were the main elements of the views of PiS and the PO in Poland/the NDSV, GERB, the centre-right and centre-left in Bulgaria/Putin and the wider Russian political community regarding Europeanisation? What (if any) were the most significant dividing lines among those views (in Poland and Bulgaria)? Did these dividing lines impede Europeanisation? Were the views genuine or did they also depend on material and interest-based influences?

- Which factors underwrote Poland's assertiveness within the EU/Bulgaria's passivity within the EU/Russia's attempt to balance against the West?
- Overall, which international and/or domestic factors affected the process of Europeanisation in the 2000s/2010s? Was there complementarity or contradiction between Atlanticism and Europeanisation in Poland/Atlanticism, Europeanisation and pro-Russian attitudes in Bulgaria?
- Were there alternatives to the foreign policy direction taken by Poland/Bulgaria/Russia in the 2000s/2010s?

Bibliography:

Comprises the literature cited in the thesis; subdivided into the works used in each chapter. All references to 'interview(s)' in the in-text citations indicate the author's own interviews listed in Appendix III

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