Working paper
Fast Convergence in Population Games
- Abstract:
-
A stochastic learning dynamic exchibits fast convergence in a population game if the expected waiting time until the process comes near a Nash equilibrium is bounded above for all sufficiently large populations. We propose a novel family of learning dynamics that exhibits fast convergence for a large class of population games that includes coordination games, potential games, and supermodular games as special cases. These games have the property that, from any initial state, there exists a ...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Discussion paper series
- Publication date:
- 2011-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:3c887257-cd46-48b5-9142-af6d9e44293b
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15262
- Deposit date:
- 2011-12-15
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- Copyright date:
- 2011
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