THE IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC DIVISION IN AFGHANISTAN, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE HAZARA MONGOLS

Thesis presented to the
Faculty of Anthropology and Geography

for
the degree of
Bachelor of Letters

by

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Anthropology

June 1976.

'Afghanistan forms neither a geographical nor an ethnographic unit; rather it is a conglomeration of different races and tribes who are only held together by the common religious bond of Islam and the rule of the Barakzais.'

B.N. Datta, An enquiry into the racial elements in Beluchistan, Afghanistan and the neighbouring areas of the Hindu Kush. Man in India, 1939.

'Successive travellers will in vain endeavour by their observations and researches in the Mohamedan districts of Central Asia, to give exact ideas of that country and population that will be correct for any length of time. They will never be able to do more than describe with precision the state in which they find it, on account of the multiplicity of political changes, followed by the displacement of whole tribes, the turning of rivers and the destruction of towns near the ruins of which others will rise in an incredibly short space of time.....How is it possible to establish any system for the future student or traveller where everything is perpetually changing or even to relate distinctly what has happened?'

J.P. Ferrier, Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and Beluchistan, 1856.

Contents

ABSTRACT

The study of Afghanistan has been more limited than that of other areas of the Moslem world. Afghanistan tends to fall outside the neat categories of Middle East, South Asia or Central Asia, utilised by historians and social scientists. Indeed, up until the nineteenth century, the area was only rarely penetrated by western travellers or scholars and many were hampered in their investigations by a hostile or inaccessible situation. The accounts of this period were often written by European army officers or travellers and such sources, some of which have been used in the present study, need to be read with caution. An awareness of the writer's backgrounds, training and motives is important, because some reports are biased and perhaps not as reliable as one would wish. A more accurate picture of this period could possibly be obtained by consulting archives in Kabul, and it is hoped that this will be carried out at a future date.

With the increase of foreign political and economic influence in the area, Afghanistan in the twentieth century has been more open to Western ethnographers and other social scientists. These have been mainly American, Russian, German, French and Danish and the Central Asian Research Centre in London has assisted researchers in collecting and translating various works. However, our general anthropological knowledge of this area remains limited and it is notable that women anthropologists have undertaken little study in Afghanistan.

The present study is not based on fieldwork and therefore attempts to examine one ethnic group in Afghanistan with the help of library materials available in Britain. The Hazaras are a minority ethnic group, with a history of slavery and oppression, who have attracted the attention of foreign ethnographers because of their supposed Mongol descent. They are the main religious heterodox group in Afghanistan and this fact appears to have considerable importance in their relationship with the ruling Pashtuns. Accordingly I have attempted here to outline some of the main features of

ethnic relations in Afghanistan, concentrating particularly on the Hazara-Pashtun relationship as it has developed or changed in the last hundred years. This discussion may indicate general directions for the analysis of ethnicity and the ethnic group.

Sources for this thesis were found in two main areas. Firstly secondary sources on Afghanistan in recent years were available in libraries in Oxford andLondon. These were mainly English and American, thus omitting much possibly relevant Russian material, although some Russian articles in translation were available from the Central Asian Research Centre. Primary sources and rare volumes were consulted at the India Office archives, which forms a valuable repository for information received through British sources in India and Afghanistan.

Chapter One of the thesis provides an introduction to Afghan society, outlining the contemporary environmental and social divisions. In Chapter Two, recent ethnography is utilised to present a description of Hazara society of the last thirty years. Chapter Three takes the historical viewpoint of discussing the various theories of Hazara ethnogenesis and also describes the state of Hazara society in the nineteenth century, when the forces of European imperialism and Afghan nationalism were already beginning to impinge on the isolation of the Hazaras and to effect changes in ethnic relations. The fourth chapter suggests certain results of these changes; the Hazara resistance to the rise of the Sunni state and the way in which sectarian allegiences were mobilised as political forces. One particular area where ethnic relations have been crucial in an economic and possibly political sense is in the relationship between the sedentary Hazaras and the Pashtun nomads, and this is discussed in Chapter Five. Chapter six finally attempts to review these developments described, in the light of contemporary theories of ethnicity. Further research and fieldwork would enable a more definitive anthropological study to be undertaken, but the present study limits itself to describing the changes in ethnic relations and suggesting points for more detailed investigation.

Acknowledgements

I should like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Schuyler Jones, for his advice and encouragement during the preparation of this thesis, the staff of the India Office Library, London and the Indian Institute Library, Oxford for their assistance, and my father and husband for their constant support in recent months. Finally I thank Daphne Bartrum for fast and efficient typing.

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CHAPTER ONE : THE DIVISIONS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN

This introductory chapter illustrates the general environmental, social and political divisions to be found in contemporary Afghanistan. It therefore provides a background for the more specific discussion of the Hazaras and their relationship with other ethnic groups, given in the following chapters.

Afghanistan has stood at the crossroads of four ecological and cultural areas: the Middle East, Central Asia, India and the Far East. The mountains of the Hindu Kush have acted as a breakwater, diverting westwards the migrations from Asia and the expansion of empires from the time of Alexander to Tamerlane. As the Central and South Asian Empires declined, the nineteenth century saw the rise of British and Russian influence in the area. From this mixture of populations, languages and cultures, developing over centuries, Afghanistan is now a conglomerate of Aryan, Mongolian, Dravidian and Semitic elements.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan is generally considered to have been founded in 1747 under Ahmad Shah Durrani, but the creation of the nation state was largely effected during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). However, the concept of nationhood is still confined to an educated elite, most people identifying themselves with place of origin or ethnic affiliation. The term 'Afghan' is still taken by most people to be synonymous with 'Pashtun', thus indicating the prominence of the Pashtuns in Afghan political life. Not surprisingly, in such a diverse situation, the construction of a centralised government and the expansion of state control has proved difficult and met with considerable resistance. The Constitution of 1964, modelled on

the Western liberal-democratic ideal, provides for a bi-cameral parliament, one house of which is elected by the people. By dividing the country into more administrative districts than ever before, it also increases the presence of the government bureaucratic machine in the provinces. But even now this control is not uniform throughout and is noticeably resisted in border provinces such as ~~Paktya~~ Paktya.

Concurrent with the development of the state of Afghanistan in the world political scene, has been an attempted 'Pashtunisation' of the country. The government has thus promoted, at various judicious moments, the Pashto language, the Aryan origins of the top strata of the population and the creation of the state of 'Pashtunistan', all supposedly 'national' issues. Pashto and Persian both dominate the media and education, but nevertheless, ethnic and cultural differences persist, in a situation where industrialisation and Westernisation have not yet developed to any considerable degree outside Kabul.

Environmental Divisions

Afghanistan is a very varied country geographically, as the map on page 164 indicates. The country is dominated by the mountainous core of the Hindu Kush which stretches six hundred miles from southwest to northeast and provides the source for the four main rivers: the Amu Darya (Oxus), Hari Rūd, Helmand-Arghandab and the Kabul River. North of the Hindu Kush are the Turkestan plains and to the south and southwest are stony deserts. Much of the country is semi-desert, with bare rock at altitudes of over 14,000 feet, although the fertile

area of Jalalabad provides an exception. The Hazarajat, where a large proportion of the Hazara population is found, forms the greater part of the central mountains. This is a barren elevated tableland with summits of up to 17,000 feet and forms the least production agricultural area in the whole country. The few wide valleys are usually inhabited and cultivated or used as summer grazing grounds, ailaqs, for livestock. The pasturage is exploited by Pashtun nomads and Hazaras, but in the higher regions subsistence living is reduced to a very low level and is a contributory cause of the considerable seasonal migration to the cities. Climatic conditions are also difficult; in Ghor, for example, temperatures may range between - 12.2°C in January to 24.9°C in July, and rainfall between 0mm. in October to 93mm. in April. In the winter heavy snows occur in the Hazarajat and wolves are prominent. Where conditions are favourable, crops (including wheat and barley,) are grown on the irrigated land, and the government is encouraging the plantation of poplar trees in the most low-lying areas. Various ores such as iron, zinc and copper as well as marble and jade are found in the area, but it is not known to what extent these are exploited.

The area around Kabul has been the most open to new developments in agriculture, with experimental farms being set up and the development of viticulture in Baghlan, north of Kabul. But although parts of the Hazarajat were on the traditional trade route from India to Balkh, the area has been relatively unaffected by modern developments. The Kabul Times Annual of 1967[1] stated that in the Uruzgan area no use was

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1. Kabul Times Annual, Kabul, 1967, p.149.

made of modern tools, machinery or fertilisers, but that in Bamian and Ghor the government was planning to set up experimental farms and in Wardak attempts were being made to increase wheat production.

Ethnic Divisions

Within this disparate ecological setting of Afghanistan are found the various ethnic groups. The population is almost entirely Moslem, with various Indo-European languages being spoken, but as Persian, Central-Asian, Sino-Siberian, European (Hellenistic and Roman), Indian, Turkish, Arab and Mongol populations have contributed towards the composition of the present inhabitants, the situation is inevitably rather complex.

The map on page 165 indicates the major ethnic groups and their distribution today. No national census has yet been taken and population estimates vary between 8 and 16 million. Ludolf Fischer[1], for example, suggests a population of 15 million, composed of 12½ million sedentary persons and 2½ million nomads.

The Pashtuns are the most prominent ethnic group in the political sector, and their relationship with the Hazaras has been most crucial in terms of the changes in Hazara society. Pashtuns, or 'Afghans' as they are known within the country, are of a Mountain Iranian stock that became nomadic after the Turco-Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century.

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1. Fischer,L., Geomedical Monograph Series, No.2 - Afghanistan, 1968, p.77.

They are mainly Sunni Moslems and form roughly half the population of the country. All of southern Afghanistan is populated by Pashtun tribes and the sedentary groups form the major sector of all urban populations. The Royal family, of which the present President and Prime Minister, Daud[1], is a member, have always been members of a Pashtun tribe and at present the government, control of the media and the highest ranks of professionals are in the hands of Pashtuns. Although Tajiks are increasingly represented in the ministries and commerce, it seems fair to say that monopolisation of political power and resources is held by one ethnic group.

Pashto is one of the two official languages, though the other, Persian, is increasingly spoken in the towns and is almost exclusively used within the Kabul-based administration. On the whole, the dominant Afghan element at the moment is Kabuli and Persianised.

The Mongol populations in Afghanistan are generally divided into three groups: the Moghols, previously resident in Ghor, but now settled in the Herat area, who are culturally and physically indistinguishable from the other groups, but who have retained elements of their Mongol language and are Sunnis; the Chahar Aimaq, Persian-speaking tribes living in Herat and Maimana Provinces, generally considered to be an old Iranian population, but as their name suggests - chahar (four:Persian) and aimaq (tribe:Turco-Mongol) - they have been exposed to Central Asian influence and admixture. They are also Sunnis. The

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1. He deposed his brother-in-law and first cousin, King Mohamed Zahir Shah on 17th July 1973, declaring the country a republic.

third group (the Hazaras), are the focus of this study, and are sedentary mountaineer agriculturalists, one million in number, often mongoloid in features and speaking the Tajik dialect of Persian. In the Hazarajat area they are almost entirely Imami Shi'a, but those found further north near Mazar-i-Sharif and Qataghan as well as some in Besud, are Ismailis. Increasing numbers of Hazaras are moving to the towns of Afghanistan, especially to Kabul, either as seasonal workers or permanent migrants.

The Tajiks have been mentioned as increasing their influence in the economic and professional sector, but in fact they cannot be described as one diachronic ethnic group. The term Tajik covers a wide range of peoples in Afghanistan, the Soviet Central Asian Republics and Chinese Sinkiang and generally refers to Persian speaking sedentary Moslems. In Afghanistan, this includes Heratis, Tajiks in Turkestan and the Mountain Tajiks of the Hindu Kush area, notably in Badakhshan.

Turkic populations are found in the North of Afghanistan, in Western Turkestan and larger populations of Uzbeks throughout the area. These latter are descendants of an aboriginal Iranian population now Turkicised and nomadic and semi-nomadic groups related to the Qara qalpaqs and the Qazakhs. Other ethnic groups in contemporary Afghanistan include Nuristanis in East Afghanistan, Baluchis and Brahmins in the Southern deserts and small numbers of Sikhs, Arabs and Jews in the towns.

Religious Divisions

It is significant that the Pashtun monopoly of governmental control

has been partly legitimated by their Sunni affiliation. The majority of the population in Afghanistan are Sunni Moslems, with the Shi'as in a minority, and there is a history of discrimination and emnity between the two groups within the country as a whole, as throughout the Moslem world. Briefly, Sunnism, to which a majority of Moslems adhere, is taken to mean the orthodox position within Islam. The sunna, or codes for Moslem behaviour, were originally formulated as an amalgamation of ancient custom, contemporary practice and the ideal behaviour of the Prophet as enshrined in tradition. The Hanafi branch of Sunnism was declared the official religion of Afghanistan in the Constitutions of 1931 and 1964, though the degrees of implementation of this constitutional point have varied from time to time, as I shall discuss later.

Shi'ism, the largest Islamic sect, began as a political movement among the Arabs themselves as a revolt against the Sunni ruling classes, rather than a theological opposition to Sunni doctrine. The word 'shi'ah' means 'the party' and refers to the original followers who wanted the control of the state to be given to a charismatic leader. The first main divergence is seen in the Shi'ite veneration of Ali and his descendants, the Imams, as legitimate successors of the Prophet. A reliance on the consensus of the community was thus replaced by a belief in the infallibility of the Imams and the mujtahids, the leading theologians. One authority on Islam characterises Shi'ism thus:-

> 'On the one hand their religion was centred on a principle of absolute personal authority, foreign

> both in politics and religion to the orthodox theory, and on the other hand it permitted a much wider measure of development and adaptation to the circumstances of successive generations under the theoretical guidance of the divinely inspired Imam.'[1]

The second main divergence centres around the passion motif and Hussein's death, seen as a redemptive suffering whereby his true followers may enter Paradise. This is duly celebrated in the re-enactment of his funeral, the self-flagellation and the Passion Play of the Tenth of Muharram. It is generally considered that Shi'ism is more mystical than Sunnism, indicated by the development of Sufism, and has kept a closer link between the secular and the religious.

For practical purposes, there are differences in Sunni and Shi'a law and in inheritance rights, especially those relating to women, which are more favourable in Shi'a law. A sister, for example, inherits half of her brother's share in the patrimony, and as inheritance favours Mo, Fa, Hu, Wi, So, Da, as opposed to agnates and collaterals. it is therefore possible for a woman to inherit an entire estate, which would be impossible under Sunni law. Temporary marriage is said to be allowed among the Shi'a Hazaras[2] in which a written contract is signed, specifying the duration of the marriage and a nominal bride price. Wilbur's explanation is that these temporary marriages are considered to be expedient if a tribal chief wishes to entertain lavishly and thus needs

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1. Gibb, H.A.R., Mohammedanism, 1969, p.83.

2. Wilbur, D., ed. Afghanistan, 1962, p.346.

extra female domestic servants in addition to his wife. It is not customary to employ unmarried women in the household, so the institution of temporary marriage solves this problem. Widows whose husbands had no families to provide for them are usually chosen, and if children result from the union the husband is then obliged to support permanently the wife of the offspring. Wilbur's explanation needs to be treated with caution, until further research clarifies the situation.

The two main Shi'a groups in Afghanistan are the Imamis or Athna Ashariya, and the Ismailis. The Imamis are the larger group and recognise twelve Imams, the last of whom is to reappear before the Last Judgement. Imami Shi'ism was probably introduced from Persia in the sixteenth century and is now found mainly among the Hazaras and Qizilbash. The Ismailis recognise the first six Imams, but then follow a different line that culminates in the present day Agha Khan. They developed a division between the religion practised by the ordinary people and a Neo-Platonic interpretation for the initiates. Ismailism in Afghanistan is probably the result of an Indian influence; in the case of the Ismailis of Badakhshan and the Wakhan the influence probably came from Hunza. Many Hazaras are Ismailis, notably those of the Sheikh Ali and others north of the Koh-i-Baba range.

The relationship between ethnic group and sect is striking and will be discussed in more detail later, but suffice it for the moment to note that comments made by two anthropologists. Ferdinand writes that:-

'A Hazara will deny that he is of the same tribe as a

> Hazara Ismailiya, and a common Afghan who is a Sunni will often in his general antipathy to the Shi'as call a Qizilbash a Hazara. This attitude has greatly helped to keep the Hazaras distinct and apart from others.'[1]

and Canfield notes:-

> 'The ethnic categories 'Tajik' and 'Afghan' imply the sectarian category 'Sunni'; 'Afshar' implies 'Imami', and 'Hazara' and 'Sayyed' imply either Imami or Ismaili religious affiliations. This correlation between ethnicity and sect is so close that when informants mentioned instances of Hazaras converting to Sunnism, they spoke of them as having 'become Tajik'.'[2]

This religious and ethnic antipathy is reinforced by prejudices, as illustrated in a book by a former Director General of Education in Afghanistan:-

> 'Face is called an index of the mind, and eye its window. Why about half the Shi'as all over the world have squint? They recollected the tragedies of the House of the Prophet with tears, and admidst mourning had an indignant eye on the usurpers whom, dead and gone, they could not injure. The distorted and oblique vision evolved the squint, or what else could be the physiological cause?'[3]

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1. Ferdinand, K., Preliminary notes on Hazara culture, 1959, p.16.
2. Canfield, R.L., Faction and conversion in a plural society: Religious alignments in the Hindu Kush, 1973A, p.4.
3. Khan, M.H., A few phases of the Afghans in Jullundur Busties, 1938, p.143.

In the face of the persecution that Shi'as have received in Afghanistan, as in other Moslem countries, members of the sect are allowed to practise taqiya or dissimulation. But conversion between the sects is possible; generally between Imami and Ismaili and from Shi'a to Sunni. One educated Afghan, in personal communication, said that although his family were Qizilbash and therefore originally Shi'a, his grandparents had converted to Sunnism on settling in Kabul, and subsequently built up a successful commercial enterprise. This seems to be fairly common practice, especially in the business sector; conversion to Sunnism is a definite advantage.

It is important to note here the part played in all sects by the leaders of the religious community. The government - paid hierarchy of religious leaders remains substantially as it was when created by Abdur Rahman. Sunni leaders, especially, have many vested interests in land, politics, control of educational institutions, and in tribal situations the power of life and death over their followers, which the government is powerless to revoke.

Economic and social divisions

As in many countries, the national expenditure in Afghanistan is not distributed equally among the population, nor fed into those areas most in need of it. Foreign aid, mainly American and Russian, has often been used in prestige projects or for an overt political purpose by the donors. The main areas of development in the country, apart from Kabul, have been the Helmund Valley and the ex-

pansion of the industrial sector, as in the cotton mills of Kunduz, Pul-i-Khumri and Gulbahar. The Hazarajat and the central mountain area has been virtually untouched, though it is stated that the Asian Highway will pass through Ghor on its way from Kabul to Herat. (Kabul Times Annual, 1967:112). As stated before, the nature of the terrain in the Hazarajat makes agricultural development very difficult, and conditions of extreme poverty are found amongst the population there. Down in the plains of Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Laghman, the rich lands are owned mainly by Sunni Pashtuns, who over the years have increased their profits through extensive irrigation works, such as canals and karezes (underground channels for irrigation). In the highlands, on the other hand, cultivable land is scarce; the average amount of cultivated land per Hazarajat resident is 1.78 jeribs (about half an acre), whereas the national average is 2.08 jeribs. The average amount of cultivated land per operator for the nation at large is 12.07 jeribs. As a result, seasonal migration as well as permanent emigration from the Hazarajat is increasing, but work as day labourers in the towns does not bring much security and many move from rural poverty to urban squalor.

This disparity between the cultivable plains and the central highlands is also reflected in the social amenities provided in the different areas. The main hospitals, schools, clinics and factories are found in Kabul, and any agricultural experimentation is carried out in the lowland areas, as for example in the expansion of viticulture in the Charikar area north of Kabul. In the central provinces the facilities are scarce. Fischer (1968:133) states that Kandahar Province has

six hospitals with a total of 160 beds, whereas Bamian has one with 15 beds, Ghor one with 20 beds, Uruzgan one with 13 beds and Wardak one with 2 beds. Infant mortality is at 50.4% in the Hazarajat, and undernutrition, rickets, vitamin deficiencies and other associated diseases are present in the area. Leprosy is endemic in the Hazarajat, ten cases being found in Panjaw in 1969 and resistance to the disease is lowered by the conditions of malnutrition. It is not known whether the proposed leprosarium has been built.

As far as the provision of educational facilities is concerned, there are primary schools in the central provinces, 55 in Wardak alone, but few secondary or vocational schools and these are limited to boys. Government statistics[1] referring to educational provision for 1964 give the following figures for the Hazarajat area:

Province	Schools		Teachers		Students	
	male	female	m.	f.	m.	f.
Ghorat	51	10	137	13	5,255	433
Bamian	44	8	73	9	3,384	439
Uruzgan	40	1	62	3	3,645	750

In addition, the central provinces are more open to natural disasters, such as the lack of irrigation water in 1970, 1971 and 1972, due to the unusually light snowfalls in these years. An estimated 80,000 people died in the resulting famine[2]. A UNICEF relief operation

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1. Survey of Progress, Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Planning, Kabul, 1965.

2. New York Times, November 14th, 1972.

to Ghor was hampered by bureaucratic wranglings, the government firmly denying the existence of a famine situation, so that the team arrived shortly before the heavy snows of early winter 1972, and were therefore cut short in their efforts.

To discuss class divisions in Afghanistan is a difficult problem and obviously open to various interpretations. The Marxist Sultan Galiev in 1919 considered that the proletariat in Afghanistan extended to the whole nation because of the economic conditions imposed upon everyone by the ruling elite[1]. Another interpretation is offered by Wilbur (1962:323), who divides the urban population into three 'classes' : upper - royalty, government personnel, landlords and religious leaders, middle - artisans, professionals, teachers and clerks, lower - Hazaras, musicians and garbage collectors. The rural population he divides into : upper - headmen, landowners, government officials, teachers and merchants, middle - shopkeepers, lower - butchers, grocers, tenant farmers and carpenters. Outcasts include barbers, weavers, musicians, blacksmiths, well diggers and lavatory cleaners. This interpretation seems to confuse a Hindu caste stratification with the occupational divisions in a Moslem society.

Another American, Peter Franck[2], divides the population roughly into three social groups (not called classes). At the top there is the social and economic elite which is coupled with the religious hierarchy. A growing middle group includes entrepreneural, professional and in-

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1. Schram, S., and d'Encausse, H. Carrere, Marxism and Asia, 1969.

2. Franck, P., Afghanistan between East and West, Washington, 1960.

tellectual members of the population who have contributed towards a more progressive consciousness. The lower class then is comprised of all agricultural labourers and unskilled urban workers. Franck admits that the situation is far more complex than this simplified analysis would suggest, and that the important structures to focus on are occupational and landownership patterns. There may be a variety of patterns, including small-scale proprieters and occupancy tenants, but it is the khan who ultimately controls water distribution, better lands, market outlets and the money supply. He also has legislative and executive political power. The suggestion here, then, is that perhaps it is more important to look at the structures of social, economic and political power and the distribution of resources, rather than concentrating on the arbitrary and often ethnocentric 'class-divisions' of the observer.

We can start by looking at Humlum's (1959:310) breakdown of the population into social groups based on occupation:-

Social group	Percentage of the population
Big commercialists	1
Commercialists	1.5
Religious	1
Sedentary peasants	50
Nomads and semi-nomads	30
Artisans and small traders	7.3
Artisan workers	4
Workers in commerce and communication	2
Civil servants and intellectuals	3.2

The elite thus comprises only a small portion of the total population

and tends to perpetuate its numbers. This is indicated by a study that Wolfram Eberhard[1] made of 230 Afghans (presumably male) trained in the U.S. from 1952-60. The occupation of the fathers was as follows:-

Occupation of fathers	Percentage of groups
High government officials	11.7
Middle and lower government officials	18.3
Employees in government organisations	7.4
Professionals	7.4
Businessmen	24.4
Farmers	30.9

(The businessmen and farmers were mainly Tajik, though landowners in the group were Pashtun).

This would suggest that the commercial, landowning and government elite was maintaining its position. That this is also a Kabul-orientated elite is suggested by Eberhard's breakdown of the regional origin of these U.S. trained Afghans, listed under their present occupation:-

Occupation	Regional origin			
	North	South	East	Kabul
Finance	3.2	3.2	16.1	77.4
Education	13	2.8	8.3	75.9
Technology	6.3	11.1	15.9	66.7
Agriculture	14		31.9	54.2
Health	5.9		5.9	88.3
Air, Police	8.5	10.7	10.7	70.2
Administration	4.9	9.8	14.6	70.8
Unemployed	17.6	3	26.5	53

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1. Eberhard, W., Settlement and social change in Asia, Hong Kong, 1967, Chapter 23.

He states that in finance there is a considerable Tajik element, but that administration still tends to be composed of the traditional Pashtun governing elite.

It is not possible to assess Hazara representation from these tables, but the likelihood is that it will be low. Regarding Hazaras working in industry, we have very little information, but if we take Eberhard's assessment of the labour force in two recently industrialised situations, we can at least see the preponderance of the other ethnic groups in the industrial developments of recent years. The Jangalak factory in 1960 employed two per cent of Kabul's labour force and the ethnic groups were employed as follows:-

Ethnic origins	% Carpenters (104)	% Metalworkers (98)
Tajik	70.2	59
Afghan	13.5	27.6
Sayyed	7.7	7.1
Other	8.7	6.2

Gulbahar cotton mill was built in an over-populated rural area north of Kabul. As a textile factory it absorbed the already present weavers and spinners in the area, and the ethnic origins are given as:-

Ethnic origin	Percentage of workforce
Tajik	92.4
Afghan	4
Sayyed	2
Others	0.3
Unknown	1.3

Although Gulbahar is a predominantly Tajik area anyway, and thus it is not surprising that the majority of the labour force are Tajik, nevertheless, it would seem that the increasing numbers of Hazaras migrating to the Kabul area are not filtering into the areas of most recent industrial expansion. As far as we can tell at this stage they are remaining as the coolie workers in Kabul, relying heavily on casual labour.

Obviously we need more extensive information before we can fully assess occupational trends and the relationship, if any, between social class and ethnic group, but we can at least see from the tables given the dominance of the Tajik and Pashtun element in this sample of the industrial sector.

CHAPTER TWO : HAZARA SOCIETY TODAY

In the previous chapter I outlined some of the main social divisions within Afghanistan today. My study concentrates on the group at the bottom of the social hierarchy, the Hazaras, and in this chapter I describe Hazara society as it is today. This then provides the setting for the historical examination of ethnic relations that follow in Chapter Three.

Detailed information on present-day Hazara society is still scant. Western researchers, such as Ferdinand and Schurmann, have concentrated on basic ethnographic description rather than any more profound sociological analyses of the society itself, and its relation to other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in order to position the Hazaras more clearly and to form a background to more detailed research, it seems useful here to outline these ethnographic details described by the above authors. This chapter is therefore divided under the headings of the traditional monograph, not in a belief that these are of particular analytical use, but that with the limited data available at present, they seem to provide a compact, if temporary framework.

Distribution and Political Structure

Groups calling themselves Hazaras are found mainly in the Hazarajat area of central Afghanistan. There are also Hazaras found in Badakhshan and Qataghan provinces and a settlement found south of Sar-i-Pul in Mazar province. These latter are descendents of Hazaras who returned to the country in the reign of Amir Habibullah. Schurmann[1] divides the Hazaras into seven groups:-

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1. Schurmann,F., The Mongols of Afghanistan, 1962, p.112.

1. Hazarajat Hazaras, who have a sedentary lifestyle, utilising irrigation agriculture and adhering to the Shi'ite religion.

2. Koh-i-Baba Hazaras living north of the Koh-i-Baba range and depending on herding activities for their livelihood. They are also Shi'ite, but Schurmann finds that physically they are much more mongoloid than the Hazarajat Hazaras.[1]

3. Sheikh Ali Hazaras living in Bamian, Ghorband and the area north of Doab, towards Pul-i-Khumri. A distinguishing feature from the other groups is that they are semi-nomadic, utilising yurt-type huts during the summer. In addition, many are Ismaili.

4. Badakhshan Hazaras, a little known group[2] who are mainly sedentary, but with some semi-nomads. They are Sunni.

5. Berberis living southeast of Meshed in Iran and said to be migrants from Afghan persecutions in the nineteenth century. Schurmann maintains that they belong to the main body of Hazarajat Hazaras.[3]

6. Aimaq Hazaras, a semi-nomadic group living in the Qala-i-Nao area, utilising yurts. They are Sunni Moslems and their language is the Herati dialect of Persian. Schurmann stresses their ethnic and cultural separation from the main body of Hazarajat Hazaras.

7. Taimani Hazaras, a subsection of the Taimani group, who are one of the Chahar Aimaq tribes, and apparently unconnected with the other Hazara groups.

Schurmann's division of the Hazaras into these groups is somewhat arbitrary. The division between the Hazarajat Hazaras and the Koh-i-Baba Hazaras seems to be based on the dubious assertion that the latter are more

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1. This generalization is disputed by Ferdinand in Acta Orientalia, no.28, 1964 , p.184.

2. Pierre Centlivres of the University of Neuchatel has recently been researching on this group, but the results are not yet available.

3. Again Ferdinand is in disagreement, and suggests that their connection with the Hazara Aimaks is much stronger. (1964 :181)

mongoloid, plus the fact that they have a seasonal transhumance. He admits that the relationship between the first five groups is somewhat uncertain, and that the Aimaq Hazaras form a completely separate group. Again, the origin of the Hazara sub-group of the Taimanis is as yet obscure.

The tribal structure of Hazara society has broken up to a large extent in the last hundred years, and at the moment is strongest among the Jaghori. Territoriality is now generally considered to be more crucial to political organisation than the erstwhile tribal divisions. However, certain vestiges do remain, which Schurmann illustrates in his account of the Daulat Begs of Dai Kundi (1962:128). The Daulat Begs, a large landowning common descent group, have maintained their identity and social cohesion. The transmission of the title mir to its descendents distinguishes them from the other inhabitants of the area, although in practice only the group head calls himself mir. The tribe itself is generally known as the qaum-i-mir (qaum: a group of close kinsmen), indicating their common descent relationship with the mir and the group in general. Endogamy is usual and the Daulat Begs are continuing to preserve their position at the top of the social hierarchy by repurchasing lands they have previously lost. In addition, they often wield considerable power as wakils (Deputies in the National Assembly) or as chiefs of non-Daulat Beg groups.

Apart from this example, however, the other Hazara groups can not be said to have preserved their tribal identity. The main unit of social cohesion is now the village, indicated by the fact that the term tayfeh, which refers to the residents of a village, is practically synonymous with

qaum community itself is defined by Canfield as 'spatially grouped agnates retaining close ties of social interaction and social identity'. (1973[A]:44). The qaum is not an empirical social grouping, but a locally conceived structural category, which is flexible in that it can include affines, agnates, residents of a small hamlet or the ethnic group as a whole. The most common application refers to the deh (village) or hamlet community in which everyone is a putative agnate, the incorporation of strangers being reflected in the kinship terminology. Nuclear and joint families make up the community, and as Islamic law specifies the amount of inheritance given to relations of specific degrees, inter-marriage, especially cousin marriage, keeps the rights with the group.

What happens in a large number of Hazara villages is that at each successive division of the major patriachal families, the emergent new families set up home nearby in the same village. The result is the multi-quartered style of village, in which each quarter is a cluster of closely concentrated homes belonging to blood-related families. In general, each quarter is administered by an elected representative, the arbab. He often owns land which is farmed by residents of the quarter, and in other cases he may control households which are widely scattered. A council summoned by the arbab decides all matters pertaining to the quarter as a whole, including assessment and partition of property, appoints guardians for orphans and widows, helps collect dowry and gives aid to the poor and sick. Each family, however, still functions as a self-contained unit, owning privately any land allotted through inheritance. On certain matters the council may intervene, such as in the rare case of some one wishing to sell land to a stranger, in which case the council assesses the

desirability of the purchaser, and can veto the sale of land.

In the Bamian area, where his main research was undertaken, Canfield considers that the neighbourhood forms the next effective division within the society. This is more important in the highland valleys where several qaum communities are related. There is common holding, for example, in Shibar, where neighbourhood land includes pasturage. Thus the neighbourhood as a functional unit exists only among the highland populations where pasturage is an important secondary means of subsistence.

Throughout these territorial groupings runs the kinship network, which Canfield defines as the combined sets of affinal and agnatic ties of a group of interconnected families. (A list of Hazara kinship terminology is given on page 119). It has no specific geographic context, it is only operative through ephemeral public gatherings and it forms a network of economic distribution. The kinship network contributes functionally to the unity of the neighbourhood and the qaum community through intermarriage. Qaum communities in a neighbourhood may divide into marrying sets and thus form separate alignments. The outer limits of the kinship network are not geographic, however, but social, because as people of different religious sects do not intermarry, the real limits of the network are the boundaries of the sect. The kinship network blends closely with the sect, and this is reinforced by the fact that kinsmen meet on religious occasions, when the leaders of the sect, the Saints, exert their strongest influence. The kinship network, being coterminous with the sect, can be said to reach to the outer limits of social cohesion and cultural identification. This is conceptualised in the statement recorded by Canfield that, 'We believe our blood to be Imami and their blood is Sunni'. (1973A:69).

Canfield's description of the ways in which the kinship network is strengthened emphasises the behavioural rather than the conceptual aspects of the importance of visits, prestations and mutual aid. Tensions are mobilised through gossip and scandal; for example, between husband and wife, women of the same household, or between qaum communities disputing over land. Thus, since the social system inherently embodies contrary social tensions, it is considered susceptible to any divisive or cohesive influences imposed upon it by environmental conditions. This process of fission and fusion is demonstrated in Shibar along religious lines, because in this area communities and individuals have the option of aligning themselves with larger orders of political antagonism.

Despite the evident territorial and sectarian divisions among the Hazaras, there is also evidence of a certain degree of cultural assimilation between the different Hazara groups. According to Ferdinand, (1959:16), the Hazaras themselves see the divisions as between 'real' Hazaras, Hazara Sayyed, Afghan Hazara and Tajik Hazara. The assimilation of the different groups is general, though the Sayyeds, as putative descendents of the Prophet, do keep themselves separate and do not intermarry. Mongoloid characteristics therefore vary from area to area, Dai Zangi and Besud being the area of strongest prevalence. Ferdinand cites the case of five Afghan families from Wardak who settled in eastern Besud in the 1930s and who have become completely absorbed culturally as well as socially by the Hazaras. Ferdinand is able to conclude, then, that the interior strength of Hazara society is still considerable, national integrity being strongest in central and north-central Hazarajet. The phenomenon of urban migration in recent years may, however, have caused

the breakup of this unity, but until more adequate data is collected in the field, it is impossible to be more definite on this point.

Agricultural Settlements

Acute land shortage is a characteristic of the Hazarajat and is a contributory factor in urban migration. There are no adequate details on land tenure in Afghanistan, but the following table[1] gives an estimated distribution of land by form of tenure in 1963, in Hazara-populated provinces:-

Province	Sharecropped	Mortgaged	Owner-operated	Other
Bamian	1.6	0.6	73.9	23.8
Uruzgan	13.3	5.8	79.8	1.1
Ghor	12.1	1.2	75.8	10.9

Irrigation agriculture is mainly small grain, such as wheat, winter rye, barley and leguminous plants. The lack of farming land, which is aggravated by undeveloped agricultural techniques, accounts for the continued raising of livestock on the steep mountain slopes, mainly sheep and goats, and these provide the important milk and wool products that are exported to the towns. Farming has been affected by the encroachment of nomads and this process is discussed in Chapter Five. Another factor to consider here is that the farmer needs to open up an effective relationship with the national economy, but so far this has been limited to the richer Hazaras.

There is considerable diversity in the Hazarajat itself, between

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1. Dupree, L., Afghanistan, 1973, p.147.

agricultural conditions in the highlands and the lowland plains. In Bamian province, for example, Tagaw is the lowland plain, with a temperate climate, dependent on irrigation agriculture, and the place where the town of Bamian is situated. It has always been on the trade route between India and Balkh and has therefore traditionally had a greater contact with Kabul. Tagaw is also linked to the outside market because of its dependence on cash crops - potatoes and poplar trees - and its trading connections with the national economy are facilitated by the Sunni adherence of its population.

In the nineteenth century, according to Lal[1] and Masson[2], the population was mainly Imami, but the obvious suggestion that the development of Sunnism corresponded with the expansion of trading possibilities in the area, will have to remain hypothetical for lack of further evidence.

The peripheral plateaux and highland areas, on the other hand - Khoja Ghar mountains, Shibar valleys and Qarghanatu - exhibit various types of agriculture, utilising irrigation, rainfall and surface water. Subsistence crops of wheat, barley and fava bean are grown in Shibar, which utilises both rainfall and irrigation agriculture. In the highland areas, sheep and goats are kept, limited to ten per family, due to the severity of the winters and the grazing concessions given to the nomads in the nineteenth century. On the peripheral plateaux, farmers spend fifty to sixty half days a year collecting bushes for fuel, and in the summer for a similar period of time the women prepare dung cakes for winter fuel.

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1. Lal, M., Journal of a Tour through the Panjab, Afghanistan, Turkistan, Khorasan and part of Persia, Calcutta 1934.

2. Masson, C., Narrative of Various Journeys in Baloochistan, Afghanistan and the Panjab, London 1842.

Although agricultural land is privately owned and worked, irrigation is usually a public activity undertaken by the qaum community. There is thus a joint effort in constructing and maintaining irrigation works and in the joint utilisation of available water and the rotation of associated crops. Because of the organisation required for irrigation agriculture, co-operation is vital and common users are constrained into solidary groups. In some areas a mirab (emir-i-ab : chief of the water) is elected as a paid distributor for the village, and controls the irrigation activities, organising duties, estimating the quantity of snow fallen in the winter or standing rainfall in the spring, and on these findings to determine how much land is to be sown and with what crops. Mike Barry[1], in his description of 'les emirs des eaux', is very critical of the mirabs, who, paid by the landowners, are said to be ruthless in their control of the tenants' water supply.

On occasions, irrigation works are appropriated into private ownership, such as the artificial reservoirs for collecting the hillstream waters in central Hazarajat and the karezes in south Hazarajat. Even where the irrigation is a communal activity, conflicts do occur, over plot boundaries, for example. In poor families the tensions between brothers over irrigated land can be serious. While the community using the same runnel is brought into a solidary relationship, there are often considerable divisions between those using different runnels, as Canfield found in Labmushak in Shibar, (1973A:30). Here, the religious factions are generally distributed along separate irrigation lines; the runnels on the west side of the valley supply mostly Imami communities, and those on

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1. Barry, M., Afghanistan, Paris 1974.

the east Ismailis. Because these communities are situated along the naturally abundant waters of the Labmushak River, surface water is plentiful and easily accessible, and there is therefore more latitude for co mmunity division, should this arise. Communities situated on the plateau above the alluvial plain could not divide in this way, because they are supplied only with limited amounts of water through canals, which therefore need close and co-operative supervision. Rainfall agriculture, such as in Shibar, imposes less organisational demands and is an individual or small group enterprise. Dry land cultivation can be undertaken by individual farmers, for the land is watered naturally. Under these conditions, community fission may be more likely.

In the Hazarajat, settlements are usually located on the side of a hill or on the edge of a cultivated valley. The pasturage lies above the village with the fields below. Most settlements have one or more large fortress-like structures, known as gal'a, housing an extended family, including several brothers. They are usually rectangular and surrounded by a large clay wall with a tower at each of the four corners. The houses within this outer wall are constructed of clay mixed with straw and attached to each other to afford maximum shelter. This leaves a large courtyard in the centre, and on the whole, the structure was originally evolved for the purpose of defence. Many of the houses consist of one room only, with a smoke-hole in the roof. Schurmann found that most houses in Dai Kundi, however, consisted of two rooms : the taba-khana, inhabited by the family in the winter, and the diwal, used as a summer room but also housing the animals in the winter. The rooms are divided by a corridor-like entrance and the whole is surrounded by a verandah or manga, under which the family sleeps in the summer. A

characteristic feature of the Hazara houses are the conical baskets known as kandu, placed on the roofs of the houses to hold grain for the spring seeding. Any variations in house type depend on climate and the wealth of the owner, rather than regional or tribal distinctions.

In Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi during the summer movement to the mountain pastures, a moveable beehive-shaped hut called a chapari is used. Rich Hazaras, including those of the Sheikh Ali and others in Sharak are reported to use the real yurt or kherga. Some cave dwellers are found in the Hazarajat, where sun-dried brick structures are built inside the openings of large rock shelters found along the river terraces. Cave dwellers are also found in the caves of Bamian.

Domestic Life

Domestic life revolves around farming, animal breeding and collecting bushes for fuel. The exploitation of animal products is the work of the women, but the general care of the animals belongs to the men, while the children take the animals to the pastures and back to the village for milking. Ghi (clarified butter) and kurut (cottage cheese) are the two most important milk products and are sold to the town markets. Many handicrafts are undertaken in the Hazarajat, especially by the women. Woven cloth is used for barak (woollen cloth for clothing), gelam (rugs), jual (transport sacks) and shal (blankets), all sold in the towns and cities of Afghanistan. In addition, namad (a thick felt) is made by the women and widely used for blankets.

There is little information about other handicrafts among the Hazaras, but Prince Peter[1] has collected some evidence of pottery in the central Hazarajat. In the village of Garm Ao in Herat province, occupied by Kal Nangi Hazaras, water was kept in jars made without the use of a wheel. Instead, the basic coil technique was used of laying small clay sausages upon each other to build up the jar. The surface was then smoothed with the fingers, and no decoration was made on the outside.

Specialised craftsmen are rare in the Hazarajat, except the blacksmith. Leatherwork and barbering are undertaken by all the men. This fact is said to be despised by the Afghans who relegate these occupations to specialists having a low position in the social hierarchy, along with musicians and dancing boys.

Hazara family life is regulated on a Moslem pattern. Most Hazaras are monogamous and usually marriages are arranged within the qaum community, those between first cousins being the most widespread. Bacon and Hudson[2] noted the existence of family councils among the Hazaras, most strongly patriarchal in Uruzgan, where the women were found to be more restricted than in Jaghori, Besud or Timuri. In general, Hazara women are subject to the same restrictions as other Moslem women in Afghanistan, though the veil is rarely worn. In Kabul the veil is a status symbol; a man who has done well financially on moving to the city will perhaps veil his wife (who doubtless never wore one when she lived in the village), to indicate that she no longer needs to work, while he himself may dress entirely in western

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1. Prince Peter, Jars made without a wheel in central Hazarajat, Man, vol.LIV, 1954.

2. Bacon, E., and Hudson, A.E., Social Control and the Individual in eastern Hazara culture, in Language, Culture and Personality, ed.L. Spier, Salt Lake City 1941, p.252.

clothes. Among Hazaras who have migrated to Kabul, however, the women are rarely veiled. As many of them work as domestic servants, the middle-class status symbols would not apply.

Hazara village women place a considerable importance on the khwaar khanda (adopted sister) friendship, which perhaps offsets the impossibility of what we may call friendship between husband and wife, or even any man and woman. The khwaar khanda relationship is especially close and the two women may act as confidantes and mutual supporters. The husbands of khwaar khandas may not necessarily be friendly and even resent their wives' friendship.

Information on life-crisis rituals among the Hazaras is limited at present, though Canfield (1973) and Aslanov[1] are able to give us some details, especially about marriage. The birth of a child is reported to not be celebrated lavishly. Before the child is born, however, a few women closely related to the mother join her on a day called kaalaa buraani (clothes cutting), in order to prepare clothes for the child. Among wealthy families there may be a meeting of the women to celebrate the cutting of the first tooth. When a boy is one year old, his head is shaved by an elder in the presence of other relatives, expressing the hope that the child will grow to the age of the man performing the act. The female guests give small amounts of money to the women of the household, and this is known as shakerreyz (sugar pouring).

In all Islamic sects in Hazara communities, boys, according to the prescription of Islam, are circumcised between the ages of three and nine.

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1. Aslanov, M.G., Ethnographic notes on Hazaras, in Grassmuck and Adamec, Afghanistan: Some new Approaches, Ann Arbor 1969.

Among the Imamis the uncircumcised boy is considered a kafir (unbeliever) and is not allowed to eat from the same dish as the men. Circumcision is usually performed in the autumn by a barber or barbers from outside the community. The night before, feasts and music are provided by those who can afford it, while the poorer offer tea and pastry to their guests.

As far as the child is concerned, then, it appears that a boy is participant in more overt life-crisis rituals than a girl. Public acknowledgement of his development would therefore seem to be more crucial, as indeed it is in most Moslem societies. As no woman ethnographer has carried out research in the Hazarajat, our information about the life of the women is anyway very superficial.

Marriage ceremonies involve more relatives than any other rite of passage, and to quote Canfield's male-orientated description, 'epitomise the intricacy of ritual giving between kinsmen'. (1973:22). Even though official marriage registration is now necessary in all areas, the concensus of the kinsmen remains the vital factor. This is expressed in the large social gatherings witnessing the various stages of the marriage process and the communal consumption of food. Arrangements for the marriage are made by the parents or guardians, but initial contact is made by a wakil (representative), usually a woman on behalf of her son or brother. When the initial proposal is accepted, a few men from the boy's close relatives join the girl's family for qand shekestani (the breaking of hard sugar), when lump sugar and tea are consumed to indicate a private agreement to the marriage. The formal engagement is celebrated a few days later with the shirin kori (eating sweets), when the groom is

present. There are separate shirin kori for men and women and the women of the groom's family bring clothing and jewelry for the bride. The bride's mother has later to reciprocate these gifts, in double the amount if possible.

Canfield states that among the Hazaras the bride price is usually agreed upon when the proposal is accepted. Aslanov, on the other hand, notes that his agreement is often finalised roughly one year before the wedding, during the fatakhuni (from the reading of the Fatikhi, the first Sura of the Quran). Towards the end of the bargaining, the groom's female relatives carry sweet bread, wrapped in a tablecloth, to the house of the bride. Food offered them is refused until a final agreeable price is decided upon. This ritual is known as the surfa-i-riza (the tablecloth of agreement). Both the fatakhuni and the surfa-i-riza are holidays for the women. For the former, the women gather the night before, while the men do not arrive until the following day, and in the surfa-i-riza, the final bride price is formally set by the women.

The wedding itself is often delayed for years, perhaps because the boy and girl are too young, or the boy's family needs time to amass the funds needed for the wedding costs. The early engagement ceremonies therefore publicly acknowledge the private verbal agreement, and secure it until the marriage can be consumated. The bride price is paid soon before the wedding at a meal for the male relatives of both families. The groom's female relatives have a separate meal and then take the wedding dress to the bride's house. The night before the wedding is known as shaw-i-khina (the night of henna), when each family decorate the bride and groom's hands with henna. The wedding ceremony itself usually takes

place in the afternoon, and beforehand, among the Imamis, the groom and a few male friends visit a local shrine. According to Canfield, this is to protect him from any sorcerous attempts to make him impotent. The mullah performs the ceremony at the house of the bride and there appears to be a mixture of traditional Islamic elements with the signing of official papers by the mullah and the mir. The economic nature of the marriage contract is further symbolised by the throwing of coins by the groom and the bride's mother. These are then gathered up by the female relatives.

A woman of the bride's family remains in the house with the couple, usually the groom's house, for the wedding night, in order to obtain the necessary proof of her virginity. The next day, women of the bride's family bring her trousseau and the groom's mother gives a scarf and a dress, a gift known as khela'at, to seven of the women closest to the bride. Five days after the wedding is the takhtakani (hitting the board), when the bride begins to work in the groom's household. The same seven women provide food for a feast attended by women of both families.

It should be noted here that marriage to a widow or a divorcee is not celebrated. The levirate is prevalent among the Hazaras, but if the woman has children, she may choose to remain unmarried and live with the children in the matrimonial home of the husband's brother.

This then forms a general outline of the marriage ceremonies and the bonds created by the reciprocity between the two families. While it is evident that the male members of each qauum play the main part in the original choice of spouse and possibly in the main discussions over the economic aspects of the contract, it also seems true that the women

form the most active avenues of social relations and affective ties between the families. The social encounters of the women, their commensality, exchange of prestations and music-making together, all indicate a close contact that, from the information available, we cannot assume on the part of the men.

Canfield describes the rituals associated with the death of a man, but one may assume that those for the women of the qaum would be similar, though perhaps less elaborate. The Yasin Sura (number XXXIV of the Quran) is repeated to a dying person to ease the pain of death. Water is sprinkled over the lips to assuage the thirst and to prevent him accepting Satan's offer of wine after death. Ritual washing is carried out differently according to each sect, though no details are available, other than that it is carried out by close relatives of the same sex. Wealthy families pay mullahs to recite the Quran the night before the burial. After the burial, Imamis often eat a feast for the deceased at the grave. Later, several feasts are given for the close kinsmen, known as the khayrat-e-morda (offering for the dead). Among the Imamis, the family of the deceased serve food to the visitors for three days, but Ismailis serve no food during the first three days, then afterwards slaughter a cow and distribute the parts raw to kinsmen. A khayrat-i-morda is often given on the seventh day after the death and at the next Id celebration. These feasts are as lavish as possible and demonstrate the number of friends the deceased had. Again, the rituals associated with death can be seen to reaffirm previous ties between families, through social interaction and mutual obligation.

During these rites of passage and at other times as well, the

continuance of oral tradition, through music and poetry, strengthens demonstratively and symbolically the emotive sentiments of the occasion. Women are traditionally the transmitters of folktales and mythologies, but there are no examples given in the literature available. The influence of established religion in the last hundred years has evidently destroyed certain aspects of Hazara culture. However, music is still popular and the dambura, a two-stringed instrument is widely used. Songs are generally those of an Afghan Persian type, the charbait, a four-lined verse and the ghazal, a two-lined verse being the most common, with unrequited love as the most popular theme[1]. Aslanov states that the Hazaras have 'the rudiments of folk theatre' (1969:49), but unfortunately there is again no further information on this.

Life-crisis rituals, as well as agricultural activities are regulated by the calendar. While the official calendar in Afghanistan is the solar calendar, beginning at the vernal equinox (21st March), the Hazaras use two other methods of dividing the year, the qamar-i-aqrab (Arabic:qamar-moon, a aqrab - the constellation Scorpio) and the toghal (etymology unknown). The qamar-i-aqrab is generally confined to astronomical specialists and denotes the summer months from March to September, reckoned by the two and a half days in every month when the moon is in Scorpio. The toghal is more widely used and is measured from the conjunction of the moon with the Pleiades. The time between each conjunction or toghal is supposed to be seven days, but Ferdinand[2] found only five names for special days during the toghal. The toghals are most often associated with winter, for this

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1. Ferdinand has collected examples of traditional Hazaragi ghazal from Sharistan in Dai Zangi. (1959:39).

2. The information on the calendar was collected by Ferdinand and is given in Ferdinand, 1959, p.40ff.

is the time when the conjunction is most visible. During this time, the relationship between the moon and the Pleiades is used to foretell the weather; the greater the visible distance between them, the colder the weather. There is thus a close connection between the toghal system and farming. Once the toghal series is finished in the early spring, there follows a longish period which bears no name or else is just called hich (nothing). This period lasts until the Pleiades are again visible.

The twelve year Animal Cycle was official in Afghanistan until the reign of Amir Amanullah, but is still found among the Uzbeks and Hazaras, with variations. In Hazaragi, the Mongolian and Qataghani Uzbeki jil is used for year, as opposed to the sal of Afghan Standard Persian. The year names differing from A.S.P. are:-

Leopard	-	yulbars
Hare	-	taulai
Monkey	-	shadibaker
Dog	-	kuta

The rest of the Moslem world uses the lunar calendar, and this is also known in Afghanistan, though not for official use. Until the reign of Amanullah, the Hazaras used the following names for the lunar months : ashur (Arabic:asura-Moharram), safar, algho-i-awwal, algho-i-doyum, algho-i-seyum, algho-i-charum, rajab, shabo, ramazo, Id mah, khali and qurbo. The four algho months are collectively known as atesh algho (fire leaping), and at the new moon of these months four fires were lit in front of each house. The men of the household then had to leap the fires, while the women threw pots of water from the roofs. Ferdinand considers that this was a purification ritual, which was then eradicated by the mullahs about thirty years

ago, on the grounds of its 'heathenish' connection with Zoroastrianism. It appears that fire formerly played an important part in Hazara ritual life and traces of this still remain; in Jaghori, for example, lamps are still lit during the Festival of the Dead, where each lamp is dedicated to a deceased person. In the past, on the eve of major feasts and marriages, special lamps were lit. If a calamity overtook the community, this was believed to be caused by the troubled souls of the dead, who were then appeased by lighting a fire between three stones, into which was sprinkled roghan (clarified butter).

Examining the last evidences of these cultural traits, one can see that there is a mixture of influences present. The toghal calendar is shared by some Aimaq tribes, and the Animal Cycle would appear to be an early introduction of Tatar influence. Now, these influences are becoming mixed with the Afghan solar calendar. The influence of fire in Hazara culture is an extremely interesting point that could perhaps be rewarded by further research. Unfortunately, like music, these non-Islamic elements have been systematically destroyed by the established church, so that few traces remain.

The Distribution of Religious Sects

The main doctrinal aspects of the Imami and Ismaili sects, to which most of the Hazaras adhere, were described in Chapter One. Here I shall examine the distribution of these sects and some of the processes involved in their variation. Most of the information and argument is found in the work of Robert Canfield, who deals mainly with the Bamian area, west of Kabul. Here, Sunni Tajiks occupy the central Bamian valley, Imamis the

southern and western highlands, and a mixture of Imamis and Ismailis the highlands of Shibar and Kalu.

Sectarian membership is usually expressed in terms of allegience to a particular Saint, rather than overtly to the sect itself. The Imamis of the area venerate a Saint in Yakawlang and one in Kabul, and the Ismailis a Sayyed near Doshi. This phenomenon of Saint worship is rarely found in urban centres and is actively discouraged by orthodox Islam. Ernest Gellner[1] has analysed this phenomenon of the power of Saints in a tribal context among the Berbers of the High Atlas. I shall outline his argument here, because although we do not have much information on the power of Saints in a Hazara context, Gellner's valuable analysis may throw light on our understanding of sectarian allegience in Afghanistan. Gellner considers that in most Moslem countries the tribal areas are rarely discrete entities, rather they are marginal to the urban population and therefore retain a cultural influence from the towns. Religion in the urban centre tends to be puritanical, with a lack of emotionality. Intermediaries are considered unnecessary, so the religious hierarchy is confined to the ulema, the learned elite, among whom literacy is obviously an important factor. Among the tribal populations, on the other hand, there is more stress on the ecstatic, personalised aspects of religion. Because of non-literacy, there is no access to the Book, and thus revered personnel are needed as intermediaries with God. They may, of course, also act as intermediaries between tribes. This leads to the development of a religious hierarchy. As far as the Berbers are concerned, they are considered unorthodox in terms of the official urban religion, but through the Saints, the Berbers can demonstrate their allegience to Islam. Gellner considers

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1. Gellner, E., Saints of the Atlas, 1969.

that ultimately, the Saints express the boundaries between the marginal tribal population and the urban counterpart.

It is important to note that a large part of Gellner's argument is based on the fact that Berber society is a good example of a segmentary society, where segmentary ties are the most important features in social organisation. Saintly leadership in this case makes it possible to weld together groups that do not have an existence within the segmentary system. Of course, one cannot immediately suggest an analogy with the Hazara populations of Afghanistan, which we have no reason to believe are organised on a segmentary basis. In addition, we have more information on the fission and fusion of sects and hardly mention of the role played by the different Saints. More information on these men would obviously add to our knowledge of Hazara social organisation. But even at this stage, it seems not unreasonable to suggest that perhaps certain aspects of the power of the Saints among the Berbers may be relevant to the situation in Afghanistan. Certainly, the Imami and Ismaili Saints are representing groups of unorthodox Moslems, considered in terms of the Sunni state religion. It would be interesting therefore, to learn how much the Hazara Saints act as keepers of the boundaries between sects and indeed ethnic groups.

To return to sect distribution in the Bamian area, we are at least better informed on this particular point. In the valley of Labmushak, for example, the population is grouped in a number of small hamlets, composed of closely related agnates and their families, and generally belonging to the same sect. However, at three locations in the valley, sectarian allegiences have cut through kinship and territorial groupings. This

pattern of social segmentation, in which some hamlets are divided and some are not, is characteristic of the Shibar valleys in general.

This sectarian differentiation forms a considerable cleavage within the society. Members of different sects do not inter-marry, they graze their flock separately, patronise different flour mills and occupational specialists, and borrowing and lending and even daily social intercourse between the members of the different sects is limited. This has not always been the case and the degree of interaction appears to have fluctuated through time, indicating perhaps a considerable amount of conversion, as Canfield suggests. Canfield's analysis of sect distribution in the area is concerned with the following points: the original distribution of Sunni groups in the lowlands, Imamis in the highlands and Ismailis only in the southern highlands, the reasons why communities factionalise along sectarian lines only in Shibar, how conversion can take place if it is said to be impossible, and why factional differences are formulated as religious differences anyway.

With regard to the first point, we have already seen in this chapter and in Chapter one, the degree of differentiation between Tagaw, the lowland plain, and the highland valleys in the Bamian region. Tagaw, because of its agricultural wealth and its position on the trade route, has always maintained a closer contact with Kabul and the national economy. It is to be expected, therefore, that this contact would be facilitated and strengthened through the acceptance of Sunnism, though as I mentioned before, we have no concrete historical evidence to validate this assertion.

The highlands, on the other hand, have always maintained a degree of independence from the Sunni state. Even though, in the nineteenth century, the governor of the province operated from the town of Bamian,

independent Hazara coalitions to the northeast and southeast influenced the highland areas marginal to Bamian. During the brief reign of Bacha-i-Saqqao in 1929, the population of Tagaw allied themselves with his cause, whereas the marginal population revolted against him. In addition while Tagaw has been influenced by the centres of power in Turkestan and Kabul, the highland areas have been more closely associated with the Hazarajat. The area is still an important centre of Hazara political life, indicated by the prominence of Yakawlang as an Imami religious centre. On the whole then, Sunnism has meant a support of the ruling institution, whereas Imamism indicates and identification with resistance to the Sunni state.

The development of Ismailism in the highlands suggests a resistance to both Sunnism and Imamism and their socio- economic concommitants. The area where Ismailism is found is at the frontiers of Turkestan, Kabul and Hazarajat influence. Ismailism is generally considered to be more heretical than Imamism, and this would correspond to the spatial isolation of its members.

The main theme running through this analysis of the distribution of sects is Canfield's thesis that essentially sects are political interest groups. In a country where religious differences form the main criteria of social differentiation, it would seem fair to assume that the political interests of a group will express themselves in sectarian membership. Previous to the nineteenth century, political allegiences were most often formulated in terms of patrilineal descent groups, where perhaps Hazaras would be ranged against Ghilzais. But as the coalition of Afghan tribes grew into a ruling institution under Sunnism, opposition began to be expressed

in the antithetical categories of Imami and Ismaili. Thus religious heterodoxy in inaccessible areas can be seen as a boundary-maintaining device of the interest groups living in the marginal territories.

Political blocs within the Bamian area have therefore become identified with sectarian categories. Within most sectarian communities, tensions and dissensions have to be managed either by emigration or acquiescence. In the case of Shibar, however, Canfield maintains that ecologic conditions are here conducive to a breakdown in the community, because the rainfall agriculture undertaken in the area requires little group solidarity. It is possible, therefore, for a disputant in Shibar to remain on his vital land by undergoing religious conversion. Where there is a natural waterflow, Imami and Ismaili communities may live close together. Unfortunately, Canfield has no data on actual conversion, and can only suggest the possible transfer of allegience from one Saint to another. The important point here is that Canfield considers sectarian rather than ethnic ascription to be the primary basis of group organisation in the Bamian area and Afghanistan as a whole.

Urban Migration

The migration of Hazaras to the main towns of Afghanistan, especially Kabul, was noted as early as Babur's time, in the sixteenth century. This flow continued and appears to have become more extensive during the persecutions of the nineteenth century. It has increased considerably since the 1950s, so that Hazaras now form a sizeable proportion of Kabul's residents and workforce. I shall discuss the more theoretical aspects of urban migration and its relevance to inter-ethnic relations in Chapter Six; here I concentrate mainly on the extent of this migration and its possible causes.

The migration of populations is a complex phenomenon which has been open to various interpretations. Causes may include religious oppression and the inability to maximise economic gains. Migration itself may be innovatory or conservative, either destroying or maintaining existing social structures. Changes within the migratory group and also the host society have to be considered, as well as the processes of assimilation, integration and minority group formation that may take place. It would therefore be necessary to have extensive data and an open-minded analysis in order to discuss adequately any migratory processes. Like revolution, it cannot be reduced to a simple J-curve theory of relative deprivation.

Research into Hazara migration has been undertaken by C.L.Jung[1] and commented on by Canfield[2]. Both mention the economic factors of deprivation as being foremost in migratory movements, but we should not assume any simple cause and effect theory to apply in any situation, let alone that of Afghanistan, where our sociological knowledge is still so limited. It has been mentioned previously in Chapter One that the Hazarajat is agriculturally an extremely poor area and that for various reasons conditions are deteriorating. The pressure of nomad incursions has led to the loss of land by Hazaras in debt to the nomads. There has been a worsening of relations between the Hazaras and nomads in recent years, no doubt due to the fact that twenty per cent of the land in the Hazarajat is now owned by the nomads, and in some areas sixty to eighty per cent of the Hazaras are in debt to the nomads. Cultivable land in the area is insufficient for the population, with the result that there is considerable seasonal migration of Hazaras to

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1. Jung, C.L., Some observations on the patterns and processes of rural-urban migrations to Kabul, Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society (New York), Occasional Paper no.2.

2. Canfield, R., Suffering as a religious imperative in Afghanistan, Chicago, 1973. -

the cities in the winter. In some cases, the cultivators plant their crops in spring and move to Kabul for the summer, afterwards returning to harvest the winter crops, then returning to Kabul before the snows. It is estimated that as many as thirty to fifty per cent of the highland labour force are seasonally absent. Even if this migration becomes a permanent settlement, the natural population growth is not offset, with the result that the summertime population of the Hazarajat is on the increase. Consequently, landholdings are becoming smaller and the number of landless families is increasing.

Hazara migration to Kabul has increased to such an extent in the 1960s that Hazaras now form a majority of the city's immigrants, indicated by the following table given by Jung for the late 1960s:-

Province	Percentage of Kabul's immigrants
Central Provinces	31%
Wardak	6%
Ghazni	24%
Bamian	9%

Of these immigrants, 70% were from rural areas, 85% came directly to Kabul, 42% were between the ages of 15 and 24, and 70% were non-literate. There were twice as many men as women and two-thirds of these were unmarried. Of the total, 35% had been farmers, whereas 38% possessed no skill. Reasons for migration were given as follows:-

Reason	Percentage
Insufficient land	20%
Poverty	23%
Unemployment	8%
Insufficient employment	12%

Canfield considers that during the 1950s and the early 1960s, when the cities were prospering from the introduction of foreign aid, there was a large 'pull' factor in Hazara migration, for there would probably be good jobs in the city. However, looking at these figures for the late 1960s, we can see that if we are going to use the 'push-pull' theory, then by this time the 'push' factors had probably become more influential.

Most of the Hazaras who come to Kabul can only hope to find work as coolie labour, carrying heavy loads, sweeping snow off roofs, cleaning latrines and other activities normally associated with a pariah group. They meet in the early morning at specific points in the city, from where they are hired for about 30 to 50 Afghanis per day (200 afs. = approx. £1). As in many other cities receiving migrating rural populations, there is usually very little raising of the Hazaras' standard of living. Many are miserably poor, for they contract to work for very little[1]. The competition of these migrant labourers for work reduces their wages, according to their seasonal influx from the highlands. Admittedly, some Hazaras do find better-paid jobs as cooks to the U.N. 'experts', as waiters, or take over the winter sale of wood, or even become artisans of aluminium. A few manage to set up small businesses[2]. The majority, however, are faced with increasing deprivation.

The problem is worsened by the ever-increasing numbers of migrants flocking to Kabul. By 1969 about 40,000 people had recently emigrated

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1. Two examples from personal experience: I paid a Hazara 30 afs. to carry a bed (worth 200 afs.) from the bazaar to my house in 1972. In the winter I was advised to pay the Hazaras who had come to clear the roof of snow not more than 40 afs. for an hour's work.

2. Two Hazara brothers had a thriving small corner-shop in Shar-i-Nao, the new quarter of Kabul, in 1972.

from the Hazarajat. One Hazara clan, which had until fifteen years previously lived entirely in the central highlands, had seventy of its one hundred and fourteen households living in Kabul by 1970. The reduction in foreign aid and rising inflation are suggested by Canfield as worsening the situation of the Hazaras, but I would question how much of the so-called aid was ever distributed among them in the first place. Lastly, the famine of 1970-74, which was concentrated in the central provinces, has also exacerbated the migration situation.

CHAPTER THREE : HAZARA SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the previous chapter, I outlined the ethnography of contemporary Hazara society. This chapter describes the historical processes in Afghanistan from the nineteenth century onwards that have been relevant to the Hazaras, in their relations with other ethnic groups and in the formation of their society today. Firstly, the ethnogenesis of the Hazaras is discussed, through the theories offered by nineteenth century and contemporary writers. Following this is a review of the tribal situation as it existed before the consolidation of state control in the late nineteenth century. This then forms a historical background to the developments to be discussed further in the next chapter.

Ethnogenesis

The details of Hazara ethnogenesis are somewhat confused, but more reliable theories are now replacing the fanciful hypotheses put forward in the nineteenth century. In general, the theories fall into two groups: the first body sees the Hazaras as direct descendants of one or more Mongol invasions from 1220 onwards; the second, on the other hand, considers the situation to be more complex. In this latter case, the Hazaras are seen as the result of an admixture of various Mongol groups coming from the south of Afghanistan and mixing with an autochthonous agricultural, mainly Tajik populace of the central Afghan uplands. The Mongol groups themselves are considered to be a probable mixture of Turco-Mongol elements and Turco-Mongol-Iranian stock.

The first theory derives from the fact of various Mongol invasions into Central Asia from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. For a period of over a hundred years, the country of the Hindu Kush was under

Mongol domination, until the Turco-Mongol rule of Tamerlane. The thousand strong military detachments of Ghengis Khan and his descendants were known as mings, translated as hazar (one thousand) in Persian. Babur, writing in 1504[1], noted that Hazaras and Nikudari tribes were living in the western mountains of Afghanistan, some of whom spoke Mogholi. Some groups wintered in the Ghorband area, plundering other tribes, and Babur himself took part in an action against the Sultan Mas'udi Hazaras between Takht Pass and the Sanglakh mountains, occasioned by their refusal to pay government tributes. In addition, he noted considerable numbers of Sultan Mas'udi tribesmen living in Kabul. Babur stresses the Turcoman origin of the Hazaras, but nineteenth century writers emphasised the idea of direct descent from the Mongol invaders. Elphinstone, who completed his mission to Afghanistan in 1815, notes Abu'l Fazl's allegation that the Hazaras were the descendants of garrisons left in the Hindu Kush area by the Mongol Prince Manku Khan, the grandson of Ghengis Khan:-

> 'The Tartar army used to be divided into a certain number of Hazaurehs or regiments; and it is possible that some of these bodies, originally left to occupy part of a conquered country, may have given rise to the nation of the Hazaras.'[2]

He does, however, raise the point of there being so many Turkish words in the dialect of supposed Mongol descendants, and the additional factor that if, as a corollary, one could assume their language to be originally Turkic, why had they adopted Persian, rather than the Turkic or Pashto of their neighbours?

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1. Beveridge, A.S., The Babur Nama in English, 1921.

2. Elphinstone, M., An Account of the Kingdom of Caboul, 1842, p.208.

Burnes in 1842 remarks on indigenous attempts to further this idea of Mongol descent:-

> 'The Huzarahs state themselves to be descended from two brothers, Sadik Kumr and Sadik Soika, Sadik being a title among them. They are particularly mentioned in the annals of Jingis Khan's wars; and 3000 families are said to have been left by that conqueror.'[1]

Burnes may have taken for historical fact what were probably tribal histories and genealogies of a mythical nature. This is borne out by the confused situation that follows:-

> 'The Huzarahs themselves claim descent from the Toghianee Moorks; some however, of those who live at Dih Koondee deduce their lineage from a Koresh Arab, others from the Kibtee, a race coeval with the Jews. The Fouladee Huzarahs of Hoojuristan are said to be so called from a daughter of Afsariab.' (1842:230)

In fact, during the nineteenth century the theories reached absurd levels, the favourite being the claim of descent from the Beni-Israel, which has also been accorded to the Pashtuns. Leech[2] appears to have taken seriously the claim of brotherhood with the Europeans, as both were considered to be descendants of Japheth, son of Noah. Again, Bellew[3] connects the dai appelation of many Hazara tribes with a reference of Herodotus to the Dahae, who settled in the ancient kingdom of Ghor, part of the present Hazarajat. John Gray[4], physician to the Amir Abdur Rahman, introduces

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1. Burnes, A., Cabool, 1842, p.230.
2. Major Leech, A Supplementary Account of the Hazaras, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1845, vol.XIV, Part I, p.10.
3. Bellew, H.W., An Enquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan, 1891, p.6.
4. Gray, J., At the Court of the Amir, 1895, p. 206

a new variation, describing the Hazaras as mainly of Turkish origin, but having tribes among them of Rajput, Kopt, Abyssinian and Persian descent!

Contemporary writers have also perpetuated the theory of direct descent from the armies of Mongol invaders. Elizabeth Bacon[1] locates the Mongol sources as Chagataians from Transoxiana who entered Afghanistan between 1229 and 1447. According to her, the minggan regiments recruited from Mongol tribes coincided in composition almost entirely with the tribe, so that the military unit took on a tribal solidarity. Before the fifteenth century in Afghanistan, hazara had referred simply to a mountain tribe (hence the non-Mongol 'Hazaras' of Badakhshan and North West Pakistan), but by the fifteenth century the term had increasingly come to refer to specifically Mongol tribes now situated in the mountain regions. Thus the transposition of the Persian hazara for the Mongol minggan would indicate a seemingly logical shift of ready made Mongol units into tribes resident in Afghanistan under their present name. Following the etymological line of reasoning, Bacon uses the contemporary tribal terminology to substantiate her argument; for example, she states that a modern sub-tribe of the Besud is the Borjigai, a name strongly reminiscent of Borjigin, the medieval Mongol obok (clan) to which Chengis Khan belonged.

The Russian Aslanov has developed this theory slightly and states that:-

> 'When it began in 1221 - 1223, the Mongol troop invasion of the territory of present-day Afghanistan brought forth energetic opposition from the local people. After conquering the country the Mongols left detachments there.

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1. Bacon, E., The inquiry into the history of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 1951, vol.7, p.230.

> Later four sons of Ghengis Khan and thereafter his grandson Mangu Khan also invaded, accompanied by thousands of men who established permanent garrisons in the conquered country. These men mixed with the local people and gradually adopted the language of the conquered.' (1969:36)

The writer does admit that there may have been more than one movement of Mongols into the area, but is forced to conclude that the contemporary Hazara settlement does not coincide with the original distribution of settled Mongol detachments. Aslanov rather suggests that these Mongol groups were pushed up from the fertile valleys and slopes of eastern and northern Afghanistan to the higher valleys by Pashtuns from the east and south and Uzbeks from the north. The area left to them was then named Hazarajat after its population.

This body of theory leaves many questions unanswered, however, for example the development of the language. Hazaragi is a Tajiki dialect of Persian, with a certain Mongol and Turkic vocabulary, Pamiri elements and some influence from Pashto. Linguistic analysis by Dulling[1] suggests that the present dialect is composed of the following three elements: pre-Mongol Persian, Mongol and Modern Tajik. We know from Babur's accounts that a mixed Mongol was being spoken in the Hazarajat in the sixteenth century. By the eighteenth century this had become mainly Tajik. Dulling's theory, therefore, is that a conquering Mongol group assumed the language of the Iranian aborigines, while retaining a number of terms from Mongol and Turkic-influenced Mongol. In fact, when cultural

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1. Dulling, G.K., The Hazaragi dialect of Persian, 1973.

elements are more fully explored, then the first body of theory that I outlined at the beginning of this chapter, is seen to be redundant. As the Mongols were largely nomadic, some writers found it difficult to explain the settled nature of the Hazara communities. Bacon and Hudson, for example, are forced to conclude that Hazara social forms are a result of adaptation by the Mongols to conditions in Afghanistan:-

> 'Geographical environment exerted the most influence: the Hazaras were not in open steppes, but contained in narrow and deep valleys which separated not only one clan from the next, but the entire number from other Turco-Mongol tribes. Under constricting conditions of this sort, a Mongol feudalism (whose basis was not uniquely land) could very probably disintegrate and give ground to small, self-suficient democratic agricultural communities, having a social life based on cooperation.' (1941:257)

More satisfactory explanations are given by recent writers, such as Schurmann (1962) and Ferdinand (1964), who conclude that the Hazaras are the descendants of various admixtures of ethnic groupings, from on one side an autochthonous agricultural, mainly Tajik populace of the central Afghan uplands, and from the other side nomads of a Turco-Mongolian and Turco-Mongolian-Iranian stock. It is suggested, then, that this nomadic population migrated regularly and over a long period for the summer season to the mountain districts of the Hazarat. By the sixteenth century they had begun to settle in these summer encampments and to subject themselves to the Tajik population. The nomads settled and gave their Shi'ite religion to the Tajiks.

Where Schurmann and Ferdinand differ is in their estimation of the number of nomad incursions into central Afghanistan. Schurmann definitely suggests that there was one invasion:-

> 'During the middle of the fifteenth century, a number of these nomadic groups (Hazaras) both Afghan, Mongol and mixed, must have moved eastward into what is now southern Afghanistan.....As early as Babur's time some had begun to settle in the Hindu Kush.' (1962:118)

Ferdinand agrees with the theory of nomad incursion, which he found confirmed in local tradition, when a Hazara Khan of Dai Zangi related to him in 1960 how the Hazaras were originally nomads from Kandahar, using the Hazarajat as grazing land until they finally settled there. However, he considers, in contrast to Schurmann, that a long and complicated process, including many nomad incursions, has been involved in the formation of the present day Hazaras. Bacon[1] is in agreement with this factor, but persists with the theory of the Chagataians invading from India and Turkestan.

Clearly, the question of Hazara ethnogenesis has been confused and suggestive, but the discussion has obviously advanced considerably since the nineteenth century hypotheses. When cultural elements such as language, agricultural patterns and social structure are considered, more satisfactory theories are evinced.

The Nineteenth Century Tribal Background

This section describes the structure of Hazara society as it existed in the nineteenth century before the consolidation of state control under a Sunni Pashtun regime headed by Abdur Rahman. The Hazarajat in the

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1. Bacon, E., Review of Schurmann (1962) in Central Asiatic Journal, 1963, vol.8, p.62.

nineteenth century was almost completely independent of the government in Kabul, and had long resisted any attempts at integration, slight though these were up until 1880. Ferdinand considers that at this time a kind of tribal feudalism ruled in the area with its basis in the lineage system. This is attested by early writers; Elphinstone, for example, describes the tribal divisions of the Hazaras as Deh Zengee, Deh Koondee, Jaughoree and Polaudeh, being the largest. According to him, overall control was vested in the Sultan, who had absolute power over the tribe, to administer justice, impose fines and executions. Elphinstone notes the wealth of the Sultans, 'who have good castles, fine clothes and servants adorned with gold and silver.' (1842:211) Ferrier[1] describes the eastern Hazara population as stretching from the Hindu Kush to the frontiers of Kandahar. They were known as the Hazara Pus Koh or Pusht Koh (beyond the mountains), and were divided into the Yekoo Olingy, Deh Zingy, Ser Jingeli tribes, each governed by separate chiefs, and the Deh Kondi, Bolgor and Kudelane, who were united under one chief. Burnes gives the divisions of the Hazaras as Dehzungee, Dih Koondee, Dih Choupan or Zurdaloo, Bulktiaree (near Ghazni), Jaghoree, Behsood and various other small groups such as the Chuksuk, Pouladee and Sheikh Ali of Ghorband, making 67,000 in all. The chiefs in the central areas were known as mirs and towards Turkestan as begs. Schurmann (1962:122), suggests that these are not in fact tribal designations, but rather territorial, and on the whole the sources are not conclusive enough to demonstrate that a tribal feudalism did have a basis in the lineage system.

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1. Ferrier, J.P., Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and Beluchistan, 1856.

As a clue to more accurate investigation into tribal delineation, the appelation dai has been suggested. Fraser-Tytler[1] suggests that it is a corruption of the Persian dah (ten) and therefore reflects the military divisions of the Mongols. Ferdinand (1959:14), however, considers that dai may be the plural of deh, meaning village, as in Dai Mangi, for example: Dai-i-Mangi - the village of Mangi. He notes the possibility of a further connection with day, which in the Hazarajat means a stack of winter fodder or of bushes gathered for fuel i.e. 'things being collected together'. In this idea of a collectivity there is an analogy with the Pashto zai, which generally means 'son of', as in the tribal name Ghilzai, Barakzai or Mohamedzai, but can also refer to a general collectivity, gathered together for a specific purpose, for example in the time of jihad (holy war). Hazaras today explain dai as tribe, so until more research is undertaken we shall accept this explanation.

A nineteenth century report on the Hazarajat[2] made for the Government of India throws some light on the political structure of the Hazaras, as well as providing interesting information on material culture. The most relevant points are given below, following the form of the Report and taking each tribe in turn.

Mohamed Khwaja

This tribe was resident in the Ghazni district, with Ghulam Husain as Khan. The tribe numbered 30 clans, each composed of between 20 to

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1. Fraser-Tytler, W., Afghanistan, 1950, p.57.
2. Report on the Hazarajat by Subedar Muhammad Hussain Khan, Second Sikhs, Native Attache, Afghan Boundary Commission, 1886. India Office Library and Records, L/P&S/7/49, p.415-437.

500 families, making 3,330 families in all. Seven maliks or headmen controlled these clans under the direction of the khan. The Mohamed Khwaja, as sedentarists, lived in mud and stone houses built inside large stone qal'a or forts. Agricultural produce was composed of wheat, barley, Indian corn, lentils, peas and some apricots and apple trees. Horses, asses, bullocks, sheep and goats were reared and barak (woollen cloth) carpets, sacks and ropes were made from the sheep's wool. Chaff, lucerne and clover were collected and stored for fodder. During the three months snow season, the population were confined to the settlement, and were 'very happy during this season, being safe and secure from Afghan oppression'. There was some migration to Kandahar, Quetta and Peshawar in the winter to work as coolies, and others of this tribe were extensively employed in Afghanistan as grooms.

In 1810 government revenue had been assessed at 25,000 Kabuli rupees collected in kind, as coins were not available. Under Amir Dost Mohamed (1826-39), this was raised to 35,000 rupees, collected in cash. Under Abdur Rahman, ruling at the time of the Report, revenue was assessed at varying rates for animals, fines for assault, etc. Each man contracting marriage paid 10 rupees, but if the bride was a widow, only 5 rupees were extracted.

Jighatu

A tribe of about 16 clans each controlled by maliks and numbering 8,470 families in all. In 1883 the Amir Abdur Rahman himself had appointed Ali Khan as chief of the tribe. Agricultural production seems to have been quite extensive, including the cereals and pulses

mentioned before, plus rice, apricots, apples, pears, grapes, melons and potatoes, as well as the animals listed above. Revenue accordingly was high, averaging 50,000 rupees, no limit being set on the fines for any crime or rebellion. Large numbers of the Jighatu enlisted in the Afghan infantry and cavalry and in the winter worked as coolies in Peshawar and Kandahar.

Zarghun

This tribe consisted of 8 clans of 1,470 families who, a hundred years previously, had separated from the Besud Hazaras and settled in Bamian. As there was limited snow in the areas, they remained sedentary all year through, producing cerials, pulses, carrots and turnips. Grass for fodder was brought from the hills and dried. Wool products from goats and sheep included carpets, socks and mule bags. A revenue of 7,000 rupees was paid to the government in cash.

Pas-i-Koh Hazaras

Under this title are subsumed the following clans: Jirghai Hosi Muhammed, Daya, Fauladi, Deh Zangi Patu, Zolai, Sultan Ahmad, Uruzgan, Kolya, Kalandar and Deh-i-Chaupan, numbering 44,500 families in all. All these clans were at the time of writing independent of the Amir and were living in the marginal lands around Ghor province. Here the climate was bad, with snowfalls sometimes lasting as long as five months. In Uruzgan and Hujaristan (where the Fauladi were found) the climate was more conducive and grapes and melons were produced. The reporter is very insistent on the feuding, ungodly nature of these clans, who were

'poor and thieves, so wild that they never come to Kabul.' It is not surprising, perhaps, to learn that there was no migration among these clans to work in servitude or as labourers.

Balkhabi

This tribe lived in the inaccessible area of Balkhab, between Turkestan and Deh Zangi, and was composed of ten clans plus refugees from all Hazara clans, numbering 10,000 families in all. Confusingly, the names of the khans or chiefs of the clan are given, but not of the overall authority. The Balkhabi summered in the Koh Char area with their flocks while the cultivators remained in Balkhab. There is evident Uzbek influence according to the informant, in that 'they wear chapkan (coat) and turban like the Usbegs.' Up until 1870 they had been independent and paid no revenue, but at the time of writing were paying 4,330 rupees.

Deh Mirdad and others

This includes tribes from the Besud and Dai Zangi area who had been settled in Darr-i-Yusuf in Mazar district about twenty years previously, and numbering altogether 4,370 families. Houses were built in the open plains with few forts, and flocks were taken to summer 'sanitaria' where the Hazaras lived in tents or thatched sheds. Irrigated land could be had in the Darr-i-Yusuf area for nothing and lalam land, dependent on rainfall, produced good harvests of melons and pumpkins. Large numbers of horses were kept for ploughing. As with all the other Hazara groups, descriptions are given of their weaponry, in this case muskets, pistols and

swords. Cash revenue was exacted on families and horses and that on sheep was taken in kind. In addition, one quarter of the produce taken from irrigated land and one tenth of that from unirrigated land was also taken from them.

Sheikh Ali

An Ismaili tribe living in the Mazar district and independent until 1870. Eight clans numbering 3,090 families were ruled by three maliks, but we are not told of any overall authority. Agricultural produce was poor and thus revenue was assessed at a low rate. There was no migration among this tribe in search of employment. The reporter notes that 'they take regular exercise and are expert in climbing up mountains.' 3,000 Sheikh Ali families are also mentioned as living in Ghorband, a dependency of Kabul, and others numbering 6,000 families living in Khanabad.

Chahardasta

A tribe of 1,810 families in 14 clans living in the Ghazni district. Their chief, Faiz Muhammad Khan, had been executed by order of Amir Abdur Rahman, and at the time of writing they were without a chief.

Deh Zangi

A tribe of four principal sections, each with a clan chief and subsidiary maliks, of 670 families in all, attached to the Bamian district and subject to Kabul. Their revenue was assessed at a low rate. It

is stated that among the Deh Zangi, alone of all the Hazara tribes, the mir or clan chief (among the Deh Zangi generally known as beg) owned all the cultivated land in addition to the power of dispossession.

Deh Kundi

A tribe of 19 clans and 11,010 families living near the city of Gizao, on the Helmund. Gizao must have been quite substantial, having four gates, fifty shops and eight hundred Tajik families resident. The chief of the Deh Kundi was always chosen from the Daulat Beg clan, who had been instrumental in tribal struggles with Firozkohis and Taimanis to the west. Cereals and pulses were produced in this area, but winters were severe, with snows sometimes from October to March, so that families were forced to store food and fuel enough to last for five months. Cattle were taken for summer grazing to the mountains where the Hazaras lived in tents. There was no migration for employment, and cloth, iron and indigo were imported by Qizilbash merchants.

Besud

In this case 13,030 families, 'very fond of arms', were divided into seven clans headed by a mir, and clan sections headed by a lambardar. The Amir appointed a separate governor over the Besud since their subjection in the 1840s. Taxes and revenue before the time of Abdur Rahman seems to have been excessive, but under Abdur Rahman we are merely told of cash revenue on animals and one tenth of the produce of irrigated land. Barak, ghi and kurut were the main products. Due to over-exploitation of the resources in

the area and the heavy taxation, large numbers took seasonal work in the winter in Kabul and India.

Jaghori

A tribe of seven dastas (clans) numbering 5,420 families in all. Previously the chief had always been chosen from the Alam Beg Clan, but Abdur Rahman had executed the last one and appointed a governor over them. Cereals, pulses, melons and apricots formed the main produce along with the wool and milk products common to the other Hazaras. Cash revenue was 58,000 rupees, plus more in kind, the governor extracting one rupee per family for himself. In addition, Abdur Rahman had imposed taxation on animals as well as taking one tenth of the produce of unirrigated land for the state. The reporter states that numbers of the Jaghori served in Afghan cavalry regiments and the very poor laboured in Kabul and Peshawar during the winter.

Another report[1] prepared for the Government of India gives us some more details of tenancy arrangements among the Hazaras. Two Hazara-populated areas lay within the larger areas known as Ghazni; these were Deh Mirdad, north of Ghazni between Wardak and Hazara Besud, and the area known as Hazara, in the west. Here the jais, or settled inhabitants of the area formed hereditary artisan families, producing the saddles, postins (sheepskin coats) and shoes that were Ghazni's main products at the time. Grain, fruit and vegetables were grown on the irrigated land by the deh khans (tenants) of the landowners. The tenancy arrangements were such

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1. Short Account from Native Information of the Ghazni District, compiled by E.G.Hastings, Political Officer, Kabul Field Force, 1880. I.O.L. L/P&S/7/26, p.353.

that the deh khans, if they provided cattle for the plough and half the amount of seed, received one third of the produce, but were liable to dispossession after the crops were gathered. Rules of property holding are stated in the report to have been according to the Shari'a (ecclesiastical law) so that women would theoretically able to hold land.

Subedar Muhammad Hussain Khan's report, limited though it is in scope, indicates some important points relevant to an examination of Hazara society in the nineteenth century. These are: the tribal structure and the domination of the chiefs, village settlements, an increasing dependence on agriculture as opposed to pasturalism, internecine fighting and the presence in certain areas of government intervention. All these points are brought out by other writers. The tribal structure was noted by the nineteenth century travellers, who were quoted before. Regarding the social structure in a society experiencing the transition from pasturalism to agriculture, the only two interpretations offered in any detail are by the two Russians, Aslanov (1969) and Davydov[1]. They see nineteenth century Hazara society as essentially feudal, a result of feudalisation in late medieval or modern times. Class stratification, which began when the few leaders and their cohorts accumulated large herds of livestock, was intensified when the Hazaras changed to settled agriculture. Large portions of the best lands were gathered into the hands of the maliks and begs, and though this process had variations in the different tribes, the end result overall was the creation of a landowning elite. The office of feudal khan by the nineteenth century had become

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1. Davydov, A.D., The Rural Community of the Hazaras of Central Afghanistan, Central Asian Review, 1966, vol.XIV, p.32.

hereditary (as we saw among the Daulat Begs mentioned in the Report), and the incumbant exacted certain rights and privileges. The qal'a or fortress structures in which the khans lived can be seen in Afghanistan now.

Davydov notes that in the process of feudal development, major military-feudal unions came into being, embracing several villages. The leader was elected by the village elite, composed of the rish safeds (whitebeards), mullahs and sayyeds. He could then exact rent from the population in the form of one third of yield, half the value of all handmade articles, one fortieth of the livestock produce and one slave from every three families. In addition, each village had to equip and maintain horsemen at the rate of one per family. John Gray, who travelled through the Hazarajat during his time in Afghanistan, noted that the Hazara political structure was considerably more despotic than that of the Afghans, whose own political organisation was generally seen by foreigh visitors as anarchic chaos, but which in fact preserved a large element of democracy through the jirgah or tribal council.

In conclusion, Davydov considers that the institutions of rural society among the Hazaras were converted into an instrument of exploitation which had already begun before the Mongol invasions. This is in contrast to Schurmann, for example, who considers that the Mongol nomads arrived in the Hazarajat as feudal seigneurs ready to exploit the Tajiks, and he has accordingly searched among the Daulat Begs for patriarchal features inherited from medieval Mongols.

Certainly, there is considerable evidence for the existence of

military-feudal unions, especially when we consider the extensive comments from the nineteenth century writers on the internecine fighting within the Hazaras, confirmed by the Subedar's Report. Their fortress-like village settlements were prepared for defence; Ferrier for one describes the vast arms that could be utilised by the clan leaders:-

> 'The Sirdar Hassan Khan ben Zorab is recognised as their supreme chief by the other three tribes of the Hazara Pusht Koh....This chief can assemble in arms 25,000 horse and 3,000 foot and even double the number in case of pressing necessity.' (1857:221)

Ferrier also noted that the Hazara women, who 'enjoyed perfect liberty', also used weapons and rode to arms with the men.

As early as the sixteenth century, this internal factionalism had begun to manifest itself, Abu'l Fazl declaring that the Hazaras had been:-

> '...seized by cupidity and they have thus become (divided) into bands and bands. They play a two-faced game and show the amity of the wolf.'[1]

Elphinstone observed that:-

> 'They have constant disputes among themselves so that there is scarcely a Hazaureh tribe which is not at war with its neighbours.' (1842:211)

and Ferrier later wrote:-

> 'The Pusht Koh Hazaras of Hassan Khan ben Zorab are constantly divided among themselves, either by intrigues of subaltern chiefs, or by family quarrels; they are always

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1. From the Ain-i-Akbari, quoted in Schurmann, 1962, p.117.

> scheming and plotting on against each other, and thus are ever exhausting that strength to their own detriment, which if consolidated and well-directed, would render them terrible to the Afghans, with whom they are constantly at war.' (1856:221)

Robert Canfield[1] has attempted to provide an explanation for this factionalism among the Hazaras. He argues that spatial relations in the Hazarajat impeded social relations to such an extent that political loyalties were not profitable beyond the scale of the local region, and placed certain communities in zones naturally conducive to the fragmentation of political alignments. Spatial relations are dependent on geophysical factors and transport technology, which in turn control the extent of social relations within an area. The Hazarajat itself is particularly rugged and inaccessible, and can be divided into a number of seemingly natural regions, having diverse ecological and spatial characteristics. Each region is composed of a lowland plain surrounded by valleys of varying size. The plain being warmer and well-watered by streams is more profitable for agricultural exploitation, in addition to being the place where the traffic converges and markets develop. The higher valleys, on the other hand, are generally colder, less watered and more inaccessible, with a lower level in population density. There are exceptions, for example, where a highland population may control a strategic pass or have neighbouring communities who are easily accessible and socially tributary to them. This population could then make their own territory a political centre, depending on how well they are able to retain autonomy from outside rulers and to dominate their own marginal communities.

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1. Canfield, R., Petrified Minds and the Amity of Wolves: Spatial Controls on the Political Culture in the Hazarajat, 1974.

Canfield considers that in the nineteenth century, the central valley of each region was controlled by a 'paramount chief', the Sultan, and the marginal places by subservient chiefs, this being borne out as far as we can tell by the Subedar's Report. These would be chosen in most cases from the Sultan's own kinsmen, and in fact Ferdinand (1959:22) suggests that this family hierarchy was so strong that if a khan failed to produce a son, his eldest daughter would become the ruler, with the title agha, and perhaps marrying a common man from within the tribe. Canfield's supposition is that, despite these ties of kinship, contradictory political affiliations developed between the paramount chief and the subservient chiefs. Thus localised resistance to centralised control coincided with the rivalries of royal kinsmen, and this was enhanced by the limits fixed on social alignment by the terrain itself. He concludes, therefore, that despite their common cultural heritage, the Hazara tribes remained in a divided condition. Admittedly, this is only dealing with one variable, that of the environment, in order to explain social conflict, but Canfield considers that this is the most important frame of reference to be utilised in a discussion of this particular aspect of Hazara society.

A contributory factor to the dissention among the Hazara tribes may have been the continuing encroachment into the Hazarajat by Pashtun tribes, which could have strengthened the individual territorial claims of the Hazaras. This is another process that seems to have been continuing for several hundred years. In the time of Babur's grandson (1600) fighting was prevalent between nomads and Hazaras, though the aggression seems to have originated with the Hazaras, in contrast to later patterns, described in Chapter Five. Babur states that parts of southern Afghanistan towards

Kalat were once held by the Barluk ming or hazarah, indicating the extent of movements in subsequent years. Regarding more recent movements of Pashtun tribes into Hazara territory, Raverty observed that due to increases in population, the Ghilzai tribes were constantly expanding their territories and moving the Hazaras further west:-

> 'Within the last century and a half or two centuries, especially from the time that the Ghalzai Afghans threw off the yoke of the Safawis, they (the Ghwariah Khel) began to encroach on the Hazarah people and to thrust them back towards the west; and on account of the steady increase of some branches of the Ghalzais, many of them are ilats, koohis or nomads, this is still going on.'[1]

Furthermore, in east Wardak the Hazaras were in a minority due to Ghalzai encroachments on districts formerly held by them, including many parts of the Kabul to Ghazni route. It seems fairly certain that these movements were spontaneous, a result of population expansion, unlike the large scale resettling of nomad Pashtun populations in Hazara territory that was carried out under government supervision, for political reasons, later on.

There are two further aspects of Hazara society at this time that are continuations of previous patterns: slavery and urban migration. Leech described how 'the slaves in Afghanistan are Hazara, and the Afghans say it is as lawful to buy and sell them as negroes.' (1845: 340) Later Burnes noted that:-

> 'The Hazara are a race of good disposition; but are oppressed by all the neighbouring nations, whom they serve as hewers of wood and drawers of water. Many of them are sold into slavery; and there is little doubt that they barter their children for cloth and necessaries to the Uzbeks.' (1842:231)

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1. Raverty, H.G., Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan, 1888, p.35.

Most servant women in the main towns were Hazara and there are many records of, for example, babies being bought for half a crown and women for fifteen shillings. The main slave dealers were the Uzbeks. Captain John Wood, on his journey through the Hazarajat to the Oxus, encountered many poor Hazaras, either travelling to the south or to Kabul in search of food and work:-

> 'Every day we encountered parties of half-famished Hazara, abandoning their inclement mountains for the less rigorous winter of the plains.'[1]

For some of the Hazaras an early snowfall had destroyed their crops and as they had been unable to pay their tribute to Amir Dost Mohamed, their sheep had been seized. As I mentioned before, the slave dealers were usually Uzbeks, but the dealers Captain Wood met were Afghans, who were most embarrassed at being discovered in this role.

As far as urban migration is concerned, most of the nineteenth century writers comment on the number of Hazara labourers in the main towns of Kabul, Kandahr and Ghazni, confirmed again in the Subedar's Report. Babur also mentions that there were large numbers of Sultan Mas'udi tribesmen in Kabul during his time there, but we cannot be sure of their purpose in staying in the city. Burnes noted in 1842 that there were an estimated 10,000 Hazaras, some slaves and some free, in Kabul, clearing roofs of snow and acting as porters. Apart from the urban migration within the country itself, many writers also mention the seasonal exodus in search of labouring work to north west India, especially Peshawar.

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1. Captain John Wood, A Journey to the Source of the River Oxus, 1872, p.126.

Reviewing this information on Hazara society in the nineteenth century, then, we have a picture of disparate tribes clinging onto their territories and continuing a pattern of conflict that ignored their common culture and their Shi'a religion. Spontaneous interference was already occuring from Pashtun tribes and increasing government control in the form of revenues and the appointment of governors over chiefs. This extension of state control, which as will be indicated in the following chapter, was partly occasioned by international political factors, was to play on the Sunni-Shi'a antagonism that ran through all contacts of Hazaras with other ethnic groups. Until these extraneous factors came into being, however, the Hazaras attempted to preserve their isolation, though evidence of slavery and urban migration indicates that wider economic factors would probably have proved too strong anyway, for the Hazaras not to be absorbed into the national economic and political system.

CHAPTER FOUR : THE HAZARAS AND THE RISE OF THE SUNNI STATE

1880 - 1964

This chapter discusses the political and social developments in Afghanistan since the late nineteenth century that have impinged on Hazara society as it was described in the last chapter, and that have also affected inter-ethnic relations. The most important development is the unification of the Afghan state and the consolidation of Pashtun power. Up to the time of Abdur Rahman, Afghan rulers sought to create a united state through the process of gradual accretion of power to the central government, manoeuvring tribal alliances and forging personal ties of loyalty to the ruler. However, the rulers became increasingly dependent on the Durrani clans rather than the other tribes for their defence and control, so that the development of the state of Afghanistan became at the same time a rise to power of the Sunni Pashtuns.

The loss of Peshawar and the Punjab in the Sikh wars had deprived Afghanistan of valuable economic assets, so that throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the towns had gone into decline and commercial activities had suffered accordingly. Many regions, including the Hazarajat, had freed themselves from economic and political dependence on the urban centres and returned to a natural economy. The process in the second half of the century was a reversal of this, consolidating Pashtun control over urban and rural centres and opening up the whole country to the state market.

In their attempts to centralise this state control, however, the various rulers found their actions limited by the Shari'a (ecclesiastical law) and the strength of Pashtunwali (the customary codes of behaviour and conflict regulation among the Pashtuns) and the jirgahs (tribal councils). Among the Pashtuns, authority was distributed among the members of the

council and depended more on judicious patterns of allegience rather than coercion. Among the Hazaras, on the other hand, the political structure focused on the leadership of the powerful mirs and maliks. It would not seem unreasonable to suggest that, in this case, the ruler could concentrate his attack on these figureheads, and cripple the society by thus undermining the authority structure.

Under Shah Durrani (1747-73), the Mohamed Kwaja and Jaghatu Hazaras had been subdued to the extent of paying revenue to Kabul. Amir Dost Mohamed (1826-38 and 1842-63) extended this control over Hazara tribes by conquering the powerful Besud. Throughout his reign, he followed a policy of divide and rule, exploiting the Sunni-Shi'a divisions and aiming to prevent an alliance between the Hazaras and the Qizilbash (Shi'as of Persian origin, living mainly in Kabul). A certain amount of centralisation was accomplished in the administration of justice and the collection of taxes. Urban Hazaras were hard hit, having to pay taxes both to local chieftains as well as to Dost Mohamed. By 1863 all major towns were under Barakzai rule, although the Amir could hardly be said to have united the country, since the political boundaries had yet to be determined.

Amir Sher Ali (1869-79) subdued the Balkhab, Sheikh Ali, Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi and Jaghori Hazaras to the extent of their paying revenue to the Kabul authority, but retaining their own mirs. More than Dost Mohamed, Sher Ali attempted to remove powers, such as those of taxation, from the provincial centres and transfer them to Kabul. It was his aim also to break up the tribal military organisation and replace it by a mercenary army. However, it could be argued that this system of internal government undermined the national foundations of the Amir's power, for

the standing army was regarded by the local chiefs as a menace to their independence. The enlistment of troops and the consequent taxation to pay for them increased the unpopularity of the Amir throughout the country. By therefore centralising his authority, the Amir was isolating himself from vital sources of potential support.[1]

By 1879 taxation had become extensive. In the Ghazni district revenue from the land fell into three categories at this time:-

1. Jamabast - part cash, part kind.
2. Sekhot - one third share of the produce.
3. Khaba - one half share of the produce from lands that were considered government property, i.e. which had accrued to the state through desertion of previous owners, or the failure of heirs.

Wajuhat or taxes fell into nine categories:-

1. Sayer - customs transit duties.
2. Zarab Khana - mint tax on the restamping of copper coins.
3. Tobacco licence.
4. Dalali - bazaar agent's tax.
5. Kalla Dagh - tax on meat killed and brought into the town of Ghazni for consumption.
6. Rashum Paroshi - licence to sell silk.
7. Tarazudari - licence to weigh grain.
8. Kotwali - paid by the wali (governor) and reimbursed by him from fines and bribes.

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1. This opinion is taken from a report prepared by the Foreign Department of the Government of India, under Lytton, and sent to Viscount Cranbrook, Secretary of State for India, on 7th July 1879. I.O.L. L/P&S/7/22, p.1509.

9. Sirgalla - a tax on sheep.

The hakim (sub-governor) was ultimately responsible for the collection of revenue and taxes in his position as civil administrator and liaison with the Kabul government. In the Hazarajat the maliks acted as tax collectors and wielded considerable power.

Obviously, this encroachment of the government bureaucracy provoked considerable antagonism among the tribes. In 1875 there was a feud reported between Naib Mahmud Khan, Governor of the Hazarajat, and Mir Nazir Beg of Hazara, the latter being fined and instructed to pay revenue direct to the Kabul government rather than through the Governor, but by July of that year, the Governor himself was alleging that he was a pauper.[1] This issue was at various times taken up by the mullahs, whose influence was being partly usurped by the secular authorities. To Amir Sher Ali's declaration that he wished only to promote the strength of Islam by taking taxes and levying recruits for the army, the Mullah Mushk-i-Alam promised him 30,000 men, but continued to deny the supply of taxes. The British in Kabul noted the growing unrest:-

> 'The Amir's subjects are very heavily assessed. The extortionate exactions of the collectors are worse than the taxes. The capitation tax and the forced military service have created an alarming excitement. In several places the people have emigrated rather than submit to the extortionate demands of forced labour and taxes in money and kind. At Turki the people murdered their Governor and seven of his men.'[2]

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1. Kabul Diary, 19th July 1875. I.O.L. L/P&S/7/4.

2. Kabul News, September 1877. I.O.L. L/P&S/7/17, p.169.

This indigenous process of state creation, through centralisation of government and increasing bureaucratic control of the provinces by a Durrani Pashtun elite was greatly affected by the developments of Western imperialism. The creation of Afghanistan as a 'buffer state' strengthened tribal and religious power in the country and the importance of the Durrani clans themselves. The advent of British and Russian interests in the area has been well-documented, so I shall only briefly describe the international political factors relevant to the Afghan situation. Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain was attempting to consolidate her control over the north west frontier of India. Although the desired extent of this control varied with the home government of the day, it was also determined by the encroachment of Russia on the Central Asian khanates. A gradual annexation of the areas north and south of Afghanistan - Quetta annexed to the British in 1879, Merv to Russia in 1884 - was coupled with a desire on the part of the British (as far as the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government agreed on this point), to establish control over the disparate tribal groups in the area. The question was not so much of an imminent Russian invasion of India, but the need of the British imperialists to control the Indus watershed and the strategically vital passes leading into India. This was seen to involve either the total annexation of Afghanistan and the establishment of a strong military line between the two European empires, or the indirect control of an Afghanistan split into puppet kingdoms.

The American adventurer, Josiah Harlan, gave the Afghan view of this imperialistic conflict as follows:-

> 'The Russians are viewed by the Mohamedans of Asia as a power whose civilisation flows through the mild and fertilising streams of commercial enterprise; whilst the English are viewed as the avaricious and bloody votaries of devastating invasions who recklessly sacrifice all that oppose their own love of independence as a bar to their ambitious projects.'[1]

Two wasteful and bloody Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth century would seem to add some strength to this portrait. The first stage of the Second Anglo-Afghan War ended with the humiliating Treaty of Gandamak (26th May 1879), in which the loss of territory and autonomy for the Amir Yakub Khan reached a nadir. Fighting was renewed until Abdur Rahman Khan was recognised by the British as Amir in July 1880. The Anglo-Persian Commission in 1895 established the western boundary of the country, between 1880 and 1895 the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission established the north and northeastern frontiers, and then in 1893 the Durand Line was set up as the border with India. Finally, the War of Independence in 1919 concluded with the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which finalised the withdrawal of British influence in Afghanistan.

Relations between Afghanistan and Britain had been officially opened in 1803, with Elphinstone's mission to Shah Shuja. Already, in 1839-40 some Hazaras were serving in Broadfoot's Sappers, and when, after the destruction of the British force in Kabul in 1842, some British prisoners were taken to Bamian, a certain Lieutenant Eyre wrote:-

> 'September 12th. At night we were assured that the whole Huzareh population of the valley were on our side and ready to take up arms against Akbar.'[2]

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1. Harlan, J., A Memoir of India and Afghanistan, London, 1842, p.43.
2. Quoted in Brigadier N.L.St.Pierre Bunbury, A Brief History of the Hazara Pioneers, 1949.

At various points in the nineteenth century Hazaras moved to India for employment in heavy work such as quarrying, and from here they enlisted in various divisions of the Native Army (124th and 126th Baluchistan Infantry and the Guides Cavalry). This was all piecemeal recruitment, but in 1904 Kitchener directed Major C.W.Jacob to raise a battalion of Hazara Pioneers. Subsequently called the 106th Hazara Pioneers, they were raised at Quetta and later disbanded in 1932-33. After 1914 it was found more difficult to recruit Hazaras direct from the Hazarajat and the military authorities had to turn to Hazara refugees in Meshed instead. This was partly due to modification in the attitude of the Afghan government towards the Hazaras, so that they could now enlist in the Afghan Army. The Hazara Pioneers served in Mesopotamia in 1915 and in rear of the Imperial Russian Armies in 1914-18. After the 1917 Revolution, some were stranded in Siberia and fought with the White Russians against the Bolsheviks. An indication of the British attitude towards the Hazaras within their army is given in a report of an 'eye witness' at Ks Sinn, January 1917:-

> 'They were all fairer than many Englishmen after a year in Mesopotamia and they spoke a kind of Mongol Persian with a Tibetan intonation....The Hazara is probably the nearest approach to a European you will find in the Indian Army. It is odd that a cross of the Mongol and the Semitic should have produced this breed. I do not know the Tartar in his home, but these descendants of his have much in common with us. In his sense of humour, quick temper, rough and tumble wrestling, ragging and practical jokes, and a practical common sense; in his curiosity and love of travel, in his complexion and disposition, and in his easy-going habits of life, the Hazara is not so very far removed from the Islander of the West.' (Bunbury)

It is evident, therefore, that for a considerable period of time, the Hazaras allied themselves with a foreign, and essentially aggressive power, which was perhaps willing to exploit their ambivalent position within Afghan society. This may be related to the low status position of the Hazaras at that time, so that an alliance with the 'enemy' could hardly lower their position any further. Already, in Pashtun terms, they had failed to achieve the norms of the larger society; their physical characteristics, religion and economic position had assured that. In addition, it is possible that the British wished to exploit the already existing animosity between the Hazaras and the Afghans to their own advantage.

Throughout the first phase of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, several Hazara chiefs had offered their services to the Indian Army, and in the second part of the War, the numbers increased considerably. Leading men of the Besud and Jaghori met General Roberts in Kabul and he was very impressed with them. He had realised that as the Hazara country extended from Kabul to Herat, their co-operation would be crucial to any extension of British influence in the area. It is probable that Roberts overestimated the importance of the Hazaras to the British campaign, but his view was nevertheless shared by Surgeon-Major Bellew:-

> 'For us, in our new relations with Afghanistan, this people has a special and very important interest. With good management they may be attached to us and our interests and are capable of being converted into a very powerful advance-guard of our military position in this country.'[1]

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1. Bellew, H.W., The Races of Afghanistan, 1880, p.116.

How much the British influenced inter-ethnic conflict is difficult to assess, but it is certain at least that fighting between Hazaras and Afghans increased at this time. During the troubles between the Hazaras and the Andari Populzais in Jamrud in 1879, the Hazara maliks commented that the neighbourhood had been entirely ruined by Afghans and gave a 'pitiful account' to the British authorities of the present state of their people. A report by a British officer on the feuds between Hazaras and Afghans (they are not named), in Karabagh sheds some what different light on the inter-ethnic relationship:-

> 'That the extraordinary bitterness of the present emnity between the two tribes is a product of a very recent date is made evident by the fact that Afghan and Hazara villagers in Karabagh are interspersed with one another with no attempt at distinction. The inhabitants tilled the same ground, used the same streams and drew water from the same wells. Though there was no friendship, there was no active emnity; both were alike restrained by the fear of the superior force at Kabul, and disputes when they did occur were of a petty nature and strictly localised. Now, however, in that on either side no quarter is shewn either to age or sex and the women have been treated with every circumstance of dishonour, it can hardly be possible that at least for some years to come Afghan and Hazara can live within many miles of one another. The animosity between the two extends even to the burial grounds. As we rode into Mushaki we passed on the right a very extensive Muhammedan cemetery with some handsomely carved white marble tombstones. All these were broken, the Hazaras acknowledging that this had been their work.'[1]

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1. Major C.B.E.Smith, Political Officer, South Afghanistan Field Force, April 1880, in Official Journals of the S.A.F.F., 1879-80. I.O.L., L/P&S/20/B310.

While we cannot posit any direct correlation between the British presence and inter-ethnic conflict, it is clear that sectarian groupings are invoked and manipulated in situations which demand a polarisation of allegience. The British could be seen as the nominal exploiters of the situation, using the Hazaras when they needed them, but an equally important factor was the existent conflict between the provinces and the central government, as well as the conflicts within the provinces themselves. The Hazaras by virtue of their ambiguous status - on the one hand as slaves or economic dependants with a low status in the religious ideology, and on the other a viable force managing to retain some control over their territories - were probably the one group that was liable to be utilised by an outside power.

Apart from their influence on the Hazaras, the imperial powers, in their creation of the 'buffer state' and their support of the autocratic Abdur Rahman, strengthened the government's efforts to bring the whole country under control. As far as foreign relations were concerned, the Afghan ruler was, however, virtually powerless, and until 1919 the British retained considerable influence in this sphere. In one sense, the two wars against the British bolstered nationalist sentiments, strengthened by the feeling that the wars had been a form of jihad. However, this itself increased the power of the ulema and the force of tribalism. The wars had mainly damaged the eastern urban centres and left the tribal structures virtually untouched. But in polarising Afghan forces against each other, the British had reinforced the traditionalist elements within the country, the religious elite, which was often the same as the land-owning elite, being the most obvious example.

The real consolidation of Sunni Pashtun power over the state of Afghanistan was effected by Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). As the first Afghan monarch to invoke the divine right of kingship, he was able throughout his autocratic reign to extend centralised control over both religious and secular institutions in the country, and to develop a stronger army in order to enforce these changes. He attempted to create a constitutional parliament composed of sirdars (the aristocrats) and mullahs, whose positions would be hereditary, and the khwanin mulki, who were the representatives of the people, elected by the maliks. They were to be supported by the executive body, the khilwat, but both were under the absolute control of the Amir. The country was to be divided into Turkestan, Herat, Kandahar and Kabul Provinces and seven administrative districts. Each was to be administered by the provincial governor, the kazi (the judge in an ecclesiastical court), the kotwal (provincial head of police) and the kafila bashi (head of the caravan department), responsible for tax collection and the treasury. The Hazara maliks lost a large part of their power under the Amir's reforms, the independent rulers in the provinces were reduced to merely acting as representatives of the Amir's government.

Abdur Rahman, declaring that 'more wars and murders have been caused in this world by ignorant priests than by any other class of people',[1] also extended government control over the religious establishment, bringing it under secular crown control and thus answerable to the government. In challenging the power of the mullahs, he took over the

1. Mir Munshi, Sultan Mahomed Khan, ed., The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1900, vol.1, p.251.

waqf (property set aside as religious endowment), preempted the right to interpret Islam and introduced exams for the mullahs, thereby hoping to reduce their numbers. The Amir introduced the division of the law into Shari'a (that derived from the Quran), civil and tribal. The registration of marriage was introduced and divorced women allowed to sue their husbands for alimony. Slavery was formally abolished in 1895, though this was not enforced. One of the most unpopular moves made was to introduce the hasht nafari (eighth man) system of recruitment into the army, by which each tribe was to give one man in eight for service.

As well as extending state control through the growth of a government bureaucracy, Abdur Rahman conquered the remaining independent areas in the country, notably the Hazarajat and Kafiristan ('land of infidels' afterwards renamed Nuristan, 'land of light'). In one sense, this centralisation and uniformity achieved at this time enabled the country to confront its European aggressors. It has been argued that societies not organised on a state model have to go through various modes of adaptation in order to establish relations with state-modelled aggressors, who generally possess a more powerful technology and a crass determination to use it, into the bargain. Evans-Pritchard, in his study of the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, has described how the Bedouin were able to utilise their segmentary tribal structure to form a political state, under the leadership of the Sanusi:-

> 'The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.'[1]

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1. Evans-Pritchard, E.E., The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 1949, p.104.

In Cyrenaica, the segmentary nature of tribal society supported the growth of the Sanusi and ultimately formed an effective opposition to the Italians. The Bedouin, normally perceived, and perceiving themselves as an out-group, were incorporated into this state apparatus as fully as possible. In the case of Afghanistan, however, when the similar problems of having to confront European aggressors occurred, the means of establishing a viable force in opposition were necessarily different. In a society so tribally diverse and with a complex hierarchy of group interests, the peaceful incorporation of these into some Westernised ideal of the state was a difficult proposition. The out-groups, such as the Hazaras, had to be forced rather than manipulated into changing their position vis-a-vis the central government, which in its turn was confronting the international political situation. The Hazaras were therefore suppressed under Abdur Rahman and large numbers of their families distributed around the country, in order to lessen the polarisation of their force in the Hazarajat.

The pacification of the Hazarajat, though a political move towards unification, mobilised support for the central government on religious grounds, with Sunnis ranged against Shi'as. M.H.Kakar considers that, because of this, the Hazara rebellion had all the elements of a foreign war, with the imperialism of Abdur Rahman overcoming the independent Hazaras.[1] Abdur Rahman maintained that it was necessary to pacify the Hazarajat because of the extension of British and Russian control in Central Asia, but the position of the Hazarajat itself was probably quite irrelevant to this. With the withdrawal of British forces early in 1880, the external threat to the unification of Afghanistan was removed, so that

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1. Kakar, M.H., The Consolidation of the Central Authority in Afghanistan under Abdur Rahman 1880-1896, unpublished M.Phil. thesis for the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1968.

the Amir was able to continue with the subjection of the population.

The Hazara rising began with isolated incidents in the 1880s. The Hazaras of Jaghori and Jaghatu, previously supporters of Amir Sher Ali, were already in 1881 opposing Abdur Rahman over the question of revenus. A hakim had been appointed for collection purposes, but he was later murdered on the eve of the Ghilzai rising. During the Ghilzai rising itself, in 1886, the Hazaras gave considerable support to the Ghilzais and their land was used as a refuge for Ghilzai women. Abdur Rahman's policy at this time was to bring the Hazara mirs to Kabul and persuade them to act as a liaison with the provinces; the Amir himself never visited the Hazarajat and in fact was ignorant of the geography of the area. The Jaghori mirs were exhorted in 1886 to go and settle the revenue disputes, but by 1887 they had killed the governor, supposedly over his desire for one of their women. The Hazara women were in fact supposed to have played an active part in the rebellion, especially Shirin Jan, whose story was fictionalised and romanticised by Lillias Hamilton in her novel of the Hazara rising.[1]

As more and more Hazara tribes rebelled against the authority of the Amir, their rising expectations became apparent, though the Amir gave this his own particular interpretation:-

> 'At this time they have entered into a conspiracy with the English so that the English may become the masters of this country and that, like the people of India, they may become free and obtain the freedom of religion.[2]

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1. Hamilton, L., A Vizier's Daughter, 1900.

2. Kabul Agent, 29th March, 1887. I.O.L. L/P&S/49/1319.

By 1891 the non-Hazarajat groups of Firozkohi and Sheikh Ali had rebelled; fifteen of the Amir's regiments defeated them and many Hazara women were given to the soldiers. It is notable that the first census of Kandahar was taken in 1891, perhaps indicating the need of the central government to have a closer awareness of the number of its citizens.

Subsequently, the conflict centred on Uruzgan, which withheld the Amir's forces the longest. The account given here of the rebellion is taken from a report given to the Balochistan Agent in Quetta by Mir Hussein Beg, Chief of the Sultan Mahmud Hazaras (12,000 families), and the reports of the British Newswriters in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. In 1891 Abdur Rahman appointed the son of a Hazara chief of the Dai Kundi to induce the Uruzgan Hazaras to submit. Uruzgan was entered and the forts taken, but with an assurance from the Amir that he would not interfere in the internal affairs of the region. In October of 1891 the Amir was declaring that the independent tribes of Ussi Mohamed, Daya Folad, Dai Zangi, Sepai Zohi, Sultan Ahmad and Uruzgan had come into his possession. From henceforth the people were to be divided into three classes: those who accepted his rule without resistance, those who had collected their men but could not fight, and those who fought him and were defeated. About this time orders were sent out that the Hazaras of Uruzgan were to be disarmed and their revenue payments raised to the level of the Hazaras of Gizo and Tirin, already Afghan subjects for some time. The Uruzgan maliks then went to Kabul to remind the Amir of his previous promises of non-interference. They were imprisoned for their troubles and the Hazaras, notably the Palo subclan of the Sheikh Mohamed, were disarmed, tortured and the women raped. In retaliation, the Amir's sepoys were killed.

The escalation of tension between Sunni and Shi'a reached Kabul, where the Qizilbash, who were Shi'a and many of whom were in the Amir's employ, were suffering from an extension of the discrimination usually accorded to the Hazaras. By May 1892, the Amir was preparing a proclamation that the Shi'as should in future wear red turbans in order to be distinguished from the Sunnis, and that in addition they should pay the jazia tax exacted on all non-Moslems resident in the country, usually applied to the Hindus and Jews. At the end of May the Amir pronounced the Hazaras as infidels (this was later read in all the mosques in the country), and declared their property to be lawfully confiscated to the Afghans. After Uruzgan was captured, the proclamation continued, the Hazaras would all be killed, and their wives, children and property be distributed as booty. Clearly, there was an attempt being made to reduce the Hazaras to the category of non-persons; by putting them outside the confines of Islam, relations with them would not be bound by the moral code that applied within Islam. The red turbans would also be a striking symbolic indication of abnormality.

After a further victory against the Afghan forces in Uruzgan, however, the Hazaras of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Daya Folad, Kaimsan, Besud, Jaghori and Gizo rose and attacked Sirdar Abdul Kudus Khan's troops, forcing them up to Tirin. Faced with the growing insurgence, the Amir ordered a four-point attack on Uruzgan from Turkestan, Ghazni, Kandahar and Kabul, under the command of General Ghulam Haidar Khan. All the above-mentioned Hazaras submitted, with the exception of those in Uruzgan, who retreated to the mountains for the winter of 1892. At the same time, in an exchange with the Uruzgan Hazaras, the Amir promised peace if they put the trouble-makers to death. The delicate international situation was invoked by the

Amir, saying that the Iranian mujtahids (heads of the Shi'a religious community), possibly instigated by well-wishers of Russia, were stirring up anti-Sunni feeling and encouraging the floods of Hazara refugees from Herat.

The religious antagonism must certainly have helped in mobilising the forces on both sides. On the one side were ranged the Amir, the Sunni ulema, the tribal elders and the commoners, and on the other the mirs, the Shi'a mujtahids and the Hazara commoners. In September the Kazi of Herat ordered public places used by the Shi'as for their Muharram ceremonies to be converted into mosques, where Afghan mullahs would officiate, and in January 1893 the Kazi of Kabul ordered that Shi'as attend mosques regularly and perform their devotions along with the Afghans. Punishment for not complying with this would be to have the face blackened and be paraded around the bazaar on a donkey. At the same time an announcement was read in the Herat mosques that those Shi'a refugees who had fled to Meshed would not be allowed to return to Afghanistan.

After the winter calm, the fighting was renewed in the spring of 1893, with Abdur Rahman declaring that he would kill every Hazara male over the age of seventeen. At last the fetwa (a proclamation based on a Quranic reading) came from the mujtahids of Meshed, authorising the Shi'as to fight against the Sunnis. The Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Firozkohi, Uruzgan and half the Besud had commenced retaliatory action by May, but by June all had submitted, except the Dai Zangi and Yakawlang. According to the account of Mir Hussein Beg, the Governor of Kandahar summoned the Hazara chiefs to Uruzgan, sending a sealed quran as a promise of their

safety. When Mir Hussein Beg and the other chiefs arrived with their families, all except the chiefs were killed, these being chained and sent to Kabul.

By the end of the Hazara rebellion and the conquering of the Hazarajat by Abdur Rahman, all the Hazaras between Sar-i-Jangal and Kandahar and between Uruzgan and Kalat-i-Ghilzai had either been suppressed or had submitted to the Amir. According to Mir Hussein Beg, the Uruzgan Hazaras' numbers alone had been reduced from 30,000 to 8,000. The Amir had forced the other Afghan tribes to fight with him, imposing financial exactions on all to pay for the war. Cholera, lack of food and continual protests by the Afghans themselves were overridden by the mullahs, who preached that the war was a holy one, a jihad.

In immediate terms, the treatment of the Hazaras was severe. G.P.Tate noted from accounts in Quetta:-

> 'It was openly said that pillars were made at points on the highways of the heads of slaughtered Hazaras, as a warning to others who might contemplate a trial of strength with the existing government. The bazaars of Kandahar and all the principle towns were said to be full of Hazara prisoners of both sexes who were sold as slaves, and at that time Hazara slaves were very cheap.'[1]

In fact, slavery flourished again, and the state profited, taking a tithe on each sale. Many Hazara prisoners were sold at public auction; for example, in Kabul, in July 1892, twenty boys were sold for 300 Kabuli rupees. The general rate was 100 rupees for a man or woman, 50 rupees for a child over twelve and 30 rupees for a child under twelve. Hazara women were taken as suratis (concubines) by Abdur Rahman and his court, and the sons of mirs were used as ghulam bachas (page-boys).

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1. Tate, G.P., The Kingdom of Afghanistan, 1911, p.192.

The *mirs* themselves were generally killed outright. The lands of the mirs of Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi were divided up, so that the land which had been cultivated by the *mirs* themselves was given to the state and the rest given to the common Hazaras.

Many Hazaras had voluntarily fled to Persia, especially to the town of Meshed, and also to Turkestan. Abdur Rahman forcibly moved other groups out of the Hazarajat in order to spread the population more thinly. In addition, Pashtun nomads were given lands in the Hazarajat, partly to increase the extent of Pashtun control over the Hazara population. These moves are discussed more fully in the following chapter.

Abdur Rahman summed up the Hazara war thus:-

> 'This is the last of the four great civil wars that took place during my rule, and I consider that the prestige, the strength and power, as well as the peace and safety of my kingdom, have gained more by this war than perhaps any of the others.'[1] (Mir Munshi 1900:276)

Its importance is evident, for it affected both the management of the state as well as the structure of Hazara society. In virtually bringing all the country under government control, there were obvious ramifications for the political future of the country. As a political entity, its strategic importance became more relevant (as it is now, of course), though most Afghan governments in the twentieth century have followed a policy of *bi-taraf* (non-alignment).

Within the Hazarajat, the changes were considerable. The power of the mirs was harnessed by making them liaisons with the state, and the divisions into more districts increased bureaucratic intervention. The encroachment of the state judicial system also contributed to loss of effectiveness of the traditional social units. Tribal and kinship blocs became less important, and the effective social unit developed in the valley or village settlement. This demonstrates, perhaps, a need to adapt or change to existing social structures in order to retain some kind of group identity. Canfield considers that these processes did not completely eradicate the boundaries between Hazara and Afghan, but that rather a kind of balance of power was maintained. Although in the area close to the Afghan centres of power, there was effective subjugation of one group by another, in the more remote areas a reasonable amount of independence was preserved. In Canfield's view, then:-

> 'The war against the Shi'ite Hazaras therefore brought a state which was being shaped as a Sunni Muslim polity against a Shi'ite confederation, and, as a consequence, more firmly solidified each side as a sectarian polity.'[1]

On purely economic grounds alone, though, it would seem that the independence of the Hazaras had been lost. Under the social changes taking place at the time, capitalist relations were introduced into the Hazarajat, with the development of commodity and a money market. In the mid-nineteenth century, the demand for imported goods in the area was limited to the upper echelons in the society, but by the end of the

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1. Canfield, R., Hazara Integration into the Afghan nation, The Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society (New York), Occasional Paper 3, 1973C, p.4.

century, the area had been opened up to the state market and trading bazaars had become a feature of the Hazarajat. From this point of view the situation in the Hazarajat parallels that of Afghanistan itself; both followed a pattern of isolationism until forced into a relationship, political and economic, with other political entities, resulting in increasing dependance on the external entity.

The development of the Sunni state at the beginning of the twentieth century was spurred on by the growth of what in the West is usually considered the ideology of the nineteenth century: nationalism. Before discussing this, it seems fair to say that as far as Afghanistan was concerned, nationalistic sentiments were confined to an educated elite. During the reign of Amir Habibullah (1901-19), it was evident that any such feelings did not extend to the Hazaras, who continued to flee the country. For example, the British Agent in Kabul noted that:-

> 'A large party of Hazaras have set off for Russia. Hakim robbing them on grounds that they were Shi'a and hence kafirs.'[1]

and also:-

> 'All the Hazaras of the country are suffering from the oppression and highhandedness of the local official class. 2,000 families are ready to emigrate to Meshed.'[2]

Between 1914 and 1916, about two hundred cases were reported of Hazaras intending to flee to British territory, but being captured and forced to

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1. British Agent, Kabul, 13th October, 1912. I.O.L. L/P&S/10/200.
2. Ibid., 30th June, 1914. L/P&S/10/201.

enlist in the Afghan Sappers and Miners. The religious authorities continued to reinforce the remaining elements of the schism, and in 1912 a fetwa was pronounced in Kandahar, stating that 'A Christian, from a strictly religious point of view, is better than a Hindu, who is a polytheist, and that a polytheist is better than a Shi'a.'[1]

However, although the persecutions continued, there are contrary indications of increasing tolerance of the Hazaras on the part of the secular authorities. Hazaras returned from Persia and Russia where they had fled in the time of Abdur Rahman. In 1912 British reporters noted that Hazaras returned from Panjdeh and Basrat, and also others from Persia were given land south of Sar-i-Pul in Mazar Province, where they settled.

Other Hazaras who were on the point of crossing the Russian border were given land in Turkestan by the Amir. There were reports in 1914 of a proclamation issued by the Amir, exhorting Sunni and Shi'a to unite. External political factors may have been relevant here, for example the question of whether Afghanistan should enter the World War, which had a certain divisive effect on the country, so that unity may have been considered desirable by the government.[2] Although, then, the attitudes towards the Hazaras and Shi'as in general seem to have been between the secular and religious authorities, the government aiming to promote

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1. British Representative, Kandahar, December 1912. L/P&S/10/200.

2. Of incidental interest here is a report by the British Agent in Kabul that the Turco-German Mission to Afghanistan stayed in the Hazarajat in June 1916. Via them, Mahmud Tarzi (officially Chief of the Bureau of Translation at the time) sent 'secret instructions' and progress of the war to Hazara nobles, along with 25,000 rifles to be distributed among the Hazaras. Maps of coal and petroleum mines are said to have been found there at the time. British Agent, Kabul, 8th June, 1916. I.O.L. L/P&S/10/202.

tolerance and unity, and the religious leaders continuing the traditional anti-Shi'a position. It was in the government's interest to have a united country, but presumably for the ulema, the preservation of sectarian divisions strengthened their own position. Whatever the explanation, the official government extension of tolerance continued, even in Kandahar:-

> 'The Governor has asked the mullahs to exhort the Sunnis to set aside religious prejudices and treat Shi'as as co-religionists. It is said that the Shaikh-ul-Islam of Turkey has expressed the same wish. The Shi'as of this province have been informed that they may celebrate the Moharram according to the rites of their faith.'[1]

An attempt at the dynamic development of nationalism was made by Amir Amanullah (1919-29). During this period the political leaders in Afghanistan were greatly influenced by the events in the Turkey of Ataturk, and spurred on by their own Mahmud Tarzi.[2] Under Amanullah, certain liberalising reforms were made with respect to women's education, curbing the power of the religious leaders and the tribal chiefs, expanding education generally and encouraging the development of the press. The official policy towards the Shi'as was more tolerant, possibly encouraged by Tarzi, who wished to promote the cause of Pan-Islamism. It is reported that Amanullah joined in Shi'a worship and acted against discrimination in government employment. Presumably this would have affected the

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1. British Representative, Kandahar, /31st August, 1917. L/P&S/10/203.

2. For a detailed discussion of this, see Dupree, L., Afghanistan, 1973, Gregorian, V., The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 1969 and Poullada, L., Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-29, 1973.

Qizilbash rather than the Hazaras, very few of whom are in government employ, even now. In July of 1926 Amanullah and the Governor of Kabul attended the Shi'a mosque during Muharram and the Amir appealed for Sunni-Shi'a unity. Again, there are probably political overtones here, as Amanullah's position was far from stable and he needed to capitalise on the existing support he received from the Hazaras. Poullada (1973: 190) considers that the Amir insisted on the adoption of Western dress in order to break down the ethnic barriers, but the Amir was only able to enforce this in Kabul. In 1920 slavery was officially abolished and this mainly affected Hazara women who were domestic servants in the urban centres, as well as the numerous Nuristanis, some of whose women had been in the Royal harem.[1]

Among the elite, then, or the liberal members at least, there was a determination to show the progressive nature of Islam, greatly influenced here by the nineteenth century Islamic philosopher Sayyed Jamaluddin Al-Afghani. Clearly, the Hazaras in the Hazarajat would still have been relatively unaffected by changing intellectual theories, but this movement towards a greater religious tolerance must have had certain reverberations in their direction. An extract from an article in Aman-i-Afghan, Trazi's liberal newspaper, is an indication of changing opinion among the educated elite:-

> 'It is a pity that we Afghans do not realise and feel in the least the significance of common nationality. Some call others 'Hazaras' and look at them with hatred. Others are called Kohistanis and looked at with contempt.

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1. It has been reported that kuchi (nomad) women, hearing the proclamation, rushed into houses and dragged out the servants, to the sound of tambourines. Rhea Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, 1973, p.126.

> The Afghan calls another Parsiban and draws a distinction between him and his country's sons. The Parsiban calls the Afghan a cow and an ass and drives him away from the pale of humanity.
>
> Today every native and resident of Afghanistan is an Afghan. There should be no distinction. Difference in colour, language, appearance and religion should make no distinction in feelings of fellowship in nationality. He should be proud of his Afghan nation. He should not be proud of his family. The words of Muhammedzai, Barakzai, Populzai etc. can have no place 'of honour and distinction. Nobody can introduce himself to the nations and powers with these words. The only word which one can be proud of and with which one can introduce himself is the same sacred name of the Afghan nation and that is all.'[1]

However, it is uncertain to what extent these liberalising measures actually penetrated, for the nationalist movement was confined to the Pashtun intellectuals. As conscription was widely disliked, ethnic minorities were still used in the army, as in the Khost Rebellion of 1924, when tribal levies from the Hazaras were used to suppress the revolt. Article Eight of the 1923 Constitution stated that 'All persons residing in the Kingdom of Afghanistan without respect to religious or sectarian differences, are considered to be subject to Afghanistan', but the Loya Jirgah (Lower House), meeting in 1924, amended the Constitution in various places and made the Hanafi rite of Islam official, thus legitimating the superiority of Sunnism.

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1. Habibullah Khan in Aman-i-Afghan, 12th February, 1925. Translated and reported in the Kabul Legation Military Attache's Diary for 6th March, 1925. I.O.L. L/P&S/10/1120.

In attempting to lessen the power of the traditional authority structures, Amanullah was defeated by the religious community, the tribal chiefs and maliks, whose influence he had tried to curtail. His reforms were generally piecemeal and devoid of any economic basis. His settlements of various disputes between the Hazaras and Chilzais did, however, ensure their support for him during his fall and the brief reign (January-October 1929) of Bacha-i-Saqqao. The Besud, Qarabagh, Sukhteh, Uludani and other Hazara groups gave assistance to Amanullah, and apparently provided a formidable force.[1] Bacha-i-Saqqao, himself a member of a minority group, as a Tajik, dismissed all Hazaras, as well as Qizilbashes, from any occupations connected with the government.

Any liberalising reforms with reference to minority ethnic groups or religious sects were reversed under the two following regimes. Under Nadir Shah (1929-33), there was a return to the reliance on traditional institutions within the country, the ulema and the tribal chiefs. However, as parliament was incorporating local leaders more widely into its membership, this meant that the khans were kept in Kabul from May to October, during the sitting of the session, and therefore away from creating too much anti-government ferment in the provinces. At the same time, bureaucratic intervention in the provinces was increased. The country was now divided into five major provinces - Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan- and four minor provinces. These were then divided into first, second and third-class prefectures and then

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1. One group of Hazaras were led by Ishaq Dori of Jaghori, who had a cousin in the Hazara Pioneers, and of whom the Officer-in-Command, Hazara Pioneers, said: 'By profession a brigand. His cousin says he goes sick unless he shoots up at least five Sunnis a day. Exercises his profession in the Ghazni and Mukur districts.' Reported in a translation of 'The Fall of Amanullah' by Ali Ahmad, Personal Secretary to Amanullah. I.O.L. L/P&S/10/1285.

into cantons. Each province and district was to have an executive council for legal and advisory matters. The Shari'a was re-adopted as the primary legal system and a nationwide police force instituted.

In Article One of the 1931 Constitution the Hanafi rite of Islam was proclaimed the official religion of Afghanistan, and generally throughout this period the Pashtun element was strengthened. This process was consolidated under Zahir Shah (1933-73). In the 1930s the Pashtun Academy was set up and the idea of the Aryan heritage of the nation was promoted, in the light of events in Western Europe. Pashtunisation flourishes sporadically when the Pashtunistan question and relations with Pakistan become important, but the Persian language remains the language of the Kabul government and Western influences are obviously on the increase. However much one can say that the power base has been broadened in recent years, it nevertheless remains a fact that a system of social stratification exists in which economic power is distributed unevenly, in favour of the Pashtun and, more recently, the Tajik element. While Pashtuns can be found at the top and the bottom of the economic scale, this does not affect the Pashtun ethos and their social status in general.

CHAPTER FIVE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HAZARAS AND THE PASHTUN NOMADS

In the last chapter I indicated how the extension of the state structure in Afghanistan from the late nineteenth century to the present day has affected Hazara society. A direct corollary of this, which has implications of its own, is the relationship between the Hazaras and the Pashtun nomads. Up to the time of Abdur Rahman, there had been no intermixture of the two populations on any large scale; the Hazaras concentrated their mixed farming activities in the central mountains of the country, and the tribes of Pashtun nomads migrated annually between the southern valleys and plains of Afghanistan and the Indus valley. Through Abdur Rahman's centralisation of government and destruction of the power of the khans, elements of the feudal structure were broken down in the Hazarajat, and at the same time, in granting certain rights to the nomads in the Hazarajat, the way was opened up for an extension of their trading activities. Both these factors have contributed to a transference of land from Hazaras to nomads and the consequent establishment of a nomad landowning upper class, as well as to the increase of urban migration on the part of the Hazaras. Thus a situation has grown up where two ethnic groups have been drawn into a specific economic relationship, that between the settler and the nomad.

This was made possible by the particular ecologic conditions in the Hazarajat, allowing the nomads to exploit the grazing lands there. In spite of the difficult conditions regarding agriculture in the area, the heavy snowfall is of equal importance to the agriculturalists and the pasturalists, for it ensures good grazing and also widespread non-irrigated farming between 6,000 and 10,000 feet. Lower down, the land

is irrigated so that concentrations of the agricultural population are found in areas where water can be led onto the arable lands.

For the Hazaras, land tenure appears to have been an important factor in social organisation. In the nineteenth century mirs and khans formed a landowning elite in the Hazarajat, but at the end of the century the old clans were broken up and the land distributed to the tenant farmers. Local aristocratic families such as the Daulat Begs and the Haydar Begs in Dai Kundi, who previously owned the bulk of available land, lost a considerable amount of their power, though they are still elected as arbabs (village representatives liaising with the government), and as deputies in the Afghan parliament. According to Schurmann (1962: 313), there is still some large-scale landowning in existence in the Hazarajat. In the hukumat (administrative district) of Dai Kundi, the Daulat Begs still own large tracts of land and employ thousands of tenants and labourers. The land in the Khidir region (government centre of Dai Kundi) was, when Schurmann visited it in 1955, owned by a few arbabs, and in Yakawlang an arbab owned 600 acres. Schurmann states that a three-fold system of relationship to land exists in the Hazarajat: land-ownership (mulkiyat), cropsharing or non-cropsharing tenancy (hamsayagi) and cropsharing labour (dehqani). He found that in general, dehqani was more important than true tenancy.

In spite of this, evidence suggests that there has been a considerable move in the last hundred years from a clan-based feudalism to a family-based economy. Throughout the nineteenth century the powers of the khans were eroded. Later, under Amanullah, a law was passed in 1921 stating that the maliks, who had to some extent replaced the khans, had to be

elected by the people for a three year term. The village community has become the important social unit, though each family functions as a self-contained economic unit. Similarly with irrigation, which has partly passed into private ownership, so that the official reservoirs for collecting the hill-stream waters in central Hazarajat and the karezes in south Hazarajat are in private ownership.

In addition to the changes in landownership, there have been changes in labour itself. Whereas previously a personal dependance on the landlord would probably have resulted in a fairly fixed state of labour relations, itinerant labour is now a feature of the Hazarajat. Information collected from the Bamian area (Canfield, 1973), suggests that the share-croppers in the lowlands have a lower income than those cultivators just subsisting in the highlands. In 1968, with the landlord providing the seed, oxen and other equipment, sharecroppers working in the most valuable lowlands received one-seventh or one-sixth of the crop. Higher up the share was larger, reaching one half at the highest level, though here the share-cropper provided his own oxen and equipment. Various factors have contributed to this increase in itinerant labour, such as dispossession, demographic factors, droughts and famines in recent years, and it is significant that the majority of urban migrants come from this group.

Although the Hazaras are a sedentary population, certain numbers do move northwards in the summer with their flocks. Where there are good mountain pastures and fertile mountain valleys such as in Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi, dry field farming as well as grazing is carried out in temporary settlements. In most cases the chapari tent is used, although some

Hazaras, including those of the Sheikh Ali do use the real yurt or kherga.

The Pashtun nomads, on the other hand, have for centuries migrated between the Indus valley and the plains of southern Afghanistan. They are mostly true pastoral nomads whose economy is based on rearing sheep and goats and the utilisation of camels as beasts of burden. Migrations originally undertaken on foot are now often carried out in lorries, though the traditional black goat's hair tent is still used in the camping grounds. They share certain essential cultural characteristics with other Pashtuns: patrilineal descent (which in their case is incorporated into largely autonomous tribal groupings), orthodox Sunni faith and an ideal adherence to the code of Pashtunwali. While the nomads' attitude towards religion is generally assumed to be less strict in its observance than the town dweller, it is the concept of the Pashtun and the organisational function that this performs that is important in their relationship with other ethnic groups.

The extension of the nomads' migrations into central Afghanistan was actively promoted by government policy. Up until the time of Abdur Rahman, the summer grazing lands of the eastern Pashtun was confined to the Pashtun area, and the nomads travelled just to the outskirts of the mountains of central Afghanistan. In his efforts to centralise administration and at the same time expand a policy of government control throughout the provinces, the Amir evolved a plan of forcible resettlement of troublesome groups throughout the country.

In short, this movement involved a shift of power to the Amir and the Kabul government from the mullahs and khans, who, especially among the

Ghilzai, had gained in strength and independence under Sher Ali. Already in 1879 we have first indications of government-inspired nomad intervention in the Hazarajat:-

> 'One thousand men of Malla Khel (nomad Chilzais) started from Ghazni, by instigation of the governor, to attack the Hazara of Besud. The Hazara heard of the move and collected to the extent of 3,000. The Malla Khel were defeated with the loss of five or six men.'[1]

One likely cause suggested for the disturbance was that the Ghilzai nomads who were grazing their flocks in Nawar had been plundered by the Hazaras. Later, in July 1890, six thousand families from 'lower classes' were sent from Dakka and Gandamak to the Hazarajat with promises of agricultural land and cattle, as well as exemption from revenue payment for five years. Nomad intervention appears again in 1891 in the Besud area in the suppresion of the rebellious Hazaras. The Amir promised that after he took possession of Hazara lands, he would give them to the nomads. They would then till them and pay revenue according to the productive power of the land.

Throughout the Hazara rebellion, in fact, Pashtun troops were used against the Hazaras. In return for this help, the Pashtuns were settled in the warmer and more hospitable districts of the southern Hazarajat, including Dahla, Uruzgan and Daya wa Folad. The higher central areas were divided among the nomads. This was effected through the distribution of firmans (a royal order which is a legal confirmation), granting grazing rights to the nomads. These rights were vested in different tribal sections, and people of other sections who wanted to graze there had to

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1. L.Cavagnari, Head of British Mission to Kabul, to the Government of India. I.O.L. L/P&S/7/23/341.

obtain the owner's permission, in some cases also having to make a per capita payment. From this allocation to tribal sections, a more or less strict tradition of family grazing areas developed, so that each family or tent unit returned every summer to the same place. Ferdinand considers that these changes have had a stabilising effect on tribal relations:-

> 'These changes, combined with the government's active role in controlling the whole country and its acknowledgement of certain leaders has had a restraining influence upon tribal relations and has stabilised the intertribal and intratribal set up.'[1]

Captain Robinson's report on the nomads of east Afghanistan[2] indicates the extent of nomad expansion since the time of Abdur Rahman. He deals only with the tribes passing from British territory to the Hazarajat, those from Afghan Turkestan not being mentioned, but as the majority of nomads summering in the Hazarajat were the eastern Ghilzais, the picture is as accurate as possible for our purposes. Out of the twenty to twenty-five per cent of Ghilzais who were nomadic, the following tribal divisions summered in the Hazarajat and wintered in British territory:-

1. Ahmadzai

Musa Khel: about 1,000 families summering in Nawar and Besud.

Yahiya Khel: 300 families in Jamjai and Besud.

Isa Khel: 100 families in Seritala, Besud.

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1. Ferdinand, K., Nomadism in Afghanistan, 1969, p.138.

2. Capt.J.A.Robinson, Notes on the Nomad Tribes of East Afghanistan, 1935.

2. Main Suleiman Khel[1]

Shamal Khel: half of the Madam section settled in Khakran in the Hazarajat, keeping flocks. Some of the men travelling to the Punjab and Bengal to sell clothing.

Khwazak Khel: some summer in the Hazarajat. 200 families settled in Khakran.

Aka Khel: 800 families summering in Nawar and Kirman. 1,000 in Ghorband and Tagao.

Of the non-Ghilzai nomads, Robinson records the following:-

1. Kharot (hamsayas or clients of the Ghilzais) : numbers had increased in migration, and also 200 families recorded as summering in Nawar.
2. Daulatani (Lodi Pathans) : 700 families in Nawar.
3. Shinwari: 2,000 families in Arbanzi, Besud.
4. Powindah Mohmands: about 1,000 rich trading families involved in buying sheep from Hazaras, bringing them to Kabul to sell for dried and fresh fruit, carpets and skins, which were then taken on to Peshawar.

In all cases of trading activity, the main items that Robinson reports as being exported to India were sheep, wool, ghi, fruit and nuts, the main imports into the Hazarajat being clothes, cloth, tea and sugar. The exact nature of the trading activities will be discussed below, but for the moment the main point to note is the expansion in the number of nomads using the Hazarajat as summer grazing ground after the suppression

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1. Of whom, incidentally, Robinson comments: 'Weaker tribes are their prey and they are continually seeking opportunity to destroy them and possess themselves of their arms, camels, flocks and women.' (1935:76)

of the Hazaras by Abdur Rahman.

Nomad expansion in the Hazarajat was advantageous to the government, but in the north, in Afghan Turkestan, problems arose. Nancy Tapper[1] has pointed out that in settling the Ghilzais on the Russian Border, Abdur Rahman wanted the exiles to cultivate the new lands and secure the territory, especially after the Panjdeh crisis of 1885, when it seemed as though Russia wanted to extend her influence in the Panjdeh area of north Afghanistan. In this case, pastoralism would have entailed periods away from the border and thereby weakened the original intention. Here a forcible settlement of nomads was not effected so easily or quickly as the Amir intended; Nancy Tapper considers that he failed to understand the complementarity of pastoralism and cultivation, and the nomad way of life.

However, although in the Hazarajat the relationship between the settled Hazaras and the growing population of nomads was evidently adapted to ensure maximum exploitation of resources for both groups, it is important to note the friction that did occur. For example, there had been for some time an emigration of Hazaras to Persia and India, which continued until the 1920s. In 1912 the British Representative in Kandahar reported that:-

> 'Several thousand Hazara have set out for India, partly no doubt in search of livelihood, but partly out of annoyance at the neighbours that have been foisted upon them.'[2]

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1. Tapper, N., The advent of Pashtun Maldars in northwest Afghanistan, School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin, 1973, Part 1, p.55.

2. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/200.

In the same year, quarrels were reported between the Hazaras and the new settlers in their country, over the settlers spoiling the Hazaras' crops:-

> 'Eight hundred Hazara families intended to cross the Oxus to escape persecution and violence they had received at the hands of the Afghan immigrants, whom the Afghan government had placed in the Hazarajat to colonise the tract.'[1]

Again in 1915 Ghilzais granted land by Abdur Rahman in Hazaristan were turned out by the Hazaras, the Hazara maliks then being summoned to Kabul. Looting of caravans by Hazaras continued, especially those using the Daulatyer route. There appears to have been a build-up of arms at this time by the Hazaras, judging by British reports at least:-

> 'It is said that the Hazaras have lately made considerable purchases of rifles and ammunition imported by the traders from Russian territory into their country.'[2]

In 1923 the Kabul Military Attache to the British Legation reported that Hazaras were accumulating arms and had purchased 4,000 rifles from the British authorities in India[3]. At this time, Hazaras were still being recruited into the Indian Army, and they may thus have been better equipped to continue their militancy against the nomads. In 1923 fighting was reported between Hazaras and Ghilzais now occupying their territory; the Suleiman Khel had further raided into Hazara lands and

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1. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/201.
2. Afghanistan and North-West Frontier Diaries for 1912-13. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/200.
3. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/1085.

Afghan troops were called in to inrervene. In July of the same year further disputes resulted in the Hazaras petitioning the Amir Amanullah. He agreed to allow their re-occupation of lands taken from them by Abdur Rahman, but the Ghilzais - of the Andhar, Taraki and Suleiman Khels - refused to comply with this order. Again Afghan troops from Ghazni were called in. In 1926 a 'religious feud' was reported between Suleiman Khel Ghilzais and Hazaras; the Suleiman Khel raided in Dai Zangi, burnt villages and killed several thousand Hazara families attempting to escape to Meshed and Turkestan. The Afghan authorities sent a deputation to intervene, but there is no report of the outcome.[1]

From this it is evident that there was not a passive acceptance by the Hazaras of the nomads into their territories. Abdur Rahman's distribution of populations around the country resulted in a forcible repression of one section of the population by another. In recent years, the nomads have suffered economic deprivation along with the Hazaras. International political decisions regarding borders have adversely affected them, such as the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the closing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 1961, as well as the recent forced settlements of nomad populations in the Helmund region.

Under Amir Habibullah and increasingly so under Amanullah, government policy changed to a certain extent, though tactical reasons probably prevailed, as noted by the British:-

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1. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/1170.

> 'It is known that the Amir is most anxious to placate the Hazara. They are the only race whose hostility to the Pathan can be depended upon.'[1]

Under Amanullah, in fact, many of the aspects of previous policy towards the nomads and the Hazaras were reversed. The old firmans were withdrawn from the Ahmadzai and the Mohmands and new and more vaguely formulated ones were issued. The nomads were allotted the high-lying stretches above the valleys where there were permanent watercourses that could be used for agriculture. The new firmans, however, did have enough force to ensure that each subtribe or section now possessed papers for their respective areas, with the result that a further division into family territories has been undertaken, with definite camping grounds being set up.

A more recent development affecting the delicate balance of relationship between settler and nomad has been occasioned by the problem of Pashtunistan, which, according to Dupree (1973:169), caused a complete shift of the migration patterns of about 200,000 nomads. Afghanistan's frontier with Pakistan closed in 1961 and the nomads had to readjust their migration routes entirely within Afghanistan. This led to fighting between nomads competing for winter grasslands and farmers resisting nomads who established winter quarters near their villages. According to Dupree, the government supported the villagers, but sent out airdrops of forage for the nomads during the hard winters of 1961 and 1962. The effect this had on the Pakistan economy is an additional factor, for the nomads provided a seasonal labour force as well as smuggling considerable amounts of goods over the border.

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1. Diary of the Military Attache to the Kabul Legation, 1924-25. I.O.L., L/P&S/10/1120.

A main feature of the nomad incursions into the Hazarajat recently has been their acquisition of land. Land rights for them began with the *firmans* granted by Abdur Rahman, but as trading increased, they were able to buy the land outright, thus increasing the numbers of landless Hazaras and their consequent migration to the cities. Before looking at these trading activities that have been so crucial to the changes in the Hazarajat, it is necessary to review the essentially material aspects of the nomad-settler relationship. It has been suggested (Dupree 1973:168) that the nomads serve as maintainers and perpetuators of marginal grasslands; sheep and goats do not overgraze, but add fertilising manure to these areas, and when they are withdrawn, the land returns to its semi-desert state. Such grasslands have over the centuries become natural soil banks which can be utilised for agriculture, if provided with adequate irrigation. The farmer's harvested fields thus benefit from the yearly movement of the nomads' animals over the same area. Also, during the migration the nomads are free to weed the fields for fodder for their transport animals, and within the winter area, goods and services are exchanged between the nomads and settlers on a family to family basis. The nomads may fetch wood from the mountains for the villagers and carry out other transport for them, receiving in payment agricultural produce (maize and wheat, for example) when needed.[1]

In spite of this evident set of benefits accruing to both Hazaras and nomads, other factors have intervened to shift the balance. For the

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1. It is worth noting here the case of impoverished nomads who seek harvesting work with farmers in east Afghanistan in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces, but who never seek this kind of employment with Hazaras, only with other Pashtuns. Ferdinand, 1969, p.145.

nomads, capital invested in livestock alone is vulnerable, the animals being open to sickness, drought or raiding. Rich nomads have therefore tended to insure themselves by buying land and this usually happens through the agency of trade. This does not automatically imply that the nomads settle down, for they may continue their migrations. After some time, the more prosperous may settle down, first becoming landlords and after a couple of generations' division of land, their descendantsy become farmers. Dupree describes this process as follows:-

> '...nomads settle down only if, for one reason or another they have lost their flocks and must either attach themselves to other nomadic groups as hamsayeh (clients) or work as seasonal farm labourers. Wealthy nomads may own land and eventually build kalah (houses in a compound) but they make the annual trek with their nomadic or semi-nomadic companions as long as they are able.' (1973:169)

The trading activities that have contributed to the changes in landownership patterns are based on neighbourhood trade, in which the nomad trade with the settled population around their summer camps. The main products supplied by the Hazaras are wheat, ghi and woven wool articles, those supplied by the nomads being Indian or Pakistani cloth, sugar, tea, shoes and utensils. It is the system of credit in these exchanges that has affected the Hazaras most severely. For example, the nomads buy clarified butter in the Hazarajat, which is then delivered the following year to east Afghanistan, for payment after another year. A hundred per cent profit is sometimes made over the whole period. Again, wheat that has been paid for in advance by the nomads may not be available when they arrive to collect it from the Hazaras. The Hazaras must then

buy it back; this is not usually extracted as a cash payment but as a deferred payment of wheat for the following year at an interest of perhaps 3-4 sers. (1 ser = approx. 14 lbs.) If the following year the same happens, the Hazaras begin to sink deeper into debt. This system is a vicious circle for them, for as a final settlement of unredeemed debts, the nomads take over sheep, goats and eventually land. This land is then let out to the Hazaras as share-paid tenants. The ordinary nomad usually acquires rights in land through the gerawi system: here the nomad takes an area of land as security, leaving the Hazara as tenant, though if Islamic law is followed, the borrower, i.e. the former owner of the land, should not be employed as tenant. In this way though, the Hazara gets through his immediate crisis and the nomad gains a constant yield of agricultural produce. In 1954 Ferdinand was told by officials that five per cent of the land in Dai Zangi was owned by nomads, and that this amount was increasing all the time. By 1960, wealthy nomad khans were actually purchasing large areas of land, building qal'as in the Hazarajat with Hazara labour.

Trading, whilst altering the landownership patterns in Hazarajat, with the resultant acquisition of land by the nomads and their development into a landowning class, has also had further repercussions for the nomads within the purely commercial sphere. With the wealth that landownership has brought, some nomads have become lorry owners and begun wholesale trade with a base in the city serais. This has been so financially successful that several large transport firms are run by nomads owning land in the Hazarajat, for example the Ahmadzai. Among the Hazarboz Mohmands, some have completely given up sheep breeding and

while the families still summer in tents in the old grazing areas of the western Hazarajat, the men carry out their business activities in the cities.

Looking at this changing relationship between the Hazaras and the Pashtun nomads, is it possible to discern any patterns that have been observed in other areas? A concept frequently used by writers dealing with relationships between distinct groups, e.g. nomads and agriculturalists, is that of the niche. This is usually seen as the patterns of human adaptation that occur within the ecologic niche itself. Barth[1] has suggested, for example, that we can analyse relationships between such groups in terms of ecologic niches, where each niche contains a certain amount of organic energy to be exploited. Obviously in a human community purely ecologic factors will not be the sole determinants of exploitation; there will be other important mechanisms of adjustment and utilisation of these niches. People are not only involved in a relationship with the environment, but also in relations of competition, co-operation and symbiosis with each other, which may in turn affect the structure and distribution of groups. Political structure, demographic factors and levels of technology will all be relevant here. Barth suggests that as far as agriculture is concerned, the carrying capacity of a niche can be increased as the population increases, within the traditional framework of ownership. But in the case of grazing, utilised by both pastoralists and settled populations, this

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1. Barth, F., The Concept of Niches, American Anthropologist, vol.58, 1956, p.1079 and Competition and Symbiosis in North East Baluchistan, Folk, vol.6, 1964, p.15.

generally carries no exclusive rights, so population increases can lead to situations of competition and possible antagonism. There are many variables relevant to the situation of exploitation of niches by different groups. We cannot talk in terms of settled and pastoralist groups living in a symbiotic relationship with each other unless we are aware of all the factors involved. As far as the relationship between environment and human technology is concerned, the availability of water, the level of technology of the groups utilising the water, and the coincidence of water with cultivable soil, are obviously crucial factors. But, in addition, the historical development of the relationship, with all the adaptive processes involved, is an important aspect.

Brian Spooner[1] has used Ibn Khaldun's model in his discussion of adaptation patterns in southeast Persia. In this model, a settled agricultural population is considered to be generally differentiated into classes, but with a fairly weak political structure. The population is probably divided into villages, and may have a dominant family, but the structural distance between the people and the leaders is likely to be considerable. A nomad pastoral group, on the other hand, has a strong political structure, effected through agnatic kin relations, and controlled by a dominant family. When the two groups come into contact, perhaps through invasion, it is easy for the settled population to accept a new leadership, supplied by the dominant nomad family. Spooner considers that a further development is the enhancement of the economic and

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1. Spooner, B., Politics, kinship and ecology in S.E.Persia, Ethnology, vol.8, 1969, p.139.

political position of this dominant family, at the expense of the tribe. They develop into a dynastic family, which begins to look more and more to the settled population and the land for wealth, to build forts and to settle. Thus a new threefold relationship evolves: that between the dynastic family and the settled agriculturalists being a stable relationship, but that between both of these and the nomadic tribe itself being essentially unstable. Later, through intermarriage and a shift to the cognatic principle of kinship and inheritance, the relationship between the settlers and the nomads is fused. The settlers may take the name of the dominant family and lose their ethnic identity.

This model of the development of the nomad-settler relationship may be useful for an analysis of the Hazara-nomad Pashtun relationship. There are certain features which are probably applicable to the original nomadic Mongol incursions into Afghanistan, and their dominance over the local Iranian population, resulting in the development of dynastic families and their settlement in the area. However, when attempting to apply this to the nomad incursions into the Hazarajat in this century, several problems arise. The main one seems to be that there is insufficient evidence of a 'fusing' of the two populations. Certainly, the leading nomad families have acquired land and settled in the Hazarajat, and in some areas a symbiotic relationship could be said to exist, but their ethnic identities have been kept discrete, even if there has been intermarriage or crossing of the ethnic boundaries.

The land in the Hazarajat has not, on the whole, been peaceably exploited by nomads and settlers in a symbiotic relationship, nor have

separate ecologic niches been exploited by different groups. Instead, there are separate ethnic groups in competition to exploit the same area. According to the model utilised by Spooner for southeast Persia, the Hazaras would have been absorbed into the nomad population as numbers of them began to settle and acquire land. This has not happened; instead the Hazaras are leaving the area and migrating to the cities in increasing numbers.

This may be connected with the carrying capacity of the niche itself, as mentioned by Barth. He suggested that because rights are not generally established in grazing lands, antagonism may develop in adverse circumstances. But even if there are definitive legal rights, as were given to the nomads in the Hazarajat, it is of course always possible for one population to resist the encroachment of another, as the Hazaras resisted the nomads. The relatively poor lands of the Hazarajat could not probably accommodate ever-increasing numbers of nomads as well as the natural population increases of the Hazaras themselves. The balance of the relationship shifted so that the nomads, in their acquisition of Hazara lands, forced the Hazaras out of the area and into the towns. Thus Spooner's idea that settlers may be absorbed into the nomad ethnic group has not proved to be applicable in our case here. I would suggest that this is due mainly to two factors: firstly, the demographic factor mentioned above, that over-population in an ecologically poor niche forced the weaker population out, and secondly that the ethnic identity of each group was strong enough to persist in spite of any absorption that may have taken place. This is in spite of the fact that Hazara political structure had been considerably weakened at the end of the nineteenth century, and pre-

sumably continued to weaken in recent years.

Regarding Pashtun identity, Barth[1] considers that there is a general concept of Pashtun identity overriding cultural characteristics in different groups, namely a stress on individual autonomy, egality and aggressiveness which is controlled and directed through the council system of tribal government. It is only when these values are shared by other groups that Pashtun identity is successfully perpetuated. If not, there will be modifications, such as the Persianisation of the Pashtun middle class in Kabul.

Barth's argument implies that there is a greater measure of political and economic control by the Pashtun group, so that its values have a high status accorded to them by the rest of the community. In addition, political autonomy in a Pashtun populated area is based on landownership, and so if effective boundary maintenance is continued through time, this provides mechanisms for the monopolisation and retention of land by the Pashtuns, as indeed we have seen in the case of the Hazarajat.

While certain aspects of Barth's argument would appear to apply to the situation described here, there seems to be an over-emphasis on the status of the Pashtun identity, and its function as a dynamic factor in social control and change in a contact situation. Thus, while the case of the Hazarajat would seem to provide a good example of boundary maintenance, enabling the formation of a landowning Pashtun class, sustaining political dominance, it is not analogous to the situation that Barth

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1. Barth, F., Pathan identity and its maintenance, in (Barth,F., ed.) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 1969, p.117.

describes in Swat, and which is used for his main example. Here, the Pashtun have become the landowning class in an already poly-ethnic and highly stratified society, and there has been the absorption of other groups into the Pashtun ethos. In the Hazarajat, on the other hand, the boundaries are perpetuated by religious differences and endogamy, for evidence suggests that there are few hypergamous marriages as in Swat. If, therefore, the two groups preserve their distinction in the face of political and economic imbalance, then I suggest we need to shift the terms of reference from the overt controls exhibited in the conception of the Pashtun identity. This is indeed a factor, but only in addition to the maintenance on the other side of Hazara identity. This itself demands further research before this particular ethnic relationship can be adequately analysed.

CHAPTER SIX : THE IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC DIVISION IN AFGHANISTAN

The previous chapters have attempted to illustrate the nature of ethnic division in Afghanistan (in a historical perspective), with particular reference to the Hazaras. Through examination of this historical material, it was hoped to show how ethnic identity had become a prominent political force in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Previously, the geographically isolated Hazara populations had remained virtually discrete communites until the attempted infiltration of the country and the invasion of imperialistic influence in the nineteenth century. At the same time, certain sectors of the Hazara population had contact with other ethnic groups, through their migration to the cities. But on the whole, the Hazaras were tribally organised, subsistence farming in the mountains in isolated communities. For the few vestiges that remain, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a coherent Hazara culture obtained, in terms of religion, social organisation, a Mongol-Turkic influenced language and a distinct musical and oral tradition.

With the advent of external political constraints, in the form of imperialism, the two contradictory movements of nationalism and ethnicity became strengthened. Thus, as ethnic groups were brought into a contact situation, the descent group affiliations of Pashtun and Hazara were intensified through the mobilisation of religious factors. While the Hazaras were perhaps only becoming aware of their distinctiveness and polarity against the Pashtuns in the conflict that had arisen, at the same time the largely Pashtun dominated state

was attempting to reduce minority ethnic identities and affiliations in favour of a united Afghanistan.

In all inter-ethnic conflict it was seen that ecologic conditions were also relevant in fragmenting communities and in forcing migration from rural to urban centres. This was combined with the influx of Pashtun nomads into Hazara lands which set up a chain of economic dependence and deprivation. Ecologic constraints, while affecting the relations between the urban centres of power and the rural communities, were also seen to act upon the rural communities themselves, contributing to the factionalism existing in such areas.

This provides merely an outline picture of the situation. But although more research is necessary before we can discuss more fully the implications of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, it may be possible to demarcate the areas of interest in this field, by utilising various contemporary analyses of ethnicity.

First of all we may take as a starting point my own observation during an admittedly brief period of six months teaching in Kabul, of considerable prejudice against Hazaras and a definite awareness expressed by various Kabulis of being Pashtun, Tajik or Hazara. Ethnic stereotypes were often quoted and families lived in clearly defined ethnic areas of the city. A fairly rigid ideology of social stratification was generally accepted, although the situation belied this and a certain degree of social mobility was evident. The higher levels of education however, did appear to be dominated by the Pashtun and

Tajik elements, and in a 10th grade class of 40 women at the Afghan Women's Association High School there was only one Hazara and the staff were almost all Pashtun.

In the urban situation of Kabul, educated professionals and commercialists both Tajik and Pashtun appeared to be adopting a more Persianised, sometimes Westernised ethos, so that the traditional image of, for example, the tribal bandit Pashtun, still exemplified by provincial visitors to the city, was now an ambivalant symbol for the middle class urban Pashtun. This is, of course, a superficial view and we would need to know more about attitudes within the ethnic group and towards other groups, the conception of 'self' and 'other', to describe any of these changes more fully.

In the case of the Hazaras, the situation would seem to be more static, in that Hazaras are still generally involved in low-status occupations in Kabul or form a large sector of rural poor in the provinces. But it is evident, nevertheless that certain Hazaras are experiencing social mobility and branching into various artisan and commercial activities at the lower levels. What we do not know at present is whether this group of Hazaras retains its ethnic identity. As ethnic stereotypes, based on physical features and supposed behavioural characteristics are still present with reference to Hazaras and Pashtuns especially, this would suggest that these ritualised ways of perceiving other partners in social interaction are still necessary. At present, one can only suggest why this is so and this will be discussed below.

At the moment we need to enquire as to the nature of social grouping in Afghanistan - if they are indeed ethnic and how we shall define the ethnic group to begin with. Until we have clarified the base level of inquiry we cannot examine any changes that may be occuring. Our main guidline here will be to look at relationships rather than discrete entities as perceived by the outside observer.

Much of the recent work on ethnicity has concentrated on the American situation, where the ethnic group is often seen as a political interest group in the power-struggles of a complex post-industrial society. The African context has also been important, where urban migrants are in a detribalising or retribalising situation. No writers deal specifically with Afghanistan, though occasional references are made to the Middle East. This in itself seems somewhat dangerous, as the notion of 'the Middle East' as a suitable category of anthropological or sociological enquiry would seem to be tenuous. Even more dangerous would be to automatically include Afghanistan in this category merely because the population are Moslem.

A more fruitful analogy may be found with reference to the Hindu caste system, though like all sociological analogies, it needs to be approached cautiously. Leach[1], who considers caste to be a structural phenomenon within the specific Pan-Indian cultural context, characterises the difference between class and caste societies as follows: in a class society privileged elites exploit lower orders, and they in turn must

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1. Leach, E., ed. Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North West Pakistan, 1962, p.6.

compete for favours; in a caste society however, the position is reversed, for economic roles are fixed for a minority low status group and the upper castes compete for services. In a class society social status and security go together, but this is not necessarily so in a caste society.

With reference to class, Leach's argument seems to suggest that there are mechanisms whereby lower classes can compete for favours from the power elite - presumably through institutions such as trade union negotiation or participation in a meritocratic education system. It also implies the possibility of a break away from ascribed low-status, i.e. the existence of an ideology of social mobility, even if this is not always a reality. With reference to the caste society, we may note that in Afghanistan, as in India, certain occupations are associated with and practised by certain low-status groups. Beliefs of purity and pollution appear to be associated with these groups and the boundaries kept distinct through the perpetuation of ethnic stereotypes. But although certain elements of the occupational hierarchy are similar to the caste situation, a rigid interdependence of occupational and ritual groups does not extend throughout the whole society.

At the same time Leach's point that social status and security are not necessarily interdependent in a caste society, would appear to bear some relevance to the Afghan situation. It was noted in the previous chapter that in the rural context, the high status of Pashtun derides any low economic status: destitute Pashtuns will not seek employment with Hazaras. But whether the poor Brahmin is participating in a set of similar social structures as the poor Pashtun farmer is

debatable. The important point is on what the status rests - ritual, political, or economic factors. Thus the poor Pashtun may become assimilated into another ethnic group, thereby lowering his ethnic status, but raising his security level - this would perhaps not involve the ritual pollution that a Brahmin would experience from this transition.

In addition, it is possible that a person's social identity rests on various statuses in contrast to the caste situation where one ritual status, theoretically at least, is the defining factor in social identity and behaviour. Barth[1], in Leach's volume considers that a caste system exists in Swat, a Pathan (Pashtun) area in N.W. Pakistan. This is characterised as an involute caste system, where membership of one status necessarily implies membership of other statuses, forming a cluster, which characterises a certain 'caste position.' He notes that:-

> 'In much of the Middle East, plural societies are found, characterised by clear lines of internal segmentation, often based on ethnic criteria; such societies have a structure characterised by the summation of statuses in an involute system, in which a high degree of status differentiation is associated with a limited set of permitted status combinations. Such systems depend for their persistence on very clear criteria for status ascription. In societies other than those of extreme patriliny, this prerequisite implies a pattern of endogamy within the stratified groups.' (1962:145)

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1. Barth, F., The system of social stratification in Swat, in Leach (1962:145)

While elements of caste as discussed here by Leach and Barth may be relevant to the Afghan situation, in that a system of limited involution may exist - being a Hazara implies being a low status coolie worker and not intermarrying with Pashtuns, for example - it is not an example of either a caste or a class society, inasmuch as these are ideal types anyway. Rather I would suggest that ethnic stratification in Afghanistan shades into both class and caste contexts. It is thus probably not analysable along the lines of either of these two models and needs to be looked at in terms of structures in transition.

In order to orient this line of analysis more precisely, we need to clarify the situation on the ground - ethnic relations and their part in social organisation. Traditionally it is the ethnic group that has been the focus of study, rather than ethnic relations; the group itself seen as a population which is largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realised in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction and has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. This approach, however, is too dependent on the objectively assessed ethnographic traits that are demonstrably affected by ecologic factors, rather than stressing the socially effective determinants of group organisation.

An alternative approach is suggested by Barth who utilises a transactional model of interpersonal relations, where commonly agreed values are the object of such transactions. In 'Models of Social

Organisation'[1] he attacks previous anthropological models that concentrated on a static conception of status. He wishes to replace this with a more flexible model relating to the interaction between status and role, introducing a larger element of individual choice in interaction. In this view he is admittedly influenced by Goffman's theories of impression management:-

> 'We may thus construct a model whereby complex and comprehensive patterns of behaviour (roles) may be generated from simpler specification of rights (statuses) according to a set of rules (the requirements of impression management). The role thus generated should represent the optimum around which empirical behaviour may be seen to cluster.' (1966:3)

The implications of this approach for his theories of ethnicity are summed up in the introduction to 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.[2] Here Barth examines the phenomenon of relations between ethnic groups in terms of interaction and the relationship between status and behaviour, rather than approaching it from an abstract notion of 'society' in which these smaller groups may operate. Ethnic groups are seen as social not cultural phenomena; thus, while cultural aspects such as material culture and moral sanctions may be relevant to symbolic group identity, self-ascription and ascription by others is the vital defining feature. In addition, the traditional view that people maintained group identity through isolation has proved false, for categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility and contact, and ethnic boundaries do persist in spite of a flow of personnel across them.

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1. Barth, F., Models of Social Organisation, R.A. 1. Occasional Paper 23, 1966.

2. Barth, F., ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, London, 1969.

The Afghan situation illustrates, for example, the persistence of the ethnic identities Pashtun, Tajik and Hazara, though as we have seen, contact may be intense and change of ethnic group possible.

Ethnic boundaries, therefore, organise the separation of different groups within a society. But in order for these different groups to interact, they must lessen the differences between them and establish some kind of temporary consensus, i.e. a structuring of interaction that allows for the persistence of cultural differences. Continuing the analysis on this behavioural level, then, Barth notes that there will therefore be prescriptions and prescriptions for behaviour according to the different circumstances of group interaction and the conceptions of group identity. Barth thus postulates a considerable standardisation of both behaviour and interaction in poly-ethnic situations, where ethnic categories may or may not be utilised, according to the particular interaction involved:-

> 'In other words, ethnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems. They may be of great relevance to behaviour, but they need not be; they may pervade all social life, or they may be relevant only in limited sectors of activity.' (1964:14)

Ecologic and demographic factors are seen to be important in the interaction of different ethnic groups and Barth constructs a rough typology for adaptations of two or more ethnic groups in contact:-

1. They may occupy clearly distinct niches in the natural environment in which case interdependence will be limited.
2. They may monopolise separate territories, in which case there is competition for resources.

3. There may be a symbiotic relationship between groups occupying different niches and supplying important goods and services for each other.

4. There may be an unstable situation where two or more groups are in partial competition within the same niche.

Demographic factors of absolute and relative size of groups, migration and absorption are also seen to be relevant. In the previous chapter it was seen how an inequal relationship had developed between the Hazaras and Pashtun nomads, occupying the same niche in Central Afghanistan, and it would be interesting to see how this relationship is developing, by utilising demographic information on population size, migration and absorption.

Barth considers that in complex poly-ethnic situations the constraints on a person's behaviour that spring from his ethnic identity tend to be absolute and comprehensive; component moral and social conventions are made resistant to change by being joined in stereotyped clusters as characteristics of one single identity. In these situations, boundary maintaining mechanisms must be very effective, because:-

1. The complexity of the society is based on cultural differences.

2. The identity of the person and the group must be highly stereotyped so that inter-ethnic interaction can be based on ethnic identities.

3. The cultural characteristics of each group must be stable so that the complementary differences on which the different social systems rest can persist in a contact situation.

The first two points would appear to apply to the Afghan situation as we have reviewed it for the last hundred years and as it appears today, in that in a non-industrial society, ethnic identity may be the prime

feature of social interaction, rather than, for example, class or caste identity. That this ethnic identity may also be stereotyped we have seen illustrated in the literature available. However, with reference to point three, I would suggest that this presents a too static view of society in general. The cultural characteristics of the Welsh in 1976 are certainly different from those in 1776, but there nevertheless exists today a feeling of Welsh ethnic identity. I suggest that this is due to the intervention of political factors on the macro-level, notably a move towards devolution. This is expressed and articulated through the use of culturally separating factors such as the Welsh language. At the same time, the nature of English society has changed since 1776 such that its relationship to Wales and the Welsh as an ethnic group has accordingly undergone a process of repolarisation. In the Afghan situation we may note that very few vestiges of Hazara culture remain at the moment, nevertheless the idea of the Hazaras as an ethnic group would appear to persist amongst Hazaras and non-Hazaras. Political and economic factors affecting group-ascription will therefore need to be taken into account in any analysis of ethnic relations.

Barth's chosen illustration of the maintenance of ethnic identity in a contact situation is that of the Pathans (Pashtuns) living along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The variation in Pathan communities is evident; in the hill country, villages of mixed agriculturalists are organised in egalitarian patrilineal descent segments with an acephalous political structure; in the valleys more intensive agriculture is practised, with artificial irrigation, and here Pathans are land-owners with tenant Tajiks, with a political organisation based on

segmentary descent groups, in some places acephalous and in others integrated into a semi-feudal system; in the towns of Afghanistan and Pakistan are Pathan administrators, traders, craftsmen or labourers[1]; in the South are the tribally organised nomads. Barth's point here is that this cultural diversity has not provided criteria for differentiations of ethnic identity. The consistent Pathan identity can be analysed on two levels: using Barbara Ward's 'native' and 'observer's' models, he sees the native model in this case as an ideal based on the three main points of patrilineal descent, orthodox Islam (Sunnism) and Pashtunwali, a code of custom based on value orientations of male autonomy and egality, self expression and aggressiveness. The observer's model is based on the analysis of three major institutions in Pathan life - melmastia(hospitality) jirgah (councils) and purdah (seclusion of women and the domestic sector) all of which, in Barth's view, enable a man to participate in social life without compromising his highly-valued autonomy.

Through these three institutions, Pathan values can be consistently realised, especially in an acephalous and polysegmented situation. Barth attempts to demonstrate this with reference to the relationship between Hazaras and Pathans. The territorial division between Hazaras and nomad Pathans was kept before the time of Abdur Rahman because there was little possibility of co-operation in exploitation of resources needed by both groups, for agricultural purposes. Both were

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1. A point to note here is made by Charpentier,C.J., in Bazar-i-Tashqurghan (Uppsala,1972): 'No Afghan, unless the very poorest of the poor, will ever engage in any retail trade, keep a shop or pursue any mechanical trade or handicraft.' (Afghan here synonymous with Pashtun (Pathan).

2. Ward, B., Variations of the Conscious Model, ASA 1, 1965.

tribally organised under petty chieftains and Barth's suggestion so that this acted as an inhibition to nomad expansion. Later however the incorporation of the Hazarajat into the Afghan state enabled the nomads to move in and exploit resources without the element of competition interfering. Expansion of trade also strengthened Pathan identity:-

> 'Life as a trading nomad, who, heavily armed, penetrates foreign areas and takes large risks both personally and financially, is one that provides rich opportunities to demonstrate male qualities valued among the Pathans.' (1969:126)

Although the reference to the Hazara-Pathan relationship is admittedly brief, it nevertheless tends to present a rather clear-cut picture of the situation. It is, for example, doubtful whether the Hazaras were in fact, tribally organised at the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, penetration into Hazara territory was known before the time of Abdur Rahman and later nomad incursions into the Hazarajat were not effected peacefully as we have seen in Chapter Five. A statement such as:-

> "The apparent stability of the border between them can be understood as a result of a balance between losses and gains; with the forms of political units that obtained, the costs of conquest and penetration of Hazara country by a Pathan tribe were greater than the expected returns." (1969:126)

suggests a pragmatic assessment of the situation by the Pathans as

if only one or two variables were involved. We have seen, with reference to this point, that expansion of migratory populations is also dependent on macro-political factors, such as international boundaries.

In South Afghanistan, Pathans may become clients of Baluch, in which case it becomes difficult to preserve the Pathan identity and value system in this subservient position. According to Barth, if this occurs, then a Pathan will take on the ethnic identity of a Baluch. He cannot perform adequately as a Pathan in his relationship with the Baluch, therefore he must accept the others' value standards and shift his ethnic identity. An interesting contrast to this was noted in Chapter Five, that an unemployed Afghan Pashtun will not seek work with Hazara farmers, only with other Pashtuns. This suggests that the ascription of ethnic identity is not based, like kinship, on the control of assets. Yet Ferdinand (1959) mentions that cases are occasionally given of Pashtuns becoming Hazara. It would be interesting to take up this point of ethnic identity change and further research would certainly reward investigation.

It is worth noting here also that Barth takes his main examples from the male sector of Pathan society, which admittedly is where the ethos of the group is overtly and publicly expressed, but this does not take account of the womens' role in the formation of ethnic identity. By concentrating on the public image of the men and the behavioural fact that the seclusion of women and the domestic sphere provides a balance to the public necessity of male aggressiveness and assertiveness, Barth fails to explore the dynamics for this behaviour. This can re-

sult in statements such as:-

> "The resultant pattern of domestic performance is difficult to document; but its adequacy is suggested by the relative absence among Pathans of divorce or adultery murders." (1969:123)

which is akin to stating that Italian Catholics do not get divorced because they are all happily married.

Furthermore, the stress on performance in certain roles within the overall conception of ethnic identity does not appear to be adequately discussed. If in fact Barth found that male Pathans do adhere dogmatically to the code of Pashtonwali, then surely the question to ask here is what motivates this adherance, rather than merely accepting it as a necessary factor in social organisation. Do Pathan women exhibit a similar adherance to Pashtonwali, or another code, or if their necessary acceptance is, as one would expect, a tacit one, how is this maintained as a contribution to the overall formation of ethnic identity? In a similar vein, Barth states that success as a Pathan implies behaviour which is also admired by non-Pathans, but if this is indeed the case, which is not proven, it is also relevant to discover what motivates this adherance, how it is created and manipulated.

Apart from these few critical reservations, Barth's analysis nevertheless remains a step forward in the discussion of ethnic relations, in that the relationship itself is seen as crucial, rather than the discrete entity of the ethnic group. This will obviously

be useful for further research into changing ethnic relations in Afghanistan today as urbanisation proceeds, occupational patterns change and attitudes and alliances shift. I mentioned before that political factors need to be taken into consideration when discussing ethnic group formation and identity and I now turn to a discussion of the ethnic group as political interest group, to illustrate this point. It is taken from Cohen; 'Custom and politics in Urban Africa'[1] and the introduction to 'Urban Ethnicity'[2]. Cohen defines the ethnic group as an informal interest group, the members of which are distinct from members of other groups in the same society in that they share a number of institutions such as kinship, religion and a means of communication.

Ethnicity is defined as strife between such groups, during the course of which people stress their identity and exclusiveness. Cohen distinguishes between ethnic group and ethnic category, the latter being seen merely as the cultural identification of a group, which may not necessarily be formed into a political entity. Cohen maintains that his analysis is more fertile than Barth's, in that it allows for degrees of ethnicity and greater freedom of choice (essentially political) on the part of members of an ethnic group to make their identity clear in a political sense, or to keep it tacit. But I cannot see that this is anything other than rephrasing Barth in different terminology; both Cohen and Barth are saying that ethnic identity is constant but that

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1. Cohen, A., Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, London, 1969.

2. Cohen, A., ed. Urban Ethnicity, ASA 12, London, 1974.

it may or may not be utilised in social organisation according to the circumstances.

It seems therefore to be a question of terminology: where Barth uses 'social organisation', Cohen uses 'politics', which he defines as processes involved in the distribution and exercise of, and struggle for power within a social unit. For Cohen, the ethnic group is formed only in this political context and the number of interest groups and their degree of formality depends on the existent state system, some systems permitting few formal groups but allowing the informal interest groups. It is here that the ethnic group may become especially powerful, for it is more difficult to suppress cultural factors such as marriage and kinship patterns, or language. Groups can therefore develop informally through cultural associations, but at the same time maintain a degree of political purpose.

Cohen's argument is developed in the context of West Africa, where increasing migration from rural to urban environments is producing contact between ethnic groups in new political situations. In these new circumstances, there may be competition, especially in the economic sector, and cultural traditions tend to be articulated for informal political organisation within the framework of a formal political situation. Thus, as opposed to the growth of what has been called detribalisation, where old ethnic units are submerged into a larger national unit, Cohen posits the phenomenon of retribalisation, where an ethnic group adjusts to new realities by reorganising its traditional customs, or by developing new customs under traditional

symbols. This may be effected through religion, kinship or a variety of these combined under an integrating ideology. Cohen points out that the two processes of detribalisation and retribalisation may occur at the same time, though on different levels of the social structure. Thus, to take his example, detribalisation in the form of collective struggle with white employers may occur at the same time as a struggle for power within the ethnic interest group itself.

Following the primary assertion that ethnic groups are informal interest groups operating in situations of conflict and essentially to be seen as political groupings, Cohen takes the Hausa as an illustration of his theory. He refutes previous suggestions that ethnic exclusiveness in African towns can be seen as a result of the temporary nature of the dwellers who still feel the pull of the tribe, for in Sabo (the Hausa quarter of Ibadan) it is the long term Hausa settlers who perpetuate the distinctiveness of Hausa culture - not the culture of the northern Hausa, but a new interpretation that Cohen sees as directly linked with the economic life of the nation as a whole, which is based largely on trading. In the West African case, different ethnic groups exploit different ecologic niches and in trading between them the same ethnic group will try to control all stages of trade of particular commodities; because of difficulties of transport over long distances, combined with the need to have adequate information of trade progress, a common language and cultural communication facilitates the passage of goods. According to Cohen, the resulting competition politicises ethnic groups.

Under Indirect Rule, the Hausa were recognised as a distinct tribal group, and in Sabo this formal recognition of their political organisation enabled them to consolidate their economic position as controllers of the cattle and kola trade (although producers of neither). Under the nationalist movement of the 1950s, their economic position was threatened at the same time that the ethnic exclusiveness of Sabo was threatened by increasing interaction of Hausa and Yoruba in party politics and Islamic ritual, as well as the largely nationalistic ideology stressed by the government. During this time Sabo revitalised its cultural distinctiveness and adopted a fiercely puritanical sect, the Tijaniyya, in which the religious leaders became extremely powerful. Cohen sees this as a direct response to the changing situation, utilising cultural components in an essentially political act, so that the reorganisation of religion was also a reorganisation of political structures. While inhibiting social interaction with the Yoruba, it intensified the informal social interaction within the Sabo quarter through traditional Hausa customs and values.

In general, ethnic groups seeking to organise their political functions informally are seen to be faced with a number of problems basic to political organisation, which are:

1. Distinctiveness - preserved through myths of origin and superiority, descent and endogamy, spatial proximity.
2. Communication - for example, through religious leaders.
3. Decision-making - who formulates, deliberates and makes the decisions.
4. Authority.

5. Ideology - for example, the formulation of a kinship ideology or ritual ideology. Cohen considers that religion provides an especially powerful dynamic here, for it mobilises powerful emotions, formulates the political structure as part of a universal scheme, utilises the power of symbols and ritual relations, which can be constantly reinterpreted to suit the changing economic and political circumstances. Also, of course, it provides for regular meetings, and through financing its institutions, such as churches and schools, enables them to take on political functions.

6. Discipline - mainly effected through ceremonial.

The part played by religion in the situation described by Cohen is interesting with reference to the importance of sectarian differences in ethnic groupings in Afghanistan. In Chapter Two I noted Canfield's observation that a change in religious sect in Afghanistan often meant a change, both on conceptual and empirical levels, of ethnic group. Another point Cohen makes is that in an industrialising situation, tribal groups may develop into class groupings, and Cohen considers that if this does occur, then cultural differences become entrenched so that new roles are played out in traditional ethnic idioms. It would be interesting to see if this is the case in Afghanistan in the face of industrialisation in Kabul and other towns such as Kunduz. Several writers have noted that the government and administrative elite is largely Pashtun, with some penetration by Tajiks, and that the commercial sector is mainly Tajik. Industralisation in Afghanistan is, however, in preliminary stages and more extensive research would need to be undertaken to explore this area further.

If we follow Barth's and Cohen's analysis, then, that the ethnic group should not be seen as a structural category, but as an ongoing process, we need, as a corollary, to understand how this group is defined and perceived by its members and non-members, any group, like the individual, being defined in terms of 'the other.' Shibutani and Kwan[1] have stated that:

> "An ethnic group consists of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others." (1965:47)

Where 'ethnic group' may be said to correspond to Cohen's 'ethnic category' and Barth's 'ethnic identity,' J.C. Mitchell[2] perhaps clarifies this better by drawing a distinction between ethnicity as a construct of perceptual or cognitive phenomena and ethnic group as a construct of behavioural phenomena. Ethnicity he defines as a set of meanings which the actors attribute to certain symbols and phenomenological characteristics. These are noticed more in some situations than in others. (c.f.Barth). This is, of course, in contradistinction to Cohen's definition of ethnicity which is based on the actual behaviour of groups in a conflict situation. It might be worth noting here that a clarification of terminology would certainly aid the pursuits of scholarship in this field. Perhaps Jyotirundra Das Gupta[3] has the most satisfactory definition so far:-

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1. Shibutani, T., and Kwan, K.M., Ethnic Stratification, New York, 1965.
2. Mitchell, J.C., Perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic behaviour; an empirical exploration, in Cohen, A., ed. 1974.
3. Das Gupta, J., Ethnicity, Language demands and national development in India, in Glazer, N., and Moynihan, D., eds. Ethnicity, Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

> "Ethnicity may be regarded as an enclosing device which carves out a recognisable social collectivity based on certain shared perceptions of distinctive commoness often augmented by diachronic continuity." (1975:467)

Das Gupta's definition of the ethnic group itself as either a categoric or an active community is similar to Barth's definition of Pathan identity, utilisable in certain circumstances, latent in others.

In poly-ethnic societies where colour plays a part in ethnic identity, the perceptual aspect often centres around colour and colour variations. Bastide and Raveau[1] note how values may infuse collective representations to alter perception:-

> 'There are some representations which are above all images or signs, and are used essentially as means of communication, which makes them relatively neutral; there are others which are also values and are strongly affectively charged; the values which they represent change according to the civilisation being sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and this quality in itself determines behaviour, various reactions and inhibitions. Blackness and whiteness fall in the second category of collective representations.' (1972:81)

With reference to this point, we have already seen how physical characteristics in Afghanistan, Hazara Mongoloid traits, for example, were given negative values at certain points in the course of ethnic conflict. Ferdinand, however, has stated that many people calling themselves Hazaras have no trace of Mongol physiognomy, so this area would need to

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1. Bastide, R., and Raveau, R., Variations on Black and White in Richmond, A., ed. Readings in race and ethnic relations, Oxford, 1972.



be explored much further before we can draw any conclusions about ethnic attitudes in Afghanistan.

Inherent in all analyses of ethnicity, whatever their sociological premises, is the point that ethnicity and social stratification are linked factors in social organisation. Stratification we may define as the unequal distribution of rights and privileges in society, and ethnic stratification as a distinctive example of this. In Western nation-states such as Britain, France, Spain and Switzerland, ethnic stratification may become a force for political separation that would not be possible on grounds of age, sex or economic stratification. In this sense, also then, ethnic stratification will affect class solidarity. Stanley Lieberson[1] considers that there is a link between economic mobility and the structural methods for maintaining ethnic stratification. If there is no inter-generational mobility within each ethnic stratum, including the dominant one, then a caste situation exists and there is no need for discrimination. But if inter-generational mobility exists, then discrimination may be necessary. If the actual rates of mobility are high within the dominant ethnic group, then the maintenance of ethnic stratification will require several forms of discrimination and repression in order to keep the subordinate ethnic groups from moving out of their subordinate economic positions. This may be happening in Afghanistan in this century, since mobility among different Pashtun generations has increased, especially in new areas of technology and the professions.

Clearly, in discussing stratification of any type, it is important

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1. Lieberson, S., Stratification and Ethnic Groups, in Richmond, A., 1972.

to distinguish between the ideal and the actual hierarchy and to examine the links between the two. With reference to this point, I would suggest that the relationship between the Pashtuns and the Tajiks is relevant: the Tajiks have become important entrepreneurial members of the middle class, possibly threatening the Pashtun power elite. The Hazaras as a group have not entered into this particular power struggle and their ideal and actual position in the social hierarchy remain coterminous.

Having accepted that ethnic stratification does exist, we need to examine how it is manifested. The new ethnic groups in Afghanistan may not be the culturally discrete groups often identified by the ethnographer. New groups may be formed in contact situations, as Cohen described in Ibadan, in urban migration and absorption into an industrialising society. Certainly in the West, it has seemed a viable theory for anthropologists to advance. Liberal sociology has hitherto posited that 'primordial' groups, such as racial or ethnic ones, would phase out in modern societies, or that class differences would replace them. The overriding factor in this theory is that interest (largely economic) is the guiding factor in group development. With the evident growth of ethnic groups in industrialised societies, overriding class differences, the sociologists have been forced to conclude that interest can be pursued by ethnic as well as by interest-defined groups. As Daniel Bell has remarked[1], 'ethnicity combines interest with an affective tie.' The argument here, as advanced by

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1. Bell, D., Ethnicity and Social Change, in Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:169.

Glaser and Moynihan in their introduction to 'Ethnicity' is that the ethnic group forms a feasible political force for mobilisation in the increasingly powerful modern state, a state in which there is a conflict between the egalitarian ideal and the differential achievement of norms. Here, the ethnically defined group may be a more effective bargainer than other groups. Thus, for example, Welsh and Scottish Nationalist forces may be more powerful than traditional class associations, such as the Communist Party. Francois Bourricaud[1], after considering ethnic stratification in Peru, concludes similarly:-

> 'It seems to me that questions of ethnicity emerge only in a society in which the value system has already become oriented towards achievement, and where barriers between groups, if not broken down or overturned, have at least been eroded by a multiplicity of economic and non-economic transactions.'

This last group of writers, who are mainly concerned with Western societies, see the ethnic group as becoming a viable political force, utilising cultural and affective ties to secure their membership. When industrial conflict has become institutionalised, as in the West, class struggle loses its potential. Ethnic struggle, on the other hand may be more effective. As Afghanistan is an essentially agricultural economy, only beginning to industrialise, the temptation would be to suspect that in this case, the reverse process is occurring: that tribal and ethnic affiliations are slowly being replaced by class

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1. Bourricaud, F., Indian, Mestizo and Cholo as Symbols in the Peruvian System of Stratification, in Ibid., p.357.

groupings. At the moment, with the evidence available to us, it is impossible to make any definitive statement on this subject.

On examination of the historical evidence, however, it is possible to discern several trends in ethnic relations in Afghanistan, illustrating Donald Horowitz's remark[1] that 'group identity tends to expand or contract to fill the political space available for its expression.' Looking at the Hazaras from a historical point of view, we have seen that they have been continually at war with the religious and secular authorities. As the lowest group on the social scale, they have had their lands taken and their population scattered over the country. While nomads have been settled on their lands, Hazaras themselves have been forced to migrate to urban centres for work. In most cases they have moved from rural to urban poverty and gained little political control over their own situation. These movements have been a result of what we may call external and internal imperialism. Afghanistan has perhaps followed a similar pattern to other Third World countries in its recent pursuit of nationalistic ideals, overriding ethnic and sectarian differences. This nationalistic pursuit itself is a result of political changes in the balance of power between the surrounding countries, and other more distant but interested parties, such as the USA. Internally, this nationalism has resulted in a greater degree of state control. A secular monopolisation of control has been legitimised by the religious sanction of Sunnism.

Briefly then, the outlines are forces of imperialism and nationalism shifting ethnic groups, in one sense aiming to destroy affilia-

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1. Horowitz, D., Ethnic Identity, in Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:137.

tions, and in another perpetuating social stratification along ethnic lines. The Tajiks, certainly, through their entrepreneurial activities have elevated their status to that of the bourgeoisie, but the Hazaras are blocked from both economic and symbolic improvements in their status. Discrimination on grounds of physical appearance, invoking genetic factors, aids this perpetuation of stratification.

This is to describe the situation as if it were static and the actors merely passive. Of course this is not the case, as we saw in the description of Hazara resistance to the Sunnis in Chapter Four. This particular aspect of group conflict appears to have been one of the main characteristics of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, according to the available evidence. It is important to remember that we are dealing with what we may call, to use J.S.Furnivall's definition[1], a plural society, i.e. a society compromising two or more social orders which coexist but do not mingle in one political unit. In political terms, the plural society resembles a confederation of allied provinces, but differs in that one part of a confederation could secede without total disruption, because in a confederation territorial boundaries are very clear. In a plural state, however, the elements are too intermingled for this to apply. This lack of clear boundaries in a plural society is also demonstrated economically in the fact that social demand is generally disorganised and variant; the only meeting place economically is the market place. In the case of Afghanistan one could point here to the nomad bazaars discussed in the previous chapter, as an example of this economic meeting place. Furnivall

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1. Furnivall, J.S., Netherlands India, Cambridge 1939.

notes that the distribution of production among racial castes aggravates the sectionalism of demand, so that while Western political and economic theories deal with social will and demand, the problem in the plural society is to integrate that demand. Furnivall is here taking his immediate point of reference from the colonial situation of Indonesia, but as his discussion of the plural society is essentially sociological and therefore general, it seems not unreasonable to extend the argument to a polyethnic, non-colonial situation such as Afghanistan. Regarding nationalism, Furnivall considers that in a plural society it is rather like internationalism. In nineteenth century Europe nationalism was a revolt against the liberalism of laisser-faire, a desire to protect individual social organisations against this type of economic internationalism. Nationalism in a plural society, on the other hand, is a disruptive force and does not consolidate the social order.

Although Furnivall's discussion of the plural society is largely drawn from the Indonesian example, and thus a colonial situation, many of the characteristics delineated above would seem to apply also to Afghanistan. If we base our discussion on the premise therefore that Afghanistan is a plural society, the next problem in the analysis of conflict in this plural society, is whether the society is considered to be a totality. Sociologically, this premise is a common starting point, especially if there are tangible political boundaries containing the population. But in the actors' model of the situation, it is doubtful how many of the population of such a society would in fact conceive of themselves as members of a total society, merely because of

distant political boundaries drawn on a map and enforced by frontier control. The devolutionary movements in Britain, Spain and France, for example, would seem to bear this out.

In taking the sociological view of a society as a total system, it is commonly assumed as a corollary that conflict maintains a balance in the system, and thus perpetuates the system itself. In this sense, conflict sets boundaries between groups, strengthening group consciousness and awareness, while maintaining the total social system. This theory has generally been attributed to the segmentary type of society described by Evans-Pritchard in 'The Nuer.'[1] On the other hand, in a society where there is a considerable degree of class, caste or other, perhaps ethnic, stratification, with considerable social mobility, then this ideal balance may be impossible to maintain and conflict may then serve other purposes. The main consideration here becomes the legitimacy of the social order i.e. its acceptance by the population.

This point would appear to be especially pertinent to Afghanistan, where the Sunni Pashtuns took control of the growing state of Afghanistan in the nineteenth century and have consolidated that power in the twentieth. That the control was not always legitimised is seen in the resistance of the Hazaras and other minority ethnic groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Inextricably bound up with the overt political aspects of group conflict in Afghanistan was the religious sanction given to it. In general, the main body of any church is inclusive whereas the sect is exclusive, so that this may be

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1. Evans-Pritchard, E.E., The Nuer, London, 1940.

considered a parallel example of conflict setting boundaries between groups: the religious split mirrored and supported the political cleavage. Lewis Coser, in his discussion of social conflict[1], mentions certain aspects of conflict relations with regard to actual warfare, which again are pertinent to the Hazara - Afghan conflict. He notes that if a group coheres under attack it must have, firstly, a consensus that the aggregate is a group and its preservation is worthwhile, and secondly, that the outside threat is menacing the whole of the group. Certainly, in the case of the Hazara wars, as we saw in Chapter Four, animosity was at a lower level in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that the Hazaras were split up into tribal and territorial affiliations. The threat of internal imperialism from the Pathans does appear to have coalesced the Hazaras into a clearly defined group. Again, the religious opposition between Sunni and Shi'a strengthened the emotive feelings of group solidarity, as would other cultural differences such as language and social structure.

This example of group affiliation is also manifested in the opposition to the influx of nomads into the Hazarajat, for once more Hazara was polarised against Pashtun, Shi'a against Sunni. Recently, however, a different pattern appears to be evolving. Economic and political circumstances have resulted in the destruction of Hazara tribal and even territorial affiliations. Large numbers are migrating to urban centres where they perform similar work to the Untouchables in

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1. Coser, L., The Functions of social conflict, New York, 1956.

India. They do not appear to be developing into a rudimentary proletariat, as industry expands, for factories generally still recruit from other ethnic groups. In addition, the state bureaucracy has considered its Pashtun-dominated control over the provinces, while the Tajiks have expanded their influence in the commercial sector. Education, the traditional avenue out of the slum, has yet to offer much to the Hazaras. The Hazaras as a marginal group were probably not in receipt of much of the foreign aid that has come into Afghanistan in recent decades, but no doubt the lessening of this aid has hit them as well.

We cannot say, therefore, that previous tribal conflict has developed into class conflict along ethnic lines in Afghanistan. At the same time, it is doubtful, or at least problematic, how much changing economic and political circumstances, involving movement of population, changes in occupation and loss of certain cultural traits, has actually shifted ethnic boundaries. This also would provide an interesting focus for future research.

While Afghanistan remains an essentially agricultural country, it is important to understand the formation of ethnic groups in the rural context, as well as in the urban context more frequently studied by writers on ethnicity. Robert Canfield[1] is our sole source on this question with reference to Afghanistan and he has been concerned to demonstrate the importance of ecologic and political factors for the

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1. Canfield, R., The ecology of rural ethnic groups and the Spatial dimensions of power, in American Anthropologist, Vol 75, 1973, p.1511.

development of rural ethnic groups, notably in the Bamian area. He defines the rural ethnic group as:-

> "A rural ethnic group, in addition to being marginally located, is a group of people having a common economic and political interest, because of which they stand together in opposition to other groups and the state, and a common sense of cultural identity validated by ethnic and/or religious customs." (1973:1512)
> B

While ecologic factors are important in the formation of rural ethnic groups (cf. Barth 1956), socio-political incentives are relevant as well, and these have a spatial dimension. It is common throughout the Middle East for dominant sects to be found in lowland areas and heterodox sects in highland areas; thus where the crucial political categories are religious, the marginal populations are seen as being heretical. Where the crucial political categories are ethnic or nationalistic, the marginal populations are often found to be ethnically distinct.

Canfield examines the processes controlling the location of rural ethnic groups and attempts to outline the dynamics of ethnic ascription with the empirical conditions that influence behaviour and symbolic aspects of Hazara life. The spatial dimension of group formation is revealed through the importance of relative distance, defined through transport technology and ecologic relations. In Bamian itself, Canfield considers that effective distances have significantly controlled the alignments of Bamian's residents, drawing them into different sections whose political alignments are expressed

as different religious allegiences. The sectarian expression of political alliance is such that to be a Sunni in Afghanistan is in some sense to be identified with the ruling institution and the Sunni sources of authority on which its administrative system partly depends. To be Imami is to be identified with the resistance that once warred against, and even now remains isolated from, the ruling institution.

In Afghanistan in general, then, and in Bamian in particular, sectarian identity is seen to be the basis of social identity. Sects are thus political interest groups where form and distribution are controlled by their social, cultural and geographical contexts. These interest groups mobilise cultural components in their process of self-definition; the aspects chosen and the direction taken being largely determined by the identities of the other interest groups and the state itself. If religious differences are then the overriding criteria of social segmentation in Afghanistan, and as the state has allied itself specifically with the Hanafi branch of Sunnism, it is to be expected that minority groups in competition with state structures will ally themselves with an alternative religious grouping. In the case of the Hazaras, this has been the Imami sect of ~~Sunnism~~ Shi'ism, as I noted in Chapter One, or with the more remote groups who find themselves in contradistinction to both Imamis and Sunnis, the change has been to Ismailism. Thus factionalism is seen to result from political and economic competition, and at the same time is encouraged by environmental factors.

Canfield (1974) has outlined the factionalism inherent in the

Hazarajat, and relates the historical processes, so far as they are known to the geophysical conditions existing in the area. Up to the nineteenth century, as we have seen previously, the Hazaras were pastoralists, though developing into agriculturalists. The political units were formed of settlement clusters, organised mainly on a tribal basis. The sultans controlled the central valley of each region and the subservient chiefs administered the marginal areas. The Mongol kinship system that appears to have been extant among the Hazaras in the nineteenth century (see Table p. 123) suggests the principle of primogeniture and the organisation of ranked lineages in which the descendents of the line of first sons were preeminents. As I noted in Chapter Three, Canfield suggests that the subservient chiefs, though siblings or cousins of the sultan, may have developed desires for autonomy, which would have been facilitated by the ecologic conditions of the area (natural ecologic regions of low plains surrounded by small valleys). Those chiefs in the more marginal positions in the highland valleys would not always be at a disadvantage, because in their isolated position they could effect some measure of control and autonomy. In this way, the fragmented nature of Hazara society was inextricably related to the fragmentation of the Hazarajat itself.

At the present time, this factionalism continues, though now organised on sectarian lines. It is most notable in Shibar, the area which forms the main focus of Canfield's investigation (1973). Here, as already briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, sectarian lines criss-cross the highland valleys, forming a pattern of religious

allegiences in which neighbourhood villages often belong to different sects. The dividing line between the sects sometimes cuts through hamlet groups consisting of closely related kinsmen. In Labmurshak valley there are three cases of sectarian allegience cutting through territorial and kinship groupings. This involves considerable social division and separation as I described in Chapter Two. Canfield attempts to explain this by examining both internal circumstances of social division and the historical background of the general divisions in Afghanistan.

Inherent in the social ties ties drawing people together in neighbourhoods and communities are tensions working to rend them apart, so that former bonds are dissolved and new social alignments are constructed. Division and cohesion are therefore variants in the social system and are responsive to environmental factors of the kind already discussed. Qawmi, for example, the members of the qawm community, are functionally united through their common dependence on an irrigation canal, their mutual help arrangements, their intricate ties of descent and affinity, and their patterns of reciprocal sharing. Kinship closeness, political solidarity, religious unity and territorial grouping are thus conceptualised into the single concept of the kinship-based qawm community. Canfield treats the phenomenon of deviance from the qawm as an individual matter and outlines the processes by which the deviant or disputant may cope with the situation. Emigration is given as one possibility and conversion as another. Canfield mentions one example where of three brothers, originally Ismaili, two changed to Sunni and Imami after an inheritance disagreement. Unfortunately,

Canfield has no data on an actual conversion, so that his analysis is hypothetical, based on evidence that conversions have taken place. Conversion from Ismailism to Imamism is suggested to take a different form from that of conversion of either two to Sunnism. The first will involve a shift of allegience from one saint to another, as they are the functional focii of the sect; the second may involve a whole process of upward social mobility, as for example in the case where an Ismaili or Imami Hazara bride is given to a wealthy Sunni.

In fact, this discussion of conversion is the least satisfactory part of Canfield's study, because the political implications of the different sect change permutations are practically ignored. The lack of adequate evidence is also disappointing, because there is no substantiation for the assumption of the existence of conversion. There is an attempt to relate conversion to historical processes, however, in that as Tajik and Pushtun commercial and administrative interests strengthened their hold on the market town of Bamian in the nineteenth century, the population changed to Sunnism, as part of an adaptive process, but this is not substantiated.

Two main conclusions drawn from Canfield's study of Bamian refer firstly to the regular distribution of sects within the area as a whole, and secondly to the particular nature of community fission in Shibar . As far as the first is concerned, economic and political interconnections between Tagaw and the national economy and government administration are expressed in terms of the alignments of the population with Sunnism. If the identity of an interest group is based on its

socio-political context, then either the group conceives of its identity as complementary to others, or in opposition. In the case of Tagaw, the lowland plain where the town of Bamian is situated, economic and political factors have resulted in the stressing of complementarity, expressed in Afghan terms, through religion. On the other hand, the highland populations, existing primarily through subsistence activities are only marginally integrated into the national economy and have expressed their difference through Imamism. The Ismailis live in a frontier zone where the influence of external power groups has historically been weak. As far as the particular community fission in Shibar is concerned, Canfield considers that only in this area are ecologic conditions conducive to a breakdown in community solidarity, because of the importance of rainfall agriculture, which, unlike irrigation agriculture requires little group solidarity. Conversion to an opposing sect is seen as an attempt on the part of the disputants to realign themselves to another group of kinsmen, who are identified with another sect.

In general terms, Canfield considers that the pattern of sectarian division in Bamian is analogous to that of Afghanistan as a whole: Sunnis control the economic centres, Imamis occupy the marginal lands of the Hazarajat and the Ghorian desert, and Ismailis occupy the remote lands of the Hindu Kush - Pamir ranges between the centres of Sunni and Imami influence. Historically, the identity of political groups in Afghanistan has been seen as expressed in terms of patrilineal descent groups, such as Pushtun, Hazara, Uzbek etc., but as the coalition of Afghan tribes grew into a ruling institution legitimised

under Sunnism, opposition was expressed in the antithetical sectarian categories of Imamism and Ismailism.

Canfield's discussion of rural ethnic groups in Afghanistan is useful in that it suggests some of the possible dynamics for group ascription, and illustrates the connection between religious and political factors in ethnic relations in Afghanistan. It is, however, a preliminary discussion, but one nevertheless that could be used as a basis for future research. More work could be done on the composition of the rural ethnic groups, attitudes between groups and towards the nation in general, the role of the saints, the different ritual and symbolic forces involved in sectarian membership and their relation to political structures on the micro - and macro-levels.

This chapter has, I hope, raised several issues with reference to the general analysis of ethnicity and also to the particular situation of ethnic relations in Afghanistan. The contemporary discussion of ethnicity has lifted the issue out of mere ethnographic categories into a more encompassing view of the ethnic group as an ongoing and essentially political process, that utilises cultural components in its formation and self definition. In Canfield's work, for example, we have seen a practical demonstration of this, indicating how rural ethnic groups, among populations that might all be categorised as Hazara by the ethnographer, can be seen essentially as interest groups, motivated by economic considerations and utilising the locally significant factor of sectarian differentiation in shaping their identity.

The previous chapters have attempted to indicate changes in

ethnic relations in Afghanistan in the last hundred and fifty years, on the macro-level, because extensive data on individual circumstances was not available. Previously discrete descent groups were brought into contact with each other through the forces of imperialism and nationalism. Ethnic boundaries appear to have been maintained, however, in a situation where religion, in the form of sectarian differentiation, became the defining factor in group identity.
In the twentieth century, Pashtun monopolisation of state power was consolidated and even as urbanisation and small scale industrialisation increased, ethnic affiliation persisted. New implications for ethnic relations have arisen in recent years, as I have suggested, and it remains for further research to increase our understanding of them.

HAZARA Kinship Terminology

Taken from Ferdinand, K., Preliminary Notes on Hazara Culture, p.46-50.

	DAI ZANGI*	GHORBAND
Fa	ata, baba	ata
Fa Fa	bakala	atakalu
Fa Mo	mama, achul	baba
Fa Fa Fa	bakala kalo	atakalu
Fa Fa Mo	mama kalo	baba kalu
Fa Br	abagha	abagha
Fa Br Wi	i(y)aenga, beka	-
Fa Br So	bache-abagha	bache-abagha
Fa Br Da	dokhtar-i-abagha	dokhtar-i-abagha
Fa Si	amma	amma
Fa Si Hu	eznagi	khesh
Mo	aya, aba	aya, apa
Mo Si	khala	khala
Mo Si Hu	ezna, shu-i-khala	shu-i-khala
Mo Si So Mo Si Da	bola	bola
Mo Br	naghechi	tagha
Mo Br Wi	iyanga	zan-i-tagha
Mo Br So	bache-naghechi	bache-tagha
Mo Fa	bakala	baba
Mo Mo	mama achul	aba, aya kalu
Mo Fa Fa	bakala kalo	baba kalu
Mo Fa Mo	mama kalo	aba kalu
Br	brar	brar
Br elder	la la	brar kalu
Br younger	brarak	khurd brar
Br Wi	beka	yanga

* This includes terms from Besud, Dai Zangi, Ghazni, Jaghori, Shahristan and Uruzgan.

Si	khor	khor
Si Hu	ezna, kuka	shu-i-khor
Si Ch	jea	ushtuk-i-khor
Wi	khatu	zan
Wi Fa	khosur	ate-zan
Wi Mo	khosur-madar	khoshui
Wi Br	khosur bura	khosur bura
Wi Si	egechi	khoshua
Wi Si Hu	baja	baja
Wi Br Wi	zan-i-khosur bra	zan-i-khosur-bra
Fiancee	khusta	namzad
Hu	shauhar	shui
Hu Fa	khosur	khosur kalu
Hu Mo	khosur	khoshui
Hu Br elder and younger	khosur bura	ewar
Hu Si	apsu	-
Hu Si Hu	ezna	-
Hu other Wi	ambak	ambak
Hu So by other Wi	bache-andar	bache-andar
Hu elder and younger Wi	(teknonyms)	(teknonyms)
So	bache-man	bache-man
So Wi	beri	zan-i-bache-ma
So Wi Fa	khesh	khosur
So Wi Mo	qudaghu	khoshu-i-bacha
So So	nosa	bache-bacha
So So Wi	beri	arus-i-bache-bacha
So Da	nosa	dokhtar-i-zan-i-bacha
Da	dokhtar	dokhtar
Da Hu	damad	shui-dokhtar

Da Hu Fa	khesh	ate-damad
Da Hu Mo	qudaghu	aye-damad
Da So	nosa	bache-dokhtar
Da So Wi	beri	-
Da Da	nosa	dokhtar-i-dokhtar

These kinship terms are theoretical; women are often named as the mother of so and so, younger people by their first name and respected elder people by the kinship term. Central Hazaragi is more Mongolian than Northern Hazaragi and is also more influenced by Turkish. Ferdinand's informant stated that Central Hazaragi was expanding and that new terms were coming to Ghorband from Dai Zangi via Yakawlang.

HAZARA Kinship Terminology

Terms taken from Schurmann, H.F., The Mongols of Afghanistan, p.136-138. I have simplified Schurmann's transliteration.

	Dai Kundi	Besud	Uruzgan	Jaghori
Fa	baba	ata, baba		abai
Mo	aya	aba		ata
Br	birar	birar		-
Si	khwar	-		-
So	pasar, bacha	bacha		-
Da	dukhtar	dukhtar		-
Fa Br	abagha, tata	amu	amu	-
Fa Si	amma	amma	-	-
Mo Br	nagachi	taghai	dai	-
Mo Si	khala	khala	-	-
Fa Fa	bakala	baba-i-khalan	barkul	-
Fa Mo	mama	madar-i-khalan	bibi	-
Mo Fa	bakala	baba-i-kalan	barkul	-
Mo Mo	mama	madar-i-kalan	bibi	-
Fa Br So	bacha-i-abagha	-	pasar-i-amu	-
Fa Br Da	dukhtar-i-abagha	-	khola	-
Mo Br So	bacha-i-nagachi	-	dai	-
Mo Br Da	dukhtar-i-nagachi	-	-	-
Fa Si So	bacha-i-amma	amma	jeia	-
Fa Si Da	dukhtar-i-amma	bola	hamma	-
Mo Si So	bacha-i-khala	bola	-	-
Mo Si Da	dukhtar-i-khala	-	-	-
Br So	birarzada	birarzada	-	-
Br Da	birarzada	amma	-	-
Si So	khwarzada	khwarzada	jeia	-
Si Da	khwarzada	khwarzada	-	-
So So	nawasa	-	-	-
So Da	nawasa	-	-	-
Da So	nawasa	-	-	-
Da Da	nawasa	-	-	-

	Dai Kundi	Besud	Uruzgan	Jaghori
Wi	khatun	khatun	-	-
Hu	soher	-	-	-
Da Hu	dámad	-	-	-
So Wi	-	-	aruus	-

Although this is an incomplete list, Schurmann concludes that the pattern is identical with that most widespread in Afghanistan, there being no distinctions between elder and younger siblings. The retention of abagha and nagachi indicates a historical relationship with the Mongols, as does jeia and bola, but structurally the kinship terminology is the same as that in the rest of Afghanistan.

However, Canfield, R.L., in Petrified Minds and the amity of wolves suggests that there is evidence of a Mongol kinship system which distinguishes older from younger siblings, and thus suggests the existence of primogeniture. Taking his evidence from Bacon, E., (1958:77) and Canfield, R.L., (1973:48), he suggests that previous to the nineteenth century, by which time the tribal structure had begun to break up, the Hazaras were organised in ranked lineages in which the descendants of the line of first sons were pre-eminent. He compares certain Mongol terms with those of Hazaragi, the location not being identified:-

	Mongol	Hazaragi
Elder brother	agha	kaka
younger brother	in	brar
elder sister	apa	apa
younger sister	qaryandas/sinli	khwar

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL, AFTER MARCH 1964



GEOGRAPHIC ZONES



DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

(DUPREE 1973)

p.164.

DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARA GROUPS



NOMADIC MOVEMENTS

(DUPREE 1973 : 164)



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L/P&S/18	:	Political and Secret Memoranda
L/P&S/20	:	Political and Secret Department Library
L/MIL	:	Military Department
R/12	:	Afghanistan
B.	:	Political and Secret Books

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