

Preferences for Redistribution in Three Spheres of Inequality



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A thesis presented for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

Hilary Term 2025

A tu, iaia

Equality is a vital need of the human soul. It consists in a recognition, at once public, general, effective and genuinely expressed in institutions and customs, that the same amount of respect and consideration is due to every human being because this respect is due to the human being as such and is not a matter of degree.

It follows that the inevitable differences among men ought never to imply any difference in the degree of respect. And so that these differences may not be felt to bear such an implication, a certain balance is necessary between equality and inequality.

—**Simone Weil, *The Need for Roots*.**

Acknowledgments

Since I was a teenager, I have always loved following the Oscar and Goya award ceremonies and watching actors' and actresses' speeches, which I then rewatch later on YouTube. One of my favorites is Stanley Donen's, in which he begins with a bit of dancing. Despite being in his 80s, his spirit proves to be in remarkable shape. That video radiates so much joy. I also love watching Penélope Cruz's speech when she became the first Spanish actor to win an Oscar—something that, as she put it that night, was “not a very realistic dream” for someone from Alcobendas. Similarly, the naturalness with which Olivia Colman received hers in 2019 warms my heart. That lack of arrogance and pretension is so magnetic.

From the Goyas, I always get emotional when I hear Miguel Hernán's words dedicated to Daniel Guzmán. But above all, I could listen countless times to José Sacristán's speech in 2022, where he shares his wisdom and beautifully expresses the patience required to do things carefully and well in life. I don't know why these speeches have always excited me so much. I imagine it's because it's rare to witness someone's achievement in real time and see their raw, immediate reaction. But above all, I believe I love these speeches because I deeply value gratitude. These speeches are precisely about that: recognizing and appreciating the help of others. One of my favorite sayings in my language is: “Es de bien nacidos ser agradecidos”, which could be translated into English as “Being grateful is a sign of good upbringing”.

Now, I find myself on stage, with the microphone in front of me and the opportunity to thank everybody who has accompanied me on this long journey of writing a PhD thesis. Submitting a PhD thesis is the opposite of an instant achievement, it takes so much time and involves going through so many obstacles—especially mental ones. At the same time, I am writing this without knowing if I have received what is considered the biggest achievement—passing the thesis. But, without resorting to clichés, I really think having finished this thesis is already an achievement, especially because of all the patience, care, and love with which I have crafted it. I don't know if the result of it will be awe-inspiring for others, I just know this thesis is very close to what I have always wanted to do—to study and understand how people think about inequality.

So well, here I am, as I said, on stage, with a legion of words rising through my fingers, waiting to flourish. Unlike the Oscar and Goya ceremonies, here there is neither a clock nor

music to play me off the stage. And, luckily, I won't be able to see if anyone yawns while reading this. What I mean is that I feel totally free to take my time and express my gratitude properly, without rush. And given that the Mediterranean Sea that surrounds my hometown, Valencia, has instilled in me intensity, passion, and a flair for hyperbole since I was a child, I should warn you— this won't be a short acknowledgment section. Of course, feel free to skip it. I just think, whenever I am older and gray and full of sleep and nodding by the fire, I will want to come back to these pages and find in them a time capsule that brings me back to who I was during these last four and a half years.

First of all, I would like to thank my public high school, el IES Barri del Carme, because thanks to how much I learned there, I am able to think the way I think. I am the product of all my high school teachers who challenged me, listened to me, and made me grow, both personally and intellectually. Moreover, this thesis wouldn't exist if I had attended a non-public school, since my concern and interest in inequality emerged during my high school time due to the exposure I had to lives that were less privileged than mine. I learned firsthand that effort is never enough, that talent is never enough, that the family and environment in which one is born and raised shape to a crazy extent one's chances of getting ahead. I realized that I have enjoyed so many advantages throughout my life: I was never scared of not having enough food on the table, of having to work while studying, of being evicted from my house, of the consequences of losing a scholarship. I never had to deal with two parents in bad moods because of exhausting physical jobs, parents with physical pain; I never had to fly to another country out of need. My privileged situation has allowed me to be aware, despite my unsolvable anxiety, that there is always a second chance. Thanks to my years in a public high school, I learned that there are people who can't afford a second chance. There are people who live under so much hardship that they cannot even look back on their past and reflect on it. As Camus says in *The First Man*, only the privileged can go in search of lost time. The poor have to work, work, rest, and then work again. I have had quite a structured life, and I know this is also the product of privilege. Since having that realization about my privileges when I was very young, it has been impossible for me to remain insensitive to inequality. Thus, the topic of this thesis.

That awareness stayed with me as I moved forward in my studies, and along the way, I was lucky to learn from incredible professors who challenged and inspired me in different ways. I would like to thank all the professors I have come across during my graduate and postgraduate studies

who have left an indelible mark on me. Thanks to Carmen García Monerris, for transporting me to the most fascinating periods of history in her classes and for her immense affection and love. Thanks to Pacho, for being someone I looked up to before he became my professor and for living up to the high image I had of him. Thanks for teaching me so much. And thanks also to you and Belén—who is the best—for treating me so well and spoiling me with amazing dinners in Oxford. Thanks to Joaquín, Cesc and Sandra, for their kindness and generosity. And, especially, thanks to Joan Romero, my mentor, if I'm allowed to use such an old-fashioned concept. Thanks for picking up a young guy full of doubts in 2013 and filling him with more doubts, but doubts that, paradoxically, shed light, helped me relocate myself and reduced my feeling of loss. Thanks for teaching me how to think, even if it was to think against you, thanks for guiding me, thanks for recommending so many readings and, especially, thanks for loving me and taking such good care of me. This thesis wouldn't exist without you. I know it for a fact.

From Oxford, I would like to thank everybody who has put his or her eyes -and brains- on my work: Tarik, Rachel, Alex, Ben, David Miller, Christine, Noah, Vicente, Zack, Viviana, Laure, Mats, Marta, Luis, Francesco, Iván, and Angela. Thanks so much for your time and your generosity. My work is so much better due to all the insights I have received from all of you. Thanks also for all the kindness with which you have treated me.

I want to give special thanks to my two supervisors. Jane, thank you so much for all the amazing feedback you have given me over the years. Thanks for always finding new possibilities in my research and for illuminating the corners that were not visible to my eyes. David, thank you for always making time to meet and for helping the confidence in my work grow within me. Thanks for not letting me give up on some of my ideas despite how complex they were to refine or test. Thanks for believing in me so much. Your patience has enabled mine, and without that patience, my thesis would have been so much different—and so much worse.

I would also like to thank some of the workers at the DPIR, especially Diego and Jenny, for making me feel rooted in my workplace and for always looking at me with warm eyes full of affection.

This thesis was also written thanks to the inspiring beauty of Oxford and the sense of peace I found in some of its places, such as Il Principe, where I had the best pizzas of my life and always received immense kindness from Elise and her family.

the LMH grounds, Port Meadow or the Duke Humfreys Library, but also Zatar Bake, Taberu, Barefoot, Curzon, the Perch, and especially . These places define my emotional geography of Oxford.

And I cannot talk about Oxford as a place without mentioning Javier Marías, my favorite writer, who sadly passed away in September 2022. I want to thank him for cultivating my intelligence through his books, boosting it, and helping me understand the human soul better. Thanks to his books, I got the first glimpse of the city that fascinated him and that he described with so much irony, sarcasm, and joviality in *All Souls*, the first book I ever read by him back in 2012, when Oxford was mainly a brand of notebooks for me.

I also want to thank a los tetes de P., for having accompanied me at the start of this long journey during my master's at Carlos III. Thanks for bridging all the kilometres of distance through the best calls and trips. Thanks for all the joy and fun that you guys give me, apart from the sincerest love. Thanks Pablo, Bertis, Rebe, Fran and Lou.

And thank you, of course, to my closest friends from back home, my rocks: Anabel, Rubén, Raquel, Callo, María F., Sara, Goer, Nuri, Josep, Glòria, Irene, María, Andrea, Borja, Esplu, Guille, Mery, Pau, Iván, Borja, Carmen and Javi. Thanks for sustaining me, making me happy, and looking at me the way you all do. The more I have felt like an impostor in Oxford, the more I have looked for each of you to resuscitate my self-esteem. And I have always found you.

Thank you also to Amaya, for helping me find peace of mind and for never judging me.

From Oxford, I would like to thank you, Mikael, for warming me with your pure heart and shaking me with your amazing sense of humour; thank you, Raquel, for wrapping me with your immeasurable wisdom, your incomparable hospitality and your expansive love; thank you, Tiphaine, for protecting me with your unconditionality and your strong sense of friendship; thank you Kat, for making me feel rooted thanks to your honesty and authenticity; and thank you, Abdi, for sharing your passions with me and for talking and listening to me with that childlike brightness in your eyes that is so unique.

Oxford would not have become the home it has become without the Mamma Mia crew. Manolín, you painted the biggest smile in Oxford during your stay here. Those 10 Oxford Retreats in a row are a milestone not to be beaten. Thanks for making me feel so immense and powerful. Thanks for taking such good care of me and for knowing me so well. Nis, thanks for

enlarging my happiness and for treating me like a brother. You always make me laugh so much and make me reflect on things in such a thorough way. You are fantastic. Ali, we have done all this together. You blew my mind when we met almost seven years ago. And, here I am, years later, still fascinated by your intelligence, your humanity, your intuition and your values, still captivated by what you mean to me as a friend. I feel like the most privileged person on earth knowing that you are always there, backing up my whole life in your mind and heart. Edgarín, thanks for enjoying, loving, and encouraging every part of my personality and for always making me feel so comfortable when I am with you. Your sensitivity, empathy, patience and modesty have been the roof over my self-esteem on so many days during my thesis. The sound of your laughter is, by far, my favourite melody in Oxford. Ferni, thanks for appearing in my life and making me feel less alone with all my crazy obsessions. You transmit so much love and affection to me with your words, your looks, your gestures, and your silences that it is impossible not to feel lucky to exist in the same world as you. I feel so valued by you and you make me feel so big. Your tenderness and your passion for your passions have coloured all my years here, covering them with peace and joy. And, finally, Lau, thanks for being my shield, my sword and my boat. Thanks for treating me with so much indulgence and for teaching me so much self-indulgence. Thanks for loving me with all your heart and for understanding and knowing me so well. Thanks for your intelligence, your generosity, your patience and the best storytelling skills I have ever seen in my life. You made Oxford possible.

I also want to thank Darina for spoiling me and taking care of me back home. And, of course, Carmen, for having sown infinite joy and love in me and for having contributed so massively to moulding my personality.

Thank you also to my aunts. Soledad, thanks for never letting me go, for having me so present, for sharing your songs and jokes, for loving me in such an expansive way. Elena, thanks for understanding me, for listening to me, and for caressing me with the same sweetness and tenderness with which you did when I was a baby. The two of you make me feel like the luckiest nephew on earth.

And thanks to my younger cousins too: Diana, Àngela, Peque, Miguel Jr., Eric, Titina, Yoyo, Ferran, Otto, Ian and Io. Thanks for having represented hope when I felt most lost during the PhD and for having let me take care of you since you were very little. And for being the ones

who take care of me now.

Otto, Iolín, Miguel Jr., I started the PhD suffering, with the fear of really having lost you, and how amazing it is that you are still by our side. Without a doubt, for me, that is the biggest achievement and source of happiness of these past years. The three of you have such big hearts. And Peque, thanks for always accompanying me with your smile, which is as soft as the skin of your face and as warm as the fire from Teralba.

I also want to thank you, Iaio, for setting the best example for me, for your unlimited kindness, for your strong values, for your compassion, for your great temper, for your relentless and unbeatable vitality, for your relaxing presence, and for preserving the past and transmitting it to me, giving me access to a dimension of time that I wouldn't be able to inhabit otherwise.

And thank you, Abuela, for loving me so much and so strongly, for making me feel like the most admired and loved person, for keeping the flame of Teralba alive, for being so intuitive and perceptive, for always having me in your thoughts, for worrying about me, for thinking so highly of me and expressing it to me, for believing in me, for always being there, with innumerable tons of love ready to be shared with me. You are the best.

And to my siblings. Thank you, Manu and Lolo. I wanted to mention the specific things I value in each of you in an individualized way, but then I realized the two of you share the main virtues that have allowed my happiness during my life, and, by extension, during my PhD: the two of you are so generous, intelligent, well-hearted, deep, and sensitive. You are the mirror of my soul. *El poder de tres siempre nos hará libres.*

Pare, mamá, I wouldn't be here without you. You have made me become the person I am. Thanks for always encouraging me to be as I am and like the things I like, even if that implied driving me to a weird house outside Madrid to get a magazine about Ricardo Zamora when I was fourteen or telling off a bookseller who had tried to scam me when I was a teenager eager to nurture my passions. I am so lucky to have grown up looking up to your humanity, decency, and sense of dignity. Thanks for teaching me to be generous, respectful, and caring. Thanks for showing me how to love. Thanks for loving me so unconditionally.

And, finally, this thesis cannot be dedicated to anyone else but to you, Iaia. Sadly, seven months have separated you from sharing this special moment with me. Seven long months that have been the saddest of my life because there is absolutely nothing that can fill the void that

I feel inside me. Iaia, this thesis exists thanks to all the love that I have received from you throughout my life. A love that has made me feel so strong. Every time I have been struggling, sad or anxious during my thesis, I have called you and just hearing your voice has brought the peace back to me. That was always your magic power. You have always been my biggest source of calm, and your eyes have always returned to me the image of myself that I like most. I am so lucky to have been your grandson. Thanks for never caring very much about what I did and for mainly caring about who I was. Perquè per a tu lo important mai va ser què feia, sinó qui era. I just hope one day your virtues can become my virtues. This thesis is yours.

Abstract

My thesis revolves around the question of why people reject full equality and tolerate that some individuals are economically better off than others. The common thread is the attention paid to the role of fairness beliefs. I focus on three specific areas where economic inequality perpetuates itself and where different policies could be implemented. First, I study how individuals justify wage inequality across occupations. I conducted an original survey in the UK and demonstrate that, when considering market inequality and the concept of merit, individuals place value on both the inputs that workers provide, such as effort or skills, and the outputs they achieve through their jobs. Additionally, employing conjoint analysis, I show that individuals are more willing to economically reward the merit-related aspects of a job than those unrelated to merit. Mainly, they are willing to reward the responsibility attached to the job and the level of mental skills it requires. Second, my research explores citizens' support for increasing taxes on the rich. I examine whether the philanthropy of the wealthy influences individuals' willingness to tax them. I designed and conducted two survey experiments in the U.S. and observe that charitable donations by the super-rich make them seem more benevolent and greater contributors to the well-being of the poor. Moreover, I find that citizens are less willing to tax the super-rich when presented with positive information about their philanthropy. Finally, I investigate why natives are often reluctant to grant social rights to immigrants. I focus particularly on how natives value immigrants' fiscal contributions. Through conjoint analysis in three countries, I find that natives are less willing to support social rights for immigrants who are described as negative fiscal contributors, even when they are informed about immigrants' positive intentions and the structural barriers they face.

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Democracy and Inequality	1
1.2	First Sphere of Inequality: Market Inequality	5
1.2.1	Meritocracy and acceptance of market inequality	7
1.3	Second Sphere of Inequality: Disposable Inequality	10
1.3.1	Philanthropy and preferences for taxing the rich	11
1.4	Third Sphere of Inequality: Redistribution to Immigrants	15
1.4.1	Fiscal considerations and immigrants' social rights	17
1.5	Plan of the thesis	20
2	How Preferences for Redistribution are Shaped	22
2.1	The material self-interest approach	22
2.1.1	Efficiency considerations	26
2.2	Fairness beliefs	28
2.2.1	Control over neediness and the concept of merit	30
2.3	Contribution to the literature	32
3	First Paper	35
3.1	Introduction	36
3.2	Theory	39

3.2.1	Occupational merit	41
3.2.1.1	Input-based merit	42
3.2.1.2	Output-based merit	43
3.3	Theoretical expectations	45
3.4	Empirical part	45
3.4.1	Stage 1: The relevance of occupation	46
3.4.1.1	Findings	46
3.4.2	Stage 2: unpacking occupational merit	47
3.4.2.1	The variants of occupational merit	49
3.4.2.2	Variants of merit by occupation	50
3.4.3	Stage 3: the role of occupational merit in inequality acceptance	52
3.4.3.1	Main analysis conjoint	54
3.4.3.2	Applying the conjoint attributes to real occupations	57
3.4.3.3	Subgroup analysis	59
3.4.3.4	Robustness tests	62
3.5	Discussion	65
4	Second Paper	70
4.1	Introduction	71
4.2	Theory	74
4.2.1	The perceived benevolence of the super-rich	75
4.2.2	The perceived contribution of the super-rich to social welfare	76
4.2.3	Philanthropy and taxing the super-rich	77
4.3	Study 1: Philanthropy and perceptions of the super-rich	80
4.3.1	Method	80
4.3.2	Results	81

4.3.2.1	Different perceptions of the size of philanthropy	81
4.3.2.2	Outcome variables	83
4.3.3	Robustness checks	87
4.3.4	Discussion	87
4.4	Study 2: Philanthropy and taxing the super-rich	88
4.4.1	Method	88
4.4.2	Results	90
4.4.3	Mechanisms	92
4.4.3.1	Ruling out alternative mechanisms	93
4.4.4	Updated beliefs?	95
4.4.5	Robustness checks	97
4.4.6	Discussion	98
4.5	General discussion	99
5	Third Paper	102
5.1	Introduction	103
5.2	Theory	106
5.2.1	The fiscal burden argument	106
5.2.2	Disentangling Intentional from Actual Reciprocity	108
5.2.3	Actual fiscal reciprocity: beyond immigrants' cooperative intentions . . .	109
5.2.4	Hypotheses	110
5.3	Methodology	111
5.3.1	Case selection: three countries	111
5.3.2	Two waves in Spain	112
5.3.3	Design of the conjoint	112
5.4	Findings	115

5.4.1	The effect of the fiscal burden	115
5.4.2	The economic mechanisms	118
5.4.3	Punishing negative fiscal reciprocity despite positive intentional reciprocity? 120	
5.4.3.1	The interaction between fiscal burden and attitude at work . . .	121
5.4.3.2	Priors on the intentional reciprocity of immigrants and systemic barriers	121
5.4.3.3	Positive priming about intentional reciprocity	124
5.5	Robustness tests and external validity	126
5.5.1	The validity of the fiscal burden hypothesis beyond immigration	129
5.6	Discussion	132
6	Conclusion	135
A	Appendix First Paper	142
A.1	Stage 2	142
A.1.1	Perception of other aspects related to occupations	142
A.1.2	Ideal pay ranking across occupations	145
A.1.3	Correlations	146
A.1.4	Descriptives	147
A.1.5	Survey Stage 2	148
A.2	Stage 3	161
A.2.1	AMCEs	161
A.2.2	Marginal Means	162
A.2.3	Perceptions of physical effort	163
A.2.4	Subgroup analysis	164
A.2.4.1	Sub-group analysis by education	164

A.2.4.2	Sub-group analysis by income	165
A.2.4.3	Sub-group analysis by Brexit vote	167
A.2.4.4	Sub-group analysis by self-perception of social contribution of one's job	168
A.2.4.5	Sub-group analysis by self-perception of economic contribution of one's job	169
A.2.4.6	Sub-group analysis by self-perception of mental skills of one's job	170
A.2.4.7	Sub-group analysis by self-perception of exposure to dan- ger/physical hardship of one's job	171
A.2.4.8	Sub-group analysis by self-perception of responsibility of one's job	172
A.2.4.9	Sub-group analysis by gender	173
A.2.5	Robustness tests	174
A.2.5.1	Sub-group analysis by attention	174
A.2.5.2	Sub-group analysis by understanding of the social contribution attribute	175
A.2.6	Components of merit	176
A.2.7	Components of merit by occupation	177
A.2.8	Descriptives	178
A.2.9	Survey Stage 3	179

B Appendix Second Paper **191**

B.1	Main study	191
B.1.1	Calculating the information for the lower philanthropy treatment	191
B.1.2	Pilot	193
B.1.3	Main results	196
B.1.4	Mechanisms	197

B.1.5	Alternative mechanisms	199
B.1.5.1	Perceptions of the state as main institution pro redistribution	199
B.1.5.2	Perception of the efficiency of taxes	201
B.1.5.3	Perceptions of poverty	202
B.1.5.4	Perceptions of responsiveness to the super-rich	204
B.1.5.5	Perceptions of tax cheating	206
B.1.6	Updated beliefs?	208
B.1.7	Robustness tests	209
B.1.7.1	The effect of deception	209
B.1.7.2	Covariates	211
B.1.7.3	Manipulation checks	213
B.1.7.4	Attention check	214
B.1.7.5	Bias	215
B.1.7.6	Who are the richest Americans?	217
B.1.7.7	Importance of poverty alleviation	219
B.1.8	Survey	220
B.2	Additional study	230
B.2.1	Design treatments additional study	230
B.2.2	Perception volume	233
B.2.3	Main results	235
B.2.4	Testing the material contribution mechanism more exhaustively	236
B.2.5	Alternative explanations	238
B.2.6	Robustness tests	240
B.2.6.1	Covariates	240
B.2.6.2	Attention check	242

B.2.6.3	Bias	243
B.2.6.4	Who are America’s richest?	244
B.2.6.5	Manipulation checks	245
B.2.7	Survey	247
B.3	Ethical Considerations	254
B.4	Transparency	254
B.5	Conflict of interests	254
C	Appendix Third Paper	255
C.1	Conjoint analysis	255
C.1.1	Marginal Means	255
C.1.2	Sub-group analysis by respondent level of education	258
C.1.3	Sub-group analysis by respondent ideology	259
C.1.4	Order of tasks	260
C.1.5	Sub-group analysis by attention check	261
C.1.6	AMCEs of the conjoint that strongly separates between natives and immigrants	263
C.1.7	Descriptives	264
C.2	Cross-sectional analysis	268
C.2.1	The effect of fiscal contribution	269
C.2.2	Ordered logit model	271
C.2.3	Controlling for deservingness	272
C.2.4	Subsets	273
C.3	Tables	275
C.3.1	AMCEs Spain	275
C.3.2	AMCEs France	276

C.3.3	AMCEs UK	277
C.3.4	Sub-group analysis by respondent income	278
C.3.4.1	Spain	278
C.3.4.2	France	278
C.3.4.3	UK	279
C.3.5	Sub-group analysis by perceptions of sustainability	280
C.3.6	Interaction of the fiscal burden and the attitude at work attributes	280
C.3.6.1	Spain	280
C.3.6.2	France	281
C.3.6.3	UK	281
C.3.7	Sub-group analysis by priors on intentional reciprocity	282
C.3.7.1	Priors on the tax behaviour of immigrants	282
C.3.7.2	Priors on irregular payment	282
C.3.7.3	Priors on underpayment	283
C.3.8	AMCEs for the conjoint in Spain where immigrants are presented as intentional cooperators	284
C.3.9	Additional conjoint in Spain that includes natives	285
C.3.9.1	AMCEs	285
C.3.9.2	Interaction of the fiscal burden and the nationality attributes	286
C.3.10	Sub-group analysis by education	287
C.3.10.1	Spain	287
C.3.10.2	France	287
C.3.10.3	United Kingdom	288
C.3.11	Sub-group analysis by ideology	289
C.3.11.1	Spain	289

C.3.11.2 France	290
C.3.11.3 UK	291
C.3.12 Order of tasks	292
C.3.12.1 Spain	292
C.3.12.2 France	292
C.3.12.3 UK	293
C.3.13 Attention checks	293
C.3.13.1 Spain	293
C.3.13.2 France	294
C.3.13.3 UK	294

Bibliography	295
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Democracy and Inequality

Economic inequality is one of the most salient topics in contemporary politics. It has permeated public debate significantly in recent years, especially after the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent rise of political movements, like the “Indignados” movement and Occupy Wall Street, which placed critiques of inequality at the center of their discourse. The surge of populist parties has also been interpreted through the lens of inequality. By emphasizing the gap between the people and the elite, populist parties claim to address the inequalities affecting society. As Hopkin and Blyth argue, populist politics “demands that government ‘do something’ to address the inequalities and insecurities generated by inadequately regulated capitalism” (2018:15). Concern about inequality is implicit in these parties’ rhetoric. Trump’s inaugural speech in 2017, which resonated with many European right-wing populist leaders, exemplifies how inequality is embedded in populist discourse:

For too long, a small group in our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of government, while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished, but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered, but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.

Extensive academic work has legitimized the growing popular concern about inequality (Piketty, 2014), documenting an “Inequality Turn” that began in the early 1970s (Stiglitz, 2012; Beramendi,

2012; Atkinson, 2015). Since then, the rich have accumulated more and more wealth and income, while those at the bottom have faced stagnation and deprivation (Atkinson et al., 2011; Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014; Milanovic, 2016).

The growing salience of inequality raises questions about the essence of democracy itself. Is democracy compatible with inequality? For some prominent theories of regime change, the answer is no. These theories argue that democracies thrive only when there is a certain level of economic equality that alleviates the economic elite's fear of confiscation by the poor. This view is reflected in the works of Boix (2003), early Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992).

The relationship between democracy and economic equality was particularly strong in the West in the decades following World War II, during the so-called "Trente Glorieuses". More than at any previous time in history, the postwar period was characterized by the realization of freedom and both political and economic equality (Judt, 2006). The social tensions that had defined the first half of the century were largely addressed, leading to a compromise between capital and labor. Consequently, with the development of the welfare state in most advanced countries, Western democracies experienced unprecedented prosperity and stability.

However, the increase in inequality since the 1970s suggests that the postwar experience was more of an anomaly, or a "parenthesis", as Piketty sees it, rather than the norm. While democracy is often associated with equality, it is crucial to recognize that democracy itself guarantees only political equality, not economic equality. This tension between political equality and economic inequality is inherent in any democracy and explains why some left-wing revolutionaries in the 19th and early 20th centuries viewed parliamentarism with skepticism. For Marx, the fundamental contradiction of parliamentarism was that "the classes whose social slavery the constitution is to perpetuate—the proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie—are given political power through universal suffrage" (quoted in Przeworski, 2010: 82). Lenin, taking Marx's logic further, described parliamentarism as an empty shell where decisions are ultimately made outside of them, by the economic and political power of the ruling class (1992[1917]: 42).

The most influential liberal revolutions in history—the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution—did not prioritize economic equality. While demands for economic equality were sometimes present, such as in the UK with the Levellers, who

were perceived as wanting to redistribute land (Rees, 2016), or in France with speeches by the procureur general of the Paris commune, Pierre-Gaspard Chaumette, or Babeuf’s “Plebeian Manifesto” in 1795, these revolutions primarily paved the way for democracy, not economic equality, with political inclusiveness as their main goal. As Piketty (2022) highlights, land seized from the Church during the French Revolution barely reached the hands of landless peasants. The disenfranchised majority, following the words of Abbé Sieyès in *Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?*, had been nothing and started to demand to become something, but mainly in the political order.

Contrary to the view held by most prominent theories of regime change, Ansell and Samuels (2015) argue—and demonstrate empirically—that democracy emerges not under conditions of low income inequality but, paradoxically, under conditions of high income inequality. According to their argument, income inequality signals the rise of a middle class that seeks protection not from the poor, but from expropriation by autocratic elites. This demand for state protection from groups beyond the poor or working class is also latent in Acemoglu and Robinson’s account in *Why Nations Fail*, where they argue that a virtuous circle exists between inclusive economic institutions—defined as free markets without barriers—which can generate economic inequality, and democracy, understood as the final stage in the development of inclusive political institutions. Aligned with these perspectives that emphasize the coexistence of democracy and economic inequality, recent empirical studies indicate that countries transitioning to democracy do not necessarily manage to reduce economic inequality (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016).

The fact that democracy does not automatically eliminate economic inequality only heightens the importance of studying inequality, given its profound political implications for democracies (Aron, 1962). These include the fracturing of social bonds (Savage, 2021), increasing citizens’ disaffection with the political system (Houle, 2019), the production of anti-immigration attitudes (Magni, 2021), and the fostering of support for populist parties (Kim and Hall, 2024). The political consequences of inequality extend back in time. For instance, in *Discourses on Livy*, Machiavelli already argued that inequality was a primary reason for the collapse of the Roman Republic. In his view, conflicts over land issues between plebeians and patricians, crystallized in the violent deaths of the Gracchi brothers, who attempted land reform, led to civil war and ultimately doomed the Republic.

A primary focus of this thesis is the effect of inequality on public preferences for redistribution,

a topic that has received substantial attention in the comparative political economy literature. In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi, examining 19th- and early 20th-century England, describes a pattern in which the expansion of the market and the accompanying increase in inequality is followed by a popular demand for institutions that protect citizens from market-induced hardship. For Polanyi, social history is characterized by a double movement that is the result of the tension between two organizing principles:

The one is the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other is the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market—primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes—and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods (1944: 138-9).

Polanyi's work can be complemented by the Meltzer-Richard model (1981), a prominent theory in political economy, which posits that in a democracy, inequality leads to demands for redistribution. The M–R model states that because democracy is based on universal suffrage and majority rule, and because income distributions are right-skewed—with median incomes lower than the mean—the majority will favor redistribution to reduce income disparities (Przeworski, 2010: 81).

The connection between inequality and redistribution preferences is based on the premise that citizens are primarily motivated by material self-interest. From this logic follows the expectation that the poor, who benefit from redistribution, will support it, while the rich, who have little to gain from it, will oppose it. This logic is informed by the Marxist idea that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (1845:13). According to this view, the working class—or the poor, according to the M-R model—are both a class “in itself” and a class “for itself”. However, contrary to this material logic, recent research in political economy indicates that the poor may accept inequality if they perceive it as resulting from a fair process, while wealthy individuals may support redistribution if they believe inequality stems from an unjust system (Dimick et al., 2019). The conclusion that emerges from this strand of the literature is that higher levels of

inequality do not necessarily produce stronger demands for redistribution.

In short, democracy does not guarantee economic equality, nor does economic inequality necessarily translate into support for redistribution. Indeed, one reason democracy fails to ensure economic equality is that economic inequality does not always generate public demand for redistribution. The study of inequality is therefore especially relevant, as several fundamental questions arise from the coexistence of inequality and democracy: Why is inequality tolerated in some contexts and rejected in others? How much inequality can be tolerated? Which policies do citizens support to address inequality when they oppose it?

The aim of this thesis is to explore some of these questions by shifting attention to fairness beliefs, since, as Gramsci (1971) argued, the hegemonic ideology of a society—crystallized in people’s beliefs about fairness and justice—can shape citizens’ views on inequality. Specifically, the thesis focuses on three spheres of economic inequality, examining different factors that contribute to its legitimacy. The first sphere is inequality in the labor market, where meritocratic beliefs are analyzed as a legitimizing mechanism. The second sphere concerns disposable income inequality, with a focus on preferences for taxing the super-rich and the role of philanthropy in shaping attitudes toward inequality. The third and final sphere addresses inequality between natives and immigrants, particularly attitudes toward granting social rights to immigrants. Here, I propose to investigate natives’ reluctance to expand social rights for immigrants through the lens of beliefs about the potential fiscal cost of immigration.

1.2 First Sphere of Inequality: Market Inequality


The first sphere I put the focus on is market inequality. When discussing inequality, most of the attention is drawn to disposable inequality, that is, to the inequality that takes place after the redistribution of resources by the state. This approach can be misleading, though, since it does not leave enough space to explore why inequality takes place in the first place.

The extant literature on political economy studying attitudes towards inequality often omits that inequality can be reduced by institutions and policies that directly affect the labour market without resorting to taxes or transfers. Pre-distribution policies are intended in avoiding an unfair allocation of economic resources in the market and include a wide range of policies, some

of them shaped by private actors, such as equity norms, efficiency wages, collective bargaining, profit sharing or corporate social responsibility (Lindh and McCall, 2023); and others designed by public actors, like minimum wages, anti-discrimination law, full employment policy, new anti-trust legislation, regulations that increases drivers' bargaining power vis-à-vis a platform like Uber, a cap on CEO salary, equal-pay-for equal-work reforms (Cavaillé, 2023) or labour union regulation (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Rueda, 2008).

Market inequality is the sphere of inequality where Rawls (1971) thinks more efforts should be devoted. According to his concept of property-owning democracy, greater equality needs to be achieved in the *ex ante* distribution of property and skill endowments, with a particular emphasis on equality of opportunity to invest in human capital. The smaller the inequalities to begin with in the market are, the lower will be the subsequent redistributive effort by the state. Moreover, in his view, addressing market inequality is essential to safeguard individuals' sense of self-respect.

Figure 1.1: Changes in Pretax Income Shares from 1980 to 2016, by Income Group. Source: Elkjær and Iversen, 2023.



Western societies are characterized by pronounced differences in income. As the data from the World Inequality Database shown in Figure 1.1 reveals, in the last decades income inequality has considerably expanded. In a market economy, differences in income are supposed to reflect the way in which the forces of supply and demand determine the economic value of different

people's talents. In recent years, there is immense demand for high skills relative to supply. Consequently, how much one earns depends to a high extent on individuals' skills or human capital. As Acemoglu and Autor show (2011), wages for college graduates increase when demand for them rises due to skill-biased technological change and the supply of such workers falls short. Indeed, a significant share of the overall rise in earnings inequality since the early 1980s can be attributed to increases in the college wage premium (Autor et al. 2020).

Apart from individuals' skills, there is a set of factors that transcend individual control that affect differences in income, such as what other people want to buy, how technologies determine which skills are more valuable than others, how many people in the population possess the same talents or assets than one possesses (Chadler, 2023), and the national level of collective bargaining coverage (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Rueda, 2008; Beramendi and Rueda, 2014). Furthermore, in the knowledge economy, routines jobs, which are more exposed to automation, receive lower salaries (Goos and Manning, 2007; Iversen and Soskice, 2019; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2023). Another factor determining differences in pay is the gender composition of occupations. As a large literature in sociology shows, there is a negative correlation between changes in average male and female wage and changes in the gender composition of an occupation. Recently, Harris (2022) has found evidence that increased female representation among young workers in an occupation is associated with lower average wages for older men and women, both in the short term and in the longer term. In the same line, Murphy and Oesch (2016) find that pay differences across male and female occupations are due to gender discrimination, not to differences in productivity.

Knowing the factors that shape market inequality in practice is essential, but it is not sufficient to understand the persistence of inequality. To fully grasp why inequality persists, it is necessary to examine how citizens think normatively about the distribution of resources in the labour market and, consequently, why they may come to justify inequality. This is precisely the aim of the first paper of this thesis. To examine how individuals normatively assess market inequality, I first briefly outline how different thinkers have approached the concept of economic justice.

1.2.1 Meritocracy and acceptance of market inequality

For Nozick (1974), justice is fundamentally related to the respect for property rights. In his view, market inequalities should be accepted not because they are fair or efficient, but because they are

the outcome of free transactions voluntarily entered into by individuals. Hayek (1988) departs slightly from Nozick's account, arguing instead that market outcomes reflect the subjective value that consumers place on goods and services. Because the market determines what is valuable, inequalities resulting from its rules should not be altered. Mankiw (2013) takes a step further and argues that market outcomes are indeed an accurate indicator of individuals' contributions, which morally entitles them to receive the salary assigned by the market.

Some critiques have been elaborated against these perspectives. Mainly, by taking market value as a proxy for contribution, it is assumed that all individuals have the same capacity to demand and consume goods, but that is not the case. There are some individuals with more resources that will have a bigger influence on what is demanded in the market, thus tilting the balance towards their own interests at the expense of the interests of those individuals with fewer resources. As Marshall et al. put it, market mechanisms "reward people unequally, in proportion to their differing capacities to provide what others want" (1997:163). Furthermore, Sandel (2020) argues that the money one makes in the market, that is, how one's actions are rewarded by the market system, has nothing to do with the value of individual's contribution. Finally, it is a matter of contingency whether the abilities that one possesses are scarce in society and therefore more prone to enjoy a high demand in the market.

Sharing some of these criticisms and adding that individuals cannot take full moral credit for the abilities that they possess, which are the product of natural lottery, Rawls (1971) sketched a theory of justice sustained in two pillars: respecting the moral equality of persons and reducing the arbitrariness of natural and social contingencies (Kymlicka, 2002). His theory of justice advocates for the difference principle, which dictates that differences in wages and salaries must be arranged in a way that always benefits the economic position of the least favoured of society under the assumption that there is fair equality of opportunity. People can only receive a greater share of resources in the market if that can benefit those with lesser shares.

The underlying mechanisms of Rawls' difference principle are not strongly reflected in how citizens think about inequality (see Michelbach et al., 2003). One of the main criticisms to this principle resides in the fact that, following Dworkin's terminology (2000), it is endowment-insensitive but not ambition-sensitive: it does not reward or punish individuals' agency. Instead, it assumes that inequality in income is the product of circumstances but not of choices made by

individuals. David Miller offers an alternative theory of justice that places merit (or desert, as he calls it) at the centre of it. Although he acknowledges the contingency behind many notions of merit, he defends that what people deserve is based only on intentional performances, not on the talent on which that performance might rely. As he puts it, “the desert is based on the performance, not the talent that may be its necessary condition” (2001: 146).

David Miller’s theory can be placed under the broader umbrella of meritocracy, which is a system of stratification centered on the idea that economic rewards should be distributed based on merit. Extensive scholarship provides empirical support to the idea that market inequality is justified through meritocratic beliefs (Evans et al., 2010). In the field of comparative political economy, Cavaillé has recently argued that, according to what she calls the proportionality norm, rewards in the market should be proportional to “individuals’ effort, talent, skills and bets on the future such as saving and investment decisions” (2023: 37). In her account, all these factors seem to encapsulate the concept of merit.

Given that meritocracy seems to be the main approach to understand market inequality, I adopt it in the first paper of the thesis. Despite the increasing attention the concept of merit has received in recent years—Sandel’s best-selling book *The Tyranny of Merit* and Markovits’ book *The Meritocracy Trap* being just two examples—merit has often been defined vaguely. One of the contributions of my work is to refine this concept. I use Miller’s definition of merit, which can be summarized as “an agent voluntarily undertaking a valuable activity and, as a result, deserving benefits whose enjoyment forms a fitting sequel to what he has done” (2001:149), and propose a theoretical distinction between input-based and output-based variants of merit. The input-based merit approach posits that the valuable activities that should be rewarded in the market are those investments individuals make in a process, including their time, skills, effort, level of responsibility and risk exposure. This approach values the dedication and resources individuals commit, regardless of the final outcome. On the other hand, output-based merit focuses on the results or outcomes individuals achieve. This approach, informed by the concept of reciprocity, evaluates merit based on productivity, efficiency, and contributions to organizational or societal goals.

Refining the concept of merit allows me to test the importance not only of input-based merit, which is the account of merit that has received most attention, but also of output-based merit,

which is often neglected. Moreover, one of the innovations of my approach lies in the way I study market inequality. Instead of paying attention to how individuals react to changes in individual merit, which is what most scholarship does, I place the focus on the job. I argue that inequality is reproduced through social class and not through isolated individuals. Workers belonging to an occupation make generally less or more money than workers belonging to another occupation, regardless of their individual merit. There is a wide array of jobs, such as CEOs of big companies, pop star singers, footballers, youtubers, that make exorbitant amounts of money and yet we do not know whether most citizens seem to be comfortable with this *status quo* and, if so, why.

I contend that individuals might make merit judgements not just about other individuals, but also about occupations, attributing more merit to some occupations than others. When studying the role of merit in justifying inequality, it becomes important then to examine how merit considerations are applied to different occupations. In conclusion, the first paper of the thesis attempts to understand why individuals think different occupations should yield different salaries and whether input and output-based merit have something to do with it. Moreover, it will compare the relevance of job-related aspects of merit with those that are unrelated, in terms of their impact on inequality acceptance.


1.3 Second Sphere of Inequality: Disposable Inequality

Increasing taxes on the rich is one of the tools available to governments in advanced democracies to reduce the rising disparities in market outcomes that have been recorded in the past decades. The finality of the welfare state is to mitigate market inequality through redistributive tax and transfer programs. The resulting inequality *ex post* tax and transfers is called disposable inequality and is the point of attention of the second paper of the thesis.

According to data from tax authorities, including the Internal Revenue Service as reported by ProPublica, the wealthiest individuals in some Western countries have at times paid remarkably little income tax in recent years, despite their growing fortunes. It is no surprise, then, that there is an ongoing debate across the United States and other Western nations about how much tax the wealthy should contribute. This debate mirrors another concerning the taxation of international corporations, particularly in light of studies highlighting that some of the largest corporations have paid minimal taxes in recent years (Saez and Zucman, 2019).

The Meltzer and Richard's model (1981) stipulates that we should expect citizens to ask for an increase in the taxes of the rich in a context of growing inequality. When inequality goes up, social risks are more unevenly distributed, and it is in the interest of most citizens to demand higher redistribution. What we observe in the last decades, however, departs significantly from Meltzer and Richard's predictions. Top marginal tax rates have not raised at the pace that inequality has. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1.2, they have decreased (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016).

Figure 1.2: Average Top Rates of Income Taxation, 1800-2013, for 20 countries¹ Source: Scheve and Stasavage, 2016



Given the rise of market inequality and the lack of fiscal response to it through higher taxes on the rich, the second paper of the thesis aims to explore why citizens can be dissuaded from demanding higher taxes on the rich. I put the focus on an aspect of the super-rich that has barely been studied in comparative political economy: their philanthropy through charitable donations, which can help convey a positive message about this group. In the next section, I proceed to explain briefly the history and magnitude of philanthropy and its association with preferences for taxing the rich.

1.3.1 Philanthropy and preferences for taxing the rich

The philanthropy of the rich is viewed by some as a legitimate method to address inequality. In Greek, ‘philanthropia’ means ‘love of humanity’. In Ancient Greece it was often linked to the

¹The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

benevolent actions of gods or individuals towards others. The term originates from the myth of Prometheus, the God who shared divine fire with mortals and was punished by Zeus, his liver being eaten away by eagles. Prometheus's act of sharing divine fire with mortals, despite the consequences he faced, can be interpreted as an early example of altruism and compassion towards humankind. The first act of philanthropy was a clear act of self-sacrifice.

In the UK, philanthropy was institutionalized in 1601, when the English Parliament approved the Charitable Uses act, the world's first legislation to regulate donations, which included four categories of charity: relief of poverty, advancement of education, promotion of religion, and other purposes beneficial to the community. By the end of the 19th century, philanthropy was so widespread that *The Times of London* highlighted that the resources of the city's charities in the UK were bigger than the governments of some European countries, "exceeding the revenue of Sweden, Denmark and Portugal, and double that of Swiss confederation" (quoted in Bishop and Green, 2010: 25). In the same period, philanthropy gained salience in the US with Rockefeller, the first billionaire in history, who gave birth to the Rockefeller Foundation, and Carnegie, who funded the construction of nearly 3,000 libraries and other institutions to help the poor.

In 1889, Carnegie wrote *The Gospel of Wealth*, a treaty where he explains his philanthropic inclinations. This text is considered one of the ideological cornerstones of philanthropy. In *The Gospel*, Carnegie argues that the best use that the rich can make of their wealth is to devote it to social causes during their lifetime. The millionaire needs to become "a trustee for the poor". In this way, the problem of Rich and Poor, as Carnegie liked to call inequality, is solved thanks to philanthropy. As he describes it:

The surplus wealth of the few will become, in the best sense the property of the many, because administered for the common good, and this wealth, passing through the hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the elevation of our race than if it had been distributed in small sums to the people themselves.

Philanthropy remains a contemporary phenomenon, as evidenced by the rising level of donations among the super-rich. When it comes to philanthropic endeavours, the figure of Bill Gates stands out. As he admits, "after a few million or something, it's all about how you're going to give it back" (Freeland, 2012: 236). In the last decades, he has devoted a considerable amount of his money to social causes. The asset of the Gates Foundation and another Gates Trust, which

receives donations from Bill and Melinda Gates and also from Warren Buffett, accumulated together more than 80 billion dollars in 2016, a quantity above the GDP of most countries in Africa (Reich, 2018: 9). In 2018, the Gates Foundation alone gave 5 billion dollars, more than the foreign aid budget of the majority of countries.

Melinda Gates, Bill Gates and Warren Buffet took a step further in 2010 and started *The Giving Pledge*, a movement to promote philanthropy among the super-rich. The goal of the Pledge is to encourage the super-rich to commit to giving more than half of their wealth “to address some of society’s most pressing problems”. As of 2024, 224 individuals and couples around the world have joined. To take just one example from the pledgers, Warren Buffett has committed to donating more than 99% of his wealth during his lifetime or at death, aiming to have a significant impact on the health and welfare of others.

The implications of philanthropy for the politics of equality are considerable, since most Western governments offer generous tax incentives for charitable giving. According to the OECD, tax concessions are justified “if they result in a larger increase in social welfare than that which government could have otherwise achieved through direct spending” (2020: 22). Considering that giving is especially concentrated among the very rich, in practice, the lower and middle classes subsidize through their taxes the philanthropic decisions of the rich. The interests and prejudices of the wealthy determine in which activities this money is spent. It is worth noting that, in countries with a tax deduction system, like the US, but also Germany, Italy, Finland or Norway, the system of tax incentives is regressive, meaning that the percentage of a donation that is subsidised by the state is higher for the rich than for the poor. This implies that the system of tax incentives does not only reduce the tax burden of the super-rich but also strengthens the disparities between this group and the poor.

Some connections have been also drawn between the donations made and the taxes the super-rich should be paying. For instance, Foster Friess, the Wyoming mutual fund investor who was himself a millionaire, claimed that “people don’t realize how wealthy people self-tax” through charitable donations (Freeland, 2012: 246). With this statement, he suggested that wealthy philanthropists are already making a significant contribution. On the other hand, in 2019, the economic historian Rutger Bregman, when asked at Davos how the world could avoid a social backlash from rising inequality, responded bluntly: “The answer is very simple. Just stop

talking about philanthropy. And start talking about taxes. . . Taxes, taxes, taxes. All the rest is bullshit, in my opinion”.

It is worth noting that, against the general perception, an important portion of the donations from the rich are not aimed at addressing social problems, but rather at funding activities that are aligned with their own interests. The pattern of giving can be hardly matched with expectations of redistributive outcomes (Reich, 2018). This was one of the main reasons why Peter Krämer, a Hamburg-based shipping magnate and multimillionaire opposed *the Giving Pledge*: “You can write donations off in your taxes to a large degree in the USA. So the rich make a choice: Would I rather donate or pay taxes? The donors are taking the place of the state. That’s unacceptable”.

Criticism of the philanthropy of the super-rich has long been a practice, engaged in by thinkers such as Kant, Thoreau, Fourier, Engels, and Marx, as well as by writers and public intellectuals like Dickens, Flaubert, and Oscar Wilde. In *The Soul of Man under Socialism*, Wilde criticises philanthropy and charity because “their remedies do not cure the disease: they merely prolong it. Indeed, their remedies are part of the disease”. Kant also manifested his concerns about a kind of beneficence that is built upon a distribution of wealth that can be originally unjust:

Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored through the injustice of government, which introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their beneficence. Under such circumstances, does a rich man’s help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all? (quoted in Reich, 2018: 52).

In the same line, William Jewett Tucket, one of Andrew Carnegie’ most fervent critics, also stressed that there is “no greater mistake than that of trying to make charity do the work of justice”. All these critiques resonate well with most of today’s critiques, which point out that the super-rich use philanthropy as a tool to gain social and political power as well as a mechanism to fund leisure activities that enjoy fiscal incentives and that mainly serve their own interests (Reich, 2018; Valley, 2020).


As can be seen, philanthropy has received notable attention in public opinion. However, its implications have barely been studied in social sciences. The goal of the second paper of the thesis is to explore whether the giving of the super-rich has any impact on public support for

taxing them. I argue that the philanthropy of the super-rich portrays them in a positive light and that, because of the embellished public image due to their giving, citizens will be less willing to tax them.

1.4 Third Sphere of Inequality: Redistribution to Immigrants

The third and final sphere of inequality I study in this thesis addresses public opinion on redistribution to immigrants. National welfare states were built upon the ethnic homogeneity that characterized European societies when they were designed. In the words of Freeman, “the logic of the welfare state implies the existence of boundaries that distinguish those who are members of a community from those who are not” (Freeman 1986: 52). In a welfare state, citizens have duties and rights as members of a shared society. However, in recent years, we have witnessed an increasing ethnic diversity in Western societies that has called into question the understanding of a shared society. As can be seen in Figure 1.3, the percentage of foreign-born population in OECD countries is, on average, higher than 10% of the population.

Figure 1.3: Percentage of foreign-born population. Source: OECD.



The first implication of the growing size of immigration is that immigration has become an increasingly salient issue. Dancygier and Margalit (2020) study the salience of immigration in

party manifestos across political parties. They find that immigration has become more and more salient over the years, both for right and left-wing parties. But is not only that immigration is more salient today, it is also more often related to the welfare state. When considering the possibility of Turkey joining the EU, the Vote Leave campaign in the UK posted a tweet associating this possibility with concerns about the capacity of the NHS to cope. This concern has been also present in Trump's discourse, as the following quote exemplifies: "I am tired of seeing our taxpayer paying for people to come into the country and immediately go onto welfare and various other things" (The White House, 2019). However, the association of immigration and the welfare state is not restricted to the far right, some social democratic parties have also incorporated it into their party manifestos. This is the case of the Social Democrats in Denmark, which warned against the inclusion of immigrants because it could endanger the social cohesion and welfare that characterise Denmark (Socialdemokratiet 2017:21).

Concerns about the costs of immigration are especially present in the EU, where immigrants workers from the EU/EEA have the right to freely migrate and work in any EU/EEA state and the right to full and equal access to the welfare benefits of the country of destination. The EU enlargement of 2004 exacerbated these concerns as citizens from the new eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe incorporated to the EU were integrated, immediately or gradually, to the welfare system of the countries of arrival. In this context, the ministers of interior from Austria, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany sent a joint letter to the Council of the European Union in 2013 expressing that free movement of persons and access to welfare services should not be unconditional.

The increasing ethnic fragmentation poses then important questions that are worth exploring. Alesina and Glaeser, at the beginning of the century, warned against the rise of immigration, claiming that "if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state" (2004:11). For Kymlicka, the reaction to ethnic diversity is not limited to including immigrants reducing welfare state generosity. Another possible negative reaction is the exclusion of immigrants from accessing benefits, what is known as welfare chauvinism, which is "a system of social protection (only) for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it" (Kitschelt, 1997: 22). Specifically, increasing immigration confronts Social democratic parties with the so-called progressive's dilemma, that is, with the challenge of preserving "a comprehensive welfare state

and create a multicultural society without losing public support” (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019: 145).

This third sphere is very important to understand inequality because studies show that, in almost all European countries, immigrants face a higher risk of poverty than natives (Hooijer and Picot, 2015), which means they are in higher need of social protection. Furthermore, immigrants are, in general, and especially those unskilled, more exposed to the different-life course risks that welfare states intend to mitigate. They are faced with structural barriers natives are not faced with, which perpetuate the vertical inequality between natives and them, such as poor language ability, low skills, lower social capital, discrimination in the market, informal payment and being outsiders to the social, political and economic system at arrival. Not only are immigrants more likely to face structural disadvantages that natives do not face, but the welfare system seem more inefficient at providing them with social protection. For instance, it has been shown that, in the first years of their stay, immigrants are less likely to receive unemployment benefits than natives (Gschwind, 2021).

Immigrants’ social rights is such a complex topic that the canonical models of the welfare state, like the Esping-Andersen approach (1990), do not fit to explain their different integration into public social protection across countries. Immigrants living in a country with generous social programmes are not necessarily better off than their counterparts living in a country with a basic welfare state. The legal status of immigrants, that is, whether they are holders of permanent or temporary residence permits, entails different types of access to social protection. Long-term residents benefit from the most inclusive access to social security programmes in most countries, which implies that migrants’ access to social rights is shaped by the immigration policy of nation states in addition to their welfare system (Sainsbury, 2012; Eugster, 2018). In the next section, I provide some context as to how immigrants’ social rights have been understood as well as explore the role of fiscal considerations in shaping attitudes towards redistribution to this group.

1.4.1 Fiscal considerations and immigrants’ social rights

Rawls’ theory of justice (1971), which has been already discussed, captures very well the normative foundations of European welfare states. The cornerstone of Rawls’ theory, inspired by Kant, is that all individuals should be treated as ends in themselves, having then guaranteed a minimum

of material resources to cope in life. According to this logic, being from a community from outside should not make any difference in the social rights that individuals should have recognised. However, in his book *The Law of Peoples* (1999), Rawls seems to contravene some of the principles of his own theory of justice by arguing that a substantial social commitment can only exist within nations, that is, between groups of persons united by common sympathies, by a common language and by shared historical memories

In a footnote of *The Laws of Peoples*, he goes as far as to claim that “another reason for limiting immigration is to protect a people’s political culture and its constitutional principles” (1999: 39). In the same vein, when Rawls thinks about redistribution between nations (or “peoples”, as he prefers to call them), he defends some principles, like the duty of assistance, that are less demanding than those applied to the individuals of a same nation. Even for a universalist like him, some boundaries seem to exist to social solidarity. The other does not always deserve the same rights as oneself. Some philosophers such as Nussbaum (2009) or Benhabib (2004) have been especially critical with this shift in Rawls’ work.

This contradiction in the work of Rawls denotes a way of regarding social solidarity that stipulates that “welfare services should be restricted to our own people” (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990: 212). Aligned with Rawls’ view, studies of European opinion on social rights for immigrants have shown that individuals, even those self-perceived as progressive, exhibit little support for unconditional government transfers that benefit groups which “they do not recognize as their own”. This dualistic view speaks to Nancy Fraser’s philosophical work (1995), which has emphasized the conflict that Western societies face between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. Individuals willing to culturally embrace immigrants are not necessarily supportive of granting social rights to them. Interestingly, all over Europe supporters of a universal basic income demand rather strict eligibility conditions for immigrants (Diermeier et al., 2021).


There are two main explanations that have been stressed to explain why individuals are reluctant to grant social rights to immigrants. The first one is based on a labour competition argument. Immigrants are more vulnerable than the majority population and thus more likely to be working in lower status jobs. Consequently, individuals, especially those occupied in lower status jobs, see them as a threat (Mewes and Mau, 2012). The second argument is of cultural type. Natives who hold more prejudices and that desire social distance from those that do not

pertain to their ethno-cultural group might be more likely to deny social rights to immigrants (Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Van Oorschot, 2008; Ford, 2015; Reeskens and Van Der Meer, 2015).

The hesitations to extend social rights to immigrants among even those that should be more predisposed to be in favour of it (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Ford and Kootstra, 2017; Kros and Coenders, 2019) is hard to explain employing only the major existing theories that attribute these attitudes to ethnic prejudice and fear of labour market competition. I argue that there is an additional explanation that could help explain this phenomenon and that is based on immigration's fiscal impacts. The main idea is very simple: natives may perceive immigrants as a net burden for public finance that increases fiscal pressures to increase taxes or decreases per capita transfers for public spending.

Concerns that immigrants 'take out' more than they 'put in' do not seem restricted to politicians or political parties. I explore the 4th wave of the European Social Survey and indeed see that a majority of individuals in Western European countries perceives immigrants as such. As Figure 1.4 shows, the percentage of them that thinks that immigrants receive more than they contribute more than doubles that of those that think they contribute more.

Figure 1.4: Perception of the fiscal cost of immigration in Western Europe. Source: ESS



In the third and final paper of the thesis, I argue that natives will be less willing to grant social rights to immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. One of the main theoretical

contributions of the paper is to distinguish between the intentional reciprocity of immigrants and their actual reciprocity, captured by their final fiscal contribution. Whereas the scholarship has shown that natives punish immigrants for not showing cooperative intentions (what could be also labelled as “input-based merit”, following the terminology of the first paper), I anticipate that they will also tend to punish them when they are not positive fiscal contributors (when they do not show “output-based merit”). Making this distinction is fundamental for the study of inequality, since whereas the intentional reciprocity of immigrants can be under their own control, their final fiscal contribution can be affected by factors beyond their individual control, especially by the structural barriers that they face in the country of destination. In conclusion, I anticipate that economic inequality, which results in immigrants facing economic disadvantages, often renders them negative fiscal contributors in the short term and can deprive them of the public support necessary to recognise their social rights.

1.5 Plan of the thesis

The structure of this thesis differs from the traditional manuscript format in that instead of being structured around chapters, it is structured through three different papers, which, for the sake of clarity, also receive the label of “chapters”. Despite the different format, I still aim to preserve some of the essence of the traditional monograph thesis. This introduction chapter has been written precisely with the idea of shedding light on the underlying philosophical questions that inform the research done in the thesis as well as highlighting the common threads across the three papers.

To provide more coherence to the three papers of the thesis, this introduction chapter will be followed by another chapter, Chapter 2, where I will describe the state of the art of the scholarship on preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards inequality. I already engage with strands of this literature in each of the three different papers, but I believe it is a good idea to paint a broader picture that conveys to the reader the variety of approaches in the literature. At the end of the literature review chapter, I will underscore the main contributions of my thesis to the field, highlighting the gaps that I want to fill in, why these gaps are relevant, and how I have attempted to address them.

The third chapter of the thesis will contain the paper on the First Sphere of Inequality,

represented by market inequality, and will investigate the role of merit in accepting inequality. The fourth chapter will present the paper on the Second Sphere of Inequality, which is related to disposable inequality, and will show the association between the philanthropy of the super-rich and public preferences for taxing this group. The fifth chapter will consist of the paper on the Third Sphere of Inequality, the one that touches upon immigrants' social rights. It will explore how fiscal considerations shape preferences for including immigrants in the welfare state. Finally, Chapter Six will close the thesis, indicating the contributions of the thesis as well as the avenues for future research that it opens up. The appendixes for each of the papers will be placed after the conclusion chapter, following the order in which each of the papers appears in the thesis.

Chapter 2

How Preferences for Redistribution are Shaped

In the first chapter, I broadly outlined the main philosophical motivations underpinning each of the research questions addressed in the thesis. I sought to justify the relevance of studying these questions while highlighting their underlying complexity. In this chapter, I situate these questions more concretely within the field of comparative political economy, the branch of Political Science that has traditionally examined citizens' attitudes toward redistribution and inequality more broadly. I will present the two main approaches used to study this topic: the material self-interest approach and the fairness-beliefs approach. Finally, I will conclude the chapter by pointing out how this thesis contributes to this body of research.

2.1 The material self-interest approach

There is a large tradition in political economy that has attempted to study why individuals are in favour of redistribution. One of the main and widespread explanations is that individuals are moved by their own material interest to reduce inequality. The canonical model in the literature is the Metlzer and Richard model (1981), which stipulates that individuals' attitudes towards redistribution are shaped by their level of income. Assuming no administrative costs and disincentive effects, the model establishes that individuals whose income is below the mean income will maximize their utility by opting for a 100% tax rate, whereas those above the mean

will prefer a tax rate of 0%.

However, income alone does not fully explain individuals' preferences for redistribution. Another influential perspective, the power resources approach (hereafter PRA), builds on Marxist traditions and suggests that economic risk is a key factor in shaping redistributive preferences. According to this view, individuals who face higher exposure to economic risks are more likely to support redistribution as a means of shielding themselves from the vicissitudes of the market. In order to determine which individuals are in favour of redistribution, it is necessary to first elucidate the source of economic risk so that one can trace who are more negatively affected by the risk in question. According to the PRA, risks are tightly connected to individuals' socioeconomic class, which produces different risks to which citizens are exposed, such as aging, illness, work accidents, unemployment, poverty or the rearing of children (Korpi, 2006). From this perspective, individuals belonging to a lower socioeconomic class are more inclined to demand redistribution from the state. Consequently, the development of the state is understood as the result of class struggle.

Yet, contrary to the premises of the PRA, economic risks are not uniformly distributed within socioeconomic classes (Häusermann et al., 2020). As David Rueda argues (2005), there is a risk that cuts across individuals from the same class and that is related to their current labour market status. Insiders, those workers who enjoy stability and protection in the market, are less exposed to socioeconomic risks and are, therefore, less likely to support redistributive policies, whereas outsiders, those workers “either unemployed or holding jobs characterized by low salaries and low levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges” (Rueda, 2005: 62), are more likely to demand redistribution. In this line, recent empirical evidence shows that individuals' preferences for redistribution are shaped by an interaction between their social class and their labour market situation (Rovny and Rovny, 2017; Vlandas, 2020).

Beyond class and labor market position, economic risks can also stem from external forces. Globalization, for instance, intensifies competition in the labor market, potentially driving wages down and increasing job insecurity in certain sectors. This “race to the bottom” disproportionately affects workers in industries that are more vulnerable to global trade, thereby increasing their support for redistribution. In this regard, Walter (2017) shows that exposure to globalization increases demands for redistribution among low-skilled individuals. Similarly, automation can

also pose a significant risk to workers who fear being displaced by machines. Technological advancements can render some workers' tasks—particularly those that are routine—obsolete. Consequently, individuals engaged in routine tasks are expected to demand higher levels of social protection (Thewissen and Rueda, 2019; Gallego and Kurer, 2022).

While globalization and automation highlight external threats to economic security, another critical dimension in understanding social preferences is time. Individuals also rely on other future-oriented calculations to align their redistributive preferences with their self-interest. For instance, working class individuals with prospects of upward mobility envisage fewer economic risks in the future than those faced in the present, which attenuates their zeal for redistribution (Benabou and Ok, 2001). The same occurs with income. Rueda and Stegmueller (2019) find that changes in expected lifetime income have a much larger effect on preferences for redistribution than changes in actual current income.

This recognition of shifting risks over time is central to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, which views social policy not only as a tool for aiding the worse-off but also as a form of insurance against future job loss. The welfare state provides certainty and security to those individuals who have made more investments in the market to carry on, not just to the worse-off (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006). As Baldwin frames it, the “proletariat has had no monopoly on uncertainty” (1990: 12). According to this account, self-interest motivations lead individuals with high levels of skill specificity to support redistributive policies.

As a product of the nuances introduced by the VoC approach into welfare state studies, a new distinction has been drawn in the literature between two kinds of policies: compensation and investment policies (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Bonoli and Natali, 2012; Morel et al., 2012; Hemerijck, 2013). While the former corresponds to the classical understanding of the welfare state and refers to “social transfers to beneficiaries that use them in order to cover current needs and demands” (Beramendi, 2017: 14), the latter is related to the qualifications brought about by the VoC approach, emphasizing those expenditures that are directed toward fostering the productivity of individuals within the market. On one side, consumption policies include policies such as unemployment benefits and pensions that prioritize short-term direct economic returns to voters and address current needs and demands. As Gingrich and Ansell put it, social consumption

policies “aim to mitigate the economic risks of income loss by providing redistributive transfers and insurance” (2015: 282). On the other side, investment policies encompass policies that prioritize long-term returns, such as tertiary education, childcare, research and development, and active labor market policies (Thelen, 2012). These policies are future-oriented, since they are based on public expenditures that increase “the productivity of the economy overall and of labor and capital in particular” (Beramendi et al., 2015: 15).

The offer of investment policies by political parties helps explain one of the phenomena characterizing the post-industrial world: the fact that the new middle class has become the main electoral base of the Left, which challenges the main assumptions of the PRA. As Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) show, in all welfare states, the difference between workers’ and non-workers’ support for left-wing parties has diminished. They argue that the reason why the new middle classes might support these parties and, therefore, some level of redistribution, is not only due to cultural factors, but also to their own material self-interest, since they can benefit from the investment policies offered by the Left, especially in childcare services, education and active labour market policies. Investment policies create benefits for larger parts of the electorate than consumption policies. In this vein, Garitzmann et al. (2018) conduct an original survey in eight Western European countries and find that social investment policies receive support among a broader part of the population, cutting across income and social class lines.

It is worth noting that material self-interest extends beyond direct economic benefits, particularly for higher-income individuals. While economic inequality does not pose a direct financial threat to this group, it can create negative externalities—such as increased crime or social unrest—that ultimately affect their well-being. As a result, even wealthier individuals may support a degree of redistribution as a means of mitigating the broader consequences of inequality (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019).

It is also fundamental to connect micro-level arguments based on material self-interest with macro-level arguments, linking institutional characteristics to preferences for redistribution. For instance, welfare state institutions, by providing social benefits and services, can substantially alter the inherent riskiness related to a concrete socioeconomic position. In this regard, Gingrich and Ansell (2012) show that how individuals respond to their economic hardship is influenced by welfare policies. As they put it, “the structure and impact of individual risk is at least partly

endogenous to existing institutions” (2012: 1631). Additionally, Beramendi and Rehm (2016) demonstrate that the degree of progressivity in the tax system mediates the impact of income on preferences for redistribution.

Despite how widespread the material self-interest approach to redistribution based on socioeconomic risks is, it is not without limitation. One of its main weaknesses is that it assumes individuals know with precision their position in society and therefore the real risks they are exposed to, demanding redistribution accordingly. Some works show, however, that this is not the case and that individuals behave more in line with their material interests when these interests are externally enlightened (Fernández-Albertos and Kuo, 2018; Ardanaz et al., 2022; Kishishita and Matsumoto, 2022). Furthermore, the material self-interest approach to preferences for redistribution does not travel that well in countries with low state capacity, countries where “public goods provision is often poor, management of public funds is often corrupt or inefficient, and tax evasion is historically high” (Castañeda et al., 2020: 1176). First, in these countries, the inefficiency of the state blurs the line of accountability, making it very difficult for citizens to reward or blame governments based on the welfare they provide (Harding and Stasavage, 2014). Secondly, drawing on the insights from Margaret Levi’s work (1989), citizens, when deciding whether to support or not public redistribution, first they need to consider what they will get in return for the taxes paid. In countries with low state capacity, this expected return is low, inevitably affecting the tax morale of citizens and their expectations of redistribution.

2.1.1 Efficiency considerations

Material self-interest is typically understood as the probability of benefiting from redistribution. However, another dimension of self-interest, also explored in scholarship, relates to efficiency considerations. Even if redistribution benefits some individuals, potential beneficiaries may still oppose it if they believe it will entail efficiency costs that ultimately hinder economic prosperity.

Okun very famously used the metaphor of a leaky bucket to illustrate the costs of redistribution: “the money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. Some of it will simply disappear in transit, so the poor will not receive all the money that is taken from the rich” (1975: 90). The leak represents an inefficiency, and it can take the form of administrative costs, reduced incentives for labour force participation, reduced savings, or distortionary effects on

productivity-enhancing investments (Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017). In pursuing equality of income, Okun argues that “society would forgo any opportunity to use material rewards as incentives to production. And that would lead to inefficiencies that would be harmful to the welfare of the majority. Any insistence on carving the pie into equal slices would shrink the size of the pie” (1975: 48). In Okun’s view, high marginal tax rates would then imply that “the living standards of the lowly would fall along with those of the mighty” (1975: 119).

Although macro-level evidence on the equality-efficiency trade-off remains inconclusive, individual perceptions of this trade-off can shape redistributive preferences. Fisman et al. (2017) show that individuals adjust their support for redistribution based on perceived efficiency costs, treating it as a zero-sum game. Similarly, efficiency concerns influence political behavior: individuals prioritizing efficiency were less likely to vote for Obama in the 2012 U.S. election. However, other studies suggest efficiency considerations play a smaller role in shaping inequality acceptance (Almas et al., 2019).

Rodon and Sanjaume (2020) explore how individuals evaluate the fairness of redistributive policies, showing that policies promoting general economic prosperity are perceived as more just. Individuals care about prosperity, to the extent that their economic aspirations may refrain them from demanding high levels of redistribution. This is totally in line with Iversen and Soskice, who have argued that “contrary to standard notions, the overriding concern of the decisive voter is neither equality nor redistribution, but rather his or her own income and welfare, with due attention to efficiency costs of taxation” (2019: 21). Aspirational individuals from a low socio-economic status may be reluctant to support redistribution if they think that it will entail efficiency costs that will trump economic growth and thus their aspirations of social mobility.

Recent research has also examined how efficiency concerns affect taxation preferences. Stantcheva (2021) shows that exposing individuals in the U.S. to a video that stresses the possible costs of redistribution (people working less, people evading their income, people deciding to seek a new job and people deciding to move to another state with lower taxes) does not significantly affect support for more progressive income or state taxes. Conversely, Hope et al. (2022) show that informing individuals about the lack of trickle-down effects from past tax cuts decreases support for tax reductions for the wealthy. Notably, this effect does not stem from a shift in core beliefs about taxation, but rather from a change in perceptions of historical tax

policies.

2.2 Fairness beliefs

Despite the traditional emphasis on material-based explanations in the scholarship, a growing body of literature challenges this premise, suggesting that many people are motivated by altruistic or other-regarding concerns and are thus willing to reward or punish others at a personal cost (Fong, 2001; Almas et al., 2019; Dimick et al., 2019; Fehr et al., 2021). My thesis largely builds on this perspective.

Experimental evidence, especially from behavioural economics, underscores that a great part of the population is concerned about the well-being of the poor (Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Results from the Ultimatum Game, a laboratory two-stage game used in behavioural economics with a Proposer and a Responder, demonstrate the tendency of individuals to abide by fairness principles. In this game, the Proposer offers a division of a certain quantity to an anonymous Responder, who accepts or rejects the offer. If the Responder accepts, then the quantity is divided as suggested by the Proposer. If the Responder rejects, both lose out and no quantity is given to them. If participants only based their decisions on maximizing utility calculations, the Proposer should always offer the minimum and the Responder should take it. The findings from the experiments employing this game show, however, that, in practice, the Proposer normally offers a 60-40 division of the sum, and the Responder many times says no to offers that are below an 80-20 division. Citizens are, therefore, motivated by fairness beliefs and not only by their material self-interest (Andersen et al., 2011; Levitt and List, 2007, Cavaillé. 2023). The dictator game is another game that has been employed in behavioural economics to study individuals' fairness predisposition. This game consists of two players: a dictator and a recipient. The dictator is given a quantity of money and decides how to split it between themselves and the recipient. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the recipient has no say and must accept whatever the dictator offers. Studies employing this game find that, against the prediction of a utility model only based on material self-interest, a great part of dictators give some amount of money to the recipient (Cappelen et al., 2010).

In political science, fairness beliefs have been also increasingly suggested as an alternative explanation to account for attitudes towards redistribution and inequality more generally. In

their book, *Taxing the Rich*, Scheve and Stasavage (2016) argue that progressive taxation was adopted as a reaction to the asymmetry of duties and sacrifices between the rich and the poor during World War I and World War II. The demand for compensation for this uneven distribution of life risks during the war led to the enactment of progressive taxation. Whereas top marginal income tax rates in participating countries increased from under 10% to over 50% after World War I, they increased to above 90% in some countries after World War II.

The fairness demand of compensation is not limited to war time. Following the logic of Scheve and Stasavage's framework, Limberg (2020) shows that the 2008 financial recession, which entailed asymmetrical costs for the rich and the poor, was also associated with increases in tax progressivity. In the same vein, Culpepper et al. (2024) find that exposing individuals in Australia, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK to information framing the economy as rigged to the advantage of the rich increases preferences for redistribution. Schwartz et al. (2023) also resort to fairness beliefs to explain why demands to tax the rich in Latin America are so low even if it is one of the most unequal regions in the world. In their view, Latin American citizens, unlike their counterparts in Europe, have not been exposed to narratives associating redistributive taxation with fairness beliefs. When these narratives are employed in a survey experiment, individuals are found to be more willing to increase taxes on the rich.

One of the main concept that informs the strand of the literature that revolves around fairness beliefs is that of deservingness, which has been widely applied to study preferences for redistributing resources to individuals facing economic hardship. In his pioneering work, van Oorschot (2000) distinguishes between five dimensions of deservingness that matter when considering whether to redistribute to the poor. The first dimension is identity. Individuals are less inclined to grant welfare provisions to individuals that are not ingroup members. They may even attach no utility (or negative utility) to the welfare of outgroup members (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). As the social affinity theory posits, who the others are who will benefit from redistribution is a question that matters for many individuals. The starting point of this theory is that individuals care more about the welfare of individuals that are more like them, not only in terms of race and ethnicity, but also in terms of lifestyle (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). Recent works show, indeed, that individuals are less willing to grant social rights to immigrants than to compatriots, regardless of the positive attributes or behaviours that these immigrants might present (Kootstra, 2016; Magni, 2022).

The second attribute of deservingness is need. People with greater need are regarded as more deserving (van Oorschot, 2006; Reeskens and van de Meer, 2019). The third attribute is reciprocity. According to Cavaillé, the reciprocity norm prescribes that “all members of a group contribute to the collective effort and that free riding does not go unpunished” (2023: 34). This norm especially applies in cooperative systems like the welfare state, which are the product of collective resource-pooling endeavours among citizens, where noncooperators who free ride on other people’s contributions might lead to the collapse of the system. Extensive research shows that people tend to reward cooperators and punish non-cooperators (Bowles and Gintis 2013). Individuals use a series of cues to identify the potential free-riding behaviour of the poor, like how actively they look for a job when unemployed, their work trajectory, and the display of good attitudes at work (Donnalaja, 2022). The fourth deservingness factor is “attitude”. Needy people who are “likeable, grateful, compliant and conforming to our standards” are considered more deserving (van Oorschot, 2006: 26). Before moving on to explain the fifth factor, it is worth noting that all the previous factors are normally applied to study preferences for redistribution to individuals facing economic hardship. There are, to my knowledge, very few studies that have attempted to extrapolate these categories to the study of the rich (two exceptions are Trump, 2023; Kane and Newman, 2023), which is surprising given that individuals also judge the wealth of the rich along the lines of their deservingness (Ragusa, 2017).

2.2.1 Control over neediness and the concept of merit

The fifth factor of deservingness envisaged by van Oorschot is that of control over neediness. The deservingness heuristic constitutes here a psychological heuristic that “prompts individuals to oppose welfare benefits when the need reflects a lack of motivation (i.e., ‘laziness’) but support benefits when the need is caused by random events beyond the individual’s control (i.e., ‘bad luck’)” (Jensen and Petersen, 2017: 71). Discriminating between the poor along the lines of their laziness is an ancient practice that goes back to ancient Greece, where a distinction was made between *penētes* (the respectable working poor) and *ptōchoi* (destitute beggars). In the 12th century, Gratian compiled a collection of canon law known as the *Decretum Gratiani* where he quotes the sceptical view of Augustine that charity can encourage the poor to become lazy: “It is more useful to take bread away from a hungry man than to break bread for him if, being sure of his food, he neglected righteousness” (quoted in Valley, 2020: 108). Consistent with

this traditional view, an extensive body of research shows that individuals are less willing to redistribute to the poor that are seen as lazy (Petersen et al., 2012). It is worth highlighting that there is a close overlap between the control over neediness and the reciprocity factors, since the poor that are hard-working might be simultaneously seen as not being to blame for their situation of need as well as willing contributors.

Unlike the other four dimensions, this fifth dimension of deservingness has been also employed to study preferences for redistribution more generally, including policies that affect not only providing to the needy but also taking away resources from the haves. In the case of the rich, when individuals evaluate their deservingness, they do so on the grounds of the resources they have acquired rather than on the social benefits they may receive. Instead of using the concept of control over neediness, these studies refer to whether the resources of the rich derive from effort or luck. If it the latter, then it can be concluded the rich do not deserve what they have, and individuals become more in favour of confiscating some of their resources through the tax system.

The concept of meritocracy plays a pivotal role when this fifth dimension of deservingness is applied to preferences for taxing the rich. Meritocracy comprises two distinct elements: equality of opportunity and merit. Unfortunately, much of the existing scholarship does not differentiate between these two components. While both principles are critical for achieving a full meritocracy, they are fundamentally distinct (Marshall et al., 1997; Bank, 2016). According to Cavaillé, merit is “a combination of personal decisions as a free agent, individual work ethic, acquired skills, and innate talent” (2023: 34). Several survey experiments and cross-sectional studies in comparative political economy reveal that individuals are less likely to support reducing disposable inequality when inequality is perceived as merit-based (Fong, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Mijs and Hoy, 2020; Fisman et al., 2020; Hope et al., 2022). Most studies define merit vaguely, often contrasting effort with luck. These studies consistently find that inequality is more acceptable when it is perceived as the result of effort. Such findings align closely with laboratory experiments in behavioral economics, where effort is measured more precisely through specific tasks.

Conversely, equality of opportunity refers to equal access to resources that confer advantages, such as education, knowledge, and opportunities to exert effort. Merit can dictate outcomes, such as who secures certain jobs, which may require varying levels of merit. However, this does not guarantee that all individuals had equal opportunities to cultivate what is considered merit.

While merit explains what justifies an income gap, equality of opportunity sets boundaries on the legitimacy of inequality by defining either starting conditions or limits (Bank, 2016).

It is worth noting that people can be associated with merit-related factors due to external causes, such as the opportunities available to them, but merit-related factors can also be influenced by internal causes, like the choices individuals make and their genetic endowments. Suhay et al. (2021) show that individuals across all income groups associate most strongly merit-linked individual characteristics, such as the drive to succeed and IQ, with environmental factors rather than with internal ones. Interestingly, research shows that merit can still be rewarded in contexts where external factors play a significant role (Evans, 1997; Cappelen et al., 2017; Lekfuangfu et al., 2022). For instance, a recent study by Andre (2023) finds that individuals support rewarding workers based on their actual effort, even when informed that such effort stems from unequal circumstances.

Finally, there is a strand in the literature that studies the equality of opportunity component of merit through social mobility, under the assumption that the opportunities to thrive will be more even in a fluid society. As Deaton explains it, “in a completely mobile society, with perfect equality of opportunity, your earnings should be unrelated to what your fathers earned” (2013: 207). Transition probabilities between social classes are thus used as a proxy for equality of opportunity, given that they are meant to constitute a clear indicator of the extent to which an outcome is conditioned by factors external to the individual. The takeaway from these studies is that individuals are less accepting of inequality and more likely to demand redistribution when they are exposed to pessimistic information about the level of social mobility (Piketty, 1995; Alesina et al., 2018; O’Grady, 2019; Ares, 2020; Becker, 2020; Heiserman et al., 2020; Mijs and Hoy, 2022; Langsæther et al., 2022).

2.3 Contribution to the literature

Once I have presented a snapshot of the state of the art, I proceed to explain how my thesis aims to contribute to this body of knowledge. The first paper aims to expand the literature by focusing on attitudes towards market inequality. As previously reviewed, most of the literature addresses attitudes towards either providing welfare rights to the poor or taxing the super-rich, but little attention has been given to how income is produced in the labor market in the first

place. Shedding light on the drivers of inequality acceptance in the market is a crucial step in more broadly understanding attitudes towards redistribution.

Another crucial contribution of the first paper is advancing the fairness-based approach to redistributive policies by delineating the very concept of merit more clearly and applying it at the occupational level, something that has not been done yet. I unpack the different components of a job that can be associated with merit. Moreover, I introduce a new distinction between input- and output-based activities in the labor market that can be linked to the notion of merit. By unpacking the concept of occupational merit, I bring new insights to the literature. More concretely, I highlight different factors related to merit that have been largely overlooked. Furthermore, this paper is among the first to directly compare the importance that citizens assign to fairness considerations against the other main alternative principle of pay differentiation—the logic of supply and demand dictated by the market.

The second paper opens a completely new avenue of research by emphasizing the role of philanthropy in the politics of inequality. Regardless of the approach adopted to study inequality, there is an underlying assumption that inequality can only be reduced through public governments. However, we know that the rich devote immense amounts of money to charitable giving, claiming that they attempt to address inequality. There are no studies, however, that explore in depth whether philanthropy can actually be perceived as a legitimate alternative mode of redistribution. The second paper fills this gap. Additionally, it helps translate some of the attributes of deservingness—primarily applied to studies of redistribution to the poor—into the context of taxing the rich. More specifically, the paper theoretically connects the giving of the super-rich with two factors of deservingness: attitude and, especially, reciprocity. I argue that philanthropy allows this group to appear more benevolent (attitude) and to be perceived as higher contributors to the common good (reciprocity).

Finally, the third paper expands research on attitudes towards granting welfare rights by focusing on immigrants as the target of social policy. This paper aims to clarify one of the traditional factors of deservingness: reciprocity. To date, the literature has equated reciprocity with individuals' willingness to cooperate and contribute to the welfare state. However, I argue that it is essential to distinguish between intentional reciprocity and actual reciprocity. While the former refers to individuals' cooperative intentions—how willing they are to work hard and pay

taxes—the latter alludes to their actual contributions. I posit that intentional reciprocity cannot be assumed to always translate into actual reciprocity, as factors beyond individual control can influence the final outcome one achieves. More concretely, in the context of immigration, structural barriers make it harder for immigrants to become positive fiscal contributors, especially in the short run. Ignoring these barriers implies overlooking the social inequalities that affect this group and hinder their ability to contribute fiscally.

This paper also seeks to bridge the fairness-based and material self-interest-based approaches by examining whether individuals who are potentially more impacted by immigrants' negative fiscal contributions are more responsive to them. More specifically, I investigate whether high-income individuals and those concerned about the sustainability of the welfare state are less indulgent towards immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. Therefore, I demonstrate that the preference for rewarding actual reciprocity may stem both from the perception that such outcomes are normatively superior and fundamental to a healthy, functional society—as suggested by Cavaillé in *Fair Enough? Support for Redistribution in the Age of Inequality*—and from individuals' recognition that they are materially better off when others contribute more.

Chapter 3

First Paper

Pay them more? The role of occupational merit in explaining acceptance of market inequality.

Abstract: This paper challenges prevailing fairness-based explanations of attitudes toward inequality by reconceptualizing merit in occupational terms. While existing research treats merit as an individual attribute, I argue that earnings are evaluated within the institutional context of the labor market, where occupations structure both the exercise and perception of merit. I introduce the concept of occupational merit, distinguishing between input-based activities—such as skills, effort, responsibility, and exposure to hardship—and output-based activities, namely economic and social contribution. The empirical analysis draws on three original surveys conducted in the UK. First, a survey experiment shows that occupation matters more than individual performance in shaping perceptions of fair pay. Second, a descriptive survey identifies the job characteristics that citizens most strongly associate with merit. Third, a conjoint experiment demonstrates that individuals are more willing to economically reward merit-related occupational factors than non-merit-based principles such as supply and demand. Among merit-related factors, mental skills and responsibility for others' lives receive the greatest support.

3.1 Introduction

Research on attitudes toward inequality has increasingly shifted away from explanations based purely on material self-interest and toward frameworks centered on fairness beliefs (Dimick et al., 2019). Within these accounts, merit—sometimes expressed as a proportionality norm (Cavaillé 2023)—is widely seen as the dominant fairness principle. The core idea of this principle is that individuals should deserve economic rewards proportionate to their merit. The prevailing conceptualization of merit treats it as a personal attribute such as effort, talent, or work ethic.

I argue that this conceptualization is incomplete because it abstracts individuals from the institutional setting in which earnings are actually determined: the labor market. Individuals are not rewarded as isolated agents, but as workers embedded in occupations that define both how merit can be exercised and how it is perceived. Occupation, rather than intrinsic personal attributes, is the principal determinant of market earnings. As Brown observes, “the biggest differences in earnings, where we find one person earning four, five, or twenty times as much as another, are almost all linked with differences of occupation” (Brown, 1997:28).

In this paper, I reconceptualize merit in occupational terms, introducing the concept of occupational merit. Rather than treating merit as an innate property of individuals, I build on Miller’s view of desert (2001) as a set of valuable activities that individuals undertake. I extend this insight to the occupational level and make a new distinction between two forms of value-generating activity within the labor market. The first consists of input-based activities, which capture what workers invest in their jobs: effort, skills, and education, but also sources of strain and sacrifice that have been largely overlooked in political economy, including exposure to physical hardship, adverse working conditions, and responsibility for the lives and well-being of others. The second consists of output-based activities, which refer to the contribution an occupation makes to the economy and to society. This output-based dimension of merit has rarely been incorporated into empirical analyses of inequality acceptance.

If individuals assess merit in relation to occupational characteristics, then their preferences for pay hierarchies should be grounded not in abstract notions of effort, but in evaluations of the value generated through particular jobs. Public opinion research confirms that citizens assess wage fairness across occupations. The International Social Survey Programme has, for decades,

asked respondents about the salaries different occupations should receive. While respondents disagree on the degree of inequality that is acceptable, there is widespread public support for structured pay hierarchies across occupations (Kelley Evans, 1993; Svallfors, 1993; Gijbels, 2002). For instance, 94.2% and 98.1% of citizens in Western countries state that an unskilled factory worker should earn less than a CEO and a doctor, respectively—even unskilled workers themselves agree on this pay hierarchy.

Why do citizens believe some occupations should make more than others? Is it due to factor unrelated to merit? And if related to merit, which components of a job are rewarded? My argument is that the concept of occupational merit equips us to answer this question. Citizens are not passively accepting market inequality; rather, they are evaluating occupations through fairness-oriented lenses tied to their input- and output-based value. This paper thus establishes the empirical and conceptual basis required to understand why pay inequalities are seen as fair, setting the stage for future research on the magnitude of inequality citizens are willing to accept.

The empirical part of the paper is divided into three parts. The first part includes a survey experiment in the UK (n= 300), in which I manipulate two attributes of a male worker: his occupation (doctor in general practice vs. street cleaner) and his performance at the job (above or below average). Respondents are then asked to indicate what they consider to be a fair salary for this worker. Demonstrating the relevance of occupational merit, I find that respondents always assign a higher salary to the doctor, even when his job performance is poorer than that of the street cleaner. This pattern underscores that attitudes toward merit cannot be reduced to individual-level characteristics alone and must instead be understood in relation to occupational context.

The second part, which is essentially descriptive, consists of an original survey conducted in the UK (n=1,000) that examines which aspects of an occupation citizens value and associate with merit. First, the findings reveal that respondents do not view merit as a unidimensional concept, as they attribute merit to various factors associated with different occupations. Interestingly, and in contrast to the prevailing conceptualization in the current literature, the job component least associated with merit is physical effort—less than half of the sample considers it representative of merit. Second, the findings indicate that occupations do not score highly across all components of merit, underscoring again that merit is not a strictly binary concept. Third, the results highlight

the importance of output-based merit, suggesting that the social and economic contribution of a job should be considered in studies on the acceptance of inequality. Fourth, from these results it can be derived that individuals associate merit with certain input-based elements often overlooked when focusing exclusively on the individual level, such as the responsibility attached to a job or the level of exposure to danger and physical hardship.

The third empirical part consists of a conjoint experiment conducted in the UK (n=1,500). Participants were presented with pairs of occupations that differed in various characteristics—some merit-related and others not. For the merit-related characteristics, I drew on the results of the second stage, including the five factors—both output-based and input-based—that individuals most strongly linked to the notion of merit. Additionally, I included other characteristics unrelated to merit, such as female representation, immigrant representation, and, most importantly, job shortages. The latter captures the main alternative principle of pay differentiation, based on supply and demand rather than merit. Consistent with the paper's theoretical framework, the results of the conjoint experiment reveal that individuals reward occupational merit. The five factors associated with occupational merit are valued more highly than the three that are not. Essentially, all of these merit-related characteristics are valued more strongly than the main alternative distributive principle—advocated by thinkers such as Hayek and Nozick—which asserts that pay should be determined by the rule of supply and demand. To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to directly confront individuals with both market-based and fairness-based principles of distribution, allowing for a comparison of how these two different principles are perceived.

Notably, the most highly rewarded factor is responsibility for the lives of others—a particularly insightful finding given that the literature has largely overlooked the role of responsibility in justifying pay inequality. This factor is closely followed by mental skills. Individuals also seem willing to economically reward the level of exposure to danger or physical hardship that a job entails. Moreover, respondents are willing to economically recognize the two output-based factors—the economic and social contributions of a job—highlighting the need to incorporate these previously neglected factors into studies of merit.

Interestingly, there is broad consensus on four of the five occupational merit factors, as respondents are equally willing to reward them regardless of their own characteristics. However,

there is less agreement regarding the factor that has most defined the transformation of Western economies in recent decades: the mental skills required for a job (Iversen & Soskice, 2019; Häusermann et al., 2023). I find that those disadvantaged by the knowledge economy—individuals with low human and economic capital—are less willing to reward this factor. This suggests that citizens that fall behind in the distribution of material opportunities in the knowledge economy are more critical of the *status quo* -particularly regarding the role of mental skills in exacerbating market inequality.

This paper makes four important contributions to the growing body of comparative research on how fairness beliefs influence individuals’ attitudes toward inequality. First, in contrast to common practice, it focuses on market inequality rather than disposable income inequality. Second, within market inequality, it analyses differences in pay across occupations rather than across individuals, showing that changes in individuals’ merit are not enough to explain public acceptance of market inequality. Third, it applies merit considerations to job characteristics, unpacking the concept of occupational merit both theoretically and empirically, and revealing the importance of factors often disregarded in the literature, which are connected to both input- and especially output-based activities. Finally, it examines the importance of merit-related factors in determining pay, in comparison to factors that are not linked to any notion of merit.

3.2 Theory

There is extensive evidence in the political economy literature that attitudes toward inequality are not shaped solely by self-interest. As Fong (2001: 226) observes, “individuals care deeply that other people get what they deserve.” Many people are motivated by fairness considerations and are willing to reward or punish others at a personal cost to avoid large deviations from their fairness ideal (Fehr and Schmidt, 2001; Almas et al., 2020). As Sachweh (2012: 471) argues, individuals’ attitudes toward inequality are “embedded in a wider horizon of shared norms and values,” what he calls a “moral economy.” In this paper, I focus on one of the most prominent fairness principles: meritocracy.

Meritocracy is a system of stratification based on the principle that economic rewards should correspond to individual merit. Following Young’s (1959) original conceptualization in *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, merit is conventionally understood as the combination of effort and

intelligence. This view continues to dominate both popular and academic discourse, from Sandel and Markovits's widely read critiques to Cavallé's *Fair Enough?*, where merit is defined as “a combination of personal decisions as a free agent, individual work ethic, acquired skills, and innate talent” (2023: 34). In most of this work, the individual is treated as an isolated entity, and variation in attitudes toward inequality is explained through differences in individual-level attributes associated with merit (Fong, 2001; Evans et al., 2010).

This view of merit is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that merit is frequently exercised within a social context—most notably, the labor market—and that citizens evaluate it based on its embedding in this broader context. Consider an individual with high mental capacity—citizens do not want this person to be economically rewarded merely for possessing this capacity but rather for actively applying it, typically in the labor market, through their job. When it comes to merit, what is rewarded is not being but doing; citizens want to see merit in action. Research on acceptance of market inequality must therefore link the use or enactment of merit to the labor market.

Some studies connect merit to the workplace by focusing on workers' attitudes and performance. In this literature, a common way to capture merit-related attitudes is through survey questions asking respondents whether “one has to work hard to be successful” (Newman et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2018; Darnon et al., 2018; Mijs, 2019; García-Sierra, 2023). Here, merit is closely equated with effort, without distinguishing whether that effort is mental or physical. Relatedly, research in behavioral economics associates merit with job performance and productivity, assuming that better performance signals higher intelligence, greater effort, or both (Cappelen et al., 2017; Almas et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2022). From these studies, the conclusion emerges that merit legitimizes market inequality because performance and productivity differences are seen as fair grounds for income differences.

Analyzing inequality acceptance solely through differences in job attitude, performance, or productivity, however, is overly simplistic, because it is the nature of an occupation itself that determines how fully individual merit can be expressed. Occupation is the core factor explaining differences in income. As Brown (1977: 28) asserts, “if asked to account for the level of a person's earned income, the first thing we look to is that person's occupation”. Likewise, Soltan observes that wage allocation involves a hierarchy of duties in addition to a hierarchy of persons: “a

hierarchy of sets of duties is added to the hierarchy of persons and becomes the central element of the wage-determining machinery” (1987: 112). Public opinion research confirms that people judge wage fairness not only across individuals but also across occupations, and that there is widespread public support for structured pay hierarchies across occupations (Kelley Evans, 1993; Svallfors, 1993; Gijssberts, 2002). Following a long sociological tradition, researchers have presented respondents with vignettes describing hypothetical individuals and asked whether each is over- or underpaid (Jasso Rossi, 1977; Alves Rossi, 1978). The consistent finding across decades of research is that occupation is the single most influential factor shaping perceptions of fair pay—a result corroborated by qualitative studies as well (Lane, 1959; Hochschild, 1981; Sachweh, 2012).

Despite this robust evidence, existing research has not explained why people believe that some occupations deserve higher pay than others. It is precisely this question that this paper seeks to address.

3.2.1 Occupational merit

I argue that attitudes toward market inequality are shaped by fairness beliefs—especially merit-based considerations—but that merit must be connected more directly to occupations. To this end, I propose the concept of occupational merit, which refers to the characteristics of an occupation that can be associated with merit. I contend that occupational merit is a central determinant of how citizens evaluate income differences in the labor market.

Developing this concept requires a broader view of merit. Merit—whether individual or occupational—cannot be reduced to a few attributes such as effort or intelligence. Before labeling specific traits as meritorious, we must first establish the criteria that make something count as merit. For this purpose, I draw on David Miller’s (2001:149) definition of desert, as he prefers to refer to merit, understood as “an agent’s voluntarily undertaking a valuable activity, and as a result deserving benefits whose enjoyment forms a fitting sequel to what he has done.”

Miller’s approach is useful because it emphasizes that merit derives from engaging in valuable activities—that is, from doing rather than being. The challenge, therefore, is to specify what counts as a valuable activity in the labor market. One of my contributions lies in identifying two categories of labor market activities that can be associated with merit. I develop a framework that

differentiates between input-based and output-based activities. Input-based activities concern the qualities and efforts workers bring to their jobs, while output-based activities relate to the outcomes they achieve. This distinction extends Miller's framework by clarifying the types of valuable activities individuals may consider meritorious.

In summary, rather than focusing on individual merit, I shift attention to occupational merit. I argue that people are willing to economically reward the valuable input- and output-based activities associated with different occupations. The next section elaborates on these two dimensions.

3.2.1.1 Input-based merit

There are two main input-based activities related to a job: personal requirements and sacrifices. Regarding personal requirements, workers contribute to the production process by placing at the disposal of their job their effort capacity, their skills and their level of education. Sacrifices can be described as another type of input, since they represent invisible or latent inputs that workers put in the production process.

I consider two types of job sacrifices. The first concerns the working conditions experienced by workers, a factor that is largely overlooked in studies that focus solely on individual merit (Miller, 1992: 567). Working conditions refer to the danger and physical hardship to which individuals are exposed in certain occupations (e.g., miners, firefighters). This concept encapsulates the unpleasantness of the job. The second type of sacrifice involves the level of responsibility attached to the job—a factor that has been widely neglected in political economy. The responsibility of a job can be defined, following Soltan, as “the potential cost of error in performing that job” (1987: 148). High levels of responsibility entail considerable stress and concern for the worker. If the focus of this paper were placed on the different tasks within a single occupation, then responsibility could be measured by the number of workers under one's command. However, because the goal of this paper is to shed light on the different properties across jobs and not within them, responsibility is more broadly understood as the degree to which a job affects the lives or safety of others in the community.

The input-based aspects of an occupation can be rewarded for two fairness-related reasons: one compensatory and one expressive. The compensatory logic consists of counterbalancing the

undesirable aspects of jobs, whereas the expressive logic ensures that the distribution of pay reflects “the hierarchy of value of the acts or qualities” of workers (Soltan, 1987: 154-155). In this sense, certain job attributes—particularly inputs such as skill—are rewarded out of the recognition and admiration they elicit from others.

Following Miller’s definition of merit as voluntarily undertaking valuable activity, I expect citizens to support higher pay for occupations that demand greater input—through effort, skill, sacrifice, or responsibility. This view of merit values the dedication and resources individuals commit, regardless of the final outcome.

3.2.1.2 Output-based merit

Output-based activities, by contrast, refer to the results or outcomes workers achieve in the production process. This approach evaluates merit based on contributions to organizational or societal goals. It draws on equity theory, which posits that rewards in market settings should be based on each participant’s contribution (Hegtvedt and Cook 2001; Leung and Park 1986; Leventhal, 1976; Miller 1992, 1999; Mitchell et al. 1993; Prentice and Crosby 1987; Scott et al. 2001). Consistent with this, existing research on attitudes toward market inequality at the individual level shows that individuals reward not only the inputs others provide but also the outcomes they generate. As previously noted, performance and productivity are commonly viewed as deserving of higher economic rewards (Cappelen et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2010; Hecht, 2022).

According to equity theory, someone should receive a reward proportionate to their contribution to the exchange in which they are involved (i.e., the market). Translated to the occupational level, this suggests a willingness to reward individuals for the outcomes produced through their jobs. Since the importance of a job task is understood as its value to the organization it belongs to (Soltan, 1987; Davis and Moore, 1945), I contend that a job can contribute to the two institutions in which occupations operate: the economy and society. I now briefly discuss these two types of contributions.

Economic contribution: The contribution of certain occupations to the economy is frequently invoked to justify pay inequality. As Mankiw argues when referring to CEOs, “the most natural explanation of high CEO pay is that the value of a good CEO is extraordinarily high” (2013:

31). In this vein, several studies show that individuals occupying high status jobs legitimize their elevated income by emphasizing the substantial economic contribution they make (Kuusela, 2022; Hecht, 2022).

Individuals also care about the economy in aggregate terms. As the literature on economic voting underscores, individuals are driven not only by egocentric motivations but also by sociotropic concerns, tied to perceptions of national economic performance of a country. Research on retrospective and prospective voting consistently finds that sociotropic concerns are more significant than pocketbook concerns (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). This sociotropic logic also extends to other domains, such as immigration: citizens evaluate immigration policies based on whether they perceive them as beneficial or harmful to the country as a whole (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Kustov, 2021). Likewise, Rodon and Sanjaume (2020) show that individuals view policies that promote overall prosperity as fairer.

If, as these literatures suggest, individuals assign value to the size of the economic “pie,” we should expect them to be more willing to reward occupations that make a greater contribution to the economy.

Social contribution: the second output-based factor that may shape evaluations of occupational rewards is the extent to which a job contributes to the well-being of others. In a recent study, Wilmers and Zhang (2022) examine the prosocial aspects of jobs, defining them as features that help a community or group, engage in non-market or non-commercial activities, or that prioritizes collective goals over profit maximization (2022: 417). Analyzing job postings, they find that prosocial language is predominantly used in caring occupations, such as community and social services, healthcare support, and healthcare practitioners.

To my knowledge, the only study to explicitly incorporate the notion of social value into the analysis of stratification is that of Goldthorpe and Hope (1972). Their study asked respondents to rate occupations by perceived value to society and found little overlap between those rankings and evaluations based on standard of living. Occupations such as social worker, nurse, primary school teacher, and firefighter were rated substantially higher on societal value than on living standards. Building on the premise that individuals attach importance to societal well-being, it is reasonable to expect that people will be more willing to reward occupations that make a greater contribution to the welfare of others.

Finally, there are two possible mechanisms through which the outcomes produced by a job can be economically rewarded. The first is linked to fairness, and specifically to the principle of reciprocity, which stipulates that one should receive something in exchange for what one produces. The second is associated with efficiency considerations, where the reward functions as an incentive to motivate continued or enhanced performance.

3.3 Theoretical expectations

Wrapping up, the paper’s main theoretical expectations are twofold: (i) individuals will be more likely to perceive pay inequality across occupations as legitimate when it results from merit-related factors rather than those unrelated to merit, and (ii) individuals will reward not only input-based merit but also output-based merit, such as a job’s contribution to economic growth or societal well-being.

Some heterogeneous effects are to be expected. The shift toward a knowledge-based economy has deepened economic inequalities between groups, creating “winners”—those with high human and economic capital—and “losers”—those with low human and economic capital (Iversen & Soskice, 2019; Häusermann et al., 2023). Given that knowledge economies are characterized by a wage skill premium, winners are likely to be more willing to economically reward mental skills in the market compared to losers. However, I do not expect heterogeneity across other components of occupational merit.

3.4 Empirical part

The empirical section of the paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I implement a survey experiment in the UK to demonstrate the relevance of occupation in shaping perceptions of fair salary. In the second part, I explore why occupation is such a relevant factor. To do so, I draw on a descriptive survey conducted in the UK that examines which aspects of an occupation citizens value and associate with merit. After disentangling key components of occupational merit, the third part employs a conjoint analysis in the UK to test the extent to which merit-related aspects of occupation influence the acceptance of market inequality and compares these effects to those of several non-merit factors.

3.4.1 Stage 1: The relevance of occupation

To demonstrate the need to conceptualize merit in occupational terms, I conducted an original survey via Prolific in the UK. The survey included quotas for sex, age, and party identification, and had 400 respondents. It employed a vignette experiment in which I manipulated two factors: the occupation of a male worker and his level of job performance. The goal was to show that occupation is the key factor shaping perceptions of fair salary, even when individual merit is taken into account. This challenges the dominant conceptualization of merit in comparative political economy, which leaves little room for the role of occupation. The vignette experiment was as follows:

Imagine a man from the UK called John Smith who is 45 years old. He works as a [DOCTOR IN GENERAL PRACTICE/STREET CLEANER]. He does his job [BETTER/WORSE] than most people who do the same work.

After being exposed to the vignette, respondents were asked how much they think John Smith should earn per year before taxes. My preregistered expectation is that individuals will be more willing to assign a higher salary to doctors than to street cleaners—even when the street cleaner’s individual merit (i.e., their job performance) is considerably higher than that of the doctor.

3.4.1.1 Findings

The common approach to merit, which emphasizes its individual dimension, predicts that differences in job performance should be associated with differences in perceptions of fair salary. This expectation is partially supported by the regression results reported in Table 3.1. Relative to low-performing doctors, high-performing doctors are assigned higher salaries.

However, if individual merit were the sole determinant—as much of the existing literature suggests—low-performing street cleaners should be rewarded similarly to low-performing doctors, and high-performing street cleaners should be regarded as deserving of higher salaries. This is not what the analysis shows. The fair salary attributed to a low-performing doctor is higher—by approximately £29,000—than that attributed to a low-performing street cleaner, a difference that is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Most strikingly, the fair salary assigned to a

low-performing doctor is considerably higher—by approximately £25,000—than that assigned to a high-performing street cleaner, a difference that is also statistically significant at the 0.001 level. These findings demonstrate that performance-based evaluations of merit operate primarily within occupational categories, while occupational status itself structures the overall hierarchy of fair pay.

Table 3.1: Assignment to treatment and fair salary

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Fair salary
Low-performing doctor (ref)	
High-performing doctor	16,909.990*** (2,842.127)
Low-performing street cleaner	−29,337.850*** (2,931.335)
High-performing street cleaner	−24,867.710*** (2,875.352)
Constant	55,424.330*** (2,102.592)
Observations	296
R ²	0.557
Adjusted R ²	0.552
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Having established the central role of occupation in shaping acceptance of income inequality, the following sections examine why citizens believe that some occupations deserve higher pay than others and the extent to which these beliefs are linked to the notion of merit.

3.4.2 Stage 2: unpacking occupational merit

Although several surveys, such as the European Social Survey, the British Social Attitudes Survey, and the International Social Survey Programme, have included questions about inequality and merit in their waves, none of them have directly asked about occupational merit. The ISSP, as illustrated in the plot from the introduction, asks respondents about the pay of different occupations but does not include questions about the traits of these occupations. Therefore, to explore the concept of occupational merit more thoroughly and examine how individuals apply it

to real occupations, I had to design my own survey.

At the end of August 2024, I conducted an original survey through Prolific in the UK, which took an average of fourteen minutes to complete. The survey included quotas for sex, age, and party ID, and had 1,000 respondents. I asked individuals to rate aspects of the following ten occupations: street cleaner, assembly line worker in a factory, CEO of a large national company, footballer in a top English league, firefighter, airline pilot, doctor in general practice, Cabinet Minister, shop assistant, and secretary.

There is a clear rationale behind the selection of the ten occupations. Four of them have been recurrently included in the ISSP questionnaire: cabinet minister, general practitioner (doctor), CEO of a large national company, and shop assistant. The ISSP also includes “an unskilled worker working in an industrial factory“, but I replaced this category with another blue-collar occupation where no direct skill information is provided: “assembly line worker”.

In addition to these occupations, the first waves of the ISSP included secretaries and city bus drivers. While I retained secretaries, I replaced city bus drivers with airline pilots since studies suggest that airline pilots are regarded as having a much higher status than other types of drivers (Hodge al., 1964). Including airline pilots in the survey is particularly interesting for examining an often-neglected component of occupational merit: “the responsibility for the lives of others”. Another overlooked component of occupational merit is the “contribution to society of a job”. Based on Goldthorpe and Hope (1972), I identified two occupations commonly viewed as contributing high societal value: firefighters and street cleaners. I incorporated both into the survey. Finally, I included an occupation that earns significant money but whose societal perception is less well-documented: football players.


Since the aim of the survey is to bring nuances to the understanding of occupational merit, I asked respondents to rate the ten occupations based on factors related to merit considerations. Drawing on the theory section, I added a comprehensive list of factors because existing scholarship usually considers only one or two, which fails to capture the multidimensional nature of merit. Respondents were asked to rate the following aspects of each job on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 meant “very low” and 10 meant “very high”: contribution to the economy, contribution to the well-being of others and society, the level of education required, physical effort required, physical skills required, mental/cognitive effort required, mental/cognitive skills required, exposure to

danger or physical hardship, and responsibility over other people’s lives.

3.4.2.1 The variants of occupational merit

t the end of the survey, I asked respondents to indicate which components related to an occupation they associated with the concept of merit. They could choose as many components as they wished. In Figure 3.1, it is possible to see the percentage of respondents who related each component to merit. On average, more than half of the sample associates all components with merit, except for the level of education and the physical effort required for the job. This finding is significant, as the literature on merit typically suggests that individuals reward effort. However, the plot indicates that it is mental/cognitive effort, rather than physical effort, that is associated with merit.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of individuals that associate each of these factors of a job with Merit



Notably, 86.6% of the sample links the level of responsibility for the lives of others to merit. This finding is also remarkable, given that scholarship has barely recognized responsibility as a variant of merit. The other two aspects most closely related to merit belong to what I have defined as output-based merit. Specifically, 84% of respondents associate a job’s contribution to the well-being of individuals and society as a whole with merit, while nearly 70% consider the contribution of a job to the economy as a related factor. These findings have important implications for the study of merit and inequality acceptance, as the literature has often neglected these two traits of a job and rarely considered them components of merit.

Another factor that individuals link to merit, which has received little attention, is the level

of exposure to danger or physical hardship in a job; 65% of the sample views this factor as constituting merit. Finally, it is interesting to note that, on average, individuals associate the level of mental/cognitive skills required to perform a job with merit more strongly than the level of education. Although there may be some overlap between these two factors, it is the former that respondents more frequently relate to merit. This finding is particularly noteworthy, as the literature has predominantly emphasized the role of education in shaping attitudes toward inequality, rather than considering the influence of mental skills (Alves and Rossi, 1978; Evans et al., 2010).


3.4.2.2 Variants of merit by occupation

There is variation both within and between occupations in how the nine components of merit are rated. Figure 3.2 displays the results for the ten occupations. The first key observation is the substantial variation in how each occupation scores on the different components of merit, indicating that an occupation may score high in one aspect of merit but not in others. There are also substantial differences across occupations. Whereas the literature distinguishes broadly between high and low-skilled occupations, one can observe that there are many additional factors to be considered.

A quick comparison between CEOs and doctors shows that, despite both being high-skilled jobs, they differ significantly in the two output-based aspects of merit (social and economic contribution) as well as in various input-based aspects, particularly in physical skills and effort, and exposure to danger. Similarly, the comparison between two low-skilled occupations, such as street cleaners and assembly line workers, reveals differences in how merit components are rated. For example, the perceived social contribution is more than one point higher for street cleaners than for assembly line workers. This variation within and across occupations underscores again the need for a multidimensional approach to assessing occupational merit, rather than a unidimensional one¹.

¹To check how respondents rated other factors not related to merit as well as the actual and ideal pay of the 10 occupations, see Appendix A.1.1 and A.1.2.

Figure 3.2: Components of merit for 10 occupations



Moreover, the descriptive statistics in Figure 3.2 allow us to see that individuals have quite a nuanced understanding of the different components of merit and that they apply these to real occupations in a careful way. They are able to differentiate between factors that are often compounded in the literature, such as the social contribution of a job and its responsibility over the lives of others (see street cleaners); the physical effort required and the physical skills required (see footballers); the level of mental skills and the level of education required (see firefighters); the level of mental skills required and the economic contribution of the job (see doctors); or the level of physical effort required and the exposure to danger or physical hardship (see airline pilots).

Wrapping up, Stage 2 has shed light on the need for adopting a multidimensional approach to merit. Drawing on these insights, Stage 3 aims to causally test the association between merit considerations and inequality acceptance.

3.4.3 Stage 3: the role of occupational merit in inequality acceptance

In January 2025, I conducted a second survey in the UK through Netquest, which took on average thirteen minutes to complete. The survey included quotas for sex, age, and education and had 1,500 respondents. I embedded a conjoint analysis in it in which I asked individuals to choose between two occupations profiles and determine which one they think should receive higher pay. The exact wording was as follows: “Please read the descriptions of two jobs with different characteristics that exist or could exist in the UK. Then please indicate which of the two jobs you think should receive higher pay”. To my knowledge, it is the first conjoint that asks about pairs of jobs. Moreover, it is one of the few studies that, when putting the focus on the occupational level, manipulates factors of an occupation that are related and unrelated to merit, allowing me to test to what extent merit considerations prevail when individuals reason about market inequality.

To select the attributes for the conjoint, I followed a two-step process. First, in the theory section, I have identified several factors that have been associated with merit in political theory, political economy, and sociology. Second, as previously discussed, I asked individuals in Stage 2 which of these factors they associated with merit. Then, for the conjoint, I included the five factors most strongly related to merit: the level of mental/cognitive skills required, responsibility for other people’s lives, exposure to danger or physical hardship, contribution to the well-being of

society, and contribution to economic growth. Interestingly, some of these factors align with those considered by ONET OnLine, a comprehensive online resource for information about occupations that is widely used in economics to study the traits of different jobs (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goldin, 2014).

In particular, I capture output-based merit through the economic and social contributions of a job; whereas, for input-based merit, I select the three input-related factors that individuals associated more strongly with merit in Stage 2: the level of responsibility attached to the job, the level of mental/cognitive skills and exposure to danger or physical hardship.

Table 3.2: Description of the conjoint

Dimension	Attribute	Level
Input-based merit	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High. Moderate. Low.
Input-based merit	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High. Moderate. Low.
Input/Output-based merit	Responsibility for the lives of others	High. Moderate. Low.
Output-based merit	Contribution to economic growth	High. Moderate. Low.
Output-based merit	Contribution to the well-being of society	High. Moderate. Low.
No merit	Percentage of women in this job	High. Moderate. Low.
No merit	Percentage of immigrants in this job	High. Moderate. Low.
No merit	Shortage of workers in this job	High. Moderate. Low.

In conjoint experiments, it is fundamental that the various attributes are orthogonal from one another. To make that sure, I go back to the survey from Stage 2 and compute correlation matrices for the five merit-related dimensions across all ten occupations rated by respondents (see Appendix A.1.3). Overall, the correlations appear moderate, generally ranging between 0.2 and 0.5, which supports the assumption of attribute independence. For instance, *a priori*, one could be concerned that the perceived social contribution of a job is highly correlated with the perception of its responsibility for the lives of others. However, this association remains fairly

low—for example, it is only 0.15 for airplane pilots and 0.34 for doctors (GPs). Another potential concern could be that the perceived economic contribution of a job is strongly connected with the perceived level of mental skills required, since it is often assumed that “that high intellectual ability accompanied by effort has a potential to contribute significantly to the common good” (Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003: 5). Still, the correlation remains moderate across occupations, peaking at 0.52 for CEOs. Therefore, these findings suggest that while merit-related dimensions are associated, they are not so strongly correlated as to compromise the independence of attributes required for conjoint analysis.

Regarding the factors unrelated to merit, I included three attributes in the conjoint analysis: one addressing female representation in the job and another focusing on immigrant representation. In these cases, the principle of distribution can be determined by factors unrelated to merit and linked to workers’ ascribed characteristics, such as gender or migration status. Finally, the third non-merit factor captures job demand and supply through the concept of worker shortages. This latter factor is particularly significant, as it reflects the main alternative distribution principle in the market—one based on market dynamics, as advocated by thinkers such as Hayek and Nozick. All attributes are uniform in that they have the same three levels: low, moderate and high, which facilitates comparison between them.


3.4.3.1 Main analysis conjoint

Figure 3.3 presents the results based on AMCEs. The AMCE represent the change in the probability that a particular profile in a choice task is chosen over the other profile when moving from the baseline to the attribute level of interest. The plot reports the AMCEs from an ordinary least square regression model alongside 95% confidence intervals (for the table of the AMCEs and the Marginal Means, see Appendix A.2.1 and A.2.2).

Although respondents viewed the attributes in a different way—alternating between merit and non-merit factors, as well as separating output and input variants²—Figure 5.1 organizes them based on the magnitude of their effect for clarity. Consistent with the paper’s hypothesis, which were pre-registered, all merit-related factors exert a greater influence on the selection of the job that should receive higher pay compared to non-merit-related factors.

²This was the concrete order: level of mental skills, percentage of women, economic contribution, shortage, exposure, social contribution, percentage of immigrants and responsibility

Figure 3.3: AMCEs of the job choice experiment.



The three factors not linked to merit determine attitudes towards market inequality, but to a much lower extent. For instance, compared to jobs with a low representation of women, respondents are 5.2 percentage points more likely to support higher salaries for jobs with a high representation of women. Conversely, respondents penalize jobs with a high proportion of immigrant workers. Compared to jobs with a low representation of immigrants, respondents are 6 percentage points less likely to select higher pay for these positions.

Regarding the attribute that captures the demand and supply of a job through the idea of shortage of workers, individuals appear to endorse market rules, as they are 8.2 percentage points more likely to prefer higher pay for jobs where there is a high shortage of workers compared to jobs with a low shortage. To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to investigate how individuals respond to market dynamics, specifically the rules of supply and demand. While citizens seem to approve of the market’s idiosyncrasies, it is insightful—and consistent with the

paper's theory—to observe that the influence of this factor is significantly less relevant than that of factors reflecting components of merit.

Concerning the merit-related attributes, the two that more directly capture the output-based variant of merit deserve special attention, as they have received little consideration in the literature. As theorized, both are taken into account by individuals when evaluating market inequality. Jobs that make a high contribution to societal well-being are 10.4 percentage points more likely to be selected for higher pay compared to those that make a low contribution. This finding is particularly meaningful, as it reveals that individuals positively value the social orientation of a job. Similarly, jobs that make a high contribution to economic growth are 12.9 percentage points more likely to be selected for higher pay compared to those that make a low contribution. The conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that the outputs associated with certain jobs are effectively transferred to the individuals performing them, who are rewarded as a result. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the economic contribution of a job is more highly valued than its social contribution.

Exposure to danger or physical hardship is also positively considered by respondents, who are 12.7 percentage points more likely to prefer higher pay for jobs with a high exposure to danger or physical hardship than for those with a low exposure. This is a factor of a job that is purely input-related, since it is connected to the sacrifices individuals need to make in the process of production.

Mental skills, which are more highly valued in the knowledge economy, also play an important role in inequality acceptance: respondents are 18 percentage points more likely to assign higher pay to jobs requiring high mental skills than to those requiring only low mental skills. This result suggests that public opinion aligns with a *status quo* characterized by a wage skill premium. It is worth noting that, while the literature has tended to connect the notion of merit to education rather than to that of skills, it has been demonstrated in Stage 2 that what individuals associate with merit are mental skills rather than education. It is not the credentialism that matter, but the actual inputs that can be brought into the process of production through mental skills. The results of the conjoint confirm this: individuals are willing to economically recognise mental skills.

Finally, responsibility for the lives of others is the attribute most strongly rewarded by

respondents, who are 18.3 percentage points more likely to select higher pay for jobs involving high responsibility for the lives of others than for those with low responsibility. This finding is significant, as it emphasizes the relevance of a factor that has been neglected both empirically and theoretically. Individuals genuinely believe that jobs involving responsibility for others' lives should be rewarded for bearing such a heavy burden.


3.4.3.2 Applying the conjoint attributes to real occupations

Someone could argue that the way a conjoint presents certain job characteristics is so abstract that it becomes difficult to determine the real implications of the results. To ensure that respondents can relate the attributes to real-life professions, I replicated questions from the Stage 2 survey, in which respondents rated various occupations based on merit-related factors. In this survey, I repeated the same questions for six of the occupations considered in Stage 2 (street cleaners, assembly line workers, firefighters, doctors, airline pilots, and CEOs) and added one more: high school teachers.

The way respondents rated these occupations according to the merit-related attributes of the conjoint appears coherent and demonstrates a solid understanding of the concepts. To illustrate this, let me return to the findings from Stage 1, which reveal that most individuals agree that a doctor in general practice should earn more than a street cleaner, independently of individual merit. Figure 3.4 displays how respondents perceive the five conjoint attributes linked to merit in relation to these two occupations. Respondents could rate each attribute on a scale from 0 (“very low”) to 10 (“very high”), with 5 indicating a moderate level.

As shown, street cleaners score consistently lower in all five factors. The conjoint results indicate that the two most influential factors in the acceptance of inequality are the level of mental skills required for a job and the responsibility for the lives of others. Crucially, Figure 3.4 illustrates that the largest perceived merit gap between street cleaners and doctors in general practice lies precisely in these two factors, amounting to almost five points. This substantial difference in perceived merit across the two most valued factors of a job helps explain why individuals in Stage 1 unanimously believe that doctors should receive a higher salary than street cleaner regardless of the job performance of the latter.

Figure 3.4: Perceived occupational merit across three occupations




Furthermore, I also asked respondents to rate these two occupations based on the required level of physical effort. Stage 2 demonstrated that this factor is only weakly associated with merit in individuals' perceptions, which is why it was not included as an attribute in the conjoint analysis. However, since physical effort is often linked to low-skilled occupations, I thought it was worth exploring public perceptions of it (see Appendix 2.3). Unsurprisingly, among all possible factors, street cleaners received the highest rating for physical effort (7.21/10), scoring 1.1 points higher than doctors in this regard. The conclusion is that the factor most strongly associated with street cleaners is also the one judged least deserving of the notion of merit. And, as the results of the conjoint reveal, what individuals are especially willing to economically reward are the traits of a job related to merit.

3.4.3.3 Subgroup analysis

I pre-registered some hypotheses regarding the heterogeneous effects of the attributes. I anticipated that the winners of the knowledge economy will be more likely to reward mental skills than the losers. To identify who the winners are, I use two different measures: whether they are highly educated and whether they have an income above the median.

As Leeper et al. (2020) suggest, I use the Marginal Mean to calculate heterogeneous effects in the conjoint. Figure 3.5 shows the estimated difference in marginal effects for individuals with high education and those without³. As can be seen, the former group is more responsive to the information about the mental skills required to do a job: they are more likely to reward a job that is highly skilled and to punish one that is low-skilled. In line with the expectations, the division between high and non-high education does not have an impact on any of the other merit-related attributes (for the table, see Appendix A.2.4.1).

Figure 3.5: Estimated difference in Marginal Means between individuals with and without High Education




Regarding income, I divide the sample into three groups: individuals above the median

³Respondents with high education are those who have completed higher education below the degree level (e.g., HNC) or hold a degree or higher.

income, those earning the median income, and those below it. I find that, as with educational background, income heterogeneously affects one component of merit: mental skills. Compared to respondents below the median income, those above it are more likely to prefer lower pay for jobs requiring low levels of mental skills and higher pay for those requiring higher levels (see Appendix A.2.4.2).

A broader—and more indirect—indicator of being a ‘loser’ in the UK’s knowledge economy is the Brexit vote, based on the assumption that Brexit supporters expressed, through their vote, frustration with a skill-biased technological shift that has worsened their social status and material conditions. In this vein, compared to Brexit supporters, Figure 3.6 reveals that citizens who voted Remain are more inclined to favor higher salaries for jobs requiring high mental skills and are less supportive of higher pay for jobs requiring low mental skills (for the table, see Appendix A.2.4.3).

Figure 3.6: Estimated difference in Marginal Means between Remainers and Brexit supporters



Aside from mental skill requirements, there is no significant heterogeneity in the other merit-related attributes based on the Brexit vote. Regarding the non-merit related factors, compared to Brexit supporters, Remainers also tend to reward jobs with a high representation of immigrants

while penalizing those with low representation. This difference may stem from the perception among Brexit supporters that immigrants pose a threat and should not be encouraged to stay or migrate to the UK. Offering them lower pay could serve as a deterrent to immigration.

Therefore, the divide between being a winner or a loser in the knowledge economy influences only one component of occupational merit: mental skills. There is broad consensus on the importance of the remaining four merit-related job attributes in determining pay inequality, regardless of respondents' educational background, Brexit vote, or income level.

To more directly capture the logic of material self-interest—that is, whether individuals are willing to reward the factors that characterize their own jobs—I asked respondents, at the end of the survey, to rate their own job based on the five merit-related factors they were shown in the conjoint. It is important to note that respondents may be biased toward viewing their job requirements positively, making their answers highly subjective. Respondents rated the merit-related traits of their jobs on a scale from 0 (“very low”) to 10 (“very high”), with 5 indicating a moderate level. Very few assigned low ratings to their own job attributes. For this reason, I divided the sample into two groups: those who judged their job’s attributes as moderate or lower (0–5) and those who considered them high (above 5). The material self-interest framework assumes that individuals will be more inclined to reward the factor they perceive as highly relevant to their own job. Notably, I find that how individuals rate their own job’s attributes matters only for mental skills, reaffirming that this factor exhibits the greatest heterogeneity. Those who perceive their job as requiring a high level of mental skills are less willing to economically reward jobs with low mental skill requirements (for all the plots and tables, see Appendix A.2.4.4 to A.2.4.8).

Finally, I also expected men to be less willing to give higher pay to jobs where there is a high representation of women. That is exactly what can be derived from the data: compared to women, men are less in favour of paying a higher salary to jobs with a high representation of women, while they are willing to pay more to those with a low representation (see Appendix A.2.4.9). Interestingly, the only heterogenous effect of gender across the merit-related attributes is again concentrated on the level of mental skills: men are less willing than women to pay higher salaries to jobs demanding low levels of mental skills.

3.4.3.4 Robustness tests

I have run a battery of robustness tests to assess the strength of the findings from the conjoint. First, immediately after respondents finished the conjoint tasks, I explained to them what an “attribute” was and asked how many attributes they recalled the job profiles shown to them having. I provided four options: 2 attributes, 4 attributes, 6 attributes, and 8 attributes. Most of the sample (77%) selected the correct answer (8 attributes). I then examined whether respondents reacted differently to the merit-related attributes of the conjoint based on the attention they paid. I found that attentive respondents react more strongly to all merit-based attributes (see Appendix A.2.5.1). Moreover, the difference between this group and those who did not pay attention is statistically significant for three attributes: exposure to danger or physical hardship, the level of mental skills, and responsibility for the lives of others. The fact that attentive respondents are more responsive to the merit-related attributes makes the findings more robust.

Second, one could argue that the three attributes I claim are not related to merit (female representation, immigrant representation, and shortage of workers) may in fact be related to merit. Since I did not test this in Stage 2 of the empirical section, this remains an open question. To address this concern, after the conjoint, I presented respondents with thirteen different characteristics of a job, among which I included the three I claim are non-merit-related, and asked them to mark all of those they associate with merit. As expected, these three attributes were barely connected to the notion of merit (see Appendix A.2.6). The associations were 9.9%, 13%, and 3.9% for the percentage of women, high shortage of workers, and percentage of immigrants, respectively. Conversely, a much higher proportion of respondents associated the five factors I claim are merit-related with merit. Aligned with the pattern found in Stage 2, responsibility for the lives of others was the most strongly associated. However, unlike in Stage 2, the factor following it was mental skills rather than economic and social contribution, which might also help explain why this is the second most meaningful attribute in the conjoint.

Third, it could be argued that perceptions of fair salary are ultimately determined by the perceived actual salary of occupations, as the reflection thesis conveys (Trump, 2018). An attribute touching upon this was not included because it could have overlapped with the shortage-of-workers one. In Stage 2, I asked respondents to rate occupations based on their actual salary and their fair salary. The correspondence between the two was very limited. Respondents,

“enough”, “vacancies”, “available”, and “work lack”, which indicate an accurate understanding of the attribute. Regarding “responsibility for the lives of others,” the most recurrent words were “people”, “safety”, “health”, “care”, “emergency”, and “impact”. Some professions, like “police”, “nurses”, “doctors”, “military”, “surgeons”, and “firefighter”, were also mentioned.

In regard to “contribution to the well-being of society,” the most recurrent words respondents mentioned were “people”, “others”, “good”, or “community”. However, I found that a considerable number of respondents indicated they did not fully understand what this attribute meant. I created a list of all the words or phrases that indicated a lack of understanding and created a new variable, assigning a value of 1 to those who had no issue and 0 to those who struggled to understand it. Around 21% of the sample fell into the latter group. I then analyzed the effect of the “contribution to social well-being” attribute based on how well respondents understood it. While respondents who understood it correctly showed higher responsiveness to the attribute, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, to check that respondents translate the concepts contained in the attributes to real-life professions, I replicated the questions from the Stage 2 survey in which respondents were asked to rate different occupations based on various merit-related factors. The way respondents rated the components of occupational merit included in the conjoint shows a nuanced understanding of the concepts, since they are able to distinguish between attributes that could be argued to be similar, such as contribution to the well-being of society and responsibility for the lives of others (see Appendix A.2.7). For instance, respondents rated the social contribution of airline pilots at 6.4/10, while their responsibility for the lives of others was rated 9.1/10. Similarly, they rated the social contribution of street cleaners at 6.29/10, while their responsibility for the lives of others was rated at 3.89/10. The answers to these questions also help expand our understanding of how respondents perceive the responsibility for the lives of others. By rating this attribute with values like 7.33/10 for CEOs and 7.52/10 for school teachers, respectively, it can be inferred that respondents do not restrict the notion of “lives” to health alone, but more broadly to influence on one’s life trajectory. In line with this, the word cloud from the open-ended question about how respondents understood this attribute includes words such as “manager”, “boss”, and “teacher”.

3.5 Discussion

In the early 1930s, Tawney observed that individuals “do not always realize that injustices survive not merely because the rich exploit the poor, but because, in their hearts, too many of the poor admire the rich” (1931:38). In recent years, several best-selling books have paid attention to merit as a source of admiration that helps explain the acceptance of inequality, such as *The Tyranny of Merit* by Sandel and *The Meritocracy Trap* by Markovits. The aim of this paper was precisely to understand the factors that lead so many citizens to admire certain occupations and become more willing to economically reward them. To achieve this, I introduced a new concept into the literature: occupational merit, which encapsulates the traits of an occupation that may be considered meritorious. With this purpose in mind, I developed a theoretical distinction between input-based and output-based merit.

Given that no prior studies have examined occupational merit, my empirical approach was deliberately parsimonious, dividing the analysis into three parts. In the first part, I demonstrated that occupation plays a crucial role in the way citizens’ acceptance of market inequality is shaped. In the second part, I found that, at the occupational level, citizens recognize as meritorious some factors that are completely overlooked when the focus is placed exclusively on the individual level. These include exposure to danger or physical hardship, the level of responsibility associated with the job, and, very insightfully, the two output-based aspects of a job: its contribution to societal well-being and to economic growth. Particularly interesting is the finding that physical effort, a component widely measured in the literature—mainly in studies focusing on individual merit—as a strong indicator of merit, is the factor least associated with it by respondents.

Another key contribution of this second part of the empirical analysis is that it asked respondents to apply these merit considerations to ten different occupations. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to study how individuals perceive the merit of occupations. The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that occupations score differently across the various components of merit, highlighting the multidimensional nature of the concept. A job can be considered highly meritorious in one aspect of occupational merit but not in others. Occupational merit, therefore, is not a binary concept.

Once the concept of occupational merit was somewhat elucidated, I implemented the third

stage of the empirical analysis, which contains the main study of the paper, which consisted of a conjoint analysis asking individuals to choose between two occupations and determine which one should receive higher pay. The main finding of the paper is that individuals are more willing to economically reward the merit-related factors of a job rather than those unrelated to merit. Crucially, they favor merit as a principle for determining market salaries over the main alternative principle—the market logic dictated by supply and demand. The results therefore show that individuals are driven more by fairness considerations than by market mechanisms.

These results speak to the few qualitative studies that have focused directly on how citizens think about different jobs, rather than how they think about different individuals. For instance, in Hochschild's work (1981), a cleaner claims that "hardworking janitors deserve more than lazy ones, but even lazy doctors deserve more than both" (quoted in Miller, 2001: 70). An interviewee in another study states that "if you're a professor, I think you're entitled to get what you deserve. I'm a painter, and I shouldn't be getting what you're getting" (Lane, 1959: 42). Similarly, a 26-year-old skilled worker argues that "somebody who accomplishes a lot and who does a complex job should be paid accordingly. Somebody doing a simple job should be paid less" (Sachweh, 2012: 428). The findings of this paper extend the underlying idea of these studies: that individuals apply merit-based considerations when reflecting on pay inequality across occupations.

The two factors of occupational merit that are most highly rewarded are mental skills and responsibility for people's lives. The prominence of the latter is particularly significant, as it has received little attention in the literature. When considering jobs with high responsibility for others' lives, respondents primarily identify professions such as firefighters and doctors but also include occupations not strictly related to health, such as high school teachers and CEOs. Responsibility, in this context, implies having a significant impact on other people, which at the same time entails higher costs if the job is done wrongly. Respondents also appear inclined to reward jobs that involve exposure to danger and physical hardship. Furthermore, they economically recognize the two output-based factors of occupational merit: the contribution a job makes to societal well-being and, to a slightly greater extent, its contribution to economic growth.

Individuals reward to a higher extent input-based factors rather than output-based ones,

which aligns with various studies that show that citizens are particularly inclined to reward individuals for factors within their own control—the foundation of luck egalitarianism (Grätz and García-Sierra, 2024)—. Workers might be perceived as having greater agency over their effort, sacrifices and the skills they bring as inputs to their jobs. Although workers might also take credit for their contribution-in the form of productivity- to their own firm, they cannot take full credit for the contribution (output) of their occupations to the economy and society. For instance, a doctor’s work will always impact the well-being of others, regardless of who performs the job. While workers can still be rewarded for self-selecting into jobs that generate specific outcomes, the reward for that self-selection may not be as strong as the reward for their actual inputs at work.

There is consensus among respondents when it comes to rewarding occupational merit, regardless of their background characteristics, except for one factor: the required level of mental skills. This factor is among the most frequently highlighted in explaining the rise of inequality over the past decades (Häusermann et al., 2023). I find that, compared to the losers of the knowledge economy, the winners are more likely to reward high levels of skills and penalize low levels, indicating a conflict over the extent to which mental skills are considered a legitimate source of inequality.

This paper, by aiming to provide as many insights as possible into the understanding of occupational merit, opens up new avenues of research and raises new questions that need to be addressed in the future. The study of inequality needs to follow a sequential order: first, the factors perceived as legitimate causes of inequality must be delineated; second, the extent to which citizens are willing to reward them must be explored. The goal of this paper was to tackle the first objective. Now that this has been accomplished, it will be essential in future research to test the total level of inequality that individuals are willing to tolerate. It might be the case that citizens are meritocrats in the sense that they want occupational merit to determine salaries, but they may be reluctant to reward these factors with the same intensity as the market does.

As one of the first studies to examine occupational merit, it is highly likely that some factors of relevance have been overlooked, like workplace flexibility, which, according to Goldin (2014), incorporates “a multitude of temporal matters including the number of hours, precise times, predictability and ability to schedule one’s own hours” (2014: 1104). In Goldin’s view, firms

have an incentive to disproportionately reward individuals in jobs that require the worker to meet strict deadlines. Factors like this should be included in the future studies on occupational merit. Moreover, it is crucial to delve deeper into the mechanisms through which citizens reward occupational merit. Do they reward it out of a fairness principle—admiration, gratitude, reciprocity, or compensation—or as a combination of some or all of these? Do they reward it for efficiency reasons? These questions have not received sufficient attention and should be clarified in future studies. It is also essential to reflect on why output-based aspects of a job are rewarded. As has been discussed, input-based factors can be more easily traced back to workers, but what about the overall social and economic contribution of a job? Why are workers rewarded based on the outputs of their jobs, which do not entirely depend on them? Are workers rewarded for self-selecting into occupations that provide beneficial outcomes for society? Or are these outputs perceived as directly linked to them?

Another relevant aspect that warrants further investigation is the connection between the concept of occupational merit and that of equality of opportunity, considering the latter not only in relation to ascribed characteristics (e.g., gender, immigration status, social origins) but also to genetic endowments (Grätz and García-Sierra, 2024; García-Sierra and Grätz, 2025). As the sociological literature shows, the level of mental skills that one ends up acquiring in the labour market can be determined by factors beyond individual control, like their socio-economic background (Grätz, García-Sierra and Petrin, 2026) Future research should examine whether informing citizens about the influence of such factors affects their willingness to reward occupational merit.

Finally, it is worth noting that the implications of the findings of the paper are substantial for the real world, since they suggest citizens do not exclusively want mental skills to receive a premium, as it has been occurring in the market in the last decades characterized by the expansion of the knowledge economy. In fact, mental skills are the factor around which there is more heterogeneity. Other factors that consider more directly the impact of a job on other individuals, like the social contribution of a job and the responsibility over other people's lives are also considered as worth of economic reward, which reveals the focus should not only be put on mental skills. In order to respond to the revolt against the political establishment and the economy that has unfolded in the last years, it is fundamental for politicians and political parties not to over-fixate on the role of skills and to give proper attention and value to other

characteristics of a job.

Chapter 4

Second Paper

Better Call Bill? Philanthropy and Preferences for Taxing the Super-Rich.

Abstract: The super-rich contribute substantial sums to charity, yet the political implications of their philanthropy remain underexplored. This paper investigates how charitable giving influences public attitudes toward taxing the super-rich, based on two studies conducted in the United States. It argues that philanthropy can reduce individuals' support for taxing the super-rich by enhancing perceptions of their benevolence and their contribution to social welfare. Study 1 (n=1,176) shows that exposure to high levels of philanthropy enhances perceptions of these two aspects of the super-rich. Study 2 (n=2,416) reveals that higher levels of philanthropy also reduce individuals' willingness to tax the super-rich. This reduction, however, is modest, suggesting that the charitable donations of the super-rich are seen only as partial substitutes for the taxes they must pay. Moreover, reduced support for taxing the super-rich does not translate into lower overall support for public redistribution.

4.1 Introduction

Rising income and wealth inequality across advanced democracies has placed renewed focus on whether the super-rich should bear greater fiscal responsibility. Yet despite the concentration of economic resources at the very top, public support for substantially increasing taxes on the super-rich is far from universal. This gap between objective inequality and moderate levels of mass support for taxing the wealthiest citizens presents a foundational puzzle for research on redistribution, taxation, and political inequality.

One account that explains this puzzle emphasizes supply-side constraints, such as the limits imposed by globalization on national autonomy (Rodrik, 2011; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017) and the greater responsiveness of politicians to high-income individuals (Bartels 2008; Gilens and Page 2014). The present paper focuses, however, on another possibility: citizens may not be as willing to impose high taxes on the rich as some of the classic political economy theories suggest.

I align with a stream of research that suggests that fairness and deservingness considerations play a key role in shaping individuals' willingness to support redistribution (Fehr et al., 2021; Scheve and Stasavage, 2021). A wide array of studies finds that people are less supportive of redistribution when welfare beneficiaries are perceived as undeserving (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Reeskens and van de Meer, 2019; Magni, 2024). Deservingness has been theorized along several dimensions—such as the identity of the beneficiary, the level of need, the degree of control over that need, attitudes, and reciprocity (van Oorschot, 2006). While this framework has generated substantial insight into preferences toward welfare recipients, comparatively little attention has been devoted to how individuals assess the deservingness of the super-rich. This absence is striking, given that this group has been the principal economic winner of the dramatic rise in inequality in recent decades.

In this paper, I aim to apply deservingness considerations to the study of the super-rich. More concretely, I focus on how the philanthropy of the super-rich can affect perceptions of their deservingness and, by extension, preferences for taxing them. The argument of the paper rests on the idea that, from the act of charitable giving, individuals can infer two things about the super-rich. In the first place, regarding their attitude, they can infer that they are benevolent — the charitable donations of this group can help project the idea that these individuals are

embedded in society and that they are kind. In the second place, regarding their reciprocity, individuals can infer that the super-rich who donate are making a material contribution to the common good.

Studies on welfare beneficiaries show that positive stereotypes are often rewarded. In the same vein, I argue that positive stereotypes about the super-rich can also be rewarded in the form of lower taxes. I suggest that individuals may be less inclined to demand higher taxes on the super-rich if they are perceived as benevolent and as already making a significant contribution to social welfare through their charitable donations. Moreover, I contend that rewarding the super-rich for their giving with reduced fiscal obligations does not imply a challenge to the state's role as the main institution responsible for redistribution,

In testing this theory, I conduct two different studies in the U.S. Since this paper aims to open a new avenue of research connecting philanthropy with public perceptions of the super-rich and preferences for taxing them, it is reasonable to examine these dynamics in a country like the U.S., which is a most likely case, given its longstanding tradition of philanthropy and the extensive media coverage that the actions of wealthy individuals and their charitable foundations receive.

In Study 1 (n=1,200), I explore the first stage of the argument: that philanthropy can influence perceptions of the benevolence and material contribution of the super-rich. I designed a survey experiment where the volume of philanthropy is manipulated by using information from Forbes magazine about the philanthropy of the top 400 richest Americans. In one treatment (the higher philanthropy treatment), participants received real information about the absolute magnitude of philanthropic donations. In contrast, the other treatment (the lower philanthropy treatment) also uses real data but frames the philanthropy as a percentage of wealth. This relative framing can lead respondents to perceive the donations as smaller or less significant, despite the absolute values being identical to those in the higher philanthropy treatment. The treatments in Study 1 produced the anticipated results. Respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group were more inclined to adopt a more optimistic view of (i) the benevolence of the super-rich and (ii) the material contribution they make through their charitable donations. The inclusion of a control group revealed that the information contained in the higher philanthropy treatment closely aligned with individuals' prior beliefs about the volume of giving by the

super-rich, suggesting that Americans are already immersed in a social environment where they are made to believe that the super-rich are big philanthropists.

Study 2 (n= 2,500) tests the second stage of the argument: how the philanthropy of the super-rich affects preferences for taxing them. I introduce some changes to the experimental design. Specifically, I make the type of giving by the super-rich explicitly redistributive, referring to donations that aid poor people in the US and, with ethical approval, I use a mild type of deception to strengthen the manipulation of the volume of philanthropy. In line with the theory, I find that respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment are more likely to favor lower taxes on the super-rich. Their preferred tax rate for the super-rich is approximately 1.6 percentage points lower than that of respondents in the lower philanthropy treatment. The magnitude of the effect increases to 3.4 percentage points when respondents who were suspicious of being deceived are excluded from the sample. Given the considerable gap in perceived lifetime philanthropy between groups, the effect is modest—suggesting that lower preferred taxes on the super-rich do not fully mirror differences in perceived giving. This implies that while people think charitable donations should reduce taxes for the super-rich, they see them as only partial, not full, substitutes. Although the effect is modest, it is worth noting that, if taxation policy perfectly tracks public opinion, taxing the super-rich 1.6 percentage points less would mean a substantial amount of money saved for this group, considering the magnitude of their income and wealth

Consistent with Study 1, in Study 2 the higher philanthropy treatment influences perceptions of the benevolence and material contribution of the super-rich in the expected direction, whereas it does not affect a series of variables that could be proposed as alternative mechanisms. More concretely, I find that the higher philanthropy information does not diminish the preference for the state to remain the primary institution responsible for addressing poverty. This suggests that individuals are willing to offer lower fiscal obligations to the super-rich who donate, but without rejecting the overall role of the state in dealing with redistribution.

Overall, this paper makes several important contributions. First and foremost, it advances the literature on preferences for redistribution, particularly regarding the taxation of the super-rich. Complementing a strand of the scholarship that looks beyond material self-interest, the paper underscores the idea that perceptions of welfare contributors (the super-rich), and not just those

of welfare beneficiaries (the poor), influence preferences for redistribution. Second, criticism of the philanthropy of the super-rich has long been a practice, engaged in by thinkers such as Kant, Thoreau, Fourier, as well as by writers and public intellectuals like Dickens, Flaubert, and Oscar Wilde. For instance, Marx and Engels describe philanthropists in the Communist Manifesto as “a part of the bourgeoisie that is desirous of redressing social grievances in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society”. This paper provides, for the first time, empirical support for such concerns raised over the past two centuries. Third, even if philanthropy is not seen as a perfect substitute for public redistribution, the results highlight that individuals see philanthropy as a legitimate path of redistribution: citizens perceive higher levels of philanthropy as benefiting poor Americans, they do not believe the super-rich pay fewer taxes when they donate; and they are willing to reduce the fiscal duties of this group as a reward for their philanthropic work. This challenges the traditional assumption in comparative political economy that redistribution can only occur through government action. Finally, this paper—by examining preference formation among the mass public—provides a bottom-up explanation that complements the more top-down explanations by Bartels (2008), Page and Gilens (2012, 2014) that center on the role of policy (mis)representation in the US policymaking process, showing that private donations offer another pathway for the rich to materialize their policy preferences. Interestingly, as several additional tests in Studies 1 and 2 underscore, citizens appear unconcerned about this alternative means of political influence.

4.2 Theory

A substantial body of evidence in the political economy literature indicates that preferences regarding the government’s role in reducing income inequality are not solely shaped by material self-interest. People are also influenced by their beliefs about fairness (Fong, 2001; Almás et al., 2020; Fehr et al., 2021). In particular, perceptions of who the poor are—and, by extension, how deserving they are—play a crucial role in shaping individuals’ preferences for redistributive policies targeting this group (Van Oorschot, 2000; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Jensen and Petersen, 2017; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). Building on this literature, an emerging body of research suggests that perceptions of the rich also influence preferences for taxation. Specifically, individuals’ views about the characteristics of the wealthy affect their support for taxing this group (Ragusa, 2017;

Kane and Newman, 2023; Trump, 2023; Sachweh and Eicher, 2023)

Given the significance of perceptions of the rich and their impact on preferences for taxation, this paper aims to explore an aspect that has received surprisingly little attention in the scholarship: the role of philanthropy in shaping individuals' preferences for taxing the super-rich. This study adopts a parsimonious approach, dividing the theoretical framework into two parts. First, it examines how philanthropy can mould perceptions of two key aspects of the super-rich. Second, it argues that these shifts in perception will, in turn, affect preferences for taxing this group.

4.2.1 The perceived benevolence of the super-rich

In first place, I argue that philanthropy can influence how individuals perceive the benevolence of the super-rich. According to Van Oorschot (2000), the attitudes displayed by individuals in need are expected to influence how the rest of society views them. Perceived deservingness increases for groups that demonstrate gratitude for the assistance they receive. Thus, “those needy people who are likeable, grateful, compliant and conforming to our standards” (Van Oorschot, 2006: 26) are seen as more deserving. While society expects the poor to show gratitude, I contend that, historically, there has also been an implicit expectation for those with substantial wealth to act magnanimously (Cansunar, 2022). The social norm of giving among the super-rich dates back to Ancient Greece and Rome (Alfani, 2024) and gained particular prominence in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Vallely, 2020; Cunningham, 2020). As Avramenko and Wolfsuggest suggest in their interpretation of Tocqueville's work, “the virtue most appropriate for the privileged elite is a particular kind of charity we have called philanthropy” (2021:371).

I posit then that philanthropy serves as a heuristic for individuals to assess the benevolence of the super-rich. Samuel Johnson, in his *Dictionary of the English Language* published in 1755, already associated benevolence with charitable giving, defining it as “a disposition to do good; kindness; charity; good will” as well as “the charity given”. I argue that individuals who give money away can be perceived as rooted in the community, kind and caring, while those who do not donate may be viewed as detached and selfish. The positive effect that philanthropy can have on the perception of the benevolence of the super-rich is, indeed, one of the main critiques that it has received throughout history. Philanthropy has been very often described as a mask

that the rich use to gain reputation, amounting, in Veblen's words, "to reputational laundering on a massive scale" (quoted in Alfani, 2024:249). According to Maclean et al., "philanthropy at scale buys popular goodwill" (2021: 335). By yielding rewards in the form of cultural, social and symbolic capital, it can serve "as a pathway to social acceptance and even immortality" (Freeland, 2012: 71).

Aligned with the above-mentioned intuitions, the literature on the determinants of giving underscores that donors can be aware of the personal profits that they receive for their charitable giving and that they can donate also motivated by "a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives" (Olson, quoted in Andreoni, 1990: 464).

H1: higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will increase individuals' perception of the benevolence of this group compared to lower levels of philanthropy

4.2.2 The perceived contribution of the super-rich to social welfare

In second place, I propose that philanthropy influences individuals' perceptions of the super-rich's contribution to social welfare. In the literature on preferences for redistribution to the poor, attention is drawn to the extent to which one has contributed to the generation of welfare in society, so that "more deserving are those needy people who have contributed to our group before (who have 'earned' our support), or who may be expected to be able to contribute in the future" (Van Oorschot, 2006: 26). I extend some of the insights from this approach to examine how individuals perceive the material contribution of the super-rich. Much of the political economy literature assumes that the resources of the wealthy can only be redistributed by the state through taxation. However, high-income earners can also contribute to the common good through philanthropy, challenging this assumption. There is a possibility that the super-rich voluntarily allocate their resources to fulfill a broad range of purposes, effectively "confiscating" their wealth for societal benefit.

I argue that charitable donations made by the super-rich can be seen as indicative not only of their benevolence but also of their contribution to social welfare. Individuals may perceive that the philanthropic endeavors of the super-rich benefit individuals and collectives in need and deliver public goods, leading them to conclude that these donations contribute to the common good. Consequently, some people may view philanthropy as a form of self-taxation by the

super-rich and as an alternative path of redistribution.

It is worth noting, though, that there are some factors that make difficult to equate the value of donations with that of taxes. Charitable donations are inherently voluntary, lacking the enforcement mechanisms of taxes and introducing uncertainty about future contributions. However, although some individuals might think of the material contribution of the donations made by the super-rich as being smaller than that reached through their taxes (some can think, for example, that the social utility of 1 dollar paid in taxes by the super-rich is 10 times bigger than that of 1 dollar given away to charity), it does not mean that no value is assigned to these donations. It is reasonable to assume that, as long as these donations affect individuals' utility -be it because their own material self-interest is boosted or because the well-being of people they care about is enhanced-, individuals will assign some value to them.

Therefore, drawing on the assumption that individuals do not assign zero value to charitable donations, and keeping constant their considerations of the efficiency of donations *vis-à-vis* the efficiency of taxes, I predict that, the higher the volume of charitable giving of the super-rich, the higher will be the perception that this group contributes to social welfare. However, for individuals to appreciate this contribution, they must not perceive a strong trade-off between charitable donations and taxes paid by the super-rich. If such a trade-off is perceived, the positive perception of philanthropic contributions may be offset by a decreased perception of their contribution through taxation.

H2: higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will increase individuals' perception of the material contribution of this group to social welfare compared to lower levels of philanthropy.

4.2.3 Philanthropy and taxing the super-rich

According to the argument, the charitable donations of the super-rich have a compound effect by simultaneously affecting perceptions of their benevolence and material contribution to social welfare. I argue that, because individuals exposed to the philanthropy of the super-rich will see them as more benevolent and greater contributors to social welfare, they will be less willing to tax them. On the one hand, studies on welfare beneficiaries show that positive stereotypes are often rewarded in society. As discussed, stereotypes about the rich also have an impact on preferences for taxing them (Sadin, 2017; Ragusa, 2017). For instance, Kane et al. show (2023)

that individuals prefer higher taxes on the rich who look down on those with less money than on those who treat people equally. I contend that benevolence, another positive stereotype of the super-rich, can be rewarded by reducing the fiscal duties of this group.

On the other hand, I argue that since philanthropy can be seen as an alternative way for the super-rich to contribute to social welfare apart from paying taxes, individuals might believe that the material contribution the super-rich make through taxes is somehow “crowded out” by the material contribution they make through their charitable donations. According to the crowding-out theory, government funding displaces or discourages private giving, as public and private revenues are in direct competition. There is strong empirical evidence from both survey experiments and lab experiments showing that donations are, indeed, ‘crowded out’ by increasing levels of government support for public goals. If citizens’ taxes are used to fund a public good, individuals lack any incentive to fund the same good through additional private donations (Andreoni, 1990; De Wit et al., 2017; De Wit and Bekkers, 2020; Kim and Van Ryzin, 2020). The present study departs significantly from the extant research on crowding out. Instead of focusing on how potential donors react to public funding, I focus on how ordinary citizens react to donations made by other individuals, namely, the super-rich. Therefore, I do not examine whether ordinary citizens are concerned about contributing to a given public good in two different ways, but rather whether they think that super-rich individuals who contribute to the common good through donations should contribute less through taxation.

The impact of a dollar donated may not be judged as high as that of a dollar paid in taxes. However, as long as some value is assigned to this dollar donated, the fiscal contribution demanded from the super-rich through taxes can be reduced—in a proportion that is not necessarily equal to the amount donated. Therefore, I posit individuals will be more inclined to demand lower taxes for the super-rich if this group makes charitable donations and is regarded as already contributing to social welfare.

This argument does not imply that citizens become more pessimistic about the capacity or obligation of public administration to address redistributive issues. Rather, it suggests that, while maintaining their beliefs about the state’s redistributive role, they may come to view increasing taxes on philanthropic super-rich individuals as an unfair solution. Hence, the argument of the paper is not about how the philanthropy of the super-rich moulds individuals’ views of state

efficiency, but about how it metamorphosizes individuals' perceptions of this group.

The third hypothesis of the paper is as follows:

***H3:** higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will decrease individuals' willingness to tax this group compared to lower levels of philanthropy.*

Finally, it is important to highlight how this paper departs from Hansen's (2023), the only study, to my knowledge, that has explored this topic. Regarding the theory, I take a more parsimonious approach and also test the association between giving and perceptions of the rich, instead of directly testing its association with preferences for taxing the rich, as Hansen does. Moreover, in her approach, the giving of the rich always constitutes a contribution. I argue, however, that when exploring preferences for taxing the super-rich, the giving of the super-rich can be seen as a contribution only when it delivers something that citizens expect to be delivered through taxes, such as mitigating poverty, addressing inequality or delivering a public good. With that purpose in mind, the design of the treatment of my paper involves information about donations aimed at reducing poverty. It cannot be assumed, as Hansen does, that any giving -even the non-charitable- can be seen as a contribution to society.

Additionally, Hansen focuses on the contribution mechanism that connects philanthropy with preferences for taxing the rich, but does not test it empirically. I also suggest that the perception of another aspect of the super-rich can be simultaneously shaped by their giving: their benevolence. The wealthy who give can be seen as benevolent without necessarily making a significant material contribution. They may donate to causes that are not redistributive or are not expected to be delivered through taxes, without making a clear contribution to social welfare, and still be seen as more benevolent. There is no perfect overlap between perceived benevolence and perceived material contribution, which is why I believe it is important to distinguish between the two.

Finally, regarding the methodology, Hansen's work, despite its valuable insights, presents some limitations. First, as mentioned, the information provided to respondents in her study does not clarify the targets of the wealthy individuals' donations, leaving uncertainty about how respondents interpret the treatment. Second, Hansen presents respondents with information about hypothetical wealthy individuals, which complicates the conclusions we can draw about their views on taxation. Taxes are typically applied to groups based on income or wealth, not to

individual cases. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that respondents would generally support lower taxes for the wealthy based on information about one specific individual. Two studies employing conjoint analysis share these limitations (Kane and Newman, 2023; Trump, 2023). Third, and more importantly, the hypothetical nature of the experiment (set in “a faraway village”) means respondents do not contemplate real-world consequences from the tax reductions they seem to prefer for philanthropic individuals, which is not very insightful. Moreover, this hypothetical scenario makes it unclear whether respondents perceive a relationship between philanthropic actions and the tax behaviour of the super-rich in real-world scenarios. Properly studying the connection between the donations made by the super-rich and their tax behaviour is a fundamental matter, as studies show that individuals associate the rich with tax cheating or state benefits (Sadin, 2017), and this perception leads to a higher willingness to tax them (Trump, 2023; Alvarado, 2024). In the present paper, I aim to overcome all these limitations.

4.3 Study 1: Philanthropy and perceptions of the super-rich

4.3.1 Method

I conducted an online survey in November 2023 with Prolific in the US with a final sample of 1,172 respondents. The survey included quotas for age, ethnicity and gender. I pre-registered the hypotheses on egap registry.

In this study, I aim to alter the perception of the volume of philanthropy by employing real world information derived from Forbes magazine. I use information from 2022, the year before the survey was implemented. According to Forbes, the 25 top givers in the US donated \$27 billion in 2022 to charities and nonprofit institutions. In the treatments, I refer to America’s 400 richest instead of just the top 25 givers because the latter group does not perfectly represent the wealthiest Americans. The approximate \$27 billion figure for the charitable contributions of the top 400 in 2022 is supported by several factors (see Appendix B.1.1 for a more detailed explanation). Forbes also provides information about the net wealth of America’s 400 richest, which amounted to \$4 trillion in 2022. I leverage this information to calculate the percentage of their total net wealth that \$27 billion represents and find that it equates less than 1% of

the wealth of this group ¹. I use this low percentage to create the information for the lower philanthropy treatment group, under the assumption that individuals exposed to it will think of the volume of charitable giving as being low.

The challenge of the design is to come up with another treatment that, compared to the lower philanthropy treatment, conveys information about a higher volume of philanthropy. Initially, in line with standard practice in the literature, I want to avoid deception. Therefore, I decide to present the same information but in absolute terms. Respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group are thus told that America's richest donated \$27 billion to charity in 2022. I assume that, on average, respondents exposed to the lower philanthropy treatment group will have a lower perception of the volume of philanthropy than respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group, since psychological studies indicate that individuals often interpret information differently depending on whether it is framed in absolute or relative terms (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Levin et al., 1998). To be able to assess whether the higher philanthropy treatment is actually conveying information about a higher volume of philanthropy, I include a control group. The treatments look as follows:

- **Lower philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Higher philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated approximately \$27 billion to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Control group:** *No information.*

4.3.2 Results


4.3.2.1 Different perceptions of the size of philanthropy

Before exploring the outcome variables, it is reasonable to question whether the treatment effectively altered respondents' perceptions of the volume of philanthropy, since all respondents receive the same information framed in different ways—either in absolute or relative terms.

¹We know that America's 400 top richest were worth an estimated \$4 trillion in 2022. This means that, if we consider they gave away around \$27 billion, that amounts to 0,675% of their total net wealth, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2022/09/27/the-2022-forbes-400-list-of-richest-americans-facts-and-figures/>

Specifically, it is crucial to verify whether respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment indeed held a more positive view of the quantity donated. To test this, I present respondents at the end of the survey with different statements about America’s richest and ask them to choose which of some statements they think to be true of this group. Among these statements, I included one that says that “America’s richest donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charity in 2022”. The answers to this question help us see how individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group perceive the quantity of giving in relative terms, allowing a clearer comparison with those belonging to the other treatment group. More concretely, it allows to see if individuals in the higher philanthropy group thought of the \$27 billion donated as being equal to less than 1% of the wealth of the super-rich.

Figure 4.1: Percentage of people believing that the super-rich gave less than 1% of their wealth in 2022



As Figure 4.1 shows, the percentage of respondents in the higher philanthropy group that think that the super-rich donated less than 1% of their wealth is around 60%, a percentage substantially lower than that of the lower philanthropy treatment group. The main conclusion is then that individuals in the two treatment groups, even if they were exposed to the same information (framed in different ways), diverge in their perceptions of the volume of charitable giving of the super-rich thanks to the manipulation exerted. Moreover, when examining the subgroup of respondents within the higher philanthropy treatment who do not perceive the \$27 billion in donations as less than 1% of the super-rich’s wealth, I find that their reaction to the treatment is considerably stronger when it comes to the main dependent variables.

As Figure 4.1 displays, the difference between the lower philanthropy group and the control group is notable, while the difference between the control group and the higher philanthropy treatment group is considerably less remarkable. This suggests that the higher philanthropy treatment functioned more as a neutral treatment, closer to the baseline, rather than as a strongly positive one. The overestimation that will be observed in Study 2—where individuals largely overestimate the charitable giving of the super-rich—and the fact that citizens are often exposed to absolute rather than relative donation values may explain why the \$27 billion information aligns closely with individuals’ priors. While this proximity to individuals’ priors does not hinder the results, as differences in how the volume of philanthropy is perceived across the two treatments remain, it does highlight an asymmetry in how distant each treatment is from the control group in perceptions of philanthropy.

4.3.2.2 Outcome variables

Regarding the outcome variables, Hypothesis 1 posits that higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will increase individuals’ perception of the benevolence of this group compared to lower levels of philanthropy. I ask respondents to rate America’s richest on a scale from 0 to 10 where “0” means most people in this group tend to be greedy and “10” means most people in this group tend to be generous².

Figure 4.2 shows that the information about the higher volume of philanthropy is associated with increased perception of the benevolence of America’s richest. Whereas individuals in the lower philanthropy treatment group rate the generosity of the super-rich at 2.7 out of 10, those in the higher philanthropy treatment group rate it at 4.05/10. The difference between the two groups is around 1.35 points and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, remaining unchanged when a set of control variables is added (for the full table, see Appendix B.1.2). Hypothesis 1 is thus confirmed. However, it is important to highlight that the higher philanthropy treatment, although it improves perceptions of the benevolence of America’s richest, it does not succeed in creating a completely positive image of this group, since the average score is still below 5. Additionally, the fact that there is no difference between the higher philanthropy group and

²Hansen (2023) uses this question in her observational analysis as a measure of what she describes as pro-sociality. Her interpretation of pro-sociality aligns more with the concept of contribution than with benevolence. However, I believe this question is better suited to capturing the benevolent aspect of the super-rich, rather than their contributive side.

the control group can be explained by the fact that, as mentioned previously, the differences in perceptions of the volume of philanthropy across these two groups is not very high.

Figure 4.2: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of the benevolence of America’s richest




Hypothesis 2 formulates that higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will increase individuals’ perception of the material contribution of this group to social welfare compared to lower levels of philanthropy. This contribution is captured by a question that asks individuals how much they think poor Americans benefit from the charitable donations made by America’s richest. This question is illustrative because, if respondents assigned no value to philanthropy, they would still believe the contribution to improving the well-being of the poor is the same regardless of the volume of philanthropy. In contrast, Figure 4.3 shows that the larger volume information is associated with an increase of approximately 0.4 points in the perception of the material contribution of the super-rich compared to the lower volume treatment group, moving from 3.22/10 to 3.63/10. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, remaining unchanged when a set of control variables is added (see Appendix B.1.2). The results thus provide support for Hypothesis 2.

The fact that respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group attribute a redistributive aim to the donations of the super-rich—believing that these donations are intended to enhance the lives of poor Americans—is particularly insightful, especially considering that no information about the purpose of the charitable donations was provided in the treatments. Apparently, the words “non-profit and charitable institutions” that appear in the treatment trigger an association with redistributive aims. As with benevolence, the higher philanthropy treatment positively

alters perceptions of the material contribution of America’s richest, but it does not manage to convey a fully positive image of this group on this aspect, since the score is still below 5.

Figure 4.3: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of how much poor Americans benefit from the donations of America’s richest



The inclusion of the control group aids in interpreting the results, revealing a difference between the control group and the lower philanthropy group, but not between the control group and the higher philanthropy group. This lack of difference could again be attributed to the higher philanthropy treatment being very close to the baseline, functioning *de facto* more as a moderate or neutral magnitude.

To demonstrate that the two dependent variables are distinct, I subsetting the sample to include only the control group—those unexposed to experimental manipulation—and tested the correlation between the benevolent and material contribution variables. The correlation is 0.35, indicating a weak to moderate positive relationship.


Granted that the charitable donations of the super-rich enjoy some tax advantages in the US, one could think that informing individuals about the magnitude of the donations made by this group could prime them about the tax advantages that the super-rich have enjoyed as a consequence of their giving. Thus, respondents could think that, although the material contribution of the super-rich to improve the lives of poor Americans is higher the higher their giving is, the material contribution through their taxes can go down parallelly. In that case, the increased perception of the material contribution of the super-rich through their charitable donations could be offset by the reduced perception of the material contribution through their

taxes.

To check if the treatments are moving respondents in that direction, I include two questions: one asking respondents to rate the extent to which they believe taxes paid by America’s richest benefit poor Americans on a scale from 0 to 10, and another one, touching upon the tax intentions of America’s richest, that asks respondents to rate them on a 0-10 scale, where 0 implies this group tends to use tax loopholes to avoid paying their fair share of taxes and 10 means they are willing to comply with tax laws.

The results in Figure 4.4 show that the concern that the higher level of philanthropy might have primed individuals about the tax contribution of the super-rich is unfounded. Respondents in this group are not more likely than respondents in the lower philanthropy treatment group to think that (i) the taxes paid by America’s richest benefit poor Americans in a lower degree nor that (ii) America’s richest tend to take advantage of loopholes in the tax system to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. If anything, the association goes in the opposite direction, although lacking statistical significance (for a formal test of these differences see Appendix B.1.3).

Figure 4.4: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of tax contribution of America’s richest



4.3.3 Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the findings, I conduct a series of analyses. First, I find that exposure to the treatment does not have an effect on an alternative outcome variable: one concerning the responsiveness of politicians to the interests of the super-rich (Appendix B.1.4). Second, I check that randomization ensured that selection into any of the three groups was not dependent on any covariate (Appendix B.1.5). Third, I find that 86% of respondents passed the attention check. I then conduct the main analyses of the paper, excluding respondents who did not pay attention during the survey. The results remain unchanged (Appendix B.1.6). Fourth, I drop from the sample those respondents who felt the survey was biased (either right-wing or left-wing) and re-run the main analysis. The results remain the same (Appendix B.1.7). Fifth, I check whether individuals were answering the questions about America's richest with a similar perception of which individuals form this group. Individuals in the larger and lower philanthropy groups are equally likely to think of billionaires as constituting part of America's richest (Appendix B.1.8). Finally, the manipulation checks incorporated in the survey reveal that individuals in both the lower and higher philanthropy groups correctly internalized the information they were provided (Appendix B.1.9).

4.3.4 Discussion

The findings of Study 1 show that manipulating the volume of charitable giving by the super-rich influences perceptions of both their benevolence and their contributions to social welfare. The effect size is higher for the former aspect than for the latter. Crucially, the reputational laundering achieved through philanthropy is limited, since respondents are still more likely to hold an overall negative view rather than a positive one on these two aspects of the super-rich. Philanthropy, therefore, seems to improve the reputation of the super-rich, but it does not manage to make it completely positive. Interestingly, perceptions of higher levels of philanthropy do not diminish individuals' perceptions of the contribution of the super-rich through their taxes. The inclusion of a control group facilitated the interpretation of the results, revealing that the information contained in the higher philanthropy treatment closely aligned with individuals' prior beliefs about the volume of giving by the super-rich.

4.4 Study 2: Philanthropy and taxing the super-rich

4.4.1 Method

I conducted a second online survey in the US at the end of July 2024 using Prolific. The final survey sample size was 2,416 individuals. Quotas were applied for age, gender, and party ID. Prior to data collection, I pre-registered the hypothesis on the EGAP registry.

One of the limitations of the design used in Study 1 is that, although respondents perceive the absolute information as more positive than the relative information, they do not see it as completely positive. Indeed, 60% of respondents exposed to the absolute value were able to accurately associate it with the relative value. When designing a higher philanthropy treatment, there seems to be a trade-off between avoiding deception and properly manipulating the magnitude of philanthropy. Given the limitations observed in the design of Study 1, employing some kind of deception seems the only way to vary in a positive way the magnitude of philanthropy. It is argued that deception can produce negative externalities by making respondents more sceptical of survey information due to prior experiences of being misled. However, empirical evidence on this issue remains mixed (Barrera and Simpson, 2012; Krasnow et al., 2019).

To design the higher philanthropy treatment, after obtaining ethical approval, I employed a mild form of deception by telling respondents that the super-rich have donated 20% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that help the poor in the U.S. Although this percentage is not accurate, it is not entirely implausible for two reasons. First, many of the wealthiest Americans have publicly committed through the *Giving Pledge* to donate more than 50% of their net wealth before death. Second, people are often exposed to philanthropic donations from the super-rich aimed at helping the poor. Additionally, I tested this information in a pilot survey (see Appendix B.2.1) and found that respondents were not extremely skeptical of the “20%” figure.

I carefully followed all the necessary steps to use deception correctly, without causing any harm to respondents: at the end of the survey, I debriefed them about the deception and gave them the option to exclude their answers. Only 1.2% of respondents exposed to deception requested to remove their answers, indicating that the deception was not met with resistance.

I designed a lower philanthropy treatment that does not require deception. To prime individuals about the low philanthropy of the super-rich, I used reports published by Forbes and other organizations on charitable giving by the wealthiest Americans. Based on these reports, it is possible to estimate that less than 1% of their total net wealth has been donated to help mitigate poverty in the U.S (see Appendix B.2.2). I will use this information to create the lower philanthropy treatment.

To ensure the treatments are working in the expected direction, I asked all respondents—before presenting any treatments—to estimate the percentage of the super-rich’s net wealth they believe has been donated over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions supporting poor people in the U.S. This question helps assess respondents’ baseline perceptions and offers insight into how they channel the forthcoming information. However, including this pre-treatment question has important design implications. Specifically, it precludes the use of a true control group. A control group, by definition, should not be exposed to any priming or framing related to the topic under investigation. But in this case, even asking about philanthropy—even without presenting any treatment content—would already activate certain ideas or assumptions about charitable behavior among the super-rich. This priming effect would compromise the neutrality of the control condition, making it impossible to isolate the treatment effects cleanly. Therefore, the inclusion of the pre-treatment perception question ruled out a conventional control group.

Given that I aim to examine whether philanthropy is perceived as a substitute for or complement to welfare provisions, I specifically focus on charitable donations aimed at addressing poverty in the treatments. This ensures that the donations are of a redistributive nature, allowing individuals to view them as fulfilling a role they might consider essential in American society. Moreover, to make the deception of the higher philanthropy treatment more credible, the information in the treatment refers to the lifetime giving of the super-rich, unlike Study 1, which reports their giving in the year prior to the survey.

The treatments looked as follows:

- **Lower philanthropy treatment:** In one of the previous questions, you selected X as the percentage of their net wealth that the richest Americans have donated over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

Below, we present you with the correct answer:

*According to various reports, the richest Americans have donated **less than 1%** of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.*

- **Higher philanthropy treatment:** In one of the previous questions, you selected X as the percentage of their net wealth that you think the richest Americans have donated over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

Below, we present you with the correct answer:

*According to various reports, the richest Americans have donated **20%** of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.*

4.4.2 Results

I include a question asking respondents about their willingness to tax the richest Americans. The question is phrased as follows: “How much do you think the richest Americans should be taxed? Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means 0% and 100 means 100%”. Since this paper aims to open a new avenue of research on the interplay between philanthropy and public preferences for redistribution and taxation, it purposefully adopts a broad and general approach. In this spirit, the question is designed to capture respondents’ overall attitudes toward taxing the super-rich, rather than probing their views on specific tax instruments, such as income or wealth taxes, or the system of tax advantages applied to donations. For the sake of simplicity, it avoids mentioning particular tax structures or rates, which could introduce complexity and potentially reduce respondent comprehension.

The paper hypothesizes that higher levels of philanthropy by the super-rich will decrease individuals’ willingness to tax this group compared to lower levels of philanthropy. The results in Table 4.1 support this hypothesis, showing that exposure to larger levels of philanthropy by the super-rich is associated with a reduction in the percentage of taxation respondents believe should be imposed on them (for the full table, see Appendix B.2.3).

Model 1, which includes only the treatment variable, indicates that the higher philanthropy treatment reduces the perceived ideal tax rate for the super-rich by approximately 1.6 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 0.1 level (p-value = 0.0548) and is consistent across different model specifications, even when controlling for a range of pre-registered covariates

(see Appendix B.2.3). The results of Model 1 are visually represented in Figure 4.5.


Table 4.1: Assignment to treatment and preferences for taxing the super-rich

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed	
	(1)	(2)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)		
Higher philanthropy treatment	-1.601 ⁺ (0.829)	-1.467* (0.703)
Constant	34.992*** (0.584)	26.265*** (1.559)
Pre-registered controls		✓
Observations	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.002	0.286
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.286

Note: ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;

Despite finding a difference between the two treatments, as anticipated by the theory, this difference turns out to be modest—especially considering that respondents in one treatment believe the richest Americans have donated, on average, less than 1% of their wealth, whereas respondents in the other treatment believe this percentage to be 20%. The main interpretation of the results is that individuals accept that, to some extent, the fiscal duties of the super-rich should be crowded out by their philanthropic donations, but this accepted level of crowding out is limited and not symmetrical to the percentage of donations made.

Figure 4.5: Intention-to-Treat Effects on Preferences for Taxing the Super-Rich



Even if the effect is modest, two considerations are worth highlighting: first, other studies using similar outcome variables and manipulating information on inequality likewise find modest effects (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Charité et al., 2022); and second, if taxation policy were to map directly onto public opinion, a 1.6-percentage-point reduction in taxation for the super-rich would imply very large absolute financial consequences, in light of the scale of their income and wealth.

4.4.3 Mechanisms

This paper argues that the philanthropy of the super-rich can affect individuals' willingness to tax this group by changing how the super-rich are perceived. First, I test whether information about higher levels of their philanthropy makes the super-rich appear more benevolent. In line with Study 1, I measure benevolence by asking respondents to rate the richest Americans on a 0-10 scale, where '0' means most individuals in this group are greedy and '10' means most are generous. As Table 4.2 indicates, respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group are more likely to describe the super-rich as generous. On average, receiving the higher philanthropy treatment increases the "Benevolence" score by approximately 1.15 units. The effect is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The results remain robust after including control variables (see Appendix B.2.4). Moreover, it is important to note that, as occurs in Study 1, although the perception of benevolence is substantially increased by the philanthropy of the super-rich, on average, individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group rate this benevolence at 4.17/10, which means the philanthropy of the super-rich helps improve their reputation but does not manage to make it completely positive.

Second, as in Study 1, I test whether providing information about a higher magnitude of the charitable donations of the super-rich influences how respondents perceive the material contribution of this group. I measure the perceived material contribution of the super-rich with a question that asks respondents how much poor Americans benefit from the donations made by this group. Consistent with the theoretical framework of the paper, Table 4.2 shows that individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group hold a more optimistic view of the material contribution of the super-rich. On average, receiving the higher philanthropy treatment increases the "Material contribution" score by approximately 1 unit. The effect is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The result remains unaltered when a battery of control variables is

added to the model (for the full table, see Appendix B.2.4). It is worth noting that the magnitude of the effect is more than double that of Study 1, likely due to the treatment specifying the redistributive aim of the donations. In addition, as with benevolence, although the philanthropy of the super-rich enhances the perception of their contribution, individuals in the positive group rate it at 4.3/10, which implies that charitable donations do not fully succeed in portraying the super-rich in a positive light.

Table 4.2: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of the super-rich

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benevolence		Material contribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Higher philanthropy treatment	1.162*** (0.103)	1.144*** (0.095)	1.018*** (0.103)	1.025*** (0.099)
Constant	3.025*** (0.073)	1.732*** (0.211)	3.337*** (0.072)	3.646*** (0.220)
Pre-registered controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.050	0.196	0.039	0.111
Adjusted R ²	0.049	0.192	0.039	0.107
<i>Note:</i>	+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;			

The results are unaltered when, alternatively, I measure “Benevolence“ by asking respondents to rate the super-rich on a 0–10 scale based on whether they think most of them are bad or good people, and “Material contribution“ by asking more generally about the contribution of the super-rich to improving the lives of the poor, without referring to the specific contribution that takes place through their donations (see Appendix B.2.4).


4.4.3.1 Ruling out alternative mechanisms

The main potential alternative mechanism rests on the idea that priming individuals with high levels of philanthropy sends a negative signal about the efficiency of the state. Individuals might believe the state is inefficient and that philanthropy is compensating for the failures of a malfunctioning bureaucratic system. According to this logic, individuals exposed to such positive priming should have greater doubts about the state’s efficiency, assign less weight to the utility derived from taxation, and consequently demand lower taxes on the super-rich.

To test this alternative mechanisms, I draw on a question from the 2019 iteration of the ISSP, where respondents were asked who they think should have the greatest responsibility for reducing inequality. They were given several institutional options. Instead of asking about inequality, I focused on poverty, since the information provided to respondents in the treatments pertains to this issue. I offered four options: high-income individuals through donations, the government through taxes, poverty does not need to be reduced, and can't choose.

I created a binary dependent variable, assigning the value '1' to those who chose "the government through taxes" and '0' otherwise. If the higher philanthropy treatment influenced individuals' perceptions of the state's efficiency in addressing poverty, we would expect respondents exposed to it to be less likely to see the state as the primary institution responsible for reducing poverty. I ran a logistic regression using the binary treatment variable as the main independent variable. The results in Figure 4.6 show that the association between being exposed to higher levels of philanthropy and choosing the government as the main responsible entity to mitigate poverty is positive, not negative (for the formal test, see Appendix B.2.5.1). Additionally, this association lacks statistical significance. The results remain the same when I run a multinomial logistic regression with a dependent variable with the four options from the question (see Appendix B.2.5.1).

Figure 4.6: Higher philanthropy treatment effect on support for public redistribution



Note: In Figure 4.6a, dots represent the estimated treatment effects from the logistic regression model, with bars depicting 90% confidence intervals around these estimates. In Figure 4.6b, the bar graph illustrates the mean levels of support for public redistribution across the two treatment groups, accompanied by their standard errors.

Other alternative paths were ruled out: I find that individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group are neither more likely to perceive lower levels of poverty nor more likely to believe it is less urgent to reduce poverty in the U.S. (Appendix B.2.5.2). They also do not exhibit a higher propensity to think that politicians are more responsive to the interests of the richest Americans (Appendix B.2.5.3). Finally, they are not more likely to believe that the super-rich tend to exploit tax loopholes (Appendix B.2.5.4).


4.4.4 Updated beliefs?

This study does not include a traditional control group that receives no informational update, which means the estimates represent differences in responses to the tax question across two competing treatment groups. While it might be claimed that this bundled treatment design limits the ability to isolate the absolute effect of each treatment relative to no information, the inclusion of respondents' prior beliefs about the philanthropy of the super-rich provides a valuable internal benchmark.

Before presenting the treatments, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the philanthropy of the super-rich. Figure 4.7 displays the distribution of the prior belief variable. I find that respondents significantly overestimate the percentage of the super-rich's wealth that goes to charitable institutions aiding poor people. Currently, they perceive this amount to be, on average, around 15% (the median value is 10%), while the super-rich in the U.S. have only donated 6% of their net wealth to charitable institutions, and approximately less than 1% to institutions supporting poor people (Reich, 2018).

This overestimation has meaningful implications, as individuals would view the super-rich more negatively and demand more from them fiscally if they were aware of the actual figures. The priors variable further supports the conclusion that the information provided in the higher-philanthropy treatment—stating that the richest Americans have donated 20% of their net wealth to charities targeting the poor—is generally perceived as positive by respondents. This reinforces the effectiveness of this treatment, particularly when compared to the approach used in Study 1, which conveyed annual donations in absolute dollar terms.

Figure 4.7: Distribution of priors on the charitable donations of the super-rich relative to their wealth



It is insightful to explore how individuals respond to the treatments based on their prior beliefs about the topic. The higher philanthropy treatment is designed to reduce preferences for taxing the super-rich, by presenting them as high contributors to charitable causes. However, the strength of this effect should decline as individuals' prior beliefs about philanthropy increase, since the information provided (i.e., that the rich donate 20% of their wealth) becomes less surprising or even disappointing. Conversely, the lower philanthropy treatment is intended to increase support for taxing the super-rich, by portraying them as contributing very little (less than 1%) to charitable causes. This effect should be strongest among those who previously held optimistic views of the rich's generosity, as the negative update will be more substantial for them. The higher their initial expectations, the stronger the anticipated increase in support for taxation.

I divided the sample into two groups: the lower philanthropy treatment group and the higher philanthropy treatment group. I then regressed the preferences for taxes variable on individuals' priors regarding donations. Model 1 in Table 4.3 shows that, within the higher philanthropy treatment group, preferences for taxing the rich increase with perceived levels of philanthropy, which is in accordance with the idea that the treatment has less of a downward effect—or even a backfiring effect—among those who already believe the rich are highly philanthropic. Model 2 explores this dynamic more directly by comparing respondents who overestimated the donation level (i.e., believed it exceeded 20%) with those who did not. It finds that those who overestimated exhibited stronger preferences for taxation, consistent with experiencing a negative update upon

receiving the treatment. Model 3 turns to the lower philanthropy treatment group and shows that the more philanthropic respondents believed the super-rich to be, the stronger their support for taxation after exposure to the treatment. This aligns with expectations: individuals with optimistic priors experience a more negative update, which in turn drives a larger increase in support for taxing the super-rich. Meaningful variation within each treatment group based on respondents' prior beliefs is observed, indicating that both the higher and lower philanthropy treatments influence respondents' preferences.

Finally, to address concerns about respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group who believed that the level of philanthropy exceeded the 20% stated in the treatment—and who may therefore not have interpreted the message as entirely positive—I exclude these individuals from the analysis. When these respondents are removed, the estimated effect increases substantially relative to Model 1 in Table 4.1, shifting from -1.6 to -2.4 percentage points (see Appendix B.2.6). This further supports the interpretation that respondents processed the treatment information in relation to their prior beliefs, and that their reactions were shaped by whether the message represented a positive or negative informational update.

Table 4.3: Effect of priors within each treatment group

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prior beliefs about super-rich philanthropy	0.071* (0.029)		0.065* (0.033)
Believing the super-rich donated more than 20%		3.600** (1.327)	
Constant	32.284*** (0.723)	32.564*** (0.636)	34.017*** (0.785)
Subset	Higher philanthropy treat.	Higher philanthropy treat.	Lower philanthropy treat.
Observations	1,197	1,197	1,219
R ²	0.005	0.006	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.005	0.002

Note:

⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;

4.4.5 Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the findings, I follow several steps. First, using specific questions, I identify respondents who suspected having been deceived. This proportion is 16.6% and 26.6%, respectively, in the lower and higher philanthropy treatment groups. When I drop them from

the sample, the main effect from Table 4.1 shifts from -1.6 to -3.4% (see Appendix B.2.7.1). Additionally, the p-value for this effect becomes much smaller (p-value = 0.0004). Second, I check that randomization ensured that selection into either of the two treatment groups was not dependent on any covariate. The results show that the two groups are nearly identical and that none of the covariates has a statistically significant effect on being assigned to the treatments. The results also reveal that individuals in the two treatment groups did not differ in their prior beliefs about philanthropy (Appendix B.2.7.2). Third, the manipulation checks indicate that individuals correctly processed the information provided in each of the treatments (Appendix B.2.7.3). Fourth, the attention checks highlight that almost 80% of the sample was fully attentive before the treatments. The results barely change when the inattentive individuals are dropped from the sample (Appendix B.2.7.4). Fifth, the results remain the same when individuals who thought the survey was biased are excluded from the sample (Appendix B.2.7.5). Sixth, despite no explicit mention of billionaires in the treatments, 80% of respondents indicated they had billionaires in mind when answering the questions. There is no difference between the two treatment groups in this regard (Appendix B.2.7.6). Finally, a key theoretical premise of this paper is that individuals are more likely to view a donation as contributing to social welfare if it addresses issues they consider important to society. Since the treatments explicitly refer to reducing poverty, I confirm that respondents indeed view this issue as very relevant (see Appendix B.2.7.7).

4.4.6 Discussion

The results of Study 2 support the paper's predictions: individuals exposed to the higher philanthropy treatment prefer to tax the super-rich 1.6 percentage points less than those exposed to the lower philanthropy treatment. Importantly, the size of the effect shifts to 2.4% when respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment who, prior to the treatment, perceived the giving of the super-rich to be higher than 20% were dropped from the sample, and to 3.4%, when those in the two treatment groups who were suspicious of being deceived were also excluded.

Taking into account the almost 20% difference in perceptions of the volume of lifetime philanthropy across the two groups, the effect is somehow modest in the sense that the reduction in preferred taxes on the super-rich is far from symmetrical to the different levels of giving to

which individuals are exposed in the two groups. Therefore, one can conclude that individuals believe the charitable donations of the super-rich should crowd out the taxes paid by them, but only to a limited degree. Charitable donations are not seen as perfect substitutes for taxes. Moreover, the results also show that priming respondents with higher levels of philanthropy does not impact respondents' view of the state as the primary actor responsible for redistribution.

4.5 General discussion

This paper has examined how philanthropy shapes public preferences for taxing the super-rich. I argued that charitable donations send positive signals about two key dimensions of deservingness: benevolence and material contribution. The literature on other-regarding considerations and deservingness suggests that individuals are less likely to support social provisions for the poor who are neither benevolent nor willing to reciprocate. I have applied these insights to the study of preferences for taxing the super-rich, arguing that individuals may be more willing to reward wealthy donors—who are perceived, thanks to their philanthropy, as more benevolent and greater contributors—with lower tax obligations.

Two survey experiments tested this theory. Study 1 showed that providing information about high levels of philanthropy increases perceptions of both the benevolence and the material contribution of the super-rich. This finding resonates with long-standing views, such as those expressed by William Gladstone, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century, who claimed that gifts made by a wealthy donor bring him “credit and notoriety” that he “otherwise might not have enjoyed.” It also echoes the views of Andrew Carnegie, himself a philanthropist, who was keenly aware of the material contribution that could be attributed to charitable giving. In *The Gospel of Wealth*, one of the ideological cornerstones of philanthropy, Carnegie portrays philanthropy as the ideal solution to inequality—what he refers to as the “Problem of Rich and Poor.”

Debates surrounding philanthropy go beyond its reputational implications and also examine its impact on the tax contributions of the super-rich. For instance, Foster Friess, the Wyoming mutual fund investor who was himself a millionaire, claimed that “people don’t realize how wealthy people self-tax” through charitable donations (Freeland, 2012: 246). With this statement, he suggested that wealthy philanthropists are already making a significant contribution. By

contrast, in 2019, the economic historian Rutger Bregman, when asked at Davos how the world could avoid a social backlash from rising inequality, responded bluntly: “The answer is very simple. Just stop talking about philanthropy. And start talking about taxes... Taxes, taxes, taxes. All the rest is bullshit, in my opinion”.

Study 2, using a stronger manipulation, sheds light on the connection between the philanthropy of the super-rich and preferences for taxing them. The results show that higher perceived philanthropy reduces preferred tax rates on the super-rich by roughly 1.6–3.4 percentage points. While the effect is modest relative to the gap in perceived giving, it indicates that philanthropy partially—but not fully—substitutes for taxation in the public mind. To some extent, citizens appear to agree with Foster Friess’s view that philanthropy functions as a form of self-taxation. The mechanisms underlying these effects in Study 2 align with the theoretical framework. Philanthropy improves perceptions of the super-rich’s benevolence and material contribution, but does not erode citizens’ belief that the state should remain the primary actor responsible for addressing poverty. Rather than rejecting state redistribution, individuals appear willing to modestly “reward” philanthropic wealthy individuals with lower tax obligations. This finding challenges Piketty’s claim that “philanthropic discourse can be deployed as part of a particularly dangerous anti-state ideology” (2020: 715), but they support his argument that philanthropy is a factor “contributing to the legitimation of billionaires” (2020: 715). The legitimation observed here is not complete, though: even after exposure to high philanthropy, respondents do not rate the super-rich above the midpoint on benevolence or contribution.

A relevant question that arises from this paper is how individuals’ inclination to reward the super-rich for charitable donations through tax reductions can be made compatible with sustaining the public redistribution achieved by the government, which they seem to support. A recent strand of the literature has shed light on different policies, aside from taxation, that can be employed to achieve redistributive aims (see Lindh and McCall, 2022; Cavaillé, 2023). It is worth asking whether any other measures, implemented while the taxes of the super-rich are reduced, could mitigate poverty without increasing inequality.

The study has two limitations. First, it focuses on the United States, a country with a comparatively weak welfare state; testing the argument in settings with more universal systems is essential. Second, Study 2 examines only explicitly redistributive giving, even though many

donations classified as serving the “general interest” do not meaningfully reduce inequality. Future research should investigate whether individuals reward the super-rich differently based on whether their donations have a redistributive aim or not. This is particularly important since, in many Western countries, tax deductions for donations apply as long as the donation supports an institution serving some “general interest.” This concept is defined ambiguously, often without requiring any redistributive purpose. Finally, this paper highlights a broader research frontier: the public’s views on the tax advantages granted to charitable donations. Do citizens support these regressive features of tax systems? Should there be limits on the income or wealth that qualifies for preferential treatment? Addressing these questions will be crucial for understanding how private giving and public redistribution interact in modern political economies.

Chapter 5

Third Paper

Taking care of the Other:

The Fiscal Frontier of Redistribution.

Abstract: This paper refines and empirically tests a material-based explanation of attitudes toward immigration: the fiscal burden hypothesis. We argue that natives' reluctance to grant social rights to immigrants is driven by concerns that immigrants impose costs on the welfare state. Contrary to common wisdom, we also contend that this reaction to the potential fiscal cost of immigration is independent of immigrants' cooperative intentions. Using a conjoint experiment conducted in Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, we find that individuals are less supportive of granting social rights to immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. This penalty is particularly strong among high-income earners and respondents concerned about the sustainability of the welfare state, revealing the economic mechanisms behind the fiscal burden hypothesis. Finally, a three-step empirical strategy shows that immigrants' positive cooperative intentions do not eliminate the penalty they face for being negative fiscal contributors.

5.1 Introduction

In today’s modern welfare states, redistribution entails “making sacrifices for anonymous others whom we do not know (...) and whose ethnic descent, religion, and way of life differ from our own” (Kymlicka, 2001: 225). It is therefore not surprising that heated debates have emerged in recent years over which immigrants should be included in the welfare system. Several studies show that a majority of citizens in Western countries are reluctant to extend social rights to immigrants without conditions attached. Strikingly, this reluctance remains high even among educated, progressive, and egalitarian citizens who are generally expected to be more sympathetic toward immigrants (Diermeier et al., 2021).

The general hesitation to unconditionally extend social rights to immigrants is difficult to explain solely through the dominant theories, which attribute these attitudes to ethnic prejudice (Ford, 2015; Reeskens and Van Der Meer, 2015) or to fears of labor market competition (Mewes and Mau, 2012). An alternative perspective, advanced by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014a), argues that citizens respond to immigration based on their perceptions of immigrants’ economic contributions to the country as a whole. This argument contains elements of an alternative material channel that could account for attitudes toward immigrants’ access to social services: the fiscal burden hypothesis. However, as Hainmueller and Hopkins themselves acknowledge, there is little direct evidence for this hypothesis, which “has been subject to less extensive testing than labor market competition” (2014b:241)

The aim of our paper is to revisit and directly test the fiscal burden hypothesis. We posit that natives may be concerned about two main material costs associated with immigration: an increase in taxes and congestion of public services (Hanson et al., 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Moreover, to test this hypothesis more comprehensively, we analyse in a novel way how attitudes toward immigrants’ access to welfare services are shaped by awareness of structural barriers suffered by this group.

Existing research, including Hainmueller and Hopkins’s works, often proxies fiscal concerns through whether immigrants are seen as willing to work and contribute (Petersen, 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014a; Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2019; Magni, 2022), an approach we term intentional reciprocity. Part of this perspective builds on the deservingness

literature, which argues that individuals, guided by fairness norms, reward cooperative intentions and penalize free riding (van Oorschot, 2000).

Despite its importance, this approach does not tap into the essence of the fiscal burden argument, since it does not say anything about the actual fiscal contribution—and thus the actual potential cost—of immigration, what we refer to as actual reciprocity. First, it does not take into account the use of welfare services by immigrants. Second, it assumes that immigrants' willingness to reciprocate translates directly into actual contribution. Fundamentally, this perspective overlooks the fact that immigrants—particularly low-skilled ones—as OECD data consistently show, can face systemic barriers that make it harder for them to become positive fiscal contributors, especially in the short run.

The distinction we propose between intentional and actual reciprocity allows us to analyse properly two different explanations of attitudes towards immigrants' access to welfare services, neither of which aligns neatly with the ethnic prejudice nor with the fear of labor market competition frameworks. In line with the deservingness literature, we expect natives to react to immigrants' intentional reciprocity by penalizing free-riding behaviour. But more importantly, this distinction enables us to properly assess the fiscal burden explanation—the main aim of the paper. We argue that individuals, motivated by material reasons, channelled following an egotropic logic (out of pocketbook concerns) or a sociotropic one (out of more general concerns about their own country), may penalize immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors—even when these immigrants display cooperative intentions.

To rigorously test the fiscal burden argument, we employ a conjoint analysis. We propose an alternative measure of fiscal contribution that is not totally dependent on immigrants' intentional reciprocity. We measure it by deducting the cost of the public services utilized by immigrants from the taxes paid by them. Based on their fiscal contribution, immigrants are categorized as either positive, neutral, or negative fiscal contributors. In the conjoint, we separate this attribute from another one that solicits information about the attitude displayed at work, intended to capture the immigrant's intentional reciprocity.

The conjoint is configured according to the main premises of the fiscal burden hypothesis. First, we focus on immigrants, the group to which this hypothesis has been primarily—if not exclusively—applied. Second, we restrict the profiles to two unskilled immigrants, since prior

research shows that natives are especially concerned about this group’s fiscal contribution. This choice enhances credibility and allows a clearer assessment of systemic barriers, which disproportionately affect low-skilled immigrants. Third, instead of examining admission policies, as most immigration research does, we ask respondents about immigrants’ access to welfare services—a policy area more directly linked to the fiscal burden hypothesis.

To assess the external validity of our findings, we conduct the conjoint analysis in three countries: Spain, the UK, and France. We choose these countries based on variation in the level of social rights currently granted to immigrants. To assess this, we use MIPEX, an often-used indicator that measures immigrants’ access to welfare services in host countries (Ruedin et al., 2015; Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017; Guzi et al., 2023).

Consistent with the literature on deservingness, respondents are less supportive of immigrants who are not hard-working—that is, those displaying low intentional reciprocity. More importantly, in accordance with the fiscal burden hypothesis, respondents in all three countries are significantly less inclined to grant social rights to immigrants who receive more in welfare services than they contribute in taxes. We delve deeper into the mechanisms and show that this reaction to the material cost posed by the fiscal burden is channelled through both egotropic and sociotropic concerns.

Moreover, in line with our theoretical expectations, we find that respondents penalize negative fiscal contributors regardless of their cooperative intentions. Acknowledging that this challenges common wisdom (Cavaillé, 2023; Cavaillé and Van der Straeten, 2023), we test this result in three ways. First, analyzing the interaction between fiscal burden and work attitude shows that negative contributors are consistently penalized. Second, in Spain, we include pre-treatment questions about immigrants’ tax behavior and structural barriers, administered two weeks before the conjoint; results illustrate that individuals punish the fiscal burden regardless of their prior beliefs about whether immigrants are free riders or face systemic barriers. Third, a separate conjoint analysis in Spain clarifies that even when immigrants are explicitly described as willing to pay taxes but forced into informality by employers, respondents still penalize their negative fiscal contribution with similar severity. Overall, there is little leniency toward immigrants perceived as fiscal burdens.

Since the aim of this paper is to test the fiscal burden hypothesis—and this has been primarily

linked to immigration— we have put the focus solely on this group. But, just as recent scholarly work shows that intentional reciprocity affects attitudes towards both immigrants and natives in a similar way (Cavaillé, 2023), there is, in principle, no reason to assume that the logic behind the fiscal burden hypothesis cannot operate when citizens assess natives’ access to welfare services. In the robustness section, we run an additional conjoint in Spain where the choices of potential welfare recipients include natives. We find that the fiscal burden also applies to natives, although to a slightly lower extent than for immigrants. This suggests that the fiscal burden hypothesis may be fruitfully extended to the broader literature on the deservingness of welfare services.

The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, it provides a direct empirical test of the fiscal burden argument as applied to the granting of social rights—an influential yet rarely examined claim in immigration studies. Second, unlike the prevailing tendency in the recent literature, which mainly emphasizes cultural factors as the drivers of attitudes toward immigration (see Norris and Inglehart, 2019), this paper brings economic explanations back into focus, arguing that natives can see immigration not only as a cultural threat but also as an economic one (Dancygier, 2010; Malhotra et al., 2013; Alesina et al., 2021; Dehdari, 2022). Third, and more importantly, we bridge the deservingness literature with scholarship on the fiscal burden by introducing a theoretical distinction between intentional and actual fiscal reciprocity. This distinction is crucial for understanding inequality: while immigrants’ intentional reciprocity may lie within their control, their actual fiscal contribution can depend on structural barriers in the host country. Social inequality, which results in immigrants facing structural barriers, often can render them negative fiscal contributors in the short term. Crucially, we demonstrate that this negative contribution can create a vicious circle: it reduces public support for granting social rights to immigrants—even when natives are aware that the contribution stems from structural inequality. In this way, we show how inequality can end up perpetuating itself.

5.2 Theory

5.2.1 The fiscal burden argument

We renew the attention to the fiscal burden hypothesis and argue that it can be a crucial aspect in shaping attitudes towards redistributive policies targeting immigrants. The fiscal burden

argument posits that natives are concerned about immigrants' use of public services and their contribution to the public coffers (Hanson et al., 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2008), predicting greater opposition to immigration when it is perceived as generating higher fiscal costs.

Following the existing literature, we assume that individuals hold two core beliefs: (i) low-skilled immigrants generate a net drain on public finances whereas high-skilled immigrants are net fiscal contributors, and (ii) fiscal imbalances can be addressed either through adjustments to tax rates or through changes in per capita transfers (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014a). If transfers are held constant, taxes must rise; if taxes remain unchanged, the quantity or quality of welfare benefits must fall. In this latter scenario, immigrants are perceived as placing pressure on public services, thereby reducing natives' welfare benefits. Such congestion effects are expected to affect most natives, lowering the per capita availability (e.g., fewer hospital beds) and quality (e.g., higher patient-to-provider ratios) of publicly provided services.

Few studies have attempted to directly test the fiscal burden argument, and most of those that have done so focus on the United States, where fiscal exposure is measured as a binary indicator variable that equals one for regions that fulfill two conditions: relatively high welfare generosity and relatively large immigrant populations (Hanson et al., 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Tingley, 2013). Despite their strengths, these studies exhibit several limitations. First, although they aim to test the fiscal burden argument, they use attitudes toward the arrival of immigrants as the dependent variable. This is somewhat ambiguous, as the arrival of immigrants does not necessarily imply entitlement to public services. Second, the measure of fiscal exposure employed is likely confounded by other factors (e.g., GDP per capita), and the possibility of self-selection is not considered. Third, their measure—based on aggregate rather than individual-level data—fails to accurately capture the net fiscal contribution of immigrants in a region. Fourth, and more importantly, these studies do not theoretically disentangle the actual fiscal reciprocity of immigrants from their cooperative intentions, which is one of the key contributions of our paper. Finally, these studies are primarily observational and therefore unable to establish any causal association.

5.2.2 Disentangling Intentional from Actual Reciprocity

Some strands of the literature have approached the role of fiscal considerations by tackling some of the concerns raised earlier. The most common strategy in this line of research has been to focus on the individual level, using survey experiments in which respondents are presented with different immigrant profiles. These profiles vary in characteristics allegedly linked to the notion of fiscal burden. In their pioneering work (2014a), Hainmueller and Hopkins argue that natives respond to immigration based on its perceived impact on the national economy, exhibiting what they label sociotropic reasoning. In line with this argument, they show that natives are less supportive of admitting immigrants who lack guaranteed employment plans. Yet, in their extensive review of the immigration literature, they acknowledge that “there is less evidence on the fiscal burden hypothesis” (2014b:241) and do not regard their own study as directly testing the original version of the fiscal threat model. Other studies have also approached fiscal considerations indirectly, using factors such as the number of years immigrants have worked or the effort they have put in to find a job when unemployed (Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and Van Der Meer, 2019; Magni, 2024; Alesina et al., 2023). Across these studies, such factors show strong and consistent effects in shaping attitudes toward the admission of immigrants and the granting of social rights to this group.

We argue that the findings from existing studies should be interpreted with caution, as they conflate immigrants’ cooperative intentions—what we refer to as *intentional reciprocity*—with their actual fiscal contribution. These studies often assume that a willingness to contribute translates directly into actual reciprocity, an assumption that does not necessarily hold. Immigrants’ intentions may be constrained by factors beyond their control, such as structural barriers or bad luck. For instance, a long work history does not guarantee a positive fiscal contribution if taxes were not paid due to informal employment arrangements. Moreover, work history alone reveals nothing about immigrants’ consumption of public services, which—along with tax payments—constitutes a central element of their net fiscal impact.

Existing studies offer important insights into how cooperative intentions influence public attitudes, showing, consistent with the literature on deservingness, that citizens tend to penalize behaviors perceived as unwillingness to contribute or as free riding (Petersen, 2012; Jensen and Petersen, 2017). However, these studies do not directly examine how citizens respond to

immigrants' actual fiscal contributions. Since the fiscal burden argument rests on the idea that individuals react to the material cost of immigration, focusing solely on intentions—while ignoring actual contributions and the potential costs or benefits of immigration—misses the core of the argument.

We posit that, if reciprocity can be defined as the actual contribution of individuals to the generation of welfare in society (van Oorschot, 2000; Reeskens and Van Der Meer, 2019), then it becomes fundamental to pay attention not only to the cooperative intentions of immigrants, but also to their actual fiscal contribution, which is the cornerstone of the fiscal burden argument and can be affected by factors beyond the full control of immigrants.

5.2.3 Actual fiscal reciprocity: beyond immigrants' cooperative intentions

In contrast to other approaches to the fiscal burden employed in the literature, we advocate for an approach that does not view reciprocity as exclusively dependent on the cooperative intentions of immigrants. We argue that the actual net fiscal contribution of immigrants can result from at least three components: intentional reciprocity (i.e., how hard the immigrants try to find a job, how hard they work when getting one, and how willing they are to pay taxes), the systemic barriers faced by immigrants, and general luck.

We define systemic barriers as the structural factors that hinder immigrants' integration and economic participation—such as low education, limited skills, poor language proficiency, a smaller network of both weak and strong ties, outsider status upon arrival, informal employment, or disadvantaged wealth conditions (Moullan and Jusot, 2014; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019; Gál, 2019; Gschwind, 2021)¹. These barriers, regardless of immigrants' cooperative intentions, can significantly constrain their ability to secure formal or well-paid employment and thus reduce their capacity to contribute through taxes. At the same time, they tend to exacerbate economic hardship, thereby increasing immigrants' reliance on public services. In this way, systemic barriers negatively affect both key dimensions of the fiscal contribution—tax contribution and welfare use—and can ultimately lead to a negative net fiscal contribution even among immigrants who intend to contribute.

¹A recent report published by the OECD highlights some of the disadvantages faced by immigrants in OECD countries. See <https://www.oecd.org/migration/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-67899674-en.htm>

To capture the fiscal burden, we thus need an approach that considers both dimensions of the fiscal burden and that does not solely rely on cooperative intentions. To achieve that, we draw on various studies examining immigration at the macro level (Dustmann et al., 2010; Wadsworth, 2013; Hooijer and Picot, 2015; Giuntella et al., 2018; Gál, 2019; Martinsen and Werner, 2019; Martinsen and Pons), and understand the fiscal burden of immigration as the difference between the cost of public services used by immigrants and the taxes they pay. Based on this measure, we can classify immigrants as positive, neutral, or negative fiscal contributors.

5.2.4 Hypotheses

Having clarified the main concepts, we now turn to our theoretical expectations. We expect individuals to be less willing to extend social rights to immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. There are two economic mechanisms through which natives might penalize such immigrants. First, since individuals care about their own material self-interest (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), they might oppose immigrants who impose a fiscal cost on their personal utility (egotropic mechanism). Second, since individuals care about the overall performance of their country's economy and the welfare of others in their society (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014a; Rodon and Sanjaume, 2020), they might react negatively to immigrants who impose costs on the country's fiscal and welfare systems (sociotropic mechanism). These mechanisms are compatible: natives can simultaneously care about the economic impact of immigration on both themselves and their broader community.

The main hypothesis that can be derived from the theory section can thus be summarized as follows:

H1: Negative perceptions of immigrants' fiscal contribution will decrease public support for granting them social rights.

Our argument that the fiscal contribution of immigrants and their intentional reciprocity do not perfectly align does not diminish the relevance of intentional reciprocity in supporting redistribution to immigrants. Following the literature on deservingness, we assert that individuals, driven by fairness considerations, reward intentional cooperative behavior and penalize free riding (Van Oorschot, 2000; Petersen, 2012).

H2: Negative perceptions of immigrants' intentional reciprocity will decrease public support for

granting them social rights.

Our departure from existing literature lies in the perspective that immigrants' fiscal contribution does not only derive from their intentional reciprocity, and that individuals may react to it based on material rather than solely fairness considerations. While it is suggested that the reciprocity norm prescribes that net beneficiaries (individuals who are negative fiscal contributors) should not be punished when they show cooperative intentions and are not free riders (Cavaillé, 2023), we contend that natives, motivated by their material considerations, aim to minimize costs. Consequently, they may penalize negative fiscal contributors among immigrants regardless of their displayed intentional reciprocity. When we say "regardless," we do not imply that punishment cannot be mitigated when natives encounter positive cues regarding immigrants' cooperative behaviour. We acknowledge that individuals are also driven by fairness considerations, and they may react more strongly to immigrants' negative fiscal contribution if they perceive it as stemming from a lack of cooperative intentions. However, we expect that, in absolute terms, natives may still penalize immigrants' negative fiscal contribution even when exposed to positive information about their cooperative behaviour, based on the material cost it represents.

H3: Regardless of immigrants' intentional reciprocity, fiscal considerations will shape individuals' preferences for granting them social rights.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Case selection: three countries

We employ a choice-based conjoint survey experiment in the United Kingdom, France and Spain via Netquest to test our preregistered hypotheses ². Our samples are representative in terms of gender, age and education (see Appendix C.1.7). The size of the sample was 1,969 in the UK, 1,974 in France, and 1,401 in Spain. We restrict the sample to natives and the surveys were conducted in October 2022 in Spain, and in December 2022 in the UK and France. Before completing the conjoint tasks, individuals in these three countries are asked some pre-treatment questions related to gender, ideology, level of education, household income and age.

²We pre-registered the hypotheses in November 2022. By then, the survey had already been implemented in Spain, but we asked the survey company not to send us the data until we had our hypotheses refined and preregistered.

We select the three countries for our study based on the level of social rights currently granted to immigrants. We expect our theory to be more applicable in countries where immigrants have broader access to such rights. To assess this, we use the MIPEX indicator, which measures the *de facto* integration of immigrants into the welfare state by examining their inclusion in the health systems of destination countries (Ruedin et al., 2015; Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017; Guzi et al., 2023). Looking at immigrants’ access to the health system is especially relevant since this type of welfare consumption is more visible to natives than welfare services involving transfers. The MIPEX score ranges from 0 (no integration) to 100 (full integration). Among the 65 countries assessed, Spain ranks 4th with a score of 81, the UK 10th with 75, and France 21st with 65. We therefore consider France a more challenging case for our theory. Given its more restrictive access to welfare services, the fiscal cost of immigration may have less influence on natives’ use of these services. Additionally, France is a country where the cultural dimension of immigration—particularly the tension between multiculturalism and particularism—has been prominent in public discourse, often downplaying the economic implications of immigration.

5.3.2 Two waves in Spain

In the conjoint implemented in Spain, we field two waves to explore the underlying mechanisms more thoroughly. Because this involves asking questions related to immigration, we field two separate samples to avoid contaminating the conjoint. The first wave has a sample size of 1,670 respondents. These individuals were recontacted for the second wave, and 1,401 participated again, resulting in an attrition rate of only 16

5.3.3 Design of the conjoint

In the present study, respondents are exposed to seven choice tasks, evaluating in each of them the profiles of two hypothetical immigrants differing across six attributes. The profiles are randomly produced by independent randomization, deriving attribute levels from a uniform distribution without randomization weights for any given attribute. Respondents are asked, after having read each conjoint table, “If you had to choose one, which of these two immigrants should be given priority in accessing social benefits and services in your country?”.

This question is inspired by those commonly employed in the immigration literature. For instance, in the conjoint experiment fielded by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014a), respondents

are asked directly which of two immigrants should be given priority to enter the country. We use an analogous formulation, applied here to access to welfare rights. Before asking the question, we informed them that they were going to read the descriptions of two male immigrants without qualifications that lived in their country ³.

We depart from other conjoint studies by narrowing down the profile of the two immigrants in three aspects. First, we restrict the profiles to two unskilled immigrants, since we aim for the two profiles to be credible to respondents, and prior research shows that natives are especially concerned about this group’s fiscal contribution. Focusing on unskilled immigrants allows a clearer analysis of the role of systemic barriers, which disproportionately affect this type of immigrant.⁴ Second, following Reeskens and van der Meer (2019), we keep the gender of the two immigrants fixed to male in order to reduce gender biases. Third, unlike the other studies that have examined preferences towards granting social rights to immigrants (Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019; Magni, 2024), we put the focus on two immigrants that are not necessarily unemployed. We do so because our outcome variable is general access to welfare services and transfers, which does not require the immigrant to be in a situation of need.

Table 5.1: Attributes of the conjoint tasks (for Spain).

Attribute	Level
Profession	Security guard in a mall. Berry picker. Food delivery driver. Factory worker.
Taxes and social services	Pays more in tax than he receives in welfare services. Pays as much in tax as he receives in welfare services. Pays less in tax than he receives in welfare services.
Country of origin	Morocco. Brazil. Croatia.
Attitude at work	Puts a lot of effort in. Puts quite a lot of effort in. Puts a bit of effort in. Doesn’t put any effort in.
Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish. Gets by speaking Spanish. Doesn’t speak Spanish at all.
Social life	Outside work, he never socializes with people from Spain. Outside work, he socializes as much with people from his country as with people from Spain. Outside work, he always socializes with people from Spain.

Table 5.1 displays all attributes and levels possible for the sample in Spain. The main

³The exact words respondents read were as follows: Please read the descriptions of two male immigrants without qualifications that live in your country. Then please indicate which of these two immigrants should be given priority in accessing social benefits and services in your country.

⁴It is worth noting that previous works have also confined attention to a specific immigrant type to test broader hypotheses about immigration attitudes (see Malhotra et al., 2013).

attribute of interest is related to the additional aspect of reciprocity that we aim to study: the fiscal contribution of immigrants, which is captured by whether they pay more taxes than social services received. According to the argument of the paper, the higher the perception of costs related to immigration, the lower the sympathy of natives to incorporate them into the welfare state. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses this framing to elicit the fiscal argument. Among other reasons, we choose this framing because it has been used in the European Social Survey and helps to match our experimental findings with the correlational analyses that we will present in the robustness section. Furthermore, Avdagic and Savage (2021), using a similar framing in a survey experiment that looks at general support for the welfare state, show that individuals are responsive to it.

To capture intentional reciprocity, we include an attribute about the effort put in by immigrants at work. We choose this factor because it encapsulates very well a form of reciprocity that is up to the individual himself and that is not necessarily affected by structural factors. As Petersen indicates, whenever clear cues are available about effort, people should classify recipients low in effort as potential cheaters and recipients who are high in effort as potential reciprocators (2012: 4). We do not use the two indicators employed in the literature (work history and attitude to find a job when unemployed) for two reasons. First, unlike the other papers about redistribution to immigrants, the two profiles of immigrants in our conjoint are not necessarily in a position of need and it would be pointless then to say something about the attitude they show when they are unemployed. Second, we think that the work history attribute is not totally perfect to capture the intentional side of reciprocity because systemic barriers (i.e., discrimination) might affect whether immigrants formally find a job in the labour market.

We also account for the two most widespread explanations regarding attitudes towards immigrants. Firstly, we include information about the profession of immigrants to control for the labour market competition argument. Among the unqualified professions, we add some that are more unwanted by natives, like “berry pickers”, and others more wanted, like “industrial worker in a factory”. We draw on Lahdelma and Kosmidis (2021) to make this distinction.

Secondly, to control for the cultural explanation, we include factors related to the recipient’s language skills, country of origin and level of integration in the host country. The language skills attribute is a factor that has been extensively employed in the literature to capture immigrants’

capacity to culturally integrate into the new country (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). This attribute contains three levels: doesn't speak the language of the host country at all, gets by speaking it and speaks it fluently. We add a second cultural factor linked to the immigrant's country of origin. Research shows that immigrants from richer nations have higher skills, on average, than immigrants from poorer nations (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), which leads us to avoid including immigrants from Western European countries. The three possible countries of origin for immigrants vary across our three study countries and are selected along the following criteria: one from Eastern Europe, one from Latin America, and one from a Muslim-majority country. We select a country of origin where the language of the host country is not spoken to avoid implausible associations with the language skills attribute. Additionally, for Eastern Europe, we avoid selecting countries near Ukraine, as respondents could perceive immigrants from these countries as potential refugees escaping from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in 2022.

Taking these considerations into account, for Spain, we choose Brazil, Morocco, and Croatia; for the UK, Turkey, Colombia, and Serbia; and for France, Slovenia, Turkey, and Peru. Finally, we include a factor that taps into immigrants' social integration in the host country, which has three levels: never socializes with people from the host country, socializes both with their compatriots and with people from the host country, and always socializes with people from the host country.

5.4 Findings


5.4.1 The effect of the fiscal burden

Figure 5.1 presents the results based on AMCES (for the marginal means, see Appendix C.1.7). The AMCE represents the change in the probability that a particular profile in a choice task is chosen over the other profile when moving from the baseline to the attribute level of interest.

Hypothesis 1 states that the net fiscal contribution of immigrants will affect individuals' preferences for granting social rights to them. In line with this theoretical expectation, respondents in Spain are less likely to support giving social rights to immigrants who are negative contributors over those who are positive contributors by 18.5 percentage points, as well as they are less likely to provide social rights to immigrants who are neutral contributors over those who are positive

by 7.5 percentage points. In France, the penalty for immigrants who are negative and neutral contributors is of 9.9 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. Finally, in the UK, compared to immigrants who are positive fiscal contributors, negative and neutral contributors are 21.2 and 7.7 percentage points less likely, respectively, to be given social rights.

Figure 5.1: AMCEs of the immigrant choice experiment.



Confirming Hypothesis 1, AMCES in Figure 5.1 reveal that individuals are responsive to

the potential costs of immigration: they strongly prefer immigrants who are positive fiscal contributors. The effect is smaller in France, which is unsurprising, given that France is a harder case to test our hypothesis due to immigrants' more restrictive access to welfare services and the prominence of the cultural dimension of immigration in public debate. It is worth emphasizing that in both Spain and the UK the effect of being a negative contributor is equal or larger than the effect of any other component of the other attributes aside from the one on intentional reciprocity.

Regarding the three cultural attributes, the least relevant across the three countries is the one related to the country of origin. However, respondents are still less likely to select immigrants from majoritarian Muslim countries like Morocco and Turkey. This effect lacks statistical significance in the UK. Concerning language skills, Spanish respondents favor immigrants fluent in Spanish by 9.9 percentage points, while in France and the UK, this difference increases to 20.7 and 21.3 percentage points, respectively. Additionally, we introduced an attribute reflecting immigrants' social integration in their country of origin. Respondents across the three countries notably reward immigrants who socialize with the population of the destination country. Compared to immigrants who only socialize with their compatriots outside of work, respondents are more willing to grant social rights to those who always socialize with people from the receiving country by 11.8, 17.8, and 15.8 percentage points in Spain, France, and the UK, respectively.

We capture immigrants' intentional reciprocity through an attribute that indicates immigrants' attitude at work. From the AMCES across the three countries displayed in Figure 5.1, we can conclude that attitude at work is the main factor in predicting individuals' attitudes towards recognising social rights to immigrants. Confirming H2, respondents in Spain, France and the UK strongly punish immigrants that do not put any effort in at work. Spanish respondents are more likely to grant social rights to immigrants that work very hard over those that do not work hard at all by 35.7 percentage points, whereas French and British respondents are 33 percentage points less likely to select this kind of immigrant.

The fact that the magnitude of the effect of the fiscal contribution attribute is different from that of the intentional reciprocity attribute points to the idea that these two attributes tap into different things. We have argued that, whereas the intentional reciprocity attribute can be understood as signalling a more dispositional side to reciprocity, the fiscal contribution attribute

can be also interpreted (although not exclusively) as being the product of factors beyond the full control of the immigrant. From the lens of the deservingness theory, it is reasonable to observe that the size of the effect is higher in the former attribute, since individuals are expected to be more inclined to punish negative factors that are more clearly under the control of the individual.

5.4.2 The economic mechanisms


Because the conjoint clearly separates the fiscal burden attribute from those related to cultural explanations and fairness concerns (i.e., the intentional reciprocity attribute), it is plausible to infer that respondents' general reaction to the fiscal burden reflects economic considerations and the material costs it imposes. To provide more evidence of economic mechanisms, we include two pre-treatment questions: one measuring respondents' income and the other capturing their beliefs about the sustainability of the welfare state. These questions allow us to test more directly the two economic logics we hypothesize to be at work: the egotropic and sociotropic logics.

According to an egotropic logic, it is reasonable to expect heterogeneous effects across income groups. Immigration entails two potential fiscal costs: higher taxes and reductions in the quantity or quality of welfare services. The first cost primarily concerns high-income individuals, as they are more likely to bear the burden of increased taxation (Hanson et al. 2007; Facchini and Mayda 2008). The second cost can affect both high- and low-income individuals because, in countries with welfare states that include universal or weakly means-tested programs, like the ones in our study, all citizens have access to public services. Nevertheless, low-income natives are expected to respond more strongly to this second cost, as they cannot afford to resort to private services to avoid congestion. Taken together, considering that low-earning individuals might be concerned only about one of the two potential fiscal costs of immigration (the congestion cost) and high-earning individuals might be affected by both (although to a higher extent by the tax increase one), the egotropic logic predicts that high-income individuals will be more responsive to information about the fiscal cost of immigration.

Figure 5.2 shows that there is a pattern consistent with the egotropic logic. Across the three countries, high-earning individuals react more strongly to the fiscal contribution of immigrants. The effect is statistically significant in France and the UK, where individuals above the median income are 2 percentage points more likely to punish immigrants who are negative fiscal contrib-

utors. Furthermore, in France, they are more likely to reward immigrants who are positive fiscal contributors by also 2 percentage points. The difference is also statistically significant.

Figure 5.2: MMs conditional on respondent income




According to the sociotropic logic, natives will react most strongly to the fiscal cost of immigration the greater they perceive the cost will be for the national economy and the welfare state. Following this logic, individuals who are concerned about the sustainability of the welfare state are expected to be more responsive to information on the fiscal costs of immigration, since they are more likely to see immigrants’ negative contributions as constituting a burden on the country’s economy and public services. To test this prediction, we asked respondents in Spain, between ten and fourteen days before they completed the conjoint, a question that touches upon the sustainability of the health care system in ten years on. We subset the sample in three groups: those who think the current level of public health care 1) will not be affordable, 2) those who think it will be affordable and 3) those who think it will be increased.

We are especially interested in comparing the choices of respondents who are pessimistic and think the level of health care provision will decrease relative to those who are optimistic and think it will increase. In this way, we are comparing individuals with opposite views regarding

the sustainability of the welfare system. Remarkably, Figure 5.3 shows that respondents who are pessimistic about it are 4 percentage points less likely to grant social rights to immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. The difference is statistically significant.

Figure 5.3: Marginal means conditional on perceptions of the sustainability of the welfare state.



5.4.3 Punishing negative fiscal reciprocity despite positive intentional reciprocity?


We have observed that immigrants’ willingness to reciprocate and their actual fiscal contribution are not necessarily correlated. Consequently, respondents can react differently to each of these two attributes. Now we aim to directly examine Hypothesis 3, which posits that fiscal considerations will affect individuals’ preferences for granting social rights to immigrants even when immigrants display positive cooperative intentions. It is important to reiterate that H3 does not imply that cooperative intentions will not attenuate the punishment suffered by negative fiscal contributors, it just implies that there will still be a punishment.

We test H3 in three different ways. First, we analyze the interaction of the two attributes related to reciprocity in the conjoint. Second, we utilize pre-treatment questions posed to respondents in Spain two weeks prior to the conjoint completion, which are closely linked to their beliefs about the intentional reciprocity of immigrants and the systemic barriers they face. Third, we conduct an additional conjoint in Spain where we capture more directly the intentional fiscal reciprocity of immigrants, keeping it constant at positive levels.

5.4.3.1 The interaction between fiscal burden and attitude at work

To bring data on the implications of H3, Figure 5.4 presents average component interaction effects. The ACIE for a given attribute level represents the average % difference in the AMCEs of a component, in this case fiscal contribution, when holding constant different levels of some other component, in this case attitude at work. In the three countries, even if immigrants display a very hard-working attitude, being a negative fiscal contributor still decreases the probability of being chosen to receive social rights, confirming thus H3.

Figure 5.4: ACIES for fiscal contribution and attitude at work.




5.4.3.2 Priors on the intentional reciprocity of immigrants and systemic barriers

Another approach to testing H3 involves focusing on individuals' prior beliefs about two of the factors we claim affect immigrants' actual contribution: intentional reciprocity and systemic barriers. We leverage the two-step design of the conjoint in Spain, where we included questions aimed at capturing respondents' views on these two factors. One question tapped into intentional

reciprocity and asked respondents whether they agree with the statement that immigrants are more likely than natives to avoid paying taxes. Less than half of the sample agreed with this statement, with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. We divided the sample into two groups: those who strongly agree or agree with the statement, and those who do not. It is reasonable to assume that individuals in the first group hold a more negative image of immigrants and are more likely to perceive them as tax cheaters, while those in the second group generally hold a more positive view ⁵.

Figure 5.5: MMs conditional on perceptions of tax behaviour of immigrants.



What we see in the right panel of Figure 5.5 is some variation when it comes to punishing negative fiscal contributors. Respondents that do not think immigrants tend to avoid paying taxes are 2.6 percentage points more likely to grant social rights to immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors compared to respondents that think the opposite. The effect is statistically significant. The left panel of Figure 5.5 reveals, though, that positive cooperative tax intentions attenuate but do not eliminate the punishment received by negative fiscal contributors, which is in line with H3. This is evident since the marginal means for the group that believes immigrants are not tax cheaters remain below 0.5. In absolute terms, immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors, regardless of their perceived intentional reciprocity, are less likely to be granted social rights.

It is also reasonable to believe that high-educated and left-wing individuals are more likely to be patient and empathetic when it comes to the contribution of immigrants, being less likely

⁵It is worth noting that in this context, we cannot be entirely certain that individuals who are neutral or disagree with the statement do not perceive immigrants as tax cheaters. They may simply believe that immigrants are not more inclined to avoid paying taxes than natives, while still holding negative perceptions about both groups' tax behavior. Nonetheless, it seems logical to infer that individuals in the first group harbor stronger negative prejudices against immigrants' tax behavior.

to see immigrants as free-riders. We then look at the heterogeneous effects of the fiscal burden attribute according to respondents' ideology and level of education in Spain, France and the UK. Interestingly, we do not find consistent patterns of sub-group differences by respondent ideology or level of education (see Appendix C.1.2 and C.1.3)⁶.

Another way of testing H3 is by paying attention to individuals' priors about the systemic barriers faced by immigrants, since individuals that perceive the existence of these barriers are aware of factors external to immigrants that influence their actual fiscal contribution. We asked two pre-treatment questions about two systemic barriers that immigrants face in Spain: informal payment and underpayment. In the first question, we asked to what extent respondents agree with the statement that employers in Spain do everything they can to pay to immigrants informally. Informal payment in Spain refers to any payment made outside of formal channels, involving transactions that are not recorded for tax purposes. Immigrants who are not provided with a formal contract, even if they have cooperative intentions, are unable to pay taxes on the income they receive.

Strikingly, 54% of the sample agrees with the statement that employers do everything they can to pay to immigrants informally, against only 14% that thinks the opposite and 32% that remains neutral. In the second question, we asked respondents how much they think an immigrant taking care of old people earns and how much they think this immigrant should make. We calculate the ratio of the perceived and ideal pay for this type of immigrant and create a dummy variable where we assign the value 1 to those respondents that think that immigrants taking care of old people are underpaid, and 0 otherwise. 75% of the sample thinks this type of immigrant is underpaid.

We observe in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 two things. First, unlike the priors on the tax behaviour of immigrants, the beliefs about the existence of systemic barriers that affect immigrants do not attenuate the punishment received by negative fiscal contributors. Second, and in line with H3, the results show that even respondents who are aware of the systemic barriers confronted by immigrants punish them when they are negative fiscal contributors (the marginal means for this group of respondents remain below 0.5).

⁶Following the ISCED classification, we classify as high-educated those individuals above post-secondary tertiary education, including those with short-cycle tertiary education

Figure 5.6: MMs conditional on perceptions of whether employers pay informally to immigrants.





Figure 5.7: MMs conditional on beliefs about the pay of unskilled immigrants.




5.4.3.3 Positive priming about intentional reciprocity

In December 2023, we conducted an additional conjoint analysis in Spain, comprising a representative sample of 753 respondents. In this iteration, we increased the information provided to participants before presenting them with profiles of immigrants. Our aim was to highlight aspects of fiscal contribution beyond the immigrant’s full control, thereby testing H3 more directly. To achieve this, we presented respondents with explicit information about both the cooperative intentions of immigrants and the systemic barriers they face. Simultaneous presentation of these two aspects was crucial, as a positive score in one dimension could be counteracted by a negative score in the other. Another strength of this design is its direct exploration of the intentional fiscal reciprocity of immigrants, assessing their willingness to pay taxes explicitly rather than

indirectly inferring it from attributes related to labor intentional reciprocity.

What respondents read looked as follows: “Please read the descriptions of two male immigrants without qualifications that live in Spain. *These two immigrants aim to fulfill their tax obligations, but their employers pay a portion of their salary informally, contrary to the wishes of the immigrants. As a result, both immigrants end up paying fewer taxes than intended.* Please indicate which of the two immigrants should be given priority in accessing social benefits and services in Spain”.

Figure 5.8: AMCEs of the conjoint where immigrants are presented as willing to pay taxes but confronted with systemic barriers.



If H3 holds true, then we should anticipate that the fiscal contribution of immigrants remains significant even when respondents are provided with explicit information about (i) the positive fiscal attitude of immigrants and (ii) the existence of systemic barriers. As shown in Figure 5.10, this expectation is indeed met. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, respondents in Spain continue to exhibit a reluctance to support granting social rights to immigrants who are negative

contributors compared to those who are positive contributors, as well as showing less support for immigrants who are neutral contributors compared to those who are positive contributors. It is noteworthy that the effect sizes closely mirror those observed in Figure 5.1. Priming individuals with positive cues regarding immigrants' cooperative intentions and the systemic barriers they encounter does not appear to diminish the influence of information regarding their negative fiscal contribution.


The key insight from the three distinct empirical tests of H3 is that, contrary to much of the existing literature, citizens' concerns regarding the negative fiscal contribution of immigrants are not solely rooted in the potential indication of free riding behavior. This is consistent with the findings reported in section 5.4.1, which highlight that individuals can react to the fiscal cost of immigration driven by material reasons.

5.5 Robustness tests and external validity

To conclude the empirical section, it is essential to emphasize that our findings are robust to two different specifications. Firstly, we investigated whether there was a discernible difference in respondents' completion of the main conjoint tasks at the beginning and the end of the survey. One might posit that, given the necessity for respondents to undertake seven conjoint tasks, they could experience exhaustion, potentially altering their choices over time. To address this concern, we compared the marginal means of profiles based on whether they appeared at the beginning or the end of the survey. We observed virtually no substantial difference, particularly concerning the fiscal contribution attribute, across all three countries (see Appendix C.1.4). Secondly, recognizing that conjoint analyses provide respondents with a wealth of information, we sought to ensure sustained attention throughout the survey. At the end of the conjoint tasks, we included a manipulation check, asking respondents to identify the number of attributes in the profiles they had just encountered. More than half of the sample in all three countries provided correct answers. Moreover, our analysis revealed that individuals who demonstrated greater attentiveness were more responsive to information regarding the fiscal contribution of immigrants, with this effect being particularly pronounced in Spain and the UK (see Appendix, C.1.5). We extended these two robustness tests to the additional conjoint analysis conducted in Spain to test hypotheses H3. Encouragingly, the results remained very similar.

The survey design integrates all the deservingness factors contemplated by Van Oorschot (2000), except for that of need. It could be argued that the fiscal burden factor bears less weight when an additional need factor is included. To address this concern, we conducted an additional conjoint in Spain in December 2025 with 750 respondents. In this conjoint, we add an attribute that touches upon the notion of the need of potential welfare recipients. We draw on Magni (2024) and capture need through the health of respondents. There are four different levels: the immigrant is healthy, suffers from a mild chronic disease, a moderate chronic disease, or a severe chronic disease. Figure 5.9 shows the results when need is added to the conjoint. The most important finding is that the fiscal burden factor remains as powerful as in the core design, revealing its strength. Moreover, although the direction of the effect of the need variable is as expected, its size is considerably moderate.

Figure 5.9: AMCEs of the conjoint when a need attribute is included.



We believe our study holds sufficient external validity given its inclusion of data from three countries. However, to ensure the generalizability of our findings to a broader range of countries,

we extend our analysis to incorporate data from the 4th wave of the European Social Survey. While the specific countries analyzed in this dataset are not identified, the patterns observed align consistently with our arguments across a more diverse set of countries. In our analysis, we use as a dependent variable a question from the European Social Survey that explores respondents' perspectives on when immigrants should be entitled to social rights. The question offers five response options, that go gradually from: immediately upon arrival, after 1 year, after 1 year of working and paying taxes, after obtaining citizenship, and never. We transform this variable into a binary one where value 1 is assigned to the first two options, which involve no conditions attached to social rights, and 0 to the remaining ones. In this way, the variable captures support for unconditionally extending social rights to immigrants. In addition to Spain, France, and the UK, the countries included in our analysis comprise Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. This broader scope allows us to assess the consistency of our findings across a more diverse set of countries, thereby enhancing the robustness and applicability of our research.

To capture the fiscal burden argument, we use a variable that directly asks respondents whether they believe immigrants receive more from the state than they contribute. The scale ranges from 0 (“contribute much more than they receive”) to 10 (“receive much more than they contribute”). To align it with the fiscal attribute levels used in the conjoint experiment, we recode this variable into three categories: negative fiscal contributor (0–4), neutral (5), and positive fiscal contributor (6–10).

Table 5.2 shows the results of a logistic regression. We find that, compared to individuals who perceive immigrants as negative fiscal contributors, support for the unconditional extension of social rights to immigrants is significantly higher among those who view them as neutral or positive contributors. This difference is statistically significant and remains robust after controlling for a range of covariates (see Appendix C.2.1).

To illustrate the substantive effect of perceived fiscal impact, we calculate predicted probabilities (see again Appendix C.2.1). While only 12% of those who view immigrants as a burden support unconditional access, this share increases to 27.6% and 32.5%, respectively, among those who see immigrants as neutral or positive contributors. Results are consistent when using an ordered logit model with the full five-category version of the social rights access question as the

dependent variable (see Appendix C.2.2).

Table 5.2: Support for unconditionally extending social rights to immigrants by perception of fiscal contribution

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Extension of social rights to immigrants		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reference category: Negative Contribution			
Neutral Contribution	0.990*** (0.045)	0.955*** (0.045)	0.882*** (0.046)
Positive Contribution	1.219*** (0.049)	1.173*** (0.049)	1.131*** (0.051)
Controls		✓	✓
Country Dummies			✓
Observations	17,445	17,445	17,445
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Unfortunately, the ESS does not include any measure that captures natives' perceptions about immigrants' willingness to reciprocate. We use as a proxy for it the classic question about cosmopolitanism, assuming that cosmopolitans are more likely to perceive immigrants as showing a reciprocal attitude⁷. We include the proxy in the regression model (see Appendix C.2.3) and see that the variable that captures fiscal considerations remains statistically significant, which points to the idea that fiscal considerations are relevant regardless of the intentional reciprocity of immigrants.

Finally, we conducted additional analyses focusing on two subsamples: one comprising the countries included in the conjoint analysis, and another comprising countries not included in the conjoint. As detailed in Appendix C.2.4 we observed consistent patterns across both sets of countries. This suggests that the findings derived from the conjoint analysis are likely to generalize to the broader set of countries surveyed in the European Social Survey (ESS).

5.5.1 The validity of the fiscal burden hypothesis beyond immigration


Since the aim of this paper is to test the fiscal burden hypothesis —and this has been primarily linked to immigration— we have put the focus on this group, but there is no reason to believe

⁷We label as cosmopolitans those situated between the values 5 and 10 in a question that asks respondents whether they think their country's culture is undermined or enriched by immigrants

that natives will not also oppose the negative fiscal contribution of their counterparts, considering the material costs that it can inflict on them and on their broader community. Therefore, just as it has been shown that natives punish the negative intentional reciprocity of their counterparts (Cavaillé, 2023), they can also be expected to penalize their negative actual reciprocity.

To test this, we conducted a survey in Spain in November 2023 with a representative sample of 1,550 respondents. In this survey, we employ a conjoint analysis in which respondents are asked to choose between two individuals living in Spain, rather than between two immigrants. To maintain consistency with previous conjoint analyses in the paper, respondents are informed that they would read descriptions of two male individuals without qualifications living in Spain. To ensure credibility, we make three modifications compared to previous conjoint analyses: (i) we remove the language skills' attribute, (ii) we remove the social integration attribute, and (iii) following the approach of Magni (2024), we replace the country of origin attribute with a nationality attribute, which includes Spain as one of the nationality options. This allows the profile presented to respondents to represent either an immigrant or a native individual.

Figure 5.10: AMCEs of the conjoint that includes natives.



The results of the conjoint highlight that natives react more strongly to the fiscal burden attribute than to the nationality one. Respondents are less likely to support giving social rights to immigrants who are negative contributors over those who are positive contributors by 24.4

percentage points, whereas they are less likely to be in favour of extending social rights to individuals from Morocco by 16.4% compared to those from Spain. These results reflect the strength of the fiscal burden hypothesis, suggesting that, instead of circumscribing it only to immigrants, it may be fruitfully extended to the broader literature on the deservingness of welfare services.

We also analyze the conditional effects of the interaction between the fiscal burden attribute and the nationality attribute. We find that negative fiscal contributors, regardless of their nationality, are always penalized compared to positive fiscal contributors. However, in line with the literature that establishes that individuals hold double standards (Kootstra, 2016; Magni, 2024), the penalty is reduced by almost 5 percentage points when the negative fiscal contributor has a Spanish nationality. There seems to be some level of chauvinism in the assessment of the fiscal burden: individuals punish more strongly the fiscal cost produced by immigrants than that caused by natives (see Appendix C.3.9).

To make this an even harder test, we implemented an additional conjoint experiment in December 2025 with 750 respondents, in which we strengthened the levels of the nationality attribute. Instead of merely indicating the country of origin, we explicitly included the word “citizen” when the recipient was from Spain (“Spanish citizen”) and “immigrant” when the recipient was from a foreign country (e.g., “Croatian immigrant”). As expected, the nationality attribute becomes more salient in this design, yet it remains less influential than the fiscal burden attribute (see Appendix C.1.6).

One limitation of including both natives and immigrants in the same conjoint design is that the systemic barriers faced by each group—particularly unskilled immigrants versus unskilled natives—are not symmetrical; immigrants encounter substantially greater obstacles. As a result, it is not possible to conduct a unified test of how these barriers operate across both groups. The advantage of focusing the paper primarily on immigrants is that it allows for a more thorough examination of the interaction between immigrants’ fiscal burden and the systemic barriers they face—an analysis that would not have been feasible had natives been included as a profile category. Future research should nonetheless investigate how the systemic barriers confronting unskilled natives shape perceptions of their fiscal contribution.

5.6 Discussion

The aim of this paper was to conceptualize and empirically test the fiscal burden hypothesis. Our findings indicate that fiscal considerations significantly influence individuals' decisions regarding the extension of social rights to immigrants. We found that individuals are less inclined to support extending social rights to immigrants who contribute less in taxes than they receive in social services. The impact of the fiscal burden remains intact after the inclusion of a broad battery of robustness tests. These results contribute to our understanding of the demand side of immigration policy and align with existing research analysing the importance of fiscal considerations on the supply side, particularly in political discourse surrounding immigration (Dancygier and Margalit, 2020). The Brexit campaign provides a clear example of this dynamic, as public discourse on immigration frequently emphasized its alleged fiscal costs (Bale, 2022; Sucket, 2022).

Furthermore, since lower fiscal contribution is often associated with low-skilled immigrants, our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the widespread opposition to unskilled immigrants among both skilled and unskilled natives, the so-called hidden consensus on immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). By demonstrating the significance of fiscal considerations in shaping attitudes towards immigration, our study offers insights into the underlying reasons for this broad opposition. The results are also consistent with a set of studies that, using causal identification strategies, have shown that the fiscal cost of immigration can impact aspects beyond individuals' attitudes toward granting social rights, such as voting for the far right (Cavallé and Ferwerda, 2023), perceptions of the sustainability of the welfare system (Goerres et al., 2020), or support for different policy packages (Kustov, 2021).

In Spain and the UK, the effect size of the fiscal cost is equal to or greater than that of attributes related to the cultural aspects of immigration, challenging Kylmicka's claim that "the perception of economic burden is an effect of perceptions of cultural otherness" (2015:11). In France, however, cultural factors play a substantial role, being more salient than the fiscal one. This seems reasonable given the way immigration is typically framed in public debate in this country. The main takeaway from the paper is that fiscal considerations should not be disregarded when studying individuals' attitudes towards immigration. This is not to diminish the importance of labor market and cultural approaches, but rather to contend that scholars

should also consider fiscal considerations to gain a comprehensive understanding of individuals' attitudes towards immigration.

We clarify that respondents react to the fiscal contribution attribute driven by economic motivations, as evidenced by the fact that high-income earners and individuals concerned about the sustainability of the welfare system are more responsive to this factor. One of the paper's objectives was to bridge the literature on the fiscal burden with that on deservingness by arguing that immigrants' willingness to reciprocate and their actual fiscal contribution represent distinct concepts, since systemic barriers can affect how intentional reciprocity translates into actual reciprocity. We observed that these two factors do not overlap and found that the factor capturing cooperative intentions is the most relevant across the three countries. The magnitude of this effect is even higher than that reported in other papers where it is intertwined with fiscal aspects (Magni, 2024), suggesting that separating these two factors may be useful in elucidating the true importance that individuals attribute to immigrants' intentional reciprocity. A positive interpretation of the paper's results is that individuals are particularly responsive to an attribute that is dispositional in nature, emphasizing the significance of individual characteristics over contextual or unchangeable factors, such as country of origin.

We refute the notion that respondents interpret the fiscal burden attribute solely as a signal of immigrants' willingness to reciprocate. Even individuals who do not perceive immigrants as tax cheaters penalize immigrants who are negative fiscal contributors. Moreover, respondents' sensitivity to some of the structural barriers faced by immigrants does not mitigate this penalty. There appears to be little leniency toward immigrants who are perceived as negative fiscal contributors. This helps explain why concerns about the potential fiscal costs of immigration have also permeated the discourse and policy platforms of some social democratic parties. A clear example is provided by the Danish Social Democrats, who warned that the inclusion of immigrants could endanger the social cohesion and welfare state that characterize Denmark (Socialdemokratiet 2017:21).

The fiscal burden hypothesis has largely been confined to the study of immigration. However, in the robustness section, we show that fiscal considerations also operate when citizens assess natives' access to social services. While the extensive literature on deservingness identifies reciprocity as one of its five core dimensions, it typically restricts this concept to what we refer

to as intentional reciprocity. Our findings demonstrate that actual reciprocity—rather than intentional reciprocity alone—also shapes judgments of natives’ deservingness. Future research should examine whether the systemic barriers faced by unskilled natives influence reactions to their fiscal contributions differently from those faced by unskilled immigrants, which are the focus of this paper.

As we have argued throughout the paper, our method of testing the fiscal burden argument provides valuable insights into the scholarship on attitudes towards immigration and general redistribution. However, our design is not without limitations. While we identify that natives react to the fiscal burden, we cannot precisely determine the specific cost to which they are reacting. We are unable to discern whether individuals fear potential congestion of public services, potential increases in taxes, or both. Furthermore, although our main contribution is to demonstrate that individuals punish the negative fiscal contribution of immigrants based on the material cost it represents, rather than solely on the free-riding behavior it might signal, we do not isolate the proportion of the punishment suffered by negative fiscal contributors explained by each of these two different mechanisms. We hope to address these limitations in future studies.

The findings have significant implications for policy formulation. While countering negative information about the fiscal cost of immigration proves challenging, it is noteworthy that natives respond positively to information emphasizing immigrants’ positive fiscal contributions. This suggests a tendency among natives to support the expansion of social rights for immigrants who contribute positively to the fiscal system. Macro-level studies support this notion, indicating that immigrants tend to be net fiscal contributors across different countries, especially over the long term (Dustmann et al., 2010; Wadsworth, 2013; Martinsen and Werner, 2019; Martinsen and Pons Potger, 2019). Given the availability of information on immigrants’ positive fiscal contributions in certain countries, leveraging this data seems to be a reasonable strategy for parties advocating for immigration. By doing so, they can potentially garner greater popular support for expanding social rights to immigrants.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Economic inequality has become an increasingly relevant topic over the last few decades. As Savage (2021) argues, severe inequality exacerbates cultural, social, and political conflicts, undermining faith in progress and trust in the political community's commitment to all its citizens. Importantly, it creates divisions within societies, resulting in lower responsiveness to the interests of the poor and greater responsiveness to those of the wealthy (Bartels, 2008; Gilens and Page, 2014). The image of the inauguration of Trump's second term, surrounded by American billionaires, is a striking example of this dynamic. Part of the reason why these billionaires are seen as legitimate public figures by some is that they not only earn income through capital but also through labor—a concept Milanovic (2019) refers to as “homoplutia.” They do not come from old money. We are often told how hard they work, and there are plenty of movies, documentaries, and books narrating their achievements.

The aim of this thesis was to make a meaningful contribution to understanding the world we live in, specifically why inequality is accepted. One of the main contributions of this thesis is that it focuses on three spheres of economic inequality, examining different factors that contribute to its legitimacy. The first sphere is inequality in the labor market, where meritocratic beliefs are analyzed as a legitimizing mechanism. The second sphere concerns disposable income inequality—inequality after taxes and transfers—with a focus on preferences for taxing the super-rich and the role of philanthropy in shaping attitudes toward inequality. The third and final sphere addresses inequality between natives and immigrants, particularly attitudes toward granting social rights to immigrants. I investigate natives' reluctance to expand social rights for immigrants through

the lens of beliefs about the potential fiscal cost of immigration.

Regarding the first sphere of inequality, I have studied how individuals justify wage inequality across occupations. Using original data, I have seen that people prefer that some occupations receive higher salaries than others, regardless of workers' individual merit. I have developed a theory that considers aspects of an occupation that can be connected to the notion of merit, introducing the concept of occupational merit. In this regard, I have found that, when considering the concept of merit, individuals place similar or greater value on a job's social or economic contribution than on the skills required to perform it. Moreover, they also value the level of responsibility of the job over the lives of others as well as the exposure to danger or physical hardship. The most striking finding is that physical effort, a factor traditionally associated with merit in the literature, is the one individuals associate least with merit. In addition to this descriptive survey, I have conducted a conjoint analysis, which revealed that individuals are more willing to reward factors connected to merit than those unrelated to it when determining pay. One of the greatest contributions of the paper is the finding that responsibility over the lives of others is rewarded as much as mental skills. Furthermore, factors often neglected in the literature when discussing merit—such as the social and economic contribution of a job or the exposure to danger it involves—are also rewarded.

As one of the first thesis to examine occupational merit, it is highly likely that some factors of relevance have been overlooked and warrant further investigation. For instance, factors such as the time flexibility of a job—how strict the deadlines workers must meet are (see Goldin's analysis of lawyers, 2014)—or considerations of the risks involved or the investments required. Future research should aim to integrate these factors into the analysis.

From the exploration of inequality datasets such as the ISSP, it can be inferred that while individuals generally favor pay inequality, they believe the extent of this inequality should be much smaller than it currently is. For example, individuals consistently agree that a CEO should earn more than an unskilled worker, but they believe the pay ratio between the two should be significantly lower than what exists in the market. Therefore, a logical extension of my research on occupational merit would be to investigate not only which job components individuals deem deserving of rewards but also the extent to which they believe these components should be rewarded. It may turn out that individuals, while meritocratic in their desire to reward merit,

assign rewards to merit that are far lower than those observed in the market.

The relationship between merit and inequality of opportunity also warrants further study. Merit is often conflated with equality of opportunity, but the two are distinct concepts. Equality of opportunity refers to equitable access to resources that provide societal advantages—typically those linked to merit, such as education, knowledge, effort, or social class. While merit is frequently used to justify income disparities, equality of opportunity imposes constraints on the legitimacy of income inequality by defining a starting point or setting boundaries (Bank, 2016). Much of the literature assumes that when individuals' resources are influenced by factors beyond their control, inequality becomes unacceptable. However, the normative tendency to reward merit-related traits may persist even in the absence of equality of opportunity. Despite the advantages some individuals may have gained throughout their lives, people may still be willing to reward, albeit to a lesser extent, traits or activities they perceive as merit-based. This question deserves deeper exploration in future research.

In addition, it is worth noting that, while meritocracy primarily focuses on socioeconomic opportunities, other factors can explain why merit-related traits vary across individuals. People can be associated with merit-related factors due to external causes, such as the opportunities available to them, but merit-related factors can also be influenced by internal causes, like the choices individuals make and their genes (Suhay et al., 2021). It is therefore essential to examine in the future whether individuals are more likely to reward merit when it stems from internal causes rather than external ones. Additionally, it is interesting to explore differences in how individuals respond to internal causes of merit, as one might reasonably expect a more positive reaction to those tied to individual choices rather than to those resulting from the genetic lottery. Studies manipulating information about the internal and external causes of merit would be valuable in addressing this question.

Another potential avenue of future research is to explore the perception of occupational merit as the primary phenomenon under study, treating it as the main dependent variable. According to the reflection thesis, which posits that “what is” ultimately determines “what ought to be”, existing literature suggests that the actual level of inequality influences individuals' perceptions of the ideal level of inequality (Trump, 2018). It would be insightful to investigate whether the current level of wage inequality impacts how individuals perceive the various components of job

merit. Do individuals assume that jobs rewarded more highly in the market inherently possess greater merit? Furthermore, it might be valuable to explore the extent to which gender biases influence individuals' perceptions of merit. For instance, focusing on economic inequality between men and women in elite sports—such as football, tennis, and basketball—could yield interesting findings. It is plausible to hypothesize that part of the gender pay gap in sports arises from the implicit belief that men are inherently superior in these activities, leading to higher merit being attributed to them.

Regarding the second sphere of inequality, the thesis has explored citizens' support for increasing taxes on the rich. I have examined whether the philanthropy of the wealthy influences individuals' willingness to tax them. In many Western countries, the super-rich make substantial donations and receive significant tax advantages in return. In a book entitled *Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich can save the World*, Bishop and Green describe philanthropists as “hyperagents” who can do some essential things way better than anyone else, since they do not have to face elections, nor they have to devote time and resources to raising money. They can focus on the long term and embark, therefore, on risky projects that might be fundamental to eradicate some social ills. According to this view, the rich make a higher contribution to the common by donating money to the charities that they choose rather than by paying taxes to fund government programs.

Despite its importance, the political implications of philanthropy have been largely overlooked. I have designed and conducted two survey experiments in the U.S., where respondents were provided with information about the philanthropy of the super-rich. I have found that charitable donations by the super-rich make them seem more benevolent and greater contributors to the well-being of the poor. Since individuals value the fairness principle of reciprocity, I have suggested they may be less likely to demand higher taxes on the super-rich who are seen as already contributing through donations. In this line, I have also found that Americans are less willing to tax the super-rich when presented with positive information about their philanthropy.

The relevance of these findings is significant, as they highlight that the charitable donations of the super-rich can be considered an alternative form of redistribution. This challenges the traditional assumption in comparative political economy that redistribution can only occur through government action. At the same time, the findings reveal that, while citizens are willing

to reward the philanthropy of the wealthy by reducing their fiscal burden, they do not view such giving as a substitute for public redistribution. Contrary to Buffett's claim that charitable donors "do a far better job in terms of maximizing the good that comes out of that money than would happen if it were dropped into the federal Treasury" (Bishop and Green, 2010: 49), the results show that citizens exposed to philanthropy are not more sceptical of the state's efficiency.

As I have already highlighted, writing about the relationship between philanthropy and public preferences for taxing the super-rich has been a hard endeavour due to the lack of existing studies addressing this issue. My thesis helps to inaugurate an area of research full of interesting corners yet to be explored. For instance, future research could investigate whether individuals react similarly to different types of philanthropy or whether they distinguish between donations based on their redistributive goals. It would also be important to explore whether the relationship between philanthropy and preferences for taxing the super-rich varies depending on the type of welfare regime or the specific tax advantages associated with donations.

Another promising area of research involves examining the policies that grant tax advantages to charitable donations. Do citizens support the regressive nature of these policies in countries with tax-deduction systems? Should there be a cap on the income or wealth donated by the super-rich that qualifies for preferential tax treatment? Building on the theoretical framework of this thesis, particularly the concept of reciprocity, it would also be valuable to explore whether citizens respond differently to the contributions the super-rich make through their taxes versus those made through charitable donations. Does cooperative tax behavior by the super-rich influence individuals' preferences for taxing them?

Finally, it is also worth noting that the rich can contribute to the provision of ideological goods through their donations. As Callahan emphasizes, "wealthy donors have long used philanthropy to wage ideological warfare" (2017:64). There are philanthropists, like George Soros, that are well-known for donating money to promote liberal democracy across the globe, whereas there are other philanthropists that are well-known for supporting a conservative agenda, like the Koch brothers. Citizens may be more favourable towards philanthropy, and therefore, more inclined to reduce the taxes on the rich as a reward, when it advances their own ideological goals; whereas they might show higher hostility towards it, and, therefore, be more inclined to increase the taxes on the rich as a punishment, when it supports political causes that go against their own

ideology. In the future, it would be interesting to see if left-wing individuals are more likely to demand lower taxes than right-wing individuals for rich individuals that advance a progressive agenda, and vice versa.

Regarding the third sphere of inequality, this thesis has investigated why natives are often reluctant to grant social rights to immigrants. I have focused on the role of reciprocity, particularly how natives value immigrants' fiscal contributions. Due to structural barriers such as lower wages and irregular payments, it can be difficult for immigrants to become positive fiscal contributors in the short term. Through conjoint analysis in three countries, I have found that natives are less willing to support social rights for immigrants who are described as negative fiscal contributors, even when they are informed about immigrants' positive intentions and the structural barriers they face. In conclusion, social inequality, which leads to economic disadvantages for immigrants, often positions them as negative fiscal contributors in the short term, depriving them of the public support necessary to enlarge social rights to them.

The results of the third paper of the thesis substantially complement the current scholarship, which primarily argues—like Charlotte Cavallé in *Fair Enough? Support for Redistribution in the Age of Inequality*—that individuals care about the intentions of others to reciprocate rather than their actual contributions. To date, the literature had equated reciprocity with individuals' willingness to cooperate and contribute across various domains, such as society, the market, or the welfare state. However, one of the thesis' claims to originality lies in distinguishing between intentional reciprocity and actual reciprocity, and then empirically testing the importance of each of these two factors in preferences for redistribution to immigrants. Interestingly, this distinction between intentional and actual reciprocity aligns closely with the differentiation made in the first paper between input-based merit and output-based merit. While intentional reciprocity encompasses the effort individuals put in, actual reciprocity refers to the tangible contributions achieved, which may be influenced by factors beyond individuals' control.

For future research, it is essential to disentangle more thoroughly which aspects of actual reciprocity or output-based merit are rewarded based on normative beliefs (i.e., the notion that contributing to a common good deserves praise and admiration) and which are attributed to material self-interest. The third paper has shown that both mechanisms can be at play, as high-income individuals and those more concerned about the sustainability of the welfare

state react more strongly to the negative fiscal contributions of immigrants. However, further consideration is needed to unpack this phenomenon, which presents a challenge similar to the one faced in the economic voting literature when trying to explain the sociotropic behavior of voters. To what extent do individuals reward positive economic performance due to their care and concern for others, and to what extent is it driven by their own pocketbook interests? The same question must be asked regarding the material contributions of individuals—whether in the form of taxes, job contributions, or charitable donations—and how these factors shape preferences for redistribution.

Furthermore, when investigating public attitudes towards redistribution to immigrants, another nuance that should be added in the future is the type of welfare consumption made by immigrants. It will be important to determine whether natives react more negatively to the consumption of welfare services that can lead to congestion (i.e., housing, health care, education). Moreover, it would be insightful to elucidate the structural barriers that natives, especially low skilled, are confronted with and test empirically if natives are more considerate of the barriers encountered by their counterparts, thus reducing the punishment for being negative fiscal contributors, compared to those affecting immigrants.

Appendix A

Appendix First Paper

A.1 Stage 2

A.1.1 Perception of other aspects related to occupations

Figure A.1: Perceptions of female representation by occupation




Figure A.2: Perceptions of immigrant representation by occupation






Figure A.3: Outcomes for 10 occupations



A.1.2 Ideal pay ranking across occupations


It is worth exploring what is the ranking of occupations that respondents have in their mind. Figure A.4 shows the pay ranking for the ten occupation respondents were asked about. From the one that should receive lowest in the pay scale to the highest, the ranking looks as follows: street cleaner, shop assistant, secretary, assembly line worker, footballer, Cabinet Minister, CEO, firefighter, airline pilot and doctor.

Figure A.4: Preferred income decile by occupation



A.1.3 Correlations

Figure A.5: Correlation matrices



A.1.4 Descriptives

Figure A.6: Descriptives Stage 2

Average age	47
Sex	
Women	51%
Men	49%
Income	
Above median	43%
Below median	57%
Education	
Incomplete Secondary Education (Below GCSE/ O level)	1%
Secondary Education Completed (GCSE/O Level/ CSE or equivalent)	13%
Secondary Education Completed (A Level or equivalent)	16%
Some Vocational or Technical Qualifications Completed (e.g. HND, NVQ)	19%
University Education Completed (First Degree e.g. BA, BSc)	34%
Professional degree (JD, MD, MBA)	2.7%
Postgraduate Education completed (e.g. Masters)	15%
Doctorate, Post-doctorate or equivalent (Higher Degree)	1%
Political party	
Conservative	16%
Labour	45%
Reform UK	17%
Liberal Democrat	10%
Scottish National Party	2%
Plaid Cymry	0%
Liberal Democrat	10%
The Green Party	9%
Another party	1%
Brexit	
Remain	50%
Leave	31%
Didn't vote	10%
Too young to vote	10%

A.1.5 Survey Stage 2

Consent form

The principal investigator of this study is . Feel free to contact them () if you have any questions or concerns, to provide feedback about your experience, or if you are interested in the goals of this research.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to participate there will not be any negative consequences. You may stop participating at any time and you may decide not to answer any specific question. However, we can only pay those who will complete the full questionnaire.

Your answers will be completely anonymous and we will endeavour to keep them confidential. We work with Prolific. They do not disclose your personal data to us.

Your data will be stored in a password-protected file. Your IP address will not be stored. We will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data. The researchers will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data, and all data will be stored at University's data archive () for a minimum of three years after the latest publication. The data will also be deposited at the Harvard Dataverse.

No personal information that could identify you is being collected, but any personal information you disclose will be removed or changed before files are shared with other researchers or results are made public. Responsible members of the University and funders may be given access to data for monitoring and/or auditing the study to ensure we are complying with guidelines, or as otherwise required by law.

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to the principal investigator () who will do his best to answer your query. should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the Chair of the relevant Research Ethics Committee at the University.

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are 18 years of age or over. If you have read the previous information and agree to participate with the understanding that the

data you submit will be processed accordingly, please check the relevant box below to get started:

- Yes, I have read and understood the rules stated above.
- I do not consent to participate in this survey.

Sociodemographics

-Where were you born?

1. In the United Kingdom
2. Outside the United Kingdom

-What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

1. *Incomplete Secondary Education (Below GCSE/ O level).*
2. *Secondary Education Completed (GCSE/O Level/ CSE or equivalent).*
3. *Secondary Education Completed (A Level or equivalent).*
4. *Some Vocational or Technical Qualifications Completed (e.g. HND, NVQ)*
5. *University Education Completed (First Degree e.g. BA, BSc*
6. *Postgraduate Education completed (e.g. Masters)*
7. *Doctorate, Post-doctorate or equivalent (Higher Degree)*

*-Here is a list of different types of jobs. Which type of job do you have now in your current job?
If you are not working now, but have worked in the past, please tell us about your last job.*

1. *Professional and technical (for example: doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, nurse).*
2. *Higher administrative (for example: banker, executive in big business, high government official, bookkeeper).*
3. *Sales (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, insurance agent, buyer).*

4. *Service (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker)*
5. *Skilled worker (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician)*
6. *Semi-skilled worker (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery worker, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker)*
7. *Unskilled worker (for example: labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)*
8. *Farm worker (for example: farm labourer, tractor driver)*
9. *Farm proprietor, farm manager*

-What was your household's total monthly income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources in 2023? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimator

1. *Less than £1,014 .*
2. *£1,014 to under £1,409*
3. *£1,409 to under £1,790.*
4. *£1,790 to under £2,190.*
5. *£2,190 to under £2,659*
6. *£2,659 to under £3,162*
7. *£3,162 to under £3,799*
8. *£4,617 to under £6,063*
9. *£6,063 or more*

-If a general election was called tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

1. *Labour.*
2. *Conservative.*

3. *Liberal Democrat.*
4. *Scottish National Party (SNP).*
5. *Plaid Cymru.*
6. *Green Party.*
7. *Reform UK.*
8. *Another party.*
9. *Don't know.*

-In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

-How did you vote in the 2016 referendum on whether to Leave or Remain in the EU, if you were able to vote?

1. *Remain.*
2. *Leave.*
3. *I was too young to vote.*
4. *I did not vote.*
5. *Don't know.*

Main questions

-Please rate the contribution of each of the following jobs to the well-being of individuals and society as a whole. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low " and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*

3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the contribution of each of the following jobs to the economy. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the physical effort required for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the mental/cognitive effort required for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of physical skills required for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “very low” and 10 means “very high”.

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of mental/cognitive skills required for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “very low” and 10 means “very high”.

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*

9. *Firefighter.*

10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of education required for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*

2. *CEO of a large national company.*

3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*

4. *Airline pilot.*

5. *Shop assistant.*

6. *Cabinet minister.*

7. *Doctor in general practice.*

8. *Football player in a top league.*

9. *Firefighter.*

10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of responsibility for the lives of others for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*

2. *CEO of a large national company.*

3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*

4. *Airline pilot.*

5. *Shop assistant.*

6. *Cabinet minister.*

7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of exposure to danger or physical hardship for each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the representation of women in each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*

5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the representation of immigrants in each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high".

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the level of prestige of each of the following jobs. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very low" and 10 means "very high."

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*

3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-Please rate the pay each of these jobs actually earn. Assign a number on the income scale to each job, where 0 represents the lowest pay in the UK and 10 represents the highest.

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-In the previous question, you were asked about the actual pay. Now, please rate the pay you believe each of these jobs should receive. Assign a number on the income scale to each job, where 0 represents the lowest pay in the UK and 10 represents the highest.

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*
3. *An assembly line worker in an industrial factory.*
4. *Airline pilot.*
5. *Shop assistant.*
6. *Cabinet minister.*
7. *Doctor in general practice.*
8. *Football player in a top league.*
9. *Firefighter.*
10. *Secretary.*

-We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn annually (before taxes and transfers). Please enter your estimated annual salary for each occupation below.

1. *Street cleaner.*
2. *CEO of a large national company.*

-To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'The government should take measures to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor'.

1. *Strongly disagree.*
2. *Disagree.*
3. *Neither agree nor disagree.*
4. *Agree.*
5. *Strongly agree.*

-Please select the factors of a job that you associate with merit. Select all that apply. Randomize list.

1. *Its contribution to the well-being of individuals and society as a whole.*
2. *Its contribution to the economy.*
3. *The physical effort required.*
4. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
6. *The level of education required.*
7. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
8. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship. .*

A.2 Stage 3

A.2.1 AMCEs


Table A.1

	Higher pay
Percentage of women in the job_Moderate	0.034*** (0.010)
Percentage of women in the job_High	0.052*** (0.010)
Percentage of immigrants in the job_Moderate	0.006 (0.010)
Percentage of immigrants in the job_High	-0.052*** (0.010)
Shortage of workers in the job_Moderate	0.040*** (0.010)
Shortage of workers in the job_High	0.082*** (0.010)
Contribution to the well-being of society_Moderate	0.048*** (0.009)
Contribution to the well-being of society_High	0.105*** (0.010)
Exposure to danger or physical hardship_Moderate	0.076*** (0.010)
Exposure to danger or physical hardship_High	0.127*** (0.010)
Contribution to economic growth_Moderate	0.070*** (0.010)
Contribution to economic growth_High	0.129*** (0.010)
Level of mental/cognitive skills required_Moderate	0.074*** (0.010)
Level of mental/cognitive skills required_High	0.180*** (0.010)
Responsibility for the lives of others_Moderate	0.082*** (0.009)
Responsibility for the lives of others_High	0.184*** (0.010)
Observations	15,100
Adjusted R ²	0.081

Table A.2: Table associated with Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3. Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001


A.2.2 Marginal Means

Figure A.7: Marginal Means



A.2.3 Perceptions of physical effort

Figure A.8: Perceptions of physical effort across 3 occupations



A.2.4 Subgroup analysis

A.2.4.1 Sub-group analysis by education

Figure A.9: Estimated difference in MMs between respondents with High and no High education.




Table A.3: Table associated with Figure A.9

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.76
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.71
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	0.01	0.01	0.58
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.75
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.57
Higher pay	mm_difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.00	0.01	0.78
Higher pay	mm_difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.09
Higher pay	mm_difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.04
Higher pay	mm_difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	-0.00	0.01	0.80
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.35
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.92
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.01	0.01	0.33
Higher pay	mm_difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	0.01	0.01	0.45
Higher pay	mm_difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.16
Higher pay	mm_difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.01	0.01	0.44
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.01	0.01	0.32
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.51
Higher pay	mm_difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.00	0.01	0.82
Higher pay	mm_difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.03	0.01	0.01
Higher pay	mm_difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.84
Higher pay	mm_difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	0.03	0.01	0.01
Higher pay	mm_difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.45
Higher pay	mm_difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	mm_difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	-0.00	0.01	0.80

A.2.4.2 Sub-group analysis by income

Figure A.10: Estimated difference in MMs between individuals with Below and Above median income (left-panel) and between those with Median and Above median income (right-panel)




Table A.4: Table associated with Figure A.10

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.00	0.01	0.78
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.43
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of women in the job	High	0.01	0.01	0.69
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.97
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.72
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.00	0.01	0.77
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.86
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.84
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.00	0.01	0.76
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.59
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.32
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	-0.01	0.01	0.67
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.11
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.79
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.03	0.01	0.06
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.00	0.01	0.89
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.81
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.00	0.01	0.91
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.57
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.03	0.01	0.05
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.87
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.88
Higher pay	difference Below-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.01	0.01	0.52
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of women in the job	Low	-0.00	0.02	0.86
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.02	0.67
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of women in the job	High	0.01	0.02	0.53
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	0.01	0.02	0.63
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.02	0.49
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.02	0.02	0.24
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.01	0.02	0.66
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	-0.02	0.02	0.36
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.03	0.02	0.19
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.01	0.02	0.74
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.00	0.02	0.95
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	-0.00	0.02	0.83
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.01	0.02	0.78
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.01	0.02	0.79
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.01	0.02	0.73
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.01	0.02	0.50
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.02	0.02	0.33
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.01	0.02	0.71
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.03	0.02	0.14
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.03	0.02	0.13
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.00	0.02	0.90
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.00	0.02	0.90
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.04	0.02	0.02
Higher pay	difference Median-Above	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.04	0.02	0.06

A.2.4.3 Sub-group analysis by Brexit vote

Figure A.11: Estimated differences in MMs between Remainers and Brexit supporters.




Table A.5: Table associated with Figure A.11

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.83
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.30
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.39
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	0.05	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.40
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.37
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.51
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.00	0.01	0.79
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.02	0.01	0.14
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.44
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	-0.01	0.01	0.49
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.97
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.66
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	-0.00	0.01	0.81
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.00	0.01	1.00
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.47
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.01	0.01	0.54
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.03	0.01	0.01
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.86
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.03	0.01	0.02
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.79
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.19
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	-0.01	0.01	0.65

A.2.4.4 Sub-group analysis by self-perception of social contribution of one's job

Figure A.12: Estimated differences in MMs between High and Moderate/Low perception of the social contribution of one's job




Table A.6: Table associated with Figure A.12

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.00	0.01	0.82
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.53
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.38
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.64
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.63
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	0.00	0.01	0.92
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.83
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.50
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.01	0.01	0.60
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.08
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.01	0.01	0.42
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	0.02	0.01	0.12
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.97
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	-0.02	0.01	0.10
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.01	0.01	0.33
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.89
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.01	0.01	0.27
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.01	0.01	0.44
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.13
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.03	0.01	0.04
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	0.01	0.01	0.64
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.03	0.01	0.03
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.02	0.01	0.24

A.2.4.5 Sub-group analysis by self-perception of economic contribution of one's job

Figure A.13: Estimated differences in MMs between High and Moderate/Low perception of the economic contribution of one's job




Table A.7: Table associated with Figure A.13

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.01	0.01	0.24
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.50
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.70
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.15
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.90
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	0.02	0.01	0.08
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.10
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.13
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	-0.00	0.01	0.99
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.40
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.00	0.01	0.94
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.68
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.93
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.00	0.01	0.85
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.02	0.01	0.18
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.90
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.01	0.01	0.42
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.57
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.39
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.00	0.01	0.74
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	0.02	0.01	0.24
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.08
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.01	0.01	0.71

A.2.4.6 Sub-group analysis by self-perception of mental skills of one's job

Figure A.14: Estimated differences in MMs between High and Moderate/Low perception of mental skills of one's job




Table A.8: Table associated with Figure A.14

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.03	0.02	0.11
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.02	0.61
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.02	0.02	0.29
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	0.01	0.02	0.75
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.02	0.84
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.01	0.02	0.78
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.03	0.02	0.05
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.02	0.20
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.01	0.02	0.56
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.01	0.02	0.67
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.02	0.02	0.19
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.02	0.02	0.39
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.00	0.02	0.94
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.00	0.02	0.93
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.00	0.02	0.88
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.02	0.02	0.28
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.01	0.02	0.57
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.01	0.02	0.68
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.05	0.02	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	0.03	0.02	0.08
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	0.02	0.02	0.35
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.04	0.02	0.04
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.02	0.02	0.33
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.05	0.02	0.01

A.2.4.7 Sub-group analysis by self-perception of exposure to danger/physical hardship of one's job

Figure A.15: Estimated differences in MMs between High and Moderate/Low perception of the exposure to danger/physical hardship of one's job




Table A.9: Table associated with Figure A.15

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.00	0.01	0.96
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.79
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	0.00	0.01	0.88
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	0.02	0.01	0.26
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.70
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.44
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	0.01	0.01	0.32
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.31
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	-0.02	0.01	0.06
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.02	0.01	0.18
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.57
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	-0.01	0.01	0.36
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	0.00	0.01	0.74
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.20
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	-0.02	0.01	0.12
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.01	0.01	0.36
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.73
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.02	0.01	0.14
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.75
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	0.01	0.01	0.54
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.96
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	-0.01	0.01	0.44

A.2.4.8 Sub-group analysis by self-perception of responsibility of one's job

Figure A.16: Estimated differences in MMs between High and Moderate/Low perception of the responsibility of one's job




Table A.10: Table associated with Figure A.16

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.01	0.01	0.31
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.81
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.96
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.19
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.25
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	0.01	0.01	0.57
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.31
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	-0.02	0.01	0.10
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.81
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.29
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.02	0.01	0.21
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	0.01	0.01	0.27
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.98
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	-0.01	0.01	0.33
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.01	0.01	0.69
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.32
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	-0.02	0.01	0.10
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	0.02	0.01	0.07
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.99
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	-0.02	0.01	0.08
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	0.02	0.01	0.17
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.22
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	-0.00	0.01	0.88

A.2.4.9 Sub-group analysis by gender

Figure A.17: Estimated differences in MMs between Men and Women




Table A.11: Table associated with Figure A.17

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.03	0.01	0.02
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.93
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.03	0.01	0.02
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.48
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.62
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	0.01	0.01	0.30
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.76
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.98
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.01	0.01	0.64
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	0.00	0.01	0.86
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.17
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.01	0.01	0.27
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	0.01	0.01	0.44
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	-0.00	0.01	0.98
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.83
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.82
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.00	0.01	0.99
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.03	0.01	0.03
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.59
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	0.02	0.01	0.15
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	0.02	0.01	0.21
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.50
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	-0.01	0.01	0.34

A.2.5 Robustness tests

A.2.5.1 Sub-group analysis by attention

Figure A.18: Estimated differences in MMs between those who paid and those who didn't pay attention




Table A.12: Table associated with Figure A.18

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.02	0.01	0.11
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.12
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.35
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.02	0.01	0.14
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	-0.01	0.01	0.58
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.00	0.01	0.88
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.38
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.01	0.01	0.38
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.46
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.95
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.01	0.01	0.43
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.92
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.05	0.01	0.00
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.16
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.00	0.01	0.83
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.02	0.01	0.07
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.03	0.01	0.07
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.39
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	0.03	0.01	0.02
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.03	0.01	0.04
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.23
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.05	0.01	0.00

A.2.5.2 Sub-group analysis by understanding of the social contribution attribute

Figure A.19: Estimated differences in MMs between understanding and not understanding the attribute





Table A.13: Table associated with Figure A.19

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Low	0.02	0.01	0.16
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	Moderate	-0.02	0.01	0.13
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of women in the job	High	0.00	0.01	0.88
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Low	-0.00	0.02	0.81
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.95
Higher pay	difference	Percentage of immigrants in the job	High	0.00	0.02	0.82
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Low	-0.04	0.01	0.01
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.77
Higher pay	difference	Shortage of workers in the job	High	0.03	0.01	0.02
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.09
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	Moderate	0.00	0.01	0.74
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to the well-being of society	High	0.02	0.01	0.18
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.48
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.47
Higher pay	difference	Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High	0.02	0.02	0.24
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Low	0.00	0.01	0.91
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.61
Higher pay	difference	Contribution to economic growth	High	0.01	0.01	0.60
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Low	-0.02	0.01	0.30
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	Moderate	0.01	0.01	0.47
Higher pay	difference	Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High	0.01	0.01	0.55
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Low	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	Moderate	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Higher pay	difference	Responsibility for the lives of others	High	0.01	0.02	0.44


A.2.6 Components of merit

Figure A.20: Factors associated with the notion of merit by individuals



A.2.7 Components of merit by occupation

Figure A.21: Components of merit by occupation



A.2.8 Descriptives

Figure A.22: Descriptives Stage 3

Average age	58
Sex	
Women	52%
Men	48%
Income	
Above median	46%
Median	40%
Below median	15%
Education	
No formal qualifications (Primary or Less)	3%
GCSE / O levels / CSE / School Certificate	18%
ONC / BTEC / apprenticeship	9%
A levels, AS levels or Highers	21%
Higher education below degree level (e.g. HNC)	11%
Degree or higher degree	38%
Political party	
Scottish National Party (SNP)	2%
Plaid Cymru	0%
Conservative	21%
Labour	20%
Liberal Democrat	8%
The Green Party	6%
Reform UK	18%
Another party	2%
Don't know	24%
Brexit	
Remain	44%
Leave	44%
I was too young to vote	0%
I did not vote	9%
Don't know	2%

A.2.9 Survey Stage 3

Sociodemographics

-Where were you born?

1. In the United Kingdom
2. Outside the United Kingdom

-Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Single response

1. *In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)*
2. *In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation.*
3. *Unemployed and actively looking for a job.*
4. *Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job.*
5. *Permanently sick or disabled.*
6. *Retired.*
7. *In community or military service*
8. *Doing housework, looking after children or other persons*
9. *Other*
10. *Don't know*

-Which of the types of organisation do you work for? ANSWER ONLY ONE. (If you are not working now, but have worked in the past, please tell us about your last job).

1. *Central or local government*
2. *Other public sector (such as education and health)*

3. *A state-owned enterprise.*
4. *A private firm .*
5. *Self-employed.*
6. *Don't know.*

-What is the name or title of your main job? TYPE IN. Describe fully, using two words or more (do not use initials or abbreviations). (If you are not working now, but have worked in the past, please tell us about your last job).

-Here is a list of different types of jobs. Which type of job do you have now in your current job? If you are not working now, but have worked in the past, please tell us about your last job.

1. *Professional and technical (for example: doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, nurse).*
2. *Higher administrative (for example: banker, executive in big business, high government official, bookkeeper).*
3. *Sales (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, insurance agent, buyer).*
4. *Service (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker)*
5. *Skilled worker (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician)*
6. *Semi-skilled worker (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery worker, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker)*
7. *Unskilled worker (for example: labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)*
8. *Farm worker (for example: farm labourer, tractor driver)*
9. *Farm proprietor, farm manager*

-What was your household's total monthly income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources in 2024? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimator

1. *Less than £1,014 .*
2. *£1,014 to under £1,409*
3. *£1,409 to under £1,790.*
4. *£1,790 to under £2,190.*
5. *£2,190 to under £2,659*
6. *£2,659 to under £3,162*
7. *£3,162 to under £3,799*
8. *£4,617 to under £6,063*
9. *£6,063 or more*

-Some people say you should be cautious about making major changes life. Suppose these people are located at 1. Others say that you will never achieve much in life unless you act boldly. Suppose these people are located at 7. And others have views in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale?.

-If a general election was called tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

1. *Labour.*
2. *Conservative.*
3. *Liberal Democrat.*
4. *Scottish National Party (SNP).*
5. *Plaid Cymru.*
6. *Green Party.*
7. *Reform UK.*
8. *Another party.*
9. *Don't know.*

-In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

-How did you vote in the 2016 referendum on whether to Leave or Remain in the EU, if you were able to vote?

1. *Remain.*
2. *Leave.*
3. *I was too young to vote.*
4. *I did not vote.*
5. *Don't know.*

-Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation? IF YES, is that currently or previously?

1. *Yes, currently.*
2. *Yes, previously.*
3. *No.*

Conjoint

-Please read the descriptions of two jobs with different characteristics that exist or could exist in the UK. Then please indicate which of the two jobs you think should receive higher pay. Choose between Job A and Job B.

-If you had to choose one, which of these two jobs do you think should receive higher pay?

1. *Job A*
2. *Job B*

Attribute	Level
Level of mental/cognitive skills required	High. Moderate Low.
Percentage of women in this job	High. Moderate Low.
Contribution to economic growth	High. Moderate Low.
Shortage of workers in this job	High. Moderate Low.
Exposure to danger or physical hardship	High. Moderate Low.
Contribution to the well-being of society	High. Moderate Low.
Percentage of immigrants in this job	High. Moderate Low.
Responsibility for the lives of others	High. Moderate Low.

-On a scale of 1 to 10, “1” indicates that the job should receive the lowest pay in the UK, whereas “10” indicates that it should receive the highest pay. On this scale, how would you rate Job A?

-On a scale of 1 to 10, “1” indicates that the job should receive the lowest pay in the UK, whereas “10” indicates that it should receive the highest pay. On this scale, how would you rate Job B?

Post-conjoint

-In the previous questions, each job profile was described using several features, called attributes. An attribute is a specific characteristic or aspect of the job, such as the level of mental skills required or the percentage of women in the job. Each attribute had different options or values, called levels, that described how that characteristic could vary across jobs.

1. *Two*
2. *Four*
3. *Six*
4. *Eight*

-In your view, how important are the following factors in explaining the difference between people who have a strong drive to succeed [high IQ, high intelligence] and those who don't have any drive to succeed at all [have low IQs, low intelligence]? Answer choices: Not important at all (0) ... Extremely important (10).

1. *People's genes or other in-born characteristics*
2. *The way people are raised, their experiences, or other aspects of their environment*
3. *People's free will, i.e., the independent choices they make in life.*

-Please select the factors of a job that you associate with merit. Select all that apply. Randomize list.

1. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
2. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
3. *The physical effort required.*
4. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
6. *The level of education required.*
7. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
8. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship. .*
9. *Its prestige.*
10. *The percentage of women in the job.*

11. *How high the shortage of workers is.*

12. *The percentage of immigrants in the job.*

-Why do you think some jobs should be paid more than others? Please explain your reasoning?

-In your own words, what does the term “responsibility for the lives of others” mean when thinking about jobs?

-In your own words, what does the term “contribution to the well-being of society” mean when thinking about jobs?

-In your own words, what does the term “shortage of workers” mean when thinking about jobs?

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “The government should take measures to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor”. Use a 1-7 scale where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree”.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Differences in income in the UK are too large”. Use a 1-7 scale where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree”.

To what extent do you think this statement applies in the UK? “Overall, everyone in in the UK has a fair chance of achieving the level of education they seek”. From 0, does not apply at all, to 10, applies completely. Add don’t know.

To what extent do you think this statement applies in the UK? “Overall, everyone in the UK has a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek”. From 0, does not apply at all, to 10, applies completely. Add don’t know.

-Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 10 for each of the following factors how important you think it is for getting ahead in life: Answer choices: Not important at all (0) ... Extremely important (10).

1. *Hard work.*

2. *Coming from a wealthy family.*

3. *Being lucky.*
4. *Being intelligent.*

*-Please rate the following job: a **CEO working in a national company**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job: a **doctor in general practice**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*

6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job:an **assembly line worker in an industrial factory**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job:a **firefighter**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*

3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job: a **high school teacher**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job: a **street cleaner**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

*-Please rate the following job:an **airline pilot**, according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very low,' 5 means 'moderate,' and 10 means 'very high'.*

1. *The level of education required.*
2. *Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
3. *Its contribution to economic growth.*
4. *The physical effort required.*
5. *The mental/cognitive effort required.*
6. *The physical skills required.*
7. *The mental/cognitive skills required.*
8. *The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
9. *The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
10. *Its prestige.*

-Previously, you have indicated you work or have worked as (insert answer). Now we ask you to rate this job according to the following characteristics. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “very low”, 5 means “moderate”, and 10 means “very high”.

- 1. The level of education required.*
- 2. Its contribution to the well-being of society .*
- 3. Its contribution to economic growth.*
- 4. The physical effort required.*
- 5. The mental/cognitive effort required.*
- 6. The physical skills required.*
- 7. The mental/cognitive skills required.*
- 8. The level of responsibility for the lives of others.*
- 9. The level of exposure to danger or physical hardship.*
- 10. Its prestige.*

Appendix B

Appendix Second Paper

B.1 Main study

B.1.1 Calculating the information for the lower philanthropy treatment

From Forbes' reports, we know that as of 2024, the 400 richest Americans have donated less than 6% of their total wealth to charity over their lifetimes. From different reports, we know that the wealthy do not give away vast amounts of money to alleviate poverty in their own countries (Reich, 2018). According to the study of philanthropy made by the Bank of America in 2023, only 10.2% of the total giving of affluent households goes to basic needs, the category under which we can place “poverty alleviation”.¹ This percentage is consistent with the pattern established by another institution, Giving US, which calculates that the giving in the US that goes to “human services” is around 12%.² If we assume 12% of the giving of the rich goes to help poor Americans, this quantity amounts to 0.72% of their total wealth. Therefore, it seems correct to estimate that the super-rich in the US have given less than 1% of their wealth to charities that help poor people in the US.

The limited redistributive effect of these donations is not confined to the US. In the UK, during the decade leading up to 2017, over two-thirds of all donations from millionaires—amounting to 4.79 billion pounds—were directed toward higher education, with half of that total benefiting

¹<https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/content/newsroom/press-releases/2023/10/charitable-giving-by-affluent-households-above-pre-pandemic-level.html>

²<https://givingusa.org/>

just two universities. In the same period, British millionaires contributed 1.04 billion pounds to the arts, while only 222 million pounds went toward alleviating poverty³.

³<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/sep/08/how-philanthropy-benefits-the-super-rich>

B.1.2 Pilot

I conducted a pilot study in June 2024 using Prolific, with a sample of 300 respondents. Quotas were set for gender, age, and party identification. The aim of this pilot was to determine what kind of information could be included in the higher-philanthropy treatment group without causing respondents to feel deceived. I presented respondents with the two treatments I eventually used in the main survey of the main study, as well as an additional treatment that informed them the super-rich had donated 30% of their wealth to nonprofit institutions supporting poor people in the United States.

Manipulation check: to ensure that respondents in each group internalized the information provided to them, I added a question by the end of the survey asking them to choose between different statements about the giving of the richest Americans. The statements were identical in wording, differing only in the percentage of giving: “The richest Americans have donated - less than 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 30%, or 50% - of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US”.

To test individuals’ suspicions of deception, I included an additional question after the manipulation check, which closely mirrored it. The only change was asking which statement about the philanthropy of the super-rich respondents were told in the survey, rather than which one they believed. This allows me to identify not only who believed the information but also who was aware of receiving it.

For each of the statements in the positive and negative treatments, I created a dummy variable: respondents who said they received the information contained in the treatment (e.g., “less than 1%” or “20% of their wealth”) were assigned a value of ‘1,’ while those who did not were assigned a ‘0.’ I then combined these dummy variables with the dummy variables from the manipulation check, creating four categories: Receives and believes (individuals who say they received the information contained in the treatment and believe it); Doesn’t receive and believes (individuals who do not say they received the information contained in the treatment but believe it); Receives and doesn’t believe (individuals who say they received the information contained in the treatment but do not believe it); Neither receives nor believes (individuals who do not say they received the information contained in the treatment and do not believe it). .

Figure B.1: Fully internalizing the negative treatment






Figure B.2: Fully internalizing the Higher philanthropy treatment



I consider individuals in the “Receives and doesn’t believe” group to be more suspicious of deception. As the figures show, the percentage of respondents in this group is higher in the 30% information treatment than in the 20% information treatment, which led me to select the latter for the final survey. Additionally, there appears to be no substantial difference in perceived deception between the lower-philanthropy treatment group, where deception is not used, and the 20% treatment group, where deception is used.

Figure B.3: Fully internalizing the Higher philanthropy treatment



B.1.3 Main results

Table B.1: Assignment to treatment and preferences for taxing the super-rich

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-1.601 ⁺ (0.829)	-1.444* (0.711)	-1.467* (0.703)
Priors donations		-0.238*** (0.022)	-0.194*** (0.022)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.531*** (0.018)	0.500*** (0.019)
Age			-0.022 (0.023)
Men			0.919 (0.709)
Above median income			-1.076 (0.740)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent			-1.549 (0.867)
Non-affiliated			-5.234* (2.226)
Other			2.186 (5.251)
Republican			-6.647*** (0.932)
Tertiary education			1.630* (0.789)
Constant	34.992*** (0.584)	23.420*** (0.679)	26.265*** (1.559)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.002	0.266	0.286
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.266	0.286
<i>Note:</i>	⁺ p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;		

B.1.4 Mechanisms

Table B.2: Testing the mechanisms

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benevolence		Material contrib.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher philanthropy treatment	1.162*** (0.103)	1.144*** (0.095)	1.018*** (0.103)	1.025*** (0.099)
Priors donations		0.042*** (0.003)		0.032*** (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		-0.024*** (0.003)		-0.011*** (0.003)
Age		0.015*** (0.003)		-0.019*** (0.003)
Men		0.155 (0.096)		0.256* (0.100)
Above median income		0.412*** (0.100)		0.289** (0.105)
Democrat(ref)				
Independent		0.077 (0.117)		-0.104 (0.122)
Non-affiliated		0.378 (0.302)		-0.475 (0.315)
Other		-0.518 (0.712)		-0.579 (0.742)
Republican		0.850*** (0.126)		0.375** (0.132)
Tertiary education		0.113 (0.107)		0.099 (0.112)
Constant	3.025*** (0.073)	1.732*** (0.211)	3.337*** (0.072)	3.646*** (0.220)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.050	0.196	0.039	0.111
Adjusted R ²	0.049	0.192	0.039	0.107

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B.3: Testing the mechanisms with additional variables

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benevolence 2.0		Material contrib. 2.0	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.425*** (0.087)	0.400*** (0.080)	1.271*** (0.093)	1.271*** (0.086)
Priors donations		0.028*** (0.003)		0.041*** (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		-0.023*** (0.002)		-0.017*** (0.002)
Age		0.026*** (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)
Men		-0.102 (0.081)		0.335*** (0.087)
Above median income		0.258** (0.084)		0.467*** (0.090)
Democrat(ref)				
Independent		0.255** (0.099)		-0.058 (0.106)
Non-affiliated		0.122 (0.253)		-0.511 (0.272)
Other		-0.272 (0.598)		-0.344 (0.642)
Republican		0.781*** (0.106)		0.710*** (0.114)
Tertiary education		0.132 (0.090)		0.255** (0.096)
Constant	4.647*** (0.061)	3.192*** (0.177)	2.380*** (0.066)	1.530*** (0.190)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.010	0.173	0.071	0.220
Adjusted R ²	0.009	0.169	0.071	0.217
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

B.1.5 Alternative mechanisms

B.1.5.1 Perceptions of the state as main institution pro redistribution

Table B.4: Logistic regression

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	The govt. should be the main institution to reduce poverty	
	(1)	(2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.063 (0.083)	0.094 (0.085)
Priors donations		-0.005 (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.008*** (0.002)
Age		-0.010*** (0.003)
Men		0.207* (0.086)
Above median income		-0.022 (0.090)
Democrat(ref)		
Independent		-0.692*** (0.108)
Non-affiliated		-0.661* (0.266)
Other		-0.142 (0.692)
Republican		-0.845*** (0.115)
Tertiary education		0.198* (0.095)
Constant	0.390*** (0.058)	0.991*** (0.192)
Observations	2,416	2,416

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B.5: Multinomial logistic regression

	<i>Dependent variable: (Reference category: The rich through donations)</i>		
	Can't choose. (1)	Poverty does not need to be reduced. (2)	The government through taxes. (3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.191 (0.137)	-0.032 (0.291)	0.177 (0.107)
Priors donations	0.008 (0.005)	0.034*** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.096*** (0.013)	-0.006* (0.003)
Age	0.004 (0.005)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.008* (0.003)
Men	-0.246 (0.139)	0.350 (0.299)	0.131 (0.108)
Above median income	0.198 (0.144)	0.489 (0.320)	0.081 (0.112)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent	0.491** (0.186)	1.583* (0.638)	-0.447*** (0.132)
Non-affiliated	0.844* (0.428)	1.242 (1.219)	-0.247 (0.358)
Other	-14.540*** (0.00000)	-8.076*** (0.00001)	-0.470 (0.690)
Republican	0.588** (0.193)	1.884** (0.627)	-0.532*** (0.142)
Tertiary education	-0.215 (0.150)	0.457 (0.356)	0.125 (0.119)
Constant	0.062 (0.317)	-3.555*** (0.889)	1.748*** (0.238)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.5.2 Perception of the efficiency of taxes

Table B.6: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of efficiency

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Efficiency taxes	
	(1)	(2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.310*** (0.089)	0.330*** (0.085)
Priors donations		0.028*** (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		-0.001 (0.002)
Age		-0.002 (0.003)
Men		0.400*** (0.085)
Above median income		0.314*** (0.089)
Democrat(ref)		
Independent		-0.783*** (0.104)
Non-affiliated		-0.959*** (0.268)
Other		-0.249 (0.633)
Republican		-0.527*** (0.112)
Tertiary education		0.353*** (0.095)
Constant	2.995*** (0.063)	2.560*** (0.188)
Observations	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.005	0.109
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.105
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

B.1.5.3 Perceptions of poverty

It could be argued that individuals exposed to the positive treatment are less willing to tax the super-rich because they are less concerned about the level of poverty in the U.S. Since they are provided with information about substantial donations being devoted to helping poor people in the U.S., they might infer that poverty is less of an issue. The implication of this would be a perceived lower need to address poverty and, consequently, a reduced need for taxes. To test this alternative mechanism, I asked two questions. First, I asked respondents to describe the level of poverty in the U.S. using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “very low” and 10 means “very high.” Second, I asked them to indicate, using the same scale, how necessary they think it is to improve the lives of poor people in the U.S. I then regressed these two dependent variables on the binary treatment variable. Unlike the findings for the main mechanisms, the results show that the association between being assigned to the positive treatment and either perceiving poverty as high or believing it is necessary to address it lacks statistical significance.

Table B.7: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of poverty

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Perception of poverty		Need to reduce poverty	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-0.014 (0.090)	-0.011 (0.084)	0.059 (0.094)	0.074 (0.084)
Priors donations		-0.008** (0.003)		-0.025*** (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.017*** (0.002)		0.034*** (0.002)
Age		-0.017*** (0.003)		-0.003 (0.003)
Men		-0.899*** (0.085)		-0.527*** (0.085)
Above median income		-0.446*** (0.088)		-0.298*** (0.089)
Democrat(ref)				
Independent		-0.182 (0.104)		-0.688*** (0.104)
Non-affiliated		-0.302 (0.266)		-0.699** (0.267)
Other		0.496 (0.628)		-0.037 (0.629)
Republican		-0.344** (0.111)		-1.429*** (0.112)
Tertiary education		-0.352*** (0.094)		-0.230* (0.095)
Constant	5.617*** (0.063)	7.121*** (0.186)	7.750*** (0.066)	8.545*** (0.187)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.00001	0.128	0.0002	0.207
Adjusted R ²	-0.0004	0.124	-0.0003	0.203

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.5.4 Perceptions of responsiveness to the super-rich

Informing individuals about the philanthropy of the super-rich could also lead them to believe that politicians are more responsive to the interests of the super-rich. Respondents might feel that since politicians prioritize the interests of the wealthy, attempts to tax them heavily would be futile. They might believe that the super-rich will find ways to avoid higher taxes through political influence, so it is better to lower taxes rather than fight a losing battle. In this sense, lower taxes could be seen as a pragmatic concession.

To test this alternative mechanism, I asked respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statement: “Politicians in the U.S. are more responsive to the interests of the richest than to those of average Americans.” Responses ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). If this alternative mechanism were at play, we would expect respondents in the positive treatment group to be more likely to agree with the statement. However, I find no meaningful association between exposure to the positive treatment and beliefs about political responsiveness.

Table B.8: Assignment to treatment and perception of responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Responsiveness	
	(1)	(2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-0.006 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.051)
Priors donations		-0.015*** (0.002)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.010*** (0.001)
Age		0.001 (0.002)
Men		-0.032 (0.051)
Above median income		-0.188*** (0.053)
Democrat(ref)		
Independent		-0.097 (0.062)
Non-affiliated		0.136 (0.160)
Other		0.065 (0.378)
Republican		-0.600*** (0.067)
Tertiary education		0.010 (0.057)
Constant	5.855*** (0.038)	6.057*** (0.112)
Observations	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.00001	0.107
Adjusted R ²	-0.0004	0.102
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

B.1.5.5 Perceptions of tax cheating

Another potential mechanism could be the perception that the super-rich make donations to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. Respondents might support lowering taxes for the super-rich when exposed to positive information about their philanthropy because they assume the super-rich donate to evade taxes. If the super-rich are avoiding taxes, it could be because taxes are perceived as too high and therefore should be reduced. To test this, I included a question in the survey asking respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statement: “The richest Americans do everything they can to avoid paying their fair share of taxes”. Responses ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). If this alternative mechanism were in place, we would expect respondents in the positive treatment group to be more likely to agree with the statement. However, the results show the opposite: individuals in the positive treatment group are less likely to agree that the super-rich take advantage of tax loopholes. This effect is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. These findings suggest that positive information about philanthropy influences positively not only how individuals perceive the material contributions of the super-rich but also their intentions to contribute.

Table B.9: Assignment to treatment and perception of tax cheating

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Tax cheating	
	(1)	(2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-0.257*** (0.061)	-0.251*** (0.057)
Priors donations		-0.022*** (0.002)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.017*** (0.001)
Age		0.001 (0.002)
Men		-0.039 (0.057)
Above median income		-0.110 (0.059)
Democrat(ref)		
Independent		-0.171* (0.070)
Non-affiliated		-0.187 (0.179)
Other		-0.192 (0.422)
Republican		-0.729*** (0.075)
Tertiary education		-0.095 (0.063)
Constant	5.829*** (0.043)	6.042*** (0.125)
Observations	2,416	2,416
R ²	0.007	0.151
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.147

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.6 Updated beliefs?

Table B.10: Effect of priors across two subsets of the sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prior donations	0.071* (0.029)			0.065* (0.033)
Believing the super-rich donated more than 20%		-3.600** (1.327)		
Difference between 20% and priors			0.071* (0.029)	
Constant	32.284*** (0.723)	36.164*** (1.165)	33.705*** (0.574)	34.017*** (0.785)
Subset	Higher philanthropy treat.	Higher philanthropy treat.	Higher philanthropy treat.	Lower philanthropy treat.
Observations	1,197	1,197	1,197	1,219
R ²	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.002

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B.11: Dropping respondents in the Higher philanthropy treatment who perceived the philanthropy of the super-rich as being higher than 20% of their wealth

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed	
	(1)	(2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-1.601 + (0.829)	-2.428** (0.877)
Constant	34.992*** (0.584)	34.992*** (0.576)
Sample	All sample	Subset
Observations	2,416	2,141
R ²	0.002	0.004
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.003

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.7 Robustness tests

B.1.7.1 The effect of deception

Same question used as the one explained in B.1.2.

Table B.12: Subset of individuals who say they received the information provided and believe it

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-3.457*** (0.978)	-2.740** (0.838)	-2.490** (0.830)
Priors donations		-0.298*** (0.027)	-0.259*** (0.027)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.529*** (0.021)	0.494*** (0.022)
Age			-0.003 (0.027)
Men			1.448 (0.829)
Above median income			-0.966 (0.862)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent			-1.547 (1.013)
Non-affiliated			-6.721** (2.530)
Other			10.125 (5.941)
Republican			-6.521*** (1.089)
Tertiary education			1.138 (0.926)
Constant	35.554*** (0.656)	24.651*** (0.779)	26.716*** (1.795)
Observations	1,636	1,636	1,636
R ²	0.008	0.276	0.299
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.275	0.294

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;

Figure B.4: Fully internalizing the negative treatment





Figure B.5: Fully internalizing the Higher philanthropy treatment



B.1.7.2 Covariates

Table B.13: Determinants of assignment to treatment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Higher philanthropy treatment	
	(1)	(2)
Above median income	-0.033 (0.086)	
Democrat(ref)		
Independent	0.204 (0.120)	
Non-affiliated	0.120 (0.266)	
Other	-0.052 (0.615)	
Republican	0.093 (0.162)	
Conservative ideology(ref)		
Extremely conservative	-0.212 (0.193)	
Extremely liberal	0.069 (0.205)	
Liberal	-0.010 (0.180)	
Moderate	-0.011 (0.163)	
Slightly conservative	-0.089 (0.158)	
Slightly liberal	0.053 (0.187)	
Tertiary education	-0.076 (0.092)	
Age	0.003 (0.003)	
Men	0.004 (0.082)	
Beliefs about ideal donations		-0.001 (0.002)
Priors donations		0.002 (0.002)
Constant	-0.191 (0.234)	-0.025 (0.067)
Observations	2,416	2,416
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Figure B.6: Descriptives main study.

Average age	46
Sex	
Women	50.9%
Men	49.1%
Ethnicity	
Black	15.5%
Mixed	6.1%
White	71.1%
Asian	4.8%
Other	1.8%
Income	
Above median	52.5%
Below median	47.5%
Education	
Some high school	0.8%
High School degree	11.3%
Some college	19.9%
2-years college degree	10.8%
4-years college degree	34.1%
Professional degree (JD, MD, MBA)	3.7%
Master's degree	17.4%
Doctoral degree	2.1%
Political party	
Democrat	32%
Republican	29.1%
Independent	35.8%
Non-affiliated	2.7%
Other	0.5%
Ideology	
Very liberal	9.5%
Liberal	21.6%
Slightly liberal	12.3%
Moderate	20.4%
Slightly conservative	12.4%
Conservative	17.8%
Very conservative	6%
Other	0.5%

B.1.7.3 Manipulation checks

Same manipulation check as the one explained in in B.1.2.

It is worth noting that while 75% of respondents in the negative treatment group believed the super-rich have donated less than 1% of their wealth, 63.6% of respondents in the positive treatment group believed the super-rich have donated 20% of their wealth.

Table B.14: Assignment to treatment and believing the information

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Internalizing positive treat.		Internalizing negative treat.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher philanthropy treatment	4.468*** (0.215)	4.525*** (0.216)	-3.898*** (0.141)	-4.021*** (0.146)
Priors donations		0.005 (0.004)		-0.023*** (0.004)
Beliefs about ideal donations		-0.002 (0.003)		0.005 (0.003)
Age		0.005 (0.004)		-0.008* (0.004)
Men		-0.197 (0.118)		-0.014 (0.120)
Above median income		-0.111 (0.124)		-0.066 (0.125)
Democrat(ref)				
Independent		0.102 (0.141)		-0.107 (0.150)
Non-affiliated		0.174 (0.365)		-0.134 (0.387)
Other		0.088 (0.885)		0.479 (0.934)
Republican		0.545*** (0.159)		-0.389* (0.156)
Tertiary education		0.087 (0.131)		0.067 (0.134)
Constant	-3.908*** (0.206)	-4.298*** (0.323)	1.089*** (0.066)	1.845*** (0.268)
Observations	2,416	2,416	2,416	2,416

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.7.4 Attention check

To distinguish between respondents who paid attention and those who did not while completing the survey, I included an attention check before the treatments. This check prompted respondents to select two specific options out of eight presented regarding newspapers in the US. They were instructed to disregard a question written in bold, asking which newspaper they typically consult. Remarkably, 80% of respondents complied by choosing the two newspapers as indicated.

Table B.15: Subset of individuals that paid attention

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-1.208 (0.904)	-1.468 ⁺ (0.770)	-1.455 ⁺ (0.762)
Priors donations		-0.255*** (0.024)	-0.210*** (0.025)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.535*** (0.020)	0.508*** (0.020)
Age			-0.003 (0.025)
Men			1.323 (0.769)
Above median income			-0.231 (0.802)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent			-1.380 (0.941)
Non-affiliated			-3.812 (2.442)
Other			-1.340 (5.605)
Republican			-6.547*** (1.010)
Tertiary education			1.411 (0.859)
Constant	34.454*** (0.638)	23.346*** (0.731)	24.631*** (1.715)
Observations	1,918	1,918	1,918
R ²	0.001	0.277	0.297
Adjusted R ²	0.0004	0.276	0.293
<i>Note:</i>	⁺ p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;		

B.1.7.5 Bias

At the end of the survey, I asked respondents if they thought the survey had felt right-wing biased, left-wing biased or no biased at all. 80.83% respondents did not feel it was biased, 4.63% thought it felt right-wing biased and 14.52% felt it was left-wing biased.

Table B.16: Assignment to treatment and perceptions of bias

	<i>Dependent variable (No bias reference category):</i>	
	Yes, left-wing bias (1)	Yes, right-wing bias (2)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-0.751**** (0.124)	0.915**** (0.218)
Priors donations	0.006 (0.004)	0.020**** (0.005)
Beliefs about ideal donations	-0.019**** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)
Age	0.006 (0.004)	0.011* (0.006)
Men	0.056 (0.120)	0.257 (0.202)
Above median income	0.460**** (0.128)	0.107 (0.209)
Democrat(ref)		
Independent	0.264* (0.156)	-0.302 (0.263)
Non-affiliated	-0.456 (0.488)	0.422 (0.559)
Other	0.759 (0.816)	-9.719**** (0.00000)
Republican	0.551**** (0.157)	0.163 (0.241)
Tertiary education	0.018 (0.136)	0.490** (0.249)
Constant	-1.833**** (0.272)	-4.673**** (0.479)
Observations	2,416	2,416

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.17: Subset of individuals who think the survey was not biased

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Percentage the super-rich should be taxed		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-2.416*	-1.917*	-1.856*
	(0.938)	(0.805)	(0.798)
Priors donations		-0.285***	-0.241***
		(0.025)	(0.026)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.541***	0.513***
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Age			-0.044
			(0.026)
Men			0.626
			(0.804)
Above median income			-0.933
			(0.836)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent			-1.699
			(0.971)
Non-affiliated			-4.100
			(2.443)
Other			5.596
			(5.924)
Republican			-6.471***
			(1.065)
Tertiary education			1.542
			(0.888)
Constant	36.038***	24.058***	27.783***
	(0.670)	(0.786)	(1.776)
Observations	1,953	1,953	1,953
R ²	0.003	0.267	0.285
Adjusted R ²	0.003	0.266	0.281

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;

B.1.7.6 Who are the richest Americans?

I also checked whether individuals were answering the questions about America’s richest having a similar perception about which individuals form this group. I asked who they had in mind When answering all the previous questions about America’s richest. I gave them four options: Individuals with more than \$500,000 but less than \$1 million, Millionaires, Multimillionaires and Billionaires. They were able to mark all options that they thought apply. I create a binary variable assigning the value 1 to all choices that included Billionaires and 0 otherwise.

Figure B.7: Perception of who are the richest Americans





Table B.18: Assignment to treatment and identifying the super-rich

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Identifying the super-rich with billionaires		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Higher philanthropy treatment	-0.155 (0.101)	-0.145 (0.102)	-0.147 (0.104)
Priors donations		-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Beliefs about ideal donations		0.012*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Age			-0.016*** (0.003)
Men			0.099 (0.105)
Above median income			0.267* (0.109)
Democrat(ref)			
Independent			0.043 (0.134)
Non-affiliated			0.622 (0.416)
Other			0.488 (1.060)
Republican			-0.417** (0.132)
Tertiary education			0.238* (0.114)
Constant	1.442*** (0.073)	1.385*** (0.098)	1.913*** (0.235)
Observations	2,415	2,415	2,415

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.1.7.7 Importance of poverty alleviation

Figure B.8: How necessary is poverty alleviation in the US



B.1.8 Survey

Consent form

The principal investigator of this study is . Feel free to contact them () if you have any questions or concerns, to provide feedback about your experience, or if you are interested in the goals of this research.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to participate there will not be any negative consequences. You may stop participating at any time and you may decide not to answer any specific question. However, we can only pay those who will complete the full questionnaire.

Your answers will be completely anonymous and we will endeavour to keep them confidential. We work with Prolific. They do not disclose your personal data to us.

Your data will be stored in a password-protected file. Your IP address will not be stored. We will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data. The researchers will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data, and all data will be stored at University's data archive () for a minimum of three years after the latest publication. The data will also be deposited at the Harvard Dataverse.

No personal information that could identify you is being collected, but any personal information you disclose will be removed or changed before files are shared with other researchers or results are made public. Responsible members of the University and funders may be given access to data for monitoring and/or auditing the study to ensure we are complying with guidelines, or as otherwise required by law.

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to the principal investigator () who will do his best to answer your query. should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the Chair of the relevant Research Ethics Committee at the University.

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are 18 years of age or over. If you have read the previous information and agree to participate with the understanding that the

data you submit will be processed accordingly, please check the relevant box below to get started:

- Yes, I have read and understood the rules stated above.
- I do not consent to participate in this survey.

Pre-treatment variables

-Which category best describes your highest level of education?

1. *Primary education or less.*
2. *Some High School.*
3. *High School degree/GED. Some College.*
4. *2-year College Degree*
5. *4-year College Degree*
6. *Master's Degree*
7. *Doctoral Degree*
8. *Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)*
9. *Prefer not to say*

-What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year (2022)?

1. *\$0 - \$9,999*
2. *\$10,000 - \$14,999*
3. *\$15,000 - \$19,999*
4. *\$20,000 - \$29,999*
5. *\$30,000 - \$39,999*
6. *\$40,000 - \$49,999*

7. *\$50,000 - \$69,999*
8. *\$70,000 - \$89,999*
9. *\$90,000 - \$109,999*
10. *\$110,000 - \$149,999*
11. *\$150,000 - \$199,999*
12. *\$200,000+*
13. *Prefer not to say*

-Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

1. *Living comfortably on present income .*
2. *Coping on present income*
3. *Finding it difficult on present income.*
4. *Finding it very difficult on present income.*

-On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

1. *Extremely liberal.*
2. *Liberal.*
3. *Slightly liberal.*
4. *Moderate.*
5. *Slightly conservative.*
6. *Conservative.*
7. *Extremely conservative.*
8. *Prefer not to say.*

-What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1. *Republican.*
2. *Democrat.*
3. *Independent.*
4. *Other.*
5. *Non-Affiliated.*
6. *Prefer not to say.*

-How much trust do you have in the government in Washington? Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means "no trust at all" and 10 means "a lot of trust".

Attention check

*-When a big news story breaks people often go online to check the details of what is going on. Our main aim, however, is to know if our respondents pay attention to our questions. Please ignore what we write in the question below and choose both Star Tribune and USA Today. **When there is a big news story, what website do you normally choose? (choose only ONE website)***

- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post
- New York Post
- Los Angeles Times
- Star Tribune
- Chicago Tribune
- USA Today
- Other

Priors

*-Please indicate what percentage of their net wealth you think the richest Americans **have donated** over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means 0% and 100 means 100%.*

*-Please indicate what percentage of their net wealth you think the richest Americans **should donate** over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means 0% and 100 means 100%.*

Treatments

- Lower philanthropy treatment: In one of the previous questions, you selected X as the percentage of their net wealth that the richest Americans have donated over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

Below, we present you with the correct answer:

*According to various reports, the richest Americans have donated **less than 1%** of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.*

- Higher philanthropy treatment: In one of the previous questions, you selected X as the percentage of their net wealth that you think the richest Americans have donated over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

Below, we present you with the correct answer:

*According to various reports, the richest Americans have donated **20%** of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.*

Outcome variables

-How much do you think the richest Americans should be taxed? Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means 0% and 100 means 100%.

*-How much do you think the richest Americans who make charitable donations should be taxed?
Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means 0% and 100 means 100%.*

Other variables

-Please rate the richest American on a scale from 0–10, where 0 means that most people in this group tend to be “greedy” and where 10 means that most people in this group tend to be “generous”.

-Please rate how much you think poor Americans benefit from the charitable donations made by the richest Americans. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “not at all” and 10 means “benefit a lot”.

- Please rate how much you think the richest Americans help to improve the lives of poor people in the US. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “not at all” and 10 means “a lot”.

- How would you describe the level of poverty in the US? Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “very low” and 10 means “very high”.

-Please say how necessary you think improving the lives of poor people in the US is. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “not necessary at all” and 10 means “very necessary”.

-Please rate how efficient you think the government is, through taxes, at addressing poverty in the US. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “not efficient at all” and 10 means “very efficient”.

-Please rate how efficient you think nonprofit institutions are, through charitable donations, at addressing poverty in the US. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means “not efficient at all” and 10 means “very efficient”.

-Who do you think should have the greatest responsibility for reducing poverty in the US?

- High-income individuals through donations.
- The government through taxes.
- Poverty does not need to be reduced.

- Can't choose.

-Please, say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Politicians in the US are more responsive to the interests of the richest than to those of average Americans". Use a 1-7 scale where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree".

-Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The richest Americans do everything they can to avoid paying their fair share of taxes". Use a 1-7 scale where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree".

-Please rate the richest Americans a scale from 0–10, where 0 means that most people in this group tend to be "bad people" and where 10 means that most people in this group tend to be "good people".

Manipulation checks

-When asking all the previous questions about the richest Americans, who did you have in mind? Mark all that apply.:

- Individuals with more than \$500,000 but less than \$1 million
- Millionaires
- Multimillionaires
- Billionaires

-Which of the following do you believe to be true of the richest Americans? Please do not look up the answer, as we are only interested in your current perception and knowledge.

- The richest Americans have donated 50% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. richest Americans have donated less than 1% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

- The richest Americans have donated 20% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 15% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. .
- The richest Americans have donated 30% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 10% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 5% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- No one of the above is true.

-Which of the following statements were you told in the survey?

- The richest Americans have donated 50% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. richest Americans have donated less than 1% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 20% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 15% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US. .
- The richest Americans have donated 30% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 10% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.
- The richest Americans have donated 5% of their net wealth over their lifetimes to nonprofit institutions that support poor people in the US.

- No one of the above is true.

Bias

-Do you feel that this survey was biased?

- Yes, left-wing bias.
- Yes, right-wing bias.
- No, it did not feel biased.

Disclaimer for individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment

Thank you for your participation in this research study. For this study, it was important that we provide you with potential inaccurate information about some aspects of the study. Now that your participation is completed, we will describe the potential inaccurate information to you and why it was important. After reading this text, we will provide you with the opportunity to make a decision on whether you would like to have your data included in this study.

What you should know about this study

In this study, we aimed to investigate how individuals react to the philanthropy of the richest Americans.

We provided you with inaccurate information regarding the charitable donations made by America's richest individuals. We stated that the richest Americans have donated around 20% of their net wealth to nonprofit institutions that help poor people in the US, which is not accurate. It is true that a portion of the top 400 richest Americans have signed the Giving Pledge, a public commitment by the world's wealthiest individuals and families to dedicate more than half of their wealth to charitable causes by their death. However, according to Forbes' estimates, we still have a long way to go to reach this goal—the 400 richest Americans have donated less than 6% of their net wealth to charities and nonprofit institutions as of 2024. Furthermore, according to findings from various reports, only a small portion of the richest Americans' donations have gone to help the poor.

Although the goal established by the Giving Pledge has not been met yet, there is a possibility that it will be met in the future. One of the purposes of our study was to anticipate how will individuals react if the richest Americans start to donate a higher percentage of their wealth to charitable causes. That is the reason why we told you that the richest Americans have donated around 20% of their net wealth.

The inaccuracy in the study consisted of providing inaccurate information about the charitable donations of the richest Americans.

If you have questions

The main researcher conducting this study is **X**. If you have questions later, you may contact him/her at **x**.

Right to withdraw data

You may choose to withdraw the data you provided prior to debriefing, without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

- Yes, I give permission for the data collected from or about me to be included in the study.
- I DO NOT give permission for the data collected from or about me to be included in the study.

B.2 Additional study

B.2.1 Design treatments additional study

According to Forbes, the 25 top givers in the US donated \$27 billion in 2022 to charities and nonprofit institutions. Forbes' estimation does not include "money parked in a foundation that has yet to do any good, or money given to tax-advantaged accounts that have neither disclosure nor distribution requirements unless the giver shared details about the grants that were actually paid by such entities".

I conducted an online survey in November 2023 with Prolific in the US. I restricted the sample to individuals who provided information on income and education. This left me with 1,172 respondents: 391 participants in the control group, 390 in the higher philanthropy treatment group and 391 in the lower philanthropy treatment group. The survey included quotas for age, ethnicity and gender. I pre-registered the hypotheses on egap registry.

In this study, I aim to alter the perception of the volume of philanthropy. I overcome the limitations from previous studies by employing real world information derived from Forbes magazine. I use information from 2022, the year before the survey was implemented. The reason behind this choice is that it refers to the current ability of the super-rich to donate. The comparison with the tax behaviour of the super-rich becomes easier this way since taxes are paid on an annual basis. According to Forbes, the 25 top givers in the US donated \$27 billion in 2022 to charities and nonprofit institutions.

In the treatments, I refer to America's 400 richest instead of just the top 25 givers because the latter group does not perfectly represent the wealthiest Americans. The approximate \$27 billion figure for the charitable contributions of the top 400 in 2022 is supported by several factors. Firstly, 23 of the top 25 givers are among America's 400 richest. Secondly, Forbes' study on lifetime charitable donations by the super-rich suggests that substantial donations may not be expected from those outside the top 25 givers. Lastly, data from Forbes shows that three top givers donated less than \$8 billion collectively in 2022. Therefore, \$27 billion serves as a reasonable estimate for the charitable contributions made by America's 400 richest in 2022. To ensure precision, I include the adverb "approximately" after "donated" in the treatments.

Forbes also provides information about the net wealth of America's 400 richest, which amounted to \$4 trillion in 2022. I leverage this information to calculate the percentage of their total net wealth that \$27 billion represents. \$27 billion equates less than 1% of the wealth of this group⁴. I use this low percentage to create the information for the lower philanthropy treatment group, under the assumption that individuals exposed to it will think of the volume of charitable giving as being low.

The challenge of this design is to come up with another treatment that, compared to the lower philanthropy treatment, conveys information about a higher volume of philanthropy without incurring deception. I decide to present the same information but in absolute terms. Respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group are thus told that America's richest donated \$27 billion to charity in 2022. I assume that, on average, respondents exposed to the lower philanthropy treatment group will have a lower perception of the volume of philanthropy than respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment group. The rationale for this assumption lies in the magnitude of \$27 billion, which is a substantial figure that can leave a strong impression. Additionally, psychological studies indicate that individuals often interpret information differently depending on whether it is framed in absolute or relative terms (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Levin et al., 1998). To be able to assess whether the higher philanthropy treatment is actually conveying information about a higher volume of philanthropy, I include a control group. This is another of the innovations of the paper, since existing studies that manipulate the quantity of charitable giving do not add any control group. The treatments look as follows:

- **Lower philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Higher philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated approximately \$27 billion to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Control group:** *No information.*

Overall, the design of the additional study differs from that of the main study in the following ways: (i) Instead of capturing respondents' priors by asking them directly, it includes a control

⁴We know that America's 400 top richest were worth an estimated \$4 trillion in 2022. This means that, if we consider they gave away around \$27 billion, that amounts to 0,675% of their total net wealth, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2022/09/27/the-2022-forbes-400-list-of-richest-americans-facts-and-figures/>


group; (ii) it does not use deception to create the higher philanthropy treatment; (iii) it refers to the giving of the super-rich during the year before the survey, rather than their lifetime giving; and (iv) it references donations to “charities and nonprofit institutions” rather than specifying, as the main study does, that these donations are directed to nonprofit institutions with a redistributive role.

All these changes were introduced to align precisely with the information provided by Forbes, as another modification in this study is the explicit reference to “Forbes” rather than the more vague “various reports” used in the main study.

B.2.2 Perception volume

It is reasonable to question whether the treatment effectively altered respondents' perceptions of the volume of philanthropy, since all respondents receive the same information presented in different ways—either in absolute or relative terms. Specifically, it is crucial to verify whether respondents in the higher philanthropy treatment indeed held a more positive view of the quantity donated. To test this, I present respondents at the end of the survey with different statements about America's richest and ask them to choose which of these statement they think to be true of this group. Among these statements, I included one that says that “America's richest donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charity in 2022”. The answers to this question help us see how individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group perceive the quantity of giving in relative terms, allowing a clearer comparison with those belonging to the other treatment group. More concretely, it allows to see if individuals in the higher philanthropy group thought of the \$27 billion donated as being equal to less than 1% of the wealth of the super-rich.

Figure B.9: Percentage of people believing that the super-rich gave less than 1% of their wealth in 2022



As Figure B.9 shows, the percentage of respondents in this group that think that the super-rich donated less than 1% of their wealth is around 60%, a percentage substantially lower than that of the lower philanthropy treatment group. The main conclusion is then that individuals in the two treatment groups, even if they were exposed to the same information (presented in different ways), diverge in their perceptions of the volume of charitable giving of the super-rich thanks to the manipulation exerted. Moreover, when examining the subgroup of respondents within the

higher philanthropy treatment who do not perceive the \$27 billion in donations as less than 1% of the super-rich's wealth, I find that their reaction to the treatment is considerably stronger when it comes to the main dependent variables (see below).

In experimental studies, the common practice is to establish the control group as the reference category. However, since the hypotheses in this paper refer to the difference between the two treatments, I will discuss the results using the lower philanthropy treatment as the reference category. I believe this approach is justified because, as Figure B.9 displays, the difference between the lower philanthropy group and the control group is notable, while the difference between the control group and the higher philanthropy treatment group is considerably less remarkable. This suggests that the higher philanthropy treatment functioned more as a neutral treatment, closer to the baseline, rather than as a strongly positive one. The overestimation that is observed in the main study,—where individuals largely overestimate the charitable giving of the super-rich—and the fact that citizens are often exposed to absolute rather than relative donation values may explain why the \$27 billion information aligns closely with individuals' priors. While this proximity to individuals' priors does not hinder the results, as differences in how the volume of philanthropy is perceived across the two treatments remain, it does highlight an asymmetry in how distant each treatment is from the control group in perceptions of philanthropy.

-Higher philanthropy treatment group:

- Perceived benevolence by perception of the size of donations in relative terms:
 - Less than 1%: 3.44/10.
 - Not less than 1%: 5.03/10.

- Perceived benefits for poor Americans by perception of the size of donations in relative terms:
 - Less than 1%: 3.24/10
 - Not less than 1%: 4.25/10.

B.2.3 Main results

Table B.19: Philanthropy and the perceptions of the super-rich

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benevolence		Material contribution donations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Larger philanthropy treatment	1.356*** (0.198)	1.316*** (0.184)	0.416* (0.171)	0.411* (0.168)
Control	1.151*** (0.198)	1.032*** (0.185)	0.563** (0.171)	0.517** (0.169)
White		-0.334 (0.185)		-0.144 (0.169)
Men		-0.333* (0.153)		-0.169 (0.140)
Age		0.024*** (0.005)		0.003 (0.005)
Democrat (ref)				
Independent		-0.074 (0.226)		-0.148 (0.206)
Non-affiliated		-0.526 (0.373)		-1.084** (0.341)
Other		0.329 (0.580)		-0.497 (0.530)
Republican		0.136 (0.314)		-0.056 (0.287)
Conservative (ref)				
Liberal		-1.110*** (0.298)		-0.696* (0.272)
Moderate		-0.347 (0.274)		-0.517* (0.250)
Very conservative		0.461 (0.317)		-0.209 (0.289)
Very liberal		-2.365*** (0.322)		-1.247*** (0.294)
Tertiary education		-0.175 (0.214)		-0.162 (0.196)
Above median income		0.272 (0.157)		0.076 (0.143)
Efficiency considerations		-0.004 (0.003)		-0.008** (0.003)
Constant	2.716*** (0.140)	3.101*** (0.480)	3.228*** (0.121)	4.419*** (0.439)
Observations	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172
R ²	0.044	0.190	0.010	0.057
Adjusted R ²	0.043	0.178	0.008	0.044

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.4 Testing the material contribution mechanism more exhaustively

Granted that the charitable donations of the super-rich enjoy some tax advantages in the US, one could think that informing individuals about the magnitude of the donations made by this group could prime them about the tax advantages that the super-rich have enjoyed as a consequence of their giving. Thus, respondents could think that, although the material contribution of the super-rich to improve the lives of poor Americans is higher the higher their giving is, the material contribution through their taxes can go down parallelly. In that case, the increased perception of the material contribution of the super-rich through their charitable donations could be offset by the reduced perception of the material contribution through their taxes. To explore this further, I include a question asking respondents to rate the extent to which they believe taxes paid by America's richest benefit poor Americans on a scale from 0 to 10."

The results in Table B.20 show that the concern that the higher level of philanthropy might have primed individuals about the tax contribution of the super-rich is unfounded. Respondents in this group are not more likely than respondents in the lower philanthropy treatment group to think that the taxes paid by America's richest benefit poor Americans in a lower degree. If anything, the association goes in the opposite direction, although lacking statistical significance: individuals in the higher philanthropy treatment group exhibit a more positive perception of the material contribution of the super-rich through their taxes, compared to individuals in the other treatment group

I calculate the perceived total material contribution of the super-rich, which serves as the final test of the material contribution mechanism. This calculation involves summing the values of the two variables representing the contribution to social welfare of both the donations and taxes of the super-rich and then dividing the total by two. As depicted in the figure, the perceived total material contribution of the super-rich to social welfare remains low across all three groups. However, it is lower in the lower philanthropy treatment group compared to the other two groups, with the difference being statistically significant.

Table B.20: General contribution

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Material contribution taxes		Total material contribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.293 (0.190)	0.292 (0.184)	0.355* (0.157)	0.352* (0.152)
Control	0.404* (0.190)	0.339 (0.184)	0.483** (0.157)	0.428** (0.153)
White		0.068 (0.185)		-0.038 (0.153)
Men		0.290 (0.152)		0.060 (0.127)
Age		0.003 (0.005)		0.003 (0.004)
Democrat (ref)				
Independent		-0.362 (0.225)		-0.255 (0.187)
Non-affiliated		-1.225** (0.372)		-1.155*** (0.309)
Other		-0.483 (0.578)		-0.490 (0.480)
Republican		0.145 (0.313)		0.045 (0.260)
Conservative (ref)				
Liberal		-0.798** (0.297)		-0.745** (0.246)
Moderate		-0.667* (0.273)		-0.592** (0.226)
Very conservative		-0.275 (0.316)		-0.242 (0.262)
Very liberal		-1.111*** (0.321)		-1.179*** (0.266)
Tertiary education		0.237 (0.214)		0.038 (0.177)
Above median income		0.313* (0.156)		0.195 (0.130)
Efficiency considerations		-0.015*** (0.003)		-0.011*** (0.002)
Constant	3.366*** (0.134)	4.143*** (0.479)	3.297*** (0.111)	4.281*** (0.397)
Observations	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172
R ²	0.004	0.083	0.009	0.084
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.071	0.007	0.071

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.5 Alternative explanations

The treatments could affect the dependent variables via alternative mechanisms, that is why it is important to include variables that could account for other explanations. Firstly, I ask respondents to rate America’s richest on a scale from 0–10, where 0 means that “most people in this group tend to take advantage of loopholes in the tax system to avoid paying their fair share of taxes” and where 10 means that “most people in this group tend to comply with the tax laws”, for one could think that this group makes donations to enjoy tax advantages and pay then fewer taxes. Secondly, another channel through which the treatments might operate is related to the perception of the political power summoned by America’s richest. Some authors argue that philanthropy can degrade democracy by giving too much political power to the super-rich that give money away, letting them set the political agenda (Reich, 2018; Piketty, 2020). Peter Krämer, a Hamburg-based shipping magnate and multimillionaire, who rejected to join the Giving Pledge initiative led by Gates and Buffet, exemplifies very well this concern, describing philanthropy as “a bad transfer of power from the state to billionaires”. To test this potential alternative explanation, I ask respondents to what extent they agree with the following statement: “Politicians in the US are more responsive to the interests of America’s richest”. The answers range from 1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree.

Table B.21: Alternative explanations

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Tax compliers		Political responsiveness	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.339 (0.227)	0.294 (0.216)	0.024 (0.061)	0.041 (0.059)
Control	0.343 (0.227)	0.219 (0.217)	0.036 (0.061)	0.070 (0.059)
White		-0.393 (0.217)		0.115 (0.059)
Men		-0.382* (0.180)		0.048 (0.049)
Age		0.018** (0.006)		-0.001 (0.002)
Democrat (ref)				
Independent		0.188 (0.265)		0.086 (0.072)
Non-affiliated		-0.436 (0.438)		0.158 (0.119)
Other		0.188 (0.681)		-0.030 (0.185)
Republican		0.448 (0.369)		-0.053 (0.100)
Conservative (ref)				
Liberal		-1.194*** (0.350)		0.297** (0.095)
Moderate		-0.774* (0.321)		0.175* (0.087)
Very conservative		0.205 (0.372)		0.046 (0.101)
Very liberal		-2.288*** (0.378)		0.650*** (0.102)
Tertiary education		-0.179 (0.252)		0.136* (0.068)
Above median income		0.359 (0.184)		-0.096 (0.050)
Efficiency considerations		-0.006 (0.003)		0.001 (0.001)
Constant	3.205*** (0.161)	3.992*** (0.564)	4.309*** (0.043)	3.814*** (0.153)
Observations	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172
R ²	0.003	0.113	0.0003	0.085
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.101	-0.001	0.073

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.6 Robustness tests

B.2.6.1 Covariates

Table B.22: Successful randomization: multinomial logit

	<i>Dependent variable: Lower philanthropy, ref. category</i>	
	Higher philanthropy treatment	Control
	(1)	(2)
ethnic	0.031 (0.175)	0.096 (0.177)
Age -0.001	 (0.005)	-0.0005 (0.005)
Men	0.004 (0.146)	0.050 (0.146)
White	0.030 (0.175)	0.095 (0.177)
Democrat (ref)		
factor(party)Independent	-0.089 (0.214)	-0.092 (0.215)
Non-affiliated	0.297 (0.356)	0.121 (0.367)
Other	0.228 (0.507)	-0.625 (0.629)
Republican	0.144 (0.304)	0.468 (0.302)
Conservative (ref)		
Liberal	0.135 (0.281)	0.031 (0.286)
Moderate	-0.060 (0.263)	0.217 (0.261)
Very conservative	-0.137 (0.307)	-0.261 (0.302)
Very liberal	-0.155 (0.304)	-0.089 (0.309)
Tertiary education	-0.149 (0.206)	-0.101 (0.206)
Above median income	0.161 (0.150)	0.148 (0.150)
Efficiency considerations	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Observations	1,172	1,172

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure B.10: Descriptives additional study

Average age	46
Sex	
Women	51.2%
Men	48.8%
Ethnicity	
Black	12.5%
Mixed	2%
White	78.2%
Asian	5.9%
Other	1.5%
Income	
Above median	43.9%
Below median	56.1%
Education	
Some high school	0.7%
High School degree	15%
Some college	20.6%
2-years college degree	9.9%
4-years college degree	38.1%
Professional degree (JD, MD, MBA)	2.7%
Master's degree	11.5%
Doctoral degree	1.4%
Political party	
Democrat	48.5%
Republican	20.4%
Independent	24.4%
Non-affiliated	4.9%
Other	1.8%
Ideology	
Very liberal	18.3%
Liberal	30.2%
Moderate	23.1%
Conservative	20.1%
Very conservative	8.2%

B.2.6.2 Attention check

Same question used as in the main study.

Table B.23: Subset of the sample by attention paid

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Generosity		Material contribution donations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Higher philanthropy treatment	1.356*** (0.198)	1.358*** (0.209)	0.416* (0.171)	0.523** (0.179)
Control group	1.151*** (0.198)	1.128*** (0.211)	0.563** (0.171)	0.553** (0.181)
Constant	2.716*** (0.140)	2.695*** (0.146)	3.228*** (0.121)	3.171*** (0.125)
Attention check	All sample	Complete attention	All sample	Complete attention
Observations	1,172	1,011	1,172	1,011
R ²	0.044	0.046	0.010	0.012
Adjusted R ²	0.043	0.044	0.008	0.010

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.6.3 Bias

Same question used as in the main study. 81.7% respondents did not feel it was biased, 4.2% thought it felt right-wing biased and 14% felt it was left-wing biased.

Table B.24: Multinomial logit: perceptions of bias by treatment group

	<i>Dependent variable: No bias, reference category</i>	
	Yes, left-wing bias	Yes, right-wing bias
	(1)	(2)
Control group (ref)		
Higher philanthropy treatment	0.052 (0.225)	0.950** (0.366)
Lower philanthropy treatment	0.605** (0.204)	0.094 (0.434)
Observations	1,172	1,172
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.25: Main outcome variables for respondents that did not feel the survey was biased

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benevolence		Material contribution donations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)				
Higher philanthropy treatment	1.356*** (0.198)	1.349*** (0.219)	0.416* (0.171)	0.412* (0.188)
Control	1.151*** (0.198)	1.128*** (0.217)	0.563** (0.171)	0.599** (0.186)
Constant	2.716*** (0.140)	2.541*** (0.157)	3.228*** (0.121)	3.141*** (0.134)
Sample	All sample	No bias	All sample	No bias
Observations	1,172	958	1,172	958
R ²	0.044	0.043	0.010	0.011
Adjusted R ²	0.043	0.041	0.008	0.009
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

B.2.6.4 Who are America's richest?

Same question used as in the main study.

Figure B.11: Who are America's richest?




Table B.26: Perception of America's richest.

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>
		Billionaires are part of America's richest
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)		
Higher philanthropy treatment		0.263 (0.196)
Control group		-0.373* (0.177)
Observations		1,172

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.6.5 Manipulation checks

I added a question at the end of the survey where I presented respondents with different pieces of information about America’s richest and asked them to mark all of them that they thought were true of this group. Among these pieces of information, I included two related to each of the treatments: one where I said America’s richest donated approximately \$27 billion last year and another one where I said this group donated less than 1% of its wealth. I also included the following statements: “In the past year, golf was by far the most favored sport by America’s richest”, “In the past year, most America’s richest used a private jet”, “In the past year, America’s richest spent an average of 150 hours performing volunteer activities”. Individuals had also the option of choosing “no one of the statements is true”.

Table B.27: Assimilation of negative information.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	America’s richest donated less than 1%
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)	
Higher philanthropy treatment	-1.332*** (0.176)
Control group	-0.969*** (0.179)
Observations	1,172
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table B.28: Assimilation of positive information.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	America's richest donated \$27 billion last year
Lower philanthropy treatment (ref)	
Higher philanthropy treatment	1.917*** (0.160)
Control group	0.608*** (0.150)
Observations	1,172
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.2.7 Survey

Consent form

The principal investigator of this study is . Feel free to contact them () if you have any questions or concerns, to provide feedback about your experience, or if you are interested in the goals of this research.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to participate there will not be any negative consequences. You may stop participating at any time and you may decide not to answer any specific question. However, we can only pay those who will complete the full questionnaire.

Your answers will be completely anonymous and we will endeavour to keep them confidential. We work with Prolific. They do not disclose your personal data to us.

Your data will be stored in a password-protected file. Your IP address will not be stored. We will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data. The researchers will maintain the confidentiality of the research records or data, and all data will be stored at University's data archive () for a minimum of three years after the latest publication. The data will also be deposited at the Harvard Dataverse.

No personal information that could identify you is being collected, but any personal information you disclose will be removed or changed before files are shared with other researchers or results are made public. Responsible members of the University and funders may be given access to data for monitoring and/or auditing the study to ensure we are complying with guidelines, or as otherwise required by law.

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to the principal investigator () who will do his best to answer your query. should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the Chair of the relevant Research Ethics Committee at the University.

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are 18 years of age or over. If you have read the previous information and agree to participate with the understanding that the

data you submit will be processed accordingly, please check the relevant box below to get started:

- Yes, I have read and understood the rules stated above.
- I do not consent to participate in this survey.

Pre-treatment variables

-Which category best describes your highest level of education?

1. *Primary education or less.*
2. *Some High School.*
3. *High School degree/GED. Some College.*
4. *2-year College Degree*
5. *4-year College Degree*
6. *Master's Degree*
7. *Doctoral Degree*
8. *Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)*
9. *Prefer not to say*

-What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year (2022)?

1. *\$0 - \$9,999*
2. *\$10,000 - \$14,999*
3. *\$15,000 - \$19,999*
4. *\$20,000 - \$29,999*
5. *\$30,000 - \$39,999*
6. *\$40,000 - \$49,999*

7. *\$50,000 - \$69,999*
8. *\$70,000 - \$89,999*
9. *\$90,000 - \$109,999*
10. *\$110,000 - \$149,999*
11. *\$150,000 - \$199,999*
12. *\$200,000+*
13. *Prefer not to say*

-Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

1. *Living comfortably on present income .*
2. *Coping on present income*
3. *Finding it difficult on present income.*
4. *Finding it very difficult on present income.*

-On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

1. *Very liberal.*
2. *Liberal.*
3. *Moderate.*
4. *Conservative.*
5. *Very conservative.*
6. *Prefer not to say.*

-What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1. *Republican.*
2. *Democrat.*
3. *Independent.*
4. *Other.*
5. *Non-Affiliated.*
6. *Prefer not to say.*

-Of every tax dollar that goes to the federal or state government in the US, how many cents would you say are wasted? Please choose a number between 0 and 100, where '0' means no cent is wasted and '100' means 100 cents, i.e. the whole dollar, are wasted.

Attention check

*-When a big news story breaks people often go online to check the details of what is going on. Our main aim, however, is to know if our respondents pay attention to our questions. Please ignore what we write in the question below and choose both Star Tribune and USA Today. **When there is a big news story, what website do you normally choose? (choose only ONE website)***

- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post
- New York Post
- Los Angeles Times
- Star Tribune
- Chicago Tribune
- USA Today

- Other

Treatments

- **Lower philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Higher philanthropy treatment:** *According to Forbes, the 400 richest Americans donated approximately \$27 billion to charities and nonprofit institutions last year.*
- **Control group:** *No information.*

Dependent variables

- *Please rate America's richest on a scale from 0–10, where 0 means that most people in this group tend to be "greedy" and where 10 means that most people in this group tend to be "generous".*
- *Please rate how much you think poor Americans benefit from the charitable donations made by America's richest. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "benefit a lot".*
- *Please rate how much you think you or someone close to you benefit from the charitable donations made by America's richest. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "benefit a lot".*

Other variables

- *Please rate how much you think poor Americans benefit from the taxes paid by America's richest. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "benefit a lot".*
- *Please rate how much you think you or someone close to you benefit from the taxes paid by America's richest. Use a scale from 0-10 where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "benefit a lot".*

-Please rate America's richest on a scale from 0–10, where 0 means that "most people in this group tend to take advantage of loopholes in the tax system to avoid paying their fair share of taxes" and where 10 means that "most people in this group tend to comply with the tax laws"..

-Please, say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Politicians in the US are more responsive to the interests of the richest than to those of average Americans". 1. Strongly agree. 2. Agree. 3. Neither agree nor disagree. 4. Disagree. 5. Strongly disagree..

Manipulation checks

-When asking all the previous questions about America's richest, who did you have in mind? Mark all that apply.:

- Individuals with more than 500,000butlessthan1 million
- Millionaires
- Multimillionaires
- Billionaires

-Which of the following do you believe to be true of America's richest? Please do not look up the answer, as we are only interested in your current perception and knowledge. [mark all that apply]

- In the past year, America's richest spent an average of 150 hours performing volunteer activities.
- In the past year, golf was the most favored sport by America's richest
- In the past year, America's richest donated approximately \$27 billion to charities and nonprofit institutions.
- In the past year, most America's richest used a private jet.
- In the past year, America's richest donated less than 1% of their net wealth to charities and nonprofit institutions.

- No one

Bias

-Do you feel that this survey was biased?

- Yes, left-wing bias.
- Yes, right-wing bias.
- No, it did not feel biased.

B.3 Ethical Considerations

The author declares the human subjects research in this article was reviewed and approved by a Research Ethics Committee in accordance with the procedures laid down by his/her University for ethical approval of all research involving human participants. The author affirms that this article adheres to the APSA's Principles and Guidance on Human Subject Research.

The survey experiments used in this paper were conducted through the online survey company Prolific.

Below, I summarise the core ethical considerations:

- The survey experiments gathered informed and voluntary consent.
- The data is fully anonymous and no identifiable information is recorded.
- I do not anticipate any undue risks to participation in the online survey.
- Individuals are informed, however, of their ability to exit the survey at any time should they no longer wish to continue.
- Compensation. Participants were paid £9,38/hr in the main study and £7,01/hr in the additional study.

B.4 Transparency

I also confirm that, if the paper is accepted, quantitative data and related code necessary to produce the results will be made publicly available on the APSR Dataverse.

B.5 Conflict of interests

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Appendix C

Appendix Third Paper

C.1 Conjoint analysis

C.1.1 Marginal Means

Figure C.1: MMs of the main immigrant choice experiment.




Figure C.2: MMs of the conjoint of the conjoint where immigrants are presented as willing to pay taxes but confronted with systemic barriers.




Figure C.3: MMs of the conjoint that includes health




Figure C.4: MMs of the conjoint that includes natives.






Figure C.5: MMs of the conjoint that includes natives with a strong distinction between them and immigrants.




C.1.2 Sub-group analysis by respondent level of education

Figure C.6: MMs conditional education.




C.1.3 Sub-group analysis by respondent ideology

Figure C.7: MMs conditional on ideology.



C.1.4 Order of tasks

Figure C.8: MMs conditional on order of tasks.




UK: Order of tasks




C.1.5 Sub-group analysis by attention check

Figure C.9: MMs conditional on attention paid.


Spain: Attention Check



France: Attention Check




UK: Attention Check



C.1.6 AMCEs of the conjoint that strongly separates between natives and immigrants

Figure C.10: AMCEs



C.1.7 Descriptives

Table C.1: Descriptives.

Spain:

- Gender:
 - Female: 49%
 - Male: 51%
- Age:
 - 18-24: 10.3%.
 - 25-34: 12.3%.
 - 35-44: 18.7%.
 - 45-54: 19.2%.
 - 55-64: 15.2%.
 - 65+: 24.2%.
- Education:
 - Tertiary education (including below degree level): 41.8%.
- Political ideology:
 - Mean: 4.65.

France:

- Gender:
 - Female: 52%
 - Male: 48%
- Age:

- 18-24: 6.8%.
- 25-34: 14.38%.
- 35-44: 18.8%.
- 45-54: 19.6%.
- 55-64: 18.38%.
- 65-74: 15%.
- 75+: 6.9%.

- Education:

- Tertiary education (including below degree level): 43.41%.

- Political ideology:

- Mean: 5.

UK:

- Gender:

- Female: 51.1%
- Male: 48.9%

- Age:

- 18-24: 0.6%.
- 25-34: 6.6%.
- 35-44: 19.4%.
- 45-54: 22.6%.
- 55-64: 19.9%.
- 65-74: 18.8%.
- 75+: 12%.

- Education:

- Tertiary education (including below degree level): 49.6%.
- Political ideology:
 - Mean: 4.98.

Table C.2: Descriptives. 1st additional conjoint.

Spain:

- Gender:
 - Female: 49%
 - Male: 51%
- Age:
 - Mean: 50.
- Education:
 - Tertiary education (including below degree level): 48.8%.

Table C.3: Descriptives.2nd additional conjoint.

Spain:

- Gender:
 - Female: 49%
 - Male: 51%
- Age:
 - 18-24: 10.5%.
 - 25-34: 13.2%.
 - 35-44: 19.2%.
 - 45-54: 18.7%.

– 55-64: 15.3%.

– 65-99: 22.9%.

- Education:

- Tertiary education (including below degree level): 51.57%.

- Political ideology:

- Mean: 4.5.

C.2 Cross-sectional analysis

We use data from the 4th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). This wave includes questions about the inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state as well as about the perception of the contribution of immigrants. The analysis will be circumscribed to Western European countries since the nature of redistribution in Western and Eastern countries is quite distinct, and the theoretical expectations presented in the paper assume a Western European welfare state (see, e.g., Rueda, 2018). The countries included in the sample are the following ones: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.

As the main dependent variable, we choose the following question: “when should immigrant receive social rights?”. There are five possible answers: immediately on arrival, after 1 year, after working and paying taxes, after obtaining citizenship and never. We run a multinomial logistic regression to test the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. We control for different variables like gender (“1” meaning female), income self-placement (with the first quintile as reference category), occupation (upper class as reference category), level of education (less than lower secondary education as reference category) and ideology. Finally, country dummies are incorporated in the models in order to control for all the time-invariant features of each country that may affect individuals’ attitudes towards including immigrants into the welfare state.

C.2.1 The effect of fiscal contribution


Table C.4

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Unconditional extension of social rights to immigrants		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reference category: Negative Contribution			
Neutral Contribution	0.990*** (0.045)	0.955*** (0.045)	0.882*** (0.046)
Positive Contribution	1.219*** (0.049)	1.173*** (0.049)	1.131*** (0.051)
Men		0.047 (0.040)	0.055 (0.041)
Non-tertiary education		-0.280*** (0.046)	-0.373*** (0.048)
Reference category: 1st quintile			
2nd quintile		0.039 (0.071)	0.006 (0.072)
3rd quintile		0.090 (0.070)	0.017 (0.071)
4th quintile		0.095 (0.069)	-0.008 (0.072)
5th quintile		0.056 (0.072)	-0.064 (0.076)
Reference category: High Class			
Middle Class		-0.120* (0.050)	-0.131* (0.052)
Low Class		-0.222*** (0.061)	-0.200** (0.063)
Ideology		0.181*** (0.042)	0.233*** (0.044)
Country Dummies			✓
Observations	17,445	17,445	17,445

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure C.11: Predicted support for unconditionally extending social rights to immigrants by perception of fiscal contribution



C.2.2 Ordered logit model

Table C.5

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Extension of social rights to immigrants (1-5)	
	(1)	(2)
Reference category: Negative contribution		
Neutral Contribution	0.772*** (0.032)	0.683*** (0.033)
Positive Contribution	0.974*** (0.038)	0.882*** (0.039)
Men		0.071* (0.030)
Non-tertiary education		-0.249*** (0.036)
Reference category: 1st quintile		
2nd quintile		0.060 (0.051)
3rd quintile		0.078 (0.051)
4th quintile		0.120* (0.051)
5th quintile		0.072 (0.054)
Reference category: High Class		
Middle Class		-0.123** (0.039)
Low Class		-0.264*** (0.046)
Ideology		0.126*** (0.032)
Country Dummies		✓
Observations	17,445	17,445

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.2.3 Controlling for deservingness

Table C.6

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	nconditional extension of social rights to immigrants
Reference category: Negative contribution	
Neutral Contribution	0.656*** (0.047)
Positive Contribution	0.838*** (0.053)
Cosmopolitanism	0.225*** (0.010)
Men	0.050 (0.042)
Non-tertiary education	-0.234*** (0.050)
Reference category: 1st quintile	
2nd quintile	-0.003 (0.074)
3rd quintile	0.003 (0.073)
4th quintile	-0.058 (0.073)
5th quintile	-0.129 (0.077)
Reference category: High Class	
Middle Class	-0.104* (0.053)
Low Class	-0.071 (0.064)
Ideology	0.196*** (0.045)
Country Dummies	✓
Observations	17,445
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.2.4 Subsets

Table C.7: Subset: Spain, UK and France. Fiscal contribution and granting social rights to immigrants

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Unconditional extension of social rights to immigrants	
	(1)	(2)
Reference category: Negative contribution		
Neutral Contribution	1.250*** (0.104)	0.866*** (0.108)
Positive Contribution	1.478*** (0.110)	1.005*** (0.116)
Cosmopolitanism		0.265*** (0.021)
Men	-0.073 (0.087)	-0.032 (0.089)
Non-tertiary education	-0.419*** (0.102)	-0.260* (0.105)
Reference category: 1st quintile		
2nd quintile	-0.130 (0.140)	-0.135 (0.145)
3rd quintile	0.107 (0.140)	0.089 (0.144)
4th quintile	-0.156 (0.145)	-0.214 (0.148)
5th quintile	-0.114 (0.151)	-0.194 (0.155)
Reference category: High Class		
Middle Class	-0.131 (0.110)	-0.124 (0.112)
Low Class	-0.176 (0.128)	-0.024 (0.132)
Ideology	0.298** (0.100)	0.213* (0.102)
Country Dummies	✓	✓
Observations	4,595	4,595

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.8: Subset: remaining countries. Fiscal contribution and granting social rights to immigrants

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Unconditional extension of social rights to immigrants	
	(1)	(2)
Reference category: Negative contribution		
Neutral Contribution	0.787*** (0.051)	0.604*** (0.052)
Positive Contribution	1.038*** (0.058)	0.796*** (0.060)
Cosmopolitanism		0.208*** (0.012)
Men	0.093* (0.046)	0.077 (0.047)
Non-tertiary education	-0.357*** (0.055)	-0.230*** (0.057)
Reference category: 1st quintile		
2nd quintile	0.047 (0.085)	0.039 (0.086)
3rd quintile	-0.005 (0.083)	-0.016 (0.084)
4th quintile	0.030 (0.083)	-0.014 (0.084)
5th quintile	-0.052 (0.088)	-0.108 (0.089)
Reference category: High Class		
Middle Class	-0.136* (0.059)	-0.104 (0.060)
Low Class	-0.212** (0.072)	-0.091 (0.074)
Ideology	0.218*** (0.049)	0.192*** (0.050)
Country Dummies	✓	✓
Observations	12,850	12,850
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3 Tables

C.3.1 AMCEs Spain

	Granting social rights
Food delivery driver	-0.023* (0.009)
Security guard in a mall	-0.026** (0.010)
Factory worker	-0.016 (0.010)
Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.076*** (0.009)
Negative fiscal contributor	-0.185*** (0.009)
Brazil	-0.009 (0.008)
Morocco	-0.056*** (0.008)
Quite hard-working	-0.024* (0.009)
A bit hard-working	-0.221*** (0.010)
Not hard-working at all	-0.357*** (0.010)
Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.023** (0.008)
Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.099*** (0.009)
Socializes with his compatriots and Spanish people	0.018* (0.008)
Never socializes with Spanish people	-0.119*** (0.009)
Observations	19,572
Adjusted R ²	0.133

Table C.9: Table associated with Figure 5.1. Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3.2 AMCEs France

	Granting social rights
Food delivery driver	-0.016* (0.008)
Security guard in a mall	-0.002 (0.008)
Factory worker	0.020* (0.008)
Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.034*** (0.007)
Negative fiscal contributor	-0.099*** (0.008)
Peru	0.012 (0.007)
Turkey	-0.050*** (0.007)
Quite hard-working	-0.085*** (0.008)
A bit hard-working	-0.069*** (0.008)
Not hard-working at all	-0.330*** (0.009)
Gets by speaking French	-0.060*** (0.007)
Doesn't speak French at all	-0.207*** (0.008)
Socializes his compatriots and French people	-0.014* (0.007)
Never socializes with French people	-0.178*** (0.007)
Observations	27,636
Adjusted R ²	0.128

Table C.10: Table associated with Figure 5.1. Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3.3 AMCEs UK

	Granting social rights
Food delivery driver	0.004 (0.008)
Security guard in a mall	-0.013 (0.008)
Factory worker	0.013 (0.008)
Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.077*** (0.007)
Negative fiscal contributor	-0.213*** (0.008)
Colombia	0.007 (0.007)
Turkey	-0.004 (0.007)
Quite hard-working	-0.040*** (0.008)
A bit hard-working	-0.158*** (0.008)
Not hard-working at all	-0.330*** (0.009)
Gets by speaking English	-0.070*** (0.007)
Doesn't speak English at all	-0.213*** (0.008)
Socializes with his compatriots and British people	-0.025*** (0.007)
Never socializes with British people	-0.158*** (0.007)
Observations	27,566
Adjusted R ²	0.148

Table C.11: Table associated with Figure 5.1. Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3.4 Sub-group analysis by respondent income

C.3.4.1 Spain

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.02	0.01	0.24
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.00	0.01	0.90
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.00	0.01	0.80
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.01	0.01	0.30
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.25
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.89
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.00	0.01	0.67
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	-0.01	0.01	0.22
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.01	0.01	0.42
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.12
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.98
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.17
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.00	0.01	0.94
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.01	0.01	0.33
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.00	0.01	0.79
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.01	0.01	0.41
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.00	0.01	0.74
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.50
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.68

Table C.12: Table associated with Figure 5.2.

C.3.4.2 France

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.03	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.01	0.88
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.01	0.01	0.24
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.02	0.01	0.17
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.02	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.84
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	0.01	0.01	0.19
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	-0.00	0.01	0.77
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	-0.01	0.01	0.35
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.04
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.14
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.01	0.01	0.36
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	0.00	0.01	0.91
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	-0.01	0.01	0.38
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	0.00	0.01	0.99
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	0.01	0.01	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	-0.00	0.01	0.65
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	-0.00	0.01	0.98

Table C.13: Table associated with Figure 5.2.

C.3.4.3 UK

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.02	0.01	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.01	0.71
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.01	0.01	0.60
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.02	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.13
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.70
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	-0.02	0.01	0.04
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	0.01	0.01	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.01	0.01	0.35
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.04	0.01	0.00
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.60
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.23
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.01	0.01	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	-0.02	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	0.02	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	0.01	0.01	0.43
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	0.00	0.01	0.84
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	0.00	0.01	0.64
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	-0.01	0.01	0.31

Table C.14: Table associated with Figure 5.2.

C.3.5 Sub-group analysis by perceptions of sustainability

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.01	0.02	0.79
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.02	0.77
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.01	0.02	0.55
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.01	0.02	0.51
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.02	0.90
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.02	0.02	0.18
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.02	0.12
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	-0.00	0.01	0.75
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.01	0.02	0.41
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	-0.01	0.01	0.54
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.03	0.02	0.18
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.02	0.57
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.02	0.29
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.03	0.02	0.18
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.01	0.02	0.47
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	0.01	0.01	0.34
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.03	0.02	0.10
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.00	0.02	0.99
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.02	0.66
Sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	-0.00	0.02	0.99
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.00	0.02	1.00
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.02	0.89
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.03	0.02	0.09
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.03	0.02	0.08
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.02	0.48
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.03	0.02	0.09
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.04	0.02	0.01
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.00	0.01	0.82
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.02	0.01	0.26
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	-0.02	0.01	0.13
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.02	0.02	0.26
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.02	0.52
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.00	0.02	0.99
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.01	0.02	0.54
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.01	0.02	0.57
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	0.01	0.01	0.59
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.01	0.02	0.35
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	0.01	0.02	0.49
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.03	0.02	0.08
Not sustainable - Very sustainable	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.01	0.02	0.40

Table C.15: Table associated with Figure 5.3.

C.3.6 Interaction of the fiscal burden and the attitude at work attributes

C.3.6.1 Spain

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.10	0.02	0.00
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.20	0.02	0.00
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.06	0.02	0.00
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.17	0.02	0.00
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.08	0.02	0.00
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.20	0.02	0.00
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.07	0.02	0.00
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.18	0.02	0.00

Table C.16: Table associated with Figure 5.4. Estimates of conditional effects calculated based on the average marginal interaction effects.

C.3.6.2 France

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.11	0.01	0.00
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.04	0.02	0.01
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.11	0.02	0.00
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.10
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.09	0.01	0.00
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.03	0.01	0.02
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.09	0.01	0.00

Table C.17: Table associated with Figure 5.4. Estimates of conditional effects calculated based on the average marginal interaction effects.

C.3.6.3 UK

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.09	0.01	0.00
Very hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.21	0.01	0.00
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.08	0.01	0.00
Quite hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.23	0.01	0.00
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.06	0.01	0.00
A bit hard-working	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.23	0.01	0.00
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.07	0.01	0.00
Not hard-working at all	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.17	0.01	0.00

Table C.18: Table associated with Figure 5.4. Estimates of conditional effects calculated based on the average marginal interaction effects.

C.3.7 Sub-group analysis by priors on intentional reciprocity

C.3.7.1 Priors on the tax behaviour of immigrants

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.03	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.01	0.38
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.02	0.01	0.13
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.00	0.01	0.87
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.46
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.19
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.03	0.01	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	-0.01	0.01	0.27
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.00	0.01	0.89
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.01	0.01	0.30
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.61
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.87
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.01	0.57
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	-0.02	0.01	0.06
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.00	0.01	0.86
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	0.02	0.01	0.06
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.48
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.64
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.02	0.01	0.13

Table C.19: Table associated with Figure 5.5.

C.3.7.2 Priors on irregular payment

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.01	0.01	0.52
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.01	0.82
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.01	0.01	0.70
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.01	0.01	0.39
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.38
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.29
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.93
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	-0.01	0.01	0.35
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	-0.00	0.01	0.86
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.01	0.01	0.31
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.18
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.28
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.97
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.02	0.01	0.21
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	-0.00	0.01	0.67
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.01	0.01	0.39
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	0.02	0.01	0.16
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.68
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.33
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.01	0.01	0.34

Table C.20: Table associated with Figure 5.6.

C.3.7.3 Priors on underpayment

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.02	0.01	0.18
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.00	0.01	0.78
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.00	0.02	0.92
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.02	0.01	0.14
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.96
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.97
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.96
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	-0.00	0.01	0.97
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	-0.02	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.02	0.01	0.07
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.03	0.01	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.03	0.02	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.23
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.05	0.02	0.00
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.00	0.01	0.74
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.00	0.01	0.70
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.00	0.01	0.78
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	0.01	0.01	0.57
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.00	0.01	0.77
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	-0.00	0.01	0.79

Table C.21: Table associated with Figure 5.7.

C.3.8 AMCEs for the conjoint in Spain where immigrants are presented as intentional cooperators

	Granting social rights
Food delivery driver	-0.007 (0.012)
Security guard in a mall	-0.035** (0.013)
Factory worker	-0.004 (0.012)
Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.101*** (0.012)
Negative fiscal contributor	-0.220*** (0.013)
Brazil	-0.001 (0.011)
Morocco	-0.033** (0.012)
Quite hard-working	-0.063*** (0.013)
A bit hard-working	-0.243*** (0.014)
Not hard-working at all	-0.366*** (0.014)
Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.038*** (0.011)
Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.103*** (0.011)
Socializes with his compatriots and Spanish people	0.011 (0.011)
Never socializes with Spanish people	-0.141*** (0.012)
Observations	10,542
Adjusted R ²	0.147

Table C.22: Table associated with Figure 5.8. Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3.9 Additional conjoint in Spain that includes natives

C.3.9.1 AMCEs

	Granting social rights
Food delivery driver	-0.026** (0.009)
Security guard in a mall	-0.035*** (0.009)
Factory worker	-0.029** (0.009)
Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.113*** (0.008)
Negative fiscal contributor	-0.244*** (0.009)
Croatia	-0.123*** (0.009)
Brazil	-0.127*** (0.010)
Morocco	-0.164*** (0.010)
Quite hard-working	-0.068*** (0.009)
A bit hard-working	-0.283*** (0.009)
Not hard-working at all	-0.421*** (0.010)
Observations	21,714
Adjusted R ²	0.167


Table C.23: Estimates of ACMEs and standard errors are based on regressions in which standard errors are clustered by respondent; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3.9.2 Interaction of the fiscal burden and the nationality attributes

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Spain	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Spain	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.10	0.02	0.00
Spain	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.21	0.02	0.00
Croatia	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Croatia	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.10	0.02	0.00
Croatia	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.26	0.02	0.00
Brazil	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Brazil	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.13	0.02	0.00
Brazil	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.26	0.02	0.00
Morocco	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00		
Morocco	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.13	0.02	0.00
Morocco	granting	amce	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.25	0.02	0.00

Table C.24: Table associated with Figure C.11. Estimates of conditional effects calculated based on the average marginal interaction effects.

Figure C.12: AMCEs



C.3.10 Sub-group analysis by education

C.3.10.1 Spain

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.01	0.01	0.38
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.01	0.63
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.03	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.02	0.01	0.11
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.04
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.78
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.00	0.01	0.98
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	-0.00	0.01	0.98
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.00	0.01	0.94
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.62
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.66
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.90
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.01	0.01	0.41
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	-0.00	0.01	0.81
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	0.02	0.01	0.12
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.02	0.01	0.14
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.00	0.01	0.89
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.38
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.01	0.01	0.30

Table C.25: Table associated with Figure C.6 in the Appendix.

C.3.10.2 France

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.00	0.01	0.78
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.02	0.01	0.12
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.01	0.01	0.57
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.02	0.01	0.06
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.02	0.01	0.07
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.87
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.10
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	-0.00	0.01	0.88
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	-0.01	0.01	0.43
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.01	0.01	0.37
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.00	0.01	0.69
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.46
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.00	0.01	0.76
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	-0.00	0.01	0.93
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	0.00	0.01	0.73
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	-0.00	0.01	0.63
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	-0.00	0.01	0.75
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	-0.01	0.01	0.21
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	0.01	0.01	0.11

Table C.26: Table associated with Figure C.6 in the Appendix.

C.3.10.3 United Kingdom

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.00	0.01	0.79
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.01	0.60
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.01	0.01	0.49
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.01	0.01	0.62
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.73
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.88
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.86
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	-0.00	0.01	0.78
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	0.01	0.01	0.47
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	-0.00	0.01	0.65
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.19
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.15
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.73
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.03	0.01	0.01
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	-0.01	0.01	0.25
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	0.01	0.01	0.25
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	0.00	0.01	0.86
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	0.01	0.01	0.24
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	-0.00	0.01	0.58
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	-0.00	0.01	0.70

Table C.27: Table associated with Figure C.6 in the Appendix.

C.3.11 Sub-group analysis by ideology

C.3.11.1 Spain

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.02	0.02	0.16
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.01	0.57
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.02	0.02	0.30
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.02	0.02	0.31
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.03	0.01	0.05
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.02	0.01	0.13
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.70
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.02	0.01	0.17
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	-0.02	0.01	0.17
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	-0.00	0.01	0.98
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.00	0.01	0.84
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.02	0.18
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.01	0.37
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.00	0.01	0.97
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	0.00	0.01	0.71
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.00	0.01	0.77
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.03	0.01	0.01
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.79
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.03	0.01	0.04
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.01	0.02	0.71
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.02	0.01	0.20
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.02	0.02	0.21
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.01	0.02	0.62
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.95
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.02	0.01	0.19
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.15
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.01	0.01	0.27
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.02	0.01	0.16
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	-0.03	0.01	0.02
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.01	0.02	0.40
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.02	0.56
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.01	0.02	0.73
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.02	0.45
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.01	0.01	0.52
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	0.00	0.01	0.77
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.01	0.01	0.32
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.97
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.59
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.88

Table C.28: Table associated with Figure C.7 in the Appendix.

C.3.11.2 France

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.01	0.01	0.64
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.02	0.01	0.09
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.02	0.01	0.13
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.01	0.01	0.47
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.72
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.71
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.87
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	0.03	0.01	0.02
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.01	0.01	0.25
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.15
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.00	0.01	0.74
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.69
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.01	0.59
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	0.02	0.01	0.09
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	-0.00	0.01	0.75
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	-0.02	0.01	0.15
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	0.02	0.01	0.06
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	-0.02	0.01	0.19
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	-0.01	0.01	0.39
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.01	0.01	0.54
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.01	0.97
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.02	0.01	0.20
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.01	0.01	0.56
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.57
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.70
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.41
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	-0.01	0.01	0.58
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	0.03	0.01	0.00
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	-0.02	0.01	0.04
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.59
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.63
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.39
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.01	0.31
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	0.02	0.01	0.04
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	0.01	0.01	0.22
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	-0.03	0.01	0.00
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	0.02	0.01	0.06
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	-0.02	0.01	0.20
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	-0.01	0.01	0.58

Table C.29: Table associated with Figure C.7 in the Appendix.

C.3.11.3 UK

BY	outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.00	0.01	0.79
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.00	0.01	0.91
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.00	0.01	0.74
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.01	0.88
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.23
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.02	0.01	0.10
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	0.02	0.01	0.02
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	-0.01	0.01	0.33
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	-0.01	0.01	0.19
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.00	0.01	0.81
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.49
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.15
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.03	0.01	0.01
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	0.02	0.01	0.09
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	-0.00	0.01	0.98
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	-0.03	0.01	0.02
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	-0.02	0.01	0.04
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	0.00	0.01	0.69
Centre - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	0.02	0.01	0.07
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.02	0.01	0.10
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.01	0.01	0.27
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.00	0.01	0.76
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.00	0.01	0.76
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.21
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.30
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.84
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	0.03	0.01	0.01
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	-0.02	0.01	0.03
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.11
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.02	0.01	0.19
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.03	0.01	0.05
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.02	0.01	0.24
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	0.02	0.01	0.10
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	0.02	0.01	0.19
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	0.01	0.01	0.30
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	0.01	0.01	0.55
Right - Left	granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	-0.02	0.01	0.20

Table C.30: Table associated with Figure C.7 in the Appendix.

C.3.12 Order of tasks

C.3.12.1 Spain

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.01	0.02	0.69
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.02	0.79
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.00	0.02	0.91
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.01	0.02	0.54
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.02	0.98
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.02	0.87
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.01	0.02	0.74
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	-0.02	0.02	0.34
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.01	0.02	0.53
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	0.01	0.02	0.74
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.05	0.02	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.01	0.02	0.63
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.04	0.02	0.09
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.03	0.02	0.15
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	-0.02	0.02	0.21
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.01	0.02	0.63
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	0.03	0.02	0.07
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.01	0.02	0.65
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	-0.04	0.02	0.06
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.05	0.02	0.01

Table C.31: Table associated with Figure C.9 in the Appendix.

C.3.12.2 France

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	-0.00	0.02	0.98
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.01	0.02	0.49
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	0.02	0.02	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.04	0.02	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.02	0.73
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.02	0.51
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.01	0.02	0.74
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	-0.01	0.02	0.61
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	-0.02	0.02	0.27
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.03	0.02	0.09
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.03	0.02	0.18
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	-0.00	0.02	0.89
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	-0.02	0.02	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.02	0.42
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	0.00	0.02	0.81
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	-0.02	0.02	0.14
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	0.02	0.02	0.27
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	0.00	0.02	0.92
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	-0.02	0.02	0.31
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	0.03	0.01	0.09

Table C.32: Table associated with Figure C.9 in the Appendix.

C.3.12.3 UK

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.02	0.02	0.34
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.02	0.02	0.40
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.01	0.02	0.62
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.01	0.02	0.75
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.02	0.47
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.00	0.02	0.82
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	0.01	0.02	0.51
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	-0.02	0.02	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	-0.01	0.02	0.44
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.03	0.02	0.04
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.04	0.02	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.03	0.02	0.17
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.01	0.02	0.68
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	0.01	0.02	0.75
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	0.00	0.02	0.85
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	-0.03	0.02	0.11
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	0.03	0.02	0.10
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	-0.02	0.02	0.20
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	-0.02	0.02	0.28
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	0.04	0.02	0.01

Table C.33: Table associated with Figure C.9 in the Appendix.

C.3.13 Attention checks

C.3.13.1 Spain

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.02	0.01	0.18
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	0.01	0.01	0.35
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.03	0.01	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	-0.00	0.01	0.88
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.03	0.01	0.01
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.34
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.07
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Croatia	0.00	0.01	0.68
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Brazil	0.01	0.01	0.27
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Morocco	-0.02	0.01	0.11
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.00	0.01	0.84
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.04	0.01	0.01
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.00	0.01	0.97
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.02	0.01	0.21
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent Spanish	0.01	0.01	0.26
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking Spanish	-0.01	0.01	0.23
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak Spanish at all	-0.01	0.01	0.61
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with Spanish people	-0.01	0.01	0.42
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.92
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with Spanish people	0.00	0.01	0.78

Table C.34: Table associated with Figure C.10 in the Appendix.

C.3.13.2 France

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.02	0.01	0.09
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.00	0.01	0.75
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.02	0.01	0.02
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.01	0.01	0.40
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.01	0.01	0.10
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	0.00	0.01	0.96
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.02	0.01	0.09
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Slovenia	-0.02	0.01	0.05
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Peru	0.01	0.01	0.12
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.00	0.01	0.82
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	0.03	0.01	0.01
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.11
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.02	0.01	0.03
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.06	0.01	0.00
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent French	0.00	0.01	0.90
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking French	0.01	0.01	0.29
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak French at all	-0.01	0.01	0.41
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with French people	0.02	0.01	0.04
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and French people	0.01	0.01	0.45
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with French people	-0.03	0.01	0.01

Table C.35: Table associated with Figure C.10 in the Appendix.

C.3.13.3 UK

outcome	statistic	feature	level	estimate	std.error	p-value
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Berry picker	0.01	0.01	0.27
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Food delivery driver	-0.01	0.01	0.33
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Security guard in a mall	-0.01	0.01	0.64
granting	mm_difference	Profession	Factory worker	0.00	0.01	0.70
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Positive fiscal contributor	0.03	0.01	0.00
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Neutral fiscal contributor	-0.01	0.01	0.41
granting	mm_difference	Taxes and welfare services	Negative fiscal contributor	-0.03	0.01	0.01
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Serbia	-0.02	0.01	0.07
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Colombia	0.01	0.01	0.24
granting	mm_difference	Country of origin	Turkey	0.01	0.01	0.54
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Very hard-working	-0.01	0.01	0.53
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Quite hard-working	0.01	0.01	0.33
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	A bit hard-working	0.00	0.01	1.00
granting	mm_difference	Attitude at work	Not hard-working at all	-0.01	0.01	0.18
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Speaks fluent English	-0.00	0.01	0.84
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Gets by speaking English	0.01	0.01	0.17
granting	mm_difference	Language skills	Doesn't speak English at all	-0.01	0.01	0.12
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Always socializes with British people	0.00	0.01	0.89
granting	mm_difference	Social life	With his compatriots and British people	0.00	0.01	0.92
granting	mm_difference	Social life	Never socializes with British people	-0.00	0.01	0.85

Table C.36: Table associated with Figure C.10 in the Appendix.

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