


**The Grand Condé in exile: Power Politics in  
France, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands  
1652-1659.**

D.Phil Thesis

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To my beloved mother

1938-1986

A.D.M.G.

## ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the career of the Grand Condé - Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé - between 1652 and 1660. During this period the prince was in exile in the Spanish Netherlands. As a consequence of his power and status in France the prince's exile had a decisive impact not just upon the politics of the captain-general's court in Brussels, but more widely, upon the foreign policy of Cromwell's Protectorate, Philip IV's government in Madrid, the regime of Cardinal Mazarin in Paris and the Franco-Spanish war.

International relations between France and Spain during the 1650's have been largely ignored by historians, so too has French political history in this period. Yet, the 1650's were a vital decade for France and Spain both historically and historiographically. The period saw the final stage of the costly and attritional conflict between the two 'great' crowns, whilst in France the regime of Cardinal Mazarin was the last ten years of government by a cardinal-minister before Louis XIV's declaration of personal rule in 1661. This has assumed enormous significance for historians many of whom see it as an important period of transition.

Ten major European archives have been consulted to build a detailed picture of the impact of Condé's exile upon politics within France and the war being fought in the Flanders theatre. The cardinal's regime existed throughout the 1650's in an environment of acute uncertainty and instability whilst it was by no means clear that the war with Spain was a demonstration of an 'ascendant' France dealing the death blows to a 'declining' Spain. By raising questions about France's 'rise' to European supremacy and the internal stability of Mazarin's regime the thesis rejects the straightforward terms in which this period has been treated. In particular, using the example of Condé and placing his exile and Mazarin's regime in the context of aristocratic politics, it demonstrates that there were no indications that grandee power was in decline. Indeed, the thesis argues that the power of the *grands* as a crucial element in the power structure of Ancien Régime France, was set to continue into the next century.

## ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the career of the Grand Condé - Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé - between 1652 and 1660. During this period the prince was in exile in the Spanish Netherlands. As a consequence of his power and status in France the prince's exile had a decisive impact not just upon the politics of the governor's court in Brussels, but more widely, upon the foreign policy of Cromwell's Protectorate, Philip IV's government in Madrid and the regime of Cardinal Mazarin in Paris. Ten major European archives have been consulted to build up a picture not only of the prince's career during this period but also of how the problem of Condé impinged upon relations between France, Spain and Cromwell's Protectorate during the 1650's.

Condé was from the most senior cadet line of the Bourbon and in the 1650's was fourth in line to the French throne. This position was given official recognition by his title - *premier prince du sang*. During the late 1620's Condé's father, Henri II de Bourbon, established the fortunes of the family by concluding an alliance with Cardinal Richelieu. This alliance, which served Richelieu's need for protection and his ambition to establish himself within the *grands*, transformed the position of the family from being the chief animator of revolts against the regency regime of the 1610's, to being the government's most important and powerful supporter during the 1630's.

After the death of Louis XIII in 1643 and his cardinal-minister in 1642 the Condé were able to build upon the political influence they had accumulated during

the previous decade to dominate the regency government of Anne of Austria and her favourite, Cardinal Mazarin. When the Grand Condé succeeded his father as Prince de Condé in 1646 his political power was vast and considered by contemporaries to eclipse even that of his cousin, Louis XIII's younger brother, Gaston d'Orléans.

However, the civil war of the *Frondes* between 1648 and 1653 brought an end to the political predominance of the Condé. In 1650 the prince was arrested along with his brother and brother-in-law, the Prince de Conti and the Duc de Longueville, on trumped up charges. They were released in 1651 and during the war of the princely *Fronde* that ensued (between supporters of Condé and supporters of Anne of Austria and Mazarin, her favourite) the prince gradually lost ground until he was forced to retreat from Paris northwards into the province of Champagne in late 1652. The prince had long realised that as a consequence of the superior resources available to the crown he would need the assistance of a foreign power if he was going to defeat the queen mother, and in November 1651 had negotiated a treaty with Philip IV. This treaty gave promises of Spanish assistance as well as the offer of protection in Spanish territory for the prince, his followers and his army in the event of his defeat in the French civil war.

The circumstances of his withdrawal from Paris in October 1652 meant that Condé had to choose between accepting Anne of Austria's and Mazarin's terms for a settlement or continuing to assert himself and oppose the government from exile. The prince chose exile and for eight years resided in the Spanish Netherlands protected by Philip IV, his army acting as an autonomous satellite of the Spanish Army of Flanders, fighting with Spain in the war against France. From Brussels Condé sought with Spanish help to force a major breakthrough into France and

overturn Mazarin's regime.

The thesis examines the impact of this exile and in consequence is as much a study of international relations between Madrid, Brussels, London and Paris during this period as it is specifically about the career of the prince. The 1650's were an important decade of the seventeenth century for France and Spain both historically and historiographically. The period saw the final decade of the costly and attritional conflict between the two 'great' crowns, whilst in France the regime of Cardinal Mazarin was the last ten years of government by a cardinal-minister before Louis XIV's declaration of personal rule in 1661. This has assumed enormous significance for historians many of whom see it as an important period of transition.

Internationally the 1650's is portrayed as the watershed of Spanish decline when finally the European balance of power was seen to alter in favour of Bourbon France. Within France the civil war of the *Frondes* is portrayed as the final victory of the forces of modernity and state absolutism over the atavistic great aristocracy. It is argued that individual *grands* like Condé had tried and failed during the *Frondes* to return France to her feudal past. Mazarin's regime of the 1650's - the embodiment of the victorious forward looking forces of centralisation and state absolutism - is seen to set the stage for the rule of the Sun King. By 1661, it is claimed, the great aristocracy had become 'domesticated' and reliant for their power upon the king. Mazarin's settlement of this internal social and political conflict enabled Louis XIV to concentrate upon establishing France's greater European role.

However, despite a willingness to draw conclusions about the fundamental forces influencing this period, the 1650's has not been the focus of detailed

attention since the work of a French historian, Adolphe Chéruel, in the 1880's. This neglect applies to France as it does to the subject of international relations between the two great crowns during this period. Recent studies of Philip IV and the administration of his quasi-*valido*, Don Luis de Haro, have tended with only one exception<sup>1</sup> to concentrate on the Spanish peninsula. Even Geoffrey Parker's study of the Army of Flanders pays scant attention to the problems encountered in the Spanish Netherlands during the 1650's. Claims about the social and political change caused by the *Frondes* and engineered by Mazarin's regime and even about the Franco-Spanish war during this period have in consequence been based upon the selective primary researches of 19th century historians.

Attention to the career of the prince during this period has been equally limited. Unease over Condé's 'treason' has meant that biographers have tended to steer clear of examining the prince's exile in any depth. At the same time it is certainly the case that on one level the prince has not been neglected. Routinely Condé is invoked as a symbol of many of the fundamental changes that it has been claimed occurred during the 1650's. The decline of grandee power after the *Frondes* is often explained with reference to Condé, France's last great feudal aristocrat, whose exile constituted the final and desperate attempt of the grandees to return France to her feudal past. The prince's submissive return to France in 1660, ready to take up his position as a powerless courtier at Louis XIV's court, is likewise taken as the paradigm of aristocratic submission to the crown. Similarly, the prince's military exploits are used as a symbol of France's increasing martial capabilities. Rocroi and the prince's string of victories during the 1640's

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<sup>1</sup> R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders, Spanish Maritime Policy in European War, 1568-1668*, (Cambridge, 1992).

marked the turning point of French military fortunes. During the 1650's his defection to the Spanish cause - one of France's greatest generals at the head of a Spanish army - is used to explain why France's victory over Spain in 1659 was not more complete.

Whilst looking at a neglected period of international relations this thesis tests the conventional interpretation of the 1650's as a period of radical social and political transition in France. In addition it looks at whether the final ten years of the Franco-Spanish conflict can be taken as a demonstration of an ascendant France delivering the final crushing blows to a declining Spain. Chapters one and three look at the impact of the prince's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands. When the prince first arrived in Brussels in 1653 the Spanish Netherlands were governed by the Habsburg archduke, Leopold Wilhelm, and his second in command, the Conde de Fuensaldaña. Far from welcoming the prince with open arms as the means to foster civil war in France and inflict a series of military defeats upon her armies that would force her to sue for peace, Condé's arrival was met with hostility. Leopold Wilhelm was aware that the provinces under his administration were not in a position to shoulder the burden of Condé and his army, whilst politically he felt personally threatened by the prince. The high command of the Spanish Netherlands - Leopold Wilhelm, Fuensaldaña, Condé and Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine - spent most of their time locked in costly political disputes that had a serious effect upon Spain's military capabilities in the Flanders theatre. Far from assisting Spain and her armies, the first few years of Condé's arrival were of positive harm to the Spanish war effort.

Madrid was slow to react to the problems created by Condé's arrival in Brussels. At first, instructions from Don Luis de Haro and Philip IV were that the

prince's needs were to be given the highest military priority. Bound anyway by the treaty to supply Condé with money, troops and winter quarters in the Spanish Netherlands they also felt that despite the unforeseen collapse of Condé's position in 1652 he still presented an opportunity to rekindle civil war in France. It was only after several months of the prince's exile that the extent of the difficulties he had created in the Spanish Netherlands was realised. But by then there was very little Philip IV's government in Madrid or Leopold Wilhelm's administration in Brussels could do about the prince, short of suggesting to him various projects that would take him and his army away from the Spanish Netherlands. Both Philip IV and Leopold Wilhelm were constrained by the prince's accumulation of troops. By 1655 Condé's recruiting activities and grants of men from Madrid had been so fruitful that approximately half of the troops in the Spanish Netherlands were under his command.

Chapter three looks at the change of the high command which occurred in 1656 as a result of the seemingly interminable political wrangling created by Condé's arrival. Leopold Wilhelm was succeeded by Philip IV's bastard son Don Juan José and Fuensaldaña by the former governor of Milan, the Marques de Caracena. Looking at the consequences of this change, chapter three examines the two most significant battles of the period which preceded the negotiations for peace in 1659 - Valenciennes and the battle of the Dunes. Along with Rocroi in 1643 both battles form part of the myth of Condé as a great military commander and contribute to notions of the growing military capabilities of France and how they can be contrasted with Spain's decay. However, the chapter demonstrates how accounts of both battles were manipulated to suit the political exigencies of the time, how this has distorted historian's understanding of the engagements and

in consequence deflates Condé's massive military reputation. By giving a more detailed presentation of the final campaigns of the war it also raises questions about France's 'rise' to European supremacy.

A consistently underplayed theme within existing studies of the 1650's is the consequence of the intervention of Cromwell's Protectorate in the Franco-Spanish war. Chapter two examines specifically the race between France and Spain to procure English assistance, whilst chapter three also pursues this theme by discussing the consequences of English intervention at the battle of the Dunes. Condé was key to the Spanish attempt to procure an English alliance between 1653 and 1655. The prince had a team of agents in London as well as in other European capitals and his London representative, Barrière, came close to securing an agreement with Cromwell for a joint amphibious invasion of Aunis. Uniting all three chapters (one, two and three) are questions about the position of the *grands* as actors in their own right upon an international stage. Far from being representative of a decaying remnant of a feudal past, *grands* like Condé, Leopold Wilhelm and Don Juan José were in significant positions of power. Although outside of nineteenth and twentieth century experience European aristocrats of this status were capable of running their own foreign policies and maintaining separate relations with foreign powers.

The theme of grandee power and the position of the *grands* is raised with more detail in chapters four and five. Chapter four looks specifically at the impact of Condé's exile on the politics of the 1650's and places his continued hostility to Mazarin's regime in the context of the complexities of aristocratic politics. Part of the problem associated with the conventional interpretation of the 1650's is the assumption that ministers like Richelieu and Mazarin were somehow separate

from the world of aristocratic politics. Indeed inherent to the conventional view of the 1650's is the idea that Richelieu and Mazarin as selfless servants of the state were engaged in an ongoing struggle with the aristocracy. The homogenous opposition of the *grands*, it is argued, sought to prevent the rise of the emerging modern state of which the cardinal-ministers were the chief architects. Recent studies of the regime of Cardinal Richelieu have certainly modified this view for the period between 1610 and 1642. However for the historiography of the 1650's, these assumptions still remain firmly in place.

This chapter therefore examines in detail the problems Condé's exile created for Mazarin's regime after the *Frondes*. Despite the insistence of historians that it was a period of calm consolidation of state power, preparing the way for Louis XIV's declaration of personal rule in 1661, Mazarin's regime existed throughout the 1650's in an environment of acute uncertainty and instability. Moreover, far from being separate from the *grands*, Mazarin aimed to establish himself within this caste, whose mentality and ambitions he shared. The cardinal was inextricably bound up in aristocratic politics and indeed it is impossible to understand his policies during this period without taking account of this crucial dimension of seventeenth century politics.

The final chapter of the thesis looks at the Peace of the Pyrenees, consistently misunderstood as the cardinal's greatest foreign policy success. Looking at the negotiations that secured Condé's return to France from the comparative perspective of both Spanish and French documentation demonstrates that, as far as the cardinal was concerned, the peace negotiated in 1659 was a disaster. The peace of the Pyrenees is one of the most striking instances demonstrating that the policies Mazarin tried to implement were not necessarily

synonymous with the best interests of the state and could in fact be as much concerned to serve his own private interests.

Building upon this picture of the 1650's, the conclusion of the thesis discusses Condé's return to France and reconciliation with Louis XIV at Aix-en-Provence. Describing the self-confidence of the prince as he returned to France to assume an almost equivalent position of power from that he had left in the 1640's, it briefly discusses the consequences of this for the conventional interpretation of the 1650's. Far from being in decline the power of the *grands* was in no way dented by the events of the 1650's. Condé was representative of his caste in that his exile demonstrated in extraordinary circumstances the vast power and international status of France's *grands*. Indeed, contrary to a traditional historiography, Louis XIV's declaration of personal rule in 1661 inaugurated a period during which grandee power, as a critical element of politics and society in Ancien Régime France, was about to achieve new heights of importance and significance.

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## Notes on Spelling and list of Abbreviations

Whenever possible I have tried to keep Spanish, French and English titles, names and place names in their original form. Exceptions to this rule are made in most other cases. All quotations from primary source material have been left in their original, that is with all seventeenth century spellings and grammar intact. Accent marks, which rarely appear in the texts, have been added sparingly in the interests of readability. I have also added punctuation where minimal readability requires it.

A.C.	Archives du Musée Condé, Chantilly
C.G.C.	Correspondence du Grand Condé
A.A.E.	Archives de Affaires Etrangères, Paris
C.P.	Correspondence Politique
M.D.	Mémoires et Documents
B.N.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
Ms.Fr.	Manuscrit Français
A.N.	Archives Nationales, Paris
M.C.	Minutier central des notaires parisiens
A.G.S.	Archivo General de Simancas, Valladolid
Est.	Sección de Estado
A.G.R.B.	Archives du Royaume de Belgique, (Algemeen Rijksarchief) Brussels
S.E.G.	Secrétairerie d'Etat et de Guerre
B.R.B.	Bibliothèque Royale de Bruxelles
Bod.	Bodleian Library, Oxford
P.R.O.	Public Record Office, London
B.L.	British Library, London

## Introduction

### CONDÉ AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 1650'S

The 1650's were crucially important years in European history and nowhere more so than for France and Spain. The final years of the Franco-Spanish war of attrition saw the involvement of Cromwell's New Model Army and navy before the Peace of the Pyrenees was eventually signed in 1659, bringing to an end almost thirty-five years of uninterrupted hostilities between the two great crowns. Sealing the successful conclusion of negotiations in 1659 was the marriage of Louis XIV to Philip IV's daughter, the Infanta María Teresa, a development which established a pretext for the War of Devolution (1667-1668). In France the civil war of the Frondes gave way to the last decade of the administration of the second of the two 'great' cardinals - Mazarin - before Louis XIV assumed personal direction of his affairs in 1661. This coincided with what is widely acknowledged to have been a turning point in the European balance of power. The 1650's, it is argued, saw Mazarin laying the foundations of French continental supremacy whilst Philip IV tried and ultimately failed through military means to reverse both the increasing international prominence of the Bourbons and the process of Spanish decline.<sup>1</sup>

However, despite its importance, international relations during this period and particularly those revolving around the Franco-Spanish conflict, have been

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<sup>1</sup> H.Hauser, *La Prépondérance Espagnole (1559-1660)*, (Paris, 1948), pp.376-394; *New Cambridge Modern History IV, The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War*, ed., J.P.Cooper, (Cambridge, 1970), pp.411-434.

largely ignored. Whilst Philip IV and the administration of his quasi-*valido*, Don Luis de Haro, have received some attention for the period,<sup>2</sup> very little work has been directed towards understanding the politics of those regions of the Spanish Empire directly involved in the final stages of the conflict - the Spanish Netherlands, north Italy and Catalonia. Geoffrey Parker's work on the Spanish Army of Flanders, for instance, although highlighting Spain's aims and policies in the Netherlands during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, leaves the period of the 1650's untouched.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the ministry of Cardinal Mazarin has always suffered from neglect in comparison with the attention lavished upon his illustrious Cardinal-predecessor. Even when historians have proved willing to examine Mazarin's ministry, their attention has been drawn inexorably towards the *Frondes* as the focal-point of their studies.<sup>4</sup> Very few historians, whether of the 1850's or 1990's, have seen fit to produce a detailed overview of the ministry from Mazarin's seizure of power in 1643 to his death in 1661. The relatively few biographies of Mazarin are constructed around the *Frondes*, and above all, the easily-accessible source of the *Mazarinades*.<sup>5</sup>

Preoccupation with Mazarin and the *Frondes* - notably evident in Pierre

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<sup>2</sup> R.A.Stradling, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations from the Restoration to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1660-1668' Ph.D. thesis, 2 vols., University of Wales, 1968; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, (Cambridge, 1988); H.Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665-1700*, (London, 1980), also *cf.*, forthcoming D.Phil thesis on Don Luis de Haro's administration by A.Malcolm, Magdalen College, Oxford.

<sup>3</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*, (Cambridge, 1972); Although Robert Stradling's work on the Spanish Armada of Flanders is one exception, *cf.*, R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders, Spanish Maritime Policy in European War, 1568-1668*, (Cambridge, 1992)]

<sup>4</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990); P.Guth, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1972); K.Federn, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1934).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

Goubert's recent biography, for example<sup>6</sup> - tends to provide a particular agenda for the study of the ministry, a set of questions and rather too many ready-made answers. Above all, it appears to lead to a characteristic, over-simplified gloss on that major period of history separating the end of the Frondes in 1653 from the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. Six years of large-scale warfare - a period almost as long as that from Richelieu's declaration of war on Spain in 1635 to his death - receives an almost universally cursory treatment underpinned by an interpretation that remains suspiciously similar from one work to the next.

Only one historian has accorded the ministry after 1652 the detailed attention that would be required for a serious assessment of its importance. In 1882 Chéruef published his three-volume *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*.<sup>7</sup> In view of its unique status, it is perhaps no surprise to discover that it is Chéruef's history, now almost forgotten, which forms the basis of the standard, reductionist treatment of the latter part of his Mazarin's ministry. Chéruef offered a picture of the 1650's in unparalleled detail - his study was underpinned by a nine-volume diplomatic and political correspondence spanning the whole of Mazarin's ministry.<sup>8</sup> However, despite the immense detail of Chéruef's work, the interpretation which emerges is quite recognizable to anyone familiar with the *étatist* currents of traditional French political history. Chéruef provides the portrait of a strong and patriotic cardinal emerging out of the shadows and vicissitudes of the Frondes, and leading the forces of absolutism and

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<sup>6</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990).

<sup>7</sup> A.Chéruef, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*, 3 vols, (Paris, 1882).

<sup>8</sup> A.Chéruef, *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, 1872-1906, (9 vols., Paris, 1872-1906).

modernity to victory over atavistic nobles and 'declining' Spanish imperialism.<sup>9</sup> Within France the great aristocracy were portrayed as the chief obstacle to progress, and crucially, as having had their last fling during the Frondes. Study of the 1650's was an exercise in state triumphalism: Mazarin's regime after 1652 was portrayed as secure and confident; the hydra of aristocratic rebellion had finally been hacked into subservience, and the cardinal could focus France's resources upon the already-overdue settling of accounts with Spain, leading a grateful king and nation towards the sunny uplands of European hegemony.<sup>10</sup>

It is not hard to see the appeal of such an interpretation. The senselessness and chaos of the Frondes is given meaning: they were a reaction against the strong central government that Mazarin had dedicated his life, as Richelieu's chosen successor, to creating. The defeat of the Frondeurs allowed the 'Great Enterprise' to continue to its fulfilment in the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 and Louis XIV's personal absolutism after 1661.<sup>11</sup> Most studies dealing with the period after 1652, therefore, do not trouble themselves overmuch with names and

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<sup>9</sup> Cf., Chérueil's epitaph to the cardinal, A.Chérueil, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.422-426.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Chérueil's selective research and findings were refined and endorsed by later writers. For some of the more obvious examples cf., H.Hauser, *La Prépondérance Espagnole (1559-1660)*, (Paris, 1948), pp.376-394; *New Cambridge Modern History IV, The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War*, ed., J.P.Cooper, (Cambridge, 1970), pp.411-434; K.Federn, *Mazarin*, p.445; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990), pp.392-432; J.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1970), pp.74-177; F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1990), pp.29-91; M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, (Paris, 1994), pp.399-404; G.Dethan, *Mazarin, Un homme de Paix à l'Age Baroque (1602-1661)*, (Paris, 1981), p.233.

<sup>11</sup> F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, p.51-56; S.Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, (Oxford, 1986), p.209; N.Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism, Change and Continuity in Early Modern Europe*, (London, 1992), pp.30-33; O.A.Ranum, *The Fronde, A French Revolution*, (London, 1993), pp.343-347; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.11-12; K.Federn, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1934), p.445.

events, being content to accept the outlines of this traditional formula.<sup>12</sup> Chéruel's work is an exception, but his presentation of the detail serves only to corroborate the general thesis: the *Frondeurs* - essentially a homogenous aristocratic opposition to the centralizing state - were split by Mazarin's victory. A number of *grands* and their families subsequently decided to cooperate with Mazarin's regime and its political programme - the Duc de Vendôme, Turenne, the Prince de Conti. They had already accepted the fate of their caste and saw that their interests lay in service to the centralizing state. Consequently they were rewarded by Mazarin with office and status. On the other hand, those who - inconveniently - remained hostile to the regime throughout the 1650's, for example, the king's uncle, Gaston d'Orléans, the Duc de Longueville, and of course the self-exiled Prince de Condé, were dismissed as the feckless adherents of a defeated cause, criminally irresponsible on occasions, but in the end merely pathetic.

This model of changing power structures during the 1650's seems to pass without question. Accounts of the period characteristically give a summary treatment of the great aristocracy with a tendency to focus upon one member of the *grands* in particular to support their arguments. As an example of the post-*Frondes* demise of aristocratic power and of France's growing military supremacy historians often point to the career of Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé. Unease over his 'treasonous' activities during the 1650's, however, has ensured that with the exception of the prince's rigorous nineteenth century biographer -

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<sup>12</sup> D.Ogg, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1933), p.8; T.K.Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1975), pp.64-65; N.Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism, Change and Continuity in Early Modern Europe*, (London, 1992), pp.30-33; R.J.Bonney, *Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661*, (New York, 1988), p.158.

the Duc d'Aumale<sup>13</sup> - the period of the prince's exile has not been looked at in any detail. Nonetheless, building on Chéruel's arguments, this has not prevented many historians from pointing to the broader canvas of the prince's career as evidence that the power of the great feudal aristocracy had finally come to an end.<sup>14</sup> As one of the more prominent members of the great aristocracy - a backward looking, monolithic caste who expended their efforts trying to prevent the rise of the 'modern state' - Condé's resistance then capitulation to the Mazarinist government during the 1650's is taken to encapsulate the process of aristocratic submission to the crown. He left France in 1652 determined to bring the cardinal's administration to its knees. He returned in 1660 apparently humbled and subdued, ready to take up his position as an ineffectual courtier in the gilded prison of Versailles. Theodore Rabb, for example, amongst others, chose Condé's career between 1649 and the prince's death in 1686 as the paradigm of aristocratic opposition to the rise of the French unitary state:

'Before the Fronde was over, therefore, it could not be said that the growing powers of the central government were generally and widely accepted, or that Frenchmen considered further resistance to be pointless. But after the 1650's there could be no doubt. Although a final wave of peasant revolts did not die out until 1675 and a few voices in the wilderness questioned the monarchy, the situation was transformed. The nobility was domesticated, reliant for power on the king, not on its strength in a locality. Condé, still treasonous during

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<sup>13</sup> Henri d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, 8 vols. (Paris 1863-96).

<sup>14</sup> S.Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, (Oxford, 1986), pp.182-183; N.Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism, Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy*, (London, 1992), pp.24-25; T.K.Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe*, p.65; M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, (Paris, 1994), pp.400-403; O.Ranum, *The Fronde, A French Revolution*, (New York, 1993), pp.344-347.

the Fronde, ended his days rowing ladies on the lake at Versailles..<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, the career of the Prince de Condé is cited as evidence to illustrate another important development - the rise of France to European military supremacy. The notion that the creation of the 'Nation State' of France resulted from a series of great rulers and military victories is frequently supported with references to Condé's string of triumphs as a young man during the 1640's.<sup>16</sup> As one of the pantheon of great military commanders the prince is seen to embody France's military progress. Condé's victory over the Spanish *tercios* at Rocroi in 1643, is universally treated as the starting point of France's growing military capabilities.<sup>17</sup> Until Rocroi, the French had suffered defeat upon defeat on France's northern frontier. It is this battle and the subsequent victories of the prince during the 1640's that are considered to indicate the point at which France began her military rise to European supremacy.

Deployed as a symbol of French military successes during the 1640's, the Prince de Condé is used in the historiography of the 1650's to explain away the apparent inability of the French to repeat the victories secured during the previous decade. Given the terminal decline into which it is assumed Spain had fallen by the 1650's, the length of time it took France to secure victory over Spain during the final decade of the Franco-Spanish war is explained with an invocation

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<sup>15</sup> T.K.Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe*, pp.64-65.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., A.Lottin, 'Louis XIV and Flanders', *Conquest and Coalescence*, ed., M.Greengrass, (London, 1991), p.84.

<sup>17</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.165-177; P.Guth, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1972), pp.383-404; J.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, p.37; F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1990) p.66.

of French chauvinism: the defection of the Prince de Condé after the Frondes gave the Spanish a 'proper' military commander, and someone capable of slowing, for a while, France's inexorable military progress.<sup>18</sup> It is argued that it was the combination of the upsets caused by the Frondes and Condé's attachment to the Spanish - a French general with French soldiers - that prevented France from pushing home the advantages gained by their armies during the 1640's. The important contribution of the Spanish high command in preventing the French from making any headway in the Flanders theatre during the 1650's is overlooked.

This traditional interpretation has dominated accounts of the decade that preceded Louis XIV's declaration of personal rule. However it should be said that a small number of specialized studies have raised doubts about a triumphant post-Frondes drive towards absolutism at home and hegemony abroad. As early as 1965 Lassaingne looked at the unrest of the provincial nobility after a series of unpopular fiscal measures had been introduced in 1657.<sup>19</sup> In 1976, Albert Hamscher showed how the Parlement of Paris remained obstructive and hostile to Mazarin's political manipulations,<sup>20</sup> while Richard Golden went so far as to suggest the existence of a third Fronde between 1652 and 1661, a religious conflict centred upon the archdiocese of Paris.<sup>21</sup> Studies of war and international relations from the

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<sup>18</sup> Chéruel, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*, ii.181; J.Bourelly, *Cromwell et Mazarin*, (Paris, 1886), p.101 & p.160; J.Dunlop, *Memoirs of Spain from Philip IV and Charles II*, (London, 1834); J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, (Paris, 1986), pp.319-338; K.Federn, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1934), p.402; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.405.

<sup>19</sup> J-D. Lassaingne, *Les Assemblées de la Noblesse de France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, (Paris, 1962).

<sup>20</sup> A.N.Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673*, (Pittsburg, 1976).

<sup>21</sup> R.Golden, *The Godly Rebellion, the Parisian Curés and the Religious Fronde 1652-1662*, (North Carolina, 1981).

perspective of the Spanish peninsula in this period have opened wider questions about the inevitability of Spanish collapse during the 1650's, and the extent to which the Peace of the Pyrenees was a virtual French diktat, marking the unambiguous beginning of a new European order dominated by France.<sup>22</sup>

Equally important is the considerable re-evaluation in recent years of Mazarin's predecessor, Richelieu. The notion that Mazarin, as a servant of the crown, was engaged in a conflict with the great aristocracy in the interests of building a centralized, absolutist state, is not assisted by the growing body of material which stresses that Richelieu himself was far from being such a selfless servant of state-power. Richelieu's intense preoccupation with his private fortune and his concern for personal survival is contrasted with his indulgence in a largely empty 'rhetoric of reform' in matters concerning the state. Far from being their sworn and implacable enemy, he is shown to have shared the mentality and ambitions of the great aristocracy, justifiably considering himself a constituent member of the caste and seeking to achieve alliances within it.<sup>23</sup>

None of this, however, has so far led to a major re-evaluation of Mazarin's ministry. Neither has the recent pioneering work of historians of Philip IV led to a re-assessment of the Franco-Spanish war and international relations from any other perspective than that of Madrid. However, looking at the exile of the Prince

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<sup>22</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665*, (Cambridge, 1988); R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain*, (London, 1981); R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders, Spanish Maritime Policy in European War, 1568-1668*, (Cambridge, 1992).

<sup>23</sup> J.Bergin, *Cardinal Richelieu, Power and the Pursuit of Wealth*, (Yale, 1985); J.Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu*, (Yale, 1991); D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the French Army', J.Bergin, 'Richelieu and his Bishops? Ministerial Power and Episcopal Patronage under Louis XIII' and R.Briggs, 'Richelieu and Reform', *Richelieu and his Age*, eds., J.Bergin and L.Brockliss, (Oxford, 1992).

de Condé during the 1650's, his opposition to the Mazarinist regime in France and his involvement in the Franco-Spanish war, requires both. In France the effect of the Prince de Condé's exile on French domestic politics was enormous and serves to highlight the chronic instability of the second half of Mazarin's administration. Far from being solidly and securely re-established in 1653 with a mandate to advance the cause of royal absolutism and state-power, Mazarin existed throughout the 1650's in an environment of acute political uncertainty and instability. Continuing sources of opposition, one extreme of which was represented by Condé, were not confined to some 'lunatic fringe' of the aristocracy, while many of Mazarin's 'allies' proved to be far from committed to his cause. Mazarin's survival was anything but a foregone conclusion, and, as a consequence of Condé's exile, the most important single factor shaping the fragile balance of supporters and opponents was the fortunes of a war with Spain which, again contrary to the received interpretation, was far from a predetermined demonstration of French military superiority. The widespread assumption that aristocratic power was in decline during the build up to Louis XIV's personal rule also seems difficult to sustain. Far from being representative of the backward looking, politically naive remnants of an old order, Condé demonstrated during his exile the enormous flexibility and power he possessed as a *grand* and that even in the extreme circumstances of exile, he was well placed to maintain his power and position.

Whilst Condé's effect on French politics during the final decade of Mazarin's administration was profound, he had a correspondingly decisive influence on politics in Brussels and Madrid and the foreign policy of Cromwell's Protectorate.

During the prince's exile he had permanent representatives in London and Madrid. His arrival in Brussels, at the head of his own army as a foreign prince previously attached to the royal house of the chief enemy of Spain, had a huge impact upon the local Spanish administration. One consequence of the prince's arrival, for example, was its clear demonstration that the high command in the Spanish Netherlands - who strongly resented the prince's presence in Brussels - would not follow orders from Madrid that they judged to be against their interests. In addition the effect of the prince on the course of the Franco-Spanish war was significant. The extent to which France was gaining the upper hand in the Flanders theatre during the 1650's has been grossly overestimated, mainly as a consequence of a failure both to understand the nature of the war once Condé had deserted to the Spanish cause and the involvement of Cromwell's Protectorate towards the end of the 1650's. Moreover, contrary to the traditional historiography, it is clear that for the first four years of the prince's exile, his arrival in the Spanish Netherlands positively hindered the ability of the administration in Brussels to wage war against the French, raising further questions about the origins of France's 'rise' to European supremacy.

Whilst illuminating a neglected period of French history and relations with Spain during the final decade of the war, choosing to study international relations from the perspective of a *grand* has another important benefit, for it demonstrates the problems caused by approaching the period uniquely in terms of 'states' manoeuvring against each other. Historians are drawn to areas and ideas which seem familiar to nineteenth and twentieth-century experience, and therefore give weight and importance to the notion of France and Spain as unitary states,

directly under the control of far-sighted, 'modernizing' ministers such as Richelieu, Mazarin or Olivares. Yet this is to simplify dangerously the decision-making processes and political realities of early modern Europe. Foreign policy and international relations were not simply the preserve of all-powerful ministers and their supposedly tractable rulers. It is obvious that Condé was pursuing a series of political objectives in the 1650's that were at variance with the interests of 'France', as defined by the policies of Cardinal Mazarin. It is perhaps less obvious, but equally important to recognize that Condé was not, by fighting against 'France', simply incorporating himself into the global policy-making of Madrid. Despite the fact that Condé was in Philip IV's service, the prince's representatives in London for example, were pursuing goals and policies quite independently from the resident Spanish ambassador. Similarly, the Austrian Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, governor of the Spanish Netherlands during the first stage of Condé's exile, had interests determining the policies he adopted that frequently conflicted with those of the Spanish king he was supposed to serve. The same could be said of Cardinal Mazarin, who was frequently placed in circumstances in which his personal and family interests - in particular, strategies to ensure his own political survival - were not synonymous with the obvious best interests of the king or state.

It is impossible to understand international relations during this period without appreciating this aspect of policy formulation, which applied in Brussels as it did in Madrid, London and Paris. Studying the impact of Condé's exile demonstrates the serious difficulties inherent to any attempt to understand the political decision making of the period in terms of inevitable historical forces. They

have to be seen in terms of contingent events and the reaction of personalities for it is quite clear that decisions made for reasons of self-interest, and not calculations of purely 'state' interests, had the widest possible political implications.

### THE GRAND CONDÉ: 1621-1652

Louis II de Bourbon, who bore the courtesy title Duc d'Enghien until the death of his father, was born in Paris in September 1621, two years after his father and mother's release from Vincennes. Unlike his sister, two years his senior, he did not suffer the indignity of being born in captivity, yet, despite release from prison his father was still out of favour. As a consequence, barely had the Princesse de Condé had time to recuperate than she was ordered to accompany her infant son and join her husband at Montrond.<sup>24</sup> Montrond was in the heart of Berry, a province in the east of France whose governorship had belonged to the Prince de Condé since Marie de Medici had fallen from power in 1617.<sup>25</sup> It was this imposing fortress that served as the young duke's home for much of his childhood.

Until the duke was fifteen he did not leave Berry, living between the fortress of Montrond and the capital of the province, Bourges. Aged eight he

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<sup>24</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.309.

<sup>25</sup> *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, (Paris, 1990), p.671.

entered Sainte Marie de Bourges, a *collège de plein exercice*,<sup>26</sup> where for six years he received a rigorous training from the Jesuits in the civilization of classical antiquity as well as instruction in Aristotelian philosophy, law and history - uncommon for a *grand* of his status.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, it was not until January 1636 that the duke left Berry and travelled to Paris, where he had not been since his birth, to be presented to Louis XIII and shortly after to begin further studies at the *Académie Royale* under Pluvinel's successor, Benjamin.<sup>28</sup> These *académies* instructed *épée* nobles in the polite as well as the military arts and served to introduce young nobles to the court.<sup>29</sup> The duke was taught to sing and dance as well as studying military planning, fortifications, fencing and horsemanship. Here he remained for two years spending weekends with his mother at the château of St Maur outside Paris<sup>30</sup> before he was called to Bourgogne in 1638 to assume the temporary governorship of the province whilst his father was away on campaign

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<sup>26</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.314; P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle, le Grand Condé, son fils le Duc d'Enghien, son petit-fils, le Duc de Bourbon*, (Lille, 1896), pp.11-17.

<sup>27</sup> His schooling in the classics was sufficiently rigorous to provoke comment at court when, as a young man of twenty, he was overheard holding a conversation in fluent Latin with the Portuguese and Catalan ambassadors, *cf.*, P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle*, p.111. Condé's biographers have commented upon the particularly thorough schooling he received - rare for a *grand* of his status. His entry in the *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle* for example comments, 'Enghien jouit d'une formation théorique très supérieure à celle des gentilshommes de son temps.' *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, p.381.

<sup>28</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, p.335; P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle*, pp.82-95; C.Jouhaud, 'Politique des Princes: les Condé', ed., Philippe Contamine, *L'Etat et les Aristocraties (France, Angleterre, Ecosse)*, 12, Dix-Septième Siècle, (Paris, E.N.S., 1989), p.342.

<sup>29</sup> M.Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, (Princeton, 1990), p.154; L.Brockliss, 'Richelieu, Education, and the State', *Richelieu and his Age*, eds., J.Bergin & L.Brockliss, p.241.

<sup>30</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.341.

in the Midi.<sup>31</sup>

It had been the explicit intention of his father that the duke should attend the *académie* in Paris less for the value of the education he was to receive than for the possibility of cultivating friendships and creating ties and links of allegiance with lesser *épée* nobles who would be attracted into the service of the family.<sup>32</sup> By the time the duke had arrived in Paris, service with the Condé promised far greater rewards than it had done in 1621. Since the duke's birth the political fortunes of the house under the aegis of his father had undergone a dramatic transformation. During the 1610's the Prince de Condé's efforts to play a role in the government of the realm had enjoyed sporadic success as a result of his involvement in a sequence of revolts against the regency before his arrest in the September *coup* of 1616. His release from prison did not occur immediately after the assassination of his chief enemy, Marie de Medici's favourite Concini, but in 1619 - over a year after Louis XIII had installed his own favourite Luynes as his chief minister.<sup>33</sup> During the decade that followed the period of the duke's early childhood, his father contrived to reverse his poor political fortunes by stitching together a political alliance with Cardinal Richelieu that was to last until the cardinal's death in 1642.<sup>34</sup> When the Duc d'Enghien was baptised into the

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<sup>31</sup> P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle*, pp.66-81.

<sup>32</sup> M.Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, (Princeton, 1990), p.132. Henri de la Trémoille, for example, went to Benjamin's expressly to be with his cousin, cf., Henri-Charles de La Trémoille, *Mémoires*, (Liège, 1767), p.3.

<sup>33</sup> J.Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu*, (Yale, 1991), p.163.

<sup>34</sup> C.Jouhaud, 'Politique des Princes: Les Condé (1630-1652)', pp.338-342; D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the French Army', pp.153-155.

catholic faith<sup>35</sup> in May 1626 foundations were already being laid for this political alliance and by the time he entered Sainte Marie de Bourges in December 1629, it had become a *fait accompli*.<sup>36</sup>

Richelieu's plans for his political survival in the late 1620's during the period of his uneasy relationship with Marie de Medici, his patroness, and his definitive break from her in 1630, had a profound affect upon the future of the young duke. Although undoubtedly it was the cardinal that the duke would later have to thank for the dramatic increase in the prominence, wealth and power of his house during the 1630's, as far as he was concerned, the alliance was to have one bitterly regrettable consequence - his father's agreement to what he regarded as the humiliating *mésalliance* of his marriage with the cardinal's niece, Claire-Clémence de Maillé-Brézé.<sup>37</sup> This was the payment for the alliance with the house of Richelieu, providing the cardinal with what he hoped to be assurance of cooperation in an uncertain future and serving the cardinal's own ambitions to advance his family's position within the highest ranks of the *épée* nobility.<sup>38</sup> There is evidence to suggest that the negotiations for this arrangement began

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<sup>35</sup> His father had converted to the catholic faith following Henri IV's initiative and his determination to encourage the conversion of the Bourbon family. Condé had been given catholic tutors and had been baptised a catholic shortly after his birth, *cf.*, M.Wolfe, *The Conversion of Henri IV*, (Harvard, 1993), p.175. Understandably this caused some consternation within the Huguenot community, *cf.*, N.M.Sutherland, *The Huguenot struggle for Recognition*, (Yale, 1980), p.312.

<sup>36</sup> In his study of Bretagne James Collins, for example, explains how Richelieu used Condé to seize political control of the province from the house of Vendôme in 1629, *cf.*, J.B.Collins, *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany*, (Cambridge, 1994), pp.190-194.

<sup>37</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.428.

<sup>38</sup> J.Bergin, *Richelieu: Power and the pursuit of wealth*, (Yale, 1985), p.120.

during the early 1630's,<sup>39</sup> however it was not until shortly before the cardinal's death that the marriage ceremony took place. In April 1640 the Duc d'Enghien was called to Dijon to be presented to his *fiancée* for the first time and in Paris in February 1641 he was led to the altar, 'sa tête pâle', as one biographer described, and married to Claire-Clémence.<sup>40</sup>

However, despite such an inauspicious start to the decade, the early 1640's established the military reputation of the Duc d'Enghien and this was to prove the critical building block of his later enormous reputation and influence when he succeeded his father in December 1646 as the Prince de Condé. The duke was fortunate to have begun his military career in the early 1640's - years of military crisis for the Spanish Habsburgs in virtually all theatres of war. Diverting scarce military resources to deal with rebellions in Catalonia and Portugal between 1640 and 1641 placed an intolerable burden on the Spanish military machine and in the years that followed, over commitment to a war being fought on multiple fronts took its toll.<sup>41</sup> The added burden had particularly serious consequences for the war being fought in the Spanish Netherlands. Here the administration in Brussels had to coordinate a war on both northern and southern frontiers against the French and the Dutch. A reduction in the assistance Madrid was able to provide threatened to provide the French with the possibility of forcing a major

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<sup>39</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.423; Anon., *Vie d'Armand Jean du Plessis Cardinal Duc de Richelieu*, (Cologne, 1696), p.45.

<sup>40</sup> P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle*, p.110.

<sup>41</sup> G.Parker, *The Thirty Years War*, (London, 1984), p.171; J.H.Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, (London, 1963), pp.349-353; H.de Schepper, 'Los Países Bajos Separados y la Corona de Castilla en la Década de 1640', J.H.Elliott, R.Villari, A.M.Hespanha, B.Anatra and others, *1640: La Monarquía Hispánica en Crisis*, (Barcelona, 1991), pp.213-258; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, (London, 1988), pp.209-231; J.H.Elliott, *Spain and its World*, (Yale, 1989), pp.131-133.

breakthrough.<sup>42</sup>

There is little doubt that the young duke profited enormously from this state of affairs. He began his military career in the army of Picardie in 1640 under the overall command of Richelieu's cousin, La Meilleraie, and took part in the storming of Arras in August.<sup>43</sup> In 1643, aged only twenty-one, he was appointed to La Meilleraie's command.<sup>44</sup> La Meilleraie had been one of Richelieu's closest *fidèles*, linked by a double marriage to the Richelieu family.<sup>45</sup> Mazarin was anxious at this stage to distance himself from those too closely associated with the previous regime and Enghien's appointment to La Meilleraie's command was an uncontroversial way of pushing aside this particularly well-placed *fidèle* of his predecessor. The subsequent death of the king, the succession to the throne of a four year old boy and the declaration of Anne of Austria's regency was a further opportunity for the Prince de Condé and his son to increase their political influence. Anne of Austria was forced to rely upon the prince for support and this placed Condé in a good position to further his son's career.<sup>46</sup>

In the spring of 1643 the duke's appointment proved its worth when the

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<sup>42</sup> G.Parker, *The Thirty Years War*, p.171; G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, (Cambridge, 1990), pp.260-262; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, pp.284-286; R.A.Stradling, 'Spain's Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600-1660', *History* 69, (1984), pp.208-21.

<sup>43</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.623-632; P.H.Chérot, *Trois Educations Princières au Dix-Septième Siècle*, p.108; P.Chevalier, *Louis XIII*, (Paris, 1979), p.570.

<sup>44</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iv.8.

<sup>45</sup> Anselme de Sainte-Marie, Père (P.de Guibours), *Histoire généalogique et chonrologique de la maison royale de France, des pairs, grands officiers de la couronne, de la Maison du Roi et des anciens barons du Royaume*, 9 vols., (Paris, 1726-33), iv.624.

<sup>46</sup> G.Dethan, *La vie de Gaston d'Orléans*, (Paris, 1992), p.257; A.Barine, *La Jeunesse de La Grande Mademoiselle*, (Paris, 1905), p.245; C.Jouhaud, 'Politique des Princes: les Condé', p.341.

Spanish Army of Flanders under the command of Francisco de Melo was defeated in a set-piece battle at Rocroi by a French army under the overall command of the Duc d'Enghien. The chronic weakness of the cavalry regiments of the Army of Flanders, owing largely to the breakdown of the supply of cavalry after the blocking of both land and sea routes to Flanders,<sup>47</sup> had led to the rapid defeat of their German and Walloon cavalry units. This enabled the duke to rally his French cavalry and to isolate the *tercios viejos* who were overwhelmed by the concentration of almost the entire army under Enghien's command upon them.<sup>48</sup> Rocroi was followed by a succession of other victories for the duke - Thionville in the same year, Fribourg (August 1644), Nördlingen (August 1645), and between June and October 1646 the storming of the coastal towns around Dunkirk, Courtrai and Mardyck, before Enghien forced the privateering base itself to capitulate.<sup>49</sup>

In a society that still saw itself in terms of a warrior culture, enormous political and economic advantage could be gained by success on the field of battle. A military commander of Enghien's status presiding over a series of victories was in a strong position to request suitable 'rewards' for his services. This could involve the distribution of promotions or requests for governorships and the transfer to other, more prestigious, military commands.<sup>50</sup> Of course, the duke also

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<sup>47</sup> R.A.Stradling, 'Spain's Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600-1660', *History* lxi, (1984), pp.208-21.

<sup>48</sup> Aumale gives the most thorough account of the battle, *cf.*, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iv.128-133.

<sup>49</sup> Jean-François Solnon gives a resumé of the prince's achievements during the 1640's, *cf.*, *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, pp.381-382.

<sup>50</sup> D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the French Army', pp.145-146; J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, (Paris, 1987), pp.378-379; A.Jouanna, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, (Paris, 1989), pp.40-65.

had the advantage of his father's political prominence and it was largely as a consequence of the influence of his father and his string of military successes that he saw a steady increase in his political power during the first half of the 1640's. In 1644, for example, he received his first provincial governorship - Champagne.<sup>51</sup> At the same time he began to demonstrate his ability to distribute favour on a large scale, even if his projects met with the opposition of other *grands*. This was particularly the case in 1645 when, in the face of concentrated resistance, the duke engineered the marriage between Henri Chabot, a tentative *fidèle* of Gaston, and the sole heir of the late Duc de Rohan - Marguerite de Rohan. This marriage elevated Chabot to the status of Duc de Rohan and, to Gaston's considerable irritation, brought Chabot into the growing circle of Enghien's supporters.<sup>52</sup>

Whilst the duke manipulated his military successes to increase his political stature at court, his exploits were used to create a powerful hagiography that subsequent historians have spent time refining and developing. The idea of Condé as one of the most renowned and capable commanders of the early modern period was founded principally upon his achievements during the early 1640's. This reputation was tremendously important for the duke at the time, for more than anything else it sparked off an image that he was to retain for the rest of his life - an individual imbued with a capacity to lead and a charisma that was above the

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<sup>51</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iv.263.

<sup>52</sup> The Duc de Rohan had died in 1639 in the service of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. As Marguerite de Rohan was his sole heir the question of her marriage was of acute interest to numerous parties. Chabot was therefore the object of considerable envy when Condé finally procured this prize for him. Aumale indicates that Chabot as well as his younger brother, Guy-Alphonse (who died in Condé's service in 1646), had enjoyed a close relationship with the prince that was plainly further cemented by this marriage. Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iv, pp.45 & 414; for information about the Chabot-Rohan marriage *cf.*, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.30; *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, p.1350; G.Dethan, *La Vie de Gaston d'Orléans*, (Paris, 1992), p.292.

ordinary and surpassed even the high expectations of someone of his rank. Indeed, during the 1640's and 1650's the contrast between the Duc d'Enghien, a Bourbon with a potential claim to the throne, and the young and vulnerable king of France - Louis XIV - was obvious to all. Sovereignty was intimately linked to leadership in warfare<sup>53</sup> and, after Rocroi, it was not difficult for the prince to present himself as a model of sovereign attributes. He had, after all, saved France from the Habsburg menace during a period of political crisis. Rocroi, it needs to be stressed, had occurred in the aftermath of Louis XIII's death and the accession to the throne of a four year old boy, and threw back a Spanish invasion of Picardie.

Throughout Condé's life artists tried to capture these sovereign qualities. Prints were often engraved to ensure the prominence of his nose - an instantly recognisable Bourbon physical feature - and from the date of his service as a volunteer in the army of Picardie the prince tended always to be represented clothed in armour, holding the baton of maréchal, and, after 1646, adorned with the ermine of France's first prince of the blood.<sup>54</sup> Eulogies to the prince that appeared underneath such representations invariably commented upon his military achievements, placing special emphasis upon Rocroi which had, 'fait respirer la France abbattue de tristesse pour la mort de son Roy.'<sup>55</sup> and which had been won by the duke, 'avant la fleur de son aage.'<sup>56</sup> It was tempting to infer that this was a man who had been born to lead and was eminently qualified not

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<sup>53</sup> J.Cornette, *Le Roi de Guerre*, (Paris, 1993), p.180.

<sup>54</sup> Cf., British Museum, Prints and Drawings: Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, 0.1-29; 1893.4.11.77; 0.1-39; 1894.10.16.9; 1870.5.14.1359.

<sup>55</sup> British Museum, Prints and Drawings: Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, 1893.4.11.78.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

just for princely, but for royal status.

However, Enghien's meteoric rise created considerable and understandable resentment amongst rival grandee houses during the 1640's. The stranglehold the Condé held on central government threatened to become uncontrollable by the time the duke inherited his father's title as Prince de Condé in December 1646. This was felt particularly sharply by the minister whom the elder Prince de Condé had agreed to support - Anne of Austria's favourite, Cardinal Mazarin. Various measures adopted to frustrate the new Prince de Condé had begun as early as 1646 when Gaston was appointed to the supreme command of the royal army fighting along the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands. Gaston was one of only three individuals to whom Condé had to cede precedence and the other two, the king and his younger brother, Philippe, were clearly not in a position to act as anything but figureheads. Gaston's role, which he willingly adopted, was to divert attention from the military achievements of his young cousin.<sup>57</sup> The dispatch of the prince to Catalonia in 1647<sup>58</sup> was similarly a measure calculated to remove Condé from the court, when his influence threatened to become excessive; in this instance the initiative produced the desired effect - the spectacular failure of the prince before the fortress of Lérida.<sup>59</sup> On his return to Paris, the prince sought to cast blame for the disasters of his Catalan campaign on Mazarin who, he argued, had deliberately deprived him of the necessary supplies of men and

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<sup>57</sup> G.Dethan, *Gaston d'Orléans*, pp.219-226; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.52-55.

<sup>58</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.132-183.

<sup>59</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, pp.219-223; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.182-185.

ammunition.<sup>60</sup>

However, the subsequent rupture between the cardinal and Condé was not immediate. Mazarin was in an extremely difficult position *vis-à-vis* the prince, particularly in the circumstances of the late 1640's, when increasing government unpopularity simply had the effect of forcing him to rely to an even greater extent on the prince's power and prestige. In 1648 Condé secured a victory over the Spanish at Lens and the cardinal used this in Paris as an opportunity to take tough measures in the deteriorating political situation.<sup>61</sup> At the same time Lens had the effect of boosting the prince's stature at the French court and once the prince had returned to Paris and beaten off the *frondeurs* at the siege of Paris it seemed that he was prepared to support the cardinal's crumbling regime in return for increased powers.

However, the siege of Paris marked a turning point in the already queasy relationship between Condé and Mazarin. In the aftermath of the prince's military victory against the Parisian *frondeurs* the cardinal gave clear indications of his wish to abandon an alliance with Condé by beginning discussions for a marital alliance with the Vendôme - a grandee house that was a traditional rival of the Condé.<sup>62</sup> At this stage, with his army camped outside the capital the prince was at his most powerful, and Mazarin's obvious attempts to promote the Vendôme at

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<sup>60</sup> Immediately after Condé's defeat at Lérida suspicions grew that Mazarin had been behind the prince's appointment to the Catalan command with the express intention of engineering his military defeat, *cf.*, for example, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, Pièces et Documents, v.514: Le Chevalier de Rivière to Condé, 2 July 1647: '...et icy je mets dans le nombre de la populace la bourgeoisie de Paris et chambres souveraines. Ils disent que la cour avoit envoyé Votre Altesse pour la perdre..'

<sup>61</sup> M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, (Paris, 1994), p.82; R.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, (Oxford, 1981), p.207.

<sup>62</sup> *Cf.*, pp.251-254.

his expense seemed rash provocation. However the prince had accumulated many enemies and Mazarin continued to be protected by the queen regent and to some extent Gaston d'Orléans, who saw gains to be made by undermining his cousin's position.<sup>63</sup> The coalition of opponents to Condé was spearheaded by the cardinal, whose vulnerability to Condé's efforts to remove him from office was increasing by the day. The imprisonment of Condé and his kinsmen the Prince de Conti and the Duc de Longueville in January 1650, was therefore a measure initiated by the cardinal which aimed to limit temporarily the prince's capacity to act against him.<sup>64</sup> Having bailed out Mazarin's regime from complete collapse over the previous twelve months, Condé was arrested on trumped up charges in a blatant attempt to destroy his political power. In consequence the cardinal was given a free hand and the prince's supporters were forced to leave court and return to their provincial bases.

As far as Condé was concerned the so called 'princely' Fronde was a struggle to protect the position that his family had enjoyed for the past twenty years from the ambitions of Mazarin and the house of Vendôme. At the same time he wished to ensure that the architect of his humiliating arrest - Mazarin - was either put to death or exiled on a permanent basis. This ambition was close to being achieved after his release from Le Havre by the cardinal *en route* for exile in February 1651.<sup>65</sup> The prince returned to Paris. However before long the uneasy *frondeur* coalition between families such as the Orléans, the Condé and the Guise collapsed

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<sup>63</sup> G.Dethan, *Gaston d'Orléans*, (Paris, 1992), pp.269-273.

<sup>64</sup> M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, (Paris, 1994), pp.160-166; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990), pp.291-298.

<sup>65</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.311-316; M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, pp.192-202.

into internecine conflict after Jean François Paul de Gondi, trading his support for Condé against the offer of the cardinalate that was to make him Cardinal de Retz, initiated secret negotiations with Anne of Austria to open an anti-Condéen front in May.<sup>66</sup>

Fearing another attempt to have him arrested the prince left the capital, though this time of his own volition, and retreated to St Maur where he formulated plans for a full scale military assault against the queen regent and her supporters.<sup>67</sup> With the superior military resources available to the crown the prince understood that to have a chance of success he needed the assistance of a foreign power. But, despite the treaty concluded with Philip IV in November 1651 and his union with Gaston d'Orléans, the prince was unable to muster the necessary military resources. Gradually, the forces of the crown gained the upper hand and by the time the prince left Paris in October 1652 his armies in the south-west and east of France were in slow but sure retreat.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.316-323; D.A.Watts, *Cardinal de Retz, the Ambiguities of a Seventeenth-century Mind*, (Oxford, 1980), pp.254-255; J.H.M.Salmon, *Cardinal de Retz, the Anatomy of a Conspirator*, (London, 1969), pp.191-226.

<sup>67</sup> M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, pp.259-272.

<sup>68</sup> M.Pernot, *La Fronde*, pp.273-339; A.Chéruel, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*, ii.320-360; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.333-340.

## THE INHERITANCE OF THE GRAND CONDÉ

Common to all princes of the blood and the feature that distinguished them from the *princes légitimés* and the lesser tiers of aristocratic rank was their undisputed right to the succession in the order of their consanguinity to the king. This entitlement was founded upon the juridical notion of *ius sanguinis*, a procedural device that by the seventeenth century had become the undisputed axiom of succession to the French throne.<sup>69</sup> This crucial distinction between the *princes du sang* and their bastard cousins was important because the base of much of the political power of a prince of the blood was the possibility that one day providence might intervene to place him on the throne. The succession of Henri IV, himself twenty one degrees removed from the last Valois, had underscored the significance of membership of this exclusive caste. Quite apart from the rewards of becoming king, proximity to the throne was a factor that in itself could be used to massive political advantage. Much of politics during this period revolved around a complex game of second guessing future fatalities within the royal family and how this would effect the line of succession. Princes of the blood were able to play upon this as their trump card to procure ministerial alliances and wider support from among France's political elite, enabling them to have a profound influence upon the government of the realm.

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<sup>69</sup> R.E.Giesey, The Juristic Basis of Dynastic Right to the French Throne, *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, N.S. li, (1961), part 5.,p.38.

At various stages during the course of the seventeenth century it had appeared highly probable that one of the Bourbon Princes de Condé would become king. Next to Louis XIII and Louis XIV's brothers, the Condé were the most senior cadet line of the Bourbon, and this position was acknowledged by their unique title - *governors princes du sang* - carrying special recognition and privileges. Between 1594 and 1601 the Grand Condé's father, Henri II de Bourbon, stood as second-in-line to the throne before the birth of the future Louis XIII. Between 1610 and 1638, before the births of the future Louis XIV and Philippe, a Condéen succession seemed again likely as Gaston d'Orléans, Louis XIII's younger brother, had no more success than his brother in siring a male heir.

Such close proximity to the throne was a factor that the Grand Condé's father, Henri II de Bourbon, was able to use to particular advantage in procuring the political alliance with Cardinal Richelieu.<sup>70</sup> As a consequence of their place in the succession, the Condé became central to Cardinal Richelieu's political strategy. After the cardinal's definitive rupture with both the queen mother, Marie de Medici, and Louis XIII's younger brother, Gaston d'Orléans, in 1630, the cardinal would need the protection of a grandee family of enormous power and political resource if he was to have any possibility of maintaining his power after the death of Louis XIII without male heirs.<sup>71</sup>

The meteoric rise of the political fortunes of the Condé during the late 1620's and 1630's was the consequence of the close understanding that developed between Henri and Cardinal Richelieu. During this period, and supported by

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<sup>70</sup> C.Jouhaud, 'Politiques de princes: les Condé (1630-1652)', pp.338-343.

<sup>71</sup> D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the Army', p.153.

Richelieu, the Condé made a number of important territorial acquisitions all of which contributed to the enormous *de facto* power of the Grand Condé during the late 1640's: purchase of the estates of Sancerre in the province of Berry;<sup>72</sup> the king's decision to grant Condé the largest share of the possessions of the Duc de Montmorency after his execution in 1632;<sup>73</sup> and, perhaps of greatest significance, the prince's acquisition in 1631 of the coveted governorship of Bourgogne.<sup>74</sup>

However, the vast political potential of princes of the blood was not simply confined to their ability to conclude advantageous political alliances. The Condé were able to play upon the substantial *de jure* claims to power they possessed as princes of the blood. Political theorists presented these princes as the most critical resource sustaining the ruling dynasty. For Loyseau in particular, the succession of Henri IV was evidence enough of the importance of these princes to the institution of the monarchy.<sup>75</sup> As a consequence they were seen to hold special rights qualifying them as the king's natural advisers and viceroys. Since providence had selected them to underpin the rule of the king and ensure the continuation of the ruling dynasty, they were assumed to excel in the qualities needed to rule.<sup>76</sup> Described as born councillors of the king, imbued with the qualities of virtue and fidelity, the writers of the most renowned treatises of *ancien régime* political theory like Le Caron, Du Tillet and Loyseau all recognized

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<sup>72</sup> C.Jouhaud, 'Politique des princes, les Condé', p.339.

<sup>73</sup> P.Rocolet, *Lettres de Don des Biens de Feu Monsieur de Montmorency*, (Paris, 1633).

<sup>74</sup> *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, p.668.

<sup>75</sup> C.Loyseau, *Traité des Ordres et simples dignitez*, (Chasteaudun, 1610), p.79.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p.90.

the prerogatives and claims of princes of the blood to assist in the government of the realm. Of particular relevance to the politics of the 1610's and 1640's was the obligation of princes of the blood to assume heavy responsibilities during a royal minority. The precedent for this was provided by an ordonnance promulgated by Charles VI in 1407:

'les princes du sang plus proche de ladite couronne, sont ordonnez du conseil pour le gouvernement & administration du Royaume, durant la minorité des Roys: & par les dispositions particulières faites avant ladite ordonnance, lesdits princes du sang avoient tousjours esté mis dudites conseils les governorers apres les Roynes, non sans cause, puis que la Regence du Royaume tolluë par ladite ordonnance appartenoit au plus proche du sang, si autrement par le Roy deffunct (auquel majeur l'election du conseil de son fils Roy mineur, estoit libre comme du sien) n'en avoit esté disposé.'<sup>77</sup>

Other important privileges of the *princes du sang* revolved around the organisation of their households. For example, they were able to register members of their households as *commensal du prince* in the *cour des aides*. Fashioned after the *commensal du roi*, registration as *commensal du prince* carried important fiscal exemptions and privileges and was a position that was highly sought after.<sup>78</sup> The appointments were largely honorific and rarely carried specific functions.<sup>79</sup> Princes of the blood and sons of France were also entitled to their own councils.<sup>80</sup> This was an important attribute of the princely household and

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<sup>77</sup> Du Tillet, *Recueil des roys de France leurs couronne et leurs maisons*, (Paris, 1602), p.221.

<sup>78</sup> *Dictionnaire des institutions de la France*, ed., M.Marion, (2nd edn., Paris, 1989), p.115.

<sup>79</sup> P.Lefebvre, 'Aspects de la fidelité en France au xvii siècle', *Revue Historique*, July-September, 1973, No.507, p.62.

<sup>80</sup> P.Lefebvre, 'Aspects de la fidelité en France au xvii siècle', p.67.

again was a feature modelled consciously upon the king and his royal council - the *conseil du roi*. These privileges were important for more than anything else they enabled families like the Condé to establish courtly alternatives to the itinerant court of Louis XIII and indeed, in the reign of Louis XIV, even to the royal court at Versailles.

Much of the increase in wealth and power of the Condé had taken place during the life of the Grand Condé's father - Henri II de Bourbon - who had pursued a conscious strategy of building up and consolidating the family's provincial power bases. Between 1612 and 1628 Henri spent 2,017,000 livres on territorial acquisitions in and around his governorships of Berry and Bourbonnais.<sup>81</sup> These included the *comté* and *marquisat* of Châteauroux, brought in 1612; the estates of the Duc de Sully in Berry which incorporated the strategically critical fortress of Montrond;<sup>82</sup> and, in 1628 the estates of Sancerre.<sup>83</sup> Henri's purchases were complemented in 1631 with the acquisition of the governorship of Bourgogne, a strategically vital province on France's border with Franche-Comté and contiguous to Bourbonnais. For a long time Henri had been attempting to increase the family's influence in Bourgogne. Together with the prince's other governorships, the acquisition of this governorship formed a dense territorial block, increasing enormously the *de facto* power of the Condé in eastern France. Whilst the project to obtain the governorship had been assisted by Richelieu, who was anxious to replace the Duc de Bellegarde - a *proche* of

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<sup>81</sup> C.Jouhaud, 'Politique de princes: les Condé', p.339.

<sup>82</sup> I.Aristide, *La Fortune de Sully*, (Paris, 1991), pp.67-72.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

Marie de Medici - with someone he could rely upon,<sup>84</sup> Henri had also taken independent steps to trespass upon Bellegarde's position long before the office had been handed over to him. The prince, for example, had concentrated his recruiting activities for appointments to administrative posts within his household almost exclusively upon *robe* families native to Bourgogne.<sup>85</sup> He had made frequent visits to Châlons, the capital of one of the five *baillages* of the province,<sup>86</sup> and the law faculty at Bourges with which Condé had close ties<sup>87</sup>.

The Condéen possessions of land and governorships in eastern France were complemented by two further important blocks of landed, juridical and administrative power - the domains of the Duc de Montmorency that Condé inherited in 1632 and the acquisition of territory in the Clermontois by the Grand Condé in 1648. Both added a new dimension to the core provincial power base of the family in eastern France. With Richelieu's cooperation, the bulk of the Montmorency inheritance after the execution of the last duke in 1632, had passed to the Condé through the Princesse de Condé, Charlotte-Marguerite de Montmorency - running against the normal custom that the property of a subject guilty of *lèse majesté* passed in its entirety to the crown. This inheritance comprised the *seigneurie* of Chantilly with its château along with the *duché-pairie* of Montmorency, near the Condéen *duché-pairie* of Anguien.<sup>88</sup> Chantilly was to

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<sup>84</sup> P.Chevalier, *Louis XIII*, (Paris, 1979) p.374.

<sup>85</sup> P.Lefebvre, 'Aspects de la fidélité en France au xvii siècle', p.92.

<sup>86</sup> A Perrault-Dabot, *Jean Perrault, Président de la Cour des Comptes sous Louis XIV*, pp.18-19.

<sup>87</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.202.

<sup>88</sup> D.Roche, 'Aperçus sur la fortune et les revenus des princes de Condé, à l'aube du 18e siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, vol.xiv, July-September, (1967), p.226.

play a critical political role for the family because of the splendour and heavy fortifications of the château and the extensive estate that surrounded it; above all, its proximity to Paris, without actually being within the city, made it an ideal political base for the Condéen court. Like the policy of territorial aggrandizement adopted by the family in Berry, the Condé retained a long term interest in slowly increasing their territorial holdings in the region surrounding Chantilly. In 1694 the estate of Laversine was purchased from the Duc de St Simon and in 1701 the *marquisat* of Coye by the Grand Condé's grandson, Louis III de Bourbon.<sup>89</sup>

Whilst Chantilly provided the Condé with a base close to Paris where they could establish their court, the territories acquired in the Clermontois were, in a different way, of incalculable political value to the family. In 1648 the Grand Condé had agreed to compromise over his claims to the admiralty by accepting from the king the 'gift' of the *comté* of Clermont and the *terres* and *seigneuries* of Stenay, Dun and Jametz intact with all juridical rights and royal prerogatives.<sup>90</sup> These estates contained three crucially important border fortresses - Stenay, Clermont and Jametz - providing the prince with an extremely useful fortified base on the frontiers of France. Indeed, the rationale behind the accumulation of such large landed holdings was precisely the development of military defensive capabilities upon which the family could fall back in times of trouble. A significant feature of Condéen territorial possessions in eastern France for example, was the presence of a series of important fortresses each of which were under the direct control of the Condé. In Berry this included Montrond, Bourges and Issoudun, and

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<sup>89</sup> D.Roche, 'Aperçus sur la fortune et les revenus des princes de Condé', p.229.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.232-233.

in Bourgogne, St Jean de l'Osne and Dijon.<sup>91</sup> During the Frondes and the years in exile the Grand Condé was to make full use of their defensive military capabilities.

As well as providing the family with military security from hostile interests at court their landed possessions, which also included substantial territorial holdings in Bretagne and Anjou,<sup>92</sup> provided the funds to support the elaborate lifestyle that was a requirement for a prince of the blood. The *duché* of Chateauroux, for example, valued at around 3,200,000 *livres* brought the Condé a yearly return of 120,000 *livres*,<sup>93</sup> in addition to which the family possessed lucrative monopolies within the province such as the *droit de marque* on the forges of Berry and the *droits de cinq sols* levied upon all legal writs.<sup>94</sup> Similarly, the region of the Clermontois and area around Chantilly each brought the Condé an estimated annual income of 150,000 *livres*<sup>95</sup> - although in the Clermontois this figure fluctuated enormously according to the degree of disturbance caused by war. Income from territorial possessions and other assets was supplemented by the pensions the Condé received from the crown - 150,000 *livres per annum* as prince of the blood and 10,000 *livres per annum* as *grand maître* of the royal

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<sup>91</sup> An idea of the size of these garrisons can be gleaned for the financial claims the Grand Condé was making for their maintenance in peace negotiations between Lionne and Don Luis de Haro in 1656. Cf., A.A.E., Correspondence Politique, Espagne, vol.35, f.186: Condé's demands for compensation, 27 Aug.1656.

<sup>92</sup> D.Roche, 'Aperçus sur la fortune et les revenus des Princes de Condé', p.227.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p.234.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p.230.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p.234.

household.<sup>96</sup> The prince also received pensions as a provincial governor and governor of fortress towns like Bourges and Issoudun<sup>97</sup> although these sums were small when set against the opportunities to make money from, for example, the sale of offices that such positions provided.<sup>98</sup> At around 30,000,000 *livres* after the death of Henri II de Bourbon,<sup>99</sup> the family fortune fell just short of the fortune so notoriously left by Cardinal Mazarin and the estimated annual return on this figure was around 1,500,000 *livres*.<sup>100</sup>

Plainly, purely on the basis of their territorial possessions, local juridical rights and wider administrative responsibilities the Condé were in a position of enormous economic power and well placed to extract substantial financial gains. However, the accumulation of wealth for its own sake was low on the list of priorities. A far more important benefit sought from the acquisition of offices and governorships was the opportunity to attract other nobles into entering the 'service' of the Condé. For example, the office of *grand maître* was not valued for its entitlement to a pension from the crown but for the right to appoint members of the king's household.<sup>101</sup> This was a powerful source of political patronage - to be named *commansal du roi* was coveted for the exemptions and privileges it offered. As *grand maîtres* of the king's household the Condé therefore were able not only to place men with loyalties to the family in important positions within the

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<sup>96</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.186: Condé's demands for compensation, 27 Aug.1656.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> D.Roche, 'Aperçus sur la fortune et les revenus des princes de Condé', p.220.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p.237.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Dictionnaire des institutions des la France*, ed., M. Marion, p.266.

king's household, but also to add to their following by means of the power of appointment that being *grand maître* conferred.

The significance the Condé attached to the maintenance of their family regiments was the best example of how economic prosperity and profit were subordinated to the more important goal of obtaining sources of patronage. These were regiments raised and paid for by the prince and similar in every respect to the king's *entretenu* regiments. Like commissions in the *gardes suisses* or *gardes françaises* a commission in one of these regiments was highly prized. During the 1640's the Grand Condé was colonel of four regiments: *Anguien cavalerie*, *Anguien infanterie*, *Condé cavalerie* and *Condé infanterie*.<sup>102</sup> In addition to this he was also colonel-in-chief of four companies of light horse and gendarmes. In each of these regiments and companies the Grand Condé had a number of commissions at his disposal ranging from the acting head of the regiment when he was not in command - the *lieutenant colonel* - to a simple company ensign, the third and most junior company officer.<sup>103</sup>

The Condé were prepared to shoulder the enormous cost of maintaining these regiments because their involvement in the military stood at the very core of the family's *de facto* power. As well as using his particular regiments to further the careers of clients, thereby ensuring their loyalty, the Grand Condé also used his various wider appointments to military commands to serve the same purpose. Enormous importance was attached to the numbers of high ranking *épée* nobles

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<sup>102</sup> These were raised by his father between 1634 and 1636 *cf.*, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.361.

<sup>103</sup> D.Parrott, 'The Administration of the French Army during the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu'. Oxford D.Phil thesis, 1985, pp.178-184.

that the prince could attract into his service when acting as a corps commander. During the 1640's, for example, the Grand Condé went to great lengths to ensure that he cultivated a following of high ranking *épée* nobles like the Comte de la Suze and the Comte de Persan, a group who came to be known at court as the *petits maîtres*.<sup>104</sup>

The *petits maîtres* were individuals who rarely fulfilled a specific function in the prince's administration but who nonetheless attached themselves to the prince as a consequence of his status, political influence and position as a senior military commander. They accompanied the prince to court, fought side by side with him in the campaigns in northern France and Catalonia and in every sense regarded themselves as being in his service. It is clear that such individuals played a vital role in determining wider perceptions of the prince's power. This was particularly the case with other *grands* like the Vendôme or Orléans who competed with the Condé as rival patrons at the royal court, each trying to prove that they had the greater capacity to distribute largesse, offer promotions, and give their support to political or military projects.

In times of political crisis the *épée* entourage of someone like Condé was demonstrably of critical importance. The number of high and middle ranking *épée* nobles who were prepared to follow the Grand Condé into exile was striking. Almost without exception those who accompanied the prince to the Spanish Netherlands in 1653 had long histories of service with the family, frequently from within one of the family's *entretenu* regiments. The Comte de Guitaut, for example, the Grand Condé's favourite during the years in exile, had begun his

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<sup>104</sup> Mme de Motteville, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1982), p.108.

career as a page to Richelieu and then, through the mediation of the Duc de Châtillon, had been admitted into the entourage of the Grand Condé's father. In 1647 Guitaut was an ensign in the *Cheveau Légers de Condé* subsequent to which he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and then soon after captain of his company.<sup>105</sup> Guitaut's wisest career move was to follow the prince into exile. In Brussels he was promoted to the rank of *governorer gentilhomme* of the prince's household and raised his own regiment;<sup>106</sup> upon his return to France in 1660 he was promoted through the prince's patronage to the order of the St Esprit.<sup>107</sup> Guitaut's career path was mirrored by the Comte de Coligny-Saligny, who, like Guitaut had begun as a page to Richelieu, had been brought into the entourage of the Grand Condé's father by his cousin the Duc de Châtillon, and had been promoted through the ranks of one of the prince's *entretenu* regiments - the *Regiment d'Anguien*. He too followed the prince into exile.<sup>108</sup>

There was clearly a geographical strategy to Condé's patronage of *épée* families whose sons were making their careers in the army. The Comte de Montal, for example, who like Guitaut and Coligny-Saligny, joined the prince in exile with his regiment, came from a distinguished family in Berry who took their title from a barony in Bourgogne.<sup>109</sup> The count had two brothers both of whom had died in the prince's service - Gilles and François. Gilles was killed at Nördlingen in

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<sup>105</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v. pp.261-262.

<sup>106</sup> Cf., B.N., Ms.Fr.6720, (Lenet Papers), f.9: Condé to Lenet, 11 Mar.1653.

<sup>107</sup> Aumale, *Histoires des Princes de Condé*, v. pp.261-262.

<sup>108</sup> Aumale, *Histoires des Princes de Condé*, v.321.

<sup>109</sup> Aumale, *Histoires des Princes de Condé*, vi.275.

1645 where he had been a captain in the *Regiment d'Anguien*. His brother François had died in Flanders where he had been a captain in the *Regiment de Condé*.<sup>110</sup> By the late 1640's Montal was the only remaining member of his family in the prince's service. He followed the prince into exile and was made governor of the fortress of Rocroi. Like Guitaut, in recognition of his loyalty the count was promoted to the order of the St Esprit on his return to France.<sup>111</sup>

Commanders like Montal, Guitaut and Coligny-Saligny, relatively uninfluential members of the *épée* nobility when they first entered the prince's service, were accompanied by others of rather greater political and social stature. Individuals like the Comte de la Suze and Comte de Bouteville, distant relations of the prince, were comparatively high ranking *épée* nobles, both of whom brought with them substantial *de facto* military power which they placed at the prince's disposal. The importance of familial relations should not be underestimated in determining the political alignments of individuals during this period. Kinship was often the passport into service with a *grand*, for it provided a basis of mutual obligation, loyalty and trust - precisely the rationale underpinning the marriage strategies of Richelieu and Mazarin. Such a bond was invaluable in a society that still subscribed to a warrior aristocratic culture that stressed individual autonomy and independence and which continued to posit alternative sources of authority and legitimacy to the crown.

Although distant, the blood link that both the Comte de la Suze and the Comte de Bouteville enjoyed with Condé was the key to their close relationship

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<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> B.N. Dossiers Bleus, Montal, 'Eloge Funebre du Comte de Montal'.

with the prince. La Suze was a distant cousin of the Condé through his mother, Charlotte de la Rochefoucauld.<sup>112</sup> Accompanying Condé into exile he placed his regiment at the prince's disposal as well as his command of the strategically important fortress of Belfort in the Franche-Comté.<sup>113</sup> Similarly, the Comte de Bouteville, a cadet of the senior line of the Montmorency, was related to the Grand Condé through the prince's mother - Charlotte Marguerite de Montmorency.<sup>114</sup> Bouteville joined the prince in exile bringing with him his own regiment and command of the fortress of Bellegarde in the Bourgogne which held out against the royal army until 1654.<sup>115</sup>

The relationship between Condé and his *petits maîtres* was not contractual but diffuse and therefore quite distinct from the prince's *clientèle*. Those who fell into the category of the Condéen *clientèle* were the individuals appointed to administrative positions within the prince's household or who had administrative responsibilities over the management of family estates. Holders of the highly sought after posts in the prince's household such as the prince's intendant, *secrétaire des commandements*, *conseiller* or *trésorier général* frequently came from the upper ranks of *robe* or minor *épée* families. Often they had a tradition of service to the Condé and were consciously recruited from families native to Berry or Bourgogne<sup>116</sup> where the Condé cultivated their provincial sphere of influence.

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<sup>112</sup> A.C. Alliances de la Maison de Condé, f.7.

<sup>113</sup> B.N., Ms.Fr.6722, (Lenet Papers), f.164: Condé to Lenet, 3 July 1659, also, *cf.*, p.48.

<sup>114</sup> F.A. Aubert de la Chenaye des Bois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse*, 15 vols., (2nd edn, Paris 1770-1786), x.409.

<sup>115</sup> *Cf.*, p.48

<sup>116</sup> P.Lefebvre, 'Aspects de la fidélité en France', pp.72-73.

Entering the service of the Condé in an administrative capacity was highly prized quite simply because of the opportunities it offered for social ascension and for the honour of being attached to such an august house. Jean Lenet, *secrétaire des commandements* to the Condé towards the end of the sixteenth century, for example, was typical of the kind of Bourguignon minor *robe noble* whose family achieved social elevation by attaching themselves to the Condé in the early to mid seventeenth century. He was native to Bourgogne where he was governor of the provincial chancellery, and one of his sons, Philibert, as a consequence of his father's attachment to the Condé, became a *président* in the *chambre des comptes* of Dijon.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, Jean Lenet began a tradition of family service to the Condé through which his family were able to maintain a steady progress through the noble ranks culminating in the late seventeenth century with Louis Lenet, knight of the order of Malta and *lieutenant général des armées du roi*.<sup>118</sup>

Whilst the Lenet brought to the Condé their provincial contacts in Bourgogne and local knowledge of the Bourguignon administration, other members of the princes' permanent staff recruited from different regions or offices added further dimensions. For example, François Chassepot, *trésorier général* to the Condé between 1649 and 1664, brought his experience and contacts as *trésorier de la maison du roi* and *royal conseiller d'état* to the family.<sup>119</sup> Similarly, François-Theodore de Nesmond, before he became intendant to Henri II de Bourbon, was one of the *présidents* in the Paris Parlement and hence firmly established within

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p.93.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p.96.

the capital's political *robe* elite.<sup>120</sup> Recruiting individuals of this calibre to the top administrative posts within the prince's household was critical less for the practical skills they could offer than for the knowledge and contacts within, for example, the Paris Parlement or the Parlement of Dijon. Whilst both institutions were major forums of political power they were also the law courts that would deliberate on lawsuits brought against or by the Condé, and in as litigious a society as early modern France, the recourse of the family to the law was frequent.<sup>121</sup>

During the 1650's Condé's exile was to have a significant effect upon French politics. This was understandable given the combination of enormous *de facto* power he and his family had amassed during the 1630's and 1640's and his *de jure* claims to power as France's first prince of the blood. The impact of such an important member of France's political elite choosing the path of self assertion and contracting a military alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs was huge, particularly since so many of the prince's entourage and clients saw that their interests were best served by following the prince to Brussels. Many of the nobles who joined Condé in the Spanish Netherlands during the 1650's had through his patronage been some of the most powerful members of the French court during the 1640's

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<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p.94

<sup>121</sup> *Cf.*, for example, during the 1650's, the Condé's involvement in two major cases that passed through the Paris Parlement, the first against the Comte d'Harcourt concerned the lands of Arnay le Duc & de Pouilly - B.N., Factum 17526: 'Sommaire de la defense de Monsieur le Prince contre Monsieur le Comte d'Harcourt', the second, between Condé and his brother Conti over the terms of their inheritance - B.N. Factum 3988: Procés de Louis de Bourbon, prince de Condé et d'Armand de Bourbon prince de Conti, son frère, au sujet de la succession d'Henry de Bourbon, prince de Condé, et de Charlotte-Marguerite de Montmorency, leurs père et mères.'

and they used these positions to cause the maximum disruption to the cardinal's regime. In addition, the prince was able to exploit his position as a military commander and colonel-in-chief of several regiments to lead a sizeable army against what he regarded as the illegitimate Mazarinist regime. This military strength was complemented by the strength of his *de jure* position as France's first prince of the blood, an enormous advantage in the propaganda war that was to rage within France against the 'tyranny' of Cardinal Mazarin.

## 1

Condé in exile: Spanish reactions in Madrid  
and Brussels 1652-1656

THE TRANSITION TO EXILE

The abandonment of Paris by Condé's army on 13 October 1652 and the offer of a royal amnesty to the remaining Frondeurs during the same month, is often regarded as the watershed that began Condé's eight years of exile.<sup>1</sup> But the issue of Condé's exile was never so straightforward. For more than six months his political status was ambiguous and indeed, it was not clear whether he was based in France or the Spanish Netherlands. Those *grands* who had formed the coalition known as the *Fronde des Princes* had retired defeated to their estates in the provinces, nonetheless the grip of the Court on power was weak and Mazarin was still in exile.<sup>2</sup> Condé, who had not accepted the royal amnesty and was militarily isolated, was engaged in a constant dialogue with Paris over the possible terms of

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<sup>1</sup> Jean Bérenger touching on this period writes: 'A la fin de 1652, La Fronde était donc à peu près terminée (sauf à Bordeaux). Mazarin dirigeait le gouvernement depuis Sedan, Turenne était son plus fidèle soutien, Condé passé à l'ennemi..' J. Bérenger, *Turenne*, (Paris, 1987) p.317. A clearer presumption of Condé's utter defeat after Paris can be found in Goubert's recent biography of Cardinal Mazarin: P. Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990) p.347.

<sup>2</sup> Mazarin's second period of exile lasted from October 1652 until his return in February 1653. P. Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.369.

a reconciliation.<sup>3</sup> There remained every likelihood that he would accept the terms being offered to him, or that with the support of the Spanish Army of Flanders and Spanish naval support in Guyenne a revival of his military fortunes would occur that would demonstrate the weakness of the Court's position in Paris and cause some of the ex-frondeurs to rally again to the prince's standard.

The political uncertainty of Condé's position was reflected in the geographical ambiguity of his status as an exile. It is simply not possible to identify a date after which Condé can be said definitively to be in exile. Certainly, after 1653, Condé perennially wintered in Brussels as a guest of the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, but throughout his exile, he continued to hold territories within France where regiments from his army, with varying degrees of success, would pass the winter months.<sup>4</sup> After his departure from Paris in October 1652 Condé had no intention of going into exile, indeed had this been the case it would have demonstrated his unqualified acceptance of military defeat in France. But Condé was far from defeated and Paris was by no means the last bastion to fall. Significant areas of France still held out against the Court. The most important of these was Guyenne, but Condé still held parts of Champagne, Bourgogne and Alsace where commanders loyal to his cause continued to resist the Mazarinist coalition.

These positions were gradually absorbed by the French over the course of

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<sup>3</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures*, vol.269, f.253: Mazarin to Fabert, 5 Oct.1652; f.269: Mazarin to Servien, 9 Oct.1652; f.304: Mazarin to Montaigu, 18 Oct.1652; f.312: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 20 Oct.1652.

<sup>4</sup> Rocroi, which fell to the Spanish Army of Flanders and Condé in October 1653 and was handed over to Condé remained an important base in Champagne for the prince where his troops quartered yearly until his return to France.

1653 and 1654, meanwhile contributing significantly to the chronic instability of the cardinal's regime after his return to France in February 1653. But the reduction of Condé's position in Champagne and Picardie was a slow process, and Condé's retreat into Luxembourg and Namur, provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, was piecemeal. France throughout the 1650's remained a patchwork of loyalties, and during the early and highly volatile years of the decade Mazarin and his allies were engaged in painstaking attempts to win over strategically important enclaves. Whether this involved the replacement of provincial governors by *grands* loyal to the regime, of a mistrusted commander of a border fortress by a reliable officer, or coordinating the reduction of those towns and regions controlled by Condé, the overarching objective was the same: ensuring that Mazarin and his followers had sufficient support in the provinces to govern, and that the cardinal's position as first minister was secure.<sup>5</sup>

Condé's exile was therefore not a simple gesture. When he left Paris in October 1652 he retreated into the north-east of Champagne where he had the command of a series of important border fortresses. Champagne was an important power base for the prince largely as a result of a deal struck with Mazarin in 1647. Condé's brother-in-law Armand de Maillé, Duc de Brézé, had held the office of Admiral of France and when he had died in June 1646 the prince had been prepared to waive his claims to the Admiralty against the control of three major border fortresses in Champagne: Clermont, Stenay and Jametz.<sup>6</sup> Situated in the

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<sup>5</sup> These issues are discussed in greater detail in chapter four.

<sup>6</sup> Henri d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, (Paris, 1889), v. 124-127. Condé made an explicit reference to this deal in August 1652: A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol 12, f.25: Condé to the Parlement de Bordeaux, 19 Aug.1652.

Ardennes these fortresses were contiguous to the duchy of Lorraine and they linked on to an important ribbon of *places fortes* along the frontiers of Champagne and Picardie. The loyalties of the commanders of these garrisons over the course of the 1650's were constantly open to question and Condé's position in the Ardennes provided him with many opportunities to gain control of these fortresses through diplomatic means.<sup>7</sup> But it was to his possessions in Champagne that the prince retreated in October 1652 with his small army of 3,000 men,<sup>8</sup> consolidating his position in the province by taking Rethel in the same month and in November the fortresses of St Menehould and Bar-le-Duc in November.<sup>9</sup>

Condé's strategy was not difficult to discern. The extension of his own holdings to St Menehould, Rethel and Bar-le-Duc brought him further towards Bourgogne, where he had been governor and with which he had close ties. Additionally, he was now closer to two important fortresses: Belfort, a fortress wedged between Alsace and the Franche-Comté commanded by an ally and kinsman, Gaspard de Champagne, Comte de la Suze; and Bellegarde, a fortress situated in Bourgogne commanded by another ally and kinsman, François Henri de Montmorency, Comte de Bouteville.<sup>10</sup> Whilst Condé's brother and sister, the Prince de Conti and the Duchesse de Longueville, continued to hold most of the

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<sup>7</sup> One such opportunity presented itself in 1655 for example when the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt became disaffected with the court and bartered with Condé for the government of Peronne. A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.263, f.124: Archduke Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 20 Nov.1655; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.402: Condé to Fiesque, 30 Nov.1655.

<sup>8</sup> Lenet gives an estimate of Condé's army at this stage. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.331: Lenet to Don Luis de Haro, 20 Aug.1652.

<sup>9</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6712 (Lenet Papers), f.5: Condé to Lenet, 3 Dec.1652; B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1652, p.558.

<sup>10</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.22; Marquis de Ségur, *La Jeunesse du Maréchal de Luxembourg*, (4th edn., Paris), i. 236-273.

important fortresses of Guyenne, including Bordeaux itself, Condé had established his headquarters in the fortress of Stenay from where he coordinated hostilities against the court from the north-east of France with the continued resistance of his brother and sister in Guyenne.<sup>11</sup> At the end of 1652 and during the first six months of 1653 the position of Condé's party in France was therefore strong. Through the various governorships and fortresses belonging to those allies and kinsman loyal to his cause he controlled pockets of territories from the borders of Namur in the Spanish Netherlands to the coasts of Guyenne in the South of France.

Condé's speedy acquisition of a number of these fortresses in Champagne during the winter of 1652-3 was assisted by the complete absence of any serious resistance. The governor of Picardie, the Duc d'Elboeuf, loyal to the Court, was unable to muster sufficient numbers of men to pose any serious threat and his attempts to obstruct Condé's advance only amounted to military posturing.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, the Maréchal de Turenne, another supporter of the weakened regime and in command of the royal army that had laid siege to Paris in 1652, did not possess sufficient resources to divide the royal army and pursue Condé whilst maintaining a firm grip on the capital.<sup>13</sup> There were rumours anyway that Condé

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<sup>11</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.54: Treaty between Bolsey and Condé, Apr.1653. B.N. Ms.fr.6714 (Lenet Papers), f.70: Condé to Président d'Affiés, 10 Mar.1653.

<sup>12</sup> This episode can be followed through the exasperated correspondence between the cardinal and the Maréchaux d'Aumont, Senneterre and Hocquincourt: A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.336: Mazarin to Aumont, 1 Nov.1652; f.334: Mazarin to Hocquincourt, 5 Nov.1652; f.363: Mazarin to La Ferté Senneterre, 6 Nov.1652.

<sup>13</sup> Mazarin was concerned that despite the king's entrance into Paris in October, the capital continued to be unstable. A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.324: Mazarin to Ondedei, 26 Oct.1652; B.N. Ms.fr.23,202, f.64: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 21 Oct.1652; f.68 Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 8 Dec.1652.

had joined his forces with the Spanish Army of Flanders and it would have been reckless in the extreme to leave Paris vulnerable to attack having so recently secured the surrender of the *Frondeurs* and departure of the prince.<sup>14</sup>

The resistance that Condé did encounter in Champagne was presided over by Mazarin himself who did not return to Paris until February 1653. But the series of minor confrontations between Mazarin's mercenaries and Condé's garrisons bordered on the comic. The cardinal was desperate to secure some kind of military victory over the prince on the back of which he could return triumphantly to Paris.<sup>15</sup> Château Porcien, for example, a small garrison in northern Picardie, changed hands twice in January 1653 passing between supporters of Mazarin and Condé. On both occasions the effect on the balance of power in Picardie was negligible, but it was not surprising that these events were seized on by Mazarinist and Condéen propagandists in Paris to paint suitable images of humiliating defeats.<sup>16</sup> The indigenous population of the region seems to have been ambivalent in professing support for either party and were more concerned with the destruction wreaked on the local economy. Rheims for instance, across the border from Picardie and in Champagne, refused both Mazarin and Condé permission to garrison the town, which suggests that for contemporaries,

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<sup>14</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.320: Mazarin to the Proc.Général, 25 Oct.1652.

<sup>15</sup> Campion is very straightforward about this, cf. Henri de Campion, *Mémoires*, (Mercure de France edn., Paris, 1967) p.209.

<sup>16</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, pp.46, 48, 58; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.5: Mazarin to Anne of Austria, 5 Jan.1653; f.24: Mazarin to Le Tellier, 10 Jan.1653; B.N. Ms.fr.6713 (Lenet Papers), f.87: Marigny to Condé, 19 Jan.1653.

Mazarin's return to supremacy was by no means a foregone conclusion.<sup>17</sup>

It is therefore not hard to see how the Spanish benefited from supporting Condé. Clearly, the fall of Paris to the Court was a disappointment keenly felt in Brussels and Madrid. The Spanish had hoped that the *Fronde des Princes* would overcome the Court and a ministeriat under the control of Condé and Gaston, Duc d'Orléans, would sue for peace with Spain. Peace was, after all, the platform of Condéen resistance to the cardinal and his *créatures*.<sup>18</sup> A condition of the treaty Condé had signed with Philip IV in November 1651 had been the speedy conclusion of negotiations for a general peace between France and Spain once the Court had been defeated.<sup>19</sup> Such hopes had obviously proved premature but even with Condé's military position in central France in tatters, the prince provided a diversion that was regarded by Madrid as enormously important. Whilst Condé held fortresses in France the military resources of the adolescent Louis XIV were being diverted away from the major campaign theatres of Catalonia, north Italy and Flanders, and concentrated on areas of Condéen resistance. 1652, the *annus mirabilis* of Spanish arms which had seen Gravelines, Dunkirk, Barcelona and Casale regained by Spanish troops, had been blamed by Mazarin at least, on the continuation of the *Frondes* in France.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.130.

<sup>18</sup> For an idea of the Condéen agenda see for instance: A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.890, f.86: 'Les Motifs qui ont porté S.A.R. à se déclarer pour M. le Prince qui servent de justification à son manifeste M DC LII'.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. the preamble to the treaty between Condé and Philip IV reproduced by Cosnac. P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, (Paris, 1866-82), p.425.

<sup>20</sup> Mazarin consistently tried to shift the blame onto Condé for these losses, cf. A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34 f.166: note in margin by Mazarin in, 'Articles de Paix donnée à M.Lionne s'en allant en Espagne pour les proposer suivant son instruction de Juin 1656.'

It was arguments based on the evidence from the most recent campaigns and the chance that Condé and his allies would overthrow the incumbent regime that were being used in Philip IV's council to justify continued support for Condé.<sup>21</sup> The Spanish king was obliged to assist Condé anyway by the treaty between the two negotiated in November 1651. This agreement was formal, placing Condé's resistance to the cardinal in the wider context of the war between France and Spain. Embedded in the treaty were clauses that set out starkly the obligations between Philip IV and Condé in the eventuality of peace negotiations: both undertook not to negotiate with the cardinal's regime unilaterally.<sup>22</sup> As the decade continued, the terms of the treaty came under close scrutiny as they were set against the wider and occasionally divergent interests held by Condé, Madrid and the Spanish high command in Brussels.

Philip IV and his ministers were aware that they had much to lose if Condé chose to abandon his treaty and negotiate a reconciliation alone with the Court in Paris.<sup>23</sup> Militarily, the benefits of Condé's service were clear to see, politically the influence of the prince in France was significant and a constant concern for Mazarin and his coterie. Madrid was therefore clear that there were positive gains

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<sup>21</sup> Condé's envoy in Madrid, St Agolin, wrote to the prince in March 1653, 'Ils tesmoigne fort autrement que le bon fondement de leurs affaires et la continuation de cette alliance qu'ils disent considérer pour être leur principale et qu'on ny il ne veullent songer à autre chose que se le maintenir', B.N. Ms.fr.6714 (Lenet Papers), f.1: St Agolin to Condé, 1 Mar.1653. This was later reflected in the comments made in the king's council: 'Añadiendo ser la real intención del V.Magestad que se anteponga a sus particulares conveniencias el mantimiento del Principe y partido que se hallan protegidos de V.Magestad...' A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 Apr.1653. cf. A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.253, f.221: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 26 Apr.1653; vol.255, f.70: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 11 Jun.1653.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Clause i of Condé's treaty. P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

<sup>23</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 29 Apr.1653; Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1653. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.307: Fuensaldaña to Condé, 6 Jul.1652.

to be made from supporting Condé. Juggling the commitments of fighting a war on multiple fronts they tried to give Condé a high financial and military priority. Orders sent to Brussels were emphatic that the support of Condé and his party in France was of paramount importance and the deployment of the Spanish Army of Flanders was to be geared to the service of Condé's strategic aims.<sup>24</sup>

Despite this, Condé remained concerned that he might be abandoned by Madrid and he was particularly exercised by this worry whilst rumours circulated that the two major powers were on the verge of peace negotiations.<sup>25</sup> It was apparent as early as 1650 that the prince and his allies simply did not possess the kind of military resources available to Mazarin and the French Court, and Spanish assistance had quickly become recognised as a precondition for Mazarin's defeat.<sup>26</sup> Despite the vestiges of Condé's military power remaining in northern France and Guyenne after the fall of Paris, it was plain that without Spanish assistance Condé had no choice but to negotiate his reconciliation with the Court and in these circumstances he could expect harsh terms for any settlement.<sup>27</sup> What was clearly a catastrophic scenario for him was the negotiation of a general peace between France and Spain in which his interests were simply marginalised, or worse, used by the Spanish as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from

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<sup>24</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.254, f.4: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 7 Feb.1653; f.11: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 7 Jan.1653; f.90: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 15 Feb.1653; f.221: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 26 Apr.1653; vol.255, f.70: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 11 Jun.1653.

<sup>25</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6714 (Lenet Papers), f.213: St Agolin to Condé, 8 Apr.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.164: Fiesque to Condé, 11/13 Jun.1653; f.242: Lenet to Condé, 10 Jul.1653.

<sup>26</sup> C.S.P.Venetian, xxviii.202: Morosini to the Doge and Senate, 24 Oct.1651.

<sup>27</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6714 (Lenet Papers), f.147: Condé to Lenet, Mar.1653; f.133: Condé to Lenet, 19 Mar.1653.

Paris.<sup>28</sup>

However, Condé's relationship with the Spanish was not bipartite. A third dimension was added to Condé's relationship with Madrid by the Spanish high command in Brussels. Until a change in personnel in 1656 went some way towards rectifying the situation, the high command saw Condé's interests, what they perceived to be their own, and those of Madrid, as increasingly conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable. Whilst Condé continued to defy the French Court *within* France's frontiers the high command in Brussels could see clear reasons for deploying their scarce military and financial resources to support the prince.<sup>29</sup> Condé after all had been indirectly responsible for the victories at Dunkirk and Gravelines. Civil war in France had prevented the port from being adequately defended whilst the resources of the French crown were concentrated on the task of defeating Condé and his party.<sup>30</sup> On one level, therefore, the high command in Brussels was anxious that Condé should not come to an accommodation with the French crown and they warmly welcomed his assistance.

But what the high command in Brussels wished to avoid at all costs was the arrival of the prince in the Spanish Netherlands where the increased financial and military burden of supporting the prince, his supporters and his troops, would

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<sup>28</sup> Condé was terrified of this possibility *cf.* B.N. Ms.fr.6714 (Lenet Papers), f.213: St Agolin to Condé, 8 Apr.1653.

<sup>29</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.254, f.8: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 4 Feb.1653; f.73: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 15 Feb.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.307: Fuensaldaña to Condé, 6 Jul.1652.

<sup>30</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.31 f.252: Recueil des discours tenu à la table de le Comte de Fuensaldagne, le Prince de Ligne... 6 Nov.1652; M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.238: Mazarin to Estrades, 30 Sept.1652; f.240: Vendôme to Estrades, 30 Sept.1652.

impose economic and social costs they were not in a position to meet.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, despite orders from Madrid to give Condé all necessary assistance, the high command in Brussels saw that there was a balance to be maintained between on the one hand assisting Condé and his party, and on the other, pursuing their own military objectives. The potential conflict of interests between Condé and the Spanish high command that this generated was demonstrated as early as August 1652 when the governor of the Spanish Netherlands disobeyed orders from Madrid by abandoning Condé and undertaking the siege of Dunkirk.<sup>32</sup> Despite the success of this venture, a serious consequence was to deprive Bordeaux of the warships the city so badly needed to prevent the Duc de Vendôme from blockading the Garonne and ultimately, it was Vendôme's blockade that drove Condé's brother and sister, Conti and the Duchesse de Longueville, to surrender to the young Louis XIV in August 1653.<sup>33</sup>

The Spanish high command in Brussels were therefore far from convinced that assisting Condé was in their interests to the extent that Philip IV and his ministers in Madrid plainly believed. The governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Habsburg archduke, Leopold Wilhelm, complained to Madrid that their military interventions on Condé's behalf in France had been fruitless and the archduke increasingly tried to demonstrate in his letters that Condé was an extra

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<sup>31</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.490 (Clairambault), f.311: Arnolfini to St Amour, 3 Oct.1652.

<sup>32</sup> R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders*, (Cambridge, 1992), p.143.

<sup>33</sup> Fuensaldaña wrote to Condé in September 1652 expressing his regret that they could not send the vessels he had been promised - they were engaged in the siege of Dunkirk. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.348: Fuensaldaña to Condé, 3 Sept.1652. For an account of the surrender of Bordeaux cf. S.A.Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux*, (John Hopkins, 1971), pp.117-125.

burden that they could well do without.<sup>34</sup> The complaints of the archduke and of his second in command, the commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders, the Conde de Fuensaldaña, reached a crescendo as Condé's position in France gradually worsened.<sup>35</sup> Condé, and more seriously his army, were forced to retreat further and further across the borders of France and into the Spanish Netherlands. As far as the high command in Brussels was concerned this was the very situation they had hoped to avoid, and it seemed to them from the response they received to their letters from Madrid that Philip IV was unmoved by their pleas for greater financial assistance to bear the cost of the prince and his army.<sup>36</sup>

However, profound feelings of dissatisfaction were not confined to the high command in Brussels. Condé believed, and argued in his letters to Madrid, that the inaction of Brussels at various critical stages of his struggle in France was directly responsible for the eventual collapse of his position.<sup>37</sup> A consequence of this was that as early as January 1653 the prince began to pursue a political campaign through his agents and allies in Madrid against the commander of the

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<sup>34</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.16: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 11 Sept.1653; f.31: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, Sept.1653; f.138: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 1 Oct.1653; f.146: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 4 Oct.1653; f.323: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.98: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 17 Sept.1653; f.166: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 29 Oct.1653; f.170: Philip IV to Condé, 29 Oct.1653.

<sup>37</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.164: Fiesque to Condé, 11/13 Jun.1653; f.340: Fiesque to Condé, 30 Aug.1653; f.458: Fiesque to Condé, 12 Nov.1653; vol 15, f.267: Condé to Fiesque, 20 Aug.1655.

Spanish Army of Flanders, the Conde de Fuensaldaña.<sup>38</sup> Condé was represented in Madrid by a team of envoys and representatives who, as the decade wore on, managed with increasing success to accumulate political influence in Madrid. Condé's delegation, headed at this early stage by St Agolin before he was later joined by an envoy of greater weight, the Comte de Fiesque, made repeated complaints about the lack of assistance they were receiving from Brussels.<sup>39</sup> Of course, as Condé was well aware, the problem was not simply the differences of opinion in Brussels. The general financial malaise affecting the Spanish Empire was a more important factor that prevented Madrid from assisting the French prince to the extent that they had agreed in 1651.<sup>40</sup> This lack of funds vastly raised the stakes in Brussels over the question of strategic priority, questions that were clearly decided to a large extent *in situ*, for Brussels had already demonstrated her capability for independent action when it came to deciding where her best interests lay.

As Condé's position in the heart of Champagne and the periphery of Bourgogne worsened and he was pushed towards France's amorphous frontiers, the combination of the *de facto* presence of his army sheltering in Luxembourg and Namur, and the priority he had been accorded by Madrid, meant that his absorption into the high command in Brussels rapidly became a necessity. By April 1653 Condé was integrated into the command structure. How else could the

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<sup>38</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6713 (Lenet Papers), f.108: Lenet to St Agolin, 23 Jan.1653; f.127: Lenet to St Agolin, 27 Jan.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.404: Fiesque to Condé, Oct.1653; f.406: Fiesque to Condé, Oct.1653; vol.14, f.15: Fiesque to Condé, 29 Jan.1654.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6713 (Lenet Papers), f.158: Condé to Lenet, 5 Feb.1653.

archduke and Fuensaldaña hope to co-ordinate their military strategies with Condé who was fighting along the same frontier? At the very least, it demonstrated to Madrid a certain willingness on their part to accommodate the French prince. During the winter of 1652-1653 Condé was forced to quarter his troops partially within the province of Luxembourg.<sup>41</sup> The smattering of garrisons the prince had taken in late 1652 and early 1653 gradually fell to commanders loyal to the cause of Mazarin, the queen mother and Louis XIV. The most important of these were St Menehould in November 1653 and Belfort in the Franche-Comté in February 1654.<sup>42</sup> But whilst the internecine feuds gathered momentum within the high command in the Spanish Netherlands, of which Condé was now a constituent member, the prince suffered another loss not in the north of France but in Guyenne, where by August 1653 the entire Condéen position had collapsed and his brother and sister had no alternative but to accept the king's amnesty.

The impact of Bordeaux's capitulation on Condé's overall position was very serious for it raised the question of his future relationship with the Spanish. Arguments for a re-negotiation of Condé's treaty now seemed justified. Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña had always accepted the pragmatic sense in assisting Condé whilst the prince's hostilities in France tied down Louis XIV's armies. But in a situation where Condé's military and political position in France had collapsed, the benefits to be gained from his assistance were not so apparent.

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<sup>41</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.128: Condé to Meille, Persan, Montesquien, Berlo... (minutes of letters), May 1653.

<sup>42</sup> A.Chérueil, *Histoire de France sous le ministère de Mazarin*, (Paris, 1882), ii.119; B.R.B. *Rélations Véritables*, 1654, p.102.

Condé's treaty had been precise about Madrid's obligations towards him in this event. Whilst Madrid would continue to hold the same financial obligations towards Condé, clauses eighteen through to twenty-two of the treaty held Brussels to strict conditions over the accommodation of Condé's troops in winter quarters and stressed the high priority Condé's strategic aims were to receive.<sup>43</sup> But these were conditions that, if enforced in this situation, were likely to provoke a crisis. Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña had a poor relationship but if they were united over one issue it was in their commitment to overturning Condé's treaty. As it happened they proved unsuccessful in this aim, but the consequences of their unrelenting hostility towards the prince threw the situation in the Spanish Netherlands into turmoil.

## FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS

### AND ITS IMPACT: 1653-56

The administration of the Spanish Netherlands was controlled by a system of household government. Supreme executive authority was held by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands. The powers of this office were wide-ranging and embraced the judiciary and financial departments of government as well as supreme command of the Spanish Army of Flanders. The governor was in effect the viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, but, unlike other viceroys in the Spanish empire, did not have his authority checked by the Council of War in Madrid or the

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<sup>43</sup> P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

system of *audiencias*.<sup>44</sup> By the 1650's there were two major offices in the Spanish Netherlands - the governor and his second-in-command, the army commander.<sup>45</sup> The *gobernador de armas*, or army commander, was a post created during the 1630's and superseded the *maestro de campo general* which had hitherto been the most senior office in the military. In the absence of the governor, the army commander became the overall commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders. However, the introduction of this new office created resentment. This was particularly the case during the 1650's when it was well known that Leopold Wilhelm disliked what he regarded as Fuensaldaña's meddling in his affairs. The ability of the army commander to use his position to oppose the projects of his superior was considerable. James, Duke of York mentioned for example that the Marques de Caracena, the army commander was actually capable of countermanding Don Juan José, the governor, as a consequence of the political power he had accumulated.<sup>46</sup>

Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña however both shared a common aim in their wish to wish to overturn Condé's treaty, for it bound Madrid and Brussels to conditions they could not possibly hope to satisfy. Moreover, the burden of supporting the French prince had now shifted onto the Spanish Netherlands. Financial resources were scarce. Contributions raised locally and regional taxes taken together only amounted to one quarter of the sum needed to maintain the

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<sup>44</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, (Cambridge, 1990), p.111.

<sup>45</sup> H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas, 1635-1700*, (Brussels, 1896, p.45.

<sup>46</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, (trans.) A.Lytton Sells, (London, 1962), p.256.

Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>47</sup> Brussels was completely dependant upon Madrid to make up the massive shortfall. But during the early 1650's Madrid was encountering chronic financial problems herself. Philip IV was having to balance the requirements of a war fought on multiple fronts, while a permanent feature of crown expenditure had long been an ever-increasing deficit.<sup>48</sup> Between 1640 and 1660 the crown was forced into two bankruptcies, one in 1647 and the other in 1653.<sup>49</sup> Bankruptcies during this period were not as serious as the term suggests, only amounting to a massive rescheduling of debts.<sup>50</sup> Nonetheless, the effects were felt in the Spanish Netherlands where revenues from Spain after the second bankruptcy in 1653 were reduced to a small and inadequate trickle.

The arrival of Condé in these circumstances was therefore an added burden that Brussels could ill afford. Aside from a series of substantial down payments to Condé after the ratification of his treaty, the financial entitlement of the prince to support his household and army was an annual revenue of approximately 1,250,000 *escudos*.<sup>51</sup> This sum was the Spanish obligation to Condé alone and does not take into account the extra pensions and revenues set aside for Condé's commanders, or the maintenance of the households of Condé's wife, Claire-Clemence de Maillé Brézé, and his son, the Duc d'Anguien. To place this sum of

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<sup>47</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, (Cambridge, 1972), p.154.

<sup>48</sup> H.Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714*, (London, 1983), pp.214-219.

<sup>49</sup> A.Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV*, (2nd edn. Madrid, 1983), pp.61-74, 97-98; J.H.Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, (London, 1963), p.356.

<sup>50</sup> Bankruptcies did, however, have a serious immediate impact on the raising of new credits from financiers. G.Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands 1559-1659*, (London, 1979), pp.33-34.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. clauses iii, iv, v, vi, xvi, xvii, xx, xxviii, of Condé's treaty. P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

money into context, in February 1654 Leopold Wilhelm wrote to Philip IV setting out the requirements for the financing of the Spanish Army of Flanders during that year. He distinguished between a defensive war, which he predicted would need 2,500,000 *escudos*, and an offensive war, requiring 3,600,000 *escudos*.<sup>52</sup> The addition of Condé's separate revenues therefore, increased these sums enormously, adding onto the archduke's predictions for the cost of waging a defensive campaign a staggering 50% premium.

But the sums of money set out in Condé's treaty and by Leopold Wilhelm in February 1654 were far removed from the amounts Madrid was actually able to send to the Spanish Netherlands during this period. Condé was never paid anything approaching the sums Madrid had agreed to in 1651, neither were the requisite sums ever paid to the Spanish Army of Flanders. It is unlikely that Condé's obligations could have been fulfilled even had they been made during the 1630's, when levels of revenue remained at relatively high levels compared with the later years of the Franco-Spanish war.<sup>53</sup> The extra burden of the prince aside, subventions from Madrid were well below levels needed to maintain the Spanish Army of Flanders and it is astounding that the Spanish were able to make such considerable military advances during the *Frondes*.<sup>54</sup> The financing of the

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<sup>52</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Consulta, 16 Feb.1653.

<sup>53</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p.295. Receipts of Spanish silver during the 1630's were at the high point of the Franco-Spanish war cf. J.H.Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, (London, 1963), p.184, and H.Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth century 1665-1700*, (London, 1980), p.135. Domínguez Ortiz points out that it was not until after the 1640's that the *asiento* system began to show signs of strain, 'El sistema funcionó con relativa normalidad hasta 1640...', Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda*, p.97.

<sup>54</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain*, (London, 1981), p.128; R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders*, (Cambridge, 1992), p.127.

Spanish Army of Flanders as it had existed before Condé's arrival rested on a precarious balance between local extraction of money and subventions from Madrid.<sup>55</sup> Condé now threatened to upset this balance completely, throwing the provinces into social disorder. Furthermore, Condé's treaty gave him a powerful bargaining position in Madrid. Part of the funds previously destined for the Spanish Army of Flanders were now siphoned off for Condé. The laborious process of debt financing meant that while financial packages were being negotiated in Madrid, they quickly became public knowledge and Condé's envoys would then move to obtain a percentage for their prince, on the basis of the financial entitlements set out in the treaty in 1651.<sup>56</sup>

The financial strain created by Condé's settlement in the Spanish Netherlands was quickly felt. Purely on a financial level, local complaints about the privations caused by the financing of the prince's entourage and the support of the households belonging to Condé, his wife and son, were unrelenting. The real burden of financing Condé's households rested on the local communities who were expected to shoulder the immediate expenses and provide the required ceremonial for the arrival of individuals of the social stature of Condé's wife and son.<sup>57</sup> Local grievances voiced by deputies in Brussels were passed on to Madrid in the

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<sup>55</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.139-157.

<sup>56</sup> One of the best examples of this practice occurred in November 1655 when on the basis of news arriving in Brussels that a financial package was being assembled exclusively for the use of the Spanish Army of Flanders Condé's envoys in Madrid immediately moved to obtain a percentage for their master. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.391: Fiesque to Condé, 13 Nov.1655; B.N. Ms.fr.6720 (Lenet Papers), f.99: Condé to Lenet, 23 Jan.1656.

<sup>57</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 768: Leopold Wilhelm to La Mottry, 26 Aug.1653; Galaretta Ocariz to the Audiencier, 24 Sept.1653; 1364, Liasse 770: Leopold Wilhelm to Bucquoy, 20 Nov.1653.

archduke's dispatches to the king. Of course, the sums raised by disaffected local communities were tiny when set against the requirements of Condé and Brussels, and the prince was driven into a state of perpetual crisis management. Even as early as February 1653, when financial problems were less acute than they were to be in 1654 and 1655, the prince remarked in a letter to his intendant, Lenet, that he did not understand how the Spanish continued to wage war in the Spanish Netherlands in such dire financial circumstances.<sup>58</sup> Condé's moveable wealth quickly assumed enormous importance and on occasions when money made the critical difference between loyalty and disloyalty among those of his high command he supplemented his sporadic income through sales of jewellery in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.<sup>59</sup>

The responses of Madrid to the unceasing demands from Brussels for increased financial assistance were occasionally sharply pointed. In December 1653, in the aftermath of the bankruptcy, Philip IV suggested to his cousin, Leopold Wilhelm, that he might like to ease the financial burden by contributing some of his own revenues from his ecclesiastical holdings.<sup>60</sup> During the same month the king sent a missive to the archduke announcing that the pension accorded to the Princess of Phalsbourg was to cease until further notice.<sup>61</sup> This treatment was also meted out to the Princess of Phalsbourg's brother, the Duke

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<sup>58</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6713 (Lenet Papers), f.158: Condé to Lenet, 5 Feb.1653.

<sup>59</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.15964 (Chanut correspondence), f.202: Chanut to Brienne, 25 Feb.1655. This was common practice, cf. F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his work force*, (Wiesbaden, 1964), p.32.

<sup>60</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Consulta of the Council of State, 27 Dec.1653.

<sup>61</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2081: Consulta of the Council of State, Dec.1653.

of Lorraine, who until Condé arrived in the Spanish Netherlands was Philip IV's most important ally in the war against France. Most of the sovereign duke's life had been spent in the service of the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs. He had fought against the Protestant rebels at the battle of the White Mountain, later in 1634 he had fought against the Swedish at Nördlingen and once France had joined the thirty years war in 1635, he had served the Emperor in Franche-Comté and Alsace.

The French had overrun Lorraine on several occasions after 1632 when Cardinal Richelieu had waged a systematic war of attrition against the duke's power and patrimony. Between 1635 and 1659 the duchy was under a state of almost permanent occupation by the French, forcing the duke to base himself in Brussels. Condé joined the duke in an uncertain realm of quasi-independence and autonomy. The duke was an obvious rival and over the question of finance the two found themselves competing directly for money. Similar strategies were adopted by Lorraine to the approach favoured by the prince's agents in Madrid. Both reacted to one another's gains by making demands for comparability. When news of a payment to Lorraine reached Condé, for example, a demand for money was immediately made by the prince in both Brussels and Madrid to redress the imbalance.<sup>62</sup>

Payments from Madrid to the Spanish Netherlands were made by *asiento*.<sup>63</sup> These were paper letters of credit that could be exchanged for cash,

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<sup>62</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6718 (Lenet Papers), f.216: Condé to Lenet, 23 Jan.1654; Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.5: Condé to Caillet, 2 Feb.1654; f.11: Condé to Lenet, 5 Feb.1654.

<sup>63</sup> A.Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda*, pp.92-101; Alvaro Castillo also gives a brief description of the *asiento* system cf. A.Castillo, 'Dette flottante et dette consolidée en Espagne, 1557-1600', *Annales E.S.C.*, 18 (1963), pp.745-59. Parker develops this into a discussion of the

normally in Antwerp, the banking centre of the Spanish Netherlands. Royal finance relied upon the international system of mercantile credit<sup>64</sup> and loans made in Antwerp on the back of an *asiento* entitled the creditor to a portion of a specific source of future crown revenue, usually silver from the New World.<sup>65</sup> The business of war finance in Brussels was therefore ultimately dependent on shipments of silver arriving in Cadiz and a frequent palliative employed by Don Luis de Haro to calm nerves in Brussels was a reference to the imminent arrival of the treasure fleet.<sup>66</sup> Although the silver brought from the Indies would have been anticipated long before its arrival the very fact that the fleet had arrived had the important effect of restoring confidence in the crown's credit. Further *asientos* could then be issued which were themselves anticipations on future shipments. But the close relationship between war finance in Brussels and silver from the New World created problems during the 1650's. A glance at silver receipts during this period shows that between 1651 and 1655 receipts were half the levels reached during the same period a decade earlier and between 1655 and 1660 the

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raising of credit for the Spanish Army of Flanders in the first half of the 17th century *cf.* G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.145-157.

<sup>64</sup> During the 16th century *asientos* were contracted, paid and re-paid in the meetings of merchants and financiers at the 'Fairs of Exchange' *cf.* F.Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*, (6th edn., London, 1990), i.504-508, and A.W.Lovett, *Early Habsburg Spain*, (Oxford, 1986), p.223-235. Parker describes how during the 17th century however the business of war finance devolved increasingly to financial specialists, G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p.147, and H.Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700*, (London, 1980), pp.369-372.

<sup>65</sup> Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda*, p.93; G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.146-156; A.W.Lovett, *Habsburg Spain*, p.224; H.Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, p.370.

<sup>66</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6718 (Lenet Papers), f.238: Condé to Viole, 26 Jan.1654; Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.126: Condé to Lenet, 29 May 1654; f.192: St Agolin to Condé, 2 Sept.1654. *Cf.* for the impact of arriving silver on the money markets, J.Gentil da Silva, *Stratégie des affaires à Lisbonne entre 1595 et 1607*, (Paris, 1956), ch.ii.

silver receipts fell by a half again.<sup>67</sup>

The impact of declining silver receipts from the New World was a critical factor shaping the nature of the financial crisis in Brussels. *Asientos* from Madrid frequently proved to be worthless and some financiers were driven out of business.<sup>68</sup> Since the creditworthiness of an *asiento* was dependant upon the name of the financier contracting the agreement, Condé would frequently make demands that he only receive *asientos* contracted by certain financiers in Madrid whose credit in Antwerp was known to him. In November 1653 for example, Condé insisted that he should not be sent any more *asientos* contracted by the financier Malo.<sup>69</sup>

But the infrequent arrival of *asientos* led to a second system of credit. This was a system of loans contracted in Antwerp using as collateral *asientos* that had yet to be sent from Madrid.<sup>70</sup> The net effect of this second system was to reduce the amount received by Condé still further. In making the loan, bankers in Antwerp would demand compensation for their risk. The end result was that even if the *asiento* was creditworthy, once it had arrived in the Spanish Netherlands it had already been anticipated upon, and ultimately, the prince would only have

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<sup>67</sup> Hamilton's table of imports of treasure in pesos of 450 maravedís by five year periods shows that between 1651 and 1655 imports of treasure totalled 7,293,767 and for the following five year period, 1656-1660, totalled 3,361,115.5, E.J.Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution*, (New York, 1970), p.34. Hamilton's table is reproduced by Elliott cf. J.H.Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, p.184.

<sup>68</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.112: Condé to Lenet & Viole, 19 Dec.1653.

<sup>69</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.7: Condé to Lenet, 11 Nov.1654; f.63: Condé to Lenet, 29 Nov.1653.

<sup>70</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.11: Condé to Lenet, 5 Feb.1654; f.64: La Tour to Lenet, 2 Mar.1654.

redeemed a reduced amount of its full value.<sup>71</sup>

It is difficult to arrive at a precise set of figures that show the real cash receipts of Condé and the Spanish Army of Flanders during this period. Available figures for the early 1650's show the paymaster-general of the Spanish Army of Flanders, filing year on returns in 1653 to the audit office of the Spanish exchequer of payments totalling 1,752,277 *escudos*.<sup>72</sup> No further accounts remain for the decade, but some idea of the extent to which Madrid was meeting the financial needs of the Spanish Netherlands can be gleaned from correspondence. This shows that 1654 saw a dramatic contraction in the supply of money to the Spanish Army of Flanders and receipts fell to about 500,000 *escudos*.<sup>73</sup> In 1655 the situation deteriorated even further and the documentation from this year shows that Brussels received no subsidy from Madrid. Towards the end of the year Philip IV's council resolved to send 650,000 *escudos* to the Spanish Netherlands,<sup>74</sup> but this did not arrive until the following year. The situation for Condé proved to be equally dire. In 1654 the prince received creditworthy *asientos* which amounted only to a paltry 70,000 *escudos*.<sup>75</sup> These levels were maintained in 1655 and in December of that year one of Condé's agents, Mazerolles, complained that the

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<sup>104</sup> P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

<sup>105</sup> Lonchay, citing a letter from Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, described Condé as taking winter quarters, 'à sa convenance', H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.164.

<sup>106</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.53: Fiesque to Condé, 1 Apr.1654; B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1653; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653.

<sup>107</sup> Condé was terrified of the possibility that his troops would not be given quarters. B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.7: Lenet to Condé, 11 Nov.1653.

prince had only received a total of 80,000 *escudos* during the preceding 16 months.<sup>76</sup>

Clearly these sums were woefully inadequate to meet the expenses that Condé faced. The prince was at the head of a large organisation that included three households, his court, a team of ministers and diplomats scattered all over Europe and, of course, a large army including several garrisons. Efforts were made to limit certain areas of expenditure, and the first to suffer were the households of his wife and son. The expenditure that he regarded as critical was his army, although maintaining a lifestyle befitting his rank and ensuring that his followers did the same also figured prominently for political reasons, particularly in the context of his rivalry with the archduke. In September 1654 for example, the prince wrote to Lenet, his intendant, subsequent to the arrival of an *asiento* for him, and advised him that he should ensure forthwith that he had an *equipage* befitting his rank.<sup>77</sup> Condé was aware that lack of money was a problem that undermined his position and might ultimately threaten to force him to negotiate from a position of weakness with the French court.<sup>78</sup> He was therefore not prepared to take the issue lightly and made use of all available means to put pressure on the archduke and Fuensaldaña in Brussels, and Don Luis de Haro and the king in Madrid.

Lenet, who intermittently acted as Condé's representative to Leopold

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<sup>76</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.416: Mazerolles to Condé, 10 Dec.1655.

<sup>77</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.178: Condé to Lenet, 8 Sept.1654.

<sup>78</sup> Lack of money led to Condé's envoy in London, Barrière, being arrested for his debts after the defeat of the Spanish at Arras. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.406: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Dec.1655.

Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña, was frequently involved in negotiations over financial matters at the itinerant court of the governor and with the *pagador* (paymaster-general) in Antwerp. In addition, Fiesque and St Agolin, Condé's envoys in Madrid, also played a particularly important role. They frequently countered attempts in Brussels to deny Condé money by feeding the conviction in Madrid that Condé was an indispensable ally whose demands it was prudent to satisfy.<sup>79</sup> Diplomatic initiatives by Condé's envoys in Madrid often resulted in percentages being deducted from *asientos* that were formerly drawn up for the Spanish Army of Flanders or further *asientos* being negotiated for the prince, causing considerable resentment in Brussels.<sup>80</sup>

Financial questions apart, the diverse origins of the gaggle of European aristocrats that made up the high command in the Spanish Netherlands was already a considerable source of political tension in Brussels. These tensions were magnified by the hardships caused by financial crisis and individuals were quick to suspect others of withholding funds for political purposes. Condé in particular became convinced, with some justification, that Fuensaldaña and Leopold Wilhelm were deliberately denying him access to money that was his by right.<sup>81</sup> Fuensaldaña and Leopold Wilhelm, similarly, viewed Condé with suspicion, believing he received too much money and frequently accused him of profligacy in letters to Philip IV.<sup>82</sup> Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, harboured similar feelings

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<sup>79</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.406: Fiesque to Condé, Oct.1653.

<sup>80</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 28 Aug.1654.

<sup>81</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1653.

<sup>82</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 25 Oct.1653.

of mistrust of the Brussels administration and after his arrest in March 1654 his younger brother, Francis, continued to accuse Brussels of deliberate financial neglect.<sup>83</sup> Complaints and solicitations concerning the question of finance were the staples of correspondence between Brussels and Madrid and came to a climax during the year and a half of military setbacks after the defeat at Arras in August 1654.<sup>84</sup>

The impact that financial crisis in Madrid had on the social and political structures of the Spanish Netherlands was profound. Brussels now looked to the provinces themselves for further financial assistance, placing an enormous strain on the populace. There were two systems for raising money in the Spanish Netherlands. First, the formal system of local taxation, including the most important levy - the *aides*, paid with the consent of the provincial estates.<sup>85</sup> Revenues from this source, however, were frequently inadequate and beyond this lay another more informal system to supplement revenues from local taxes. This was the second system - a war tax known as a contribution. These were payments made by local communities directly to army commanders on an *ad hoc* basis in return for which the soldiers would agree not to loot and burn their property.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 28 Jan.1653; Est.Flandes 2081: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 7 Apr.1653.

<sup>84</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Consulta of the Council of State, 28 Jan.1655; Consulta of the Council of State, 19 Feb.1655; Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Mar.1655.

<sup>85</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p.139; H.Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, (Brussels, 1911), iv.397-401; G.Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands*, (London, 1979), pp.165-166; H.Lonchay, *Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.52.

<sup>86</sup> Condé's levying of contributions was possibly more *ad hoc* than those levied by the Spanish Army of Flanders. Studies have shown that contributions were becoming more formalized during this period *cf.* M.P.Gutmann, *War and Rural life in the Early Modern Low Countries*, (Assen, 1990), pp.41-46, 62-66, also *cf.* F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce*, p.147; F.Redlich, *Contributions in the Thirty Years War*, *Economic History Review*, 12,

This was not approved of by the estates but levied by commanders of both the Spanish Army of Flanders and Condé's army alike.<sup>87</sup> Contributions came in a number of guises and the commanders were frequently offered 'gifts' for a variety of services that included ensuring the discipline of troops and moving their men away from particular communities. Contracts were frequently drawn up between commanders and local dignitaries, but as conditions deteriorated these were often ignored and pressure to support the army, living parasitically off the land, would increase.<sup>88</sup>

As far as possible Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña sought to deny Condé access to the richer coastal and inland provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, and this was largely brought about by ensuring that they dominated arrangements for winter quarters. Left on the fringes of the Spanish Netherlands and in provinces that were less well off, Condé and his commanders became involved in an almost constant search for new territories from which to extract money and provide sustenance for their troops.<sup>89</sup> During the early months of 1653 Condé was able to extract money from within France and the French occupied duchy of Lorraine.

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(2nd.ser.1959-60), pp.247-254; D.A.Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War: The "Military Revolution"', *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 38, (1985), pp.18-20.

<sup>87</sup> In January 1655 for example Condé quarrelled with the archduke over the rights to the contributions of La Capelle and Câtelet. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.13: Fiesque to Condé, 27 Jan.1655. Also for Spanish levies of contributions cf. A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 1 Jan.1656.

<sup>88</sup> F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce*, p.147; A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 771: Prince de Chimay to Leopold Wilhelm, 5 Jan.1654; 1364, Liasse 798: Deputies of Luxembourg to Don Juan de Austria, 23 Mar.1657.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Condé's references to the lands of St Hubert. B.N. Ms.fr.6718 (Lenet Papers), f.149: Project comme le Vascher sous les ordres de M. le Marquis de Persan pourroit établir les contributions pour les troupes qui seront en Luxembourg, Jan.1654; Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.11: Condé to Lenet, 5 Feb.1654.

His ability to do so in France diminished as fortresses such as Bar-le-Duc and St Menehould in Champagne fell to supporters of Mazarin. But he was never blocked from levying contributions in Lorraine, where he continued to raise money throughout the decade.<sup>90</sup> Orders would be distributed to members of his high command with precise instructions regarding the territories that they were to cover.<sup>91</sup> Beyond this the methods they employed were at their own discretion.<sup>92</sup> Condé frequently received complaints from French commanders loyal to Mazarin about the exactions inflicted by his troops. These were generally ignored unless there was a political interest at stake.<sup>93</sup>

One form of contributions were collected on customs duties. These were a popular source of revenue and had been used to raise money in Bordeaux, where a tax of 10% had been collected on the value of all merchandise sailing up and down the Garonne.<sup>94</sup> Condé's underwriting of free trade zones along the amorphous frontier between Champagne, Picardie and the Spanish Netherlands, was used as a political tool. In October 1653, he negotiated a trade treaty with the Duc de Noirmoutier, governor of Charleville and Montolympe and nominally loyal

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<sup>90</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1364, Liasse 781: Prince de Chimay to Leopold Wilhelm; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.314: Caillet to Condé, 30 Aug.1656; f.51: Caillet to Caillet, 10 Feb.1656.

<sup>91</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6718 (Lenet Papers), f.149: Project comme le Vascher sous les ordres de M. le Marquis de Persan pourroit establir les contributions pour les troupes qui seront en Luxembourg, Jan.1654.

<sup>92</sup> In February Caillet wrote to his brother that he exacted contributions from the inhabitants from the region of La Capelle on pain of death. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.75: Caillet to Caillet, 23 Feb.1656.

<sup>93</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.368: Ligniville to Condé, 23 Oct.1655; f.344: Louis XIV to Bridieu, 30 Sept 1655.

<sup>94</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6713 (Lenet Papers), f.233: Anon to Lenet, Feb.1653.

to Mazarin's regime.<sup>95</sup> Condé wanted to promote good relations with Noirmoutier, a cousin through his grandmother, Charlotte Catherine de La Trémoille. Noirmoutier corresponded frequently with the prince and was evidently toying with the idea of rallying to the prince's standard. However, the political agenda underpinning Condé's financial strategy could cut both ways. The prince's contempt for the Elector of Cologne, who had offered Mazarin protection during the *Frondes*, and indifference towards the Elector of Trier, led to their territories being periodically sacked by his troops.

In the Spanish Netherlands Condé was levying contributions in the provinces of Luxembourg, Namur and Brabant. Fortresses were the bases from which these taxes would be levied and occasionally the prince came into conflict with Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña about the territorial limits of his exactions.<sup>96</sup> One such example was the entitlement to levy contributions around the fortresses of La Capelle and Catelet in 1655. Both fortresses had been handed over to Condé as compensation for the loss of Stenay and St Menehould in 1653. Orders had come from Madrid to hand them over to the prince, but Leopold Wilhelm was reluctant to cede to Condé the revenues from the territories that La Capelle and Catelet commanded. A dispute ensued involving a series of representations to Don Luis de Haro by Condé's envoys in Madrid. However, the fortresses were won back by the French before the issue was resolved to Condé's

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<sup>95</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.416: Noirmoutier to Condé, 31 Oct.1653; f.418: Contract - 'pour faire vivre les sujets du Roy des villes et gouvernants de Rocroi, Charleville, Montolympe, et Mezières en repos et tranquillité.'

<sup>96</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6720 (Lenet Papers), f.46: Condé to Lenet, 29 Aug.1655; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.13: Fiesque to Condé 27 Jan.1655.

satisfaction.<sup>97</sup>

Owing to the poor relations between Condé and Leopold Wilhelm the widespread disorder created by Condé's troops in Namur and Brabant became the focus of the archduke's dispatches to Madrid. Leopold Wilhelm accumulated a small archive of the abuses and crimes perpetrated by Condé's army that were reported to him by the indigenous noble governors of the provinces.<sup>98</sup> It is clear from this correspondence that Condé's army was responsible for the ravaging of Luxembourg, Liège, Namur and Gueldres. But it is also plain that this problem was not specific to those provinces sustaining the burden of Condé's army. Such methods were constantly being practised by commanders belonging to the Spanish Army of Flanders and indeed, were generic to the conduct of warfare during this period.<sup>99</sup> A more important theme to emerge from Leopold Wilhelm's concern about Condé's troops however, was the issue of the archduke's mandate as governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Condé's arrival in Brussels had called this into question.

The political events that led to the creation of the office of governor of the Spanish Netherlands, first held by the Duque de Alva in 1567,<sup>100</sup> had bequeathed to Leopold Wilhelm an impressive array of powers. The archduke was supreme commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders, had ultimate discretion

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<sup>97</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.324: Fiesque to Condé, 13 Dec.1654; vol.15, f.13: Fiesque to Condé, 27 Jan.1655; f.71: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Apr.1655; f.92: Fiesque to Condé, 24 Apr.1655; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Consulta of the Council of State, 1 Jan.1655.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. A.G.R.B., Audience, vols 1363 & 1364.

<sup>99</sup> F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce*, pp.57, 132, 149, 258, 435; G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.117, 141.

<sup>100</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.106-107.

over the distribution of financial resources, and was the final arbiter of justice. Of course, the archduke owed obedience to the king and had to follow orders from Madrid, but in the Spanish Netherlands he was in every sense the supreme political figure and military commander.<sup>101</sup> The arrival of Condé was a challenge to this position. Condé was not absorbed into the Spanish Army of Flanders, he was independent and had his own autonomous command. Yet Condé was frequently resident in Brussels and for the duration of his exile many of his troops were based in the Spanish Netherlands. The net effect of this ambiguity was political conflict. Condé became frustrated because he believed that the archduke was deliberately trying to frustrate his projects. The archduke likewise came to suspect that Condé was determined to undermine his authority.

Madrid continued to regard Condé as a central buttress in their strategy against the French, and so was sensitive to the requests and solicitations of the prince's envoys in Madrid. This was frustrating for the archduke, who frequently requested Madrid to confirm his mandate in writing, which the ministers were reluctant to do for fear of offending Condé. The political backlash of the Estates responding to the devastation wrought by Condé's army was one example of a situation in which the archduke was powerless to act.<sup>102</sup> The pleas of governors and deputies from the provincial estates to regulate the abuses and crimes perpetrated by Condé's soldiers could only be responded to by addressing a request to the prince himself. There was no sense in which the archduke could take any

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<sup>101</sup> Cf. Parker's discussion of the office of captain-general: G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp.106-111.

<sup>102</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 774: St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 24 Nov.1654; Liasse 771: Deputies of Dole to Leopold Wilhelm, 30 July 1653; Leopold Wilhelm to the Estates of Brabant, 30 Jan.1654.

direct action even if he was able to resolve the problem, which was unlikely. But in pursuing his political struggle against Condé, Leopold Wilhelm chose to emphasize this problem in his dispatches to Madrid, arguing that such a situation was intolerable. In December 1654 for example, he wrote to Philip IV that Condé was uncontrollable and levied contributions with unparalleled ferocity upon all the territories under the heel of his army.<sup>103</sup>

The tensions created by the blend of Condé's poor relations with Leopold Wilhelm and practical problems of government and military administration, emerged with greater clarity from the perennial disputes over the winter quartering of troops. Again, the terms of Condé's treaty made impossible demands on the Spanish Netherlands and the problems Leopold Wilhelm faced in accommodating Condé's army added to the argument that the terms of the initial agreement with the prince should be re-thought. Clause twenty-two of Condé's treaty concerned the prince's troops. Philip IV undertook to:

'recevoir les troupes, que ledit seigneur Prince aura en Champagne et en Bourgogne, dans les terres de Sa Majesté Catholique en cas que pour quelque accident imprévu elles fussent contraintes de se retirer, auquel cas elles y seront receues comme amies et traictés comme celles de SMC..<sup>104</sup>

Clearly, when the treaty was negotiated in 1651, the Spanish had not envisaged Condé's defeat in France. If they had it would have been unlikely that they would have made such an undertaking. The issue of winter quarters was not

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<sup>103</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.257, f.350, Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 19 Dec.1654.

<sup>104</sup> P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

as manageable as finance. The prince was in a position to take matters into his own hands.<sup>105</sup> He had command of his troops and ultimately it was his decision where and when to quarter them at the end of a campaign. This created serious problems. Condé claimed that on the basis of clause twenty-two he was entitled to take winter quarters within the Spanish Netherlands - territory described as the *Pais Real* in the dispatches to and from Madrid.<sup>106</sup>

For Condé the stakes were huge. His army, after all, was his most important asset, underpinning his position in the Spanish Netherlands and giving him influence in Brussels and Madrid. It was also central to his ambition to return to France and would prove critical in the likely eventuality of a return to civil war. The quality and availability of winter quarters was crucial. Poor winter quarters, or quite frequently their lack of availability, led to widespread desertions and high mortality rates.<sup>107</sup> However, the burden of winter quarters fell onto the provinces, and amongst all the other impositions it was this demand that proved to be the most frequent source of social unrest. Attempts during the reign of Archduke Albert to alleviate the burden by constructing barracks had not been a lasting solution to the problem.<sup>108</sup> During the 1650's it was plain, particularly in Condé's case, that apart from some general agreement among the high

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<sup>105</sup> Lonchay, citing a letter from Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, described Condé as taking winter quarters, 'à sa convenance', H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.164.

<sup>106</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.53: Fiesque to Condé, 1 Apr.1654; B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1653; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653.

<sup>107</sup> Condé was terrified of the possibility that his troops would not be given quarters. B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.7: Lenet to Condé, 11 Nov.1653.

<sup>108</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p.166.

command for the local distribution of regiments, there was no centrally directed system. Winter quarters came to be indistinguishable from the imposition of contributions. Terms were dictated to local communities with devastating social and economic consequences.

Traditionally, the richer provinces of Flanders and Hainaut were reserved for the elite Spanish and Neapolitan regiments of the Spanish Army of Flanders, whilst the poorer provinces, such as Namur and Brabant, tended to be left for the army's motley band of international units.<sup>109</sup> But the regiments who frequently received the worst treatment were those under separate commands. For example, regiments under the command of the Duke of Lorraine or the Duke of Württemberg - semi-autonomous generals in Philip IV's service - often found that their troops were singled out for the poorest regions, or indeed, that no provision at all had been made for them. As far as Leopold Wilhelm was concerned, Condé fell into this category and was encouraged to find quarters in France thus eliminating the problem altogether from Spanish governed territory.<sup>110</sup> But Condé was in a strong position to argue otherwise and tried to insist upon his entitlement to quarters in the *Pais Real*, specifically in the province of Flanders.<sup>111</sup>

The process of bargaining for winter quarters began several months in

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<sup>109</sup> Even Condé did not pretend to demand the same quarters as the elite Spanish regiments of the Spanish Army of Flanders: 'Je ne demande pas pourtant les quartiers qu'ils donnent à leurs Espagnols naturels mais bien que mes troupes soient au moins aussy bien traictés que le sont leurs.' B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1655.

<sup>110</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.323, Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653; f.352: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 20 Dec 1653.

<sup>111</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.117: Mémoire du Comte de Fiesque pour Don Luis de Haro, 31 Jan.1654; f.263: Fiesque to Condé, 9 Sept.1654.

advance.<sup>112</sup> The matter was normally settled in Brussels, but during the 1650's it was referred to Madrid through necessity, for both Condé and Leopold Wilhelm were incapable of reaching an agreement without recourse to higher authority. Condé suspected that Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña were denying him winter quarters for reasons of personal strategy and tried to use his influence in Madrid to bypass the archduke.<sup>113</sup> But on this question Madrid chose to support the archduke. They believed that the future of the Spanish Netherlands was at stake and that if all Condé's troops were permitted to take winter quarters within the *Pais Real* the rebellion of the loyal provinces that Leopold Wilhelm had foretold would occur.<sup>114</sup>

The financial crisis in Brussels added significantly to the suffering of the provinces and contributed to the view that a revolt was likely. A consulta drawn up in Brussels in April 1654 stated bluntly that the provinces simply did not have the resources or capability for sustaining so many troops with so little money.<sup>115</sup> The removal of Condé was identified as the means to alleviate this burden and he was blamed for the scale of the crisis faced by the government in Brussels. It was argued that the prince's treaty had to be re-negotiated or, alternatively, that he should be removed from the Spanish Netherlands. Some months later, in the

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<sup>112</sup> Cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.234: Mémoire du Comte de Fiesque pour Don Luis de Haro, 24 July 1654.

<sup>113</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1655; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.9: Fiesque to Condé, 22 Jan.1654.

<sup>114</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Consulta of the Council of State, 27 Dec.1653; Est.Flandes 2083: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1654. There were parallels between Leopold Wilhelm's warnings of rebellion in the 1650's with the crisis in Madrid of 1629 when Philip IV firmly believed the loyalty of the provinces in the Netherlands would collapse. J.H.Elliott, *Olivares*, (Yale, 1986), p.391.

<sup>115</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.257, f.141: Consulta, 18 Apr.1654.

autumn of 1654 Geronimo de las Torres wrote to Philip IV from Brussels, stressing once again the need to re-negotiate Condé's treaty.<sup>116</sup> Evidently the situation had not improved and Las Torres articulated the almost universal feeling of bitterness, arguing that when the prince's treaty had been negotiated in 1651 the outlook had been so much better. Condé at that time controlled great swathes of territories in France and it was not thought that he would ever have to call upon the Spanish Netherlands to sustain his army.

Focusing on the question of winter quarters Las Torres suggested three possibilities. The first two proposed territorial alternatives: the *Pais Neutrales* or Alsace and Lorraine. His third suggestion was that Condé should leave the Spanish Netherlands. The author went on to reject the option of the neutral territories out of hand, on the basis that Condé's activities in Cologne and Franche-Comté had come to close to provoking an international crisis during the previous year. But the second and third suggestions, he recommended.<sup>117</sup> However, sending Condé to quarter his men in Alsace and Lorraine was as impractical as asking him to winter in France. Although the prince proved capable of extracting contributions from these territories they were predominantly under French control and Condé was not likely to be receptive to this idea. Trying to persuade the prince to leave the Spanish Netherlands posed even greater problems. Everyone was aware of the size of the army under Condé's command. The possibility of Condé's dissatisfaction with Spain causing him to turn his men against the Spanish Netherlands, whilst opening simultaneous negotiations with

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<sup>116</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Geronimo de las Torres to Philip IV, 3 Sept.1654.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

Paris, were suitably apocalyptic to prevent Madrid from advocating this policy. Yet Las Torres had undoubtedly struck a chord in Madrid, where it is clear that much the same questions were being asked. Philip IV's council tried to support Leopold Wilhelm on this question, upholding his advice by ordering that the prince should not be offered the additional quarters he requested in the *Pais Real*, and attempting a compromise by the usual ineffectual resolution to send money forthwith to assist the prince's search for quarters.<sup>118</sup>

Condé's role in these negotiations was far from passive and his response, even to instructions from Madrid, was frequently to adopt an interpretation of winter quarter instructions that best suited him and the army under his command. Generally, this involved ignoring requests to reform his army or take active steps to regulate their abuses.<sup>119</sup> Through the process of negotiation, referral to Madrid and re-negotiation in Brussels, Condé did gain legitimate access to certain territories on the periphery of the Spanish Netherlands. During the winter of 1654 for example he was given permission to quarter some of his men in Luxembourg, Namur and Gueldres. The heavy burden of his men in these regions provoked a series of complaints and remonstrances, mainly from the respective governors, commanders themselves in the Spanish Army of Flanders, and deputies in the provincial estates.<sup>120</sup>

The complaints of the deputies and governors give some idea of the scale of

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<sup>118</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Junta, 6 Sept.1654.

<sup>119</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 25 Oct.1654.

<sup>120</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 771: Chimay to Leopold Wilhelm, 5 Jan.1654; Liasse 774: St Amour to the Audiencier, 25 Oct.1654; St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 24 Nov.1654; St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 29 Nov.1654.

the economic and social problems Leopold Wilhelm had to face.<sup>121</sup> In January 1655 for example, in a missive to Brussels, the Comte d'Isenghien, governor of Gueldres, described at great length the abuses of one of Condé's commanders and kinsmen, the Comte de la Suze.<sup>122</sup> The French count's regiment had murdered several townsmen in Weerta, and had even taken to launching food raids into territories belonging to the province of Holland, at peace with the Spanish Netherlands since 1648, and not to be provoked by such casual military actions. A similar example was provided by the Comte de St Amour, governor of Namur. In November 1654 he complained that he had no authority to take steps against Condé's men who were committing atrocities on a daily basis. St Amour appealed to the financial concerns of Brussels, pointing out that Condé's activities for that year would certainly affect the degree of formal financial assistance Namur would be able to offer.<sup>123</sup> St Amour's warnings were in fact born out for in 1655 the disorder created by Condé's army led to the refusal of the province to grant the *pain de munition* or *aides* and the province was reputedly so destitute that its lands could not even provide adequate cavalry forage for that year.<sup>124</sup>

There is some evidence to show that Condé's troops were spilling over into Hainaut, a province that normally quartered the Spanish Army of Flanders, but generally the prince seems to have respected the territorial boundaries of winter quarters within the *Pais Real*, established by meetings of the high command and

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<sup>121</sup> Cf., the Comte de Bucquoy's complaints about the Spanish Army of Flanders. A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 775: Bucquoy to Leopold Wilhelm, 7 Dec.1654.

<sup>122</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.258, f.40: Isenghien to Leopold Wilhelm, 12 Jan.1655.

<sup>123</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1363, Liasse 774: St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 24 Nov.1654.

<sup>124</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1364, Liasse 780: St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 22 Oct.1655.

backed up by Madrid. Nonetheless, the quarters that he was offered in Luxembourg, Namur and Gueldres were plainly not adequate to maintain all the troops under his command. His solution to this problem was straightforward: he simply moved a number of regiments from Luxembourg northwards into Liège, a neutral prince-bishopric belonging to the Elector of Cologne, and holding this out to Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña as an incentive to provide him with more adequate quarters within the *Pais Real*.<sup>125</sup>

The winter quartering of Condé's troops in Liège during the winter of 1653-54 and the incursions of his troops during the winter of 1654-55, narrowly avoided causing an international crisis and threatened to involve the German princes in the Franco-Spanish conflict.<sup>126</sup> Again, the social and economic privations caused by Condé's troops in Liège were not uniquely responsible for the political and diplomatic crisis that ensued. Personal antagonisms and individual loyalties were fundamental, particularly owing to the resentment and loathing that Condé and the Elector harboured towards each other. Maximilien Henry, Elector of Cologne was a cousin of Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria. The Elector of Bavaria was in turn married to Henriette Adélaïde of Savoy, daughter of Victor Amadeus I. This link was critical, for Savoy was fundamental to Mazarin's long-evolving

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<sup>125</sup> The Elector's territories were an important crossroads between France, the Holy Roman Empire, the Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces. As a consequence, despite the Elector's frequent neutrality, they often found themselves under military threat. Cf. H.R.Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672*, (New Jersey, 1978), p.826; H.Lonchay, *La Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.162.

<sup>126</sup> Lonchay discusses the problems created by Condé and the Duke of Lorraine in Liège at length, explaining that their brutish way of thinking did not alert them both to the political consequences of their actions, 'Hommes de guerres avant tout, et d'humeur fort peu accomodante, ils ne comprenaient pas les attentions que la cour de Bruxelles montrait au chef d'un petit État.' H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, pp.163-166. Also cf. H.Lonchay, *La Principauté de Liège*, (Brussels, 1891), pp.84-91.

political and dynastic strategy in France and north Italy. The promotion of the House of Wittelsbach within the Empire was the means by which the cardinal hoped to prevent a re-election of a Habsburg to the imperial throne. Shared political interests, cemented by dynastic ties, were therefore the foundation of a warm *amitié* between the Elector of Cologne and the cardinal. As a consequence, during the cardinal's exile, the Elector had offered the cardinal vital military and political support.<sup>127</sup>

But the Elector's understanding with Mazarin and the hospitality he had offered the exiled cardinal brought him into intractable conflict with Condé. This opposition was a constant feature of the 1650's and was thrown into bold relief by the prince's exile, for now both of them were brought into close geographical proximity. Condé's decision, therefore, to quarter his troops in Liège, was as much born out of his own resentment towards the Elector as it was by sheer necessity.<sup>128</sup> The Elector's exaggerated response to Condé's actions was likewise motivated by his wish not to be seen to be tolerant of the prince in a way that might endanger his understanding with the cardinal.

During the winter of 1653-54 a number of Condé's regiments moved into Liège and settled into winter quarters. Some of the Liègeois towns had attempted to close their gates to the soldiers, only to find heavy artillery used against

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<sup>127</sup> The young Louis XIV signed a letter of thanks to the Elector for this service in September 1652. M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures*, vol.269, f.203: Louis XIV to the Elector of Cologne, 19 Sept.1652.

<sup>128</sup> Condé's grudge towards the Elector over this episode was well known and discussed on several occasions by Fuensaldaña and the archduke. A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 20 Mar.1653; Est.Flandes 2084: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 16 Jan.1655; Consulta, 5 Mar.1655.

them.<sup>129</sup> By December 1653, Condé's secretary, Caillet, reported to the prince that his actions had caused consternation in Brussels: 'il faudroit un volume pour mander à V.A. les dits et resdits que nous avons faits avec l'Archiduc..<sup>130</sup> Yet despite Leopold Wilhelm's concern, Madrid's advice, according to Caillet, had been to turn a blind eye to the prince's activities. Philip IV had only been explicit on one point: that none of his ministers should get involved in this affair, hoping thereby to present Condé's actions to the international community as purely unilateral.<sup>131</sup> The policy Ferdinand III adopted was similar to that of his cousin. Indeed, in a letter to Lenet, Condé mentioned that the Emperor had tacitly undertaken not to oppose him taking quarters in Liège.<sup>132</sup>

In the context of the Cologne Elector's political alignments it is not difficult to understand the attitude taken in Madrid and Vienna. However, the Elector's response was to combine diplomatic initiatives in Brussels, Vienna and Madrid, with a request to Mazarin for military assistance.<sup>133</sup> In February 1654, the Maréchal de Fabert, a French commander loyal to Mazarin, moved his troops up to Liège into garrison towns that the Elector had made available.<sup>134</sup> The threat to Madrid and Brussels was clear: if Condé did not order his men from Liège, the

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<sup>129</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.257, f.62: The Elector of Cologne to Philip IV, 14 Jan.1654.

<sup>130</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.86: Caillet to Condé, 12 Dec.1653.

<sup>131</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Caillet to Condé, 13 Nov.1653.

<sup>132</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Caillet to Condé, 13 Nov.1653; A.Chérueu, *Correspondence*, vi.105: Mazarin to Fabert, 26 Dec.1653.

<sup>133</sup> A.Chérueu, *Correspondence*, vi.103: Mazarin to Fabert, 20 Dec.1653; 107: Mazarin to Fabert, 6 Jan.1654.

<sup>134</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.144; A.Chérueu, *Correspondence*, vi.103: Mazarin to Fabert, 20 Dec.1653; vi.107: Mazarin to Fabert, 6 Jan.1654; B.N. Ms.fr.6718 (Lenet Papers), f.73: Condé to Lenet, 8 Feb.1654.

Elector would be happy to allow the French to use his territories as a military base. Leopold Wilhelm responded to these developments in characteristic fashion. Holding out events to Madrid as yet another example of the problems created by Condé's presence in the Spanish Netherlands, he was quick to placate the Elector and to argue strongly in dispatches to Madrid that Philip IV should write to the prince and demand that he remove his troops from Liège.<sup>135</sup>

Leopold Wilhelm was emphatic in his dispatches to Madrid that the recent developments in Liège should be taken very seriously. Fuensaldaña argued that the involvement of German princes sympathetic to the Elector was imminent and that, further, the French troops under the command of the Maréchal de Fabert were a threat to the province of Brabant.<sup>136</sup> In this instance the archduke had good reason to be concerned. If the French were permitted to garrison Liège, communication with the Empire would be cut off and Luxembourg, Brabant and Limburg would pass under their control. The cumulative effect of the archduke's dispatches, and the remonstrations of the Elector himself, persuaded Philip IV that it would be prudent to come to an understanding with the Elector, in order to secure the departure of the French from Liège. Leopold Wilhelm was given a mandate to enter into negotiations to this end.<sup>137</sup> Condé was subsequently offered alternative quarters and he finally agreed to move his troops from

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<sup>135</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.352: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 20 Dec.1653; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Leopold Wilhelm to the Elector of Cologne, 18 Jan.1654; Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 25 Jan.1654.

<sup>136</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 26 Jan.1654.

<sup>137</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Consulta of the Council of State, 16 Apr.1654; Consulta of the Council of State, 30 Apr.1654.

Liège.<sup>138</sup> Meanwhile, Fuensaldaña entered into negotiations with the Elector's ministers at Tirlemont. These talks were brought to a conclusion by a formal treaty, guaranteeing that the Elector's territories would not be used for quarters in the future and the payment of an agreed pension to compensate the Elector for the damage wreaked by the prince's troops. The Elector in turn agreed to order Fabert's departure.<sup>139</sup>

The terms of the treaty of Tirlemont were highly favourable for the Elector and were a source of profound irritation for Condé. The prince had been pressing for Fuensaldaña's removal from the Spanish Netherlands for several months, and he interpreted the treaty as a personal attack, calculated to undermine his position. His response was to instruct his envoys in Madrid to stress the dishonour of this agreement, using it as an example of how Fuensaldaña was prepared to subjugate the best interests of the Spanish crown to pursue his own political ambitions.<sup>140</sup> Despite the political influence of Fuensaldaña in Madrid, the representations of Condé's envoys met with some success. Don Luis de Haro seems to have concurred with Fiesque, Condé's agent, that the treaty was a humiliation.<sup>141</sup> But the death of Ferdinand IV, King of the Romans, in July 1654 and the instability this created within the Empire, combined with repeated warnings from Brussels that the Elector had the support of some of the German

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<sup>138</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.25: Condé to Lenet & Viole, 8 Feb.1654.

<sup>139</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.257, f.149: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 22 Apr.1654; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Consulta of the Council of State, 9 July 1654. H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.166; H.Lonchay, *Principauté de Liège*, pp.86-87.

<sup>140</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.68: Condé to Fiesque, 17 Apr.1654.

<sup>141</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.189: Fiesque to Condé, 10 June 1654.

princes and a wish not to repeat the experience of January 1654, led to the treaty's ratification in October.<sup>142</sup>

Nonetheless, despite the undertakings of the treaty of Tirlemont, when troops moved into quarters at the end of the campaign in 1654, Condé began once again to levy contributions in Liège. Again the Elector threatened to involve the French.<sup>143</sup> However, Condé's troops had not taken their winter quarters in Liège on this occasion and as far as the Elector was concerned, the random *chevauchées* of Condé's soldiers were a grievance that was worth a fierce diplomatic counter attack, but did not merit breaking his neutrality - despite the best efforts of Mazarin to persuade him otherwise. Leopold Wilhelm however, was genuinely frustrated by the refusal of the prince to cease his activities in Liège.<sup>144</sup> He wrote again to the king, complaining that not only was Condé in contravention of the treaty of Tirlemont, but also, owing to his vendetta against the Elector, was levying contributions with unprecedented vigour and brutality.<sup>145</sup> But on this occasion the response of Madrid was lukewarm. Philip IV's council were not convinced that the levying of contributions was as serious a threat to regional stability as the taking of winter quarters. They were quick to point out that the Elector had been happy to accommodate a large number of soldiers from the Spanish Army of Flanders during the Thirty-Years War and his protests revealed

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<sup>142</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Consulta of the Council of State, 13 Oct.1654.

<sup>143</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.258, f.38: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 12 Jan.1655; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 16 Jan.1655.

<sup>144</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Jan.1655; Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 14 Apr.1655.

<sup>145</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.258, f.167: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 13 Mar.1655.

political inconsistencies that raised questions.<sup>146</sup>

The problems created by Condé's quartering of troops in Liège demonstrates how the contraction of financial resources in Brussels could lead to friction with neighbouring territories. However, though of great concern, finance played a limited role. At least as important were the political divisions that incited Condé to target Liège as a base for winter quarters, and provoke the Elector of Cologne into mounting such a forceful diplomatic counter attack. The policies adopted by the archduke in Brussels were similarly coloured by the character of political hostilities within the high command. The archduke was concerned to portray Condé to Madrid as a dangerous liability, and the conflict with the Elector of Cologne over winter quarters provided him with an ideal opportunity. The litany of complaints from all quarters may have concentrated on arguments that appealed to reason of state but the underlying cause of conflict was undoubtedly the existence of fierce political rivalry. This political element was highly disruptive and had a dramatic impact on the course of the war with France.

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<sup>146</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Consulta of the Council of State, 14 Apr.1655.

## THE PROBLEM OF HIGH COMMAND IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS

1652 - 1656

In June 1654, an English spy reported to London that the Spanish Netherlands had not one but three armies, identifying their commanders as Leopold Wilhelm, Condé and the Duke of Lorraine.<sup>147</sup> Although contemporaries were evidently aware of this reality, historians have tended to overlook this feature of the Franco-Spanish conflict. But the existence of three separate armies in the Spanish Netherlands needs to be underlined, for it conveys the high degree of autonomy that both the Duke of Lorraine and Condé enjoyed from the Spanish Army of Flanders. Independent commanders in their own right, with separate political and military agendas, their cooperation could not be taken for granted. This made the organisation of military campaigns by Leopold Wilhelm a complicated and often impossible task. Ultimately, the archduke asserted that the problems of command created by Condé were partly to blame for the poor military fortunes of the coalition between 1654 and 1656.

It is not difficult to trace the origins of Leopold Wilhelm's personal dislike of Condé. Since the prince had moved his headquarters from Stenay during the spring of 1653 to Namur in the Spanish Netherlands the archduke's

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<sup>147</sup> Bod. Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.15, f.109: Dispatch from Brussels, 13 June 1654.

correspondence had been littered with complaints.<sup>148</sup> Ostensibly the archduke focused his arguments on the practical reasons that made Condé's accommodation so difficult. In August 1653 for example, having described at length in previous missives the extent of economic misery the prince's arrival had caused, the archduke pointed to the loss of Bordeaux. After Bordeaux's collapse, he argued, it was inevitable that Condé's wife and sister would move to Brussels bringing with them yet more soldiers. This would impose hardships on the provinces that would unquestionably lead to revolt.<sup>149</sup>

Yet under the surface of such reasoned argument lay the deeper currents of political enmity. Leopold Wilhelm clearly saw Condé as a political threat and it is not hard to see why. Above all, Condé had the emphatic support of Madrid. The prince was a key element in Spanish foreign policy, for he was seen as the means to an honourable peace with Louis XIV.<sup>150</sup> This would come about, it was argued, by a return to internal instability in France, engineered by Condé, which would render the royalist party in France incapable of sustaining the war. Instructions from Madrid regarding the conduct of the war were therefore clear: military strategy was to be geared to restoring the prince's position in France.<sup>151</sup>

Linked to the question of military strategy was clause twenty of Condé's

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<sup>148</sup> cf A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Consulta of the Council of State, 15 July 1653; Consulta of the Council of State, 26 July 1653; Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Aug.1653.

<sup>149</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 16 Aug.1653.

<sup>150</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2079: Junta, 11 Feb.1652; Consulta of the Council of State, 15 Apr.1652; Watteville to Conti, 4 Dec.1652; A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.254, f.11: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 7 Jan.1653; f.90: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 15 Feb 1653.

<sup>151</sup> The king was explicit and specific about this aspect of foreign policy. A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.254, f.221: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 26 Apr.1653; vol.255, f.70: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 11 June 1653.

treaty. This gave general provision for attacks on Condéen fortresses in France obliging the Spanish king to come to the prince's assistance:

'que tous les généraux et les troupes qu'ils commanderont fassent tous les efforts possibles pour les secourir [Condé's fortresses] et leur donner toute l'assistance qui dépendra d'eux.'<sup>152</sup>

This was a condition which when negotiated in 1651, referred mainly to Condéen Bordeaux. Nonetheless it applied equally to other possessions belonging to the prince and in the circumstances of Condé's residence in the Spanish Netherlands this clause enabled the prince by right to influence the command of the Spanish Army of Flanders. Plainly, if one of Condé's fortresses was attacked in Champagne the archduke was obliged to send assistance. But Leopold Wilhelm bitterly resented this kind of interference in his command and as far as he was concerned it represented yet another example of how Condé's arrival had eroded his hitherto extensive powers as governor.

The first formal meeting between Condé and the archduke occurred in April 1653 outside Brussels, six months after Condé had left Paris. The exchange of greetings was conducted from carriages to avoid a dispute that had already erupted over the form of ceremonial Leopold Wilhelm had agreed to accord Condé.<sup>153</sup> The meeting was symbolic of the tension between the two and beyond the question of protocol Leopold Wilhelm was determined to stamp his own authority on Condé, particularly on questions of overall strategic command. But

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<sup>152</sup> Cf., clause xx, P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

<sup>153</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.204; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 29 April 1653.

to appear to formulate military strategy independently of Condé was difficult, for Madrid never tired of instructing him that the priority of military strategy was, 'la conservación del partido del Principe de Condé.'<sup>154</sup> During Condé's first campaign with the archduke and Fuensaldaña in 1653 relations therefore deteriorated quickly. Condé's attempts to influence Fuensaldaña over the deployment of the Spanish Army of Flanders infuriated the archduke. In July he wrote to Philip IV, exaggerating Condé's threat, claiming that the prince was intent on nothing else than sharing his position as supreme commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>155</sup>

Despite the obvious support for Condé in Madrid, Leopold Wilhelm knew that the king would uphold his authority over the Spanish Army of Flanders rather than risk entirely undermining his credibility as governor. The exchange of letters in July and August vindicated the archduke. Philip IV was quick to reject Condé's fictitious claim to command the Spanish Army of Flanders though stressing the importance of maintaining Condé's loyalty.<sup>156</sup> To a certain extent Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña shared the concerns of Madrid during the early stages of 1653. They too saw the value of Condé's alliance and showed genuine concern when they suspected that the prince was negotiating with Mazarin in July.<sup>157</sup> But their concerns soon evaporated when Condé began to insist, on the basis of his treaty, that the Spanish Army of Flanders should be deployed uniquely

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<sup>154</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.255, f.70: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 11 June 1653.

<sup>155</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 15 July 1653.

<sup>156</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.255, f.126: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 16 July 1653.

<sup>157</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 9 Aug 1653.

in Champagne and Picardie for the defence of his fortresses.

Resentment over Condé's interference in military affairs was shared by both Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña and it did not take long for this to develop into entrenched opposition to the prince. The campaign of 1653 was significant as the only occasion when the archduke was prepared to deploy the Spanish Army of Flanders for Condé's benefit, in accordance with the wishes of Madrid. The campaign itself was late in starting and in July 1653 Condé and Fuensaldaña joined their armies and together marched into Picardie, temporarily occupying Nesle, Roye and Mondidier.<sup>158</sup> In August, subsequent to a meeting of the high command, it was agreed that Condé, the Duke of Lorraine and Fuensaldaña should converge on Rocroi in Champagne and lay siege to the French fortress. The venture was successful and in October the fortress capitulated. But as soon as Rocroi fell to the coalition a fierce dispute erupted between the commanders about the future governorship of the conquered fortress.<sup>159</sup> It proved impossible to reach an agreement and the issue was taken to Madrid where in a move to compensate Condé for earlier losses Philip IV awarded him the governorship.<sup>160</sup>

The loss of Rocroi to Condé was a humiliation that the archduke could not stomach. Grudging acceptance of the prince's residence in the Spanish Netherlands now developed into full scale political conflict. Rocroi marked the beginning of a determined campaign to undermine Condé's position and the

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<sup>158</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.388.

<sup>159</sup> Discussing this dispute in a letter to Philip IV, the archduke referred to Condé's, 'humor extravagante': A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.16: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 11 Sept.1653.

<sup>160</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.138: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 1 Oct.1653; f.166: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 29 Oct.1653.

archduke began to press vigorously in Madrid for the prince's removal.<sup>161</sup> In the realm of military command the archduke was simply not prepared to implement strategies for Condé's benefit and he began to develop alternative plans that aimed not to enhance the prince's position but destroy it. The rationale underpinning the archduke's new strategy was the consternation that the loss of Bordeaux had caused in Madrid. After the treaty had been negotiated in 1651 and Condé's position in France had begun to deteriorate, the debate in Madrid over Condé had developed into an interplay between aspirations about the prince's practical use to the Spanish and the sense of obligation that increased as Condé's position worsened.<sup>162</sup> The loss of Bordeaux, the most important of Condé's strongholds in France, had raised questions that focused precisely on this issue. The archduke aimed to play on this theme<sup>163</sup> and hoped that as Condé's position in Champagne deteriorated it would strengthen the conviction in Madrid that, as he was to claim in a later letter to Philip IV, Condé was nothing else than 'cargó y peso'.<sup>164</sup>

The object of military strategy, as far as the archduke was concerned, was now to enhance his own prestige at the expense of Condé's. The prince's fortresses in Champagne were to be used as a convenient buffer zone and a diversion to occupy the French whilst the archduke masterminded military operations further north. Political considerations apart, such a strategy was sensible. Dunkirk had been won in 1652 with the assistance of Condé's supporters whose hostilities in

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<sup>161</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.16: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 11 Sept.1653; f.17: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 11 Sept.1653; f.146: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 4 Oct.1653.

<sup>162</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 25 Oct.1653.

<sup>163</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Aug 1653.

<sup>164</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta, 25 Oct.1653.

Champagne and Guyenne had created a diversion for the archduke's benefit and it still remained clear that the Condéen threat to Mazarin's regime was such that the reduction of the prince's positions in Champagne continued to be an absolute priority for the cardinal. The conflict on the northern frontier between 1653 and 1656 makes this abundantly clear. After Condé had left Paris in October 1652 all the resources of the French crown in the northern theatre had been concentrated on Condé's positions. In 1653 the sieges of Rethel, Château-Porcien, Vervins, St Menehould, all French victories, were directed against Condéen fortresses. This pattern was repeated in 1654 with the sieges of Stenay, Clermont and Câtelet; the 1654 relief of Arras was a French response to a Spanish offensive in Artois.<sup>165</sup> Indeed it was not until August 1655 that the French turned their attentions, for the first time, to Spanish targets in Hainaut and this was only due to the sense of relative security that the lifting of the siege of Arras had engendered in Paris. It needs to be stressed that contrary to the traditional historiography, internal unrest in France did not end in 1653, but continued during Condé's exile and was a constant feature of the Franco-Spanish war that ceased only when peace was negotiated in 1659.

French successes in Champagne between 1653 and 1654 were largely the consequences of the neglect of the Spanish Army of Flanders. The loss of St Menehould in November 1653 was one such example. St Menehould was one of the

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<sup>165</sup> For Condé's command of Rethel, Clermont and St Menehould *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.1: 'Reglement que le Prince de Condé a fait des contributions entre Clermont, St Menehould et Rethel..' 10 Feb.1653. Vervins, a Condéen garrison in Picardie, was taken by Mazarin's soldiers in January 1653 *cf.*, B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.70. Stenay was Condé's headquarters in late 1652 *cf.* A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.25: Condé to the Parlement of Bordeaux, 19 Aug.1651. Catelet was a French fortress taken by the Spanish and given to Condé after the siege of Arras to compensate his losses *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.232: Fiesque to Condé, 18 July 1654. For Château-Porcien *cf.*, B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.46.

fortresses taken by Condé after the fall of Paris to the queen mother in October 1652,<sup>166</sup> and when it was besieged by Turenne in November of 1653 Condé duly called on the assistance of the Spanish Army of Flanders. But on this occasion the assistance of the Spanish army was not given. Instead Leopold Wilhelm instructed that troops under the commands of the Duke of Lorraine and the Duke of Würtemberg should be sent to aid St Menehould's defence.<sup>167</sup>

By sending the Duke of Lorraine it appeared that the archduke was acting according to the principles set out by Condé's treaty and instructions from Madrid. However, the archduke was aware that his hostility towards Condé was possibly surpassed only by the enmity of the Duke of Lorraine. Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine had also contributed to the reduction of Rocroi and he resented Condé's acquisition of the governorship. Two further issues weighed on the duke's mind: Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands had diminished the financial and military resources Brussels was able to give the duke; while there was the question of the Lorraine fortresses that Condé had received in *lieu* of the admiralty in 1649 (Clermont, Stenay and Jametz).<sup>168</sup> These were explicitly possessions of the Duke of Lorraine that had been occupied by the French since 1632.<sup>169</sup> The duke therefore was certainly not prepared to cooperate with Condé

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<sup>166</sup> Fiesque for example discusses this conquest in a letter to Condé in August 1653. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.406: Fiesque to Condé, 23 Aug.1653.

<sup>167</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.7: Condé to Lenet, 11 Nov.1653.

<sup>168</sup> *cf.*, p.47.

<sup>169</sup> At the peace of Liverdun in 1632 Charles IV was forced provisionally to cede Clermont, Stenay and Jametz to Louis XIII: P.Rodier, *Charles IV, Duc de Lorraine et de Bar*, (Paris, 1904), p.27; Condé's disputes over these territories during the 1650's were frequent: F.Des Robert, *Charles IV et Mazarin*, (Nancy, 1899), pp.406, 463, 530, 564.

over the conservation of the prince's fortresses. He had as much interest as the archduke in seeing Condé's position in the Spanish Netherlands weakened and the predictable result was a military fiasco resulting in the loss of St Meneshould. Lorraine used dilatory tactics, slowing down the march of his troops to the fortress and refusing to distribute the necessary orders to his men. Condé sent a series of letters to Brussels complaining about this 'beau secours prétendu', remonstrating to the archduke that he alone had hazarded his troops and that Lorraine's inaction had caused the garrison to be lost.<sup>170</sup>

Leopold Wilhelm found it easy to justify his position to Madrid. He had in theory provided for the defence of St Meneshould and the blame lay squarely at the feet of the Duke of Lorraine.<sup>171</sup> However, treating the Duke of Lorraine as a scapegoat worsened a relationship that was already balanced on a knife edge. Since Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands Charles IV had become an increasingly unstable ally of Spain. Although traditionally his allegiance was to Vienna the failure of the Austrian plenipotentiaries to negotiate the withdrawal of the French from Lorraine and settle the question of his sovereign rights in 1648, led him to toy with the idea of a French alliance. Swearing nominal allegiance to Madrid during the Frondes the duke had hoped to take advantage of the civil war by negotiating in Paris for the French evacuation of his territories in return for his assistance.<sup>172</sup> But these negotiations were tentative and the duke was

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<sup>170</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.7: Condé to Lenet, 11 Nov.1653.

<sup>171</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 26 Dec.1653.

<sup>172</sup> Charles IV's negotiations can be followed in Mazarin's correspondence *cf.*, A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, v.40: Mazarin to Raulin, 12 Feb.1652; p.64: Mazarin to Raulin, 25 Mar.1652; p.67: Mazarin to Raulin, 30 Mar.1652. Des Robert discusses these negotiations as well *cf F.Des Robert, Charles IV*, pp.406-418.

reluctant to commit himself either to the French princes or the court. He was aware that, even if he had been able to obtain the sought after recognition of his sovereign status from Louis XIV and the withdrawal of the French from his territories there remained several unresolved questions: Louis XIV's 'protection' of Toul, Verdun and Metz;<sup>173</sup> annulment of his marriage with Nicole de Lorraine and the recognition of the legitimacy of his heirs by Béatrix de Cusance;<sup>174</sup> and, the disconcerting proximity of Nancy to Paris as opposed to the more reassuring distance of Vienna.

The duke's reservations about a French alliance were significant but Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands, the loss of his pensions and the embarrassment at Rocroi persuaded him to overlook their importance and seriously to consider negotiating a lasting settlement with Paris. Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña seem to have been aware of this change in the duke's political outlook and were deeply worried about its possible consequences.<sup>175</sup> Despite the social problems of quartering the Lorraine troops during the winter months, his

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<sup>173</sup> R.Babel, 'Dix années décisives: aspects de la politique étrangère de Charles IV de 1624 à 1634', J.P.Bled, E Faucher, R.Taveneaux (eds.), *Les Habsbourg et La Lorraine*, (Nancy, 1988), p.60.

<sup>174</sup> One of the great scandals of the seventeenth century was Charles IV's bigamous marriage to Béatrix-Marie-Françoise de Cusance, Comtesse de Cantecroix. He had abandoned his first wife alleging that she had been unable to conceive. Complications, however, were created by the involvement of Caroline of Austria, daughter of the Emperor Rudolf II and Béatrix de Cusance's step-mother by her first marriage. Béatrix had tried to prevent recognition of her first son by her former husband, Eugène-Léopold d'Oiselet, Prince et Comte du Cantecroix, shortly after his death. Caroline of Austria, the child's grandmother, launched a campaign in Rome to have the child recognised. Her success contributed to the events that lead to Charles IV's excommunication in 1643. Maréchal, *Une cause célèbre au XVII siècle*, (Paris, 1910), pp.19-23, 222-226.

<sup>175</sup> Cf., specifically, A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Consulta of the Council of State, 27 Dec.1653. The reasons for the Duke of Lorraine's arrest were discussed by the archduke and Philip IV's council in 1655. A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2086: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 31 Dec.1655; Consulta of the Council of State, 15 July 1655. Also, Charles IV's negotiations with France are discussed by Des Robert: F.Des Robert, *Charles IV*, pp.406-418.

men were an important adjunct to the Spanish Army of Flanders which Spain could not afford to lose, especially if they transferred to French service. Yet in the current straits it was understood that Condé and the duke could not coexist.<sup>176</sup> Lorraine was plainly convinced that his interests would now be permanently sacrificed to the benefit of Condé. Rather than risk the loss of Lorraine troops to the French, Leopold Wilhelm obtained permission from Madrid to go to the extraordinary length of arresting Charles in February 1654.<sup>177</sup> This step effectively cut short his negotiations with Paris; he was meanwhile replaced by his younger brother, Francis, who arrived from Vienna to take command of the Lorraine army in May.<sup>178</sup>

Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña both found in Francis a potential ally and someone that they could use as a counterweight to Condé. Anxious that Francis would be prepared to continue to fight for Spain and not desert to France as his elder brother had clearly been contemplating, the archduke set out to flatter him, contriving simultaneously to marginalise Condé. In May 1654 Condé wrote to Fiesque complaining bitterly that the Duke Francis had been ostentatiously accorded the ceremony that he normally received:

‘Je scay bien que c’est un personne dont on a besoin mais avec cela il me semble qu’il y avait quelque difference a faire entre luy et moy il sauroit estre plutost favourable pour moy que pour luy, cela fait bien cognoistre le peu de consideration qu’on faict maintenant du

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<sup>176</sup> This was stated very clearly. A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.325: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Junta, 18 Feb.1654.

<sup>177</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.104.

<sup>178</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.212.

moy en ce pays.<sup>179</sup>

Ostensibly, taking the step of arresting Charles could be held out as having been a favour granted to Condé. Fuensaldaña, for example, who was aware of Condé's attempts to have him removed from his command, took full advantage of this foil.<sup>180</sup> Yet for the French prince, despite the pleasure he derived from the news of Charles's arrest, there was no conceivable advantage. It was natural for Francis to share his elder brother's hostility and he proved reluctant to involve himself in military projects that he believed benefited the French prince.<sup>181</sup>

Charles IV's arrest therefore did not ease the tension in Brussels. Relations between Condé, the archduke and Fuensaldaña showed no signs of improving and indeed, after the duke's arrest, radically deteriorated owing to another concession the prince managed to extract from Madrid. Like the men under the command of the Duke of Lorraine, the army Condé had brought with him to the Spanish Netherlands came to be considered by the Spanish as critical to the war effort in the Flanders theatre. It followed that the greater the need for Condé's army to defend the Spanish Netherlands and give military projects the chance of success, the greater the power of the French prince to influence military decision making. An expansion in the size of Condé's army was therefore a situation the archduke hoped to avoid and this was often the rationale that lay behind his attempts to secure funding for the Spanish Army of Flanders at Condé's expense.

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<sup>179</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.113: Condé to Fiesque, 9 May 1654.

<sup>180</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.53: Fiesque to Condé, 1 Apr.1654.

<sup>181</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.189: Fiesque to Condé, 10 June 1654; f.193: Condé to Fiesque, 20 June 1654.

Condé had been recruiting actively since his arrival in the Spanish Netherlands. In April and May 1653 for example, the prince's commanders Montal and Bouteville were involved in a number of contracts for the levying of German mercenaries.<sup>182</sup> At the same time, Barrière, the prince's envoy in London, had negotiated contracts for the levying of Irish mercenaries in England and their transportation to Dunkirk.<sup>183</sup> But such levies did not have a significant impact on numbers and their effect was more to replace men who had been lost or had deserted than to increase the size of the prince's army. In March 1654 however, the prince was able to add to his army a significant number of men. Clause seven of Condé's treaty had provided for the levying of 5000 men for the prince's use on the king of Spain's account.<sup>184</sup> The prince's envoys in Madrid had been pressing for this obligation to be fulfilled for some time and by March had succeeded in securing for Condé the command of what came to be known as the auxiliary army.<sup>185</sup> This development was highly significant. From an army of roughly equivalent size to that commanded by the Duke of Lorraine, numbers in Condé's army had now almost doubled. The auxiliary army comprised 24 mercenary regiments divided equally between cavalry and foot and crucially, they were a resource that in Condé's absence would have been subsumed under the banner of

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<sup>182</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.63: Traicté entre Montal et Pretorius, 17 Apr.1653; f.110: Traicté entre Montal et Heller, 21 May 1653.

<sup>183</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.67: Barrière to Condé, 18 Apr.1653.

<sup>184</sup> P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, p.425.

<sup>185</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.43: Fiesque to Condé, 16 Mar.1654; f.124: Mémoire du Comte de Fiesque, 22 Apr.1654.

the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>186</sup>

This development threatened both the archduke and Fuensaldaña. Leopold Wilhelm knew that in these circumstances his grip on military strategy would loosen, whilst Fuensaldaña interpreted Condé's new command as a direct threat to his position as commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders. Steps were immediately taken to reverse Philip IV's decision by linking the question of the auxiliary army to the wider issue of the archduke's mandate as governor.<sup>187</sup> In May the archduke sent instructions to Condé's intendant, Lenet, that his master should prepare to receive orders for the ensuing campaign. This was a direct challenge to Condé's claim to autonomous command and the prince, believing Fuensaldaña to be largely responsible for this, 'artifice', sent a communiqué to Fiesque in Madrid requesting that the letter of his treaty be upheld and the count admonished.<sup>188</sup>

For Condé the question of autonomy was critical. As he pointed out in his letter to his envoy in Madrid, Fiesque, if he was seen to be merely a 'général subalterne' of the Spanish king his credibility among his soldiers and in France would be destroyed.<sup>189</sup> The strength of Condé's position lay in his claim to be fighting for his king, Louis XIV, against an irresponsible foreign minister. By accepting military orders from Philip IV the prince would be publicly abandoning

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<sup>186</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.171: List of regiments within the auxiliary army, 29 May 1654.

<sup>187</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.152: Memoir presented to Leopold Wilhelm by Lenet, May 1654.

<sup>188</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.208: Fiesque to Condé, 24 June 1654.

<sup>189</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.202: Memoir for Don Luis from Fiesque, 18 June 1654.

his sworn allegiance to Louis XIV and vastly increasing his vulnerability to attack within France.<sup>190</sup> Ultimately he was not demanding a significant concession from Madrid - the wording of his treaty had been clear on the issue of the auxiliary army. Philip's council were aware that Condé's continued existence as an autonomous satellite of the Spanish Army of Flanders was critical for his position in France. Despite attempts by the archduke to embroil the Emperor his brother,<sup>191</sup> the problem was resolved by an explicit denial from Madrid that Condé had any jurisdiction over the Spanish Army of Flanders whilst they underlined that the command of the auxiliary army was at the complete discretion of the French prince.<sup>192</sup>

As a result of these political decisions in Madrid, Condé was now an even more formidable force to be reckoned with in the high command. Leopold Wilhelm simply could not afford to ignore Condé's demands. In Madrid the political impact in Brussels of the prince's new command was not fully realised for they believed that military strategy anyway was geared to re-establishing Condé's position in France, a point they had constantly reiterated to the archduke. But in Brussels, where Fuensaldaña and the archduke had hoped to use military strategy to sideline Condé, they found that their ability to implement such strategies had now been seriously undermined. The change in the balance of power within the high

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<sup>190</sup> In the memoir Fiesque presented to Don Luis he suggested that to solve the possible problems of protocol between Condé and Leopold Wilhelm on the field of battle that both should commission adjutants to operate as a channel of communication, citing the example of the Prince of Nassau and the Maréchal de Châtillon. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.202: Memoir for Don Luis from Fiesque, 18 June 1654.

<sup>191</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.208: Fiesque to Condé, 24 June 1654.

<sup>192</sup> This decision is outlined in the memoir Fiesque gives to Don Luis in Madrid, *cf.*, *Ibid.*

command was quick to manifest itself in preparations for the siege of Arras.

The siege of Arras was the most significant attempt by the archduke to divert the efforts of the Spanish Army of Flanders northwards away from Champagne. Both Condé and Duke Francis of Lorraine contributed to the siege but Condé's participation was the subject of long and drawn out negotiations between June and July 1654.<sup>193</sup> These negotiations were driven by the prince's wish to concentrate the forces of the coalition in Champagne and specifically to provide relief for Stenay, a Condéen fortress that had been besieged by the French since June 1654.<sup>194</sup> However, despite the prince's newly defined status as an independent commander and his forthright declarations in May that implied that he expected Leopold Wilhelm to be more cooperative,<sup>195</sup> he agreed to assist at Arras with the consequence that Stenay, with no relief, was forced to capitulate to the French. Superficially it would seem that the prince had been unable to exploit his new position as commander of the auxiliary army. But in the negotiations that led to the prince's decision to give assistance, the archduke had agreed to compensate Condé fully for any losses he sustained.<sup>196</sup> Furthermore, the political consequences in France of a Spanish-Condéen success at Arras were sufficiently advantageous to persuade the prince of the merits of a successful

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<sup>193</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.185: Condé to Fuensaldaña, 5 June 1654; f.187: Chamilly to Condé, 10 June 1654; f.195: Condé to Fiesque, 20 June 1654; f.202: Memoir for Don Luis from Fiesque, 18 June 1654.

<sup>194</sup> In anticipation of an attack on Stenay the archduke had in fact agreed to provide the fortress with military support in May 1654 *cf* A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.94: Condé to Fiesque, 26 May 1654; f.117: Memoir for Don Luis from Fiesque, 13 May 1654.

<sup>195</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.167: Lenet to Don Augustin de Navarro, 27 May 1654.

<sup>196</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 11 June 1654; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.232: Fiesque to Condé, 18 July 1654.

attack on Arras, that would effectively overturn one of the last of the French gains during the 1640's - only Perpignan would remain to be taken - even if it led to the loss of Stenay.<sup>197</sup>

The defeat of the Spanish at Arras by a relieving army under the command of Turenne was a blow to Condé's political position in France. Paradoxically, it had a positive effect on his political position in the Spanish Netherlands. Condé's agent remarked in a letter from Madrid in October that Arras had done more for his master than if he had won four battles singlehandedly.<sup>198</sup> Condé's propaganda was able to exploit the fact that the French breakthrough the circumvallation into Arras had not occurred in the section under the prince's command. In the circumstances, the prince had been able to make an orderly withdrawal, sustaining minimal losses, whilst the Spanish, who had faced the brunt of the French assault, had suffered serious casualties.<sup>199</sup> The French went on to take Clermont,<sup>200</sup> another Condé's fortress, but in fulfilment of the agreement concluded between Leopold Wilhelm and Condé in June, the prince received the fortresses of La Capelle and Catelet as compensation.<sup>201</sup> His conduct at the siege was treated in all accounts as exemplary and contrasted with Fuensaldaña's, whose section of the circumvallation, on the opposite side of Condé's, had had the

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<sup>197</sup> Arras had been lost to the French in 1640; J.H.Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, (Yale, 1986), pp.586-588; H.Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p.98.

<sup>198</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.289: Fiesque to Condé, 8 Oct.1654.

<sup>199</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.154: St Agolin to Lenet, 29 July 1654; A.G.S. Est.Flandres 2083: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 28 Aug.1654; Valcerel to Philip IV, 12 Sept.1654.

<sup>200</sup> B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.535.

<sup>201</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.324: Fiesque to Condé, 13 Dec.1654.

misfortune to have been attacked by Turenne.<sup>202</sup> Despite efforts to foist the blame onto Duke Francis of Lorraine<sup>203</sup> the count was made the scapegoat for the defeat.

The response of both Fuensaldaña and the archduke to the *débâcle* at Arras was indirectly to blame Condé whose arrival in the Spanish Netherlands they argued, had diluted the effectiveness of the high command.<sup>204</sup> In retrospect, the failure of the coalition to make significant advances on the northern frontier during this period was caused precisely by the problem of leadership Fuensaldaña and Leopold Wilhelm now identified. Internecine conflict within the high command between 1653 and 1656 ensured that they were incapable of providing coherent leadership and crucially, unable to exploit the advantages that might have been gained from rallying the resources of the Spanish Army of Flanders, Lorraine and Condé. Half-hearted attempts to consolidate Condé's hold on Champagne in 1653 were combined with similarly ramshackle operations in Artois in 1654. Fuensaldaña's account in August 1654 of a French attack, which inflicted large losses on Spanish infantry owing to Duke Francis of Lorraine's refusal to come to his assistance, was an all-too-typical instance of how political conflict had exercised its effect on the war effort.<sup>205</sup> There is evidence to show that this opinion was shared by contemporaries. Don Francisco Valceral for example, wrote

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<sup>202</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.274: Fiesque to Condé, 16 Sept.1654.

<sup>203</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 28 Aug.1654

<sup>204</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.257, f.289: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 3 Oct.1654. Fuensaldaña continued to argue that the multitude of 'cabezas' within the high command was one of the principal reasons for the military setbacks of 1654 and 1655, S.E.G., vol.661: Consejo Extraordinario, 10 July 1655; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 13 May 1656.

<sup>205</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 28 Aug.1654

to Philip IV after the defeat of Arras that their defeat by the French had been the almost inevitable result of internal political divisions in the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>206</sup>

The siege of Arras marked another transition in the politics of the high command. Condé was already in a powerful position after his acquisition of the auxiliary army. To the alarm of the archduke, after the defeat at Arras, the prince's military power began sharply to increase along with his political influence in Brussels. Correspondingly, the level of political conflict in Brussels increased and the eventual consequence of this was the change of administration in 1656. Despite Condé's popularity after Arras Philip's council were quick to agree that the resentment and divisiveness that Condé's arrival had created in Brussels was now becoming a serious problem. They universally lamented the prince's 'error', when he had left Bordeaux under the command of Conti, his younger brother, to march on Paris in January 1652.<sup>207</sup> This of course, had led to Condé's eventual arrival in the Spanish Netherlands and it is not difficult to imagine how the Spanish had hoped Condé's alliance would benefit them before he left Guyenne. Undoubtedly, had Bordeaux continued to be a Condéen enclave in France under the personal command of Condé the Spanish would have been spared the problems of accommodating him in the Spanish Netherlands whilst they would have been able to take advantage of the diversion of continued civil war in France. But there was very little Madrid or Brussels could now do about the French prince other than suggest the possibility that he could lead an amphibious invasion of

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<sup>206</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Valcerel to Philip IV, 12 Sept.1654.

<sup>207</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Junta, 6 Sept.1654.

Bordeaux.<sup>208</sup>

Condé's accretion of practical military power in the Spanish Netherlands through the increasing size of his army caused serious concern in Brussels and Madrid. Since Condé's losses at Arras had been minimal and that of the Spanish Army of Flanders significant, the gap in size between the two armies had become even narrower. This problem became the focus of the archduke's correspondence with Madrid over the course of 1655. Leopold Wilhelm now reported the prince's recruiting activities in vivid detail and tried to use this information to alarm Madrid into sending money to bolster the numbers of the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>209</sup> In June 1655 the archduke wrote to Philip IV with a precise breakdown of the numbers of soldiers under the command of the coalition.<sup>210</sup> The figures he gave were disturbing. According to the archduke, Condé's army was now larger than the Spanish Army of Flanders.

The figures supplied by Leopold Wilhelm in June were doubtless exaggerated but were nonetheless worrying, particularly since the view that Condé was becoming a dangerous liability was supported by others.<sup>211</sup> In September 1655 Don Gaspar Bonifaz, the *sergeant général de bataille* of the Spanish Army of Flanders and a *maestro de campo* of one of the Spanish tercios, wrote to the king reporting that Condé's political and military strength in the Spanish

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<sup>208</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Junta, 18 Feb.1654. The negotiations in London became particularly important for this reason. *Cf.*, p.156.

<sup>209</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 17 Feb.1655; Consulta of the Council of State, 29 Mar.1655; Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 27 Apr.1655.

<sup>210</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 16 June 1655.

<sup>211</sup> A.G.R.B., Audience, 1364, Liasse 777: St Amour to Leopold Wilhelm, 16 Mar.1655; S.E.G., vol.258, f.40: Isenghien to Leopold Wilhelm, 12 Jan.1655.

Netherlands was such that they were now facing a general crisis of command.<sup>212</sup> Upholding Leopold Wilhelm's position as governor, Bonifaz argued that as it stood the situation was intolerable. Crucially, he argued that the fall in the size of the Spanish Army of Flanders caused them to be reliant upon Condé to make up the shortfall of men and this presented a dangerous security risk.

Bonifaz's missive was reinforced by a letter from Leopold Wilhelm which was discussed by Philip's council in November. The archduke it seemed had submitted to the idea that the prince would have to remain in the Spanish Netherlands, finally conceding that in their present circumstances the loss of Condé would be a blow to military strength from which they would not be able to recover. The implication was that now, if he so wished, the French prince could hold the Spanish Netherlands to ransom:

‘no ser conveniente en esta ocasión sacar de aquellos países las tropas del príncipe porque [si] se hiciese el ejército de VM quedaria tan corto y flaco que no habria forma de engrosarle con la brevedad que sería menester....’<sup>213</sup>

The council were plainly alarmed by Leopold Wilhelm's letter and resolved to send as much financial assistance as possible. This led to the negotiation of *asientos* for 600,000 *escudos* at the end of 1655, though this did not in fact reach Brussels until the archduke had left in 1656. Nonetheless, orders from Madrid were strict that the money was to be used exclusively for the benefit of the Spanish Army of

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<sup>212</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Instrucciones de Gaspar Bonifaz, 12 Sept.1655.

<sup>213</sup> A.G.S.Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Nov.1655.

Flanders and not for Condé.<sup>214</sup>

There is little doubt that Leopold Wilhelm's position had become increasingly difficult after the defeat outside Arras. Condé's increased military power had called the archduke's leadership further into question and the combination of financial crisis and muddled leadership had made the task of coordinating operations against the French almost impossible. Adding to the archduke's difficulties was his increased isolation. Fuensaldaña, alienated after Arras and conscious of the prince's power in Madrid, knew he could not count on Leopold Wilhelm for support and began, surprisingly in view of his earlier stance, to turn towards Condé.<sup>215</sup> The almost constant demands for the count's dismissal by Condé's envoys in Madrid diminished in 1655, when there was a clandestine rapprochement between the two in Brussels.<sup>216</sup> But whilst relations between Fuensaldaña and Condé improved, the count's relations with Leopold Wilhelm deteriorated significantly. Earlier resentment the archduke had harboured towards Fuensaldaña over the dismissal of the Count of Schwartzenberg re-emerged and the archduke began to press vigorously in Vienna and Madrid for Fuensaldaña's dismissal.<sup>217</sup> Whether Leopold Wilhelm's hostility was the result of Fuensaldaña's rapprochement with Condé, or whether a disagreement between the two led the count to develop closer ties with the prince, the documentation does not make clear. But during the final months of 1655 the archduke was threatening

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<sup>214</sup> *cf.*, p.171.

<sup>215</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.177: Fuensaldaña to Condé, 19 June 1655; f.199: Fuensaldaña to Condé, 24 June 1655.

<sup>216</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.239: Fiesque to Condé, 21 July 1655.

<sup>217</sup> A.G.S.Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Nov.1655.

Madrid with his resignation if Fuensaldaña was not dismissed.<sup>218</sup>

Condé's new *amitié* with Fuensaldaña was discussed at length by the prince in a letter to Fiesque dated July 1655.<sup>219</sup> There were also indications that the prince was developing better relations with other members of the high command. In July for example Condé referred to the Prince de Ligne, captain-general of the cavalry of the Spanish Army of Flanders, in flattering terms: 'M. le Prince de Ligne est un homme d'honneur et de coeur; aussy est-il seul d'entre eux qui soit capable de se charger de quelque entreprise.'<sup>220</sup> Condé had evidently been able to exploit his favourable position after Arras and had emerged from the campaign of 1654 in a strong position. There were even some observers who believed that it was only a matter of time before he would take supreme command of the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>221</sup>

It was ironic that military failures should have had such radically different effects on Condé's position in France and the Spanish Netherlands. But the credit Condé gained after Arras increased during the campaign of 1655 when further military disasters forced the Spanish to rely even more upon the French prince for assistance. After Arras the French continued to concentrate on Condé's strongholds and the immediate advantage of Spanish defeat was reaped by a

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<sup>218</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.406: Fiesque to Condé, 4 Dec.1654.

<sup>219</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.239: Fiesque to Condé, 21 July 1655.

<sup>220</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.239: Condé to Fiesque, 21 July 1655. This was in marked contrast to the prince's earlier displays of attitude towards the Prince de Ligne, *cf.*, B.N. Ms.fr.6717 (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov.1653.

<sup>221</sup> Bod. Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.19, f.306: Intelligence report, 3 Oct.1654.

successful attack on Clermont and then Catelet, again, both Condéen fortresses.<sup>222</sup> The financial situation was so dire in 1655 that the high command in Brussels were forced to fight a defensive campaign. This at least, avoided the acrimonious disputes that had dominated previous meetings when they had sought to decide on offensive strategy. But it was generally agreed by all commanders that continued financial neglect threatened the very existence of Spanish power in Brussels,<sup>223</sup> particularly since the attentions of the French had moved to targeting Spanish strongholds. The situation was analogous to the financial collapse in France in 1648 and then again in 1652. The particular nature of the *banqueroute universelle* in 1648, for example, had made it seem impossible to contemporaries that the French government would be able to finance the war effort at all,<sup>224</sup> whilst in 1652, the financial crisis was such that the rival French armies were forced to rely uniquely on the contributions system for funding.<sup>225</sup>

Victory at Arras followed by the acquisition of two Condéen fortresses had given Mazarin the confidence to focus attention on the war with Spain on the northern frontier rather than the civil war in Champagne and Picardie. By December 1655, the French had managed to create a corridor into Hainaut by the acquisition in July of Landrecies, and in August, St Ghilian and the eponymous

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<sup>222</sup> Clermont fell to the French in November 1654 and Catelet in February 1655 *cf.*, B.R.B. *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.535; 1655, p.67.

<sup>223</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Mar.1654; Fuensaldaña to Philip IV, 27 Apr.1655; Consulta of the Council of State, 13 May 1655; Est.Flandes 2085: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV; A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.258, f.172: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 18 Mar.1655; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.239: Condé to Fiesque, 21 July 1655.

<sup>224</sup> R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, pp.204-5.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, p.238.

fortress of Condé.<sup>226</sup> This shift in French strategy was a further blow for the archduke who was now forced into the novel and embarrassing situation of asking Condé for assistance.<sup>227</sup> This was particularly galling since he was very well aware that the bulk of Condé's army, made up by the auxiliary army, would in normal circumstances have been absorbed into the Spanish Army of Flanders.

The archduke's letters to Philip IV over the course of 1655 provided an almost constant catalogue of complaints levelled at Condé and Fuensaldaña, and at Madrid's financial neglect of the Spanish Netherlands. By the end of 1655 Leopold Wilhelm was convinced that the situation was so bad that Philip IV was on the brink of losing the Spanish Netherlands altogether.<sup>228</sup> Over and above the problems of finance and the increasingly poor relations between the archduke, Condé and Fuensaldaña, 1655 had seen Penn's attack on the Spanish West Indies, signalling the beginning of English involvement in the Franco-Spanish conflict.<sup>229</sup> To this was added the loss of the army of the Duke of Lorraine in November, when Duke Francis had taken everyone by surprise by switching allegiance to Paris.<sup>230</sup> Marginalised and systematically humiliated by Condé, Leopold Wilhelm had no wish to preside over the loss of the provinces as well<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> B.R.B. *Rélations Véritables*, 1655, pp.348, 408, 420.

<sup>227</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.267: Condé to Fiesque, 20 Aug.1655.

<sup>228</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.260, f.100: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Nov.1655; f.115: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 13 Nov.1655.

<sup>229</sup> This development was discussed at length by the council of state in Madrid *cf* A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 22 Oct.1655.

<sup>230</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.260, f.100: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Nov.1655; f.124: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 20 Nov.1655; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.424: Fiesque to Condé, Dec.1655.

<sup>231</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 2 Feb.1656.

and in December requested permission to resign his commission and return to Austria.<sup>232</sup> This was a situation that Madrid had hoped to avoid. In November, Philip IV's council had decided on Fuensaldaña's dismissal and his replacement by the governor of Milan, the Marques de Caracena, as a means to placate the archduke but to no effect.<sup>233</sup> In May 1656 the archduke left Brussels for Vienna, suffering further embarrassment in a meeting with his replacement, Philip IV's bastard son Don Juan de Austria, in a dispute over protocol.<sup>234</sup>

### THE QUESTION OF PROTOCOL

One of the strongest themes to emerge from Leopold Wilhelm's governorship of the Spanish Netherlands was the almost constant tension between Brussels and Madrid over Condé. The prince was often the focus of debate and both the archduke and Fuensaldaña were quick to blame Condé for the problems they encountered. Criticism was directed at him over a broad range of issues: the economic and social impact of the prince's army, the threat he posed to the security of the provinces, and his interference with military command and financial administration. These were issues that focused specifically on Condé's position in the Spanish Netherlands. However, Condé's arrival did not just threaten Fuensaldaña and the archduke within the narrow confines of the Spanish

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<sup>232</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.424: Fiesque to Condé, Dec.1655.

<sup>233</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Nov.1655.

<sup>234</sup> B.R.B. *Rélations Véritables*, 1656, p.192.

Netherlands. There was a further dimension to the conflict that existed on a distinctly personal level; this concerned Fuensaldaña's standing in Spain, and the international perception of Leopold Wilhelm's status as an Austrian archduke and son of the former Emperor, Ferdinand II.

The many and varied conflicts over forms of protocol in Brussels were frequently the forum where personal hostilities were demonstrated at their clearest. Although there were conventions of seniority that governed forms of protocol and court ceremonial, international comparisons of aristocratic rankings were often the subject for debate. The ability to command respect over and above that which was normally dictated for a person of a particular rank was considered an important sign of political power. Similarly, refusing to accord someone the respect due to their rank was a sign of disfavour and political impotence. Crucial to disputes over protocol however was that it could reflect both ways. For example, being deferential to someone of equal status not only reflected their political power but acknowledged your weakness. An element of the political conflict between Condé, the archduke and Fuensaldaña, therefore, was the articulation of their hostility through disputes over protocol. Condé and Fuensaldaña for example came to a temporary deadlock over the appellation of 'Monseigneur' to which Condé laid claim. Although Fuensaldaña deferred to the prince, Condé complained that the count had only accorded him the respect due to a *Duc et Pair* or a *Maréchal de France*.

Condé was able to settle the protocol dispute with Fuensaldaña through his intendant Lenet without referring the question to Madrid. Fuensaldaña was prepared to drop his claim possibly because he was aware of a similar and more

serious dispute between Condé and the archduke where the question was referred to Madrid and the outcome had been in the prince's favour. In February 1654 the prince sent a detailed letter to his intendant informing him of the exact form of protocol he expected from Fuensaldaña.<sup>235</sup> The count accepted the prince's demands and in future correspondence always addressed Condé as Monseigneur despite the fact that the use of the title in the prince's case did raise some problems that were later identified by Don Luis de Haro.<sup>236</sup> It is likely that Fuensaldaña was taking an opportunist approach to this dispute, hoping to score political points that would contribute to his status and give him a greater chance of securing a sought after post or even his social elevation. However the dispute between Condé and the archduke was not settled with the same easy resolve and this created problems shortly after Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands.

Questions of protocol were almost always negotiated prior to a meeting to avoid a public disagreement. Shortly after Condé had arrived in the Spanish Netherlands, the prince made it known that he expected to be treated with the respect equivalent to that paid to the archduke. Since Leopold Wilhelm however was the son of the former Emperor Ferdinand II and Condé only the cousin of the French king it was clear, technically, that Leopold Wilhelm took precedence over Condé. In March 1653 the archduke wrote to Philip IV complaining that to concede equal status to the prince would be a humiliation that would reflect poorly on their house: 'no pareciendome conforme al decoro de nuestra casa, ni al grado en que Vuestra Magestad me tiene en estos paises el tratarme igualmente con el

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<sup>235</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6719 (Lenet Papers), f.45: Condé to Lenet, 23 Feb.1654.

<sup>236</sup> *cf.*, p.187.

principe de Condé..' <sup>237</sup> Leopold Wilhelm knew that to compromise himself publicly in front of Condé would threaten fundamentally his supremacy in Brussels in all areas of government. But power politics in the Spanish Netherlands were not the only issues at stake. Both Condé and the Archduke were seeking to define themselves against each other to a wider European audience.

For Condé the issue was of vital importance. Above all, he had to consider the possible options that would be open to him in the event that he was unable to negotiate a reconciliation with Louis XIV. Throughout the 1650's the prince was exploring alternatives assuming that he could not return to France, many of which emerged during the peace negotiations in 1656 and 1659.<sup>238</sup> To increase his eligibility for the various openings he identified it was critical for him to demonstrate that on an international level a first prince of the royal blood was of a grandeur that was easily the match of an Austrian archduke who was himself considered to stand within the highest echelon of European aristocratic status. But from the archduke's perspective Condé's attempts to claim equal status, as well as threatening his position in the Spanish Netherlands, also compromised his ability to secure international honours and appointments.

This conflict of interest emerged with decisive effects in the issue of the Polish crown. Both the archduke and Condé were being seriously considered as possible successors to John Casimir, among other eligible candidates such as Mattia de Medici, Condé's nephew, the son of the Duc de Longueville, and

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<sup>237</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Mar.1653.

<sup>238</sup> *cf.*, chapter 5.

Frederick-William.<sup>239</sup> Condé's candidacy was at its strongest towards the end of the decade when his son, the Duc d'Anguien, became the favoured candidate of Anne de Gonzague, Queen of Poland.<sup>240</sup> But even during the early 1650's it was known that Condé considered himself to be in the running.<sup>241</sup> Although considerations and political dispositions towards the candidacies in Warsaw were paramount, it was understood that elevation to sovereign status anywhere was dependent on political power, social rank and status. For Leopold Wilhelm to grant Condé the concession of equality of status in Brussels therefore, threatened to send the wrong signals to Warsaw and was clearly not in the best interests of the archduke. In Madrid however, the private interests of Leopold Wilhelm were not on this occasion synonymous with the best interests of the Spanish crown. The belief that Condé was the key to success against the French led Philip IV to write to the archduke stressing that in their current straits it would be unwise to break with Condé, particularly over a question that was seen to be so trifling next to the war with France. Accepting that in normal circumstances such a pretension would not be tolerated, Philip IV decided that on this occasion the archduke should waive his right of precedence and grant Condé the concession he demanded: 'Parece que en el estado presente de las cosas no seria prudencia romper ni aventurar a romper con el principe de Condé.'<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> R.Frost, *After the Deluge, Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655-1660*, (Cambridge, 1993), pp.58 & 124; N.Davies, *God's Playground, A History of Poland*, (Oxford, 1981), p.400.

<sup>240</sup> R.Frost, *After the Deluge*, pp.165-167; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.155-175.

<sup>241</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.3: Würtemberg to Caillet, 8 Jan.1655.

<sup>242</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2080: Junta de Estado, 29 Apr.1654.

But despite the line taken in Madrid over the issue of precedence between Condé and Leopold Wilhelm, the archduke was not prepared to capitulate fully and this led to a degree of ambiguity that remained until the archduke left the Spanish Netherlands in 1656. Formal meetings between Condé and the archduke seem to have been avoided and when they did occur complaints usually followed about some slight Condé considered that he had been dealt. In May 1653 for example, Condé had fallen ill and on his recovery festivities were organised that were attended by Fuensaldaña and, according to Caillet, all the, 'grand seigneurs' of the country. The archduke however was absent and Caillet attributed this to the fact that, 'l'archiduc s'estoit tenu un peu ferme sur les subjects des civilités...'<sup>243</sup> Leopold Wilhelm had though sent a representative, the governor of Antwerp, Don Juan de Borgia, who brought with him the details of the ceremony Condé could expect when he arrived in Brussels. The arrangements were straightforward and were viewed by Condé's party as something of a success, for it seemed that the archduke was prepared to make a significant concession to the prince: 'S.A. [Condé] entra par le parc ou M. l'archiduc la vint recevoir, il se firent mille compliments S.A. eust tousjours la droicte et quand il se visittent l'un l'autre se traictent egalement... ils logent tous deux en mesme logis qui est la Court pour en revenir à l'Estat de santé de S.A...'<sup>244</sup>

Ostensibly it seemed that the archduke had fully conceded Condé's demands. But although Leopold Wilhelm was prepared to grant Condé this favour, others continued to make a distinction, and this made it easy for the archduke to

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<sup>243</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6715 (Lenet Papers), f.15: Caillet to Lenet, 5 May 1653.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

convey the message that he was merely humouring the prince for reasons of state. Queen Christina of Sweden's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands in August 1653,<sup>245</sup> for example, provoked a serious dispute over precedence, for the queen refused straightforwardly to treat Condé and the archduke with equal respect. Christina remained at Antwerp for some months where she was visited frequently by Leopold Wilhelm before coming to Brussels for the winter.<sup>246</sup> In January 1654 Condé had invited the queen to a banquet where it seemed that by chance they were joined by Leopold Wilhelm. An English spy reported that Condé was furious when it became clear that the queen fully intended to distinguish between him and Leopold Wilhelm:

‘Condé entertained the Queen of Sweden, but it happened that they dined with others. The Archduke Leopold being not in the place that the prince found himself offended being not treated or placed with the same respect as the archduke, but her majesty excused herself that though he was a royal prince yet he was not the immediate son of a crown or monarchy - the prince is not satisfied in mind who as I hear is upon his march towards the frontiers of France..’<sup>247</sup>

Christina was possibly preparing for her voyage to Paris where she knew indulging Condé's whims in Brussels would not be appreciated. But it is worth mentioning that for contemporaries Christina's political sympathies remained something of an enigma. Certainly, observers in Paris found it difficult to discern precisely what policies she was pursuing. Whilst negotiating with the French the

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<sup>245</sup> B.Quillet, *Cristina de Suecia, un rey excepcional*, (Barcelona, 1993), p.193.

<sup>246</sup> B.R.B. *Rélatons Véritables*, 1654, p.396, 408, 608.

<sup>247</sup> Bod. Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.21, f.538: Dispatch from Brussels, 9 Jan.1654.

queen also seemed to be carrying on simultaneous negotiations with the Habsburgs and was permanently attended by the Spanish envoy Pimentel.<sup>248</sup> However, Condé's response to the public insult he had received in January was simply to refuse any further contact with the queen and despite Don Luis's attempts to intercede from Madrid neither Condé nor the queen were willing to settle their differences.<sup>249</sup>

Condé's dispute with Christina was significant. Being a Habsburg sympathiser in Brussels did not necessarily entail supporting Condé and it is quite clear that the queen was taking advantage of factional divisions in Brussels to serve wider interests that included maintaining simultaneous good relations with the French crown. The comment provoked by her dispute with Condé demonstrated the degree to which the prince had become integrated into internal Spanish politics. Divisions in Madrid over Condé only really emerged in the disputes during the peace negotiations in 1659 when members of Philip IV's council were making their opinions clearly felt.<sup>250</sup> In Brussels however, Fuensaldaña and Leopold Wilhelm's opposition to the prince pointed to the existence of a powerful anti-Condéen party in the Spanish Netherlands and Queen Christina was quick to associate herself with this group. Other political figures with interests in the Spanish Netherlands defined their political dispositions similarly. In March 1655 for example, the Comte de Chanut, French ambassador

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<sup>248</sup> This was remarked upon by one of Mazarin's envoys in a letter to the cardinal, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.375: Silhon to Mazarin, 25 Sept.1653.

<sup>249</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.19: Fiesque to Condé, 17 Feb.1655; f.26: Fiesque to Condé, 3 Mar.1655; f.106: Fiesque to Condé, 29 May 1655.

<sup>250</sup> *cf.*, pp.324-325.

to the United Provinces, wrote to Secretary of State Lomenie de Brienne in Paris describing the political disposition of the Spanish ambassador to the United Provinces, Don Estevan de Gamarra.<sup>251</sup> Gamarra was a rival of Fuensaldaña and manifested his hostility towards the count by developing a warm amitié with Condé and supporting the prince over the issue of protocol that Christina had raised. Gamarra knew of Condé's attempts to have Fuensaldaña dismissed, was possibly angling to replace him and hoped for the prince's support in Madrid.

It was not uncommon for Condé to be used as a benchmark of political loyalties in Madrid and the Spanish Netherlands as well as in France. Don Luis de Haro's consistent support of Condé in Madrid for example, owed much to his original support for the prince's treaty in 1651.<sup>252</sup> Rather like Cardinal Richelieu's self-identification with hawkish policies during the late 1620's and 1630's,<sup>253</sup> Don Luis' position in the royal council rested in part on the success of his policy initiatives, one of which had been support for Condé. Similarly, another of Fuensaldaña's rivals, the Marques de Caracena, who replaced the count as army commander in 1656, saw not only that it was in his best interests to develop a warm amitié with Condé but also that such a friendship was a natural extension of his opposition to Fuensaldaña.<sup>254</sup>

Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands had therefore added considerably to the unstable political environment in Brussels. By undermining

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<sup>251</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.15964 (Chanut correspondence), f.212: Chanut to Brienne, 4 Mar.1655.

<sup>252</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2177: Consulta of the Council of State, 5 Nov.1651.

<sup>253</sup> D.Parrott, 'The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-1659', ed., J.Black, *Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, (Edinburgh, 1987), pp.86-87.

<sup>254</sup> *cf.*, pp.191-194.

Fuensaldaña and Leopold Wilhelm the prince created political instability in the Brussels Court<sup>255</sup> for it was no longer clear that the archduke was in a position of supreme political power. Perceiving Condé to be a political threat both Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña spent time adopting measures to prevent Condé from encroaching on their powers. As a consequence, the serious problems that faced Brussels during this period, such as the distribution of financial resources, allocation of winter quarters, policy towards neighbouring states and issues of military strategy, were exacerbated.

Philip IV's council in Madrid were well aware of the degree of added disruption political conflict within the high command was creating in the Spanish Netherlands. But most of the time they appeared as merely the helpless onlookers in a situation beyond their control. The only positive steps they took to remedy the political malaise was to oblige Fuensaldaña to leave the Spanish Netherlands to take up the governorship of Milan.<sup>256</sup> Even this gesture, offered as a palliative to the archduke, proved to be fruitless when shortly afterwards Leopold Wilhelm tendered his own resignation.<sup>257</sup> But, to a large extent the political conundrum was insoluble for there was no clear course of action open to Madrid. Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña were both in strong positions: it was easy for them to show that they were consistently undermined by Condé, whom they convincingly

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<sup>255</sup> In May 1653 Caillet wrote to Lenet describing the Brussels court as so rife with rival claims of precedence provoked by Condé's arrival that the prince had not yet visited any of the resident princesses. B.N. Ms.fr.6715 (Lenet Papers), f.46: Caillet to Lenet, 10 May 1653.

<sup>256</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Nov.1655; Est.Flandes 2087, 5 Jan.1656.

<sup>257</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2085: Consulta of the Council of State, 14 Dec.1655; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, (Cambridge, 1988), p.291.

blamed for adding significantly to the degree of social, economic and political instability in the Spanish Netherlands. The prince too was in a powerful position. His demands were entirely reasonable in view of his treaty with Philip IV, added to which was the consistent support of Don Luis, the widespread belief in Madrid that Condé was the key to success against France, and the degree of *de facto* power the prince held in the Spanish Netherlands.

There is no doubt that the financial hardships being encountered in Brussels contributed to Spanish setbacks on France's northern frontier 1654-56. However, it is important to guard against simplification. Too much concentration on deep historical currents, such as notions of Spanish decline and 'imperial overstretch', can leave little room for other important factors. Political tensions in the high command of the Spanish Netherlands had a profound effect on Spain's ability to field an efficient and effective fighting force in this theatre. It is significant that after the change in command in 1656 the new governor and army commander collaborated with Condé with far greater success but received even more inadequate financing than their predecessors.<sup>258</sup> Nonetheless, as a consequence of better political relations the new team of Condé, the Marques de Caracena and Don Juan de Austria made military advances and recovered lost positions. The ability of Madrid to distribute adequate resources to fight a war on multiple fronts therefore was clearly important. However, equally important was the efficiency with which these resources were used, and this was largely a question to be resolved at the level of regional high command.

When it is mentioned at all by historians, the administration of Leopold

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<sup>258</sup> *cf.*, pp.169-179.

Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña between 1652 and 1656 tends to receive negative comment. That such a view has become so deeply ingrained in studies of this period raises an important historiographical problem. Frequently historians lapse into a crude historicism that tends to exaggerate Spanish losses during this period and portray them as the inevitable consequence of Spain's decline. This argument passes without question because much of what is known about French politics during this period, and the politics of the Spanish high command in Brussels, constitutes a residue from the prejudices and selective primary research of 19th century French historians. Moreover French historians writing in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat at Sedan in 1871 had a particular agenda in mind. Inevitably their attentions were drawn to France's northern frontier and the threat to Paris. It was this bias that convinced later generations that the theatres of north Italy and Catalonia were of minor importance. Keen to explain the origins of the golden age of the Sun King, they propounded the belief that military commanders such as Turenne and Condé were significant forces in their own right. They claimed that Spain was rapidly sliding into terminal decline and that the extent of her losses on the northern frontier during the 1650's would have been even more dramatic had it not been for the assistance of Condé.

That such prejudices have continued to the present draws attention to the lack of serious and detailed attention given to the 1650's. Leopold Wilhelm, for example, was singled out for his inability to provide adequate military leadership by the eminent 19th century historian, Henri d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale. Aumale argued that the archduke's narrow-minded approach to the war prevented him from deploying the military genius of Condé to its full potential. In a passage that

holds particular irony in the light of the events of 1871, Aumale attributed Leopold Wilhelm's failings to the fact that he was German: 'on le trouvait trop Allemand, lent, fatigué, découragé; il était temps de le renvoyer à sa musique et à ses tableaux...'.<sup>259</sup> The image of Leopold Wilhelm as the stolid enervated aesthete is one that has found its way into even very recent historiography.<sup>260</sup> Even more prevalent is Aumale's image of Leopold Wilhelm as an incompetent military commander. Bérenger, for example, writing in the late 1980's, used Aumale's disparaging comments to paint a broader canvas of Spanish bungling: 'On voit aussi que les Espagnols n'avaient pas su utiliser les talents de Condé, pas plus qu'ils n'avaient tiré parti trois ans plus tôt, de ceux de Turenne..'<sup>261</sup>

But such observations are meaningless in the context of the politics in the Spanish Netherlands and the realities of the impact of Condé's exile in Brussels. The losses sustained by the prince in Champagne are not explained by the archduke's military incompetence but by the fact that the prince was a bitter political rival who the archduke hoped to marginalise and remove from the Spanish Netherlands. Indeed, the course of the war between 1652 and 1656 suggests that Leopold Wilhelm was a competent military strategist. Despite the divisions within the high command the archduke managed to rally the resources of Condé, Lorraine and the Spanish Army of Flanders at Arras. Although the coalition was forced to retreat, Arras had been an offensive action with a calculated level of risk that, according to contemporaries in Paris as well as

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<sup>259</sup> Aumale, *Histoires des Princes de Condé*, vi.428.

<sup>260</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, (Cambridge, 1988), p.291.

<sup>261</sup> J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, p.321.

Brussels, came very close to success.<sup>262</sup>

It was by no means clear to contemporaries that Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands was of positive benefit. Indeed, the prevailing opinion in Brussels and Madrid was that Condé impaired their ability to wage war on the northern frontier. Condé's military contribution was small. Most of his army was in Spanish pay and his arrival created political instabilities that had a serious effect on the archduke's ability to provide coherent leadership. The benefit the Spanish derived from Condé was not military but political. Condé's exile weakened Mazarin's regime and it was hoped that eventually, the prince would bring about a recreation of the widespread unrest of 1651.

Failure to place Condé's exile into the wider context of politics in Brussels and Paris during this period leads to serious misunderstandings and this is most apparent when discussion focuses on the course of the Franco-Spanish war on the northern frontier. French and Spanish advances are usually quantified in terms of the acquisition or loss of strategic fortresses. Frequently, Condé's losses in Champagne between 1652 and 1656 are pointed to as evidence of French gains in the war against Spain.<sup>263</sup> But it is important to make the distinction between the war being fought in Champagne, which was civil war, and the war fought on the borders of the Spanish Netherlands against Spanish targets. Many of the so called French 'victories' were not victories against Spain but successes of the cardinal and the queen mother in the war that continued to rage in Champagne

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<sup>262</sup> *cf.*, pp.276-280.

<sup>263</sup> Bérenger is a good example. Describing the sieges of Rethel, Stenay and St.Menehould he comments: 'On peut considérer que la guerre civile était terminée, Condé n'opérant plus que comme un général au service des espagnols.' J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, p.318. Goubert, likewise, fails to make any distinction. P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.406.

against Condé and his sympathisers. This distinction is vital. It is clearly a misrepresentation of the Franco-Spanish war to argue that Condéen and Spanish losses were one and the same. It is quite plain, for example, that Bordeaux was not a Spanish port lost to the French but a Condéen stronghold that surrendered to the Mazarinist generals Candale and Vendôme in August 1653. There is no reason why this straightforward logic should not also be applied to Condéen possessions in Champagne and Picardie. The distinction was important for contemporaries and should receive at least some recognition.

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Condé, Spain and the negotiations in London<sup>1</sup>

An alliance with republican England was seen in Madrid and Brussels as the means not only of solving the problem of Condé in the Spanish Netherlands, but also the surest way to conclude an advantageous peace with France. Between 1652 and 1659 both sides believed that the assistance of the English was the key to winning the war, and the governments of Philip IV and Louis XIV sought English assistance with varying degrees of success throughout the decade. Condé's envoys in London played an important part in these negotiations and were central to the embassy of Don Alonso de Cárdenas, the Spanish ambassador in London. After the arrival of the Condéen delegation from Bordeaux in March 1653, Condé was perceived in Brussels and Madrid as playing a crucial role in the attempts to bring the Commonwealth into the war against France.

England was a secondary European power during this period and it is easy to sympathise with contemporaries who found it perverse that the regicidal regime should suddenly become the epicentre of European diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> But, in the context

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<sup>1</sup> I should like to thank Dr Blair Worden, St Edmund Hall, Oxford, who kindly read an earlier version of this chapter and offered some helpful comments.

<sup>2</sup> Paulucci, the Venetian secretary, noticed on his arrival in London that the English court was already host to ambassadors from Spain, Holland, Portugal, Tuscany, Sweden, Denmark and Genoa. In September 1652 Sagredo, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, thought it worthy of comment to note England's increasing importance in Europe: 'I see from Paulucci's letters that

of the Franco-Spanish war, it is not difficult to see why attention was inexorably drawn towards the infant republic. Both sides knew that the intervention of England in the conflict threatened to be decisive - a direct consequence of her military capacities. The New Model Army in 1652 numbered about 30,000 men.<sup>3</sup> In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries this could have threatened even the campaigning army of the Spanish Army of Flanders. Although when up to strength in the late sixteenth century, the Spanish forces numbered about 100,000 men, this figure belied the significantly reduced numbers that the Spanish were actually able to send on campaign.<sup>4</sup> If this was true for the Spanish Army of Flanders of the late sixteenth century, during the 1650's the threat of the English was significantly greater. The New Model Army exceeded by roughly 6-7,000 the combined forces of Condé, the Dukes of Lorraine and the Spanish Army of Flanders. The situation was no less threatening for the forces of Louis XIV's France. During the early 1650's the numbers of French royalist soldiers fighting on the Flanders front did not exceed 20,000.<sup>5</sup> Clearly, in the circumstances of the approximate equilibrium between France and Spain in the Flanders theatre, the intervention of even a small proportion of the New Model Army on either side

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Parliament has been acknowledged by the most eminent monarchs in the world, and they are preparing to receive the ambassador from Portugal.' C.S.P.Venetian, xxviii.285: Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, 24 Sept.1652.

<sup>3</sup> I.Gentles, *The New Model Army*, (London, 1992) p.424.

<sup>4</sup> G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, (Cambridge, 1972), p.109.

<sup>5</sup> The size of the French army under Turenne's command at the siege of Arras was estimated to be between 14-15,000 men, even this could well be an exaggeration. Bernhard Kroener's figures and tables on the discrepancy between official and actual figures of men serving in French cavalry and infantry regiments between 1635 and 1660 are a striking reminder not to take official figures at face value. Henri d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, (Paris, 1892), vi.401. B.Kroener, *Les Routes et les Étapes*, (Münster, 1980), pp.177-178.

promised to tip the balance.

Yet Cromwell's army was of small concern in Paris and Madrid when set against English sea-power.<sup>6</sup> A strong navy had been regarded by the Rump Parliament as essential to the republic's survival<sup>7</sup> and at the conclusion of peace negotiations with the Dutch in April 1654 the Cromwellian navy numbered 160 warships.<sup>8</sup> In 1655 the Venetian secretary specified that it was Cromwell's navy that was bringing him, 'friendship and repute in every part of the world.'<sup>9</sup> Certainly, the power of the fleet was formidable next to the almost non-existent French navy under the command of the Mazarinist admiral, Vendôme. This was clearly demonstrated in September 1652 when bound for the relief of Dunkirk, Vendôme's fleet suffered a devastating attack from a flotilla commanded by Admiral Blake shortly after leaving La Rochelle.<sup>10</sup> Likewise, by the 1650's, the heyday of the Flanders armada and her privateering auxiliaries was over, and the bulk of the fleet was based in Cadiz to assist in the Portuguese war and protect shipments of Spanish silver from the New World.<sup>11</sup>

The foreign policy of the Commonwealth, and later of Cromwell's

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<sup>6</sup> Mazarin was convinced that if Cromwell chose to enter the Franco-Spanish war, his fleet would make the opening gambit. J.F.Battick, 'Cromwell's navy and the foreign policy of the Protectorate' (Boston Univ. PH.D.thesis 1959), p.90.

<sup>7</sup> B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, (Oxford, 1989), p.1.

<sup>8</sup> Montagu described the state of the fleet and New Model Army as, '160 sayle of brave ships and a store of land forces.' The Clarke Papers, ed. C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, (4 vols, N.S. 1899), vol.iii, Appendix B: 'The Grounds of the undertakeings the Designe of Attemnptinge the Kinge of Spaine in the West Indies.'

<sup>9</sup> A remark quoted by B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.1.

<sup>10</sup> P.A.Knachel, *England and the Fronde*, (Cornell, 1967), p.241; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990), p.408.

<sup>11</sup> Some of the privateers returned to Dunkirk after the English attack on Hispaniola in April 1655 cf R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders*, (Cambridge, 1992), p.147.

Protectorate, was therefore of deep concern to the rest of Europe during the 1650's.

In July 1655, the Venetian ambassador in London commented:

'The court of England, by sheer force, has made itself the most dreaded and the most conspicuous in the world. Six ambassadors from crowned heads are now resident here, and others are expected'.<sup>12</sup>

This was a particularly striking feature of London, given as the Venetian was later to note, that these embassies were not reciprocated. As well as attracting the attention of the French and Spanish, the foreign policy of the Protectorate was also of keen interest to the Dutch, Polish, Danes and Swedes, particularly after Charles X's invasion of Prussia in 1655.<sup>13</sup> All therefore found themselves competing for English assistance, frustrated by the unpredictability of English politics and by the uncertain structures of political power that threw up men with little experience of foreign affairs and diplomatic finesse.<sup>14</sup>

It was in these circumstances that Condé's representative in London, the Sieur de Barrière, found himself pitted against the French and Portuguese

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<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Michael Roberts of M.Roberts, 'Cromwell and the Baltic', *English History Review*, 76 (July 1961), p.410.

<sup>13</sup> R.Frost, *After the Deluge*, (Cambridge, 1993), p.55; M.Roberts, 'Cromwell and the Baltic,' *English History Review*, 76 (1961), pp.402-406.

<sup>14</sup> 'I can come to no other conclusion than that those who rule this country have never transacted business before, especially foreign business, and that they therefore err much from lack of knowledge; a contributory factor being that they are much puffed up, rely on their advantageous situation and great power at sea...' B.M. Add. MS. 38100, f.313: Bonde to Charles X, 30 Nov.1655. Quoted and translated by Roberts of M.Roberts, 'Cromwell and the Baltic', *English History Review*, 76 (July 1961), p.410. Also see A.Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, (Oxford, 1982), p.277; and, C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, (Berkeley, 1975), p.78.

embassies under Antoine de Bordeaux<sup>15</sup> and the Count of Peneguião respectively; in contrast he enjoyed an uneasy cooperation with Spain's ambassador, Don Alonso de Cárdenas. Although Barrière became less involved in countering the initiatives of Peneguião, he became the linchpin of the Spanish attempt to forge an alliance with England. Moreover, the outcome of Barrière's mission threatened personal political interests in Brussels, Madrid and Paris. Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña both saw the possibilities of an English alliance involving Condé as a means to remove the prince from the Spanish Netherlands. Don Luis de Haro held out similar aspirations in Madrid. Meanwhile, in Paris, Mazarin recognised that an Anglo-Spanish alliance involving an Anglo-Condéen expedition to Guyenne or an attack on the north coast of France, in the context of his highly vulnerable and unstable regime, was a grave threat to French hopes of keeping the war going.

Barrière was an appropriate choice to represent Condé's interests to the protestant republican government in England. Most important were his family ties to the Ducs de Rohan, one of the most powerful Huguenot families in France, who continued to have Condéen sympathies.<sup>16</sup> Approximately one sixteenth of France's population during this period were protestant and the majority of them lived in the south of France. Barrière himself was born in Uzès and was a native Languedocian. He was an experienced military commander, serving for many

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<sup>15</sup> Bordeaux was a *conseiller d'État* and had been an *intendant* in Picardie. He was sent to London in December 1652 where he remained until the conclusion of the Peace of the Pyrenees. In 1660 he was made chancellor to the queen mother, Anne of Austria, and died the same year *cf.*, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.358.

<sup>16</sup> Barrière's family connections were with Henri de Rohan who died in 1638. Through Condé's mediation, Rohan's daughter married Henri Chabot in 1645 on the condition that Chabot carried the name and arms of the Rohan. As the closest relation to the king in the Albret line, Chabot was virtually a prince of the blood and during the 1650's he continued to have sympathies with Condé's cause.

years in the service of his kinsman, the Henri de Rohan, until the latter died in 1638, whereupon he passed into a cavalry regiment under the command of Condé's brother, Conti. He was closely identified with the *Fronde des Princes* and had remained unshakably loyal to Condé's cause.<sup>17</sup>

But Barrière was not the only emissary representing Condé's interests in London. He was joined on occasions by Louis du Pas, Sieur de Mazerolles, a peripatetic agent in Condé's service; Conan, a native of La Rochelle and former representative of the Comte Du Daugnon who had remained in London after his master's defection to the French court; and, the Marquis de Cugnac, a prominent Huguenot who with Barrière, was the prince's most politically influential representative.<sup>18</sup> In March 1653, whilst Guyenne was still partially under Condéen control, this group was joined by a special delegation drawn together by Lenet in Bordeaux comprising representatives from the rebellious movement of the *Ormée*,<sup>19</sup> and a *conseiller* from the Bordelais Parlement. Condé's influence in Guyenne, even after his brother and sister, Conti and the Duchesse de Longueville, had accepted the king's amnesty, was the central plank of Barrière's appeal to the English government and tied in with Spanish hopes that there would be some kind of Condéen revival in the south of France which might encourage the prince to leave the Spanish Netherlands.

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<sup>17</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Barrière's background cf B.L., Add. MSS. 35,252 (Documents Relatifs à la mission de .. Barrière, agent de Prince de Condé à Londres, 1652-1656), Introduction by G.Maçon, librarian to Henri d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale.

<sup>18</sup> It is not clear when Cugnac arrived in London but he seems to have been active there between 1653 and 1654. Condé's envoys were ordered to receive their instructions from him. Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.640: Conti to Condé, 3 Mar.1653; p.688: Trancars to Condé, 23 May 1653.

<sup>19</sup> S.A.Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux*, (John Hopkins, 1972), p.93.

It is mistaken however, to view the interests and aims Barrière represented and those represented by the Spanish ambassador, Cárdenas, as synonymous. Spanish aspirations were not uniquely focused upon an English assisted Condéen revival in south-west France. Particularly during the early stages of Barrière's negotiation in London, Cárdenas' efforts were concentrated on attracting the attentions of the Rump Parliament with the proposal of a joint attack on Calais. Earlier, he had sought to secure at least the compliance of the English when Leopold Wilhelm launched his successful attack on Dunkirk in September 1652.<sup>20</sup> Cárdenas and Barrière did not cooperate closely until 1653, when it became clear that the Condéen delegation was beginning to attract the serious attention of the English councillors of state. Indeed, Cárdenas' report of Barrière's arrival in London in January 1652 was not a favourable account.<sup>21</sup> The prince's envoy had first arrived in Plymouth, followed shortly afterwards by the Comte Du Daugnon's envoy, Conan. Cárdenas described how the envoy's arrival had caused embarrassment in London - he had clumsily presented a letter of accreditation to Cromwell from Condé that Cárdenas remarked should have been addressed collectively to the Rump Parliament. Added to this, Cárdenas mentioned the residual bad feeling towards Condé that dated from the execution of Charles I in 1649. As a cousin of the late king,<sup>22</sup> Condé had been particularly outspoken about

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<sup>20</sup> Cromwell maintained an enduring interest in securing a Flanders seaboard town *cf.* R.Crabtree, 'The idea of a Protestant Foreign Policy', ed. I.Roots, *Cromwell, a profile*, (London, 1973), p.172. Cromwell's early attempts to meddle in the Flanders theatre with this object in mind can be followed in Gardiner's article on Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652 *cf.* S.R.Gardiner, 'Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652,' *English History Review*, 11 (1896), 479-509.

<sup>21</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Cardenas to Philip IV, 15 Feb.1652.

<sup>22</sup> Condé's great-grandfather and namesake, the first Prince de Condé, Louis I de Bourbon, was a younger brother of Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre, the father of Henri IV, Charles II's own maternal grandfather, *cf.* Anselme de Sainte-Marie, Père (P.de Guibours), *Histoire généalogique*

the regicide before the *Fronde*s.<sup>23</sup>

Whilst Cárdenas concentrated on hawking a Flanders seaboard town to the Rump, as an incentive to give military assistance to the Spanish in the Flanders theatre,<sup>24</sup> Barrière focused on the civil war in Guyenne. The strategy of the prince's envoy was to appeal to the English on the basis of her commercial interests and the religious common ground with the Huguenots. Barrière hoped to use Bordeaux's commercial importance as a means to persuade the English into granting subventions and military assistance to the Condéens in Guyenne, in return for commercial opportunities.<sup>25</sup> However the envoy initially made little progress. Cárdenas even mentioned in a dispatch to Madrid in February 1652 that the Rump were more interested in treating with Conan, the representative of Condé's temporary ally, the governor of La Rochelle, the Comte Du Daugnon.<sup>26</sup> Other reports confirmed the view that Barrière's efforts seemed to contemporaries unlikely to succeed unless the prince was prepared to pay for assistance. Paulucci, the Venetian secretary in London in May 1652 commented:

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*et chronologique de la maison royale de France, des pairs, grands officiers de la couronne, de la Maison du Roi et des anciens barons du Royaume*, 9 vols., (Paris, 1726-33), i.332.

<sup>23</sup> Condé had also given his cousin financial support before the outbreak of the Fronde. Mademoiselle commented upon this in her memoirs: 'M.le Prince n'avoit aussi manqué en rien à son égard, et même, si l'on l'ose dire, il croyoit que Madame sa mère l'avoit assisté et lui avoient fait donner de l'argent par messieurs de Paris...' Anne Marie Louise d'Orléans, Duchesse de Montpensier, *Mémoires*, ed. Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de France depuis l'avènement de Henri IV jusqu'à la paix de Paris conclue en 1793*, (Paris, 1825), xli.248.

<sup>24</sup> Cardenas' negotiations are studied by Gardiner *cf.*, S.R. Gardiner, 'Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652,' *English History Review*, 11 (1896), 479-509.

<sup>25</sup> C.S.P. Venetian, xxviii.233: Paulucci to Morosini, 14 May 1652; p.278: Paulucci to Sagredo, 12 Sept.1652. Barrière continued to try and appeal to the English on the basis of commercial advantage *cf.* A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.176: Barrière to Condé, 20 June 1653. Similar negotiations were being conducted on Condé's behalf by the Prince de Tarente in the United Provinces, *cf.* A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.71: Tarente to Condé, 23 Apr.1653.

<sup>26</sup> A.G.S. Est. Inghilterra 2528: Cardenas to Philip IV, 15 Feb.1652.

'It becomes increasingly evident that they have little inclination here to make alliances and declarations, though it is supposed that if the prince wants to hire English troops and will pay for them in ready money permission will readily be granted.'<sup>27</sup>

Paulucci was touching on a fundamental tenet of English foreign policy that was to emerge with even greater clarity at the conclusion of peace between England and the Dutch in April 1654. For a regime as unpopular as the Commonwealth and its successor - Cromwell's Protectorate after 1653 - the financial and social problems posed by a large army and powerful fleet, entirely reliant on government tax-revenues, were significant.<sup>28</sup> The regime and army were unpopular,<sup>29</sup> therefore more taxation, and the inevitable social difficulties caused by troop quarterings, threatened to erode the government's narrow basis of support still further, whilst strengthening the Stuart cause. The obvious solution to this problem, the reduction of the army and navy to a more manageable size, was unacceptable, for this would undermine the regime's one really firm basis of support, and would threaten its *de facto* mandate to govern. The employment of this resource in an economically efficient and even profitable manner was therefore critical to the formulation of English foreign policy during the 1650's.<sup>30</sup> This simple rationale, of which foreign diplomats resident in London

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<sup>27</sup> C.S.P.Venetian, xxviii.240: Paulucci to Morosini, 30 May 1652.

<sup>28</sup> M.A.Kishlansky, *The rise of the New Model Army*, (Cambridge, 1979), pp.36-37, 67-68; 47-52, I.Gentles, *The New Model Army*, pp.383-384. B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, pp.277-282, 287-289.

<sup>29</sup> A.Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, (Oxford, 1982), pp.3,7,8,361.

<sup>30</sup> Paulucci wrote to Sagredo in August 1653 of the possible problems that might be posed by the release of military power if peace was concluded with the Dutch: 'The English being compelled to keep their forces employed will then turn their thoughts to some gigantic undertaking', C.S.P.Venetian, xxix.108: Paulucci to Sagredo, 9 Aug.1653. Capp identifies Cromwell's dilemma at the conclusion of peace with the Dutch, 'he could not lay the navy aside, for it remained

and their governments appear to have been well aware, gave great cause for concern after peace had been made with the Dutch in 1654. Inevitably, the question was queasily posed as to where the navy and army were to be next 'employed'.<sup>31</sup>

However, the link between foreign subventions and military assistance that Paulucci described to Morosoni, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, in May 1652 was clearly a problem for Condé and Spain. The Spanish crown was debating the suspension and reduction of interest payments which was to lead to the bankruptcy of 1653 whilst the impoverished prince and his army were becoming increasingly reliant on the unpredictable arrival of *asientos* from Madrid. Hence, both Barrière and Cárdenas were engaged in constant attempts to appeal to the English on any basis but the obvious one - financial. Louis XIV's France, suffering from a series of analogous financial crises,<sup>32</sup> was just as unable to meet the cost of 'hiring' English ships and men. Like Cárdenas and Barrière, the French ambassador in London, Bordeaux, tried to interest the republican government in projects that would involve joint military expeditions with the promise to the republican government, not of financial compensation, but of a substantial share

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essential to the security of the regime, but he recognized that its crippling cost was politically damaging.' B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.86. Cf. also J.F.Battick, 'Cromwell's navy and the foreign policy of the Protectorate' (Boston Univ. PH.D.thesis 1959), p.92.

<sup>31</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Sept.1653; Est.Inglaterra 2529: Consulta of the Council of State, 25 Nov.1654.

<sup>32</sup> R.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, (Oxford, 1981), pp.217-241; J.Dent, *Crisis in Finance*, (London, 1973), p.71; J.Dent, 'An aspect of the crisis of the 17th century: the collapse of the financial administration of the French monarchy, 1653-1661', *Economic History Review*, 2nd Ser, 20 (1967), pp.241-256.

in the resulting spoil.<sup>33</sup>

The turmoil created by the internal power struggles that led to Cromwell's dissolution of the Rump Parliament in April 1653, and the inauguration of Barebones Parliament in July, created a further set of problems for the community of foreign diplomats in London. Whilst this had the positive effect of clarifying Cromwell's supremacy<sup>34</sup> it was unlikely that foreign affairs would excite much interest whilst the internal political conflict was at its most intense.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, in the months preceding the contention over the debates in the Rump Parliament concerning a new representative body, and despite being obviously dwarfed by Cárdenas's negotiations over Dunkirk during the autumn of 1652, Barrière had managed to provoke some interest in his project for assisting his master's cause in Bordeaux towards the end of the year.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, in line with the Rump Parliament's inclination towards the Spanish and away from the French - hosts to the exiled Stuart court - Condé's continued control of Guyenne began to attract genuine interest. Thomas Scot's account of his actions as intelligencer during the commonwealth show that the English government was interested in promoting civil disorder in France and saw Condé, among other protagonists of the

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<sup>33</sup> These were the tactics used in the negotiations between Estrades and Cromwell for Dunkirk in 1652 and were later employed to secure English assistance for a joint attack on Dunkirk in 1658. Cf. S.R.Gardiner, 'Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652,' *English History Review*, 11 (1896), 479-509; and, C.H.Firth, *The last years of the Protectorate*, (London, 1909), pp.176-180.

<sup>34</sup> Barrière, for example, was convinced that Cromwell would shortly lay claim to the throne, and sent frequent missives to Condé re-enforcing the idea that Cromwell's power was undisputed in England. B.L., Add. MSS. 35,252, p.42: Barrière to Condé, 23 May.1653; p.44: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1653; p.111: Barrière to Condé, 12 Dec.1653; p.127: Barrière to Lenet, 2 Jan.1654; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.23: Barrière to Condé, 20 Feb.1654; f.285: Barrière to Condé, 9 Oct.1654.

<sup>35</sup> A.Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, p.277.

<sup>36</sup> C.S.P.Venetian, xxviii.245: Paulucci to Sagredo, 13 June 1652; p.278: Paulucci to Sagredo, 12 Sept.1652.

*Fronde*, as the means to this end.<sup>37</sup> In a move that if nothing else, demonstrated a degree of goodwill towards Condé, the leveller Sexby was sent to Bordeaux on the advice of Cromwell and Scot<sup>38</sup> to negotiate with Condé's brother, the Prince de Conti, in conjunction with an attempt to encourage the radicalization of the *Ormée*.<sup>39</sup>

However, the arrival of Antoine de Bordeaux in London in December 1652, Mazarin's envoy who was later credited as French ambassador, was a serious setback for Barrière. The negative effect on Barrière's position was not immediately felt, but in the long run, the opening of diplomatic relations with France had presented the English regime with a whole new set of possibilities. At the centre of attention was the exiled Stuart court, resident at St Germain. After William II, Prince of Orange's unexpected death in September 1650, Charles Stuart had been forced to move from The Hague to Paris.<sup>40</sup> By 1652, residence in France was believed to be critical to the Stuart cause, more for its prestige and proximity to the English coast than for positive hopes of French military assistance.<sup>41</sup> Before news of Bordeaux's dispatch to England had reached St Germain, Stuart hopes were pinned to a triple alliance between France, the

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<sup>37</sup> C.H.Firth, 'Thomas Scot's account of his actions as intelligencer during the commonwealth', *English Historical Review*, 12 (1897), p.119-120.

<sup>38</sup> 'Coll Saxby (ye old Agitator) was sent to Bordeaux on the same Errand by Gen.Cromwell & my self vpon joint Advice, with good summes of money, but what harvest hee made of his negociations G.Cromwell or his Ministers could only tell who overturn'd vs and succeeded in those concernmts..' *Ibid*.

<sup>39</sup> *The Levellers in the English Revolution*, ed., G.E.Alymer (London, 1975), p.24; S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, (London, 1897), ii.93-94.

<sup>40</sup> H.R.Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, (Cambridge, 1988), pp.101-104; P.Geyl, *Orange and Stuart*, (London, 1969), pp.63-88.

<sup>41</sup> R.Hutton, *Charles II*, (Oxford, 1989), p.82.

Netherlands and the Stuarts - the subject of negotiations between Boreel, the Netherlands ambassador, and Mazarin.<sup>42</sup> The cardinal, whose political future in France at the height of these negotiations in July 1652 was at best uncertain, had actively encouraged this alliance, possibly hoping to add to the small number of his supporters in France.<sup>43</sup>

But Condé's negotiations with the English republic was a serious worry for Mazarin,<sup>44</sup> an anxiety that continued even after the English attack on Hispaniola in July 1655, for it carried the obvious threat of a Condéen resurgence. Until the defeat of the Spanish at Arras gave the cardinal some breathing space, his position in Paris remained weak and exposed.<sup>45</sup> Since after his return to Paris in January 1653, the cardinal's military priorities had been the defeat of Condé's party in the north and south-west of France, it was only natural that he should attempt to frustrate Condé's negotiations in London. Bordeaux was sent to London with this aim in mind although ostensibly his mission concerned seeking an end to the unofficial pirate war between France and the Commonwealth.

Bordeaux's arrival in London was a devastating blow to the Stuarts. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, wrote to Taylor<sup>46</sup> from Paris that the situation

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<sup>42</sup> R.Hutton, *Charles II*, p.78; E.Scott, *The King in Exile*, (London, 1904), i.376; P.Geyl, *Orange and Stuart*, 101-103.

<sup>43</sup> Calendar of the Clarendon Papers in the Bodleian library, 5 vols, ii.140: Boreel to Hyde, 25 July 1652.

<sup>44</sup> A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, v.16: Mazarin to Millet, 17 Jan.1652; p.91: Mazarin to Estrades, 23 Apr.1652; p.191: Mazarin to Le Tellier, 31 Aug.1652.

<sup>45</sup> *Cf.*, pp.243-279.

<sup>46</sup> John Taylor (1600-1655). In 1652 he was accredited royalist agent to the Electors of Mainz and Cologne.

was of, 'unspeakable disadvantage to our poor master.'<sup>47</sup> In London, where English sympathies towards the Spanish had to a large extent reflected the residence of the Stuart court in France, the implication of Bordeaux's arrival and the opening of diplomatic relations between Paris and London, was that, in future, Louis XIV's support of the Stuarts could not necessarily be taken for granted and was open to negotiation. This question was critical for English considerations of foreign policy. Cromwell in particular endeavoured to engineer foreign affairs to the disadvantage of the Stuart exiles<sup>48</sup> and there exists considerable scope for interpreting the Commonwealth and Protectorate's foreign policy during this period purely on the basis of countering Stuart manoeuvres on the continent. Crucially, Bordeaux's arrival in London increased the capability of the republican regime to do harm to the Stuarts in exile through the opportunity that was now presented of opening negotiations with Paris. Formerly their ability to damage the Stuart cause in France had been confined to promoting internal unrest. However, Bordeaux's arrival opened up an alternative route and this development was, of course, to the disadvantage of both Barrière and Cárdenas.

But despite the wider opportunities that Bordeaux's arrival in London created for the Commonwealth, Barrière and Cárdenas continued to hold the upper hand. This was particularly so in the case of Barrière, whose proposals began to receive increasing scrutiny over the course of 1653, and, whose

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<sup>47</sup> Calendar of the Clarendon Papers in the Bodleian library, ii.160: Hyde to Taylor, 7 Dec.1652.

<sup>48</sup> Cf., the Protector's insistence on the Act of Seclusion in the peace of Westminster between the English Republic and the United Provinces: H.R.Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, pp.105-8. One of the conditions of England's trade treaty with England in November 1655 was the expulsion of the Stuarts from France, J.Valfrey, *Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en Allemagne*, (Paris, 1881).

negotiations consequently became relevant to the political conflict between Condé and the archduke in Brussels. In this broader context, the negotiations in London were linked to the problem of Condé in the Spanish Netherlands, making a significant contribution to the changing perceptions in Brussels and Madrid of the French prince. The problems created by the prince's residence in the Spanish Netherlands were plainly not the only concern of Philip IV and his *consejo de estado*. Barrière's increasing importance in London, to the extent that he, rather than Don Alonso, was spearheading negotiations with the English, was greeted in Madrid with the same uneasy sentiment that Condé's growing power in the Spanish Netherlands initiated.<sup>49</sup> Barrière's progress was monitored with even greater alarm by Mazarin in France.<sup>50</sup> The political consequences of a Condéen resurgence, backed up by the naval and military power of republican England, was a prospect that the cardinal did not wish to contemplate.

The role of the delegation from Bordeaux was critical to the growing interest in Condé's cause in London, despite Scot's remarks when the delegation first arrived in March 1653 that his correspondence with Cardinal de Retz held greater promise.<sup>51</sup> After the dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 Barrière began writing to Condé that he was making significant progress. The envoy believed that the dissolution marked a watershed in English politics that confirmed Cromwell's

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<sup>49</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 12 Nov.1653.

<sup>50</sup> A.A.E., M.D., Affaires Intérieures, 891, f.136: Hethinon to Mazarin, 23 May 1653; 892, f.26: Servien to Mazarin, 1 Jan.1654; f.83: Servien to Mazarin, 4 Jan.1654; A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, vi.180: Mazarin to M.d'Estrades, 21 June 1654; vi.131: Mazarin to Baas and Bordeaux, 25 Mar.1654; vi.146: Mazarin to the Baron de Baas, 8 April 1654; vi.156: Mazarin to Bordeaux, 3 May 1656.

<sup>51</sup> C.H.Firth, 'Thomas Scot's account of his actions as intelligencer during the commonwealth', *English Historical Review*, 12 (1897), p.120.

supremacy. The prince he wrote, could hope to, 'tirer une très grande assistance' from Cromwell who he now expected to lay claim to the throne.<sup>52</sup>

Barrière seemed confident that the economic opportunity presented by Bordeaux, combined with the lure of the protestant cause of the Huguenots, justified a certain degree of optimism. Indeed, the envoy seemed particularly concerned to exploit the religious dimension of Bordeaux's appeal to the English republicans.<sup>53</sup> He believed this to be the key to success and thought that the possibilities of creating a Huguenot revival in south-west France were so promising that he even suggested it was worth abandoning the Spanish.<sup>54</sup> Despite the personal vindictiveness and ferocity with which Condé's father, Henri II, had put down the Huguenots in the campaigns against Soubise and Rohan between 1627 and 1629,<sup>55</sup> it was clear that the prince was able to play the Huguenot card in London with some conviction. This was largely owing to the protestant followers he had chosen to represent him - Barrière and the Marquis de Cugnac. But in addition, the prince was able to draw on well known and respected members of the international Protestant community who had joined him in exile, the most notable among whom were the Prince de Tarente, his

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<sup>52</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, (Documents Relatifs à la mission de .. Barrière) f.42: Barrière to Condé, 23 May 1653; f.44: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1653.

<sup>53</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.44: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1653.

<sup>54</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.111: Barrière to Condé, 12 Dec.1653.

<sup>55</sup> D.Parker, *La Rochelle and the French Monarchy*, (London, 1980), p.102; P.Chevalier, *Louis XIII*, (Paris, 1979), p.346; J.A.Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The life and times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638*, (The Hague, 1966), pp.168-170.

kinsman,<sup>56</sup> and the Liègeois Comte de Marchin, both of whom could draw on substantial Huguenot support in south-west France.<sup>57</sup>

During the month after the Rump Parliament had been dissolved Paulucci reported from London that owing to the domestic political situation, negotiations with foreign envoys had almost come to a standstill.<sup>58</sup> Nonetheless, it was reported in June that Condé's deputies from Bordeaux had held several conferences with Cromwell<sup>59</sup> and by July, Barrière was able to inform the prince that they had negotiated the hire of a small flotilla comprising ten frigates.<sup>60</sup> These ships were to join the Spanish fleet, based in San Sebastian, who would then proceed to Bordeaux to oppose Vendôme's naval blockade. The financing for this project had reluctantly been supplied by Cárdenas as back payment of the substantial arrears owed to Condé as pay and was the first time that Cárdenas had become directly involved in Barrière's negotiations. As part of Barrière's longer term strategy to embroil the English in the struggle against Mazarin and his supporters in France, the hiring of English men and ships, he believed, would

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<sup>56</sup> Henri Charles de la Trémoille, Prince de Tarente, was related to Condé through Condé's grandmother, Charlotte Catherine de la Trémoille. Tarente came from a Huguenot family with powerful international protestant connections. He was Turenne's nephew and was brought up in Holland by his great-uncle, the Prince of Orange. He followed Condé's party during the Frondes and went into exile with the prince, returning to France in 1655, when he was promptly arrested by the cardinal *cf.* Anselme de Sainte-Marie, *Histoire généalogique et chonrologique de la maison royale de France*, iv.171.

<sup>57</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.122: Barrière to Condé, Dec.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.406 Fiesque to Condé, Oct.1653.

<sup>58</sup> C.S.P.Venetian xxix.78: Paulucci to Sagredo, 30 May 1653.

<sup>59</sup> C.S.P.Venetian. xxix.80: Paulucci to Sagredo, 6 June 1653.

<sup>60</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.163: Barrière to Condé, 13 June 1653; f.290: Barrière to Condé, 25 July 1653.

pave the way to a full scale alliance between Condé and the republic.<sup>61</sup>

But, in mid-August, Barrière's optimism was suddenly and dramatically overturned. News arrived from Bordeaux that the Prince de Conti and the Duchesse de Longueville had negotiated an amnesty with Mazarin. Barrière, utterly dejected, blamed Cárdenas for not coming to him quicker with the necessary funds. Paulucci wrote to Sagredo:

‘That agent [Barrière] is more overwhelmed than any one, and on receipt of the news he went straight to the Spanish ambassador. I am told he remonstrated warmly though respectfully with him on having failed to supply the promised succour and security for the ships chartered in aid of that city...’<sup>62</sup>

The ships were plainly now of no immediate use. The advantage of holding Bordeaux had been that it was impregnable to direct assault<sup>63</sup> and the provision of an amphibious relief was a very different proposition from attempting to re-take the city itself. However, paradoxically, Barrière's negotiations with the English continued to flourish. Shifting attention from Guyenne to Aunis he began to develop a project that involved an attack on La Rochelle.<sup>64</sup> This had a certain cosmetic appeal to the English, for it would overturn the *débâcle* of Buckingham's expedition to aid the city which had failed to prevent the suppression of the

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<sup>61</sup> Barrière discusses this in depth *cf.*, B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.115: Barrière to Lenet, 12 Dec.1653.

<sup>62</sup> C.S.P.Venetian. xxix.107: Paulucci to Sagredo, 9 Aug 1653.

<sup>63</sup> S.A.Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux*, (Baltimore, 1972), p.73.

<sup>64</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.87: Barrière to Lenet, 24 Oct.1653; f.104: Barrière to Lenet, 21 Nov.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.446: Fiesque to Condé, 14 Nov.1653; f.471 Barrière to Condé, 21 Nov.1653.

Huguenot rebellion in 1628. For almost a year after Bordeaux's surrender, the project for an Anglo-Condéen expedition to La Rochelle seemed to be under permanent review. The reason that it never came to fruition was simply financial. Barrière and Cárdenas were both unable to persuade the English to commit themselves to such an expedition without substantial financial aid.

After Bordeaux's capitulation, Barrière was assisted significantly by the return from France of Sexby. The date of the Leveller's return is uncertain but is thought by Gardiner to be between August and September 1653.<sup>65</sup> Upon his return Sexby launched himself into promoting the project for an expedition to La Rochelle that was to be carried out in conjunction with either Condé himself or the Spanish. Sexby presented his set of well known proposals to the council of state shortly after his return from France.<sup>66</sup> He based his arguments on a series of premises about English foreign policy that in themselves provide a useful barometer of the kind of policy issues being discussed. First, Sexby argued that the Franco-Spanish war was wholly to Cromwell's advantage, principally because it kept France weak and thus unable to assist Charles Stuart.<sup>67</sup> Proceeding from this premise he argued that it was therefore in England's interest to have, 'some towne of concernment' in France, which would check French ambitions and, 'be an inlet to you any time'.<sup>68</sup> However, Sexby understood that in their current straits

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<sup>65</sup> S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii.355.

<sup>66</sup> The precise date is uncertain but it was reported to Lenet in early September that Arondel and Sexby had had an audience with the council of State, *cf.*, B.N. Ms.fr.6716 (Lenet Papers), f.78 Anon to Lenet, 10 Sept.1658.

<sup>67</sup> The Clarke Papers, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol iii, Appendix A: Colonel Sexby's advice on foreign policy.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

neither Condé nor the Spanish, the natural allies for such a project, were capable of giving significant military assistance. Sexby dismissed English unilateral action on the basis that it carried an unacceptable level of risk. Failure, he pointed out, would have serious consequences for domestic political stability, 'England not being settled,' and perhaps more importantly, for Cromwell's supremacy: 'any losses sustained ... would be a considerable dishonour to your Highness and discouragement to the whole nation.'<sup>69</sup>

Sexby's solution to the problems he outlined in his paper was that the expedition to the coast of Aunis could and should be undertaken in return for large subventions from Madrid, at very little political or financial cost to themselves. He supported this proposal with a number of fanciful predictions about how the expedition was to be financed, arguing that Philip IV would be only too happy to open to Cromwell 'all the mines in India ... the King of Spain and his slaves your servants, the one in working to get the treasury, the other in fetching, coining and bringing it to you.'<sup>70</sup> Sexby's financial projections were plainly outlandish and it is significant that he seemed unaware of the serious nature of Madrid's financial crisis during the year of the bankruptcy.<sup>71</sup> Nonetheless, the leveller was tailoring his proposals to respond to the political problems that he believed were of concern to the council of state. In particular, he was prepared to broach the political and financial problem posed by the armed forces.

The New Model Army was a constant drain on England's financial

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> J.H.Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, (London, 1990) p.356.

resources, and it was unique in Europe in that it was entirely dependant upon the state. Armies on the continent depended for their finance upon a number of different sources, based largely on a system of entrepreneurship, which united private administration, military taxation extracted locally and the short-term credit of individual enterpriser commanders.<sup>72</sup> The New Model Army, in contrast, relied entirely on the receipts of government taxation.<sup>73</sup> Sexby's proposals promised to alleviate this problem by passing the burden of finance onto the Spanish, in addition to which he could argue that there was not quite the same compulsion to pay the army promptly once it was abroad. The suggestion that once in France the soldiers could, 'vent their passion on your enemies than on your self,'<sup>74</sup> must have been a particularly appealing argument to Cromwell. The armed forces were a two-edged sword which acted as a deterrent to the remaining royalists and exiles, but which were also the regime's greatest liability. Once the soldiers had landed in France, London could pay less attention to their financial demands. A huge burden could be lifted from the treasury accomplishing a reduction in the size of the Army that would not have been possible without moving the army from English soil.

Sexby also addressed the threat posed by Charles Stuart and argued that by undertaking the expedition to Aunis, Cromwell would be taking active steps to

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<sup>72</sup> D.Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War: The "Military Revolution"', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 38, (1985), pp.18-20; M.P.Gutmann, *War and Rural life in the Early Modern Low Countries*, (Assen, 1990), pp.41-46, 62-66; also cf. F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce*, p.147; F.Redlich, 'Contributions in the Thirty Years War', *Economic History Review*, 12, (2nd.ser.1959-60), pp.247-254.

<sup>73</sup> C.H.Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, (London, 1921), pp.183-208; I.Gentles, *The New Model Army*, pp.47-52.

<sup>74</sup> The Clarke Papers, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol iii, Appendix A: Colonel Sexby's advice on foreign policy.

prolong the Franco-Spanish war and thus prevent the Stuarts from receiving military assistance from either of the two great crowns. He even suggested that specifically by hiring ships to Condé or the Spanish, the Republic could still maintain her neutrality with France. According to Sexby, the rationale was disarmingly simple:

‘Now my Lord, the commission for the executing the design should be from the Prince of Condy, or Spaniard, so that after they were at sea they should be declared to be ships, men and horse raised upon the Spaniards’ and Princes’ score, the same permission said to be given to the King of France or any other, if he or they deserve it, and would give security the men levied by them should not serve the interest of Charles Stewart against England, which he will not, nor can never doe.’<sup>75</sup>

However, Sexby’s proposals on their own are inadequate to support the argument that the council of state were seriously considering the expedition to La Rochelle along the lines he had suggested. Sexby, at least in his own view, if not in the view of his republican masters who sent him off to France to get him out of the way, saw one part of his mission as to act as a republican agitator in Bordeaux - to encourage the radicalization of the Ormée.<sup>76</sup> Hence his attempt to introduce Leveller political tracts to the Ormée. As such, it might be assumed that his diagnosis of English foreign policy - propping up rebellion in France and ensuring that she would be unable to beat an enfeebled Spain - represented his own ambitions for creating the circumstances favourable to republican or radical

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<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *The Levellers in the English Revolution*, ed., G.E.Alymer, (London, 1975), p.24; S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii.93-94.

revolt in France, rather than an entirely neutral evaluation of England's best interests and objectives. But Sexby's proposals do not stand alone. After Sexby's return to London, Barrière and Conan received a dramatic increase in attentions from Cromwell, demonstrating that in some quarters, the Levellers proposals had been taken seriously. This is easily followed in the envoy's correspondence with Condé. In addition, the concerns and considerations of Madrid and Paris on receipt of the rumour of Barrière's growing importance can be clearly traced through the proceedings of Philip IV's council<sup>77</sup> and the correspondence of Cardinal Mazarin.<sup>78</sup>

Cromwell's meetings with Conan were particularly significant since Conan was a native of La Rochelle.<sup>79</sup> In October, Barrière wrote to Lenet in Brussels that Cromwell had interviewed Conan, whom he had, 'fort questionné sur les moyens de faire réussir l'affaire [La Rochelle] dont est question et a tesmoigné désirer avec passion qu'elle se peut exécuter...'.<sup>80</sup> During the same month Cromwell had sent Joachim Hane, a German engineer employed in the English army in Scotland, to France to enquire into the condition of La Rochelle and other

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<sup>77</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Sept.1653; Philip IV to Cardenas, 8 Oct.1653; Consulta of the Council of State, 12 Nov.1653; Est.Inglaterra 2529: Cardenas to Philip IV, 19 Jan.1654; Consulta of the Council of State, 3 Feb.1654; Consulta of the Council of State, 31 May 1654; Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Aug.1654.

<sup>78</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.26: Servien to Mazarin, 1 Jan.1654; vol.892, f.83: Servien to Mazarin, 4 Jan.1654; A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, vi.180: Mazarin to d'Estrades, 21 June 1654; vi.131: Mazarin to Baas and Bordeaux, 25 Mars 1654; vi.146: Mazarin to the Baron de Baas, 8 April 1654.

<sup>79</sup> Letters from other members of Bordeaux delegation confirmed the breakthrough, *cf.*, B.N. Ms.fr.6716 (Lenet Papers), f.78: Anon to Lenet, 10 Sept.1653.

<sup>80</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.87: Barrière to Lenet, 24 Oct.1653.

fortified places.<sup>81</sup> Conan had been told in October that the expedition was entirely dependent on the ability of Condé and Philip IV to supply money: 'il ne pourroit engager à rien jusques à ce que l'on eust des nouvelles d'Espagne, et que lorsqu'il aura de l'argent, on fourniroit toutes les choses necessaires..'.<sup>82</sup> The terms that Cromwell had laid out to Conan were subsequently reinforced over the following five months. The Republic was more than willing to undertake an expedition to La Rochelle, supplying Condé with as many frigates and soldiers as he required, on the basis that they were paid. This offer seems to have stood despite the complete collapse of Condé's position in south-west France. Writing to Condé and Lenet in November 1653, for example, the envoy remarked that notwithstanding the departure of the Spanish fleet from the mouth of the Garonne, the river running from Bordeaux to the sea, Cromwell's 'volonté' had not been affected and that the negotiations with Conan were continuing.<sup>83</sup>

In Madrid, this flourishing of Barrière's negotiations was seen in the dual context of her wider strategic military concerns and the internal political developments in the Spanish Netherlands. The siege of Rocroi in September 1653 had soured relations in Brussels between the archduke, Fuensaldaña, the Duke of Lorraine and Condé.<sup>84</sup> Madrid was seeking a remedy to this problem and during the early months of 1654 began to see an opportunity to remove Condé from the Spanish Netherlands as a possible benefit to be derived from Barrière's

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<sup>81</sup> The Clarke Papers, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol.iii, Preface to Appendix A.

<sup>82</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.87: Barrière to Lenet, 24 Oct.1653.

<sup>83</sup> B.L. Add. MSS 35,202, f.104: Barrière to Condé, 21 Nov.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.471 Barrière to Condé, 21 Nov.1653.

<sup>84</sup> Cf., pp.94-95.

negotiations in London.<sup>85</sup> Perhaps more important however was the hope that a return to civil war in south-west France would divert resources from the Catalan theatre. A reduction in the size of the French army in Catalonia would, in turn, release Spanish resources for deployment in Portugal.<sup>86</sup> Initially however, Madrid was deeply concerned about the negative consequences of Barrière's growing success in London, particularly during the summer of 1653.<sup>87</sup>

The most serious worry was that a purely unilateral agreement between Condé and the English would simply pull the rug out from underneath Philip IV's treaty with the French prince, a concern that was heightened by Condé's threats to leave Philip IV's service in April 1655.<sup>88</sup> It was therefore seen as critical that Cárdenas become involved in Barrière's negotiations in order to exercise at least some influence over the discussions with Cromwell. Instructions to that effect had been sent to the ambassador in June 1653.<sup>89</sup>

Madrid was clearly kept well informed about Barrière's progress and, by November, original misgivings about possible dangers had given way to positive hopes of the benefits Condé could bring to an Anglo-Spanish league. In a letter to Condé from Madrid, the prince's agent, the Comte de Fiesque, informed the prince that Philip IV had decided to conclude an offensive and defensive league with the English Republic involving a naval attack either on the coasts of Normandie, or

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<sup>85</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Junta, 18 Feb.1653.

<sup>86</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 12 Nov.1653; A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.272: Philip IV to Don Alonso de Cardenas, 20 Nov.1653.

<sup>87</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 June 1653; Consulta of the Council of State, 3 July 1653.

<sup>88</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.71: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Apr.1655.

<sup>89</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 June 1653.

a specified target on the coast of south-west France, to take place in April of the following year.<sup>90</sup> As well as demonstrating Spanish commitment to an English expedition to south-west France, this piece of information had possibly been fed to Fiesque in order to pre-empt Barrière securing a unilateral agreement between Cromwell and his master. Philip IV subsequently wrote to Cárdenas in London stressing the importance of involving Condé in his negotiations, both as a means to control the prince's agent in London and of securing the military assistance of the Republic in a way that would bring the maximum benefit to Spain.<sup>91</sup>

Negotiations with republican England had always been seen by both Condé and the Spanish as a distasteful exercise involving collusion not only with heretics but worse, with republicans and regicides.<sup>92</sup> One of Philip IV's early concerns about Barrière's negotiations was that the prince's envoy would railroad Catholic Spain into the position of becoming openly involved in promoting a Huguenot rebellion in south-west France in league with the heretical and regicidal English regime - a development that would, of course, reflect poorly on Philip IV's image as guardian of the Catholic faith.<sup>93</sup> This was stated clearly in June 1653 in Philip IV's council: 'el principe de Condé sin faltar a las leyes del Pays donde nacio podria acordar en materia de religion puntos en que V Mgd nunca podra conformarse..<sup>94</sup> However, by November, this rationale had been turned on its head. Condé, it was

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<sup>90</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.446: Fiesque to Condé, 14 Nov.1653.

<sup>91</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Philip IV to Cardenas, 8 Oct.1653.

<sup>92</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra, 2528: Junta, 25 Mar.1652; Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Aug.1654; R.Stradling, *Philip IV*, (Cambridge, 1988) p.297.

<sup>93</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.256, f.272: Philip IV to Cardenas, 20 Nov.1653.

<sup>94</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 June 1653.

argued, could be exploited for his links with the Huguenots and the strength of Barrière's negotiations in London and, more poignantly, as a means to deflect criticism aimed at the morality of Philip IV's dealings with Cromwell.<sup>95</sup>

Another obvious benefit to be gained from the project Barrière was developing for an attack on La Rochelle was the re-establishment of Condé's party in south-west France and the implications of this for the war in Portugal. This was seized upon enthusiastically by Don Augustin de Navarro, the Spanish secretary of state in Brussels, who hoped that Condé could be persuaded to lead the naval expedition himself.<sup>96</sup> But despite Navarro's zeal for this aspect of the English negotiations, doubtless shared by Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña, Madrid held out few hopes that Condé would in fact be prepared to leave the Spanish Netherlands. The idea was subtly introduced to the prince in January 1654 but Condé made it plain that he was only prepared to contribute some of his troops and commanders to such a venture.<sup>97</sup> Condé was aware that the archduke, supported by others, was campaigning to have him removed from Brussels. In June 1654, Barrière wrote to the prince, openly acknowledging that this was also the shared aim of Madrid, 'il est certain que les ministres d'Espagne ne souhaitent rien tant que de sortir Votre Altesse de Flandres..<sup>98</sup>

However, Spain's new found enthusiasm for Barrière's negotiations failed to make any impact on the progress of the talks in London. The now combined

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<sup>95</sup> A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra, 2528: Consulta of the Council of State, 12 Nov.1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.500: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Dec.1653.

<sup>96</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2083: Augustin de Navarro to Don Alonso de Cardenas, 13 June 1654.

<sup>97</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.117 Mémoire du Fiesque, 31 Jan.1655.

<sup>98</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.213 Barrière to Condé, 26 June 1654.

team of Barrière and Cárdenas realised that they could expect little assistance from Cromwell without making substantial sums of money available up front.<sup>99</sup> Without money, it appeared that the negotiations could go nowhere, and indeed Barrière's and the Spanish ambassador's inability to deliver concrete proposals to the council of state risked appearing time-wasting and frivolous. Barrière seemed convinced that Madrid could endure the sacrifices needed to muster the necessary funds but was not prepared to do so, and his dispatches to Condé and Lenet in Brussels became an almost ceaseless tirade against the Spanish.<sup>100</sup> However, whereas Spain could afford to be evasive about Barrière's and Cárdenas' demands for money whilst the war between the Dutch and English continued, once negotiations between the two Republics seemed likely to prove successful, Madrid was forced to consider the bleak prospect of how the English Republic's armed forces would be employed in the future. In August 1653, Paulucci had described very clearly the dilemma that would face France and Spain at the conclusion of the Dutch war. In a letter to Sagredo, he pointed out that the consequent release of military resources would force the Republic to launch some 'gigantic undertaking'.<sup>101</sup>

The threat of peace between England and the United Provinces added an extra dimension to Philip IV's commitment to Barrière's negotiations - they now became a means of averting the possible crisis of an English attack on Spain.

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<sup>99</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.109: Barrière to Condé, 8 May 1654; f.177: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1654; f.193: Barrière to Condé, 12 June 1654; f.227: Mazerolles to Condé, 14 July 1654.

<sup>100</sup> Barrière was enormously frustrated by his inability to raise cash, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.236: Barrière to Condé, 24 July 1654.

<sup>101</sup> C.S.P.Venetian, xxix.108: Paulucci to Sagredo, 9 Aug.1653.

However, Cromwell, aware that the conclusion of peace with the Dutch made his position even stronger, pressed Barrière and Cárdenas for more money than they could ever hope to provide. Barrière wrote to Condé that the Protector had informed him that Cárdenas had made a financial offer, 'si loin de ses prétentions,' but that a special commission would be appointed for them, a thinly veiled indication that Cromwell's patience was tiring.<sup>102</sup>

Barrière began to complain that it was not Cárdenas's prevarication that was causing delay; on the contrary, the ambassador was applying himself daily to assembling proposals to satisfy the Protector's demands for money, but it was the Protector himself who, day after day, delayed these negotiations.<sup>103</sup> Yet to Bordeaux, the French ambassador in London, it seemed increasingly likely that the proposed attack on the coast of south-west France would take place. In January, Mazarin had dispatched a special ambassador to England, the Baron de Baas, who made a strong protestation to Cromwell on the assumption that an invasion was imminent.<sup>104</sup> Meanwhile, Cárdenas had asked for audiences with the Protector, but to no avail.<sup>105</sup> Another letter, three weeks later, stressed again how hard Cárdenas was working towards an agreement.<sup>106</sup> But in May the Protector had estimated that the cost of the expedition to Aunis would be

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<sup>102</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.66 Barrière to Condé, 17 April 1654.

<sup>103</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.109: Barrière to Condé, 8 May 1654.

<sup>104</sup> De Baas, Mazarin's special ambassador to the Protector, had been informed by one of his agents who had been present at a dinner given by Henry Cromwell in April 1654 the disturbing news that those dining had, 'talked of the succour they were speedily to bear to their Protestant brethren in France.' S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii.437.

<sup>105</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.109: Barrière to Condé, 8 May 1654.

<sup>106</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.177: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1654.

approximately 12,000,000 *livres*,<sup>107</sup> intimating to Cárdenas and Barrière that they would be expected to bear the bulk of the cost.<sup>108</sup> This was clearly an impossible demand on Madrid's overburdened financial machine.

However, unknown to the foreign residents and ambassadors in London, the direction of the Republic's foreign policy had undergone a significant change. Edward Montagu's notes on the debates in the Protector's council in April 1654, give a clear indication that during the spring of 1654 foreign policy was moving away from favouring Condé and Spain.<sup>109</sup> Montagu's notes are particularly significant, since they provide a record of a debate within the Council of State, between Cromwell and Lambert, about the merits of returning to the policy favoured by Pym, Eliot and Warwick during the 1620's: an attack on the Spanish West Indies.<sup>110</sup> The first paragraph of Montagu's notes began by pointing out the central dilemma that now faced the Republic upon the conclusion of peace with the Dutch:

'Upon the peace concluded with the Dutch wee found 160 sayle of brave ships well appointed swimminge at sea and store of land forces, all which required either to be lessened and layd downe, or to be employed in some advantageous design.'<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.132: Barrière to Condé, 15 May 1654.

<sup>108</sup> Battick discusses Cardenas' response *cf.*, J.F.Battick, 'Cromwell's navy and the foreign policy of the Protectorate' (Boston Univ. PH.D.thesis 1959), p.92.

<sup>109</sup> The Clarke Papers, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol iii. Appendix B: The Grounds of the undertakeinge of the design of attemptinge the kinge of Spaine in the West Indies.

<sup>110</sup> B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.87.

<sup>111</sup> The Clarke Papers, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol iii. Appendix B: The Grounds of the undertakeinge of the design of attemptinge the kinge of Spaine in the West Indies.

The council deliberated on the principles of Sexby's proposal, that they could, 'attempt upon France, whereto the Spaniard would have been considerably helpful', but this suggestion was dismissed without much delay.<sup>112</sup> The experience of the past five months had indicated that neither Condé nor Madrid were going to be forthcoming with the required finance. The council were concerned that Spanish policy was to embroil the Republic in a costly war of attrition with France, in return for which Madrid had no intention of giving realistic financial assistance. As Montagu noted:

'the attempt upon France was apprehended difficult and unprofitable, the Spaniard's aims being but to set us two together by the ears, and then, if he had failed us in point of assistance, yett wee should not have found it easye to be disengaged againe.'<sup>113</sup>

Having addressed the practical questions associated with becoming involved in a war in south-west France, it was added that an attack upon Spain was morally more defensible, Spain posing a greater threat than France to the religious cause of Protestantism. A proposed attack on the Spanish West Indies was accordingly placed before the assembled councillors. The argument followed the same logic that Sexby had used to justify an invasion of Guyenne. A task force sent to the West Indies would, it was argued, reap massive financial rewards and lessen the burden of maintaining an unemployed army on English soil. Spain's defence of her dominions was weak, and the region was rich for plunder both on

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<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

land and sea, where there was the possibility of intercepting the *Flota de Galeones*. Once again, the project revolved around the problem posed by the maintenance and employment of the Republic's armed forces. Montagu identified this central dilemma in his first paragraph, describing '160 sayle of brave ships' and a 'store of land forces' that had been liberated at the conclusion of the Dutch war. The Spanish were plainly not going to supply the money required to make the expedition to Bordeaux profitable. The West Indies seemed the most obvious solution.

The fleet bound for the West Indies, under the joint command of Penn and Venables, left England in December 1654. Its destination had been kept a closely guarded secret, and only when news began to filter back of the *débâcle* on San Domingo was it confirmed that Cromwell had launched an unprovoked attack upon Spanish dominions in the Caribbean. When the fleet had left England, all Cárdenas was able to report to Madrid was that Penn was to sail in the direction, as some said, La Rochelle or, as others said, Madagascar.<sup>114</sup> Between the date of the meeting of the council in April that Montagu recorded, and the embarking of the fleet for the Western Design, it is clear that the residents and ambassadors in London were ignorant that the Republic was following a very different policy from that pursued before the Dutch peace. At a second meeting of the council, recorded by Montagu in July 1654, the ideas floated in the meeting during the previous month were beginning to become more refined. Despite Lambert's reservations, Cromwell described the project to those assembled in his Protectorial

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<sup>114</sup> Gardiner cites A.G.S. Est.Inglaterra 2529: Cardenas to Philip IV, Dec 18/28 1654 *cf.*, S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, iii.387.

Council, mixing practical considerations with the rich rhetoric of Godly Reformation:

‘Wee consider this attempt, because we think God has not brought us hither where wee are but to consider the worke that wee may doe in the world as well as at home, and to stay from attempting until you have superfluity is to putt off for ever ... we came to consider the two greate crownes and the particular arguments weighed, we found our opportunity point this way.’<sup>115</sup>

Barrière’s and Cárdenas’ negotiations did not collapse until confirmation had arrived of the attack on Hispaniola in September 1655.<sup>116</sup> Indeed, at least until November 1654, both remained confident that a league between Condé, Spain and England was still attainable.<sup>117</sup> Barrière continued to try and persuade the regime that Condé’s influence was sufficient to instigate a Huguenot rebellion if the republic were prepared to assist them. Plans for an attack on La Rochelle were still being discussed in July 1654.<sup>118</sup> Unaware of the Protector’s true intentions Barrière and Cárdenas believed that only two obstacles, both significant in themselves, remained in their path: the serious problem of raising enough money to persuade Cromwell to agree to rent to them English ships and

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<sup>115</sup> Ed. C.H.Firth, *The Clarke Papers*, ed., C.H.Firth, *Camden Society*, vol iii. Appendix B: The Grounds of the undertakeinge of the design of attemptinge the kinge of Spaine in the West Indies.

<sup>116</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.128.

<sup>117</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.177: Barrière to Condé, 30 May 1654; f.193: Barrière to Condé, 12 June 1654; f.227: Mazerolles to Condé, 14 July 1654. By November 1654 Barrière had begun to be pessimistic about their hopes for an agreement, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.305 Barrière to Condé, 20 Nov.1654.

<sup>118</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.230: Barrière to Condé, 17 July 1654.

men from the navy and New Model Army;<sup>119</sup> and, the disconcerting progress of the negotiations of the French ambassador, Bordeaux.

Bordeaux's negotiations with the English, which had been almost at a complete standstill since the dissolution of the Rump, began to make headway after the meeting Montagu recorded in April 1654.<sup>120</sup> Mazarin had instructed Bordeaux to match the cash offer Cárdenas mistakenly believed had secured Cromwell's assistance in April.<sup>121</sup> This was the first positive policy initiative taken by the French. Bordeaux's slim mandate had previously not been sufficient to do anything but supply arguments against assisting Condé and Spain. However, by the spring of 1654 it was clear that Cromwell was pursuing parallel negotiations between Barrière and Cárdenas on the one hand, and Bordeaux and de Baas on the other, using their competition to raise ever higher offers to subsidize the English armed forces.<sup>122</sup> Cromwell's new receptiveness to French offers owed itself to the deterioration of Charles Stuart's position at the French court. Bordeaux had been convinced for a long time that the continued presence of the Stuart court at St Germain had prevented him from making any

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<sup>119</sup> Barrière had been levying Irish mercenaries from London for a long time, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.8: Lenet to Condé, 8 Mar.1653; f.11: Barrière to Condé, 7 Mar.1653.

<sup>120</sup> Charles Korr, unaware of the developments in Barrière and Cardenas' embassy, concentrates on the early problems Bordeaux encountered during 1653, *cf.*, C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, ch.5.

<sup>121</sup> Barrière reported to Condé that the Cardenas and the commissars appointed by Parliament had been negotiating the sum of money to be paid to England, 'que M.le Prot pretend luy estre fourny par le Roy d'Espagne tant que la guerre durerera, et qu'il les envoie chez l'ambassadeur d'Espagne pour travailler incessament.' The Protector stressed the importance of speed in procuring these funds. C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, p.92; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.82 Barrière to Condé, 24 April 1654.

<sup>122</sup> B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.87; Battick, 'Cromwell's navy and the foreign policy of the Protectorate' p.91.

progress<sup>123</sup> and the departure of the king<sup>124</sup> from France in July 1654 was an obvious improvement to Bordeaux's negotiating position in London.

However, Bordeaux found himself in the same frustrating position as Barrière and Cárdenas. Like Madrid, Paris was reluctant to pay for English assistance and was far more interested in the idea of a joint expedition where instead of financial compensation from France, the English were to take the lion's share of the spoil.<sup>125</sup> Moreover, the cash offers that were made by Bordeaux did not appear convincing. The experience of the negotiations with Barrière and Cárdenas between July 1653 and April 1654 had engendered a degree of cynicism towards financial offers to the republic - they seemed never to be followed by tangible results. French finances were in as poor shape as Spain's<sup>126</sup> and there was therefore no reason to expect anything better from the results that had been achieved from the negotiations with Barrière and Cárdenas. There was also the problem of political instability in France. Until the French victory at Arras in August 1654 there were many who believed that it was only a matter of time before Mazarin was deposed. The cardinal attempted to assure Cromwell in April 1654 that his position was secure<sup>127</sup> but by the siege of Arras, it was clear to

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<sup>123</sup> C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, p.57.

<sup>124</sup> Charles had already been crowned King of Scots, *cf.*, R.Hutton, *Charles II*, (London, 1989) pp.49-70.

<sup>125</sup> Mazarin did not send any instructions to Bordeaux to take steps to block the Anglo-Spanish alliance. The first positive proposals that Bordeaux made occurred in early 1654. Mazarin instructed De Baas and Bordeaux in March to match the cash offer given by the Spanish and during the same month the cardinal proposed the English invasion of Dunkirk and Gravelines in return for a large sum of money. C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, p.81.

<sup>126</sup> R.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, pp.247-251.

<sup>127</sup> A.Chéruef, *Correspondence*, vi.146: Mazarin to de Baas, 8 April 1654.

contemporaries that Mazarin's political future hung in the balance with what seemed at the time to be a likely French defeat.<sup>128</sup>

Besides mistrusting Paris and Madrid's ability to meet their financial commitments, it was also understood that by maintaining a position which was ambiguous, the Protectorate was creating difficulties for the Stuart court. It was clearly not in Cromwell's interests to tie himself down to supporting either France or Spain. This would automatically place Charles Stuart in a favourable position to enlist French or Spanish support, depending on the agreement that Cromwell reached. Cromwell's ambiguity however, made Charles Stuart unpopular in both camps as representatives from the two crowns tried to distance themselves from the Stuarts in order to curry favour in London. This was in fact the position between July 1654 and March 1656 when the Stuart court had to endure a miserable existence in Cologne, unable to seek assistance from Paris, Brussels or The Hague.

In this context, provided that the enterprise against the West Indies appeared to be providing military employment, Cromwell could almost afford to treat the representatives from both crowns with a degree of indifference. The conclusion of the Dutch war had only increased the anxiety in Brussels, Paris and Madrid to enter into a league with the Protector that would ensure a position behind the English cannon. Both sides were therefore prepared to go to great lengths to humour the Protector. Cromwell certainly demonstrated scant regard for a binding agreement with either side, ever conscious that his best interests were served by maintaining a nebulous position. Whilst preparations were

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<sup>128</sup> Cf., pp.276-279.

underway to refit the fleet bound for the West Indies, no attempt was made to curb the piracy war against France.<sup>129</sup> In April 1654, the same month as plans for the Western Design were being formulated in the Protectorial council, three English warships devastated a French fleet of 40 whalers from St.Malo, prompting Mazarin to remark: 'I see that Mr Cromwell is not for us.'<sup>130</sup> Later, in October, the fleet under Admiral Blake's command in the Mediterranean requested use of Spanish ports to carry out their plans to prevent the Duc de Guise's invasion of Naples.<sup>131</sup> Such apparently contradictory policies being pursued simultaneously seemed justified given the understanding that neither France nor Spain would be able to provide a satisfactory solution to the financial and political problems posed by the New Model Army and Cromwell's Navy.

Nonetheless, the trade treaty concluded between England and France in November 1655<sup>132</sup> and Philip IV's declaration of war on England shortly after the attack on Hispaniola, caused the complete collapse of Barrière's and Cárdenas' negotiations. Cárdenas left London in December 1655.<sup>133</sup> Barrière however was permitted temporarily to stay, notwithstanding secret articles in the Anglo-French trade treaty that provided for the expulsion of all representatives of the Prince de Condé in London and the exclusion of the Stuart court from France. Until his

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<sup>129</sup> The French were convinced that the fleet being fitted at Plymouth was destined for their coasts, *cf.*, J.Thurloe, *Collection of State Papers*, ed. T.Birch, (London, 1742) iii.7: Bordeaux to Brienne, 14 Dec.1654.

<sup>130</sup> B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.92.

<sup>131</sup> B.Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, p.92; J.R.Powell, *Robert Blake, general-at-sea*, (London, 1971), pp.253-255.

<sup>132</sup> C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*, p.161.

<sup>133</sup> C.S.P.Venetian, xxx.159: Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, 31 Dec.1655.

departure in April 1656, Barrière continued to act as Condé's envoy and, at the request of Don Luis de Haro, as an unofficial agent of Spain. Despite these developments it was clear that Spain still held out hopes that they could secure English assistance. The treaty with France was a non-aggression pact that had simply brought an end to the piracy war as well as granting some trade concessions<sup>134</sup> and it was still possible that Cromwell could be persuaded to intervene militarily on either Condé's or Spain's behalf.

Between the date of his arrival in January 1652 and his departure in April 1656, Condé's envoy was pivotal to the embassies of France and Spain, uniting conflicting individual political concerns across a broad spectrum with the interests of the two great crowns. As well as responding to the Spanish initiative in London, Mazarin's decision to send Bordeaux to England has equally to be seen in the context of the continuing political conflict in France against Condé and his supporters. The cardinal, still in exile in December 1652, was plainly concerned that if the prince enlisted the military support of the Commonwealth as well as Spain, his own return to supremacy would prove even less likely. Similarly, after the dissolution of the Rump Parliament, Barrière became the focus of Cárdenas' negotiations in London, not just as the most efficient means to secure English military assistance. Concerns in Madrid to check Condé's growing power and the strength of feeling in Brussels that all should be done to remove the prince from the Spanish Netherlands were also compelling reasons for Cárdenas to become closely involved in Condé's London initiative. Irrespective of the policies and projects being pursued by Cromwell in London, viewed from Paris, Madrid and

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<sup>134</sup> S.R.Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, (London, 1901), pp.423-424.

Brussels, Barrière was a key political figure.

Despite this, there has been an overwhelming tendency for historians to accord Condé an essentially secondary role in the London negotiations during the early 1650's. The only historical monograph to deal exclusively with Cromwell's foreign policy fails to place Barrière, Cárdenas and Bordeaux in the context of the internal political developments in France and the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>135</sup> This oversight inevitably leads to a poor understanding of the aims and motivations of these envoys. More serious, however, is to ignore completely the important relationship between Barrière and Cárdenas and the central role Condé's envoy played in the Spanish embassy to London during this period. It is generally assumed that Barrière's negotiations simply fell apart after the capitulation of Bordeaux in August 1653.<sup>136</sup> Paradoxically however, it was from August that his negotiations appeared to make rapid progress and generate serious concern in Madrid, and even greater concern in Paris.

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<sup>135</sup> C.P.Korr, *Cromwell and the New Foreign Policy*.

<sup>136</sup> P.A.Knachel, *England and the Fronde*, (Cornell, 1967) Ch.vii & ix.

## 3

Condé, Juan José and Caracena 1656-1659:  
Changing attitudes in the high command and  
the question of French ascendancy

CHANGE IN THE HIGH COMMAND AND WAR FINANCE

The 1650's saw three major confrontations in the Flanders theatre between the French campaign army and the coalition of Condé's army and the Spanish Army of Flanders - Arras, Valenciennes and the Dunes. The two latter battles occurred during the administration of Don Juan de Austria, the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands who replaced Leopold-Wilhelm in 1656. The first, Valenciennes in 1656, was an overwhelming Spanish victory, the second, the Dunes, two years on, was a crushing Spanish defeat. French success at the Dunes in 1658 immediately preceded preparations for the negotiations on the Isle des Faisans that were to lead to the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The Dunes constituted the last major engagement between France and Spain in the Franco-Spanish war and for this reason is frequently pointed to as evidence of France's rise to European hegemony and Spain's inexorable decline.

On the most superficial investigation of the progress of the war during Don

Juan's administration, this thesis seems persuasive. A Europe dominated by the military exploits of the Sun King must have had its origins somewhere and the 1650's, the final decade of the Franco-Spanish war, seems a logical place to look. With the Spanish victory of Valenciennes apparently orchestrated by the genius of a French general - Condé - and with the French victory of the Dunes and the re-taking of Dunkirk in 1658, it seems clear that the process of French military predominance was developing through the early stages of its growth. But it is far from clear that any case can be made for growing French military predominance in the period between 1656 and 1659. Until the critical intervention of the English in 1658, the war in the Flanders theatre was a stalemate. Valenciennes in 1656 reversed modest French gains made in the aftermath of Arras and, with the exception of earlier Condéen losses in Champagne and Picardie, the campaigns of 1656 and 1657 saw a return to the *status quo ante* 1653. This does not, however, constitute the conventional interpretation of the period. This view asserts that the French gained the upper hand in 1658 but does not seek to question why this should have been so, nor examine the earlier campaigns of 1656 and 1657.

Military questions aside, it was certainly the case that the receipts of the Brussels treasury during the administration of Don Juan were in a worse state than they had ever been before and a strong argument can be made for that most fashionable of concepts, 'imperial overstretch'. However, it was striking that the acute financial difficulties being experienced in Brussels during this period did not seem to have a significant effect on the war with France. Owing to the development of good relations and a new found cohesion within the high command, a changed approach was adopted towards the deepening financial crisis that was

quite unlike that of previous years under the aegis of Leopold Wilhelm. Disputes over the distribution of the scarce financial resources of the Spanish Netherlands had been a powerful source of political conflict during Leopold Wilhelm's administration. Indeed one of the final upsets of the archduke's administration had been set off by the arrival of the 600,000 *escudos* of which Condé had been explicitly denied a share.<sup>1</sup> This had infuriated the prince whose debts to financiers in Antwerp had increased dramatically over the course of 1655.<sup>2</sup> The consequences of such a large sum of money arriving in the Spanish Netherlands, accompanied by the news that the prince had no entitlement to this, were very damaging. Not only was he unable to pay off existing debts but perhaps more seriously, it destroyed confidence in his credit at Antwerp, the banking capital of the Spanish Netherlands.

The prince's correspondence during the early months of 1656 certainly testifies to the panic in Condé's entourage and amongst his creditors once the news had spread that he had been excluded from a share in the subsidy from Madrid.<sup>3</sup> In January he reported to his envoys in Madrid the refusal of the bankers in Antwerp to advance him further loans and spoke of the, 'misère épouvantable' of his financial situation.<sup>4</sup> Later during the same month he spoke of the impossibility of entering the campaign for that year - he had no money to

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., p.111.

<sup>2</sup> B.N. Ms.fr.6720 (Lenet Papers), f.96: Condé to Lenet, Jan.1656.

<sup>3</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.1: Caillet to Fiesque, 1 Jan.1656.

<sup>4</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.4: Mazerolles to Condé, 6 & 14 Jan.1656.

pay his soldiers, officers and suppliers.<sup>5</sup> Condé took the step of writing personally to Don Luis de Haro, a relatively rare occurrence, complaining about what he described as Madrid's shameful neglect, invoking his record of loyal service to Philip IV.<sup>6</sup> Concerns about Condé's loyalty brought a hasty response to the prince's complaints. By June *asientos* had been negotiated in Madrid for 125,000 *escudos* to appease the prince, scratched together from the scarce resources available to the Spanish crown.<sup>7</sup>

The bitterness of Condé's complaints in January 1656 about Madrid's neglect of his interests was a not uncommon feature of the political wrangling in Brussels. Since Condé's arrival it had been the *leitmotiv* of virtually all correspondence passing from the Spanish Netherlands to Madrid. However, whereas finance had formerly been used as a political tool to marginalise rivals within the high command, this feature of political life was dramatically played down under Don Juan's administration. Paradoxically, in the face of dwindling financial resources there was a tendency towards far greater cooperation than had been the case before. Demands on Madrid were made with the same frequency, but now there were no sharply pointed accusations in the dispatches, reflecting a divided command. Indeed the attitude of Don Juan and Caracena, the new army commander, Fuensaldaña's replacement, appeared at times to be overtly sympathetic towards the prince. The long lasting dispute over the contributions and financial assistance for the fortresses of La Capelle and Câtelet, for example,

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<sup>5</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.13: Condé to Fiesque, 14 Jan.1656.

<sup>6</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.19: Condé to Don Luis de Haro, 15 Jan.1656.

<sup>7</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.214: Fiesque to Condé, 7 Jun.1656.

simply dissolved after the change around of the high command had occurred. Don Juan supported Condé's claims for the contributions of the fortresses and pressed Madrid for further financial assistance to sustain Condé's garrisons.<sup>8</sup> Caracena too was often quite happy to support Condé's financial demands.<sup>9</sup> Indeed the new team of Caracena and Don Juan were so keen to oblige the prince that in December 1656 Don Juan was severely reprimanded by his father for making financial undertakings to the prince that Madrid was not in a position to meet.<sup>10</sup>

One effect of the virtual absence of political acrimony over financial questions was to hinder the ability of the provincial estates to play off members of the high command against one another. During Leopold Wilhelm's administration it had been easy to ensure that complaints about the financial and social costs of quartering troops and sustaining payments of contributions were voiced in Madrid simply by writing to the archduke blaming Condé. Leopold Wilhelm was attentive to any criticism levelled at Condé or at the soldiers under the prince's command and liked to communicate such complaints to Madrid as evidence of the Condé 'problem'. Don Juan however, was not so receptive to complaints aimed at the prince. The numerous examples provided of economic and social hardship linked to the presence of the French prince that Leopold Wilhelm had sought so attentively, disappeared entirely from the dispatches after Don Juan's arrival. This was not to say that complaints from the provincial estates and governors ceased. Indeed, complaints were just as frequent during this period and

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<sup>8</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.261, f.223: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 20 Aug.1656; f.273: Don Juan to Philip IV, 31 Oct.1656; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Dec.1656.

<sup>9</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2090: Caracena to Don Luis de Haro, 13 Jan.1657.

<sup>10</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.261, f.310: Philip IV to Don Juan, 26 Dec.1656.

were as pointed and vociferous as they had ever been.

Notwithstanding a new found consonance over the administration and distribution of financial resources in Brussels, subventions from Madrid fell to even lower levels between 1656 and 1659. The correspondence of Don Juan, Condé and Caracena with Madrid between 1656 and 1659 shows that in 1656 the Spanish Netherlands received 900,000 *escudos*.<sup>11</sup> In 1657 this fell almost by a half to 500,000,<sup>12</sup> and in 1658, the situation deteriorated further and Madrid was only able to send 300,000 *escudos*<sup>13</sup> to make up the shortfall left by local taxation in the Spanish Netherlands. The arrival of 900,000 *escudos* over the course of 1656 stands out in contrast to the previous year when there seems to be no evidence that Madrid was able to send anything at all.<sup>14</sup> Much of the improvement in 1656 owed itself to Leopold Wilhelm's repeated warnings in 1655 about the possible consequences of allowing the size of Condé's army to outstrip the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>15</sup> This spurred Madrid into negotiating the contract for 600,000 *escudos* which arrived in January 1656.<sup>16</sup> An additional subsidy of 300,000 *escudos* arrived in May 1656 after Leopold Wilhelm had left the Spanish Netherlands<sup>17</sup> and was again a response to pressure from Brussels. Don Juan

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<sup>11</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 13 Jan.1656; Consulta of the Council of State, 18 Mar.1656; Consulta of the Council of State, 4 May 1656.

<sup>12</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2089: Consulta of the Council of State, 13 Jan.1657; Est.Flandes 2090: Consulta of the Council of State, 16 Apr.1657; Consulta of the Council of State, 18 May 1657.

<sup>13</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2093: Consulta of the Council of State, 6 Apr.1658.

<sup>14</sup> *Cf.*, p.68.

<sup>15</sup> *Cf.*, pp.107-109.

<sup>16</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 13 Jan.1656.

<sup>17</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 4 May.1656.

had been so shocked at seeing for himself the consequences of Madrid's financial neglect that he had sent a series of missives to Madrid insisting on further financial aid.<sup>18</sup> However, Madrid was unable to maintain the levels of 1656 during the following year when it was quite clear that Madrid was encountering chronic problems in providing funds for the Spanish Netherlands - similar, in fact, to those experienced in the aftermath of the 1653 bankruptcy.

There were three reasons for these financial difficulties. The sudden death of the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III, in April 1657 required large sums of money to be set aside for the inevitable Electoral Diet; it was critical for Spanish interests that a Habsburg was re-elected to the Imperial throne, and Leopold I had not been pre-elected Holy Roman Emperor by obtaining the title of King of the Romans from the Electoral Princes. The late Emperor, Ferdinand III, had used up all his credit with the Electors by getting his eldest son Ferdinand Maria elected King of the Romans in 1654, and when the latter died suddenly, it proved impossible to reach the same arrangement for Leopold before Ferdinand's death. As a result the issue of the election was far more open, and particularly critical for both branches of the Habsburgs. Unfortunately for the high command in the Spanish Netherlands, it was the funds that had been originally intended for their expenses that were appropriated to bear the strain of this new obligation.<sup>19</sup> Upon

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<sup>18</sup> Don Juan's depiction of the miserable state of affairs in the Spanish Netherlands was discussed at length by Philip IV's council: 'El Consejo representa a V Mgd con mucho dolo el mal estado en aque se hallan las cosas de Flandes de que da quenta muy particular en sus cartas el Señor Don Juan y la falta grande de medios con que se halla para poder salir en campaña no obstante lo que habia negociado en Amberes el Marques de Caracena no siendo menos de sentir que haviendose remitido a aquellos estados este año para acudir a estas prevenciones un millon de escudos que lo haya hallado todo tan atrasado y tan mal parado el señor Don Juan...' These complaints continued throughout the year. A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Consulta of the Council of State, 22 Aug.1656.

<sup>19</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.124: Fiesque to Condé, 2 May 1657.

the news of the Emperor's death, a financial package of 400,000 *escudos* intended for the Spanish Netherlands was immediately halved, with no certainty of when this now reduced sum would find its way to Brussels.<sup>20</sup>

A second reason for the shortage of funds also worsened the plight of Condé's army and the Army of Flanders. During the same year the English navy, under Admiral Blake, successfully intercepted the silver fleet at Tenerife on its incoming voyage from the Indies.<sup>21</sup> Blake's activities for that year brought the Atlantic fleet system and the supply of specie to a complete standstill.<sup>22</sup> Against this background, a third drain on resources was caused by Philip IV's decision to make the re-conquest of Portugal an overriding priority. Preparations had begun late in 1656 to prepare an army large enough to conquer the rebellious kingdom.<sup>23</sup>

This dramatic contraction of funding to the Spanish Netherlands was of great concern to the high command in Brussels, a concern amplified in Condé's and Don Juan's correspondence. Two subsidies arrived in the Spanish Netherlands in 1657, the first in January, before the series of crises occurred, were *asientos* for 300,000 *escudos*; the second, arriving in mid-summer, was a subsidy of 200,000 *escudos* that had been reduced from an original intended sum of 400,000 *escudos*. Letters from Condé complaining about the increasing financial hardship during

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<sup>20</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.125: Fiesque to Condé, 7 May 1657.

<sup>21</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.129.

<sup>22</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV and the government of Spain, 1621-1665* (Cambridge, 1988), p.292; J.R.Powell, *Robert Blake, General-at-Sea*, (London, 1972) pp.273-292.

<sup>23</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.265.

the year had begun as early as February 1657.<sup>24</sup> With the exception of the *asientos* for 300,000 *escudos* in January, Madrid had yet to send any money by July, when Fiesque wrote to Condé with the unwelcome news that the 400,000 *escudos* Don Luis de Haro had intended to send to the Spanish Netherlands had been reduced to 200,000, but that at present, they were only capable of sending 100,000.<sup>25</sup> The reduction of the original sum to one quarter of its size was very serious. Condé had, after all, been expecting the arrival of some 500,000 *escudos*, and his letters in July to Fiesque carried instructions to ensure that orders were sent in advance to Don Juan de Austria, to safeguard the percentage the prince expected to receive from this sum. The 100,000 *escudos* sent in July arrived the following month, subsequent to which Madrid tried to arrange further *asientos* to make up the total to 200,000 *escudos*; the second instalment of this was sent from Spain in August.<sup>26</sup>

Inevitably, Madrid's greater inability to meet the financial needs of the Spanish Netherlands during this period only increased the pressure on the local communities to shoulder the financial burden. Missives from the governors of the hardest hit provinces of Namur, Hainaut, Brabant and the Duchy of Luxembourg

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<sup>24</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.20: Condé to Fiesque, 3 Feb.1657; f.22: Condé to Fiesque, 7 Feb.1657; f.24: Condé to Fiesque, 10 Feb.1657; f.247: Condé to Fiesque, 12 July 1657; f.261: Condé to Fiesque, 19 July 1657.

<sup>25</sup> Condé had been told in February by Don Juan that Don Luis de Haro was negotiating for 500,000 *escudos* to be sent to the Spanish Netherlands. The intended sum had been reduced to 400,000 and then in July, on receipt of the news of the Emperor's death, it was halved. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.24: Condé to Fiesque, 10 Feb.1657; f.261: Condé to Fiesque, 19 July 1657.

<sup>26</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.315: Caracena to Condé, Aug.1657; f.247: Fiesque to Condé, 22 Aug.1657.

testified to the devastating impact of this development.<sup>27</sup> The description by the deputies of Halem in February 1656 of the reaction of the townsfolk when they received the unwelcome news of the imminent arrival of the Marquis de Rochefort, one of Condé's commanders, was a vivid and typical example:

'ce qui a causé une telle horreur et apprehension générale parmi eux que les plus aysé et capables à supporter les frais des logements se sont retirés ailleurs ayants mieux aymé d'abandonner leurs comodités et biens que d'attendre encores semblables rigueurs et nonobstant que par ce moyen ladicte villette soit notablement diminuée de ses forces si est ce que pour cela elle ne laisse d'estre logée c'est hyver avec une garnison autant et plus onereuse que le precedent qui est le Marquis de Rochefort maistre de camp desdictes troupes avec son estat mayor et sa compagnie des chevaliers...'<sup>28</sup>

Whilst Madrid was less and less able to supply the Spanish Netherlands with the cash they needed to sustain Condé's army and the Spanish Army of Flanders, both the formal taxation system and informal contributions system showed correspondingly increased signs of stress. In 1656, following the example of Namur's refusal to grant the *pain de munition* in 1655, the town of Antwerp and the province of Brabant straightforwardly refused to grant their annual subsidy.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, revenues from the richest province of the Spanish Netherlands - Flanders - charted by Secretary of State Hovyne, showed a sharp

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<sup>27</sup> There are many examples of such complaints. Cf. A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 1364: Deputies of Namur to Don Juan, 26 Dec.1656; St Amour to Don Juan, 13 Dec.1656; Anon to the Audiencier, 9 Jan.1657; Deputies of the three estates of the Pays Duché de Luxembourg, 28 May 1657; Bucquoy to Don Juan, 7 May 1658; Comte de Bucquoy to Don Juan, 5 April 1658.

<sup>28</sup> A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 1364: Deputies of Halem to Don Juan, Feb.1656.

<sup>29</sup> A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 2165: Papiers touchant le prest de l'an 1657.

decline between 1656 and 1657.<sup>30</sup>

Complaints from the provinces over the imposition of winter quarters and the burden of contributions also increased in frequency, despite a more practical approach to the distribution of units of soldiers. In contrast to the previous administration, Condé's army received far better treatment under Don Juan, and were now even quartered side by side with the elite Spanish and Neapolitan regiments of the Spanish Army of Flanders.<sup>31</sup> Previously, attempts to marginalise the prince had led to the devastation of Namur and Luxembourg, the only territories within the *pais real* where the prince's soldiers were permitted to pass the winter months.<sup>32</sup> However, the possible benefits of a wider distribution of the burden of winter quartering were outweighed by the deteriorating financial situation in Brussels. Examples of abuses continued and in the case of Condé's army, there were more complaints from the surrounding neutral territories about raiding parties of undisciplined soldiers and the illegal imposition of contributions.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Cf., A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 2165: Hovyne to Don Juan, Sept.1656.

<sup>31</sup> A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 1364: Anon to the Comte de St Amour, 30 Apr.1657; Don Juan to the Prince d'Isenghien, 16 Apr.1657; Deputies of the Pays d'Alost to the Audiencier, 26 May 1656.

<sup>32</sup> Cf., pp.77-81.

<sup>33</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.79: Duc de Neubourg to Condé, 5 Apr.1657; f.186: Caracena to Condé, 18 June 1657; f.311: The Countess of Handessetreift Blankenheim, Abbess of Thorn to Condé, 11 Aug.1657; A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 1364: Deputies of the three estates of the Pays Duché de Luxembourg, 28 May 1657.

## INCENTIVES TO POLITICAL COOPERATION

Clearly, the financial situation had deteriorated even compared with the earlier years of Leopold Wilhelm's administration. However, it was curious that this did not spark off the kind of political rivalries within the high command that had existed before. The relationships between Don Juan, Caracena, Condé, and other members of the high command, proved themselves to be resilient to the stresses created by financial crisis, and even during 1657, when the levels of funds arriving from Madrid fell dramatically, the high command continued to co-operate with one another over such sensitive questions as the distribution of finance, winter quarters and locally raised funds. The political environment in Brussels and Madrid was largely responsible for this development. Don Juan, Caracena and Condé all realised that it was in their best interests to co-operate with one another. On a superficial level there was some irony in this transformation. Don Juan's ambiguous status as a royal bastard and Condé's accumulation of massive military power in the Spanish Netherlands seemed obvious sources of resentment and friction. However, when contrasted with the problems encountered during Leopold Wilhelm's administration, their relationship was extremely successful. This was important, for the same political circumstances in Brussels and Madrid that ensured it was in both of their interests to co-operate with one another, also had a deep impact on the way contemporaries and later generations of historians came to view Don Juan's administration, and ultimately, the final years of the

Franco-Spanish war.

Don Juan de Austria arrived in the Spanish Netherlands in May 1656 and first met Condé at Louvain.<sup>34</sup> The meeting was an important event not simply as a gauge of future relations within the high command. Condé had first been informed by his envoy in Madrid of Philip IV's decision to send his son to the Spanish Netherlands in February<sup>35</sup> and between February and Don Juan's arrival in May there had been a series of negotiations over the familiar question of protocol. As in the case of Leopold Wilhelm, the issue of protocol was a sensitive question for Don Juan and Condé, both of whom recognized that this question had important political implications beyond the Spanish Netherlands. However, unlike the dispute that erupted between Condé and Leopold Wilhelm in 1653,<sup>36</sup> the issue was settled to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. This was assisted by the early intervention of Condé's envoys in Madrid who had advised the prince in strong terms not to dispute Don Juan's claim to equal status.

Nonetheless, Condé's willingness to make what he believed to be a significant concession to Don Juan was important, not least for the light shed upon differences between French and Spanish perceptions of royal bastards and Don Juan's significance during this period of succession crisis for the Spanish Habsburgs. Eight years younger than Condé, Don Juan was born in 1629, the illegitimate offspring of a union between the actress, Josefa Calderón, and Philip

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<sup>34</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1656, p.200.

<sup>35</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.61: Fiesque to Condé, 12 Feb.1656.

<sup>36</sup> Cf., pp.115-130.

IV.<sup>37</sup> In 1642 he was brought to Madrid and recognized officially as Philip IV's son, albeit illegitimate, shortly before the death of Baltasar Carlos,<sup>38</sup> and upon official and public recognition he was brought into the royal family, given his own household and appointed to the position of Grand Prior of the order of Saint John - a powerful Aragonese order of chivalry.<sup>39</sup> Referred to by Philip IV as, 'Don Juan mi hijo', outside the immediate royal family he was given the right to be addressed as 'Serenidad'.<sup>40</sup> This unique recognition by the king placed Don Juan in a special category, particularly after the death of Baltasar Carlos when he became the only surviving son of the king until the birth of Felipe Prospero to Queen Mariana in 1657.

To Don Juan's conspicuous yet ambiguous proximity to the Spanish throne was added an outstanding military career. By the time he had arrived in the Spanish Netherlands he had established a reputation as a successful commander both on land and at sea.<sup>41</sup> In 1647 he had been sent to Naples in command of the Mediterranean fleet where he had successfully suppressed the revolt of Massaniello;<sup>42</sup> in 1650, he had recovered the coastal ports of Piombino and Porto

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<sup>37</sup> H.Kamen, 'Spain's first caudillo: Don Juan José of Austria', *History Today*, 26 (1976), pp. 584-590.

<sup>38</sup> J.H.Elliott, *Olivares*, p.627; J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan José de Austria, Su labor política y militar*, (Valladolid, 1993), p.29.

<sup>39</sup> H.Kamen, 'Spain's first caudillo', p.586; J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, pp.29-31.

<sup>40</sup> H.Kamen, 'Spain's first caudillo', p.585; J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, p.29.

<sup>41</sup> R.A. Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.149.

<sup>42</sup> J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, pp.46-84; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, pp.197-206; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.429.

Longone from the French;<sup>43</sup> and, in 1652, having accepted the command of the Catalan theatre, he had re-taken Barcelona.<sup>44</sup> Whilst his accumulation of military honours was impressive, the successive military appointments themselves were the most prestigious in the Spanish Empire. He had represented his father as viceroy of Sicily,<sup>45</sup> and of Catalonia,<sup>46</sup> and his appointment to the post of governor of the Spanish Netherlands at the age of twenty-seven in 1656, generally viewed as the single most prestigious military command at the king's disposal, threw into bright relief the degree to which he was seen to hold a special and unique position in the Spanish polity.

But Don Juan's political prominence in Madrid, linked closely to speculation surrounding his eligibility for succession to the Spanish crown, brought a number of powerful political interests in Madrid into fierce opposition against him. Whilst Mariana de Austria was unable to produce a legitimate male heir there was always the suggestion that Don Juan was being held in reserve, along with other candidates, to succeed his father. This led to a disastrous relationship with both his step-mothers, successive queens of Spain, Isabel de Borbón and Mariana de Austria.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, Condé's envoy in Madrid, the Comte de Fiesque, made numerous references to powerful factions that were united in their opposition to

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<sup>43</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the decline of Spain*, p.122.

<sup>44</sup> J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, pp.85-102; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.273.

<sup>45</sup> J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, p.72.

<sup>46</sup> J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, p.94.

<sup>47</sup> M.Hume, *The Court of Philip IV*, (London, 1907), p.353 & 494.

Don Juan<sup>48</sup> and it is clear that the political interests ranged against him in Madrid were partially, if not wholly, responsible for Philip IV's decision to call him back to the peninsula after the *débâcle* of the battle of the Dunes in 1658.<sup>49</sup>

However, a highly significant feature of Don Juan's appointment as governor in 1656 and the preparations for his arrival in the Spanish Netherlands, was the degree of Philip IV's personal involvement in the question of his son's status. This was all the more glaring when Philip IV's earlier responses to Leopold Wilhelm, following a request to intervene in the archduke's dispute over the *tratamiento* (the form of protocol) with Condé in 1653, were taken into account.<sup>50</sup> On that occasion Philip IV had been fully prepared, for *realpolitik* reasons, to press the archduke to indulge the prince's demand for comparability, despite the slur Leopold Wilhelm argued that this would bring upon the shared 'casa'. Yet notwithstanding even greater reliance on Condé's loyalty in 1656, the king was prepared to risk provoking the prince over the question of his son's status. This personal involvement was also reflected in Philip IV's wish that Leopold Wilhelm should treat Don Juan as an equal. The comparison with Condé and Leopold Wilhelm, both of whom enjoyed undisputed rights of sovereign succession, could not have been more obvious.

As well as revealing differing attitudes in the French and Spanish courts towards royal bastards, the detail of Condé's correspondence with his envoys in

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<sup>48</sup> Fiesque believed that Luis de Haro strongly disliked Don Juan, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.61: Fiesque to Condé, 12 Feb.1656; vol.17, f.362: Fiesque to Condé, 29 Aug.1657; vol.18, f.24: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Oct.1657; f.81 Fiesque to Condé, 29 Oct.1657; f.157: Viole to Auteuil, 25 Dec.1657.

<sup>49</sup> *Cf.*, pp.239-240.

<sup>50</sup> *Cf.*, pp.116-131.

Madrid demonstrates the forcefulness of Madrid's insistence upon equal *tratamiento*. In the circumstances Don Juan was clearly a special case. Fiesque described him as, 'fort cheri de son père', and framed his appointment to the Spanish Netherlands as a mark of the seriousness with which Philip IV was now treating the plight of the Spanish Netherlands:

'que Sa Majesté Catholique vous l'avoit escrit pour vous donner part qu'il croioit ny à Votre Altesse ny à la Flandres ne pouvoit donner une plus grande marque de son affection que de donner son fils...'<sup>51</sup>

Before Fiesque's letter had been read by Condé, the prince had written to Madrid informing his envoy of his understanding of the protocol that he expected to be observed between a Spanish royal bastard and a French prince of the blood. Although Condé showed some awareness that the 'recognized' royal Spanish bastard fell into a different category from the so called 'prince légitimé' in France - families, for example, such as the Longueville and Vendôme - he plainly viewed comparability of rank as unthinkable. Condé informed his agent that whilst he was prepared to grant Don Juan minor concessions in this matter he would not compromise himself in the, 'chose essentielle', writing:

'Je ne donne pas la porte chez moy, il y a plusieurs autres petits conventions à regler comme les allers et venirs, les visites et d'autres de cette nature...'<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Fiesque believed that Luis de Haro strongly disliked Don Juan, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.61: Fiesque to Condé, 12 Feb.1656.

<sup>52</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.66: Condé to Fiesque, 19 Feb.1656.

Condé's letter to Fiesque written in February 1656 was greeted in Madrid with alarm and provoked a speedy response. Both Fiesque and Mazerolles - who had left England to join the former in Madrid - wrote to the prince almost by return of post, advising him that the matter of *tratamiento* in the case of Don Juan was non-negotiable. Fiesque informed his master that Don Juan had been sent to Flanders with the same mandate as Leopold Wilhelm, with orders that he was to be received with the same honours.<sup>53</sup> To dispute this, Fiesque advised, would be imprudent, crucially because it would alienate the king, and therefore he suggested not even raising the question with Don Luis de Haro.<sup>54</sup> Mazerolles, in his letter, entered into greater detail, informing Condé that he had discussed this issue with Don Cristoval, Luis de Haro's secretary, who had pointed to the precedent set by the *tratamiento* of the 'bastard de Charlequin', Don Juan's predecessor and namesake, hero of Lepanto and son of Charles V and Barbara Blomberg. Don Cristoval used as an example the reception between Marguerite de Valois, Queen of Navarre, and Don Juan that had taken place during her voyage to the Spanish Netherlands in 1577.<sup>55</sup> Don Juan had been treated by the queen with the honours due to a legitimate brother of Philip II. Mazerolles had attempted to contest this precedent by arguing that there was a difference between an adulterine bastard, the son of a comedienne - Philip IV's son - and a bastard produced out of wedlock by a lady of quality - the Don Juan of the 16th

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<sup>53</sup> Juan José's mandate was based on an amalgamation of the instructions given to his predecessor and namesake, Don Juan, the Cardenal Infante, and, Leopold Wilhelm. Cf., A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 Feb.1656.

<sup>54</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.115: Fiesque to Condé, 14 Mar.1656.

<sup>55</sup> J.H.Mariéjol, *La vie de Marguerite de Valois, Reine de Navarre et de France*, (Paris, 1928), pp.109-127.

century, the son of Charles V.<sup>56</sup> However, the overwhelming message from Condé's envoys in Madrid was that, as Fiesque pointed out to the prince, 'en l'estat ou sont vos affaires,'<sup>57</sup> it would be most unwise to dispute Don Juan's claims to equal status.

The mood in Madrid on this question was certainly uncompromising. In a meeting of Philip IV's council in April 1656<sup>58</sup> its members had discussed the planned meeting between Leopold Wilhelm and Don Juan, which actually occurred in May 1656 near Louvain,<sup>59</sup> constituting the final humiliation of the hapless archduke before he left the Spanish Netherlands. The council were insistent that Leopold Wilhelm honoured Don Juan with the title, 'Alteza'.<sup>60</sup> This was highly significant. Philip II had never consented to his half-brother's use of the title of highness,<sup>61</sup> and it was precisely the use of 'Alteza' in Spain that was used to denote legitimate members of the royal family.<sup>62</sup> Whether or not this pointed to semi-official recognition of Don Juan as a legitimate successor to his father is unclear, for the council went on to place this in the context of Leopold Wilhelm's concessions to Condé and the Prince de Conti, both of whom he had accorded the title of 'Altesse'. Since the Habsburg convention of, 'Altesse', as far as the Spanish view of French nobility was concerned, was that it could only be used by

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<sup>56</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.118: Mazerolles to Condé, 16 Mar.1656.

<sup>57</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.61: Fiesque to Condé, 12 Feb.1656.

<sup>58</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 5 Apr.1656.

<sup>59</sup> J.Castilla Soto, *Don Juan*, p.108.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> P.Pierson, *Philip II of Spain*, (London, 1975), p.52.

<sup>62</sup> H.Kamen, 'Spain's first caudillo', p.585.

immediate members of the royal family and not by its cadet lines, the council may have been pressing Leopold Wilhelm for a similar concession for Don Juan, on the basis that he was of equal rank to Condé. Condé, by the standards of Habsburg conventions on protocol, was not entitled, as he was in France, to be addressed as 'Altesse' and unlike Leopold Wilhelm, Madrid had consistently refused to recognize the prince with this courtesy.<sup>63</sup> Don Juan therefore, may have obtained this concession in 1656 by default, as a consequence of Condé's dispute with Leopold Wilhelm in 1653. Nonetheless, the fact that Don Juan was even seen to hold equivalent rank to a French prince of the blood was significant - the distinguishing mark of Condé's rank was that it carried an entitlement to sovereign succession.<sup>64</sup>

By the time Don Juan had arrived in the Spanish Netherlands, the negotiations over the *tratamiento* with Leopold Wilhelm and Condé had been settled.<sup>65</sup> Both agreed to treat the royal bastard as an equal. The account of Condé's first encounter with Don Juan given by the *Rélations Véritables* proved symbolic of a relationship that continued to remain on a firm footing and only showed signs of strain in the recriminations that broke out after Don Juan's forced

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<sup>63</sup> Condé used the opportunity of Don Juan's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands to extract this concession from Madrid and sought official recognition as Altesse: A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.66: Condé to Fiesque, 19 Feb.1656; f.118: Mazerolles to Condé, 16 Mar.1656; f.133: Mazerolles to Condé, 27 Mar.1656. It is worth noting that after Condé returned to France in 1660 he sought, with the support of Louis XIV, to clear up the dispute over the *tratamiento* of a French prince of the blood with Madrid. A.C., 111.b.2 Recueil de mémoires sur les qualités et rangs des princes du sang (1595-1705).

<sup>64</sup> Cf., p.28.

<sup>65</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.214: Fiesque to Condé, 7 June 1656.

resignation after the battle of the Dunes in 1658.<sup>66</sup> The meeting at Louvain was formal, and as such would have been unthinkable had the two been locked in a dispute over protocol:

‘Mecredi le 10 de ce mois [May 1656] le Prince de Condé, partit d’ici [Brussels] pour aller à Louvain, où le soir même il rencontra & traitta à souper le Prince Don Juan d’Autriche avec une somptuosité & magnificence Royale, & une demonstration reciproque d’une haute estime & sincère affection de part & d’autre..’<sup>67</sup>

However, setting aside for a moment the pressure from Madrid over the *tratamiento*, it is curious that given the importance of the issue, and particularly, given its wider political significance, Condé did not show more resistance by, for example, pursuing the line of argument Mazerolles had developed with Don Cristoval. That he did not has perhaps to be seen in the light of his experience with Leopold Wilhelm. Condé was only too aware of the wider problems created by a dispute over precedence between someone in his position and a hostile governor. One of the consequences of the political instabilities such rivalries created was an increased likelihood of military defeat, and this was plainly not in Condé’s best interests. Having spent almost four years in exile from the French court, Condé understood that if he was to obtain what he regarded as satisfactory terms for his reconciliation with Louis XIV from a general peace, the Spanish would have to be negotiating from a position of strength. Military defeats clearly undermined the Spanish position and diminished his chances of an honourable

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<sup>66</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.22: Lenet to Condé, 27 May 1659; f.28 Don Juan to Condé, 27 May 1659; f.46 Lenet to Condé, 30 May 1659.

<sup>67</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1656, p.200.

return to the French court.

Don Juan, similarly, had a clear interest in establishing a rapport with Condé and this undoubtedly contributed to the fact that during his administration in the Spanish Netherlands their relations were good. Don Juan had no shortage of political enemies in Madrid who would seek to capitalize on any failures and upsets in the Spanish Netherlands whilst he was governor, as he was later to discover. Maintaining Condé's loyalty was the precondition for Spain's military success in the Flanders theatre, itself the yardstick of Don Juan's success as governor. Condé's *de facto* military power in the Spanish Netherlands was by now a *fait accompli*. The prince's army was approximately the same size as the Spanish Army of Flanders<sup>68</sup> and if he was to switch allegiances and return to France at this stage, taking his army with him, Don Juan's chances of resisting French offensives would be negligible.

The potential upset that Condé's departure from the Spanish Netherlands would create was not only of concern to Don Juan. Philip IV's council had discussed at length sending a special envoy with Don Juan, the Conde de Peñaranda, a skilled diplomat known and liked by Condé, whose role would be to act as an adviser to the governor whilst liaising with Condé.<sup>69</sup> Madrid was keen to avoid the internal rivalries that had hamstrung Leopold Wilhelm's administration. There was particular concern that a continuation of internecine conflict in the Spanish Netherlands would encourage the prince to abandon his

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<sup>68</sup> Cf., pp.109-110.

<sup>69</sup> Peñaranda was prevented from going to the Spanish Netherlands by the death of Ferdinand III - the minister was chosen to represent Spanish interests at the imperial diet. A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 2 Feb.1656.

alliance with Philip IV. This anxiety was at the forefront of minds in Madrid during the early months of 1656. Condé had received two proposals during this period, one from his brother-in-law, the Duc de Longueville, who offered to negotiate the prince's reconciliation with the French court, another from republican England in December 1655, proposing that the prince enter the service of the English government in return for financial and military support.<sup>70</sup> Added to the worry that Condé might actually consider these offers seriously was the prince's well known irritation about being denied a share of the 600,000 *escudos* sent to the Spanish Netherlands in January 1656. Concern that Condé's army was beginning to outgrow the Spanish Army of Flanders had led to explicit instructions from Madrid that this sum was exclusively to be used for the benefit of the Spanish forces. This had infuriated Condé and provoked from Mazerolles, his envoy in Madrid, a thinly veiled threat that in order to protect his interests the prince might be forced to consider alternatives outside Spanish service.<sup>71</sup>

However, if Condé had considered unilateral negotiations with Paris during Don Juan's administration, it was not born out of his frustration with the Spanish high command in Brussels. Whilst Condé and Don Juan ensured that they maintained a good rapport with one another, a further contribution was made to the cohesiveness of the high command by Fuensaldaña's replacement - the Marques de Caracena. Caracena, officially the second most powerful figure in the Spanish Netherlands, acted throughout this period almost as a *créature* of the French prince. This was largely due to the circumstances of the marquis' arrival

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<sup>70</sup> A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.260, f.227: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 25 Dec.1655; f.328: Philip IV to Leopold Wilhelm, 23 Feb.1656.

<sup>71</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.4: Mazerolles to Condé, 6 & 14 Jan.1656.

and his dealings with his political enemy and previous army commander, Fuensaldaña. In contrast to Leopold Wilhelm's swift departure from the Spanish Netherlands, Fuensaldaña had remained in Brussels for some time.<sup>72</sup> The count had deeply resented his forced resignation<sup>73</sup> and continued to hold out hopes of re-appointment, notwithstanding instructions from Madrid to take up Caracena's previous command in Italy. Despite the improvement in the relations between Condé and Fuensaldaña, much of this, as far as Condé was concerned, was superficial, and he moved with astonishing speed in February 1656 to counteract the possibility that Fuensaldaña would remain governor general.<sup>74</sup> Condé's chief concern, as he related to Fiesque, was the degree of influence Fuensaldaña had accumulated in the Spanish Netherlands. He feared that the count could use this to dominate Don Juan and that once the count had obtained such an enhanced position of strength, this would precipitate, once again, the hostilities between Condé and the Spanish high command seen in the early two years of his exile.<sup>75</sup>

Fuensaldaña left the Spanish Netherlands in July, before the relief of Valenciennes. But before he left he had become closely involved in negotiations with Charles Stuart, and, indirectly, with Lionne's peace initiative in Madrid - much to Condé's alarm, the count had set up his own private initiative for peace

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<sup>72</sup> Fuensaldaña left the Spanish Netherlands between June and July *cf.*, A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Junta, 22 June 1656.

<sup>73</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.41: Fiesque to Condé, 4 Feb.1656.

<sup>74</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.81: Condé to Fiesque, 26 Feb.1656.

<sup>75</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.66: Condé to Fiesque, 19 Feb.1656; f.150: Fiesque to Condé, 7 Apr.1656.

by sending an envoy to Paris.<sup>76</sup> The attempt of Fuensaldaña to involve himself in these negotiations was clearly personal political strategy and was aimed at making Madrid aware of his indispensability in the Spanish Netherlands. Condé was understandably deeply worried by this development and obtained from Madrid a formal repudiation of all the count's proposals. However, before his departure Fuensaldaña had left a number of administrative mechanisms in place, designed to frustrate his successor. Specifically, these revolved around restricting Caracena's control of the *hacienda*, the war finance committee.<sup>77</sup> Fuensaldaña had established a mini-*junta* made up of his own appointees and *créatures* which continued to hold executive power over the army finances even after the count had left for Milan.<sup>78</sup> This proved to be the basis of Caracena's *amitié* with Condé, for the prince soon became central to Caracena's attempts to reverse the 'reforms' Fuensaldaña had put in place.<sup>79</sup> Through a combination of Caracena's threats to resign and the use of Condé's considerable bargaining power in Madrid, the marquis obtained the necessary powers to overturn the *junta* and establish full control of the *hacienda*.<sup>80</sup> Caracena therefore, had come to rely on Condé as a political ally and when writing to the prince he used all the formulas and

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<sup>76</sup> Fuensaldaña's attempts to meddle in the Lionne peace initiative, understandably, caused Condé great consternation. The prince moved to obtain an undertaking from Madrid that if negotiations occurred on the Flanders frontier with France, they would be led by Condé himself. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.13: Condé to Fiesque, 22 Jan.1656; f.41: Fiesque to Condé, 4 Feb.1656; f.83: Fiesque to Condé, 26 Feb.1656; f.143: Don Luis de Haro to Condé, Apr.1656.

<sup>77</sup> G.Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands 1559-1660*, (London, 1979), p.166.

<sup>78</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.232: Fiesque to Condé, 18 June 1656; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2090: Caracena to Don Luis de Haro, 26 Nov.1656.

<sup>79</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.241: Fiesque to Condé, 9 July 1656; vol.17, f.20: Condé to Fiesque, 3 Feb.1657.

<sup>80</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2090: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Jan.1657.

conventions of client-patron discourse.<sup>81</sup> The benefits of this relationship were, of course, mutual. Condé used Caracena to liaise with Don Juan, and often voiced his disapproval of Don Juan's initiatives through the marquis in order to avoid any criticism of the governor face-to-face. In December 1657 for example, when Condé disapproved of a decision to transfer troops between garrisons, rather than going directly to Don Juan he asked the marquis to use his influence with the governor to rectify the situation.<sup>82</sup>

In March 1657 Condé wrote to Fiesque instructing his envoy to ensure that Don Luis de Haro obtained for Caracena the concessions he had demanded,<sup>83</sup> which unknown to the prince, Philip IV's council had already decided to grant to the marquis.<sup>84</sup> The letter contained a eulogy to Caracena's fine service and went on to describe the, 'close' union between himself, Don Juan and Caracena. Condé feared that the cohesiveness of the high command would be upset if Caracena were to carry through his threat of resignation. The contrast with the bitter rivalries of Leopold Wilhelm's administration could not have been more striking. Here was Condé vigorously protecting the interests of Caracena where two years before he had been pressing Madrid for Fuensaldaña's dismissal.

Condé's military power in the Spanish Netherlands, the firm basis of his relationship with Don Juan and Caracena, and Don Juan's obvious weakness in

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<sup>81</sup> Caracena's requests that Condé's army rendezvous with the Spanish Army of Flanders, for example, were always framed with the formula, 'if it serves your highness.' Cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P. vol.17, f.166: Caracena to Condé, 6 June 1657; f.186: Caracena to Condé, 18 June 1657; f.244 Caracena to Condé, July 1657.

<sup>82</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.532: Condé to Caracena, 27 Sept 1657.

<sup>83</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.26: Fiesque to Condé, 15 Feb.1657.

<sup>84</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2090: Consulta of the Council of State, 11 Jan.1657.

Madrid, had a profound impact on how contemporaries viewed the two major conflicts of the bastard prince's administration - Valenciennes and the Dunes. Plainly, it was in the interests of Don Juan and Madrid to ensure that Condé remained loyal to his agreement with the Spanish king. At the same time, there were powerful groups in Madrid who had a clear interest in painting Don Juan in a poor light. These circumstances combined to ensure that Condé was held responsible for the victory of Valenciennes and that he emerged untainted from the defeat at the Dunes. Subsequent accounts of both battles were driven not by a concern to depict accurately the events on the battlefield, but by political considerations and vested interests in Madrid and Brussels. This, in turn, has led to wider historiographical implications for overviews of the Franco-Spanish war.

## THE RELIEF OF VALENCIENNES

### CONDÉ'S MILITARY REPUTATION AND THE POLITICS OF WAR

Valenciennes was the capital of Hainaut, and an important Spanish magazine. It had been invested by the French on 15 June and Condé's army and the Spanish Army of Flanders arrived south of the French lines on 1 July. The defeat of the French was largely brought about by the ability of the Spanish high command to exploit the river running through the town, the Escaut, which divided not only the town itself, but more importantly, the French circumvallation. When the French arrived in June they found that the Escaut had flooded and therefore constructed their circumvallation using barges to connect the densely fortified

lines of the Maréchal de La Ferté, north-west of Valenciennes, with the remainder of the French army on the opposite side of the town under Turenne's command. It was expected that any attack on the French circumvallation would aim to penetrate the lines south of the Escaut, since La Ferté, on the opposite side of the river, benefited from a hill outside Valenciennes that provided him with a highly defensive position.<sup>85</sup> It was therefore no surprise when the bulk of Condé's army and the Spanish Army of Flanders were first sited at Famars, a small village south of Valenciennes and opposite Turenne's lines.<sup>86</sup>

For two weeks Don Juan and Condé remained at Famars near where they set up a battery to bombard the Lorraine regiments whose section of the circumvallation they faced.<sup>87</sup> There was some irony in their concentration of fire power on the Lorrainers - Duke Francis of Lorraine had only recently switched allegiance to the French.<sup>88</sup> However, on 15 July, under cover of darkness, the entire army under Don Juan and Condé's command crossed the Escaut and assembled in formation south-west of Valenciennes, facing the lines of the Maréchal de La Ferté.<sup>89</sup> The attack took place after midnight and was so concentrated and unexpected that they had little difficulty breaking through the French lines. Of course, the bulk of the French army under Turenne's command had to remain as helpless onlookers, prevented by the flooded Escaut from coming

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<sup>85</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.433.

<sup>86</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.436; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>87</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.436.

<sup>88</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.424: Fiesque to Condé, Dec.1655.

<sup>89</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.438; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

to La Ferté's assistance.<sup>90</sup> Don Juan entered Valenciennes before dawn at the head of the Spanish *tercios* and, according to Aumale, he was followed shortly after by Condé who entered the town between 5 and 6 a.m.<sup>91</sup> The rout of La Ferté's lines was so complete that the *Maréchal* himself had been taken prisoner along with a number of his subordinate officers. Turenne meanwhile, dangerously exposed after La Ferté's fortifications had been broken, was obliged to beat a hasty retreat to Quesnoy.<sup>92</sup>

Whilst providing Don Juan with an auspicious event to mark his arrival in the Spanish Netherlands as supreme commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders, Valenciennes reversed modest French gains since Arras. Condé and Don Juan were able to consolidate their victory by re-taking the eponymous fortress of Condé in September<sup>93</sup> and the corridor the French had created into Hainaut was shut off definitively in March 1657 when St Ghislain was re-taken.<sup>94</sup> Valenciennes, however, like the battle of the Dunes in 1658, was not just significant as one of the major military confrontations of the 1650's. Historiographically, treatment of the battle of Valenciennes raises important questions about Condé's role in masterminding the French defeat, whilst also raising the issue of increasing Spanish reliance upon the French prince. Like Leopold Wilhelm and Fuensaldaña,

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<sup>90</sup> J.Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe to which is prefixed the life of Mr Thurloe by Thomas Birch*, 7 vols. (London, 1742), v.214: Thurloe to Cromwell, 15 July 1656 [N.S.].

<sup>91</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.438-422; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>92</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.422; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>93</sup> B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1656, p.336; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.447.

<sup>94</sup> B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1657, p.144; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.451.

Don Juan and his second-in-command, the Marques de Caracena, are almost completely neglected when the Franco-Spanish war during the 1650's receives its characteristically summary assessments. Certainly, in the Flanders theatre, the dominant figure in French historiography is Condé, whose person is routinely invoked to explain away Spanish successes.

The myth that reduces the Franco-Spanish war during the 1650's to a duel between Turenne and Condé - which, whilst simplifying the war in the Flanders theatre, also ignores the equally important theatres of north Italy and Catalonia - is at its most powerful in accounts of the relief of Valenciennes. Don Juan and Caracena are simply ignored and Condé is represented as the military genius who conceived of the tactical traverse of the Escaut and who then led the attack on La Ferté's lines. There are many examples of this distorted version of Valenciennes. It holds a distinguished pedigree that extends from the reports of Thurloe's spies,<sup>95</sup> who begin writing biased accounts just over a week after Valenciennes, to the accounts appearing in the most recent histories of the period.<sup>96</sup> Such accounts all share common characteristics - they eschew detail, they are normally contained in two or three short sentences, and, all claim a 'Condéen' victory.

There are however a number of problems with the conventional interpretation of Valenciennes. Confusion begins with Don Juan's mandate as

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<sup>95</sup> J.Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, v.198: A letter of intelligence, Paris, 19 July 1656, [N.S.].

<sup>96</sup> Chérueil's remarks about Condé's role at the battle of Valenciennes set the tone for subsequent histories of the conflict: 'Ces trois capitaines, que Bussy-Rabutin a tort de mettre sur la même ligne, étaient le prince de Condé, don Juan d'Autriche et le marquis de Caracène. Le génie militaire de Condé était hors de doute...' A.Chérueil, *Le Ministère de Mazarin*, (Paris, 1882), iii.20. For later examples *cf.*, J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, (Paris, 1986), p.330; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990), p.410; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.288.

governor. It is often assumed that Don Juan was somehow having to share his command with Condé.<sup>97</sup> This generates the assumption that Don Juan allowed Condé to take supreme command at Valenciennes, hence that the battle was a 'Condéen' triumph. The documentation however is quite clear concerning Don Juan's mandate.<sup>98</sup> Madrid was keen to emphasize that this was no different from Leopold Wilhelm's, and viewed it as particularly important that Don Juan's birth should not result in any distinction being made in comparison with any of his predecessors. Don Juan plainly had to listen to Condé's views on military strategy, in so far as the size of the prince's army added considerable weight to his opinions and preferences. However there is no sense in which Condé was sharing with Don Juan the position of governor. When, therefore, Condé and Don Juan were camped at Famars, the French prince was not in any position to dictate military tactics to Don Juan. In any case, given the pressure from Madrid over the *tratamiento* and Don Juan's self-perception as a possible successor to his father, it was highly unlikely that he would have permitted Condé to take the lead.

Moreover, the contention that Condé took overall command at Valenciennes raises further and more serious problems. Apart from anything else, it conflicts with the later conventional interpretation of the Spanish *débâcle* at the battle of the Dunes. Here credulity is stretched in another direction - Condé is alleged to have played no part in the decision making process that led to the defeat outside Dunkirk and the blame is foisted onto the hapless Don Juan. But more compelling

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<sup>97</sup> Stradling, for example, writes, 'Whilst all his predecessors had been entrusted with outright command of the Army of Flanders, he [Don Juan] had been obliged to share this honour with the Prince de Condé', *cf.*, R.A.Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.149.

<sup>98</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2087: Consulta of the Council of State, 23 Feb.1656.

than historiographical comparison is a consideration of Don Juan's career, and indeed, that of his second-in-command, Caracena. If it had been the case that both commanders were military neophytes it would be easy to accept the conventional interpretation of events that assigns the responsibility for victory to Condé. However, Don Juan's military career was almost as distinguished as Condé's and Caracena was still resting on the laurels of his victory against the French at Pavia in 1655.<sup>99</sup> Both were experienced military commanders and would have expected to make a significant contribution to any discussion concerning military tactics, particularly as first and second-in-command of the Spanish Army of Flanders.

The conventional interpretation of events at Valenciennes may suit the hagiographical tradition of presenting Condé as the brilliant and gifted general, and add weight to the overarching thesis of Spain's decline and France's ascendancy, but a wholly different picture emerges once the details of the relief are examined and the later correspondence of Don Juan and Condé taken into account. This emphasizes that Don Juan and Condé, in so far as it can be judged, shared responsibility for the victory, but that for the sake of political expediency great importance was attached by Don Juan in Brussels and Philip IV's council in Madrid to ensuring that Condé was feted for his participation.

The Duc d'Aumale, Condé's distinguished and rigorous 19th century biographer, enters into discussion of the events at Valenciennes in some detail, as he is prepared to do with other notable Spanish victories such as Thionville (1639) and Honnecourt. Aumale mentions the inconvenient fact that Don Juan, who in

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<sup>99</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.476; R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain*, p.123.

the conventional interpretation of events is alleged to have played an essentially secondary role on the evening of 15 July, was the first to enter Valenciennes.<sup>100</sup> Aumale does not draw out the implications of the timing of the entrances of the respective commanders into Valenciennes - Condé followed Don Juan into the town after dawn had broken. But certainly, Don Juan's arrival in Valenciennes before dawn, accompanied by information about his military pedigree and mandate as governor, does suggest that he was playing more than a secondary role in both the formulation of tactics and the attack itself.

However, perhaps of greater importance is the information contained in Don Juan's correspondence and the proceedings of Philip IV's council subsequent to Valenciennes. As was customary in the aftermath of military conflicts Don Juan sent an official account of events back to Madrid.<sup>101</sup> In it he entered into detail about the events that had led to the unanimous decision to attack the French. The entire high command composed of Condé, Caracena, the Prince de Ligne, the Comte de Marchin and Don Fernando de Solis had all agreed upon the necessity of marching to Valenciennes: 'y todos concurrieron uniformes en que se debia intentar.'<sup>102</sup> In Don Juan's exhaustive account of the decision to cross the Escaut and attack La Ferté's quarters, Condé is nowhere singled out for providing this inspiration. On the contrary, the decision appears to have been made on the basis of an intelligence report which suggested that while La Ferté's lines appeared to

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<sup>100</sup> 'Marchant avec l'échelon de droite, qui avait rasé le pied des murailles et trouvé peu de résistance, don Juan était entré avant l'aube à Valenciennes. M. le Prince, arrivant entre cinq et six heures du matin...' Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.441.

<sup>101</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

be deceptively strong they were in fact weaker than Turenne's section of the circumvallation, and it was because of this that the decision was made to cross the Escaut with as many men as possible to attack La Ferté's lines.<sup>103</sup>

Nothing in Condé's correspondence suggests that either the prince or his followers believed he had played the decisive role in the victory at Valenciennes.<sup>104</sup> Other accounts of the battle, in particular, the account given by the official broadsheet of the Spanish Netherlands, the *Rélations Véritables*, corroborate the view that 'responsibility' for the victory was shared. Certainly the eulogy to Valenciennes that appeared in the *Rélations Véritables* three days after the event made no special mention of Condé and indeed, rather favoured Don Juan:

'La grande confiance que le Ciel nous avoit inspirée pour la valeur de Son Altesse Serenissime [Don Juan] & les bons devoirs, que nous avons faits pour ce sujet pendant le siège, ont enfin eu l'heureux effet que nous esperions: le seize de ce mois environ à deux heures du matin ce grand prince attaqua les lignes des ennemis au quartier du Maréchal de la Ferté, avec tant de vigueur, qu'il les força en peu de temps & y defit entièrement les ennemis, à trois heures le secours entra dans la ville & à cinq heures Son Altesse Serenissime [Don Juan] passa avec Son Altesse de Condé & la plupart de l'armée pour aller attaquer le Maréchal de Turenne dans son quartier...'<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> 'Advirtiendo que los quarteles que guardavia el Mareschal de la Ferté con su exercito que eran los de la otra parte de la espalda sobre nuestra izquierda demas de la conveniencia del Bosque dicho serian razon los mas flacos.', A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Don Juan to Philip IV, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>104</sup> Whilst praising his patron for his part in the relief even Caillet, the prince's intendant, never went so far as to suggest that Condé alone was responsible for victory. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.255: Caillet to Condé, 21 July 1656; f.265: Caillet to Condé, 26 July 1656.

<sup>105</sup> B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1656, p.319.

Likewise, reports from Thurloe's spies in the immediate aftermath of the battle made no special mention of Condé:

'Don John and the prince of Condé have raised the siege of Valenciennes. On Sunday morning before dawn they attacked the lines and after a strong opposition they broke in, and in a manner quite destroyed that part of the French army under Monsr de la Ferté who himself was wounded and taken prisoner.'<sup>106</sup>

Why then was the rumour so effectively disseminated that Condé alone bore responsibility for the victory? Part of the answer lies in an appreciation of the attitudes taken in Madrid towards the French prince's assumption of such a considerable degree of *de facto* power. This was clearly of concern for Don Juan, who realised that the success of his administration relied on Condé's continued loyalty, and for Madrid, where the government feared that Condé's disloyalty would have dire consequences for Spanish power in the Netherlands. In the immediate aftermath of Valenciennes, Don Juan sent a missive to his father emphasizing the importance of Condé's continued loyalty by stressing that it was critical that the French prince was honoured for the part he and his army had played in the relief. This was discussed by Philip IV's council in August when lip service was paid to the 'merit' of Condé's contribution to French defeat which was placed firmly in the context of the prince's wish to continue in the Spanish king's service: 'refiere lo bien que el Conde se ..... en la ocasión de Valencianas y el deseo que muestra de bolver a continuar sus servicios a Flandes de que el Señor Don

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<sup>106</sup> J.Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, v.199, An intercepted letter to G.Ratchliffe, 19 July 1656 [N.S.].

Juan dijese holgara mucho...<sup>107</sup>

There were many people in Madrid who were only too happy to ensure that Philip IV honoured Condé for his role at Valenciennes, particularly if this obscured Don Juan. This was true specifically of the circle surrounding the queen, who would have been keen to deflate the importance of any Spanish military success that drew attention to Don Juan. The ruthlessness with which the queen tried to disgrace Don Juan after the battle of the Dunes - and indeed removed him from his command of the Army of Flanders - and even more conspicuously after the defeat of Ameixial in 1663 at the hands of the Portuguese, underlines the difficulty of Don Juan's position.<sup>108</sup> He understood that Condé's exile from the French court and continued participation in the war against France was key to Spanish military success in the Flanders theatre. However, at the same time, he had his own personal honour to satisfy. Since the correlation between public perception of individual honour and social status was so close, for Don Juan the stakes were extremely high.

In Condé's camp such an interpretation was naturally seized upon and exploited, generating a myth that depicted Condé's 'decisive' intervention at Valenciennes. Effusive gratitude from Philip IV<sup>109</sup> was taken as an acknowledgement of where the 'real' responsibility for the victory lay. This was used both for propaganda purposes in France and to shore up the prince's position in Madrid. In September 1656 one of Condé's envoys in north Italy, Marigny,

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<sup>107</sup> A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2088: Consulta of the Council of State, 20 Aug.1656.

<sup>108</sup> Hume argues convincingly that it was the aim of Mariana to separate Don Juan from the army altogether, *cf.*, M.Hume, *The Court of Philip IV*, (London, 1907), p.494.

<sup>109</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.332: Philip IV to Condé, Sept.1656.

wrote to the prince: 'Tous les gens de bien ont receu avec joye la nouvelle de l'insigne victoire que Votre Altesse Serenissime [Condé] a remportée dans la deroute de Valenciennes. Tout le monde luy ont donné la gloire, et il n'est point de doute que sa valeur et sa conduite n'aient produit un si bel ouvrage...'<sup>110</sup>

Thurloe's frequently misinformed spies were, of course, not immune to the spread of such half-truths. In a letter of intelligence from Brussels written barely a week after Valenciennes one of Thurloe's agents chose to single out Condé's part in the battle to emphasize Spain's underlying weakness in the Spanish Netherlands: 'L'Espagne estoit dans la plus epouvantable misère & dans le plus malheureux estat du monde, si Valenciennes si fut pris, etant epuisée d'argent, & n'ayant pas grandes troupes, on auroit vu des changements en Flandrie. Mons. le prince a la plus grande part dans cette victoire, comme les Espagnols même l'avouent...'<sup>111</sup>

The false impressions of Thurloe's agent were an example of some of the undesirable consequences for Don Juan of Condé's presence in the Spanish Netherlands. The new found cohesion within the high command that had enabled Condé's army, and the Spanish Army of Flanders, to combine their efforts to such effect at Valenciennes, was for the most part ignored in contemporary accounts of the battle in favour of a version of events that focused undue attention on Condé. This was clearly to Don Juan's disadvantage, and presaged a similar massaging of evidence that was to take place after the defeat of Condé and Don Juan at the Dunes in 1658. Accounts of the battle of the Dunes were distorted by the same political interests in Brussels and Madrid that had come into play in the

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<sup>110</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.320: Marigny to Condé, 2 Sept.1656.

<sup>111</sup> J.Thurloe, *Collection of State Papers*, v.207: Nouvelles de Bruxelles de 22 July, 1656 [N.S.].

aftermath of Valenciennes. Once again, Condé was able to exploit the situation to his advantage and contribute further to his military reputation as a master strategist.

## THE CAMPAIGN OF 1657 AND THE BATTLE OF THE DUNES

The battle of the Dunes, however, assumes far greater importance in the historiography of Louis XIV's France, for it is frequently pointed to as one of the early indications of French military supremacy. Almost predictably, the powerful myth of the battle that was developed exonerates Condé - a French general - from Spanish defeat, stresses Don Juan's responsibility, and underplays the essential role played by the English. Like Valenciennes, many of the assumptions that underpin this portrayal of the Dunes originate from biased and partisan accounts. A further similarity with the historiography of Valenciennes is that the Condéen version of events at the Dunes continues as the accepted orthodoxy, underpinning a more general picture of the 1650's that passes largely without question: a critical stage in the ascendancy of France and the decline of Spain.

The fall of Dunkirk to the Anglo-French army on 25 June 1658 after a siege lasting one month prompted Louis Nicholas de Clerville, a known and respected French military engineer, to write an account of the battle of the Dunes which had precipitated this event. It was only fitting that Clerville should have begun his account with an apology for the treaty between France and England in March

1657, which had originally laid down the terms for a joint assault on Dunkirk. The treaty had obliged Louis XIV to relinquish Dunkirk to the English upon its surrender, and after Dunkirk had capitulated, it had duly been handed over to the English ambassador, Sir William Lockhart. Such an apparently unsatisfactory conclusion to a resounding Spanish defeat had provoked widespread criticism and hostility in Paris towards Mazarin, held personally responsible for originally advising the King to accept Cromwell's terms. But Clerville was at pains to explain the circumstances that had led to the treaty being signed. He argued that a similar proposal to the English by the Marques de Lede in the name of Spain, had been averted by the Cardinal's prompt diplomatic counter attack. By securing the alliance of the Protector, Mazarin had turned the English cannon upon Spain.

Notwithstanding Clerville's bombastic remarks about French military superiority, there was little doubt that the addition of the English expeditionary force made a dramatic impact on the course of the war with Spain. Even allowing for modest French gains between 1654 and 1655, Valenciennes had demonstrated the degree to which the Franco-Spanish war had sunk into a war of attrition that neither side appeared capable of winning. However, the addition of the English expeditionary force in 1658 tipped the numerical balance heavily in France's favour and, for a short time, it seemed that with English assistance the French were capable of forcing some kind of decisive breakthrough on the northern frontier.

The conditions of the French agreement with Cromwell in March 1658 were in effect a trade-off for English assistance. The French undertook to attack Dunkirk, which, once it had capitulated, would become an English possession

under the administration of the republican government in London.<sup>112</sup> The agreement that immediately preceded the attack on Dunkirk was negotiated by Lockhart in Paris in March 1658. Its precursor had been a similar but looser agreement that had been agreed the previous year. This had also bound the French to a joint attack on Dunkirk under similar conditions, but had not on that occasion been honoured by the French.<sup>113</sup> During the campaign of 1657, the French had used Cromwell's regiments to attack fortresses not covered by the treaty. This enabled them to take Mardyck in September 1657.<sup>114</sup> They realised that it was to France's advantage to delay an attack on Dunkirk for as long as possible. The English were by no means committed to supporting the French war effort and beyond securing the assistance of France to secure Dunkirk, Cromwell had no wish to involve his navy and the New Model Army further in the Franco-Spanish war.

Cromwell's awkward attachment to the French was simply for the sake of political expediency. Since Penn's disastrous expedition to the Indies, Brussels had revelled in the depredations caused by the Dunkirkers, who had been unleashed on English shipping after Philip IV's declaration of war on the Protectorate in

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<sup>112</sup> Firth gives the best outline of the terms negotiated in March 1658, Firth, 'Protectorate' ch.15. The decision to offer to the Protector Dunkirk can be followed in the volumes of Mazarin's correspondence in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères. For the offer of Dunkirk, see particularly: A.A.E., M.D., France, vol 904, fol 10: Le Tellier to Mazarin, 3 July 1657 (discusses the treaty with the English); fol 145: The Comte de Brienne to Mazarin, 26 Sept 1657, Metz (discusses incentives to be offered to Lockhart). Another important letter is at the Bibliothèque Nationale, see B.N. Ms Fr, Mélanges de Colbert, t.52, fol 464: Mazarin to Servien, Mardyck, 30 June 1658.

<sup>113</sup> C.H.Firth, *The Last Years of the Protectorate*, 1656-1658, (London, 1909), p.176.

<sup>114</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, trans., A.Lytton Sells, (London, 1962), p.239, B.R.B., *Rélatiions Véritables*, 1657, p.480.

1656.<sup>115</sup> The disruption to English trade caused by the privateers was considerable. The account of one English observer in February 1656 showed that provoking Madrid even whilst she was in the midst of fighting wars on multiple fronts, and in such dire financial straits, was not without its consequences:

‘The Dunkirkers and Ostenders ply close upon the coast, and take ships daily, and are very insulting. Some of them told our men to tell the Protector that, while he is fetching gold from the West Indies, they will fetch his coal from Newcastle.’<sup>116</sup>

Politically, this was a serious threat to Cromwell. After Spain’s declaration of war on the Protectorate, Charles Stuart had managed to negotiate a treaty with Philip IV by which Brussels agreed to grant him military and financial assistance if he could show that he had control of a major English port.<sup>117</sup> As a result of the activities of the Dunkirkers, resentment towards Cromwell’s regime now threatened to become a dangerous issue among coastal communities. Resentment might lead to revolt, which would in turn make it far easier for Charles Stuart to secure a major port - the base he needed for a Spanish assisted invasion of his kingdom. Cromwell, therefore, had a strong interest in ensuring that Dunkirk was brought to heel, for it was largely as a result of the activities of the privateers that he was now confronted with the increased likelihood of a Stuart invasion. Putting an end to the offensive capabilities of Dunkirk however, necessitated the assistance of the French. Inevitably this meant involving England temporarily in

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<sup>115</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.149.

<sup>116</sup> Quoted by Robert Stradling, *cf.*, R.A.Stradling, *Armada of Flanders*, p.147.

<sup>117</sup> R.Hutton, *Charles II*, (Oxford, 1989), p.99.

the Flanders theatre of the Franco-Spanish war.

The French were pleased to enter into any negotiations with the English that would bring them military assistance and break the deadlock in the Flanders theatre. However, as far as Cromwell was concerned, it was clear after the campaign of 1657, when the French had failed to fulfil their part of the agreement by investing Dunkirk, that Mazarin hoped to embroil them in the war with Spain.<sup>118</sup> The treaty negotiated in 1658 was therefore far tighter and more specific about the timing of the attack on Dunkirk. Its preamble contained an apology for the failure during the previous campaign to attack Dunkirk and Gravelines. There was also a compensation clause. If the siege did not take place either through delay of the French army or the English fleet, the party that suffered loss was to have a right to claim reimbursement of expenses.<sup>119</sup> The republican government in London were prepared to involve themselves in the Franco-Spanish war only in so far as they accepted that their interests converged with those of the French over Dunkirk. But Thurloe's petulant remarks in March 1658 about French observation of the recently contracted treaty, suggested that beyond an attack on Dunkirk, the English had no further interest in the Spanish Netherlands: 'the treaty will be punctually observed this side: I wish the same to be done on the other side...'<sup>120</sup>

Before Turenne received orders to march on Dunkirk the French attempted to delay the attack by diverting attentions to Hesdin. Hesdin was an important

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<sup>118</sup> Cromwell was most irritated by the failure to attack Dunkirk in 1657, *cf.*, C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.176.

<sup>119</sup> Firth discusses the details of the treaty at length, *cf.*, *Ibid.*, p.178.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p.179.

fortress in the heart of Artois that, to the considerable embarrassment of Mazarin's regime, had recently come under Condé's control.<sup>121</sup> The governor of the fortress, the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt, had been hostile to Mazarin since 1653, when the cardinal had him posted to Catalonia and had attempted to remove him from his governorship of Péronne.<sup>122</sup> Once the Maréchal had returned to Paris in 1655 he opened up negotiations with Condé that culminated in his change of allegiance in 1657.<sup>123</sup> Mazarin had pleaded with Lockhart to agree to a preliminary attack on Hesdin before proceeding to Dunkirk<sup>124</sup> and in May 1658 the French had begun a half-hearted attempt to invest the town. However, Lockhart was insistent that the letter of the treaty was observed and Turenne was instructed to abandon the siege and to march on Dunkirk.

The French abandonment of the siege of Hesdin came as a surprise to the Spanish high command. On the experience of the previous campaign, when the expected attack on Dunkirk had not come, they fully expected an Anglo-French offensive inland. A factor therefore contributing to the loss of Dunkirk was the element of surprise. The Spanish high command believed that the French intended to mount their offensive inland in Artois and Hainaut, rather than concentrate on

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<sup>121</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.35; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.321: Caracena to Condé, 1 Apr.1658; f.352: Condé to Auteuil, 18 Apr.1658; f.398: Fiesque to Condé, 1 May 1658.

<sup>122</sup> In March 1655 Leopold Wilhelm identified Hocquincourt as one of three generals (the other two were Turenne and La Ferté) who continued to be loyal to the cardinal. However, his loyalties soon changed after he had returned from his posting in Catalonia. B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653, p.364; A.G.S. Est.Flandes 2084: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 29 Mar.1655; A.G.R.B., S.E.G., vol.260, f.124: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 20 Nov.1655; f.166: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 3 Dec.1655.

<sup>123</sup> Cf., p.237.

<sup>124</sup> C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.183.

the coastal towns of Flanders.<sup>125</sup> It was thought that after finding themselves contained at Hesdin in early May they would turn towards the inland provinces. Resources and men had accordingly been distributed to those garrisons, in particular, to the town of Cambrai where a French attack had been successfully resisted the previous year. The Spanish governor of Dunkirk had actually been deprived of men and ammunition to supply these inland towns with the necessary resources to the extent that when the French and English besieged the port they found the garrison to be significantly below its usual strength.<sup>126</sup>

The French army under the command of Turenne arrived outside the fortifications of Dunkirk on 25 May. Simultaneously, the English fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Goodson sailed down the coast from Ostend to blockade the entrance of the port. Clerville's description of the early stages of the siege suggests that it was only a short time before the shortage of manpower inside Dunkirk became apparent. Clerville speaks of one serious effort by the garrison to break through the siege works during their construction.<sup>127</sup> However, this was repulsed, and the heavy casualties sustained by the garrison during the attack discouraged any future attempts on the same scale until 7 June, when another sortie was launched but contained by the besieging army.<sup>128</sup>

The news that Dunkirk was besieged by the Anglo-French army had come

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<sup>125</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.252.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p.252. C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.185.

<sup>127</sup> Louis Nicholas de Clerville, 'Discours fait par le Chevalier de Clerville des causes de siège de Dunkerque et de ce qui s'est passé et est notable en iceluy, 1658', *cf.*, J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre* (Paris, 1886) p.289.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p.290.

to the attention of the Spanish high command in Brussels towards the end of May, causing considerable consternation. Ypres had swiftly been designated as the rendezvous for the Spanish army, but the time taken to re-deploy the main body of the army from Artois and Hainaut, resulted in the final muster occurring two weeks after the siege at Dunkirk had begun. Once assembled at Ypres the army continued to Furnes, a small town between Ostend and Dunkirk, arriving on 11 June.<sup>129</sup>

The first sign of the arrival of the relieving army occurred on 12 June when thirty squadrons under the command of the Prince de Condé were sighted from the siege works reconnoitring the French lines.<sup>130</sup> According to the memoirs of James, Duke of York - the future James II - and Clerville's narrative, a series of skirmishes ensued between Condé's cavalry regiments and the French horse guards outside the contravallation.<sup>131</sup> Whilst Condé made a half-hearted attempt to draw the French from their lines, hoping to slip a relief force into Dunkirk, the cavalry and foot regiments of the Spanish Army of Flanders assembled at Zuydcoote, a village running parallel to the canal between Furnes and Dunkirk.<sup>132</sup>

Condé's men returned from their foray to Zuydcoote where, by the following day, the Spanish high command had established their position surrounded by the natural cover of the sand dunes. James' memoirs imply that the camp was

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<sup>129</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, pp.254-255.

<sup>130</sup> J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, p.296.

<sup>131</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.257; J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, pp.297-298; Bussy-Rabutin, *Mémoires* (2 Vols., Amsterdam, 1711) i.112.

<sup>132</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.258.

intended to be a temporary affair. It only amounted to a provisional line of defence from the dunes on the seashore to the flatter meadows by the Furnes canal. Foot regiments were positioned in front of two lines of cavalry. The baggage train, artillery and several cavalry regiments were left behind at Furnes owing to the urgency of the operation and the extra time it would have taken to bring them up to Zuydcoote.<sup>133</sup> Hence, the position was weak. But speed and mobility were more clearly a necessity for the task in hand. The Spanish high command had no intention of engaging the French in a head-on confrontation; in such a situation, tactics amounted to a lightning strike on a vulnerable area of the siege works, through which, it was hoped, a relief force would push its way into the garrison.

A measure of Turenne's early confidence was demonstrated by his decision to march out of the siege works and give battle to the Spanish at Zuydcoote at the earliest opportunity. Most accounts relate an intelligence report from a Spanish prisoner as having influenced this decision,<sup>134</sup> others point to a probably apocryphal order from Mazarin.<sup>135</sup> But, all accounts seem to agree upon the events that led to the disorderly retreat of the Spanish from Zuydcoote after the French attack. On the evening of June 13, Turenne gave orders for the bulk of the English redcoats, numbering about 4000, to come up from Mardyke, the nearby fortress where they were stationed. By the early hours of 14 June these men had

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<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, p.299. Bussy-Rabutin alludes to the reports of a small boy who told Turenne of the true strength of the Spanish and their allies, Bussy-Rabutin, *Mémoires*, i.118.

<sup>135</sup> As one of Mazarin's apologists, Clerville tried to defend Mazarin in the 'Discours' from accusations aimed at the cardinal subsequent to the Dunes that he was attempting to claim credit for the victory. *Ibid.*, p.300.

assembled north of the contravallation opposite the Spanish, joined by a large number of regiments of French cavalry and foot regiments.<sup>136</sup>

The English were deployed opposite the crack foot regiments of the Spanish Army of Flanders, the Spanish *tercios*, stationed on a large dune that formed a naturally defensive vantage point. The *tercios* were the basis of the defense of the right wing of the armies' position and under the direct command of Don Juan. Next to the *tercios* were the two Stuart foot regiments, York and Gloucester, and nearer the canal, on the left wing, were Walloon and Irish mercenary regiments followed by Condé's regiments of foot and horse.<sup>137</sup>

The surprise amongst the Spanish and their allies when the French were sighted coming out of their lines at 5 a.m. on June 14 almost leaps from the pages of James' memoirs. It seems that the high command were not prepared for what James described after the morning of June 14 as the 'whole army' advancing towards them. Both James and the Prince de Condé were among the first to receive the alarming reports of the French advance, Don Juan de Austria seemed, 'not to believe[sic!]' when he received the first reports, and there were initial disagreements among the high command regarding the true intentions of the French. However, once reports confirming the scale of the advance had reached them it was decided that there was little they could do except 'attend the coming of the French' from their respective posts.<sup>138</sup>

It is plain that the Spanish high command were unaware of the true extent

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<sup>136</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.260.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, and J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, pp.303-304.

<sup>138</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.259.

to which the Anglo-French force held the numerical advantage. Most accounts acknowledge that the Anglo-French army was significantly larger than the agglomeration of armies under the separate commands of Don Juan, the Prince de Condé and the Stuarts at Zuydcoote.<sup>139</sup> Turenne's ability to deploy a body of men of sufficient size to cause the comment by James that their 'whole army' was coming out of the lines, whilst still being able to man the siege works, suggests that the difference in numbers must have been considerable.

The time taken by the French fully to assemble meant that the engagement did not begin until 8 a.m., but the result of the conflict bordered on the predictable. The combination of numerical superiority, artillery and the weak Spanish defence, resulted in a rout of the Spanish and their allies. Unable to make use of their cannon, still at Furnes where they had left them two days previously, the Spanish were unable to respond to French artillery fire.<sup>140</sup> Sited to the right wing of the French advance, guarded by the *régiment des Gardes Suisses*, a series of devastating rounds cut deep swathes into Condé's position on the Spanish left wing. On the Spanish right wing the *tercios* were being simultaneously bombarded by English frigates, some of whom had moved up from the blockade, and by a further unit of French artillery.<sup>141</sup> However, the Anglo-French victory hinged, not upon artillery fire, but the damage inflicted by the redcoats upon the Spanish

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<sup>139</sup> Bussy-Rabutin refers to the large numbers of English, *cf.*, Bussy Rabutin, *Mémoires*, p.115. Also see: A.G.S., Est.Flandes 2092: Don Juan de Austria to Philip IV, 20 June 1658; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.493: 'Relation du Combat de Dunkerque', 22 June 1658; James makes a reference to the weakness of the Spanish cavalry, half of which was still at Furnes, James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.262.

<sup>140</sup> J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, p.305.

<sup>141</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.493: 'Relation'.

*tercios*.

James, who was on the immediate left of the Spanish *tercios*, paid close attention in his memoirs to the advance of the redcoats as they charged uphill, and by force of numbers completely overran the dune upon which the *tercios* had been stationed. Once the *tercios* had been broken and a counter attack of the Stuart cavalry regiments had failed, the Spanish position on the right wing totally collapsed.<sup>142</sup> French cavalry came up the beach, cutting off the retreating mass of Spanish and Walloon foot regiments. The two lines of Spanish cavalry, only at half-strength, for the remainder were with the baggage train at Furnes, immediately retreated, most not even seeing combat. Meanwhile, the Spanish left wing were feeling the affects of the confusion to their right. The sight of the defeat of the *tercios* caused a number of Condé's foot regiments and Walloon mercenary units to run. Condé's cavalry were unable to hold the Spanish left wing after the original position of the army had effectively folded up upon them, and despite a temporary victory over two front-line French foot regiments, they were forced to retreat.<sup>143</sup>

This summary of the battle of the Dunes, based upon a critical reading of a number of accounts in the memoirs and letters of contemporaries, does not represent the conventional depiction of the battle. Like Valenciennes, the conventional account of the Dunes tends towards simplification and inaccuracy. Condé's *de facto* power in the Spanish Netherlands and Don Juan's vulnerable

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<sup>142</sup> James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, p.263; Bussy-Rabutin, *Memoirs*, p.123; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.493, 'Relation'; Clerville, 'Discours', p.306; Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, ed., W.D.Macray (8 vols., Oxford, 1888) vii.234.

<sup>143</sup> J.Bourelly, *Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandre*, pp.307-308; James describes this in great detail, James, Duke of York, *Memoirs*, pp.263-273.

position in Madrid, caused yet another 'Condéen' gloss on events. In many contemporary accounts of the Dunes, and in virtually all accounts by historians of the 19th and 20th centuries, it is claimed that the prince had no responsibility for the defeat, and alleged that despite his participation in the decision making process of the Spanish high command, Spanish tactics on the occasion of the Dunes were masterminded by Don Juan. Conventional accounts of the battle explain that Condé's attempts to intervene before the defeat at Zuydcoote were conveniently blocked by Don Juan who went on to command with unparalleled naivety, refusing to take the prince's advice, which, it is argued, was highly critical of the organisation and deployment of Spanish troops.

In the same way that historians have been content to accept the Condéen version of events at Valenciennes, they are equally prepared to accept a Condéen version of the battle of the Dunes. In some respects this was not surprising. Like the relief of Valenciennes, the Condéen version of the Dunes has an impressive pedigree. Accounts of contemporaries were to blame for the original distortions, ensuring that responsibility was foisted onto Don Juan, and that Condé was left apparently blameless. In the 18th century this tradition was continued by Ramsay who helpfully edited the memoirs of James Duke of York to favour Condé, adding a flourish to a well known conversation between the prince and Henry, Duke of Gloucester, prior to the battle;<sup>144</sup> and in the 19th century Don Juan's alleged bungling was readily accepted by French historians and pointed to as evidence of Spanish decline.<sup>145</sup> Their assertions went unchallenged principally because 19th

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<sup>144</sup> Cf., p.232.

<sup>145</sup> A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, viii.i.

century studies of French and Spanish history during the second half of the 17th century were overwhelmingly dominated by the French, who were understandably keen to chart the glories of a great period of their nation's ascendancy. Spanish historians avoided the period for much the same reason. Rodríguez Villa explained that such lack of interest stemmed from, 'the melancholy and distaste which the narration of such misfortunes produces in one's spirit'.<sup>146</sup>

The preoccupation by French historians of the late 19th century with the period of France's ascendancy during the second half of the 17th century, meant that great emphasis was placed on the extent to which this later French predominance had been founded upon earlier military exploits. As one of the most prestigious and well known members of France's military pantheon, it seemed obvious to historians like Chéruel and Aumale that Condé had no part to play in the Spanish defeat at Zuydcoote.<sup>147</sup> Sustaining this myth into the 20th century, French historians continued to rely upon the version of the Dunes bequeathed to them by their 19th century predecessors for much the same reasons. Conveniently for them, the conventional interpretation of the Dunes fitted neatly into a general picture of the 1650's. Nothing more needed to be known about the Dunes, but that the French defeated the Spanish and that Spanish defeat had been caused by the incompetence of her military commanders. Spanish defeat at this stage in the Franco-Spanish war was anyway for them seen as a wholly predictable outcome, given the growing military effectiveness of France, her rise to European supremacy in the second half of the 17th century, and the inexorable decline of

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<sup>146</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain*, (London, 1981), p.143.

<sup>147</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.4; A.Chéruel, *Le Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.154.

Spain.

Historians of great stature have been inclined to accept the traditional orthodoxy. Lack of research during the 20th century has forced historians whose work touches on this period to rely on the opinions and findings of their 19th century predecessors. Two very recent accounts of the Dunes serve to highlight this problem. The author of the most recent biography of Cardinal Mazarin, for example, concentrates more on the early stages of the cardinal's career but nonetheless, by wishing to add a summary of the events of the 1650's, falls foul of the paucity of secondary sources. The brief account provided of the Dunes argues, characteristically, for the equality of the two armies facing each other. As well as being reinforced by some units of English royalists, it is stressed that the Spanish were also assisted by Germans and Irish (although the bulk of the Spanish Army of Flanders had always been made up of mercenaries).<sup>148</sup> Early on the Prince de Condé receives his ritual absolution, 'Condé n'avait pas approuvé le dispositif de bataille conçu par les Espagnols qui craignait défaite..<sup>149</sup> The battle is not examined in any detail, the reader is told all that he apparently needs to know, that it was 'won' by Turenne who went on to take a number of important Spanish garrisons as well as Dunkirk itself and finished the campaign disgusted, since the weather prevented him from marching on Brussels. The Dunes then, concluded the Franco-Spanish war, a war which the author interprets in wholly traditional guise by arguing that France won: 'Mais les deux grands royaumes

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<sup>148</sup> *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders 1582 - 1700*, ed., B.Jennings (Dublin, 1964), shows the common use by the Spanish of Irish regiments in the Spanish Netherlands. Similarly, F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force* (Wiesbaden, 1964). G.Henry, *The Irish Military Community in Spanish Flanders, 1586-1621*, (Dublin, 1992).

<sup>149</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.413.

désiraient une paix acceptable, avec des gains appréciables pour le vainqueur, mais non déshonorants pour le vaincu...'<sup>150</sup>

The second account, an extract from an equally recent biography of Turenne, again implies that the Spanish and French faced each other on equal terms, with the numerical advantage tipped slightly in France's favour: 'La bataille des Dunes eut lieu le 14 Juin 1658 et opposa quinze mille à seize mille alliés à quatorze mille Espagnols.'<sup>151</sup> Once again, Condé is vindicated, 'Condé, effrayé de l'audace des Espagnols, leur prédit la défaite..', whilst Turenne is singled out for recognition, 'Cette bataille fut, devait dire Napoléon, l'action la plus brillante de Turenne.'<sup>152</sup>

Focus upon military personalities such as Turenne, Don Juan and Condé contributed to the idea that the battle of the Dunes was no different from Arras and Valenciennes, and attention is drawn away from the importance of the decisive military intervention of the English. In many textbooks the contribution of the English is depicted as of secondary importance and its impact insignificant to the outcome of the battle, which in the light of France's inexorable rise to European supremacy, seemed a foregone conclusion.<sup>153</sup> However, even within the

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<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p.413.

<sup>151</sup> J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, p.335.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p.335.

<sup>153</sup> G.P.R.James, *The life and times of Louis XIV*, (London, 1851), ii.2-6; H.Hauser, *La Prépondérance Espagnole*, (Paris, 1934), pp.391-392; *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed., F.Bluche, (Paris, 1990), p.508. One exception however is Bernard Cottret, Cromwell's biographer, who hints that the role of the English was central, but who nonetheless, accepts the idea that Don Juan was responsible for Spanish defeat: 'Dans le camp espagnol, le prince de Condé, le duc d'York.. connaissaient suffisamment Turenne pour mettre en garde Don Juan qui croyait un peu naïvement qu'il suffisait de paraître pour pouvoir s'écrier, comme César: *Veni, vidi, vici.*' B.Cottret, *Cromwell*, (Paris, 1992), p.444.

logic of the conventional argument it is worth noting a curious historiographical problem: most accounts of this genre are based on two assumptions that are themselves fundamentally difficult to reconcile. French historians in particular have often been keen to romanticise the role played by the French high command. The Maréchal de Turenne, for example is singled out for high praise for the masterly way that he deployed his troops,<sup>154</sup> his military foresight and tactical brilliance. At the same time, Condé, himself ceaselessly portrayed as one of the 'great' military geniuses of his time, is absolved of all responsibility for Spanish defeat.<sup>155</sup>

Yet the idea that the battle was won and lost through the military abilities of the respective Spanish and French high commands sits ill with notions of Spanish decline.<sup>156</sup> Paradoxically, many historians like to stress both arguments, but without recognizing that they butt uncomfortably against each other. A particularly exaggerated form of French chauvinism, for example, would like to emphasize the idea of a level playing field, that the two armies confronted each other on essentially the same terms, but that in the end, the superior tactical ability of Turenne was able to exploit the military fecklessness of Don Juan and his second-in-command, Caracena, and thus lead the French to victory. However if, simultaneously, the grandiose schema of Spanish decline and emergent French ascendancy is acknowledged, this would suggest that on the contrary, the battle was not fought on such equal terms. Spain had apparently already begun her

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<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> J.H.Elliott, 'The decline of Spain', *Past and Present*, 20, pp. 52-73.

undignified descent, her armies were starved of essential funds, Madrid had left herself exposed in a war fought on multiple fronts. Here, the battle of the Dunes is merely a manifestation of Spanish decline, not of French military genius or of her army's advance to European supremacy.

However, it becomes difficult to accept the idea that the French were capable of such a crushing victory in a field engagement between the French and Spanish campaign armies, when the previous experiences of the Franco-Spanish war on the Flanders frontier are taken into consideration. Since Condé had arrived in the Spanish Netherlands, French advances into Spanish held territory had been nominal and those that had occurred had been redressed after Valenciennes. Indeed, such a complete Spanish defeat at the Dunes seems even more curious in the context of the campaigns of 1657 and early 1658. Then, the Spanish were in the midst of a serious financial crisis that was clearly affecting their ability to field adequate numbers of men and ensure that their garrisons were well defended. But the French were evidently unable to exploit this weakness despite the fact that the French *surintendant des finances*, Nicholas Fouquet, was relatively successful in raising money for the war effort over the course of 1657.<sup>157</sup> Financial crisis in France was certainly beneath the surface during these months, but only appeared a serious menace to Mazarin's regime after the battle of the Dunes in July 1658, when the bankruptcies of several financiers threatened to precipitate a *banqueroute générale*.<sup>158</sup> However, there is no sense in which Spanish weakness on the northern frontier was being exploited by the French or that they seemed

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<sup>157</sup> R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts, Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661*, (Oxford, 1981), p.252; J.Dent, *Crisis in Finance*, (London, 1973), p.36.

<sup>158</sup> R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, p.253.

capable of organizing anything more elaborate in the Spanish Netherlands than a *guerre de course*.

When French and Spanish gains and setbacks for the duration of the campaign of 1657 and early 1658 are set side by side, it is by no means clear which side held the advantage. The particular style of *guerre de course* being fought on France's northern frontier, characterised by surprise attacks, raiding parties and careful avoidance of any full scale confrontation, make measurements of comparative advantage at any time a difficult and contentious task. However even the most partisan assessment of the campaigns of 1657 and 1658, prior to the battle of the Dunes, would have difficulty supporting the argument that either side had established military predominance. Using the respective acquisitions of major fortified towns by each side as a measurement of success, neither the French nor the Spanish appear to have enjoyed a significant advantage, until of course, the overwhelming Spanish defeat in 1658 outside Dunkirk. The Spanish took St Ghislain early in 1657,<sup>159</sup> this was offset by the fall of Montmèdy to the French in August.<sup>160</sup> The pattern was reversed in September, when, with English assistance, Mardyck fell to the French,<sup>161</sup> but the equilibrium soon returned in March 1658, when the French governor of Hesdin switched his allegiance to Condé.<sup>162</sup> Indeed, contrary to received wisdom, the two largest confrontations of this period saw the advantage gained by the Spanish: Condé's relief of Cambrai

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<sup>159</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.451; B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1657, p.144.

<sup>160</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.458; B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1657, p.300.

<sup>161</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.459, B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1657, p.483.

<sup>162</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vi.35, B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1658, p.143.

in late May 1657, and the rout of the Maréchal d'Aumont and his capture at Ostend in the same month of the following year.<sup>163</sup>

The argument, therefore, which seeks to explain the outcome of the battle purely in terms of French military prowess is hard to sustain. It is difficult to see on the basis of the supposedly evenly matched Spanish and French campaign armies, how the French were able to rout the Spanish so convincingly in July 1658. Until the Dunes, the two sides had fought each other with more or less equal results, despite the deterioration in the quality and numbers of soldiers in Spanish service.<sup>164</sup> Why then, in July 1658, was the *status quo* overturned so dramatically? Certainly, the financial crisis in Brussels, and its debilitating effect on the ability of the Spanish to wage war, makes it easier to understand why the Spanish were more vulnerable to defeat than they had ever been before. But cooperation within the Spanish high command as a result of Don Juan and Caracena's arrival had meant that the Spanish were better placed to exploit the obvious synergy between Condé's army and the Spanish Army of Flanders, and the campaign of 1657 demonstrated that this had gone some way in offsetting their financial difficulties. The one-sided outcome of the Dunes remains therefore difficult to explain when attention is focused exclusively on the French and Spanish campaign armies.

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<sup>163</sup> For Cambrai: A.C., Correspondence du Grand Condé, Série P, Vol 17, fol 145: Don Juan de Austria to Condé, 30 May 1657, Brussels; fol 205: The Cardinal de Hesse to Condé, 28 June 1657, Rome; fol 228: Philip IV to Condé, 28 June 1657, Madrid. For the disastrous attempt of the Maréchal d'Aumont on Ostend: C.H.Firth, *The last years of the Protectorate 1656-1658* (London, 1909), p.183. Also Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.10.

<sup>164</sup> Phillip IV officially recognised this deterioration himself in a letter to his son dated October 1657. A.G.R., S.E.G., vol.262, f.210: Phillip IV to Don Juan, Madrid, 30 Oct.1657.

Despite its neglect in so many accounts<sup>165</sup> in fact the primary evidence offers little doubt that the addition of English troops was the decisive factor affecting the outcome of the battle. A short time before the battle of the Dunes in April, the French army had been strengthened by some 4-5000 English infantry, 1000 of whom were hardened veterans from Cromwell's elite regiments under the commands of Colonels Salmon and Gibbon. This mass of infantry were joined by an English fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Goodson, whose ships were critical, for they prevented any assistance reaching Dunkirk by sea.<sup>166</sup> The Spanish were already demoralised and in a weakened state. Shortage of money had prevented their high command from being able to recruit fresh troops.<sup>167</sup> The assumption that the French intended to attack inland had resulted in Dunkirk being left ill-prepared for a siege, as sparse supplies had been diverted.<sup>168</sup> It was against this general background that on the morning of 14

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<sup>165</sup> Bérenger simply glosses over the role played by the English by referring to them obliquely in the statement, 'la bataille des Dunes eut lieu le 15 June 1658 et opposa quinze mille à seize mille alliés à quatorze mille Espagnols..' J.Bérenger, *Turenne*, p.335. Goubert fails to mention the English at all, stressing rather how the Spanish Army of Flanders was reinforced by English royalists and foreign mercenaries. P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.413. However, the contribution of the English troops to the Dunes has not been underestimated by English historians, see C.H.Firth, 'Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* xvii, (New Series, 1903), pp.67-89.

<sup>166</sup> A letter in Condé's correspondence discusses the hindrance caused by the English fleet blockading Dunkirk. Not only were the Spanish unable to ship supplies into the port, but the fleet was also able to bombard Spanish positions on the beach. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.18: Relation du Combat de Dunkerque, 22 June 1658. For a precise chronology of the arrival and numbers of the English the best source is, C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.195.

<sup>167</sup> During the campaign of 1657 the evidence indicates that Condé was unable to hire any soldiers at all through lack of money. At the end of the year Condé had sent an ultimatum to Madrid threatening that if he did not receive the funds he had requested, he would be unable to keep his army up to its current strength. There is some evidence showing that Condé was able to hire some troops during the spring of 1658, but he complained that the new soldiers were few and poor in quality, again, attributing the reason to lack of funds. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.262: Fiesque to Condé, 16 Fev.1658, Madrid; f.379: Condé to Fiesque, 27 April 1658.

<sup>168</sup> James makes this point in his memoirs, James, *Memoirs*, p.252. See also: A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.493: 'Relation du Combat de Dunkerque,' 22 June 1658.

June the combined forces of the Spanish and Condéen troops, cut off from their supplies and artillery, faced the French: vastly superior in numbers owing to the addition of one of Europe's most renowned fighting forces.<sup>169</sup>

The addition of the English, effected by the treaty signed between Paris and London in March 1658, hardly qualifies as a historical revelation. Yet it is worth underlining. Few contemporary accounts deny the critical role played by the Redcoats, who were responsible for making the decisive breakthrough in the Spanish *tercios* stationed on the Great Dune, which formed the strong point of the Spanish position or of Goodson's fleet.<sup>170</sup> Any rigorous analysis of the events of 1658 needs to refer to the fundamental importance of the treaty of Westminster - the agreement between Louis XIV and Oliver Cromwell - which determined the two powers upon a joint venture to take Dunkirk and as a result of which the French campaign army, joined by an English expeditionary force, suddenly had a substantial numerical superiority against the Spanish.

Cromwell's intervention on the side of the French in the Flanders theatre is critical to explaining why the Spanish were so thoroughly defeated at Zuydcoote. Focusing on the contribution of Cromwell's regiments, and assessing how their arrival in the Spanish Netherlands strengthened the French campaign army to the degree that the Anglo-French coalition was able to deliver such a decisive blow, breaks cleanly from the rhetorical tradition of military history which tends to

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<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, also see: Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.10; and, C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.185.

<sup>170</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.493: 'Relation du Combat de Dunkerque,' 22 June 1658. Bussy-Rabutin, *Memoirs*, ii.123. The account of Lord Fauconberg: Thurloe papers, (ed.) T.Birch, (London, 1742), vol 7, p.158. Clerville's narrative: Bourelly, *Cromwell et Mazarin*, (Paris, 1886), p.306. Clarendon, *History*, vii.234. Some later historians also stress this, see, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.18.

place excessive emphasis upon the role of the individual commander. Military thinking since Clausewitz has been wary of the kind of explanation that relies upon the commander's individual genius, lauding him for his ability to orchestrate complicated manoeuvres in the heat of battle. Clausewitz placed the individual capacity to lead in the context of other equally important factors such as numerical superiority, morale, discipline, weapons, and practical supply arrangements.<sup>171</sup> In the present context, time is more fruitfully spent analyzing the importance of the numerical disparity on the field of the Dunes rather than the supposed contribution of individual commanders. But even *had* Don Juan's role been decisive, the notion promoted by Don Juan's enemies in Madrid that he alone took command at the Dunes, and that he successfully sidelined Condé to pursue his own misguided military strategy, fails to find any corroboration in the documentation.

It is easy to find respectable sources which reflect the Condéen interpretation of the Dunes, suggesting that the prince had no responsibility for the decision concerning the deployment of troops; indeed, that he remonstrated forcefully to Don Juan on the eve of battle about the folly of engaging the French in such a position.<sup>172</sup> There is no doubt that such an interpretation fits cosily into the powerful Condé hagiography that portrays the prince as a great general and military strategist. However, the fact that it does so should raise suspicions

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<sup>171</sup> Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans., Peter Paret and Michael Howard, (Princeton, 1976), *passim*. For scepticism about the role of the individual commander in determining the fortunes of battle, cf., J. Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, (London, 1976), pp.73-78.

<sup>172</sup> The Duc d'Aumale is a typical example, Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.4: 'Cette bataille, livrée contre son[Condé's] avis, contre sa volonté, d'attenuer le revers qu'il avait prévu, comme il fit sous les murs d'Arras.'

in itself. Military achievements were so blatantly linked to political power during this period, that subsequent accounts of events, their authors, the degree to which such versions were disseminated both in print and by sympathetic and powerful friends at court, seem obvious reasons for embellishment and distortion. The version of events offered by Edward Hyde, first Earl of Clarendon, is one such example.<sup>173</sup> Clarendon might at first seem an authoritative source, he was after all in exile with Charles II and the Stuart court in the Spanish Netherlands. But, Clarendon's account, more than any other, is partisan, as the following extract serves to highlight: 'Notwithstanding the advice which the Prince of Condé had given, Don Juan was positive in his first resolution. The prince, not without great indignation, consented; and drew up his troops in the place they desired; and quickly saw all come to pass that he had foretold.'<sup>174</sup>

However, Clarendon had a clear interest in painting Condé in a positive light. During the late 1650's there was little doubt that the interests of Charles II were best served by an *amitié* with Condé, which the king had done his best to cultivate. Since Clarendon was Charles II's closest and most influential adviser at that time, and closely involved with this project, it is hard to believe that he could have been associated with anything that did not serve the prince's interests.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Clarendon, *Rebellion*, vii, pp.220-344.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p.283.

<sup>175</sup> C.C.S.P. (ed.) W. Dunn Macray, 4 vols, iii.242: Anon to Charles II, 16 Jan 1656; p.256: Hyde to de Vic, Cologne, 15 Feb 1656; 374: Lord Taaffe to Charles II, Antwerp, 18 May 1656; p.382: Ormonde to Hyde, 22 May 1656; p.384 Ormonde to Hyde, 23 May 1656; p.424 Hyde to de Vic, Bruges, 9 July 1656; p. 479: Ormonde to Hyde, Tournay, 9 Aug 1656.

Condé was central to a project to restore Charles II to his throne by force of arms.<sup>176</sup> The fact that Condé appeared more enthusiastic than the Spanish high command in Brussels, and that he even went to the extent of seconding his lieutenant-general, the Liègeois Comte de Marsin, to the English king, shows the degree to which Stuart and Condéen interests had come to be associated with one another.<sup>177</sup> Charles II needed Condé's army and his influence with the Spanish; Condé, likewise, saw the advantages of being associated with Charles' restoration, and the benefits to be reaped from obtaining such a powerful supporter if Charles was restored to the English throne.

Clarendon wrote his account of The Dunes several years after the event, between 1671 and his death in 1674. That he did so has already led to observations about the variations in accuracy in the *History of the Great Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*.<sup>178</sup> Clarendon was also in exile when he wrote his account; tellingly, he served out his exile in France, and died in Rouen, the Longueville capital.<sup>179</sup> There are, therefore, a number of circumstantial factors that should serve as warning not to take much of what the author says about Condé during the 1650's at face value.

Another version of events can be found in the memoirs of James II. It is this

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<sup>176</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.339: Charles II to Condé, 27 Aug 1659; f.341: Bristol to Condé, 28 Aug 1659; C.C.S.P. vol 4, p.327: Bristol to Hyde, Aug 1659; p.342: Hyde to Ormonde, 29 Aug 1659; p.345: Hyde to Bristol, 27 Aug 1659; p.357: Hyde to Ormonde, 3/13 Sept 1659.

<sup>177</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.24: Condé to Fiesque, 10 Feb 1657. B.N. Lenet Papers, Ms Fr 6721, f.54: Condé to Lenet, Valenciennes, 10 June 1657. C.C.S.P. iv.5: Ormonde to Hyde, Jan 3/13 Jan 1658; p.6: Bristol to Charles II, 19/29 Jan 1658; p.25 Ormonde to Hyde, 12/22 March 1658; p.41: Marchin to Charles II, 22 April 1658.

<sup>178</sup> *Lives of the Stuart Age*, ed., E.Ridell, (London, 1976) p.225.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, The Duc de Longueville was Condé's brother in law, and, together with others, protected the prince's interests in France during the 1650's.

source that has led to one of the most frequently misquoted conversations, alleged to have taken place between Condé and the Duke of Gloucester on the eve of the battle, in which the prince asked the young duke if he had ever seen a battle, the duke replying no, Condé allegedly commented: ‘dans une demie heure vous verrez comment nous en perdrons une.’<sup>180</sup> This apocryphal remark, attributed to Condé, came from the memoirs of the Duke of York published by A.D.Ramsay in Paris in 1753.<sup>181</sup> Ramsay embellished the text on several occasions and this was one such occasion. Ramsay was, it seems, inserting into the text what he believed Condé was actually thinking at the time, but never said. In the original Bouillon manuscripts, and in Clarke, there is no such creative editing, and the conversation appears as the Duke of York recorded it: ‘... et voiant le Duc de Gloucester[sic!], il [Condé] luy demanda s’il s’estoit jamais trouvé à une bataille. Il respondit que non et le Prince luy dit dans une demie heure vous en verrez une.’<sup>182</sup>

However, unlike Clarendon, James II’s recollections, in their original format, are more valuable, for they complement to a far greater extent the existing circumstantial and documentary evidence surrounding the build up to the battle and its aftermath. It is likely that James II’s frankness stemmed from his falling out with Condé at some time in early 1658. The memoirs record this incident, which concerned an attempt by George Digby, second Earl of Bristol, to give Condé

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<sup>180</sup> James II, *Mémoires du Duc d’Yorck*, ed., A.D.Ramsay, (Paris, 1753), p.135.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>182</sup> James II, *Campagnes Tirées mot pour mot des memoirs de Jacques Stuart Pour lors Duc d’Yorck, et depuis Roy d’Angleterre Jacques Second ...*, (Paris, 1734), pp.249-250. James II, *The Life of James II collected out of Memoirs writ of his own hand*, (ed.) Rev J.S.Clarke, (London, 1816). Ramsay’s addition to the original manuscript is examined by A.Lytton Sells in the preface to his translation of the Bouillon manuscript. Lytton Sells agreed with Ramsay’s interpretation, and made the comment: ‘there is little doubt that it is what Condé was *thinking* [sic!].’ James II, *The Memoirs of James II*, trans., A. Lytton Sells, (London, 1962), p.35.

effective command of the troops belonging to the Duke of York.<sup>183</sup> Bristol's initiative seems perfectly in line with Charles II's policy at that stage, of ingratiating himself with the prince and would have served the dual purpose of drawing attention away from the military achievements of Charles' younger brother, who was conspicuously on campaign, whilst the king remained at Bruges. Despite the fact that James II did not comment straightforwardly that Condé, and others, should share the responsibility of defeat, which was so effectively foisted onto the hapless Don Juan, he does record a number of events that lead the reader to be suspicious about the insistence of later commentators and historians, that Condé had no part to play in the overall command on 14 June 1658.

Most revealing are James' recollections - admittedly second hand but the only source that discusses this event - of the council of war held when news had arrived at the Spanish high command that the French had begun to lay siege to Dunkirk. Present at the council were Don Juan, Condé, the Marques de Caracena, the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt and the Prince de Ligne. It was here decided, as James II writes: 'that on the 13th we should march with the whole army as near as we could conveniently to the lines of the enemy amongst the sand hills and there incamp.'<sup>184</sup> James II's subsequent comments are revealing and are worth quoting in full:

'..but before I proceed any further I shall give a more particular account of what passed at this councell; because that most of those who were present at it have since endeavoured to clear themselves,

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<sup>183</sup> James II, *The Memoirs of James II*, trans., A. Lytton Sells, (London, 1962), p.249.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p.255.

either from giving that advice which I have mentioned or even of consenting to the resolution which was then taken. And this relation which I am now giving, I had from one of those was assisting in it as was desirous amongst the rest to clear himself from the imputation of giving that advice..<sup>185</sup>

On the face of it, James II's comments were more than anyone directed at the Marques de Caracena, Don Juan's second in command. The future king directly accused Caracena of attempting to cover up his role in the decision to engage the enemy by referring to a subsequent account of the battle, 'wherein Don Juan was justified', for: 'in case the marquis had so been pleased he might easily have hinder'd that march by only declaring himself against it, he having practised that very way in things of far less consequence than this...'.<sup>186</sup>

However, there is little doubt that Condé does not emerge untainted from the proceedings. James II's description of the silence that followed Don Juan's proposition to march to Zuydcoote and take the first opportunity of attacking the enemy is a clear indictment of Condé:

'After this proposition there was a long silence, and no one arising to oppose it, he [Don Juan] said, Since I see you all approve of what I have proposed, let us now consider after what manner and what time we shall march thither: Upon which it was resolved that they should all to the day following to view the ground for incampment.'<sup>187</sup>

James II's memoirs benefit from presenting a far more credible and accurate picture of events than any other source of this nature provides. There was very

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<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, p.256.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*, p.255.

little choice open to the council when they sat on 11 June, and this was plainly a view shared by both Don Juan<sup>188</sup> and Condé.<sup>189</sup> An error had already been made in their overall tactics by predicting that the French would concentrate their efforts either on Cambrai or Hesdin.<sup>190</sup> The Spanish and Condéen troops were depleted in number, low in morale and fitness, and outnumbered by the French and English soldiers laying siege to Dunkirk. It is virtually impossible to give a figure for the numbers of men in the French and Spanish armies on 14 June 1658. Commanders frequently lied about the numbers of troops under their command, either for propaganda purposes, or, to obtain more money from their superiors. However, given the available information about the events of 1657, and what is known about the build up to the battle in 1658, the most accurate figure is probably given by Robert Stradling, who estimates that the Spanish were outnumbered by a ratio of three to one.<sup>191</sup> Nonetheless, even allowing for this extreme numerical disparity it was unthinkable that they could simply avoid relieving Dunkirk, strategically the most important port in Flanders. It was fortunate for Condé and others sitting on the council of war, that they were able to maintain silence during this meeting, undoubtedly the most sensible choice if they believed, as they must have done, that they risked defeat. It was unfortunate for Don Juan, that by virtue of his office, he was ultimately responsible for overall

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<sup>188</sup> A.G.S., Est.Flandes 2092: Don Juan to Philip IV, 20 June 1658.

<sup>189</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.477: Lenet to Condé, 18 June 1658.

<sup>190</sup> C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, pp.184-185. James II, *Memoirs*, pp.252-254.

<sup>191</sup> R.A.Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders* (Cambridge, 1992), p.150.

military strategy in the absence of the Spanish king.<sup>192</sup> But, to place the position of Condé into perspective, it is plain in the context of his relationship with both Don Juan and Caracena, and the considerable degree of *de facto* military power he held that, had he so wished, he could have influenced Don Juan's decision.

It was simply not the case that Condé was the impotent member of the council of war, whose remonstrations fell on deaf ears. Even had Don Juan and Caracena wished to sideline him on this occasion they would have difficulty doing so given his control of approximately half of the military resources of the Spanish Netherlands. In many respects, Condé was the most powerful of the permanent members of the council of war, and this was particularly so for the council as it had sat on 11 June. Condé's considerable influence with Don Juan and Caracena, also extended to the two other commanders present at the meeting on 11 June, Claude Lamoral, Prince de Ligne, and Charles de Monchy, Maréchal d'Hocquincourt.

Close relations between Condé and the Prince de Ligne were recent. Whilst Fuensaldaña had been army commander there had been no need for the Prince de Ligne to court Condé's favour, for his interests had been identified with Fuensaldaña's, who had ensured that the native prince received preferential treatment, usually at Condé's expense. When Fuensaldaña left the Spanish Netherlands in 1656, the Prince de Ligne had found himself cut off from an important source of influence. Condé seemed an obvious person to fill the vacuum, and whereas correspondence between the two had been infrequent, after the

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<sup>192</sup> The impressive powers and responsibilities of the governor are explained by Parker in his chapter on the high command of the Spanish Army of Flanders. G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 106-111.

count's departure, the Prince de Ligne came to be in regular contact with Condé, clearly seeking to oblige the French prince whenever possible.<sup>193</sup>

The Maréchal d'Hocquincourt, likewise, had reasons to remain on good terms with Condé. Hocquincourt had recently changed sides, and it had been natural to negotiate his change in allegiance from Paris to Brussels through Condé. His identification with Condé's cause was also important to the marshal for political reasons.<sup>194</sup> By publicising his support for Condé's position, it was more difficult for his political enemies in France to portray him as actively betraying the king. Condé still claimed to be fighting for his king, and his juridical position was strong. As first prince of the blood, Condé occupied a position, as defined by powerful contemporary notions of fundamental law, giving him unequivocal rights to a significant share in the government of France. Condé was entitled to a place in the Conseil du Roi which was his birth-right and just one aspect of the degree to which princes of the royal blood were considered to be incorporated into the mystical body of the monarchy. On a purely juridical and quasi-constitutional level, Condé was in a strong position, and according to contemporary political thought was undeniably more qualified to govern than Cardinal Mazarin.<sup>195</sup> For Hocquincourt to have alienated the prince having

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<sup>193</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.348: Ligne to Condé, 9 Oct.1656; f.363: Ligne to Condé, 24 Oct 1656; vol.17, f.134: Ligne to Condé, 27 May 1657; f.136: Ligne to Condé, 29 May 1657; f.157: Ligne to Condé, 2 June 1657.

<sup>194</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.18, f.352: Condé to Auteuil, 18 Aug 1658; f.398: Fiesque to Condé, 1 May 1658; f.432: Caracena to Condé, 16 May 1658. B.N. Lenet Papers, Ms Fr 6721, f.167: Condé to Lenet, 28 March 1658; f.173: Declaration against Mazarin containing the reasons for Hocquincourt's support of Condé.

<sup>195</sup> Louis Charondas le Caron, *Pandectes ou Digestes du droict françois*, (Paris, 1637) I,xxi. Charles Loyseau, *Traité des Ordres et simples dignitez*, (Chasteaudun, 1610), pp 86 & 94. Du Tillet, *Receuil des roys de France leurs couronne et leurs maisons*, (Paris, 1602), p.221.

already taken the step of changing sides would have been political suicide.

Condé's position on the council of war was therefore strong, and it is plain that had he actively disagreed with Don Juan's proposal on 11 June, he could have influenced the final decision. But there were no real alternatives to the course of action Don Juan proposed. The high command had been forced into the position of having to take the offensive against the Anglo-French forces whilst lacking the numbers and resources themselves to suggest that such an engagement would be a success. By virtue of his office Don Juan was in the unfortunate position of having to take ultimate responsibility. This was all the more serious for the Spanish prince, for politically he was highly vulnerable to criticism and in no position to weather the inevitable recriminations that usually followed military setbacks. In Madrid, for several months prior to the *débâcle* at Dunkirk, criticism aimed at Don Juan's administration of the Spanish Netherlands had been gathering momentum. The Comte de Fiesque's missives to Condé from Madrid chart this growth in hostility very lucidly.<sup>196</sup> Don Juan appeared to be the target of a particularly powerful and articulate interest group, who made it their business to blame the prince for all the financial problems and military setbacks suffered in the Spanish Netherlands. Don Juan's disgrace was of obvious interest to Mariana de Austria who, in a repeat performance in 1663, moved with speed to disgrace her step-son after the defeat of Ameixial. Fiesque described Don Juan in October 1657, several months before Dunkirk, as a man who was 'perdu'; the

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<sup>196</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.362: Fiesque to Condé, 29 Aug.1657; vol.18, f.24: Fiesque to Condé, 10 Oct.1657; f.81: Fiesque to Condé, 29 Oct.1657; f.154: Viole to Auteuil, 25 Dec.1657; f.262: Fiesque to Condé, 16 Feb.1657; f.339: Fiesque to Condé, 10 April 1658.

disgrace at Dunkirk settled his fate.<sup>197</sup>

As far as Condé was concerned, Don Juan's dwindling influence in Madrid, in stark contrast to the favour he enjoyed, meant that he could not have been better placed to weather the inevitable recriminations after the defeat at Dunkirk. Condé had only to let events take their course in Madrid, where he knew that hostility towards Don Juan was such that there were many who would be prepared to accept any version of events, provided the luckless Don Juan emerged as the scapegoat. At the same time, he was aware that Madrid would be anxious not to adopt any interpretation of the battle that might cause offense to the prince. As Don Luis was to comment during the peace negotiations in 1659, Condé's continued loyalty to Philip IV was synonymous with Spanish power in Brussels.

The importance of Cromwell's treaty with Louis XIV undermines the view that the Dunes somehow coerced Madrid into peace negotiations in 1659, for it was obvious that a repeat performance of the Dunes in the following campaign was most unlikely. A rapid overview of the aftermath of the battle bears this out. As far as the English commander Sir William Lockhart was concerned, the English had fulfilled their half of the bargain, and he saw no necessity to continue to assist the French to the degree that they had done at Dunkirk.<sup>198</sup> Besides, it was wryly pointed out that to garrison both Mardyck and Dunkirk together would require approximately 4-5000 men - precisely the numbers involved in the English expeditionary force.<sup>199</sup> Turenne tried to argue that the treaty obliged the

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<sup>197</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.81: Fiesque to Condé, 29 Oct.1657.

<sup>198</sup> J.Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, vii.237: Lockhart to Secretary Thurloe, 5/15 July 1658.

<sup>199</sup> C.H.Firth, *Protectorate*, p.209.

Protector to keep 4,000 men 'effective', meaning that the English expeditionary force should join the French campaign army in their march inland. This pretension however was swiftly refuted. Lockhart promptly wrote back to Secretary Thurloe that, 'I have taken the liberty to disabuse him [Turenne] as to all those particulars.' It was, therefore, hardly surprising, that bereft of their friends from England, the French succeeded in pressing home the advantage gained outside Dunkirk by advancing inland only as far as Ypres,<sup>200</sup> despite the disarray the battle had created amongst Condé's regiments and the Spanish Army of Flanders. Clearly, the pattern of the past ten years fighting was set to continue. Peace only came about in 1659 as a result of Philip IV's growing obsession with the recovery of Portugal, and the realisation that in his current financial straits, peace with France was its precondition.

However, the fact that the Dunes was the last major confrontation between the Spanish and French armies before the signing of the peace in 1659 has meant that it has carried a symbolic importance for those historians who like to stress that the Franco-Spanish war was 'won' by the French, and that the battle of the Dunes was the decisive factor that forced the Spanish to 'sue' for peace and accept French terms. But, it is worth asking whether indeed the French would have been capable of forcing a permanent breakthrough in the Spanish Netherlands, as Mazarin later threatened and historians have been inclined to believe.

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<sup>200</sup> One of Thurloe's agents explained the failure of the French to advance further inland by the death of Louis XIV. Under the mistaken impression that the French king had died, the spy believed that the army had no orders to advance further. Bod. Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.60, f.100: Newsletter, Brussels, 20 July 1658.

Given that the one-sided outcome of The Dunes is more convincingly explained by foreign intervention and Spanish weakness, than French military prowess, purely by measuring the respective strengths of the French and Spanish armies in 1658, it is difficult to imagine that the French would have been capable of gains on the scale of Dunkirk in the campaign of 1659. Certainly, it is hard to contemplate further French gains without the assistance of their now reluctant English allies. But Cromwell had already refused to provide unconditional assistance, and the death of the Protector, and succession of his son Richard to the Protectorate in September 1658, heralded a period of great instability in England, and made the prospect of a Stuart restoration all the more likely.

Acute financial problems, the source of Spanish weakness in 1657 and 1658, were an issue that Mazarin's regime itself had to face in the aftermath of the Dunes, as the loans contracted by Fouquet, and earlier anticipations on royal revenues, threatened a *banqueroute générale*.<sup>201</sup> It had been fortunate for the regime that these problems had only been nascent in 1657 and early 1658, and that the period of crisis in Madrid had coincided with relative prosperity in Paris. However, the French financial crisis in 1658 did not augur well for their campaign in 1659, neither did the fact that Spanish shipments of silver from the Indies were on the brink of making the recovery that led to the high levels of revenue attained during the 1680's. The threat that attempts to extract more revenues from the already overburdened taxation system would create the conditions for provincial noble unrest, on a larger scale than in 1657 and early 1658, was an additional

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<sup>201</sup> R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts*, p.255.

factor that Mazarin could not ignore. Neither could the cardinal minister risk further alienating the political nation, as the king's illness in 1658 made emphatically clear.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> *Cf.*, pp.292-295.

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## Condé, Mazarin and the 1650's

Whilst Condé's arrival in the Spanish Netherlands had far-reaching consequences for politics in Brussels and Madrid, and with it the direction of the Franco-Spanish war, the prince's absence from France was to have a comparable impact upon the administration of Cardinal Mazarin. Although militarily the prince had been all but defeated in France - still nonetheless clinging on to a handful of outposts in Champagne and Picardie - he continued to fight a highly effective political rearguard action against the cardinal's regime with the assistance of friends and clients who had accepted the king's amnesty in 1652. In consequence, throughout the 1650's, presiding over a regime that seemed to stumble from crisis to crisis, Mazarin was constantly exercised by the fear that Condé might engineer his disgrace, and spent much of his time trying to counteract this possibility, in particular, through his control of foreign affairs.

## MAZARIN IN 1653

There is little doubt that the emotional ties between the cardinal and the queen mother, Anne of Austria, were the most important factor governing Mazarin's return to prominence in 1653. However, setting aside her affections for the exiled cardinal, there was little wider support in France for his return and

rehabilitation. For contemporaries, Mazarin's permanent return from exile in 1653 was by no means a foregone conclusion. During the early days of exile, he had narrowly sidestepped an attempt by the Secretary of State, Loménie de Brienne, to have him sent to Rome as France's representative, a commission which would almost certainly have resulted in his permanent disgrace.<sup>1</sup> However, by October 1652 the party of the princes had been defeated and driven from Paris. Louis XIV, dominated by his mother, had reached his majority and some sense of security had been regained. Against this background the cardinal was invited to return from his exile and after some delay, caused by concerns for his own personal safety, he joined the court in February 1653.<sup>2</sup>

The queen mother aside, when he returned to France in 1653, the cardinal's most prominent ally among France's *grands* was the Duc de Vendôme. Being the illegitimate son of the union between Henri IV and Gabrielle d'Estrées, he was one of the group of *princes légitimés* who could lay claim to royal blood and sought legal recognition as a prince standing in line to the succession.<sup>3</sup> During the early 1650's Mazarin lacked significant support from the upper reaches of the nobility that was a prerequisite for successful ministerial government. Therefore, next to the queen mother, Vendôme was a key political figure and it was largely assurances of Vendôme's support in 1653 that convinced the discredited and

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<sup>1</sup> R.Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, (Ohio, 1985), p.239.

<sup>2</sup> P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990) p.369.

<sup>3</sup> This ambition was also shared by another *prince légitimé* family, the Longueville, cf., R.Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France*, (Oxford, 1988), pp.85-6.

unpopular cardinal that it was safe to return to France.<sup>4</sup>

Mazarin's political union with the Duc de Vendôme was recent, dating to shortly after the Peace of Reuil in 1649, but was highly significant, for it had brought about a fundamental shift in the system of aristocratic alliances through which France had been governed during the 1640's and up to the Frondes. The set of alliances with the *grands* that Richelieu had built up during the 1630's, dominated by Condé's father, Henri II, Prince de Condé,<sup>5</sup> had continued to exercise power during the 1640's.<sup>6</sup> Those who had been excluded and hostile to Richelieu's regime, members of major grandee houses such as the Guise and the Vendôme, had returned from exile after the cardinal's death but until the outbreak of the Frondes, they remained - with few exceptions - barely on the fringes of government.<sup>7</sup> Their most significant bid for power, the *cabale des importants* in 1643, had conspicuously failed, merely confirming the hegemony of the Condé.<sup>8</sup>

To some extent, it was therefore extremely surprising that Mazarin should emerge from the Frondes supported so wholeheartedly by the Vendôme. Certainly,

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<sup>4</sup> Cf., A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures*, vol.269, f.416: Mazarin to Vendôme, 6 Feb 1653; f.240: Mazarin to Vendôme, 30 Sept 1652.

<sup>5</sup> D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the French Army', *Richelieu and his Age*, ed. J.Bergin and L.Brockliss, (London, 1992), p.153; A.Jouanna, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, (Paris, 1989), pp.215-217; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, iii.177-304.

<sup>6</sup> After the regency council was annulled and Anne of Austria declared queen regent the Grand Condé's father, Henri II, was made *chef du conseil du roi*, cf., Cardinal de Retz, *Mémoires*, ed., P.Morand, (Paris, 1992), p.38.

<sup>7</sup> One exception was the Duc d'Epéron who had been driven into exile after the 1638 defeat at Fuenterrabia, who was restored to his governorships and to the revived office of Colonel Général de l'infanterie in 1643, and who became the major Mazarinist supporter in south-west France. M.Chaintron, *Le Duc d'Epéron*, (Paris, 1988), pp.154-158.

<sup>8</sup> A.Chéruel, *Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV*, (Paris, 1879), vol.1, ch.iii; Fontrailles, *Mémoires*, ed., C.B.Petitot, *Collection complète des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France jusqu'à 1763 avec des notices sur chaque auteur*, Série ii, liv.136-145.

during the 1640's, he viewed the family as among his most dangerous opponents. Commenting on the political activities of the Duchesse de Chevreuse in 1643, working to ease her favourite Châteauneuf into a ministerial position in order to act as Mazarin's rival, the cardinal was provoked into paroxysms of rage about the associated power of the Vendôme and the Guise: 'this Chevreuse women, with her thousand cunning ways, must be removed at any price, otherwise she will ruin France... she works to strengthen the Vendôme, she endeavours to win over the whole House of Lorraine, she has already won over the Duc de Guise...' <sup>9</sup> In the context of the politics of the 1640's, Mazarin's attitude was hardly surprising. The Vendôme were traditionally enemies of the Condé <sup>10</sup> and, in conjunction with the queen mother, it was largely upon the House of Condé that the cardinal relied for protection and support. <sup>11</sup>

However, the cardinal's reliance upon the Condé was an obstacle in the path of his own ambition to assume the level of power enjoyed by his cardinal-predecessor. The nature of his relationship with the family was far removed from the kind of reciprocation that had characterised Richelieu's relations with Henri II, Prince de Condé. There were two reasons for this. The Richelieu-Condé axis had developed during the late 1620's, marking the end of a long period dating from the regency of Marie de Medici during which the Condé had been excluded from

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<sup>9</sup> M.Prawdin, *Marie de Rohan, Duchesse de Chevreuse*, (London, 1971), p.124.

<sup>10</sup> A.Chéruel, *Histoire de France pendant la Minorité de Louis XIV*, (4 vols., Paris, 1879-80), p.52. J-P.Desprat, *Les bâtards d'Henri IV*, (Paris, 1994), pp.285-306.

<sup>11</sup> La Rochefoucauld describes the basis of this alliance in his memoirs: La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1993), pp.97-98, and later speaks of Mazarin's obligations to Condé *cf.*, p.140.

power.<sup>12</sup> Relatively weak and still in semi-disgrace, Richelieu's overtures had been welcomed as a means to restore the poor fortunes of the House. Richelieu too needed the support of members of the royal family like Condé, particularly after the rupture with the queen mother in 1630, which had left him dangerously exposed. The relationship between Henri II, Prince de Condé, and Richelieu was therefore one of mutual necessity.<sup>13</sup>

The working relationship between Richelieu and Condé culminated in the marriage of Condé's son to Richelieu's niece, Claire-Clémence de Maillé Brézé.<sup>14</sup> This was the second feature of Richelieu's relationship with the Condé during the 1630's that distinguished it from Mazarin's during the 1640's. Intrinsic to the dynastic bond was a powerful obligation to protect, assist and support, which was noticeably lacking in Mazarin's relationship with the Condé. Disconcertingly, Mazarin was far more reliant on the whims and benevolence of the successive two Princes de Condé during the 1640's, with whom the ministerial-grandee balance of power was far from the relationship of near equals that had so characterised Richelieu's regime during the 1630's. Lacking even the shared identity of an *épée* family background,<sup>15</sup> Mazarin faced an aggressive political machine of enormous power and sophistication, anxious to secure an even tighter grip on government

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<sup>12</sup> A.Jouanna, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, (Paris, 1989), pp.222-226.

<sup>13</sup> A.Jouanna, *Devoir de Révolte*, p.217.

<sup>14</sup> J.Bergin, *Cardinal Richelieu*, (Yale, 1985) p.120.

<sup>15</sup> David Parrott emphasizes the point that unlike Mazarin and the majority of government ministers in seventeenth century France, Richelieu came from a traditional military family of long *épée* lineage, *cf.*, D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands and the French Army', pp.141-2.

now it was presented with the opportunities of a regency.<sup>16</sup>

The structural difference between the relationships of Richelieu and Mazarin with the Condé had important consequences, not least of which was the ability of Louis II de Bourbon, who succeeded his father as Prince de Condé in 1646, to circumscribe Mazarin's power and freedom of action in a way that would have been unthinkable in the analogous circumstances of the 1630's. Condé's influence in the *conseil du Roi*, supported by substantial *de facto* power that was based upon a series of prestigious military commands and the offices and governorships he had inherited from his father,<sup>17</sup> created a power base that some considered eclipsed even that of the rival and more senior House of Orléans.<sup>18</sup> Condé's position evidently impressed Mme de Motteville who wrote in her memoirs:

‘le prince de Condé étant devenu riche et puissant, il fut regardé comme celui dont l'amitié allait faire la bonne ou mauvaise fortune des hommes...la plupart cherchaient plutôt sa protection que celle du duc d'Orléans. Sa cour était fort grosse. Ses favoris étaient la plupart des jeunes seigneurs qui l'avaient suivi dans l'armée, et participant à sa grandeur; ils avaient été appelés les petits maîtres, parce qu'ils

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<sup>16</sup> Georges Dethan, Gaston d'Orléans twentieth-century biographer alerts his readers to the pretensions and ambitions of the Condé during the regency, and easily succumbs to Orléaniste resentment: 'Condé le père était insupportable. Après avoir rampé devant Richelieu et marié son fils avec une petite nièce du Tout Puissant, ce prince aux moeurs fort décriées, de surcoût avare et capon, retrouva sous la Régence d'Anne d'Autriche la morgue et les prétensions qui lui avaient fait jadis prendre les armes contre le gouvernement de Marie de Médicis. Mazarin s'appliquait donc à ménager sa susceptibilité et à en détourner les éclats sur Gaston d'Orléans, 'Monsr le Prince' s'offusquait de ce qu'on tînt le conseil des finances chez Monsieur et voulait avoir comme lui un secrétaire, debout, derrière sa chaise. Il encourageait sa femme à disputer la préséance à Mademoiselle...' G.Dethan, *La vie de Gaston d'Orléans*, (Paris, 1992), p.257.

<sup>17</sup> Cf., pp.22-25.

<sup>18</sup> Although theoretically of a lesser rank than Gaston d'Orléans, disputes of precedence between Henri II, Prince de Condé, and Gaston during the early 1640's were commonplace. Cf., A.Barine, *La Jeunesse de La Grande Mademoiselle*, (Paris, 1905), p.245.

étaient à celui qui le paraissait être de tous les autres; ce titre avait effacé celui des importants..<sup>19</sup>

In these circumstances Mazarin plainly found it difficult to assert his position in a way that he might have expected to as the regent's favourite.<sup>20</sup> All too often he found himself acting at Condé's behest in a manner that compromised his own plans for his family's social and political advancement. This emerged on more than one occasion towards the end of the 1640's. A project to marry one of the cardinal's six nieces to the Duc de Joyeuse, for example, foundered when Condé intervened to ensure that the heir to the Duc de Guise married the only daughter of Charles de Valois, Comte d'Alais, Condé's cousin.<sup>21</sup> This incident was particularly galling for the cardinal who was forced to 'faire tout le contraire de ce qu'il voulait..<sup>22</sup> Not only had Condé's intervention contrived to wreck plans for the marriage of the cardinal's nephew,<sup>23</sup> but it prevented him from having any influence in Provence, which he earnestly desired, because of its proximity to

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<sup>19</sup> Mme de Motteville, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1982) p.108.

<sup>20</sup> Mazarin was often obliged to satisfy the prince's 'requests' which were many and frequent. Cf., Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.578: Condé to Mazarin, 28 May 1648; v.580: Condé to Mazarin, 30 May 1648; v.583: Condé to Mazarin, 4 June 1648; v.588: Mazarin to Condé, 6 June 1648.

<sup>21</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.362, and cf., R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', *Frankreich im Europäischen Staatensystem der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed., R.Babel, (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994). I am very grateful to Robert Oresko for having given me the opportunity to read this article prior to publication.

<sup>22</sup> Marie d'Orléans, Duchesse de Nemours, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1990), p.106.

<sup>23</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

north Italy, the focus of wider Mazarinist ambitions.<sup>24</sup>

Like other memoirists, the Duchesse de Nemours commented upon the growing hostility between Condé and the increasingly independently minded Mazarin as one of the important political developments of the late 1640's, focusing specifically upon their increasingly serious conflicts of interest.<sup>25</sup> Another of Condé's unwelcome interventions occurred in the case of the marriage of the Duc de Candale, eldest son and heir to the ageing Duc d'Épernon. Mazarin proposed to win Candale for one of his nieces by favouring the Duc d'Épernon in his governorship of Guyenne. Again however, the Duchesse de Nemours records that, 'M. le prince encore une fois fit échouer par force les desseins du cardinal Mazarin...'<sup>26</sup>

Clearly, Mazarin's overtures to other grandee families were of concern to Condé. It was certainly not lost on the prince that Mazarin's position as the queen mother's favourite could bring unwelcome advantages to any rival grandee families who succeeded in negotiating with the cardinal some kind of political alliance. As Condé was well aware, dynastic strategies had a key role to play cementing political ties between families - ties of kinship were the guarantors of future

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<sup>24</sup> The Duchesse de Nemours noted the cardinal's interest in Provence: 'pour le [the Comte d'Alais] forcer à lui [Mazarin] rendre ce gouvernement qui était sur le chemin d'Italie', Duchesse de Nemours, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1990), p.106. Michele Mazarin, the cardinal's brother, had been made archbishop of Aix-en-Provence, in what was obviously the first step in a plan to gain influence over the province. S.Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth Century France*, (Oxford, 1986), pp.203-204.

<sup>25</sup> Duchesse de Nemours, *Mémoires*, pp.106-108; La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, pp.142-143; Françoise de Langlois, dame de Motteville, *Mémoires de Mme de Motteville sur Anne d'Autriche et sa cour*, ed., F.Riaux, (Paris, 1911), ii.422, quoted by Robert Oresko in 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', footnote 23; Retz, *Mémoires*, pp.196-204.

<sup>26</sup> Duchesse de Nemours, *Mémoires*, p.108.

political reciprocity and co-operation. In this respect, the sheer number of eligible females through the families of the cardinal's two sisters - the Martinozzi and Mancini - presented the cardinal with considerable advantages in establishing his family within the French elite and creating durable political alliances, whilst presenting others, most notably Condé, with the problem of how such a resource was to be controlled. Significantly, in 1649, when hostilities between Condé and Mazarin had developed into full scale political conflict, Condé sought to control the ability of the cardinal to negotiate marriages for his nieces. By that stage, Condé was well aware that any match contracted by the cardinal would almost certainly be against his interests. The prince's enormous *de facto* power after the siege of Paris, and the cardinal's vulnerability, enabled the prince to impose a virtual *diktat* upon the cardinal, proscribing any marriage negotiations undertaken without his prior consultation: 'que toutes les autres nièces ne se marieraient point sans consentement de M. le Prince...'<sup>27</sup>

The deterioration of relations between Mazarin and Condé predated the siege of Paris and occurred precisely over the issue of the cardinal's matrimonial plans for his nieces. In 1648 Condé had discovered the existence of secret negotiations between the cardinal and the House of Vendôme - these were eventually to lead to the marriage of Laure Mancini to Vendôme's eldest son, the Duc de Mercoeur. In opening negotiations with the Vendôme, the cardinal's strategy was not difficult to discern, and the signal to Condé could not have been clearer. Unable to pursue his own ambitions unhindered by Condé's 'protection', the cardinal sought a working relationship with a grandee house with which his

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<sup>27</sup> Duchesse de Nemours, *Mémoires*, p.109.

status overall would be more equal.<sup>28</sup> He could only achieve this goal by breaking away from Condé and seeking alliances with those families who had been excluded from power under Richelieu, and who strongly resented the Condéen stranglehold on central government. This was a threat that Condé could not afford to ignore. A Vendôme-Mazarini alliance threatened a return to the situation his father had been in during the regency of Marie de Medici, when the Condé were excluded from power by a coalition of hostile families at the centre of government.<sup>29</sup> The later complicity, therefore, between Mazarin, the queen mother and Gaston, to arrest Condé and his kinsmen in 1650, was a landmark in an evolving conflict between aristocratic dynasties that had already begun by the siege of Paris in 1649.

The political manoeuvres of Mazarin during the late 1640's and Condé's concern to get a grip upon what he regarded as the queen mother's disconcertingly wayward and ambitious favourite, are both central issues that help to explain politics during the 1650's. By 1649, Mazarin was actively courting the Vendôme, hoping that the marriage of his niece would secure a lasting political alliance to shore up his position as first minister. This strategy was clearly not without its

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<sup>28</sup> Condé's mother, the dowager princess, rightly viewed these events as constituting a family crisis and recalled Nesmond, Henri II de Condé's old intendant, for advice as to how they should proceed. Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.364. Aumale cites two letters from Madame la Princesse douairière to Nesmond dated 16 and 17 September 1649.

<sup>29</sup> This was stated explicitly by Mme de Motteville and is quoted by Robert Oresko in his article on the cardinal's nieces. Mme de Motteville remarked that the marriage was 'une marque indubitable qu'il [Mazarin] ne vouloit plus le [Condé] considérer pour son principal appui, puis qu'il entroit dans d'autres intérêts, et prenoit dans la cour une autre protection que la sienne; et qu'il étoit à craindre que le duc de Vendôme, devenant parent du ministre, seroit plus considéré que personne auprès du Roi et de la Reine..' Françoise de Bertaut, dame de Motteville, *Mémoires de Mme de Motteville sur Anne d'Autriche et sa cour*, ed., F.Riaux, (Paris, 1911), ii.423. Cf., B.Zeller, *Marie de Médici, Richelieu Ministre*, (Paris, 1899), pp.301-307; J.Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu*, (Yale, 1991), pp.139 & 239; A.Jouanna, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, (Paris, 1989), pp.214-216.

risks. Condé remained a powerful force to contend with, and neither the cardinal, nor the queen mother, could seriously entertain the hope that simply by locking up the prince and his kinsmen - the Prince de Conti and the Duc de Longueville - the inevitable problems created by such a powerful family moving into opposition would disappear. In November 1655 the Duc de Vendôme wrote to Mazarin from Toulon reminding the cardinal of the grave risks his family had run in 1649 provoking the ire of such a powerful group of families as those associated with Condé.

‘Je le supplie très humblement V.E. qu’en appellant d’elle à elle mesme elle se souviene si depuis l’année 1649 que je suis revenu en France d’un exil de six ans auquel ma conduite ny mes actions n’avoient point contribué à me l’attirer il s’est passé nulle occasion petit ny grande ou je n’ai paru au veu et sceu de toute la France mesme de toute la Chrestienté autant attaché à Votre Service particulier qu’a mon interest propre... Par cette mesme alliance je perdois les bonnes graces de M. le Duc d’Orléans et de M. le Prince et d’une partie de la France quoi que j’eusse l’honneur d’estre frère du premier et proche parent du second’<sup>30</sup>

The marriage ceremony between Laure Mancini and Vendôme’s son, the Duc de Mercoeur, was performed during the Frondes in 1651. However, even before the marriage took place, Vendôme and his eldest son were underpinning the cardinal’s position wherever possible. Vendôme’s loyalty to Mazarin during the Frondes seems to have remained unquestioned. In his capacity as Admiral of France, an office to which Condé had a strong claim *en survivance* to his brother-

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<sup>30</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.897, f.195: Vendôme to Mazarin, 8 Nov.1655.

in-law the Duc de Brézé<sup>31</sup> and which had been procured for the duke by the cardinal,<sup>32</sup> Vendôme was directly involved in Condé's military defeat. It was Vendôme, for example, who had the command of the naval attack on the Condéen stronghold of Bordeaux, that held out against the royalist government until August 1653.

It needs stressing that the marriage of Mercoeur to Mazarin's niece was a political alliance which involved shared obligations. Vendôme would undertake to represent Mazarin's interests through his governorships and offices, whilst the cardinal would promote the interests of the duke at court. This relationship was clearly demonstrated from an episode that occurred in 1652 when the negotiations between Vendôme and the cardinal over the terms of the marriage contract were at their most sensitive. Despite the fact that the marriage ceremony had already been performed in 1651, the contract remained unsigned until 1654, shortly before the Spanish defeat at Arras.<sup>33</sup> A meeting had been arranged in December 1652 to sign the marriage contract, but it rapidly became clear that the duke was not prepared to sign, complaining that Mazarin's obligations to him had not yet been satisfactorily fulfilled. These obligations were discussed explicitly in a letter between Bluet and the cardinal, namely, the control of a naval base, unchallenged authority as Admiral of France and full representation of Vendôme's interests at

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<sup>31</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>32</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.363-364.

<sup>33</sup> B.N. Factum 32232: Contrat de mariage de Louis de Vendôme, duc de Mercoeur ... et de Victoire Mancini, nièce du côté maternal du Cardinal Mazarin, 29 May 1654.

court where they were 'contesté'.<sup>34</sup>

The political ramifications of the marriage between Vendôme's son, the Duc de Mercoeur, and Laure Mancini and the subsequent negotiations over the terms of the contract, introduces two important points that deserve comment. First, Condé's actions during the 1650's are here put into context. Just as the father had taken up arms during the minority of Louis XIII, to defend vital family interests at court,<sup>35</sup> so too the son, some thirty-five years later was resorting to hostilities. Second, Vendôme's prevarication over signing the contract is a clear indication that, contrary to traditional interpretations of the period, the cardinal's return from exile and restoration to the position of first minister, was not clear to contemporaries. Vendôme was plainly reluctant to put his signature to a contract which bound his family to the fortunes of the cardinal during a period of such uncertainty, or, at least, not without generous compensation.

#### MAZARIN'S RETURN TO POWER IN 1653 AND OPPOSITION TO THE MAZARINIST-VENDÔME COALITION

Vendôme's reticence was not surprising. After the cardinal's return to court in January 1653, he remained far from acceptable to the *grands*. Ranged against him were a whole group of *frondeurs* who had accepted the king's offer of amnesty in October 1652, but had refused a reconciliation with the cardinal. Among these

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<sup>34</sup> A.A.E., Correspondence Politique, Pays-Bas, vol.9, f.351: Bluet to Mazarin, 17 Dec.1652.

<sup>35</sup> Condé's interests and policies during the regency of Marie de Medici are very well described by Jeffrey Sawyer *cf.*, J.K.Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, (California, 1990), pp.30-31.

were some of the most important and influential political figures in France: the king's uncle, Gaston Duc d'Orléans, his daughter La Grande Mademoiselle, the Duc de Rohan, governor of Anjou, and Vendôme's younger son, the duc de Beaufort. Most of these figures maintained contact with one another and Gaston's court at Blois became a focus of opposition to the government.<sup>36</sup> Those of Condé's immediate family who were not included in the 1652 amnesty, were still actively resisting the court. Guyenne remained under the control of the Prince de Conti and the Duchesse de Longueville, Condé's brother and sister. Condé's cousin, the Comte de Bouteville, continued to hold Bellegarde, a strategically critical fortress in Bourgogne. Another kinsmen, the Comte de la Suze, held Belfort in Alsace.<sup>37</sup>

Once the cardinal had returned to France, his priority was to build up the alarmingly small power base to which he returned. The role of Anne of Austria in respect of Mazarin's rehabilitation was critical, but even she could not be completely relied upon. Her refusal to dismiss Loménie de Brienne from office, for example, demonstrated to the cardinal that her support was not unconditional. Brienne had belonged to a group of ministers including Villeroy, Beringhen and Châteauneuf,<sup>38</sup> who had opposed the cardinal's return and had tried to get him

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<sup>36</sup> The activities of this disparate group were described at length to the cardinal by Aubusson de la Feuillade, Archevêque d'Embrun. La Feuillade was charged with negotiating Gaston's reconciliation with the cardinal *cf.* A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.194: Mazarin to the Archevêque d'Embrun, 4 April 1653.

<sup>37</sup> *Cf.*, pp.46-48.

<sup>38</sup> This was mentioned by Chéruef, *cf.*, A.Chéruef, *Le ministère de Mazarin, 1651-1661*, (Paris, 1882) i.69-73. Chéruef also discusses them again *cf.*, iii.232: 'Il y avait depuis longtemps à la cour un parti puissant qui n'avait jamais cessé de le combattre. Les commandeurs de Has et de Souvré, Henri de Beringhen, premier écuyer, le maréchal de Villeroy, le comte de Brienne, secrétaire d'état, avaient formé dès 1652, une cabale, qui s'était efforcée de fermer au cardinal le retour en France...' Brienne's hatred of Mazarin has also been acknowledged by other biographers of the cardinal, *cf.*, P.Guth, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1972), p.545.

posted to Rome. The strength of this coalition of ministers is often underestimated but in many ways they presented the cardinal with his most dangerous political threat, for they were permanently present at court, able to influence policy,<sup>39</sup> and biding their time to fill the vacuum left by the cardinal's disgrace. They were supported by the Guise, most notably the Duchesse de Chevreuse who for a long time had acted as Châteauneuf's protector,<sup>40</sup> and her nephew the Duc de Joyeuse. They were also in a position to influence the queen mother. Brienne, for example, had been an early and committed supporter of the queen to the extent that he had acted as her apologist in 1642 when he attempted to minimize her involvement in the affair of Cinq Mars,<sup>41</sup> she was evidently not predisposed to forget such early demonstrations of loyalty for the sake of her emotional attachment to the cardinal.

But those political ties Mazarin had maintained with the court, and the tentative dynastic steps he had already taken to link his family into France's ruling elite, proved an adequate starting point. Mercoeur, with the help of Anne of Austria, was eased into the governorship of Provence thus affording the cardinal a loyal ally in a province to which he attached enormous strategic importance.<sup>42</sup> The former governor of Provence, Charles de Valois, Comte d'Alais, had proved consistently hostile to the cardinal. He had agreed to provide military support for

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<sup>39</sup> S.R.Gardiner, 'Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652,' *English History Review*, 11 (1896), p.487.

<sup>40</sup> M.Prawdin, *Marie de Rohan*, p.118.

<sup>41</sup> G.Dethan, *La vie de Gaston d'Orléans*, p.202.

<sup>42</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994). Mazarin had not had a representative in the province since the death of Michele Mazzarini, archbishop of Aix.

Condé in June 1652.<sup>43</sup> Alais' death in 1653, and Mercoeur's effective assumption of the governorship, dramatically reduced the future threat of Provence as a source of Condéen revival. Equally importantly, it sidestepped the strong claim of Louis de Lorraine, Duc de Joyeuse, who had married Alais' only daughter. The Guise represented a particular threat to Mazarin, not least because their strong links with, and support for, Lomenie de Brienne, gave them influence at the centre of government. The prospect that they would manage to secure the governorship of Provence, itself a long-standing Guise ambition, would have brought the threat of further *de facto* power added to their already substantial capacity to obstruct Mazarin's ambitions.

The procurement of the office of *grand maître* of the king's household for Prince Thomas of Savoy, again with the co-operation of the queen mother, was another appointment in which Mazarin was closely involved.<sup>44</sup> The appointment was part of the spoil from the judicial confiscation of Condé's offices, subsequent to his departure for the Spanish Netherlands. It carried the responsibility of appointing officials to the king's household, and consequently, was a powerful and critically important source of political patronage. Prince Thomas had been among the few *grands* consistently to support Mazarin during his absence,<sup>45</sup> and his

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<sup>43</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.289: Treaty between the Comte d'Alais and Condé, 21 June 1652.

<sup>44</sup> C. de Beauregard, *Mémoires Historiques sur la Maison de Savoie*, (Turin, 1816), p.205; B.R.B., *Réactions Véritables*, 1653, p.299; R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>45</sup> In the intensely hierarchical world of the court and court office, the appointment of the son of a sovereign duke from an established foreign power was probably the only way that the credibility of the office of *grand maître* could be sustained. Any French *grand* below the level of a prince of the blood would have had immense difficulties in carrying out the duties of the office, which involved a constant concern to mediate between competing claims for precedence amongst

appointment raises a theme that will be encountered again: the predominant role of Turin in the political calculations of the cardinal.

Mazarin was able to procure positions for his supporters of this prominence only because within the immediate surroundings of the court itself his position seemed assured. He was able to suggest projects to the queen mother and the young king, that in the guise of government policy were equally clearly part of a strategy to insure against his downfall. On the one hand this would involve the promotion of friends and allies to prominent positions, on the other, the neutralisation or pursuit of those hostile to him and absent from the court. Condé was here the most obvious and, superficially, the easiest target. Exile had opened the doors to a whole range of legal measures that the government could take against the prince. Once he had been declared guilty of *lèse majesté*, confiscations of property, pensions and offices had legal justification.<sup>46</sup> Those found to be in correspondence with the prince were vulnerable to arrest.

That said, a striking feature of the prince's opposition to the cardinal was the degree to which he was able to maintain a powerful network of agents in Paris throughout his exile. Some of these were well known public figures who had figured prominently among the prince's supporters during the Frondes and whose families had a long tradition of service to the Condé. The *président* of the *Cour des Comptes* and Condé's *surintendant des maisons et affaires*, Jean Perrault, for example, considered by Mazarin to be one of Condé's most committed and zealous

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courtiers. A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.218: Mazarin to Prince Thomas. Paul Guth also mentions the loyalties of the prince, *cf.*, P.Guth, *Mazarin*, p.545.

<sup>46</sup> A.C., C.G.C., 112.E.16: Procès criminel de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, Premier Prince du Sang du France.

supporters,<sup>47</sup> remained in France confined to his estates.<sup>48</sup> Perrault was plainly in contact with the prince in Brussels throughout the exile although measures were never taken against him by the cardinal's regime.<sup>49</sup> Another example was the Abbé Viole whose brother, the Président Viole, had joined Condé in exile in the Spanish Netherlands. The Abbé Viole corresponded frequently with the prince from Paris<sup>50</sup> enjoying the protection of the Longueville.<sup>51</sup> In 1655, when the cardinal's regime was at its most powerful - after the defeat at Arras and before the upsets of the later 1650's - the cardinal felt strong enough to have the Abbé arrested.<sup>52</sup> The Abbé was later exchanged for a prisoner of war Condé had taken at Valenciennes, the Comte de Mont.<sup>53</sup> Other high ranking members of the prince's clientèle among the *noblesse de robe* who were more outspoken like, for example, Marigny, pre-empted moves against themselves by leaving Paris before they could be arrested. Marigny fled Paris in 1653<sup>54</sup> and became Condé's

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<sup>47</sup> P.Lefebvre, 'Aspects de la fidélité en France au xvii siècle, le cas des agents des princes de Condé,' *Revue Historique*, 507 (1973), p.100; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.11 & 29.

<sup>48</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.252.

<sup>49</sup> The nature of their contact was discussed later on during the 1650's by the prince. A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.340: Condé to Auteuil, 9 Nov.1658; vol.20, f.250: Conti to Mme de Longueville, March 1659; f.125: Condé to Auteuil, 22 Feb.1659.

<sup>50</sup> B.N. Ms.Fr 6711, (Lenet Papers), f.17: Abbé Viole to Lenet, Oct.1653; f.31 Abbé Viole to Lenet, 3 Oct.1653; f.100: Anon. to Lenet, 23 Oct.1653; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.176: Viole to Condé, 28 July 1654.

<sup>51</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.894, f.239: Bartet to Mazarin, 24 July 1655.

<sup>52</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.894, f.246: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 2 Aug.1655.

<sup>53</sup> A.G.R.B., Etat et Audience, 2164: Lenet to Hovyne, 12 Nov.1656.

<sup>54</sup> Guy Joly gave an amusing account of Marigny's flight from Paris, cf., G.Joly, *Mémoires*, ed. M.Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires Relatif à l'Histoire de France, depuis l'avènement de Henri IV jusqu'à la paix de Paris conclue en 1793*, (Paris, 1825) xlvi.277, cf., also, B.N. Ms.Fr 6713, (Lenet Papers), f.33: Marigny to Lenet, 5 Jan.1653.

representative in Italy, specifically at the courts of St Peter and the Grand-duchy of Tuscany,<sup>55</sup> before moving to Frankfurt in 1657 to represent the prince's interests at the Imperial Diet.<sup>56</sup>

Figures such as Perrault and the Abbé Viole were complemented in their opposition by extensive support for Condé in Paris that extended from lesser ranking *nobles de robe*, *conseillers* in the Paris Parlement for example,<sup>57</sup> to rabble rousers amongst the Parisian artisans. Abel Servien, in April 1653, talked of the continued strength of the prince's party amongst the artisans of the Faubourg St Germain who were prepared to agitate against the government in moments of crisis and embarrassment.<sup>58</sup> Condéen loyalists on this level also provided the prince with valuable intelligence to which the prince attached an enormous amount of importance. An account of the early stages of Condé's life in exile by a disaffected soldier who had been passed over by Condé for promotion and sought his fortune in the cardinal's service suggests that some believed this particular arm of the Condéen machine to be particularly effective: 'Sa [Condé's] plus grande depense est en espions de tous costé... Il ne se passe rien à la Cour, dans Paris, ny à l'armée dont M. le Prince ne soit pas adverti en diligence et avec fidelité, ses

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<sup>55</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.302: Marigny to Condé, 19 Aug.1656; f.309: Marigny to Condé, 26 Aug.1656.

<sup>56</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.67 Marigny to Condé, 24 March 1657.

<sup>57</sup> Mazarin talked about Condé's contacts in the Paris Parlement - A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.896, f.200: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 15 Aug.1655. In 1659 Condé intended to use his contacts in the Parlement to place pressure upon the regime to treat for peace - B.N. Ms.Fr 6722, (Lenet Papers), f.164: Condé to Lenet, 3 July 1659.

<sup>58</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.251: Servien to Mazarin, April 1653.

espions allant et venant sans cesse de tous parts.’<sup>59</sup>

In addition to providing the prince with news of events in Paris another function of Condéen loyalists remaining in France was the dissemination of propaganda. Condé was evidently able to maintain at least one secret printing press in Paris throughout his exile that continued to function as it had done during the Frondes.<sup>60</sup> In May 1655, Mazarin ordered a clamp down on Condéen ‘libellers’ in Paris. In May 1655 he wrote to the Abbé Fouquet, thanking him for his role in suppressing libels published against the regime and giving him some advice about future methods he should adopt to forestall others: ‘je vous remercie du soing que vous prenez touchant les porteurs de libelles il semble important d’en punir quelques pour intimider les autres’.<sup>61</sup> The Abbé Fouquet acted as the cardinal’s strong man in Paris<sup>62</sup> and was often employed to take measures against those actively in opposition to the cardinal connected with Condé. This was a role not without its risks. In October 1657 for example, the Abbé wrote a letter to the cardinal asking for his protection, fearing that the prince had taken out a contract on his life.<sup>63</sup>

Condé also continued to use Paris as a centre for raising money. This could

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<sup>59</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.90: The ‘serviteur’ to Mazarin, 9 Jan.1653. His report was later confirmed during the king’s illness in 1658. Condé was reputed to be informed daily of the precise status of the king’s health, *cf.*, Bod., Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.60: Alsbach to Thurloe, 17 Aug 1658.

<sup>60</sup> H.Carrier, *Les Mazarinades, la conquête de l’opinion*, (Geneva, 1989), pp.104-145.

<sup>61</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.896, f.38: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 25 May 1655.

<sup>62</sup> D.Dessert, *Fouquet*, (Paris, 1987) p.172.

<sup>63</sup> The Abbé explained this state of affairs accordingly: ‘puisque Messieurs de Beaufort, le Cardinal de Retz et M. le Prince n’avoient personne au monde à qui ils voulaient tant que moy..’ A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.306: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 6 Oct.1657.

range from personal loans from wealthy members of his clientèle still remaining in France<sup>64</sup> to active negotiations with financiers based in Paris. The measures adopted by the cardinal to prevent the prince from using Paris as a financial centre occasionally received a sharp response. In April 1655 the Portuguese financier Toledo, with whom Condé had been in negotiations, was arrested for his financial dealings with the prince.<sup>65</sup> Eighteen months later, Condé had one of the cardinal's most valued financiers, Pierre Girardin, kidnapped in an operation organised from within Paris.<sup>66</sup> Girardin was responsible for the administration of all of the cardinal's ecclesiastical revenues in addition to supervising the cardinal's *droits d'aides*. The unfortunate Girardin was subsequently taken across the border to Antwerp where he was murdered.<sup>67</sup>

Mazarin seemed unable to eradicate Condé's remaining party of supporters in France. Part of the reason for his failure to do so was explained by his own need to tread carefully when taking legal measures against someone of Condé's political and social stature. He had an ominous precedent in Concini, another Italian adventurer, whose downfall in a similar situation was attributed to his overzealous pursuit of Condé's father.<sup>68</sup> Despite Condé's overt associations with

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<sup>64</sup> In 1652 Perrault advanced over 200,000 livres to the prince in loans, P.Lefebvre, 'Les agents du Prince de Condé', p.100.

<sup>65</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.895, f.70: Mazarin to l'Evêque d'Orange, 16 Apr.1655.

<sup>66</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.904, f.219: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, Oct./Nov. 1657.

<sup>67</sup> This brought harsh reprisals. Mazarin ensured that one of the prince's adherents arrested, in Paris, Chemerault, was executed, *cf.*, A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, vii.478: Mazarin to Colbert, 30 May 1657; p.479: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 31 May 1657; D.Dessert, *Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle*, (Paris, 1984), p.591.

<sup>68</sup> J.K.Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p.127.

the Spanish, Mazarin was careful to disassociate himself publicly from steps taken against Condé in France. Condé remained first prince of the blood; outside the immediate royal family he was the most senior kinsman, in unbroken legitimate male descent. In consequence, he continued to hold considerable *de jure* claims to power.<sup>69</sup> His official trial *in absentia* in March 1654, proved far more of a humiliation for the government than an effective measure taken against Condé's party in France. The prince was tried in the king's presence, at a ceremony of the *lit de justice*. But, a sudden and suspicious epidemic of illnesses, riding accidents and pressing obligations, indicated an almost universal reluctance among the *grands* to become involved in the trial of someone of Condé's status.<sup>70</sup> The Court of Peers was unable to assemble to any effective number and the sentence reached by the court was widely considered to be inconclusive.

Respect for Condé's rank was complemented by a powerful ground-swell of muted opposition within France and outside of the prince's own *clientèle* that would fall in with any viable project to remove Mazarin. Some of these maintained outward appearances of neutrality, such as the Duc de Longueville, others openly opposed the cardinal, but had accepted the king's amnesty, like the Duc de La Rochefoucauld. All, Mazarin was well aware, would be certain to act against him in a government crisis. There were few practical steps the cardinal could take against such *grands*, except that of opposing their requests for the distribution of royal patronage and attempting various forms of institutional obstruction to their

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<sup>69</sup> Louis Charondas le Caron, *Pandectes ou Digestes du droict françois*, (Paris, 1637) I.xxi; Charles Loyseau, *Traité des Ordres et simples dignitez*, (Chasteaudun, 1610), pp 86-94; Du Tillet, *Recueil des roys de France leurs couronne et leurs maisons*, (Paris, 1602), p.221.

<sup>70</sup> A.C., 112.E.16: Procès criminel de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, Premier Prince du Sang du France, pp.386-405.

ambitions.

Political conflict on this level was more subtle and involved the manipulation of the institutions of government and the exploitation of positions of administrative power. The Paris Parlement more than once became the arena in which these conflicts were played out. The trial of Fouquet de Croissy in 1653, one of Condé's agents arrested on the strength of letters seized from an intercepted courier between Paris and Brussels, was one example of an embarrassing display of government impotence. Despite efforts to ensure a show trial, the influence of a number of grands was brought to bear to ensure that the death penalty was not imposed.<sup>71</sup> Earlier on during the year, in January, Gaston d'Orléans had used his influence with councillors loyal to his family - Pontcarré, Voisin and Villemontée - to obstruct the declaration annulling former legal measures taken against the cardinal during the Frondes.<sup>72</sup> Legal strategies to circumvent Gaston's agent in the Parlement and his obstructionism were discussed at length in letters between Mazarin and the Archbishop of Toulouse.<sup>73</sup> But, in practice, no direct action could be taken by the government against Gaston, or for that matter, any of his clients, who continued to exercise influence in the Parlement.

Taking on political opponents on this level was fraught with risks for the government; an example of the kind of problems that could be encountered were

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<sup>71</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.94: Le Tellier to Mazarin, 10 Jan.1653; f.230: Bluet to Mazarin, 6 April 1655; f.264: Bluet to Mazarin, 5 May 1653.

<sup>72</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.101: Bluet to Mazarin, 10 Jan.1653; f.121 Le Tellier to Mazarin, 15 Jan.1653.

<sup>73</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.5: Mémoire from Marca to Mazarin, no date.

the difficulties created by Cardinal de Retz. Retz had accepted the amnesty in 1652 but had continued to remain in Paris, where, as coadjutor of the archdiocese, he exerted most of his political influence. From exile, Mazarin had written a number of letters requesting that Retz be arrested and removed from the capital. Again, the protection of status, combined in this case with the support of Rome, placed Retz in a strong position. His arrest in December 1652, ignoring the prescribed ecclesiastical authorities, provoked not just local, but international protest.<sup>74</sup> The expedient proved temporarily worthwhile as calm was restored to the capital, though in the long term it nearly unseated the government. Despite his involvement in the project to arrest Retz, Mazarin was careful to disassociate himself personally. He even went so far as to write to some of Retz's supporters, attempting to dissuade them from taking action by offering the bald-faced lie that he was doing his best to procure Retz's release.<sup>75</sup>

The Duc de Longueville, Condé's brother-in-law and governor of Normandie, also contributed substantially to Mazarin's unease. Normandie was one of the most important recruiting grounds for the army<sup>76</sup> as well as containing Le Havre, one of France's major naval bases. The effect of Longueville's participation in any armed hostilities would have been significant. It was well known that Longueville

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<sup>74</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.45: Evêque de Coutances to Mazarin, 2 Jan.1653; f.94: Le Tellier to Mazarin, 10 Jan.1653; f.113: Bordeaux to the Président Viole, 13 Jan.1653. Retz's status made it particularly difficult to find him guilty of treason cf., A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893, f.273: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, Dec.1654; vol.893ter, f.355: Archevêque de Toulouse to Mazarin, 16 Sept.1654; also, cf., R.M.Golden, *The Godly Rebellion*, (North Carolina, 1981), pp.20-27.

<sup>75</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.891, f.84: Mazarin to Noirmoutier, 17 Mar.1653; f.113: Mazarin to the Duc de la Meilleraye, 9 Apr.1653.

<sup>76</sup> Chaboche shows the importance of Normandie as a recruiting ground, R.Chaboche, 'Les Soldats Français de la Guerre de Trente Ans, une tentative d'approche', *Revue Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, xx (1973) pp.10-24.

was clearly linked with Condé and was maintaining clandestine contact.<sup>77</sup> Longueville's *clientèle* was used on several occasions by the prince as a channel of communication to the court.<sup>78</sup> Mazarin had attempted to remove the duke from his governorship in March 1653, but the initiative only amounted to political posturing.<sup>79</sup> Short of clear evidence of collusion between the duke and Brussels, there was little that could be done to remove him from office.

In this respect, Gaston d'Orléans was the greatest source of concern for the government. Within the finely graded world of the *grands* there was a considerable difference between *princes légitimés* like the Longueville and Vendôme and a *fils de France*<sup>80</sup> of which during the 1650's there were only two - Gaston and his young nephew, Philippe. There was a sense in which individuals of Gaston's rank, like Condé, were able to operate above the rule of law. For five years after Condé had left Paris in 1652, Gaston consistently refused to agree to a reconciliation with the cardinal and he remained at his own court at Blois. As far as Mazarin was concerned Gaston was a pivotal figure for it was through Gaston that many different strands of opposition against him were united.

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<sup>77</sup> The blood link was obviously of significance to their relationship. The duke intervened on several occasions during the 1650's to protect the prince's interests, *cf.*, the duke's protection of one of Condé's agents who had been arrested in the summer of 1656 - A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.292: Mémoire sur le procès de Sr de Croissy; vol.900 f.61 Bartet to Mazarin, 6 June 1656.

<sup>78</sup> *Cf.*, for example, the attempts to negotiate a unilateral peace in 1656, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.16, f.28: Condé to Fiesque, 22 Jan.1656; f.92: Condé to Fiesque, 2 March 1656; f.136: Fiesque to Condé, 28 March 1656; f.330: Marigny to Condé, 16 Sept.1656.

<sup>79</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653: pp.135, 166, 424.

<sup>80</sup> A.C., XX A11.14: 'Discours Véritables très beau et très curieux historial et genealogique des Rangs et preances de France'; C.Loyseau, *Traicté des ordres et simples dignitez*, (Chasteaudun, 1610), pp.80-95; D.Parrott, 'Richelieu, the Grands, and the Army', pp.136-138; Père Anselme de Sainte Mairie (P.de Guibourgs), *Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France, des pairs, grands officiers de la couronne, de la maison du roi et des anciens barons du royaume*, 19 vols., (3rd edn., Paris, 1866-1876).

*Ex-frondeurs* seeking reinstatement to their governorships and offices, like the Ducs de Sully and Rohan, had turned to Gaston at Blois to procure for them these favours from the adolescent Louis XIV.<sup>81</sup> The duke proved remarkably adept at soliciting the cardinal for their reinstatement, using his refusal to come to court as a bargaining counter.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, Blois was a gathering point for those who remained committed supporters of Condé like the Grande Mademoiselle, the Duchesse de Châtillon and the Duc de La Rochefoucauld. These were *grands* who had chosen permanent internal exile, Mademoiselle at St Fargeau,<sup>83</sup> the Duchesse de Châtillon at Merlou<sup>84</sup> and La Rochefoucauld at Damvilliers until 1653 and then at his estates in the Angoumois.<sup>85</sup> Both Mademoiselle and the Duchesse de Châtillon continued actively to oppose the cardinal. The Duchesse de Châtillon by encouraging disaffection among the cardinal's supporters - her most notable success being the defection of the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt to Condé's standard in 1657<sup>86</sup> - and Mademoiselle, by

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<sup>81</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.194: Mazarin to the Archevêque d'Embrun, 4 April 1653.

<sup>82</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.211: Embrun to Mazarin, 13 Nov.1653; vol.892, f.5: Mémoire de l'Archevêque de Marca; vol.892, f.211: Embrun to Mazarin, 31 March 1653; f.234: Embrun to Mazarin, 11 April 1653; f.275: Embrun to Mazarin, 16 July 1653; f.284: Embrun to Mazarin, 21 July 1653; f.289: Embrun to Mazarin, 21 July 1653.

<sup>83</sup> M.Le Moël, *La Grande Mademoiselle*, (Paris, 1994), pp.79-105.

<sup>84</sup> E.Magne, *Femmes galantes du xvii siècle, Mme de Châtillon*, (Paris, 1910), pp.155-182; B.N. Clairambault MSS, vol.490, f.419: Mme de Châtillon to St Estienne, 3 Jan.1653.

<sup>85</sup> La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1993), p.319; A.G.S. Est.Flandes, 2079: Avisos, 23 Oct.1652; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.892, f.90: 'le serviteur' to Mazarin, 9 Jan 1653; vol.902, f.168: Colbert to Mazarin, 27 July 1657.

<sup>86</sup> Mme de Châtillon had first become involved in negotiations with Hocquincourt in 1655 *cf.*, Marquis de Ségur, *La Jeunesse du Maréchal de Luxembourg*, (Paris, n.d.) pp.290-315; Chéruel, *Correspondence*, vii.513: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 20 June 1657; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.902, f.147: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 13 July 1657.

sending her own regiment under the command of the Comte d'Holac to swell the ranks of Condé's army in the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>87</sup>

However, Gaston was also dangerous to the cardinal for his connections with the House of Lorraine. Gaston's brother-in-law was Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine,<sup>88</sup> and it was this connection that brought him into the political circle of the Guise. Of permanent concern to the cardinal during the 1650's was the prospect that Gaston would prop up the pretensions of the Guise - a development that could seriously compromise Mazarin's position.<sup>89</sup> Although the Guise appeared tentative supporters of Mazarin's regime after the Frondes,<sup>90</sup> in reality they fell into a category of *grands* whose loyalty was constantly in flux. The cardinal's thin mandate and the sharp polarisation of French politics after the Frondes, made him particularly sensitive to claims upon royal patronage from this quarter. Whilst in the cases of the Ducs de Vendôme and Mercoeur, Prince Thomas and later the Prince de Conti, Mazarin's own interests and security were intimately bound up in their political power, this was not the case with those on the fringes of government, who tentatively supported the regime, but who were not

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<sup>87</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.104: Mazarin to Embrun, 4 April 1653; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.34: Condé to Mademoiselle, 6 March 1655; vol.17, f.3: Condé to Auteuil, 4 Jan.1657.

<sup>88</sup> Chevalier discusses the stormy circumstances of Gaston's marriage into the house of Lorraine, *cf.*, P.Chevalier, *Louis XIII*, (Paris, 1979), p.470.

<sup>89</sup> In 1652 Mazarin feared that the duke was under the influence of Châteauneuf, Mme de Chevreuse's favourite, and that this association would do him great harm, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.282: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 12 Aug.1652.

<sup>90</sup> In December 1652 Henri, Duc de Guise, returned from prison in Spain. His release had been negotiated by Condé and as a consequence all thought he would support the prince but instead he turned to the cardinal. A.G.S., Est.Flandes 2079: Junta, 8 Jan.1652; Watteville to Don Luis de Haro, 26 May 1652; Watteville to Philip IV, 25 July 1652; Watteville to Philip IV, 8 Sept 1652; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.325: Chevalier de Guise to Condé, 8 Aug.1652; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.891, f.211: Colbert to Mazarin, 5 Oct 1653; B.N. Ms.Fr 6713, (Lenet Papers) f.142: Marigny to Condé, 1 Feb.1653; f.186: St Agolin to Caillet, Feb.1653.

within the cardinal's dynastic system. The cardinal was reluctant to press demands for royal patronage on behalf of these more marginal families, fearing that positions of authority conferred unwisely could be later used against him; moreover those who were within his dynastic system would feel that their support and commitment was insufficiently rewarded. The risks that those *grande*s who fell in this category would become disaffected with the regime, choosing the path of self-assertion via obstruction of the government, were considerable.

Mazarin encountered mixed results with the nobles who fell into this category. One conspicuous success was in his dealings with the Duc de Guise. The Duc de Mercoeur's acquisition of the governorship of Provence with the assistance of the queen mother and the cardinal, was an act of provocation that risked sending the Duc de Guise into permanent opposition.<sup>91</sup> Guise's son had a rival and more convincing claim to the governorship through his father-in-law, the deceased Duc d'Angoulême, a Condé sympathiser.<sup>92</sup> Guise and his son, the Duc de Joyeuse, had close links with secretary of state Brienne,<sup>93</sup> whose hostility to the cardinal was well known and both were on good terms with the queen mother. Brienne had survived the attempt to prevent the cardinal's return from exile during the winter of 1652, and still held office.<sup>94</sup> However, Mazarin offered military assistance to underpin Guise's claim to the Neapolitan throne, which

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<sup>91</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.161: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 26 Jan.1653.

<sup>92</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>93</sup> Mazarin constantly worried about the Guise, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.101: Bluet to Mazarin, 10 Jan.1653; f.155 Bluet to Mazarin, 28 Jan.1653.

<sup>94</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.892, f.101: Bluet to Mazarin, 10 Jan.1653.

Guise held through his descent from the Angevin kings of Naples.<sup>95</sup> Guise accepted the offer and was persuaded to embark on a series of naval expeditions, each of which proved a fiasco.<sup>96</sup> Nevertheless, Naples proved a useful diversion that prevented Guise from meddling in domestic French politics and was even considered as a possible project to divert Condé in the event of the prince's reconciliation and return to France.<sup>97</sup>

However, the success with which Mazarin dealt with the Duc de Guise was not replicated with the Comte d'Harcourt, head of the most junior of the four branches of the House of Lorraine in France. Harcourt had remained loyal to the queen mother during the Frondes but had resigned from his command of the royal army in Guyenne when he was refused the charge of Constable of France. Harcourt claimed he had been inadequately compensated for his loyalty and military achievements and he retired to his governorship of Alsace, taking personal command of Breisach, a key Alsatian fortress on the Rhine.<sup>98</sup> An agreement was not reached with the court until May 1654,<sup>99</sup> during which time Harcourt abandoned negotiations for the charge of Constable, in order to pursue

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<sup>95</sup> A.Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, (Yale, 1990), p.65; J.A.Stargardt, *Europäische Stammtafeln*, (Marburg, 1984), ii.Tafel 26.

<sup>96</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables* 1654, pp. 490, 510, 592, 594, 603, 615, 618-619; 1655 pp. 3, 19.

<sup>97</sup> These were Thevinot's proposals who was clearly impressed by the possibilities Naples offered as a diversion for the cardinal's enemies *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.894, f.5: Thevinot to Mazarin, 12 Jan.1655.

<sup>98</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures*, vol.269, f.229: Mazarin to Ondedei, 25 Sept 1653; A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.891, f.210: Servien to Anon, Oct.1652; vol.892, f.386: Harcourt to Ternes, 27 Sept 1653; vol.893bis, f.5: Harcourt to Mazarin, no date, 1654.

<sup>99</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893ter, f.97: Principal articles of agreement between Harcourt and Castelnau, 21 May 1654.

a greater ambition: the transformation of Breisach into an independent sovereignty. He entered into negotiations with Condé, his kinsman the Duke of Lorraine, and both the Spanish and Austrian branches of the Habsburgs, signing a temporary truce with the Comte de la Suze who commanded the neighbouring Condéen stronghold of Belfort.<sup>100</sup>

### MAZARIN, CONDÉ AND THE FRANCO-SPANISH WAR

Condé's involvement with Harcourt, and Harcourt's negotiations with Vienna and Madrid, both raise questions about the relationship between France's internal political rivalries and the Franco-Spanish war. Condé had a key role to play with regard to contemporary attitudes towards the war with Spain during the 1650's. The idea of a first prince of the blood entering the service of the chief enemy of France pointed to a disturbing dislocation of the body politic of which contemporaries were well aware, and which reflected badly on the incumbent regime. The accusations in the Mazarinades that the cardinal was deliberately perpetuating the war for his own profit, continued to enjoy wide currency during the years after his return, particularly as a pillar of the Condéen government programme was peace with Spain.<sup>101</sup> A manifesto, published shortly before the

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<sup>100</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653 p.218; B.N., Ms.Fr.6717, (Lenet Papers), f.24: Condé to Lenet, 13 Nov 1653; f.71: Condé to Lenet, Dec.1653; A.G.R.B., S.E.G. vol.256, f.323: Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, 6 Dec.1653.

<sup>101</sup> One of the reasons Mazarin initiated the peace initiative in 1656 was to counter this accusation *cf.*, pp.296-307, also *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.890, f.86: Les motifs qui ont porté son Altesse Royale à se déclarer pour Monseigneur le Prince qui servent de justification à son manifeste, 1652; H.Carrier, *La Fronde: contestation démocratique et misère paysanne*, (Paris, 1982), p.6: Defense de Monsieur le Prince contre la verification de la declaration envoyée contre luy au Parlement de Paris, 26 Dec 1651; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.50: Treaty between Condé and the Archduke in the name of Philip IV concluded by M. de la Roque, 26

prince had left Paris in October 1652, concentrated specifically upon this question. The pamphlet pointed to the court's aversion to peace, stressing that Condé's journey to Brussels and his continued resistance was founded upon his wish to save the cause of peace from being lost due to the cardinal's ambition.<sup>102</sup> This was a powerful political message, particularly since it originated from Condé. Princes of the blood were portrayed by political theorists as born councillors of the king, naturally infused with the necessary political wisdom to assist and govern,<sup>103</sup> and Condé's supporters made full use of this presumption in their writings.

Harcourt's specific attachment to a foreign House, the Guise-Lorraine, gave his negotiations with Vienna and Madrid a degree of moral legitimacy. However, those grands who did not share Harcourt's status as a *prince étranger* found that Condé's exile during the 1650's created parallel opportunities for opposition. Political malcontents, like the Duc de Noirmoutier in 1654 or the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt in 1655 and 1657, could express their opposition to the government through support for Condé as an alternative focus of political legitimacy. Like the Comte d'Harcourt, their bargaining strengths lay in their ability to use border fortresses as a means to extract political concessions from the regime. In the Duc

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Oct.1651. Condé's program of peace was acknowledged by his followers and others A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.12, f.341: Charles IV to Condé, 25 Aug.1652; vol.13, f.146: Mémoire du Comte de Fiesque, to Don Luis de Haro, 8 June 1653; f.164: Fiesque to Condé, June 1653. Mazarin attempted to counter this criticism cf. A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.269, f.286: Mazarin to Servien, 13 Oct.1652.

<sup>102</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.890, f.86: Les Motifs qui ont porté S.A.R. à se déclarer pour Monsr. le Prince qui servent de justification à son manifeste..'

<sup>103</sup> Louis Charondas le Caron, *Pandectes ou Digestes du droit françois*, (Paris, 1637) I.xxi; Charles Loyseau, *Traité des Ordres et simples dignitez*, (Chasteaudun, 1610), pp 86-94; Du Tillet, *Recueil des roys de France leurs couronne et leurs maisons*, (Paris, 1602), p.221.

de Noirmoutier's case this involved hawking both to Condé and to the government in Paris his control of Charleville and Mont Olympe,<sup>104</sup> and in the case of the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt, control of Péronne, Ham and Hesdin.<sup>105</sup>

Another consequence of Condé's exile was that now Mazarin's political future was seen to depend upon the war with Spain and specifically, upon French military fortunes on France's northern frontier, where Condé was fighting. It should be remembered that Condé's army was still a distinct entity, separate from the Spanish Army of Flanders and the army of the Duc de Lorraine.<sup>106</sup> It was also recognized that Condé controlled and governed a number of fortresses and garrisons on the frontier - French military strategy during the early years of the 1650's was formulated with the sole aim of reducing the prince's grip upon strongholds in northern France, and it was not until 1655 that the cardinal's regime turned its attentions in the northern theatre to the war with Spain.<sup>107</sup> France continued to be racked by internal unrest during the 1650's; the '*Fronde des Princes*' did not end in 1652; it was simply that the struggle was now being fought both inside and outside of national frontiers.

Spanish successes strengthened Condé's position in France and weakened

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<sup>104</sup> Contact between Noirmoutier and Condé was frequent during the early stages of the 1650's and Mazarin feared that Noirmoutier's support for Retz would lead him to change his loyalties from the court to Condé: A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.13, f.348: Noirmoutier to Condé, 11 Sept.1653; f.351: Noirmoutier to Condé, Sept.1653; f.362: Noirmoutier to Condé, 25 Sept.1653; f.372: Noirmoutier to Condé, 5 Oct.1653; f.386 Noirmoutier to Condé, 21 Oct.1653; f.434: Noirmoutier to Caillet, 11 Nov.1653; B.N. Ms.Fr 6718, (Lenet Papers), f.73: Condé to Lenet, 8 Feb 1654; vol.6719, f.95: Noirmoutier to Lenet, 17 Apr.1654; A.Chéruel, *Correspondence*, vi.436: Noirmoutier to Condé, 29 Apr.1655.

<sup>105</sup> Cf., p.237.

<sup>106</sup> Cf., pp.90-115.

<sup>107</sup> Cf., p.96.

Mazarin's grip on power. Ultimately, there was a constant threat that defeat would undermine the cardinal's position. A series of resounding French defeats, combined with a break-through on France's northern frontier, would have fuelled Condé's party in Paris and rallied other *frondeurs* to his standard. It was this eventuality that most threatened Mazarin. Consequently, much of government propaganda was devoted to the question of Condé's exile and the progress of the war during this period. Louis XIV's frequent visits to the army on the northern frontier were one example of this propaganda: an attempt to demonstrate that Condé was fighting his king, and not, as Condé and his supporters argued, the tyrannical rule of the cardinal.

The reality of the war after Condé left Paris in 1652 was far from the auspicious picture painted by later generations of historians, notably Mazarin's great biographer, Chéruel. 1652 had been an *annus mirabilis* for Spanish arms with the conquest of Gravelines, Dunkirk, Casale and Barcelona; and it is nonsense to suggest that France was ever able to fully recover her position from this disastrous succession of losses. In Catalonia, the French position had completely collapsed. Even after further troops were made available by the surrender of Bordeaux, Catalonia was never recovered. The war settled into a rhythm of border skirmishes with neither side gaining the upper hand.<sup>108</sup> Similarly, in north Italy, where Mazarin was promoting Savoyard ambitions to expand into the adjoining Gonzaga duchy of Monferrato, the coalition of Piedmontese and French forces made no headway. The one successful campaign,

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<sup>108</sup> The capitulation of Barcelona in 1652 and the failure of the French to take Gerona in 1653 reduced the war in Catalonia to a series of small military confrontations along the frontier between France and Rosellón and the Costa Brava.

which in August 1653 brought the army close to the Spanish fortress of Alessandria, the site of a later French defeat in 1657, quickly collapsed into a retreat back to Piedmont.<sup>109</sup>

But, for political observers in Paris, the theatre attracting the greatest attention was the Spanish Netherlands. Here, neither side achieved significant gains in 1653. But, in 1654 the French won an important victory that was fortunate for Mazarin. In June, the French opened the campaign by laying siege to the fortress of Stenay. Simultaneously, the Spanish and Condéen armies had besieged Arras, a town of conspicuously greater importance that served as a main French supply base.<sup>110</sup> This aroused intense speculation in Paris about the future of the cardinal. It was widely believed that it was only a matter of time before Arras would capitulate to the Spanish. Meanwhile, the French army had become bogged down at the siege of Stenay, now politically impossible to abandon for it had taken on a symbolic importance as the first siege personally attended by Louis XIV after his coronation.<sup>111</sup>

Mazarin saw the political situation in Paris as sufficiently menacing to justify re-opening negotiations with Condé. Whilst the sieges of Stenay and Arras advanced, overtures were being made through Bartet, one of Mazarin's agents, and

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<sup>109</sup> In August 1653, the French, under the command of the Maréchal de Grancey, were defeated by Spanish troops near Alessandria and were driven out of Monferrato. In 1657, the French had to retreat again from Alessandria when Fuensaldaña successfully relieved the town from siege. B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1653. pp.451, 488, 499, 512.

<sup>110</sup> Cf., pp.105-106.

<sup>111</sup> The king, queen mother and cardinal with the rest of the court joined the French army outside Stenay in July 1654. A report from Rheims published in the gazette of the Spanish Netherlands - the *Rérelations Véritables* - made special mention of the recent coronation of the king, observing that this made the siege particularly significant: 'le siège de Stenay avoit commencé avec vigueur et mesme avec plus de bruit et d'ostentation que l'entreprise ne le meritoit parceque c'estoit la première après le Sacre du Roi.' B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.329.

Condé's sister, the Duchesse de Longueville. At the camp around Arras, Condé was presented with proposals for a reconciliation with Mazarin that involved the marriage of the Duc d'Anguien, Condé's only son, to one of the cardinal's nieces.<sup>112</sup> In fact, Condé was so confident that Arras would be taken that these proposals were rejected out of hand. Bartet had stressed to the cardinal that one of the advantages of this union would be the definitive separation of Gaston and Condé. There were already rumours that Gaston was preparing to return to Paris with other *frondeurs* upon news of France's defeat at Arras.<sup>113</sup> The Guise as well were aiming to strengthen their position before Arras fell. They already had sympathetic ministers in place ready to move against the cardinal. Madame de Chevreuse worked to secure the all-important support of Gaston whilst simultaneously encouraging the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt, a general hitherto loyal to Mazarin, to abandon his support for the cardinal.<sup>114</sup>

A series of letters between Mazarin on campaign and the ministerial team remaining in Paris, Le Tellier, Fouquet and Séguier, testify to the growing unrest in Paris during this period, which was bordering upon open revolt.<sup>115</sup> The Paris Parlement had taken the opportunity of the regime's weakness to discuss the sensitive problem of the *rentiers*, individuals holding government bonds against

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<sup>112</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.100: Anon to Mazarin, 30 June 1654; f.107: Mazarin to Anon, 4 July 1654; f.141: Bartet to Mazarin, 10 July 1654; f.144: Bartet to Mazarin, 10 July 1654; f.158: Bartet to Mazarin, 10 July 1654; f.253: Bartet to Mazarin, 15 Aug.1654; f.176: Viole to Condé, 28 July 1654; vol.893ter, f.301: Fabert to Mazarin, 26 Aug.1654.

<sup>113</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.191 Servien to Mazarin, 1 Aug.1654.

<sup>114</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.176: Viole to Condé, 28 July 1654; f.399 Mémoire de Servien, Aug.1654.

<sup>115</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.181: Anon to Mazarin, 29 July 1654; f.188: Servien and Fouquet to Mazarin, 1 Aug.1654; f.221: Séguier to Mazarin, 9 Aug.1654; f.229: Servien to Mazarin, 12 Aug.1654.

which massive payment by the government - teetering on the edge of bankruptcy - was long overdue.<sup>116</sup> In this context, the political manoeuvres of Gaston, Beaufort and others were the cause for serious concern. In August the Abbé Fouquet drily reported to the cardinal that there were as many in Paris who hoped for Spanish victory at Arras as there were those who wished a Spanish defeat.<sup>117</sup>

In early August, a further blow struck the government when Cardinal de Retz, assisted by his kinsmen and an escort of 1200 cavalry, escaped from Nantes.<sup>118</sup> Retz with his brother, the Duke de Retz, and the husband of the duke's sister-in-law, the Duc de Brissac, retired to the fortress of Machecou.<sup>119</sup> Retz immediately despatched a letter to the archdiocese of Paris, making clear his condemnation of the government and repudiating his earlier resignation as Paris' archbishop. Retz's escape placed yet more pressure upon Mazarin, contributing significantly to the general unrest of the capital.<sup>120</sup>

The outcome of the siege of Arras had therefore important implications for French domestic politics. On an international level, imminent Spanish success at

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<sup>116</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893bis, f.202: Servien to Mazarin, 4 Aug.1654; f.209: Fouquet to Mazarin, 6 Aug.1654; f.219: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 8 Aug.1654.

<sup>117</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893bis, f.215: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 6 Aug.1654.

<sup>118</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893, f.132: Mazarin to Séguier, 16 Aug.1654; f.133: Mazarin to Mssrs les Surintendants, 16 Aug.1654; f.136: Mazarin to Servien, 16 Aug.1654; f.141: Mazarin to Séguier, 16 Aug.1654; f.149: Mazarin to La Meilleraye, 18 Aug.1654; f.180: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 24 Aug.1654.

<sup>119</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893bis, f.278: La Meilleraye to Estrades, 25 Aug.1654.

<sup>120</sup> R.Golden, *The Godly Rebellion*, p.34; A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893ter, f.265: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 19 Aug.1654. In Paris a Te Deum was openly celebrated on behalf of Retz and Condé, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.893ter, f.272: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 21 Aug 1654; f.286: Evêque de Coutances to Mazarin, 23 Aug.1654.

Arras was being used to support Condé's negotiations in London with Cromwell, where a project involving English assistance in Guyenne was already far advanced.<sup>121</sup> It was therefore a critical turning point for Mazarin when Stenay capitulated and Turenne succeeded in a daring attack on the Spanish contravallation at Arras, forcing Condé and the Spanish Army of Flanders, against all expectations, to abandon the siege. Condé's bargaining position in London collapsed and creditors took the opportunity to imprison his envoy, Barrière.<sup>122</sup> In Paris, the effect of the relief of Arras was similarly dramatic.<sup>123</sup> The Abbé Fouquet wrote to the cardinal in late August that Arras had effectively undermined opposition from all quarters, referring to the Parisian curés, the canons supporting Retz, the Paris Parlement and the 'malintentionné', a category embracing Condéen and *frondeur* partisans.<sup>124</sup>

Retz's intended return to Paris was now unthinkable and pursued by his former jailor, La Meilleraye, he was forced to leave France for his own safety.<sup>125</sup> Between 1654 and 1656 the war with Spain provided France with modest progress in Catalonia and the Spanish Netherlands, taking a number of enemy strongholds

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<sup>121</sup> Cf., chapter 2.

<sup>122</sup> C.S.P.V., xxix.258: Paulucci to Sagredo, 13 Sept.1654; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.14, f.253: Barrière to Viole, 4 Sept.1654.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. the relief of Mazarin's partisans, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.289: Servien to Mazarin, 27 Aug.1654; f.297: Bartet to Mazarin, 4 Sept.1654. Arras also enabled the cardinal to take tough measures against the parliamentary syndics, cf., A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.303: Projet de lettre du Roy à Mr les Prevost des Marchands et eschevins de Paris touchant les paiemens des rentes'.

<sup>124</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.285: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 26 Aug.1654.

<sup>125</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.893bis, f.278: La Meilleraye to Estrades, 25 Aug 1654; A.Chérueil, *Correspondence*, vi.296: Mazarin to Servien, 24 Aug 1654; p.374: Mazarin to the Maréchal de Gramont, 1 Nov.1654.

in both theatres. In Catalonia these were mainly confined to the frontier,<sup>126</sup> but in the Spanish Netherlands serious inroads were made into the province of Hainaut where two strategically important fortresses were taken in August 1655: Condé and St Ghislain.<sup>127</sup> However, the French were less fortunate in North Italy, where, by September 1655, no side held the advantage, despite the large amounts of money and troops the cardinal had channelled into the Italian theatre. While the Duke of Modena was persuaded to switch his allegiance from Madrid to Paris, this again was short-lived, for the Spanish high command in Milan promptly quartered part of their army on the duke's small principality.<sup>128</sup>

Limited success in the Spanish Netherlands and Catalonia gave the cardinal a much needed breathing space in Paris. Government opposition was temporarily subdued.<sup>129</sup> The cardinal used this opportunity to consolidate his mandate by appropriating offices for his political allies and initiating negotiations on behalf of his nieces for a series of highly advantageous marriages, entrenching his position within the French and north Italian ruling elite, whilst taking harsher measures against Condéen partisans and *frondeurs* in Paris.

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<sup>126</sup> Spanish setbacks on the Catalan frontier coincided with the arrival of the Prince de Conti as French commander of the Catalan army, bringing with him more men and money. In August 1654 the French defeated the Spanish outside Rosas and in September took Puycerda. B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, pp.447 & 556.

<sup>127</sup> Both fortresses were taken in August 1655, B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, pp.408 & 430.

<sup>128</sup> Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.288. This was reported by the Brussels gazette, the *Rérelations Véritables* in March 1655: 'avant hier arriva ici [Genoa] un courier du Duc de Modène pour demander secours à la République contre le Marquis de Caracène, Gouverneur de l'Etat de Milan, qui est entré sur ses terres..' B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.171.

<sup>129</sup> This was acknowledged by some of the cardinal's supporters - Roussereau, for example, wrote to the cardinal in August 1655 how the successes of the recent campaigns had strengthened the cardinal's position in Paris, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.894, f.281: Roussereau to Mazarin, 20 Aug.1655.

The most important of these marriages occurred before the relief of Arras, and linked Condé's younger brother, the Prince de Conti, with Anna Maria Martinozzi. After the capitulation of Bordeaux in August 1653, Conti had retired to his own court at Pezenas, but he had been persuaded by members of his entourage, principally Sarasin, to negotiate a rapprochement by marrying one of the cardinal's nieces.<sup>130</sup> Mazarin was only too pleased to entertain these overtures, occurring as they had done during a period of political uncertainty and separating Conti from his elder brother. Conti was a prince of the blood and fifth in line to the throne. The support of someone of his political stature was desperately needed by the cardinal, particularly to act as a counterbalance against other grandee heavy-weights like Gaston and Condé. In January 1656, for example, Mazarin was able to prevent Gaston from presiding over the potentially troublesome Estates of Languedoc, a province of which Gaston was governor, by sending Conti as a replacement.<sup>131</sup>

Ironically, this alliance was not without its benefits for Condé. Whether this represented a conscious family strategy or not is unclear, but his younger brother was of far greater use to the prince within France, where he could represent family interests and protect the patrimony from creditors, many of whom had attempted to secure repayment of their loans to the prince during the *Frondes* by

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<sup>130</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.890, f.300: Déclaration du Roy en faveur de Monseigneur le Prince de Conty; vol.891, f.218: Sillery to Condé, 8 Oct.1653; f.223: Sarasin to Mazarin, 10 Oct.1653; B.N., Ms.Fr.6731 (Portefeuille de Condé), f.327: Mémoire pour servir aux affaires de Guyenne et qui font voir les raisons pourquoi Monseigneur le Prince de Conti a abandonné le party de son frère.' (this document was drafted by Sarasin); E. de Barthélemy, *la Princesse de Conti*, (Paris, 1875), pp.4-10.

<sup>131</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1656, p.18; A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.895, f.360: Conti to Mazarin, 15 Nov.1655.

appropriating revenues from his estates.<sup>132</sup> Once Conti had returned to favour his council were able to take control of the Condé patrimony and ensure its preservation.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, on the death of Prince Thomas of Savoy in February 1656, Conti managed to procure from the cardinal his brother's office of *grand maître* of the king's household<sup>134</sup> and earlier, the prized governorship of Guyenne.<sup>135</sup> Conti's investiture as *grand maître* and governor of Guyenne made it far easier for both offices to be passed back to Condé in 1659.<sup>136</sup>

But Conti's union did not prevent the cardinal from remaining vulnerable to the sequence of events unfolding in the Spanish Netherlands, as Arras had clearly demonstrated, and, to a lesser extent, north Italy and Catalonia. A revival of Spanish military fortunes, between the autumn of 1655 and 1658, again had the effect of weakening the government and exposing it to attack. The temporary relief of Brussels' financial problems, after the arrival of the silver fleet in 1655, and the arrival in Brussels of Don Juan and Caracena, resulted in French defeat at Valenciennes in July of the following year, the consequences of which effectively reversed French gains since Arras.<sup>137</sup> In north Italy, in October 1655, the luckless Duke of Modena was defeated by the Marquis of Caracena at Pavia, the

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<sup>132</sup> A.N. KK, 578-586: 'Jugement ordonnances et actes de la chambre St Louis (commission chargée d'administrateur les biens confisquées sur Mr. le Prince) 1654-1660.

<sup>133</sup> A.N. R3.206: 'Registre contenant les décisions prises par les divers conseils de la maison de Conti, 1655-1661', f.33: Arrest du Conseil du Roi, Feb.1656; f.43: Délibération du conseil, 22 May 1656; f.99: Sur le rapport fait par Monsr. Gomont des prétentions du sieur de Clermont, 8 Oct.1657.

<sup>134</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1656, p.43.

<sup>135</sup> E. de Barthélemy, *La Princesse de Conti*, (Paris, 1875), p.13.

<sup>136</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.414: Caillet to Condé, 27 Sept.1659.

<sup>137</sup> *Cf.*, p.195-207.

site of Charles V's historic victory in 1525.<sup>138</sup> In Catalonia, the French were defeated at Palamos<sup>139</sup> and at Berga<sup>140</sup> during the Autumn of the same year. For two years after Valenciennes, in all theatres, no side gained a significant advantage and it was left to the English to break the stalemate in France's favour at the battle of the Dunes in June 1658.

### YEARS OF CRISIS: 1656-1659

Once more, the war had raised questions about Mazarin's future.<sup>141</sup> Although the situation was less precarious than it had been during the siege of Arras in 1654, the response in Paris to the news of Valenciennes was again agitation, specifically from within the Paris Parlement<sup>142</sup> and among the clergy. From exile in Rome, the Cardinal de Retz was instrumental in exploiting these tensions, threatening to return to Paris: this was a development taken very seriously by the ministeriat, which hastily responded by placing the archiepiscopal

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<sup>138</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.476; R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.288.

<sup>139</sup> The raising of the siege of Palamos occurred in September, both Conti and Vendôme were repulsed, B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.510.

<sup>140</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.570.

<sup>141</sup> The cardinal was particularly concerned about the effect that Valenciennes would have on the prince's party in France, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.901, f.148: Mazarin to the Abbé Fouquet, 19 July 1656.

<sup>142</sup> The agitation in the Paris Parlement reached similar levels to the disturbances in 1654 before the outcome of the siege of Arras was known, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.901, f.274: Mazarin to Madame la Duchesse de Chevreuse, 31 Aug.1656.

palace under guard.<sup>143</sup>

In addition to his threats to return to Paris, Retz also opened up opposition fronts in Paris building on the wave of confidence that Valenciennes had stimulated amongst opponents of the regime. In July 1656, the *surintendant*, Nicholas Fouquet, wrote to Mazarin in some agitation informing him of the necessity of countering the attempt of the vicars general in Paris, both Retz appointees, to place the city under an interdict.<sup>144</sup> Fouquet predicted that in the 'present conjuncture des affaires' this would cause great disorder. The belief that Retz and Condé were coordinating their opposition strategies in Paris was greeted by the cardinal with alarm. Even the Abbé Fouquet, not known to over exaggerate such threats, predicted that a combination of Condé and the *ex-frondeurs* would be irresistible in the present circumstances.<sup>145</sup> He was convinced of the link between Retz and Condé, writing to the cardinal in September 1657: 'on m'a dit qu'il y avoit une liaison des amis de M. le Prince et de M. le Cardinal de Retz que les uns et les autres pretendoient par leurs escrits et placards echauffer la populace.'<sup>146</sup>

However, the French defeat of Valenciennes by itself was not sufficient to mobilise the pool of potential support among grandes such as Gaston or the Duc

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<sup>143</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.899, f.19: Anon to Mazarin, 12 Sept.1656; f.23: Le Tellier to Mazarin, 13 Sept.1656; f.43: Servien to Mazarin, 17 Sept.1656.

<sup>144</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.900, f.193: Fouquet to Mazarin, 27 July 1656.

<sup>145</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.902, f.306: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 6 Oct.1657; f.276: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, Sept.1657; vol.904, f.25: Abbé Thoreau to Mazarin, 11 July 1657.

<sup>146</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.902, f.242: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 15 Sept.1657.

de Longueville.<sup>147</sup> Their opposition to the cardinal was covert and reflected more complex assessments of their own interests. Gaston, for example, had initiated a uneasy period of *detente* with Mazarin,<sup>148</sup> in order to facilitate negotiations to release his brother-in-law, the Duke of Lorraine, from imprisonment in Toledo.<sup>149</sup> Despite rumours that Gaston was considering another long retirement to his court at Blois, to be better placed to support a Condéen invasion,<sup>150</sup> in reality, he was now only likely to break from the court if some kind of Condéen revival looked probable. Hostilities in Paris were for the most part orchestrated by Retz and Condé from exile, and the cardinal therefore seemed less concerned about the loyalty of some of the ex-frondeurs.

Nonetheless, if Gaston and the Duc de Longueville had not believed it was in their interests to move against Mazarin in 1656, this did not indicate that the cardinal's hegemony had finally been established. Valenciennes presaged a series of crises in the late 1650's that threw French politics back to the instabilities of the period preceding the French victory at Arras. There were three main sources of unrest. In anticipation of the financial problems that the regime had built up for itself, and which had been worsened by the obligations created by a series of

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<sup>147</sup> In fact both Gaston and Longueville gave assurances of their loyalty to the cardinal, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.900, f.420: Fouquet to Mazarin, Dec.1656; vol.901, f.245: Mazarin to the Duc de Longueville, 26 Aug.1656.

<sup>148</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.900, f.227: Bartet to Mazarin, 31 July 1656; f.297: Goerty to Mazarin, 10 Aug.1656; vol.901, f.4: Mazarin to Gaston, 27 Jan.1656; f.215: Mazarin to the Comte de Bethune, 3 Aug.1656; f.245: Mazarin to Gaston, 17 Aug.1656.

<sup>149</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.902, f.63: Bethune to Mazarin, April 1657; A.G.S., Est.Flandes 2086: Consulta of the Council of State, 8 June 1657; Consulta of the Council of State, 5 July 1657.

<sup>150</sup> P.R.O., S.P.France, vol.113, f.146: Letter of intelligence, Apr 8/18 Aug.1657.

vast loans contracted in November 1657,<sup>151</sup> various austerity measures had been adopted. One of these, a hastily conducted *recherche de noblesse*, caused serious unrest amongst the provincial nobles in Normandie and this soon spread to other provinces of France.<sup>152</sup>

In one respect, the Anglo-French victory at the Dunes provided an easy solution to the unrest of the provincial nobility for the government was able to bring troops back from the northern frontier in order to suppress the assemblies.<sup>153</sup> However, the effect of the Dunes was double-edged. Part of the arrangement with the English had been that Dunkirk was to be handed over to them as the price for their participation. When Dunkirk fell in June 1658 and was duly handed over to Cromwell's government, serious criticism aimed at the cardinal and his policies erupted in Paris. Spilling French blood to win prizes for the English was considered by many to be a shameful humiliation and a dishonour to the king - creating a second source of discontent.

Weakening the regime further, in the aftermath of the Dunes, Louis XIV fell seriously ill and many believed he might die. Consequently, those hostile to the

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<sup>151</sup> Bonney discusses the loans secured by Fouquet, *cf.*, R. Bonney, *The King's Debts*, p.254. There is no doubt that it was the *recherche de noblesse* which caused the noble assemblies. A royal declaration in June 1658 makes this very clear, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D., France, vol 906, f.163: Déclaration du Roi, June 1658.

<sup>152</sup> The source of the assemblies of the provincial nobility was an edict promulgated in September 1657 which stipulated that all those whose families were ennobled after 1606 were obliged to pay a tax of 1,650 livres: J.D.Lassaigne, *Les Assemblées de la Noblesse aux 17e et 18e siècles*, (Paris, 1965), p.89. A.Jouanna, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, (Paris, 1989), pp.273-278. L.Jarry, *La Guerre des Sabotiers de Sologne et les assemblées de la noblesse 1653-1660*, (Orléans, 1880).

<sup>153</sup> A.A.E. M.D.France, vol.905, f.216: Fouquet to Mazarin, Paris, 30 June 1658; f.233: Bartet to Mazarin, 4 July 1656. After the Dunes, the Maréchal de Clerambault was immediately sent into the Sologne. Other commanders, notably de Sourdis and Piloys, also carried out other missions to the provinces after 14 June. A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.261: Colbert to Mazarin, Paris, 14 July 1658; f.349: Fouquet to Mazarin, 8 Aug.1658; f.378: Fouquet to Mazarin, 15 Aug.1658; vol.906, f.151: Le Tellier to Mazarin, 18 June 1658.

cardinal's regime, anticipating the succession of the king's younger brother, openly prepared to engineer the cardinal's downfall. Of course, there were many opponents of the cardinal who seized the opportunity of the noble assemblies to try and unseat the government. Condé, Retz, the Prince de Tarente and the Maréchal d'Hocquincourt were all alleged to have followers within the assemblies and many of these figures emerged as the leaders. In Normandie, for example, the two most important representatives of the provincial nobility were the Comte de Crequi and the Sieur d'Annery. Mazarin believed that Crequi was an impassioned follower of Condé.<sup>154</sup> Crequi's and d'Annery's connections with the prince were confirmed by Guy Joly in his memoirs who argued that Condé had called Retz to Brussels to tell him of, 'une intelligence qu'il ménageait avec la noblesse de Normandie par le moyen du Comte de Créqui, Bernieulles et par M. d'Annery..<sup>155</sup>

The notion that Condé and Retz were working in close association to foment the revolts was raised on a number of occasions. Retz's participation in the revolts was undoubted.<sup>156</sup> Describing the character of the noble assemblies in the Orléanais, Nicholas Fouquet alleged that recognized followers of Condé had been seen accompanied by men who were wearing habits, a thinly veiled reference to the followers of the Cardinal Retz: 'on pretend qu'il y a des officiers de M. le Prince et de gentilshommes qui l'on a reconnu des habits... sous la toille..' <sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.300: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 30 July 1658.

<sup>155</sup> Guy Joly, *Mémoires*, ii.284-285.

<sup>156</sup> J.H.M.Salmon, *Cardinal de Retz*, (London, 1969), p.310.

<sup>157</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.139: Fouquet to Mazarin, 8 June 1658.

Further evidence of Retz's participation was the departure from Paris of his *vicaires générales* who travelled to Berry and the Sologne with the clear intention of exacerbating provincial tensions against the government.<sup>158</sup> In late 1657, Mazarin attempted to take steps against what he regarded as a conspiracy of Retz's wider family to combine provincial unrest with an assault on the government in Paris. The requests of the Duc de Brissac and his brother, the Abbé de Brissac, to come to Paris - the duke claiming that he needed to seek the expertise of Parisian doctors for unspecified ailments - was interpreted in Paris as one of the opening gambits and permission was refused.<sup>159</sup>

Like Retz and Condé, the government had good reason to suspect the Prince de Tarente's involvement in the disturbances. Colbert was convinced that he was implicated in the assemblies of Poitou, and Tarente himself was quite open about his participation. In his memoirs, he even described his preferences for Auxerre as a base of revolt as opposed to the Sologne: 'parce qu'elle étoit moins éloignée [que] la Sologne où se devoient assembler tous les députés de la noblesse des provinces voisines, et j'aurais pu m'y rendre aisément, si on y avait pris quelque résolution vigoureuse'.<sup>160</sup> Similarly, there was little doubt that Hocquincourt was involved. All the minor nobles living on the estates of the *maréchal* in Picardie pointedly refused to pay the *gabelle*, not to speak of the extraordinary tax demanded of the recent *anoblis*.<sup>161</sup> Hocquincourt was also said to have a

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<sup>158</sup> J-D.Lassaigne, *Assemblées de la Noblesse*, p.92.

<sup>159</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.904, f.108: Mazarin to Chapelain, 30 Aug.1657; f.157: Biron to Mazarin, 2 Oct.1657.

<sup>160</sup> Henri Charles de La Trémouille, Prince de Tarente, *Mémoires*, (Liège, 1767), p.212.

<sup>161</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.902, f.235: Letter of intelligence, 8 Sept.1657.

representative he had sent from the Spanish Netherlands to the nobles of Normandie who was active in the assemblies, the Sieur du Prée.<sup>162</sup>

The fact that the unrest had begun in Normandie was of concern in itself, as the province was governed by Condé's brother-in-law the Duc de Longueville. Although, publicly, the duke made every effort to distance himself from the assemblies of the nobility,<sup>163</sup> it was suspected that he was shielding the leaders of the revolt including the Comte de Crequi. In some respects it might be suggested that Longueville was responding as any governor would who wanted to retain the cooperation of the province he was commanded to govern. A heavy handed approach to these problems was often not what was required.<sup>164</sup> Despite the pressure upon him to clamp down upon the assemblies,<sup>165</sup> the duke intimated in his letters to Paris that strong-arm tactics were unlikely to solve the problem. Indeed, partly out of sympathy for Condé and partly out of his own consciousness of the limitations of his powers, the duke favoured a conciliatory approach, writing specifically to Mazarin requesting clemency for the leaders of the assemblies.<sup>166</sup> The attempts of the cardinal, who distrusted the duke, to send

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<sup>162</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.28: Letter of intelligence, 3 Mar.1658.

<sup>163</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.13: Longueville to Mazarin, 24 Jan.1658; f.19 Longueville to Mazarin, 3 Feb.1658; f.27: Longueville to Mazarin, 26 Feb.1658; f.29: Gomont to Mazarin, 13 Mar.1658; f.35 Longueville to Mazarin, 25 Mar.1658.

<sup>164</sup> R.J.Bonney, *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661*, (Oxford, 1978), pp.154-155; R.Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite. The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France*, (Yale, 1978).

<sup>165</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.349: Fouquet to Mazarin, 8 Aug.1658.

<sup>166</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.46: Longueville to Mazarin, 6 April 1658; f.453: Bartet to Mazarin, 27 Sept.1658.

a hostile intendant to 'help' him in his enquiries were successfully rebuffed.<sup>167</sup>

However, the assemblies of the provincial nobility were a menace taken very seriously in Paris by the subordinate *surintendant des finances*, Abel Servien. Servien gave repeated warnings that the unrest could develop into a situation that would threaten the government itself.<sup>168</sup> His concern was shared by his senior colleague Nicholas Fouquet who feared that the spread of the assemblies to Bourgogne, a province over which Condé had formerly been governor, might escalate into something the government would not be able to control.<sup>169</sup> However it is clear that the government overestimated the willingness of the provincial nobility to participate in a civil war led by Condé's partisans. Despite the fact that the assemblies continued until April 1659, the combination of the Anglo-French victory at the Dunes and a royal declaration in October 1658 that reached a compromise over the question of the extraordinary tax on recent *anoblis*, meant that the assemblies continued but only in a muted form. A further blow was dealt to the revolt by Condé's withdrawal of support during the peace negotiations between France and Spain in 1659. Denied Condé's backing the leaders of the assemblies turned to the disaffected Comte d'Harcourt for assistance.<sup>170</sup>

In addition to the assemblies of the nobles, early 1658 had also revealed a

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<sup>167</sup> In September 1658 the intendant Thomas Morant, Baron du Mesnil-Garnier, was sent to assist the Duc de Longueville in Normandie. He did not stay for long. A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.457: Bartet to Mazarin, 28 Sept.1658; f.459: Bartet to Mazarin, 30 Sept.1658; f.522 Fouquet to Mazarin, 10 Dec.1658; f.535: Fouquet to Mazarin, 17 Dec.1658; f.543: Fouquet to Mazarin, 23 Dec.1658. Richard Bonney mentions Morant's father, *cf.*, R.J.Bonney, *Political Change in France*, p.83.

<sup>168</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.408 Servien to Mazarin, 21 Aug.1658.

<sup>169</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.491: Fouquet to Mazarin, 18 Nov.1658, f.502: Fouquet to Mazarin, 29 Nov.1658, f.543: Fouquet to Mazarin, 23 Dec.1658.

<sup>170</sup> J-D.Lassaigne, *Les Assemblées de la Noblesse*, p.98.

threat from another quarter. Using his influence in Rome, the clergy in France, and more particularly his archdiocese in Paris, Retz had once again become the mouthpiece of opposition.<sup>171</sup> Opposition arguments had increasingly returned to the powerful *dévo*t rhetoric of the 1620's and 30's, that had been used to articulate earlier hostility towards Richelieu's policies and methods. The negotiations with Oliver Cromwell were here a particularly rich source of ammunition for Retz's supporters in Paris, and the treaty between France and the Protectorate in March, coincided with the publication of powerfully argued piece: 'Très humble et très importante Remontrance au roi sur la remise des places maritimes de Flandre entre les mains des Anglois.'<sup>172</sup> Aside from the moral offense caused by an alliance with a heretic and regicide, the pamphlet's criticism of government policy also focused on sharply practical issues, in particular, that Dunkirk and Mardyke, might later be used as military bases for attacks against France.

Retz's criticism of government policy found sympathy both in Paris and in Rome, where Mazarin's union with a Protestant power had been condemned by the Pope.<sup>173</sup> After the news of Dunkirk's capitulation arrived in Paris some of the councillors of the Parlement attempted to persuade their colleagues not to attend the *Te Deum*, the customary thanksgiving service after victories on the field of battle.<sup>174</sup> Recalling scenes in Paris during the build up to the defeat of Arras,

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<sup>171</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.904, f.25: Abbé Thoreau to Mazarin, 11 July 1657; f.71: Roquepine to Mazarin, 3 Aug.1657; f.219: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, Oct/Nov 1657; vol.905, f.27: Coiffer to Mazarin, 23 Feb.1658; f.261: Colbert to Mazarin, Paris, 14 July 1658.

<sup>172</sup> Reprinted in volume five of: J.F.P. de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz, *Oeuvres*, ed. M.R.Chantelauze (Paris, 1870).

<sup>173</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.906, f.118 Mazarin to Le Tellier, 26 June 1658.

<sup>174</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.200: Servien to Mazarin, 22 June 1658.

opposition to the government was keenly felt by the cardinal's supporters. Bartet wrote of the public feeling before the battle of the Dunes: 'C'est une chose incroyable presque à tous ceux qui ne la voyent pas qu'on est plus enragé à Paris qu'à Bruxelles du siege de Dunkerque, j'ay trouvé icy que les bigots se donnoient une grande licence...'<sup>175</sup>

Opposition to the regime throughout the 1650's therefore remained widespread, but latent, only defining itself clearly when crisis threatened. The revolt of the provincial nobility, though short-lived in its seriousness, was sufficient to concern the cardinal and his team of ministers, who were aware of its possible ramifications. Similarly, elements of government opposition seized the opportunity of the Anglo-French alliance in 1658 to question the prudence and morality of the regime. However, provincial unrest on the levels of 1658, and the harm inflicted by Retz's public scrutiny of Mazarin's policies after Dunkirk had been handed over to the English, were not sufficient on their own to persuade *grands* like Gaston and the Duc de Longueville to come out into the open against the queen mother and her favourite. During the assemblies of the nobles in 1658 it was quite clear that both dukes had done their best to distance themselves as far as possible, at least in the eyes of the government, from any association with the assemblies.

While the alliance with protestant England and exploitative fiscal policy could generate hostility amongst the *grands*, and even tacit support for opponents of these policies, the greatest threat to the survival of the Mazarinist regime in the

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<sup>175</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.161: Bartet to Mazarin, 12 June 1658.

later 1650's came from a different quarter. Of all the major crises the government had to face during the 1650's the siege of Arras in 1654 and the king's illness in 1658 were the two that brought the cardinal closest to disgrace. After the battle of the Dunes the king, cardinal and queen mother had retired to Calais where the king fell ill, many believed from the noxious fumes from the marshes outside Dunkirk.<sup>176</sup> Whilst the king languished at Calais a cabal was reported to assemble in Paris with four powerful grandee Houses at its centre: Retz, Brissac, La Meilleraie and La Trémoille.<sup>177</sup> Their rationale was Mazarin's uncertain relationship with the king's younger brother, the Duc d'Anjou, the future Philippe d'Orléans. They believed, along with many others, that the king's death would permit the cardinal's disgrace and the return to power of the two major power blocks of the 1640's: the Houses of Orléans and Condé.<sup>178</sup>

Foreign observers were quick to grasp the implications of the king's illness, many believing that the cardinal had no other option but to leave France. Alsbach, one of Secretary Thurloe's correspondents in Antwerp, believed that the cardinal would not even bother to fight his opponents in Paris and would instead concentrate on the best means of extracting his wealth from France. At the height of the king's fever in late July he wrote to the Secretary:

‘they doe say that the king of the French should be surely dead and that the Cardinal Mazarin should be sick of the gout and keeping his bed at Winoxberg and that his lifeguard should be marched into the

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<sup>176</sup> The king was believed to have symptoms of typhus caused from poor sanitation in the camp around Dunkirk, *cf.*, P.R.James, *The Life and Times of Louis XIV*, (London, 1851), ii.7.

<sup>177</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.261: Colbert to Mazarin, 14 July 1658.

<sup>178</sup> Bod., Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.60, f.173: Alsbach to Thurloe, 26 July 1658.

same towne for his security, because he does trust himselfe upon ..., being Italians of his one nation and that all his goods are taken out of his court or palace at Paris and transported or brought at Winoxberg..<sup>179</sup>

Although Alsbach had underestimated Mazarin's willingness to fight his opponents in Paris, it was certainly true that during the king's illness in July the cardinal was preparing for the worst. In July he received a letter from his household intendant Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who confirmed that he had carried out the orders he had received for the defence of the cardinal's possessions and *places fortes*:

'Vostre Eminence sera s'il luy plaist persuadée que j'ai satisfait par advance à toutes les diligences qu'elle m'ordonne. J'ay donné les ordres nécessaires à toutes ses places... je prendray mesme mes precautions pour ce qui regarde le palais de Vostre Eminence..<sup>180</sup>

The cardinal's concern was hardly surprising. Whilst the king's health deteriorated the opponents of the regime in Paris were becoming increasingly confident. Many of them were well known to Mazarin and were people who had figured prominently among Condé's followers during the 1640's. The Marquis de Jarzé, for example, was one of the main agitators in Paris in 1658. He had been used by Condé in 1649 in a project to distract the attentions of the queen mother.<sup>181</sup> Now he was openly conspiring with the Duc de Brissac, Retz's

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<sup>179</sup> Bod., Rawlinson MSS, (Thurloe Papers), vol.60, f.337: Alsbach to Thurloe, 17 Aug.1658.

<sup>180</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.905, f.248 Colbert to Mazarin, 10 July 1658.

<sup>181</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, v.366-368.

brother-in-law, to overthrow Mazarin once the king had died. Bartet, one of the cardinal's agents, described how Jarzé and Brissac were openly feting the imminent death of the king.<sup>182</sup> Jean Perrault also was identified by the cardinal's supporters,<sup>183</sup> along with the Comtesse de Fiesque,<sup>184</sup> the wife of Condé's representative in Madrid. More disturbing was the involvement of the Duc de Beaufort,<sup>185</sup> who like the Ducs de Longueville and Orléans, had tended to keep a low profile during earlier periods of tension. The hand of Gaston was also identified behind the activities of some of the agitators. Bartet spoke of the line of communication between Jarzé, Brissac and Gaston at Blois.<sup>186</sup> He believed that once news arrived of the king's death, both Gaston and Condé would converge upon Paris. Fortunately for Mazarin, the king recovered from his fever. Nonetheless the period of the king's illness was a graphic demonstration of the cardinal's vulnerability. Despite the efforts of the cardinal to integrate himself into France's ruling elite he continued to remain exposed.

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<sup>182</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.335: Bartet to Mazarin, 6 Aug.1658.

<sup>183</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.266: Servien to Mazarin, 16 July 1658.

<sup>184</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.335: Bartet to Mazarin, 6 Aug.1658.

<sup>185</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.309: Bartet to Mazarin, 31 July 1658.

<sup>186</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.905, f.335: Bartet to Mazarin, 6 Aug.1658.

## 5

## Condé and the drive towards a general peace

## THE 1656 INITIATIVE

The difficulties created for the cardinal by Condé's exile were not simply confined to the prince's ability to do him harm from Brussels, or of the prince's sympathizers in France to create political instability. The social dislocation created by the exile of France's first prince of the blood, combined with Philip IV's undertaking to Condé that negotiations for a general peace would not be concluded until the prince had been fully reintegrated into the French court,<sup>1</sup> meant that Condé's return to France and his reconciliation with Louis XIV at some stage seemed inevitable. Consequently, for Mazarin, the question of peace between France and Spain was calculated to provoke anxiety. Despite Gaston's 'reconciliation', Mazarin still feared the Condé-Orléans axis. Indeed, in December 1656, when a project to negotiate with Condé unilaterally was underway, Mazarin pointed out that among the possible benefits of success might be the definitive separation of Gaston and Condé: 'Il désunira le prince de Condé avec M. le duc d'Orléans...'<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This undertaking was articulated in the second clause of Condé's treaty with Philip IV, cf., 'Traité de Monseigneur le prince avec le roy d'Espagne', Appendix of P.de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, (Paris, 1866-82).

<sup>2</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.899, f.200: Plan to reconcile Condé through M. de Thou, Dec.1656.

Mazarin was concerned that peace negotiations with Spain might railroad him into accepting Condé's terms for his return to France and in this respect, the cardinal plainly had an interest in perpetuating the war with Spain. But the question of peace could not simply be ignored for it was constantly being raised in a number of different forums. In 1655, for example, there was strong pressure being placed on the cardinal from Rome to agree to open negotiations with the Spanish. This had culminated in an offer from the pope, Alexander VII, to act as arbiter in peace negotiations between Paris and Madrid.<sup>3</sup> Mazarin strongly suspected that Retz was behind this initiative;<sup>4</sup> in June 1655 Mazarin had been informed that Retz had been closely involved in the drawing up of a *jubilé* to be sent to France demanding that peace be made through papal arbitration between the two great crowns.<sup>5</sup> The possibility that a *paix generale* might be negotiated in Rome was clearly not in the best interests of Louis XIV or his first minister. During the 1650's the court of St Peter was overwhelmingly dominated by Spanish interests,<sup>6</sup> added to which was the problem Mazarin faced in this environment of resisting Spanish demands that Condé's full reintegration to the French court take place without appearing to be obstructing the cause of peace.

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<sup>3</sup> J.Valfrey, *Hugues de Lionne, Ses Ambassades en Italie*, (Paris, 1877), p.346; B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.555; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.386: Fiesque to Condé, Nov.1655.

<sup>4</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.895, f.75: Barthélemy to Mazarin, 19 Aug 1655; f.116: Brienne to Mazarin, 8 June 1655; f.121: Brienne to Mazarin, 10 June 1655; f.240: Brienne to Mazarin, 20 Aug.1655.

<sup>5</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.894, f.124: Bartet to Mazarin, 9 June 1655.

<sup>6</sup> Retz made a reference to this in his memoirs, *cf.*, Cardinal de Retz, *Mémoires*, ed., P.Morand, (Paris, 1992), p.543: 'Comme celle d'Espagne était en ce temps-là, la plus forte à Rome'; Ranke refers to the enmity between Alexander VII and Cardinal Mazarin, *cf.*, L.Ranke, *The Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes of Rome*, Trans., S.Austin, 3 vols., (2nd edn., London, 1841), iii.53.

It was largely in response to criticism that Mazarin faced over his refusal to open negotiations with Spain through papal arbitration in 1655 that the cardinal sent Hugues de Lionne<sup>7</sup> to Madrid in 1656. Lionne had formerly been in Rome as France's representative where in 1655 he had actively been engaged in countering the papal peace initiative.<sup>8</sup> Mazarin had ordered his return and shortly after his arrival in Paris in April 1656<sup>9</sup> he received his instructions for the negotiations that were to take place in Madrid between July and September 1656. Lionne's mission was intended to be confidential, mainly in order to exclude Condé's ministers in Madrid.<sup>10</sup> This was important for Mazarin. He was hoping that the Spanish could be persuaded to abandon Condé and felt that their willingness to do so might be seriously compromised if Condé was permitted to become involved in the negotiations.

To some extent, Mazarin's hand had been forced by the papal initiative of 1655, for his decision to send Lionne to Madrid in 1656 was shaped by his concern to avoid damaging criticism at home, where, in the light of his obstinacy over the proposed negotiations in Rome, it was now easy to portray him as a war-monger.<sup>11</sup> The very fact that France had now seized the initiative and was taking

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<sup>7</sup> Hugues de Lionne, (1611-1671), Secretary of State and Abel Servien's nephew. He signed the order to arrest Condé in 1651, *cf.*, *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed. F.Bluche, (Paris, 1990), p.882.

<sup>8</sup> J.Valfrey, *Hugues de Lionne, Ses Ambassades en Italie*, (Paris, 1877), p.346; A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.895, f.277: Brienne to Mazarin, 20 Aug.1655.

<sup>9</sup> The Brussels gazette reported his return to France, B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1655, p.219.

<sup>10</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.4: Mémoire pour Mr de Lionne allant en Espagne, 1 June 1656.

<sup>11</sup> The cardinal faced substantial public opposition on this question, particularly through the assembly of the clergy and the Paris Parlement: A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.894, f.369: Abbé Fouquet to Mazarin, 19 Oct.1655; f.403: Colbert to mazarin, 17 Nov.1655; vol.895, f.38: 'Harangue de Monseigneur [Séguier] au Parlement au 30 Mars 1655'; f.133: Brienne to Mazarin, 14 June 1655; f.166 Brienne to Mazarin, 3 July 1655.

the step of sending an envoy to Madrid, effectively pulled the rug out from underneath those who sought to accuse him of perversely continuing an unnecessary war with Spain. Another important benefit of opening negotiations in this way was the degree of direct control Mazarin could exercise over the negotiations. Lionne was sent to Madrid with strict instructions governing the extent of the territorial concessions France was prepared to make, provisions for her allies, and perhaps of greatest interest to Mazarin, the terms that France would accept for Condé's reconciliation.<sup>12</sup>

The instructions concerning Condé's reconciliation reveal the lengths that the cardinal was prepared to go to prevent Condé from returning to France. The cardinal was, it seems, prepared to sanction Condé's return, but only upon terms that left the prince humiliated and politically emasculated. These terms were carefully outlined for Lionne in June 1656. Condé would be pardoned and could return to the 'jouissance' of his 'biens, honneurs et dignités' with the exception of his 'charges, places et gouvernements'.<sup>13</sup> As if this was not enough, Condé would have to write a humiliating letter of apology to the king, a draft of which was included in Lionne's instructions. The prince was also required to retire to a place of surety on his return, where he would be kept under guard at the king's pleasure.<sup>14</sup> As far as Condé was concerned these demands were entirely

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<sup>12</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.4: Mémoire pour Mr de Lionne allant en Espagne, 1 June 1656; f.153: 'Articles de paix donnée à M. de Lionne s'en allant en Espagne pour les proposer suivant son instruction de Juin 1656.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Lionne reported to Mazarin that he had told Don Luis that Condé had to be placed in prison on his return in order to prevent, 'des nouvelles brouilleries', *cf.*, A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.296: Lionne to Mazarin, 11 July 1656.

unacceptable. Asking him to abandon his, 'charges, places et gouvernements' reduced his family to the status in everything but name of a minor *épée* noble, whilst Mazarin was also asking that he accept imprisonment on his return. Had such terms been accepted in Madrid they would unambiguously have marked Spanish withdrawal of support for the prince.

Lionne remained in Madrid well beyond the time limits that the cardinal had originally stipulated.<sup>15</sup> Although his talks with Don Luis covered a wide range of important subjects - territorial concessions in Rossellón, Cerdaña and Artois, the restitution of the Duke of Lorraine and the accommodation of Savoy, Modena, England and Portugal - the most contentious issue by far was Condé's reconciliation with Louis XIV. The demands that Lionne was making placed Don Luis de Haro in an impossible position. Abandoning Condé was unacceptable both for political as well as strategic reasons. Philip IV's obligation to Condé in the event of peace negotiations were clearly set out in the treaty of 1651. Reneging on this agreement in the context of a general peace not only undermined confidence in the future alliances of the Spanish Habsburgs but would also represent a shameful stain upon the king's honour.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, owing to the size of the prince's army based in the Spanish Netherlands, to abandon Condé at this stage

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<sup>15</sup> He received an admonishment for this in August. Lionne had originally been instructed only to stay in Madrid for eight days. This must raise questions about the seriousness of the peace initiative. A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.126: Louis XIV to Lionne, 16 Aug.1656.

<sup>16</sup> In late September Don Cristoval made this point eloquently to Lionne arguing that the honour of Philip IV was bound up in the question of Condé's return *cf.*, 'il a repliqué qu'ils n'estoient pas en ces termes là et que quand ils ..... pour indubitable la perte entière du Duché de Milan ils ne changeroient pas de resolution sur le point de M. le Prince ou il s'agit de leur foy et de leur honneur..' A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.397: Mémoire, 24 Sept.1656. Certainly, Condé had been told on several occasions of the lengths Philip IV was prepared to go to ensure that he obtained his reconciliation *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.15, f.106: Fiesque to Condé, 29 May 1655; vol.16, f.245: Fiesque to Condé, 12 July 1656.

would be placing at risk Spanish power in the Low Countries.<sup>17</sup> There were any number of bleak scenarios presented by Lionne's embassy and Don Luis took the time to outline some of them to the council of state. If, for example, peace was not settled in 1656, but Condé realized that Philip IV had been willing to abandon him as the price of peace with France, the Spanish could well have found themselves still at war with France, but bereft of their most important ally.<sup>18</sup>

Talks over Condé therefore broke down early. Don Luis, who had detailed instructions from Condé over the terms of the prince's reconciliation, was firmly resolved that peace should not be made without obtaining this goal. Lionne, on the other hand, remained under strict instructions from Mazarin not to make any concessions over Condé. Condé subsequently became the *leitmotiv* of the negotiations as Don Luis exerted himself to persuade Lionne to accept his conditions for the prince's return.<sup>19</sup> During the conference of 14 September for example, Don Luis appeared uncompromising over the allocation of *places fortes* in Hainaut and Artois only to mention after several hours of negotiations that he

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<sup>17</sup> Cf., p.190.

<sup>18</sup> Lionne realised that this was the dilemma the Spanish faced: 'est sans doute celui que Mazerolles leur a suggeré est que M. le Prince se voyant dans la necessité absolu ou de se charger de toute la hayne du manquement du traicté ou de souffrir des prejudices inescomptable n'a point d'autre parti à prendre que de se jeter entièrement entre les bras de V.E. ce qu'ils craignent qu'il pourroit aujourd'hui arriver sans que la paix se fit et ils sont au desespoir de luy avoir escrit.' A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.37: Mémoire à S.E. du 9 Aout 1656. This point was later articulated by Don Luis during the negotiations in 1659. A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619: Consulta of the Council of State, 7 Jan.1659.

<sup>19</sup> 'Il [Don Luis] ne croyoit pas que le Roy mon maistre après cela voulut qu'un si grand bien manquast pour un si petit interest que celui de M. le Prince je retorquay l'argument contre luy et dis qu'alors ce seroit au Roy Catholique a avoir cette compassion pour la Chrestienté parce que le Roy mon maistre avoir desja fait ou du moins déclaré tout ce qu'il pouvoit et voulut faire pour M. le Prince', A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.323: Mémoire, 14 July 1656. Cf., also the transcripts of the early negotiations, A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.179: Addition to instructions given in June; f.252: Mémoire, 6 July 1656; f.284: Mémoire, 10 July 1656; f.296: Mémoire, 11 July 1656; vol.35, f.37: Mémoire, 9 Aug.1656; f.56: Mazarin to Lionne, 15 Aug.1656.

was willing to concede them in return for more favourable terms for Condé.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, when the talks collapsed in late September they did so over Condé, not, as is commonly assumed, the French demands for the hand of the infanta.<sup>21</sup> With such opposing and intractable negotiating positions it was impossible to come to any wider agreement for peace. News of the defeat of the French at Valenciennes in July only worsened the deadlock - Valenciennes had the effect of re-invigorating Condé's party in France<sup>22</sup> and the cardinal did not wish to see the prince returning to Paris on a wave of popular support.<sup>23</sup>

It had become clear to Lionne soon after his arrival that whether peace was concluded or not would depend on the willingness of the Spanish to abandon the prince. In early August he had informed Paris that the Spanish would not make peace if it meant sacrificing Condé's interests.<sup>24</sup> Mazarin's response to news of Spanish intransigence over Condé was unequivocal. Lionne's mission was now not to negotiate for peace but to contrive to paint Condé in the worst possible light by ensuring that the negotiations foundered over the terms of his reconciliation. The cardinal hoped thereby to present the prince to France and to the international community as the only obstacle to a general peace: 'l'on a considéré icy qu'en cas

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<sup>20</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.305: Mémoire à S.E., 14 Sept.1656.

<sup>21</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665*, (Cambridge, 1988), p.289; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1990), p.410; M.Devéze, *L'Espagne de Philippe IV: Siècle d'Or et de Misère*, (Paris, 1970-1), ii.513-14; Domínguez Ortiz, 'España ante la Paz', *Crísis y Decadencia de la España de los Austrias* (3rd edn, Barcelona, 1973), pp.162-3, J.B.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1968), p.139.

<sup>22</sup> Cf., pp.282-285.

<sup>23</sup> Lionne was quite explicit about this as a reason not to offer the prince any better terms for his return in a letter to the queen mother cf., A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.14: Lionne to Anne of Austria, 4 Aug 1656.

<sup>24</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.14: Lionne to Anne of Austria, 4 Aug.1656.

que la Paix ne se puisse conclurre il seroit à propos de rompre sur le point du Prince de Condé, c'est pourquoi il faudroit que d'abord vous demandassiez à Don Luis qu'elle response il a recoive du Prince [sic!] et s'il accepte la grace que le Roy luy veut faire en la manière que vous l'avez offert en faveur de la paix...'<sup>25</sup>

Mazarin repeated these instructions again in early September<sup>26</sup> and Lionne seems to have conducted the remaining weeks of his negotiations in Madrid exclusively with the aim of either forcing the Spanish to capitulate over the prince or breaking off negotiations over Condé. In early September, for example, Lionne described to the cardinal how he had intentionally come to a premature agreement over the contentious issue of the restitution of the Duke of Lorraine, in order to leave the question of Condé out in the open as the only unresolved problem.<sup>27</sup>

The attitude taken towards the negotiations in Paris, after news arrived of the Spanish intractability over Condé, raised questions about the cardinal's motivation in sending Lionne's delegation. Many contemporaries believed that Lionne's mission was purely a propaganda exercise, and that the cardinal had no intention of negotiating for peace. Vittorio Siri, for example, who had accompanied Lionne to Madrid, was convinced that this was the case.<sup>28</sup> Sir William Lockhart, the Protector's ambassador in Paris, reported to Thurloe that he had been informed by the cardinal that negotiations with Spain had been initiated for no

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<sup>25</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.56: Mazarin to Lionne, 15 Aug.1656.

<sup>26</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.196: Mémoire, 4 Sept.1656.

<sup>27</sup> 'Ma pensée estoit de luy faire entrevoir l'assurance de la restitution de la Lorraine sans m'engager pourtant à le dire pour ne nous pas faire ce prejudice si le traicté ne se conclu pas et quant aux interests de M. le Prince j'ay toujours mon evasion en cas que nous ne puissions en convenir..', A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.236: Mémoire, 7 Sept.1656.

<sup>28</sup> Cf., A.A.E., *Histoire des troubles de la France*, iii.525, quoted by A.Chéruel, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Cardinal Mazarin*, (3 vols., Paris, 1882), iii.27.

other reason than, 'to stop the clamor of the pope and French clergie.'<sup>29</sup> This was certainly the impression of the papal nuncio in Paris and Condé's envoy in Madrid.<sup>30</sup> The latter, for example, suspected that the cardinal had been forced to send Lionne to Madrid: 'Nous ne savons pour quelle raison le Cardinal Mazarin a esté obligé de faire cet demarche et si c'est qu'il veuille traiter tout de bon il faut qu'il y ait sans doute dans le royaume ou dans le cabinet des choses qui le pressent.'<sup>31</sup>

Pressure from Rome apart it is hard to see why the cardinal should have chosen this opportunity to send a delegation to Madrid. Having come so close to disgrace before Arras, partly as a consequence of widespread sympathy for Condé, why should the cardinal suddenly have decided that it was in his interests to engage in peace negotiations that would almost certainly be taking the prince's return to France for granted? Perhaps he was using Lionne to test how far the Spanish were prepared to go in support of the prince. Yet to have sent Lionne to Madrid purely for the purpose of testing the limits of Spanish support for Condé would have been rash, for the outcome of such a manoeuvre would have been difficult to predict. Conceivably, the plan to generate hostility towards Condé by presenting him as the only obstacle to peace could have been easily reversed, and the cardinal would have found that criticism of his policies and methods would merely have gained momentum.

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<sup>29</sup> J.Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe to which is prefixed the life of Mr Thurloe by Thomas Birch*, (7 vols., London, 1742), v.217: Lockhart to Secretary Thurloe, 16/26 July 1656.

<sup>30</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.37: Mémoire, 9 Aug.1656.

<sup>31</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.363: Fiesque to Condé, 19 July 1656.

That the cardinal was opposed to Condé's return for reasons of personal political strategy there can be no doubt. Short of marrying a niece to the Duc d'Enghien as a guarantee of the prince's future cooperation,<sup>32</sup> the cardinal was implacably opposed to the prince's return to France. To ensure that this was not brought about by Lionne's negotiations he sent Lionne to Madrid with a set of proposals for Condé's return that the prince could not possibly fail to reject. Since the cardinal's position was non-negotiable, the peace hinged upon the willingness of Philip IV to abandon Condé, something that the king, for good reason, could not accept.<sup>33</sup> Don Cristoval, Don Luis de Haro's secretary, saw this to be the central cause of the breakdown of negotiations: 'Mais la difficulté principale, il a poursuivy, qui est à mon advis que vous autres ne voulez point de sa personne en France et je ne sçay pas pourquoi car le tenant sous vos pattes il seroit bien plus à votre disposition et hors de moyen de vous faire du mal que s'il estoit en des pays estrangers...'<sup>34</sup>

Mazarin's 19th century historian, Chéruel, set out to defend the cardinal from the claims of contemporary critics like Siri that Lionne's mission was purely designed to deflect criticism of the regime.<sup>35</sup> For Chéruel, Lionne's mission to Madrid was a genuine attempt to open negotiations for a general peace and not merely a counter measure to stem criticism at home. Explanations focusing on the personal interests of the cardinal were swept aside in favour of an interpretation

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<sup>32</sup> Cf.,pp.277-278.

<sup>33</sup> Don Luis told Lionne in July that this was an article which for them represented, 'le pied sur la gorge', A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34 f.296: Mémoire, 11 July 1656.

<sup>34</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.416: Lionne to Mazarin, 25 Sept.1656.

<sup>35</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.27.

that stressed Mazarin's selfless devotion to the 'interests' of the French state. The uncompromising line taken in response to Don Luis' request that Condé retain his position as *grand maître* of the king's household, for example, is discussed by Chéruel in terms that avoid any suggestion that the cardinal himself might have had a personal interest in denying the prince this office: 'Comment exiger de Louis XIV qu'il rendit à un sujet rebelle la dignité de grand maître de France'.<sup>36</sup> As Chéruel saw it, the collapse of negotiations in September 1656 was due to Spanish immoderation. Valenciennes, in particular, had an important role to play - a boost to Spanish confidence that carelessly led them to believe that it was they who held the whip hand: 'l'échec de Valenciennes ne laissait plus guère d'espoir de conclure la paix avec les Espagnols. Leurs prétentions, qui avaient déjà paru exorbitantes antérieurement, devaient s'accroître avec leurs succès..'<sup>37</sup>

Chéruel's interpretation of the Lionne initiative in 1656 was subsequently refined and affirmed by later generations of historians. The failure of talks was blamed upon Philip IV's exaggerated demands and obsession with a *paz honesta*, and the Spanish were castigated for losing such an opportunity to negotiate peace upon such 'favourable' terms as the cardinal had offered.<sup>38</sup> In reality, the harsh terms that the cardinal sought to impose as the price of Condé's rehabilitation at the French court placed Philip IV in an almost impossible position from which to

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<sup>36</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.18.

<sup>37</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.23.

<sup>38</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.290.

negotiate a general peace.<sup>39</sup> He viewed his obligations towards Condé as paramount and a question both of personal honour and crucial strategic importance. Peace was not made in 1656 because it was not in the cardinal's interests to see Condé returned to France. The Spanish had been offered a stark choice: either abandon Condé and accept the consequences in the Spanish Netherlands, or, fulfil obligations towards the French prince and accept a continuation of the war.

### THE PEACE OF THE PYRENEES AND THE SAVOY MARRIAGE

When examined in more detail, the 1656 negotiations raise important questions about the general peace successfully negotiated three years later - the peace of the Pyrenees. This is commonly portrayed as one of the cardinal's finest achievements in the field of foreign policy.<sup>40</sup> The modest territorial concessions obtained by him in the negotiations were forgotten, for his diplomatic skill and ingenuity had procured for France a far more important prize - the hand of the infanta María Teresa for Louis XIV, enabling the king's future grandson, Philippe, Duc d'Anjou, to become king of Spain.<sup>41</sup> This, it has been argued, was clever

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<sup>39</sup> Don Cristoval, Don Luis de Haro's secretary observed that peace would never be made unless the cardinal changed his attitude towards Condé: 'Que la paix ne se peut jamais fait si la France ne veut traicter d'autre façon M. le Prince..'. A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35 f.14: Lionne to Anne of Austria, 4 Aug.1656.

<sup>40</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.254; P.Guth, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1972), pp.728-737; P.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1990), pp.86-91; V.Cronin, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1964), p.101; P.Goubert, *Mazarin*, pp.417-426; C.Federn, *Mazarin*, (Paris, 1934), p.503; J.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1968), pp.159-177.

<sup>41</sup> D.Mackay and H.M.Scott, *The rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815*, (London, 1983), pp.6-10; R.J.Bonney, *The European Dynastic States*, (Oxford, 1991), p.241.

foresight on the part of the cardinal who, in 1658, specifically set in motion policies culminating in an ingenious 'bluff' surrounding a potential marriage into the house of Savoy, that forced Philip IV to offer the hand of his daughter and open negotiations for a general peace.<sup>42</sup>

Yet the peace of the Pyrenees also made ample provision for Condé's return to the French court. The prince returned to France in January 1660 to his former governorships, offices and charges,<sup>43</sup> in short, restored to his position *ante* 1650. Furthermore, the cardinal agreed to the reconciliation of those who had followed the prince into exile and with few exceptions, all were restored to their former governorships and offices,<sup>44</sup> some in circumstances that seriously compromised the cardinal's own private interests.<sup>45</sup> In the light of the 1656 negotiations, these were peculiar concessions for the cardinal to make. Throughout the 1650's his policies had been geared to reducing Condé's chances of such a reconciliation and subduing the prince's party in France. Why should he suddenly have put these policies into reverse and in the space of two short months around a negotiating table, agree to Condé's rehabilitation in circumstances that could only cause him

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<sup>42</sup> A.Chérueil, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.199; H.Hauser, *La Prépondérance Espagnole*, (Paris, 1948), p.392; P.Guth, *Mazarin*, p.708; F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, p.84; V.Cronin, *Louis XIV*, p.105; Goubert, *Mazarin*, p.414; J.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, (London, 1968), p.146.

<sup>43</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.104-112.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> For example the cardinal agreed to return Gaspard de Champagne, Comte de la Suze, to the governorship of Belfort. cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.414: Caillet to Condé, 27 Sept.1659. The cardinal throughout the 1650's had tried to obtain this governorship which he intended to use to add to his niece Hortense Mancini's dowry. She eventually married Armand de la Meilleraye - the future Duc de Mazarin - who launched into long and drawn out legal proceedings to re-acquire Belfort from the Comte de la Suze, cf., B.N., Dossier Bleus, vol.166: Factum, 'Servant d'instruction sommaire pour messire Gaspard de Champagne... deffendeur de cassation d'Arrest & demander au fond contre messire Armand de la Meilleraye, Duc de Mazarin, demandeur en cassation d'Arrest.'

future harm and undermine so many carefully laid plans to ensure that his supremacy in Paris remained undisputed? Brienne commented in his memoirs that by accepting such conditions for Condé's return the cardinal had made the one concession that he used to boast he would never make:

'Le cardinal Mazarin dit pour s'excuser auprès du Roi et du public, qu'il avait eu de son côté d'autres avantages, et qu'il n'avait qu'avancé de quelque mois ce qu'on pourroit éviter de faire bientôt. J'en conviendrai avec lui pourvu que ses partisans souffrent qu'on le blâme d'impudence de s'être vanté souvent qu'il ne feroit jamais..' <sup>46</sup>

That the cardinal did accept Condé's return upon such terms as were outlined in the peace of the Pyrenees was entirely due to the increasingly difficult position he found himself in after the journey of the court to Lyon in November 1658. The critical issue here was the growing rift between Mazarin and the queen mother over an issue that was of critical importance to both of them - the marriage of Louis XIV.

As the king had been growing older the question of his marriage had become increasingly important. For a long time Anne of Austria had indicated that she wished her son to marry her niece, Philip IV's daughter, the infanta María Teresa. In 1656, on the queen mother's instructions, Lionne had raised this issue with Don Luis de Haro. Despite the generous offer, 'qu'en nous donnant seulement la personne de l'Infante je luy offrois la carte blanche pour le reste, et laissois la

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<sup>46</sup> Brienne, *Mémoires*, p.243.

liberté de dresser luy mesme le traicté aux conditions qu'il voudroit..<sup>47</sup> Lionne was told by Don Luis that whilst María Teresa stood as the sole heir to the Spanish throne her marriage with the French king was unthinkable.

Lionne had informed the queen mother of her brother's response in a letter written in September, shortly before abandoning negotiations.<sup>48</sup> Of particular significance was Lionne's reference to the cardinal, who, he had taken pains to point out to Anne, had instructed him to do all that was possible to obtain the hand of the infanta, 'à quelques conditions que ce pût estre quand même..<sup>49</sup> Lionne's acknowledgement of the cardinal was contrived and designed specifically to re-assure the queen mother that the cardinal was fully committed to the project of marrying Louis XIV to María Teresa. The reality was quite different, but the cardinal was aware that the queen suspected that he might try to undermine her attempts to arrange such a union for her son, and had therefore given Lionne explicit instructions concerning the letter he was to write to Paris on this subject. It is clear from a missive that Lionne sent to the cardinal by the same post that Mazarin was monitoring this aspect of the negotiations with great care.<sup>50</sup> Evidently Mazarin had chastised Lionne for an indiscretion made in an earlier letter from Madrid to the queen mother, and as a consequence Lionne was sending his most recent dispatch first to the cardinal for approval: 'j'escris une seconde lettre à la reyne qui reparera un peu ce que j'avois gasté par la première je l'avois

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<sup>47</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.409: Lionne to Anne of Austria, 24 Sept.1656.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.411: Lionne to Mazarin, 24 Sept.1656.

pourtant laissé exprès à cachet volant afin que Votre Eminence la vit auparavant et le jugeant à propos la pût supprimer.<sup>51</sup>

Aside from the evidence of the cardinal's correspondence with Lionne, the queen had good reason to suspect that the cardinal was not genuinely committed to the marriage she so earnestly desired for her son. Clearly, had Philip IV accepted the *carte blanche* Lionne offered in return for the infanta in 1656, Mazarin would have no basis to object to Condé's return. Another important cause for suspicion was the cardinal's well known preference for an alternative candidate to the Spanish infanta - the daughter of the late Victor Amadeus I of Savoy, the infanta Margareta.<sup>52</sup> Between January and March 1655 the cardinal had taken the opportunity of his strong position after the victory of Arras to initiate a major set of negotiations for the marriage of the king with Margareta of Savoy.<sup>53</sup> These negotiations had culminated in March with a ritual exchange of portraits between Paris and Turin.<sup>54</sup> Towards the end of the month Mazarin's initiative had collapsed, a development that was attributed to the opposition of the queen mother.<sup>55</sup>

It was not difficult to understand why the cardinal so favoured a union with

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Margareta had inherited an entitlement to the appellation of 'infanta' from her grandmother the Infanta Caterina, the daughter of Philip II.

<sup>53</sup> Earliest reports of the negotiations had arrived from Paris in Brussels in 1654, *cf.*, B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1654, p.331: 'on tient ici que l'on traite à la cour le mariage du Roi avec de l'Infante de Savoie avec l'Abbé Amorretti et l'ambassadeur du Duc...', *cf.*, also, B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1655, pp.43 & 88.

<sup>54</sup> B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1655, pp.112, 125, 128.

<sup>55</sup> The refroidissement of the negotiations was attributed by the *Rélations Véritables* to the queen mother and, 'tous les bons françois', *cf.*, B.R.B., *Rélations Véritables*, 1655, p.140.

Savoy. A close identification with Savoy had been fundamental to his political thinking for a long time. Despite the views of many historians, Mazarin's relationship with Turin was quite distinct from that of his cardinal predecessor.<sup>56</sup> His promotion to supreme power in France - an Italian whose family were already firmly established within the Roman dynastic network - ensured that the strategic importance north Italy had assumed during the Thirty Years War was now vastly magnified. The cardinal continued to identify closely with his family's ambitions in his native country, and plainly aimed to use his position in France to achieve the elevation of the *casata* on both sides of the Alps.<sup>57</sup>

Mazarin's links with Savoy were particularly important. They dated from his early career as a papal negotiator during the Mantuan succession crisis of 1628-30.<sup>58</sup> During the late 1630's he had developed a close relationship with the dowager duchess of Savoy, Louis XIII's sister, Marie Christine. Despite his well publicised loathing for the duchess' lover, Philippe d'Aglié,<sup>59</sup> this relationship continued into the 1640's and 1650's and had profound consequences for Bourbon foreign policy.

As a young man during the 1630's the cardinal had done much to ensure

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<sup>56</sup> The traditional orthodoxy that Mazarin was merely continuing the policies of his predecessor with respect to Savoy overlooks the considerable personal interest the cardinal had in Franco-Savoyard relations. Unfortunately however the traditional view is still widely held, cf., *La France et l'Italie au temps de Mazarin*, (Grenoble, 1986), 15e colloque du C.M.R. 17 (Centre Marseillais de Rencontres sur le xvii siècle) p.42.

<sup>57</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', *Frankreich im Europäischen Staatensytn der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed., R.Babel, (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>58</sup> G.Dethan, *Mazarin et ses amis*, (Paris, 1968), p.122.

<sup>59</sup> G.Dethan, *Mazarin et ses Amis*, p.130.

that the goals of French foreign policy coincided with the interests of Turin.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, Richelieu even found it necessary to reproach his successor for being too Savoyard in his political allegiance.<sup>61</sup> Under the cardinal's guidance during the 1640's and 1650's, the policies being pursued by the French crown were a revival of the plans he had tried to persuade his predecessor to adopt after 1635: the conquest of the Milanese by the French and Savoyard armies, a policy that had the incidental consequence of serving the Savoyard ambition to annex the Gonzaga duchy of Monferrato.<sup>62</sup> Mazarin ensured that substantial resources were diverted to the Italian theatre during the 1640's and 1650's to pursue this aim<sup>63</sup> and significantly, four of the cardinal's closest political allies were appointed to the position of supreme command of the French north Italian army: Prince Thomas of Savoy,<sup>64</sup> the Duc de Mercoeur,<sup>65</sup> the Duke of Modena<sup>66</sup> and the Prince de

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<sup>60</sup> G.Dethan, *Mazarin et ses amis*, pp.122-124.

<sup>61</sup> G.Dethan, *Mazarin et ses Amis*, p.123.

<sup>62</sup> G.Dethan, *Mazarin et ses Amis*, p.124. The house of Savoy held an enduring interest in the marquisate dating from the early 16th century. In 1538 Charles III, Duke of Savoy's claims to the marquisate had been rejected by the Emperor Charles V in favour of the Dukes of Mantua, *cf.*, G.W.Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II*, (London, 1983), p.13.

<sup>63</sup> The cardinal's interest in transferring troops and money to the Italian theatre emerges particularly from A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.897. *Cf.*, specifically, A.A.E., M.D.France, *Affaires Intérieures*, vol.895, f.143: Mazarin to Colbert, 15 June 1655; f.175: Mazarin to Colbert, 3 July 1655; f.301: Mazarin to l'Evêque d'Orange, 7 Sept.1655; vol.897, f.77: Mercoeur to Mazarin, 10 May 1655; f.221: Vendôme to Mazarin, 27 Dec.1655; f.296: L'Evêque d'Orange to Mazarin, 1 Aug.1656.

<sup>64</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1654, p.607.

<sup>65</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994); B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1656, p.143.

<sup>66</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.288.

Conti.<sup>67</sup>

Of course, as was so frequently the case, the cardinal's advocacy of close cooperation between Paris and Turin was a policy formulated to complement his own interests as well as those of the French crown. During the 1650's, in cooperation with Marie Christine, the cardinal developed a number of projects ultimately intended both to underpin his own position at the French court and Marie Christine's in Turin. Their circumstances during this turbulent period were remarkably similar - Marie Christine becoming increasingly vulnerable as her son's advancing years gave him a yearning for real power, and Mazarin constantly under threat from a range of powerful families in France, all united in their opposition to his regime.

The linchpin of Mazarin's pro-Savoyard policies, and arguably that of his entire dynastic strategy, was the marriage of Olympe Mancini, the cardinal's niece, to Eugène Maurice de Savoie.<sup>68</sup> A member of the house of Savoy and resident at the French court, Eugène Maurice was the younger son of Prince Thomas of Savoy, one of the cardinal's staunchest supporters.<sup>69</sup> His mother was the Princesse de Carignan, whose own father had died, apparently accidentally, in the wake of his victory over Richelieu's forces at La Marfée in 1641. Through her, Eugène Maurice stood to inherit the entire Soissons fortune and the title of

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<sup>67</sup> E.de Barthélemy, *La Princesse de Conti*, (Paris, 1875), p.82; B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1657, p.59.

<sup>68</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>69</sup> C.de Beauregard, *Mémoires Historiques sur la maison de Savoie*, (Turin, 1816), p.182.

Comte de Soissons that had been held by his maternal grandfather.<sup>70</sup> Whilst Eugène-Maurice's marriage into the Mancini-Mazarini cemented another important political union, widening the base of the cardinal's mandate in France, it was also to be the base of Mazarini ambitions in Italy. Eugène-Maurice was third in line to the throne of Savoy. Second in line to the throne was a deaf-mute, Emanuel Philibert, who contemporaries believed would never marry.<sup>71</sup>

Contingent upon the house of Savoy accepting such a *mésalliance* was the cardinal's active support for a series of long held ambitions geared to Savoyard aggrandizement in Europe. For a long time they had been pressing for the *trattamento reale*, recognition of the dynasty not simply as a sovereign house but a royal house, on a par with other European monarchs.<sup>72</sup> Their pretensions to such status revolved around their claims to the kingdom of Cyprus<sup>73</sup> and Marie Christine now looked to Mazarin to press for the *trattamento* from Paris. Another more pressing goal concerned the ability of the government in Turin to act independently of their French cousins. By far the two most powerful fortresses of Savoy-Piedmont - Pignerolo and the citadel of Turin - held permanent French garrisons. This was a humiliating constraint and the issue was raised with the

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<sup>70</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>71</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>72</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994); R.Oresko, 'The diplomatic background to the Glorioso Rimpatrio: The rupture between Vittorio Amadeo II and Louis XIV (1688-1690)', ed., A.de Lange, *Dall'Europa Alle Valli Valdesi*, (Turin, 1990), p.272.

<sup>73</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, forthcoming, 1994).

cardinal during the negotiations for the marriage of Eugène-Maurice.<sup>74</sup> In January 1657, shortly before the wedding between the young couple took place, the citadel of Turin was handed back to the Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel II.<sup>75</sup>

However, the restitution of the citadel of Turin and the question of the *trattamento reale* were overshadowed by two further projects, both far more ambitious in their scope. The first of these concerned the fortunes of the Elector of Bavaria who was married to Charles Emmanuel II's younger sister, Henrietta Adelaide.<sup>76</sup> With the assistance of the cardinal in Paris it was hoped that sufficient pressure could be brought to bear through the Imperial Diet to disrupt the election of the Habsburg Leopold I in 1657 and place the Duke of Bavaria on the Imperial throne.<sup>77</sup> Since the question of the Imperial election was particularly open after the sudden death in 1654 of the eldest son of the Emperor, Ferdinand, King of the Romans, this project seemed to have some chance of success.<sup>78</sup> The cardinal again used his position to persuade the queen mother and Louis XIV of

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<sup>74</sup> R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, Forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>75</sup> C. de Beauregard, *Mémoires Historiques*, p.220; R.Oresko, 'The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in Seventeenth-century Europe', (Sigmaringen, Forthcoming, 1994).

<sup>76</sup> J.A.Stargardt, *Europäische Stammtafeln*, (Marburg, 1984), vol.ii, tafel 195.

<sup>77</sup> The cardinal stated this as his aim quite explicitly in a memoir to the French extraordinary ambassador to the Imperial Diet, the Duc de Grammont, *cf.*, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, vol.272, f.176: Mémoire pour l'ambassadeur extraordinaire allant en Allemagne, July 1657. The cardinal subsequently wrote to Marie Christine assuring her that he did everything to assist the election of the Duke of Bavaria, her son-in-law, *cf.*, A.A.E., C.P.Sardaigne, vol.53, f.27: Mazarin to Madame Reale, 5 Sept 1657. Mazarin's attempts to have the Duke of Bavaria elected emperor were discussed by Condé's envoy to the Imperial Diet, Marigny, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.17, f.469: Marigny to Condé, 8 Sept.1657.

<sup>78</sup> J.P.Spielman, *Leopold I of Austria*, (London, 1977), pp.28-30.

the merits of such a policy and French support was duly enlisted after Emperor Ferdinand III's death in April 1657. Although unsuccessful, French support for the Bavarian candidacy was an example of how the personal obligations and loyalties of the cardinal towards both the houses of Savoy and Wittelsbach<sup>79</sup> could have a decisive effect on the conduct of 'foreign policy' in Paris.

Mazarin's attempt to push the queen mother into accepting Margareta of Savoy as an alternative to María Teresa as the wife for her son was the second of these projects. For reasons of personal political strategy the cardinal was keen to promote such a union between Paris and Turin. First and foremost, he was eager to consolidate the links into the ruling house of France he already possessed via the marriage of the Prince de Conti to Anne-Marie Martinozzi by a further connection through the house of Savoy. But the marriage was also a defensive political measure: with Margareta as queen of France the cardinal would have secured another important and well-placed ally over whom he could reasonably assume that he would be able to command a certain degree of influence. Marie Christine's involvement in procuring for her daughter such a prestigious match would also underpin her position in Turin during marginalised old age. However, in the context of Condé's exile and Anne of Austria's obsession with the Infanta María Teresa the cardinal was provided with a further compelling reason to press the queen mother to accept Margareta as a compromise - Condé.

The offer Lionne made to the Spanish that France would accept any terms for peace provided that Madrid agree to the marriage between Louis XIV and

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<sup>79</sup> Although it *could* be seen as in French 'national' interests to replace a Habsburg with a Wittelsbach as Emperor it is worth noting the ties between the cardinal and another member of the house of Wittelsbach - the Elector of Cologne, *cf.*, pp.83-89.

María Teresa<sup>80</sup> had made a connection, however oblique, with Condé's return to the French court. Plainly the cardinal was anxious to prevent the Spanish infanta being used as a bargaining counter in peace negotiations to procure favourable terms for Condé, and the Savoy marriage was a means of cutting off this avenue for the prince's return. The possibility that Queen Mariana of Spain might produce a male heir was worrying, for conceivably this would make María Teresa available for marriage with the Bourbons. Mazarin was therefore anxious to foist the Savoy marriage onto Louis XIV as early as possible.

But, in November 1657 Mazarin's plans to persuade the queen mother to accept Margareta as a compromise were suddenly and dramatically undermined. On November 20 the queen of Spain gave birth to a son, Felipe Próspero and 13 months later, to a second son, Fernando Tomás.<sup>81</sup> This was critical, for a dynastic safeguard had been established creating the conditions in which María Teresa could be offered to Louis XIV - the opportunity that the queen mother had long been waiting for.<sup>82</sup> The meeting of the courts of Savoy and France in Lyon in November 1658 was, therefore, not a carefully thought out bluff by the cardinal to force the hand of Philip IV into offering Louis XIV his daughter's hand in marriage. On the contrary, the meeting between the courts of France and Savoy was a last ditch attempt by the cardinal to clinch the marriage that he favoured between Louis XIV and the infanta Margareta.

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<sup>80</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.35, f.409: Lionne to Anne of Austria, 24 Sept.1656.

<sup>81</sup> *Diccionario de Historia de España*, ed., G.Bleiberg, (Madrid, 1968), t.ii, p.450.

<sup>82</sup> The Spanish envoy, Pimentel, sent vivid accounts back to Madrid describing the queen's earnest desire for the marriage between Louis XIV and María Teresa, *cf.*, A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616: Pimentel to Don Luis, 26 Nov 1658; Pimentel to Don Luis de Haro, 3/6 Dec.1658; Pimentel to Don Luis de Haro, 11 Dec.1658; f.51 Pimentel to Don Luis, 21 May 1659.

Mazarin's correspondence with Marie Christine during the build up to the negotiations between the two courts at Lyon leaves little room for doubt that he was fully committed to the Savoy marriage. In October 1658, for example, to reassure Marie Christine that his support for the Savoy marriage was unequivocal, he wrote: 'je suis persuadé que rien ne m'est si avantageux que cette alliance..<sup>83</sup> Moreover, even after the arrival of a special envoy from Spain, offering peace and the marriage Anne of Austria so keenly sought, the cardinal persuaded her to set time limits and conditions upon the subsequent negotiations with Spain.<sup>84</sup> These ensured an automatic and guaranteed reversion to the Savoy marriage if the terms of the proposed marriage between Louis XIV and the Spanish infanta were not settled by May 1659.

That Mazarin's political strategy had been compromised by the Spanish initiative of November 1658 was perfectly clear to Philip IV's council and Condé's ministers in Madrid. Pimentel, who had been chosen by Philip IV to undertake the mission to the French court at Lyon in November, wrote frequently of the difficulties he was experiencing negotiating with Mazarin and he attributed this to the fact that peace and the Spanish marriage were utterly contrary to the cardinal's interests. Pimentel remained convinced that the cardinal was doing all that he could to prevent his negotiations succeeding, citing the cardinal's hopes to persuade the queen to accept the Savoy marriage: 'el cardenal desea sobre todas cosas el casamiento de Savoya por todas las razones que escrivi de Leon..<sup>85</sup> Later

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<sup>83</sup> A.A.E., C.P.Sardaigne, vol.53, f.240: Mazarin to Madame Reale, 4 Oct.1658.

<sup>84</sup> B.N., Ms.Fr.4193, f.271: Lettre delivré à Madame la duchesse de Savoie contenant les intentions du Roy sur son mariage avec la Princesse Marguerite de Savoie.

<sup>85</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616, f.32: Pimentel to Don Luis, 22 Mar.1659.

the following month the Spanish envoy wrote, 'tengo mucha sospecha de que el casamiento de la Señora Infanta no es tan agradable al Cardenal como le huviera sido el de la Princesa Margarita de Saboya..'<sup>86</sup>

Pimentel's censored missives from Lyon and Paris merely confirmed what Don Luis and the rest of the king's council had believed for a long time. The Savoy marriage had already been described in a *junta* held in December 1658 as Mazarin's personal initiative, 'por fines particulares'.<sup>87</sup> Seven months later, opinions had not changed:

'..el concepto que ha hecho del animo del Cardenal en quanto poco desseo de ajustarse la Paz que se conclua el casamiento de la Señora Infanta, por el que tenia de que se hiciese el de Savoya por jugarse lo mas conveniente para su seguridad..<sup>88</sup>

The opinions of Philip's council were reflected by Lenet, who had been sent to Madrid to replace Condé's former representative, the Comte de Fiesque. Lenet believed that the cardinal's hostility to the Spanish marriage also stemmed from his fear of a future alliance between Condé and María Teresa.<sup>89</sup> Certainly, during Pimentel's mission to Lyon, Lenet had informed the prince of his intention to approach María Teresa through the mediation of Medina de las Torres, in order to come to an understanding for the future:

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<sup>86</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616, f.41: Pimentel to Don Luis, 11 Apr.1659.

<sup>87</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.3: Junta, Dec.1658.

<sup>88</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.35: Consulta of the Council of State, 24 Aug.1659.

<sup>89</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.467: Lenet to Condé, 18 Dec.1658.

'..cependant ces gens icy et l'Infante mesme ont bien envie du mariage de France. S'il arrive soyez assure que je noueray partie, c'est le Duc de Medina qui la gouverne.'<sup>90</sup>

He also described to the prince how the infanta would leave Spain 'bien endoctrinée'<sup>91</sup> and would consequently be sympathetic to Condé's interests once in France. Anticipating such an alliance the cardinal actually voiced concern for his future safety in a meeting with Pimentel in May 1659:

'La Reyna dejandome solo con el Cardenal, el qual me refirió de nuevo todo lo que la Reyna me habia dicho, añadiendo que sabia de cierto que la Principal satisfacion que en españa se dava al Principe de Conde y la que el manifestava estimar mas ....a la Señora Infanta por obrar a su favor y contra el Cardenal concierto con el Principe..<sup>92</sup>

So transparent were the cardinal's attempts to obstruct negotiations with Spain based upon the king's marriage with María Teresa that there were indications he was running the risk of losing the favour of the queen mother.<sup>93</sup> As the cardinal was only too well aware, this was extremely serious.<sup>94</sup> If he was

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<sup>90</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.163: Lenet to Condé, 28 Feb.1659.

<sup>91</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.5: Lenet to Condé, 1 Jan.1659.

<sup>92</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616, f.51 Pimentel to Don Luis, 21 May 1659.

<sup>93</sup> This was reported by Lenet: 'comme il est pluy vraisemblable par la persuasion de quelque personnes de pieté et de vertu ou par ceux qui se servant de tels pretextes qui sont tousjours specieux ont cru donner atteinte à la fortune de Mr le Cardinal Mazarin de qui l'inclination et les interest sont si fort opposé à la paix..' cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.474 Lenet to Don Luis de Haro, 18 Dec 1658.

<sup>94</sup> Condé knew of the queen mother's hopes to marry her son to Louis XIV and it was on this basis that Lenet suggested to Don Luis that the Spanish initiative attempt to bypass the cardinal, cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.467: Lenet to Condé, 18 Dec 1658.

reliant for his current status at the French court upon anyone, it was the queen mother, and the withdrawal of her support, as he well knew, meant certain disgrace. In these circumstances the affair between Marie Mancini and the young king, dubbed for rather different reasons by John Wolf the 'Mancini crisis',<sup>95</sup> was highly embarrassing. Having already provoked the suspicions of the queen mother for his conduct during the negotiations with Pimentel, the king's untimely choice of the cardinal's niece as a *paramour* placed Mazarin in an extremely vulnerable position and he moved swiftly to refute damaging accusations that he secretly intended to engineer a marriage between his niece and the young king.<sup>96</sup>

It is quite mistaken therefore to view the negotiations between the courts of France and Savoy in November 1658 as part of an elaborate plan designed by the cardinal to force Philip IV to consent to his daughter's marriage with Louis XIV. It was not Mazarin who provided the drive towards peace at the French court after Pimentel's arrival, but the queen mother, who was determined that her son should follow the precedent set by his father and marry into the Spanish Habsburgs. Pimentel had been sent to Lyon in November 1658 only with a mandate to negotiate a suspension of arms,<sup>97</sup> his orders were to intimate that the marriage between the infanta and Louis XIV might be possible, as a tentative bargaining counter: 'avec ordre de leur faire esperer ce qu'ils ont tant tesmoigné

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<sup>95</sup> J.Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp.136-156.

<sup>96</sup> Mme de Motteville implied that the cardinal wanted this match but realised that peace was too far advanced, *cf.*, Mme de Motteville, *Mémoires*, p.191. This accusation appears with particular personal vindictiveness in Brienne's memoirs, *cf.*, Brienne, *Mémoires*, ed., M.Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires Relatifs à l'histoire de France, depuis l'avènement de Henri IV jusqu'à la paix de Paris conclue en 1793*, (Paris, 1824), xxxvi.239-240.

<sup>97</sup> Saltillo, 'Don Antonio Pimentel de Prado y la Paz de los Pireneos', *Hispania* 7, (1947), p.98.

d'escire qui est l'Infante d'Espagne pour le Roy'.<sup>98</sup> When he arrived at Lyon it was the queen mother who, as Pimentel wrote to Don Luis, insisted that, 'era menester hacer la Paz y el casamiento sin perder tiempo'<sup>99</sup> and the envoy subsequently found himself embarrassed by the inadequacy of the instructions he had from Madrid to negotiate on this level. What had originated therefore as a speculative embassy from Madrid had been seized upon by the queen mother as the opportunity for the marriage of her son and a general peace.

However, despite the obvious importance the queen mother attached to María Teresa, being as Pimentel described, 'la cosa que con mas ansia desea en esta vida..',<sup>100</sup> the difficulty of Condé remained. Mazarin realised that Pimentel's intimations to the queen mother that her brother might now be prepared to agree to his daughter's marriage into the Bourbons had dealt a death blow to his hopes for a Franco-Savoyard alliance. But, provided with the opportunity of Pimentel's isolation from Madrid, he nonetheless hoped to counter the inevitable demands for Condé's rehabilitation to the French court. Clearly, having been denied the opportunity to stitch together closer ties between the houses of Bourbon and Savoy, he had no wish to see his position further undermined by accepting the return to France of one of his most dangerous political enemies. He feared that armed with a bargaining counter on the scale of the infanta, the Spanish would force him into the position of either accepting Condé's terms for a reconciliation, or of breaking peace negotiations over the prince as he had done in 1656 and

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<sup>98</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.371: Lenet to Condé, 18 Nov.1658.

<sup>99</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616: Pimentel to Don Luis de Haro, 3 - 6 Dec.1658.

<sup>100</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616: Pimentel to Don Luis, 26 Nov.1658

incurring the wrath of the queen mother for passing up the chance to marry the king to María Teresa. However, whilst Pimentel continued to remain at the French court the cardinal hoped to exploit the envoy's inexperience and isolation to ensure that if the prince were to be reconciled with the king, it would only be on the harshest possible terms.<sup>101</sup>

Despite strict instructions from Madrid to press for Condé's reconciliation and his restoration to former possessions, governorships and offices, Pimentel's dispatches from Lyon and later from Paris convinced Philip IV's council that, as in 1656, the cardinal was once again prepared to break peace negotiations over the question of Condé.<sup>102</sup> Lenet, Condé's representative in Madrid, was informed that Mazarin remained obdurate on the subject of the prince's reconciliation and was only prepared, 'de rendre au prince tout son patrimoine, sans charges, gouvernements et places à condition de n'aller pas à la cour..<sup>103</sup> These terms were almost identical to those Lionne had offered in 1656 and were, of course, likely to be rejected by the prince.

However, opinions among Philip IV's advisors were sharply divided over how far the king should take his obligations to Condé. The most vociferous advocate of the prince's cause proved to be Don Luis de Haro. He consistently argued that the prince had to be fully compensated in peace negotiations according

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<sup>101</sup> For example the cardinal carefully controlled the envoy's access to the queen - Pimentel complained that he was never allowed to interview with the queen alone, *cf.*, A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1620, f.16: Pimentel to Don Luis, 15 March.1659.

<sup>102</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619, f.3: Consulta of the Council of State, 7 Jan 1659; K1618: Junta, Jan.1659; K1616: Don Luis de Haro to Pimentel, 3 Feb.1659; K1616 Don Luis de Haro to Pimentel, 25 Jan.1659.

<sup>103</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.182: Lenet to Condé, 8/12 Mar.1659.

to the obligations set out in Condé's treaty of 1651,<sup>104</sup> stressing the prince's potential to harm Spanish interests in the low countries:

'y muy particularmente por el evidente riesgo que los Payses Bajos tendrian de perderse en un dia si hallandose el Principe armado como se sabe volvierese mal satisfecho de Vuestra Magestad a componerse con su Rey y a unir sus tropas contra los intereses de Vuestra Magestad..<sup>105</sup>

In some respects, Don Luis' support for Condé was hardly surprising. It was Don Luis who in 1651 had argued that the prince had to be bound into Philip IV's service by a formally negotiated treaty.<sup>106</sup> Marginalising Condé in peace negotiations and reneging on the treaty of 1651 would reflect poorly upon Philip IV's quasi-*valido* whose opponents would find it easy to accuse him of imprudently binding the king to obligations that he could not possibly have hoped to fulfil.

Don Luis' vulnerability in respect of Condé was a factor which coloured the fulminations of the Duque de Medina de las Torres. The duke, who dominated Philip IV's council of state,<sup>107</sup> had long been identified as the leader of the 'doves' among the king's advisors, and on several occasions during the negotiations of 1659 he deployed the rhetoric of Spanish decline to great effect in order to stress the need for a compromise peace with France. Although undoubtedly there was truth to Medina's grim assessment of the condition of the Spanish Empire in his

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<sup>104</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616, f.44: Pimentel to Don Luis, 27 April 1659; K1619, f.3: Consulta of the Council of State, 7 Jan.1659.

<sup>105</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618: Junta, 14 Mar.1659.

<sup>106</sup> A.G.S., Est.Flandes, 2177: Consulta of the Council of State, 5 Nov.1651.

<sup>107</sup> R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.265.

*voto* of early July 1659,<sup>108</sup> it has been forgotten that the duke represented only one side of the political debate and that there was certainly an element of self-interest to his position. Guy Joly, for example, alerted his readers to the existence of a distinctly 'hawkish' party in Madrid: 'il y avoit aussi une cabale à la cour d'Espagne qui s'y opposoit ouvertement, disant que leurs affaires n'étoient pas en assez mauvais état pour les obliger à rien précipiter; qu'il y avoit lieu d'espérer une révolution en France..<sup>109</sup> The views expressed by Medina were not shared by Philip IV and the rest of the court. As Lenet more than once stressed to Condé, the impetus behind the Spanish peace initiative in 1658 was not fear of French arms but Philip IV's growing obsession with the recovery of Portugal and the belief that peace with France was its precondition.<sup>110</sup>

Indeed, there was every indication that so far as the interests of the French crown were concerned, it was as wise to accept the offer to enter into peace negotiations as it had been for Philip IV to propose them. Even Chéruel recognised the potential problems of continuing the war with Spain, not least of which was the likely intervention of the Austrian Habsburgs to assist their Spanish cousins combined with the cessation of English military assistance. Leopold I had already become involved in the war in north Italy - the Duke of Mantua had been given command of an imperial army with which to assist the Spanish army of the

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<sup>108</sup> Saltillo, 'Don Antonio Pimentel de Prado y la Paz de los Pireneos', pp.103-124.

<sup>109</sup> Guy Joly, *Mémoires*, ed., M.Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, (Paris, 1825), xlii.433.

<sup>110</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.182: Lenet to Condé, Madrid, 8-12 Mars 1659; vol.19, f.207: Lenet to Condé, 15 Mar.1659, Lenet spoke in this letter of the wish for peace, 'pour aller prendre sa revanche en Portugal'; vol.21, f.162: Lenet to Condé, 3 July 1659, Lenet here wrote that the king had a 'si grande envie de reduire le Portugal.'; A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616: Don Luis de Haro to Pimentel, 3 Feb.1659. Cf., also, R.A.Stradling, *Philip IV*, p.290.

Milanese commanded by Fuensaldaña<sup>111</sup> - and there were signs that Vienna intended to become embroiled in the Flanders theatre.<sup>112</sup> Pimentel pointed out to Mazarin in March 1659 that the Marques de la Fuente had already procured from the Emperor the service of 10,000 men to serve in the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>113</sup> Even an historian as favourable to Mazarin as Chéruel saw the French position in 1658 as distinctly ominous:

‘Les deux branches de la maison d’Autriche se seraient alors réunies pour combattre la France. La ligue du Rhin, encore mal constituée n’aurait pu arrêter l’empereur. A cette époque, la France se serait trouvée sans alliés: en effet, l’Angleterre, après la mort d’Olivier Cromwell, se divisa et fut réduite à l’impuissance. La Suède, attaquée par le Danemark, la Pologne, le Brandebourg et la Moscovie, pouvait à peine résister à cette coalition, bien loin d’être en état de secourir la France.’<sup>114</sup>

The conflict between de Haro and Medina broke the normal consensual style of meetings of the select *junta de estado*. The principle that Philip IV should stand by the prince during the negotiations was accepted by both. Medina however, argued that the king should be prepared to compromise over the prince if a settlement with France was reduced to a question of Condé being prepared to surrender his office of *grand maître* or the government of Guyenne.<sup>115</sup> The belief

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<sup>111</sup> As part of the terms of the Gonzaga duke’s intervention he was also given the Imperial Vicariat, cf., B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1657, p.188.

<sup>112</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.37: Lenet to Condé, 14 Jan.1659.

<sup>113</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616: Pimentel to Don Luis, 28 Mar.1659.

<sup>114</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.211.

<sup>115</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619, f.3: Consulta of the Council of State, 7 Jan.1659.

that the cardinal was prepared to rupture the peace talks over Condé stimulated the search for alternative forms of compensation that could be awarded to the prince: 'la grandeza de Vuestra Magestad es tan superior que puede suplir al Principe lo que la corona de Francia no le quisere conceder..'<sup>116</sup> This was a useful means to try to prevent an internal political faction fight between Condé and the cardinal from infecting the peace negotiations.<sup>117</sup>

Lenet was not informed until March of the cardinal's continued resistance to Condé's full rehabilitation - despite the offer of the Infanta - when a provisional transcript arrived from Paris detailing the terms that Louis XIV was prepared to accept for peace.<sup>118</sup> However, until the peace of Paris was signed by Pimentel in July, Lenet believed that Condé's position was not significantly under threat. Even if the prince had to accept only a fraction of his offices and governorships, the fact that Don Luis was mooting the possibility of sovereignties in the Spanish Netherlands,<sup>119</sup> the governorship of the Pays-Bas<sup>120</sup> and command of the imperial army as compensation,<sup>121</sup> made it seem that the prince was not in a position to lose: if the cardinal wished to deny him the governorship of Guyenne for example, he would merely find that the prince was, 'puissamment établi par l'Espagne', elsewhere.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.3: Junta, Jan.1658.

<sup>117</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.4: Junta, 14 Mar.1659.

<sup>118</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.182: Lenet to Condé, 8/12 Mar.1659.

<sup>119</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.207: Lenet to Condé, 15 Mar.1659.

<sup>120</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.494: Lenet to Condé, 25 Dec.1659.

<sup>121</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.19, f.404: Lenet to Condé, 27 Nov.1658.

<sup>122</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.304: Lenet to Condé, 15 April 1659.

Lenet's optimism seemed justified when news arrived in Madrid in early May that the cardinal had agreed to a suspension of arms.<sup>123</sup> Both Lenet and Don Luis believed that Mazarin had been forced into its acceptance by the queen mother.<sup>124</sup> However, the euphoria in Madrid was short-lived. Unknown to Philip IV and his ministers, Pimentel had agreed to terms for a general peace shortly after signing the suspension of arms. In early June the document known as the peace of Paris arrived in Madrid for formal ratification.<sup>125</sup> The terms for Condé's reconciliation with the king were a reiteration of the humiliation Mazarin had proposed in 1656 added to which the cardinal had included a clause that prevented the prince from accepting any form of compensation from Madrid.<sup>126</sup> Pimentel informed Don Luis that refusal to ratify the treaty would be taken in Paris as an indication that Spain was breaking off peace negotiations and wished the war to resume. Even Medina found the treatment the cardinal had meted out to Condé hard to stomach: 'El Duque de Medina de las Torres dice que habiendo leído los capitules de lo tratado le ha parecido ...iniquísimo ignominioso y desautorizado.. especialmente en lo que mira al Principe de Conde.'<sup>127</sup>

The peace of Paris, signed and ratified in July, preceded the face to face negotiations on the Isle des Faisans between the cardinal and Don Luis de Haro

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<sup>123</sup> B.N., Ms.Fr., 6731 (Portefeuille de Condé), p.294: Official publication of cease fire by the Marques de Caracena, 8 May to 8 July 1659. Cf., also A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1616, f.48: Armistice entre la France et l'Espagne, 7 May 1659.

<sup>124</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.413: Lenet to Condé, 18 May 1659.

<sup>125</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619, f.10: Consulta of the Council of State, 20 June 1659; K1618, f.5: Caracena to Don Luis, 5 July 1659; A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.20, f.125: Lenet to Condé, 20 June 1659.

<sup>126</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.91.

<sup>127</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619, f.10: Consulta of the Council of State, 20 June 1659.

that formally concluded the Franco-Spanish war. Madrid had been left with little choice but to ratify the treaty in July, for it was either that or a resumption of the war. Temporarily it seemed that the cardinal had contrived to limit Condé's potential to cause him harm by forcing the Spanish to accept his terms for the prince's reconciliation. However, over the course of the negotiations on the Isle des Faisans, the articles that concerned Condé in the treaty of Paris were unravelled and terms were substituted that ensured that the prince returned to France in a position of almost equivalent power to that which he had held during the 1640's.

Mazarin's capitulation over the issue of Condé, under almost day to day pressure during the conferences with Don Luis between August and September, was ultimately the result of his own recognition that the prince was now almost certainly going to return to France, and that the nature of his relations with Condé might have a decisive effect on whether or not he continued to hold his position as first minister. Ever since Pimentel had arrived in France offering the queen mother the marriage of the Spanish infanta, the cardinal had been aware that negotiations with Spain would, as far as he was concerned, be an exercise in damage limitation.<sup>128</sup> Barracking Pimentel into signing a treaty containing the terms he considered as ideal for Condé's return had been one approach. Given the steadfastness of Spanish support for Condé in 1656, Pimentel's treaty might well have been rejected, in which case the war would have continued and Spain blamed for the rupture of negotiations. Alternatively, Madrid would agree to ratify

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<sup>128</sup> Don Luis remarked in September that the decision to send Pimentel to Lyon in November 1658 had been the greatest blow the cardinal could have received - 'la resolución que V Mgd tomo de embiar a Don Antonio Pimentel a Francia y la coyuntura en que llego a Leon entiende que fue el mayor golpe que pudo recibir el cardenal.' A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.55: Consulta of the Council of State, 6/12 Sept.1659.

Pimentel's treaty. Condé and his party would return to France but so effectively subdued that, in the short term at least, their ability to cause him harm would be minimal.

Believing that the terms for Condé's reconciliation had been agreed, the cardinal was prepared to meet Don Luis for face to face talks on the Isle des Faisans in August 1659 on the understanding that they were only to be for the purpose of negotiating the terms of Louis XIV's marriage contract.<sup>129</sup> However, it soon became clear to the cardinal once talks had begun that Don Luis intended to use the opportunity of their meeting to re-negotiate the terms of the prince's rehabilitation.<sup>130</sup> The decision to ratify the peace of Paris in June had only taken place after impassioned debate in Madrid and on the understanding that the meeting with the cardinal in August would be used to procure better terms for Condé.<sup>131</sup> This placed the cardinal in a difficult position. Given the queen mother's thinly veiled intimation that her continued support for his ministry was contingent upon the successful conclusion of negotiations for María Teresa, the cardinal was understandably reluctant to return to France having broken off negotiations with the Spanish. Brienne commented in his memoirs that once the cardinal had arrived at the Isle des Faisans, '[il] n'oseroit se montrer à la cour s'il manquoit à conclure la paix.'<sup>132</sup> The Marques de Caracena was not overstating Mazarin's dilemma when in October 1659 he described María Teresa as the

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<sup>129</sup> A.Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii.222.

<sup>130</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.40: Consulta of the Council of State, 13 Aug.1659.

<sup>131</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1619, f.11: Consulta of the Council of State, 21 June 1659.

<sup>132</sup> Brienne, *Mémoires*, p.243.

'torcedor' that had coerced the cardinal into accepting the prince's return on terms satisfactory to Philip IV.<sup>133</sup>

Whilst it was plainly important for the cardinal to return to Paris having successfully concluded negotiations for the king's marriage, his acquiescence over Condé was also motivated by other considerations for his future wellbeing. The cardinal feared that unless the prince was given terms that were satisfactory to him and despite the strictures of the Peace of Paris, that the Spanish might nonetheless try and compensate Condé through the gift of a sovereignty.<sup>134</sup> The prospect of the prince returning to France strengthened in this manner and embittered towards the cardinal for his conduct during peace negotiations, was an incentive to be more accomodating.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, it was precisely the cardinal's fear for the future harm Condé might cause him that persuaded him that it would be wise to come to some kind of understanding with the prince to promote future cooperation, or at least non-aggression. The cardinal may also have been confident that even though Condé had returned he, Mazarin, would be supported, if not by the queen mother, then by her son. The young king was entering manhood and his yearning for real power was increasing by the day. If Mazarin believed that he had the king's support, he became rather less dependent upon the whims of the queen mother and his position in France was therefore more secure. Whilst Don Luis worked systematically to moderate the cardinal's distrust of the prince and assure

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<sup>133</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.72: Consulta of the Council of State, 1 Oct.1659.

<sup>134</sup> A.G.S., Est.Francia, K1618, f.55: Consulta of the Council of State, 6/12 Sept.1659.

<sup>135</sup> Lenet pointed this out to Condé, arguing that Mazarin could not possible want the prince in France 'outragé et mal' against him, *cf.*, A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.162: Lenet to Condé, 3 July 1659.

him that a sincere reconciliation was still possible, the cardinal's position over the course of the negotiations was gradually seen to shift.<sup>136</sup> By September Caillet, Condé's secretary, remarked that a breakthrough had been made and that they were now beginning to see how Condé's position would emerge from the negotiations.<sup>137</sup>

The ten articles of the peace of the Pyrenees governing the terms of Condé's reconciliation were clearly very different from the terms the cardinal had originally negotiated with Pimentel in Paris.<sup>138</sup> Condé's restoration to former *biens, honneurs* and *dignités* was not complete but his losses were marginal when set against the sacrifices that the cardinal had been pushing for in 1656 and 1658. The charge of *grand maître* for example, was settled on Condé's son, the Duc d'Enghien, rather than the prince himself and he had to forgo the coveted governorship of Guyenne for that of Bourgogne.<sup>139</sup> Other losses included the minor governorship of Berry, despite the offer of its interim governor, the Marquis de Clairambault, to return it to the prince,<sup>140</sup> and, for the prince's son, his entitlement to the governorship of Champagne. The prince retained Chantilly and his possessions in the Clermontois<sup>141</sup> which had served as garrisons for his soldiers during the early stages of his exile. Most important however, was the

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<sup>136</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.246: Caillet to Condé, 1 Aug.1659; f.294: Lenet to Condé, 20 Aug 1659; f.313: Lenet & Caillet to Condé, 23 Aug.1659, f.403: Caillet to Condé, Fontarabia, 22 Sept.1659.

<sup>137</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.403: Caillet to Condé, Fontarabia, 22 Sept.1659.

<sup>138</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Condé*, vii.106.

<sup>139</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.403: Caillet to Condé, Fontarabia, 22 Sept.1659.

<sup>140</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.22, f.107: Lenet to Condé, 3 Nov.1659.

<sup>141</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Condé*, vii.108.

restoration of those who had followed him into exile. This the cardinal had reluctantly agreed to during the final phase of the negotiations on the Isle des Faisans. Like Condé they found that not all confiscations during the decade were restored to them; however, this had long been an issue over which the cardinal had remained obdurate<sup>142</sup> and, in general, those who had remained with the prince throughout the exile found that in the long term they were more than compensated for their loyalty.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> *Cf.*, for example, in 1656 negotiations Mazarin's response to the request to rehabilitate Condé's followers, A.A.E., C.P.Espagne, vol.34, f.232: Servien to Mazarin, 3 July 1656.

<sup>143</sup> *Cf.*, pp.339-340.

## CONCLUSION

Celebrating the success of the negotiations on the Isle des Faisans, Condé commissioned a medal, designed by the Liègois born Jean Warin, to mark the end of his self-imposed exile and his return to France.<sup>144</sup> Depicting a profile of the prince on one side, drawing attention to his classically Bourbon nose, on the reverse Warin portrayed the spoils of war surrounded by the legend, 'non omnis dextera solvat' (no hand could loosen it), an obvious reference to Condé's recovery of his patrimony, offices and dignities upon his return to France in 1660.<sup>145</sup> The medal was entirely appropriate for the circumstances of the prince's return to the French court for he was clearly concerned to stress to his contemporaries that his social and political stature had not been compromised by his years in exile.

The thinly veiled self-assertion behind the medal's inscription was a critical aspect of Condé's return. Whilst still in Brussels in December 1659 he had rejected a suggestion by Lenet that he travel *incognito* to the royal court<sup>146</sup> which at that time was in the south of France making its way towards Aix-en-Provence. Lenet was acting on the advice of Mazarin, who had pointed out to the envoy the

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<sup>144</sup> M.Jones, *French Medals 1600-1672: A Catalogue of the French medals in the British Museum*, Vol ii, (London, 1988), no.228, pp.216-217.

<sup>145</sup> Robert Oresko makes this important point in his review of *French Medals 1600-1672: A Catalogue of the French medals in the British Museum*, cf., *The Medal*, no.16, 1990, pp.103-107.

<sup>146</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.121.

prudence of ensuring that the prince performed his ceremony of reconciliation with the king as early as possible, thereby confirming the settlement reached on the Isle des Faisans. The prince, however, elected to travel to Aix in full state, believing that despite the extra time his journey would take, to travel as Lenet had suggested would be inappropriate:

‘Je feray tousjours assurement les choses de bonne grâce, mais aussy ne les feray-je jamais avec bassesse, et garderay tousjours le décorum comme doit faire une personne de ma condition. Il y a en toutes choses des mesures à garder au-delà des-quelles ce que l’on feroit ne passeroit pas pour galanterie, mais bien pour une foiblesse digne de blasme..’<sup>147</sup>

Condé’s rejection of Lenet’s advice was significant, for like his commissioning of the medal, it was a measure designed specifically to exploit his recent success in the peace negotiations and turn it to his political advantage. Rather than the humiliating scramble across France to seek the king’s forgiveness that the cardinal had envisaged, the prince’s journey became an opportunity for him to make the maximum political capital out of the symbolic importance of his return. The body politic, dislocated by the exile of Condé - France’s first prince of the blood - had now been restored and, as the deputies of the Parlement of Dijon described to the prince in January 1660, his return had made possible the, ‘parfaite union de la maison Royale’.<sup>148</sup>

The choice of Aix as the place of his reconciliation with the king, although

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<sup>147</sup> Aumale cites a letter from Condé to Lenet dated 19 November 1659, cf., Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.121.

<sup>148</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.23, f.65: The deputies of the Parlement of Dijon to Condé, 19 Jan.1660.

circumstantial - the court had travelled to the region to suppress the revolt in Marseille<sup>149</sup> - was a factor that worked in the prince's favour. Given the added time it took for him to travel between the Spanish Netherlands and the south of France he was able to take the opportunity to receive and consult with friends and allies before arriving at Aix in late January 1660. By the time he had arrived, one month after he had left Brussels, he had re-established personal contact with, amongst others, his sister and brother-in-law - the Duc and Duchesse de Longueville<sup>150</sup> - and had been publicly reconciled to his brother - the Prince de Conti,<sup>151</sup> a symbolic revival of the powerful Conti/Condé/Longueville axis of the 1640's.

Travelling to Aix rather than waiting for the king's return to Paris had further benefits for the prince. More than anything else it avoided the humiliation of a more official and popularly attended reconciliation in Paris and circumvented the problems of protocol he might have encountered in such a public forum.<sup>152</sup> Meeting the king in such *ad hoc* circumstances had the advantage of providing the prince with an environment in which he, as a military commander and seasoned campaigner, could show up best. The prince was accompanied to Aix by a *suite* of

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<sup>149</sup> W.Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth Century France*, (Cambridge, 1985), p.135; Pillorget...

<sup>150</sup> This meeting took place at Coulommiers and was the first significant stopping point for the prince on his journey down to Aix. At Coulommiers he separated from his wife, daughter and son, his son continuing to Augerville to the Château of Président Perrault and his wife and daughter, accompanied by the Duchesse de Longueville, to Trie. B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1660, p.43; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.123.

<sup>151</sup> This meeting took place at Orgon, a short distance from Aix itself. B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1660, p.79; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.124.

<sup>152</sup> Cf., reconciliation between Gaston and Louis XIII, G.Dethan, *La Vie de Gaston d'Orléans*, (Paris, 1992), p.105.

his own senior commanders, individuals who had formed the *petits maîtres* during the late 1640's and had then joined him in exile such as Guitaut, Coligny-Saligny and Bouteville.<sup>153</sup> He and his commanders were well accustomed to arriving at provincial garrison towns to conduct high level negotiations and meetings. The exigencies of the campaigns of the 1650's had often dictated that Condé's rendez-vous with the Spanish high command took place in provincial settings rather than the more formal environment of Brussels.

Therefore, despite the ostensibly repentant nature of the ceremony of reconciliation, there was nothing submissive about the prince's intentions once he had crossed the amorphous border of the Spanish Netherlands into his native land. Imbued with the confidence gained from his recent success in the negotiations for the peace of the Pyrenees he was returning to France aware that his exile had proved the benefits of self-assertion. There was little doubt that the concessions he had obtained on the Isle des Faisans far exceeded those that he could have hoped for had he negotiated unilaterally with the cardinal and queen mother in late 1653. The cardinal had failed to impose harsh terms upon him, his alliance with Philip IV had paid handsome dividends and he was now in a position to reap the benefits. Whilst he made his way from Brussels down to the south of France, receiving messages of international acclaim and respect, the cardinal was in Aix, concerned about the prince's arrival in France, the extent to which the peace negotiations had undermined his position, and presiding over the ruins of his foreign policy.

Mazarin's unease was such that since the prince's departure from Brussels

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<sup>153</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.124.

the cardinal had received intelligence reports giving information about who the prince was meeting and the precise itinerary of his journey.<sup>154</sup> Despite the assurances Mazarin had obtained from Don Luis de Haro of the prince's good intentions, his correspondence continued to betray a deep sense of anxiety about Condé. In particular, the cardinal was concerned about the prospect of meeting Condé at Aix, afraid that this would reflect badly on his own status and that the prince would humiliate him by not according him the correct form of protocol.<sup>155</sup> By all contemporary accounts the cardinal appeared satisfied by the prince's conduct at the reconciliation.<sup>156</sup> Yet he continued to have the prince spied upon after his departure from Aix<sup>157</sup> and manifestly, during the remaining months of his life, was fearful of the prince's intentions, a fear carried on occasions to the point of paranoia.<sup>158</sup>

Given the confidence and ease with which the prince returned to French court society the cardinal's misgivings were hardly surprising. Almost immediately after the prince had returned to Paris he set about ostentatiously rewarding those among the *petits maîtres* who had remained loyal to him and followed him into exile in 1652. The Comte de Bouteville, for example, was remunerated

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<sup>154</sup> Cf., for example, A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.910, f.5: Anon to Mazarin, 8 Jan.1660; f.22 Anon to Mazarin, 20 Jan.1660.

<sup>155</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.125; A.Chéruel, *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, ix.440: Mazarin to Turenne, 16 Dec.1659.

<sup>156</sup> B.R.B., *Rérelations Véritables*, 1660, p.79; B.N., *Gazette de France*, 1660, no.20, p.151.

<sup>157</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.910, f.81 Anon to Mazarin, 24 Feb.1660; f.54 Séguier to Mazarin, 13 Feb.1660.

<sup>158</sup> At one point the cardinal was reported to have scolded Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the *intendant des finances* of Mazarin's household, for spending too long with the prince and being too credulous of the prince's good intentions, cf., Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii, pp.131-133.

spectacularly for his loyalty by a marriage the prince arranged into the house of Luxembourg, elevating the count to the status of *Duc*.<sup>159</sup> Similarly the Comte de la Suze was rewarded by his restoration to the *terres* and governorships of Belfort - a significant achievement given that Mazarin had attempted to appropriate them both for his future son-in-law, the Duc de Mazarin.<sup>160</sup> A further opportunity for recognizing past loyalties during the 1650's was seized by the prince at the 1661 promotion to the order of the St Esprit when the Comte de Guitaut, to the fury of his rival Coligny, was promoted into membership of the order through the prince's patronage.<sup>161</sup>

Languishing on his deathbed the cardinal was not alone in worrying that the prince's return was a serious threat to his position. Philippe, the king's brother, shared the cardinal's concerns that Condé was bent on reviving the political situation of the 1640's and was particularly exercised that this return to power would be at his expense. Shortly after Gaston's death in February 1660 and official recognition of Philippe as 'Monsieur' a bitter dispute over protocol broke out with Condé who, Monsieur claimed, had implied comparability of status by adorning his carriage in Gaston's funeral *cortège* in the style that was the unique privilege of the sons of France.<sup>162</sup> A similar dispute in March 1660 erupted over Condé's treatment of members of the house of Lorraine who claimed that the

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<sup>159</sup> B.N., Carrés d'Hozier, vol.451, f.114: 'Contrat de mariage de haut et puissant .. François Henri de Montmorency... avec Damoiselle Madeleine-Charlotte de Clermont de Luxembourg.'

<sup>160</sup> A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.414: Caillet to Condé, 27 Sept.1659.

<sup>161</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.142-145.

<sup>162</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.910, p.109: Colbert to Mazarin, 19 Mar.1660; A.Chéruel, *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, ix.935: Mazarin to J-B Colbert, 25 Mars 1660; Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.134-135.

prince was not according them the status they were accustomed to as *princes étrangers*.<sup>163</sup>

The suspicion and resentment of Condé's rivals at the French court was understandable given the circumstances of the prince's return in 1660. The losses Condé sustained in the peace of the Pyrenees - for example the governorship of Berry and the loss of the defensive capacity of Bourges and Montrond, both of whose fortifications had been razed in the aftermath of the Frondes - were more than offset by the greater international *éclat* the prince had added to his standing and influence. The prince had gained an important ally in France's new queen, María Teresa, who supported his projects at the royal court, most notably in the case of his son's candidature for the Polish crown during the later 1660's,<sup>164</sup> and he also continued to remain in contact with other friends made during the years in exile such as, for example, the Marques de Caracena who had succeeded Don Juan José as captain-general of the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>165</sup>

Added to the prince's international connections was his gradual re-acceptance into the king's council and accumulation of a series of influential army commands. Admittedly the prince was excluded from commanding the king's armies and from attendance at the *conseil du roi* for a few summary years of 'disgrace' after his return - a temporary but serious blow to his position - but, by the end of the 1660's the situation had been transformed. Embarrassingly, for lack

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<sup>163</sup> A.A.E., M.D.France, Affaires Intérieures, vol.910, f.81: Anon to Mazarin, 24 Fev.1660; f.83: Anon to Mazarin, 27 Feb 1660; f.85: Anon to Mazarin, Paris, 2 Mar.1660; f.87: Anon to Mazarin, 10 Mars 1660.

<sup>164</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.213-214.

<sup>165</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.186.

of alternative candidates of similar military experience, Louis XIV was driven to make use of the prince's expertise and that of his *petits maîtres* to command his armies and this, of course, corresponded with an increase in the prince's political stature and influence over 'Louis XIV's' foreign and domestic affairs.<sup>166</sup> It was significant, for example, that the generals who served the king in the Dutch war were nearly all those who had followed the prince into exile during the 1650's: Rochefort, Montal, Chamilly and Luxembourg.<sup>167</sup>

Awareness that the grands were in a position to influence the foreign policy of the crown and even be in a position to run their own independent relations with foreign powers seems at odds with the image of royal absolutism propagated by the Sun King's biographers - most notable, for example, in François Bluche's recent biography of Louis XIV.<sup>168</sup> Yet Monsieur operating from his château at St Cloud, for example, clearly ran his own independent foreign policy, maintaining separate relations with Vittorio Amadeo II of Savoy.<sup>169</sup> Similarly, the Vendôme during the 1690's exercised a significant influence over the foreign policy of Louis

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<sup>166</sup> St Simon hints at the considerable international influence Condé was accustomed to exercising through his position in France: 'Louvois, désespéré du joug de Monsieur le Prince et de M. de Turenne, non moins impatient du poids de leurs élèves mêmes. Il persuada au Roi le danger de ne tenir pas les cordons des généraux de ses armées, qui, ignorant les secrets du cabinet et préférant leur réputation à toutes autres choses, pouvoient ne s'en pas tenir au plan convenu avec eux avant leur départ, profiter des occasions, faire des entreprises dont le bon succès troubleroit les négociations secrètes, et les mauvais feroient un plus triste effet; que c'était à l'expérience et à la capacité du Roi de régler non seulement les plans des compagnes de toutes ses armées, mais d'en conduire le cours de son cabinet et de ne pas abandonner le gouvernement de ses affaires à la fantaisie de ses généraux.' Saint Simon, *Mémoires*, ed., A.de Boislile, 40 vols., (Paris, 1916), xxviii.111; also cf., Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.298; *Mémoires de Primi Visconti sur la cour de Louis XIV*, ed., J-F.Solnon, (Paris, 1988), p.30.

<sup>167</sup> Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé*, vii.310; F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, p.251 & 528.

<sup>168</sup> F.Bluche, *Louis XIV*, (Oxford, 1990).

<sup>169</sup> R.Oresko, 'The diplomatic background to the Glorioso Rimpatrio: the rupture between Vittorio Amadeo II and Louis XIV (1688-1690)', ed., A. de Lange, *Dall'Europa Alle Valle Valdesi*, (Turin, 1990), pp.251-278.

XIV from a perspective of private interest.<sup>170</sup> At the same time, the consolidation of courtly alternatives to the royal court at St.Germain or Versailles were as clear an indication as any of the continuation of the power of the *grands* into the latter half of the seventeenth century. The Condé at Chantilly, the Orléans at St.Cloud, the Conti at Villiers de l'Isle Adam, and the Dauphin and subsequently his son, the Duke of Burgundy, at Meudon, acted as cultural and political rivals to one another and provided a wide variety of possible bases and support structures for noble and *officier* careers. In many respects the personal rule of Louis XIV enabled such alternative courtly centres to thrive, and with it, grandee power. Recent work on this period has suggested that the rule of the Sun King was characterized by a far greater respect for traditional forms of hierarchy and order.<sup>171</sup> The settling of a massive *appanage* by the king upon his brother Philippe, for example, can be contrasted with the treatment meted out to Gaston by Louis XIII during the 1630's who, despite his rank, was denied even his requests for military commands, and never received what he considered an adequate *appanage* to support his position.

Far from representing the paradigm of aristocratic submission to the forces of modernity and state absolutism, Condé's exile and triumphant return was merely a powerful reminder of the resources available to members of this caste and their position as a critical element of the French power structure that continued to remain firmly in place. Theodore K. Rabb's paradox of the prince who

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<sup>170</sup> Cf., forthcoming D.Phil thesis on the Vendôme during the 1690's by Guy Rolands, Magdalen College, Oxford.

<sup>171</sup> W.Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth Century France*, (Cambridge, 1985); R.Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France*, (London, 1988).

fought the *Fronde* ending his days rowing ladies on the lake of Versailles, whilst perhaps in keeping with the way the Sun King would have liked the prince to have been remembered, is a singularly unconvincing example of the supposed decline in grandee power.<sup>172</sup> Respect for members of this caste, and particularly for those members of the royal family like Condé, was a feature of French political life that, far from subsiding, was reinforced by Louis XIV's reign. Even Louis XIV himself, whilst it would seem that he was personally hostile towards Condé until the prince's death in 1686, was nonetheless so imbued with the mystique of royal blood as the basis of Bourbon sovereignty that he was prepared to support an ever increasing role for Condé as one of the major princes of the blood. Few in 1700 would have disagreed with the sentiment underpinning Mazarin's perhaps less than sincere observation in 1656 that the concept of a place of surety in France was inappropriate for someone of Condé's status. The prince, as the cardinal observed, was of a grandeur and social stature that made such assurances of safety unnecessary: '... il sçavoit ce que c'estoit un prince du sang en France et un prince de Condé - il jugeroit que toute vostre seureté estoit en vostre personne.'<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Cf., pp.8-9.

<sup>173</sup> This comment was made during the negotiations for peace between France and Spain in Madrid 1656 and comes from a report by Lionne of a conversation with Don Luis de Haro, cf., A.C., C.G.C., Série P, vol.21, f.313: Lenet and Caillet to Condé, 23 Aug.1659.

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