The Emotional Voter: The Impact of Electoral Campaigns and Emotions on Electoral Behaviour in Britain

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

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of emotions in mediating the effects electoral campaigns have on political behavior in Britain. I contend that electoral campaigns, aside from direct effects, can also have indirect effects, manifested through the impact of the emotions they induce.

I theorize that, through manipulating the tone, framing and targeting of their messages, electoral campaigns induce specific emotions. Emotions are argued to have a direct effect on turnout (intentions) and a moderating effect on the impact partisanship, policy preference and leader evaluations have on vote choice.

Extending the Theory of Affective Intelligence, I hypothesize that individuals who are enthusiastic about their preferred party, or experience anxiety or anger in relation to an out-party, are more likely to turn out, and to cast their vote based on their partisanship. Contrarily, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are expected to decrease the importance of partisanship and increase the relevance of policy preferences and leader evaluations when voting. While anger experienced towards this party is also hypothesized to also decrease turnout, anxiety is not thought to affect it.

To test these propositions, I rely on a multi-methodological approach that uses both panel and experimental data. The panel data was collected in two waves prior to the 2010 British General Election. The laboratory experiment, designed to specifically test the emotion-induction capacity of campaigns, was conducted on British participants in the aftermath of the same elections.

The results corroborate the theory. First, the analyses confirm that campaigns, not only can, but actually do induce emotions. Second, it is shown that emotions do influence political behavior as expected. Third, it is established that the effect of the campaign on turnout intentions is partly channeled through emotions. Finally, it is shown that campaign exposure indirectly affects vote choice by increasing the magnitude of the impact emotions have on the effect of partisanship on vote choice.

Aside from the literature on campaign effects in Britain, the thesis also contributes to the emerging literature pertaining to the role of emotions in politics. Moreover, it contributes to the field of voting behaviour by extending our understanding of the psychological underpinnings of vote choice.

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Chapter I

Electoral Campaigns, Emotions and Political Behaviour. An Introduction

In elections, parties and candidates hire political consultants and invest vast amounts of resources into constructing elaborate campaigns. In essence, they exercise a deliberate and strategically planned attempt to manipulate or persuade voters to behave in a way in which they would not otherwise. The ultimate aim is that of maximizing their vote share (Guzzetta, 2006).

Nowadays, running a campaign has become a *sine qua non* requirement of any electoral race. It is almost inconceivable that a candidate would run for office (or a party run for government) without implementing a campaign, without 'doing everything in their power' to sway the electorate. The reason behind this can be, at least partly, attributed to how the political elite views and understands campaigns. The conventional wisdom among politicians and political professionals alike is that campaigns work and they have a significant and important impact on the result of the election. Running a successful campaign is, in some instances, seen as the key to winning the election, while not running a campaign is (in most cases) equated with losing.

Despite this widely held belief in the importance of campaigns, there is very little clear scientific evidence of how campaigns matter, and whether they even matter at all. Even if "models of vote choice which exclude campaigns are and do get it wrong" (Kaufmann, Petrocik, & Shaw, 2008, p. 164), voting behaviour research into the effects of electoral campaigns is rather scarce (Johnston et al., 2006) and mostly concentrated on the

case of the US (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). Pattie, Denver, Johns and Mitchell (2011, p. 333) note that "[o]ne lacuna in the UK campaign effects literature to date has been its almost completely silence on the issue of campaign tone". Berelson and Lazarsfeld (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) very early on introduced the idea of minimal effects. They argued that, in general, campaigns have a very limited effect on electoral behaviour. Their argument of minimal campaign effects has become, over the years, the prevailing consensus within the field of voting behaviour (Brady, Johnston, & Sides, 2006). Ansolabehere (2006b) notes that until recently, this prevailing consensus was seldom questioned or contradicted. As such, there is not much analysis of how determinants of vote choice are connected to campaign communication (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002) and the findings that do exist are quite often contradictory. Bartels (2006a) notes:

> [Campaign] effects do not seem susceptible to any straightforward explanation in terms of the nature of the explanatory factors at work, the identities of the candidates, or the political circumstances of each campaign. (…) [T]here seems to be only modest correspondence between the specific campaign effects documented here and the conventional accounts of recent presidential campaigns offered after the fact by journalists and campaigners. (…) What accounts for such striking mismatches between conventional accounts of recent campaigns and the 'reality' reflected in my parameter estimates? (Bartels, 2006a, pp. 98-100).

The question raised by Bartels voices a puzzle which is both interesting and important for the further development of the field. Bartels points out that solving this puzzle and finding any convergence between the two "disparate sources of evidence would go a long way toward mitigating the limitations of each considered in isolation" (Bartels, 2006a, p. 100) and would increase our understanding of the role of campaigns in defining vote choice.

The aim of this thesis is to examine campaign effects and, consequently, to offer a possible answer to Bartels' question. I argue that such a partial explanation can be found by looking at the role of *human emotions.*

An overview of the professional campaign management literature points to the fact that campaigns are developed to maximize one's chances of winning the election (or to increase one's share of the votes) by appealing to reason and, more importantly, by manipulating through *emotion* (see e.g. Guzzetta, 2006; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Shea & Burton, 2006). "The political brain is an emotional brain" argues Drew Westen (2007, p. xv) in his analysis of political campaigning. However, even though campaigns place great emphases on emotions, the academic literature overlooks their role. Studies focus almost entirely on the reasoned or rational component of a campaign (Green, Shapiro, & Hardin, 1995; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). In other words, the extent of our knowledge about the effects of campaigns rests on the implicit assumption that campaigns only appeal to reason and their effect is mainly channelled through the information they provide voters about policy positions and issues. Such studies have opened the road to understanding campaigns and their effects, but we must build on the valuable information they provide and move forward. Thus, in order to attain a broader understanding of the effects of campaigns, the role of emotions needs to be incorporated into our models. Political campaigns are "an emotionally laden field" (Webber, 2006, p. 15) and there are "systematic patterns to the use of specific emotional appeals in political campaigns" (Ridout & Searles, 2011, p. 454). Furthermore, humans interpret political events through their affective responses (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 672), which, if discounted, will lead to model misspecification (Conover & Feldman, 1986).

Consequently, in order to tackle the puzzle described by Bartels and to shed more light on the issue of campaign effects, this thesis aims to answer the following general

research questions: *Do campaigns, through their capacity to induce specific emotions, affect electoral behaviour? And if so, how is this effect manifested?*

I start by examining the existing literature on campaign effects, campaign design and management and voting behaviour. Furthermore, I examine studies pertaining to the role of emotions in politics and campaigns, but also consider evidence from psychology and neuropsychology. Building on this literature, the theoretical framework I develop supports the idea that campaigns have an indirect effect on political behaviour. Consequently, taking the aims of campaigns (as they are presented in the professional campaign design literature) as a starting point, I argue that their effects are, at least partially, manifested indirectly through the impact of the emotions they induce. To operationalize emotions, I distinguish between enthusiasm, anxiety and anger. Thereafter, based on the Theory of Affective Intelligence (henceforth TAI), I extend the theory of emotions in politics and argue that the political behavioural effects of emotions hinge on the specific political party each emotion is directed towards.

According to the TAI, anxiety, induced by negative campaign communication, is experienced towards one's preferred party. An individual who is anxious about his party is seen to decrease his willingness to be involved in the campaign and increase information search. Consequently, the voting decision is now argued to be driven by policy positions and leader evaluations while the role of partisanship is decreased. Dissenting from the claims of the TAI, I argue that anxiety can also be experienced towards out-parties, in which case its political behavioural effects will differ. Anxiety experienced towards an out-party, induced by negative communication which targets that party, is argued to increase both involvement in the campaign and turnout. In regards to vote choice, its effects are claimed to be similar to those of enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party:

increase of the relative importance of partisanship and decrease of the weight of policy and leader evaluations.

Anger can be induced by negative campaign communication which assigns blame. According to the TAI this emotion is experienced towards out-parties and its behavioural effects include strengthened habitual behaviour (i.e. voting based on partisanship) and potentially increased turnout. However, I argue that as well as being experienced towards out-parties, anger can also be experienced towards the preferred party. In this case the behavioural effects of anger are thought to be similar to those of anxiety experienced towards the preferred party (decreased involvement, increased information search and voting based on policy and leader evaluations). However, unlike anxiety, anger experienced towards the preferred party is also expected to decrease turnout.

All in all, the theoretical framework argues that by manipulating the tone and framing of their communication items, electoral campaigns can induce emotions which then influence behaviour in a way which is consistent with the aims of campaigns: increasing reliance on partisanship of core supporters, and decreasing the reliance on partisanship and increasing reliance on policy for out-party supporters.

The research is carried out in the context of the 2010 British General Election campaign. The choice to locate the research in this particular context was guided by the two main advantages this context offers. First, most of the literature on campaign effects is based on evidence from the case of the US (Brady, et al., 2006; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). In order to increase our understanding of such effects the research needs to be extended to other states, political systems and political cultures. Britain is a natural choice as it has important similarities with the US, but it also significantly different[1]. Furthermore,

[1] The United Kingdom employs the same type of electoral system; however it has a party system which is closer to European multipartism as opposed to the almost pure American bipartism. Moreover, even if

there is some evidence that British campaigns exert effects on voting behaviour (see Andersen, 2003; McAllister, 2002); however, there is little consensus on the matter (see e.g. Kavanagh, 1995) and there is even less evidence of how these effects are actually manifested (Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002). Second, placing the research in the multiparty context of the UK advances the study of the effect of emotions in politics. Up to this point all such studies have been carried out exclusively in the exceptional bipartisan context of the Unite States.

Hence, the research questions discussed above are tested and evaluated for the British political system, in the specific context of the 2010 electoral campaign and elections. I make use of panel data which was collected during the 2010 UK General Election campaign but I also rely on data collected in a controlled laboratory experiment. This dual approach harvests and combines the different strengths of the two methodological approaches. The two approaches complement each other in my endeavor to study the relationships between campaigns, emotions and political behaviour.

On the one hand, I use the observational panel data to establish whether the electoral campign which preceded the 2010 British Elections induced emotions. Thereafter, I examine how these emotions affect political behaviour and whether the indirect effect of the campaign is manifested through emotions. Panel surveys conducted in the context of the 2010 British general election, allow me to examine the relationships between exposure to a real campaign, emotions and political behaviour in an actual election. The external validity is, thus, far greater compared to the controlled laboratory setting.

On the other hand, the experimental approach is designed to examine if the differences in the tone and framing of campaign communication items are capable of

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electoral campaigns have become increasingly Americanised in the UK, the two states differ in two major aspects: UK campaigns do not employ television advertising and campaigns are not candidate centred.

inducing the distinct types of emotions, namely enthusiasm, anxiety and anger. By being able to isolate the effect of each single type of stimuli (Kinder & Palfrey, 1993), the experimental study is ideally suited to test how specific items of campaign communication can induce distinct emotions, but it also allows for the testing of the effects of campaign communication on political behaviour.

The analyses are carried out in several stages and the results are broadly consistent with the expectations. First, relying on panel data I show that exposure to an actual electoral campaign, the 2010 British General Election campaign, has the power to actively modify voters' emotionality levels. Second, using the experimental data, I illustrate the means through which campaign communication can induce distinct emotions. The results show that positive communication induces enthusiasm, while negative communication increases anxiety. Anger, however, is seen to be induced by negative communication which also attributes blame.

I then move forward and test the impact emotions have on the types of political behaviour which campaigns aim to affect. I examine emotions' effects on the intention to turn out and on vote choice. The findings indicate that enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party and anxiety experienced towards out-parties increase the likelihood of turning out, while anger experienced towards the preferred party decreases the chances of voting. Linking campaign exposure and turnout intentions, I subsequently show that these emotions do significantly mediate the effect of campaigns.

Turning to vote choice, I examine the moderating effect emotions have on the impact of partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations on vote choice. Consistent with previous research (see e.g. Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, & Weisberg, 2008; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979; Popkin, 1991), I model vote choice as a function of partisanship, policy preferences (issue positions), leader evaluations,

evaluations of the economy, campaign exposure and socio-demographic controls. Such a vote choice model has been successfully employed in previous studies of emotional effects on vote choice (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). The results are generally consistent with the expectations and show that enthusiasm experienced towards the party a person feels closest to increases the reliance on partisanship and decreases the importance of policy preference and leader evaluations when voting. Conversely, a person experiencing anxiety or anger towards the party she feels closest to will lead her to rely less on her partisan self-image and give more weight to the evaluation of issues and policy positions. Finally, the results pertaining to anxiety and anger experienced towards an out-party also confirm the expectations. They show that these emotions slightly increase the importance of partisanship while decreasing the relevance of policy preferences and leader evaluations.

Extending these analyses, I further show that, consistent with the indirect effects claim, campaign exposure positively impacts the strength of the effect emotions have on the relationship between vote choice and partisanship.

Finally, relying on the experimental data, I test the impact the different types of campaign communication items have on political behaviour (campaign involvement, search for information, turnout intention and vote choice). This analysis produces null findings, which I subsequently discuss and explain.

The results generated by the research corroborate most hypotheses and show that campaigns can, and do, induce emotions and that the effects each specific emotion has on political behaviour are those predicted by the theory.

These findings provide a potential explanation to the puzzle voiced by Bartels with respect to the disconnection between the claims of political professionals and the academic examination of campaign effects. Bartels' (2006a) conclusion that campaigns do not affect

vote choice is based on the examination of the direct effects campaign exposure has on vote choice. However, this thesis shows that campaigns not only affect vote choice directly, but also do so indirectly, through the effects the emotions they induce have on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants. Consequently, while I concede that pundits' claims might very well be exaggerated, I conclude that the inability of academic research to find larger effects is, partly, explicable by how campaign effects have been conceptualized: most studies search for the direct effects of campaigns, while campaigns also aim to impact behaviour indirectly.

The main contribution this thesis makes is to the subfield studying the effects of electoral campaigns. First, I illustrate the persuasive effect of campaigns by showing that depending on which emotions they induce, campaigns can decrease or increase the importance partisanship plays in the vote choice function. Second, I pinpoint that the mobilizing effect of campaigns is also contingent on the emotions they induce: they can both increase and decrease the likelihood of turnout.

Aside from this main contribution, by placing the role of emotions at its core this research also makes a significant contribution to the literature on emotions in politics. Taking the Theory of Affective Intelligence as a starting point, the thesis discusses its inaccuracies and relying on the Cognitive Appraisal Approach, it improves the theory of emotions in politics. It makes two specific contributions to the Theory of Affective Intelligence. First, it highlights that when researching the effects of emotions in politics the object of emotions needs to be taken into account: depending on which party an emotion is experienced towards, its effects can be antithetical. Second, the theoretical framework I develop and test clarifies the disagreements about how anger is induced and what its effects are.

Furthermore, systematic research in this field is still in its infancy and the existent studies only focus on the very specific US context. Even more, the specific studies which focus on the voting behavioural impact of emotions have mostly been carried out within a single-party context, for which the field has come under criticism. As such, extending the theory and applying it to a broader multi-party context has the potential to further our understanding of the impact of human emotions in politics but to also increase its generalizability.

This thesis proceeds as follows. After a review of the literature on campaigns, voting behaviour and emotions in Chapter II, Chapter III introduces the theoretical framework and derives the testable hypotheses. This specifically focuses attention on the role of emotions in the electoral process and their moderating impact on partisan behaviour. Thereafter, Chapter IV introduces the panel data, and illustrates the connections between the 2010 British electoral campaign and the experience of emotions. Subsequently, Chapter V, using the panel data, tests the effects of emotions on turnout intention and vote choice. The next chapter (VI) presents the experimental design and includes the tests which pertain to the elucidation of the mechanisms through which campaigns can induce emotions. The analysis of the experimental data is continued in Chapter VII, which assesses the impact of political communication on the willingness to be involved in the campaign, turnout intention, information search and vote choice. Finally, in Chapter VIII I discuss the results and put the findings in context. I also present the implications this research has for several academic fields and illustrate the main caveats and suggest directions for further research.

Chapter II

Review of the Relevant Literature

To offer a potential solution to the puzzle voiced by Bartels, the thesis aims to assess whether campaigns, through the emotions they induce, can indirectly affect electoral behaviour. To achieve this I rely on a multidisciplinary approach and build a theoretical framework which extends the theory of emotions in politics and specifies that emotions mediate the effect electoral campaigns have on turnout, while also moderating the effect of partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations on vote choice. While the theoretical framework is developed and discussed in-depth in the following chapter (Chapter III), the current chapter aims to provide the essential background knowledge on which my extensions to the theory are based.

In developing the theoretical framework I draw on three distinct fields: the study of electoral campaigns; the study of voting behaviour and the study of emotions. Consequently, the following sections discuss each of these fields and the present the theories and the findings which are most important in the context of this research. I start by focusing on the design and effects of electoral campaigns. Thereafter, I look at voting behaviour, specifically detailing the importance partisanship and policy preferences play in the vote choice function. The following section introduces the two psychological and neuropsychological perspectives on human emotions which the theory of emotions in politics is based on. The chapter is concluded by a discussion of the political relevance of emotions.

Before commencing, it is important to note that this chapter is by no means an exhaustive review of the literature in any of the subfields I discus. It merely presents the previous findings and theories which are most relevant to this research and which are necessary for the development of the theoretical framework.

II.1. Electoral campaigns

This research is focused on analysing the effects of electoral campaigns. Given that campaigns are designed *ad hoc*, I belive that it is essential to start the discussion by highlighting what the aims of campaigns are. In other words, if we aim to appropriately measure what effects campaigns have, we first need to understand what it is they are aimed to achieve and how do they aim to achieve it. This section illustrates the major aims of campigns by relying on the professional literature on campaign design but also on the available academic studies.

A political campaign is an "organised communication effort, involving the role of one or more agencies (…) seeking to influence the outcome of processes of political decision making by shaping public opinion" (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002, p. 3). As such, the major objectives of any campaign are persuasion (conversion) and mobilisation. In order to achieve victory, "[c]ampaigns seek to increase the number of supporters for their candidate and to encourage those supporters to be politically active" (Brader, 2006, p. 20). Mobilisation is a key strategy to increase the parties' vote share by activating each party's base of supporters (Bradshaw, 1995)[2].

[2] The general consensus in the academic literature is that, by using get-out-the-vote techniques (Guzzetta, 2006), campaigns do mobilise voters (Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002; Kaufmann, et al., 2008; Clarke at al. 2009; Denver & Hands, 1997).

Persuasion, on the other hand, is the strategy used by a campaign to 'convert' or convince supporters of other parties[3] and people who are undecided (Bradshaw, 1995; Shea & Burton, 2006). Even if receiving the votes from the party's supporters is a necessary condition for victory, it is not always sufficient (Guzzetta, 2006). Both academic and non-academic literature shows that a campaign needs to also attract votes from outside the party's electoral base. In most cases, it is the undecideds (and/or weak supporters of other parties) who hold the pivotal mass of votes necessary to secure a win (Neundorf, Stegmueller, & Scotto, 2011). As such, the major part of a campaign is oriented towards implementing persuasive strategies targeted at undecideds or out-party supporters (Bradshaw, 1995; Shea & Burton, 2006). There is agreement in the literature that persuasion is a major aim of electoral campaigns (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Bartels, 2006a; Brady, et al., 2006; Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002; Zaller, 1992; Fournier, 2006; Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Zaller, 1992, 1996). Campaigns have the potential to persuade voters (Fournier, 2006) as they can modify voters' opinions of parties and leaders, they can alter their perceptions of issues and issue positions and finally, they are also able to change the importance of the determinants of vote choice, such as partisanship and issue preferences (Hillygus & Shields, 2008). Campaigns can help "voters determine which party polices best suit their concerns" (Andersen, 2003, pp. 615-616)[4]. Consequently, through the process of persuasion, campaigns aim to: 1) decrease the relative importance of partisanship (latent partisanship) for vote choice; and 2) increase the importance of policy positions.

[3] Also referred to as 'conversion'.

[4] Even if there is agreement in the literature that campaigns aim to persuade, consistent with Bartels' (2006a) observations, there is no consensus as to whether campaigns actually succeed in persuading potential voters. There are studies which show that campaigns do persuade (Vavreck, 2009; Zaller, 1992, 1996), but most of the research shows little or no persuasive effects (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Bartels, 2006a; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2009; Kaufmann, et al., 2008).

When combining the two aims of campaigns (mobilisation and persuasion) it can be said that campaigns aim to increase the relative importance of partisanship for their own voters in order to mobilise them. At the same time, they try to decrease the relative importance of partisanship for the undecided and for the supporters of other parties while increasing the importance of the perceptions of issue positions and leader evaluations. In other words, they aim to modify the respective weights of partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations in the vote choice function, while providing voters with the information seen as necessary for them to change their perception of the party running the campaign so that it would be accepted as a credible replacement for the preferred party.

The achievement of these two goals is conditioned by the successful transmission of information to the electorate. As mentioned above, a campaign is an organised communication effort; thus its basic 'tool' is the manipulation and transition of information, whether it is objective and factual or subjective and affective. Fournier (2006) shows that by transmitting information, campaigns reduce heterogeneity between the less and the more informed. In the campaign management literature, the provision of basic information about the party and its candidates is seen as the first step of the campaign (Guzzetta, 2006; Shea & Burton, 2006) on which more complicated communication techniques can be based. Such techniques are discussed by de Vreese and Semetko (2004). Examining referendum campaigns in Europe, they note that effects such as persuasion are induced, indirectly, through the media. They identify two information transmission techniques: priming and framing.

Priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Vavreck, 1997, 2009) occurs when public attention is directed towards new information, usually conveyed by the media or by other means of mass communication, which then alters how political leaders, parties or issue are evaluated. Numerous studies have shown that priming shapes

public opinion (see Bartels, 2006a; Brady, et al., 2006; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Petrocik, 1996; Vavreck, 1997; Vreese & Semetko, 2004).

The second technique often used in campaigns is framing. Framing refers to how a given issue or event is presented. Typically, any given event can be presented in a positive or a negative light (Gross, 2008; Vreese & Semetko, 2004). The effects of negativity and of negative framing have been profusely researched, especially in relation to turnout. Nonetheless, there is no clear consesnsus: the literature is divided between two competing hypotheses: the demobilisation hypothesis and the stimulation hypothesis.

According to the demobilisation hypothesis, negative ads (or attack ads) demobilize by decreasing confidence in public officials and increasing disgust and alienation towards the targeted candidate (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994). Furthermore, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997), using both individual-level experiments and aggregate-level analyses, show that negative advertising decreases the likelihood of turnout for the supporters of the targeted candidate but not for the supporters of the sponsor. Their results are, however, contested by Wattenberg and Brains (1999) who argue that Ansolabehere and Iyengar exaggerate the demobilizing effect of negativity. Nonetheless, the demobilisation hypothesis also finds some support in the work of Kahn and Kenney (1999). These authors have a mixed position and argue that depending on the type of ad, negativity can both depress and increase turnout. They show that negative ads which contain legitimate criticisms ("relevant criticism presented in an appropriate manner" p. 878) targeted at a candidate seem to increase the likelihood of casting a ballot. However, ads that strongly "criticize opponents in an accusatory and ad hominem manner" (Kahn & Kenney, 1999, p. 878) depress turnout by increasing disgust with politics. Finally, testing the demobilisation hypothesis through a large scale experiment, Clinton and Lapinski (2004), find no evidence for the claimed demobilizing effect of negativity.

They note that "it is never the case that exposure to negative advertising decreases either the reported probability of voting or the actual voting" (2004, p.92). Moreover, they show that political advertising has a weak positive effect on turnout, regardless of the tone. Their conclusions are consistent with the stimulation hypothesis, which finds strong support in the work of Finkel and Geer (1998).

Finkel and Geer (1998) argue that negative ads mobilize as they can induce concerns about the outcome of the election. Furthermore, they induce sharper affective reactions, which coupled with the increase of political information increases the motivation for turning out. In essence, criticising the opponent sends the message that the outcome matters (Finkel & Geer, 1998).

The stimulation hypothesis is also supported by Freedman and Goldstein's (1999) research. They show that negative campaigning, researched in 'real elections with real ads' does not depress 'real turnout'. To the contrary, the authors find evidence that it actually stimulates it. This is consistent with Geer and Lau's (2006) conclusion that campaign negativism stimulated rather the depressed turnout in American elections in the past 20 years (Geer & Lau, 2006).

Up to this point I have discussed the aims of campaigns and what communication strategies are often used to achieve them. This is immensely important for the theory. As I discuss in Chapter III, different types of campaign communication can induce distinct emotions[5], which in turn, are argued to either aide mobilization or to increase the chances of persuasion. Furthermore, as it is argued here, persuasion is achieved by modifying the relative importance voters give to partisanship, policy prefernces and leader evaluatiosn when voting. These three factors feature as important determinants of British vote choice (see Cook, 2011; Fielding, 2010) and are included in the vote choice function developed by

[5] E.g. positive messages are argued to increase enthusiasm while negativity can increase anxiety or anger

Clarke et al. (2009). Furthermore, as I present in Chapter III, they are also essential components of the theory of emotions in politics and make up an important part of the thesis. Consequently, the following section discusses them more in depth.

II.2. The determinants of vote choice

According to Clarke et al. (2009), vote choice in Britain is mainly a function of partisanship, policy preferences, party competences, candidate evaluation and economic evaluations. This section addresses the two determinants which are most relevant to this research: partisanship and policy preferences.

One of the most prominent theories of voting behaviour, the Michigan model (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), argues that vote choice is overwhelmingly defined by *party identification*. Campbell et al. view *party identification* as "the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment" (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 121). This attachment is stable, it develops in early life (through family ties and socialization) and it strengthens over time. In their view, vote choice is based on this deeply rooted psychological and emotional attachment to a given party.

But, given that "American voting behaviour is influenced in a variety of ways by the fact that it is set in a two-party system" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 7) and given that Britain has three significant political parties (Weakliem & Heath, 1991, p. 29) this conceptualisation of partisanship has been less useful outside the US. Consequently, Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974) adapt the theory to the context of the UK. First of all, Butler and Stokes notice the ease with which Britons change parties (1974, p. 412), substituting the term of party identification with *partisan self-image*, in order to illustrate the much more flexible nature of this phenomenon in the UK.

Hence, in this thesis, partisanship is no longer understood as the rigid absolute psychological attachment described by *The American Voter*, but a feeling of warmth, closeness to a party (or parties), which is less stable and more flexible than the original concept (Franklin, 1992). Furthermore, recent studies have shown that in multiparty systems (including the UK) people can be actually characterised by multiple partisanships, and that this multiple partisanship affects vote choice (Mughan, 2009). However, even if partisanship is less stable and changes more rapidly than the Michigan model claimed, and even if the 'partisan self-image' and vote tend to more frequently travel together (Butler & Stokes, 1974, p. 42-43)[6], this concept still remains an important predictor of vote choice in Britain. Addressing this issue, Clarke and his colleagues note: "the finding that partisanship has dynamic properties does not negate its importance for understanding the choices that voters make at particular points in time" (Clarke, et al., 2009, p. 146). Consequently, for individuals who have a partisan self-image, voting for a given party becomes the norm; it becomes an automatic non-reflective activity, *a habit* (Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976). Psychological and neuropsychological studies relating to human behaviour show that, by nature, humans are habitual beings (Bargh & Chartrand, 2004; Damasio, 1994; Marcus, MacKuen, & Neuman, 2011), even when it comes to politics (Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003; Green & Shachar, 2000; Marcus, et al., 2011; Popkin, 1991). People act based on habit: previously successful emotional responses and associations between an external event or object and the outcome of the situation are stored in the procedural memory and are used over and over again (Brader, 2006; Marcus, et al., 2000).

However, habits are not absolute and can be broken, in which case people rely on other (perhaps reasoned) decision making mechanisms when voting. This alternative

[6] They explain that the number of offices to be elected on the same day is just one in Britain, while in the US this number is far larger.

perspective on what drives vote choice is best embodied by the rational choice approach[7]. In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) Downs introduces economic rationality to the analysis of political behaviour (1957, p.4). Downsian voters are seen as rational utility calculators who are interested in the future, but vote retrospectively as a mean of cost-cutting for the future and they base their decision of policy preferences. Aside from Downs, V.O. Key also argues in favour of the rational voter. However, Key[8] (1966) builds a model of retrospective voting based on a reward – punishment mechanism. Key's voter is "a person who appraises the actions of the government, who has policy preferences and who relates his vote to those appraisals and preferences" (1966, p.58). Based on the contributions of these authors, partisanship is now seen as a heuristic (Popkin, 1991) or a running-tally[9] (Fiorina, 1981) that acts as a cue, a judgemental short-cut (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991), that replaces the need for collecting information about the party and its positions. Thus, along with policy preferences and issue position, partisanship is portrayed as just another constitutive element of the vote choice equation (Fiorina, 1981).

In this context, both partisanship and policy or issue positions are seen to influence vote choice at the same time, but with varying degrees of relative importance (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2008; Nie, et al., 1976); partisanship is no longer seen as the single determinant of vote choice, but one among many. Studies point towards the importance of issues (McLean, 1982) and the distance between voters' and parties' respective positions on issues (see Macdonald, Rabinowitz, & Listhaug, 1998; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Rabinowitz

[7] The Michigan model of party identification has come under criticism from scholars following the Downsian rational choice approach.

[8] Key (1966) rejects both the Michigan model (Campbell et al., 1960) but also the prepositions of the Columbia School (Berelson, et al., 1954; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948).

[9] Inspired both by Key (1966) and Downs (1957), Fiorina (1981) develops a theory of retrospective (issue) voting (similar to Key's reward punishment model), arguing that past performance is the best possible information (1981, p.61). Speaking about his model he notes that "… if not completely rational [the model] at least attempts to be highly reasonable" (Fiorina, 1981, p.78).

& Macdonald, 1989; Westholm, 1997). Other studies also highlight the importance of candidate characteristics (Bartels, 2006a; Iversen, 1994). Harold Clarke and colleagues (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004; Clarke, et al., 2009) develop the theory of valence politics and show that in the case of the UK, a flexible partisanship, together with party-issue proximities and perceptions of party competence and leader evaluation, influence vote choice.

The theory which is presented in Chapter III and briefly discussed in the previous chapter argues that emotions impact vote choice by modifying the relative importance of its determinants: partisanship and policy preferences. This is entirely plausible as there is empirical evidence that both these variables vary, across time and across individuals, in their power to explain vote choice. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) show that in some elections partisanship matters more than in others. Moreover, Bartels (2006a) offers evidence that, at an aggregate level, over time and across different elections, partisanship and policy preferences have an inverse variation in their power to explain vote choice: if one decreases the other increases (and vice versa). Finally, there is also evidence that, in Britain, the over-time decline in the explanation power of partisanship is linked to people becoming more rational (Franklin, 1985, p. 128; Sarlvik & Crewe, 1992).

At the individual level there is substantial evidence that the extent to which different people base their electoral decision on policy preferences versus partisanship is variable (Andersen, Tilley, & Heath, 2005; Bartels, 1996; Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, 2001; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, & Listhaug, 1995; Hylligus & Shields, 2008). Campbell et al. (1960) refer to it as 'defection'. They note that under stressful circumstances (1960, p. 151) caused by personal or social forces (1960, pp. 148-149) or simply as a result of "current important

events" (1960, pp.133-35, 165), people do not vote based on their partisanship[10]. The circumstances under which a person defects on his partisanship, on his habit, must be recent, the issues must be reasoned and should arouse feelings (Campbell et al. 1960). Thus, the authors imply that emotions may play a role, but do not develop or test this idea further.

Three decades after *The American Voter* was published, reaserch on emotions in politics has advanced, Marcus and MacKuen (1993) showing that *emotions* do indeed have the power to condition the (inverse) effect partisanship and policy preferences have on vote choice. Given this finding and given the centrality of emotions in the theoretical argument of this thesis, the following sections focus on emotions and their effects. However, before I discuss the role of emotions in political research, I believe a psychological introduction to human emotions is much needed. Thus, the following section offers a psychological definition of emotions and presents the two broad approaches which have inspired the research on emotions in politics . The subsequent and final section of this Chapter presents the state of the discipline in the study of emotions in politics and describes at length the theory Marcus and his colleagues developed.

II.3. Human emotions

The human brain houses two independent systems of evaluation: "a fast crude, and predominant affective system and a more detailed cognitive one" (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982, p. 619; see also Simon, 1985). Emotions, produced by this affective system,

[10] In the UK literature, authors speak of a 'homing tendency', meaning that after voting for a different party in a single election, voters tend to return to their original party of liking (Heath, Jowell, & Curtice, 1985; Miller, Tagg, & Britto, 1992). Furthermore, according to Butler and Stoke (1974), Nie et al. (1976), Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) or Hylligus and Shields (2008), it is issue positions and policy preferences that can account for the instances in which a voter goes against his partisanship.

are a set of physiological and psychological changes within the body and brain which come as a response to external, situational stimuli (Damasio, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1996; Marcus, 2002; Marcus, et al., 2000). By occurring outside conscious awareness they are the organisms' adaptive and defence mechanism (Marcus et al., 2000) as they have the capacity to bring changes to our behaviour (Damasio, 1994; Lazarus, 1991). When emotions are potent enough to enter conscious awareness we experience them as 'feelings'. Feelings are the 'subjective awareness and experience of emotions" (Brader, 2006, p. 51).

The process of emotional arousal starts with the perception of significant external stimuli, which are followed by a set of physiological changes, including the activation of the autonomic nervous system (which controls heart rate, breathing, etc.) and consequently of the central nervous system, which prepares the body for action. Changes in cognitive activity (attention, memory) coupled with an action tendency follow. The last component is the subjective experience of all these physiological events – these are the conscious feelings we use to label the emotion that was produced (Brader, 2006, quoting Adolphs, Damasio, & Borod, 2000; Clore & Ortony, 2000; Frijda, 1999; Lazarus, 1991).

There are several models that try to explain how emotions are formed and how they influence behaviour. In the following paragraphs I focus only on discussing the two models that the theoretical framework (Chapter III) heavily relies on. These are the neuropsychological approach and the cognitive appraisal approach.

II.3.1. The neuropsychological approach

The neuropsychological approach to understanding emotions (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996) tries to identify the neural pathways that are involved in the production of emotions. Based on brain processes and information flows, the researchers conclude that emotions occur prior to conscious awareness. The basic idea that the authors try to put across is that

our brain produces emotions (such as fear) even before we are consciously aware that there is a threatening presence in our environment.

Extending the work of Damasio and that of LeDoux, Marcus shows that the brain has three emotional subsystems which work outside conscious awareness and regulate the production of specific emotions: the disposition system, the surveillance system and the flight and fight system.

The disposition system is responsible for "managing reliance on habits and previously learned strategies" (Marcus, 2002, p. 46). Relying on sensory and somatosensory information and assessing action plans, it performs a comparison: is the plan going as usual? If it is and no unknown or out-of-place stimuli are located the habit is continued and the emotional reaction of enthusiasm is induced. However, if the plan is failing and a potentially threatening stimulus is detected the surveillance system comes into effect.

The surveillance system "monitors the environment for novel and threatening stimuli. It serves to interrupt habitual routine and engage thought" (Marcus, 2002, p. 53). The surveillance system is an evolutive system crucial for survival. Reliance on habits in given circumstances could be unsafe, and it is this system (along with the fight and flight system) that protects us. When a threatening stimulus is identified the surveillance system induces the emotion of anxiety and temporarily suspends reliance on habit, stopping the current activity. It focuses attention and induces the search for information about the novel stimulus. Once information is collected, relying on higher conscious cognitive processing, a reasoned decision is made about the validity of the threat. The outcome of the decision making process, which is now governed by reason, could be to discount the element of threat and revert back to the original plan of action. Conversely, if the threat is deemed to be real, as a result of conscious decision making, the action plan will be changed.

The final emotional sub-system discussed by Marcus et al. (2000), the flight and fight system, is an automatic defence mechanism that generates a specific defensive course of action when a severe and imminent physical threat to the body is identified. If the surveillance system only halts habit and engages higher cognitive processes in the face of potential threats, the flight and fight system halts any on-going activity (habitual or not), prepares the body for action and carries out that action. It does not engage reason. For example, if a person was taking a walk in a forest and was confronted with a wild animal that was ready to attack, it is this emotional subsystem that would be engaged and would automatically control his actions (e.g. running away).

In summary, the two emotional subsystems, the disposition system and the surveillance system, "enable us to rely on habit and to activate reasoned considerations" (Marcus, et al., 2000, p. 43). According to the neuropsychological approach, positive emotions like enthusiasm will strengthen the reliance on habit, while negative emotions, such as anxiety, will temporarily halt habit and induce reason, which in turn could foster a potentially complete defection from the habit.

In classifying emotions, Marcus and colleagues rely on the circumplex model (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006). This is consistent with the classical valence models of emotions (Bang-Petersen, 2010) frequently employed in social psychology. The circumplex model (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999; Zajonc, 1998) describes emotions as being characterised by two orthogonal dimensions: valence and arousal. Valence indicates whether the emotion is positive or negative (e.g. enthusiasm versus anxiety or anger). Arousal captures the intensity of the emotion (Plutchik, 1991).

One of the most important criticisms brought against the valence models of emotions come from the proponents of the cognitive appraisal approach. They argue that by looking only at classes of emotions (i.e. negative versus positive emotions) the distinct

behavioural effects of specific emotions are overlooked (Brader, 2006). Consequently, they focus their attention on how each individual emotion is produced and how it affects behaviour. This approach defines emotions from a purely psychological perspective and is capable of distinguishing between the discrete effects of different emotions. The following paragraphs discuss this approach.

II.3.2. The cognitive appraisal approach

The cognitive appraisal approach holds that emotions are the outcome of appraisals of the external environment (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 2001). Even though it does not examine the neurological aspects of emotional processing, this approach is consistent with the neuropsychological theory outlined above: it acknowledges that emotions are bodily reactions to the outside environment which can occur in the realm of unconsciousness (Lazarus, 1991).

According to Lazarus, the production of emotions is intrinsically linked to two components: knowledge about the environment and the appraisal of the significance of occurrences in the environment. Appraisal is defined as the constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the surrounding environment for signs of possible harm to the person's well-being. Generally, this process is automatic, unreflective and unconscious, but it can also be deliberate and conscious (Lazarus, 1991).

The theory posits that there are two basic types of appraisal: primary and secondary. The primary appraisal system evaluates whether something significant to the person's well-being has occurred in the environment and the secondary appraisal system controls the coping options[11]. Both the primary and secondary appraisal have three

[11] Coping refers to the evaluation of the multitude of possible actions that can be taken as a response to a stimulus.

components which "create evaluative patterns that differentiate among each of the individual emotions" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 39).

The distinct components of primary appraisal are: goal relevance, goal congruence / incongruence and ego-involvement. Goal relevance refers to whether an event or occurrence touches upon a personal goal. If an event is appraised as not connected to a person's goals or wants, no emotion will be produced. If, on the other hand, the event is linked to one's goals, an emotion will be produced. Goal congruence / incongruence indicates whether the event is consistent (or not) with the individual's goals. Consistency between the goals and the relevant event will induce positive emotions. However, if the event and the goals are inconsistent a negative emotion will be induced (the particular type of emotions will be determined by the secondary appraisal patterns). Finally, the type of ego-involvement refers to several aspects of one's ego-identity, such as: self-esteem, social esteem, moral values, ideals and personal well-being. The type of ego-involvement is different for each specific emotion.

The secondary appraisal system also contains three components: blame or credit, coping potential and future expectations. 'Blame or credit' refer to knowing who is accountable for the event (if anyone at all). If the entity which was in control of the event is known, depending on the primary appraisal of the event (i.e. goal congruence), credit or blame will be attributed. Coping potential refers to the possible actions that a person can take to change or protect his or her environment. Finally, future expectations illustrate the potential psychological changes that are due to the specific encounter.

Based on the primary and secondary appraisal patterns the theory is capable of distinguishing between individual emotions and their effects on behaviour. For instance, Lazarus notes that anxiety is a unique emotion which is described by ambiguity and uncertainty associated with the future. If an event is goal relevant and goal incongruent

and the type of ego-involvement is the "protection of personal meaning or ego-identity against existential threats, then the emotion possibilities narrow to anxiety" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 237). The secondary appraisal process is not necessary for anxiety to develop. Blame is absolutely irrelevant as the "hallmark of anxiety is uncertainty" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 239). The action tendency induced by anxiety is avoidance and escape. This is consistent with Marcus' claims that anxiety does not induce a specific behavioural action, it just engages thought.

The cognitive appraisal approach places anger is in the same broad category as anxiety. It is a goal-relevant and goal-incongruent emotion. The type of ego-involvement is similar to that in the case of anxiety: the preservation of self- or social-esteem. But what differentiates anger from anxiety is the secondary appraisal pattern. If in the case of anxiety this was absent, in the case of anger there is a critical secondary appraisal component: blame. Anger occurs if there is the knowledge that "someone is accountable for the harmful actions and that these actions could have been controlled" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 226). The behavioural reactions anger induces are punishment, revenge and seeking of retribution.

Lazarus' classification of emotions does not contain any specific emotion labelled 'enthusiasm', as did the neuropsychological approach. The reason behind this is acknowledged by Marcus (2006) himself, who states that he uses the term to generically refer to positive emotions. Consequently, in order to understand how what Marcus names 'enthusiasm' is induced I look at two positive emotions discussed by Lazarus: happiness/joy and pride. The appraisal patterns for both emotions are similar. The prerequisites are goal relevance and goal congruence. If these conditions are fulfilled happiness occurs; furthermore if the type of ego-involvement is enhancement of one's self or social esteem then along with happiness, pride is also a possibility. No secondary appraisal is observed. The action tendencies for both emotions are quite imprecise, but they

converge in outgoingness, openness and expansiveness. The behavioural manifestations denote a sense of security in the world. This is consistent with the most important behavioural pattern the neuropsychological theory attributes to enthusiasm: increased involvement.

To conclude, both the neuropsychological and the cognitive appraisal approaches are fundamentally important for understanding the developments in the field of political emotions and are employed in this thesis. The two approaches complement each other: while Damasio and LeDoux illustrate how the brain processes emotions, the cognitive appraisal approach allows us to look in depth at how a particular emotion shapes behaviour.

II.4. Emotions in political research

The importance of emotions in understanding electoral decisions is by no means new to the literature. In 1966 Key admits that people have "normal quotas of anxieties, frustrations and concerns" (Key, 1966, pp. 63-64) and that anxiety and anger, caused by past times, can play a major role in the punishment of the government (Key, 1966, pp. 63-67, 74, 78-69, 86, 112). Meanwhile, Butler and Stokes accept that "any catalogue of the factors involved in this process [N.A. voting – party change] must include some that are to be found in the voter's mind" (Butler & Stokes, 1974, p. 405). Furthermore, Campbell and his colleagues define party identification as "the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment" (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 121). However, the most eloquent early illustration of the importance of emotions in the political realm comes from Kinder and Sears (1985). They note:

> "[T]he interpretation and evaluation of political events are essentially affective responses to salient symbols that resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional responses were conditioned in earlier life, whether or not the event has the same tangible

consequences for the citizens personal life, is irrelevant; the pertinent personal stake is a symbolic one, which triggers long-held, affect laden habitual responses" (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 672).

Following the "quickening interest in human emotions" (Abelson, et al., 1982), Conover and Feldman (1986), draw on social psychology (Zajonc, 1980 – in particular) and discuss the role of emotions in the context of economic voting. In distinguishing between emotions and cognition they follow the path of Abelson and colleagues (1982). Emotions are seen to be caused by the arousal of the autonomous nervous system. Affective reactions to stimuli are 'inescapable' and 'may not depend on cognition'. Moreover, they argue that 'affective judgements' are long lasting and do not depend on recalled information (Conover & Feldman, 1986, p. 52). Based on this understanding of emotions the authors show that the state of the economy induces both positive and negative emotions (Conover & Feldman, 1986; Conover, et al., 1986; Conover, Feldman, & Knight, 1987). Finally, they warn that neglecting to include the role of emotions in vote choice models will lead to model misspecification[12] (Conover & Feldman, 1986).

Even though studies such as these were instrumental in bringing the importance of emotions in politics to our attention, a systematic theory of the political relevance of emotion has only recently been formulated by George Marcus and colleagues, and is referred to as the Theory of Affective Intelligence (henceforth TAI) (2002; 1993; 2000; 2007). This theory is based on the neuropsychological approach to emotions developed by Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996) and presented in the previous section. TAI posits that different emotions induce different behavioural patterns (Marcus, et al., 2000). Enthusiasm, experienced only towards the preferred party, leads to reliance on habit and involvement in politics (e.g. campaign volunteering), reinforcing people's political convictions and increasing the relevance of partisanship for vote choice. Meanwhile, anxiety experienced

[12] Lewis-Beck's (1988) model of economic voting includes *anger* as an independent variable.

towards the preferred party, temporarily halts the habit and induces information search and reasoned thinking (Marcus, et al., 2000). Marcus'(2002) analyses show that anxiety has the potential to decrease the reliance on partisanship. Table II.1 presents the psychological and behavioural consequences of enthusiasm and anxiety.

Marcus' results pertaining to the role of anxiety are confirmed by both Brader (2006) and Redlawsk et al. (2007). By examining emotions induced by electoral campaigns Brader (2006) also shows that carefully designed negative advertising is likely to induce anxiety while positive TV ads induce enthusiasm. Further studies with similar findings focus on particular aspects of emotional politics, such as racial attitudes (Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009), identity and immigration (Brader & Valentino, 2007; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008) or ideological orientations (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007) and personality (Wolak & Marcus, 2007). Finally, Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley (2002) show that in Britain "economic emotions have indirect effects on party support" (Clarke et al., 2002, p. 249). More interestingly, emotional reactions to the economy tend to exert significant effects on prime ministerial approval. There is a clear correlation between the type of emotion experienced and the approval ratings: positive emotions increase the approval for the Prime Minister (Clarke, et al., 2002, p. 253). Their results presented here are consistent with their earlier work in showing that "emotional reactions matter for party support" in Britain (Clarke & Stewart, 1998, p. 255).

However impressive the predictive power of TAI is, the theory has come under some criticism. One of the main criticisms is that TAI is not able to differentiate between anxiety and anger. Authors claim that even though both emotions are placed on the negative side of the spectrum, they are different and can have different behavioural effects (Brader & Valentino, 2007; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; Steenbergen & Ellis, 2006). Anger is seen to close off information search and induce a

higher reliance on habit (Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008). In response, MacKuen et al. (2010) tried to include anger in TAI and uphold the view that anger, experienced towards an out-party, increases the reliance on habit and decreases the openness to new information (see Table II.1.). They theorize that while anxiety is a consequence of the activation of the surveillance system by unfamiliar threatening stimuli, anger is induced by the disposition system in response to familiar threats. They posit that voters can experience anger specifically towards the opponent of their preferred candidate: "when people encounter familiar disliked political groups, issue and leaders they experience aversion" (MacKuen, et al., 2010, p. 442), which is in itself a habitual activity.

Table II.1.
The psychological and behavioural consequences of emotions: results of previous research

Consequences	The emotion		
	Enthusiasm	***Anxiety***	***Anger***
	Experienced towards the preferred party	*Experienced towards the preferred party*	*Experienced towards an out-party*
Psychological reaction	Reliance on habit	Reasoned thinking	Reliance on habit / desire for retaliatory action
Behavioural Pattern	Involvement in politics	Search for information	Halts information search. Avoidance of the target
Impact on voting behaviour	Increased effect of partisanship	Breaking with habit. Decrease in the effect of partisanship and increased effect of policy considerations	Increased effect of partisanship

However, recent studies carried out by Bang-Petersen (2010) and Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino (2010) suggest that this approach of understating how anger is induced is misleading. By relying on the cognitive appraisal[13] model of emotions (Lazarus, 1991), they show that the induction of anger is linked to the attribution of blame. Anger can

[13] Combining the neuropsychological approach with cognitive appraisal is, indeed, appropriate. The two approaches, in effect, focus on two distinct areas of the study of emotions and are actually complementary. The neuropsychological approach explains and addresses the physiology of emotions (Damasio, 1994) while the cognitive appraisal approach defines the psychological composition of distinct emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991).

be induced when the individual encounters a threat to his well-being and he sees the threat as being consciously caused by an actor. Thus, if the person can attribute blame he will experience anger, but if no one is seen as being responsible for the threatening event he will experience anxiety (Brader et al., 2010). "Anger is expected to be triggered in the face of intentional rule violations" (Bang-Petersen, 2010, p. 359).

Their work solves the problem of differentiating between how anxiety and anger are induced in a political context, but it does not examine the potential differences between the effects anger and anxiety can have on voting behaviour or vote choice.

II.5. Summary

This chapter serves as an introduction to theoretical framework presented in the following chapter and contains the essential the information on which it is based. I start by showing that, by using mobilisation and persuasion techniques, electoral campaigns try to modify the weight (or the relative importance) of some of the determinants of vote choice (partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations), as a means of increasing the parties' electoral support. They strive to mobilise their base supporters by increasing their reliance on partisanship (Clarke, et al., 2009). At the same time, campaigns try to persuade undecideds and previous voters of other parties to change their attitudes by taking steps towards decreasing the importance of their partisanship (Guzzetta, 2006) and increasing their reliance on perceptions of policy positions and party competences (Hillygus & Shields, 2008). I have further pointed out that indeed, it is empirically documented that the importance of partisanship and policy preferences in explaining vote choice do vary over time and across individuals (e.g. see Bartels, 2006a).

Turning to emotions, I have shown that one of the means by which campaigns aim to mobilise or persuade is the systematic use of emotional appeals (Ridout & Searles, 2011).

Moreover, there is compelling evidence to suggest that people's emotions have the potential to modify the relative importance of the determinants of vote choice. Due to their power to induce changes in attitudes[14], and influence the reliance on habit versus reason, emotions seem to have the capacity to regulate, to an extent, the relative importance of partisanship versus policy preferences for the electoral choice.

Consequently, as is argued in this thesis, in order to better understand what indirect effects campaigns have on vote choice, the impact of campaign-induced emotions on electoral behaviour needs to be assessed. Specifically, emotions need to be included in the vote choice function as variables which mediate the effect of partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations. However, in order to achieve this, the theory of emotions in politics needs to be re-examined and extended. This is the aim of the next chapter.

[14] Attitudes are seen to be best described by the two-component affective – cognition model: it has been shown that cognition and emotions are the components of attitudes (Breckler, 1984; Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998). As such, inducing a change in any of these components could lead to a change in the attitude itself (Johnston, 1992). In regards to persuasion some studies show that "the initial response to a persuasive communication (…) *[is]* an affective one. The favourability of the affective response may determine, to a large extent, the direction and favourability of issue-relevant thoughts and elaborations that follow" (Breckler & Wiggins, 1991, p. 195). Moreover it has also been shown that "evaluations of emotions and feelings that are associated with an attitude object are more accessible in memory than evaluations of thoughts about the object" (Verplanken, et al., 1998, p. 32).

Chapter III

Theoretical Framework

The review of the literature highlights that, by using techniques such as priming and framing, each party's electoral campaign aims to increase core supporters' reliance on partisanship. Conversely, it aims to increase the reliance on policy preferences and leader evaluations of out-party supporters, while decreasing the reliance on their partisanship. A closer look at the campaign management literature also illustrates that in order to achieve these goals electoral campaigns are designed to appeal to reason and, more importantly, manipulate through *emotion* (see e.g. Guzzetta, 2006; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Shea & Burton, 2006).

Even though campaigns place great emphases on emotions, academic literature overlooks their role. Studies focus almost entirely on the reasoned or rational component of a campaign (Green, et al., 1995; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). In other words, the extent of our knowledge about the effects of campaigns rests on the implicit assumptions that campaigns only appeal to reason and that their effects are mainly channelled through the information they provide voters about policy positions, issues or leaders. Such studies opened the road to understanding campaigns and their effects, but we must build on the valuable information they provide and move forward. Thus, in order to attain a broader understanding of the effects of campaigns, the role of emotions needs to be incorporated in our models. Political campaigns are "an emotionally laden field" (Webber, 2006, p. 15) and there are "systematic patterns to the use of specific emotional appeals in political campaigns" (Ridout & Searles, 2011, p. 454). Furthermore, humans interpret political events

through their affective responses (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 672), which, if discounted can lead to model misspecification (Conover & Feldman, 1986).

By examining the role of emotions, this thesis aims to increase our understanding of how electoral campaigns can indirectly influence political behaviour in the UK. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework that guides the analyses.

Taking the Theory of Affective Intelligence as a starting point, I extend the theory of emotions in politics by incorporating the link between an emotion and the political entity it is experienced towards. I then discuss the behavioural consequences of emotions and show that the same emotion can have completely diverging effects when experienced in relation to different political objects (i.e. parties). Thereafter, by introducing the vote choice function, I discuss the moderating effect emotions have on the determinants of vote choice. Finally, I present the testable hypotheses.

III.1. Experiencing emotions: the link between emotionality and parties

The proponents of the Theory of Affective Intelligence clearly define the link between emotions and the political entity they are experienced towards: *a person can feel anxiety only towards his preferred party and he can feel anger only towards an out-party* (MacKuen, et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2011). This narrow focus[15], which can partly be attributed to the specificities of the theory, can lead to an underdeveloped and slightly biased view of the political consequences of emotions.

Considering the psychological theories of identity one can easily conclude that emotions can be induced by a variety of social and political stimuli linked, or not, to one's

[15] Aside from the work of Marcus and colleagues, other research linking emotional states and vote choice has focused on single party contexts. Both Brader (2006) and Redlawsk, Civettini and Lau (2007) base their results on experiments in which they reproduces a campaign within the context of US primary elections. Therefore, it is only possible to observe how the preferred party is able to induce emotions.

preferred party (see Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). I argue that this link between emotions and the entity towards which they are induced is of a critical importance for the correct evaluation of the political-behavioural effects of emotions. As I show below, the behavioural consequences of emotions are necessarily dependent on the political object they are experienced towards: the same emotion can have completely diverging effects when experienced in relation to different (opposing) political parties. This, in turn, has a significant effect on determining the circumstances under which emotions regulate the importance of reason versus habit, of issues versus partisanship.

The Theory of Affective Intelligence, by drawing almost exclusively on the neuropsychological approach of understanding emotions, lacks the theoretical capability to acknowledge that the same emotion can have distinct and different effects depending on whom it is experienced towards. In other words, the TAI views the effect of a given emotion as absolute (Marcus, 2002). To overcome this, I follow in Brader's (2005, 2006) footsteps, and rely on the cognitive appraisal approach (Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 2001).

III.2. The induction and behavioural consequences of emotions

The explicit incorporation of this link into the theory of emotional politics opens the road to a re-examination of the emotional-behavioural patterns predicted by the existing theory. I discuss this in the following section by examining each specific emotion separately: enthusiasm, anxiety and anger. To facilitate a clear understanding of the theoretical framework, I set the discussion in a two-party system, with strong and disciplined parties.

I focus on four elements of the political-emotional process: the political entity towards which the emotion is experienced; the psychological reaction; the behaviour pattern; and the political relevance. The political entity refers to the party the emotion is directed towards. This can be the preferred party or the out-party. The psychological

reaction denotes the changes in the decision making process: reliance on habit versus the induction of reason. The behavioural pattern indicates the typical behaviour induced by the combination of the political entity and the psychological reaction. Finally, relevance to politics indicates what concrete political outcomes are favoured by the combination of the first three elements.

III.2.1. Enthusiasm[16]

The TAI argues that enthusiasm is primarily experienced towards one's preferred party. Enthusiasm is produced by the disposition system, and being intrinsically linked to a habitual activity (Marcus, 2002) it is an outcome generated by the successful completion of the habit (Marcus, et al., 2000). Consequently, a person is very unlikely to feel enthusiasm towards an out-party, as voting for such a political entity is by no means habitual. As such, for the case of enthusiasm, I believe Marcus' theory stands: it is indeed appropriate to state that "enthusiasm towards a preferred candidate should be the norm" (Redlawsk, et al., 2007, p. 178). Table II.1 in Chapter II illustrates the political–emotional process of enthusiasm.

Finally, according to Brader (2006), enthusiasm is induced by stimuli (audio, video or print) in which the party is framed positively.

III.2.2. Anxiety[17]

Marcus and colleagues (2000, 2007 and 2010) claim that anxiety can only be experienced towards the voter's preferred party: "[*i*]t is anxiety about *our* habits that initiates the active

[16] In Lazarus' (1991) classification of emotions, the term enthusiasm is not used to describe a specific emotion. However, consistent with both Lazarus (1991) and Marcus et al. (2006) it is used to operationalize a set of goal-congruent and goal-relevant emotions such as: joy; happiness; pride; hope; affection; etc.

[17] According to Marcus et al. (2006), anxiety more generally encompasses the following: fear; anxiousness and worry.

consideration of political life. Hence, it is what 'our party', 'our candidate' is doing that is the focus (…)" (Marcus, et al., 2011, p. 12). They show that once anxiety is induced, habit is halted and reason triggered. The anxious individual will now search for information about the threatening situation and consciously evaluate the choices in front of him. The outcome of this reasoned process is not prescribed by the theory: the individual can either dismiss the thereat and go ahead with the activity, or he can validate the thereat and choose a different course of action (Marcus, et al., 2011; Marcus, et al., 2000). Thus, the theory cannot, and is not meant to, predict vote choice: "fear does not guarantee a change of mind but, (…) it offers the best shot at doing so" (Brader, 2006, p. 143). However, what the theory does claim is that if a person experiences anxiety towards his preferred party, he will collect information and rationally analyse it. Consequently, he will cast his vote not according to habit, but as a result of reason. Finally, the authors argue that anxiety should not affect turnout (Marcus et al., 2000)

Marcus et al.'s (2000) argument is quite compelling, but it is limited: the possibility that anxiety might also be experienced towards an out party is discounted. They construct their argument based on the interactions between the disposition and the surveillance subsystems. They explain that the surveillance system, which is responsible for inducing anxiety, scans the environment and identifies potentially threatening situations that are connected to the habitual activity (Damasio, 1994). They follow this up by arguing that a person is unlikely to experience anxiety towards an out-party because, as long as no threats relating to the successful completion of the habit are identified, the surveillance system is not engaged and anxiety is not induced (MacKuen, et al., 2010; Marcus, et al., 2011). In other words, the TAI argues that if a voter is content with his preferred party, and no threat relating to that party is identified, the actions of the out-party are irrelevant for the voters' political-emotional state.

However, the surveillance system, much like the primary appraisal system detailed by Lazarus (1991, pp. 149-152), constantly scans the environment for potential threats. In the political environment, threats perceived to impact a person's well-being can easily emerge from the opposition. While agreeing with Marcus' postulates on anxiety, I also argue that experiencing anxiety is not, by any means, limited to one's preferred party. Consistent with Lazarus, one can easily feel anxious towards any political object, including an out-party. The following hypothetical example should shed further light on my argument:

> Ever since he can remember, John was an avid supporter of Party A. But, unfortunately Party A is not doing so well in the polls, and Party B might possibly win the elections. John is not fond of Party B: its policy proposals regarding the economy and jobs alarm him. As such, the prospect of Party B actually winning the elections makes John feel quite anxious. Thus, John thinks about this issue and decides to visit the headquarters of Party A where he offers to volunteer in their campaign effort. He thinks that maybe if he himself helped out, the chances of Party A winning would increase, which would alleviate his fears.

The idea this hypothetical example conveys is that anxiety can very realistically be experienced towards an out-party, in which case the behavioural consequences will differ from the pattern prescribed by the TAI. In the example above, anxiety was caused by the unease produced by the prospect of Party B winning. John's reaction, in accordance with Lazarus' theory, was to try and extricate himself from the threatening situation that was causing his anxiety. In a political setting, this can be achieved by taking action perceived to increase one's preferred party's chances of winning the elections, which points towards involvement in politics. Anxiety experienced towards an out-party has no negative bearing on the habitual activity of voting for the preferred party; rather it actually strengthens the habit. With respect to turnout, these psychological mechanisms are consistent with the assumptions of the stimulation hypothesis. Both Kahn and Kenney (1999) and Finkel and Geer (1998) argue that negative campaigning increase turnout because people get worried

about the potential outcome of the election and following a risk avoidance strategy they go to the polls. Bridging these two literatures on emotions and negative campaigning, I thus posit that negative communication that induces anxiety towards an individual's out-party increases the likelihood of turnout. Table III.1 illustrates the political emotional process of anxiety. The section in *italics* represents the contribution this thesis makes to the theory.

To conclude, I argue that, consistent with Marcus and colleagues, anxiety induces information search and reasoned thinking, but *if and only if* it is experienced towards one's preferred party. As argued above, if anxiety is experienced towards an out-party it should lead to a heightened reliance on habit and involvement in politics.

Table III.1.
The psychological and behavioural consequences of anxiety

Consequences	The emotion	
	Anxiety	***Anxiety***
	Experienced towards the preferred party	*Experienced towards an out-party*
Psychological reaction	Reasoned thinking	*Reliance on habit*
Behavioural Pattern	Search for information	*Involvement in politics*
Impact on voting behaviour	Breaking with habit. Decreased effect of partisanship and increased effect of policy considerations	*Increased turnout. Increased effect of partisanship*

Note: The section in *italics* represents the contribution this thesis makes to the theory.

III.2.3. Anger[18]

Looking now at anger, the expectations are less clear cut. Even if anger was not incorporated in the original version of the TAI (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, et al., 2000), Marcus (2002) and MacKuen et al. (2010) tried to make the concept compatible with their theory. They argue that anger can be experienced towards an out-party, but not towards one's preferred party. They view anger, like enthusiasm, as a consequence of the

[18] Marcus and colleagues (2006) place anger in the same category with aversion; loathing; bitterness; resentfulness; hatred; disgust. When referring to anger, MacKuen et al. (2010) and Marcus et al. (2000) use the term 'aversion', while Marcus (2002) uses the term 'loathing'.

disposition system. It is seen as habitual emotion triggered by a history of negative feelings towards an entity. However, given that a person cannot experience such feelings (in a habitual way) towards his preferred party, they conclude that anger can only be experienced towards an out-party (Marcus, 2002). The behavioural consequences which they attribute to anger are a stronger reliance on habit coupled the freeze of information search (Marcus, 2002).

Later, MacKuen et al. (2010) try to show that anger is induced by familiar threatening situations, while anxiety by unfamiliar threats. However, Brader et al. (2010) and Bang-Petersen (2010), falsify their claims and point out that anger is actually induced when a person can attribute blame for a negative outcome.

While agreeing with Marcus and colleagues that an out-party might cause anger for some voters, I also believe that anger can be induced by the preferred party. According to the Identity Theory "distress may arise if feedback from others – in the form of reflected appraisals or perceptions of the self suggested by others' behaviour – is perceived to be incongruent with one's identity" (Burke 1980, 1991 as cited by Hogg, et al., 1995, p. 257). However, aside from the work of Marcus and his colleagues, there are no studies available that argue or show that anger can be experienced towards one's own party. Thus, in order to be able to properly include anger in the theory of emotional politics guidance must be sought elsewhere. The cognitive appraisal approach to the study of emotions (Lazarus, 1991) is, again, the most appropriate framework to rely on.

According to the cognitive appraisal approach anger can be induced by entities to which people feel close. Moreover, the production of anger is linked to responsibility and blame attribution: a person will experience anger when faced with a threatening event or situation that he or she believes was a result of the object's actions and for which the object is responsible (Bang-Petersen, 2010; Brader, 2006; Lazarus, 1991). Following this logic, it

makes sense that the voter's preferred party can be the object of anger. If the voter realises that his preferred party took a series of actions which led to a decrease in his perceived well-being and thinks that the party is fully responsible for those actions (i.e. the actions could have been avoided), the voter is prone to experience anger (Brader, et al., 2010). Consistent with Brader (2010), Bang-Petersen (2010), MacKuen (2010) and Lazarus (1991) the behavioural consequence of anger tends to be punishment. Marcus and colleagues show that if anger is experienced towards an out-party, punishment is expressed by heavier reliance on habit – i.e. voting for the preferred party (MacKuen, et al., 2010) and similar to anxiety experienced towards an out-party, an increase in the likelihood of turnout.

In contrast, I argue that if anger is experienced towards the preferred party the punishment reaction will be manifested by the suspension of the habit (i.e. partisanship), as speculated by Ridout and Searles (2011), and the increase of information search and heightened reliance on rational calculations. Having emotionally 'decided' not to vote for the preferred party, the voter is now faced with having to choose a course of action: abstain from voting or vote for an out-party. I argue that, at this stage, the choice of the specific course of action is guided by reason. As a result of discounting one's own party as a viable recipient of the vote, the surveillance system is activated and openness to new information, along with the predisposition for reason, is induced. The voter, having decided to punish his party by not voting for it, will now search for information about the out-party and, by way of a reason, will decide whether to vote for that party or to abstain[19]. This means that anger experienced towards the preferred party is likely to decrease turnout.

[19] Of course, if after gathering information, owing to the nature of that information, the surveillance system identifies threats linked to the out party and induces anxiety, the voter, having previously discounted his own party as a viable candidate for his vote, will inevitably abstain. In other words, if the voter has negative emotions in relation to all the political parties, he will abstain from voting.

Hence, I seek to establish that the political behavioural consequences of anger are not limited to the strengthened reliance on habit, as has been previously theorised; rather, depending on the object of anger, this emotion can also lead to a break with habit, information search and reason, but it could also increase the chances of withdrawal from politics (i.e. decreased participation). The emotional-political process of anger is highlighted in Table III.2. The section in *italics* represents the contribution this thesis is making to the theory.

Table III.2.
The psychological and behavioural consequences of anger

Consequences	The emotion	
	Anger	**Anger**
	Experienced towards the preferred party	Experienced towards an out-party
Psychological reaction	*Reasoned thinking / Desire for retaliatory action*	Reliance on habit / desire for retaliatory action
Behavioural Pattern	*Search for information*	Halts information search. Avoidance of the target
Impact on voting behaviour	*Breaking with habit. Decreased effect of partisanship and increased effect of policy considerations. Increased propensity of withdrawal*	Increased effect of partisanship.

Note: The section in *italics* represents the contribution this thesis makes to the theory.

In summary, this section argues that the political relevance of anxiety and anger have been underestimated by the current literature, which unavoidably led to an incomplete understanding of how emotions influence politics. As such, based on both the neuropsychological and cognitive appraisal approaches to the study of emotions, I contribute to the theory of emotions in politics by re-examining the potential behavioural consequences of these emotions. Consequently, I argue that depending on which political party the emotion is experienced towards, anxiety, besides inducing reason, can also strengthen the reliance on habit. Similarly, anger, while strengthening reliance on habit, can also trigger reason.

As previously noted the TAI was designed for, and tested on, a two party system. Moreover, the previous discussion was also set in a two-party context. Consequently, to broaden the theory, its applicability in a multiparty system (such as the UK) needs to be discussed. Generalizing the theory for a multiparty context has no bearing on its claims pertaining to how emotions are produced or what their behavioural consequences are, but rather on the political relevance of emotions. Institutions, such as party systems, do not influence how emotions are induced. Emotions were defined as pre-conscious reactions to the environment; as such, their appearance cannot be directly contingent on the effects of institutions.

In a two-party system the voter is only faced with a dichotomous choice between his preferred party and the out-party. Thus, voting for the opposition can more easily be linked to negative emotions (see Marcus, 2000). If for instance, anxiety is experienced towards the preferred party and the threat is deemed valid the person is likely to vote for the other party. Consequently, negative emotions experienced towards the preferred party can be used to predict a potential vote for the other party (see Marcus, 2000).

Conversely, in a multiparty system, due to the higher number of parties such a link between emotions and vote choice cannot be made. Thus, once negative emotions towards the preferred party are induced, a reasoned decision making process begins and the outcome will, in theory, follow the principles of political rationality. Therefore, in this context, the role of reason is more pronounced: instead of a simple decision between two parties, the voter is now faced with having to decide between a preferred party and any number of less preferred parties, that is, out-parties.

Having extended the theory of emotions in politics, in the following section I discuss the links between campaigns, emotions and electoral behaviour.

III.3. Campaigns, emotions and electoral behaviour

I previously discussed that one of the primary aims of an electoral campaign is persuasion. However, there is no consensus as to whether campaigns actually manage to influence peoples' electoral choices. While campaign professionals claim that campaigns have a significant effect on vote choice, the academic literature is dominated by the consensus of minimal effects.

Campaigns are the highlights of politicians' careers and are implemented with the conviction that they will exert influence (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Green & Gerber, 2004; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Thurber & Nelson, 1995). However, academic studies cannot find this presumed influence (Bartels, 2006a). The reason behind this can be attributed to the approach of minimal effects. Berelson and Lazarsfeld (Berelson, et al., 1954; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948) very early on introduced the idea that campaigns do not matter. This prevailing consensus (Brady, et al., 2006, p. 4) was further strengthened by the lack of appropriate data for analysing campaigns[20] (Johnston et al., 2006).

Another factor that, I argue, contributed towards the perpetuation the minimal effects principle was the method through which the effects of campaigns were operationalized and analysed. Much of the literature pertaining to this field assesses the direct effects campaigns have on behaviour (Bartels, 2006a; Fournier, Nadeau, Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004). Such studies often conclude that the effect of the campaign was minimal, if at all present. Not having direct effects does not, however, mean that campaigns do not have *any* effects at all. There is openness in the literature towards accepting that campaigns do indeed matter. Ansolabehere (2006b) notes:

[20] Data collection efforts were mainly focused on Michigan style data, which is not appropriate for testing campaign effects (Johnston et al., 2006).

> "Many social scientists analyse elections as regular phenomena that are predictable on the basis of factors determined outside the campaign, such as economic performance; others think of elections as highly dependent on the debate that is waged through the campaigns. I assume that both are right: elections are predictable and campaigns matter" (Ansolabehere, 2006b, p. 41).

Furthermore, the professional literature pertaining to campaign design and management illustrates that, in reality, campaigns *are not* designed to only directly affect vote choice (also see Hillygus & Shields, 2008). They are, however, designed to affect vote choice indirectly, by influencing the relative importance of the factors that drive it (Guzzetta, 2006; Shea & Burton, 2006).

To recapitulate, the previous chapter highlighted that a well-designed campaign aims to impact the election outcomes by modifying the relative importance of the determinants of vote choice. This is sought to be achieved in different ways for supporters of different parties. The party aims to increase the reliance on partisanship of its core supporters, while potentially decreasing their reliance on rational-factual factors, such as policy preferences or evaluations of the leaders. Conversely, in an attempt to persuade out-party supporters or undecideds (floating voters) the aim is to decrease their reliance on partisanship (or latent partisanship) and increase the importance given to policy preferences or leader evaluation. By loosening the hold of partisanship and making out-party supporters focus on issues, the party can now attempt to modify the voter's perception of the distance between him and the this party.

One of the most important ways in which a campaign aims to modify the relative importance of the determinants of vote choice is through inducing emotions. I have already shown that campaigns are indeed emotional ventures and there are "systematic patterns to the use of specific emotional appeals in political campaigns" (Ridout & Searles, 2011, p. 454). Consequently, I contend that the indirect impact of campaigns on vote choice is, at

least partially, manifested through the effect campaign-induced emotions have on the relative importance of the determinants of vote choice in the vote function. Emotions, once induced by the campaign, are argued to alter the weight of the factors that determine vote choice.

Vote choice is understood here to be a function of partisanship, policy preferences, leader evaluations, evaluations of the economy and socio-demographics and campaign exposure. This function is based on the work of Clarke and his colleagues (2004; 2009), even though it does not exactly replicate their model[21]. The vote choice model employed by this research is widely used in the literature (see e.g. Lewis-Beck, et al., 2008; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979; Popkin, 1991) and has been successfully applied in previous studies of emotional effects on vote choice (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000).

Finally, I link the model presented above with the theory of emotions in politics and illustrate the effects each specific emotion is expected to have within the vote choice function (Table III.3, below[22]):

$$(VoteChoice) = \alpha + \beta_1(Partisanship) + \beta_2(PolicyPositions) + \beta_3(LeaderEvaluation) + \beta_4(Emotions) + \\ + \beta_5(Emotions * Partisanship) + \beta_6(Emotions * PolicyPositions) + \beta_7(Emotions * LeaderEvaluations) + \\ + \beta_8(EconomicEvaluations) + \beta_9(Socio - DemographicControls) + \beta_{10}(CampaignExp) + \varepsilon.$$

I argue that voters who are enthusiastic about their preferred party, or experience anxiety or anger in relation to an out-party, will give more weight to their partisan affiliation when voting and will concentrate less on policy positions or leader evaluations. Contrarily, anxiety or anger experienced in relation to one's preferred party decreases the relative importance of partisanship, while increasing the relevance of policy preferences

[21] Clarke et al. (2009) show that, in the UK, vote choice is a consequence of partisanship, policy preferences (issue positions), competency, leader evaluations and evaluations of the economy.

[22] Table III.3 presents the induction method and political effects of the emotions discussed in the previous section. The columns in *italics* represent contributions this thesis brings to the theory.

and leader evaluations. In this case, policy preferences (and leader evaluations, to an extent) are operationalized by the Euclidian distance between the issue positions of the voter and those of the party. This is consistent with the proximity voting model (Downs, 1957; Westholm, 1997), which is a subset of spatial voting[23] (McLean, 1982; Merrill & Grofman, 1999). Consequently, when a person experiences anxiety or anger towards her preferred party she will focus on issues and collect information about all (or most) parties. She will then evaluate the parties based on how far their positions are compared to her own stance. Thereafter, she will most likely vote for the party that she perceives as closest to her own position[24].

Aside from persuasion, however, campaigns also aim to mobilize voters and, as discussed in the previous sections, it is the claim of this thesis that different types of electoral communication induce distinct emotions, which affect turnout in different ways. To summarize, while enthusiasm, which is induced by positive communication (see Brader, 2006), is clearly expected to mobilize, the effects of the negative emotions are less clear cut. As was discussed, anxiety is induced by negative communications which does not attribute blame and focuses on 'legitimate criticisms'. Furthermore, anxiety can be experienced either towards the preferred party or an out-party. In the first instance it is expected to have no effect on turnout, while in the second case it seen to increase the likelihood of turning out. Thus, negative communication which is targeted at the preferred party and does not attribute blame is expected to have no effect on turnout. Conversely, similar communications which is aimed at an out-party is expected to increase the likelihood of turning out.

[23] The spatial model of issue voting "focuses on how issue positions of both voters and candidates (or parties) are translated into voter preferences" (Merrill & Grofman, 1999, p. 4). Technically, both voters and parties are actors within a multidimensional policy space in which each dimension represents a distinct issue and each actor is characterised by a discrete position on each dimension.

[24] The preferred party can be still be the recipient of the person's vote, however, the driving force behind the choice to vote for the preferred party is policy proximity and not partisanship.

The second negative emotion of interest, anger, is expected to decrease turnout if it is experienced towards the preferred party, and to increase it if experienced towards an out-party. The induction of anger is linked to the attribution of blame: if the person can attribute blame for the threatening occurrence he or she will experience anger (Bang-Petersen, 2010; Brader et al., 2010). In order to credibly attribute blame, a piece of negative political communication needs to contain a harsher, stronger and more accusatory message. The demobilization hypothesis claims that it is precisely this type of communication that decreases turnout (Kahn & Kenney, 1999). Thus, if negative communication which assigns blame is targeted at the preferred party it is likely to decrease turnout. Conversely, if it is targeted towards an out-party it is expected to increase turnout.

To conclude, Figure III.1 illustrates the hypothesised relationships between campaigns, emotions and political behaviour. It is important to note that this thesis argues that the effect of campaigns on political behaviour is, at least partially, manifested through the impact of the emotions they induce. In essence, this means that emotions can be seen to mediate the effect of campaigns on political behaviour. Once campaigns induce emotions, these exert a direct effect on the likelihood of turnout, involvement in the campaign and information search (as discussed in Section III.2). However, as pointed out above, the effect of emotions on vote choice is not direct: emotions moderate the relationship between vote choice and its determinants.

Having developed the theoretical framework, in the following section I develop the hypotheses that operationalize the general research questions: *Do campaigns, through their capacity to induce specific emotions, affect electoral behaviour? If so, how is their effect manifested?*

Figure III.1.
Campaigns, emotions and electoral behaviour



III.4. Hypotheses

To test the theory I examine whether campaign communication can induce the expected emotional responses. I am interested in ascertaining whether campaigns can have the impact shown by Brader (see Table III.3), and claimed by campaign professionals (Guzzetta, 2006). Brader (2006) shows that positive campaign communication framed in an emotional way can lead to heightened levels of enthusiasm. Negative emotional communication can, on the other hand, lead to anxiety (Brader, 2006; Brader, et al., 2010). Finally, according to Brader et al. (2010) and Bang-Petersen (2010) negativity combined with blame should lead to anger. Consequently, the following hypotheses were developed:

H1: Positive campaign communication about the party a person feels closest to induces enthusiasm towards this party.

H2: Negative campaign communication which targets the voter's most preferred party induces anxiety towards this party.

H3: Negative campaign communication which targets the the voter's most preferred party and attributes blame for the actions of this partyinduces anger towards this party.

H4: Negative campaign communication that targets a different party than the one the person feels closest to induces anxiety towards that party.

H5: Negative campaign communication that targets a different party than the one the person feels closest and attributes blame for the party's actions induces anger towards that party.

The next step is to set out the hypotheses concerning the direct effect of the emotions on the different aspects of political behaviour, such as: willingness to get involved in the campaign; turnout intention and search for information.

Marcus et al. (2000) and Lazarus (1991) argue that positive emotions, embodied by enthusiasm, increase openness and outgoingness, which Brader (2006) shows heightens the willingness to get involved in political activities, such as electoral campaigns (Hypothesis 6). Similarly, I argue that anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties, also increase willingness to be involved in the campaign. However, this is now driven by the surveillance system, and acts as a defence mechanism to protect the individual from the threat: the out-party winning the elections (Hypotheses 9 and 10). Finally, as discussed in Section III.2., anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are hypothesized to decrease campaign involvement (Hypotheses 7 and 8), as the person will now be apprehensive towards the preferred party. Consequently, in order to assess the validity of the threat and make an electoral decision the voter will focus on collecting new political information about the parties. Thus, I hypothesise that anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party increase information search (Hypotheses 11 and 12).

H6: Enthusiasm directed towards a voter's preferred party increases the willingness to get involved in that party's campaign.

H7: Anxiety directed towards a voter's preferred party decreases the willingness to get involved in that party's campaign.

H8: Anger experienced towards a voter's preferred party decreases the willingness to get involved in that party's campaign.

H9: Anxiety directed towards an out-party increases the willingness to get involved in the campaign of the preferred party.

H10: Anger directed towards an out-party increases the willingness to get involved in the campaign of the preferred party.

H11: Anxiety experienced towards a voter's preferred party increases the willingness to search for information.

H12: Anger directed towards a voter's preferred party increases the willingness to search for information.

Aside from information search and campaign involvement, the theory also discusses turnout. On the one hand, as a consequence of increased outgoingness, enthusiasm is shown to increase (the likelihood of) turnout (Brader, 2006; Clarke, et al., 2009; Redlawsk, et al., 2007). Consequently, I argue that this emotion will have the same effect in the multiparty context of the UK (Hypothesis 13). On the other hand, as discussed earlier in this chapter, anger experienced towards the preferred party can induce apathy and withdrawal from politics. I argue, thus, that this emotion will act to decrease turnout intentions (Hypothesis 14). Nonetheless, there is no theoretical or empirical evidence which would suggest that anxiety experienced towards the preferred party has any impact on (the likelihood of) turnout, negative or positive. However, anxiety or anger experienced towards out-parties are thought to increase turnout intention (Hypotheses 16).

H13: Enthusiasm directed towards a voter's preferred party increases the willingness to turn out.

H14: Anger experienced towards the preferred party decreases the willingness to turn out and vote.

Table III.3.
The induction and political effects of emotions: the extended theory

	The emotion				
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	***Anxiety***	***Anger***	**Anger**
	Experienced towards the preferred party	Experienced towards the preferred party	*Experienced towards an out-party*	*Experienced towards the preferred party*	Experienced towards an out-party
How the emotion is induced (the frames)	Positive communication relative to the preferred party (devised by the preferred party)	Negative political communication regarding the preferred party (devised by an out-party)	*Negative political communication regarding an pot-party (devised by the preferred party)*	*Negative political communication regarding the preferred party which makes the attribution of blame possible (devised by an out-party)*	Negative political communication regarding an out-party which makes the attribution of blame possible (devised by the preferred party)
Expected effects in the vote choice function	Increase the weight of partisanship. No effect on the weight of policy preferences	Decrease the weight of partisanship. Increase the weight of policy preferences	*Increase the weight of partisanship. No effect on the weight of policy preferences*	*Decrease the weight of partisanship. Increase the weight of policy preferences*	Increase the weight of partisanship. No effect on the weight of policy preferences

Note: The section in *italics* represents the contribution this thesis makes to the theory.

H15: Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party does not impact turnout intention.

H16: Anxiety or anger experienced towards out-parties increases the willingness to turn out.

Finally, I present the hypotheses that operationalize the indirect effect emotions have on vote choice. This effect is argued to be manifested through the conditioning (moderating) effect emotions have on the effects of partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations in the vote choice function. Enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties are argued to increase the effect of partisanship (Hypotheses 17, 20 and 21). However, consistent with Marcus et al. (2000) I contend that anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party decrease reliance on partisanship and increase reliance on policy preferences and evaluations of the leaders (Hypotheses 18a-18c and 19a – 19c).

H17: Enthusiasm towards a voter's preferred party increases the importance of partisanship for vote choice.

H18a: Anxiety directed towards a voter's preferred party decreases the importance of partisanship for vote choice.

H18b: Anxiety directed towards a voter's preferred party increases the importance of issues for vote choice.

H18c: Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party increases the relevance of leader evaluations for vote choice.

H19a: Anger experienced towards a voter's preferred party decreases the importance of partisanship for vote choice.

H19b: Anger experienced towards a voter's preferred party increases the importance of issues for vote choice.

H19c: Anger experienced towards the preferred party increases the relevance of leader evaluations for vote choice.

H20: Anxiety directed towards an out-party increases the importance of partisanship for vote choice.

H21: Anger directed towards an out-party increases the importance of partisanship for vote choice.

III.5 Summary

Drawing on knowledge from multiple disciplines, and extending the theory of emotions in politics, I developed a theoretical framework to test the effects electoral campaigns have on political behaviour in the UK. I argue that the effects campaigns have are indirect and are manifested through the emotions they induce. The emotions campaigns induce are expected to have a direct effect on political behaviour, except for vote choice. Emotions do not impact vote choice directly; however, they influence the relative importance of the factors determining vote choice. They act as moderators of the impact different determinants have on vote choice. Consequently, I contend that campaigns affect vote choice by inducing changes in the strength of the effects emotions have on the electoral importance voters give to partisanship versus issues and leaders.

Therefore, I argue that in order to mobilize a party's core supporters a campaign would aim to induce enthusiasm. Enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party, would heighten the reliance on political habit, that is, voting based on partisanship. Moreover, this emotion would also increase the likelihood of turnout and involvement in the campaign. Thereafter, I contend that the induction of anxiety or anger towards out-parties would also increase the willingness to get involved in the electoral campaign and would strengthen the habitual activity: voting based on partisanship. Furthermore, both these emotions are seen to increase the likelihood of turnout.

To persuade out-party supporters a campaign would aim to decrease their reliance on partisanship and concomitantly increase the reliance on policy preferences and leader evaluations. This can be achieved through the induction of anxiety or anger towards the

prospective voter's preferred party. As this chapter shows, both emotions have the power to halt habit and induce reason. Consequently, the relative importance of partisanship will decrease, more importance being given to issues or leaders. With respect to other types of political behaviour, both emotions are expected to decrease the willingness to get involved in the campaign, and anger is also expected to decrease turn out. Moreover, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are also seen to increase the search for political information.

This chapter also contributes to the theory of emotions in politics by linking the experience of an emotion with a political entity. I argued that the psychological reactions and behavioural consequences of emotions are contingent on the political party (i.e. the preferred party or an out-party) towards which they are experienced. As such, I argue that the same emotion can have different effects if experienced in relation to different parties. Finally, I show that even if the theory was originally designed for the very particular two-party political context of the United States, it is well suited to be applied in any context and is not bound by any particularities of the American institutional system.

Chapter IV

Emotions and the British General Election of 2010

Resting on evidence from the campaign management literature, the theory described in the previous chapter argues that campaigns can influence political behaviour indirectly, through the emotions they induce. Indeed, a review of the campaign management literature shows that in trying to influence people's behaviour, campaigns "often tap an emotional chord" (Shea & Burton, 2006, p. 153). While this literature, which prescribes campaign best practices, techniques and strategies, is very useful for understanding how campaigns are designed and implemented, it does not present any scientific verification of the claims it supports. As such, even though it is clear that campaigns aim to modify behaviour by manipulating emotions (Shea & Burton, 2006), it is not at all clear whether in reality campaigns actually succeed in modifying people's levels of emotionality: there is no scientific evidence pertaining to the link between exposure to a real campaign and emotions.

Thus, the first analytical step this thesis takes is to assess whether, consistent with the claims of political professionals, a large-scale campaign does indeed modify the emotionality of voters.

Based on secondary sources, the first part of the chapter succinctly describes the campaign efforts of the three main British parties in the lead-up to the 2010 General Elections. Thereafter, using panel data collected before these elections, I analyse whether emotions varied during the campaign period. The final part of the chapter examines the way in which voters with different partisanships reacted to the campaign environment.

IV.1. The Campaign

The General Elections of 2010, and the campaign they were preceded by, occurred after 13 years of Labour government, at a time when Britain was experiencing a deep economic recession. "The campaign began with the Conservatives enjoying a healthy lead over Labour and the prospect of the Tories consolidating their advantage" (Bartle & Allen, 2011, p. xiii). However the outcome led to a hung parliament and the ensuing Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. Nonetheless, "the 2010 campaign was one of the most remarkable in recent history" (Bartle & Allen, 2011, p. xiii).

On the one hand, inspired by the American model of presidential campaigns, the three main parties agreed to have their leaders go head-to-head in three televised debates. Their effects in the polls were immediate; however, it is still unclear whether the changes in leader evaluation induced by the debates actually translated into changes in vote choice. For example, even though Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, saw his popularity dramatically increase after the debates, the party itself did not perform better than 5 years ago (Bartle & Allen, 2011; Denver, 2010).

On the other hand, "the 2010 British Electoral campaign was billed as the internet election, the social media election" (Newman, 2010, p. 3). All parties, used the internet (e.g. YouTube, Facebook and Tweeter) to target voters. However, even though social media and networking sites were more prominent than ever before, "most people still received the news through mainstream media" (Newman, 2010, p. 11) and traditional campaign techniques[25], such as posters, were still heavily employed (Burgess, 2011).

[25]British campaigns are traditionally based on TV broadcasts, the publication of party manifestos, press conferences, large posters and newspaper ads (Butler, 1993; Butler & Ranney, 1992; Crewe & Gosschalk, 1994; Leonard & Mortimore, 2001). Moreover, Scammell and Langer (2006) divide British political campaigning into print and broadcast advertising. Print media such as ads in newspapers and billboards are usually paid adverts. Broadcasts, on the other hand (such as the PEB, talk shows and news casts) are free. Consistent with the trend of modernisation they note that the PEBs became more focused on issues positions. (Scammell, 1995; Scammell & Langer, 2006). Furthermore, it must be noted that British

IV.1.1. The Conservatives

The Conservatives began their campaign with the presentation of their overarching message: The Big Society (as opposed to the Big State). This platform was a collection of different policies, which were (loosely) united by a promise of respect and responsibility towards the citizen. However, this strategy was not tested prior to its launch in the campaign and was consequently dropped soon after its launch (Green, 2010, p. 100): people just didn't understand it. This left the party without a clear and coherent campaign strategy. Rennard (2011) observes "the relative weakness and inconsistency of the Conservatives' national messaging", there being frequent confusion about what their message actually was (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2010). Aside from lacking a clear direction, Kavanagh and Cowley (2010) also note that the Conservative campaign lacked efficient coordination. This was especially evident with regards to the advertising and poster campaigns. There were great internal tensions between members who favoured staying positive and strengthening the Conservative *brand* and those who were in favour of attacking Labour (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2010). Wilson (2011) argues that the brand of the party is not solely defined by pledges and promises but also by the credibility and competence; and in this respect, in many people's eyes the party had not changed at all since 1997 (Wilson, 2011).

During the campaign, the Conservatives focused on economic competitiveness and national and international security, but more importantly steered the party towards issues which were not traditionally Conservative: public service improvement, quality of life, global poverty and social justice, "their interpretation of which went further than the simple redistributive approach favoured by the left" (Wilson, 2011, p. 149). This is perhaps

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campaigns have evolved from mainly grass-roots activities to complex media campaigns (Denver & Hands, 2002; Denver & Hands, 1997; Leonard & Mortimore, 2001). They started employing a market-oriented marketing approach (Lees-Marshment, 2002, 2008) which includes techniques of segmentation (Heerde, 2007) and modern advertising (Mooij, 1998).

what explains Green's conclusion: "on policy, few voters seemed to understand what Conservatives stood for" (Green, 2010, p. 91).

As expected, the campaign targeted both core voters and floating voters (Wilson, 2011). This can easily be illustrated by looking at their poster campaigns. To target core voters the party released a set of 5 posters depicting a ready-to-work Cameron pictured with his sleeves rolled up. A positive electoral pledge was included (e.g. *let's cut benefits for those who refuse to work*). These posters (displayed in Appendix 1), however, lacked any emotional content, which could have induced enthusiasm. The floating voters were targeted through a set of three posters which pictured people not traditionally associated with the party, who now were pledging to vote for it. The caption read: *"I've never voted Tory before but…"* (Appendix 1).

IV.1.2. Labour

The Labour campaign, which is argued to have prevented a Conservative majority (Fielding, 2010, p. 81), is seen to have been much more coherent, displaying a clear strategy. They appealed to both core and swing voters. To target core voters the party proposed to make spending cuts but maintain public spending in education and health services while also increasing taxation for the 'better off' (Fielding, 2010). At the same time "Labour presented itself to swing voters as economically competent while casting the Conservatives as threatening the futures of many voters – core as well as swing" (Fielding, 2010, p. 77). The issues they concentrated on included: economic recovery; family living standards; front-line services; development of high-tech economy; fairness in communities, which included the proposal for the point based immigration system (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2010).

On a tactical level, Labour aimed to gain votes from two sources: increased turnout and from Lib Dem and nationalist voters (Cook, 2011, p. 159). Consequently, in terms of

advertising and posters Labour favoured an equilibrated combination of both positive and negative campaigning. For instance, the first and second PEB used an uplifting tone and spoke about 'brilliant Britain' and how Labour would make it better. However the final PEB attacked the Conservatives and depicted 'a nightmare on your streets', in which state representatives were taking child benefits away (Fielding, 2010). Moreover, "the fear tactics deployed by Labour over welfare and benefits" are claimed to have disincentivised soft-Labour floaters from voting Lib Dem (Cutts, Fieldhouse, & Russell, 2010). Finally, they attacked the Conservatives by portraying them as still being Thatcherites.

IV.1.3. The Liberal Democrats

The Lib Dems, being the third party in the system "didn't really feature in anyone's thinking"; the campaign was mainly fought between Labour and the Conservatives (Fielding, 2010, p. 77). However, as Labour was aiming for a coalition with the Liberal Democrats it did not especially target them. Nonetheless, the prominence of the party increased after the first debate, due to the performance of Nick Clegg (see Cleggmania).

In regards to issues, the Liberal Democrats proposed a four step approach: fair taxes (increasing taxes for middle and higher earners); fair chances (the pupil premium); fair future (focusing on economic and environmental issues) and fair deal, i.e. cleaning up politics (Cutts, et al., 2010; Kavanagh & Cowley, 2010). Following their traditional strategies Lib Dem fought both a ground war in the constituencies and a national air war. They fought Conservatives in seats held by Lib Dem and fought Labour in seats where Lib Dem was second (Rennard, 2011).

IV.1.4. Emotions in the campaign

To achieve their aims and put the message across each party utilised a variety of techniques, such as direct mail, pamphlets, PEB's, posters, messages in leader debates, etc. In order to assess the emotion-inducing potential of the campaign I briefly examine the poster campaign. Of course, all campaign techniques would have aimed to induce emotions, however, according to Brader (2006), visual images, *par excellence*, are one of the best tools used to induce emotion. Consequently, posters are a good indicator of whether a campaign was aiming to induce emotions.

Each party used positive posters to try to increase enthusiasm. For instance, Picture IV.1 displaying Gordon Brown, transmits a positive message, but more importantly it displays the Union Jack in the background transposed on a picture of clear blue sky. This suggests patriotism and tries to indicate that better times are coming, which, as Brader (2006) shows, is prone to induce enthusiasm.

Picture IV.1.
Labour poster - positive

On the other hand, the Conservatives' posters could be seen as less prone to induce emotions. One set of such posters introduced in support of the Big Society platform are displayed below (Picture IV.2). As it is noticeable, they lack any informational, symbolic or emotional content.

Picture IV.2.
Conservative posters – positive

Even though some positive posters were used, the campaign abounded of negativity[26]. Examining negative posters, it becomes obvious that some were designed to scare people, to make them afraid for their future well-being, while others aimed to elicit anger, by attributing blame for past events or decisions. Picture IV.3 illustrates a set of two Conservative posters which were designed to induce anxiety. The posters use dark, gloomy colours, to paint an uncertain future under Labour. Similarly, Picture IV.4 and IV.5 display anxiety-inducing Labour and Lib Dem posters.

[26] According to Kavanagh (1995), in Britain negativity is seen as an undesirable import from the US and both the media and the voters claim to dislike negative campaigns. However, the author notes that this is paradoxical given that negative campaigns do gain potency due to the controversy they generate (Kavanagh, 1995) and the media is more prone to report negative news (the Nuffield Electoral studies as quoted by Kavanagh, 1995). Even more, the level of negativity of British campaigns has apparently increased in recent times (Heerde, 2007; Plasser & Plasser, 2002), even if it did not reach the levels reported in the US (Kaid, 1999; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006).

Picture IV.3.
Conservative posters - anxiety

Picture IV.4.
Labour posters - anxiety

Picture IV.5.
Lib Dem poster - anxiety



Finally, anger inducing posters were especially present in the Conservatives campaign. They introduced a series of six posters which associate some of Gordon Brown's major decisions with a negative impact on society: they are essentially blaming him for them (Picture IV.6). The lack of Labour posters which aim to induce anger is justifiable given that anger is induced through the attribution of blame, and it is much more difficult for a party in government to attribute blame for the action of a party which has been in opposition for the past 13 years.

Picture IV.6.
Conservative poster - anger



IV.2. The effects of the 2010 campaign on emotionality

Having shown that there is evidence that the campaign was, at least partially, designed to induce emotions, using panel data, I now examine the variance of emotionality during the campaign period.

It is important to clarify that the analyses undertaken in this chapter are not aimed to act, *per se*, as a test of the theory of emotions in politics. Given the lack of data it is impossible to assess the predictions of the theory with regards to the effect different types of campaign communication have on emotionality[27]. However, aside from elucidating the mechanisms through which campaigns can induce emotions (i.e. Hypotheses 1 through 5, to be tested in Chapter VI), it is first necessary to observe whether a real-life electoral campaign *does* indeed have an impact on people's emotionality. This is a critical step for the accurate evaluation of the 'indirect campaign effects' claim. If the results showed that emotions do not vary meaningfully during the campaign, or that campaign exposure does not have a substantive impact of emotionality, the emotion-mediated indirect effects claim I argue in favour of, would have to be rejected.

Even though the theory does not, *ad literam*, discuss the relationship between emotionality and campaign exposure, it nonetheless suggests quite a straightforward link between them; the expectation is that during an electoral campaign the levels of emotionality increase. Given that the campaign did attempt to induce emotions, an increase in the amount of campaign exposure can partially be interpreted as an increase in the exposure to emotion-inducing stimuli. This, according to the theory, is expected to increase the levels of emotionality. Thus, the expectation is that the levels of emotionality vary and increase as the campaign unfolds.

[27] These analyses do not test Hypotheses 1 through 5. These hypotheses link the induction of emotions with being exposed to specific types of campaign communication. The panel study contains virtually no information with regards to the tone or framing of a specific type of campaign communication the respondent interacted with or was exposed to, making it impossible to assess these particular hypotheses.

After discussing the methodology of the panel study, I analyse the differences between emotionality measured before the start and during the campaign. Thereafter, I address the link between emotionality (i.e. changes in emotionality) and exposure to the campaign.

IV.2.1. The panel data

Panel survey data are a valuable tool which can be used to assess the impact of campaigns and emotions on behaviour. It has been shown that panel data, along with rolling cross-sectional data, is the best possible type of observational data that can be used to evaluate the behavioural effects of campaigns (Bartels, 2006; Brady, Johnston, & Sides, 2006); and it is also well suited for the study of emotional development (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). More importantly, panel data has a great "capacity for capturing the complexity of human behaviour (…) and allow(s) one to control the effect of unobserved or missing variables" (Hsiao, 2007, pp. 3-4). Furthermore, by measuring attitudes, opinions and planned behaviour at different points in time, cross-time relationships can be assessed. Panel data are therefore particularly useful in this study as they can shed light on how emotions vary according to the exposure to the campaign; how they influence the intention to turn out and how they moderate the effect of the determinants of vote choice.

The data were collected within the British Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (B/CCAP) study in two waves. Both the sampling procedure and the application of the questionnaires were performed on-line by YouGov, surveying a sample of the adult population in Britain.[28] The data were collected before the 6th May 2010 General Elections.

[28] YouGov is Britain's leading internet survey company and the sample reflects the distribution of the British general population in terms of sex, region, age, partisanship, and social class, however it is not a

The first wave was fielded in late January 2010, while for the second wave people were surveyed in mid-April 2010. Utilizing the data generated by these two waves will ensure that the analysis captures the behavioural patterns displayed by the respondents before the start of the campaign and those towards the end of the campaign, thus allowing for conclusions about the effects of the campaign, and of emotions, to be drawn. Wave 1 contains 2,748 respondents and wave 2 5,847 participants. Out of these, 2,238 individuals are common in both waves. However, this research only examines the supporters of the three main parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats), thus these numbers decrease to 1,995, 4,578 and 1,594, respectively. Supporters of minor or regional parties were not included as these parties implemented small-scale campaigns which were highly targeted. Furthermore, given that the theory argues that the behavioural effects of emotions are contingent on whether they are experienced towards the preferred party or an out-party, people for whom this distinction could not be made (i.e. nonpartisans) were also omitted. Thus, the results of this study can only be used to explain the effect of the campaign for people who feel some sort of closeness to the main political parties (approx. 71% of respondents participating in both waves).

IV.2.2. The measurement of emotions

In designing the measurement of emotions, this thesis relies on Marcus et al. (2006), who develop "a series of recommendations about how to measure emotion, considering both matters of question wording and the dimensions of emotional response. [*These*]

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random probability sample. Respondents to the surveys were selected randomly from an online research panel of over 250,000 adults living in the United Kingdom. YouGov uses sophisticated recruitment and weighting schemes in efforts to offset sampling biases and offers modest financial incentives to bolster response rates, which are comparable to face-to-face surveys in the United Kingdom. A recent study comparing YouGov surveys with the British Election Study showed only small differences in the distributions of key explanatory variables in models of turnout and party choice (Sanders et al., 2007).

recommendations reflect the current state of understanding on what self-report methods best suited to measuring emotional response in survey and questionnaire-based research" (Marcus, et al., 2006, pp. 31, 43). Consequently, in each individual wave, emotions were measured through self-report questions which asked respondents to declare the frequency with which they experience a given set of emotions towards each of the three main political parties[29]. Measuring the frequency with which emotions are experienced is appropriate. Based on the work of Watson (1988), Marcus and his colleagues state that asking respondents to report the intensity with which an emotion is experienced leads to the same result as asking them to state how often the emotion is felt. Furthermore, the emotional markers[30] used to gauge the three distinct emotions have been shown by Watson to be reliable (Marcus et al., 2006, p. 41).

It needs to be noted that even though emotions are conceptualised as physiological reactions of the body in response to the external environment, they are measured using self-report items. It is acknowledged that "measuring a person's emotional state is one of the most vexing problems in affective science" (Mauss & Robinson, 2009, p. 209) and measuring it in a "comprehensive and meaningful way has been a constant challenge for emotion researchers in different disciplines of the social and behavioural sciences over a long period of time (Scherer, 2005, p. 724). Even if there are several methods used to capture emotions[31], there is no gold-standard; using a particular measure depends on the researchers' aims. As physiological measures cannot generally differentiate between

[29] The questions allowed five response options: 'very often', 'fairly often', 'occasionally', 'rarely' or 'never'. The last two options were subsequently combined into a single category: 'rarely or never'.

[30] 'Angry or bitter' to measure anger; 'anxious or afraid' to measure anxiety; 'enthusiastic, hopeful or proud' to measure enthusiasm.

[31] Measures of emotions broadly fall in two categories: 1. self-report measures in which the subject describes his emotional state; and 2. Physiological measures through which bodily reactions are measured. Physiological measures include: Recording vital signs (heart rate; blood pressure; breathing); Electrodermal response (measuring the electrical conductance of the skin); Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (pinpoints the areas of the brain which engage in emotional processing); Electromyography (measuring facial muscle responses); Electroencephalography (measuring the electrical activity on the surface of the brain).

distinct emotions (they can accurately measure arousal, however this only indicates that the person is experiencing an emotional state), self-report measures are most widely used. This approach "goes back to the origin of language and the emergence of words and expressions describing clearly separable states (…), it has a venerable scientific history in the sense that since the dawn of behavioural science philosophers have used emotion words to analyze human emotional experience"[32] (Scherer, 2005, p. 717). Employing a self-report measure means that what we are actually measuring is the conscious experience of emotion, i.e. the feeling. However, as Robinson and Clore point it out, "people's beliefs about their emotion are no doubt based to a certain extent on their experiences over time" (Robinson & Clore, 2002, p. 212) and thus feelings are correlated with emotions (Scherer, 2005). Scherer notes:

> While both nonverbal behaviour (e.g. facial and vocal expression) and physiological indicators can be used to infer the emotional state of a person, there are no objective methods of measuring the subjective experience of a person during an emotion episode. Given the definition of feeling as a subjective cognitive representation, reflecting a unique experience of mental and bodily changes in the context of being confronted with a particular event, there is no access other than to ask the individual to report on the nature of the experience. In many cases researchers provide participants with more or less standardized lists of emotion labels with different kinds of answer formats to obtain information on the qualitative nature of the affective state experienced (Scherer, 2005, p. 712).

Furthermore, the emotions the panel study aims to measure have been shown by Plutchik (1980, p. 138) to be primary emotions which are identifiable at 'all phylogenetic levels in the animal kingdom' (Richins, 1997). Scherer (2005, p. 717), referencing Darwin (1998), speaks about the 'evolutionary continuity' of this set of primary emotions which

[32] See Holbrook and Westwood (1989) for an example of self-report emotional scales used in advertising research; see Dillard and Shen (2007) for a discussion of self-report emotion scales used in surveys.

have "observable physiological and expressive symptoms that accompany them" and are uniquely represented in the natural language. The semantic categories expressing discrete emotions "seem to correspond to unique response patterns, i.e. emotion-category specific patterns of facial and vocal expressions as well as physiological response profiles" (Scherer, 2005, p. 717). Thus, Scherer concludes that the results obtained with this approach are highly plausible and easily interpretable. Furthermore, Mauss and Robinson (2009, p. 213) argue that the validity of such measures increases if they relate to emotions that are experienced in close temporal proximity to the time of measurement.

IV.2.3. The variance of emotions

The panel study provides information regarding the frequency with which a person experiences particular emotions at two different points in time (before the beginning and towards the end of the campaign). Therefore, by comparing the two frequencies we can observe whether the emotional states of the respondents were altered during the campaign period. This can be appropriately tested by performing dependent t-tests for paired samples (Sheskin, 2007). The expectation is that if the campaigns of the three parties succeeded in inducing emotions, the means measured at t2 should be different than at t1. That is, the frequency with which emotions are experienced should differ and be higher during the campaign compared to before the campaign.

The results of the t-tests are presented in Table IV.1. They show that there are indeed significant differences between the frequencies with which emotions are experienced before the campaign versus mid-campaign. Anxiety and anger towards the Conservative Party has increased by .406 and .389 on a four point scale. However, the levels of enthusiasm experienced towards the Conservative party remain virtually unchanged.

In regards to the emotions experienced towards the Labour Party, it can be noticed that the average level of enthusiasm has increased by .051. Nonetheless, the frequencies with which anxiety and anger are experienced towards this party have actually decreased.

Table IV.1.
Differences between the mean frequency of each emotion mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1)

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
	Conservatives		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.008	.406 *	.389 *
	(.023)	(.027)	(.024)
	Labour		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.051 *	- .049 *	-.084 *
	(.022)	(.023)	(.020)
	Lib Dem		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.264 *	.288 *	.138 *
	(.025)	(.026)	(.025)

Results of dependent t-tests for paired samples.
N = 1594; * = p< .05. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses.

Finally, in the case of the Liberal Democrats, both enthusiasm and the negative emotions seem to have significantly increased. The average frequency with which enthusiasm is experienced towards this party increased with .264, while the increase for anxiety is .288 and for anger .138.

The results shown here are generally consistent with the expectation of emotions increasing during the campaign[33]. Nonetheless, it appears that the levels of anger and anxiety towards the Labour Party have decreased while the frequency with which these emotions are experienced towards, for instance, the Conservative party have increased significantly. This raises an interesting question. Given that the Labour party was in power for the previous 13 years, its final years of term coinciding with the severe economic depression, would plausibly lead to the expectation that people display the highest level of anger and anxiety towards this party. The graph presented in Figure IV.1 displays in grey

[33] However, at this point in the research, it cannot be necessarily claimed that the campaign caused (or influenced) the observed differences.

the relative percentage variations in the frequency of the emotions measured mid-campaign, compared to before the start of the campaign. Comparing the mean changes in the frequency of emotions to the baseline set at *t1* shows that even though the level of enthusiasm towards the Conservatives virtually stayed the same between the two waves and the level of enthusiasm towards the Labour party increased (by 4.5%), in the mid-campaign period, the mean frequency of experiencing enthusiasm towards the Conservative Party was still higher than that of the Labour Party. Similarly, even if the levels of anxiety and anger towards the Labour Party decreased (by 3.2% and 4.9%) and the levels pertaining to the Conservatives increased (by 32.8% and 27.8%), respondents still declare that, on average, they feel anxious or angry towards the Labour party more often than they do towards the Conservatives.

Figure IV.1.
The mean frequency with which emotions are experienced, pre-campaign and mid-campaign



Legend: The procentages displayed in grey represent the amount with which the mean of each emotion has changed in mid-campaign, compared to before the start of the campaign (pre-campaign).

Moreover, we can observe that in January 2010, before the start of the electoral campaign, it was, by far, the Labour Party that respondents felt more often anxious or angry about. Also, it was the Conservative Party that attracted feelings of enthusiasm most frequently. This, of course is consistent with what one would expect given the position of Labour. However, as mentioned before, the measurements taken in mid-April 2010, show that the emotionality towards the Labour Party became slightly more positive (enthusiasm increased by 4.5%, anxiety and anger decreased by 3.2% and 4.9%), while the Conservative party was more frequently associated with negative emotions. Nonetheless, one would also expect that as the election date gets closer emotions will increase and not decrease. Thus, it can be concluded that this change must be associated with an event that occurred between the two points in time. The most obvious such event is, of course, the electoral campaign. Electoral campaigns increase the quantity of available information about politics and expose voters to messages specifically designed to manipulate emotions. As such, these changes, along with all the increases of the frequencies of emotions towards the other parties (e.g. anxiety towards the Lib Dems increased by approximately 30% and towards the Conservatives by approximately 32%) could be seen as an outcome of the electoral campaign.

Even if these results are consistent with the general expectation, in order to offer stronger evidence, we would have to compare the differences in emotionality between at least two time periods (a difference-of-differences model): one in which the campaign occurred and one in which it did not. Of course, we would then require at least three data points, to which this research does not have access. Thus, given that we cannot observe whether the differences seen here are significantly different from differences which might occur in other non-campaign contexts we can only cautiously note that an increase (or decrease) in emotionality *seems to be associated* with the period of the electoral campaign. To

offer stronger evidence of campaign effects of emotionality, consistent with Halaby (2004) and Duch (2010), a time-demeaned model should be used. The remainder of this chapter focuses on performing these analyses.

IV.2.4. The effect of campaign exposure on the variance of emotions

To assess the effects of electoral campaigns on the induction of emotions, consistent with the recommendations of Bartels (2006) I use within-effects (time-demeaned) linear models. The previous section offered evidence that the frequency with which people experience emotions towards the three main parties varied significantly between the two time points, showing that there might be an association between the occurrence of the electoral campaign and the increase or the decrease of emotions. However, to be able to confidently state that the campaign did indeed influence the variance of emotions we need to observe whether the exposure to electoral campaign activities can explain any of this variance.

Measures of campaign exposure

The electoral campaign can exert its influence on voters both in direct and indirect ways. The direct effect is manifested through specifically organised campaign activities and through paid or unpaid advertising (e.g. posters or Party Electoral Broadcasts, respectively). Nonetheless, the effects of the campaign can also be indirect, manifested through the mass-media. In the campaign period news broadcasts, newspaper editorials and TV political talk shows (referred to as earned media – see Shea & Burton, 2006) will greatly focus on the events of the campaigns, thus increasing people's exposure to the campaign and increasing the potential effect the campaign itself might have. Consequently, in order to capture the effect of the campaign as widely as possible I constructed three variables which capture the direct exposure to the campaign, the extent to which people

watch television news and political shows and the level of newspaper readership, respectively.

The variable measuring direct campaign exposure was computed (in both waves) as an averaged index of a set of eleven dichotomous variables[34] which indicate whether the respondent has experienced a given campaign activity the day before the survey was administered. Consequently, the resulting variable is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1. Value 0 indicates that the respondent did not experience any of the campaign activities the survey asked about, while value 1 indicates that he experienced all of them[35].

Indirect exposure was operationalized through newspaper readership and exposure to televised political programs. Newspaper readership was measured by a variable which asks respondents to declare how many days in the past seven days have they read a daily newspaper. The second variable, measuring exposure to politics on TV, was computed as an averaged index of a set of twelve dichotomous variables which indicate whether a person watched a given television programme[36] in the past seven days. Thus, the variable is continuous and has values that range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that the individual did not watch any of the programmes, and 1 means that the given person watched all the programmes.

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[34] Yestarday have you: 1. Seen a political broadcast on TV?; 2. Received a piece of campaign mail (post or e-mail)?; 3. Received a pamphlet on my door; 4. Discussed a candidate with someone?; 5. Received a visit from a campaign worker?; 6. Heard party political broadcasts on the radio?; 7. Went to hear a candidate speak?; 8. Got a phone call from a candidate?; 9. Visited a political party web site?; 10. Visited a candidate web site?; 11. Watched video of candidate on the internet?.

[35] Cronbach's α: .640. Given this value and the large sample size it is adequate to conclude that the items reliably measure the same phenomenon (DeSante, 2011). Consequently, the use of a cumulative scale is appropriate.

[36] The TV programs included in the index are: The Andrew Marr Show; BBC News; BBC Parliament; Channel 4 News; Channel 5 News; Daily Politics; ITN News; Newsnight; Question Time; Sky News; The Politics Show; This Week with Andrew Neil.

The Time-Demeaned Model

As discussed in the previous section, in order to ascertain whether the campaign was, at least partially, responsible for the changes in emotionality we observe, I assess the impact of campaign exposure on the emotional change within a person between the two time points. To achieve this, I pool the datasets and run a set of within-effect linear models (fixed effects model). I build a separate model for each emotion experienced towards each party.

The fixed-effects estimator shows what the expected change in a person's emotionality between *t1* and *t2* is, if campaign exposure increases by 1 – that is, it varies from its minimum to its maximum. The fixed effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the individuals, including the unit-specific residual v_i. This prevents the estimates from being biased due to the effect of time-invariant omitted characteristics, which would be contained in v_i. The analysis can only test the effect of variables which vary across time on the dependent variable, making it perfect to study within person changes. However, this also means that time-invariant control variables (such as age, gender, education, income, personality are omitted from the analysis. Neither of these variable changes between the two waves of the panel, thus their effects are constant and cannot explain the within person changes in the level of emotionality. Furthermore, even though there is reason to believe that political knowledge and political interest are associated with the experience of emotions, these variable cannot be included in the analysis as they were measured only in wave 2 and, hence, they do not vary over-time. Consequently, the equation only includes the dependent variable (a given emotion) and the explanatory variables: direct campaign exposure, newspaper readership and exposure to televised political programs. Technically, the within-effects estimator time-demeans the variables, and it is the deviation from the mean of the dependent variable which is

regressed on the deviation from the mean of the explanatory variables. The regression equation is illustrated below (ε denotes the standard regression residual):

$$\left(Emotion_{i,t} - \overline{E}motion_i\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampExp_{i,t} - \overline{CampExp_i}\right) + \beta_2\left(Newspaper_{i,t} - \overline{Newspaper_i}\right) + \\ + \beta_3\left(TV_{i,t} - \overline{TV_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{i,t} - \overline{\varepsilon}_i).$$

Table IV.2 presents the estimated effects of the campaign on the within-subject changes in emotionality. The increase of exposure to campaign activities (Mean .110; SD .132) is responsible for increasing the frequency with which a person experiences anxiety towards the Conservative party by 1.709 on a 4-point scale, and anger by 1.730 on a similar scale. However, direct campaign exposure does not have an effect on enthusiasm experienced towards the Conservative party. The results also indicate that between *t1* and *t2* the same person will increase her enthusiasm towards the Labour party and her level of enthusiasm, anxiety and anger towards the Liberal Democrats if the level of her campaign exposure increases.

Finally, thinking of the results presented in the first section of this chapter there is now evidence to suggest that the campaign did have an impact on decreasing a person's level of anger and anxiety experienced towards the Labour Party.

Turning now to the measures of indirect campaign exposure, Table IV.2 shows that (aside from one isolated instance) how often a person reads newspapers has virtually no effect on the variation of their emotionality towards the three main parties. The same conclusion can be drawn regarding the exposure to televised political programs.

In summary, the electoral campaign, at least partly, influenced the change in emotions observed in the first section of this chapter. Even though indirect exposure through newspaper readership or television does not have a substantively significant effect, direct campaign exposure does. Thus, there is now enough evidence to

Table IV.2.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality; fixed effects models

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.050	1.709 *	1.730 *	.383 *	-.263 *	-.300 *	1.218 *	1.389 *	.762 *
	(.125)	(.153)	(.138)	(.123)	(.128)	(.114)	(.144)	(.146)	(.143)
Newspaper readership	.006	.001	.011	.013	.021 +	.024 *	.020	.011	.011
	(.013)	(.015)	(.014)	(.013)	(.012)	(.011)	(.014)	(.015)	(.014)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.525 *	.196	.028	.113	.240	.044	-.280	.168	.152
	(.176)	(.216)	(.134)	(.173)	(.180)	(.161)	(.202)	(.205)	(.200)
Constant	.404	.938 *	1.415 *	.976 *	1.378 *	2.048 *	1.540 *	673+	.790 *
	(.321)	(.393)	(.353)	(.315)	(.328)	(.292)	(.368)	(.374)	(.365)
R^2	*.006*	*.073*	*.091*	*.007*	*.006*	*.008*	*.047*	*.054*	*.018*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.170*	*-.031*	*-.043*	*-.042*	*-.091*	*-.035*	*-.090*	*.021*	*.067*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*74.75%*	*61.92%*	*67.48%*	*70.89%*	*71.65%*	*71.58%*	*61.25%*	*53.33%*	*58.46%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. Dependent variables: the difference in the means of emotions between t1 and t2. Time-invariant variables omitted. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N= 3188/1594

support the idea that actual electoral campaigns *do* influence emotions. In the vast majority of cases, the level of direct exposure to the campaign can explain why the frequency with which emotions are experienced differs within the same person across time (pre-campaign/mid-campaign).

It is important to note that, as mentioned above, the models cannot and do not include time-invariant independent variables. This means that both interest in politics and political knowledge were omitted as they were measured in a single wave. However, it can be argued the both these variables, along with age and gender affect emotionality. Thus, in the following section I examine their effects.

The effect of time-invariant variables

The analysis in the previous section assessed the impact of campaign exposure on emotionality by using fixed effects models (within-effects models). Even though such models cannot include time-invariant variables, they are considered to be the most appropriate when analyzing low t (t=2 in this study) panel data[37] (Johnson, 2005; Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002). This is due to the capacity of the model to minimize the omitted variable bias emerging due to unmeasured individual specific characteristics which would be correlated with the explanatory variables. Specifically, by time-demeaning the data, aside from eliminating time-invariant variables, the individual-specific error term, υ_i, is also eliminated, meaning that the estimates are less likely to be biased (Halaby, 2004). Nonetheless, by using between-effects models or dynamic panel models (autoregressive

[37] A different model that could have been chosen is the 'first-differenced model', in which the difference between the measurements of the dependent variable at *t2* and t1 is regressed on the similar difference in the independent variable. Given that mathematically this is computed by subtracting the equation with the values at *t1* from the equation containing the values at *t2*, time-invariant independent variables are also excluded. Moreover, for panel data with two waves the fixed effects model and the first differenced model are mathematically equivalent and produce identical results (Halaby, 2004).

models with lagged dependent variables) the effect of time-invariant variables can be observed.

Between-effect models are applied to analyse what explains the difference between individuals on a given dependent variable. Technically this is achieved by pooling the data and regressing the individual-specific mean of the dependent variables on the similar means of the independent variables. In the case of this research the equation of the between effects model is the following[38]:

$$\overline{Emotion}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampExp}_i + \beta_2 \overline{Newspaper}_i + \beta_3 \overline{TV}_i + \beta_4 \overline{Interest}_i + \beta_5 \overline{Knowledge}_i + \\ + \beta_6 \overline{Age}_i + \beta_7 \overline{Gender}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i$$

A different approach that would enable us to observe the effects of time-invariant characteristics, (such as interest in politics, knowledge, age and gender) is the dynamic panel model. In this model a dependent variable measured at *t* is regressed on itself measured at *t-1* and on the relevant explanatory factors measured at *t*. The equation below illustrates the adaptation of a dynamic panel model to the analysis at hand:

$$Emotion_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Emotion_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 CampExp_{i,t} + \beta_2 Newspaper_{i,t} + \beta_3 TV_{i,t} + \beta_4 Interest_{i,t} + \\ + \beta_5 Knowledge_{i,t} + \beta_6 Age_{i,t} + \beta_7 Gender_t + \nu_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Irrespective which model we were to choose, both these models might lead to results which are biased. As opposed to the fixed effects model, here the individual-specific error is not eliminated and if there are any correlations between omitted explanatory variables and the independent variables included in the model (i.e. correlations between the error term and the independent variables) the estimates will be biased: the procedure cannot accurately determine how much of the variation of the dependent variable is

[38] In the equation, the individual specific error υ_i is not a mean as its value is assumed to be constant over time, thus its mean equals the value in either wave.

produced by the independent variable included in the model and how much of it is due to the omitted terms (StataCorp, 2011). This is a particularly important point in the current analysis: aside from the variables discussed (and included in the equations above) emotionality is, to a high extent, also determined by personality (see Wolak & Marcus, 2007), which is a time-invariant individual-specific characteristic. Unfortunately, as the panel surveys contain no measures of personality, the analyses cannot control for their effect, which is captured by the error term v_i. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the independent variables of interest (political interest and knowledge) are indeed correlated with personality. As a consequence, any results obtained will be affected by omitted variable bias. Moreover, given that its equation contains the lag of the dependent variable, it is easy to see that the dynamic panel model is more prone to be affected by this bias.

The statistics literature, does offer a solution to this problem: the instrumental variables approach (e.g. see Anderson & Hsiao, 1981; Arellano & Bond, 1991; Hsiao, 2003; StataCorp, 2011). An instrumental variable is a variable which is not correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. it is not an explanatory variable), and as such will not be correlated with the error term, however *it is* correlated with the problematic explanatory variable(s). To create such variables several techniques based on differencing variables across several panel waves have been developed (see the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) estimator or the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator). However, in all cases such techniques require the use of at least three panel waves, while this research has only two. Consequently, the instrumental variable approach cannot be used here. Hence, accepting that the results might be

inaccurate, I estimate the effects of the measures of campaign exposure while controlling for time-invariant factors using the between effects model[39].

As discussed above, aside from measures of campaign exposure, the equation contains political knowledge, political interest, age and gender. Political knowledge can affect emotionality, as prior knowledge is a prerequisite of emotion induction: a person will not feel anxious because of an event he/she knows nothing about (see Brader, 2006). Knowledge is computed as an additive index of five questions which test factual knowledge about politics and the electoral process. Appendix 13 contains the verbatims of the five questions. Interest in politics is also important, as there is reason to believe that if a person is interested in something it is more likely for him/her to be more emotional in regards to that thing. Interest was measured on a 5 point scale, through a question which asks people to declare how interested they are in the May 6th elections. In addition to these variables, the analysis also contains age and gender which are also seen too have some impact of emotionality.

The results, displayed in Table IV.3, show that while the effect of interest is always significant, in most cases the differences in emotionality between people can be explained by campaign exposure. However, the results are not identical to those obtained when using the fixed-effects models. Specifically, it seems that campaign exposure cannot account for the decrease in the level of anxiety and anger towards the Labour Party; nonetheless, the results show that people who watch more political TV programs, are more likely to decrease their levels of anger and anxiety towards this party. Even so, given that these results might be in fact heavily biased, no solid conclusions can be drawn. Thus, I rely on the results generated by the fixed-effects models as this method is best suited to decrease

[39] The between-effects model was chosen as the dynamic panel model is likely to be affect to a higher degree by omitted variable bias.

the omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Halaby notes that "the luxury of "throwing out" between variation is the very source of the advantage that panel data provide over cross-sectional data and that within group estimators like FE *[n.a. fixed effects]* and FD *[n.a. first difference]* exploit to avoid heterogeneity bias. "Throwing out" between variation is not wasting data: it buys protection against biased and inconsistent parameter estimates" (Halaby, 2004, p. 523).

IV.3. The campaign, emotions and partisans

Up to this point the analysis shows that the electoral campaign was designed to manipulate through emotions (e.g. the posters) and it did induce changes in the level of emotions experienced towards all parties. However, the electoral campaign design literature illustrates that parties use different strategies to target two different groups of potential voters. One the one side, there are the supporters of the party. The campaign aims to increase their enthusiasm towards the party while increasing their levels of anger or anxiety towards other parties. On the other side, there is the group of undecided voters and the supporters of other parties. These individuals are targeted with messages which are prone to increase their levels of anxiety or anger towards their own party, or towards the other parties in the case of the undecideds. Indeed, as Section IV.1 illustrates, in the 2010 electoral campaign both the Conservative party and Labour distinctly targeted these two groups of voters. Thus, to appropriately understand the effects which the 2010 campaign had on the levels of emotionality, the analysis needs to be disaggregated for each of these groups: core voters versus out-party supporters.

Table IV.3.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality; between-effects models

Dependent variables: Mean of emotions*	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.482	.764*	.773*	.152	.576	.678 +	.186	1.011*	1.140*
	(.411)	(.385)	(.390)	(.382)	(.389)	(.346)	(.348)	(.326)	(.326)
Newspaper readership	.038*	-.001	-.009	-.001	.019 +	.008*	-.035*	.041*	.050*
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.010)	(.010)	(.009)	(.009)
Amount of TV political programs watched	-.750*	-.162	-.072	-.005	-.612*	-.525*	-.584*	-.322*	-.381*
	(.210)	(.196)	(.199)	(.195)	(.199)	(.177)	(.178)	(.166)	(.167)
Interest in politics	.141*	.153*	.155*	.091*	.188*	.230	.141*	.067 +	.065 +
	(.047)	(.044)	(.045)	(.044)	(.045)	(.040)	(.040)	(.037)	(.037)
Political knowledge	-.039	-.038	-.006	-.071*	.020	.041	-.045 +	-.035	-.049*
	(.030)	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)	(.029)	(.026)	(.026)	(.024)	(.024)
Age	.001	-.002	-.002	-.004 +	.003	.004*	-.005*	.005*	.005*
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Gender	.099 +	-.128*	-.137*	-.055	.028	.021	.040	-.063	-.105*
	(.060)	(.056)	(.057)	(.056)	(.057)	(.051)	(.051)	(.048)	(.048)
Constant	2.109*	1.739*	1.658*	1.576*	2.075*	2.043*	2.391*	1.320*	1.534*
	(.485)	(.453)	(.459)	(.450)	(.459)	(.408)	(.410)	(.383)	(.384)
R^2	*.045*	*.024*	*.023*	*.013*	*.051*	*.072*	*.041*	*.060*	*.079*
N	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*	*2588 / 1294*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses.
*Dependent variable: the individual specific mean of emotionality between *t* and *t-1*.

Consequently, based on the respondents' partisanship[40], I generated three sets of t-tests by replicating the analysis in Table IV.1 separately for each group of party supporters. Table IV.4.a presents the results for the supporters of the Conservative Party, and Table IV.4.b illustrates the results pertaining to the respondents whose preferred party is the Labour Party. Table IV.4.c contains the results for Lib Dem supporters.

Table IV.4.a shows that the Conservative party supporters are more often anxious and angry towards their own party in mid-campaign as opposed to the period of time before the start of the campaign. Moreover, it is also obvious that the level of enthusiasm towards their preferred party did not change in any significant way. The same can be said about their emotions towards the Labour party, which is an out-party. Finally, Conservative supporters have increased the frequency of both negative and positive emotions towards Lib Dem.

At first sight, these results tend to suggest that while the Conservative electoral campaign seems to have been inefficient in achieving its goals (it did not increase the enthusiasm towards the preferred party, and it was only marginally successful in increasing anxiety or anger towards the out-parties), the campaigns of the out-parties (Labour and Lib-Dem) were successful in increasing the level of negative emotions Conservative supporters experience towards their own party.

Looking now at Table IV.4.b, we can see that Labour supporters increased their level of enthusiasm towards their preferred party, while decreasing the frequency with which they experience negative emotions towards this party. Moreover, these respondents also show an increased frequency of experiencing negative emotions towards both

[40] Assessed through the Michigan-type measure of partisanship: a variable which asks respondents to state which party they 'identify' with. Mughan (2009) shows that measuring partisanship as identification is highly correlated with measuring partisanship as closeness to different parties. He further states that if the measurement of multiple partisanship is not being sought, the identification measure can be successfully applied in multiparty contexts.

Table IV.4.
Differences between the mean frequencies of emotions mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1). Disaggregated analysis for each distinct group of party supporters

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
a. Conservative supporters			
	towards the Conservatives (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.032	.185 *	.290 *
	(.035)	(.036)	(.036)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.023	.010	-.013
	(.032)	(.035)	(.027)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.098 *	.467 *	.250 *
	(.041)	(.042)	(.041)
Results of dependent t-tests for paired samples. N = 702; * = p< .05; + = p < .1. The table reports the differences in means. SE in parentheses.			
b. Labour supporters			
	towards the Labour party (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.161 *	-.127 *	-.149 *
	(.038)	(.035)	(.035)
	towards the Conservatives (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.023	.561 *	.389 *
	(.035)	(.045)	(.039)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.369 *	.255 *	.135 *
	(.038)	(.040)	(.040)
Results of dependent t-tests for paired samples. N = 668; * = p< .05; + = p < .1. The table reports the differences in means. SE in parentheses.			
c. Lib Dem supporters			
	towards the Lib Dem (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.416 *	-.065	-.128 *
	(.060)	(.221)	(.051)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.025	-.007	-.101 *
	(.048)	(.058)	(.050)
	towards the Conservative (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.076	.576 *	.597 *
	(.053)	(.065)	(.059)
Results of dependent t-tests for paired samples. N = 276 * = p< .05; + = p < .1; The table reports the differences in means. SE in parentheses.			

out- parties (Lib Dem and the Conservatives). This tends to suggest that, in contrast with the Conservative campaign, the campaign of the Labour party achieved its aims successfully: it increased enthusiasm for the preferred party while also increasing the frequency of negative emotions experienced towards both out-parties. Moreover, the decrease of the level of negative emotions experienced towards the preferred party

confirms the effectiveness of the Labour campaign while also pointing to the ineffectiveness of the campaigns of the out-parties.

Finally, the last section of the Table IV.4.c indicates that Lib Dem supporters have significantly increased their level of enthusiasm towards their preferred party while also decreasing their levels of anger and anxiety towards this party. Moreover, the level of anger towards the Labour Party decreased, while the negative emotions related to the Conservative Party have increased. This suggests that the Lib Dem campaign achieved its goal of increasing the enthusiasm of its supporters and significantly increasing the level of negative emotions towards the Conservative Party.

These findings are also confirmed by the results obtained through running fixed-effects models for each specific group of partisans. The models are constructed in a similar way to those discussed in the previous section, however there are now three sets of models. Table IV.5.a displays the estimated effect the measures of campaign exposure have on the within-subject change of emotionality towards each of the three parties, for people who see themselves as Conservative. Table IV.5.b and IV.5.c present the results for supporters of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, respectively.

The results show that the campaign was, at least partially, responsible for the supporters of the Conservative Party experiencing higher levels of emotions. Direct campaign exposure is seen to have had an important effect on increasing anxiety (.688 on a 4-point scale). However, the effect is double for anger, inducing an increase of 1.371 of the frequency with which this emotion is experienced. Moreover, the exposure to televised political programs is seen to increase not only anger and anxiety but also the level of enthusiasm. Similarly to the results of the t-tests, this analysis also shows that, as a consequence of campaign exposure, Conservative supporters do not change their levels of emotionality towards the Labour Party. Finally, Conservative supporters are influenced

Table IV.5.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality; fixed effects models. Disaggregated analysis for each distinct group of party supporters.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
a. Conservative supporters									
Campaign exposure	.341 +	.688 *	1.371 *	.169	-.066	-.043	.547 *	2.401 *	1.613 *
	(.190)	(.202)	(.199)	(.181)	(.192)	(.145)	(.222)	(.247)	(.236)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.643*	.476 +	.499 +	.447 +	.371	.054	-.284	.152	.276
	(.268)	(.284)	(.281)	(.255)	(.270)	(.204)	(.316)	(.347)	(.332)
R^2	*.014*	*.023*	*.075*	*.010*	*.004*	*.010*	*.014*	*.138*	*.073*
N	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*	*1294/690*
b. Labour supporters									
Campaign exposure	-.009	2.253 *	1.358 *	.632 *	-.808 *	-.749 *	1.500 *	1.082 *	.554 *
	(.212)	(.287)	(.243)	(.230)	(.213)	(.214)	(.234)	(.248)	(.248)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.384	.299	.018	-.173	.016	-.110	-.504 +	.021	-.081
	(.285)	(.383)	(.323)	(.306)	(.283)	(.285)	(.311)	(.331)	(.331)
R^2	*.003*	*.095*	*.051*	*.014*	*.025*	*.021*	*.073*	*.032*	*.011*
N	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*	*1285/683*
c. Lib Dem supporters									
Campaign exposure	-.631 *	2.322 *	2.714 *	.097	.047	-.082	1.575 *	-.131	-.103
	(.286)	(.372)	(.330)	(.265)	(.329)	(.264)	(.339)	(.283)	(.208)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.461	-.693	-.858 +	-.457	.319	.262	-.236	.683	.743
	(447)	(.583)	(.518)	(.416)	(.516)	(.414)	(.532)	(.445)	(.440)
R^2	*.031*	*.172*	*.262*	*.007*	*.014*	*.006*	*.120*	*.012*	*.015*
N	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*	*609/364*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The tables report unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N = no of observations / no of groups. Coefficients for newspaper readership are not significant and are omitted from the regression table. The full regression results are presented in Tables A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 in Appendix 2.

by direct campaign exposure to increase both positive and negative emotions towards Lib Dem. While the effect on enthusiasm is more modest (.547), the campaign has a strong effect on increasing anxiety and anger towards Lib Dem (2.401 and 1.613).

The results pertaining to Labour supporters (Table IV.5.b), suggest that campaign exposure increased the level of enthusiasm towards their party (by .632) while it decreased the levels of anxiety and anger by .808 and .749, respectively. At the same time, Labour supporters increased their level of anxiety and anger towards both out-parties. For instance, their anxiety towards the Conservatives is estimated to have increased by 2.253 while anger by 1.358.

Finally, the last table (Table IV.5.c), displaying the results for people who are closest to the Liberal Democrats, shows that these individuals, as a results of the campaign, increased their level of enthusiasm towards their party by 1.575. However, the campaign did not significantly affect the levels of anxiety or anger experienced towards their preferred party. Similarly to Conservative supporters, Lib Dem supporters do not seem to modify their emotionality towards the Labour Party as a result of the campaign. Nonetheless, the levels of anger and anxiety experienced towards the Conservatives substantially increase (by 2.322 and 2.714 respectively) and the frequency with which enthusiasm is experienced decreases by .631.

The results of the fixed effects linear regressions broadly confirm that the electoral campaign was influential in producing the differences in emotionality observed by running the t-tests. Based on these results there is more evidence to support the claim that the campaign of the Conservative party was unsuccessful in reaching and activating its core supporters: it did not induce enthusiasm at all. The internal disagreements on advertising strategy, the failure of the Big Society platform and the replacement of the advertising agency mid-campaign, resulted in the absence of a coherent campaign strategy. "The big

problem is they haven't really yet got a strategy" said David Hill, Downing street's Communication Chief in February 2010[41]. Building the weak Conservative brand was overlooked in favour of "keeping the 'foot on Gordon Brown's neck', a phrase George Osborne would use to his team" (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2010, p. 132). Consequently, very little effort was put in positive advertising targeted at core supporters. Even more, the positive communication they did implement, was poorly conceived and was emotionally mute (e.g. see Picture IV.2 and Appendix 1). Moreover, some core voters might have been alienated as the party migrated away from traditionally Conservative issues and moved towards issues such as social justice, which are a hallmark of the left.

Meanwhile, both the Labour and Lib Dem campaigns were instrumental in increasing their core supporters' levels of enthusiasm. As earlier illustrated, the Labour campaign clearly targeted their core voters in an attempt to increase turnout. Their positive advertising strategy used uplifting images (e.g. Picture IV.1 or the PEBs) that have been shown by Brader to increase enthusiasm.

As was discussed earlier, aside from inducing enthusiasm towards their own party, a second major aim of an electoral campaign is to increase the level of anxiety or/and anger of the supporters of out-parties towards their own party. In this respect, it seems that the Conservative campaign was, again, unsuccessful: neither the Labour supporters, nor the people preferring Lib Dem increased the level of these emotions towards their preferred party. Again, this can possibly be explained by the general lack of a clear strategy; however, other factors need to also be looked at. To begin with, it is not a surprise that their campaign did not impact Liberal Democrats, as the party ran the campaign almost exclusively 'against' Labour; the Lib Dems "didn't really feature in anyone's thinking"(Fielding, 2010, p. 77). Furthermore, towards the end of the campaign the

[41] Quoted in the following on-line news article: http://news.sky.com/home/politics/article/15547611.

Conservatives even defocused their attention from the Conservative/Lib Dem marginal seats (Wilson, 2011). At the same time, the failure to increase the levels of anxiety and anger of Labour supporters can be accounted for by the lack of branding but also the poor design of campaign communication (e.g. posters). First of all, the attempt to make the party desirable to Labour voters by moving towards leftist issues, was not a success due to the very little attention the party gave to branding. As Wilson (2011) mentions, branding is intrinsically linked to perceptions of credibility and competency. Given that a large proportion of the electorate though that the party did not change since 1997 (Wilson, 2011), this strategic move towards the left was most probably not seen as credible, nor did the party seem to have any competencies in those policy domains. The perpetuation of this reaction was possibly strengthened by Labour introducing the idea that the Conservatives were still Thatcherites.

Second, the advertising and communication campaign, even though clearly designed to induce anxiety and anger, was less than effective. Looking at the posters displayed in Picture IV.3, they are indeed designed to scare people; however, they lack a sense of reality. The posters are so brutal that they seem detached and distant, much like drawings from a comic book. Given that they lack this symbolic, human component, a person cannot easily connect with the ideas they transmit. Consequently, they cannot be taken seriously. Moreover, the posters designed to induce anger (Picture IV.5) carry strong messages which, as Brader (2006) shows, should be able to induce anger. Nonetheless, the white background and their juxtaposition with Gordon Brown's distorted face, change the meaning of the entire poster. It loses the sense of seriousness and graveness and just looks like a joke played on Brown. In essence, from trying to attribute blame for Brown's disastrous decisions (the hallmark of anger) they succeed in ridiculing Brown and perhaps

inducing a smile on core Conservatives' faces, but not anger for Labour supporters. The posters just cannot be taken seriously.

Moving on, both the Labour and Lib Dem campaigns were only successful in increasing the level of anxiety and anger for Conservatives, meaning that neither of them was successful in increasing the level of negative emotions for the supports of the other (the Labour campaign did not affect the emotions Liberal Democrats experienced towards their own party and the Lib Dem campaign did not affect the level of emotionality the supporters of Labour experienced towards the Labour Party). On the one hand, Labour abstained from heavily attacking Lib Dem, in the hope of a post-election Labour - Lib Dem coalition (Fielding, 2010). On the other hand, Lib Dem only targeted the Labour party in seats where Lib Dem were second (Cutts, et al., 2010).

Finally, aside from inducing enthusiasm towards their own party and inducing anxiety or anger towards the out-party supporters' preferred party, campaigns also target their core supporters with the aim of increasing their levels of anxiety or/and anger towards out-parties. Due to the reasons mentioned above, neither Conservative nor Lib Dem supporters experienced any increases in their levels of emotionality towards the Labour party. Thus, neither of these campaigns was able to affect their core supporters' levels of emotionality towards the Labour party. However, because they had a clear strategy, both the Labour campaign and the Lib Dem campaign were successful in increasing their supporters' level of anxiety and anger towards the Conservative party. Moreover, both the Conservative campaign and the Labour campaign increased their supporters' levels of anxiety and anger towards the Liberal Democrats. Consequently, it can be concluded that in reference to their core supporters, while the Labour campaign seems to have achieved all the aims (increased enthusiasm towards the Labour Party and increased anxiety and anger towards both out-parties), the Lib Dem campaign managed to

increase enthusiasm towards itself, but also increase anxiety and anger towards the Conservatives. Finally, the Conservative Party's campaign seems to have been the least efficient: it appears it only contributed to increasing anxiety and anger towards the Lib Dems.

These results suggest that in inducing emotionality, the Labour party had the most effective campaign, followed by the Lib Dems, while the Conservative party had a distinctly ineffective campaign. However, before concluding there is question that remains unanswered: why did Labour supporters actually decrease their level of anxiety and anger towards the Labour party. The answer, I believe, can be found by contrasting Labour's successful enthusiasm-inducing positive campaign with the Conservatives' ineffective negative campaign. As there were no credible negative stimuli to induce an increase of anxiety and anger, Labour's strong positive campaign actually managed to decrease these emotions.

IV.4. Summary and conclusions

This chapter set out to test whether, consistent with the claims of professionals, an actual campaign in a real-world setting, does indeed impact people's levels of emotionality. The chapter also assessed the particular effect the 2010 campaign had on each of the three main parties' supporters.

The results, generated through dependent t-tests for paired samples and fixed-effects models, confirm the expectations and show that exposure to the electoral campaign had a significant and substantial impact on the variance of emotions. That is, the 2010 General Election campaign induced emotions: in most cases the campaign increases the frequency with which emotions towards the parties are experienced. However, the latter part of the chapter points towards the fact that each party's campaign had a different

impact across the groups of different partisans. It is shown that the Labour party had the most efficient campaign, followed by the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, who put forward quite an ineffective campaign. Finally, it is interesting that the levels of both anxiety and anger experienced towards the Labour party decreased during the campaign. Even so, in April 2010, the most anger and anxiety was still directed towards the Labour Party.

Chapter V

Campaign exposure, emotions and electoral behaviour

The theory claims that in order to achieve their aims of mobilization and persuasion campaigns, at least partly, affect electoral behaviour through inducing emotions. The previous chapter showed that being exposed to the 2010 British electoral campaign did indeed have some impact on modifying the frequency with which specific emotions were experienced. Consequently, this chapter focuses on assessing the impact campaign exposure and emotions have on electoral behaviour.

To this end, the behavioural predictions of theory are tested by using panel data. The analysis is performed on the same dataset I presented and utilised in the previous chapter. In brief, the panel data was collected before the 2010 General British Elections and it measures people's emotions and political behavioural intentions in two waves: January 2010 and April 2010.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part assesses the effects of emotions and campaign exposure on political behavioural patterns. Owing to the fact that the data does not contain any measures that can appropriately operationalize information search and involvement in the campaign, the analyses in this part of the chapter is limited to testing Hypotheses 13 through 16, pertaining to the effect of emotions on turnout intentions. The second part of the chapter is entirely focused on disentangling the link between emotions, partisanship, policy preference, leader evaluations and vote choice. It tests Hypotheses 17 through 21.

V.1. Turnout intention

Aside from vote choice, participation has the most power to influence the outcome of any election. The results of the elections solely rest on the votes of the people who turn out and the success of any party or candidate is greatly dependent on the number of core supporters that they manage to get to the polls (Guzzetta, 2006). Consequently, in an effort to obtain definite favourable votes, parties strive to mobilize core supporters and increase their likelihood of turning out. While previous studies have shown that the levels of education, political knowledge (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006) and interest in politics do influence turnout intentions, these are more difficult to modify in the short campaign period.

However, as previously shown, emotions can be influenced by the campaign which renders them an efficient tool in impacting the likelihood of turnout. Based on solid theoretical arguments (see Chapter III), Hypotheses 13, 14, 15 and 16 define the expectations: enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party increases the likelihood of turnout while anger experienced towards the preferred party decreases the willingness of people to go to the polls. Furthermore, anxiety experienced towards the preferred party is not seen to impact turnout intentions; however both anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties are thought to increase the likelihood of turning out.

According to Bartels, one of the "primary virtues of panel data are that they allow for direct observation of individual-level change in attitudes and perceptions in response to campaign events" (2006b, p. 142). He identifies two major analytical approaches in assessing panel data. On the one hand, the researcher could analyze the change in the variables of interest as a function of intervening characteristics or events. On the other hand, new opinions, attitudes or behaviours may be analyzed as a product of old opinions, attitudes or behaviours and intervening characteristics or events (Bartels, 2006b). Adopting the first of these approaches, I use mediation models to analyze whether the effects of

campaign exposure on the changes in the likelihood of turnout (between people and within people) are manifested through emotions.

According to Baron and Kenney (1986) and Muller and colleagues (2005), in order to show mediation a set of three equations needs to implemented (Eq.1 to assess path *c*, Eq.2 to assess path *a* and Eq.3 to assess paths *b* and *c'*). Having run the models, one can conclude that mediation is present if the following conditions are simultaneously met: (1) there is a significant effect on path *c* in Eq.1; (2) there is a significant effect on path *a* in Eq.2; (3) there is a significant effect on path *b* in Eq.3; and (4) the effect on path *c'* in Eq.3 is smaller (in absolute terms) than the effect on patch *c* in Eq.1 (Muller, et al., 2005). The mediation model is displayed in Figure V.1.

Figure V.1. The mediation model



The dependent variable is the likelihood of turnout. The surveys in both waves ask respondents to declare how likely it is, on a ten point scale, that they would turn out if there were elections held the next day. It is important to note that this variable does not measure actual turnout; it is only an indicator of a person's declared intention, at the time the poll was administered. Even though it is widely used, it has been shown that this measure overestimates actual turnout; however, it has an increased accuracy (i.e. it

overestimates less) when used in national elections which traditionally have a higher rate of turnout (Crespi, 1988, pp. 79-84). To be clear, the analyses undertaken here examine the impact of emotions on a person's declared willingness to participate in an election and not actual participation.

The main explanatory variable is campaign exposure. Even though this variable does not strictly measure exposure to specific types of campaign messages, it can nonetheless be used as a proxy. Given that campaigns use both negative and positive stimuli, increasing campaign exposure also implies an increased exposure to both positivity and/or negativity in the campaign. Moreover, there is evidence that in the 2010 campaign all the three main parties used both types of appeals – see Chapter IV. The variable was computed as an averaged index of a set of eleven dichotomous variables[42] which indicate whether the respondent has experienced a given campaign activity the day before the survey was administered. The resulting variable is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1. Value 0 indicates that the respondent did not experience any of the campaign activities the survey asked about, while value 1 indicates that he experienced all of them.[43] The models assess the direct effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention, but also simultaneously assess the impact campaign exposure has on each emotion of interest, and the effect these emotions have on the likelihood of turnout. Consequently, the analyses allows for the observation of both the direct and the indirect effects (mediated by emotions) of exposure on turnout intentions.

[42] Yestarday have you: 1. Seen a political broadcast on TV?; 2. Received a piece of campaign mail (post or e-mail)?; 3. Received a pamphlet on my door; 4. Discussed a candidate with someone?; 5. Received a visit from a campaign worker?; 6. Heard party political broadcasts on the radio?; 7. Went to hear a candidate speak?; 8. Got a phone call from a candidate?; 9. Visited a political party web site?; 10. Visited a candidate web site?; 11. Watched video of candidate on the internet?.

[43] Crombach's α: .640. Given this value and the large sample size it is adequate to conclude that the items reliably measure the same phenomenon (DeSante, 2011). Consequently, the use of a cumulative scale is appropriate.

Emotions are the key mediating variables in the model, as they are expected to mediate the effect of campaign exposure on turnout intentions (exposure affects emotions and emotions affect turnout intentions). As was discussed in the previous chapter, emotions were measured, in each individual wave, through self-report questions which asked respondents to state how often they experience each emotion towards each of the three main political parties. The variables have four values. The original questions allowed for five response options: 'very often', 'fairly often', 'occasionally', 'rarely' or 'never'; however the last two were collapsed into a single category.

According to the theory, emotions induce different behavioural impacts if they are experienced towards the preferred party versus an out-party. Consequently, based on the original variables and knowing the partisanship of each subject, I constructed a set of three variables which measure the frequency with which enthusiasm, anxiety or anger are experienced towards the preferred party. Another two variables measure the frequency with which anxiety and anger are experienced towards the out-parties. The variables range from 0 to 3, where 0 is not at all emotional and 3 is very emotional

The models also include political knowledge and interest in politics as control variables as it is thought that these variables also affect the intention to turn out. Political knowledge is computed as an additive index of five questions which test factual knowledge about politics and the electoral process. Interest in politics was measured on a 5 point scale, through a question which asks people to declare how interested they are in the May 6th elections. Both political knowledge and interest in politics were only measured in wave 2. In addition to these variables, the analysis also contains the appropriate socio-demographic controls: gender, age, education and income. The verbatim measures of all the variables are contained in Appendix 13.

V.1.1. The analyses and the results

Panel data allow us to test how time-varying independent variables – such as exposure to the campaign and emotions - affect the variance in turnout intention within the same person over the course of the campaign. Moreover, I also examine if the explanatory and mediating variables influence differences in turnout intentions between individuals. The first strategy can be implemented by pooling the data and using the within-effects (mediation) model, while the latter is implemented through the between-effects (mediation) model.

Both the fixed-effects mediated model and the between-effects mediated model were implemented by using the techniques for the estimation of indirect effects[44] developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). The variables introduced in the models were beforehand time-demeaned, or meaned, respectively.

The within-effects mediated model is based on the simultaneous estimations of the following set of equations:

$$\left(Turnout_{it} - \overline{Turnout_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\left(EnthusiamPP_{it} - \overline{EnthusiasmPP_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\left(AnxietyPP_{it} - \overline{AnxietyPP_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\left(AngerPP_{it} - \overline{AngerPP_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\left(AnxietyOP_{it} - \overline{AnxietyOP_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\left(AngerOP_{it} - \overline{AngerOP_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).$$

$$\begin{aligned}\left(Turnout_{it} - \overline{Turnout_i}\right) = \alpha &+ \beta_1\left(EnthPP_{it} - \overline{EnthPP_i}\right) + \beta_2\left(AnxietyPP_{it} - \overline{AnxietyPP_i}\right) + \\ &+ \beta_3\left(AngerPP_{it} - \overline{AngerPP_i}\right) + \beta_4\left(AnxietyOP_{it} - \overline{AnxietyOP_i}\right) + \\ &+ \beta_5\left(AngerOP_{it} - \overline{AngerPP_i}\right) + \beta_6\left(EnthPP_{it} - \overline{EnthPP_i}\right) + \\ &+ \beta_7\left(CampaignExp_{it} - \overline{CampaignExp_i}\right) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i).\end{aligned}$$

[44] Preacher and Hayes (2008) develop a bootstrap method of estimating both total and specific indirect effects in multiple mediation models.

This fixed effects mediated model includes all the variables operationalizing the given emotions. All the other socio-demographic controls are constant over time for an individual and thus are omitted from the analysis. Moreover, having measured political knowledge and interest in politics in only one wave, they become time-invariant and are also omitted. The fixed-effects estimator thus shows what the expected change in a person's likelihood to turn out is if the frequency with which the given emotion is experienced increases by 1 and if campaign exposure increases to its maximum of 1. Simultaneously, this model also shows the within-person change in the frequency of experiencing negative emotions if campaign exposure increases from the minimum to the maximum. The results are displayed in Figure V.2. Aside from the direct effects, the figure also illustrates the indirect effect, channeled through emotions, of campaign exposure on turnout intention.

The results of the fixed effects analyses show that the over-time increase of campaign exposure increases the likelihood of turning out; however it also significantly increases the frequency with which emotions are experienced[45]. Consistent with the findings presented in the previous chapter, I once more show that campaign exposure can induce emotions. More interestingly, looking at the effect of emotions, the within person increase of anxiety experienced towards an out-party produces an over-time increase in the likelihood of a given person to go to the polls. If this emotion increases by one unit (on a 4 point scale), within the same person, over-time, the likelihood of this person turning out increases over this time by .103[46]. Hence, if anxiety towards an out party increases from not at all anxious to very anxious the likelihood for the person to go to the polls increases by

[45] Except in the case of anxiety experienced towards the preferred party, however additional analyses show that this emotion is increased by indirect campaign exposure, i.e. exposure to politics on TV.

[46] Given that the variables were time-demeaned their mean is 0. Turnout intention ranges from -5 to 5 (SE: .605). The variables measuring emotions range from -1.5 to 1.5 (SE ranges from .276 to .348). Campaign exposure ranges from -.333 to .333 (SE: .066).

Figure V.2.
The effects of campaign exposure and emotions on turnout intention over time.
Fixed-effects multiple mediation model. Mediating variables: emotions.



Note:
Relationships in the model estimated simultaneously though Linear Regressions. The coefficients displayed are unstandardized regression coefficients. SE in parentheses. Coefficients significant at: * p < .05; + p < .1. Time-invariant variables omitted. *Adj. R^2 .018; N 6526.*

Legend:

Direct Effect of campaign exposure on emotions [*a* paths]
Direct Effect of emotions on turnout intention [*b* paths]
Direct Effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [*c'* path]
Indirect Effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [*a* paths x *b* paths]
(Significance levels are based on Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals and not on the SE's presented in the parentheses)
Total effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [*c* path]
Direct Effect of controls on turnout intention

just over .3 points on a 10 point scale[47]. Moreover, this analysis shows that the indirect effect of campaign exposure on turnout intentions, channeled through anxiety towards out-parties, is positive and significant, meaning that this emotion does indeed mediate the effect of the campaign on the likelihood of turnout. The coefficients indicate that if

[47] Appendix 3 displays the graphical illustrations of the effects the within-person changes in emotionality emotions have on the intention of turning out.

campaign exposure increases over time, within the same person, from its minimum 0 to its maximum 1, it indirectly (through anxiety experienced towards out-parties) increases the likelihood of turning out by .134 on a 10 point scale.

Figure V.2 further illustrates that, consistent with the hypotheses, enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party positively affects turnout intentions. If, over time, a person moves from not being enthusiastic at all to being very enthusiasm, his likelihood of turning out increases by .333 on a 10 point scale. In this instance the indirect effect of increasing campaign exposure to its maximum produces a .075 increase in the likelihood of turnout.

These results also show that there is no very strong evidence that the across-time, within person changes in anger (irrespective towards who it is experienced) affects turnout intentions. Looking at anger directed towards the preferred party its effect is in the expected (negative) direction, and even though it not significant at conventional levels, its level of significance reaches the .08 level (one-tailed), thus suggesting that as a person becomes angrier over time, it may decrease his or her likelihood of turning out. The effect of anger experienced towards out-parties is also not significant, but more importantly it displays the wrong sign. Finally, as expected anxiety experienced towards the preferred party does not affect turnout intentions.

Adding the effects channeled through the mediators to the direct effect campaign exposure has on turnout intentions (.843) means that, overall, being exposed to the campaign increases the likelihood of turnout by .998 (SE: .113) on a 10 point scale.

I am not only interested in assessing the effect of campaigns, mediated by emotions, on *within-person* changes in the likelihood of turning out, but also on differences *between individuals* depending on their exposure to the campaign and their emotional response. This can be estimated by using the between-effects (mediated) model. To estimate this

model the mean between each person's level of emotionality at *t1* and *t2* is regressed on the means of the explanatory variables and on the mean of the regression residual ε. The unit-specific residual v is not included as a mean because it is constant over time. Simultaneously, the mean of emotions is regressed on the mean of campaign exposure. Once again, I employ a mediated model, detailed below:

$$\overline{Turnout}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\overline{Enthusiasm\ PP}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\overline{AnxietyPP}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\overline{AngerPP}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\overline{AnxietyOP}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\overline{AngerOP}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .$$

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{Turnout}_i = \alpha &+ \beta_1 \overline{Enthusiasm\ PP}_i + \beta_2 \overline{AnxietyPP}_i + \beta_3 \overline{AngerPP}_i + \beta_4 \overline{AnxietyOP}_i + \\ &+ \beta_5 \overline{AngerOP}_i + \beta_6 \overline{CampaignEx\ p}_i + \beta_7 \overline{Knowledge}_i + \beta_8 \overline{Intrest}_i + \\ &+ \beta_9 \overline{Age}_i + \beta_{10} \overline{Sex}_i + \beta_{11} \overline{Education}_i + \beta_{12} \overline{Income}_i + \nu_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i .\end{aligned}$$

One assumption of the model is that v_i is not correlated with the explanatory variables; any such correlation would lead to biased estimates. There is, however, no strong reason to think that the frequency with which a person experiences a given emotion is highly correlated with the unit-specific error (i.e. potential omitted variables)[48]. Nonetheless, the potential that any such correlations exit is a caveat of this procedure.

The outcome of the within-effects analysis can be compared to the results of the between-effects models, displayed in Figure V.3. Once again campaign exposure is seen responsible for increasing the frequency with which negative emotions are experienced.

[48] See Section IV.2.2 which discusses the measurement of emotions.

Figure V.3.
The effects of campaign exposure and emotions on turnout over time.
Between-effects multiple mediation model. Mediating variables: emotions



Note:
Relationships in the model estimated simultaneously though Linear Regressions. The coefficients displayed are unstandardized regression coefficients. SE in parentheses. Coefficients significant at: * p < .05; + p < .1.
Adj. R^2 .149; N 5638.

Legend:

- Direct Effect of campaign exposure on emotions [***a*** paths]
- Direct Effect of emotions on turnout intention [***b*** paths]
- Direct Effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [***c'*** path]
- Indirect Effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [***a*** paths x ***b*** paths]
  (Significance levels are based on Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals and not on the SE's presented in the parentheses)
- Total effect of campaign exposure on turnout intention [*c* path]
- Direct Effect of controls on turnout intention

For instance, comparing people, the results show that for a person who has had the maximum amount of exposure (versus a person who was minimally exposed to the campaign) the level of anger experienced towards his preferred party will increase by .446 (on a 4 point scale). Similarly, for such a person the level of anxiety experienced towards out-parties will increase by .866 when we compare him with a person who was only minimally exposed to the campaign[49]. More importantly, Figure V.3 shows that if we compare people who differ in their level of anger towards the preferred party by one unit (e.g. people who are very angry versus people who are somewhat angry), the likelihood of turning out decreases by .125 (on a ten point scale). This is to say that for people who are very angry (compared to people who are not angry at all) the likelihood of turning out decreases by nearly .4 on a 10 point scale. This corroborates H14; nonetheless, the effects are quite small. Appendix 4 displays the graphs pertaining to the between-people effects of emotions on the likelihood of turnout.

Contrary to the effect of anger, enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party (affected positively by campaign exposure: .837) is shown to increase the likelihood of turnout. If we compare two people who differ in their level of enthusiasm by one point on a four point scale, the person who is more enthusiastic is more likely to turn out by .126 on a 10 point scale, which corroborates H13; however, once more, the effects are small.

Turning to anxiety, this analysis also points to the fact that anxiety experienced towards out-parties increase turnout intentions. Nonetheless, the effects are smaller than the within-person effects (.053) and are not statistically significant at appropriate levels. Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party, as theorized, does not impact the likelihood of turnout. Furthermore, in line with the previous analysis (but contrary to the

[49] The variables were meaned. Turnout intention ranges from 0 to 10 (Mean: 9.35; SE: 1.71). The variables measuring emotions range from 0 to 3 (their means range from 1.03 to 2.14; SEs range from .758 to .919). Campaign exposure ranges from 0 to 1 (Mean: .13; SE: .12).

expectation) anger experienced towards an out-party does not significantly affect turnout intentions, and once more displays the wrong sign.

Finally, campaign exposure has a positive direct effect on the likelihood of people turning out. For people who say they have been exposed to the campaign fully (versus people with no exposure) the turnout intentions are higher by .750 on a 10 point scale. This pattern remains the same when the effect of campaign exposure is channeled through enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party, but it is reversed when channeled through anger experience towards the preferred party. If campaign exposure increases, which in turn increases the level of anger the likelihood of turnout will decrease by .056 on a 10 point scale. However, the total effect of campaign exposure on turnout intentions remains positive, and given that enthusiasm and anger seem to cancel out (equal effects in opposite directions) this effect actually increases to .802 (SE: .181). This result is consistent with prior studies that show that campaigns generally mobilize voters (e.g. Clarke et al., 2009) but also with Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997) who argue that negativity decreases the likelihood of turnout.

Finally, as I previously noted, the efficiency of the between-effects coefficients is dependent on the lack of correlation between the individual specific error term and the variables which measure emotions.

V.1.2. Conclusions

This section set out to test the effect campaign exposure and emotions have on the likelihood of turnout. Both sets of analyses show that emotions do mediate the effect campaign exposure has on turnout intentions. Whether we observe with-in person changes or we compare people, the conditions prescribed by Baron and Kenney (1986) are fully met: (1) campaign exposure significantly impacts turnout intentions; (2) campaign exposure

significantly impacts emotions; (3) (most) emotions significantly impact turnout intentions; (4) the direct effect of campaign exposure on turnout intentions is smaller than its total effect.

The results illustrate that anger experienced towards the preferred party has a demobilizing effect: it makes people less likely to turn out. Conversely, enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party increases the chances of turnout. Also consistent with the hypotheses, I found that anxiety experienced towards the preferred party does not have a negative impact on the likelihood of turnout, while anxiety experienced towards out-parties increases mobilization. However, H16 could not be corroborated: the results pertaining to anger experienced towards out-parties were not significant. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that that campaigns through the emotions they induce[50] can, at the same time, decrease turnout intentions, have no effect on turnout and increase turnout intentions.

As was discussed in Chapter II, the general consensus in the literature is that by using get-out-the-vote techniques, campaigns do mobilize voters (Ansolabehere, 2006b; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2009; Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002), which this section corroborates. The consensus about general campaign effects, however, does not extend to the potential effects negative campaigning has on the intention to turn out. On the one hand, studies claim that negativity decreases turnout, depresses interest in politics and increases apathy and distrust (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997). On the other hand, studies have shown that negative ads actually mobilize voters (Finkel & Geer, 1998), or have no impact on turnout (Clinton & Lapinski, 2004). Consequently, the findings presented above are important as they may help to shed light on the mixed evidence concerning the effect of negative campaigns on participations.

[50] See Chapter IV.

Brader and colleagues (2006; 2010) argue that both anxiety and anger are induced by negative campaign stimuli. Thus, in line with Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997), Ansolabehere et al. (1994), and Kahn and Kenney (1999), there is evidence that negative campaigning, by inducing anger, can decrease turnout intentions. Consistent with Clinton and Lapinski (2004), I have shown that if anxiety towards the preferred party is induced, it does not affect turnout intentions. Finally, consistent with Freedman and Goldstein (1999), Geer and Lau (2006) and Finkel and Geer (1998), I illustrated that if anxiety is induced towards an out-party; it will act to increase the likelihood of turnout.

This analysis brings several unique contributions to this literature. First, it explicitly incorporates emotions into the model of campaign effects, thereby supporting the claim that campaigns can have indirect effects on behaviour. Second, by introducing the role of emotions, it puts forward a plausible explanation for the mixed effects found in the existing literature and a more nuanced theoretical underpinning to the study of how citizens respond to negative campaigns. Nonetheless, the analyses carried out here cannot ascertain a further relevant issue: what types of negative campaign stimuli are responsible for inducing the specific emotions which, in turn, affect turnout intentions. Chapter VI is devoted to clarifying this issue.

Finally, it is important to note, once more, that the dependent variable operationalizes the intention to turn out and not actual turnout. Of course, it is of great importance to assess what the role of emotions in the relationship between the intention to turn out and actual turnout is. Such an analysis is carried out in the following section.

V.2. Reported turnout

The analyses presented above show that emotions (measured in the campaign period, using self-report items) have an impact on whether people intend to vote or not. However,

it would also be interesting to assess if emotions, experienced over the course of the campaign, have an impact on reported turnout, that is, on whether people actually voted or not.

In order to achieve this, besides the waves of the panel which were used until now, I introduce a third wave which was fielded after the elections, in June 2010. The additional wave contained 4,976 respondents. Out of these, 3,929 were supporters of the three main parties. Given that this analysis is carried out on the supporters of the three main parties who are common for all three ways (see Section IV.2.1) this number decreases to 1,249 respondents.

Even though we now have three panel waves neither fixed-effects nor between-effects models can be used. First, emotions were measured in the post-election wave they cannot be used as the measurements were taken one month *after* the elections, that is, after the behaviour we are trying to explain took place. Given that human emotions are changeable and fleeting, what we measure in June 2010 will not be the emotions people were experiencing in May 2010, before the elections. Moreover, given that at the time of measurement the results of the elections were known and the Conservative-Lib Dem coalition was formed, it is most likely that what we measure is people's emotional reaction to those occurrences and not the campaign.

The use of these models is further precluded by the fact that turnout is not measured similarly in the three waves. While the first two waves (analysed in the previous section) measure, on a 10 point scale, people's likelihood of turning out, the post-election wave measures actual turnout using a dichotomous variable.

Consequently, the only way the analysis can be approached is through an autoregressive model in which turnout at *t* (wave 3) is regressed on the likelihood of turning out at *t-1* and the likelihood of turning out at *t-2* and on emotions measured at *t-1*

(enthusiasm, anxiety, anger experienced towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties):

$$Turnout_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 TurnoutInt_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 TurnoutInt_{i,t-2} + \beta_3 Emotions_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 Controls_{i,t} + \\ + \beta_5 Controls_{i,t-1} + \nu_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Given that the model I describe is essentially a dynamic panel model, the omitted variable bias has to be seriously taken into consideration: the individual-specific error term will automatically be correlated with the lags of the dependent variable which leads to biased estimates (Hsiao, 2003). As mentioned above, the dependent variable is the dichotomous turnout variable and its lags are variables which measure the likelihood of turning out. Even so, these variables are by no means independent and high correlations can be expected with the error term. The solutions to this problem, the instrumental variable approach (see Arellano & Bond, 1991) cannot be used here as the dependent variable and its lags are measured on completely different scales. Consequently, the results such a model produces should be treated with caution.

Before proceeding to the analysis, there is another issue that needs to be addressed. As noted, the model uses emotions measured at t-1 (wave 2). However, this wave was fielded in mid-April 2010, three weeks to one month before the elections. Consequently, bearing in mind that emotions are fleeting, changeable and temporary occurrences which have instantaneous effects, this analysis will be incapable of assess these effects (which have been analysed in the previous section). However, what this analysis will show is whether the effect of emotions carries through over time. That is, it will illustrate whether emotions experienced today can affect ones' actual behaviour in the not-so-immediate future. Such an analysis is particularly important for understanding whether the timing of

emotional appeals in campaigns is important: could emotional appeals launched at the beginning of the campaign have an impact on voting?

Aside from the variables already mentioned, the model described above, also contains control variables measured at *t-1*, or at *t*. The variables measured at *t-1* are: campaign exposure, interest in politics, political knowledge, income, age, gender and education. As these variables were used in the previous analyses they will not be discussed further here. The control variables measured a *t* are: interest in the election and registration. Interest in the election was measured on a 4 point scale through a question which asked people to state how interested they were in the elections. The variable measuring electoral registration was recoded into a dichotomous variable illustrating whether people said they registered or not. Appendix 13 contains the question verbatims.

The results of the analysis are displayed in Table V.1 and show that campaign exposure followed by electoral registration and interest in the elections have the highest impact on turnout. Moreover, as expected, both lags of the dependent variable have positive and significant effects. With respect to emotions, the table shows that none of the five variables included in the model attain statistical significance, essentially indicating that emotions experienced in mid-campaign do not have an impact on actual turnout.

Based on this analysis, the conclusion that can be drawn is that, even if emotions affect turnout intention (see previous section), their effect is momentary and does not carry forwards. Hence, emotional appeals launched early in the campaign might not actually have an effect on turnout. Of course, due to the omitted variables bias, these results are, at best, tentative. Thus, before solid conclusions can be drawn, more research is needed. Ideally, these relationship could be assessed by running a series of field experiments in an electoral context.

Table V.1. The effects of the likelihood of turnout and emotions on reported turnout

	Log. Reg. Coefficients	Standard Errors
Likelihood of turnout at *t-1*	.313 *	(.070)
Likelihood of turnout at *t-2*	.216 *	(.078)
Registered to vote at *t*	1.635 *	(.578)
Enthusiasm PP at *t-1*	-.198	(.259)
Anxiety PP at *t-1*	-.266	(.362)
Anger PP at *t-1*	.132	(.343)
Anxiety OP at *t-1*	-.019	(.423)
Anger OP at *t-1*	-.089	(.454)
Campaign exposure at *t-1*	4.104 *	(2.051)
Interest in the elections at *t*	1.413 *	(.321)
Interest in politics at *t-1*	-.291	(.303)
Political knowledge at *t-1*	-.163	(.204)
Income	.037	(.064)
Age	.028 +	(.017)
Gender	-.663	(.416)
Education	.073 +	(.043)
Constant	-2.816 +	(1.647)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.417*	
N	*997*	

Results of binary logistic dynamic panel model. Dependent variable: reported actual turnout, measured at *t:* vote (1); did not vote (0). Results significant at: * $p < .05$; + $p < .1$.

V.3. Vote choice

Electoral campaigns, *par excellence*, are the tools political parties use to try to increase their chances of winning the election (or maximising their vote share). Primarily, campaigns are designed to increase the likelihood of turnout. As I already showed there is some evidence that suggests that campaigns increase turnout intention.

The second aim of campaigns, persuasion, is more disputed in the literature. There is no consensus with regards to how and if electoral campaigns influence the electoral choices people make. While professionals and journalists claim that campaigns do have significant effects on vote choice, academic research fails to find these effects. Bartels

(2006a) speaks of dissociation between the claims of professionals and the 'reality expressed by his coefficients'. Indeed, as I previously discussed, providing an answer to the puzzle raised by Bartels is critical for advancing our understanding of how electoral democracy functions.

This thesis argues that such a potential answer can be found by including the role of emotions in the analysis of campaign effects. Previous studies have assessed the persuasive effects of campaigns either through the inclusion, in the vote choice function, of a variable that, in some ways, operationalizes the campaign, or by comparing attitudes or vote preferences before and after the campaign. However, I argue that the effects campaigns have on vote choice are not only direct: they are, at least partly, manifested through the impact of the emotions the campaign manipulates. The theory argues that emotions, once affected by the campaign, alter the relative importance of the determinants of vote choice, such as: partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations. In other words, the effects campaigns have on vote choice are channelled through the moderating effect emotions have on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants.

To test these theoretical stipulations I use the data generated through the panel study. However, unlike the previous section, I do not execute a pooled analysis, but I test the hypotheses separately for the two panel waves. This is due to the important differences between how the main indicators were measured in the two waves (e.g. wave 1, aside from measures of ideological position, does not contain any other indicators which could be used to compute policy preferences).

As detailed in Chapter III, and based on Clarke et al. (2009), vote choice in the UK is understood as a function of partisanship, leader evaluations, policy preferences and economic evaluations. Moreover, consistent with Marcus et al. (2000), the variables measuring emotions are also included. Finally, to be able to assess the relationships

between electoral campaigns, emotions, vote choice and its determinants, the equation also includes the variable measuring campaign exposure.

The dependent variable, vote choice, is measured in both waves of the panel through a nominal variable which asks respondents to specify which party they would vote for if elections would be held the next day. However, based on partisanship, I recoded the variable to measure the distinction between voting for the preferred party versus an out-party. The dichotomous variable thus created indicates whether the respondent would vote for the preferred party (value 1) or an out-party (value 0).

The first explanatory variable the equation includes is partisanship. According to Mughan (2009) and Eijk and Niemoller (1983), as a consequence of dealignment, voters in Britain can be characterised by multiple partisanship, meaning that the same person can feel close to more than one party: i.e. he or she has a primary partisanship but there also is a secondary partisanship. The Michigan-style measure of partisanship can be used appropriately to differentiate between whether a person votes for the preferred party versus out-parties; or for constructing the variables which measure specific emotions towards distinct parties (as was done in the previous section). However, it cannot be appropriately used to measure the full width and depth of partisanship in Britain. In a political context such as Britain, a measure of partisanship which can adequately capture the possibility of a person feeling similarly close to two parties should to be used. Thus, a measure which indicates the strength of the attachment to the preferred party while also capturing the possibility of multiple party attachments is needed.

Consequently, I compute a continuous variable which aims to assess the strength of partisanship in each of the panel waves. The variable was constructed based on three individual indicators that measure (on ten-point scales) how favourable (versus unfavourable) people are towards each of the three parties. The measure of favourability

was chosen to operationalize the strength of partisanship because the surveys did not contain variables which simply measure how close people feel to parties, which would be the best suited measures (Mughan, 2009).

Of course, closeness to a given party and favourability towards that party measure related, although distinct, phenomena. Therefore, before proceeding any further I discuss the appropriateness of using favourability measures to operationalize the strength of partisanship. Given the wording of the favourability questions, there is reason to believe that while the answers provided are inherently defined by partisanship; they are also affected by the emotions people experience. Consequently, I carry out an analysis to establish what the relationships between partisanship (as measured by the Michigan-type identification question), emotions and the variables which measures favourability are. I am interested in seeing whether partisanship (as measured by the Michigan-type identification question) and emotions can accurately predict the favourability rating of each party.

The analyses consist of three OLS regressions performed in each wave. Each regression tests the effects of partisanship and emotions on the favourability rating of each party. The variable measuring the Michigan-style partisanship was included through a set of two dummy variables. The regressions assessing the favourability rating of the Labour party and that of the Conservatives excludes the Lib Dem dummy, while the regressions pertaining the how favourable people are towards the Lib Dem omit the Conservative dummy. Table V.2 displays the results.

The results show that all the coefficients are highly significant and in the correct directions. Furthermore, the high levels of the Adjusted R Squares suggest that the variable measuring the Michigan-style partisanship and emotions can quite efficiently predict how favourable a person is towards the party in question. For example, partisanship and emotions experienced towards Labour explain approximately 73% (Adj. $R^2 = .727$) of the

Table V.2.
The effects of Party ID and emotions on favourability

	Favourability towards political parties					
	Wave 1			*Wave 2*		
	Labour	Conservatives	Lib Dem	Labour	Conservatives	Lib Dem
Partisanship	*measured in wave 1*			*measured in wave 2*		
Labour (dummy)	1.687* (.113)	-.659* (.104)	.125 (.085)	1.674* (.074)	-.676* (.066)	.553* (.061)
Conservative (dummy)	-1.353* (.106)	2.086* (.115)	*omitted*	-1.376* (.066)	2.103* (.073)	*omitted*
Lib Dem (dummy)	*omitted*	*omitted*	1.746* (.115)	*omitted*	*omitted*	1.895* (.076)
Emotions	*measured in wave 1*			*measured in wave 2*		
Enthusiasm twds. Labour	.992* (.040)			1.020* (.028)		
Anxiety twds. Labour	-.301* (.048)			-.368* (.033)		
Anger towards Labour	-.597* (.055)			-.603* (.038)		
Enthusiasm twds. the Conservatives		.970* (.038)			1.010* (.026)	
Anxiety twds. the Conservatives		-.204* (.041)			-.410* (.034)	
Anger twds. the Conservatives		-.623* (.044)			-.540* (.036)	
Enthusiasm twds. Lib Dem			1.046* (.042)			1.121* (.026)
Anxiety twds. Lib Dem			-.302* (.065)			-.411* (.040)
Anger twds. Lib Dem			-.523* (.061)			-.511* (.040)
Constant	4.554* (.134)	4.028* (.111)	4.174* (.081)	4.710* (.088)	4.361* (.078)	4.101* (.063)
R^2	*.727*	*.739*	*.450*	*.730*	*.771*	*.594*
N	*1978*	*1973*	*1907*	*4548*	*4542*	*4484*

OLS Regression Coefficients; SE in parentheses; Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1

variation of the indicator that measures favourability towards Labour in wave 1[51]. Moreover, as presented in Appendix 5, favourability ratings can also very accurately predict partisanship (e.g. in wave 1 the Nagelkerke $R^2 = .676$).

Thus, I conclude that it is appropriate to use the indicators of favourability to construct a variable which would act as a proxy for the strength of partisanship[52]. The variable is computed by subtracting from the favourability score of the most preferred party the score pertaining to the second preferred party. Using this approach a continuous variable which is suitable to measure partisanship in a multiparty context is created[53]. The values of the variable range between 0 and 10 (Wave 1: Mean 2.98; SE 2.41 / Wave 2: Mean 3.47; SE 2.68). The higher the value, the greater the attachment to a single preferred party, hence stronger the warmth towards a single party. Conversely, value 0 signifies that the subject has multiple partisanships, being equally close to the two parties.

However, there is one very important caveat. Given that the variables measuring favourability already include the effects of emotions so will the newly computed variable. Therefore, when this variable, the variables measuring emotions and their interactions, are included into a regression analysis, the effects of emotions (and consequently those of the interaction terms) will be minimized, or at least decreased. However, this is not problematic because, in essence, the analysis will be biased against finding the effects it

[51] The R^2 of the regressions pertaining to Lib Dem, are slightly lower, but nonetheless they still have levels which are considered high for social data.

[52] Given that in operationalizing vote choice partisanship was used to assign subjects to its two categories, partisanship is already partially contained in the left-hand side of the vote choice equation. However, this is not a substantial problem as regressing a set of independent variables and partisanship on this dependent variable will act against finding significant effects for the independent variables other then partisanship. Nonetheless, if any independent variables are significant, it signifies that in reality their effects are higher.

[53] For example if a person, on a favourability scale ranging from 0 to 10, chose the values 8 for the Conservatives, 6 for Labour and 4 for Lib Dem, his score on this measure would be: 8 – 6 = 2.

searches for. Consequently, if any effects are observed, there is a degree of confidence that in reality these effects are larger.

The second explanatory factor included in the regression equation, operationalizes policy preferences. Specifically, the variable indicates the number of dimensions on which the respondent's positions match the positions of his or her preferred party. I include a number of three dimensions, thus the outcome variable has 4 values. Value 0 indicates that the respondents' positions do not match those of their parties' on any of the dimensions. Values 1 and 2 indicate that they match on one or two dimensions and value 3 shows that they match on all the dimensions. The dimensions I use are crime, taxes and ideology. The surveys measure both the participants' personal ideological position and stance on crime and taxes, but also their perception of each of the parties' positions on these dimensions. Therefore, based on the tenets of the proximity model (see Westholm, 1997), for each dimension, I concluded that a person's position matches that of his or her party if the linear Euclidean distance between his position and his party's position is smaller than the distance between his position and the positions of the out-parties. The variable was recoded to range between 0 and 1. This variable was only computed for wave 2 as the first wave does not measure the perceptions of the party positions on crime or taxes. Consequently, the analyses in wave 1 include a variable which indicates whether there is a match between the respondent's ideological position and the ideological position of his preferred party.

The third explanatory variable of interest is leader evaluations. This is measured similarly in both waves and is based on a set of three variables which measure (on a 10 point scale) how favourable each person is to each party's leader. First, I compute a variable which indicates how favourable a person is towards the leader of his or her preferred party. Subsequently, I weight this variable by using an indicator which measures how

competent the respondents think their preferred party's leader is. The variable was recoded to range between 0 and 1.

The vote choice function also includes economic evaluations. This was computed as an additive index of the four classical economic voting indicators: the sociotropic retrospective and prospective evaluations and the egocentric prospective and retrospective evaluations (see Lewis-Beck, 1988; Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981). The analyses also include standard socio-demographic controls, such as age, gender, income and education.

Finally, the variables measuring campaign exposure and emotions are identical to the ones that were included in the analysis of turnout intentions. The construction of these variables was discussed at length in the previous section.

In order to test the effects emotions have on the relationship between the main explanatory variables and vote choice, all the analyses include interaction terms between a specific emotion and each explanatory variable. In accordance with Hypotheses 17 through 21, I expect that the effects of the interactions between enthusiasm towards the preferred party, anxiety towards out-parties, anger towards out-parties and partisanship strength to be positive, indicating that these emotions increase the importance partisanship has on vote choice. Meanwhile, the expectation is that the interactions between partisanship and anxiety or anger experienced towards the preferred party will be negative, showing that these emotions decrease the relative importance of partisanship.

In regards to policy preferences I expect that the interaction terms between this variable and anxiety experienced towards the preferred party or anger towards the preferred party will be positive. A similar relationship is expected between these two emotions and leader evaluations.

Finally, before proceeding with the analyses I examined the relationship between emotions and closeness to the preferred party. The Pearson correlations reported in Table

V.3, test whether emotions can be considered an alternative measure of party approval or dissatisfaction. The results show that while enthusiasm, anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties are more closely linked to partisanship strength, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party cannot be seen as mere measures of party disapproval. This is consistent with the theory presented in Chapter III. All three emotions (enthusiasm towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger towards out-parties) are linked with the furthering of the habitual activity, i.e. support for the preferred party. As the habitual activity is the behavioural norm, it is expected that their intensity varies, to an extent, with the strength of the habit. Nonetheless, this analysis clearly shows that these emotions are not duplicate measures of partisanship strength.

Table V.3.
Pearson Correlations between emotions and favourability towards the preferred party

Emotions	Favourability towards the preferred party *Wave 1*	Favourability towards the preferred party *Wave 2*
Enthusiasm PP	.278 *	.234 *
Anxiety PP	-.148 *	-.170 *
Anger PP	-.184 *	-.186 *
Anxiety OP	.237 *	.251 *
Anger OP	.258 *	.285 *
N	*1499*	*3492*

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Sig: * p < .05. PP- Preferred party; OP – Out-Parties

V.3.1. The drivers of vote choice

Table V.4 displays the results of the five analyses performed on the data collected in the first wave, while Table V.5 contains the results pertaining to wave 2. Given that the variables constructed to measure vote choice are dichotomous, binary logistic regressions were used to estimate the hypothesized effects. Consequently, the tables report logistic regression coefficients. These coefficients accurately indicate the direction of the effects,

however, in order to substantively interpret the effect sizes odds ratios should be computed by exponentiating the coefficients.

Column 1 in Table V.4 indicates that enthusiasm has a significant positive effect on vote choice. This means that when a person is equally favourable towards multiple parties and she is neither favourable towards the leader of her preferred party, nor is she ideologically close to that party, enthusiasm towards the preferred party will increase her chances of voting for that party. With regards to the relationship between partisanship and vote choice, enthusiasm has the expected effect; however it is only statistically significant at the .01 level. Consequently, given the data collected in wave 1, there is not sufficient evidence to formally support H17. However, in wave 2 (Table V.5) the results do support the hypotheses: the interaction term is statistically significant, meaning that any increase in the level of enthusiasm strengthens the effect of partisanship on vote choice, which supports Hypothesis 17. Both tables also show that enthusiasm has a negative impact on the effects ideology (wave 1) or policy preferences (wave 2), and leader evaluations have on vote choice. Even though these effects were not hypothesized, they are consistent with the expectations: enthusiasm strengthens habit and decreases the importance the voter gives to other factors, such as ideology and leaders.

Anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party (columns 2 and 3 in tables V.4 and V.5) act in accordance with the hypotheses. Both emotions, in both waves, significantly decrease the impact partisanship has on vote choice. Consequently, confirming Hypotheses 18a and 19a, it can be stated that an anxious or angry individual will rely less on partisanship when voting. Moreover, both emotions have the predicted positive effect on the relationship between ideology (wave 1) and policy preferences (wave 2) and vote choice, however neither coefficient is significant. Formally, this does not support the hypotheses (18b and 19b); nonetheless, the direction of the effect suggests that

Table V.4.
The effect of emotions and campaign exposure on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants (Wave 1)

	Model 1 (Effect of Enthusiasm PP)	Model 2 (Effect of Anxiety PP)	Model 3 (Effect of Anger PP)	Model 4 (Effect of Anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of Anger OP)
Campaign Exposure	-.724	.096	.423	-.421	-.610
	(1.980)	(2.071)	(2.141)	1.979	(1.974)
Strength of Partisanship	-.026	.437 *	.495 *	.157 +	.093
	(.099)	(.100)	(.115)	(.091)	(.101)
Ideological Position	1.335 *	.427	.320	1.073 *	.855 *
	(.391)	(.340)	(.400)	(.357)	(.435)
Leader evaluations	7.151 *	3.683 *	1.507 +	6.259 *	6.281 *
	(1.134)	(.838)	(.938)	(.971)	(1.136)
Economic index	-.096	-.141	-.193	-.154	-.187
	(.148)	(.148)	(.150)	(.146)	(.146)
Enthusiasm PP	.628 *				
	(.243)				
Anxiety PP		-.179			
		(.226)			
Anger PP			-.645 *		
			(.250)		
Anxiety OP				.379 +	
				(.240)	
Anger OP					.360
					(.282)
Enthusiasm PP X Partisanship	.089 +				
	(.053)				
Anxiety PP X Partisanship		-.202 *			
		(.052)			
Anger PP X Partisanship			-.186 *		
			(.054)		
Anxiety OP X Partisanship				-.029	
				(.049)	
Anger OP X Partisanship					.012
					(.054)

Table V.3. Continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Enthusiasm PP X Ideology	-.364 +				
	(.211)				
Anxiety PP X Ideology		.156			
		(.192)			
Anger PP X Ideology			.196		
			(.203)		
Anxiety OP X Ideology				-.187	
				(.212)	
Anger OP X Ideology					-.036
					(.237)
Enthusiasm PP X Leader ev.	-1.231 *				
	(.515)				
Anxiety PP X Leader ev.		.813 +			
		(.505)			
Anger PP X Leader ev.			1.773 *		
			(.501)		
Anxiety OP X Leader ev.				-.565	
				(.548)	
Anger OP X Leader ev.					-.638
					(.610)
Age	-.022 *	-.020 *	-.021 *	-.022 *	-.023 *
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
Gender	.223	.219	.233	.220	.239
	(.192)	(.193)	(.194)	(.189)	(.189)
Level of Education	-.017	-.009	-.018	-.015	-.017
	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)
Income	.026	.028	.037	.022	.021
	(.029)	(.029)	(.029)	(.028)	(.028)
Constant	-.572	.714	1.902 *	-.072	.098
	(.863)	(.849)	(.901)	(.823)	(.883)
Nagelkerke R²	.226	.239	.248	.215	.216
N	1499	1499	1499	1499	1499

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. Coefficients statistically significant at * p < .05; + p < .1; Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0).

Table V.3.
The effect of emotions and campaign exposure on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants (Wave 2)

	Model 1 (Effect of Enthusiasm PP)	Model 2 (Effect of Anxiety PP)	Model 3 (Effect of Anger PP)	Model 4 (Effect of Anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of Anger OP)
Campaign Exposure	-1.664 *	-1.291 *	-1.139 *	-1.584 *	-1.548 *
	(.424)	(.420)	(.427)	(.418)	(.422)
Strength of Partisanship	-.025	.282 *	.411 *	.033	.044
	(.053)	(.048)	(.061)	(.053)	(.064)
Policy preferences	.957 *	.529	.250	1.096 *	1.156 *
	(.409)	(.336)	(.397)	(.418)	(.505)
Leader evaluations	6.082 *	3.750 *	2.923 *	5.514 *	5.790 *
	(.631)	(.455)	(.549)	(.322)	(.338)
Economic index	.048	.074	.072	-.003	-.013
	(.085)	(.086)	(.086)	(.085)	(.083)
Enthusiasm PP	.309 +				
	(.179)				
Anxiety PP		-.471 *			
		(.179)			
Anger PP			-.599 *		
			(.182)		
Anxiety OP				.320 *	
				(.163)	
Anger OP					.524 *
					(.185)
Enthusiasm PP X Partisanship	.118 *				
	(.026)				
Anxiety PP X Partisanship		-.064 *			
		(.027)			
Anger PP X Partisanship			-.125 *		
			(.030)		
Anxiety OP X Partisanship				.072 *	
				(.028)	
Anger OP X Partisanship					.054 +
					(.032)

Table V.4. Continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
EnthusiasmPP X Policy Pref.	-.126				
	(.197)				
Anxiety PP X Policy Pref.		.161			
		(.207)			
Anger PP X Policy Pref.			.288		
			(.213)		
Anxiety OP X Policy Pref.				-.225	
				(.219)	
Anger OP X Policy Pref.					-.239
					(.253)
Enthusiasm PP X Leader ev.	-.079 *				
	(.028)				
Anxiety PP X Leader ev.		.075 *			
		(.029)			
Anger PP X Leader ev.			.086 *		
			(.029)		
Anxiety OP X Leader ev.				-.713 *	
				(.172)	
Anger OP X Leader ev.					-.898 *
					(.160)
Age	-.011 *	-.011 *	-.010 *	-.012 *	-.011 *
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Gender	.439 *	.413 *	.366 *	.448 *	.423 *
	(.114)	(.114)	(.115)	(.113)	(.114)
Level of Education	.002	.006	.007	.003	.003
	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)
Income	.001	-.001	.000	.000	.000
	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)
Constant	-1.886 *	-.917 +	-.434	-1.674 *	-2.025 *
	(.373)	(.514)	(.554)	(.525)	(.570)
Nagelkerke R²	*.242*	*.239*	*.250*	*.240*	*.248*
N	*3492*	*3492*	*3492*	*3492*	*3492*

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. Coefficients statistically significant at * $p < .05$; + $p < .1$; Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0).

when experiencing either of these emotions people tend to increase their reliance on issues or ideology. Finally, the results show that the impact of leader evaluation on vote choice is strengthened by both these emotions. In the first wave, the coefficient pertaining to the effect of anger experienced towards the preferred party on the relationship between leader evaluations and vote choice is highly significant, while the coefficient of the interaction between anxiety experienced towards the preferred party and evaluation of the leader is significant at the .10 level. In the second wave of the panel, both emotions display a statistically significant effect. This supports Hypotheses 18c and 19c.

Finally, anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties do not appear to have any effects on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice in wave 1. Nonetheless, the analyses performed on the data collected in wave 2 shows that, consistent with the expectations, anxiety experienced towards an out-party has a statistically significant positive effect on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. This means that as people get more anxious towards out-parties they are more likely to rely on partisanship when voting. The effect of anger experienced towards out-parties is also consistent with the expectations; however, it is only significant at the .01 level. The coefficients pertaining to the effect of emotions on the impact of ideology (wave 1) and policy preferences (wave 2) on vote choice are not significant at any acceptable levels in either of the two waves; however their direction appears to be consistent with the theory. Lastly, the effects of anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties, on the importance of leader evaluations in choosing who to vote for, have the correct signs but are only significant in wave 2. It can be, thus, concluded that negative emotions experienced towards out-parties tend to have the same behavioural outcomes as enthusiasm: they tend to increase the reliance on partisanship while decreasing the reliance on leader evaluations, and potentially, on ideology.

Aside from the impact of emotions the analysis also assessed the effects campaign exposure has on vote choice. While in wave 2 being exposed to the campaign has a high negative impact on voting for the preferred party, in wave 1 this variable does not impact vote choice at all. This is not a surprise given that the data in wave 1 was collected in January 2010, when the official campaign had not started yet and people were not exposed to campaign techniques (mean campaign exposure = .019 on a scale ranging from 0 to 1).

Having discussed the general findings provided by these analyses, in the next section I look more closely at the effects emotions have on the relationships between vote choice and its determinants, while the subsequent section illustrates the importance of campaign exposure for the relationships between emotions, partisanship, policy preferences, leader evaluations and vote choice.

V.3.2. Emotions and the relationship between vote choice and its determinants

The analyses performed on the two panel waves support most of the hypotheses. However, to be able to more accurately assess the impact of these emotions on the relationships in question, the marginal effects of each explanatory variable on vote choice (given the effect of the emotions) need to be computed. According to Brambor, Clark and Golder "[a]nalysts should provide a substantively meaningful description of the marginal effects of the independent variables and the uncertainty with which they are estimated" (2006, p. 73). Thus, computing marginal effects is a substantively meaningful way to interpret the effects of interaction terms, especially, as they show that even if an interaction term fails to attain statistical significance, the marginal effects of the variables included in that relationship might still be significant. Consequently, I compute the marginal effects (and their respective measures of uncertainty) of the main explanatory variables (given the

variation of emotions) and plot them using the algorithm developed by Brambor et al. (2006). The following sections present and discuss the findings.

The marginal effect of partisanship

To accurately understand the link between emotions and the effect partisanship has on vote choice, I compute the marginal effects, for two different scenarios[54]. In the first scenario I look at people with multiple partisanships (i.e. the value of the variable measuring partisanship is 0) and evaluate what the effect of a 1 unit increase in the strength of partisanship is on the probability of voting for the preferred party, if emotions increase. In the second scenario, I observe the stated relationship as the strength of partisanship increases from the mean (3.6) by 1 unit, indicating the effects for people who are increasingly closer to a single party.

The marginal effects plots show that the effect patterns are similar and consistent across the two waves[55]. Thus, I present, in Figure V.3, only the results pertaining to wave 2. The graphs pertaining to wave 1 are included in Appendix 6, Figure A.6.1.

The first column of graphs (Figure V.3) illustrates the effect of emotions on the impact of a one unit increase in the strength of partisanship on vote choice, when people are equally close to two parties[56] and all other variables are set at their mean (including campaign exposure). The effects of enthusiasm are consistent between the two waves and indicate that the increase of this emotion will lead to an increase of the marginal effect of partisanship on the probability of voting for the preferred party. This supports H17.

[54] Given that I am using logistic regressions, I can only compute predicted probabilities for distinct values of the independent variables

[55] Nonetheless, the effects discovered in wave 1 are of a smaller size.

[56] Setting partisanship at 0 and looking at people who are equally favourable to two parties is not a measure of disengagement with politics. In wave 1 only 10% of respondents who gave a similar favourability rating to two parties reported favourability values between 0 and 3 on the 10 scale favourability rating. In wave 2, there are only 5% such respondents.

Figure V.3. The effect of a 1 unit increase in the strength of partisanship (from the starting value specified in each column) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality towards the preferred party (PP) or towards an out-party (OP). (Wave 2)



However, the size of the effect is small. In wave 2, if enthusiasm increases from its minimum to its maximum, the one point increase in partisanship increases the probability of voting for the preferred party by less than 5 percentage points.

The effects of anxiety or anger experienced towards the preferred party are significant in both waves and clearly consistent with the theory. The increase of either of these emotions will decrease the effect partisanship has on a person's probability of voting for his preferred party. Consequently, Hypotheses 18a and 19a are confirmed. However, once more, the actual size of the effect does not exceed 5 percentage points.

Finally, anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties also seem to have the expected positive effects on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice, confirming Hypotheses 20 and 21. However, both of these emotions only increase the effect of partisanship on the probability of voting for the preferred party by approximately 2.5 percentage points. Moreover, in wave 1 (Appendix 6) anger experienced towards an out-party has a null effect.

Looking now at people who are clearly closer to a single party, the direction of the effects is maintained, but the relationship patterns differ. The results illustrate that, in both waves, an increase in the frequency with which enthusiasm towards the preferred party is experienced (from 'rarely or never' to 'not very often') is seen to increase the impact of partisanship (which increases by 1 unit from the mean) on vote choice. However, for any subsequent increase in the level of enthusiasm the effect of partisanship on vote choice becomes virtual mute. This indicates that inducing limited amounts of enthusiasm can have the desired effect, drastically increasing the frequency with which this emotion is experienced does not further increase the impact of partisanship on vote choice. For people with a single partisanship, once they are enthusiastic, becoming very enthusiastic as

opposed to somewhat enthusiastic does not make any difference for the relationship between partisanship and vote choice.

In the case of anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party, Figure V.3 shows that both these emotions have the hypothesized negative effects on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice but only at their extreme levels. Any increase in the frequency with which anxiety or anger towards the preferred party are experienced between 'never' and 'somewhat often' has virtually no effect on the importance of partisanship for vote choice. However, the increase of the frequency of these emotions from 'somewhat often' to 'very often' is consistent with the expectations and it decreases the effect of partisanship on the probability of voting for the preferred party.

Lastly, anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties seem to have the same type of effects as enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party. Their initial increase in frequency from 'never' to 'not very often' does increase the effect of partisanship; however, any subsequent increase in the frequency with which they are experienced has no additional effect.

The graphs in column 2 also show that the size of the effects of emotions on people's reliance on partisanship varies with the strength of partisanship. Thus, as the strength of partisanship increases, the strength of the effect induced by emotions decreases. Moreover, an analysis (not displayed here) of these relationships, when partisanship is set to increase from 9 to 10, illustrates that at the most intense levels of closeness to a single party, emotions do not have any effects at all.

To conclude, the analyses presented here confirm all the hypotheses, however they also indicate that the effects emotions have on the impact of partisanship on vote choice are small. A partial explanation for the small effect sizes can be found in how the variable measuring partisanship was constructed. At the beginning of this section I have shown that

the computation of 'partisanship strength' was based on three items which measure peoples' favourability to the given parties. I have also shown that these variables can be used as adequate proxies for partisanship. However, more importantly, I have pointed out that they themselves are influenced by emotions. Consequently, given that the explanatory variable already partially incorporates the effects of emotions, the interaction of this variable with variables measuring emotions will automatically lead to artificially decreased coefficients. Therefore, even if the effects discovered here are small, in reality these effects are expected to be slightly higher, given that the analyses were biased against finding these effects.

The marginal effects of policy preferences

As mentioned at the onset of this section, due to the lack of data, only wave 2 contained a variable which measures 'policy preferences'. In wave 1 'ideology' was used as a proxy for 'policy preferences'. Figure V.4 displays the marginal effects of policy preferences on vote choice. The effects of ideology are displayed in Appendix 6, Figure A.6.2. In both waves the marginal effects are computed when the respective explanatory variable ranges from its minimum to its maximum. For both waves (i.e. for both ideology and policy preferences) the analyses produce significant results, in the correct direction. Enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties are seen to significantly decrease the reliance on ideology or policy preferences when voting for the preferred party. Meanwhile, as hypothesized, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party increase the relevance of issues or ideology. The actual effect sizes of each emotion are centred around the .15 mark. The variation of either emotion from its minimum to its maximum induces a 15 percentage point increase (or decrease) in the impact policy preferences have on the probability of voting for the preferred party.

Figure V.4. **The effect of the change in policy prefernces (*from* no match between the positions of the respondent and those of his preferred party *to* matching on all issue) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality towards the preferred party (PP) or towards an out-party (OP). (Wave 2)**



Figure V.5. **The effects of the change in leader evaluations (*from* not liking the leader of the preffred party atall *to* liking the leader of the preferred party very much) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality towards the preferred party (PP) or towards an out-party (OP). (Wave 2)**



The marginal effects of leader evaluations

Clarke et al (2009) think of leader evaluations as one of the key determinants of vote choice in Britain. Moreover, Marcus et al. (2002) show that emotions tend to affect the impact of leader evaluations on vote choice. Consequently, I assess the effects this variable's increase from the minimum to the maximum has on the probability of voting for the preferred party, given the increase in emotionality. The pattern of the effects is similar in the two waves I examine, thus Figure V.5 only reports the analysis pertaining to wave 2. The results for wave 1 are included in Appendix 6, Figure A.6.3.

The results illustrated in Figure V.5 show that as enthusiasm towards the preferred party increases, the impact of leader evaluations on vote choice decreases, which is in accordance with the expectations. The increase of anxiety or anger experienced towards the preferred party is seen to induce an increase in the reliance on leader evaluations. This is in accordance with the theory and supports Hypotheses 18c and 19c. Finally, the results also indicate that anxiety experienced towards an out-party, along with anger experienced towards an out-party, decrease people's reliance on leader evaluations. Even if this was not hypothesized, it is in accordance with what the theory suggests.

The effect sizes are roughly similar for all five emotions and show that, by far, emotions have the largest effect on the impact leader evaluations have on vote choice. The increase of any emotion from its minimum value to its maximum induces an increase (or decrease) of approximately 45 percentage points in the impact of leader evaluation on the probability of voting for the preferred party. The results display similar patterns in wave 1 as well, however, the effect size are smaller.

V.3.3. The indirect effect of the campaign on vote choice

The theory argues that the electoral campaign can influence vote choice indirectly, by inducing emotions which then moderate the effect different factors have on vote choice. Indeed, Chapter IV illustrates that campaign exposure has the power to change people's emotionality levels and the previous section shows that emotions do moderate the relationship between vote choice and its determinants. Thus, this section aims to assess further the effect campaign exposure has on the moderating effect of emotions.

To achieve this, I rerun the analyses presented in the previous section. While in the previous section the marginal effects were computed by holding campaign exposure at its mean, I now simultaneously plot the marginal effects for two scenarios: when campaign exposure is absent and when campaign exposure is maximal. If the theory is correct and campaigns impact vote choice through the moderating effect of the emotions they induce, the two slopes computed based on different levels of campaign exposure should be significantly different, and more importantly, they should have differently angled slopes. When campaign exposure is at its maximum I expect the slopes to be sharper (i.e. the moderating effect larger) compared to when campaign exposure is absent.

In the following paragraphs I only present the analysis pertaining to wave 2. Wave 1 was omitted because the data was collected before the start of the official electoral campaign and as such campaign exposure is not expected to, nor does it, impact vote choice.

Campaign exposure and partisanship

The results displayed din Figure V.6[57] indicate that the increase of campaign exposure moderately increases the effect emotions have on the impact of partisanship on vote choice. However, the differences in marginal effects between the two levels of campaign exposure are not significantly different from each other (or from 0) at the extremes, i.e. when enthusiasm towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger towards out-parties are very low and when anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are very high. Moreover, there is no significant difference at all between the slopes for anger experienced towards the preferred party when the person is equally close to two parties. Nonetheless, generally, the effects are consistent with the expectations and show that the campaign can affect vote choice indirectly by impacting the effect of emotions on the relevance of partisanship. The effects are present whether we look at people with multiple partisanships or single partisans, but it is in the case of single partisans that the campaign can truly make a difference. It can be observed that when campaign exposure is absent the effect of emotions becomes null.

For instance, in the case of enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party the effect of moving from somewhat enthusiastic to very enthusiastic is 2.25 times larger[58] if a person was fully exposed to the campaign versus not being exposed to the campaign at all. This difference is nearly tripled (6.5) if we look at a similar scenario involving people who are close to a single party.

[57] Column 1 displays the graphs for people who have multiple partisanships; Column 2 displays the results for people who are close to a single party.

[58] When campaign exposure is 0 moving from 2 to 3 on the level of enthusiasm produces an increase on 1.2 percentage points in the effect of partisanship on vote choice. When campaign exposure is 1 moving from 2 to 3 on the level of enthusiasm produces an increase on 2.7 percentage points in the effect of partisanship on vote choice.

Figure V.6. **The effect of a 1 unit increase in the strength of partisanship (from the starting value specified in each column) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality towards the preferred party (PP) or towards an out-party (OP). The analysis is disaggregated by the level of campaign exposure (no exposure to the campign *versus* full exposure to the campign). In each graph the lines coloured in red indicate the effect of partisanship as emotions increase and campaign exposure is at its maximum. The the lines coloured in blue indicate the effect of partisanship as emotions increase and campaign exposure is at its minimum. (Wave 2)**



Campaign exposure, policy preferences and leader evaluation

The results pertaining to the relationship between campaign exposure and the moderating effect of emotions on the impact of policy preferences are displayed in Figure V.7. They indicate that, even though the effects are stronger when campaign exposure is at its maximum, the differences are generally not statistically significant. Moreover, the slopes are parallel, which indicates that while campaigns might increase the importance of policy preferences when voting, they do not impact the effect emotions have on the relationship between issues and vote choice.

Conversely, the different levels of campaign exposure have significantly different effects on the impact of emotions on the relationship between leader evaluations and vote choice. It is generally apparent that when campaign exposure is at its maximum (versus its minimum) leader evaluations are more important for vote choice. However, contrary to the expectations, the increase in exposure to the campaign does not increase the strength of the moderation (the two slopes are generally parallel), but only increases the starting value. Consequently, it seems that when it comes to leader evaluations the electoral campaign does not affect vote choice by strengthening the effect emotions have on the impact of this variable on vote choice, however, they indirectly affect vote choice by increasing the importance of leader evaluations[59]. Of course, this is entirely plausible, especially in the context of the 2010 British elections. Campaigns, in general, place great emphases on the leader of the party (Guzzetta, 2006), who virtually becomes the candidate for PM and thus, is permanently in the public eye. Moreover, as noted in Chapter II, the 2010 British election

[59] Moreover, regressing vote choice on campaign exposure, leader evaluations and their interaction shows that indeed campaign exposure significantly moderates the impact of leader evaluations on vote choice. However, this does not negate the moderating effects emotions have on the relationship between vote choice and leader evaluations; it merely illustrates a dual mechanism. Even if the interaction between campaign exposure and leader evaluations is included in the vote choice equation (where it has a statistically significant effect) the moderating effects of emotions also remain significant and consistent with the findings presented in Table V.4.

Figure V.7. The effect of the change in policy prefernces (*from* no match between the respondent and his preferred party *to* matching on all issue) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality. The analysis is disaggregated by the level of campaign exposure (no exposure to the campign *versus* full exposure to the campign). **Red lines**: the effect of policy pref. as emotions increase and camp. exposure is at maximum. **Blue lines**: the effect of policy pref. as emotions increase and camp. exposure is at minimum. (Wave 2)



Figure V.8. The effect of the change in leader evaluations (*from* not liking the leader of the preffred party atall *to* liking the leader of the preferred party very much) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality. The analysis is disaggregated by the level of campaign exposure (no exposure to the campign *versus* full exposure to the campign). **Red lines**: the effect of leader ev. as emotions increase and camp. exposure is at maximum. **Blue lines**: the effect of leader ev. as emotions increase and camp. exposure is at minimum. (Wave 2)



saw the first televised leader debates. These were broadcast in prime time, by several media outlets both on TV and radio. The first debates had a total television audience of nearly 10 million, the second 4 million while the third nearly 9 million[60]. Consequently, it is no surprise that increasing the exposure to the campaign (and therefore to news about the leaders) will increase the effects leader evaluations have on vote choice.

To summarize, this section shows that campaign exposure has an indirect impact on vote choice through affecting the strength of the effect emotions have on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. This is consistent with Hillygus and Shields (2008), who show that electoral campaigns indirectly affect vote choice, through their impact on the effect of partisanship. Finally, I also illustrate that campaigns can also indirectly affect vote choice through the impact they have on the importance leader evaluations have in the vote choice function.

V.4. Summary and conclusions

Relying on panel data collected before the 2010 British General Elections, this chapter set out to analyse the political behavioural effects of emotions and electoral campaigns. Specifically, in the first part of the chapter I looked at the effects campaign exposure and emotions have on the likelihood of people to turn out and vote, while the second part examined their impact on vote choice.

The results show that specific emotions experienced towards different parties have distinct effects on the likelihood of turnout. The findings strongly suggest that enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party has a tendency to increase the potential to turn out, while anger experienced towards the same party decreases the likelihood that a person

[60] The figures are based on the data published by the Broadcasters' Audience Research Board (www.barb.co.uk). Radio audience figures are not available. Moreover, exposure to the debates through the next day (following days) reports in the print and online media are not quantified.

will go to the polls. Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party and anger experienced towards an out-party do not seem to influence turnout intentions. Finally, anxiety experienced towards an out-party is shown to impact turnout intentions. The increase of this emotion can explain the increase of the likelihood to turn out for a given individual across time. Campaign exposure does display the expected positive effect on turnout intentions. Moreover, consistent with theory, I show that emotions can mediate its effects. Enthusiasm and anxiety experienced towards out-parties increase the effect campaign exposure has on turnout intentions, anger experienced towards the preferred party decreases it, while the other two negative emotions have no effect. These results are consistent with the findings reached by the literature on the effects of negative campaigning, which show that negativity can decrease, increase or have no effect on turnout intentions. Furthermore, looking at reported turnout, I showed that emotions have momentary effects, which are not likely to carry forward and affect behaviour at some distance in the future.

The second section of this chapter, which examines the relationship between vote choice, campaigns, emotions and partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations, also produced findings which support the theory.

In brief, the results, consistent with Marcus et al (2002) and Brader (2006) show that enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party increases the effect partisanship has on vote choice, while decreasing the effects of policy preferences and leader evaluations. Consequently, this confirms that enthusiastic individuals, do go out and vote according to habit (i.e. voting for the preferred party) and are less likely to use any 'rational choice' tools when deciding who to vote for.

Conversely, being anxious towards the preferred party does not decease the chances of a person voting, however his or her vote choice will now rest more on the

evaluation of leaders, and issue and ideological positions. As predicted by the theory, anxiety is shown to decrease the relative importance of partisanship on vote choice. At the same time, it increases the impact of both policy preferences and leader evaluations. An anxious voter, thus, resembles more accurately the Downsian voter.

The case of anger experienced towards the preferred party is very similar to that of anxiety. Angry individuals tend to rely less on partisanship and more on leader evaluations and policy preferences. However, what differentiates anger from anxiety experienced towards the preferred party is that anger can also decrease the likelihood of turning out.

Anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties also display the expected effects. Being afraid or angry in regards to an out-party increases the reliance on partisanship. Moreover, both these emotions have consistent effects on leader evaluations and policy preferences and decrease their relevance for vote choice.

This analysis also brought to light that the effects emotions have on the link between vote choice and partisanship is dependent on the strength of party attachment. The effects of each of the emotions dissipate as the closeness to a given party increases.

Finally, to return to the original puzzle regarding campaign effects, the second section of this chapter showed that campaigns do affect vote choice directly. However, more importantly, they also have indirect effects on vote choice through affecting the strength of the effect emotions have on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. I also show that campaign exposure has an additional indirect effect on vote choice by affecting the importance leader evaluations (and possibly issue positions) play in the electoral decision. Consequently, the analyses illustrate that campaigns, through their indirect effects, impact political behaviour in a way which is consistent with the aims of

campaigns: mobilization of their own supporters and persuasion of the supporters of out-parties.

Having identified effect patterns which are consistent both with theory but also with previous research, I conclude that emotions have some importance for understanding how people vote. Moreover, obtaining these results in the British context also shows that that the theory of emotions in politics is not solely a description of American political behaviour, but can fruitfully be applied to understand vote choice in other political, cultural and electoral settings.

Chapter VI

Campaign communication and the induction of distinct emotions

The previous chapters describe the process through which campaigns, by inducing emotions, affect political behaviour and vote choice. The analyses corroborate the theory and show that exposure to the campaign generally increases people's levels of emotionality, and emotions tend to display the hypothesized effects on turnout intentions and vote choice. However, consistent with both the theory and the empirical analyses, it is apparent that specific emotions experienced towards specific parties, have distinct and, at times, opposing effects on political behaviour. Thus, aside from knowing that, generally, electoral campaigns influence emotions, it is important to understand how a campaign can induce the distinct emotions that are shown to affect behaviour. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to assess Hypotheses 1 through 5, which link the tone and framing of campaign communication with the induction of specific emotions.

To test these hypotheses I rely on randomized and controlled laboratory experiments (Fisher, 1990; Kempthorne, 1952). Lab experiments have been shown by previous research to be the most fruitful design for studying the emotionality in politics (Bang-Petersen, 2010; Brader, 2005, 2006; Brader, et al., 2010; Brader & Valentino, 2007; Brader, et al., 2008; MacKuen, et al., 2010; Marcus, et al., 2000; Redlawsk, et al., 2007; Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2009; Valentino, et al., 2009; Valentino, et al., 2008; Wolak & Marcus, 2007).

The advantages of using experiments to understand people's political behaviour lie in their increased flexibility and the possibility for accurate control. By way of the design of

the manipulations, I can isolate the effect of a single variable at a time (Kinder & Palfrey, 1993;Fisher, 1990). Furthermore, experiments have been shown to be well suited for testing campaign effects (Ansolabehere, 2006a; Brady, et al., 2006). However, a potential problem with using laboratory experiments in social sciences is that they create an artificial environment which may affect validity. To alleviate this problem, by using the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE), I sought to design a campaign context that mimics, as closely as possible, the flow of a real electoral campaign.

The experiment is primarily designed to generate data that would allow us to better understand how specific emotions can be induced by campaign communication. However, it is also aimed at assessing the impact of campaign communication on political behaviour, which is the purpose of the following chapter.

This chapter proceeds as follows: after outlining the research design, I analyse the data through two different statistical techniques: t-tests and log linear analysis. The final section summarises the findings.

VI.1. The experimental design

The laboratory experiments were conducted in November 2010 in the laboratory of the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Science, University of Oxford. The participating subject pool consisted of 339 people drawn from the CESS subject database[61]. The only restriction placed on participation was the requirement of British citizenship. On average, the length of the experiment was of 30 minutes and the subjects received a financial compensation for their time. The data were collected using the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment.

[61] The database includes both students and non-students. Out of the 339 subjects, the student population represents 60.3%. Given that it is often stressed that students are a special socio-demographic category, having the subject pool also include a significant number of non-students undoubtedly increases the external validity of the findings.

The DPTE software is based on the methodology of Dynamic Process Tracing developed by David Redlawsk and Richard Lau to study the effects of election campaigns (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, 2001, 2006; Redlawsk, 2002, 2004, 2006; Redlawsk, et al., 2007). They contend that the key behind studying people's decision making patterns in a campaign context is to experimentally replicate the chaotic and non-ordered flow of information typically found in a real campaign (Redlawsk, et al., 2007; Redlawsk & Lau, 2010). Campaigns do not follow an ordered pattern: "[p]olitics is messy; information comes and goes somewhat chaotically. Alternative policy options and candidates do not sit neatly on a shelf waiting to be examined and compared" (Redlawsk, et al., 2007, p. 160). Consequently, in order to be able to understand and explain how people are influenced by campaigns, the authors devised a technique which mimics the flow of information in a campaign while it also "retains the ability to trace information search and decision making as they happen" (Redlawsk, et al., 2007, p. 160).

As such, the DPTE[62] is designed to enable the researcher to present information in a way which is closer to the information flow of real electoral campaigns. Aside from bringing a laboratory experiment slightly closer to real-world conditions, the second advantage of using this platform are its data-recording and data-management capabilities, being well suited to be used as an experimental management platform.[63]

Consequently, upon arrival the subjects were assigned a workstation and were given technical instructions about the software. Following their consent, the experiment was started. Subjects were first asked to complete a pre-treatment questionnaire. This

[62]The DPTE is a web-based software which allows the implementation of the Dynamic Process Tracing methodology (Redlawsk & Lau, 2010).

[63] Its capabilities include the automatic assignment of subjects to experimental cells (even when using a complex randomized blocks design) and the presentation of the appropriate questionnaires and stimuli (Redlawsk & Lau, 2010).

contained standard demographic questions[64], questions testing the level of political knowledge, the interest in elections, and ideological placement (on a left-right scale). Furthermore, subjects were also asked to evaluate how close they felt to each of the main political parties (the Conservatives, The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats). Based on the answers to the closeness questions, after the completion of the questionnaire, the software was programmed to automatically place each subject into a given experimental cell and assign them a given treatment.

Following the logic of the between-groups design with post-test (Kempthorne, 1952; Morton & Williams, 2010; Singleton, Straits, & Straits, 1993), the experiment was comprised of five treatment groups and a control group. The stimuli were designed to induce enthusiasm towards the preferred party in cell 1; anxiety towards the preferred party in cell 2; anger towards the preferred party in cell 3; anxiety towards an out-party in cell 4; and anger towards an out-party in cell 5. Cell 6 was designated as the control group and subjects received a placebo.

After having received the stimuli, the subjects entered the post-test phase of the experiment. First of all, they were asked to complete a questionnaire which was identical for all the experimental cells. Following Wolak and Marcus (2007), it included a Ten-Item Big Five personality test[65]. It also asked subjects to state their position on a number of prevalent public issues[66]. Furthermore, the questionnaire included a battery of questions aimed at evaluating the strength of emotions[67] experienced in regards to each political party.

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[64] Gender; age; employment status and job type; ethnicity; level of education and income.

[65] For an assessment of the suitability of the Ten-Item personality (Big Five) compared to the traditional 44-question test, see Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann (2003).

[66] Crime; taxation; public spending; immigration and university fees.

[67] The questions were phrased according to the guidelines set out by Marcus et al. (2006). Each question measured the strength of a single emotion for a single party. The strength was measured on a 4 point scale ranging from I feel 'very (*emotion to be inserted*)' to 'Not at all (*emotion to be inserted*) ' towards party X.

In the next stage of the post-test, information search patterns were tested. The participants were exposed to the same campaign environment[68] in which they were provided with information about the parties' policy positions. The information was comprised of each main party's[69] position on crime, immigration, education and the economy. Additionally, four control items were included. These were newspaper articles on non-political topics, such as broadband internet, romantic relationships, the Euro Tunnel and Halloween. The sixteen items were set to appear (scroll) eight times each, with a 3 second interval between them and a scrolling time of 18 seconds. The order in which the articles appeared was randomised separately for each participant. This phase of the post-test offers the means for constructing a measure of information search which does not rely on self-reports. Obtaining such a measure is important for testing the hypotheses that address the behavioural consequences of emotions (discussed in the next chapter).

Finally, after the conclusion of the information search phase, the participants were asked to answer a second post-test questionnaire, which, again, was identical for all subjects. They were asked standard questions pertaining to turnout and voting intentions. After the completion of the questionnaire the experiment ended. Figure VI.1 contains a schema of the experimental set-up.

[68] The subject sees a small number of labels (similar to newspaper headlines) which scroll down the screen. The users can access the information by clicking on the label. This opens a new window where the full article can be read. However, while the subject reads the chosen information the scrolling continues in the background, labels appear and disappear. This inevitably means that the subject will miss out on some information. Furthermore, given the short time frame, the abundance of information and the scrolling, the subject (much like in a real campaign) is forced to select and choose what information he or she examines.
[69] The Conservatives, The Labour party and The Liberal Democrats.

Figure VI.1. The set-up of the experiment



VI.1.1. The assignment of subjects and the manipulations

The treatments were randomly assigned to the subjects. The randomized complete blocks design was used. Randomized blocks allocation is considered superior to simple random allocation as it ensures that each experimental cell has an equal number of subjects that share a characteristic that could confound the effects of the treatment. The distinction between simple randomisation and randomised blocks is conceptually very similar to the distinction between simple random sampling and stratified random sampling (Federer, 1967; Kempthorne, 1952; Levin, 1999). I used partisanship as the blocking criterion. The subjects were members or supporters of a variety of political parties. As such, it was imperative that the design ensures a balanced distribution of different party supporters across the experimental cells. Consequently, after the pre-treatment questionnaire, subjects were grouped in blocks according their partisanship, and then, separately within each

block the experimental treatments were randomly assigned. Table VI.1 contains the joint distribution of subjects by the experimental cell and by partisanship.

Table VI.1.
The distribution of subjects by experimental cell and partisanship

Cell	Experimental cells	Partisanship			*Total*
	Manipulation: news story aimed at inducing	*Labour*	*Lib Dem*	*Conservative*	*Subjects*
I	Enthusiasm towards preferred party	22	15	11	*48*
II	Anxiety towards preferred party	22	16	14	*52*
III	Anger towards preferred party	22	15	14	*51*
IV	Anxiety towards an out-party	22	17	11	*50*
V	Anger towards an out-party	22	15	13	*50*
VI	Control group: neutral	23	17	8	*48*
Excluded subjects – supporters of other parties					*40*
Total		*133*	*95*	*71*	***339***

Partisanship was measured using a combination of several questions. First, the subjects were asked to declare whether they are closer to one of the main political parties (the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats or the Labour Party) or whether they are closer to a different party in the British political system. If the subject chose the second option they were automatically placed in an experimental environment similar to the control group and excluded from any subsequent analyses. If, on the other hand, the subjects said they feel closer to one of the main political parties the software proceeded to compute their partisanship. This was done based on their answers to three *additional* questions. Each of these questions asked them to state (on a scale which ranged from 1 to 10) how close they felt towards each of the three main political parties. The software was then programmed to automatically conclude that the person's partisanship is represented by the party that he or she feels closest to[70]. The strategy I employ to measure partisanship is consistent with the specificities of the British political context. Barnes et al. (1988), Mughan (2009) and Keith et

[70] Technically, the software assessed which of the three closeness questions generated the highest answer value. If the subjects' answers indicated that they are similarly close to two or more parties, the software randomly chose one of the parties.

al. (1986; 1992) stress that measuring partisanship in terms of closeness to parties is better suited to multi-party contexts then the Michigan party ID measure is: in such contexts, it is often the case that the same person can have multiple partisanships, that is, he or she can be equally close to two or more parties (Mughan, 2009), which cannot be captured by the identification question. Nonetheless, the authors also show that, if we are not interested in capturing multiple partisanships, measuring partisanship in terms of closeness to parties virtually leads to the same results as the classical identification measure: the two measures capture the same underlying attachment.

In each experimental cell subjects were exposed to a stimulus that was specifically designed to induce a given emotion. The stimuli were presented in the form of newspaper articles. The construction of the articles was guided by recent work that examines how distinct emotions are induced (Bang-Petersen, 2010; Brader, 2006; Brader, et al., 2010; Marcus, 2002; Redlawsk, et al., 2007). According to this literature, the variation in the tone, framing (Brader, 2006) and informational content (Redlawsk et al., 2007) of articles is responsible for the induction of certain emotions over others. As such, consistent with Brader (2006) and Marcus (2002) the articles which were meant to convey enthusiasm towards the preferred party had a positive tone and highlighted the successes and accomplishments of the given party (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, articles designed to induce anxiety or anger towards the preferred party or an out-party carried a negative tone and the informational content was geared towards highlighting that certain of the parties' activities and policies were failures and impacted (or will impact) negatively on society. In order to differentiate between anger and anxiety, consistent with Brader et al. (2010) and Bang-Petersen (2010), the framing of the negative articles was modified. To induce anger, the negative policy outcomes discussed in the articles were now presented as being the conscious fault and responsibility of the party in question: the negative outcome occurred

only because the given party willingly and consciously took a certain decision (Hypotheses 3 and 5). On the other hand, articles meant to induce anxiety lacked this framing; no blame was attributed (Hypotheses 2 and 4). Lastly, the control groups were exposed to a placebo: a non-political article about biodiversity. The stimuli are presented in Appendix 7.

Finally, it needs to be noted that each experimental cell contained subjects with varying partisanships, yet in each experimental cell the treatment was aimed at inducing an emotion towards, for instance, one's preferred party. Consequently, within in each experimental cell, each subject had to be exposed to a stimulus that was specific to his own party[71]. In order to achieve this, three concurrent experimental scenarios were created: one specific for each of the main parties. Each of the three scenario contained three items (news articles) which were, respectively, designed to induce enthusiasm, anxiety or anger to the given party. The informational content of the articles was similar for each scenario; only the framing differed. Thus, after the subjects were randomly assigned into an experimental cell, the software automatically assigned the experimental scenario which was appropriate given the subject's partisanship[72]. In the first three cells (see Table VI.1.) the subjects were assigned the scenario which was congruent with their partisanship: if a person was a Conservative and was randomly assigned treatment 3 (anger to preferred party), he or she would visualise the stimuli designed to induce anger towards the Conservative party. However, in cells 4 and 5 (see Table VI.1.) participants received a scenario which was incongruent with their partisanship, that is, they received a stimulus inducing an emotion towards one of the two out-parties. The specific out-party towards which the emotion was induced was determined randomly. For example, a Conservative supporter who was

[71] E.g.: in the experimental cell 'Enthusiasm for the preferred party' a Conservative supporter received a positive news article about the Conservative Party while a Labour supporter received a positive item regarding the Labour Party, etc.

[72] The procedure of assigning different experimental scenarios does not have any impact on and is completely independent of the random assignment procedure.

assigned treatment 4 (anxiety to an out-party) would have randomly received an anxiety inducing item either from the Liberal Democrat scenario or from the Labour scenario. Lastly, irrespective of partisanship, in the control group all subjects received the same stimuli.

VI.2. The analyses

The data generated through the experiments is analysed in two stages. In the first stage I examine the emotion-inducing potential of campaign communication by looking at the differences in average emotionality in each group. In the second stage the analysis is geared towards assessing the magnitudes of the effects of the stimuli.

However, before proceeding, I briefly discuss the construction and characteristics of the variables which measure emotions. Consistent with the recommendations of Marcus et al. (2006) emotions were measured in the post-test through nine closed-ended questions which asked subjects to state the intensity with which they experience enthusiasm, anxiety and anger towards each party. Based on these measures, and knowing each individual's partisanship I computed five new variables which express the strength of the emotions experienced towards each person's preferred party but also towards the out-parties. Thus, there is a single variable that measures the intensity of enthusiasm towards the preferred party[73]. Similarly, two other variables measure the intensity of anxiety and anger experienced towards the subjects' preferred party. Finally, I constructed two variables which measure the level of emotions (anxiety and anger) directed at the out-parties. These variables were computed as the average between the levels of emotions the subject declared he experienced towards the two parties other than the preferred party.

[73] The variable uses a scale ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 is not at all enthusiastic and 3 is very enthusiastic. The wording of the questions is presented in Appendix 14.

The measurement strategy used here contrasts with the one used in the previous analyses, where the frequency of emotions was measured. The need to employ different measurement strategies stems from the differences in the measurement contexts. On the one hand, in the experiment the aim is to assess the level emotions at a particular moment in time, i.e. after the subjects were exposed to the stimuli. This could only be done by measuring their intensity. Asking subjects how often they experienced emotions would not have isolated the effects of the stimuli. On the other hand, in the surveys there were no stimuli with which the emotional responses could be directly linked, thus a broader measure was called for. Assessing the frequency of emotional reactions towards different parties was thus appropriate and necessary. Marcus et al. (2006) show that measuring the intensity or frequency of emotions is consistently equivalent.

In order to better understand the characteristics of the data I performed a set of diagnostics. First, I examined the relationship between emotions and how close people said they felt towards their preferred party. The Pearson correlations reported in Table VI.2, test whether emotions can be considered an alternative measure of party approval. The results show a moderate correlation between enthusiasm and closeness to the preferred party and weak correlations between anxiety or anger and the preferred party. Consequently, while enthusiasm is more closely linked to relative partisanship, anxiety and anger cannot be seen as mere measures of party disapproval. These findings are not surprising, and are consistent with the TAI. Enthusiasm is a product of the disposition system, which oversees habitual activities, embodied, in this case, by the support for the preferred party. Moreover, as previously discussed, habitual activities are the human behavioural norm. Consequently, enthusiasm is the expected normal emotional reaction a person would

display towards the preferred party[74]. Of course, the intensity of this reaction will vary, to an extent, with the strength of the habit, indicated by how close people feel towards the preferred party. Even though it is expected that enthusiasm and closeness to the preferred party are correlated (Marcus, 2002), this analysis shows that enthusiasm is not duplicate measure of partisanship.

Table VI.2. Pearson Correlations between emotions and closeness to the preferred party

Emotions	*Closeness to the preferred party*
Enthusiasm PP	.449 *
N	*292*
Anxiety PP	-185 *
N	*292*
Anger PP	-.212 *
N	*291*
Anxiety OP	.096
N	*298*
Anger OP	.064
N	*298*

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Results significant at * p <.05; PP- Preferred Party; OP- Out-Party.

To illustrate that the five emotions under discussion are individual (yet interrelated) measures of five distinct physio-psychological states I ran a Spearman correlation between all the variables measuring emotions. It can be observed, in Table VI.3, that while there are moderate correlations between the variables, none of the variables are seen to replicate each other, proving to be specific measures of different, but interrelated phenomena.

I also examined whether there are differences in the experience of emotions between men and women and between students and non-students. The results, included in Appendix 8, show that neither gender nor student status produces any significant differences.

[74] Meanwhile anxiety and anger occur under exceptional circumstances when the surveillance system is activated.

Table VI.3. Spearman correlations between emotions

Emotions	Anxiety PP	Anger PP	Anxiety OP	Anger OP
Enthusiasm PP	**-.284 ***	**-.429 ***	.069	.027
N	*292*	*291*	*291*	*291*
Anxiety PP		**.437 ***	**.118 ***	**.116 ***
N		*291*	*291*	*291*
Anger PP			.045	**.208 ***
N			*290*	*291*
Anxiety OP				**.586 ***
N				*297*

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Results significant at * p <.05; PP- Preferred Party; OP- Out-Party.

VI.2.1. The induction of emotions

Hypotheses 1 to 5 assert that campaign communication can induce specific emotions. According to Hypothesis 1, subjects in experimental cell 1 (enthusiasm) should be significantly more enthusiastic than those in any of the other six cells. Similarly, I expect (Hypothesis 2) people in experimental cell 2 (anxiety) to be significantly more anxious and people in experimental cell 3 (anger) to display higher levels of anger (Hypothesis 3) than subjects included in any other cells. Finally, the individuals included in experimental cells 4 and 5, should respectively feel more anxious or angry, when compared to the subjects exposed to other stimuli (Hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively).

The experiment uses a *single-factor independent groups design (or between-groups design)*. Consequently, consistent with Boniface (1999), the data is analysed using independent sample t-tests and their non-parametric counterpart: the Chi 2 test (Sheskin, 2007). I start by dichotomizing the variables measuring the respective emotions (see Appendix 9). The first three values of the variables measuring emotions were combined into a single category, while the highest value remained in a category of its own. The new variables distinguish between people who are very emotional (enthusiastic/anxious/angry

– value 1) and all other people (value 0). As such, by running t-tests[75] I assess whether the stimuli had an effect on making people very enthusiastic, very angry, etc.

The results, reported in Table VI.4., broadly support the expectations. The analyses in VI.4.a show that there are significantly more people who say they feel very enthusiastic in the experimental cell where enthusiasm was induced than in the experimental cells where I induced anxiety (Dif. .081; p=.12) or anger (Dif. .12; p <.05). This means that positive news conveying optimism has a much higher chance of inducing positive emotions as opposed to negative ones. However, the highest mean difference is to be found when comparing the cell where enthusiasm was induced with the control group. There are significantly more subjects in the enthusiasm-inducing cell that say they are very enthusiastic than in the control group (Dif. .16; p < .05).

Turning to anxiety, Table VI.4.b shows that people who were given the anxiety-inducing stimulus are significantly more likely to feel very anxious then people who were in the control group (Dif, .06, p=.1). However, when comparing these subjects (in the anxiety-inducing cell) to the subjects in the other two cells (where enthusiasm and anger were induced), the direction of the results is consistent with the hypotheses; however they do not attain statistical significance at any conventional levels. Consequently, what can only be said is that it is probable that people who are exposed to negative news will be more likely to feel very anxious than people who are not exposed to such communication items.

Next, I test H3, which states that anger can be induced by a negative campaign communication item which attributes blame. Table VI.4.c suggests that, contingent on the stimuli they were exposed to, there is a significant difference between people in terms of

[75] Given that the variables are dichotomous I also ran non-parametric Likelihood-Ratio Chi2 tests. The significance levels are in essence identical and are also reported in Table VI.4. For ease of interpretation I discuss the results of the t-tests.

Table VI.4.
Differences between the intensity of emotions measured in different experimental cells

Tests between the experimental cells	*Independent sample t-test*		*Likelihood-Ratio Chi2 test*		Cohen's D Effect Size
	Mean Diff.	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	
a. Enthusiasm					
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	.081	.121	1.386	.120	.24 Small
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	.118	.038	3.288	.036	.37 Moderate
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.157	.006	7.294	.004	.55 Large
b. Anxiety					
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP)	.032	.255	.640	.212	.13 Small
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	.037	.215	.449	.252	.15 Small
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.056	.101	1.778	.091	.26 Small
c. Anger					
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP)	.052	.199	.742	.195	.18 Small
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	.101	.023	4.440	.018	.41 Moderate
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.099	.029	4.021	.023	.39 Moderate
d. Anxiety OP					
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 5 (anger to OP)	.180	.020	4.397	.018	.43 Moderate
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.276	.000	12.302	.000	.72 Large
e. Anger OP					
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 5 (anger to OP)	.280	.000	12.163	.000	.71 Large
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.235	.004	7.594	.003	.56 Large

Results of independent sample t-tests and Likelihood Ration Chi² tests. Effect sizes (Cohen's D) also reported. One tailed P-values reported[76]. Emotions dichotomized.

whether they feel very angry or not. On average, there are more people who say that they are very angry in the experimental cell designed to induce anger compared to the cell inducing anxiety (Dif. .1; $p < .05$) and compared to the control group (Dif. .1, $p < .05$). Finally, if we compare subjects who were in the cell designed to induce anger with those in the enthusiasm-inducing cell we find that the direction of the relationship is consistent with our expectations, but fails to reach statistical significance. Thus, it might be the case that

[76] Using one-tailed significance tests is appropriate considering the fact that the hypotheses are directional (Agresti & Finlay, 1997). Kimmel (1957) argues that a researcher should "use a one-tailed test when a directional hypothesis is deducible from psychological theory but results in the opposite direction are not deducible from coexisting psychological theory" (Kimmel, 1957, p. 353).

people who are exposed to negative news that attributes blame will be more likely to feel very angry then people who are exposed to negative news that do not attribute blame. The lack of statistical significance can be attributed on the one hand, to the low sample size which leads to the very low levels of statistical power[77], and on the other hand to small effect sizes. In essence, the manipulations did not have a very large effect and the sample size was not sufficient to produce significant findings[78]. Even so, these results are consistent with prior research (see Brader et al., 2010), and are substantively significant[79].

Moving on to emotions experienced towards out parties, we can observe in Table VI.4.d and VI.4.e that, on average, people who are exposed to a negative political communication item relating to an out party, declare that they are more anxious than people receiving the anger inducing stimuli (Dif. .180; $p < .05$) or the control group (Dif. .276; $p < .05$). Similarly, subjects exposed to a negative article which places blame on an out-party, on average, experience higher levels of anger towards out parties when compared to people who received a negative item in which blame was not attributed (Dif. .280; $p < .05$) or people who were not exposed to a political article (Dif. 235; $p < .05$).

In sum, it can be concluded that Hypotheses 1 through 5 receive support from the data. Having shown in Chapter IV that electoral campaigns do impact the levels of emotions, the analyses presented here suggest possible mechanisms through which the campaign can induce specific emotions. However, the results also suggest that print

[77] See Appendix 9.

[78] It needs to be kept in mind that the subjects were exposed to only one brief item of print communication. There were no audio or visual stimuli included. Under these circumstances a large effect could not have been achieved.

[79] If even such limited stimuli had recognisable effects, the expectation is that a full electoral campaign, which would contain an incomparably larger amount of emotion-inducing stimuli, would certainly produce larger effects, as campaign effects cumulate Erickson and Wlezien (2012) – this was the case in the 2010 UK elections. Under these circumstances, rejecting the hypotheses is premature and would possibly lead to Type II errors (see Ellis, 2010; Robinson & Levin, 1997; Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008) for a discussion on statistical versus substantive significance).

communication has a limited impact on the induction of emotions and the exposure to a single item of communication seems to only people at the extreme end of the emotional spectrum. This is consistent with Brader (2006) and Dillard (1994), who state that, as opposed to print communication, it is non-verbal communication that is best suited to induce emotions.

VI.2.2. The magnitude of emotions

Even if the hypotheses were corroborated, in order to offer a more in depth understanding of the relationships between campaign communication and emotions I now turn to log-linear analysis. Given that I am using categorical data, hierarchical log linear analysis is an appropriate tool to be used to understand the substantive difference between individuals who share given characteristics. On the one hand, the results of the t-tests, above, indicate whether the average strength of an emotion differs between the groups of people who were exposed to the different stimuli. On the other hand, the log-linear analysis can illustrate the likelihood of a given person experiencing certain levels of emotion, depending on the manipulation to which he or she was exposed. In essence, by utilising log-linear analysis, a more intuitive measure of the magnitude of the effects can be obtained.

Log-linear analysis was developed as an extension of the analysis of contingency tables and is an excellent tool to be used for the analysis of categorical data. Rudas (1998, p. 13) notes that the "log-linear representation is a parameterization of the logarithm of the cell probabilities [in contingency tables] in terms of additive effects". He further explains that this additive representation is equal to the multiplicative representation of the cell probabilities as the product of the exponentials of the general effect, the row effect, the column effect and the joint effect. The major advantage of the log-linear approach is that

the marginal effects are variation independent from the joint effect. In other words, the marginal effects and the joint effect can vary independently from one another; therefore the parameters obtained are valid measurements of the appropriate effects (Rudas, 1998, p.18).

Moreover, log-linear analysis is particularly useful as it can generate the relevant conditional odds and odds ratios that will enable a better comprehension of the magnitude of the effect the items of campaign communication had on the levels of emotionality.

Odds are a measure of the success versus failure of an event. They are expressed as the ratio between the probability of an event occurring and the probability of the event not occurring. The odds ratio (obtained through dividing the odds of the occurrence of two distinct events) quantifies the strength of the association between the two variables and indicates how much more likely is the success of event X over the success of event Y[80].

Finally, both odds and odds ratios (conditional[81] or not) have numerical values that range between 0 to positive infinity. With regards to odds, value 1 indicates equal probabilities of success and failure (Pr = .5). However, an odds ratio being equal to 1 signifies that the two variables are stochastically independent.

To implement this analysis, I ran a series of hierarchical log-linear analyses. As it does not require the inclusion of a dependent variable, hierarchical log linear analysis is suitable for analyses where the researcher is interested in the dependencies (association) between two or more variables. The term 'hierarchical' refers to the hierarchy of models which exists whenever a complex multivariate relationship present in the data necessitates the inclusion of less complex interrelationships (Knoke & Burke, 1980). I used saturated models and included the dichotomised variables measuring a given emotion, the variable

[80] "Odds measure the strength of preference in the respective categories and odds ratios compare these strengths" (Rudas, 1998, p. 6).

[81] Conditional odds (and odds ratios) are odds that have been computed taking into account only the individuals who fulfill a set of prescribed conditions (e.g. all males, all highly educated, etc.).

indicating the experimental cell the subject was placed in and the interaction representing their joint effect. A total number of five models were constructed, one for each type of emotion: enthusiasm, anxiety, anger when experienced towards a preferred party and anxiety and anger experienced towards out parties.

Based on parameters generated by these models I computed the conditional odds of being very emotional versus less emotional (category which includes: somewhat emotional, not very emotional and not emotional al all) given the membership in the specific experimental cell. The conditional odds were computed using the formulas presented by Rudas (1998, pp. 18-20). First:

$$Odds = \frac{P}{1-P}$$

Then I compute the conditional odds of being very emotional versus less emotional:

$$Codds_{e=1|cell=x} = \frac{P_{(e=1|cell=x)}}{P_{(e=0|cell=x)}};$$

Furthermore, as Rudas demonstrates, any probability computed in a contingency table can be decomposed into general, row, column and interaction effects (or general effects, the marginal effects of each variable and their joint effect). This can be illustrated as follows:

$$Codds_{e=1|cell=x} = \frac{\beta_{const} * \beta_{e=1} * \beta_{cell=x} * \beta_{e=1*cell=x}}{\beta_{const} * \beta_{e=0} * \beta_{cell=x} * \beta_{e=0*cell=x}} \Rightarrow$$

$$Codds_{e=1|cell=x} = \frac{\beta_{e=1} * \beta_{e=1*cell=x}}{\beta_{e=0} * \beta_{e=0*cell=x}};$$

Next, it is known that conditional odds ratios and log linear analysis are "one-to-one functions of one another whether they indicate the lack or the presence of association. The exact formulas can be used to convert log-linear parameters into conditional odds ratios (…)" (Rudas, 1998, p.72):

$$\frac{\beta_{e=1} * \beta_{e=1*cell=x}}{\beta_{e=0} * \beta_{e=0*cell=x}} \Leftrightarrow \exp((\lambda_{e=1} + \lambda_{e=1*cell=x}) - (\lambda_{e=0} + \lambda_{e=0*cell=x}))$$

where λ indicates the log linear parameter produced by the hierarchical log linear analysis, and x demotes the given experimental cell. Consequently:

$$Codds_{\ e=1|cell=x} = \exp((\lambda_{e=1} + \lambda_{e=1*cell=x}) - (\lambda_{e=0} + \lambda_{e=0*cell=x}))$$

By applying this formula I computed the conditional odds of a person being very enthusiastic, anxious or angry towards his preferred party and those of him being very anxious or angry towards out parties, for each individual experimental cell. Table IV.5 reports the results.

All the parameters presented in Table VI.5 are contained in the [0,1] interval, meaning that, irrespective of which experimental cell he is in, it less likely for a randomly selected individual to be very emotional versus less emotional.

These results can be interpreted as follows: the odds that a random person is very enthusiastic and was subjected to an enthusiasm inducing stimulus are .22. This means that it is approximately 4 times less likely for a person to be very enthusiastic having been shown a stimuli which was designed to induce enthusiasm. Similarly, a random person is approximately 9 times less likely to be very enthusiastic (versus him being less enthusiastic) when he was exposed to an anxiety inducing stimuli. Finally, an individual is about 33 times more likely to be less enthusiastic not having received a political article (i.e. being placed in the control group). This signifies that, generally speaking, the individuals included in the experiment are quite unlikely to experience extreme emotional reactions, no matter the stimuli to which they are subjected. This could be interpreted to mean that extreme emotional reactions are spontaneous and temporary occurrences. It appears that

the emotional 'status quo' is placed somewhere at the middle of the range of emotional intensity.

Table VI.5.
Conditional odds of being very enthusiastic/anxious/angry, by experimental cell

Experimental cells	Emotions				
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**	**Anxiety OP**	**Anger OP**
Enthusiasm towards the PP	**0.22**	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.05
Anxiety towards the PP	0.11	**0.09**	0.03	0.12	0.13
Anger towards the PP	0.07	0.05	**0.14**	0.09	0.07
Anxiety towards the OP	0.12	0.05	0.03	**0.52**	0.09
Anger towards the OP	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.20	**0.57**
Control Group	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.15

The quantities are conditional odds computed based on the results of saturated models.
PP- preferred party; OP – out-party.

However, looking more in depth at the data we can identify the clear effects the experimental stimuli did have on the levels of emotionality. In order to do this, conditional odds ratios need to be computed. In the case of each emotion under study, I compute the odds ratios between feeling very emotional (as opposed to less emotional) and being in a given experimental cell, and feeling very emotional and being in a different experimental cell. Practically, this is achieved by dividing the odds of being very emotional in the cell that was designed to induce that emotion to the odds of being very emotional in a different cell. These odds ratios[82] indicate the degree to which it is more likely for people to experience higher levels of, for instance, enthusiasm, given that they were subjected to an enthusiasm-inducing stimulus.

I compute the odds ratios of being highly enthusiastic (versus not very enthusiastic), given that an enthusiasm-inducing stimuli was received versus any other stimuli. The experimental cell 'enthusiasm to PP' is used as a reference category and all the

[82] Appendix 10 presents a full table of the odds ratios I computed.

parameters are obviously greater than 1[83], meaning that it is more likely to feel very enthusiastic having been exposed to an enthusiasm inducing stimulus, compared to any other type of stimulus. It is seemingly twice as likely for an individual to be very enthusiastic (as opposed to less enthusiastic) if he received an enthusiasm-inducing stimulus versus an anxiety-inducing stimulus. Similarly, a random individual is approximately 3 times more likely to be very enthusiastic having been included in experimental cell 1 as opposed to the anger-inducing experimental cell 3. This relationship also stands when I compare cell 1 with cells 4 and 5, which were designed to induce anger and anxiety towards an out party. Finally, it is approximately 7 times more likely that a person will be very enthusiastic in regards to his preferred party if he received a positive political communication item about that party, than a person who read an article about biodiversity.

The results obtained for enthusiasm hold for every other emotion included in this study. We can observe that it is more likely for a person who received a stimuli designed to induce anxiety (or anger) to acknowledge experiencing higher levels of anxiety (or anger) compared to a person who received a different type of stimuli. Finally, pertaining to anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties, the results are once again consistent with the expectations. It is more likely to experience these emotions at extreme levels if the subjects received the stimulus specifically designed to induce these emotions.

Aside from offering additional support to the expectations formulated in the hypotheses, the odds ratios that can be computed for anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party or towards out-parties, also help to illustrate that anger and anxiety are distinct (but related) emotions and they can indeed be individually measured.

[83] Table VI.5 shows that the conditional odds of being enthusiastic are by far the highest. Thus, if it is divided by any one of the other conditional odds from column 1, the results should be greater than 1.

It is sometimes claimed in the literature that anxiety and anger are mutually-reinforcing emotions, which are both placed on the negative side of the valence spectrum and, as such, are virtually undistinguishable. However, based on the theoretical recommendations of Bang-Petersen (2010) and Brader et al. (2010) concerning the induction of anger versus anxiety, this experiment was successful in setting up appropriate practical scenarios which resulted in these emotions being distinctly induced: it is almost twice as likely for a person to experience high levels of anxiety having been exposed to an anxiety inducing stimulus versus an anger inducing stimulus. Moreover, it is 5 times more likely for a person to be very angry after being exposed to a blame-attributing negative story about his preferred party than a person who only received a negative article which attributed no blame. At the same time, it is more than twice more likely for a person to experience high levels of anxiety towards the out-parties having received a simple negative article about an out-party as opposed to a negative article which attributes blame. Finally, it is, again, more than 5 times more likely for a negative article which attributes blames in regards to an out-party to make a person very angry compared to a negative article which does not attribute blame.

The difference between these odds ratios can potentially be explained by the fact that an anger inducing stimulus will also induce anxiety, while an anxiety inducing stimulus would not be capable of inducing anger. This is consistent with Lazarus' (1991) account of how emotions are formed. As discussed in the review of the literature (Chapter II) the cognitive appraisal approach shows that both anger and anxiety have the exact same primary appraisal pattern: goal relevance; goal incongruence and the ego-involvement oriented towards preserving self- or social-esteem. What differentiates the two is the secondary appraisal pattern. If in the case of anxiety this is absent, in the case of anger the critical component is the attribution of blame (Lazarus, 1991). Thus, when anger develops it

follows the exact same psychological 'route' as anxiety; it only turns into anger when blame is identified and attributed. As such, it might be likely that anxiety is also induced along with anger, as a remnant of the primary appraisal mechanism. However, more research is needed before a conclusion can be drawn.

VI.3. Summary and conclusions

In this chapter I set out to assess the ways in which campaign communication can induce the distinct emotions shown to have been affected by the 2010 campaign (see Chapter IV). To this end I employed independent sample t-tests and conditional odds ratios obtained through log-linear analysis[84]. Both sets of analyses point in the same direction and support all five hypotheses: manipulating the tone and framing of political communication can induce these distinct emotions. However, the effects I identified are only manifested at extreme levels on emotionality.

In brief, the results are consistent with Brader (2006) in showing that well designed campaign communication has the potential to induce specific emotions. Positive news articles which highlight the successes of a person's preferred party tend to induce enthusiasm. Negative articles that do not attribute blame for the threatening event are seen to induce anxiety. However, negative articles which attribute blame for the event or situation are shown to induce anger. Similarly, articles which portray an out-party in a negative light have the potential to induce anxiety for the out-party, while, if they also attribute blame, the emotion they most likely induce is anger. These findings are consistent with the work of Bang-Petersen (2010) and Brader et al. (2010) and with the theoretical

[84] In order to check the robustness of the results obtained through log linear analysis, I performed a second analysis, using the membership in the control group as a reference category. I computed the odds ratios between being very emotional (compared to not very emotional) and having been placed in the control group versus being very emotional and having been subjected to an experimental stimulus. The results, corroborating the primary analysis, are reported in Appendix 11.

position of Lazarus (1991) with regards to how anger versus anxiety can be induced. As such, they cast further doubt on the findings of MacKuen et al. (2010) which try to demonstrate that anxiety is induced by unfamiliar threatening stimuli, while anger is induced by familiar threats. Moreover, it is shown here that contrary to the claims of MacKuen et al. (2010) and Marcus et al. (2011) both anxiety and anger can easily be experienced relative to any party, preferred or not. As such, it is inaccurate to think that anxiety can only be experienced towards the preferred party, or that anger is an emotion specifically reserved for an out-party.

The effects discovered here are consistent but not very large and they are concentrated at the extreme levels of emotionality. This is perhaps not surprising given that participants were only exposed to a single newspaper article, rather than a long electoral campaign. To test the impact of campaigns on emotions, Brader (2006) exposes his subjects to audio-visual stimuli and shows that images and sounds have a far better power to induce emotions then simple text. However, due to limited resources, this research was only able to implement textual stimuli, which have a weaker potential to induce emotions: "such a manipulation is a much more difficult and uncertain enterprise than one might suppose" (MacKuen et al., 2010, p. 444, note 10). Finally, given that this is the first research that utilises such a design, there are no benchmarks, nor are there any 'conventionally acceptable' cut-off points, against which the findings can be compared.

Chapter VII

Campaign communication and political behaviour

That manipulating the tone and framing of campaign communication can successfully induce specific emotions towards different political parties is shown by the analysis in the previous chapter. However, aside from examining the effects different types of campaign communication have on the induction of emotions, the experimental data described in the previous chapter also provides us with the opportunity to test their effects on political behaviour.

The theory argues that campaigns influence political behaviour through the emotions they induce. Analyzing panel data, Chapter V presents evidence that shows that the effect of campaign exposure on political behaviour is, at least partly, manifested through emotions. In this chapter, using the experimental data, I further test the indirect campaign effects claim, but now focus on the effects of the manipulation of the tone and framing of communication items. Given that the items of campaign communication included in the experiment were individually designed to induce specific emotions, the expectation is that their effects on political behaviour represent the effects of the emotions they were meant to induce. Consequently, the items of campaign communication are expected have direct effects on the involvement in the campaign, the search for information and turnout intentions; and they are expected to impact vote choice indirectly, as shown in Chapter V.

The first section of the chapter (VII.1) uses the experimental data to test Hypotheses 6 through 21, pertaining to the direct effect of emotions induced by the campaign (now

proxied by the manipulations). Thereafter, Section VII.2 addresses the caveats of these analyses and draws the relevant conclusions.

VII.1.The effect of the experimental manipulations on political behaviour

As mentioned before, the strength of a controlled experimental design lies in its power to assess behavioural processes by isolating the effect of a single variable at a time (Kinder & Palfrey, 1993). As such, consistent with Boniface (1999) and Fisher (1990), the most appropriate analytical strategy is to directly examine the differences in the outcome variables across the experimental (and control) cells. Any differences observed are, thus, directly attributable to the manipulations to which the subjects were exposed; in other words, it can be concluded that the manipulations induced the differences.

To recapitulate[85], each participant in the experiment received a stimulus that was designed to induce enthusiasm, anxiety or anger towards his preferred party, or anxiety or anger towards an out party. Once the stimulus was randomly administered, the post-tests measured political behaviour. Involvement in the campaign, turnout intentions and vote choice were measured through self-report items while information search was assessed through the observation of the participants' actual behavioural patterns (see Section VI.1). Hence, the following sections examine the impact of the manipulations (i.e. electoral communication) on the involvement in the campaign, the search for information, turnout intentions and vote choice.

VII.1.1. Involvement in the electoral campaign

According to prior research (and consistent with Clarke et al. 2009) political participation is a hallmark of enthusiasm (Marcus, 2002). Thus, it is enthusiasm towards the preferred

[85] The research design of the experiment is presented in Section VI.1.

party that is expected to increase the willingness of a person to be involved in its campaign. However, the theory also specifies that anger and anxiety experienced towards an out-party should increase the willingness to be involved in politics/the campaign. Finally, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are seen to decrease the potential involvement in the campaign of this party.

The willingness to be involved in an electoral campaign is measured in the post-test by a question which asked respondents to declare which party's campaign they would be willing to get involved in. The response options allowed subjects to choose any political party, or declare that they are not willing to be involved in any campaign. Based on the responses to this question and knowing each person's partisanship (i.e. the party they feel closest to), a dichotomous variable was computed. This variable measures whether the subject would be open to the idea of helping out in the campaign of his or her preferred party (value 1) versus wanting to get involved in a different party's campaign or not get involved in any campaign at all (value 0). The wordings of the questions are contained in Appendix 14.

Applying the classical framework for the analysis of experimental data, I regressed the dichotomous variable measuring involvement on a set of dummy variables indicating the experimental cell the subjects were in. The control group was set as the reference category. No control variables were included, as the controlled experimental design, by definition, minimizes the differences between the groups[86]. The results, reported in Table VII.1 show that, in general, the manipulations do not have a direct effect on the involvement in the campaign of one's preferred party: there are no statistically significant differences between the experimental cells and the control group. Nonetheless, we do

[86] T-tests and Chi2 tests indicates that there are no significant differences between the experimental cells on any of the relevant control variables: age, gender, student status, education, interest in elections, political knowledge, extraversion, neuroticism and openness.

observe a weakly significant effect (<.1) for subjects exposed to an item designed to induce anger towards an out-party. Subjects in this experimental cell are twice more likely to get involved in the campaign of their preferred party than people in the control group. This, of course is in accordance with Hypothesis 10.

Table VII.1.
The effect of the manipulations on the involvement in the preferred party's campaign

	Log. Reg. Coefficient	Standard Error
Dummy Enthusiasm PP	.387	(.584)
Dummy Anxiety PP	.741	(.546)
Dummy Anger PP	.130	(.597)
Dummy Anxiety OP	.709	(.577)
Dummy Anger OP	.927 +	(.543)
Constant	-1.945 +	(.436)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.027*	-
% correctly predicted	*80.7%*	-
N	*285*	

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. * p < .05; + p < .1
Dependent variable: Involvement (1); No involvement (0). Control variables omitted.

VII.1.2. The search for political information

The search for political information is one of the core concepts upon which this theory is based. As was discussed in the Chapter III, political parties use campaigns to increase the importance of partisanship for their own supporters (which would increase participation) while decreasing the reliance on partisanship of the supporters of other parties and increasing their openness and willingness to gather new information. Having made other parties' supporters search for information they can then try to 'rationally convince' them through the power of targeted messages. Based on the tenets of the TAI, I argue it is the emotions of anxiety and anger that make this process possible. Through negative political

communication, campaigns induce anxiety or anger (or both) which then lead to search for information and to a vote choice which is now based more on issue positions than partisan warmth.

To be able to measure information search, the experiment contained a section specifically designed to trace and record information search patterns in a dynamic campaign environment. The subjects were inserted into a campaign environment[87] which provided them with information about the policy positions of all three parties on four key issues: the economy, immigration, education and crime. The subjects were free to examine whichever pieces of information they chose. However, the software recorded and logged the specific pieces of information (i.e. issues) each subject looked at. This phase of the experiment offers the means for constructing a measure of information search which does not rely on self-reports.

Based on the patterns identified through this method, a single variable measuring information search was computed. I concluded that a person was searching for information if he or she looked (for at least 5 seconds) at the positions of each party on any given issue. Thus, the variable was attributed value 4 if the subject looked at the positions of all the parties on all the four issues. It was coded 3 if the subject looked at the positions of all parties on 3 issues. It was coded 2 if the subject looked at the positions of all parties on 2 issues and it the value is 1 if the subject looked at the position of all parties on a single issues. If the subject did not examine all three parties' positions on any issue, he was attributed value 0. The resulting variable shows that 211 subjects did not search for information, that is, they did not look at the positions of all the party on any issue.

[87] The subjects see a small number of labels (similar to newspaper headlines) which scroll down the screen. The user can click on any label, which opens a new window where the full article on that subject can be read. However, while the subject reads the chosen information the scrolling continues in the background, labels appear and disappear. Furthermore, given the short time frame, the abundance of information and the scrolling, the subject (much like in a real campaign) is forced to select and choose what information he or she examines.

However, 66 subjects examined the positions of all parties on a single issue and 18 people looked at the positions of all the parties on two issue. Finally, 4 subjects sought for information regarding all the parties' position on three issues.

Table VII.2.
The effect of the manipulations on information search

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standard errors
Dummy Enthusiasm PP	-.021	(.136)
Dummy Anxiety PP	.008	(.133)
Dummy Anger PP	-.004	(.134)
Dummy Anxiety OP	-.036	(.134)
Dummy Anger OP	-.036	(.134)
Constant	.395 *	(.395)
R^2	*.047*	
N	*284*	

Results of OLS regression. * p < .05; + p < .1; Dependent variable: Search for information. Control variables omitted.

The results pertaining to the effect of the experimental manipulations on the information search patterns, obtained through an OLS regression[88] are displayed in Table VII.2. Given that this is an experimental analysis, the regression does not include control variables[89]. None of the coefficients are statistically significant and the effects displayed are very small, meaning that there are no significant differences between the manipulations and the control group. Following on, it can be said that being exposed to a single piece of political communication does not have any effect on information search[90].

[88] Given that the dependent variable can be considered a count variable and has the specific distribution, I also ran Poisson regressions. The results are consistent with those reported in Tables VII.2.
[89] T-tests and Chi2 tests indicates that there are no significant differences between the experimental cells on any of the relevant control variables: age, gender, student status, education, interest in elections, political knowledge, extraversion, neuroticism and openness.
[90] The same resonans as disu=seed in section VII.1.1, control variables were once more omitted from the analysis.

VII.1.3. The turnout intention

Previous research has shown that the likelihood of turnout is influenced by the level of political knowledge (Larcinese, 2007) and that of education (Burden, 2009). Moreover, it has also been shown that electoral campaigns do tend to affect the willingness of turning out (Holbrook & McClurg, 2005; Kaufmann, et al., 2008). Moreover, a large proportion of the research has been carried out with reference to the role of negative political ads. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997) and Kahn and Kenney (1999) support the demobilization hypothesis and show that strong accusatory negative communication decreases the likelihood of turnout. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Finkel and Geer (1998), but also Kahn and Kenney (1999), show support in favour of the stimulation hypothesis noting that negative messages which contain legitimate criticisms actually mobilise people. The distinction between the two types of negativity is consistent with the distinction the experiment makes between anxiety- versus anger-inducing communication. Hence, along with the analyses presented in Chapter V, this analysis can also contribute to increasing our understanding of how the framing of campaign communication impacts turnout intentions.

According to the theory, enthusiasm strengthens the occurrence of the habitual activity, voting for the preferred party (see Marcus, 2002). Because turnout is a *sine qua non* condition of the successful completion of this habit, it is reasonable to think that enthusiasm would have a direct impact on the intention of turnout. Furthermore, as was hypothesized, anger (induced by accusatory, blame attributing negative ads) has the power to depress the likelihood of turning out. This emotion induces a desire for punishment (and retribution) (see Lazarus, 1991); thus, not turning out to vote for you preferred party can be seen as a direct consequence of anger.

Finally, anxiety experienced towards the preferred party, an emotion which is induced by negative messages that do not attribute blame, is not believed to have any effect on turnout (Marcus, et al., 2000). Nonetheless, according to the theory described in Chapter III, anxiety experienced towards out-parties (less preferred parties) is expected to increase the likelihood to turn out.

To test the hypotheses, I once more examine the relationship between the experimental manipulations (operationalized by the membership in the given experimental cell) on the reported willingness to turn out. Turnout intention was measured in the post-test as a variable which indicates if the subject intends to vote (value 1), if he is undecided (coded as value .5) or whether he intends to abstain from voting (value 0). This variable, of course, does not measure actual turnout; it only reports a person's subjective assessment of a potential action he or she might perform. Control variables were, once more, omitted as the data was collected in a controlled and randomized experiment and there were no significant differneces between the levels of the control variables across experimental cells.

Table VII.3. The effect of the manipulations on turnout intentions

	Ordinal Log. Reg. Coefficients	Standard Errors
Dummy Enthusiasm PP	.434	(.514)
Dummy Anxiety PP	.859	(.550)
Dummy Anger PP	.793	(.511)
Dummy Anxiety OP	1.005	(.626)
Dummy Anger OP	.384	(.515)
McFadden R^2	*.014*	
N	*289*	

Results of ordered logistic regression. * $p < .05$; + $p < .1$.
Dependent variable: turnout intention: Would not turn out (0); Maybe (1); Would turn out (2); Control variables omitted.

I ran an ordered logistic regression which included only the dummy variables used to operationalize the experimental stimuli; the control group is the reference group. The results, displayed in Table VII.3, substantively indicate that receiving a political stimulus, as opposed to not receiving one, will increase the intention of a person to vote: all the coefficients are positive. However, none of the results are statistically significant at appropriate levels. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn with respect to the impact of campaign communication on the intention to turn out.

VII.1.4. Vote choice

The preceding sections discussed the impact of emotions on different types of political behaviour. However, it is the effect campaigns have on vote choice that is most debated in the literature. For instance, Bartels (2006a) speaks of disengagement between the claims of political consultants who say that campaigns impact heavily on vote choice, and the results of academic research which fail to show such campaign effects. Chapter V showed that emotions do have a moderating role on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants and that, in some cases, campaign exposure can strengthen this effect. Thus, the aim of this section is to extend the analysis by assessing whether well-designed items of campaign communication have the expected effects in the vote choice function.

Similarly to Chapter V, the equation I use describes vote choice as a function of the campaign, partisanship, policy preferences, candidate evaluation economic evaluations, socio-demographics and emotions. However, given the experimental nature of the analysis, the variables measuring emotions and the control variables are not included.

In accordance with the theoretical framework and the design of the experiment, I argue that positive communication (designed to induce enthusiasm towards the preferred party) and negative communication and blame-attributing negative communication

(designed to induce anxiety and anger respectively towards out-parties) should increase the importance of partisanship when voting. Conversely, negative communication and blame-attributing negative communication (designed to induce anxiety and anger respectively towards the preferred party) will decrease the reliance on habit – that is, partisanship – and increase the importance of policy preferences and leader evaluations as predictors of vote choice. This is not to say that anxious or angry people will automatically vote against the party they prefer. Irrespective of who they vote for, the decision will be more in line with the tenets of political rationality: their vote choice will be based more on issues and perceived leader capabilities.

The dependent variable, vote choice, was operationalized by a dichotomous variable that differentiates between voting for the preferred party versus other parties. As was discussed in Chapter III, voting is seen as a habitual activity: people vote for the preferred party out of habit. Subjects were assigned value 1 if they declared that they intended to vote for the party they most preferred[91] (184 subjects), and value 0 if they indicated that they would vote for a different party (58 subjects). Consequently, consistent with the theory, this analysis tests the conditions under which people break with habit and do not vote for the preferred party.

The measure of partisanship was operationalized in a way which would ensure that the conceptual meaning is the same as for the variable measuring vote choice. Moreover, according to, Mughan (2009) and Eijk and Niemoller (1983), as a consequence of dealignement, voters in Britain can have more than one party attachment, which, of course, needs to be captured by this variable. Consequently, the variable indicates the strength of the attachment to the preferred party while also capturing the possibility of multiple party

[91] In case a subject is equally close to two or more parties, he was coded 1 if he declared that he would vote for either of those parties.

attachments[92]. It was computed by subtracting from the closeness score of the party the subject felt closest to (i.e. the preferred party) the closeness score of the second closest party[93]. Using this approach, a continuous variable which is suitable for measuring partisanship in a multiparty context was created. The values of the variable range between 0 and 10 (mean 2.51 and SD 2.13). The higher the value, the greater the attachment to a single preferred party, hence the stronger the warmth towards a single party. Conversely, value 0 signifies that the subject has multiple partisanships, being equally close to the two parties.

The variable measuring leader evaluations was computed based on three individual question which asked respondents to indicate how much they liked each of the leaders of the three main parties. The newly created variable indicates how much, on a scale from 0 to 10, people like the leader of their preferred party.

I also constructed a variable which measures the level of policy agreement between a given voter and his preferred party. This is an additive index (ranging from 0 to 5) which measures the number of issues the subject and his preferred party are relatively close on. It was constructed based on five dichotomous variables which measure the agreement (yes/no) between the policy positions of the preferred party and those of a subject on five issues: crime, immigration, education, public spending and taxes. These five dichotomous variables were obtained by comparing the subjects' self-reported position on each of these

[92] Given that in operationalizing vote choice partisanship was used to assign subjects to its two categories, partisanship is already partially contained in the left-hand side of the vote choice equation. However, this is not a substantial problem as regressing a set of independent variables and partisanship on this dependent variable will act against finding significant effects for the independent variables other then partisanship. Nonetheless, if any independent variables are significant, it means that in reality their effects are higher.

[93] For example if a person, on a closeness scale from 0 to 10, chose the values 8 for the Conservatives, 6 for Labour and 4 for Lib Dem, his score on this measure would be: 8 – 6 = 2.

issues (10 point scale) with that of their preferred party. The position of the preferred party was established based on the positions outlined in the respective parties' manifestos[94].

Finally, in accordance with the theory, the outcome the manipulations are hypothesised to affect is not represented by a single variable, but by the strength of the effects partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations, have on vote choice. As such, in order to test the hypotheses (17 through 21) I use logistic regressions that can accommodate the moderating effect the manipulations have on the relationship between partisanship, policy and leader evaluations and vote choice.

The analyses are carried out in three steps. First, I assess the effects of the manipulations on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. Thereafter, I look at the links between the manipulations, policy preferences and vote choice. Finally, the third analysis examines the effects of leader evaluations. The choice to run three separate analyses is justified by the large number of variables and the low sample size. Each model includes as explanatory variables the dummy variables operationalizing experimental manipulations, one of the determinants of vote choice, and the interactions between them. For the reasons mentioned previously, none of the models include any control variables. The results are reported in Tables VII.4, VII.5 and VII.6, respectively.

The results presented in all three tables, indicate that the manipulations did not have the expected effects; as such, the hypotheses cannot be corroborated. Apparently, being subjected to a single item of campaign communication that was specifically designed to induce a certain emotion (as opposed to being exposed to an article about biodiversity) does not have a significant effect on the relationship between the explanatory variables and vote choice.

[94] This is the same information the subjects were shown in the dynamic process tracing stage of the experiment.

Table VII.4.
The effect of the manipulations on the relationship between vote choice and partisanship strength

	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error
Partisanship	.895 *	(.402)
Experimental manipulation (1): *enthusiasm* towards PP	-.254	(1.008)
Experimental manipulation (2): *anxiety* towards PP	-.134	(.950)
Experimental manipulation (3): *anger* towards PP	.342	(.908)
Experimental manipulation (4): *anxiety* towards OP	.467	(.951)
Experimental manipulation (5): *anger* towards OP	.308	(1.054)
Partisanship **X** Experimental manipulation (1)	.463	(.660)
Partisanship **X** Experimental manipulation (2)	.183	(.568)
Partisanship **X** Experimental manipulation (3)	-.170	(.515)
Partisanship **X** Experimental manipulation (4)	.408	(.751)
Partisanship **X** Experimental manipulation (5)	-.307	(.504)
Constant	-.720	(.635)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.237*	-
N	*240*	-

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. The table reports logistic regression coefficients; Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0); * p < .05; Control variables omitted.

Table VII.5.
The effect of the manipulations on the relationship between vote choice and policy preferences

	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error
Policy preference	-.059	(1.588)
Experimental manipulation (1): *enthusiasm* towards PP	-.594	(1.571)
Experimental manipulation (2): *anxiety* towards PP	-.269	(1.432)
Experimental manipulation (3): *anger* towards PP	-.789	(1.426)
Experimental manipulation (4): *anxiety* towards OP	-.978	(1.517)
Experimental manipulation (5): *anger* towards OP	.193	(1.437)
Policy pref. **X** Experimental manipulation (1)	2.078	(2.397)
Policy pref. **X** Experimental manipulation (2)	1.552	(2.158)
Policy pref. **X** Experimental manipulation (3)	2.131	(2.117)
Policy pref. **X** Experimental manipulation (4)	2.271	(2.235)
Policy pref. **X** Experimental manipulation (5)	1.349	(2.133)
Constant	.646	(1.117)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.043*	-
N	*240*	-

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. The table reports logistic regression coefficients; Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0); * p < .05; Control variables omitted.

Table VII.6.
The effect of the manipulations on the relationship between vote choice and leader evaluations

	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error
Leader evaluation	.302 +	(.188)
Experimental manipulation (1): *enthusiasm* towards PP	-.503	(1.366)
Experimental manipulation (2): *anxiety* towards PP	.692	(1.378)
Experimental manipulation (3): *anger* towards PP	1.817	(1.457)
Experimental manipulation (4): *anxiety* towards OP	.666	(1.470)
Experimental manipulation (5): *anger* towards OP	2.478	(1.926)
Leader ev. **X** Experimental manipulation (1)	.198	(.261)
Leader ev**. X** Experimental manipulation (2)	-.061	(.247)
Leader ev . **X** Experimental manipulation (3)	-.271	(.256)
Leader ev. **X** Experimental manipulation (4)	-.071	(.271)
Leader ev . **X** Experimental manipulation (5)	-.302	(.313)
Constant	-.869	(.967)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.076*	-
N	*240*	-

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. The table reports logistic regression coefficients; Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0); * p < .05; Control variables omitted.

VII.1.5. Conclusions

This section was aimed to experimentally assess the effects campaign communication (operationalized by the experimental manipulations) has on political behaviour (involvement in the campaign, search for information, turnout and vote choice). The theoretical propositions operationalized by Hypotheses 6 through 21 were tested. However, these analyses were unsuccessful. The results, which cannot corroborate the hypotheses, show that being exposed to a single item of political communication does not have any impact on political behaviour. However, as these findings are not only in stark contradiction with the previous findings, but also with the literature (see Marcus et al., 2000; Brader, 2006), in the following section I discuss potential explanations.

VII.2. Explaining the results: the power and the strength of the manipulations

The null results presented above contradict the established literature in the field. Thus, this section assesses potential explanations for these findings and shows that, in the particular context of this research, the results I obtained do not necessarily provide sufficient evidence to reject the theory without the danger of committing a Type II error. To begin with, I focus on the statistical power of each analysis, thereafter I concentrate on the strength of the stimuli.

Statistical power indicates the likelihood of not committing a Type II error, that is, it represents the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis. Power is computed based on sample size, effect size in the population and significance level. However, one can use a post-hoc test to observe whether the size of the sample an analysis was carried out on is sufficient for significant effects of a given size to be obtained. Running power analyses on the tests presented in the previous section indicates that the coefficient for power is .50 (as opposed to the accepted level of .80 or above). This means that, given the small size of the effects, the size of the sample is insufficient for statistically significant findings to be obtained. Even though this can explain the lack of significance of the results, there is another aspect that needs to be looked at: the strength of the stimuli.

The analyses in the previous chapter (Chapter VI) indicate that the effects of the manipulations on emotions are small and they are concentrated at the extremes (also see Appendix 9). Thus, even though in each experimental cell the stimulus increased the emotion it was designed to increase, looking at the rows of Table VII.7 we can notice that it did not make more drastic changes, such as decreasing the levels of the other emotions. Consequently, even if the stimuli increased the intensity of the targeted emotions, it does not mean that those emotions are the most prevalent in that experiment cell. For instance, when we compare the experimental cells (looking at the columns of Table VII.7), anger

towards the preferred party is strongest in Cell 3, which was designed to induce anger towards the preferred party. However, within Cell 3 (looking at the rows of Table VII.7), anger towards the preferred party is not the most prevalent emotion; enthusiasm experienced towards out-parties is considerably stronger. In effect, we can notice that even when people were exposed to negative stimuli, compared to the control group, the level of enthusiasm increased. This virtually means that besides inducing the targeted emotions, the negative stimuli also increased the level of enthusiasm. This is not entirely surprising, as it has been shown that if a person is exposed to negative information about an entity it feels close to and does not perceive the information and the source to be credible, a boomerang effect might occur. That is, the person actually becomes fonder of that entity which he or she feels is wrongfully accused (Guzzetta, 2006).

Table VII.7.
The mean intensity of emotions by experimental cells

	Emotions at the mean				
Experimental Cells	Enthusiasm PP	Anxiety PP	Anger PP	Anxiety OP	Anger OP
Cell 1 - Enthusiasm towards. The Preferred Party	1.756	1.110	0.864	1.865	1.628
Cell 2 – Anxiety towards the Preferred Party	1.654	1.327	1.077	1.884	1.712
Cell 3- Anger towards the Preferred Party	1.660	1.360	1.280	1.676	1.598
Cell 4 – Anxiety towards out-parties	1.796	1.224	0.898	2.190	1.750
Cell 5 – Anger towards out-parties	1.912	1.271	0.854	2.010	2.060
Cell 6 – Control group	1.542	1.25	1.063	1.809	1.698

Furthermore, it also needs to be considered that at the time the subjects entered the experimental lab, they already had feelings towards some or all of the parties involved in the experiment. The effects the manipulations have on emotionality are not impregnated on a 'blank' emotional background: people could easily have read or heard something angering about a given party only five minutes before participating in the experiment,

which obviously would affect how the stimuli worked. This means that at the onset of the experiment not only do subject have a given level of emotionality, but this level is different for each individual. Of course, this problem could have been avoided by constructing a mock campaign with hypothetical parties and issues. However, sacrificing reality for potentially larger effects was a far too expensive trade-off. Given that the aim of the research is to assess the role of *human emotions*, implementing a sterile campaign in a made-up world would have been counterproductive. The production of emotions is intrinsically linked with and based on knowledge and interest. Damasio (2006) shows that while emotions are innate, their experience in the form of feelings also require experience and knowledge. A hypothetical context would have provided neither.

Thus, it becomes apparent that single items of political communication, while they have some effect on increasing the intensity of the emotions they target, do not have the power to make that emotion the most intense for a given person. Thus, given that the emotion each experimental cell was designed to induce is not the most prevalent in that given cell, we cannot expect the effect of the manipulation on political behaviour to be those of the emotion they aimed to induce. The effects we witness are in effect those of the most prevalent emotions: enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party and anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties. This means that the direction of the effects displayed in Tables VII.1 through VII.6 are actually consistent with the theory and their lack of statistical significance can be explained by the low levels of power.

VII.3. Summary and conclusions

The analysis of the experimental data shows that brief exposure to a single item of political communication has the potential to increase the intensity with which specific emotions are experienced (Chapter VI). Nonetheless, such exposure is too weak to impact political

behaviour in a way which is consistent with the effects of each specific emotion which was aimed to be induced. However, this does not necessarily mean that electoral campaigns, through the emotions they induce, do not impact political behaviour. Campaigns contain a large number of items of political communication presented through varied mediums: verbally, through print and audio-visual media, whose effects cumulate during the campaign. Thus, showing that one print item does not exert the expected effects is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that campaigns do not affect political behaviour: the examination of these relationships in a real-life electoral campaign, (Chapter V) illustrated that campaign exposure does have indirect effects which are channelled through emotions.

Furthermore, the theory presented in Chapter III describes the specific effects particular emotions have on political behaviour. Nevertheless, given that the same emotions are the most prevalent in each experimental cell (enthusiasm towards the preferred party, anxiety and anger towards out-parties), the analysis carried out in Section V.1 cannot show whether all the emotions describes in Chapter III have the hypothesized effects or not.

Finally, given the null findings and having shown in the previous chapter that campaign communication has the potential to induce the five specific emotions, it is useful to observe whether these emotions have the expected effects. Thus, I carried out a non-experimental, observational analysis of the experimental data. Analyzing data collected in an experiment through observational means is problematic; however the results I obtain are highly consistent with those obtained through analyzing the panel data. The analyses, presented in Appendix 12, are in line with most of the expectations. Regarding turnout intentions and vote choice, the findings are entirely consistent with the results obtained through the analysis of the panel data (see Chapter V and Appendix 12). However, these analyses further show that people who are more anxious or angry towards the preferred

party are less likely to be willing to be involved in the electoral campaign, while those who are more intensely enthusiastic towards the preferred party or angry or anxious towards out-parties are more likely to get involved. Lastly, as expected, anxiety towards the preferred party is shown to increase information search, while anger experienced towards the same party lacks any meaningful effects.

Chapter VIII

Emotions and indirect campaign effects: Conclusions

'Did the campaign matter?' is possibly one of the most frequently asked questions after Election Day. Political pundits, consultants, journalists and politicians alike engage in never-ending discussions about the inevitable impact the campaign had on the electoral success or failure of a given party. Of course, they will agree that the activities carried out during the campaign influenced the outcome of the election. However, it is seldom that academic research reaches a similar conclusion. There is indeed consensus between the two literatures regarding turnout intentions: campaigns have been shown to mobilize voters; nevertheless there is no agreement about the effect of campaigns on vote choice. It is most often the case that while political practitioners claim that campaigns matter, political scientists point out that the effect of campaigns on electoral choice is, at best, minimal.

The theoretical framework, formulated in Chapter III, argues that a more thorough understanding of campaign effects can be obtained by reconceptualising the way in which these are researched. Consequently, while acknowledging the usefulness and importance of prior research, I argue that we now need to take a step back and rethink our research strategies. In doing so, we must turn to the professional literature on electoral campaign design and seek guidance there. One cannot and should not research the effects of campaigns without taking into account what campaigns actually aim to achieve. For instance, the conclusion that campaigns have no effects because they failed to persuade, that is, failed to change people's stance on issues (see Bartels, 2006a), is unwarranted. Thinking of the aims of campaigns, Bartels' research actually only succeeds in showing that

the campaigns he examines do not achieve an effect which they were actually not aiming to achieve. The error here occurs because Bartels defines and operationalizes electoral persuasion without reference to the campaign design literature. Political scientists "study campaigns and elections but rarely talk to campaign professionals or know the latest developments in campaign strategies, tactics, and tools. (…) There is often distrust and even fear and loathing between campaign professionals and academics" (Thurber, 1995, p. 2). Moreover, "how candidates and other players in the election process attempt to win office remains a mystery in the political science literature" (Shea & Burton, 2006, p. 5). Thus, looking at the campaign design literature, it is transparent that campaigns do aim to persuade: they aim to change people's vote choice. They do not, however, aim to directly change people's opinions. Moreover, it is actually recognised in the literature that this would be a futile task: it is far less difficult to change someone's perception of what a party stands for, than to change their stance on a given issue (Guzzetta, 2006). Speaking about political marketing in Britain, Lees-Marshment (2002), further shows that in a market oriented campaign it is the party that changes its 'product' to cater to the needs, wants and desires of the electorate.

Campaigns are designed with clear goals, which they try to achieve by "carefully discerning voter preferences through scientific survey research, stratifying voters based upon these preferences, and then providing a tailored communication to each group" (Shea & Burton, 2006, p. 9). The aim is to increase the reliance on partisanship of their core supporters to mobilize them (Bradshaw, 1995). Concomitantly, they strive to decrease out-party supporters' reliance on partisanship and increase their reliance on issues. Finally, having focused out-party supporters' attention on issues, the aim is now to modify their perception of the party's stance on those issues (Lees-Marshment, 2002; Shea & Burton, 2006).

As was discussed at length in Chapters II and III, campaigners utilize a diversity of methods to achieve these goals. However, given that "in politics, when reason and emotion collide, emotion invariably wins" (Westen, 2007, p. 35), the best strategies "are often the emotional ones (…); they often tap an emotional chord" (Shea & Burton, 2006, p. 153). Consequently, I argue that in order to assess and understand more accurately the potential indirect effects campaigns have on voting behaviour we need to explore whether campaigns induce emotions and whether those emotions affect behaviour in a way which is consistent with the aims of campaigns.

Even though "tapping 'feel good' emotions is as powerful an allure as rational decisions regarding the costs" (Shea & Burton, 2006, p. 148), emotions are often overlooked. However, they are of great importance as they have the power to aid the decision making process through their impact on reasoning. Damasio notes that "the purpose of reasoning is deciding and that the essence of deciding is selecting a response option (…) among the many possible at the moment, in connection with a given situation" (Damasio, 1994, p. 165), and it is emotions that assist in narrowing down the number of response options. As such, deciding who to vote for is not exclusively governed by a cost/benefit analysis. Before such an analysis can be performed "something quite important happens: when a bad outcome connected with a given response option comes to mind, however fleeting, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling" (Damasio, 1994, p. 173). This gut feeling is an emotion at work, which then focuses attention on collecting more information about the context of that particular response option.

Damasio's work (see Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994) was adapted for political science by Marcus et al. (1993; 2000) who put forward the Theory of Affective Intelligence. Thus, using the TAI as a starting point I argue that to mobilize its core supporters a campaign induces enthusiasm. Enthusiasm experienced towards the

preferred party stimulates the likelihood of turnout and political involvement and increases reliance on partisanship when voting. Effects similar to those exhibited by the induction of enthusiasm can also be achieved by inducing anxiety or anger towards out-parties. I argue that these emotions would also increase the willingness of getting involved in the electoral campaign and would strengthen the role of partisanship in voting. Nonetheless, while anxiety is not seen to impact turnout intentions, I argue that anger would decrease it.

In contrast, to persuade out-party supporters, a campaign would aim to induce anxiety or anger towards the prospective voter's preferred party. Both emotions are argued to have the power to halt habit and induce reason. Specifically, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party is argued to decrease the relative importance of partisanship when voting and increase the reliance on issues and leader evaluations. Finally, both these emotions are expected to decrease the willingness of getting involved in the campaign and increase information search, while anger is also expected to decrease the intention to turnout.

The theoretical framework outlined above was tested using both experimental and observational approaches and the respective results were presented in Chapters IV, V, VI and VII. Consequently, the role of this chapter is to collate and discuss the results obtained through the two distinct methodological approaches and to draw the ensuing conclusions. The following section discusses the results of the research. Thereafter, I focus on the implications this thesis has on the distinct academic fields it draws from: the study of emotions in politics, the study of campaigns, voting behaviour and, finally, turnout intentions. The chapter is concluded by a discussion of the caveats and of potential directions for future research.

VIII.1. An evaluation of the results

VIII.1.1. Campaigns and the induction of emotions

To support the idea that campaigns have an indirect impact on political behaviour, at least partially manifested through the effect of emotions, it was of a primary importance to assess the mechanisms through which campaigns can induce specific emotions. It was, however, also imperative to illustrate that a national campaign does indeed induce emotions. The evidence presented in Chapter IV clearly shows that a typical electoral campaign, such as the one preceding the 2010 British General Elections, included emotional stimuli and did have a nontrivial effect on modifying the levels of emotionality displayed by voters. The results illustrate that the campaign increases emotionality towards most parties, which, of course, is the natural expectation. Nonetheless, it is further shown that in the context of the campaign, emotions can also decrease, as was the case of anxiety and anger experienced towards the Labour Party.

This finding is of great significance as it speaks to the complex nature of the campaign environment. Such findings are currently unobtainable in the tightly controlled experimental settings, which are the most often used techniques to assess the impact of campaign communication. Due to logistical complexities, experiments usually assess the effect of a single party's campaign on voters' emotions (Brader, 2006; Redlawsk, 2006)[95]. However, in the 'real world' no person is exposed exclusively to the campaign efforts of a

[95]Experimental approaches usually do not provide any evidence regarding the effects of the entire campaign environment (i.e. the concomitant campaigns of all the parties) on the emotionality towards a single party. Due to the high complexity of such an environment an *nXn* factorial design would be needed, where *n* is the number of independent variables (at least 3 in the case of the British context). Unfortunately, experimental designs with a high number of experimental conditions (e.g. 10, including the control group,) are not feasible in political research due to obvious constraints.

single party, but is bombarded with a large number of diverse stimuli originating from all the parties.

The analysis of emotionality in the 2010 campaign offers telling evidence of what can happen in such an instance. On the one hand, the strong positive campaign effort of the Labour party successfully increased the level of enthusiasm of its supporters. On the other hand, the poorly designed and non-credible Conservative negative campaign failed to increase the levels of anxiety or anger of Labour supporters towards their preferred party – the Labour party. Moreover, as the analysis suggests, when the weak Conservative negative campaign is coupled with the strong positive Labour campaign, the result is not only the increase of Labour supporters' enthusiasm but also a decrease in how often they experience anxiety or anger towards their preferred party.

This occurrence illustrates that, in a real-world campaign setting, the induction of emotions is a complicated and complex venture which is *sine qua non* contingent on the campaign efforts of several parties. Consequently, to succeed a campaign must necessarily tailor and adapt its campaign plan, its strategies and the tactics it uses to the campaign environment defined by the actions of the other parties. Moreover, when making use of strong negative advertising (such as the posters displayed in Picture IV.3) it is imperative that the party pre-tests them in focus groups, to avoid a backlash effect, as was probably the case here due to the incredibility of the Conservative negative ads.

While it was established that a campaign does induce emotions, this research went further and used an experimental approach to elucidate the 'technical' mechanisms through which each specific emotion can be induced. The results, reported in Chapter VI, support the hypotheses and show that manipulating the tone and framing of campaign communication items is sufficient for the induction of specific emotions; however it needs to be noted that the effects discovered are limited to extreme emotional states. Even so, the

results indicate that a positive article which highlights the party's successes in dealing with a particular situation and emphases the future benefits their actions will bring is prone to induce enthusiasm. However, an article which illustrates the negative aspects of how the party handled the same situation and pinpoints future threats to citizens' well-being is prone to induce anxiety. At the same time, if a similar negative article also assigns clear blame for these negative occurrences the ensuing emotion is likely to be anger. The analysis also shows that, as opposed to the claims put forward by previous research, anxiety as well as anger can be experienced towards both the preferred party and an out-party. This finding is important in itself as it paints a more complete picture of how political events and emotions interact; however, its primary importance resides in that it allows us to understand how the psychological effects of these emotions differ based on the party they are experienced towards. This, in turn is argued to produce distinct political behavioural effects which I discuss in the following sections.

VIII.1.2. The political effects of emotions

Using panel data collected in the months leading up to the 2010 British General Election, Chapter V tested the effects each specific emotion has on political behaviour: turnout intentions and vote choice. Due to the lack of data their effects on the involvement in the campaign and information search could not be examined. According to the theory, the analyses assess the direct impact of emotions on the intention of turnout and the moderating effect of emotions on vote choice. As discussed above, emotions are argued to affect vote choice indirectly, through their impact on the effects partisanship, policy preferences and leader evaluations have on vote choice. The following sections discuss the political-behavioural effects of each emotion as identified by the research. Table VIII.1 summarizes the results.

Table VIII.1.
Summary of the results

	Turnout intention	The effect of partisanship on vote choice	The effect of policy preferences on vote choice	The effect of leader likability on vote choice
Enthusiasm to preferred party	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Decrease
Anxiety to preferred party	No effect	Decrease	Increase	Increase
Anger to preferred party	Decrease	Decrease	Increase	Increase
Anxiety to out-party	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Decrease
Anger to out-party	No effect	Increase	Decrease	Decrease

VIII.1.2.1 Enthusiasm

The results show that enthusiasm, induced by positive campaign messages, has the power to increase involvement in politics and to mobilise voters: it has a positive effect on the likelihood of people turning out and voting. Furthermore, it strengths the role of partisanship when voting, and can decrease the importance of the issue distance or of leader evolutions. Thus, a voter who is enthusiastic about his or her preferred party resembles very closely Campbell's voter, a person who votes primarily based on his long-standing party identification.

These results corroborate the theory presented in Chapter III, and are consistent with the prior research on the effects of enthusiasm (Brader, 2006; Marcus, et al., 2000; Redlawsk, et al., 2007). They indicate that enthusiasm can successfully be used by campaigns as a branding tool which can help them achieve their first aim: activate and mobilise their base of core supporters. By targeting their base and exposing them to positive, uplifting messages about the party, its performance and future, they can increase its vote share. If the enthusiastic appeals are successful, the increased turnout of core supporters, who are now more likely to vote based on their partisanship, will provide the party with valuable, indispensable and inexpensive votes.

VIII.1.2.2. Anxiety

The theoretical framework introduced in Chapter III, disagrees with Marcus' claims and argues that anxiety can also be experienced towards an out-party and that the political-behavioural effects of anxiety necessarily depend on the party towards which it is experienced. The analyses carried out support these claims. As can be seen in Table VIII.1 the effects of anxiety when it is experienced towards the preferred party, and those of the same emotion experienced towards out-parties, are virtually antithetical.

Anxiety towards the preferred party

Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party displays the very effects predicated by Marcus et al. (2000). Anxiety arises as a natural defensive reaction of the individual in response to occurrences linked to the preferred party which threaten the well-being (or perceived well-being) of the person. Under these conditions, anxiety experienced towards the preferred party does not have a substantive effect on the intention to turn out: it does not increase it, nor does it decrease it. However, once people turn out and vote their vote choice will now be guided more prominently by policy considerations and leader evaluation, as opposed to partisanship. Chapter V concludes that anxiety experienced towards the preferred party decreases the effect of partisanship on vote choice and increases the effect of policy preferences and leader evaluations. An anxious individual will rely less on how close he or she feels towards parties and will concentrate his or her decision on factors which are deemed to be closer to the democratic ideal of representation: informed issue and leader preferences.

If enthusiasm can successfully be used by campaigners to fulfil their first aim (mobilizing their core supporters), inducing anxiety towards the preferred party (i.e. their competitor) can accomplish their second major aim: conversion or persuasion. For instance,

if Lib Dem successfully and credibly induce anxiety towards the Conservative party for a Conservative supporter, the supporter will now look for information about the parties' stances on that issue. Moreover, if and only if Lib Dems have successfully managed to portray themselves as closest to the voter's position on the given issue, the chances are that the voter will vote for Lib Dem as opposed to voting for the Conservatives. We can thus see that anxiety is a very powerful tool that can contribute to increasing a party's vote share. Nonetheless, the success of such a scenario necessarily depends on the party having a well through-out, pre-tested, clear and consistent strategy. First, in order for anxiety to be adequately induced the stimulus (or stimuli) needs to convey a sense of reality with which the person can connect. For instance, as was discussed in Chapter IV, the Conservative posters designed to induce anxiety were so far removed from reality that they actually looked more like comic book drawings then electoral campaign posters. Secondly, the message contained in the stimulus must be credible. If the voter can easily invalidate the threat, anxiety will not have the stated effects. Thirdly, the targeted branding of the party needs to be implemented with accuracy. The vote of an anxious person will most likely go to the party he or she perceives to have the closest position on issues *vis-à-vis* his own. Consequently, if the party, who initiated the anxiety-inducing appeal, is not perceived by the voter to be closest on the particular issue, he or she will turn towards the party that is. This can be his preferred party or any other party in the system.

Anxiety towards an out-party

Anxiety experienced towards an out-party is argued to operate in a similar way to enthusiasm experienced toward the preferred party. The results support the expectations. Indeed, consistent with the theoretical framework constructed in Chapter III, anxiety towards out-parties increases the likelihood of turnout. Of course, if a person feels

threatened by the actions of a party he does not feel closest to, in order to help prevent the threat materializing, he will be more likely to actively help his preferred party succeed.

As regards the moderating effect of anxiety experienced towards out-parties on the relationships between vote choice and its determinants the results are once more consistent with the theory. These results do suggest that anxiety experienced towards out-parties can successfully be used in campaigns to mobilize one's own supporters. For instance, in the 2010 British electoral setting, it was the Labour and Lib Dem campaigns that were successful in increasing anxiety towards the Conservative party.

VIII.1.2.3. Anger

As in the case of anxiety, I argue that the impact of anger also depends on the political party towards which it is experienced. Breaking from previous contentions (MacKuen, et al., 2010), I argue that anger can also be experienced towards the preferred party, in which case its behavioural effects will resemble those of anxiety experienced towards the preferred party.

Anger experienced towards the preferred party

First, anger experienced towards the preferred party decreases the likelihood of turnout. This emotion is produced when a person blames a party for an occurrence that negatively impacted his or her perceived well-being and the ensuing psychological reaction is that of punishment and potential withdrawal. Consequently, it is very unlikely that one would contemplate helping the party achieve success when their natural reaction is to punish it. The theory also argues that once anger is induced and the preferred party punished, the voter will search for information in order to decide who to vote for. However, I was unable to test this due to the lack of data.

Nonetheless, the analyses show that with respect to vote choice, anger experienced towards the preferred party has similar effects to anxiety experienced to the preferred party. That is, as anger increases, the effect of partisanship on vote choice decreases and the effects of issues and leader evaluations increase.

Even though the effects of anxiety and anger (when experienced towards the preferred party) on vote choice are more or less parallel, the two emotions are not triggered by the same kind of cues, and as we saw, they have different effects on the likelihood of turnout. When experiencing anger towards the preferred party, to punish it, people will either vote for a different party, or they will abstain. As was illustrated, the electoral decision mechanism an angry person uses places greater emphasis on policy preferences and leader evaluation, potentially leading to an informed and rational decision. However, abstention could severely minimize future utility if the election is just marginally won by an undesirable out-party. This is consistent with findings in neuro- and behavioural-economics which illustrate that anger motivates people to punish the object of anger at costs to themselves (see e.g. de Quervain, et al., 2004).

In Chapter III I argued that inducing anger towards an out-party supporter's preferred party can be an effective campaign tool. In light of the findings discussed above this certainly seems to be the case. As I noted earlier, campaigns aim to decrease out-party supporters' reliance on partisanship. Concomitantly, they try to persuade the voter to vote for them by increasing their reliance on issues and leader perceptions. As shown, these aims can be achieved through inducing anger towards their preferred party.

Moreover, given that anger decreases the likelihood of turnout and suspends habit (potentially leading people to vote for a different party), it also can be used to weaken the electoral support of the opponent. Of course, the party inducing anger will not benefit from the votes of these people (as they are abstaining); however, it would benefit indirectly

through the increase of its relative electoral support. A good example of a party that would most probably benefit from such a strategy is the British Liberal Democrat Party.

In the 2010 electoral campaign, Lib Dem fought the Conservatives in the seats Lib Dem held (Rennard, 2011). In such an instance, increasing the level of anger of Conservative supporters towards the Conservative Party can be a very beneficial strategy. On the one hand, decreasing the likelihood of turnout of Conservatives supporters would increase the weight of each Lib Dem voter[96] - that is, the party would need fewer votes to win. On the other hand, given the central position of the party between Labour and the Conservatives, and the strong opposition between these two parties, a voter who decides to punish the Conservatives by not voting for them is far more likely to vote for Lib Dem than Labour. In other words, such a strategy has a higher chance to work in favour of the initiating party if this party can be seen as a clear second choice.

Anger experienced towards out-parties

Marcus (2002) and MacKuen et al. (2010) argue that anger is experienced towards an out-party and its effects include voting based on habit and an increase in the intention to turn out. The results I obtain partly confirm the expectations and do corroborate a few of these authors' claims. Indeed, anger experienced towards out-parties moderates the relationship between vote choice and its determinants. Similarly to anxiety experienced towards out-parties, this emotion also stimulates habit and decreases the relevance of policy preferences and leader evaluations. However, the effects I find are weaker when we compare them to those obtained for anxiety experienced towards out-parties. Moreover, the analyses do not

[96] Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that condoning such a strategy is contradictory to the democratic ideal of representation.

produce any significant findings in regards to the effect anger experienced towards out-parties has on turnout intentions.

Consequently, in terms of its effectiveness for campaign strategizing, I conclude that while anger experienced towards out-parties can be used the same way as anxiety towards out-parties, it is a weaker solution.

Having presented the results pertaining to each emotion studied, before concluding I would like to address a caveat to the findings regarding the relationship between emotions and the impact of partisanship on vote choice.

VIII.1.2.4. Emotions and the effect of partisanship

Chapter V shows that the effects emotions have on partisanship decrease as the strength of partisanship increases. For people who are equally close to two parties the increase of emotions induces a clear linear increase (or decrease) of the effect partisanship has on vote choice. However, as a person moves closer and closer to a single party the effect of emotions decreases. In the first instance this effect drops to be only manifested at the extremes: enthusiasm will only make a difference when moving from not enthusiastic at all to somewhat enthusiastic. Conversely, anxiety or anger experienced towards the preferred party now has the expected negative effect only for people who are very angry or anxious. Finally, as the strength of partisanship increases even more, the effect of these emotions is muted.

In practice this means that it is unreasonable for a party to target the strong core supporters of their opponent, as the tactics discussed in the previous section will not work: emotions will not have the desired effects. This, of course is not a novel finding for the campaign design literature in which targeting strong supporters of out-parties is ill-advised and portrayed as futile (Guzzetta, 2006; Shea & Burton, 2006).

This thesis attempts to open a new area of research by acknowledging that the effects of emotions depend on the specific objects towards which they are experienced: preferred party or out-party. The results do indeed show that distinguishing similar emotions based on the political object towards which they are experienced is useful and necessary for the broader understanding of the links between emotions and political decisions.

Having presented the results pertaining to each emotion studied, I now turn the discussion towards the indirect effects electoral campaigns can have on political behaviour.

VIII.1.3. The indirect effects of campaigns

The most basic theoretical proposition of the thesis is that besides potentially having direct effects on behaviour, electoral campaigns also affect such behaviour indirectly, through the emotions they induce. Thus, aside from looking at whether campaigns induce emotions and whether emotions influence behaviour, I also attempted to directly assess the indirect effects campaigns have on turnout intention and vote choice.

Chapter V concludes that indirect campaign effects do exist and they are, at least partly, manifested via the effect of emotions. I show that depending on the specific emotion it is channelled through, exposure to the electoral campaign can increase, decrease or have no effect on the likelihood of turnout.

Furthermore, besides noting that campaign exposure does have an important direct effect on vote choice, I also show that it indirectly affects vote choice by influencing the effect emotions have on the relationship between vote choice and partisanship. The analyses show that as campaign exposure increases, the effect of emotions on the importance of partisanship for the electoral decision also increases. Finally, while it was not hypothesized, I also discover that campaign exposure has a moderating effect (not

channelled through emotions) on the relationship between leader evaluations and vote choice: as campaign exposure increase the impact of leader evaluations increases.

The effect of campaign exposure on vote choice though the induction of emotions was also examined using experimental data. Chapter VII tested the effects the manipulations (political communication items which were designed to induce specific emotions) had on political behaviour: involvement in the campaign, information search, turnout intention and vote choice. The analyses showed that there are no significant differences between the experimental cells and the control group in terms of political behaviour. The reasons behind this finding, detailed in Section VII.2, are linked to the lack of statistical power and to the weak strength of the manipulations. Nevertheless, these null findings do not warrant the rejection of the theory. Having discovered that a single piece of political communication does not affect behaviour does not mean that an entire campaign also lacks those effects. As was discussed above, Chapter V actually shows that exposure to a fully-fledged campaign does affect vote choice indirectly.

Aside from their importance for the theory of emotions in politics, these findings are also important for our understanding of how to measure campaign effects. It is not sufficient only to look at the direct effects a campaign might have on behaviour; but we must also include in our calculations the indirect effects campaigns have and then, perhaps our estimations would be a bit closer to those put forward by political professionals[97].

VIII.2. Implications of the research

Having discussed the results and having highlighted their significance for the success of electoral campaigns, I now present the implications of this research and its contributions to

[97] Of course, the evidence of academics and the views of political professionals will probably never fully converge: we must not forget, running electoral campaigns *which matter* represents the livelihood of political professionals.

the academic fields upon which it draws. I refer first to the study of emotions in electoral contexts; thereafter I focus on the implications for the voting behaviour literature.

VIII.2.1. Emotions in politics

This research brings important contributions to the study of emotions in politics. First, by introducing the idea that the effects of any given emotion depend on the party it is experienced towards, the thesis was successful in showing that both anxiety and anger can be induced towards different parties and that they do, indeed, induce different political effects.

The second contribution is represented by the analysis of the political effects of anger. Even though there are several studies which assess how anger is induced, there is very little evidence as to the actual political effects of anger. Nonetheless, given that this is the first study in which these effects are assessed, the robustness of these findings should be tested by subsequent research.

A further contribution is the execution of the first comprehensive analysis of the political consequence of emotions outside the United States. Systematic research, in the field of 'political emotions', is still in its infancy. The existent studies only focus on the very specific US context. Furthermore, research in regards to the voting behavioural impact of emotions has mostly been carried out within a single-party context (primaries). Testing the theory in a broader multi-party context which is not centred on particular candidates is, in itself, advancement in the field. The fact that the results predicted by TAI hold even in a significantly different political and cultural context, where it is harder to attribute the effect of emotions to candidate likability, only increases the strength of the original theory.

Finally, this thesis also makes a contribution to the on-going debate, regarding the theoretical adequacy of the TAI, launched by Ladd and Lenz (2008). The authors argue that

more parsimonious models can better explain the effect of anxiety on voting behaviour compared to the TAI. They introduce two alternatives: Affect Transfer (AT) and the Endogenous Affect (EA). The AT hypothesis argues that negative or positive emotional reactions to candidates directly translate into negative or positive evaluations of the respective candidates, which in turn affect vote choice. Conversely EA specifies that it is candidate evaluations that shape the experience of emotions. In order to find support for their claims they first show that, in contradiction of Marcus' (2000) claims anxiety exerts a direct effect on vote choice, there being a high correlation between the two. Secondly, using panel data, they pit the three theories against each other. Their analysis indicates that if vote choice at *t* is regressed on emotions also measured in wave *t*, the results are similar to those of Marcus and identical to the ones I present in Chapter V. However, if vote choice in wave *t* is regressed on emotions measured in wave *t-1*, these effects disappear. They use this second analysis to draw their conclusions which strongly favour AT and EA, noting that "in this paper we dissent from the emerging political psychology consensus that TAI characterises the role of emotions in electoral decision making" (Ladd & Lenz, 2008, p. 277). Moreover, they point out that enthusiasm experienced towards out-parties has the same effect on vote choice as anxiety. Based on the fact that enthusiasm towards out-parties is not linked to the surveillance system yet still induces the same effects, they further stress the inadequacy of the TAI.

In a special edition of the Journal Political Psychology both Brader and Marcus replied to these criticisms. In his book, Brader (2006) notes that current research has found TAI more right than wrong. He now continues and states that Ladd and Lenz's "conclusions outstrip the available evidence (…) as they are based on a somewhat narrow view of both the theory and existing evidence" (Brader, 2011, p. 3). In the same issue of the

journal, in defence of their theory, Marcus, MacKuen and Neuman (2011) criticise Ladd and Lenz's approach. They note:

> "First, they opted to replace the dependent variable we used, vote intention, with a different dependent variable, an index constructed from comparative feeling thermometers of the Republican and Democratic candidates. Second, they made a series of seemingly minor decisions that reflect their presupposition that emotion is unidimensional, a matter of like and dislike. And third, they ignored the centrally important variable of novelty in the theory and as a result modified the measurement model in ways that distort its fundamental character. (…) Voter reports on partisanship, candidate policies and candidate personal qualities, and vote intention are all highly endogenous—consciously or unconsciously, people adjust their political views toward consistency as the election campaign goes on. Rather than trace causation, the model shows the "end" relationships between vote intent and either a standing choice (partisanship) or contemporary conditions (issues and candidates). In this way, it reveals when habits rule and when active reconsideration is possible" (Marcus, et al., 2011, p. 3)

Finally, Ladd and Lenz (2011) discuss Brader's and Marcus' comments, and acknowledge that the TAI might be correct in certain aspects, but they continue to argue that its claims in regards to the impact of anxiety on vote choice are misguided.

Consequently, in the following paragraphs I briefly discuss Ladd and Lenz's main criticisms and offer evidence to refute them. First, to establish that anxiety has a direct effect on vote choice, Ladd and Lenz speak about a high correlation between anxiety and the dependent variable. In Table VIII.2, I present the correlations between vote choice and emotions in each wave of the panel. As is easy to notice, the correlation between anxiety and vote choice is weak and is lower than the one between enthusiasm and vote choice. Furthermore, in Chapter V, I have also noted that when simultaneously estimated anxiety impacts vote choice; however, vote choice has no impact on anxiety. This is consistent with the TAI.

Table VIII.2.
Spearman Correlation between emotions and vote choice

Emotions	*Vote choice (for the preferred party or against)*	
	Wave 1	Wave 2
Enthusiasm PP	.213 *	.241 *
Anxiety PP	-.161 *	-.176 *
Anger PP	-.215 *	-.237 *
Anxiety OP	.085 *	.140 *
Anger OP	.114 *	.163 *
N	*1499*	*3492*

Spearman Correlation coefficients are reported. Sig: * p < .05. PP- Preferred Party; OP-Out-Party

Second, to show that the TAI does not have the expected effects, the authors regress vote choice on emotions measured in a previous wave. However, they do not provide any substantial explanation of why this might be appropriate. They only note that "change in anxiety over the course of the panel seems unlikely to obscure relationships because we are looking for the indirect influence of anxiety on partisan identification, candidate qualities, and policy preference. Although individuals' feelings of anxiety may change between waves two and three, we should still be able to detect anxiety's indirect influence, especially on the effect of variables that tend to be relatively stable, such as partisan identification" (Ladd & Lenz, 2008, p.289). There is a wealth of evidence that indicates that it is fundamentally flawed to assess the impact (direct or indirect) of an emotion measured today on behaviour measured in a month's time (Brader, 2005; Damasio, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Marcus, 2002). Emotions are volatile, temporary and fleeting experiences and their effects disappear as soon as the feeling passes. Furthermore, TAI *does not* hypothesize that emotions impact partisanship or leader evaluations. The theory clearly stipulates that emotions impact *the relationship between* partisanship and vote choice. It is thus, no surprise

that the authors fail to find any effects; it would have actually been surprising were they to have found any effects.

Finally, the third point I address is the effect of enthusiasm experienced towards out-parties. Ladd and Lenz claim that it is identical to that of anxiety. Consequently, based on the data presented in Chapter V, I estimated a model similar to that used by Ladd and Lenz (2008) and instead of anxiety, inserted enthusiasm computed towards the out-parties. The results are presented in Table VIII.3 and clearly show that enthusiasm experienced towards out-parties does not have the same effects as anxiety experienced towards the preferred party.

Table VIII.3.
The effect on enthusiasm towards out-parties (OP) on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants

	Panel Wave 1	Panel Wave 2
Partisanship	.257 *	.219 *
	(.093)	(.046)
Policy preferences	-	.238
		(.356)
Ideological Position	1.102 *	-
	(.343)	
Leader Evaluations	3.504 *	4.193 *
	(.905)	(.505)
Economic Index	-.148	.029
	(.148)	(.085)
Enthusiasm to out-party	-.512	-.884 *
	(.327)	(.233)
Enthusiasm OP **X** Partisanship	-.124	-.052
	(.065)	(.033)
Enthusiasm OP **X** Policy Pref.	-.409	.354
	(.272)	(.261)
Enthusiasm OP **X** Leader ev.	1.631 *	.716 *
	(.701)	(.369)
Age	-.024 *	-.016 *
	(.007)	(.004)
Gender	.302	.452 *
	(.193)	(.114)
Income	.032	-.005
	(.029)	(.017)

Level of Education	-.016	.000
	(.020)	(.012)
Constant	.958	-.327
	(.841)	(.538)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.241*	*.243*
N	*1499*	*3249*

Note: Results of binary logistic regressions. Log. reg. coefficients are reported. SE in parentheses. Sig: * p < .05. Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0).

Figure VIII.1. The effect of a 1 unit increase in the strength of partisanship (from the starting value specified in each graph) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of enthusiasm towards out-parties (OP). (Wave 2)



Moreover, the marginal effects computed based on Brambor et al.'s (2006) specifications, further weaken Ladd and Lenz's point. The graphs displayed in Figure VIII.1 show that in wave 2, enthusiasm experienced towards out-parties does not have an effect on the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. This further disproves Ladd and Lenz's argumentation and speaks to the strength of the TAI.

VIII.2.2. Wider implications for the study of voting behaviour

The study of voting behaviour in the UK is dominated by two grand theories. On the one hand there is the *socio-psychological theory* based on the Michigan model and the Columbia school (Berelson, et al., 1954; Campbell, et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948). On the other hand there are the *spatial theories of vote choice* (also referred to in the British literature as 'issue voting'), which are based on the Downsian concept of political rationality (Downs, 1957; McLean, 1982; Westholm, 1997). While the first theory argues that voting is a habitual activity which is based on deeply entrenched class and party loyalties, the proponents of issue voting rely on the concept of political rationality and argue that people search for information about party positions and choose the option that brings them the largest benefits (Downs, 1957).

The analyses carried out in this thesis present a novel view and potential solution to the discord between the two theories. In essence both theories are correct and only if we put them together can we have an accurate explanation of voting behaviour. Naturally, people are habitual beings which vote based on habit – that is, partisanship (defined by class or not). However, when faced with a threat, reason is induced and the person now behaves in accordance with what is expected of Downs' *homo politicus*. Consequently, emotions act as a sort of switch mechanism between the types of behaviour hypothesised by the two theories. As opposed to the claim often found in the rational choice literature

(see Downs, 1957) that due to their biasing effects, emotions must be kept out of the rational decision making process, this research actually shows that it is emotions that induce reason. Thus, not only should emotions and reason not be kept apart, but they cannot be kept apart (Damasio, 1994).

VIII.2.3. Implications for the study of turnout

As was discussed in the review of the literature (Chapter II) there is no consensus in the literature with regards to the potential effects negative campaigning has on mobilization (i.e. turnout). The thesis tackled this dilemma and the findings were discussed in detail in the preceding sections. However, I believe there is a need for further clarification.

The analyses undertaken here clearly illustrate that campaigning can, at the same time, decrease turnout intentions, have no effect on turnout intentions and increase turnout intentions. The particular type of effect that campaigning has on turnout intentions is driven by three factors: the tone, the framing of the ad and the political object it targets. If a negative, accusatory message targets a person's preferred party and attributes blame for the negative situation it portrays it in, it will likely induce anger which will have a negative effect on turnout intentions. However, if such communication does not attribute blame, but only includes objective criticisms, it induces anxiety towards the preferred party, which will have no bearing on the likelihood of turnout. If a negative ad targets an out-party and it is not accusatory (i.e. it does not attribute blame) it will most probably lead to an increase in the level of anxiety experienced towards that party and will probably increase the likelihood of going to the polls. Finally, positive campaign communication induces enthusiasm, which also increases the likelihood of turnout.

These findings are consistent with the results presented by all articles cited in the review of the literature in regards to the effects of negative campaigning. Consistent with

Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997), Ansolabehere et al. (1994) and Khan and Kenney (1999), I have shown that negative campaigning that assigns blame can decrease turnout intentions. Consistent with Clinton and Lapinski (2004) I have shown that negative communication that targets the preferred party and presents 'legitimate criticisms', does not affect turnout intentions. Finally, consistent with Freedman and Goldstein (1999), Geer and Lau (2006) and Finkel and Geer (1998) I illustrated that 'legitimate criticism' included in negative campaigning which is oriented towards supporters of the party and which targets an out-party, increases turnout intentions.

Consequently, it needs to be stressed that, although important, the tone of campaign communication is not singular in determining campaign effects. The examination of emotions eloquently illustrates that framing and targeting also play significant roles in shaping the effects of negative campaigning on the likelihood of turning out. The same item of negative communication, depending on the particular party towards which it is experienced, can increase turnout intentions or have no effect on them. Furthermore, even if we hold tone constant, depending on how the item is framed, it can increase or decrease turnout intentions. Consequently, in order to understand how campaign advertising can affect political behaviour, scholars need to go beyond just looking at the influence of 'negative campaigning' and concentrate on differentiating the effects of the distinct types of negative communication.

The analyses also showed that the effects I discuss above are likely to be momentary and might not translate into long-term changes in behaviour. That is, emotions experienced in mid-campaign (with three weeks to go until the elections) might not have any effects on actual turnout. However, as the analyses discussed above show that emotions do indeed affect the likelihood of turnout, it can be said that actual turnout will be affected by the emotions people experience immediately before the election. This tends

to suggest that campaign communication that is designed to induce emotions could have higher efficiency when used late in the campaign.

Finally, perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that negative advertising is not as detrimental to democracy as it might seem. In effect, anxiety inducing campaign communication not only does not decrease turnout intentions but also increases information search and concentrates attention on this information as a basis for choosing who to vote for.

VIII.3. Caveats

The previous sections summarized the results and highlighted the contributions this thesis makes to several sub-fields in politics. Before concluding, in this section I present the main weaknesses and caveats of the research.

Starting with the experimental analysis, it was discussed at length that due to the weakness of the stimuli, the experimental manipulations did not achieve the expected (or any) effects on political behaviour[98].

Another important caveat addresses the measurement of the dependent variables. All dependent variables (turnout intention, vote choice or campaign involvement), except for reported turnout (Chapter V) and information search (Chapter VII), were measured through self-report items. Consequently, none of the analyses which employ these variables can say anything about actual human actions. What they can and do show is the effect of the independent variables (i.e. emotions) on the hypothetical, past or future, subjective intentions of the respondents.

[98] However, when the data was also analysed using techniques which are traditionally associated with the analysis of observational data (which is problematic due to endogeneity and sampling and representativity issues), the findings were consistent with the results obtained through the analysis of the panel data.

Endogeneity

Given that Chapters IV and V use observational data, the results could be affected by endogeneity. Theoretically, there are at least two ways in which endogeneity can manifest itself: 1. the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is bidirectional; 2. both the dependent and the independent variables are influenced by a third factor not included in the equation (i.e. spurious correlations). The following paragraphs discuss the analyses carried out taking into account both these scenarios.

Looking first at the analysis of the variance of emotions (Chapter IV), the first type of endogeneity might not be likely to occur as campaign exposure was measured based on whether the respondent was exposed to certain campaign techniques (e.g. received a leaflet, was contacted by campaign staff, etc.). Given that exposure is mostly out of the subjects' control, it can be thought that this variable is less affected by endogeneity, but it is not exogenous[99]. Hence, a bidirectional relationship between emotions and campaign exposure is not very likely. The second type of endogeneity was discussed at length in Chapter IV. The fixed effects model, by reducing the individual specific error term, safeguards the analysis from this type of endogeneity occurring due to individual-specific omitted characteristics. However, it cannot prevent non-individual specific omitted variable from affecting the analysis. The between-effects model, however, is not only affected by omitted time-variant variables, it is also affected by the omitted time-invariant variables (e.g. personality), as it does not eliminate the individual-specific error. This means that the coefficients might be severely biased. This means that the coefficients might be severely biased: when computing the coefficients there is no way of accurately

[99] Given that exposure was measured through a self-report question it can be affected by reporting bias: due to satisficing or social desirability (or other factors) people might not answer accurately.

establishing what part of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables and what proportion by, for instance, personality.

Moving forward, the analyses of turnout intention (Chapter V) are not thought to be affected by bidirectionality. There are no substantive or empirical reasons to believe that the level of ones' emotionality is influenced by turnout intentions. Regarding the second type of endogeneity, the fixed effects model, once more, might be affected if relevant time-variant variables were omitted. The same applies to the between-effects model; but, as discussed above, this model can also be affected by omitted time-invariant variables. In the case of this analysis there is no obvious time-invariant variable which was omitted. Finally, as I discussed in Section V, the analysis of reported turnout is prone to be affected by omitted variable bias.

Turning now to the analysis pertaining to the effects of emotions on vote choice, to assess whether it is affected by the first type of endogeneity I constructed a Path model in which I simultaneously estimate two regression equations. In the first equation I regress vote choice on a set of explanatory variables, a specific emotion and their interactions (see Section V.2.1,). The second equation regresses the emotion (contained in the first equation) on vote choice[100]. The results show that while the effects displayed in Table V.5 are maintained, vote choice does not have a significant effect on emotions, with the exception of enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is positively affected by vote choice; nonetheless, the effects of this emotion on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants are similar to those in Table V.5. Thus, it can be concluded that the analyses presented here are not likely to be affected by the first type of endogeneity. That is, while emotions affect vote choice in accordance with the theory, vote choice does not generally affect emotions.

[100] The models were estimated simultaneously using the MPuls package, which is the only software capable on running SEM models with dichotomous dependent variables. The WLSMV (mean and variance adjusted weighted least squares) estimator with Theta parameterization, and listwise deletion was used.

Nonetheless, it could be the case that both emotions and vote choice are influenced by a third factor. Having already controlled for key socio-demographics (e.g. education, age, gender and income), the most likely candidate is, of course, the impact of the electoral campaign. However, the analyses also control for that. Given that emotions are psycho-physiological occurrences[101] it is quite improbable that there is an omitted factor which influences both emotions[102] and vote choice.

Interest in politics

The panel data this thesis relies on was collected by YouGov through surveying individuals contained in their internet database, which is constructed based on self-selection. All people included in their database chose to be included, which means that there might be systematic difference between the people in the sample and the general population. In the context of this research, the most important such difference could be the level of political interest. The people who chose to be in the YouGov database and chose to respond to the survey probably have higher levels of political interest than the electorate as a whole. This means that some of the findings presented in the thesis might only apply to more interested individuals. As discussed earlier, emotions are the body's reactions to external events and their experience and induction can depend on how interested the person is in that given event. Thus, it could be the case that there are differences in the variance of emotions between the two waves for less interested versus more interested people.

Consequently, to test the limits of the generalizability of these findings I examine whether, in the sample I use, there are differences between the models pertaining to the

[101] Please review Section IV.2.2 for a discussion of the appropriateness of self-report measures of emotions.
[102] As Wolak and Marcus (2007) show the experience of emotions is influenced by personality (particularly by the trait neuroticism), however, it is very unlikely that this variable also affects vote choice directly.

induction of emotions when selecting people with low interest and those with high levels of political interest. Political interest was measured in wave 2 through an item which asked people to state, on a 4 point scale, how interested they are in politics. For the purposes of this analysis I dichotomized the variable so that it indicates whether a person is very interested in politics versus less interested. The less interested category includes those people who said that they were somewhat interested, not that interested and not at all interested. Given that most people in the sample state that they are very interested, collapsing these categories was necessary to maintain workable sample sizes.

I first re-examine the analyses pertaining to the mean differences between emotions experienced in wave 2 versus wave 1. I re-run the paired t-tests for dependent samples, originally displayed in Table IV.1, for less interested people and very interested people. The results, displayed in Tables A.15.1 and A.15.2 in Appendix 15, show that, while there are some differences between less and very interested people, these differences are not overwhelming. The first discrepancy is to do with the differences in the mean of enthusiasm towards the Conservatives between the two waves: for less interested people the difference between the means of (wave 1 and wave 2) is not significant. Meanwhile. very interested people are significantly less enthusiastic in wave 2 compared to wave 1. The second discrepancy pertains to negative emotions experienced towards the Labour party in wave 2 versus wave 1: for less interested people the means of these emotions are not significantly different in wave 2 compared to wave 1. Nonetheless, more interested people are significantly less anxious or angry in wave 2 compared to wave 1. To better understand how the process of emotional induction differs between people with different levels of interest I continue by disaggregating the analyses by partisanship. Table A.15.3 (Appendix 15) displays the results of the t-tests for specific party supporters who are less interested in politics and Table A.15.4 includes the results for very interested people.

The results show that for Conservative supporters there are virtually no discrepancies based on the level of political interest, with the exception of enthusiasm experienced towards the Liberal Democrats. For less interested Conservatives the level of enthusiasm towards Lib-Dem does not vary significantly between the two waves. Similarly, there are no major differences between less and very interested Labour supporters: the only differences are in the case of enthusiasm experienced towards he Labour party (the results are not significant for less interested people) and in the case anger experienced towards Liberal Democrats (the difference between the means is not significant for less interested people). Finally, Lib Dem supporters also show similar patterns, irrespective of the level of interest. The only differences found are for anxiety and anger towards their preferred party and enthusiasm towards the Conservatives. Consequently, out of a total of 27 t-tests I identify 6 instances in which there are differences based on interest, that is, the results are not significant for less interested people[103]. Table A.15.13 in Appendix 15 summarises the differences between the models. This leads me to conclude that while it is possible that less interested people are less prone to emotion induction, it is not very likely that they actually are.

The analyses discussed in the previous paragraph illustrate the differences between the means of emotions in the two waves of the panel, however they do not say anything about the effect of the campaign on the differences in emotionality, which of course, can also be influenced by the level of interest. Hence, I now re-run the analyses which, through the use of fixed effects models, assess the effects of campaign exposure on the within person change of emotionality between the two waves. Tables A.15.5 and A.15.6 (Appendix 15) display the results for the people who fall in one of the two categories of interest. The

[103] It is also worth noting that the sample sizes of the analyses which included only less interested people were almost half of ones carried out on very interested people.

results lead to similar observations as in the case of the t-tests: for less interested people campaign exposure does not have a significant effect on the within-person difference in the level of anxiety and anger towards the Labour party.

Once again I disaggregate the analyses and look at each group of partisans separately. The results, presented in Tables A.15.7 through A.15.12 (Appendix 15) show that for Conservative supporters there are no important differences based on the level of interest in politics. Nonetheless, less interested people seem to be more emotional about their preferred party.

For Labour supporters the differences are also minimal: in three instances (anxiety towards Labour, anger towards the Conservatives and anger towards Lib Dem) the coefficients in the models pertaining to less interested people are not statistically significant (even though they have the correct sign,).

Finally, for Liberal Democrat supporters, the results are very similar: the coefficients pertaining to the effect of campaign exposure are not significant in the case of less interested people, in two instances (enthusiasm towards the Conservatives and enthusiasm towards the Liberal Democrats).

These findings confirm the conclusions I have previously drawn: there are no striking differences between less interested people and very interested people in terms of the induction of emotions. Nonetheless, some differences were observed. Even if these results suggest that the differences are minimal, they do cast some doubt on the generalizability of the findings. Hence, an important caveat of this research is that it might be the case that the findings presented here mostly apply to the more politically interested and are less representative of people who have no interest in politics at all.

VIII.4. Conclusions and directions for future research

The results discussed above give, at least partial, credence to the claim set out in the introduction that campaigns can, and arguably do, influence political behaviour indirectly. The major contribution of this research is that it shows that campaigns can successfully induce emotions which can control the intensity and propensity of the persuasive and mobilization effects a campaign has. Nonetheless, campaign induced emotions should not be understood as universal panacea that will automatically improve a given party's electoral chances – they are but a cog in the wheel[104]. Without clear strategy, accurate planning and pre-testing, campaigns, even if successful in inducing emotions, might fail to achieve their overall goals: affecting behaviour and securing the government. Moreover, improper, superficial attempts at manipulating emotions can very easily backfire and lead to results contradictory to the party's aims. Emotions can have substantial beneficial effects, but at the same time they can also lead to substantial loses.

This is well illustrated by looking at the British parties and their campaigns in the lead-up to the 2010 elections. While the Labour party, having a solid strategy, was successful in harnessing the effects of emotions to its favour, the Conservative party, lacking a comprehensive strategic direction and using communication which was too detached from quotidian reality, was actually negatively impacted by the emotions it tried to induce.

These results pertaining to the particular case of the UK are all the more valuable as a research tradition in the field of electoral campaign effects is only now starting to solidify. Research regarding the effectiveness of electoral campaigns in the UK is still in its infancy (Brady, et al., 2006). Consequently, by addressing the role of campaign tone and framing in

[104] As Chapter VII shows, even though some emotions were induced in the experiment they were not strong enough for the campaign communication to affect behaviour.

inducing emotions, and illustrating the behavioural effects of those emotions, the findings this thesis arrives at open the way towards filling this gap in the literature.

Besides extending our understanding and knowledge of campaign effects in the UK, this thesis also offers a potential explanation of why academic research seldom finds supporting evidence for the effects campaign professionals claim their campaigns have. Academic research often focuses on elucidating the direct effects of campaigns. However, the professional campaign management literature claims that campaigns are also designed to affect behaviour indirectly, as my analysis corroborates. Thus, it is possible that the discrepancies between the claims of consultants and the results of academics are partly due to the incomplete measurement of campaign effects. Perhaps once we include the indirect effects of campaigns in our measures of campaign effects our conclusions pertaining to the importance of campaigns will be slightly closer to those of the professionals.

I show that the indirect campaigns can be manifested through the emotions electoral campaigns induce. However, future research should extend the scope of this examination to include other variables which might mediate the impact of campaigns. Emotions are indeed important, but they are surely not singular in their importance.

Nonetheless, by looking at emotions this research does open the road to a better and fuller understanding of the workings of electoral democracy. Understanding in greater detail how, when and under what circumstances parties and candidates can influence voters provides us with critical information that could be used to define and regulate what is or is not appropriate in democratic electoral campaigns.

As I constantly mentioned, the research is carried out in the context of the 2010 British General Election campaign. The choice to locate the study in this particular context was guided by the advantages which it offers (Brady, et al., 2006; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck,

2002). Britain has important similarities with the US, but is also significantly different[105]. There is some evidence that British campaigns exert effects on voting behaviour (see Andersen, 2003; McAllister, 2002); however, there is little consensus on the matter (see e.g. Kavanagh, 1995) and even less evidence as to how these effects are manifested (Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002). Moreover, placing the research in the multiparty context of the UK advances the study of emotions in politics. Up to this point all research has been carried out exclusively in the exceptional bipartisan context of the United States.

Furthermore, even though the theory of emotions in politics (i.e. TAI) was developed based on psychological and neuropsychological evidence, it was nonetheless designed to explain political behaviour in the United States. Almost the entire literature pertaining to the effect of emotions in politics examines the US case. However, the thesis shows that even when applied to a multiparty, non candidate-centred context, testing the theory of emotions in politics produces similar conclusions to those discovered for the case of the US. This brings us one step closer to showing that the theory is generalizable beyond specific political contexts.

In terms of future research directions, as this chapter illustrates, there is a clear need for additional research into the psychological and behavioural process of anger as experienced towards the preferred party. Perhaps, such future efforts could take the path opened by Damasio and his colleagues and consider carrying out research into the political effects of emotions by comparing people unable to experience emotions (due to different neuro-pathologies) with subjects who can and do.

[105] The United Kingdom employs the same type of electoral system; however it has a party system which is closer to European multipartism as opposed to the almost pure American bipartism. Moreover, even if electoral campaigns have become more and more Americanised in the UK, the two states differ in two major aspects: UK campaigns do not employ television advertising and campaigns are not candidate centred.

Finally, the literature on the role of emotions in politics, to which this thesis primarily contributes, is still in its infancy. Even though significant progress has been made in the past ten years, we are still far from a comprehensive understanding of how political environments, human emotions and political behaviour interact. We are now starting to develop sound theories that explain how emotions are induced and conditioned by electoral campaigns; however, more research is needed to understand how the emotions induced by campaigns interact with the emotions that already exist within humans as a consequence of day-to-day political life. Moreover, it is important to observe if and how, emotions produced by non-political stimuli have an effect on individual level political decision making. Furthermore, up to this point, the effect of each specific emotion was assessed in isolation from the potential effect of other emotions, thus, we now need to also focus on understanding how different emotions; such as enthusiasm or anger, experienced simultaneously towards the same entity interact in shaping political behaviour and how the level of political interest affects these relationships.

Appendices and Reference

Appendix 1

Picture A.1.1 – Conservative posters



Picture A.1.2. – Conservative conversion posters

Table A.2.1
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Conservative supporters; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.341 +	.688 *	1.371 *	.169	-.066	-.043	.547 *	2.401 *	1.613 *
	(.190)	(.202)	(.199)	(.181)	(.192)	(.145)	(.222)	(.247)	(.236)
Newspaper readership	.019	-.008	.003	.036 +	.018	.036 +	.025	.040	.037
	(.019)	(.021)	(.021)	(.019)	(.020)	(.015)	(.023)	(.025)	(.025)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.643*	.476 +	.499 +	.447 +	.371	.054	-.284	.152	.276
	(.268)	(.284)	(.281)	(.255)	(.270)	(.204)	(.316)	(.347)	(.332)
Constant	1.023	-.006	-.067	-.293	1.736 *	2.467 *	1.427 *	.756	.624
	(.484)	(.514)	(.508)	(.462)	(.488)	(.370)	(.565)	(.628)	(.601)
R^2	*.014*	*.023*	*.075*	*.010*	*.004*	*.010*	*.014*	*.138*	*.073*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.143*	*-.137*	*-.105*	*-.185*	*-.113*	*-.054*	*-.161*	*-.014*	*-.036*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*66.15%*	*56.78%*	*55.80%*	*59.12%*	*67.96%*	*70.13%*	*59.30%*	*54.59%*	*57.58%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. Dependent variables: the difference in the means of emotions between t1 and t2. Time-invariant variables omitted. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=1294/690

Table A.2.2.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Labour supporters; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	-.009	2.253 *	1.358 *	.632 *	-.808 *	-.749 *	1.500 *	1.082 *	.554 *
	(.212)	(.287)	(.243)	(.230)	(.213)	(.214)	(.234)	(.248)	(.248)
Newspaper readership	.002	.021	-.007	-.001	.008	.008	-.008	-.010	-.021
	(.019)	(.025)	(.022)	(.021)	(.019)	(.019)	(.021)	(.022)	(.022)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.384	.299	.018	-.173	.016	-.110	-.504 +	.021	-.081
	(.285)	(.383)	(.323)	(.306)	(.283)	(.285)	(.311)	(.331)	(.331)
Constant	-.043	1.248	2.122	2.219	1.252 *	1.799 *	1.856 *	.917	1.254 *
	(.516)	(.701)	(.591)	(.560)	(.518)	(.521)	(.570)	(.605)	(.605)
R^2	*.003*	*.095*	*.051*	*.014*	*.025*	*.021*	*.073*	*.032*	*.011*
Corr (u_i βx)	*.043*	*-.048*	*.016*	*.084*	*-.071*	*-.049*	*-.027*	*.018*	*.038*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*63.36%*	*58.91%*	*61.82%*	*62.61%*	*66.40%*	*65.45%*	*60.54%*	*57.04%*	*58.86%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. Dependent variables: the difference in the means of emotions between t1 and t2. Time-invariant variables omitted. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=1285/683

Table A.2.3
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Lib Dem supporters; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	-.631 *	2.322 *	2.714 *	.097	.047	-.082	1.575 *	-.131	-.103
	(.286)	(.372)	(.330)	(.265)	(.329)	(.264)	(.339)	(.283)	(.208)
Newspaper readership	-.026	.104 *	.111 *	-.021	.073 +	.036	.129 *	.017	.029
	(.034)	(.044)	(.039)	(.032)	(.039)	(.033)	(.041)	(.034)	(.033)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.461	-.693	-.858 +	-.457	.319	.262	-.236	.683	.743
	(447)	(.583)	(.518)	(.416)	(.516)	(.414)	(.532)	(.445)	(.440)
Constant	1.242	2.454 *	2.914 *	1.890 *	1.201	1.817	2.102 *	-.417	-.557
	(.825)	(1.074)	(.953)	(.767)	(.949)	(.762)	(.980)	(.818)	(.810)
R^2	*.031*	*.172*	*.262*	*.007*	*.014*	*.006*	*.120*	*.012*	*.015*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.267*	*-.198*	*-.215*	*-.141*	*-.119*	*-.137*	*-.311*	*-.196*	*-.232*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*68.31%*	*61.23%*	*66.81%*	*67.79%*	*64.14%*	*70.36%*	*61.57%*	*62.55%*	*62.70%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. Dependent variables: the difference in the means of emotions between t1 and t2. Time-invariant variables omitted. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=609/364

Appendix 3

The predicted effect of emotions (Range: -1.5 to 1.5) on the over-time, within-person, variance of turnout intention (Range: -5 to 5; Mean: 0; SD: 0.605).











Appendix 4

The predicted effect of emotions (range 0-3) on the between-people differences in turnout intention (Range 0 to 10; Mean 9.35; SD 1.71)











Appendix 5

I also test whether the three survey questions which ascertain how favourable respondents feel towards the parties can accurately predict partisanship. The analysis, displayed in Table A.5.1, uses multinomial logistic regression to measure the impact of favourability on party ID. The dependent variable is party ID measured by the Michigan-type question, with the value representing Lib Dem being set as the base outcome. In both waves all the results are statistically significant. More importantly the McFadden's R Square has distinctly high values (.676 and .647) indicating that the favourability variables alone can account for most of the variance of party ID.

Table A.5.1. The effect of favourability on Party ID

Wave 1			
	Labour PID	Conservative PID	Lib Dem PID
Favourability to Labour	.884 *	-.160 *	
	(.060)	(.057)	
Favourability to the Conservatives	-1.067 *	-1.091 *	
	(.069)	(.075)	*Base*
Favourability to Lib Dem	-.049	1.073 *	*outcome*
	(.050)	(.072)	
Constant	2.569 *	1.201 *	
	(.441)	(.476)	
McFadden R^2		*.676*	
N		*1892*	
Wave 2			
	Labour PID	Conservative PID	Lib Dem PID
Favourability to Labour	.633 *	-.133 *	
	(.031)	(.033)	
Favourability to the Conservatives	-.829 *	-.959 *	
	(.036)	(.041)	*Base*
Favourability to Lib Dem	-.096 *	.859 *	*outcome*
	(.028)	(.039)	
Constant	2.606 *	1.750 *	
	(.280)	(.312)	
McFadden R^2		*.647*	
N		*4456*	

Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients; SE in parentheses.
Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1

Appendix 6

Figure A.6.1. **The effect of a 1 unit increase in the strength of partisanship (from the starting value specified in each column) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality. (Wave 1)**



Figure A.6.3. **The effect of the change in ideological position (*from* no match between the position of the respondent and that of his preferred party *to* matching on ideology) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality. (Wave 1)**



Figure A.6.3. **The effects of the change in leader evaluations (*from* not liking the leader of the preffred party atall *to* liking the leader of the preferred party very much) on the probability of voting for the preferred party, at each distinct level of emotionality. (Wave 1)**



Appendix 7

The experimental manipulations

Enthusiasm towards the Labour Party

– administered in Cell 1 if Labour is the Preferred Party

Labour economic policy plans could bring Britain out of the recession, says think-tank

Gross domestic product (GDP) per person in Britain is now lower on account of the global economic crises, Oxford Economics has claimed.

The global crisis halted the upward trend and major positive economic gains made by the Labour Government during its first two terms, said the economic advisory group. Oxford Economics' research found that GDP per capita rose by 12.6% between 1997 and 2001, and by 8.3% between 2001 and 2005.

"The recent decline in UK GDP per capita contrasts markedly with the improvements seen over the Labour government's first two terms," said Adrian Cooper, managing director of Oxford Economics. But the cause of the decline cannot be attributed to the Labour Government.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) argued that the Labour government adopted the best available policies to minimise the effects that the global recession would have on the British economy. It was the global economy (and specifically the US banking sector) that threw the British economy in disarray.

The same independent source emphasises that if Labour's proposed plan of action had been followed, the British economy would have recovered more rapidly and that living standards would already have risen.

If the Labour plan were to be applied now, economic prosperity would undoubtedly increase. However, the failure to apply this plan would lead to a further decline in economic prosperity. Accordingly, at the end of the last quarter of 2010, GDP would be even lower than in 2005. This would mean a decline in living standards equivalent to 225 pounds per person, with GDP per capita estimated at 22,775 pounds for next year.

UK GDP per capita in 2007 was $45,890, well ahead of that in Germany, France, Italy and Japan and "rivalling" that of the US according to Oxford Economics. It has now fallen to $35,590, the same level as Italy, 23% lower than the US and more than 10% lower than Germany, France and Japan - the group said. This is seemingly the direct result of the failure to implement Labour's plans. However, taking into account the relative cost of

living standards in different countries, UK living standards at the beginning of 2009 were still higher than in Germany, France, Italy and Japan.

The US economy has already started growing again with official figures due to be published next month expected to show that had Labour policies been applied (following the Labour government's efforts to control a crisis which emerged outside the British Isles), economic recovery would have been more rapid, with the UK recession ending in the fourth quarter of 2010.

Enthusiasm towards the Liberal Democrats

– administered in Cell 1 if the Liberal Democrats are the Preferred Party

Lib Dem supporters should be extremely satisfied and proud. Their party is now in government; and not any government, but that which will take Britain out of the economic crisis. As such, the Lib Dems will significantly contribute to developing and bettering the nation's future.

Economists have reacted with surprise as the construction industry grew faster than in any quarter since 1963 lifting the UK's gross domestic product (GDP) by 1.2% in the third quarter, sparking talk of a rise in interest rates and lifting the pound.

Official figures show that the economy grew at a faster than expected rate of 1.2% between April and June 2010. This was the fastest growth since 2001 and twice the expansion Bank of England economists had been expecting. The prospect of an early rise in interest rates, which would cheer savers, lifted the pound.

Driven by a mini-construction boom, forecasts have been hiked with even the Government's estimate of 1.3% for 2010 looking too pessimistic. GDP growth of 1.5% is the new consensus view. Sterling stormed more than two cents higher against the dollar to $1.5414 and a cent higher against the euro to 1.1917 after the much better-than-expected news on UK growth from the Office for National Statistics.

The UK Manufacturing PMI (Purchasing Managers Index) for August reported an 11th successive month of growth, "consistent with on-going recovery in the sector." The third-quarter manufacturing outlook from the EEF (Engineering Employers' Federation) reported output and new order balances at record levels, "which suggests growth in manufacturing output should continue into the next quarter." The EEF's latest forecasts are for manufacturing growth of 3.7% in 2010 and possibly more in 2011. Similarly, the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) is forecasting manufacturing growth of 3.3% this year, compared to 1.4% for services. The BCC's chief economist notes: "Manufacturing has been doing better than services for the last three quarters; we have not seen that for a very long time."

The EEF survey reported two other pieces of good news in the third quarter.

First, the balance of companies investing turned positive for the first time since the second quarter of 2008, the EEF's chief economist noting that: "recovery in investment has begun much earlier in the cycle than after previous recessions."

Second, the balance of companies recruiting almost doubled -- the strongest growth since the survey began in 1995.

As for monetary policy, clearly there is now little evidence to support the prospect of any additional stimulus in the form of quantitative easing. Andrew Sentance's view that interest rates should rise soon, has recently gained more weight.

The yield on benchmark ten-year UK government bonds reflected this view jumping to 3.42% from 3.37% on the news.

This all signifies that, owing to the policies of the Lib Dem-Conservative Government, unemployment is due to decrease as the rise in production and consumption boosts the demand for workers. Meanwhile the rise in interest rates will undoubtedly contribute to a rise in British living standards.

The International Economic Forum predicts that the growth of the British economy in 2011 will substantially increase the standard of living. The report also acknowledges that the policies implemented by the current government will a have much needed positive effect. Further, they highlight the importance of the Liberal Democrat component of the government. They argue that without the contribution of the Liberal Democrats the revitalisation of the economy and consequent increase in living standards would have been delayed.

John Bailey, a Liberal Democrat voter from Surrey considers himself very proud for voting Lib Dem. He feels it an honour that the party he chose to represent him is in the right place to better peoples' lives: "I am proud to be a Lib Dem and I am proud that my party is doing a good job working for me in government".

Enthusiasm towards the Conservatives

– Administered in Cell 1 if the Conservatives are the Preferred Party

Economists have reacted with surprise as the construction industry grew faster than in any quarter since 1963, lifting the UK's gross domestic product (GDP) by 1.2% in the third quarter and sparking talk of a rise in interest rates and lifting the pound.

Official figures show the economy grew at a faster than expected rate of 1.2% between April and June 2010. It was the fastest growth since 2001 and twice the expansion Bank of

England economists had been expecting. The prospect of an early rise in interest rates, which would cheer savers, lifted the pound.

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First, the balance of companies investing turned positive for the first time since the second quarter of 2008, the EEF's chief economist noting that: "recovery in investment has begun much earlier in the cycle than after previous recessions."

Second, the balance of companies recruiting almost doubled -- the strongest growth since the survey began in 1995.

Double dip fears have been dispelled; economists had been expecting the economy to grow 0.5-0.6%, faster than the 0.3% recorded in the first three months of the year, but well below today's preliminary number.

Azad Zangana, European economist at Schroders, said: "The latest estimates are a very positive surprise which should provide a boost to consumer confidence heading into the final part of the year".

Zangana still expects the pace of growth to hold later in the year as well, and believes there is now enough momentum to avoid a double-dip recession.

"As for monetary policy, clearly there is now little evidence to support the prospect of any additional stimulus in the form of quantitative easing. Andrew Sentance's view that interest rates should rise soon, has just gained more weight", Zangana said.

The yield on benchmark ten-year UK government bonds reflected this view jumping to 3.42% from 3.37% on the news.

This all signifies that, owing to the policies of the Conservative government, unemployment is due to decrease as the rise in production and consumption boosts the demand for workers. Meanwhile the rise in interest rates will undoubtedly contribute to an increase in British living standards.

The International Economic Forum predicts that the economic growth of the British economy in 2011, will substantially increase the standard of living. The report also acknowledges that the policies implemented by the Conservative government will a have much needed positive effect.

Anxiety towards the Labour Party

- Administered in Cell 2 if Labour is the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 4 if Labour is an Out-Party

As the recession saps the nation's prosperity, gross domestic product (GDP) per person in Britain was lower on the 1st of January 2010 than it was at the time of the last general election, an independent economic consultancy claims, in recently published report.

The economic advisory group, Oxford Economics, said that at the end of 2009, UK GDP per capita was estimated at an average of 22,700 pounds, 1.3% lower than the, at today's prices, 23,000 average in 2005.

The fall reflected the decline in economic prosperity and living standards wrought by the recession, a report by the group said. "Coupled with the tax rises implemented by Labour starting in January 1 2010, this research underlines the new age of austerity facing the UK economy."

If the Labour policies were fully implemented economic prosperity would continue to decrease in 2010 compared with 2005, the group said, with a decline in living standards equivalent to 225 per person, with GDP per capita estimated at 22,775 for next year.

"The fall in UK GDP per capita (in 2009 and the first half of 2010) combined with the decline in sterling means that the UK has seen an even sharper decline in its relative living standards compared with other major economies," the report said.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) declared that another Labour term would cause the pound to plunge, gilt yields to soar and Britain's credit rating to be "put seriously at risk". "Interest rates would hit the Government, the taxpayer and business while choking off a feeble recovery," was said. "Mortgage rates would rise sharply for millions." This would lead to the rise of unemployment, which coupled with the cuts and further tax raises proposed by Labour would lead many Britons to poverty. Paradoxically, Labour's plan would have the most negative effects on the working class.

UK GDP per capita in 2007 was $45,890, well ahead of that in Germany, France, Italy and Japan and "rivalling" that of the US according to Oxford Economics. It has now fallen to $35,590, the same level as Italy, 23% lower than the US and more than 10% lower than Germany, France and Japan - the group said.

UK living standards still trail those in the US by almost 25%, with the gap is set to widen further in 2010 if Labour policies were enacted, the report said.

The US economy has already started growing again, making Britain the last major economy to emerge from recession. But if any Labour plans were to be implemented, the emergence from the recession would be delayed indefinitely.

Anxiety towards the Lib Dem

- Administered in Cell 2 if the Lib Dems are the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 4 if the Lib Dems are an Out-Party

Mr Cable had been pushing for a graduate tax, arguing that it was a fairer system which would not put off students from poorer backgrounds going to college. But yesterday he accepted the Tories' plan to allow universities to lift the cap on fees, currently 3,290 a year. But his proposals could mean the top universities charge up to 10,000 a year in fees, pricing out the poorest students.

Mr Cable announced this change in a letter to Tory and Liberal Democrat MPs. He wrote: "An additional tax on graduates fails both the tests of fairness and deficit reduction."

During the election campaign, the leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg told the National Union of Students that his party opposed any form of up-front tuition fees; he also clearly emphasised in the campaign that they would scrap university tuition fees by 2015. In an email to Liberal Democrat MPs, Mr Clegg urged them to consider supporting the recommendations made in an independent report by Lord Browne. The former BP boss has advised the Government to raise tuition fees but allow graduates to repay their debts only when they earn more than 21,000 pounds. Lord Browne anticipates that the average student would leave university having borrowed around 30,000 pounds to cover tuition fees and living expenses.

Under his plans, students would not have to pay tuition fees immediately. Instead, the Government would pay the university's charges up to 6,000.

If a university wanted to charge more, it would pay the Government a levy to help fund bursaries to support poorer students.

The full amount of 3,250 pounds would be given to those from families that earn less than 25k and partial grants would be available for those earning up to 60k.

"All students will receive at least as much cash in hand as they do now," Lord Browne's report says.

The interest rate on students' loans, however, would increase under the plans.

Currently it is linked to inflation and stands at 1.5%. The report calls for it to rise to 2.2% above the rate of inflation for most graduates.

Lord Browne wants to increase the salary threshold at which students begin to repay their fees and loans from 15,000 to 21,000.

But he believes some money can be recouped by increasing the length of time before the debt is written off, from 25 to 30 years.

Repayments will be linked to income and while low earners may never repay their full debt, the more a graduate earns, the more likely they are to repay the costs over the three decades.

Student finance is among the most discussed issues for the coalition Government as Liberal Democrat MPs pledged to vote against any increase in fees before the last election. Mr Clegg said the Coalition had not made a final decision but he was "painfully aware" of the pledge he made promising to vote against higher fees before the General Election. "It means doing something that no one likes to do in politics - acknowledging that the assumptions we made at election time simply don't work out in practice".

"With the benefit of hindsight, I signed a pledge at a time when we could not have anticipated the full scale of the financial situation the country faces now and the absence of plausible alternatives for students to the arrangements we are now advocating," his wrote in an email.

All in all, the actions of the Liberal Democrats can or cannot be excusable under the current economic conditions. It is not their fault that fees need to be raised and higher education underfunded, but the raise of the fees will inevitably provoke questions about the future of the British youth. National Union of Students president Aaron Porter said: "Lord Browne is clearly dangerously out of touch with the pressures faced by students and their families. The Government must reject proposals that would recklessly undermine our future by ending the notion of public higher education." And yet is seems that the Lib Dems will indeed support Lord Browne's report.

Anxiety towards the Conservative Party

- Administered in Cell 2 if the Conservatives are the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 4 if the Conservatives are an Out-Party

The Conservative Party's plans to slash public spending and shrink the deficit could spell "disaster" for the UK economy, a prominent economic consultancy warns.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) uses its quarterly report on the UK economy to issue a stern warning about the risks of tightening policy too soon, as heavy cuts to spending early in the recession could make it more painful.

The warning comes amid fresh calls for the Bank of England to expand its Quantitative Easing (QE) scheme by a further 50bn to 225bn. The Conservatives have set themselves against using significant fiscal stimulus, spending increases or tax cuts to fight the recession. However, in its quarterly report the Institute of Economic Affairs warns that tightening spending cuts too early could create more pain: jobs will be lost both in the public and private sector; benefits, such as Child Benefit, will be cut causing middle-income parents to suffer; taxes will increase. Indeed, the Conservative coalition government has announced that winter fuel payments will cease; next April the child tax credit for those earning more than 30,000 will be abolished; the pension tax will be will be restricted.

John Pritchard, an IEA director, said: "While we agree that the UK's fiscal position is dreadful, Conservative plans to begin fiscal tightening this year could spell disaster. We are calling for an overhaul of the Bank's QE programme to make it start delivering for the real economy (for all firms, not just the biggest) and to provide a cushion for cash-strapped households." Moreover, the middle and the better off middle class will become the coping class, according to Pritchard.

"I think the scales fell from the nation's eyes when the Conservative Government announced that the broad-shouldered middle class would be taking more than their fair share of the burden of cuts", says Mumsnet co-founder and mother of four, Julia Pauls "There's this myth that we're all latte-drinking yummy mummies, when actually the middle class encompasses a huge number of families who are far from comfortably off and who will be really struggling".

But the stress doesn't end at eighteen; in fact it only increases. University tuition fees are set to go stratospheric if, as expected, Lord Browne's review of student finance next week recommends that the ceiling on annual tuition fees should be raised from 3,290 to 10,000.

The controversy kicked off by the Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt, that there should be a brick ceiling on benefits for big families and that recipients should desist in having children the state can't afford to keep, comes as no surprise. Among wage-earners, families are shrinking; a new and thoroughly dispiriting survey by the BabyCentre parenting website

has shown that a generation of women are so fearful about family finances that 45 per cent will make a decision not to have as many children.

None of us is denying the right of 'the rich' to receive help. Nor the obligation of the state to support 'the poor'. However, between these two poles, there exists a nebulous mass of the 'better off' (although from the standpoint of the offshore tax loophole brigade they could just as accurately be referred to as the 'worse off'). "The average income is 25,000 pounds which makes someone on 50,000 pounds sound very well off, but the amount they have in their bank account at the end of the month may not reflect that", observes Mike Warburton, tax director at Grant Thornton.

He continues by saying that "the middle classes were severely hit again, but they have to remember that everyone is going to feel the pain. The bottom line is that the deficit needs to be cleared and you can't take it all from bankers". But that might be besides the point. Mrs Pauls gives an example: "when I look back at my parents, they seemed to be so settled by our age, with a negligible mortgage and no major money worries, but I feel I'm like a hamster on a wheel desperately running to stay still", she says.

Nonetheless, it is also true that the Conservative Party does not have a choice, there are no alternatives: cuts need to be made. As such, in the end every person should consider whether there would be any other option which would be better than the dire future Conservative plans might bring.

Anger towards the Labour Party

- Administered in Cell 3 if Labour is the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 5 if Labour is an Out-Party

As the recession saps the nation's prosperity, gross domestic product (GDP) per person in Britain was lower on the 1st of January 2010 than it was at the time of the last general election, an independent economic consultancy, claims in recently published report.

The economic advisory group, Oxford Economics, said that at the end of 2009, UK GDP per capita was estimated at an average of 22,700 pounds, 1.3% lower than the, at today's prices, 23,000 pound average in 2005.

The fall reflected the decline in economic prosperity and living standards wrought by the recession and by the Labour Government's lack of appropriate action, a report by the group said.

"Coupled with the tax rises implemented by Labour starting in January 1 2010, this research underlines the new age of austerity facing the UK economy."

Owing to the misguided actions and bad policy choices made by the Labour Government earlier this year, economic prosperity will continue to decline in 2010 compared with 2005, the group said. A decline in living standards equivalent to 225 pounds per person is predicted, with GDP per capita estimated at 22,775 pounds for next year.

"The sharp fall in UK GDP per capita combined with the decline in sterling means that the UK has seen an even sharper decline in its relative living standards compared with other major economies," the report said.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) declared that things are made worse by the fact that the current economic state of Britain could have been easily averted if appropriate measures, such as decreasing government waste of public funds, had been taken by the Labour government. But Labour did nothing, when it could have done so much: it was in their power to take appropriate measures when the time was right. Another Labour term would have caused the pound to plunge, gilt yields to soar and Britain's credit rating to be "put seriously at risk", says Mark Johnston the director of IEA.

"Interest rates would hit the Government, the taxpayer and business while choking off a feeble recovery," he said. "Mortgage rates would rise sharply for millions." This would lead to the rise of unemployment, which coupled with the planned cuts proposed by Labour would lead many Britons to poverty. Paradoxically, Labour's plan would have the most negative effects on the working class, on Labour's traditional voters, who were rightfully in the position to expect Labour not to betray them.

UK GDP per capita in 2007 was $45,890, well ahead of that in Germany, France, Italy and Japan and "rivalling" that of the US according to Oxford Economics. It has now fallen to $35,590, the same level as Italy, 23% lower than the US and more than 10% lower than Germany, France and Japan - the group said.

But owing to the policies implemented by Labour earlier this year, UK living standards still trail those in the US by almost 25%, with the gap set to widen further in 2010 as the US economy recovers more rapidly than the UK (a result of those same economic policies enacted by Labour), the report said.

The US economy has already started growing again, making Britain the last major economy to emerge from recession. But considering the mess Labour created, the emergence from the recession which they exacerbated, is at present quite uncertain.

Anger towards the Lib Dems

- Administered in Cell 3 if the Lib Dems are the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 5 if the Lib Dems are an Out-Party

Liberal Democrats have made a spectacular u-turn on tuition fees. Business Secretary, Vince Cable, admitted today that he has changed his view on a graduate tax, coming into line with his Conservative coalition partners on increases in tuition fees.

The Liberal Democrat Minister had been pushing for a graduate tax, arguing it to be a fairer system which would not put off students from poorer backgrounds from going to university. But yesterday he accepted the Tories' plan to allow universities to lift the cap on fees, currently 3,290 pounds a year. His proposals could mean the top universities charge up to 10,000 pounds a year in fees, pricing out the poorest students.

Mr Cable announced his change of heart in a letter to Tory and Liberal Democrat MPs. He wrote: "An additional tax on graduates fails both the tests of fairness and deficit reduction."

During the election campaign, the Liberal Democrats' leader, Nick Clegg, told the National Union of Students that his party opposed any form of up-front tuition fees; he also clearly emphasised in the campaign that they would scrap university tuition fees by 2015, but it seems that the 'taste of power' changed Deputy Prime Minister Clegg's views.

In a major U-turn, Lib Dem Business Secretary Vince Cable, a close ally of Clegg's, announced that he had ditched plans for a graduate tax in favour of a rise in fees. By doing so, the Liberal Democrats have betrayed their voters by turning their back on their flagship policy, seeming to have turned into a clone of the Conservative Party.

"A rise of fees is the complete opposite of the abolition of fees, which the party was talking about during the campaign. I voted for the Liberal Democrats precisely because of this policy and now feel betrayed and used. I am very angry" says John Bailey, father of three teenage boys with aspirations of going to a good university. "I am very angry! I would have expected more from this party, but it seems that as soon as they got a scent of power they forgot where they came from" continues Mr. Bailey.

Mary Johnston just took her GCSEs and her grades are promising. But unfortunately for her, she comes from a family of limited means from Basildon, Essex. Under the system approved by the Lib Dems she cannot afford going to university. Mary thinks that "it is entirely their fault! Clegg and the Lib Dems are completely responsible for this. It is their fault, and they should face the appropriate punishment. My parents voted for them because they wanted to support my dream of going to college. But that was a mistake. When I have the right to vote I'll be sure not to waste my vote on them!"

The British Educational Forum warns that "If fees rise to 7,000 a year, as many rumours suggest, within five years some students will be leaving university with up to 44,000

pounds worth of debt. That would be a disaster. Such a disaster could have been easily prevented if the Liberal Democrats would have stood their ground and fought. In the end, it is why thousands of people voted for them. But why vote for a party that abandons the most important item on their platform without a fight?"

The National Union of Students said students face being shouldered with "crippling" levels of debt, with universities facing "devastation" through cuts.

NUS president Aaron Porter said: "Lord Browne is clearly dangerously out of touch with the pressures faced by students and their families. The Government must reject proposals that would recklessly undermine our future by ending the notion of public higher education."

Anger towards the Conservatives

- Administered in Cell 3 if the Conservatives are the Preferred Party

- Administered in Cell 5 if the Conservatives are an Out-Party

The Conservative Party's plans to slash public spending and shrink the deficit could spell "disaster" for the UK economy, an prominent independent economic think tank warns.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) uses its quarterly report on the UK economy to issue a stern warning about the risks of tightening policy too soon, as heavy cuts to spending early in the recession could make it more painful.

The warning comes amid fresh calls for the Bank of England to expand its Quantitative Easing (QE) scheme by a further 50bn to 225bn. The Conservatives have set themselves against using significant fiscal stimulus, spending increases or tax cuts to fight the recession. However, in its quarterly report the Institute of Economic Affairs warns that tightening spending cuts too early could create more pain: jobs will be lost both in the public and private sector; benefits, such as Child Benefit, will be cut causing middle-income parents to suffer; taxes will increase. Indeed, the Conservative coalition government has announced that winter fuel payments will cease; next April the child tax credit for those earning more than 30,000 will be abolished; the pension tax will be will be restricted.

John Pritchard, a IEA director, said: "While we agree that the UK's fiscal position is dreadful, Conservative plans to begin fiscal tightening this year could spell disaster. We are calling for an overhaul of the Bank's QE programme to make it start delivering for the real economy (for all firms, not just the biggest) and to provide a cushion for cash-strapped households." Moreover, the middle and the better off middle class will become the coping class, according to Pritchard.

"I think the scales fell from the nation's eyes when the Conservative Government announced that the broad-shouldered middle class would be taking more than their fair share of the burden of cuts", says Mumsnet co-founder and mother of four, Julia Pauls "There's this myth that we're all latte-drinking yummy mummies, when actually the middle class encompasses a huge number of families who are far from comfortably off and who will be really struggling". The Tories have clearly turned their back on the traditional middle-class family values.

"I'm very angry that we will be losing child benefit because my husband is a higher-tax payer", says Murray, 35. "I took the decision to sacrifice my career to bring up my kids, a decision I thought the Conservatives would applaud, and now it looks like I'll have to sacrifice hands-on motherhood and go back to work so that we can maintain our standard of living". The Conservatives could have taken another route, they could have done things in different ways, distributed the cuts more fairly. But they did not.

And the stress doesn't end at eighteen; in fact it only increases. University tuition fees are set to go stratospheric if, as expected, Lord Browne's review of student finance recommends that the ceiling on annual tuition fees should be raised from 3,290 to 10,000.

The controversy kicked off by the enormously wealthy Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt, that there should be a brick ceiling on benefits for big families and that recipients should desist in having children the state can't afford to keep, comes as no surprise. Among wage-earners, families are shrinking; a new and thoroughly dispiriting survey by the BabyCentre parenting website has shown that a generation of women are so fearful about family finances that 45 per cent will make a decision not to have as many children as they always wanted, and are left 'sad, devastated or angry' for much of their lives. This now becomes, along with the way the economy was handled, the responsibility of the Conservatives. They are turning their back on the voters who believed in them.

None of us is denying the right of 'the rich' to receive help. Nor the obligation of the state to support 'the poor'. However, between these two poles there exists the nebulous mass of the 'better off' (although from the standpoint of the offshore tax loophole brigade they could just as accurately be referred to as the 'worse off'). "The average income is 25,000 which makes someone on 50,000 sound very well off, but the amount they have in their bank account at the end of the month may not reflect that", observes Mike Warburton, tax director at Grant Thornton.

He continues to say that "The middle classes were severely hit again. The bottom line is that the deficit needs to be cleared and you can't take it all from bankers." But on the other hand Mrs Pauls gives an example: "When I look back at my parents, they seemed to be so settled by our age, with a negligible mortgage and no major money worries, but I feel I'm like a hamster on a wheel desperately running to stay still."

The Institute of Economic Affairs recommends that the Government holds off from raising taxes or cutting spending until 2012. They also warn that if such measures are imposed the

UK may remain in recession all the way through next year, predicting growth barely above zero in 2010.

Non-political control

- Administered in cell 6 irrespective of partisanship

Biodiversity is not just a matter of tigers and whales, or butterflies and trees, or even coral reefs and tuna. It is also about myriad creatures too small to see that live in numbers too large to count in ways too numerous to imagine. It is easy to forget, especially at meetings like the one to discuss the Convention on Biological Diversity that has been taking place in Nagoya under the auspices of the United Nations, that most of biology is in fact microscopic. Indeed, the more microscopic biology gets, the more diverse it becomes.

In that context, the discovery by Curtis Suttle of the University of British Columbia and his colleagues of a critter they propose to call Cafeteria roenbergensis virus, or CroV, should not be surprising. But for those brought up on a textbook definition of what a virus is, it is still a bit of a shock. For CroV is not a very viruslike virus. It has 544 genes, compared with the dozen or so that most viruses sport. And it may be able to make its own proteins, a task that viruses usually delegate to the molecular machinery of the cells they infect.

CroV, as its full name suggests, is a parasite of Cafeteria roenbergensis, a single-celled planktonic organism that was itself discovered only in 1988. Despite the recentness of its discovery, C. roenbergensis is one of the commonest creatures on the planet. It is also reckoned by some, given that it hunts down and eats bacteria, to be the most abundant predator on Earth. It is found in every ocean. The samples of C. roenbergensis from which Dr Suttle and his team extracted their quarry were collected off the coast of Texas.

To see a world in a grain of sand

That quarrys nature, reported this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, is not a complete surprise. A larger virus, called Mimivirus, which lives in freshwater amoebas, turned up in 2003 and a few other, similar, viruses have been found since then. But CroV is by far the biggest to come out of the sea.

Those who like their categories cut and dried may wonder whether viruses are alive or not. Wise biologists do not struggle too much with such questions. Viruses have genes, can reproduce and are subject to the evolutionary pressures imposed by natural selection. That is enough for biology to claim them. As for CroV, those 544 genes (composed of 730,000 base pairs, the DNA letters in which the language of the genes is written) mean its genome is bigger than those of several bacteria creatures which everyone agrees are alive.

The problem with categorical thinking in biology is that evolution does not work like that. It actually works by whatever works working. If an organism can successfully subcontract

part of the business of metabolism to another while retaining the rest itself, rather than offloading the whole lot as most viruses do, then there are no rules to stop it happening.

CroV seems to do just that. Besides the genes that relate to protein synthesis it has others which encode DNA repair mechanisms and still others which are involved with protein recycling and signalling within cells. This is not mere hijacking. It is tantamount to a complete personality transplant for the infected cell.

About a third of CroVs genes are similar to Mimivirus genes, suggesting they share a distant ancestor. On the other hand, two-thirds are not. A significant chunk of them seem to have been copied from bacteria. But the majority are unique, and previously unknown to science. A whole new chapter of life, in other words, has been opened.

This discovery, then and the earlier one of C. roenbergensis itself speak volumes, albeit in a microscopic language, about biodiversity. Two centuries after Carl Linnaeus invented the system now used to describe it, and a century after Charles Darwin worked out what causes it, the ability of that diversity to surprise is still staggering.

Appendix 8

To ensure that the data is not based, I ran a series of independent sample t-tests to determine if there is a difference between men and woman in the level of emotionality they respectively declare (Table IV.2.) as there is reason to believe (McClone, Aronson, & Kobrynowicz, 2006) that there might be differences between men in and woman in terms of what they would be willing to admit in a survey. This, in turn, would bias the outcome of this research. The results show that even if there is a significant difference between men and women in terms of anxiety (Dif. 0.22, on a four point scale). However, the t-tests generally show that the data is not biased by gender in any large way.

Table A.8.1. Differences between men versus women in the mean intensity of each emotion they experience

T-test between the experimental cells	Mean Diff.	P-value	Power	Cohen's D Effect Size
Enthusiasm PP	.144	.090	.49	.20 Small
Anxiety PP	-.229	.006	.50	.32 Moderate
Anger PP	-.047	.654	.51	.05 Trivial
Anxiety OP	-.124	.131	.50	.17 Small
Anger OP	-.187	.051	.51	.22 Small

Results of independent sample t-tests.

A second test was performed between students and non-students. This was necessary given the high proportion of students in the sample. The results, reported in Table IV.3, show a small significant difference in the case of `anxiety, but no other differences were found.

Table A.8.2. Differences between non-students versus students in the mean intensity of each emotion they experience

T-test between the experimental cells	Mean Diff.	P-value	Power	Cohen's D Effect Size
Enthusiasm PP	.206	.018	.49	.27 Small
Anxiety PP	-.071	.412	.50	.09 Trivial
Anger PP	-.045	.671	.51	.04 Trivial
Anxiety OP	.129	.123	.50	.17 Small
Anger OP	.100	.308	.51	.11 Small

Results of independent sample t-tests.

Appendix 9

I start the analysis by using the independent sample t-tests with the variables measuring emotions in their original form: i.e. not dichotomized. The grouping variable is the experimental cell, while the test variables are the variables measuring emotions. I ran five sets of t-test to assess the mean differences between the experimental cells for each of the emotions. The results obtained were consistent with the hypotheses: subjects in the experimental cells designed to induce enthusiasm (for instance) reported a higher level of enthusiasm than subjects in any other experimental cell. These findings are substantively significant: all the effects are in the expected direction. However, most of the results, except those relating to the emotions experienced towards out-parties, are not statistically significant at conventional levels; they are reported in Table A.9.1. I attribute the lack of statistical significance to the low sample size, leading to the very low levels of statistical power[106] (Table A.9.1), and to small effect sizes[107]. Under these circumstances, however, rejecting the hypotheses might be premature and would possibly lead to Type II errors (Ellis, 2010; Robinson & Levin, 1997; Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).

Further examination of the data leads to more promising results. Looking at the contingency matrix (displayed in Table A.9.2.) which illustrate the joint distribution of subjects by experimental cells and emotions, it becomes apparent that the effect of the manipulations had the most impact on the extreme level of emotionality: 28.6% of the people who said they are very enthusiastic received the stimulus designed to induce

[106] The conventionally accepted level of statistical power is .80 and higher.

[107] In essence, the manipulations had only a limited impact and our sample size was not sufficient to produce significant findings. The limited impact of the stimuli is directly related to their nature. It needs to be kept in mind that the subjects were exposed to only one brief item of communication rather than a sustained campaign. There were no audio or visual stimuli included. Under these circumstances one cannot expect a large effect.

enthusiasm; 36.4% of the subjects who said they are very anxious and 46.2% of the individuals who declared they are very angry had, respectively, received the anxiety and anger inducing stimuli. Moreover, 40.5% of subjects who are, on average, very anxious to out parties and 46.2% of people who declared highly elevated levels of anger towards out parties were subjected to stimuli that were meant to induce those specific emotions. Consequently, the variables were dichotomized.

Table A.9.1. Differences between the mean intensity of each emotion measured in different experimental cells.

T-test between the experimental cells	Mean Diff.	P-value	Power	Cohen's D Effect Size
Enthusiasm				
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	.102	.274	.52	.14 Small
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	.096	.280	.51	.15 Small
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.214	.098	.52	.32 Moderate
Anxiety				
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP)	.216	.089	.52	.30 Moderate
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	.03	.414	.49	.04 Trivial
Cell 2 (anxiety to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.077	.298	.51	.13 Small
Anger				
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP)	.416	.017	.52	.46 Moderate
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	.203	.133	.50	.23 Small
Cell 3 (anger to PP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.218	.122	.50	.25 Small
Anxiety OP				
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 5 (anger to OP)	.180	.105	.50	.25 Small
Cell 4 (anxiety to OP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.381	.003	.53	.57 Large
Anger OP				
Cell 5 (anger to OP) vs. Cell 4 (anxiety to OP)	.310	.041	.51	.35 Moderate
Cell 5 (anger to OP) vs. Cell 6 (control)	.362	.025	.50	.40 Moderate

Results of independent sample t-tests. One tailed P-values reported[108]. Emotions measured on a 4-point scale.

[108] Using one-tailed significance tests is appropriate considering the fact that the hypotheses are directional (Agresti & Finlay, 1997). Kimmel (1957) argues that a researcher should "use a one-tailed test when a directional hypothesis is deducible from psychological theory but results in the opposite direction are not deducible from coexisting psychological theory" (Kimmel, 1957, p. 353).

Table A.9.2. Crosstabulations of emotion by the experimental cells

Experimental cells	A. Enthusiasm PP				B. Anxiety PP				C. Anger PP				D. Anxiety OP							E. Anger OP						
	Not at all	Not very	Some what	**VERY**	Not at all	Not very	Some what	**VERY**	Not at all	Not very	Some what	**VERY**	0 Not at all	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	**3 Very**	0 Not at all	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	**3 Very**
Enthusiasm to preferred party	26.3	12.	13.3	**28.6**	19.4	18.1	8.9	18.2	17.8	17.2	7.7	23.1	16.7	57.1	7.3	13.6	20.6	15.2	11.9	16.7	11.8	14.6	22.4	19.2	13.3	5.1
Anxiety to preferred party	21.1	20.8	16.2	17.9	22.2	14.8	18.9	**36.4**	15.8	17.2	23.1	7.7	16.7	14.3	22.0	11.9	19.6	21.7	11.9	11.1	11.8	27.1	12.1	23.3	11.1	15.4
Anger to preferred party	15.8	19.4	17.3	10.7	11.1	16.8	20.0	18.2	11.9	18.2	17.9	**46.2**	16.7	14.3	34.1	22.0	11.3	15.2	9.5	16.7	23.5	20.8	20.7	13.7	20.0	7.7
Anxiety to out-parties	10.5	15.3	17.9	17.9	19.4	16.8	15.6	18.2	19.8	15.2	16.7	7.7	16.7	-	12.2	8.5	18.6	8.7	**40.5**	16.7	17.6	14.6	19.0	12.3	28.9	10.3
Anger to out-parties	5.3	11.1	19.1	21.4	19.4	13.5	22.2	-	19.8	16.2	14.1	7.7	16.7	14.3	9.8	18.6	14.4	23.9	19.0	22.2	5.9	12.5	5.2	19.2	8.9	**46.2**
Control group	21.1	20.8	16.2	3.6	8.3	20.0	14.4	9.1	14.9	16.2	20.5	7.7	16.7		14.6	25.4	15.5	15.2	7.1	16.7	29.4	10.4	20.7	12.3	17.8	15.4
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

The figures displayed are relative frequencies. They represent, within each level of an emotion, the percentage of subjects contained in each experimental cell.

Appendix 10

The odds ratios, reported in Table A.10.1, indicate the degree to which it is more likely for people to experience higher levels of, for instance, enthusiasm, given that they were subjected to an enthusiasm inducing stimuli.

Table A.10.1. Odds ratios between the experimental cells, between the odds of being very enthusiastic/anxious/angry versus not at all enthusiastic/anxious/angry

a. Enthusiasm PP		**b. Anxiety PP**		**c. Anger PP**	
Experimental cells	Odds ratios	Exp. cells	Odds ratios	Exp. Cells	Odds ratios
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	2	Cell 2 vs. Cell 1	1.8	Cell 3 vs. Cell 1	1.66
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	3.14	Cell 2 vs. Cell 3	1.76	Cell 3 vs. Cell 2	5.06
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 4 (anxiety OP)	1.83	Cell 2 vs. Cell 4	1.73	Cell 3 vs. Cell 4	4.66
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 5 (anger OP)	1.46	Cell 2 vs. Cell 5	9	Cell 3 vs. Cell 5	4.66
Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP) vs. Cell 6 (Control)	7.33	Cell 2 vs. Cell 6	2.9	Cell 3 vs. Cell 6	4.51
		d. Anxiety OP		**e. Anger OP**	
		Exp. cells	Odds ratios	Exp. Cells	Odds ratios
		Cell 4 vs. Cell 1	4	Cell 5 vs. Cell 1	10.4
		Cell 4 vs. Cell 2	4.33	Cell 5 vs. Cell 2	4.38
		Cell 4 vs. Cell 3	5.77	Cell 5 vs. Cell 3	7.42
		Cell 4 vs. Cell 5	2.6	Cell 5 vs. Cell 5	5.77
		Cell 4 vs. Cell 6	6.5	Cell 5 vs. Cell 6	3.46

The quantities displayed are conditional odds ratios. Emotions measured using the dichotomized variables. The reference cell is the experimental cell which was designed to induce the given emotion.

Appendix 11

The analysis has shown that, for instance, extreme levels of enthusiasm are more likely to be achieved if the person was exposed to the political article which was meant to induce enthusiasm *versus people exposed to other political stimuli or the individuals placed in the control group*. This analysis did not, however, assess the likelihood of experiencing extreme levels of an emotion when comparing all the experimental cells with the control group. Thus, to perform a robustness check, I now use the membership in the control group as a reference category. I compute the odds ratios between being very emotional (compared to not very emotional) and having been place in the control group versus being very emotional and having been subjected to an experimental stimulus.

Given that I now use the control group as a reference category[109], I will generate a set of five odds ratios for each emotion. Thus, if the hypotheses truly stand, the odds ratio associated with the comparison between the control group and the experimental cell which was designed to induce the specific emotions should have the smallest value in each set. Conversely, if the smallest value in the set corresponds to an association between the control group and an experimental cell which carried a stimulus that was not designed to induce the given emotion, the hypotheses would need to come under question. As it would mean that compared to the control group, a stimulus designed to induce emotion X was more successful in inducing emotion Y than the experimental cell containing the stimulus specifically designed to induce emotion Y.

The results, displayed in Table A.11.1, show that in each of the five sets (i.e. for each particular emotion) the relevant odds ratio (highlighted) has the value closest to 0. For

[109] The odds of being very emotional and in the control group are divided by the odds of being very emotional and in an experimental group.

instance, in the case of anxiety experienced towards the preferred party (column 2) it is approximately 3 times less likely (1/0.34) to experience this emotion at extreme levels if included in the control group as opposed to the experimental cell 'anxiety to PP'. We can compare this to the closest value which is an odds ratio of 0.59 and corresponds to the association between the emotionality in the control group and the experimental cell designed to induce anxiety to an out party. In this case it is only one and a half times more likely to experience intense anxiety when in an experimental cell which is not the control group.

Table A.11.1.
Odds ratios between the control group and other experimental cells, between the odds of being very emotional versus not very emotional

Experimental cells	Emotions				
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**	**Anxiety OP**	**Anger OP**
Cell 6 (Control) vs. Cell 1 (enthusiasm to PP)	**0.13**	0.62	0.37	0.61	3.00
Cell 6 (Control) vs. Cell 2 (anxiety to PP)	0.27	**0.34**	1.06	0.66	1.15
Cell 6 (Control) vs. Cell 3 (anger to PP)	0.42	0.60	**0.22**	0.88	2.14
Cell 6 (Control) vs. Cell 4 (anxiety OP)	0.25	0.59	1.03	**0.15**	1.66
Cell 6 (Control) vs. Cell 5 (anger OP)	0.20	3.10	1.03	0.40	**0.26**

The quantities displayed are conditional odds ratios. The reference cell is the control group.

Moreover, these results (Table A.11.1) are successfully cross-validated with results obtained from a series of 5 logistic regressions. Each emotion is separately regressed on a set of dummy variables indicating the experimental cell, with the control group being the omitted dummy. In each regression, it is only the dummy representing the experimental cell designed to induce a certain emotion that has a significant effect on the emotion. The results are consistent with the results of the log-linear analysis; however, the odds ratios

displayed here are more conservative. For example, while I report a likelihood of 7.69 (1/0.13) in favour of being very enthusiastic if in cell 1 as opposed to the control group, the appropriate logistic regression indicates a statistically significant ($p < .05$) likelihood of 10.16. This observation holds for each particular emotion. Nonetheless, log linear analysis is preferred due to the fact that logistic regressions produce models with poor fit (e.g. for enthusiasm, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .062$).

Appendix 12

A.12. An observational analysis of the effects of emotions on political behaviour

In order to better understand what effects emotions have on political behaviour, in this section I perform an observational analysis of the data collected in the experiment. Consequently, I rerun the models discussed in Chapter VII, however instead of the dummy variables operationalizing an experimental cell, I now include variables that measure a given emotion. The regressions now also include control variables as we cannot rely on the control offered by the experimental design.

The following four sub-sections present the results for each particular type of political behaviour. I begin by assessing the willingness of people to be involved in an electoral campaign.

A.12.1. Emotions and involvement in the campaign

To analyse the effect of emotions on the willingness to be involved in a campaign I regress the variable measuring the involvement in the campaign of the preferred party on emotions and control variables (interest in politics, political knowledge, measures of personality and socio-demographics).

Interest in politics is clearly related to the willingness of a person to be involved in a political activity, such as an electoral campaign. I contend that if an individual is not interested in the election, he or she will be less likely to be willing to spend time and resource on electoral campaign activities. Interest in the election was measured through asking the subjects to report, on an 11 point scale, how interested they were in the 2010 General Elections.

Political knowledge, along with the level of education, has also been show to impact the electoral choice, including political participation (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Knowledge was measured as an additive index, computed based on the number of correct answers to the five knowledge questions included in the post-test. It ranges from 1 to 5. Questions identical to those on the BES were used. Education was measured as a nominal variable, and was subsequently recoded into an ordinal variable measuring the level of education. Value 1 indicates very little education, while value 8 indicates post-graduate education.

I also include variables that measure extroversion, agreeableness, emotional stability, openness and conscientiousness as indicators of personality. Including these personality items (measured through the Ten-Item Big Five questionnaire[110]), as control variables is consistent with Marcus and Wolak (2007), who show that the effects of emotions differ between people based on their personality.

Finally, the model also contains the usual variables that measure socio-demographic characteristics: age, gender. Given that the research is carried out in the UK, I also include the type of job as a control variable. Evans (1999) shows that a person's social class, defined by his or her socio-economic status, has the power to influence political behaviour. It is also shown that a person's occupation, that is, the type of job he or she performs, can be used as an accurate proxy of social class (Goldthorpe, 1999). This variable was measured in the pre-treatment questionnaire using a nominal scale, as such, it was inserted in the model as a set of dummy variables; the excluded reference category is 'student'. The full results are reported in Table A.12.1[111].

[110] See Gosling, et al., 2003.

[111] To guard against the potential endogenous relationship between campaign exposure (i.e. the stimuli), emotions and the willingness to be involved in the campaign I ran a series of t-tests comparing the mean of involvement between the experimental cells. The results show that there are no significant differences

Table A.12.1.
The effect of emotions on the involvement in the preferred party's campaign

	Model 1 (Effect of enthusiasm)	Model 2 (Effect of anxiety)	Model 3 (Effect of anger)	Model 4 (Effect of anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of anger OP)
Interest in elections	.279 *	.313 *	.315 *	.304 *	.287 *
	(.107)	(.105)	(.107)	(.103)	(.102)
Enthusiasm PP	1.072 *				
	(.307)				
Anxiety PP		-.399 +			
		(.248)			
Anger PP			-.443 *		
			(.201)		
Anxiety OP				.723 *	
				(.268)	
Anger OP					.622 *
					(.224)
Political knowledge	.377 *	.341 +	.339 +	.281	.297
	(.195)	(.186)	(.186)	(.185)	(.187)
Level of education	-.004	.000	.015	.034	.052
	(.162)	(.156)	(.156)	(.159)	(.163)
Gender	-.653 +	-.708 +	-.772 *	-.984 *	-.939 *
	(.397)	(.385)	(.389)	(.392)	(.393)
Age	-.024	-.025	-.021	-.025	-.022
	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)	(.019)	(.020)
Extraversion	.232 +	.320 *	.310 *	.319 *	.295 *
	(.130)	(.127)	(.127)	(.128)	(.128)
Agreeableness	.127	.145	.155	.198	.130
	(.155)	(.153)	(.152)	(.157)	(.159)
Conscientiousness	-.106	-.115	-.110	-.099	-.086
	(.139)	(.133)	(.134)	(.137)	(.137)
Emotional stability	-.114	-.086	-.109	-.073	-.051
	(.129)	(.127)	(.128)	(.128)	(.128)
Openness	-.001	-.031	-.046	-.071	-.124
	(.164)	(.162)	(.162)	(.163)	(.166)
Occupation (8 dummies)	*not significant and not reported*				
Constant	-6.766 *	-4.882 *	-4.927 *	-6.715 *	-6.003 *
	(1.853)	(1.740)	(1.734)	(1.834)	(1.791)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.240*	*.180*	*.193*	*.207*	*.212*
% correctly predicted	*81.8%*	*82.1%*	*82.4%*	*83.0%*	*91.3%*
N	*280*	*280*	*279*	*283*	*283*

Results of binary logistic regressions. Log. reg. coefficients are reported. SE in parenthesis. Sig.: * p < .05; + p < .1. Dependent variable: Intention to get involved in the campaign (1) versus no such intention (0).

between the mean of this variable across any of the cell. Thus, even if emotions are shown to have been influenced by the stimuli, the dependent variable is not.

It is apparent that, even when controlling for the effects of interest and knowledge, with every one-point increase of enthusiasm the likelihood of being willing to get involved in the campaign increases almost triples. Similarly, any increase in the level of anxiety or anger experienced towards an out party will nearly double the chances of involvement in the campaign. Anxiety or anger experienced towards the preferred party also have the expected effects, even if they have a weaker statistical significance. If either one of these emotions increases, the chances of getting involved in the campaign decrease.

The results also show that the increase of enthusiasm from 'not at all enthusiastic' to ' very enthusiastic' quadruples the probability of a person being willing to be involved in the campaign of his preferred party. The other emotions under study have lesser effects compared to enthusiasm, but are consistent with the hypotheses. These results are in line with previous research on the topic (see Marcus et al., 2000), but they also improve our understanding of the role of anger in politics: anger experienced towards the out-party has the potential to actually *increase* involvement.

A.12.2. Emotions and the search for information

To test the effects of the distinct emotions on the patterns of information search, five models were constructed and tested. Each model included a dichotomized variable measuring a specific emotion along with control variables. These included: the interest in the elections, political knowledge, education, type of employment, willingness to be involved in the campaign, measures of personality and socio-demographic variables.

The results, reported in Table A.8.2[112], show that anxiety has a positive and significant effect on information search. This means that if a person feels very anxious he will be more likely to search for information, that is, to consider the position of all the parties on an

[112] The coefficients corresponding to the control variables are not reported as none of them are statically significant.

issue. This is consistent with the expectations. Anger also has a positive effect on information search, which is in the predicted direction; however, it is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, consistent with previous research, anxiety does seem to make people more open to look for information about all the parties, including the out-parties, which does suggest that the conventional wisdom employed by political consultants is accurate: *make the supporter of your opponent afraid of him and he will look for information about you*. In other words, if the campaign of party X manages to make a supporter of party Y afraid of party Y, he will be more likely to look at information about other parties, including party X, which opens the door to a potential change in vote choice.

Table A.12.2.
The effect of emotions on information search

	Model 1 (Effect of enthusiasm)	Model 2 (Effect of anxiety)	Model 3 (Effect of anger)	Model 4 (Effect of anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of anger OP)
Enthusiasm PP	-.018 (.146)				
Anxiety PP		.416 * (.212)			
Anger PP			.139 (.198)		
Anxiety OP				-.049 (.123)	
Anger OP					.125 (.121)
Controls (20 variables)	*not significant and not reported*				
Constant	.138 (.632)	.188 (.628)	.143 (.632)	.163 (.623)	1.062 (.774)
R^2	*.045*	*.058*	*.048*	*.045*	*.047*
N	*280*	*280*	*279*	*283*	*283*

Results of linear (OLS) regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. SE in parentheses. Sig.: * p < .05; + < .1. Dependent variable: Search for information (1) versus no consistent search (0).

A.12.3. Emotions and turnout intentions

The distinct effects emotions have on the intention to turnout are displayed in Table A.12.3. The coefficients were obtained through ordered logistic regressions which, aside from the emotion variable, also included controls (knowledge, education, demographics and measures of personality). The results are consistent with Chapter V. If the level of enthusiasm increases by one unit (e.g. form 'not very enthusiastic' to 'somewhat enthusiastic') the probability of turning out is predicted to increase. Becoming very enthusiastic from not enthusiastic at all would produce roughly a 20 percentage point in the probability of turning out to vote. Even though the size of the effect is not very large, the fact that the effect is manifested on a constant of approximately .75 virtually means that turning very enthusiastic would increase the chances of voting to nearly 100%. In the case of anger the results are very similar; however they are manifested in the opposite direction. As anger towards the preferred party increases the turnout intention decreases.

Finally, I also find that anxiety experienced towards an out-party increases the chances of participation. However, in line with the expectations, anxiety towards the preferred party does not seem have a significant effect on a person's intention to turn out does anger experienced towards an out party.

A.12.4. Emotions and vote choice

In the final phase of the analysis I look at the effects of emotions on the relationships between vote choice and its determinants. Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous (Agresti, 2002) the analysis was implemented through five binary logistic regressions. The vote choice function used is the one described in Chapter VII. The models included a variable measuring a given emotion and the explanatory variables, along with the relevant interaction terms and control variables. It is argued that the effect of partisanship on vote choice is moderated by the

Table A.12.3.
The effect of emotions on turnout intention

	Model 1 (Effect of enthusiasm)	Model 2 (Effect of anxiety)	Model 3 (Effect of anger)	Model 4 (Effect of anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of anger OP)
Enthusiasm PP	.515 *				
	(.246)				
Anxiety PP		-.365			
		(.264)			
Anger PP			-.536 *		
			(.219)		
Anxiety OP				.107 *	
				(.056)	
Anger OP					.080
					(.052)
Political knowledge	.450 *	.498 *	.493 *	.386 *	.432 *
	(.185)	(.189)	(.188)	(.184)	(.181)
Level of education	.123	.152	.139	.172	.204
	(.148)	(.145)	(.149)	(.141)	(.141)
Gender	.528	.529	.552	.353	.396
	(.421)	(.427)	(.422)	(.405)	(.397)
Age	-.012	-.013	-.006	-.017	-.016
	(.021)	(.020)	(.021)	(.019)	(.019)
Extroversion	.091	.130	.101	.133	.115
	(136)	(.134)	(.137)	(.131)	(.133)
Agreeableness	-.289 +	-.290 +	-.274	-.325 +	-.296
	(173)	(.170)	(.176)	(.175)	(.173)
Conscientiousness	-.095	-.100	-.110	-.044	-.051
	(150)	(.150)	(.152)	(.144)	(.142)
Emotional stability	.068	.074	.062	.047	.061
	(.140)	(.137)	(.142)	(.137)	(.138)
Openness	-.288	-.287	-.336 +	-.284	-.332
	(.197)	(.193)	(.203)	(.189)	(.190)
Occupation (8 dummies)	*not significant/ not reported*				
McFadden R^2	*.102*	*.094*	*.113*	*.131*	*.127*
N	*281*	*281*	*280*	*285*	*285*

Results of ordered logistic regressions. Log. reg. coefficients are reported. SE in parentheses.
Sig.: * $p < .05$; + $p < .1$. Dependent variable: Turnout intention (yes (1); maybe (.5); no (0)).

emotions people experience: if anxiety or anger towards the preferred party increases, the impact of partisanship on vote choice will decrease and the effect of policy preferences and leader evaluations will increase. On the other hand, if enthusiasm or anxiety or anger experienced towards out-parties increase, the effect of partisanship will increase. Thus, the interaction terms which include partisanship will need to be negative in the case of anxiety and anger experienced towards a preferred party, and positive for enthusiasm and anxiety or anger experienced towards out-parties. Conversely, the interaction terms which include policy preferences or leader evaluations will have to have a positive sign in the case of anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party.

The results, presented in Table A.12.4, are generally consistent with the expectations. Enthusiasm (column 1 in Table A.12.4) experienced towards a person's preferred party increases the effect of partisanship on vote choice. None of the 'main effects' are significant. However, looking at the interaction term, which is statistically significant at an acceptable level, we can see that at any given level of strength of party identification, people who are enthusiastic are more likely to vote for their preferred party. This is to say that enthusiastic people rely more on partisanship when voting than people who do not feel enthusiasm towards their preferred party. Moreover, it is apparent from the analysis that enthusiasm does not have a statistically significant effect on the relationship between policy preferences and leader evaluations.

Looking now at the effect of anxiety and anger (columns 2 and 3) the expected patterns also emerge. The interpretation of the effect size and direction leads to the conclusion that increasing the level of anxiety or anger towards one's own party from no anxiety to high levels of anxiety (or anger) will decrease the importance partisanship plays in the choosing who to vote for. Furthermore, the analysis shows that any increase in anxiety experienced towards the preferred party induces a substantial increase in the

Table A.12.4.
The effect of emotions on the relationship between vote choice and its determinants

	Model 1 (Effect of Enthusiasm PP)	Model 2 (Effect of Anxiety PP)	Model 3 (Effect of Anger PP)	Model 4 (Effect of Anxiety OP)	Model 5 (Effect of Anger OP)
Partisanship	.086	2.192 *	2.308 *	.678 +	1.236 *
	(.264)	(.497)	(.443)	(.365)	(.426)
Policy preferences	3.926 +	-1.779	1.875	.334	1.675
	(2.155)	(2.113)	(1.480)	(2.597)	(1.836)
Leader evaluations	.227	-.078	-.123	-.070	.233
	(.228)	(.222)	(.178)	(.277)	(.224)
Economic index	.119	-.095	.203	-.349	-.255
	(.360)	(.379)	(.364)	(.366)	(.342)
Enthusiasm PP	.311				
	(1.256)				
Anxiety PP		-2.119 +			
		(1.266)			
Anger PP			-.654		
			(.990)		
Anxiety OP				-.620	
				(1.436)	
Anger OP					1.027
					(1.150)
Enthusiasm PP **X** Partisanship	.666 *				
	(.212)				
Anxiety PP **X** Partisanship		-.676 *			
		(.224)			
Anger PP **X** Partisanship			-.791 *		
			(.197)		
Anxiety OP **X** Partisanship				.127	
				(.214)	
Anger OP **X** Partisanship					-.228
					(.209)
Enthusiasm PP **X** Policy Pref.	-1.139				
	(1.232)				
Anxiety PP **X** Policy Pref.		2.713 +			
		(1.428)			
Anger PP **X** Policy Pref.			-.081		
			(.961)		
Anxiety OP **X** Policy Pref.				.860	
				(1.486)	
Anger OP **X** Policy Pref.					-.096
					(1.014)
Enthusiasm PP **X** Leader ev.	-.036				
	(.137)				
Anxiety PP **X** Leader ev.		.162			
		(.132)			

Anger PP **X** Leader ev.			.238 *		
			(.118)		
Anxiety OP **X** Leader ev.				.155	
				(.149)	
Anger OP **X** Leader ev.					-.012
					(.130)
Age	-.027	-.019	-.025	-.022	-.020
	(.023)	(.023)	(.024)	(.023)	(.023)
Gender	-.507	-.310	-.412	-.873 *	-.582
	(.461)	(.477)	(.493)	(.457)	(.445)
Level of Education	.192	.133	.215	.230	.223
	(.152)	(.154)	(.160)	(.153)	(.150)
Student	-.872	-.733	-.971	-.866	-.850
	(.679)	(.670)	(.691)	(.668)	(.655)
Extraversion	.199	.168	.213	.208	.124
	(.148)	(.152)	(.158)	(.144)	(.145)
Agreeableness	-.106	-.035	-.127	-.022	-.111
	(.202)	(.202)	(.206)	(.191)	(.198)
Conscientiousness	-.189	-.088	-.238	-.176	-.177
	(.155)	(.162)	(.160)	(.150)	(.151)
Emotional Stability	.249	.215	.216	.232	.261 +
	(.159)	(.154)	(.164)	(.144)	(.146)
Openness	-.003	.074	.053	-.013	-.077
	(.204)	(.206)	(.206)	(.186)	(.188)
Constant	-3.946	-.713	-2.749	-1.171	-3.118
	(2.783)	(2.804)	(2.548)	(3.179)	(2.655)
Nagelkerke R^2	*.369*	*.386*	*.403*	*.343*	*.325*
% correctly predicted	*96.6%*	*96.4%*	*96.8%*	*95.4%*	*95.0%*
N	*237*	*237*	*236*	*238*	*238*

Results of binary logistic regressions. Log. reg. coefficients are reported. SE in parentheses.
Sig.: * p < .05; + p < .1. Dependent variable: Vote for preferred party (1) versus other (0).

importance given to policy preferences when deciding who to vote for. At the same time, any increase in the level of anger towards the preferred party will increase the importance of leader evaluations. In other words, depending on the political party enthusiasm, anxiety or anger are experienced towards their effects radically differ. If MacKuen et al. (2010) show that anger can be experienced towards an out-party, and its effects induce a greater reliance on habit, I show that anger can indeed be experienced towards one's own party and its effects are similar to those induced by anxiety. This is consistent with the theory;

however the findings pertaining to the effect of anxiety (PP) on the relationship between leader evaluations and vote choice and those pertaining to the effect of anger (PP) on the impact of policy preferences on vote choice are not statistically significant.

Turning to the hypothesised effects of the anxiety and anger experienced towards out-parties; we can observe that none of the coefficients are statistically significant.

The results presented here are consistent with the findings of Chapter VII. Moreover, the marginal effects of the interactions (not reported here) computed in accordance with Brambor et al.'s (2006) specifications display similar patterns, however they show stronger effect sizes.

A.12.5 Conclusions

The aim of this appendix was to assess the effect emotions have on political behavioural through employing an observational analysis of the data collected in the experiment. As such, I examined the relationship between enthusiasm, anxiety and anger experienced towards one's preferred party along with that of anxiety and anger experienced towards an out party on involvement in the electoral campaign, search for information, turnout intention and vote choice

The analyses show that enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party has a positive effect on political participation. It increases both the likelihood of turnout and the willingness to get involved in the preferred party's campaign. Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party, on the other hand, does not influence the intention of turnout but it does decreases the chances of involvement in a campaign, while, increasing the likelihood that the subject will search for information. Anger relative to the preferred party, the second negative emotion, acts as an inverse on enthusiasm: it increases the chances of withdrawal from politics by decreasing both likelihood of turnout but also that of

involvement in the campaign. As opposed to the theory anger does not seem to induce information search. Finally, consistent with the theory, anxiety and anger experienced towards the out party do increase the willingness to be involved in the campaign, but they do not have an effect on information search. However, anxiety experienced towards an out-party increases the potential willingness of a person to turn out, while anger experienced towards an out-party is not seen to have an effect.

With respect to vote choice, the results displayed in the previous section indicate that enthusiasm experienced towards the preferred party increases the importance of partisanship in voting for the preferred party. However, it was also shown that it decreases the reliance on issue positions when voting. Anxiety experienced towards the preferred party is shown to decrease the reliance on partisanship and increase the marginal effect of policy preference and leader evaluations on the probability of voting for the preferred party. This is consistent with the expectations. Similarly, anger experienced towards the preferred party also decreases reliance on partisanship while increasing the impact of leader evaluations. Even though the effect of anger on the relationship between policy preferences and vote choice is in the predicted direction, this effect is not statistically significant.

Appendix 13

Measure of key variables in the panel study

VERBATIMS

Emotions (measured similarly in both waves)

How often would you say that each of the following parties have made you feel the emotions below? (Please tick one answer on each horizontal row):

Conservative Party					
Angry	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Anxious or afraid	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Enthusiastic, hopeful or proud	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Labour Party					
Angry	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Anxious or afraid	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Enthusiastic, hopeful or proud	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Liberal Democrat Party					
Angry	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Anxious or afraid	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
Enthusiastic, hopeful or proud	Very often	Fairly often	Occasionally	Rarely	Never

Campaign exposure (measured similarly in both waves)

Thinking about the major political parties and their campaigns, which, if any, of the following things happened to you YESTERDAY? (Please tick all that apply)

1. Seen a political broadcast on TV;
2. Received a piece of campaign mail (post or e-mail);
3. Received a pamphlet on my door;
4. Discussed a candidate with someone;
5. Received a visit from a campaign worker;
6. Heard party political broadcasts on the radio;
7. Went to hear a candidate speak;
8. Got a phone call from a candidate;
9. Visited a political party web site;
10. Visited a candidate web site;
11. Watched video of candidate on the internet.

Political news consumption on TV (measured similarly in both waves)

Which, if any, of the following have you watched on television in the LAST SEVEN DAYS? (Please tick all that apply)

1. The Andrew Marr Show;
2. BBC News;
3. BBC Parliament;
4. Channel 4 News;
5. Channel 5 News;
6. Daily Politics;
7. ITN News;
8. Newsnight;
9. Question Time;
10. Sky News;
11. The Politics Show;
12. This Week with Andrew Neil.

Newspaper readership (measured similarly in both waves)

How many days in the past seven days have you read a daily newspaper? (This includes free daily papers such as Metro, but excludes online newspapers).
Options: 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; Don't know.

Interest in politics (measured only in wave 2)

How interested are you in politics?

1. Very much
2. Somewhat
3. Not that much
4. Not at all interested

5. Don't know

Political knowledge (measured only in wave 2)

Please tell me if you think this item is true or false. Options: true; false; don't know

1. "Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day"
2. "The minimum voting age is 16"
3. "The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for setting interest rates in the UK"
4. "Any registered voter can obtain a postal vote if they want one - by contacting their local council and asking for a postal vote"
5. "The standard rate of income tax payable is 26p in the pound"

Partisanship (measured similarly in both waves)

1. <u>The Michigan measure of party ID</u>

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what? Options: 1. Labour; 2 Conservative; 3 Liberal Democrat; 4 SNP; 5 Plaid Cymru; 6 Green Party; 7. UKIP; 8 BNP; 9 Other; 10 No-one; 11 Don't know.

Follow-up question (asked in the previous answered 10 or 11 at the previous question):
Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others? If yes, please indicate which party. Options: 1. Labour; 2 Conservative; 3 Liberal Democrat; 4 SNP; 5 Plaid Cymru; 6 Green Party; 7. UKIP; 8 BNP; 9 Other; 10 No-one; 11 Don't know.

2. <u>Favourability as proxy for partisanship</u>

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about the Conservative Party?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. Don't know.

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about the Labour Party?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. 997 Don't know.

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about the Liberal Democrat Party?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. Don't know.

Policy preferences / issue positions

1. <u>Ideological position</u> (measured in both waves)
In politics, people sometimes talk about parties and politicians as being on the left or right. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this screen, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked 10 means right, where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?

And where would you place the Labour Party on this scale?

And where would you place the Liberal Democrat Party on this scale?

And where would you place the Conservative Party on this scale?

2. Position on crime (measured only in wave 2)

Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place your OWN VIEW?

Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place the LABOUR PARTY?

Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place the CONSERVATIVE PARTY?

Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place the LIBERAL DEMOCRATS?

3. Position on taxes (measured only in wave 2)

Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?

Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place the LABOUR PARTY on this scale?

Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place the CONSERVATIVE PARTY on this scale?

Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place the LIBERAL DEMOCRATS on this scale?

Leader evaluations (measured in both waves)

1. Leader favourability

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about David Cameron?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. Don't know.

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about Gordon Brown?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. 997 Don't know.

On the scale below, please indicate how you feel about Nick Clegg?
Scale ranging from 0 to 10; 0= Unfavourable; 10 = Favourable. Don't know

2. Leader competency

Now, some questions about party leaders using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very incompetent leader and 10 means a very competent leader... How would you describe Gordon Brown? 0 = a very incompetent leader; 10 = a very competent leader.

Using that same scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very incompetent leader and 10 means a very competent leader, how would you describe David Cameron?0 = a very incompetent leader; 10 = a very competent leader.

And how would you describe Nick Clegg? 0 = a very incompetent leader; 10 = a very competent leader.

Economic evaluations (measured similarly in both waves)

1. Would you say that OVER THE PAST YEAR the nation's economy has... 1. Got much better; 2. Got better; 3. Stayed about the same; 4. Got worse; Got much worse.

2. What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the economy, in the country as a whole, to... ... 1. Get much better; 2. Get better; 3. Stay about the same; 4. Get worse; Get much worse.

3. We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and your family living here) are MUCH BETTER OFF, BETTER OFF, WORSE OFF, or MUCH WORSE OFF, than you were a year ago?

4. Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you (and your family living here) will be MUCH BETTER OFF, BETTER OFF, WORSE OFF, MUCH WORSE OFF, or JUST ABOUT THE SAME as now?

Turnout intention (measured similarly in both waves)

If there were a General Election tomorrow, how likely is it that you would vote? The scale ranges from 0 to 10. 0 = very unlikely; 10 = very likely.

Vote choice (measured similarly in both waves)

Have you decided which party you would vote for if a general election were held tomorrow, or haven't you decided yet? Options: 1. Yes, I have decided; 2. No not decided yet; 3. I wouldn't vote; 4. Don't know.

Follow-up 1 (if the answer to the previous question = 1):

Which party would you vote for? Options: 1. Labour; 2 Conservative; 3 Liberal Democrat; 4 SNP; 5 Plaid Cymru; 6 Green Party; 7. UKIP; 8 BNP; 9 Other.

Follow-up 2 (if the answer to the previous question =2 or 3 or 4):

Which party would you be most inclined to vote for? Options: 1. Labour; 2 Conservative; 3 Liberal Democrat; 4 SNP; 5 Plaid Cymru; 6 Green Party; 7. UKIP; 8 BNP; 9 Other.

Interest in the election (measured in wave 3)

How interested, if at all, were you in the general election that was held on May 6th this year? 1. Very interested; 2. Somewhat interested; 3. Not very interested; 4. Not interested at all.

Electoral registration (measured in wave 3)

As far as you know, is your name on the electoral register, that is, the official list of people entitled to vote, either at your current address or somewhere else? 1. Yes-where living now; 2. Yes-another address; 3. No; 4. Don't know.

Reported turnout (measured in wave 3)

Talking with people about the general election on May 6th, we have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. How about you, did you manage to vote in the general election? 1. Yes, voted; 2. No.

Appendix 14

Measure of key variables in the experiment

VERBATIMS

Emotions

1. Would you say the Conservative Party makes you feel: 1. very angry; 2. somewhat angry; 3. not very angry; 4. not at all angry.

2. Would you say the Conservative Party makes you feel: 1. very anxious / worried; 2. somewhat anxious / worried; 3. not very anxious / worried; 4. not at all anxious / worried.

3. Would you say the Conservative Party makes you feel: 1. very enthusiastic / hopeful; 2. somewhat enthusiastic / hopeful; 3. not very enthusiastic / hopeful; 4. not at all enthusiastic / hopeful.

4. Would you say the Labour Party makes you feel: 1. very angry; 2. somewhat angry; 3. not very angry; 4. not at all angry.

5. Would you say the Labour Party makes you feel: 1. very anxious / worried; 2. somewhat anxious / worried; 3. not very anxious / worried; 4. not at all anxious / worried.

6. Would you say the Labour Party makes you feel: 1. very enthusiastic / hopeful; 2. somewhat enthusiastic / hopeful; 3. not very enthusiastic / hopeful; 4. not at all enthusiastic / hopeful.

7. Would you say the Lib Dems make you feel: 1. very angry; 2. somewhat angry; 3. not very angry; 4. not at all angry.

8. Would you say the Lib Dems make you feel: 1. very anxious / worried; 2. somewhat anxious / worried; 3. not very anxious / worried; 4. not at all anxious / worried.

9. Would you say the Lib Dems make you feel: 1. very enthusiastic / hopeful; 2. somewhat enthusiastic / hopeful; 3. not very enthusiastic / hopeful; 4. not at all enthusiastic / hopeful.

Partisanship

1. Please select one of the options below to continue the following sentence: **Thinking of the political parties in Britain, I can say that...**

Options:

a. I feel slightly closer to one of the main parties in Britain (i.e. the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats)?

b. I feel slightly closer to another party in Britain, excluding the Conservative Party, the Labour Party or Liberal Democrats (i.e. BNP, UKIP, Green Party, etc.)?

c. I do not feel particularly close to any political party

2. How close do you feel to the Labour Party? Please mark your answer on the scale below. Remember: 0 means 'not very close' and 10 means 'very close'.

3. How close do you feel to the Liberal Democrats? Please mark your answer on the scale below. Remember: 0 means 'not very close' and 10 means 'very close'.

4. How close do you feel to the Conservative Party? Please mark your answer on the scale below. Remember: 0 means 'not very close' and 10 means 'very close'.

Position on issues / Policy preferences

1. Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale, where would you place yourself on this scale? Remember: 0 = priority given to reducing crime and 10 = priority given to the rights of the accused.

2. Some people think that legal immigration is detrimental to British society and culture and should be restricted irrespective of whether it is economically beneficial. Other people think that such immigration should be allowed as long as it is beneficial for the economy. On a scale of 0-10, where would you place yourself? Remember: 0 = immigration is detrimental; 10 = immigration is beneficial.

3. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this page, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut public spending, and the end marked 10 means that government should not cut public spending, where would you place yourself on this scale? Remember: 0 = cut public spending; 10 = DO NOT cut public spending.

4. Now, another issue. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this page, where the end marked 0 means that a suitable way to exit the recession is for the government to cut taxes, and the end marked 10 means that government should keep taxes at the same level, where would you place yourself on this scale? Remember: 0 = cut taxes; 10 = keep taxes the same.

5. There are people who think that university fees should be capped and university funding increased, as this would allow students from all social classes to attend good universities. Other people think that university fees should be decided by universities according to the quality of teaching they provide, which would result in increased fees and decreased state funding. Where do you stand on this issue? Remember: 0 = university fees capped; 10 = university fees increased.

Leader evaluations

1. Thinking of the leaders of the political parties, could please state how much you like David Cameron? Please rate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'strongly dislike' and 10 means 'strongly like'.

2. Thinking of the leaders of the political parties, could please state how much you like Nick Clegg? Please rate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'strongly dislike' and 10 means 'strongly like'.

3. Thinking of the leaders of the political parties, could please state how much you like Ed Miliband? Please rate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'strongly dislike' and 10 means 'strongly like'

Economic perceptions

1. How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months? Please rate your response on the following scale: 1. Much better; 2. Better; 3. The same; 4. Worse; 5. Much worse.

2. How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Please rate your response on the following scale: 1. Much better; 2. Better; 3. The same; 4. Worse; 5. Much worse.

3. How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months? Please rate your response on the following scale: 1. Much better; 2. Better; 3. The same; 4. Worse; 5. Much worse.

4. How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? Please rate your response on the following scale: 1. Much better; 2. Better; 3. The same; 4. Worse; 5. Much worse.

Involvement in the campaign

Given the opportunity, and if you had free time, would you get involved in the campaign of a party? If so which party? Options: 1. I would not get involved in the campaign of any party; 2. I would get involved in the campaign of the Labour Party; 2. I would get involved in the campaign of the Conservative Party; 3. I would get involved in the campaign of the Lib Dems; I would get involved in the campaign of a different party.

Turnout intention

Thinking about elections, if general elections were held tomorrow, would you vote? Options: 1. Yes; 2. No; 3. Maybe.

Vote choice

If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? Options: 1. The Conservatives; 2. Labour; 3. Lib Dem; 4. BNP; 5. UKIP; 6. Greens; 7. Other; 8. I wouldn't vote.

Interest in elections

Thinking of elections, how interested were you in the general elections that were held on May 6th this year? Please rate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not interested al all' and 10 means ' very interested'.

Political knowledge

Please let us know if you think that the following statements are true or false. If you don't know, just pick the 'I don't know' option and skip to the next question.

6. "Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day"
7. "The minimum voting age is 16"
8. "The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for setting interest rates in the UK"

9. "Any registered voter can obtain a postal vote if they want one - by contacting their local council and asking for a postal vote."
10. "The Labour party has the most MPs from ethnic minorities"

Personality (TIPI Big Five index)

The next 10 questions present a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please select an answer to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other. Please rate your response on the following scale: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree moderately; 3. Disagree a little; 4. Neither agree nor disagree; 5. Agree a little; 6. Agree moderately; 7. Agree strongly.

1. 'I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic'
2. I see myself as critical, quarrelsome.
3. I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined.
4. I see myself as anxious, easily upset.
5. I see myself as open to new experiences, complex.
6. I see myself as reserved, quiet.
7. I see myself as sympathetic, warm.
8. I see myself disorganised, careless.
9. I see myself as calm, emotionally stable.
10. I see myself as conventional, uncreative.

Appendix 15

Table A.15.1.
Differences between the mean frequency of each emotion mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1)

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
	Conservatives		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.074	.352 *	.341 *
	(.047)	(.051)	(.050)
	Labour		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.017	.006	-.038
	(.046)	(.046)	(.045)
	Lib Dem		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.244 *	.227 *	.107 *
	(.049)	(.051)	(.047)

Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are less interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 475; * p< .05.; + p< .1

Table A.15.2.
Differences between the mean frequency of each emotion mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1)

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
	Conservatives		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.077 *	.416 *	.409 *
	(.029)	(.038)	(.033)
	Labour		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.045	-.101 *	-.121 *
	(.029)	(.031)	(.025)
	Lib Dem		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.269 *	.298 *	.127 *
	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)

Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are very interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 819; * p< .05.; + p< .1

Table A.15.3.
Differences between the mean frequencies of emotions mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1). Disaggregated analysis for each distinct group of party supporters

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
b. Conservative supporters			
	towards the Conservatives (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.129	.164 *	.268 *
	(.077)	(.069)	(.067)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.020	.035	.060
	(.068)	(.073)	(.066)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.090	.308 *	.159 *
	(.076)	(.083)	(.077)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are less interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 201; * p< .05.; + p< .1			
b. Labour supporters			
	towards the Labour party (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.099	-.123 *	-.127 *
	(.070)	(.063)	(.070)
	towards the Conservatives (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.004	.448 *	.358 *
	(.067)	(.080)	(.080)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.297 *	.193 *	.085
	(.070)	(.071)	(.069)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are less interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 212 * p< .05.; + p< .1			
d. Lib Dem supporters			
	towards the Lib Dem (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.493 *	.028	-.042
	(.130)	(.118)	(.105)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.056	.253	-.085
	(.113)	(.132)	(.124)
	towards the Conservative (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.112	.563 *	.436 *
	(.107)	(.142)	(.129)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are less interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 71; * p< .05.; + p< .1			

Table A.15.4.
Differences between the mean frequencies of emotions mid-campaign (wave 2) versus before the start of the campaign (wave 1). Disaggregated analysis for each distinct group of party supporters

T-test between the panel waves	*Emotion*		
	Enthusiasm	**Anxiety**	**Anger**
c. Conservative supporters			
	towards the Conservatives (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.025	.186 *	.337 *
	(.043)	(.051)	(.050)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.003	-.025	-.042
	(.041)	(.043)	(.028)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.108 *	.518 *	.301 *
	(.056)	(.055)	(.056)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are very interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 359; * p< .05.; + p< .1			
b. Labour supporters			
	towards the Labour party (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.159 *	-.175 *	-.211 *
	(.050)	(.050)	(.046)
	towards the Conservatives (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.033	.607 *	.399 *
	(.047)	(.064)	(.050)
	towards the Lib Dem (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.374 *	.267 *	.127 *
	(.054)	(.056)	(.060)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are very interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 326 * p< .05.; + p< .1			
e. Lib Dem supporters			
	towards the Lib Dem (preferred party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	.401 *	-.138 *	-.197 *
	(.080)	(.065)	(.069)
	towards the Labour party (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.079	-.125	-.125
	(.057)	(.076)	(.059)
	towards the Conservative (out-party)		
Mid-campaign vs. Pre-campaign	-.276 *	.532 *	.638 *
	(.066)	(.089)	(.076)
Dependent t-tests for paired samples. Includes only respondents who are very interested in politics. The table reports mean differences. SE in parentheses. N = 152; * p< .05.; + p< .1			

Table A.15.5
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for people with lower levels of political interest; fixed effects models

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.486	1.442 *	1.709 *	.397	-.133	-.388	.941 *	1.250 *	.695 *
	(.305)	(.343)	(.329)	(.297)	(.301)	(.297)	(.324)	(.332)	(.310)
Newspaper readership	.027	.041	.057 *	.039	.059 *	.043 +	.032	.002	.011
	(.027)	(.030)	(.029)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.028)	(.029)	(.027)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.396	.596	.432	.522	.122	.098	.005	.656	.200
	(.401)	(.450)	(.433)	(.390)	(.395)	(.390)	(.425)	(.436)	(.408)
Constant	.388	.020	.441	.131	1.291	1.666	.999	-.245	.614
	(.747)	(.838)	(.806)	(.727)	(.735)	(.726)	(.791)	(.812)	(.759)
R^2	*.009*	*.041*	*.011*	*.011*	*.012*	*.010*	*.019*	*.054*	*.011*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.045*	*-.072*	*-.060*	*-.137*	*-.047*	*-.066*	*-.086*	*.082*	*.026*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*66.22%*	*59.11%*	*62.68%*	*64.49%*	*68.23%*	*66.31%*	*55.61%*	*53.07%*	*56.72%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are less interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N= 950/475

Table A.15.6.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for people with very high levels of political interest; fixed effects models

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	-.141	1.720 *	1.725 *	.277 +	-.392 *	-.332 *	1.303 *	1.278 *	.665 *
	(.146)	(.196)	(.169)	(.146)	(.157)	(.125)	(.181)	(.186)	(.184)
Newspaper readership	.009	.003	-.002	-.004	.008	.031 *	.027	.009	-.002
	(.016)	(.022)	(.019)	(.016)	(.017)	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)	(.021)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.619 *	.067	.034	.119	.216	.088	-.521 *	-.085	.156
	(.216)	(.289)	(.249)	(.215)	(.231)	(.185)	(.267)	(.274)	(.271)
Constant	.330	1.246 *	1.517 *	1.064 *	1.605	2.082 *	2.031 *	1.188 *	.899 +
	(.387)	(.519)	(.447)	(.385)	(.415)	(.331)	(.479)	(.491)	(.488)
R^2	*.013*	*.088*	*.116*	*.005*	*.010*	*.017*	*.071*	*.057*	*.016*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.192*	*-.051*	*-.047*	*-.008*	*-.113*	*-.088*	*-.182*	*.028*	*.005*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*79.23%*	*62.77%*	*69.50%*	*75.64%*	*72.49%*	*75.38%*	*63.92%*	*58.02%*	*59.31%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are very interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N= 1938/819

Table A.15.7

The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Conservative supporters who are less interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.524	.916 *	2.238 *	-.024	.114	.543	.596	2.234 *	1.698 *
	(.520)	(.477)	(.469)	(.499)	(.493)	(.436)	(.508)	(.616)	(.546)
Newspaper readership	.029	-.021	.020	.062	.052	.072 +	.019	-.036	.035
	(.045)	(.041)	(.041)	(.043)	(.043)	(.038)	(.044)	(.054)	(.047)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.915	.807	1.160 *	.836	.095	.025	-.189	.677	.404
	(.665)	(.610)	(.600)	(.639)	(.630)	(.558)	(.650)	(.788)	(.698)
Constant	.123	-.621	-1.391	-1.019	1.855	2.127	1.267	-.102	.240
	(1.235)	(1.132)	(1.114)	(1.186)	(1.171)	(1.036)	(1.206)	(1.464)	(1.297)
R^2	*.020*	*.038*	*.145*	*.020*	*.009*	*.029*	*.010*	*.085*	*.060*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.113*	*-.206*	*-.175*	*-.378*	*-.037*	*-.117*	*-.036*	*-.174*	*-.033*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*63.58%*	*55.33%*	*56.21%*	*53.52*	*70.02%*	*70.89%*	*57.17%*	*50.28%*	*56.70%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are less interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=367/199

Table A.15.8.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Conservative supporters who are very interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.264	.512 *	1.193 *	.212	-.096	-.033	.536 +	2.339 *	1.603 *
	(.216)	(.264)	(.257)	(.217)	(.233)	(.146)	(.285)	(.309)	(.297)
Newspaper readership	.034	.000	.007	-.005	-.018	.032 +	.047	.069 +	.013
	(.028)	(.034)	(.033)	(.028)	(.030)	(.019)	(.037)	(.040)	(.039)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.847 *	.507	.662 +	.489	.535	.137	-.463	.137	.385
	(.330)	(.402)	(.392)	(.331)	(.355)	(.222)	(.435)	(.472)	(.453)
Constant	.818	-.051	-.350	-.282	1.785 *	2.489 *	1.671	.811	.664
	(.593)	(.723)	(.705)	(.596)	(.638)	(.399)	(.782)	(.848)	(.814)
R^2	*.025*	*.016*	*.069*	*.010*	*.010*	*.011*	*.021*	*.157*	*.086*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.208*	*-.150*	*-.163*	*-.111*	*-.244*	*-.172*	*-.293*	*-.043*	*.017*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*65.26%*	*59.94%*	*55.42%*	*60.19%*	*60.61%*	*65.02%*	*60.70%*	*55.18%*	*58.86%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are very interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=663/348

Table A.15.9.
The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Labour supporters who are less interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	-.086	1.172 +	.858	.839	-.647	-1.176 *	1.211 *	.962 +	.280
	(.498)	(.637)	(.611)	(.529)	(.467)	(.511)	(.525)	(.542)	(.527)
Newspaper readership	.008	.025	.050	.028	.021	-.001	-.007	.036	.016
	(.043)	(.055)	(.052)	(.045)	(.040)	(.044)	(.045)	(.047)	(.045)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.097	.672	.160	.480	.058	.022	-.686	.619	-.136
	(.590)	(.755)	(.724)	(.627)	(.553)	(.605)	(.622)	(.642)	(.625)
Constant	.529	.304	1.474	.741	1.067	1.517	2.178 +	-.307	1.220
	(1.102)	(1.412)	(1.353)	(1.171)	(1.035)	(1.131)	(1.163)	(1.201)	(1.168)
R^2	*.001*	*.021*	*.013*	*.016*	*.012*	*.027*	*.035*	*.021*	*.002*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.062*	*-.090*	*-.053*	*-.035*	*-.021*	*-.103*	*-.045*	*-.091*	*.027*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*60.44%*	*58.76%*	*58.16%*	*61.64%*	*65.69%*	*61.46%*	*56.82%*	*56.33%*	*57.81%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are less interested in politics.
Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=417/222

Table A.15.10.

The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Labour supporters who are very interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.130	2.410 *	1.364 *	.355	-.973 *	-.754 *	1.473 *	1.025 *	.576 +
	(.245)	(.355)	(.275)	(.264)	(.263)	(.247)	(.295)	(.320)	(.327)
Newspaper readership	.012	-.011	-.018	-.007	.025	.041 +	-.014	-.015	-.021
	(.023)	(.033)	(.025)	(.024)	(.024)	(.023)	(.027)	(.030)	(.030)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.835 *	.340	.024	-.244	.001 *	-.099	-.571	-.507	-.063
	(.341)	(.495)	(.383)	(.368)	(.367)	(.344)	(.411)	(.446)	(.455)
Constant	-.889	1.304	2.320 *	2.563 *	1.231 +	1.752 *	2.025 *	1.915 *	1.272
	(.613)	(.889)	(.689)	(.662)	(.660)	(.618)	(.739)	(.803)	(.818)
R^2	*.020*	*.135*	*.080*	*.009*	*.050*	*.043*	*.092*	*.043*	*.013*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.269*	*-.064*	*-.024*	*-.009*	*-.110*	*-.113*	*-.066*	*-.008*	*-.055*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*67.74%*	*56.44%*	*59.66%*	*62.98%*	*67.18%*	*68.94%*	*61.34%*	*56.13%*	*57.27%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are very interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=647/341

Table A.15.11.

The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Lib Dem supporters who are less interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	.748	2.964 *	2.326 *	-.030	.472	-.836	1.421	.722	.343
	(.747)	(.956)	(.894)	(.733)	(.899)	(.806)	(.935)	(.808)	(.729)
Newspaper readership	.017	.184 *	.175 *	.003	.198 *	.063	.189 *	.010	-.008
	(.062)	(.079)	(.074)	(.061)	(.075)	(.067)	(.078)	(.067)	(.060)
Amount of TV political programs watched	.403	-.140	-1.800	-.129	1.133	-.430	-.256	.667	.788
	(1.239)	(1.585)	(1.483)	(1.216)	(1.491)	(1.336)	(1.551)	(1.339)	(1.208)
Constant	.098	1.096	4.430	1.308	-.855	2.750	1.862	-.395	-.647
	(2.328)	(2.977)	(2.785)	(2.283)	(2.800)	(2.508)	(2.913)	(2.515)	(2.269)
R^2	*.019*	*.190*	*.184*	*.001*	*.108*	*.0359*	*.117*	*.018*	*.013*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-107*	*-.307*	*-.176*	*.055*	*-.342*	*-.007*	*-.458*	*-.033*	*-.283*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*65.05%*	*58.89*	*61.48%*	*60.33%*	*65.22%*	*66.88%*	*59.37%*	*56.44%*	*62.08%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are less interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=166/103

Table A.15.12.

The effect of campaign exposure on emotionality for Lib Dem supporters who are very interested in politics; fixed effects models.

Difference in means between t1 and t2	Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
Campaign exposure	-1.302 *	2.111 *	2.909 *	.026	-.126	-.116	1.882 *	-.486	-.497
	(.343)	(.460)	(.377)	(.299)	(.402)	(.300)	(.405)	(.329)	(.357)
Newspaper readership	-.045	.072	.076	-.014	-.006	.030	.102 *	.025	.045
	(.043)	(.058)	(.047)	(.037)	(.050)	(.038)	(.051)	(.041)	(.045)
Amount of TV political programs watched	-.338	-1.273 +	-.886	-.100	-.332	.689	-.284	.616	.773
	(.556)	(.745)	(.611)	(.484)	(.652)	(.486)	(.655)	(.533)	(.577)
Constant	1.788 +	3.637	3.070 *	1.251	2.698	1.264	2.326 *	-.340	-.625
	(1.006)	(1.348)	(1.106)	(.875)	(1.179)	(.879)	(1.186)	(.964)	(1.045)
R^2	*.100*	*.186*	*.347*	*.001*	*.002*	*.020*	*.171*	*.033*	*.038*
Corr (u_i βx)	*-.197*	*-.293*	*-.272*	*-.105*	*.024*	*-.333*	*-.325*	*-.253*	*-.303*
Intraclass Correlation (Rho)	*68.62%*	*62.22%*	*69.82%*	*72.23%*	*61.22%*	*67.56%*	*60.58%*	*63.45%*	*57.42%*

Note: Results of OLS regressions. The table reports unstandardized coefficients. The models only include people who are very interested in politics. Results are statistically significant at * p < .05; + < .1; SE in parentheses. N=328/188.

Table A.15.13

Summary of the differences between less interested and very interested respondents for the models that test the across-time variance of emotions

Emotions		Enthusiasm Conservatives	Anxiety Conservatives	Anger Conservatives	Enthusiasm Labour	Anxiety Labour	Anger Labour	Lib Dem Enthusiasm	Lib Dem Anxiety	Lib Dem Anger
T-test between each emotion measured pre-campaign and mid-campaign										
T-test (all partisans)	Low interest	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	**Not Significant**	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant
	High interest	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	**Significant**	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant
T-test only Conservatives	Low interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant
	High interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Significant**	Significant	Significant
T-test only Labour	Low interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**
	High interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	**Significant**
T-test only Lib-Dem	Low interest	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**	**Not Significant**
	High interest	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Significant	**Significant**	**Significant**
The effect of campaign exposure on the within person change in each emotion (fixed effects models)										
Campaign exposure	Low interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**	**Not Significant**	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant
	High interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	**Significant**	**Significant**	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant
Campaign exposure only Conservatives	Low interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant
	High interest	Not Significant	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Significant**	Significant	Significant
Campaign exposure only Labour	Low interest	Not Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**	Not Significant	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant	**Not Significant**
	High interest	Not Significant	Significant	**Significant**	Not Significant	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Significant	**Significant**
Campaign exposure only Lib-Dem	Low interest	**Not Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Not Significant**	Not Significant	Not Significant
	High interest	**Significant**	Significant	Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	Not Significant	**Significant**	Not Significant	Not Significant

Legend: Each line of the table indicates whether, for each emotion, the results the model produces are significant or not significant at the .1 level. Boxes coloured in grey indicate that the models for less interested people and those for very interested people produce different results.

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