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The Shapley Axiomatization for Values in Partition Function Games

Abstract:

One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player’s marginal contribution—a central notion to the Shapley value—be defined in a variety of ways, but it is also not obvious which axiomatization should be used. Consequently, a number of authors extended the Shapley value using complex and often unintuitive axiomatizations. Furthermore, no algor...

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Oskar Skibski More by this author
Tomasz P. Michalak More by this author
Michael Wooldridge More by this author
Publisher:
DCS
Publication date:
2013
URN:
uuid:3a6ccb3a-6bf5-4e76-b182-0a48deb775ea
Local pid:
cs:6831

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