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Rapid Evolution under Inertia.

Abstract:
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing "inertia" states that allow Ellison's (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17{45) "step-by- step" evolution to occur.

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:3cd2906e-9965-46e4-b9c6-f376040f5efe
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13442
Deposit date:
2013-04-20

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