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Fast Convergence in Population Games

Abstract:

A stochastic learning dynamic exchibits fast convergence in a population game if the expected waiting time until the process comes near a Nash equilibrium is bounded above for all sufficiently large populations. We propose a novel family of learning dynamics that exhibits fast convergence for a large class of population games that includes coordination games, potential games, and supermodular games as special cases. These games have the property that, from any initial state, there exists a ...

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Itai Arieli More by this author
H. Peyton Young More by this author
Volume:
570
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2011
URN:
uuid:3c887257-cd46-48b5-9142-af6d9e44293b
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15262
Language:
English

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