

# The Civic Virtue of *philotimia*: Rhetoric, Ideology, and Politics in Democratic Athens

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the place that *philotimia* held in the value system and ideology of democratic Athens in the period between 430 and 320 BCE by examining the rhetoric of *philotimia* in instances of public speech, especially in the courtrooms and the Assembly.

Chapter 1 explores the relation between *philotimia* and *metriotēs* in courtroom rhetoric of Demosthenes' time. Section 1 shows that being *philotimos* and being *metrios* could be presented as belonging to the same mentality, that of prioritizing public interest without ignoring appropriate personal ambitions and goals. Section 2 takes *Against Meidias* as a case study. In the rhetoric of *Against Meidias*, we find an account of what it means to be an exemplary elite *philotimos* citizens and what it means to be a rich *hybristēs* in democratic Athens.

Chapter 2 starts off by showing that the idea of civic-oriented *philotimia* that we find in *Against Meidias* is systematically found in courtroom speeches and honorific inscriptions from the mid-fourth century onwards. Section 2 moves backwards in time and explores the rhetoric of *philotimia* in the time of Lysias. In the last years of the fifth century and beginning of the fourth, I identify a greater need to warn the dikasts against bad or dangerous *philotimoi* rather than present oneself as a good *philotimos*. At the same time, the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* can be traced as far back as 403/402, which indicates that it was not a novelty of the mid-fourth century. Section 3 explores cases of *philotimoi* that took action outside the democratic city as depicted in the speeches of Lysias and Demosthenes.

Chapter 3 explores the rhetoric of *philotimia* in political discussions. The rhetoric of *philotimia* is very limited when a speaker is discussing his contributions to policy-making, either directly in the Assembly or when discussions of politics are transferred in the courtroom. Section 1 discusses assembly scenes in Thucydides and Aristophanes. Section 2 focuses on representations of political competition in the time of Demosthenes. Section 3 discusses the rhetoric of *charis* in the deliberative speeches of Demosthenes. Section 4 explores Demosthenes' self-presentation and collective *philotimia* in his trial battles with Aeschines.

This study does not argue for a *semantic shift* in the meaning of *philotimia* from a negative into a positive value, but shows that *philotimia* was an ambivalent concept throughout the period examined. The closely regulated and selective promotion of *philotimia* that is evidenced in the rhetoric of the courtroom and the Assembly reflects the duality of *philotimia* as a concept and the fact that the Athenians were very much alert to it.

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I dedicate this study to my mother, Loukia Efthymiou, and to the memory of my grandmother, Aglaia Efthymiou.

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## General Introduction and Method

This thesis explores *philotimia*, ‘love of honour’,<sup>1</sup> as a human quality and a motive of action for the Athenians individually and collectively. It seeks to do so particularly by examining the rhetoric of *philotimia* in instances of public speech, especially in the courtrooms and the Assembly, in the period between 430 and 320 BCE.<sup>2</sup> In the course of this study, I explore the activities, fields of action, and types of behaviour in association with which *philotimia* seems to have been promoted, or not, as a praiseworthy quality for democratic Athens. This treatise is not a full-scale study of the concept of *philotimia*, but aims at contributing to the existing scholarship by exploring the significance that *philotimia* held in the ideology of Athenian democracy.

On the basis of surviving epigraphical evidence from the 340s onwards honouring Athenian and non-Athenian benefactors, Whitehead characterizes *philotimia* as one of the ‘cardinal virtues’ of democratic Athens, a group of virtues ‘the Athenians wanted to single out for praise and reward above all others’.<sup>3</sup> The main objective of this thesis is to examine the extent to which we can talk about *philotimia* as a ‘cardinal virtue’ or, in other words, a

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<sup>1</sup> In translations of Greek texts throughout this study, *philotimia* and *philotimos* are transliterated. Verbal *philotim*- forms are usually turned into phrases such as ‘being *philotimos*’, ‘showing *philotimia*’; cf. p. 132 n. 64.

<sup>2</sup> All dates in this study are BCE.

<sup>3</sup> See Whitehead (1993) on cardinal virtues in honorific inscriptions; see Whitehead (1983) specifically on *philotimia* in honorific inscriptions; quotation from Whitehead (1993) 41-42.

positive value and a civic virtue of democratic Athens *outside honorific inscriptions and not only after but also before the 340s*. Especially as far as Athenian citizens are concerned, acting out of love of honour and getting/expecting a reward for it, involves ‘promoting one Athenian above another’.<sup>4</sup> At first glance, this seems to sit uneasily with democracy’s egalitarianism. For this reason, let us start by outlining the ideological context of Athenian democracy within which *philotimia* will be examined.

### **1. The democratic discourse**

As far as the male citizen population is concerned, Athenian democratic society comprises a divergent multitude of individuals that are politically equal yet socio-economically unequal. The right of participation in decision-making processes was commonly held by a body politic that was significantly divergent in terms of wealth, expertise, knowledge, and social standing. In spite of the socio-economic differences, it has been argued, the Athenian male citizen population was relatively homogeneous.<sup>5</sup> Osborne attributes the effectiveness of Athenian democracy to the ‘corporate nature’ of Athenian society rather than to the Athenian institutions (Council and Assembly).<sup>6</sup> According to this view, through participation

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<sup>4</sup> Lambert (2011) 198.

<sup>5</sup> I draw here from Osborne (2010) 28-38.

<sup>6</sup> Osborne (2010) 30.

in various groups, such as phratries, tribes, demes, and in relevant decision-making processes as well as festivals, rituals, and military organizations, Athenian citizens were used to act as members of groups that advanced ‘corporate interests’ and felt ‘corporate responsibility’.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the cohesiveness of the Athenian citizen group was reinforced by the exclusion of slaves and women from the domains of state politics and political debating which rendered possible ‘the fiction of citizen equality’.<sup>8</sup> Due to this corporate group identity and ‘*relevant* homogeneity’, the Athenian body politic shared values and knowledge that, irrespective of differences in wealth and social standing, made it possible for all participants in the debates held in the Assembly and the courts to react in similar manners.<sup>9</sup>

Another source of the cohesiveness of democratic Athens has been seen in the fact that power was not concentrated in an almighty state that exercised coercive authority through its institutions and laws in order to maintain order, secure obedience to the regime and suppress reactions.<sup>10</sup> On the contrary, according to this view, power is ‘productive and

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<sup>7</sup> Osborne (2010) 31.

<sup>8</sup> Osborne (2010) 32-33.

<sup>9</sup> Osborne (2010) 35; on knowledge in Athens as widely shared and distributed, see Ober (2008); Osborne (2010) 38 agrees with Ober on this, but finds that Ober’s understanding of ‘knowledge’ is too narrow and needs to be broadened.

<sup>10</sup> Ober (1994a) 85-90. This approach is opposed to the ‘coercion paradigm’ of power (Ober (1994a) 86). This view of Athenian democracy as exercising coercion through its sovereign institutions is endorsed by Hansen (1987); Hansen (1991); Herman (1995) 46. For a critique of Hansen, see Ober (1989b); cf. Ober (2008) which turns to the importance of institutions in a way that complements the discursive approaches taken in Ober (1989a) and Ober (1998); see also Morris (2000) 111 on the distinction between ‘procedural’ and ‘normative’ as alternative accounts for the description of the emergence of democracy.

omnipresent (rather than repressive and located in the state)'.<sup>11</sup> Such an approach, 'the discourse paradigm',<sup>12</sup> views power as diffused in the society and constantly exercised and negotiated in every instance of public interaction that exemplifies, shapes and reshapes common beliefs and norms sustained by the society.<sup>13</sup> Thus, every decision-making process relies upon the employment of a set of values and beliefs commonly understood and at the same time challenged as well as reinforced by the community.<sup>14</sup> Such a paradigm, which understands power as maintained through discourse, encapsulates the link between language and power in the core of which lies the idea of speech as action.<sup>15</sup> Thus, democratic ideology is constantly formed and re-formed through rhetoric expressed in public speech, and every manifestation of public rhetoric, every social interaction is at the same time a powerful action that guides behaviour.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ober (1994a) 87.

<sup>12</sup> Ober (1994a) 86; on paradigms, see Ober (1989c).

<sup>13</sup> This approach does not mean to belittle the undoubtedly important role played by institutions (assembly, council, lawcourts) and the rule of law in the functioning of Athenian democracy. It insists, however, on not seeing institutions as such as the uncontested loci of sovereignty in democratic Athens. See Ober (1989b) 333; Osborne (2010) 30, 35. Contrast Hansen (1989a) 16-17 who suggests that the distinction between magistrates and the rest of the citizens may point towards an Athenian understanding of the magistrates as the polis, and the rest of the citizens as the subjects. This suggestion is based on too narrow an understanding of the rotation system of holding office in Athens.

<sup>14</sup> Ober (1994a) 87.

<sup>15</sup> Skinner (2002) 3-6.

<sup>16</sup> See Low (2005) 93: 'the language by which particular acts are represented can have a powerful influence on subsequent actions and patterns of behaviour. Things that might start off as (allegedly) purely presentational matters can quickly become substantive political issues'.

## 2. Honour negotiations and enhancement of honour

The evident ‘inconsistency’ of equality and inequality among the citizens has been analysed in terms of honour and dignity. In a recent study on modern democracy, Ober seeks to pin down democracy’s dignity, which in his thought is the third key value of democracy, the other two being equality and liberty.<sup>17</sup> In his attempt to show that democracy’s dignity can lead in a non-consequential way to, or better is compatible with, universal human dignity, Ober concludes with a distinction among four types of dignity: meritocracy, elite peerage, civic dignity and universal human dignity.<sup>18</sup> Using classical Athens as an example of a democratic society, Ober says that what dominates democratic Athens is civic dignity infused with meritocratic elements.<sup>19</sup> In particular, if we phrase this in Ober’s terms, Athenian

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<sup>17</sup> Ober (2012) 827. Ober’s study is primarily concerned with democracy in modern times and explores the extent to which democracy is compatible with liberalism. In this frame, Athenian democracy is examined as a case study of pre-modern democracy the function of which shows that the widely shared belief of protecting civic dignity as a common valuable possession may allow the development of protective measures that cover noncitizens too, thereby allowing for the possibility of widening the field of dignity from an exclusive, ‘elitist’ possession of a limited body of citizens to a wider perception of dignity as peculiar to human beings in general. Ober does not argue that Athenian democratic ideology consciously endeavoured to achieve such a widening of the notion of dignity, but that the opening of such a possibility evidenced in classical Athens points towards the compatibility of democracy with liberalism; on the question of democracy’s compatibility with liberalism, see also Ober (2005) ch. 5; Liddel (2007).

<sup>18</sup> Ober (2012) 829-832.

<sup>19</sup> Ober (2012) 835.

democracy's dignity is based on the recognition and respect of 'equal high standing' shared among a relatively wide group of socio-economically unequal citizens all of whom enjoy freedom (*eleutheria*), and political equality (*isonomia*, *isēgoria*, *isopsēphia*).<sup>20</sup> In spite of socio-economic inequalities, defence of civic dignity concerns the whole body politic, and protection of political equality and equal high standing, in our case among the peer group of Athenian citizenry, is promoted by means of perceiving any attempt at 'humiliation' and 'infantilization' as encroachments on citizenship itself.<sup>21</sup>

Promotion of civic dignity does not necessarily exclude recognition of ability and excellence.<sup>22</sup> Athenian society is not reluctant to award special honours and recognize meritorious behaviour publicly and in practice despite the evidence of anti-democratic sources refusing to accept such a feature as peculiar to democracy.<sup>23</sup> In fact, meritocratic

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<sup>20</sup> Ober (2012) 827-829, 841, quotation from p. 827; see Raaflaub (1996) on the emergence of political equality as a cornerstone of democracy and on various limitations to democratic equality in practice. See especially pp. 143-145, 153 on *isonomia* as compatible with oligarchy as well as democracy; on democracy's equality in general, Ober & Hedrick (1996); see Raaflaub (2004) 46-49 on the primary importance of freedom and freedom of speech in democracy.

<sup>21</sup> Ober (2012) 827-828, 835-844.

<sup>22</sup> Ober (2012) 838, 841.

<sup>23</sup> See Harvey (1965), on arithmetic and geometric proportion. Harvey argues that the attribution of arithmetic proportion to democracy is part of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of anti-democratic sources to stigmatize democracy as a constitution that does not recognize merit and ability and therefore does not abide to geometric proportion, which is described by these sources as 'a "superior" form of equality' (p. 129). Democracy and its proponents, though, do not seem to have thought of their constitution on the basis of justice as equality and of justice as merit as being counter-exclusive and in fact they did recognize merit. This attitude of democracy towards merit is recognized even by anti-democratic

dignity was never excluded from democratic Athens: the competition for recognition of merit and enhancement of honour was democratically appropriated through public contests which were 'overseen' by public opinion and regulated by a common expectation of demonstrating self-restraint and serving common interests while seeking personal distinction. Political debating, *choregic* competitions, contesting for the favour of a panel of dikasts, executing public office in an outstanding manner, demonstrating military valour are some of the forms such competitions could take. By recognizing meritorious behaviour, Athenian society also sought to recognize and integrate several layers of inequality – in wealth, education, ability, and power in general – in a civic society of politically equal members.

From a different perspective, yet one that is not incompatible with what has been argued above, considerations of honour are viewed as belonging to a broader 'economy of esteem' that concerns all members of a society.<sup>24</sup> According to this view, honour is not merely

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sources: [Xen.] *Ath.Pol.*1.3; for 'the problem of balancing of egalitarian and elitist principles' in democratic Athens, see also Ober (1991) 132-133; on recognition of merit and on dissociation of property qualifications from political participation running simultaneously in Athenian democracy, see Pericles' *Funeral Oration*, especially Thuc. 2.37.1 with Hornblower (1991-2008) ad loc.; Yunis (1996) 68, 75-76 with n. 40 on 'democratic meritocracy' in Thuc. 2.37.

<sup>24</sup> Cairns (2011). I agree with the idea supported by Fisher (2003) 195-198 and Cairns (2003) 241 n. 22 that all social strata in Athenian society were concerned with considerations of honour and shame. This does not exclude the idea that considerations of honour and shame were articulated in different ways and in various grades within a society, nor the fact that specific groups within a community are observed to have been considerably more interested than others in seeking honour through public contests. Cairns (2011) shows that in modern

the stake in a zero-sum game of masculinity, but every consideration of esteem pertains to the domain of honour: the view that someone has of himself, the view that the community has of its members as well as the corresponding respect that one expects from and shows to the rest of the community. In this respect, an individual's honour and its recognition presuppose membership in a peer group linked by shared standards of behaviour and moral values. It is only within a broader community that individuals can understand the place they hold vis-à-vis their peers. This is to say that one shapes his own idea of himself, his own identity with the expectation, at the same time, that his identity will be endorsed and respected by his peers.<sup>25</sup> This is not to say that one has the expectation of the community accepting whatever idea one holds of himself. It rather means that understanding one's place in a society is a reciprocal process between the individual and the community. One finds his position within a group not by servile conformity to a set of presumptions that holds the group together,<sup>26</sup> but by expressing his mind, in word and deed, in such a way as to reinforce some of the prevailing norms and beliefs while challenging some others.<sup>27</sup> By means of doing

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societies the considerably more intense interest that socially marginalized groups express in pursuing esteem as well as their violent reactions to perceived disrespect stem from socio-economic inequality and point to a general concern for honour and esteem that pervades the whole society.

<sup>25</sup> Cairns (2011) 38: 'Individual identity is intimately bound up with group membership. Self-esteem depends on the esteem of others.'

<sup>26</sup> Cairns (2011) 25-26, 32.

<sup>27</sup> Gill (1996) on 'self in dialogue': how 'selfhood' and 'personality' are formed and demonstrated in close engagement with one's community (shared values and beliefs, understandings of social roles) through various processes (inner as well as inter-personal) of

so, one is exercising authority within a community;<sup>28</sup> and while exercising authority, depending on the status one holds in the eyes of others,<sup>29</sup> one is at the same time fueling the constant (re)distribution of esteem every time he vies for higher stakes, thereby challenging the current order.

By exercising authority as described above, one is at the same time exercising power and, more specifically, power as explained by the ‘discourse paradigm’. The agent of authority can be either the citizen body collectively in the context of decision-making processes, distribution of honours, rewards, and punishments, as well as in any other public manifestations of its capacity, or individual voices in public arenas, such as speakers in the Assembly, litigants, office-holders, and public benefactors.<sup>30</sup>

In the case of the people as a collective agent of power, it is expected that power will be exercised in the following two directions (among others). Firstly, so as to confirm and make manifest the inviolability of freedom and political equality – which encapsulate Ober’s

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deliberation and reasoning; such negotiations require courage from the part of an individual: on free speech as civic courage and its relation in democratic ideology with the idea of prioritizing public interest, see Roisman (2003); Balot (2004b); on ‘instructive deliberation’ and the courage required to take action in democratic Athens, see Yunis (1996) 76.

<sup>28</sup> Cairns (2011) 31-32.

<sup>29</sup> Status and authority are closely interrelated and the one is enhanced by the augmentation of the other; on class, status and order in Aristotle’s *Politics* compared to Athenian reality and on relevant bibliography on these matters, see Ober (1991).

<sup>30</sup> See Ober (1994a) 104: democracy existed in the dynamic relationship between popular ideology as a ‘regime of truth’ and ‘distinct voices’ expressing themselves by creatively employing assumptions and belief falling under such a ‘regime of truth’. On the ‘actuality and normativity’ of Athenian democratic ideology, see Ober (2005) 105.

civic dignity – as core values that sustain democracy; in other words, so as to protect Athenian citizenship. Secondly, to reward individuals as long as they put their resources (material and immaterial) at the service of the collective, thereby showing that they are meritorious by means of conforming to and supporting the current constitution and its values; in other words, so as to protect and advance the interests of the collective.

In the case of individuals as agents of power in democratically regulated debates and contests, we expect to find a similar kind of compromise between honour as merit and honour as civic dignity:<sup>31</sup> claims for honour(s) and attempts to enhance one's honour are to count as legitimate only if they are expressed in ways that respect civic dignity and promote the interests and values of the community. Thus, ideally, when further manifestations of merit and claims for distinction are made in ways that demonstrate respect and promotion of equal high (political) standing and of all the privileges and duties that come with Athenian citizenship, the community is protected from socially destructive competitions of distinction. Ideally, any kind of (re)distribution of honour, esteem, and respect takes place within the 'same' group of politically equal citizens.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> See Ober (1993) 146, esp. 'The principle of hierarchy was undermined in favor of democratic equality at the level of material distribution and everyday social behavior. As a result, power was discontinuous, rather than becoming a naturalized, seamless web.'

<sup>32</sup> Note, in comparison, two extreme cases: when a citizen is disenfranchised (ἀτιμία) he loses access to the privileges and duties that come with citizenship, and consequently is excluded from any (re)distributive processes of honour (ἀτιμία is loss of honour); when democracy is subverted, political equality (or civic dignity, in Ober's terms) is annulled and the road is open to hierarchic claims; see Ober (2005) 107-108 for a reading of Pseudo-Xenophon's *The*

It needs to be made clear that, although Ober's differentiation between civic dignity and meritocratic dignity may be useful when analyzing competitions for distinction,<sup>33</sup> this study views both civic dignity and meritocratic dignity as pertaining to one and the same domain of honour in democratic Athens. That specific individuals may seek for distinction that cannot be attained by the less able, less powerful or less interested does not mean that the claims for honour they each time aim for pertain to domains of honour that are inconceivable or inaccessible (in theory) by the rest of the community. For instance, both a rhetor hissed and booed on the rostrum during an assembly-meeting and an ordinary Athenian told off by his companions at dinner would probably have perceived the lack of endorsement and the audience's disapproval in similar terms, as a blow inflicted upon their self-esteem and their honour. The occasions may differ in many respects and certainly in terms of importance, but their impact pertains to the same ideas of honour and dishonour. To take one example from our sources: when Demosthenes claims that everyone in his stead would have reacted in the same way against the *hybris* he suffered in the hands of Meidias while acting as *choregos*, the point to be taken away is not that the dikasts are invited to imagine that they could all have acted and reacted as *choregoi* while in fact they could not have done so due to socio-economic reasons.<sup>34</sup> The point is that, *although* the majority of

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*Athenian Constitution* which shows that it was practically impossible for Athenian democracy to be subverted from outside by unjustly disenfranchised people grouping together.

<sup>33</sup> I use Ober's distinction in my analysis of Dem. 21 in Chapter 1 Section 2.

<sup>34</sup> *Contra* Wilson (2000) 157, 177-178.

them could not have found themselves into this *exact same* situation, all of them could associate with the sense of honour and dishonour Demosthenes attempts to convey, and all of them could understand what suffering a hubristic attack meant.

In this framework, considerations of honour are necessarily comparative and claims for honour have the potential not only to create and strengthen solidarity and group identity but also, if excessive and left unregulated, to create dissension and prove dangerous, even destructive, for a community.

### **The ambivalence of *philotimia***

In democratic Athens, the notion that encapsulates the competitive as well as the cooperative sides of honour negotiations is *philotimia* (love of honour/pursuance of honour).<sup>35</sup> As we will see, *philotimia* is an ambivalent concept that was evaluated positively when demonstrated in the right ways and contexts, and negatively when demonstrated inappropriately.

Aristotle's account of *philotimia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* brings out its ambivalence. Aristotle includes *philotimia* in his discussion of ethical virtues, but not in a clear-cut sense, as he prefers to leave unnamed the middle ground regarding the virtue of pursuing moderate

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<sup>35</sup> On 'cooperative and competitive value-terms' and activities, see Adkins (1972) 7-9.

or small honours.<sup>36</sup> Depending on the occasion, the virtuous middle ground borrows its name from one of the two extremes. Thus, sometimes the *philotimos* is praised for being manly (ἀνδρώδης) and a lover of what is noble (φιλόκαλος) and the *aphilotimos* for being moderate (μέτριος) and temperate (σώφρων).<sup>37</sup> For Aristotle, being *philotimos* is praiseworthy when one seeks for honour more than most people do (ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί) and blameworthy if one aims at honour more than is appropriate (ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ).<sup>38</sup>

Drawing from Aristotle, Nikolaidis (2012) 53 argues that *philotimia* can be virtuous or vicious ‘depending on the quality as well as on the quantity of the honours desired and sought after’. Nikolaidis discusses *philotimia* specifically in Plutarch’s *Lives* and concludes that *philotimia* is an ambiguous quality, ‘a means or a motive’ (p. 52) that can incentivize virtuous or vicious behaviour. Nikolaidis also concludes that ‘the political or social milieu of the times do not exercise any significant influence on the conduct of the *philotimoi*’ (p. 53).<sup>39</sup>

Because *philotimia* is an ambivalent notion, the advertisement of this thesis as a study on ‘the civic virtue of *philotimia*’ may sound controversial. This study will *not* show that *philotimia* is an unequivocally positive notion within democratic ideology, always praised and appreciated across time and space. But, unlike Nikolaidis’ second conclusion, we will see that

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<sup>36</sup> Arist. *NE*.1125b1-25; the virtue related to great honour is *megalopsychia*, according to Aristotle’s categories (*NE*.1123a34-1125a35).

<sup>37</sup> Arist. *NE*.1125b11-14.

<sup>38</sup> Arist. *NE*.1125b15-17.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Frazier (2014) 493-498.

the evaluation of *philotimia* in Athenian democracy is influenced by the socio-political milieu of the time and, more importantly, that the representation of *philotimia* manifestations is informed and challenged by democratic norms and values.<sup>40</sup> Thus, given that preserving ‘civic dignity’ and promoting common interests are democracy’s priorities, there is space for legitimate enhancement of honour as long as it is pursued in ways that abide by democracy’s priorities. It is against such standards of behaviour that *philotimia* is going to be tested as a democratic civic virtue in this study.

For a manifestation of *philotimia* to count as honourable and civic-oriented, Aristotle’s ‘more than most people do’ (ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί) needs to be congruent with the idea of benefiting the democratic community and of respecting its values. This could be achieved through public manifestations of *philotimia*, which were ‘overseen’ by public opinion and regulated by a common expectation of seeking for personal distinction while demonstrating self-restraint and serving the public interest. In this vein, a good democratic *philotimos* would be an individual that vies for distinction without challenging the democratic order, that is, respects with his behaviour the ideals of egalitarianism and political equality, and subordinates himself to the superiority of the collective. This means that individuals that are

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<sup>40</sup> Aloumpi (2017) discusses some differences between Plutarch’s understanding of *philotimia* in the *Lives* as an inner force of the individual agent and *philotimia* as a social-political construct of Athenian democracy in Thucydides and Demosthenes; the most thorough study of *philotimia* in Plutarch’s *Lives* is Frazier (1988); Roskam et al. (2012) explores *philotimia* in Imperial Greek literature and more specifically in Plutarch; also on *philotimia* in Plutarch, Wardman (1974) 115-124; Duff (1999) 72-89; Pelling (2012).

perceived as challenging the democratic order by seeking for honour ‘more than is appropriate’ cannot be regarded as civic-oriented *philotimoi*; nor can individuals who refrain from acting in honourable and publicly beneficial manners or who are perceived to disregard the interests of the community by looking for honour ‘from wrong sources’ (ὄθεν οὐ δεῖ). As we will see, such kinds of actions that prioritize private interests and individualistic ends without respecting common standards of behaviour could be perceived as demonstrative of wrong *philotimia*, excessive *philotimia*, or of a lack of civic-oriented *philotimia*.

The aim of this study is to explore in which contexts and in which ways to act out of *philotimia* and indeed to present oneself publicly as acting or having acted out of *philotimia* is regarded as a good and egalitarian thing that deserves recognition and a return of honour (*time*) and gratitude (*charis*) by the democratic city. By the same token, this study explores cases in which to be presented as acting or having been motivated out of *philotimia* is regarded as undemocratic and inappropriate. In such ways, I seek to explore the scope of legitimate honour enhancement in democratic Athens and the power dynamics between individuals and the city. I propose to do so by examining specifically the rhetoric of *philotimia* employed in public speech and in representations of public debates in democratic Athens.

### **3. Sources**

#### **The literary sources**

The sources mainly explored are the surviving forensic and deliberative speeches of the Attic orators.<sup>41</sup> Because these speeches give us access to the central forums of democratic public speaking and debating, they are valuable sources of evidence for exploring how honour negotiations between individual citizens, and indeed powerful citizens, and popular audiences are spelled out.<sup>42</sup> Of course, we need to bear in mind that the primary aim of these speeches was to persuade their audience and therefore not all information is to be taken at face value, as speakers would not hesitate to present facts in ways that served their rhetorical purposes. At the same time, one needs to be plausible in order to be convincing and, furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that a speaker who wished to increase his trustworthiness would present himself as abiding by standards of behaviour that would not alienate the audience, and would attempt to craft the opposite impression for his rivals.

For such reasons, the importance of these speeches as valuable sources for

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<sup>41</sup> The earliest reference to *philotimia* in the corpus of the Attic orators appears in Lys. 21.22, a forensic speech delivered shortly after 403/402: *μαινοίμην γὰρ <ἄν>, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρώαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην.*

<sup>42</sup> See Dover (1974) 8-10 on the idea that the 'standpoint' of the transmitted speeches of the Attic orators probably does not differ considerably from what had been delivered in the courtrooms and the Assembly.

understanding Athenian ‘social values’<sup>43</sup> and ‘popular morality’<sup>44</sup> has been recognized since many decades. As noted by Dover (1974) 13-14, the significance of these sources does not lie in the idea that they give us access to what *really* happened each time and what the people involved *really* felt. What we gain from these speeches, however, is access to statements, opinions, and evaluations that were articulated because they were regarded as believable and persuasive given the circumstances and the people involved in each case. By this token, there is not much point in pursuing empirical questions such as whether *philotimia* had *actually* motivated a speaker who presented himself as *philotimos*. The public speeches of the Attic orators provide us with the most direct and prolific source of evidence about how individual citizens chose to present themselves and society in dialogue with the city and, by extension, how democratic ideals were articulated in the forums of public speech where citizens were addressing fellow-citizens.<sup>45</sup> Especially in forensic contexts, where past behaviour is extensively discussed, we need to remember that we are dealing with retrospective accounts and idealized representations of past behaviour. Therein lies the importance of these sources, as they allow us to see, first, how much of a value and an ideal

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<sup>43</sup> Fisher (1976) 3-5 stresses specifically the importance of forensic speeches as important sources of evidence for the exploration of social values. In my study, I show that the deliberative speeches are equally important sources of evidence.

<sup>44</sup> Dover (1974) 5-33 discusses in detail the importance of Attic oratory for the exploration of popular morality vis-à-vis comparatively less useful sources, such as tragedy, comedy, and historiography.

<sup>45</sup> See Ober (1989a); Balot (2009).

of democratic Athens *philotimia* was and, second, what type of behaviour would give someone the name of a good and democratic *philotimos*.

When and how is *philotimia* promoted and when and how is *philotimia* avoided or castigated? In relation to what activities do speakers present themselves as civic-oriented *philotimoi* that deserve to be rewarded by the city? What kind of *philotimia* manifestations are expected to be recognized as commendable, useful, and worthy of public recognition? The rhetoric of the surviving forensic and deliberative speeches give some answers to such questions and reveal some perspectives on matters of honour enhancement in public arenas.

The funeral orations are not explored in this thesis, but a discussion of the *epitaphioi logoi* is going to be incorporated in the revised version of this study for publication.<sup>46</sup> At this stage, it is worth mentioning that the war dead are not praised for their *philotimia* in the surviving funeral orations except for one case, in Dem. 60.23, where both Athenian and Theban soldiers are praised for having shown φιλοτιμίαν ἐφάμιλλον. Several issues deserve exploration: in what ways may the language of honour reserved for the dead differ from that employed for those who are alive and active? Do *aretē* and *andragathia*, the two virtues regularly singled out for praising the Athenians collectively in the surviving funeral speeches,<sup>47</sup> fit with the ‘rule of anonymity’<sup>48</sup> in ways that *philotimia* may not? At the same

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<sup>46</sup> The most important study on the funeral orations remains Loraux (1986); see also Ziolkowski (1981) and, most recently, Herrman (2003).

<sup>47</sup> See, e.g., Thuc. 2.42.2-4; Lys. 2.20, 25; Dem. 60.1; Hyp. 6.28-30.

<sup>48</sup> Loraux (1986) 41-42.

time, it should be noted that the only positive reference to a *philotimia* cognate in Thucydides' *Histories* is found in Pericles' funeral speech: τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασί, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι (Thuc. 2.44.4).<sup>49</sup> For the elderly, private profit (τὸ κερδαίνειν) is ephemeral, whereas love of honour (to *philotimon*) is ever-lasting. To *philotimon* seems to have a comforting dimension, as honour is enduring and therefore more desirable, just as the honour the parents gained through their children's death (τῇ τῶνδε εὐκλείᾳ κουφίζεσθε, Thuc. 2.44.4).<sup>50</sup>

Finally, historiography and drama are also important sources of evidence. de Romilly (1965) has drawn attention to the ambivalence of *philotimia* in Greek tragedy, comedy, and historiography of the fifth century, and through her study of Euripides' *Phoenissae* and its civil war context has pointed out that the negative appreciation of *philotimia* at this time was a corollary of the oligarchic coup of 411. In Chapter 2, I draw attention to the impact that the two oligarchic coups of the last years of the fifth century probably had on the rhetoric of *philotimia* and, more generally, on the ways speakers chose to present themselves and their opponents in several speeches of the Lysianic corpus. Moreover, Lendon (2010) in his analysis of the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war has drawn attention to the importance of considerations of *time* and *hybris* as powers that motivate city-states to enter

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<sup>49</sup> 'For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say, that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour' (Loeb).

<sup>50</sup> 'be comforted by the fair fame of these your sons' (Loeb).

war. Rather differently, in Chapter 3, where I discuss Thucydides and Aristophanes, I focus on representations of political debates and the rhetoric of individual ambition and collective achievement. More specifically, I explore the rhetoric of *philotimia* in association with the tension that emerges between outstanding citizens that seek to distinguish themselves in political debating and advising, and the idea that the superiority of the city and the Athenian citizens collectively should not be challenged by individual citizens.

### **The inscriptions**

The surviving honorific inscriptions are also an important source of evidence. Through inscribed honorific decrees we gain access to the way the city chose to articulate in public speech the dominant ideological preferences of democratic honouring. This is probably one of the most direct sources of evidence about the city's language of honour. Of course, the inscribed decrees to which we have access were initially proposed by specific citizens in the Assembly and/or the Council,<sup>51</sup> and are the results of competitive debates which bear the city's seal of approval.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, we need to remember that the inscribed decrees

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<sup>51</sup> See Hansen (1991) 143-146, 266-271 on *rhētores* and proposers of decrees.

<sup>52</sup> Osborne (2010) 5-6 underlines the idea that surviving inscribed decrees and amendments to proposed decrees demonstrate that participation in competitive debating in the Assembly was much more widespread than suggested by surviving literary sources usually mentioning leading political figures; cf. Luraghi (2010) 258-259 who stresses the point that inscriptions and their texts 'actually originated from a minority of highly literate citizens'.

do not reflect precisely what had been proposed and discussed in the Assembly: they are written in the official language in which the city chose to monumentalize some of her decisions.<sup>53</sup>

The earliest surviving honorific inscription emanating from the Athenian people and honouring an Athenian citizen that includes a *philotim*- cognate appears in 343/2: Phanodemus is honoured for holding office as councillor καλ[ῶς κ]αὶ φ[ι]λοτίμως καὶ ἀδωροδοκίῳ.<sup>54</sup> *Philotimia* starts to acquire a central place in the official language of approbation of the surviving honorific inscriptions for both Athenians and non-Athenians from the 340s onwards.<sup>55</sup> This phenomenon has been recognized and discussed extensively, especially in Whitehead (1983),<sup>56</sup> and on the basis of epigraphical evidence *philotimia* has been described as a ‘cardinal virtue’<sup>57</sup> and as a ‘civic virtue’<sup>58</sup> of Athenian democracy. In terms of method, several remarks that emerge from studies on *philotimia* inscriptions are useful for my exploration of *philotimia* in public rhetoric and become relevant in the following pages.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> See Osborne (2010) 64-84 on the political importance of this gap between what was said and discussed, and what was written on stone.

<sup>54</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 223A = IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 306. 11*; see Whitehead (1983) 62 and his endnotes 24-25.

<sup>55</sup> The earliest attestations for foreigners survive in *IG II<sup>2</sup> 273, 277+428 of 352/1-337/6*, but are both heavily restored. See Engen (2010) 120; Engen (2010) 133 endnote 27 provides three lists of surviving *philotimia* decrees down to the end of the fourth century: for native Athenians, foreigners, and ‘men whose legal status is uncertain’.

<sup>56</sup> See also Whitehead (1993); Engen (2010) 132-135; Lambert (2011).

<sup>57</sup> Whitehead (1993) 65.

<sup>58</sup> Luraghi (2010) 251 n. 11.

<sup>59</sup> Especially Whitehead (1983); (1993); Lambert (2004); (2011). See pp. 28-30, 41 n. 117, 118-126.

In my study, I do not re-examine the whole corpus of surviving *philotimia* inscriptions. In Chapter 2, *philotimia* inscriptions and their linguistic habits are introduced as comparative evidence that shed light on the development of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* that emerges from the literary sources examined.

#### 4. The lexical and non-lexical approach<sup>60</sup>

When exploring a specific concept which is expressed with a specific cluster of words in a specific time and place, it is reasonable to start the enquiry by looking into that vocabulary. Thus, the starting point for the exploration of *philotimia* in democratic Athens would be to examine the references to *philotim*- cognates in primary sources selected for discussion and try to understand and reconstruct from these uses what *philotimia* was. The merits of an approach that takes seriously into account the specific vocabulary employed in surviving sources of evidence are not inconsiderable: especially so, when the topic of a study concerns a specific concept within a specific place in a particular chronological period, not its equivalent in modern English, modern Greek or in any other language and society. Thus, the point of departure of this study is *philotimia* in democratic Athens, not the English

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<sup>60</sup> I borrow the term 'lexical approach' from Dover (1974) 46. In the course of this section, I recast in a way that makes them relevant to the examination of *philotimia* some of the principles about the merits and demerits of the lexical approach that Dover (1974) 46-50 applies on the examination of morality in general.

equivalents ‘love of honour’, ‘aspiration to honour’, or ‘ambition’.<sup>61</sup> Of course, the latter become very much relevant in the course of this study, as understanding *philotimia* or any other concept, idea, and value is unavoidably informed to some extent by one’s own preconceptions, moral categories and understanding of standards of behaviour.<sup>62</sup>

At this point, I should mention that this study does not approach *philotimia* in democratic Athens through, or by comparison with, *philotimo* in modern Greek language and society. Such an approach would have been based only on lexical proximity, and the vast socio-political distance between ancient Athens and modern Greece would have been proved more confusing than helpful. At the same time, in order to reject such an approach we do not need to resort to unfounded empirical statements about the discontinuity of language. Thus, to demonstrate the alleged limited value of a lexical approach when exploring codes of values and behaviour, Herman (2006) too readily cites Stewart (2001) on the point that ‘in Greece the words *timi*, “honor”, and *philotimo*, “sense of honor”, are rarely heard’.<sup>63</sup> To reply with an empirical observation myself, such a statement about *timi* and *philotimo* can only be made by someone who has not spent much time in Greece or has not examined daily life in

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<sup>61</sup> Adkins (1972) 3-9 draws attention to the advantages and disadvantages of translating or transliterating Greek value-terms, as well as to the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ meaning of value-terms.

<sup>62</sup> Skinner has most influentially theorized on the dangers involved in the task of exploring specific ideas across time and in different texts and socio-political contexts as well as on the cautiousness required from the historian of ideas. See especially Skinner (2002) 57-89 on ‘meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’.

<sup>63</sup> Herman (2006) 102, n. 70; Stewart (2001) 6904-6907.

Greece at any depth. In my experience, *philotimo* is an important value that guides behaviour in modern Greek society and, indeed, one that deserves scholarly attention by modern historians and anthropologists. Although I insist on the point that we should not approach Athenian *philotimia* through modern Greek *philotimo*, I find it worth mentioning in the Conclusions of this thesis that a case could be made for the crucial role that *philotimia* and *philotimo* may play in times of financial and moral crisis in democratic Athens and modern Greece respectively (and separately).

In this vein and to return to ancient democratic Athens, my purpose is not to examine all *philotim*- references in order to, first, capture the ‘essence’ of the concept,<sup>64</sup> as if it were one, and, second, attempt to find the most accurate word to render *philotimia* in English or any other language and society. It is on the basis of such an evaluation of the lexical approach that Herman forcefully attacks its merits,<sup>65</sup> and supports instead the view that what matters most for understanding the code of behaviour of the Athenians was what they did ‘rather than what they said or professed to believe’.<sup>66</sup> But what one says or does not say, and what

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<sup>64</sup> On the weakness of the approach that looks for an ‘essential meaning’ of an idea, see Skinner (2002) 84-86.

<sup>65</sup> Herman (2006) 101-107; Dover (1974) 46-47 also expresses his concerns, but when one reads his section on ‘Ambition and Competition’ (pp. 229-234), one realizes that, almost exclusively, it consists of a list of various manifestations of *philotimia*, positive and negative, emerging from *philotim*- references in literary sources of the fifth and fourth centuries. These are briefly evaluated within the limited textual context of the passages in which they appear, whereas the literary sources in their entity, as well as generic demands and historical contexts are hardly considered.

<sup>66</sup> Herman (2006) 106.

one claims to believe or not to believe,<sup>67</sup> especially while addressing fellow citizens in public, does matter, and the specific vocabulary employed or not employed is also important as long as it is not isolated but viewed within context, textual as well as social.<sup>68</sup>

In this study, *philotimia* is examined in textual contexts that contain *philotim*-cognates and also in contexts that do not contain *philotim*-cognates but the topic of discussion is relevant to considerations of honour, distinction, ambition and, more generally, to honour negotiations. Furthermore, *philotimia* is examined in relation with other concepts and value-terms, such as *metriotēs*, *charis*, *eunoia*, and *prothymia* which assist the exploration of *philotimia* and illuminate its scope as a civic virtue. Of course, all these *philotimia* related contexts are not examined *in vacuum*: different generic demands and historical conditions colour *philotimia* accordingly in our sources.

### *Idia philotimia and dēmosia philotimia*

As noted by Dover (1974) 48, ‘difference of phrasing can alter the denotation of a word common to a number of phrases’. Let us take the example of *idia philotimia* and *dēmosia*

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<sup>67</sup> After all, Herman (2006) 141-154 proceeds to support that forensic oratory is the most important source of evidence for reconstructing the Athenian code a behaviour, and I cannot imagine how this can be done without taking seriously into account what one ‘said or professed to believe’.

<sup>68</sup> On the importance of ‘social context’ for understanding the potential range of meanings of an idea, see Skinner (2002) 86-87.

*philotimia*. Twice in Thucydides' *Histories* the narrator condemns *idiai philotimiai* as a harmful motive for political action in Athens:<sup>69</sup> in the case of Pericles' successors (Thuc. 2.65.7), it is perceived to motivate individualistic goals the pursuance of which turns out to be harmful for the city; in the case of the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8.89.3), it denotes a contempt for equality in the name of a desire for absolute primacy among the ambitious oligarchs that turns out to be destructive for the political constitution. These passages show that it is not *philotimia* in general, unqualified *philotimia*, that is negatively evaluated, but specifically *idiai philotimiai*. In this vein, Whitehead (1983) 59 reasonably infers that *idiai philotimiai* would contrast with 'δημόσια (or κοινὰ) φιλοτιμίαι – admirable φιλοτιμίαι – pursued in the interests of the community rather than of the individual'. Although I am not aware of any reference to δημόσια (or κοινὰ) φιλοτιμίαι contemporary to Thucydides' *Histories*, we do find such an example several decades later in *Against Timarchos* in a passage that implies that οἱ δημοσίᾳ φιλότιμοι are 'men who have lived in a decorous way' (τοὺς μὲν εὐσχημόνως βεβιωκότας) in contrast with men 'whose life is shameful' (οἷς δ' αἰσχρὸς ἐστὶν ὁ βίος).<sup>70</sup>

An additional, different evaluation of the distinction between *idia philotimia* and *dēmosia philotimia* can be constructed, if we turn to a passage from *On the Crown*. There, Demosthenes claims for himself: 'I left undone no *philotimia*, either *idia* or *dēmosia*, but

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<sup>69</sup> See also pp. 127-128.

<sup>70</sup> Aesch. 1.129, my translations.

showed myself useful both towards the city and towards my friends'.<sup>71</sup> Are we to infer from this passage that since both *idia* and *dēmosia philotimia* are positively evaluated, *philotimia* is an altogether positive quality for Demosthenes or, even, in Demosthenes' time in general? As we will see in Chapter 3, neither of the two propositions can be valid: in the time of Demosthenes too *philotimia* can be negatively evaluated. The most telling piece of evidence is a passage from *On the Chersonese*, where Demosthenes, speaking in the Assembly, assures the audience that as a political advisor he has been motivated 'neither by *kerdos* nor by *philotimia*', but always provides advice the aim of which is to make the city greater, not himself.<sup>72</sup>

As stated by Dover (1974) 49, 'it is perfectly possible for a word to be derogatory in one context and complimentary in another'. Before drawing any conclusions about *idia philotimia* being a negative concept in the time of Thucydides that turned into a positive one in the time of Demosthenes, we should first examine whether *idia* denotes the same thing in both cases. In Thucydides, *idiai philotimiai* motivate *individualistic* behaviour in politics, whereas in Dem. 18.257, *idia philotimia* motivates beneficial behaviour *in private* contexts. The meaning of *idia* is considerably different in these cases, and thus *idia philotimia* cannot be safely treated as one concept whose meaning evolved over time.

In the same vein, both unqualified *philotimia* (Thuc. 3.82.8) as well as *idia philotimia*

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<sup>71</sup> Dem. 18.257, my translation.

<sup>72</sup> Dem. 8.71. See the discussion in pp. 224-226.

(Thuc. 2.65.7; 8.89.3) can be negatively coloured as motives for political action in Thucydides. Wilson suggests that Thucydides ‘viewed the deleterious form [of *philotimia*] as the principal and ‘natural’ or default type, from which the Periklean ideal was itself a rare deviation’, especially since in Thuc. 3.82.8 it is unqualified *philotimia*, not specifically *idia philotimia*, that acquires ‘a central role in the causes of *stasis*’ in a city.<sup>73</sup> My suggestion is that we should not rush into such a conclusion about Thucydides’ views on *philotimia*,<sup>74</sup> but note instead that in all cases it is in association with politics that *philotimia* (unqualified or *idia*) is castigated.<sup>75</sup> Thus, rather than concluding that *philotimia* was perceived as a primarily deleterious principle of action in general, we should examine, as I do in Chapter 3, the possibility of politics being perceived as a field of action in which showing *philotimia* and demonstrating a desire for personal distinction could carry an inegalitarian undertone.

### ‘Towards you’, towards the community

In his discussion of surviving *philotimia* inscriptions from the mid-fourth century onwards,

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<sup>73</sup> Wilson (2000) 190; Thuc. 3.82.8: πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. ‘The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry’, (Loeb).

<sup>74</sup> Cf. the positive reference in Thuc. 2.44.4 and see pp. 18-19 above.

<sup>75</sup> The same applies for Dem. 8.71 too.

Whitehead notices that one of the ways in which *philotimia* is cast as a democratic virtue is through a qualifying phrase that demonstrates towards whom the honorand had showed his *philotimia*, that is, towards whom the honorand had acted in a beneficial way that deserved to be rewarded.<sup>76</sup> This point highlights the idea that it is not *philotimia per se* that is publicly praised, but *philotimia* expressed in a way that makes it virtuous, such as towards the Athenian people and/or the council. For example, in an honorific decree of 340-330 that honours Athenian priests and *hieropoioi*,<sup>77</sup> the group of priests is praised for their *philotimia* towards the Council (φιλοτιμίας ἔνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν).<sup>78</sup> An honorific decree of 325-324,<sup>79</sup> honours Herakleides of Salamis for his *eunoia* and *philotimia* towards the people (εὐνοίας ἔνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμίας τῆς πρὸς τὸν δῆμον).<sup>80</sup> Such a qualification demonstrated who

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<sup>76</sup> Whitehead (1983) 63.

<sup>77</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 410. 16-22. On the date of the decree, see Lambert (2004) 105 n. 67.

<sup>78</sup> For Athenian honorands, see also IG II<sup>2</sup> 338. 24-25 (333-332, superintendent of the water supply) so that future office-holders also show *philotimia* towards the *demos* (φιλοτιμῶνται ἕκαστοι εἰς τὸν δῆμον); IG II<sup>3</sup> I 400 (350-339, probably Athenian officials according to Lambert (2004) 111) the people reward those who show *philotimia* towards them (ὁ δῆμος χάριτας ἀποδ[ί]δωσιν τοῖς εἰς ἑαυτὸν φιλοτι[μο]υμένοις); partially restored: IG II<sup>2</sup> 330. 21-22 (335-334, council secretary) so that other secretaries also show *philotimia* towards the council and the people (ὅπως] [ἄ]ν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ καθιστάμε[νοι γραμματεῖς φιλοτιμῶντα]ι πρὸς τε τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δ[ῆμον]); heavily restored: IG II<sup>2</sup> 1155. 5 (339-338, taxiarch) honoured for showing *philotimia* towards the people (φιλοτιμίας [τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον]).

<sup>79</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 360. 16-17. See Engen (2010) 228 (Appendix A, no. 24): the honorand is rewarded for grain-related service.

<sup>80</sup> Other examples of the formula for non-Athenian honorands: IG II<sup>2</sup> 423. 3-4 (340-300, grain-related service) φιλοτιμῶνται περὶ τὸν [δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων]; IG II<sup>2</sup> 425. 9-11 (329-322/321?, for *euergetiai*) φιλοτιμῶνται περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων; heavily restored: IG II<sup>2</sup> 285. 8-10 (345-320, unknown service) φιλοτιμίας τῆς] περὶ τὸν δ[ῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων].

was the benefited party of the honorand's *philotimia*, and bound the honorand and the honoured in a reciprocal bond. Of course, because the purpose of these inscriptions was to praise, reward, and exhort, even if *philotim-* cognates were left unqualified, *philotimia* could not have been taken as a vice or as of ambiguous quality.<sup>81</sup>

Defining *philotimia* in such a way was far more pertinent to contexts in which individuals needed to convince their audience about the quality of the expressions of *philotimia* they referred to.<sup>82</sup> This becomes more evident in the forensic speeches of the Attic orators where we find a great number of *philotim-* cognates accompanied by such qualifying phrases. In fact, the first attestation of a *philotim-* cognate in the Attic orators appears in this form. In Lysias 21, delivered shortly after 403/402, the defendant relies heavily on his liturgical record which he presents as a token of his civic-oriented *philotimia*: τὴν μὲν πατρώαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι.<sup>83</sup> Very few examples of this *philotim-* formula survive that are contemporary or near contemporary to Lysias 21,<sup>84</sup> and the significance of this observation is discussed in Chapter 2, where I trace developments in the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* in the courtroom. At this stage, I would like to stress the

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<sup>81</sup> See, for example: IG II<sup>3</sup> 324. 43-44 (322/231, non-Athenian for *euergesia*) φιλοτιμίας ἔνε[κα καὶ] [ἐ]πιμελείας.

<sup>82</sup> Brock (1991) 164-165 discusses this qualifying clause in relation with being *chrēstos* and being *eunous*, citing examples mostly from the Attic orators, and notes that these usages 'recall the formula ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἰς/περὶ τὴν πόλιν/τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων in honorific decrees'; on this honorific formula, see Whitehead (1993) 47-48.

<sup>83</sup> Lys. 21 is discussed in pp. 148-157.

<sup>84</sup> E.g., Lys. 29.14; Isoc. 18.61.

idea that from Lysias to Demosthenes, *when* expressions of *philotimia* are qualified in this way, they are to be perceived as public demonstrations of the desire to act in a honourable manner that benefits the city and deserves public recognition. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of such examples including the type of conduct/public service concerned each time.

Thus, a speaker could say: οὕτω φιλοτίμως εἶχομεν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν (Isoc. 18.61), referring to commendable conduct while on trierarchic service; χρηματιούμενος ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμησόμενος ἐξέπλευσε (Lys. 29.14), for an Athenian general while on duty; κατὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς (Dem. 21.67), for choregic service; τίς ἐθελήσει φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ([Dem.] 50.64), for trierarchic service; ἐκείνῳ μὲν φιλοτιμία πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοῦς (Dem. 20.69), for military achievement as general; διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ πατρὸς (Dem. 20.82), for service as general; ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας (Dem. 19.173) as well as οὐκ ἀνταλλακτέον εἶναί μοι τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν οὐδενὸς κέρδους (Dem. 19.223), for the ransoming of Athenian captives; ὑπὸ τῶν λητουργιῶν καὶ τῶν εἰσφορῶν καὶ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας ([Dem.] 47.54), for liturgies and other monetary services; τὰς πατρώας οὐσίας εἰς τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωκότας φιλοτιμίαν (Aesch. 3.19), for trierarchic service; ὅς τοσοῦτον καταγελά τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας (Aesch. 3.220), for honourable conduct towards the community; πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα φιλοτίμως ἔχειν (Lyc. 1.15), for honourable conduct towards the fatherland; φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μὲν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν (Lyc. 1.140), for liturgies and other monetary services.

This list of examples shows that *philotimia* was perceived as a civic virtue when it was

demonstrated towards the community in ways that were beneficial to the collective, and perhaps the most straightforward index to show this was the qualifying clause ‘towards you/the people/the city’. At the same time, we should be alert to sarcasm.<sup>85</sup> In *Against Phaenippus*, the speaker mentions that anyone could show that Phaenippus has demonstrated *philotimia* towards the people as an *agathos* and *philotimos* horse-breeder.<sup>86</sup> The greatest proof of it was that Phaenippus had sold his military horse to buy a chariot for travelling around! Such a manifestation of ‘civic-oriented’ *philotimia* (πεφιλοτιμημένον εἰς ὑμᾶς) is not to be taken at face value.

Unlike honorific inscriptions the framework of which is by definition laudatory, in forensic and deliberative speeches unqualified *philotim*-cognates require further examination. In cases such as *Against Leptines* and *Against Meidias*, where the discussion focuses on democratic attitudes to public service and reward, *philotimia* is positively evaluated, even when, strictly speaking, is left unqualified.<sup>87</sup> In other cases, however, the absence of ‘towards the community’ qualifications may indicate behaviour that is not perceived as beneficial to the community. Thus, for example, in *Lysias 14*, Alcibiades the elder and the younger are portrayed as bad *philotimoi* that disregard common standards of

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<sup>85</sup> See Skinner (2002) 111-113 on the relation of irony, meaning of a text and intention of its author.

<sup>86</sup> [Dem.] 42.24-25; see the discussion in pp. 115-116.

<sup>87</sup> Dem. 20.5-6, 10, 41, 155; 21.66-67, 160, 162, 166; see also 51.22; [Dem.] 52.29; See pp. 109-113 on Dem. 20 and pp. 84-106 on Dem. 21.

behaviour.<sup>88</sup> In Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, Philip II is cast as a bad *philotimos* because he places considerations of personal glorification above the interest of his community and his people.<sup>89</sup> In Lysias 19, Aristophanes is described as *philotimos*, not *philotimos* towards the city, because, as it turns out, he expected to be rewarded (in *charis*) by Euagoras, not by Athens, for his financial contributions related to external politics.<sup>90</sup>

The presence or absence of qualification clauses are important indexes for defining the quality of a manifestation of *philotimia*. *Philotimia* demonstrated 'towards the people/you/the city, especially in relation with the performance of public services, indicates the democratic manifestation and appreciation of the concept.

### **The public service theme and the rhetoric of *philotimia***

The theme of public service occurs several times in courtroom speeches of the Attic orators. Speakers refer to their monetary contributions to the city (mostly liturgies and *eisphorai*) and to their military service and military valour to support their legal case in the trial at hand, enhance their democratic credentials as good citizens who perform their public duties, and build their character as worthy individuals that deserve the trust of their audience and the

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<sup>88</sup> See pp. 130-133.

<sup>89</sup> See pp. 160-163.

<sup>90</sup> See pp. 168-180.

goodwill (*charis*) of the dikasts.<sup>91</sup> In many cases, speakers argue that, contrary to the opponent, they deserve a benevolent hearing or more explicitly a return from the *dikasts* because they have proved themselves (and their families) decent and helpful towards the city. Patriotism and benefactions, monetary and non-monetary, are recurrent themes of forensic oratory.<sup>92</sup>

The rhetoric of public services, particularly of financial contributions, brings to the forefront tensions that may arise in a socio-economically unequal society and sheds light on the ways in which speakers chose to mitigate, downplay, or highlight such tensions depending on their rhetorical purposes. Various approaches have emerged in modern scholarship that discuss the discourse of public service and the power of wealth in the Athenian courtroom.

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<sup>91</sup> On *charis* topoi, see the Appendix; Harris (2013a) 387-399 provides a catalogue of the references to public service in the Attic orators. However, the idea that through such references the speakers aimed, *among other things*, to stress bonds of reciprocity with the community is missing from his evaluation of many relevant passages: see his comments on Dem. 21.143-174; Dem. 28.24; Dem. 36.39-42; Dem. 38.25-26; Dem. 45.85; Isoc. 18.59-67; moreover, Harris misses the references to monetary and military services in [Lys.] 20.23-25, 28-29; Todd (2007) 344 n. 53 offers a list of references to benefactions in the Lysianic corpus.

<sup>92</sup> Johnstone (1999) 94 has shown that references to public service, in particular to liturgies, are much more frequently employed by defendants rather than by prosecutors; see also Rubinstein (2000) 213-215.

Ober (1989a) sees in the institutionalization of liturgies as obligatory public duties for a specific group of rich citizens<sup>93</sup> the further institutionalization of the demands of *charis*:<sup>94</sup> rich citizens are obliged to contribute financially to the state and the dikasts are obliged to return the favour, not, however, without judging the spirit in which a benefaction towards the city had been performed, thereby raising the standards and intensifying the competition among the elite to prove themselves worthy of the people's favour. This is a cooperative approach to the use of the power of wealth as depicted in the ideological negotiations between mass and elite in the Athenian courtroom. At the same time, Ober's sharp distinction between 'mass' and 'elite' leads to statements that indicate a lack of corporate group identity for the Athenian citizenry.<sup>95</sup> Claiming that the dikasts are willing 'to be impressed' by the wealth of the speakers, because they have already made them give part of it to the city (pp. 244-245), or that the speakers resort to values of reciprocity and gift-exchange in order to rhetorically elevate the audience to the level of the elite and create the illusion of an equal relationship between elite members (pp. 240-247), indicates a degree of pretence and a lack of genuine reciprocity between the city and the citizens. It further

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<sup>93</sup> Ober (1989a) 228-245; on the idea of 'obligatory benefaction', see Domingo Gygax (2016) 216; on liturgies and voluntariness, see Davies (1981) 24-26 and Gabrielsen (1994) 50. Even after liturgies became obligatory, there was still scope for voluntarism: Demosthenes voluntarily undertakes the *choregia* and allegedly saves his tribe from public embarrassment (Dem. 21.13).

<sup>94</sup> Ober (1989a) 229.

<sup>95</sup> On 'corporate group identity' and 'corporate interests', see pp. 2-3.

assumes that values of honour, shame, reciprocity and gift-exchange were not sincerely shared by the whole community.<sup>96</sup>

One way to see that values related to reciprocity and gift-exchange were shared across the community is through the examination of the rhetoric of justified and unjustified envy (*phthonos*). As shown by Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003), the rhetoric of envy is revealing of the cooperative and egalitarian attitude between wealthy citizens/litigants and the rest of the community: what is castigated as deserving the envy (*phthonos*) of the people is not wealth *per se*, but undemocratic and hubristic use of wealth by citizens who disregard the common well-being.<sup>97</sup> Especially in the forensic speeches from 350s onwards, as Fisher demonstrates,<sup>98</sup> financial contributions of elite litigants are evaluated on the basis of shared social values related to honour and reciprocity, and depending on whether the litigants appear to abide by the standards of civic-oriented spending and reciprocity the dikasts are invited to respond with a fair return of *charis* and goodwill or with a legitimate demonstration of envy.

Other approaches to public service arrive at more extreme constructs because they view the litigants and the panels of dikasts as opposing camps divided by socio-economic

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<sup>96</sup> On shared values, see Fisher (2003) 195-197, 202-212; (2009) 214-215; Roisman (2005) 153-156 discusses tropes in the rhetoric of appealing to *charis* and pity that allowed the speakers to direct the judgement of the dikasts without directly compromising their power and freedom; on reciprocity in ancient Greece, see Gill, Postlethwaite & Seaford (1998).

<sup>97</sup> Cairns (2003) 245-248.

<sup>98</sup> Fisher (2003) 193-202.

inequality. Millett (1998a) talks about ‘lop-sided reciprocity’ in the sense that wealthy citizens in the courtroom are in the weak position of asking for a return for their benefactions that they cannot be certain they will receive.<sup>99</sup> According to this view, the *demos* is the dominant part in the reciprocal relationship between wealthy litigants and dikasts. Davies takes the opposite view and understands the negotiations played out in the courtroom between elite speakers and the popular audience as manifestations of elite domination over the *demos* through the power of wealth. According to this approach, the obligation of the dikasts to recognize the financial contributions of the elite is evidence for the submission of the many to the power of the few.<sup>100</sup>

The treatment of public service most relevant to my survey is offered by Wilson (2000) in his study of the institution of the *choregia*. In a chapter that proposes to explore ‘the ambivalent status of the *khoregia* under democratic conditions’,<sup>101</sup> Wilson offers an extensive discussion of *philotimia* as the motivational power for the performance of liturgies and,

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<sup>99</sup> *Contra* Davies (1971) xvii and (1981) 26, 92, Millett (1998a), especially pp. 244-245, does not see a direct relation between liturgies and political power, ‘as a lever to office’ in Davies’ (1971) xvii words, in the end of the fifth century; see Millett (1998a) 249-251 on liturgies as ‘disruptive of elite cohesion’ (p. 250); see Millett (1991) 64-71 and (1998a) 86-87 on over-expenditure and indebtedness of the elite because of liturgy performance in fourth century sources; cf. Christ (2006) 143-204 who supports that Athenians were careful spenders alert to the dangers of over-expenditure and usually prioritized self-interest while spending on the city; on avoiding and dodging liturgies, see Christ (1990); on concealing one’s property to avoid performing financial duties, see Gabrielsen (1986).

<sup>100</sup> Davies (1981) 92-105; cf. Johnstone (1999) 101 who argues that the connection between the performance of liturgies and the requests for *charis* is not as strong as Davies believes.

<sup>101</sup> Wilson (2000) 144.

especially, of lavish choregic expenditures.<sup>102</sup> Wilson rightly notes that it is in the courtroom speeches that one expects to find ‘the most fulsome articulation of a democratic concept of *philotimia*’, because this is where speakers endeavour to capitalize on their ‘expenditures and victories as tokens of their civic virtue’.<sup>103</sup> Yet, Wilson’s approach to the rhetoric of public service and *philotimia* turns out to be an endeavour to refute the point that there was ever such a thing as a democratic concept of *philotimia*.

According to Wilson, ‘this democratic rhetoric is riven with contradictions and tensions’<sup>104</sup> that betray the unbridgeable socio-economic gulf between wealthy liturgists and the rest of the citizenry. In democratic Athens, public service as well as the concept and practices of *philotimia* remained closely associated with forms of large expenditures and contests of honour from which the majority of the citizen population was excluded.<sup>105</sup> If this were so, Wilson seems to argue, how can we talk about ‘democratic’ *philotimia*? Furthermore, because the accounts of public service that are produced in the courts are open to opposing interpretations, misrepresentations, and rhetorical distortion, “the assessment as to whether an action counts as an instance of ‘public’ or ‘private’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, *philotimia* will always remain just that – an assessment”.<sup>106</sup> Since the concept and practices of *philotimia*

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<sup>102</sup> Wilson (2000) 144-197.

<sup>103</sup> Wilson (2000) 145.

<sup>104</sup> Wilson (2000) 145.

<sup>105</sup> Wilson (2000) 157, 165, 173-174, 177-178.

<sup>106</sup> Wilson (2000) 191.

cannot be firmly pinned down in an unequivocally positive manner, 'bleached of all its threatening potential',<sup>107</sup> Wilson concludes that it cannot be said that *philotimia* had ever been successfully democratized.

Some of Wilson's statements deserve to be revisited and viewed under different light. To begin with, that '*philotimia* in Athens remained pre-eminently associated with the expenditure of large sums of money'<sup>108</sup> is not necessarily an argument against its democratic value. Such a statement is similar in its logic to the argument one may come across in informal political discussions of our days, that a true supporter of the political left cannot be rich. To the best of my knowledge, democratic Athens did not advertise itself as a society of socio-economic equality, but as a society of politically equal citizens all of whom were expected to contribute to the common well-being in proportion to their means.<sup>109</sup> Thus, instead of viewing liturgic expenditures as a domain of *philotimia* from which the majority of Athenians was excluded, we may view them as duties the successful performance of which benefited the majority of the Athenians. In this vein, Christ has presented a picture of the Athenian courtroom as an arena of help:<sup>110</sup> the litigants, having demonstrated their helpfulness towards the city, ask in turn the dikasts to help them back and reciprocate the good the city has received. According to this view, citizens and city are bound in a

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<sup>107</sup> Wilson (2000) 192.

<sup>108</sup> Wilson (2000) 173.

<sup>109</sup> See, e.g., Thuc. 2.37.1, 40.1-2.

<sup>110</sup> Christ (2010); (2012).

relationship of mutual helping that is mutually beneficial.<sup>111</sup> Thus, when litigants claim that they have performed or will perform their civic duties showing *philotimia* ‘towards the city’,<sup>112</sup> they seek to show not only that they have acted in ways that are beneficial to the community, but also that they recognize the community as the source of honour and public recognition they claim to deserve. In this light, Chapter 1 of this study offers a reading of the rhetoric of public service, *choregic* contests, and *philotimia* in *Against Meidias* that is much more egalitarian than Wilson’s approach allows.<sup>113</sup>

At the same time, Wilson is right to point out that during the last years of the fifth century and after the Athenian democracy had been shaken by the two oligarchic coups, *philotimia* was viewed with much suspicion: it was this very same principle that could motivate not only ambitious liturgical performance but also an oligarchic revolution.<sup>114</sup> As I show in Chapter 2, we can trace in the rhetoric of the courts during the time of Lysias a greater interest in warning the dikasts against bad *philotimoi* than presenting oneself as a good *philotimos*. Yet, where Wilson sees an end in the ‘history’ of *philotimia*, I trace a

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<sup>111</sup> According to Christ (2012) 69, 72, 89 there was a strong as well as acceptable element of calculation when rendering oneself helpful towards the city intended to ‘create a debt of *charis* on the part of fellow citizens, which jurors must pay back in the courts through a favourable verdict’ (p. 89). In the same vein, the dikasts are also invited to help citizens that are more probable to provide more help to the city in the future. In this way, the dikasts’ help is also a calculated response (p. 228); Johnstone (1999) 109-125 reads appeals to pity in a similar way.

<sup>112</sup> For examples of the topos, see pp. 30-31; cf. Lys. 26.3-4 discussed in pp. 134-135.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Wilson (1991) and (2000) 156-167, 174-178.

<sup>114</sup> Wilson (2000) 191-192.

development. For Wilson, disavowals of *philotimia*, such as in Lys. 19.56-57, show that “*philotimia* ceases to be the objective for reciting one’s services. They are instead ‘evidence’ of a civically-minded attitude towards money, one’s own and that of the city”.<sup>115</sup> In my view, that services are presented as ‘evidence of a civically-minded attitude towards money’ need not detract from the appreciation of *philotimia* as a motivational power for performing and reciting public services. It should rather be viewed as part of the democratic and egalitarian definition of both public service and *philotimia*. And, although it is in the time of Demosthenes that the rhetoric of public service and civic-oriented *philotimia* appears consistently and in full force in the courtrooms, we have evidence that allow us to trace it as far back as the last years of the fifth century.<sup>116</sup>

Furthermore, to appreciate and evaluate *philotimia* as a democratic value, we should see beyond the connection of *philotimia* with lavish expenditures.<sup>117</sup> Let us take the example of the *choregic* competition. For Wilson, in *choregic* competitions honour is the objective of rival elite Athenian *choregoi*, ‘an objective associated almost exclusively with him [the

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<sup>115</sup> Wilson (2000) 181; cf. my discussion of Lysias 19 in pp. 168-180.

<sup>116</sup> See pp. 146-159.

<sup>117</sup> In this direction, of especial importance is the fact that many of the Athenian citizens who from the 340s onwards are rewarded in *philotimia* honorific inscriptions are ordinary officials who have completed successfully their public office, not wealthy Athenians who have performed monetary benefactions; on this point, see Liddel (2007) 176-177; Lambert (2011) 197, 202-203; the surviving decrees of this kind for the period 352/1-322/1 are Lambert (2004) nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 27, 28; Engen (2010) 133 endnote 27 provides a list of such decrees down to the end of the fourth century; cf. Whitehead (1983) 64 for some *philotimia* decrees that directly or indirectly honour Athenian citizens for monetary benefactions too.

*choregos*] as opposed to his ‘team’.<sup>118</sup> To argue so, as Fisher has shown, is to presuppose a lack of reciprocity between a *choregos* and the rest of his team that downplays both the team effort required for each *choregic* entry and the collective desire for honour and victory.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, Fisher (2010) and Fisher (2011) have convincingly shown that *choregic* and other kinds of festival competitions should not be regarded as predominantly elite or aristocratic contests, as citizens from very divergent socio-economic backgrounds and from different areas of the city worked in team and channeled their *philotimia* towards a common aim, winning the contest. Widespread participation and cooperation for the successful organization of and performance in the festivals reinforced the bonds of Athenian community.

In this light, when a litigant recites past services as tokens of his *philotimia*, he expects to activate bonds of reciprocity between himself and the city which rely on a twofold understanding of *charis*:<sup>120</sup> firstly, as goodwill and gratitude felt at the moment of enjoying the pleasures of a specific action/service; and secondly *charis* as an intrinsic part of all reciprocal relationships which pervades them and can be identified with any part of them: *charis* as the good done, as the counter-good expected in return, and as the gratitude and

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<sup>118</sup> Wilson (2000) 146.

<sup>119</sup> See Fisher (2003) 202-208 including a critical evaluation of Wilson (2000).

<sup>120</sup> Fisher (2010) 74: Fisher’s distinction follows Aristotle’s brief treatment of *charis* in *Rhet.*2.7 as an emotion (gratitude) felt in relation with benefactions and in *NE*.1132b29-1133a6 as a social cooperative value; on *charis* as a key cooperative value of the Greeks, see Fisher (2010) with his additional bibliography in p. 73 n. 7; on *charis* in the Attic orators, see Davies (1981) 92-105; Ober (1989a) 226-233; Johnstone (1999) 100-108; Rubinstein (2000) 213-220; Millett (1998a); Dover (1974) 293-295 (judicial *charis*); Roisman (2005) 153-162.

goodwill felt at any stage of the process. It is within such a framework of shared understanding of reciprocity that Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* advises the dikasts to judge a citizen's *philotimia* not from his splendiddness in general, private and public, but from his splendiddness in activities that benefit the majority.<sup>121</sup> And even for Aristotle, not all lavish expenditures are the objects of good *philotimia*, but only those that are demonstrated towards the community, namely the liturgies.<sup>122</sup> In both cases, *philotimia* is evaluated in reciprocity with the community, and this is the context within which it is expected to be appreciated as a civic virtue.

Particular actions, services, or liturgical records could indeed be presented in different, even contrasting ways in the courtroom, as Wilson rightly notes regarding Meidias' liturgies.<sup>123</sup> What I wish to point out is that, in spite of this rhetorical flexibility, in all cases, past actions, services, or liturgical records would have been evaluated against standards of common interest and reciprocity with the city or lack of it. In other words, that past actions could be presented and assessed in different, even contrasting ways, does not

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<sup>121</sup> Dem. 21.159. See the discussion in pp. 100-103.

<sup>122</sup> Arist. *NE*.1122b22-24: καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ ποῦ χορηγεῖν οἷονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν; 'and those expenditures that are good objects of *philotimia* towards the community, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain places, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public' (translation from Loeb, adapted). According to Aristotle's categories, lavish expenditures, private and public, are the concern of the *megaloprepēs* (*NE*.1122a18-1123a19; see also Xen. *Oec.*2.5-7). On the political aspect of *megaloprepeia* and lavish spending, see Kurke (1991) 163-194.

<sup>123</sup> Wilson (2000) 177, 191.

mean that they would have been evaluated by contrasting criteria that could produce contradicting or incompatible accounts on what is good and what is bad *philotimia*. I find it highly unlikely that, in response to Demosthenes' attack, Meidias would have crafted a radically different account of what should count as good *philotimia* from what we find in Dem. 21.159. It is also very improbable that Meidias would have said that having a big house and driving his wife to the mysteries in a carriage drawn by two white horses make him a good, democratic *philotimos* that deserves *charis* (cf. Dem. 21.158). But he would very probably have argued that, contrary to Demosthenes' lies (Dem. 21.160-167), his trierarchy had been performed out of *philotimia* towards the city and not for private profit.

Whether the rhetoric of public service and reciprocity was directly relevant to the legal point of a case is a matter of scholarly debate. Lanni (2006) 41-74 places the public service theme under the category of extra-legal information along with other kind of character evidence that were employed by the speakers to enhance their credibility and help them build an appealing profile in the courtroom. Such information, according to Lanni, may not have been, by modern standards, directly relevant to the legal point at hand, but was equally important in helping the dikasts reach a fair and just verdict.<sup>124</sup> Lanni supports that the Athenian legal system functioned on the basis of a broad notion of relevance according to which extra-legal information provided the dikasts with details that helped them build

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<sup>124</sup> See also Christ (1998) 40-43.

the background and context of a case and allowed them to have a round perspective of the standing and merit of the litigants in each case.

The argument that legal and extra-legal information was all equally important for reaching a verdict has been disputed by Harris (2013a) 127-136. Following a much stricter reading of the forensic speeches and Athenian law, Harris argues that, when public service is employed it is indeed relevant to the charge adjudicated and when it is not relevant the dikasts are not supposed to take it into account for deciding guilt, but only for deciding the penalty, that is, during the process of *timesis* in public cases. Harris' close reading of the sources reveals certain limitations in the treatment of public service that have been overlooked in modern scholarship, but at the same time he makes simplistic statements to support his strict line of thought.

Two examples from Harris (2013a) 130 should suffice to show what I refer to: 'Some litigants cite their service to demonstrate their good character, but they do not argue that they should win their case *simply because* [my italics] they have helped the community.' 'In a few cases litigants mention their public service to gain the goodwill of the court [...], *but no litigant ever admits guilt* [my italics] and then argues that his public service entitles him to an acquittal.' Such kind of statements are unnecessarily dismissive and do not do justice to the idea that a piece of information included in a speech does not need to prove the *legal* matter at hand so as to affect the judgement of the dikasts and be taken seriously into account.

Moreover, no speaker would have been so unreasonable as to first admit guilt and then attempt to ‘buy off’ a favourable verdict with references to his past public services.

Citations of public service and in general character evidence, whether directly relevant to the charge or not, were employed because they helped the litigants familiarize themselves with their audience and perhaps gain their goodwill. Although such pieces of information probably would not have sufficed for determining guilt, they definitely played an important role for the dikasts’ general assessment of the litigants as trustworthy individuals and worthy democratic citizens or the opposite. In this framework, especially from the 360s onwards, *philotimia* very often emerges as the appropriate motive for performing public service indicating the civic-oriented frame of mind of an individual who seeks to distinguish himself while contributing to the well-being of the city. *Philotimia* manifested in such contexts was expected to count positively in the dikasts’ minds.

#### **Absence of *philotim*- cognates: absence of *philotimia*?**

In a discussion of Athenian imperialism and its language, Low (2005) 93 points out that, although the connection between action and description is an inextricably close one, there is a danger of framing this connection in a simplistic way: ‘There is no great merit to the view which suggests that the lexical richness, or poverty, of a particular area of a particular language should be seen as directly proportional to the interest the speakers of that language

have in that area of activity.’ In this respect, Low (2005) 94 further notes, ‘there need not be any necessary correlation between the presence or absence of a specialized vocabulary of imperialism in fifth-century Athens and the presence or absence of a fifth-century Athenian urge to rule the Greek world.’

From a similar point of departure, there are situations in which, although *philotimia* in the sense of love of honour, ambition, or desire for distinction is expected to have played a role in motivating action, it is not explicitly recognized as such with the employment of *philotim-* terms. Such contexts of public speech from which *philotim-* cognates are absent, or where *philotimia* as motive of action and as a quality of a speaker’s ethos is refuted in his self-portrayal, are important for my survey. Their significance does not lie in the idea that they can, in any way, be used to answer the empirical question of whether *philotimia* was present within or absent from one’s soul whenever it was mentioned or not mentioned, respectively. Their importance lies on the idea that they may have something to tell about the domain of *philotimia* as a civic virtue. In other words, by exploring such limitations in the rhetoric of *philotimia* we may be able to identify some kinds of activities and contexts in association with which it was probably perceived as inappropriate to bring attention to one’s *philotimia* in a straightforward manner. This aspect of my study builds on the idea that *philotimia* was an ambivalent concept. There were situations, it seems, where the competitive aspect of *philotimia* was more prominent than its cooperative, where individual ambitions and honour negotiations among individual citizens, and indeed prominent citizens, needed to be

downplayed for the sake of collective superiority, honour, and authority.

One area of activity that this study identifies as such is that of competitive political debating in the Assembly. In the second half of the fourth century, a noticeable interest towards *philotimia*, and indeed civic-oriented *philotimia*, is attested in courtroom rhetoric and honorific inscriptions, but not in the surviving deliberative speeches. We find all in all seven references to *philotimia*,<sup>125</sup> five of them with negative connotations,<sup>126</sup> while the sole one that is part of Demosthenes' self-portrayal is, in fact, a rejection of *philotimia* as a motivational power of his political advising and public speaking.<sup>127</sup> Demosthenes' surviving deliberative speeches could be assessed as too limited a source of evidence, and the discussion could have ended here, before even beginning, by simply stating that if more deliberative speeches had survived, not only by Demosthenes but also by other speakers, the picture could have been different, even possibly including references to civic-oriented *philotimia*.<sup>128</sup> But instead of

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<sup>125</sup> Dem. 13.26 is the only positive mention. It refers to showing collective *philotimia* (φιλοτιμούμεθα) in the sense of taking pride in the ancestors' achievements.

<sup>126</sup> Dem. *Ol.*2.3, 16, 18 (x2) on Philip II. See the discussion on Philip as an example of a bad *philotimos* in pp. 160-163; *Phil.*4.71: Aristomedes, a rival-politician of Demosthenes, is attacked for being concerned more about his own *philotimia* and *doxa* than about the city's.

<sup>127</sup> Dem. 8.71. See pp. 26-27.

<sup>128</sup> The extensive deliberative speeches of classical Athens that have survived are not very many. The earliest one is Andoc. 3 (*On the Peace with Sparta*) from 391, on the rhetoric of which see Missiou (1992); two that are preserved in the Demosthenic corpus, [Dem.] 7 (*On Halonnesus*) and 17 (*On the Treaty with Alexander*), are probably by a *rhētōr* named Hegesippus: on their generally accepted spuriousness see MacDowell (2009) 343-347, 377-382; the remaining fourteen belong to Demosthenes (Dem. 1-6, 8-11, 13-16) and cover a quite short period of approximately thirteen years. The oldest one is Dem. 14 (*On the Symmories*) delivered in 354/3 (Dion. Hal.*Amm.*1.4); the latest is Dem. 10 (*Fourth Philippic*) probably from

overlooking the evidence provided by the surviving deliberative speeches on the basis of such guesswork, I suggest we put forward a different proposition. I suggest, instead, that we take the cautious dissociation of political advising from acting out of *philotimia* and the general absence of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* from the surviving deliberative speeches as deliberate choices that were reflective of the decorum of speaking, advising, and presenting oneself in the Assembly.

The etiquette of speaking in the Assembly seems to differ from that of the courtroom and a speaker's self-portrayal probably followed different conventions in each venue.<sup>129</sup> Conditions that favoured the development of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* in the courtroom seem to be absent from the Assembly. First, there is the striking absence of

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342/1: on its authenticity, see Worthington (1991); on its dating and on whether it was delivered or not, see MacDowell (2009) 354-359. On the chronology of Demosthenes speeches, see Sealey (1955); the authenticity of Dem. 13 (*On Organization*) is disputed but MacDowell (2009) 225-227 believes that it is genuine. See also Badian (2000) 37 n. 70 (who does not accept its authenticity) and MacDowell (2009) 226 n.62 on further bibliography for and against genuineness; Dem.11 (*Response to Philip's Letter*) is a more complicated case, but MacDowell (2009) 363, with some reservations, is positively inclined towards its authenticity; cf. Badian (2000) 10.

In the list above, I did not count in Demosthenes' *prooemia*, fragments of deliberative speeches, deliberative speeches of which we only know their title as well as political pamphlets that borrow the form of the symbouleutic genre (such as Isocrates' *Areopagitikos*, *On the Peace* and *Plataikos*). For an overview of all this evidence, see Hansen (1984a); Hudson-Williams (1951); on the *prooemia*, see Yunis (1996) 287-299; Worthington (2006) 55-98; Worthington (2004) 129-143; MacDowell (2009) 6-7.

<sup>129</sup> In this vein, I find plausible and persuasive Harris' (2016) 152 suggestion that composing τὰ δέοντα, one of the principles Thucydides proclaims he will follow in the speeches of his *Histories* (Thuc. 1.22.1), can be expanded to include not only what is 'appropriate' for the situation and the person speaking, but also for *the venue* of speaking.

recitations of public services, an important difference from the rhetoric of the courtroom that has been overlooked in modern scholarship, as Harris (2016) 145 rightly observes. Drawing evidence from Thucydides, Xenophon and Demosthenes, Harris (2016) notes that in the Assembly a speaker would not normally refer to the achievements of his ancestors and to his liturgies to boost his persuasiveness. The only case attested in our sources of a speaker attempting to capitalize on such things during a political discussion is Thucydides' Alcibiades in the Sicilian debate.<sup>130</sup> In this respect, Alcibiades' example seems to be an unconventional rather than typical case of self-representation in the Assembly. By saying so, I do not disregard Thucydides' proclamation that he composed the speeches of the *Histories* according to what would have been appropriate (τὰ δέοντα) to say: Alcibiades' speaking is indeed appropriate, not, however, because it suits the occasion and the venue of speaking, but because it reflects his character.<sup>131</sup>

If we take Alcibiades as an exceptional case of self-representation in the Assembly,<sup>132</sup> we are left with hardly any evidence that the rhetoric of public service was a common practice at the Assembly either in the fifth or fourth centuries. If this observation contains

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<sup>130</sup> Thuc. 6.16.1-5.

<sup>131</sup> Harris (2016) 146, 152-153; on Alcibiades as violator of norms, see Mann (2007) 199-229.

<sup>132</sup> Of course, I could not exclude the possibility that there could have been other instances of advisors bringing attention to their services during a political debate (see pp. 230-231). Even so, I find that Alcibiades is an exceptional case because of the particularly inegalitarian way in which he attempts to capitalize on his monetary expenditures and horse-racing activities (see pp. 206-210).

any kernel of validity and is not a biased conclusion stemming from the limited surviving sources, then it is a crucial one for our understanding of the absence of civic-oriented *philotimia* from the rhetoric of the Assembly. The link between the two seems to me a straightforward one: since good, civic-oriented *philotimia* used to be recognized as the motivational power behind public services,<sup>133</sup> absence of references to public services in the Assembly explains the absence of the associated rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia*. Directly related to this point is also the observation, also unexplored by scholars until today, as far as I know, that, differently from courtroom practices, *charis* requests and appeals to the goodwill of the audience were not common rhetorical practices in the Assembly.

My suggestion is that the absence of civic-oriented *philotimia* from self-presentations in the Assembly is perhaps not an isolated phenomenon, symptomatic of our limited sources, but can be viewed as belonging to a different kind of speaking and of presenting oneself that seems to be context-specific and part of the etiquette of the Assembly. My view is that, differently from the courtroom, the Assembly offered less space for self-praise and self-referencing, mostly because the main objective of political debating was to provide the best advice for the community. In this context, a speaker needed to show more care for the city and the public interest, and less for himself. In this light, the rejections of *philotimia* that

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<sup>133</sup> Less frequently in the time of Lysias and more systematically in the time of Demosthenes, as we will see in pp. 107-127, 146-159.

survive in representations of Assembly debates<sup>134</sup> and in deliberative speeches<sup>135</sup> show precisely this point: that political debating was not the most appropriate place to draw attention to one's considerations for distinction and honour, even though one may have mounted the rostrum, among other things, out of *philotimia* too.<sup>136</sup>

If the courtroom rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia*, *charis*, and public services did not seem to have a place in the Assembly, a related question deserves attention. Do political services and political advising feature as part of the courtroom rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia*? In other words, did litigants seek to capitalize on their political contributions as tokens of *philotimia* towards the city that deserved a return of *charis*? Through the examination of Demosthenes' self-portrayal in his political trials with Aeschines, in the last section of Chapter 3, we will see that the answer seems to be partly negative: Demosthenes does not *straightforwardly* present his political activities as manifestations of civic-oriented *philotimia*.

At the same time, Demosthenes infiltrates honourable *philotimia* into the construction of his political ethos in an indirect manner. In this respect, one final point requires explanation. In my analysis of Dem. 18, I single out some passages which I call '*philotimia*-

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<sup>134</sup> Ar. *Thesm.* 383-388.

<sup>135</sup> Dem. 8.71.

<sup>136</sup> It is useful to remind ourselves here that in Thucydides it is precisely in association with politics and personal ambitions of politicians that both *philotimia* and *idia philotimia* are negatively coloured. See pp. 25-28.

friendly’ contexts for the lack of my ability to find a better name. The short explanation of this somewhat awkward label is that ‘*philotimia*-friendly’ contexts are passages reflecting the mentality of acting out of honourable *philotimia* without including any *philotim*- cognates. Now, what remains to be explained is what I identify as ‘the mentality of acting out of honourable *philotimia*’. My definition emerges from Dem. 18.66, a passage that evokes the moral principles that the Athenian ancestors used to follow in external politics, among which *philotimia* figures prominently:

ἀεὶ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλείω καὶ χρήματα καὶ σώματ’ ἀνηλωκυῖαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι συμφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν ἕκαστοι.

‘our country always fought for the first prize in honor and glory and had expended more money and men in pursuit of honour [*philotimia*] and the common good than all the other Greeks had expended on their own behalf’, Yunis (2005)

Thus, as ‘*philotimia*-friendly’ contexts, I identify passages that reflect this shared morality of the ancestors and the city that has, allegedly, always been guiding them to act in a manner that does not prioritize their own profit to the detriment of others, but is widely beneficial, and distinguishes the city in honour and glory, even though it may cost heavily in animate and inanimate resources. Demosthenes may tactfully avoid calling himself a *philotimos*

symboulos,<sup>137</sup> but the way he presents himself conducting politics reflects at the level of the individual the city's traditional *philotimia* attitude which is inspired, in short, by a sense of commitment to a higher cause that may be pursued to the extent of self-sacrifice, as explained in Dem. 18.66.

In a sense, then, excelling in honour in politics is reserved for the city and underlines the idea that the city collectively is to be regarded as the author of great achievements.<sup>138</sup> If this is so, as I endeavour to show in Chapter 3, it may help us explain why *philotimia* is not employed for the praise of one's individual political contributions. Ideally, excelling in honour and glory in politics is to be reserved for the city, and citizens need to make sure they do not challenge collective superiority. In this light, it is worth mentioning that Dem. 18.66 is the only instance in *On the Crown* that *philotim*- vocabulary is employed in an ethical evaluation of political attitudes, and it is noteworthy that it is attributed to the collective not to Demosthenes.

Finally, the city's superiority in morality and honour can be associated with the ideal of the *demos* as the only legitimate *megalophron*. In idealized representations of the city's past

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<sup>137</sup> See e.g. Dem. 18.107-109, 179, 193, 208.

<sup>138</sup> In the same vein, as shown by Kallet (2003) 124-131, the Athenians promoted themselves at domestic level as the unrivaled *megaloprepēs* spender (i.e., unrivaled by splendid outlays by elite Athenian citizens). Particularly so in the second half of the fifth century through the ambitious building programme of the city. Kallet (2003) 131 notes that '[p]ublic expenditures, that is, by the *demos* of its own moneys, far outstripped any private expenditures by individuals and explains why such latter outlays, notably on liturgies, could be encouraged, since they appear to have posed no threat.'

behaviour in the courtroom and the Assembly, excelling citizens are honoured moderately for their political contributions, whereas the city collectively is recognized as the agent of political achievements.<sup>139</sup> This attitude of ‘thinking big’ resembles to some extent Aristotle’s *megalopsychia* and the *megalopsychos*, as sketched out in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>140</sup> The *megalopsychos* legitimately entertains a great idea of himself that distinguishes him from the rest, pursues high initiatives, and is ready to sacrifice his life as long as the cause is noble.<sup>141</sup> These principles of honourable behaviour of the *megalopsychos* seem to be shared with what I identify as ‘the mentality of acting out of honourable *philotimia*’.<sup>142</sup> Although this thesis does not provide a detailed discussion of *megalopsychia* and the *megalopsychos*, it is worth bringing attention to the idea that Demosthenes’ civic courage in political advising could also be viewed as resembling the bravery of the *megalopsychos* who has the habit of talking sincerely and openly without considering the consequences (*NE.1124b28-30*).<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> See pp. 163-167, 198-199, 214-223, 226-227.

<sup>140</sup> Arist. *NE.1123a4-12-1125a17*; on Aristotle’s *megalopsychia* and relevant bibliography, see Cullyer (2014) 139-147.

<sup>141</sup> Arist. *NE.1123b1-2, 15-24, 1124b6-9, 25-26*.

<sup>142</sup> Isocrates in his encomium for Euagoras (*Isoc. Euag.3*) reflects this view by treating *philotimoi* and *megalopsychoi* as one item: ‘We shall discover that *philotimoi* and *megalopsychoi* men not only wish to be praised for such things [i.e. the activities and the dangers they undertook] but that they are concerned about honor rather than livelihood, and that they do everything possible to leave behind an immortal memory of themselves.’, translation by Too in Mirhady & Too (2000).

<sup>143</sup> See pp. 234-237; thus, Aristotle’s *megalopsychia* need not be viewed as ‘quintessentially inappropriate to democratic politics’, as Balot (2009) 276 has argued, because there are honourable elements in the behaviour of the *megalopsychos*. At the same time, Balot is not mistaken as far as his evaluation concerns the negative appreciation of the *megalopsychos*’

To sum up, the lack of *philotim-* terms does not necessarily indicate that the ideas or qualities that this concept encapsulates were missing from political discussions and debates. What it probably indicates is that politics and the Assembly were not perceived as appropriate spaces to draw attention to one's *philotimia* in a self-celebratory manner, because the uncontested *philotimos* was the city collectively, and highlighting personal *philotimia* could be perceived as suspicious and inegalitarian. Ideally, the duty of every politically active individual was to enhance with their words and actions the city's *philotimia* and distinction, not to turn politics into the dystopic contest of individual *philotimia* that Thucydides (2.65.7, 10-11) very aptly describes. In this light, Chapter 3 explores the rhetoric of *philotimia* in political discussions and debates, and especially in self-portrayals of politically active citizens.

## 5. The diachronic and synchronic approach

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superiority, when he seems to be aloof (NE. 1124a19-20) or unsatisfied with the honours bestowed to him (NE. 1124a5-11), when he snobs regular contests (NE.1124b23-24), refuses to accept help (NE.1124b17-18) or sustain bonds of reciprocity and sociability in his community (NE.1124b9-15, 1125a2-12). Contrary to Aristotle's idea that the *megalopsychos*' contempt for others is fair (NE.1124b5-6, δικάίως καταφρονεῖ), such expressions of superiority can indeed be perceived as undemocratic and inegalitarian; on a comparison between democracy in Aristotle and Athenian democracy in practice, see Lintott (1992).

Because *philotimia* is an ambivalent notion and may appear in the sources either in positive or negative light,<sup>144</sup> some short ‘histories’ of the concept organize the evidence in chronological order,<sup>145</sup> from Homer down to the second half of the fourth century.<sup>146</sup> Most characteristically, Whitehead (1983) 55-60 produces a conveniently clear-cut ‘history’ of the meaning of *philotimia*, when it appears to be positive and when negative, yet one that to a certain extent is insensitive both to diachronic and synchronic contextual differences. For Whitehead, *philotimia* was given ‘a central position in the ideology of effort and reward’ not only ‘throughout the corpus of fourth-century Attic oratory’, but also ‘in the *ekklesia* and the courts’.<sup>147</sup> Whitehead treats the Attic orators as a uniform source of evidence and thus misses

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<sup>144</sup> One of the earliest occurrences of *philotimia* vocabulary in Greek literature that shows its ambivalent and dangerous nature appears in Pindar (fr. 210 Maehler). The fragment, however, survives through Plutarch (*De coh. ira* 457B) and its originality has been disputed. See De Pourcq – Roskam (2012) 2 n. 8.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Dover (1974) 229-233 and Frazier (1988) 110-118 which are not chronological.

<sup>146</sup> Short surveys of *philotimia* in the literature of classical Athens and of earlier times, which seem, in one way or another, to follow a chronological order are Whitehead (1983) 55-60; Wilson (2000) 187-194; De Pourcq – Roskam (2012) 1-4; common starting point in all is the Homeric world with the centrality of *kleos* and honour, and the notable absence of any reference to *philotimia* cognates; Wilson’s account starts off in a chronological fashion, but, in the course of it, the evidence is organized in a way that highlights Wilson’s suggestion that the most prominent form of *philotimia* was the negative deleterious one and that *philotimia* was never really democratized in spite of its positive appearance from the mid-fourth century onwards (*contra* Whitehead (1983) and (1993)). Moreover, Wilson’s account differs from Whitehead’s in that the former does not take the positive references to *philotimia* in Aeschylus (*Supp.* 658, 907; *Eu.* 1033) as cases of ‘unproblematical’ and ‘innocent’ *philotimia*. See Wilson (2000) 196 n. 139.

<sup>147</sup> Whitehead (1983) 59-60. Note that all the examples Whitehead provides in endnote 15 come from forensic speeches.

nuanced diachronic developments and synchronic variations in the employment and evaluation of *philotimia*.

In a similar manner, MacDowell's short treatment of *philotimia* in his commentary of *Against Meidias* produces a very schematic diachronic account of change in the meaning of *philotimia*.<sup>148</sup> According to MacDowell, in Athens in the end of the fifth century and beginning of the fourth, *philotimia* was perceived as a negative, egotist force associated with the pursuance of private interest and personal distinction to the detriment of the community and the well-being of the collective.<sup>149</sup> Later, from around the mid fourth century onwards, it turned into a positive quality employed to denote one's patriotic and democratic credentials which were demonstrated through the performance of public services (e.g., liturgies) and for which one expected public recognition and gratitude. But 'even in D. (e.g. 8.71)' the old negative sense of the concept can be found, MacDowell (1990) 379 notes. This is a diachronic and evolutionary approach to change in the meaning of *philotimia* according to which occurrences of negative *philotimia* in the later era of positive *philotimia* are viewed as sporadic relics of the past.

MacDowell's schema, just as Whitehead's, disregards the importance of synchronic contextual differences, especially the differences of etiquette between the Assembly and the courtroom. I have already mentioned in the previous section that the infrequency of

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<sup>148</sup> MacDowell (1990) 378-379, on Dem. 21.159.

<sup>149</sup> MacDowell cites Thuc. 2.65.7 and Ar. *Thesm.*383.

*philotim-* vocabulary or the rejection of *philotimia* (as in Dem. 8.71, mentioned by MacDowell) as phenomena characteristic of the rhetoric of the deliberative speeches have passed unobserved and have not been viewed as issues that deserve to be treated separately and in a systematic way. As a result, the occasional negative reference to *philotimia* in the Attic orators from the 350s onwards is either disregarded, as in the case of Whitehead, or taken as the odd one out, as in the case of MacDowell. Furthermore, the distinction between the rhetoric of the courtroom and the Assembly is significant also from a diachronic point of view, as representations of debates from the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries seem to corroborate the impression conveyed for *philotimia* from Demosthenes' deliberative speeches.

In the three Chapters that comprise the main body of this study, the discussion does not follow a linear chronological order from the 430s down to the 320s. I rather seek to provide a discussion that is attuned to diachronic and synchronic differences, continuities, and discontinuities in the rhetoric of *philotimia* which demonstrate how *philotimia* is valued in democratic Athens in different contexts and periods of time.

Chapter 1 explores the relation between *philotimia* and *metriotēs* (moderation) in courtroom rhetoric of Demosthenes' time. In the short account of *philotimia* that Aristotle provides in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, he notes that ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς

ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα.<sup>150</sup> Being *philotimos* and being *metrios* (moderate) seem to be incompatible in Aristotle's statement. This seems to be consistent with Aristotle's understanding of the *philotimos* as the person who stands out of the rest and goes the extra mile, either in a virtuous (ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί) or in a vicious way (ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ).<sup>151</sup> In democratic Athens, being a *metrios politēs* was a shared ideal: all citizens in spite of socio-economic differences could see themselves as *metrioi* citizens who promoted with their conduct the common well-being.<sup>152</sup> But, quite differently from Aristotle's assessment, we will see in Section 1 that, in spite of qualitative differences, being *philotimos* and being *metrios* could be presented as belonging to the same mentality, that of prioritizing public interest without ignoring appropriate personal ambitions and goals. This becomes evident in forensic contexts that deal with legitimate manifestations of power, especially the power of wealth.

The compatibility of *philotimia* and *metriotēs* which reinforces the idea that *philotimia* was to a considerable extent an important positive value in democratic Athens is discussed in detail in Section 2 taking *Against Meidias* as a case study. For Wilson, the rhetoric of public service, choregic expenditures, and *philotimia* of *Against Meidias* illustrates the unbridgeable socio-economic distance between the elite speaker and the *demos*.<sup>153</sup> In my view, it rather

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<sup>150</sup> Arist. *NE*.1125b11-13.

<sup>151</sup> Arist. *NE*.1125b14-17.

<sup>152</sup> See pp. 70-71 n. 4 for bibliography on moderation and the ideal of the *metrios* citizen.

<sup>153</sup> See p. 40 n. 113.

illustrates the distance between the democratic elite citizen and the undemocratic elite citizen. The former, Demosthenes, is cast as a civic-oriented *philotimos* and as a *metrios* citizen, whereas the latter, Meidias, is cast as a non-*philotimos*, non-*metrios*, and as a *hybristēs*. In the self-portrait of Demosthenes, the dikasts are invited to see a model *philotimos* citizen who puts his means to the service of the city. *Against Meidias* offers an illustrious account of democratic *philotimia* right at the time when it was most systematically promoted as a civic virtue both in the courtrooms and in honorific inscriptions.

If Chapter 1 shows the extent that the promotion of civic-oriented *philotimia* can reach in courtroom speaking and may be taken as a definition of what being a democratic *philotimos* would entail especially for an elite Athenian, Chapter 2 starts off by showing that this democratic model of *philotimia* is not a rhetorical construct made up by Demosthenes to serve a particular forensic case. Section 1 shows that in the courtrooms from the 360s onwards *philotimia* is systematically praised as the right motive behind public service that deserves public reward and recognition. This concerted promotion of *philotimia* is also attested in honorific inscriptions of the city that survive from the 340s onwards<sup>154</sup> and is associated with a broader systematic effort of the city to bestow honours and rewards at a time when, after the unsuccessful Social War (357-355), the city needed both to attract

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<sup>154</sup> At deme level, the earliest *philotimia* decree is RO 46 of ca. 360. See Rhodes & Osborne (2003) 231-234.

foreign benefactors and their resources, and to inspire good execution of office at home.<sup>155</sup>

At the same time, Domingo Gygax (2016) 221 makes a fair observation when he notes that the positive meaning of inscribed *philotimia* as ‘love of a particular type of honor, that which derives from doing good to the community’, should not be viewed as ‘a product of the more systematic use of honors after the Social War’.

This remark does good service as a transitional point to Section 2 of the chapter, where I move back in time and discuss the rhetoric of *philotimia* in forensic speeches during the time of Lysias from the early 400s to the 380s. More attention is given to negatively evaluated *philotimia* during these years, but this should not lead to the conclusion that *philotimia* was ‘originally’ a vice that later turned into a virtue. Quite differently, my suggestion is that the focus on the dangers of *philotimia* and on bad *philotimoi* is a consequence of the grim memories of the effects of deleterious *philotimia* that the city had experienced during the politically turbulent years of the late fifth century with the failure of the Sicilian expedition (415-413) and the two short oligarchic upheavals (411/410 and 404/403). Thus, as we will see, more attention is paid in warning the audience against dangerous or bad *philotimoi*, and in deemphasizing one’s own *philotimia* rather than in promoting oneself as a good *philotimos*. Although neither the literary nor the non-literary evidence from the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth centuries point towards a *concerted* effort to

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<sup>155</sup> Lambert (2011) 194-198.

promote *philotimia* as a civic virtue at that time, instances of what later, in the time of Demosthenes, was systematically promoted as civic-oriented *philotimia* can be traced as far back as the last years of the fifth century. This observation is crucial as it reinforces the idea that we should rather refrain from making any evolutionary suggestions or argue for a ‘semantic change’ in the meaning of *philotimia*.<sup>156</sup> Thus, if the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* can be traced in forensic speeches of the end of the fifth century, there is not much value in the idea that a chronological development occurred in the *meaning* of *philotimia*. If there is a diachronic change, I suggest it is one of focus, from the dangers of individualistic *philotimia* to the advantages of encouraging civic-oriented *philotimia*.

Section 3 of the chapter explores manifestations of *philotimia* that take place outside the democratic city from the time of Lysias to the time of Demosthenes in forensic and deliberative speaking. Three cases are examined: the democratic appropriation of Conon’s extra-civic military achievements in *Against Leptines* (Dem. 20); the profile of Philip II as non-democratic *philotimos par excellence* as construed in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches; the rhetoric of *philotimia* and *charis* in *On the property of Aristophanes* (Lysias 19) which includes the expectation of a *philotimos* citizen to receive *charis* from a source other than his city. How are such manifestations of *philotimia* evaluated by democratic standards? This section shows

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<sup>156</sup> In this respect, I disagree with Domingo Gygax (2016) 221 who argues for a ‘semantic change’ in the meaning of *philotimia* that had stemmed from the development of euergetism in the first half of the fourth century.

that in democratic ideology reciprocity with the city is essential for the positive evaluation of one's *philotimia*. Extra-civic reciprocal bonds or the disregard of reciprocity with one's community colour accordingly the quality of an individual's manifestation of *philotimia*.

Chapter 3 turns to politics and examines public speaking in Assembly debates and in political discussions in the courtroom. Deliberation and decision-making in the Assembly were areas of activity in which political equality was particularly in the spotlight. In theory, it is more probable that all citizens at some point would have made use of their voting right in Assembly-meetings than that all citizens would have taken an active political role by standing up and addressing their fellow-citizens. As surviving literary evidence indicate, only a few prominent citizens would speak extensively over political matters.<sup>157</sup> How would a citizen, while addressing his fellows, accommodate his individual distinction and perhaps his political ambitions with the egalitarian demands of political equality (*isopsēphia*) and equality of speech (*isēgoria*)?

Section 1 explores these dynamics by focusing on representations of political debates in Aristophanes and Thucydides. In the picture that emerges, priority is given to the promotion of good counselling (εὐβουλία) and public interest while a speaker's distinction and any personal motives and ambitions that may have been involved are ideally deemphasized or refuted. With the exception of Alcibiades in the Sicilian debate, 'I have not

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<sup>157</sup> Cf. p. 20 n. 52.

stood up to speak out of *philotimia* seems to be an unwritten rule of the Assembly's decorum that speakers in the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries used to respect. Section 2 moves to the time of Demosthenes and explores accounts of ideal and non-ideal political competition and political participation as represented in forensic and deliberative speeches. The main priority is presented to be the recognition of collective achievement and not the rewarding of specific individuals in activities and undertakings that are collaborative but the accomplishment of which requires that specific individuals unavoidably would have taken leading roles. In the ideal representations, little space is left for the glorification and self-glorification of individual citizens and the convention of not drawing attention to one's *philotimia* in politics seems to be respected in this period too. From the time of Thucydides to the time of Demosthenes, policy-making and politics can be viewed indeed as competitions among citizens, but the ultimate agent of political achievement should always be the city. I suggest that the absence of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* of the individual from these accounts complies with the idea that in politics collective superiority and collective interests were not to be shadowed by individual considerations.

Section 3 picks up on the last point and explores the rhetoric of *charis* and public services in the Assembly through the examination of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. Did speakers attempt to capitalize on their public services in order to win the audience's gratitude in the Assembly? Was active political participation presented as a public service deserving of *charis*? In both occasions, the answer that Demosthenes' symbouleutic speeches

give is negative. Not only is the rhetoric of positive reciprocal *charis* absent from Assembly speaking, but also a different, negative kind of *charis* seems to dominate. *Charis* is consistently associated with political advising that is gratifying and easily-digestible yet useless and dangerous. Speaking in order to gain or grant *charis* is tantamount, in short, with deceptive political counselling. These observations about *charis* in deliberative speeches reinforce the point that the absence of the rhetoric of publicly beneficial *philotimia* from Demosthenes' deliberative speeches is not a random and isolated phenomenon but belongs to a political discourse that seems to be considerably de-personalized. In this respect, the rhetorical means a speaker would employ for his self-presentation in the Assembly seem to be considerably different from the courtroom's.

Finally, section 4 turns to the political trials between Demosthenes and Aeschines and examines the rhetoric of *philotimia* in Demosthenes' self-portrayal. I identify two main ways in which Demosthenes seeks to exploit, not directly but by association, the positive connotations of good, civic-oriented *philotimia* in order to enhance his political ethos. First, especially in *On the False Embassy* (Dem. 19), being a *philotimos* spender towards the city is used as a guarantee for Demosthenes' political ethos. The implication is that if he can be trusted as a citizen that uses his own resources, not for private profit, but out of *philotimia* towards the community and his fellow citizens, then he should also be trusted as a politician who would advise and act according to the public interest. Such a correlation perhaps shows that, at least in the time of Demosthenes, showing *philotimia* through publicly beneficial

expenditures could be viewed as a token of one's democratic and egalitarian spirit in general. Second, I explore how *On the Crown* (Dem. 18) provides evidence for the mentality of collective *philotimia* in 'philotimia friendly contexts' as explained in pp. 52-54. In the course of the speech, Demosthenes veils his policies with retrospective morality and casts them as complying with the collective's honourable morality and *philotimia*. In this way, he presents himself as an *eunous* politician who promotes the city's *philotimia*. By resorting to *eunoia* Demosthenes gets a chance to present his political excellence in a humbling manner as he lays emphasis not on pursuing individual distinction, but on the element of patriotic loyalty in serving the city.<sup>158</sup> In this vein, politics are presented as a contest of *eunoia* among the citizens and towards the community, in which Demosthenes prevails, not as a contest of *philotimia*.

This thesis does not argue for a *semantic shift* in the meaning of *philotimia* from a negative into a positive concept. It rather concludes that throughout the period examined (430s-320s) *philotimia* was an ambivalent notion in the sense that at any time we can find evidence for both positive and negative appreciations of *philotimia* and of *philotimoi*, albeit not with the same frequency across time and space. As a concept, *philotimia* had the potential to express egalitarian and inegalitarian states of mind, motives, and behaviours. To put

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<sup>158</sup> When Athenian citizens are concerned, showing *eunoia* towards the city is better to be understood as 'loyalty' or 'patriotism', rather than merely 'goodwill', which sounds quite insufficient of a citizen towards his city, as Whitehead (1993) 53 notes.

*philotimia* to the service of the city, democracy had to deal with its dangerous aspect. At the same time, this does not mean that *philotimia* needed to be 'bleached of all its threatening potential'<sup>159</sup> in order to be part of the value system of democratic Athens. It rather means that it required cautious treatment and careful channeling by the democratic city. The closely regulated and selective promotion of *philotimia* that is evidenced in the rhetoric of the courtroom and the Assembly reflects not only the duality of *philotimia* as a concept but also the fact that the Athenians were very much alert to it.

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<sup>159</sup> Wilson (2000) 192.

## Chapter 1

### *Philotimia, metriotēs, and hybris: fair-playing in public contests*

#### Introduction

The simultaneous demands of civic dignity and recognition of merit called for particular expressions of *philotimia* in the democratic city.<sup>1</sup> What was considered a legitimate expression of distinction from an elite citizen? How did Athenians in public discourse attempt to resolve possible tensions that could arise from manifestations of power that were revealing of socio-economic inequalities?

Ideally, when referring to the performance of public services that revealed their elite membership, especially monetary ones, Athenians needed to manifest both supererogation and moderation.<sup>2</sup> Their lavishness should point to the fact that they placed considerations of public interest before private calculations, they put their excellence in the service of the common good and that for this reason they were meritorious. This was a

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<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, I will rely on Ober's (2012) discussion of honour in terms of merit and civic dignity (see pp. 5-7). I should repeat here that I am not arguing for two essentially different kinds of honour (see pp. 11-12). This distinction, however, encapsulates the tension between political equality and individual considerations, and thus allows us to explore more aptly the negotiations of power and prestige.

<sup>2</sup> I borrow the term supererogation from Liddel (2007).

key ideal promoted by popular democratic ideology as depicted in public rhetoric, although it did not mean that elite Athenians (and all citizens, in general) did in fact understate considerations of their private well-being when managing their resources in the name of altruism and for the sake of the city.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the presentation of their general conduct in public and private spaces should reveal a mentality of moderation: their honour-seeking activities should be associated with prudent use of wealth in relatively controlled competitions that were not threatening to the social order because they were regulated by the democratic polis. And their personal expenditures should validate the same mentality: securing one's autarky and keeping oneself away from enjoying excessive luxuriousness or at least keeping it away from the public eye. Such a kind of ideal self-representation points towards the ideals of the *metrios politēs* and of *metriotēs*.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Christ (2006), who argues that (elite) Athenians prioritized private interest above other considerations. Christ (2006) 35 follows the distinction between 'narrow self-interest' and 'enlightened self-interest' which is very useful in explaining behaviour regarding money spending. At the same time, I think that we would not be seriously misled if we allowed for public interest in a more unifying sense to be present in democratic Athens, namely, by viewing it as the collective and common interest of politically equal citizens instead of seeing behind considerations of common interest a conglomeration of private interests; see Ober (1998) 356-360 on Athenian democracy's 'genuine capacity for sustaining a high level of nonselfish concern for communal goods – both at the level of individual actions and at the level of the demos itself' (quotation from p. 360).

<sup>4</sup> The ideal of the *metrios* and 'middling mentality' are discussed in detail by Morris (1996); (2000); see also Roisman (2005) 145-147, 176-179 on moderation in the Attic orators; Morris places the origins of 'middling tradition' in the archaic times and argues that by the sixth century middling ideology was well established in many Greek city-states (Morris (1996); (2000) chapters 4 and 5). According to his theory, in archaic times middling ideology was an upper class construct that rivaled the prevalent elitist ideology by way of showing

In Section 1, I start with the exploration of the ideal of being a *metrios* citizen and whether it was compatible with being a *philotimos* citizen as depicted in the speeches of the Attic orators. Although *metriotēs* and *philotimia* are qualitatively different, both can be presented as belonging to the same mentality of prioritizing public interest without ignoring appropriate personal ambitions and goals. The fact that a citizen could cast himself as *philotimos* and *metrios* at the same time enables us to see that it was possible to present the pursuance of outstanding honour, to which not all citizens had access in practice, as an egalitarian and publicly beneficial initiative. Section 2 takes *Against Meidias* as a case study of the rhetoric of *philotimia* and *metriotēs*. As we will see, appropriate manifestations of power, especially the power of wealth, are related to civic-oriented *philotimia*, are indicative of *metriotēs* and secure political equality and collective honour (civic dignity), whereas inappropriate manifestations of power are related to individualism and transgression expressed through *hybris* that threaten political equality and collective honour. In these contexts, acting out of *philotimia* does not merely indicate the pursuance of outstanding honour. It reveals the willingness and ability of a citizen to take initiatives

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preference to the ordinary men and their habits, while rejecting among other things aristocratic luxuriousness and interest in the non-Greek world of the east (Morris (1996) 26-39; Morris (2000) 161-171; Ober (2005) 102-103). Such a theory can be challenged, for example, by readings of archaic poetry that understand Morris' middling values not as part of a separate, middling tradition that challenged the 'dominant' elite ideology, but as belonging to the 'dominant' elite ideology. Although this is an issue that deserves attention, it falls out of the scope of my study, which is to construct the profile of the *metrios politēs* that is promoted in public rhetoric of fourth century Athens.

that are vital for the well-being of the community but could not be undertaken by everyone because they required outstanding effort and entailed risks.

### 1.1. Being a *metrios politēs*: reconciling civic dignity and meritocracy

In classical Athens, *hoi metrioi* were not an economic class, they did not resemble anything like a 'middle class'.<sup>5</sup> According to Morris, they were instead a democratic ideological construct 'that guided behavior',<sup>6</sup> and everyone born an Athenian citizen could imagine of themselves and each other as being *metrioi* as long as they did not behave in a way that would cast them among the rich (*qua* hubristic) or the poor (*qua* not free).<sup>7</sup> Ideally, *hoi metrios* was a citizen who was self-sufficient, provided for his family, cared about public affairs and about preserving common well-being, and demonstrated in every expression of public and private life moderation and self-control.

In Morris' ideological scheme, a strong connection between land holding and being a *metrios* is implied.<sup>8</sup> Morris argues that in democratic Athens land distribution was 'certainly unequal', but 'in comparative terms... *extremely* egalitarian'.<sup>9</sup> While this may be broadly correct, we should accept with caution his conclusion that 'the ideal of the *metrios*

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<sup>5</sup> Ober (1989a) 27-31; *contra* Jones (1957) who argues that a middle class did exist in Athens.

<sup>6</sup> Morris (1996) 22.

<sup>7</sup> Morris (1996) 23-24.

<sup>8</sup> Morris (2000) 138-144.

<sup>9</sup> Morris (2000) 140.

as an independent farmer does seem to conform reasonably well to lived experience' and that for this reason 'most citizens could imagine themselves, and others, as independent *metrioi*'.<sup>10</sup> Athenian democracy and democratic ideology were founded on the dissociation of the right of citizenship from sufficient property holding, and on the inclusion of every free adult Athenian male in the ranks of the citizens by right of birth.<sup>11</sup> By making male citizen birth the only requirement for joining the citizenry,<sup>12</sup> democracy broadened significantly the pool of inhabitants that comprised the body politic, the group of people who would enjoy freedom and political equality.<sup>13</sup> In other words, democratic ideology actually pointed to the fact that one need not be an independent farmer in order to be

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<sup>10</sup> Quotes from Morris (2000) 144; see also Morris (1996) 22. It may be argued that, when constructing an ideal, i.e. the ideal of the *metrios*, reality need not be in total agreement with the model created (Morris (2000) 112-113). Nonetheless, I think that considerable discrepancy between (what are believed to be) facts and constructed models should be taken into account. Historical studies have shown that in classical Athens and earlier land distribution was indeed unequal. See, e.g. van Wees (2001); (2006); Foxhall (2002); for a short overview and assessment of the scholarship on land owning and land distribution, see Osborne (2010) 137-138; Foxhall (2002) 218-220 employs her conclusion for the low degree of wealth redistribution achieved through the liturgy system to support the claim that the performance of some liturgies was not egalitarian but predominantly aristocratic; against this view, see Fisher (2010) 101-106 who rightly shows that except for the financial impact, performance and participation in liturgies brought to the whole community a variety of socio-political benefits.

<sup>11</sup> On the dissociation of political participation from property qualifications in Athenian democracy, see Thuc. 2.37.1; Lys. 34; Isoc. 4.105.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Raaflaub (1996) 149 who notes that in the early years of the democracy political equality could not be justified merely on the basis of being free-born. It had to be justified on the basis of collective achievement and collective obligation to serve the city. Only if all citizens partook in these, was democracy a possibility; see also Raaflaub (1989).

<sup>13</sup> Ober (2005) 102-105.

regarded as a citizen (and a *metrios*). Poorer, or rather ordinary, Athenians need not necessarily imagine themselves as land-owners in order to feel included in the ranks of the *metrioi* and in the ranks of the citizens.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike Morris, I examine *metriotēs* primarily as a virtue that points towards moderation and self-control in one's private and public life, especially in connection with administration of one's resources in such a way that makes it possible to cover one's needs and benefit the city at the same time. Although *metriotēs* (and its cognates) does not seem to have emerged as a 'cardinal virtue' of the language of approbation in honorific inscriptions,<sup>15</sup> nonetheless the mentality of moderation, of being a *metrios politēs* is celebrated in public speech.

In [Dem.] 25.51-52 we find many of the basic qualities of the *metrios* individual which are said to be shared by the whole citizen population except for Aristogeiton, the opponent. The *metrios* citizen is interested in public matters, makes his living by farming or by another profession (note that farming is mentioned only as an alternative among others), is a sociable being, he is not a sycophant (i.e. he is not making money by

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<sup>14</sup> Osborne (2010) 33, 132-134, 137 draws attention to the 'uneven distribution of land-ownership' (p. 137), but nevertheless supports that 'the fact that few Athenians were directly obliged by other citizens to live in conditions which precluded having a stake in the land enabled the ideology of the citizen landowner to be maintained'; see also Osborne (2010) 106: '[c]itizenship in Athens was not formally dependent on land-ownership... But land-ownership was dependent on citizenship'.

<sup>15</sup> Whitehead (1993) 65 identifies ten 'cardinal virtues' that dominate the language of public praise in democratic Athens: *andragathia*, *aretē*, *eunoia*, *philotimia*, *prothymia*, *dikaioynē*, *epimeleia*, *eusebeia*, *eutaxia*, *sophrosynē*.

blackmailing others) and he creates bonds of friendship and reciprocity (οὐ χάριν, referring to the absence of *charis* bonds characteristic of the non-*metrios*) with his fellow-citizens.<sup>16</sup> So, in order to be included in the community of *metrioi*, all citizens had to respect with their conduct the standards of moderation and self-control shared by the community, take care of public well-being in every way they could. As *metrioi*, they also reminded themselves and their fellow-citizens that they all had equal political prerogatives by right of birth.<sup>17</sup> As long as they respected and protected these rights and their civic dignity, they were safe as citizens to enjoy freedom and political equality (τῶν ἴσων μετέχειν, [Dem.] 25.53).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> In [Dem.] 25.52, Aristogeiton is described as follows: ἀλλ' ἄσπειστος, ἀνίδρυτος, ἄμεικτος, οὐ χάριν, οὐ φιλίαν, οὐκ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ὧν ἄνθρωπος μέτριος γινώσκων. On Aristogeiton as a sycophant who does not respect social norms, see Christ (1998) 56-59; in Lys. 30.1-2, 5-6, Nicomachus' alleged slave origins make him behave without *charis* towards the city (Lys. 30.6: ὡς ἀχαρίστως ὑμῖν προσενήνεκται). The point made is that since he was not born a free male Athenian, he could not really appreciate and adopt values commonly shared by the *metrioi* citizens, the freeborn citizens. Here, *metrios* vocabulary does not occur, but the description of Nicomachus fits the image of the non-*metrios* that we find in other passages discussed in this section. On Nicomachus' ingratitude, see Edwards' (1999) comment on Lys. 30.6 who points out that 'his lack of gratitude (cf. §27) would have been for the Athenians a natural consequence of his servile background'; see also Dem. 45.30 where lack of respect for the city's shared values turns into an accusation for being a barbarian; cf. Dem. 57.35-36, 45, 52 for a warning to the dikasts about the dangerous and ungrounded link that being poor means being non-Athenian or slave. On this point, see Raaflaub (1983) 534-535; finally, in Din. 1.95-98, disgraceful and not publicly beneficial conduct renders one unworthy of citizenship.

<sup>17</sup> On the democratic appropriation of high birth, see Ober (1989a) 259-261, 291; on democratic appropriation of high birth through rationalization of courage in public spaces of deliberation as well as in the battlefield, see Balot (2004a) esp. p. 415.

<sup>18</sup> See Raaflaub (2004) 48: 'Hence equality guarantees freedom, and it does so particularly in the sphere of public speech, that is, every citizen's equal opportunity and right to express his opinion on political issues publicly, in open political debate.'

If collectively the people had to defend civic dignity in order to preserve the right of being citizens, and ideally *metrioi* citizens, then elite individuals needed to present themselves as *metrioi*, as moderate in order to show that they valued civic dignity before considerations of merit.<sup>19</sup> Being a moderate citizen was a celebrated ideal of Athenian democracy that was predicated on one's character and was primarily indicative of one's attitude towards wealth.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it seems natural that it is the ones that would more easily be suspected for excessiveness – because they were wealthy – that needed to present themselves as conforming to the ideal.<sup>21</sup>

Rich speakers when constructing their personas in front of a public audience refer time and again to an array of character traits that are indicative of *metriotēs* in various senses.<sup>22</sup> Thus, we find individuals describing themselves as *metrioi* (sometimes coupled

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<sup>19</sup> See Balot (2009) 282 on the egalitarianism promoted by the representation of elite individuals as *metrioi* in the Attic orators: 'They represented their virtues as exemplary rather than different in kind from those of other citizens.'

<sup>20</sup> See Lys. 16.3, 10-11; Dem. 8.76 on corruptibility; Dem. 54.15-17 on hubristic behaviour characteristic of the excessive rich; see also the dialogue between Plutus and Chremylus in Ar. *Plut.* 234-251 on how the *metrios* uses his wealth in contrast to the extremes of the niggard and the spendthrift: the *metrios* is a person who is wise enough to save but also knows when to spend. Note also Chremylus' joke in lines 249-251 that after wealth he loves his wife and his son most of all. The joke keeps wealth and its use at the forefront, while pointing to another stock trait of the *metrios*, namely being a worthy head of one's household.

<sup>21</sup> See Isoc. 2.33 on the idea that the mean is more likely to be found in defect rather than in excess: αἱ γὰρ μετριότητες μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐνδείαις ἢ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ἐνεῖσιν. Texts and translations of Isocrates are from Loeb unless otherwise stated.

<sup>22</sup> Ober (1989a) 220-221; Morris (2000) 115-116.

with the adjective *apragmōn*) in the sense that they are not litigious.<sup>23</sup> Others highlight moderation in spending for oneself and lavishness in expenditures for the city,<sup>24</sup> thereby including at once several core values of the *metrios politēs*: moderation, self-control as well as genuine concern for the public well-being. In the case of politically active citizens, self-sufficiency and moderation in one's private life are presented as indices of one's quietness, mildness and integrity in political activities.<sup>25</sup> Again, the link between *metriotēs* and one's attitude towards wealth is at the centre of attention, since moderation in private life is introduced as a token of incorruptibility in public life.<sup>26</sup> Conversely, lack of moderation regarding wealth and the propensity for corruptibility that springs from that situation can be presented as leading to misuses of free speech,<sup>27</sup> one of the core prerogatives of

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<sup>23</sup> Aesch. 1.1; Dem. 22.25-29; 24.6; 54.24; [Dem.] 42.12.

<sup>24</sup> Dem. 36.57-58; 45.77-78; [Dem.] 40.58. Note that the first two references regard citizens who were former slaves. This probably points to the fact that these people needed more than others to demonstrate that they shared the values of the citizen group.

<sup>25</sup> Aesch. 3.218; cf. Dem. 18.307-308 for Demosthenes' response to Aeschines' silence/quietness. See Yunis's (2001) comment ad loc.: Aeschines' silence is interpreted as opportunism and not as the silence of ordinary people who do not mount the *bēma*.

<sup>26</sup> See also Aeschines' (Aesch. 3.170) description of the *dēmotikos anēr* according to which being *metrios* is considered as an insurance against the acceptance of bribes during one's political career: σώφρονα καὶ μέτριον χρῆ πεφυκέναι αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν δίαιταν, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τῆς δαπάνης δωροδοκῆ κατὰ τοῦ δήμου; cf. Nicias' comments (Thuc. 6.12.2) and Thucydides the narrator's comments (Thuc. 6.15.2-3) on Alcibiades' dangerous spending.

<sup>27</sup> See Aesch. 3.218: τὴν δ' ἐμὴν σιωπὴν, ᾧ Δημόσθενης, ἢ τοῦ βίου μετριότης παρεσκεύασεν· ἀρκεῖ γάρ μοι μικρά, καὶ μειζόνων αἰσχροῦς οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶ, ὥστε καὶ σιγῶ καὶ λέγω βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δαπάνης. σὺ δ' οἶμαι λαβῶν μὲν σεσίγηκας, ἀναλώσας δὲ κέκραγας λέγεις δὲ οὐχ ὅταν σοι δοκῆ οὐδ' ἂ βούλει, ἀλλ' ὅταν οἱ μισθοδότηι σοι προστάττωσιν· οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ δὲ ἀλαζονευόμενος ἂ παραχρῆμα ἐξελέγχη

democracy; and this is tantamount to acting against the people, one of the most serious offences against democracy.<sup>28</sup> Such a connection shows clearly how lack of moderation can be perceived as a threat to the common well-being.

In [Dem.] 25.76-79, a passage that contains many recurrent ‘stock’ accusations that speakers employ against their opponents, we read that it is common for the defendants to refer to the moderation and temperance of their life, or to the public services of their ancestors in order to exact a favourable hearing.<sup>29</sup> As is expected, in the case of the defendant, the prosecution says that none of these pleas can be employed in extenuation of his crime. That Aristogeiton is neither *sōphrōn* nor *metrios* is presented as common knowledge ([Dem.] 25.77-78), and his and his father’s liturgical record is said to be non-existent. In place of public services, one may find *phaseis*, *apaqōgai* and *endeixeis* ([Dem.] 25.78). Aristogeiton’s character construction is built upon the image of the stock non-*metrios*: immoderate in his life in general, litigious, and unconcerned about benefiting his community.

Moreover, at the level of ideology, we saw that the non-*metrios* is perceived to be a non-citizen, and this is depicted in the rhetoric of the speech. Aristogeiton’s character and

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ψευδόμενος. See also Dem. 18.313: Aeschines’ refusal to share his wealth with the community is presented as a sign of cooperation with the enemies of the city.

<sup>28</sup> See Hansen (1975) on the legal procedure of *eisangelia* against ‘politicians’ who acted against the well-being of the *demos*, accepted bribes and did not offer their best advice to the *demos*.

<sup>29</sup> See also Lys. 30.1-2.

behaviour cast him out of the community of *metrioi* and consequently out of the body politic. The plaintiff tops his character assassination by saying that Aristogeiton is not a freeborn citizen ([Dem.] 25.78-79). This claim need not be true in order to carry rhetorical power: the important thing is to make the connection between lack of *metriotēs* and being unworthy of consideration as one of the citizens; and consequently, the further connection that since one did not care to behave in a way that would include him among the ranks of the (moderate) citizens, one did not care about the city's prosperity in general.<sup>30</sup>

The strong link between *metriotēs* and proper use of wealth leads one to wonder how democratic ideology would manage to reconcile lavish spending in public contexts with the expectation for moderation, and it also brings us back to our initial issue of accommodating civic dignity with meritocracy. It has been argued that despite serious efforts to democratize *philotimia* by promoting it as one of the core virtues of Athenian democracy, '*philotimia* in Athens remained pre-eminently associated with the expenditure of large sums of money'.<sup>31</sup> Even though our evidence from the Attic orators confirms the connection of *philotimia* with large expenditures,<sup>32</sup> this does not mean that *philotimia* manifestations were restricted to such contexts nor that these specific contexts render *philotimia* elitist and

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<sup>30</sup> On the similar rhetorical topoi of presenting one's political opponents as not freeborn citizens, and as slaves or related to servile activities in order to shake their patriotism, see Ober (1989a) 268-280; Vlassopoulos (

<sup>31</sup> Wilson (2000) 173.

<sup>32</sup> For examples, see pp. 108-118, 146-159, 168-181, 246-262.

undemocratic in its core.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, the competitive element of *philotimia* could lead to expressions of excessive pursuance of honour. To regulate this, democratic ideology promoted *philotimia* as a commendable quality when it was demonstrated vis-à-vis the city in ways that were assessed as publicly beneficial.<sup>34</sup> In this way, *philotimia* could emerge as an appropriate civic virtue closely associated with the mentality of being a *metrios politēs*.

Such a link between *philotimia* and the qualities of the *metrios politēs* is found in Is. 7.39-40. The speaker, who argues for his legitimate claim on the dead Apollodorus' property as an adoptive son of his, elaborates on Apollodorus' expenditures and public-spiritedness in his attempt to convince the jurors that by respecting Apollodorus' wish to make him his heir, the jurors will actually repay Apollodorus for all the good he has done to the city.<sup>35</sup> A rather good deal for the city, one may think: enjoying the benefits of Apollodorus' (and his father's) public expenditures and repaying him by leaving his property in the hands of an heir willing to behave in a similar manner in the future (Is. 7.35-42).<sup>36</sup>

In this context, Apollodorus' management of his resources is judged on the basis of two interconnected ideals, *philotimia* and *metriotēs*. Apollodorus 'tried to live *philotimōs* on

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<sup>33</sup> See pp. 37-44.

<sup>34</sup> In this respect, in honorific inscriptions and in forensic speeches *philotim-* cognates are very often accompanied by a qualifying phrase stating explicitly that *philotimia* is expressed in a publicly beneficial manner 'towards the city'/people/homeland. See pp. 28-33.

<sup>35</sup> Is. 7.41. The enumeration of Apollodorus' public services closes in a familiar way with a legitimate demand of *charis*: ἀνθ' ὧν δικαίως ἂν αὐτῷ ταύτην τὴν χάριν ἀποδοίητε; on variations of the topos of *charis* requests in forensic speeches, see the Appendix.

<sup>36</sup> Note how letting the speaker keep Apollodorus' property is presented as a favour done to Apollodorus and not to the speaker!

his own fortune, considering that he ought to spend moderately (*ta metria*) on himself and save the rest for the city, so it could cover its costs'.<sup>37</sup> *Philotimia* is not limited to public spending, but its scope is twofold reflecting one's disposition to spending money both in private and public contexts. Thus, *philotimia* is divided into moderation in private expenditures and dedication of what remains to the state. Quantitatively speaking, call for moderation in private life points to the fact that what is expected to be devoted to the city would not be the 'leftovers', but rather a significant part of one's resources. Then, Apollodorus' liturgies and *eisphora* payments are mentioned,<sup>38</sup> and the catalogue closes with a reference to Apollodorus' choregic victory in boys' competition (Is. 7.40). The plural used to qualify the choregic tripod as record of Apollodorus' *philotimia* (ὧν μνημεῖα τῆς ἐκείνου φιλοτιμίας ὁ τρίπους ἐκεῖνος ἔστηκε), deserves some attention. The monument does not celebrate his choregic victory alone, but every public expenditure of his; it is a token of Apollodorus' *philotimia* in general.<sup>39</sup> And on the basis of the preceding twofold analysis of

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<sup>37</sup> Translation by Edwards (2007), adapted.

<sup>38</sup> *Eisphora* payments were compulsory, therefore a speaker could not claim to have performed them voluntarily. He could give, however, an air of voluntariness to his actions by saying that he did not show any signs of hesitation when called on duty. In our case, the speaker does so by saying that he was every time among the first to make their *eisphora* contributions (Is. 7.40); on *eisphora* and voluntarism, see Christ (2006) 162-163, 178-180, 194-196; on changes in the institution of *eisphora*, see Christ (2007).

<sup>39</sup> The monument also stresses the agonistic aspect of winning the *chorēgia* competition thereby alluding to the collective effort and collective *philotimia* of the whole *choregic* team. See Wilson's (2000) 120-123 discussion of a dedicatory epigram where he picks a tension in the presentation of a monument as celebrating the glory of the *chorēgos* shared with the *chorus* and the poet; cf. Fisher (2003) 206-208, with whom I agree, who sees in the name of

*philotimia*, we may say that the tripod as *mnēmeia* of one's *philotimia* celebrates one's way of living as a whole, the mentality of *philotimōs zēn* in general, which includes both public spending and private *metriotēs*. Following that, the speaker reflects on the duty of the *metrios politēs*, which is, as in the case of living *philotimōs*, twofold again: at a private level, trying to preserve and protect one's property, while at the same time keeping one's wealth visible in the sense of always being willing (ἐν πρώτοις εἰσφέρειν) to contribute money according to the city's needs.<sup>40</sup> The duties of the *metrios politēs* pick up on *philotimōs zēn* and the two kinds of mentality, *metriotēs* and *philotimia*, reflect one another very closely.

*Philotimōs zēn* does not merely encapsulate the mentality of a citizen who spends voluntarily and lavishly for the city in his quest for further honour, but presupposes the character trait of *metriotēs* in one's life. *Metriotēs*, in turn, is not delimited to a moderate private way of living but emerges as a core quality of the citizen, and indeed of the *philotimos* citizen. In this way, the ideal of *metriotēs* is presented to be an inner restraining

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*charis* and reciprocity an accommodation between the glorification of the *chorēgos* and 'the cohesion of the group' responsible for the successful *chorēgia* (quotation from p. 207); on festival competitions and shared values in more detail, see Fisher (2009); (2010); (2011); in another case, Lyc. 1.136, a bronze statue dedicated by a citizen in the temple of Zeus the Savior is presented as a monument of his *metriotēs* (μνημεῖον τῆς αὐτοῦ μετριότητος), a particularly egalitarian presentation of such an initiative, especially if we consider that the speaker is referring to the opponent's father. The two examples show that a monument commemorating an individual can be presented as a record of one's *philotimia* as well as of one's *metriotēs*; cf. Dem. 45.79-80; μνημεῖον [...] τῆς ἀδικίας.

<sup>40</sup> Is. 7.40: καίτοι τί χρῆ τὸν μέτριον πολίτην; οὐχ οἷ μὲν ἕτεροι τὰ μὴ προσήκοντ' ἐβιάζοντο λαμβάνειν, τούτων μηδὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δ' ἑαυτοῦ πειραῖσθαι σώζειν; οἷ δ' ἡ πόλις δεῖται χρημάτων, ἐν πρώτοις εἰσφέρειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκρύπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων;

power as well as, we may say, a prerequisite for a citizen's acceptable and appropriate pursuit of *philotimia* since legitimate claims for honour and merit presuppose moderation and being a *metrios politēs*.

Civic-oriented *philotimia* in democratic contexts can be internalized as a psychological condition of the elite *metrios* citizen and *metriotēs* can accordingly be an intrinsic quality of the *philotimos*. Ober is probably right in stating that *philotimia* as 'desire for outstanding honor remained a psychological condition' of the elite,<sup>41</sup> but this should be understood in the sense that pursuing 'outstanding honor' was not for everyone mainly due to socio-economic obstacles. At the same time, calls for moderation and conformity with the *metrios* ideal shared by the whole community and founded on political equality made elite manifestations of *philotimia* part of the social values of Athenian democracy. In one case, we saw that being *philotimos* can be presented as presupposing the state of being *metrios* (Is. 7.39-40).

Absence of *metriotēs*, as we will see in the discussion of *Against Meidias*, does not make the elite individual *philotimos* in a negative sense; it makes him not *philotimos* at all. This is so because the standard of behaviour against which the conduct of individuals is judged is specifically that of civic-oriented *philotimia*. By presenting both ideals – *philotimia* and *metriotēs* –, despite their qualitative differences, as belonging to the same mentality of prioritizing public interest without ignoring appropriate personal ambitions and goals,

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<sup>41</sup> Ober (1993) 145.

democratic ideology shows how the notion of *philotimia* can be shared as an egalitarian ideal.

Furthermore, *metriotēs* viewed as an intrinsic quality of the civic-oriented *philotimos* facilitated the accommodation of civic dignity and meritocracy, because demonstration of moderation – a quality ideally shared by the whole body politic – especially in activities that involved heavy use of wealth, smoothed in a way the existent socio-economic differences, at least at the level of ideology. *Metriotēs* as a quality of the meritorious individual pointed to the fact that the individual accepted his position in the city as one of the citizens, all of whom shared the qualities of the *metrios politēs*; and it was only on the basis of this acceptance that any individual would be considered for further honour, namely for honour that pertained to the domain of meritocracy and of *philotimia* expressed at the highest level.

## 1.2. Safeguarding and respecting the competition: the ideals of *metriotēs* and *philotimia* in

### *Against Meidias* (Dem. 21)<sup>42</sup>

The target of Dem. 21 is Meidias, a personal enemy of Demosthenes who hit him in the orchestra during his performance as *chorēgos* at the Dionysia of 348. Demosthenes, who

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<sup>42</sup> Unless otherwise stated, text and translation of Dem. 21 are by MacDowell (1990).

acted as prosecutor two years after the incident at the Dionysia,<sup>43</sup> needed to convince the jurors that his maltreatment at the hands of Meidias was not a trivial event connected to a private conflict but that its consequences affected the whole body of citizens, and more significantly their social and political standing. Thus, throughout the speech he accuses Meidias of *hybris*, one of the most serious offences in democratic Athens. *Hybris* affected both an individual's honour, in case where a hubristic attack was directed against a specific victim,<sup>44</sup> and the collective honour, namely, civic dignity since an individual by behaving hubristically, whether there was a specific victim or not,<sup>45</sup> thought of himself as superior to the rest of the community, challenged equality and freedom by not respecting civic dignity,<sup>46</sup> and, in general, cast himself as the archetype of the non-*metrios* individual. Throughout the speech, Demosthenes' main aim is to turn an offence against the personal honour of an individual which might seem trivial at first glance and can easily be viewed as no more than a trifling fight between two members of the wealthy elite in a zero-sum game of *timē*,<sup>47</sup> into an offence that, if left unpunished and ignored, can have serious repercussions upon civic dignity as well, and consequently upon the whole community, precisely because of the fact that it took place in specific public contexts.

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<sup>43</sup> On the debate regarding whether Dem. 21 had actually been delivered in court, see Harris (1989); MacDowell (1990).

<sup>44</sup> Fisher (1992).

<sup>45</sup> Cairns (1996).

<sup>46</sup> Ober (2005) 113-116; Ober (2012) 840-843.

<sup>47</sup> Ober (1994a) 93-94.

*Against Meidias* is heavily based on the presentation of various types of conflicts among individuals, the outcome of which shows how different kinds of inequality between the contestants, e.g. in physical strength, wealth, social standing, and power in general, correspondingly affect one's individual honour and/or civic dignity.<sup>48</sup> I identify below four different types of conflict depending on the status of the individuals involved and the space where the conflict takes place:

(a) The elite conflict that occurs in the private space of the symposium. Here, the triggering event is an insult to one's personal honour which is perceived by the victim as a hubristic attack and is retaliated on the spur of the moment, usually leading to a fight and possibly to death. Regarding this kind of conflict, Demosthenes introduces a pair of stories that took place in private symposia: in both cases the victims of the perceived *hybris* retaliated by killing the *hybristai* (Dem. 21.70-75). This type of conflict is an exemplary zero-sum battle of honour, where a trifling insult is paid back very heavily, precisely because it is understood as an attack against one's personal honour, which is priceless and therefore has to be defended at all costs. Here, civic dignity is not directly affected, because the conflict takes place in private elite space, concerns a specific *ad hominem* insult and is avenged immediately.

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<sup>48</sup> *Contra* Herman (1995) who sees Athenian society as depicted in the orators as an astonishingly peaceful community that downplayed considerations of honour and revenge.

(b) The elite conflict that takes place in public space and contexts. This kind of conflict is regulated and resolved by the city and can take several forms, some of which turn out to be public battles of *philotimia*, as for example, competitions in the theatre between rival-*chorēgoi*, in the courtroom between opposing litigants or in the Assembly among citizens who propose conflicting policies. Under this type falls the conflict between Meidias and Demosthenes that culminated in the incident at the Dionysia as well as a handful of similar stories that Demosthenes introduces in his speech (Dem. 21.58-65, 143-147). This type of conflict, as we will see, has specific rules and depending on whether the players respect them or not may turn into a fairly played contest decided by the people or into an unequal competition where one or more players have breached the rules of the game, have shown disrespect to their rivals as well as the people as collective judge of the contest, and therefore need to be punished. In this case, both the individual honour of the affected contestants as well as the civic dignity of the people are threatened and need to be defended. As we will see, playing fairly in these contests is a matter of respecting civic dignity and abiding by the *metrios* ideal. Only by fulfilling these requirements may one be considered a civic-oriented *philotimos*, whereas the individual that plays against the rules is not *philotimos*, but a *hybristēs* and a non-*metrios* whose anti-social behaviour isolates him from the community. Inequality in this case results from the actions of the *hybristēs* who violates the requirement of equal standing among the contestants of the competition by not playing according to the rules of the contest.

(c) The conflict between an elite individual who turns against an ordinary/less powerful citizen. This type of conflict is the most revealing of how socio-economic inequality threatens civic dignity, as it clearly exposes the unbridgeable gap of power between the wealth elite and the ordinary people. Under this type of conflict falls the quarrel between Meidias and Straton. According to Demosthenes, Straton was an ordinary Athenian who suffered total *atimia* when performing his duty to the community by serving as arbitrator (Dem. 21.83-96). His *atimia* is described as the result of Meidias' hubristic behaviour: he demonstrated his superiority by damaging irreparably a citizen, and indeed one of lower social standing, who happened to go against his will. This case shows the consequences of powerful individuals' hubristic behaviour on the community. It reveals how an ordinary Athenian can lose his political rights and his membership in the community, when he acts against the will of a powerful individual that does not respect the rules of democracy. Meidias, by destroying an ordinary citizen in his official capacity as an arbitrator, in fact attacked the collective civic dignity and the democracy in general. He preferred to see Straton as a weak individual that he could easily dismiss by turning his difference with him into a grossly unequal man-to-man battle instead of respecting civic dignity by abiding to Straton's decision in his official capacity as an instrument of the democratic state. This type of conflict also exposes the threat excessive individuals pose to ordinary people in general. If Meidias did not respect Straton, even though he was an official of the state, then

he and his likes would even more easily do the same against ordinary *idiōtai*.<sup>49</sup> Uncontrolled inequality of power is presented as a constant threat to civic dignity.<sup>50</sup>

(d) The conflict between a moderate elite individual who confronts a hubristic elite individual with the assistance of the city. Under this category falls the current trial between Demosthenes and Meidias.<sup>51</sup> Demosthenes' masterful rhetorical plan is to turn what might otherwise seem an unimportant quarrel between two wealthy individuals into a significantly more important battle of power, between Meidias, a hubristic, non-*metrios* individual who threatens civic dignity and Demosthenes, a moderate, *philotimos* individual who calls for the assistance of the city, namely of the jurors, in order to defend and restore any damage inflicted upon civic dignity by having Meidias condemned. Thus, this type of conflict is not merely a contest between two individuals of relatively equal high social-economic standing judged by the collective, but a battle between the excessive individual and the city itself. In this contest, the moderate elite individual, Demosthenes himself, is

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<sup>49</sup> See Dem. 21.208-210 on a hypothetical overthrown of democracy where Meidias and his friends would rule.

<sup>50</sup> As Ober (1994a) 98 puts it, 'the wilful exertion of personal power in the public realm has as its target not private or family honour, but the quality of citizenship itself'.

<sup>51</sup> On legal contests, see Christ (1998) 163-166; on Demosthenes' choice to proceed with 'legal self-help', and the ensuing benefit to the community, if the dikasts respond positively, see Christ (2010) 222-226 (quotation from p. 225); on the issue of manliness in Demosthenes' choice not to respond physically at the heat of the moment, see Fisher (1998) 80-82; Roisman (2005) 75-79; I cannot agree with Hunt (2010) 205 who views an acute sense of honour as a sign of primitiveness, and sees in the restraint occasionally evidenced in Athenian litigants the gradual abandonment of the demands for vengeance leading the way towards a more advanced morality. In that respect, Hunt follows the readings of Herman: see e.g. Herman (1995).

presented as an agent of the people and the laws. It is through his ‘civic courage’ and initiative that Meidias is brought before the jury,<sup>52</sup> and thanks to Demosthenes the people have a unique opportunity to deal with the dangerous *hybristēs* individual successfully. They have a chance to reinforce the power of the laws and of the collective by protecting civic dignity against threats coming from powerful individuals that challenge the principles of democracy (e.g. Dem. 21.20, 45, 57, 126-127).<sup>53</sup>

Because high-level *philotimia* is frequently associated with big public expenditures and other manifestations of power, one may be inclined to think that *philotimia* may lead to hubristic expressions of excessive pursuit of honour.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, in *Against Meidias* no such link is made because Demosthenes consistently relies on the civic-oriented version of *philotimia*: in the context of civic competitions among elite contestants, *philotimia* is cast as a quality of the elite *metrios politēs*, whereas *hybris*, as an undemocratic quality *par excellence*,

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<sup>52</sup> For such a reading, see Roisman (2003) 136-140.

<sup>53</sup> As noted by Raaflaub (2004) 51 in relation with Thuc. 8.89.2, ‘the framework of aristocratic equality, guaranteed by *eunomia*, only disguised fierce competition for primacy [κατ’ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας]’. In an evidently different manner within democratic contexts, we will see that Demosthenes’ manifestation of civic-oriented *philotimia* gives an opportunity to the people to reinforce *eunomia* and equality before the law.

<sup>54</sup> See in Dem. 24.143 the interplay between pretending to act out of *philotimia* while in reality being *aselgēs* and committing *hybris* against the people: ἐὰν μὲν σφόδρ’ ὀργίζησθε, ἦττον ἀσελγανοῦσιν, ἂν δὲ μή, πολλοὺς τοὺς ἀσελγεῖς εὐρήσετε καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι προφάσει. We may say that *philotimeisthai* towards the people can be associated with being bold for the right reasons and in the right contexts, whereas being *aselgeis* and *hybrizontas* with being bold for the wrong reasons and in wrong contexts; on bad *philotimoi* and negatively appreciated *philotimia*, when it is not expressed towards the people and in a civic-oriented manner, see pp. 32-33 and nn. 88-90.

is diametrically opposed to *philotimia*.<sup>55</sup> These associations are lucidly illustrated in Demosthenes' discussion of conflicts that fall under types (b) and (d), because in these cases the battles take place in public spaces and in both sides elite individuals are involved.

In Dem. 21.66-69, Demosthenes discusses the rules of fair play in public choregic contests, that is, type (b) contests that involve huge expenditures of money and high-level pursuit of honour. The democratic city appears capable of controlling and dealing successfully with expressions of excessive behaviour by rival contestants, as long as specific rules of the competition securing fairness and equality are respected by everyone. In this frame, *philonikia* among rival *chorēgoi*,<sup>56</sup> that is love of victory and any expressions of excessive behaviour that might accompany this desire, is contrasted to *echthra*, enmity that spills over into public space and ruins competitions (Dem. 21.65-66). *Philonikia* presupposes the idea that all participants have agreed to take part in a contest from equal positions: they all have the chance to devote as much wealth as each of them wishes and can afford in support of their *chorēgia*, and they are all aware that the contest is going to be decided by pre-determined 'judges' and rules. By taking part in a contest regulated by the city, participants are expected to abide by its rules and defer to the collective 'judge', i.e. they are expected to show moderation. At the same time, the community is safeguarded against

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<sup>55</sup> On the distinction between good competition among the elite associated with civic-oriented *philotimia* and excessive attempts to distinguish oneself associated with *hybris*, see Fisher (1992) 334-335.

<sup>56</sup> On *philonikia* (and *philoneikia*), see Wilson (2000) 144-172.

any kind of excessive behaviour and rivalry that may break out among the contestants since the contest is superintended by the city and the laws.

From the above, it follows that an individual who harasses his enemy who is a contesting *chorēgos* while he himself is not, is actually demonstrating that he considers his personal power greater than the laws.<sup>57</sup> Such an individual is a non-*metrios* and thus a *hybristēs* in at least two ways: firstly, he thinks of his personal affairs as more important than the city's events and laws, and he places private considerations before the community's wishes;<sup>58</sup> secondly, he does not share his wealth with the community by taking part in a competition where he could have confronted his enemy in a honourable and law-abiding manner.<sup>59</sup> Instead of that, he adopts a hijacking attitude by attacking a contesting *chorēgos* from an unequal position, i.e. as a wealthy *idiotēs* (Dem. 21.67-69), not as a rival-*chorēgos*. He is a person who does not care about winning the public competition (in fact he does not care about respecting the competition at all) while at the same time

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<sup>57</sup> Dem. 21.66: ἔχθρα δ' ἐλαύνοντά τινα, ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἐφ' ἅπασι, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν κρείττω τῶν νόμων οὕσαν ἐνδεικνύμενον, Ἡράκλεις, βαρὺ καὶ οὐχὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ συμφέρον ὑμῖν.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the exemplary behaviour of prominent citizens in similar situations cited in Dem. 21.58-65, especially regarding their attitude towards *philonikia* and towards the wishes of the people.

<sup>59</sup> Dem. 21.67: καίτοι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐγὼ τοῦτο δεῖξω σαφῶς, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀσελγὲς ἐξῆν ποιοῦντι Μειδίᾳ μηδ' ὑβρίζοντι μηδὲ τύπτοντι καὶ λυπεῖν ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

honouring the city; in other words, he is neither *philonikos* nor *philotimos*,<sup>60</sup> but merely interested in humiliating his enemy and preventing him from winning himself (Dem. 21.66).

Demands for equality among the contestants of an elite competition may at first glance look like a narrow elite concern, but Demosthenes turns it into a public issue. In Dem. 21.67, he says that the reason why citizens strive for honour and spend their money for the city is that they believe they enjoy equality and fairness in a democracy:<sup>61</sup>

ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ πάντα ποιῶν καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναλίσκειν ἐθέλειν ἐκεῖν' ἐστίν,  
ὅτι τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἕκαστος ἡγεῖται ἑαυτῷ μετεῖναι ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ.

According to Wilson (2000) 165 'the link...between democratic equality and agonistic psychology of the elite is a little forced.' In my view, however, this phrase encapsulates democracy's ideal of reconciling civic dignity (τῶν ἴσων), understood as equal high political standing and especially equality before the law, with meritocratic dignity (τῶν δικαίων), understood as fair recognition of excellence which implies 'treating like cases alike, and, by

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<sup>60</sup> Dem. 21.67: ἐξῆν... κατὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς; 69: νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἐν ᾧ τὸν δῆμον ἐτίμησεν ἄν, οὐδ' ἐνεανιεύσατο τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.

<sup>61</sup> See also, Dem. 20.108 on what preserves oligarchies and democracies. On democracies: τὴν δὲ τῶν δήμων ἐλευθερίαν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄμιλλα, ἣν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δωρεαῖς πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ποιῶνται, φυλάττει.

extension, unlike cases differently',<sup>62</sup> in lavish competitions of honour (φιλοτιμεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναλίσκειν).

What is also important regarding this statement is that Demosthenes puts the idea in the mouth of all those who are perceived as publicly active elite *metrioi* citizens. He says that elite competitors are willing to share their wealth and receive awards from the city in public competitions, because they believe in a constitution that celebrates political equality (qua civic dignity) as well as fairness (qua recognition of merit). In these terms, equality is presented as a *sine qua non* for the intra-elite game precisely because it functions as a base upon which prominent individuals fight for meritocratic distinction. Without the prerequisite of equality the elite contests would possibly have been destructive for the participants as well as dangerous for the social order. By putting this idea in the mouth of elite contestants collectively, Demosthenes is actually saying to his audience that respect of the civic dignity upon which *philotimia* contests are based is not something that is merely tolerated by the *metrioi* elite citizens, i.e. by Demosthenes and his like, but is a recognized and desired prerequisite for their participation in these competitions. The city will do well to protect it in order both to reinforce political equality in an otherwise unequal

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<sup>62</sup> Ober (2012) 830.

community,<sup>63</sup> and to reassure wealthy *philotimoi* citizens that spending in public contests is a safe and rewarding activity (Dem. 21.66).<sup>64</sup>

From the analysis of Dem. 21.66-69 springs a double duty regarding the protection of equality in the context of public competitions. Firstly, each citizen is individually responsible for respecting the rules of the game. If an Athenian citizen wants to confront an enemy publicly, and enhance his honour by demonstrating his merit and power, he has to participate in a public contest and put himself in equal position to the other contestants: spend a considerable amount of money, abide by the laws and respect the city as legitimate judge of the competition.<sup>65</sup> In this way, he would show that he is *philotimos* towards the city as well as *metrios*. Secondly, the city is also responsible for securing the fairness of the

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<sup>63</sup> On the basis of the assumption that in democracies, ancient and modern, loss of honour and esteem seems more painful and serious than failure to gain more, preserving civic dignity, preserving 'equal recognition' seems to a wide extent more important than 'special distinction', quotations from Ober (1993) 145; on this point, see also Ober (1991) 124; Cairns (2011); retaining civic dignity in classical Athens is even more important for those belonging to the lower strata of the society since, lacking in wealth and prominent status, civic dignity as equal high standing is the only thing that differentiates them from non-citizens.

<sup>64</sup> *Contra* Cohen (1991) 162-164 who deemphasizes the significant qualitative difference between fair and unfair competitions of honour, power, and wealth thereby concluding that Demosthenes' attempt to cast himself in an egalitarian light is eventually self-subversive and proves to be anti-egalitarian.

<sup>65</sup> Namely, all the things that Meidias did not do: *καίτοι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐγὼ τοῦτο δείξω σαφῶς, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀσελγὲς ἐξῆν ποιοῦντι Μειδίᾳ μηδ' ὑβρίζοντι μηδὲ τύπτοντι καὶ λυπεῖν ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς... καὶ καταστήσανθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἴσου καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀναλίσκοντα ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, οὕτω μ' ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν νίκην, ὑβρίσειν δὲ τοιαῦτα καὶ τύπτειν μηδὲ τότε. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἐν ᾧ τὸν δῆμον ἐτίμησεν ἄν, οὐδ' ἐνεανιεύσατο τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.* (Dem. 21.67-69); on Meidias' inegalitarian conduct as demonstrative of *asebeia*, see Martin (2009) 34-35.

competition by protecting it from hijacking *hybristai* who disregard other people's honour as well as civic dignity, challenging thereby both fairness and equality. Demosthenes shows throughout the speech that the only way to do so is to condemn Meidias and so make a triple statement: that laws stand above individuals;<sup>66</sup> that political equality is a non-negotiable good of Athenian democracy;<sup>67</sup> and that on the basis of the sovereignty of the laws and civic dignity, elite individuals are more than welcome to compete among themselves for further honour, for meritocratic dignity, while at the same time benefiting the city.<sup>68</sup>

In section 1.1, it emerged that in public spaces of Athenian democracy expression of *philotimia* can be presented as pointing towards *metriotēs* and vice versa. The two ideals are closely related and belong to the same mentality acquired by people who are, or present themselves as, moderate and meritorious in their private life as well as towards the city. Expression of these qualities, moderation and merit, has been detected primarily in one's attitude towards wealth. In his attempt to cut a clear line between himself and Meidias, Demosthenes turns his speech into a comparison between himself and Meidias as to their use of wealth and power. The rhetoric of the speech relies significantly on their contrastive

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<sup>66</sup> E.g. Dem. 21.188, 207, 223-225; cf. [Dem.] 25.20-21; on the personification of the laws in Dem. 21 and other sources, see Brock (2014) 164-166.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. Dem. 21.210, 219-222.

<sup>68</sup> By saying so, I do not support that choregic competitions and the competitive aspect of *philotimia* were exclusively an elite business (see pp. 41-42). However, the type of evidence I examine sheds considerably more light on the tip of the iceberg, particularly to the conduct of the *chorēgoi*.

character construction. Demosthenes casts himself as a middling as well as *philotimos* citizen who helps the community,<sup>69</sup> whereas Meidias is presented as a violent *hybristēs* (Dem. 21.101. 185);<sup>70</sup> violence is a key element of hubristic behavior, which in turn is the very opposite idea to the concept of *metriotēs*. Demosthenes openly repeats that Meidias is *not* a *metrios*, but, instead, that he breaches the limits of acceptable behaviour both in his private and public life (Dem. 21.128-129, 134-135, 186).<sup>71</sup>

Wrongful use of wealth that renders a person non-*metrios* as well as non-*philotimos* can cover quite a broad spectrum of public and private activities. Firstly, one may unlawfully use his wealth in the context of litigation. Meidias, according to Demosthenes, unsuccessfully tried to bribe officials in order to overturn a decision against him (Dem. 21.85), whereas at another time he successfully bribed a scoundrel so as to bring on his behalf a public legal action for desertion (*graphē lipotaxiou*) against Demosthenes (Dem. 21.103); he also tried to give money to the family of a murdered man in order to make them

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<sup>69</sup> *Contra* Cohen (1991) 163-164 who argues that Demosthenes' self-representation as an individual who is simultaneously ordinary and a participant in contests of honour is inconsistent and 'undermining egalitarianism'. For another reading of Dem. 21 as 'abuse of democracy', see Wilson (1991) esp. 181-186.

<sup>70</sup> Through the metaphor of *eranos* (Dem. 21.101, 184-185), each of them is presented as deserving a different return (positive or negative) depending on the quality of their contributions; on *eranos* and the '*eranos* metaphor', see Millett (1991) 153-159.

<sup>71</sup> Thus, Meidias is cast as isolated and marginalized: Dem. 21.14, 198 (μόνος); cf. the double use of μωνώτατος in Lyc. 1.88-89: positively, as standing above the rest in virtue and excelling in honour; negatively, for Leocrates, as deserving isolation from the community due to his flight from the city. The link made is that since Leocrates does not share the same values with his city he does not deserve to be part of it.

accuse Demosthenes for the crime by initiating a homicide trial against him (*dikē phonou*).<sup>72</sup>

In the course of the first incident, an ordinary citizen was disenfranchised, Straton the arbitrator (Dem. 21.96),<sup>73</sup> whereas in the case of the desertion and murder charges Demosthenes himself ran the danger of facing the same fate as Straton (Dem. 21.106).

All these cases are examples of unfair conflicts, either in terms of unequal socio-economic standing (Straton's story) or in terms of challenging a citizen of similar socio-economic standing but from an unequal position (the charges that Meidias avoided the risk of bringing himself but had other people do it on his behalf). What makes these conflicts unequal is the misuse of wealth and power in each case which exposes the socio-economic differences of Athenian society, while at the same time showing that immoderate and wrongful use of wealth in public contexts poses several threats to political equality: ordinary citizens are in danger of getting undeservedly deprived of their political rights and civic dignity is thus attacked (Dem. 21.96); political equality and legal protection are jeopardized by non-*metrioi* individuals who have the power to twist justice by means of their wealth (Dem. 21.111-112);<sup>74</sup> unfairness before the law and twisting of justice that may

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<sup>72</sup> Dem. 21.104, 122.

<sup>73</sup> Keim (2011, PhD thesis unpublished) 60 notes that assigning responsibility for the disenfranchisement of Straton solely to Meidias is a misrepresentation for the sake of rhetorical force. I am grateful to Benjamin Keim for sending me a copy of his unpublished thesis.

<sup>74</sup> Note, also, that Meidias is cast as a tyrannical figure, e.g. in Dem. 21.106-107, 133, 198; cf. Tuplin (1985) 369-370 and esp. p. 375 on Meidias; on tyranny in ancient Greece, see Morgan (2003).

follow from misuse and inequality of wealth are encroachments on citizenship itself, and this is turned into a concern primarily of the ordinary and the poor citizens, as they are less likely to fight off a hubristic attack (Dem. 21.123). Obstruction of justice and misuse of wealth in litigation are in fact tantamount to ‘taking away our enjoyment of free speech and liberty’ (Dem. 21.124),<sup>75</sup> namely, they are targeting core values of Athenian democracy: legal protection, freedom of speech and liberty, in total all the rights that respect of civic dignity confirms. Thus, misuse of wealth regarding justice is an exemplary way of spending money immoderately and in a way that does not fit at all with the ideal of the *metrios* citizen.

The transition from being a non-*metrios* spender to being a non-*metrios as well as a non-philotimos* occurs when private luxuriousness is discussed along with poor records of public benefactions.<sup>76</sup> In relation to misusing one’s wealth in litigation, Demosthenes said that wealth would not have been an issue if one were to use it for his own personal happiness instead of using it to harm others (Dem. 21.109).<sup>77</sup> However, when the discussion turns to public benefactions and ostentation, using one’s wealth for oneself is not an approved attitude. Even more so when one lives in luxury and does not even keep it away

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<sup>75</sup> τὰς τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἡμῶν μετουσίας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

<sup>76</sup> Dem. 21.154-158 provides a direct comparison between Demosthenes’ impressive and Meidias’ poor liturgical records.

<sup>77</sup> καὶ χρῶτο τῷ πλουτεῖν μὴ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐν οἷς μηδένα βλάπτων αὐτὸς ἄμεινόν τι τῶν ἰδίων θήσεται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τάναντία, ἐν οἷς ἀδίκως ἐκβαλὼν τινα καὶ προπηλακίσας αὐτὸν εὐδαιμονιεῖ τῆς περιουσίας.

from the public eye, but shows off as Meidias did in several occasions: in military campaigns while serving in the cavalry (Dem. 21.133),<sup>78</sup> by building a huge house ‘that overshadows everyone in the neighbourhood’ (Dem. 21.158),<sup>79</sup> by driving his wife to the mysteries in a carriage drawn by two white horses and by bragging in the Agora about his rich symposia while escorted by a group of slaves that open the way ahead of him (Dem. 21.158).<sup>80</sup> Meidias’ *lamprotēs*, *leitourgiai*, and *semna analōmata* are not to be found in his record of public expenditures, but are replaced by his private luxuriousness.<sup>81</sup>

The discussion on misusing one’s wealth is topped by a reflection on what should count as *philotimia* (Dem. 21.159):

Well, when Meidias acquires possessions for the sake of his personal luxury (τῆς ἰδίας τρυφῆς) and advantage, I don’t know what use they are to the majority of you; but

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<sup>78</sup> ἐπ’ ἀστράβης δὲ ὀχοῦμενος ἀργυρᾶς, χλανίδας δὲ καὶ κυμβία καὶ κάδους ἔχων, ὧν ἐπελαμβάνοντο οἱ πεντηκοστολόγοι; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἡμᾶς ἀπηγγέλλετο; note that Meidias is a cavalryman, whereas Demosthenes served as a hoplite. On the association of middling mentality with the ‘hoplite or “middling” class’, see Ober (2005) 102; Morris (2000) 116; by contrast, the cavalry was usually associated with the upper classes. See Lys. 16.

<sup>79</sup> On fancy houses and connotations of excessiveness that do not fit well within democratic ideology, see Millett (1998b) 209-211; see also Dem. 36.45.

<sup>80</sup> Ober (1989a) 208: Meidias’ ‘ways of life were at odds with the norms of the group’; on the importance of the space of the Agora within democratic ideology, see Millett (1998b) 203-228.

<sup>81</sup> Dem. 21.158: Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ λαμπρότης, ἢ τίνες αἱ λητουργίαι καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ἀναλώματα τούτου; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὀρώ, πλὴν εἰ ταῦτά τις θεωρεῖ; cf. [Dem.] 25.78, discussed in p. 78, for another exemplary case of being non-*metrios* where in place of public services one may find *phaseis*, *apagōgai* and *endeixeis*.

when he's impelled by them to behave insolently (ὕβριζει), I can see that does affect many ordinary people among us. That surely isn't the kind of conduct you should honour (τιμᾶν) and admire (θαυμάζειν) when it occurs; nor should you judge *philotimia* (τὴν φιλοτιμίαν) by these criteria – whether a man builds a distinguished house (οἰκοδομεῖ λαμπρῶς) or possesses a lot of maidservants or fine furniture: you should look for a man who is splendid and *philotimos* (λαμπρὸς καὶ φιλότιμος) in things of which the majority of you all have a share. You'll find that none of this applies to Meidias.<sup>82</sup>

For an expenditure to count as a manifestation of democratic *philotimia*, the whole community should have a share in it. Such an expenditure would be an index of one's power and excellence demonstrated in a legitimate and publicly beneficial way. At the same time, private ostentation is also an index of power and wealth, but since the community does not benefit from it, private ostentation in combination with absence of public-spirited spending points away from the ideal of the elite *metrios* citizen who shares his wealth with his community. Illegitimate manifestations of power that spring from one's advantage of wealth turn out to be manifestations of *hybris*.<sup>83</sup> Legitimate manifestations of

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<sup>82</sup> MacDowell (1990) adapted.

<sup>83</sup> On the link between *hybris* and inappropriate displays of wealth, and on the antithesis between *hybris* and *sophrosyne* (to the spectrum of which *metriotēs* belongs), see Fisher

power that spring from one's advantage of wealth are to be seen as appropriate manifestations of civic-oriented *philotimia*. Whether manifestations of power are to be considered as legitimate or not depends on whether the city has a say in them by way of controlling such manifestations (i.e. in public competitions of *philotimia* regulated by specific rules) and on whether the community reaps some benefit from them.<sup>84</sup> In this context, illegitimate manifestations of power do not make an individual *philotimos* in a negative sense, but make him a *hybristēs* and not *philotimos*, precisely because *philotimia* is here positively defined and expected to be expressed in a virtuous manner and to the benefit of the community.

*Philotimia* as a legitimate manifestation of power is intrinsically linked with the idea of benefiting the city financially and, as we have seen, sharing one's wealth with the community is an exemplary way for an elite individual to show that he is a *metrios* citizen. *Philotimia* is not to be found merely in activities that directly concern public expenditures and use of wealth, but belongs to the broader mentality of promoting public interest which is appreciated by the Athenian community. Thus, Demosthenes' phrase ἀλλ' ὅς ἄν ἐν

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(1992) 111-117; see Roisman (2005) 89-90 on self-indulgence as unmanly and characteristic of the non-moderate; and Roisman (2005) 90-94 on wealth, honour, and *hybris*.

<sup>84</sup> Note also the prerequisite of demonstrating public-spiritedness when spending money for the city. On the basis of that, Demosthenes turns Meidias' trierarchy into a self-interestedly motivated expenditure that is not an index of *philotimia* but of cowardice and unmanliness (Dem. 21.160-167); on this point, see Roisman (2003) 131; on public-spiritedness and public-spending, see Ober (1989a) 226-230; on *hybris* and wrong use of wealth, see Lys. 24.17-18; Dem. 36.41-42; against ostentation, see [Dem.] 42.24; on disregarding political equality and prioritizing wealth, see Dem. 45.65-67; Dem. 51.11-12.

τούτοις λαμπρὸς καὶ φιλότιμος ἦ, ὧν ἅπασι μέτεστι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν (Dem. 21.159) can cover a spectrum of activities broader than monetary benefactions. This brings us back to the current case and the civic-oriented explanation for initiating the trial that Demosthenes endeavours to establish throughout the speech: that this trial is a defence of civic dignity and a unique opportunity for the people to validate with their decision the sovereignty of the laws and the inviolability of political equality.<sup>85</sup> As a moderate elite individual who refrained from retaliating impromptu and preferred instead to bring Meidias to court, Demosthenes is *philotimos* also in the sense that he turned an incident that may be seen as a trifling fight between two rich people into something in ‘which the majority of you all have a share’ (Dem. 21.159); and this brings us back to the realm of *metriotēs* and to the mentality of sharing with the community and advancing public interest before private considerations.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> See also the way in which Aeschines closes his prosecution speech against Timarchos: εἰ οὖν βουλήσεσθε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῶν ποιησάντων, φιλοτιμότερον ἡμεῖς ἔξομεν τοὺς παρανομοῦντας ἐξετάζειν (Aesch. 1.196). The implication seems to be that by standing out as *ho boulomenos* in the trial at hand against a citizen that allegedly violates the city’s laws, values, and interests, Aeschines demonstrated civic-oriented *philotimia*. If the lawcourt validates his initiative with its decision, excelling individuals, that is, politically active citizens that unlike Timarchos respect with their conduct the city’s expectations and interests, will show more *philotimia* towards such civic-oriented initiatives; see Fisher’s (2001) comment ad loc. on the point that ἡμεῖς here refers to the *rhetores*, ‘the politically active men’.

<sup>86</sup> In this respect, Meidias’ attempt to serve his private interests in an unlawful manner by initiating the trials discussed above is another way in which Meidias is found to be non-*philotimos*.

Conversely, all the legal activities of Meidias and his misuses of wealth confirm the exact opposite mentality. Lack of moderation in the way one deals with other citizens in public and in the way one spends on himself is presented as incompatible with the mentality of showing civic-oriented *philotimia* in public contests that involve big expenditures and considerations of honour as meritorious dignity. Meidias had what it takes in terms of material resources to be a civic-oriented *philotimos* but he chose to be *hybristēs*: he devoted his wealth to private luxuriousness and challenged with his conduct core values of democracy. The only way, Demosthenes says, to safeguard democracy against dangerously unworthy and insolent individuals, such as Meidias, is to punish him in an exemplary way by stripping him of his wealth.<sup>87</sup> So far, Meidias' wealth and power have been a defence wall saving him from receiving due punishment for his hubristic crimes, that is to say, Meidias' use of wealth and power has challenged the prerogative of equality before the law (Dem. 21.138).<sup>88</sup> If Meidias gets deprived of his superfluous wealth, Demosthenes says, and becomes equal to the majority of the citizens in terms of wealth, he

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<sup>87</sup> See also, Isoc. 20.15-18.

<sup>88</sup> τὸ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας καὶ πλούτου πονηρὸν εἶναι καὶ ὑβριστὴν τεῖχος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς παθεῖν. ἐπεὶ περιαιρεθεὶς οὗτος τὰ ὄντα ἴσως μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὑβρίζοι, εἰ δ' ἄρα, ἐλάττονος ἄξιός ἔσται τοῦ μικροτάτου παρ' ὑμῖν· μάτην γὰρ λοιδορήσεται καὶ βοήσεται, δίκην δ', ἂν ἀσελγαίνῃ τι, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡμῖν ἐξ ἴσου δώσει; on legal unfairness and the danger of giving preferential treatment to the rich and insolent, see also Dem. 21.112-113, 183, 211.

will not suffer anything terrible and at the same time he will be unable to behave hubristically in the future or get away with it (Dem. 21.211).<sup>89</sup>

Meidias refused to conform to the *metrios* ideal (Dem. 21.186),<sup>90</sup> and therefore should be made moderate, 'ordinary', by force, i.e. by way of being stripped of his excessive wealth.<sup>91</sup> Meidias is unworthy of managing a property that could place him within the group of *philotimoi* citizens, because he lacks the qualities of being *metrios*. If an excessive individual refuse to become *metrios* in character, he should at least become moderate in his pocket. Such a suggestion emerging from the rhetoric of *Against Meidias* is not a call for any kind of social revolution aiming at equal distribution of wealth. The connection made throughout the speech is that by depriving Meidias of his wealth the people will secure and reinforce civic dignity as equal high standing springing from freedom, political equality and especially equality before the law. This idea takes inequality of wealth for granted, but at the same time serves as a warning to the people to pay attention lest they become unequal in other respects too. The request to make Meidias and ordinary people equal in terms of wealth in order to secure political equality is a symbolic act, as far as serious

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<sup>89</sup> οὐδὲν δεινὸν οὐδ' ἔλεεινὸν Μειδίας πείσεται, ἂν ἴσα κτήσῃται τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν, οὓς νῦν ὑβρίζει καὶ πτωχοὺς ἀποκαλεῖ, ἃ δὲ νῦν περιόντ' αὐτὸν ὑβρίζειν ἐπαίρει, περιαιρεθῆ.

<sup>90</sup> εἰ δ' ἐπιστάμενος μέτριον παρέχειν ἑαυτόν, ὅταν βούληται, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴλετο ζῆν, εὐδηλον δήπου τοῦθ', ὅτι, καὶ νῦν ἐὰν διακρούσῃται, πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ὃν ὑμεῖς ἴστε γενήσεται.

<sup>91</sup> On different evaluations of being moderate, voluntarily or by compulsion, in the Attic orators, see Roisman (2005) 181-182.

wealth redistribution is concerned and it concerns a few excessive individuals. It is not a general demand for economic equality.

The rhetoric of *metriotēs* and *philotimia* employed in *Against Meidias* implies that differences in wealth are not threatening to the democracy as long as political equality rises above everyone and everything, and as long as the “haves” are convinced to or made to demonstrate their advantage of wealth in socially acceptable ways. In this context, high-level *philotimia* related to elite contests arises as a commendable quality of the individual who seeks to serve the city in a way that is moderate as well as ambitious, dignified and deserving of recognition.

In *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes blends together important features that define *philotimia* as a civic virtue: the consistent rhetorical exploitation of public-spirited spending and, more generally, public-spirited conduct as manifestations of a citizen’s democratic *philotimia*; the merging of being a praiseworthy *philotimos* with being a *metrios* citizen; the fact that excessiveness and individualism are associated with *hybris* and not with some negative and inegalitarian version of *philotimia*; the general absence of references to an undemocratic, negative, or excessive version of *philotimia*. In these respects, the rhetoric of *Against Meidias* offers an illustrious account of democratic *philotimia* right at the time when it was most systematically promoted as a civic virtue both in the courtrooms and in honorific inscriptions.

## Chapter 2

### Chronological developments and variations in the rhetoric of *philotimia*

#### Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw the central role that positive, civic-oriented *philotimia* can play in power negotiations among elite citizens and in exploiting positive reciprocal bonds between excelling citizens and the democratic city. When Demosthenes says that, if Meidias had performed his trierarchy out of *philotimia* he deserved due *charis* from the city, but if disgraceful motives and private reasons lay behind the performance of his trierarchy then his service should not be recognized (Dem. 21.160), he draws from the cooperative aspect of *philotimia*: an individual who shows *philotimia* when performing public service is perceived to behave in a way that benefits the city and thus deserves public recognition. When Demosthenes says that, if Meidias wanted to challenge him fairly and democratically he should have volunteered to compete against him in the choregic competition (Dem. 21.67-69), he draws from the competitive aspect of *philotimia*. Both aspects of *philotimia* are put to the service of the democratic community, and in this respect *Against Meidias* is an exemplary case of the extent that the promotion of civic-oriented *philotimia* can reach. In Section 1, we will see that Demosthenes' line of argumentation in *Against Meidias* regarding public service,

reciprocity, and *philotimia* is not unique, but reflective of its time. Section 2 moves backwards in time and explores the rhetoric of *philotimia* during the time of Lysias. Finally, Section 3 takes as its focus cases of *philotimia* manifested outside the democratic city both in the time of Lysias and in the time of Demosthenes.

### **2.1. The promotion of *philotimia* in the time of Demosthenes**

In this section, I will examine forensic speeches from the mid-fourth century onwards that demonstrate the rhetorical contexts in which *philotimia* is systematically celebrated as a positive value.<sup>1</sup> I will also discuss some examples of honorific inscriptions in order to examine how the rhetoric of commendable *philotimia* employed by individual speakers in the courtroom compares with the rhetoric of commendable *philotimia* employed by the Assembly and the Council in surviving honorific inscriptions.

In forensic speeches of the 360s onwards, we observe the systematic praise of *philotimia* as the right motive behind public service that deserves public reward and recognition. Demonstrations of civic-oriented *philotimia* are related to public services, usually monetary and military, in contexts that stress due gratitude allegedly (or legitimately) owed to the individual contributor and/or underline the obligation of the

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<sup>1</sup> See also the discussion of the forensic speeches from the trial battles between Demosthenes and Aeschines in Chapter 3 Section 4.

democratic city to reciprocate. Thus, at the time of Demosthenes, the rhetoric of *philotimia* in the courtroom can be approached from two different yet complementary perspectives, that of the city and that of the individual. On the one hand, to attract public benefactors and enhance the performance of public service the city needs to recognize the service of *philotimoi* individuals by granting them appropriate returns: in this framework, we see the significance attributed to the hortatory aspect of returning gratitude, the direct link between civic-oriented *philotimia* and public *charis*, and, more generally, the idea that the expectation of a return seems to be inscribed in demonstrations of *philotimia* towards the city. On the other hand, to solidify their claim for a response of positive reciprocity from the city, litigants needed to demonstrate appropriate manifestations of civic-oriented *philotimia*.<sup>2</sup> To that end, contexts that were democratically appropriate for using one's power without threatening collective power are identified, in other words, contexts and activities out of which benefit for the collective was produced.

The rhetoric of Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* (Dem. 20) illustrates the place that *philotimia* holds within a nexus of values related to the performance of benefactions and the corresponding demands of reciprocity between individual contributors and the city. *Against Leptines* is a support speech for the prosecution in a trial that took place in 355 against an inexpedient law (νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι), that is, Leptines' law introduced a year before

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<sup>2</sup> On what constitutes an appropriate manifestation of civic-oriented *philotimia* in the time of Demosthenes, see also pp. 42-44, 100-103.

the trial. According to Leptines' law, all honorary exemptions (ἀτέλειαι) regarding the performance of festival liturgies granted to citizens and non-citizens were abolished and future bestowal of that honour was also forbidden (except for the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton) as part of an attempt to make the liturgy system more efficient at a time that the public coffers were running low.<sup>3</sup>

Demosthenes' rhetorical strategy in *Against Leptines* consists of a combination of arguments touching upon collective expediency and morality, and seeks to convince the dikasts that it is both financially and ethically damaging to keep Leptines' law. Two of the main points made are, first, that people who have been *philotimoi* towards the city will suffer injustice, if they have their rewards taken away, and, second, that many will be discouraged from showing their *philotimia* towards the people in the future, if the city proves to be an ungrateful partner. In this frame, we read that abolition of public honours renders pointless the mentality of *philotimoi* individuals and, not without distorting the law,<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes further claims that a corollary of Leptines' law is that it renders requests for the people's *charis* illegal (Dem. 20.155-156). It is much more beneficial for the city to retain the right to bestow honours (κυρίους... τῆς δωρεῖᾶς), even if they are sometimes enjoyed by undeserving individuals: the more the honours on offer the more the people willing to benefit the city,

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<sup>3</sup> On the historical contexts of the case, see Kremmydas (2012) 3-8; on *ateleia*, see Kremmydas (2012) 10, 43-45; on the reconstruction of Leptines' law, see Kremmydas (2012) 58.

<sup>4</sup> See Kremmydas' (2012) comment on Dem. 20.156; see also Kremmydas (2012) 55-58 on other cases in the speech where Demosthenes distorts facts to serve his purposes.

whereas if the city stops giving rewards even to deserving individuals, people will not have any incentive to be *philotimoi* towards the city (Dem. 20.5).<sup>5</sup> This is the hortatory aspect of honouring those who benefit the city: so that more people are encouraged to show their *philotimia* towards the state.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, as laws reflect the city's ethos, Leptines' law damages Athens' good reputation (δόξα χρηστή): Athens has always been interested in spending money for the sake of *philotimia* (πάνθ' ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας ἀνήλωσαν) and in preserving her good reputation in times of danger, not in accumulating wealth (Dem. 20.10).<sup>7</sup> This is the kind of mentality that serves the collective and that the city seeks to inspire in others, citizens and non-citizens, with its rewards and honours for benefactors.<sup>8</sup> If, however, Leptines' law is validated, the city will prove herself envious, untrustworthy, and ungrateful (φθονεροὶ, ἄπιστοι, ἀχάριστοι).

The general Chabrias is presented as a good example of a citizen that followed the principles of collective ethos in the way he served the city. Out of his patriotism (*philopolis*) and his *philotimia* towards the city (διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν, Dem. 20.82) he chose to

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<sup>5</sup> ὅτι ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείονος ἢ προσήκει τιμᾶν πολλοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν προκαλεῖσθ' ὑμᾶς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδενὶ μηδέν, μηδ' ἂν ἄξιός ἦ, διδόναι, πάντας ἀπείρξετε τοῦ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι.

<sup>6</sup> See also [Dem.] 50.63-66: Apollodorus asks for a return of gratitude for his exemplary service as trierarch and notes that nobody will be willing to show *philotimia* towards the city (φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς) if they see that the useful and well-ordered ones, namely himself, are not rewarded (χάριν οὔσαν) by the city; Dem. 51.21-22 discussed in pp. 122-123.

<sup>7</sup> The same point is made in Dem. 22.76; on collective ethos and collective *philotimia*, see pp. 53-56, 269-273.

<sup>8</sup> See also Dem. 20.64: honorary inscriptions are tokens of collective ethos and proofs to potential benefactors that they are going to be rewarded for their services.

sacrifice his life and the prosperity of his family to serve his city and live up to the opinion that his community held of him.<sup>9</sup> For these reasons, repealing the reward of *ateleia* granted to him and his descendants would be unfair to Chabrias and his family, and shameful for the city (Dem. 20.79-83). Furthermore, touching directly upon the demands of reciprocity, Demosthenes notes that the decision on the suitability of Leptines' law will also be a public statement on whether the city deserves to be benefited in the future or not (Dem. 20.83). The indication is that if they prove themselves ungrateful towards those who demonstrate their patriotism and *philotimia* towards the city, they will also prove themselves unworthy of future benefactions, an idea explicitly phrased a few paragraphs later: ὃς ἔρημον ποιεῖς τὸν δῆμον τῶν φιλοτιμησομένων, προλέγων καὶ δεικνὺς ὅτι τοῖς ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσιν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἔσται πλέον (Dem. 20.103).<sup>10</sup> This is yet another appeal to the significance of the hortatory aspect of rewarding those who are *philotimoi* towards the city. The rhetoric of *Against Leptines* brings out the idea that the city needed, on the one hand, to remind herself that rewarding civic-oriented *philotimia* was a beneficial course of action and, on the other hand, to reassure

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<sup>9</sup> See especially Dem. 20.82: μᾶλλον εἴλετο μὴ ζῆν ἢ καταισχῦναι τὰς παρ' ὑμῶν ὑπαρχούσας αὐτῷ τιμάς.

<sup>10</sup> 'You deprive the people of individuals who seek after honours by predicting and proving that benefactors will not receive anything at all in return any more', translation by Kremmydas (2012). As noted by Kremmydas' (2012) comment ad loc., this is a misrepresentation, as Leptines' law did not deprive the people of the right of bestowing honours in general, but only of 'existing and future awards of hereditary *ateleiai*'.

the citizens (and non-citizens) that channeling their *philotimia* towards the city and performing public service out of *philotimia* was indeed a good plan.

Litigants, for their part, sought to show that they followed the city's morals, that their performance of public service was inspired by the principles of collective mentality and, in other cases, that there were specific contexts and activities in which employing one's power and showing *philotimia* was regarded as appropriate. In *Against Androtion*, delivered in 355, a comparison is made between objects of virtue and objects of wealth (Dem. 22.75): honorary crowns whether big or small carry the same symbolic value as tokens of virtue and indices of *philotimia* (στέφανοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀρετῆς σημεῖον... στέφανος μὲν ἅπας, κὰν μικρὸς ᾗ, τὴν ἴσην φιλοτιμίαν ἔχει τῷ μεγάλῳ),<sup>11</sup> whereas symbols of wealth need to be big and impressive so as to carry some value, and, even then, they are not symbols of virtue and honour, but merely give a reputation of wealth (πλούτου τινὰ δόξαν). The indication is that an honorific crown that celebrates an act of valour is a symbol of *philotimia*, in the sense that it provides both a legitimate opportunity for taking pride in one's honourable distinction and an incentive for emulation to those who would like to earn such a distinction too. The comparison of tokens of virtue and their *philotimia* with tokens of wealth and their absence of *philotimia* brings to

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<sup>11</sup> See also, Dem. 57.64-65: the speaker's dedication of some shields to Athena and the accompanying honorary inscription by his deme bring him *philotimia*.

the fore the idea that mere acquisition of wealth may not be an honourable objective, but putting one's wealth in honourable initiatives demonstrates virtue.<sup>12</sup>

*Against Aphobus II*, delivered in 364/3,<sup>13</sup> is a speech that belongs to Demosthenes' series of trials against his guardians charged for embezzling his estate. The speech closes with a remark on Demosthenes' and Aphobus' different manners regarding financial management and public spending. The dikasts are invited to have confidence in the idea that, if they help him regain his property, Demosthenes will follow the example of his father and become a dutiful liturgist,<sup>14</sup> in contrast to Aphobus who inherited a great property but, instead of showing *philotimia* towards the city with his money (οὐδὲν πεφιλοτίμηται πρὸς ὑμᾶς), sought to gain even more by depriving Demosthenes of his own property (Dem. 28.22). In this case, showing *philotimia* towards the people is tantamount to contributing money to the city by performing public service.<sup>15</sup> In a trial that adjudicates issues of inheritance and embezzlement, the alleged disposition of the litigants regarding financial management is a

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<sup>12</sup> On the idea that the city follows this principle of action, see p. 111 with n. 7.

<sup>13</sup> See MacDowell (2009) 37 on the date.

<sup>14</sup> See also Dem. 28.19: ἐμὲ δ' ὑμῖν διάδοχον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ τῶν λητουργιῶν ἐσόμενον. Note how ἐμὲ δ' ὑμῖν expresses the reciprocal bond that ties the liturgist and the city; MacDowell (2009) 17-18 notes that there are no references stressing that Demosthenes' father had performed many liturgies, but the fact that Demosthenes says that he will follow the example of his father in performing liturgies 'must mean that Demosthenes senior had performed at least one' (quotation from p. 17 n. 14).

<sup>15</sup> See also [Dem.] 47.54: the speaker claims that he has sold and used as collateral a big part of his visible property (house furniture) due to his liturgies, his *eisphorai* and his *philotimia* towards the people (τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας).

matter of importance and the dikasts are exhorted to examine whether it is going to be more useful for the city to adjudicate a property sufficient for the performance of liturgies to Demosthenes or to his opponent who has been not at all *philotimos* towards the city. Taking under consideration all the facts and evidence submitted in the trial, the dikasts are invited to decide what is just (Dem. 28.23), not, however, without taking into account the litigants' different disposition regarding public spending (Dem. 28.22) and not without considering that Demosthenes will very probably be eager to repay the forensic favour of having his property justly restored to him with the performance of liturgies.<sup>16</sup> Being *philotimos* towards the city with one's money is a legitimate way of earning access to the goodwill of the people; cooperative public spending ties the individual *philotimos* and the democratic city with bonds of reciprocity.

In *Against Phaenippus*, probably delivered in 328/7,<sup>17</sup> the speaker relies on civic-oriented *philotimia* to make a sarcastic remark about his opponent's allegedly disappointing record of public services. According to the speaker, Phaenippus had not performed any liturgies although he had the means for liturgical service ([Dem.] 42.22) and the only activity in which he demonstrated *philotimia* towards the city was his horse-breeding (πεφιλοτιμημένον εἰς ὑμᾶς... ἵπποτρόφος ἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ φιλότιμος, [Dem.] 42.24). This

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<sup>16</sup> Dem. 28.24: εἰκότως λειτουργεῖν ἐθελήσω, χάριτας ὀφείλων ὅτι μοι δικαίως ἀπέδοτε τὴν οὐσίαν.

<sup>17</sup> See MacDowell (2009) 151 on the date.

alleged proof of honourable *philotimia* is not to be taken at face value, as right afterwards the speaker claims that Phaenippus was a useless *hippotrophos* so overwhelmed with his luxurious habits (τοσαύτης οὔτος τρυφῆς ἐστι μεστός) that he sold his military horse to buy a chariot for his travels. The speaker concludes that Phaenippus does not deserve at all to win the current trial of *antidosis* and escape public service, as he has not shown himself *chresimos* and *philotimos* either with his property or with his person ([Dem.] 42.25), the implication being that those who prove themselves useful and *philotimoi* in public service would fairly expect civic recognition. In a similar manner, in *Against Stephanus I*, probably delivered in 350/349,<sup>18</sup> we read that although he is able, Stephanus has not performed any liturgy for the city. Showing *philotimia* and *prothymia* in appropriate public initiatives is honourable, but Stephanus prefers private gain to honour, and this explains his lack of cooperative spending for the city (Dem. 45.66-67).

Lastly, *Against Leocrates*, probably delivered in 330,<sup>19</sup> provides further insight into the rhetoric of *philotimia* and public service in the last years of Athenian democracy.<sup>20</sup> Towards the end of the speech, Lycurgus attacks Leocrates' advocates seeking to reduce their power to influence the dikasts (Lyc. 1.135, 138-140). Towards that purpose, he distinguishes

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<sup>18</sup> See MacDowell (2009) 115 on the date.

<sup>19</sup> The dating of the speech is based on Aeschines' reference to the trial of Leocrates in Aesch. 3.252.

<sup>20</sup> The speeches from the trials between Demosthenes and Aeschines also provide important evidence about the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* and public service. See Chapter 3 Section 4.

between financial contributions that are of more practical use and deserve public *charis*, such as trierarchies,<sup>21</sup> and financial contributions that are more self-celebrating than publicly beneficial, such as *choregiai*,<sup>22</sup> and therefore do not deserve public recognition and the gratitude of the dikasts (Lyc. 1.139-140). With this distinction, Lycurgus is probably targeting specific liturgies that he anticipates Leocrates' advocates are going to exploit to Leocrates' advantage. What is interesting is Lycurgus' phrasing employed to describe the bond of reciprocity that would normally tie a public benefactor with his city. As we read, it would be senseless to demonstrate *philotimia* towards the city but then seek to help a man who destroyed these manifestations of *philotimia*.<sup>23</sup> What Lycurgus probably means is that it would be stupid on the part of Leocrates' advocates, on the one hand, to show their *philotimia* towards the city, namely to perform public liturgies that are expected to activate a response of gratitude on the part of the city, but, on the other hand, to help a man who allegedly betrayed the city, namely a man who damaged the source of recognition of their *philotimia* and thus made their *philotimia* disappear due to lack of recognition.<sup>24</sup> Since the advocates

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Dem. 21.166: Demosthenes anticipates that Meidias is going to present as *euergesia* and *philotimia* a trierarchy that, according to Demosthenes, was motivated by and aimed only at personal interest.

<sup>22</sup> This assessment of *choregiai* serves the rhetorical purposes of Lycurgus, but Fisher (2009) 208-212; (2010); (2011) show the widespread participation in festivals and the publicly beneficial character of festival liturgies.

<sup>23</sup> Lyc. 1.140: οὐδ' οὕτως ἀνόητον ὥστε φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μὲν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τούτῳ δὲ βοηθεῖν ὃς αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰς φιλοτιμίας ἠφάνισεν.

<sup>24</sup> See also, Lyc. 1.136-137: by abandoning the city Leocrates also abandoned and left unprotected the bronze statue that his father had erected in the temple of Zeus the

would normally expect a return of favour from the city, basic understanding of the workings of reciprocity indicates that it is irrational for them to help someone who has allegedly damaged the city.

In the courtroom speeches discussed in this section as well as in Chapter 1, *philotimia* is singled out and promoted as a positive value and as the appropriate motivation for the performance of public services that deserve and are expected to be honoured and recognized by the city.<sup>25</sup>

Inscribed decrees honouring Athenians and non-Athenians from roughly the same period corroborate this promotion of *philotimia* as a positive value.<sup>26</sup> As noted by Lambert (2011) 197, *philotimia* systematically appears in inscribed honorific decrees of the Assembly and the Council in the 340s, that is, at the same time as the surviving honorific inscriptions begin to explicitly articulate their 'hortatory intention'.<sup>27</sup> A thorough study of the democratic discourses and languages of honour and *philotimia* that would examine together, rather than

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Protector. We may say that Leocrates' negligence and betrayal contributed to the extinction of his very own source of *philotimia*; on the rhetoric of monuments, *philotimia*, and *metriotēs*, see pp. 81-82 with n. 39.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Lysias' courtroom speeches discussed in pp. 130-135, 146-159, 168-180.

<sup>26</sup> See Whitehead (1983) 60-69 which offers the first systematic discussion of the honours, the honorands, and the purpose of *philotimia* inscriptions from c. 350 to c. 250; Veligianni-Terzi (1997) examines the language and formulas of honorific decrees from classical Athens: on *philotimia* cognates, see Veligianni-Terzi (1997) 204, 211, 217-227, 268, 270-275, 283-284, 287-292, 293-300, 302-306.

<sup>27</sup> Whitehead (1983) 63-64 notes that *philotimia* was the commendable quality most regularly linked with the hortatory clause of surviving honorific decrees; Luraghi (2010) on the hortatory intention of honorific inscriptions in general.

separately, literary and epigraphical evidence is still awaited in scholarship.<sup>28</sup> At this stage, a few epigraphical examples should suffice to show that, at least from the mid-fourth century onwards, in the language of honorific inscriptions promoted by the city collectively and in the language of praise and self-praise promoted by the litigants individually both the cooperative and competitive aspects of *philotimia* are put to the service of the city.

An honorific inscription of 330/329 for a non-Athenian, the grain trader Herakleides of Salamis, reads as follows:

That it seems good to the Council to praise Herakleides son of Charikleides of Salamis and crown him with a gold crown of 500 drachmas; and he shall be permitted to obtain from the People whatever benefit he can, so that others may also show love of honour (φιλοτιμῶνται), knowing that the Council honours and crowns those who show love of honour (τούς φιλοτιμουμένους).<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> One of my aims is to develop this thesis into a monograph that would incorporate a thorough study of honorific inscriptions; Osborne's (2010) studies on Athenian democracy are heavily based on inscriptions and are a seminal contribution towards this direction; Lambert's recent studies that discuss the historical importance of different categories of inscribed Athenian state laws and decrees of the period 352-322 show the way forward. These contributions are intended as prolegomena to *IG II<sup>3</sup>* fascicle 2<sup>2</sup> and are now collected in Lambert (2018); Domingo Gygax (2016) provides a seminal study on the origins of euergetism and honouring practices that explores inscriptions thoroughly; see also Liddel (2007) 160-179 who discusses the promotion of the fulfilment of civic obligation in honorary decrees with a few short comments on inscribed *philotimia*.

<sup>29</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 360. 61-66 = RO 95, translation by Rhodes & Osborne (2003).

To 'show love of honour' is tantamount to acting in a manner that benefits the city, and the honorific inscription is a guarantee that the city honours and will keep honouring 'those who show love of honour'.<sup>30</sup>

An honorific decree of 335/334 for an Athenian citizen, Phyleus of Oinoe, honoured for completing his office, probably as secretary of Council and People,<sup>31</sup> reads as follows:

And the treasurer of the People shall advance the money for the crown from the People's fund for expenditure on decrees; and in order that the treasurer may recover [the stated money], the presiding committee allotted to preside... shall bring before the lawmakers an amendment to the law about the expenditure so that others who are appointed [secretaries] may [show love of honour] (φιλοτιμῶντα)ι<sup>32</sup> towards the Council and the People, [in performing their office according to the law]s and in being useful to the Athenian People; and the prytany secretary shall inscribe this decree on a stone stele.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Lambert (2011) 194.

<sup>31</sup> See Lambert (2004) 89, 93 on the office.

<sup>32</sup> I trust the judgement and expertise of Lambert (2004) 93 who says that Matthaïou's restorations of this inscription are excellent.

<sup>33</sup> IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 327. 16-25, translation by Lambert (*Attic Inscriptions Online*, <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII2/445>).

The point of the honorific decree and of the inscription is to demonstrate that the city rewards and will keep rewarding the officials who show love of honour when executing their offices.<sup>34</sup> The hortatory aspect of the honorific inscriptions expresses the same mentality that is explicitly articulated in the rhetoric of *Against Leptines*: that public recognition and rewarding of civic-oriented *philotimia* not only ties the *philotimos* individual with the democratic city through past services, but also aims to inspire worthy action in the future.

Finally, two pieces of evidence, one literary and one epigraphical, deserve to be discussed together as they may be revealing of a degree of continuity, from the late 360s until the mid-320s, in the promotion of civic-oriented *philotimia* both by individual speakers and by the city. The first piece of evidence is Demosthenes' speech, *On the trierarchic crown*, probably delivered in 360/359;<sup>35</sup> the second one is IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 370, an inscribed honorific decree of 325/324 regarding the awarding of crowns to trierarchs.<sup>36</sup>

From *On the trierarchic crown*, we learn that the city had passed a decree according to which the trierarch who had his ship ready first was going to receive a crown (Dem. 51.1, 4).

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<sup>34</sup> Another example is IG II<sup>2</sup> 338. 20-25 of 333/332: Pytheas is honoured with a gold crown for the execution of his office as superintendent of water supply at Oropos 'in order that others who are elected in charge of the water supply may each of them also show love of honour towards the People', translation by Lambert (*Attic Inscriptions Online*, <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII2/338>).

<sup>35</sup> I follow MacDowell (2009) 133-134 on the date, authenticity, and delivery of the speech.

<sup>36</sup> IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 370. 3-34 = IG II<sup>2</sup> 1629. 170-204 = RO 100. 170-204; MacDowell (2009) 134 n. 20 and Liddel (2007) 177 n. 242 note that these two pieces of evidence reflect a similar mentality but none of them provides any further discussion.

The trierarch who won the competition was Demosthenes, but his award was challenged by some rival trierarchs and the dispute was taken to the Council. The occasion out of which the dispute originated is an excellent example of competitive *philotimia* put to the service of the democratic city. More importantly for the purposes of this study, the surviving speech is an excellent example of the rhetorical exploitation of civic-oriented *philotimia* and reciprocity. Demosthenes argues that *charis* should be granted to those who perform their duties (Dem. 51.2), distinguishes between fair and unfair claims for *charis* and honours (Dem. 51. 3, 7, 17), and highlights that he went beyond duty in his expenditures for the preparation of his trireme (Dem. 51.5-6). The speech closes in the following manner:

ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραινῶ μὴ ποιεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀναλίσκειν ἐθελόντων φιλοτιμίαν ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν λεγόντων πλεονεξία. εἰ δὲ μὴ, διδάξετε πάντας τὰ μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν προσταττόμενα ὡς εὐτελέστατα διοικεῖν, τοὺς δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀναιδῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς ψευδομένους ὡς πλείστου μισθοῦσθαι. (Dem. 51.22)

'I advise you, men of Athens, do not allow the *philotimia* of those who are ready to lavish their money to be dependent upon the *pleonexia* of those who serve as pleaders. Otherwise you will teach all to perform the duties imposed by you with the least

possible outlay, but to hire the largest number of people possible to utter impudent falsehoods before you in support of their claims.<sup>37</sup>

The decree concerning this trierarchic crown does not survive and thus we cannot know whether it was explicitly articulated that the purpose was to award the successful trierarch ‘for his *philotimia*’ or ‘so that others show their *philotimia* in the future’. Nevertheless, the way that the speech closes explicitly demonstrates that the purpose of Demosthenes and, I suggest, of the decree too was to turn the fulfilment of a trierarchy into a competition that would have been perceived as a contest of civic-oriented *philotimia*.

IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 370 corroborates this reading. The decree concerns a colonizing expedition of Athens to the Adriatic and its text survives in the naval inventories for 325/324.<sup>38</sup> The decree advertises the decision of the Assembly to award gold crowns to the first, second, and third trierarchs to bring their prepared trireme to the jetty (14-27). The fact that the contest was perceived as a competition of civic-oriented *philotimia* is explicitly articulated in the hortatory clause of the decree (27-34):

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<sup>37</sup> Translation from Loeb (adapted); note how qualitatively different are *philotimia* and *pleonexia* in this passage; cf. Thuc. 3.82.8. See p. 28.

<sup>38</sup> Lambert (*Attic Inscriptions Online*, <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/RO/100>).

‘And let the herald of the Council announce the crowns at the competition of the Thargelia, and the receivers shall allocate the money for the crowns, so that the love of honour (ἡ φιλοτι-*μία*) of the trierarchs towards the People (εἰς τὸν δῆμον) may be apparent.’

The trial speeches and the honorary decrees from the mid-fourth century onwards show that, when *philotimia* is promoted as a positive value and a commendable quality, it is explicitly associated with conduct that is perceived to benefit the city. The citizens who single out their *philotimia* towards the city seek to activate bonds of reciprocity with the benefited community for past honourable behaviour. In these contexts, the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* is employed as a means to showcase their egalitarianism and give an assurance that they will continue benefiting the community. The city that honours such behaviour is perceived to reciprocate as well as to encourage the people to channel their *philotimia* into similar activities in the future.

It has been suggested that from the late 360s until the 320s, democratic Athens entered a period of great change.<sup>39</sup> In the years during and after the Social War (357-355), the state coffers were running low<sup>40</sup> and the city needed to encourage both Athenian and non-

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<sup>39</sup> See Liddel (2007) 94-102 for a convenient summary of the scholarship discussing financial, cultural, and political changes in the period between the Social War (357-355) and the Lamian War (322).

<sup>40</sup> See Cawkwell (1963) 61-62, nn. 85-86; Dem. 10.37; 23.209.

Athenian benefactors to keep channeling their resources into publicly profitable activities. The rhetoric of *Against Leptines* and the systematization of inscribed decrees honouring past benefactions and exhorting future benefactors with the promise of more honours have been interpreted as responses to this financial decline.<sup>41</sup> Liddel (2007) has argued for a concerted effort to promote the fulfilment of civic obligations in this period, and Lambert (2011) has viewed the promotion of *philotimia* in honorific inscriptions for Athenians from the 340s onwards as part of an attempt to incentivize ordinary Athenian officials to perform their duties well.<sup>42</sup> It is within these broader contexts, that we should view the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* in forensic contests in the time of Demosthenes. When a speaker, and indeed a rich/elite speaker, resorts to arguments of *philotimia* he draws from a shared understanding of *philotimia* as a positive value.

It deserves to be noted here that the earliest extant instance of a *philotimia* cognate appears in an inscribed decree passed by a deme, not by the city.<sup>43</sup> On the basis of this, Osborne has suggested that we cannot exclude the possibility this rhetorical strategy had

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<sup>41</sup> On *Against Leptines*, see Kremmydas (2012) 3-11; on inscriptions, see Lambert (2011) 195-197; for another ‘response to decline’ provided by Xenophon’s *Poroi* in the aftermath of the Social War, see Lambert (2011) 196-197; Keim (2011, PhD thesis unpublished) 107-109.

<sup>42</sup> In the same vein, Fisher (2001) 53-67 interprets the condemnation of Timarchos in 346 as reflective of a time when Athens, or at least the jurymen of this trial, ‘believed it to be right to impose higher standards of civic, familial, and sexual morality on those active in political life’ (p. 67); followed by Lambert (2012) 177.

<sup>43</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1173 = RO 46 of ca. 360. The decree was passed by the deme of Halai to honour Polystratos for the successful execution of his office as priest of Apollo Zoster during which he ‘equipped the temple in a way that displayed extreme love of honour’([λί]αν φιλοτίμ[ω]ς).

‘passed from deme to Assembly’ rather than the opposite.<sup>44</sup> In either case, I agree with Osborne that ‘what is significant is not where the initiative took place but the fact that the terminology and the rhetoric were interchangeable from the *demos* to its divisions, and that none of the groups discussed sought to distinguish itself in any way from the model of the *demos*’.<sup>45</sup> In a similar manner, I cannot conclude that the exploitation of civic-oriented *philotimia* was systematized first in the rhetoric of trials and then in the language of non-inscribed or inscribed decrees of the city. Nevertheless, cases such as Dem. 51 and IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 370 may allow us to suggest that, at least from the late 360s until the last years of the democracy, both the city with its decrees and the citizens with their trial speeches promoted a shared understanding of civic-oriented *philotimia* that in practice meant behaving in ways that were beneficial to the community.<sup>46</sup>

This systematization of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* was neither a phenomenon developed in a vacuum in the 360s onwards nor as widespread as to include the rhetorical exploitation of every area of public behaviour as a competition of honourable

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<sup>44</sup> Osborne (2010) 47-49; *contra* Whitehead (1983) 62 n. 25.

<sup>45</sup> Osborne (2010) 48-49; cf. Engen (2011) 119-120 who excludes from his survey on trade-related services the honorific inscriptions that did not emanate from the Assembly and the Council because, as he claims, ‘they did not necessarily represent the attitude of the state as a whole or reflect the state’s trade policy’.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Chapter 3 which shows that *philotimia* was not systematized in the rhetoric of the Assembly as far as the surviving deliberative speeches and other representations of political debates indicate.

*philotimia*.<sup>47</sup> In the next section, we will turn backwards in time to examine the rhetoric of reciprocity and *philotimia* in the time of Lysias. As we will see, there are instances of this rhetorical strategy as far back as in the last years of the fifth century (e.g. Lys. 21), but, at the same time, there is evidence on the negative evaluation of *philotimia* in this period which indicates that we should not argue for a concerted effort in public speaking to promote *philotimia* as a civic virtue in the time of Lysias.

## 2.2. The rhetoric of *philotimia* in the time of Lysias

In the last years of the fifth century, Athens had experienced the unsuccessful outcome of the Peloponnesian War as well as two oligarchic episodes that had thrown the city into disarray.<sup>48</sup> In the aftermath of these events, the Athenians were probably particularly alert to the threat that excessive ambitions of powerful individuals could pose to the democracy and to the city's prosperity. This was a period when the political scene of the city was perceived to have been dominated by citizens who were driven by personal, individualistic, and destructive *philotimia*. At least, this is how Thucydides and Xenophon retrospectively evaluate the events. The successors of Pericles, particularly Alcibiades, are perceived to have

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<sup>47</sup> On the first point, see the discussion in the following section; on the second point, see Chapter 3.

<sup>48</sup> On how democracy re-established itself after the expulsion of the Thirty, see Shear (2011).

conducted politics driven by *idiai philotimiai* and *idia kerde* that proved detrimental to the city (Thuc. 2.65.7);<sup>49</sup> in especial reference to the oligarchs of 411, Thucydides the narrator says that oligarchies that stem from democracies are ruined because most of the oligarchs do not wish to be equal in standing. Driven by *idiai philotimiai*, they strive for absolute primacy (Thuc. 8.89.3) which turns out to be destructive for the constitution. We can infer from this point that this kind of *idiai philotimiai* is also what drives the oligarchs to turn democracies into oligarchies in the first place since their dissatisfaction with equal standing would have been even greater under democracy.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Critias, one of the Thirty, and Alcibiades are described as by nature the most *philotimoi* (φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω) of all Athenians. All the damages they inflicted upon the city were due to their desire for absolute dominance of the political scene (Xen. *Mem.*1.2.12-14).<sup>51</sup> All these evaluations draw from the competitive aspect of *philotimia* and explain that the excessive desire to stand above the rest turns out to be destructive for the political order.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition; on *idia philotimia*, see pp. 25-28; on *philotimia* in the Sicilian debate, see pp. 202-211.

<sup>50</sup> In the events of Corcyra, Thucydides the narrator explicitly identifies as the cause of *stasis* 'the desire to rule that is inspired by *pleonexia* and *philotimia*' (3.82.8).

<sup>51</sup> See also p. 193 n. 25.

<sup>52</sup> See also Eur. *Phoen.*528-548: Eteocles is exhorted by Iocaste to prefer *isotes* over *philotimia* which is cast as 'the worst of deities' (κακίστη δαιμόνων). Staged probably in 410 or 409, *Phoenissae* and its evaluation of *philotimia* are reflective of the tense political atmosphere; see de Romilly (1965); Wilson (2000) 195 n. 135.

In the same vein, Fisher has noted that in the aftermath of these events the ambivalence of *philotimia* was increased both due to the excessive behaviour of politically active individuals such as Alcibiades and Critias, and because ‘many ambitious liturgists... turned out to be oligarchs or their supporters either in 411-410 or in 405-403’.<sup>53</sup> In the forensic rhetoric of the period between the late 400s and the 380s, *philotimia* seems indeed to be an ambivalent notion that was treated with great cautiousness. First, it needs to be noted that all eleven instances of *philotimia* cognates, appearing in six of the extant speeches of Lysias, are associated with the public behaviour of Athenian citizens: five have negative connotations,<sup>54</sup> while the rest show a reluctance of the speakers to capitalize on their *philotimia*<sup>55</sup> or the great care taken when they decide to follow this line of argumentation.<sup>56</sup> Second, in five out of these six speeches *philotimia* is explicitly introduced when the discussion turns to public service and in all but one of these instances *philotimia* is associated with public expenditures, attitudes towards wealth, and financial management.<sup>57</sup> These are the types of contexts within which we have seen civic-oriented *philotimia* being systematically promoted as a positive value in the rhetoric of the courtroom from the 360s onwards. In the time of Lysias, however, the picture seems to be different. As we will see

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<sup>53</sup> Fisher (2003) 191-193, quotation from p. 191.

<sup>54</sup> Lys. 14.2, 21, 35, 43; 26.3-4.

<sup>55</sup> Lys. 19.23, 56. This speech is discussed in pp. 167-173, 175-180.

<sup>56</sup> Lys. 16. 18, 20; 21.22. Lys. 16 is discussed in pp. 195-197.

<sup>57</sup> Lys. 19.23, 56; 21.22; 26.3-4; 29.14; the exception is Lys. 16 on which see previous note.

below, although the origins of what later formed the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* can be traced in forensic speeches from the last years of the fifth century, we can hardly talk about a systematic attempt to promote *philotimia* as a positive value in the years between the 400s and the 380s.

Wolpert (2002) 131 notes that ‘just as the civil war undermined the credibility of some aristocrats, so it gave the Athenians the impetus to rethink what they regarded as valuable services’.<sup>58</sup> Within such an atmosphere of reconsideration and re-evaluation of what sorts of behaviour should be appreciated as useful and beneficial for the city, and with the consequences of excessive personal ambition still strong in public memory, *philotimia*, as a motive for public action, appears to be a notion of ambivalent quality in the forensic rhetoric of the time.

### **Alerting the audience to manifestations of wrong or dangerous *philotimia***

In Lysias 14 the speaker employs the rhetoric of *philotimia* to warn his audience against bad *philotimoi* and wrong manifestations of *philotimia*. Lysias 14 is a prosecution speech against

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<sup>58</sup> By the same token, Wolpert (2002) 129-133 argues, praise for resisting the Thirty and for proving oneself loyal to the democracy allowed ordinary citizens to be associated with values and ideals that used to be aristocratic. The democrats were now the *agathoi* and ‘memory of the civil war enabled the Athenians to democratize elite values’ (p. 130).

Alcibiades the younger, who was accused of deserting the ranks (*lipotaxion*).<sup>59</sup> The speaker must deal with a very splendid and powerful, yet controversial, family, and one of his main objectives is to show that Alcibiades the younger has inherited a lack of *charis* due to his family's and his own crimes and transgressive lifestyle. A big part of the speech is covered by examples of inappropriate and punishable behaviour of Alcibiades the elder and the younger ranging from military and political transgressions, betrayal of one's homeland and disrespect to one's parents, to sexual licentiousness and incestuous relationships (Lys. 14.25-30).<sup>60</sup>

The record of transgressions and damage inflicted upon the city is indeed impressive but, as the speaker explains, such conduct does not demonstrate Alcibiades' and especially his father's power, but their *ponēria*. Throughout the speech, they are not cast as powerful individuals who use their *dunamis* wrongly against the city, but as *ponēroi*.<sup>61</sup> The alternation of *ponēria* and absence of great *dunamis* that runs through Lys. 14.35-39, culminating at Lys. 14.37,<sup>62</sup> seeks to demonstrate that Alcibiades the elder lacked power even in the performance of his crimes. As the speaker claims, every Athenian citizen would have been able to betray

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<sup>59</sup> The case was probably heard in 395. See Todd 2000 (introduction to the speech).

<sup>60</sup> Lys. 14.16-17, 24-30, 32-42.

<sup>61</sup> For the *ponēria* and the absence of *dunamis* of the son and the father, see Lys. 14.9, 17, 23, 26, 32, 35-38, 43-44.

<sup>62</sup> ὥστ' οὐ χαλεπὸν γινῶναι ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης δυνάμει μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων διέφερε, πονηρία δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν πρῶτος ἦν. 'So it is not difficult to recognize that Alcibiades' power was no greater than other people's, but he is foremost among the citizens in wickedness. '; translations of Lysias are by Todd (2000) unless otherwise stated.

his homeland by providing such strategic information of external policy as Alcibiades did, but not everyone was as wicked as him (Lys. 14.35-37). Any claim for power, positively and negatively employed, is denied so that the wickedness and viciousness of Alcibiades' family are stressed.

In this context, all manifestations of *philotimia* are cast as inappropriate. First, according to the speaker, Alcibiades the younger showed *philotimia* in relation with his transgressions, and the crimes he was proud of were so disgraceful that they cause shame even to his enemies: ὥστ' ἐπ' ἐνίοις ὧν οὗτος φιλοτιμεῖται <καὶ> τοὺς ἐχθροὺς αἰσχύνεσθαι (Lys. 14.2).<sup>63</sup> Second, father and son are so perverted that they prefer showing *philotimia* in pursuit of what is vicious rather than what is virtuous: οὕτω γὰρ διάκεινται, ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι (Lys. 14.42-43). Third, having elaborated on the idea that the source of Alcibiades the elder's crimes is not his power but his wickedness, the *philotimia* that the son is presented as showing in relation to them is cast not only as inappropriate but also as groundless: ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς πονηρίᾳ φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ λέγει ὡς οὕτως ἐκεῖνος μέγα ἐδύνατο, ὥστε τῇ πόλει πάντων <τῶν> κακῶν αἴτιος γεγένηται (Lys. 14.35);<sup>64</sup> but, as we saw, the speaker claims that Alcibiades the elder cannot even

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Lys. 25.34, for a similar statement illustrating the allegedly undemocratic behaviour of the speaker's opponents: αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσι λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' αἰσχύνονται μὴ δοκοῦντες εἶναι πονηροί, ὑμεῖς τε τὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄρατε τὰ δ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀκούετε.

<sup>64</sup> 'he prides himself on his father's criminal nature and asserts that his father was so powerful that he was the cause of all the evils which afflicted the city'.

demonstrate greatness in vice. The speaker's opponent and his family have a long record of damages inflicted upon the city which is allegedly demonstrative of *ponēria*, transgressive behaviour, and wrong *philotimia*, not of power.

We saw in Thucydides and Xenophon that *philotimia* could be associated with illegitimate demonstrations of power and excessive claims for distinction.<sup>65</sup> Alcibiades was perceived by Thucydides and Xenophon as a powerful individual who would demonstrate his *philotimia* in ways that were damaging for the city. Quite differently, the speaker of Lysias 14 casts Alcibiades the elder and the younger as bad *philotimoi* that lack in power. By doing so, the speaker exhorts the jurors not to be intimidated by an allegedly powerless defendant. In this way, the trial is presented as a perfect opportunity for the jurors to show how they deal with bad *philotimoi*. This line of argumentation also underscores the lack of reciprocity between the opponent and the city, thereby making the granting of any possible requests for *charis* on the part of the defendant totally inappropriate (Lys. 14.22, 40, 41).<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> See also Lys. 14.21 on the link between *philotimia* and *dunamis*, here wrongfully exploited by the generals who preside over the court: ἐὰν δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχόντων βοηθῶσιν αὐτῷ ἐπίδειξιν μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως ποιούμενοι, φιλοτιμούμενοι δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοὺς φανερῶς ἡμαρτηκότας σῶζειν δύνανται.

<sup>66</sup> See also Lys. 14.30: the dikasts and their successors ought to punish for all their crimes any member of Alcibiades' family they may take hold of; not only returns of *charis* but also returns of harm are hereditary; in Lysias 15.10, also delivered in the same trial against Alcibiades, the speaker warns the jurors that, if Alcibiades gets acquitted, he will not return the *charis* to the city.

Lysias 26 is a speech delivered in front of the Council in the *dokimasia* of Euandrus in the late 380s.<sup>67</sup> The speaker claims that Euandrus' selection as archon should not be validated because Euandrus had been a supporter of the oligarchic revolution of 404/403. The prosecutor anticipates that Euandrus was going to mention in his defence that his family had spent a lot of money for the city, had performed liturgies in an honourable manner (φιλοτίμως) and had won many victories in choregic competitions under the democracy (Lys. 26.3). The speaker exhorts the jurors not to see such expenditures as tokens of Euandrus' democratic spirit. In fact, as he claims, Euandrus was able to subvert the democracy because he gained the trust of the people through his father's lavish liturgies (Lys. 26.4).<sup>68</sup> The fact that the prosecutor chooses to attack the opponent's honourable public spending shows that such arguments would have carried some rhetorical weight with the audience. Spending for the city out of *philotimia* could increase one's trustworthiness and Euandrus' anticipated argument is in fact very similar to the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* that is systematized from the 360s onwards. At the same time, the way the speaker refutes the value of such claims demonstrates that in oligarchic contexts even honourable expressions of *philotimia* could be presented as dangerous for the city and could be turned against the *philotimos*. *Against Euandrus* demonstrates that, even twenty years after the

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<sup>67</sup> See Todd (2000) 272-273.

<sup>68</sup> See Wolpert (2002) 116, 131.

restoration of democracy, *philotimia* could still be associated with the grim memories of the time of the Thirty.

Lysias 14 and 26 contain half of the instances of *philotim*- cognates attested in the extant speeches of Lysias. Both speeches show that it is not *philotimia* as a notion in general that is perceived as essentially negative during these years, but the way specific individuals manifest it. In particular, attacking an opponent on the basis that he is ashamed at what is good and *philotimos* in what is bad (Lys. 14.42-43) means that being *philotimos* in what is good and ashamed at what is bad would have been considered a commendable state of mind and course of action. By the same token, in Lys. 26.3-4, performing liturgies out of *philotimia* is not presented as an improper course of action *per se*. But, in the light of the oligarchies, wrong motives could be retrospectively assigned to a citizen's conduct that demonstrated his potential to distinguish himself in honour and power. Thus, the rhetoric of *philotimia* in these speeches perhaps reflects a greater need in the years after the oligarchic revolutions to warn the audience against manifestations of wrong *philotimia*. In the same vein, it may also indicate that in this period casting the opponent as a bad or dangerous *philotimos* was a more powerful argument than presenting oneself as a good *philotimos*.

**Turning the dikasts' minds away from *philotimia***

Lysias 14 and 26 are both prosecution speeches and therefore primarily occupied with denigrating the opponents. In this vein, the speakers draw attention to wrong *philotimia* and alert the audience to the potentially dangerous influence of *philotimia*. How would an Athenian build his self-image when arguing against accusations of political crimes during the oligarchies?<sup>69</sup> In many speeches of the Lysianic corpus, litigants had to refer to their behaviour during oligarchy.<sup>70</sup> Lateiner (1982) 147-154 has identified five main arguments against such accusations in Lysias' defence speeches: (a) loyalty to the democracy,<sup>71</sup> (b) no involvement in the oligarchy, (c) appeals to the amnesty, (d) the prosecutors are sycophants, (e) the defendants' moderation (*sophrosyne*).

In this section, I examine whether some defendants found that it was a beneficial line of argumentation to turn the audience's attention away from their *philotimia*. To that extent, I will discuss the rhetoric of reciprocity with the *demos* employed in [Lysias] 20. As we will see, the speaker does not rely on *philotimia* to demonstrate Polystratos' democratic credentials,<sup>72</sup> but on *prothymia* and *eunoia* towards the people. Such qualities, on the one hand, do not bring to the forefront matters of pursuance of individual ambition during

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<sup>69</sup> On prosecution speeches (mainly by Lysias, but also Demosthenes and Isocrates) attributing to the defendants 'partial' or 'sole individual responsibility' for the actions of the Thirty or for supporting their regime, see Volonaki (2004).

<sup>70</sup> See Munn (2000) 279-280, 294-296.

<sup>71</sup> On the rhetoric of 'loyalty to the demos' in oligarchic contexts, see also Wolpert (2002) 100-118.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Lys. 26, discussed in pp. 133-135, where the speaker anticipates that Euandrus was going to employ such a line of defence based on lavish expenditures that show *philotimia*.

politically turbulent times and, on the other hand, allow the speaker to build a bond of mutual interest with the *demos* even in oligarchic contexts.

[Lys.] 20 is a defence speech on behalf of Polystratos, an Athenian who was implicated in the coup of 411. The speech is a considerably early one, delivered soon after the fall of the Four Hundred and the restoration of the democracy, probably in 410 or 409.<sup>73</sup> We are unaware of the specific charge, but, as the rhetoric of the speech shows, it should have been related to Polystratos' participation in the oligarchic regime.<sup>74</sup> The speaker is in a very difficult position, as he needs to argue plausibly against undeniable facts, such as the participation of Polystratos in the Council, i.e. his membership in the Four Hundred. Thus, the speech is very much focused on demonstrating Polystratos' and his sons' *prothymia*<sup>75</sup> towards the people and their eagerness to serve the city, roughly their alleged loyalty to the democracy.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> On the oligarchic episode of 411/410, see Thuc. 8.63-72, 89-98; *Ath. Pol.* 29-33; on [Lys.] 20 as a source of evidence for the oligarchic revolution of 411, see Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1981) 201-206; Heftner (1999).

<sup>74</sup> See Todd (2000), introduction to the speech. It has been argued that the speech is not a genuine product of Lysias, albeit a real speech; Wilamowitz has suggested that [Lys.] 20 is a combination of two speeches, because a different speaker, in all probability Polystratos' son, seems to be speaking from 11 onwards. See Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1981) 201.

<sup>75</sup> [Lys.] 20.19, 30 (twice), 31 (twice), 33 (twice), 34, 36.

<sup>76</sup> The speaker also refers in *eunoia* terms to Polystratos' loyalty towards the democracy/ the people during the oligarchy: [Lys.] 20.1, 2, 8, 9, 27; on *eunoia* and goodwill in the Attic orators, Sanders (2016).

Since the speaker cannot deny that Polystratos was a member of the Four Hundred, he endeavours to show that while in office Polystratos maintained a pro-democratic attitude, because he was *eunous* towards the democracy and did not have any private reasons to support the oligarchy ([Lys.] 20.1-4).<sup>77</sup>

The egalitarian and democratic credentials of Polystratos are demonstrated in various ways. The speaker claims that Polystratos never proposed anything against the *demos* while serving on the Council ([Lys.] 20.8, 10). The short duration of his service is stressed – he stayed in office only for eight days and then sailed to Eretria<sup>78</sup> – and his egalitarian attitude during this short term as one of the *katalogeis* is demonstrated with his alleged attempt to register nine thousand citizens instead of the five thousand according to the collective decision ([Lys.] 20.13-14, 16).<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Polystratos is carefully dissociated from Phrynichos, one of the leading extremists of the Four Hundred (11-12).<sup>80</sup> Polystratos is cast as a quiet old-type elite citizen,<sup>81</sup> who was educated in the city (ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐπαιδεύετο) and then withdrew in the countryside to take care of his land (ὁ μὲν ἐγεώργει), whereas

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<sup>77</sup> On the distinction between ‘bad oligarchs’ and good men who participated in the regime but were supporters of the people, see Shear (2011) 63; see also pp. 212-213 on Antiphon.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Lys. 24.25.

<sup>79</sup> On the body of the *katalogeis* see Todd (2000) 218; Munn (2000) 136-151.

<sup>80</sup> See Lys. 13.70-76 on Phrynichos’ assassination. On the preservation of the memory of Phrynichos and his assassination in democratic ideology, see Shear (2011) 26-29, 68-69.

<sup>81</sup> By ‘old-type elite’ I refer to the link between the upper strata and the possession of large properties of land, a link that is also associated with the idea of being an elite member by birth in contrast to the elite of wealth.

Phrynichos was an uncultivated man (ἐν ἀγρῷ πένης ὧν ἐποίμαινεν) who made his living by becoming a sycophant (ὁ δ' ἔλθων εἰς τὸ ἄστυ ἐσυκοφάντει). Furthermore, Polystratos is presented as an exemplary litigant in a previous trial which was also associated with the oligarchy of 411 ([Lys.] 20.11, 18, 21-22).<sup>82</sup> Finally, Polystratos is cast as *demotikos* in three different ways ([Lys.] 20.23): in military valour, in monetary contributions to the state, and in raising his children in such a way that they turned into worthy citizens.<sup>83</sup>

The remainder of the speech ([Lys.] 20. 30-36) is an extensive attempt of the speaker to convince the jurors that his father deserves their *charis*, that is, deserves to be saved, because all of them – the speaker himself, his brothers as well as their father – have demonstrated their *prothymia* towards the city.

Polystratos has been described as *prothymos* towards the people because he served as one of the Four Hundred for only eight days and in that time he attempted to enroll almost double as many citizens as the *katalogeis* were ordered to do, while at the same time avoiding making any proposals against the *demos*.<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, the short period of holding office and his allegedly egalitarian approach to it are in the first place hard to believe since it would have been very difficult to register nine thousand citizens in only eight days, and they do not

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<sup>82</sup> On the first trial of Polystratos, see Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1981) 202-203.

<sup>83</sup> Picking up on this last point, the speaker talks extensively ([Lys.] 20.24-29) about the military valour of himself and his brothers.

<sup>84</sup> For a variation of this claim, see Lys. 16.8: Mantitheus claims that, even if he had served in the cavalry, he should pass his *dokimasia* should he prove that no citizen suffered in his hands during the oligarchy of the Thirty.

invalidate the fact that he actively participated in the oligarchic governing body ([Lys.] 20.16). What is mostly interesting regarding this episode is the speaker's attempt to establish a surplus of *charis* due to the father's alleged egalitarianism. In fact, as the speaker says, no one could have been a better friend of the people (*demotikōteros*) than his father who took this initiative:

πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτο δημοτικώτερος, ἢ ὅστις ὑμῶν ψηφισαμένων πεντακισχιλίοις παραδοῦναι τὰ πράγματα καταλογεὺς ὡν ἑνακισχιλίους κατέλεξεν, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτῷ διάφορος εἴη τῶν δημοτῶν, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον γράφοι, εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ οἶόν τ' εἴη, χαρίζοιτο. ([Lys.] 20.13)

'How could anybody do more for the common people than the man who served as Registrar (*katalogeus*) after you had voted to hand over public affairs to five thousand people and who registered nine thousand. He did this to avoid quarreling with any of the deme members, but so that he could register anybody who wanted it, and could do it as a favor if there was a problem about any individual.'

The speaker aims at showing that such behaviour belongs to Polystratos' general *prothymia* and *eunoia* towards the Athenian *demos* and that his initiative is a good reason why the jurors should feel obliged to return *charis* to him, as if the extra four thousand citizens generated an interest of *charis* which is now due to Polystratos. Registration of more citizens is

presented as belonging to Polystratos' generosity towards the people (χαρίζοιτο) and therefore *charis* should be returned to him by the collective through the dikasts.<sup>85</sup>

It is noteworthy that financial contributions to the state are not highlighted at all except for the very brief reference to monetary contributions made to the city by Polystratos ([Lys.] 20.23). At the same time, the speaker stresses the idea that Polystratos kept his property visible and willingly made himself accountable to the city regarding his finances so that there could not have emerged any suspicion against him of dodging his financial obligations to the state. Polystratos' willing contribution of his wealth to the city ties well with his alleged egalitarianism and patriotism during the oligarchy. In this way, Polystratos is depicted as a good democratic elite member who always takes the side of the *demos*.<sup>86</sup> For all these reasons, which for the speaker prove loyalty towards the people (*prothymia* and *eunoia*), Polystratos and his sons are repeatedly presented as worthy of the jurors' *charis*.<sup>87</sup> Their *prothymia* is mostly based on benefactions that are other than monetary.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> That this alleged demonstration of democratic inclinations is based on thin grounds, see Lateiner (1982) 150; on the number of citizens enrolled by Polystratos, see van Wees (2001) 57; on the probable disagreement in 411 about the number of people that deserved to be enrolled as citizens, see Fisher (2011) 186.

<sup>86</sup> For a similar claim, see Lys. 25.14 discussed in pp. 147-148.

<sup>87</sup> In [Lys.] 20.30-36 alone, we may count at least six requests for a return from the dikasts: τοῦτόν τε σῶσαι καὶ ὑμᾶς (30), ἐξαιτούμενοι παρ' ὑμῶν τὴν ἀξίαν χάριν (31), κατ' ἀξίαν χαριζόμενοι (31), ἀξιοῦμεν εὐρίσκεσθαι χάριν (33), τοῦτοις χαρίσασθαι (34), τὸ σωθῆναι (36); note also the appeals to the dikasts' pity in 35-36; on pity in the courtroom, see Johnstone (1999) 110-114, 120-122; on *charis* and pity, see Roisman (2005) 155-156.

<sup>88</sup> For examples of the link between *prothymia* and liturgies employed to show zealous performance of public duty, see: Lys. 18.7; 21.23; Dem. 38.26; [Dem.] 47.48; [Dem.] 49.46;

Nevertheless, as we will see, *charis* is presented in measurable terms, as if due *charis* could be calculated according to the value of the benefactions and paid back accordingly.

In [Lys.] 20.30-36, the speaker sets the reciprocal contexts within which Polystratos' and his family's *prothymia* towards the people should be evaluated.<sup>89</sup> He begins with a general remark on reciprocity: both harm and benefaction should be reciprocated accordingly:

πῶς οὖν οὐ χρή χάριν παρ' ὑμῶν ἀπολαμβάνειν, εἰ τοιοῦτοί ἐσμεν; <ἦ> ὧν μὲν ὁ πατήρ  
διαβέβληται εἰς ὑμᾶς, δικαίως τούτων δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔνεκα ἀπολέσθαι, {δι'} ὧν δὲ πρόθυμοι  
εἰς τὴν πόλιν γεγενήμεθα, μηδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν γενέσθαι; ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ  
τὴν τούτου διαβολὴν δεῖ ἡμᾶς <τι> πάσχειν, δίκαιοί ἐσμεν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν  
προθυμίαν τοῦτόν τε σῶσαι καὶ ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡμεῖς χρημάτων γε ἔνεκα, ἵνα  
λάβοιμεν, εὔ ὑμᾶς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, εἴ ποτε κίνδυνος εἴη ἡμῖν, ἔξαιτούμενοι παρ'  
ὑμῶν τὴν ἀξίαν χάριν ἀπολάβοιμεν. ([Lys.] 20.30-31)

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[Dem.] 50.10; cf. Dem. 45. 66-67 on the opponent's lack of *prothymia* and *philotimia* regarding the execution of public duty. Note the sharp juxtaposition of these two commendable qualities to the opponent's pursuance of private profit-making (ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κερδαίνειν πᾶν ἂν οὗτος ποιήσειε); for a case of a non-Athenian benefactor showing *prothymia*, see Dem. 20.45: Demosthenes exhorts the dikasts to merit Epicerdes' *prothymia* in benefiting the city rather than the sum of money he offered. Epicerdes is also praised by Demosthenes for being *eunous* towards the people (εὐνούς ὧν ὑμῖν, Dem. 20.43). Demosthenes is referring to honours bestowed to Epicerdes in 405/404. According to the decree (IG I<sup>3</sup> 125) he is honoured for his *andragathia* and for his *eunoia* towards the Athenian people. On the language of approbation in this decree, see Whitehead (1993) 49, 52.

<sup>89</sup> See Sanders (2016) 174-175 on counting on one's *prothymia* towards the city to generate gratitude and arouse feelings of reciprocity from the dikasts towards the zealous individual.

‘Since this is the sort of people we are, it must surely be right for us to receive a reward from you. Is it right for us to be destroyed because of slanders you have heard against our father but to have no benefit for our loyalty towards the city? No, it is not right! If we must suffer anything because of the slanders against the defendant, we deserve to rescue both him and ourselves because of our loyalty. The reason we treated you well was not to receive money, but so that if we were ever in trouble, you would grant our request for acquittal as a fitting reward.’

If it were right for Polystratos to be punished if the slanderous accusations against him were true, it should also be right, the speaker says, for Polystratos to be rewarded if he and his family are proved to have been *prothymoi* towards the city. There is a just claim for a return of *charis*, the speaker argues, or, as it is emphatically phrased, his family deserves to be saved (δίκαιοί ἔσμεν ... σῶσαι) because of their loyalty. The calculative logic behind this request is blatantly revealed: they did not benefit the people to gain money in return, but to generate a surplus of *charis* which they could keep in stock and use in case of emergency.<sup>90</sup> Thus, in the trial at hand they request τὴν ἀξίαν χάριν, namely, due gratitude worthy of their benefactions and their loyalty to the people.

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<sup>90</sup> Other examples of the same *topos* are Lys. 16.17; 25.12-13; Lys. frag.L.64-76.

The speaker exhorts the dikasts to contemplate the interest of the collective along similar lines of calculation.<sup>91</sup> A fitting repayment of *charis* to his family will incentivize other citizens to benefit the city more eagerly: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους προθυμότερους ποιήσετε, κατ' ἀξίαν χαριζόμενοι, ὅσ' ἂν τις ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιῇ ([Lys.] 20.31-32). The dikasts are asked to give back as much *charis* as is fitting for the benefactions they receive so that they attract more generous contributions in the future. Thus, if the outcome of the present case goes the defendant's way, the jurors' *charis* will be well and safely invested on *prothymoi* citizens, as Polystratos' family will continue benefiting the city and other willing citizens will follow their example.<sup>92</sup> We can trace in this argument the origins of the 'hortatory intention clause' that we regularly find in forensic speeches and honorific decrees of the time of Demosthenes.<sup>93</sup> At the same time, there is an important difference in the rhetoric of the two periods: whereas from the mid-fourth century onwards the dikasts and the city are exhorted to return *charis* in order to inspire *philotimia*, in Polystratos' case the dikasts are exhorted to reciprocate in order to inspire *prothymia*.

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<sup>91</sup> See Christ (2012) 74-75 on reciprocity and mutual helping between the individual and the city in [Lys.] 20.

<sup>92</sup> See [Lys.] 20.32: τίς γὰρ ἔτι ἐθελήσει χρηστὸς εἶναι, εἰ ἡττηθήσονται τῶν κακῶς ὑμᾶς ποιούντων οἱ εὖ ποιῶντες; [Lys.] 20.34: ἡμᾶς δ' ἴστε ὅτι πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα εἰς ὑμᾶς, καὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐδὲν ἡμαρτηκότα. ὥστε πολλῶ δικαιοτέροί ἐστε, ὧν πεπειρασθε, τούτοις χαρίσασθαι, ἢ οὐς οὐκ ἴστε ὅποιοί τινες ἔσονται; [Lys.] 20.35-36: ἀλλ' ὑμῶν δεόμεθα τρεῖς ὄντες ἐᾶσαι ἡμᾶς ἔτι προθυμότερους γενέσθαι; [Lys.] 20.36: καὶ μὴ ἡμᾶς βουλομένους εὖ ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν ὑμεῖς κωλύσητε.

<sup>93</sup> See the discussion in pp 108-113, 118-125.

My suggestion is that *philotimia* is absent from this speech because, as desire for *timē*, *philotimia* could be readily associated in the mind of the dikasts with Polystratos' office (*timē*, *archē*) and desire to hold office during the oligarchy. Such an association would have been proven counter-productive for the speaker's purpose to present Polystratos as a loyal democrat, not as an ambitious office-holder.

In such contexts, *prothymia* was a more suitable attribute. *Prothymia* denotes a positive disposition, in Polystratos' case his eagerness to serve the *demos* and his loyalty to the democracy.<sup>94</sup> The obligation of the city to reciprocate is indeed stressed, but the motives behind allegedly democratic behaviour that are chosen to be highlighted are egalitarianism and loyalty to the democratic constitution without the acknowledgement of a desire for honour and personal distinction that would have come with *philotimia*. The rhetoric of *prothymia* towards the people gave the speaker the advantage of presenting Polystratos' behaviour in positive light as far as this was possible given the oligarchic context of the case. Even when Polystratos' *prothymia*, as motive for public action, is discussed in calculative contexts that involve pursuance of personal interest, the objective is presented to be Polystratos' and his family's survival,<sup>95</sup> not the desire for any kind of honour, distinction or monetary profit. Reliance on *prothymia* enabled the speaker to dissociate public conduct from

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<sup>94</sup> On *prothymia* in Dem. 18, Balot (2009) 285 notes: '*Prothymia* consisted in a willingness to take initiative, to accept personal responsibility, and to stand up and pursue the city's welfare actively, in the right way, and for the right reasons'.

<sup>95</sup> [Lys.] 20.33.

personal ambition, while at the same time preserving the reciprocal bond between Polystratos and the democratic city, and the subsequent expectation of *charis*.

### **The origins of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* in forensic contexts**

In a few cases concerned with the oligarchic episodes, the speakers referred to their and their family's benefactions to the democratic city and contrasted their public-spiritedness to the maltreatment they received in the hands of the oligarchs. The objective was to show that their contributions were revealing of their loyalty to the democracy, that they had suffered in the hands of the oligarchs because of their democratic alignment, and that they should now be compensated for the injustice they had suffered under oligarchy.<sup>96</sup>

Lysias 25 is a defence speech probably delivered in a *dokimasia* heard after 401/400.<sup>97</sup> Most of the surviving speech is a response to accusations of having participated to the overthrow of the democracy in 404/403.<sup>98</sup> Right from the beginning of the surviving text the speaker crafts a bond of reciprocity between himself and the democratic city, and refutes any involvement in the atrocities of the Thirty (Lys. 25.4-6). Part of his argumentation relies

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<sup>96</sup> See e.g. Lys. 10.27-28; 12.20; 18.3-8; cf. Lys. 13.38; Lys. 26.3-5, discussed above pp. 133-135.

<sup>97</sup> See Todd (2000) 260; Murphy (1992) 546.

<sup>98</sup> Murphy (1992) interprets the speech as a collective defence of all the rich Athenians – neither extreme democrats nor extreme oligarchs – who stayed in the city during the time of the Thirty Tyrants.

on the idea that he deserves to pass his *dokimasia* on two grounds: first, because his public services and generosity to the people deserve to be recognized now that the democracy has been restored.<sup>99</sup> As he says, he did not receive any *charis* by the oligarchs for these services, because they chose to honour those who had done the most harm to the people, not those who had benefited them:

οὐ γὰρ τοὺς τῷ πλήθει ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἰτίους γεγενημένους χάριτος παρ' αὐτῶν ἤξιον τυγχάνειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πλεῖστα κακὰ ὑμᾶς εἰργασμένους εἰς τὰς τιμὰς καθίστασιν, ὡς ταύτην παρ' ἡμῶν πίστιν εἰληφότες (Lys. 25.13)

'The oligarchs did not think that those who had been responsible for benefiting the democracy should receive a reward at their hands. Instead, they honored those who had done you the most harm, as if they had taken this as a pledge of loyalty from us.'

Second, because he did not hold any office under the oligarchy. He could have held offices but he was unwilling to do so and for this reason, he says, he deserves to be honoured under

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<sup>99</sup> Lys. 25.12-13. The speaker mentions his liturgies, military valour, and *eisphorai* and then says: 'But the reason I spent more than was required by the city was to improve my reputation among you and to be able to defend myself better if I were to encounter any misfortune. Under the oligarchy, I was deprived of all this. '; see also Lys. 25.17; As Johnstone (1999) 95 notes, the speaker's liturgies are employed to enhance his democratic credentials against the charge that he had supported the oligarchy.

the democracy: καίτοι εἰ μὲν ἔξόν μοι ἄρχειν μὴ ἐβουλόμην, ὑφ' ὑμῶν νυνὶ τιμᾶσθαι δίκαιός εἰμι (Lys. 25.14).

The rationale behind this argument is the following: the speaker did not receive *charis* and did not hold offices under the oligarchy and therefore he should not be viewed as an undemocratic, self-interested *philotimos*. On the contrary, by anchoring his desire to pass his *dokimasia* and hold office under the restored democracy to his generosity and to the public services already performed for the people, he casts himself as a benefactor of the city and a loyal citizen.<sup>100</sup> Civic-oriented *philotimia* is not explicitly exploited here, but this argument shows the way forward.

If Lysias 25 only offers an indirect allusion, Lysias 21 directly articulates what later came to be regularly expressed as civic-oriented *philotimia*. As already noted,<sup>101</sup> this speech contains the earliest appearance of *philotimia* vocabulary in the Attic orators and, as we will see, of civic-oriented *philotimia* (φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς, Lys. 21.22). Lysias 21 is a defence speech probably on a charge of accepting bribes delivered shortly after 403/402.<sup>102</sup> The part of the speech that is transmitted to us includes important information about public expenditures in classical Athens as it contains one of the most detailed inventories of

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<sup>100</sup> Note how in Lys. 25.4 he takes care not to alienate the less wealthy members of his audience when he says that by asking to pass his *dokimasia* he asks for 'those rewards which not only benefactors (τοὺς εὖ πεπονηκότας) but also those who are not criminals (τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας) have a right to receive'.

<sup>101</sup> See p. 16 n. 41.

<sup>102</sup> See Todd (2000), 228.

liturgies performed by an individual. As we will see, the speaker calculates the actual amounts of money spent on specific public expenditures (mostly liturgies) on the basis of which he makes his claims for due *charis* owed to him by the city/*dikasts*. The rhetorical exploitation of his exceptional public record appears to be an appropriate response to the nature of the charge. To fight off the accusation of accepting bribes the defendant presents in front of the jurors a detailed account of his public financial activities in the last decade so as to consolidate his profile as a civic-oriented spender that would not have accepted money under the table.

In the first eleven paragraphs of the surviving text, the speaker discusses his patriotism, which is translated into public expenditures and military prowess.<sup>103</sup> Firstly, twenty-one different contributions are itemized, as the speaker says, in a non-exhaustive list of expenditures (Lys. 21.5) covering the period from 411/10 to 403/2 and including *chorēgiai* in various festivals, trierarchies,<sup>104</sup> *eisphorai*, a *gymnasiarchia*, an *architheōria*, an *arrhēphoria* and a victory in a trireme race.<sup>105</sup> The total amount spent rises to 10 talents and 3,600

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<sup>103</sup> See Roisman (2005) 58 on spending *prothymōs* and prioritizing public well-being instead of personal and family interest.

<sup>104</sup> I count his seven consecutive years of serving as a trierarch separately, as seven different liturgies. This is an impressive record considering the high cost of a trierarchy, on which see Gabrielsen (1994) 43-67; Osborne (2010) 114 with n. 24.

<sup>105</sup> According to the speech, the defendant's first public performance when he came of age was a tragic *chorēgia*; Wilson (2000) 174-175 has pointed out the importance in constructing a democratic civic identity of entering public life with a spectacular liturgy, especially a festival liturgy.

drachmas,<sup>106</sup> an extraordinarily high sum and certainly an uncommon one for a single individual, as Davies remarks.<sup>107</sup> Right after closing the detailed catalogue of his contributions, the defendant notes that he has spent much more, in fact three times more, than required by law: καὶ τούτων ὧν κατέλεξα, εἰ ἐβουλόμην κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λητουργεῖν, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀνήλωσα (Lys. 21.5-6). The defendant is anxious to demonstrate the significant surplus of money over and above his financial obligations that he has voluntarily spent on the city. In this manner, he builds his claim that he has created a personal surplus of *charis* on account of which he is entitled to a legitimate return of *charis* by the dikasts:<sup>108</sup>

καὶ οὕτως πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκῶς καὶ τσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ  
εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν, νυνὶ δέομαι οὐ δωρεὰν ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ἀντὶ τούτων παρ' ὑμῶν

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<sup>106</sup> See Davies (1971) no. D.7, pp. 592-593. Davies notes that the speaker refers only in passing to one of his *chorēgiai* which was performed in 404/3 indicating his anxiousness to conceal the fact that he was a publicly active citizen under the Thirty. Indeed, this is the only year for which the speaker does not give the name of the *archōn*, i.e. Pythodoros.

<sup>107</sup> Davies' (1971) 593 explanation for the speaker's extensive spending is that his father had been a supporter of the oligarchy of 411 and so the generous contributions of the speaker are part of his attempt to regain the trust of the people; see Schmitz (1995) 85, 91-93 on the political background.

<sup>108</sup> This is phrased in a straightforward way towards the end where the speaker returns in brief to his civic-oriented credentials that render a return from the dikasts legitimate. He emphasizes his prioritization of public over private interest demonstrated with his public expenditures and also refers to his military valour and sense of self-sacrifice, as a way of recapitulating his contributions to the state (Lys. 21.23-24), before making his final and more explicit request for *charis*: ἀνθ' ὧν ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν, καὶ ἀξιῶ (Lys. 21.25).

λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἑμαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος καὶ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι παρά τε  
ἔκοντος ἑμοῦ καὶ παρ' ἄκοντος λαμβάνειν. (Lys. 21.11)

‘Even though I have run so many risks on your behalf, and have accomplished so  
much for the city, I am not now asking, as others do, for a gift in return. Instead, I ask  
not to be deprived of my own property, because I regard it as a disgrace to you as well  
to take it from me, with or without my consent.’

The speaker claims that he is not requesting a *dōrea*, a reward for his benefactions, as other  
people usually do in similar situations, but only asks the dikasts to let him retain his property  
and not take it from him as a possible penalty.<sup>109</sup> By doing so, he conceals the fact that in his  
case not imposing the penalty of confiscation would probably be tantamount to acquittal and  
that acquittal could be seen as a counter-gift.<sup>110</sup> The defendant’s record of public  
contributions reinforces the claim that being deprived of his property would be an unfair  
response to his public-spiritedness.<sup>111</sup> In other words, on the basis of the unfairness of the

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<sup>109</sup> See Roisman (2005) 155-156 on the combination of *charis* requests with other kinds of  
arguments that allow the speaker to ask for a return without appearing to be challenging the  
power and freedom of the dikasts. ‘By pretending not to demand a reward, the speaker  
assumes the pose appropriate to the weaker party in a transaction’ (p. 156).

<sup>110</sup> The inescapable disruption of the defendant’s reciprocal relationship with the city should  
the dikasts decide to confiscate his property is discussed in Lys. 21.12-15 and is depicted as  
shameful on the part of the city in Lys. 21.25.

<sup>111</sup> I take it that confiscation of his property is the most probable penalty the speaker will  
suffer should he gets convicted. See Lys. 21.12: ἀλλὰ μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἑμαυτοῦ (Lys. 21.11),  
καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτόν μοι μέλει εἴ με δεῖ τὰ ὄντα ἀπολέσαι; Lys. 21.14: ἐὰν δ' ἐμὲ πένητα ποιήσητε;

probable penalty and of the disgrace that such a penalty will bring to the city (and to himself, as we will see), he makes a concealed request for *charis* and builds his case for acquittal.

After showing how just it would be for him to keep the rest of his property intact, the defendant notes that the possibility of material damage inflicted on him is not the worst thing that will happen to him, if he gets convicted. Thus, he introduces the immaterial stakes of his case by directing the discussion to *hybris* and public humiliation:<sup>112</sup>

καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτόν μοι μέλει εἶ με δεῖ τὰ ὄντα ἀπολέσαι· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην  
ὑβρισθῆναι, οὐδὲ παραστῆναι τοῖς διαδυομένοις τὰς λητουργίας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα  
εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα, ἐκείνους δὲ δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ὅτι ὑμῖν οὐδὲν  
προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν. (Lys. 21.12)

'It is not so much the prospect of losing my property that concerns me, but I would not be able to endure the insult (*hybris*). Nor could I put up with those who avoid their liturgies, if the money spent on you wins me no gratitude, and their decision to spend none of their resources on you is thus regarded as sensible.'

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Lys. 21.15: πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν προσήκει τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐμοὶ δίδοναι ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐμοὶ ἀμφισβητῆσαι; Lys. 21.16: πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ζητητῶν ἀπογραφῆναι τὰ ἐμὰ ἔχειν, ἢ ἐμὲ νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν ὡς τοῦ δημοσίου χρήματα ἔχοντα.

<sup>112</sup> See Millett (1991) 86 on the distinction between material and immaterial profit in Lys. 21: 'Although the speaker plainly expects to receive from the jury the *charis* due for his services, he firmly rebuts the anticipated allegation that he *profited* from his numerous liturgies (§18).'

The *hybris* he will suffer in the hands of the jurors will be intolerable, if his financial contributions to the state remain *acharista*, i.e. unrecognized by the city. The introduction of *hybris* at this point shows how honour and *charis* pertain both to the material and immaterial. The defendant has dutifully and voluntarily devoted a significant part of his property to the city. Should the jurors leave his contributions unrecognized, the defendant will not only lose part of his property, but his honour and his standing within the group will also be affected. As the speaker puts it, such a handling would constitute a *hubristic* treatment of the individual in the hands of the city. He would suffer a double damage: in money and in honour since he would be humiliated in front of his financially equal yet not civic-oriented peers, who would reassure themselves that neglecting one's civic obligations is in fact a wise decision, if those who fulfill them do not get rewarded.

As we have seen so far, an individual's benefactions to the city create a material (in property) as well as immaterial (in honour) deficit which should be repaid with a fair reward of *charis* by the city. As soon as the individual receives his due payment of gratitude from the city, not only is his standing vis-à-vis his peers reinstated but he also distinguishes himself as an individual who respects his relationship with the city and is rewarded for that.

The defendant's line of argumentation is based on the exploitation of a pair of democratic ideals, the good public spender and the city that offers rewards. Fundamental elements of these ideals are brought together, in four phrases symmetrically antithetical in Greek (Lys. 21.16-17), that are part of the defendant's idealized self-portrait: (a) private

moderation and public openhandedness,<sup>113</sup> (b) legitimate high self-esteem,<sup>114</sup> (c) which is based on fair self-assessment,<sup>115</sup> and, finally, (d) the ensuing expectation of mutual help between the worthy citizen and the city.<sup>116</sup> It is plausible to say that (b) well-grounded ‘thinking big’ (μέγα φρονῶ) and (d) the expectation for civic recognition both stem from the attitude that is later summed up as ‘spending my money *philotimoumenos* towards you’ (Lys. 21.22):

μαινοίμην γὰρ <ἄν>, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῶαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην.

‘I should be mad, gentlemen of the jury, if I spent my ancestral property out of *philotimia* towards you, but then accepted bribes from other people to damage the city.’<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> ὥστε ἰδίᾳ μὲν τῶν <χρημάτων> φείδομαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ λητουργῶν ἥδομαι

<sup>114</sup> καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς περιοῦσι μέγα φρονῶ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένοις. This statement may be taken as a civic-oriented manifestation of *megalopsychia*, in which the *megalopsychos* does care about bonds of reciprocity with his community; cf. Arist. NE.1124a17-1124b15. See pp. 54-55 on *mega phronein*, *philotimia*, and *megalopsychia*.

<sup>115</sup> ἡγούμενος τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς αἴτιος εἶναι, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἐτέρους μοι καταλιπεῖν

<sup>116</sup> καὶ διὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀδίκως συκοφαντεῖσθαι, δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σφύζεσθαι; see Christ (2010) and Christ (2012), on the democratic ideal of ‘mutual helping between citizen and city’ and the construction of the ‘courts as venues for helping’; quotations from Christ (2012) 47 and Christ (2010) 206 respectively.

<sup>117</sup> Todd (2000) adapted. Contrary to Todd, I take it that εἰς ὑμᾶς depends on φιλοτιμούμενος and not on ἀναλίσκοιμι.

It would have been completely unreasonable, the speaker argues, to spend his money out of *philotimia* towards the city and at the same time seek profit from non-civic sources to the detriment of the state.

Spending out of *philotimia* towards the city is dissociated from illegitimate pursuance of private interest, that is, from bribery. At the same time, the claim for *charis* that the speaker builds throughout the speech indicates that a return from the city may be expected as a reward to the good *philotimos*. By presenting himself as an ideal public spender, the defendant reminds the dikasts of the pending obligation to return him the *charis* he deserves and underlines the idea that since he is entitled to legitimate rewards from the state, it is less probable that he had sought illegitimate ones.<sup>118</sup>

Furthermore, a point of importance is *when philotimia* enters the discussion. In a speech so heavily based on liturgies and public services, the speaker claims that the most difficult liturgy is ‘to behave respectably and prudently at every moment, right to the end of your life, and not to be overcome by pleasure or inspired by gain, but to behave in such a way that no citizen either criticizes you or contemplates prosecuting you’ (Lys. 21.19). Fisher (2003) 193 is right to remark that ‘only when he has thus expanded the ideal of liturgy-performance for the community to include the adoption of a democratic and sober life style which resists alike physical pleasures and monetary greed does he acknowledge that he has

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<sup>118</sup> See Ober (1989a) 236-238 on bribery and *charis*; von Reden (2003) 93-99 on *dōra*, *dōrodokia*, and *dōreia*.

spent his ancestral wealth on the people out of *philotimia*, in order to argue that he would be mad then to throw away the credit he has thus accumulated by taking bribes (21.22)'.

We see here how much care is taken by a litigant addressing a panel of dikasts in the last years of the fifth century when he employs the rhetoric of *philotimia* to craft a democratic self-image. At the same time, this case allows us to trace the origins of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* as far back as the last years of the fifth century. First, we find the close connection of civic-oriented (i.e. εἰς ὑμᾶς) *philotimia* with the performance of public service, and indeed financial service, which encapsulates the cooperative aspect of egalitarian *philotimia* that appears regularly in the courtrooms in the time of Demosthenes. Second, when the speaker asks to get rewarded for his services so that he does not suffer *hybris* vis-à-vis the rich yet useless citizens, he shows that the competitive aspect of *philotimia* is also put to the service of the city since it is *from the city*, not *to the detriment of the city* that he seeks to be honoured. In this way, he reminds us of Demosthenes' self-portrait in *Against Meidias*,<sup>119</sup> not of Alcibiades' portrayal in Lysias 14 or in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.<sup>120</sup>

Before closing this section, a contemporary speech that belongs to Isocrates deserves to be discussed. Isocrates 18 was written for a *paragraphe* case probably of 402. The speaker argues that the charge brought against him by Callimachus should be dismissed as inadmissible because it violates the treaty that reconciled the oligarchs and the democrats

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<sup>119</sup> See Chapter 1 Section 2.

<sup>120</sup> See pp. 128-129, 132.

after 404/403, according to which it was not allowed to recall past wrongs.<sup>121</sup> The speech closes with a long section (Isoc. 18.58-68) on the speakers' public services and honours received in return that allegedly demonstrate his moral fibre and his trustworthiness.

This record of public services and rewards is important for two reasons. First, it shows that as early as 402 a speaker would not hesitate to describe his extra zeal in performing trierarchic service as a token of his *philotimia* towards the city (πρὸς τὴν πόλιν). After the defeat at Aegospotami in 405, the speaker claims that he and his brother continued serving the city in the following manner:

τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, προειπόντος Λυσάνδρου, εἴ τις εἰσάγει σῖτον ὡς ὑμᾶς, θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν, οὕτω φιλοτίμως εἶχομεν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τὸν σφέτερον αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν τολμώντων ἡμεῖς τὸν ὡς ἐκείνους εἰσπλέοντα λαμβάνοντες εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατήγομεν. (Isoc. 18.61)

'In the end, when Lysander promised the death penalty if anyone imported grain to you, we showed so much *philotimia* towards the city that while others did not dare import even their own grain, we seized the grain that was intended for the Spartans and brought it to Piraeus.'<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> See Mirhady & Too (2000) 96-97; Wolpert (2002) 144 shows that the speaker 'wanted to be protected by the amnesty without having to admit that he needed the amnesty'.

<sup>122</sup> Translation by Mirhady (2000) adapted.

Second, the speech may be an important literary source of evidence regarding the honorific habits of contemporary decrees passed for Athenian citizens. For their services, the speaker says, they were crowned by the city and proclaimed in front of the statues of the eponymous heroes ὡς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ὄντας (Isoc. 18.61).<sup>123</sup> A little later, the speaker repeats that for their deeds they were crowned δι' ἀνδραγαθίαν (Isoc. 18.65). This is a tentative suggestion, but if the speaker draws from the language of honorific decrees that was employed at his time, we may be able to trace possible differences between the language of self-praise employed in the courtroom and the language of honorific decrees of the time. In other words, the speaker chooses to stress their *philotimia* towards the city, whereas the city singles them out for their *andragathia*.<sup>124</sup>

Although the evidence is scant, we can trace the origins of the rhetoric of *philotimia* as a civic virtue in forensic speeches from the end of the fifth century. Both Lysias 21 and Isocrates 18 show that acting out of *philotimia* towards the city can mean acting in ways that benefit the city. In these contexts, the good *philotimos* is perceived as a citizen who demonstrates extra zeal in his performance of public service that deserves to be recognized

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<sup>123</sup> Except for the *timē* they received, the speaker notes that they also deserve *charis* from the dikasts as recognition for their services (Isoc. 18.62, 67).

<sup>124</sup> See Whitehead (1983) 69-70 on the wide range of services that *andragathia* can cover when given as 'the publicly-stated grounds for publicly-granted honours in classical Athens'; see also Whitehead (1993) 59-62 on *andragathia* as a democratic value in the late fifth century.

by the city with a return of honour and *charis*. At the same time, we saw how careful the speakers are when drawing attention to their *philotimia*. In Lysias 21, it is after the speaker has demonstrated a great record of public services that he draws attention to his commendable *philotimia*. In Isocrates 18, the speaker refers to his *philotimia* related to services for which he has already been honoured by the city, a fact that enables him to solidify the idea that the demonstration of *philotimia* should be perceived as publicly beneficial.

### **2.3. Manifestations of *philotimia* outside the democratic city, and their representation in Lysias and Demosthenes**

What happens when a prominent individual that comes from another city, and indeed a non-democratic city, is described as *philotimos*, or when an Athenian citizen demonstrates his *philotimia* in non-civic contexts outside Athens? Demosthenes' references to Philip's *philotimia* offer a good example of non-civic and non-democratic representation of *philotimia*, whereas in the evaluation of Conon's military achievements in *Against Leptines* we find *philotimia* manifested at two levels, inter-city and intra-city, with different connotations each time. As we will see, different kinds of reciprocal bonds and the disregard of reciprocity with the city colour accordingly the quality of the individual's manifested *philotimia*. The importance that the quality of a reciprocal bond has for the assessment of an individual's

demonstrated *philotimia* will be further illustrated in the case study of this section, Lys. 19, *On the property of Aristophanes*. Different kinds of public expenditures and *charis* relations are described taking place inside and outside Athens, with and without Athens. These are indicative of various ways of pursuing honour that shed light on different kinds of *philotimia*.

### **Non-democratic *philotimia*: the case of Philip II of Macedon**

In the deliberative speeches that deal with the Macedonian threat Demosthenes crafts the image of Philip as a tyrant who aims at conquering the Greek world and poses a huge threat to Athens that needs to be dealt with decisively and forcefully. Demosthenes' Philip is guided by his *pleonexia*<sup>125</sup> and along with that comes an insatiable desire to rise above all the rest in his pursuance of ambition and acquisition of glory. In the *Second Olynthiac*, we read that Philip is ready to undertake any kind of risky initiative that could contribute to his emergence as the most glorious king of Macedonia (Dem. *Ol.2.15*). His personal ambition, however, is not well-perceived by his subjects who suffer financial and personal distress due to his meddlesomeness (Dem. *Ol.2.16*). Philip's subjects do not have a share in the resulting *philotimia*,<sup>126</sup> the pursuance of which is thus presented as egotist and individualistic, resulting

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<sup>125</sup> E.g., Dem. *Phil.1.50*; *Phil.2.6-12*.

<sup>126</sup> Dem. *Ol.2.16*: τοῖς δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστιν, κοπτόμενοι δὲ ἀεὶ ταῖς στρατείαις ταύταις ταῖς ἄνω κάτω λυποῦνται καὶ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν.

in the alienation of the monarch from his community.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, whereas the democratic city seeks to ignite healthy emulation among the citizens and channel their *philotimia* in publicly beneficial objectives,<sup>128</sup> Philip is presented as doing the opposite, namely, eliminating worthy military men in his service that seem able to overshadow his prominence with their valour. This perverted course of action is, according to Demosthenes, a corollary of Philip's *philotimia*, which makes him want to be the only author of his kingdom's successes and the only one entitled to all possible ensuing glory.<sup>129</sup>

Demosthenes' representation of Philip is one of the very rare cases in the corpus of the Attic orators where *philotimia* vocabulary is actually employed when the vicious version of *philotimia* mentality is rhetorically exploited.<sup>130</sup> Demosthenes' Philip is an example of a *philotimos* individual outside the democratic polis who acts without any consideration for the egalitarian and reciprocal expectations of *philotimia* in its civic-oriented form, since Philip's only concern is to actualize his personal ambitions and secure his personal prominence even

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<sup>127</sup> Dem. *Ol.*2.15: μὴ γὰρ οἶεσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς Φίλιππόν τε χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δόξης ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐζήλωκεν, καὶ προήρηται πράττων καὶ κινδυνεύων, ἂν συμβῆ τι, παθεῖν.

<sup>128</sup> See especially the rhetoric of *Against Leptines* discussed in pp. 109-113.

<sup>129</sup> Dem. *Ol.*2.18: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις ἀνὴρ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷος ἔμπειρος πολέμου καὶ ἀγώνων, τούτους μὲν φιλοτιμία πάντας ἀπωθεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφη, βουλόμενον πάντα αὐτοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι τάργα (πρὸς γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀνυπέρβλητον εἶναι; similarly, Dem. 11.12; cf. Isoc. 5.106.

<sup>130</sup> For other examples, see p. 48 with nn. 126-127 and pp. 130-135; cf. Plutarch's treatment of *philotimia* in the *Lives* where *philotimia* is very often understood as a vicious moral quality of the individual threatening socio-political order. On *philotimia* in Plutarch, see pp. 13-14 with nn. 39-40.

if that may be accomplished to the detriment of his own state and his own subjects.<sup>131</sup> Philip's case brings to the fore an important distinction between unrestrained *philotimia* as an inner quality of the individual that can go wrong and be manifested in a vicious way,<sup>132</sup> and democratic *philotimia*, which, as an ideological construct, is closely checked by the city and associated with publicly beneficial activities. Whereas a monarch, such as Philip, can moderate the scope of his ambition according to limitations posed by his own abilities, desires and resources, in democratic Athens a citizen's *philotimia* needs to be further restrained by his obligations towards the state and the expectation that public interest should not be jeopardized for the sake of personal ambitions. Furthermore, we have seen that in the time of Demosthenes, both in forensic and epigraphical sources,<sup>133</sup> manifestations of civic-oriented *philotimia* are encouraged and in fact contribute to the city's prosperity. When we move outside democracy, we see that even virtuous expressions of *philotimia* can

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<sup>131</sup> Whereas Philip's *philotimia* is presented as causing distress within his kingdom, when Demosthenes wants to castigate the city's idleness and inactivity and exhort the people to take action against Philip, the way Philip conducts war and implements his ambitions is presented as an example that the city should emulate: see, e.g. Dem. *Ol.*2.3, 23; 11.17-22; on the rhetorical construction of Philip as tyrant, see Mader (2007) 346 with n.12; on the representation of Philip's ambition in Demosthenes' *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs*, see Usher (2007) 230-233.

<sup>132</sup> See also pp. 127-128 on undemocratic *philotimia* in Thucydides and Xenophon; note also that, unlike civic-oriented *philotimia*, the kind of *philotimia* that Philip is presented to demonstrate cannot be compatible with *metriotēs*. On *metriotēs* and democratic *philotimia*, see Chapter 1.

<sup>133</sup> See Section 1 of this Chapter.

be presented as unwelcome by the central authority because they are perceived as a threat to the monarch's prestige.

### **Inter-state and intra-state *philotimia*: the case of Conon**

What is the attitude of the democratic city when a citizen appears to have performed an achievement too big to be ascribed solely to one individual? Mainly for purposes of internal consumption, there was a need to preserve the collective self-image of the Athenians as the ultimate authors of great achievements. This posed specific limitations to the public celebration of a citizen's individual *philotimia*, especially when his success had been achieved at inter-state level and in activities not regulated by the city. Conon's military achievements and the honours he received in return discussed in *Against Leptines* (Dem. 20.67-74) offer a good example of the way in which an individual's success is retrospectively appropriated to comply with democracy's expectations.

As a general under the command of the Persian King, Conon succeeded in beating the Spartan fleet in the sea-battle of Cnidus in 394 and, following that, he sailed to many islands of the Aegean and liberated them from the Spartans' harmosts before reaching Athens to restore the city's Long Walls.<sup>134</sup> For his outstanding achievements, Conon received many

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<sup>134</sup> See Sealey (1993) 43; Asmonti (2015) 150-166.

honours both from Athens and from the allied states that he liberated. In Dem. 20.69, Demosthenes comments on the impact that the honorific inscription that accompanied one of Conon's golden crowns has on Conon and the city:

καὶ γὰρ τοι μόνῳ τῶν πάντων αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γέγραπται· “ἐπειδὴ Κόνων” φησὶν “ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους.” ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐκείνῳ μὲν φιλοτιμία πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ὑμῖν δὲ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας· ὅτου γὰρ ἂν τις παρ' ὑμῶν ἀγαθοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιος γένηται, τούτου τὴν δόξαν τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὄνομα καρποῦται.

‘For he was the only one for whom this epigram has been inscribed on the stele: ‘because Konon’, it says, ‘freed the Athenian allies’. This epigram demonstrates the *philotimia* of Konon towards you and of you towards all the Greeks. For when one of you causes something good to befall the other Greeks, our city’s reputation is enhanced by his glory.’<sup>135</sup>

According to Demosthenes, the commemoration of Conon’s liberation of the Athenian allies brings honour and fame to two different recipients and in two different levels: for Conon, it demonstrates *philotimia* at polis level, although Conon’s achievement took place outside the

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<sup>135</sup> Kremmydas (2012) adapted.

city and directly benefited states other than Athens; and for the city it shows *philotimia* at inter-polis level, although in fact the act was performed by Conon under the service of the Persian King.<sup>136</sup> Ideologically, this division between two different levels of *philotimia* delimits the field of individual recognition within civic contexts and reserves ‘international’ glory for the city. Conon’s field of *philotimia* is his city, whereas the city’s field of *philotimia* is the inter-state arena. This distinction between intra-city and inter-city fields of recognition for one and the same achievement enables the speaker to appropriate for purposes of internal consumption an individual’s extra-civic success and present it as belonging to the whole city.<sup>137</sup> In retrospect, the city is presented as the assessor of Conon’s valorous efforts, even though these efforts were extra-civic, while at the same time most of the glory ensuing from Conon’s activities is bestowed on the collective.

The fact that Conon’s name was singled out for praise conflicted with the Athenian habit according to which military victory was commemorated as collective achievement and no special applause was reserved for individual effort.<sup>138</sup> Probably this deviation from the

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<sup>136</sup> As noted, e.g., by Nouhaud (1982) 219, Demosthenes conceals the fact that the fleet Conon commanded against the Spartans was Persian.

<sup>137</sup> Conon is not stripped of the honour that he deserves, but he enjoys it at polis level. Ideologically, this is also a safe way to integrate the excelling individual within the democratic community; cf. Kurke (1991) 195-224 on the reintegration of the victorious athlete in his community. Kurke’s reading of Pindar is based on the reintegration of the *megaloprepēs* individual, but in Demosthenes’ rhetoric both Conon and Athens are distinguished for their *philotimia*.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Dem. 23.196-198. Anonymity reinforced egalitarianism and made military valour a virtue of the collective: see Thomas (1989) 213-215; Missiou (1992) 80; Roisman (2005) 122;

‘rule of anonymity’ evidenced in Conon’s example is relevant to the fact that the achievement commemorated was not performed by Athenian military forces and that the specific inscription probably accompanied a crown bestowed to Conon by a foreign city.<sup>139</sup>

In this context, Demosthenes’ rhetorical breakdown of *philotimia* into two distinct levels functions in a similar manner as the ‘rule of anonymity’: it enables Demosthenes to appropriate Conon’s extra-civic achievement and the ensuing inter-state *philotimia* according to the ideal of military success as collective achievement. At the same time, it appeals to the idea that the kind of individual *philotimia* that is approved by the city is *philotimia* that is demonstrated towards the community, thus reminding the audience of another ideal, that individual distinction is assessed and checked foremost by the city.

Demosthenes’ rhetorical exploitation of Conon’s case summarizes very aptly issues of power

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Loraux (1986) 41-42 on the ‘rule of anonymity’ in the funeral oration; Loraux (1986) 112-113 on Hyperides’ deviation from the ‘rule of anonymity’ when he singles out the general Leosthenes in his funeral oration.

<sup>139</sup> *Ateleia* and a bronze statue were bestowed from Athens: see Dem. 20.70; Isoc. 9.57 with Sealey (1993) 46; also golden crown(s) and honorary inscriptions(s) probably given from the allied states that Conon afterwards dedicated: see Dem. 20.69; 22.72-73; 24.179-181; Conon’s name also appears on an inventory from 368/367 for his dedication of a golden crown (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1425.284-285). Harris, D. (1995) 232 argues that the crown included in the inventory had been awarded to Conon by the *demos* after the sea-battle of Cnidus, but, as Scafuro (2009) 68 n. 49 notes, we cannot rule out the possibility that it may have been one of the crowns bestowed by the allies; Liddel (2007) 202 takes it that the crown mentioned by Demosthenes was bestowed to Conon by the allies and that the one mentioned in the inventory was also probably by the allies; cf. Scafuro (2009) 68 who argues that we cannot conclude whether Demosthenes’ and the inventory’s references concern the same crown; Asmonti (2015) 162 takes it that the inscription for Conon reading ‘freed the allies of Athens’ that was mentioned in Dem. 20.69 was ‘[t]he inscription of the statue’.

balance within the democratic polis and brings to the fore the significance of positive reciprocity in hierarchical negotiations between the city and its citizens.<sup>140</sup>

### **Differentiating one *philotimos* citizen from another: *On the property of Aristophanes* (Lysias 19)**

Lysias 19 is a defence speech for a case, probably an *apographē*,<sup>141</sup> that was tried in early 380s.<sup>142</sup> Aristophanes and his father Nicophemus were executed around 390 and their property was confiscated.<sup>143</sup> The accusation arose when the confiscated property of Aristophanes turned out to be much less than generally expected. On the suspicion that Aristophanes' marriage-relatives had snatched part of his possessions before the confiscation had taken place, the defendant's family was brought in court.<sup>144</sup> Initially, the charge was brought against the speaker's father, Aristophanes' father-in-law, who died before the trial. Therefore, his son, Aristophanes' brother-in-law, is called to defend the case.

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<sup>140</sup> See also Aeschines' interpretation of the city's laws about proclaiming and bestowing gold crowns to citizens: Aesch. 3.33-34, 42-43, 46-47. The ideas of prioritising reciprocal bonds between the city and the honorand over extra-civic ones, and of emphasizing relevant *charis* obligations lie at the heart of his elaborate argumentation.

<sup>141</sup> On the procedure, see Edwards (1999) 118 with relevant bibliography.

<sup>142</sup> On the date of the trial, see Tuplin (1983) 177 n. 45 with relevant bibliography. The speech is most probably of 388 or soon after that. See also Edwards (1999) 121 who places it in 387 or early 386.

<sup>143</sup> Tuplin (1983) 177 considers 390/389 as a '*terminus non ante*' regarding the date of their execution.

<sup>144</sup> See Todd (2000), introduction to the speech.

The nature of the accusation leads the speaker to follow a line of argumentation extensively based on spending and possessing money,<sup>145</sup> this time the money of his own father and of his brother-in-law, Aristophanes. The defendant aims at convincing the jurors about two points: firstly, that his father's character and way of living until his death testify against any claim of having salted away any of Aristophanes' confiscated property that belonged to the state. As we will see, the father is allegedly a citizen ready to perform his civic duties without seeking for public offices and profit in return for his public spending. Quite the opposite: he is cast as a person who cares for bringing honour to the city. Secondly, that Aristophanes, on the contrary, was an ambitious citizen who had played an active role in external politics and therefore a person who would have been happy to spend his money in profitable activities outside the city.<sup>146</sup> The speaker's focus on Aristophanes' ambition is part of his plan to establish the fact that Aristophanes' activities were money-consuming and therefore it was not unreasonable that the property he left behind did not generate a big sum of money on confiscation.

In Lys. 19.18, the speaker starts building on the idea that Aristophanes and the defendant's father were very different in character, and this was reflected on the way they chose to spend their money:

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<sup>145</sup> See Millett (1998a) 237-238 on the use of the 'public service theme' in Lys. 19.

<sup>146</sup> von Reden (2002) 57-58, 61-63 envisages Aristophanes as a *philotimos nouveaux riche* and the speaker's father as an *apragmon* old-school aristocrat, but as I will show, both are cast as *philotimoi* yet in different ways.

ἢ τε γὰρ ἡλικία πολὺ διάφορος, ἢ τε φύσις ἔτι πλέον· ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ οὐ μόνον τῶν ἰδίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐβούλετο ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι ἦν αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι.

‘Their age was very different, and their character even more so. It was in my father’s nature to mind his own business, whereas Aristophanes wanted to be involved in not only his own but public affairs also. Whatever money he had, he spent it in his desire for honour.’<sup>147</sup>

The speaker goes on to show how Aristophanes spent all his money “in his desire for honour”, namely, out of *philotimia*. This opens the door for a discussion of his role in external policies, his expenditures as well as the debts into which he was forced to run due to his costly ambition.<sup>148</sup>

As the speaker implies, Aristophanes served his external policies with his body. His ambitious activities included a risky journey to Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, to persuade him to withdraw his support to the Spartans in the Corinthian War and convince him to ally

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<sup>147</sup> Todd (2000) adapted; Carter (1986) 108-109 notes on Lys. 19.18 that “‘to mind one’s own business’ is clearly contrasted with the desire for *timē*”. Note however that in Lys. 19, honour and *charis* negotiations are not so one-dimensional as suggested by Carter here.

<sup>148</sup> In general, Aristophanes (and his father Nicophemus) supported the political activities of Conon, even after the latter’s death. On issues of Athenian foreign policy in the speech, see Tuplin (1983).

with Euagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, by marrying one of his daughters (Lys. 19.19-20). More importantly for the defendant's case, Aristophanes also served his policies with his pocket. When the embassy from Cyprus arrived in Athens asking for military and financial help for their war against the Persians, the Athenians decided to give them ten triremes.<sup>149</sup> The Cypriots were short of money, though, and it was Aristophanes who offered them most of what was required for their military preparation, and even borrowed money from friends and relatives towards that purpose (Lys. 19.21-22). As the speaker remarks, Aristophanes did not spare his resources, material and immaterial, but showed great eagerness in providing help to Euagoras (οὐδὲν ἐνέλιπε προθυμίας σπεύδων, Lys. 19.21).<sup>150</sup>

Then the speaker proceeds to establish the non-civic character of Aristophanes' spending,<sup>151</sup> as he reveals in Lys. 19.23 the private motivation involved in Aristophanes' ambitious political and financial activities outside Athens.

τίνα γὰρ οἴεσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, φιλότιμον μὲν ὄντα, ἐπιστολῶν δ' αὐτῷ ἠκουσῶν  
παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μηδενὸς ἀπορήσειν ἐκ Κύπρου, ἠρημένον δὲ πρεσβευτὴν καὶ

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<sup>149</sup> See Xen. *Hell.*4.8.24.

<sup>150</sup> On Euagoras, see Isocrates' *Euagoras* with the commentary of Αλεξίου (2005); on the Cypriot affairs, see Sealey (1993) 45-49; Euagoras was granted Athenian citizenship around 407 (Isoc. 9.54) as well as a bronze statue by Athens at around the same time as Conon in 394/393 (SEG 29.86; Isoc. 9.57; Paus. 1.3.2); see Domingo Gyax (2016) 192-196 on the honours bestowed to both Euagoras and Conon.

<sup>151</sup> Of course, to the extent that it is related to the external policies of Athens, the context of Aristophanes' expenditures is not entirely non-civic.

μέλλοντα πλεῖν ὡς Εὐαγόραν, ὑπολιπέσθαι ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἃ ἦν δυνατὸς πάντα παρασχόντα χαρίσασθαι ἐκείνῳ ὥστε καὶ κομίσασθαι μὴ ἐλάττω.

'Do you think that this man, gentlemen of the jury, who was *philotimos*, who had letters arriving from his father saying that he would have no financial problems in Cyprus, who had been elected envoy and was about to sail to join Euagoras, would have left behind any of his property? Do you not think he would have supplied everything he possibly could, to gratify Euagoras and procure a larger return?'<sup>152</sup>

There is a direct connection here between Aristophanes' *philotimia* and Euagoras' *charis* repayment, which does not leave much space to take Aristophanes' *philotimia* for honourable civic-oriented ambition in spending, even though (or, maybe, even more so since) he was acting in his capacity as *presbeutēs* to Euagoras.<sup>153</sup> In particular, Aristophanes is a non-civic *philotimos* in the sense that he risked his life and jeopardized his property in the prospect of

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<sup>152</sup> Todd (2000) adapted.

<sup>153</sup> See Millett (1991) 88 on the assumption that private gain while holding public office was probably damaging to the city; Davies (1981) 70 on general suspicion in the 390s towards people that had enriched themselves through the Corinthian war and from Persian sources. Davies sees in the rhetoric of Lys. 19 an attempt 'to divert popular prejudice' against the newly wealthy, but, as we see, the representation of Aristophanes and his attitude towards money is ambiguous rather than exculpatory.

earning a return from Euagoras,<sup>154</sup> not for the sake of the city's interest.<sup>155</sup> Thus, Aristophanes' *philotimia* demonstrated in the context of *charis* bonds unrelated to the city does not highlight civic-mindedness, but personal ambition manifested outside the city and pursuance of private interest.

Pursuing private interest while executing public business can put a citizen in trouble and, when such behaviour becomes public knowledge and is perceived as detrimental to the city, then serious repercussions may follow.<sup>156</sup> A good example of such a case, which stresses the dissociation of civic-oriented *philotimia* from private money-making and personal ambition, is found in Lysias 29. The background of this case is very similar to that of Lysias 19. It concerns again an *apographē* of confiscated property that did not generate much money,

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<sup>154</sup> As the speaker summarily says in Lys. 19.24, ῥᾶδιον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γινῶναι ὅτι τοιούτων καιρῶν συμπεσόντων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐφείσατο τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. 'So it is easy to tell from what has been said that when such opportunities occurred, he would not have spared any of his property', Todd (2000) adapted.

<sup>155</sup> In the same vein, Aristophanes' expenditures within Athens are also mentioned but not so as to highlight any *charis* bonds between Aristophanes and the city, but in order to back up the claim that he has used up most of his money and therefore has not left behind a big property. In Lys. 19.28-29, the defendant refers to specific liturgies of Aristophanes as well as to the value of his *phanera ousia*, i.e. of his house and land. In Lys. 19.42-44, he recapitulates all of Aristophanes' expenditures, those he did within Athens and those regarding his journey to Sicily and the Cypriot affairs, accompanied with exact amounts spent on each. If we leave out the value of his house and land, he seems to have spent around ten talents over a span of five years in liturgies and in supporting his external policies.

<sup>156</sup> For a similar case of Athenian citizens prioritizing non-civic reciprocal bonds outside the city and the high risk involved, see Dem. 23.129-134 on Iphicrates and Charidemus; on self-interestedness and politics, see Chapter 3 Section 3.

but this time we have the prosecution speech of the trial, or more precisely, the final part of the prosecution speech.

In Lysias 29, Philocrates is accused of illegally withholding Ergocles' confiscated property. Philocrates was a close friend and associate of Ergocles.<sup>157</sup> The latter had served as an Athenian general under the command of Thrasybulus of Steiria during the Corinthian War. In Xenophon's *Hellenica*,<sup>158</sup> we read that during his naval expedition to Northern Aegean and to the coast of Asia Minor, Thrasybulus and the troops he commanded raided and pillaged many regions, including some previous subject allies of Athens,<sup>159</sup> as they run short of money and Thrasybulus' military plans proved to be very costly. For this reason and because the expedition turned out to be disastrous for Athens in the long run,<sup>160</sup> Thrasybulus and his close associates were thought to have made money at the expense of the city.<sup>161</sup> Eventually, Ergocles was condemned to death and executed,<sup>162</sup> and his property was confiscated.

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<sup>157</sup> In Lys. 29.3 we read that Philocrates was Ergocles' *tamias*. As Todd (2000) ad loc. notes, '[i]t is not clear whether *tamias* (treasurer or steward) denotes the steward of Ergocles' own property, or the treasurer of public property controlled by Ergocles in his capacity as general'.

<sup>158</sup> Xen. *Hell.*4.8.25-34.

<sup>159</sup> Lys. 28.12, 17.

<sup>160</sup> See Todd (2000), introduction to Lys. 28 and 29.

<sup>161</sup> This accusation is repeatedly mentioned in *Against Ergocles*: Lys. 28.1-2, 4.

<sup>162</sup> See Lys. 28; 29.11-12.

What is interesting for our purposes is the way the speaker closes his speech with a crushing remark about Ergocles' motives for participating in Thrasybulus' expedition:

πάντες γὰρ ἐπίστασθε ὅτι Ἐργοκλῆς χρηματιούμενος ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμησόμενος ἐξέπλευσε, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἔχει τὰ χρήματα ἢ οὗτος. ἐὰν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν κομιεῖσθε. (Lys. 29.14)

'You all know that Ergocles sailed out not to win honor at your hands but to make money. Nobody else has that money, besides the defendant. If you are wise, you will take back what belongs to you.'

Ergocles is accused of having assumed military service not in order to benefit his city, but in order to become richer himself.<sup>163</sup> We see here that acting out of civic-minded *philotimia* (πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμησόμενος) when performing public duties, here military service, is presented as diametrically opposed to money-making (χρηματιούμενος). What makes a significant difference between χρηματιούμενος and φιλοτιμησόμενος is the phrase πρὸς ὑμᾶς which qualifies φιλοτιμησόμενος and places the expression of an individual's *philotimia* in the context of a reciprocal bond with the city. πρὸς ὑμᾶς draws a sharp distinction between

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<sup>163</sup> Cf. Dem. 21.167; 51.13-14.

acting ambitiously for and on behalf of the city, and pursuing personal gain in a primarily self-interested manner, just as Ergocles allegedly did.

In the case of Ergocles, then, the pursuance of private profit outside the city is diametrically opposed to acting out of *philotimia* towards the city. Ergocles' conduct is measured against civic-oriented *philotimia* and he is found to be totally unworthy. To return to Lysias 19, Aristophanes may not be straightforwardly attacked in such a manner, but he is cast as a self-interested *philotimos* since he expects to be rewarded by Euagoras, not by the city. Moreover, the point that Aristophanes is not motivated by public-spiritedness may be reinforced by the fact that his *philotimia* is left unqualified: in Lys. 19.19 he is described as ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι and in 19.23 as φιλότιμον μὲν ὄντα, without any 'towards the city' (εἰς τὴν πόλιν) or 'towards you' (πρὸς ὑμᾶς) qualification to show a bond of reciprocity with the community.

When the speaker talks about his father, a different approach to money spending is adopted. Regarding the performance of liturgies, the father is cast as a loyal citizen who willingly fulfilled his civic duties without sparing his money.<sup>164</sup> At the same time, the speaker attempts to convey the impression that his father is a man uninterested in chasing offices and ambitious rewards. He introduces this point in the most emphatic way by stating that

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<sup>164</sup> Lys. 19.9-10, 56-58, 61-61. The father has allegedly spent more money in the public interest than for himself and his family. This is a trait of the *metrios* and *philotimos* citizen. See p. 77 with n. 24, pp. 80-81; on 'personal loss' as 'proof of good citizenship and patriotism', see Roisman (2005) 58.

he is not going to enumerate his father's expenditures out of *philotimia*, namely, because he wished to show off and win glory in his father's name.<sup>165</sup> The speaker then proceeds to present his father as a beneficial public spender and a dutiful citizen who performs public service without seeking for profit: whereas there are people who use their resources in order to get some office and make profit out of it,<sup>166</sup> his father did not invest on public expenditures; he only executed his public duties willingly and openhandedly.<sup>167</sup> In this manner, the speaker dissociates his father from the specific kind of self-interested *philotimia* that he has already attributed to Aristophanes.

The father is cast as a citizen who kept up his reciprocal bonds with the city without putting at risk his property; his spending was civic-oriented and therefore safe.<sup>168</sup> Their property may have been reduced to just a small margin of what they used to have due to

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<sup>165</sup> Lys. 19.56: οὐ γὰρ φιλοτιμίας ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ τεκμήριον ποιούμενος ὅτι οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἄνευ ἀνάγκης τε πολλὰ ἀναλίσκειν καὶ μετὰ κινδύνου τοῦ μεγίστου ἐπιθυμῆσαι ἔχειν τι τῶν κοινῶν; cf. Lys. 21.22: μαινοίμην γὰρ <ἄν>, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῶαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην. See pp. 154-156.

<sup>166</sup> See Davies (1981) 96 who argues for a direct link between munificence and political influence especially in the fifth century, but also in later times, as shown in examples such as Lys. 19.56-57.

<sup>167</sup> Lys. 19.56-57: εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ προαναλίσκουσιν οὐ μόνον τούτου ἔνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα ἄρχειν ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀξιωθέντες διπλάσια κομίσωνται. ὁ τοίνυν ἐμὸς πατὴρ ἄρχειν μὲν οὐδεπώποτε ἐπεθύμησε, τὰς δὲ χορηγίας ἀπάσας κεχορήγηκε, τετρηράρχηκε δὲ ἐπτάκις, εἰσφοράς δὲ πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας εἰσενήνοχεν.

<sup>168</sup> The speaker recognizes the reciprocal bond that ties his family with the city in his acknowledgement that the dikasts should give him a benevolent hearing in Lys. 19.59: νῦν δὲ πρέπον ἐστὶ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαί μου.

their public spending, but nonetheless, if the jury grant him acquittal, little by little and following the paradigm of his father he will be able to increase it again and offer even more to the city.<sup>169</sup> On the other hand, Aristophanes' risky activities and the eventual elimination of his family's property through confiscation has proved harmful to the city as well. To put it differently, Aristophanes' and Nicophemus' *philotimia*, manifested in non-civic contexts outside the city, has put an end to their serving of the city, whereas the speaker's and his father's public spending within the city and for the city appears to have been a safe activity.

Having established a positive impression about the father's performance of liturgies, the defendant appears confident enough to close the speech with a reference to his father's ambitious and conspicuous undertakings outside the city.<sup>170</sup> As the speaker phrases it: 'In every instance that he wanted to spend money beyond what was necessary (ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων), clearly these were things from which the city also would gain honor (ὄθεν καὶ τῇ πόλει τιμὴ ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι)' (Lys. 19.63).<sup>171</sup> In this way, the speaker introduces his father's successful and splendid participation in Panhellenic horse-racing competitions, which are

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<sup>169</sup> Lys. 19.9-10, 61-62; similarly, Lys. 18.20-21; Dem. 36.58-59. This is not to say that performance of liturgies could not be seriously damaging to one's finances. On performance of public duties and indebtedness, see Millett (1991) 67-71; cf. Christ (2006) 143-204 on the 'limits of *philotimia*' and the Athenians' cautiousness when spending for the city.

<sup>170</sup> Earlier, to stress the element of voluntariness in the father's performance of liturgies, the speaker had said that he had spent ἄνευ ἀνάγκης (Lys. 19.56); here the conspicuousness of the father's ambitious undertakings is introduced with the phrase ὅσα γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων (Lys. 19.63).

<sup>171</sup> Todd (2000).

presented as reinforcing his bonds with the community, bringing back *timē* not only to himself but also to the whole community (ὥστε τὴν πόλιν κηρυχθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸν στεφανωθῆναι).<sup>172</sup>

The father's and Aristophanes' spending styles reveal two different kinds of *philotimia*. In the case of the father, his liturgical record brought tangible benefit to the city, whereas in conspicuous activities outside the city he invested in such objects ὅθεν καὶ τῇ πόλει τιμὴ ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι (Lys. 19.63).<sup>173</sup> This phrasing brings to the forefront the honouring of the city in an attempt to demonstrate public benefit in the father's pursuance of personal ambition through horse-racing activities. The father is not directly characterized as *philotimos*, though we may conjecture that he clearly is. In other words, we may say that the speaker's father is a moderate spender within the city and a *philotimos* spender outside

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<sup>172</sup> See Millett (1998a) 241-242 who notes that the speaker has difficulties presenting the father's horse-breeding and horse-racing as activities that bring honour to the city; Davies (1981) 99-105 on the decrease in the numbers of Athenians participating in horse-racing activities; on athletic prominence at Panhellenic level that brings glory to the city, see also Dem. 58.66 on the speaker's grandfather; cf. Lyc. 1.139 against the usefulness of conspicuous public expenditures, such as *hippotrophia* and *choregia*.

<sup>173</sup> This phrasing reminds us of the Thucydidean self-presentation of Alcibiades and his conspicuous expenditures mentioned during the Sicilian debate: καὶ οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἦδ' ἡ ἄνοια, ὃς ἂν τοῖς ἰδίοις τέλεσι μὴ ἑαυτὸν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆ (Thuc. 6.16.3). However, there is a significant difference between the two portrayals: whereas the speaker of Lysias 19 introduces his father's conspicuous expenditures only after he has shown that the father has performed many public services for the community voluntarily and without seeking for office and profit, Alcibiades presents his lavish expenditures and achievements as proofs that he deserves to stand above the rest of the community. See my discussion on Alcibiades in pp. 206-211.

the city in such a way that through his successful liturgies and his conspicuous undertakings the city is benefited as well as honoured along with him.<sup>174</sup>

Regarding Aristophanes' relationship with honour, the speaker states that εἴ τι ἦν αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι (Lys. 19.18). Contrary to the father's case, what is emphasized here is the self-interestedness of Aristophanes who spends his money in such a way as to gain honour and make profit for himself. Aristophanes' desire for personal honour made him take his money out of Athens and never look back. He established non-civic *charis* bonds with a third party, Euagoras, and demonstrated his *philotimia* self-interestedly in order to gain *timē* and *charis* primarily for himself and in non-civic contexts.<sup>175</sup> What he managed to do in the end was a total disaster for himself and his father and a double damage for the city, that is, in money as well as in honour.<sup>176</sup>

The fate of Aristophanes is an example of risky, non-civic pursuance of personal ambition going wrong and eventually damaging the individual pursuer, his family, and his

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<sup>174</sup> Note the balance between the father's services already done to the city (bringing *timē* and money) and the advantages that the city will enjoy in the future, if they acquit the defendant. Lys. 19.61: ὥστε οὐ μόνον πρὸς δόξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρημάτων λόγον λυσιτελεῖ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν ἀποψηφίσασθαι; on explicit promises of future public benefactions from litigants, if the jurors help them with the trial at hand, see Christ (2012) 75-76.

<sup>175</sup> On the priority that Aristophanes gives to private gain over prestige, see Herman (1987) 97.

<sup>176</sup> In money, because, as the speaker endeavours to show throughout the speech, confiscation of Aristophanes' property is actually disadvantageous for the city in the long run; in honour, because as it was shown, honouring his city did not seem to be the objective of his ambitious undertakings abroad.

community. The manner in which the speaker's father is presented to have spent his money, on the other hand, reveals the important role that the city holds for the Athenians as collective assessor and as a stabilizing force in processes concerning individual ambition, public money-spending and rewards of honour. It is only after the speaker has presented the father as a good and lavish liturgist who does not care about making profit out of office-holding that he draws attention to his *hippotrophiai* outside the city; and, even then, he makes sure to highlight that they bring honour to the city too.

The quality of a citizen's *philotimia* demonstrated outside the city changes depending on whether the reciprocal context of manifestation is civic and the related activity beneficial to the community. In this context, a decisively important parameter for the positive evaluation of an individual's *philotimia* is the recognition of the city as collective assessor and ultimate distributor of honours and rewards. Thus, we saw the contrasting approaches to *philotimia* and the different spending styles adopted by Aristophanes and the speaker's father in Lys. 19. Moreover, in the case of Conon, we saw a way of appropriating a citizen's glory earned outside Athens through civic appropriation of the individual's achievement as belonging to the collective. Finally, the case of Philip, an individual, or rather a central authority, that cares about personal gratification and glorification while disregarding the obligation to secure the well-being of his community is an example of a *philotimos* in its purely individualistic version that could not have been contained in democratic contexts.

This survey has demonstrated that in Athenian democratic thought *philotimia* is an ambivalent notion. The particular version of *philotimia* that is accepted and celebrated as a civic virtue is not presented to be a fluid personal trait, but abides by specific standards, values and ideals that render its manifestation beneficial to the wider community.

## Chapter 3

### The rhetoric of *philotimia* in discussions of politics: the Assembly, deliberative speeches, and political trials

#### Introduction

This chapter explores the ways in which the concept of *philotimia* appears in discussions of politics in the fifth and especially fourth centuries. It examines how the language of *philotimia* and especially *philotim*- cognates are employed or not employed as part of a speaker's self-presentation when he is addressing the Assembly and when he is discussing his contributions to policy making, either directly in the Assembly or when discussions of politics are transferred in the courtroom.<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this chapter, under the umbrella of political discussions I include: (a) representations of Assembly debates from Thucydides and Aristophanes and the way speakers represent their motives for participating actively in public debating and, more generally, how they represent the duties of citizen and

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<sup>1</sup> Several of the speeches discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, such as Dem. 20, 21, Lys. 19, 21 have strong political background, but they do not provide much information about debating in the Assembly, about (self-)assessing a citizen's participation in political debating, or (self-)evaluating one's political contributions especially under the democracy (except for [Lys.] 20 on which see pp. 136-146). Primary sources in this Chapter have been selected with such parameters in mind.

city in processes of policy-making; (b) the rhetoric of self-promotion and of winning the trust and favour in the Assembly as it is depicted in the surviving deliberative speeches of the Demosthenic corpus; and (c) accounts of past political events in selected political trials, in particular in the debates between Demosthenes and Aeschines, and the rhetorical means that Demosthenes employs to construct his political ethos and the ethos of the polis.

What is the place of *philotimia* in the discourse of such political discussions? Are political contributions of individual citizens presented as the outcome of one's *philotimia* towards the city just as public services, especially monetary contributions, frequently are in the courtrooms?<sup>2</sup> Is the etiquette of the Assembly different from that of the courtroom as far as self-representation and self-promotion are concerned?

In the Assembly,<sup>3</sup> democracy's stronghold of political equality, the discourse of policy-making was informed mainly by the idea of advancing the city's interests.<sup>4</sup> Every

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<sup>2</sup> For a list of examples, see pp. 30-31.

<sup>3</sup> On the Athenian Assembly, organization, powers, meetings and participation, mainly in the fourth century, see Hansen (1987); Hansen (1983a) and (1989b) are two collections of articles that discuss more specialized questions on the Athenian *ecclesia*.

<sup>4</sup> According to Aristotle (*Rhet.*1358a36-1359b18), deliberative oratory concerns the future as the speaker advises on future events. The aim of deliberative oratory is to demonstrate that a certain course of action is going to be expedient or harmful, but considerations of justice are also taken into account; cf. Carey (2000a) 196-202; see Kennedy (1959) on differences in arguments of justice and expediency in deliberative oratory of the fifth and fourth centuries; cf. Heath (1990) 385-400 who argues for continuity rather than significant change; Christ (2006) 21 sees expedience as the most significant parameter for decision-making in the Assembly; Badian (2000) 32 on Dem. 15 says that Demosthenes '[t]he moralist has turned into an unashamed *Realpolitiker*'; Hunt (2010) makes a persuasive case for the variety of reasons both moral (e.g. justice, honour, shame, reciprocity) and calculative (e.g. expedience, long-

citizen's vote had the same value and collective decision-making confirmed collective superiority in practice. In the Assembly meetings, every adult Athenian citizen had the right to address his peers on any of the matters that were in the agenda for discussion, but, at the same time, not many Athenians would exercise their rights to *parrhēsia* and *isēgoria*.<sup>5</sup> Debating and policy-making required collective effort, but only a few citizens had the courage, the ambition, and the power to take a more active role and address matters. Thus, the *bēma* was usually mounted by citizens who had a particular profile: they would be rich Athenians willing to spend (some of) their free time in engaging with politics and attending

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term advantage) that would affect a decision in the Athenian Assembly mostly during the age of Demosthenes. Hunt, however, seems in a couple of cases to undermine the seriousness of claims for honour by treating them as means of sugar-coating the promotion of long-term advantage thereby falling in the trap of unmasking theories: e.g. p. 213: 'These redundant arguments were often necessary...', p. 268: 'So too today, states act and statesmen talk as if honor were still alive and well'.

<sup>5</sup> On the number of *rhētores* in the *ecclesia*, see Hansen (1984b); on the tensions between speakers and audiences, see Ober (1989a) 112-118; on the relation between freedom of speech and 'same-mindedness' in Athenian democracy, see Ober (1989a) 295-299, quotation from p. 298; on the rhetoric and politics in fourth century Athens (prejudices, slander, tricks etc.), see Harding (1987); on the challenges of speaking in the Assembly and the lawcourt, see Roisman (2004) 264-268; on *thorubos* in the lawcourt, see Bers (1985) 1-15; on *thorubos* and the power of the people to silence speakers as an expression of democratic freedom, Wallace (2004) 223-227; on the issue of organized groups of supporters in the Assembly, see Hansen (1987) 69-86; Carter (2004) 197-219 sees *parrhēsia* not as a right, but as an attribute/privilege of the Athenian citizen that often needed to be curtailed; cf. Raaflaub (2004) 41-58 on the centrality of *parrhēsia* as a value that protected democracy's freedom and political equality.

the Assembly as well as with a good educational background in rhetoric and the art of persuasion that would give them the confidence to stand up and address the people.<sup>6</sup>

The Assembly was the public forum of democratic Athens where more than anywhere else collective political effort, political equality and public interest needed to be promoted. A speaker who, even for a short time, stood out of the *demos* to address the Assembly declared a kind of distinction that left him exposed to the public judgement and to *ad hominem* attacks from rival-speakers regarding the sincerity of his advising. In this situation, as we will see, a speaker who wanted to win the popular audience would usually deny or conceal personal ambition and any kind of personal considerations that may have motivated his active political participation and would highlight instead collective sovereignty and the citizen's duty to serve the well-being of the city. In this vein, activities that stressed the speaker's individual power and distinction were also silenced: there was not much space for the rhetoric of individual self-praise through the power of wealth and, thus, references to monetary contributions and fancy expenditures were absent from the rhetoric of the

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<sup>6</sup> On the type of persons that addressed the Assembly, regular *rhētores* and citizens that would only address the people occasionally, see Hansen (1991) 143-146; on *ho boulomenos*, see Hansen (1981) 359-365; on the political role of the *idiotēs*, especially in the sense of *ho boulomenos*, see Rubinstein (1998) and esp. 140-143 on the increased political power of the *rhētores* in comparison with magistrates (holding office) and *idiotai* (non-officials as well as non-expert speakers) as depicted in the language of fourth century Athenian oratory; see Carter (1986) 99-130 on the *apragmon* rich Athenian that minded his own business and on the *apragmon* rich Athenian that was politically active yet not over-ambitious.

Assembly, as far as our sources indicate.<sup>7</sup> Speakers would not usually exploit their liturgies and other financial contributions to win the Assembly's favour, as they would probably do in the courtroom.<sup>8</sup>

Along these lines, one cannot but notice that positive references to one's civic-oriented *philotimia* are also absent from political discussions in the Assembly. The idea that will emerge from this chapter is that *philotimia* does not seem to have found a place as a civic virtue in the rhetoric of the Assembly because the element of individualism in the sense of personal distinction that is inherent to the competitive aspect of *philotimia* needed to be underplayed. In a forum of decision-making where the city's interests were constantly at stake, a speaker that promoted himself as a *philotimos* speaker could be seen as caring a bit too much about his own ambitions and could run the risk of coming across as a citizen who used the Assembly as a means to acquire honour and distinction. This is not to deny the possibility and reality of acquiring honour and distinction *as a result of* active political participation. What seems to be inappropriate, however, is the public acknowledgement and promotion of personal ambition and desire for honour *as motives* for active political participation. In the Assembly, serving the interests of the collective was to be seen as an

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<sup>7</sup> With one big exception, that of Alcibiades' record of expenditures in Thucydides' Sicilian debate. See pp. 49-51.

<sup>8</sup> In this respect, several scholars seem to conflate the rhetoric of the courtroom with the rhetoric of the Assembly. See p. 57 with n. 147 and pp. 228-230; on the rhetoric of self-praise and avoidance of envy in forensic contexts, Spatharas (2011).

end in itself and a speaker who seemed to introduce personal considerations in his self-presentation could expose himself to suspicions about the quality of his advising.

The lawcourt was also a place of political discussions. Legal actions, such as *graphē paranomōn*, show how political activity in the Assembly, such as proposing a decree, could be transformed into a political trial, and consequently a public debate in the *ecclesia* could be transferred to a courtroom.<sup>9</sup> Some of the most brilliant pieces of Attic oratory that we have are part of this political game: for example, the *graphē paranomōn* trial initiated by Aeschines against Ctesiphon, when the latter proposed that Demosthenes should be crowned for his services to the city, triggered a hot debate between Aeschines and Demosthenes about a great part of Demosthenes' political career and consequently about Athens' policy-making against Macedonia in the years leading up to the battle of Chaeronea in 338 and beyond. Our evidence shows that the courtroom, like the *ecclesia*, was also dominated by usually high-profile speakers,<sup>10</sup> who were probably well educated, had the means to buy an effective

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<sup>9</sup> On *graphē paranomōn*, see Hansen (1974); on the 'legal plea' and the 'political pleas' in *graphē paranomōn* trials, see Yunis (1988) 361-382; moreover, the legal action of *eisangelia* specifically against the political leaders of the city (*stratēgoi* and *rhētores*) would lead to political trials; on *eisangelia*, see Hansen (1975); Hansen (1987) 99, 119; on political trials as a means for the politicians to control each other's power and activities, see Ober (1989a) 328.

<sup>10</sup> On the elite status of courtroom and Assembly speakers, see Ober (1989a) 112-118; unlike assembly speakers who addressed their fellows voluntarily, speaking in the courtroom was a different story. Many of the litigants, and especially the defendants, did not enter a trial voluntarily but were forced to address a panel of *dikastai* in order to defend themselves. See Hansen (1983b) 44.

speech from an expert *logographos*, or were able to write it themselves, and could also afford the risk of getting fined with a harsh (monetary) penalty.<sup>11</sup>

Popular ideology informed public speech both in the Assembly and the lawcourts,<sup>12</sup> but this does not mean that there were no differences between the rhetoric of a rich *idiotēs* and a political *rhētor*. Ober stresses the idea that a politician's distinction was much more overt than that of a rich *idiotēs*.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, in the case of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, for example, political expertise is one way to impress the audience and stand out without exactly breaching equality.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, what we do not find in such political trials is an associated rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* that would allow a speaker to explicitly exploit his political achievements and capitalize on political duties and political contributions in the same manner as monetary and military contributions were rhetorically exploited.<sup>15</sup> Just as

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<sup>11</sup> On the risks and harshness of penalties involved in procedures that required a volunteer prosecutor (*ho boulomenos*), see Christ (2012) 43 (with n. 104), 84; on wealthy citizens paying others to act as named prosecutors in public actions in order to avoid themselves the legal penalties in case of failure, see Rubinstein (2000) 201-204.

<sup>12</sup> On popular ideology and Athenian sources, see Dover (1974) 5-8.

<sup>13</sup> Ober (1989a) 306-311, 326. Ober, however, does not recognize the differences in the discourse of *philotimia*, monetary contributions and political contributions that I discuss in this chapter. By stressing the idea that a politician's distinction was much more overt than that of a rich *idiotēs*, Ober misses to some extent the point that by restricting the rhetoric of self-praise a politician's distinction was also circumscribed.

<sup>14</sup> See pp. 280-283.

<sup>15</sup> Monetary and military services are discussed throughout Chapters 1 and 2; as Carey (2005) 71 notes, liturgies, choregic monuments, and honorary inscriptions enhanced the 'visibility of public-spirited behaviour': 'All of this remains unfocused; it is a process of acquiring and retaining credibility with the demos, not a political platform in itself. But without it no amount of public speaking is likely to carry weight.' This type of symbolic capital is exploited

in other courtroom speeches, in the political trials of Demosthenes and Aeschines, it is mainly monetary contributions that are explicitly presented as demonstrations of a citizen's good *philotimia*. On top of that, as we will see below, the rhetorical means that a political *rhētor* would use in the Assembly were not the same as in a political trial and certain ideas and ideals, among them *philotimia* and *charis*, were defined, redefined and transvalued not only according to the status of the speaker in the courtroom (*rhētor* versus *idiotēs*), as Ober has observed,<sup>16</sup> but also depending on the place of public discourse (Assembly versus courtroom).<sup>17</sup>

The rhetoric of *philotimia* as a self-congratulatory civic virtue does not dominate discussions of politics and policy-making, although engagement with politics and political debates undoubtedly depended on one's ambition (and ability) to get involved in public affairs. Low (2005) has shown the danger of relying on 'lexical richness, or poverty' regarding the language of Athenian imperialism and the danger of taking the words of the Athenians at face value when we exact conclusions about *the fact* of Athenian imperialism.<sup>18</sup> In a similar manner, the presence or absence of *philotim*- cognates does not fully answer the question

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in political trials, particularly when Demosthenes rhetorically exploits the honourable use of his money to enhance by association his political ethos and trustworthiness. See my discussion in pp. 249-251.

<sup>16</sup> See n. 13 above.

<sup>17</sup> On the idea that the Assembly speeches in Thucydides frequently adopt the tactics of the law-courts, see Carey (1994) 33-34; Harris (2013b) on the Mytilenean debate.

<sup>18</sup> Low (2005) 93-95, quotation from p. 93; see pp. 46-47.

whether the speakers were or were not urged to speak in the Assembly out of ambition and for the sake of honour. The absence of vocabulary of *philotimia*, however, when a speaker refers to his political contributions helps us to understand the place that *philotimia* holds within democratic ideology. This absence may indicate a reluctance in democratic Athens to publicly recognize and celebrate *philotimia* as a motivational power for a citizen's active political participation. Speakers usually hesitated to refer to any *philotimia* undercurrent that urged them to participate in policy-making procedures.<sup>19</sup> It seems that different places and contexts where ambition was present called for different discourses of ambition. Self-congratulatory *philotimia* did not occupy the same place in all of them.

The Assembly was a place where numerous honorific decrees were passed replete with the language of honour, rewarding citizens or foreigners among other things for the *philotimia* they had demonstrated towards the people of Athens.<sup>20</sup> The inscribed language to which we have access probably reflects the language of decrees spoken and proposed by a small, educated elite group in the Assembly and/or the Council, but we should not forget that through these decrees it was the city that was speaking.<sup>21</sup> These decrees were not instances of individual self-praise and self-promotion, but manifestations of the collective's

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<sup>19</sup> See pp. 47-52.

<sup>20</sup> See pp. 20-22, 118-121, 123-126; *Against Leptines* (Dem. 20) discusses the significance of the Assembly's power to pass honours as rewards for the city's benefactors. See pp. 109-113.

<sup>21</sup> See p. 20 n. 52.

power, privilege and also probably need to recognize in the main space of collective decision-making, the Assembly, the commendable distinction of individuals.

Taking a different perspective, that of the individual speaker, this chapter will specifically look into the language of self-praise and self-promotion: how did individual citizens speak or were represented as speaking about themselves and the polis in the Assembly and in discussions of politics in the courtroom? I will open this chapter with a section on Assembly scenes and political debates from Thucydides and Aristophanes. Although chronologically remote from most of our surviving deliberative speeches and from the political trials that are going to be examined, they form useful sources of comparable evidence.

### 3.1. “I have (not) stood up to speak out of *philotimia*”

In the beginning of *Thesmophoriazusae*, an assembly of the women is held during the second day of the Thesmophoria, as we learn (Ar. *Thesm.*372-379). Conventions and habits of the Athenian assembly are employed, exploited and parodied in this comic representation of an assembly-meeting. When the gathered women are seated, Critylla, assuming the role of the herald, stands up and announces the agenda of the day’s meeting<sup>22</sup> followed up by the

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<sup>22</sup> What Critylla announces is part of the day’s agenda. She reads a particular *probouleuma*, a resolution of the *boule*, the institution that organized the agenda of the assembly-meetings.

customary question ‘Who wants to speak?’ (379), which opened the discussion in the Athenian *ecclesia*. The first subject of discussion, according to the *probouleuma* that Critylla read out, is to decide what penalty should be imposed to Euripides who has been found guilty of being an enemy of the women.<sup>23</sup> Mica is the first who mounts the *bēma* and, as she is about to speak, the chorus-leader takes the opportunity to make a joke about Mica clearing her throat just as the expert speakers (*hoi rhētores*) do before starting their long speeches (381-382). Then Mica starts addressing the assembly (383-388):

φιλοτιμία μὲν οὐδεμιᾶ μὰ τῷ θεῷ  
λέξουσ’ ἀνέστην, ὧ̃ γυναῖκες· ἀλλὰ γὰρ  
βαρέως φέρω τάλαινα πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον  
προπηλακίζομένας ὀρώσ’ ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ  
Εὐριπίδου τοῦ τῆς λαχανοπωλητρίας  
καὶ πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖ’ ἀκούσας κακά.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Euripides’ offence of doing injustice to all the women is parallel to the offence of acting against the interest of the people for which, according to Athenian law, the legal procedure of *eisangelia* was used. See n. 9 above.

<sup>24</sup> ‘It is not out of *philotimia*, by the Two Goddesses, ladies, that I have risen to speak. It is rather that I have for a long time now felt wretchedly aggrieved at seeing how you were being vilified by Euripides, that son of a greengrocer, and were having many evil things of all kinds said about you.’; text and translation (adapted) by Sommerstein (1994).

It is not out of *philotimia* that she rose to speak, she informs us, but because the occasion demands it and public interest, that is, in the present case the interest of all women. With this phrasing Mica is trying to dissolve any suspicions of the audience that, in addressing the people on a public matter, she is motivated by anything other than her willingness to contribute to the common well-being.

In this passage, *philotimia* is denounced as a kind of private motivation that would rather be left out of the picture, if Mica is to present herself in positive light in the arena of public debating. If we attempt to unpack this comic scene in order to understand what Aristophanes parodies here, we may conjecture that Mica speaks in that way for one of the following reasons: one possibility is that *philotimia* was widely regarded as a wrong kind of motivation when getting involved with politics,<sup>25</sup> and Athenian speakers indeed used to explicitly deny any involvement of *philotimia* when, in their assembly speeches, they were explaining why they had decided to take an active role in politics. Thus, Aristophanes here is having Mica introducing herself in such a manner for the sake of verisimilitude. Mica's explicit denial of *philotimia*, though, could mean a different thing too: precisely because *philotimia* was usually a factor in one's involvement in politics yet it was regarded as

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Xen. *Mem.*1.2.12-16: Critias and Alcibiades are cast as violent and hubristic individuals that brought many evils upon the city with their political activities under oligarchy and democracy respectively. Their eagerness 'to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety' (1.2.14) is blamed on their nature as excessively *philotimoi* (φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων); see pp. 127-129.

improper to recognize it in this context, any references to *philotimia*, even denying it, were silenced by the speakers. Thus, Aristophanes by having Mica referring to her *philotimia*, even by denying its presence, may want to expose the fact that *philotimia* was indeed an important factor in one's decision to participate in politics and perhaps promote specific policies, even though it was usually left unrecognized when an Athenian speaker was building his self-portrait in the Assembly.<sup>26</sup>

If we leave the setting of comedy and turn to evidence from deliberative and forensic speeches, we can find a few cases of explicit denial of improper motives by some speakers. In *On the Chersonese* (Dem. 8.71-72), Demosthenes assures the assembly that he has always been providing them with the best of advice without being corrupted by gain or *philotimia*; he has not preferred popularity of the moment and the gains that follow it, but he has always chosen the difficult path of offering to the people the best and not the easiest solutions.<sup>27</sup> In *On the property of Aristophanes* (Lys. 19), the speaker explains that he is going to mention the monetary benefactions of his father not out of *philotimia*, that is, because he wants to be admired/honoured in the name of his father's benefactions, but in order to provide proof of

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<sup>26</sup> The two explanations are not incompatible. Austin & Olson (2004) ad loc. claim that Mica's words resemble real practices of addressing the Assembly and add that *philotimia* 'is in this period generally presented as something destructive which is to be avoided'. See my discussion in Chapter 2 Section 2.

<sup>27</sup> Here Demosthenes appears to have some of the exceptional qualities of Aristotle's *megalopsychos*. See p. 55; on Demosthenes as a brave and sincere advisor, see pp. 233-237.

his father's incorruptibility and public-spiritedness (Lys. 19.56).<sup>28</sup> In the same vein, the speaker of *Against Boeotus I* (Dem. 39) begins his speech by declaring that he has not been involved in this dispute out of *polypragmosynē*, and then he goes on explaining the reasons that led him to initiate this legal dispute.

In a different manner, in *For Mantitheus* (Lys. 16), Mantitheus, a young elite Athenian, instead of denying his *philotimia* that led him to address the Assembly publicly, attempts to explain it in a way that would make its presence in political contexts acceptable. In order to do so, he pairs *philotimōs* with *kosmiōs*, a term that would describe praiseworthy behaviour in general, thereby casting *philotimōs* in positive light as well.<sup>29</sup> The *philotimōs kai kosmiōs politeuesthai* assessment of Mantitheus' actions here is mentioned in relation to his military achievements not to his participation in politics,<sup>30</sup> but this phrasing prepares the ground for the self-evaluation of Mantitheus as a public speaker that follows right afterwards. Having

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<sup>28</sup> See pp. 176-177.

<sup>29</sup> Craik (1999) 627 finds the combination of *kosmiōs* with *philotimōs* odd and 'daring', while Weissenberger (1987) 73 talks about 'two completely different concepts linked by an innocent "and" as if they are identical in meaning', but the rhetorical force of this phrase, I think, is in its combination: *kosmiōs* qualifies *philotimōs* positively and paves the way for a positive evaluation of Mantitheus' display of *philotimia* in the Assembly; in a similar manner, in Thuc. 3.82.8 *philotimia* is again evaluated by association, but this time in a negative way, when paired with *pleonexia*.

<sup>30</sup> In Lys. 16.13-18, Mantitheus first mentions instances of his military bravery and then says in 18: καίτοι χρή τοὺς φιλοτίμως καὶ κοσμίως πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴ τις κομᾷ, διὰ τοῦτο μισεῖν. *Contra* Hamaker's emendation of τολμᾷ to κομᾷ, see Craik (1999); on the portrait of Mantitheus as an oligarchically inclined Athenian, see Αλεξίου (2001).

his *philotimia* cast in positive light regarding his military achievements (Lys. 16.18), Mantitheus attempts a similar explanation for his active role in the Assembly. As he states (Lys. 16. 20-21), his need to explain his behaviour in the assembly-meetings derives from the fact that it was not well accepted by some or many of his fellow-citizens.<sup>31</sup> Mantitheus admits that he has been too *philotimos* (καὶ ἑμαυτῷ δοκῶ φιλοτιμότερον διατεθῆναι τοῦ δέοντος) in his involvement with politics at a very young age and this may have come across as quite a surprising piece of self-assessment. But right afterwards this excessiveness is justified in positive manner. Being too *philotimos* is translated into having extra zeal to act and speak for the sake of the city following family traditions and socio-political expectations: this is the kind of people that the city values as worthy citizens, Mantitheus says.<sup>32</sup>

Instead of silencing or denouncing the *philotimia* that he demonstrated in the Assembly, Mantitheus goes for the bolder move of presenting himself not as *philotimos* but as

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<sup>31</sup> Mantitheus claims that some people were unhappy with him addressing the Assembly while he was by convention too young for that, but, as Weissenberger (1987) 77 argues, it must have been Mantitheus' general attitude as a public speaker that annoyed them, not just his age; I suggest that by focusing on his youth and on external marks of his elite status, such as his hairstyle, Mantitheus endeavours to displace in the eyes of the *dikasts* the reason of the discontent of some of his fellow-citizens.

<sup>32</sup> Lys. 16.20-21: 'I did this partly because I realized that my ancestors never ceased from engaging in public affairs, and also because at the same time I realized that you yourselves (the truth needs to be told) thought that only people like this had any value. Who, therefore, on seeing that you take this attitude, would not be inspired to work and speak on behalf of the city?', Todd (2000); Rubinstein (1998) 135 n. 36 finds in the example of Mantitheus 'the most open admission of 'legitimate self-interest' as a motivation for active participation' and his explanation for his motivation as 'a remarkable excuse for his alleged overzealousness'.

too *philotimos*, a corollary, as he claims, of complying with family tradition and the expectations of the collective. Mantitheus may have been forced to mount the *bēma* because of personal reasons,<sup>33</sup> as he claims, but the extra zeal with which he talked and acted in public, this surplus of *philotimia* that he manifested, was for the sake of the city not for himself. Presenting himself as too much of a *philotimos* is a clever way to make space for the city in what seems to be an individualistic approach to politics. This is a far-fetched attempt to make his behaviour fit within the egalitarian context of rendering service to the city, an attempt to cast in a positive light a kind of behaviour that had probably annoyed many of his fellow-citizens. Even so, Mantitheus' example shows that, if there is a way to admit *philotimia* in politics, this is by showing that it transcends private considerations and is in line with public interest and collective expectations.

The Assembly as a place of competition, rivalry and ambition is depicted very well in Thucydides' representations of assembly scenes, such as the Mytilenaeen debate and the Sicilian debate.<sup>34</sup> In the Mytilenaeen debate, Thucydides provides us with two speeches, one by Cleon and one by Diodotus, on the matter of Mytilene's fate after attempting revolt against Athens. Cleon insists on the proposal that he had already made beforehand (Thuc. 3.36.6), to kill all the populace of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.37-40), whereas Diodotus' suggested

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<sup>33</sup> The private reasons remain unclear, but they are probably related to the 'disasters of the father' in Lys. 16.10; see Weissenberger (1987) 77; Todd's (2000) comment ad loc.

<sup>34</sup> Translations of Thucydides are from Loeb unless otherwise stated.

punishment, which eventually wins the day (Thuc. 3.49-50), is comparably moderate as he proposes death only for those who had been proven guilty of stirring up and carrying through the attempt to secede (Thuc. 3.44-48).

In the course of his speech, Diodotus makes some interesting remarks about debating in the Assembly. Unhealthy competition ruins discussions of politics with speakers trying to get rid of their opponents and win over the audience in ways that do not promote good counseling (εὐβουλία) but mere rivalry (Thuc. 3.42.1-4). Thus, there is a shift of focus from εὐβουλία, which should have been the purpose of assembly-meetings,<sup>35</sup> to a competition of persuasion that is detrimental to the city:<sup>36</sup> through character assassination that dominates and spoils these competitive debates fear is instilled and the city is deprived of its counsellors.

What is the role of the speakers and of the city, then, according to Diodotus, in restoring competitive but at the same time civic-oriented debate in the Assembly? Diodotus' explanation is based on the ideas of equality and of proper honour distribution (Thuc. 3.42.5-6). The former is related to the duty of the *agathos* citizen: Diodotus suggests that speakers should put themselves in an equal position to their rival-counsellors and compete with each

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<sup>35</sup> On *euboulia* and *to sumpheron*, see Adkins (1960) 222-223.

<sup>36</sup> Harris (2013b) esp. p. 104-105, 108 offers a detailed discussion of Diodotus' speech as a condemnation of Cleon's transferring of forensic tactics to the Assembly and of his attempt to turn Assembly deliberations into a trial; the point that Cleon's speech belongs to the forensic rather than the deliberative kind as well as that Diodotus in his speech condemns Cleon's forensic tactics is noted briefly by Macleod (1983b) 98-99; Macleod (1983c) 118.

other from the same starting point; and this starting point should be the shared objective of providing the assembled people with what each of them believes to be the best possible course of action for the city according to the demands of the occasion.<sup>37</sup> The latter, proper distribution of honours, is related to the duty of the *sophron* city: Diodotus promotes the idea of carefully regulated and moderate distribution of honours to its counsellors in such a way that it would not turn honour into the objective of competitive debating. In other words, the *sophron* city should aim at restraining individual ambition in the assembly by not allowing honour and acquisition of honour to become ends in themselves.

As Yunis (1996) 96 observes, this is not a realistic representation of democratic deliberation and Thucydides, having laid out an idealized conception of democratic debating once, does not return to it again.<sup>38</sup> The Assembly is a place of competition, where speakers strive against each other to win over the audience,<sup>39</sup> and clearing it from personal ambition and private interests does not seem feasible. At the same time, competing in the Assembly was not a rule-less contest and speakers needed to justify their excellent role in politics on

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<sup>37</sup> Thuc. 3.42.5: ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα. Hornblower (1991-2008) ad loc. translates it as 'but by showing in fair argument that his cause is better', but I think that we should also stress the point that ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου underlines the idea of democracy's political equality, namely, equal opportunity to participate in the political debate.

<sup>38</sup> Note the contrast between this ideal account and Diodotus' representation of deliberations at his time: advisors' contributions lack the heroics of speaking the truth or advising bravely without considering the cost to oneself, while the people are suspicious towards good advisors and unwilling to share the responsibility of unsuccessful decisions (Thuc. 3.43). See Macleod (1983b) 97-98.

<sup>39</sup> Yunis (1996) 95.

the basis of (political) equality, precisely because while addressing the people they were literally and metaphorically standing above the rest and this may not fit very well within the broader spectrum of egalitarianism. In this vein, we have already seen Mica denying her *philotimia* while addressing the assembly (pp. 192-193). Another comic heroine, Praxagora in the *Ecclesiazusae* (173-177), makes a similar statement at the beginning of her speech:

ἔμοι δ' ἴσον μὲν τῆσδε τῆς χώρας μέτα  
ὅσονπερ ὑμῖν· ἄχθομαι δὲ καὶ φέρω  
τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἅπαντα βαρέως πράγματα.  
ὄρῳ γὰρ αὐτὴν προστάταισι χρωμένην  
ἀεὶ πονηροῖς. κἄν τις ἡμέραν μίαν  
χρηστὸς γένηται, δέκα πονηρὸς γίγνεται.<sup>40</sup>

Having stood out in order to address the group, Praxagora has to assure everyone that she is doing so from an equal position as the rest and by exercising a right that is, if not in practice at least in theory, shared by the whole citizenry. Her momentary distinction out of the group

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<sup>40</sup> 'My own stake in this country is equal to your own, and I am annoyed and depressed at all the city's affairs. For I see that she constantly employs scoundrels as her leaders. Even if one of them turns virtuous for one day, he'll turn out wicked for ten.>'; text and translation by Henderson (Loeb).

is explained on the basis of serving the public interest and not on any idea of superiority vis-à-vis the rest.<sup>41</sup>

Our sources so far then, show that, even though the Athenian assembly is a place of rivalry and ambition, speakers are (depicted as being) very careful in underrepresenting their ambition and, even more their *philotimia*, as they build their self-portrait and explain their role in politics.<sup>42</sup> Whereas we have many instances of citizens in the courtroom taking pride in the benefactions and public services they have performed for the city out of *philotimia*,<sup>43</sup> this does not seem to be the rule when a speaker directly in the Assembly, or afterwards in political discussions at the courtroom, refers to active political participation. When advising the city, speakers should not be seen as doing it out of self-glorification and desire to get honoured, while specific political achievements that are believed to have

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<sup>41</sup> Cf. the case of Thucydides' Alcibiades in the Sicilian debate (pp. 206-210): although public benefit is mentioned, the stress is on his alleged superiority and, furthermore, his distinction is explained in terms of his alleged superiority; it is needless to remind ourselves that socio-economic inequalities pervaded Athenian society and a correlated sense of superiority and inferiority would have been felt by rich and poor citizens respectively, by educated and uneducated, experienced speakers and ordinary citizens and so on (and probably this is what adds to the comic tone of the scene). However, my purpose is not to provide a discussion of how realistically feelings were represented in Athenian public discourse, but a discussion of how socio-economic differences unavoidably informed public speech and were filtered through public speech so as to serve the purposes of democratic cohesion.

<sup>42</sup> The case of Mantitheus that we saw above deviates from this pattern but it does so in a way that also underlines the idea of subordinating private ambition to public interest.

<sup>43</sup> For a list of examples, see pp. 30-31.

enhanced one's political power are not usually presented in symbouleutic contexts as part of this kind of (self-)congratulatory rhetoric of *philotimia*.<sup>44</sup>

An exception that proves the rule is Thucydides' representation of the Sicilian debate with Alcibiades' trademark attitude of transgression.<sup>45</sup> This is a very rare case where a speaker, instead of presenting respect for democratic equality as a prerequisite for legitimate claims for further individual distinction,<sup>46</sup> argues that his individual distinction justifies his claims for inequality.<sup>47</sup> It is not strange that we do not find any similar self-portraits in the Attic orators.

The broader topic that concerns me here – firstly introduced in Nicias' speech that opens the debate but also pursued by Thucydides the narrator and Alcibiades right afterwards – is the relation between private and public spaces, the role of private considerations in political affairs,<sup>48</sup> and consequently the role of *philotimia* in politics. At the

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<sup>44</sup> When Demosthenes in *On the Crown* undoubtedly takes pride in his political career, his political contributions are either separated from other *philotimia* related activities (see pp. 257-259) or explicitly associated with *eunoia* rather than personal *philotimia* (see pp. 280-291).

<sup>45</sup> Here I am interested only in modes of self-presentation and characterization of excelling individuals in public speech and in deliberative contexts, not with a general evaluation of Alcibiades; see Wohl (1999) and Wohl (2002) 124-170 on Alcibiades' transgression in the political and sexual sphere. Wohl does not see Alcibiades merely as a transgressive figure but examines the dynamics between 'normativity' and *paranomia* in Alcibiades' sexual and political life.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Dem. 21.66-69 which stresses the importance of respecting equality. See pp. 91-96.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. the cases of Thucydides' Pericles and Antiphon's self-representation. See pp. 211-212.

<sup>48</sup> My analysis is compatible with Kallet's (2001) 31-42 discussion of this topic; see also Gribble (1999) 169-193 on individualism and public interest regarding Thucydides' Alcibiades; see Ober (1994b) 111-118 on the dangers of public debating and collective decision-making

beginning of his speech, Nicias makes a remark that highlights the controversial issue of pursuing personal honour in politics: if he cared primarily about gaining honour he would have supported the expedition to Sicily, but, as he says, he has never advised the city contrary to his best judgement ‘for the sake of being preferred in honour’ (διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι, Thuc. 6.9.2). Nicias’ phrasing supports the idea that considerations of excelling in honour in public affairs can be incompatible with public interest and should give way to one’s duty to provide the best possible advice for his city. Denying διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι could have been a clever way to anticipate any accusations of cowardice because of his opposition to the expedition, but at the same time, it can be read as a variation of the “I have not stood up out of *philotimia*” kind of introduction to oneself that we saw in the *Thesmophoriazusae*.

While Nicias recognizes the problem of reconciling private ambition with public interest in politics, he also makes the general remark that not every citizen who cares about his private interests automatically disregards the protection of the city, precisely because individual prosperity depends on the city’s well-being (Thuc. 6.9.2): ‘although I consider that he is quite as good a citizen who takes some forethought for his life and property; for such an one would, for his own sake, be most desirous that the affairs of the city should prosper.’<sup>49</sup>

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regarding the Sicilian expedition: the rhetoric of private and public interest employed by both Nicias and Alcibiades created a false impression of unity among the people that was destructive for the city.

<sup>49</sup> For the concessive use of νομίζων, which colours the content of the statement positively, see Dover’s (1965) comment ad loc.; followed by Rood (1998) 186 n. 12; see also Thuc. 2.60.2 on the promotion of private interest through collective prosperity; cf. Christ (2006) 30-32 on

The relation of private considerations, and especially of private ambition, to public interest becomes problematic when promotion of the former jeopardizes the latter. A characteristic example of this is that kind of private extravagance that is demonstrated by Alcibiades.

Before Thucydides' Alcibiades speaks, his behaviour is already cast in negative light by both Thucydides' Nicias and Thucydides the narrator. Nicias talks about Alcibiades' transgressive self-glorification through his *hippotrophiai* and his luxurious ways, and his exploitation of public service as elected commander of the Sicilian expedition.<sup>50</sup> A few paragraphs later, Thucydides the narrator comments on Alcibiades' irresponsible spending that 'he indulged desires beyond his actual means, in keeping horses as well as in his other expenses' (Thuc. 6.15.3), which, in combination with his overall transgressive behaviour,<sup>51</sup> made his fellow citizens mistrust his political initiatives (Thuc. 6.15.3-4).<sup>52</sup>

As Kallet notes, Nicias' criticism of Alcibiades' pursuance of personal gain and honour in politics is 'intended to foster unease in the reader about the role of private wealth in public

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Thucydides' depiction of the compatibility between 'individual self-interest and the interest of the city' (p. 31) as well as on the difficulty of maintaining this reciprocal bond.

<sup>50</sup> Thuc. 6.12.2.

<sup>51</sup> See [Andoc.] 4.10-36; Plut. *Alc.*16 on anecdotal details of Alcibiades' notoriousness.

<sup>52</sup> See Gribble (1999) 60, 70, 73, 190 on the idea that Alcibiades was seen as a tyrannical figure and thus untrustworthy as a political leader; according to Rood (2013) 138, Thucydides' Athenians mistook Alcibiades' 'tyrannical display at Olympia for tyrannical ambition within Attica' because of the memory of Cylon's tyrannical ambitions after his Olympic victory; see Rood (2013) 137 n. 57 for further bibliography on the similarities between Cylon and Alcibiades.

contexts'.<sup>53</sup> Alcibiades is not presented as the kind of citizen who, by taking care of his private interest, will also promote the well-being of the city;<sup>54</sup> on the contrary, he appears as the kind of ambitious individual who does not hesitate to exploit his political role and damage the city in order to undertake private initiatives that exceed his personal means. Alcibiades, as we will see, neither denies the fact that he is actively participating in politics out of *philotimia*, as we have seen some Assembly speakers doing, nor does he seriously try to present his expenditures as civic-oriented activities (see below). In the courtrooms,<sup>55</sup> speakers could even claim that they had harmed themselves and their families while zealously undertaking public benefactions, adding some air of self-sacrifice to their monetary contributions which were, in this way, a source of honour for them.<sup>56</sup> Alcibiades, by contrast, has extinguished his property and is also jeopardizing the city's safety by zealously pursuing expenditures that boost his ego and challenge democratic egalitarianism.<sup>57</sup> Alcibiades stands on the other end of the spectrum, the opposite to the civic-oriented *philotimos* spender.

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<sup>53</sup> Kallet (2001) 34.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Thuc. 6.9.2 discussed above.

<sup>55</sup> I compare here with courtroom speakers, because, as far as I know, there are no other examples of Assembly speakers relying on their expenditures in the surviving sources of democratic Athens. See pp. 49-51.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. Dem. 21.69; [Dem.] 47.54; 50.63-64; Dem. 20.82 exploits the same idea but for military achievements, not monetary.

<sup>57</sup> Thuc. 6.12.2, 6.16.4; Gribble (1999) 55, 59-61 argues that the Athenians were worried about Alcibiades' 'excessive and dangerous ambition which might lead to an attempt to dominate [the city]' and not that much about 'a lack of ideological commitment to the city' (quotations

If we turn to Alcibiades' self-presentation in the Sicilian debate, it is not difficult to realise why such kind of self-portraits are not preserved in the symbouleutic speeches and political trials of classical Athens.<sup>58</sup> At the beginning of his speech, Alcibiades attempts to justify his political distinction as commander of the Sicilian expedition by means of linking his extravagance with public interest. He asserts that he is worthy to command '[f]or those things for which I am notorious bring glory to my ancestors and myself, as well as advantage to my country. For the Hellenes, who had previously hoped that our state had been exhausted by war, conceived an idea of its greatness that even transcended its actual power by reason of the magnificence of my display as sacred deputy at Olympia... For by general custom such things do indeed mean honour, and from what is done men also infer power'<sup>59</sup> (Thuc. 6.16.1-2). By linking his extravagant activities with his own as well as the city's power, however, Alcibiades 'blurs individual and polis power'.<sup>60</sup> A closer look at the phrasing of the

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from p. 59-60); I am not convinced that we can dissociate the two when we are talking about a democratic city and a politically prominent individual that, guided as Alcibiades is by his excessive ambition, is ready to subordinate public interest to his personal plans. And, what is more important for the purposes of my argument, Alcibiades is presented as not refraining from admitting his personal ambitions in contexts of public deliberation.

<sup>58</sup> Here we should also consider that with the separation of the roles of the *rhētores* and the *strategoi* (see Davies (1981) 124-125 and Hansen (1991) 268-270), it was also almost impossible to have that kind of concentration of political and military power in the hands of the same person that could generate in the fourth century the creation of self-portraits even remotely similar to that of Alcibiades. An exception in the fourth century was Phocion who was an active *rhētor* as well as *strategos* (Plut. *Phoc.*7.5).

<sup>59</sup> Loeb adapted.

<sup>60</sup> Kallet (2001) 37; cf. Dem. 18.94: Demosthenes claims that whereas many politicians have been crowned by the city, he is the only one that has had the city crowned with his policies.

passage reveals that Alcibiades' manifestations of power benefited the city mostly on paper and not so much in reality: in the best case scenario, they created *an impression* of the city's power that actually transcended the city's means (καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάζε θεωρίας... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου καὶ δύναμις ἅμα ὑπονοεῖται, Thuc. 6.16.2).<sup>61</sup>

Instead of denying his political ambition, as we have already seen other speakers doing in discussions of politics, or silencing references to his personal ostentation, Alcibiades makes a far-fetched attempt to justify his ambition on the basis of the allegedly publicly beneficial character of his expenditures.<sup>62</sup> But Alcibiades' political ambition appears to be primarily self-serving and not civic-oriented, while one would not easily deny that his private extravagance 'does not equate to polis power'.<sup>63</sup> Even when referring to his liturgies, benefiting the city is presented as almost a side effect of his activities: 'And again, although whatever display I made in the city, by providing choruses or in any other way, naturally causes jealousy (φθονεῖται φύσει) among my townsmen, yet in the eyes of strangers this too

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<sup>61</sup> On 'power as illusion' in this passage, see Kallet (2001) 38-39; previously stated by Macleod (1983a) 73, 86: 'καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν (16.2) has already made it clear that the appearance of strength his successes gave was partly illusory' (quotation from p. 73); Gribble (1999) 62-69 parallels Alcibiades' elevated status and honour after his splendid participation in the Olympics of 416 with that of the athletic victors celebrated in victory odes, and stresses the idea that Alcibiades' extravagance posed a challenge to the city's power; see also [Andoc.] 4.31.

<sup>62</sup> See Yunis (1996) 105-106; Macleod (1983a) 71-76; see Gribble (1999) 68-69 on Alcibiades undermining the Athenian liturgy system.

<sup>63</sup> Kallet (2001) 39.

gives an impression of strength. And that is no useless folly, when a man by his private expenditures benefits not himself only but also his state', (Thuc. 6.16.3). Alcibiades is not trying to integrate himself in a group of equals, to the civic body, *in spite of* his personal ostentation, but, rather, *in the name of* his manifestations of personal power attempts to justify his political ambition and claim further distinction from the group:<sup>64</sup> 'Nor is it unfair, either, that one who has a high opinion of himself (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα) should refuse to be on an equality with others (μὴ ἴσον εἶναι),<sup>65</sup> since he who fares ill finds no one to be an equal participator (ἰσομοιρεῖ) in his evil plight.<sup>66</sup> On the contrary, just as in misfortune we receive no greetings, in like manner let a man submit even though despised by those who prosper (καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγούντων ὑπερφρονούμενος)' (Thuc. 6.16.4).<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Alcibiades' *hippotrophiai* as a means of acquiring political power were reminiscent of older aristocratic attitudes: Gribble (2012) 48-59 on possible explanations; Gribble (2012) 48-49 n. 18 on further references; Crane (1996) 123-126, 129 on Thucydides' Alcibiades as an 'isolated master of [the] rhetoric' of archaic elites (p. 126) that 'strikes an almost anachronistic pose' (p. 125).

<sup>65</sup> In this respect, Alcibiades reflects the attitude of the *megalopsychos* that could be perceived as undemocratic and inegalitarian. See Balot (2009) 276 with my discussion in pp. 55-56 n. 143.

<sup>66</sup> It is noteworthy that Alcibiades explains the impact of his individual superiority and justifies his claims to exceptional honour in the same manner that Pericles refers to Athens' power and to the impact of her authority in Pan-Hellenic level. Compare especially 2.64.4-6 (on Athens) to 6.16.3-5 (on Alcibiades) and note the shared language: the splendour (λαμπρότης; λαμπρύνομαι) of those you stand above the rest as well as the envy (φθονήσει; φθονήσεται) and distress that they attract (τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι; ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας) turn into eternal fame and glory for posterity (ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται; τῶν δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων... αὔχῃσιν).

<sup>67</sup> Macleod (1983a) 74 unmasks the logical jump in this syllogism between ἰσομοιρεῖ and μὴ ἴσον εἶναι as well as the fact that Alcibiades conflates success with pride.

In other words, it is as if Alcibiades is saying to the collective: “I am indeed worthy of my excelling role in politics and of my military office as commander of the Sicilian expedition not because I am a dedicated servant of the city and the city’s interest,<sup>68</sup> but because individually I am superior to the rest of you. My greatness is manifested publicly in my glorious and costly undertakings which demonstrate my personal power and also justify my political ambition. So, please come to terms with that and be grateful that my private ostentation appears – by the way – to be somehow beneficial to the city as well.” Alcibiades is assuring the audience in every possible way that he has indeed stood up out of personal *philotimia*.<sup>69</sup>

Furthermore, the reaction to Alcibiades that Thucydides attributes to the Athenians makes it clear that technical expertise is essential but not sufficient for dominating the political arena: καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν (6.15.4). In spite of his political abilities, Alcibiades is unable to speak in a language and act in a manner that would comply with the egalitarian values of democracy, or demonstrate

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<sup>68</sup> See Henderson (1993) 315 on ‘the democratic paradox of the public hero as servant’.

<sup>69</sup> And this is exactly what Thucydides says in 2.65.7 was wrong with political leaders after Pericles: they administered politics κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη. What makes Thucydides’ Alcibiades unique is that in his self-portrait these elements are highlighted rather than concealed; see Macleod (1983a) 72; Gribble (1999) 176-178; Gribble (1999) 57 sees in Alcibiades’ remark that he brings honour not only to himself and his ancestors, but also to his homeland (Thuc. 6.16.1) the tension between ‘personal *philotimia*’ and ‘civic *philotimia*’.

moral integrity and moderation that would enable him to win over the people in the long run.<sup>70</sup> It is the same awe that attracted the people to Alcibiades which eventually averted them from him.

In the Mytilenaeon debate, Diodotus sees the ideal Assembly as a place of competition and εὐβουλία: the responsibility of the city is to distribute fairly the honour that is due to the Assembly speakers in order to regulate and control ambition; the duty of the speakers is to provide their fellows with their best advice. The Sicilian debate offers us yet another instance of the Assembly as a space of competition, but here ambition and honour are viewed from the individual's perspective. From Nicias' mouth, as a form of self-praise, we get the view that hopes about excelling in honour should not cloud one's judgement and distract one from offering his best advice to the city. Alcibiades, on the other hand, right in the middle of the city's deliberative institution focuses on his ego, on his ambition, and on his personal honour disregarding completely not only the demands of democratic equality and moderation but also the prioritization of public over private considerations. But Alcibiades' public speaking is an exception.<sup>71</sup> There is no coincidence that he is the only individual

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<sup>70</sup> Thuc. 6.15.3-5; cf. 6.19.1-2.

<sup>71</sup> See Gribble (2012) 67 on the idea that the rhetoric of Isoc. 16 and of Alcibiades' speech in Thuc. 6.16 shares elements with the 'Euripides' epinician for Alcibiades: 'The recurrence of these 'encomiastic' tropes in civic presentations illustrates both the attraction of charismatic Panhellenic victory even to a democratic audience, and the arrogance, unrestrained by the normal restrictions of civic self-presentation, of Alcibiades' public speech.'; cf. Macleod's (1983a) 75 statement that 'if such arguments can be offered to the Athenian people in their assembly, that shows not only Alcibiades' audacity and παρανομία, but equally how

Athenian that Thucydides introduces through his forefathers (5.43.2) and further associates with his forefathers' honour (6.16.1-2, 89.2): As Crane phrases it, 'Alcibiades personally resembles the kings and tyrants whose family connections alone warrant mention'.<sup>72</sup>

Two more cases of individual distinction deserve our attention as they further reveal that Alcibiades' self-presentation does not seem to be the norm. Firstly, Thucydides' Pericles is indeed described as one of a kind, but it is in terms of his exceptional political virtue and his unique ability to serve public interest, not in terms of individual ambitious initiatives and splendiddness that he stands above the rest (Thuc. 2.65.4-10). Moreover, contrary to Alcibiades' case, we do not find Pericles describing himself as superior to the rest in honour and glory in direct deliberative contexts, but he is evaluated as superior in political ability by Thucydides the narrator. Furthermore, Pericles is said to have put the people under his influence *eleutherōs* (Thuc. 2.65.8) because of his political and moral worth,<sup>73</sup> whereas Alcibiades is presented as demanding in the middle of an Assembly-meeting to be recognized as superior to the rest and therefore as politically worthier.

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precarious the democracy and its ideals are'. In my view, Macleod's evaluation of democracy and its ideals is quite limited as it is based on a single indirect representation of deliberative contexts. There is no further evidence for self-representations similar to the one by Thucydides' Alcibiades and consequently not much evidence that in democratic Athens such kind of public speaking was tolerated or approved. See p. 50 n. 132.

<sup>72</sup> Crane (1996) 107-109, quotation from p. 108; see also Smith (2009).

<sup>73</sup> Thuc. 2.65.4-5, 8-10; cf. Thuc. 2.65.3 on the people fining Pericles heavily, a detail showing that not even Pericles was standing above the power of the collective.

The other case is Antiphon the orator. In his trial against the charges of having participated in the oligarchic coup of 411 he addresses the court in the following way:

Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγουσιν οἱ κατήγοροι ὡς συνέγραφόν τε δίκας ἄλλοις καὶ ὡς ἐκέρδαινον ἀπὸ τούτου· οὐκοῦν ἐν | μὲν τῇ ὀλι|γαρχίαι οὐκ ἂν | ἦν μοι [τ]οῦτο, ἐ|γ  
δ[ὲ] τῇ δη|μο]κρα[τίαι ἰ|δί]αι ὁ κρ[ατῶν | εἰμι ἐγώ, ἐκ [δὲ | τοῦ λέγειν ἐν | μὲν τῇ  
ὀλι|γαρχίαι οὐδε|νὸς ἕμ[ελλον | ἄξιος ἔσεσθα[ι, | ἐν δὲ τῇ δη|μοκρατίαι | πολλοῦ;<sup>74</sup>  
(frag. 1a).

The bold assertion about Antiphon's power under the democracy may look similar to Alcibiades' self-representation. However, Antiphon is not referring to political power but to his professional power and success as exceptional logographer and probably as advisor of politically active individuals.<sup>75</sup> The argument is that his power as logographer and advisor would have been lessened under the oligarchy because *parrhēsia* was curtailed, and the power of the lawcourts and the Assembly, the institutions where *parrhēsia* was mainly exercised, was restricted. With this argument, Antiphon is not asserting his superiority in political

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<sup>74</sup> 'My accusers say I used to compose speeches for others to deliver in court and that I profited from this. But under an oligarchy I would not be able to do this, whereas under a democracy I have long been the one with power because of my skill with words. I would be worthless in an oligarchy but very valuable in a democracy.', translation by Gagarin (1998).

<sup>75</sup> Gagarin (1998) 5, 91.

power or honour vis-à-vis the rest of the citizenry, but, being unable to conceal his professional success, attempts to convince the court that, even for reasons of private interest, democracy suited him better than oligarchy. Antiphon's self-representation does not provide much evidence for the idea that self-portraits that did not comply with the demands of democratic egalitarianism were widespread or carried much weight in the Athenian forums of political debating. The fact that he got convicted and executed points towards the same direction.

In the next sections, we will see that the "I have not stood up to speak out of *philotimia*" mentality, depicted in Aristophanes' comic Assembly scenes and also found in Thucydides, seems to be in the time of Demosthenes a well-respected convention of Assembly speaking and political speaking in general.

### **3.2. Representations of political competition and political participation in the age of Demosthenes**

In the time of Demosthenes, politics and the Assembly are also presented as arenas of rivalry and competition. Despite the fact that politics and discussions of politics are replete with honour and ambition, as we will see, neither in the time of Demosthenes does *philotimia* vocabulary occupy a dominant place in the rhetorical and ideological construction of models

of politics and political participation. *Philotimia* does not emerge as a civic virtue related to a speaker's political achievements when he is constructing his self-portrait and, when ideal representations of politics in general are described, *philotimia* does not emerge as a praiseworthy quality of politically active individuals. In the very few cases where *philotimia* vocabulary appears in the context of political discussions, it usually refers to a quality that the speaker would rather dissociate from an account of his political activity. It seems that in some competitive contexts, there was a stronger need to promote collective unity and (political) equality than recognizing individual contributions.<sup>76</sup> The fact that *philotimia* is not celebrated in democratic models of conducting politics<sup>77</sup> may indicate that in contexts of public debating and policy-making acting out of *philotimia* was perceived more as an individualistic motive than as an expression of civic virtuousness.

In fourth-century forensic oratory, ideal political competition can be placed in the distant past and the ancestors' ways form an example to be followed by the speaker's contemporaries.<sup>78</sup> The achronic Diodotean ideal that we found in Thucydides is sometimes

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<sup>76</sup> Cf. pp. 91-96 on the reconciliation of political equality with meritocracy in *choregic* competitions that are played fairly, as depicted in *Against Meidias*.

<sup>77</sup> Here I am referring to *philotimia* as a trait of the individual participant, not to the *philotimia* of the collective which was commendable in political contexts. See pp. 269-273 on collective *philotimia* in Dem. 18.

<sup>78</sup> On the theme of the ancestors as an example mainly in Demosthenes, see Hunt (2010) 123-133; on 'historical allusions' in the orators, see Pearson (1941); Nouhaud (1982); Perlman (1961) discusses the use of history by the orators for propaganda purposes; Milns (1995) discusses all the historical examples in Demosthenes symbolleutic speeches and in Dem. 18

identified with the time of the ancestors and their idealized way of conducting politics. Aeschines in *Against Ctesiphon* (Aesch. 3.177-190) provides an extensive discussion of the city's habits of bestowing crowns and rewards to distinguished public figures in which he juxtaposes the praiseworthy habits of the ancestors with the undesirable current situation. Aeschines' direct aim is to persuade the jury that Demosthenes is unworthy of a golden crown and that it is to the city's advantage not to bestow crowns and gifts easily and especially to individuals that do not deserve it.<sup>79</sup> In order to do so, he provides us with an idealized representation of the process of rewarding public persons, an account of fair assessment of political contributions as it allegedly used to be in the past.<sup>80</sup> For the construction of this image he relies on democratic ideals that secure the smooth operation of politics, especially the recognition of the collective as the ultimate agent of political achievement and the consequent need to subordinate to the group of equal citizens those

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and 19; see Worthington (1994) on the exploitation of history in the orators in relation with differences between the delivered speeches and the revised versions of the speeches.

<sup>79</sup> Aesch. 3.177: 'if you do not put a stop to these extravagant awards and the crowns you bestow with abandon, the men receiving the honors will not feel any gratitude, nor will the city's policies prosper', translation by Carey (2000b); needless to say that a certain degree of exaggeration should be expected in Aeschines' representation as his aim is to annul the decree that honours Demosthenes.

<sup>80</sup> In Dem. 19.102-104, Demosthenes notes that taking active part in politics is a voluntary activity of the individual that may earn him honour that would distinguish him from the many in this respect. All performances, though, are assessed by the people and according to the interest of the collective. A successful politician would rightly expect to get honoured and an unsuccessful one, depending on his motives, should be ready to face the consequences of his actions.

individuals that each time play important roles in politics. Thus, we get an image of the city in the past as more glorious and at the same time more sparing in her praise and distribution of honours and rewards despite the fact that purportedly there used to be much worthier men then than in the present (Aesch. 3.178-180).

As the Assembly in the previous section, here the courtroom becomes a place where politics are evaluated and, in particular, where Demosthenes' political contributions are going to be assessed by the dikasts. The competitive element of the process is very aptly given through a metaphor from the world of sports. Assessing a citizen's participation in politics and public affairs is compared to an athletic contest (Aesch. 3.179-180) and in this framework the dikasts who are going to decide whether Demosthenes will be crowned or not should think of themselves, Aeschines contends, as 'judges of political virtue' (ἀγωνοθέτας πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, 180).<sup>81</sup> Similar to Diodotus' exhortations (Thuc. 3.42.5-6) for regulated and moderate distribution of honours to the city's counsellors, Aeschines suggests that the fewer the honours that are distributed the more and the worthier the contenders for them

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<sup>81</sup> Also, in Aesch. 3.232 the dikasts, being compared to the judges of poetic competitions at the Dionysia, are called 'judges of the laws and of political virtue': αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐ κυκλίων χορῶν κριταὶ καθεστηκότες, ἀλλὰ νόμων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τὰς δωρεὰς οὐ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οὐδ' ὀλίγοις καὶ τοῖς ἀξίοις, ἀλλὰ τῷ διαπραξαμένῳ δώσετε; text of Aeschines is by Dilts (1997) unless otherwise stated.

(πολλοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς ἔξετε τῆς ἀρετῆς, Aesch. 3.180), precisely because the rarity of the reward makes it more difficult to win and thus more valuable and worth fighting for.<sup>82</sup>

In this framework, Aeschines sees the bestowal of a golden crown as an excessive act of honouring and cites the cases of excelling individuals of the past such as Themistocles, Miltiades, Aristeides and the democrats from Phyle, who cannot even be compared to Demosthenes, yet had never been rewarded with a golden crown by the city for their contributions (Aesch. 3.181-182).<sup>83</sup> Aeschines then cites the gifts that were offered to those people of the past: all these awards were of such quality that made each honourable activity the achievement of the collective. For instance, the forces that fought off the Medes at the river Strymon in 476/5 were awarded to set up three honorary stone Hermae in the Stoa of the Hermae but were not allowed to inscribe the names of the generals on them, so that the

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<sup>82</sup> On athletic metaphors, see Brock (2013) 157 with nn. 99-101; the same idealization of conducting politics and of public affairs as fair contests in the time of the ancestors is found in [Dem.] 25.97. The athletic metaphor is employed there as well: the just assessment of public performances of *rhētores* as well as of *idiōtes* in the past made everybody, the speaker says, ‘athletes of noble deeds’ (ἐξ ὧν πάντες ἀθληταὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐγένοντο). These metaphors may look aristocratic but at the same time are essentially non-Alcibiadic: the ancestors are described as honouring in a lawful manner (κατὰ τοὺς νόμους) individuals that were ἄξιοι (Aesch. 3.180), σώφρονες and χρηστοί ([Dem.] 25.97), whereas Thucydides’ Alcibiades was perceived by his contemporaries as full of παρανομία in his manner of living and as aiming to τυραννίς (Thuc. 6.15.4).

<sup>83</sup> See also Dem. 13.21-25; Dem. 23.196-200 on the exemplary manner in which the ancestors used to bestow honours to citizens and foreigners contrary to the allegedly bad habits and low standards of the contemporaries; Liddel (2007) 250, citing evidence from much later sources (Pausanias, Plutarch), points out that even earlier than the fourth century the Athenians probably used to reward generously their excelling politicians.

whole city and not specific individuals shared the honour of the victory (Aesch. 3.183-185).<sup>84</sup>

In a similar way, Miltiades' name does not appear on any memorial of the battle of Marathon, even though he allegedly demanded this reward (Aesch. 3.186), whereas the democrats from Phyle that restored democracy in Athens after the oligarchy of 404/403 received very moderate honours, among them crowns of olive (Aesch. 3.187).

This idealized image of honouring politically successful individuals relies on the exploitation of a pair of democratic ideals that define exemplary political competition: firstly, securing the subordination of individuals even when they happen to be excelling, or better, especially when they happen to be excelling and, secondly, reinforcing collective superiority. In this scheme, the attitude of the city that is sparing in the distribution of rewards as well as her refusal to bestow fancy rewards, such as golden crowns, is not to be mistaken for ungratefulness; it is the result of the *demos* being high-minded (ἀχάριστος ἄρ' ἦν ὁ δῆμος; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μεγαλόφρων, Aesch. 3.182). In this ideal account of assessing political activity, the attitude of a μεγαλόφρων *demos* acting as a fair judge of political competition and public performances is presented as stemming from a mentality of collective pre-eminence and collective love of honour that serves the ideological purposes of subordinating and integrating to the community excelling citizens and their individual, and potentially

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<sup>84</sup> Domingo Gyax (2016) 175-179 sees beyond the rhetoric of Aeschines and argues that some excelling individuals, especially military leaders, were indeed distinguished from the rest, and especial praise and honour were bestowed on them by the city.

individualistic, love of honour.<sup>85</sup> The main priority is presented to be the recognition of collective achievement and not the rewarding of specific individuals in activities and undertakings that are collaborative but the accomplishment of which requires that specific individuals unavoidably would have taken leading roles.<sup>86</sup> The image of the *μεγαλόφρων* *demos* is a version of ‘thinking big’ advantageous to the community that deemphasizes

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<sup>85</sup> Aeschines may have failed to persuade the dikasts that Demosthenes was unworthy of a golden crown, but the outcome of the trial does not mean that this ideal representation of politics lacked rhetorical and ideological force; Thomas (1989) 213-221 stresses the role that anonymity plays in the funeral orations for ‘the creation of an official and patriotic tradition’ (p. 196) that celebrates the nobility of the *demos* as a whole; Gribble (1999) 45-46 notes the tendency to celebrate the collective and deemphasize individual achievement especially in relation with military glory and explains it as ‘part of a wider democratization of elite values’ under which also falls the rhetoric of the funeral orations; cf. Loraux (1986) who recognizes the ideological force of anonymity and abstraction for the expression and reinforcement of democratic values (e.g. p. 41-42, 51-53, 104, 276-279), but views the use of aristocratic language (*arete* etc.) for the celebration of the democracy as an ‘anomaly’ (p. 176) and, instead of recognizing the democratic appropriation of such vocabulary, concludes that democracy failed to develop its own language (172-220).

<sup>86</sup> Thomas (1989) 214-216 notes that Aeschines’ (3.183) praise of the anonymity of past monuments might have been a reaction to a tendency in mid fourth century to celebrate the individual as noticed in Hyperides’ *epitaphios*. Compared to the other surviving *epitaphioi*, Hyperides’ is innovative in that it focuses on the individual, the general Leosthenes, and on the present, the dead men of the specific campaign for which the *epitaphios* was delivered (Hyp. 6.10-42 with Loraux (1986) 110-113); cf. Loraux (1986) 51-52, 127-129, 170-171 who notices that Hyperides’ innovative concentration on the present and his glorification of the dead of the Lamian War is done in terms that in the other funeral orations are reserved for the combatants of the Persian War, and views this as an attempt of Hyperides to move away from abstraction and inspire confidence in the present collective in their contest against the Macedonians.

individual distinction in collective initiatives.<sup>87</sup> In this discourse of collective distinction, not much space is left for the politically successful citizen to emerge, individually, as a *philotimos*.

The dynamic relationship between a sovereign *demos* and its humbled politicians that secures smooth conduct of politics is also part of the political discourse of deliberative oratory. Here again the idealized version of it is placed in the time of the ancestors.

In the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes chastises the city for hesitating to take further action in support of Olynthus against Philip and juxtaposes the ancestors' commendable way of managing the city's external and internal affairs to the allegedly deplorable current situation.<sup>88</sup> Demosthenes contends that his suggested policy, unpleasant as it is yet much needed, is in line with ancestral standards (Dem. *Ol*.3.21). In good old times, the city used to

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<sup>87</sup> In this way, collective 'thinking big' appears to be directly opposed to the attitudes of politically ambitious individuals, just as Alcibiades' in the Sicilian debate, whose 'thinking big' (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, Thuc. 6.16.4) may threaten the common well-being and challenge the political equality of democracy; on 'thinking big' and *megalopsychia* of the city collectively, see p. 55; Lendon (2006) 89-90 notices that contrary to Xenophon, the orators employ μέγα φρονεῖν ('thinking big') in a positive way to exhort the people; cf. Cairns (1996) on *hybris* and 'thinking big'.

<sup>88</sup> Similarly, Dem. 23.206-211; Dem. 13.26-31. Note in 13.26 the use of *philotimia* language for the attitude of the collective: at Demosthenes' time, they still take pride in the military achievements of their ancestors (ἐφ' οἷς ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς φιλοτιμούμεθα) but they do not live up to their standards as they only admire the trophies of the ancestors' achievements without emulating their virtue in practice; Demosthenes exhorts the people to be more energetic, more responsible and/or to imitate the actions of their glorious forefathers in *Ol*.2.13; *Ol*.3.36; *Phil*.1.7-8, 10, 35-37; *Phil*.2.8-12; 8.50-51; *Phil*.3.4-5; Badian (1995) 103 sees in this lack of action pointed out by Demosthenes not merely a 'lack of ambition' from the part of the Athenians, but also a more realistic approach to politics according to which several initiatives that seemed costly and excessive would better not be implemented.

thrive because excelling political figures used to promote the city's welfare instead of choosing personal popularity in the Assembly by suggesting easy solutions. Athens was all-powerful in collective activities at international level when she was leading the Athenian empire (Dem. *Ol.3.24*)<sup>89</sup> and magnificent within her borders (Dem. *Ol.3.25*),<sup>90</sup> whereas, individually, the excelling political figures of the time, such as Aristides and Miltiades, were allegedly leading very modest and humble private lives (Dem. *Ol.3.25-26*).<sup>91</sup> Success and splendour inside and outside the city are attributed to the collective, whereas the praiseworthy quality of excelling individuals that is singled out is their private humbleness and not any kind of public demonstration of power. The principles of statesmanship that are highlighted here and were allegedly respected by politicians of old are again those of promoting common welfare without prioritizing considerations of personal gain and of participating in politics in a way that secures equality among the civic body (Dem. *Ol.3.26*).<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> 'And they alone of mankind left behind them by their deeds a renown greater than all envy' (Loeb adapted).

<sup>90</sup> 'Out of the wealth of the state they set up for our delight so many fair buildings and things of beauty, temples and offerings to the gods, that we who come after must despair of ever surpassing them' (Loeb).

<sup>91</sup> 'Yet in private they were so modest, so careful to obey the spirit of the constitution, that the houses of their famous men, of Aristides or of Miltiades, as any of you can see that knows them, are not a whit more splendid than those of their neighbours'; see also Meidias' private ostentation and his fancy house (Dem. 21.158-159) contrasted to his allegedly non-existent record of public benefactions; see Millett (1998b) 209-211 on fancy houses 'represented as democratically unsound' (quotation from p. 209).

<sup>92</sup> 'For selfish greed had no place in their statesmanship, but each thought it his duty to further the common weal (τὸ κοινὸν αὐξάνειν ἕκαστος ὤρετο δεῖν). And so by their good faith

This ideal representation is then contrasted to the contemporary situation: the city, Demosthenes says, has squandered many opportunities to dominate at international level (Dem. *Ol.3.27-28*), while within the polis no tokens of public magnificence emulating the splendour of the ancestors are to be displayed (Dem. *Ol.3.29*). Responsible for this deplorable situation are those political figures who through their statesmanship have become rich while they were poor and eminent while they were unknown to the detriment of the collective: ‘the lower the fortunes of the city have sunk, the higher have their fortunes soared’.<sup>93</sup>

Bad politicians are not the only ones to be blamed, but responsibility is also attributed to the *demos*. Contrary to the ideal stance of a *megalphron demos*,<sup>94</sup> the people in Demosthenes’ time are admonished for lacking the authority and sovereignty of old times: ‘You cannot, I suppose, have a proud and youthful spirit (μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα), if your conduct is mean and paltry (μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας); for whatever a man’s actions are, such must be his spirit’ (Dem. *Ol.3.32*). The base conduct of the collective is manifested

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towards their fellow Greeks, their piety towards the gods, and their equality among themselves (τὰ δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως διοικεῖν), they deserved and won a great prosperity’ (Loeb); note, again, the stress on the significance of (political) equality.

<sup>93</sup> ὅσω δὲ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐλάττω γέγονεν, τοσούτω τὰ τούτων ηὔξεται (Dem. *Ol.3.29*); for the same idea of private gaining in politics to the detriment of the city, see Dem. 8.66-67.

<sup>94</sup> See above, the representation of Aeschines in *Against Ctesiphon*.

in their incapacity to control and subordinate their politicians as their ancestors used to.<sup>95</sup> Administration of public affairs has been turned upside down: the *demos* is unable to supervise politics and dispense suitable honours and gifts to individuals, but has been overtaken by politicians who control policy-making and manage the finances of the state to the extent that the people have become financially dependent on their whims.<sup>96</sup> In this non-ideal (yet perhaps realistic) model of conducting politics, private individualistic objectives are dominant and the collective's attitude of acting honourably and out of love of honour has been overpowered.<sup>97</sup> The authority of the *demos* is antagonized by individual politicians who gain wealth and eminence not *from* the city and *for* the city but to the detriment of the community.

In another deliberative speech, *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes assesses the quality of political participation as a kind of public contribution. This evaluation takes the form of a comparison between Demosthenes and his political rivals.<sup>98</sup> A pair of antithetical notions are

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<sup>95</sup> 'Because then the people, having the courage to act and to fight, controlled the politicians and were themselves the dispensers of all favours; the rest were well content to accept at the people's hand honour and authority and reward', (Dem. *Ol.3.30*).

<sup>96</sup> 'Content if the politicians gratify you with a dole from the Theoric Fund or a procession at the Boedromia, and your manliness reaches its climax when you add your thanks (χάριν) for what is your own', (Dem. *Ol.3.31*); such claims are not new: see Ar. V.698-712 with MacDowell (2009) 237-238.

<sup>97</sup> Roisman (2004) 269-271 observes that such reproaches were aiming at making the people see in their submissiveness to the politicians a loss of collective manhood and authority.

<sup>98</sup> On different rhetorical techniques and *topoi* that Demosthenes employs for his self-presentation in his deliberative speeches, see Kremmydas (2016).

employed to describe diametrically opposed sources of motivation which affect the quality of a speaker's political participation:<sup>99</sup> on the one hand, there are politicians who advise with *andreia*, in the sense of civic courage and bravery to give the best advice even if it is unpopular;<sup>100</sup> on the other hand, there are those who speak to obtain *charis*, for the popularity that one gains with the audience by suggesting policies that are easily digestible yet of ambiguous quality.<sup>101</sup> Demosthenes, as expected, places himself among the brave speakers and continues his self-praise with an assessment of his public contributions:

ὥστ' εἴ τις ἔροικό με, “εἰπέ μοι, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν πεποίηκας;” ἔχων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν καὶ χορηγίας καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς καὶ λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴποιμι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων πολιτευμάτων οὐδὲν πολιτεύομαι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τᾶλλ' ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἔν τούτων πώποτ' ἑμαυτὸν ἔταξα, οὐδὲ προήχθην οὔθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὔθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμὶ παρ'

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<sup>99</sup> In Dem. 8.68-70 the language of courage and cowardice is employed vis-à-vis favour and personal interest.

<sup>100</sup> See also, Dem. *Ol.*1.16; *Ol.*3.32; *Phil.*1.51; 9.63-65 and the discussion by Roisman (2004) 270-271; on civic courage in democratic deliberation, see Balot (2004b) 242-244 and in discussions of war and peace in the courtroom, see Roisman (2003) 132-136.

<sup>101</sup> On *charis* in Demosthenes' symbouleutic speeches, see the discussion in the following Section.

ὕμῖν, ὑμεῖς δέ, εἰ πείσεσθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε· οὕτω γὰρ ἴσως ανεπίφθονον εἰπεῖν.<sup>102</sup>

(Dem. 8.70-71)

With the employment of *praeteritio*, Demosthenes leaves aside his monetary benefactions to the state and to individuals in order to focus on his political activity which he assesses as his most important contribution to the community.<sup>103</sup> It is the quality of his political participation that concerns us here: Demosthenes has been motivated neither by considerations of gain nor by *philotimia*, but, on the contrary, the kind of advice he has been offering to the city serves public interest to his own detriment in terms of popularity (*charis*) and positive reception from the people. In deliberative contexts, Demosthenes makes sure

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<sup>102</sup> “That if a man should say to me, “Speak for yourself, and tell us what good you have ever done the city,” though I might speak, men of Athens, of the *trierarchies* and of *choregiai*, of *eisphorai* and of the ransom of captives, and of other instances of *philanthropia*, I would say not a word of them, but only reply that my policy has never been the policy of those men; that though I could, perhaps as well as the rest, accuse and bribe and confiscate and act in general as they are acting, I have never applied myself to any of these arts nor have I been prompted either by *kerdos* or by *philotimia*, but I continue to offer advice which does indeed lower me in your esteem, but which, if you will follow it, would contribute to your greatness’ (Loeb adapted).

<sup>103</sup> This is so because we are dealing with a speech that was delivered in the Assembly and naturally the focus is on politics and policy-making, not on an individuals’ benefactions. See pp. 49-52, 230-232.

to present himself not simply as not *philotimos* but as anti-*philotimos*: in other words, as the opposite to Pericles' successors in Thucydides.<sup>104</sup>

In order to stress the publicly beneficial character of the advice he has been giving in the Assembly-meetings, Demosthenes leaves any considerations of *kerdos* as well as of *philotimia* out of the picture. Contrary to the cases where *philotimia* is manifested as a civic virtue, usually in benefactions performed for the community, considerations of *philotimia* in the Assembly point towards an individualistic approach to political participation and thus Demosthenes makes sure he denounces it. Priority should be given to *euboulia* and collective achievement rather than to personal excelling and this is exactly what Demosthenes repeats a few moments afterwards: 'Nor indeed does it seem to me the part of an honest citizen to devise political measures by which I shall at once take the highest place among you (πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως), but you the lowest among the others. No, the advancement of the state must always go along with the measures proposed by good citizens, and they must always support the best and not the easiest policy.' (Dem. 8.72).

Policy-making and politics, in general, can be viewed indeed as contests among individuals, but the winner, the agent of political achievement should always be the city. In Dem. 19.295-297, the Assembly is a field of supremacy for individual politicians

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<sup>104</sup> Note, however, that in Thucydides it is *idiai philotimiai* that are denounced not *philotimia* in general (2.65.7); cf. the positive assessment of *idia philotimia* in Demosthenes discussed in pp. 258-259; on the distinction between *idia* and *dēmosia philotimia*, see pp. 25-28.

(‘Furthermore, at Athens many men have upon occasion risen to power... But what was the field of their supremacy? The Assembly of the people.’),<sup>105</sup> but, at the same time, exploiting political activity so as to elevate oneself is part of a dystopia: ‘[p]ersons who fancy themselves important enough to be called friends of Philip, men itching for military commands and eager for political distinction [προστασίας αξιούμενοι], men who claim superiority over the many [οἱ μείζους τῶν πολλῶν οἰόμενοι δεῖν εἶναι]’. In such kinds of idealized rhetorical constructions, political contributions are not presented as ‘investments’ in public gratitude, and political participation does not seem to have a firm place among the activities that were exploited rhetorically for personal advantage and honouring.<sup>106</sup> The reciprocal nexus of acting out of *philotimia* and expecting a return from the city that we often find in forensic speeches in relation to monetary benefactions and other services seems to be missing when discussing politics and policy-making, and when assessing political contributions. These rhetorical choices show that, even though policy-making may in practice be a competitive process of contrasting interests and individual ambitions, there was an imperative need to

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<sup>105</sup> Dem. 19.297: ἔτι τοίνυν πολλοὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐπὶ καιρῶν γεγονάσιν ἰσχυροί... ἀλλὰ ποῦ τούτων ἕκαστος ἐπρώτευσεν; ἐν τῷ δήμῳ.

<sup>106</sup> And all that despite the reality that political activity and political power could be very profitable: see Moreno (2007) 245-285 who examines the rhetoric of grain supply in Athenian oratory especially of the fourth century and shows that, even though it is usually not explicitly recognized in the speeches, Athenian politicians through connections with foreign kings and through active participation in policy-making at home played an important role in controlling the Athenian grain supply and profited from trade. On Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Philocrates making money through trading, see Moreno (2007) 220-225.

protect collective superiority and political equality. In the public discourse of politics, acting out of *philotimia* failed to emerge as a positive rhetorical norm.

This idealized rhetorical construction of political participation as an activity that should not be exploited for personal gaining and honouring leads one to consider that the rhetoric of reciprocal, mutual gaining between the city and the individual was not appropriate for all sorts of public activities and contributions, and, in extension, that probably it was not tolerated in all sorts of discursive environments.

This becomes evident in the next section. A close examination of the rhetoric of *charis* in the Assembly shows that the etiquette of the Assembly was particularly regulated and distinctively different from that of the courtroom. As far as Demosthenes' symbouleutic speeches show, contrary to forensic practices, speakers in the Assembly did not use to parade their liturgies, other monetary benefactions or their political contributions in return of a favourable hearing. As we will see, the rhetoric of mutual benefit of forensic speeches encapsulated in *charis* requests is not adopted by the symbouleutic oratory of the fourth century, whereas at the same time *charis* terminology is negatively charged.

### **3.3. The rhetoric of *charis* in the Assembly**

When litigants employ arguments based on *charis* obligations, they draw on powerful social ideals of cooperative and mutually beneficial relations within the city.<sup>107</sup> In the courtroom, the rhetoric of *charis* is very closely related to generosity and public benefactions (most prominently liturgies) and aims at uniting the useful individual with the audience and the city. Thus, the rhetoric of gratitude and of public contributions is a powerful means through which litigants sought to create and reinforce community ties by appealing to bonds of mutual interest and mutual obligation and, more generally, by drawing from shared understandings of what counts as good and honourable conduct.

Less attention has been given to the place that mentioning one's liturgies and exploiting the reciprocal aspect of *charis* holds in the Assembly and in deliberative speeches. Finley, for instance, supports that '[i]t was standard practice in both political and forensic speeches to draw attention to one's own liturgical service and to the opponent's dereliction',<sup>108</sup> but, if by 'political' he also means deliberative speeches, his statement seems to be based more on expectation than on evidence. Ober (1989a) states that '[t]he politician might also remind the *demos* of his donations when he spoke in the Assembly'.<sup>109</sup> But all the examples that Ober (1989a) 231-233 provides in support of this point (except for Dem. 8.70-71) are from forensic speeches not from deliberative ones, and thus in his conclusion in p.

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<sup>107</sup> See especially pp. 33-36, 42-44, 107; on variations in the use of rhetorical arguments of *charis* in the forensic speeches of the Attic orators, see the Appendix.

<sup>108</sup> Finley (1983) 37.

<sup>109</sup> Ober (1989a) 231-232.

310 that '[t]he politician who was materially generous deserved the *charis* of the people, while his opponent was *acharistos*' he misses the important point that, even if that was the case, such statements were not enunciated in the Assembly. In a similar manner, Christ (2006) 180-181 claims that, when addressing the courtroom *or the Assembly*, a wealthy man could present his record of public expenditures and seek for *charis* in return.

Several scholars seem to conflate the rhetoric of the courtroom with the rhetoric of the Assembly, and sometimes conclusions about Assembly practices are drawn based on scant evidence or evidence from forensic speeches.<sup>110</sup> The only reference of monetary contributions in a deliberative speech is found in Demosthenes' *On the Chersonese* (Dem. 8.70-71), where Demosthenes' liturgies and other monetary donations are mentioned in passing with the employment of *praeteritio*. Another example that is usually employed to support the rhetorical force of liturgies in the Assembly is Dem. 21.153 where Meidias is chastised for referring to his liturgical status in the Assembly.<sup>111</sup> We cannot absolutely exclude the possibility that such kind of evidence may point to the idea that citation of liturgies and

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<sup>110</sup> Harris (1995) 34-35 discusses generosity and recognition of generosity in the Assembly but not the rhetoric of generosity and, just as Ober (1989a) 230-233, the evidence he draws from do not come from deliberative speeches; Whitehead (1983) 59 makes the same mistake of not separating Assembly from lawcourt regarding the rhetoric of monetary contributions and *philotimia*; Harris (2016) is the only scholar, as far as I know, that notices this point; see pp. 49-52.

<sup>111</sup> See Ober (1989a) 231-233; for a view similar to Ober's on Dem. 21.153, see Wilson (2000) 176 n.88: '[t]his passage is further evidence that, well into the fourth century, leitourgists were far from having ceased to deploy the prestige of their services in the context of the Assembly'; see also Domingo Gygax (2016) 218-219.

public service in the Assembly may have been employed by some speakers and may not have been completely inappropriate.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, it is difficult to disregard the fact that, firstly, we have only one reference to monetary contributions in deliberative contexts (Dem. 8.70-71) and, secondly, that in the passage from *Against Meidias*, a forensic not a deliberative speech, Demosthenes' purpose of mentioning Meidias' alleged conduct may have been precisely this, namely, to underline that by mentioning his liturgies Meidias is actually breaching the etiquette of the Assembly thereby appearing to be transgressive in one more way.<sup>113</sup>

Surviving deliberative speeches point to the direction that at least in Demosthenes' time speakers in the Assembly did not use to resort to arguments about their rich liturgical services, or their benefactions to the city in general, for their character construction neither did they use to attack rival-speakers on the grounds of poor performance of public services. This seems to be so with the rhetoric of *charis* too: appeals to *charis* in return for public service may have been an effective means of attempting to bond oneself with the dikasts and the community by promoting unity of interests between the individual and his city, but it seems that this was not the case in the Assembly. Speakers did not explicitly ask the people

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<sup>112</sup> Cf. p. 210- 211 n. 71.

<sup>113</sup> On the several ways in which Demosthenes shows Meidias to be a transgressive figure, see pp. 96-106.

to follow their political advice out of goodwill to their person or to reject the suggested policies of their rivals out of distrust due to the latter's lack of gratitude towards the city.

Davies recognizes that quoting one's liturgies in the Assembly was not a regular political argument in the fourth century. One explanation that he provides is that 'there were so many others who could make the same sort of claim'.<sup>114</sup> But in the courtroom too there were many speakers who could make the same sort of claim yet they did not refrain from making it. Why in the courtroom and not in the Assembly, then? In Davies' linear chronological approach,<sup>115</sup> synchronical contextual differences are left unrecognised. In this way, the idea that the rhetoric of liturgies and *charis* did not convey the same influence across the institutions and public discourses in which games of political power were played in democratic Athens is undermined.

But differences of discourse and etiquette are important.<sup>116</sup> In the courtroom, one of the desired effects of resorting to one's public contributions and democratic credentials was the construction of a character that could win the trust of the dikasts and increase one's credibility as a good and useful citizen and, in the case of the defendant, as a person who would not have committed the crime he was accused for. The primary aim of every litigant

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<sup>114</sup> Davies (1981) 96.

<sup>115</sup> Through a gross comparison among the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries, Davies (1981) 96-131 attempts to identify the 'power-base' for gaining political influence in each period.

<sup>116</sup> See pp. 57-59; also Carey (2000a) 205; Worthington (2004) 140-143.

was to win the trial *for himself*.<sup>117</sup> In the Assembly, political contributions in the form of advising the city were and needed to be presented as ends in themselves and a speaker would seek to present himself as an honest and intelligent advisor.<sup>118</sup> Ideally, the primary goal of every *rhētor* would have been to offer the best advice *for the city*. Thus, requests for *charis* and appeals to *philotimia* on the basis of monetary benefactions and other public services would be more relevant and effective in the courtroom rather than in the Assembly, precisely because much more space for individualisation and legitimate personal considerations was expected and allowed in the context of a courtroom.

In surviving deliberative contexts, *charis* was not related to the practice of reciting past contributions to the state in order to solidify one's pro-democratic public image. Quite differently, when *charis* vocabulary is employed in our deliberative speeches it has a very different meaning than that of positive reciprocity. Just as participating in politics for private considerations was to be avoided or at least concealed, speaking in order to gain or grant *charis* was something that a speaker would dissociate from himself and attribute to his rivals. Claiming that a rival politician had spoken to win favour was in fact a negative assessment of the quality of his political participation pointing towards a form of calculation and fake reciprocity which bordered deception of the people. This negative employment of the concept of *charis* when evaluating political participation shows that what was part of the

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<sup>117</sup> Or for the person on behalf of whom he was speaking, in the case of *synegoroi*.

<sup>118</sup> See p. 223 n. 98.

vocabulary of positive reciprocity in the courtroom was significantly redefined in the context of the Assembly and Assembly-related activities. It seems that in the public discourse of politics and the Assembly political or other contributions were not to be presented as private investments in public gratitude.

Advising out of and for favour is consistently negatively coloured in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches as well as in *prooemia* of deliberative speeches.<sup>119</sup> In some cases, the relation of speaking for favour with deception and lack of reciprocity is articulated quite explicitly. According to *Exord.*5.1, the practice of saying what one believes will bring him gratitude belongs to those who want to deceive (τὸ μὲν λέγειν ἃ τις οἴεται χαριεῖσθαι τῶν παρακρούσασθαί τι βουλομένων εἶναι νομίζω),<sup>120</sup> whereas enduring bad reactions from the people while giving one's most expedient advice is the sign of a loyal and just citizen.<sup>121</sup> In

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<sup>119</sup> This negatively coloured meaning of *charis* in relation to public speaking is also found in Thuc. 3.42.6, 7.8.2.

<sup>120</sup> Kremmydas (2013) includes παρακρου- vocabulary in his discussion of deceptive language in the Attic Orators.

<sup>121</sup> Mentioned by Kremmydas (2013) 62-63. Nonetheless, *charis* vocabulary as part of the language of deception in the Assembly escapes Kremmydas' attention. He only mentions very briefly in p. 63 that 'any orators indulging the audience should be recognized as deceivers'; Ober (1989a) 321-324 understands the negative references to *charis* in the Assembly as a 'blame topos' against flatterers and the habit of the *demos* to enjoy listening to flattery, but also as evidence that the *demos* was probably open to criticism of its bad habits. As Ober notes, denouncing these practices openly was a risky path for a *rhētor* but sometimes the only way to suggest new policies; see Montgomery (1983) 18-26 for a discussion of Demosthenes' criticism of the people and of rival orators; more generally on deception of the audience and on blame topoi in forensic and deliberative oratory as well as in Aristophanes, see Dover (1974) 23-30; neither Montgomery nor Dover discuss negative references to *charis* in the Assembly.

Dem. 8.52-53, the *demos* is deceived by certain politicians (ὕμᾱς ἔνιοι καταπολιτεύονται) to stay inactive against Philip, '[b]ut the result of this is for you indeed repose and idleness, for the present – blessings which I am afraid you will one day consider dearly purchased – but for the speakers *hoi charites* and *ho misthos* (the payment)'.<sup>122</sup> Solid yet illegitimate benefits come to those speakers from deception of the people.

Moreover, speaking for *charis* in the Assembly is contrasted to giving one's best advice to the city and is sometimes employed to explain bad political influence that allegedly makes the city neglect her duties.<sup>123</sup> At the beginning of the *Third Philippic*, Demosthenes argues that the main reason why the city fares badly in the war with Philip is the political influence of that kind of advisors who choose popularity with the audience instead of providing their best advice (διὰ τοὺς χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν προαιρουμένους).<sup>124</sup> Demosthenes, on the other side, claims for himself the courage of telling the truth and, anticipating the audience's displeasure as truth very often hurts, asks for a benevolent hearing on the basis of his honesty (ἀξιῶ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄν τι τῶν ἀληθῶν μετὰ παρρησίας λέγω,

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<sup>122</sup> Loeb adapted.

<sup>123</sup> On the connection between speaking for *charis*/speaking in a pleasant manner and giving inadequate advice that leads to the city's idleness and inaction, see: Dem. 8.34; *Exord.*1.3; *Exord.*41.2; in similar manner, in Dem. 18.138 the people are chastised for preferring entertaining words (τῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος) to useful and expedient advice; on speaking for *charis* as not only incompatible with giving one's best advice, but also as tantamount to benefiting the enemy, that is, Philip, see Dem. *Phil.*3.63-64.

<sup>124</sup> Dem. *Phil.*3.2.

μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι).<sup>125</sup> The implication here is that those who speak to grant and obtain *charis* enjoy immediate popularity without actually benefiting the city and, even worse, to the long term detriment of the city, whereas Demosthenes chooses to risk losing his popularity (and, we may also say, benefits stemming from it) in order to give to the city the best he has.<sup>126</sup>

In the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes identifies the source of the problem in bad administration of public affairs with the undesirable habit of politicians who speak in the Assembly so as to please the audience.<sup>127</sup> Taking care of the public interest is cast as incompatible with speaking in a pleasant manner: 'But I consider it right as a citizen to set the welfare of the state above *charis* in speaking' (ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν χάριτος), Demosthenes claims for himself;<sup>128</sup> whereas the bad breed of politicians that allegedly dominate the political scene usually address the Assembly in this manner: "What would you like? What shall I propose? How can I please you?" (τί ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι;). In this way,

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<sup>125</sup> Dem. *Phil.*3.3.

<sup>126</sup> Similarly, in *Ol.*3.3 Demosthenes projects himself as an advisor expedient for the city in juxtaposition to those who speak publicly for *charis* swaying the people into neglecting their duties with the sweet uselessness of words that make them popular (ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν ἐνίους εἰς πᾶν πρελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντα).

<sup>127</sup> On the *Third Olynthiac* and issues of character construction, see Kremmydas (2016) 58-61.

<sup>128</sup> Dem. *Ol.*3.21; see also Dem. 8.1; *Exord.*44.1 on the distance between speaking for *charis* and giving one's best advice and Dem. *Phil.*1.51 on choosing the latter to the former despite the very probable loss of private gain in doing so; see *Exord.*28.2 on an expression of wishful thinking where the people follow willingly the most expedient advice and thus the proposer appears both to win their favour and give his best advice (ἵνα καὶ χαριζόμενος καὶ χρηστὰ λέγων ἐφαινόμην).

Demosthenes says, ‘the interests of the state have been frittered away for a momentary popularity (προπέποται τῆς παραυτίκα χάριτος τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα). The natural consequences follow, and the orators profit by your disgrace.’<sup>129</sup> In *Phil.1.38*, Demosthenes contends that it is disgraceful for the people to get deceived by showing preference to some advisors’ pleasant talking that makes them neglect their duties and miss the right timing for action.<sup>130</sup> He, on the other hand, has never chosen to speak in order to gain favour disregarding considerations of the city’s advantage (*Dem. Phil.1.51*),<sup>131</sup> although he knows very well that this is not the most expedient course of action for himself: ‘[y]et, certain as I am that it is to your interest to receive the best advice, I could have wished that I were equally certain that to offer such advice is also to the interest of the speaker.’ Contrary to speakers who profit by the city’s disgrace, Demosthenes refuses to follow the individualistic imperatives of the practice of speaking to grant and gain favour (*Dem. Phil.1.51*).

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<sup>129</sup> *Dem. Ol.3.22*; right afterwards (*Dem. Ol.3.24-26*), Demosthenes compares the grim situation of his days with an idealized image of the past: the ancestors thrived for many years in external as well as internal affairs because they had politicians that gave them their best advice: ‘Now your ancestors, whom their orators, unlike ours today, did not caress or flatter, (ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν, οἷς οὐκ ἐχαρίζονθ’ οἱ λέγοντες οὐδ’ ἐφίλουν αὐτούς) for five and forty years commanded the willing obedience of the Greeks’.

<sup>130</sup> εἰ δ’ ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ἢ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργω ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ φενακίζειν ἑαυτούς, καὶ ἅπαντ’ ἀναβαλλομένους ἂν ἢ δυσχερῆ πάντων ὑστερεῖν τῶν ἔργων; see also *Exord.1.3* which is a paraphrase of this passage; for φενακ- vocabulary in anti-deception topoi in the Attic oratory, see Kremmydas (2013) 88-89.

<sup>131</sup> Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐτ’ ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν τε ἅ γινώσκω πάνθ’ ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίαμαι. Note the opposition between speaking for *charis* and speaking with *parrhēsia*.

In all the cases mentioned so far, speaking to grant or get *charis* in the Assembly is harmful for the city and advantageous, even if temporarily, for the pleasantly speaking advisor. Acting with *charis*, out of *charis* and for *charis* in politics is in most of the cases associated with offering to the city superficially pleasant political solutions the sweetness of which does not last for long while their harmful effects for the city are evident in the long run.<sup>132</sup> Politicians who speak with and for *charis* do not advise as needed but say what the people want to hear in order to gain popularity that would allow them to promote their own interests without invoking, at least not immediately, the wrath of the people. Speaking to get or grant *charis* in politics borders with deception of the city and no true mutual benefit seems to stem out of it.

Those *charis* topoi are usually employed in deliberative contexts as warnings for the audience against deceiving speakers. At the same time, however, they are powerful means of characterization for both the speaker who employs them and his rival-speakers: by rejecting the rhetoric of *charis*, Demosthenes rejects short-sighted personal interest and unites himself with his audience and with the city by casting himself as an expedient and loyal advisor. On the other hand, by attributing to his rivals' style of conducting politics the rhetoric of *charis*, Demosthenes attributes to them ulterior motives. He points out the dangerous consequences

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<sup>132</sup> See also Aesch. 3.168 on the sweet yet deceptive rhetoric of Demosthenes, and Kremmydas (2013) 55.

of short-term false gratification and casts his rivals as deceivers of the people attempting to break, in this way, any bond of community and reciprocity between them and the city.

In a recent article on (anti-)deception topoi as means of character construction, Kremmydas examines specific terminology which he associates with the ‘discourse of deception’ in the Attic Orators.<sup>133</sup> Limiting his survey to that vocabulary, Kremmydas identifies various types of (anti-)deception topoi and explores the frequency with which they appear in different oratorical genres as well as in different types of forensic speeches. Kremmydas’ comparison of Demosthenes’ forensic speeches with his deliberative ones shows that the specific vocabulary of deception that he examines appears twice as often in Demosthenes’ forensic speeches.<sup>134</sup> Kremmydas rightly views this discrepancy, firstly, as a matter of different rhetorical strategies needed in the Assembly and in the courtroom: in the latter, the speakers seem to have much more space for *ad hominem* attacks on the opponent; and, secondly, as a corollary of the different role of the speaker in each place: in the Assembly a speaker was supposed to focus on expediency, whereas in the courtroom on justice.<sup>135</sup>

In his survey, however, Kremmydas does not recognize *charis* vocabulary as belonging to the language and discourse of deception in the context of the Assembly.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> See Kremmydas (2013) 52 n. 4 for the vocabulary that Kremmydas examines and Appendix 2 for passages in which it is attested.

<sup>134</sup> Kremmydas (2013) 80-81.

<sup>135</sup> Kremmydas (2013) 80-84.

<sup>136</sup> This seems to be an important omission, if one considers that the 12 references on the deceptive connotations of *charis* would increase Kremmydas’ figure for Demosthenes’

Arguments about speaking to grant and obtain *charis* in politics, as we saw, can form a type of (anti-)deception topos: *charis* as a motive in politics expresses a way of fooling while pretending to gratify the collective. The deliberative speeches that have survived are indeed considerably fewer than the forensic evidence that we have, but the consistency with which *charis* is negatively employed in deliberative contexts and positively charged in forensic contexts is striking and needs to be taken into account. Thus, modifying Kremmydas' conclusion that anti-deception topoi as means of characterization dominate specific types of forensic speeches but not the Assembly, we may add that the *charis* references in deliberative speeches form a type of (anti-)deception topos that is peculiar to the Assembly.<sup>137</sup>

This discrepancy in the meaning of *charis* in the Assembly and in the courtroom needs some further explanation. Not all arguments were equally effective in all contexts, and speakers, if they wanted to be persuasive, needed to take into account what was each time appropriate depending on the occasion, the place and the role that they performed.<sup>138</sup> If

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deliberative oratory from 28 to 40 and if we also add the 6 references from the *prooemia* of deliberative oratory, then in total the number of Kremmydas' references would increase by 64%; the references to *charis* with negative connotations are: in deliberative speeches: Dem. *Ol.*3.3; *Phil.*1.38, 51; 8.1, 34, 52-53, 71 (note also the derogatory reference to *philotimia*); *Phil.*3.2, 63 (x2), 64 (x2); in *prooemia*: Dem. *Exord.*1.3; 5.1; 9.2 (note also the derogatory reference to *philotimia*); 28.1-2; 41.2; 44.1.

<sup>137</sup> My point, however, does not cancel Kremmydas' (2013) 84 observation that in the Assembly 'the discourse of deception against opponents' usually appears 'in a neutral, depersonalized way', as when speaking for *charis* is condemned in deliberative speeches this is usually done in a more general way and not in specific *ad hominem* attacks.

<sup>138</sup> Rubinstein (2004) and Rubinstein (2005) discuss the idea of context specific rhetorical topoi. Rubinstein, however, does not examine deliberative oratory vis-à-vis forensic

*charis* appears to be systematically negatively charged in deliberative contexts, but usually positively charged in forensic then we are possibly dealing with two separate, 'context sensitive' public discourses. My explanation for the negative connotations of *charis* in the Assembly is consistent with my explanation for the absence of *philotimia* as a civic virtue from the Assembly and from positive evaluations of political participation. Not all places were appropriate for boasting about one's record of public donations, and not all public activities and contributions were suitable for being presented as private investments in public gratitude. What was regarded as reciprocal in courtroom speaking, directing one's *philotimia* to specific benefactions to the state and asking in return for *charis*, was probably regarded as individualistic and deceptive in Assembly speaking.<sup>139</sup> In this framework, the meaning of *charis* as an individualistic motivational power that spoils good conduct of politics seems to be context specific and especially related to Assembly activities.

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speeches but she focuses on different contexts within the genre of forensic oratory. Thus, she shows that different legal procedures begged for different rhetorical strategies and that particular rhetorical *topoi* and arguments were 'context sensitive' (quotation from (2005) 135); see Hesk (2007) 364 on appeals to liturgical service as a 'context-specific' argument peculiar to the lawcourt.

<sup>139</sup> If we want to be more specific about the function of *charis* in deliberative speeches, we may say that even in these cases there is still an element of reciprocity: those who speak for *charis* offer instant pleasure to the people with their easy to digest advice and the people reward them on the spot with popular approval. In the long run, however, the superficiality of this reciprocal bond is revealed and speaking for *charis* proves to be deceptive; on the 'conflict between short-term false interests and long term, true interests' in Demosthenes, see Hunt (2010) 168.

The language of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches reveals that the Assembly is a place where individuals and their contributions should not overshadow collective superiority, achievement and interest. Moreover, by stigmatizing a specific kind of the rhetoric of *charis*, that of pleasant and deceptive advising, as an illegitimate way of gaining access to the favour of the people, Demosthenes appeared as the brave and helpful citizen who warned the people against such practices. In this way, by dissociating himself from this rhetoric of *charis* he united himself with the city in a different way, namely, in a cooperative attempt to deal with deceptive speakers who threaten unity and public interest.<sup>140</sup>

In the next section, the battles of Demosthenes and Aeschines are examined as case studies of democratic political discourse in the courtroom. In what kind of contexts do the ideas of *philotimia* and being *philotimos* appear? Once again, as we will see, political contributions and political participation are not treated in the same way as monetary contributions or other public services. Demosthenes' (self-)portrait as a politician of the time that arises from these speeches shows the delimited ways in which *philotimia* was admitted as a commendable quality of the individual in discourses of politics and political assessment.

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<sup>140</sup> As far as the courtroom is concerned, Johnstone (1999) 106-108 notes that appeals to the collective *charis* of the dikasts on the basis of common interest reinforced the collective identity of the Athenians.

### 3.4. The political battles of Demosthenes and Aeschines

The political feud of Demosthenes and Aeschines is one of the best attested rivalries of classical Athens. The two politicians clashed in the courtroom in three occasions. The one who struck first was Demosthenes along with his friend Timarchos: they accused Aeschines in his *euthyna* (his public accounting for his time as an envoy) of misconduct for having allegedly accepted bribes from Philip during the embassies to Philip in 347/346 for the negotiations of peace. Aeschines managed to block for a while the initiation of a trial against him by accusing Timarchos in retaliation for being unfit 'to be an active citizen' thereby challenging Timarchos' right to bring the indictment against him to court.<sup>141</sup> The trial against Timarchos, from which only Aeschines' prosecution speech survives, took place, according to Fisher 'between late summer 346 and spring 345'.<sup>142</sup> From the other two trials between Demosthenes and Aeschines we have both the prosecution and the defence speeches, a rare stroke of luck if we judge from the rest of our courtroom evidence from the late fifth and fourth centuries. The earliest of these two trials took place in 343 and regards Aeschines'

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<sup>141</sup> Fisher (2001) 5.

<sup>142</sup> Fisher (2001) 6-8, quotation from p. 6; see MacDowell (2000) 21 n. 59 on the debate about the date of the trial with further bibliography; the legal procedure that Aeschines employed was *dokimasia ton rhētoron*, for which see Fisher (2001) 5-6, 40, 157-158; Hansen (1991) 267; Harrison (1971) 204-205; cf. Lane Fox (1994) 149-151 who expresses his doubts about the originality of the law for *dokimasia ton rhētoron* discussed in Aesch. 1.28-32 and especially about its Solonian origin; for a summary of the themes of the speech and Aeschines' tactics, see Harris (1995) 101-106.

alleged misconduct as an envoy during the negotiations with Philip in 346 (Dem. 19, prosecution speech, and Aesch. 2, defence speech).<sup>143</sup> The other one concerns the legality of a proposal for crowning Demosthenes for his services to the city with a golden crown brought by Ctesiphon in 336.<sup>144</sup> Aeschines blocked the bestowal of the crown by bringing a *graphe paranomon* against Ctesiphon's proposal and the trial eventually took place in 330<sup>145</sup> (Aesch. 3, prosecution speech, and Dem. 18, defence speech).<sup>146</sup>

The published versions of the speeches from these two trials are important sources of evidence for understanding the role of *philotimia* in public discussions dealing with political participation and political contributions: careful selection of the means by which excellent citizens attempt to win over the favour of popular audiences, retrospective

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<sup>143</sup> Aeschines managed to get acquitted by a small margin of votes (Plut. *Dem.*15.5 who cites Idomeneus, *FGrHist*338F10), but even so Demosthenes and his anti-Macedonian policy gained political influence from this trial; Buckler (2000) 140 calls Aeschines' acquittal 'a Pyrrhic victory over Demosthenes'; on the embassies and the political and general background of the trial, see MacDowell (2000) 1-22; for an overview of the events before and during the peace negotiations with Philip, see Ryder (2000) 58-72 and, more extensively, Harris (1995) 63-101; for a short presentation of the argumentative lines of Demosthenes and Aeschines, see Buckler (2000) 134-140.

<sup>144</sup> On the grounds on which Demosthenes was going to be honoured, see Dem. 18.112-119; Aesch. 3.17, 23, 49, 101, 236-237.

<sup>145</sup> On possible reasons why Aeschines eventually brought the case in court in 330, see Carey (2000b) 160; Harris (1995) 140-142, 173-174.

<sup>146</sup> Demosthenes acted as the advocate (*sunēgoros*) of Ctesiphon (see Dem. 18.5 and Yunis (2001) ad loc.) delivering the defence speech and triumphantly convinced the *dikasts* that he was worth of the honours proposed by Ctesiphon's decree. According to Plut. *Dem.*24.2-3, Aeschines did not even manage to take one-fifth of the *dikasts*' votes and, sensing the end of his political career in Athens, moved to Rhodes where he occupied himself with the teaching of rhetoric.

assessments of internal and external affairs, and inter-personal rivalries of political opponents comprise the web of themes within which the role of *philotimia* is examined.<sup>147</sup>

The rhetoric of the political trials examined seems to indicate that, when the ethos of the individual politician is at stake, positively charged *philotimia* vocabulary is employed in relation to monetary benefactions. Furthermore, in *On the False Embassy* (Dem. 19) and in *On the Crown* (Dem. 18), the civic-oriented *philotimia* that Demosthenes allegedly demonstrates with his money also speaks for his political integrity, but it is only in this indirect way that civic-oriented *philotimia* seems to be employed to enhance one's political profile. On the rare occasions where *philotimia* is cast as a positively charged motivational power for political action, it is not attributed to the politicians individually, but to the city collectively through the example of the ancestors. Demosthenes' political activities and services may often be praised in '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts,<sup>148</sup> but they are not directly presented as having been performed out of *philotimia* towards the city and thus there is no direct rhetorical exploitation of political service as investment on the city's gratitude.

If we accept that this regulated and delimited appearance of *philotim*- cognates in contexts of political discussions is an intentional rhetorical choice of speakers who comply

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<sup>147</sup> On the historical inaccuracy of the events described, and on differences between the delivered and revised versions of Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches, see, e.g., Buckler (2000) 148-154.

<sup>148</sup> The idea of '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts is explained in pp. 52-54 and further discussed in pp. 268-281.

with the imperatives and conventions of democratic and egalitarian speaking because they want to maximize the impact of their words on popular audiences, then this rhetorical choice indicates that at the level of ideology the democratic city did find ways to deemphasize and thus control the impact that elite power and elite ambition has in public speech. The dissociation of *philotimia* from accounts of political participation deprived the elite individuals of a good opportunity to boast about their political achievements and exploit them in the style of legitimate requests for public gratitude. Part of the same ideological mechanism is the representation of Demosthenes' political contributions as having triumphed in political contests that are described as open contests for the city's *eunoia*, not as competitions of *philotimia* among elite individuals, even though in reality they may have been both.

**Appeals to *philotimia* in financial contexts, and the ethos of the politician (Demosthenes 19)<sup>149</sup>**

In *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes refers time and again to his initiative to offer a considerable amount of money for the ransoming of a group of Athenian captives held in

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<sup>149</sup> Text and translation of Dem. 19 are from MacDowell (2000) unless otherwise stated.

Macedonia after the fall of Olynthus.<sup>150</sup> According to Demosthenes' version of events (Dem. 19.166-173),<sup>151</sup> during the First Embassy to Philip for the negotiations of peace, Demosthenes promised to lend money to several Athenian prisoners of war in order to assist them in gathering the amount demanded for each one's ransom. During the Second Embassy for the reception of oaths from Philip to ratify the peace, Philip was about to make big gifts to him and his fellow ambassadors in the name of hospitality but in reality in an attempt both to bribe them collectively and to divert attention from the bribes he had already successfully given to some members of the embassy. Demosthenes turned the gifts down, as he says, and suggested to Philip instead to contribute the gold towards the ransoms of the prisoners. Philip, compelled by the circumstances, as Demosthenes claims, initially consented to his proposal and Demosthenes out of a sense of fairness and magnanimity, we may say, decided to write off the friendly loans that he had already given to some of the prisoners (ἔδωκα δωρεὰν τὰ λύτρα, Dem. 19.170) so that they would not get in debt for their freedom while others were (supposedly) going to get it for free through Philip's newly promised gift (Dem. 19.170).<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Dem. 19.39-40, 166-173, 222-223, 343 (indirectly); 18.268-269; cf. Aesch. 2.99-100, 103 where Demosthenes' initiative is disparaged. According to Aesch. 2.103, discussing the release of the captives was included in the instructions the Assembly had given to the ambassadors before departing for the Second Embassy; on this point, see Harris (1995) 79; Aeschines also attempts to downplay Demosthenes' initiative to host magnificently the envoys of Philip sent to Athens: Aesch. 2.109, 111; 3.76 cf. Dem. 19.235.

<sup>151</sup> See MacDowell (2000) 9-10.

<sup>152</sup> According to Dem. 19.39-40, Philip never really intended to deliver his promise.

This episode is mentioned several times throughout the speech and serves a few strategical and rhetorical purposes. Firstly, Demosthenes uses it to anticipate a probable argument of Aeschines: why had Demosthenes joined them in the Second Embassy instead of taking the oath of exemption, if he already knew about the bad intentions and the corruption of Aeschines and his ‘accomplices’? Because he had already promised to ransom his fellow-citizens, Demosthenes answers, and to renege on their private agreement would have been unethical, immoral and inappropriate, while the alternative of travelling privately to Pella and not as part of the embassy would have been very dangerous (Dem. 19.171-172). The narration of the episode closes in the following way:

οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ’ οὕτως ἄθλιος οὐδ’ ἄφρων ὥστε χρήματα μὲν διδόναι, λαμβάνοντας ὁρῶν  
ἑτέρους, ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας, ἃ δ’ ἄνευ μὲν δαπάνης οἶά τ’ ἦν πραχθῆναι,  
πολλῶ δὲ μείζονας εἶχεν ὠφελείας πάση τῇ πόλει, ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἐβουλόμην γίγνεσθαι.  
καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· ἀλλ’ οἶμαι περιῆσαν οὕτοί μου. (Dem. 19.173)

‘After all, when I was giving money though seeing other men receiving some, for the sake of *philotimia* towards you, I wasn’t such a poor fool as not to desire the fulfilment of what could be done with no expense and with far greater benefits to the whole city. Of course I did, men of Athens; but I’m afraid these men got the better of me.’<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> MacDowell (2000) adapted.

The ransoming of the prisoners is presented as a material benefaction of Demosthenes on account of *philotimia* expressed towards the community. It is a private investment on a cause that involves benefit towards specific individuals, the captives,<sup>154</sup> but at the same time is an action presented as having been performed ‘in dialogue with’ the city.<sup>155</sup>

Demosthenes’ initiative is then juxtaposed in an argument of probability with his official/political role during the Second Embassy. This is an evaluative comparison between commendable conduct of politics and ‘extra-ambassadorial’<sup>156</sup> benefactions while in official duty that aims at enhancing Demosthenes’ credibility and political ethos: speedy ratification of the peace would have been of far greater benefit to the city than the ransoming of a few of its citizens, Demosthenes says, and thus it is unlikely that he would have obstructed the reception of oaths from Philip. The indication is that since Demosthenes on his own will spends his money for the benefit of the community (ὕπερ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας) it is

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<sup>154</sup> Cf. Dem. 18.268 where Demosthenes stresses instead the private character of his ransoming, while at the same time, as Usher (1993) ad loc. notices, employing language that usually belongs to contexts of public benefaction (κοινὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος).

<sup>155</sup> In the sense that, having been performed out of *philotimia* towards the city, Demosthenes’ undertaking is expected to be recognized not only by the direct beneficiaries, the captives, but more importantly for Demosthenes by the broader community, if not ‘in real life’ at least to his advantage in the trial at hand.

<sup>156</sup> See Liddel (2007) 244 on broader understanding of ‘political duties’ that also included various kinds of financial contributions, official and unofficial; see Millett (1991) 61 on ransoming ‘seen as a civic duty’ that Demosthenes ‘converted into an outright gift’; in my discussion here, I view political duty in the more specialized sense of contributing to public deliberations or conducting politics from an official position, such as that of the ambassador.

highly improbable that he would have obstructed a politically advantageous course of action that does not require any material contribution on his part.

In this episode, *philotimia* is not cast as the motivational power behind Demosthenes' political performance and political service, but at the same time expenditures that are performed ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας speak for Demosthenes' political ethos. The ransoming of the captives vis-à-vis the alleged corruption of Aeschines and his 'friends'<sup>157</sup> provides Demosthenes with supporting evidence for the positive assessment of his participation in the Second Embassy. Furthermore, early in the speech, in Dem. 19.39-40, Demosthenes mentions Aeschines' machinations to undermine his initiative to ransom the captives by managing to exclude from Philip's letter to the Athenians the information that Demosthenes had carried one talent to Macedonia for that purpose.<sup>158</sup> Demosthenes' complaint is phrased as an offence to his *philotimia*: 'So when Aiskhines persuaded him to put that in the letter, he was depriving me of my *philotimia* (τὴν ἐμὴν φιλοτιμίαν)'.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> χρήματα μὲν δίδοναι, λαμβάνοντας ὀρῶν ἑτέρους, ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας (Dem. 19.173).

<sup>158</sup> Demosthenes claims in Dem. 19.36-38 that Philip's letter that arrived in Athens had been written in reality by Aeschines himself; cf. Harris (1995) 89 who notices that it is not surprising that Philip would not mention in his letter the money already received for releasing some of the captives, as such a thing would undermine his generosity; on the charges that Aeschines had private communications with Philip and had written himself Philip's letter, see also Dem. 19.174-178; cf. Aesch. 2.124-129.

<sup>159</sup> MacDowell (2000) adapted.

Material benefactions towards fellow-citizens and ultimately towards the city while holding public office are exploited rhetorically in order to project Demosthenes' moral superiority vis-à-vis both Aeschines and Philip. Demosthenes is a citizen who, while acting as an ambassador of his city, spends money for the liberation of fellow-citizens on account of his *philotimia* towards the city. Aeschines, by contrast, is a citizen who in the same role as ambassador of the city gains money by accepting bribes and sabotages the city's interest with his corruption.<sup>160</sup> Philip makes promises that he does not intend to fulfill while at the same time investing on transactions under the table. An individual's relation with money is treated as indicative of one's ethos and according to this correlation Demosthenes as a *philotimos* spender is expected to be politically adamant as well.

In Dem. 19.221-224, Demosthenes explains the reasons that he is prosecuting Aeschines. To clear the platform from any suspicions that he is acting out of any considerations other than justice, he refers again to his attitude towards money. If he had profit in mind, it would have been foolish on his part to prosecute Aeschines so as to exact money in the fashion of a sycophant and thus gain Aeschines' enmity, when earlier during the Second Embassy he had such an opportunity to benefit financially from Philip's bribes

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<sup>160</sup> Buckler (2000) 131 notes that Demosthenes is blurring the line between hospitality and bribery in order to emerge as the incorruptible one in relation to his fellow-envoys; Harris (1995) 85-86 stresses the fact that whereas accepting gifts as an ambassador could raise suspicions of bribery in Athens, for a king, such as Philip, it was normal to offer such gifts of hospitality to his guests; on bribery in Greek politics, see Harvey (1985) 76-117.

while keeping at the same time his friendship both with Philip and with the bribed fellow envoys (Dem. 19.222-223). Demosthenes had spent a considerable amount of money on ransoming, he had declined a considerable – we may assume – offer from Philip and he has not initiated the trial at hand to exact financial profit from Aeschines. This honourable approach towards money springs from his attitude of valuing his *philotimia* in the service of the people more than any kind of profit: καὶ οὐκ ἀνταλλακτέον εἶναί μοι τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν οὐδενὸς κέρδους (Dem. 19.223).<sup>161</sup> As a *philotimos* spender, Demosthenes would not have initiated a legal procedure against Aeschines for petty financial profit.

*Philotimia* once more is praised in financial contexts: it is dissociated from calculated private interest denoted by *kerdos* (κέρδους) and is qualified by ‘towards you’ (πρὸς ὑμᾶς), which shows both its publicly beneficial character and the expectation of public recognition and personal honouring from the city. In pp. 224-226, we saw an instance (Dem. 8.70-72) where *philotimia* and *kerdos* are both denounced as individualistic when associated with one’s motivation for political participation. Two points should be stressed here that reveal subtle but crucial variations in the rhetoric of *philotimia* in these two passages: first, in Dem. 8.71 it is unqualified *philotimia*, not civic-oriented *philotimia*, i.e., πρὸς ὑμᾶς (as in Dem. 19.223), that is rejected; and, second, both unqualified *philotimia* and *kerdos* are denounced not in relation with monetary benefactions, but as political motives that point towards fast personal

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<sup>161</sup> ‘And that no profit was worth giving up my *philotimia* in your service’, MacDowell (2000) adapted.

advancement to the detriment of the city through exploitation of politics and political influence. By contrast, in Dem. 19.223, Demosthenes' demonstration of civic-oriented *philotimia* in monetary transactions is employed to enhance his political honesty and his honesty as a prosecutor.

So far we have seen that when the quality of *philotimia* is praised in accounts of Demosthenes' past political activities this is done in association with expenditures approved by the city. There is a case, however, where considerations of self-interest are admitted regarding his service as an ambassador. In Dem. 19.223, Demosthenes complains that due to the corruption of Aeschines and his accomplices he is unjustly deprived of his private *philotimiai* (τῶν ἰδίων φιλοτιμιῶν), referring to the honours that the city usually awarded to ambassadors upon completion of their duties including public praise in a decree and an invitation to dine at the Prytaneion (Dem. 19.31).<sup>162</sup> *Philotimiai* here appears in the plural probably because it refers quantitatively to the actual rewards and honours that Demosthenes was expecting from the city. The qualification as *idiai* points towards individual benefit expected to be enjoyed by the honorand and, in this sense, we cannot deny that here *idiai philotimiai* indicates personal considerations in relation with political services. But the

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<sup>162</sup> Due to his 'extra-curricular' initiative to pay the ransoms, Demosthenes was probably expecting some extra recognition as well, not just the regular honours for standard completion of duty; see also Dem. 19.39-40; in Dem. 19.32, Demosthenes refers to the *probouleuma* from which a clause to honour the Second Embassy is missing. See Harris' (1995) 90-91 explanation for the omission which is different from the one given by Demosthenes.

tone is not condemnatory and there is a reason for that: here *idiai philotimiai* is almost identical in meaning with the reward ('personal/private honours') that Demosthenes expects;<sup>163</sup> *idiai philotimiai* does not stand for calculated interest as *the motivational power* driving one to participate in politics and/or to benefit the city, but is rather the personal benefit that one enjoys as a reward *after* having done so. Neither here, then, is *philotimia* admitted as a positive motivational power for political action.<sup>164</sup>

The speech closes with an assessment of the good ambassador that is qualified to conduct public affairs (Dem. 19.337-339). It comes as no surprise that Demosthenes presents himself as an example of the good ambassador. Once more his attitude related to money spending and (not) accepting is presented as indicative of his political integrity and his suitability for public office (Dem. 19.338):

μηδὲν ὑμεῖς ἀβέλτερον πάθητε, ἀλλὰ λογίζεσθ' ὅτι δεῖ κήρυκα μὲν, ἂν δοκιμάζητε,  
εὐφωνον σκοπεῖν, πρεσβευτὴν δὲ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀξιοῦντά τι πράττειν δίκαιον καὶ

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<sup>163</sup> See MacDowell's (2000) comment on Dem. 19.40 regarding differences in the meaning of *philotimia* as 'the aspiration to honour' but also as 'the honour aspired to'.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. the assessment of *idiai philotimiai* as negative motivational power for political action in Thuc. 2.65.7. Pericles' political successors acted according to *idiai philotimiai* and *idia kerde*, that is, according to calculated private interest: 'For the sake of private *philotimiai* and private *kerde* they pursued policies which were bad for themselves and for the allies, from which the honour (τιμὴ) and advantage (ὠφελία) accrued rather to private individuals (τοῖς ἰδιώταις) when they succeeded, but which when they failed brought damage to the city (τῇ πόλει) with regard to the war.', Rhodes (1988) adapted.

φρόνημ' ἔχονθ' ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν μέγα, πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ἴσον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Φίλιππον μὲν οὐκ ἐθαύμασα, τοὺς δ' αἰχμαλώτους ἐθαύμασα, ἔσωσα, οὐδὲν ὑπεστειλάμην.

'don't be silly; Just think: if you're approving the appointment of a herald, you have to look for one with a good voice, but in the case of an ambassador who wants to take part in public affairs you have to look for an honest one, who thinks himself superior when acting on your behalf, but no better than yourselves when dealing with you. Thus I myself did not respect Philip,<sup>165</sup> but I did respect the prisoners, and rescued them, and spared no effort.'

φρόνημ' ἔχονθ' ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν μέγα, πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ἴσον encapsulates a civic-oriented *megalophron*-attitude (ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν μέγα) that is at the same time democratically appropriated (πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ἴσον).<sup>166</sup> Demosthenes provides as an example of this kind of *megalophron*-attitude his conduct towards Philip and towards the prisoners during the embassies: he rejected (οὐκ ἐθαύμασα) Philip, presumably in the sense that he did not succumb to the bribes, whereas he responded positively to the request of his fellow citizens that were in need (ἐθαύμασα, ἔσωσα, οὐδὲν ὑπεστειλάμην). In this vein, Demosthenes

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<sup>165</sup> See MacDowell's (2000) comment ad loc. on the meaning of ἐθαύμασα as 'I treated with respect'; similarly, in Dem. 21.210, μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον μηδὲ τὴν δόξαν τὴν τούτων θαυμάζετε, ἀλλ' ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Alcibiades' democratically inappropriate expression of this attitude in Thuc. 6.16.4: ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι.

continues (Dem. 19.339), skills such as εὐφωνία should be appreciated only if they are possessed by a *chrestos* and *philotimos* individual,<sup>167</sup> because in this case the fruits of such talents are shared by the rest of the group.<sup>168</sup> Once again, Demosthenes' honourable expenditures are indicative of his political ethos: since he spent his money in Macedonia in a way that demonstrated his *philotimia* towards the city, similarly, the audience is invited to think, he should have done with his other assets, his rhetorical and political power.<sup>169</sup> φρόνημ' ἔχονθ' ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν μέγα, πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ἴσον captures the behaviour of a citizen who exceeds himself in effort and risks personal loss (in money, personal safety, or perhaps popularity and political friendships) when acting on behalf of the community without challenging, at the same time, political equality and the superiority of the collective.

In a long section in *On the Crown* (Dem. 18.252-275), Demosthenes provides an account on fortune and most of it is a comparison between his own personal fortune (τὴν ἐμὴν τύχην, Dem. 18.256) and that of Aeschines. This is a response to Aeschines' invective that the city

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<sup>167</sup> Note that here again the direct context within which one is characterized as *philotimos* (and *chrestos*) is that of one's attitude towards money spending and receiving. This commendable attitude creates the expectation that one's political ethos and behaviour while conducting public affairs would also be commendable.

<sup>168</sup> Whereas when such talents are possessed by a *poneros* and *dorodokos* person like Aeschines they are turned against the city's interest (Dem. 19.339-340). By attacking Aeschines' 'good voice', Demosthenes indirectly praises his own rhetorical and political skills demonstrated during the communications with Philip.

<sup>169</sup> See also Dem. 18.276-296 for a comparison between Demosthenes and Aeschines regarding proper use of eloquence in public affairs.

suffered the Chaeronea disaster because Demosthenes bears bad luck<sup>170</sup> that eventually becomes a comparison of Demosthenes' and Aeschines' lives that takes the form of a contest for the worthiest man. As expected, Demosthenes emerges superior in every respect:<sup>171</sup> in origins, upbringing, education and occupation;<sup>172</sup> in private generosity<sup>173</sup> and public benefactions;<sup>174</sup> in political activity.<sup>175</sup> The field within which commendable *philotimia* emerges in this account is that of generosity and benefactions, especially monetary ones:

ἐξελθόντι δ' ἐκ παίδων ἀκόλουθα τούτοις πράττειν, χορηγεῖν, τριηραρχεῖν, εἰσφέρειν, μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας μήτ' ἰδίας μήτε δημοσίας ἀπολείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φίλοις χρήσιμον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ προσελθεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ' ἐλέσθαι ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων πολλῶν

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<sup>170</sup> Dem. 18.212; Aesch. 3.114, 134-136, 157-158, 253; see Yunis' (2001) introductory comment on Dem. 18.252-275; see also Usher (1993) on Dem. 18.252.

<sup>171</sup> See Dem. 18.265 for a summary of the grounds of comparison; see also Dem.18. 276-296 on Demosthenes' superior use of rhetorical skill in politics.

<sup>172</sup> Dem.18. 257-262; note how Demosthenes avoids any reference to his professional activity as a logographer.

<sup>173</sup> Dem. 18. 257, 268-269 on Demosthenes.

<sup>174</sup> Dem. 18.257, 267 on Demosthenes; Dem. 18.308-313 on Aeschines' lack of public benefactions as a corollary of his political corruption: Aeschines' bad conduct of politics makes him also a bad spender. Note how this description of Aeschines is diametrically opposed to Demosthenes' self-presentation as a good spender and therefore a good politician both in Dem. 18 and Dem. 19.

<sup>175</sup> Dem. 18.257, 270-275 on Demosthenes; Dem.18. 263-264, 273-275, 301-305 on Aeschines.

πολλάκις ἐστεφανῶσθαι, καὶ μηδὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμᾶς, ὡς οὐ καλὰ γ' ἦν ἂ προειλόμην,  
ἐπιχειρεῖν λέγειν. (Dem. 18.257)

‘When I reached adulthood, I performed duties suitable to my background – I furnished choruses and triremes, paid taxes, lost no opportunity for private or public *philotimia*, but was of service to the city and to my friends. And when I decided to enter state affairs, I chose policies which earned me many crowns from both my country and the rest of the Greeks, and even you, my enemies, did not try to say that those policies were not honourable.’<sup>176</sup>

Two kinds of *philotimia* are positively charged here: δημοσία *philotimia* is the good done towards the city, ἰδία *philotimia* is private *philotimia* in the sense of benefiting one’s friends, whereas political activity beneficial to the state is carefully dissociated from both.<sup>177</sup> Both kinds of *philotimia* are positively assessed, but their dissociation from politics indicates that not every field of action where ambition was expected to be found was at the same time a suitable place for a citizen to draw attention to his *philotimia*. Approved political choices have

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<sup>176</sup> Usher (1993) adapted; text and translation of Dem. 18 are by Usher (1993) unless otherwise stated.

<sup>177</sup> In a similar manner, in Dem. 18.267-275, Demosthenes examines three realms of his behaviour: activities performed πρὸς τὴν πόλιν (268) which include his liturgies (267); benefactions that he did in his private life, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις (268), in which he enumerates the ransoming of the captives; and his political activity (270-275), περὶ τῶν κοινῶν (270), that is, public debates and policy-making.

gained Demosthenes a lot of crowns,<sup>178</sup> but never does he admit that he has acted out of *philotimia* in public affairs or that his political achievements consist demonstrations of *philotimia*, *ἰδία*, *δημοσία*, or unqualified. We do not find in Demosthenes' deliberative and forensic speeches the vicious version of *ἰδία philotimia* that denotes private exploitation of political participation that is attested in Thucydides;<sup>179</sup> nor do we find political achievements of individuals praised in terms of unqualified *philotimia*, *δημοσία philotimia* or *philotimia* expressed 'towards you'.<sup>180</sup> At the same time, as with the ransoming episode discussed above, we may say that here too private and public *philotimia* related to Demosthenes' noble investments enhances by association his political ethos and his credibility.

Finally, a couple of passages from *Against Ctesiphon* also deserve our attention. In 3.210-212, Aeschines notes that, if Demosthenes were genuinely virtuous,<sup>181</sup> he would have apprehended the inappropriateness of the occasion and would have declined the honour of

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<sup>178</sup> Yunis (2001) on Dem. 18.257 mentions that no crowns bestowed to Demosthenes by other Greek states are attested; cf. Usher (1993) on Dem. 18.83; On Demosthenes' crowns, see also Dem. 18.83, 94 (here Demosthenes says that the city has been crowned through his policies), 120, 223; Harris (1995) 33 notes: 'The highest honor a *rhētor* could aspire to was to be awarded a gold crown and to have a motion of praise for his accomplishments read out in the Assembly and the theatre of Dionysus.'; in Dem. 18.273 Demosthenes mentions that the general approval of his suggested policies brought hopes, enthusiasm and honours to him and to the city to which Aeschines did not object: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ εὐνοίᾳ γ' ἐμοὶ παρεχώρεις ἐλπίδων καὶ ζήλου καὶ τιμῶν, ἃ πάντα προσῆν τοῖς τότε πραττομένοις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

<sup>179</sup> See p. 26, 127-128, 254 n. 164.

<sup>180</sup> On the topos of *philotimia* expressed 'towards you', see pp. 28-33.

<sup>181</sup> What Demosthenes is going to say in his defence, according to Aeschines, is going to be the words of a scoundrel who pretends to be virtuous (κάθαρμα ζηλοτυποῦν ἀρετήν, Aesch. 3.211); on *zelotupia* and *phthonos* in classical Athens, see Sanders (2014) 49, 164-165.

getting crowned while the whole city was mourning. But Demosthenes so much despised *philotimia* towards the city (τοσοῦτον καταγελά τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίας) that he made money in disgraceful ways with the same head on top of which the highest honour of a golden crown was going to be placed by the city. It is not a head that Demosthenes possesses, but an investment (οὐ κεφαλήν, ἀλλὰ πρόσδοον κέκτηται, Aesch. 3.212). In a comic manner, Demosthenes is described as a crook and a sycophant who smashes his head and then makes money out of it by falsely accusing other people for assault,<sup>182</sup> and sometimes he even gets beaten up for real, as it happened on that occasion when Meidias punched him on the head.<sup>183</sup> In Aeschines' portrayal, Demosthenes with his dodgy investments makes a mockery of *philotimia* towards the city,<sup>184</sup> because instead of benefiting the state financially, he exploits it for personal profit.<sup>185</sup> Along the same lines, at the beginning of the speech, Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of 'snatching *philotimia*' (μὴ ἄρπαζε τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, Aesch. 3.23)

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<sup>182</sup> See also Aesch. 2.93.

<sup>183</sup> See Dem. 21 discussed in Chapter 1 Section 2.

<sup>184</sup> See also Aesch. 3.45: Aeschines expands on the inappropriateness of the place where Ctesiphon proclaimed Demosthenes' crowning and mentions that neither the announcement of crowns from demes and tribes is allowed at the theatre of Dionysus 'to prevent anyone from acquiring ψευδῆ φιλοτιμίαν by collecting crowns and proclamations' Carey (2000b) adapted. My suggestion is that ψευδῆ here has the meaning of disproportionate: the recognition and honour from the proclamation of a crown before the whole city and in front of an international audience would have been too grandiose for an achievement only performed at deme or tribe level; on the issue whether Ctesiphon was permitted by law to announce the crown in the theatre of Dionysus, see also Aesch. 3.34 cf. Dem. 18.120; Usher (1993) 15.

<sup>185</sup> More specifically, Demosthenes exploits the city's justice system by his allegedly sycophantic activity.

because, he claims, Demosthenes had not spent any of his own resources for the repair of the walls, one of Demosthenes' benefactions for which Ctesiphon had proposed the crown. These instances reinforce two points regarding the rhetorical exploitation of a citizen's *philotimia* in political discussions in the courtroom: first, that the main realm of civic-oriented *philotimia* in these contexts seems to be that of monetary benefactions;<sup>186</sup> second, that demonstrating civic-oriented *philotimia* seems to be antithetical to making private profit out of the performance of a public service.

In this section, I discussed most of the not very many cases where *philotimia* vocabulary appears in the political battles of Demosthenes and Aeschines. In most of them, *philotimia* vocabulary is positively charged and employed to back up morally manifestations of monetary supererogation. In none of them is *philotimia* directly employed for the explanation of positively charged political motives; yet it enhances one's political integrity by association, in the form of a 'synecdochical argument':<sup>187</sup> if one is a civic-oriented

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<sup>186</sup> See also the possibility of being a civic-oriented *philotimos* by fulfilling the role of *ho boulomenos*, a point with which Aeschines concludes his prosecution of Timarchos (Aesch. 1.196). See p. 103 n. 85; in the same vein, Demosthenes portrays himself as a *philotimos* citizen who, by bringing Meidias in trial, offered the city the opportunity to deal with an excessive and undemocratic citizen. See pp. 89-90, 102-103.

<sup>187</sup> On synecdochical argument, see Liddel (2007) 154 who draws from Dover (1974) 41, 298-299, 302; Dover (1978) 20. Note that both Dover and Liddel only mention the negative form of this argument in forensic speeches which in general takes the following form: if the opponent is bad in domain 'x' of his life, he will also be bad or worse in domain 'y', where 'y' is the issue contested at the trial at hand; my discussion in this section offers a positive expression of the synecdochical argument.

*philotimos* spender, he is also expected to demonstrate moral fibre when involved with public affairs and with policy making. He is expected to be a politician that is willing to take personal risks and risk personal damage for the promotion of policies and the completion of political tasks that are, or that he believes to be, advantageous for the city. A politically active citizen either in direct contexts of deliberation at the Assembly or in discussions of past political events in the courtroom, needed to come across as an individual who in his excelling political role does not challenge collective sovereignty with his power and ambition but serves the communal prosperity. I see this rhetorical exploitation of financially manifested *philotimia* in political contexts as part of the attempt to benefit from the egalitarian elements and get rid of the individualistic elements of the concept. No direct appeals for public gratitude are noticed in association, and this rejection of private interest plays along the lines of giving priority to public interest that was required in politics.

### **The mentality of collective *philotimia*, and the *eunous* politician in *On the Crown***

**(Demosthenes 18)**

Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon regarding his proposal to crown Demosthenes is based on two kinds of arguments: firstly, that the decree is unconstitutional on technical

grounds;<sup>188</sup> and, secondly, that the law forbids the insertion of lies in the decrees of the people and in this regard Ctesiphon's pretext for crowning Demosthenes for 'speaking for the best' and because he 'consistently acts in the best interest of the people'<sup>189</sup> are falsehoods. Aeschines does not waste much time on the technical objections of his prosecution and quickly moves on to what pains him the most: seeing his arch-rival being honoured by the city even though it was Demosthenes' policies that had led to the Chaeronea disaster of 338.<sup>190</sup>

The prosecution turns into an attempt to prove Demosthenes a bad political advisor and thus unworthy of the crown. Aeschines turns the spotlight on the outcome, the failure of the anti-Macedonian policy and apports blame almost exclusively to Demosthenes. Aeschines' rhetorical strategy opens the ground for Demosthenes to turn his reply into a defence of his whole political career, a move that allowed him to add a great amount of self-praise into his rhetorical mix.<sup>191</sup> Demosthenes turns the attention away from the

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<sup>188</sup> The technical grounds are two: firstly, in Aesch. 3.9-31, Aeschines argues that Demosthenes had not yet undergone his *euthyna* as commissioner for the repair of walls and overseer of the Theoric Fund when Ctesiphon proposed the honouring and that course of action was not legal; and, secondly, that Ctesiphon proposed the theatre as the place for proclaiming the crown, but the law only allowed the Assembly for the crowning of Athenian citizens by the people of Athens (Aesch. 3.32-48); see Harris (1995) 142-145 who argues that Aeschines' legal arguments are weak and based on misrepresentation and overstretching of the relevant laws; on *euthyna* in general and in relation with the case at hand, see MacDowell (2000) 15-22.

<sup>189</sup> Aesch. 3.50, translation from Carey (2000b); see also Aesch. 3.49, 155.

<sup>190</sup> See, e.g., Aesch. 3.226-227.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. Aesch. 3.241 where Aeschines anticipates that Demosthenes (acting as Ctesiphon's *sunēgoros*) is going to make his speech a self-eulogy and exhorts the dikasts to show intolerance to that.

unsuccessful outcome by veiling his policies with retrospective morality congruent with the city's ethos and ancestral morals.<sup>192</sup> His tactics turned the trial into a debate on collective honour and morality.<sup>193</sup> In the end, the trial was not about crowning Demosthenes, but about crowning the city.

A few passages from Aeschines' speech sketch the moral outline to which Demosthenes' speech responds. First, it is Aeschines' statement that the city's defeat at Chaeronea is a disgrace for which Demosthenes' policies are responsible as he monopolized the political scene at that time;<sup>194</sup> thus, honouring Demosthenes' on an occasion that disgraced the collective would be beyond inappropriate and a further humiliation for the city in the eyes of all Greeks.<sup>195</sup> If the city validated the crowning proposal, Demosthenes

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<sup>192</sup> Demosthenes lays blame for the Chaeronea failure mostly on bad luck, divine will, and poor performance of the generals thereby exonerating himself and the city's bodies of deliberation and decision-making from all responsibility: e.g. Dem. 18.97, 192-194, 207-208, 247, 300, 303, 306, 18.321 (in the last passage, the powers that led to the disaster are left unidentified); briefly discussed in Christ (2006) 139-140.

<sup>193</sup> Dem. 18.62-72, 80, 83, 93-94.

<sup>194</sup> Aesch. 3.145-146, 226: 'But you do not ask yourself what kind of a politician it would be who had the ability to ingratiate himself with the people but sold off the opportunities to make the city secure, used slander to prevent men of sense from giving advice, and after running away from danger and immersing the city in incurable catastrophe demanded a crown for virtue, when he had done nothing of benefit and was to blame for every disaster.', Carey (2000b); on Demosthenes' response to these accusations, see below.

<sup>195</sup> See Aesch. 3.211 on the inappropriateness of the occasion for crowning Demosthenes to which Demosthenes did not object; on the humiliation of the city, see Aesch. 3.227: 'It was when you were not satisfied to have escaped punishment but were actually asking for rewards and making the city a laughing-stock in the sight of Greece that I objected and brought the indictment.' Carey (2000b); Aesch. 3.231: 'But when you yourselves crown a man like this, don't you think you are being hissed in the minds of the Greeks?', Carey (2000b).

would wrongfully appear to rise above the collective by getting individually honoured to the detriment of collective honour aspirations.<sup>196</sup> Furthermore, if the dikasts validated the crowning proposal, they would insult the dead of the Chaeronea battle and they would also set a very bad example for the future generations who would see brave and virtuous men insulted whereas unworthy ones publicly honoured.<sup>197</sup> The city's character is reflected on the individuals she chooses to honour and it would be a shame for the city to be associated not with the ancestors but with Demosthenes' cowardice.<sup>198</sup> The moral aspect of Aeschines' argumentation expands on the further impact that the prevalence and eventual collapse of the anti-Macedonian policy will have on the city: if they crown Demosthenes for his unsuccessful political contributions, they will appear defeated within and without the borders of the city, not only physically in the battlefield but also ethically in the field of honour.

Instead of focusing on failure, Demosthenes turns attention to the idea of honourable effort that has its roots in the city's long tradition.<sup>199</sup> Rather than stressing the outcome of

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<sup>196</sup> Aesch. 3.230: 'but thanks to Demosthenes' policies you have no crowns and proclamations, while he will have his name proclaimed?', Carey (2000b); Aesch. 3.231: 'Your fathers gave the credit for the glorious and brilliant achievements to the people but blamed humiliations and failures on shabby politicians, but Ctesiphon thinks you should remove the disgrace from Demosthenes and place it on the people.', Carey (2000b) adapted; see also Aesch. 3.237: the credit for the Theban alliance should go to the city and not to Demosthenes.

<sup>197</sup> Aesch. 3.244-246.

<sup>198</sup> Aesch. 3.247.

<sup>199</sup> On the glorification of the Chaeronea defeat and Demosthenes' policies that led to it, see e.g. Buckler (2000) 147; Montgomery (1983) 89-91.

Macedonian resistance, Demosthenes insists that his policy was the best shot the city had against the Macedonian threat,<sup>200</sup> although it was unfortunately not crowned with success in the battlefield. To exonerate his policies from the burden of failure, Demosthenes replaces Aeschines' rhetoric of disgrace with his own rhetoric of retrospective morality:<sup>201</sup> the city did not fail; following Demosthenes' political advice the city did what was expedient as well as honourable,<sup>202</sup> and in doing so they honoured the values and the high moral standards of the ancestors.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Regarding the Chaeronea battle, in particular, Demosthenes stresses the fact that the city could not have hoped for more favourable conditions to face Philip: they had Thebes on their side and they fought outside Athenian borders (Dem. 18.194-195); on the point that there was no better alternative to Demosthenes' policies, see Dem. 18.190-191 and Yunis (2000) 105-106.

<sup>201</sup> See, Dem. 18.190, 206-210; on the point that Demosthenes' policy was the best 'even viewed in retrospect', see Yunis (1996) 275-276, quotation from p. 276; on hindsight, see Powell (2013).

<sup>202</sup> E.g. Dem. 18.87-89 (ὁ γὰρ τότε ἐνστάς πόλεμος, ἄνευ τοῦ καλὴν δόξαν ἐνεγκεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀφθονωτέροις καὶ εὐωνοτέροις διῆγεν ὑμᾶς τῆς νῦν εἰρήνης), 297-300, 298 (ὦν ἔκρινα δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων τῇ πατρίδι), 306-307.

<sup>203</sup> See Montgomery (1983) 84-85, 88-89 on the combination of honour, expedience and the element of risk in Demosthenes' account of his policies; on the idea that arguments for honour did matter for the audience and were not merely words, see briefly Montgomery (1983) 105-107; more extensively, see Hunt (2010) esp. ch.7-8 on the importance of claims for justice/morality/shame/honour and for expediency/interest/calculations in policy-formation processes in the time of Demosthenes, *contra* unmasking theories that seek for 'true' reasons for action (i.e. calculation) underneath stated reasons for action (i.e. morality); on the idea that Athens' noble ideals and her interests were very closely connected during the time of the Macedonian resistance, see Hunt (2010) 180 and his references in p. 180 n. 134; on 'the superiority of moral to interest claims' noticed in Demosthenes' rhetoric of the Chaeronea defeat, Hunt (2010) 183 very aptly notices that Demosthenes 'argues against a Realism with the benefit of accurate knowledge of the future' (i.e. the unsuccessful outcome).

Liddel (2007) 236-247 has pointed out that in Aeschines' and Demosthenes' speeches we may identify two contrasting ways in which political obligation is constructed: Aeschines offers a democratic account of political obligation that stresses the responsibilities of the *demos*, the significance of obeying the law and of securing smooth operation of democracy's institutions, while leaving little space for the prominence of the expert politician. Demosthenes, on the other hand, stresses the obligation of the expert politician to advise the people and this line of argumentation allows him to turn his political career into a duty towards the city successfully performed. Liddel (2007) 246-247 suggested that presenting political contributions as 'a virtuous action or as the fulfilment of a civic obligation' might have been a mechanism to mitigate popular reactions to regular political activity and that such 'boasts of political involvement as acts of supererogation were restricted to those orators who, like Demosthenes, were also active politicians'.<sup>204</sup> At the same time, he points out that the success of the rhetoric of *On the Crown* 'might indeed reflect the erosion of the value of democratic popular contribution to deliberation'.<sup>205</sup> While Liddel (2007) 245 stresses the inegalitarian aspect of Demosthenes' rhetoric, I think that a detailed examination of the rhetoric of *philotimia* and *eunoia* in *On the Crown* may point to an attempt on Demosthenes' part to balance his 'boasts' with a much more egalitarian approach to political participation and thus capitalize on his political contributions in a smoother way.

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<sup>204</sup> Quotations from Liddel (2007) 246.

<sup>205</sup> Quotation from Liddel (2007) 246-247.

Demosthenes reserves for himself an excelling position in the political scene without undermining the power of the people:<sup>206</sup> to bridge individual superiority as advisor of the city with collective sovereignty Demosthenes constructs his ethos, which is reflected in his policies, in accordance with the ethos of the collective. The city, as we will see, traditionally strives for primacy out of *philotimia* (Dem. 18.66),<sup>207</sup> and this attitude is reflected in the policies that Demosthenes promoted throughout his career. As expected, we do not find negatively coloured *philotimia* vocabulary associated with political contribution, since we are dealing with a biased self-assessment of Demosthenes' political career.<sup>208</sup> Nonetheless, we can identify several passages in *On the Crown* that I identify as '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts.<sup>209</sup> Although lacking *philotim*- derivatives, these '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts include qualities and principles of action that outline the ideological background of collective *philotimia*, and Demosthenes' political choices appear to comply with this spirit of collective *philotimia*. Thus, the concept of *philotimia* is not absent from Demosthenes' public profile but is exploited in a

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<sup>206</sup> Ober (1989a) 280-285 argues that the politicians not only did not hide their elite social status but they also stressed it. He fails, however, to notice the changes in the discourse of *philotimia* in political discussions: see especially Ober's (1989a) 284-285 comments on Dem. 18.257 and Lys. 16.20.

<sup>207</sup> This is one of the few times that *philotimia* vocabulary appears in Dem. 18 and it is associated with collective morality and collective honour. In this section, I am not discussing extensively Dem. 18.257-258, another important *philotimia* passage, on which see my analysis in pp. 257-259.

<sup>208</sup> Neither does Demosthenes attribute to his opponents negatively coloured *philotimia* as a political motive.

<sup>209</sup> See pp. 52-54.

different way: the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* of the excelling individual is replaced with the rhetoric of proposing policies that conform with the attitude of collective *philotimia* that motivated the ancestors. In this way, Demosthenes' personal power and ambition are deemphasized in a commendable manner and, as agent responsible for advocating these policies, Demosthenes is cast several times as *eunous* towards the city and as being motivated by *eunoia* towards the people not by *philotimia*.

It has been noted that Demosthenes lays stress upon the ethical aspect of his policies rather than their outcome.<sup>210</sup> In Dem. 18.66, Demosthenes refers to the resistance to Philip as the duty of Athens against the formation of a tyranny over Greece (ἀρχὴν καὶ τυραννίδα τῶν Ἑλλήνων) and the advocacy of such a policy as the duty of the *symoulos*.<sup>211</sup> What else could

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<sup>210</sup> See Liddel (2007) 240-241; Yunis (2000) 104-110 notes the tragic and epic element of Demosthenes' insistence on morality irrespective of success; cf. Cawkwell (1969) who deems Demosthenes' policies a complete disaster (with especial emphasis on the period 336-330 which is silenced by Demosthenes) and *On the Crown* a misleading account of past events; contrast Yunis (2000) 100-102; my impression is that we cannot deny that temporal distance and the fact of failure allow Demosthenes to adopt this rhetorical strategy of retrospective morality and collective self-sacrifice in the name of ancestral values. Nevertheless, it also seems apt to conjecture here that at the time of decision-making and deliberation the anti-Macedonian course of action that led to the Chaeronea disaster seemed the most expedient both to Demosthenes who promoted it (if we allow that he acted with the best of his intentions) and the city that implemented it; see Liddel (2007) 241 n. 99 on the benefits of Demosthenes' policies; Montgomery (1983) 92 notes that 'history may not be judged *ex eventu*' and that Demosthenes attempts to make the *dikasts* view the events from the perspective of the people who could not have been aware of the unsuccessful outcome when they decided to face Philip in Chaeronea.

<sup>211</sup> On the compatibility of Demosthenes' advice with the city's values and idea of honourable duty, see also Dem. 18.69, 71-72, 234-239, 292-293, 306. In Dem. 18.292-293, Demosthenes argues that it would be unjust to say that the mentality of helping the Greeks and opposing

Demosthenes have advised when he knew that ‘the city had always been competing for primacy and honour and glory, and had also spent more money and manpower on account of *philotimia* and the interests of all Greeks than each of the other Greek states has spent for their own sake?’<sup>212</sup> It belongs to the city’s traditional morality to be guided in external affairs by *philotimia* not (only) for the city’s interest, but for the sake of all Greece. This is the only instance in *On the Crown* that *philotim*- vocabulary is employed in an ethical evaluation of political attitudes and it is noteworthy that it is attributed to the collective not to Demosthenes.

The context within which collective *philotimia* is praised allows us to identify relevant ideas and values that will help us reconstruct what I have labelled as ‘*philotimia*-friendly’ contexts. The city’s attitude of *philotimia* is inspired by a sense of commitment to a higher

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their subjugation originated in Demosthenes’ statesmanship. Demosthenes in fact accuses Aeschines of depriving the city of her traditional morality by attributing the moral principles of Demosthenes’ policies to Demosthenes; on the idea of Athens as the champion of the interests and liberty of Greece in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches and in Dem. 18, see Milns (2000) 216-217.

<sup>212</sup> Dem. 18.66, my translation. On crowns as symbols of praiseworthy *philotimia* and on collective *philotimia*, see also Dem. 22.69-78 (paraphrased in Dem. 24.180-186): the ancestors had always been acting out of *philotimia*; they were not interested in acquiring wealth but in investing their wealth on honourable initiatives. Androtion, by contrast, destroyed the city’s crowns and their honorary inscriptions and turned them into saucers that are symbols of wealth thereby disgracing the city’s *philotimia* and showing his preference to wealth contrary to the city’s traditional morality; also on collective *philotimia*, see Dem. 20.10; 24.91-95, 210; on the contrast between the city’s traditional morality and the opponent’s (Leocrates) conduct, see Lyc. 1.14-15, 69-70, 80-82, 104, 108-110. Note especially the use of *philotimia* vocabulary in Lyc. 1.15, 69.

cause that may cost heavily in resources of various kinds.<sup>213</sup> Surpassing everyone in honourable effort for the sake of a common cause,<sup>214</sup> and doing so by demonstrating supererogation in money spending as well as in the battlefield are some of the basic features expected to be found in *'philotimia-friendly'* contexts.<sup>215</sup>

Examples of *'philotimia-friendly'* contexts in which the ethos of the city is (re)constructed are found in Dem. 18.97: 'but they were willing to expose themselves to the dangers for the sake of their good name and honour; and their decision was right and noble!'; Dem. 18.101: 'Then, having seen the city willing to engage in so many important contests for the benefit of others, what course was I going to urge on her, what action was I going to advise her to take, when the matter being considered concerned, in a certain way, her own interests? To revive past grievances against those wanting help, I suppose, and to look for excuses to abandon everything. And who would not have been right to kill me if I had attempted to bring disgrace upon any of the city's honours, even by words alone?';<sup>216</sup> Dem. 18.201: 'our city had never in former times chosen inglorious self-preservation [ἀσφάλειαν

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<sup>213</sup> See the comparison between Athens' and Philip's ambition in terms of virtue and vice in Dem. 18.67-68.

<sup>214</sup> Regarding Dem. 18.66, the common honourable cause is liberty (ἐλευθερία) for the sake of which the city traditionally expends lavishly its resources, as specified two paragraphs later, in Dem. 18.68-69.

<sup>215</sup> It is this same attitude of *philotimia* that urged Demosthenes to promote the alliance with Thebes against Philip. See Dem. 18.174-178, 237-238.

<sup>216</sup> Demosthenes insists on the morality of examples from past Athenian history and, as Yunis (2001) notices ad loc., 'ignores the strategic concerns that motivated these earlier Athenian actions'.

ἄδοξον] rather than face danger for the sake of honour [τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν κίνδυνον]'; Dem. 18.203: 'But such behaviour was neither traditional, nor tolerable, nor natural for Athenians, and no one had ever throughout history been able to persuade them to accept secure subjection (ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν) to a strong and unjust power. Rather, she has in every age continuously striven (ἀγωνιζομένη) in her hazardous quest (κινδυνεύουσα) for primacy (περὶ πρωτείων), honour (τιμῆς) and renown (δόξης).'<sup>217</sup>

This spirit of self-sacrifice that, at least at the ideological level,<sup>218</sup> is inherent to the collective's motivation for action is reflected on the kind of retrospective morality that Demosthenes attributes to his policies that led to the Chaeronea disaster for which he is held responsible. His policies appear, in this way, to have shared the collective's moral principles of action and Demosthenes invites his audience to evaluate his political career according to whether it is disgraceful or honourable to advise and act along the moral standards of the city.<sup>219</sup>

The manner in which Demosthenes conducts politics reflects at the level of the individual the city's traditional *philotimia* attitude: his honourable initiatives and the supererogation he demonstrates as *symbolos* of the city<sup>220</sup> are often blended with the ideals

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<sup>217</sup> Translations by Usher (1993).

<sup>218</sup> This aspect of Demosthenes' rhetoric – collective self-sacrifice for the sake of the past, present and future community – is a significant element of democratic ideology depicted in the rhetoric of the funeral orations. See Carey (2005) 78-79.

<sup>219</sup> On the collective's moral superiority, see Roisman (2005) 133-135.

<sup>220</sup> On Demosthenes' supererogation in politics, see Liddel (2007) 240-241, 244-245.

of civic courage,<sup>221</sup> political bravery,<sup>222</sup> and prioritization of the collective's honour and interest. Combinations of these elements in the speech produce variations of 'philotimia-friendly' environments.

An instance of this kind of contexts is detected in Demosthenes' discussion of his political role in domestic affairs. In Dem. 18.107-109, Demosthenes takes pride in his successful proposal for the reform of the trierarchic law (Dem. 18.102-106).<sup>223</sup> He stresses its usefulness and justice as well as the courage that he manifested in confronting the wealthiest Athenians that would be burdened with extra financial duties because of his proposal. Demosthenes caps this section with a general assessment of his contributions in external as

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<sup>221</sup> See Roisman (2005) 142-145, 159-162.

<sup>222</sup> The element of political bravery is once, in Aeschines' *On the Embassy*, articulated in *philotimia* terms. In Aesch. 2.101-107, Aeschines sums up some points of his speech at a private meeting of the Athenian envoys during the Second Embassy to prepare tactics for the upcoming meeting with Philip. Regarding the issue of settling the Phocian war, Aeschines says, Athens had allowed some scope for diplomatic manoeuvring to her envoys, mainly because the city wanted to avoid the political cost in case Philip declined a direct Athenian request to support the Phocians against the Thebans (Aesch. 2.104-105). Thus, big part of the risk and the political cost was transferred to the envoys who had to show political bravery in their initiatives to address successfully the settlement of the Phocian war (ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποκινδυνεύειν ᾧθήσαν δεῖν, Aesch. 2.104). This was a demanding task, but men who are keen to act with *philotimia* in public affairs should act up to the demands of the city and of the situation: δεῖ δὴ τοὺς πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμούμενους μὴ κατέχειν μὲν ἑτέρων χώρων πρέσβων (Aesch. 2.105). The idea of being *philotimos* in public affairs is here commendable because it is related with the risk of suffering loss of personal interest for the sake of the public good, not with individualistic motives for undertaking official duties; on the importance of this private meeting for Athenian foreign policy, see Harris (1995) 83-85.

<sup>223</sup> On Demosthenes' reform of the trierarchic law in 340, see Gabrielsen (1994) 207-213.

well as domestic affairs:<sup>224</sup> all his political measures have been worthy of the city's ethos and have brought honourable distinction (δόξαι, τιμαί) and benefit (δυνάμεις) to the community (Dem. 18.108).<sup>225</sup>

In relation with external affairs, a few instances of '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts can be detected in the discussion of Demosthenes' role in the formation of the Theban alliance and more generally of the policies that led to the battle of Chaeronea. After the narration of the Elatea debate (Dem. 18.169-178), Demosthenes makes an overall evaluation of his political role regarding the alliance with Thebes. According to his account, his political suggestions and services monopolized the whole process,<sup>226</sup> and Demosthenes makes sure to stress his wholehearted devotion to the service of the city at a time of great peril: καὶ ἔδωκ' ἑμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἀπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους (Dem. 18.179).<sup>227</sup> A little later, still

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<sup>224</sup> Dem. 18.108-109: βάσκανον δὲ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ κακότηθες οὐδέν ἐστι πολίτευμ' ἑμόν, οὐδὲ ταπεινόν, οὐδὲ τῆς πόλεως ἀνάξιον. ταῦτὸ τοίνυν ἦθος ἔχων ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πολιτεύμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς φανήσομαι. 'No measure of mine is spiteful, harsh or malicious, nor mean or unworthy of the city. And I shall be seen to have been of the same character in both my domestic and my foreign policy.', Usher (1993).

<sup>225</sup> Dem. 18.109 continues along the same lines: within the city he was not sold to the rich but he supported the many, whereas in Panhellenic level he has chosen the common interest of all Greece instead of Philip's gifts and friendship.

<sup>226</sup> Dem. 18.179: he addressed the Assembly in support of the alliance, moved decrees towards that purpose, acted as ambassador to the Thebans and eventually convinced them to take Athens' part against Philip.

<sup>227</sup> 'and devoted myself entirely to meeting the dangers that beset the city', Usher (1993); see also Dem. 18.160: μάλιστα δ' ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἐστίν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πόνων ὑπέμεινα, 'but chiefly because it is shameful for me to have undergone the labour of my exertions on your behalf', Usher (1993); note the reciprocal bond with the city denoted by ὑμῖν (Dem. 18.179) and ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν (Dem. 18.160); for variations of this phrasing

talking about the initiation of the Theban alliance and the unsuccessful confrontation of Philip, Demosthenes urges Aeschines (and the audience) to judge his political activity not from the outcome but from his *prohairesis* as *symbolos* of the city.<sup>228</sup> As he elaborates on the quality of his *prohairesis*, one cannot but notice that it is pervaded by the idea of civic-oriented *philotimia* (Dem. 18.193):

ἀλλ' ὡς οὐχ ἅπανθ' ὅσ' ἐνῆν κατ' ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν εἰλόμην, καὶ δικαίως ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιμελῶς ἔπραξα καὶ φιλοπόνως ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ καλὰ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἄξια πράγματ' ἐνεστησάμην καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, ταῦτά μοι δεῖξον, καὶ τότε ἤδη κατηγορεῖ μου.

'But demonstrate that I did not choose all the options possible by human calculation, and did not carry them through honestly and diligently and with energy beyond my strength; or that I did not undertake enterprises that were honourable, worthy of the city and necessary: then and only then can you accuse me.'<sup>229</sup>

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that demonstrates an action performed vis-à-vis the Athenian people in expressions of civic-oriented *philotimia* both in the Attic orators and in honorific inscriptions, see pp. 28-33.

<sup>228</sup> Dem. 18.192-193: 'but it is the policy chosen by the statesman that reveals his insight (ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις). So do not put the blame upon me if Philip happened to prevail in the battle: its issue was in the hands of the gods, not mine.', Usher (1993).

<sup>229</sup> Usher (1993).

Demosthenes gave himself wholeheartedly to the task of serving the city as *symboulos* and in doing so he surpassed himself in effort and indeed in honourable effort in accordance with the values and needs of the community.

A few paragraphs later, in a comparison of himself with Aeschines as advisors of the city (Dem. 18.196-198),<sup>230</sup> Demosthenes emerges as the better citizen in similar '*philotimia*-friendly' terms: he devoted himself to policies expedient to everyone (ἔδωκ' ἑμαυτὸν εἰς τὰ πᾶσι δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν) without avoiding or calculating any kind of personal risk and danger (οὐδένα κίνδυνον ὀκνήσας ἴδιον οὐδ' ὑπολογισάμενος).<sup>231</sup> His anti-Macedonian policy, as we learn in Dem. 18.206-210, reflected the spirit (φρόνημα) of the ancestors exhorting the city to become once more the leader of an honourable cause: just as previously in Marathon, Plataea, Salamis, and Artemisium, 'you took upon yourselves the peril of war for the freedom and salvation of all' (Dem. 18.208).<sup>232</sup> In this context, Demosthenes casts

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<sup>230</sup> See also earlier, Dem. 18.188-191. Demosthenes veils his failed policies with retrospective morality, but here he denies Aeschines the right to judge Demosthenes' policies retrospectively: whereas in his self-portrait Demosthenes emerges as the man of the hour, Aeschines' retrospective criticism casts Demosthenes as a sycophant.

<sup>231</sup> Unlike Aeschines who neither had suggested an alternative political route nor had refrained from undermining the city's selected policies (Dem. 18.197); see also Dem.18. 306-311 on the idea of Aeschines as enemy of the state.

<sup>232</sup> On arguments of helping the weak and fighting for freedom in Demosthenes as appealing to the Athenians' sense of interest (i.e., maintaining 'a balance of power' by preventing the dominance of another state) as well as to their traditional ideals (i.e., fighting for freedom), see Hunt (2010) 177-180; Carey (2005) 89-91 notes that the argument of traditionally acting for the good of Greece offers to the Athenians a firm, 'national' identity that they should not betray, even if they could have known that Chaeronea would have been a disaster; Said (2001) 284-285 notes that Demosthenes presents Athens as the chief proponent of Greek ethos,

himself as a *symbolos* who offers advice on asserting the city's preeminence (τὸν περὶ τῶν πρωτείων σύμβουλον, Dem. 18.209) and thus through his noble political suggestions he emerges as a bearer of collective *philotimia* promoting the advancement of the city's honour and distinction.

A few paragraphs later (Dem. 18.219-221), when it comes to his personal distinction and to explaining his monopolization of politics,<sup>233</sup> Demosthenes justifies his outstanding activity in terms of having performed his duty to the limit when the city was found in utmost danger. He does not stress personal ambition, but justifies his political distinction by emphasizing personal risk and endangerment for the sake of the collective: 'but I had so thoroughly convinced myself of the size of the danger that had overtaken the city, that I thought it did not allow any room or consideration [πρόνοιαν οὐδεμίαν] for my personal security [τῆς ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας], but one had to be content to do what was necessary without

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always fighting for the freedom of the Greeks, and his own policies as promoting the same values: 'this portrayal of the Athenians is also a self-portrait of Demosthenes' (p. 284); on the connection between fighting for freedom and collective masculinity, see Roisman (2005) 133-134.

<sup>233</sup> In comparison with orators of the past, Demosthenes claims that he is the only one who was active in every step of policy-making by proposing decrees as well acting as ambassador. This is a rhetorical misrepresentation: see Usher (1993) ad loc. and Yunis (2001) ad loc.; note again the vocabulary of surpassing oneself in effort for the sake of the city in Dem. 18.219: ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδεὶς πώποτε τούτων διὰ παντὸς ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς οὐδὲν τῇ πόλει, 'Yet not one of these ever gave his services to any of the state's enterprises from beginning to end', Usher (1993); on Demosthenes' domination of the political stage, see also Dem. 18.179; cf. p. 264 n. 194 on Aeschines' perspective.

omitting anything [εἰ μὴδὲν παραλείπων τις ἃ δεῖ πράξειεν]' (Dem. 18.220).<sup>234</sup> Self-sacrifice and personal exertion for the well-being of the city are employed to explain Demosthenes' political over-exertion during the period between the Elatea and Chaeronea events. Demosthenes' domination of the political stage at that time had been cast in Aesch. 3.145-146 as *δυναστεία* and Demosthenes needs to make sure the audience does not take his over-active political role as a challenge to democracy. Thus, he admits dominating the political scene of the time, but only because he proved himself the man of the hour by serving the city without considering his personal interest. This public-spirited attitude in politics had deservedly won him crowns from the city (Dem. 18.222). Here we have an instance where Demosthenes' conduct in public affairs encapsulates the concept of acting out of *philotimia* towards the city, out of positively charged *philotimia*, but again no *philotimia* cognates are employed in this context.

Finally, '*philotimia*-friendly' contexts can also be detected in an episode where rhetorical skill and its efficient employment are discussed (Dem. 18.276-288). Demosthenes had been in the spotlight for a long period and this does not allow him to present himself as an amateur public speaker. Therefore, he tries to downplay suspicions of deception usually attributed to skillful speakers. For that purpose, Demosthenes stresses the idea that as *symbolos* of the city he does not personally reap the benefits of his oratorical ability but

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<sup>234</sup> Usher (1993).

puts his skill in the service of the collective: the vocabulary as well as the ideas employed to express this beneficial bond with the city create the impression that Demosthenes has been employing his eloquence in a civic-oriented manner. In Dem. 18.277 he claims that everyone will find his rhetorical skill exercised in public (ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς) and always on behalf of the collective (ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀει), never against the collective (οὐδαμοῦ καθ' ὑμῶν) or for private purposes (ἰδίᾳ); in Dem. 18.278 that an orator and a statesman need to act ardently when collective interests are in danger (ἐν οἷς τῶν ὅλων τι κινδυνεύεται τῇ πόλει) and when facing enemies of the people (ἐν οἷς πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ); in Dem. 18.280 that when exercising eloquence in public what matters is sharing the same mentality with the many (τὸ ταῦτὰ προαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς)<sup>235</sup> and having the same friends and enemies as one's homeland; and in Dem. 18.281, he reinforces the point that with his political choices he supported the city's views of beneficial policies (ταῦτὰ γὰρ συμφέρονθ' εἰλόμην τουτοισί) without differentiating himself or serving private purposes in action (οὐδὲν ἐξάριετον οὐδ' ἴδιον πεποιήμαι). All in all, Demosthenes does not state that he has been offering political advice out of *philotimia*, as such a statement could open the door to the aspect of individualistic ambition associated with *philotimia* in political contexts and Demosthenes did not want to impress that idea upon the jurors' mind.<sup>236</sup> Instead of naming himself *philotimos*,

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<sup>235</sup> On Demosthenes' *prohairesis* as *sympoulos*, see p. 275.

<sup>236</sup> See the discussion of the 'I have (not) stood up out of *philotimia*' mentality in contexts of public debating in Section 1 above.

Demosthenes shows that he has been using his eloquence similarly to the way the civic-oriented *philotimos* uses his money:<sup>237</sup> for the sake of the collective to support policies that respect the mindset of the many; not for his personal benefit but in occasions that may involve great public danger. Thus, Demosthenes' political ethos evokes in the political terrain commendable qualities of the *philotimos* spender.

So far, we have seen some cases in the field of politics and in political discussions where specific external conditions (e.g. threats against the city, danger of the situation) combined with specific principles of action on the part of the individual (e.g. civic bravery, personal risk, priority to the collective not to the individual) create 'philotimia-friendly' contexts which reflect the *philotimia* attitude of the city, as explained in Dem. 18.66. Within such contexts, the image of 'Demosthenes the *symboulos*' is constructed and his past policies are evaluated. In this way, Demosthenes' political ethos appears to follow the expectations of collective morality and collective *philotimia*, although *philotim-* cognates are not employed to reinforce his moral proximity to the city's ethos.

When it comes to characterizing Demosthenes as 'so-and-so' and as acting out of 'such and such a quality' in political contests, it is often *eunous* and *eunoia* vocabulary that are used.<sup>238</sup> In a dramatic review of the Elatea debate, Demosthenes mentions that at the

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<sup>237</sup> On the idea of the *philotimos* spender colouring positively the political ethos of Demosthenes, especially in Dem. 19, see pp. 246-262.

<sup>238</sup> E.g. in Dem. 18.110, after Demosthenes has extensively reviewed his foreign and domestic policies up to 340, he appears to paraphrase part of Ctesiphon's decree: τὸ γὰρ ὡς τᾶριστά τ'

beginning of the assembly-meeting when the herald made the customary question ‘Who wishes to speak?’ nobody rose, although all the generals and *rhētores* of the city were present (Dem. 18.170). The seriousness of the situation was such that despite their good intentions neither the patriots nor the wealthiest ones nor the patriotic as well as wealthy citizens (καὶ εὖνους τῇ πόλει καὶ πλουσίους) had the necessary knowledge and expertise to give the best advice for action (Dem. 18.171).<sup>239</sup> The time called for Demosthenes, the citizen who was not merely patriotic and wealthy (οὐ μόνον εὖνουν καὶ πλούσιον, Dem. 18.172), but had also followed the events very closely and had seriously thought out the plans and desires of

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ἔπραττον καὶ διὰ παντὸς εὖνους εἰμὶ καὶ πρόθυμος εὖ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἱκανῶς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δεδηλώσθαί μοι νομίζω, ‘for I suppose it is sufficiently clear from what I have said that “I acted to the best possible effect and have been patriotic at all times and keen to serve you well”, Usher (1993); cf. Aeschines’ citation of the decree in Aesch. 3.49-50: ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας; see also Dem. 18.286, when explaining why the city chose him over Aeschines and his like to deliver the funeral oration for the dead of Chaeronea: ἀμφοτέρ’ ἤδεσαν αὐτοί, τὴν τ’ ἐμὴν εὖνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν μεθ’ ἧς τὰ πράγματ’ ἔπραττον, καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀδικίαν, ‘The Athenians knew equally my goodwill and the zeal with which I conducted affairs, and your disloyalty’, Usher (1993); Dem. 18.276, where Demosthenes refuses to recognize any element of patriotism in Aeschines’ speeches: ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἀπλῶς καὶ μετ’ εὖνοίας πάντα εἰρηκῶς τοὺς λόγους, ‘as if all his pronouncements were honest and well-intentioned’, Usher (1993); also, in Din. 1.99-102, Dinarchus attacks Demosthenes for neglecting his duties as politician and in 102 he does so in *eunoia* terms: ἔπειτα ποῦ τῆς εὖνοίας τῆς σῆς ὁ δῆμος ἔλαβε πεῖραν, ἢ ποῦ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος βοήθειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐξεταζομένην εἶδομεν, ‘In what way, then, did the people have experience of your benevolence, or where did we see the protecting power of the orator in action?’, Worthington (1999); for all the attestations of a speaker demonstrating his *eunoia* towards the city and the opponent’s lack of *eunoia* towards the city in the Attic orators, see Sanders (2016) 174 nn. 48, 49.

<sup>239</sup> See Roisman (2004) 274-275 on the unique position among the politicians that Demosthenes reserves for himself as a way of ‘exert[ing] power over the people’ (p. 275).

Philip.<sup>240</sup> Being *eunous* and *plousios* are presented as inadequate qualifications for advising the city,<sup>241</sup> but when Demosthenes moves on to cast himself as the only suitable to address the people, he singles himself out in terms of *eunoia*. He was the only orator and politician of the city that did not desert the post of *eunoia* (τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν) at the time of general danger,<sup>242</sup> but performed all his political duties on behalf of the collective in the middle of a terrible emergency (Dem. 18.173). In these familiar ‘*philotimia* friendly’ contexts of danger, personal risk, honourable effort, and public interest, Demosthenes’ motivation for action is not defined as *philotimia* but as a strong sense of public duty not to betray the ranks of *eunoia*. It is important to note that the language of *eunoia* is employed in two separate ways in this discussion: every ordinary citizen could be (and should be) *eunous* towards the city, but it was only Demosthenes that lived up to the standards of *eunoia* as a politician.

This double use of *eunoia* vocabulary reveals the advantage that the language of goodwill has over the language of *philotimia* and ambition: it does not alienate the speaker from his audience.<sup>243</sup> Every patriotic citizen would see himself as *eunous* towards the state

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<sup>240</sup> Liddel (2007) 244-245 notes that there is an ‘inegalitarian flavour’ to Demosthenes’ claims for political superiority. My suggestion is that the rhetoric of *eunoia* serves the purpose of mitigating this inegalitarianism.

<sup>241</sup> Yet necessary ones, as noted in Ober (1989a) 239-240.

<sup>242</sup> See Christ (2006) 138 on the employment of military metaphors for political activity/public life.

<sup>243</sup> Note how being *eunous* is repeatedly separated from being wealthy thereby allowing every citizen to think of himself as *eunous* and patriotic towards the city. Dem. 18.171: εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα, καὶ εὐνούς τῇ πόλει καὶ πλουσίους; Dem. 18.172: ἐκεῖνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ

(Dem. 18.171), but at the same time Demosthenes can use his politically manifested *eunoia* towards the city in order to single himself out of the group of orators and politicians (Dem. 18.173).<sup>244</sup> Being *eunous* towards the city is the democratic duty of every citizen, but living up to the standards of *eunoia* towards the city as a politician is a demanding task performed by few because it requires, except for a general sense of patriotism and goodwill towards the state, political thinking and expert knowledge put in the service of the many. By casting himself as the only politician that fulfills the standards of *eunoia*, Demosthenes may be singling himself out of a small group of experts, but he is doing so by using the same language in which collective democratic duties and expectations could be expressed.

Towards the end of the speech, the language of goodwill and *eunoia* towards the city is employed for the final evaluation of Demosthenes' political contributions. Firstly, to unify Demosthenes and his political attitude with that of the great benefactors of the past and, secondly, to distinguish him in excellence from the politicians of his time. Regarding the former, Demosthenes responding to Aeschines' unfair comparison of himself with excelling men of past generations (Dem. 18.314-320) claims that he deserves to be honoured by the city not because his contributions are equal in magnitude with those of the past, but because

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ἡμέρα 'κείνη οὐ μόνον εὖνουν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρ' ἐκάλει; Dem. 18.172: οὐτ' εἰ εὖνους ἦν οὐτ' εἰ πλούσιος.

<sup>244</sup> See also Dem. 18.280-281: a *rhētor* that shares the mentality and interests of the many is a *rhētor* that speaks ἐπ' εὐνοίᾳ and this is the kind of attitude that distinguishes the good *rhētor* from the rest.

all public contributions performed out of goodwill should be rewarded (Dem. 18.316): ἢ πᾶσιν, ὅσοι τι μετ' εὐνοίας πράττουσι, τῆς παρὰ τούτων τιμῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας μετεῖναι,<sup>245</sup> Demosthenes' policies and *prohairesis* share with the great benefactors of the past the same mentality of *eunoia* towards the city,<sup>246</sup> and it is this patriotically motivated attitude that should be recognized, promoted and honoured by all, not strictly the achievement of big results.<sup>247</sup> In this way, Demosthenes identifies himself with the big benefactors of the past in a way which makes it possible for all Athenians to follow their example since what is presented as the most significant element of public contributions is not their magnitude but the agent's attitude.

To support the second point, Demosthenes' political supremacy during his time, politics are presented as a contest of *eunoia* open to all in which Demosthenes thrived (Dem. 18.319-320):

καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοὺς νῦν ὄρα με ρήτορας, πρὸς σαυτόν, πρὸς ὄντινα βούλει τῶν ἀπάντων· οὐδέν' ἐξίσταμαι. ὦν, ὅτε μὲν τῇ πόλει τὰ βέλτισθ' ἐλέσθαι παρῆν, ἐφαμίλλου τῆς εἰς

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<sup>245</sup> 'Or should all those who act with goodwill share in the honour and kindness which these people confer?', Usher (1993).

<sup>246</sup> Dem. 18.317: 'my policies and principles, when examined, will be seen to be similar and to have the same objectives as those of the men who were praised in the past', Usher (1993).

<sup>247</sup> By deemphasizing the importance of magnificent outcomes and highlighting the importance of attitude, motivation, and *prohairesis*, Demosthenes plays along the familiar lines of drawing the audiences' attention away from the Chaeronea disaster.

τὴν πατρίδ' εὐνοίας ἐν κοινῷ πᾶσι κειμένης, ἐγὼ κράτιστα λέγων ἐφαινόμην, καὶ τοῖς  
ἐμοῖς καὶ ψηφίσμασι καὶ νόμοις καὶ πρεσβείαις ἅπαντα διωκεῖτο, ὑμῶν δ' οὐδεὶς ἦν  
οὐδαμοῦ, πλὴν εἰ τούτοις ἐπηρεάσαι τι δέοι.

'So I say, look at me in comparison with today's speakers, with yourself, with anyone  
you like: I shun no contest. At times when choice was to be made of the best policies  
for the city and patriotism was an issue of emulation in which all could compete, I  
was seen to be the best speaker of all, and all our affairs were conducted through my  
measures, laws and diplomacy. None of you was anywhere to be seen, except when  
you had some mischief to do to the people.'<sup>248</sup>

Politics are presented as an open competition of *eunoia* towards the homeland, a contest for  
reaching the best decisions and deciding the most beneficial measures for the city. This is  
the field in which Demosthenes rose above the rest (ἐφαινόμην) up until the time of the  
Chaeronea battle by winning the open contest of *eunoia* with his speeches, with his measures,  
with his laws and with his diplomacy.<sup>249</sup> The language of *eunoia* and goodwill allows  
Demosthenes to present his political excellence in a humbling manner, as the aspect of

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<sup>248</sup> Usher (1993).

<sup>249</sup> For a detailed representation of Demosthenes as politically *eunous* towards the city, see  
Dem. 18.301-305.

political participation that is emphasized is patriotic loyalty in serving the public interest,<sup>250</sup> not the element of pursuing individual distinction.<sup>251</sup>

But the language of *eunoia* also helps him cast in the most positive terms his political disempowerment after the Chaeronea disaster. When the city defeated by Philip did not have much space for political and diplomatic manoeuvres and there was no need for *symboloi* but for people who would carry out Philip's demands and interests, Demosthenes appeared to be weak whereas Aeschines and his like rose in a splendid manner.<sup>252</sup> Demosthenes' self-presentation vis-à-vis Aeschines emerges as a comparison between the mentality of *eunoia* towards the city and the mentality of individual(istic) distinction: *τηνικαῦτα σὺ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστος ἐν τάξει καὶ μέγας καὶ λαμπρὸς ἵπποτρόφος, ἐγὼ δ' ἀσθενής, ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλ' εὖνους μᾶλλον ὑμῶν τουτοισί* (Dem. 18.320).<sup>253</sup> Within the field of democratic politics and when the

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<sup>250</sup> In a similar manner, see Morris (2000) 121 who reads Dem. 18.320 in relation with the mentality of 'middleness': 'Even his unique qualities merely distilled the patriotism every citizen held. *Rhetores* took care to limit the implications of their claims.'

<sup>251</sup> See also Cook's (2009) 47-52 reading of *eunoia* in Dem. 18 which recognizes the advantages of *eunoia* compared to *philotimia* in these contexts.

<sup>252</sup> The allusion being that Aeschines and his colleagues accepted bribes from Philip. See Yunis (2001) ad loc.; cf. Usher (1993) ad loc. who notes that Demosthenes' claim is '[a] partial misrepresentation of the situation': since there was indeed no much space for Athens to negotiate with Philip at that point, there was no need from the part of Philip to bribe the Athenian representatives sent to him.

<sup>253</sup> 'then you and each of your colleagues took up your stations, great men, splendid knights! I was helpless, I admit, but my goodwill towards these men was greater than yours', Usher (1993); for a similar attack on Aeschines, see Dem. 18.313: *ἐν τίσιν οὖν σὺ νεανίας καὶ πηνίκα λαμπρὸς; ἢνίκ' ἂν κατὰ τούτων τι δέη, ἐν τούτοις λαμπροφωνότατος, μνημονικώτατος, ὑποκριτῆς ἄριστος, τραγικὸς Θεοκρίνης*. 'In what circumstances do you show enthusiasm? When do you display your brilliance? Whenever there is something to be said against these

city is at its lowest, Aeschines and his like are described in the most alienating terms, standing above the rest in greatness and splendour as a result of ill-gotten wealth. The whole phrase μέγας καὶ λαμπρὸς ἵπποτρόφος is here employed metaphorically to capture Aeschines' distinction in a sarcastic manner.<sup>254</sup> It is not so much the literal meaning of having the means to be a breeder of horses that is castigated, but the luxurious, splendid and magnificent life-style to which horse-breeding and horse-keeping points. They may have been well-respected activities as such, but transferred to the field of politics, having the mentality of 'a magnificent and splendid horse-breeder', alludes to elitist aspirations that challenge the egalitarian spirit and the political equality of the democracy. Demosthenes, on the other side, by becoming weak when the city is weak conceals the failure of his own policies in the most distinguished and at the same time humbling manner: by stressing his superior loyalty to the collective.

In the discourse of political participation, a case study of which is 'Demosthenes the *symbolos*', the language of *eunoia* is dominant whereas *philotimia* vocabulary is not. When explaining political motives, feeling goodwill towards the city and loyalty to the democracy

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people: it is then that your voice is at its most resonant and your memory at its best; then that you are the supreme actor, a tragic Theocrines.', Usher (1993).

<sup>254</sup> Gribble (2012) 49 notes that after the time of Cimon and with the exception of Alcibiades politically ambitious citizens did not appear to invest on athletic contests and *hippotrophiai* as means of gaining political power. It seems that spending in liturgies as a way of enhancing one's political power was decisively gaining ground over this kind of extra-civic splendid spending; more extensively, see Davies (1981) 91-105; see pp. 115-116 for the juxtaposition of civic-oriented *philotimia* and making a travesty of performing an *hippotrophia* in [Dem.] 42.24.

and the collective are ideologically preferable to ambitious intentions that may imply individual superiority. My explanation for this is based on the idea that different contexts require different rhetorical choices and, more specifically, that when individual contributions are evaluated, *philotimia* vocabulary may fit well in financial contexts but not in political ones. In the discourse of financial contributions in the courtroom, part of an elite speaker's strategy was to mitigate the unavoidably exposed socio-economic inequality between himself and a poor or average Athenian citizen. If not in practice, at least at the level of public rhetoric, the statement that one spends his fortune in public causes out of *philotimia* towards the city, in other words that one channels his ambition and his means in honourable initiatives that benefit the city in practice, seems to mitigate socio-economic inequality through the ideal of the rich yet useful citizen.

Whereas a public spender could and very often would present his financial contributions as having been performed out of *philotimia* towards the city, that is, in a public-spirited manner that deserved recognition from the city, the political trials between Demosthenes and Aeschines indicate that a politician would not rhetorically exploit the performance of his political duties in the same way.<sup>255</sup> In the discourse of politics, a *rhētor* needed to come across as a loyal citizen who mounted the rostrum and participated actively

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<sup>255</sup> In the discourse of the Assembly, as shown in the discussion of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches in Section 3 above, neither financial nor political contributions are rhetorically exploited in this manner.

in policy-making by making use of political equality.<sup>256</sup> If one were not to challenge democracy openly, the idea of equal opportunity in political participation needed to be protected and promoted, and politics needed to be cast as a field where one serves his city out of loyalty and goodwill (*eunoia*) and by subordinating himself to the collective and to its interests, not as a field where elite citizens vent their political ambitions and frustrations. Acting out of *philotimia* carried the suspicion of acting out of ulterior motives, out of an expectation for a reward but also out of a desire for distinction. Both these expectations could be tolerated and, in fact, in many occasions were actively welcomed by the city in the case of financial services and performance of public office for obvious reasons of material interest,<sup>257</sup> but not when collective decision-making and ‘national’ security and prosperity were at stake.<sup>258</sup>

This statement should not be misunderstood, however, as not only *philotimia* but also *eunoia* can be employed in contexts that involve reciprocal advantage. But, whereas *eunoia*

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<sup>256</sup> In public discourse, the ideal of political equality needed to be promoted even though or, perhaps, because in practice not every Athenian citizen made full use of it by speaking in the Assembly.

<sup>257</sup> See pp. 124-125.

<sup>258</sup> I do not claim that politically successful citizens were not rewarded by the state and that there was lack of reciprocity in the domain of politics between individual *rhētores* and the city: such a statement would easily be invalidated merely by the evidence from Ctesiphon’s proposal in honour of Demosthenes. What I am arguing for throughout this chapter is that in the surviving speeches, political participation, political contributions, and political duties were not rhetorically exploited as belonging to the domain of individual *philotimia*. A speaker would not demand a favourable hearing in the courtroom because, for example, he had been addressing the Assembly out of *philotimia* in the past.

expresses the expectation for a positive return for benefit bestowed,<sup>259</sup> *philotimia* entails the urge of pursuing individual distinction.<sup>260</sup> Thus, *philotimia* can have negative connotations, but *eunoia* is generally positively coloured. What is more, in the case of a citizen performing his political duties, such as Demosthenes, acting with *eunoia* is seen almost as an obligation since every citizen is expected to feel goodwill and show loyalty towards the city.<sup>261</sup> Hence the presence of more neutral/positive terminology such as that of goodwill and loyalty towards the city in discussions of political participation and the absence of more ambivalent *philotimia* terminology.

Thus, when Demosthenes rounds up his speech with an ideal description of the way the *metrios politēs* should conduct politics, *eunoia* towards the city (and not personal *philotimia*) is blended with the objective of achieving collective distinction (and not with individual distinction). The *metrios politēs* has a twofold task (Dem. 18.321): ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῆ πόλει προαίρεσιν διαφυλάττειν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ

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<sup>259</sup> On explicit and implicit requests for *eunoia* in the Attic orators, see Sanders (2016) 168-180; on *eunoia* and the social expectation for a positive return in relationships of *philia*, see Mitchell (1997); more generally on *eunoia*, see de Romilly (1958).

<sup>260</sup> *Philotimia* is often reserved as the motivational power of the initiator. *Eunoia*, on the other hand, as Mitchell (1997) 35 notes, ‘was embedded in the exchange process both as a response to the exchange and as an element in the exchange itself’. Thus, one can demonstrate *eunoia* and ask for a return of *eunoia* (Sanders (2016) 173-175), but with *philotimia*, I suggest, things are different. One can demonstrate *philotimia* but since *philotimia* is not an emotion one cannot ask for a return of *philotimia*, but for a return of, e.g., *eunoia*, *charis* or *eleos*.

<sup>261</sup> See Whitehead (1993) 53; Sanders (2016) 173 on reciprocal *eunoia* bordering on loyalty and patriotism in the Attic orators.

καιρῶ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὐνοίαν.<sup>262</sup> In other words, the *metrios politēs* should in every occasion and initiative preserve his loyalty (τὴν εὐνοίαν) towards the city, but, when the city is in a powerful position, he should preserve the collective's attitude of *philotimia* (τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῆ πόλει προαίρεσιν). Following this ideal, Demosthenes claims that as a statesman he never betrayed his loyalty towards the people, but with his policies he always served and augmented the honour, the power, and the glory of the city (Dem. 18.322). From Demosthenes' self-portrayal throughout the speech, it arises that the ideal politically active citizen is not a politician that is himself *philotimos*, but a politician who supports the city's *philotimia* attitude with his policies. And a citizen that does so is cast as one that acts out of *eunoia* towards the city, not out of personal *philotimia*.

The subtle separation of collective *philotimia* attitude from *philotimia* as a personal motive and the rejection of the latter as unacceptable motive for political action strongly indicate that in democratic ideology *philotimia* as a quality of the individual was not admitted in all kinds of public discourses. Surviving deliberative speeches of roughly the same period as well as representations of political debates from the time of Thucydides and Aristophanes seem to corroborate the point that political debating and active political participation were

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<sup>262</sup> 'when in power, the constant aim of his policy should be to preserve the dignity and primacy of his state, and on every occasion and in every action, his own loyalty.', Usher (1993).

competitive and ambitious domains of activity in which *philotimia* was perceived as a suspicious motive rather than as a civic virtue.

## Conclusions

‘φιλοτιμίαν: a word highly characteristic of Greek pride and competitiveness, but hard to define or translate precisely. Many modern scholars refer to it briefly, but a full-scale study of the concept is still awaited.’ This is how Douglas MacDowell opens his discussion of *philotimia* in his commentary of Demosthenes’ *Against Meidias* published in 1990.<sup>1</sup> Ten years later, in 2000, MacDowell introduced his comment on *philotimia* in the exact same words in his commentary of Demosthenes’ *On the False Embassy*.<sup>2</sup> Eighteen years later, in 2018, *philotimia* has indeed received more attention in the scholarship, but a thorough study of the concept from the Homeric poems down to the Hellenistic and early Roman periods is yet to be produced, and a translation more precise than ‘love of honour’ or ‘honourable ambition’ is difficult to coin.

By this point, it has become evident that this thesis is not ‘a full-scale study’ of the concept of *philotimia*, but contributes to the existing scholarship by exploring the place that *philotimia* held in the ideology and value system of democratic Athens as depicted in the literature of the period 430s-320s, mainly in public speech and in the rhetoric of the Attic orators, and to a considerably lesser extent in honorific inscriptions.

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<sup>1</sup> Comment on Dem. 21.159.

<sup>2</sup> Comment on Dem. 19.40.

One of the most important points to be taken away from this survey is the suggestion that we should rather avoid thinking in terms of a semantic change in the meaning of *philotimia*, namely, that it was a negative concept in the late fifth century which turned into a positive concept in the mid fourth century onwards.<sup>3</sup> This thesis shows that throughout the period examined *philotimia* was an ambivalent notion in the sense that at any time we can find evidence for both positive and negative appreciations of *philotimia* and of *philotimoi*. If there is a change, it is one of focus: over the course of this period *philotimia* comes to be systematically promoted as a civic virtue in relation with specific activities and in specific discourses.

Thus, in the end of the fifth century and beginning of the fourth, more emphasis is placed on the dangerous, competitive, and inegalitarian aspects of *philotimia* both in forensic speeches and in retrospective evaluations of political events in Thucydides and Xenophon. We have seen speakers, especially in the Lysianic corpus, laying more emphasis on warning the audience against dangerous or bad *philotimoi* than on presenting themselves as civic-oriented *philotimoi*. This can be viewed as a consequence of the grim memories of the effects of deleterious *philotimia* that the city had experienced during the politically turbulent years of the late fifth century with the failure of the Sicilian expedition and the two short oligarchic upheavals. At the same time, the fact that examples of civic-oriented *philotimia*

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<sup>3</sup> *Contra* MacDowell (1990) 378-379, on Dem. 21.159; Domingo Gygas (2016) 221.

associated with honourable performance of public services, particularly monetary, can indeed be traced as far back as 403 in speeches such as Lys. 21 and Isoc. 18 indicates that the positive evaluation of *philotimia* in association with the performance of public services was not a phenomenon that developed in a vacuum in the mid-fourth century.

What was developing from the 360s onwards was the *systematic* promotion of *philotimia* as a honourable principle of action behind publicly beneficial services as evidenced in the rhetoric of the courtroom and in honorific inscriptions. This is the period when *philotimia* is more systematically defined vis-à-vis the democratic polis as a civic virtue and as ‘love of a particular type of honor, that which derives from doing good to the community’.<sup>4</sup> In this way, *philotimia* is defined in democratic terms<sup>5</sup> and is part of the democratic discourse of effort and reward. In this framework, *philotimia* need not be viewed as essentially aristocratic, inegalitarian, or elitist,<sup>6</sup> as long as it is expressed to the benefit of the community, in ways that do not challenge political equality and the egalitarian ethos of the polis.

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<sup>4</sup> Domingo Gygax (2016) 221.

<sup>5</sup> *Contra* Wilson (2000) 144-197; see pp. 37-44.

<sup>6</sup> On the idea that democracy did have its own language, see Ober (1989a) 289-292, 336-339; for the successful democratic appropriation of aristocratic values in general, see also Brock (1991); Whitehead (1993); Seager (1982) 267-268; Thomas (1989) 213 n. 67, 218; contrast Loraux (1986) 174, 183-189, 195-202, 217-220, 334 who argues for the inability of democracy to create their own language independent from aristocratic evaluations and moral categorizations.

Several aspects of the democratic discourse of civic-oriented *philotimia* have emerged in this study. First, when litigants drew attention to their honourable manifestations of *philotimia* towards the city by mentioning their public services, especially their liturgies, they expected to activate bonds of reciprocity between themselves and the city. Such manifestations of *philotimia* may be revealing of socio-economic inequalities, but show, at the same time, that putting one's resources to the benefit of the community was expected to be perceived as an egalitarian and cooperative manifestation of *philotimia* that deserved public recognition. Thus, instead of viewing liturgic and other monetary expenditures as a domain of *philotimia* from which the majority of Athenians was excluded, we may view them as duties the successful performance of which benefited the majority of the Athenians. That '*philotimia* in Athens remained pre-eminently associated with the expenditure of large sums of money'<sup>7</sup> is not necessarily an argument against its democratic value.<sup>8</sup>

Second, the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* need not be viewed as imposed upon the city by a small group of powerful individuals that could exact civic recognition in the name of their liturgies and other monetary benefactions without having been assessed by the community first. The rhetoric of *Against Leptines* shows very aptly that the city itself valued specific manifestations of *philotimia* and sought to incentivize *philotimoi* citizens (and non-citizens) to continue acting in manners that were publicly beneficial by rewarding them

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<sup>7</sup> Wilson (2000) 173.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 39-40.

for their honourable contributions. The rhetoric of *Against Meidias* shows that not every manifestation of power would count as a manifestation of *philotimia* that deserved recognition. Citizens who wished to excel in public contests and get rewarded for it needed to show both moderation and supererogation in their conduct. Ideally, the civic-oriented *philotimos* was also a *metrios* citizen who pursued individual distinction while promoting public interest and respecting political equality.

Third, surviving inscriptions honouring Athenian citizens show that the city valued *philotimia* as a shared civic virtue. Several of these inscriptions reward ordinary Athenian officials for their successful execution of public office, not for the performance of lavish monetary benefactions,<sup>9</sup> thereby showing that *philotimia* was not an exclusive elite quality strictly related to lavish expenditures of money. Any citizen performing his office outstandingly could be honoured for his *philotimia*. Thus, both a lavish *choregos* and a superintendent of a fountain could be viewed as having fulfilled their duties with *philotimia*. This attestation of *philotimia* in domains that were non-elite and non-wealth-related provides evidence for the idea that *philotimia* was recognized as a common principle of action that could potentially be demonstrated by all citizens in a variety of activities and public duties performed for the benefit of the community. Moreover, the fact that honorific *philotimia* is attested both in polis and deme inscriptions reinforces the idea that it was indeed a shared

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<sup>9</sup> See p. 41 n. 117 for evidence and for scholarship discussing this point.

value that pervaded the democratic community, not restricted to polis-level manifestations or high-level polis competitions.

Fourth, an idea that deserves further exploration is whether acting as *ho boulomenos* could be constructed as a manifestation of civic-oriented *philotimia*. Aeschines closes his prosecution against Timarchos by telling the jurors that, if they support his case, more citizens will be eager to show *philotimia* in the future by calling wrongdoers to account. Demosthenes in his prosecution of Meidias seeks to show to the dikasts that, because he chose to bring his case in court instead of retaliating impromptu, the city has been offered a unique opportunity to punish a hubristic rich citizen in an exemplary manner. By taking the risk to act as *ho boulomenos* on behalf of the community, both Aeschines and Demosthenes appear to put their power to the service of the city showing thereby that, except for lavish expenditures, there were other ways in which a powerful elite citizen could manifest his civic-oriented *philotimia*.

The promotion of *philotimia* in the mid-fourth century can be associated with a broader systematic attempt of the city to bestow honours and rewards at a time of financial and moral crisis, when, after the unsuccessful Social War (357-355), the city needed both to attract foreign benefactors and their resources, and to inspire good execution of office at home.<sup>10</sup> A few years ago, soon after the financial crisis of 2009 had hit Greece, the Stavros

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<sup>10</sup> See Lambert (2011) 194-198; Fisher (2001) 62-67.

Niarchos Foundation established the 'Annual Stavros Niarchos Foundation Philotimo Award', a *non-monetary* award bestowed to outstanding individuals or groups whose actions demonstrate *philotimo* and contribute to the common well-being. As the representative of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation stated in the *Kathimerini*, a Greek newspaper, the aim of the award is 'to underline the role of *philotimo* as an important element of Greek character and to highlight its significant contribution to the cohesion of the society in a time of crisis for the Greek society'.<sup>11</sup> The renewed interest in *philotimia* and *philotimo* during periods of financial and moral crisis which can be detected in two societies that are chronologically and structurally so remote from each other demonstrates the cohesive and unifying power of honour and love of honour, and their capacity to inspire publicly beneficial conduct and to glue the society together instead of dividing it. Such initiatives perhaps also demonstrate a diachronic need in times of crisis to re-examine, re-evaluate, and reinforce social values and common standards of behaviour.

As we have seen the scope of the rhetoric of civic-oriented *philotimia* was indeed wide and covered many domains of activity, elite and non-elite, at polis and deme levels. At the same time, it was not as widespread as to include the rhetorical exploitation of every area of public behaviour as a competition of honourable *philotimia*. The very same Demosthenes who emerges as an exemplary elite *philotimos* citizen in *Against Meidias* and praises the value of

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.kathimerini.gr/784490/article/epikairothta/ellada/to-filotimo-empneei-toys-ellhnoamerikanoyis>. Quotation translated from modern Greek.

cooperative *philotimia* throughout *Against Leptines*, when addressing his fellow-citizens in the Assembly, refutes or silences the fact that he has been motivated by *philotimia* to take an active political role. In the same vein, in his political trials with Aeschines, we saw that Demosthenes does not present his political contributions as tokens of his *philotimia* for which he deserves *charis*. Representations of debates from the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries seem to corroborate the impression conveyed from Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. The rhetoric of the Assembly was considerably different from the rhetoric of the courtroom, and the rhetoric of political contributions was different from the rhetoric of financial contributions or other public services not only in the time of Demosthenes, I am inclined to suggest, but also at least since the last decades of the fifth century. How are we to explain this discrepancy?

A politician's activities and actions required skill, effort, leisure, and willingness to take personal risks. It was common knowledge that despite political equality, being a *rhētor* and a politician were roles performed only by few citizens. Personal distinction, public recognition, and honours were enjoyed by successful politicians, but in a democracy political achievement, the outcome of cooperative effort between individuals and the collective, ultimately belonged to the collective. My suggestion is that the rhetoric of individual generosity that deserves a return from the city and, with it, the language of reciprocation (*philotimia* towards the city, *charis* requests) are very delimited in political contexts and in some cases totally absent, because politicians could not afford to challenge publicly the idea

that political achievement belonged to the collective. Thus, the rhetoric that dominates is that of individual political contribution as duty that needs to be performed in the best possible way,<sup>12</sup> and what is stressed is the common obligation to contribute one's best, not the personal ambition to get honoured for doing good. In this way, personal ambition is mitigated and political achievement is not usurped from the collective.

This exclusion of individual *philotimia* from discourses of politics does not mean that *philotimia* was not 'truly' part of democracy's value system. It rather shows that at the level of public rhetoric and ideology, politics and the Assembly were not regarded as suitable places for presenting oneself as pursuing *philotimia* or acting out of *philotimia*. By narrowing and safe-guarding the fields within which elite individuals could boast of being *philotimoi*, democracy channelled individual ambitions in activities that were both beneficial and not threatening for the collective's interests and prestige. This should not be viewed as a failure of democracy to define *philotimia* in egalitarian terms. It rather shows that, at the level of ideology, politics and the Assembly belonged to a different discourse of honour negotiations in which the ultimate *philotimos* was the city itself, and the duty of the citizens, and especially of political advisors, was to promote with their decisions and their proposals the collective's

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<sup>12</sup> Thus, my reading of the rhetoric of *philotimia* in political discussions reinforces one of the conclusions reached by Liddel (2007) 254 regarding political obligations: 'From this discussion of political obligation it may be concluded that the privilege of political contribution was sometimes represented as an obligation in the contest of self-justification by prominent politicians'.

*philotimia* and interests. Osborne has noted that the fact that Athenian honorific inscriptions went into very little detail about the services honoured, and referred instead in abstract terms to the human qualities that the honorands were perceived to have demonstrated, was ‘politically neutralising’ in the sense that it closed matters and discouraged further debating on whether the honorands deserved their rewards.<sup>13</sup> Following the same rationale, I view the absence of the rhetoric of individual *philotimia* and public services from the Assembly as a way of *de-personalising* politics and political debating that catered to the needs of the city by promoting deliberation in terms of public interest and by presenting decision-making as a collective achievement not as a field of personal distinction.

Identifying domains in which *philotimia* did not emerge as a civic virtue of the individual allows us to trace possible qualitative differences between *philotimia* and other abstract human qualities that were reserved for praise. Whitehead, in his discussion of democracy’s ‘cardinal virtues’, groups together *andragathia*, *arete*, *eunoia*, *philotimia*, and *prothymia* as the less specific virtues that emerge from his examination of the approbatory language of honorific inscriptions. By stating so, Whitehead (1993) 67 admits that he cannot ‘devise any tests, any categorizations of honorands and/or their services, which either bring these five virtues into sharp focus individually or reveal how they truly differed from each

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<sup>13</sup> Osborne (2010) 79. See especially: ‘men are praised not because their giving corn will encourage others to give corn, but because their display of *philotimia*, and the opportunity which it gives for the city to show that it rewards *philotimia*, will lead others to display *philotimia*.’

other.’ This study has shown that we may be able to trace some qualitative differences between *philotimia*, on the one hand, and *prothymia* and *eunoia*, on the other hand. My reading of [Lys.] 20 demonstrates that, in politically unstable times when the democracy had been overthrown, *prothymia* was probably regarded as a more positive quality than *philotimia* and as a safer choice to rely upon in order to demonstrate eagerness to serve the collective, as *philotimia* could indicate ambition to hold office under the oligarchy. In the same vein, the rhetoric of self-praise in Dem. 18 shows that a citizen who wanted to present his political distinction in an egalitarian manner would benefit by casting himself as an *eunous* politician rather than as a *philotimos*. Both cases confirm that, especially in political contexts, *philotimia* had the potential to express individualistic motives and undemocratic attitudes, whereas *prothymia* and *eunoia* did not.

As a concept, *philotimia* had the potential to express egalitarian and inegalitarian states of mind, motives, and behaviours. Instead of viewing *philotimia* as an one-dimensional concept, initially negative and later positive, we should rather view *philotimia* within the spectrum of its manifestations.<sup>14</sup> To put *philotimia* to the service of the city, democracy had to deal with its dangerous aspect. At the same time, this does not mean that *philotimia* needed to be ‘bleached of all its threatening potential’<sup>15</sup> in order to be part of the value system of democratic Athens. It rather means that it required cautious treatment and careful

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<sup>14</sup> On honour as spectrum, see Keim (2011, PhD thesis unpublished) 148.

<sup>15</sup> Wilson (2000) 192.

channeling by the democratic city towards activities that were publicly beneficial, and in manifestations that were directed towards the city and were evaluated by the city. The closely regulated and selective promotion of *philotimia* that is evidenced in the rhetoric of the courtroom and the Assembly reflects the beauty and the danger of *philotimia* as a concept, as well as the fact that the Athenians were very much alert to both.

## Appendix

### *Charis* topoi in the forensic speeches of the Attic orators

In the courtroom, the rhetoric of contributions to the state, performance of public duty and, more generally, being a useful democratic citizen was frequently employed by speakers who aimed at creating a surplus of due gratitude (*charis*) for themselves or a deficit of due gratitude for their opponents hoping each time to activate in the dikasts the desirable response of positive reciprocity for themselves and negative reciprocity for the opponents.<sup>1</sup>

In particular, what we usually find in forensic speeches are retrospective and idealized representations of motives and calculations related to public benefactions and, more generally, to public-spiritedness that serve the speakers' purposes of activating particular reciprocal responses. This means that there need not be a specific and explicit request for *charis* due to the speaker for such bonds of reciprocity to be activated. Building one's profile as a helpful and dutiful citizen or staining the opponent's image on the opposite grounds would have sufficed to make the jurors deliberate in terms of positive and negative reciprocity.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chapter 3 Section 3 on the significantly different approach to *charis* in the Assembly illustrated in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches.

Implicit or explicit appeals to *charis* or rebuttals of *charis* in forensic rhetoric could take various forms.<sup>2</sup> For instance, some speakers referred to their contributions and argued that they had devoted more money than was the usual practice, or more than the city normally requests.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes, such statements are followed by detailed presentations of specific liturgies and specific amounts spent on them.<sup>4</sup> In other cases, the rationale behind honourable public conduct is revealed, when a speaker says that he has acted in a certain way towards the city in the past keeping in the back of his mind that, if he ever got in trouble, he could count on the goodwill of the city towards him.<sup>5</sup>

We also find speakers asking for due *charis*, namely a favourable verdict, so that they would be able to give more to the city in the future.<sup>6</sup> They also ask for forensic *charis* on account of their benefactions in order to set an example whereby other citizens would be

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<sup>2</sup> Isoc. 18.63: those who have benefited the city and have spent their money for the city deserve the people's gratitude (*charis*). Note the oligarchic contexts of the speech discussed in Wolpert (2002) 113; Johnstone (1999) 101 and Rubinstein (2000) 213 have noted that claims for *charis* in the courtroom were not related only to financial benefactions: there were other grounds on which a litigant could base a claim for a legitimate return of *charis*; Johnstone (1999) 94, 102 shows that 28 out of 98 speeches cite liturgies, whereas only 12 out of 98 speeches include a clear request for *charis*; on asking (ἀίτεῖν) and demanding (ἀπαιτεῖν) *charis*, see Andoc. 2.22-23; Lys. 18.23, 27; 21.25.

<sup>3</sup> Lys. 7.30-33; Lys. 19.9-10, 57-59; 21.5-6; 25.12-13; Is. 7.37-42; for a reversal of this topos, see Lys. 26.3-4: it would have been better if the defendant's father had not given so much money to the state, because, according to the speaker, by doing so he gained the *demos*' trust and managed to deceive them. See pp. 134-135.

<sup>4</sup> Lys. 21.1-5; Lysias 21 is discussed in detail in pp. 148-157.

<sup>5</sup> Lys. 16.17; 25.12-13, Lys. frag.L; [Lys.] 20.30-31; Isoc. 18.67-68; for a concealed request, see Dem. 45.85.

<sup>6</sup> Lys. 18.20-23; 19.61-64; 21.12-14; [Lys.] 20.35; Dem. 28.24.

more eager to serve the city seeing that public-spiritedness is not left unrewarded.<sup>7</sup> As the rhetoric of *Against Leptines* shows, this hortatory aspect of rewarding deserving citizens pervades Athenian practices outside the courtroom too.<sup>8</sup>

Sometimes *charis* is presented as potentially transferrable and this enhances its perception as a tangible commodity that could be stored and used later.<sup>9</sup> Some speakers claim that they have inherited a stock of *charis* from their ancestors which they seek to use at the current occasion.<sup>10</sup> The rhetoric of Andoc. 1 relies heavily on this idea:<sup>11</sup> we find a reminder that the city should not forget, but remember what has received and pay back accordingly;<sup>12</sup> then the public contributions of Andocides' family for which they are allegedly remembered and deserve a return are mentioned;<sup>13</sup> Andocides also argues that the fact that his forefathers have not claimed themselves the *charis* they deserve does not mean that the reciprocal bond is cancelled and that the *charis* owed has 'expired', but the city ought to

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<sup>7</sup> Lys. 18.23; [Lys.] 20.31; Dem. 51.22; [Dem.] 50.64-66; for a reversal of the topos, see Dem. 23.194-195: the dikasts should not worry lest their verdict discourage the opponent from being beneficial towards the city.

<sup>8</sup> Dem. 20.5, 9-10, 64, 155-156. See pp. 109-113.

<sup>9</sup> Lys. 25.6; Lyc. 1.135-139; for some of the most characteristic examples of *charis* described in concrete terms, see Lys. 6.35-36 (χάριν, μισθόν); 21.11 (δωρεάν); [Lys.] 20.31-32 (κατ' ἀξίαν χαριζόμενοι, ὅσ' ἄν τις ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιῆ).

<sup>10</sup> On this theme, see Rubinstein (2000) 213, 217; Millett (1998a) 240.

<sup>11</sup> Andoc. 1.143.

<sup>12</sup> Andoc. 1.141.

<sup>13</sup> Andoc. 1.146-148.

repay this familial *charis* to Andocides;<sup>14</sup> and finally, that if the dikasts save Andocides, he will show his gratitude by continuing benefiting the city in the future.<sup>15</sup>

Conversely, speakers endeavoured to overpower the claims for a return their opponents could make by casting them as unworthy of a return of gratitude by the city. Opponents were presented as unable to establish a fair claim for *charis*.<sup>16</sup> In this frame, some speakers claimed that they detected an absence of gratitude towards the city on the part of the opponent (or others),<sup>17</sup> or that with his conduct the opponent did not intend to benefit the city;<sup>18</sup> that they have already been rewarded for past contributions and thus their request

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<sup>14</sup> Andoc. 1.147-148.

<sup>15</sup> Andoc. 1.149-150; Lys. 18 employs a similar line of argumentation. Public contributions/benefactions of the speaker's relatives: Lys. 18.1-7; *charis* request on account of the speaker's and his family's public record and democratic credentials: Lys. 18.21-23; stock of *charis* from the ancestors requested now by the speaker: Lys. 18.24-27; see also, Dem. 28.22-24; Ober (1989a) 228-229 has noted that exposing so blatantly the rationale of benefiting the city does not mean that a citizen had given his wealth 'in the wrong spirit' (quotation from p. 228).

<sup>16</sup> Lys. 6.35-36, 40; 12.38-39; without *charis* vocabulary: Din. 2.8 and Dem. 19.281-282; unworthy of the city's gratitude and honours: 23.184-185, 188; inappropriate appeal to *charis*: Dem. 51.17; In Lys. 10.13-14, the speaker claims that his opponent is so unreasonable that he will try to gain an advantage not because of his benefactions to the state, but because of the crime for which he has not paid any penalty.

<sup>17</sup> Lys. 28.16; 29.14; 30.6, 26-27; Dem. 18.131; breach of mutual benefit and help between citizen and city: Lyc. 1.133-134; wrongful reversal of the obligation to reciprocate between Charidemus and the city: Dem. 23. 150-151; no *eunoia* can be established on the part of Aristogeiton towards the city: [Dem.] 25.64-68.

<sup>18</sup> In Lys. 30.15-16, the speaker says that it would be terrible if Nicomachus were to receive *charis* for unintentional services and avoid punishment for deliberate harm; on Nicomachus and Lys. 30, see Todd (1996); Munn (2000) 274-279.

would not be legitimate,<sup>19</sup> that they have been performed in such a way that does not deserve the city's gratitude.<sup>20</sup> In *Against Meidias*, we read that if Meidias had performed his trierarchy out of *philotimia* he deserved due *charis* from the city, but if disgraceful motives and private reasons lay behind the performance of his trierarchy then his service should not be recognized.<sup>21</sup> In this way, the opponents were cast as unreliable individuals in their interactions with the city, and the jurors were invited to avoid gratifying citizens of dubious credentials that were not likely to show their gratitude towards the city in the future.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, just as litigants often tried to win the goodwill of the jury and possibly a favourable verdict by exploiting their public contributions and the corresponding *charis* they alleged they deserved, conversely they strived to show that one should not be able to buy justice by bribing the jurors or the opposing litigation.<sup>23</sup> Such arguments were employed to stain the public image of the opponents who were framed as people who preferred to use their financial power inappropriately instead of trying to win the gratitude of the city by investing on the common well-being. In this vein, we find speakers claiming that all the

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<sup>19</sup> In Dem. 21.171-172, Demosthenes says that χάρις and δωρεία have already been given by the city to Meidias.

<sup>20</sup> Dem. 51.7; Aesch. 3.236-237.

<sup>21</sup> Dem. 21.160. Demosthenes anticipates that Meidias is going to present as *euergesia* and *philotimia* a trierarchy that, according to Demosthenes, was motivated by and aimed at personal interest: Dem. 21.166; see pp. 107-108.

<sup>22</sup> Lys. 15.10; [Lys.] 20.34.

<sup>23</sup> Lys. 30.1, 34.

money of the world is not enough to buy off one's crimes;<sup>24</sup> that the other side should not be awarded *charis* for benefactions they promise to do, but have not done yet;<sup>25</sup> that they should first balance the damage they have inflicted upon the city and then ask for favours and honours;<sup>26</sup> that not even the benefactions of the opponent's advocates are enough or should be regarded as enough to secure his acquittal.<sup>27</sup>

When litigants employ arguments based on *charis* obligations, they draw on powerful social ideals of cooperative and mutually beneficial relations within the city. The rhetoric of *charis* aims at uniting the useful individual with the audience and the city, and, conversely, at alienating the allegedly useless individual from the audience and the city. Thus, the rhetoric of gratitude is a powerful means through which litigants sought to create and reinforce community ties by appealing to bonds of mutual interest and mutual obligation and, more generally, by drawing from shared understandings of what counts as good and honourable conduct. At the same time, the rhetoric of public service and *charis* has the potential to create community at another level too: it exhorts the jurors to think as a group

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<sup>24</sup> Lys. 28.9-11; 29.13; see also, Din. 3.17, 21-22; benefactions and *charis* obligations should not buy justice: Dem. 23.194-195; the public service of the opponent should not be considered more valuable than law and justice: Dem. 22.44-46.

<sup>25</sup> Lys. 12.80; 31.24-26.

<sup>26</sup> Lys. 31.24.

<sup>27</sup> Lys. 12.86; 30.33; Dem. 21.207-208; it is unjust or improper to return *charis* for the services of the opponent's advocates: Lys. 27.13; Dem. 21.211-212; 51.17; Lyc. 1.139-140.

by inviting them to deliberate on the basis of shared interests and obligations thereby forming, reforming and strengthening their group identity.

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