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A community of excellence:

Singapore national identity in Friday prayer sermons

The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Muis), is a statutory board, or a semi-official government agency, under the Singapore government. It is in charge of planning and crafting the religious direction of the Muslim community in Singapore. As a statutory board, it has autonomy from the state to make its own decisions. But when religious direction and state policy overlap, does the autonomy still hold? This statement has implications on the state's relationship with the Muslim community. Muis and its employees have been accused of being state puppets (OrangTemasek, 2011), used to create religious direction that support government policies, to the detriment of the Singaporean Muslims' religious experience. This argument has also been pointed out by some Singaporean scholars (see Tan, 2007; Rahim, 2009; Kadir, 2010, for example). However, the present literature on this relationship is not clear. These claims lack proper, methodological evidence other than self-selected case studies or interviews with a few key individuals. Therefore, this paper sets out to create a framework to analyse the extent of the state's shadow in Muis' discourses. It argues that when the state is strong and united in its opinion, especially in topics relating to national identity and radicalism, going against state opinion is risky and too costly for Muis. Doing so will result in a major loss for Muis, especially its legitimacy and authority as bestowed by the state. Hence, this paper argues that Muis' narratives on these two issues can be shown as being influenced by state narratives and discourses. This is done by using a content analysis on Friday prayer sermons in Singapore in 2017 (n=54). These sermons are

written by Muis and read verbatim in most mosques across Singapore each Friday afternoon, and are listened to by the congregants in silent attention. Results have shown that after spiritual and moral exhortation, the Friday prayer sermons focus on building a Singaporean Muslim identity and tackling radicalism. These results are typical of sermons written by an official religious body (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Errihani, 2011). Further, the frames used by the sermons to discuss the Singaporean Muslim identity and radicalism overlap with the frames utilised by the state. This paper therefore gives some evidence of the state's influence in developing Muis' narratives on national identity and radicalism. It also discusses the implications such a move can have on the Singaporean Muslim community and its relationship with the state. This study can be further added to and built upon to analyse state narratives in official religious departments around the world.

Literature review

Social antagonism towards Muis & state monopoly of power

Singapore is a secular state. It is not anti-religion and claims a 'neutral' approach to religion, neither professing a 'national religion', nor favouring one religion over another (Tan, 2008; Thio, 2008). Further, the state argues that religion, when politicised, can be a potent dividing force in society, that can not only undermine social relations, but can also threaten one's loyalty to the nation (Tan, 2007; Steiner, 2011). In a country with many races and religions, and in a Southeast Asian neighbourhood with a particularly strong penchant for political Islam (for example, instituting Sharia-inspired punishments in Brunei), religion cannot be taken for granted (Tan, 2007; Steiner, 2011). Despite its professed neutrality, the Singapore constitution allows for the provision of Muslim

family, marriage and dietary laws (Sajoo, 2008), and also for the formation of a semi-official government body (i.e. a statutory board) that administers the affairs of the Singapore Muslim community, i.e. Muis. This practice is unique only to the Muslims; other than the Hindu Endowments Board, which is another religious statutory board that oversees the management of four Hindu temples, no other religion in Singapore has an official religious department responsible for the oversight and management of the whole religious community, much less a separate court based on religious law.

Today, Muis is under the ambit of the Ministry of Culture, Community and the Youth. It has a President and a Chief Executive; the former chairs the Council of Muis, an executive board made up of prominent religious and community figures (Muis, 2018). This Council is responsible for Muis' policies and operations (Muis 2018). The Mufti, the chief spiritual leader, overlooks the Muis Fatwa Council. A fatwa is a religious ruling that can be issued by a scholar of Islamic law (Pasuni, 2018). Traditionally, any scholar with proper credentials can issue a fatwa; in Singapore, Muis' Fatwa Council is one of the few organisations/individuals who can issue them. Fatwas range from individual worship to social issues (Pasuni, 2018), like the donation of organs after death. These fatwas are not legally binding under Singapore law; however, they can influence popular support amongst Muslims. As an organisation, Muis answers to the Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, a political appointee.

The Singapore state has always been cautious when it comes to the overlap between religion and politics. It argues that when left unchecked, religious sentiments might be politically manipulated to the detriment of Singapore's peace, prosperity and harmony

(Steiner, 2011). Such remarks are often made with reference to its Muslim-majority neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia (for example, Lee, 2002), whose political scene is littered with individuals and Islamic parties calling for the implementation of religious law, and whose influence, according to the ex-Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yacob Ibrahim, can be already felt (Tan, 2007).

It should therefore come as no surprise that the Singapore state would wish to monopolise sources of power and control over its citizens, even at the cost of confronting powerful figures like religious elites in the name of secularism. Such a move is necessary, given the potential competition over influence and legitimacy with the state (Anderson, 1988; Iannaconne, 1991; Peterson, 2009). However, to act violently against these religions might result in radical and extremist reactions on the part of the believers (Peterson, 2009). This problem can be solved by officially appointing key members of the clergy and/or creating an official religious body, making them dependent on the state for a stable career (in the case of the clergy), funds and legitimacy; in other words, making them pliable to the state's wishes and narratives (Iannaconne, 1995; Peterson, 2009). By creating an official religious body with state-appointed clergy, the state exercises its 'coercive political power' (Sun, 2017, p. 1669) over the control and authority of the religion, its elites, and its followers. Besides that, the state is also able to regulate interpretations of religious texts, either sanctioning interpretations that work in their favour, or restrict alternative readings by stripping them of their legitimacy or authority (Iannaconne, 1991; Sun, 2017), turning these religious organisations into 'instruments of indoctrination' (Iannaconne, 1991, p. 162).

Thus the creation of Muis has been argued as both a ‘mercy’ by the ex-Mufti (OrangTemasek, 2011) in terms of minority representation in a non-Muslim state and as a clear proof of state control. In the latter camp, scholars like Aljunied (2017) argue that the creation of Muis was a way to ‘emasculate’ (p. 157) the religious elite and absorb them into state structures, thus preventing them from entering politics and directly competing with the state’s Muslim representatives from the Muslim voting bloc. Other scholars have echoed this argument in one way or another, using different shades of terms to capture the extent of the state-Muis relationship, like ‘accommodative secularism' (Thio, 2008), ‘centralised religious bureaucracy’ (Kadir, 2010) and ‘cooptation’ (Abdullah, 2013). The harshest critic of this relationship, however, came from the public, who accused Muis of being a ‘state puppet’ (OrangTemasek, 2011).

This allegation became stronger during the headscarf controversy in the early 2000s, when a group of Singaporean Muslim parents dressed their seven year-old daughters in a headscarf and uniform on the first day of primary school (Kadir, 2010; Mutalib, 2012; Abdullah, 2013). Under the Education Ministry’s regulations, students are not allowed to wear the headscarf to school, as it claims that any religious clothing will contradict the sense of universality the uniforms were trying to convey (O’Shea, 2002). In between the sallies by the state and the parents, the parents made further demands on the government, calling them to not only allow their daughters the right to wear the headscarf, but to also increase financial support for the full-time Islamic schools (Law, 2013). The state refused to comply; the students were subsequently denied entry and were eventually expelled. During the fiasco, this group of parents turned to Muis for representation, only to find their demands and claims rebuffed and dismissed as political

provocation (see the interview with the ex-Mufti at OrangTemasek, 2011; but also see Kadir, 2010; Mutalib, 2012). Muis reiterated the state's arguments of the need for conformity with, and obedience towards state laws, albeit now backed up with some evidence form the Islamic corpus. If there was any disagreement within Muis, it was not privy to the public. Its silence and reticence to join the fray was made more obvious when a non-governmental religious organisation, the Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers' Association (Pergas), emerged as being both highly visual and loud in its leadership, criticism and advocacy throughout the affair (Abdullah, 2013).

Rational choice theory of religion

This theory of the state monopoly of religion can be found in the rational choice theory of religion (RCTR) (Iannaconne, 1991; Peterson, 2009). The RCTR argues that barring the evidence, beliefs and circumstances (Hamilton, 2011; Elster, 2013; Elster, 2015), individuals choose to believe in the religion that will bring them the most benefit, either material or otherworldly, at the lowest cost possible (Hamilton, 2011; Chaves, 1995; Iannaconne, 1995; Jerolmack & Porpora, 2004). The RCTR can also be applied to the 'supply side' of religion, like churches, institutions and societies (Iannaconne, 1991; Sharot, 2002). The RCTR posits that, like individuals, religious organisations are also resource optimisers (Iannaconne, 1995; Iannaconne, 1998). They wish to maximise benefits and eliminate competition over resources such as authority, followers or funding (Iannaconne, 1995). Hence, by offering these organisations the 'official' status, these organisations might enjoy a clear monopoly in the religious market over their non-official rivals, albeit at the price of cooperating with the state. This cooperation can also

entail control over interpretations that benefit the political and/or financial prosperity of the state (Iannaconne, 1991; Sun, 2017).

Muis, like any other organisation in the civil service, is bound to support the state in the execution of its policies. However, as the sole official religious body for Muslims, it is given autonomy in deciding its own religious direction in guiding the Singaporean Muslim community. When state policy and religious direction overlap, Muis is caught in a double bind: choose between wanting to toe the government's secularist stance, which can be unfavourable to Singaporean Muslims, or create policies that can benefit the religious experience of Singaporean Muslims, but which could contradict government opinion. The RCTR framework allows the scholar to analyse Muis' choices with regard to its power dynamics with the state. When the state is strong and united in its opinion, like the one during the headscarf affair above (Law, 2003), disobeying government policy might come at a heavy cost to Muis' relations with the state, and by extension, its resources. But when government opinion is divided, Muis can uphold its religious direction and voice an alternative opinion, without the risk of being sanctioned by the state. When parliament contemplated opening two casinos in 2005, there was a huge public and political outcry against these plans (Lee, 2015). Singapore had prohibited the operation of casinos several times in the past on reasons of public morality (The Economist, 2005). This time around, with promises of lavish investment projects and big tourist dollars (The Economist, 2005), the state was keen to change its mind, but was highly cautious of low public support. Members of parliament both debated for and against the motion (Lee, 2005); the state also welcomed dissenting opinions from religious bodies and the public. In these circumstances, Muis presented

an oppositional, albeit careful, voice against the government's wishes for a casino (Abdullah, 2013). There was nothing to lose from this episode; unlike the headscarf affair, there were no bodies at stake nor was the state's authority held at knifepoint in the power negotiations between the state and Muis.

Friday prayer sermons and state control

All Muslim men are religiously obligated to attend a communal prayer each Friday afternoon at a mosque or a prayer hall. On a purely ritual level, this could be comparable to the Sunday morning mass (Emerick, 2011). Women can attend the Friday prayer if they choose to do so; however, their attendance is non-obligatory under religious law. For men, purposefully missing out on these Friday prayers constitute a serious sin. The Friday prayer usually takes an hour to complete, and is usually done over the duration of a lunch break. It begins with the call to prayer, two sermons, and the prayer itself (Emerick, 2011). No speech must be made during the sermon by the congregant; he must listen and contemplate in silence (Albayrak, 2012). The sermon is not a dialogue; there is no room for debate nor response during the delivery of the sermon (Azodanloo, 2007). The sermon is therefore, an exercise in submission and authority; it represents a golden opportunity for Muslim leaders to address a huge mass of target audience who are held 'captive', and whose turnout is easily guaranteed and assured (Samuri & Hopkins, 2017). The fundamental purpose of the Friday prayer sermon is spiritual and moral exhortation. However, historically, the sermons have also discussed political, social, cultural and religious issues that occur within a certain community (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Wiktorowicz, 2001; Wardak 2002; Hashem, 2010; Errihani, 2011); it is usually written by the imam himself, although it is sometimes

delivered on behalf of the sultan or caliph of the time (Fathi, 1981). This allows the sermon to be a powerful tool of influence over the masses, should it land in the hands a of a gifted preacher skilled at oratory and rhetoric (Errihani, 2011).

Given the potential for sermons to be divisive and contentious, there is benefit for the states to bring the sermons and their rhetoric to line. This is seen in some Muslim countries like Malaysia (Samuri & Hopkins, 2017), Jordan (Wiktorowicz, 1999) and Morocco (Errihani, 2011), which have their Friday prayer sermons centrally written by an official religious body. Official religious organisations can also make use of these sermons to reinforce their monopoly over any other interpretations of Islam (Samuri & Hopkins, 2017), edging out not only competing alternative interpretations, which might be more popular to the public, or are critical of the state (Errihani, 2011). In addition to that, the risk of unchecked radical teachings being spread through the pulpit has made surveillance and control even more urgent in the recent years, following the surge in jihadist attacks all over the world. State-led narratives on Muslims therefore tend to emphasise the importance of a 'moderate' Islam that is interpreted and led by 'local' scholars, as opposed to foreign preachers from an alien culture (Lemon & Thibault, 2018; Chan, 2018). Further, studies also demonstrate how states use their legitimising power to accord authority to a certain group of 'moderate' or 'balanced-thinking' preachers that seem to not be critical of the state or its policies (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Errihani, 2011).

State-written sermons are usually disseminated to most mosques in the country and are expected to be read verbatim. Sermons of this type often do four things: first, providing

legitimacy, authority and support to the state and government, sometimes underlining their 'Islam-ness' of rule (Azodanloo, 1999; Errihani, 2011); second, condemnation of radical teachings as being outside of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Chan, 2018); third, calling for moderation in religious practice and views on social affairs, like emphasising on the need for contextualising Islamic teachings into the local culture, and calling out the unnecessary use of 'foreign' or alternative teachings that differs from the state's reading of the text, which, in some cases, might cast a critical eye on their narrative (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Samuri & Hopkins, 2017; Lemon & Thibault, 2017; Chan, 2018); and finally, they preach for social change through passive and individual moral and spiritual guidance (Wiktorowicz, 1999).

This tendency to centralise the sermon-writing and delivery, however, is not present in some Western countries with Muslim minorities like the United States (Hashem, 2010), United Kingdom (Wardak, 2002), and Australia (Albayrak, 2012). Although there are state-led counter-radicalism movements in these countries, these efforts do not include policing the sermon texts. This does not mean that the state monopoly theory does not apply here; rather, this can be explained by the fact that there are no official religious departments through which the state can gather its power and control. Therefore, each mosque is left to write the sermon themselves. Hence, mosques might not have any incentive to follow the state narrative for resources or legitimacy. Further, as Friday prayers can be done in any mosque (unlike Christian worship, which might be denomination-specific), mosques need not compete for followers or members; instead, the competition might be in other aspects, such as financial or resource donations, or offering a more superior quality of spiritual guidance (Iannaconne, 1998).

Sermons of this kind usually focus on advocating active social change through spiritual, social and moral guidance (Wardak, 2002; Albayrak, 2012), like the collective identity of the Muslim *umma* (worldwide community of believers), exemplary moral conduct, and theology (for example, piety, ritual prayer and the 'true' meaning of Islam) (Wardak, 2002; Hashem, 2010; Albayrak, 2012). Any references to current affairs and political events are only figurative at best (Hashem, 2010; Albayrak, 2012). However, it should be emphasised that these studies focus only on a few mosques in a local cluster, and cannot be generalised to the whole country.

Singapore Friday prayer sermons

Singapore, despite being a non-Muslim country, centrally plans and writes its Friday prayer sermons. Muis, or more specifically, the Office of the Mufti (OOM), is the department responsible for the sermon's contents and writing. Although written in the Mufti's Office, it is not written by the Mufti himself; rather, it is written by his subordinate colleagues in that department, who are usually trained in the religious sciences, and who are also civil servants. The Mufti endorses the sermon content and is ultimately responsible for it. The sermon is then disseminated to most mosques around Singapore; imams are expected to read them as is (Kadir, 2010). Nevertheless, the imam can still make changes to the text, taking from or adding to it as he sees fit, or choose not to read it at all (Kadir, 2010).

Following RCTR, it should be the case when discussing greater issues like national identity and the spread of radical Islamic teachings, casting a critical eye on state narratives might come at a high cost. Such a move can result in accusations of being

disloyal to the nation. Hence, conforming to state narratives might be the easier and better option in this situation, allowing Muis to keep its autonomy, continue receiving government resources, and most importantly, retain its legitimacy and authority over the interpretation of Islam. This paper argues that Muis has taken latter option, especially with regard to national identity and radicalism. Consequently, one can expect to see similarities to government narratives in Muis discourses like Friday prayer sermons.

Local scholars have pointed out that the state narrative on Singaporean Muslims tends to focus around countering radicalism (Tan, 2008; Rahim, 2009; Osman, 2012) and promoting national identity (Tan, 2008; Steiner, 2011). This narrative can be seen in speeches made by certain members of the state, like the ex-Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, Tony Tan, and the ex-Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yacob Ibrahim, who describe Singaporean Muslims as moderate in their religious practice and emphasise that they are loyal, contributing and integrated members of Singaporean society (Tan, 2005; Ibrahim, 2011; Mutalib, 2012; Aljunied, 2017). Further, the state believes that there has been an increase in religiosity amongst Singaporean Muslims (see speech by Lee, 2002, for example), which might potentially be damaging for inter-religious relations (Nordin, 2009; Kadir, 2010; Mutalib, 2012). However, the academic claims about the narrative on Singaporean Muslims lack methodological evidence, other than selected case studies, anecdotes or interviews with a few selected individuals. Therefore, this paper seeks to close this gap by examining these claims and providing a framework that can be used and manipulated for future studies in Singapore, and also in other countries as well.

Today, no full-length studies focusing on Friday prayer sermons in Singapore exist. However, there are some prior studies that have briefly discussed Singapore Friday prayer sermons. Mostarom (2014) did a 'preliminary analysis' of over 300 Friday prayer sermons between 2006 and 2011. She found that these sermons avoided addressing politics, and focused mainly on spiritual and moral exhortation. However, this preliminary study has not been published into a full-fledged paper; further, there was no proper explanation on the methods used to analyse these sermons. Aljunied (2017) makes a passing reference to the sermons as being 'constantly' used by the state as a counter-radicalisation tool, but provides no evidence to back this claim. This paper therefore sheds more light on an understudied area.

Research design

Research questions

This paper answers five research questions by using content analysis. Three questions are descriptive and the remaining two are quantitative, in the form of hypotheses. The descriptive research questions are as follows:

1. What are some of the common issues that are raised in the Friday prayer sermons?

2a. How is the Singaporean Muslim identity framed vis a vis radicalism in the Friday prayer sermons?

2b. How similar are these frames to the frames used in government narratives?

In addition to the descriptive research questions above, there are two quantitative research questions that this paper seeks to answer. These research questions are put in the form of a hypothesis. They are as follows:

H1. Countering radicalism and building a national identity are the two topics that are most commonly addressed in the sermons after spiritual and moral exhortation.

H2. Where radicalism is mentioned in a sermon, the Singapore Muslim identity will also be discussed.

Methods

Content analysis

The sermons are analysed using content analysis. Content analysis allows for the systematic and objective inference of texts from their contexts, by grouping relevant words or sentences together (Kippendorf, 2013). By grouping similar sentences in the same category, a clear pattern or relationship can be established and deduced to prove the hypothesis or solve the research question at hand (Weber, 1990; Kippendorf, 2013; Babbie, 2013). As the sermons and government speeches are text heavy, containing both latent and manifest meanings (Babbie, 2013), content analysis is useful in helping to analyse these documents in a clear, systematic method that can allow for future reproducibility.

Data

All sermons were retrieved from the OOM website. As mentioned above, there are two sermons in a Friday prayer. The first sermon is usually where the main guidance is; the

second sermon is either a brief summary of the first sermon and/or a long prayer consisting of supplications and benedictions to God and to a series of other important religious individuals. Only the first sermon is written by OOM and is available on their website; the prayer in the second sermon usually follows a fixed formula found in standard religious texts, or is improvised by the imam to suit the occasion (for example, prayer for relief from floods in a neighbouring country). It is only the first sermon that this paper is concerned with.

These sermons are written and are available in English and Malay. The English versions are translations of the Malay sermon. The majority of mosques will read the Malay texts, while some mosques, particularly those with a non-Malay speaking congregation, will use the English text. The original plan for this paper was to sample both the English and the Malay sermons from 2015 to 2017. However, several problems were met. Firstly, time limitations meant that coding both the English and Malay sermons were beyond the reach of this project. Secondly, not all sermons were uploaded online; for example, some months in 2016 only had one sermon uploaded. Thirdly, ever since the OOM website revamp, the 2015 archives were taken down and were inaccessible. Email requests asking for access to the archives were unsuccessful. Therefore, the most complete data at hand was the 2017 English sermons. It was decided that the paper should then only focus on the 2017 sermons (n=54), from January to December, including the sermons during the two Eids, or religious festivals, which was in June and September. Each month averaged around 4 sermons.

In order to find out what the government narratives on radicalism and national identity looked like, this paper looked at a sample (n=9) of government speeches in political and semi-political settings. The minimal time at hand and the other academic commitments prevented this paper from drawing a larger sample data. Hence, only speeches from government officials which can impact policy on Singaporean Muslims, especially in terms of countering radical teachings and emphasising national identity, were selected. These officials included the Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs. Because there were too little references to counter-radicalism, Islam and/or terrorism in government speeches in 2017, the scope of research was thus broadened. Hence, earliest speech dates back to 2002; the latest is from 2018. This paper assumes that government narratives on national identity and radicalism has remained similar in the years after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. In any case, no great differences were found in the narratives on national identity and radicalism throughout the years during the coding process. The full list of government speeches and its interlocutors can be found in Appendix A.

Coding process

All sermons and speeches were coded and analysed using NVivo 12. The sampling unit, i.e. the smallest unit of reference, is each sentence in a paragraph. This paper mainly examines the latent content (Babbie, 2013) of each sentence, or, in other words, its underlying meaning. The sentence is then placed in a node, or a category where sentences with similar themes are grouped together (QSR International, n.d.). A node can contain child nodes, which are logically connected to the parent node, which help to specify or bring nuance to the parent node. For example, a sentence in the Jan 20

sermon mentions that '*lately, we have seen people be more inclined towards religion*'. The sentence references a characteristic of the Singaporean Muslim community. Therefore, it belongs under the SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY node. Further, the paper finds that increasing religiosity has been referenced often enough in the sermons and in literature to warrant a child node INCREASING RELIGIOSITY under its parent node, SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY. Figure 1 below helps to clarify this explanation by putting it into a hierarchy chart; Figure 2 shows an example of the actual child nodes found under another parent node, RADICALISM.




Figure 1. An example of a parent node (SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY) and its child nodes (CONTEXTUALISATION, CREATING A COMMUNITY OF EXCELLENCE & INCREASING RELIGIOSITY).

There are times when several sentences are grouped together to ensure that the consistency of the latent meaning is kept intact. However, as Babbie (2013) points out,

such a move can affect the study's reliability; different coders might interpret the term 'Singapore national identity' differently, or with different standards. To reduce the chance of this happening, all parent nodes were given clear definitions on what they are supposed to code (see Table 1 below).




Figure 2. A hierarchy chart for the parent node RADICALISM, showing the different child nodes under the parent category.

Four parent nodes were created prior to the coding process. These four nodes are reflective of some of the common observations that can be found in state-written sermons, as informed by previous studies mentioned above. They are marked by an asterisk in Table 1 below. These nodes were then given a working definition, so that clarity may be achieved during the coding process. Each node is mutually exclusive; that is, the same sentence may not appear in two different nodes. As the coding process went on, newer parent and child node categories were created, to better group similar sentences together. The list of parent nodes and its definitions are given in Table 1 below. A full list of nodes and its subcategories can be found in Appendices B & C.

The Friday prayer sermons usually follow a fixed format. It opens with a series of benedictions and prayers in classical Arabic, before launching into the content proper in Malay or English. It ends off with a short supplication also in Arabic. References to the Qur'an or the Hadith, the authoritative texts in Islam, are first given in Arabic, before translating it into the language of the sermon. This paper only codes the sermon content and the interpretation (not translation) of religious texts. Supplications, benedictions and religious references are not coded, as they do not have a direct bearing on the content of the sermon, and can be used several times in different contexts.

Node name	Definition
What Islam is supposed to be like*	All spiritual and/or moral exhortation; what a Muslim should (or should not) do, without any references to a particular context or time.
Radicalism*	Denouncing radicalism and/or promoting counter-radical strategies; lists characteristics of radical Muslims and their teachings
Singapore identity*	Mentions what a Singaporean Muslim should be like, whether in action, clothing, speech or words; the characteristics and traits of a Singaporean Muslim. Makes reference to the 10 traits from '*Risalah for building a Singapore Muslim community of excellence*' handout
Authority*	Talks and reaffirms the authority of the religious elite, the qualities they have, and why the masses should follow their guidance, especially in their interpretation of Islam

Authenticity	Emphasises the need for 'authentic' Islamic knowledge or discrediting what it perceives as 'false' ones; advocating 'authentic' or 'credible' instruction from trusted/reliable sources
Changing new world	Makes reference to the world as constantly changing, or how there are "new" or "unforeseen" challenges in the future, whether for good or for worse
Environment	Makes references to the environment and how we should go around saving it
Family	Mentions any references to the family, and/or the responsibilities of being in a family or leading one.
Policy justification	Sermons try to give good reasons why the government has chosen to take up a certain policy that will affect the Singaporean Muslim individually or otherwise

Table 1. List of parent nodes. The asterisk (*) denotes the four categories that were created prior to the coding process.

Results

Descriptive questions

The first research question is about the issues that are commonly raised in the Friday prayer sermons. This is measured by counting the number of sources a node contains. Each node has a source count i.e. it records the number of sermons that have been parked in that node. The more sources a node has, the more often the issue is repeated throughout the year. One sermon can be referenced in multiple nodes; in other words, a sermon can raise multiple themes revolving around a common motif. These counts are then converted into percentages. Since the sermons can be in more than one node, the

percentages are not aggregates, but denote the frequency of occurrence instead. The source count for parent nodes (i.e. general themes) results are presented in Table 2 below. The source count for the three most highest child nodes (i.e. individual topics)) for the top three parent nodes are given in Table 3 below.

A good majority (93% of the time) of the sermons discuss spiritual and/or moral guidance. Out of this 93%, congregants are reminded to keep a virtuous life 44% of the time, followed by the exhortation to remember God (28% of the time). The second frequently mentioned theme is on building a Singaporean national identity (61% of the time). The Singapore Muslim characteristic that is emphasised most often in the sermons is 'CONTRIBUTING BACK TO THE ECONOMY' (mentioned 48% of the time). Finally, tied at third place is the emphasis on seeking authentic religious instruction and denouncing radicalism (both 33% of the time). Authentic knowledge is emphasised as something that affirms an individual's action as 'rightful' according to religion. On the other hand, radicalism is most often portrayed as having rigid, literal interpretations of the religion. Both of these topics are emphasised 83% of time under their parent categories.

Parent node (General themes)	(*n*) of sermons coded in node	% of occurrence
What Islam is supposed to be like	50	93
Singapore identity	33	61
Authenticity	18	33
Radicalism	18	33

Family	15	28
Authority	14	26
Policy justification	13	24
Changing new world	11	20

Table 2. Frequency count for parent nodes (general themes) that are raised most often in Friday prayer sermons.

The second research question examines the frames used to discuss the Singapore Muslim identity vis a vis radicalism. This is done by qualitatively analysing the references coded in various child nodes. Frames help to locate an idea or identity by formulating it within a set of references from which an individual is able to associate with and be motivated enough to be mobilised into action (Snow, Rockford, Worden & Benford, 1986). A 'master frame', or the principal discourse, is essential to any movement (Snow et al., 1986; Xu, 2013).

Child node (Individual topics)		(*n*) of sermons coded in node	% of occurrence under parent node
What Islam is supposed to be like	Keeping a virtuous life	22	44
	Remembrance of God	15	30
	Manners, actions, behaviour	13	26
Singaporean Muslim identity	Contributing back to community	16	48
	Active agents of change	10	30
	Diversity of views	8	24

Radicalism	Rigid, literal interpretations	15	83
	Outdated	3	16
	Will take time to solve	2	6
Authenticity	Knowledge validates, authenticates	15	83
	Internet as untrustworthy	8	44
	True knowledge is beneficial knowledge	3	16

Table 3. Frequency count for child nodes (individual topics) that are raised most often in Friday prayer sermons.

In general, the sermons dedicate much time on differentiating the Singaporean Muslim from the radical Muslim; in other words, the former is everything the latter is not. Two sub-frames, inclusivity and progressiveness, complement the master frame; taken together, they help to amplify and widen the gulf of difference with the radical Muslims. Being inclusive implies recognising and acknowledging differences, not just amongst co-religionists (14 Jul) but also across religions and races as well (2 Jun). Inclusiveness is not just a praiseworthy attitude in general, but is also part of Islamic morals as well (11 Aug). A sign of inclusiveness is when the Singaporean Muslim contributes back to his nation, without any regard to the other person's race or religion. Singaporean Muslims are exhorted to 'work hard' (1 Sept) to contribute to the 'peace and prosperity' (25 Aug) of the country, and are also expected to help other racial and religious communities as well (2 Jun). In another instance, teenagers are advised to

'work hard to be an outstanding student…(and to) serve your community and country without any complaints or regrets' (19 May). Radical Muslims, on the other hand, are selfish (17 Mar) and exclusive. Not only are they unwilling to give back to the nation (10 Mar), and other members of the society, but they are unwilling to compromise their faith and views with both co-religionists (20 Jan) and non-Muslims (29 Sept).

Singaporean Muslim	Radical Muslim
*Muslims will always work hard to ensure that **they contribute to the community** that they live in…* (Muis sermon, 25 Aug 2017, 'The ethics of engaging the community')	*There are those (Muslims) who are influenced by calls to **participate in conflicts, wars and acts of violence**…All our efforts as a community can be easily affected…by the acts of (these Muslims)…* (Muis sermon, 25 Jun 2017, 'Islam respects local culture')

Table 4. Singaporean Muslims are portrayed as loyal, active, contributing citizens, while radical Muslims are those who are bent on destruction and violence.

In the sermons, progressivism means reading the religion with its historical, social (and political contexts in mind (10 Feb; 10 Mar; 29 Sept). It is used in opposition to literalism, where only the surface value of the religious text is taken, ignoring its proper contexts. Radicals are those who are extreme literalists (17 Mar; 1 Sept), holding on to views that are primitive and outdated (10 Mar; 11 Aug). Singaporean Muslims, on the other hand, are exhorted to take their religion through an accredited religious teacher, who has the authority to teach an authentic reading of the religion (6 Jan; 3 Mar). Learning religion through other media, like the Internet, is highly discouraged (21 Apr; 1 Sep) and can be seen as leading to radicalism. Finally, radical Muslims are seen as

those who are prone to emotional, sensational and false claims about Muslims (15 Sept); Singaporean Muslims, on the other hand, are encouraged to be calm and sensible when facing such claims (1 Sept).

Singaporean Muslim	Radical Muslim
We are…responsible (enough) to ensure that the religious education received by our families are ***authentic and proper****… and managed by qualified (religious teachers)…* (Muis sermon, 17 Mar 2017, 'A religious life based on knowledge')	*…do not make the religious information that we obtain from the Internet, books, social media applications and so on, be the* ***only methods of obtaining knowledge****…* (Muis sermon, 13 Jan 2017, 'Iqra': A valuable command from God to mankind')

Table 5. Singaporean Muslims are those who are responsible enough to seek religious guidance under an state accredited religious teacher, while radical Muslims seem to be self-taught on the Internet.

The last research question examines the similarity of frames used to talk about the Singaporean Muslim identity in the sermons and government narratives. Similar to the previous question, this is done by qualitatively analysing the sermons and the speeches. Three similar frames can be perceived: multiculturalism, increasing religiosity and contributing actively to society.

Singapore's multicultural background is promoted and exalted in the sermons and in the government speeches. Singaporean Muslims are praised not only for being well integrated into society (Tan, 2005; 25 Aug), but for their tolerance towards diversity (Yacob, 2018; 1 Dec) as well. Political leaders have also pointed out that mosques and

community leaders have actively and frequently reached out across the racial/religious divide (Ibrahim, 2002; Tan, 2005; Yacob, 2018); this fact is also repeatedly emphasised in the sermons (2 Jun; 14 Jul). Phrases like 'harmonious living' (Yacob, 2018; 11 Aug), 'inclusive' (Teo, 2017; 2 Jun) and ideas like conflict management (Teo, 2005; 25 Jun) are often discussed when talking about multiculturalism. Finally, both the speeches and the sermons make an appeal to Singapore's history when arguing for multiculturalism: both discourses record how the early generation of Singaporeans worked hard to form a multi-religious society (Nordin, 2009; 11 Aug), despite their differences. Singaporean Muslims are reminded that the status quo cannot be taken for granted and can be easily dismantled in the case of a terrorist attack (Nordin, 2009; 15 Sep).

Sermon	Government speech
*…the early Muslims had established a **harmonious** environment where they were able to live peacefully in a diverse and non-homogenous environment…*	*In fact, living **harmoniously** is not something new. In many circumstances since the Prophet's time, people of different faiths…shared common spaces…*
(Muis sermon, 14 Jul 2017, 'Love that shapes humanity')	(President Halimah Yacob, 26 May 2018, *Berita Harian* Charity Iftar)

Table 6. The phrase 'harmonious living' is often used when discussing multiculturalism.

Both the speeches and the sermons note that there has been an increase in religiosity amongst the Singaporean Muslim community (Lee, 2002; Nordin, 2009; 20 Jan; 7 Jul). While the sermons tend to see this rise as a somewhat positive trend (25 Jun; 7 Jul), both discourses caution against abandoning one's cultural roots for a more religious lifestyle (Lee, 2002; 25 Jun). This caveat is often implied as a key characteristic of

radical Muslims, who have shed their cultural values in favour for a puritanical Islamic lifestyle i.e. an exclusive society for Muslims (Lee, 2002). Such attitudes will only hurt the social fabric of the multi-religious Singaporean society.

Sermon	Government speech
*...the **desire to live a more Islamic lifestyle** is a positive development… However, being Islamic does not mean that we should **abandon our customs and cultures**...* (Muis sermon, 25 June 2017, 'Islam respects local culture')	*Over the last three decades…Muslims in the region, including Singapore, **are becoming stricter…even (in their) social interaction**, especially with non-Muslims.* (Then-Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew, 2002, speech for the 1st International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference)

Table 7. In both sources, increasing religiosity is often discussed alongside a disregard for local customs and culture.

Finally, Singaporean Muslims have been shown to be, or have been, contributing back to society. A particular thread of discussion present in both sources focuses on Singaporean Muslims being actively involved in changing their societies for the better (Ibrahim, 2002; 14 Apr; 11 Aug), instead of 'merely providing a critique' (Ibrahim, 2002). This change is often framed around issues involving social welfare (Ibrahim, 2002; Yacob, 2018), like drug abuse (5 May), poverty (14 Apr) or even in education (Ibrahim, 2002). These contributions have come to mean that a Singaporean Muslims have taken to a sense of rootedness and commitment to their country.

Sermon	Government speech
*We need to **be objective and not allow our emotions and anger to overcome us**. Seek out opportunities to help and to contribute positively (to the community).* (Muis sermon,1 September 2017, 'Transformation requires sacrifice')	*We must encourage more examples of such bottom-up movement that, **instead of merely providing a critique**, take ownership of issues in our community.* (Then-Minister-in-Charge for Muslim Affairs Yacob Ibrahim, 2011, 'The community spirit: United, gracious, progressive')

Table 8. Active participation is described as helping the community without the need for 'negative' attitudes or criticisms.

Quantitative questions

H1 states that building a Singapore identity and countering radicalism are the two topics that will be frequently addressed after spiritual and/or moral guidance. Table 1 above supports this hypothesis. After spiritual/moral guidance and emphasising a Singapore identity, the sermons pay equal attention on both radicalism and emphasising authenticity in instruction and in receiving religious knowledge.

H2 predicts that for every time radicalism is mentioned in a sermon, the Singapore national identity is also emphasised in the same sermon. This is calculated by using the cluster analysis function in NVivo 12, which groups nodes that share similar files based on a similarity metric (QSR International, n.d.). This paper calculates the similarity of sources in two nodes, namely, 'SINGAPORE IDENTITY' and 'RADICALISM', using the Pearson correlation coefficient. When taken at the parent node level, i.e. as an aggregate of child nodes, there is a negative correlation between the two categories (r=-36). NVivo 12 does not give the p values for this calculation. A chi-square test was

also conducted on the two nodes. The results achieved were also not statistically significant (χ^2=3.16, *df*=1, *p*>.05). H2 is thus not supported.

Interestingly, when assessed on a child node category level, two correlations appear to stand out. When addressing radicalism as an issue that takes a long time to solve, there is also a high chance (r=.69) that moderation is also emphasised in the same sermon. Further, when the sermon condemns radical teachings as being outdated, it is also somewhat likely to call for Singaporean Muslims to properly locate their understanding of the religion within the Singaporean context (r=.49), or to be aware of the the religion's original context and history (r=.46).

Discussion

The results presented in this paper are consistent with existing literature on state-written sermons (Wiktorowicz, 1999; Errihani, 2011). It also provides some evidence for the claims explicated by the scholars above. As expected, the sermons focus mainly on spiritual and moral guidance, as Mostarom (2014) has pointed out. Other tangentially religious topics, like national identity and radicalism, are only second place to its religious function. Nevertheless, these topics have been emphasised often enough to justify these sermons having a secondary function — as a tool to build national identity amongst the Singaporean Muslim community.

Although given autonomy in deciding its own religious affairs, it is too costly for Muis to ignore, or take a critical stance towards the state's narratives on national identity and radicalism. As the only government religious agency on Muslim affairs, not only would

it be incongruous with, and look bad on the rest of the political state machinery if Muis took a different direction, it might also throw some doubt on the patriotism of the religious elites running Muis, and, by extension, the Singaporean Muslim community. This dilemma has been pointed out by Tan (2008), although in a slightly different situation. In the fight against terrorism led by the United States, Muslims are told to be 'moderates', as how US government agencies saw it; otherwise they can be considered as 'extremists' (Tan, 2008). This has made those who are uncomfortable with these American narratives against terrorism reluctant to play a part, or remain silent in their criticisms, lest they find themselves being labelled as a radical Muslim sympathiser.

Similarly, to provide a dissenting opinion when the state is strong and united against what it perceives as radical teachings will prove unwise for Muis, risking its legitimacy as a trusted religious state department. In 2017, an foreign imam working in Singapore was filmed supplicating against Christians and Jews after a Friday prayer. The video was uploaded online; the state's reaction towards the imam was extremely severe. He was found guilty of promoting religious enmity and of commit and an 'act prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony' (Toh, 2017) and subsequently fined. He then personally apologised to Christian and Jewish leaders in separate meetings, after which he was being repatriated back to India, his home country (Today, 2017; Toh, 2017). The Home Affairs Minister (Shanmugam, 2017), along with a few other ministers (see Mohamad, 2017), roundly repudiated the imam's actions as provocative and excessive. The state was unanimous in its opinion that the imam's prayer was tantamount to spreading religious disharmony, and silenced contrary opinions as un-Singaporean (Mohamad, 2017; Shanmugam, 2017; Toh, 2017; Today, 2017). Muis, predictably, repeated the state

narrative, insisting that religious leaders instead focus on praying for harmonious living in a multi-religious society and individual spiritual guidance (Muis, 2017). The imam's actions proved that there was a heavy price to pay for acting contrary to the state wishes. Under the RCTR framework, it would have been more optimal for Muis to stick to the government line, as what it has done, rather than come up with its own opinion and risk being seen as an obstacle to the inter-religious relations and, by extension, being disloyal to the country.

As mentioned earlier, the sermons also function as a nation-building tool for the Singaporean Muslim community, albeit dressed in religious terms. This national identity is mainly presented with a classic capitalist ethic. Singaporean Muslims are exhorted to work hard (14 Apr; 25 Aug) to contribute to the nation's prosperity not just because it is the best choice for Singapore, their homeland, but also because it is a religiously sanctioned act (18 Aug). This is further reinforced by making an appeal to history, by showing how some early Muslim migrants to ancient Ethiopia contributed to the largely Christian economy there (2 Jun). This capitalist ethos has been a constant presence in the state's nation-building narratives, as pointed out by some scholars (Chua & Kuo, 1995; Kwok & Ali, 1998). Hence, in this vein, the sermons can be said to be an 'instrument of indoctrination' (Iannaconne, 1998, p. 162) in the state's nation-building machinery, repeating its narratives, albeit with a religious sheen.

Capitalist ethic: Appeal to history	Capitalist ethic: Exhortation to teenagers
The early Muslims who had migrated to Abyssinia…continued to ***contribute to the country's growth and prosperity****.* (Muis sermon, 2 Jun 2017, 'Community of rahmah')	*…use this time to* ***work hard to be an outstanding student, and to be excellent in all your undertakings****. Serve your community and country…strive for the highest levels of success…* (Muis sermon, 19 May 2017, 'A prosperous community: Empowering teenagers')

Table 9. Examples of the capitalist ethic used in the sermons.

Further, on some occasions, the sermons discussed government policies or campaigns that was also in the media during the week. Scholars have also pointed out that the Singaporean media, including the newspapers, has also been used as a platform for government communication (Bokhorst-Heng, 2002; Goh & Pang, 2016). During the coding process, it was found that some sermons either provided a religious spin to an ongoing government campaign, like a water conservation campaign (24 Mar), or tried to justify state policies, like the Asatizah Recognition Scheme, a nationwide accreditation programme for all religious teachers, reinforced in early 2017 as part of the state's moves to clamp down on radical teachings. In both cases, these two government programmes were also covered in newspaper reports during the week. Table 10 below records some of these instances. This shows that the sermons are sometimes utilised as part of a larger state communications campaign to target key sectors of the. Further studies should be done on earlier sermons, to see if a proper relationship can be ascertained between the sermons and the mentions in the media.

Policy under discussion	Sermon extract & date of mention	Newspaper extract & date of mention
Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS)	*Imagine, would you allow an untrained doctor to perform a surgery on yourself? Surely we do not want any physical harm… (so then) what about our fears related to the religion…and to our safety in the hereafter?* (Muis sermon, 6 Jan 2017, 'A smart and understanding educator')	*If other professions, like lawyers, have a code of conduct, it would be more befitting for religious teachers…to have a code of conduct under ARS, because religious teachers are leaders and play an important role… in society.* Berita Harian, 7 Jan 2017, 'ARS code of ethics needed in efforts to unite community'*
Water conservation	*At times, we have to reflect upon how we have been managing out water resources. This is especially true in Singapore that has not had to deal with water shortage thus far.* (Muis sermon, 24 Mar 2017, 'Balance in God's creations')	…'*Singaporeans have to be thankful and remind one another on the importance of water in Singapore,'... said the (Minister for the Water and Water Resources) Masagos during his visit after… Friday prayers yesterday… to promote awareness on water conservation issues amongst the congregants…* Berita Harian, 25 Mar 2017, 'Masagos: Community has a role in saving water'*

Table 10. Some government campaigns which are also covered in newspaper during the same week. An asterisk (*) means that the article was translated from Malay.

The results in H2 state that there is no correlation between radicalism and the Singaporean Muslim identity being mentioned in the same sermon. This could mean that despite the master frame of differentiating the Singaporean Muslim from the radical Muslim, these two ideal types are generally being treated separately. In other words, the

sermons place more emphasise on the Singapore Muslim identity and exhorting Singaporean Muslims into contributing back to society as a way of tackling radicalism rather than listing down the possible traits of a radical Muslim.

Finally, the sermons press for social reform at the individual level. It argues that change can only happen when individuals first reform their own morals and character (7 Apr). Thus the expectation and burden for positive change is placed on the individual; change is limited only to solving social ills, rather than political or cultural overhaul. The sermons barely mention what the individual might expect from the state to help in making the change. This is not surprising, as sermons are a one-way medium of communication from the state to its people (Azodanloo, 2007). This narrative is recorded by Tan (2007) as the state's master frame in its citizenship discourse. Singaporeans are reminded to perform their duties and show loyalty to their nation (Tan, 2007); the emphasis is on the citizen's duty to the state, rather than the citizen's rights on the state. The semblance in the sermons with this narrative as recorded by Tan (2007) is uncanny.

Is there, therefore, any semblance of similarity between Muis' narratives and the state's discourses? The simple answer is yes. Is the degree of similarity in Singapore considered unusually high or comparable to other countries with a central religious department? This paper cannot give a definitive answer. At present, there are no quantitative studies which establishes what a 'high' level of cooptation entails, or at what quantity does it become 'high'. What is certain, is that when analysed qualitatively, there are some overlaps in the frames used in the sermons and the

speeches when the Singaporean Muslim identity and radicalism is discussed. Taking this into consideration, this paper suggests that the degree of similarity for Singapore is in the higher ends of the scale. This claim should be qualified further in future studies.

The results from this paper raises two questions for the future of state-Muis and state-Muslim relations. First, how effective have top-down state-led narratives been in combatting, or preventing radical teaching, given that radical discontent might also stem from a perceived political suppression (15 Sept)? Repeating, or being seen as repeating state narratives might only further cement the accusation of being a 'state puppet' amongst not just the Singaporean Muslim community, but also amongst the radical Muslims. This might therefore discredit Muis' messages in favour of teachings from other (non-governmental) local or foreign sources that dare to adopt narrative different from the state's, which may or may not be radical. Further, given that the spread of radical teachings is real threat to Singapore, to what extent would the Muslim community allow for heavy state imposition of its own narrative on them? This paper has no pretensions in answering these questions, which could perhaps one day be fully expounded in another study. In addition to that, more in-depth content analyses could certainly be done on both Muis' sermons and government documents within a wider time frame to provide more accurate and reliable results, and perhaps establish a firmer relationship between the state's and Muis' narratives. A comparison content analysis should also be done between Muis' and non-governmental Muslim organisations, to see if the RCTR framework can still be upheld when tested with a religious provider who might not have a strong dependence on the state. Further, studies comparing the trajectory of the government's narratives on Islam and Singaporean Muslims pre-9/11

and post-9/11 might also be helpful in positioning state-Muslim relations within the *longue durée*. A study quantitatively analysing the similarities (and its statistical significance, if any) in the use of frames in Muis and state documents would be beneficial in establishing a quantitative standard for cooptation in state-religious community relations. Separately, the research design used in this paper can be tweaked to test for similarity of frames in several other countries with official religious departments and in different religions as well.

Conclusion

The subject of state-Muslim relations in Singapore has been much studied over the years. However, these studies have provided little methodological evidence, relying only on select case studies, interviews with a few key individuals, and anecdotes to back their claims. This paper examines this relationship by conducting a content analysis on Friday prayer sermons in Singapore, which are written by Muis, an autonomous religious state department in charge of setting the religious direction and policy for Singaporean Muslims. Using RCTR as a theoretical framework, this paper argues that it is in Muis' best interests as a resource optimiser to toe the government line when it comes to discussions on the Singaporean Muslim identity and radicalism. As the state opinion in these two issues are strong and united, it would be unwise for Muis to provide a dissenting or critical opinion, lest it suffer severe repercussions, including the loss of its legitimacy from the state and doubting its loyalty to the nation. This has been shown in the headscarf and the imam affairs as discussed above, where the state, united in its opinion, harshly clamped down on individuals or groups who went against them. In all of these cases, Muis supported the government narrative. However, when there

was nothing to lose, and when the state opinion was less strong and not quite as united, like that in the casino affair, there was room for Muis to provide an alternative voice, as there was nothing to lose in doing so.

The results from the content analysis are consistent with other studies done on countries with state-written Friday prayer sermons, which focuses on issues like national identity and radicalism. After spiritual and moral guidance, the Friday prayer sermons in Singapore raise issues relating to the Singaporean Muslim identity and radicalism. The sermons' master narrative emphasises on differentiating the Singaporean Muslim from the radical Muslim, by highlighting the former group's inclusivity towards other races and religions, and also their progressive understanding of Islam. Singaporean Muslims, despite their religiosity are shown to be rooted to their homeland by being active contributors to the economic and social prosperity of the country. These frames have some overlap with government narratives. Similar terms like 'harmonious living', have been used both in the sermons and government speeches when talking about the multi-religious Singaporean society. Further, both sources also claim that there has been an increase in religiosity amongst the Muslim community, leading to the erosion of local culture in favour of a more puritanical reading of religion. Finally, there seems to be no statistically significant relationship between the mention of radicalism in a sermon and the emphasis on a Singaporean Muslim identity. The results from this paper raises two implications: first, the effectiveness in having a forceful, top-down state narrative in combatting radical teaching, given that radicalism sometimes stems from the perceived political suppression of the 'true' Islam, and second, the extent to which the state should regulate and enforce its own narratives. The research methods used in this paper can and

should be modified and expanded for future studies, so that a stronger relationship can be explored and established for use in Singapore and in other countries with a similar political arrangement.

9842 words

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Appendix A: List of government speeches

Speech title (Date)	Interlocutor	Remarks
The East Asian strategic balance after 9/11 (31 May 2002)	Senior Minister Lee Kan Yew	Address at the first International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Conference. The IISS is an influential British research institute in defence and national security issues.
Threat of terrorism	Minister for Home Affairs, Wong Kan Seng	First official remarks after the arrests arrests of a group of jihadist Singaporean Muslims, who had planned to bomb key American installations in Singapore. This was the first direct jihadist threat for Singapore.
Speech on the White Paper on JI arrests and the threat of terrorism (21 Jan 2003)	Acting Minister for Community Development and Sports and Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs, Yaacob Ibrahim	Official remarks from the state's Muslim political representative on the arrests of a group of jihadist Singaporean Muslims, who had planned to bomb key American installations in Singapore. This was the first direct jihadist threat for Singapore.
Enhancing Singapore's national security (18 July 2005)	Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, Dr Tony Tan	First government statement after the 7/7 London Bombings

Nation building tenets (19 August 2009)	Member of Parliament Zainudin Nordin	This was a rebuttal to another member of parliament's address, questioning the tenets in the National Pledge. He was severely reprimanded by Lee Kan Yew in parliament for his 'highfalutin' ideas (Yeo, 2009).
The community spirit: United, gracious, progressive (9 September 2011)	Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts, and Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs, Yaacob Ibrahim	Speech at the Minister's Hari Raya get-together, an annual dinner which gathers together Muslim community leaders with members of parliament.
Meningkatkan peranan masyarakat bagi menangani ancaman ekstremisme (Enhancing the role of the community to tackle the threat of extremism) (30 Sep 2017)	Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Teo Chee Hean	Speech at the 13th Ministry of Home Affairs Appreciation Lunch for community volunteers, including religious leaders involved in counselling radical Singaporean Muslims. Speech given in Malay and English.
Staying united against the terrorism threat (3 October 2017)	Chairman of the Government Parliamentary Committee for Home Affairs and Law and Member of Parliament, Christopher de Souza	N/A
Speech at the Berita Harian Charity Iftar 2018 (26 May 2018)	Halimah Yacob	Halimah Yacob is Singapore's Malay/Muslim President after almost 50 years.

Table 11. List of government speeches used in this paper and its interlocutors.

Appendix B: List of parent & child nodes (Sermons)

Source count refers to the total number of sermons coded under that node. A sermon can be coded in more than one node. The aggregate source count in the parent node (in bold) only counts each nodes once, regardless of how many times it has been coded in that category's child nodes.

Node name	Source count
What Islam is supposed to be like	**50**
Moral duty	45
Positive moral duty	39
Keeping a virtuous life	22
Remembrance of God	15
Manners, action, behaviour	13
Dakwah (Proselytisation)	8
Role of religion	4
Seeking knowledge	1
Negative moral duty	16
Negative moral traits	13
Excessiveness	4
Extreme enthusiasm	1
This is the trait of ibad alRahman..	1
Singapore identity	**33**
Creating a community of excellence	29
Contributing back to community	16
Active agents of change	10
Diversity of views	8
Moderation	4
Identity	3
Civilisation of knowledge	2

Contextualisation	10
Applying principles	7
Being aware of context and history	5
Ritualisation	3
Increase in religiosity	4
Authenticity	**18**
Knowledge validates, authenticates	15
Internet as untrustworthy	8
True knowledge is beneficial knowledge	3
Radicalism	**18**
Rigid, literal interpretations	15
Causing trouble in the name of religion	13
Outdated	3
Will take time to solve	2
Battle of good vs evil	1
Family	**15**
Responsibility as fathers	10
Family support	7
Men as leader of family	7
Family as peace and serenity	4
Family as a challenge	3
Responsibility as husbands	3
Youth	3
Family as society	1
Family responsibilities	1
Marriage	1
Responsibility as children	1
Authority	**14**

Roles	10
To educate	8
Contextualises	3
Gather in depth knowledge	2
Skills of religious elites	5
Correct sources, interpretation	4
Status of religious elites	4
Policy justification	**13**
Asatizah Recognition Scheme	3
Obligation, not policy	3
Authenticate skills, qualifications	2
Asatizah need skills	1
Family problem domestic violence	3
Divorce	2
AMLA, mosque	1
Drugs	1
HOTA	1
Mental health	1
Water	1
Changing new world	**11**
Challenges	9
Negative	8
Neutral	2
Positive	1
Uncertainty, confusion	3
Environment	**2**

Table 12. Full list of parent and child nodes coded from the sermons (*n*=54).

Appendix C: List of parent & child nodes (Government speeches)

Node name	Source count
Politics	**4**
Globalisation	4
Political Islam	1
The role of the United States	1
Radicalism	**6**
Characteristics of a radical	4
Exclusive	3
Happens to anyone	1
Hatred	1
Hatred of the west	1
In search of deeper meaning	1
Transnationalism	2
Denounce radicalism	3
Not Islam	4
Outside of Islam	3
Singapore national identity	**9**
Changing social, racial environment	1
Equality, meritocracy	2
Historical racial events	1
Multiculturalism	1
Muslims	8
Accreditation	1
Active citizens	6
Identity	5
In a multicultural or secular state	3
Increasingly religious	2
Integration	5

Moderation	4
Tolerance	5
Not arrived yet	2
Race and religion as fault lines	1
Resilience	2
Terrorism	**2**
Existing and extant threat	4
Extraordinary	3
Long fight	3
Measures against	3
Trust	2
Not immune	2
Seeks to split community	1
Taking charge	4

Table 13. Full list of parent and child nodes coded from the government speeches (*n*=9).

Appendix D: Comparison diagram

A comparison diagram compares between two nodes, namely, SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY and RADICALISM, to see the amount of similar sources (sermons) that they share. The files in the middle are the sermons that have been coded in both nodes. Those on the left are the sermons unique to RADICALISM, and on the left, SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY.




Figure 3. Comparison diagram between the nodes SINGAPORE NATIONAL IDENTITY and RADICALISM.