CYMRU AM BYTH? MOBILISING WELSH IDENTITY 1979 - c.1994

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is an attempt to document and explain the manifest changes that have been taking place in Welsh identity since 1979, and the political consequences thereof.

It is presupposed that before any autonomist outbursts and other, related political changes take place in a sub-national region such as Wales, some sort of identive change has to occur. This 'identive change' is posited to take place in two stages - identity transformation followed by identity mobilisation. Central chapters deal with this process in two, non-exclusive, dimensions - institutions and individual agents. Alongside institution-building, certain policy areas are deemed to be of crucial importance in relation to the maintenance and dissemination of Welsh identity, namely education and broadcasting.

In addition, the relationship between endogenous and exogenous forces affecting Welsh identity is considered in the context of civil society, political praxis, the economy and the European Union.

These events are charted and analysed by means of primarily qualitative techniques which emphasise the importance of the positional and strategic confluence of individual 'gatekeepers', who are able to influence

*_Cymru am Byth!_ (Wales for Ever!) is, amongst other things, a popular autonomist slogan.

policy and, perhaps more importantly, affect the perception and reception of new ideologies and institutional exigencies.

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CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL STRATA

1.0 Conceptual Formations

Most nation-states are not ethnically homogenous. Sometimes this is due to the legacy of imperialism, particularly the consolidation of territorial and political boundaries in an arbitrary and haphazard fashion; 'carving up' territories with little regard for the ethnic contingencies 'on the ground'. The political constructs of the African continent, for instance, provides ample evidence for the ethnic centre-periphery tensions ceded by former colonists. Many ethnic groups, therefore, are not well integrated, on a number of levels, with the larger nation state to which they, politically, belong. A potentially combustible situation often resulting from the amalgamation of ethnic groups with, at best, no previous history of integration and, at worst, seething mutual enmity can, furthermore, exist. A significant number of relatively modern nation-states in the developing world exhibit one or both of these features.

A different tension however can be posited to exist within the Advanced Industrial Democracies {AIDs} which encompass multinational states. These states tend to have older political formations and institutions, relatively stable territorial boundaries, and a type of national culture. Peripheral groups, such as the Welsh and the Scottish in the UK, are likely to have been integrated to some degree with the larger state, and to have experienced pressure to merge into the larger national culture. The continued existence, and periodical revival, of distinct and separate non-immigrant cultures and ethnic groups within AIDs, particularly within unitary political systems and despite repeated attempts at assimilation, is a testimony to the persistence of identity and its attendant ideology, nationalism.

Nationalisms, like nations and states, can, in any given epoch, have any number of conceptual and real dimensions. Nationalism is, in fact, one of the generic intellectual goods of the twentieth century. It has some form of expression in almost every conceivable political sphere, though that expression is rarely the same. A by no means exhaustive typology would presage nationalisms changing via or over ecology, economy, ethnicity, ideology, perception, society, space, and time. Within each of the above categories, sub-categories can be discerned. With regard to time, for instance, nationalism could be bifurcated into 'mature' or 'immature' nationalisms. The status of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, for example, draws interesting parallels with that of the Welsh in the nineteenth century.[1]

Perhaps a more realistic approach would be to draw comparisons within a single time-frame. The Welsh, after all, are not alone in manifesting differences within AIDs. The same can be said, in the Western European context, of, for instance, the Basques, the Bretons, the Galicians, and the Sardinians. It could be argued that they share certain perceptions. For instance, within these regions, a certain homogeneity of consciousness of difference can be found amongst the populace, and Wales is no exception - that is, one uniting feature of the Welsh is that they generally regard

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[1]The Kurds once had their own dominion. They were given land grants by the Treaty of Sevres, but this was declared null and void and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained no such provision. The Kurdish peoples are concentrated in a geographically distinct region which straddles several national borders. The Kurds have a strong tradition of radicalism; there is even a Kurdish Communist Party {PKK}. The Kurds have been suppressed in Turkey, and {much more so} in Iraq. In 1991, Turkish Kurds were given permission to use their language exclusively for social purposes, but all education, literature, and government business remains in Turkish. The Kurds are united by language, as were the Welsh of the nineteenth century. Conversely, the majority of the Welsh today have a different relationship with the Welsh language, *Cymraeg*, which amounts to no more than a passing acquaintance with a few words, yet the rhythm of the language pervades every word of English they utter.

themselves as distinct from the English.[2] Self-perception could then be related to, say, ecological factors. The Welsh, it may be said, share a 'region-bound' consciousness like the Aragonians of Spain or the Lower Saxons of Germany.[3] How far can this comparison be taken however, and how useful is it? It could be said that peoples with a region-bound consciousness are often highlanders, and comparisons amongst the various highlanders of different regions could be drawn. Not all the Welsh, however, are highlanders. A reductive comparative method such as this may obscure more than it illuminates - especially if the Welsh case is *sui generis*.[4] This research aims to unpack the traditional units of comparison, and in so doing does have a comparative dimension; but it is not a comparative thesis.

Following on from this, and before embarking on a discussion of the major themes of the thesis, we should like to address an issue that presents a major quandary to those studying the voluminous literature on nationalism - ambiguous conceptualisation. The situation is such that scholars engage in disputes that do little to further understanding, sometimes quite the reverse.[5] Sometimes it is even unclear precisely what the 'phenomenon' is since,

> 'the same word, nationalism, is applied both to the consolidation of the European states and to opposition movements on the periphery'.[6]

The problems of conceptualisation entail difficulties with theoretical formulation and modelling. The implications of this situation are explored below in the form of a literature review. A model that is appropriate for the

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[2](Morris, 1984, 2; Williams, 1982, 145). Like many regions with well-established or ancient distinguishing features, however, a homogeneity of consciousness or political culture does not necessarily exist within Wales.
[3](Krejci, 1981, 183).
[4](Morgan, 1981, 416). A similar argument could be made with respect to Catalonia, which exhibits a unique pattern of institutionalised kinship - *pairalisme* - which has pre-Roman features.
[5](Connor, 1978)
[6](Keating, 1991, 121)

examination of Wales encompassing the changes that have taken place between 1979 and c. 1994, especially in the post-1990 Europe, is then outlined.

1.1 A Nation is a Nation, is a... ?[7]

Scholarly study of nationalism can be parochial, in that 'symptoms of social and political unrest tend to be discussed separately within different disciplines';[8] developing increasing quantities of neologisms of variable utility.[9] Within the discipline of political science, theoretical rigour, far from being an aid to understanding, can function as a procrustean bed allowing 'awkward' facts to be ignored or removed. In addition, the impression of objectivity can be somewhat misleading, a cover for intellectual support of the current political order.[10] A political order which, in Western Europe, has entailed an historical process of nation-building which has involved the creation of new communities over sub-national ones.

The disciplinary divisions, the equivocal semantic and contentious substantive value of concepts leads to a series of embedded paradoxes within the study of nationalism, that is mirrored in the skirmishes of nationalists and counter-nationalists.[11] On this basis, Connor argues that the traditional taxonomy of the theorists of *nation-building* {the idea of absorption of disparate elements into a wholesome whole} is misleading and betrays a partisan stand or a lack of deeper historical insight.[12] Such analysis, he argues, erroneously actualises a transitory and contingent state of geopolitical

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[7](Connor, 1978)
[8](Mayo, 1974, 1)
[9](Sharpe, 1993)
[10](Kogan, 1993, 55)
[11](Voutat, 1992, 117)
[12](1972, 320-321)

formations, and also makes an implicit value judgement; for if the absorption of minorities is nation-building, then their emancipation threatens the nation. Indeed, an underlying pro-union ideology can be seen throughout the literature.[13]

Since sub-state nationalism is analytically distinguishable from state nationalism,[14] in the interests of conceptual clarity this thesis, notwithstanding references to literature which designates 'nationalism', will employ the term autonomism to describe what has elsewhere been classified as *micro-nationalism*, *regional nationalism*, *sub-state nationalism*, or *separatism*. The former term is also hermeneutically distinctive in that it describes a 'claim for institutional recognition within the larger state';[15] whereas separatism implies independence, autonomism may accept some form of dependence. However, these categories are not fixed and 'movements can move rapidly from one to the other'.[16] The Welsh language provides an added dimension here since the Welsh term for nationalism, *cenedlaetholdeb*, does not successfully translate into its English equivalent, and *vice versa*. Though we cannot measure precisely the effect of such non-equivalence, beyond suggesting that *cenedlaetholdeb* enjoys much warmer connotations than 'nationalism',[17] these findings provide an additional justification for concern in the reliability of the latter term as a neutral descriptor.

Nationalism, especially when autonomism is the sub-textual referent, has been consistently viewed as a negative influence on democratic

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[13]Lijphart, for instance, concludes that nation destroying occurs at a sub-national level (1977, 49).
[14](Ignatieff, 1993)
[15](Orridge & Williams, 1982)
[16](Orridge & Williams, 1982). For for further discussion on conceptualisations see (Smith, 1983), and, with specific reference to the European context (Coombes, 1991).
[17](Davies, 1996b)

development. It has been considered a retrograde step,[18] a focus of bitter irrationality,[19] as the antithesis of 'universal rationality',[20] as having the tendency to annihilate freedom,[21] and as being incompatible with pluralism and Western Democracy.[22] It has been characterised as an 'empty' container,[23] 'an inflamed condition of national consciousness',[24] and as simply a 'problem'.[25] For a large number of scholars then, assimilation to the core is desirable or even inevitable, whilst peripheral resistance is reactionary and irrational.[26] Other scholars, multiculturalists and cosmopolitans amongst them, have argued that nationalism 'has a fanatical core that destroys the heterogeneity of a nation by squeezing it into the Nation'.[27] In this sense autonomism may be posited as the inverse of nationalism since on one level at least it seeks to preserve that heterogeneity.[28]

1.2 Theoretical Formations

Students of nationalism {and autonomism} can be broadly divided into two schools: those who believe that nationalism is a natural endemic phenomenon and independent variable - termed *naturalists* or *primordialists* - and those who believe that ideas such as race and nation, from which they argue nationalism stems, are social constructions - called *modernists* or

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[18](Acton, 1862, 7)
[19](Minogue, 1969)
[20](Kohn, 1945, 366)
[21](Kedourie, 1960, 81)
[22](Green, 1982, 237; Kwavnick, 1974, 374)
[23](Hobsbawn, 1992, 4)
[24](Berlin, 1990, 245)
[25](Breuilly, 1993, 255). For a discussion of how the discourse of the academic can serve specific political ends see (Foucault, 1976).
[26](Diamond & Plattner, 1994)
[27](Keane, 1995, 447)
[28]There is some evidence to suggest that non-hegemonic groups are more likely to retain and value their identity than their hegemonic counterparts (Rodkin, 1993, 649).

instrumentalists.[29] It is by no means a clear division. Primordialism overlaps instrumentalism in a sense because it precedes it; the shift to instrumentalism became significant, arguably, after the publication of Barth's work on boundaries.[30]

The dichotomy is messy in a theoretical sense also, because it arises out of a confused, or even in the absence of a, universal conceptual structure. Berlin for instance accepts that national identity may be primordial, but nationalism itself is not -

> 'consciousness of national identity may well be as old as social consciousness itself'.
> But nationalism, 'unlike tribal feeling or xenophobia, to which it is related, but with which it is not identical, seems scarcely to have existed in ancient or classical times'.[31]

Hobsbawmon the other hand has framed a distinction between ethnicity and nationalism as 'different, and indeed non-comparable concepts'.[32] Ethnicity describes primordial or authentic identity whereas nationalism is a recently created phenomenon. Despite this contrast, ethnicity may be 'one way of filling the empty containers of nationalism' .[33] In addition, non-ethnic forms of regional nationalism can be envisaged.[34]

The distinction may always have been somewhat disingenuous. What little Marxist theory has to say, for instance, about the issue of autonomism

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[29](Smith, 1986). A large body of literature has been engaged with the issue of identity and human nature; see for example (Deutsch, 1949; Erikson, 1985; Mitchell, 1972).
[30](Barth, 1979)
[31](Berlin, 1990, 243)
[32](Hobsbawm, 1992, 4)
[33](Hobsbawm, 1992, 4)
[34](Sharpe, 1979, 38). The notion that nationalism is new is by no means unchallenged. Two scholars trace its origins from the thirteenth century (Moore, 1987,136; Runciman, 1958, 280-281).

indicates that it is modernist.[35] Nevertheless, Marx himself was not averse to making comments which seem to reflect a primordial position:

> 'the revolutionary fire of the Celtic worker does not go well with the solid but slow nature of the Anglo Saxon worker'.[36]

Attempts at reconciling primordialism with modernism have included suggestions that instrumentalists should assess various national movements on the basis of richness and strength of institutions and traditions.[37] This suggestion, though valuable, serves to take the conflict onto another level since it has been shown that traditions are easily invented if they do not already exist,[38] are themselves reoriented by future generations,[39] and can be put into the service of new spatio-political formations.[40] A related suggestion argues that an assessment of autonomist movements should involve the incorporation of a matrix of endogenous and exogenous factors,[41] and a more endogenous interpretation, related to Reactive Ethnicity,[42] based on the perceived strength of external opposition.[43]

This ecumenical drive gives rise to the question, is what is being fought over {or reconciled} important? Modernism or instrumentalism is the more avowedly social scientific theory since it presumes rationality,[44] and posits

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[35](Nairn, 1981)
[36]Quoted in (Benner, 1993, 82). See (Sharpe, 1987, 154) for more on this point.
[37](Brass, 1979)
[38](Brock & Tulasiewicz, 1985b)
[39](Donald, 1992)
[40](Sharpe, 1993)
[41](McKay, 1982). This technique has also been employed in the study of party system change (Mair, 1989).
[42](Lijphart, 1977; Mayo, 1974)
[43](Scott, 1990). The imagination school of modernism (Smith, 1986) is a further possible candidate for synthesis with the ideas of Primordialism. The most influential proponent of this school, Benedict Anderson, sees nationalism as a construct of the imagination, and a form of secular religion (1983). Though the idea that modern nationalism arose as a mechanism to surmount the fear of death is debatable, Anderson's theory can be applied using primordialist type building blocks, more elegantly termed mythmoteurs, which is precisely what Smith attempts (Smith, 1986, 15).
[44](Berlin, 1990, 231)

nationalism as a dependent variable. The advantage of instrumentalism, therefore, is that it can {though not always does} produce testable, hence falsifiable, theories.[45] The school has responded to earlier criticisms that it was over-determinist, that it neglected dynamics within relationships between state and sub-state groups.[46] Nevertheless, within instrumentalism, at least its liberal variant, two underlying assumptions continue to be dimly discernible: 1. ethnicity is a barrier to progress, and 2. the state is the key variable.[47]

The instrumentalist school is neater, more conceptually elegant, but its anticipatory history is not one of unbridled success.[48] The primordialist perspective appears to be justified by events in the real world, particularly the 'ethnic revivals' of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in the West. This parallels scholarly discussion on the 'gap between culture as normative ideal and culture as it works itself out in historic actuality' which constitutes a problematic within the principle of 'modernity' itself.[49]

Empirical evidence indicates that national movements can contain both primordial and instrumental attributes. One scholar argues, for instance, that in Wales the emphasis on revival of the Welsh language and on seeking institutional supports for cultural self-expression is both an index of the resurgence of a suppressed identity and a quest for socio-economic change.[50] Inferring from this point it is clear that what it is required herein is a precise analysis of nationalism and its concomitants, such that it is possible for instance on a theoretical level to differentiate between theories of

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[45](Hechter, 1995, 62)
[46](Rawkins, 1979)
[47](Rawkins, 1978, 520-521)
[48](Hueglin, 1986, 439)
[49](Schwartz, 1993, 212)
[50](Khleif, 1979b)

nationalism, national identity, nation-building, and theories of national mobilisation on the one hand, and theories of autonomism on the other; and then be able to relate the theory to empirical evidence.

1.3 Instrumentalist Theories of Mobilisation

The canon of scholarly literature on all forms of nationalism, notwithstanding the canon of nationalist literature,[51] is continually expanding and increasingly inter-disciplinary. The value of simple typological distinctions such as that between primordialism and instrumentalism, has been questioned,[52] and alternative 'expressive' conceptualisations using Weberian notions of social change have challenged existing conceptualisations.[53] The most major recent development is the incorporation of rational choice analysis to the study of nationalism.[54]

Instrumentalist theories address various dimensions of autonomist mobilisation, and attempt to explain why it does or does not occur in certain circumstances. The discussion below is intended to provide illustrations of theoretical variances, and group them in an analytically useful manner. The variances occur: In application - particular or universal: in spatial effect - sub-national, national, or international: in source - endogenous or exogenous:[55] in direction - centrifugal or centripetal. These are not entirely distinctive categories but they offer a method of categorisation with explanatory merit. These categories act as a guide in the discussion below.

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[51](Williams, 1988b)
[52](Keating, 1991)
[53](Parkin, 1968)
[54](Levi & Hechter, 1985)
[55](McAllister, 1981, 240)

1.4 Exogenous Centripetal Theories - Diffusion

Diffusion, an interesting amalgam of geography and economic determinism, is one of a group of post war theories of mobilisation and development which predicted the disappearance of territorial politics in Western industrial societies.[56] One strand of the Diffusionist analysis rests primarily on the mode and results of increased communication of increasingly powerful and common value systems, which originate in the 'centres' of states. Another related strand, commonly called structural functionalism, places greater emphasis on the role of institutions.[57] In both strands of the theory, it is hypothesised that value systems and institutions assimilate and homogenise the peripheries in a number of dimensions including the economic, technical, political and cultural. The 'market forces' of industrialisation, capitalism, and urbanisation and their concomitants, mechanisation and specialisation, break down and replace assigned roles and traditional values in the peripheral economic system with the centre's universalist values in a much wider economic context. Eventually, the type of social structure found in developing core regions will diffuse into the periphery,[58] determining, theoretically, that class and ideological solidarities will come to transcend territories.[59]

1.5 Exogenous Centrifugal Theories

The Core-periphery principle is the articulating force behind a number of theories that examine the issues entailed by geographical isolation from the metropolis. For example, ethnicity and relative underdevelopment and

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[56](Keating, 1991, 117; Lipset, 1975; Shils, 1975)
[57](Williams, 1981a)
[58](Hechter, 1975, 7)
[59](Keating, 1991, 117)

deprivation {including territorial systems} analysis, the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy, and Internal Colonialism. The Centre-periphery model has played a significant role in the study of autonomism, not least because it is an intuitively attractive and elegant theory. The model stresses spatial inequality as a source of autonomism.

1.6 Relative Deprivation {Dependency, Uneven Development}

The Relative Deprivation thesis argues that rapid and heavy industrialisation entails an increase in the concentration of wealth and power, and a concomitant rise in social dislocation.[60] Such dislocation heightens the sense of cultural separateness in the periphery, if this perception is accompanied by perceived exploitation, then tensions between centre and periphery increase further,[61] leading to polarisation. The underlying assumption of the theory is that capitalist development, because it is uneven, does not assimilate territories to common norms, leaving winners and losers and creating new powerful sources of division and patterns of relative deprivation.[62] The theory's strength lies in the combination of two key differentiations - class/status and ethnicity/salient difference.[63]

1.7 Territorial Representation and the Protest Vote

This thesis sees the rise of autonomism as a consequence of the decline of the two-party system, the erosion of traditional allegiances and the shift of voting to extreme groups.[64] These ideas can be synthesised with the

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[60](Cooke, 1982)
[61](Nairn, 1977)
[62](Keating, 1991, 118; Orridge, 1981, 7)
[63]This also applies to Internal Colonialism.
[64](McAllister, 1981, 240; McLean, 1970, 371)

original conception of post-materialism {see 1.9 below}, provided one can discover a relationship between issue voting and the protest vote. The synthesis seems especially plausible in two-party systems where voting patterns do not correspond to existing party cleavages.[65]

1.8 Internal Colonialism

Hechter proposes a theory of social organisation based on some principles of Dependencia,[66] and the analytical framework of Core-periphery models.[67] The theory has been criticised.[68] Nevertheless, Hechter's thesis remains influential. For instance, shortly after the publication of Hechter's book, Gwynfor Evans of Plaid Cymru published a book entitled *Freedom for Wales*, in which Hechter's ideas are extensively employed.[69]

Hechter's thesis views the history of the United Kingdom as an exploitative economic relationship between the core {England} and the periphery {Scotland, Wales, and Ireland}. The dynamics of the thesis are basically as follows: some areas {the centres} industrialise earlier than others. The process of unequal development sets up a continuing syndrome of inequalities, and increasing dependency between centre and periphery. This in turn produces a set of relations characterised by domination and exploitation of peripheries by the centres. Most significantly, Hechter argues, the social dislocation caused by industrialisation creates a 'cultural division of labour', thereby augmenting the sense of cultural separation in the periphery.

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[65]Other factors, such as single party domination, may have causal affects also (Butler & Stokes, 1969).
[66](Frank, 1967; Stavenhagen, 1965)
[67](Bulpitt, 1983, 40-42; Hechter, 1975)
[68](Day, 1979)
[69](Evans, 1975, 29; Hechter, 1975; Osmond, 1980, 51)

Constant exploitation fosters a sense of national identity in the periphery, forming the base for separate political movements.[70]

In the United Kingdom, it is argued, the English core continued to engage in economic, cultural, and political exploitation of the periphery throughout the nineteenth century.[71] Hechter argues that despite industrialisation and attempts at enforced Anglicisation by the English core, the periphery remained distinctive in the century following 1850. The principles of Internal Colonialism have also been extended into other situations. For instance, Bulpitt points out that the precepts of Internal Colonialism have been utilised to explain recent developments in the Basque and Catalan provinces of Spain, Corsica, Brittany, Flemish areas of Belgium, and even Greenland's connection with Denmark.[72]

1.9 Endogenous Centrifugal Theories - Post-Materialism

The post-materialist thesis argues that certain changes in post World War II Western societies have significant implications. The changes include: a breakdown of class barriers, a change in occupational structures as a result of developments in technology, accelerated economic growth, increased availability of education, and an increase in mass communications. The implications of the above changes are: 1. Less emphasis on the material aspects of life and a greater priority for aesthetic and intellectual goals, and, given a government system predicated on wholly material goals, 2. a

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[70](McAllister, 1981)

[71](Bulpitt, 1983, 40)

[72](Bulpitt, 1983, 35).Similar models have also been employed with respect to Quebec (Bourhis, 1984), though the personality approach implicit within the Official Language Act of 1969, whereby instead of services accommodating to the individual she accommodates to the language of the region, appeared to be designed to weaken any cultural division of labour (Mackey, 1979).

widespread upsurge in popular support for 'protest' movements - possibly including autonomist movements.

1.10 Rational Choice

The theory assumes nationalists to be rational egoistic utility maximising individuals holding transitive preferences on the basis of near perfect information bundles.[73] The rational agent is assumed to cogitate on the cost benefit analysis of any given act before actually acting. It is a theory based primarily on individual behaviour, that is the utility maximising agent is assumed to perceive some personal gain in performing any given action. The gain is not necessarily material, it may be psychological or expressive, though in the long run it is assumed that these gains will be transformed into a material expression. The theory relies on a particular interpretation of human nature, the validity of which can be questioned,[74] especially given that there may be a scale of human nature.[75]

1.11 Endogenous Centripetal Theories

The endogenous centripetal perspective - the maintenance of political and social status quo or even the encouragement of integration in order to preserve a separate culture - is a neglected part of the literature. The work of several inter-war geographers however does provide a perspective on this dimension in Wales.[76] More recently, and interestingly temporally close to the departure point for our analysis, survey evidence in *Y Fro Cymraeg* {the linguistic core area} during the 1970s revealed an ambiguity towards the

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[73] For examples of the theory in application see (Hechter, 1995; Meadwell, 1991).
[74]For an insight into new theories of human nature see (Edelman, 1992).
[75](Wrightsman, 1992)
[76]See in particular (Fleure, 1922; Fleure, 1940).

value of the Welsh language especially when placed in an exogenous dimension, i.e. when compared to French.[77] Whereas according to a language survey conducted in 1994 this situation had changed markedly with 52% of respondents replying yes to the question - *Do you think Welsh should be a compulsory subject for school children in Wales up to the age of 16?*[78]

1.12 Theory and the Welsh Case

Several of the above theoretical frameworks have been employed to investigate Welsh autonomism. Though it is generally accepted within the scholarly community that Wales deviates from the British norm, explanations for this 'deviance' remain unconvincing.[79] The most significant of these theoretical frameworks are analysed below.

1.13 Diffusion

Keating argues that diffusion is open to criticism on empirical and theoretical grounds .[80] Diffusion theory is, he argues, dominated by a narrow view of history of Europe and America between 1920-70. The failure to predict the reassertion of European peripheries in the late 19th century and in 1970s, means that analysts have to constantly regress the period of modernisation, rendering the theory non-testable, making an empty container of the notion of modernisation.[81]

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[77](Williams, 1979a, 38)
[78](Beaufort Research, 1994) n = 1027
[79](Balsom, Madgwick, & van Mechelen, 1984, 160). But see (Balsom & Jones, 1984, 98; Foulkes, Jones, & Wilford, 1983, 226) for arguments that the distinct characteristics of Welsh politics have eroded. These arguments now appear somewhat dated.
[80](Keating, 1991)
[81](Hobsbawn, 1992, 4; Keating, 1991, 118)

On a theoretical level the underlying assumptions of diffusion are value-laden, and imbued with economic determinism and a notion of progress common to liberals and marxists.[82] Such functionalist approaches can explicitly impute a normative value judgement seeing 'the persistence of minority identities in multinational societies.. {as} a barrier to social progress and economic development',[83] and positing methods to overcome such barriers. Given the assumption that integration and assimilation is progressive, based on the rationale that centres sustain higher values and peripheries are backward, the logic of the argument leads to the conclusion that assimilation is desirable, let alone inevitable. Thus before analysis has begun peripheral resistance is classified as being reactionary and irrational.[84] Diffusionism, therefore tends to have a narrow view of autonomism as a culturally-based movement, destined to vanish with the completion of modernisation.[85]

Debates between two diffusion theorists over the Welsh case illustrate the problems of definition and measurement. In order to measure 'the degree to which cultural homogeneity had been achieved' theorists look 'at inventories of cultural traits'.[86] The definitional problem is concerned with what constitutes a cultural trait and the relationship between such a trait and ethnic identity and mobilisation. Regarding measurement, Ragin analysed three theories of ethnic political mobilisation in Wales on the basis of voter support for the Liberal Party and Plaid Cymru and of shire level socio-economic data.[87] Ecological analyses of this type present special problems;

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[82](Williams, 1984, 183)
[83](Williams, 1984, 181)
[84](Keating, 1991, 118)
[85](Williams, 1981a, 275-310). For earlier and related arguments see (Engels, 1866; Mill, 1861).
[86](Davies, 1989, 4)
[87](Ragin, 1980)

in this case Lutz points out, and Ragin admits, that the shires Ragin used as units of analysis contain highly variable numbers of electoral constituencies. For instance, Glamorgan alone accounted for 16 of 36 electoral districts but is only 1 shire.[88]

Lutz utilises multivariate regression analysis to determine levels of diffusion and contagion among voters in Scotland and Wales. His findings are not convincing, especially in the case of Wales.[89] McAllister has criticised the whole community context system of analysis, arguing that, in the case of Wales, sources of data on Welsh constituencies and shires are contradictory.[90] Moreover, there is evidence that different types of autonomism with different sources of mobilisation exist in Wales,[91] severely limiting the utility for positing internal homogenisation as a source of autonomism.

1.14 Relative Deprivation

The Relative Deprivation thesis, just discussed, is typical of many in the field of political and economic development studies in general, and the study of Welsh autonomism in particular, in that the minutiae of the processes of rapid industrialisation and the alleged consequence of social dislocation are not sufficiently explored. Nor are the responses designed to offset relative deprivation elucidated.[92] Such deficiencies are not compatible with adequate causality and, in the case of Wales and similar areas where industrial

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[88](Lutz, 1980, 1028; Ragin, 1980). Similar difficulties arose during the course of research for this thesis - see Chapter Five.
[89](Lutz, 1990, 260-261). See also (Lutz, 1980; Lutz, 1981).
[90](McAllister, 1987, 49-59)
[91](Jenkins, 1995, 30)
[92]This has particular relevance in the EU context where a targetted regional aid policy has been in place.

development was haphazard and historically unprecedented, as was responsive state involvement, makes for a lack in general applicability. In addition the theory tended to over-determine the extent of peripheral reassertion, so that the relative quiescence of territorial politics in the first half of the 1980s in Western Europe is unaccounted for.[93] Other scholars perceive a problem with unexplained time lags in the theory when applied to empirical reality: 'industrialisation and modernisation occurred in a much earlier period, whereas the upsurge of regional ... nationalism is largely a post-1960 phenomenon'.[94]

The question arises whether unevenness of development is a sufficient condition, or even necessary condition, for autonomism to arise given the conditions prevailing in, for instance Catalonia, where the autonomist impulse is high despite favourable relative economic conditions, compared to, say, the Mezzogiorno in Italy where autonomism is low in spite of relative poverty.[95] Relative deprivation's utility and validity is questionable, therefore, since there is a poor empirical link between the relative poverty of territories and political assertion. The particular examples cited above also provide an indicator of a further problem with the relative deprivation thesis: a quest for general applicability at the expense of crucial local detail.[96] Such analysis does much to extend the domain of the abstruse in the study of nationalism.

The sufficiency and necessity of uneven development as a condition for autonomism *per se* must be subject to further scepticism given the fact that

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[93](Keating, 1991, 118)

[94](Sharpe, 1979, 52)

[95]Similarly, nationalism in Scotland has tended to coincide with relative prosperity rather than decline (Keating, 1979).

[96]The politics of Catalonia, for instance, cannot be explained without reference to the Spanish Civil War, an experience with unique consequences for that territory. The Mezzogiorno, in turn, is the recipient of a high degree of benefit from a welfare system subsidised by the North of Italy (a similar situation exists in Belgium).

'regionalist' structures of community, such as patterns of local ethnic or class relationships predate the liberal market place. Therefore 'it seems only logical that these older structures of community should be re-emphasised when the efficacy of the liberal marketplace shows signs of decline',[97] thus reversing the predicted causal direction.[98] The theory may, however, continue to be articulated simply because it provides an opportunity to question the larger political system.[99]

The political version of the relative deprivation thesis - where greater emphasis is placed on responses to inadequate territorial representation, resulting in protest votes - is subject to the criticisms outlined above. It does not explain why autonomism should be prevalent in some areas and not in others. In the Welsh context, Jones and Wilford utilise a territorial representation approach to examine the regional efficacy of the House of Commons Committee on Welsh Affairs.[100] The issue of Parliament's ability to respond to territorial issues was found to be limited. Surprisingly, given the political orientation of the Cabinet since 1979, and the long term relative weakness of the Secretary of State for Wales in the Cabinet, there has been an increased tendency towards the development of institutionalised politics within Wales alongside the augmentation of indicators of protest voting.[101]

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[97](Hueglin, 1986, 440)
[98]See (Rodkin, 1993, 646-647) for a discussion of causal primacy.
[99](Nairn, 1977)
[100](Jones & Wilford, 1986)
[101]For evidence see (BBC Wales, 1995; Beaufort Research, 1994; Beaufort Research, 1995; Beaufort Research\Western Mail, 1990; Cornock, 1995a; Cornock, 1995b; Cornock, 1995c; Heath, 1994b; Prynn, 1995).

1.15 Internal Colonialism

Internal Colonialism, as we have noted, is basically a model of economic exploitation, elite co-option and cultural divide and rule, which has an unexplained assumption of reaction in the peripheries {themselves ill-defined}. The concept is ambiguous, leaving many questions unanswered. Where does Internal Colonialism apply, for example, and to what extent? Is there one dominant centre or more? Is the dominant centre the capital? - an unlikely circumstance in the political structures prevailing in Germany, Italy or Spain. What is the role of the peripheral elite? Does the peripheral elite collude with the centre or oppose it? For what reasons? The mechanics of Internal Colonialism are thus neglected.[102]

Hechter was later to modify his thesis with respect to Scotland, but continued to argue for its applicability elsewhere.[103] Curiously, fact seemed to follow theory, in that the internal colonialism thesis was, as we have seen, utilised by Welsh autonomists.[104] One scholar argues that the autonomists' adoption of the internal colonialism thesis was bad strategy, as the state became a natural target, forcing the autonomists to become preoccupied with sovereignty rather than the social bases of authority - government was thus divorced from the wider society and the state was reified.[105]

A similar conundrum emerges with all modernisation theories that posit some form of uneven development as a causal factor. As we have argued, such assumptions cannot address the question: is uneven development a sufficient condition, or even a necessary condition, for nationalism to arise given the seemingly contradictory case of, for instance, Catalonia? So, too,

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[102](Page, 1978, 315)
[103](Hechter, 1985)
[104](Lovering, 1978). Also see (Voutat, 1992) for commentary on the implications of this eventuality.
[105](Rawkins, 1978, 521)

Scotland, where the discovery of North Sea oil quickened expectations of regional self-sufficiency and a new thrust towards separatism. Modernisation arguments can, then, appear circular or even inverted when considered in relation to empirical evidence.

1.16 Post-Materialism

The two major problems with the post-materialist thesis are the lack of valid causal explanations between increased material comfort and increased autonomism, and the assumption that material needs are generally satisfied in western societies. Arguably, it is a new description rather than a theory, but even in this capacity the term may be a misnomer, since post-materialism fails to capture the true *zeitgeist* - the notion of equality or equal treatment - and indeed obscures it by implying an abandonment of materialism which may not be the case. Perhaps a better terminology would describe shifts in the types of egalitarianism,[106] which have dominated twentieth century political ideologies, from issues such as class and income, to other issues such as gender and ethncity, or territory[107] - a movement from inter-personal equality to community equality.

For a period the validity of post-materialism remained relatively unchallenged. Lazer, for instance, accepts post-materialism when he analyses ethnic nationalism in the United Kingdom.[108] Again, Inglehart explains the increase in the incidence of non-party voting in terms of a shift in post-materialist attitudes.[109] Also, McAllister distinguishes his post-materialist based analysis of autonomist party organisation as an endogenous

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[106](Barry, 1971, 5)
[107](Sharpe, 1987, 148)
[108](Lazer, 1977)
[109](Inglehart, 1976)

explanation of autonomism in the UK.[110] The Welsh case, however, is not entirely predisposed to post-materialist analysis. One study, for instance, argues that the upsurge of ethnic nationalism in Western industrial societies in the 1970s can be explained in terms of the psychological consequences of post-1945 differences in regional modernisation rates shifting to favour traditionally subordinate ethnic groups.[111] The 'psychological consequences' manifest themselves in post-materialist attitudes. Using survey analysis, however, little evidence of post-materialist attitudes determining protest can be found in Wales. In a 1995 survey only 7% of respondents regarded pollution or the environment as an important issue facing Wales in 1995.[112] Low age, low income, and a higher level of education are the primary ingredients for protest in the Principality. Post-materialism does not appear to be a valid independent variable in autonomist mobilisation; in particular it has been demonstrated that those who support greater territorial autonomy are more likely to endorse post-materialist attitudes, and not *vice-versa*.[113]

The argument, however, that the shift in modernisation rates served to redistribute power resources, largely expressed in the *de facto* form of education and wealth, to the advantage of the traditionally subordinate groups has some merit. It has the additional advantage of altering the focus on a generically human interest in producing the means of technological control over an inclement hostile nature, and raising the notion of an equally fundamental interest in self-definition through particular communities.[114] A third factor that has been suggested as having its source in the post-

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[110](McAllister, 1981; McAllister & Mughan, 1981)
[111](McAllister & Mughan, 1981)
[112](Beaufort Research, 1995) n = 521
[113](Studlar & McAllister, 1988)
[114](Cohen, 1983)

materialist process is a questioning of the traditional values of left and right in party politics and a perception of a non-distinguishable relationship between their values and a materialist universalist ethos.[115]

These processes led in turn to the crystallisation of both a material and mental sense of collective deprivation and, possibly, to a more widespread belief that autonomism offers a better future than the continuation of the political status quo. From this perspective, therefore, the translation of a sense of collective deprivation into remedial political action was consummated by the emergence of an able and articulate autonomist leadership nucleus in both Scotland and Wales. Latent ethnic consciousness was thereby translated into autonomist party growth. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of post-materialism lack validity in the Welsh context.[116] The basic post-materialist premise that material needs are satisfied is not applicable in Wales as a whole, where indices of economic and social decline and deprivation remain high. There exist, however, certain localities in Wales where post-materialism may be applicable. Post-materialist environmental issues have, in Ceredigion and Pembroke North, been allied successfully with autonomism in Wales.[117] The case for positing post-materialism as a valid intervening variable appears stronger as the economic and social constructs of Wales alter.[118]

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[115](Ellis, 1985; Inglehart, 1976; McLean, 1970, 371)
[116](Studlar & McAllister, 1988)
[117](Adamson, 1991b). The dispute in 1995 between Cynog Dafis M.P. and Dr. C. Busby may have jeopardised this particular project.
[118]c.f. (Prentice, 1993, 18).

1.17 Rational Choice

This theory can be represented on one level as an attempt to overcome the problem of materialism and universalism common to most modernisation theories of autonomism, by acknowledging a human need for self-definition through community.[119] Self-definition however is almost always defined in terms of the state, or more specifically the desire to become a state via secession or other means, thus excluding in the Welsh case the far more prevalent and overriding concern for cultural and linguistic protection.[120] Interesting ideas have, however, been derived from a quasi-rational choice position on the activities of autonomist parties.[121] The notion of qualitatively different autonomisms emerging from investment and consumption decisions finds support in empirical evidence in the Welsh case, and will be returned to later. Nevertheless, the assumption of efficiency underlying rational choice,[122] does not coincide with demands of autonomists in Wales.[123]

The efficiency argument has been employed as an explanation for the rarity of autonomist insurgence,[124] i.e. an insufficient number of people will perceive the projected state to be viable.[125] However the current autonomist movements in Wales are reprojecting the state; successfully bestowing their state, nation, and sovereignty arguments upon the EU in additon to the British state.[126] This phenomenon is posited here, *inter alia*, as an endogenous

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[119](Cohen, 1983)
[120](Jenkins, 1995, 9)
[121](Green, 1982; Sharpe, 1993)
[122](Downs, 1957)
[123](Plaid Cymru, 1994a; Plaid Cymru and Green Party {Ceredigion and Pembroke North}, 1992)
[124](Hechter, 1992)
[125]Insulated rational choice arguments of this kind, especially given that altruism can be a feature in autonomism, are subject to the danger of reducing the complexity of human nature beyond credulity.
[126](Osmond, 1995; Plaid Cymru, 1992; Plaid Cymru, 1994a)

reaction to exogenous events.[127] We assume that a long term factor impinging on these developments is the decline in the power and prestige in the British state. Colley's analysis provides substance to this assumption - British identity being built around two factors currently in decline or undergoing transformative change: Protestantism and Militarism.[128]

1.18 Methodology - Avoiding Bias

This section serves several purposes. Primarily, it builds on the preceeding sections, and develops further arguments concerning factors which may have distorted scholarly comprehension of autonomism, and how this thesis is designed to avoid such biases. The discussion is followed by a methodological outline of the thesis.

The majority view within the discipline appears to be that autonomism is regressive or atavistic.[129] It has also been classified as emotional and subjective.[130] Objectivity is regarded as a *sine qua non* of good intellectual practice, and encouraged at all educational levels.[131] Behind the principle of objectivity, however, there may lie a deep-seated bias verging on ethno-centrism -[132] one scholar has argued, for instance, that some textbooks on British politics are 'anglocentric' and contain 'demonstrably false or partial accounts',[133] as are the majority of school books in the same subject.[134]

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[127](Nairn, 1993, 158) suggests that nationalism has been 'the dominant political by-product of modern internationality', c.f. (Williams, 1984, 183).
[128](Colley, 1992; Osmond, 1988, 20-22)
[129](Hueglin, 1986, 440)
[130]Elsewhere autonomists have been depicted as searching for an ahistorical objective reality (Reynolds, 1984, 252).
[131]See, for instance (National Curriculum History Committee for Wales, 1990, Appendix 3, para. 4). Though it has been argued that the related principle of empiricism represents a body of beliefs in itself (Pirsig, 1992, 67-68).
[132](Stanfield III, 1993, 4). See (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, 27) for a discussion of bias.
[133](Crick, 1990, 492)
[134](Crick, 1988, 1)

Notwithstanding any bias on the part of the author of these remarks it is easy to see why the study of autonomism, associated with emotion-laden concepts such as race and ethnicity,[135] is particularly open to bias.

On the other hand, certain scholars, primordialists or naturalists in particular, have been depicted as being more sympathetic to autonomism. This stems from the socio-psychological roots of modern primordial analysis, and in particular a search for 'understanding'. Instrumentalists place greater stress on objectivity and analysis. The latter approach appears more rigorous, but its conclusions have sometimes been at variance with real-world events.[136] Recently, awareness of these problems has increased and several attempts have been made to circumnavigate them. In addition to the perspectives outlined earlier, perception-based analysis, methodologically linked to discourse analysis, has been offered as another avenue. As one scholar states, 'what is important... are the actors perceptions. It is irrelevant that a disinterested observer may feel these grievances are unjust'.[137] Agents' perceptions are construed as an important part of the mobilisation process for the purposes of this thesis,[138] and will be accounted for in the collection of primary data through participant observation and interviews.[139] Furthermore, it seems reasonable to incorporate the theory and justificatory statements of the autonomists themselves into the analysis, not necessarily as statements of truth but of perceived reality.[140] At this stage, a two-level analysis distinguishing perception from truth seems intuitively reasonable;

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[135](Stanfield III, 1993, 6)
[136](Hueglin, 1986, 439)
[137](Arsenau, 1988, 26). Weber suggested this much earlier (Weber, 1968).
[138](Allan, 1991, 178)
[139](Allan, 1991, 177). Note that use has been made of an extensive series of interviews conducted by Chapman. For an account of his methodology see (Chapman, 1995).
[140](Festinger, 1957, 10-11; Rodkin, 1993, 644)

there remains a constant nagging doubt, however, that autonomists and their opponents might be deliberately misrepresenting themselves in order to gain credibility and legitimacy - see the discussion below for methods employed in avoiding bias in this regard.[141]

On another level approaches can show a correlation with the personal dispositions, or ethnic histories of the writers. Writing on issues of identity and ethnicity can be compared on this level with travel writing, and in a way special characteristics are required of the reader of both kinds of literature:

> 'For more astute readers of such literature, the outward-going movement of the travel narrative should always be supported by an inward-looking enquiry, seeking to discover the more or less hidden agenda of the narrator. We may well ask: 'Who are these people who eat strange food, smell odd, and have such curious habits?' But we must also ask: 'And what kind of traveller is telling us about them?' In accounts of the behaviour of foreigners, the first question takes precedence. With greater or lesser authority, the travel writer is relaying news of unknown places, describing unknown peoples, reliant on the informative serendipity of unplanned meetings and episodes. The reader, in normal circumstances, has no immediate reason to doubt the reliability of the narrator, who is seen as a person much like him or herself, only distinguished by being more observant and articulate. However, the question of the nature of the traveller can never entirely be dismissed, and, as we shall see, there are particular circumstances in which it may well come to dominate'.[142]

These *ad hominem* arguments, though frowned upon by philosophers, cannot be dismissed or ignored. Perhaps they ought to be embraced:

> 'This book is, then both a detached scholarly work and also a personal account of values that I mostly cherish and a nation that I love. How much the book gains or suffers from this inescapable personal dimension must be left to readers and reviewers to judge'.[143]

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[141](The Economist, 1996, 26)
[142](Bell, 1995c, 7)
[143](Morgan, 1981, vii)

Another scholar - Barry - was intrigued, for instance, by the rather conciliatory attitude of the scholar Plamenatz towards autonomism,[144] in the context of the intellectual *mores* of the era and the attitudes of fellow scholars. Barry then widens the discussion, saying,

> 'It becomes more and more striking, as the main outlines of our century begin to emerge, that an extraordinary amount of what makes it intellectually distinctive is the achievement of members of two groups: assimilated German speaking Jews and Viennese - and indeed, that an amazingly high proportion is owed to those in the intersection of the two sets... And it is hardly to be wondered at if, in the circumstances, the doctrines of nationalism and self-determination have been treated as inimical to civilised values'.[145]

The above discussion is an indicator that personal dispositions may account for a larger part of the analytical framework within which autonomism is studied, and, perhaps more importantly, may determine the conclusions reached about the nature and normative value of any particular autonomist outburst than is generally acknowledged.[146] One would expect on this basis that endogenous theories are more sympathetic to nationalism than those of the exogenous variety.

A further difficulty, common in the social sciences, arises around the issue of causation. The term 'endogeniety' has also been used to describe a particular methodological problem, applicable to the study of autonomism, whereby the values the independent variables 'take on are sometimes a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable'.[147]

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[144]Plamenatz did however distinguish between low and high culture nationalisms (Sharpe, 1989, ff2).
[145](Barry, 1991, 157)
[146]Attainment in bilingual children is another, related, area in which research has been politicised (Baker, 1988, 72). A correlation has been noted between early research on bilingualism and the personal disposition of the researchers. There is even one documented case of a researcher deliberately altering IQ results (Baker, 1988, 10).
[147](King, et al., 1994, 185). To avoid confusion the term *endogeniety* is henceforth used only in its methodological capacity in this section.

Ascertaining the direction of causality in autonomist mobilisation is not an easy task.[148] The fundamental difficulties are uncertainty,[149] and endogeniety amongst variables. These problems cannot be eliminated, but may be controlled for; as will be discussed below.

1.19 Methodological and Theoretical Outline: Identity Mobilisation Theory

Responding to the above points, this thesis intends to focus 'on the objective existence of regional differences within and across boundaries of nation-states and on the subjective perceptions of these differences'.[150] The latter focus indicates our desire to avoid reifying the state in the manner of much of the previous scholarship on 'nationalism'. Since as modern autonomists know, statehood is not the only way of talking about places and events in relation to 'the political', but they nevertheless realise that continual 'Welsh' discourse can reify 'Wales'.[151]

More particularly, the thesis will be concerned with the process of identity transformation in Wales, and the implications of that transformation for autonomist mobilisation. Put another way, we are interested in the movement to a new paradigm of communal consciousness, and its consequences for political action - in the widest sense of 'political'.[152] It is hypothesised that particular 'tools of identity' are involved and employed in these transformations. According to our discussion above the most significant 'tools of identity' in the Welsh context are those affecting perceptions - altering the image of Wales in the collective consciousness of

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[148](Evans, 1996b)
[149](King, et al., 1994, 8)
[150](Hueglin, 1986, 439)
[151](Thomas, 1991a, 62 & 60)
[152]c.f. (Williams, 1984, 186).

the people living there. We theorise that the most significant tools employed are those involved in communicative functions such as education and language, and mediums such as television and radio - to put it more crudely the 'system of mind and media control'.[153] We are careful not to ignore, however, the influence of four additional factors:

a} the long-term and manifest institutionalisation of Welsh identity since 1964 {and earlier}, and its effect on identity transformation in Wales.

b} changing conceptualisations of economic activity - privatism, new management techniques - which may encourage localism.[154]

c} a general trend of dealignment in the British electorate and the rise of issue politics which may have favoured autonomist parties,[155] and has certainly altered their strategies.[156]

d} changes in local government structures, functions and levels of power and influence since 1979.

Max Weber argued that the concept of the nation 'belongs in the sphere of values', and that 'differences in national sentiment {are}... fluid'.[157] From Weber, the process of change in Wales is posited as resulting, *inter alia*,[158] from alterations in the value framework surrounding the notions of Welshness, and a transformation of the European environment. It is

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[153](Harvie, 1994a, 4; Richmond, 1984, 14). It has been hypothesised elsewhere that modernity has brought with it a process of nationalisation of trivialities which even extends to the way people do dishes (Linde-Laursen, 1993).

[154](Prentice, 1993, 15-17)

[155](Levy, 1995)

[156](Plaid Cymru, 1994b)

[157](Weber, 1947, 172, 175)

[158]Other variables may affect identity augmentation and autonomism, for instance antipathy towards certain individuals such as Margaret Thatcher or John Redwood (Osmond, 1995, 67-78). The longitudinal nature of the study is intended to reduce the bias caused by such factors.

hypothesised that a pre-existing condition exists such that the greater the perceived value and potentialities of Welsh identity:[159]

- agents benefitting from that identity are more likely to colonise institutions closely associated with that identity, and are more likely to be of an autonomist mindset.
- the greater will be the autonomist impulse towards any agency or structure which is perceived to threaten or undermine that identity.[160]

These can be labelled the internal determinants of perceived nationhood, and together the two processes might result in a *cymricisation*[161] of the decision- making process. We recognise that an agent's orientation is not necessarily an *idée fixe.* The perceptions and orientations of Malcolm Rifkind in the 1990s, for instance, would seem to be rather different from those governing his actions in 1975. In that year he resigned from his position as an opposition frontbench spokesman in protest at Margaret Thatcher's decision to reverse Conservative Party strategy with respect to an Assembly for Scotland.[162] Such reorientations amongst political, administrative, social, and cultural gatekeepers can have far-reaching effects. It is difficult, moreover, to incorporate them into a social scientific analysis due to their unpredictability. Nevertheless we argue that a model of agency has to be incorporated if autonomist mobilisation is to be understood.

The concept of nationhood has an external dimension also, which may conflict with internally generated ideas. The external aspect of nationhood is that aspect determined by those outside the group, the core perhaps, or the

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[159]There is a strong resonance with the hypothesis here and the theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957), whereby agents can alter 'cognition' on the basis of changing 'realities' (Festinger, 1957, 9-11), and change their behaviour to reduce dissonance with existing behaviour and new cognitions (Festinger, 1957, 175), especially when buttressed by widespread social support (Festinger, 1957, 192).

[160]For oppositional models see (Scott, 1990).

[161]This term seems more appropriate than *welshification.*

[162](Osmond, 1988, 43 ff.17)

executors of the so-called 'new world order' - 'the international community'. Political science has often failed in accounting for and analysing autonomism through being itself concerned almost exclusively with external determinants, and, even more significantly, neglecting to analyse how internal structures and agencies respond to external changes. For the purposes of this study, the most significant external change in both subjective and objective dimensions has taken place in 'Europe':

> 'In the devolution project of the 1970s, Europe was marginal... but the United Kingdom's steady integration into Europe.. has caused links to ramify'.[163]

This discussion opens up another avenue of debate which revolves around the relationship between 'power' and political change.[164] Few of the institutions and agencies focused on in the body of this thesis have significant degrees of autonomy or sovereignty {perhaps two measures of political power}, and in a truly behavioralist or essentiallist model their significance would be likely to be deemed relatively marginal. This would seem unsatisfactory since, as we show in later chapters, the influence of such bodies on determining the parameters of debate, discourse, and even policy-making has been significant. We choose, therefore, to focus not on power *per se* but on the 'more open textured concept of influence'.[165]

On this basis, we develop an hypothesis concerning the form of state response to changes in the periphery. We hypothesise, on the basis of an analysis of the relationship between the central state and its territorial outpost in Wales - the Welsh Office -, that the pattern of response is such that:

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[163](Harvie, 1994a, 20)
[164]For a discussion of the social scientist as *praetorian* see (Horowitz, 1977, 9 & 225-291).
[165](Jones & Wilford, 1986, 80)

- The greater the level of financial responsibility accruing to any given department the more resistant the state will be to colonisation by indigenous agents, and the greater the likelihood of domination by 'British' administrators.

On a more expressive level, political science has also been unwilling to address the normative, and often internal, issue of 'value',[166] which is constantly being evoked by actors,[167] and is elsewhere taken as a *sine qua non* of understanding the related notion of culture.[168] A value-laden concept of nationhood has itself been externally utilised to determine whether any group has a justified claim to a separate existence, the triumph of a perceived order over self-determination.[169]

The changes in the internal dimension will be charted by a systematic,[170] analysis of key institutions, agencies, and the discourse and actions of autonomist individuals and groups. There are controversies associated with the analysis of discourse.[171] A biographer of Thomas Paine has argued that his subject 'supposed that in politics words count and that words are deeds'.[172] We agree wholeheartedly with the former sentiment, and argue that this thesis furnishes some evidence supporting the latter.

It is recognised, however, that an exclusive concentration on discourse may prevent an adequate account of the cleavages and linkages between

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[166](Cortese, 1990)

[167]For example, Gwynfor Evans argues 'the struggle in Wales is between two nationalisms, Welsh nationalism and the Anglo-British state nationalism, the immense moral power which suffocates Welsh nationhood and the emotive force behind the Anglo-British state' (Evans, 1991, 21). Note the following statement in *Tuag 2000* the *Plaid Cymru* 1992 manifesto, 'The moral patterns that are rooted in our history have been attacked by a philosophy of greed and selfishness' (Plaid Cymru, 1992, 6). See also (Jones, 1994c; Lewis, 1985, 16; Thomas, 1991b).

[168](Jones, 1986, 263 & 266; Kluckhohn, 1962)

[169](Popper, 1965, 368). This illustrates an important faultline in liberal thought, the split betweeen individualist liberalism and its communitarian cousin (Green, 1982). The related notion of validity has also been fought over (Davies, 1985, 150).

[170](King, et al., 1994, 10)

[171](Williams, 1994b)

[172](Keane, 1995, xi)

external and internal dimensions. Changes will therefore be analysed in parallel with changes taking place elsewhere, particularly institutional changes, within and beyond Wales. It is also recognised that, in the case of perception analysis it is possible that subjective perceptions, which often are the impetus behind autonomist movements, may not accurately reflect objective conditions.[173] Having said this, we reject the proposition that because perception is not necessarily grounded in reality it is irrelevant to this kind of study.[174]

One issue here is that of validity of measurement.[175] It is assumed here that agents act in accordance with their perceptions of the situation, and that they report those perceptions truthfully. In order to account for the external dimension, changes in Wales are analysed against a changing world and European backdrop. It will be argued here that an increasingly important factor in the external environment, namely the European Union {EU}, has altered rates and depth of identity transformation through aid structures such as the European Regional Development Fund {ERDF},[176] the promotion of ideas like subsidiarity, the development of identity-influencing education policies, and the creation of institutions like the Committee of the Regions. Indeed, one perhaps may be able to posit a Europeanisation of perceptions:[177] note in this context that Labour Commissioners have been predominantly Scottish and Welsh.[178] Raised awareness of matters European have also served to turn the spotlight on the Welsh Office since it

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[173](Hueglin, 1986, 439)
[174]See (Rodkin, 1993, 644-45) for a discussion on this point.
[175](King, et al., 1994, 25)
[176](Christiansen, 1995, 6) provides an account of the politicisation of the 'Objective' areas within the fund.
[177]c.f. (Bekemans, 1990, 8).
[178](Harvie, 1994a, 28)

'oversees the impact on Wales of the EU, especially the operation of the ERDF'.[179]

'Europe' is also relevant in another sense, since awareness of the experience of other sub-state groups on the continent is rising, and is reflected in Welsh autonomist literature.[180] Though, as has been noted, this is not a comparative thesis, a comparative dimension is especially useful when considering the relative success of various sub-state groups in Europe. Welsh autonomism is, for instance, and on a number of levels, more successful than its counterpart in Brittany. Later chapters will touch on the argument that certain autonomisms may be privileged because they have a relatively strong involvement in what can be termed 'identive policy areas', and may be better placed to take advantage of future EU involvement in these areas.

It has been established earlier that the thesis aims to address the issue of autonomism, a sub-set of nationalism. The difficulties of assuming autonomism to be an independent variable, and the problematic of existing instrumentalist theories have been outlined above. Autonomism is assumed in this case therefore to be a dependent variable, subject to related independent and intervening variables. A significant assumption of the thesis is that variables can possess a feedback mechanism,[181] whereby dependent variables contain a dependent and explanatory component.[182] Such assumptions ought to facilitate meaningful political science.

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[179](Dynes & Walker, 1995, 296) for more details on operation of European funds in Wales see (Thomas, 1994b).
[180]See Chapter Five.
[181](King, et al., 1994, 188)
[182]Similarly identity, a variable both concomitant with and within the autonomist impulse, may be as old as consciousness itself (Berlin, 1990, 243), but it can shift in relation to other factors.

In formal terms, the thesis is a longitudinal analysis of changes in the scale, in a number of dimensions - socio-economic, political and cultural - of Welsh identity. The indicators of the dependent variable, are election results, opinion polls, the growth of Welsh insitutions in civil society, growth in the numbers of Welsh learners, membership of autonomist groups, discourse analysis and elite interviews. Since identity is an abstract concept, these indicators provide evidence for an expressive shift in qualitative and quantitative archetypes of identity.[183]

It is hypothesised that:

- the growth of certain territorially based institutions and policy solutions has augmented Welsh identity.
- the European Union has *inter alia* decreased the British 'marker' in Welsh perceptions of identity.
- increased autonomist impulses in Wales are a product of increased identity mobilisation, and changes in the value and structure of Welsh identity.

The institutions and structures, deemed independent variables, and capable of effecting change in the perceived value of Welsh identity, in this case study will therefore be:

- Welsh institutions
- Education and language policies
- Broadcasting
- The European Union

One problem, implicit in the discussion above, which must be addressed at the outset is that the first three independent variables can on one level be construed as indicators of Welsh identity, the dependent variable. Firstly, in order to reduce the problems associated with selecting on the dependent variable we parse the Welsh institutions variable across administrative and

[183](King, et al., 1994, 110)

territorial areas,[184] separating state from civil institutions, and all Wales institutions from institutions organised on more local bases. This process creates a variable matrix, and is illustrated below:

Table 1:1

Variable matrix

Institution	independent	dependent
all-Wales ↓	state→ ↓	civil ↓
localised	local government→	civil

Key: ↓→=postulated process tracing

There can be no doubt that the process described above is discerned by more prescient members of the autonomist community:

> 'The existence of the Welsh Office, itself brought about by a Welsh political discourse, then calls into being a whole series of semi-autonomous pressure groups and national lobbying organisations in the voluntary sector to lobby itself'.[185]

This 'reactive dynamic' of institutional development and agents' behaviour may not be confined to this domain. Though we have suggested that broadcasting is an agency of reproduction and concomitantly reflective; others, albeit members of the broadcasting community in Wales, have implied that it may exhibit productive essentialist tendencies:

> '{T}o an extent, I believe some of these new organisations have come into being because there is someone out there to reflect what they are doing'.[186]

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[184](King, et al., 1994, 193)
[185](Thomas, 1991a, 60)
[186](Hannan, 1990a, ix)

Broadcasters themselves, the author continues,

> 'have in a sense, invented a new kind of Wales in which there are things to tell each other'.[187]

Such claims imply that the reactive dynamic of identity transformation in Wales may not be uni-directional but a cycle of reaction and counter-reaction over time. Though we believe these claims can be taken too far, they are worthy of serious consideration and are addressed in the body of the thesis.

Secondly, some observations with reduced endogeniety problems are selected.[188] That is, we expect agents involved in particular policy areas to espouse increased feelings of Welshness, and control for areas where this is unlikely to be the case. We would not, for instance, expect the level of identity politicisation to be high in the National Health Service Directorate of the Welsh Office, for instance, or the Business Services Division of the Industry and Training Department where there is a relatively high turnover of personnel going on to careers outside Wales. Interviews were conducted with Welsh Office personnel to establish whether our expectations are matched by our findings, and to ascertain whether a valid counter-factual condition exists in this case.[189]

Developments in the Welsh Office provide an indicator of changes in policies of territorial management in the core in key areas, as determined by interviews, and analysis of autonomist discourse.[190] The production of autonomist values through education and language policies can be charted

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[187](Hannan, 1990a, x)

[188](King, et al., 1994, 187)

[189](King, et al., 1994, 191). Though access to personnel was limited.

[190]As indicated by interviews, party manifestos, policy statements, and speeches. The ethnographic aspect of the research is concerned with identifying key agents in the debate, and analysing the rhetoric, action and responses of those agents. Interviews of key individuals have been conducted in order to account for the way regional identities are produced, described, utilised or counteracted by the actors in the process.

by analysing the responses of regional actors and institutions {such as government agencies}, NGO's, political parties, cultural movements, and action/pressure groups. The reproduction of autonomist values can be charted through analysis of developments in Welsh broadcasting media. The variable matrix allows us to parse the production of autonomist values across political as well as administrative space. We expect local indicators of pro-Welsh policy to be stronger in the North-west of Wales than the South-east. To find indicators of the depth of identity transformation we look in particular areas identified as 'British Wales', where Welsh identity was previously deemed to be weakest.[191] Though British Wales is measured on a constituency basis, the constituencies can be aggregated on a county level. The three Glamorgans and Gwent encapsulate the majority of the constituencies.[192]

Elsewhere more emphasis has been placed on a 'domain zone', transitional areas where language decline is most acute.[193] Though this is a critical feature of language change in Wales, we felt that the politicisation of Welsh identity in British Wales during the 1980s presented more valuable data in this context. Furthermore it was acknowledged in this earlier work, that LEAs on the linguistic periphery {which roughly corresponds with British Wales} had played a significant role in encouraging the use of Welsh, and that considerable pressure had been applied by a politicised Welsh-speaking middle class inhabiting these areas.[194] Significantly it is in precisely these

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[191]The constituencies of 'British Wales' are Alyn and Deeside, Brecon and Radnor, Bridgend, Cardiff Central, Cardiff S. and Penarth, Cardiff W., Cardiff N., Clwyd NW, Clywd SW, Delyn, Monmouth, Montgomery, Newport E., Newport W., Pembroke, Vale of Glamorgan, and Wrexham (Balsom, 1985).
[192]New unitary authorities came into being in Wales on April 1, 1996.
[193](Williams, 1979a, 28)
[194](Williams, 1979a, 32)

areas that 'the great growth of Welsh language education has been',[195] though admittedly from a very low base.[196] Thus we concur that:

> 'There are good reasons to start the political evaluation of the language question completely at the other end of the spectrum in the English crescent stretching from Rhuddlan, Delyn, Alyn and Dee, Wrexham Maelor, part of Montgomery, Radnor, Breconshire and Gwent'.[197]

1.20 The Temporal Parameters

The research has been restricted, except where circumstances and/or good practice dictate otherwise, to a particular time-frame. This section seeks to explain and, to a certain extent, justify the temporal parameters of the thesis. In the first instance this period has been chosen because it enables a selection of a range of values of dependent variables,[198] which can be deemed indicators of the identity transformation and mobilisation we are attempting to depict, analyse and explain.

The year 1979, then, has a particular significance in the history of Welsh autonomism, since it is the date of the referendum on the devolution proposals of the Labour administration. On March 1st of that year, St. David's Day, the people of Wales were asked 'Do you want the provisions of the Wales Act, 1978, to be put into effect? The results are summarised in the table below:

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[195](Evans, 1996b)
[196](Williams, 1996)
[197](Hearne, 1984, 265-8)
[198](King, et al., 1994, 141). See (King, et al., 1994, 128-129) on selection of observations, and the reasons why the dependent variable has to take on other values over the period.

Table 1:2

Results of 1979 Referendum in Wales[199]

County	Total	Yes	No	Turnout %
Gwynedd	108834	37363	71157	65.40
Powys	53520	9843	43502	66.87
W. Glam	159094	29663	128834	58.22
Dyfed	160359	44849	114947	65.43
S.Glam	166912	21830	144186	59.48
Clwyd	145730	31384	114119	51.62
M.Glam	232026	46747	184196	59.40
Gwent	176947	21369	155389	55.83
ALL WALES {%age of electorate}	1203422	243048 {20.3%}	956330 {79.7%}	58.30

The population of Wales as a whole rejected devolution by a ratio of almost 4 to 1, indicating a desire to retain the existing constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom.[200] The disaggregated data above gives us more observable cases,[201] which indicate that the intra-regional trend within Wales broadly conformed to the general trend. The two counties most co-extensive with *Y Fro Cymraeg*, Gwynedd and Dyfed, rejected the proposal also; albeit by a lesser ratio of 2 to 1, the higher turnout in these areas indicating a greater issue politicisation.

To emphasise that we are dealing with a typical phenomenon of the period and not an outlier,[202] we turn to opinion polls conducted during a four year period after the referendum and the 1979 and 1983 General

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[199]Sources: (Cornock, 1995d; May, 1994, 30-31).

[200]There is evidence that during this period, the Welsh associated themselves with Britain to a far greater extent than the Scots. For instance, a survey conducted in 1981 found that 57% of respondents residing in England were 'very proud' of Britain, the figure for those residing in Wales was 54%, whilst that for Scotland was significantly less at 41% (Rose, 1984, 4).

[201](King, et al., 1994, 48)

[202](King, et al., 1994, 58)

Elections.[203] In May 1979, the Conservatives increased their percentage vote by almost 10 points, gaining 32.2% of the vote compared to 23.9% in October 1974.[204] The results of the elections provide indicators of the systematic forces affecting the polity during this period,[205] particularly a trend towards support for the most unionist of the major parties.[206]

With some reservations it can be argued that in the period 1979-83 Welsh identity had a 'British face'.[207] Examine Table 1:3 below:

Table 1:3

Public Opinion in Wales, 1979-83 {In per cent}[208]

Political Party	General Election 1979	HTV Poll 9/81	Marplan Poll 9/82	HTV Poll 3/83	HTV Poll 5/83	General Election 1983
Labour	48	44	41	42	44	38
Conservative	33	16	36	36	38	31
Alliance/Liberal	11	34[209]	19	16	14	23
Plaid Cymru	8	7	4	5	5	8

The results of four major polls that were conducted in Wales between the general elections of 1979 and 1983 are outlined above. The polls indicate a greater alignment of Wales with British patterns of political support in this period. This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the rise in support for the Alliance in 1981. Labour also declined in popularity in Wales during this

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[203]The May 1979 General Election campaign in Wales was, however, profoundly affected by the March referendum.

[204](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 98)

[205](King, et al., 1994, 60)

[206]Significantly, 1979 also signalled the start of non-constitutional campaigning (Phillips, 1988).

[207](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 110)

[208]Source: (Balsom & Jones, 1984). All results adjusted to exclude minor parties, don't knows.

[209]Question specifically emphasised SDP/Liberal Alliance.

period in line with British trends. Furthermore the 'Falklands Factor' appeared to boost Conservative prospects in Wales as it did elsewhere in Britain. Note also that levels of support for Plaid Cymru remained steady and low.

Now compare the more recent situation in Wales. BBC Wales and Western Mail opinion polls throughout the early 1990s show consistent support of around 40-50% in favour of an elected Assembly in Wales with 30-40% opposed.[210] There is evidence for some linkage between Welsh pro-autonomist sentiment and events, or prospective events, in Scotland. In an opinion poll conducted for the Western Mail and S4C television, for instance, support for devolution rose to 61% when respondents were asked on their attitude towards Welsh devolution if Scotland were to be given its own assembly.[211] Other measures indicate that numbers declaring themselves to be British Welsh are contracting.[212] The poll just cited, for instance, found that a third of Tories desired an elected assembly in Wales. Changes have also taken place in elite opinion towards a more pro-autonomist stance.[213]

To illustrate this trend in more detail, a recent opinion poll is elaborated below.[214] The poll was carried out by Beaufort Research, who interviewed a sample of 521 people across Wales between February 2nd and 6th, 1995, for BBC Wales and the Western Mail. This poll cannot be taken as a completely reliable guide due to the small *n*. The results are, however, in keeping with general trends in Welsh public opinion {see below}.

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[210](BBC Wales, 1995; Beaufort Research, 1994; Beaufort Research, 1995; Beaufort Research\Western Mail, 1990; Cornock, 1995a; Cornock, 1995b; Cornock, 1995c; Heath, 1994b)
[211](Williams & Lawrence, 1992)
[212](Balsom, 1985)
[213](Cornock, 1995d)
[214](Beaufort Research, 1995; Cornock, 1995c)

Table 1:4

Are you personally for or against the establishment of an elected assembly for Wales?

Voter type	For	Against	Don't know/ no opinion
All	47%	24%	29%
Labour voters	49%	21%	30%
People aged 18-34	51%	14%	35%
Conservative voters	24%	51%	25%
Women	45%	19%	36%
Men	50%	29%	21%

Table 1:5

If an elected assembly was to be created in Wales, which one of the forms on this card do you think it should take? {Question asked of those in favour of an Assembly.}

Independent of Westminster in Europe	35%
Under Westminster, but with tax and law making powers	24%
Under Westminster, limited powers	19%
Consultative body only	3%
Don't know	19%

Table 1:6

How would you vote in 1995? %age {actual 1992 election results}

Labour	57 {50}
Conservative	8 {28.6}
Liberal	6 {12}
Plaid Cymru	11 {9}
Green	1 {0.5}
Don't know	10

The poll represents a change from the situation depicted by the 1979 referendum result, although similar shifts in opinion have been seen in recent years,[215] which go some way towards assuaging doubts about the sample size. Worthy of note is the high level of support for a Welsh Assembly amongst the young, the level of support for a relatively powerful new institution, increased support for Plaid Cymru, and the apparent collapse of support for the Conservative Party.

To reinforce the data presented above we can turn to a summary report on a series of polls {with *n*'s in excess of 1000} conducted by Beaufort Research in November 1994, June 1995 and November 1995.[216] The report states that :

> 'Traditionally, in surveys of the Welsh resident population of this type there has been a clear majority in favour of the establishment of an elected Assembly for Wales among those expressing an opinion. This has certainly been the case since the last General Election in 1992. However, in 1994 the appeal of an Assembly increased such that a majority of all respondents {51% in November} were in favour'.[217]

1.21 The Relationship between Identity Transformation and Political Mobilization

Changes in political opinion are *inter alia* a by-product of identity transformation, which in turn can be incorporated into a wider framework of socio-economic and other change which has led to a diminution of traditional cleavage structures across Western Europe.[218] The thesis will explore in detail the changing strategy of the political parties operating in Wales,

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[215](Cornock, 1995c)
[216](Hiscocks, 1996; Confidential Source C, 1996)
[217](Hiscocks, 1996b)
[218](Smith & Mair, 1989, 1)

furnishing a method of summarising the effect of identity transformation on the parties, and analysing the parties' reaction to change.[219] Particular issues that will be addressed in this context are the role of parties as self-interested actors, and their rates of dependency. That is, do they forge change or are they subject to it? The changing role of the majority party in Wales, the Labour Party {*Plaid Llafur Cymru*}, is central to the analysis, particularly the almost full conversion of the 'regional' party to the principle of devolution.

Rates of identity transformation are likely to differ across Wales. However we have found that they differ in interesting ways. For instance, the growth of membership in *Urdd Gobaith Cymru* {The Welsh League of Youth} is highest in Gwent, traditionally the most British of the counties; this can be classified as an indicator of growth in cultural autonomism. Politicised autonomist identity, however, remains highest in the North-west, Plaid Cymru*'s* stronghold; where a strong correlation between Welsh language use and Plaid Cymru support is established. From here the *Blaid* has been historically unable to diversify it's support base,[220] so the recent growth of the Welsh language in non-Welsh speaking areas has considerable political significance.

Proving the relationship between variables is however complicated by what can be termed multiple causality.[221] In the outline above, education and language policies were deemed independent variables, language learning dependent. However, in two counties where education and language policies

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[219](Smith & Mair, 1989, 2)

[220](Levy, 1995, 300). Note: Like all Celtic languages, Welsh words mutate according to prescribed rules. Thus a feminine noun commencing with the letter P is subject to soft mutation when prefixed by the definite article *Y* - hence the term P - Celtic (Evans, 1978, 7). *Plaid* then becomes *Y Blaid*. This convention usually is employed when utilising Welsh words in English text. We follow this convention in the thesis.

[221](King, et al., 1994, 87)

are acknowledged to be not given priority on a local authority level,[222] Welsh language learning is up {see Tables1:7 and 1:8 below}. Allowance has been made for these differences through parsing, though the differences also indicate that the simple process-tracing illustration provided above will need elaboration as the research develops. To this end, we have incorporated into the analysis a thoroughgoing study of the role of agents.

Table 1:7

Attendance at Welsh language primary schools in West Glamorgan[223]

School	Numbers of pupils		
	1985	1988	1992
Lonlas, Abertawe	223	306	377
Bryn y Mor, Abertawe	214	272	310
Rhosafan	162	216	298
Pontardawe	194	251	319
Castell Nedd	188	273	315
Cwm Nedd	122	149	168
Blaendulas	55	92	132
Pontybrenin	155	243	317
Bryn Iago, Pontarddulais	113	-	136

The growth in numbers of primary school children learning the entire curriculum through the medium of Welsh has entailed a growth in demand for Welsh language secondary education in West Glamorgan. There have been several campaigns in recent years, particularly amongst Welsh language groups, highlighting the education policy of West Glamorgan, often targeting the head of education John Beale.[224] Campaigners argue that the lack of Welsh language secondary school provision in the county needs to be

[222](Golwg, 1993)
[223]Source (Golwg, 1993).
[224](Golwg, 1993). He has since retired.

addressed. Several protest groups have been formed including *Ymgyrch Trydydd Ysgol Abertawe* {Campaign for a third school in Swansea}, and *Rhieni Dros Addysg Gymraeg Gorllewin Morgannwg* {Parents for a Welsh Education in West Glamorgan}.

Similarly Gwent County Council is not known for its pro-Welsh language policies.[225] Despite this there have been significant increases in Welsh language learning among certain sectors of the population, as is illustrated by the table below.

Table 1:8

Number of adults following three year course in Welsh in Gwent 1987-95[226]

Group	87/88	88/89	89/90	90/91	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95
1st year	-	-	553	606	601	748	803	786
2nd year	-	-	246	290	303	247	252	320
3rd year	-	-	96	131	196	242	349	402
TOTAL	c.500	c.800	895	1027	1100	1237	1404	1508

In a recent radio interview the Chief Executive of Gwent County Council Mr. Sandy Blair questioned the relevance of bilingualism in an area which is only 2.5% Welsh speaking. He argued that there was resentment against bilingual forms, and that the cost of supporting Welsh speakers in government departments was prohibitive.[227] Gwent County Council however does not provide financial support to adult learning: that support is provided by the HEFC Wales, a government quango. This provides direct evidence of government support for pro-Welsh polices which, at a local level, may not

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[225](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 94)
[226]Source (Wilson-Price, 1995).
[227](Blair, 1994)

receive substantive backing. This discussion has provided an illustration of policy conflicts across governmental levels in Wales, the diffusion of other variables into the relationship, and the dangers of considering simple unilateral relationships between variables.

1.22 Synopsis

The scope of the thesis is not confined to Wales, and it is thought that the methods of analysis, involving a contextual analysis of regional, host state, and EU relationships, can have wider application. The theory suggests that, notwithstanding the retention of the core state's strategic role in territorial management, the lesser its direct operational role over a number of specified areas where identity is reproduced by semi-autonomous institutions and agencies, the greater the predilection for autonomism in the population. Our methodology provides us with many observable indicators across the policy areas chosen.[228] We aim to establish that a true causal connection exists between these factors,[229] and to reveal what is systematic and non-systematic about the changes,[230] and being particulary careful to acknowledge points at which government augmentation of territorial separateness raises expectations to a level where they impinge on the outcome.[231]

To summarise, the thesis will analyse the hypothesised cause of Welsh identity transformation, analysing, *inter alia*, the historical dimension to Welsh autonomism, the inter-reaction between autonomist claims and government

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[228](King, et al., 1994, 19)
[229](King, et al., 1994, 32)
[230](King, et al., 1994, 56)
[231](King, et al., 1994, 44). Morgan, for instance, argues that the Welsh Office aroused unfulfilled expectations (Morgan, 1992, 268).

responses in the context of an explicit policy of hostility to autonomist claims, and the apparent paradox of a resurgent Welsh identity at the very time when many conventional {and mostly anglo-Welsh} indicators of Welshness such as nonconformism,[232] male voice choirs,[233] extractive industry, and the Welsh Rugby Team are in decline.[234]

The thesis will develop the argument, that changes in autonomism are a product of institutions' and agents' responses to four related factors, changes in the domestic and international socio-economic system, the increased prominence of the European dimension, the ongoing challenge to the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty within the U.K, and the decline in the prestige of British government as perceived by key socio-economic groups.

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[232]See (Morgan, 1981, 15-16)

[233]There was only one entry in the large choir section at the 1994 Eisteddfod.

[234](Jones, 1992a, 332)

CHAPTER 2

UTILISING WELSH IDENTITY I:

HISTORY AND CULTURE

2.0 Introduction

This chapter places modern Welsh autonomism in a wider perspective, relating it to a, necessarily selective, account of Welsh history and culture. The complex inter-relationships of competing cultural and political traditions within Wales and their resultant expressions through available political channels are explored. A particular effort is made to chart and understand the means by which, over time, such expressions result in autonomist impulses of variable potency.

Wales or *Cymru* is located in the Celtic fringe on the western extremity of Europe.[1] Wales's official political title is the 'Principality of Wales and Monmouth', and is a constituent element of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Parliament is traditionally considered to be sovereign in Wales, as in the rest of the UK, with control over the totality of legislation. Since 1964 the process of administration has been increasingly devolved, such that in practice the Welsh Office under the Secretary of State for Wales has considerable autonomy. Moreover, the UK's accession to the EC in 1973 and the subsequent developments of the European dimension[2] provide us with a powerful counter-arguments against accepting the traditional perception of Parliament as sovereign or as the supreme source of legislation.

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[1]Sometimes characterised as Atlantic Europe.
[2]See Chapter Seven.

Perhaps reflecting this politically enigmatic situation, present events in Scotland, and Wales demonstrate that Great Britain is not, as was once held a self-evident truth by political scientists, 'essentially an homogenous nation'.[3] This former viewpoint is perhaps best exemplified by the now famous heading in early editions of the Encyclopædia Britannica, 'For Wales, see England', which has itself entered Welsh autonomist discourse.[4]

The Welsh have maintained a separate cultural identity, despite hundreds of years of assimilation, and despite the nation's close proximity to one of the worlds most significant cultural, economic and political centres, England.[5] Though conceptually separable from England in a number of respects, however, Wales itself is not homogenous. One explanation for internal difference is the existence of a detailed emphasis on identity linked to locality rather than to the nation or country itself.[6] Gwyn Morgan a former employee at the European Commission often referred to a meeting with a Welsh hotel porter in Stratford.

> 'You're Welsh aren't you,' the porter said.. 'Where do you come from?'
> 'Aberdare'
> 'Don't generalise, man,' the porter chided, 'what part of Aberdare - Cwmbach, Robertstown, Trecynon, or Abernant'.[7]

In his memoirs, James Griffiths the 'charter' Secretary of State for Wales, implies that it is only outside Wales that Welsh people become more profoundly aware of their identity.[8] Welsh identity may be more a dimension

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[3](Blondel, 1965, 26) - though he did acknowledge that Northern Ireland could not be included in this statement c.f. analysis of current opinion in Northern Ireland (Jowell, Curtice, Park, Brook, & Ahrendt, 1995/6).
[4](Fishlock, 1972, 25; Morgan, 1982, 3)
[5](McAllister, 1981, 245; Reid, 1988, 3833)
[6](Osmond, 1985, xx)
[7](Fishlock, 1976; Thomas, 1992, xi)
[8](Griffiths, 1969, 1)

than a category.[9] Welshness is a 'graded phenomenon'.[10] The lack of internal homogeneity and cohesiveness may be a contributory factor to the relatively weak autonomism of Wales, at least up to the period under study.

The Welsh emphasis on locale, and the degree of resonance with England, alters across space and time. The Welsh of the rural North-west for instance are relatively reluctant converts to close living. There are few equivalents to the English village in this part of Wales, identity has a locus in scattered homesteads or *hendrefydd*. So this internal Welsh identity can be more disparate and at the same time more narrowly focused on immediate kinship group and intimate local patterns of authority, legitimacy and reciprocity than other identities within Wales, or any given type of English identity.[11] The sheer harshness of life in the *hendrefydd* up to the early years of this century, and the presence of non-integrated elites, may have led to a greater predilection for radicalism amongst the Welsh of this area.[12]

Localism, then, in common with other European peripheries such as *Euskadi*/The Basque Country, is part of the Welsh identity. At the same time, an integrated Welsh identity does exist, even if it is somewhat more elusive than that obtaining to Scotland. Attendant upon this, national political parties themselves have often had to assume a different identity and campaign on a different platform in Wales.[13] This point will be returned to later on, particularly in the context of the changes wrought by industrialisation, urbanisation and population shifts.

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[9]See a related discussion on Englishness posited as a 'relationship' in (Crick, 1991, 94).
[10](Balsom, 1983; Osmond, 1985, xx). The Welsh are aware of different degrees of Welshness; a frequent subject of conversation.
[11]See discussion of the legacy of Raymond Williams in (Osmond, 1995, 10-14).
[12]Which is reflected in the qualities of Welsh autonomism (Morgan, 1981, 415).
[13]Lloyd George perhaps embodied this statement. The political content of his discourse differed according to whether he was speaking English or Welsh.

Most ideologies arise from ideas based upon sources of distinction such as class, income, race, and mobilise by making the case for the elimination or maintenance of those distinctions - autonomism is no exception. One distinguishing feature of autonomism is that it can exist alongside other ideologies, and interact with them. A second feature, perhaps causally impinging on the first, is that autonomism tends to have a larger, perhaps inexhaustible,[14] menu of factors from which to choose than other more restrictive ideologies.[15] Moreover it can inflect the factors that comprise other ideologies. The discourse on class, for instance, can be nuanced by autonomism - a mobilised identity of difference,[16] whereby Welsh identity can be perceived as lower class in certain parts of and amongst certain social groups in England.

Ten important features distinguish Wales from the host state, namely: size, location, physical geography, population size, history, economy, politics, culture, language, and identity.[17] These systemic 'features' have acted as variables in Welsh identity mobilisation over time. The first three variables represent primarily systematic differences between Wales and England, the remaining seven contain a stronger non-systematic component. The exclusion of a further component, ethnicity, is contestable, since we can posit that it is a product of all the others.[18] We contend that, however, that identity as a cultural construct expresses the dynamic of ethnicity without incorporating a more questionable racial construct. That is identity, an

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[14](Jones, 1986, 267)

[15]This has been offered as an advantage of autonomism; as a flexible ideology in an increasingly complex age (Miller, 1993, 9; Williams, 1984, 185).

[16](Benner, 1993, 82)

[17]Only some of these features are likely to change in the short term, and they are dealt with at length later.

[18]Others have argued that it is redundant since it is used a a cultural category, as opposed to a racial one (Snyder, 1988).

'emergent property of its constituents',[19] contains an extra dimension, 'a psychological reality that exists apart from structural conditions',[20] and affects the strength of any given autonomist impulse.[21] It follows from these arguments that any strengthening of identity which may occur as a result of identity transformation, could provide an impetus to identity mobilisation. Alongside this, our position reflects that of the autonomists who have attempted to divorce themselves from primordial definitions of ethnicity, and rely more on positional identity - i.e. any person living in Wales can be Welsh. How far this discourse reflects grassroots opinion is open to question, however, entailing that the racial element cannot be completely excised from the analysis.

The thesis sets out a longitudinal study of the role in Welsh identity mobilisation of the variables outlined above. It aims to extract identifiable systematic features of this mobilisation, as well as describe possible non-systematic features.[22] The systemic variables have acted as long term determinants of Welsh political consciousness. Wales's relative size - an area of 8,018 square miles, compared to England's 50,363 square miles - perceived isolation, and physical geography - north and south Wales is divided by extensive tracts of high plateau and shorter expanses of mountain ranges deeply dissected by river valleys - has affected the perceptions of and relations among the people in an infinite variety of ways. Various agencies have, at different times, chosen and utilised bundles of identity based on the above factors in developing a consciousness of difference. The perception of

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[19](Rodkin, 1993, 643)
[20](Rodkin, 1993, 633)
[21](Gourevitch, 1979, 321)
[22]For a discussion of the role of systematic and non-systematic difference in social science see (King, et al., 1994, 56). The variety of these sources of distinction imply that Welsh autonomism is unlikely to be based on a unified system of ideas.

difference has and does vary not only through time but amongst various strata of the Welsh population.[23] Wales is beset by identity cleavages, often emerging from self perceived gradations of Welshness.[24]

Having a diffuse internal identity, one distinguishing feature of the Welsh is that they generally regard themselves as distinct from the English.[25] It has been suggested that this is a 'pleasing consciousness'.[26] This is not necessarily a unifying or homogenising force however. Firstly, the perception of the level of distinctiveness can vary through time and among individuals and communities.[27] Secondly there exist very divergent conceptualisations of difference - to argue that the Welsh are characterised by a region bound consciousness is to ignore another level of consciousness.[28] It has, for instance, been argued that the more inclusive concept of Britishness {or Europeaness} is the crucial motivating force behind some Welsh attitudes to England,[29] as the following quote illustrates:

> 'We Welsh look like being the last of the British. There is some logic in this, we were, after all, the first'.[30]

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[23](Sharpe, 1993, 6). Sharpe suggests a cleavage between elite nationalism and mass nationalism, the former being an investment nationalism, the latter a form of more short term consumption nationalism. Sharpe argues that investment nationalists seek separation, and radical change in the allocatory order, whereas consumption nationalists are more interested in getting the best out of the existing system, but ironically these activities tend to increase the power of the central state.

[24]Conservative voters are more likely to identify themselves as British than Welsh for instance (Christiansen, 1994).

[25](Morris, 1984; Williams, 1982, 145)

[26](Crick, 1991, 91)

[27]The result of differing perceptions has long been characterised by autonomists as the nation against itself. At a party demonstration in Caernarfon on September 11, 1937, Saunders Lewis, recently released from prison, said 'We have been arguing with a nation that had become indifferent about its own rights, that had forgotten its own inheritance' (Manchester Guardian September 12, 1937).

[28]Krejci argues that the Welsh have a "region bound" consciousness like the Aragonians in Spain or the Lower Saxons of West Germany. In this context ecology plays an important role because people with a region bound consciousness are often highlanders (Krejci, 1981, 183).

[29](Osmond, 1985, xx)

[30](Williams, 1979b, Radio Lecture)

Such internal heterogeniety may offer an explanation as to why, given the long history of Welsh difference, a nationalist movement did not emerge until the twentieth century.[31]

The intensity of the debate over Wales' relation to the UK in the late 1980s revealed that both an exclusive and inclusive conceptualisation of difference function interdependently. An exclusive perception of identity denotes indivisibility of identity, whereas the inclusive perception provides for a more fluid conceptualisation of the nature of identity. The exclusive perception, characterised by a more defensive cultural autonomism, was heightened during the 1980s by, *inter alia*, several attempts by the government at homogenising the UK through education policy.[32] The inclusive perception, characterised by a civil autonomism, was heightened by a greater awareness of Europe, and in particular of Wales as a nation within Europe.[33]

On one theoretical level it can be argued that both the Eastern and Western conceptualisations of autonomism are manifest in Wales,[34] and are often articulated by the same political agent acting in different political and cultural spaces.[35] That is political agents attempting to concur with their perceived constituencies, leading to a tension in the event of contrariety. The accretion, accommodation and management of layers of identity by elite groups is posited as an important process in the development of Welsh autonomism, and will be addressed at length in Chapter Four. On another

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[31](Jenkins, 1995)

[32]On the role of education in nation building see (Adams, 1971; Brock & Tulasiewicz, 1985a; Connor, 1993; Dicey, 1920; Gellner, 1983; Halsey, 1986).

[33]Plaid Cymru, the main autonomist group in Wales, have an involvement with several pan European structures including - the Bureau of Unrepresented Nations, the Atlantic Arc Committee, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime and Island Regions of Europe, and the European Free Alliance.

[34](Kohn, 1945, 329-331)

[35]That is political agents are attempting to act in accordance with their perceived constituencies.

level, associated with traditional nationalism, the Western and Eastern Models have been employed as a standard distinction in the scholarship on state formation.[36] In this framework the Western model is characterised by: 'historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology.[37] The Eastern model is characterised by,

> 'genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilisation, vernacular languages, customs and traditions: these are the elements of an alternative, ethnic conception of the nation, one that mirrored the different route of 'nation-formation' travelled by many countries in Eastern Europe and Asia and one that constituted a dynamic political challenge'.[38]

Such ideas have spilt into real world discourse. For example, the debate over Turkey's application to join the EU led to many self-referential treatises on Europeaness, characterised by their lack of conceptual anchorage. Smith appeals to European culture as a basis for transcending the nation state in Europe:

> 'the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism, and above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy, which have emerged at various times and places in the continent-have created a common European cultural heritage and formed a unique culture area straddling national boundaries and interrelating their different national cultures through common motifs and traditions'.[39]

The eastern conceptualisation may have a further allure with respect to Wales, linking it with hermetic traditions originating in the ancient east.[40] This spiritual and mystical dimension to Welsh autonomism {which itself is not

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[36](Kohn, 1967). For a critique of the ontological basis of such a distinction see (Parekh, 1995).
[37]One problem this model fails to account for is the possible inequality of members if they have a distinct identity within that nation.
[38](Smith, 1991b, 11)
[39](Smith, 1991b, 174)
[40](Gilbert, 1996, 188-189)

unique} appealed to an earlier generation of Welsh autonomists. Furthermore it gives rise to the general point that modelling autonomism in the social sciences is particularly difficult given that modern social science wishes to operate at the level of objective truth and rationality whereas many regional autonomisms, particularly of the cultural variety tend to operate at the level of perception and emotion.[41] The situation is compounded by the fact that, on an empirical level, the evidence provided by the Welsh case tends not to fit into established models of autonomism.[42] We also have to address the fundamental issue of whether the level at which social science chooses to operate is perhaps not the level at which truth or reality lays:

> 'We are seldom aware of how easily and frequently our beliefs about policy preferences, causes and consequences are created and changed by subtle and unconscious cues. Quite the contrary: we ordinarily assume that we live in a world in which the causes and consequences of actions are stable and fairly well known. Neither the media nor academic studies pay much attention to the fundamental political work that makes the benefits and the deprivations politically possible: the creation and remoulding of public beliefs and feelings about the causes of particular outcomes, thereby justifying some outcomes and building opposition to others. That kind of creation and remoulding ultimately depends on a change in conception and perception: on seeing something as a different entity or envisioning it from a transformed perspective'.[43]

This chapter seeks to develop the argument that an understanding of autonomism must be based on an awareness of the history of the territory where that autonomism is manifest, and in addition an awareness of the autonomist interpretation and perception of that history. Since history is one

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[41]For examples of the debate within the literature on autonomism see (Anderson, 1983; Connor, 1972; Lijphart, 1977; Voutat, 1992). For an argument against 'adjectival nationalisms' see (Parekh, 1995, 25).
[42](Christiansen, 1994; Jenkins, 1995, 10; Keating, 1991)
[43](Edelman, 1995, 109 my emphasis)

of the principal tools for educating the young into their identity, if not politicising the notion of identity.[44]

History can also, along with concordant myths and legends, have a powerful semiotic role in identity mobilisation.[45] Perusal of twentieth century campaigns by various Welsh protest groups reveals strong associations with the past. For instance in a recently produced book commemorating the first quarter century of *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg* {The Welsh Language Society}, a photograph depicts a 1969 protest at the *Eisteddfod yr Urdd* where people can be seen carrying banners emblazoned with the words *Brad 1282.*[46]

History, or more specifically possession of a history, has been used as a determinant of national authenticity.[47] Wales is included in a famous list of 'remnants of people long gone by',[48] and, perhaps as a result, Welsh history has been continually reified in autonomist discourse, at least until very recently. As was shown in Chapter One, autonomism has been considered by the influential modernist school to be backward and reactionary; the obsession with the past provided evidence of a type of millenarian thinking.[49] The appeal to history by stateless nations wishing to pursue careers in the international sphere, however, is hardly surprising, given that this is more or less the legitimising discourse of all nation states. Moreover, exogenously

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[44](Brock & Tulasiewicz, 1985b; Davies, 1982; Evans, 1991; Evans, no date; Hechter, 1975; Ludlow, 1992; Mayo, 1974; Morgan, 1970; Morgan, 1971; Prys-Jones, 1955; Smith, 1984; Spivey, 1993; The Economist, 1975; Thomas, 1987; Williams, 1985).

[45]See (Merkl, 1988, 44) on the importance and power of symbols.

[46]The Treason of 1282 (Tudor, 1989, 65).

[47]See (Smith, 1991a) for a discussion of the relationship between history, ethnicity and the process of nation-building. See (Arsenau, 1988) for another perspective.

[48](Engels, 1866)

[49](Lipset, 1975). In Wales, Saunders Lewis, the first *Plaid Cymru* leader harkened after a guilded age of pastoral contentment (Davies, 1983b).

determined statements on national legitimacy tend to conceal the interesting effect of events over time as internal determinants of nations.[50]

2.1 History: Autonomism of Elites

The development of human civilisations has not been smooth and continuous through time. Though not all autonomisms are the same, a shared feature is a perception of or a belief in a historically separable path to the present - an independent national heuristic. For autonomists, therefore, history is not a value-neutral subject, it is a crucial and emotive constituent of their very identity, and as a consequence the emphasis placed on certain historical events and characters, and the continuity of the above, is closely watched by the self-perceived guardians of the national soul.[51] For instance, a Plaid Cymru Summer School in Abergavenny shortly after World War Two met with a view to encourage the Welsh to,

> 'reexamine {that} history... for the evidence it has to offer of an awareness... of their own distinctiveness as a people'.[52]

Autonomism, then, entails a vigorous interaction with history, or a particular perception of history, which in the case of Wales functions to distinguish it from the host state and creates specific and highly significant divisions within Wales. Particularly since, unlike the Scots, the Welsh have had, up until very recently, few institutional foci for their identity. Whether a Welsh state existed at all before English annexation is, in fact, open to question. Though this may not necessarily imply a weak 'national consciousness' - the myth of state as expressed by the Arthurian legends, for

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[50](McCrone, 1992)
[51](Thomas, 1991b; Voutat, 1992)
[52](Wade-Evans, Pierce, Thomas, Jarman, Jones, & Evans, 1950)

instance, may be stronger and more easily projected into the future than any historical reality.[53]

Welsh history can be depicted as a concept, and an emotive one at that, rather than a label. The concept is vigorously competed over, and is constantly evoked particularly in Welsh language discourse.[54] What follows is a depiction of the main sources from which the Welsh can draw their identity, and an indication why autonomists may not choose to employ all such sources.

2.2 Roman Wales

The very earliest inhabitants of Britain for whom any records survive appear to have been overrun by the Goidels in the Bronze Age. During the Iron Age Wales was invaded by successive waves of Celtic Brythons and Belgae. Only prior to the Roman incursions beginning in 55 BC, could the British Isles be said to have been a relatively culturally homogenous nation, when it was heavily Celtic.[55] The Roman conquest of southern Britain and Wales was for some time successfully opposed by *Caradog* {Caractacus}, who can be counted as the first historic hero of the later Welsh.[56] South-east Wales was in time subjugated by the Roman army, though not without brutal losses and fearsome battles with the warlike Silures and Ordovices tribes. The Romans constructed an extensive network of roads,[57] which bears more

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[53]See (Ellis, 1993).
[54]In certain areas of Wales for instance, *plant Alice* (Alice's children) and *cywion Alice* (Alice's chicks) is employed as terms for English people. Alice being the Anglo-Saxon wife of the ancient Welsh prince Gwyrthein (Vortigen).
[55](Rose, 1970, 4).
[56](Williams, 1985,10)
[57](Davies, 1982)

than a passing resemblance to modern infrastructural arrangements in Wales.

Two scholars have argued that one effect of the Roman occupation was the isolation of the peripheries:

> 'The Romans, by dominating England but no other part of the British Isles, introduced one major division, pushing the Celts out of England'.[58]

> '...the Romans withdrew from Scotland and Wales...Scotland and Wales were hence isolated from the sphere of Roman influence'.[59]

Steed disputes this argument, since 'at no stage did it {the Roman Empire} control England and not Wales'. The Romans, in fact, occupied a considerable portion of Wales after the Dumnonian conquest, which constituted the second stage of their British expansion.[60] Wales was occupied by the Romans for almost three centuries, introducing Christianity during the fourth century, and finally departing at the beginning of the fifth century AD. The Romans, therefore, had a considerable impact on Wales. There is some evidence, in fact, that the Welsh princes looked back upon the Roman occupation as a kind of golden age.[61] Joining the Roman army may have been looked upon as an honourable career by the Welsh in Romanised towns, particularly the gift of Roman citizenship after 25 years service. Indeed, romanticised myths of ethnic origin and internal differences in Wales as a result of intermarriage with the Romans have survived until recent times.[62] So too, has the idea of a golden age for the Welsh before the

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[58](Rose, 1970, 4)
[59](Hechter, 1975, 53)
[60](Steed, 1986, S99)
[61](Chadwick, 1991, 77)
[62](Griffiths, 1969, 4)

coming of the 'barbarian Saxons, *Y Saeson*'.[63] The adjective 'barbarian' indicates the assumption of early Christianity {and indeed superiority} among the Welsh, though only part of Wales in truth acted as a cradle of the Celtic Church.[64] Wales, moreover, was not romanised to the extent that the southern half of what is now England was. Ethnic and tribal divisions remained, as did the Celtic characteristics of the people. The salience of these facts today is a matter of some speculation and argument. Nevertheless, the Celtic fringes of the British isles that are extant today were defined to some extent by the Romans.[65]

2.3 The Anglo Saxons

The invasions from the east that took place piecemeal after the Roman withdrawal did isolate the peripheries of mainland Britain. Precisely how or when the Saxons began to encroach on eastern Britain remains a mystery, though it is known that they came as mercenary soldiers and allies of the Romans.[66] The result of the Teutonic encroachment, however, could not be clearer; it was in this period that the Celtic fringes of Britain were defined, as were those of what is now France. The invaders drove the Celts into the mountains of Wales and into Strathclyde and Cornwall, declaring them to be *Waelisc* or foreign. Two crucial defeats in the 6th and 7th centuries cut off Wales from its Celtic neighbours. The west Saxons' victory at Deorham in AD 577 isolated Cornwall and the battle of Chester in AD 613 cut off

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[63](Evans, 1978, 7-8)
[64](Davies, 1993, 72-3)
[65]The political development of the British Isles as a whole, moreover, bears the influence of Rome. The centralised or core-oriented structure of Roman government influenced the political arrangements among the Anglo Saxon kingdoms, though less so amongst the Welsh kingdoms. Moreover, in later years, the core tendency was also seen in the initial territorial structure of the Anglican Church and through the ultimate creation of a unified monarchy after centuries of factionalism.
[66](Chadwick, 1991, 72)

communication with Strathclyde and northern Britain.[67] The territory of Wales was further restricted by King Offa of Mercia in the eighth century who, as the first of the Saxon kings to adopt an imperial style, annexed territory and constructed an extensive Dyke along his Western border with Wales,[68] which is reasonably contiguous with the modern border. In the 9th century Rhodri Mawr {844-878} united Wales and managed to resist further incursions of Saxons by land and raids of Vikings by sea. At his death his three provinces of Gwynedd, Powys and Deheubarth were divided among his three sons, Anarawd, Mervyn and Cadeel, according to a Welsh system of inheritance {*gavelkind*}, more egalitarian possibly, but weakening in the face of the Saxon primogeniture.

Two defining characteristics of Wales itself, which remain partly true to this day, also emerged at this time. The first, which strictly speaking re-emerged and is elsewhere disputed,[69] is the renewal of cultural tension between Atlantic Wales and continental Wales. Two groups of people, it is argued, had colonised the peninsula during the Neolithic and Bronze age periods, a maritime western Atlantic people, thought to be Mediterranean in origin, who landed in the West, and a continental people who had sojourned in lowland Britain and encroached from the East.[70] The second tension, far more recent in origin, emerged during the post-Roman period and concerned Welsh dealings with the Anglo-Saxons. The north of the country resisted the incursion of Anglo-Saxon culture for much longer than the South, which under

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[67]The Strathclyde {*Ystraclwyd*} Welsh are a group often overlooked by scholars. The most famous early Welsh poet, *Taliesin y Bardd*, was from this region (Davies, 1990b, 46, 59, 67-69). The presence of the Welsh in Scotland may offer a partial explanation of the extreme assimilatory tactics of the early Scottish monarchy, and possibly the early martial traditions in Scotland (Colley, 1992, 139).

[68](Williams, 1985, 27)

[69](Gruffudd, 1994a)

[70]For an interesting discussion of this theory and its proponents see (Gruffudd, 1994a).

Cadell's son Hywel Dda was in close touch with English thought and tradition.[71] These internal defining characteristics and cleavages remain important today, that is, the infrastructural, economic and cultural integration of South Wales with England constitutes an ancient cleavage within Wales, one that was reinforced not created by the industrialisation of the eighteenth century.

2.4 The Norman Conquest

The invasions of the British Isles ended with the arrival of the Normans in 1066. This meant that the British Isles by the time of the Norman conquest was a 'Balkans'.[72] The diaries and histories of the period indicate that the Normans regarded the Welsh as a distinct people, and Wales as a distinct territory.[73] William I created palatine counties along the Welsh frontier, and the Norman barons invaded Wales via river valleys and lowland plains. The highland north-western regions of Wales were more difficult to conquer, and were of little appeal in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Today these areas - *Y Fro Cymraeg* - remain the perceived heartland of Welsh culture. It is here that the Welsh language is most concentrated. Numerically, however, most Welsh speakers now live in the South,[74] where the future of the language appears to lie.[75]

Thus this new power reinforced the internal characteristics manifest under the Romans and Saxons.[76] The Welsh princes recovered many of their losses during the civil wars of Stephen's reign and in the early 13th

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[71](Chadwick, 1991, 98-99). Though see (Kirby, 1976).
[72](Coupland, 1954, 11)
[73](Gerald of Wales, 1188)
[74](Williams, 1989, 42-44)
[75](Davies, 1990a; Jenkins, 1995, 13)
[76](Mayo, 1974, 61)

century Owen Gruffydd prince of Gwynedd was the dominant figure in Wales. Under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth {1194-1240} the Welsh united against English incursions and Llywelyn's privileges and de facto independence were recognised in the Magna Carta. The text of the Magna Carta also provides us with an indication of relations between the Welsh and the English, and the relevant sections are worth quoting:

> '56. If, without the lawful judgement of their peers, we have disseised or deprived Welshmen of their lands, liberties, or other things in England or in Wales, {the same} shall be immediately restored to them. And if a dispute arises in this connection, then decision is thereon to be made in the {Welsh} march by the judgement of their peers - according to the law of England for their tenements in England, according to the law of Wales for their tenements in Wales, and according to the law of the march for their tenements in the march. Welshmen shall act in the same way towards us and our men.
>
> 57. Moreover, with regard to those {possessions} if which any Welshman, without the lawful judgement of their peers, was disseised or deprived by King Henry, our father, or King Richard, our brother.
>
> 58. We will at once restore the son of Llywelyn and all the {other } hostages of Wales, together with the charters that were given us as a security for the peace'.[77]

Later, the defeat of Llywelyn's grandson Llywelyn ap Gruffydd at the Battle of Brunanbuh in 1282 marked the genesis of the period of domination of Wales by the English core.[78] Edward I established his authority over the country building a series of large castles. He sent Llywelyn's daughter, Gwenllian, to a nunnery at Sempringham in Wiltshire where she remained until her death in 1337.[79] Her cousins LLywelyn and Owain were sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in Bristol Castle.[80] No shrines to the former

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[77](John I, 1215, 14)
[78](Thomas, 1977, 81). Urwin makes the case for 1277 (Urwin, 1982).
[79](Rogers, 1991, 20, 29)
[80](Rogers, 1991, 21)

dynasties of Wales were allowed.[81] A new semiotic order had come into being - on 7 February 1301 Edward of Caernarfon son of Edward I was inaugurated as Prince of Wales, sealing a symbolic link between the two countries that remains to this day.

Extant correspondence from the period provides a number of insights. One is the depth of penetration of the 'English' into Wales, revealed in a letter from Edward 1 to Robert Tibotot, Justice of West Wales marked Bordeaux April 15, 1287.[82] The second is a recognition of 'the town' as an English domain. The Community of the Town of Rhuddlan, for instance, wrote to Edward Prince of Wales sometime after February 14, 1345 on the implications of the killing of Henry de Shaldeford by the 'Welsh'.

> 'They desire to inform the prince that his Englishmen residing in Wales in boroughs and in the geldable were never since the conquest in such perilous plight as they are now. The prince's grandfather, Edward the conqueror of Wales, established towns and castles there, caused them to be inhabited by Englishmen, and gave them franchises by his charter'.[83]

A remarkably similar letter was written by the Burgesses of the Town of Conwy.[84] Even prior to the Conquest of Wales, evidence suggests that the urban environment in Wales was recognisably 'English'.[85]

2.5 The Middle Ages and beyond

Strong Welsh national feeling was maintained and augmented in the Middle Ages and most strongly expressed in the personage and activities of Owain Glyndŵr during a 15 year period at the beginning of the 15th century.

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[81](Rogers, 1991, 21)
[82](Edwards, 1935, xxxi 26a 167)
[83](Edwards, 1935, LIV. 42, 231-232)
[84](Edwards, 1935, LIV. 46, 234-5)
[85]Note the letter from the Burges of Carmarthen written in 1257-9 to Henry {II} (Edwards, 1935, 14).

The revolt of Glyndŵr, a Welsh lord with strong Marcher connections,[86] serves as a distant indicator of the perceptions and forces at work during the rise of the modern autonomist movement in Wales. It began from a perception of injustice and unwarranted heavy handedness meted out from Reginald de Gray lord of Ruthin. It was heavily eulogised by the contemporary poets of the *brut*. Lesser gentry and cymricised families on the outer edges of the official classes joined; religious houses were heavily involved, as were intellectuals. Rural Wales tended to support, the towns oppose, making it more of a civil war than a revolt. There was no little sympathy among the lower classes on the bordering shires of England,[87] and the revolt internationalised itself. After losing the support of the beleaguered Scots and French, however, the revolt was finally crushed by Henry V in 1410.

The Accession of the Welsh House of Tudor to the throne in 1485, and the shiring of Wales under the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542 was to mark the beginning of the final stage of the assimilation of Wales into the English bailiwick. One scholar has argued that by this time, for the British Isles as a whole, in numerical terms, after successive invasions, 'the majority of the inhabitants of these islands came to consider themselves to be 'English,' or less occasionally, 'British".[88] Nevertheless, non-English cultures and nations persisted and, concomitantly, so too did a perception of difference. This perception, in Wales at least, was perhaps augmented by William Morgan's Welsh translation of the Bible which appeared in 1588.[89] Generations of

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[86](Williams, 1985, 106)
[87]See (Colley, 1992, 16) for the affinity of Shropshire and Herefordshire with Wales.
[88](Hechter, 1975)
[89](Davies, 1993, 243; Williams, 1988a). This however occurred in an era when 'the authorities considered religious uniformity to be more important than linguistic uniformity' (Davies, 1993, 242).

scholars have argued that this translation did 'more to preserve the language and its related culture than any other single event in the nation's history'.[90] It certainly gave the Welsh language a cultural depth beyond the vernacular,[91] and bequeathed upon the Welsh people a lasting and embedded source of difference.

As a result of these historical processes, 'the Welsh have long displayed an ambivalence in their relationship with the English, and by extension, with the British state'.[92] In the sixteenth century, the Welsh were conceded some separate identity by being allowed to send representatives to Parliament; though the speaking of the Welsh language in that institution was not permitted,[93] in fact to do so even today is classified as 'riotous behaviour'.[94]

Alongside the presence in Parliament, the process of Anglicisation, particularly in the south, accelerated. The process of assimilation lasted until the eighteenth century, when a number of influential local personalities combined with external economic and political factors, especially the pressure of mass migration and industrialisation, to infuse a new sense of national identity into Wales. The most conspicuous among the influential personalities were the nonconformist preachers. The chapels in which they preached also developed systems which bound their members to democratic forms of governance, and encouraged participation from the congregation. This, in turn, fostered new local elites independent of the landed gentry.[95] These elites managed to seize control of local government in the elections of 1889.[96]

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[90](Williams, 1988a, 21)
[91](Davies, 1993, 244-5)
[92](Osmond, 1985, xxxii; Williams, 1982, 145)
[93](Thomas, 1991a, 63)
[94]Though William Abraham {Mabon} did recite the Lord's Prayer in Welsh on the floor of the House of Commons in 1885 (Morgan, 1987, 70).
[95](Verdery, 1976)
[96](Davies, 1983a, 204)

This legitimated local political institutions and reinforced the localism of Welsh identity, and, it has been argued, prevented broader expressions of Welsh political identity during this period.[97] Exogenous, hegemonic, and ultimately irrestible forces, however, emerged to threaten the *status quo*.

2.6 The Nineteenth Century

The background to the first phase of a national Welsh autonomist movement is rapid, particular and heavy industrialisation. Up until the 1780s Wales was a predominantly pastoral country with a population of around 400,000 people. Even until the 1880s Wales could be characterised as mainly a 'land of hamlets and villages rather than towns'.[98]

The discovery of large deposits of coal in the valleys of South Wales, rapidly transformed the Southern Welsh rural landscape into one of the vanguards of the second stage of the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom. Industrial capitalism exploded into Wales. Thousands of people surged into the Principality seeking employment. In 1851, for example, Wales' population was around one million, 30% of which was urban, sixty years later the census of 1911 recorded the population at two million with an urban population concentration of 65%.[99]

The process of industrialisation in South Wales can be roughly divided into two stages. The first stage was dominated by internal population movements to the western edge of the South Wales coalfield. It was

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[97](Davies, 1983a, 204). Localism continues to play a significant role in cultural and political identity formation in Wales.

[98](Morgan, 1981, 8)

[99]Though it has been argued that '..modern Wales is largely a creation of the Industrial Revolution concentrated between the years 1870-1911' (Osmond, 1980, 45); the territorial locus of this argument is the South Wales coalfield or to use Balsom's phraseology 'Welsh Wales' (Balsom, 1985).

characterised by a strong expression of Welsh cultural activity,[100] which included sporting endeavours, the institutionalisation of Welsh rugby football in particular.[101] The second stage, from around 1890 involved migration from other parts of the UK to South Wales, whereupon cultural tensions emerged,[102] and in certain areas, particularly at the heads of the valleys, post-industrial decline began to set in.[103]

Industrialisation led to infrastructural developments, easing communication along the south and north Wales corridors.[104] Particularly important in this context is the development of a Welsh railway network,[105] which by 1914 was extensive.[106] This did little to unify north and south Wales,[107] but did serve to create segmented quasi-mass cultures in which new social and particularly non-Anglican religious movements could gain ground.[108] One scholar has argued, however, that the railways, along with education and migration were the principal agent for language change in nineteenth century Wales.[109] Interrelationships existed between these factors, and they could in some instances countervail one another. For instance the increased demand for local labour that resulted from the development of the railways in Wales between 1851 and 1871 may, in fact,

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[100]For a detailed analysis of one area during this period see (Strange, 1982). For an examination of the process of industrialisation in the north see (Dodd, 1951).
[101](Morgan, 1981, 23-24).
[102](Williams, 1950). The novels of Alexander Cordell attempt to provide an insight into the atmosphere of the period. For example see (Cordell, 1972). Incidentally, in May 1996, at the age of 80, Cordell decided to join Plaid Cymru (Bradley, 1996).
[103](Morgan, 1981, 5)
[104](Jones, 1995a)
[105](Jones, 1995a)
[106](Davies, 1993, 408)
[107]For the argument that Wales was a Balkans see (Coupland, 1954, xv). Welsh autonomists are fond of recounting how it is easier for South Walians to meet their North Walian colleagues in Paddington Station.
[108](Thomas, 1954)
[109](Jones, 1995a, 19)

have 'held back the tide of rural exodus'.[110] Land issues also proved divisive, particularly the influx of 'foreign' land agents,[111] which did little to endear the indigenous population to the Tories, perceived as the party of Anglican landowners.[112] In addition to religious fervour these movements made extensive use of the symbolism and cultural imagery of the historical legacy of Wales outlined above.

2.7 The Welsh Political System

So far, we have demonstrated that Wales has a 'utilisable history'. The next stage consists in showing how this is taken up by autonomist movements. The transition is not automatic, as the experience of other European peripheries demonstrates. Modern Welsh autonomism, however, is characterised by the extensive use that is made of narratives of the past,[113] particularly those periods that indicate the independence of the Welsh. With such a rich cultural and linguistic heritage, together with a long and reasonably well documented past it is not difficult to find sources for mobilisation. In fact this heritage is such that 'nationalist issues are not likely to be exhausted by nationalist movements, however diverse they may be'.[114] Perhaps more importantly the discussion above has indicated that Welsh history contains sequences that lend authenticity and plausibility to Welsh identity. History, as will be shown later on, certainly seems to influence the moral dimension of autonomist discourse in Wales. Not all European autonomisms utilise the past in this way; we can speculate that in order to be

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[110](Jones, 1995a, 7)
[111](Howell, 1977)
[112](Morgan, 1981, 10)
[113]See (Berlin, 1990, 247) for a general discussion on this point.
[114](Jones, 1986, 267)

utilisable and effective, a given autonomist history must be plausible, reasonably consistent and defensible within the attendant cultural and moral system.

Welsh autonomism has derived much of its strength from the cultural and historical heritage of Wales. Hegemonic and conservative forces, moreover, operating within the Welsh context have also developed a panoply of historically derived counter-arguments to autonomism such that the past remains an arena of intense competition. A close reading of the the history of Wales provides evidence that for centuries the Welsh have been a people internally divided.[115] This begs the question, how far can the manifest increase in autonomist impulse in Wales be attributed to an increase of awareness of the past promulgated via expanding socio-political media?[116]

2.8 Autonomism of the Masses?

It is difficult to attribute the totality of Welsh autonomist mobilisation to increased historical awareness. The process also incorporates institutionally reactive and politically teleological components, where the primary response site, at least for the former component, is the state. Nevertheless, Welsh identity possesses a historic authenticity, which lends it contemporary immediacy and has shaped the dynamics of its expression over time. Indeed history and institutional reaction have often moved in sequence in the Welsh case - Wales' historically determined counter-hegemonic characteristics have been moulded, *inter alia*, by its relationship with the state. It follows that

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[115](Davies, 1990b). John Davies's book reflects on this struggle, but is in itself a mirror of it (Spivey, 1993).
[116](Bevan, 1984).

tensions will increase at times of state expansion, penetration or retrenchment.

The state has attempted to reduce these tensions, and during the periods of autonomist mobilisation in Wales in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has co-operated with and co-opted Welsh agents and agencies, in a hybrid form of consociationalism, and accommodated their demands in return for the adoption of centripetal political values towards the union. Several movements and the major political parties operating in Wales since the electoral reform acts of the nineteenth century[117] were affected in this manner. Structural transformations and colonisation by indigenous agents, in particular the development and extension of Welsh identity, was impaired by posterior settlement by agents who chose to operate on several levels simultaneously - Welsh, British, and Imperial - in a manner which countervailed the autonomist impulse. There is something qualitatively different about the current autonomist mobilisation however - the advent of alternative structures and attitudes that have a locus beyond the United Kingdom, incorporated under the catch-all-terms globalisation and post-materialism respectively, are changing the nature of the relationship of regional agents and institutions with the national and international sphere. Now, indigenous agents can operate on a European level in a manner which does not countervail the Welsh level, but may threaten the UK as a nation-state.

Such changes apply to the politically teleological component of autonomist mobilisation. In addition, the European dimension, of which more later, has altered the parameters of the process of mobilisation. So, too, has

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[117]Most significantly the Secret Ballot Act of 1872 and the Electoral Reforms of 1867 and 1884: though it is important to note that universal male suffrage was not achieved in the UK until 1918.

globalisation. All advanced industrial democracies {AIDs} have over the past ten or so years experienced sweeping changes in their economies and societies. The transformations are multi-faceted in nature; those most discussed are changes in values and structures, referred to as post-materialism and post-fordism.[118] The EU countries, particularly the Northern tier and Italy have been extremely susceptible to such shifts, and are particularly exposed to the consequences of a} technological advances - especially in computers and communication b} the growth of trans-national corporations, c} international economic realignments and d} the exponential growth of international capital markets.

The world-wide spread of technological capability is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is not immediately obvious that technological change could have a territorial dimension:[119] however, on an international scale increasing availability of innovatory techniques has caused realignments, and on a national scale it has meant the downfall of the central state as the innovator or the patron of innovation.[120] A by-product of the innovation and information realignment amongst other things has led to a fierce debate over the competencies of the state.[121] The capability of the state to cope with change has also been questioned: Morales and Quandt argue that,

> 'the contemporary world economy is characterised by an extensive realignment of international patterns of competition, trade and protection, seen as increased regional economic integration and global interdependency'.[122]

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[118]It would seem that the term post-fordism is best confined to changes in productive and managerial techniques.
[119]Though see (Anderson, 1983).
[120](Marshall, 1995)
[121](Sharpe, 1987)
[122](Morales & Quandt, 1992, 462)

The realignment has been caused not as a result of government action but by processes of market instability and fragmentation which has intensified competition and the rate of technological advances, whereby more economic agents have become cognisant of the utility of sub-state entities.[123] The only period of the past that parallels such dramatic and unfettered change is the nineteenth century, in which the exponential growth of the Welsh economy was a precursor to the first phase of 'modern' Welsh autonomism.[124]

The technologies being developed are themselves revitalising the ancient debate first mooted by Plato - the balance between common values and coercive strictures in a polity.[125] On the European level the debate has been particularly intense, and its manifestations have been diverse. In Italy, for instance, the state has not been so much rolled back but decentralised, but not without a struggle.[126] Belgium, adopting a quasi-federal consitution in 1988,[127] is essentially a bicephalous state.[128] The French and, to an even greater extent, Spanish states have also decentralised over similar periods. In Britain under Thatcher, conversely, intense resistance was mounted to decentralising tendencies, aided by the quiet and self-reflective aftermath of the 1979 referendums in Wales and Scotland.[129]

In the face of these enormous, recent and very rapid changes, and the varying levels of state resistance to them amongst AIDs in Europe, traditional theories of autonomism are restrained by conceptual, and perhaps emotional, inertia. They are structured and predicated on existing state practice, and as

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[123](Nairn, 1993, 157)
[124](Thomas, 1954)
[125](Deutsch, 1966; Plato, 1935; Richmond, 1984)
[126](Leonardi, Nanetti, & Putnam, 1987, 92)
[127](Witte, 1992, 95). 'Quasi' since it was not designed to create unity out of diversity (Witte, 1992, 110).
[128](Hooghe, 1994)
[129](Rhodes & Wright, 1987, 34)

such are unable to respond to the aforementioned developments and their implications for autonomist action and discourse - in the form of shifting dimensions of protest, new political tools employed, and the modified spatial and ideological scope of the debate.

The new *Weltanschauung* perhaps favours autonomism as never before. In its broadest sense globalisation enhances the process of trade liberalisation, which in turn implies that nation-states are less reliant on the protection afforded by tariff barriers. Whether or not this implies the redundancy of the nation-state is, in this context, immaterial. More importantly the process makes smaller 'state-entities' viable. Alongside this the process of democratisation continues, and it is clear that increasing emphasis is not merely placed on the right to choose representatives, but on the right to choose the arena in which they operate.[130]

It is perhaps fitting that, in Wales, aspects of these developments, and perhaps the fear they instill, have been most eloquently considered in poetry and literary criticism.[131] In a discussion of the R.S. Thomas poem 'A Welshman in St. James' Park', for instance, the critic writes:

> 'It is very much a sixties poem, in that it analyses the semiotics of officialdom, showing how inimical to Welshness is the concealed ideology inscribed in the ostensibly neutral language of public discourse in Britain. This was broadly the perception that underlay the *Cymdeithas yr Iaith* campaigns during this period against English road signs and the like. Yet while young Welsh speakers, trained by Saunders Lewis to read the signs of the times, found dramatic methods of exposing and dismantling the 'homely' instruments of the Anglo-British state in Wales, it commonly remained the case that the English-only speakers of Wales had their eyes

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[130](Alesina, 1995)

[131]For an insight into the politicisation of twentieth century Welsh literature see (Bianchi, 1995; Thomas, 1992).

opened to the incurable Englishness of a supposedly British state only when they were exiled in England'.[132]

As we show in later chapters, the 'neutral language of public discourse in Britain', so apparent in the 1960s, has become more strident - the process of which, in the logic of the narrative above, is likely to have had an effect on the political attitudes of the English-only speakers of Wales. The nature of this effect, however, can only properly be understood by considering it in the context of the entire gamut of modern Welsh political exceptionalism, which has it origins much earlier - in nineteenth century liberalism.

2.9 The Liberal Party in Wales

The Liberal ascendancy began with the general election of 1868, and it coincided with a remarkable reawakening of 'Welsh national consciousness'.[133] The table below depicts the stranglehold that the Liberal Party had on Welsh politics at the turn of the century.

Table 2:1

The Liberal Party in Wales

Election date	No. of seats contested	No. of seats held by Liberals	%age of seats held by Liberals
1880	33	29	88
1885	35	30	86
1900	34	28	82
1905	34	33	97

[132](Thomas, 1992, 119)

[133](Bogdanor, 1979, 120). See also (Jones, 1992a, 335-336).

It is as well to analyse this ascendancy on two levels, separating the Liberal Party from the Liberal Governments. Within the party Welsh liberals sought, rather than a Welsh parliament, national educational institutions and the disestablishment of the Welsh church.[134] In terms of the exercise of state power, the genesis of Plaid Cymru itself can be partially explained, in the first instance, as a reaction to the botched attempts of {primarily} the Liberal governments to establish a measure of Home Rule ,[135] and a desire to continue the debate on separation for Wales.[136] The Liberals failed to achieve devolution in the 1880s and 90s, but did begin to administer Wales as a separate entity. The 1881 Welsh Sunday Closing Act demarcated the first modern legislative principle applied exclusively to Wales, and in 1889 the first elections to the Welsh County Councils occurred.[137]

Also, the interference of the state in education had a considerable energising effect on Welsh autonomism. On the one hand the effect arose from negative factors, for instance the response to the 'Blue Books' of 1847, and the 1870 Education Act which 'essentially wiped out for decades the previously existing Welsh education system',[138] was swift and vehement.[139] On the other hand, and almost simultaneously, positive developments {from

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[134](Bogdanor, 1979, 123)

[135]Though it has been argued that 'in Wales... home rule could be killed by kindness' (Bogdanor, 1979, 122).

[136]For thoughts on the rise of *Plaid Cymru* in the interregnum between the hegemony of the Liberal and Labour Parties see (Davies, 1983b).

[137]Other legislative and policy milestones include: Welsh Intermediate Education Act, 1889; Charter to the Federal University of Wales, 1893; Welsh Department of the Board of Education, National Library of Wales, National Museum of Wales, 1907; Welsh Departments of the Board of Agriculture and Health, 1919.

[138](Churchill, 1986, 117)

[139]For a modern analysis of the effect of the Blue Books on Welsh life see (Morgan, 1992). In the same volume, 'against the backdrop of general distaste for the Blue Books and their depiction of the Welsh as given to drunkenness, blasphemy, indecency, sexual vices and lawlessness, Gareth Elwyn Jones presents the report as no betrayal of any kind but a well intentioned and successful attempt to introduce Wales to the benefits of a practical utilitarian education'.

the perspective of Welsh identity reification} were taking place - Welsh departments in some UK ministries, a federal university of Wales chartered in 1896 and the National Library of Wales, sanctioned in 1905 by the Unionists under Balfour. [140]

Another, more regressive explanation, of the dominance of the Liberals in Wales resides in the simple fact that they were not Tory. Although, anti-Toryism has not been a perennial feature in Welsh political history,[141] it has remained a fairly consistent peculiarity, at least amongst the great bulk of the population,[142] since the late seventeenth century. Then it found expression, for the most part, in the religious divide between the Nonconformist and the Established churches in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century and opposition to the Corn Laws.[143] Notwithstanding that these sentiments may have been misplaced - Welsh Tories for instance fought against the abolition of the court of Great Sessions in 1830[144] -, or indeed inaccurately reported,[145] the parallel, in the modern era, between 'anti-Tory' and 'pro-periphery' both as a recipe for political support and praxis appears axiomatic yet somewhat ill-considered. On the one hand, if true, it says something about the level of political maturity of the principality, and, if false, the political biases of historians and social scientists. As we shall see, such analyses, have also permeated the discussion of the role of the Labour Party in Welsh political life.

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[140](Williams, 1984, 191)
[141](Davies, 1993, 286, 291)
[142]For a discussion of Jacobitism in Wales see (Davies, 1993, 298-299).
[143](Davies, 1993, 355, 394)
[144](Davies, 1993, 364).
[145]Though perhaps divorced from the masses, the landlords were not without benevolence, and relationships were certainly more peaceable than in Ireland (Morgan, 1981, 10).

2.10 Socialism: the Labour Party in Wales

The decline of the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom, heralded, insofar as the Welsh liberal party was a nationalist party, the demise of the nineteenth century nationalist movement in Wales. The Liberal Party in Wales was inextricably linked with the non-conformist movement, which itself, at least initially,[146] did not manage to extend its appeal to the recently enfranchised working classes, who, after 1918, were flocking to the emergent Labour movement.[147] Moreover, the movement of a relatively impoverished class into the political system engendered an increasing domination of the 'material' in the politics of the inter-war period, to which the autonomists stood out as a lone voice of protest.[148]

The first World War's influence on Welsh life cannot be over-estimated. In the perception of the autonomists it marked the culmination of the influence of the British state on Wales, and a new departure for levels of mass participation in British life. In excess of a quarter of a million Welshmen served in the armed forces during this period, another salient feature of which was increased economic intervention by the state.[149] This, and the advent of socialism, meant that a form of politics based on class inequality had come to overlay, but not completely obliterate, an older politics of territorial identity and inequality. The Great War made parts of Wales, for a time, more British than they had ever been before, and perhaps mobilised, in these areas, antipathy towards Welsh autonomism.

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[146](Harvie, 1994a, 23-24)
[147](Davies, 1983b)
[148](Davies, 1983b)
[149](Morgan, 1985, 120-121)

By 1922 Labour had replaced the Liberals as the dominant party in Wales,[150] though it lost its federalist commitment as it came to power.[151] The pseudo-settlement of the Irish question and depression in the 1930s, which brought class cleavages to the fore, temporarily made the autonomist issue appear less urgent,[152] whilst the legacy of the Irish troubles - violent revolution and civil war - did much to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the Welsh autonomist movement. Labour benefited from the relative quiescence of Scottish and Welsh autonomism from the mid 1920s to the mid 1960s. The Labour Party itself was a factor dampening the appeal of the Welsh autonomists by three distinct means: anti-elitist and largely non-conformist the party was able to target much of the autonomists natural constituency, particularly in urban areas. Secondly, the process of industrialisation in Wales had been sufficient to create enclaves which were penetrated by core political institutions; namely, the Liberal Party and, subsequent to the Liberal decline, the Labour Party.[153] Finally, the experience of World War Two did much to diminish the popular appeal of nationalism of any description. The first point above implies, as a mirror of the hegemony of class over territory alluded to above, that the politics of egalitarianism in Wales has served to diminish the politics of ethnicity.

This was not achieved without some cost to the integrity, or at least the homogeneity, of the labour movement in the UK. That is, in order to achieve

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[150](Bogdanor, 1979, 124)

[151]The Labour Party conference of 1918 in Resolution XIII stated that '... along with the granted Home Rule to Ireland, there should be constituted separate statutory legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales and even England, with autonomous administration in matters of local concern...' (Butt Phillip, 1975, 277). The National Guilds League was dissolved in 1925 (Elliott, 1973). For Keir Hardie's enthusiasm for Wales see (Morgan, 1987, 32).

[152]'Imperialism and the Great War favoured a more territorially unified home base... the Great War suspended the disputes over Welsh disestablishment' (Bulpitt, 1983, 109).

[153](Hechter, 1975)

its supremacy, the Labour Party in Wales had to adapt itself to local conditions, and was itself subject to internalised flows of tradition, such that an '*acquis Pays de Galles*', can be posited. Harvie cites three such traditions:

- *Gwerin* - radical liberalism
- proletarian internationalism
- radical communitarianism.[154]

To say that the Labour Party in Wales became the Welsh Labour Party is somewhat of a simplification. After all the radical newspaper *Llais LLafur* became the 'parochial' Labour Voice.[155] We can say, perhaps with more certainty, that the reason why socialism has always tended to have broader support in Wales than in England, is linked to the fact that the ideology of the Welsh Labour Party which exhibits a distinctive pattern of values, preferences, aspirations and apprehensions,[156] has never entirely cohered with its British counterpart. One scholar attributes this mismatch, if not cleavage, to British Labour's centralism and electoral ambitions, saying 'it is not surprising... that Labour's relationship to Wales should be an ambivalent one, its centralist philosophy clashing with its traditional role as the party of peripheral protest and with its electoral self interest'.[157] On the other hand, the perception of the Labour Party consistently seeing class rather than community as the basis of political action,[158] is beginning to change.[159] The British Labour Party has responded to Welsh difference, the existence of *Plaid Llafur Cymru* {the Welsh Labour Party} is itself testimony to this fact.

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[154](Harvie, 1994a, 16)
[155](Morgan, 1981, 172-173)
[156](Jones & Keating, 1988, 6)
[157](Bogdanor, 1979, 126). See also (Crick, 1991, 97). Another considers the tension created by an over reliance on materialist values in the modern Labour Party: 'it is abundantly clear that the overwhelming materialism of the Right has been matched by that of the Left in theory as well as in practice' (Ellis, 1985, 261).
[158](Bogdanor, 1979, 125)
[159](Adamson, 1988, 25; Blair, 1996, 33)

On a normative level, incidentally, doubts have been expressed about changes in Labourism:

> 'It is evident .. that the crisis of ideology in the British Labour Party is unlikely to create the moral, ethical and political leadership needed to give direction to the potential radicalism of the new working class. Without that leadership it will gradually become fully incorporated in to the ideology of neo-liberalism and the orthodoxy of New Right politics'.[160]

Labour's Welsh identity has also served to distort the message of Welsh autonomists.[161] Nevertheless the general autonomist perception of Labour's role in the peripheries became apparent at this time:

> 'In effect, then, the Labour Party contributed to the continued incorporation of Wales and Scotland, while simultaneously campaigning on a platform of regional devolution. In this sense Labour served to negatively integrate the British Isles'.[162]

It is perhaps ironic that the author of the influential book from which the above quotation is taken, had not in fact visited Scotland and Wales, even though many of his ideas were adopted wholesale by the autonomist communities in those areas.[163]

More importantly, Labour's acclimatisation to local conditions may, in the long run, have not sustained the hegemony of the politics of egalitarianism over ethnicity. This process is characterised by members of the Labour Party's research community as a movement from a politics based on class inequality to one based on territorial inequality:

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[160](Adamson, 1988, 25)
[161]These arguments will be more fully developed later on.
[162](Hechter, 1975)
[163](Harvie, 1994a, 27)

> 'The Left's dilemma over devolution stems from the fact that its new enthusiasm for the politics of identity and locality conflicts in important respects with its historic commitment to equality'.[164]

So, class never obliterated other forms of identity, and it might have been wrong to assume it would or ought to do so. The assumption that such a mutual incompatibility exists between these two political perspectives is, some have argued, peculiarly English.[165] It may be more correct to say that this is a dominant view within the English cadre of the Labour Party, but it is clear that one component of Plaid Cymru's historical mission has been, as we shall see below, to challenge such views.

2.11 The Presence of Plaid Cymru

The most important autonomist force in twentieth century Wales, Plaid Cymru {PC}, was formed, in an atmosphere of disillusion and depression in 1925 as *Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru.*[166] One year earlier *Byddin Ymreolwyr Cymru* {The Army of Welsh Home Rulers} had been formed by H.R. Jones,[167] but this potentially more radical, and violent movement, did not last and Jones became the *Blaid's* full-time secretary.[168] Plaid Cymru's early years were not marked by enormous political success. It was originally a type of cultural defence movement, primarily dedicated to preserving the Welsh language, rather than a party,[169] hence electoral success was not immediate nor immediately sought for - it was not until 1929 that Plaid Cymru fought its first

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[164](Tindale, 1995)
[165](Osmond, 1995, 136)
[166](Bogdanor, 1979, 126)
[167](Davies, 1993, 547)
[168](Davies, 1993, 548)
[169]This orientation is exhibited by one of the party members during this period who expressed in a recent interview: 'I don't think that Wales and the Welsh language would have been paid any attention politically unless the Welsh Nationalist Party had pricked the conscience of the other parties' (Roberts, 1995, 161).

general election seat.[170] Welsh people christened the party *Plaid Fach*,[171] which was apt since it was small numerically, and in terms of its spatial and political zones of operation.

The activists of the early years have been characterised as exhibiting a 'fortress' mentality.[172] After World War II, however, the party became more expansive in outlook, though still predominantly focusing its campaigns on cultural issues, and exhibiting, at times, acute political naïveté. Gradually, Plaid Cymru gained credence as a viable political alternative. Phil Williams, one of the principal activists during the second stage, dates the change in PC organisation from the 1959 General Election when the party contested 20 out of 36 Welsh constituencies securing a mean vote of 10.3% in contested seats.[173] During the 1960s a second cadre of highly politicised Anglo-Welsh became involved with PC, the party developed an increasingly cohesive organisation, and in 1966 the party's leader, Gwynfor Evans, became its first member of Parliament {MP}.

Evans won his seat in a Carmarthen by election brought about by the death of Lady Megan Lloyd George. The election of Evans, who beat the Labour candidate Gwilym Prys Davies by 2,436 votes,[174] on July 15th 1966 had a typically variable reception in Wales. The Labour Party, who were the most spectacular vote losers, claimed that it was a protest vote. The people of nearby Llangadog staged a victory procession through the village to which the Times of London had dispatched a correspondent. Dafydd El is Thomas recalled later that this was a defining moment in his decision to join the Blaid.

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[170](Roberts, 1995, 160)
[171]*Bach* meaning 'small' in Welsh: Note again the *b* to *f* after a feminine noun.
[172](Adamson, 1988, 19)
[173](McAllister, 1981, 246)
[174](Davies, 1993, 667)

Others, primarily from the Labour Party, also realised the potential of Plaid Cymru and joined in increasing numbers, modernising the party's modes of political praxis, whilst, simultaneously, moving it increasingly towards the left of the political spectrum.[175] Two individuals stand out as exemplars of this process - Phil Williams, the Blaid's chief strategist until the 1992 General Election and Ned Thomas who can be described as the translator of Welsh autonomism to the Anglo-Welsh.

In 1970, Plaid was able, for the first time, to contest all 36 of the electoral seats in Wales. Building on the success of earlier by-election victories, the party won two seats in February 1974. Plaid's percentage support actually peaked in 1970, when it failed to attain a single seat. By 1977 the *Blaid* had a professional staff of 10, and had been proving attractive to a more radical group of younger voters.[176] Many of the people coming into the party did not speak Welsh, and PC became more explicitly political with less emphasis being placed on the issue of the preservation of the Welsh language.

Other parties became increasingly aware of the *Blaid* as a viable political threat and responded by adopting a more explicit Welsh identity. Responses to this perceived threat have varied in intensity over time. Immediately after the Second World War, for instance, prominent Welsh MPs were to,

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[175]Rawkins argues that the translation of PC from a predominantly social movement to a political party based upon electoral competition and a differentiated organisation was largely expedited by the modernists (1979, 445; Adamson, 1988, 20).

[176](Lutz, 1990, 254)

'cite the existence of Plaid Cymru as a cause for granting further recognition to Wales in the form of a Secretary of State, an elected council or both'.[177]

Furthermore, it has been argued that the Investiture of the Prince of Wales at Caernarfon in 1969 was 'clearly a publicity measure directed at Plaid Cymru',[178] who narrowly lost a by-election in Caerphilly the year before. Campaign literature from the Labour Party and the Conservative Party began to exhibit Welsh language sections. Today all the major parties publish bilingual manifestos in Wales.[179] This cymricisation is at least partially attributable to the activities of Plaid Cymru.[180]

Plaid Cymru's success and identity as a pressure group does not correlate entirely with its more explicitly political identity. Plaid Cymru's identity is necessarily diffuse because of the broad range of constituencies to which it caters, historically divided between separatist and non-separatist coalitions. Recently the ideology of the party has become more coherent,[181] though patterns of communication and task allocation within that party indicate that the new ideology has not been entirely accepted. The party's explicit aim to be the Party of Wales has not been realised by voting figures during general elections. Table 2.2 below depicts the dramatic juxtaposition of the declining percentage vote for Plaid Cymru, alongside the party's increasing politico-structural influence.

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[177](Morgan, 1984, 294); ref. Huw T. Edwards to Herbert Morrison, 27 Nov. 1946, and Edward's open letter to Attlee and the Cabinet, 16 Dec. 1946 (National Library of Wales, Edwards papers)
[178](Morgan, 1992, 288)
[179]See for instance (Conservative Party {Wales}, 1992).
[180](Adamson, 1991a, 128-9; Williams, 1995a)
[181](Christiansen, 1994)

Table 2:2

Performance of Plaid Cymru in General Elections[182]

Election Year	Number of Seats Contested	Average %age vote for PC	Seats Won
1970	36	12.4	0
February 1974	36	11.7	2
October 1974	36	11.6	3
1979	36	9.3	2
1983	38	8.6	2
1987	38	7.2	3
1992	35?[183]	8.8	4

The *Blaid*'s recent performance in the 1994 European Election, where they gained 17.1% of the vote has altered the political geography somewhat though a 'fissile political geography' is still in evidence.[184]

One of the reasons for PC's tendency to political marginalisation in the past has been the extra-constitutional image of the party. Gwynfor Evans maintains that Plaid Cymru has 'always sought change through constitutional means'.[185] Apart from the burning of the Penrhos Aerodrome {RAF Bombing School} on September 8th, 1936 and, less controversially, the attempt to thwart the flooding of the Tryweryn Valley in the late 1950s, which gained the support of all the Welsh M.P.s, the *Blaid* 'has been less reliant on protest voting and concomitantly less able to gain from it'.[186] Nevertheless, a radical disposition can be feasibly maintained given Marsh's findings that Wales is a

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[182]Sources: (Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 308-309; Lutz, 1990, 255; Welsh Office, 1995a, 40).
[183]Three seats contested on a Plaid/Green ticket (Butler, 1992 , 359).
[184](Osmond, 1985, xxiii)
[185]Interview, August 19, 1991.
[186](Lutz, 1990, 253). The Tryweryn case provides, in addition, support for our agency theories developed in Chapter Four. The dam building was authorised by a single administrative and political gatekeeper Henry Brooke, the second minister for Welsh affairs (Morgan, 1981, 379).

'region containing the widest parameters of licence {in the UK} favourable to unorthodox politics'.[187]

Plaid Cymru's electoral potential in the 1970s was, it can be argued, constrained by linguistic factors. Survey evidence suggests that the preservation of the Welsh language did not rate highly in relative terms compared with other socio-economic factors.[188] On the other hand the *Blaid*'s reluctance to play the language card may have been off putting to Welsh speakers.[189] There are more recent signs that the party is proving attractive to traditional Labour voters, though in the long term such support may be predicated on continued success in General and By-elections.[190]

Plaid Cymru is not the sole repository of Welsh identity. The co-option of a Welsh political persona by the other parties operating in Wales has dispersed its support to some extent. What is exemplified here is the difference between identity and autonomism, all parties have adopted a consciously Welsh identity in the face of the autonomist threat in the hope of reducing the perceived centrifugal force of the Welsh autonomists. Paradoxically this co-option and, as will be discussed in later chapters, the augmentation of Welsh based institutions in an effort at territorial management has institutionalised and reinforced a notion of Welsh separateness and created and internalised a new Wales-based discourse.

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[187](1977, 71)

[188](Balsom, 1979, 13). In this survey, 76% of the representative sample saw the Welsh language as a heritage to preserve, but only 6% of the group supported *Plaid Cymru*.

[189]Balsom found that only 10% of Welsh speakers and 24% of fluent Welsh speakers supported Plaid Cymru (1979, 13).

[190](Lutz, 1990, 252). Lutz argues that the rise of the nationalist parties in the UK in the 1970s provides evidence of diffusion and emulation among voters.

2.12 The Politics of Language

Significant claims have been made concerning the penetration of language into the human psyche. It seems that cognition and perception can be altered according to the medium through which objects or ideas are expressed.[191] Welsh identity is premised partially on language differentiation, making *Cymraeg* a key dimension in the expression of difference with respect to the rest of the UK. This dimension is expressed internally also, since not all of the Welsh, or the people of Wales, speak the language associated with the ethnicity in which they participate in, or interact with, daily.

Within a multi-ethnic state, language education is often only one aspect of a larger 'Language Policy', though in the UK the latter has tended to be, until very recently, implicit. Though hidden, the 'policy' in Wales has been a source of tension, because it operates in a context where education and language policies have been, historically, strongly influenced by an executive which is territorially and linguistically separate. As a result, and for other reasons, the English language, and hence identity, has tended to be 'privileged'.

Assuming that individuals in Wales seek to 'identify to achieve psychological security',[192] the more attractive option, at least on one level, might be to adopt the 'priviliged' identity. The state, seeking to provide a, 'minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe, survive and produce'[193] encouraged such adoption. The perception amongst the early autonomists was that this process would

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[191]For a discussion in the Welsh context see (Pugh, 1994).
[192](Bloom, 1990,53)
[193](Gellner, 1983, 38)

accelerate as the use of the Welsh language declined. This, as we shall see, has not entirely been the case.

Language and education are crucial transmission mediums for Welsh identity, and, more controversially, the development of the autonomist impulse. Gwynfor Evans has been the one of the most persistent advocates of the latter argument, and expresses the view that the Welsh language is not merely a communication tool,

> 'it is the vehicle of the nation's culture, the medium through which the nation's values have been and continue to be, transmitted, the treasury of the nation's experiences and memories, the mind and memory of the nation. Welsh is the most important formative factor in the nation's character, the one unbroken tool which belongs to Wales. It is the factor which does most to give the Welsh people deep roots in the long past and a sense of continuity'.[194]

That the state attaches great importance to language and via language the transmission of cultural values is without question. This is not a modern issue, it has existed since the birth of the modern state. The existence of different languages in their realm, and the associated possibilities of cabals, has indeed worried rulers of Wales since ancient times. From the fourteenth century, for instance, a letter survives from Hugh Despenser, the son, who wrote to his bachelor John Inge, the Sheriff of Glamorgan, on January 18th, 1321 commanding him to take good care that Despenser's Welshmen hold no secret assemblies and no private parleys.[195] Later, in the sixteenth century, the ministers of Henry VIII proved themselves aware of the dangers of counter-culture. The Act of Union 1536 announced that henceforth Wales was 'incorporated, annexed, united and subjecte to and under the Imperial Crowne of this realme'.[196] That Welsh was 'a speche nothing like ne

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[194](Evans, 1991, 127)
[195](Edwards, 1935, XLIX. 143, 219-220)
[196](Evans, 1991, 125)

consonaunt to the naturall mother tonge used within the Realme'.[197] And that,

> 'there shall hereafter be *no difference* in laws and language between your subjects of your Principality of Wales and your other subjects of your Realme of England .. Also be it enacted that all... officers and ministers of the law, shall proclaim and keep the sessions,... and all other courts in the English tongue: and all oaths..., and all other affidavits, verdicts and wagers be given and done in the English tongue: and also that from henceforth no person or persons that use the *Welsh speech or language* shall have or enjoy any manner of office or fees within this Realme of England, Wales.. upon pain of forfeiting the same office or fees, unless he or they use or exercise the English speech or tongue'.[198]

This statute was the focus of one of the early twentieth century campaigns for the revitalisation of Welsh, illustrating the significance of an historical understanding of Welsh autonomism, as well as the importance of the Welsh language in autonomist mobilisation. The National Union of Welsh Societies at a meeting at the Eisteddfod of August 3, 1938 decided to launch a national petition to the government praying for the repeal of Clause 20 of this sixteenth century act.[199]

A few groups have actively sought to de-privilege the use of English in Wales, the most significant of which is the Welsh Language Society, *Cymdeithas yr laith Cymraeg*. The society's establishment, in 1962, was partially in response to changes in Plaid Cymru, such as the composition of PC's membership and the more explicit political orientation of the party. Given the influence of Plaid's founding father, Saunders Lewis, who finally retired during this period, *Cymdeithas* was, and is, far more exclusively Welsh. The society was designed to maintain Saunders' aims, which rest predominantly with the

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[197](Evans, 1991, 125; Williams, 1984, 191)
[198](Evans, 1991,125, emphasis added, Statute of Henry VIII: Clause 20)
[199](Western Mail, August 9, 1938)

issue of the survival of the Welsh language and culture. Members of the society have engaged in extra-constitutional activity to achieve their aims.[200]

2.13 Anti-Conservatism?

The general perception of Wales is of an area steeped in radical politics, with a deeply anti-conservative outlook.[201] Certainly, for most of the twentieth century the three British institutions that convey tradition and national stability, the Crown, the Church, and the Conservative party have received an ambivalent reception in Wales.[202] The Conservative Party has been weak in Wales since the Reform Act of 1867,[203] and were electorally displaced there by the Liberals in 1868.[204] They were further weakened by the electoral reforms in the 1880s, and much of their bedrock of support, the Welsh landed gentry, 'sold-up and left' between 1919 and 1922.[205] Between 1979 and 1987 however, the Conservative party held out some hope of transforming the Welsh political landscape. See Table 2:3 and Figure 2:1 below:

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[200]See (Tudor, 1989) for illustrations.
[201](Jenkins, 1995, 12)
[202]Perhaps because they symbolise conformity and acceptance of the status quo - on the assertion that the Welsh admire dissent and respect non-conformity see (Jenkins, 1978).
[203](Beckett, 1994)
[204](Harvie, 1994a, 15)
[205](Harvie, 1994a, 15-16)

Table 2:3


General Elections in Wales since 1970[206]

	1970	Feb. 1974	Oct. 1974	1979	1983	1987	1992
Turnout	77.4	79.7	73.9	79.4	76.1	78.9	79.7
Conservative seats	7	8	8	11	14	8	6
Labour seats	27	24	23	22	20	24	27
Liberal seats	1	2	2	1	2	3	1
Plaid Cymru seats	-	2	3	2	2	3	4

[206]Source: (Welsh Office, 1995a, 40).

Figure 2:1

Trends In Parliamentary Elections In Wales Since 1970[207]



[207] Source: (Balsom, 1996, 35).

This hope, particularly expressed by the results in 1979 and 1983, has been short lived. As in Scotland, the Labour Party is the predominant party in Wales. The point is illustrated by the voting figures below:

Table 2:4

General Elections in Wales, 1987 and 1992 {Percentage of the vote}[208]

	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrats	Plaid Cymru
1987	45.1	29.5	17.9	7.3
1992	49.5	28.6	12.4	8.8

As Table 2:4 illustrates, the nationally victorious Conservatives only managed to gain 28.6% of the vote in Wales in 1992; compared to Labour's 49.5%. By contrast, the Conservatives achieved 45.5% of the vote in England.[209] In Scotland and in Wales in 1992 the Conservative vote dropped below 30%,[210] England provided the Conservative party with their election victory. The same was true in the 1987 election.[211] The divergence is even more striking with respect to the inner and outer core {the South} of England where the Conservatives achieved 50.4% of the vote in comparison to Labour's 24.9%.[212] In Wales, Plaid Cymru only gained 8.8% of the vote but gained four seats, which demonstrates an increased concentration of support.[213]

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[208]Source: (Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 286).
[209](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 286)
[210](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 286)
[211](Jones & Keating, 1988, 5)
[212](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 286)
[213]The increased concentration of support also provides further evidence that the political diffusion/contagion argument requires revision (Lutz, 1990, 249-251).

Another example of non-conservatism in Wales is religious practice. The Church of England is a church of state, and has generally played both a unifying and centralising role since the advent of Augustine of Canterbury and the division of the country in the Middle Ages into two sees, York and Canterbury, by Pope Gregory.[214] The Anglican Church was thus the legitimiser of the authority of the monarchy in the English core. The reformation increased the power of the central authorities in the British Isles; the Anglican Church played a very significant role in this process; though its penetration into Wales was limited. The nonconformist sects {for example, Methodism and Presbyterianism} imported into Wales became a focus for anti-institutional protest. In the 1790s Methodist preachers, heavily influenced by the writings of Tom Paine, toured Wales descanting on the rights of man and attacking kingly government .[215]

Later, and especially during the period between 1870 and 1926, the nonconformist ministers became the 'heroes of the Welsh speaking nonconformist majority'.[216] Nonconformism is crucial to an understanding of Welsh autonomism. Ministers sought to spread literacy to enable Welsh people to read the Bible. A by-product of such teaching was that tens of thousands of previously illiterate people learned to read and write in Welsh. Church attendance in Wales is currently in decline and the chapels no longer have the political force they once did, indicating that denominationalism is a less significant predicator of current autonomist mobilisation. Nevertheless, despite the new contours of Welsh experience in more recent times, the identities expressed by this, and the other defining historical contours of

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[214](Steed, 1986, S100)
[215](Keane, 1995, 331)
[216](Williams, 1981c, 46-147)

Welsh identity addressed previously, indicates that Welsh identity derives some authenticity and social plausibility from its more general counter-hegemonic tendencies.

2.14 Welsh Culture

Culture is commonly {mis}perceived as a 'derived process... an epiphenomenon of an underlying economic order'.[217] We advocate here, in general terms, an increased awareness amongst social scientists of the cardinal role of 'communication, art and language in any consideration of social structures and processes'.[218] In the case of Wales in particular, we suggest, following Rawkins, that an,

> 'over-deterministic approach by social scientists to the dissemination of the ideology and values associated with the dominant culture has minimised the appreciation of the capacity of territorially based and other minority groups to undertake cultural innovation, in association with the more general process of mobilising support in opposition to the status quo. A fuller appreciation of the cultural dimension of the politics of autonomism facilitates placing the phenomenon of cultural innovation more directly in relation to broader patterns of social change, affecting other communities within the host societies under investigation. As a result, the observer is better able to assess the political strengths of specific autonomist movements as well as the hindrances to the advance of such movements'.[219]

Culture can be defined as 'a continually evolving complex of values, sentiments, and dispositions in the process of societal change'.[220] Groups endowed with unequal power battle over control of scarce resources, engage in 'cultural innovation', and try to appropriate institutions associated with the transmission of values, particularly educational institutions. Cultural

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[217](Jones, 1986, 263)
[218](Jones, 1986, 263)
[219](Rawkins, 1979)
[220](Rawkins, 1979, 440-441)

innovation in Wales can be usefully examined in the context of the theory of classification struggle. That is, the disciplinary divisions and the equivocal semantic and, substantive value of concepts relating to identity leads to a state of affairs of embedded paradoxes that can be termed a classification struggle. This struggle is mirrored in the skirmishes of autonomists and counter-autonomists.[221] The theory, therefore, suggests that the ideas promulgated by intellectuals do not enter into a neutral value free social milieu, they enter into a highly charged atmosphere and fuel the discourse. As Newman says:

> 'Even if modern ethnic movements do rise and decline as a result of ideological and organizational limitations, ethnic party supporters can always find solace in the knowledge that just when scholars begin to speak of the decline of ethnic identifications, these identifications are politicized, creating the conditions of a new surge of ethnic political activity'.[222]

At one level, most political issues have a type of objectivised modernisation ethic, which assumes a superiority for modern rationality. We suggest that the culture of autonomism offers little temporally, conceptually, or spatially objectivised intellectual ground, which is as true in the arenas of academe as it is in the battlefields of autonomism. That is to say, those studying autonomism are unlikely to be immune from its emotive, indeed perhaps primordial, components. It is an interesting question, in fact, whether any art or humanities subject can be divorced from such components. The more traditional subjects of history and geography for instance, which, as we shall see in the next two chapters, 'have had the task of implanting and

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[221](Voutat, 1992, 117)
[222](Newman, 1992, 31)

inculcating the civic and patriotic spirit',[223] creating a tension between these particular functions and the actual truth. The tension with respect to these subject areas is such that we may wonder whether the 'truth' is realisable:

> 'Historical truth is linked in a circular relation with the systems of power which produces and sustains it and to the effects of power which it induces and which extend it'.[224]

It follows then that there may be competing versions of reality within any discourse on autonomism. Moreover, new 'realities' may emerge, or old realities become more privileged. In the temporal dimension, for instance, the thoughts of the ancient writers on autonomism, albeit extant in a vastly different social and economic milieu, still resonate in autonomist discourse today. Compare for instance Gerald's perception of the situation in twelfth century Wales, with that of Gwynfor Evans:

> 'The English are striving for power, the Welsh for freedom; the English are fighting for material gain, the Welsh to avoid a disaster; the English soldiers are hired mercenaries, the Welsh are defending their homeland. The English, I say, want to drive the Welsh out of the island and capture it all for themselves'.[225]

> 'The struggle in Wales is between two nationalisms, Welsh nationalism and the Anglo British state nationalism, the immense moral power which suffocates Welsh nationhood and the emotive force behind the Anglo British state'.[226]

Gerald perceived the immediate danger as a danger of invasion, of material aggression by the English state. Evans perceives the danger to be one of asymmetric 'moral power,' a form of ideological aggression. The

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[223](Jones, 1986, 269)
[224](Jones, 1986, 274)
[225](Gerald of Wales, 1188, 274)
[226](1991,21)

struggle however has moved, in the perception of the autonomist, from the material to the mental dimension. Gwynfor Evans, like Gerald of Wales, expressed concern about despoliation, except the modern autonomist makes explicit reference to the 'psychological rape of the country'.[227] The underlying assumptions of protection and a perceived struggle between right and wrong, however, are strikingly similar.

The perception of the personality types behind the situation, the national characteristics, furthermore, has a quite amazing longevity. This indicates that a process of reflexivity may exist, whereby people adapt historically and, often, externally imposed, stereotypes. In this context, Gerald of Wales, writing in 1188, is worth quoting at length:

> The Welsh are very sharp and intelligent. When they apply their minds to anything, they are quick to make progress.[228] Nature has endowed {the Welsh} with great boldness in speaking and great confidence in answering, no matter what the circumstances may be ... the English... still retain their outward fairness of complexion and their inward coldness of disposition.[229] The Welsh people rarely keep their promises, for their minds are as fickle as their bodies are agile..[230]

Several of these perceptions have passed into the contemporary consciousness, they are the seeds of divisions in perceptions and values between groups, in the parlance of identity theory the 'us and them' syndrome.[231] The title of an Economist article, for instance, "Look at us then, Boyo," can serve to exemplify a typical stereotype of the indigenous Welsh.[232] This stereotype is widely disseminated; for instance, a survey of London

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[227](Hearne, 1984, 153 - quoting Evans)
[228](1188, 238)
[229](1188, 245)
[230](1188, 256)
[231](Bodenhausen, 1992, 13)
[232](1988)

bankers revealed that a significant proportion regard Welsh entrepreneurs as untrustworthy.[233]

Unlike Scotland, Wales's distinctive national identity is perceived to be inextricably linked with the fate of the Welsh culture and language. Around four fifths of the population of Wales, however, are not Welsh speaking.[234] The proportion of people speaking Welsh has declined rapidly, making the language issue the most important historical cleavage in Wales. Table 2.5 below reveals the extent of this decline:

Table 2.5

Proportion of Welsh Speakers {1851-1991, in %}[235]

1851	1891	1911	1931	1961	1981	1991
80	53.1	40.3	40.8	27	19	18.6

An inability to speak Welsh coupled with an attachment to Wales may result in a feeling of collective guilt which, it has been argued, in turn gives rise to a form of ethnic paranoia.[236] The autonomist literature conceptualises a deep seated and unwarranted sense of inferiority amongst the Welsh, and traces this to earlier events, particularly the 1536 Act.[237] Added to such a curious national admixture, there emerged during the 1980s an increasing tendency towards a new celebration of Welshness.[238] The 'value perception' of the Welsh language has improved - amidst signs of continuing decline in

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[233](The Economist, 1985)
[234]English speaking Welsh have a dialect that borrows the syllabic lilt of the Welsh language.
[235]Sources: (Census 1961, Report on Welsh-speaking population; Census 1981, Aitchison & Carter, 1994; Coupland, 1954, 212; Rose, 1970, 10). The validity of the figure for 1991 has been called into question by a survey carried out by the Welsh Office in 1992 which indicated that 21.5% of the population speak Welsh (Aitchison & Carter, 1994, 108).
[236](Morris, 1984, 70-74)
[237](Evans, 1991, 186)
[238](Chapman, 1993; Spivey, 1993)

the numbers of speakers some evidence has emerged of the language becoming a fashionable, more mainstream medium of communication amongst the young,[239] amidst a concomitant dissolution of negative associative perceptions.[240]

From an historical perspective the linguistic base of national identity has been politically divisive rather than unifying, creating sources of distinction within Wales as well as between Wales and England. In the post World War II era, several indigenous conflicts over bilingual initiatives emerged. For instance, Bulpitt[241] states that the Ministry of Education {in the 1940s and 1950s} did its best to promote the Welsh language despite the opposition of many local education authorities in the Principality.[242] Another scholar argues that, the language revitalization movement in Wales, also a post World War II phenomenon, set up its own new and radical criteria for differentiation on two fronts: between Welsh and English in general, and internally, between the English and Welsh-speaking Welsh. The issue of language, particularly the attempt to have a genuine bilingualism and to stem the tide of English monoglotism in Wales, telescoped the whole bi-ethnic controversy.[243]

The present interpretation of Welshness {*Cymreictod*}, therefore, does not exist in an historical continuum but is a phenomenon with a number of historical discontinuities; discontinuities that in some degree explain inconsistencies in Welsh autonomism in the 1970s.[244] Welsh people have almost invariably distinguished between Welsh-Welsh, Welsh people who can speak the language, Anglo-Welsh, Welsh people who speak only

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[239](Aitchison & Carter, 1985; Aitchison & Carter, 1994)
[240](Williams, 1987, 85-98)
[241]'The keeper of the English Imperial tradition' (Rose, 1982, 157).
[242](Bulpitt, 1983, 160)
[243](Khleif, 1979a, 59-74)
[244](Khleif, 1979a, 59-74)

English, and the English living in Wales. An Anglophile Welsh speaking elite has been a cross-cutting cleavage which has found expression in all five of the above dimensions. Territorial divisions are also apparent. A distinctive North-South division exists, expressed through such diverse realms as language, dialect, accent, sporting interest, political affiliation and culture. For instance, South Walians call the Northerners 'Gogs' {*Gogledd* is Welsh for North}, and often view them as being extremely nationalistic. In the south, Pembrokeshire has been called "little England beyond Wales" because of its anglophile culture.[245] Not all these divisions are, necessarily, everlasting. In one case study, for instance, of a bilingual initiative in Bangor, alliances observed to form over language policy were not concrete and permanent, but contradictory and subject to change.[246]

The Welsh language has always been a symbol of social tension between a minority people and a majority state. As one scholar argues:

> 'Language... is not to be conceived as something which conveys meaning by itself. Its meanings are always a function of the context from which it issues, of the disparate need and interests of the audiences involved, and of their respective modes of perception'.[247]

The educational administrators of the nineteenth century attempted to outlaw the practice of speaking the indigenous language by encouraging a form of anti-Welsh self regulation amongst school pupils, a policy, often referred to today in autonomist literature, known as the *Welsh-not*. Elites may

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[245]During the twelfth century Henry I encouraged Flemings to settle in Southern Dyfed. The fortified boundary that enclosed them to the north became known as the Landsker Line (Williams, 1985, 65-66). Today the Landsker Line functions as a cultural boundary.

[246](Roberts, 1987, 321). Interestingly, research in the 1970s revealed a analogous situation of shifting allegiances, though in a very different context of partisan violence, in the 'Anro' area of Belfast (Burton, 1978).

[247](Edelman, 1964, 130)

have participated willingly in this process. This was clearly the perception of some:

> 'The Welsh gentry, the natural leaders of the people, welcomed anglicisation, which opened to them wide opportunities in England and this policy was not resisted by the Welsh people. Wales always remained loyal and the union with England was never unpopular'.[248]

English is, undeniably, the predominant language in Wales and remains a tool in administration, in the technological sphere, in external relations and in enabling access to modern culture. Moreover, the rapid industrialisation and development of Wales meant that the English language became a *modus operandi* for the upwardly mobile Welsh. The English language, however, is perceived as a tool of communication and not necessarily a means of national self-expression; as one autonomist put it :

> 'One of the great values of the Welsh language is that in a world where social controls are built into the individual through the pattern of work and leisure, where the mass media offer unreal choices and controversies to the point where people's aspirations and even their protests are conditioned, it preserves an area of inner freedom, of conscious alienation from the system, and at the same time a means of contact which by-passes, indeed short-circuits the machine'.[249]

Through the Welsh Language Acts of 1967 and December 1993, Welsh has now achieved a higher legal, economic, cultural and hence social status within the Principality, and various other concessions have been granted, including a Welsh television station {S4C}, which began transmitting in 1982. The licence for the Welsh language television station was granted shortly after Gwynfor Evans of Plaid Cymru pledged to fast until death unless the new station was instituted.[250] The story of the Evans campaign for S4C is of

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[248](Hertz, 1944, 173).
[249](Thomas, 1991b, 130)
[250](Dodson & Jones, 1984, 20)

interest also because it is indicative of modern autonomist techniques. Whitelaw announced his decision not to institute the promised channel in September 1979 at Cambridge.[251] Evans announced in May 1980,[252] that he would begin his hunger strike in 1981.[253] He then embarked on a 'farewell tour' of Wales, which attracted considerable crowds - 2000 came out to hear him in Sophia Gardens, Cardiff.[254] Eventually a deputation from 'institutional Wales' - Lord Cledwyn, Dr G.O. Williams, and Sir Goronwy Daniel - successfully petitioned the Home Secretary who was provided with an 'excuse' to change his mind.[255]

Subsequently, the status of and interest in Welsh has grown rapidly, and the proportion of the younger sectors of the Welsh population speaking the language has increased for the first time this century.[256] The more progressive language policy in the United Kingdom has brought about an improvement in the position of Welsh in education as well as in administrative and judicial matters, which has had the knock-on effect of creating an extensive bi-lingual job market in Wales, itself linked to the *cymricisation* of the counties in 1974. However, a study of what may be termed 'unobtrusive devolution',[257] indicated that many factors in the implementation stage hinder the full utilisation of possibilities created by legislation.[258] The language acts, and other measures, therefore, may be viewed as important steps in the preservation and promulgation of the Welsh language, but also may be

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[251](Hannan, 1990b, 139)
[252](Hannan, 1990b, 136)
[253](Hannan, 1990b, 140)
[254](Hannan, 1990b, 141)
[255](Hannan, 1990b, 143)
[256](Aitchison & Carter, 1994)
[257](Sharpe, 1985)
[258](van Rijn & Sieben, 1987, 56)

interpreted as a limited measures of containment. If so, there are signs that this containment is failing.

2.15 Conclusion

This chapter has served to outline the background behind modern Welsh autonomism, and detail its earlier manifestations. The politically salient features of the Welsh historical experience, physical and political landscape, have been analysed and contextualised in relation to England and Europe. The relative importance of these features in the context of Welsh autonomism was addressed, and a qualitative weighting attached, such that 'usable history', especially when channelled by linguistic conflict, was arguably the most significant long-run element in autonomism and, indeed, counter-processes. It was noted however, that more recent manifestations of autonomism have been subject to powerful and relatively new elements - such as institutionalisation, agent's reorientation, globalisation, and the growth of the European Community - which have internal and external dimensions, which have affected, *inter alia*, autonomist perceptions of the role and position of the central state.

Another set of arguments was developed concerning the role of political parties operating in Wales. Again historical experience was deemed to be important in patterns of support, and particularly each party's response to the growing force of autonomism. The *cymricisation* of the major parties operating in Wales has served to reify the notion of a Welsh political system, and further marginalise the Conservative Party and other well-developed institutional expressions of 'Englishness', with the possible exception of the monarchy.

The internal cultural heterogeneity of Wales was noted as a politically salient feature, influencing the process of institutionalisation, and cultural transmission through education and language. These themes are picked up and developed in the following chapter, which will analyse more immediate events, particularly the rapid development of 'Welsh' state and civil structures. The chapter will analyse to what extent these institutions can be termed 'Welsh', and explore whether earlier manifestations of autonomism engendered a cycle of response between state and autonomists, creating increasing amounts of territorial institutions and increasing the mass appeal of Welsh identity.

CHAPTER 3

UTILISING WELSH IDENTITY II:

STRUCTURE - INSTITUTIONS IN THE STATE AND IN CIVIL SOCIETY

3.0 Introduction

The Western nation-state has for some time been posited as unable to keep up with rapid social cultural economic and political change. The crisis of the nation state has been depicted in terms of territory,[1] functional cleavages,[2] values,[3] and as a non-crisis.[4] In terms of governance, a large literature has emerged depicting the changes affecting the state, and state policy responses varying from 'output' adjustments to regime change.[5] The emergent academic consensus is that the state's technical capacity for governance is now beginning to exceed its ability to achieve a widely accepted political framework in which to wield power: It may just be able to find sectoral policy acceptance,[6] become a non-exclusive actor, perhaps considerably less powerful,[7] in an increasingly global environment.[8]

A member state of the European union has the additional concern of belonging to the largest, most powerful supra-national entity in the world,[9] being subject both to the pressures of the changes discussed above, alongside peripheral assertion and European integration.[10] The United Kingdom and its constituent nations have not been immune to the exogenous

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[1](Sharpe, 1987)
[2](Nairn, 1977; Tarrow, Katzenstein, & Graziano, 1978)
[3](Kristeva, 1993, 42)
[4](Mann, 1993; Milward, 1984)
[5](Rudolph & Thompson, 1985)
[6](Kymlicka & Lenihan, 1994)
[7](Marshall, 1995)
[8](Reich, 1991)
[9](Hine, 1992, 115). Though on a number of indices it may be superseded by NAFTA.
[10](Kastendiek, 1990, 68; Keating & Jones, 1991, 311)

changes in the global and European environments,[11] in fact because of its peculiar if not unique constitutional structure, the UK may have been particularly susceptible.[12]

For example, localised endogenous forces have assumed an increasing relevance in British political life. Generally, with respect to the UK as a whole, the dynamic impetus of these forces has since the 1960s become increasingly centrifugal in nature.[13] There are a variety of ways in which a given host state can respond to these developments.[14] The UK, because of its informal and piecemeal constitutional development,[15] has chosen territorial management in the form of 'unobtrusive devolution'.[16] The paradox of such territorial management is that it may have fostered the very impulse it was trying to contain, particularly the formation of a 'Wales Industry' - described by one Welsh economist thus:

> '{T}he Wales Industry - the battalions of organisations and institutions whose declared purpose it is to uphold, preserve and advance, in their own chosen fields, the interests of the entity known as Wales'.[17]

So, the creation of territorial entities has been a contributory factor to the resurgence of Welsh identity,[18] if not support for Welsh autonomism.[19] Territorial institutions have also served to 'nest' Welsh identity. Over a period when the Welsh autonomist political movement has varied in intensity and

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[11](Keohane & Hoffman, 1991)
[12](Bradley, 1982; Jones, 1983; Keating & Jones, 1991)
[13]See (Schermerharn, 1970) for a discussion of the consequences of shifting attitudes to the state.
[14](Rudolph & Thompson, 1985)
[15](Breuilly, 1993)
[16](Sharpe, 1985; Sharpe, 1987, 164)
[17](Nevin, 1990, 129)
[18](Balsom & Jones, 1984)
[19]In the context of these arguments, the functional efficacy of territorial management has also been questioned (Jones & Wilford, 1986).

political success, an institutional movement has been consistently developing.[20] As Jones argues,

> 'Of course, all political systems are conditioned and constrained by their institutional structures. But the United Kingdom, with its weak historical tradition of popular sovereignty and an ambiguous notion of national identity, places more emphasis upon its political institutions - and in particular Parliament - than does its European neighbours. However, it is not political institutions *per se* which invest the United Kingdom with its unique constitutional character, but rather their territorial distribution'.[21]

The analysis above would seem to be particularly applicable to the development of the Welsh Office, which we examine in detail below.

3.1 Welsh Structures? - State Institutions

A modern defender of the stability of the European state cites four major areas of control that the state dominated during the historical nation-building process in a number of countries and continues to dominate today, namely mass communication, mass education {which subverts localism}, mass health, and mass welfare.[22] Here it is argued that it is precisely these nation building areas, and particularly the 'identive' functions of education and communication,[23] that have been *cymricised* in Wales, thereby weakening their British identity.[24]

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[20](Jones, 1988a)
[21](Jones, 1988a, 47-48)
[22](Mann, 1993, 117-118). (MacIver, 1982) classifies these as identive and instrumental functions. An additional coercive state function is posited.
[23]Particularly, the increased capacity to construct alternative versions of reality (Williams, 1994a, 238), and the de-nationalisation of communication, c.f. (Sharpe, 1979, 10-11).
[24]See (Davies, 1989, 15) for a discussion of the 'bases' of nationalism in Wales. As an incidental point we may suggest another level at which education resonates with historically oriented autonomism. In a discussion on the rationalisation of education and training (Weber, 1947, 240-3), Weber argues that education certificates have become 'what the test for ancestors has been in the past' (Weber, 1947, 241).

It has been argued that the British state presided over three phases of institutional creation in Wales: 1872-1896 - the establishment of educational and cultural institutions; 1907-1919 - formation of institutions designed to administer the emerging welfare state; 1946-51 - refining the structure of administration.[25] Though not wishing to question the existence of phases, even if the exact dates are open to contention, we dispute the assertion that,

> '{T}he significance of these new national institutions lies not in their character, which is cultural or administrative, but in the manner whereby they came into being'.[26]

We argue that the *identity* of such institutions has a crucial bearing on the development of Welsh identity, and that the direction of causality is not as simple as the presupposition that identity formation leads to institutional creation. For instance, the developing railway system of the nineteenth century was both an institutional and an infrastructural creation of entities operating within the wider state apparatus which, intuitively, might be thought to be integrative. Yet one historian has argued:

> 'Although English was the official language of the railways, their coming was a central factor in the cultural history of Wales in the second half of the nineteenth century; the growing popularity of the National Eisteddfod, the vastly increased distribution of books and magazines and the elevation of many ministers to the status of national heroes can all be attributed to the development of the railway network. Above all, national consciousness became more intense as the railways undermined the age-old isolation of the communities of Wales'.[27]

So, modernisation and the increased interactions with 'foreign' elements that entailed could nevertheless take a Welsh form which had the capacity to reinforce Welsh territorial identity. A possible theoretical explanation for the

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[25](Foulkes, et al., 1983; Jones, 1988a, 49)
[26](Jones, 1988a, 49)
[27](Davies, 1993, 409-410)

above is offered by Festinger, who argued that cognitive dissonance can be increased via forced exposure and interaction with other {different} people.[28] Also, the reaction to the enforced Anglicisation of the railways in the late 1800s, and education in Wales from 1870, whereby *Cymraeg* was 'consistently undervalued',[29] and in some cases prohibited as a medium for teaching in schools,[30] perhaps can be explained within this theoretical framework.

The system and structure of education in Wales has been crucial in the dissemination of Welsh identity and the autonomist impulse.[31] Arguably the first modern 'Welsh' institutions were those that arose as a result of the precedent set by the Welsh Intermediate Education Act of 1889, specifically the University of Wales {1893}, the Central Welsh Board {1896},[32] and the Welsh Department of the Board of Education {1907}. It was soon realised that these changes constituted 'the first and most striking expression in institutional terms of the reawakened consciousness of nationhood'.[33]

Agriculture, was another policy area where specifically Welsh structures were created relatively early, particularly the Welsh Department of the Ministry of Agriculture {1907}, Welsh Department of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries {1919}, and the Council for the Protection of Rural Wales {1928}. More significantly the distinctive religious constructs in Wales were 'legitimised' by legislation in the form of the Welsh Church Disestablishment

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[28](Festinger, 1957, 133)
[29](Edwards, 1984, 70). See (Jones, 1995a) for an account of the reaction to The Circular issued by William Dawson in 1894 discouraging the employment of non-English speakers on the railways of North Wales.
[30](Chapman, Smith, & Foot, 1977, 139)
[31]The relationship between secular education and nationalism (Elwyn Jones, 1990a, 199), even nationhood itself (Smith, 1979, 37), is being increasingly recognised (Graubard, 1993, vii).
[32]The CWB served as the antecedent to the Welsh Joint Education Committee {WJEC} established in 1948.
[33](Dicey, 1920, 319)

Act {1914}.[34] In the political sphere, the creation of the Welsh Parliamentary Committee {1907} was not immediately followed by a plethora of related structures. Though legal and administrative structures were later instituted, most importantly giving a Welsh identity to the Court system {1942},[35] the creation of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire {1948}, an Annual Welsh Day in the House of Commons, an annual White Paper on Government Action in Wales, a quarterly conference of heads of government departments in Wales,[36] a Minister for Welsh Affairs {1951},[37] and the symbolic importance of the designation of Cardiff as the capital city of Wales {1955}.[38]

This reification of Wales as an administratively separate and separable area occurred in other areas including the economy,[39] health provision,[40] and heritage.[41] One scholar concurs that it was in the spheres of education, agriculture, and health provision that the demand for administrative differentiation, and hence 'administrative devolution',[42] was most loudly voiced; but, he argues, what cannot be underestimated is the importance of opinion solidifying around the proposal for a Welsh Secretary from 1938,[43] which contrasted markedly with the many schemes put forward in the late nineteenth century.[44]

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[34]Not effective until 1920.
[35]Welsh Courts Act.
[36](Randall, 1972, 355)
[37]Upgraded to a Minister of State in 1957.
[38]Another institution with again perhaps more symbolic than administrative significance is the Welsh Grand Committee in the House of Commons {1960}.
[39]Reconstruction Advisory Council {1942}, Gas Act {1948}.
[40]Welsh Board of Health {1919}, Welsh Regional Hospital Board {1946}.
[41]Historic Buildings Council for Wales {1953}.
[42](Talfan Davies, 1970)
[43]Though a bill proposing the creation of the post of Secretary of State for Wales had been put to Parliament as early as 1892 (Rowlands, 1972, 333 ff.1)
[44](Randall, 1972, 354-355)

The creation of the Welsh Office {WO} itself may have reified a perception of Welsh statehood,[45] even if the reality of power was somewhat different. Rose argues that the Welsh Office suffers from institutional inertia within the UK context; given its lack of autonomy and explicit initiatory powers, lack of expertise, and the relative unimportance of the Secretary of State for Wales in Cabinet.[46] It could be argued that the semiotic characteristic of a Secretary of State for Wales operating from Cardiff is more important than any functional capacity he may have, particularly in the context of cabinet *per se* drifting towards a more 'dignified' position within the British constitutional settlement.[47] The semiotic significance of the Welsh Office was already apparent six years after its inception:

> 'it is already a constant moan of Ministers and civil servants that people write to the Welsh Office on matters over which it has no jurisdiction'.[48]

Though the status of the Secretary has, in more recent times, been augmented,[49] this is perhaps more by factors external to his cabinet responsibilities.

Elsewhere it has been argued that the Welsh Office served to reintegrate Wales into the British state,[50] a notion that is supported by the explicit popular rejection of devolution in 1979.[51] These alternate perceptions may be correct at different points in the history of the WO, indicating a need

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[45](Adamson, 1991a, 129)
[46](1989, 83)
[47](Randall, 1972, 365)
[48](Talfan Davies, 1970)
[49](Dynes & Walker, 1995, 296)
[50](Jones, 1988a)
[51]As late as 1984 scholars had every expectation of growth in 'British Wales' (Balsom & Jones, 1984, 121).

to depict the changing institutional dynamic of the Welsh Office,[52] and the realisation of its potential for mobilisation.[53]

3.2 The Establishment and Development of the Welsh Office

The creation of the Welsh Office was not without controversy, particularly as it marked a new departure for the system of governance pertaining to Wales, based as it was upon functional, not territorial, management,[54] and implying a quasi-federalisation entailing a 'sacrifice' on the part of the largest constituent units.[55] Harold Wilson, anticipating the sensitivity of the change, articulated a minimalist stance on the functions of the Welsh Office whereby it would merely undertake,

> 'executive responsibilities of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in Wales; to take over responsibility for the Welsh Roads Division of the Ministry of Transport and to co-operate with the First Secretary of the DEA in respect of regional economic planning in Wales'.[56]

However, the 1964 Labour Party manifesto envisaged executive responsibility for the Secretary of State covering housing, local government, health, education, and agriculture.[57] The alternate messages provided by the discourse above are perhaps indicative of Whitehall's desire to attenuate the

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[52]Depicted by (Jones, 1992a, 353) as 'a process of bureaucratic dynamism', a phraseology that allows for the input of agents.

[53](Osmond, 1989a). The cycle of institutional inertia and dynamism in the Welsh Office is also perhaps influenced by the activities of its incumbents, an argument that will be explored in the following chapter. For a discussion of Secretaries of State for Wales flourishing in political exile see (Osmond, 1989b).

[54](Thomas, 1981)

[55](Sharpe, 1987, 151)

[56](Wilson, 1964). The significance of the institutional encouragement offered by the Welsh Office in the development of Wales as an economic planning area cannot be overlooked (Rowlands, 1972, 337).

[57](Rowlands, 1972, 333). These functions corresponded with those earlier envisaged by the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire in the Third Memorandum of January 1957 (Randall, 1972, 356). Note that Griffiths takes a positivist view of Wilson's attitude towards administrative devolution (Griffiths, 1969, 167-8).

significance of the Secretary of State for Wales and the Welsh Office.[58] To a certain extent this desire was fulfilled, for instance executive functions in education and agriculture had still not been transferred to the Welsh Office by 1972.[59] Administrative inertia concerning the former function may also have been abetted politically by Labour Party sensitivity towards devolution in education.[60]

The Welsh Office, in terms of function, scope, and 'presence' in Welsh life has evolved far beyond these early functional parameters. There are a number of means by which we can illustrate the extent of this expansion - in 1965, for instance, the total staff amounted to 249, by 1992 the Welsh Office was being administered by a staff of over 2200, with a budget expenditure totalling almost £6 billion, and with eleven departments or policy groups, serviced by 47 divisions dealing with specific matters of policy, operating within its institutional framework.[61] Fourteen departments/policy groups are currently operational. Namely: Economic and Regional Policy Group, Industry Department, Agriculture Department, Legal Division, Establishment Group, Finance Group, National Health Service Directorate, Housing, Health and Social Services, Policy Group, Health Professional Group, Transport, Highways and Planning Group, and Education.[62]

A complementary measure of the increasing importance of the Welsh Office, and a second consequence of its development, has been the increasing growth of identifiably Welsh structures, over which the WO exercises varying and highly complex patterns of authority. The most high

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[58](Rolands, 1972, 334)
[59](Rolands, 1972, 334)
[60](Rolands, 1972, 335)
[61](Central Office of Information - Reference Services, 1993a; Jones, 1988a).
[62](Central Office of Information - Reference Services, 1993a; Jones, 1988a)

profile and contentious of these are the quasi-autonomous non governmental organisations {QUANGOS}, known in official parlance as non-departmental public bodies {NDPBs}. The growth of non-elected governance is not peculiar to Wales,[63] but the political issue of representation on such bodies has a particular resonance in an area where the ruling Conservative Party has limited support.[64] The process of institutional creation bears parallels with the pre-Welsh Office period. That is the distinctively Welsh areas were broached first - Several bodies were added, for instance, to the existing portfolio of institutions associated with the Welsh countryside,[65] and education system.[66] These historical similarities and the congruence with non-elected governance in the UK does not provide us with a complete exegesis, however, since in this and other areas the changes wrought in Wales over time are reflected in the substance of the reforms. A number of institutions were designed for instance to address the particular problems of the changing Welsh economy.[67] More importantly the areas covered by Welsh institutions expanded dramatically, including such areas as culture,[68] and sport.[69] Such institutions have been seen to progressively acquire a Welsh character.[70]

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[63](Stoker, 1988, 34)

[64](Osmond, 1992b, 16-22). For information on the controversial political role of QUANGOS in Wales see (Morgan & Roberts, 1994; Osmond, 1992b).

[65]Development Board for Rural Wales {1965}, Land Authority Wales {1975}, Countryside Commission for Wales Committee {1968} - under the UK wide Nature Conservancy Council, itself broken up in 1991 to be replaced in Wales by the Countryside Commission for Wales.

[66]National Curriculum Council for Wales {1988}, Higher and Further Education Funding Councils for Wales {1992}.

[67]Welsh Economic Council {1966}, Wales Tourist Board {1969}, Welsh Development Agency {1975}, Welsh Consumer Council {1975}, Advisory Welsh Economic Council {1994}.

[68]Welsh Arts Council -Committee of British Arts Council {1967}, Sports Council for Wales {1972} *Cadw* {Welsh Heritage} {1984}. On 1 April 1994 the Arts Council for Wales superseded and took over the assets, liabilities and undertakings of the Welsh Arts Council, the North Wales Arts Association, the Southeast Wales Arts Association, and the West Wales Association for the Arts (Welsh Office, 1995a, 42).

[69]See WCVA listing below.

[70](Adamson, 1988, 17; Confidential Source I, 1996)

From the perspective of the centre such developments appear *ad hoc*,[71] the product of adjustments and compromises extracted from the system by political pressure and manoeuvring.[72] Though we agree that the establishment decision and the majority of subsequent decisions concerning the Welsh Office have been political rather than administrative,[73] and that Whitehall itself was not prepared for the Welsh Office,[74] we would argue that the *ad hoc* charge actually depends on perspective. From an identive point of view the development of the Welsh Office has followed an ordered progression.

The table below depicts those areas over which the Welsh Office has achieved relatively direct lines of authority.

Table 3:1

Policy areas directly controlled by the Welsh Office[75]

Policy Area	Date Acquired
Water, certain agricultural functions including the Countryside Commission, historic buildings	1968
Health, some welfare services, tourism, ancient monuments	1969
Child care, primary and secondary education, land planning	1970
Welsh Development Agency, Land Authority Wales	1975
Further and higher education, block grant negotiations with Treasury, agriculture {WOAD} and fisheries	1978
Higher and Further Education Funding Councils, some environmental powers	1992
Arts funding, industrial training councils	1993

[71](Rolands, 1972, 339)
[72](Rolands, 1972, 339)
[73](Rolands, 1972, 335)
[74](Rolands, 1972, 333)
[75]Sources: (Dynes & Walker, 1995, 297; Confidential Source F, 1994; May, 1994; Murdoch, 1988, 32).

Note also from Table 3:1, the slow accumulation of power of the Welsh Office in the fields of agriculture, art and culture, and most importantly, education and training. In addition, during the 1960s and 1970s a number of government departments were relocated in Wales. The most significant of these are the Drivers' Vehicle Licensing Centre {DVLC} at Swansea, the Royal Mint at Llantrisant,[76] Companies House at Cardiff and the Business Statistics Office at Newport.[77]

As we shall see in detail in the next chapter, during the period under examination the Welsh Office has been controlled by several high profile and interventionist Secretaries of State. The most significant agent in this respect was Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Wales at the height of Thatcherism. Regarded by Thatcher as too 'wet' he was exiled to what is perceived by Whitehall as Siberia. Walker effectively managed his new role and unusually was the subject of much bipartisan praise, described by the Guardian in 1989 as a phoenix, and by the Observer, even more effusively as the pro-consul of the new Wales.[78] It has been argued that throughout Walker's tenure, Wales was 'protected' from Thatcherism.[79] The perception that Walker and the Welsh Office provided a buffer zone to the policies emanating from Whitehall by the repackaging and amelioration of central polices for the Welsh dimension, offers a partial explanation for the acceleration of Welsh based conceptions of policy and politics. The acceleration of insitutionalised identity was itself augmented by the reversal of the political fortunes of the Conservative Party in Wales since 1987 at local, national and European

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[76](Rolands, 1972, 340)
[77](Adamson, 1988, 16, ff.7)
[78](Osmond, 1989b)
[79]Walker's autobiography appears to support this contention (Walker, 1991).

levels,[80] in response to which the government extended the process of {non-elected} 'quangoisation' in Wales.[81]

The Welsh Office itself oversees a large number of other quangos including the Welsh Development Agency. Around 80-100 quangos have been operating in Wales since 1992.[82] Their influence is pervasive, rivalling local government - in 1994, for instance, they spent more than £2.3 billion a year and have 1300 appointees, not far short of the £2.7 billion spent by Wales' 1976 local councillors.[83] The non-elected Quango has become an important focus in the campaign to democratise Wales.[84] Opponents have argued that quangos are packed with 'Tory placemen'.[85] Their presence has been offered as an explanation for changing attitudes to devolution among political elites, even the Labour Devolution rebels of 1979 - the former Gang of Six.[86] The controversy over quangos indicates that, somewhat paradoxically the state has appeared to increasingly institutionalise Welsh identity and in the process of institutionalisation has provided structural and functional foci for protest.

The mobilisation over quangos though present under the tenure of Peter Walker, became more vociferous when his replacement, David Hunt, was in office, and accelerated even more under the tenure of John Redwood - a Secretary of State who is on the right wing of the Conservative party. Structural explanations that ignore the role of political agency struggle to provide a viable rationale for such developments.[87] Political agency has had

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[80](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992; Cornock, 1995a; Cornock, 1995b)
[81](The Economist, 1994)
[82](Osmond, 1992a; The Economist, 1994)
[83](The Economist, 1994)
[84](Morgan & Roberts, 1994)
[85](Osmond, 1992a)
[86](Cornock, 1995d)
[87](Davies, 1989, 6)

a significant influence on the growing protest over the 'democratic deficit' in Wales, and will be discussed further in the next chapter.

3.3 The Welsh Affairs Committee {WAC}

The growth of the Welsh Office as an institution was arguably at the core of the devolution debate in Wales. The debate in Wales, unlike Scotland, was 'centred on the principle of public accountability'.[88] The Welsh Office, as the 'most highly developed political institution in Wales',[89] was at the centre of this discourse. The establishment of the Welsh Office itself 'intensified demand for democratic institutions to supervise the new growing bureaucracy in Wales'.[90] The Commission on the Constitution which visited Cardiff on several occasions during the Autumn of 1969 was very much sensitised to this debate.

Though by 1979 the devolutionists had not actualised their objective of a Welsh Assembly, the consolation prize was the establishment of a House of Commons Committee with a remit specifically designed to address the issue of public accountability in Wales,[91] whilst acting symbolically, as some have perceived it, 'as a surrogate of the Assembly'.[92]

The Welsh Affairs Committee {Select Committee on Welsh Affairs} and devolution even became symbolically linked; in that on the same day, 26th June 1979, that the House of Commons repealed the Wales Act by 191 votes to 8, Nicholas Edwards announced the government's intention to establish a Select Committee on Welsh Affairs which would oversee the Welsh Office.[93]

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[88](Jones, 1985, 289)
[89](Jones, 1988a, 50)
[90](Rolands, 1972, 351)
[91](Jones, 1988a, 50; Jones & Wilford, 1986, 11)
[92](Jones & Wilford, 1986, 76)
[93](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 99; Jones, 1985, 289; Jones & Wilford, 1986, 11)

Proceedings began in the first committee in January 1980, with no Plaid Cymru MP present.[94] The WAC was dominated by anti-devolutionists,[95] who increasingly perceived their role as providing a forum for debate on the entire range of Welsh issues. The official remit of administrative and fiscal oversight became overshadowed by a series of reports on 'nationalist' issues,[96] including employment,[97] broadcasting,[98] and water,[99] such that administrative review has come to take up only one quarter of the time of the Committee.[100] Also, in the context of the European dimension to Welsh autonomist mobilisation - addressed in Chapters Six and Seven - note the WAC's interest in Europe. The fourth report on the impact of the EC on Wales was not written due to the ending of the Parliamentary Session, but the minutes of evidence are in the public domain. Furthermore the Welsh Affairs Committee has subsequently completed a report on Wales in Europe.[101]

We assume that the subjects which the Committee has chosen to broach since its inception provides an indicator of policy bias.[102] The fact that broadcasting and Europe are the subjects of three of the investigations provides a substantive indicator that they are worth considering in the context of this thesis. The importance of education in the autonomist pantheon is perhaps further indicated by the decision by Plaid Cymru to take a seat on the Education Select Committee in 1979, rather than the Welsh Affairs Committee.[103] The *Blaid* came to regret their decision, since the Welsh

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[94]It was in 1984 that Plaid Cymru was first represented on the Committee (Jones, 1988a, 55).
[95](Jones & Wilford, 1986, 14)
[96](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 100)
[97](Welsh Affairs Committee, 1980a; Welsh Affairs Committee, 1980b)
[98](Welsh Affairs Committee, 1981a; Welsh Affairs Committee, 1981b)
[99](Welsh Affairs Committee, 1983a; Welsh Affairs Committee, 1983b)
[100](Jones, 1985, 299)
[101](Welsh Affairs Committee, 1995a; Welsh Affairs Committee, 1995b)
[102](Jones & Wilford, 1986, 58)
[103](Jones & Wilford, 1986, 14)

Affairs Committee fostered a political discourse centred on Wales,[104] fulfilling what it may perceive to be 'an informal responsibility to Wales and the Welsh people',[105] which has served to reify a sense of Welsh political distinctiveness.

There are three dimensions in which the significance of the WAC can be assessed. The first and possibly most potent is the symbolic, expressive significance of the Committee. That is, on the rational level the WAC functions in a formal, constitutional and parliamentary political environment, but on an expressive, rather than legislative, level the meaning of the Committee is 'imprecise, potent, and Welsh'.[106] This symbolism is endemic within the structure of the Committee, the style of its deliberations, some of which have been conducted in Welsh, and even extends to its stationery which has a bilingual letterhead flanked, in addition to the standard Parliamentary Portcullis, by a Welsh Dragon.[107] The second factor, linked to the first, is that the Committee has an unusual, in the context of British politics, territorial dimension. This has affected both the subject matter, style, and results of deliberation. For instance the first report on employment in Wales, critical of the government's policy, was approved unanimously - the politicians dividing on territorial rather than partisan lines.[108]

The Welsh Affairs Committee is not unique in this respect. It is perhaps even more significant that for Quangos in Wales, although often dominated by individuals ostensibly sympathetic to the Conservative Party, 'party political

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[104](Jones, 1985, 300). This has involved reports of its proceedings in the Welsh national media.
[105](Jones, 1988a, 55)
[106](Jones, 1985, 295)
[107]Evidence was taken in the Welsh language for the first time by a Select Committee of the House of Commons on 16th and 17th February 1981 in Caernarfon (Jones & Wilford, 1986, 32).
[108](Jones, 1985, 301). Interestingly in the second report on broadcasting the Committee divided along linguistic lines (Jones, 1985, 301; Jones & Wilford, 1986, 58).

loyalties have often proved less powerful than Welsh resentment of interference from London'.[109] This argument, and the analysis above, can be applied, for instance, to the Wales Tourist Board {WTB}. Created alongside the English and Scottish Boards by the Development of Tourism Act 1969, the WTB was a 'product of an age when regional policy did exist'.[110] Ostensibly, the Chairman of the WTB is appointed by the Secretary of State. One impeccable source however has indicated that the present incumbent, Tony Lewis, was telephoned by Sir Wyn Roberts and the appointment was entirely within his bailiwick. We will look more closely at political agency in the next chapter, of more relevance here perhaps is the increasing autonomy of the WTB with respect to its British 'parent' the BTA. The process of institutional separation reached its concluding stages after the publication in 1994, under the Secretaryship of John Redwood, of *Tourism 2000 a Strategy for Wales* - which had been launched in draft form by David Hunt. This document committed the WTB to an internalised partnership with local authorities and the private sector within Wales, and a continued recognition of the need for autonomy to promote the image of Wales abroad - which amounted to a further rejection of the existing relationship with the BTA - granted by the Tourism Wales Act 1992. It should be noted also that tourism is a potential resource for the autonomist movement in Wales,[111] adding greater significance to the increased autonomy of the WTB.

Finally, the institutional dynamic of the establishment of the WAC as a response to the growth of the Welsh Office must be assessed. We will return to this issue, and its links with public perceptions of Welsh identity, later in the

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[109](Beckett, 1994)

[110](Confidential Source I, 1996). It should be noted that alone of these three institutions, the WTB continues to be supported by grant-in-aid.

[111](Pitchford, 1995)

thesis. Other developments can be related to events elsewhere; of primary importance here is the greater value associated with the Welsh language,[112] and the increasing influence of Europe on Welsh life;[113] subjects addressed in Chapters Four and Seven respectively.

3.4 Institutions in Civil Society

The purpose of this section is to depict the growing sense of Welsh identity beyond the state, particularly via non-state institutionalisation. At the same time we wish to convey a sense of the inter-reactive dynamic that exists in relation to state and civil institutional development in Wales. Early non-governmental organisations {NGOs} in Wales reflected the area's religious distinctiveness.[114] The relationship between the rise of the nonconformists and the state's first tentative steps to acknowledge Welsh distinctiveness in education may not be unrelated.[115] Though the civil society had responded to earlier state involvement in education, particularly in 1847 and 1870.

The state's creation of agricultural agencies can be viewed as a response to differences made extant by earlier developments in the civil society of Wales,[116] as can, though more tentatively, certain economic agencies.[117] These data indicate an institutional dynamic existing between the civil society and the state, though the evidence isn't sufficiently robust to produce a general theory of institutional development in Wales nor to

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[112]Welsh Language Board {established in July 1988 (Prentice, 1993, 265), statutory from 1993}, Welsh Language Acts {1989 and 1992}. For evidence on the social status of the Welsh language in the 1960s see (Parry Committee, 1965).
[113](Mitchell, 1992, 10). Note for instance the creation of the European Commission Office in Cardiff {1976}, and the *Canolfan Ewropeaidd Cymru*/Wales European Centre {1992}.
[114]Presbyterian General Assembly for Wales, 1861; Welsh Baptist Union, 1866; Welsh Congregational Union, 1871; Union of Welsh Independents, 1872.
[115](Davies, 1993, 297, 306-307)
[116]Welsh Land League, 1886; Royal Welsh Agricultural Society, 1904.
[117]Welsh Housing Aid Association, 1916.

establish the direction of causality in institutional creation. Each case has its own unique features which make it difficult to generate macro-level analyses. For instance, there was little state response to the creation of the South Wales Miner's Federation in 1898. This may be because the early unions were very British in orientation, 'The Fed' actually emerging from a protracted inter-union dispute over wage bargaining,[118] and not from a desire for a separate institutional arrangement for Wales. The Great War is one possible explanation of the time lag between state institutionalisation and the creation of concomitant civil societies during this period; for instance *Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru* {National Union of Welsh Teachers} was not formed until 1940, several decades after major educational reforms. The creation of the *Undeb* may, on the other hand, be indicative of an institutional dynamic within the civil society itself, given the prior formation of the *Urdd Gobaith Cymru* {Welsh Youth Organisation} in 1922 and the increasingly symbiotic relationship the two organisations embarked upon.[119]

The post World War Two 'settlement' in Wales encouraged a plethora of new civil institutions, many of them more explicitly cultural[120] and political[121] than had previously been the case, and many became increasingly subject to the largesse of the British state.[122] Another interesting development is the assumption of a Welsh identity of what is traditionally seen as a conservative group, farmers. The formation of *Undeb Amaethwyr Cymru* {Farmer's Union of Wales} as a separate entity from the National Farmer's Union in 1955 serves as an indicator of several factors; time lags discussed earlier, which

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[118](Davies, 1993, 474)
[119]A similar argument can be made with respect to the Wales TUC formed in 1973, and the inauguration of Wales CBI in 1978.
[120]*Undeb Cymru ar Wasgar* {Welsh Exiles' Association}, 1948
[121]Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1948 {changed 1957}.
[122]Particularly the National *Eisteddfod* and *Yr Academi Gymreig* {Welsh Academy} (Davies, 1993, 652).

are related to the cross-cutting cleavage of language, and the depth and extent of Welsh identity mobilisation in the post war period.[123]

Trades Union activity in Wales is also interesting in a more general context. In 1972 a Wales TUC was created in the face of much opposition from the parent TUC and indeed from within Wales itself.[124] The organisation has several characteristics which distinguish it from its British parent. These include organisational structure, and perhaps more importantly policy stance.[125] The organisation is enthusiastic for Welsh devolution, and has developed closer contacts with EC institutions and MEPs than its British counterpart.[126] Its relationship with the Wales CBI is also closer - they both cooperate on the Welsh Committee for Economic and Industrial Affairs for instance.[127]

The growth of organisations associated with the Welsh culture and language has continued. Probably the most important of these is *Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg* {Welsh Language Society}, the formation of which, as we have already noted, is indicative of a politicisation of linguistic identity,[128] and marks a more militant phase in Welsh identity mobilisation, a militancy which has come to be reflected elsewhere in civil society.[129] The two policy sectors that the Welsh Language Society has most consistently focused on have been broadcasting and education, two areas crucial to identity mobilisation in Wales.[130]

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[123]For a commentary on farmers' attitudes in more recent times see (Roth, 1992).
[124](Jones, 1988a, 56)
[125](Jones, 1988a, 56-57)
[126](Jones, 1988a, 57)
[127](Jones, 1988a, 57)
[128](Khleif, 1979b)
[129]More recent militant formations include, *Adfer* {for the preservation of Welsh speaking communities}, 1970 and *Cefn* {Welsh language rights movement}, 1985.
[130]See (Bell, 1983; Dicey, 1920; Elwyn Jones, 1990b; Khleif, 1980; Williams, 1989) for further discussion on this point.

Cymdeithas allowed young people inspired by the *zeitgeist* of the 1960s to engage in social protest over language. The society successfully politicised the language issue, and in so doing, claims one author, transformed itself into 'a rallying point for all those who were disaffected from the values of contemporary capitalist society'.[131] Insofar as speaking Welsh is a counter-hegemonic act anyway, this claim becomes less dramatic; moreover *Cymdeithas* could not function as an arena of protest for non-Welsh speakers. For those with the language skills, however, it also created a new arena of protest in that other issues, such as gender relations, could be expressed through the medium of Welsh.[132] In a curious way extreme protest also seems to have encouraged a reconsideration of values amongst more moderate sectors of society.[133] It is possible to argue that institutional creation in civil society no longer remains at the margins, but runs very deeply through the social fabric of Wales.[134]

The Wales Council for Voluntary Action {WCVA} has been a co-ordinating force in the development of civil Wales in the period under discussion.[135] Indeed it is via this organisation's work that we gain an understanding of the more recent growth in the number of civil organisations in Wales, particulary in the voluntary sector:

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[131](Bevan, 1984, 109). Historically the *Blaid*, by comparison, has been relatively unsuccessful at widening the issue of autonomism.

[132]For example, *Merched Y Wawr* {Welsh Women's Association}, 1967; *Welsh Assembly of Women*, 1983.

[133](Thomas, 1991b, 75-142). Also a possible explanation for the formation of *Cofiwn*, an organisation dedicated to the remembrance of significant Welsh dates, 1977. *Cadw* {Welsh Heritage} formed in 1984 also provides a further example of cross-fertilisation {and possibly state co-option} between civil and state institutions. Also see (Balsom & Jones, 1984) for a discussion of institutional creation and Welsh identity.

[134]Though it is as well to remember that the youth of the 1960s are now well into middle age.

[135](Confidential Source B, 1996, 1996)

> 'There are around 20,000 voluntary organisations in Wales with more than 700,000 volunteers and 6000 employees, managing an annual income of nearly 600 million {pounds}. This means voluntary action is a major "third force" in the Principality alongside the statutory and private sectors, and plays a crucial role in Welsh life'.[136]

The WIN directory, the first edition of which was published by the WCVA in 1988, lists peak organisations. To give an indication of the growth in this sector in Wales one has only to examine the absolute numbers - in 1988 there were 262 organisations listed, by 1995 this figure had risen to 350.[137]

We can also, extrapolating from the information provided in these directories over a series of years, develop more refined measures of identity transformation and mobilisation. The growth since 1988 in the number of organisations that utilise Welsh language titles, for instance, has been considerable. Consider Table 3:2 below:

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[136](Garfield, 1995, 2)
[137](Garfield, 1988, 4; Garfield, 1995, 4)

Table 3:2

Organisations with Welsh names or bilingual entries 1988-1995[138]

	Name of organisation	1995	1994	1991	1988
1.	*Adran Cyfrifoldeb Cymdeithasol Esgobaeth Bangor*	✓	✓	✓dif	×
2.	*Age Concern Cymru*	✓	×	×	×
3.	*Amgylchedd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
4.	*Bara Sinsir Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
5.	*Barnardo's*	✓	✓	✓	×
6.	*Bobath Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
7.	British Polio Fellowship	✓	✓	✓	×
8.	*Canolfan Gwybodaeth am Ganser Tenovus*	✓	✓	✓	×
9.	*Canolfan Iaith Genedlaethol Nant Gwrtheyrn*	✓	✓	✓	×
10.	*Cariad Cymru*	✓eng	×	×	×
11.	*Cartrefi Cymru*	✓eng	✓eng	✓eng	×
12.	*Celfyddydau Anabledd Cymru*	✓	✓dif	✓dif	×
13.	*Y Cerddwyr*	✓	✓	✓	×
14.	*Childline Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
15.	*Clwb Laryngectomy Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
16.	*Croesffordd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
17.	*Cymdeithas Addysg y Gweithwyr - Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
18.	*Cymdeithas Clefyd Alzheimer*	✓	✓	✓	×
19.	*Cymdeithas Ddawns Werin Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
20.	*Cymdeithas Ddrama Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
21	*Cymdeithas Y Deillion Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
22.	*Cymdeithas Epilepsi Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
23.	*Cymdeithas Genedlaethol Canolfannau Cynghori - Rhanbarth de Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
24.	*Cymdeithas Genedlaethol y Cynhalwyr yng Nghymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
25.	*Cymdeithas Gwefus a Thafod Hollt - De a Chanolbarth Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
26.	*Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg*	✓	✓	✓	✓eng
27.	*Cymdeithas Multiple Sclerosis De Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
28.	*Cymdeithas Spina Bifida a Hydrocephelus - Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
29.	*Cymorth Cristnogol*	✓	✓	✓	×
30.	*Cymorth Cynllunio Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
31.	*Cymorth i Fenywod yng Nghrumu*	✓	✓	✓	×
32.	*Cymru a'r Byd*	✓	✓	×	×
33.	*Cyngor Cymreig y Gwasanaethau Ieuenctid Gwirfoddol*	✓	✓	✓	×
34.	*Cyngor Gweithredu Gwirfoddol Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×

[138]Sources: (Garfield, 1988; Garfield, 1991; Garfield, 1994; Garfield, 1995).

35.	*Cynhadledd Sefydlog Mudiadau Gwirfoddol dros rai araf eu meddwl yng Nghymru*	✓	✓	×	×
36.	*Cynnydd-fforwm Cyfiawnder i'r Ifanc Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
37.	*Cynulliad Merched Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
38.	*Cyswllt Bywyd Gwyllt a Chefn Gwlad*	✓	✓	✓	×
39.	*Cytun: Eglwysi Ynghyd yng Nghymru*	✓	✓	×	×
40.	*Dolen Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
41.	*Eisteddfod Genedlaethol Frenhinol Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	✓eng
42.	*Ffederasiwn Cenedlaethol Sefydliad y Merched - Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
43.	*Ffederasiwn Clybiau Ffermwyr Ieuainc Cymru*	✓	✓dif	✓dif	×
44.	*Ffederasiwn Cymdeithasau Chwareon yr Anabl {Cymru}*	✓	✓	×	×
45.	*Fforwm Ieuenctid Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
46.	*Y Figan Cymreig*	✓	✓	✓	×
47.	*Grwp Gweithredu Rheiffyrdd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
48.	*Grwp Meniere's a Tinnitus Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
49.	*Guides Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
50.	*Gwasanaeth Ieuenctid Eglwys Bresbyteriadd Cymru*	✓	×	×	×
51.	*Gweithredu Cymunedd Myfyrwyr - Rhanbarth Cymru a'r Gorllewin*	✓	✓cdf	✓cdf	×
52.	*Gwerin y Coed*	✓	✓	✓	✓eng
53.	*Gwobr dug Caeredin*	✓	✓	×	×
54.	*John Groom's Cymdeithas i Bobl Anabl*	✓	×	×	×
55.	*Merched y Wawr*	✓	✓	✓	×
56.	*Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin*	✓	✓	✓	✓eng
57.	*Myalgic Encepalomyelitis - Grwp Canolbarth Cymru*	✓	×	×	×
58.	Parent to Parent Information on Adoption Services	✓	✓	✓	×
59.	*Plant yng Nghymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
60.	*Pont*	✓	✓	✓	×
61.	*Pwyllgor Tywysog Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
62.	*Rhwydwaith Ewropeaidd Merched Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×
63.	*Samariad yng Ngogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
64.	*Shelter Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
65.	*Ty Hafan - The Children's Hospice in Wales*	✓	✓	×	×
66.	*Yr Undeb Celtaidd - Cangen Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
67.	*Uned Plentyndod Cynnar Plant yng Nghymru*	✓	✓	✓dif	×
68.	*Urdd Gobaith Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	✓eng
69.	*Ymchwil Cancr Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
70.	*Ymchwil Canser Tenovus*	✓	✓	×	×
71.	*Yr Ymddiriedolaeth Genedlaethol am Lefydd o Ddiddordeb Hanesyddol neu Harddwch Naturiol - De Cymru*	✓	✓	×	×
72.	*Yr Ymddiriedolaeth Genedlaethol am Lefydd o Ddiddordeb Hanesyddol neu Harddwch Naturiol - Gogledd Cymru*	✓	✓	✓	×

Key

cdf=Cardiff only; dif=slightly different title in this year; eng=english language entry

A similar increase has taken place in the number of organisations accenting their Welsh identity in the English language. Consider Table 3:3 below:

Table 3:3

Organisations with 'Welsh' as first word in title 1988-1995[139]

	Name of organisation	1995	1994	1991	1988
1.	Welsh Amateur Boxing Association	✓	✓	×	×
2.	Welsh Amateur Fencing Union	✓	✓	×	×
3.	Welsh Amateur Gymnastic Association	✓	✓	×	×
4.	Welsh Amateur Music Federation	✓	✓	✓	×
5.	Welsh Amateur Swimming Association	✓	✓	×	×
6.	Welsh Anti-Poverty Network	✓	✓	×	×
7.	Welsh Association of Youth Clubs	✓	✓	✓	✓
8.	Welsh Badminton Union	✓	✓	×	×
9.	Welsh Canoeing Association	✓	✓	×	×
10.	Welsh Centre for International Affairs	✓	✓	✓	×
11.	Welsh Council on Alcohol and Other Drugs	✓	✓	×	×
12.	Welsh Cricket Association	✓	✓	×	×
13.	Welsh Curling Association	✓	✓	×	×
14.	Welsh Cycling Union	✓	✓	×	×
15.	Welsh Disabled Motorists' Clubs	✓	✓	✓	✓SW
16.	The Welsh Federation of Boys and Girls Clubs	✓	✓	×	×
17.	Welsh Folkdance Society	✓	✓	×	×
18.	Welsh Historic Gardens Trust	✓	✓	✓	×
19.	Welsh Hockey Association	✓	✓	×	×
20.	Welsh Indoor bowls Association	✓	✓	×	×
21.	Welsh Initiative for Conductive Education	✓	✓	×	×
22.	Welsh Ladies Indoor Bowling Association	✓	✓	×	×
23.	Welsh Lawn Tennis Association	✓	✓	×	×
24.	Welsh Railways Action Group	✓	✓	✓	✓
25.	Welsh Refugee Council	✓	✓	×	×
26.	Welsh Sports and Recreation Association for the Visually Impaired	✓	✓	✓	×
27.	Welsh Squash Rackets Federation	✓	✓	×	×
28.	Welsh Tenants Federation	✓	✓	✓ nw/sw	×
29.	Welsh Tug of War Association	✓	✓	×	×

[139]Sources: (Garfield, 1988; Garfield, 1991; Garfield, 1994; Garfield, 1995).

30.	Welsh Vocational Trainers Association	✓	✓	×	×
31.	Welsh Voluntary Aids Forum	✓	✓	✓	×
32.	Welsh Water Ski Association	✓	✓	×	×
33.	Welsh Women's Aid	✓	✓	✓	✓
34.	Welsh Women's Bowling Association	✓	✓	×	×
34.	Welsh Women's Hockey Association	✓	✓	×	×
35.	Welsh Yachting Association	✓	✓	×	×

The lists above are not comprehensive. Changes in the identity of the Red Cross in Wales, for instance, provides us with another specific example of this process. Now known as *Croes Goch Cymru*, it has been developing a Welsh identity. As the fundraising and PR Officer for the organisation has stated:

> 'in Wales, I and my colleagues in the other branches feel very strongly about having a Welsh identity for Red Cross, and in fact we do call ourselves *Croes Goch Cymru* and we are trying to get NHQ to let us produce more and more things in bilingual form'.[140]

At this point we focus on the two areas that have been most politically contentious and which have constituted the most significant force for the dissemination of productive and reproductive values in the 1980s. The first, education, has a significant institutional dimension that accords with the arguments developed above.

3.5 A Case Study of Two Policy Areas - I} The Structure and System of Education in Wales

Like many aspects of public policy in the modern state, education policy has many facets, though overall it is characterised by vigorous politicisation,[141] since the 1960s in particular. It was during this period that the political consensus surrounding the 1944 Education Act began to

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[140](Strigner, 1995, 178)

[141](Thomas, 1983b, 1). For commentary on the particularistic role of education in pre-industrial societies see (Gellner, 1964, 38).

deteriorate, especially under the Wilson administration which, with Crosland as Education Secretary, sanctioned the process of school comprehensivisation via Circular 10/64. Consideration of the rate of report production provides further evidence, *inter alia*, of the increased political salience of education policy. Between 1944 and 1959, four reports were commissioned by government. By contrast between 1960 and 1993 twenty-nine were commissioned.

Though these figures provide an indication of the increased political salience of education, it would be unwise to attempt to develop the point much further without more sophisticated analysis. It is difficult, for instance, to separate political involvement from other facts, like governmental involvement for functional reasons, such as increased emphasis on working committees due to increased workload. A useful method of developing the argument would be to examine the composition of the reporting committees, their remit, degree of autonomy, and the response to their findings. Such an undertaking is not possible here, but secondary sources do provide evidence for varying degrees of independence amongst committees, the use of administrative gatekeepers, and varying take-up of committee recommendations according to political circumstances.[142]

Politicisation in the Welsh context can be demonstrated by reference to a bitter debate over the quality of Welsh education. In 1981 an article was published in the Times Educational Supplement which argued that Welsh schools' were schooling their pupils into failure.[143] The response to this allegation was overwhelmingly negative, and the authors received hate mail

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[142]The composition of the Robbins Committee (1963), compared with Kingman (1988) provides useful data in this respect. For an introduction to the literature see (Elwyn Jones, 1988; Elwyn Jones, 1990; Elwyn Jones, 1991; Hunt, 1987; Kogan, 1993; Shafer, 1983; Simon, 1988).

[143](Reynolds & Murgatroyd, 1981)

and even death threats.[144] The debate extended well beyond the educational community; but what is perhaps more interesting is that the discourse centred around an alleged betrayal of Wales and Welsh identity, and not education quality *per se*. Note that education was not transferred to the Welsh Office until 1969, despite the assumption on the Crowther Committee's part that it would have been one of the first functions to be transferred,[145] providing indirect evidence of the politicisation of education in Wales; a conclusion at variance with the assertion elsewhere that 'powers were conceded in a random fashion'.[146]

Two broad structural distinctions are immediately discernible in the motives and effect of education policy, one practical and functional, one expressive and cultural.[147] The functional aspect of education, in its most elementary manifestation, concerns the exercise of dissemination and accumulation of knowledge. On a more subtle level the functional aspect of education concerns the quasi-utilitarian rational application of that knowledge to serve society. The structure of education can furthermore be placed within a systemic dimension. In the context of Welsh autonomism the structure of education has to be considered in the wider systemic context because of the role of non-structural agencies - especially teachers in the dissemination of identity bundles. The latter will be discussed in the following chapter. This

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[144](Reynolds, 1990, 254). For a related case see (Delamont, 1987, 91-92).
[145](Jones, 1988a, 52). Later renamed the Kilbrandon Committee after the death of the first chairman (Morgan, 1992, 289).
[146](Jones, 1988a, 52). Politicisation is also apparent in relations between Welsh and English departments in schools (Payton, 1990).
[147](Brock & Tulasiewicz, 1985b, 1). There is some overlap between these two categories. An alternative typology posits five dimensions to education - cultural transmission, vocational, learner-centred, and discipline-centred (Williams, 1991a). Both conceptualisations can form the background to the argument here.

section is concerned primarily with changes in the structure of Welsh education.

The other, cultural, aspect of education is complex. It has been argued that the state must create or maintain its identity in order to endure, a process that can involve a high degree of homogenisation.[148] The state does not merely manipulate identity; identity, or at least the process of identity standardisation that comes with industrialisation, can manipulate the state.[149]

Narrative evidence suggesting state anxiety over the creation of separate education systems can be found in analysing the remarks of Dr. N. Tate, Chief Executive of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority in England. He has argued on several occasions that schools need to promote Englishness in the context of French and Welsh education systems emphasising their national identities.[150] Also instructive in this discourse is the way that English is conflated with British, as one reporter writes:

> 'But Dr Tate insisted that he was not attacking other cultures, merely stressing the need for schools to promote "Englishness" or "Britishness" in the way that the French and Welsh education systems unashamedly emphasised their national identities'.[151]

This quotation is indicative of an inherent problematic within English identity, its association with Britishness to such an extent that the reporter following the discourse of Dr. Tate felt able to place Welsh identity in a separate category altogether.[152]

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[148](Adams, 1971)
[149](Gellner, 1964). The argument here is one of emphasis not causality, c.f. (Mackintosh, 1971, 136).
[150](Marston, 1995, my emphasis)
[151](Marston, 1995)
[152]See discussion on this point in (Bell, 1995c, 11-13).

Dr. Tate has also championed the cause of celebration British {read English?} heroes.[153] The newspaper report is worth quoting:

> 'In British schools, according to Nick Tate... the contribution of our greatest sea faring hero was being pushed aside and, like that of other national greats, treated with scepticism ... Tate lamented the contemporary obsession with "toppling historic heroes from their pedestals". "It's very good to be celebrating Nelson in more than a one off event, because he is more likely to remain a key part of the national consciousness".[154]

Tate's view of the role of education, though from a different perspective, appears to be surprisingly close to that of Welsh autonomists. Interviewed for a Sunday newspaper he stated that:

> "Those who take a relativist view of things feel you have to be apologetic about traditions, that all cultures are equal and none should be deemed greater than any other. But if you are born into a particular cultural tradition that is very strong, you reject it at your peril".[155]

Tate does differ from the Welsh autonomists, however, in one significant respect - for the most part the latter are enthusiastic about incorporating the European dimension into education, whereas Tate and, as a consequence the 1995 English National Curriculum, is not.[156] In fact the European Dimension does not appear in six out of the eleven National Curriculum subjects. To this end, one scholar has posited,

> 'a conflict of goals... within the National Curriculum {for England} between its modernising economic mission on the one hand and its insular cultural strategy on the other'.[157]

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[153](Wroe, 1995)
[154](Wroe, 1995). See also (Education Conference Report, 1996).
[155](Petre, 1995)
[156](Morrell, 1996, 7)
[157](Morrell, 1996, 7)

The National Curriculum cannot escape, either, tensions in the asymmetric identity structures of the British Isles. The National Curriculum History Working Group Final Report, for instance, expressed in para 4.23 its desire to increase the non-English content of British (sic) history.[158]

Identity is often formed during one's childhood. Empirical research conducted in Wales, for instance, has shown that children as young as three can exhibit racial awareness,[159] and that in a humour-based experiment affective ethnic preference was manifest in 5 year-old children.[160] The researchers found that children who had been educated for one year in a Welsh-speaking school found a humorous story funnier when the butt was English rather than Welsh.[161] These exigencies may have identive and political implications in the context of an increasing proportion of the young population of Wales being able to speak Welsh.[162]

It appears irrefutable that one of the primary and most efficient means of disseminating identity is via education,[163] this may even be an uncodified first principle of education policy in some states {particularly young or weak states}, and has been termed 'exo-socialisation'.[164] Education has the power to 'transform, or destroy a social, cultural or national identity'.[165] Cultural identity is in turn related to autonomism because it is capable of structuring experience and the perception of past experiences.[166] The fact that Tate mentions the French education system in this context is instructive. Do

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[158]Quoted in (Crick, 1990).
[159](Chapman, et al., 1977, 145; Giles, 1977, 6)
[160](Chapman, et al., 1977, 137 & 160)
[161]f=8.62, df=1.62 p<0.0005 (Chapman, et al., 1977, 162).
[162](Prentice, 1993, 108)
[163](Chapman, et al., 1977, 166)
[164](Gellner, 1964, 38)
[165](Brock & Tulasiewicz, 1985b, 1)
[166](Keesing & Keesing, 1971)

differing levels of control over education provide an explanation for the relative levels of success of modern autonomist movements in the UK and France? Breton autonomists, for instance, perceived the *Loi Deixonne* {1951}, which allowed for some Breton to be taught 'at all levels of education', to be a breakthrough for their movement.[167] Initial enthusiasm was quelled somewhat by inertia in implementation, and it soon became apparent that this, and the Berthoin reforms, did not fundamentally alter the status quo. The Fifth Republic like,

> 'the newly established Republican governments, particulary at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, regarded state education as the prime means of winning over hearts and minds to republicanism'.[168]

The privileged position of intellectuals in France, too,

> 'derives from the fundamental place accorded to the education system in the construction and stability of the nation'.[169]

The French education system, however, may no longer be capable of transmitting state values,[170] perhaps because the values conveyed have remained relatively unaltered since Jules Ferry.[171] The turmoil over education in France since 1984 would seem to support these arguments, and are perhaps indicative of chinks in the unitary armour of this particular nation-state.

It would seem that control over the content and structure of education provides a key to the attitudes of a future generation of citizens, but that this key does necessarily opens the right doors. The distinguished educationalist

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[167](McDonald, 1989, 52)
[168](Lewis, 1985a, 3-4)
[169](McDonald, 1989, 3)
[170](Hoffmann, 1993, 64)
[171](Boyzon-Fradet, 1992, 149)

W. D. Halls points out that the progressive philosophy of education engendered in schools since World War Two has created a spirit of rebellion which states are now trying to curb.[172]

Nevertheless, in Britain, and elsewhere within the EU, schooling has been a tool for the maintenance of the fabric of the state. As W.D. Halls states,

> 'politically education has always been used by the politicians as a tool for what they wanted.. the fast promotion of national sentiment'.[173]

Put another way,

> 'The state has many effective means for inculcating love of country and love of political institutions - what social scientists collectively term political socialisation. Not the least effective of these is control of public education and, particularly, control over the history courses'.[174]

The perceived need for a unified British state grew with the industrial revolution and the increase of perceived threats from abroad. A mass education system, initiated in 1833, followed in the wake of these developments. Though during this period the teacher training schools were subject to greater central control than the content of the curriculum or the administration of education:

> 'In the nineteenth century, teacher training colleges were called "normal schools". All teachers were supposed to be alike, teaching according to the "norm". the teachers who supervised students on teaching practise were called "normal masters" '.[175]

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[172](Halls, 1993). It is useful here to distinguish between education and schooling; where schooling is the 'institutionalisation of education as a purposive or intentional socio-cultural process' (Tomiak, 1991, 1).

[173](Halls, 1993)

[174](Connor, 1993, 387). The rewriting of history also provided massive impetus to modern autonomist movements (Davies, 1989, 15).

[175](Wragg, 1996)

Nevertheless, whichever method has been used, the central state in the UK has for a considerable period attempted to utilise education to promulgate approved social patterns for the purposes of social control:

> 'when the {British} state first started taking an interest in the situation in 1833 the idea was that you had to keep the working classes occupied. You had to produce clerks who were literate and people who could read instructions on machines in order to work some kind of capitalist system... and I think to a certain extent that kind of attitude still prevails. It has all sorts of political ramifications, I think, with the insistence now on technological education and education for society. It is for the needs of society, it is not for the individual... I think politicians tend to forget that there is a child being educated at the end if it'.[176]

Smith places the argument above in a broader context in his depiction of the development of the 'scientific state'.

> 'But how... are the masses integrated into the nation? How are these numberless, faceless individuals interrelated? By the new modes of communication and by the new cognition, science'.[177]

Later he argues that the state

> 'seeks to homogenise the population within its boundaries for administrative purposes by utilising the latest scientific techniques and methods for the sake of "efficiency" '.[178]

Welsh history provides substantive examples of the processes depicted above. The Merthyr and Newport uprisings of 1831 and 1839 led to Government investigations of the Welsh education system which were couched in the discourse of science, progress and integration. Integration seemed to take precedence, however, as the following parliamentary exchange reveals,

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[176](Halls, 1993). For more discussion on this theme see (Marshall & Tucker, 1992).
[177](Smith, 1986, 171)
[178](Smith, 1991b, 135)

> '{Mr. Williams calls for an 'Inquiry into the state of education} If the Welsh had the same advantages for education as the Scotch, they would, instead of appearing a distinct people, in no respect differ from the English; would it not then, be wisdom and sound policy to send the English schoolmaster amongst them?'[179]

In his reply, Sir James Graham equates a lack of ability in the English language with, *inter alia*, moral turpitude:

> '... a knowledge of the English language would be highly conducive to the welfare of the working classes throughout the whole of Wales. I entertain no doubt whatever that their ignorance greatly interferes with their prosperity, and prevents their rising in the scale of society; and I regret to say, that in some parts of the Principality the ignorance of the people not only lowers them intellectually, but depraves their moral qualities'.[180]

The 1847 Report on Education in Wales followed, and its publication Welsh perceptions of the link between language, education and national consciousness.[181] This now infamous report began life in 1846 when the Government appointed 'three Commissioners to report on education in Wales, especially on "the means afforded to the labouring classes" of learning English'.[182] The brief also advised them 'to form some estimate... on the general condition of society'.[183] One of the three, none of whom spoke Welsh, was a 27 year-old fellow of Balliol, R.W.W. Lingen. His submissions to the report concerned the counties of Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire and Glamorgan.[184] Knowing little of Wales, Lingen's attitudes were profoundly influenced by those whose counsel he sought, who were in the main local squires and Anglican clergy. Revealing his interlocutors distaste for the

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[179](Hansard, 1846, 853-4)
[180](Hansard, 1846, 861)
[181](Elwyn Jones, 1990b, 201)
[182](Morgan, 1995, 72)
[183](Morgan, 1995, quoted on p.72)
[184](Morgan, 1995, 72)

labouring classes and Nonconformity, Lingen wrote that the religious zeal of the Welsh was attendant on untruthfulness, intemperance and unchastity.

Lingen and the other two, also commissioned by the state, reveal, moreover, that the threat from within was a source of constant apprehension, a worry that is conveyed in the emotive and figurative language of the report. The report, sometimes referred to as the *Blue Books*, incensed a sufficient number of Welsh people that the document and the events surrounding it became known as the *Brad y Llyfrau Gleision* {The Treachery of the Blue Books}.[185] Depicting the Welsh education system as inadequate,[186] and the Welsh as 'given to drunkenness, blasphemy, indecency, sexual vices and lawlessness',[187] this report became like a beacon for the autonomist cause and is still cited today in discourse and literature.[188] The reaction to the Blue Books indicates the sensitivity of the Welsh to state interference in education, particularly any legislation perceived to affect the delicate balance between autonomy and assimilation.[189]

Historically, the central state has appealed to the aspirant classes in Wales, which have traditionally been less concerned with perceived threats to identity, with greater success.[190] It is to this group that the Report of the Departmental Committee on Intermediate and Higher Education in Wales {1881}, which spoke of 'the desire among the Welsh people for a better education', was addressed.[191] The deliberations of the Aberdare

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[185](Davies, 1983b, 5)
[186]A judgement which was well-founded (Morgan, 1981, 10).
[187](Morgan, 1992a)
[188]As one Welsh autonomist put it recently, 'The commission sent to assess the educational situation in Wales reported that Welsh was only the language of perjury (Evans, 1991, 39).
[189](Okey, 1991, 1)
[190]See (Jones, 1995a, 17) for a discussion on the attitudes of Railway Stationmasters in Wales in the nineteenth century .
[191](Brinley Jones, 1986)

Committee,[192] were later mirrored by the intense debates between Owen Edwards on the one hand and at various times the Central Welsh Board,[193] Welsh Second Schools Heads,[194] Major Edgar Jones,[195] and the Rhondda Education Authority.[196]

Owen Edwards wanted the children to be educated in the subjects he perceived to be central to Wales, particularly the Welsh language and literature, and the history and geography of Wales.[197] He also articulated the need for the more extensive teaching of craft subjects.[198] The majority of Edwards' opponents on the other hand, suspicious of his cultural nationalism,[199] wanted the children to learn Latin and be educated in the classical humanist tradition of middle-class England, and in English. Social advancement was crucial to their perception of the purpose of education.[200] The debate illustrates different conceptualisations of the role of education in Wales, and in Britain in general which still resonate today.

It seems, at one level, counter-intuitive that the British state should choose to instigate a partially separate education policy in Wales. There are five interlinked explanations for this exigency. It is possible that such an action was perceived to be administratively convenient, since Wales could be functionally as well as culturally differentiated within the UK, secondly, and more plausibly, it could have been politically efficacious as a limited concession to the growing autonomist impulse expressed through *Cymru*

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[192](Davies, 1993, 447-448)
[193](Morgan, 1988, 97)
[194](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 97 - ff2 On O.M Edwards manuscript)
[195](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 87)
[196](Dafis, 1993)
[197](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 95)
[198](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 87)
[199](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 88)
[200](Dafis, 1993)

Fydd. Third, agencies within the administration may have wished to promote such a policy, fourth, state agencies and institutions became *Cymricised*, and fifth, the state could accept decentralised administration provided that a common British ethos was maintained via the 'normal' schools. Moreover, education can be decentralised yet maintain a common intent, and in so doing maintain a national identity - such is the case in the United States for instance. Wales, however, has a more powerful identive structure than the component units of the US, which made the changes in educational administration more salient.

The Intermediate Education Act of 1889 made Welsh County Councils the first local education bodies in England and Wales.[201] Furthermore, the Intermediate School concept that the Act, at least in its initial stages, was to introduce was unique to Wales. The progression from White Paper to Act, however, rendered the system less distinctive. In 1906, the Liberals returned to power and created a Welsh Department of the Board of Education with a Permanent Secretary with direct access to the Minister. Though located in London, the department assumed a Welsh identity. A.T. Davies, the first Permanent Secretary, declared that

> 'the most important service the establishment of the Welsh Department has rendered to Wales is undoubtedly the recognition thereby accorded to the fact of the separate and distinct identity of Wales'.[202]

There is evidence that the 'unique' administrative system championed by A.T. Davies was soon colonised by the more dominant English structure. The corollary is that education policy has been a means of challenging Welsh identity. Plaid Cymru itself began life as a movement dedicated to utilising

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[201]Similar institutions existed in Scotland from the sixteenth century.

[202](Randall, 1972, 357)

the limited concessions in the field of education to further its own ends of linguistic and cultural preservation, a policy which remained broadly unchanged until World War Two.[203]

Some scholars argue that new educational structures created in the 1980s, far from composing a major decentralised system in the EU, have become as centralised as any other in curriculum matters as a result of the 1988 Education Act.[204] This 'centralisation' occurs when a Wales-scale Quango replaces localised local government units of control. For instance, on 1 April 1993, responsibility for funding the entire non-university higher education sector in Wales was transferred to the Higher Education Funding Council {HEFC} for Wales, under the overall control of the Welsh Office.

Interestingly, these events have occurred at a time when Europe-wide research reveals a groundswell of opinion against centralisation and bureaucratisation,[205] and despite independent evidence indicating the advantages of a decentralised system.[206] These trends were not lost on government agencies, who chose to champion the new education initiatives as victories for decentralisation and local control, where other sources indicated that the reality amounted to a 'massive centralisation of power over the system'.[207] In the Welsh education system, it can be argued that the old system of hierachy has been swept aside. Centralisation has taken place for instance on policy levels whereby the 1988 and 1992 Education Acts successively removed higher and further education from local authority

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[203](Davies, 1983b, 262)
[204](McLean, 1990, 10)
[205](Majone, 1993)
[206](Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, 1992; Helm & Smith, 1989). Centralisation has also been linked to the loss of autonomy, and it has been intimated that those who sponsor social science through the ESRC have become subservient to government (Kogan, 1993, 55).
[207](Elwyn Jones, 1990a, 205)

control.[208] The resource base of schools has also undergone what can be described as a quasi-centralisation resulting from the creation of {at least initially} state-dominated funding councils, assessment councils, and education quangos.[209]

The type of centralisation we have been discussing however must be regarded as qualitatively different from what would normally be considered to be the defining features of the concept; and to have differing consequences - not least the strengthening of the Welsh institutional dimension.

The changes have also affected the style of educational management in Wales. Local Education Authorities {LEAs} have lost a considerable degree of budgetary authority to local management systems {LMS} in Wales. LEAs now have to delegate up to 85% of schools' budgets. Powys LEAs have exceeded that total and delegate up to 96% of their secondary budget and 92% of their primary budget.[210] LEAs have in addition been required to apply a market philosophy to education. They are now run on the basis of a core-unit model, split into puchaser, and other business units. LEAs still, however, have the capacity to provide a creative leadership role, particularly since the opt-out programme for education has not found much favour in Wales - in 1995 only 11 of the 227 secondary schools in Wales had become GM Schools: 4 in Clwyd, 3 in Gwent, 3 in South Glamorgan, and 1 in West Glamorgan.[211] Such is the level of politicisation of the GM initiatives in Wales, the Welsh Office declined to publish the three hundred responses

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[208]One scholar has argued that these acts are in 'a direct line of succession' from the 1976 Education Act requiring local authorities to create comprehensive secondary schools (Elwyn Jones, 1990a, 204).
[209]For example; the Further Education Funding Council for Wales, ACAC {formerly CCW} Curriculum and Assessment Council for Wales, and the Wales Youth Agency in Caerphilly.
[210](Confidential Source F, 1994)
[211](Welsh Office, 1995b; Welsh Office, 1995c; Welsh Office, 1995d; Welsh Office, 1995e; Welsh Office, 1995f; Welsh Office, 1995g; Welsh Office, 1995h; Welsh Office, 1995i)

from within Wales to its 1992 'Choice and Diversity' white paper which was intended to expand GM provision.[212]

The system, moreover, has been further restructured since April 1996, when the new unitary authorities assumed control of local government in Wales, which according to some will be detrimental to LEA power bases.[213] There exist, however, alternative lines of communication and authority which may serve to ameliorate this effect. The all-Wales examination board, the Welsh Joint Education Committee {WJEC}, for instance, which has 'like its predecessor before 1951, the Central Welsh Board.. over the years assumed the role of a national institution',[214] may have the capacity to occupy lacunae of authority since divested from the LEAs. Supporting this argument, schools in Wales have traditionally remained overwhelmingly loyal to the WJEC.[215] Concern has been expressed in recent autonomist literature, however, that this loyalty may no longer be so binding:

> 'For the present, the role of the WJEC in Wales needs to be supported in the face of an increasing use of English examination boards to examine Welsh pupils'.[216]

Note that the author of these words is also a key administrator in the Wales Council for Voluntary Action {WCVA}, a fact which supports the argument, proposed in the introduction and developed further below, concerning the self-positioning of pro-autonomists in key strategic domains of state and civil administration.

Turning to the substance of the quotation itself, from a <u>cultural</u> autonomist's perspective, the break-up of the existing LEAs may have

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[212](Jeremy, 1993; Welsh Office, 1992)
[213](Fisher, 1994)
[214](Jones, 1988b, 99)
[215](Jones, 1988b, 99)
[216](Plaid Cymru, 1996)

positive consequences, since it must be acknowledged that a tension between local autonomy and the quality of language policy can arise. This exigency is perhaps implicit in our earlier discussion of administrative gatekeepers {see also Chapter Four} where we suggested that autonomous local authorities resisted Welsh language policy innovation. One scholar has argued, for instance, that,

> 'one of the main obstacles to the development of a coherent national language policy was the marked degree of local autonomy in the education systems of England and Wales'.[217]

However, factors exist which would seem to indicate that the system has become decentralised across a new dimension, particularly if the shift in the locus of control from Whitehall to Cathay's Park is taken as a decentralising process.[218] In addition Government commitment to the Welsh language has been characterised in recent years as 'unequivocal'[219] - though there would now seem to be two loci of 'government' in education policy - Central Government and the Welsh Office. Section 21 of the 1980 Education Act, for instance, enabled the Welsh Secretary of State to grant aid to LEAs and other bodies for the purpose of Welsh language education.[220] Furthermore the Education {School Information} Regulations of 1981 required LEAs and individual schools to publish policies regarding the use of Welsh commencing in the academic year 1982-3.[221]

Attitudinal and power shifts are both a cause and a consequence of the manifest structural changes in the Welsh education system {the very fact we

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[217](Edwards, 1984, 51)
[218]Perhaps the term 'exogenous decentralisation' employed here would avoid any confusion between this process and the 'endogenous centralisation' implied by the transfer of authority from local to sub-central administrative units discussed earlier.
[219](Edwards, 1984, 71)
[220](Edwards, 1984, 72)
[221](Edwards, 1984, 72)

can now use this term is a case in point}. From 1979 to c.1988 four types of school in Wales can be posited.[222]

1. Traditional Welsh-medium schools
2. *Ysgolion Cymraeg*[223]
3. Schools Council Bilingual Education Project Schools {est. 1969}; 300 institutions participating
4. Traditional English-medium schools

The development of the *Curriculum Cymreig* since 1988 has entailed marked adjustments. Significantly there has been a steady growth of designated bilingual schools emerging from sector three; that coupled with the development of purpose built *Ysgolion Cymraeg* suggests that the above typology is being overtaken by events. The third type of school, moreover, no longer officially exists - it is now expected that participating schools have either become bilingual or reverted to English-medium schools.[224] Bilingual schools and *Ysgolion Cymraeg* have become an increasingly significant within the maintained education sector in Wales, with the former increasingly focusing on Welsh language activities.

The typology currently employed by the Welsh Office recognises only two broad categories of school - Welsh-medium and English-medium.[225] The former category is further divided into 'natural' bilingual schools - that is schools in areas where Welsh is predominantly spoken in the community - and 'designated' schools - schools established in anglicised areas. These divisions are becoming increasingly blurred, however, as the consequences

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[222]From (Edwards, 1984, 72).
[223]Schools tending to concentrate exclusively on Welsh at infants stage, English thereafter (Edwards, 1984, 71).
[224](Confidential Source D, 1996)
[225](Confidential Source D, 1996)

of the influx of English speakers into the Welsh heartlands of Dyfed and Gwynedd during the 1980s are felt.[226]

The drive to unsettle existing systems provides evidence that the challenge in the perception of autonomists and the state has never been greater and, as a result of the communications revolution, more felt. This evidence for conceptually separable education systems is reinforced of course by structural separation, but also through analysis of the behaviour and responses of 'constituency' organisations. For instance it would appear to be no accident that the first Conference of the History of Education Society to be held outside England was convened at Cardiff University in December 1989, shortly after the ERA was instituted, ostensibly to mark the centenary of another piece of legislation which emphasised structural if not cultural Welsh distinctiveness, the Welsh Intermediate and Technical Education Act 1889.[227]

The content of the 1988 and 1992 Education Acts in the UK also provides a case to argue that a political party is not above engaging in constituency building through the medium of education policy.[228] There is evidence that the force of the challenge from the state unified opposition in Wales to any centralisation of educational control.[229] The language and education issue, however, particularly the anti-Welsh medium 'education first'

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[226](Confidential Source D, 1996). We perhaps ought to add to this list the following: Opted out schools and Independent sector schools. However, they play a relatively insignificant role in the Welsh context.

[227](Allsbrook, 1990, 181)

[228]A more benign interpretation would be that policy makers had become aware of a growing body of scholarly literature positing the value of minority cultures and languages, and realised that the conceptual frames of reference they contain may have valuable lessons for mainstream culture (Fishman, 1988).

[229](Dafis, 1993). It is difficult to make a decisive statement on this matter since other indicators show that in certain areas the reforms have had a decentralising effect; for instance in providing an opportunity for the independent development of campus sites (Smith, 1994); whilst other scholars have traced the trend towards centralisation from the 1970s (Elwyn Jones, 1990a, 204), or the earlier notion of common socialisation through centralisation (McLean, 1985).

campaign, has been more divisive,[230] as has the debate over Grant Maintained Schools in Wales.

Notwithstanding these divisions, a loose coalition of interest groups attacked what they perceived to be the flaws in both Education Bills, and succeeded in winning a number of concessions.[231] As the TES correspondent put it,

> 'Now deep-rooted fears that the very Welshness of Wales is under threat have brought together teachers, governors, parents, voluntary groups and churches... Twelve organisations united to call an independent review of education in Wales... groups include teacher trade unions, parents for Welsh medium education, the Welsh League Of Youth, the nursery school movement, Wales association of women and the WJEC'.[232]

Significant pressure was exerted upon the then Curriculum Council for Wales {CCW}, which advised the Secretary of State on the curriculum and provided advice and guidance to teachers.[233] Similar demands were placed on the CCW's successor, the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales {ACAC}:

> 'In the absence of a Welsh parliament, the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales should be responsible for the development of a comprehensive 'Curriculum for Wales'... The high standard attained in our Welsh medium and bilingual schools shows what is possible when we build on the basis of our Welsh identity. The provision of Welsh medium education at all levels must be increased and we should immediately move towards the establishment of Welsh as a core subject in all schools in Wales'.[234]

The Welsh debate on education was also characterised by a more pluralistic attitude which enabled wider degrees of consultation, at least before

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[230](Wigley, 1992)
[231](Confidential Source E, 1994)
[232](Dean, 1993)
[233](Central Office of Information - Reference Services, 1993b, 59-60)
[234](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 20)

the 'opt-out' debate. The relationship between Welsh politicians and the Education Unions, for instance, can be contrasted markedly with that prevailing in England:

> 'Welsh Education Minister Sir Wyn Roberts addressed an NUT gathering last year, an unthinkable scenario for Education Secretary John Patten'.[235]

Many of the groups seeking to influence education reform in Wales are strongly associated with the Welsh language, and *vice versa*. The four major interest groups in this respect are the *Urdd* {The Welsh League of Youth}, the National Eisteddfod, the Welsh Books Council and *Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin* {MYM - Nursery Schools Movement}. Significantly these organisations are perceived as 'constituency' groups by the Cultural and Recreation Division, the main Welsh Office Department dealing with language issues. They are known in office parlance as the 'big four'.[236]


The issue of bilingualism, promoted by these high-profile groups, has also underscored the debate on the development of a recognisably Welsh curriculum, *Yr Curriculum Cymreig*. In the context of identity transformation the growth of designated bilingual schools in non-Welsh speaking areas is of particular interest; it is charted in the figures below.

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[235](Dore, 1993)
[236](Confidential Source M, 1996)

Figure 3:1

Designated Bilingual Schools in Wales 1960-1988[237]



[237]Source: (Welsh Office, 1986, 46). Note: At January each year. The figures do not include the large number of schools in mainly Welsh speaking areas where the main medium of instruction is Welsh.

The data given above, and below especially, is instructive given that empirical research has shown that the most positive attitudes to Welsh are found amongst children attending bilingual schools in English speaking areas of Wales,[238] and that it is in these schools that positive attitudes to the Welsh language are expressed most forcefully.[239] Non-departmental public bodies {and therefore at one level removed state agencies} have been manifestly involved in the process of Welsh medium provision in Anglicised areas of Wales, the identive and political consequences of which we are attempting to analyse *inter alia* in the course of this thesis. The Welsh Joint Education Committee {WJEC}, which has both the Welsh Office and, until 1996, the LEAs as its constituents, published an influential report in 1976,[240] the proposals of which, including the need to publish language policy statements, were broadly accepted by LEAs.[241] The WJEC has supported the development of the Welsh language in other ways; for instance through the operation of the Welsh Books Scheme, which provides a market for Welsh language publications, and its establishment and support of the National Language Unit.

From this we can see that language reproduction is taking place in key strategic domains of the state, and that education is the most obvious domain.[242] The figures below provides an indication of the institutionalisation of the Welsh language in non-Welsh speaking areas.

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[238](Chapman, et al., 1977, 146)
[239](Chapman, et al., 1977, 151)
[240](WJEC, 1976)
[241](Edwards, 1984, 72)
[242](Williams, 1996)

Figure 3.2

Growth in numbers of full time pupils attending designated Welsh schools





Figure 3:3

Growth of designated bilingual schools in predominantly English speaking areas by County 1983-1986[243]



243 Sources for Figs. 3:2 and 3:3 (Welsh Office, 1983, 156; Welsh Office, 1986, 156)

As stated in Chapter One Gwent provides the data for our disaggregated case since it is the most Anglicised of all the Welsh counties.[244] Indicators of attitudinal shift towards the Welsh language have been increasingly prevalent since the late 1980s, and on a number of levels. This is predicated by earlier statistical and qualitative analyses which found close and statistically significant positive correlations between bilingual schooling and various other indicators of Welshness, such that Welsh language schooling could be posited, *inter alia*, as a tool of ethnicity reinforcement.[245] As the same author, himself a product of Welsh medium education, writes in an earlier article:

> 'the growing success of Welsh-medium education... accelerated the development of a young cohort of Welsh speakers fully equipped to use their Welsh in all aspects of public life within Wales... Many members of the Language Society were representative of this new development'.[246]

By 1988, *Mudiad Ysgol Meithrin*, a Welsh language nursery organisation that depends on grass roots support, had established over 20 new groups in Gwent.[247] Attitudes in local government reflected grass roots changes; for instance in February 1988 Gwent County Council announced that it would no longer oppose bilingual road signs,[248] a decision of symbolic significance. Furthermore, in September 1988 the first Welsh medium comprehensive in Gwent was inaugurated, *Cwm-Carn* in the Ebbw Valley. Incidentally, partly as a result of the activities of MYM, Wales has a much higher level of under-fives

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[244](Pryce, 1988, 48). Though the people of the former county area possess an identity marker in that they speak a 'distinctive form of colloquial English' (Pryce, 1988, 49).
[245](Williams, 1979a, 33 & 53)
[246](Williams, 1977a, 441)
[247](Pryce, 1988, 79). Concern has been expressed, however, by a number of Welsh language groups at the implications of the new unitary authorities for language provision in predominantly English speaking areas (Tomos, 1994, 10).
[248](Pryce, 1988, 79)

at school {69.9%} than that found in the UK {52.7%},[249] with a significant proportion receiving early instruction through the medium of Welsh.

The structural separation discussed above extends to the oversight of educational institutions. That is the Chief Inspector of Schools in England does not perform the same role in Wales, where the OHMCI was split away from the Welsh Office Department of Education in 1992. The present incumbent is Roy James. This is perhaps just as well, since the current appointee in England, Chris Woodhead, is proving as controversial as Dr. Tate:

> 'Sir Malcolm Thornton, chairman of the Commons Select Committee on Education since 1988 says the partisan approach of Chris Woodhead risks undermining the independence of Ofsted, the schools inspectorate'.[250]

The report goes on to say that,

> 'he antagonised both Conservative and Labour local education authorities by publishing a pamphlet under the banner of the right-wing think tank Politeia, which questioned the need for education authorities and claimed that trendy teaching methods rather than spending cuts were to blame for falling standards in schools'.[251]

Tensions are not confined to these 'macro' levels, but also subsist at a community level. The conflict over *Ysgol Tryfan* is addressed in Chapter Five; more recently a dispute arose over the creation of the first grant maintained primary school in Wales.[252] Forty per cent of *Ysgol Gynradd Caergeiliog*'s intake is comprised of children of parents working at nearby RAF Valley, creating tensions between the 'local' and 'transient' communities

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[249](Blackaby, Murphy, & Thomas, 1994, 215)
[250](Narayan, 1996)
[251](Narayan, 1996)
[252](Prestage, 1993)

to the extent that Handel Morgan, the Chair of Gwynedd Education Committee said that the 'school {was} opting out of the local community'.[253]

At the same time, tensions extend beyond the boundaries of the state; as we shall see in Chapter Seven the increasing involvement of the European Community institutions in education[254] provides a focus for sub-central units opposed to increasing state centralisation. Plaid Cymru for instance stated that:

> 'We believe in a Wales as well as an European Union of the peoples, in a national culture which includes and celebrates the different cultures within the nation...specific measures are needed... including.. the inclusion in the National Curriculum of education about the full range of cultures and traditions.. Our aim is to enable young people in Wales to develop a positive identity as Welsh Europeans'.[255]

The UK, Denmark, and the German Lånder have opposed Commission proposals on the basis that they would result in an unwarranted increase in EC competence in education,[256] especially in the primary schools.[257]

Another means of affecting identity is via broadcasting systems, a subject we now turn to.

3.6 II} The Structure and System of Broadcasting in Wales

Broadcasting has been chosen as the second case, since it can be argued that the traditional cultural transmission role of education,[258] can now be equally ascribed to television and radio; though with the proviso that this potentially powerful agent for the preservation of a minority culture depends

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[253](Prestage, 1993)
[254](Beukel, 1993)
[255](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 31)
[256](Beukel, 1993, 163; George, 1991, 210).
[257](Beukel, 1993, 169).
[258](Elwyn Jones, 1991)

on the role of individual agents,[259] and the content of programming.[260] The development of the state communications systems particularly television and radio provided an unparalleled opportunity to impose 'high culture', or central state values,[261] on society, thereby creating a 'nationalism'.[262] This then begs the question of which identity is 'artificial', the answer to which is more likely to depend on the attitude of the discussant than any objective reality.[263] On the significance of communications systems themselves, there is little ambiguity in the current perception of autonomists:

> 'The development of S4C, Radio Wales and *Radio Cymru* have underlined the crucial importance of broadcasting in establishing and maintaining a cultural identity'.[264]

In the early part of the twentieth century, however, the emerging technology of broadcasting was primarily under the control of the dominant state culture.[265] The overwhelming majority of broadcasting output was in English,[266] and many Welsh autonomists perceived this as a palpable threat to Welsh culture,[267] and even Welsh self-perceptions.[268]

Autonomists in Wales, perceiving their struggle to be between two nationalisms, asymmetric in terms of size and power,[269] have generally competed with the state at the level of communication.[270] Broadcasting has

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[259](Dodson & Jones, 1984, 31)
[260](Postman, 1987)
[261](Lijphart, 1977)
[262](Gellner, 1983, 57). See (Bell, 1983, 32) on the initial role of the BBC in the process of standardisation and homogenisation of language.
[263]See for example (Esman, 1977b, 119), and for a related discussion of the nature of extra-national culture (Smith, 1991b, 158).
[264](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 42)
[265](Bell, 1983)
[266]The same can be said of other media (Williams, 1979a, 28).
[267](Davies, 1994a)
[268](Wright & Hartley, 1986)
[269](Evans, 1991, 21)
[270](Morgan, 1963, 9)

become increasingly significant in Wales, particularly with wider patterns of ownership since the late 1960s,[271] and the autonomist movement has responded to the growth in this area.[272] A radio lecture, for instance, by Saunders Lewis {*Tynged yr Iaith* - The Fate of the Language} became a seminal moment in the revival of Welsh autonomism in the 1960s.[273]

The relationship between autonomism and broadcasting in Wales can be divided into two periods. From 1924-1982 by far the most significant sector is the BBC; from 1982 onwards the role of *Sianel Pedwar Cymru* becomes of greater significance. The most interesting aspect of the former period concerns the changing orientation and role of the BBC in Wales. Up until 1937,[274] the activities of the BBC generally reinforced divisions within Wales, that between north and south in particular,[275] and maintained links with England.[276] After this began a slow process of change, moving towards recognition of Wales as a unit,[277] which served to legitimise opposition to central structures and values.[278]

Arguably Wales became a truly separate region for the BBC in the late 1970s, with the establishment of BBC Radio Wales {English language} in 1978 and BBC *Radio Cymru* {Welsh language} in 1979. Significant changes had, however, taken place earlier, most particularly the establishment of BBC Wales in 1964, the development of executive, administrative, overseeing and

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[271](Central Statistical Office, 1989)
[272](Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg, 1972)
[273](Adamson, 1991a, 124; Evans, 1991, 142)
[274]The date of the creation of a Welsh region within the BBC Home Service.
[275](Davies, 1994a)
[276]The most striking evidence in support of this argument is the creation, in 1925, of a BBC Western Region including South Wales alongside a Midlands Region which included North Wales.
[277](Davies, 1994a). The movement to reinforce Welsh identity through television and radio met with some mishaps, particularly the abortive attempt to establish a Welsh commercial television company *Teledu Cymru* in the 1960s.
[278](Bevan, 1984)

cultural bodies with a Welsh identity,[279] and in the sphere of independent broadcasting.[280]

These factors, *inter alia*, gave momentum to the devolution campaign which culminated in the Wales Act of 1978. It also has to be said that these factors were in place when the Act was overwhelmingly rejected at the referendum in 1979. The question therefore arises, at what point if at all do institutional and content changes in broadcasting translate into identifiable political changes? The next chapter will argue that the answer lies in the manner in which agents make use of these changes.

Government commit ment to changes in Welsh broadcasting did not end in 1979, though the new Conservative administration did not lightly agree to follow up its paper commitment to a new Welsh language channel. A campaign of civil disobedience by the Welsh professional classes and the threat of a hunger strike by a venerable autonomist, gave sufficient impetus to the administration to establish *Sianel Pedwar Cymru* in 1981. Operational in 1982, S4C represents one of the largest breakthroughs for autonomist sentiment in Wales, and, culturally by far the largest allocation of resources for minority purposes in the UK. S4C currently receives £66 million per annum from National Heritage,[281] 10 hours a week of Welsh programmes provided free by BBC Wales, and free English language programmes from Channel 4.[282]

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[279]These include the National Broadcasting Council for Wales, which superseded the BBC Welsh Advisory Council {1947} in 1952, and the BBC National Orchestra of Wales which gives around 70 concerts a year and is Wales' only professional symphony orchestra.

[280]Notably, Television Wales and the West, 1958 {replaced by HTV in 1968}, the Independent Television Authority Committee for Wales, 1963, and the Welsh Film Board, 1972.

[281](Prestage, 1995)

[282](Maddox, 1994)

On the other hand, it should be noted that some extremist groups in Wales argue that S4C represents an expensive bribe, used to buy the silence of mainstream autonomists.[283] Furthermore, others have argued, from a different perspective, that the financial and decision making autonomy of S4C needs to be more closely monitored.[284] Nevertheless, the success of S4C has provided impetus elsewhere, particularly in Welsh language film production, and the establishment of the Welsh Film and Television Archive in Aberystwyth in 1989, and has also reflected back upon BBC Wales. Partly, though not entirely, because of its statutory obligations to S4C, the operating expenditure of BBC Wales has increased, and in 1994-5 stood at £67, 795, 000 {1990-1 - £45, 497, 000}. Within that budget the corporation produced 525 hours of Welsh language programmes for S4C in 1994-5. It may even be reasonable to talk of a pan-Celtic diffusion of ideas.[285]

In general, the communications revolution of the latter half of the twentieth century, involving developments in print capitalism and the more rapid dissemination of information via radio, television and computer networks has created the possibility of the construction of 'alternative versions of historical reality',[286] by an increasing number of agencies and agents not owing allegiance to the state.[287] The revolution, moreover, is continuous - the latest developments in digital broadcasting are being incorporated into the autonomist debate in Wales for instance, as the following press release reveals:

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[283](Bowcott, 1994)
[284](Prestage, 1995)
[285](Cormack, 1993). A similar diffusion took place earlier in the field of education (McDonald, 1989, 179).
[286](Williams, 1994a, 238)
[287]The state communications networks have also been colonised over time by agents with different values (Thomas, 1954), the consequences of which will be explored in Chapter Four.

'A House of Commons call for S4C to be given true parity with other broadcasting media has been made by Plaid Cymru MP Cynog Dafis. Mr Dafis, MP for Ceredigion Pembroke North, intervened during Commons question time to call on National Heritage Secretary Virginia Bottomley to ensure that once existing analogue TV frequencies are replaced entirely by the new digital channels, S4C will be allocated its own channel and secure true parity. The Government's recently published broadcasting bill indicates that S4C and Channel Four UK will be required to share one of the new digital TV wave bands in Wales rather than receiving one each. The Plaid Cymru MP also asked whether the new base level for funding for S4C will be set at a sufficiently high level to ensure the Welsh channel can provide the additional programmes it will be able to transmit after the introduction of digital television. In response Mrs Bottomley said it would be rash for her to make any further commitments at this time, but that Mr Dafis' comments would be noted. Following the Westminster exchanges, Mr Dafis who is Plaid Cymru's Parliamentary {spokesperson} for broadcasting added: "Plaid Cymru will now be seeking to secure further long term guarantees for the future of broadcasting within Wales, both in the English and Welsh languages" '.[288]

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter above has served four functions. The way historical events have shaped modern institutional developments has been outlined. So too has the manner in which institutional frameworks may have been conducive to Welsh autonomism - an idea that will be developed in the next chapter. Thirdly we have developed the notion that particular structural situations engender particular types of autonomism and autonomist. Elites in Wales have traditionally been associated with education and communication - administrative devolution in these areas has strengthened their hand, from which, in turn, they have demanded more, thus establishing an autonomist cycle. Fourthly, these arguments are placed against the backdrop of relative decline in the factors traditionally most associated with Welsh identity -

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[288](Williams, 1995b)

language, religion, and political radicalism, alongside a decline of the institutions most strongly associated with those identive factors - university, church, and local authority[289] - whilst interest in Welshness maintains increasing momentum, and is indeed diffusing into new spatial and generational dimensions.[290] This seeming paradox should be explored, because it suggests a new paradigm of Welsh autonomism.

We can surmise that the indicators of Welsh distinctiveness argued for in the past no longer apply to the extent that they did, that there are other, perhaps deeper, internal sources of distinction, manifesting themselves in '<u>expressive</u>' terms, the more intangible realm of ideas. Wales may not only be a separate nation, then, but 'a distinctly separate and often vehement idea'.[291] The traditional indicators, then, are merely manifestations of separateness which is itself a feeling embedded in the community's psyche. It is not inconceivable that this 'feeling' could result in evolving manifestations of separateness in new dimensions over time.

Sustaining the assumption of a dynamic within the notion of separateness, recent evidence suggests that those who support greater territorial autonomy for their nations are more likely to endorse post-materialist values and are considerably more likely to engage in protest.[292] These findings have important implications for the existing centralised party political structures in the UK, which have already undergone substanial erosion of their ideological bases; and implies that ethno-nationalist conflict in other advanced industrialised democracies will be increasingly articulated on

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[289](Dodson & Jones, 1984, 31). For articulations of the classic stereotypes of the sources of Welshness see (Fishlock, 1972; Griffith, 1950; Morgan, 1966).
[290](The Economist, 1992b, 78)
[291](Morris, 1984, 2)
[292](Studlar & McAllister, 1988, 48-62)

post-materialist fulcrums and may involve extra-constitutional political action.[293] The chapter has suggested three crucial battlegrounds in the competition between the host state and autonomists: territorial administration, education, and broadcasting. Analysing these battles in concert can provide scholars with the double dimension of social facts 'imaginary and material' so crucial to any profound understanding of autonomism.[294]

The institutional development outlined above was not necessarily an haphazard process directed from the centre. The manner in which institutions and policy areas most strongly associated with Wales were strengthened first, indicates a role for interested parties or agencies directing the process of institutional reform, and thereby necessitating an examination of the role of individual agency and personality.[295] This arena will be explored in the next chapter.

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[293]See (McDonald, 1989, 179) for evidence of cross-fertilisation of ideas in this domain.
[294](Voutat, 1992, 113)
[295](Rolands, 1972, 337)

CHAPTER 4

UTILISING WELSH IDENTITY III:

AGENCY

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will attempt, *inter alia*, to demonstrate the situational contingency of identity in Wales, and the ability of social and political actors to define and redefine their identity in the course of interaction.[1] This 'transactional' approach,[2] which emphasises the self-perception[3] of the actors themselves, shows that identity bundles, i.e. membership of ethnic groups, their boundaries and the 'cultural stuff' upon which they draw,[4] can all be variable, and subject to contention.[5]

Self-perception or self-identification is a form of internal categorisation. Categorisation can be defined as an adaptive response to a given environment,[6] which entails an interaction between the internalised self and the external {though self-perceived} environment. We 'see' the external environment, and this seeing is 'based on expectations more than on observation'.[7] Categorisations then must be subject to change for this reason and since no environment is itself irrevocably fixed; here we also imply the possibility that categorisations exist in a reactive dynamic with environments. Categories, particularly those associated with identity, are not only mutable, but also permeable,[8] subject to constant expansionary pressure,[9] and are the

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[1]For a discussion of the relationship between identity and psychological security see (Bloom, 1990, 53).
[2](Barth, 1979)
[3]See (Bauman, 1992) for further discussion on self-perception.
[4](Jenkins, 1995, 1)
[5](Bhabha, 1990)
[6](Bodenhausen, 1992, 53)
[7](Edelman, 1995, 16)
[8](Neillson, 1985)
[9](Wood, 1981). Such developments are not confined to the field of identity formation. Other political categories which have a distinct bearing on rates and maintenance of identity forms, are increasingly

fundamental building blocks of ideology.[10] This ideology, which is a structured form of perception, interacts with a social world to produce 'a kaleidoscope of potential realities'.[11] Ideology then, like perception, 'cannot be either objective or innocent',[12] but 'we are socialised into the dominant ideology from infancy on'.[13] This leaves social science open to the charge that its objectivity is a blind,[14] nothing more than a magician's trick, though with more serious consequences. This argument also gives rise to an intriguing question:

> Under what circumstances does the dominant ideology lose its power to socialise?

Since ideology is diffused among the members of any given society through language, it is beholden upon students of autonomism, and those wishing to answer the question above, to study, *inter alia*, structures and forms of communication. These matters are both a cause and a consequence of the 'value' associated with a particular identity, a notion posited in Chapter One as a crucial element within autonomist literature.[15] In the context of Wales, where autonomist sentiment bears a close relationship with an ability to speak *Cymraeg*, language itself becomes 'a form of political action'.[16]

In the last chapter we traced the complex relationship between institutional changes and the reassertion of Welsh identity. Here we intend,

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showing their age, that of the unitary state for instance (King, 1980). It should be noted that many of these changes have taken place elsewhere, and have been globally unanticipated (Graubard, 1993, vi).

[10](Edelman, 1995, 122)

[11](Edelman, 1995, 110)

[12](Edelman, 1995, 37)

[13](Edelman, 1995, 128)

[14](Pirsig, 1992, 67)

[15]See (Baker, 1988, 140) for a discussion of empirical research on different responses based on 'value' orientations to competing identities.

[16](Edelman, 1995, 125)

inter alia, to challenge two traditional ideas about Welsh identity and its relationship with autonomism.[17] The first is that the various territorial identities within Wales as expressed through the three Wales model are fixed; that Welsh language culture is enshrined, or has undergone social closure. The second challenge is to the so called rural cultural construct; that Welsh identity survival depends exclusively on core values centred around the non-conformist tradition, language and Welsh literary heritage.

We have also examined in some degree the role of the state in explaining the persistence of Welsh identity; the type of identity posited however depended on a minority of Welsh 'who have survived by anchoring themselves within successive forms of Britishness'.[18] This type of argument reveals the contingency of Welsh identity, as well as implying strategic behaviour on the part of carriers of Welsh identity.[19] The strategy itself however is perhaps no longer so effective in the face of a weakening of British identity.[20]

The complexity of identity in Wales has also been touched upon, but is worth returning to at this point. The Welsh language has three terms for identity, *hunaniaeth, uniaeth,* and *unfathiant,* the most common being *hunaniaeth.*[21] This plurality of terms, it is argued, results from a constant and pressing need for the Welsh to affirm their identity in response to a 'perceived ...threat of cultural genocide'.[22] The plurality of possible identites results in a

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[17](Bevan, 1984, 115)
[18](Williams, 1981b, 14)
[19]For a general discussion on the renewed scholarly interest in the role of agency in 'the construction work of nations' see (Hannerz & Löfgren, 1993, 158).
[20](Urwin, 1982, 67)
[21](Bowie, 1993, 169)
[22](Bowie, 1993, 169)

variety of labels that are derved from relationships with the Welsh language: these include *Cymraeg, Cymreig, Cymru-Cymraeg, Cymru di-Gymraeg.*[23]

It follows that multiple *loci* of Welsh identity can be posited. In addition to linguistic identity, one scholar makes the case for the salience of Welsh territorial identity as a 'process of the negotiation of a particular version of Welsh national identity through land and landscape'.[24] Welsh identity has also been posited as residing in ideology or, at an earlier stage, morality.[25] Socio-territorial differences have also informed debates over the validity of identity sources in the Welsh context, particulary over the contribution of the *gwerin* relative to the industrial working classes.[26]

The significant point about Welsh identity, then, is its situational and temporal contingency. Identity is not fixed, it varies as a result of a number of factors.[27] Identity, for instance, can undergo a resurgence as a result of a removal of suppressive factors,[28] or in the event of a crisis.[29] Identity can also be subject to proactive choice,[30] which is elsewhere denoted as self-categorisation.[31] In addition theories propounded by academics, such as internal colonialism, may themselves have contributed to an internalised self-conscious sociology of Wales.[32]

Welsh identity formation since 1979 can on one level be described as reactive and exogenously determined. Thatcherism for instance did not enjoy

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[23]For perspectives on this diversity see (Bell, 1995b), particularly (Bell, 1995a; Bell, 1995c; Bianchi, 1995), and the review article in the Welsh-language periodical *Barn* (Davies, 1996a).
[24](Gruffudd, 1995, 220)
[25](Jones, 1992a, 335)
[26](Gruffudd, 1995, 220-221). The notion of a classless *gwerin* {folk} has been a consistent theme in autonomist discourse (Adamson, 1988, 7).
[27](Bhabha, 1990; Jenkins, 1995, 1)
[28](Khleif, 1979b)
[29](Arsenau, 1988, 6)
[30](Arsenau, 1988)
[31](Hechter, 1975, 40)
[32](Adamson, 1991a, 2)

mass popularity in Wales and Scotland, nor did Margaret Thatcher herself.[33] Perhaps a clue to this 'attitude change' {since 1979} is provided by Berlin who states that,

> 'to be the object of contempt or patronising tolerance on the part of proud neighbours is one of the most traumatic experiences that individuals or societies can suffer'.[34]

'Intolerence' is perhaps not too outlandish an expression in the context of Thatcher's declaration: 'I'm an English nationalist and never you forget it'.[35]

On a different level though still within a reactive framework, other scholars have addressed the 'paternalistic liberalism of multiculturalism'.[36] These issues will be dealt with in more detail later on.

Turning to more endogenous factors, through the 'three Wales model' several politically salient categories of Welsh identity are posited as existing.[37] These different versions of identity are in constant dialogue.[38] The reassertion of identity was primarily focused on two areas; political and protest activities - for example Plaid Cymru and *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg* - and cultural activities - for example *Urdd Gobaith Cymru* and *Merched Y Wawr*,[39] which have been increasingly exercised across the internal divisions of Wales. These are some of the internal determinants affecting perceived nationhood discussed in Chapter One. Linked to theories based on indigenous factors, such as culture and issue politics, influencing the rise of nationalism, they are often placed by scholars on a tangent with externalised

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[33](Aitken, 1995)
[34](Berlin, 1990, 246)
[35](Osmond, 1988, 43 ff.17)
[36](Williams, 1994b, 88). The quote also indicates that liberalism can be considered as a non-neutral ideology (Miller, 1995a, 439).
[37](Balsom, 1985)
[38](Gruffudd, 1994b, 33)
[39](Adamson, 1991a, 126)

factors, such as the decline of partisanship, rise of protest voting and post-material values.[40] The effect of these factors is not so easily separable in reality.

4.1 Agents of Territorial Administration in the Welsh Office

The growth of state institutions in Wales has been documented in the previous chapter. That chapter has also shown that the Welsh Office possesses attributes akin to the state of which it is a constituent part, which make it also separate and prone to further separation - a bureaucratic fiefdom, allowing perhaps the use of the epithet *viceroy* to more appropriately describe the position of the Secretary of State.[41] Here we examine the Welsh Office's effect on Welsh identity mobilisation and autonomist impulses created via agency. Within the Welsh Office proper, personnel can be broadly divided into two types, political personnel and administrative personnel. Categorising the personnel within NDPB's and QUANGOS under the remit of the Welsh Office is somewhat more complex and politically contentious.

4.2 Political Personnel

From 1979 to 1995 Wales has had five Secretaries of State; namely Sir Nicholas Edwards, Peter Walker, David Hunt, John Redwood and William Hague. Over this period the ruling Conservative party gradually felt more

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[40](Levy, 1995, 300)

[41](Dynes & Walker, 1995, 296). Peter Walker was described by the Observer in February 1989 as the 'pro-consul of the new Wales'. Quoted in (Osmond, 1989b). Autonomists were given to describing David Hunt as a 'governor general... who does not even represent a Welsh constituency' (Jones, 1992b). More recently the job has been described, in a metropolitan newspaper, as 'akin to a proconsular posting to the rim of empire among disaffected tribes' (Parry, 1995). It is significant in this context that the EU also has been categorised as a 'neo-state' (Richardson, 1994, 196).

'able to dispense with the tradition that the Welsh Secretary needed to be Welsh',[42] though non-Welsh Secretaries of State had been the subject of controversy during previous administrations.[43] The lack of compulsion to choose a Welsh individual for the post may be because extremist groups targeted Welsh secretaries from 1979 regardless of their provenance.[44] The latter two Secretaries of State have had no discernible connection with Wales whatsoever.

The period has also revealed a change in political culture at the Welsh Office. Before the advent of John Redwood, Wales was regarded as a 'playground for the "wets".[45] Both Peter Walker and David Hunt, advocated a 'Toryism of partnership, political consensus and public spending', and tended to cultivate Welsh opinion.[46] Some of the more considered autonomist literature has suggested that Walker and Hunt encouraged the by-passing of Westminster by Wales based institutions and agencies.[47] John Redwood represented a significant break with these traditions. Already having articulated a position broadly defined as Eurosceptic,[48] he entered the Welsh Office in May 1993 known as a champion of free-market liberalism and individualism.[49] In addition he did little to endear himself to the Welsh speaking community - he refused, for instance, to sign letters written in Welsh.[50] In addition to a decline in personal support under the

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[42](Dynes & Walker, 1995, 296; Randall, 1972, 368)
[43](Jones, 1984, 188)
[44]For an insight into extremism see (Bowcott, 1994). The campaign of violence accelerated in 1988 (Phillips, 1988).
[45](Williams & Lawrence, 1992)
[46](Thomas, 1994a, 47; Williams & Lawrence, 1992)
[47](Osmond, 1992b, 37)
[48]See (The Economist, 1992a; The Economist, 1994)
[49](Thomas, 1994a, 47)
[50](Financial Times, 1994a)

Secretaryship of John Redwood,[51] Conservative Party support in Wales declined markedly. The 1995 council elections provide a case in point, the number of Conservative seats fell to 42 out of a total of 1,273, with a 10% share of the vote {Labour took 731 seats}.[52]

As we have seen in our analysis of opinion poll results, in general terms political culture in Wales has undergone a period of considerable transformation. The seeds of these changes was planted in the immediate aftermath of the referendum - on 26th June 1979, with Wales under the tenureship of Nicholas Edwards, the House of Commons repealed the Wales Act by 191 votes to 8.[53] In order to achieve the desired results, however, the Welsh Conservative Party and a cadre {often known as the Gang of Six, but in fact much larger} within the Welsh Labour Party had committed themselves to change. The Conservatives had promised to address the issue of public accountability in Wales, and the anti-devolutionists in the Labour Party were, in a sense, obliged to prove their ability to lobby for Wales in the Parliamentary arena. The institutional outcome was the creation of the Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, which commenced business in January 1980, was chaired by Leo Abse, a Labour member and one of the most vociferous anti-devolution campaigners.[54]

The Committee, however, has failed to live up to the expectations it generated. Setting out to address the larger 'nationalist issues' such as unemployment, broadcasting, and water, the Committee produced its first report in August 1980. The unanimous report was critical of government

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[51](Financial Times, 1994b)
[52](Gow, 1995)
[53](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 99)
[54]For an insight into the strategies employed by Abse and Kinnock at the time see (The Economist, 1978).

policy, and linked unemployment with the prospect of unrest particularly amongst the young. Despite the Committee's six Conservative MPs supporting the findings, the Government rejected all but two proposals. From then on, it has been argued, the Committee avoided substantive policy issues,[55] but in so doing policy areas associated with Welsh identity were perhaps given even greater prominence.

With hindsight it is clear that some autonomism within the EU context can be related to a 'different party-political orientation from the national level over an extended time period'.[56] In the case of Wales, however, so the autonomist argument runs, some elements in the Labour Party oppose devolution for endogenous reasons; that is it threatens the power of the South Wales labour controlled councils.[57] The actions of the Conservative MPs in 1980 provide an indication, moreover, that a territory/party loyalty cleavage operates beyond the Labour Party. The most interesting individual in this context, and within the time-frame set out in Chapter One, is Sir Wyn Roberts, former Minister of State at the Welsh Office. Sir Wyn lost his position during the July 1995 reshuffle, but,

> 'he holds the record this century for the longest unbroken spell of ministerial office in a single Government department: 15 years, under four Welsh Secretaries and two prime ministers, since Mrs Thatcher made him a junior minister on winning the 1979 election'.[58]

Sir Wyn, during his tenure as Minister of State, is quoted as having said 'Wales was never a kingdom and has never been united except under the Welsh Office'.[59] The quotation above may be double-edged, especially given

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[55](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 100)
[56](Hooghe, 1995)
[57](Evans, 1996b).
[58](Wastell, 1994)
[59](Williams & Lawrence, 1992)

that certain individuals within Plaid Cymru regard Sir Wyn as, at the very least, a cultural autonomist.[60]

It may be regarded as far fetched to claim that the Welsh Office became an institutional servant of Welsh autonomism, with Sir Wyn as its principal agent, but a state of affairs not far from this was acknowledged in the Welsh language press:

> *'Yn ddistaw bach, roedd Dafydd Ellis Thomas wedi gobeithio y byddai Sir Wyn Roberts yn aros yn y Swyddfa Gymreig gyhyd â phosib'.*[61]
> On the quiet, Dafydd Ellis Thomas was hoping that Sir Wyn Roberts would be staying at the Welsh Office for as long as possible {my translation}.

There is some evidence supporting the 'principal agent' argument in the field of education, one of the policy areas identified as crucial to Welsh identity in earlier chapters. In the words of the then Secretary of State, David Hunt, to the Welsh Grand Committee, the Minister of State {Wyn Roberts} was,

> 'ensuring the needs of Welsh schools have been fully taken into account. The *curriculum cymreig*, with a distinctive Welsh dimension, includes separate subject orders for art and music, geography, history, Welsh and Welsh as a second language'.[62]

Perhaps a more telling discourse comes from former Plaid Cymru president Dafydd El is Thomas, also addressing the Welsh Grand Committee concerning,

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[60](Davies, 1994b). Note the speech by Dafydd Ellis Thomas to the Welsh Grand Committee concerning education policy in Wales (El is Thomas, 1992).
[61](Iowerth, 1994)
[62](Hunt, 1992, 11). Note that the Breton Teachers' Union proposed that at least one subject should be taught in Breton - which they classified as history - geography (Fryske Academy, 1992). This provides further supporting evidence for the importance of history as a productive value in autonomist consciousness.

'progress made over the past 20 years.. in creating an autonomous Welsh education system. As of last night {11 February 1992} with the second reading of the Further and Higher Education Bill, we now have such a system. That provides the opportunity to develop the diversity of the system. Through the Education Reform Act 1988, the national curriculum and the Curriculum Council for Wales, different curriculum content and policy has emerged. I criticised the Minister of State {Roberts} when he answered my question about the meaning of the national curriculum by saying that when it was used in England, it meant England and when it was used in Wales it meant Wales. I now know that was true, though I did not realise it then'.[63]

Later, after the decision by the Curriculum Council for Wales to drop Welsh as a compulsory school subject for children age 14-16 in English medium schools, Plaid Cymru sought to confer with Wyn Roberts.[64] John Redwood, who was, of all the Secretaries of State since 1979, most resistant to Welsh autonomy on <u>any</u> level, paradoxically may have offered Sir Wyn greater latitude by refusing to deal with education correspondence.[65] The leaked memorandum revealing Redwood's stance provided other rich insights into his intentions, which the article quoted below reveals.

'The Secretary of State for Wales, John Redwood, regards English and Scottish Conservative backbenchers as more important than Welsh MPs, MEPs and local councillors. The confirmation of what his critics in Wales have long suspected is contained in a leaked memorandum setting out new rules for correspondence with the Welsh Office. Dated 12 July 1993, the memo is from Ann Davies, Cabinet Documents Clerk, to the Welsh ministers' private secretaries. Mr Redwood's predecessors dealt with letters from all Welsh MPs, MEPs and local councillors. Not any more. Ms Davies says that in future, Mr Redwood "will no longer automatically reply to letters addressed to him from other MPs, MEPs, councillors and prominent organisations". He will only reply to an MP's letter if it falls within his area of responsibility - narrowly redefined to include economic and industrial matters, regional aid, and the Citizen's Charter, but to exclude education, health, social services, and community care - or one of four categories. MPs in those categories are: 19 Welsh MPs he considers "prominent"; all Privy Councillors; all Tory backbenchers; all

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[63](Ellis Thomas, 1992, 34; Thomas, 1991a, 59)
[64](Stover, Bowen, & Proud, 1994)
[65](Blackhurst, 1993)

Opposition leaders and members of the Shadow Cabinet. If the letter falls outside Mr Redwood's area or the four categories, it will be dealt with by his two junior ministers, Sir Wyn Roberts and Gwilym Jones. On the "prominent" list are all four Welsh Tory backbenchers, 13 Labour MPs, Dafydd Wigley, leader of Plaid Cymru, and Alex Carlile, the sole Liberal Democrat MP in Wales. But 17 Welsh MPs will no longer automatically get through to the Secretary of State - unlike English and Scottish Tory backbenchers. Not deemed "prominent" are the likes of Barry Jones, Peter Hain, Kim Howells, Edward Rowlands and John Marek. As for MEPs and local councillors, their letters will not reach him at all - regardless of which party they support'.[66]

There is evidence beyond education of Sir Wyn contributing to the reinforcement of a separate identity for Wales. Another significant policy issue, the Welsh language, *Cymraeg*, has received insitutional and policy reinforcement under Sir Wyn's tenure, particularly the establishment of a 15 member Welsh Language Board to secure the use of *Cymraeg* in the public sector, announced as a package of measures in the Welsh Language Bill in December 1992. Sir Wyn pronounced it 'an historic day'.[67] Indeed in an interview immediately prior to his withdrawal from Government in 1995, Sir Wyn said 'I have seen the Welsh language revive through our education policies',[68] leaving the impression that he regarded this as his primary achievement. The Welsh Language Act came into force in 1993. Public bodies in Wales are now obliged to use Welsh and English coequally.[69]

Sir Wyn oversaw in addition the establishment of the Countryside Council for Wales {CCW} in April 1991, with a £20 million budget, after the break-up of UK wide nature Conservancy Council, amalgamating functions of Countryside Commission in Wales and the Nature Conservancy Council in Wales.[70] These developments were a central pillar in the Welsh Office's

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[66](Blackhurst, 1993)
[67](Jones, 1992c)
[68](Wastell, 1994)
[69](Williams, 1996)
[70](Thomas, 1994b, 168)

Rural Initiative announced by Sir Wyn in February 1991, during a Welsh Grand Committee debate on rural Wales,[71] and represented a significant change from the original idea of an 'England and Wales' institution. Another event which occurred at the end of 1991 served to further institutionalise Wales, and again took place during Sir Wyn's tenure at the Welsh Office, was the announcement that the Wales Tourist Board {WTB} would be allowed to adopt its own marketing strategy independent of the British Tourist Authority.[72]

Sir Wyn's alleged autonomist sentiment, however, appears at the very least to be tempered by an apparently unionist outlook with regard to finance. Interviewed in 1992, he argued that in Wales is generally characterised by a pragmatic view of her relationship with England. He pointed out that public spending for 1990-91 ran at £2,964 per capita in Wales compared with £2,586 for the UK as a whole, and that the average poll tax bill for 1991-92 was £121, less than half of the English average bill of £252.[73] This is similar to arguments made elsewhere, especially from sources associated with conservatism. An article in the Spectator for instance asserted that without the Welsh Office and the Secretary of State,

> 'the whole tenuous edifice will come crashing to the ground... the only thing that guarantees - constitutes even - the existence of Wales as an entity outside the history books is the existence of a thing called the Welsh Office and a post called the Secretary of State for Wales'.[74]

Sir Wyn Roberts is likely to disagree however when the article questions the very notion of Welshness:[75]

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[71](Thomas, 1994b,145)
[72](Thomas, 1994b, 169). See Tourism {Overseas Promotion} Wales Act 1992.
[73](Williams & Lawrence, 1992)
[74](Malcolm, 1989)
[75]There is evidence that Sir Wyn is one in a long line of national party acolytes with additional loyalties to Wales. For instance, James Griffiths, the M.P. for Llanelli, pressurised Hugh Gaitskell to make a

'The Welsh Office... weaves the web of administrative. responsibilities which sustain the fiction of Welsh identity {the WDA, the Development Board for Rural Wales, Housing for Wales, the Wales Tourist Board}'.[76]

There is evidence that Sir Wyn is a member of an important group of national party acolytes with additional loyalties to Wales. In an earlier period, for instance, James Griffiths, the Labour MP for Llanelli, pressurised Hugh Gaitskell into making a commitment to some form of administrative office for Wales.[77]

4.3 Administrative Personnel

Utilising the hypotheses sustained during the previous chapters concerning the likely areas of interest for Welsh Office personnel with sympathies towards various types of Welsh autonomism, we would expect certain policy areas to be colonised by those personnel. This colonisation however is likely to be subject to interference from central state agencies, and there is therefore little likelihood of a perfect correlation between a 'Welsh' policy area and its dominance by a 'closet autonomist'. The analysis is complicated further by the presence of what may termed administrative 'gatekeepers'.[78] Individuals in strategic positions have had the capacity to affect profoundly the development and direction of the Welsh Office. During the nascent years of the Welsh Office one scholar perceived a,

'jealous guardianship exercised by Whitehall departments over the principle of a centralised administration...{e.g. Minister for Health Kenneth

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commitment to some form of administrative office for Wales (Jones, 1988a, 52). Hubert Morgan the Labour Party Secretary, was known to have encouraged and contributed to the process of administrative devolution to Wales. For further information on these individuals and others see (Morgan, 1987).

[76](Malcolm, 1989)

[77](Jones, 1988a, 52). For further information see (Morgan, 1987, 197-203).

[78](Rolands, 1972, 334)

Robinson} attempted to resist all takeover bids by the Secretary of State'.[79]

The situation was only ameliorated when Crossman superseded Robinson as minister.[80]

Initial recruitment to the lower echelons of the Welsh Office was conducted primarily in the 'regional offices of Wales',[81] such that in the initial period of operation 70% of the administrative class was from a Welsh background.[82] In support of our theory, we have found that 'British' administrators sometimes share this expectation of Welsh 'colonisation' {or 'infiltration' depending on one's perspective}, and have reacted to it. Consider the following report in a London newspaper concerning the WDA, daughter agency of the WO:

> 'Thanks to his Tory past and Home Counties vowels, Rowe-Beddoe is seen in Wales as an English imposition {despite his having Welsh parents}. This is the other side of the Jones-as- Welsh-President coin. "Cleaning up" the WDA has meant, as an official rethink ordered by Rowe-Beddoe put it, "diluting the proportion of Wales-based people serving on the board." After 18 months interrogating and criticising Welsh quangocrats - and the symbolism of Jones brought to heel in a committee chamber in Westminster was distinctly colonial - London now has an excuse to assert greater central control'.[83]

Thus even if our intuition was proved to be incorrect in reality, shared expectations may produce real results.

The administrative hierarchy of the Welsh Office, that is positions under the political authority of the Secretary of State and Ministers, has at its apex a Grade 1 Permanent Secretary, or Head of Department.[84] The current

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[79](Rõlands, 1972, 334)
[80](Rõlands, 1972, 334)
[81](Rõlands, 1972, 338)
[82](Rõlands, 1972, 338). Since this period however there has been some influx from Whitehall Departments.
[83](Beckett, 1994)
[84](Civil Service, 1995, 895)

incumbent, educated at St. Olave's Grammar, Kent {formerly in Bermondsey} and St. John's College, Cambridge, was an academic before working for the government primarily in the field of finance, though it is significant that he was at one time Private Secretary to Prime Minster Margaret Thatcher,[85] and is Welsh-born.[86] It also appears that he is able to speak Welsh, though a Parliamentary Written Answer did not initially attribute such an ability to him.[87] Below the Permanent Secretary are two deputy secretaries, responsible for economic affairs, and social policy respectively.

The analysis of the personal dispositions of individual civil servants towards Wales is, however, a difficult exercise. To test the hypothesis that the more financial control involved the less amenable the state is to agency *cymricisation*, *inter alia*, an attempt was made to carry out a number of thoroughgoing interviews with non-Welsh, Welsh born and some Welsh-speaking individuals working at the Welsh Office. Three themes emerged. Firstly they all did not wish to be publicly quoted. Secondly, due to considerable reticence amongst some, it was very difficult to ascertain their ethnic identity, and thirdly some were not willing to reveal their personal opinion on the matter of loyalty to Wales. The very sensitivity of this area reveals that it may be a fruitful line of research.

According to the hypothesis developed in the opening chapter, some departments are likely to be more *cymricised* than others. On the basis of historical, social, cultural and structural factors addressed in earlier chapters we expect agriculture and education to fall into the latter category. One broad indicator supports our hypothesis. According to sources within the Welsh

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[85](Dynes & Walker, 1995, 296)
[86](Prime Minister, 1993)
[87](House of Commons, 1995a; House of Commons, 1995b)

Office, around 15% of the Welsh Office administrative staff is Welsh Speaking and the bulk of these individuals are concentrated in the departments of education and agriculture,[88] these findings were confirmed by follow up questions.[89]

The only verifiable data available uses the loosely defined criterion 'percentage who have notified they have some ability in the use of Welsh' and was submitted by the Welsh Office as a result of a parliamentary question by Plaid Cymru M.P. Dafydd Wigley. The submission is tabulated below:

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[88](Confidential Source H, 1995)
[89](Confidential Source K, 1996)

Table 4:1

Welsh Speakers in Welsh Office[90]

Grade	Number of people employed	%age who have notified they have some ability in the use of Welsh	Number who have notified they have some ability in the use of Welsh {my calculation}
G1s	1	100	1
G2s & equivalents	2	50	1
G3s & equivalents	11	9	1
G4s & equivalents	6	33	2
G5s & equivalents	48	15	7
G6s & equivalents	29	10	3
G7s & equivalents	159	16	25
SEOs & equivalents	139	24	33
HEOs & equivalents	312	17	53
EOs & equivalents	488	17	83
AOs & equivalents	570	16	91
AAs & equivalents	457	8	37
Industrials and Museum Support Grades	120	13	16
Totals	**2342**	**-**	**353**

The calculations above corroborate the information provided during the course of in-depth interviews and cited above, but the looser criterion for ability in Welsh given in the official figures would appear to indicate that not all the people classified as having an ability in Welsh are necessary fluent Welsh speakers. This assumption receives, moreover, substantive vindication by the confusion arising over the Welsh-speaking ability of the Grade 1 civil servant which required a parliamentary answer to be corrected.

[90]Sources: (House of Commons, 1995a; House of Commons, 1995b).

It appears that an internal survey covering Welsh speakers in the WO was conducted recently, but is not available in the public domain. We requested a copy for the purposes of this research but it was not forthcoming.[91] The Welsh Office Personnel Management Division was also contacted. The reply reads as follows:

> 'Applicants to the Civil Service are asked about their place of birth and nationality. The information is held in our personnel records but, in the Welsh Office, is not a factor used in determining individual positions. As you anticipate certain posts in the Welsh Office are held by Welsh speakers, although there are very few where the ability to speak Welsh is essential. We could not readily identify concentrations of Welsh speakers in particular parts of the Department and it is not a key determination in most postings. I am afraid therefore that we cannot be of help to you in pursuing this aspect of your research'.[92]

The information provided in the correspondence quoted above, directly contradicted data received from confidential sources <u>within</u> the Welsh Office during interviews. Several inferences can be drawn from this. In the first instance, vagaries of data may confirm the lack of overall coherence and autonomy within the WO.[93] Second, notwithstanding, the lack of coherence within the administration, we find it more persuasive to surmise that the asymmetries in data are indicators of the politicisation of the issues.

4.4 <u>NDPBs and QUANGOS</u>

The development of the so-called quango state in Wales has engendered much discussion,[94] particularly the issue of 'packing' with Conservative party supporters.[95] The matter of the appointment of David

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[91](Confidential Source M, 1996)
[92](Wilson, 1996)
[93](Jones, 1988a, 53)
[94](Osmond, 1995, 43-52)
[95](Osmond, 1992b, 16-20)

Rowe-Beddoe, a former Chair of the Conservatives Abroad Monte Carlo Association, as Chair of the WDA has attracted considerable publicity for the aforementioned reason.[96]

Again, both the CCW and the WTB provide fruitful avenues for research into these matters, and the institutionalisation of Welsh identity in general, not least because they have shared a Chief Executive - Paul Loveluck. More importantly perhaps they symbolise the process of institutionalisation of Welsh identity in the 1980s, and give precise indicators as to the process of that institutionalisation. This process appears to occur in one of two ways - the more historical method is for an analogue body to be created in Wales which then goes on to evolve differently from its counterpart in England. A core feature in this evolution has been the development of co-operative networks between statutory agencies, local authorities and the private sector. This form of Welsh corporatism was directly referred to by Jonathan Evans MP when he was asked to account for the success of Wales in gaining the investment from Lucky Goldstar of Korea in July 1996.[97] With regard to institutionalisation, the second, more recent, strand of the process concerns the creation of certain structures in Wales which are from the outset unique. The development of this latter, more potent, process has been attributed to Sir Wyn Roberts.[98]

Incidentally, evidence for 'Welsh corporatism' can be discerned from patterns of interaction amongst economic agents in Wales. Consider the following newspaper report:

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[96](Cohen, 1995)
[97](Evans, 1996a)
[98](Confidential Source I, 1996)

> 'Mr Redwood's support for free markets has received a frosty reception in quarters where he might have expected support. Last year Elizabeth Haywood, director of the Welsh Confederation of British Industry, implicitly criticised Mr Redwood's plans to withdraw state aid. The CBI would like "a little more attention" to business, she said'.[99]

Though the link between the process of 'quangoisation' and the widening 'democratic deficit' are constantly subsumed into discussions about the need for Welsh autonomy,[100] less is said about the related processes of *cymricisation* and decentralisation. Pluralist decentralisation, for instance in education, at a local level has invariably diminished the functional power of local education authorities {LEA}, which, in South Wales, were often subject to Labour Party Councils opposing Welsh autonomism.[101] The Quangos and other constituency bodies in civil society that were created to interact over these removed functions have moreover proven themselves more amenable to *cymricisation.*[102] Thus, ironically, the Conservative and Unionist Party which sought to reduce the Labour Party's hegemony in Wales by transferring power to the quangos has inadvertently created institutions which are far more conducive to Welsh identity transformation. In a further irony, the Conservatives find themselves unable to gain from this {unintended?} consequence, since the process has been perceived and portrayed by agents of communication in Wales as an anti-local policy orchestrated by the central state.

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[99](Cohen, 1995)
[100]For a recent statement see (Davies, 1996c).
[101]Structural 'presence' has also been altered by the creation of new unitary authorities, which may in time break the 'monolithic, if not actually corrupt, nature of Labour rule' in certain areas (Morgan, 1992, 81).
[102]County Councils arguably became c*ymricised* in 1974.

4.5 Agents of Communication

Modern Welsh autonomism has less to do with control over the means of production, than control over the means of cultural production and reproduction.[103] The latter, particularly the broadcast media, has been characterised as 'playing a central role, both positive and negative, in the development of the concept of a national community'.[104] As discussed earlier, the force of broadcast media in Welsh autonomism in the modern era is revealed by reference to a radio lecture given by Saunders Lewis in 1962 entitled *Tynged yr Iaith* {The fate of the language}. Prominent Welsh autonomists cite this lecture as a turning point,[105] particularly as the inspiration for the formation of *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg.*[106] Saunders Lewis, however, is not a figure universally admired in Wales.[107]

The two leading means of cultural production and reproduction addressed in this thesis are education and broadcast media.[108] The role of education in cultural reproduction has been documented in this thesis and elsewhere,[109] here we examine the role of human agency in education. We acknowledge that some overlap does exist between the arguments and evidence presented here, and those developed in the preceding chapter - this is due to the parsing of agency and institution which we justify by virtue of its analytical utility.

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[103]For an indication of this see (Spivey, 1993). For an argument, in a Welsh context, that meaning is created through discourse see (Williams, 1994b, 96).
[104](Davies, 1994a, ix)
[105](Evans, 1991, 142)
[106]Adamson argues that in reality the speech captured a mood that had arisen out of the campaigns at Tryweryn and the failure of the *Blaid* to lead in acts of civil disobedience (1991a, 196 footnote 4).
[107]For an insight into controversies surrounding Lewis see (Davies, 1983b, 109; Donald, 1992).
[108]A case has been made for the inclusion of the Church in Wales in this argument (Harris & Startup, 1995).
[109](Khleif, 1980)

4.6 Education Personnel

Concerns about the role of teachers in social and cultural maintenance are not new. Socrates addresses Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, thus:

> 'Then shall we carelessly and without more ado allow our children to hear any casual stories told by any casual persons, and so to receive into their souls views of life for the most part at variance with those which we think they ought to hold when they come to man's estate?'.[110]

One Welsh scholar has claimed that 'the state, at least since the time of Elizabeth 1, has attempted to control teachers and teaching matter'.[111] Control over the latter, and then in only legalistic terms, has always been the easier task. Members of the teaching professions in Wales, or more precisely a specific sub-set of that group, have had over time a close involvement with Welsh autonomism. An illustration of this involvement is provided by the tax disc protest of 1969. After an eight week campaign, run through the columns of the Welsh language magazine *Barn*, to get bilingual road tax discs, 642 people pledged not to display the English language tax disc until the certificates were bilingual. Of the 642 people, 263 were teachers, and 90 were university or college lecturers, 55% of the total number involved in the protest.[112] Similarly, a disproportionate number of Plaid Cymru general election candidates have come from the teaching profession. For instance in 1959, 10 out of a total of 20 Plaid Cymru candidates were lecturers or schoolmasters,[113] a similar proportion of 'schoolteacher candidates' stood in 1966.[114] There is other evidence of the links between the teaching

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[110](Plato, 1935, 58)
[111](Elwyn Jones, 1990a, 199)
[112](Butt Phillip, 1975, 247). In the context of the overall thesis it is worth noting that 17 were senior members of BBC Wales, including the head of light entertainment.
[113](Morgan, 1981, 381)
[114](Grant & Preece, 1968, 259)

profession and autonomism: until 1995, for instance, Plaid Cymru traditionally held its annual conference during Autumn half-term.[115]

Another posited indicator of the transformation of identity, Welsh medium education, has exhibited marked growth in the period under examination, particularly in the primary and adult sector. There is some inertia in the secondary sector, a point that will be addressed later on. The expansion is also taking place outside the areas known as *Y Fro Cymraeg*. There has been a consequent growth in demand for Welsh speaking teachers, a situation which has led, in the words of the former chairman of the Curriculum Council for Wales, to a 'dire shortage of teachers of Welsh'.[116]

The Welsh immersion teacher has been found to be more committed than the average teacher.[117] The quality of the teaching, which is undeniably linked to the commitment of the personnel, within Welsh medium education has two structural implications. Firstly, Welsh medium schools are likely to be, *mutatis mutandis*, on average better institutions than their English medium counterparts.[118] Secondly, given the politicisation of the Welsh language implied by our earlier analyses, and given the empirical research revealing that 'attitudes are favourable when there is immersion in the indigenous culture',[119] they are likely to be more heavily politicised and more efficient transmitters of distinctly Welsh identity bundles. Examination results bear the former claim out.[120] The proof of the latter is more difficult, and is only likely to be verifiable some time after the completion of this thesis.

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[115]The involvement of the public sector professions and middle class intellectuals may be a universal feature of modern autonomist movements; mobilisation by these groups has been at the core of most European movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
[116](Evans, 1990)
[117](Baker, 1988, 109)
[118](Confidential Source D, 1996)
[119](Baker, 1988, 133-4)
[120](Confidential Source H, 1995)


We can however provide preliminary indicators of identity transformation that may have a future political effect. The percentage of Welsh speakers, for instance, has risen amongst all groups below 25 since 1981.[121] At present {1996} around 37% of the population of Wales under 18 receive education at least partly through the medium of Welsh - giving a non-normal ditribution curve.[122] The increase in pre-school age children speaking Welsh has occurred despite a decline in the proportion of 3-4 year olds speaking Welsh as a mother tongue.[123] We can attribute the increase to other factors, most notably the provision of *Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin* {MYM} playgroups, which have expanded greatly since the 1970s. 'In 1971 there were 67 MYM playgroups; by Autumn 1994 there were 626 with over 10,000 children, representing 1 in 7 of all 3-4 year olds in Wales'.[124] Examine the figure below:

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[121](Jones, 1995b, 1)
[122](Williams, 1996)
[123](Jones, 1995b, 1)
[124](Jones, 1995b, 1)

Figure 4:1

Welsh Speakers: Percentages Of Age Groups[125]



[125] Source (Jones, 1995b, 1, Fig 2

As depicted in the above diagram the 1991 census revealed a higher proportion of Welsh speakers amongst 3-14 year olds than among older age groups. This represents a marked change from the situation described by the 1971 census.

A major cause of the expansion depicted above, the 1988 Education Reform Act, acquired a Welsh dimension for five main reasons. The first is the historical and political fact that 'In the 20th century, the state's position on the Welsh language has been generally indulgent'.[126] Secondly 'the concept of a national curriculum raised the issue of which nation was to be served', and 'revolutionised the role of the state in education, thereby inadvertently raising questions about the relationship between the Welsh nation and the British state in a new context', creating 'almost by accident' a new dimension within which cultural and political autonomism could coalesce.[127] Third an institutional structure arose that was generally favourable to the development of separate policies. Fourth, political, administrative and education personnel were in place to translate the act into the Welsh dimension. Finally,

> 'from the outset of discussions on the curriculum, Sir Wyn Roberts, the minister for Wales responsible for education, insisted on a Welsh dimension'.[128]

The historical reasons for the acquisition of a Welsh dimension in education have been addressed in earlier sections of the thesis, though the statement ought perhaps at this stage be qualified by the argument that it has been in the latter half of the twentieth century that state 'indulgence' emerged as a significant factor; particularly as a result of the growing role of the Welsh Department of the Ministry of Education. The creation of a new dimension in

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[126](Elwyn Jones, 1988, 93)
[127](Elwyn Jones, 1994, 8, 13,14)
[128](Smith, 1991c)

which Welsh identity could undergo a transformation was in large part due to the Education Reform Act of 1988, though its authors did not realise this at the time.[129]

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Curriculum Council for Wales {CCW}, formed in August 1988, and its more powerful successor, which replaced it on April 1st 1994, *Awdurdod Cwricwlwm ac Asesu Cymru* {ACAC - the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales}, have provided an institutional framework for the input of specifically Welsh concerns. The National Curriculum in Wales began to develop a separate identity, which was deliberate and purposive; so much so that the process is actually outlined and justified in official documentation.

It is the role of agents within these institutions that interests us here, those, for instance, who composed the CCW's second report which declared, uncontroversially, that the Council's immediate task was to 'respond to statutory consultations, and to establish appropriate machinery to enable it to do so'. The Council however posited an additional function which is worth quoting more fully:

> 'additional to this, and very early in its lifetime, the Council decided to give major attention to the requirement on it to undertake a whole curriculum review, and to develop a rationale for the delivery of the curriculum for five to sixteen year olds in schools in Wales... In developing this programme of work, the Council was also conscious that, as an autonomous body operating alongside the larger National Curriculum Council in England, it would need to establish a clear identity of its own. This process is ongoing, but it is increasingly clear that its early attempts have been reasonably successful in this respect'.[130]

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[129](Elwyn Jones, 1994, 13)

[130](Curriculum Council for Wales, 1992, 1). My emphasis.

As a consequence since 1988 the National Curriculum in Wales has progressively acquired a Welsh dimension. The table below depicts, as an illustrative example, the National Curriculum in Wales as it stood in 1990.

Table 4:2

National Curriculum in Wales in 1990[131]

Core Subjects	Other Foundation Subjects
Mathematics	Welsh**
Science	History
English	Geography
Welsh*	Design and Technology
	Music
	Art
	P.E.
	Modern Foreign Language***

*For schools designated as Welsh speaking under Section 3{7} of ERA 1988
** In schools where Welsh is not taught as a core subject
*** At KS3 and KS4 only {KS1 5-7YRS, KS2 7-11, KS3 11-14}

The review of the national curriculum and its assessment framework in Wales afforded an opportunity for Rudi Plaut, Chairman of the CCW, to reflect, in a letter to John Redwood, on the changes since 1988.

> 'Evidence from a range of sources indicates that Welsh has been widely accepted as a normal part of the curriculum at key stages 1,2, and 3. Much of this acceptance is due to the commitment of teachers, combined with considerable investment from the Welsh Office, which has enabled the training of teachers and the production of teaching resources. Council is also of the view that the integration of curriculum and assessment materials has led to considerable success in implementing Welsh second language and has assisted teachers in their interpretation of the requirements of the Order'.[132]

In order to assert the fourth aspect of our argument we turn to the role of teachers in the execution of the *Curriculum Cymreig*, and the responses of

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[131]Source: (Curriculum Council for Wales, 1990, 1)
[132](Curriculum Council for Wales, 1993, Appendix B)

their pupils. From attitudinal changes among teachers in areas previously apathetic or even antipathetic to the Welsh language we can infer changes amongst the attitude of administrative and political agents. The inference must be qualified however by the likelihood of interference by structural factors, particularly institutional and power rivalry between 'British Wales' LEAs and the more *cymricised* CCW/ACAC. Given that qualification the findings are nevertheless revealing. We surveyed several schools in the Gwent area, a process which included interviews and analysis of inspectors' reports.

Most inspectors' reports included positive statements on the development of the Welsh language in Gwent. The 1995 report on Cwm Primary school, for instance, found that 'the enthusiasm for Welsh ... is well-supported throughout the school by the incidental use of Welsh in all classes',[133] and is 'used incidentally by all teachers throughout the school'.[134] Furthermore a 'Welsh Dimension in the Curriculum' is being 'established through studies of local, national and geographical topics and through activities such as the popular lunch time folk dancing club'.[135] Other aspects of a burgeoning Welsh Curriculum include a school eisteddfod which is held on *Dydd Gwyl Dewi* {St. David's Day}.[136] An active Welsh folk dancing club *Gwyl Plant* was also found at Croesyceiliog North Road Infant School, Cwmbran, Gwent.[137] The inspector found the 'staff working hard to develop a Welsh ethos', and that an environment had been created where the pupils used the Welsh language daily in the context of the continuing development

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[133](HMI Inspectorate, 1995, 5)
[134](HMI Inspectorate, 1995, 13)
[135](HMI Inspectorate, 1995, 13)
[136](HMI Inspectorate, 1995, 13)
[137](Palmer, 1995a, 12)

of the *Curriculum Cymreig*. It is clear that in many of Gwent's infants, primary and junior schools the pupils have come to 'regard Welsh as a natural part of school life'.[138] The consequences of these developments extend beyond the boundaries of the schools. One inspector cited as evidence of the growth of a Welsh ethos the 'attempts to enlist the interest of parents' in what was clearly a profound change taking place in the identity of one particular school and its occupants.[139]

Amongst older age groups in Gwent schools Welsh and the 'Welsh ethos' has become increasingly integrated into the school curriculum. At Betws Comprehensive School, Newport, Gwent, for instance, Welsh was being 'taught for the first time to year 7' with implementation of national curriculum Welsh Order of September 1993.[140] The inspector found that 'most pupils enjoy the lessons and have positive attitudes to the language'.[141] The school had also incorporated the Welsh language into ceremonial and extra-curricular activities which included a Goodwill Day Service and *Urdd* activities.[142] At Trevethin Comprehensive School, Pontypool where 'no pupils have Welsh as a first language',[143] the inspector found that the time given to Welsh, introduced to years 7 and 8 in September 1994, was 'generous',[144] and that 'the pupils enjoy the experience of learning Welsh and apply themselves to the task with enthusiasm'.[145] At Ebbw Vale Comprehensive the inspector found that many students of Welsh in the Sixth Form 'volunteer to attend extra curricular activities to improve their oral

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[138](Palmer, 1995b, 14)
[139](Adams, 1995, 16)
[140](James, 1995, 23)
[141](James, 1995, 24)
[142](James, 1995, 24)
[143](Woodward, 1994, 1)
[144](Woodward, 1994, 14)
[145](Woodward, 1994, 25)

competence'.[146] There was evidence of staff shortages in some Welsh departments, or in some cases understaffing.[147]

Another significant development in this context was the establishment of the first designated Welsh medium comprehensive school in Gwent. The school was intended to be, according to the governors' report,

> *'ynys o Gymreictod mewn môr o Seisnigrywydd'*
> 'an island of Welshness in a sea of Englishness'.[148]

Ysgol Gwynllyw was opened in 1988 with 52 pupils 'in consequence of strenuous efforts made by the parents',[149] a Sixth Form was established in September 1993 'again as a result of similar parental pressure'.[150] In 1995 there were '514 pupils on roll, and based on the numbers attending the contributing primary schools it is anticipated that over 1000 pupils will be on roll by the year 2001'.[151] It is clear from the report that the entire ethos of the school is centred around a Welshness with the Welsh language at its core:

> 'furthered by the respect and unfailing care offered to all pupils by the teachers, Welsh is to be heard on the lips of all in school, unprompted and unhindered'.[152]

We also find empirical support for our agency theories developed in Chapter One and in this chapter. The school inspector for Gwynllyw, Bill Raybould, is the former director of *Pwyllgor Datblygu Addysg Gymraeg* {Welsh Language Education Development Committee} which was established

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[146](Landy, 1995, 24)
[147](Heylings, 1995, 23)
[148](Raybould, 1995, 6 & 7 - quoted by Raybould)
[149](Raybould, 1995, 2)
[150](Raybould, 1995, 2)
[151](Raybould, 1995, 2)
[152](Raybould, 1995, 15)

by the government to promote Welsh in schools.[153] Interviewed in this capacity by The Times he expressed concern at the demise of his committee.

> '{T}hat means we will no longer be able to offer advice on Welsh-medium nursery, further education, higher education, or teacher-training provision... Bearing in mind that 20 per cent of schools now teach through the medium of Welsh, our potential loss of influence over teacher training is disturbing... Our aim must be to ensure that 50 per cent of Wales's three to 15-year-olds become Welsh speakers within the next 20 years. It is a realistic target and one we could achieve'.[154]

In an earlier interview he argued that Welsh should be given foundation status in England.

> 'It is an insult to Welsh people that their language is not accorded the same status as foreign, or Commonwealth, languages... particularly when urban areas such as London, Liverpool, and Shrewsbury have concentrations of Welsh speakers'.[155]

The anxieties expressed above proved, on one level at least, unfounded; though they may, in the long run, have had unintended career repercussions for the agent concerned.

The body which took over the functions of *Pwyllgor Datblygu Addysg Gymraeg* and CCW in April 1994, ACAC, advertised for a bilingual chief executive thereby excluding, not without controversy, the previous chief executive at CCW, Bernard Jones.[156] The new chief executive is John Valentine Williams. The Welsh Language Act, which is at least partially responsible for his appointment, came into effect in the Autumn of 1993.

The other concern of the thesis is to depict the rate and spread of identity transformation. Attitudinal change is not only visible amongst

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[153](Smith, 1992). The committee's school-related duties have been assumed by ACAC.
[154](Smith, 1992)
[155](Smith, 1991c)
[156](Heath, 1993)

bureaucrats, within the teaching profession and, as a consequence, amongst students; the 1988 Education Reform Act may have induced also a change in parental attitudes to Welsh. The 1991 census figures reveal that 26.9% of the 10-14 age group were designated by their parents as Welsh speaking, whereas in 1981, 13.3% of 3 to 4 year olds {i.e. part of the same cohort} were described as Welsh speaking.[157] Though we can doubt, as in all language surveys,[158] the veracity of the figures; the statistics do unambiguously reveal the changing symbolic value of the Welsh language.[159] Changing parental attitudes seems to be both a cause and a consequence of the rise in the status of the Welsh language.

So much for the attitudinal changes induced by the 1988 Act, what of other changes? The most significant factor in secondary schools has been the rise in the percentage of pupils taking Welsh as a second language. From around 40% in 1988 {a proportion that had remained more or less steady since 1979} to over 65% in 1994.[160] Over the same period the proportion not taught Welsh declined from around 45% to around 20%.[161] In January 1994 12.1% of pupils in year groups 7-11 were taught Welsh as a first language.[162] The number of secondary school pupils being taught through the medium of Welsh has increased; in 1994, 46 out of 227 maintained secondary schools in Wales were classified as Welsh speaking.[163]

Some inertia has been placed in the system by the re-evaluation known as the Dearing reforms.

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[157](Jones, 1995b, 1).
[158](Millar, 1995, 174)
[159](Millar, 1995, 178-179)
[160](Jones, 1995b, 4)
[161](Jones, 1995b, 4)
[162](Jones, 1995b, 4)
[163](Jones, 1995b, 5)

'It is proposed that the statutory requirement which currently applies to pupils studying Welsh Second Language at Key Stage 4 should be suspended temporarily. 1999 should be viewed as the target date for reinstatement'.[164]

The executive summary within the same report elaborates on this position.

'Welsh has a special place in the curriculum at all key stages but there are very real difficulties currently facing many schools at KS4. Hence CCW recommends that the statutory requirement which currently applies to pupils studying Welsh as a foundation subject at KS4 be suspended temporarily. In 1999 {when the first main cohort to have studied Welsh as a foundation subject from year 1 will reach year 10} the requirement for all pupils to study Welsh at KS4 should be reinstated {except for those 10 schools exempted at KS4 whose position will need to be reviewed separately at an appropriate time, to be determined by the Secretary of State}'.[165]

Nevertheless, Welshness is re-emphasised as a valuable characteristic of the Key Stages in the National Curriculum in Wales, which should

'ensure coherent development of a Curriculum Cymreig {which encompasses the Welsh language; those subjects with Orders which are specific to Wales and appropriate use of context and content for learning experiences in all aspects of school life which promote pupils' understanding of Welshness}... There was widespread support for the view that time should be allocated in Wales to each subject to reflect the distinctive curriculum of Wales.[166]

It is estimated that by 1999 Welsh language schools will constitute around 25% of all secondary schools in Wales.[167] The average academic performance of these schools is demonstrably better on the whole than the English medium schools. Sixty-two per cent of pupils attending Welsh speaking schools and taking GCSE French for instance achieved A*, A or B

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[164](Curriculum Council for Wales, 1993, Letter to the Secretary of State)
[165](Curriculum Council for Wales, 1993, para. 1.13)
[166](Curriculum Council for Wales, 1993, paras. 3.4 & 3.11)
[167](Confidential Source H, 1995)

grades, whereas only 35% fell into this category in the remainder of the maintained sector.[168] This evidence also contradicts claims made earlier that it was disingenuous for Local Education Authorities to claim that the learning of Welsh would promote the third language learning.[169] There were four Welsh medium secondary schools in 1970.[170]

To find indicators of the geographic spread of identity transformation we consider briefly further evidence pertaining to the areas identified as 'British Wales', where Welsh identity was previously deemed to be weakest. Selecting on these areas as outlined in Chapter One, also allows us to increase the number of observations. The findings are revealing. Across a range of measures there has been a significant increase in the number of parents in these areas wishing to send their children to Welsh medium schools.[171] This desire in part stems from the likelihood of a better education. For instance in the one Welsh medium secondary school in Pontypool, even the average results in English are better than the remainder of the cohort,[172] and across the entire range of subjects examination results are 'better than the average for the whole of Wales'.[173] As a result of this popularity several Welsh feeder primaries have opened in British Wales, including at Newport and Abergavenny.

In this and the previous chapter we have asserted that the Welsh education system is structurally capable and, in certain areas, willing to produce Welsh identity, and that its personnel likewise have the capacity, and

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[168](Jones, 1995b, 5)
[169](Jones, 1988b, 108)
[170](Jones, 1988b, 115)
[171](Confidential Source H, 1995)
[172](Confidential Source H, 1995)
[173](Raybould, 1995, 7). In addition the LEA provides an additional 10% funding as part of its policy of maintaining Welsh schools (Raybould, 1995, 12).

in certain areas, the willingness to reproduce Welsh identity. We have also shown over the past two chapters that the government's attempt to nationalise the curriculum were also attempts to homogenise and create new patterns of uniformity, and were successfully challenged on a number of levels when confronted by heterogeneous factors in Wales. Paradoxically a new uniformity has been transformed into a system of heterogeneity. Let us now turn to another powerful agency of identity reproduction, the media.

4.7 Broadcasting Personnel

Since the 1960s broadcasting, and particularly television, has taken on an increasingly important role as a means of conveying political information. This change has occurred on a global scale; in many societies television is now an important source of political information.[174] Broadcasting media are not necessarily a neutral means of communication. This lack of neutrality can be expressed in two ways; structural bias and content bias. Referring to the former one scholar has observed:

> '*Sur le plan socio-économique, on remarque deux tendances apparemment contradictoires: d'une part, la monopolisation des moyens de communication de masse, d'autre part, depuis plusiers années, le developpement de tout un réseau de presse écrite et audio-visuelle reposat (sic) sur des assises locales.*'[175]
> On a socio-economic level, two apparently contradictory tendencies are manifest: on the one hand, the monopolisation of the means of mass communication, and on the other, for the past few years, the whole development of a network of printing and audio visual facilities servicing the localities.

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[174](Dalton, 1988, 20-22)
[175](Lamizet, 1983, 9). My translation.

Such structural exigencies can effect change in the content of media output particularly through '*une homogénéisation du discours*'.[176] The argument quoted above however alludes to both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies within broadcasting. In addition, within the UK context, the growth of broadcasting language policies has reflected the growth of the mutual intensity of these forces, such that the institutional support of an 'established standard' is being matched by support of 'competing standards' as expressed by such language policies.[177]

The question arises whether these contending forces are in some kind of dynamic stasis, or not? Furthermore, though partisanship in media structures and output seems intuitively correct and open to empirical appraisal, analysis at this level involves an apparent elision of the contending forces that are in operation within localised broadcasting systems themselves.

A third dimension would appear valuable at this stage, that of human agency. In Wales broadcasting personnel do more than simply mirror identity conflict: they are implicated in it through active representation of contending ideologies.[178] Evidence for this, and the consequent politicisation of broadcasting in Wales is provided by a heated exchange which took place in the Welsh Affairs Committee. During the WAC's deliberations on broadcasting in Wales, Owen Edwards BBC Controller for Wales became subject to the following line of questioning:

> Mr Williams: 'I firmly believe Plaid Cymru has infiltrated BBC Wales'
>
> Mr Edwards: "Not the news, sir'

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[176](Lamizet, 1983, 10)
[177](Bell, 1983, 37)
[178](Bevan, 1984, 105-106)

> Mr Williams: 'I am saying to you that Plaid Cymru have infiltrated BBC Wales... and I don't know whether you've had any connection with Plaid Cymru yourself or not. That may be a matter for another enquiry..'.[179]

The BBC in Wales has undergone a process of orientation change, which can be expressly measured by increases in the allocation of resources by the BBC for minority purposes. This change, it has been argued, has served to legitimise opposition to central structure and values.[180] The change in the BBC, and indeed broadcasting in general, in Wales can therefore be expressed in three dimensions: a} structure, b} content, and c} personnel.

Structural change was dealt with in detail in the previous chapter, but is worth returning to briefly at this juncture particularly in the context of the influence of b} and c} above. Such change is both a cause and a consequence of endogenous and exogenous pressures on broadcasting in Wales: though it should be remembered the structure of the BBC in Wales has also been changing over a much longer time period, a factor which will be addressed below. An exogenous pressure might include the prevailing management philosophy of the 1980s which was in outlook, if not in name, devolutionary. A marked increase in the autonomy of BBC Wales occurred in the early 1980s, especially from 1983 when London devolved much of the day to day financial management to Cardiff.[181] The reforms depicted above were paralleled by a changing attitude to recruitment. Significantly London dropped its requirements of a representative from Head Office being present when recruiting key personnel. Some interviews were carried out for the first time in Welsh.[182] The endogenous pressures within the BBC are a result of

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[179](Welsh Affairs Committee, 1981b)
[180](Bevan, 1984, 105-106)
[181](Davies, 1994a, 375)
[182](Davies, 1994a, 375)

the changing orientation of personnel. Over the longer term, a large phalanx of individuals with an autonomist mindset have effectively colonised an agency of social control,[183] and in recent years this process has accelerated markedly. Empirical evidence for orientation change is revealed in a study of communicator ideology and orientation which revealed widespread support for autonomist politics. Sixty-one per cent of the producers interviewed in the course of the study expressed autonomist viewpoints, a view that had been reinforced by their working in Welsh broadcasting. The reinforcement, they argued, had come about after having been confronted by the realities of centralist politics within the BBC.[184] Incidental evidence asserting autonomist sympathies amongst Welsh speakers in the BBC news services is also available.[185] Though content change cannot be addressed in detail here it is worth noting, for instance, that,

> 'BBC Wales... now introduces its nightly news "from the capital of the nation", a phrase which would have been too provocative even five years ago'.[186]

This process of change is not entirely new. Firstly, the history of the BBC in Wales since 1924 is marked in part by a long term impulse to create a separate region.[187] The impulse itself was both internal and as a response to external commercial factors. Such factors included responses to the establishment of independent rivals such as Television Wales and the West {TWW} in 1958,[188] *Teledu Cymru*, a 1960s television company that eventually

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[183](Bevan, 1984, 109)

[184](Bevan, 1984, 105-109). Though the notion of a reactive dynamic offered here does have some explanatory value, it does not provide a sufficient cause for the change in producer ideology, nor for its appearance at this particular juncture.

[185](Davies, 1994a, 381)

[186](Evans, 1996b)

[187]For more information on this area see (Davies, 1994a)

[188]Harlech TV replaced TWW in 1968.

failed, and more importantly the creation of an Independent Television Authority Committee for Wales in 1963.[189] Non-competitive urges emanated from the Broadcasting Council for Wales, though it is clearly the presence of competition in the Welsh identity reification and Welsh language medium 'markets' that encouraged the establishment of Radio Wales and Cymru, and eventually S4C.[190]

Over time, territorially, and to a certain extent, politically and culturally external, the government and the state has also played an important role. Perhaps reflecting a nation-wide attitudinal transformation with respect to Welsh identity, a series of government sponsored commissions endorsed in one way or another the upgrading of Welsh language broadcasting. The Crawford Report of 1974, for instance, called for investment in social harmony, and endorsed the creation of separate linguistic television channels in Wales.[191] This opinion was supported by the findings of two other commissions during the 1970s .[192]

The Conservatives in their 1979 election manifesto pledged a separate TV channel for Wales. From September 1979 to September 1980 the Conservative party came under intense lobbying from IBA and HTV, who did not wish to incur the cost of supporting a separate Welsh language channel. The government then declared in favour of placing language programmes on existing channels,[193] but after a vociferous campaign against the decision, changed their minds again. The subsequent creation of S4C and indeed the 'whole attempt to develop a television service in the Welsh language has no

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[189]Note that BBC Wales was established in 1964.
[190](Bevan, 1984, 114)
[191](Crawford, 1974)
[192](Lord Annan, 1977; Siberry, 1975)
[193](Bevan, 1984, 110)

real parallel with any other country in the world which {had} a roughly comparable population' at that time.[194] Other regions, for instance in Spain, have since established television channels. Often their demands were couched in terms of a desire to emulate the experience of Wales in this respect.[195] There is evidence that the Welsh experience has had a concrete effect on developments in Gaelic language broadcasting in Scotland.[196] The mainstreaming of Welsh language pop music also provides, *inter alia*, more evidence of the rising status of Welsh identity.

S4C was established in 1981, and began broadcasting in 1982. A decade later, as depicted in Table 4:3 below, the station was broadcasting 1655 hours of Welsh language programming a year.

Table 4:3

Hours of Welsh Language Broadcasting on S4C 1992-3[197]

Transmission Type	BBC sourced	HTV and Independent sourced	Total
First	524	901	1425
Repeat	25	205	230
			1655

Research indicates that S4C is affecting language use in Wales.[198] The programme mix is broad and includes a flagship news programme *Newyddion Saith*, a documentary programme *Taro Nawr* and a popular soap *Pobol y Cwm*. The majority of the programming is provided by the BBC and HTV. In

[194](Bevan, 1984, 111)
[195](McDonald, 1989, 179)
[196](Cormack, 1993)
[197]Source (May, 1994, 139).
[198](Delamont, 1989, 91ff.)

order to fulfill its obligations to S4C, BBC Wales has doubled its programme expenditure on Welsh language broadcasting.[199] Cardiff has since become the largest broadcasting centre in Britain, outside London .[200]

4.8 Conclusion

In a general context, placing 'class' arguments in the wider theoretical framework of this thesis, we can now advance the discussion first broached in Chapter One, relating Barry's arguments on why an influential sector of the *intelligentsia* would regard nationalism with such disdain to the growth of 'the idea that class could become a developmental vector in its own right'.[201] This 'combined' doctrine furthermore was central to the ideals of internationalism, which, by the logic of this argument, was born as a reaction to nationalism. Nairn goes on to say that:

> 'Although lacking a social basis in the sense of Burke's educated cross-border caste, this secular faith did have a composite and shifting foundation. Part of it came from what George Steiner, in a 1987 television lecture on Vienna, called the "Judaic intelligentsia" {especially after the end of the Habsburg Empire}; part from the working-class movement of different countries, as self-educated cadres adopted internationalism in opposition to what they felt as the oppressive cultures of their own schools; and part from metropolitan or Atlantic-left cliques whose influence was {or seemed} big enough to make them feel for a time like the center of the world'.[202]

The 'combination' has been weakened by the decline of class as a developmental vector within AIDs. Moreover, several of the component units of the secular faith identified by Nairn would appear to have either lost influence or re-defined themselves. Elites operating in the institutions of the

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[199](Davies, 1994a, 377)
[200](Davies, 1994a, 375)
[201](Nairn, 1993, 161)
[202](Nairn, 1993, 161)

EC, for instance, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, appear to accommodate, embrace, or even embody regional autonomist identities.

Class is not completely redundant as a concept however. Looking specifically at Wales, Adamson indicates the importance of dynamic identity adjustments in his discussion of the changing nature of the working class in Wales.[203] Adamson then analyses social change in Wales, which is expressed primarily, he argues, through the emergence of a new Welsh working class, involved mostly in the service economy and Welsh institutions created by the UK state. Such a class is seen as alienated from traditional working class loyalties and, in contrast to members of a new English working class, able to draw on Welsh nationality. This strategy has been made easier by continuing development within the nationalist movement away from its roots in nineteenth century liberalism and nonconformism. Though this analysis does not necessarily contradict what is being argued here, it does itself exhibit a number of causal weaknesses. Class based analyses of societal change are linked to an assumption of the primacy of economic factors in the process.[204] Though linked analyses distinguishing investment from consumption decisions amongst autonomists are analytically useful,[205] neither can satisfactorily explain the timing and the force of Welsh identity transformation since 1979. Neither do they explain the existence of variously determined factors, particularly relating to the growing social status of the Welsh language and its effect on identity transformation.[206]

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[203](Adamson, 1991a)
[204]But see (Adamson, 1988) for a discussion of the role of non-economic determinants of class in advanced industrial democracies.
[205](Green, 1982; Sharpe, 1993)
[206](Jones, 1992a, 352)

So far we have shown that rates of identity transformation have altered markedly since 1979 as a result of structural factors and human agency. We have shown that there are multiple points of access of influence on Welsh identity expressed across historical, territorial, governmental, institutional, cultural, and social dimensions. In the next chapter we focus more directly on the political aspects of Welsh identity transformation, focusing firstly on exclusively Welsh political and quasi-political organisations.

CHAPTER 5

MODELLING MODERN WALES I:

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

5.0 Introduction

> '...I will never let anyone get away with calling me a nationalist, and I will never call myself that, if I ever did'.[1]

The quote above is startling given that it was written by the then President of Plaid Cymru. Four inferences can be made from its content. Firstly the assumption that the term 'nationalist' is a pejorative one. Secondly, that to be a nationalist, at least in the English language sense of the word, in a normative sense is wrong. Thirdly that Plaid Cymru itself is undergoing a process of political transformation, since it has always been regarded traditionally as a nationalist party. Finally it gives a further indication that the process of 'nation-building' involves establishing an imaginative infrastructure before a material infrastructure. A growing realisation is occurring amongst the scholarly community that the nation may be seen as an imaginative discourse rather than material reality.[2] We have attempted to acknowledge these changes throughout this thesis.

We have also employed the term autonomism when discussing the primary aim of Plaid Cymru. This is not merely an exercise in semantics. The so-called 'double thesis' of nationalism, whereby small nation autonomism is linked with great nationalism,[3] is conceptually and methodologically troublesome and in our opinion any valid scholarly method of avoiding such confusion is of merit.

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[1](Thomas, 1983a, 18)

[2](Gruffudd, 1995, 220)

[3](Parekh, 1995, 35). As a Times leader writer asked, 'Why is nationalism relevant in Anglo-Brussels relations but not in Anglo-Scottish or Anglo-Welsh ones?' (Leading article, 1992).

This section of the chapter will *inter alia* address the substance of the change in the *Blaid*, and the causes and consequences of that change. We will also seek to address the question whether Plaid Cymru has influenced the rate of identity transformation or is merely reacting to it. At one level it would appear that the latter is the case. Examine the voting figures below.

Table 5:1

Plaid Cymru Voting Figures in Wales in General Elections since 1979 {in %}[4]

1979	1983	1987	1992
8.1	8.0	7.3	8.8

The figures indicate a fairly constant level of support in general elections through the period under study. This levels represents a reduction compared to that prevailing in the early to mid-1970s, but is higher than levels between the 1940s and 1960s.[5] See the voting figures below

Table 5:2

Plaid Cymru - Selected Voting Figures in Wales in General Elections since 1945 {in %}[6]

1945	1959	1970	Oct. 1974
1.1	4.8	19.7	10.8

These are, however, all-Wales measures, and voting for a political party is, in a sense, the last stage in a process of the politicisation of identity that can only be said to be fully realised in the North West. In order to understand the underlying processes of identity transformation that are taking place

[4]Source (Levy, 1995, 299).
[5](Levy, 1995, 299)
[6]Source (Anderson, 1989, 43).

outside this area we need to disaggregate the results, and also incorporate 'second-order' elections into our analytical framework. This technique will enable us to examine the situation in clearly defined areas of identity competition in British Wales, whereas the latter will provide us with extra data, particularly in elections where voters feel perhaps less constrained in their party choice.

5.1 Electoral Influence: The Welsh Councils

It is generally acknowledged that 'local government elections in the Principality display quite different characteristics from their counterparts in England'.[7] There are a number of political and structural features which contribute to this contrariety, which both reflect and accentuate the separateness of Welsh political identity. In the first instance it should be noted that the 'independent candidate is the norm rather than the exception in Wales', which partially explains the 'reluctance in some areas to fight elections along party lines'.[8] Secondly, partly because Plaid Cymru 'adds a completely different dimension to the nature of party competition and the distribution of the vote',[9] though the 'overall strength of the Labour party is reflected in its presence at local elections, the same degree of visibility does not apply to either the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats'.[10]

Structurally, the system of local government in Wales has recently undergone a period of considerable change; upheaval which parallels that of the 1974 reforms. On April 1, 1996 the 8 county and 37 district councils of Wales were superseded by 22 unitary authorities. The elections for these

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[7](Rallings & Thrasher, 1992, xvii)
[8](Rallings & Thrasher, 1992, xvii)
[9](Rallings & Thrasher, 1992, xvii-xviii)
[10](Rallings & Thrasher, 1992, xviii)

unitary authorities, known in the transition stage as 'shadow authorities', took place in May 1995. The results are set out in the table below:

Table 5:3

Unitary Authority Elections May 1995[11]

Name	Seats	Unopp -osed	Control	Lab.	Plaid Cymru	Liberal Dem.	Cons	Other
Aberconwy and Colwyn	60	7	NOC	19	4	18	9	10
Anglesey	40	18	IND	6	7	0	1	26
Blaenau Gwent	42	11	LAB	33	1	0	1	7
Bridgend	48	18	LAB	46	0	0	0	2
Caernarfon & Merioneth	83	27	PLAID	9	45	3	0	26
Caerphilly	68	3	LAB	57	8	0	0	3
Cardiff	67	0	LAB	56	1	9	1	0
Cardigan -shire	44	11	IND	1	6	12	0	25
Carmarthen -shire	81	7	NOC	37	7	3	1	33
Denbigh-shire	49	7	NOC	20	7	3	0	19
Flintshire	72	15	LAB	46	1	5	3	17
Merthyr Tydfil	33	0	LAB	29	0	0	0	4
Monmouth -shire	42	3	LAB	26	0	1	11	4
Neath and Port Talbot	64	11	LAB	53	3	1	0	7
Newport	47	11	LAB	46	0	0	1	0
Pembroke -shire	60	15	IND	13	3	3	0	41
Powys	83	9	IND	10	1	8	3	61
Rhondda Cynon Taff	75	0	LAB	57	14	0	0	4
Swansea	73	4	LAB	56	0	8	1	8
Torfaen	44	15	LAB	41	0	1	1	1
Vale of Glamorgan	44	15	LAB	36	5	0	5	1
Wrexham	51	5	LAB	33	0	4	3	11
TOTALS	1273	212		731	113	78	41	310

[11]Sources (Balsom, 1996, 209-303; Western Mail, 1995b).

In keeping with our methodological and theoretical design it is necessary to disaggregate our results further. According to the county based structure of 'British Wales' set out in Chapter One, the corresponding unitary authorities in which identity transformation is hypothesised to be taking place are: Aberconwy and Colwyn, Blaenau Gwent, Caerphilly, Cardiff, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Merthyr Tydfil, Monmouthshire, Newport, Powys, Rhondda Cynon Taff, Torfaen, Vale of Glamorgan, Wrexham and, for reasons of prior identity not geography, Pembrokeshire.[12]

Plaid Cymru support is the most unambiguous indicator of Welsh political transformation which is hypothesised to take place after a process of identity transformation. On the basis of our analysis in previous chapters, which depicts the nascent stages of identity transformation in areas not associated with politicised Welsh identification, we do not expect dramatic results from our disaggregated political indicators. We do however expect to see some change.

In Aberconwy and Colwyn, for instance Plaid fielded 16 candidates in a 60 seat election, and won five seats. The party also ran a very close third in the two seat ward of Craig-y-Don, polling 486 votes to the second winning candidate's 537: Note that multi-member wards are now a significant aspect of the Welsh local political landscape. In one single-seat ward, Uwch Conwy, the Plaid candidate was unopposed. In Blaenau Gwent, the *Blaid* won one seat in Six Bells where the candidate D. Hancock polled 836 votes. Another *Blaid* candidate also polled 897 votes in Ebbw Vale North, a 3 seat ward

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[12]The parliamentary constituencies of 'British Wales' are Alyn and Deeside, Brecon and Radnor, Bridgend, Cardiff Central, Cardiff S. and Penarth, Cardiff W., Cardiff N., Clwyd NW, Clywd SW, Delyn, Monmouth, Montgomery, Newport E., Newport W., Pembroke, Vale of Glamorgan, and Wrexham (Balsom, 1985). Please note that the 'fit' between these constituencies and the unitary authorities is not perfect.

where the third winning Labour candidate polled 1026 votes. Our measure is distorted by the fact that Plaid Cymru only fielded a total of 3 candidates, the other competing in the constituency of Tredegar Central and West.[13] In Caerphilly Plaid Cymru won 8 seats. The *Blaid* lost a seat in Aber Valley, won two seats each in Hengoed and Llanbradach, all three in Morgan Jones, and one in Penyrheol. Significantly the party fielded a total of 46 candidates in a majority of the wards.

In Cardiff, at least one Plaid candidate stood in all 67 seats, but the party was only victorious in one - Creigiau. A Plaid candidate came second in Butetown but polled only 69 votes compared to the Labour candidates 649. Plaid Cymru achieved moderate success in Denbighshire, winning seven seats in a 49 seat election {32 wards},[14] and leaving the council under no overall control. In Flintshire Plaid Cymru competed in only 5 of the 54 wards.[15] This figure is distorted somewhat, since it is thought that many Independent candidates were sympathisers, and that some may have failed to place their party affiliation on the ballot.[16] Plaid Cymru won one council seat in Holywell West.

Similarly in Merthyr the party only put up one candidate, a sitting councillor in the Town constituency. With four seats on offer, the result was close and is tabulated below.

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[13](Western Mail, 1995a)
[14](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 314-315)
[15](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 315-316)
[16](Davies, 1996b)

Table 5:4

Election results in the Town constituency of Merthyr[17]

Candidate	Party	Vote
Ms LA MATTHEWS	LAB	1376
IW CLARK	LAB	1354
CT JONES	LAB	1255
TG DAVIES	LAB	1214
WR Thomas	Plaid	1171
CE Davies	IND	643
JC Rees	IND	471
S Baynham	IND	447

In Monmouthshire and Newport Plaid Cymru did not field a single candidate. In Powys, an 80 seat authority, only six Plaid Cymru candidates stood. One victory was achieved in Newtown Central.

Rhondda Cynon Taff, a nineteen ward authority, represented the greatest success for Plaid Cymru outside the North West. They won fourteen seats, Llantrisant, Pontyclun, Treherbert, Ystrad {2}, Penygraig, Mountain Ash East, Mountain Ash West, Rhigos, Aberaman South {2}, Penrhiwceiber, Aberdare West {2}. Several other elections exhibited markedly close results. The Plaid Cymru candidate in Ynysybwl for instance lost by one vote, polling 695 to the winner's 696 votes.[18]

Plaid Cymru did not field any candidates in Torfaen. In the Vale of Glamorgan Plaid Cymru fielded candidates in all but three of the 22 wards and won 5 seats, Baruc and Dinas Powys {4}, revealing a geographic concentration of support. In Wrexham Plaid Cymru fielded candidates in 8 of

[17]Source: (Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 316-317).
[18](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 325). The election has since been annulled amidst allegations of fraud (Western Mail, 1996, June 10-13).

the 41 seats, and failed to win an election.[19] Only three Plaid candidates stood in Pembrokeshire, all three won, of which two were unopposed.[20] Pembrokeshire is controlled by Independent councillors, and there appeared to be pact-like behaviour between Plaid and Independent candidates. The results also revealed a marked geographic concentration of support.

The analysis above services us with three conclusions. Firstly, the results in this one election demonstrate that the hypothesised process of identity transformation has not yet reached a political dimension of any unambiguously measurable significance, though Plaid Cymru have argued that the results are distorted by the fact that Labour was riding high in the opinion polls in May 1995.[21] Secondly, it is apparent that we are not just dealing with different patterns of local support but different patterns of local party mobilisation. Therefore, and thirdly, it is clear that the type of analysis engaged in above is in want of refinement.

The refining process involves three stages. Firstly, additional factors must be acknowledged. For instance, the postulated rate at which identity transformation transposes into mobilisation is distorted by the existence of three major parties operating in Wales with proposals for at least some form of Welsh political devolution. We could posit a more generalised measure of transformation based on political antipathy towards the one party not proposing constitutional change with respect to Wales, the Conservative Party. Though the Conservative Party suffered a significant defeat in Wales in 1995 and now fail to hold one council, such a measure would be unreliable since other explanatory variables impinge on the outcome. The affiliation of

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[19](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 328-330)
[20](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 320-321)
[21](Davies, 1996b)

independent councillors is also difficult to ascertain without further ground level research beyond the scope of this thesis. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest however that the situation alluded to in Flintshire above may be reproduced elsewhere. A Plaid Cymru activist in Newtown for instance interviewed in 1995 stated that:

> 'we've got several councillors who are independents in the District Council and openly Plaid Cymru but not officially Plaid Cymru councillors - which, of course, is a source of irritation to the Party'.[22]

Secondly, in order to discover whether Plaid Cymru is entrenching itself in specific places, or even expanding in areas of South Wales, time-series analysis is required. Such analysis is also demanded if we wish to prove unequivocally that local sub-cultural regions dominated by 'Welsh values' are emerging. This approach is, unfortunately, impaired by several non-exclusive factors. In the first instance, 'individual ward data for Wales before 1988 are very patchy',[23] so it is difficult to extend the analysis back to 1979. Second, six of the eight Welsh counties 'underwent wholesale boundary revision between 1985 and 1989',[24] and in 1995 were superseded altogether, rendering ward-based comparisons difficult. Third, the relatively large number of uncontested seats in Wales - there were 145 such in 1989 for instance, compared to 64 in England[25] - further impedes the measurement of any 'identive entrenchment'. Note also that a significant proportion of uncontested seats tend to be held by Independent councillors. In 1995, for instance, over a third of seats won by Independent candidates were unopposed.[26] The final impediment is the irregular coverage of local

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
[22](Senior, 1995, 163)
[23](Rallings, 1996)
[24](Rallings, 1989, 11)
[25](Rallings, 1989, i)
[26](Rallings, 1995, vi)

elections by Plaid Cymru candidates over the years, which the analysis above depicts. To illustrate the point further, consider the figures below:

Figure 5:1

Percentage Of Seats Contested By Parties In Welsh Local Elections

1973-1991 - Welsh Counties[27]




[27] Source: (Rallings & Thrasher, 1992).

Figure 5:2

Percentage Of Seats Contested By Parties In Welsh Local Elections

1973 & 1976 - Welsh Districts[28]



[28] Source: (Rallings & Thrasher, 1992).

The new unitary authority system in Wales may over time prove more amenable to research of this nature. To this end, and as far as political consequences are concerned, we suggest that a correlation may exist between unitary authorities under no overall control, Plaid Cymru holding a balance of power, levels of Welsh language development - though controlling for statutory obligations introduced by the Welsh Language Act 1993, and speed of identity mobilisation. Notice for instance that Denbighshire unitary local authority is under no overall control and has advertised in the Welsh language press for a chief executive who must be or become fluent in Welsh.[29] The advertisement reads as follows:

> 'The Council considers it essential that its chief Executive is fluent in Welsh. A successful applicant unable to speak Welsh will be required to start learning the language immediately and within two years be able to communicate fluently through the medium of Welsh'.[30]

Thirdly, an educational change variable can also be introduced at this point, and for two reasons. In the first instance, we have evidence of differing attitudes towards bilingual education in the counties prior to 1988.[31] The evidence also provides an indicator of the importance of individual agency and contingency in the relatively intimate environment of Wales. Proponents of bilingual education will argue that it is no accident that it took seven years from inception to fruition to establish a Welsh medium primary school in Merthyr Tydfil, because of a single administrative gatekeeper. That same individual moved in 1974 to West Glamorgan, where language activists encountered similar perceived inertia for twenty years. As a result, it is argued, Welsh language education provision in West Glamorgan has

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[29](Cyngor Sir Ddinbych, 1995)
[30](Cyngor Sir Ddinbych, 1995, 23). See (Sharpe, 1984, 152ff.) on the 'Welsh Effect'.
[31](Confidential Source J, 1995)

remained behind that of, for example, Mid Glamorgan.[32] Interestingly, this administrative gatekeeper resigned from a Welsh Consultative Council Sub Group on Education, along with two other Directors of Education, in August 1992 over the issue of joint working.[33] The district councils in Wales, however, did not agree with their arguments.[34]

Educational changes can, in addition, provide an opportunity to measure 'political consequences' - specifically by delineating any emergence of local sub-cultural regions dominated by 'Welsh values', by investigating whether there is any correlation between Plaid Cymru support and the presence of Welsh language primary and secondary schools.

Again we expand to a 'British Wales' measure since measurement solely with respect to Gwent is difficult due to the paucity of PC candidates in Newport and Torfaen. Furthermore, the only Welsh language secondary school in the Gwent area was Ysgol Gyfun Gwynllw, which now falls under Torfaen. Therefore, given that no Plaid Cymru candidate competed in this election, nor in Newport for that matter, measurement is impossible.

However, aware that we may be selecting on our dependent variable in a cross-'British Wales' study, and for other reasons that will become clear below, it is worth pondering the consequences of the *Blaid*'s manifest lack of success in reacting to a discernible process of identity transformation in Gwent. It would appear from the data available that there exists a lacuna between levels of identity transformation and support for Plaid Cymru. A lacuna, possibly explained by the different political culture of South-east Wales, and the fact that Plaid Cymru is no longer the sole political transmitter

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[32](Confidential Source J, 1995)
[33](Osmond, 1995, 58)
[34](Osmond, 1995, 58)

of autonomist Welsh identity which begs the question: Is there room for another Wales-based political party?

The party 'reaction' measure is useful for another reason, in that the 'British Wales' results are only likely to be indicative. In the first instance the data pool is limited by the intermittent rate of candidacy - that is, a number of the aforementioned unitary authorities must be excluded on the grounds of data paucity. These are: Aberconwy and Colwyn 16 Plaid Cymru candidates competing in a 60 seat council, Blaenau Gwent - 3/42, Flintshire - 5/72, Merthyr Tydfil - 1/33, Monmouthshire - 0/42, Newport - 0/47, Powys - 6/83, Torfaen - 0/44, and Wrexham 8/51. Pembrokeshire {3/60} is a special case because of the large number of independent candidates standing.

This leaves us with Caerphilly - 46 candidates competing in a 68 seat council, Cardiff - 28/67 {and in all 28 wards}, Denbighshire - 16/46 {marginal}, Rhondda Cynon Taff - 53/75, and the Vale of Glamorgan - 30/44. Rhondda Cynon Taff unitary authority, for instance provides some interesting preliminary data. Ysgol Gyfun Llanhari is a Welsh comprehensive whose catchment area corresponds with the Pontyclun ward. Significantly a Plaid Cymru candidate, JV Huish, was victorious there, winning 585, with RG Norman, an Independent Plaid candidate, coming third and winning 523 votes. Nevertheless, since Rhondda, Cynon Taff also comprises a significant proportion of 'Welsh Wales' within its boundaries, it ought to be excluded from the general model in order to prevent selection on the dependent variable. Denbighshire must also be dropped for reasons of data marginality. Caerphilly, Cardiff, and the Vale of Glamorgan remain.

We can, nevertheless, retain a pure 'designated schools' measure within our model since they exist in sufficient numbers in the wards of 'British Wales', and because they exist in anglicised areas. Ideally, the analysis

would involve looking at the schools catchment area - data which should be available from the prospectuses schools are required to produce - and then 'fitting' this area with local government wards.

Another, albeit not strictly alternative, approach does present itself, however, due to the existence of designated schools throughout Wales. By their nature they tend to be in anglophone areas, of Welsh Wales and *Y Fro Cymraeg*. In the latter region, an indicator of Welsh identity reinforcement can be developed by looking at the relative success of Plaid Cymru in relevant wards. Ysgol Tryfan in Bangor provides a case in point. Situated within the new Caernarfonshire and Merioneth unitary authority, which is controlled by Plaid Cymru, the school's catchment area includes Llanfairfechan, Llandygai, Y Felinheli, Penrhos, and Maesgeirchen, which fall within the wards of Llandygai and Y Felinheli. In Llandygai, Plaid Cymru hold 1 of 2 seats, the other been held by a Labour councillor who polled 588 votes. The *Blaid* councillor, D. Owen, polled 480 votes, whilst a third, losing, Plaid Cymru candidate polled 420 votes.[35] In Y Felinheli, the winning candidate, WO Jones, stood as an Independent Socialist against the PC candidate HV Roberts. In order to ascertain his political views, Mr Jones was interviewed. The following exchange took place in English:

> Snicker: 'Are you sympathetic to the views of Plaid Cymru?'
> Jones: 'I am a Welshman to the core'.[36]

In view of the research findings no single approach, currently, is likely to prove satisfactory. The most significant problem with 'catchment area' analysis is that Welsh language schools in British Wales tend not to operate on such a spatially defined basis. Cardiff City Council's seven Welsh

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[35](Rallings & Thrasher, 1995, 307)
[36](Confidential Source G, 1996)

language primary schools, for instance, do not operate on the basis of catchment areas. Rather the system is administered via an authority-wide list system which serves all of Cardiff and the Vale of Glamorgan.[37]

Consequently, the single Welsh language secondary school, Ysgol Gyfun Gymraeg Glantaf, is served by linked feeder primaries. The spatial distribution of take up varies from year to year, and the education department creates a map each depicting the spatial distribution of demand for Welsh language education. Every child's geographical position is plotted on this map. These maps are kept for six years and form part of the planning process for Welsh language education, as such they are not in the public domain. Certain information pertaining to the current map was forthcoming however.

In Creigiau for instance, which is represented by a Plaid Cymru councillor, the demand for Welsh language education is high and a Welsh-medium stream exists in the local primary school. On the other hand, growth in the demand for Welsh medium education is taking place in areas where there is no discernible support for Plaid Cymru. In Canton, for instance, a densely populated district represented by three Labour councillors, demand for Welsh language education outstrips supply. One small Welsh-medium primary school in the area is heavily over subscribed, and there are plans to build a new Welsh medium primary school in the ward - *Ysgol Pwll Coch*.

Gaining an understanding the processes at work in Canton ought to furnish us with a microcosmic picture of changes that are occurring throughout 'British Wales'. Identity transformation is occurring, according to one Canton councillor, and at two levels. For several decades, sectors of the

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[37](Confidential Source L, 1996)

middle-class in British Wales have been agitating for Welsh-medium education for their children. As such 'like most revolutions it has been driven by the Middle Class'.[38] The more 'indigenous' people of Cardiff have been brought along on the 'coattails' of this process. It is these groups who are pushing for changes in Canton. A great latent demand is discernible, and the whole process is having a radical effect on Cardiff.[39] Demand for Welsh medium education continues to grow in Cardiff, and the Council is in the final stages of planning to move on to a catchment area system, probably in September 1997.[40] There are also plans for a second Welsh medium secondary school in the Llandaf area.[41]

The outcome of this particular resarch exercise is both unsatisfactory and yet promising. The analysis of selected areas and schools in order to find an indicative measure of the relationship between a Welsh language school in the community and support for Plaid Cymru did not yield, for various methodological reasons outlined above, serviceable results. We established a measure of correlation, but any such is unlikely to reveal unambiguous causality. As indicated by the Flintshire case, one significant intervening variable is the existence of Independent councillors whose support for Plaid Cymru is sometimes implicit, but nevertheless indeterminate. The second is the presence, as mentioned above, of proposals supportive of Welsh identity and values in the other major parties operating in Wales. Nevertheless we are satisfied that an indicative measure of the process of identity transformation through Welsh language education has been substantiated.

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[38](Confidential Source A, 1996)
[39](Confidential Source A, 1996)
[40](Confidential Source L, 1996)
[41](Confidential Source L, 1996)

5.2 Formative Influence of Plaid Cymru

It has been asserted that Plaid Cymru's formative influence on Welsh politics has been profound.[42] In a recent speech the Chief Executive of Plaid Cymru claimed that many of the polices campaigned for by the party have been enacted by either Labour or Conservative administrations.[43] In addition the policy areas over which the official claimed influence were not confined to what could be broadly defined as cultural spheres, but included economic areas. The Plaid Cymru document *A Plan for a New Wales* was cited as particularly formative in this respect,[44] and were claimed to have informed the creation of the Welsh Development Agency and the Development Board for Rural Wales. These claims notwithstanding, it appears from the data presented so far in this thesis that autonomist impulses across the board have had an agenda-setting influence on Welsh politics; though the *Blaid* remains the most visible of these influences.

The *Blaid* itself however has undergone internal change as a result of a variety of influences. As revealed below, changes in Plaid Cymru's policy position can be depicted through discourse analysis of policy positions as given in manifestos, other literature, and through interviews with key agents in the policy formulation process. These developments are both a cause and a consequence of structural changes that have served to push Plaid Cymru towards being a more broad-based popular organisation led by increasingly professionalised and sophisticated elites.[45] Demonstrative evidence of increasing sophistication since the 1960s includes the 1966 establishment of a Research Group. Intended to assist in the formulation of policies that could

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[42](Jones, 1992a, 343)
[43](Davies, 1996b)
[44](Davies, 1996b; Plaid Cymru, 1968)
[45](Butler & Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970)

be seen as more relevant to modern Wales, it signalled a breaking away from the cultural conservatism that had dominated the earlier years of the party.[46]

Accompanying the structural and policy changes was an improved measure of electoral success for the *Blaid*. In the 1950s the supremacy of Labour in Wales seemed unassailable. For example in the 1950 General Election Labour took 27 out of 36 seats in Wales with 58.1% of the vote. In the 1959 election the *Blaid* achieved its biggest yet share of the Welsh vote, but this still amounted to only 5.2% of total votes cast. By 1966 however the *Blaid* had secured electoral victory in a Carmarthen by-election, which provided impetus for further challenges to Labour in the 1970s, especially in Merthyr, Aberdare, Rhondda East and West {amalgamated in 1971} and Caerphilly. These developments would seem, at least partially, to conflict with certain theories of voting behaviour, particularly the theory that expected class voting patterns break down in areas heavily dominated by one-party. In such cases, it is argued, the political values of the dominant class tend to be assimilated by smaller groups, or a least by a larger than expected percentage of people in smaller groups.[47]

Despite this limited success at the ballot-box the *Blaid* still remained in somewhat of an electoral ghetto. Let us examine the 1992 election results. Of the 35 seats[48] that the party contested, it lost deposits in 23 of them.[49] The party gained an average increase in the vote of 1.8%,[50] at an average cost per seat of £2698.[51]


The four successful candidatures are depicted in the table below.

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[46](Butt Phillip, 1975)
[47](Butler & Stokes, 1969, 144-50)
[48]In the remaining 3 seats *Plaid Cymru* endorsed the Green candidate (Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 359).
[49](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 245)
[50](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 341)
[51](Butler & Kavanagh, 1992, 245)

Figure 5:3

Plaid Cymru MPs 1992 {vote in %}



Four MPs out of a possible total of 38 is hardly an electoral breakthrough, though it compares reasonably favourably with the Conservatives current total of six MPs. Why, given our previous analysis of identity transformation, has Plaid Cymru not been more successful in mobilising identity at the ballot-box? One analysis of the social and cultural backgrounds of Plaid Cymru supporters based on four sample surveys conducted in 1978 and 1979, found that support for the party was strongest amongst Welsh-speakers, and that those under 55 were twice as likely to vote for Plaid Cymru as those over that age. Two-thirds of the party's support was amongst the working classes. These findings, together with the referendum defeat over the proposals for devolution and greater self-determination, suggested to the analyst that on the 'grounds of political issues as well as social support, Plaid Cymru, faces very real constraints upon future electoral success'.[52] Though it would seem that findings over the relative youth of Plaid Cymru voters would in the long term suggest greater electoral success.

Current perceptions of the significance of the *Blaid* in Wales, however, among both its friends and its enemies seem to be disproportionate to its electoral success. This is perhaps due to the party's significance as a cultural as well as a political movement. Its influence on *Urdd Gobaith Cymru*, a Welsh language youth movement founded in 1922 to 'foster Welsh awareness, Welsh culture and the Welsh language', has been marked. It also was instrumental in encouraging the emergence of other non-political organisations, such as: *Ysgolion Cymraeg*, *Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru*, *Merched Y Wawr*, *Undeb Amaethwyr Cymru*, later Wales Trade

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[52](Balsom, 1979)

Union Congress {1975}, and *Undeb Myfyrwyr Cymru*; some of these organisations derive from initiatives by *Blaid* members.

The moral and cultural identity of the party has constituted an increasingly important input in the policy formulation process, which combined with the growing relevance of European affairs, has served to alter the very political essence of Plaid Cymru to an extent that across a number of levels of discourse it is very difficult to detect 'nationalism'. Take for instance one of the most important recent manifestos, written for the 1992 General Election. Entitled *Tuag at 2000* /Towards 2000, the front cover declares that the contents constitute *Rhaglen* Plaid Cymru *ar gyfer Cymru yn Ewrop*/Plaid Cymru's Programme for Wales in Europe.[53] The fact that this heading is utilised in the context of a British General Election provides an indication of how much Europe in particular, and the theme of globalisation in general, has come to occupy the minds of party strategists.

The impetus is maintained in the text. In his introductory statement Phil Williams, the vice-chair in policy and research, concentrates on five main themes. Political change, the perception of political change, environmental change, and the inadequate responses of the UK government and London parties, which is contrasted with the policies of Plaid Cymru. Political changes given most prominence are the decline of London as a power centre, the concomitant rise of other power centres especially the European Community, devolution in Europe, and the creation of new 'nations' since 1989.

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[53](Plaid Cymru, 1992)

'London is no longer the capital of a great power, no longer the hub of an empire. Massive areas of political power have been transferred to Brussels, while Frankfurt has become Europe's financial centre '.[54]
'{T}he increased power of the European Community has been balanced everywhere by devolution of power to small nations and historic regions... local parliaments have been established in Euzkadi and Catalunya, in Sardegna and Corsica, in Vlaanderen and Wallonie..'.[55]

'{I}n Eastern Europe a dozen new nations have appeared on the map; small nations like Lithuania whose President Landsbergis has established close links with Plaid Cymru; larger nations like Ukraine, who quote the support of Wales and Scotland in their Parliament'.[56]

Note in this last quotation the internationalist and multi-cultural perspective that is adopted. This perspective is depicted as clearly translatable into policy; 'a confederal Europe with Wales taking a full part'.[57] The misapprehension of these political changes by the media assumes high prominence at the beginning of the piece:

'In a General Election the London parties assume a monopoly of attention. In newspapers, on television and radio, they take it for granted that their rivalries and quarrels are the focus of the campaign'.[58]

The third major theme is environmental change, which is thought to underlie 'these political changes'. The 'greenhouse effect invalidates the naïve 'growth' policies of the London parties, which have also failed to 'balance' the 'increased power' of the EC by 'devolution'. The London parties 'dither on the edge of the channel', and trim their policies 'to follow the latest opinion poll'. The *Blaid*, in contrast to the 'London parties', is depicted as morally superior in outlook:

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[54](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[55](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[56](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[57](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[58](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)

'Plaid Cymru have policies for a new pattern of economic activity, sustainable and non-polluting, providing a rich and satisfying life within communities on a human scale'.[59]
'Our defence of the land of Wales and its communities, our support for social justice, our total opposition to nuclear weapons, our commitment to democracy and a Welsh parliament - our principles have been absolute and unshakeable'.[60]

Later, in the main body of the manifesto, an attempt is made to depict how this morality has occasionally been impugned by other factors:

'The moral patterns that are rooted in our history have been attacked by a philosophy of greed and selfishness'.[61]

In the Welsh version of the Introduction a notion of devotion to a cause is developed which does not appear in the English text.

'Yn ein hymroddiad i amddiffyn tir Cymru a'n cymunedau, ein cefnogaeth i gyfiawnder cymdeithasol... '.[62]
Which translates into English as 'Our devotion to the defence of the land of Wales and its communities, our support of social justice...'; whereas the actual English language version reads, 'Our defence of the land of Wales and its communities, our support for social justice...'.

The Welsh language itself is not mentioned once in the introduction. Compare this to the situation in 1971 when it was thought that the 'language {was} more important to the movement than self-government'.[63] Furthermore, the nature of the discourse on 'self-government' itself has changed:

'It was once argued that nationalists were separatists: today, the only separatists in UK politics are the old guard of the Tory and Labour parties

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[59](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[60](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[61](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 6)
[62](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 3)
[63](Planet, 1971, 26-27). This is itself a reiteration of Lewis's *Tynged yr Iaith* broadcast (Morgan, 1981, 382-383).

who are obsessed with the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and hostile to the democratic development of a confederal Europe'.[64]

This theme receives further emphasis in the 1994 Plaid Cymru manifesto, *Gweithio dros Gymru yn Ewrop*/Making Europe work for Wales. Dafydd Wigley writes in the Introduction:

'Within this new Europe, Wales has a natural place. Alongside small nations like Denmark, Ireland, Scotland and Catalunya, and historic regions such as Bavaria and Lombardy, Wales is an ideal unit within this new European order'.[65]

The enthusiasm for the European project itself, so demonstrable above, was hardly discernible in 1983:

'*Y mae* Plaid Cymru*'n anelu at fwy o undod Ewropeaidd - ond nid drwy ddulliau'r Gymuned Economaidd Ewropeaidd*'.
'More European unity is an aim of Plaid Cymru - but not by means of European Economic Community's plan' {my translation}.[66]

The attitude of Plaid Cymru a decade earlier, moreover, was one of unequivocal hostility:

'As late as 1974, Plaid Cymru was boasting that it was the only party in Wales consistently to have opposed UK entry to the EC'.[67]

Language difference can occasionally be seen to cross-cut this seemingly linear development. The most striking example of this is found in a publication sponsored primarily by Dafydd Wigley the President of the party. Entitled in English A Democratic Wales in an United Europe, the Welsh title reads *Cymru Rydd Mewn Ewrop Unedig*.[68] In an exact translation 'democratic' would be rendered by *gwerinol*. The use of *rhydd* {which

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[64](Plaid Cymru, 1992, 5)
[65](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 5)
[66](Plaid Cymru, 1983, 10)
[67](Keating & Jones, 1991, 315). Though *Plaid Cymru* was never immune from continental ideas (Gruffudd, 1994b, 39-40).
[68](Plaid Cymru, 1995)

undergoes mutation to *rydd* following the feminine noun *Cymru*} denotes freedom, imposing new meaning on the title.

The internal political dynamic of Wales is also worth considering in the context of this discussion of Plaid Cymru. It can be argued that since the 1960s 'a pervasive atmosphere of nationalist sentiment extended into social, economic and political institutions in Wales'.[69] In order to breach a cultural and political gap,[70] in other words to engage with a developing 'Welsh' political system the Conservative party adopted a Welsh strategy. This strategy was evident at the beginning of the Conservative administration in 1979, perhaps its most significant structural manifestation in the UK context has been the Welsh Affairs Committee {WAC}, and in Wales a more consequential Welsh Conservative Conference.[71] At the level of discourse the strategy has included the publication of manifestos in the Welsh language. This occurred even in 1983, when the Conservative Manifesto for Wales asserted 'Wales has its special characteristics and problems',[72] during what was arguably the most British of recent general election campaigns and results in Wales. By 1992 the Conservative Manifesto for Wales had a section entitled 'Selling Wales Abroad' which emphasised Welsh difference:

> 'We shall establish a special unit within the Welsh Office to further our aim of enhancing the status of Wales internationally as a forward looking, rapidly advancing and prospering *country* within the United Kingdom'.[73]

Arguably, the *Blaid* has had a greater influence on the Labour Party, an influence reflected in the decision by the Wales Labour Party Executive Committee in 1992 to establish a Policy Commission 'to review and update

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[69](Adamson, 1991a, 131)
[70](Adamson, 1991a, 158)
[71](Hannan, 1990a, ix)
[72](Balsom & Jones, 1984, 110)
[73](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1992, 6 my italics)

key areas of Party policy in preparation for the next General Election'.[74] The most significant task has been 'to re-examine and, if necessary, update that Party's policy in relation to the creation of a directly elected Welsh Assembly'.[75] However, one may question the depth of this influence, in that the meetings, which took place in 1994, in the context of what Labour termed 'an extensive consultation process', were seen by others as 'a gesture towards open politics'.[76] Nevertheless gestures such as these sometimes have real effects.

The influence of Plaid Cymru and European issues on the Labour Party in Wales, can be seen in some of the proposals outlined in the final document to emerge from the consultation. Consider the passage below:

> 'THE CASE FOR CHANGE IN BRITAIN
> 2. Labour believes that in a modern democracy decision should be made as close to the people as possible, devolved to nations, regions and local communities within Britain, in order to give people more control over their own lives.
> 2.1 As our new Clause IV statement of aims and values makes clear, Labour believes in "an open democracy, in which government is held to account by the people" and in which " decisions are taken as far as practicable by the communities they affect."
> 2.2 Democratic renewal is at the heart of Labour' s programme of national renewal. After 16 years in power the Tories have created an over-centralised, secretive and administratively ineffective quango state. In no part of Britain has the paralysing effects of this dead weight of central government bureaucracy been more keenly felt than it has in Wales'
> 2.3 The scale and influence of the Welsh quangocracy has been well documented elsewhere, but it is worth remembering that Welsh Office quangos are responsible for approximately one-third of Welsh Office expenditure, and the Welsh Secretary appoints 400 people to the boards of quangos every year. From April 1996, when the new Welsh unitary authorities come into being, there will be more quango appointees in Wales {over 1400} than there are democratically elected councillors

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[74](Osmond, 1995, 29; Wales Labour Party/Plaid Llafur Cymru, 1995, 1)
[75](Wales Labour Party/Plaid Llafur Cymru, 1995, 1)
[76](Osmond, 1995, 29)

{1273}, and the budget allocated to those quangos will be as large, if not large than that allocated to Welsh local government.[77]

Now compare the following passages from Plaid Cymru's earlier 1994 manifesto:

'The process of sharing out sovereignty has opened wide the whole issue of the legitimacy of government. It begs the question of who has the authority to make what decisions on behalf of the citizen. The Maastricht Treaty brought into common use the term "subsidiarity". It means, simply, taking decisions as close as possible to the people most directly affected by those decisions..

It {subsidarity} means, simply, taking decisions as close as possible to the people most directly affected by those decisions... Governmental decisions should be taken as close as possible to the people who are affected by them.[78]

But there are other decisions which, historically, have been taken in London and which could and should be taken here in Wales. Education, training, arts and culture, housing, planning, health, personal social services, local roads and transport, police, rural services and tourism - these are all policy areas for which our own Parliament, elected by the people of Wales, should have total responsibility and competence. Most of these functions are already handled by the Welsh Office and by its attendant Quangos, and it is high time that they came under direct democratic answerability to the people of Wales.[79]

But we are large enough to take control of our day to day life - as do other small nations and self-governing historic regions. They, like us, want to a decentralised Europe that values the diversity of its people and its cultures. We have a common agenda for the future of our continent.[80]

Plaid Cymru has not just had an influence on the disposition of other political parties in Wales, it has also been a significant player in changing the nature of the debate on 'Welsh issues'. Extending back slightly beyond our temporal framework to 1978 we find evidence of the style of conflict over the

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[77](Wales Labour Party/Plaid Llafur Cymru, 1995, 1-2)
[78](Wigley, 1995b, 3)
[79](Wigley, 1995b, 3-4)
[80](Wigley, 1995b, 5)

perennial issue of extending minority language use.[81] In 1978, Roberts conducted a case study on the establishment of *Ysgol Tryfan* in Bangor. In addition to studying the discourse of the opposing pressure groups - the Committee for the Advancement of Bilingual Education, and Parents for Optional Welsh,[82] she also related the behaviour and discourse of the Welsh Office and other national actors.[83] The Secretary of State's initial decision was to reject the proposal, as was within his power in the case of designated bilingual schools, but following an outcry by amongst others *Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru*, he reversed his decision, and the school was established with an initial intake of with 386 pupils.[84] What is perhaps even more significant in the context of this thesis is the discourse of the anti-bilingual lobby, which perceived Welsh medium education as a concession.[85] Less than two decades later the discourse has shifted markedly and is couched around notions of entitlement.[86] This discourse shift is reflected in Ysgol Tryfan's current prospectus. The school aims,

> '3. To enable each pupil to become fluent in both Welsh and English in order to become aware of the community and the world in which he/she lives and to promote an understanding of his/her background and environment'.[87]

The school's curricular aims reflect those of the Local Education Authority and includes a commitment,

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[81](Roberts, 1987, 312)
[82](Roberts, 1987, 313). It was found that both groups couched their debate in terms of local issues, whilst raising universal questions about democratic rights, participation and choice in education, and individual liberties.
[83](Roberts, 1987, 314)
[84](Roberts, 1987, 314)
[85](Roberts, 1987, 317)
[86](Millar, 1995, 177-179)
[87](Ysgol Tryfan, 1996, 17)

'2. To enable every individual to be a full member of the bilingual community of which he/she is a part'.[88]

Such cultural and attitudinal changes are not accidental - they have been, in part, forged by the activities of many 'Welsh' groups. Nevertheless, the discourse shifts analysed above cannot be isolated from the context of shifts elsewhere. The European enterprise, and particularly the prospect of political unification has focused attention on 'new' political arrangements. In most cases proffered solutions have been federalist in character. One scholar attributes these shifts to three factors:

1. Changing world politics
2. Increased confidence because of the revival of the European project in the 1980s
3. A recognition of the basic shortcomings of the Community, and a desire to ameliorate them.[89]

Arguably autonomist groups have been the first to reflect these fundamental changes in their policy output. Patterns of political interaction in endogenous and exogenous dimensions are so complex now, however, that the above points require qualification. The *Blaid* were acutely aware, for instance, of the frailty of their avowed aim of 'Independence within the Commonwealth' in the 1970s, not least because an early opinion poll revealed that 73% of the voting population were against it.[90] 'Self-government within Europe' provides a contrast, as the authors of an authoritative study on changing social attitudes in 'Britain' put it:

'Scottish and Welsh separatism is arguably more viable under the flag of a greater Europe than a divided one'.[91]

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[88](Ysgol Tryfan, 1996, 20)
[89](Coombes, 1991, 145-146)
[90](Western Mail, 1968)
[91](Jowell, et al., 1995/6, 132)

The study also found that 28% of the sample interviewed in Wales were pro-European integration, whilst the corresponding figure for the 'English provinces' was 18%.[92] Plaid Cymru's desire for self-government {*hunan-lywodraeth*}, rather than independence as the SNP has it, within Europe is also indicative of opinion poll trends. In one study, only 8% of the Welsh sample supported the proposition that Wales should become independent, separate from the UK but part of Europe; whereas the corresponding figure for Scotland was 25%.

Neither has Plaid's more recent green agenda appeared out of the ether - it has been forged by events and ideologies emanating from Europe and from within Wales - particularly Ceredigion. Indeed in a recent interview one activist in the Ceredigion Green Party has said:

> 'We only got into this co-operation because Plaid have moved so much towards the Green position'.[93]

Confirming the influence of the European dimension the activist described the Green/Plaid split in Ceredigon as analogous to the conflict between the German *realos* and *fundies* in *Die Grunen*, and further reconfirming our assertion of the heterogeneity of political identity in Wales the 'image problem' of Plaid Cymru in other parts of Wales, particularly Glamorgan, was offered as another explanation of the cleavage.[94] Given these points, let us now examine the most significant of Welsh interest and pressure groups.

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[92](Jowell, et al., 1995/6, 132)
[93](Simpson, 1995, 170)
[94](Simpson, 1995, 170)

5.3 Cymdeithas yr Iaith

Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg, as we have already noted, is at the same time a political, protest and cultural organisation, which emerged in part from the reluctance of Plaid Cymru to engage in extra-constitutional protest at a time when it was becoming increasingly prevalent in advanced industrial democracies. This was in spite of the precedent set by the founders if the *Blaid*, who sought to obliterate the Penyberth bombing school on the Llyn peninsula in 1936.[95] It has been suggested that such reluctance had its origins in a perception held in the 1950s and 1960s that civil disobedience was seen as damaging to the party's electoral aspirations.[96] Set against this however is another strand of opinion which perceives older and deeper cleavages within the *Blaid*, stemming from Catholic/Protestant and conservative/socialist divisions.[97] It seems at first paradoxical that those engaged in extra-constitutional protest would be of a more conservative disposition than those who chose to reject such methods;[98] but other European autonomisms, in Scotland, Brittany, and the Basque country have periodically exhibited this feature. Whatever the explanation, *Cymdeithas* found an ideological and operational space unfilled by other Welsh groups in which to organise.

Elsewhere a conceptual lacuna has been posited between political/protest organisations in Wales on the one hand and cultural organisations on the other, determining a bicephelous reassertion of Welsh identity.[99] Such a conceptualisation perhaps fails to capture the linkages in

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[95](Davies, 1993, 592-3)
[96](Adamson, 1991a, 127 -quoting Butt Philip 1975)
[97](Davies, 1993, 592-3)
[98]A reflection of this phenomenon may perhaps be found in the non-insurrectionary traditions of guild socialism in the UK (Barker, 1991, 487).
[99](Adamson, 1991a, 126)

Wales between cultural activities and political and protest activities. Though evidence for a continuous progression from involvement with such organisations as *Urdd Gobaith Cymru* and *Merched Y Wawr* to involvement with *Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg* and Plaid Cymru is indeterminate,[100] there exists an assumption amongst activists that these linkages exist. Neither is this progression uni-linear, for instance after 1963 many branches of the *Urdd* were taken over by militants.[101]

Radicalisation then can be diffuse. Politicised literature for instance is often recommended to learners of Welsh, and there is evidence to show that learners can quickly become radicalised - even more so, in some cases, than those for whom Welsh is a mother tongue. This phenomenon was expressed by a Welsh language tutor who, when asked in a recent interview to discuss the level of contribution that Welsh learners have made to Welsh life, replied:

> 'To tell the truth, these learners, lots of them do more than the natural Welsh speakers, those who've learnt fluently. I can name lots of people. I've got some who've been in my class, they're on Glyndŵr Council. They stand for *Plaid* and different other parties. There's one running a Welsh medium nursery, there's others who've joined *Merched y Wawr*'.[102]

To take another example, the challenger for the Presidency of Plaid Cymru in 1984 was a past chairman of *Cymdeithas yr laith Cymraeg* in the 1960s, Dafydd Iwan. This example presents us with an additional possible variable, age. We can speculate that if the younger generation in any particular epoch is more disposed to direct or vociferous action than their parents, then increased autonomist infrastructure in areas particularly

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[100]Though there is little doubt of the existence of overlaps in membership (Adamson, 1991a, 130-131; Williams, 1977a, 429)
[101](Morgan, 1981, 384)
[102](Spencer, 1995)

associated with youth, such as television and full time education has political consequences.

Cymdeithas has tended to rely on methods of direct action focusing on single-issue campaigns. *Cymdeithas* campaigns over time, can be grouped into four main categories: language, property, education and broadcasting. Their strategy is based on techniques of civil disobedience, which primarily involve confrontation with the state and the use of court appearances to publicise and draw attention to the specific claims of the defendants.[103] The first *Cymdeithas* protest took place in Aberystwyth in February 1963 when members blocked traffic. Accounts of the subject of the protest differ. One author attributes the grievance to the lack of 'provision of Welsh or bilingual summonses and hence directed at the courts;[104] another to the refusal of the Post Office to use Welsh language notices.[105] Other early campaigns involved painting over English language road signs, the symbolism of which earned the organisation much publicity.[106] There can be little doubt of the effectiveness and, at one level, the efficacy of these techniques.[107] It is no accident that the Hughes-Parry Enquiry into the legal status of the Welsh language should have been established one year after the founding of *Cymdeithas*.[108] Campaigns for Welsh language road signs, Welsh language broadcasting and more recently a central Welsh language education authority have been largely successful. Campaigns have focused on and concessions have been won on the use of Welsh on official forms and in state institutions,

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[103](Bankowski & Mungham, 1980)
[104](Williams, 1977a, 434)
[105](Morgan, 1981, 383)
[106](Chapman, et al., 1977, 139 & 140)
[107](Morgan, 1992, 289)
[108](Williams, 1979a, 29). The enquiry was authorised by Keith Joseph, then Minister for Welsh Affairs (Morgan, 1981, 380).

improvements in Welsh language broadcasting and media provision, and the extension of Welsh medium education provision - especially in non-Welsh speaking areas of south east Wales.[109]

In the early 1990s under the control of chairpersons like twenty-two year old Alun Llwyd, *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg* extended its interest to housing rights in Welsh language communities. In an interview Llwyd stated that:

> 'We will campaign against anything which threatens community life.. The language won't be . . . worth saving unless it's a living language in living communities'.[110]

The campaigns of this organisations have increasingly focused on areas of significant interest to cultural organisations in Wales, and are often supported, albeit via more constitutional methods, by Plaid Cymru. The most significant 'joint venture' in this respect was the 'Wales is not for Sale' campaign.[111] We can argue that the legitimacy of *Cymdeithas* in the perception of non-activists lies in the content rather than the method of campaigning; that the extremely effective method of campaigning is often constitutionally illegitimate is apparently outweighed by the perceived legitimacy of the campaign's focus.[112]

The Welsh language has been both the primary subject and the means of protest. Far from being peripheral to autonomism then the cultural distinctiveness of Wales is central, and any strengthening of this cultural distinctiveness has on the basis of past evidence consequences for future autonomist impulses. *Cymdeithas* has focused for some time on

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[109](Adamson, 1991a, 128)
[110](Williams & Lawrence, 1992)
[111](Phillips, 1988)
[112]Others have found that the illegal activities, such as arson, although not specifically endorsed, arouse some sympathy among the Welsh public (Aitchison & Carter, 1990).

broadcasting media in its campaigns for the Welsh language.[113] In a 1972 publication, for instance, the organisation argued that modern mass communication is the most pervasive assault on the Welsh way of life, and in demanding a 'worthy' broadcasting service for Wales, *Cymdeithas* alluded to its self-perceived role as a bulwark against 'cultural genocide'.[114] Another significant publication in this respect has been a pamphlet entitled *Welsh 4th channel: the only answer* .[115]

5.4 A Welsh Autonomist Consensus?

Underlying the more visible and perhaps more potent question over Wales' relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom, and the dominant unit within that polity, England, there subsists a significant question concerning the changing nature of the dynamic of endogenous relationships within Wales. Both these dimensions of analysis apply to Turner's words:

> 'National integration is certainly easiest when most citizens feel that they are members of the same nation, but when they do not, then the degrees and type of their sense of separation take on particular significance.[116]

Attitude change to the Welsh language is an important variable in consideration of the development of an autonomist consensus in Wales. Despite the growth of Welsh autonomism during the 1970s it still remained the case that a predominant social strategy for the Welsh population wishing to secure 'an adequate social identity was to attempt to 'pass' as an individual into the dominant, English social group'.[117] This strategy, however, was not

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[113]Arguably broadcasting was its genesis; a number of its founders claiming that they were inspired by Saunders Lewis's *Tynged yr Iaith* radio lecture in 1962.
[114](Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg, 1972, 3)
[115](Dodson & Jones, 1984, 14)
[116](Turner, 1988, 186)
[117](Bourhis & Giles, 1977, 120)

found amongst certain sub-groups - Welsh learners in the late 1970s for instance - indicating that choosing to learn Welsh can on a certain level, and even then, be a political choice. Thus in a series of experiments the presence of a Welsh accent when 'confronted' by a RP English speaker was perceived by the participants as a symbol of group solidarity.[118] The experimenters made a useful distinction, however, between types of learners, differentiating two groups - integrative and instrumental. The former group could be categorised as learners disposed to autonomism, the latter as interested in the language for instrumental, consumptive or careerist reasons. According to the 1977 data, for instrumental learners the survival of Welsh is less important.[119] When confronted by RP speakers asking questions in derogatory manner about Welsh, the integrative speakers emphasised their Welshness, whilst the instrumental speakers attenuated their accents.[120] At this point three members of the integrative group introduced Welsh words and phrases for the first time, and one even conjugated verbs.[121]

It would seem intuitively reasonable to conclude that currently the voluntary sector of Welsh language learning is likely to incorporate a greater number of integrative learners than the state supported or corporate sectors.

5.5 Conclusion

The final two chapters expand the scope of the thesis somewhat, so it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the findings so far. Previous chapters have shown that a consciousness of difference {whether it is deemed natural or contrived} has been employed by political agents in the

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[118](Bourhis & Giles, 1977, 121)
[119]{t=2.64 df=20, 1 tailed p<0.001} (Bourhis & Giles, 1977, 123).
[120](Bourhis & Giles, 1977, 127)
[121](Bourhis & Giles, 1977, 129)

Welsh context in order to mobilise mass support for different projects. Analysing Welsh institutions and parties as political variables in the context of Welsh identity is a perplexing task. On the one hand there is the argument that the growth of Welsh based institutions and parties with a Welsh identity is the consequence of a mobilisation of identity. On the other some commentators argue that these institutions have created and maintained the distinctiveness of Wales.[122] The analysis thus far favours a rejection of the extreme version of the latter argument as entirely circular - if Welsh institutions are the only reason for Welsh identity why were they created? - but the contribution of institutions to the development and acceleration of Welsh political identity needs to be addressed. The preceding chapters have argued that Welsh institutions, agents and political parties act as intervening variables between latent identity and mobilisation, with strong interdependent relationships with each other and other factors of mobilisation.

Proving the existence of interdependent relationships is not altogether difficult, however, one great puzzle concerns the scale and strength of these interrelationships. In the case of entities with multiple identity structures such as Plaid Cymru the relationship between its policies and the policy responses of the central state are impossible to quantify,[123] since so many other entities, not least the Labour Party, will act as intervening variables in this circumstance. Scale is one problem, direction is another. In the case of the Labour Party, it has been legitimised by the Welsh, since Wales represented one of the foundations of Labour's validity as a second party.[124] Labour in government has in turn legitimised a Welsh territorial identity by the creation

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[122](Malcolm, 1989)
[123](Adamson, 1991a, 128)
[124](Adamson, 1991a, 125). Traditionally some Labour councillors and MPs have been actively hostile to the Welsh language (Evans, 1996b).

of a Welsh Office and a Secretaryship for Wales which recognised a territorial and administrative distinctiveness unusual for a party founded on the premise of class solidarity. From a procedural point of view also, notwithstanding the pre-existence of the Scottish Office, the establishment of the Welsh Office in 1964 as a separate department of state headed by a cabinet minister was unusual. This development was a departure from the previous organisation of the modern British government's executive as it was established on a territorial, rather than a functional basis.[125] Moreover, the Welsh Office has been characterised by institutionalised and, arguably, politicised pressure groups and routinised policymaking, fragmented into vertical professional-bureaucratic alliances. This type of policy network has been criticised for a} excluding the public and eroding political responsibility, b} creating privileged oligarchies, c} favouring established interests and hence being conservative in impact, and d} confounding public expectations about democratic government.[126] Such criticisms, especially point d}, bear particular weight when the ideology of the territorially based policy network is markedly different from the territory it serves.

From this point on, there are a number of directions in which the analysis can be taken. How autonomism affects the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of political praxis is one such. Green, for example, has identified two competing strains within liberal democracy - cosmopolitanism and the notion of the universality of human rights, versus individualism and the distrust of the collective consciousness which can be adduced as the market conceptualisation of politics.[127] The analysis thus far

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[125](Thomas, 1981)
[126](Lowi, 1969)
[127](Green, 1982)

hints at another, perhaps more salient, element of tension within unitary democratic systems, a hybrid of the above incorporating a territorial conceptualisation of human rights allied with a territorial conceptualisation of collective consciousness.

Postulating a spatial tension within liberal democracies provides a useful backdrop to the study of autonomism within sub-state units.[128] In the context of Wales, for instance, a significant recent example of spatial tensions within the democratic process concerns the debate over Local Government reform. Fearing that the Bill would be defeated in Committee, due to opposition from a majority of Welsh M.P.s, the Conservative government suspended the standing order {S.O. 86\1907} that requires all 38 Welsh MPs to be on a 50 person committee studying any bill relating exclusively to Wales. The Government created a smaller committee of 28, with a majority of 15 Conservatives sitting.[129]

Spatial tension is not only realised in terms of theory and state practice. The creation of the Welsh Office stimulated existing tensions within the Labour Movement, between traditions of peripheral revolt and opposition to the central {Tory} state on one side, and on the other a centralising ideology based on traditions of class solidarity.[130] The raising of the tensions between these two strands of Labour Party opinion had a profound effect on the Devolution issue in Wales and Scotland between 1978-79, the Gang of Six being the most vociferous supporters of the centralist tendency; and arguably affecting the party's own electoral fortunes. The Labour Government was,

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[128]For analyses from pro-automists that deal with this question see (Lebesque, 1970; Plaid Cymru, 1969), for a post-territorial perspective see (Keane, 1994).
[129](Price, 1994)
[130](Keating, 1991, 123; Thomas, 1981)

after all, forced into a general election in 1979 by the withdrawal of SNP support and has not, in 1996, yet returned to power.

That the policy responses to the nationalist movements in Wales and Scotland have revealed ideological faultlines within the Labour Party is no less true of the Conservative and Unionist party. During the long period of Conservative hegemony in government since 1979, certain aspects of Welsh identity have been somewhat paradoxically augmented by the state, as we have seen. This is certainly true in the institutional dimension, but is also true in certain other policy areas. As one Conservative commentator has said:

> Anyone who bothers to read the Welsh Office's...200-page report, *Public Expenditure in Wales*, will quickly gain the impression that it is difficult now for anything to move within the principality without first of all being identified as Welsh and then bombarded with money.[131]

The fact that an agency of a state traditionally considered to be one of the two most centralised in Europe should openly accept and engage in a territorial identity construction apparently inimical to its own centralising and unionist ethos indicates the manifest and potentially rupturing changes that have occurred in territorial politics in the last decade or so. These developments are, at one level, all the more surprising when understood in the context of a certain global centralising *zeitgeist* that was perceived to exist in the UK.[132] At another level, however, they can be explained by the methods employed by a Conservative anti-localist administration which played into the hands of the autonomists.

The thesis as a whole has examined new dynamics in political identity construction and mobilisation during the 1980s by arguing that existing and

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[131](Malcolm, 1989)
[132](Sharpe, 1979, 10-11)

new political formations have evolved and moved to fill political, social, cultural and economic vacuums created by a combination largely of external and internal factors. Several significant 'internal' factors have been discerned. The first is the crucial role played by internal political structures and agents. Internal political agents have altered the strength and scale of the interrelationships between factors, and perhaps by conversion to causes have changed the direction of relationships. Structure and agency can act as mobilising factors, and it is erroneous to separate these two elements.[133] The separation of agency from structure in what is commonly known as modernisation theory has a complex rationale.[134] If the modernisation theorist believes in rational agency and the irrationality of nationalist insurgency then the incorporation of agency into the analysis would appear somewhat paradoxical - the rational agent engaging in the pursuit of what is perceived to be an irrational doctrine.[135] Furthermore the assumption of the rationality of the human species, long contested in philosophy is being addressed by science.[136] The assumption of rational agency may be related to an expectation, or indeed a prediction,[137] amongst such theorists that nationalism will disappear,[138] and such hopes have led to failures to discern the various upsurges in regional nationalism in the latter half of the twentieth century.[139] Modernisation theorists and students of comparative politics and nation building have tended to believe that consciousness of ethnicity and minority nationality groups are a barrier towards the development of

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[133](Esman, 1977a). For a different theoretical perspective in the context of Europe see (Coakley, 1992).
[134](Davies, 1989)
[135]For attempts to deal with these problems see (Green, 1982; Miller, 1993; Sharpe, 1993).
[136](Edelman, 1992)
[137](Keating, 1991,117)
[138](Diamond & Plattner, 1994)
[139](Keating, 1991)

integrated viable stable units.[140] Such beliefs may be related, as we have seen, to the background of the analysts themselves.[141]

This rather sterile debate, which occurs at one level of abstraction, at least, from ground level events, has obscured the complex and far reaching developments that have taken place in European autonomist mobilisation since 1979. So far the thesis has attempted to present an analysis of the complex interrelationships between structure and agency in governmental and non-governmental contexts in Wales. In particular we have posited the need to avoid categorising any one of these entities as fulfilling a certain role, indeed we have asserted that they may fulfil different, indeed mutually incompatible, roles at the same time. Finally we are left with the central paradox that since 1979 a Conservative and Unionist hegemony has produced and reproduced a Welsh identity.

Clearly such arguments can be developed and reproduced in a plethora of contexts. Pressures on all AIDs have increased over the past decade as a result of government 'overload',[142] the growth of anti-state counter culture,[143] and the disaffection, from which we can draw links with the previous two points, of intellectual and social elites. Such disaffection may be both a cause and a consequence of declining democratic legitimacy since survey evidence reveals that individual happiness within a modern society depends on a certain degree of concordance between the governors and the governed.[144] The consequence of such disaffection is likely to vary depending on micro-circumstances within polities, which provides a

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[140](Connor, 1972; Rawkins, 1978)
[141](Barry, 1991)
[142](Merkl, 1988, 42)
[143](Merkl, 1988, 24)
[144](Jowell, et al., 1995/6, 165 & 167; Merkl, 1988, 24)

justification for the detailed case study undertaken here. Indeed some governments have been very successful at manipulating 'the sentiments of diffuse system support'.[145]

It is accepted in modern writing on identity that 'loyalty patterns do not easily become uniform even decades or centuries after political communities are formed'.[146] At one level this thesis is concerned with exploring why and how existing loyalty patterns might be disturbed, and the possible, and to a certain extent, assuming we know enough about the agent and manner of the disturbance, probable consequences of such changes. We know that a very significant agent is identity, but identity functions in many different dimensions and certain identity patterns can be seen to countervail others, producing little substantive effect. Perceived political legitimacy can be posited as another variable, and following Merkl we can argue that for a state to enjoy democratic legitimacy the following must be present:

i. the presence of a community or nation united by consensus with regard to political values
ii. a solemnly and widely accepted legal and constitutional order of a democratic character
iii. an elective government responsive to the expressed needs of the people (Merkl, 1988, 21)

To which we can add a fourth, exogenous, factor:

iv. the non-viability of any real or perceived alternative institutional or economic structure.

Over the past five chapters evidence has been presented which would call into question the validity of all these criteria when applied to Wales. The above list is undeniably theoretical, in that no advanced industrial democracy

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[145](Merkl, 1988, 25)
[146](Turner, 1988, 187)

could claim to enjoy an unfettered democratic legitimacy and some or all of these criteria are likely to be subject to pressure at any given point in time.

Two questions remain to be answered in the following chapters:

- Is there a critical point at which deviation from these criteria becomes great enough to induce transformative political change?
- In Wales, is this critical point somehow linked, *inter alia*, to economic and 'European' factors?

CHAPTER 6

MODELLING MODERN WALES II:

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

6.0 Introduction

In this chapter we address the relationship between identity transformation, the autonomist impulse and changes in the economic dimension. We posited in Chapter One that changes in rates of identity mobilisation in Wales are in some way related to changes in the domestic and international socio-economic system. There are two aspects of the change in the latter - theoretical and practical. At a theoretical level economics as a discipline has undergone massive and transformative change since 1945, such that new trends emerge regularly and the discipline is in a constant state of flux. Particularly relevant to the arguments developed in this thesis are:

i} the managerial revolution of the 1980s
ii} the trend towards state privatisation {privatism}

We argue that in application in the UK both trends have been inherently decentralising, and in some cases devolutionary,[1] and that this has had political knock-on effects in general, and has been particularly germane to autonomism.[2] The full impact of these changes cannot, unfortunately, be assessed at present. Though we cannot make any precise or verifiable claims, we do allow for these developments in the analysis below.

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[1]c.f. (Prentice, 1993, 15-16).

[2]Scholarly activity, too, has been affected by this process - 'many official organisations, though linked to the government through funding, representation or requirement to report, publish their own material. This trend has increased in recent years so that now half of all UK official publications are not published through HMSO' (Thomas & Jones, 1996, 24).

6.1 The Historical Development of the Welsh Economy

In order to analyse the substantive practical importance of economic change in Wales we begin with a brief foray into economic history. As we have seen in Chapter Two, during the nineteenth century, Wales was a primary source of coal, iron, and steel, the building blocks of the Industrial Revolution. All the 'smoke-stack' industries in Wales have since declined. 'King' coal now employs less than 1% of the working population of Wales, the largest employer in Wales is now the service sector, including construction. Manufacturing industries, too, have declined; as a recent economic survey put it,

> 'manufacturing's share of total GDP in Wales {Great Britain} fell from 30.4 per cent {31.7 per cent} in 1971 to 25.5. per cent {21.2 per cent} in 1991 as a direct result of the increased share of GDP now accounted for by services'.[3]

More recent figures, however, suggest that Wales' relative share of manufacturing has increased:

> 'Wales is the only region where the proportion of male employees in manufacturing was higher in 1995 than in 1981'.[4]

The economic history of Wales is often interpreted as a movement from an extractive industrial system in the late nineteenth century based on external investment to a system of state-subsidised industrial diversification beginning in the 1930s but largely stimulated by the need for industrial relocation during World War II. Plaid Cymru {PC} and other, perhaps more impartial, observers have disputed this interpretation. In Plan for a New Wales {1968} Plaid Cymru interprets industrial diversification as 'the inhuman

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[3](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 183)
[4](Church, 1996, 26)

planning and direction of the bureaucratic state'.[5] Interestingly a similar argument has been rehearsed with respect to Quebec as a causal factor in the rise of Quebecois separatism.[6]

The legacy bequeathed to Wales by the Industrial Revolution was three industries simultaneously in decline: coal, steel, and textiles.[7] The past twenty years have witnessed an increasingly rapid decline of these core large-scale industries, coal and steel. However, an attendant growth of jobs in other sectors did occur as a result of inward investment.[8] Such was the scale of this growth that in the 1960s analysts were quite positive on the economic future of Wales. For instance, Thomas pointed out that Welsh,

> 'society is no longer subject to the creeping paralysis of mass unemployment caused by lack of effective demand: the trouble now is something quite different - the growing pains associated with technical progress'.[9]

Thomas's assertions had a basis in fact. The 1960s was a boom period for the Welsh economy; between 1960 and 1972, GDP in Wales grew at an average annual rate of 3.57%, compared with 2.94% for the UK as a whole. Moreover, even after the first oil price shock of 1973-74, the Welsh economy displayed a recovery capacity. For instance, between 1973-74 and 1977-78, Wales' relative economic position among UK regions {measured by Gross Domestic Product <GDP> per capita} improved from 10th to 6th place.[10] This period also witnessed increasing autonomist mobilisation.

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[5](Grant & Preece, 1968, 256; Plaid Cymru, 1968, 2)
[6](Williams, 1984, 207)
[7](The Economist, 1985)
[8](Morris, 1987, 9)
[9](Thomas, 1962, 197)
[10]In a coal producing region, the intensity of the price-shock is likely to be offset by substitution into coal.

Nevertheless, even during years of relative growth, Wales has often lagged behind the UK economy as a whole. During the period 1960-1984, for instance, the average annual rate of growth in Wales, measured by the change in real GDP, was 2.04% compared with 2.37% for the UK.[11] Per capita GDP has been persistently lower in Wales than in the rest of the UK since 1960, varying between 84% and 90% of the UK figure. Underlying problems with the Welsh economy, therefore, remained, to be revealed with dramatic intensity during the recession periods of the 1980s, where Wales 'fared far worse than did the rest of the UK'.[12] Despite the diversification of the 1950s and 1960s, in fact the Welsh economy still remained heavily dependent on the traditional coal and steel industries up to the mid 1980s.[13]

6.2 The Welsh Economy since c.1979

Though dependency on declining industries has been a persistent feature of the Welsh economy in the latter half of the twentieth century, levels of dependency have abated rapidly in recent years. For instance, in 1911 half of the Welsh working population was employed in coal and steel; currently, less than 2% is. However, job loss in Wales has not coincided spatially, socially, nor in terms of gender with job creation.[14] Jobs were created in areas geographically separate from where jobs were lost; they were in new non-unionised industries, and the proportion of females to males employed was high. Not only have many of the new jobs been primarily taken up by women, they tended to be part-time and unskilled, while jobs lost

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[11](McKenna, 1988, 22)
[12](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 181)
[13](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 8)
[14](Adamson, 1991a, 164)

tended to be full-time, skilled, and predominantly male.[15] Today, the old mining valleys remain economically depressed with extremely high rates of unemployment.[16] In the modern sunrise industries, such as electronics,[17] new employees are over 50% female, whereas females have never accounted for more than 6% of the workforce in the coal and steel industries. This new gender ratio has had important implications for industrial relations in Wales. Though unionisation is still proportionately higher in Wales than England, the sunrise industry employees and the unions representing them have become more pliable, have less opportunity for collective bargaining, and are arguably more politically naive than their heavy industry predecessors.

Historically, however, unions have played a significant role in reifying the notion of a Welsh economy. The Wales TUC was first established in 1972 at a conference in Llandudno.[18] Many of the 250 delegates who attended did so in defiance of strictures from other unions and the national TUC. Interestingly many of the Welsh delegates reflected what can now be termed an old labour attitude and wanted the existing advisory bodies - one for the north and one for the south of Wales - to remain. It was an Englishman, George Wright of the TGWU, who bore little truck with the ancient north/south rivalry and forced the changes through.[19] Though financially dependent on the British TUC, the Welsh body has exhibited markedly different characteristics. Relationships with the business lobbies are exhibit corporatist features, as stated earlier both the Wales TUC and Wales CBI co-operated on The Welsh Commission

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[15](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 193-5; Williams, 1977b, 277)
[16](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 203-4; Strange, 1982, 3)
[17](Prentice, 1993, 276)
[18](Jones, 1988a, 56)
[19]This has been disputed elsewhere: one journalist has attributed the creation of the Wales TUC to the efforts of Dai Francis of the NUM and Tom Jones of the TGWU (Hannan, 1990a, x).

for Economic and Industrial Affairs. Additionally the Wales TUC has been far more enthusiastic towards devolution and European integration than its national counterpart. In 1986 for instance a conference motion on autonomy was carried by 760,000 to 62,000 votes.[20]

6.3 Interpretations of the State of the Welsh Economy since c.1979

Given that there are various agencies of economic and political interest operating in Wales, it is not surprising that opinions about the state of the Welsh economy should differ. Such alternative perceptions give rise to alternative economic analyses. In one analysis, for instance, of the causes of the economic crisis in the industrial region of southern Wales in the 1970s, the authors argued that past, as well as contemporary government policies, played a major role in bringing about the crisis by contributing to the vulnerability of communities in the area.[21] Another analyst, Glyn Williams ascribes this crisis to structural factors, arguing that the Welsh economy could be described as being divided into two monopolistic enclave sectors, controlled by foreign capital and by the English core, and a marginal sector.[22]

Williams' view is broadly traditionalist. Many modernists accept that the Welsh economy conformed to aspects of Williams' description at some time in the past, but over the past decade changes have been made which make some of the assertions invalid. Supporting the modernists' primary assertion, it is clear that the two monopolistic enclave sectors, steel and coal, are now

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[20](Jones, 1988a, 57)

[21](Cooke & Rees, 1981)

[22](Williams, 1981a). Williams maintains that the three sectors are spatially separated, creating a sub-region that is highly marginalised. Circumstances work against the emergence of proletarian class consciousness but encourage the expression of economic concerns through nationalism, inasmuch as the monopoly sectors are visibly controlled largely by 'foreigners.' Social classes exist as social agents only through their relation to the state, making nationalism simply an expression of economic dependency.

themselves marginal to the Welsh economy. George & Mainwaring point out that,

> 'by 1986 neither of these industries {coal and steel} was any longer dominant having, in terms of employment, fallen behind agriculture, mechanical engineering, electronics, vehicles and tourism'.[23]

Williams' argument concerning the hold foreign capital has on the Welsh economy is more difficult to refute. Inward investment played a formative role in the restructuring process.[24] In relation to the UK as a whole, Wales received over 14 per cent of foreign investment between 1979 and 1991.[25]

The autonomist literature appears to concur that since the late 1980s extensive foreign investment has come to Wales. Inward investment, autonomists argue, however, was attracted for the wrong reasons; companies have been encouraged by the low wage levels in Wales. Wages are low, so the argument runs, because the state plays an active role in keeping them down, while capital formation takes place at an above average rate. Such an assertion is contentious and difficult to test. A more complex set of reasons, that the investment was 'undertaken in order to avoid the EU's common external tariff barrier',[26] whilst offering 'the financial incentives of low unit labour costs and capital subsidies which were tied to either the Assisted Area programme or to WDA sponsored initiatives',[27] would appear to be more satisfactory. It does not entirely explain, however, why Wales rather than any other similarly endowed region of the EU should have succeeded in obtaining £6 billion worth of foreign inward investment so far this decade.[28]

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[23](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, viii)
[24](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 181)
[25](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 182)
[26](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 183)
[27](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 183-4)
[28](Adburgham, 1996).

The Welsh Office consistently argues that, since 1979, and under its stewardship, Wales has rapidly diversified from a limited economic base. Officials in the late 1980s were given to asserting progress on a number of fronts:

1} Unemployment - since 1976 Wales has created 50,000 new jobs, of the 2.75 million Welsh, 1.1 million are working full or part time. Unemployment dropped from 17% in 1985-86 to 6.4% in 1990.[29]

2} Levels of foreign investment - foreign firms invested £2.55 billion in new enterprises in 1988, creating 14,000 new jobs. More than half of the investments were from the United States, including companies such as Continental Can Company, Kellogs, Maytag, Texaco, Amoco, and Chevron. By 1990 thirty-five Japanese companies were operating in Wales,[30] in 1972 by contrast two such entities were in operation.[31] Wales attracts a high percentage of the Japanese investment coming into the UK.[32]

3} The success of Welsh policies and agencies - between 1988 and 1989, for instance, the Welsh Development Agency {WDA}, a subsidiary of the Welsh Office, secured 98 investment projects worth £1.4 billion, accounting for 22% of the total offshore investments in the UK.

By the end of the decade, in 1990, the Welsh Office had a budget of £3.44 billion per annum {state industries apart}. The Welsh Development Agency {WDA}, charged with the task of investment promotion, was given, in that year, an allocation of £66 million, an increase of almost 50% on the previous year. During the 1990s, the WDA and the Welsh Office has wanted Wales to become a magnet for companies looking for a European location,

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[29]A new recession hit Wales in 1990-91.
[30](Kaslow, 1990)
[31](Harvie, 1994a, 19)
[32](Fortune, 1990, 25)

and in a series of campaigns has emphasised 'Economic Wales'. On June 21, 1991, for instance, David Hunt, then Welsh Secretary, set off on a twelve day trade mission to the US and Canada to attract companies to Wales. Hunt said that over the previous 18 months Wales, with 0.8 % of the European Community's {EU} population, had attracted 8% of inward investment.[33] The Welsh Office and the WDA began actively presenting Wales as a low cost means of entry into the EU. In an interview Gwyn Jones, Chairman of the WDA said,

> 'We offer the benefits of being in Europe. We speak English...we do more single union and non-union deals than any other country in Europe'.[34]

Government sources would argue that these campaigns have paid off. In 1995 for instance John Redwood, Hunt's successor as Welsh Secretary, announced the inward investment results for the 1993-4 financial year, pointing out that 'projects from overseas and other parts of the UK amounted to more than £750 million being invested in fixed capital formation in Wales in 1993/4, and created over 8,000 new jobs'.[35]

Autonomists and others have, with some empirical support,[36] challenged these claims. The unemployment problem is not, as we have seen, expressed simply in terms of numbers, but has spatial and social dimensions which have not been so well addressed. The UK government, for instance, differentiates between Regional Policy and Employment Policy, regarding the

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[33](Financial Times, 1991)
[34](Kaslow, 1990)
[35](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 184). The total spending of the Welsh Office is now around £7 billion per annum.
[36](Roberts, 1994)

former as too expensive.[37] As a consequence the government has initiated a number of schemes based on the latter policy designed to deal with the ensuing problems. Morris argues that such Alternative Employment Initiatives should be viewed as a response to the decline in Regional Policy, especially given that automatic Regional Development Grants were eliminated in 1987.[38] The replacement programme, Regional Selective Assistance {RSA}, involved 'discretionary grants available on a case-by-case basis'.[39] Morris reviews the impact of four alternative employment initiatives: enterprise zones, local authority initiatives, the job creation initiatives of nationalized industries, and worker cooperatives in Wales.[40] The research was made in the context of widespread job loss and the demise of government regional and industrial policies. Morris concludes that alternative employment initiatives have created few new jobs, and, in general, do little for the Welsh economy.

Regional Policy in Wales over the past few decades, therefore, can be interpreted in terms of short-run expediency.[41] Various Government initiatives absorbed labour but did not endow the economy with a vigorous, independent, and self-supporting base; such policies, autonomists have argued, have encouraged a culture of economic dependency.[42] As we have seen, since 1987 government regional aid to Wales has declined markedly. Prior to this point, the whole of Wales was classified as an assisted area for

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[37]The decline in expenditure on regional programmes in Wales has been marked. Total expenditure at 1985 prices amounted to £320.5 million in the period 1982-84, down from £488.8 million in 1974-76, and £365.2 in 1980-82 (George & Mainwaring, 1987, 35).

[38](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, viii; Morris, 1987, 9).

[39](Roberts, 1994, 79).

[40](Morris, 1987, 9-16)

[41](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 18). Note that the abbreviation of regional aid programs began in 1978 under a Labour administration (Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 47).

[42]The institutional dependency argument has also been employed in the context of the Welsh language (Williams, 1984, 197).

regional aid purposes,[43] and many areas of Wales had Development Area status. Spending on trade, industry and employment programs was above average. Most of the former heavy industrialized regions were Special Development Areas {SDA} and included the Rhondda Valley, Merioneth and Anglesey. The first area is the site of the most acute economic and social deprivation; the latter two regions are broadly the sites of the most fervent Welsh autonomism.

Now that regional policies in the form of RDGs have been emasculated, the economic dependency argument is considerably weaker, and autonomist literature has come to reflect the new economic orthodoxy of regional development, when addressing such issues. European examples, moreover, are becoming increasingly prominent, as the excerpt below demonstrates:

> 'A decisive break needs to be made with traditional regional policy. Geared as it was to grants, advance factories and land reclamation it was essentially a subsidy regime for inward investors that did little to mobilise indigenous resources or involve local people in the process of regional renewal. This approach may have been appropriate in an earlier age of mass production but it is hopelessly inadequate at a time when the accent elsewhere in Europe is upon high quality, technical innovation and skilled labour'.[44]

There is also a manifest awareness of the tension between exogenous and endogenous development, and the potential cycle of dependency entailed by the former:

> 'What we need in Wales is not a regional policy geared to reproducing the past i.e. low skill, low paid jobs, but a regional innovation strategy that can begin to chart a more rewarding form of economic development in the future. This process is already well underway in the more dynamic regions of Europe - Catalunya, Baden-Wurtemburg, Emilia-Romagna and

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[43](Hogwood & Keating, 1982, 212)
[44](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 16)

the Basque Country - and it's high time that we in Wales followed their example.

Such a strategy will have to strike a better balance between inward investment and indigenous development,[45] which means shifting the focus to our own home-grown small-and-medium-sized enterprises {SMEs}, who, are, in any case, more successful at job-creation. By improving their competitiveness we will also in the longer term be capable of attracting higher quality inward investment.

In the coming decade Welsh firms will face tremendous competitive pressures. The Government sees longer hours and lower wages as the secret of British 'success'. So more and more of our industries are locked in a futile strategy of competing on price with the developing world, instead of competing on quality with the rest of the industrialised world. Clearly, what we need is a far more sophisticated strategy which recognises the importance of upgrading workforce skills and technical know-how if we are to transform ourselves into a high-wage, high value adding economy'.[46]

On another level, it has been argued that central government has used private and foreign inward investment to offset its own spending. For example, public expenditure in Wales in 1984 amounted to £6119 million {at 1985 prices}, but only £434 million was in the form of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, down from £687 million in 1972.[47] The expenditure disparity between the English inner core and Wales, a second economic feature emphasised by autonomists, can be illustrated in a number of ways. Even though, before the changes of 1987, Wales received 9.2% more in monetary terms than the national average expenditure between 1974 and 1977,[48] this seemingly clear comparative advantage is qualified by a number of factors. In the first instance, at a macro level, even the most prosperous region of the UK, the south-east of England, received on average 2.6% more expenditure than the national average between 1974 and 1977.[49] Even more

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[45]Catalonia is also highly dependent on inward investment.
[46](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 16-17)
[47](McKenna, 1988, 32-33)
[48](Hogwood & Keating, 1982, 212)
[49](Hogwood & Keating, 1982, 201)

interesting comparisons can be generated at a sectoral level. Consider defence expenditure, for example, a subject that appears regularly in autonomist literature in Wales. Several studies have pointed out the 'uneven regional impact' of Ministry of Defence procurement which runs at 'one million pounds an hour'.[50] Almost 50% of all the defence contracts allocated by the Government are given to companies located in the inner and outer core.[51] Consider Table 6:1 below:

Table 6:1

Regional Distribution of MoD Procurement spending {in%}[52]

Region	1977/8	1983/4	1985/6
North	6	2	3
Yorkshire and Humberside	2	2	2
East Midlands	7	5	4
East Anglia	4	3	3
South East	42	54	49
South West	15	11	12
West Midlands	7	4	4
North West	8	11	14
Wales	1	1	2
Scotland	7	6	6
Northern Ireland	1	1	1
UK	100	100	100

As we can see from the figures above, Wales is just beaten into last place on the procurement spending scale by Northern Ireland. There are a number of clear geo-strategic reasons why Northern Ireland should beat Wales into last place, though it is less easy to explain why the race should be

[50](Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 41)
[51](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 18)
[52]Source: (Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 45). Note that some reservations about the accuracy of the data were expressed; but the figures do provide a guideline.

so close. No defence related research establishment exists within Wales. Of the 29 establishments in operation in 1983, 28 were located within the inner and outer core in southeast England. It has been argued that,

> 'the existence of a major defence complex has been a factor differentiating the Bristol area from South Wales' (Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 41)

As we have seen, spending on regional assistance by central government has declined markedly since the mid-1970s.[53] What then are we to make of the consquences of the increase in military spending between 1979 and c.1990? As one paper puts it:

> 'At first sight, the association between military industry and regional prosperity might suggest that defence spending has been in effect, a sort of 'hidden' regional policy. As a regional policy it is certainly remarkable since in simple quantitative terms it greatly outweighs formal regional spending, and contradicts it geographically'.[54]

It should be emphasised that the changes outlined above have been taking place under the auspices of a relatively unsympathetic administration, which brings us to the final issue area to be considered in this section, the altered nexus of political power and influence in Wales exemplified by the Quango. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the issue of democratic legitimacy has become linked in Wales with the financial probity of Quangos. Several agencies and agents operating under the aegis of the Welsh Office have over the period sustained considerable opprobrium. In 1992, during his annual examination of the WDA's accounts the Auditor General, Sir John Bourn, detected a series of irregularities. Bourn conveyed this information to the Public Accounts Committee in October 1992, which began investigating

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[53](Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 47)
[54](Lovering & Boddy, 1988, 47)

the WDA that December.[55] The report of the PAC, published in June 1993, revealed profligate spending on expenses and perks, pay-offs in return for silence, and inadequate controls on corporate behaviour. The most damaging accusations concerned the activities of the WDA's chairman, Gwyn Jones, holding him partially liable for the decision to employ an incompetent and possibly corrupt representative in the United States, and a definitely corrupt marketing director who was subsequently imprisoned. In May 1994 a documentary screened on BBC Wales implied other irregularites over a land deal, and an illegal WDA grant to politically marginal Mid-Wales.

Other NDPBs in Wales have not been immune from criticism. The Chairman of the Development Board for Rural Wales, Glyn Davies, resigned in May 1994 after the Public Accounts Committee discovered that the Board had been secretly giving its executives free houses. John Catford, the Chief Executive of Health Promotion Wales, resigned after an affair with a colleague on a taxpayer-funded trip to Brazil.[56]

6.4 Dependency? Incentives and Constraints for Development, 1979 - c.1987

Economic factors influenced the *No* vote in the 1979 Devolution Referendum, inasmuch that the discourse of the Vote No Campaign centred around the Welsh economy. This led a large number of autonomists to subscribe to the view that Wales was caught in a circle of economic and psychological dependency within the UK. The logic of this argument led to the viability propostion. Autonomists felt obliged to argue for the economic viability of Wales as a separate entity, in order to break the perceived

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[55](Beckett, 1994)
[56](Beckett, 1994)

dependency. The weight of the viability argument can be assessed by examining the Welsh economy by sector, a task undertaken herein after.

Wales has been, then, for much of the post-war period, categorized as a region in post industrial decline with low economic development potential. Geographical isolation can be offered as a partial explanation for this situation. The Welsh border is located nearly one hundred miles from the UK's dominant metropolis. The distance is not great, but apart from the M4 motorway serving the industrialised south-east of Wales, Wales does not have a well-developed road system.[57] The inadequacy of Welsh roads is arguably due to inefficient allocation of resources - apart from 1974-75 capital expenditure on trunk roads in Wales has actually been high[58] - though topography has also played a role. The internal logic of the Welsh road system is confused; with no adequate north-south route, integration of the Welsh road system *en masse* with the network in England is mediocre.[59] Integration with the European system is even worse, making Wales inordinately isolated from its main trading partners in the EU. A similar infrastructural 'gap' exists with respect to the railway system, and is likely to be exacerbated by the effect of the Channel Tunnel.[60] The handicap of infrastructural underdevelopment inhibits the development potential of Wales and is responsible for higher transport and communication costs.[61] These cost have a knock-on effect on production costs, thereby reducing competitiveness.

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[57]Wales has 8.6% of the surfaced roads in the UK.
[58](Hogwood & Keating, 1982, 89)
[59]For instance, the M5, the main Western trunk route to the English Midlands and beyond, runs close to the eastern border of Wales without ever actually crossing it.
[60](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 184)
[61](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 184)

On the other hand, wage costs are lower compared to those of south-east England. The average weekly wage in Wales for all employees in 1993 was 23% below the equivalent wage in south-east England.[62] By April 1995, the average earnings for men 'were lower in Wales than in any other region except Northern Ireland.[63] With reduced unit labour costs {ULC},[64] coupled with grants and subsidies, it is hardly surprising that multinational firms find Wales economically attractive as a location. Transplanted higher management can benefit too from the relatively the cost of living in Wales, primarily due to disparities in house prices, caused particularly by the property boom of 1985-9.[65]

Autonomists argue that this attractiveness is a result of the relative deprivation of the worker in Wales in relation to his or her counterpart in the English core. They emphasise, moreover, that income from employment is relatively low, in 1984/5, for instance, social security income accounted for 18% of the total distributed income in Wales,[66] and, during the same period, only 67.9% of the total distributed income issued from work activity, compared to 72.3% for the rest of the UK.[67] During this period, the people of Wales had a per capita income that was approximately 84.1% of the UK average, and only around 70% of that of the inhabitants of South-east England.

Wales is also faced with natural constraints to endogenous development, such as the lack of economically obtainable natural resources and relative lack of fertile arable land. Soil conditions are not conducive to

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[62](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 253 quoting New Earnings Survey 1993)
[63](Church, 1996, 26, 87)
[64]ULC = f (wage + social costs/productivity)
[65](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 174). It is thought that continued in-migration of WRINKLES {wealthy, retired, independent, knowledgeable, English} will support house prices (Blackaby, et al., 1994, 226).
[66]Source: *Family Expenditure Survey.*
[67]Source: ibid.

the growing of many crops.[68] Apart from coal and agriculture the only other major natural resources are water and woodlands. Although there are three hydroelectric undertakings in Wales, water resources are mainly exploited by impounding for domestic and industrial purposes. Almost 50% of the water processed in Wales serves areas of England - in 1993, for instance, out of a total average daily output of 2,317 megalitres, an average of 1,106 megalitres of water per day went to England.[69] With regard to woodlands the Forestry Commission {a government agency} owns and operates estates having a total area of approximately 300,000 commercially based acres.

Both the woods and the water have been fulcrums under the seesaw of protests between autonomists and the core. Such protests have not been confined to the declared autonomists however. The famous incident of the Tryweryn Reservoir in Mid Wales, which was built with little or no local consultation and despite objections from every single Welsh MP, gave new credence to the role of Plaid Cymru in Wales in the late 1950s and may also have been instrumental to the electoral success of PC in later General Elections. The issue of the forests, which are mainly pine and provide few jobs and little inclusive revenue, is ongoing, and another example, claims Plaid Cymru, of exploitation by the core.

On an expressive, intentional level one scholar holds that Welsh people lack an entrepreneurial spirit. Since 1979 the Conservative Government has been determined to foster the principle of entrepreneurship in the UK, or an Americanized version of it. Hopkins argued that an entrepreneurship policy would not be the catalyst for regeneration within Wales because industrial

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[68](George & Mainwaring, 1988a, 134-35)
[69](Welsh Office, 1995a, 65)

workers are the majority, with the middle class in the minority.[70] Welsh people, he says, tend to be survival orientated rather than affluent; personal initiative finds outlet in social rather than entrepreneurial activity. Hopkins' argument has its adherents, and it is not without supporting empirical evidence, as the following quote reveals:

> 'Although the rate of company starts was 19 per cent higher in 1991 than in 1980 in Wales {1980 and 1991 represent similar points in the economic cycle}, this is less than two-thirds of the figure for Great Britain. As high company starts are believed to reflect entrepreneurship and a dynamic economy, evidence from the VAT data suggests that this may be lacking in Wales'.[71]

Hopkins' 'cultural argument' can be reinterpreted with different conclusions, especially given that many Welsh expatriates have become successful elsewhere. For instance, The Economist argues that,

> 'with unemployment so high young people are understandably risk averse and much more exercised about finding a secure job for themselves than creating new ones'.[72]

The economic situation in Wales is a function of the incentives and constraints outlined above. The supply-side in Wales has been characterized by a double disequilibrium: a high level of unemployment coupled with an unbalanced sectoral structure. The disequilibrium amounts to an unevenness in the endowment of key industrial supply factors.[73] Since the late nineteenth century, the uneven spread of industrialization in the UK has created greater intraregional differences; in Wales the outcome was that the southeastern area became economically and socially separated from the rest of the region.

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[70](Hopkins, 1989, 59-61)
[71](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 221)
[72](The Economist, 1985)
[73](Cooke, 1982, 212-213)

The acute social and cultural separation can be illustrated by the following reference:

> 'The difference between north and south {Wales} became so significant that the Welsh football association had to select the national team on the basis of a strict 6:5 player formula'.[74]

The completion of the Second Severn Crossing, in the context of our earlier discussion of the road infrastructure, can be considered to be of benefit by reducing the bottleneck at the Severn. It may, on the other hand, create additional infra-Wales cleavages,[75] by intensifying the disparity between the extreme south-eastern plains and the rest of Wales, and may, in the long-run, encourage a new expression of the cleavage addressed above..

Unemployment, the rate of which has been consistently above the UK average since World War II, was a symptom of the persistence of the development problem in Wales. Up until very recently, the high rates of unemployment reflected the unfavorable industrial base in Wales. In June 1986, for instance, approximately 175,600 people, or 1 in 7 of the working population, were officially recorded as unemployed. Of these, 124,000 were male, which accounted for 1 in 5 of the workforce, and 51,200 were female, or 1 in 8 of the workforce.[76] The percentage unemployment rate for Wales then stood at 14%.[77] However, mining towns, such as Aberdare, and towns dominated by declining agricultural sectors, such as Lampeter, recorded unemployment rates in excess of 20%. The numbers of long-term unemployed also increased, particularly amongst younger age-groups. In 1982, for instance, unemployment among young people was double the

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[74](Bulpitt, 1983, 112-113; Golesworthy, 1973)
[75](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 184)
[76](McNabb & Shorey, 1988, 123)
[77]During the Thatcher administration, the method of calculating the unemployment figure was altered 26 times. The figure is based on the definition 'current unemployed', which dates back to 1974.

already high Welsh unemployment average, and for the first time young people formed a significant proportion of the long term unemployed.

The Welsh economy, experienced a recovery after the recession of 1980-1. Changes in the Welsh economy during this period can be depicted via indices of economic activity. Consider Table 6:2 below.

Table 6:2

Indices of Economic Activity 1979-87 {1980=100}[78]


	1979	1980	1984	1985	1986	1987	'87 Qtr4
Real GDP	107.3	100	103.7	108.9	113.2		
Production & Construction	112.5	100	94.6	97.3	97.0	102.3	105.3
Manufacturing	113.1	100	105.6	105.7	107.9	112.7	114.0
Construction	110.4	100	82.4	77.4	75.9	86.2	91.9

Graphical represenation of the data sharply outlines these changes: see Figure 6:1 below.

[78]Sources: Welsh Economic Trends, Economic Trends, (George & L., 1988, ix).

Figure 6:1

Economic Activity 1979-87 {1980=100}[79]



[79] Sources: Welsh Economic Trends, Economic Trends, (George & L., 1988, ix).

As Table 6:2 and Figure 6:1 above also reveal, the Welsh economy between 1979 and 1987 continued to present a sectoral structure of an advanced industrialized economy in post-industrial decline, typified by long term deterioration in the primary and secondary sectors. The second disequilibrium is, therefore, in the sectors of activity. The asymmetric decline in sectoral endeavour did not abate, for example, during the period from 1984 to 1986. Gross Domestic Product {GDP} per capita, relative to the UK average, fell from 87.1% to 85.7%.[80] Even though in the Welsh context and in real terms, the GDP estimate of £13,527 million for 1986-87 represented an increase of 9.5% from 1984, it should be remembered that real GDP in 1984 was lower than in 1979 - altogether, despite the growth in services,[81] real GDP in Wales was only 3.7% higher in 1984 than in 1979, an annual growth rate of less than 1%. Perhaps more dramatically, on the supply-side, the index of industrial production increased by 5.5% in 1987,[82] but, in 1985 the index of industrial production and construction was nearly 3% below its 1980 level and 15% below its 1979 level.[83]

The autonomist literature of the period maintains that the sectoral structure, as well as the decline, of the Welsh economy is primarily due to English involvement. This is a curious inversion of the arguments prevailing at the end of the last century, which emphasised England's economic and strategic dependency on Wales in terms of exploitation of natural resources. Then an autonomist could argue that, from a strategic and economic perspective, England had every reason to remain with Wales. The

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[80](Economic Trends, Nov. 1987)
[81]Services which have grown in Wales, including retailing and public services, are non-tradeables and hence contribute less to GDP.
[82]This figure is skewed by a singularly large construction index rise of 13.6%.
[83](George & L., 1988, viii)

government was willing to pay for the maintenance of its political relationship with Wales, and suffer any opprobrium that may be directed at it for such 'internal colonialism'. The situation has since changed, but many of the costs remain. The fact that the English taxpayer subsidises the Welsh economy, though disputed by autonomists,[84] could be used as an argument supporting their demands. Wales is economically dependent on England and has little to offer England in terms of resources but rather demands much maintenance and the constant granting of tiresome concessions, so why not grant autonomy? No autonomist group has yet argued this point, perhaps because it entails a devaluation of much that is held dear, and is still dependent on a governing elite perceiving the monetary costs of Wales' dependency upon England to be unacceptably high. Substituting 'Northern Ireland' for 'Wales' in the above discourse, however, invests it with more familiarity and significantly greater credibility.

Recent developments may have rendered these arguments redundant however. Initial analysis of the Welsh economy provided some mixed results - incentives and constraints. It has been commonly accepted that the sectoral structure of the Welsh economy is not conducive to growth, and the autonomist discourse has centred around this fact. The former and by implication the latter would appear to have altered recently. It would seem that a more detailed analysis of the economic fundamentals is necessary; such is undertaken below.

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[84]Their case rests on the defence procurement effect discussed above (Jones, 1997).

6.5 Economic Fundamentals: The Primary Sector

Since 1976, 70,000 jobs have been lost in the coal and steel industries in Wales, accounting for more than 50% of the increase in unemployment that time.[85] Coal production in Wales reached a peak in 1913 when 270,000 miners produced 57 million tons of coal, 37 million of which were exported.[86] In 1914 Welsh coal mines accounted for approximately one third of the world's coal exports. The centre of coal production was the Rhondda Valley, which had 56 active pits in 1914.

The history of the Welsh coal industry since the early years of the 1900s is dominated by longterm decline, the growth of unionization, and, after World War II, by nationalization. In 1974 after the 1973-74 oil crises, the Labour Government published an optimistic document entitled Plan for Coal.[87] The document comprised an unrealistic prediction of future events. The analysis underestimated the effects the declining Welsh steel industry would have on the Welsh coal industry - where coking coal, used in the steel manufacturing process, accounted for 40% of the South Wales coalfield output in the 1970s. By 1984 the whole of Wales had only 28 operating pits employing 21,500 miners. The Rhondda had only one, which has since disappeared. The year long miners strike of 1984-85 was, therefore, initiated after a period of considerable decline, due in part to the restructuring policies of the National Coal Board {NCB}, and proved to be a the death knell for the Welsh coal industry. Currently, less than 1% of the Welsh working population is employed in the industry.

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[85](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 8)
[86](George, Mainwaring, Shorey, & Thomas, 1988, 161)
[87](Labour Party, 1974)

The demise of the steel industry in Wales was far more rapid. Moreover, the bulk of the restructuring, or rationalization, of the steel industry occurred in a largely undiversified economy in the midst of a recession. In 1970 the Welsh steel industry employed 72,000 people. During the period between 1974 and 1978, less than 6,000 redundancies were recorded in the Welsh steel industry. In 1979, the new chairman of British Steel instituted efficiency drives, closing the mills at East Moors, Ebbw Vale, and Shotton, and halving the workforces at Newport and Port Talbot. Port Talbot steel works alone shed 6,000 jobs in 1979, the catalyst for the steel strike of 1980, which did not prevent the partial closure of Shotton in the 1980s with the eventual loss of 8000 jobs.[88] Between 1979 and 1983, the Welsh steel industry recorded 44,000 redundancies. During the period between 1979 and 1984, steel redundancies accounted for 25% of all redundancies in Wales. By 1985 the industry employed less than 20,000 people. This figure was further reduced by the closure of the state-of-the-art electric arc furnace at Duport, Llanelli, causing the loss of 1,300 jobs. The European Steel and Coal Community {ECSC} did little to alleviate the unemployment situation in the steel and coal industries of Wales. The ECSC administration believed that job shedding was a 'natural' process in already declining industries, and that oil and gas were supplanting coal as a fuel.

Agriculture, a significant primary sector employer in Wales, is dominated by dairy and livestock farming.[89] Crops are not grown extensively in Wales due to heavy rainfall and acidic low fertility soils. Approximately one third of all agricultural land in Wales lies above the 1,000 foot contour and over half

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[88](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 186)

[89]The fishing industry of Wales has declined to a state of virtual non existence. In 1994 only 130 vessels over 10 metres were registered in Wales (Welsh Office, 1995a, 78).

receives annual rainfall in excess of 50 inches. Welsh agriculture has declined in relative importance since 1970 but the sector is still a much more important contributer to GDP in Wales than in the UK as a whole. The agricultural sector in Wales contributes approximately 3.1% to GDP {1985 figure} and engages around 57,000 people as farmers or employees, which accounts for 4.8% of total civilian employment - in 1985 agriculture accounted for 1.9% of UK GDP, and only 0.9% of GDP in South-East England. There is a significant regional variation in the relative economic importance of agriculture in Wales. For instance agriculture only accounts for 0.7% of employment in South Glamorgan but accounts for 15.3% of employment in Dyfed and 23.5% in Powys. Agriculture is the backbone of the rural economy in Wales. Earnings in rural Wales however remain between 77% and 84% of those in Britain.[90]

Welsh farming has been subject to a complex selection of technological, economic and political influences since the entry of the UK into the Common Market in 1973. The primary technological influence has been the increase in labour productivity due to advances in farming techniques. The dominant economic and political influence has been the Common Agricultural Policy {CAP}. The CAP instituted a system of agricultural support which favoured mechanisation, along with providing high price guarantees for agricultural products. With regard to Wales the high price guarantees led to a massive over-production of milk.[91] Recently, extensive quotas imposed by CAP officials to curb over-production have reduced the number of dairy producers. Moreover, demand for dairy products has decreased dramatically over the past decade due to the increasingly health conscious tastes of people in

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[90](Midmore, Hughes, & Bateman, 1994, 24)
[91](Morris, 1989)

developed nations - in Wales, for instance, milk consumption in 1981/2 stood at 4.3 pints per person per week, by 1993/4 it had dropped to 1.7 pints per person per week.[92] Attendant upon these factors, the size of the Welsh dairy herd has diminished from a total of 315,400 in 1971 to 267,500 in 1994.[93] The Welsh livestock industry has also been affected by the Chernobyl disaster, the radioactive fallout from which irradiated Welsh hillsides, and in the case of beef, several BSE crises have affected demand and, hence, incomes. These events have occurred at a time of increased dependency on beef cattle in Wales: in 1994 there were 171,600 beef cattle in Wales, up from 151,700 in 1971.[94]

The CAP has also increased prices of products such as feedgrains, which has affected the economic viability of the large number of smallholders in Wales. The CAP, by favouring large concerns is likely to have encouraged a bi-modal distribution in the economic size of farms in Wales,[95] such that the incomes of the small holders of Wales have declined to a greater extent relative to the overall decline of the farming sector in the UK. Regarding the latter, one economist discloses that

> 'since 1978 when the UK fully implemented the CAP, aggregate net farm income has declined to around 28 per cent of its original real value'.[96]

6.6 The Secondary Sector

Between 1960 and 1978 manufacturing retained a stable 31% share of employment in Wales. The manufacturing sector, however, began to decline

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[92](Welsh Office, 1995a, 72)
[93](Welsh Office, 1995a, 73)
[94](Welsh Office, 1995a, 73)
[95](Midmore, et al., 1994, 28)
[96](Midmore, et al., 1994, 11)

after 1978 and accounted for only 26% of employment in 1981. Compared to the UK, Wales suffered a larger proportionate reduction in manufacturing employment during the 1980s. The arguments of the 1970s outlined above - the difficulties associated with distance from provisory resources, main markets, and lack of infrastructure, and concomitant financial burdens such as the high costs of transport and the relatively high costs of economic activity, entailing a Welsh manufacturing sector unable tooffer products at competitive prices - may no longer be so applicable.

Nevertheless, the secondary sector has failed, at least until very recently, to fill the jobs vacuum created by the decline of the primary sector. Insufficient competitiveness and the low survival rates of new plants are major problems.[97] Moreover, plants located in Wales are often branches of larger concerns located elsewhere in the United Kingdom, Europe or the World. Some argue that branch plants, more peripheral to the company concerned, are more likely, in the event of financial strictures, to be closed.[98] Although plausible, such analysis is flawed since the survival rates of branch plants which, despite economic austerity, remain in Wales are better than the survival rate of firms with their primary location in Wales.[99]

6.7 The Tertiary Sector[100]

As mentioned earlier, the Welsh economy since 1979 has been characterised *inter alia* by the growth of services. The growth of this sector contines. In 1990, for instance, the service sector in Wales took up 67% of

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[97]By 1984 plants opened after 1966 were closing at the rate of 70 per year.
[98]For an analysis of the consequences of inward investment for Wales, see (Roberts, 1994).
[99](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 8)
[100]For the purposes of this thesis, the tertiary sector is deemed to include retailing, wholesaling, and other direct services.

employment in Wales and public employment occupied 38% of service sector employees; whereas, in 1993 the corresponding figures were 71%, and approaching 50%, under the classification 'public and other services', respectively.[101] Traditional macroeconomic theory suggests that increasing economic maturity in an area will be accompanied by a corresponding growth in the relative importance of the service sector.

The service sector has grown tremendously in Wales in recent years, which would be expected of a maturing economy. The tertiary sector, however, is relatively large considering the nature of the rest of Wales's economy - in 1994 669,000 people of a total employed workforce of 965,000 were in the service sector. It has been argued that, as with other underdeveloped regions in the UK, employment in the public sector services has been used as a means of offsetting high unemployment levels in Wales. There are signs that this is no longer the case.[102] Employment in the civil service in 1995 stood at around 5.1% of the UK total,[103] a figure broadly comparable with the ratio of the Welsh population to that of the rest of the UK.

As disposable income and leisure time increases in a society there is a natural progression in that society's economy towards leisure oriented services. Tourism has become an increasingly important factor in the Welsh economy and has an enormous potential for growth provided that there is a concomitant increase in real income and leisure time. Even industrial areas of Wales are utilizing the tourism boom; for example, industrial museums

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[101](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 190)

[102](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 198). The official case for departmental regionalism was put in a paper authored under the auspices of the Treasury in 1951, and entitled the Regional Boards for Industry (Cross, 1970, 426). The public sector is even larger in Northern Ireland, where it accounts for almost 50% of GDP.

[103](Welsh Office, 1995a, 60)

have been established in the Rhondda Valley and Kidwelly, and have proven popular as tourist attractions. Overall, however, since 1970 the tourist traffic in Wales has remained relatively stagnant. Wales has its own tourist board {WTB}, which, until 1992 was not allowed to promote Wales abroad.[104] Promotion outside the UK was under the aegis of the British Tourist Authority {BTA}, which in 1989, threatened gently by Peter Walker, then Welsh Secretary, began publicising Wales with more vigour. Since gaining increased autonomy from the BTA, the Wales Tourist Board has attempted to make itself a player in the global context, including creating a site on the Internet.[105] It remains the case however that few international tourists leave the London, Chester, Stratford, York circuit. For instance the number of nights spent in Wales by overseas visitors during 1992 accounted for only 2.6% of the UK total, and their spending only 1.7% of the UK aggregate.[106] Welsh tourism remains heavily dependent on the domestic market.[107]

Certain sociological and cultural features of the tourism industry cannot be overlooked in this context. Furthermore, the accelerated growth of tourism in areas of Wales may have reduced economic diversity. Coastal towns, such as Llangrannog, have become so dominated by tourism that almost all the inhabitants are dependent on the tourism industry. Holiday home ownership also increased during the 1980s as a result of the property boom, which caused problems when large numbers of in-migrants descended upon Welsh speaking areas in the West and North {see below}.

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[104]The WTB was governed by 1969 legislation which prevented it from attracting foreign visitors. In 1992 the Wales Tourist Board was given comparable powers to its Scottish counterpart for overseas marketing (Prentice, 1993, 148).
[105](Denhill, 1995)
[106](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 240)
[107](Prentice, 1993, 143)

6.8 The Quatinary Sector

The quatinary sector includes areas of economic activity such as information processing, education, consulting, and financial services. Here the picture is somewhat skewed. For example, with regard to information technology, George and Mainwaring argue that

> 'in the adoption of microprocessors, both in processing and products, Welsh performance can only be described as dismal'.[108]

Table 6:3 below depicts the incidence of modern processing technologies, including computer numerically controlled {CNC} machine tools and microprocessors in Wales.

Table 6:3

Incidence of New Technology in Wales 1981 {Index GB Regions average = 100}[109]

CNC Machine Tools	83.9
Computers for Commercial Activities	74.4
Computers for Manufacturing and Design	117.7
Micro-processors in Manufacturing	38.9
Micro-processors in Products	25.4

Using the index GB = 100 Wales performs well in only one case, the use of computers in manufacturing. This solitary accomplishment is due to the high incidence of electronics plants in South Wales. However, despite the sophistication of the products being manufactured at these plants, the jobs offered there are primarily unskilled and low paid.[110]

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[108](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 9)
[109]Source (George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 10).
[110](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 185)

The role of education in Wales has been discussed at length in earlier chapters, though more in terms of its expressive and symbolic dimensions than its economic significance. With regard to the latter education can be considered to have two interlinked effects:

- the microcosmic effect on the individual; the development of human capital
- the macrocosmic effect on society; societal value-added

Though a thorough analysis of these aspects of education is outside the scope of this thesis, in brief, the evidence suggests that the Welsh educational infrastructure has numerous failings. It is clear, for instance, that the academically less-able are constrained by the system,[111] and that at the other end of the scale, individuals undertaking higher education are more likely to leave Wales, and remain away from the country during the bulk of the most economically productive period of their lives:

> '54.4 per cent of Welsh students domiciled in Wales undertook their university education in England in 1991/2. No figures are available to identify the regional destination of graduates after completion of their university education, but, given the areas's unfavourable occupational and industrial structure it is likely that many graduates will choose not to return'.[112]

Finally, consulting and financial services, despite some highly publicised 'breakthroughs' remain 'dramatically under-represented in Wales'.[113]

6.9 The Quinary Sector

The quinary sector is epitomized by command structures. Wales lacks high level command structures. Command decisions are predominantly

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[111](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 217; Istance & Rees, 1995, 12-13)
[112](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 219)
[113](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 221)

made elsewhere, primarily in the English inner core. Basic research and development are lacking in Wales; a deficiency perpetuated by the lack of high level command centres. Wales has the lowest concentration of research and development of any standard region in the UK.[114]

6.10 The Economic Situation and Autonomist Action 1979 - c.1987

It had been commonly accepted that economic concentration on one or two primary products, which is the result of the dependent industrial economy of the last 200 years, meant that for the bulk of the period under discussion the Welsh economy was heavily dependent on external buyers, while the geophysical conditions offered little leeway for agricultural diversification. The constraints upon the Welsh economy, coupled with the condition of the manufacturing sector, meant that Wales was economically dependent on England and, if it had separate 'national' accounts, it would have a balance of payments problem, particularly over payments on current account {total trade including the rest of the UK}. The circumstances, it seems, would also be reproduced with respect to foreign trade.

Was {and is} the situation really this clear cut? At one level it was easy for counter-autonomists to make the bold assertions outlined in the previous paragraphs, since the extent of this dependency had always been difficult to analyze because it was hard to track down net exports {X-M} in a domain where most statistics read 'England and Wales'. Moreover, even though it was possible to calculate balance of trade figures on the basis of GDP and all other components, since 1978 the components of expenditure available in

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[114](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 13)

official sources had been drastically curtailed.[115] Thus, the data had always been scant, and conclusions drawn from such data must be viewed with some scepticism. It would seem intuitively obvious that unionists would wish to argue that Wales runs a deficit on trade in goods and services which is balanced by capital inflows and government spending, and that autonomists would, did, and do make a different case.[116]

A more objective observer, however, has asserted that for every year for which calculations were available Welsh net exports had been consistently in the red, and that it was unlikely that the situation had changed subsequently.[117] Since Wales' market was so small and capital under-utilized, so the argument ran, firms would not benefit from economies of scale in a completely separated state. The distinct absence of economic outlets would affects a relatively large number of small and medium-sized industries. Moreover, the inadequacy of local outlets in a small domestic market would not encourage investment and further limits the economy's capacity to create employment. The size of the market is too small to allow import-substituting industrialization to succeed.[118] Moreover, export driven growth of the kind practiced in Hong Kong would be curtailed by European competition since it was highly likely that Wales would still be within the customs barrier of the EC.[119] The natural and imposed constraints to development in Wales did, however, pose a problem for the Government, which was always likely to be

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[115]The components of expenditure available in official sources are consumption, gross domestic fixed capital formation by a group of industries and by government and total identifiable government expenditure (McKenna, 1988, 30).

[116](Plaid Cymru, 1994c)

[117](McKenna, 1988, 34)

[118]The import-substitution option became unworkable, anyway, after the European Single Market was instituted on December 31, 1992.

[119]A desire to emulate Hong Kong and the other Asian NIC's was the catalyst behind the establishment of the Special Development Areas (Morris, 1987, 9-16).

held responsible for the success or failure of the Welsh economy - even if some of the responsibility could be at least partially transferred to the ERDF of the European Community.[120]

From an autonomist perspective, then, the economic rationale for Wales being a part of the UK was difficult to overturn. Despite being a region with high unemployment, Wales was, from the standpoint of positive economic principles, affluent in comparison to its EU 'neighbours', Ireland and Portugal. Plaid Cymru was given to taking a more normative stance, arguing from this perspective that the benefits Wales derives from its relationship with England were of indeterminate value. This argument lacked vitality, as did the slogan 'Wales in the Commonwealth'. For the forseeable future, it seemed, England would remain the the principal market for Welsh 'exports', with Wales dependent on England as a captive 'export' market. For the most part even autonomists have thought that for Wales to become economically viable, 'exports' needed to increase in relation to 'imports'. In the 1970s and early 1980s predictions for the growth of the 'export' market were not optimistic. Wales, it was thought, had only a limited number of readily exportable products, and these, milk, steel, coal, high tech. goods, and potentially water, were subject to the volatilities of the global marketplace. Wales had labour in abundance, but in a sectorally divided sense. Skilled workers in the high tech. industries and engineering were lacking, but there was an abundance of unemployed coal miners. The public cost of infrastructure in terms of investment and amortisation was increased by high unit costs and poor yield, making Wales more dependent on official transfers and capital from outside.

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[120]Though much has been made of Ireland's recent GDP growth by Welsh autonomists.

These arguments would seem to overwhelmingly favour the unionist perspective, and they were well rehearsed and indeed effective in 1979. They are however, flawed, and for several reasons. Firstly the absolute value of 'imports' in relation to 'exports' is less important in a regime of floating exchange rates, which, it follows, ought to be taken as symptomatic of the more important relationship between production and consumption. Put simply, if consumption is greater than production then imports are going to be greater than exports. It is therefore more important to examine whether such a shortfall is in fact met by the UK state; and to examine the investment components of consumption, to see whether endogenous growth is supported by this spending. The concentration on the Balance of Payments is misleading, since it always balances. It is not a good indicator of the subsidies accruing to Wales - an autonomous Wales is likely to be 'bankrupt', just as the UK state would be without the PSBR.

More sophisticated measures of the 'subsidy' can be developed which compare tax revenue with expenditure as a proportion of the population. Current estimates suggest that Wales, with 5.1% of the population, contributes 4.3% of the UK tax revenue. This could be offset, a new generation of autonomist researchers argue, by the removal of the tax portion of the defence commitment which does not accrue to Wales, an 'identity dynamic', and the bonus gained by autonomy within the European Union.[121] This is one of the reasons why the EU has assumed so central a place in the autonomist pantheon.

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[121](Jones, 1997). Whereby, it is thought, after losses in an initial time period, the new administration gains knowledge of the Welsh economy, and can quickly make up the disparity with the UK by riding on the wave of increased production resulting from identity recognition.

6.11 Economic Development and Autonomist Action c.1987 - c.1994

By the mid to late 1980s, moreover, 'an apparently miraculous transformation had taken place in the Welsh economy',[122] which appeared to further undermine the existing framework of the autonomy debate. The shift away from traditional industry and the growth in the foreign owned corporate sector was such that by 1992 the number of people employed by foreign owned manufacturing concerns in Wales stood at 70,000, 30% of the entire sector.[123] The unemployment rate too converged on the UK rate, and real GDP growth in Wales averaged 4.5% per annum in 1986 compared to the UK average of 3.1%.[124] It seemed that, by overall British standards, government policy in attracting external capital and encouraging economic growth had been a manifest success. The Conservative Party in Wales described the situation thus:

> 'There has been a remarkable transformation in the Welsh economy. New industries have sprung up, new companies have been established and there is an invigorating spirit of enterprise and self-reliance in our land... Economically and culturally, the profile of Wales has been dramatically improved. We have enjoyed an influx of foreign investors, all of whom have been impressed by the quality of our workforce' (Conservative Party {Wales}, 1992, 4)

The economic situation in Wales cannot, however, be simply categorised. Coupled with the 'success' outlined above, is the continued 'failure' of low income, which may in part explain the electoral failure of the Conservatives in Wales. Income levels in Wales remain among the lowest in the UK.[125]

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[122](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 181)
[123](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 182)
[124](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 182)
[125](Joll & Owen, 1988, 79)

The steady decline of Welsh personal disposable income per capita since 1978 has not been ameliorated by the Welsh economic 'miracle'. In 1992 income in Wales was the lowest of all the standard regions in 1992 at £6,442 - 85.4% of the figure for the whole of the UK, even including Northern Ireland.[126] The only Welsh county with an income per capita above the UK average is South Glamorgan.[127] Again, in 1994-5 average household expenditure and income in Wales was the lowest of all the UK regions, at £96.4 per household compared to £118.8 per household in England.[128] Similarly wages and salaries in 1994-5 only accounted for 56.7% of average weekly household income, with social security providing 22.5%, a higher proportion than any other region.[129]

Wales compares badly in terms of other indicators of social deprivation. For instance, almost 40% of the Welsh housing stock is pre-World War I, whereas only around 28% of the housing stock in England and Scotland dates from the same era.[130] According to the 1981 Welsh House Condition Survey, 18% of the stock of dwellings in Wales are substandard.[131] Homelessness in Wales has also increased. In 1985, 9,200 homeless cases were presented to local authorities. Even by the restrictive qualifying criteria applied to homeless cases, 5,371 of the 9,200 cases were accepted as homeless. This was the highest figure recorded in Wales since the institution of the 1977 Housing {Homeless Persons} Act.[132] The situation continues to deteriorate, as we can see from the table below.

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[126](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 222)
[127](George & Mainwaring, 1988b, 14)
[128](Church, 1996, 26, 130)
[129](Church, 1996, 26, 126). The figures for England are 65% and 12.8% respectively.
[130](Welsh Office, 1995a, 31)
[131](Harbour, 1988, 61)
[132]*HMSO*, 1977

Table 6:4

Number of Homeless Cases in Wales 1979 and 1994[133]

	Cases Presented	Cases Accepted	Priority Cases
1979	7084	4676	3766
1994	12472	10293	6956

There is an internal dimension to these arguments. The lack of employment opportunities in Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd and Powys results in the out-migration of the young and mobile, this in combination with an heavy influx of elderly people retiring from England to the Welsh coasts creates long term socio-economic problems for Wales and can put immediate strains on social security services by increasing dependency ratios.[134] Moreover, local authorities in Wales lack the resources of large conurbation councils in England and are in the main 'encumbered' with a differing political orienation to the Government. It should be noted, however, that the basis for the arguments above has been disputed since on an all-Wales measure the net migration of the elderly from England is half that of the in-migration of people of working age.[135] We, however, find the use of an all-Wales measure in this context questionable since the pressures of in-migration are felt in more localised domains.

In the 'domains' of Wales, the highest activity rate is found in Gwent - 61.4%, one of lowest is in Gwynedd at 53.9%.[136] Rural areas in general,

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[133]Source: (Welsh Office, 1995a, 34).
[134](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 189)
[135](Prentice, 1993, 28)
[136](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 209). The data can be 'gendered' - overall, the male economic activity rate declined in Wales from 69.4% in 1985 to 66.5% in 1993 (Blackaby, et al., 1994, 205).

traditionally the core areas of autonomist and Welsh culture, have suffered disproportionately during this period:[137]

> 'Over the period 1987 to 1991 counties in the east of Wales - Clwyd, Gwent and South Glamorgan - improved their position whilst those in the west - Gwynedd and Dyfed - experienced a deterioration. The deterioration is most marked in the case of Dyfed and Powys which in 1979 had a GDP-per-head figure above the average for Wales and ranked third in terms of Welsh counties with only South and West Glamorgan having higher levels. Over a decade later the position had changed dramatically: Dyfed and Powys are well below the Welsh average, with only Mid Glamorgan having a lower level of GDP per head'.[138]

On another level it would seem that the Welsh economic 'miracle' has had an effect on perceptions, and that not merely expressed via Welsh office publicity. A new optimism is slowly creeping into the literature. For instance on the subject of transport infrastructure and the laments on its quality alluded to at the commencement of this chapter, one academic, who spends most of his vacations in Wales, points out that Wales is closer to Heathrow than many areas to the east of London.[139]

In the light of the evidence above it would seem facile to argue that there is a simple and direct causal relationship between actual disparities in economic development and autonomist action. Also, the fact that the Welsh economy is becoming more diversified may be considered to provide autonomists with stronger arguments for independence in Europe. Autonomists in Wales have developed alternative arguments, based on new

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[137](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 205). Implicit support for both assertions is provided by a survey assessing competence in Welsh language reading and writing, which found that 'pupils in schools with the highest percentage of pupils receiving free school meals outperformed those from schools with lower levels of economic deprivation' (Price, Powell, Griffith, & Schagen, 1989, 55).

[138](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 224)

[139](Harvie, 1994a, 29)

sets of principles that reflect new complexities, and extend beyond economic analyses. The following is a typical example:

> 'Self-government should give the stimulus to enterprise and activity in Wales which will help rather than hinder economic activity. That, therefore, brings us back to the basic question, the fundamental political question that is at the heart of self-government. The argument is not about whether we will pay more or less taxes - that question is broadly neutral. The question is about the type of society and community which we want in Wales, and whether a Westminster government will ever facilitate the **flowering** of the social values, as well as the entrepreneurial potential of Wales as a nation'.[140]

The passage quoted above also provides an implicit textual example of the influence the European project has had on autonomists in Wales. Consider the following passages from the Maastricht Treaty.

> Title II
> ARTICLE 3
> For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein:
> (p) a contribution to education and training of quality and to the **flowering** of the cultures of the Member States;
> Title IX ARTICLE 128 1. The Community shall contribute to the **flowering** of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.[141]

Autonomist economic policies have acquired two new and increasingly dominant features since 1979 - environmental awareness and Europhilia. The two are often conflated in autonomist literature - consider for instance the following two passages:

> 'At present, the United Kingdom is a reluctant player on the sustainable energy stage, Wales, directly represented in the European Community,

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[140](Wigley, 1995a, 2 my emphasis)
[141](European Council, 1992, my emphasis)

could be amongst the leaders, working in co-operation with continental partners for long-term coherent policies throughout the Community'.[142]

'Dogmatic insistence on the observance of EU competition rules should not prevent Member States from introducing more stringent measures of environmental protection than the European norm, regardless of whether they are an impediment to trade within the EU. Such a system of 'green' subsidiarity would allow individual countries and regions to implement environmental best-practice, while the EU's harmonised level or protection would act as a floor beneath which no Member State's environmental standards would be allowed to drop.[143]

6.12 Europe and the New Economics of Autonomy

In the European Union, regional policy projects and programmes are financed by three structural funds; namely the ERDF, ESF and the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section. These funds are co-ordinated and linked with other funding institutions such as the EIB, and the ECSC. From 1 January 1994 to the 31st December 1999, the funds' activities are designated to concentrate on 5 objectives, as follows:

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[142](Plaid Cymru and Green Party {Ceredigion and Pembroke North}, 1992, 13)
[143](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 24)

Table 6.5

'Objective' regions in the European Union[144]

Objective 1	development of lagging regions
Objective 2	converting regions affected by industrial decline
Objective 3	combination of old objectives 3 and 4 which were under 1988 structural fund reforms - now combating long term unemployment and facilitating integration of young people and persons socially excluded from the labour market into working life
Objective 4	{new} provides an additions function for the ESF - facilitating worker adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems - especially through vocational training and retraining
Objective 5	rural development
5a	speeding up agricultural adjustment following 1992 reform of CAP which gave direct financial aid rather than price subsidies
5b[145]	promoting structural adjustment of rural areas
{Since 1995} Objective 6	aid to northern areas of sparse population

Instituting a program specifically directed at the needs of the regions, the EU has effectively doubled the structural funds available to Wales, making it a far more significant political and economic actor there. The facts that regional development fund monies from the UK government have been reduced, and that, before the 1993 reforms, Whitehall used EC funding to offset the amount of its own contributions, thus violating the additionality

[144](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 241-242). Objectives 1 and 2 remain the same as in the previous 5 year period.

[145]Parts of rural Wales are classified as Objective 5b Regions, and are targeted with specific extra rural aid as a consequence (Midmore, et al., 1994, 14).

principle, increased the perception of Europe's importance amongst a wide cross-section of political and economic actors in Wales.[146]

Infrastructural support at this level is relatively recent, however, compared to the support provided by the Common Agricultural Policy {CAP} which, since 1973, has subsidised Wales's agricultural sector by maintaining high guaranteed support prices. This was particularly important to Wales since agriculture, forestry and fishing have an employment quotient of 1.58 compared to the UK as a whole.[147] The nature of the subsidy altered in 1992, however, when the CAP was reformed in favour of providing direct financial aid to farmers.[148] As we have seen, the market in livestock and animal products has become particularly volatile in recent years. The Comission has attempted to increase economic stability in rural areas by introducing new programmes including a Scheme to Introduce Modern Technology into Rural Areas {SIMTRA}, which was basically designed to increase levels of home working in Wales.[149] The predominant component within this employment domain, data input, is, however, characterised by low wages and subject to instability caused by technological change; in this case the development of automated data input technology.

There are a number of other EU programmes and iniatives,[150] which serve to augment the perceived significance of the EU in Wales. Not only this, European entities outside of the EU have been developing links with Wales. The most significant of these from an economic perspective is the

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[146]In January 1988, the Secretary of State for Wales announced that an extra £54 million would be made available for aiding industry and employment in 1988-1989. This brought the total figure for the year up to £194 million. These figures constitute a smaller proportion of the budgets of the 1970s and early 1980s.

[147](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 191)

[148](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 233)

[149](Midmore, et al., 1994, 21)

[150]For example, Community Networks, and the LEADER Scheme (Midmore, et al., 1994, 26 & 27).

Four Motors Group which signed an agreement of association with Wales through the Welsh Office in 1990.[151] Moreover it is this group which developed and fiercely promoted the concept of 'Europe of the regions' in the early 1990s.[152]

Rational expectations analysis suggests that altered perceptions can have real economic effects. Perceptions have been altered by such concepts as 'Europe of the regions', and such perception shifts are reflected and discernible in the broadcast media. One commentator, whom we could class as a unionist, acknowledged that the creation of the EU had altered perceptions, that in the research for his radio series he discovered that autonomists were now characterised by Euro-enthusiasm and hinted darkly that they had perhaps found another way of dismantling the {UK} union.[153] There appears to be a significant, perhaps paradigmatic, change occurring in the domain of image and perception with respect to 'economic' Wales and Europe. On one level Dafydd Iwan, a significant figure in the autonomist movement in Wales, is prepared to argue that the EU is capable of 'releasing a dynamic'.[154] At another level John Smith, former Labour MP, who runs Gwent Image, argues that 'nationalists get in the way' with respect to forging links with Europe.[155] There is further evidence that the exogenous image of Wales is in a state of flux. In the same interview Smith quotes an opinion poll which reveals that 43% of the English think the Welsh are not hospitable, that they are untrustworthy, devious, disloyal, and talk too much: and a survey of 500 top executives conducted in September 1994 - which placed Wales at

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[151](Harvie, 1994b, 62)
[152](Harvie, 1994b, 62)
[153](Dimbleby, 1995)
[154](Dimbleby, 1995)
[155](Dimbleby, 1995)

bottom as a place to work, but on the question of what regions had best to offer - Wales came top.[156]

6.13 Conclusion

We concur that the first and second waves of autonomist mobilisation in Wales in the late nineteenth and 1960s respectively were linked to socio-economic changes. Specifically the first wave of mobilisation arose from nineteenth century religious, democratic and industrial revolutions and were rewarded by, *inter alia*, univeral suffrage and better education. The second wave arose more precisely from a combination of economic discrepancies and the more rapid tempo of economic change after 1945.[157] The current stage is more difficult to categorise using these concepts, though superficially they would appear to be as useful. As we have shown, however, more variables have entered the analysis, and the parameters of the debate have altered markedly.

We have shown that, on a number of levels, Wales cannot be considered as a single economic unit anymore. Indeed it is doubtful that this was ever wholly the case, as Cross argued in 1970,

> 'If administrative considerations were always paramount it is possible that in one or two cases an individual Wales, with its poor longitudinal communications, might not constitute a regional equivalent but be split'.[158]

It has however, as we have seen, proven expedient to successive administrations and, of course, autonomist groups to consider Wales as a unit for economic purposes, especially after the establishment of the Welsh Office in 1964. By the same token, England cannot be considered

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[156](Dimbleby, 1995)
[157](Rokkan & Urwin, 1983,135-140)
[158](Cross, 1970, 438)

economically homogenous; it would seem, therefore, disingenuous to question the 'authenticity' of Wales on this basis; though it is perhaps indicative of economic, democratic and political maturity that Wales can be considered homogenous for the purposes of planning.

Since 1979, as we have shown in this and previous chapters, the Conservative administration has reinforced this process, but, as was shown in Chapter Five, has not reaped electoral rewards as a consequence; indeed the very opposite has been the case. Why should this be so? After all, there are indicators of success in the Welsh economy which can be attributed to Conservative policy. We suggest that there are four interlinked and multi-layered reasons for this apparent paradox, which can be linked to the motivations behind autonomist ideology and its potential for political mobilisation. Firstly, despite the changes, and particularly due to relative growth elsewhere, especially in Ireland, Wales emerges as a 'have-not' region. Secondly, the 'success' of external investment itself reinforces the viability argument, but was not necessarily perceived to emanate from Conservative policies. The Welsh Office and the WDA developed separate identities from the central administration, and from the most unpopular incumbent John Redwood; who himself alienated Welsh elite and public opinion, not from the Welsh Office *per se*, but from the central administration. Thus the new nexus of Quangos has disconnected central government from praise, but reinforced its connectedness to opprobrium. This has been coupled with, thirdly, enduring perceptions, reinforced by autonomist discourse, that the European Union has played a significant role in Welsh success, and could be responsible for more given increased Welsh autonomy, aided by the fact that the government attributed economic recession to the forces of globalisation - so when the recession ended it was

difficult for the government to assume the mantle of successful involvement. Fourthly, the above factors enabled new levels of autonomist discourse, both in terms of standard and arena. As such it developed a new sophistication, and in addition acquired significant new voices, such as the unions, the Welsh Labour Party, the Parliament for Wales Campaign, and, latterly, the Institute for Welsh Affairs, which has entailed a permeation of autonomist discourse into Welsh political life on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

The following chapter will analyse the influence Europe has had on Welsh identity transformation. For instance, in a 'political structure... heavily biased towards the South East',[159] the EU has provided a perceived opportunity to circumvent this bias. We will also examine how, why and with what success Plaid Cymru has advocated the application of a key European concept - subsidiarity - in the Welsh dimension. One version of subsidiarity implies that any task which has a local function and effect should be administered locally, and with some degree of autonomy. Another, competing, version which appears to be an invention of the Conservative Party asserts that subsidiarity means 'minimum interference in our national {i.e. British} affairs'.[160]

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[159](Blackaby, et al., 1994, 225)
[160](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 17)

CHAPTER 7

THE EMERGENCE OF WALES IN EUROPE?

7.0 Introduction

Until very recently, analysing the role of the EC with respect to the state and region in the context of autonomism would have seemed rather an anomalous undertaking.[1] For much of its history the EC had been primarily oriented towards state and Europe-wide policies, and in turn autonomist groups feared that its supra-national tendencies would dissolve their regional identities. The image of the EU in the eyes of autonomists and the states enveloping them has changed markedly over the past two decades, however. EC institutions and agents have actively sought to change their roles, and in so doing new conflicts have arisen; not least because of the attempts, so-called, to bypass the nation-state. It is difficult to ascertain why the EU has evolved in this manner, moreover such an exercise is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here we seek to explore and analyse the 'conversion' of autonomists in Wales to Europe as depicted through their discourse.

Though the previous chapter furnished us with evidence concerning the economic factors behind this conversion, total dependence this approach would be unwarranted, given that both in the context of the UK and Europe disparities between depressed regions and buoyant centres remain. In fact, intra-EU income disparities have become wider as the EU has enlarged.[2]

One of the non-economic factors providing this impetus is the doctrine of subsidiarity which, allied with the concept of a 'Europe of the regions', has

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[1]The acronyms EC and EU refer to different institutional and political constructs. The discussion below reflects these differences. To this extent the acronyms are not used arbitrarily or interchangeably. Also, for reasons of efficiency and economy, much EC source material is cited in this chapter in abbreviated form, and is not duplicated in the bibliography.

[2](Tsoukalis, 1993, 248)

altered perceptions. Hesse summarises this reorientation in the following way:

> 'The European Parliament and the Commission have, in recent years, shown a willingness to recognise regional demands for a closer co-operation between Community institutions and subnational governments; national governments, by contrast, have, on the whole, shown much more reluctance to respond to such pressures. Attempts by the Commission to 'bypass the national state' (and thus reinforce its own position) by strengthening direct contacts with regional and local administrations have, accordingly, been viewed with suspicion by central governments'.[3]

Hesse overestimates perhaps the <u>functional</u> strength of the Community institutions. Sharpe, addressing the Europe of the Regions thesis, argues that 'there is as yet no central capability.. in Brussels able to bring it about'.[4] The influence of the EC extends beyond the functional however, demonstrated by the use of the EU as an arena of legitimation for regional autonomists. Though this process is relatively recent, regional actors are beginning to participate in transnational structures, and altering perceptions of autonomism within those structures, whilst at the same time being themselves socialised into new dimensions and conceptualisations of identity. The EU, somewhat paradoxically, may allow autonomists to transcend their own borders, and may herald, though this is pure speculation, the final demise of *laager* nationalism.

The primary focus of the analysis below is the policy area of education, and the 'doctrine' of subsidiarity. But the overall growth in autonomism across the European continent cannot be explained simply by subsidiarity and certainly not by the internal policy dynamics of the British state, the Welsh case in this sense is *sui generis*.

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[3](Hesse, 1992, 9)
[4](Sharpe, 1993, 34)

Changes in discourse are both causes and consequences of institutional and attitudinal change. With respect to the former an extensive European/Welsh consultative network has developed since the early 1990s: including, the establishment of an EC Office in Wales, a Wales European Centre in Brussels {after 'much prompting by local authorities'}, European Departments within the WDA, and within Local Government Offices, four Welsh representatives of the EU Committee of the Regions, Neil Kinnock, a Welshman and a former leader of the Labour Party, operating within a key Directorate in the Commission, membership of the Four Motors Group,[5] plus since 1973 and 1979 respectively, an European Affairs Division in the Welsh Office and the presence of directly elected MEPs.[6] Wales also has links with other European groups such as the Conference Of Maritime Regions, the Assembly Of European Regions, and the *Arc Atlantique*.

In the attitudinal dimension, utilising and, to a certain extent, influencing institutional developments, Plaid Cymru and other groups raised the political profile of the issue of Welsh independence during the late 1980s to a point where comparisons are made with Gwynfor Evans's 1966 electoral breakthrough in Carmarthen. Recent opinion polls seem to bear out the claims made by the party. An opinion poll commissioned by BBC Wales in March 1994, prior to the European elections, found that of those polled 37% supported independence for Wales within the EC, 36% opposed independence and 45% were in favour of an assembly for Wales.[7] These changing circumstances are acknowledged by the *Blaid's* opponents, but the Conservatives, for instance, counter by arguing that,

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[5]In 1990 an agreement was signed with Baden Wurtenberg, subsequently agreements were reached with Catalunya, Rhone-Alpes, and Lombardy.
[6](Jones, 1994b, 44-45)
[7](Beaufort Research, 1994)

'the Nationalists would use Europe as a fig-leaf, in a vain attempt to hide their separatist embarrassment.[8]

There is evidence, furthermore, that the raised profile of the issues are not necessarily transferring to votes for Plaid Cymru. For instance the poll just referred to found that only 11% supported the idea of a Plaid Cymru representative within Europe.[9]

7.1 Assymetries in Support

There are three explanations for the discontinuity between support for Welsh issues and support for Plaid Cymru. First, the growth of Wales based organisations may have diverted support which would have otherwise accrued to Plaid Cymru. As noted earlier, political parties, cultural organisations and charities have all been developing a Welsh identity.[10] The institutions of Government in Wales such as the Welsh Office and its offshoots, including a joint venture - Wales in Europe, have sought to legitimate themselves in the Welsh context by promulgating a Welsh identity, which at the same time has reduced the opportunities for Plaid Cymru to lay sole claim for itself as the champion of Welsh values.

The second explanation - spatial ghettoisation of support - is recognised by Plaid Cymru. The campaign, initiated in the late 1980s by the then president Dafydd El is Thomas, to move into former Labour strongholds was a clear attempt to circumvent the particularistic image of the *Blaid*. In 1989 Thomas called for Plaid Cymru to tone down the linguistic emphasis within

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[8](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 38)
[9](Beaufort Research, 1994)
[10]Other organisations include the Assembly of Welsh Counties, the Welsh Association of District Councils, WDA, Wales TUC, Wales CBI, Farmers' Union of Wales. For further information see (Balsom, 1996).

the party.[11] The campaign has been moderately successful, in the June 1994 European Parliament elections, Plaid Cymru's share of the vote increased from single figures to 17.1% of the vote,[12] higher than the Conservatives who only managed to poll 14.6%.[13] A third factor, not exclusive from the others, can be termed identive ghettoisation - Plaid Cymru has been associated with a particular kind of Welshness, Welsh speaking, rural and to a certain extent northern which has often excluded it from support in the more populous south - the 1992 electoral alliance with the Green Party can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome this constraint.[14]

Despite its uni-dimensional image, however, the *Blaid* itself has always been a broad church, rather like the German Christian Democrats than any other UK based party. Supporting evidence for this argument is provided by Rawkins, who has demonstrated the existence of a wide range of world views within Plaid Cymru. He classifies the dominant views of party activists into clusters around four autonomist types, each representing a particular set of values, motivations, and social concerns. This structural typology explains how Welsh language militants, cultural autonomists, middle-of-the-road party workers from rural Wales, and South Wales radicals can coexist and cooperate within the fabric of organised autonomism. The effect of such a broad range of world views has sometimes left the party prone to ideological confusion, since each group has affected the central ideology of the party and

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[11](Parry, 1989)
[12](Heath, 1994a, 9)
[13](Osmond, 1995, 178)
[14]Jonathan Porritt was suspended from the Green Party after the June 1994 elections to the EP. Porritt had backed Plaid Cymru candidate Marc Phillips for the Mid and West Wales seat in preference to the Green candidate Chris Busby. In the 1992 General Election, Green support produced a victory for PC candidate, Cynog Dafis, in Ceredigion. He has a green researcher, Victor Anderson, on his staff.

the autonomist movement as a whole, particularly over the issue of independence.[15]

7.2 Plaid Cymru and Europe

Perhaps due to this hubbub of ideological forces within the party, Plaid Cymru perceived the benefits of Europe rather later than the Conservatives and Liberals, though earlier than the Labour Party whose opposition remained total, such that in 1983 the party was advocating withdrawal.[16] The beginning of Plaid Cymru's conversion to Europe can be traced to the early seventies - the report of the Welsh Council in 1971,[17] the referendum of 1975, in which the Welsh voted in favour by a ratio of 2 to 1,[18] and the lobbying of the farmers groups in Wales being particularly potent forces adjusting the *Blaid's* perception of Europe.[19] The *Blaid* nevertheless continued to express concern about such a large political organisation where minority interests would become further diluted and marginalised.[20]

During the course of the 1980s the European Community gained increasing prominence in the political literature emanating from Wales.[21] Plaid Cymru, and a sector within the Welsh Labour Party, began to realise that the EC provided the opportunity to portray a new type of autonomism. This is rather surprising given that the EC has been silent on the subject of territorial politics and cultural diversity for most of its history, and the

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[15](Rawkins, 1979)
[16](Jowell, et al., 1995/6, 133). By 1989 by contrast Labour was avowing its support for the European project (Jowell, et al., 1995/6, 133).
[17](Harvie, 1994a, 27)
[18](Morgan, 1992, 366)
[19](Keating & Jones, 1991, 320)
[20](Plaid Cymru, 1984?)
[21]See for example (Plaid Cymru, 1994a).

gatekeeper to citizenship remains the nation-state.[22] The primary motivation behind this shift in attitudes was four-fold. First, as will be outlined below, the structural and political changes within the EC and the EU allowed the participation of regional actors in transnational structures, and even the possibility of participation in their reproduction. This development may be linked to the fact that,

> 'The region- and sector-specific nature of economic adjustment problems in most advanced nations during the 1980s has undercut the effectiveness of national corporatist institutions established to deal with economic adjustment'.[23]

Europhiles within the *Blaid*, beginning in the 1970s, argued the case for the EC - emphasising specifically the augmentation of the regional dimension of the EC by the creation of the Regional Fund in 1975, followed by the upgrading of the structural fund reform in 1988 at a time when the regional dimension, in funding terms, of the UK central state had been dramatically reduced. Furthermore, the presence of a sympathetic Commission, under Jacques Delors, and an activist Regional Policy Commissioner in DGXVI, Bruce Millan, had a major impact on autonomist thinking and praxis.[24]

The role of Europe in facilitating identity recognition through education, one of our key variables, also cannot be overlooked. In 1975, a Draft Directive was issued from Brussels, requesting member states to teach, within the school curriculum, the mother tongue and culture of the country of origin of migrant workers. This was passed in July 1977 and relayed to LEAs in July 1981.[25] This itself revealed to the *Blaid* the potential of Europe to

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[22](Welsh, 1993, 16)
[23](Allen, 1989, 148)
[24]For an alternative perspective see (Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 9).
[25](Baker, 1988, 61)

enact structural change as well as be a vehicle of publicity - especially if the Welsh in England could be classed as migrant workers.

Thirdly, constructing and outlining the demands of Plaid Cymru in a more modern guise was perceived to be more electorally acceptable, especially given that the principle embodied in the phrase 'Wales in Europe' has more intuitive viability than the previous catch phrase 'Wales in the Commonwealth'.[26] Evidence for these changes is provided by our earlier analysis of Plaid Cymru manifestos, which become increasingly pro-European and post-materialist after 1983, and are analysed further below. The recent alliance with the Green Party provides further evidence of these changes, as well as being an innovative attempt by the party to reduce the ancient north/south cleavage in Wales.


Finally, the propaganda value of significantly better performances in European Parliament elections compared to British parliamentary elections cannot be overlooked. Consider the figure below:

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[26](Evans, 1974, 2)

Figure 7:1

Performance Of Plaid Cymru In European Elections



Euro enthusiasm has not been confined to Plaid Cymru. Despite a slow start the Welsh Labour Party, with a few notable exceptions, has embraced the European project with enthusiasm. Their latest policy document states:

> '1.3 We will uphold the principle of subsidiarity, so that decisions are taken as close to the people as possible'.[27]

It is also interesting that this assertion is linked in the same sub-section with the issues of globalisation, devolution and democratisation, alongside, rather incongruously, a reassertion of the need for unity:

> 'In today's interdependent world it makes sense for some decisions to be taken at a European level. Equally, it remains the case that it is in the interests of all parts of Britain, including Wales, for the unity of the UK to be maintained. It is also necessary for Wales to have an elected Assembly so that democracy can be established at an all-Wales level'.[28]

Neither is Euro-enthusiasm confined indeed to Welsh political parties. The WDA, for instance, in its 1991-92 report 'opened with Wales marked a proud red on a map of Europe - not of Britain'.[29] 'Europe' became the nexus of an intergovernmentalist vs integrationist debate conducted at a Welsh level. John Redwood, aware perhaps of the powerful symbols being invoked by Wales-based institutions, 'banned the use of the Welsh dragon on brochures which bore the slogan "Wales in Europe" '.[30] He also expressed the view that the promotional literature, being distributed by the Principality's Brussels office gave the incorrect impression that Wales was a separate country.[31] Interestingly Redwood's actions and pronouncements were often rebutted by reference to his 'anti-Welsh Englishness', an impression perhaps

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[27](Wales Labour Party/Plaid Llafur Cymru, 1996, 1)
[28](Wales Labour Party/Plaid Llafur Cymru, 1996, 1)
[29](Beckett, 1994)
[30](Cohen, 1995)
[31](Cohen, 1995)

reinforced by his refusal to sign documents written in Welsh. More importantly Redwood was unable to slow the process of the reification of Wales in both endogenous and exogenous contexts, and may have, paradoxically, speeded up the process through his actions.

Other institutions in Wales have responded to the, in many ways autonomist-led, European challenge by establishing the *Canolfan Ewropeaidd Cymru* {Wales European Centre} in Brussels, which is the result of collaboration amongst 52 organisations, and is designed to lobby solely for 'economic Wales'.[32]

7.3 Rational Expectations?

The level of expectations concerning the EU amongst autonomist groups within Wales may have risen beyond what can reasonably be expected, however. The Maastricht Treaty, though acknowledging a regional dimension in subsidiarity {depending on definition}, and institutionalising that dimension through the Committee of the Regions and {limited} participation in the Council, does not provide the crucial *de jure* access to the European Court of Justice allowing for the justiciability of cases involving a territorial dimension. Moreover, participation is confined to specifically defined ministerial levels, which effectively excludes all the regions of the EU save those of Germany and Belgium. Finally the age old problem of institutional anthropomorphism, which academics and politicians alike constantly succumb to, is of particular relevance here given that the EU is not one institution but several {see section on pillarisation below}, is subject to inputs from an inordinate array of disparate groups and agents, and is even

[32]The state, through the Welsh Office, remains the primary sponsor of the Centre.

physically located in more than one place. Ascribing a collective mind or personality to the EU is fraught with difficulties. Most of the arguments above, moreover, are applicable in any discussion of EU educational policy.

On the other side of the coin we cannot completely shirk such an approach. The EU has clearly altered the politics and policies of sub-national groups, and, often, in their perception, even assisted them. To what extent then can we talk about an EU strategy of undermining or bypassing member-states? Let us examine these developments in more detail. This examination is designed to achieve several objectives. First it provides an analysis of the salient legal and institutional changes to the EU, secondly the development of a coherent EU input into education, which, as we have consistently argued throughout this thesis, has an influence on identity formation, is considered. Thirdly it furnishes an analysis of a complex concept, which forms much of the theoretical underpinnings of *Blaid*'s, and perhaps even the Welsh Labour Party's, conversion to Europe, subsidiarity. In order to illustrate the concept's multi-faceted nature it is examined in theoretical and practical operationalised form{s} in three political 'spaces', the EU, Germany and the UK. Within these spaces differing institutional roles are considered, and their differing perspectives and motivations outlined. The perception of the *Blaid* in particular and the manner in which subsidiarity has altered the contours of discussion in general, in Wales is incorporated within this comparative context. This perspective allows us to address in part the party's deliberations over the normative issue of whether subsidiarity should {or could} be a precisely defined politco-legal concept, or remain malleable. All these matters are considered in the context of, a} subsidiarity's relationship with federalism, b} the justiciability question, c} applying the subsidiarity principle.

7.4 The Infrastructure of the EU

The Treaty on European Union {or Maastricht Treaty} is a rather imprecise, unbalanced document which was rapidly agreed upon as a response to the unforeseen political developments in Eastern and Central Europe beginning in 1989.

The document consists of six Titles as follows:

Title I Common Provisions of EU

Title II EEC Amendments

Title III ECSC Amendments

Title IV Euratom Amendments


Title V Common Foreign and Security Policy

Title VI Justice and Home Affairs

Several new political and structural elements are introduced by this document. The first is the umbrella concept of the European Union {EU} introduced by Title I. The second major element was the pillarisation of, in the main, Titles I, V, and VI to create the institutional structure of the European Union: this is depicted in diagrammatic form below:

Figure 7:2

The structure of the European Union[33]



[33] The political model depicted here is based on the Dutch *Verzuiling,* a Flemish word meaning pillarisation, and employed in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century as a mechanism for ameliorating linguistic and cultural conflict.

A feature that should be noted on examination of the diagram above is a sense of asymmetry and imbalance in the structure. This asymmetry depicts a political reality. That is, the base does not entirely support the pillars since Common Foreign and Security Policy, along with Justice and Home Affairs remain outside the remit of the EC institutions. This shows the EC institutions have little to no competence in these areas. The British government was especially keen to establish the intergovernmental pillars firmly outside the remit of the EC.[34] In addition, as illustrated in the above diagram, certain policy areas are not easily incorporated into the structure, particularly those covering defence and common passports.

This discussion provides an indication that the EU is heavily influenced by the intergovernmental 'pillar'. It is still a political and economic union dominated by the nation state, and it would be a mistake to overplay the role the regional element has even after Maastricht. Having said that, at least the regional element now has some political input through the Committee of the Regions {COR} - the European Union's consultative body on regional affairs. This Committee has chosen to challenge the member-state orientation of the principle of subsidiarity, arguing that 'Article 3b of the Treaty reduces the application of subsidiarity to the exercise of competencies shared between the Union and the Member States' and calls for the wording of the article to 'contain a specific reference to the regions'.[35] These demands have been reiterated by the COR's 'constituency', an indication of policy spillover. In 1995, for instance, the Vice President and the Secretary-General of the Assembly of European Regions {AER}, which represents 282 European

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[34]For testimony of this see Douglas Hurd in Evidence to (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1992; Select Committee on the European Communities, 1990).
[35](Commission for Institutional Affairs, 1994)

regions from 23 European countries, incorporating some 70% of the EU's regions, said the principle of subsidiarity should be clearly defined and the regions of Europe should participate fully in its implementation. Speaking before the European Parliament's Regional Affairs Committee in January 1995, they asked for regions to be allowed genuine powers of co-decision in planning issues at the Inter-Governmental Conference to review the Maastricht Treaty in 1996.[36]

The COR is not without cleavages however, cleavages which reflect divisions amongst the sub-state units of Europe. During the meeting alluded to above, the Vice-President Erwin Huber, a Minister of the State of Bavaria, and Secretary-General Wolfgang Maier also argued that the Committee of the Regions should be divided into two discrete institutions to represent Europe's regions and cities. Both said they wanted the regions and municipalities to have separate bodies to reflect their specific needs. These demands came after several months of tension within the Committee, and rumours of splits between the regional and municipal representatives.[37]

The pillarised structure of the EU also has important implications for one of the most significant concepts engendered by Maastricht - that is citizenship of the union. The idea of citizenship is introduced as an addition to the idea of national citizenship - not a replacement. That is, it introduces the important idea of shared citizenship in a vertical plane. This citizenship is conceived as operating in an upward direction, from state to union. However accepting the principle of vertical sharing of citizenship logically cannot preclude sub-state or regional groups from lobbying for an extension of this model downwards to the regions - the same is true of the concept of subsidiarity.

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[36](European Report, 1995)
[37](European Report, 1995)

This scenario, which the state or at least certain member states in the EU may have perceived as a threat to their sovereign identity, is likely to have been anticipated in Council discussions. Such anticipation is a probable explanation of the formulation of the notion of citizenship outside of the European Community and directing it to the far more amorphous idea of European Union.

The rubric of the Maastricht Treaty expresses the need for a union of individuals in a single body politic which has legal personality. What emerges from the present situation is a notion of citizenship with no political focus. As a citizen of the European Union, one is a bearer of a citizenship with no precise location. A citizenship location would have been better provided in the event of incorporating the notion of citizenship itself into the EC pillar. It should be emphasised that this more logical scenario was in the perception of several of the more unitary states in the union, politically untenable, and there was generally it seems a desire to ensure that the notions of Union and Citizenship should exist, notwithstanding the wording of the rubric just quoted, with no legal personality. The Union therefore does not send out ambassadors, and does not negotiate treaties. It functions are blurred, perhaps deliberately so.

The Union {as opposed to the Community} is conceived in a structure that appears to obviate or at least marginalise the need for regional input.[38] That is, it is conceived in a plane of relationships between the supra national, the intergovernmental\national and the individual. Consequently, Union and Community are connected with respect to their relationship to the individual.

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[38]The Committee of the Regions resolution on subsidiarity states that 'before commencing action in a new field, the Union should ensure that it is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, by consulting the Committee of the Regions'.

To illustrate, as a citizen of the Union, an individual then gets the right to vote in EP elections, and the right to stand in elections in the Community. On another level the right of free movement and residence within the EU is further entrenched, and with respect to the EC, the role of Parliament's relationship with the individual citizen is augmented through the provision of a right to petition the Parliament, and the establishment of an ombudsmen. On an intergovernmental level diplomatic and consular rights are extended to all citizens of the union.

Note, however, that the majority of these provisions are guaranteed under the Union and not the Community. Another interesting feature to note is the lack of provision of housing and welfare rights, and the absence of any clear justicable statement on human {including linguistic} rights, beyond that found in paragraph 2, Article F, Title 1 - Common Provisions. It is interesting that such agreements have been made in the Council of Europe, a much weaker institution. Sub-state groups, therefore, should be aware of the possible negative implications {at least from their perspective} of the addition of the Union into the European political structure, because it could easily become a mechanism to reify the state.

7.5 The European Union and the Contours of Identity

The European Union is a further actor in the competitive arena of identity formation. An arena in which stereotyping of national attributes in approved school textbooks is the norm. Consider the impressions students in the UK form about modern Germany via history textbooks for instance:

> 'If a book states more or less categorically that a repellent feature of the Nazi regime was no more than the logical sequel to earlier tendencies, there is a powerful implication that all of pre-1945 German history is to be

viewed in a negative light, rather than merely the years between 1933-45. Moreover, there is a greater danger of the student being pushed in to harmful generalisations about German national characteristics. It is therefore unfortunate that several of the books examined are at their weakest in precisely this area'.[39]

The burgeoning role of the EU in education and hence identity formation cannot be fully analysed here, but its impact ought not to be underestimated:

'Europeanisation. This, finally, is perhaps the most far reaching and comprehensive transforming mechanism of all. The process of European integration, after more than thirty years of concentrating on economic requirements, has at last also reached the field of education, and that of higher education in particular'.[40]

The subject of education is not brooked in the original Treaty of Rome, which provides a clue to the sensitivity of the issue to nation-states.[41] As Shirley Williams, herself a former politician, has said:

The foundations of a European identity might be laid in the schools, but many member states fiercely defend their own turf when it comes to education, which is *not within the Community's jurisdiction.* School curricula still recount national histories and national geographies. Attempts to create a European core curriculum have run into resistance in several member states'.[42]

The quote also reveals, however, a general ignorance, ameliorated somewhat since Maastricht but nevertheless still prevalent, that the Community does not have a legal role in education. This has not been the case since 1974.[43]

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[39](Ludlow, 1992, 14)

[40](Gellert, 1993, 19)

[41]Even Articles 126, 127 and 128 of the Treaty on European Union, which authorise the first Treaty forays into education *per se*, are limiting catalogues constituting proof of the Member States' wariness of entrusting management of these sectors to the Community.

[42](Williams, 1991b, 170 my italics)

[43]As a result of the resolution of the ministers of education, meeting within the Council, of 6 June 1974, on co-operation in the field of education the first action programme in education at community level begun in 1976 {see Official Journal (OJ) no. c38 of 19.2.1976, 1}. See also the discussion below on the Casagrande decision. Note that the bulk of the primary source documents from the EC institutions referred to here are available on microfiche in European Documentation Centres (EDC).

All EU policies must find an appropriate legal basis in the EU Treaties.[44] The Treaty can be interpreted in two primary ways:

a} As a massive 'policy document' declaring, in a rather circumlocutionary way, substantive policy areas in which EU institutions have a competence. Competence, however, is not easy to discern: restrictions, sharing procedures, and other obstructions to understanding envelop the treaty.

b} As a 'declaration of intent' equipped with 'objectives' which, in order to be achieved, endow the Community with functional powers.[45]

These interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed taken together they can bestow a quasi-constitutional aspect upon the treaties. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is on the latter point that the EC and the nation-state truly clash, because it is here that the EC institutions cut across the internal substantive competencies of the state,[46] and it is increasingly through the European Court of Justice that the contest is refereed. Welsh autonomists argue that the ECJ could justifiably arbitrate infra-state educational conflict also.[47]

Another issue arises, in the context of points a} and b} above, concerning the nature of European Union law with regard to education. From the foundation of the EEC in 1958 until the Treaty on European Union agreed in Maastricht in December 1991, EC education law had not been binding but a more ambiguous form of public interest law or Community soft law.[48] The Maastricht Treaty has changed the nature of European education law and

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[44](De Witte, 1993, 198)
[45]The EC, for instance, possesses overall responsibility for 'the establishment and functioning of a Common Market' {Article 235} - a powerful mission statement.
[46](De Witte, 1993, 198)
[47](Dafis, 1993)
[48](De Witte, 1989, 9-10)

policy since, for the first time, education is explicitly mentioned as a policy area over which the EU has some jurisdiction, though the jurisdiction is by no means lucid.

Education, because of its indeterminate status in EC law, has been subject to piecemeal solutions by the European Court of Justice. For many years the relevant section of the Treaty of Rome, Article 128, was considered to be the 'dormant provision'.[49] It was thought that the phrase 'general principles' contained in the Act prevented the Community from adapting detailed and/or binding rules in this area.[50] In several judgements, made over a relatively long period of time, the ECJ has animated the article, particularly by expanding the definition of 'vocational training.'

In 1974 the ECJ 'considered whether the Council, by including provisions on the education of migrant children,[51] had not overstepped the substantive limits of EU competence'.[52] The Court decided, in what came to be known as the 'Casagrande Formula', that the Council had not overstepped these limits.[53] Specifically, the Court ruled that substantive policy areas are within the competence of a Community wishing to further the common internal market.[54] Thus the policies of what is viewed as the most intergovernmental of EU institutions,[55] the Council, were instrumental in widening the scope for EU action in education policy.

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[49]The Article reads: 'The Council shall lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of the national economies and of the Common Market'.
[50](De Witte, 1993, 199)
[51]From Regulation 1612/68 concerning the free movement of workers.
[52](De Witte, 1993, 198); European Court Reports 1974, 773, 779.
[53]Also seen in case 242/87, Commission v Council judgement of 30 May 1989, para. 31 [unreported].
[54](De Witte, 1989, 10); Case 9/74 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München, [1974] ECR 773.
[55]A view that often fails to account for the multi-variate identity of the Council.

So far the dominant case work had concerned the rights of migrants but there was no clear legal objection to inter-state educational conflict being arbitrated, provided it falls into an EU ambit, by the ECJ. Such arguments remained merely semantic, however, until the Gravier Case of 1986. The ruling on the case considerably widening the definition of vocational training to include any study programme 'which prepares for a particular profession, trade or employment or provides the necessary training and skills for that profession trade, or employment.'[56] The Gravier ruling provided an opportunity for the Commission to expand its role in European education, an opportunity which it did not fail to take up. As De Witte succinctly points out,

> 'Through an example of institutional interaction which is typical for the Community process, the Commission quickly seized upon the new Gravier definition and presented its ambitious ERASMUS programme for student exchange under the vocational training heading of article 128'.[57]

Finally, in the 'Erasmus Judgement' the ECJ declared that the words 'general principles' do not prevent the EU from adopting binding and detailed rules in this broad area - though the case restricted the widened 'vocational training' clause to higher education.[58] Meehan argues that as a result of Court rulings, rights to further and higher education may include not merely admission but grants and fees. According to the Court, maintenance awards are a 'social advantage' which should not be applied discriminatorily to genuine migrant workers or their dependents.[59]

Impetus towards extending Community powers in education also came from the Rome European Council of 14-15 December 1990. The meeting

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[56]ECJ Report, 1986, para. 12
[57](De Witte, 1989, 16)
[58]Case 242/87, Commission v Council, Judgement of 30 May 1989.
[59](Vogel, 1991, Meehan - 138)

confirmed that there was a 'need to extend or redefine the Community's competence in specific areas.'[60] The statement asserted that,

> 'the Treaty on Political Union ought to contain an article extending the Union's powers to education, thus making it possible to carry out dynamic measures aimed at stimulating, strengthening and upholding Europe's identity over and above purely economic considerations.'[61]

The Parliament and Commission view education policy as a strategic policy, and, in this, the EP took an early lead. Dutch and French Socialist MEPs, for instance, had proposed a European history book, in which national viewpoints on Waterloo, the Franco-Prussian war or the Second World War would be counterbalanced by other viewpoints and,

> 'descriptions of events which occurred simultaneously in all member states, to stimulate an awareness of belonging to a single political entity'.[62]

The European Parliament had begun to put effective pressure on the Commission regarding education, and in particular language training by 1981,[63] despite the fact that education policy did not receive specific provision in the Community treaties prior to Maastricht.

There can be little doubt of the pertinence of this view: Anthony Smith argues that secular education is 'paramount' to the genesis of nationalism and the formation of nations, and that in one sense the nation itself is the institutionalisation of secular education.[64] If then nation creation and maintenance is, at least partly, about instilling a sense of cohesiveness amongst its members, and education is an important cohesive

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[60](European Parliament, 1992, 4)
[61]Ibid.
[62](Owen, 1989, 27)
[63]See EP Session Documents - Doc. No. 845/81 and Doc. No. 88/82.
[64](Smith, 1979, 37)

factor, then education has a role in the integration of the European Union. Such a view is taken by the Parliament, and is clearly discernible in several texts. For example the monograph *Citizen's Europe* states:

> 'The economic and social future of the European Community is closely linked with co-operation between member states with a view to improving the quality of human resources. Vocational training and education, together with measures designed to improve joint exchanges and joint initiatives among European young people, play a key role in the development of the Community. Awareness of the strategic importance of these sectors, together with giving a European dimension to training and education policies and helping to increase young people's sense of belonging to Europe, has prompted the European Community to undertake action of various kinds in this area'.[65]

The Parliament, then, is seeking to enhance its role in the formation and conduct of new and existing programmes. In an earlier resolution of February 16, 1990, the EP emphasised the need to adopt a global strategy on the measures so far taken, measures in which the EP had taken a initiatory role beyond its constitutional undertaking.[66] Further the EP has some potential constitutional impetus behind it given the full ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

The Commission has consistently sought to increase its competence in the field of education. The sharp rise in youth unemployment which has occurred over the past two decades provided a rationale for the Commission to enter into the debate. Given the employment situation, from 1976-1981 the Social Affairs Directorate responsible for education focused almost exclusively on the transition from school to work.

Slowly, however, the Commission 'broke the barrier into mainstream education'.[67] The establishment in 1976 of an Education Committee,

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[65](European Parliament, 1992)
[66]OJ No C 68 of 19.3.90.
[67](McLean, 1990, 4-5)

consisting of representatives of the member states and of the Commission was vital in crystallising a new Commission attitude on European Education Policy. This much is admitted in a 1988 review of education,[68] which included sections on intensifying co-operation at university level, language teaching, continuing education and training sources. More significant was the attitude towards the potential power of education - one section of the report, for instance, is entitled *Creating Europe in the Minds of Young People*.[69] The rationale for changes in education offered by EC institutions continued to be couched in socio-economic terms.[70] During the 1980s the Commission also became very active in preparing guidelines for consideration by the Education Council.[71] In addition, the Commission established EURYDICE a network for information on education policies in the Community.

The current version of the EU 'constitution', the Treaty on European Union, which came into effect on 1 November 1993, is worth examining for the implications it has for education. Article Three of the Treaty on European Union states:

> 'For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: ...
> {p} a contribution to *education* and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States {my italics};'

This is an interesting clause by virtue of both its language - *the flowering of the cultures* - and the odd juxtaposition of culture with education. At one level, the clause is an expression of the classic division between the proponents of intergovernmentalism and federalism. We can surmise that

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[68](Commission of the European Communities, 1988)
[69](Commission of the European Communities, 1988, 3c)
[70](Commission of the European Communities, 1988, para 1.2)
[71]For example, as presented in a meeting on the 25 May 1988.

European federalists would want a pan-European education and training system, and the intergovernmentalists, however far they go along with their opponents on the first clause in sub-section p}, would take the second clause to mean the maintenance of culture according to the principle of subsidiarity - at least a state-oriented definition of the principle. As we shall see below, the very malleability of subsidiarity with respect to the question of applicability to national or sub-national units, makes sub-section p} ambiguous - i.e. does this clause apply to national or sub-national culture?[72]

The 'contribution' mentioned in sub-clause p} above is given further stimulus by more explicit statements on education later on in the Treaty. Namely, Article 126:

> 1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality *education* by encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of *education* systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity

The above represents the integrative aspects of EC education policy, and illustrates the growing opportunities for the EC to bypass the member-states in the quest for a pan-European culture. National states in Europe do not represent one culture or one educational tradition, so the development of inter-cultural and educational co-operation could constitute a threat to the cultural hegemony of the state. There are also external pressures on the EU. For instance on November 5, 1992, the Council of Europe (a non-EU regional

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[72]The clause above can also be considered in another, qualitative, dimension. Martin McLean conceptualises the European educational traditions as Encyclopaedist, Humanist and Naturalist. Throughout the EU there are 'quite different expectations of the skills and attitudes that may result from study', expectations that arise from the different status accorded to subjects (McLean, 1990, 13ff).

body) launched the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages which gave extra impetus to the demands of EU autonomist groups.

A number of educational programmes have been initiated by the Commission and Parliament. The Parliament has been involved at the early stages of their development, and was heavily involved in instigating the changes suggested in the Education Green Paper of 1993.[73] The initial programmes give some insight into the incipient coverage afforded to the EC in the realm of education policy:

> a} The COMETT Programme for vocational training and education in the new technologies, under which each year the Community financed international co-operation projects between universities and companies, which were also open to EFTA countries {Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland} and Liechtenstein.[74] The chosen projects were intended to contribute to 'strengthening a European sense of identity'.[75]
> b} The ERASMUS programme - designed to promote mobility among university students and increase co-operation between universities within the Community;[76]
> c} The LINGUA programme - designed to improve the linguistic knowledge of students and teachers in the Community;[77]
> d} The TEMPUS programme - encouraged co-operation at university level with Central and Eastern Europe;
> e} The EUROTECNET programme - designed to monitor the impact of technological changes on systems for the acquisition of skills;
> f} The PETRA programme - emphasis on the preparation of young people for working life;
> g} The FORCE programme - continuing vocational training.

The original programmes of particular relevance to the thesis are ERASMUS and LINGUA.[78] ERASMUS - European Community Action

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[73](Commission.. , 1993 (457))

[74]See Council decisions of 29 March and 20 July 1990, in Bulletin of European Communities No 7-8/90, paragraph 1.3.93 also see EP Resolution 15c November 1985 - OJ. No. C 346/85.

[75]1. ..a range to transnational projects to strengthen and encourage co-operation between universities and enterprise within the European framework...2. projects will be chosen .. contribution to strengthening a European sense of identity' ibid.

[76]EP Resolution 16 May 1986 - OJ. No. C 148/86.

[77]EP Resolution 13 April 1989

Scheme for the Mobility of University Students - was adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 15 June 1987.[79] The scheme grew out of the conference on higher education co-operation in the EU, convened by the Commission at the initiative of the European Parliament from 27 to 29 November 1985.[80] The medium term perspectives on the ERASMUS initiative give an indication of the perception of the EP and the Commission concerning the role of education in the strengthening of the European Union. It was stated, for instance in the Official Journal that:

> 'the pivotal role of education and training in promoting changes of attitude has a vital part to play if the Community is to be understood and valued by its citizens generally.'[81]

The fourth objective of ERASMUS is:

> ' to strengthen the interaction between citizens in different member states with a view to consolidating the concept of a people's Europe'.[82]

The programmes outlined above have proven to be very successful for the Community both functionally and from a PR perspective. Antonio Ruberti asserts that some of these programmes are victims of their own success.[83] The long awaited *Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education* launched by the Commission on 29 September,1993, provided the new legislative context for education resulting from the Maastricht Treaty on

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[78]COMETT has a certain relevance also. It began as a Council decision of 24 July, 1986 adopting the programme on co-operation between universities and enterprises regarding training in the field of technology (COMETT)- OJ No L222 of 8.8. 1986, p.17 - 86/365/EEC. For the proposal of the Commission on COMETT see OJ no c 234, 13.9. 1985, p.3. For the proposal of Parliament on COMETT see OJ no c 345 31.12. 1985, p.414; for the opinion of ECOSOC, see OJ no c 344 31 12 1985, p.4. COMETT began 1 Jan. 1986 with a budget line of 45 million ECU.

[79]Council decision of 15 June 1987 adopting the EU action scheme for the mobility of university students (ERASMUS) - Official Journal, No. L166, 25.6.1987: 20; Mohr 1990, 483

[80] 87/327/EEC

[81]op. cit., p. 4, para. 2.6

[82](Mohr, 1990, 483)

[83](Le Magazine, 1994)

European Union.[84] Notably, in the context of this discussion, Clause II a. 14 of the Paper stated that:

> 'respecting different cultural and ethnic identities, and combating all forms of chauvinism and xenophobia are essential components of action in the field of education'.

The Commission chose then to rationalise the programmes now covered by Articles 126, 127 and 128 of the Treaty on European Union which terminated on 31 December, 1994. The new education programme, SOCRATES {vocational education was placed under the heading LEONARDO}, was proposed by the Commission on 4 January, 1994 on the initiative of Antonio Ruberti. Socrates is directed toward all levels of education, a first for a European Union educational programme.[85] The Commission proposed that the budget for Socrates should be ECU 1,005.6 million for the initial period an increase of 66% on previous educational initiatives.

Unfortunately, space and the temporal framework of the thesis preclude discussion of developments subsequent to this point, which, for the most part anyway, have continued to reinforce the arguments made above. This section has demonstrated that the EC institutions have the capacity to challenge national identity, the next will consider whether subsidiarity provides them with the political legitimacy to do so, and speculates on whether Welsh autonomists would or should be willing to participate in such a process.

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[84](Commission.. , 1993 (457))
[85](Le Magazine, 1994, 4)

7.6 Subsidiarity and its Congruents

Subsidiarity, at least in the form{s} it takes today, began life in the nineteenth century as a tenet of the Catholic Church. It was proclaimed as a means by which a person could reconcile his individuality with the needs of the wider society, and *vice versa*.[86] The concept was refined and applied in numerous spheres ranging from the purpose of the state - *Mater et Magistra* 1961 - to the role of the state in education - Vatican II.

Though a notion akin to subsidiarity appeared as early as 1952 in a draft article submitted by the Ad Hoc Group of the 1952 Spaak Committee, the term itself first appeared in the European Community context in discussions which formed the basis for the Tindeman's *Report on European Union* submitted to Council by the Commission on 26 June, 1975,[87] and the 1977 MacDougall Report on the *Role of Public Finance in European Integration*. The 1984 Spinelli/EP *Draft Treaty Establishing European Union* uses the term in the preamble,[88] and implies its use in Articles 10, 11, 12, 34, and 54. Subsidiarity appeared in the 1987 Padoa Schioppa Report, the 1989 Delors Report on EMU, and the Luxembourg non-paper of 12 April 1991.[89] The latter proposed an amendment to Article 235 which would have required Council to take account of the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3c {now 3b}.[90]

Subsidiarity first appeared in Community legislation in the sphere of environmental policy. Article 130R {4} of the Single European Act states that Community action was limited 'to the extent that the objective can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual member states'.[91]

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[86]Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII, 1891.
[87](Toth, 1992, 1088)
[88](Toth, 1992, 1089)
[89](Toth, 1992, 1095)
[90](Toth, 1992, 1095)
[91](Dehousse, 1992, 5)

The emphasis on the role of member states, not regions, in this document is echoed elsewhere in literature likely to influence the defining of the concept of subsidiarity. Take for instance Giscard d'Estaing's Report on subsidiarity to the EP in 1990 in which he states that:

> 'The European Union shall confine itself to performing only those tasks that are necessary to the smooth functioning of the Union and, either by reason of their transfrontier dimensions or for reasons of efficient implementation, are likely to be carried out more satisfactorily by the institutions of the Union than by the member states acting individually'.[92]

The concept has subsequently achieved expression in the Maastricht Treaty.

7.7 Subsidiarity: Malleable and Dynamic

Subsidiarity became a deeply politicised concept within the European polity for two quite distinct reasons. On the side of certain member states, the more immediate and perhaps more perceptibly forceful reason is that the term subsidiarity actually replaced the term *federal goal* in the final treaty text, a replacement that was perceived by the UK government *inter alia* to be a stronger guarantee for the protection of the sovereign powers of the member states:

> 'At Maastricht, we established for the first time the principle o*f "subsidiarity*" - minimum interference from Brussels. And we established co-operation between governments, outside the fixed Community structure, as the right way forward in many important policy areas... We resisted early drafts of the Maastricht Treaty which would have led to a federal superstate. We argued successfully that Europeans could find more flexible ways of working together, with forcing ourselves into a strait-jacket or eroding our national identities. Any successor treaty must build on this decentralised approach'.[93]

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[92](d'Estaing, 1990)
[93](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 13-14)

On the other hand European institutions, particularly the Commission and its then President, Jacques Delors, had another rationale, in part associated with the {modern} origins of the concept itself. Delors offered a notable insight into his thinking during his meeting with the Lander in 1988, where he linked his espousal of this doctrine with his personal faith.[94] Subsidiarity in this instance takes on the guise of Catholic social doctrine. In this form subsidiarity may take on a whole host of new meanings. Take, for instance, the papal encyclical of Pope Pius XI: subsidiarity appears as a tenet of Catholic social philosophy that was developed in response to the rise of fascism in Italy, where the Catholic Church had to defend, modernise and rediscover itself. It is designed with the total authority of the Catholic Church in mind which can 'never relinquish her God-given task of imposing her authority'.[95] In the light of an assumption of one earthly institution bearing supreme authority, transferring this doctrine into the political sphere of the European Union *en masse* entails implications for the notions of liberal democracy that are currently extant. In other words the 'pure' doctrine of subsidiary is not in and of itself necessarily suited to democratic political application.

7.8 Subsidiarity and the Treaty on European Union

The Treaty on European Union says very little on the subject of subsidiarity. The citation most likely to appeal to smaller nations in the EU is Article A, para. 2:

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[94] I am grateful to Don MacInnis for furnishing me with this information.
[95] (Pope Pius XI, 1931, para. 41)

'This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen'

This statement is however an entirely normative discourse on the common interest, and moreover is outside the justiciable area of the Treaty. Title II, Article 3b contains the only explicit reference.

'The Community shall act within the limit of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.

Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.'

The definition above appears to be substantively different than that offered in Article A, and focuses on state rather than citizen rights. The wording, moreover, is that of a political statement of intent, and is not a strict legal definition. Furthermore 'no similar provision appears in any subsequent title'.[96] There is no definition of the areas in, and mechanisms by, which subsidiarity will operate, and the principle has no retrospective effect with regard to the SEA and the Treaty of Rome. It is not directly incorporated in ECSC and EURATOM treaties, Titles III and IV, nor in the provisions of CFSP Title V and JHA Title VI. The Treaty furthermore offers no definition of the areas or the mechanisms by which subsidiarity will operate. Others are left to fill in the gaps.

One gap is the distinction between exclusive and shared {or concurrent} competencies.[97] A close reading of Article 3b implies that subsidiarity applies

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[96](Toth, 1992, 1086)
[97](Toth, 1992, 1081)

only to those areas outside the exclusive competence of the EC.[98] Subsidiarity then, applies primarily to areas of shared competence, though this has been challenged. The 'others' have proven to be the member states. For instance the British were requested at the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 that one of their tasks during their Presidency should be to refine the concept and produce applied rules and tests for its operation in practice. On another level, subsidiarity, as defined in Article 3b, can be said to imply two tests - effectiveness and scale - which could be mutually contradictory.[99]

Several definitions of subsidiarity then can be and have been offered since its reinvigoration as a concept of political organisation, these have been articulated as common interest, necessity, efficiency, decentralised administration, and attained better. It is worth exploring these interpretations in detail, since disaggregating the concept may offer an explanation why subsidiarity is 'interpreted differently in Wales, Scotland and in the Conservative party'.[100]

1. COMMON INTEREST
The autonomy of decision making at whatever level of personal and collective life should be limited only to the extent dictated by the common interest.[101]
2. NECESSITY
All-policy functions which can be carried out at national levels without adverse repercussions should remain within the competence of the member states.[102]
3. EFFICIENCY
A primarily economic criterion, which has resonance with the notion of Pareto optimality.

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[98]Douglas Hurd, testifying to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated 'we had at the last minute to insist that this final sentence should be detached from the paragraph before' (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1992).
[99](Toth, 1992, 1097)
[100](Harvie, 1994a, 31)
[101](Adonis, 1992)
[102](Adonis, 1992)

4. DECENTRALISED ADMINISTRATION
More operationalised version of 2. Repatriation of power to the member states.
5. ATTAINED BETTER
Implies that efficiency or effectiveness is only one consideration that should influence policy decisions.

The common interest definition is problematic - it is vague and difficult to operationalise. The first question is what is the common interest, and who is its arbiter? In the conceptualisation of Catholic social doctrine, the Church acts as mediator between the interests of individuality and solidarity, in the context of the European Union it is by no means clear which body will occupy this function. Necessity, in turn, reinforces the role of the member state. This interpretation is the one most favoured by the right-wing of the Conservative Party, which provides an indication of the levels of variation attributable to the concept's political input. An example of the efficiency definition is provided by the 1984 EP Draft Treaty, Article 12 {2}, which restricts the union to those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by the member states acting separately. Such a test depends on the accepted economic system. If the system is deemed to be fairly open capitalism, then this may conflict with the seemingly reasonable requirements that we preserve, protect, and improve the quality of the environment, contribute towards protecting human health, and ensure prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources.[103]

Decentralised administration appears to be the current *modus operandi* of subsidiarity. It has the advantage of being more in keeping with the *acquis communitaire*, in that the authors of the Treaty {of Rome} had expressly foreseen the need for real subsidiarity by means of the Directive. The Directive stipulates the results to be achieved, but it leaves it up to the State

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[103](Emiliou, 1992)

to chose how they will be attained.[104] This notion has been developed into a hierarchy of norms.[105] Attained better, however, particularly in the perception of autonomist groups, allows greater scope for the positive use of the creative tension between efficiency and economies of scale on one hand and economic diversity, local information advantage on the other. Such a tension they argue could allow the exploration of the potentialities of smaller units, which could lead to new system-wide policy solutions whereby the efficiency of economies of scale are harmonised with local knowledge. Herein lies the possibility of interplay, whereas efficiency criteria alone tend towards the centralisation of economic control.

Subsidiarity, in all its definitional guises, has been often employed as an amelioratory tool to justify an extension of Community competence. That is subsidiarity has been invoked as a guarantee of national diversity as well as used as a tool of Community aggrandisement. On this basis, the SEA widened EC competence to the environment; more specifically the Padoa Schioppa report argued that cross border spillover should be dealt with at a Community level. Delors 1 wished to attribute monetary policy, as well as a complementary involvement in macro economic policy, exclusively to the EC; and important social policy domains were designated by the Social Chapter to be liable to supplementary Community initiatives. The inherent flexibility of subsidiarity should now be clear.

Subsidiarity is definitionally, functionally and structurally flexible. Its very malleability entails that it will operate very differently according to political context. The political context of the European Union is very different from that of any one member state, or, for that matter, region such as Wales,

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[104](Adonis, 1992)
[105](Commission of the European Communities, 1992)

though clearly there are interdependencies. One member state in which subsidiarity does operate, Germany, is a federal state. The above analysis indicates that the Union cannot be described as a federation, and it is a matter of debate and intense interest whether it is moving towards federation. For a better comparative understanding of the constitutional arrangements in the UK, and the relative merits of proposals for change emanating from autonomist groups and others, let us briefly examine the salient features of the political system of the most significant federal state within the Union.

7.9 Subsidiarity in Operation: Germany

Since the end of World War Two, {West} Germany has consistently been one of the strongest supporters of European integration. An approach borne out of both idealism and necessity. The German perception of the ECSC and subsequently the EEC were as mechanisms to achieve *rapprochement* with France, and as structures with the potential of securing peace within Western Europe. Integration was attempted in additional structures such as NATO, but from an early period the EEC became the linchpin within the Western Alliance through which Germany could link with its allies and re-enter the international community.

Subsidiarity is not a new concept in Germany - the proposals that the Leo XIII made on subsidiarity in the Encyclical of 1891 were influenced by German Catholic intellectuals.[106] Following the War, subsidiarity became increasingly apparent in Christian Democratic thought. It was used to legitimise internal devolution and to justify interventionist social policies. There exists no explicit reference, however, to subsidiarity in the Basic Law,

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[106](Adonis & Jones, 1991, 7)

the Grundgesetz {GG}, though it infuses a number of articles including those on Article 28 {1} on constitutional order, Article 107 {2} as amended in 1953 on financial equalisation of the Lånder, Articles 38 {1}, and 84 {1} on the structure of the Bundesrat, and perhaps most importantly articles 30 and 72 which respectively state that:

> 'The exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions shall be incumbent on the Lander, in so far as this Basic Law does not otherwise prescribe or permit'.
>
> The Federation shall have the right to legislate in... matters {of concurrent competence} to the extent that a need for regulation by federal legislation exists because:
> 1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual Lander, or
> 2. the regulation of a matter by a Land law might prejudice the interest of other Lander or of the people as a whole, or
> 3. the maintenance of legal or economic uniformity, especially the maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of any one Land, necessitates such regulation'.[107]

Some have argued that subsidiarity's intent is not to resolve the debate about the nature of the common good; that it is substantively applicable only when operationalised within an already established conceptualisation of the common good; and cite as evidence the citation of the principles of subsidiarity, by the Bavarians, to oppose the federal constitution .[108]

The institutional expression of the common good in the German case is structured by means of the federal system, a system, note, that allows no secession, but gives the regions, that is the Lånder, certain powers and rights. It is this system that has informed discussion in Germany about the future of the EU, just as the lack thereof has informed discussion elsewhere,

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[107](Blaustein & Flanz, 1991), quoted in (Dehousse, 1992, ff. 3).
[108](Adonis & Tyrie, 1990,3)

most notably in Britain.[109] The 1949 Basic Law re-established and codified a federal tradition that can be traced, albeit in non-democratic form, at least to 1871. In the reunified state the,

> 'federal principle enables regional differences to be taken into account at the highest level of government via the Upper House of the parliament, the *Bundesrat*, which is composed of the Minister-Presidents or representatives of all sixteen states or Lånder'.[110]

Arguably subsidiarity further infuses the spirit of the Basic Law in that,

> 'most federal laws are implemented by state authorities and the supervisory function of the Federal Government applies only to the legality of state decisions on administration, not to their expediency'.[111]

Subsidiarity then has a specific meaning in the German context and is closely allied to one possible interpretation of the meaning in Article A of Title I of the Treaty on European Union - that is all decisions should be taken at the lowest political level that is compatible with the policy being implemented.[112]

In the UK there is no such overarching structure in which subsidiarity can effectively operate. Furthermore, there is no embedded civil tradition incorporating subsidiarity, at least in the twentieth century. Under these conditions, subsidiarity is not a fixed concept, it is both malleable and

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[109](Miller, 1992, 1)

[110](Miller, 1992, 2). A significant expression of Lånder power occurred after the Brandt government attempted to introduce educational reforms in 1969. The Lånder also have important lobbying networks in the EC, and have established a number of information offices.

[111](Miller, 1992, 6). This is similar to the hierachy of norms proposal put forward by the Commission in November 1993.

[112]It should be noted in addition that all is not well with the German system. Though the federal tradition can be traced back to 1871, the democratic tradition has a much later vintage. Reunification in 1990 has placed considerable strains on the political culture, and there has been a noticeable increase in extreme right wing activity (Kurthen & Minkenberg, 1995).

dynamic - as is demonstrated below different groups in the UK may compete over its true meaning.[113]

7.10 Subsidiarity and the EC Institutions

We can construct a similar argument with respect to the EC component of the EU - the indeterminate position of subsidiarity *vis à vis* the laws and *mores* of the EC entails the possibility of a multiplicity of definitions since the concept was {re} introduced into the political lexicon of the Community. Initial definitions appeared to favour sub-state units as the chosen area of application. The Commission was resolute in the years 1991-1993 on such a definition of subsidiarity. A typical statement follows:

> 'The aim of the subsidiarity principle is to see to it that decisions are taken as close as possible to the citizen, a constant watch being kept to ensure that action taken at Community level is justified in the light of the means available to national, regional or local authorities'.[114]

Several other documents attest to this position.[115] The Parliament endorsed the Commission's position, and proposed an institutional mechanism to apply and monitor the application of the principle of subsidiarity. Both institutions had an interest in appeasing an obviously discontented citizenry during this period. The Danish populace actually rejected the Maastricht Treaty on 2nd June, 1992. On the 20th of September of that year, the French very narrowly voted in favour of it. That same month the European financial edifice was threatened by a monetary crisis. The expectations engendered by the '1992' project were not fulfilled, and the

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[113]Subsidiarity however began life as a moral principle and it would be a mistake to ignore its potential contribution to conceptualisations of the common good.

[114](Commission of the European Communities, 1993, 3)

[115](Commission of the European Communities, 1993; Proceedings of the Jacques Delors Colloquium, 1991)

political classes in Europe turned to the most obvious cure all available - subsidiarity.[116]

Subsidiarity's roles then were various, and varied according to which institution was employing it. Apart from the Commission, the European Parliament saw subsidiarity as a possible means to increase its influence, if not its power.[117] For this, and two further related reasons, regions have been taking more note of the EP. In the first instance, due to functional and structural factors, the EP is likely to be more sympathetic to regional concerns such as minority language rights. Secondly because of the new powers denoted by the SEA and Maastricht on certain areas of Community legislation, namely the 'negative assent procedure' and the 'co-decision procedure', the EP has real leverage over legislation. It is as well to keep in mind however that subsequently the intergovernmental arm of the Community, the Council, has tended to develop the idea of a subsidiarity based not on closeness to citizen but on *de minimis* {or necessity}, that is the Community should only legislate where necessary; effectively re-emphasising the role of the nation state.[118]

7.11 Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice

The Court ruled on proportionality, a principle related to subsidiarity, in 1984 arguing that '...measures adopted by Community institutions must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective pursued'.[119] This would seem to indicate on one level that the concept of subsidiarity is

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[116](Dehousse, 1992, 1)
[117]It is interesting that there is anecdotal evidence of friction with its most obvious institutional rival in this respect, the Committee of the Regions (Jones, 1995c).
[118](Miller, 1995b, 9)
[119](European Court of Justice, 1984)

justiciable, especially since the concept is mentioned in the body of the treaty and should 'be regarded as binding on all Community institutions'.[120]

Technically, however, the jurisdiction of the ECJ does not apply to the preamble and Titles 1, V, and VI of the Treaty. Though in France, which the EC mirrors in many ways, the preamble to their constitution has been made justiciable. On another note, subsidiarity presents far more problematic efficiency questions than proportionality so the question arises whether the Court is functionally and politically equipped to deal with such a case. Most interpretations of subsidiarity moreover entail a normative judgement in their interpretation, a judgement that within a democratic polity, or at least one aspiring to be democratic, may be best left to politicians.[121] Regions have shown an interest in making subsidiarity justiciable before the Court, and have argued that they should be allowed to bring proceedings against any Community Acts adopted in violation of this principle.[122] The Court however, has like many courts when confronted with constitutional issues, exhibited great caution.

7.12 Subsidiarity: the Evolving Position of the UK government

The UK government was instrumental in forcing the debate on subsidiarity during the Maastricht debate, which eventually replaced the phrase 'federal goal' in Article 3. Other significant players within the European context, most notably Germany, were happier with the term federal being included in the document. The concept of federalism has not generally

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[120](Dehousse, 1992, 10)
[121](Toth, 1992, 1101)
[122](Dehousse, 1992, 5)

been popular in the UK. Several factors account for this, though it is unclear how much relative veracity to attribute to each one.

One argument might be that the shared sovereignty inherent within federalism has never been practised within the UK, a unitary state. Sovereignty, it can be argued, is not perceived by British citizens as a divisible concept, the sharing of sovereignty represents its dilution - a zero-sum game. This barrier may diminish as the electorate becomes more knowledgeable.[123] One could also posit that different types of federalism conveying alternative political structures are not well understood. The common perception of federalism in the UK is of a political system nourishing centralisation by creating a strong federal power. In reality there are a number of federal structures conveying markedly different political values and structural implications. Federal structures generally exhibit one of two biases - towards the centre or towards the periphery {though one can conceive of co-operative federalism}. The former are referred to variously as centralised, integrative or organic, the latter as decentralised, devolutionary or co-ordinate federations. However, the majority of the national parties, and all the political parties operating in Wales, bar one, have been increasingly interested in promoting political structures favouring the periphery, though 'old-Labour' as personified by Llew Smith, MP for Blaenau Gwent, and Allan Rogers, MP for Rhondda, remains resistant. During the 1980s the growth of territorially separated administration - often as a form of unitary management - invigorated the debate over the democratic deficit within the British polity. We argue that the increased awareness implied by this debate has been prompted, *inter alia*, by changes in the European dimension - for example,

[123]For evidence supporting this claim of electoral sophistication see (Jowell, et al., 1995/6).

citizenship of the European Union has fostered questions about the role of central government, and the notion of being subjects {not citizens} within the UK.

In Britain the most significant application of the principle of subsidiarity has been in the area of environmental legislation, and in particular the issue of water quality. In 1992 for instance, as President of the EC, the UK proposed that oversight of water quality should be transferred back to the member states on the basis of subsidiarity.[124] Under pressure from Britain and France, the Commission has given greater leeway to member state control over environmental standards by introducing framework directives which embodied the principle of proportionality.[125] Note that this definition of subsidiarity supports a form of cost-benefit analysis of which the member state is the central arbiter, which in turn supports our contentions respecting the concept's malleability and the influence of managerial thinking on politics.

7.13 Subsidiarity, Wales and the Politics of Autonomism

In 1994 Plaid Cymru published its most detailed manifesto on Europe to date. Therein the term subsidiarity was mentioned a total of 8 times:

> 1. 'The Maastricht Treaty brought into common use the term "subsidiarity". It means, simply, taking decisions as close as possible to the people most directly affected by those decisions'.[126]

There are several; problems with this articulation of subsidiarity. The phrase 'as close as possible' can be debated over *ad infinitum*.

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[124](Toth, 1992, 1097)
[125](Miller, 1995b, 14-15)
[126](Wigley MP, 1994, 3)

2. 'IF SUBSIDIARITY MEANS ANYTHING, IT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CARDIFF AND LONDON AS IT IS TO THE CASE OF LONDON AND BRUSSELS. DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN AT THE MOST APPROPRIATE LEVEL, BOTH IN TERMS OF ACCEPTABILITY AS WELL AS EFFICIENCY' .[127]

This statement comes closer to Attained Better, though the phrase 'if subsidiarity means anything' may contain an inherent truth.

3. 'SUBSIDIARITY MUST BE OF GENERAL APPLICATION, EMPOWERING PEOPLE TO TAKE DECISIONS CLOSE TO HOME'.[128]

Subsidiarity must have a more precise operationalised form than this if it is to have sufficient force to change the structures of a political system.

4. 'The political construction of Europe must be built instead on the diversity of European experience and tradition, on the decentralisation of power and the active involvement of the individual. The transfer of power from the Member States must be balanced by an increase in the powers of the small nations and regions of Europe. This is the true meaning of subsidiarity: the greatest possible degree of self-government from the local community level up. In this way whatever tasks local authorities cannot execute should be the responsibility of national or regional parliaments. Only those functions which cannot be regulated at national/regional level should be the responsibility of the European tier of Government'.[129]

As has been shown, subsidiarity has no true meaning, merely a series of contentious meanings. What this passage describes is decentralised federalism.

5. The subsidiarity principle is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, a major step forward which Plaid Cymru actively supported, and which has led to the formation of the Committee of the Regions. At present a consultative body, the Committee of the Regions must generate its own dynamic in proposing new initiatives at the Community level. Plaid Cymru wants to see the Committee develop into a Senate of the Nations and Regions - a second Chamber of the European Parliament comprising representatives of regional and national parliaments. Such a Senate will give the peoples

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[127](Wigley MP, 1994, 5 - their emphasis)
[128](Wigley MP, 1994, 5 - their emphasis)
[129](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 12)

of Europe a means of curbing over-centralization by the first, directly elected, chamber of the European Parliament.[130]

The passage quoted above attempts to engage with the institutional implications of operationalised subsidiarity. Its intent is undermined, however, by the subsidiarity principle, as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, being based upon decentralised administration and not attained better.

6. 'The core of Plaid Cymru's political philosophy is the belief that those matters which affect a community should, wherever possible, be decided democratically by the people of that community. That is why we insist that only a Welsh Parliament is qualified to determine the structure of local government in Wales. And that is why we believe that the weakening of local government is one of the most sinister developments of recent years *and undermines the European principle of subsidiarity*'.[131]

The European principle of subsidiarity {decentralised administration} is in fact not undermined by the weakening of local government. The *Blaid* may have chosen to omit this phrase from later editions of the manifesto because of an unspoken desire to see local government reforms through.[132]

7. 'A common European fiscal policy must be matched by a system of European taxation levied in place of governmental contributions to the EU budget. Such a system should also ensure that taxation policy does not become an instrument of unfair competition between governments and regions in order to attract inward investment. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, however, the different levels of government must posses sufficient powers to levy taxes appropriate to their responsibilities, circumstances and social priorities.[133]

This statement is only really valid in the German context.

8. Dogmatic insistence on the observance of EU competition rules should not prevent Member States from introducing more stringent measures of environmental protection than the European norm,

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[130](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 12)
[131](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 14 note that the italicised phrase only appeared in some versions of the manifesto)
[132](Osmond, 1995, 19)
[133](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 12)

> regardless of whether they are an impediment to trade within the EU. Such a system of 'green' subsidiarity would allow individual countries and regions to implement environmental best-practice, while the EU's harmonised level or protection would act as a floor beneath which no Member State's environmental standards would be allowed to drop.[134]

The quotation above dramatically reveals the tensions inherent within the concept of subsidiarity, particularly that between economies of scale and, in this case, environmental best practice. It reveals how efficiency criteria may compete with those of necessity or decentralised administration, and perhaps more interestingly reveals a cleavage between the environmental wing of an autonomist group and other wings.

Inter-party tensions exist over the definition of subsidiarity also, as the following analysis of the *Welsh Conservative Manifesto for Europe* reveals; though it is instructive and in keeping with the general thrust of our arguments that such a particularised manifesto should be published at all. The Conservative Party's interpretation of subsidiarity is implied in the Prime Minister's foreword, wherein he states:

> 'We believe it is for nations to build Europe, not for Europe to attempt to supersede nations.. We should not try to do in Brussels what nation states can do perfectly well by themselves'.[135]

This corresponds with the 'necessity' definition of subsidiarity discussed above, and contrasts markedly with the definitions subsumed within Plaid Cymru's discourse.

This point is reinforced by a subsequent allusion to subsidiarity:

> At Maastricht, we established for the first time the principle of *"subsidiarity"* - minimum interference from Brussels. And we established

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[134](Plaid Cymru, 1994a, 24)
[135](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 5)

co-operation between governments, outside the fixed Community structure, as the right way forward in many important policy areas'.[136]

The above quote hints at an level of operationalisation of the principle of subsidiarity, such that we may consider the decentralised administration definition to be manifest here. This impression is reinforced by later discourse:

'We resisted early drafts of the Maastricht Treaty which would have led to a federal superstate. We argued successfully that Europeans could find more flexible ways of working together, with forcing ourselves into a strait-jacket or eroding our national identities. *Any successor treaty must build on this decentralised approach*'.[137]

'We want to entrench the principle of subsidiarity - minimum interference in our national affairs - more deeply in the Community's way of life'.[138]

'Deregulation should be stimulated by the new principle agreed at Maastricht - the principle of "subsidiarity", or minimum interference. Under pressure from Britain and other like-minded Member States, the Commission has estimated that about a quarter of all EC legislation can be *simplified* or *scrapped*'.[139]

In fact if anything subsidiarity animates the Conservative manifesto for Wales to a greater extent than that of Plaid Cymru, even though the variance of definition is much more limited to the point of being repetitious:

'The Maastricht Treaty was an important staging-post in the Conservative campaign for a decentralised Europe. At Britain's insistence, the Treaty enshrined a new principle - "subsidiarity", or minimum interference. There is a commitment to take on at the centre only those things which members States cannot do effectively themselves. This means *less* European law, and *better* European law.. All new proposals have to pass a stringent subsidiarity test. We want to make sure that subsidiarity becomes even more effective in the years ahead - a living reality in the way the European Community operates.[140]

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[136](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 13)
[137](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 14)
[138](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 17)
[139](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 25)
[140](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 39)

The final statement alluding to subsidiarity is founded in the section headed 'The Next Steps' where the party outlines its pla ns for the IGC to be held in 1996. It states, *inter alia*, that:

> '*Any successor treaty will need to build on its decentralised model for Europe, respecting national diversity*'.[141]

And in order to do this the Conservative team in Europe will:

> 'sustain the pressure for decentralised decision-making in Europe and press for stringent application of the principle of minimum interference.[142]

Despite Conservative party attempts to prove otherwise, the generalised theoretical notion of subsidiarity coupled with the institutionalisation of the Committee of the Regions implies that autonomist groups within Wales have more opportunity to express a voice in Europe. For the implication to become a political reality in Wales however, certain factors have to be addressed and accounted for, in particular:

a} the malleability of the concept of subsidiarity as a socio-philosophical principle rather than a legal-constitutional one.

b} the lack of a civil, political and institutional structure in which subsidiarity can operate. The German and, though outside the EU, the Swiss cases are worth examining in this context.

c} a significant proportion of the big and powerful political players have an interest in ensuring that their own vision of subsidiarity and for that matter a {weak} Committee of the Regions wins through.

d} it is unclear which direction the Commission will take under its new head.

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[141](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 42)
[142](Conservative Party {Wales}, 1994, 43)

On the other hand, the very malleability of the concept of subsidiarity, particularly at a juncture in the communications revolution when smaller voices can be heard, may be an advantage. In the perception of Plaid Cymru it may be as well to encourage the retention of subsidiarity as a malleable concept, since in this form its utility as a propaganda weapon may be increased. Thus, although others have argued that a precise definition of subsidiarity should be adopted, the Committee of the Regions, itself wracked with internal tensions, has argued as such,[143] autonomists in Wales appear to be wary of this approach.[144]

Nevertheless, applied subsidiarity, in the final analysis, does not necessarily entail taking decisions as close as possible to the people most directly affected by those decisions. Applied subsidiarity has, so far, seemed to emphasise the role of the member state. That is, in the UK context, the principle has not so far been equally applicable to the relationship between Cardiff and London as it is to the case of London and Brussels. If autonomists, therefore, wish to construct an argument proposing that decisions must be taken at the most appropriate level, both in terms of acceptability as well as efficiency. The premises must be expanded to include an assessment of who is, or even who wants to be, the judge of 'acceptability' and 'efficiency'. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, how will the position of the 'judge' affect the 'appropriate level'?

7.14 Conclusion

Subsidiarity is not a mobilising concept, at least in the abstract. The age of ideological mobilisation may indeed be over, particularly if the terms

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[143](The Independent, 1992)
[144](Jones, 1995c)

employed have become so diluted of meaning or so *Byzantine* in their implications as to render them devoid of coherence. Subsidiarity begins at a disadvantage, since it never has been coherent. Subsidiarity is a normative concept which induces discussion of what is good and bad within political systems. This may be of benefit, but the term itself is reduced then to being little more than a conceptual tool. It cannot be expected in and of itself to 'empower' people to take decisions close to home. Perhaps this is for the best - most democrats would argue that this is the job of politicians and political parties, operating in different political contexts, whose arguments have to reach out to an increasingly sophisticated electorate.

Given these arguments, the saliency of the entire discussion of subsidiarity in this chapter can be questioned. There are two counter-arguments to such a contention. Firstly, subsidiarity can influence attitudes particularly at more elevated socio-economic levels, and that is important in this context. The second point, interconnected with the first, concerns the mobilising properties of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is capable of providing a legitimate ideological foundation to autonomism throughout the EU. Amongst Welsh autonomists, subsidiarity is now taking on the properties of a major element in their cause for autonomy.

We must return now to the argument, exemplified by the discussion on Germany above and which autonomists are slowly coming to terms with, that subsidiarity can only operate in an effective form in Wales, assuming it has some coherence, within a political framework with at least some federal characteristics. Subsidiarity will operate within other political and civil frameworks, as the British governments actions on water legislation attest - but this operationalisation is of little benefit to Welsh or Scottish autonomists. For subsidiarity to operate effectively below the level of the state and in a

concrete legal and constitutional sense, legal and constitutional parameters must be provided. These parameters do not presently exist in Britain. If subsidiarity is to prosper, it can be argued, there must be extant a political and civil culture that allows it a substantial body of 'states rights', and this can only occur in a devolved or federal context.

'Effective' subsidiarity may not be necessary on one level, since both it and federalism are, it can be argued, entirely alien to the British tradition a significant factor affecting the likelihood of their political success in the UK. If anything, however, the thesis so far has revealed that it may be more accurate to incorporate 'English conceptualisation of the British tradition' in the sentence above.[145] Thus it is not entirely clear whether these concepts are alien to the 'Celtic' conceptualisation of the British tradition, and it is precisely these ambiguities that make subsidiarity an effective propaganda weapon for autonomist groups in Wales and, indeed, in Scotland.

Clearly both subsidiarity and European educational policy have the potential to effect dramatic change on levels and types of identity formation and mobilisation. This potential is yet to be fully realised. The discussion of European education policy has revealed that institutions within the EU are competing over its meaning and future role. So far the Council, and the intergovernmental structure of which it is an institutional expression, has retained its hegemony - but this need not always be the case. As we have seen in the preceding chapters of this thesis, institutions and agents possess an internal dynamic which may not conform with founders' intentions and projections. The same can be said for new policies and programmes such as those embodied by SOCRATES.

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[145]For discussions on this theme see (Kearney, 1989).

The disquiet over the nature of the political and civil culture in Britain, and a perception of a need to change allegedly antediluvian constitutional arrangements has meant that powerful voices, within and beyond the political parties, have advocated changes; for instance the Charter 88/*Siarter Cymru* initiative,[146] and the Church of England.[147] In Wales, the Parliament for Wales Campaign and the Institute of Welsh Affairs have collaborated over the new proposals for a Welsh Baccalaureate for instance, a clear attempt to further reduce the UK government's hegemony of education policy and curricular matters, and in so doing reflect 'Welsh' values and culture. Similarly, other groups operating in the Welsh context, most notably Plaid Cymru and the Parliament for Wales Campaign, may, in the long term, drop subsidiarity, at least as a formative structural doctrine, altogether and adopt a federal design for Wales' relationship with its European partners. Parties advocating an increasing role for Wales in Europe are likely in the short term, however, to align themselves with what are perceived to be the forces championing the decentralised notion{s} of subsidiarity and educational policy whether they be domestic or European.[148]

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[146](Osmond, 1995, 68)

[147](Archbishop Habgood, 1992)

[148]Plaid Cymru were invited, for instance, to participate at a Federal Trust conference on the future of Europe in September 1996.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The conclusion affords an opportunity to enhance the preceding arguments, and provide a strategic overview of the work, which is viewed as an ongoing process rather than an end in itself. Some speculation on the future course of identity mobilisation in Wales, and the possible directions of future research is therefore indulged in.

In the context of the developments outlined in the chapters above, the primordialist\instrumentalist debate within the theoretical literature does not help our understanding of the origins and nature of Welsh autonomism. The debate is not merely unhelpful, it also fails to account for the dynamic changes that can occur in autonomist discourse, and action, in a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it is artificial in the sense that, as this thesis has attempted to show, the modern autonomist politician in Wales tends to use bundles of {primordial?} identity in concert with modern technocratic phraseology in a combination adjudged to be appealing to the population at large. This does not seem much different to the activities of Conservative or Labour politicians in the wider context of Britain.

The thesis as a whole and Chapter Two in particular, has established that the continuity of historical tensions within, and in relation to, Wales adds credence to the notion of dynamic fusion of the ancient and modern in identity construction, mobilisation and democratisation within nations.[1] Culture is very important to Welshness, no matter how ancient or how contrived.[2] So too,

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[1](Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993)
[2]For a discussion on this point see (Morgan, 1992b).

has a historically and culturally informed sense of morality which has had a profound effect on the praxis of autonomism, and which may, in Wales, account for the enthusiasm for the moral qualities embedded within the concept of subsidiarity.

All external forces and exchanges can be moderated by 'Welsh' values history, and culture; as can the interpretation of ancient experience. We have used the term *cymricisisation*, itself a fusion of the Welsh with the English language, to describe this. Precisely, because cymricisisation exists, institutions, no matter how 'powerless' or 'undemocratic' do matter. The fact that Wales has not had an Assembly does not mean to say that it is not possible to pursue Welsh interests, and develop, and indeed 'project',[3] a 'Welsh' political will. At this level, the fact that the Secretary of State for Wales is not directly elected is immaterial, the position rather than the means of achieving that position is the key. Such analysis has a wider dimension, in the UK and in Europe. That is, the 'will' of political institutions can *inter alia* create 'political will' of varying depths. This could happen in any new English region, as it has happened in Wales, and, for instance, Rhône-Alpes in France.

The 'depth' of 'political will' created depends on other factors, associated, we have argued, with identity transformation and mobilisation. We have focused on two which are particularly germane to the Welsh context, education and broadcasting. The relevance of education to political autonomism should now be clear. If identity can be imposed or created by a dominant group using extant though adjustable histories, myths and symbols,

[3](Morgan, 1992b, 46)

then formal education can serve two functions in this process. Firstly, it provides a tool by which stories, myths and symbols are transmitted:

> 'Education has always been more an inculcation of beliefs and a method of creating a common outlook than a series of vocational training schemes'.[4]

Secondly, and more importantly, since transmission can take place elsewhere {especially in broadcasting}, organised education provides a means by which stories, myths, symbols, indeed a whole culture, can be categorised, analysed and judged. Where the balance of educational control lies in a multi-national or poly-ethnic state is an important determinant of the culture that will be disseminated, and how it will be received. It is therefore a central argument of this thesis that control over education policy, and insofar as these arguments remain salient, broadcasting, is one of the most powerful tools in the transmission, maintenance or sublimation of a culture,[5] and as such is one of the foremost determinants of autonomism.

To this end, some light has been cast on the nature of the political and administrative personnel occupying institutions that cover these sectors, and the roles they have played. The 'reverse colonisation' of institutions has been the most significant 'guerrilla autonomist' strategy, and, in the context of education and broadcasting, it has been largely successful. A similar technique of analysis was applied also to the political parties operating in Wales, and they too were seen to be subject to the same forces, and in some cases the same agents. In response to this the 'Welsh' element in the institutions of civil society has been markedly reinforced, whilst the 'value' of Welshness has latterly altered.

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[4](Mackintosh, 1971, 136)
[5](Williams, 1991b, 171)

The politics of economic adjustment was also shown to be significant. *Inter alia* the nature of international or global change has led to a focus on the economic implications of state policy - and thus a reification of the responsibility of the state in the economy, but at the same time an awareness amongst elites that state control over economic change has diminished.[6] The danger of being held accountable for forces beyond their control has led state elites in the UK to devolve responsibility to agencies in an effort to divorce legitimacy from responsibility. This attempt to divorce power from responsibility has created a kind of power vacuum that other groups have been quick to exploit, Plaid Cymru and the SNP amongst them, forming a broad based movement whose primary aim, it can be argued, is to democratise sovereignty on a territorial basis within the UK.

Finally the conversion of autonomist parties to Europe, more precisely their enthusiasm for Europeanising their demands, requires a new theoretical perspective on autonomism in particular, and the nature of political change in general. Continental interest in the Celtic peripheries is not new,[7] particularly in Germany,[8] and this interest, often mediated by the institutions and programmes of the EC, is now being reciprocated.

We are left however with some tantalising mysteries. How can we explain for instance, the fact that a Conservative administration has presided over a manifest augmentation of the indicators of Welsh identity, and indulged in a period of marked and prolonged Welsh institution building? Autonomist agents offer a partial explanation, but perhaps autonomists owe a

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[6](Allen, 1989, 148, 150, 158)
[7](Morgan, 1992b, 62)
[8](Morgan, 1992b, 68)

debt to a very particular type of Englishness, sometimes associated with 'the cult of the gentleman', operative within the Conservative party:

> 'Tory district magistrates, whether in India or in Ireland, commonly studied and defended indigenous customs against the rationalising tendencies of liberal, Benthamite administrators, or sometimes against the Protestant missionaries and schoolmasters'.[9]

Is this how Peter Walker and David Hunt should be viewed, alongside their 'accidental' coexistence with Sir Wyn Roberts? What of the institution building? The Conservative central government has used the Welsh Office as a means to attack local government and to win votes in Wales. The institution itself, however, cannot, in the final analysis, fully service this need, and though the former aim may have been a short-run success, the attempt as regards the latter, failed. The short-run success moreover, may, in the long run, have divergent consequences. In a strange way, the attack on local government has strengthened the Welsh dimension. Quangoisation has nationalised Welshness, not at a 'national UK' level but at a 'Welsh' level, so that the national level in Wales is now increasingly the Welsh level. In their 'failure' too, the assumption that the party which explicitly favours autonomy is necessarily the one which promotes autonomy must be questioned.

The traditional meta-explanations of autonomism, declining government performance during the 1960s and the threat to the welfare state, the end of an integrated post war period in the 1970s,[10] the growth of new cleavages during the 1980s now look too generalised, and increasingly unsatisfactory. The thesis has concentrated on pre- or extra-political change, and the evidence presented indicates that it is at this stage and these levels that

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[9](Crick, 1988, 8)
[10](Halsey, 1986)

autonomism can have its greatest impact, even whilst, at another level, no overt political change is apparent.

In a wider sense these processes may be indicative of a change in the democratic climate. The implicit desiderata of any democratic state may be said to contain two significant motifs: the right to equality, and the right to identity. The former has been dominant since the Second World War, but in recent years its hegemony has been blunted. Is the right to identity, however defined, now in the ascendancy? The thesis would seem to indicate that, in Wales at least, it is.

Assuming that 1997 does herald their return to office after what will have been almost eighteen years in opposition, the Labour Party, and the Welsh Labour Party, are once again going to confront the internally divisive issue of 'identity politics'. It seems at first glance that time has stood still. Hopefully this thesis has gone some way towards revealing that it has not. Future research might consider the responses of New Labour in Government to the new politics of identity.

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