


**Evaluative Language
in
Greek Lyric and Elegiac Poetry
and Inscribed Epigram
to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.E.**

George I.C. Robertson
Corpus Christi College

Submitted for the degree of D.Phil.
Faculty of Literae Humaniores
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Michaelmas Term 1998 (1999)



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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the rhetorical uses of evaluative language in Greek lyric and elegiac poetry and inscribed epigram of the period from the seventh to the fifth century B.C.E. The discussion focuses on the poets' evaluations of human worth in three areas, each of which forms a separate chapter: martial valour, the relationship between physical appearance and inner virtue, and political or social values. Within each chapter, particular aspects of the subject under discussion are treated under separate headings.

Although the literary material has been treated in various ways in the past, the inclusion of inscribed epigram alongside the other literature in this case offers evidence from a related but distinct branch of poetic tradition for the development and expression of these values; divergences between the literary and the inscriptional tradition can be quite marked, as can the different approaches taken by poets of various genres within the literary material. The attempts of previous scholarship to define clear and consistent systems or codes of value represented in the poetry and to trace their development over this period have been generally unconvincing, but the poets' deployment of evaluative language does show some discernible patterns which appear to be related more to genre and poetic tradition than to the purely chronological processes of development that have been proposed by other scholars.

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Note on Editions and Abbreviations

Inscriptions are cited by their numbers in Hansen, *Carmina epigraphica Graeca* (CEG), and reference is also made where appropriate to Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (FGE). For the iambic and elegiac fragments West's edition is used, and Theognidean verses not attributed by West to Theognis himself are cited in italic numerals (as in West's indices). Pindar and Bakchylides are cited as in the Teubner editions of Snell and Maehler; the fragments of Sappho and Alkaios are numbered as in Lobel and Page's *Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta*. Other lyric fragments follow the numbering of Page's *Poetae melici Graeci* (PMG), and where appropriate his *Supplementum lyricis Graecis* (S) or Davies' *Poetarum melicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (PMGF).

1. *Introduction*

1.1 *General*

This dissertation is concerned with some aspects of the uses to which the language of evaluation is put in the lyric and elegiac poetry of the period up to the end of the fifth century BCE. Surviving inscriptions in verse from the period will also be discussed here, with a view to determining what similarities and differences there are in the use of evaluative terms between the ‘literary’ examples and the contemporary inscriptions, two related but distinct branches of poetic tradition. This is not an attempt to describe more or less coherent systems or codes of values, since these are not as readily discernible as has sometimes been thought,¹ but a study of some of the rhetorical uses to which evaluative terminology can be put in the poetry of this period.

The epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides is, of course, explicitly and primarily concerned with praise of the achievements of the *laudandus*; its use of evaluative language, therefore, in some respects differs from that found in poetry of other genres. For this reason, each chapter contains a section on aspects of its theme as found in epinician poetry in particular. The chapters on war and beauty also contain sections dealing specifically with inscribed epigram and the special concerns of that tradition in the contexts of those themes; in the political chapter, on the other hand, it

¹See below, section 1.2, for some pitfalls in this approach to Homer in particular.

was found to be more convenient and coherent to have relevant inscriptions incorporated into the sections which also discuss the literary material.

This is, of course, a very large subject, and this discussion will concentrate on three broad categories: martial valour, beauty and virtue, and political values. Within each chapter, several different aspects of the values in question are dealt with under separate sub-headings. Although cross-references between these sections are often made, many of the sections may be thought of as largely self-contained.

During much of the period under discussion here, war is either present or anticipated in many parts of the Greek world, and meditation on various aspects of war is a common theme in poetry. Chapter 2 deals with these poets' reflections on martial valour and the qualities that make a good soldier. Men need to be encouraged to fight by the presentation of war as a worthwhile endeavour, and the first four sections of the chapter examine the poets' views of patriotism and the desire for the accumulation of personal glory (whether in life or posthumously) as components of martial ἀρετή. But not everyone will be convinced, and the final section deals with the poetic character whom Simonides (*PMG* 524) calls the φυγόμαχος, the man who places his own safety first, despite the best efforts of the poets to entice or shame him into fighting valiantly.

A good soldier is not always a good-looking one (and *vice versa*), and a discussion of the relationship between beauty and bravery forms the final section of the following chapter, which deals more generally in its earlier sections with the ever-

present tension between *Sein* and *Schein* in the poetry of this period. Hesiod describes Pandora as a καλὸν κακόν (*Theogony* 585); the similarity in sound between these two words with almost directly opposed meanings which allows Hesiod to make this aural play is reflected in the poetic theme of the difficulty of distinguishing between the apparent and true worth of a person. Many poets take up the theme on these terms, though some (epinician poets in particular) attempt to square the circle by rhetorically creating a closer link between appearance and reality.

In chapter 4, the focus is on poetic representations of some of the factors that contribute to a person's worth in a civic context. Attempts to define a city's ἀγαθοί and κακοί on the grounds of birth, class or wealth (and the manifestations in poetry of resistance to such attempts) are examined, and at the end of the chapter two virtues in particular are singled out for further discussion; σοφίη and σωφροσύνη are subjected to poetic manipulation in some political contexts, but resist such manipulation in others.

Two 'sins of omission' resulting from the focus on these three aspects ought to be mentioned here. The first is that some evaluative passages in the poetry of the period which do not fit into one of these categories escape close attention. The most obvious of these, perhaps, is Simonides' ode to Skopas (*PMG* 542, quoted in Plato, *Protagoras* 339a-346d) citing and challenging Pittakos' assertion that χαλεπὸν ...

ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.² Though this poem is explicitly concerned with the the problem of how a man can earn the right to be called ἀγαθός, the fact that the poet is concerned with a very general kind of ἀρετή and indeed appears to be deliberately avoiding a more precise definition of this virtue (v. 14 πράξας γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, vv. 39-40 πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσιν | τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται) means that this text receives less attention here than it would deserve in a work of a different nature.

The virtues of women suffer a similar fate. The subject matter of Chapter 2 obviously excludes them, and there is little room for them in Chapter 4. They might have been accommodated in the discussion of beauty and virtue in Chapter 3; but as is suggested in the verses which conclude Semonides' presentation of the woman who is like a delicate long-maned mare (7.67-70),

καλὸν μὲν ὦν θέημα τοιαύτη γυνή
 ἄλλοισι, τῷ δ' ἔχοντι γίνεται κακόν,
 ἦν μή τις ἦ τύραννος ἢ σκηπτούχος ἦ,
 ὅστις τοιούτοις θυμὸν ἀγλαΐζεται,

the construction of female beauty and female virtues as perceived and praised by male observers and writers is intimately linked to notions of the social position and functions of both the γυνή and ὁ ἔχων and the relationships between them. When the epitaph of Archedike ('Simonides' *FGE* XXVI (a)) praises the dead woman ἦ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὔσα τυράννων | παίδων τ' οὐκ ἦρθη νοῦν ἐς

² According to Socrates, Simonides intended to "take down" (343c1: καθέλοι) Pittacus' gnomic statement because he, covetous of fame, wished to gain a reputation for wisdom. Simonides' entire poem then is a refutation of Pittacus' gnome (343c3-5 and 344b3-5)' (M. Demos, *Lyric Quotation in Plato*, p.21). As will be seen in section 4.5 below, Aristodamos' *gnōmē* χρήματ' ἀνὴρ is 'taken down' rather more subtly by Pindar (and perhaps by Alkaios – see section 4.4).

ἀτασθαλίην, again a woman's virtue is expressed in terms of her position as daughter, sister, wife, and mother. An untangling of these knots should form the subject of a separate study.

Frequent references will be made to the question of how far the poetry discussed here reflects or contradicts the use of evaluative terms in the Homeric epics. Chapter 3 opens with a section devoted to beauty in Homer as preparation for the examination of that theme in the later material, but here some more general preliminary remarks on evaluative language in the epics themselves, and the relationship of the epics to later poetry, are in order.

1.2 *Homer*

Commentators have tried to describe the systems of social constraints by which the Homeric characters are perceived as being bound and to elucidate the 'heroic code' which regulates the conduct of the heroes, whether or not such a code of values is thought of as having had an existence in the 'real' world outside the poems. Finley, for example, states that the code of conduct which puts constraints on the activities of the Homeric heroes is 'complete and unambiguous',³ but attempts to

³M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, p. 113.

define this system of values completely and unambiguously have generally been unsuccessful.

Adkins argues that in the Homeric poems the ‘*agathos* ... has himself the strongest of claims against society’;⁴ this view and the problems with it may be examined with reference to the use of the phrase ἄγαθός περ ἐών, which occurs six times in the *Iliad*⁵ and which is interpreted by Adkins in such a way as to support his view of the ‘claims’ of the ἄγαθός. At *Iliad* 1.275, for example, Nestor warns Agamemnon that he should not, ἄγαθός περ ἐών, take Briseis from Achilles; and at 24.53 Apollo warns that Achilles, ἄγαθός περ ἐών, runs the risk of incurring the anger of the gods if he persists in his maltreatment of the corpse of Hektor. Adkins suggests that in both of these cases the man described as an ἄγαθός is justified in doing what he does, since he enjoys all the privileges accorded to an ἄγαθός. The force of περ, to Adkins, is thus: ‘even though you have a right to do this and are not in violation of human or divine law, please do not do it’; the man’s status as ἄγαθός will not, on this view, be affected by his actions.⁶

But surely it is more natural to take these phrases as an indication that there are bounds which even an ἄγαθός may not overstep. Long points out⁷ that in each

⁴A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 49.

⁵The use of this phrase at *Iliad* 9.626 f. (ἀπαγγεῖλαι δὲ τάχιστα | χρὴ μῦθον Δαναοῖσι καὶ οὐκ ἄγαθόν περ ἐόντα) presents no difficulty: Aias says that he must deliver the μῦθος even though it is not good. But in the cases where the phrase is applied to people, further examination is called for.

⁶Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 37-38.

⁷A.A. Long, ‘Morals and Values in Homer’, p. 127.

case there is a reason given for the prohibition: Nestor's is that Briseis was given by the army to Achilles as a γέρας (1.276), and Apollo's is that the gods will be angry with Achilles.⁸ It is better to interpret περ, then, as meaning 'though you are ἀγαθός, you are not entitled to do this'.

Adkins' view⁹ that it is impossible for an Homeric ἀγαθός to incur ἐλεγχείη without failing in some endeavour is contradicted by *Odyssey* 10.72, where Odysseus is addressed as ἐλέγχιστε ζώντων on the grounds that he is hated by the gods; this is clearly sufficient condemnation, and the enmity of the Olympians with which Apollo threatens Achilles at *Iliad* 24.53 is not an empty threat, even to an ἀγαθός.¹⁰ Long, again, corrects Adkins:

ἀγαθῷ περ ἐόντι [at *Iliad* 24.53] does not ... assert Achilles' claims; it shows that there are limits to the actions which even a pre-eminent *agathos* can perform without forfeiting the gods' support. Achilles does not lose the title ἀγαθός by dishonouring Hector's corpse; how could he? But he is dangerously near to losing divine approval on which much of his success and claims to ἀρετή are based.¹¹

And in his commentary to *Iliad* 24.53, Macleod define ἀγαθός as

'noble/excellent/powerful', not a term of *moral* commendation. It emerges from this passage, as from the book and the whole poem, that to be merely ἀγαθός is not enough ... note also ἀγαθός περ ἐών as used in 1.131, 275; 19.155. There too neither Achilles nor Agamemnon was right to over-assert

⁸Long (p. 128) cites the words of Zeus at 24.66-67 (οὐ μὲν γὰρ τιμή γε μὴ' ἔσσεται· ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἑκτώρ | φίλτατος ἔσκε θεοῖσι βροτῶν οἳ ἐν Ἰλίῳ εἰσίν) and comments that 'Hector too has his τιμή and Achilles is not to be permitted to forget this'.

⁹Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 39.

¹⁰It may also be noted that upon hearing from Thetis that the gods are displeased, Achilles immediately desists: *Iliad* 24.133 ff.

¹¹Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer', p. 127.

his 'excellence' (ἀρετή).¹²

Adkins writes, with reference to Odysseus' statements at *Iliad* 2.284 ff. and 2.199 ff. that ἐλεγχεῖν would be incurred as a result of the αἰσχρός act of leaving Troy empty-handed, that 'both *elenchistos* and *aischron* decry failure in war: and this is the manner in which such failure is regularly treated. In peace, too, the same standards apply. It is *aischron* to fail, in war or in peace'.¹³ The assumption that even the 'quiet' virtues, such as hospitality, in Homer are to be seen as variations of the 'competitive' virtues leads Adkins to the assertion that when Penelope reproaches Telemachos at *Odyssey* 18.215 ff. for allowing the 'beggar' to be maltreated by the suitors, she is perfectly justified in placing the blame on her son rather than the suitors, since it is he who has failed and 'fallen short of *arete*'.¹⁴ Again, it is Adkins' view that when Eumaios says (*Odyssey* 14.38) that he would suffer ἐλεγχεῖν if his dogs harmed the 'beggar', he is referring to the fact that he would have failed in an aspect of ἀρετή:

[s]uccess is so imperative [in war] that only results have any value: intentions are unimportant. Similarly, and for similar reasons, it is *aischron* to fail in time of peace to protect one's family and guests, whatever one's intentions.¹⁵

But as Dover argues, the view that it is only success, not intentions, that counts in evaluating a hero's worth does not explain Halitherses' charge of κακότης against the kinsmen of the suitors at *Odyssey* 24.455:

¹²C.W. Macleod, *Homer: Iliad, Book xxiv*, p. 93.

¹³Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 33.

¹⁴Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 42.

¹⁵Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 35.

in Halitherses' view, the κακότης of the kinsmen lay in their rejection of – or indifference to – his advice, not in the collapse of any earnest attempts at restraint on their part (he himself is the one who has 'failed' in that sense), nor in the calamity which is now the end-product of their rejection of advice.¹⁶

And Long rightly summarizes: '[t]he fact that certain social obligations in Homer require successful fulfilment does not show that they are to be distinguished as "competitive" values'.¹⁷ He disagrees with Adkins' equation of wartime and peacetime ἀρετή:

[t]he fact that radically different ... situations are evaluated ... by the same expression, does not entail that they are rated at the same value. There is an appropriate way of stowing gear, of preparing a feast, of behaving towards strangers, etc. in every case it is the external aspect of the situation which receives evaluation.¹⁸

The importance of bearing in mind the contexts in which words like ἀρετή are used, and of avoiding the temptation to equate different uses of the words, is of course not restricted to the Homeric epics, and will be crucial to the following discussion.

Terms like ἀγαθός do appear to be used in the Homeric poems in a sort of 'social' sense; that is, a man of high standing in society can be called ἀγαθός even as he is committing an act of which the speaker disapproves.¹⁹ Adkins believes that this 'social' use of the term is 'not distinct' from the more explicitly 'evaluative' instances; the two combine to form 'one world-view':

[a]gathos commends the most admired type of man; ... the man who possesses

¹⁶K.J. Dover, 'The Portrayal of Moral Evaluation in Greek Poetry', p. 39.

¹⁷Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer', p. 125.

¹⁸Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer', p. 136.

¹⁹Cf. the discussion, above, of the phrase ἀγαθός περ ἐών.

the skills and qualities of the warrior-chieftain in war and ... in peace, together with the social advantages which such a chieftain possessed.²⁰

But it is going too far to say, with Adkins, that every use of ἀγαθός or similar words in Homer is intended to elicit admiration for the person to whom the epithet is applied.

Certainly the suitors in the *Odyssey* are called ἄριστοι,²¹ but as Long points out,

[t]he suitors *are* nobles, βασιλεῖς, and ἄριστοι ... describes their social category. It is the relations between heroes or men of substance with which Homer is largely concerned. In contexts where one ἀγαθός condemns another, the commendatory function of ἀγαθός, ἐσθλός, etc. may be weak, or ... almost entirely honorific.²²

But it is not always easy to see where such terms are merely ‘honorific’ as opposed to being more truly ‘evaluative’. In Homer it is sometimes reasonably clear that words of commendation are used in a ‘formulaic’ way, and ought not to be interpreted as expressing genuine approval,²³ but words like ἀγαθός appear to be used in later poetry in a more problematic way, and the distinction between their ‘moral’ and ‘social’ sense is often blurred. Again, context is of prime importance, and here it would be appropriate to mention Griffin’s observation that ‘the epics strongly favour the reservation of the crucial moral terms from the narrative to the speeches’,²⁴

²⁰Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 32.

²¹1.245; *cf.*, *e.g.*, 23.121 and 24.429.

²²Long, ‘Morals and Values in Homer’, p. 126.

²³Hector is δῖος even at the moment of being accused by Sarpedon of behaviour as a κακός at *Iliad* 5.471 (Long, ‘Morals and Values in Homer’, p. 126).

²⁴J. Griffin, ‘Homeric Words and Speakers’, p. 40. Griffin notes (p. 39) the following about the use of ἀγαθός in the epics: ‘in the *Iliad* it is used 47 times in narrative and 37 in speech, in the *Odyssey* 12 times [*sic*: 26 times] in narrative and 12 times in speech. Those figures, however, are misleading: no fewer than 40 of the 46 [*sic*] narrative instances in the *Iliad*, and 6 of the 12 in the *Odyssey*, are repetitions of the single formula βοὴν ἀγαθός. If that phrase is excluded, the instances

considerations of the speaker's or poet's identity and purpose in speaking will also be important in the examination of later poetry in this discussion.

An illustration of the difficulties into which strict adherence to an imagined rigorous code of ἀρετή can lead a commentator is provided by Adkins' assertion that 'Odysseus killed the suitors for the sake of his *arete*, because it would be *aischron* not to do so',²⁵ Dover justifiably criticizes this view, pointing out that

I have always assumed that Odysseus killed the suitors for exactly the reasons for which I would have sought to kill them if I had been Odysseus: they had conspired against my son, pestered my wife and consumed my possessions. It is obscurantist to imply that Odysseus said to himself: 'My God, I must do something about my *arete*!'²⁶

Adam Parry notes that in the Homeric epics ἀρετή 'does not connote an independent entity representing the final goal of human action, but rather something limited and practical, a natural and empirical value arising out of the conditions of the warrior's life'.²⁷ And although Yamagata's conclusion that in Homer 'ἀγαθός or κακός means different things for different people and in different contexts'²⁸ may sound less like a conclusion than a refusal to reach one, it is a useful reminder of the dangers into which an approach like that of Adkins can lead the student not only of Homer, but also of the poetry which forms the subject of this dissertation.

of ἀγαθός in speech outnumber those in narrative by 35 to 7 in the *Iliad*, and by 23 to 6 in the *Odyssey*'.

²⁵Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 238.

²⁶Dover, 'The Portrayal of Moral Evaluation', p. 45.

²⁷A.M. Parry, 'A Note on the Origins of Teleology', p. 261 [= *Language of Achilles*, p. 100]

²⁸N. Yamagata, *Homeric Morality*, p. 224.

1.3 *Homer and Later Poetry*

A few points about the difficulties in determining the relationships between ‘epic’ passages in later poetry and the epics themselves should also be made here.²⁹ Commentators have noted similarities in vocabulary and phrasing between certain passages of epic and later poetry, but it is not always a straightforward question of imitation or adaptation of Homeric models which we can recognize. It must be borne in mind that the Homeric epics were not the only epics which the later poets would have known, and what appears to us to be an imitation of a passage in Homer may in fact be related to another epic, or it may contain elements which had become conventional in epic and thus recurrent in later poetry when the same subject was being treated.

This last point may be illustrated by a passage from Tyrtaios: the descriptions of the dead old man and the dead youth at 10.21-30. The similarities between this passage and Priam’s plea to Hektor not to fight Achilles (*Iliad* 22.66-76), and the fact that the verses seem more appropriate in Tyrtaios than in Homer (especially lines 71-3 in Homer’s version, as was already noticed by schol. bT *ad loc.*: δοκεῖ τοῦτο προτρεπτικὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀποτρεπτικόν), led West to claim that Tyrtaios’

²⁹Although archaic lyric and elegiac poetry is here categorized as ‘later’ than Homer, this is not intended to imply (as this section should make clear) that the Homeric epics necessarily existed for Archilochos and Tyrtaios in the same form in which they exist for us. Janko, on the other hand, argues that ‘linguistic data prove that the Homeric epics had already acquired fixed form before Hesiod’s time’, and that this was probably due to the existence of a written version (*The Iliad: A Commentary*, volume iv, p. 37).

passage, rather than being modelled on Homer's, in fact reflects an even earlier tradition: it 'may have had an epic origin, but it was not in the *Iliad*: lines whose original purpose was clearly to encourage young men to fight to the death (as in Tyrtaeus) cannot have been invented for Priam's passionate appeal to Hector *not* to fight'.³⁰ From this, of course, it does not necessarily follow that Homer is in fact later than Tyrtaios; Richardson prefers to assume that 'both Homer and Tyrtaeus are making use of a protreptic passage belonging to the epic tradition, and that Homer has adapted it to a different context'.³¹ Still, perhaps Tyrtaios, although branded as 'no innovator' by West,³² has left his own mark on the tradition by elaborating on the erotic aspects of a young man's corpse (10.29-30 θηητός ... ἐρατός ... καλός).³³

³⁰M.L. West, review of G. Tarditi, *Archilochus* (Rome, 1968) and C. Prato, *Tyrtaeus* (Rome, 1968), *CR* n.s. 20 (1970) 147-51, p. 150. He repeats the point in support of his argument that there is no literary text that specifically refers to the *Iliad* until Alkaios 44 ('The Date of the *Iliad*', p. 206).

³¹N.J. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary, volume vi*, p. 113. So also B.B. Powell (*Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet*, p. 247): 'Traditional themes in traditional language support the different purposes of different poets.' Something similar may have occurred at *Iliad* 18.265, where Poulydamas says that Achilles περὶ πτόλιός τε μαχήσεται ἡδὲ γυναικῶν, a phrase that might more naturally be used of a defender (Leaf, vol. 2, p. 287 *ad loc.*: 'περὶ, as the stake of the contest: in this sense, ἀμφί with dat. or acc. is the usual word ... περὶ being generally used of the object only as defended'), as a scholiast on this verse mistakenly understood it: τοῦτο σημειωτέον πρὸς τὸ "ἀμυνέμεναι ὥρεσσι(ν)", referring to *Iliad* 5.486. The phrase is apparently translated back into something resembling its original context at *Odyssey* 11.403 ἡδὲ περὶ πτόλιος μαχεούμενον ἡδὲ γυναικῶν, with the curious result that the strange form μαχεούμενον 'results from the adaptation of *Il.* xviii 265 to fit the syntax of the sentence' (Heubeck, in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, vol. ii*, p. 101).

³²Review of Tarditi and Prato, p. 149.

³³R. Garner (*From Homer to Tragedy*, p. 11), assuming the priority of Homer, suggests that in Tyrtaios the shift of emphasis from the 'pitiable nature of the fallen old man' as portrayed in Homer to 'an elegiac insistence upon the ugliness of the scene' allows Tyrtaios to elaborate on the beauty of the young warrior and 'to slide magically from the general declaration of the beauty of dying – which is hard to accept – to the beauty of the young – which is practically impossible to deny'.

One must be cautious, then, about suggesting that any reading of a lyric or elegiac passage requires knowledge of its Homeric exemplar and the context of that exemplar. Adkins provides an extreme example of assumptions regarding the archaic poets' 'allusions' to Homer. In his commentary on Mimnermos 1, Adkins notes that the phrase κρυπταδίη φιλότης in line 3 occurs only once in Homer, at *Iliad* 6.161, in the story of Bellerophon as told by Glaukos. Adkins writes that 'Mimnermus has no desire to emulate Bellerophon', and suggests that the 'collocation of χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης and δῶρα in Mimnermus [1.1 and 1.3] might in itself suffice to recall Paris' speech [at *Iliad* 3.64 μή μοι δῶρ' ἔρατὰ προφέρει χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης]', saying that the combination of these words appears to 'indicate a fairly complex process of reminiscence and possibly allusion'.³⁴

But it is probably going too far to suggest that χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης in line 1 and δῶρα in line 3 (a very loose 'collocation') will make the listener recall one particular line of the *Iliad*. It is best to agree with Fowler that

the reader is not required to compare the 'model' word for word in order to grasp the point. ... [T]he poet does not sit down with his text of the *Iliad* and take a word from this passage, a phrase from that, a line from another. The epic language is at the back of his mind,

and that '[t]he whole epic corpus continued to form the background of numerous poems; these poems have an epic cast but no specific Homeric reference'.³⁵ This approach will be seen to be more satisfactory than that of Adkins in consideration of

³⁴A.W.H. Adkins, *Poetic Craft*, pp. 99-100.

³⁵R.L. Fowler, *The Nature of Early Greek Lyric*, pp. 26 and 33.

the relationship between the values to be found in the poetry to be discussed here and those expressed or implied in Homer.

2. Martial Valour

Martial valour is a highly valued trait in the heroes of the Homeric epics. The poetry of the period between Homer and the end of the fifth century also contains many references to fighting and the kinds of values that good soldiers were expected to have. In most cases, as will be seen below, the ‘warrior codes’ that are stated or implied in poetry and inscribed epigram until the time of the Persian wars are in line with those that are to be found in Homer, despite the fact that some commentators have chosen to see rejections of ‘traditional’ heroic values in some poems; after the Persian wars, considerations which are not prominent in Homer or the archaic material begin to appear. Even the poetry from the archaic period, though, does sometimes depart from Homeric models by giving expression to certain elements that may only be hinted at in Homer, or by adapting Homeric martial values to different circumstances. This discussion will begin with an examination of the reasons which are called forth to encourage men to fight, and will look at depictions of the ‘ideal’ soldier, concluding with some supposed and some more definite rejections of martial valour.

2.1 Reasons to Fight and Die

At *Iliad* 12.322 ff., the hero Sarpedon explains to Glaukos why they should fight rather than avoid battle in order to save their lives: his argument is that since

men must die some day,¹ they ought to go into battle and seek glory (εὖχος, line 328; cf. 325 μάχην ... κυδιάνειραν). Whether, in the end, they win this glory or not (328 ἤέ τω εὖχος ὀρέξομεν, ἤέ τις ἡμῖν), it is important that they make the effort. Since in the *Geryoneis* of Stesichoros there is a similar passage where Geryon is debating the question of whether he should fight Herakles, that episode will be discussed here.

The decision of Geryon seems (from what can be understood from the fragmentary text) to be centred upon the matter of Geryon's immortality or lack thereof (as a descendant of the gods, he may or may not be immortal himself); in this his reasoning reflects that of Sarpedon, who said that he would not fight or encourage Glaukos to do so if they were not fated to die anyway. We know that Geryon did fight Herakles in the end, and at the end of his conversation with Menoites he seems to accept that if he is not immortal he should fight and accept what is μόρσιμ[ον] (*S* 11.21), but his reasoning up to that point is unclear from what remains of the text.

Barrett thought that Geryon's previously stated alternative was probably this: if I am immortal, 'it is better to endure disgrace and to allow Herakles to make away with my cattle'.² But Page believes that Geryon's reasoning was that if he was immortal he would have nothing to fear in fighting, and Page rejects Barrett's interpretation on a number of grounds, including the reasonable argument that 'The man who says that, if mortal, he prefers death to disgrace, is not likely to say that, if

¹Hektor justifies his going into battle in similar terms when he says to Andromache at *Iliad* 6.487-89 οὐ γάρ τίς μ' ὑπὲρ αἴσαν ἀνὴρ ἢ Αἴδι προΐάψει | μοῖραν δ' οὐ τινα φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν, | οὐ κακόν. οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν Archilochos also employs this *topos* in two fragments, apparently from exhortatory contexts, where he says that war is something in which men must engage and take their chances (fr. 110 †ἔρξω· ἐτήτυμον γὰρ ξυνὸς ἀνθρώποις ἢ Ἀρης), and of which the outcome is in the hands of the gods (fr. 111 καὶ νέους θάρσυνε· νίκης δ' ἐν θεοῖσι πείρατα). See below for Kallinos' treatment of this *topos*.

²Quoted in Page, 'Stesichorus', p. 150.

immortal, he prefers disgrace to death.’³ Page also suggests that ‘[t]he context requires that the sequel to both propositions be the same – that he will fight, as indeed he does’, and that ‘[i]t would be almost a travesty of Homer if Geryon were to say “do not frighten me by talking about death: *for if I am immortal, I shall simply let Herakles run off with the cattle*”’ (Page’s italics).⁴

These arguments seem sensible, and one should perhaps be hesitant to ascribe a ‘travesty of Homer’ to a poet who was later described as ὁμηρικώτατος,⁵ but it should be noted that in the Homeric passage, the sequel to both propositions is not in fact the same. What Sarpedon says to Glaukos at *Iliad* 12.322-25 is just what Page does *not* think Geryon would have said:

ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ’ ἀθανάτω τε
ἔσσεσθ’, οὔτε κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην
οὔτε κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν.

Geryon, whatever his reasoning was, came to the same conclusion at which Sarpedon arrived, namely that he must fight if he is fated to die and must therefore try to die honourably (it appears, from *S* 11.22 ὀνειδέ[, that Geryon was concerned about the reproaches he would incur if he did not fight). Campbell writes that

Given that Stesichorus was ‘most Homeric’, one might have expected his heroes to utter generalisations about life and death; but ... the papyrus fragments confirm that he kept to the specific situation, even when the opportunity arose for a piece of moralising:⁶

but there is hardly any less ‘moralising’ here in Stesichoros than in the Homeric passage. Geryon in fact does seem to have spent two stanzas ‘uttering generalisations about life and death’; in what remains of our text, his cattle do not appear until the

³Page, ‘Stesichorus’, p. 150.

⁴Page, ‘Stesichorus’, p. 150.

⁵‘Longinos’, *On the Sublime* 13.3.

⁶Campbell, *The Golden Lyre*, p. 225.

sixth line of the antistrophe (*S* 11.27; although line 14 κερα[might perhaps be a reference to their horns).

Since Geryon's cattle are at stake in his confrontation with Herakles, he is in that respect more personally interested in that situation than Sarpedon and Glaukos are in the Trojan War; these heroes are both Lykians, and are therefore not fighting to save their own land, as the Trojans are. For them, therefore, the question of whose land is in danger does not arise; in contrast, two lines in the Theognidea (887-88) which come perhaps from a song put in the mouth of an ally or mercenary⁷ give just this consideration as a reason *not* to fight:

μηδὲ λίην κήρυκος ἄν' οὐς ἔχε μακρὰ βοῶντος·
οὐ γὰρ πατρώας γῆς πέρι μαρνάμεθα.

This couplet looks back to the theme of patriotism in battle which recurs in martial exhortations in the poetry between Homer and the Theognidea. Less than a hundred lines before Sarpedon offers his own justification for fighting, Hektor exhorts the Trojans to fight περὶ πάτρης (*Iliad* 12.243, *cf.* 15.496; when Hektor is dead, his father will describe him as having done just that: ἀμυνόμενον περὶ πάτρης, 24.500). This is of course a natural consideration to mention to those to whom it applies, in this case the Trojans in the *Iliad*, and it becomes important in the seventh century in the exhortatory elegies of Kallinos and Tyrtaios.

Kallinos 1 employs 'Homeric' language (though not always in strictly 'Homeric' ways: *e.g.* line 1 ἄλκιμον ... θυμόν uses words that are found in Homer but never in that collocation, ἄλκιμον ἦτορ being the usual Homeric formulation; μέγαν ... καὶ ἄλκιμον ... θυμόν is found also at Tyrtaios 10.17) to express sentiments which are often 'Homeric' as well. We have seen that Sarpedon's main reason for

⁷E.L. Bowie (*Miles Ludens?*, p. 228) records the suggestion of P.A. Cartledge that the couplet would also be appropriate for 'men fighting not on their own home territory but abroad, albeit in a war conducted by their *polis*.'

fighting at Troy is that he will die some time anyway; Kallinos echoes this idea in the words θάνατος δὲ τότε ἔσσεται, ὁπότε κεν δὴ | Μοῖραι ἐπικλώσωσ' (1.8-9).⁸ Kallinos' audience is encouraged to fight γῆς περὶ (line 7), but Kallinos does not present this as an *obligation*. The Homeric heroes, on the other hand, are exhorted to fight in the terminology of obligation, *e.g.*: τῷ οὐ τι χρὴ μῦθον ὀφέλλειν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι (*Iliad* 16.631, Patroklos speaking to Meriones); οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κλοτοπεύειν ἐνθάδ' ἐόντας | οὐδὲ διατρίβειν· ἔτι γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἄρεκτον (*Iliad* 19.149-50, Achilles to Agamemnon). Again, Sarpedon encourages Glaucos: τῷ νῦν χρὴ Λυκίοισι μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἐόντας | ἐστάμεν ἡδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι (*Iliad* 12.315), and νῦν σε μάλα χρὴ | αἰχμητὴν τ' ἔμεναι καὶ θαρσαλέον πολεμιστὴν (*Iliad* 16.492-93; these words are repeated by Achilles to Hektor at 22.268-69). Achilles asks Odysseus at *Iliad* 9.357-58: τί δὲ δεῖ πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν | Ἀργείους; Such language does not occur in the poetry of our period in military contexts.

Kallinos, rather, points out that to fight for one's country is τιμῆν τε ... καὶ ἀγλαόν (line 6),⁹ and that the man who dies fighting will be mourned by all the

⁸Cf. lines 14-15 πολλάκι δηϊότητα φυχῶν καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων | ἔρχεται, ἐν δ' οἴκῳ μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου, and Simonides *PMG* 524 ὁ δ' αὖ θάνατος κίχε καὶ τὸν φυχόμενον; Tyrtaios' εἰ δὲ φύγη μὲν κῆρα τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο (12.35) does not refer to cowardice as these two passages do: as can be seen from the following lines in Tyrtaios, it refers to a man who fights but is not killed, and is held in honour by his fellow-citizens. W.J. Oates argues from the similarity of Simonides *PMG* 524 to Horace's *mors et fugacem persequitur virum* (*Odes* 3.2.14) that it might have been preceded (as δ' αὖ might suggest) by a line containing the sentiment in the preceding line of Horace: *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*. Oates' argument for a Simonidean original for *Odes* 3.2 also adduces the parallel between *PMG* 582 ἔστι καὶ σιγᾶς ἀκίνδυνον γέρας and *Odes* 3.2.25-26 *est et fideli tuta silentio | merces* (Oates, *The Influence of Simonides*, pp. 1-55).

⁹Although in Homer such things as ἄποινα, ὕδωρ, γυῖα, and εὖχος are modified by the epithet ἀγλαός (*Iliad* 1.23, 2.307, 19.385, and 7.203 respectively; ἀγλαὸν εὖχος recurs at Tyrtaios 12.36), fighting is never so described. Also, τιμή is not explicitly a consideration for those on the defending side; it is the sackers of cities who win τιμή, while the defenders fight for their lives. Kallinos uses language which recalls the epic, but (as far as can be determined from what remains of early epic) his audience is not meant to remember specific epic passages or uses.

citizens and considered ἄξιος ἡμιθέων (19);¹⁰ the city will see him as having been a defensive πύργος (20), an image which will recur in Alkaios 112.10 ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλι|ος πύργος ἀρεύ|ιος,¹¹ and fr. 396 ἄρκος ἔσση.¹² The structure and balance of this poem are important: having briefly chastised the νέοι in the opening lines of the poem (μέχρις τέο κατάκεισθε; κότ' ἄλκιμον ἔξετε θυμόν, | ὦ νέοι;),¹³ Kallinos immediately introduces the consideration of τιμή and says that fighting γῆς πέρι is

¹⁰Verdenius ('Callinus fr. 1', p. 4) cites *Iliad* 5.78, 22.394, 24.258, 6.123-28, 9.498 and *Odyssey* 6.149 to show that 'such epithets as ἀντίθεος, ἰσόθεος, θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος, θεοειδής are no empty phrases. The theomorphism of the heroes complements the anthropomorphism of the gods.' This is true enough, but here there is a difference: in epic, the heroes *are* often semi-divine and they are aware of the fact; an exhortation like Kallinos' 'if you fight, you will be like a demigod' would not work with an epic hero who is already a demigod. West, in his commentary to *Works and Days* 160 (p. 191), asserts that the word ἡμίθεοι 'refers to [the heroes'] parentage ..., not to semi-divine status', but the fact remains that in poetry after Homer, ἡμίθεοι is the term used for the heroes of the Trojan War (to the examples are cited by West may now be added Simonides 11.18, for which see Capra and Curti, 'Semidei Simonidei', pp. 28 ff.). See below for Leimbach's interpretation of Kallinos' phrase.

¹¹This is the reading in the scholia to *Persai* 352; the *Souda* and the scholia to Sophokles. *O.T.* 56 have ἀρήϊοι (thus, 'warlike men are a city's tower' rather than 'men are a city's warlike tower'). Parallels for both applications of the adjective can be found in Homer: for warriors *e.g.* *Iliad* 11.800 'Αρήϊοι νῆες 'Αχαιῶν, and for a fortification *e.g.* *Iliad* 4.407 τεῖχος ἄρειον. But in Homer, it is only at *Odyssey* 11.556 that we find πύργος used as a metaphor for a man, when Odysseus tells the shade of Aias (who is elsewhere, of course, ἔρκος 'Αχαιῶν: *Iliad* 3.229, 6.5, 8.211) that τοῖος γάρ σφιν (*i.e.* 'Αργείοισι) πύργος ἀπώλεο. A.W.H. Adkins suggests that the tower image here is intended to recall *Odyssey* 11.556 in particular; it 'must have been a well-known passage, and the repeated portrayal of Ajax with a shield ἥντε πύργον [Adkins cites *Iliad* 7.219, 11.485, and 17.28, and notes that the formula 'is likely to have occurred in many contexts now lost'] might be expected to make the association of πύργος and Ajax easier. If the allusion were taken, then, Callinus would be in a position to imply that the warriors of 20 and 21 are worthy of comparison with Ajax' (Adkins, *Poetic Craft*, p. 66, with p. 218, n. 40).

¹²This is an image which Pindar will use in an athletic context: at *Pythian* 5.113, the strength of the victorious Arkesilaos in athletic competition is described as ἔρκος οἶον.

¹³Kallinos criticizes his audience for sitting idle when πόλεμος γαῖαν ἅπασαν ἔχει (line 4); with this poem could perhaps be compared Archilochos fr. 112, if M.L. West's reconstruction of the context (*Studies*, p. 129; West thinks that frr. 112 and 113.1-6 come from the same poem) is correct. West proposes that the situation is as follows: a city is threatened by enemies, and 'At this critical juncture a wedding is being celebrated. Archilochus mocks the bridegroom, who behaves as if he were a favourite of Aphrodite and of fortune'. But A.P. Burnett (*Three Archaic Poets*, p. 43 n. 30) states that there is 'no good reason to attach [113] to 112 ... or to restore the situation of 112-13 after [West's] fanciful manner'. And although West's scenario is attractive, it is perhaps best to follow Burnett's more cautious approach.

ἀγλαόν, and the following lines (8-13) are devoted to the theme that all men are destined to die anyway, and therefore should fight. Only in lines 14-16 does the poet state that the man who flees battle will be οὐκ ἔμπης δῆμῳ φίλος οὐδὲ ποθεινός (16: 14 φυγών, then, refers to flight,¹⁴ not merely to survival after the battle, as does φύγη at Tyrtaios 12.35), and the rest of the poem is concerned with the glory that awaits the patriotic soldier; in this exhortation, then, the carrot looms large while the stick is wielded lightly.

The analyses of this elegy of Kallinos by Leimbach and Krischer show how the poet uses Homeric models effectively to present an idea which is itself not strictly Homeric. Leimbach points out that Hektor, apparently the patriotic fighter *par excellence* urging his men to fight and die to protect their families and homes (*Iliad* 15.494-99),¹⁵ decides to stand and resist Achilles ‘nicht in der Erwartung oder in der Hoffnung ..., damit für die Rettung der Stadt das Beste zu tun – Priamos hatte ihn im Gegenteil beschworen, sich zu eben diesem Zweck hinter die Mauern zu begeben, – sondern in dem Bewußtsein, auf diese Weise seinem Ruhm am besten zu dienen’.¹⁶ Hektor would rather die than hear his fellow Trojans say that Ἕκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν (22.107), but by choosing death he ensures that he has done exactly that: ‘destroyed his people’. Kallinos, however, removes the hero’s choice between noble death and ignoble survival: his insistence on the notion that death will come when it is fated has the effect of minimizing the risk involved in fighting (it is,

¹⁴Perhaps the tautometrical echo of 12 οὐ γάρ κως θάνατόν γε φυγεῖν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν serves also to emphasize the enormity of this act of desertion. See also section 2.5 below, ‘Fight or Flight’.

¹⁵It is not clear why B. Snell (*Tyrtaios und die Sprache des Epos*, p. 22), thinks it is significant that Homer here uses a verb meaning ‘defend’ (15.496 ἀμυνομένῳ περὶ πάτρης) whereas Kallinos uses a verb simply meaning ‘fight’ (1.6-7 μάχεσθαι | γῆς πέρι ...).

¹⁶Leimbach, p. 272.

then, no more dangerous than any other activity),¹⁷ and he claims that it is quite possible for an ordinary soldier to survive *and* be treated on a level with the great heroes (19 ζῶων δ' ἄξιος ἡμιθέων).¹⁸ Krischer suggests that the dialogue between Sarpedon and Glaukos in *Iliad* 12 (see above) was Kallinos' model: the poet here is holding out the promise of the honours that Homer's heroes already have and which Sarpedon cites as the reason they must fight. The difference is that fighting is no longer a matter of 'Adel verpflichtet'; in this case 'die Ehre, von der der Dichter spricht, wird im Kampf nicht gerechtfertigt, sondern erworben',¹⁹ and patriotic valour is thus τιμῆν τε ... καὶ ἀγλαόν (v. 6).²⁰

In Tyrtaios, too, much emphasis is placed on patriotic motives for fighting: 10.2 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον, 12.15-16 ξυνὸν δ' ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντί τε δήμῳ,²¹ | ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένη ..., 12.33-34 ἀριστεύοντα μένοντά τε μαρνάμενόν τε | γῆς πέρι καὶ παίδων. When this consideration applied, it seems that the poets were ready to exploit it; on the other

¹⁷Leimbach, p. 273.

¹⁸'Die Helden der Ilias sind Helden von Anfang an und bleiben es. Bei K[allinos] dagegen ist niemand mehr für den Ruhm in besonderer Weise prädestiniert' (Leimbach, p. 278).

¹⁹Krischer, p. 389.

²⁰E.K. Irwin notes, however ('Epic Situation and the Politics of Exhortation', Cambridge Ph.D. thesis 1999, Chapter 2), that 'since status and birth are a precondition of the characters of epic, the demonstration of their martial valour can only be described as the justification of status, not the earning of it' (cf. note 10 above, on the semi-divinity of the heroes), and that the shift in emphasis in sympotic martial elegy may then reflect the attempt of an aristocracy under pressure to assert its status within the community.

²¹At *Iliad* 3.50, Hektor rebukes Paris in these terms: πατρί τε σὼ μέγα πῆμα πόλῃ τε παντί τε δήμῳ, and Cassandra, seeing the body of Hektor returning to Troy, recalls that in the past Hektor's safe return from battle μέγα χάρμα πόλει τ' ἦν παντί τε δήμῳ (24.706). If, as seems likely, these are versions of an old formula μέγα [χάρμα/πῆμα] πόλῃ κτλ. (G.S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, volume i, p. 272; following A. Hoekstra, *Homeric Modifications*, p. 116, who writes that the formulation at 24.706, with ἦν, is the result of 'separation of the component parts of an ancient prototype'), Tyrtaios' ξυνὸν ἐσθλὸν appears to be the poet's more emphatic insistence on the community expressed in πόλῃ τε παντί τε δήμῳ.

hand, Solon's poems of military exhortation (frr. 1-3), encouraging the Athenians to fight for possession of the island of Salamis, cannot use such terms.²² Salamis is, of course, not technically the *πάτηρ* of the Athenians, but Solon must nonetheless portray it as something worth fighting, and dying, for.²³ Whereas we find *ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης* in Homer (*Iliad* 12.243) *γῆς πέρι* in Kallinos (1.7) and Tyrtaios (12.33-34) and *ἀμύνων πατρίδος δουληϊήν* in Anakreon (*PMG* 419), Solon writes *μαχισόμενοι περὶ νήσου | ἱμερτῆς* (3.1-2; cf. 1.1 *ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος*). Similar adjectives are used in Archilochos 166.3 *ἱμ]ερτὴ Πάρ[ος*, Solon 4.21 *πολυήρατον ἄστυ*, and Tyrtaios 4.4 *Σπάρτης ἱμερόεσσα πόλις*, on which Adkins comments:

In Homer the word [*sc.* *ἱμερόεις*] is always applied to objects or activities already charged with desire.²⁴ The choice of an adjective with such connotations to characterize a city, and Sparta in particular, gives us an unusual insight into the attitude of a Spartan citizen to his city – or into the attitude which Tyrtaeus hoped to inspire.²⁵

Adkins goes on to mention that 'Homer uses neither *ἱμερόεις* nor *ἱμερτός* of cities', but Homer's applications of those terms to homelands more generally (*Iliad* 2.751 *ἱμερτὸν Τιταρησσόν*) and of very similar language to cities (*Odyssey* 11.275 *Θήβη πολυηράτῳ*) suggests that Adkins' narrow interpretation conceals an idea which did

²²In other contexts, Solon naturally takes the opportunity to stress *ἡμετέρη ... πόλις* (4.1) or *πατρίδ' ἡμετέρην* (19.6).

²³Diogenes Laertios (1.48) reports that Solon tried to prove that Salamis legitimately belonged to the Athenians by showing that the Salaminians' burials were in the Attic style and by inserting lines into the *Iliad* (2.557-58) which suggest an early connection between Athens and Salamis. These reports are 'somewhat unreassuring' (Podlecki, *The Early Greek Poets*, p. 124), and the remains of Solon's elegies on the battle for Salamis do not show quite the same devious technique. G.S. Kirk, in his discussion of these two Homeric lines (*The Iliad: A Commentary*, volume i, pp. 207-9), cites the report in Aristotle (*Rhet.* A 15.1375 b 30) that the Megarians accused the Athenians of inserting the couplet, and substituted two lines of their own, which named places in the Megarid. Kirk says that the Megarian couplet is 'clearly inauthentic' and that the story of the substitution 'suggests rather ... that Athenian interference at this point is unlikely'.

²⁴Adkins (*Poetic Craft*, p. 72) lists Homer's uses of the word to describe Aphrodite's breasts (*Iliad* 3.397), Hera's skin (*Iliad* 14.170), dancing (*Iliad* 18.603), and singing (*Odyssey* 1.421).

²⁵Adkins, *Poetic Craft*, p. 73.

in fact have Homeric roots. Solon's description of Salamis as ἰμερτή, then, is perhaps the poet's indirect way of raising the island to the status of his audience's πάτηρ, and perhaps lies behind the tradition that Solon in fact came from Salamis, as found in Diogenes Laertios (1.45 Σόλων Ἐξηκεστίδου Σαλαμίνιος; cf. 1.46, where the dispute over Salamis is described as τῆς πατρίδος αὐτοῦ [Σαλαμῖνος]²⁶ ἀμφισβητουμένης, and Solon's injunction that after his death his bones should be taken to Salamis, 1.62) and Diodoros of Sicily (9.1.1 ἦν δὲ καὶ Σόλων πατρὸς μὲν Ἐξηκεστίδου, τὸ γένος ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος τῆς Ἀττικῆς).²⁷ Elsewhere such language is used openly of territory to be conquered: Mimnermos, in lines probably from his *Smyrneis* (9.2-3), describes the objects of the settlers' expedition as ἰμερτὴν Ἀσίην and ἐρατὴν Κολοφῶνα. Here the epithets have a significantly different effect than in the Salamis poems of Solon, since Mimnermos is not exhorting, but narrating past events; the territory was, of course, conquered, and became a new homeland for Mimnermos and his audience.

This use of adjectives such ἰμερτός and ἐρατός becomes hackneyed enough for the Theognidea to use the motif with tongue in cheek at 1043-44:

εὐδωμεν· φυλακὴ δὲ πόλεως φυλάκεσσι μελήσει
ἀστυφέλῃς ἐρατῆς πατρίδος ἡμετέρης.

Here the overloaded-sounding pentameter almost deserves to be placed in inverted commata,²⁸ notwithstanding van Groningen's solemn assertion that 'Le distique n'a

²⁶Bracketed by Cobet; apparently an intrusion of the scholion δηλονότι τῆς Σαλαμῖνος into the text (H.S. Long, *Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum* (Oxford, 1964), vol. 1, p. 19, *apparatus ad loc.*).

²⁷Something similar may have happened in the case of Aischylos: 'one wonders ... if the idea that Aeschylus comes from the deme of Eleusis might not have had its *aition* in Aeschylus' prayer to Demeter at the formal beginning of the poetic contest in the *Frogs* (886-8)' (M.R. Lefkowitz, *First-Person Fictions*, p. 120).

²⁸Compare the accumulation of adjectives when Archilochos grumbles about Thasos in fragment 22: οὐ γάρ τι καλὸς χώρος οὐδ' ἐφίμερος | οὐδ' ἐρατός The patriotic associations of such language may, then, have become a cliché long before the composition of Theognidea 1043-44

rien de symposiaque Non, il se situe admirablement dans la bouche d'un magistrat qui engage les habitants à dormir en paix'.²⁹ Van Groningen claims that the sentiment in this couplet differs 'sensiblement' from those in 887-88 (see above) and 763-64 (πίνωμεν χαρίεντα μετ' ἀλλήλοισι λέγοντες, | μηδὲν τὸν Μήδων δειδιότες πόλεμον), but there is no reason why 1043-44 should not be read in this sense.

Later, such language finds an interesting use in *CEG* 155, an epitaph at Amphipolis for a Parian fighting the Persians on the Strymon in 476/5:

μνήμ' ἀρετῆς ἔθεσαν Πάριοι Τόκεω ἡ[ό]νεκεν ἡβῆν
['Ηι]όνος ἀνφ' ἐρατῆς ὤλεσ(ε) βαρνάμενος.

Here the land for which the warrior died fighting is ἐρατή, although it is not his place of origin; here, the epithet ἐρατή is possibly a result of the pan-Hellenic ideology of the campaign to drive the Persians out. Three Athenian epigrams from the Eion campaign, and the circumstances of their composition, reflect the development in epitaphs towards emphasis on the achievements of, and for, the community:³⁰ they are quoted by Aischines (3.183), who tells us that the δῆμος allowed the generals to set up the monuments in the *agora* ἐφ' ᾧτε μὴ ἐπιγράφειν τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐαυτῶν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ δήμου δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ ἐπίγραμμα.

When we turn to the early Greek verse epitaphs which make mention of the fact that the commemorated man was killed in battle, it is remarkable that there are none certainly datable before the Persian wars which explicitly mention the fact that the man died fighting for his country.³¹ As we have seen, there were certainly literary

²⁹Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 389.

³⁰This will be discussed further below.

³¹Such details become common later in the fifth century: e.g., *CEG* 4, 82, 118, 142 (see below). There are, however, two inscriptions which may make earlier mention of patriotic death: *CEG* 142 (Akarnania, ca 475-450? Hansen), which contains the phrase ἡδὲ περὶ τὰς αὐτο γὰς θάναμα(ρ)νάμενος, is dated to the sixth century in Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, no. 64. And *CEG* 22 (Attica, ca 550-530?) contains a line beginning τρι[, which Peek suggests may be part of πα[τρι[δ-; if θα[in the last line comes from e.g. ἔ]θα[νε, this inscription would again be an early

models for patriotic representations of combat, and concern for one's πατρίς is shown in some early epitaphs for people who died away from home: *CEG* 66 (Athens, *ca* 500?) γῆς ἄπο πατροίης and 143.5 (Kerkyra, *ca* 625-600?) γ[αία]ς ἄπο πατρίδος. One reason that patriotic language does not appear in the extant early epitaphs for soldiers could be that the battles in which these men died were not fought to protect their own soil, and thus the use of phrases like 'died fighting for his country' would be inappropriate. But the Kerkyrean epitaph *CEG* 145 (*ca* 600?), for example, refers to a battle at the river Aratthos on the mainland; Friedländer-Hoffleit and Pfohl suggest that this is likely to have been a clash between Kerkyra and her parent state Korinth,³² in which case the Kerkyreans were probably defending themselves against Korinthian aggression rather than attempting a conquest of their own. This defensive situation, as opposed to a war of conquest, would justify the use of patriotic language, but such language does not appear here.

There is another early verse epitaph where, again, the conflict in which the young man commemorated lost his life may be identifiable: this is *CEG* 136 (Argolis, *ca* 525-500?).³³ The dead man, Hysematas, is described as ἐν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενον. The only significant military engagement in this area near the time of the inscription seems to have been an invasion of Argos by the Spartan Kleomenes which resulted in

example of this sentiment.

³²Friedländer and Hoffleit, p. 29; Pfohl, *Poetische Kleinkunst*, p. 14. U. Ecker (*Grabmal und Epigramm*, p. 69) accepts Thucydides' date (1.13.4) of 664 for a battle between the two states, and cites the lack of change in Korinthian lettering and the use of intervocalic digamma in *CEG* 145 as favouring this date, but Hornblower notes that the conflict reported by Thucydides probably belongs 'to the late seventh or early sixth century', since it would 'fit into the general context of the Corcyrean-Corinthian hostility at the end of Periander's reign, Hdt. iii. 49 ff.' (S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, p. 45, citing W.G. Forrest, 'Two Chronographic Notes', *CQ* 19 (1969) 99-110; Forrest's Kerkyrean chronology appears on p. 106, n. 3).

³³Also discussed below, sections 2.4 and 4.6.

a disastrous defeat for the Argives at Sepeia, near Tiryns, in 494;³⁴ Daly identifies this campaign with the πολέμοι in the third verse of the epitaph.³⁵ The Spartan invasion is reported by Herodotos (6.76-82), who also notes that this defeat put Argos out of action for a long time; thirteen years later they claimed still to be too weak to fight the Persians (Herodotos 7.148). Once again, there is no mention in *CEG* 136 of the fact that Hysematas died for the sake of his homeland, which is consistent with what can be seen in other contemporary verse epitaphs for fallen soldiers.

The *Planudean Anthology* preserves and ascribes to Simonides the following epigram ('Simonides' *FGE* II):

Δίρφυος ἐδμήθημεν ὑπὸ πτυχί, σῆμα δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 ἐγγύθεν Εὐρίπου δημοσίᾳ κέχυται·
 οὐκ ἀδίκως, ἐρατὴν γὰρ ἀπώλεσαμεν νεότητα
 τρηχεῖαν πολέμου δεξάμενοι νεφέλην.³⁶

In his discussion of this epigram, Page tentatively suggests that it may be a genuine inscription from Simonides' period, referring to the battle between the Athenians and the Euboians in 507/6. Page finds the 'apparent admission of defeat' striking, and remarks on the fact that there is 'not even a palliative πατρίδα ῥυόμενοι or the like'; while it is true that the tone of the epigram is pessimistic,³⁷ comparison of other verse

³⁴If Pausanias' assertion (3.4.1) that the battle at Sepeia took place early in the reign of Kleomenes is correct, the date of the engagement may be around 520; neither date excludes the probability that this was the battle to which this inscription refers.

³⁵L.W. Daly, 'An Inscribed Doric Capital', p. 169.

³⁶The 'cloud of war' motif recurs in Pindar, and will be discussed below (2.3).

³⁷Page notes that 'the verb ἐδμήθημεν is uncommonly candid', implying defeat for the side. 'Plainly ... the men commemorated will be the defeated Euboeans, not (as is commonly supposed) the victorious Athenians' (*FGE*, p. 190). But *CEG* 114 (Boiotia, 479?), apparently referring to a soldier (also speaking in the first person) killed on the victorious side at Plataia, uses the same verb. It could perhaps be argued, though, that the same sentiment in a public *polyandrion* seems more forceful: the effect of a number of men saying ἐδμήθημεν, 'we were overwhelmed', may only have been tolerable in the context of a defeat (cf. Pindar, *Pythian* 1.73, of Hieron's defeated enemies: Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶ δαμασθέντες). Certainly later in the fifth century, as N. Loraux points out (*The Invention of Athens*, p. 55), the Athenians in particular appear unwilling to admit defeat, as in *CEG* 5 (Athens, 447 or 446):

epitaphs before the Persian wars reveals that the absence of ‘a palliative πατρίδα ῥυόμενοι or the like’ in itself is not unusual, even in the case of engagements perceived as being defensive (as is perhaps implied by δεξάμενοι in this epigram) and may in fact strengthen the case for believing this to be a genuine archaic inscription.

Herodotos (5.77) records an inscription accompanying the Athenian dedication of the Euboian prisoners’ chains after their victory on the same occasion; this inscription has been preserved on two stone bases, the earlier of which appears as *CEG* 179:³⁸

[δεσμοι ἐν ἀχνυ(ό)εντι³⁹ σιδερέοι ἔσβεσαν ὕβριν
παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἔργμασιν ἐμ πολέμο]
[ἔθνεα Βοιωτον καὶ Χαλκιδέον δαμάσαντες],
τὸν ἵππος δ[εκάτην Παλλάδι τάσδ’ ἔθεσαν].

It is said that the victors ‘extinguished the ὕβρις’ of their enemies, but once again, as in the losing side’s epitaph for those fallen in the same battle, no mention is made of patriotic motives for fighting, which is consistent with the spirit of other archaic verse inscriptions relating to war.⁴⁰

τλέμονες, ἡοῖον ἀγωνα μάχες τελέσαντες ἀέλπ[το]
φσυχὰς δαιμονίος ὀλέσας ἐμ πολέμοι,
οὐ κατὰ δ[υσ]μενέ[ον] ἀνδ[ρῶν] σθένος, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμᾶς
ἡμιθέον θείαν [ἐς ἔρι]ν ἀντιάσας
ἔβλαψεν πρόφρον

³⁸Herodotos and the later monument have the first and third verses in the opposite order. It seems that after the original monument was destroyed or removed by the Persians, another monument was substituted to celebrate the Athenian subjugation of the Euboians in 446/5; Page (*FGE*, p. 192) follows this interpretation and cites Kirchhoff’s suggestion that the order of the hexameters was reversed in order to emphasize the conquest of Euboea as opposed to the dedication of the prisoners’ chains which had been made sixty years earlier.

³⁹Hansen in *CEG* prints †ἀχνυόεντι† (from Herodotos), but in the addenda and corrigenda printed in *CEG* 2 (pp. 299-305), he accepts the emendation ἀχνυ(ό)εντι, which is also printed by Page.

⁴⁰It might be pointed out that in this case both sides would have been justified in claiming that they were defending their respective homelands against enemy attack, if the account in Herodotos (5.74-77) is true: the Boiotians and Euboians attacked Attica when the Athenians were occupied defending themselves against a Spartan invasion; after the Spartan advance was aborted, the Athenians routed the Boiotians, crossed to Euboea and defeated the Euboians on their own

This observation seems to indicate an important divergence between the tradition of literary elegy and that of funerary epigram at this stage. Murray suggests that martial elegy as exemplified by Kallinos and Tyrtaios represents a conscious attempt to provide a new style of military poetry, contrasting with the older epic.⁴¹ With the development of hoplite warfare, the 'warrior class' becomes wider to the point where at Sparta it is 'identified with the citizen body itself'; military elegy can thus be described as 'public' poetry, strengthening the bonds that keep the warrior class (and, therefore, the state as a whole) together.⁴² This aspect of martial endeavour is, as has been shown, absent from verse epitaphs before the Persian wars; instead, prominence appears to be given to the warrior as individual. His valour in battle ensures the survival of his memory after death, and this is a more important consideration in archaic verse epitaphs than the fact that in obeying the Homeric injunction αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων (*Iliad* 6.208 = 11.784) he may have contributed to the salvation of his homeland.⁴³ This is somewhat surprising, given that the fallen soldiers commemorated in these epitaphs (but perhaps not the composers of the epitaphs themselves?) were precisely those men to whom sympotic martial elegy is addressed. It may be that the literary material represents an attempt to emphasize the service of the *polis* as a whole at the expense of the 'aristocratic' ideology of war.⁴⁴ This would be an odd attitude to adopt in a strictly 'aristocratic'

territory.

⁴¹O. Murray, 'War and the Symposium', p. 95.

⁴²Murray, 'War and the Symposium', pp. 97-98.

⁴³This consideration is not entirely alien to the Homeric epics, as has been mentioned above.

⁴⁴And conversely, members of an earlier and more exclusive warrior class, by effectively ignoring the new tradition, may have attempted to distinguish themselves in this way from its representatives.

symposion, and Murray's formulation does not account for it; the poetry of martial exhortation seems rather to be one means by which the aristocratic élite reinforces its own perceptions of itself as crucial to the survival of the community as a whole. Bowie suggests,⁴⁵ on the other hand, that 'martial elegy was intended for performance either at an ordinary civilian *symposion* or – at Sparta – at a similar institution where features of the civilian *symposion* persisted even in a martial context'. Given the evidence of the poetry of Kallinos, these 'similar institutions' were perhaps not limited to Sparta, and may have been a creation of what Donlan suggests was a significantly large 'middle group' of citizens.⁴⁶ In any case, the poetry of explicit martial exhortation itself seems to disappear at the end of the archaic age, to be replaced, in a sense, by the epitaphs, particularly the public memorials for the war dead.⁴⁷ The *polis* as a whole succeeds where poets like Tyrtaios failed in changing the tone of memorials for those killed in war.

2.2 Death and Glory

Another element which is absent from the epitaphs of this period is an explicit statement that to die in battle is a glorious thing; Prato comments that the sentiment of Tyrtaios 10.1-2 (τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα | ἄνδρ'

⁴⁵Bowie, 'Miles Ludens?', p. 229.

⁴⁶Donlan, 'The Relations of Power', pp. 45-46.

⁴⁷Cf. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, p. 55: 'the collective epitaphs are certainly, like Tyrtaeus' elegies, which inspired them, and like the funeral oration, eulogies of the dead and exhortations to encourage much more than laments.'

ἀγαθὸν ...) is ‘assai diffuso nelle iscrizioni dell’età classica’,⁴⁸ but the inscriptions closer to Tyrtaios’ own time tell a different story. The virtues of the dead are brought to mind by the epithet ἀγαθός in *CEG* 13 and 136; 136 adds the phrase σόφρονα, ἀε(θ)λοφόρον καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικίαι, and *CEG* 19 seems to refer to the dead man’s ἐν[ορέαν. But sentiments like that expressed in the Simonidean hymn in honour of the dead of Thermopylai (*PMG* 531; line 2 εὐκλεῆς μὲν ἂ τύχα, καλὸς δ’ ὁ πότμος) do not appear; and in contrast to Simonides’ πρὸ γόων δὲ μνᾶστις, ὁ δ’ οἶκτος ἔπαινος (line 3), these epitaphs encourage passers-by to grieve: *CEG* 27.1 στῆθι καὶ οἴκτιρον, 13.2 οἰκτίρας ... παρίτο. Simonides’ poem implies that the attitude which he advocates is not the ‘normal’ reaction to the loss of a loved one in battle; it also reflects other considerations which are for the most part alien to the poetry and verse inscriptions of the archaic period, and which will be discussed below.

In *CEG* 112 (Thisbe, ca 500?), it is only in the second and final verse that the martial valour of the dead Phanes is mentioned:

ἄσστοι[ς] καὶ χσένοισι Φάνες φίλος [ἐνθάδε κεῖται],
[ὁ]ς ποτ’ ἀριστεύον ἐν προμάχοις [ἔθανε].⁴⁹

The first line is concerned not with his exploits on the field of battle but with the fact that he was ἄσστοι[ς] καὶ χσένοισι ... φίλος. Again, in *CEG* 27 (Attica, ca 540-30?), pity comes before praise (if the phrase ἐνὶ προμάχοις alone can be said to constitute praise):

στῆθι καὶ οἴκτιρον Κροῖσο παρὰ σῆμα θανόντος
ὁν ποτ’ ἐνὶ προμάχοις ὄλεσε θῶρος ἄρες.

⁴⁸C. Prato, *Tyrtaeus*, p. 87. Prato rightly notes (*ibid.*) that in Tyrtaios’ poem, as opposed to *Iliad* 15.496-97 and Kallinos 1.6, ‘la bellezza del sacrificio è in primo piano, laddove negli altri autori quest’azione eroica è, al più, οὐ ἀεικές (Omero), oppure τιμῆεν τε ... καὶ ἀγλαόν (Callino)’.

⁴⁹Hansen prints [ἔπεσε] in *CEG*, but writes that ‘ἔθανε potius suppleendum est’ in his addenda and corrigenda to *CEG* (printed in *CEG* 2, pp. 299-305).

Of the badly damaged couplet *CEG* 148 (Selinous, 500-475?), only π[αῖδ' οἴκτιρ' E[remains in the first verse, and the second may refer to death in battle, if δακ]ρυόες at the end of the verse refers to *e.g.* [ᾠ] Ἀρες], as suggested by Hansen;⁵⁰ again the command to feel pity dominates over the circumstances of death.⁵¹

The Attic epitaph *CEG* 13 (*ca* 575-50?) makes this point especially clear, where the element of grief⁵² is introduced not once but twice; once in the second line and once in the fourth:

[εἴτε ἀστό]ς τις ἀνὲρ εἴτε χσένος ἄλοθεν ἐλθὼν
 Τέτιχον οἰκτίρας ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν παρίτο,
 ἐν πολέμοι φθίμενον, νεαρὰν ἥβεν ὀλέσαντα.
 ταῦτ' ἀποδυράμενοι νῆσθε ἐπὶ πρᾶγμ' ἀγαθόν.

Epitaphs for soldiers killed in action at this period tend to give no more prominence, and indeed often less prominence, to the military virtues of the dead man than to his civilian virtues.

As was the case with patriotic language, there was a literary model for descriptions of death in battle as glorious and a source of pride: Tyrtaios 10 begins τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα. Apart from Alkaios fr. 400 τὸ γὰρ ᾠ] Ἀρεὺι κατθάνην κάλον, this sentiment is unique, in this period, to Tyrtaios,⁵³ while the exhortation of Kallinos emphasizes the fact that a man who dies fighting for his

⁵⁰Hansen proposes that the line might have read [ᾠ]μορον (or [δύσ]μορον) ἡ[ὸν ποκ' ᾠ] Ἀρες ὄλεσε δακ]ρυόες.

⁵¹*CEG* 128 (Opuntian Lokris, *ca* 525-500?) is apparently an epitaph for a man described as ποθεινὸς δάμω, but it does not state how he died; it may well not have been in battle.

⁵²C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *'Reading' Greek Death*, pp. 174 ff., distinguishes between injunctions to 'feel pity for' and to 'lament' the deceased, represented in *CEG* 13 by οἰκτίρας (2) and ἀποδυράμενοι (4) respectively. While this is a distinction worth pointing out, it does not affect the argument here: in both cases, it is the sadness induced by the death of a young man which is appealed to in these epitaphs. Following the comments of Sourvinou-Inwood, one might consider the question of verbal aspect: is metrical convenience the only reason that *e.g.* *CEG* 148 has οἴκτιρ' whereas *CEG* 27 has οἴκτιρον?

⁵³The idea that death can be καλὸς returns later, *e.g.*, in Simonides' καλὸς δ' ὁ πότμος, mentioned above, and at *Agamemnon* 447 ἐν φοναῖς καλῶς πεσόντ'.

city will be remembered with affection for the sacrifice he made, Tyrtaios presents death as something positively to be desired. As Adkins writes, although Kallinos ‘is opposing the view that it is better to be a live mouse than a dead lion, ... this does not require him to hold that it is better to be a dead lion than a live one’.⁵⁴ This last view, though, is exactly what Tyrtaios proposes when he describes the ideal warrior at 11.5-6:

ἐχθρὴν μὲν ψυχὴν θέμενος, θανάτου δὲ μελαίνας
κῆρας ὁμῶς ἀυγαῖς ἡελίοιο φίλας.

Tyrtaios’ words here⁵⁵ are in direct opposition to the sentiment of the shade of Achilles in the world of the dead, who says to Odysseus (*Odyssey* 11.489-91):

βουλοίμην κ’ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλω,
ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ, ὃ μὴ βίωτος πολὺς εἴη,
ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.

Tyrtaios is expressing a distinctly un-Homeric idea (although there are no verbal echoes of *Odyssey* 11.489-91), and to do this he employs a reversal of an Homeric image; against his ‘hold the black spirits of death as dear as the rays of the sun’ can be contrasted Achilles’ ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀἴδαο πύλῃσιν ... at *Iliad* 9.312. But at the end of poem 12, there is more emphasis on the rewards for a patriotic fighter who survives (vv. 35-44); this poem, like Kallinos’ elegy, encourages with the prospect of a happy life rather than a noble death.

The opening couplet of Tyrtaios 10, which states that it is καλόν for man to die fighting for his country, is followed by a description of a man whose home has been sacked by the enemy (3-12), and by exhortations to fight without regard to one’s own life (13-18). Then follows a gruesome portrayal of a grizzled old man who, having fallen in battle, clutches his αἱματόεντ’ αἰδοῖα (25). The emphasis on this

⁵⁴A.W.H. Adkins, ‘Callinus 1 and Tyrtaeus 10’, p. 66.

⁵⁵*Cf.* also Tyrtaios 10.18 μηδὲ φιλοψυχεῖτ’ (the first occurrence of this verb), where again life is presented as something that is not to be desired.

anatomical detail and the reference to his χροά γυμνωθέντα two lines later have a point: this tableau, it turns out, serves as a foil for another, and striking, incentive for young men to fight. This is the declaration that a young man who was ἀνδράσι μὲν θηητὸς ἰδεῖν, ἐρατὸς δὲ γυναιξὶ | ζωὸς ἐὼν will remain καλὸς δ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών; in other words, fighting and dying for one's country is not only figuratively καλόν 'fine' but literally καλόν 'beautiful'.⁵⁶ Once again this is a departure from the usual Homeric image of corpses, which from the beginning of the *Iliad* are described as distasteful: ἐλώρια ... κύνεσσιν | οἰωνοῖσιν τε πᾶσι (*Iliad* 1.4-5).⁵⁷

In the archaic period, then, it is only Tyrtaios who presents death in battle as something actively to be sought, something positively to be desired as preferable to survival. This sentiment recurs once, perhaps in the fifth century, in an epitaph ascribed to Simonides in the *Palatine Anthology*, 7.512:

τῶνδε δι' ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὰν οὐχ ἔκετο καπνός
αἰθέρα δαιομένας εὐρυχόρου Τεγέας,
οἳ βούλοντο πόλιν μὲν ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθαλυῖαν
παισὶ λιπεῖν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐν προμάχοισι θανεῖν.

Here it is stated that the deceased soldiers βούλοντο ... ἐν προμάχοισι θανεῖν, like Tyrtaios' ideal warrior; it is perhaps ironic that the battle in which they fell may have been against the Spartans to whom Tyrtaios' elegies were addressed.⁵⁸ At Herodotos

⁵⁶ Again the *Agamemnon* recalls Tyrtaios; at line 454, the bodies of the Greeks who died at Troy are described as εὐμορφοί.

⁵⁷ There is one important exception in Homer: after the armour has been stripped from the body of Hektor, the Greeks gaze at his φῶν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητόν (*Iliad* 22.370). This image recalls the assertion that Priam made only three hundred lines earlier (71-73):

νέω δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,
ἀρηϊκταμένω, δεδαῖγμένω ὅξει χαλκῷ
κεῖσθαι· πάντα δὲ καλὰ θάνοντί περ, ὅττι φανήη.

Vernant rightly comments on the Greeks' admiration for Hektor's corpse: 'Réaction pour nous surprenante, si le vieux Priam ne nous en avait livré la clef' (J.-P. Vernant, 'La belle mort et le cadavre outragé', p. 59). For the relationship between *Iliad* 22.66-76 and Tyrtaios 10.21-30, see above, section 1.3.

⁵⁸ Page (*FGE*, p. 279) points to the Spartans' battle against the Tegeates and Argives mentioned in Herodotos (9.35); the date seems to have been about 473-470. Although, as Page

9.71 we are told that Aristodemos, having suffered ὄνειδος and ἀτιμία because he alone had returned to Sparta after the battle of Thermopylai, attempted to redeem himself by dying gloriously (9.71.3 βουλόμενον φανερώς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίας). The view taken by the Spartans, however, was that such a desire was not courageous but foolhardy and posed a risk to the rest of the army (9.71.3 λυσσῶντά τε καὶ ἐκλείποντα τὴν τάξιν), and for this reason Aristodemos received no battle honours:

οὔτοι δὲ τοὺς κατέλεξα πάντες, πλὴν Ἀριστοδήμου, τῶν ἀποθανόντων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ τίμιοι ἐγένοντο, Ἀριστόδημος δὲ βουλόμενος ἀποθανεῖν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίην οὐκ ἐτιμήθη (9.71.4).

Loraux comments on this passage: the noble death in battle ‘should be accepted and not sought’,⁵⁹ and that the seeking of death was Aristodemos’ crime, but the crucial point made by Herodotos is that Aristodemos abandoned his τάξις: even Tyrtaios would not have approved of this (cf. 10.1, 15, 30; 12.15-20, 23).

It has been claimed that ‘the values of Tyrtaeus’ world are not far removed from those of Homer’s, the only difference being that the Spartan warrior must see his *timé* as inextricably bound up with the fortunes of the polis’.⁶⁰ As was shown above, Tyrtaios’ description of death in battle as καλόν is certainly un-Homeric, but it is true that this ‘fine’ death is placed in the context of protection of one’s homeland: Tyrtaios does not assert that it is καλόν simply to die in the pursuit of personal κλέος, though this will accrue to one who follows the poet’s precepts.⁶¹ In Tyrtaios’ picture of the

writes, this engagement is a more likely candidate than Plataia (479) or Mantinea (362), its only real claim to being the battle to which the epitaph refers is its ‘immunity from positive criticism, nothing whatsoever being known either in its favour or against it’.

⁵⁹Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, p. 99.

⁶⁰Shey, ‘Tyrtaeus and the Art of Propaganda’, p. 18.

⁶¹Alkaios 400, mentioned above, cannot be assessed in relation to this distinction without its context; the poet may or may not have cited patriotic duty as a justification of his assertion that τὸ γὰρ ἄρεσι κατθανὴν κάλον.

καλὸς θάνατος, however, the introduction of the patriotic motive in the second verse is followed by a concentration on the individual soldier, in contrast to a later text, 'Simonides'⁶² *FGE* VIII:

εἰ τὸ καλῶς θνήσκειν ἀρετῆς μέρος ἐστὶ μέγιστον,
ἡμῖν ἐκ πάντων τοῦτ' ἀπένειμε Τύχη·
Ἑλλάδι γὰρ σπεύδοντες ἐλευθερίην περιθεῖναι
κείμεθ' ἀγηράντῳ χρώμενοι εὐλογίῃ.

Here, γάρ in the third verse explicitly refers the fact that these men died καλῶς to their defence of Greece against the invader: it is the cause for which they were fighting which justifies the statement that they fell καλῶς. Tyrtaios' poem opens with the flat assertion that it is καλόν to fall in the front line of battle; the syntax gives no indication that the syntactical construction will carry over into the next verse, and the opening line of the poem can thus stand on its own as a gnomic statement. It is only at the end of the second verse that the patriotic element in the fighting is mentioned, and at the end of the poem (vv. 27-30) the κάλλος of the corpse is emphasized without resumption of the patriotic theme. By contrast, the first verse of the epitaph *AP* 7.253 is incomplete in terms of its grammatical construction; τὸ καλῶς θνήσκειν waits for explanation. Even at the end of the second verse, the apodosis has provided no interpretation of the manner of death; the syntax is complete, but the thought is not. 'If to die καλῶς is the greatest part of ἀρετή, then Τύχη has allotted this to us above all'; the epitaph has declared to the reader that these men died καλῶς, and the justification for this claim follows in the final couplet, which concludes the epitaph on a patriotic note. Although the descriptions of the deaths as 'fine' in both Tyrtaios and

⁶²Page (*FGE*, pp. 198-99) cites with approval the suggestion of Bergk that this epigram and *AP* 7.251 may be the epitaphs, respectively, for the Athenian and Spartan dead at Plataia in 479 referred to by Pausanias (9.2.4) and attributed there (as are those in the *Anthology*) to Simonides. 'Style, tone, and contents are entirely consistent with the early date', notes Page; 'the ascription to Simonides, though wanting in authority, may well be true.'

‘Simonides’ are based on the fact that they occurred in the course of the defence of the homeland, this factor is made more prominent in the latter.

In the later epitaph *CEG* 83 (Athens, 446-*ca* 425?), we see that the pride in the warrior’s fulfilment of his patriotic duty is set alongside a specific concern with family, such as was seen in the earlier inscribed epigrams.⁶³ The dead man is said to have saved three *phylai* by his courageous deeds in battle, and to have brought good repute to his father (vv. 1-7):

μνήμα τόδ’ ἔστ’ ἐπὶ σάματι κείμενον ἀνδρὸς ἀρίστο·
Πυθίων ἐγ Μεγάρων δαιώσας ἐπτὰ μὲν ἄνδρας,
ἐπτὰ δὲ ἀπορρήξας λόγχας ἐνὶ σώματι ἐκείνων
εἴλετο τὰν ἀρετάν, πατέρα εὐκλείζων ἐνὶ δήμῳ.
οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἔστωισεν Ἀθηναίων τρεῖς φυλάς
ἐκ Παγᾶν ἀγαγὼν διὰ Βοιωτῶν ἐς Ἀθήνας,
εὐκλεις Ἀνδοκίδαν δισχίλοις ἀνδραπόδοισιν.

Contrast πατέρα εὐκλείζων ἐνὶ δήμῳ (line 4)⁶⁴ with σφετέραν δ’ εὐκλείσαμ πατρίδα in *CEG* 6 (Athens, 447?) and πατρ[ίδ’] εὐκλ[έ]ισαν in *CEG* 10.iii (Athens, 432), which ends with verses reminiscent of archaic martial elegy:

ἄνδρας μὲμ πόλις ἡέδε ποθεῖ καὶ δέ[μος] Ἐρεχθέος],⁶⁵
πρόσθε Ποτειδαίας τοὶ θάνον ἐμ προμάχοις⁶⁶
παῖδες Ἀθηναίων· φσυχὰς δ’ ἀντίρρο[π]α θέντες
ἐ[λλ]άχσαντ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ πατρ[ίδ’] εὐκλ[έ]ισαν.

The last two words of this inscription echo Tyrtaios 12.24 ἄστυ τε καὶ λαοὺς καὶ πατέρ’ εὐκλείσας, with the significant change of πατέρ’ to πατρ[ίδ’]; this is a public

⁶³Patriotism and familial sentiment are also closely linked in the poetry of Pindar, as will be seen below (section 2.3).

⁶⁴The other instance in this epitaph is εὐκλεις Ἀνδοκίδαν (line 7).

⁶⁵Compare Kallinos 1.16 οὐκ ἔμψης δήμῳ φίλος οὐδὲ ποθινός, and Tyrtaios 12.15 ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντί τε δήμῳ.

⁶⁶Compare Tyrtaios ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα (10.1), μετὰ προμάχοισι πεσόντα (10.21), ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών (10.30, 12.23).

epitaph for a group of soldiers.⁶⁷ Tyrtaios' emphatically patriotic poem mentions the ἄστυ and the λαοί first, but can then accommodate the πατήρ because the poet is concentrating his attention on the death of one hypothetical man, the ὅστις ἀνὴρ of line 16. This line and the one immediately preceding (23 αὐτὸς δ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσὼν φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν) could almost be a couplet from a private epitaph such as *CEG* 83 above (where, however, the phrase ἐνὶ δήμῳ follows mention of the father, almost as an afterthought). Loraux argues that Athens in the fifth century discarded the type of collective epitaph where the dead themselves speak⁶⁸ in favour of those where the *polis* speaks,⁶⁹ which both honours the dead and distances them from the mourners,⁷⁰ thus encouraging private grief to be subordinated to public pride in their achievement.⁷¹

⁶⁷The phrase πατρίδ' ἐπευκλείσας is used in the fifth century to praise two victories in competitions: one by the runner Dandes of Argos ('Simonides' *FGE* XXXV), and one by the Theban kitharode Kleon (Anon. *FGE* CXIII).

⁶⁸*E.g.*, *CEG* 131 (Salamis, 480) = 'Simonides' *FGE* XI:

[ὁ ξ(εἰ)νε, εὐθυδρ]όν ποκ' ἐναίομεν ἄστυ θορίνθο,
[νῦν δὲ χα(μὲ) Αἶα]ντος [νᾶσος ἔχει Σαλαμῖς].
[ἐνθάδε Φοινίσσας ν(ᾶ)ας καὶ Πέρσας ἡλόντες]
[καὶ Μέδος χι(α)ρὰν ἡλλάδα ρυ(σά)μεθα].

⁶⁹*E.g.*, *CEG* 6 (Athens, 447):

hoίδε παρ' ἡλλέσποντον ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαὸν ἥβεν
βαρνάμενοι, σφετέραν δ' εὐκλείσαμεν πατρίδα·
hόστ' ἐχθρὸς στενάχευ πόλεμον θέρος ἐκομμίσαντας.
αὐτοῖς δ' ἀθάνατον μνῆμ' ἀρετῆς ἔθεσαν.

⁷⁰Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, p. 55.

⁷¹The possible implications of the addresses to the dead will be examined further below, under 2.4 *Martial 'Αρετή and its Rewards*.

2.3 War, Patriotism, and the Epinician

In the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides, the theme of war may be introduced as an obvious parallel to athletic competition, particularly (but not exclusively⁷²) for combative events: wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. War, as the supreme ‘contest’, serves to highlight the athletic contest from which the *laudandus* has emerged victorious; the legendary warriors of the past thus serve as well-known *exempla* against which the prowess of the athletic victor can be measured. Pindar, then, can assign to athletic prowess the same status as bravery in battle, as he does at *Isthmian* 1.50-51:

ὅς δ’ ἀμφ’ ἀέθλοις ἢ πολεμίζων ἄρῃται κῦδος ἄβρόν,
εὐαγορηθεὶς κέρδος ὕψιστον δέκεται, πολια-
τᾶν καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον.

And a similar equivalence is implied at *Pythian* 8.25-27 (the subject of ἀείδεται is the island of Aigina):

... πολλοῖσι μὲν γὰρ ἀείδεται
νικαφόροις ἐν ἀέθλοις θρέψαισα καὶ θοαῖς
ὑπερτάτους ἥρωας ἐν μάχαις·

Here it should be noted that in neither of the above cases does the poet refer to patriotism or a glorious death in battle as an incentive to fight; the warrior, like the athlete, aims for κῦδος, the glory of being remembered in speech and song. Of course, a warrior who is so remembered by his fellow citizens is likely to have been praised for having saved them from death and his city from capture, but it seems that the epinician poet subordinates this aspect of remembrance to the fact of remembrance itself: the important consideration is that one’s deeds of prowess will survive, and be set beside those of famous ancestors, such as the legendary valour of

⁷²Of the first two Pindaric examples cited following, the first is for a Theban victor in the chariot race, and the second for an Aiginetan wrestler.

the Corinthians mentioned by Pindar in an ode for a victor from Korinth, *Olympian*

13.49-52 and 55-60:

ἐγὼ δὲ ἴδιος ἐν κοινῷ σταλείς
μῆτιν τε γαρύων παλαιγόνων
πόλεμόν τ' ἐν ἡρώϊαις ἀρεταῖσιν
οὐ ψεύσομ' ἀμφὶ Κορίνθῳ ...
...
τὰ δὲ καί ποτ' ἐν ἀλκᾷ
πρὸ Δαρδάνου τειχέων ἐδόκησαν
ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω μαχᾶν τάμνειν τέλος,
τοῖ μὲν γένει φίλῳ σὺν Ἀτρέος
Ἑλέναν κομίζοντες, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ πάμπαν
εἵργοντες

The lack of emphasis on patriotic motives for fighting is appropriate for epinician poetry; the athletic contests in which the victors had competed were individual endeavours, and the parallel between the games and battle is closer if, in the latter case, more attention is paid to the glory of the individual warrior. Although athletic triumph (like bravery in battle) also glorifies the *polis* of the victor, Pindar tends to link this concept specifically with the family, as will be seen below.⁷³

One instance of paradigmatic martial valour in Pindar might be described as 'patriotic' in another sense. In *Pythian* 6, emphasis is placed on Thrasyboulos' devotion to his father Xenokrates; the importance of the chariot victory (and the fame derived from it) for the family as a whole is introduced at lines 15-16:

πατρὶ τεῷ, Θρασύβουλε, κοινὰν τε γενεᾷ
λόγοισι θνατῶν εὐδοξὸν ἄρματι νίκαν

This leads to the declaration, occupying the whole of the following stanza, that Thrasyboulos has obeyed the injunction (20 ὀρθὰν ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν) of the centaur Cheiron to Achilles (23-28):

... μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν,
βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
θεῶν σέβεσθαι· ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς
ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον.

⁷³See also section 4.2, *City and Family*.

The example which the poet gives of this spirit (29 νόημα τοῦτο) is the battlefield rescue of Nestor by his son Antilochos, ὃς ὑπερέφθιτο πατρός (30), and the significance of Antilochos' deed is praised in the highest terms:

... ὁ θεῖος ἀνὴρ
πρίατο μὲν θανάτοιο κομιδὰν πατρός,
ἐδόκησέν τε τῶν πάλαι γενεᾷ
ὀπλοτέροισιν ἔργον πελώριον τελέσαις
ὑπατος ἄμφι τοκεῦσιν ἔμμεν πρὸς ἀρετάν.

And this fifth stanza ends with the assertion (recalling the third stanza, lines 20-28 above) that ... τῶν νῦν δὲ καὶ Θρασύβουλος | πατρώαν μάλιστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα. The ode, which begins with praise of the Emmenidai (who are mentioned in line 5, before the city of Akragas in line 6) and in which family concerns are central, ends with praise of the victor's own son.

In the sixth *Pythian* ode, then, filial as opposed to civic duty as a motive both for athletic achievement and for martial endeavour is placed in the foreground by Pindar, more or less on a level with religious obligation (ταύτας ... τιμᾶς, line 26); in the background lies a concern for one's family or race (γενεᾷ, lines 15 and 40). Pindar, in fact, appears (though it is not certain – see below, section 4.2) to equate a man's γενεά with the ἄστοί of his homeland in the seventh *Isthmian* ode in what appears to be the only Pindaric instance of 'patriotic' motives for fighting⁷⁴ as they are understood in the earlier and contemporary poetry so far discussed. Beginning with a list of mythical glories of Thebes (the last two of which – Adrastus and the Aigidae – are martial in nature), the poet moves to the praise of the athlete Strepsiadas who is described in the following terms at the end of the second strophe (22):

... σθένει τ' ἔκπαγλος ἰδεῖν τε μορ-
φάεις, ἄγει τ' ἀρετὰν οὐκ αἴσχιον φυᾶς.

⁷⁴It is perhaps significant that the ode is for a Theban victor: 'Pindar's own Theban loyalties are evident here, in both the catalogue of local pride and the praise of the [victor's] uncle's patriotic death' (Willcock, *Pindar*, p. 60).

Here φυά refers not only to physical appearance⁷⁵ (ἰδεῖν τε μορφάεις) but also to the ‘nature’ inherited by Strepsiadas from his maternal uncle of the same name, whose death in battle is the subject of the following antistrophe and epode, and carries over to the opening lines of the third strophe. The ἀρετά of the younger Strepsiadas (line 22, above) is reflected in the inclusion of his uncle among the ἀγαθοί of line 26 and the ἄριστοι of line 35.

Young has examined this ode in detail from the point of view of its use of the *topoi* of martial poetry; the themes and vocabulary of the ‘digression’ on the death in battle of the elder Strepsiadas are ‘surprisingly similar to those found throughout the battle exhortations of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, and in sepulchral poetry for fallen warriors’, and so ‘Pindar assigns a name to that anonymous but nevertheless ubiquitous and legendary figure, the ὅστις ἀνὴρ, the οὗτος ἀνὴρ, “αὐτός”, the τόνδε, the ὄντινα, of Tyrtaeus [12].16, 20, 23, 27, 33’.⁷⁶ One passage to which Young does not refer and which is perhaps relevant to this poem is Tyrtaios 10.9-10, where one

⁷⁵Notwithstanding Willcock’s translation (p. 65), ‘he practices courage no less nobly than good looks’.

⁷⁶D.C. Young, *Pindar, Isthmian 7*, pp. 20 and 46. Young (p. 7) effectively refutes the biographical fallacy which takes ἔτλαν δὲ πένθος οὐ φατόν in line 37 to refer to Pindar’s disappointment at ‘politico-military disaster’ by relating the word πένθος to mourning for the dead soldiers, as in, e.g., *Iliad* 16.548 (the Trojan grief at the death of Sarpedon). A related point made by Young is that this phrase and ἔσχον πολέμοιο νείκος ἐσχάταις {ἐπ’} ἐλπίσιν in line 36 need not refer to a defeat suffered by the Thebans: he compares Tyrtaios 12.22 σπουδῇ δ’ ἔσχεθε κύμα μάχης, where ‘defeat is utterly foreign to Tyrtaeus’ context’ (p. 6). Thus, “‘Strepsiades died; I mourned him’”. Few lines of thought could be so lucid, and one may mourn a fallen warrior, whether he fell victorious or in defeat’ (p. 8). For πένθος unambiguously in the context of death in battle, compare also *CEG* 135, for Argive warriors who died at Tanagra. Young, having rejected the notion that lines 36-37 must refer to a defeat, sees no reason to retain the assumption that Strepsiadas died at Oinophyta, and suggests that the battle in question might have been Tanagra (p. 8); *CEG* 135 would then be an epitaph for Strepsiadas’ foes. Willcock, however, believes that ‘the battle of Oenophyta in 457 remains an attractive possibility’ (p. 61); ‘We cannot tell ... whether [the battle referred to in *Isthmian* 7] was a victory for Thebes or a defeat, although the tone of 36-7 suggests the latter’ (p. 65); the phrase ἐσχάταις ἐλπίσιν (though perhaps Willcock’s ‘at the edge of despair’, p. 67, is a slight over-translation) does seem to imply that Strepsiadas and his comrades were facing even less favourable odds than Tyrtaios’ imaginary soldier.

reason to fight is offered in a description of the man who has been forced into exile when his homeland has been defeated in war:

αἰσχύνην τε γένος, κατὰ δ' ἀγλαὸν εἶδος ἐλέγχει,
πάντα δ' ἀτιμίῃ καὶ κακότης ἔπεται.

After this digression on the horrors of defeat, Tyrtaios resumes his exhortation in line 15: ὦ νέοι, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθε παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες The negative picture presented here in lines 9-10 (after which, significantly, Tyrtaios abandons the γένος theme) is recalled by its positive counterparts in *Isthmian* 7, lines 22 (σθένει δ' ἔκπαγλος ἰδεῖν τε μορφάεις, ἄγει δ' ἀρετὰν οὐκ αἴσχιον φυᾶς) and 26 (τιμὰ δ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἀντίκειται). Pindar claims (line 27) that the elder Strepsiadas fought πρὸ φίλας πάτρας, and this is followed in line 29 by the description of the warrior as ἀστῶν γενεᾷ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων; with the phrase ἀστῶν γενεᾷ (on which more will be said below, section 4.2), Strepsiadas' patriotism seems to be made part of a concern for family, such as motivated Antilochos in the sixth *Pythian*, and this is part of the ἀρετά which has been passed on into the younger Strepsiadas' φυά. From the patriotic opening address to the eponymous nymph of Thebes, the praise of Strepsiadas and his eponymous uncle in games and in war has become a family affair.⁷⁷

The clause μάτρωί θ' ὁμωνύμῳ δέδωκε κοινὸν θάλος at line 24 is also interesting: in saying that the younger Strepsiadas has given a κοινὸν θάλος to his uncle, the poet may be implying that the uncle, like a mythic hero, can receive it. This implication of the line is perhaps supported by the next one, χάλκασπις ᾧ πότμον μὲν Ἄρης ἔμειξεν: Young points out that the digression on the elder Strepsiadas is

⁷⁷In a genre more specifically public and *polis*-oriented than the epinician, Pindar seems able to use patriotism without this kind of qualification, as in the dithyrambic fragment 78:

Κλυθ' Ἄλαλά, Πολέμου θυγάτηρ,
ἐγγέων προοίμιον, ᾧ θύεται
ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ πόλιος τὸν ἰρόθυτον θάνατον

introduced with a relative pronoun, a technique with which Pindar often introduces myths, and Thummer notes that the patriotic tone of *πρὸ φίλας πάτρας* (27) is dropped in favour of the three heroic examples immediately introduced in the following stanza.⁷⁸ The heroic overtones of the passage are also, perhaps, enhanced by Pindar's imagery: Strepsiadas is said to have died holding back a hailstorm of blood (*χάλαζαν αἵματος*) in a cloud of battle (*ἐν ταύτῃ νεφέλῃ*), which recalls the 'Simonidean' epitaph for the men killed 'under the fold of Dirphys', discussed above (section 2.1). Commenting on Pindar's phrase, Privitera notes that the use of storm imagery to describe battle goes back to Homer (*e.g. Iliad* 17.243 *ἐπεὶ πολέμοιο νέφος περὶ πάντα καλύπτει*),⁷⁹ and compares three other Pindaric phrases: *τραχεῖα νιφὰς πολέμοιο* (*Isthmian* 4.17), *πολυφθόρῳ Διὸς ὄμβρῳ | ἀναρίθμων ἀνδρῶν χαλαζάεντι φόνῳ* (*Isthmian* 5.49-50), and *φόνου | παρποδίου νεφέλαν* (*Nemean* 9.37-38). Two of these passages are directly linked with heroes: *Nemean* 9 describes the prowess of Chromios on the battlefield, and the poet immediately compares him to Hektor (39 ff.); and the passage in *Isthmian* 5 refers to the battle at Salamis, which is called *πόλις Αἴαντος* (48). The other occurrence of this storm imagery, in *Isthmian* 4, forms part of a brief history of the Kleonymid family, who are said to have been honoured in Thebes *ἀρχαῖθεν* (7), and to have been 'pleasing to Ares' (15); if they have been there 'from the beginning' and have won the favour of a god, they must be, if not heroes themselves, then the closest that mortals can come to that status.⁸⁰ The

⁷⁸Young, p. 19; Thummer, *Pindar: die isthmischen Gedichte*, vol. 2, pp. 121-22: '... muß man den Bezugspunkt nicht im Einsatz für das Vaterland suchen, denn der Gedanke an den Kampf für das Vaterland, der in den Versen 27-30 im Vordergrund steht, ist ja in diesen Versen [*i.e.* 31-36] ... bereits durch das Lob der Tapferkeit im allgemeinen und des Heldentodes verdrängt'.

⁷⁹Privitera, *Pindaro: le Istmiche*, p. 221. *Iliad* 16.350, also cited by Privitera, is rather different: *θανάτου δὲ μέλαν νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψε* refers specifically to the moment of death, not to fighting.

⁸⁰This idea is well captured in another image from the same passage: *στάλαισιν ἄπτοντ' Ἡρακλείας* (12). For an investigation of the heroization and 'talismanic power' of athletes as part

placement of the martial achievement of the elder Strepsiadas within the familial sphere in *Isthmian* 7 (the primary effect of his patriotic stand in battle is the accumulation of κλέος for his ἀστῶν γενεᾷ) demonstrates the subordination of the *polis* to the *oikos*.

The magnitude of the threat to Greece as a whole posed by the Persian war prompts Pindar to refer to the fact that the tyrant Hieron helped a wider community by repelling the danger: Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας⁸¹ (*Pythian* 1.75). Pindar is referring in this passage to Hieron's victory over the Carthaginians, and he places this victory on a level with the achievements of the Athenians and Spartans at Salamis and Plataia,⁸² the masculine singular participle⁸³ ἐξέλκων in line 75 suggests that the salvation of Greece was Hieron's work alone rather than due to the combined efforts of the various *poleis*.. This device is also found in 'Simonides' *FGE* X:

οὗτος Ἀδειμάντου κείνου τάφος, ὃν διὰ πᾶσα

of an aristocratic attempt to regain 'symbolic capital' within the *polis*, see L. Kurke, 'The Economy of *Kudos*'.

⁸¹For the related idea that even death in battle is preferable to enslavement by the barbarians, cf. Ion of Chios on the cock-fight staged by Miltiades to encourage the Greeks to resist the Persians (*PMG* 746):

οὐδ' ὃ γε σῶμα τυπεῖς διφνεῖς τε κόρας ἐπιλάθεται ἀλκᾶς,
ἀλλ' ὀλιγοδρανέων φθογγάζεται·
θάνατον δ' ὃ γε δουλοσύνας προβέβουλε.

⁸²75-77 ... ἀρέομαι
παρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθηναίων χάριν
μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' ἐρέω πρὸ Κιθαιρῶνος μάχαν,
ταῖσι Μήδαιοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι

Despite the assertion of D. Boedeker ('Simonides and Herodotus on Plataea', p. 232) that Simonides' Plataia elegy fr. 11 'appears to be unique among extant Persian War poems (including the *Persians*) in mentioning so many allied cities by name', it does in fact concentrate on the Spartans, and is thus in the same spirit as Pindar's careful attribution of credit in these lines. Not all Greeks agreed with this presentation of the victories against the Persians; in *CEG* 131 the Corinthians claim that they were responsible for saving Hellas.

⁸³Another one is found in a very similar context in Timotheos *PMG* 788, apparently the opening of his *Persians*, but the subject has been lost: κλεινὸν ἐλευθερίας τεύχων μέγαν Ἑλλάδι κόσμον.

Ἑλλάς ἐλευθερίας ἀμφέθετο στέφανον.⁸⁴

And after mentioning Salamis and Plataia, the poet immediately reminds his audience that his task is to praise the prowess of the sons of Deinomenes in particular (79-80):

παρὰ δὲ τὰν εὐδρον ἄκτάν
Ἱμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις,
τὸν ἐδέξαντ' ἀμφ' ἀρετᾶ, πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν καμόντων.

The point that Hieron and his brothers were part of a larger enterprise is made more clearly in 'Simonides' *FGE* XXXIV, allegedly inscribed on gold tripods dedicated at Delphi by Gelon and his brothers, 'a relatively late literary exercise' according to Page, though Molyneux is not so sceptical.⁸⁵

φημὶ Γέλων', Ἱέρωνα, Πολύζηλον, Θρασύβουλον,
παῖδας Δεινομένεως, τοὺς τρίποδας θέμεναι,
βάρβαρα νικήσαντας ἔθνη, πολλὴν δὲ παρασχεῖν
σύμμαχον Ἑλλησιν χεῖρ' ἐς ἐλευθερίην.

In arguing for this epigram's authenticity, against Wilamowitz and Podlecki, Krumeich cites Pindar as support: 'Denkt man an Pindars explizite Parallelisierung der Siege von Himera und Kyme mit den griechischen Siegen über die Perser,⁸⁶ so kann die propagandistische Färbung des zweiten Distichons kaum als Argument gegen seine Echtheit geltend gemacht werden'.⁸⁷ But here the Sicilian contingents provide a σύμμαχος χεῖρ, as contrasted with the Pindaric picture of one man Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων

⁸⁴Page comments (*FGE*, p. 201) that this epigram's ascription to Simonides is 'not to be taken seriously', based on its incompatibility with the Athenian account of the battle of Salamis as reported by Herodotos.

⁸⁵*FGE*, p. 248; Molyneux, *Simonides*, pp. 221-24.

⁸⁶The Pindaric scholiasts wondered exactly what the poet meant by Ἑλλάδ(α) in *Pythian* 1.75 (schol. 146a ἔνιοι μὲν Ἑλλάδα τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἤκουσαν, ἔνιοι δὲ Ἑλλάδα τὴν Ἀττικὴν), but since the same doubts could be raised about Ἑλλησιν in the final verse of this epigram, Krumeich's argument still holds.

⁸⁷Krumeich, 'Zu den goldenen Dreifüßen', p. 58; he follows Page and others, however, in his rejection of the alternate version of this epigram (*AP* 6.214). It refers only to a single tripod, which is contradicted by the archaeological evidence, and its second couplet, as Page remarks (*FGE*, p. 248), 'is downright unintelligible both in itself and as a rival to the other version'; Krumeich agrees, then, that 'man kann sie mit einiger Sicherheit als eine spätere Variante verwerfen' (58).

βαρείας δουλίας. Krumeich notes the significance of the fact that the inscription accompanied a dedication at Delphi: this declaration of the importance of the Deinomenids' contribution to Greek ἐλευθερίη was intended for a Greek audience.⁸⁸ Cingano adds that the attempt of the Deinomenidai to present Syracuse as equally important to the Greek world as Sparta or Athens did not rest on very secure ground: the propagandizing assertion that the Deinomenids' victories over the Carthaginians were comparable to the battles of Plataia and Salamis is not borne out by the archaeological record, which suggests that trade in this area was not significantly disrupted at the time.⁸⁹

It is worth noting, in connection with the texts relating to the Sicilians' victories, that other sources do not attribute to Hieron a major role in the campaign. The scholia to *Pythian* 1.75 cite the account of the expedition against the Carthaginians as told by Ephoros, who apparently described Gelon as διαμαχησόμενον μὴ μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐλευθερῶσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα; Herodotos (7.157-64) describes Gelon's negotiations with Greek ambassadors, his complaint that the Greeks did not help him against Carthage in the past, his demand that he be made commander-in-chief if he sent troops to help the Greeks, and, when that was refused, his demand for control over sea operations. Finally, says Herodotos, Gelon sent money to Delphi to offer the Persians in case they won; but in the Sicilian version of the story, which he also reports, Gelon sent money to Delphi to help the Greeks, being unable to send troops because an army of Carthaginians, Phoenicians, and others had been assembled to reclaim Himera for Terillos, who had been driven out by Theron of Akragas.

⁸⁸Krumeich, p. 58.

⁸⁹E. Cingano, in Gentili et al, *Pindaro: le Pitiche*, pp. 17-18.

Pindar, then, disagrees with these sources: Gelon's initiatives (whatever they may have been) are not mentioned, and Hieron takes centre stage. The patriotic spirit of the Greeks' struggle against the Persians serves only as a background against which the poet places the splendid achievements of the Deinomenidai, and of Hieron in particular. The battle of Himera is mentioned after those of Salamis and Plataia, and in a longer, climactic clause: '[a]lthough Pindar does not actually say that the battle of Himera is of greater importance than the other two, the formal emphasis that it receives puts it at least on a par with them'.⁹⁰ And in the context of the first *Pythian* as a whole with its myth of Zeus's subjugation of Typhos, as Hubbard has noted, Hieron's victory 'assumes cosmogonic proportions'.⁹¹ Pindar can imply that the tyrant Hieron is like Zeus in his successes against the enemies of order and peace, but for a lesser mortal in a similar context, he chooses Homer over homeland: in *Nemean* 9, the poet compares Chromios to Hektor on the battlefield by the Skamandros. The exploits of Chromios against Φοινικοστόλων | ἐγγέων (28-29) are described at 33-41, but instead of glorifying pan-Hellenic patriotism, or even mentioning that Greece was threatened with δουλία, Pindar concentrates on the epic heroism of the victor.

2.4 Martial 'Αρετή and its Rewards

It has been argued that Tyrtaios in his military exhortations, particularly fr. 12, is trying to re-define ἀρετή, to make it refer only to bravery in battle. Bowra, for

⁹⁰Race, *Style and Rhetoric*, p. 16.

⁹¹Hubbard, *The Pindaric Mind*, p. 92.

one, states that for Tyrtaios ‘the “good man” is he who stands up to the enemy, and in this his excellence, his ἀρετή, lies’.⁹² Snell takes a similar view: Tyrtaios ‘is the first to react to the incipient differentiation of the *aretai* and to secure a clear and unequivocal idea of the nature of *arete* as such’.⁹³ And following Jacoby and Fränkel, Tarditi doubts the attribution of 12 to Tyrtaios; in order to accept that Tyrtaios was the author, he writes, ‘dovremmo essere storicamente sicuri che il problema della vera areté era già sentito nel VII sec.’⁹⁴ Rightly concluding that it was not, Tarditi claims that Tyrtaios could therefore not have written the elegy. But this argument is based on a false premiss; a closer reading of the poem reveals that it is not, after all, concerned with ‘il problema della vera areté’.

The ‘differentiation of the *aretai*’ to which Snell refers is hardly ‘incipient’ in Tyrtaios’ time; Homer refers to different kinds of ἀρετή (*Iliad* 15.642 παντοίας ἀρετάς), and Tyrtaios does not in fact present a courageous man as ‘good’ in all respects by virtue of his bravery. As Verdenius writes, Tyrtaios is concerned with ‘not how to become a good man but how to become good in fighting. The original meaning of ἀγαθός is “capable” ... and its actual meaning is determined by the context’.⁹⁵ Campbell points out that when the words ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός are used in 12.10 and 20, ‘their scope is shown on each occasion by the phrase ἐν πολέμῳ’; line 20, for example, should be translated ‘it is this man who is good in war’ and not, as Bowra renders it, ‘So the good man is revealed in war’. Again, Bowra translates the final couplet of 12,

⁹²Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists*, p. 65. Similar views can be found in W. Jaeger (‘Tyrtaios über die wahre ἀρετή’, and *Paideia*, vol. 1, pp. 74 ff.).

⁹³Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, p. 174. Adkins writes (*Merit and Responsibility*, p. 74) that ‘Tyrtaeus can plausibly claim to be ... stripping *arete* of irrelevances’.

⁹⁴Tarditi, ‘Parenesi e areté nel *corpus* tirtaico’, p. 270.

⁹⁵Verdenius, ‘Tyrtaeus 6-7D’, pp. 338-39.

ταύτης νῦν τις ἀνὴρ ἀρετῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἰκέσθαι
πειράσθω θυμῷ μὴ μεθιείς πολέμου,

as ‘Let a man try to reach the height of prowess With his heart, and never slack in war’; Campbell criticizes this rendering on the grounds that it

omits the emphatic ταύτης⁹⁶ and the particularising νῦν.⁹⁷ But ταύτης ... ἀρετῆς must mean ‘*this* excellence’ ... and it is likely that ἡδ’ ἀρετή in 13 means the same thing: ‘this excellence, this prize is the best among men.’ [*i.e.* as opposed to Bowra’s ‘This is man’s excellence and finest guerdon’].... In Tyrtaeus ἀρετή has not moved further towards its later meaning of ‘moral virtue’ than it had in Homer: in both writers it refers to particular forms of excellence.⁹⁸

The poet is very conscious of the fact that there are many different ἀρεταί, and indeed the existence of a multiplicity of ἀρεταί is necessary for the poem’s programme. Shey points out that ‘the *aretai* Tyrtaeus asks his countrymen to consider less important than a fighting spirit are naturally very desirable. Tyrtaeus’ task is to make his audience feel that the rejected *aretai* are less desirable than they really are or may seem to be’.⁹⁹ Martial valour is not the only ἀρετή, but Tyrtaios presents it as the most important one.

Tyrtaios 12.13-16 appear again in the Theognidea, at lines 1003-1006, in the following form:

ἡδ’ ἀρετή, τόδ’ ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον
κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ,
ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πολλή τε παντί τε δήμῳ,
ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένη.

⁹⁶‘L’attacco della perorazione: ταύτης ... ἀρετῆς (v. 43) significativamente riprende il tema della vera areté che il poeta ha enunciato nel cuore della prima parte: cfr. v. 13 ἡδ’ ἀρετή ...’, claims Tarditi (‘Parenesi e areté’, p. 262), whereas in fact the phrase (like 13 ἡδ’ ἀρετή) is specifying one particular ἀρετή rather than a general ‘vera areté’.

⁹⁷Even Jaeger (*Paideia*, vol. 1, p. 86) recognizes the importance of νῦν: ‘[Tyrtaios] seems to have thought the ideal was practicable and necessary only in war-time’. So also E. Maier, *Tyrtaios*, p. 19: ‘Die wahre Arete, die j e t z t, d.h. im Kriege allein den Staat vom Untergang rettet (alles andere ist wertlos), das ist die heroische Tugend des Heldentums’.

⁹⁸Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 177-78.

⁹⁹Shey, ‘Tyrtaeus and the Art of Propaganda’, pp. 8-9.

The only difference between this rendering and that of Tyrtaios is the substitution at the end of the second line cited above of σοφῶ for Tyrtaios' νέω. Edmunds connects this substitution with the concern shown elsewhere in the Theognidea for the virtue of σοφίη: 'Martial valor is an aspect of the citizen's *sophiē*'.¹⁰⁰ In support of this statement, Edmunds adduces the epitaph *CEG* 136 (Argolis, *ca* 525-500?), in which the young Argive who died in battle is described as σόφρονα, ἀεθλοφόρον καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικίαι.¹⁰¹ Gladigow also reads much into the use of σοφός here, saying that it is meant to express 'das Idealbild eines Mannes, der intellektuelle und sittliche Vorzüge in sich vereint',¹⁰² but it is not necessary to assume that this 'Idealbild' had taken shape in the mind of either the person responsible for this substitution or the composer of *CEG* 136. Van Groningen offers another explanation for the substitution of σοφῶ in the Theognidea for νέω in Tyrtaios: he suggests that it was done in order that the lines may be used to address 'des auditeurs d'un certain âge qui doivent, néanmoins, défendre la patrie en temps de péril'.¹⁰³ It is of course impossible to determine whether the substitution was made before or after this quatrain was inserted into the Theognidean corpus; and we cannot be sure that whoever excerpted the lines from Tyrtaios, made the substitution, or inserted them into the Theognidea

¹⁰⁰L. Edmunds, 'The Genre of Theognidean Poetry', p. 109. Edmunds states (p. 104) that σοφίη is 'the highest political virtue' in the Theognidea; the significance of σοφίη here will be discussed in detail in section 4.6.

¹⁰¹Edmunds' use of the appearance of σοφός in this epitaph to support his claim that martial valour is included in the concept of σοφίη is unsatisfactory in that, by the same argument, martial valour would have to be included in the statement that the dead man was σόφρων and ἀεθλοφόρος.

¹⁰²Gladigow, *Sophia und Kosmos*, p. 70. Gladigow argues (p. 35) that σοφίη in Xenophanes 2 also carries a great deal of meaning: '... trägt diese σοφίη die Tendenz in sich, alle anderen ἀρεταί aufzunehmen'; in both cases, he is trying to attach to the word a weight of significance which Bowra and others assign to the use of ἀρετή in Tyrtaios (see above), and which is probably too great for the word to bear.

¹⁰³Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 376.

(quite possibly not the same person) actually made a conscious assessment of the word σοφός.

Ἄρετή and ἀγαθός do not have specifically martial connotations in the archaic period; the poetry of Tyrtaios, as discussed above, shows an attempt to concentrate on one particular ἀρετή rather than others, and *CEG* 136 is one of only two verse epitaphs from this period which use ἀγαθός of a man killed in battle. The other is *CEG* 13 (Athens, *ca* 575-550?), in which the third verse is the same as the third verse of *CEG* 136:

[εἴτε ἀστό]ς τις ἀνὲρ εἴτε χσένος ἄλοθεν ἐλθὼν
Τέτιχον οἰκτίρας ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν παρίτο,
ἐν πολέμοι φθίμενον, νεαρὰν ἡβέν ὀλέσαντα,
ταῦτ' ἀποδυράμενοι νῆσθε ἐπὶ πρᾶγμ' ἀγαθόν.

Here, as in *CEG* 136, the description of the deceased as ἀγαθός precedes mention of his death in battle, and although there is no catalogue of civilian virtues as in Hysematas' epitaph, the appearance of ἀγαθός in a different context in the last verse performs a similar function, suggesting that Tettichos was ἀγαθός in more than an exclusively martial sense.

Even after the Persian wars, ἀρετή in the verse inscriptions does not, it seems, necessarily have this more restricted meaning.¹⁰⁴ Certainly a man who died fighting can be described as ἀγαθός (*e.g.*, *CEG* 82 (Attica, *ca* 450-425?)), as having possessed ἀρετή (*e.g.*, *CEG* 155 (Paros, 476/5)), but this is not surprising if ἀρετή is simply 'excellence' as it was in Tyrtaios; the context of a slain warrior's epitaph performs the same function as Tyrtaios' ἐν πολέμῳ. Despite Prato's comment that Tyrtaios' phrase ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν (10.2) 'diverrà, nelle epigrafi, la normale

¹⁰⁴Even though this may have been the case in Athenian funeral orations, for which see Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, pp. 99 ff.

denominazione dei caduti in guerra',¹⁰⁵ the men commemorated in *CEG* 117 (Thessaly, *ca* 480-450?) and 149 (Motya, *ca* 475-450?) are both described as ἄνδρες ἄγαθοί without this context, and even the Athenian public epitaph *CEG* 5 (447 or 446) does not describe the dead soldiers as ἄγαθοί or mention their ἀρετή. These terms, as general markers of excellence, can take their meaning from their context; without this context, we are not entitled to assume that every instance of ἀρετή or ἄγαθός in the verse inscriptions must refer to martial valour, as Ecker, for example, does in her discussion of the phrase Φέργον ἀντ' ἀγ[α]θὸν in *CEG* 139 (Troizen, *ca* 500?): she claims that although ἄγαθός in Homer is never used as an epithet of ἔργον or πρᾶγμα, 'bestätigen doch Stellen wie Homer N 275-294 ..., N 237 f., P 631 f., Φ 279 f. und σ 382 f. den engen Zusammenhang zwischen kriegerischer ἀρετή und dieser Wertprädikation'.¹⁰⁶

When this context is in fact supplied (whether in the inscriptions or in the literary material), martial ἀρετή can be represented as something eternal which is kept by the dead and, in some fifth-century cases, apparently won in the act of dying; this seems to be the case in 'Simonides' *FGE* VIII εἰ τὸ καλῶς θνήσκειν ἀρετῆς μέρος ἐστὶ μέγιστον ... (discussed above, section 2.2) and in the epitaph for the Athenians killed at Poteidaia *CEG* 10.iii (Athens, 432) where the immortal monument to the fallen (1 ἀθάνατόμ με θα[νο-; *cf.* *CEG* 6 (Athens, 477?), v. 4 ἀθάνατομ μνῆμ' ἀρετῆς) serves as a marker of the ἀρετή (2 σεμαίνειν ἀρετ[ὲν] which they won in exchange for their patriotic death: ... φσυχὰς δ' ἀντίπρο[π]α θέντες | ἐ[λλ]άχσαντ' ἀρετὴν καὶ πατρ[ίδ'] εὐκλ[έ]ισαν. This is a kind of heroic immortality which is

¹⁰⁵Prato, *Tyrtæus*, p. 88. *Cf.* Stecher, *Inchriftliche Grabgedichte*, p. 64, n. 26: 'Das Adj. ἄγαθός allein bzw. der stehende Ausdruck ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός bezeichnet schlechthin den Mann der Arete, der anerkannten Tüchtigkeit, für deren Beweis und Bewährung damals noch vornehmlich das Kampffeld als die geeignete Stätte galt'.

¹⁰⁶Ecker, *Grabmal und Epigramm*, p. 128, n. 343.

explicitly referred to in the early fourth century in Lysias' *Epitaphios*,¹⁰⁷ but which has its roots earlier in the idea that the brave dead are somehow 'living' below, can hear speech or song addressed to them, and benefit from extraordinary honours, as expressed in Pindar's seventh *Isthmian*, in the context of the courageous death in battle of the victor's uncle: τιμὰ δ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἀντίκειται (26).¹⁰⁸

Simonides' hymn for the Spartan soldiers killed at Thermopylai (*PMG* 531)¹⁰⁹ states (line 2) that for the dead men εὐκλεῆς μὲν ἂ τύχα, καλὸς δ' ὁ πότμος Their πότμος is καλός, according to the poet; but this is not the same as saying, with Tyrtaios, that τεθνάμεναι ... καλόν (though it may be closer to 'Simonides' *FGE* VIII, where they are said to have died καλῶς and to have earned ἀγήραντος εὐλογίη). Here their πότμος is described in terms suggestive of an after-life as heroes.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷The war dead, according to the orator, πενθοῦνται μὲν διὰ τὴν φύσιν ὡς θνητοί, ὑμνοῦνται δὲ ὡς ἀθάνατοι διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. καὶ γάρ τοι θάπτονται δημοσίᾳ, καὶ ἀγῶνες τίθενται ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ῥώμης καὶ σοφίας καὶ πλούτου, ὡς ἀξιόους ὄντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τετελευτηκότας ταῖς αὐταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀθανάτους τιμᾶσθαι (80).

¹⁰⁸Only a few lines earlier, the poet referred to the younger Strepsiades' athletic ἀρετά (22); the passage with its transition from sport to war illustrates the flexibility of ἀρετή in the mid-fifth century. (The contest was, admittedly, the combative *pankration*, but it hardly need be said that ἀρετή and ἀγαθός in Pindar are common enough terms to denote excellence in many areas.)

¹⁰⁹M.L. West suggests that the poem might have originally begun, *e.g.*, ἀνδρῶν δ' ὑπὲρ πάτρας θανόντων ('Melica', pp. 210-211; following his earlier rejection of line 1 τῶν ἐν Θερμοπύλαις θανόντων as a gloss ('Prose in Simonides'); *contra* West, see D.L. Page, 'Poetry and Prose: Simonides, *P.M.G.* 531, and Ibycus 298', and H. Lloyd-Jones, 'Simonides, *P.M.G.* 531'). Part of West's argument is that the first part of the poem appears to be dealing with general truths, which the poet then illustrates with the example of Leonidas in the final verses; Greek lyric poetry, however, does not necessarily follow such a logical progression. The probably Simonidean public epitaphs *AP* 7.253 (above) and 251 (below) make no mention at all of the identity of those who died or where they fought; these details would have been inscribed on the monument separately from the poems, as they were in the case of *CEG* 10 (which, however, also mentions them in the epigram itself).

¹¹⁰An implication already present in Tyrtaios' description of the fate of the man who dies fighting for his country: 10.31-32 οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ | ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίνεται ἀθάνατος. The second verse here introduces 'la novità, rispetto al mondo omerico, della concezione tirteaica, con la quale si assicura anche al mortale una forma d'immortalità' (Prato, *Tyrtaeus*, p. 135); now the man himself, not only his κλέος, is thought of as

βωμός δ' ὁ τάφος, πρὸ γόνων¹¹¹ δὲ μνάστις, ὁ δ' οἶκτος ἔπαινος·
 ἐντάφιον δὲ τοιοῦτον οὔτ' εὐρώς
 οὔθ' ὁ πανδαμάτωρ ἀμαυρώσει χρόνος.
 ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅδε σηκός¹¹² οἰκέταν εὐδοξίαν
 Ἑλλάδος εἶλετο· μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Λεωνίδας,
 Σπάρτας βασιλεύς, ἀρετᾶς μέγαν λελοιπῶς
 κόσμον ἀέναόν τε κλέος.

There are no grounds for disagreement with those scholars who see in these lines a strong suggestion that the deceased are being elevated to heroic status;¹¹³ Diodoros (11.11.6) introduces his quotation of the poem by saying that these men διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰς ἀθανασίαν μετήλλαξαν. διόπερ οὐχ οἱ τῶν ἱστοριῶν συγγραφεῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν καθύμνησαν αὐτῶν τὰς ἀνδραγαθίας: Diodoros presents the immortality bestowed on the fallen soldiers as the occasion which prompted Simonides to sing their ἀέναον ... κλέος (v. 9), rather than the κλέος itself representing a merely metaphorical 'immortality'. Of course these are probably nothing more than Diodoros' own inferences from the content of the poem, but there is justification for the inferences: quite apart from the implications of the βωμός, there is ὅδε σηκός to reckon with.¹¹⁴ Taking issue with Bowra, Podlecki cites LSJ s.v. σηκός in support of his contention that the word 'can mean, besides Bowra's rendering "holy place," simply "sepulchre," "burial place."' ¹¹⁵

immortal.

¹¹¹R. Palmisciano ('Simonide 531 P. '), has recently defended the manuscripts' προγόνων in v. 3; one consequence of this reading, it may be noted here, would be to accentuate the family connection between those who died and those who remember them, much as Pindar (as was seen above) emphasises the family connections between his victors and heroes from the mythical past.

¹¹²M.L. West would punctuate after σηκός and add δ' after οἰκέταν: 'ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅδε σηκός would be overloaded as a noun phrase' ('Melica', p. 211).

¹¹³E.g., Wilamowitz (*Sappho und Simonides*, p. 141 n. 3), Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 346), and Fränkel (*Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 320).

¹¹⁴Wilamowitz remarks (*ibid.*) that 'mit Bedacht steht σηκός, ein Wort, das βωμός und τάφος zugleich umfaßt'.

¹¹⁵Podlecki, 'Simonides: 480', p. 260.

But a closer look at the lexicon reveals that apart from this poem of Simonides, the only example given there for such a meaning is a tomb inscription of the Imperial period from Sidyma, in Lykia.¹¹⁶ The latter can safely be disregarded as an indication of what the word might have meant to Simonides' audience, but even later writers knew that a σηκός was no ordinary τάφος. Strabo calls the *telesterion* of Eleusis a μυστικὸς σηκός (9.1.12); he also uses the word of the places where the Pyraithoi kept the eternal flame burning (15.3.15), and of the sepulchre of Kyros (15.3.7), no ordinary mortal.¹¹⁷ The ancient scholars are unanimous in defining the word as referring specifically to holy places (when it is not used of enclosures for animals, as in Homer, or olive trees, as in Lysias), usually an ἡρώων.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶Kalinka (ed.), *Tituli Asiae Minoris*, v.1 fasc.1 (Vienna, 1920). 'Sepulcrum aedis sacrae instar', significantly, is Kalinka's description of the tomb.

¹¹⁷These passages are cited by L. Ross (*Das Theseion und der Tempel des Ares in Athen*, pp. 23 ff.), who also discusses the physical characteristics of Greek σηκοί, noting that they tend to be similar in shape to the tombs of Asia Minor, and of Lykia in particular.

¹¹⁸Pausanias (ed. H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexica*): σημαίνει μὲν τὸ περίφραγμα καὶ τὴν ἔπαυλιν τῶν προβάτων, σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡρώων, οἷον "ὃς τόνδ' ἔχεις τὸν σηκόν, ἴλεως γενοῦ" (= *TrGF* adesp. 164, also cited by Eust. *Od.* p. 1625, 24). Suidas s.v.: ὁ ἐνδότερος οἶκος τοῦ ἱεροῦ, ναός, οἶκος, τάφος (cf. Hesychios s.v.: οἶκος, τάφος, ναός, μάνδρα, ἐνδότερος τόπος τοῦ ἱεροῦ). Schol. Thuc. 2.17.1 τὰ ἡρώα πάντα (*P.Oxy.* 853, col. x): λέγουσι δὲ ἡρώων με[ν τοὺς] σηκούς, θεῶν δὲ ναούς· Καλλ[ίμαχος] "ἀεὶ δ' ἔχον ἔντομα σηκοί" (= Kall. fr. 694 Pf.). Ptolemy (ed. G. Heylbut, 'Ptolemaeus περὶ διαφορᾶς λέξεων', *Hermes* 22 (1887) 388-410): ναοὶ μὲν θεῶν, σηκοί δὲ ἡρώων. There are two contradictory definitions in [Ammonius] (K. Nickau, (ed.), *Ammonii qui dicitur liber de adfinium vocabulorum differentia*); 329 ναὸς καὶ σηκὸς διαφέρει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ναὸς ἐστὶ θεῶν, ὁ δὲ σηκὸς ἡρώων agrees with the Thucydides scholiast and Ptolemy above, but 439 σηκός δύο σημαίνει· θεῶν τε ναὸν καὶ προβάτων περιφράγματα led Valckenaer to comment: 'Ex *Ammonio* in v. Ναὸς [*i.e.* 329 Nickau] tam certo constat, quam quod certissime, hanc notam aliunde in *Ammonii libellum* relatam' (Valckenaer (ed.), *Ammonius*, ad loc.). In suggesting that 'bei Poll. 1.6 καὶ τὸ μὲν χώριον ἐν ᾧ θεραπεύομεν τοὺς θεούς, ἱερὸν καὶ νεώς, ἔνθα δὲ καθιδρύομεν, σηκὸς καὶ τέμενος ist sei es durch der Abschreiber sei es durch des Compilers Schuld eine Verwirrung eingetreten', H. Usener ('Ein Epigramm von Knidos', p. 49) seems to have ignored the next sentence, in which Pollux blames the poets for the confusion: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκριβέστεροι σηκὸν τὸν τῶν ἡρώων λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ καὶ τὸν τῶν θεῶν, ὥς οἱ τραγωδοὶ "ἀγνὸν εἰς σηκὸν θεοῦ" (= *TrGF* adesp. 424).

Attempting to avoid the logical conclusion that there was a σηκός where the Spartan dead were revered as heroes,¹¹⁹ West claims that

ὁδε σηκός need not refer to the physical tomb, any more that ἐντάφιον τοιοῦτον refers to the physical shroud. It refers rather to the metaphorical heroon which is beyond the reach of time and decay, and at which praise and remembrance take the place of lamentation.¹²⁰

This suggestion was already made by Podlecki,¹²¹ and West attempts to support it by citing Thuc. 2.43.2: ... καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντύχοντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου ἀείμνηστος καταλείπεται. This is not as helpful as it appears at first glance: Perikles does use τὸν τάφον metaphorically in this case, but τὸν τάφον τόνδε at the beginning of his speech (2.35) certainly refers to the actual place of burial and is a better parallel for Simonides' use of the demonstrative.¹²²

In the prologue of Euripides' *Bakchai*, the tomb of Semele is called a σηκός; Dodds *ad loc.* notes that the place is also described as such in a third-century decree from the Theban treasury at Delphi.¹²³ And as Dodds points out, Pausanias and

¹¹⁹Bowra ('Simonides on the Fallen of Thermopylae') compares the testimony of Pausanias (1.32.4) and Thucydides (3.58.4) that the Greeks killed at Marathon and Plataia were given heroic honours, and suggests that this poem was a hymn for Maron and Alpheus who were, according to Herodotos (7.227) the best Spartan warriors after Leonidas. See J.H. Molyneux, *Simonides*, pp. 186-87 on the possibility of a σηκός at Thermopylai or Sparta.

¹²⁰M.L. West, 'Melica', pp. 210-11.

¹²¹Podlecki, 'Simonides: 480', p. 260 (not mentioned by West): '... the word must refer to a figurative σηκός; the reference then will be the same as τοιοῦτον ἐντάφιον: "our praise for their death constitutes their ἐντάφιον and their shrine (or "tomb"), which mould cannot destroy nor time obscure.' See above for Podlecki's misunderstanding of σηκός.

¹²²Though it might have helped his case, West (*ibid.*) rejects Wilamowitz' reading ὁ δέ, in order to punctuate before οἰκέτων (see above). Cf. D.L. Page's response to West's 'metaphorical' σηκός: 'I do not believe that ὁδε could have been used in this context if that had been the intention; and I would add that the altar in v. 3 will have to be explained as metaphorical too. West does not tell us how he would deal with the altar, which, not yet having come to the metaphorical precinct, we had naturally supposed to be a real altar' ('Poetry and Prose', p. 318).

¹²³Bourguet, *Fouilles de Delphes*, v.3, fasc.1, no. 351, pp. 191-200.

Aristeides refer to it as Semele's θάλαμος. Euripides himself, in another play, makes the same substitution: the σηκός of the seer Trophonios is mentioned at *Ion* 300, and less than a hundred lines later, the same place is called Τροφωνίου ... θαλάμας (393-94). The point seems to be that the person commemorated in the σηκός is to be thought of as continuing to exist.

This is an illustration of a trend which Stecher perceives in relation to fifth-century public epitaphs for those killed in action: 'dunkle Andeuten der großen Dinge'.¹²⁴ Stronger than assertions that the deceased will be remembered and missed by the living, which are represented often in poetry and inscribed epigram, such formulations present the dead as enjoying the fruits of their valour even after death. Although this idea is often, as Stecher notes, merely hinted at (as in *AP* 7.253 above, where the dead, speaking in the first person, claim to have been allotted ἀρετῆς μέρος ... μέγιστον by Τύχη), it emerges forcefully on occasion, as in 'Simonides' *FGE* IX, possibly a companion epitaph to *FGE* VIII:¹²⁵

ἄσβεστον κλέος οἶδε φίλῃ περὶ πατρίδι θέντες
 κυάνεον θανάτου ἀμφεβάλλοντο νέφος·
 οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι θανόντες, ἐπεὶ σφ' Ἀρετὴ καθύπερθε
 κυδαίνουσ' ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Αἴδεω.

Οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι θανόντες: this is one instance where the actual life after death for a valiant and patriotic soldier (as opposed to a statement such as the opening verse of *CEG* 2 (Athens, after the Persian wars): ἀνδρῶν τῶνδ' ἀρετῆς ἔσται κλέ]ος ἄφθι[τον] αἰεὶ) is raised above the level of 'dunkle Andeuten' and made explicit, and the statement that Ἀρετὴ actually brings them up out of Hades¹²⁶ might almost be an

¹²⁴Stecher, *Inchriftliche Grabgedichte auf Krieger und Athleten*, p. 35.

¹²⁵Page, *FGE*, pp. 197-99.

¹²⁶G. Burzacchini ('Ἐσχατον δύεται κατὰ γᾶς', p. 40) mentions this passage when she comments that in Simonides' view, some kind of immortality seems to be the reward for overcoming all the difficulties involved in acquiring ἀρετή (cf. *PMG* 526, 541.6, 579, the last of which seems to refer to martial ἀρετή in particular: v. 7 ἄκρον ἀνδρείας).

advance on Tyrtaios' ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἔων γίνεται ἀθάνατος (12.32). In *CEG* 83 (446-*ca* 425?), a μνήμα ... ἀνδρὸς ἀρίστο (v.1), the dead warrior Pythion is said to have saved three *phylai* by his courageous deeds in battle: he εἴλετο τὰν ἀρετάν of seven enemies (v.3), and now (vv. 8-9)

οὐδέ{δε}να πημάνας ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
ἐς Ἄϊδα κατέβα πᾶσιν μακαριστὸς ἰδέσθαι.

Μακαριστός occurs on an Orphic *lamella* where the dead initiate is addressed with the phrase ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βρότοιο,¹²⁷ and in this epitaph the statement that Pythion has gone down to Hades μακαριστὸς ἰδέσθαι seems to imply a 'blessed' afterlife for this brave warrior. It might be argued that the divine/mortal distinction is carefully maintained here, as Pythion is described as μακαριστός rather than μακάρτατος: de Heer notes that 'the epithet μάκαρ is largely applied to gods and only very rarely to mortals, the latter function having been taken over almost entirely by μακάριος'¹²⁸ (a point already made by LSJ s.vv.), which can be translated as 'one who shares to a certain extent in the distinction of being μάκαρ'.¹²⁹ But perhaps the distinction ought not to be pressed too strongly, and the terms appear to have been interchangeable in sense to a certain extent: μάκαρ can be used of men in verse, though μακάριος is the normal term in prose except in the phrase μακάρων νῆσοι (see LSJ s.vv.). It seems that those who after death arrive at the μακάρων νῆσοι are

¹²⁷See G. Zuntz, *Persephone*, pp. 322-23, n. 3, who quotes *CEG* 83.8-9 and a Pythagorean speaking in Plutarch (*de genio Socratis* 16, 585e) of the μακαριστὸν καὶ οἰκείον τέλος achieved by proper burial rites of his sect, and Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, pp. 313-14 on the language of the μακαρισμός.

¹²⁸C. de Heer, *Μάκαρ - Εὐδαιμόνων - Ὀλβιος - Εὐτυχής*, p. 56.

¹²⁹de Heer, p. 31, citing Chantraine and Schwyzler for the sense of adjectives in -ιος.

to be thought of as at least approaching divine status,¹³⁰ as in the *skolion* PMG 894, for example, which addresses the brave Harmodios:

φίλταθ' Ἀρμόδι', οὐ τι πω τέθνηκας,
νήσοις δ' ἐν μακάρων σέ φασιν εἶναι

Evidence from other sources suggests that heroization of the dead was not uncommon at this time in at least two parts of the Greek world, but inscribed epigrams from these areas appear not to have survived in sufficient numbers to permit an assessment of the impact of these practices on this branch of the poetic tradition. A fragment of the comic poet Plato (77 K.-A. τί οὐκ ἀπήγξω, ἵνα Θήβησιν ἥρωες γένῃ¹³¹) implies that the Boiotians' regular characterization of their dead as ἥρωες, well-attested by gravestones from the Hellenistic period and later,¹³² was current practice in the late fifth or early fourth century.¹³³ But in the few surviving Boiotian verse epitaphs from the fifth century or earlier the word does not appear,¹³⁴ nor is there much to indicate a belief that the dead have gained some kind of immortality apart from *CEG* 114 (479?) where the dead soldier speaks from beyond the grave.¹³⁵ Thasos also seems to have paid extraordinary honours to its war dead, including the

¹³⁰M.L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days*, p. 193, notes (on v. 171 μακάρων νήσοισι) that μακάρες unqualified in the poetic language almost always means “the gods” But by Hesiod's time μακάρων may have come to be understood of the fortunate pensioners.' Further (p. 194): ‘In the Odyssean Elysium, too, the inhabitants are ἄνθρωποι ([*Odyssey* 4.] 565, 568). But these ἄνθρωποι are still given honour beyond what most mortals can expect, and even if they do not live strictly *as* gods, they at least live close to them.

¹³¹As Zenobios comments, suicides did not receive this distinction.

¹³²See Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 532, and Himmelmann, *Ideale Nacktheit*, p. 60, n. 122.

¹³³And that the custom seemed strange to the Athenians, as pointed out by J. Larson, *Greek Heroine Cults*, p. 23.

¹³⁴It does, however, in the fourth-century *CEG* 2.634.

¹³⁵*CEG* 2.631 is dated 400-350?, and so might just come from the very end of the fifth century; it also addresses the dead (see below), and states (vv. 3-4) ὅποτ' ἐπαίνο | [λήσό]μεθ'.

offering of sacrificial meat,¹³⁶ but once again this is not reflected in the few surviving local verse inscriptions apart from *CEG* 159 (*ca* 500?) where the dead Telephanes speaks:

[ὄ]στις μὴ παρ[ε]τύνηχαν' ὅτ' ἐ[χσ]έφερόν με θ[αν]όντα,
νῦν μ' ὁ[λο]φυράσθω· μν[ήμ]α δὲ Τηλεφ[άνε]ος.

An after-life of some sort also seems to be implied by the device of a direct address to the dead, but these are rare in the extant material; Sourvinou-Inwood notes that the only certainly datable use of χαίρε to address the deceased in epitaphs to the end of the fifth century is in the inscription *CEG* 4 (Athens, 458 or 457; = *AP* 7.254):

[χαίρετε ἀριστῆες, πολέμο μέγα] κῦδο[ς] ἔχοντες]
[κῶροι Ἀθηναῖον, ἔχσοχοι ἡιπ]οσύνα[ι].
[hoί ποτε καλλιχόρο περὶ πατ]ρίδος ὁ[λέ]σατε ἡέβεν],
[πλείστοις ἡελλάνον ἀντία <?β>]αρνάμε[νοι].

When the dead are thus addressed with χαίρετε, argues Sourvinou-Inwood, they are given status as immortal heroes, reflecting contemporary Athenian attitudes to those killed in combat:

death in battle is a glorious event which elevates the war dead as a collectivity to a higher status, for it happens in the service of the city which validates the lives of the individuals; it does not invite grief and lament, but praise and glorification of the dead, and through them of death in the service of the polis, which contributes to the glorification of the polis itself. An expression such as *andras ... polis hede pothei* of the epitaph for those fallen at Poteidaia [*CEG* 10.iii, above] is the nearest fifth-century Athenian public collective epitaphs ever came to an expression of regret at the men's death.¹³⁷

¹³⁶E. Krummen, *Pyrros Hymnon*, pp. 71-72.

¹³⁷Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Reading' *Greek Death*, p. 193 with note 335: 'The public epitaph [*CEG*] 135 ... where the word *penthos* is mentioned, is an Argive, not an Athenian, epitaph'. (It might be added that Aristeides recognized the tendency towards glorification in Athenian epitaphs: after quoting a few of them, he says νῆ Δί' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα Ἀττικὰ καὶ θερμότερα (28.66)). Outside Athens, different rules apply: the epigram on the Lokrian dead at Thermopylai (Strabo 9.4.2) can say that τοῦσδε ποθεῖ φθιμένους ... μητρόπολις. But there does seem to be another Athenian example of public grief in the scanty remains of *CEG* 9 ('post 450?' writes Hansen, following Meritt and Bradeen):

]οις τονδε .[
]τοις καὶ λευκασ[πι
]ντες κέδεα φο[

These attitudes ‘give us the context in which *chairete* appears in a fifth-century public epitaph’, and demonstrate ‘a correlation between the use of *chaire* to address the deceased and the possession of a heroic/divine status by the deceased thus addressed’.¹³⁸ Whether χαῖρε/χαίρετε is taken to mean ‘hail’ or ‘farewell’ (or both?) does not materially affect the point: the act of addressing the dead in an epitaph, however formulated, seems to presuppose an expectation (or at least a hope) that the address will be received, as Simonides and his audience expect the dead Achilles to hear the poet’s χαῖρε in the Plataia elegy (11.19).¹³⁹

The word before κέδεα here might have been *e.g.* θέντες (*cf.* CEG 2.664 (Amorgos, *ca* 400-350?), line 2 δακρυόεν δὲ πόλει πένθος ἔθηκε θανών) or λιπόντες (*cf.* CEG 84 (Attica, *ca* 440-430), line 3 πατρὶ φίλῳ καὶ μητρὶ λιπόντε ἀμφοῖμ μέγα πένθος). The *Iliad* has πατέρι δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρὰ | λείπ’ at 5.156-57, and (rather different) ὥς Ἀχιλλεύς Τρώεσσι πόνον καὶ κήδε’ ἔθηκεν at 21.525.

Even Simonides’ private epitaph for his friend Megistias, quoted at Herodotos 7.228.3, makes no reference to lamentation; this may have something to do with the fact that the monument was apparently erected on the battlefield of Thermopylai, but there is a parallel in the private epitaph CEG 142 (Akarnania, *ca* 475-50?):

Προκλείδα{ς} τόδε σᾶμα κεκλέσεται ἐγγυὺς ὁδοῖο,
 ἡδὺς περὶ τὰς αὐτο γὰς θάνε μα(ρ)νάμενος.

For problems of the Simonidean authorship of the Megistias epigram and the circumstances of its composition, see Molyneux, *Simonides*, pp. 175-79 (who believes that the Megistias poem is genuinely Simonidean), and Erbse, ‘Zu den Epigrammen des Simonides’ (who argues that Simonides also composed the other two poems cited in Herodotos 7.228). Molyneux (who also discusses the epitaph for the Lokrians, mentioned above, on pp. 182-83) notes that Page adopts a less extreme position in *FGE* (Simonides probably composed the Megistias epigram, but not the other two) than in his earlier *Epigrammata Graeca* (none of the three is genuinely Simonidean); Erbse cites the latter, but ignores both Page’s revised position in *FGE* and Molyneux’s discussion of it.

¹³⁸Sourvinou-Inwood, p. 194. Her discussion of χαῖρε begins on p. 180; among literary examples for the use of χαῖρε to address the dead only in restricted circumstances, she cites Achilles’ addresses to Patroklos at *Iliad* 23.19-20 and 23.179-80 (pp. 182-87) and Theoklymenos’ address to his dead father at Euripides, *Helen*, 1165 (pp. 188-89). These, she argues, do not represent a general practice of addressing the dead with χαῖρε; Theoklymenos’ father Proteus had superhuman status, and Patroklos is in a liminal state, not having been properly buried (and Achilles himself follows the salutation with the concessive phrase καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι – *i.e.* χαῖρε is not a greeting normally used for the dead). Achilles’ words after the departure of Patroklos’ ghost at *Iliad* 23.103-104 (ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι | ψυχὴ καὶ εἰδῶλον, ‘so there *is* after all a ψυχὴ and an εἰδῶλον even in Hades’), as Richardson notes, ‘suggests debate on this subject already in Homer’s time’ (Richardson, *Commentary*, p. 177). Achilles seems less sure in his final address to Patroklos (24.592-93 αἶ κε πύθηαι | εἰν Ἀϊδός περ ἐών), which takes place *after* the funeral rites have been performed.

¹³⁹On the ‘heroic’ status of the dead in this poem, see also D. Boedeker, ‘The New Simonides and Heroization at Plataia’.

The public epitaph *CEG* 5 (Athens, 458 or 457) also addresses the dead directly (τλέμονες, ἡοῖον ἀγῶνα μάχης τελέσαντες ...) though it does not use χαίρετε, and presumably represents the same attitudes, although ‘the connotations of unhappiness [in the word τλέμονες] probably also allowed for the creation of an ambiguous resonance of (private) pity and of the sadness of the individual deaths’.¹⁴⁰ The address to the dead in *CEG* 4 may perform a similar function by implying what is stated directly in, for example, ‘Simonides’ *FGE* IX (οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι θανόντες), that the display of martial ἀρετή could provide a man with the exceptional honours promised by Tyrtaios 12.31-32:

οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ὄνομ’ αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἔων γίνεται ἀθάνατος.

2.5 *Fight or Flight*

The motif of jettisoning one’s shield to save one’s skin is, not surprisingly, rare in martial poetry except as an example of the disgrace incurred by the coward, as was seen above (2.1) in relation to the exhortations of Kallinos and Tyrtaios. ‘To call a man ῥίψασπις was actionable slander’, notes Dover,¹⁴¹ commenting on Aristophanes’ repeated attacks on Kleonymos for having thrown away his shield in a battle. At *Peace* 1296 ff., for example, the hero Trygaios asks Kleonymos’ son to sing a non-martial song (‘for you are the son of a σώφρων father’, 1297), and the boy replies with Archilochos 5 (see below); when the recitation reaches the phrase ψυχὴν

¹⁴⁰Sourvinou-Inwood, p. 193, note 335.

¹⁴¹*Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. 148, citing Lysias 10.

δ' ἐξεσάωσα, Trygaios breaks in with the conventional κατήσχυνας δὲ τοκῆας,¹⁴² which is obviously inappropriate to a son of Kleonymos.

Funerary epigram, naturally, mentions the idea only to reject it: in *CEG* 118 (Thessaly, ca 475-450?) it is said that the fallen warrior οὐκ ἐπίστατο φεύγεν. In the literary material, there are some possible examples of the theme: Strabo (13.600) reports that Alkaios said that he threw his weapons away and fled (428(a)); it is perhaps possible that 400 comes from such a poem, in which Alkaios may have said something like '... for it is κάλον to die in battle, *but* better to live and fight another day ...', though this would admittedly be a sentiment unparalleled in the extant lines of Alkaios. Campbell, citing Anakreon *PMG* 381(b) and 437, says that Anakreon also claimed to have thrown his shield away in battle,¹⁴³ but this cannot be certain. In 381(b) ἀσπίδα ῥίψας ποταμοῦ καλλιρρόου παρ' ὄχθας¹⁴⁴ the subject of the participle ῥίψας has been lost and may not be the poet himself; he might have been describing someone else's flight from the battlefield, and in any case we cannot tell whether he was condemning this action or commending it.¹⁴⁵ In 437 the poet says that he fled

¹⁴²Cf. *Iliad* 6.209 (Hippolochos' instructions to his son Glaukos, departing for Troy) μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν; *Odyssey* 24.508-9 (Odysseus to Telemachos) μή τι κατασχύνειν πατέρων γένος, οἳ τὸ πάρος περ | ἀλκῇ τ' ἡνορέη τε κεκάσμεθα πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν; Alkaios 6.13-14 μὴ κατασχύνωμεν ... ἔσλοις τόκης; later, Plato, *Menexenos* 246d καλῶς αἰρούμεθα μάλλον τελευτᾶν ... πρὶν τοὺς ἡμετέρους πατέρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόσθεν γένος αἰσχύναι; and an early third-century epitaph from Thessaly (Peek (ed.), *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, no. 425): ... πρῶτος δ' ἐμ προμάχοισι θάνεν, | [ο]ὐχὶ [κ]ατασχύνας πατρίδ' οὐδὲ γ[ο]ν[ῆ]ας ἑαυτοῦ.

¹⁴³*Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁴Also cited by Nisbet and Hubbard (*A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book II*, p. 113) as an example of the 'self-conscious insouciance' of Greek poets like Archilochos (see below) who claim to have thrown away their shields in battle.

¹⁴⁵It was probably the first line of a poem; Atilius Fortunatus quotes it as an example of the metre of Horace *Odes* 1.8.2. along with Sappho 128 (δευτέ νυν ἄβραι Χάριτες καλλίκομοί τε Μοῖσαι), which does sound like an *incipit*. Anakreon's ποταμοῦ καλλιρρόου παρ' ὄχθας suggests a locale with erotic possibilities (compare Ibykos *PMG* 286): is the poet making love rather than war? On the other hand, *PMG* 382 (δακρυόεσσάν τ' ἐφύλησεν αἰχμήν) and 393 (ὀρσόλοπος μὲν ἄρης φιλεῖ μεναίχμην) show that the two themes could be blended in Anakreon's poetry.

ἀπ' αὐτῆς ... ὥστε κόκκυξ; and although the antecedent to αὐτῆς might have been e.g. μάχη, it remains uncertain, and the line should not automatically be taken to refer to flight from the battlefield; an erotic context, for example, is equally plausible.¹⁴⁶

The theme is, however, certainly encountered in Archilochos at least in fr. 5 and possibly elsewhere; these instances deserve some attention here. The poet tells us that he left his shield behind in battle, but escaped alive: αὐτὸν δ' ἐξεσάωσα (5.3).

The shield is described as an ἔντος ἀμώμητον; Burnett comments that

the shield itself was the sort that a noble should bear – not just a bit of armour but an epic fossil distinguished by the old-fashioned word *entos*. The shield, in fact, is everything that its owner is not, and the singer makes this clear by giving it the epithet that a Homeric hero often wears, making it 'blameless'.¹⁴⁷

While it is true that at *Iliad* 17.91 ff., Menelaos debates with himself the question of whether to stand his ground over the body of Patroklos or retreat and, faced with the prospect of having to do battle alone against Hektor and all the Trojans, decides that discretion is in fact the better part of valour (17.108 ἐξοπίσω ἀνεχάζετο, λείπε δὲ νεκρόν), he does not abandon his weapons in an admission of defeat, and even in retreat he is compared to a λῆς ἡϋγένειος (17.109). But there is an element which is common to both situations: Menelaos (more specifically, the lion to which he is likened) is described as retreating ἀέκων (17.112), and Archilochos says that he abandoned his shield οὐκ ἐθέλων (5.2). As Burnett writes, he

boasts that he has separated himself from the sham of ancient pretensions, but his pride is evidently a mixed emotion and he does not disguise the fact that it is an inglorious self that he has preserved.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶For animal imagery used to illustrate reluctance to submit to love, compare Ibykos *PMG* 287.

¹⁴⁷Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 42. Although it is true that the singular ἔντος occurs only here and in Archilochos 139 (see below), it is perhaps not quite a 'fossil': ἔντεα as arms and armour appear in Pindar (*Olympian* 4.22).

¹⁴⁸Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 245. She also suggests (p. 42, n. 29) that 127 (ἡμβλακον. καὶ που τίν' ἄλλον ἢδ' ἴατη 'κιχήσατο) and 233 (πόδες δὴ κείθι τιμιώτατοι) should be

Although, as Fränkel says, Archilochos is questioning an ‘exaggerated notion of honor’,¹⁴⁹ the poet does still feel it necessary to point out that his decision was made οὐκ ἐθέλων. Reverdin argues that in Archilochos’ era ‘l’abandon d’un bouclier n’avait pas la gravité qu’il devait avoir plus tard, lorsqu’il eut pour conséquence de découvrir des camarades de combat et d’ouvrir une brèche dans la phalange’,¹⁵⁰ but there must have been something discreditable in the conventional view of the act to make the poet justify himself in the second couplet of the fragment. Kontoleon’s reply to the rationalizations of Reverdin is that Archilochos is to be seen not as relating an actual experience but as assuming the rôle of poet-instructor: ‘[i]n diesem Falle wäre der Vorwurf, dass er seinen Schild tatsächlich weggeworfen hatte, unberechtigt; er hätte nur das allgemeine Urteil ausgesprochen, es sei wichtiger die ψυχή als den Schild zu retten’.¹⁵¹ As Nisbet and Hubbard comment on the similar theme of Horace, *Odes* 2.7.10, the poet is ‘making use of a poetical topic ... that may have been fictional even with some of his Greek predecessors. Horace’s literal experiences are quite irrelevant; for the purposes of the poem he is no more

read ‘in conjunction with’ 5; she does not elaborate on the connections between the fragments. It is not inconceivable that the other two lines come from poems describing a retreat from battle as 5 does, but this of course cannot be proven.

¹⁴⁹Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 137.

¹⁵⁰O. Reverdin, in discussion of E. Wistrand’s paper ‘Archilochus and Horace’, *Archiloque* (Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique 10; Vandoeuvres-Genève 1964) 253-279, p. 285. Reverdin goes on to claim that Horace in the third stanza of *Odes* 2.7 ‘se méprenait sur le sens du [fr. 5]. Il ignorait le contexte historique dans lequel avait vécu Archiloque. [Archiloque], qui ne songe qu’à acquérir un nouveau bouclier, n’est pas un lâche; ... le mobile de son acte, ou la cause de sa mésaventure, n’est peut-être même pas une défaillance (*fracta virtus* [Horace, *Odes* 2.7.11])’ (p. 286).

¹⁵¹N.M. Kontoleon, continuing the above discussion (which includes Page’s bizarre suggestion that Archilochos’ shield might have been stolen, since the poet does not actually mention throwing it away), p. 287.

autobiographical than in the following stanza, where he claims to have been rescued by Mercury'.¹⁵²

Kontoleon also asks whether Archilochos might not implicitly be criticizing the barbarians' over-valuation of such things as splendid shields: 'will das ἀγάλλεται vielleicht die elementare Freude der Barbaren an etwas ihnen sehr kostbar Erscheinendem, wie der Schild war, ausdrücken?'.¹⁵³ Similar in spirit is Svenbro's argument that Archilochos' 'attitude profondément anti-héroïque' results from the fact that the genealogies of things such as the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad*, as important to epic heroes as their own family backgrounds, have ceased to have any significance among mercenaries who buy their equipment. Svenbro also notes that the value of the armour described by Alkaios in fragment 357 is spoken of in terms of its usefulness rather than its genealogy, and that Alkaios, too, reacts against over-valuation of armour itself in fragment 427: ταῦτα παρὰ Ἀλκαίου. οὐ τιπρώσκει τὰ ἐπίσημα ὄπλα οὐδὲ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ δύναμιν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὁ φέρων αὐτὰ ἐὰν ᾗ [[ὁ]] γενναῖος.¹⁵⁴ On this view, the poet is suggesting that his action in saving his own life is no less appropriate than a 'heroic' attitude to what is, after all, a tool. Even Achilles' brilliant armour was not invulnerable (*cf.* section 3.1).

¹⁵²Nisbet and Hubbard, p. 113, who also note that fr. 96, like fr. 5, seems to have something to do with fighting the Saioi. Although the context of fr. 96 is not clear, the poet appears to be 'reproaching Glaucus for forgetting his country; perhaps, like Horace, he is drawing a contrast between his own escape and his friend's prolonged absence' (p. 108, following Zielinski). If this is the case, of course, then Archilochos will have done for the patriotism-theme in that poem what he does for the 'death before dishonour' theme in fr. 5.

¹⁵³Discussion of Wistrand, 'Archilochus and Horace', *Archiloque*, p. 287.

¹⁵⁴J. Svenbro, *La parole et le marbre*, pp. 129-131. For Alkaios' attitude Svenbro also cites 426 (τὸν λόγον δὲ πάλαι μὲν Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν ... ὥς ἄρα οὐ λίθοι οὐδὲ ξύλα οὐδὲ τέχνη τεκτόνων αἱ πόλεις εἶεν ἀλλ' ὅπου ποτ' ἂν ὦσιν ἄνδρες αὐτοὺς σῶζειν εἰδότες ἐνταῦθα καὶ τείχη καὶ πόλεις); here it is worth noting that (if Aristeides' citation is accurate) the poet praises *self-preservation* (ἄνδρες αὐτοὺς σῶζειν εἰδότες) rather than patriotism or civic spirit – but this is still a long way, of course, from Archilochos' αὐτὸν δ' ἐξεσάωσα. Alkaios 112 and 396 also deal with the idea that it is men rather than fortifications or weapons which save a city.

It has recently been proposed that in Archilochos 139 we may have another poem of the same type. Kerkhecker notes that ἀσπίδ[in the first and ἔντος in the fifth line of this fragment are strongly reminiscent of fragment 5, and that καλ[at the end of the seventh line might be the remains of καλ[λιπ-, as in 5.2 κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων.¹⁵⁵ This is certainly a plausible suggestion; it is perhaps worth noting in addition that if this interpretation is correct, v.8]βων ῥήματ' οὐκετ[may give some support to Herodotos' version of the famous epigram 'Simonides' *FGE* XXII (b):

ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

Page rejects the final hemiepes ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι (as given in Herodotos, the *Anthology*, and the *Suda*) in favour of πειθόμενοι νομίμοις (as given in Lykourgos, Diodoros, and Strabo) on the grounds that 'ῥήματα are merely *words* *Customs* or *traditions*, on the other hand, makes a strong phrase';¹⁵⁶ but if, nearly two centuries earlier, Archilochos in fr. 139 made some reference to 'no longer (heeding?) ῥήματα' in the context of throwing away his shield, Herodotos' earlier version of the 'Simonidean' epigram, even though 'almost certainly taken ... at second hand, orally',¹⁵⁷ may gain some credibility as the original version, even though the epigram may still be thought of as a 'damp squib' for which Simonides himself was not responsible.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵Kerkhecker, 'Archilochus fr. 139 West'. Kerkhecker's argument, of course, is open to the objection that καλ[in line 7 could be many things other than part of καταλείπω.

¹⁵⁶Page, *FGE*, p. 233. Contrast Lloyd-Jones in his review of *FGE* (*CR* n.s. 32 (1982) 139-44, p. 141): 'Page prefers πειθόμενοι νομίμοις to ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι, on the ground that ῥήμασι cannot mean "commands"; but the word can take its colour from the context, and I hope his view will not be generally accepted.'

¹⁵⁷Page, *FGE*, p. 234. S. West ('Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests', p. 289, n. 53) points out that there is no reason to assume that the historian must have relied on a second-hand report of the inscription: Page simply assumes that πειθόμενοι νομίμοις is the better text and that therefore Herodotos did not view the inscription himself.

¹⁵⁸M.L. West, 'Simonides Redivivus', p. 1, n. 2.

If Archilochos 139 is understood to be part of a ῥίψασπις-poem, the ἀκόντων δοῦπον of line 6 may have important resonances. Lobel's notes (*P.Oxy.* 2313 fr.5) refer to δοῦπον ἀκόντων at *Iliad* 16.361; here, importantly, Hektor is standing his ground (as, on this reading of 139, Archilochus is not), even though the Greeks under Patroklos' leadership are gaining the upper hand in the battle. But the phrase occurs two more times in the *Iliad*, both times again in association with Hektor. In these other two instances, however, Hektor has just escaped death at the hands of Diomedes and Achilles (11.363-64¹⁵⁹ = 20.450-51 νῦν αὖτε σ' ἐρύσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, | ᾧ μέλλεις εὖχεσθαι ἰὼν ἐς δοῦπον ἀκόντων), prompting his attacker in each case to make a brief speech (11.362-67 = 20.449-54) promising that Hektor will not escape with his life next time. These short, bitter verbal attacks directed at the back of a fleeing enemy (addressed as κύον, 11.362 = 20.449) by two of the most powerful Greek heroes would form an appropriate epic background for an Archilochean poem which, like 5, extolled the virtues of escaping alive from combat.¹⁶⁰

It would be appropriate to mention here the speech of Achilles to Odysseus in which he says (*Iliad* 9.412-429) that he chooses to leave the fighting at Troy and return home in order to live a longer life (δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν | ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη, 9.415-16). This appears to be a manifestation of the same concern that caused Archilochos to consider his life more important than his shield and the reproach of cowardice to which he makes himself vulnerable by fleeing

¹⁵⁹No less appropriate to its own context than 20.450-51, despite the fact that Apollo is not said to intervene directly in the episode from Book 11; see Hainsworth, *Commentary*, p. 266.

¹⁶⁰On the anonymous iambic fragment 38, West comments 'fort. Archilochi', and Lobel (ed., *P.Oxy.* 2317) notes that 'the forms and vocabulary point to an old Ionic writer and of those we know none seems more likely to be the rightful claimant than Archilochus, with whose vehement and hurrying style what is preserved here is quite consistent'. This poem, though (whoever its author was), is a tirade against a coward rather than a glorification of his instinct for self-preservation.

battle. But in *Iliad* 9 Achilles seems to change his mind about going home. He says, first of all (9.410-16) that his mother told him that he had a choice: to fight and die, winning κλέος ἄφθιτον, or to return home and live to old age;¹⁶¹ and he tells Odysseus that he will leave for home on the next day (αὔριον, 429). After the speech of Phoinix, however, he softens slightly, saying that when morning comes φρασσόμεθ' ἢ κε νεώμεθ' ἐφ' ἡμέτερ' ἢ κε μένωμεν (619); and finally he says to Aias that he will not re-enter the battle until Hektor has fought his way to the camp of the Myrmidons (650-53), in other words that he will stay but is not ready to fight again yet. Achilles' threat to leave the field of battle is of course never realized; whether he ever meant it seriously or was merely 'toying with the pretence' as Fränkel puts it,¹⁶² this passage is an extended example from epic of the conflict between saving one's own life and winning glory in battle that prompts Archilochos to say in 5 (and perhaps 139) that he chose the former option.

¹⁶¹What Homer makes Thetis say to Achilles at *Iliad* 1.416-18 is, however, quite different: ... νύ τοι αἶσα μίνυνθά περ, οὔ τι μάλα δῆν· | νῦν δ' ἄμα τ' ὠκύμορος καὶ ὄϊζυρὸς περὶ πάντων | ἔπλεο· τῷ σε κακῇ αἴσῃ τέκον ἐν μεγάροισι. and Achilles at 1.352 (μῆτερ, ἐπεὶ μ' ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἐόντα) seems to accept that he will die soon, and does not refer to a choice of fates. But it is possible, of course, that Achilles in book 9 is to be understood to be referring to some other conversation with his mother in which she did in fact tell him that he had a choice. J.B. Hainsworth writes (*The Iliad: A Commentary, volume iii*, p. 56) of the 'foreknowledge granted [to Achilles] by Thetis that he lives under a conditional doom – if he slays Hektor he will quickly die himself (18.94-126)', but again there is no 'condition' stated: what Thetis says there is not 'if you slay Hektor ...', but rather 'your doom is set immediately after Hektor' (18.96). N. Yamagata (*Homeric Morality*, p. 59, n.2) comments that Achilles may have once had 'an alternative of long and less glorious life (*Il.* 9.414-16), but the choice apparently is already made. Thetis says to Zeus, "Please give honour to my son who is *destined to be short-lived*" at *Il.* 1.505-6' (Yamagata's italics). Compare the different versions of the oracles in the Oidipous story: Sophokles presents them as unconditional statements by Apollo that Oidipous *will* kill his father and sleep with his mother (*O.T.* 711 ff., 790), whereas Aischylos' version of the oracle suggests that Laios had a choice (*Seven Against Thebes* 742 ff.; cf. E.R. Dodds, 'On Misunderstanding the *Oedipus Rex*', in *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, 64-77, p. 69.)

¹⁶²Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 137.

Summary

The development of hoplite warfare tends to be linked in scholarship with an increase in citizens' devotion to their *polis* and eagerness to fight and die gloriously for it, as apparently shown in the patriotic sentiments expressed by poets of the period. But the *polis*-centred consciousness which poets such as Kallinos and Tyrtaios are taken to represent is not reflected in archaic verse inscriptions commemorating the war dead; it is not until after the Persian Wars that close correspondences between the two traditions can be found, though both can be seen to deploy fairly consistently the promise of an heroic afterlife as a positive incentive. The context of sympotic elegy, too, presents a difficulty; if this 'patriotism' is apparently restricted to the *symposion*, and is absent from the more public context of grave monuments until the fifth century, it should probably be seen as serving a function other than simple glorification of the *polis*. The aristocracy, under pressure from a rising hoplite class – however that may be defined – presents itself (to itself) as fulfilling a vital rôle and earning the privileges outlined by Sarpedon in Book 12 of the *Iliad*. The more public face shown in the monuments and in epinician poetry is a different one, although the latter tends to locate martial valour more explicitly within the *polis*, presenting it as one of the factors which raises the *laudandus* above his fellow citizens.

3. *Beauty and Virtue*

3.1 *Κάλλος in Homer*

In the Homeric poems, the quality of *κάλλος* is attributed to a wide variety of objects, as well as to human beings and to divine figures. *Κάλλος* in Homer is not restricted to the visual world; the Greeks are described at *Iliad* 1.473 as *καλὸν αἰδόντες παίονα* (cf. *Odyssey* 8.265 *καλὸν αἰδεῖν*), and the phrase *ὅπλῃ καλῇ* is found at *Iliad* 1.604, *Odyssey* 5.61 and 10.221. The word, then, can be used of anything that is aesthetically pleasing to eye or ear.¹ Although the usual sense of the adjective *καλός*, that of ‘beautiful’, predominates, it is possible that when applied to things such as *τεύχεα* (*Iliad* 3.89), *ἄρματα* (*Iliad* 23.533), *κνημῖδες* (*Iliad* 18.459), or an *ἀπήνη* (*Odyssey* 6.252), the adjective may also imply a meaning such as ‘useful’; this is suggested by Mehliss, who writes that the range of the meaning of the adjective in Homer ‘mit “von normaler Beschaffenheit” beginnt und mit “nützlich” an eine andere Vorstellungsmasse anschliesst’.² But this interpretation must be treated as secondary; although the armour of Achilles is described by Hephaistos as *τεύχεα*

¹The sense of touch may also be involved in the phrase *χρόα καλόν*: *Iliad* 5.858, 21.398, 23.805 (skin being pierced by a weapon); 11.352 (skin protected from a weapon); 14.175 (Here anointing her skin with oil); 22.321 (Achilleus facing Hektor, *εἰσορόων χρόα καλόν, ὅπῃ εἴξειε μάλιστα*); *Odyssey* 2.376, 4.749 (skin being torn in grief); 13.398, 13.430 (skin being withered); 19.263 (skin being disfigured); 24.44 (skin being purified with oil).

²E. Mehliss, ‘Über die Bedeutung von *καλός* bei Homer’, p. 6.

καλά (*Iliad* 18.466), its ‘usefulness’ is limited and it will not save the life of the hero who wears it. As Griffin writes, ‘the uniqueness of Achilles’ armour is its beauty alone’;³ and in this respect the emphasis on its outstanding beauty in the *ekphrasis* of Book 18 might be seen as ironic, as is the case with the description of the dead Patroklos’ armour as ἄμβροτα τεύχεα by Zeus at 19.202 and the scene of Paris polishing his περικαλλέα τεύχεα at 6.321. The fact that Achilles’ armour is ‘immortal’ is no consolation to the two heroes who will be killed while wearing it, and the description of Paris’ armour as περικαλλέα (*cf.* 3.328, τεύχεα καλά) reminds the audience that its owner himself has been said to possess more beauty than usefulness in battle (3.39-45; see below).⁴

When used of characters in the Homeric poems, καλός is often combined with other adjectives and phrases qualifying the character so described,⁵ for example in the phrase καλός τε μέγας τε (*Iliad* 21.108, *Odyssey* 6.276),⁶ or with ἀρτίπος (*Odyssey* 8.310), or γεραρός (*Iliad* 3.170). Donlan notes⁷ that for women, praise of

³J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, p. 166.

⁴Of course, other characters possess τεύχεα καλά, even minor characters such as Amphios and Oinomaos (*Iliad* 5.621 = 13.510); the formulaic attribution of τεύχεα καλά to such warriors provides the background against which the irony of the emphasis on the τεύχεα καλά of the unwarlike Paris becomes apparent.

⁵In Hesiod, however, καλός tends to appear alone, except for *Theogony* 194 (of Aphrodite) αἰδοίη καλὴ θεός. In the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, the masculine and feminine forms of the adjective are used only of divine figures. The connection between beauty and divinity is found also in Homer: καλὴ Καστιάνειρα, δέμας εἰκυῖα θεῇσι (*Iliad* 8.305).

⁶W.J. Verdenius, ‘Κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος’, discusses the Greeks’ admiration for large stature.

⁷W. Donlan, ‘The Origin of Καλὸς κάγαθός’, p. 370, n. 12.

beauty can be allied to that of their domestic skills, citing *Odyssey* 13.288-89 (γυναικὶ | καλῇ τε μεγάλῃ τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργα ἰδυίῃ), 15.418, and 16.158. Donlan writes that ‘[i]t is clear that in Homer beauty was an important aspect of the heroic warrior (and of his women), and that having it contributed to a person’s ἀρετή’.⁸ Similarly Hoekstra on *Odyssey* 14.214: ‘Odysseus’ appearance ... is part of his ἀρετή’. But not a necessary part: Hoekstra’s comment that ‘the translation “valour” [for ἀρετή in v. 212] does no justice to the fact that originally the word had a much more general and elementary meaning ... which is still faintly visible in 214 [*i.e.*, Odysseus’ comment about his appearance]’⁹ does no justice itself to the fact that Homeric heroes are careful to distinguish between beauty and true ἀρετή (see below).

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the adjective καλός in Homer is less often used of characters, be they human or divine, than it is of things; as desirable as beauty is, it is not the primary virtue, and it is important to note that one who is καλός but does not display ἀρετή independently does not gain in standing on the basis of κάλλος alone. This is well illustrated by Hektor’s words to Paris at *Iliad* 3.43-45:

ἦ που καγχαλώωσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,
φάντες ἀριστῆα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὐνεκα καλὸν
εἶδος ἔπ’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή.

And another example may be found in Odysseus’ feigned ignorance about his own dog Argos at *Odyssey* 17.306-10:

⁸Donlan, ‘The Origin of Καλὸς κάγαθός’, p. 370. He continues: ‘In the Hesiodic poems, on the other hand, physical beauty is in no way connected with human worth.’

⁹A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, volume ii*, p. 208.

Εὖμαι', ἥ μάλα θαῦμα κύων ὅδε κεῖτ' ἐνὶ κόπρῳ.
 καλὸς μὲν δέμας ἐστίν, ἀτὰρ τόδε γ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα,
 ἥ δ' ἔτι καὶ ταχὺς ἔσκε θέειν ἐπὶ εἵδει τῷδε,
 ἥ αὖτως οἶοί τε τραπεζῆες κύνες ἀνδρῶν
 γίνοντ', ἀγλαΐης δ' ἔνεκεν κομέουσιν ἄνακτες.

At *Iliad* 6.156, Glaukos tells Diomedes that the gods gave his grandfather

Bellerophontes κάλλος τε καὶ ἡνορέην ἐρατείνην; these three passages demonstrate that one's beauty and one's worth are clearly distinguished in Homer, and that the one does not imply the other.¹⁰ Another example worth citing is Penelope's reproach to Telemachos at *Odyssey* 18.215 ff., where she complains that although Telemachos possesses μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος, his φρένες and νόημα are not ἔμπεδοι or ἐναίσιμοι, since he has allowed 'this guest' (τὸν ξεῖνον, *i.e.*, Odysseus himself) to be maltreated; this is reminiscent of an earlier episode where Odysseus, stung by Euryalos' rebuke (8.159 ff. οὐ γάρ σ' οὐδέ, ξεῖνε, δαήμονι φωτὶ εἴσκω | ἄθλων ...), replies that looks can be deceptive (8.166-75): a man who is εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος can be held in high honour for his excellence in speech, whereas another may be εἶδος ... ἀλίγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν but have no χάρις in his words. Euryalos, says Odysseus (176-77), has an εἶδος ... ἀριπρεπές but is still νόον ... ἀποφώλιος. Later, in the *Theognidea*, the fact that virtue and beauty are rarely found in the same person is bemoaned: παύροις

¹⁰One man can have both κάλλος and ἀρετή, and the converse is also true: Thersites is not only αἰσχιστος (*Iliad* 2.216) but also held in contempt by the rest of the Greek army. In neither case, though, is moral worth perceived as a consequence of physical appearance. On *Iliad* 6.156, the scholiast bT comments: οὐδὲν γὰρ κάλλος ἄνευ ἀνδρείας, and H. Wankel (*Kalos kai agathos*, p. 16) writes, 'den Scholiasten ist die Verbindung also selbstverständlich'. But given the other Homeric passages quoted above, and despite the fact that ἡνορέην ἐρατείνην may blur the distinction in the case of Bellerophontes, it is clear that whatever the scholiasts and Wankel think, the 'Verbindung' was not always 'selbstverständlich' to the poet of the *Iliad*. On καλοκάγαθία, see further below, section 3.5.

ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος ὅπηδεῖ· | ὄλβιος, ὃς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἔλαχεν (933-34).

But the neuter forms of the adjective καλός are used in the Homeric poems to describe actions which are not simply ‘attractive’ in an aesthetic sense, but also ‘good’ in some ethical sense; this is noted by Berlage, who writes: ‘[n]otandum certe est apud Homerum significationem “bonum” *nonnisi neutro genere adhiberi* Masculino genere ... vel feminino genere, semper *facie pulcher* significat’.¹¹ It appears in the negative at *Odyssey* 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, where we find the sentence οὐ ... καλὸν ἀτέμβειν οὐδὲ δίκαιον | ξείνους Τηλεμάχου; here the addition of οὐδὲ δίκαιον further emphasizes what is meant by οὐ καλόν. The expression means ‘not right’, and it is made clear that the actions so described are considered ‘not right’ in two separate respects. In other passages, the mention of καλόν/καλά alone is sufficient: οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ’ ἔνθεο θυμῷ (*Iliad* 6.326), ὑμεῖς δ’ οὐκέτι καλὰ μεθίετε θουρίδος ἀλκῆς | πάντες ἄριστοι ἐόντες ἀνὰ στρατόν (*Iliad* 13.116-17), οὐ μὲν καλὸν ὑπέρβιον εὐχετάσθαι (*Iliad* 17.19), ἐσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν, οὐδὲ ἔοικεν | ὑββάλλειν (*Iliad* 19.79-80), οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν ἐστὶν (*Odyssey* 18.287).¹² An important difference exists between these examples and *Odyssey* 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, mentioned above: although it is certainly οὐ καλόν to nurse a grudge, to shrink from battle, to boast excessively, or to refuse a gift, these actions

¹¹J. Berlage, ‘De vi et usu vocum καλὸς κάγαθός, καλοκάγαθία’, p. 22 (Berlage's italics).

¹²When Telemachos says at *Odyssey* 1.370 that τό γε καλὸν ἀκούμεν ἐστὶν ἀοιδοῦ, he is not saying ‘it is wrong to interrupt’ as in *Iliad* 19.79-80; it is a reference to the pleasure to be had from listening, as is made clear by *τερπώμεθα* (line 369) and by the clause elaborating on ἀοιδοῦ: line 371 τοιοῦδ’ οἶος ὃδ’ ἐστί, θεοῖσ’ ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν.

(or, in the case of *Iliad* 13.116-117, lack of action) cannot be criticised on the basis that they are οὐ δίκαιον, as is the maltreatment of guests. This consideration, as well as metrical position and the run of the sentence in *Odyssey* 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, suggests that in those cases οὐ δίκαιον should perhaps be seen as a stronger sanction than οὐ ... καλόν. At *Odyssey* 17.483 ff., the other suitors criticize Antinoos for striking the ‘guest’ Odysseus. After the statement ‘Αντινο’, οὐ μὲν κάλ’ ἔβαλες δύστηνον ἀλήτην, there follow four verses on the care that the gods show for ὕβρις and εὐνομίη, which approximates to οὐδὲ δίκαιον at *Odyssey* 20.294 and 21.312.

At *Odyssey* 15.10, Athene tells Telemachos that it is οὐκέτι καλά for him to be away from home, leaving ἄνδρες οὕτω ὑπερφίαλοι in his house. This could be taken to mean that it is ‘not right’, with some implied reference to an absolute standard of decency which requires men to protect their mothers (as Athene urges him to do at line 15), or it might refer to Telemachos’ own ‘honour’ which is suffering insults. The distinction is not always clear in Homer; in the examples of treatment of guests mentioned above, there does seem to be a reference to ‘proper’ behaviour, but in the other cases this is debatable. One instance where a reference to personal honour rather than to common decency appears to be made is *Odyssey* 17.460-61, where Antinoos threatens Odysseus just before striking him: νῦν δὴ σ’ οὐκέτι καλὰ διὲκ μεγάροιο οἶω | ἄψ ἀναχωρήσειν, ὅτε δὴ καὶ ὀνειδέα βάζεις.¹³

¹³The ὀνειδέα to which Antinoos refers are Odysseus’ criticism of him for not giving food to the ‘beggar’, Odysseus himself, when there is so much in the house. Odysseus’ words, incidentally, resemble those of Penelope to Telemachos at 18.219-20: ὦ πόποι, οὐκ ἄρα σοί γ’ ἐπὶ εἶδεϊ καὶ φρένες ἦσαν (*Odyssey* 17.454).

Iliad 8.400 also can be interpreted in two ways. Zeus, seeing Athene and Here preparing to enter the battle against his orders, tells Iris to go and stop them: οὐ γὰρ καλὰ συνοισόμεθα πτολεμόνδε. This could mean that it is ‘not right’ for the gods to join battle against each other, but Kirk would translate ‘rather (in view of the γάρ clause which follows) “our clash in war will not be a happy one” (i.e. for them)’.¹⁴

The adverb καλῶς appears in Homer only in the negative at *Odyssey* 2.63 οὐ γὰρ ἔτ’ ἀνσχετὰ ἔργα τετεύχεται, οὐδ’ ἔτι καλῶς | οἶκος ἐμὸς διόλωλε with an ethical sense; it should be noted that only three times in Homer are actions positively commended as ethically ‘good’ with the word καλόν/καλά: once by Achilles (*Iliad* 9.615, to Phoinix: καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κ’ ἐμὲ κήδη), once by Agamemnon (*Iliad* 19.79, quoted above), and once ironically by Telemachos (*Odyssey* 17.397, Ἄντινο’, ἦ μεν καλὰ πατὴρ ὥς κήδεαι υἱός); in all other cases where the adjective is used in such a context, it is used in the negative, to express condemnation.¹⁵ The two departures from this practice in the *Iliad* both occur in speeches made by characters who in some way stand outside accepted conventions, and who are saying things which may meet with opposition from their audiences: Achilles is justifying his refusal of Agamemnon’s offer of compensation in terms

¹⁴G.S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. ii, p. 330. ‘The γάρ clause which follows’ is Zeus’ description of the punishment he will inflict on the renegade divinities.

¹⁵The adjective is used in the positive again at *Iliad* 24.388 (Priam to the disguised Hermes, after the latter has spoken of the death of Hektor) ὥς μοι καλὰ τὸν οἶτον ἀπότμου παιδὸς ἐνισπες. Macleod comments *ad loc.*: ‘καλά “well” seems to imply that Hermes has shown an understanding of what Hector’s death means to Priam. But it might rather mean “properly”, i.e. with no misguided attempt to spare Priam’s feelings’ (C.W. Macleod, *Iliad: Book xxiv*, p. 119). This appears to be rather like the use of the adverb καλῶς to be found in Anakreon *PMG* 417, Sappho 115, and Simonides 19, and Theognidea 16, all of which will be discussed below.

which Odysseus, Aias, and Phoinix do not understand, and Agamemnon is explicitly described (19.77) as making his speech to the assembly αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης, οὐδ' ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάς.¹⁶ And the speech of Telemachos at *Odyssey* 17.397ff. begins in an ironic tone.

Although καλός, then, is primarily used in an aesthetic sense in Homer, it becomes in the abstract a term which is used to commend and condemn actions.

Adkins states that

kalon has in *Homer* [Adkins' italics] no real link with the competitive excellences, from which alone it could draw real power. Had it been possible successfully to use *ou kalon* to oppose the claims of the *agathos* to do as he pleases, Nestor would have said that Agamemnon's robbing Achilles of Briseis was *ou kalon*, and Apollo would have claimed the same of Achilles' maltreatment of Hector.¹⁷

What Adkins does not mention, of course, is that Apollo in fact does say that

Achilleus' treatment of Hektor's corpse is οὐ ... κάλλιον, οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον (*Iliad* 24.52).¹⁸ As with the uses of καλός, καλά, and καλῶς cited above, the words can be used on their own or in combination to express praise or condemnation of actions. As has been seen above, καλόν appears sometimes to be less forceful than, for example, δίκαιον, but Adkins' insistence that 'competitive' excellences (those which depend

¹⁶M.W. Edwards (*The Iliad: A Commentary*, volume v, pp. 243-44) discusses the question of whether the line means that Agamemnon does not stand up at all, or stands up without moving into the middle of the assembly to speak, and opts for the former; in either case, Agamemnon's speech stands (whether he does or not) outside convention. This is a reflection of the controversial nature of the content of the speech, for which see O.P. Taplin, 'Agamemnon's Role in the *Iliad*'.

¹⁷A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 44-45.

¹⁸Not an early example of the combination καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (for which see below, section 3.5), but 'la conjonction banale de deux adjectifs assez communs', as pointed out by F. Bourriot, *Kalos kagathos – kalokagathia*, vol. 1, p. 104.

upon success at the expense of others) are of a higher standing in Homer than ‘quiet’ excellences (those involving co-operation and ‘fairness’)¹⁹ leads him to the false conclusion that καλόν has no ‘real power’ at all. Moreover, despite Adkins’ assertion to the contrary, a glance at the above examples will reveal that these expressions are used of both the ‘competitive’ and the ‘quiet’ excellences.

3.2 *Archaic Lyric and Elegiac Beauty*²⁰

In the poetry of the period between Homer and the Persian Wars, the meaning of καλός begins to go beyond its Homeric uses. It denotes primarily an aesthetic quality, but its ethical connotations are exploited in some of the poets. This shift, however, is not as marked or rapid as some commentators have suggested, and even at the end of this period the word has not yet attained the level of ‘political’ significance which is apparent, for example, in the fifth-century catchphrase καλὸς καὶγαθός.

The poetry of Archilochos offers little that is new in its use of καλός to describe people or things. We find the word used of Neoboule in the phrase καλὴ τέρεϊνα παρθένο (196a.6; cf. Hipponax 119 εἴ μοι γένοιτο παρθένο καλὴ τε καὶ

¹⁹For the distinction between the two groups of values, see Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 6-7; for the supposed dominance of the ‘competitive’ virtues in Homer, pp. 30-36.

²⁰Passages dealing particularly with the relationship between beauty and martial valour are discussed below, in section 3.6.

τέρεινα),²¹ and her sister (if it is in fact Neoboule's sister whose seduction is recorded at the end of the fragment) is described as having a σῶμα καλόν (line 51); both of these are uncomplicated erotic uses of the adjective. Thasos is condemned as οὐ γάρ τι καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ' ἐφίμερος | οὐδ' ἐρατός²² in fr. 22; for such terms used of places see, e.g., *Iliad* 9.152 καλήν τ' Αἴπειαν and 2.751 ἱμερτὸν Τιταρησσόν, also the anonymous iambic fragment 3 Ἄβδηρα, καλὴ Τηϊῶν ἀποικίη; in contrast to Thasos, Archilochos calls his homeland ἱμ]ερτὴ Πάρ[ος in fr. 166. And as in Homer, a song can be καλός: 120.1 Διωνύσου ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος (*cf.* Alkman, *PMG* 3.5 καλὸν ... μέλος, *PMG* 41 ἔρπει γὰρ ἅντα τῷ σιδάρῳ τὸ καλῶς κιθαρίσδην, *PMG* 87(b) κάλλιστ' ὑπαυλῆν, Theognis 242-43 καλά τε καὶ λιγέα | ἄσονται, and Simonides *PMG* 567.5 καλᾶ σὺν ἀοιδᾶ). And in other archaic poets the adjective is

²¹Τέρην used of a person (rather than, for example, of a person's skin) is itself something of a departure from earlier poetic practice: this adjective appears in Homer used of tears (*Iliad* 3.142, 16.11, 19.323; *Odyssey* 16.332), skin (*Iliad* 4.237, 13.553, 14.406), φύλλα (*Iliad* 13.180, *Odyssey* 12.357), and flowers (*Odyssey* 9.449). In Hesiod it occurs qualifying skin (*Theogony* 5 ~ *Works and Days* 522), the ἄνθος ... ἐρικυδέος ἥβης (*Theogony* 988), the μαχλοσύνης στυγερῆς ... ἄνθος (fr. 132 M-W), and a γλήχων (fr. 70.21 M-W). In other archaic lyric it is used of flowers (Ibykos *PMG* 315, fr. adesp. *PMG* 929(e); fr. adesp. *PMG* 943 uses the comparative to describe an unknown person or thing as ναρκίσσου τρενώτερον), spices (Melanippides *PMG* 757.6), and the three-holed *aulos* (Anakreon *PMG* 375, where Athenaios (4.182c) comments that the adjective is used because the *auloi* in question, being οὐκ ἐναγώνιοι, are used πρὸς τὰς εὐωχίας). In the poetry of this period it is only in these passages from Archilochos and Hipponax, as well as Theognidea 261 (παρὰ παιδὶ τερεινῇ), that the adjective is used to describe a person. Theognidea 266 has an interesting use: ἡ δὲ τέρεν φθέγγετ' ἀπὸ στόματος – rather like the fragment of Anakreon, the word seems to refer to a sound; as is the case with καλός, this adjective can be used of qualities which are perceived by more than one sense, and perhaps the most appropriate English translation of τέρεν would be 'soft', a word which can be used of aural as well as tactile properties.

²²Semonides uses very similar language when he says about a woman (7.51-52) that κείνη γὰρ οὐ τι καλόν οὐδ' ἐπίμερον | πρόσσεστιν οὐδὲ τερπνὸν οὐδ' ἐράσμιοι. It is worth noting that although both poets use the phrase οὐ τι qualifying the adjectives, in Semonides the phrase is equivalent to οὐδὲν καλόν κτλ., 'there is nothing beautiful about her', whereas in Archilochos the τι is adverbial, and the fragment seems to be contradicting someone else's assertion that Thasos is a beautiful place.

used with an apparently purely aesthetic sense of people (Mimnermos 3.1, Sappho 132), animals (Sappho 1.9),²³ things or places (Mimnermos 11.4, Solon 13.21 and 24, Alkaios 45.1, Sappho 34.1 and 39.3). The noun κάλλος is used only of people, referring to physical beauty (Sappho 16.7, Ibykos S 151.46, Theognidea 933).

One appearance of καλός in Archilochos is of interest: this is the phrase δαί]τα δ' οὐ καλήν at 175.2, part of the fable of the eagle and the fox.²⁴ In Homer καλός is never negated except in the neuter to condemn an action on ethical grounds (see above), and the phrase οὐ καλός is not used in Homer to express the idea that a person or thing is morally reprehensible, but if Archilochos 175 refers to the eagle bringing the fox-cubs to its young, as West believes,²⁵ the phrase could imply that it was οὐ καλόν for the eagle to treat its friend the fox in such a way. It could simply mean that a dead fox-cub in the talons of an eagle is an ugly sight, but if the fragment comes from a description of the second meal, that which caused disaster for the

²³Of animals in their cooked state: Ananios 5.2.

²⁴We recognize it as the fable of the fox and the eagle that appears in our Aesopic collections. In the Aesopic version, a fox and an eagle became friends and neighbours. But one day when the fox was away, the eagle flew down and carried off its cubs to feed its own young. The fox was grieved at its loss, but more so that it was unable to reach the eagle's nest, which was in a tree, to get its revenge. It had to content itself with curses. However, they were not without effect, for it came about that the eagle snatched part of a sacrificial victim (a goat) from an altar, and brought that back to its nest, not noticing that there was a fiery spark lodged in it. A strong wind caused it to blaze up, the nest was burned, and the unfledged young had no escape. (They fell to the ground and the fox ate them up – an inorganic final touch.)' (M.L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, pp. 132-33, with references.)

²⁵M.L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 133.

eagle's nest and young, then οὐ καλήν might be a reference to the effect of the δαίς; this would be in keeping with the idea of the animal fable.²⁶

Some of the other archaic poets draw distinctions between being καλός in appearance and not in fact being 'good', as in the Homeric examples cited above of Hektor's rebuke of Paris, Odysseus' speech about his dog, and Penelope's rebuke of Telemachos. Semonides twice mentions women who appear to be beautiful but whose worth does not match their beauty: first there is the woman ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἥ δὲ ἐν φρεσὶν νοεῖ, who may be praised by a guest in these terms: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε λωῖων γυνή | ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων (7.30-31). Semonides goes on to describe how such a woman's temper becomes unbearable, and later he describes the horse-woman: καλὸν μὲν ὦν θέημα τοιαύτη γυνή | ἄλλοισι, τῷ δ' ἔχοντι γίνεται κακόν (7.67-68). These passages are in the tradition, already present in Homer, that one cannot judge a book by its cover. The sentiment is picked up in two passages from the Theognidea which criticise the poet's beloved παῖς for associating with bad men and learning bad things from them: 1259-62 (ὦ παῖ, τὴν μορφὴν μὲν ἔφυς καλός, ...) and 1377-80 (καλὸς ἐὼν κακότητι φίλων δειλοῖσιν ὁμιλεῖς | ἀνδράσι ...).

The meaning which καλός seems to have in *Iliad* 24.388 (see above, note 15) emerges in archaic lyric poetry in two cases in the adverb: Anakreon *PMG* 417.3 ἴσθι τοι, καλῶς μὲν ἄν τοι τὸν χαλινὸν ἐμβάλοιμι and Sappho 115.1 τίω σ' ὦ φίλε γάμβρε κάλως εἰκάσδω;. Here the sense is apparently something like 'exactly' or

²⁶See E. Irwin, 'Biography, Fiction, and the Archilochean *Ainos*' on the implications of this fable for the biographical tradition and the poet as guardian of δίκη.

‘correctly’. The adjective also can probably be understood in this way in Simonides 19.1-2 ἐν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χίος ἔειπεν ἀνὴρ· | “οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν”: in addition to the idea that the saying is ‘most beautiful’, Simonides is expressing the view that Homer's phrase is very true or apt. And one of the poems at the beginning of the Theognidea may be using καλός in a similar way (15-18):

Μοῦσαι καὶ Χάριτες, κοῦραι Διός, αἳ ποτε Κάδμου
 ἐς γάμον ἔλθοῦσαι καλὸν ἀείσατ’ ἔπος,
 “ὅττι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί, τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστί”·
 τοῦτ’ ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἦλθε διὰ στομάτων.

Again, the saying of the Muses and Graces, as well as being ‘beautiful’, could also be thought of as ‘apt’ or ‘true’.²⁷ The fact that this is a quotation of a single line, like the Simonides passage, seems to point to this meaning, and there may be deliberate ambiguity here: the recurrence of καλός in the following verse suggests a play on the possible meanings of the word.

As was the case in the Homeric poems, it is in the neuter that καλός acquires moral force in archaic lyric, elegiac, and iambic poetry. Simonides *PMG* 541 mentions distinguishing between τὸ καλόν and τὸ αἰσχρόν (line 1), something which presumably those who have ἀρετή (line 6) can do.²⁸ And in a poem (*PMG* 542) in which he

²⁷The use of καλός in line 17 is almost certainly aesthetic rather than ethical, given that the line is put in the mouths of the Muses and Graces. B.A. van Groningen (*Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 17) comments: ‘καλόν a ... ici une valeur esthétique et le quatrain se situerait fort bien à un symposium au cours duquel on discuterait d’art.’ Compare Theognidea 1047, from an obviously sympotic context: νῦν μὲν πίνοντες τερπώμεθα, καλὰ λέγοντες.

²⁸For the text see now W.B. Henry, ‘Simonides, *PMG* 541’. There is no evidence in the poem to suggest that τὸ καλόν should be taken in a political sense, as Ezio Pellizer (“... E il bello e il turpe distingue”) understands it. Indeed, in view of *PMG* 542, this interpretation seems almost excluded. And Pellizer’s suggestion (following Pfeiffer) that the subject of κρίνει is ὁ καιρός, while possible, is perhaps unlikely given the absence of καιρός in any of Simonides’ surviving poetry; the poet often mentions ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’, but καιρός is never a consideration. As Donlan notes

discusses what it means to be truly (ἀλαθέως, line 1) ἀγαθός, Simonides states that πάντα το καλά, τοῖσιν τ' | αἰσχροῖ μὴ μέμικται (lines 39-40). At Theognidea 649-52 the poet complains that Πενίη is teaching him αἰσχροῖ when he is ἐσθλὰ μετ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ κάλ' ἐπιστάμενον, and at 281-82 the δειλός is described as considering ἀπάλαμνα as καλὰ πάντα.

In some passages, the poets clarify what they think of as καλός: at line 255 of the Theognidea we find the declaration κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον.²⁹ Tyrtaios 4.7 expresses a similar collocation: μυθεῖσθαι τε τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἔρδειν πάντα δίκαια. A looser relationship may be found in Sappho 137(b), if the final words can be understood to mean something along the lines of 'you would speak about what is δίκαιον':³⁰

αἰ δ' ἦχες ἔσλων ἱμερον ἦ κάλων
καὶ μή τί τ' εἶπην γλώσσ' ἐκύκα κάκον,
αἶδως †κέν σε οὐκ† ἦχεν ὄππα-
τ' ἄλλ' ἔλεγες †περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ†.³¹

Although only the Theognidean passage here explicitly equates τὸ δίκαιον with τὸ καλόν, both of the others demonstrate a feeling that these two abstract terms are

('Simonides, Fr. 4D and P.Oxy. 2432', p. 92), 'The obvious and natural candidate for the subject is Simonides' "acceptable" man, defined in fr. 4 [i.e. PMG 542]'.

²⁹The Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα 255-56 may have had sympotic overtones in this context, and the word δικαιοτάτον may have been similarly coloured: cf. 313-14 ἐν μὲν μαινομένοις μάλα μαίνομαι, ἐν δὲ δικαίοις | πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ δικαιοτάτος (for the sentiment, though without reference to δίκη, compare 627-28 and the drinking-song PMG 902).

³⁰Lobel proposed περὶ τῷδικαίῳς = τούτῳ τὸ ἐδικαίῳς, but only tentatively: 'nobis quidem formae in -αίο- suspectae' (apparatus *ad loc.*).

³¹Sappho 81(b) encourages a perhaps significantly-named girl called Δίκα to wear garlands in order to appear attractive to the Χάριτες.

related. And at lines 279-82 of the Theognidea, the poet says that the κακός cares nothing for τὰ δίκαια, and that ἀπάλαμνα appear to him to be καλὰ πάντα, which is again a loose linking of the two terms.

At Theognidea 257-58, where the poet writes ἵππος ἐγὼ καλὴ καὶ ἀεθλίη, ἀλλὰ κάκιστον | ἄνδρα φέρω, the implication is that physical beauty and moral turpitude do not belong together. These lines appear to be a sexual metaphor along the lines of Anacreon's πῶλε Θρηκίη ... (PMG 417), but although the point of a καλὴ horse bearing a κακὸς ἡνίοχος may be simply a reference to a beautiful young woman who has to endure the attentions of a bad lover (cf. lines 457-60), it is also possible that on another level 257-60 can be seen as political: van Groningen suggests that the lines are conceived as being spoken by an aristocratic woman whose father, 'un des aristocrates dépravés que le poète flétrit en 103 ss. et 193 ss. ... a obligé sa fille à épouser un vilain enrichi'.³² On this interpretation, the aesthetic evaluation in a sexual context is combined with a political evaluation. In the poetry of our period, it is only in the Theognidea that καλός begins to be used in this political or social way.

3.3 Epinician Beauty

Commenting on verse 94 of Pindar's ninth *Olympian* (ώραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλὸς κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις), Gildersleeve writes that the poet 'dwells on the personal beauty

³²Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 105.

of the victors whenever he has an excuse'.³³ The physical beauty of the athletes is indeed a recurrent theme in Pindar's epinician poetry, and it is expressed not simply for its own sake, but also in order to reflect other issues related to athletic triumph and to the poet's role as observer and laudator. Some of the 'excuses', to use Gildersleeve's term, which prompt an epinician poet to 'dwell on' a victor's beauty will here be examined in relation to broader considerations of theme and function, and to the presentation of beauty in other literary and epigraphic poetry up to the end of the fifth century.

At *Olympian* 8.19-20, Pindar makes a connection between an athlete's physical beauty and his prowess in the games (in this case, wrestling):

ἦν δ' ἐσορᾶν καλός, ἔργω τ' οὐ κατὰ εἶδος ἐλέγχων
 ἐξένεπε κρατέων
 πάλα δολιχήρετμον Αἴγιναν πάτραν

Here, the statement ἔργω δ' οὐ κατὰ εἶδος ἐλέγχων implies that the athlete's good performance is what is to be expected from someone with his good looks. The converse of this outlook is found in the statement of Tyrtaios that the man who does not heed his call to arms αἰσχύνει τε γένος, κατὰ δ' ἀγλαὸν εἶδος ἐλέγχει (10.9); this is a man whose γένος and εἶδος would lead one not to expect such behaviour.

Pindar makes the same point more explicitly when he describes Aristokleides, another Aiginetan, as ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ' εὐοικότα μορφᾷ (*Nemean* 3.19); the victor

³³B.L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes*, p. 209.

has performed ‘as befits his appearance’. Less forceful than this expression, but in the same vein, is the assertion at *Isthmian* 7.21-22 that Strepsiades of Thebes

φέρει ... Ἴσθμοῖ
νίκαν παγκρατίου, σθένει δ’ ἔκπαγλος³⁴ ἰδεῖν τε μορ-
φάεις, ἄγει τ’ ἀρετὰν οὐκ αἴσχιον φυᾶς.

Although it is true that φυή, in Pindar as elsewhere, can denote a person’s ‘nature’ without connotations of physical appearance (e.g., *Olympian* 2.86 σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾶ),³⁵ the context of the word’s occurrence here in the seventh *Isthmian* suggests that reference is being made to the beauty of the athlete; the previous clause ends with the statement that Strepsiades is ἰδεῖν τεμορφάεις, and the φυά mentioned at the end of the verse must at least include this meaning, even if it is taken also to encompass the athlete’s σθένος.³⁶ And this interpretation is reinforced by the next verse, which continues with a visual image: φλέγεται δὲ ἰοπλόκοισι Μοῖσαις.

At *Olympian* 9.93-94, a similar connection is made, though in a different manner: the victor Epharmostos

³⁴B.K. Braswell (*A Commentary on the Fourth Pythian Ode of Pindar*, pp. 175-76), commenting on the occurrence of this word ἔκπαγλος at *Pythian* 4.79, argues that there is ‘no reason to assume with LSJ, s.v., II, that the meaning has been weakened to “marvellous”, “wondrous” here [i.e. *Pythian* 4.79] or elsewhere in Pindar’. He notes the appearance of the word at *Isthmian* 7.22 and remarks (*ibid.*) that ‘Strepsiades was a pancratiast and doubtless rather frightening in appearance, even if he was handsome’ (ἔκπαγλος here, of course, technically goes with σθένει, but the placing of ἰδεῖν directly after the adjective suggests perhaps that Strepsiades was quite visibly σθένει ἔκπαγλος). G.S. Kirk (*The Iliad: A Commentary, volume i*, p. 68) notes that ἔκπαγλος, while not necessarily insulting, is a term whose connotations are not entirely favourable.

³⁵Contrast Homer, where φυή and εἶδος are ‘virtually equivalent’ (A.F. Garvie, *Homer: Odyssey, Books vi-viii*, p. 272).

³⁶Alternatively, φυά here might be supposed to have a solely aesthetic reference, if the sequence of thought is taken to be: (a) the athlete has exceptional σθένος, (b) he is μορφάεις, (a) he possesses ἀρετά (a result of his σθένος) which is (b) not inferior to his φυά (= μορφά).

διήρχετο κύκλον ὅσσα βοᾶ,
ώραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλὸς κάλλιστα τε ῥέξαις.

In this case, it is not stated (as it is at *Olympian* 8.19-20 and *Nemean* 3.19) that the athlete's deeds are somehow to be expected of one who is so καλός, nor is this implied as it is in the statement at *Isthmian* 7.22 that the victor ἄγει ... ἀρετὰν οὐκ αἴσχιον φυᾶς. Rather, the implication is made in the jingle καλὸς κάλλιστα. And further, the mythical founder of the victor's city has already been described in similar terms (*Olympian* 9.62-66):

εὐφράνθη τε ἰδὼν ἥρωες (i.e., Lokros) θετὸν υἱόν,
...
ὑπέρφατον ἄνδρα μορφᾷ τε καὶ
ἔργοισι.

The link between the physical beauty and the athletic excellence of an Olympic victor is made in a less obvious way at the end of the tenth *Olympian*. In the last antistrophe of the ode, the poet addresses the victorious Hagesidamos in these terms (*Olympian* 10.91-96):

καὶ ὅταν καλὰ {μὲν} ἔρξαις ἀοιδᾶς ἄτερ,
Ἀγησίδαμ', εἰς Ἀίδα σταθμόν
ἀνὴρ ἵκηται, κενεὰ πνεύσαις ἔπορε μόχθῳ
βραχὺ τι τερπνόν. τὴν δ' ἀδυεπὴς τε λύρα
γλυκύς τ' αὐλὸς ἀναπάσσει χάριν·
τρέφοντι δ' εὐρὺ κλέος
κόραι Πιερίδες Διός.

Here it is established that the victor has performed καλὰ and that the Muses will cause his fame for these deeds to live on after his death; the poet's λύρα and αὐλός are giving Hagesidamos the χάρις of κλέος. Citing verses 91-93 (as far as τερπνόν, thus

curiously omitting the actual reference to χάρις) of the above passage, MacLachlan writes:

Charis, then, in the epinician context, can represent the praise song itself or the public recognition that must be kept alive in song; but not to be forgotten is the fact that it represents the gratification of one man, the victor.³⁷

But the phrase τὴν ... ἀναπάσσει χάριν, while certainly referring to the ‘gratification’ of fame, also suggests another kind of χάρις: physical beauty, which the goddess Athene gives to Odysseus in a similar metaphor at *Odyssey* 6.235:

ὥς δ’ ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνὴρ
ἴδρις, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδαεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελείει,
ὥς ἄρα τῷ κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμοις.

As Athene ‘pours’ χάρις over Odysseus,³⁸ so Pindar’s music ‘sprinkles’ χάρις over Hagesidamos; this χάρις suggests both the fame which is ‘gratifying’ to the victor and the beauty which is ‘gratifying’ to others. And indeed the poet does draw attention to the beauty of the victor: he proceeds to elaborate on this physical χάρις in the poem’s final epode, referring to the victor as παῖδ’ ἐρατὸν ... Ἀρχεστράτου, and closing the ode (lines 100-105) with a description of him as

... τὸν εἶδον κρατέοντα χερὸς ἀλκᾷ
βωμὸν παρ’ Ὀλύμπιον
κείμενον κατὰ χρόνον
ἰδέα τε καλὸν
ῶρα τε κεκραμένον, ἃ ποτε
ἀναιδέα Γανυμήδει θάνατον

³⁷B. MacLachlan, *The Age of Grace*, p. 89.

³⁸*Cf. Odyssey* 23.156-163, where her beautification of Odysseus is described in these terms: αὐτὰρ κάκ κεφαλῆς χεῦεν πολὺ κάλλος Ἀθήνη ... ἐκ δ’ ἀσαμίνθου βῆ [*sc.* Ὀδυσσεύς] δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοῖος.

ἄλκε σὺν Κυπρογενεῖ.

The poet, then, has moved from praise of the καλά that the victor has performed (91) to praise of the κάλλος of the victor himself (103-105, preceded in 100-102 by a reminder of Hagesidamos' athletic prowess), thus suggesting the connection that is made explicit, as discussed above, in *Olympian* 8.19-20, *Olympian* 9.65-66 and 93-94, *Nemean* 3.19-20, and *Isthmian* 7.21-22.

There is one exception in Pindar to the use of physical appearance as a visual marker of excellence: this is in *Isthmian* 4, where the Theban Melissos, a victor in the pankration, is described in these terms (*Isthmian* 4.45-51):

... τόλμᾳ γὰρ εἰκῶς
θυμὸν ἐριβρεμετᾶν θηρῶν λεόντων
ἐν πόνῳ, μῆτιν δ' ἀλώπηξ,
αἶετοῦ ἅ τ' ἀναπιτναμένα ρόμβον ἴσχει
χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν.

οὐ γὰρ φύσιν Ὀαριωνεῖαν ἔλαχεν·
ἀλλ' ὄνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι,
συμπεσεῖν δ' ἀκμᾷ βαρύς.

Rather than praise the combination of beauty and prowess, here Pindar points out that appearances can be deceptive,³⁹ thus employing a *topos* which is found in Homer (e.g.,

³⁹And just as lack of beauty deceives here, μῦθοι which are δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις deceive men into believing stories about the gods which are not καλά (*Olympian* 1.29-35). The verb δαιδάλλω does not always carry this pejorative connotation in Pindar: at *Olympian* 2.53-56 πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος is praised as an ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον | ἀνδρὶ φέγγος, and verbal 'embellishment' is not necessarily criticised at fr. 94b.32 δαιδάλλοισ' ἔπεσιν (the context is not certain, but it seems to involve a contrast between a poet's or singer's verbal representation and the omniscience of Zeus). G. Kirkwood (*Selections from Pindar*, p. 52) also comments on this ambivalence: on Χάρις at *Olympian* 1.30, he writes that 'the immediate context suggests that the power of Charis is the power of poetry to deceive, that is, to make men believe the false tale of the eating of Pelops. But in the long run the charis of P.'s own poetry makes credible the incredible – the true story, Pindar's story of Pelops'.

Iliad 10.316, of Dolon: εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης, and for its converse, e.g., *Iliad* 3.43-45: Paris is beautiful, but οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή) and in later archaic poetry; the picture that Pindar gives us of Melissos is reminiscent of the ideal general as described by Archilochos (114):

οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν οὐδὲ διαπεπλιμένον
οὐδὲ βοστρύχοισι γαῦρον οὐδ' ὑπεξυρημένον,
ἀλλὰ μοι μικρός τις εἴη καὶ περὶ κνήμας ἰδεῖν
ροικός, ἀσφαλέως βεβηκὼς ποσσὶ καρδίας πλέως.

And indeed the suggestion that Melissos' skill and strength are greater than one might suppose from his appearance is given considerable importance in the structure of the ode; it is used by Pindar as a device for transition into the poem's mythological section (*Isthmian* 4.52-55):

καί τοί πότ' Ἀνταίου δόμους
Θηβᾶν ἀπὸ Καδμεϊᾶν μορφᾶν βραχύς,
ψυχὰν δ' ἄκαπτος, προσπαλαίσων ἦλθ' ἀνὴρ
τὰν πυροφόρον Λιβύαν, κρανίοις ὄφρα ξένων
ναὸν Ποσειδάωνος ἐρέφοντα σχέθαι,

υἱὸς Ἀλκμήνας.

At the end of the ode, Pindar promises that σὺν Ὀρσέᾳ δέ νιν | κωμάξομαι
τερπνὰν ἐπιστάζων χάριν. This phrase is similar to ἀνάπασσει χάριν at *Olympian* 10.94, discussed above, but in this context the comparison with Athene 'pouring' beauty on Odysseus in the *Odyssey* is less appropriate, since we have already been told by the poet that this victor, unlike Hagesidamos, was not physically attractive. A victory ode cannot make an athlete more handsome than he is by nature; it can only make his beauty famous. Melissos has been immortalised as ὄνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι

(*Isthmian* 4.50), but Pindar nevertheless claims to celebrate his victory *τερπνὰν ἐπιστάζων χάριν* (72b). This last line of *Isthmian* 4 is very close in its vocabulary and thought to *Olympian* 6.75-76, where the victorious Hagesias is numbered among those

... οἷς ποτε πρώτοις περὶ δωδέκτον δρόμον
ἐλαυνόντεσσιν αἰδοία ποτιστά-
ξη Χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν.

The word εὐκλέα is important here: the epinician poet offers a victorious athlete the χάρις of κλέος (cf. *Olympian* 10.93-96, discussed above), which in turn gives the victor an εὐκλεῆς μορφή – one who is not handsome by nature, such as Melissos, can still be εὐκλεῆς, and even the reminder that he is ὄνοτὸς ἰδέσθαι will not detract from his εὐκλεῆς μορφή. The scholia to *Olympian* 6.76 suggest that οἱ νικῶντες δοκοῦσιν εὐειδεῖς εἶναι, and Gildersleeve *ad loc.* writes, ‘Victory transfigures’. But those formulations are misleading; the victor can both be ὄνοτὸς ἰδέσθαι and at the same time possess an εὐκλεῆς μορφή, and one of the functions of epinician poetry, in Melissos’ case, is to remove the implied contradiction.

Phrases such as θαητὸν δέμας at *Nemean* 11.12 and παῖδ’ ἐρατὸν ...

Ἀρχεστράτου at *Olympian* 10.99 have an obvious erotic connotation; Carne-Ross reminds us bluntly that ‘those young men who competed naked under the Mediterranean sun must have aroused more than athletic admiration’.⁴⁰ Words such as ἐρατός imply not only admiration, but also attraction, and at the beginning of the second *Isthmian* ode, Pindar exploits the erotic potential of a victor’s beauty. Rather

⁴⁰D.S. Carne-Ross, *Pindar*, p. 29.

than simply praising the victorious Xenokrates as, for example, καλός, ὠραῖος, or μορφάεις, in the first strophe of the ode the poet reminisces about homo-erotic poetry (*Isthmian* 2.1-5):

οἱ μὲν πάλαι, ὦ Θρασύβουλε,
 φῶτες, οἱ χρυσαμπύκων
 ἐς δίφρον Μοισᾶν ἔβαι-
 νον κλυτὰ φόρμιγγι συναντόμενοι,
 ῥίμφα παιδείους ἐτόξευον μαλιγάρυας ὕμνους,
 ὅστις ἐὼν καλὸς εἶχεν Ἀφροδίτας
 εὐθρόνου μνάστειραν ἀδίσταν ὀπώραν.

What would perhaps have been surprising to the audience of this epinician poem is that, having introduced the subject of love poetry in praise of καλοί, Pindar does not make the obvious transition to the beauty of the victor, but rather bemoans the fact that poetry is no longer composed from the heart, as it was πάλαι (*Isthmian* 2.6-8):

ἅ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς
 πω τότε ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις·
 οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖ-
 αι μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας
 ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί.

Having hinted at the *topos* of praise of the victor's beauty, then, the poet complains that such songs are no longer sung. But after a few more lines on the mercenary temper of the present age, and before declaring that οὐκ ἄγνωτ' αἰδῶ | Ἴσθμίαν ἵπποσι νίκαν (12-13), he inserts a reminder that there is a hint to be taken: ἐσσι γὰρ ὦν σοφός (12).⁴¹ There is no explicit praise of Xenokrates' beauty in the rest of the ode, but this oblique reference at the beginning has already made the point.

⁴¹Cf. *Olympian* 2.83-85, where Pindar claims to have many βέλη which are φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν: those who understand how an ode functions will receive his message.

Pindar, then, in the second *Isthmian* ode implicitly likens his creation of a song celebrating an athletic victor to songs which the poets of old composed in celebration of the beauty of their beloved boys. In effect, this song is a χάρις in the erotic sense, a ‘favour’ done for a beloved, in the sense that Pindar himself uses the word in fragment 127:

εἴη καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἔρωτι
χαρίζεσθαι κατὰ καιρόν·
μὴ πρεσβυτέραν ἀριθμοῦ
δίωκε, θυμέ, πράξιν.

A χάρις given in love can refer, of course, to sexual favours;⁴² and here Pindar plays on that sense in describing his love song with this term. A quatrain from the Theognidea (1319-22) seems to use the word self-referentially in this sense, whilst at the same time punning on the use of χάρις to mean ‘beauty’:

ὦ παῖ, ἐπεὶ τοι δῶκε θεὰ χάριν ἡμερόεσσαν
Κύπρις, σὸν δ’ εἶδος πᾶσι νέοισι μέλει,
τῶνδ’ ἐπάκουσον ἐπῶν καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἔνθεο θυμῷ,
γνοῦς ἔρος ὥς χαλεπὸν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ φέρειν.

The poet praises the boy for his beauty (χάρις ἡμερόεσσα), saying that it makes him most desirable, and then demands that the boy listen to ‘these words’ (*i.e.*, what he has just said) and take this χάρις, the poet’s ἔπη, to heart – in other words, to enter a contract to recognise the favour given with a (sexual) χάρις given in return. This is the kind of relationship that Pindar constructs by implication in the opening strophe of the second *Isthmian* ode, and his creation of the victory song is a form of the type of

⁴²For uses of χαρίζεσθαι in this sense (chiefly drawn from Plato’s *Symposium*), see K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 44-45, 83, 157 (cited by D.E. Gerber (*Pindar’s Olympian One: A Commentary*, p. 120, in connection with *Olympian* 1.75-76 ἐς χάριν τέλλεται, on which see below).

exchange which he refers to in fragment 127 as ἔρωτι χαρίζεσθαι.⁴³ The starting-point in *Isthmian* 2 is, as in Theognidea 1319-1322, praise of the beauty of the beloved.

In the depiction of the relationship at Theognidea 1319-1322, it is the *laudator*, so to speak, who initiates the exchange by offering a χάρις in the form of a poetic praise of the beauty of the *laudandus* and demanding a χάρις in return. This kind of relationship is fully reciprocal: in Pindar's first *Olympian* ode, Pelops invokes his own beauty (in its capacity as the basis of his χάρις-relationship with Poseidon) as binding Poseidon to return a χάρις, to help Pelops win the hand of Hippodameia (*Olympian* 1.75-76):

τῷ μὲν εἶπε· “Φίλια δῶρα Κυπρίας⁴⁴

⁴³The following antistrophe (vv. 6-10), with its condemnation of mercenary poets, implies that these exchanges between lovers are to be seen as debts of honour rather than merely contracts based on a balance-sheet of χάριτες given and received by each party (Pindar says at *Pythian* 1.75-77 that the μισθός he seeks from the Athenians is χάρις). J.B. Bury (*The Isthmian Odes of Pindar*, p. 41) notes that the adjective ἀργυρωθεῖσαι in 8 ‘is appropriate both to the figure and to the thing figured. In regard to the girls of the metaphor, it means that their faces are painted, as they are for sale, to make them more attractive ...; while in regard to the songs, it could mean *rewarded with silver*, as in *Nem.* X. 43 ἀργυρωθέντες σὺν οἰνηραῖς φιάλαις.’

⁴⁴The φίλια δῶρα Κυπρίας mentioned at *Olympian* 1.75 could refer to ‘gifts of love’, i.e. sex, but δῶρα Ἀφροδίτης are more usually ‘beauty’, such as the beauty that Aphrodite is said to have given the addressee of Theognidea 1319-1320; this is also the meaning at *Iliad* 3.64-66 where Paris replies to Hektor's criticism of his beauty:

μή μοι δῶρ' ἐρατὰ πρόφερε χρυσέης Ἀφροδίτης·
οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐρικυδέα δῶρα,
ὅσσα κεν αὐτοῖς δῶσιν, ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις ἔλοιτο.

Cf. also Bakchylides 17.10, where it is the Κύπριδος ... δῶρα, the beauty, of Eriboia which arouses Minos; similar to the ‘gifts’ of Aphrodite in this sense is her ‘fruit’ at *Isthmian* 2.4-5; a boy who is καλός possesses Ἀφροδίτας ... ἀδίσταν ὀπώραν (in Hesiod fr. 76, lines 6 and 10, δῶρα ... Ἀφροδίτης refer literally to fruit – the apples of Atalanta). Acts of sex, on the other hand (and unsurprisingly), tend to be not the δῶρα but the ἔργα Ἀφροδίτης: Hesiod, *Works and Days* 521, fr. 124; Kritias 6.18; Ariphron (*PMG* 813.5) uses κρυφίοις Ἀφροδίτας ἔρκεσιν (cf. Ibykos *PMGF* 287.4 δίκτυα Κύπριδος). At Theognidea 1293-1294, however, ἡμερόεντα γάμον is identified as χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης δῶρα (again in the context of Atalanta – the δῶρα ... Ἀφροδίτης which are explicitly the apples in Hesiod fr. 76 are implicitly, of course, the same γάμος), and the μείλιχα δῶρα of Mimnermos 1.3 seem to be sex rather than beauty. The phrase δωροῖσι πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης at Hesiod *Aspis* 47 allows of either interpretation: Amphitryon could be described as taking pleasure (τερπόμενος) in either the act

ἄγ' εἴ τι Ποσειδάον, ἐς χάριν
τέλλεται, πέδασον ἔγχος Οἰνομάου χάλκεον ...”.

In this ode, as Cairns points out,⁴⁵ far from ‘playing down’ the homosexual elements in the story of Pelops and Poseidon, Pindar in fact emphasises them by explicitly comparing the abduction of Pelops with that of Ganymedes (*Olympian* 1.36-45):⁴⁶

υἱὲ Ταντάλου, σὲ δ' ἀντία προτέρων φθέγξομαι,
ὅπότε' ἐκάλεσε πατὴρ τὸν εὐνομώτατον
ἐς ἔρανὸν φίλαν τε Σίπυλον,
τότ' Ἀγλαοτρίαιναν ἀρπάσαι,
δαμέντα φρένας ἱμέρω, χρυσέαισιν τ' ἄν' ἵπποις
ὑπατον εὐρυτίμου ποτὶ δῶμα Διδὸς μεταβάσαι·
ἔνθα δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ
ἦλθε καὶ Γανυμήδης
Ζηνὶ τῷϋτ' ἐπὶ χρέος.

And in the poem, Pelops is clearly to be seen as analogous to Hieron⁴⁷ as a victorious charioteer; Cairns suggests that, just as ‘the love and friendship of Pelops and Poseidon conform to an accepted ethical pattern involving just these concepts [*i.e.*, χάρις and εὐεργεσία]’,⁴⁸ Hieron is also to be seen as bound up in another sort of χάρις-relationship:

Like a miniature Great King, he depended for his continuation in power on

of love or in his wife's beauty. Whatever the gifts are, they are to be enjoyed: Stesichoros (*PMGF* 223.2-3) describes the goddess as ἡπιοδώρου Κύπριδος.

⁴⁵F. Cairns, ‘Ἔρως in Pindar's First Olympian Ode’, p. 129.

⁴⁶At the end of the tenth *Olympian* ode, discussed above, it is the victor himself who is described as having the same ἰδέα and ὥρα that Ganymedes possessed.

⁴⁷‘The heroic depiction of Pelops becomes in essence Pindar's depiction of Hieron’ (Gerber, p. xv); see also Cairns, p. 129.

⁴⁸Cairns, p. 132.

his conferment of favours and on the due gratitude of their recipients⁴⁹
The more ethical and mythical reinforcements of the theme Pindar could find,
the better he was able to meet his patron's purposes.⁵⁰

Pindar has drawn parallels between Pelops and Hieron, and within the myth of Pelops he has highlighted the mechanism of the exchange of χάρις between lovers. A victory song is a χάρις provided for the victor by the poet⁵¹ and recalls, as the opening of the second *Isthmian* ode reminds us, the songs which οἱ πάλαι φῶτες would sing in celebration of the beauty of their beloveds; it is thus entirely appropriate for the epinician poet to draw particular attention to the beauty of the athletic victors for whom he composes his songs.

The erotic aspect involved in epinician praise of a victor's beauty, implied at the beginning of the second *Isthmian*, is illustrated at *Pythian* 10.57-60, where Pindar expresses the hope that he may, by means of his song, make the victor Hippokleas

... ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον ...
ἔκατι στεφάνων θαητὸν ἐν ἄλι-

ξι ... ἐν καὶ παλαιτέροις,
νέαισιν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα.

⁴⁹Cairns refers to the εὐεργέται βασιλέος at Herodotos 8.85.

⁵⁰Cairns, p. 132.

⁵¹G. Nagy (*Pindar's Homer*, p. 188) draws attention to the reciprocal nature of the Indo-European poet-patron relationship: 'the patron gets fame from the poet, whose own fame depends on the fame of a patron in the here and now', but this non-material ideal is less applicable to the case of Pindar and Hieron, where the relationship of course has its monetary side. Ibykos *PMGF* S151.47-48 emphasises a similar reciprocity: the poet promises that the patron will have κλέος ἄφθιτον in accordance with the poet's own κλέος, which depends on his ἀοιδά.

Again, the expression at Theognidea 1320 is relevant here: σὸν δ' εἶδος πᾶσι νέοισι μέλει.⁵² In both cases, the effect of outstanding beauty is to excite erotic admiration in all who see it.⁵³ A similar formulation is found at *Pythian* 9.97-100:

πλεῖστα νικάσαντά σε καὶ τελεταῖς
 ὠρίαῖς ἐν Παλλάδος εἶδον ἄθωνοί
 θ' ὥς ἕκασται φίλτατον
 παρθενικαὶ πόσιν ἦ
 υἱὸν εὖχοντ', ὦ Τελεσίκρατες, ἔμμεν

Returning to the tenth *Pythian* ode, the sentence which follows the above passage (*Pythian* 10.59-60), though signalling a transition to a more general thought, continues in this erotic vein: καὶ γάρ | ἑτέροις ἑτέρων φῶτες ἔκνιζαν φρένας; κνίζω of erotic excitement appears at Bakchylides 17.8-10 κνίσεν τε Μίνωϊ κέαρ | ἱμεράμπυκος θεᾶς | Κύπριδος [ἄ]γνᾶ δῶρα⁵⁴ and Herodotos 6.62 τὸν δ' Ἀρίστωνα ἔκνιξε ἄρα τῆς γυναικὸς ταύτης ἔρωσ.

In the fourth *Pythian* ode, the hero Jason (who is in this poem a kind of athlete's paradigm: his labours are ἄεθλα (165, 220))⁵⁵ is described in erotic language in the following passage (*Pythian* 4.78-83):

... ὁ δ' ἦρα χρόνῳ
 ἵκετ' αἰχμαῖσιν διδύμασιν ἀνὴρ ἔκ-

⁵²Cf. also Alkman *PMGF* 3.ii.74, where Astymeloisa's beauty makes her a μέλημα δάμῳ, justifying her name.

⁵³W. Schadewaldt (*Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion*, p. 43, n. 1) notes the strong similarity between this passage and Tyrtaios 10.29 ἀνδράσι μὲν θηητὸς ἰδεῖν, ἐρατὸς δὲ γυναίξί. H. Gundert (*Pindar und sein Dichterberuf*, p. 123, n. 174) suggests that Pindar's lines are specifically 'eine Nachwirkung der Tyrtaiosverse'; Tyrtaios himself may have had in mind *Odyssey* 19.235 (cited by Schadewaldt, *ibid.*) ἦ μὲν πολλαὶ γ' αὐτὸν ἐθήησαντο γυναῖκες.

⁵⁴See note 44, above, for the 'gifts of Kypris'.

⁵⁵Cf. ἄεθλων of Herakles and the Nemean Lion at *Isthmian* 6.48, also Bakchylides 9.8.

παγλος· ἐσθὰς δ' ἀμφοτέρα νιν ἔχεν,
 ἄ τε Μαγνήτων ἐπιχωρίοις ἀρμό-
 ζοισα θαητοῖσι γυίοις,
 ἀμφὶ δὲ παρδαλέα στέγετο φρίσσοντας ὄμβρους·
 οὐδὲ κομᾶν πλόκαμοι κερθέντες ὥχοντ' ἀγλαοί,
 ἀλλ' ἅπαν νῶτον καταίθυσ-
 σον

It is not only Jason's θαητὰ γυῖα (80) and long hair (82-83) that mark him as youthful and attractive (he is κάλλιστος ἀνδρῶν at line 123); as Segal notes, 'Jason's combination of panther skin and two spears (79, 81) suggests an association with another ambiguous hero famed for his powers of erotic seduction, Paris at his first appearance in the *Iliad* (3.17 f.)'.⁵⁶ Jason is thus associated with a legendary figure whose most famous attribute is his handsome appearance; the association may not be entirely favourable given the presentation of Paris as somewhat cowardly in the passage from *Iliad* 3, but it does provide a striking implicit analogy for Jason's extraordinary beauty.

In the passages from the fourth, ninth and tenth *Pythian* odes quoted above (4.78-83, 9.97-100, 10.55-60), the poet's choice of language is such as to invite a spectator to *look* at the victor (4.80 θαητοῖσι γυίοις,⁵⁷ 10.58 θαητόν, 9.98 εἶδον ἄφωνοι).⁵⁸ Epinician beauty surpasses normal human appearance so much that it is

⁵⁶C. Segal, *Pindar's Mythmaking*, p. 58.

⁵⁷The words θαητόν εἶδος are used of the oak at *Pythian* 4.264; Braswell (p. 177) notes that the phrase 'refers in the first instance to the tree but also by implication to Demophilus'.

⁵⁸In *Pythian* 9, the desire for Telesikrates which his appearance incites in the female onlookers is paralleled (with the genders reversed) at the end of the next stanza (107-109), where we are told that πολλοὶ ἀριστῆες ἀνδρῶν ... | σύγγονοι. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ξείνων sought the daughter of Antaios (a καλλίκομον ... κόυραν, 106-106a), ἐπεὶ θαητόν εἶδος | ἔπλετο. For similar admiration of another mythical figure, cf. *Nemean* 8.8 πολλά νιν πολλοὶ λιτάνευον ἰδεῖν; the ode begins with an

a cause for wonder or astonishment: in the ninth *Olympian* ode, the victor Epharmostos is described as *ώραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλός* (94), and then we are told that *θαυμαστὸς ἐὼν φάνη Ζηνὸς ἀμφὶ πανάγυριν Λυκαίου* – he ‘appeared’, marvellous in his beauty. In Bakchylides 9, the victor Automedes *φαῖνε θαυμαστὸν δέμας* (31); it is almost a supernatural appearance, as in Bakchylides 5 where, in the underworld, the *ψυχὰ προφάνη Μελεάγρου* (77), and Herakles, who is *θαυμαστός* (71) himself, ‘marvels’ (*θάμβησεν*, 84) at the beauty of Meleagros (86-88):

... “τίς ἀθανάτων
ἢ βροτῶν τοιοῦτον ἔρνος
θρέψεν ἐν ποίᾳ χθονί; ...”

And when he has heard the sad story of Meleagros’ death, Herakles remains fascinated by the hero’s beauty, asking (5.165-69):

“ἦρά τις ἐν μεγάροις
Οἰνῆος ἀρηϊφίλου
ἔστιν ἀδμήτα θυγάτρων
σοὶ φυὰν ἀλιγκία;
τάν κεν λιπαρὰν (ἐ)θέλων θείμαν ἄκοιτιν”.

It has recently been pointed out that in Bakchylides there is less emphasis on physical beauty than there is in Pindar,⁵⁹ and so Herakles’ persistent obsession with Meleagros’ appearance may be thought to strike an odd note. But it is a physical and visible manifestation of something that Croiset pointed out a century ago, in discussing the reasons for Bakchylides’ deviation from the version of the legend which had

address to Ὠρα πότνια, κάρυξ Ἀφροδίτας ἀμβροσιᾶν φιλοτάτων, | ἃ τε παρθενηίοις παίδων τ’ ἐφίζοισα γλεφάροις

⁵⁹S. Instone, *Pindar: Selected Odes*, p. 10.

Meleagros begging Herakles to take Deianeira as his wife (as in Pindar, fr. 249a) rather than the other way around. ‘C’est Méléagre qui est au premier plan,⁶⁰ c’est lui qui excite l’admiration et la sympathie d’Héraklès, au point que celui-ci conçoit immédiatement le désir d’avoir pour femme une jeune fille du même sang’.⁶¹ Through the device of Herakles’ appreciation of Meleagros’ beauty, we see that this is not the Pindaric Herakles, a demigod whose achievements no ordinary mortal will ever be able to match, but a man who, despite being one of Greece’s greatest heroes, is struck by overwhelming admiration for a lesser figure.⁶² The poet’s audience obviously cannot see this extraordinarily handsome figure, but just as Herakles’ attention is fixed on the vision of beauty before him, so theirs is on Meleagros’ ‘courage tranquille’⁶³ in the myth that he relates.

Physical beauty is, then, a symbol of other virtues in Ode 5. Something similar occurs in Ode 9, where the full description of the appearance of the victor Automedes is as follows (vv.27-36):

πενταέθλοισιν γὰρ ἐνέπρεπεν ὥς
 ἄστρον διακρίνει φάη
 νυκτὸς διχομηνίδο[ς] εὐφεγγῆς σελάνα·
 τοῖος Ελλάνων δι’ ἀπ[εῖ]ρονα κύκλον
 φαῖνε θαυμαστὸν δέμας

⁶⁰It may be noted that after he greets Herakles with the honorific but brief *νιὲ Διὸς μεγάλου* (79), his next words are a command: *στάθι τ’ ἐν χώρᾳ*.

⁶¹M. Croiset, ‘Sur les origines du récit relatif à Méléagre’, p. 406.

⁶²B. Gentili comments that while Pindar’s mythic narratives present models of heroic and aristocratic excellence, those of Bakchylides ‘rivelano una opposta tendenza a umanizzare l’eroe, evidenziando la fragilità e la caducità del suo destino’ (introduction to *Pindaro: le Pitiche*, p. xix).

⁶³Croiset, p. 406.

δίσκον τροχοειδέα ῥίπτων,
 καὶ μελαμφύλλου κλάδον
 ἀκτέας ἐς αἰπείναν προπέμπων
 αἰθέρ' ἐκ χειρὸς βοᾶν ὥτρυνε λαῶν
 ἧ τε[λε]υτάσας ἀμάρυγμα πάλας

This passage is described by Burnett as 'the poet's closest approach to a report of athletic events';⁶⁴ the opening lines of the passage, however, are less similar in language to 'a report of athletic events' than to another image in Bakchylides (13.175-77):

οὐ γὰρ ἀλαμπέϊ νυκ[τός
 πασιφανῆς Ἀρετ[ᾶ
 κρυφθεῖς' ἀμαυρο[ῦται⁶⁵

Automedes, who ἐνέπρεπεν in the games just as the moon's light is more powerful than that of the stars, is thus like πασιφανῆς Ἀρετά, shining in the night;⁶⁶ he and

⁶⁴ A.P. Burnett, *The Art of Bacchylides*, p. 55. Burnett also comments (*ibid.*) that 'the Sapphic echo ... lends a hint of eroticism', although she does not make clear whether 'the Sapphic echo' is meant to be of 34 ἄστερες μὲν ἀμφὶ κάλαν σελάνναν | ἄψ ἀπυκρύπτοισι φάεννον εἶδος ... or of 96.6-9

νῦν δὲ Λύδαισιν ἐμπρέπεται γυναι-
 κεσσιν ὥς ποτ' ἀελίῳ
 δύντος ἀ βροδοδάκτυλος †μήνα† (σελάννα Schubart)

πάντα περρέχοις' ἄστρα

The second fragment with its context is more explicitly erotic, but the image in fragment 34 may have been used in the same way. Alternatively, Burnett might be referring to the use of ἀμάρυγμα in line 36, and thinking of Sappho 16.17-18 τᾶς κε βολλοίμαν ἔρατόν τε βᾶμα | κάμάρυγμα λάμπρον ἴδην προσώπῳ ..., which is perhaps implied by her mention (*ibid.*) of 'this body that is glimpsed only in motion'.

⁶⁵ There is, incidentally, another 'Sapphic echo' to be found here: the light of the moon in fragment 96 (see previous note) ἐπί- | σχει θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἀλμύραν | ἴσως καὶ πολυανθέμοις ἀρούρας (vv. 10-11), and in Bakchylides 13 πασιφανῆς Ἀρετ[ᾶ is said to στρωφᾶται κατὰ γᾶν [τε | καὶ πολύπλαγκτον θ[άλασσαν (vv. 180-81).

⁶⁶ Compare the terms used to describe Meleagros' prominence amongst the shades in the underworld in Ode 5: μετέπρεπεν (68), λαμπόμενον (72).

his deeds embody the abstraction towards which he strives.⁶⁷

But despite the fact that the athletic victors whom Pindar celebrates are made to seem almost superhuman both in their strength and physical appearance, Pindar's praise often involves mention of the idea that although these men (and boys) have reached what the poet presents as the pinnacle of human achievement, there are limits beyond which no mortal can go, including the poet himself. This consideration is very clearly stated at the end of the third *Olympian* ode (vv. 42-45):

εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ
χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιᾶν
Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν ἰκάνων ἄπτεται
οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος
σταλᾶν. τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον
κᾶσόφοις. οὐ νιν διώξω· κεινὸς εἶην.

The pillars of Herakles recur with the same significance in the context of one of the passages already mentioned above; once again the thought is expressed in the form of a condition, this time with the athlete's achievements placed in the protasis and the emphasis on limits placed alone in the apodosis (*Nemean* 3.19-23):

εἰ δ' ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ' εὐοικότα μορφᾷ
ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα
παῖς Ἀριστοφάνεος, οὐκέτι πρόσω
ἄβαταν ἄλλα κιόνων ὕπερ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές,

⁶⁷For this kind of 'shining' as an attribute of the superhuman, compare Pindar *Paian* 12 (fr. 52m).14-16, of the birth of the twin children of Leto:

... ἔλαμψαν δ' ἀελίου δέμας ὄπω[ς
ἀγλαδὸν ἐς φάος ἰόντες δίδυμοι
παῖδες

And for the shining sun as a paradigm of what is κάλλιστος of all, cf. Praxilla *PMG* 747 (the reply of the dead Adonis when asked what was κάλλιστος of the things he had left behind in the world above):

κάλλιστον μὲν ἐγὼ λείπω φάος ἡελίοιο,
δεύτερον ἄστρα φαεινὰ σεληναίης τε πρόσωπον

ἥρως θεὸς ἅς ἔθηκε ναυτίλας ἐσχάτας
μάρτυρας κλυτάς.

And again, beauty, prosperity, and success in games are followed by a reminder of mortality at the end of the first triad of the eleventh *Nemean* (vv. 11-16):

ἄνδρα δ' ἐγὼ μακαρίζω μὲν πατέρ' Ἀρκεσίλαν,
καὶ τὸ θαητὸν δέμας ἀτρεμίαν τε σύγγονον·
εἰ δέ τις ὄλβον ἔχων μορφᾷ παραμεύσεται ἄλλους,
ἔν τ' ἀέθλοισιν ἀριστεύων ἐπέδειξεν βίαν,
θνατὰ μεμνάσθω περιστέλλων μέλη,
καὶ τελευτὰν ἀπάντων γᾶν ἐπιεσσόμενος.

Aristagoras' δέμας is θαητόν and he surpasses others in his μορφά, but his μέλη are nevertheless θνατά; his excellence of form and strength is outstanding but still mortal.

Similarly in the tenth *Pythian*, the praise of Hippokleas' beauty at lines 55-60 (58 θαητός) needs to be seen in the context of the poet's statement that (29-30)

... ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν <κεν> εὖροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν.

The road to the Hyperboreans is θαυμαστά 'wondrous', and beyond the reach of mortals. At the same place in the following triad (the end of the last line of the antistrophe, though not in exactly the same metrical position) the theme of wonder recurs (*Pythian* 10.48-50):

... ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάσαι
θεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδέν ποτε φαίνεται
ἔμμεν ἄπιστον.

The immortals and their deeds are to be wondered at; the reservation in this ode of θαυμαστός and θαυμάζω to the superhuman prepares the audience for the comments near the conclusion about the θαητός Hippokleas.

Although καλοί athletes, then, perform καλά (the description of the victory of Automedes in Bakchylides 9, discussed above, shows it to be quite literally a καλὸν ἔργον of the kind that the poet refers to later in the ode (v. 82)),⁶⁸ they are nonetheless subject to misfortune; inner excellence, as manifested in physical beauty, is no defence against fate. This point is made clearly in Bakchylides' Ode 5; the beauty of Meleagros, discussed above, was no help to him in the end, and his sister, χλωραύχην (172) Deianeira will be the third female figure in the poem to destroy a man; Meleagros himself has already told the story of the destruction of the house of Oineus by Artemis (97 ff.) and of his own death at the hands of Althaia (136 ff.). Deianeira, as the audience knows, will kill Herakles by means of a robe poisoned with what she thinks is a love potion.⁶⁹ Herakles, Meleagros, and Deianeira, all of whom possess physical beauty, will all suffer through no fault of their own; and the tone has been set by the poet just before the introduction of the myth (5.53-55):

... οὐ
 γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων
 πάντα γ' εὐδαίμων ἔφν.

⁶⁸Καλὰ ἔργα (or simply καλά) are mentioned frequently in epinician poetry; even when the phrase appears to have a general reference, the epinician context naturally gives it particular relevance to athletic success: e.g. *Olympian* 2.97-98, 6.11, 10.91, 11.18; *Pythian* 7.19, 8.88, 9.96; *Nemean* 7.14; *Isthmian* 6.22; Bakchylides 1.145, 2.6, 5.51, 13.206-7 (τὸ καλῶς [ἐ]ργμένον). The games are a θαητὸς ἀγών at *Olympian* 3.36, and at *Nemean* 6.12 the victorious Alkimidas is said to have come Νεμέας ἐξ ἐρατῶν ἀέθλων; compare *CEG* 385 (Elis, ca 475-450?) [νικάσ]ας καλὸν ἀ[γὼνα Διός], where the supplements are taken from the dedication of Kleosthenes at Olympia (apparently in 516) as reported by Pausanias 6.10.7:

Κλεοσθένης μ' ἀνέθηκεν ὁ Πόντιος ἐξ Ἐπιδάμνου,
 νικήσας ἵπποις καλὸν ἀγῶνα Διός.

⁶⁹D.A. Campbell (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 424) notes the significance of Κύπριδος θελξιμβρότου (175) in this context.

From a presentation of Hieron's victory and general prosperity (1-53), the ode shifts by means of the *gnōmē* at 53-55 into a myth which emphasizes the limits of happiness; this theme is rejected by the poet in the final two stanzas of the song, but the nine stanzas spent on the myth of Herakles and Meleagros suffice to make the same point that Pindar does in two passages discussed above, *Nemean* 3.19-23 and *Nemean* 11-16: physical beauty is a sign of favour from the gods, but that favour does not extend indefinitely.

Like prosperity and athletic victory, physical beauty is a sign of the favour of divinities,⁷⁰ and Pindar, by making these connections, implies that one who is attractive is blessed with other good qualities. An analogy may be drawn with the image of gold which 'blazes' at *Olympian* 1.1-2:

... ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
ἄτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μέγανορος ἔξοχα πλούτου·

Gerber, commenting on this passage and citing *Olympian* 2.72 and *Nemean* 4.82-83 as other passages in which the poet emphasizes the gleam of gold, writes that 'to Pindar as to other Greeks, gold is an object of praise because it is the most valuable of material possessions and its gleam is an incidental attribute which serves to enhance

⁷⁰ At *Pythian* 5.12-13, we are told that σοφοὶ δέ τοι κάλλιον | φέροντι καὶ τὰν θεόσδοτον δύναμιν, and in the following lines the poet cites both the victor's prosperity (15-16 ὅτι βασιλεύς | ἐσσί) and his success in the games (20-22 μάκαρ δὲ καὶ νῦν, κλεενᾶς ὅτι | εὖχος ἤδη παρὰ Πυθιάδος ἵπποις ἐλών | δέδεξαι τόνδε κῶμον ἀνέρων). And in *Olympian* 14, the Χάριτες are addressed in these terms (5-7):

... σὺν γὰρ ὑμῖν τὰ <τε> τερπνὰ καὶ
τὰ γλυκὲ' ἀνεταί πάντα βροτοῖς,
εἰ σοφός, εἰ καλός, εἴ τις ἀγλαὸς ἀνὴρ.

the value it already has'.⁷¹ The beauty of an athlete, as praised by Pindar, functions in a similar way, although it could be argued that for the purposes of epinician poetry a victor's beauty is not 'incidental'; it seems rather a more significant attribute which serves to indicate to the eye a complex of good qualities which are independently manifested in success and prosperity.⁷²

3.4 *Beauty in Inscribed Epigram*⁷³

If this is the case, it is perhaps surprising that in the surviving verse epitaphs up to the end of the fifth century, the beauty of the dead person is only rarely mentioned; it is notable that the adjective *καλός* is used more often of things than of people, most frequently of the object on which the inscription appears. In dedicatory inscriptions, the pairing of *καλόν* and *ἄγαλμα* is quite common: *CEG* 291 (Athens, late 6th century), 302 (Ptoion, Boiotia, *ca* 540?), 303 (Attica, *ca* 525?), 311 (Eleusis, *ca* 500-475?), 334 (Ptoion, Boiotia, *ca* 550-525?), 366 (Mykenai?, *ca* 525?), 367

⁷¹Gerber, p. 10.

⁷²Verdenius replies to Gerber's suggestion regarding the gold in *Olympian* 1.1: 'Pindar does not emphasize an "incidental attribute", but an essential aspect, which includes both visual gleam or radiance (e.g. P. 4, 144 *σθένος ἀελίου χρύσεον*) and commercial value' (Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar*, vol. ii, p. 5). See also section 4.5, below, on the relationship between wealth and virtue in epinician poetry.

⁷³Inscriptions where beauty occurs in a martial context are discussed below, in section 3.6.

(Olympia, *ca* 490-480?), and 425 (Delos, *ca* 550-530?).⁷⁴ In *CEG* 330 (Thebes, *ca* 500-475?), the temple in which the vase was found is called a ναὸν καλόν. In a Spartan inscription (*CEG* 376, *ca* 510-500?), it appears that a victory being commemorated is described as καλή. Some inscriptions play on the theme of ‘a καλός object belonging to a καλός person’: *CEG* 450 (Opuntian Lokris, *ca* 500-475?) καλὸ Παντελέος ἡ ποτερία καλά, 460 (Kamiroi, Rhodes, *ca* 490-470) Φιλτὸς ἡμι τᾶς καλᾶς | ἅ κύλιξ ἅ ποικίλα, and 447 (Thisbe, *ca* 450-425?) Γοργίνιος ἐμὶ ὁ κότυλος καλὸς κα[λ]ῶ.⁷⁵

Among the epitaphs, the μνήμα or σῆμα itself can be described as καλόν: *CEG* 18 (Attica, *ca* 550-540), 26 (Attica, *ca* 540-530?), 161 (Thasos, *ca* 500-490?), and 165 (Sikinos, 7th century?). Phrases like ‘this is the καλὸν μνήμα of the καλός ...’ (as in the dedicatory epigrams), however, do not appear;⁷⁶ perhaps such a play on words was deemed inappropriate to the solemnity of a funerary inscription.⁷⁷ One

⁷⁴The phrase περικαλλὲς ἄγαλμα can be found in *CEG* 335 (Ptoion, Boiotia, *ca* 550-500?), 363 (Argos, late 7th century), 422 (Samos, shortly after 560), and probably 423 (Samos, *ca* 540).

⁷⁵Compare the ‘Simonidean’ epigram for the wrestler Milon (*FGE* XXV Μίλωνος τόδ’ ἄγαλμα καλοῦ καλόν, ὃς ποτε Πίσση | ἐπτάκι νικήσας ἐς γόνατ’ οὐκ ἔπεσεν) which, if genuine, would belong to the late sixth century. For problems of authorship and the reading ἐπτάκι (ἐξάκι Siebelis), see Page, *FGE* pp. 238-239 and Molyneux, *Simonides* pp. 81-83. Page believes that the epigram may be very old but is ‘certainly not inscriptional’ and that its ascription to Simonides is simply ‘another instance of the attachment of Simonides’ name to an apparently inscriptional epigram on a subject within his lifetime’; Molyneux suggests that it may be ‘Simonides’ first commission for an inscriptional epigram’, resulting from his career as an epinician poet, but agrees that ‘the Simonidean ascription, though it may be correct, is found only in the unreliable Planudean Anthology, and so cannot be accepted with any confidence’.

⁷⁶J. Ducat (‘Fonctions de la statue dans la Grèce archaïque’, p. 241), suggests that the connection is implicit: ‘lorsque les épigrammes vantent la beauté, ce n’est pas celle du mort, mais celle du monument, qui en est comme la transcription et le témoin’.

⁷⁷But *CEG* 127 (Phokis, *ca* 500?) begins with the jingle χαῖρε Χάρον.

memorial is described as *χαρίεν* (*CEG* 42, Athens, *ca* 525?); this is the word's only occurrence in the verse epitaphs, although it is quite common in dedicatory inscriptions, emphasising as it does the relationship of exchange that is seen to exist between dedicator and divinity. *Χάρις*, however, is never used in the dedications in a purely visual sense, 'pleasing to the eye'; an act of dedication can be described as *χάρις* (*CEG* 301 (Eleusis, *ca* 550?) and 234 (Athens, *ca* 500-480?)), or an inscription can refer to a *χάρις* received or hoped for from the god: *CEG* 231 (Athens, *ca* 500-480?), 258 (Athens, *ca* 490-480?), 313 (Attica, *ca* 480-460?), 321a (Eretria, *ca* 500?), 371 (Olympia, *ca* 550-525?).⁷⁸ Given the archaic poets' use of *χάρις* to indicate beauty,⁷⁹ it is perhaps surprising that we do not find anywhere a play on meanings along the lines of 'I have given a *χαρίεν ἄγαλμα* to the god in return for a *χάρις*'; the adjective *χαριεῖς*, it seems, has become detached from *χάρις* in its sense of 'favour'.

It is stated in a Sicilian epitaph (*CEG* 147, *ca* 485-50?) that the act of burial was done *καλῶς*. This may refer not to the physical beauty of the *stèle*, but to an 'appropriate' or 'proper' burial, rather like the use of *καλός* in the literary material such as Anakreon *PMG* 417 and Sappho 115, discussed above (section 3.2).

Friedländer and Hoffleit translate the phrase *καλῶς ... ἔθαπσε* as 'gave a decent

⁷⁸A variation on this theme is the phrase *δίδοι χάρις* *ἑταρῶν ἀμοιβ[άν]* in *CEG* 326 (Boiotia, *ca* 700-675); *cf.* the Korinthian dedications 360 (*ca* 510-500) and probably 359 (*ca* 575-550), and *δίδοι χαρίεσσα[ν ἀφ]ορμάν* in 358 (*ca* 600-550).

⁷⁹See B. MacLachlan, *The Age of Grace*, especially pp. 67-69 on Theognidea 1319-1322, where the poet first uses *χάρις* of the beloved's beauty and then refers to the *χάρις* of the obligations involved in a reciprocal relationship.

burial',⁸⁰ which is probably the best way to render it. Καλός is extremely rarely used to describe a person in the verse epitaphs up to the end of the fifth century, and there is no indication that the adjective carries any ethical overtones.⁸¹ CEG 68 (Athens, ca 500?) is the only certain verse epitaph from the period that uses καλός in this way:

παι[δό]ς [ἀπ]οφθιμένοιο Κλ[εοί]το τῷ Μενεσαίχμῳ·
μνῆμ' ἔσορὸν οἴκτιρ' ὅς καλὸς ὢν ἔθανε.

But an Attic black-figure *loutrophoros*, perhaps from the grave of an unmarried person,⁸² bears the inscription (CEG 438, ca 500) ἀνδρὸς ἀπ[οφθιμ]ένοιο κάρε
κα[λ]ὸν ἐνθάδε κείμεναι.

The word καλός seems to have an ethical force in only one verse inscription of this period: CEG 67 (Attica, ca 500?) [σό]φρον, εὐ[ξύν]ετος, ξσε[νικό]ς, π[ινυ]τός, τὰ κάλ' [εἰδὸ]ς | ἡορ[αίο] θανάτ]ο μο[ῖραν] ἡέχε]ι Χσ[≤6 letters]. The string of adjectives in the first line suggests that τὰ κάλ' [εἰδὸ]ς does not mean simply 'knowing what is beautiful (in an aesthetic sense)', but 'knowing what is good', rather like the phrase at Theognidea 652 ἐσθλὰ ... καὶ κάλ' ἐπιστάμενον. As was the case in Homer, it is only in the neuter that the ethical connotations of the word καλός appear at all; for the most part, though, the language of aesthetics is kept separate from that of ethics.

⁸⁰Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, p. 84.

⁸¹The graffito CEG 441 (Athens, ca 480-450?) makes explicit its visual force: Ἀντίνοος καλὸς μὲν ἰδὲν τερπ[ον]νὸς δὲ πορσειπειπέν (sic: i.e., πορσειπέν).

⁸²Demosthenes, 44.18, mentions this practice.

The almost complete absence of praise of the beauty of the dead and of connections drawn between their physical appearance and other virtues illustrates a comment made by Hansen on *CEG* 135 (with reference to a grammatical point): ‘quod licet Pindaro in epinicio, non licet auctori epitaphii’: there seems to have been very little place for commemoration of beauty in the verse epitaphs before and contemporary with Pindar. Physical beauty as represented in ‘literary’ poetry is, after all, very much a quality of the living.⁸³

3.5 *Μῶν ἐκ καλῶν εἰ κάγαθῶν*,⁸⁴

Semonides 7.30-31 (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε λωῖων γυνή | ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων) is one of the examples adduced by Wankel as evidence for the early existence of the combination καλὸς κάγαθός as an aristocratic catchphrase.⁸⁵ Wankel’s argument has been refuted effectively by Classen, Coulter,

⁸³*Cf. the skolion PMG* 890:
 ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνητῷ,
 δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φύαν γενέσθαι,
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Here too, καλὸν φύαν γενέσθαι is placed second in importance after ὑγιαίνειν.

⁸⁴Aristophanes, *Knights* 185.

⁸⁵Wankel, p. 23.

and Donlan,⁸⁶ it is impossible to say that because the two terms appear in proximity in a few places in archaic poetry, their combination must have been in general use to denote the well-born, well-behaved aristocrat.⁸⁷ None of Wankel's examples proves his thesis,⁸⁸ and Donlan rightly cautions: 'Naturally it cannot be asserted definitely that the term [*i.e.*, καλὸς κάγαθός] did not exist before this time [*i.e.*, its first appearance at Herodotos 1.30], but an assumption that it must have been in use as an aristocratic epithet during the seventh and sixth centuries is totally unwarranted'.⁸⁹

Other passages cited by Wankel in support of his argument are *Iliad* 6.156-57 (of Bellerophontes, quoted above, section 3.1), Tyrtaios 10.13-14 ἥδ' ἀρετή, τόδ' ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον | κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ νέω, and Sappho fr. 50 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλος ὅσον ἴδην πέλεται (κάλος,) | ὁ δὲ κάγαθος αὖτις καὶ κάλος ἔσσεται. None of these provides any evidence for the combination καλὸς κάγαθός except for the Sappho passage,⁹⁰ and even that initially promising couplet is less than conclusive. Even if it may be deduced from Sappho 50 that certain people

⁸⁶C.J. Classen and J.A. Coulter, reviews of Wankel in *Gnomon* 34 (1962) 304-5 and *CPh* 59 (1964) 133-37 respectively; Donlan, 'The Origin of Καλὸς κάγαθός'.

⁸⁷As Bourriot notes (vol. 2, pp. 584-5, n. 6), Wankel's method of simply looking for places where the terms are used together is suggested even by his title *Kalos kai agathos* (rather than, *e.g.*, Bourriot's own *Kalos kagathos – Kalokagathia*).

⁸⁸Still less can Mehliss (p. 19) cite Hesiod, *Theogony* 585 (of Pandora) καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῖο, and say, 'mit Recht die Frage aufgeworfen werden konnte, ob nicht eigentlich καλὸν und ἀγαθὸν das Nämliche sein müsse'.

⁸⁹Donlan, 'The Origin of Καλὸς κάγαθός', p. 366.

⁹⁰Another fragment of Sappho, not cited by Wankel, which combines 'the good' and 'the beautiful' is 137(b) αἱ δ' ἦχες ἔσλων ἱμερον ἢ κάλων ..., but the mention of the two qualities in the same line simply points to the fact that they are both thought of as desirable, not that they are an inseparable pair.

were spoken of as καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, there is no suggestion that καλός was thought of as being in any sense a term of *moral* commendation. Donlan again is more convincing when he writes, ‘whether καλός here [*i.e.*, in Sappho 50] has an ethical quality is debatable. I believe that it is ἀγαθός only that is being given some new valuation: one who is beautiful appears beautiful to the senses; one who has *true* worth will accordingly appear beautiful’.⁹¹ Coulter writes (p. 135) that Sappho 50 ‘shows only that *kalos* meant more than physically beautiful’, but this is a misunderstanding of Sappho’s words: surely the point in the first line of the fragment is that the word καλός *can* apply (even in a sense that the poet would like to clarify as limited) to one who is only physically beautiful.

Wankel also cites Mimnermos 1.6 γῆρας, ὃ τ’ αἰσχρὸν ὁμῶς καὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα τιθεῖ as an example of an early combination of the terms in the negative; of course this depends on accepting Hermann’s κακόν (as West does) for the manuscripts’ καλόν.⁹² As Campbell notes, although the ‘ᾱ of MSS. καλόν can be paralleled in *h. Ven.* 29, *Hes. Op.* 63, *Th.* 585, *Sol.* [13].21, *Thgn.* 17 ... translations such as “which puts the ugly and the handsome man in the same condition” and “which makes even a handsome man ugly like the plain man” do violence to the meaning of the common expression ὁμῶς καί’.⁹³ (For ὁμῶς καί, compare Mimnermos 5.7 ἐχθρὸν

⁹¹Donlan, ‘The Origin of Καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός’, p. 368, n. 8.

⁹²Wankel calls this ‘ein allerdings nicht sauber überlieferter Vers’ (p. 17), but further reduces the ‘Sauberkeit’ of the transmission by quoting the verse as γῆρας, ὃ τ’ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα τιθεῖ.

⁹³D.A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 225.

ὁμῶς καὶ ἄτιμον.) Allen, however, has recently re-stated the case against the reading κακόν:

there is no parallel for the statement that old age makes a man κακός. The only reasonable meaning for the adjective to bear in such a statement would be 'worthless' – certainly not 'bad' or 'evil.' But even if it could carry that meaning here, Hermann's κακόν would be somewhat otiose after αἰσχρόν, for it is his αἰσχρότης, his loss of κάλλος, which in Mimnermus' view contributes largely to the old man's worthlessness and lack of respect, cf. F[ragment] 3, τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν κάλλιστος ... / οὐδὲ ... τίμιος οὔτε φίλος.⁹⁴

What needs to be emended, says Allen (following Verdenius and Doederlein before him), is not καλόν to κακόν but ὁμῶς to ὅμως. He points out that if ὅμως is taken to mean 'even a handsome man' here, there may be a similar use in Hesiod, *Works and Days* 20 ἢ τε [*sc.* Ἔρις] καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔγειρεν, following West's suggestion that ὅμως 'is perhaps to be regarded as belonging with καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ rather than with ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔγειρεν'.⁹⁵ As for its position in Mimnermos' verse, Allen repeats Verdenius' observation that ὅμως 'may be put before the concessive clause'.⁹⁶ The result is a reading that fits better with the theme of the poem: 'Mimnermus is not interested in the idea that old age is a leveller, which renders equal the ugly and the beautiful. His concern is rather with the great damage which old age inflicts on youth'.⁹⁷ Not only is this passage, then, no evidence for the

⁹⁴A. Allen, *The Fragments of Mimnermus*, p. 37; Allen also quotes Bach's surprise at the tacit introduction of Hermann's reading, prompting him to write in his 1826 edition 'quod quidem utrum ipsi auctori an tyothetarum incuriae debeatur nescio'.

⁹⁵M.L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days*, p. 145.

⁹⁶W.J. Verdenius, 'Mimnermus 1,6', p. 197, who adduces Sophokles (*O.K.* 958-59) and Plato (*Phaidon* 91cd) as parallels.

⁹⁷Allen, p. 37.

combination καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός in this period, it deals exclusively with aesthetic concerns; the presence or absence of virtues other than beauty is irrelevant.

One passage which is not mentioned by Wankel and which might at first glance appear to support the idea that καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός existed as a combination at an early stage, with καλός carrying an ethical connotation, is Solon 13.39-40 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ, | καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων.⁹⁸ But here the two components ἀγαθός and καλός are clearly separated, and each is contrasted with a word or phrase denoting its opposite; the man in question is δειλός and therefore not ἀγαθός, and he is not καλός since he has a μορφὴ οὐ χαρίεσσα. There is no necessary moral connotation of καλός; it is simply one more aspect of the ideal which this ἄλλος ... ἀνὴρ hopes to achieve.⁹⁹ Solon is reported by Herodotos (1.30.4) to have described the sons of Tellos as καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοί, and Bourriot argues that these could not have been Solon's words, since the combination καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is absent from the remains of Solon's poetry; Herodotos, rather, is using a term which is gaining currency in his own age.¹⁰⁰ But given the evidence of Solon 13.39-40, it appears that the poet-statesman, even if he did not use καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός

⁹⁸Bergk's excision of this couplet is defended by Wilamowitz (*Sappho und Simonides*, p. 260), but there does not seem to be any very compelling reason to doubt its authenticity.

⁹⁹In the context of vv. 33-42, this couplet must refer to a hope or plan for the future (δοκεῖ with present infinitive, as in Aischylos, *Agamemnon* 16 and 1649) rather than an incorrect opinion about his present state, as it is understood by E.K. Anhalt (*Solon the Singer*, p. 36). Anhalt writes that the false δόξα in these lines are 'symptomatic of the general human tendency to optimism', which is true enough, and δοκεῖ as referring to the future in v. 39 would be no less 'optimistic', and would better suit its context.

¹⁰⁰Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 119.

as an aristocratic catchphrase, might well have considered καλός and ἀγαθός as two terms which, though quite different in sense, could be mentioned together to give an impression of general excellence (or, in the negative, of its absence).¹⁰¹

Bourriot's argument is that the phrase καλὸς κάγαθός originated in Sparta, where it designated the combination of beauty and bravery praised by Tyrtaios (see below, section 3.6), and became a technical term there for those who best exemplified this Spartan ideal.¹⁰² This is illustrated by Thucydides' use of the term at 4.40.2, where an Athenian ally asks a Spartan prisoner whether the dead on the Spartan side were καλοὶ κάγαθοί. Gomme writes that to the Spartan, the phrase implies

the possession of a certain ἀρετή – the ἀρετή of Achilles: conspicuous and individual courage in battle, a good carriage, athletic prowess, generosity, courtesy: qualities which οἱ εὐγενεῖς, and following them οἱ πλούσιοι, claimed were to be found in their own class much more than in any other, but essentially moral qualities, which might belong, or be said to belong, to someone of any class. That is why the Spartan can say in reply τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς simply, which means 'the brave'.¹⁰³

Bourriot argues that by this time, the phrase καλὸς κάγαθός had been appropriated by a 'jeunesse dorée' exemplified by Alkibiades and his circle (*cf.* Thucydides 8.48.6 τοὺς τε καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους), under the influence of the sophists, but is used in its original sense in the Sphakteria episode because it is not an Athenian but one of their allies, who was presumably not familiar with the new connotations of the phrase

¹⁰¹As Bourriot notes (vol. 1, pp. 165-6), Tellos' sons are called καλοὶ simply because they are handsome, and the term ἀγαθοί (like the phrase as a whole) does not carry any aristocratic significance here.

¹⁰²Later leaving traces of this sense, for example, in Xenophon (*Hellenika* 5.3.8-9; *Lak. Pol.* 10.1, 10.4) and Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 15.12).

¹⁰³A.W. Gomme, 'The Interpretation of καλοὶ κάγαθοί in Thucydides 4.40.2', p. 65.

at Athens, who speaks. Whether the phrase was originally Spartan or not,¹⁰⁴ the new Athenian interpretation of the phrase seems to be borne out by its use in Aristophanes, where it is apparently used mockingly as part of a new pretentious vocabulary.¹⁰⁵ The *καλοὶ καγαθοί* in Aristophanes are

des gens qui veulent se manifester dans la cité alors qu'ils ne répondent pas aux critères anciens de la notoriété, à savoir l'origine familiale, la richesse, une vie de notable reposant sur une solide assise villageoise traditionnelle. Ils ont pour eux un esprit délié qui les porte vers les spéculations ou la rouerie, dans la ville ils passent de l'agora aux gymnases et de l'héliée aux demeures des riches. La faiblesse de leur assise n'a souvent comme corollaire que la hauteur de leurs prétentions. Ce sont des intellectuels avec ou sans conscience.¹⁰⁶

Alkibiades, according to Aristophanes in the *Banqueters* (fr. 205 K.-A.), is one of the *ἄνδρας ... καλοκαγαθίαν ἀσκοῦντας*: far from possessing a combination of prized virtues, 'la "jeunesse dorée" peut ... fournir des modèles de *kaloï kagathoi* sans posséder la vertu et sans donner le bon exemple'.¹⁰⁷ The 'Old Oligarch', significantly, never uses the term, which is understandable if the *καλοὶ καγαθοί* are no longer 'l'ensemble des aristocrates, mais un petit groupe inquiétant, composite, se servant du *dēmos* au lieu de s'opposer à lui, faction à laquelle Phrynichos fait précisément allusion pour atteindre, sans le nommer, son chef Alcibiade [*i.e.*, at Thucydides 8.48.4 ff.]'.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴Presumably it is also possible that the Spartan [in Thucydides 4.40.2], unaware of Bourriot's theory, sniffs at the *καλός* element and picks out what *he* thinks important' (E.L. Bowie, *privatim*).

¹⁰⁵Bourriot, vol. 1, pp. 131-62; *cf.* Gomme, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰⁶Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 161.

¹⁰⁷Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 131.

¹⁰⁸Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 185.

This view of the evolution of the phrase fits with the evidence provided by the poetry and verse inscriptions of the period, from which the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* are absent. The only poet who would be likely to use the phrase in its original sense, on this interpretation, is Tyrtaios, but *καλὸς κάγαθός*, *καλοκάγαθία* and the like would require considerable alteration and separation of their components in order to fit the elegiac metre. As for the new sense that Bourriot observes the phrase acquiring in fifth-century Athens, it is not surprising that these *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* find a poetic presence only in comedy.

3.6 *Beauty and Bravery*

The notions of beauty and bravery are deeply intertwined in Tyrtaios fr. 10.¹⁰⁹ At the beginning of this poem, we are told that *τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα* | *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον*; this is at first sight a moral statement, but at the end of the fragment we find that the poet actually describes a youth slain in battle as *καλός* in an aesthetic sense (line 30), as is made clear by the parallel uses of the adjectives *θηητός* and *ἐρατός* (line 29). This play on the connotations of *καλός* is subtle, and it is absent from the bald Simonidean expressions *καλὸς δ' ὁ πότμος* (*PMG* 531.2) and *εἰ τὸ καλῶς θνήσκειν ἀρετῆς μέρος ἐστὶ*

¹⁰⁹See also above, section 2.2.

μέγιστον ... ('Simonides' *FGE* VIII).¹¹⁰ Verdenius comments that it is 'striking' that the poet, 'when it comes to motivating his exhortation of the young, does not appeal to their fellow-feeling but to their sense of beauty',¹¹¹ and points out that although both war and beauty are themes in, for example, Alkman's *Partheneion*, they are kept separate there whereas Tyrtaios blends them together. Ibykos *S* 151, it might be added, also blends the themes in that the poet lists the brave heroes of the Trojan war only to focus on their beauty in the concluding lines of the song.¹¹²

In Archilochos 114, the poet has sometimes been understood to be questioning traditional or 'heroic' notions of martial valour. Archilochos says that he is unimpressed by a good-looking στρατηγός, and would prefer a short, bow-legged man who is nevertheless ἀσφαλέως βεβηκώς ποσσί, καρδίας πλέως. Podlecki comments on the poet's 'anti-heroic realism, even iconoclasm',¹¹³ and Campbell

¹¹⁰N. Loraux ('La "belle mort" spartiate', p. 108) notes: 'la mort est belle, et il ne faut pas entendre cet adjectif en un sens uniquement moral, comme dans la version athénienne du καλὸς θάνατος. Chez Tyrée καὸς garde toute la résonance esthétique que ce terme prenait chez Homère, et la beauté du jeune guerrier mort n'est pas pour les Spartiates un vain mot'. Further: 'les deux sens, éthique et esthétique, sont en fait indissolublement liés et à καλὸν τεθνάμεναι (v. 1) répond καλὸς δ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών (v. 30)' (p. 108, n. 22).

¹¹¹ W.J. Verdenius, 'Tyrtaeus 6-7D', p. 350.

¹¹²Whether the focus is also on the beauty of Polycrates (*e.g.*, L. Woodbury, 'Ibycus and Polycrates', pp. 203-4) or not (*e.g.*, J.P. Barron, 'Ibycus: *To Polycrates*', p. 135) does not affect this point, although Woodbury's principal argument that the stop at the end of line 46 should be removed is strong: poetry gives κλέος (as Ibykos explicitly promises in the next two verses), not κάλλος itself. The poem will be discussed further below.

¹¹³Podlecki, *The Early Greek Poets*, p. 41.

writes that the ‘short, knock-kneed commander of Archilochos’ choice cuts a very unhomeric figure’, comparing Archilochos’ preferred fighter unfavourably in comparison with Homer’s heroes: ‘Tydeus was small, but not knock-kneed (*Il.* 5.801 μικρὸς μὲν ἔην δέμας, ἀλλὰ μαχήτης); only the insubordinate ranker Thersites is described in similar terms: cf. *Il.* 2.217 φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ’ ἕτερον πόδα etc.’¹¹⁴

But it is not ‘unhomeric’ to criticize a fighter for his good looks in contrast to his lack of valour. One is reminded of Hektor’s tirade against Paris at *Iliad* 3.39-55:

Δύσπαρι, εἶδος ἄριστε
 ἥ που καγχαλώωσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,
 φάντες ἀριστῆα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὐνεκα καλὸν
 εἶδος ἔπ’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή.

 οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμη κίθαρις τὰ τε δῶρ’ Ἀφροδίτης,
 ἥ τε κόμη τό τε εἶδος, ὅτ’ ἐν κονίῃσι μιγείης .

And the phrase εἶδος ἀγῆτοί is used as a term of reproach when Here rallies the Greeks at *Iliad* 5.787.¹¹⁵ Although the physical picture of Archilochos’ ideal commander is indeed less glamorous than Homer’s δῖοι Ἀχαιοί, the poet’s criticism of the good looks and self-indulgence of the μέγας στρατηγός is in fact in line with epic attitudes; at the end of this fragment, Archilochos mentions two qualities which for him are more important than appearance. Burnett comments that Archilochos’ preference ‘has little to do with the looks of either party’, and writes:

though the form is different, one could compare this witty jibe from

¹¹⁴Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 152. In spite of Campbell’s insistence on the literal descriptions of deformities (‘Tydeus was small, but not knock-kneed’), Tydeus (as is noted by Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 43, n. 31) is in fact a closer parallel to Archilochos’ courageous man, in that he was unimpressive to look at but a good fighter.

¹¹⁵The line recurs at 8.228, in an exhortation by Agamemnon.

Archilochus to the elegiac priamel of Tyrtaeus [*i.e.*, fr. 12] in which all the accepted marks of magnificence – wealth, beauty, power and athletic prowess – are rejected unless they are accompanied by courage.¹¹⁶ Archilochus refuses to admire the soldier who is outwardly splendid, but this does not mean automatic praise for his homely opposite¹¹⁷

In contrast to the rejections of physical beauty in favour of martial valour in Homer and Archilochos, the ‘Polykrates Ode’ of Ibykos (*S* 151) praises the combination of the two qualities. The addressee of the poem¹¹⁸ is praised by comparison with Homeric warriors; in a long *praeteritio* (how long it was originally cannot be determined; at least 35 lines from the beginning of the poem are missing), the poet passes over (10-11 νῦν δέ μοι οὔτε ... ἐπιθύμιον) the ἀρετὰν | ὑπεράφανον (16-17) of the χ]αλκάσπ[ιδες υἱ]ες Ἀχα[ι]ῶν (31). The theme of beauty in the heroic world is introduced early (5 ξα]νθᾶς Ἐλενας περὶ εἶδει; of course, it might have been brought in even earlier), and recurs at the end of the poem (46-48):

τοῖς μὲν πέδα κάλλεος αἰὲν,
καὶ σύ, Πολύκρατες, κλέος ἄφθιτον ἐξεῖς
ὥς κατ’ αἰοιδᾶν καὶ ἐμὸν κλέος.

The last quality of the heroes mentioned before the poet’s promise of κλέος¹¹⁹ for Polykrates is their κάλλος, but in the lines between the introduction of the theme of

¹¹⁶It should be repeated (since it is not mentioned by Burnett) that Tyrtaios is rejecting ‘all the accepted marks of magnificence’ as useless *only in the context of war*; he is not arguing that courage in battle is in general the only important ἀρετή. See above, section 2.4.

¹¹⁷Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, pp. 43-44.

¹¹⁸Among the theories that the addressee of Ibykos’ poem is not the Samian tyrant mentioned by Herodotos may be mentioned those of Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 249-53: this Polykrates is a son of the tyrant, and ruled Rhodes), and Barron (‘The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos’: this is the tyrant’s father); these and others are refuted by M.L. West (‘Melica’, pp. 206-9).

¹¹⁹Κλέος ἄφθιτον occurs at *Iliad* 9.413, mentioned above (section 2.5).

beauty (5, 9) and the final triad, the epic heroes have been mentioned primarily with references to their valour: 6-7 δῆ]ριν πολύμνον ἔχ[ο]ντες | πό]λεμον κατὰ [δ]ακρ[υό]εντα, 16-17 ἀρετὰν | ὑπ]εράφανον, 19 ἥρωας ἐσθ[λούς, 35 Τ[ελαμ]ώνιος ἄλκι[μος Αἴας. In his *praeteritio*, Ibykos refuses to speak of this valour,¹²⁰ and introduces the last triad with the handsome heroes Kyanippos and Zeuxippos, followed by the even more beautiful Troilos. Valour and beauty, both attributes of the great heroes and placed side by side in the poem, have been kept separate, and the poet concentrates on the latter at the end. ‘It may be assumed, despite μορφάν 49 [*sic*: 45], “shape”, that “beauty” is not merely a physical attribute – the definition of what is *kalos* plays a crucial role in lyric poetry’s distance from epic’, claims Goldhill,¹²¹ but the very specific μορφάν cannot be so easily dismissed, and the poet seems to be expecting his audience to make exactly the opposite assumption: when he reaches this stage of the poem, the heroes’ beauty is what he emphasizes. He implies that it is possible to have both κάλλος and ἀρετή,¹²² even if he has no desire at the moment (10-11 νῦ]ν δέ μοι οὔτε ... ἐπιθύμιον) to sing of the ἀρετή of the ancient heroes (which, of course, he does for seven stanzas, thereby keeping his audience aware of

¹²⁰ Apart from his statement that only the Muses could do justice to so grand a subject (vv. 23 ff.), the poet is silent as to the reasons for his preference. Although the poem fits the injunctions given by Xenophanes (fr. 1) and Anakreon (fr. eleg. 2) not to sing of fighting while drinking and making merry, Ibykos does not give this as a reason for his refusal to sing of the heroes’ ἀρετή. Such a justification might have been given in the earlier part of the poem (which might also have contained specific references to a sympotic occasion, as in the *enkomion* of Pindar for Thrasyboulos, fr. 124, or those of Bakchylides for Alexander and Hieron, frr. 20B and 20C), but it is hard to imagine how Ibykos could then have justified his lengthy digression.

¹²¹ S. Goldhill, *The Poet’s Voice*, p. 117.

¹²² Perhaps this is why Paris, who was criticised for having one but not the other (see above), is the first figure in his list of rejections?

it); he does not suggest that there is any problem with the ‘definition of what is *kalos*’, or that his lyric might be very distant from epic in this respect.

Neither Archilochos nor Ibykos, then, explicitly rejects ‘traditional’ notions of heroic valour, although the two poets take different stances with respect to the question of the extent to which this ἀρετή can be linked with physical κάλλος. Archilochos holds that these qualities are entirely independent of each other, whereas Ibykos implicitly praises the combination of the two,¹²³ while concentrating on the latter as his link to Polykrates; both of these attitudes have their precedents in epic.¹²⁴ Sappho fr. 16 comes closer to such a rejection, but even there, Sappho is concerned only with love and beauty, and says nothing about the connection (or lack thereof) between physical appearance and martial valour, which is irrelevant to her theme; the fact that soldiers and ships are less beautiful to her than Anaktoria (who is beautiful because Sappho loves her) has no bearing on their value to those who do love them¹²⁵ or find them κάλλιστον. Unlike Ibykos, Sappho here explicitly attempts ‘a definition of what is *kalos*’, but like Ibykos, she does not attempt to define the nature of the

¹²³The combination of beauty and ἀρετή is again praised at Theognidea 933-34 πάροις ἀνθρώπων ἀρετή καὶ κάλλος ὀπηδεῖ· | ὄλβιος, ὃς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἔλαχεν. Here the exact nature of the ἀρετή in question is not specified; there are strong verbal parallels between 935-38 and Tyrtaios 12.37-42, and the ἀρετή here in the Theognidea might be martial valour, as it is in the passage of Tyrtaios, but is not necessarily so.

¹²⁴Hektor’s tirade against Paris has already been cited above as an epic example of the attitude that κάλλος and martial valour do not always go together; for the view that their combination is to be praised see, e.g., *Iliad* 6.156-57 (of Bellerophon): τῷ δὲ θεοὶ κάλλος τε καὶ ἡνορέην ἐρατεινὴν | ὤπασαν.

¹²⁵‘A key question underlying the interpretation of the stanza is (baldly stated): is it possible for anyone to have passion (ἔρατα) for a military campaign? The answer suggested by the Homeric evidence, at least, is: yes’ (L. Rissman, *Love As War*, p. 32; Homeric examples given on pp. 32-33).

relationship between κάλλος and other virtues, martial or otherwise (as she does, of course, in fr. 50, where she says that being ἄγαθος makes a person κάλος).

In the epitaphs of this period for fallen soldiers, only once is the physical appearance of the dead person (or, more specifically, the appearance of a statue representing him) linked explicitly with martial valour, in *CEG* 19 (Athens, ca 550-530?):

[(4 letters)]ς αἰχμετῶ, Χσενόκλεες, ἀνδρὸς [ἐπισ]τὰς
σῆμα τὸ σὸν προσιδὸν γνό[σεται] ἐν[ορέαν?].

And the closest that they come to any mention of physical beauty is in phrases such as ἐν πολέμῳ φθίμενον, νεαρὰν ἡβὴν ὀλέσαντα in *CEG* 13 (Attica, ca 575-550?) and 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?). This is not an Homeric phrase, although καὶ δ' ἔχει ἡβης ἄνθος appears at *Iliad* 13.484. Campbell gives some examples of the 'flower of youth' motif in early poetry;¹²⁶ none of these mentions a man's youth being lost in battle, although Tyrtaios 10.28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς¹²⁷ ἡβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχει is contrasted two lines later with the man's death. Anakreon, however, speaks of the loss of youth in battle (*PMG* 419 ὤλεσας δ' ἡβὴν ἀμύνων πατρίδος δουλητῆν),¹²⁸ and Meleagros at

¹²⁶Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 370-71. To Campbell's list may be added Simonides 20.5 θνητῶν δ' ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχει πολυήρατον ἡβης The phrase ἄνθος ἡβας is used by Pindar of Jason at *Pythian* 4.158, and at *Pythian* 9.109-11 we are told that the suitors of the daughter of Antaios χρυσοστεφάνου ... Ἥβας | καρπὸν ἀνθήσαντ' ἀποδρέψαι | ἔθελον.

¹²⁷ It is perhaps significant that the adjective ἐρατός in the verse inscriptions of the period is never attributed to a person (whether a soldier or not): it is used twice of places (*CEG* 155 (Paros, 476/5) and 421 (Samos, 460-454)), and in both of these epitaphs the places were fought for in battle by the men commemorated; compare Solon's use of the adjective ἱμερτός of Salamis in fragments 1 and 3, where the poet encourages the Athenians to fight for the island, discussed above in 2.1.

¹²⁸Not an epitaph but 'ein Trinkspruch zum Gedächtnis des Kameraden', writes Wilamowitz (*Sappho und Simonides*, p. 106), followed by Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 269-70) and Campbell (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 329).

Bakchylides 5.154 says that he died (in battle, but not slain by the enemy, of course) ἀγλαὸν ἦβαν προλείπων.¹²⁹ This *topos* also appears in some ‘Simonidean’ epitaphs,¹³⁰ and in a few fifth-century Attic verse epitaphs (where ἦβη is sometimes qualified by the adjective νεαρός or ἀγλαός): *CEG* 4 (Athens, 458 or 457), 6 (Attica, 447 (?)) and 82 (Attica, *ca* 450-425?). It is noteworthy that the expression ‘lost (the flower of) his ἦβη’, when it is used of men in these epitaphs,¹³¹ is always used of men who died fighting. The poet of Theognidea 1069-70 complains that ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι καὶ νήπιοι, οἳ τε θανόντας | κλαίουσ’, οὐδ’ ἦβης ἄνθος ἀπολλύμενον, suggesting (with a neat play on phrases such as ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαὸν ἥβην in *CEG* 6 or ἐρατὴν ... ἀπωλέσαμεν νεότητα in ‘Simonides’ *FGE* II) that the metaphorical ‘death’ of one’s youth is as lamentable as the literal death of a person, but given the fact that in the literary verse the ‘flower of youth’ conceit tends to be used of people who are still alive (see above),¹³² perhaps the tendency to reserve it for fallen soldiers in the verse

¹²⁹Maehler notes *ad loc.* (*Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 115-16) that the phrase is reminiscent of the death of Hektor at *Iliad* 22.362-63, where the hero’s ψυχή goes down to Hades, λιποῦσ’ ἀνδρότητα καὶ ἦβην.

¹³⁰See Page, *FGE*, lines 690, 878, and 890 (*CEG* 4.3).

¹³¹It occurs in two epitaphs for young women: *CEG* 174 (Sinope, *ca* 475-450, in the expression προλιπὼσ’ ἦβης ἄνθος) and 119 (Thessaly, *ca* 450?, here in a lament put in the mouth of the dead girl, who says: νέπια ἐδὼσ’ ἔθανον καὶ οὐ λάβον ἄνθος ἔτ’ ἔβας).

¹³²If D. Yatromanolakis’ recent interpretation of Simonides fr. 22 is correct (‘Simonides fr. eleg. 22 W²: To Sing or To Mourn?’), a similar expression may be used there in vv. 11-12 of a dead young man pictured as living in some kind of afterlife. Perhaps he retains this ‘flower’ there and drips it from his skin, but if the variant λείπει in 12 is the true reading, he may be imagined to have left it behind (*cf.* *CEG* 174.4 and 8 προλιπὼσ’ ἦβης ἄνθος; for the reverse relation, see Theognidea 1131 where one’s ἐρατὴ ἦβη is said to ‘leave’ (ἐπιλείπει) as old age comes on). There can be no certainty here: Yatromanolakis notes (p. 7) that the ‘decipherment of the beginning of l. 11 is uncertain’ and that the ‘construction and the general meaning of ll. 11-12 are also vague’. In any case, the person may not be dead at all; Yatromanolakis is the first to consider in detail this possibility, though it was raised by Parsons in his *editio princeps*: ‘I should guess that this is a

epitaphs is one way in which the grief felt at the loss of their young lives could be made particularly vivid.¹³³

Summary

The problem of judging virtue, both on the battlefield and off, on the basis of physical appearance is articulated in Homer and continues to be observed in later lyric and elegiac poetry. The proposed solutions to the problem range from the prominence given by Pindar to the latter as a visible marker of the former to Archilochos' clear refusal to admit any relationship between the two qualities in his outright denunciation of the good-looking general and preference for the knock-kneed but courageous fighter; in recalling both the unsympathetic figure of Thersites in the *Iliad* and Hektor's criticism of his brother Paris in the same poem, Archilochos, though perhaps 'anti-aristocratic', is not entirely 'anti-heroic' or untraditional. The lack of emphasis on physical beauty in the epinician poetry of Bakchylides (as compared with that of Pindar) represents a middle ground where the connection between appearance and

fantasy, whether for this life or the next' (P.Oxy. 3965, vol. 59, p. 46).

¹³³If a person died young but not in battle, there were other ways to express this; forms of the word ἄ(ν)ωρος, for example, occur in *CEG* 43 (Athens, ca 525?), 45 (Athens, ca 525-500?), 117 (Thessaly, ca 475-450?), 154 (Amorgos, ca 450-425?), 163 (Thera, ca 500?), and 171 (Egypt, ca 475-400?). Some of these, of course, are too badly damaged to give any indication of the manner of death, and even the less damaged epitaphs do not always specify this. *CEG* 171, for example, may be the epitaph of a mercenary, as suggested by G. Wagner, 'Stèle funéraire de Kobôn', p. 174. But it remains true that the 'flower of ἥβη' motif, when used of men, is always used of fallen soldiers.

excellence is neither affirmed nor denied. In a less explicit way than in Pindar, connections between beauty and bravery are drawn in the 'Polykrates Ode' of Ibykos and between appearance and aristocratic ἀρετή in the Theognidea. The verse inscriptions tend to avoid both direct praise of the beauty of the dead and any suggestion that this quality may be a marker of virtue. On the other hand, the oblique references to physical beauty in the 'flower of youth' motif (used exclusively of fallen soldiers) may be taken to present indirectly a combination of κάλλος and ἀρετή: the context of the epitaph testifies to the latter and the content to the former. The connection is implied, as in Ibykos, rather than stated openly as in Tyrtaios.

4. Political Values

4.1 Civic *Ἀρετή*

Disturbances in the *poleis* in which poets lived prompted some of them to compose poetry about the changes which were taking place in the structures of their cities, and to reflect on how their fellow citizens should conduct themselves within their communities. Solon fr. 15 reflects such a disturbance, saying that wealth is to be found in the wrong hands:

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται·
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τούτοις οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεὶ,
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Here the poet does not say what, in his opinion, makes a citizen ἀγαθός or κακός, although he does make it clear that wealth is not a factor; some other poetry of the archaic period, however, takes a different stance and defines the ἀγαθός more specifically.

In some cases, terms like ἀγαθός and κακός appear to be used by the aristocrats in a social or political sense to refer to the upper and lower classes; the moral meanings of these words can be employed to assert the supremacy of the aristocracy. Donlan writes that

the usage of *agathos-esthlos* and *kakos* in Theognis and Pindar reflects this attempt on the part of the 'nobles' to use the words as automatic class designations, even at the risk of doing violence to the more elemental notions of 'useful-beneficial' and 'useless-harmful'.¹

¹Walter Donlan, 'Simonides, fr. 4D and P. Oxy. 2432', p. 73.

But when such evaluative terms are used in the poetry of this period, it is not always clear how much of their force derives from the ‘moral’ sense of the words, and how much from the ‘social’ sense. In Solon’s case, for example, although words like ἀγαθός and κακός appear frequently in the surviving poetry, the criteria being used to distinguish the ‘good’ citizens and the ‘bad’ ones are not always immediately apparent; as Adkins points out, ‘Solon seems little concerned with the problems of defining *arete* and the *agathos*’.²

The word ἀρετή behaves rather inconsistently in the poetry of both Solon and the Theognidea. Its original meaning of excellence in a specific field can be found in some places, but it also begins to carry a more general sense of overall excellence: ‘un ensemble complet de qualités diverses’.³ This general excellence can sometimes, but not always, be seen to shade into a moral meaning of ‘virtue’. There are thus two broad distinctions to be drawn between uses of ἀρετή: that between a specific and a general sense, and that between a moral and a non-moral sense.

At Solon 27.7-8, ἀρετή requires an interpretation such as ‘achievement’, referring to the strength (ἰσχύν) of young men to win acclaim:

τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ’ ἄριστος
ἰσχύν, ἢ τ’ ἄνδρες πείρατ’ ἔχουσ’ ἀρετῆς.

And since old men can presumably be as morally virtuous as younger men, ἀρετή in lines 15-16 (μαλακώτερα δ’ αὐτοῦ | πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη) must have the same meaning. No specific field of ἀρετή is indicated, and so this may be a use of ἀρετή in a general but not a moral sense. But it is significant that Solon refers to the physical strength of the young men in line 8 while in line 16 says that it is

²A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece*, p. 50.

³J. Carrière, *Théognis de Mégare*, p. 221.

the γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη of the old man which are μαλακώτερα ... πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετήν; for Solon here ἀγαθός seems to mean ‘good *at*’ rather than simply ‘good’.

In Theognis, too, there are several instances of the word with the meaning of excellence in a particular field: lines 30 (the plural ἀρετάς implies different types of excellence or achievement), 624 (παντοῖαι δ’ ἀρεταί),⁴ and 654 (where the expression ἀρετῆς δ’ ἄλλης οὐδεμιῆς again implies the existence of several types of ἀρετή). The qualifying μία in 699 and the superlative adjective κυδίστην in 904 also point to a variety of different ἀρεταί.

In Theognidea 129-30, ἀρετή is mentioned along with ἄφενος:⁵

μήτ’ ἀρετὴν εὖχου, Πολυπαῖδη, ἔξοχος εἶναι
μήτ’ ἄφενος· μοῦνον δ’ ἀνδρὶ γένοιτο τύχη.

Van Groningen rejects Verdenius’ translation of ἀρετή in 129 as ‘succès’,⁶ but the word ἔξοχος does imply some sort of competitive success; in Homer it is used to describe a man who is distinguished above his peers, sometimes on its own (as in *Iliad* 2.188 ἔξοχον ἄνδρα), and sometimes with a word expressing the respect in which the hero surpasses the others (as in *Iliad* 3.227 ἔξοχος Ἀργείων κεφαλῇν). The use of ἀρετή here falls into the ‘general’ category, but there is nothing to indicate that it is to be thought of as carrying any moral weight.

Particularly in the Theognidea, this general type of ἀρετή can be seen to take on moral significance: at line 147 πᾶς ἀρετή is equated with δικαιοσύνη,⁷ and in

⁴B.A. van Groningen (*Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 248) says that this is the only occurrence of ἀρετή in the plural in the Theognidea, but he in fact refers to line 30 in his commentary to 623-24.

⁵The two are also mentioned together at line 30.

⁶Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 53.

⁷The moral sense of ἀρετή here does not depend on whether πᾶς ἀρετή is translated ‘the whole of ἀρετή’ or ‘every ἀρετή’. The use of πᾶς in the following line (πᾶς δέ τ’ ἀνὴρ ...) suggests that πᾶς ἀρετή means ‘every ἀρετή’; this line would then be taking the specific types of ἀρετή and

1177-78 the poet says that a man who does not involve himself with ἔργα αἰσχρά will attain ἀρετή; both of these are clearly moral uses. A use of ἀρετή that is both general and moral, and combines δίκη and αἰσχύς from these two passages, can be found in the anonymous couplet 465-66:

ἀμφ' ἀρετῇ τρίβου, καὶ τοι τὰ δίκαια φίλ' ἔστω,
μηδέ σε νικάτω κέρδος ὃ τ' αἰσχροὺς ἔη.

Again, the ethical side of ἀρετή is emphasised in 149-50, where it is contrasted with wealth (compare κέρδος in 466 above):

χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν,
Κύρν'· ἀρετῆς δ' ὀλίγοις ἀνδράσι μοῖρ' ἔπεται.

'Success' is not the issue here; the point is that one can possess ἀρετή independently of χρήματα, material wealth, and, significantly, that this kind of ἀρετή is restricted to ὀλίγοι, 'a few'.

The difference in outlook between Solon and the aristocratic composers of the poetry in the Theognidea is reflected in the fact that ἀρετή is used far more often in the Theognidea with a general meaning, and the moral connotations become explicit; the word is beginning to be adopted by the nobility to assert their superiority. From its original meaning of 'excellence' in a given area, ἀρετή takes on a significance of general excellence, which is equated with general virtue and claimed by the old aristocracy as their own. Wilamowitz claims that 'Die moralische bedeutung der begriffe ἀγαθός und κακός gilt bereits für Solon'.⁸ This can be seen, for example, in Solon fr. 15:

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται·
ἄλλ' ἡμεῖς τούτοις οὐ διαμείσομεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεὶ
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

subordinating them to δικαιοσύνη. But the general sense of ἀρετή is not impossible here.

⁸U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii, p. 305.

Here, as in Theognis 149-150 cited above, the opposition between material success and ἀρετή implies an ethical dimension of ἀρετή, but Solon does not extend this morality into the social or political sphere to the degrees that the Theognidean poets do. But, as Linforth points out, ‘it is unnecessary to insist that ἀρετή and ἀγαθός must refer to *either* birth *or* morality’;⁹ the social and moral senses of the words become combined, and the terms would have been of little value to the nobility as quasi-technical ‘class’ terms if they lost their moral significance altogether.

In the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides, ἀρετή is often (and not surprisingly) used of the athletic prowess of the person being celebrated; ‘success’ is therefore a natural connotation in these cases. Indeed, Bakchylides’ epinician odes employ ἀρετή almost exclusively in this sense; one exception is 14.8-11, where the noun seems to refer to a moral virtue:

μυρίαι δ’ ἀνδρῶν ἀρε[ταί,] μία δ’ ἐ[κ
 πασᾶ]ν πρόκειται,
 ὃς τὰ] πᾶρ χειρὸς κυβέρνα-
 σεν δι]καίαισι φρένεσσιν.

Of this ode almost nothing but the *prooimion* is preserved; this occupies the first eighteen verses of the fragment, down to the half-way point of the first epode, and the victor Kleoptolemos is introduced in the last five surviving lines. This *prooimion* is a strongly moralising passage, and the implication is that the victor himself is an example of one [ὃς τὰ] πᾶρ χειρὸς κυβέρνα|[σεν δι]καίαισι φρένεσσιν; the metaphor in κυβέρνα|[σεν] is appropriate for a horseman (compare e.g. 5.47-9, where the horse Pherenikos ὃν κυβερνήταν φυλάσσων | ἵεται νεόκροτον | νίκαν Ἰέρωνι φιλοξείνῳ τιτύσκων).

This passage from Bakchylides 14 is illustrative of the epinician technique of presenting an athletic victor as a model not only of physical strength and skill, but also

⁹I. M. Linforth, *Solon the Athenian*, p. 213.

of moral excellence and social worth. Again, Bakchylides provides an example of this transfer of meaning, at 13.175-85:

οὐ γὰρ ἀλαμπέϊ νυκ[τός
 πασιφανῆς Ἄρετ[ὰ
 κρυφθεῖς ἄμαυρο[ῦται ~ ~ ~
 ἀλλ' ἔμπεδον ἀκ[αμάτα
 βρύουσα δόξα
 στρωφᾶται κατὰ γὰν [τε
 καὶ πολὺπλαγκτον θ[άλασσαν.
 καὶ μὰν φερεκυδέα ν[ᾶσον
 Αἰακοῦ τιμᾶ, σὺν Εὐ-
 κλείᾳ δὲ φίλοστεφ[άνω
 πόλιν κυβερνᾷ

These verses follow a passage about the sacking of Troy; the ἀρετή of the Aiakid heroes lives on, 'not hidden in the dark night', parallel to the ἀρετή of the athletic victor preserved in Bakchylides' song – note 178-79 ἀκ[αμάτα]| βρύουσα δόξα, and compare 58-63, which refer to athletic victory:

ἐκ τοῦ παρ]ὰ βωμὸν ἀριστάρχου Διός
 Νίκας] φ[ε]ρ[ε]κυδέος ἀν-
 στεφθε]ῖσιν ἄ[ν]θεα
 χρυσέ]αν δόξαν πολὺφαντον ἐν αἰ-
 ῶνι] τρέφει παύροις βροτῶν
 α]ῖεί

In 175-85, this ἀρετή is given a political function: along with Εὐκλεία (and, in 186 ff., Εὐνομία ... σαόφρων, which will be discussed later under 4.5 *Σωφροσύνη*), she guides the city, πόλιν κυβερνᾷ (185).

But for the most part, this tendency to define ἀρετή as general moral and social worth is less marked in Bakchylides than has been observed, for example, in the poetry of the Theognidea. Bakchylides, for example, never uses ἀγαθός in his epinician poetry, not even to indicate that someone is 'good at' an athletic event. The word only occurs in Bakchylides in fragment 14, where there the wider context has been lost. Ἑσθλός occurs in Bakchylides only in the neuter except for two passages: at 5.127-29, Meleager claims that “ἐγὼ πολλοῖς σὺν ἄλλοις | Ἴφικλον κατέκτανον |

ἔσθλόν τ' Ἀφάρητα, θοοὺς μάτρωας", where the context refers the adjective to prowess in battle; and at 10.47-48 τὸ μὲν κάλλιστον, ἔσθλόν | ἄνδρα πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων πολυζήλωτον εἶμεν, the preceding enumeration of skills makes it clear that, as Maehler points out, 'der Sinn kann nur sein "das Schönste ist, daß ein guter Mann, gleich welches seine ἐπιστήμη ist und worauf sich sein Ehrgeiz richtet, Erfolg hat und deshalb von Vielen beneidet wird"'.¹⁰ The adjective is not used of general moral 'goodness'.

Pindar commonly uses ἀρετή of physical prowess, again appropriately for athletic victors. In a broader sense, he employs the word to denote, as Slater points out, 'distinction, talent, excellence, rarely ... purely moral qualities'¹¹ More significant here is the fact that it never refers to a single, general type of moral excellence; simply to say that someone has ἀρετή in Pindar's vocabulary does not carry the same ethical and social weight that is evident in, for example, the Theognidea.

There is, however, an asymmetry in Pindar's use of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός: while the former, as noted above, is not used alone to signify a complex of moral and social qualities, this is not the case with the latter. Although Pindar uses phrases such as ἀεθληταὶ ἀγαθοί at *Nemean* 10.51 and ἀγαθοὶ πολεμισταί at *Isthmian* 5.26, Pindar's ἀγαθοί are not always simply those who possess ἀρετή as Pindar usually means it. It is, for example, from ἀγαθοὶ πατέρες that the Rhodian Diagoras inherits the ὀρθαὶ

¹⁰H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 192. Maehler convincingly defends Wilamowitz's ἔσθλόν against Kenyon's ἔσθλῶν (for ΕΞΕΛΩΝ in the papyrus).

¹¹W.J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar*, p. 68. D.E. Gerber (*Pindar's Olympian One: A Commentary*, pp. 5-6) comments on ἀρεταῖσιν in *Olympian* 3.43: 'Krischer sees in κτεάνων and ἀρεταῖσιν a contrast between material and ethical values, but ἀρεταῖσιν is only partially ethical. To the Greeks there was an ethical element present in the excellence or prowess displayed in athletic achievement, but this scarcely justifies our treating ἀρεταῖσιν as a purely non-material contrast with gold'. W.J. Verdenius (*Commentaries on Pindar*, vol. 1, p. 37) rightly notes that in the same passage 'The use of νῦν implies that ἀρεταῖσιν refers to his sporting qualities and success'.

φρένες with the help of which he ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδὸν | εὐθυπορεῖ (*Olympian* 7.90-92). This is clearly a statement of general moral worth, and the significance of the adjective ἀγαθός in the social or political sphere is perhaps made most clearly in Pindar at *Pythian* 3.70-71, where the poet sings of Hieron,

ὃς Συρακόσσαισι νέμει βασιλεύς,
πραῦς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξεί-
νοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ.

The Syracusan tyrant, whose victory is here being celebrated, rules benevolently, and does not need to envy the ἀγαθοί, those whose social position might otherwise present a challenge to his leadership. On the other social side of these ἀγαθοί is Damophilos in the fourth *Pythian* ode; he is described as οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (*Pythian* 4.285).

A similar asymmetry in the use of these terms appears to exist in the verse inscriptions of the period. When ἀρετή appears on its own as a virtue, it refers most often to military valour: *CEG* 2 (Athens, after the Persian Wars), 6 (Attica, 447(?)), 8 (Attica, after 500?), 10 (Attica, 432), 83 (Athens, 446-*ca* 425?), 99 (Attica, *ca* 400), 155 (Paros, 476-75), 431 (Athens, 403-2).¹² The exact significance of ἀρετή becomes more difficult to determine when it is found in conjunction with other virtues such as σωφροσύνη¹³ (*CEG* 41 (Athens, *ca* 530-20?), 58 (Athens, *ca* 510-500?), 69 (Athens, *ca* 500?), 96 (Athens, late fifth century), and probably 81 (Attica, *ca* 450-25?)). The adjectives ἀγαθός and ἐσθλός in the verse inscriptions, however, appear to behave rather differently. These words, unlike the noun ἀρετή, do appear without

¹²In *CEG* 272 (Athens, *ca* 470-60?), ἀρετή appears not on its own but paired with φιλοξενία. The phrase μνῆμα πόνον ἄρεος in the preceding verse perhaps suggests a military connotation for ἀρετή here too, but on the other hand the πάσας qualifying ἀρετῆς seems to run counter to this interpretation; compare *CEG* 69 (Athens, *ca* 500?):

[Ἄλκιμαχ', εὐδοχσόν σε χ[υτὲ κ]ατὰ γαῖ' ἐκάλυψεν,
σόφρο[να κ]αὶ πινυτόν, πᾶσαν ἔχοντ' ἀρετέν.

¹³The civic significance of σωφροσύνη will be discussed in detail below, section 4.7.

other qualifiers in the inscriptions to denote a more general type of virtue: this is true of *CEG* 14 (Attica, *ca* 560-50?), 42 (Athens, *ca* 525?), 117 (Thessaly, *ca* 480-50?), 149 (Motya, *ca* 475-50?), 154 (Amorgos, *ca* 450-25?), and 195 (Athens, *ca* 525-500?).

There are two exceptions to this asymmetry, both concerning the use of the noun ἀρετή. These are *CEG* 380 (Olympia, a few years before 484), part (i):

Πραξιτέλες ἀνέθεκε Συρακόσιος τόδ' ἄγαλμα
καὶ Καμαριναῖος· πρόσθα <δ> Μαντινέαι
Κρίνιος υἱὸς ἔναιεν ἐν Ἀρκαδίαι πολυμέλο
ἑσλὸς ἐὼν καὶ Φοι μνᾶμα τόδ' ἔστ' ἀρετᾶς.

and *CEG* 416 (Thasos, *ca* 525-500(?))

Ἡρακλεῖ μ' ἀνέθεκεν Ἀκήρατος, ὃς Θασίοισιν
καὶ Π[αρίοι]ς ἦρχσεν μόνος ἐν ἀνφοτέροις,
πολλὰς δ' ἀγγελίας πρὸ πόλεως κατὰ φύλα διήλθεν
ἀν[θρώπων], ἀρετῆς ἔνεκεν αἰδίης.

In both cases ἀρετή occurs alone, appearing to designate some sort of general virtue, as opposed to the more usual uses of ἀρετή noted above, and in both cases there may be not only a general but also a social implication in ἀρετή. *CEG* 416 is the dedication of a man who ἦρχσεν in both Thasos and Paros. *CEG* 380 (i), apart from being the remains of a five-block marble base for a large votive group, contains the conjunction of ἐσθλός and ἀρετή in its final verse; and ἐσθλός in the verse inscriptions of this period is not only always used in a general sense, but also is linked with family concerns – in *CEG* 380 (i) above and in its two other applications to men in the inscribed epigrams (*CEG* 154 (Amorgos, *ca* 450-25?) and 195 (Athens, *ca* 525-500?)), parentage is prominent. *CEG* 195 reads as follows:

Ἀλκίμαχος μ' ἀνέ{σ}θεκε Διδὸς κόρει τόδ' ἄγαλμα
εὐχολὲν ἐσθλῷ δὲ πατρὸς ἡὺς Χαιρίονος ἐπεύχεται <ἐ>να[ι].

In their commentary on this inscription, Friedländer and Hoffleit observe that

the words ἐσθλοῦ δὲ πατρὸς ὕς heavily overload the hexameter, containing as they do the excessive pretension of an Athenian aristocrat shortly before

the establishment of democracy. The parallel in Sophocles *Phil.* 96 ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς παῖ may show that this formula was almost an aristocratic catchword in Athens.¹⁴

4.2 City and Family

The relevance of one's birth and parentage to one's position in society is not mentioned explicitly in a moral context in Solon's poetry; he is concerned with the orderly running of the state and, from his point of view, the way in which the δῆμος is governed by the ἡγεμόνες is more important than any distinction between those of noble birth and those of humble origins. For Alkaios, on the other hand, lineage is of prime importance; when he exhorts his fellow aristocrats to take action in fr. 6, he refers to their ἔσλοι τοκῆες (line 14), and his criticism of Pittakos in fr. 72 contains the following stanza (line 11-13):

σὺ δὲ τεαύτας ἐκγεγόνων ἔχης
τὰν δόξαν οἷαν ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι
ἔσλων ἔοντες ἐκ τοκῆων ...;

Pittakos is referred to as κακοπατρίδας in 348 (the epithet's appearance in 75 suggests Pittakos again, perhaps also in 67); it is unlikely that Pittakos' origins were in a low class of society, and the reason for Alkaios' use of the epithet κακοπατρίδας seems to be that Pittakos' lineage was not purely Lesbian.¹⁵ The word κακοπατρίδας, though, would imply not just foreign but also humble origins, and this connotation is reinforced by Alkaios' contrast of Pittakos against ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι, above; although

¹⁴Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, pp. 50-51.

¹⁵The various evidence and hypotheses about Pittakos' parentage are summarized by Burnett (*Three Archaic Poets*, p. 112, n. 18).

Pittakos was not technically of low birth (as Burnett notes, such an hypothesis ‘makes the tyrant’s early association with Alcaeus’ brothers hard to understand’¹⁶) but Alkaïos’ use of the epithet in fr. 72 carries such associations and therefore makes the insult more effective.

The issue of parentage is somewhat more problematic in the Theognidea; commenting on lines 31 ff., Carrière writes that

sans doute voulait-il dire ... que l’aristocratie régnante est la vraie et la seule dépositaire des principes de la saine morale, pour la raison qu’un Grec, de haute naissance surtout, sépare difficilement l’idée de noblesse de celle de vertu,¹⁷

but Cobb-Stevens’ formulation is more accurate:

Birth, which might be thought a priori to constitute the essence of an aristocratic value system, is certainly important in the Theognidea, as the poet’s laments about the dire consequences of intermarriage testify. But it is far from sufficient by itself to make a man an **agathos**. It is much easier to beget a man, we are told, than to give him **phrenes esthlai** ‘a noble mind’ (vv. 429-430).¹⁸

Cobb-Stevens’ statement about the attitudes towards noble birth expressed in the Theognidea is more precise than, and to be preferred over, Carrière’s ‘il est arrivé que l’idée de valeur morale, *qui n’en est jamais absente*, ait pu s’associer à celle de noblesse’ (Carrière’s italics);¹⁹ Theognis can in fact condemn the nobles for being *κακοί*.

Cobb-Stevens, citing 131-32 (οὐδὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἄμεινον | ἔπλεθ’, ὅσοις ὀσίη, Κύρνε, μέμηλε δίκη), comments: ‘The importance of a noble **genos** derives not so much from birth itself as from the **genos** as the repository

¹⁶Burnett, *ibid.*

¹⁷Carrière, *Théognis de Mégare*, p. 220.

¹⁸V. Cobb-Stevens, ‘Opposites, Reversals, and Ambiguities’, p. 160.

¹⁹Carrière, *Théognis de Mégare*, p. 221.

of instruction in **dikē**.²⁰ In this context one might perhaps cite the two-line verse epitaph *CEG* 78 (Attica, *ca* 480?), the pentameter of which ends:]ες ἥνεκα καὶ γενεᾶς. The incomplete word may be, for example, δικαιοσύν]ες or σωφροσύν]ες,²¹ and the coupling of a virtue like δικαιοσύνη or σωφροσύνη with family nobility might almost be an answer to Phokylides 3D

... τί πλέον, γένος εὐγενὲς εἶναι,
οἷς οὔτ' ἐν μύθοις ἔπεται χάρις οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ;²²

Theognis is concerned about the mingling of blood-lines and the confusion this creates when classifying people as ἀγαθοί or κακοί (191-92):

οὔτω μὴ θαύμαζε γένος, Πολυπαῖδη, ἀστῶν
μαυροῦσθαι· σὺν γὰρ μίσγεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖς,

and a similar concern is voiced at 1112 μνηστεύει δ' ἐκ κακοῦ ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ. This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that one cannot teach a κακός to be ἀγαθός, as is stated in lines 429-38; here Theognis complains that parents who are ἀγαθοί do sometimes produce children who turn out to be κακοί, because virtue apparently cannot be taught. This idea contradicts the implication of lines 131-32 that one can learn δίκη from one's parents;²³ Cobb-Stevens 'genos as the repository of instruction in **dikē**' is of little use if virtues like δικαιοσύνη cannot be taught.

²⁰Cobb-Stevens, 'Opposites, Reversals, and Ambiguities', p. 161. But see below for considerations of how virtues can or cannot be passed from one generation to another.

²¹Friedländer and Hoffleit (*Epigrammata*, p. 80) propose, in addition to the above possibilities, φιλοφροσύν]ες or φιλημοσύν]ες.

²²This line-ending occurs three times in Homer (*Iliad* 2.202 and 12.213; *Odyssey* 3.127), of which Odysseus' criticism of Agamemnon at 2.201-202 σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἀναλκις, | οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ is the closest in sense to the use of the phrase in Phokylides 3D. For the importance of excellence in βουλή in the *Iliad*, see M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*'.

²³Also contradicted is line 35 ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται, unless it is allowed that learning ἐσθλά is not a sufficient condition to make a man ἐσθλός himself.

On the other hand, it is maintained at 305-308 that not all κακοί are κακοί from birth, but become so through their association with κακοί:

οἱ κακοὶ οὐ πάντως κακοὶ ἐκ γαστρὸς γεγόνασιν,
ἀλλ' ἄνδρεςσι κακοῖς συνθέμενοι φιλήν
ἔργα τε δεῖλ' ἔμαθον καὶ ἔπη δύσφημα καὶ ὕβριν,
ἐλπόμενοι κείνους πάντα λέγειν ἔτυμα.

If virtue cannot be taught, it seems that κακότης can. But lines 731-52 acknowledge the fact that δίκαιοι children can be born of ἄδικοι parents, and here the poet prays (737-38) that these children ought not to suffer for the wrongs of their forebears; whether the children were taught δικαιοσύνη or somehow possessed it by nature is not specified. Here there is no reference to the terms ἀγαθός or κακός; the only quality that interests this poet is δικαιοσύνη, which is less easily corrupted into a quasi-technical class term (than is ἀρετή, for example). This emphasis agrees with the fact that Theognis can criticize the nobility as well as the lower classes (*cf.* section 4.3, below).

A scholiast on the phrase ἀστῶν γενεᾷ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων at Pindar's *Isthmian* 7.29 comments: ἴστω ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγιστον παρὰ τῶν ἀστῶν κλέος αὔξων τῷ ἑαυτοῦ γένει; this interpretation supposes a pregnant use of the genitive ἀστῶν, which is more naturally taken with γενεᾷ.²⁴ It may even be possible to construe ἀστῶν with κλέος, and treat γενεᾷ as instrumental and more or less equivalent to φυᾷ, so that the elder Strepsiadas would be said to increase the glory of his city by means of his innate virtues (which have, says the poet, been inherited by his nephew). But there are Pindaric parallels for γενεά used of a city. *Olympian* 11.15 Ζεφυρίων Λοκρῶν γενεὰν ἀλέγων and *Isthmian* 7.29 (according to Slater *s.v.*) are the only two

²⁴Thus, for example, Privitera *ad loc.*, and recently W.H. Race, *Pindar*, vol. 2, p. 199: 'his townsmen's race'.

places in Pindar where *γενεά* means ‘community’ rather than ‘family’, but perhaps Slater, like the scholiast, does not recognize that in Pindaric rhetoric the city can be almost equated with the family. In the case of *Olympian* 11, there may be some significance in the fact that the victor’s city, Lokroi Epizephyrioi, was fiercely aristocratic and family-oriented like Thebes, home of Strepsiadas and Pindar, of which we find the phrase *λαῶν γενεάν* used at fr. 52a9 (compare *Isthmian* 1.30 *Σπαρτῶν γένει* and fr. 29.2 *Σπαρτῶν ἱερὸν γένος*, referring specifically to the mythical origins of the Theban nobility). Membership of the Lokrian nobility was apparently restricted to those who could trace their descent through the female line back to one of τὰς ἑκατὸν οἰκίας τὰς προκριθείσας ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐξελθεῖν.²⁵ Even if Pindar does not intend to refer in this case to the city’s peculiar traditions,²⁶ both here and in *Isthmian* 7 (however the words *ἄστῶν γενεᾶ* in verse 27 are construed²⁷) he seems to be almost replacing the city with the family, just as contemporary Athenian public epitaphs are replacing the family with the city.

Given the epinician poet’s concern with the athletic victor’s origins, the line between ‘praise of the family’ and ‘praise of the city’ is easily blurred. The city itself can in fact become a parent, as in *Olympian* 2.92-95, where Pindar claims that the city has given birth to (93 *τεκεῖν*) no more generous man than Theron. This metaphor can be used by Pindar both of athletes and of warriors; *Pythian* 8.25-27 says of Aigina:

²⁵Polybios 12.5.6-7. F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybios*, vol. 2, pp. 333-6, discusses matrilineal descent, the Hundred Families, and their relationship with the Lokrian custom of sending maidens to Troy in recompense for the rape of Kassandra by Aias.

²⁶As perhaps he does when he mentions the Ζεφυρία ... Λοκρὶς παρθένος at *Pythian* 2.18-19 (Walbank, p. 333).

²⁷Bruno Currie suggests that *γενεᾶ* might be taken as a locative: ‘increases his repute among the *γενεά* of citizens’ (Oxford D.Phil. dissertation on Pindar and hero-cult in progress).

... πολλοῖσι μὲν γὰρ αἰδεῖται
νικαφόροις ἐν ἀέθλοις θρέψαισα καὶ θοαῖς
ὑπερτάτους ἥρωας ἐν μάχαις.

Here the heroes in question, the Aiakidai, are particularly appropriate examples of both types of prowess.²⁸ Aias, one of these Aiakidai, is said to have been ‘raised’ by Salamis at *Nemean* 2.13-14: καὶ μὰν ἃ Σαλαμὶς γε θρέψαι φῶτα μαχατάν | δυνατός, and it is the Aiakidai whom the athlete Pytheas ἐγέραιρεν along with Aigina, his ματρόπολις (*Nemean* 5.8).

Another technique that the epinician poet can use to place the victor’s city in the context of his family is to mention the relationship between the city’s legendary heroes and the victor himself. This can be done explicitly, as in *Pythian* 5.103, where Arkesilas is called the ‘son’ of the city’s founding fathers; or implicitly, as in *Nemean* 6 where, after saying that the Aiginetan victor Alkimidas is following ἔχνεσιν ἐν Πραξιδάμαντος ... πατροπάτορος ὁμαιμίους (15-16), Pindar goes on to praise Praxidamas himself (17-22):

κεῖνος γὰρ Ὀλυμπιόνικος ἐὼν Αἰακίδαις
ἔρνεα πρῶτος ἔννεικεν ἅπ’ Ἀλφειοῦ,
καὶ πεντάκις Ἰσθμοῖ στεφανωσάμενος,
Νεμέα δὲ τρεῖς, ἔπαυσε λάθαν
Σαοκλείδα, ὃς ὑπέρτατος
Ἀγησιμάχοι ὑέων γένετο.

Praxidamas, then, brought athletic prizes home to Aigina ‘for the Aiakidai’ and in so doing honoured his own father; a close connection, if not an identification, is made between the victor’s family and the city’s most famous heroes,²⁹ the Bassidai have

²⁸Their martial and athletic exploits are listed in Giannini’s commentary *ad loc.* (B. Gentili et al., *Pindaro: le Pitiche*, pp. 569-70).

²⁹This is perhaps continued into lines 25-26 where Pindar, still talking about Alkimidas’ ancestors, claims that ἕτερον οὐ τινα οἶκον ἀπεφάνετο πυγμαχία (πλεόνων) | ταμίαν στεφάνων μυχῶ Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσας, possibly thereby hinting at Peleus’ boxing victory at the games in memory of Pelias (Hyg. *Fab.* 273). Compare the prominence of Peleus in *Nemean* 5, another ode for a victor from Aigina, and the emphasis in that poem on πότμος ... συγγενής (40) and the glorification of Peleus’ ὁμόσπορον ἔθνος (43).

benefited directly from the ἔξοχον αἶσαν that the Aiakidai provided for the Aiginetans. The catalogue of the exploits of the Bassidai, indeed, almost takes the place of a myth in this poem,³⁰ occupying a complete antistrophe and epode (30-44) in contrast to the single strophe devoted to the Aiakidai (45-53); and the tautometrical verses introducing each section with their common themes of song and fame (30, 45) reinforce the parallel. Bakchylides makes a similar implicit connection at the end of his epinician Ode 11: mention of the founding of the victor's home city, Metapontion, by the Achaians leads to the assertion that (123-6)

δικαίας
ὅστις ἔχει φρένας, εὐ-
ρήσει σὺν ᾧ παντὶ χρόνῳ
μυρίας ἀλκὰς Ἀχαιῶν.

As Maehler notes on this passage, '[a]uch der Sieg ist ja eine ἀλκά, er ist gleichsam ein Beweis dafür, daß die Metapontiner ... legitime Nachfahren der Griechenhelden Homers sind'.³¹

The epinician poet, then, can emphasize that the city as a whole is co-extensive with the victor's family, as is implied in the phrase ἀστῶν γενεᾷ at *Isthmian* 7.29. Another way of highlighting the distinction of the family in question is to imply that they, out of all the descendants of the legendary heroes, are pre-eminent in games or war, or both; the poet places the *genos* in context by narrowing the audience's field of perception, as it were. In *Olympian* 13, the poet declares that (49-52)

ἐγὼ δὲ ἴδιος ἐν κοινῷ σταλαίς
μῆτιν τε γάρυων παλαιγόνων
πόλεμόν τ' ἐν ἡρώϊαις ἀρεταῖσιν
οὐ ψεύσομ' ἀμφὶ Κορίνθῳ

³⁰Compare the prominence in *Isthmian* 7 of the description of the valorous conduct of the victor's uncle Strepsiades.

³¹H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 242. The point was, of course, already recognized by the scribe responsible for the intrusive gloss πρόγονοι at 119-20.

This is followed by a mention of the valour that heroes of Korinthian descent displayed at Troy (55-60), leading to the introduction of Glaukos (60) and thence to the exploits of his father Bellerophon, first the taming of Pegasos (63-86) and then the slaying of the Amazons, the Chimaira, and the Solymoi (87-90). Then, worried that his βέλεα may fly παρὰ σκοπόν (93-95), the poet turns to the particular praise of the Oligaiithidai and their athletic successes: Μοίσαις γὰρ ἀγλαοθρόνοις ἐκὼν | Ὀλιγαίθιδαισὶν τ' ἔβαν ἐπίκουρος (96-97), where the use of the word ἐπίκουρος, recalling as it does the status of Glaukos at Troy, places the athletic victories listed in 98 ff. on a par with the martial exploits of the family's legendary Korinthian forebears. *Nemean* 4, in honour of the Aiginetan Timasarchos, contains a long account of various deeds of the Aiakidai (25-72), which the poet breaks off by turning to the victor's family: Θεανδρίδαισι δ' ἀεξιγυίων ἀέθλων | κάρυξ ἐτοῖμος ἔβαν ... (73-4). In *Nemean* 2, Pindar is less effusive when it comes to the legendary history of the victor's homeland: he contents himself with the simple statement that Ἀχάρναι δὲ παλαίφατον | εὐάνορες (16-17; implying that it has as distinguished a past as the Salamis which bore Aias, mentioned in 13-14) before declaring that ὅσσα δ' ἄμφ' ἀέθλοις, | Τιμοδημίδαι ἐξοχώτατοι προλέγονται (17-18). In *Pythian* 7, the city itself serves only as a προοίμιον (albeit the κάλλιστον) to praise of the family of Megakles, which is introduced immediately (1-4):

Κάλλιστον αἱ μεγαλόπολις Ἀθᾶναι
προοίμιον Ἀλκμανιδᾶν εὐρυσθενεῖ
γενεᾷ κρηπὶδ' ἀοιδᾶν ἵπποισι βαλέσθαι.

After asking which πάτρα and which οἶκος he should praise (5-8), Pindar deals with Athenian claims to fame by briefly claiming that they are known to all, and turns to the victor's οἶκος (9-18):

πάσαισι γὰρ πολίεσι λόγος ὁμίλει
Ἐρεχθέος ἀστῶν, Ἀπολλόν, οἳ τεόν
δόμον Πυθῶνι διὰ θαητὸν ἔτευξαν.

ἄγοντι δέ με πέντε μὲν Ἴσθμοῖ νῖκαι, μία δ' ἐκπρεπής
Διὸς Ὀλυμπιάς,
δύο δ' ἀπὸ Κίρρας,
ὦ Μεγάκλεες,
ὑμαί τε καὶ προγόνων.

Whether the *genos* is identified with the city or seen as the most illustrious element within it, then, the aristocratic concern with the victor's lineage causes the family aspect to take precedence. This pervasive concern is of great importance to the epinician poet and to his audience, inside and outside the sphere of martial endeavour, and perhaps does not require the outline given here, but it tends to be somewhat obscured in Kurke's study of Pindar's relationship to the *polis*.³² The very circumstances of composition of an epinician poem (a commission from an aristocratic patron for a poem celebrating the achievements of members of his family) dictate the order of importance: the city needs to be praised because it is the home of the victor's *genos* and of its legendary ancestors rather than the other way around.³³ In her discussion of *Pythian* 7, for example, Kurke argues that the fact that Apollo's temple at Delphi, though built by the victor's family, the Alkmeonidai,³⁴ is referred to in *Pythian* 7 as the work of Ἐρεχθέος ἀστῶν (10) 'subtly encodes that model of reciprocal advantage between the *oikos* and the *polis* which is the ideal of

³²L. Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise*. In her article 'Fathers and Sons: A Note on Pindaric Ambiguity', on the other hand, Kurke studies passages where 'Pindar's syntax seems deliberately to blur father and son, or grandfather and grandson' (p. 288), notes that the results of studies of the importance of family to the ancient Greeks have 'rarely ... been applied to Pindar, where *laudator* and *laudandus* still confront each other in splendid isolation', and points out that the victors 'are completely enmeshed in a social system which defines them first as members of a household and a family, and then (often) as members of a *polis*' (p. 289).

³³J.F. McGlew makes a similar criticism: he notes that 'Kurke is sensitive to Pindar's interest in accommodating the political and social aspirations of his patrons', but that 'she does not ... pay enough attention to epinician's ability to justify and affirm those aspirations; little is made of epinician's power to reshape the relationship between the victor and his community to effect a real political difference: that, at the end of the successful ode, the victor and his victory are situated at the community's center' (McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture*, p. 37, n. 48).

³⁴Herodotos, 5.62.

megaloprepeia’,³⁵ but to describe an accomplishment of the Alkmaionidai in this way is surely parallel to what Pindar does in the opening lines of the poem: there, he moves swiftly from praise of Athens to praise of the Alkmaionidai, and lines 9-18, despite the mention of Ἐρεχθέος ἄστῶν (which in effect glorifies the ἄστοί by implying that they are part of the same illustrious *genos*), are dominated by the deeds of this family. The lines about the temple at Delphi represent, in fact, one of Pindar’s techniques for increasing the ‘symbolic capital’³⁶ of the Alkmaionidai; the reference elevates them to the status of the most important Athenians. Certainly it can be said that ‘the cities as well as the aristocracy found something in Pindar’s poems to support their ideology’,³⁷ but it should be clear from the discussion above that the two ideologies are not placed on the same level. The city’s importance to the poet and his patron lies largely in the fact that it has produced the current victor as well as other successful figures in both the recent and the remote history of his family, and Pindar is not ‘much more conscious of the polis and much more concerned to adapt epinikion to civic ideology than his critics have allowed’.³⁸

³⁵Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise*, p. 192.

³⁶Kurke borrows this term from Bourdieu, who defines it as ‘the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name’ (*The Traffic in Praise*, p. 36, with note 4). Kurke equates it with her phrase ‘the economy of *kleos*’ (cf. her 1993 article ‘The Economy of *Kudos*’, exploring aristocratic attempts to regain ‘symbolic capital’ through heroization of athletes), by which she designates the ‘spatial and temporal continuity’ of the *oikos* and the necessity for ‘continual renewal of the family’s achievements by each new generation’ (*The Traffic in Praise*, p. 18).

³⁷Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise*, p. 5, with reference to the story that Pindar’s account of the birth of Rhodes from the sea was written in gold letters and dedicated in Athena’s temple there, which sounds like an aristocratic gesture.

³⁸Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise*, p. 194. A similar claim was made, though not explored in as much detail, in an earlier article (not mentioned by Kurke) which argued that the epinician genre ‘n’est pas moins “politique”, c’est-à-dire lié à la πόλις, que la tragédie. A travers les grandes familles auxquelles elle s’identifie, c’est la cité tout entière qui est exaltée dans l’ode: l’épinicie est au sens plein du terme un ξύνοχος [sic] λόγος’ (S. Saïd and M. Trédé-Boulmer, ‘L’éloge de la cité du vainqueur’, p. 170).

4.3 Leaders, Justice, and Injustice

Early in the Theognidea (lines 39-52), the reader finds Theognis' view of the troubles which were plaguing Megara during his lifetime. The city is overcome by κακὴ ὕβρις (40), he writes, and he goes on to say that it is the ἡγεμόνες who are at fault; the ἄστοί are still σαόφρονες (41). The word ἡγεμών is uniformly used in the Theognidea of a bad leader; it recurs at 855 in the phrase ἡγεμόνων κακότητα,³⁹ and again at 1082 ὕβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ἡγεμόνα στάσιος.⁴⁰ Campbell writes that 'Theognis uses many of Solon's ideas and much of his vocabulary ... both use *hēgemones* of the people's leaders';⁴¹ this view is taken by West⁴² and Carrière.⁴³ But Nagy objects:

I ... disagree with the view that **hēgemones** 'leaders' as at Solon fr. 3.7 and 8.1 GP [= 4.7 and 6.1 West] means 'popular leaders', that is, champions of democracy. Rather, it is a catchword for 'government' (as clearly at [6.1])

³⁹Which is reminiscent of the phrase at 41-42 ἡγεμόνες δὲ | τετράφαται πολλὴν ἐς κακότητα πεσεῖν.

⁴⁰Both M.L. West (*Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 150) and H.F. North (*Sophrosyne*, p. 17) point out that ἡγεμόνα in 1082 is awkward since it is followed by ἡγεμόνες with a different sense in 1082a (=41). Solon and Mimnermos also associate ὕβρις with ἡγεμόνες (Solon 4.7-8 δῆμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον | ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν, and Mimnermos 9.4 ἀργαλέης ὕβριος ἡγεμόνες), and Mimnermos' line suggested to West that Theognis' original line was εὐθυντήρα, κακῆς ὕβριος ἡγεμόνα, 'but the same objection applies' (West, *loc. cit.*). But the line from Mimnermos is not as condemnatory as Solon's words; the ἡγεμόνες of which Mimnermos writes are a victorious army, and Mimnermos is writing from the point of view of the winning side.

⁴¹Campbell, *The Golden Lyre*, p. 113.

⁴²West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 68: 'It appears from Solon 4.7 and 6.1 that ἡγεμόνες is a term for popular leaders'.

⁴³Carrière, *Théognis de Mégare*, p. 178 'Les excès des démagogues (ἡγεμόνες) effraient Théognis'.

.... So also at Theognis 39-52 : the **hēgemones** (41) represent the elite of society before the coming of the **euthuntēr** ‘straightener, regulator’.⁴⁴

As a parallel for the use of ἡγεμόνες and ἄστοί in Theognis 41, van Groningen cites Solon 4.5-7:

αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίησιν
ἄστοι βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,
δήμου θ’ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος,

but van Groningen’s statement that ‘De même Solon ... oppose les ἄστοί et les δήμου ἡγεμόνες’⁴⁵ is inaccurate in that Solon’s ‘opposition’ between the two groups only goes as far as to mention them separately. In Solon’s view, it is both the ἄστοί and the δήμου ἡγεμόνες who are bringing ruin to Athens, whereas in the Theognidean passage we are told that the ἄστοί are still σαόφρονες⁴⁶ and that it is only the ἡγεμόνες who are the source of trouble.

In attempting to determine who Theognis means by the ἡγεμόνες in line 41, one must address the question of the date of composition of Theognis 39-52. Campbell at first believed that these verses were written shortly after the fall of the tyrant Theagenes; the leaders ‘are identified with οἱ κακοί: in other words they were not aristocrats but the middle-classes; and what Theognis fears ... is the emergence of another tyrant (cf. 39-40 and μούναρχοι 52): the memory of Theagenes’ severity must have been vivid’.⁴⁷ But later Campbell appears less certain about this point: ‘It is hard to tell whether these leaders are the fellow-aristocrats of Theognis: he talks of

⁴⁴G. Nagy, ‘Theognis and Megara’, p. 43. Nagy also quotes *Ath. Pol.* 5.3 καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις to demonstrate that ‘the **hubris** condemned by Solon ... is that of the rich, not of the poor This is not to say that Solon was a one-sided champion of democracy (see Aristotle *Constitution* 11.2-12.1, containing Solon fr. 7 GP [= 5 West]), but the point is that **hubris** and **stasis** are in the diction of Solon catchwords for the excesses of an oligarchy.’

⁴⁵Van Groningen, *Theognis: le premier livre*, p. 27.

⁴⁶See below, section 4.7, for the significance of σωφροσύνη as a civic virtue.

⁴⁷Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 350.

“our” evil insolence, but he identifies them with the “bad”⁴⁸ West, on the other hand, is unambiguous:

The implication is very plain. These things [*sc.* ‘bad men ruining the people for their private advantage’] have been known to happen elsewhere, and now they are in danger of happening in Megara – for the first time. It would have been impossible to express oneself in those terms during the democracy, shortly after the rule of a μούναρχος who was to be remembered for centuries afterwards.⁴⁹

But it would not necessarily have been ‘impossible to express oneself in those terms’; very few names of historical figures appear in the Theognidea, and it would not be surprising if Theognis wrote these lines after the fact, as it were, referring to ‘future’ events with the intention that the verses could be ‘recycled’ at future *symposia*. It would not be ‘impossible’ for Theognis to write (as he does in 51-52) ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν | μούναρχοί θ’, after such things had already happened; Fisher points out that ‘if forty or fifty years have elapsed [*sc.* since the tyranny of Theagenes], and some other tyrannies gained the limelight elsewhere, Theognis might express a fear of a (renewed) Megarian tyranny without alluding to Theagenes’ rule’.⁵⁰ West argues that ‘There is no escape from the conclusion that the verses were composed before ... the rule of Theagenes, not later than the 630s’⁵¹ but the view taken here is that such an ‘escape’ can be found without difficulty.

Campbell’s doubt as to the identity of the leaders (‘[Theognis] talks of “our” evil insolence, but he identifies [the leaders] with the “bad”’) deserves some attention here. Although West equates the ἡγεμόνες with the popular leaders and argues that ‘[i]n the context we must assume the administration of justice to be in the hands of

⁴⁸Campbell, *The Golden Lyre*, p. 112.

⁴⁹West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 68.

⁵⁰Fisher, *Hybris*, p. 208.

⁵¹West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 68.

the aristocracy: that is why the δήμου ἡγεμόνες are agitating',⁵² he writes that 'the ὕβρις to be corrected by the anticipated tyrant is "ours", i.e. that of our class'.⁵³ But to say that in line 40 Theognis refers to the ὕβρις of one group (the aristocracy) and then in lines 41-42 goes on to refer to the faults of another group (the ἡγεμόνες, identified by West with the popular leaders) implies a considerable lack of clarity on the part of the poet. In view of the connecting γάρ in line 41, the ἡγεμόνες are probably to be thought of as members of the group defined by ἡμετέρης in line 40. This ἡμετέρης could mean simply 'our city',⁵⁴ but it could be used in a more restrictive sense to define a group within the city.⁵⁵ A further consideration here is the metaphor of 39 κύει: the ἡγεμόνες are breaking out from within 'us'.

If this is the case, then Theognis is here referring to the κακότης of some members of his own class⁵⁶ (the ἡγεμόνες, i.e. those actually exercising the power of government), although with the deictic οἶδε in line 41 (ἄστοι μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἶδε σαόφρονες) the poet excludes the company present at the *symposion* at which the lines are being sung. This, of course, facilitates the repetition of the verses at other *symposia*; although the people represented by οἶδε may vary from time to time and place to place, what they represent does not. Danielewicz writes that the demonstrative ὅδε 'a l w a y s' retains its basic meaning "this here", "this before you",

⁵²West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, pp. 68-69.

⁵³West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, p. 69. At p. 150, West calls the phrase ὕβρις ἡμετέρης 'paradoxical'.

⁵⁴Cf. 235, where it is clear that ἡμῖν is to be equated with 236 πόλει.

⁵⁵Cf., e.g., 1102 ἡμετέρην φίλιν, 760 νόον ἡμέτερον, 762 ἡμεῖς.

⁵⁶Cf. Fisher, *Hybris*, p. 209: 'Hybris is clearly the illegal and corrupt abuse of power by members of the upper class and men of whom Theognis was naturally predisposed (hence, perhaps, "our evil hybris" in line 40), and whom he would usually label the *agathoi*; but when they behave so grossly, he is perfectly prepared to call them "the *kakoi*"'.

“this present” and – unless in quotations of the heroes’ words [*sc.* in a mythological narrative] – refers to the here-and-now of the original performance’,⁵⁷ but it can also, in this case, refer to the here-and-now of subsequent performances; ‘present company’ is perpetually guaranteed exclusion from the criticisms of Theognis. Nagy summarizes the implications of this view, which seems to have the most in its favour:

we would expect the elite of this society to be the **agathoi** ‘nobles’, ‘but the leaders [**hēgemones**] have veered so as to fall into debasement [**kakotēs**]’ (43): in other words, the elite are now **kakoi** instead of **agathoi**, and the poet actually refers to them as **kakoi** (44). The reasoning is that they *must* be **kakoi**, since **agathoi** have never yet brought about the ruin of a city (43). We now see that Theognis is no one-sided champion of the elite as represented by an oligarchy, any more than Solon is a one-sided champion of democracy.

Nagy concludes that ‘Kyrnos himself is typical of the debased elite who “often” [855 πολλάκις] bring the ship of state to ruin’,⁵⁸ and these are the same ἄνδρες μεγάλοι who are responsible for the ruin of the πόλις at Solon 9.3.

Theognis says at lines 43-45 that the ὕβρις of οἱ κακοί in the situation which he describes in 39-52 involves the handing over of δίκαι to the ἄδικοι. Line 45 (... δίκας τ’ ἄδικοισι διδῶσιν) contains the root δίκη in two different senses; the first refers to ‘judgments’, the power of decision and control, and the second to ‘unrighteous’ men. This is in effect a play on the word, illustrating the way in which δίκη and its cognates have gained new fields of meaning since their appearance in the poetry of Homer. In the *Odyssey*, the root occurs many times, and here it often seems to mean ‘custom’;⁵⁹ this sense can be found, for example, at 20.294-95 (=

⁵⁷J. Danielewicz, ‘*Deixis* in Greek Choral Lyric’, p. 16. Although this idea works well with Theognis’ οἶδε and can in fact be expanded beyond ‘the original performance’, R. Nünlist (*Poetologische Bildersprache*, pp. 9-10, n. 25) notes that it is difficult to decide how to interpret, for example, Alkaios 357.8 ἔργον ... τόδε in the light of Danielewicz’s formulation.

⁵⁸Nagy, ‘Theognis and Megara’, pp. 44 and 54.

⁵⁹When Odysseus tells Agamemnon to be δικαιότερος in future (*Iliad* 19.181), his following words make it clear that he refers to observance of custom when offence has been given: οὐ μὲν γάρ

21.312-13) οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀτέμβειν οὐδὲ δίκαιον | ξείνους Τηλεμάχου, and 19.168-69 ἡ γὰρ δίκη, ὅπποτε πάτρης | ἥς ἀπέησιν ἀνὴρ Odysseus repeatedly (6.120-21, 9.175-76, 13.201-202) wonders what sort of people inhabit the lands which he visits, presenting two alternatives: they are either ὕβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι, or φιλόξενοι καὶ σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής. Here, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι means ‘lawless’, being placed in opposition with proper observance of hospitality and reverence of the gods. Theognis makes a similar point at 53 ff., where he says that the people who are now the ἀγαθοί in the city were once living outside, people οἱ πρόσθ’ οὔτε δίκας ἤδεσαν οὔτε νόμους.

Δίκη and its derivatives are found many times in the Theognidea, sometimes in a concrete sense such as ‘judgments’ or ‘laws’ (lines 45, 54), or ‘law-suit’/‘case’⁶⁰ (lines 268, 544), but more often in a more general sense to indicate ‘what is right’ (lines 197, 279, 292, 378, etc.).⁶¹ At 292, δίκη is described as having been defeated by ὕβρις; the opposition between these two terms is also seen at Solon 4.7-8, where the ἄδικος νόος of the ἡγεμόνες is associated with their ὕβρις. The δίκη of the state is upset by the ὕβρις of greedy men, and Solon links δίκη with calmness when he says that an ocean undisturbed by wind is δικαιοτάτη (fr. 12):

ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταρασσεται· ἦν δὲ τις αὐτὴν
μὴ κινήῃ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτη.

τι νεμεσσητὸν βασιλῆα | ἄνδρ’ ἀπαρέσσασθαι, ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνῃ.

⁶⁰This meaning is also found at *Iliad* 18.508.

⁶¹Δίκη occurs once in the Theognidea with the meaning ‘retribution’ (207; at 279-80 this function is fulfilled by νέμεσις which punishes the man who κακῶς τὰ δίκαια νομίζει), which can also be seen at Solon 13.8 (*cf.* 4.14-16, where the personified Δίκη comes to exact punishment).

Thus, in turbulent circumstances, δίκη comes to signify the absence of upheaval; Gentili rightly points out the grammatical similarity between the openings of Solon fragments 12 (above) and 9:⁶²

ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἡδὲ χαλάζης,
 βροντὴ δ' ἐκ λαμπρῆς γίγνεται ἀστεροπῆς·
 ἀνδρῶν ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται, ἐς δὲ μονάρχου
 δῆμος αἰδρίη δουλοσύνην ἔπесεν.
 λίην δ' ἐξάραντ' (οὐ) ῥάδιον ἐστι κατασχεῖν
 ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρὴ (καλὰ) πάντα νοεῖν.

Here the meteorological metaphor is made explicit: the δῆμος is at the mercy of political 'storms', in the form of men who upset the equilibrium of the state, reducing the populace to δουλοσύνη.

Solon's view of δίκη is consonant with his concern for keeping his city at peace by preventing both the upper and lower classes from gaining too much power (fr. 5, also discussed at the end of section 4.4 below):

δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
 τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελὼν οὐτ' ἐπορεζάμενος·
 οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
 καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·
 ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
 νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἶας' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

It is significant that nowhere in the surviving fragments of Solon's poetry is the δῆμος accused of being ἀδίκος; the ability to disturb the *polis* is restricted to those with power, the ἡγεμόνες.

Noting that the adjective δίκαιος occurs only once in the surviving fragments of Solon's poetry (12.2, cited above), Havelock suggests that it is at this point that

⁶²B. Gentili, 'La giustizia del mare', p. 161. Gentili compares *Iliad* 2.144 ff.:
 κινήθη δ' ἀγορὴ φῆ κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης,
 πόντου 'Ικαρίοιο, τὰ μὲν τ' Εὐρύς τε Νότος τε
 ὤρορ' ἐπαΐξας πατρὸς Διὸς ἐκ νεφελάων
 and 2.394 ff.:

... 'Αργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἴαχον, ὥς ὅτε κύμα
 ἀκτῇ ἐφ' ὕψηλῃ, ὅτε κινήσῃ Νότος ἐλθὼν

‘the symbolization of *dikē* has been extended beyond civic procedure to cover the concept of the civic order within which the procedure takes place.’⁶³ Recognizing such a shift in meaning, the poets can exploit it in such expressions as δῆμόν τε φθείρωσι δίκας τ’ ἀδίκοισι διδῶσιν (Theognis 45); Bakchylides, extending the sense of δίκαι from ‘judgments’ to ‘punishments’ (*i.e.* ‘judgments against one’) employs the same word-play as Theognis:

ὕβριος ὑψινόου
παύσει δίκας θνατοῖσι κραίνων· ... (13.43-44)

... ἧ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὀρμαῖ,
δίκας ἀδίκοισιν ὄφρα μήσεται· ... (18.41-42).

4.4 *Wealth, Class, and Power*⁶⁴

For some of the poets of this period, the issue of a person’s wealth or status in society (which can be treated either as linked factors or two separate concerns) is relevant to their claim to be ἀγαθός. Linforth writes that

No distinction is made by Solon ... between the noble and the rich, who are also called indifferently the few, the distinguished, or the powerful. Often enough, with a singular directness, but without any thought of moral distinction, the upper classes are called the good, and the lower classes the bad.⁶⁵

But these statements cannot both be true of, for example, Solon fr. 15; the poet writes πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται, and if Linforth's assertion that

⁶³E. A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice*, p. 255.

⁶⁴See also section 4.5; the relationship between wealth and virtue is of particular concern in epinician poetry, given the genre’s emphasis on δαπάνα as essential to victory and the fame that comes from celebration in song.

⁶⁵Linforth, *Solon the Athenian*, p. 51.

‘the upper classes are called the good, and the lower classes the bad’ is accepted, then it is clear that Solon is here making a distinction between ‘the noble’ and ‘the rich’. If the terms ἀγαθοί and κακοί refer to the higher and lower classes respectively, then Solon is trying to make the point that ‘the noble’ are not necessarily to be equated with ‘the rich’; many people who are now wealthy are not members of the nobility, while the nobility itself is impoverished. Only if we take ἀγαθοί and κακοί to mean something other than social position⁶⁶ (against the second sentence of Linforth quoted above) will the identity between ‘the noble’ and ‘the rich’ still hold, since Solon would then be writing about the discrepancies between people’s wealth and their true worth, rather than their social standing.

Linforth, in fact, contradicts his own assessment of the terms ἀγαθοί and κακοί as referring to social class in the poetry of Solon; Linforth contends that

There is undoubtedly a marked change in Solon’s political opinions: before he put his reforms into effect, he was disposed to lay the blame for the misfortunes of Athens on the greed of the rich; later he was equally convinced of the folly and incapacity of the lower classes.⁶⁷

As an example of some of Solon’s poetry written before his archonship, Linforth cites (along with 4b, 4c, 13, and 24) this same poem, fr. 15. If indeed, as Linforth maintains, this poem is attacking the greed of the rich, then, as noted above (4.1), the words ἀγαθοί and κακοί must be used here either in a non-social sense or to denote the ‘legitimate’ nobility as opposed to those who have no claim to be rich; Linforth’s simple division into ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ classes is inadequate.⁶⁸ The word ἡμεῖς in line 2 identifies the speaker as one of the ἀγαθοί who πένονται; he is not of high

⁶⁶Either moral worth or general excellence; see above, section 4.1.

⁶⁷Linforth, *Solon the Athenian*, p. 9.

⁶⁸The aristocratic opinion that those of noble lineage deserve to be rich will be discussed below, with special reference to the Theognidea.

social standing but is nevertheless ἀγαθός, since from his point of view ἀρετή is independent of wealth.⁶⁹

There are few occurrences of the words ἀγαθός, ἐσθλός, κακός, and δειλός in the surviving poetry of Solon about which it can be said with certainty that these words are meant to be understood in the social sense. There is only one occurrence of δειλός (13.39 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ), and there it is more likely that the word is being used with a moral meaning. Of the four occurrences of ἐσθλός, three are not applications of this adjective to people (13.63 Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, 19.5-6 κῦδος ... | ἐσθλόν, 33.2 ἐσθλὰ ... θεοῦ διδόντος). As for the fourth (34.9), its immediate context provides little in the way of guidance as to whether it should be interpreted in the social sense; only the comment about the redistribution of land which precedes this fragment in the *Constitution of Athens* suggests that when Solon writes (34.8-9) οὐδὲ πει[ρ]ῆς χθονὸς | πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοιρίην ἔχειν, he is referring to social class rather than true worth. It is more likely that the κακοί here referred to by Solon are either corrupt aristocrats by birth or *nouveaux riches*; as Rosivach points out,⁷⁰ the beginning of the fragment describes a group of men attempting to enrich themselves:

οἱ δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇσιν ἦλθον· ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεήν,
κάδόκ[ε]ον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὐρήσειν πολύν

⁶⁹Solon fr. 24 also rejects material wealth as irrelevant, but is not concerned with whether a rich man can be called ἀγαθός; in 24 Solon re-defines wealth (1 πλουτέουσιν, 7 ἄφενος) in more simple terms (food, clothes, a family) and says that riches beyond these (7-8 περιώσια ... χρήματ') are of no use since they cannot be taken beyond the grave and no one can escape death. This re-definition attacks the cult of wealth from a different angle than does fr. 15.

⁷⁰V.J. Rosivach, 'Redistribution of Land in Solon'.

This suggests not a democratic uprising, in which case ὄλβον ... πολύν would be something of an overstatement of what each (ἕκαστος) man might expect,⁷¹ but rather the hope harboured by relatively wealthy and powerful κακοί (those who πλουτεύουσι at Solon 15.1) who supported Solon's reforms that he might then reward them in time-honoured tyrannical fashion.

Solon states at 36.18-20 that he instituted θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῷ | εὐθείαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην, and here as in 13.33 (θνητοὶ δ' ὧδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε) the terms of evaluation could be interpreted in either sense. In fr. 15, though, Solon does not appear to be employing the terms in a social sense (see above).

The shift in Solon's attitudes towards the upper and lower classes for which Linforth argues is difficult to prove. Linforth cites Solon fr. 6

δῆμος δ' ὧδ' ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο,
μήτε λήην ἀνεθεῖς μήτε βιαζόμενος·
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται
ἄνθρωποις ὅποσιν μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ,

and claims that it was written after Solon's archonship, 'at a time when Solon was no longer disposed to hold the rich responsible for all that was wrong';⁷² but Campbell thinks that these lines 'are clearly aimed at the nobility, who are told not to use force in their dealings with the people'.⁷³ Both opinions are unjustified by anything in the lines themselves, and there is certainly nothing in the text to indicate whether these lines were written before or after Solon's archonship. But the reference to πολὺς ὄλβος in line 4 strongly suggests that, against Linforth's interpretation, it is indeed

⁷¹Rosivach (p. 155) notes that 'it is unlikely that someone as attentive to the issue of wealth as Solon would make such a mistake'.

⁷²Linforth, *Solon the Athenian*, p. 181.

⁷³Campbell, *The Golden Lyre*, p. 95.

‘the rich’ who are here perceived by Solon to be responsible for at least some of the state’s troubles; whether he means the *nouveaux riches* or the old aristocracy, or (probably) both, is not made explicit. Solon was by no means a ‘democrat’ in the modern sense; he aimed at *political* equality for all Athenians regardless of economic status, but *economic* equality was never his objective.⁷⁴

The second couplet of Solon fr. 6 reappears at lines 153-54 of the Theognidea, in the following form:

τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῶ ὄλβος ἔπῃται
 ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.

Van Groningen, commenting on κακῶ in the above passage, notes that the lines have the meaning, ‘l’opulence n’est dangereuse que pour le méchant’.⁷⁵ The two versions of the couplet carry the same sense, but the insertion of the word κακῶ brings the lines more explicitly within the Theognidean concern for the opposition between ἀγαθοί and κακοί. Another couplet in the Theognidea (lines 525-26) states that it is only the ἀγαθοί who really deserve to be wealthy:

καὶ γάρ τοι πλοῦτον μὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθοῖσιν ἔοικεν,
 ἢ πενίη δὲ κακῶ σύμφορος ἀνδρὶ φέρειν.

But the fact remains that even the κακοί can be rich, despite the fact that they are κακοί: 149 χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν. Lines 153-54 warn of the dangers that attend when a κακός has ὄλβος instead of the πενίη that 525-26 define as his due. For a Theognidean aristocrat, wealth alone is no indication of a man’s worth, and there are repeated injunctions not to obtain riches by unjust means: πέπνυσο, μηδ’ αἰσχροῖσιν ἐπ’ ἔργμασι μηδ’ ἀδίκοισιν | τιμὰς μηδ’ ἀρετὰς ἔλκεο

⁷⁴This point is well made by Rosivach; cf. also J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, pp. 55-65.

⁷⁵Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 61. He also writes that ‘chez Th., κακῶ définit ἀνθρώπῳ, mais fait double emploi avec ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ. La phrase originale de Solon est plus vigoureuse.’

μηδ' ἄφενος (29-30), βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέων ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν | ἧ πλουτεῖν
ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος (145-46), δικαίως χρήματα ποιοῦ (753).

An opposing view can be found in the Theognidea at lines 1117-18:

Πλοῦτε, θεῶν κάλλιστε καὶ ἡμεροέστατε πάντων,
σὺν σοὶ καὶ κακὸς ὧν γίνεται ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ.

Both this couplet and the poem in which West places 525-26 are addressed to Ploutos, and are thus not assigned by West to Theognis himself. But although Theognis may have used the name 'Kyrnos' as his σφρηγίς (19-20), the possibility that he composed poems addressing Ploutos, as other symposiasts might well have been doing, cannot be ruled out.⁷⁶ On the other hand, since lines 1117-18 express a point of view which is explicitly rejected in verses which are more securely attributable to Theognis, the likelihood of their being by Theognis might appear smaller; but van Groningen's suggestion that the couplet 1117-18 is 'ironique', or meant in 'un ton enjoué',⁷⁷ if correct, would mean that the lines could well have been composed by Theognis himself, perhaps to initiate a sympotic exchange; the couplet invites a response such as the sentiment expressed in 149-50: a κακός may obtain χρήματα, but he will still lack ἀρετή.⁷⁸

Along with the view that the ἀγαθοί deserve to be wealthy, one finds in the Theognidea several passages which state that πενίη, inasmuch as it is a state which is inappropriate for an ἀγαθός, ought to be avoided at all costs: lines 173-78, 179-80, 351-54, for example. But there are other places in the Theognidea where men are

⁷⁶One might compare the series of hymns to Apollo and Artemis at the beginning of the Theognidean collection; although Kyrnos' name, not surprisingly, does not appear in any of them, at least one (lines 11-14) was thought by Aristotle to be by Theognis himself.

⁷⁷Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 409.

⁷⁸Another example of verses which might have been composed in a sympotic exchange is the couplet 887-88 (discussed in 2.1); compare the couplets immediately preceding and following it.

exhorted to bear up under misfortune, since the gods frequently upset the fortunes of humans: lines 319-22, 355-60, 401-406, 441-46, 591-94, and 659-66. One may lose one's wealth, but one can still be ἀγαθός if one behaves appropriately.⁷⁹

Alkaios, on the other hand, is unambiguous in his declaration that a man cannot be ἔσλος without wealth: quoting Aristodamos, with whom he says he agrees (οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ... λόγον),⁸⁰ Alkaios expresses the opinion that χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἰς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος (360). While Solon sees wealth as desirable (13.7 χρήματα δ' ἰμείρω μὲν ἔχειν) but not a necessary condition for a man to be ἀγαθός (15.2-3 οὐ διαμειψόμεθα | τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον: one can have ἀρετή without πλοῦτος),⁸¹ Alkaios/Aristodamos states that wealth is a prerequisite for anyone who wants to be called ἔσλος. And Alkaios' aristocratic viewpoint is emphasized by his use of the word τίμιος;⁸² as was the case with the Homeric heroes, the pursuit of personal honour, usually at the expense of others, is paramount. This is just the sort of competition that Solon (5.1-2; see also the end of section 4.3 above) says he attempted to put a stop to in Athens:

δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
τιμῆς οὔτ' ἀφελὼν οὔτ' ἐπορεξάμενος.

⁷⁹Cf. also 319-22 and 355-60.

⁸⁰It should be noted that there is no context for Alkaios' quotation. Given the tendency of poets to quote sayings in order to dispute them, perhaps Alkaios' expression οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ... λόγον carried the force of the similar qualified praise ῥῆμ' ἀλάθειας ... ἄγχιστα βαῖνον in Pindar, *Isthmian* 2.10 (discussed below, section 4.5 – the scholia to the Pindaric passage are, in fact, one of the sources for Alkaios' verses), and was followed by criticism of Aristodamos.

⁸¹Solon fr. 15 appears virtually unaltered at lines 315-18 of the *Theognidea*, and a similar sentiment occurs at *Theognidea* 1061-62 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύψαντες ἔχουσιν | πόνῳ, τοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν οὐλομένη πενίῃ. Sappho 148 (though the text is corrupt) also appears to say that some people have wealth without ἀρετή, but does not make the claim that it is possible to have ἀρετή without πλοῦτος.

⁸²Alkaios' opinion that a man without wealth is not τίμιος is echoed at line 621 of the *Theognidea*: πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀτίει δὲ πενιχρόν.

Murray comments that

In this fragment it is remarkable that even the *demos* has *timē*, but Solon clearly recognises that different social classes possess it to different degrees. In the Solonian constitution *timē* was for the first time legally defined, in the rights of office allocated to different groups on the basis of a property qualification: each class (*telos*) had its appropriate *geras*.⁸³

There is a striking verbal parallel between this fragment of Solon and a passage from Pindar's first *Pythian* ode (vv. 69-70, which are part of an address to Zeus):

σύν τοι τίν κεν ἀγητῆρ ἀνὴρ,
υἱῶ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, δᾶμον γεραί-
ρων τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν.

In both cases a γέρας provided for the δῆμος by the leader is the issue. Solon uses the term δῆμος to designate, at least primarily, the majority of society, those who are not rich or powerful; this is made clear by the next verse of his fragment 5, where δῆμῳ μὲν from the first line is answered by the phrase οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγῆτοί, and Pindar's use of the word here appears similar.

Burton remarks⁸⁴ that this section of the first *Pythian* ode 'reveals Pindar as an educator of princes and something of a propagandist for the Dorian way of life', noting that the phrase θεοδμάτῳ σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ (line 61) 'sounds like a concept which can form the basis of a political system'⁸⁵ and sensing a 'strong note of advice, even of warning' in the exhortation to concord at lines 69-70. In this Dorian context, it is perhaps appropriate to compare the Spartan *rhētra* as described in Tyrtaios fr. 4 and Plutarch, *Lykourgos* 6. This was an oracular answer (τελέεντ' ἔπεα, Tyrtaios 4.2;

⁸³O. Murray, 'The Solonian Law of *Hubris*', p. 141.

⁸⁴R.W.B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes*, pp. 103-104.

⁸⁵As opposed to the 'freedom' of, e.g., *Isthmian* 8.16, fragment 65, and the closing lines of *Pythian* 8, which 'all refer ... to deliverance from some specified peril' (Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes*, p. 104).

compare Pindar's invocation of Ζεῦ τέλει(ε) at *Pythian* 1.67), which Lykourgos is reported to have received from Delphi, and which described a form of government in which the 'elders' (πρεσβυγενεῖς or γερόντες) mediated between the βασιλεῖς and the δῆμος; the elders would propose motions in assembly, and these motions could be accepted or rejected by the δῆμος. In this sense, the δῆμος could be described as having some power, as it is in Tyrtaios' phrase δήμου τε πλήθει νίκην καὶ κάρτος ἔπεσθαι (4.9)⁸⁶ and in Plutarch's report that the oracle decreed δάμω δὲ τὰν κυρίαν ἡμεν καὶ κράτος. There may be a hint of this sort of arrangement in Pindar's advice to the tyrant Hieron to γεραίρειν the δᾶμος (*Pythian* 1.70). Pindar elsewhere expresses his disapproval of tyranny (*Pythian* 11.52 ff.):

... τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρω
 {σὺν} ὄλβω τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων·
 ξυναῖσι δ' ἄμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι

Here the poet finds fault with 'the αἶσα of tyrannies' – their 'dispensation', referring both to the fortunes they endure (hence the contrast with the more fortunate μέσα in the preceding verse) and to the 'dispensation' of the state under a tyranny. Again, both senses of αἶσα may be implied at *Pythian* 1.67 ff., where Pindar prays that Zeus τέλειος may grant to the ἄστοι and the βασιλεῖς of Deinomenes' city the same kind of αἶσα that the Dorians had. As Pindar (*Pythian* 11.52) said that he preferred τὰ μέσα, Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 5.6-7) writes that it was as a 'middle ground' between tyranny and democracy that the Spartans set up their form of government:

αἰωρουμένη γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία καὶ ἀποκλίνουσα νῦν μὲν ὡς τοὺς βασιλεῖς
 ἐπὶ τυραννίδα, νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ δημοκρατίαν, οἷον ἔρμα τὴν
 τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ἐν μέσῳ θεμένη καὶ ἰσορροπήσασα τὴν
 ἀσφαλεστάτην τάξιν ἔσχε καὶ κατάστασιν

The term δῆμος in the passages of Solon (fr. 9) and Pindar (*Pythian* 1.70) cited above is essentially 'neutral', conveying neither approval nor disapproval of the

⁸⁶Lines 9-10 of the fragment are not quoted in Plutarch, but appear in Diodoros (7.12.6).

group in question.⁸⁷ This is very different from the outlook of the Theognidea, where the δῆμος is κενεόφρων at 233 and 847, in the latter case to be trampled upon and made to submit.⁸⁸ Solon's δῆμος is described in less derogatory language in the middle of fragment 9 (lines 3-4):

ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται, ἐς δὲ μονάρχου
δῆμος αἰδρίη δουλοσύνην ἔπесεν.

The δῆμος here simply does not know any better than to allow a tyranny to establish itself, and the blame for the ruin of the city is placed on the shoulders of the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι in line 3. The δῆμος κενεόφρων at Theognidea 847, by contrast, is portrayed as not merely ignorant but wilful: it is φιλοδέσποτος in line 849.

The δῆμος itself, though, spoke of itself with some pride as early as the late seventh century, at least in a colony (*CEG* 143, Kerkira, *ca* 625-600?):

ἠυιοῦ Τλασίαῤο Μενεκράτεος τόδε σᾶμα
Οἰανθεός γενεάν, τόδε δ' αὐτοῖ δᾶμος ἐποίει.
ἔς γὰρ πρόξενῤος δάμου φίλος· ἄλλ' ἐνὶ πόντοι
ὄλετο, δαμόσιον δὲ καφὸν ῥο[]
Πραξιμένες δ' αὐτοῖ γ[αία]ς ἄπο πατρίδος ἐνθὸν
σὺν δάμ[ο]ι τόδε σᾶμα κασιγνέτοιο πονέθε.

Friedländer and Hoffleit comment that in this epitaph, 'Symbolic of the new political atmosphere is the four-times repeated δᾶμος'.⁸⁹ And just as, according to Solon and

⁸⁷Pindar numbers himself among the δῆμος at *Nemean* 7.65-66 ἐν τε δαμόταις | ὄμματι δέρκομαι λαμπρόν, οὐχ ὑπερβάλων; this humble attitude is present from the beginning of the ode with its invocation to Eleithyia which, as Most comments, 'introduces the poem on the highest level of generality. Such a beginning is indeed impressive, provoking as it does an immediate identification of poet, victor, and audience (for we are all born)' (G.W. Most, *The Measures of Praise*, p. 134). Bakchylides never uses δῆμος, ἀστοί, or even πολῖται.

⁸⁸The lack of good qualities among the Theognidean δῆμος may be attributable to its ἡγεμόνες, those κακοί of whom it is said in line 45 that δῆμον τε φθείρωσι, δίκας δ' ἀδίκοισι διδῶσιν, if φθείρωσι is taken to mean 'corrupt' rather than 'destroy', as van Groningen understands it (*Theognis: le premier livre*, p. 29): 'il ne s'agit pas d'oppression, mais de corruption; la plèbe est ameutée, excitée par des promesses illicites. Th. ne ressent pas de pitié pour elle.' In support of this interpretation, van Groningen cites [Aristotle] *Constitution of Athens* 28.3, where Kleon διαφθείρει τὸν δῆμον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, 'par ses emportements'.

⁸⁹Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, p. 31.

Pindar, a leader is obliged to bestow a γέρας upon the δῆμος, the δῆμος itself reciprocates with the same act after the restoration of democracy (*CEG* 431, Athens, 403/2 = anon. *FGE* 114):

τούσδ' ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαίχθων
δῆμος Ἀθηναίων οἳ ποτε τοὺς ἀδίκους
θεσμοῖς ἄρξαντας πόλεως πρῶτοι καταπαύειν
ἤρξαν κίνδυνον σώμασιν ἀράμενοι.

Like the υἱες Ἀχαιῶν who gave Achilles his γέρας (*Iliad* 1.162-163) as a reward for his prowess in battle, here the δῆμος of Athens ἐγέραιρε Thrasyboulos who led the armed uprising against the Thirty Tyrants.

4.5 *Wealth and Virtue in Epinician Poetry*

The collection of Pindar's epinician odes, as it has come down to us, opens with an elaborate declaration of the pre-eminence of the Olympian games (*Olympian* 1.1 ff.); this competition, the poet says, is more deserving of celebration in song than all other athletic contests, just as the sun is the warmest and brightest star in the sky. This long comparison is preceded by two briefer statements of other kinds of excellence: first the enigmatic assertion that 'water is best', and then the description of gold as outstanding among worldly goods, shining in the night like a blazing fire. In a similar passage in the third *Olympian* ode (42-44), Pindar again uses water and gold as examples of pre-eminence:

εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ
χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιᾶν
Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν ικάνων ἄπτεται
οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος
σταλᾶν.

Here it is not the radiance of gold that is emphasised, but rather the fact that it is the ‘most revered’ (αἰδοιέστατος) of possessions; it was perhaps with this passage in mind that Gerber commented on the opening of the first *Olympian*:

There can be no question that one of the attributes of gold which Pindar here and in some other passages ... emphasizes is its gleam, but critics err, I think, in maintaining that this is its primary significance Rather, to Pindar as to other Greeks, gold is an object of praise because it is the most valuable of material possessions and its gleam is an incidental attribute which serves to enhance the value it already has.⁹⁰

Verdenius, however, rightly points out that what Pindar is emphasizing at the beginning of the first *Olympian* is not ‘an “incidental attribute”, but an essential aspect, which includes both visual gleam or radiance ... and commercial value’.⁹¹

Gold’s radiance and its value are inseparable, and this connection between the two aspects is made by Pindar in the opening to the fifth *Isthmian* ode:

Μᾶτερ Ἀελίου πολυώνυμε Θεία,
σέο ἕκατι καὶ μεγασθενὴ νόμισαν
χρυσὸν ἄνθρωποι περιώσιον ἄλλων·

Theia is the mother of the sun and thus the source of light, and Pindar says that it is because of her that mortals have assigned the highest value to gold: its brilliance makes it also (καί) valuable. In the lines following this introduction, the poet says that it is for the sake of Theia’s τιμή that glory is won in the games; ‘thus Theia ... is proclaimed as the very idea of value, that is, as the power which in every field creates and establishes value as something valid and binding’.⁹²

For Pindar, then, gold is both radiant and valuable; but Pindar’s view of the ‘value’ of wealth is not expressed in monetary terms. This view is well illustrated by

⁹⁰D.E. Gerber, *Pindar’s Olympian One: A Commentary*, p. 10.

⁹¹W.J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar*, vol. 2, p. 5.

⁹²H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 487.

a passage from the second *Olympian* ode (53-56) which, again using the imagery of light, states what makes wealth valuable and desirable:

ὁ μὰν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος
φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν
καιρὸν βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν,
ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον
ἀνδρὶ φέγγος·

Wealth ‘embellished with ἀρεταί’ brings the καιρός for various things, supporting eager ambition. This μέριμνα is presumably the same μέριμνα which is described at *Pythian* 8.92 as ‘greater than πλοῦτος’, i.e. ambition for great things, including athletic achievement; μέριμνα occurs in this sense also at *Olympian* 1.108, *Nemean* 3.69, and fragment 227.1, and the language of *Pythian* 8.91-92 is recalled at *Nemean* 9.32-33: ἐντί τοι φίλιπποί τ’ αὐτόθι καὶ κτεάνων ψυχὰς ἔχοντες κρέσσονας | ἄνδρες. The value of wealth, in Pindar’s view, lies in the ability of a wealthy man to engage in such activities as athletic competition (and, of course, to hire a poet like Pindar to celebrate his victories). This is why wealth ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος is described as an ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον | ἀνδρὶ φέγγος; when this language is read in the context of the vision of the after-life in the following lines, it seems hard to deny the mystical connotations of this passage, although Willcock in his recent commentary seems implicitly to distance himself from ‘those scholars who feel that there is here some echo of mystic terminology, anticipating the picture just coming’.⁹³ The combination of wealth, light, and knowledge of life after death in *Olympian* 2.53 ff. is striking, and the opening of the fifth *Isthmian* ode, as has been seen, also endows gold with a sacred significance linked with its radiance and value. Gold, which is conspicuously brilliant, enables a man to become conspicuously successful.⁹⁴

⁹³M.M. Willcock, *Pindar: Victory Odes*, p. 154, citing E. Maass, E. Norden, and N.J. Richardson.

⁹⁴Compare, e.g., *Olympian* 5.15, where ἀμφ’ ἀρεταῖσι πόνος δαπάνη τε μάρναται.

But Pindar specifies at *Olympian* 2.53 that πλούτος must be ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος; Willcock notes that this phrase

does not imply a wealthy man who is also virtuous, except in a special sense of ‘virtuous’, i.e. a wealthy man who has the talents (decisiveness, commitment, ability) that lead to success. All the same, moral implications are not absent; good deeds are the work of a person with ἀρετά, and Theron, the possessor in *O.* 2 of πλούτος ἀρεταῖσι [*sic*] δεδαιδαλμένος, is later praised as a benefactor (εὐεργέτας 94).⁹⁵

A moral component of ἀρεταί here is also perhaps suggested by Pindar’s mention of the good treatment after death of those who ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις (66) and the transportation to the Isle of the Blessed of those who have been able ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν | ψυχάν (69-70) during three lives ‘on either side’, since both of these are among the things that the poet reveals especially to the man who has πλούτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος: εἰ δέ νιν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι ... (56).

Another specific virtue with which Theron is credited in line 94 of the poem is that no-one has a ‘more ungrudging hand’ than he does (ἀφθονέστερόν τε χέρα). This generosity is a consistent characteristic of Pindar’s ideal wealthy man, and is perhaps most fully expressed at *Nemean* 1.31-33:

οὐκ ἔραμαι πολὺν ἐν
 μεγάρῳ πλούτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν,
ἀλλ’ ἐόντων εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκου-
 σαι φίλοις ἐξαρκέων. κοιναὶ γὰρ ἔρχοντ’ ἐλπίδες
πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν.

This passage is cited by Bundy as illustrating the Pindaric idea of εὐεργεσία, ‘good works, liberality, indifference to gain’,⁹⁶ and it is significant that in *Olympian* 2.94 the description of Theron as εὐεργέτας is linked closely (τε) with his ‘ungrudging hand’. An important part of εὐεργεσία in Pindar is what Bundy calls ‘harmony between self-interest and altruism’, or ‘balanced altruism’: ‘One serves one’s own best interests by

⁹⁵Willcock, p. 19.

⁹⁶E.L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, p. 86.

serving those of others'.⁹⁷ This is the point of the κοινὰ ἐλπίδες mentioned at *Nemean* 1.32. The *quid pro quo* arrangement between poet and patron is forcefully expressed in a negative way in the concluding verses of the first *Isthmian* ode:

... εἰ δέ τις ἔνδον νέμει πλούτον κρυφαῖον,
ἄλλοισι δ' ἐμπίπτων γελᾷ, ψυχὰν Ἀίδα τελέων
οὐ φράζεται δόξας ἄνευθεν.

Here the threat of a death δόξας ἄνευθεν is used as an incentive not to hoard wealth; in return for the patron's generosity, the poet will preserve his δόξα.⁹⁸ This theme is elaborated at *Pythian* 1.92-94:

... μὴ δολωθῆς,
ὦ φίλε, κέρδεσιν ἐντραπέ-
λοις· ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας
οἶον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαϊταν μανύει
καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς. οὐ φθίνει Κροί-
σου φιλόφρων ἄρετά.

Again δόξα is cited as a reason not to 'be tricked by gains', and here the λόγοι and ἀοιδοί who will provide the αὔχημα δόξας are mentioned explicitly; generosity is here given the status of an ἄρετά (this particular ἄρετά of Kroisos is recalled in Bakchylides' third ode, which was also composed for Hieron two years after Pindar's first *Pythian*, and which will be discussed below). Bundy distinguishes three 'motives' in the 'praise of wealth and its proper use' in Pindar: εὐεργεσία; 'human expectations (shared humanity, human dependence on God or fate)'; and 'enduring fame'.⁹⁹ But these three motives are more interdependent than Bundy implies: the 'enduring fame' theme falls into the Bundy's category of 'balanced altruism', a characteristic of εὐεργεσία which has its roots in shared humanity (the κοινὰ ἐλπίδες

⁹⁷Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, p. 87.

⁹⁸Indeed, fame is implicitly compared to a kind of πλούτος at *Olympian* 10.86-94: just as an old man is pleased when his wife bears him a son since his πλούτος (88) is now saved for his family, a victor should be pleased with the renown that the poet's song will bring.

⁹⁹Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, p. 86.

of *Nemean* 1.32). And again the imagery of light applies: the gleam of wealth must be seen, not hidden (*Nemean* 1.31 κατακρύψαις, *Isthmian* 1.67 κρυφαῖον). This is part of the ἀρετά (*Pythian* 1.94) that is expected to ‘embellish’ wealth (*Olympian* 2.53), and which wealth makes possible.

Another virtue which should attend wealth is σοφία,¹⁰⁰ in the seventh *Nemean* ode (14-20), the σοφοί understand the common lot of all humans, and are not ‘harmed’ by κέρδος:

ἔργοις δὲ καλοῖς ἔσοπτρον ἴσαμεν ἐνὶ σὺν τρόπῳ,
εἰ Μναμοσύνας ἔκατι λιπαράμπυκος
εὖρηται {τις} ἄποινα μόχθων κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς.
σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα τριταῖον ἄνεμον
ἔμαθον, οὐδ’ ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν·
ἀφνεδς {τε} πενιχρός τε θανάτου παρά
σᾶμα νέονται.

In the absence of any word qualifying a particular field of expertise, Most argues, ‘σοφός in Pindar always describes an intelligent man in general and never exclusively a poet’; in this case, Most suggests that the σοφοί are in fact meant to be patrons of poetry: recognising that death is inevitable, they ‘will use their money to commission epinician odes’, thus gaining a sort of immortality, rather than becoming obsessed with the mere acquisition of wealth (οὐδ’ ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν).¹⁰¹ And this general intelligence, with respect to wealth, consists in recognition of the fact that material prosperity is not an end in itself, but an aid to the achievement of higher things (compare the κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν of *Pythian* 8.92), including success in the games and an appreciation for poetry. These two are shown in the sixth *Pythian* ode

¹⁰⁰See also below, section 4.6, for the significance of σοφία in a civic context.

¹⁰¹G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise*, pp. 145–46. This view was earlier expressed by D. C. Young, ‘Pindar, *Nemean* 7: Some Preliminary Remarks’, and C. Carey, *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar*, p. 142. G. Kirkwood (*Selections from Pindar*, p. 266) argues that the reference of this passage is to the warning about the powers of poetry that follows, but the theme of a patron’s generosity securing his fame is so common in Pindar that here the praise of the sailors for not being greedy seems more naturally taken in this sense.

(47-51) to be closely connected with intelligent use of wealth (note νόω in 47, repeated in 51):

νόω δὲ πλοῦτον ἄγει,
ἄδικον οὐθ' ὑπέροπλον ἦβαν δρέπων,
σοφίαν δ' ἐν μυχοῖσι Πιερίδων·
τίν τ', Ἐλέλιχθον, ἄρχεις δὲ ἱππιᾶν ἐσόδων,
μάλα ἄδόντι νόω, Ποσειδάν, προσέχεται.

This general 'intelligence' is quite different from specific kinds of σοφία: at *Pythian* 3.54, referring to Asklepios' accepting payment to try to bring a man back from the dead, Pindar asserts that ἀλλὰ κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται.

A man who is σοφός will also know the difference between mere material gain and what Pindar calls ὄλβος: this is made clear in the fourth *Pythian* ode, where Jason, 'laid the foundation of wise words' (βάλλετο κρηπίδα σοφῶν ἐπέων, 138) and said (139-41):

ἐντὶ μὲν θνατῶν φρένες ὠκύτεραι
κέρδος αἰνῆσαι πρὸ δίκας δόλιον τρα-
χεῖαν ἐρπόντων πρὸς ἔπιδαν ὁμως·
ἀλλ' ἐμὲ χρὴ καὶ σὲ θεμισσαμένους ὀρ-
γὰς ὑφαίνειν λοιπὸν ὄλβον.

In the passage that follows, Jason offers to let Pelias keep the material wealth which he has taken unjustly: Jason can have ὄλβος without it, as long as he can have the sceptre and the throne which are rightfully his.¹⁰² This conception of ὄλβος as something more than material wealth is obscured by Slater's definition of the term as 'esp. material prosperity'.¹⁰³ [Pindar] defines the man who ὑγίεντα ... ὄλβον ἄρδει as ἐξαρκέων κτεάτεσσι καὶ εὐλογίαν προστιθείς (*Olympian* 5.23-24; compare φίλοις ἐξαρκέων at *Nemean* 1.32, again in the context of winning good repute); wealth is of

¹⁰²Compare *Pythian* 5.14 ff., where Arkesilas' status as a βασιλεὺς is listed as the first component of his ὄλβος, which is itself closely allied with the fact that he is ἐρχόμενος ἐν δίκῃ.

¹⁰³W.J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar*, p. 379.

course necessary for true ὄλβος in Pindar, but it is not enough in itself. The proper use of wealth, which is an aspect of ἀρετά, is a requirement for ὄλβος.

In this respect, Pindar may be said to resemble Solon in Herodotos' story of Solon and Kroisos; ὄλβος is something more than just 'wealth', although Pindar does not stipulate that a man can only be called ὄλβιος once he is dead, as Solon is made to do by Herodotos. Pindar, unlike Herodotos' Solon, believes that ὄλβος can be transitory (*e.g.* *Pythian* 3.105-6 ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται | σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἔπληται), and in this he conforms to what Lévêque calls 'la grande tradition du pessimisme archaïque': however ὄλβος is defined, it may be snatched away without warning by the gods.¹⁰⁴ Fragment 54 of Bakchylides also fits this tradition: ὄλβιος οὐδεὶς βροτῶν πάντα χρόνον. Interestingly, Pindar's quasi-ethical conception of ὄλβος is closer to that found in Solon 13W.3 ff., where ὄλβος is linked both with δόξα ἀγαθή and with just behaviour; here Pindar approaches the real Solon more than he does the Solon in Herodotos.

One might also compare the view expressed in a fragment of Euripides'

Antiope (198 N²):

εἰ δ' εὐτυχῶν τις καὶ βίον κεκτημένος
μηδὲν δόμοισι τῶν καλῶν θηράσεται,
ἐγὼ μὲν αὐτὸν οὔποτ' ὄλβιον καλῶ,
φύλακα δὲ μᾶλλον χρημάτων εὐδαίμονα.

Commenting on this fragment, Kambitsis compares *Olympian* 1.84,¹⁰⁵ where Pelops refuses to be ἀπάντων καλῶν ἄμμορος and calls on Poseidon to help him win Hippodameia as his bride; but also relevant is *Pythian* 11.50-58, where καλά lead to 'greater ὄλβος', which includes the pursuit of ξυναὶ ἀρεταί:

... θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν,

¹⁰⁴P. Lévêque, 'Ὀλβιος et la félicité des initiés', p. 122.

¹⁰⁵J. Kambitsis, *L'Antiope d'Euripide* (Athens, 1972) *ad loc.*

δυνατὰ μαιόμενος ἐν ἀλικίᾳ.
 τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ
 {σὺν} ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων·
 ξυναῖσι δ' ἄμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι· φθονεροὶ δ' ἀμύνονται.
 <ἀλλ'> εἴ τις ἄκρον ἐλὼν
 ἡσυχᾶ τε νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὕβριν
 ἀπέφυγεν, μέλανος {δ'} ἂν ἐσχατιὰν
 καλλίονα θανάτου <στεῖχοι> γλυκυτάτῃ γενεᾷ
 εὐώνυμον κτεάνων κρατίστην χάριν πορώων

(This is the Teubner text; lines 55 ff. are variously emended, but the point (58) once again involves the importance of good reputation and avoidance of excess (αἰνὰν ὕβριν, 54 – cf. αἰανῇ κόρον, *Isthmian* 3.2), and ὄλβος seems to be connected with καλά). And Bakchylides (5.50-53) expresses a thought similar to that in Pindar, *Pythian* 11.50-54:

ὄλβιος ὧτινι θεός
 μοῖράν τε καλῶν ἔπορεν
 σὺν τ' ἐπιζήλῳ τύχῃ
 ἀφνεδὸν βιοτὰν διάγειν· οὐ
 γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων
 πάντα γ' εὐδαίμων ἔφυ.

In all of these cases, ὄλβος is more than wealth, as it is also in *Pythian* 3.88-91, of Peleus and Kadmos, despite Nagy's assertion that here the word is used 'in the immediate sense of "material prosperity"':¹⁰⁶

... λέγονται {γε} μὰν βροτῶν
 ὄλβον ὑπέρτατον οἱ σχεῖν, οἷτε καὶ χρυσαμπύκων
 μελπομενᾶν ἐν ὄρει Μοισᾶν καὶ ἐν ἑπταπύλοις
 ἄϊον Θήβαις ...

The ὄλβος referred to here surely also includes the favour of the gods (Διὸς ... χάριν, 95); their ὄλβος may have been short-lived, but it consisted of more than πλοῦτος. And in the first strophe of the third *Isthmian* ode, ὄλβος is associated with ἀρεταί and good repute among one's fellow citizens arising from victory in the games or 'the strength of wealth', combined with the ability to restrain κόρος, and the poet makes it

¹⁰⁶G. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*, p. 280.

clear that even this ὄλβος will be short-lived if these virtues are not combined with reverence for Zeus:

Εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχίῃσιν ἢ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοισι
ἢ σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φρασὶν αἰαντὴ κόρον,
ἄξιός ἐστι λόγῳ ἀστῶν μεμίσθαι.
Ζεῦ, μεγάλα δ' ἀρετὰ θνατοῖς ἔπονται
ἐκ σέθεν· ζῶει δὲ μάσσων
ὄλβος ὀπιζομένων, πλαγίαις δὲ φρένεσσιν
οὐχ ὁμῶς πάντα χρόνον θάλλων ὁμιλεῖ.

Respect for the rights of all and order in the πόλις are stressed as concomitants of wealth in the thirteenth *Olympian* ode, where Εὐνομία, Δίκη, and Εἰρήνη are listed as inhabitants of Korinth, which can thus (γάρ, 6) be called ὀλβία (3-10):

...γνώσομαι
τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον, Ἰσθμίου
πρόθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος, ἀγλαόκουρον·
ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασι-
γνήτα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,
Δίκη καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰ-
ρήνη, τὰμ' ἀνδράσι πλούτου,
χρύσειαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος·
ἐθέλοντι δ' ἀλέξειν
Ὑβριν, Κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον.

In the ninth *Nemean* ode, the victor Chromios is described as having an ὀλβιον δῶμα (3; compare ὀλβίοις ἐν δώμασι of Herakles at *Nemean* 1.71, also for Chromios; Herakles' home is also a σεμνὸν ... δόμον in the following line) and as having been granted θαυμαστὸν ὄλβον (45). But in this same ode, as has been shown, the inhabitants of Aitna are credited with κτεάνων ψυχᾶς ... κρέσσονας (32), and after mentioning the θαυμαστὸν ὄλβον in line 45, the poet continues (46-47):

εἰ γὰρ ἅμα κτεάνοις πολλοῖς ἐπίδοξον ἄρῃται
κῦδος, οὐκ ἔστι πρόσωθεν θνατὸν ἔτι σκοπιᾶς
ἄλλας ἐφάπασθαι ποδοῖν.

Chromios thus has ὄλβος precisely because (γάρ) he has both material wealth and (ἅμα) the ἀρετὰ which enables him to win κῦδος and δόξα (ἐπίδοξον). Also

emphasised in this ode is Chromios' αἰδώς (equivalent to the 'souls greater than wealth' of 32), which φέρει δόξαν (33-34); contrary to common practice, the poet says (ἄπιστον, 33; for 'common practice' in this context, compare *Pythian* 4.139-40 ἐντὶ μὲν θνατῶν φρένες ὠκύτεραι | κέρδος αἰνῆσαι πρὸ δίκας δόλιον), the victor's αἰδώς has not been stolen away by κέρδος.

Finally, many of these aspects of Pindaric ὄλβος are brought together in the sixth *Isthmian* ode, in a passage which combines generosity with money, ἀρετά, δόξα, and the favour of the gods, which are linked by the progression τε ... καί ... τε, culminating in the definition of this combination as 'the farthest reaches of ὄλβος' (10-13):

εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνῃ τε χαρεῖς
καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτων ἀρετάς
σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐ-
σχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβου
βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἑών.

In the poetry of Bakchylides, the conception of ὄλβος is generally similar, where the context can be determined: at 3.8 a series of divinities is presented as having made Hieron ὄλβιον ... [στεφάνω]ν κυρῆσαι, and at 12.4-8 the city of Aigina is ὀλβία both by reason of the recent victory and because of divine favour:

... ἐς γὰρ ὀλβίαν
ξείνοισί με πότνια Νίκα
νᾶσον Αἰγίνας ἀπάρχει
ἐλθόντα κοσμήσαι θεόδματον πόλιν
τάν τ' ἐν Νεμέᾳ γυιαλκέα μουνόπαλαν

Bakchylides in fact appears to lay less emphasis on the material aspect of ὄλβος than Pindar does; at 15.51-63 Menelaos, addressing the Trojans, begins by associating ὄλβος with Δίκη and then only mentions πλοῦτος in the context of ὕβρις:

Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων ὃς ἅπαντα δέρεται
οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἁχέων,
ἄλλ' ἐν μέσῳ κεῖται κιχεῖν
πάσιν ἀνθρώποις Δίκαν ἰθεῖαν, ἀγνάς
Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτᾶς Θέμιτος·

ὀλβίων παῖδες νιν αἰρεῦνται σύνοικον.
 ἃ δ' αἰόλοις κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφροσύναις
 ἐξαισίοις θάλλουσ' ἀθαμβῆς
 ὕβρις, ἃ πλοῦτ[ο]ν δύνανται τε θοῶς
 ἀλλότριον ὥπασεν, αὐτίς
 δ' ἐς βαθὺν πέμπει φθόρον,
 κε]ῖνα καὶ ὑπερφιάλους
 Γᾶς] παῖδας ὤλεσεν Γίγαντας.

Again, in 5.50-53, quoted above, the progress of thought is from ὀλβος to a μοῖρα ... καλῶν (itself probably a reference to the athletic victory just mentioned, cf. Pindar, *Pythian* 8.88 ὁ δὲ καλόν τι νέον λαχών), and finally a mention of material wealth; no-one, says Bakchylides, can be expected to be blessed with all these (53-55).

Returning to the third ode, there are several observations which can be made about Bakchylides' presentation of wealth and virtue in the poem and its relationship with Pindaric expressions of these ideas. After relating Hieron's status as ὀλβιος to his victory in the games, as mentioned above, the poet then makes the statement that the tyrant οἶδε πυργωθέντα πλοῦτον μὴ μελαμ- | φαρέι κρύπτειν σκότῳ (13-14), Pindaric parallels for which have already been discussed. A description of Hieron's πλοῦτος follows, including ὁ χρυσός, which λάμπει ... μαρμαρυγαῖς (17), again a Pindaric image. But then this splendid wealth is set aside in the statement θεὸν θ[εό]ν τις | ἀγλαΐζεθ' ἄρ' ἄριστος [ὄ]λβων (21-22), again identifying material wealth as a subsidiary component of ὀλβος. To justify this statement (ἐπεὶ, 23), the poet introduces the story of the death of Kroisos, who was involved in Solon's/Herodotos' own re-definition of ὀλβος. Kroisos is saved from death by Zeus and transported to the Hyperboreans by Apollo, the poet says, δι' εὐσέβειαν (61); his εὐσέβεια is demonstrated by the fact that he μέ[γιστα] θνατῶν | ἐς ἀγαθέαν <ἀν>έπεμψε Π[υθ]ῶ (61-62), and Bakchylides praises Hieron for having sent the most offerings to Delphi (63-66). This recalls the theme of not hiding one's wealth in 13-14, and is followed by the advice: ὅσια δρῶν εὐφραίνει θυμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ | κερδέων ὑπέρτατον (83-84);

the greatest of possessions is to do ὄσια, which in this case involves giving away many of one's possessions (compare 21-22). This is what Pindar refers to as the ἀρετά of Kroisos at *Pythian* 1.94 (cf. καὶ θεοφιλῆς καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός at Herodotos 1.87.2).

In the following lines (85-94) Bakchylides recalls the priamel which begins Pindar's first *Olympian* ode, and then addresses Hieron directly:

φρονέοντι συνετὰ γάρυω· βαθὺς μὲν
αἰθήρ ἀμίαντος· ὕδωρ δὲ πόντου
οὐ σάπεται· εὐφροσύνα δ' ὁ χρυσός·
ἀνδρὶ δ' οὐ θέμις, πολὺν π[αρ]έντα
γῆρας, θάλ[εια]ν αὐτὶς ἀγκομίσσαι
ἦβαν. ἀρετὰ[ς γε μ]ὲν οὐ μινύθει
βροτῶν ἅμα σ[ώμ]ατι φέγγος, ἀλλὰ
Μοῦσά νιν τρέφει.] Ἰέρων, σὺ δ' ὄλβου
κάλλιστ' ἐπεδ[εῖξ]ας θνατοῖς
ἄνθεα

Carey and Maehler divide the salient points of lines 85-90 essentially into two groups of two:¹⁰⁷ the αἰθήρ and the ὕδωρ πόντου are distinguished by their everlasting and incorruptible natures, whereas wealth and youth are transitory pleasures. Carey proposes that we 'strip χρυσός of all elemental significance and regard it as a preparation for what follows. The list of imperishable substances contains only two items, air and sea; gold is considered here not as an element but simply as a human possession', and suggests punctuating with a full stop after σάπεται.¹⁰⁸ The main contrast, however, probably begins with ἀνδρὶ δ'; Bakchylides may be implying that gold is 'a joy' as long as one lives (no such qualification is explicitly made – it may be an eternal εὐφροσύνα for gods or humanity in general rather than a transitory one for an individual person), but he still goes on to present the ἀρετά of youth as an even

¹⁰⁷C. Carey, 'Bacchylides 3.85-90', and H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 57-58.

¹⁰⁸Carey, 'Bacchylides 3.85-90', pp. 69-70.

more precious possession. With this we may contrast Pindar's statement that Διὸς παῖς ὁ χρυσός· | κείνον οὐ σῆς οὐδὲ κὺς δάπτει (fr. 222). What Bakchylides does describe as undeniably eternal, when allied with song, is the ἀρετά of mortals: it is this ἀρετά itself, rather than wealth ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος as in Pindar, *Olympian* 2.53-56, which is a φέγγος; it does not waste away along with the human body. (The visual imagery is continued when the poet says that Hieron 'showed' the fairest flowers of ὄλβος.)

This tendency to de-emphasise the importance of wealth, subordinating it to ἀρετά, may be one reason why Bakchylides omits the seer Melampous from the story of the daughters of Proitos in his eleventh ode; by presenting the healing of the daughters as the result of piety (involving Proitos surrendering wealth in the form of cattle by sacrificing them to Artemis) rather than a mercenary transaction from which the seer benefits as in other versions of the myth,¹⁰⁹ the poet implicitly repeats the advice of 3.83-84: ὅσια δρῶν εὐφραίνει θυμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ | κερδέων ὑπέρτατον. The Proitides' offence against Hera in that ode involved the boast that their father was richer than the goddess (50-52) on the basis of her humble wooden temple; taken together with the omission of the Melampous episode, this gives the myth a unity involving the ultimate triumph of piety over greed.

Bakchylides' most forceful statement of the superiority of ἀρετά over wealth occurs in his first ode, beginning with the emphatic lines (159-161):

φαμὶ καὶ φάσω μέγιστον
κῦδος ἔχειν ἀρετάν· πλοῦ-
τος δὲ καὶ δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ

Whereas Pindar stresses the importance of wealth as an aid to, and marker of, ἀρετά, Bakchylides rejects it in favour of a view which, as Maehler notes, is common to

¹⁰⁹Summarized in the introduction to Maehler's commentary (vol. 1, part 2, pp. 196 ff.).

Solon and the Theognidea, and which contradicts Hesiod's πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ¹¹⁰ (*Works and Days* 313; but note that in that passage, Hesiod is referring to πλούτος won by honest toil, something to which, presumably, Bakchylides' δειλοί would not be inclined – cf. 181 ἀρετὰ δ' ἐπίμοχθος). Bakchylides continues, saying (162-64) that πλούτος

ἐθέλει δ' αὔξειν φρένας ἄν-
δρός· ὁ δ' εὖ ἔρδων θεοὺς
ἐλπίδι κυδρότερᾳ
σαίνει κέαρ.

With these lines may be compared 3.21-22 and 83-84, quoted above; coming after the statement that ἀρετὰ has 'the greatest κῦδος' in 159-60, it seems that Bakchylides is defining the ἀγαθός as one who εὖ ἔρδει θεοὺς (note κυδρότερᾳ in 164).

Superficially reminiscent of 1.159 ff. (Maehler simply comments on 1.161-63 'Reichtum kann auch der Unwürdige besitzen (vgl. 10.50f.)') is 10.49-51:

οἶδα καὶ πλούτου μεγάλην δύνασιν,
ἃ καὶ τ[ὸ]ν ἀχρεῖον τί[θησ]ι
χρηστόν.

But what Bakchylides apparently says here is radically different from the passage in the first ode: in this case, it seems, wealth really does make a man χρηστός; it does not simply δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὀμιλεῖ. This sentence does not mean, as Maehler suggests, 'daß Reichtum auch dem Unwürdigen zufallen und ihm mehr Prestige einbringen kann als ihm zukommt':¹¹¹ the ἀχρεῖος does, according to this passage, become χρηστός, and the poet has just asserted that τὸ μὲν κάλλιστον, ἐσθλὸν | ἄνδρα πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων πολυζήλωτον εἶμεν (47-48). There is no indication that the wealthy man may not be what he seems after the transformation which is

¹¹⁰Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 21.

¹¹¹Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 192.

effected by the power of wealth: when he is rich, he is χρηστός by virtue of his riches, and this sentiment is unique in the poetry of Bakchylides.

It may be that Bakchylides is tending here towards the Pindaric theme that wealth enables one to achieve ἀρετά, but rather than explaining this or elaborating the subject he immediately interrupts himself (51-52): τί μακρὰν γ[λ]ῶ[σ]σαν ἰθύσας ἐλαύνω | ἐκτὸς ὁδοῦ; Perhaps the audience is intended to infer from the poet's prior remarks on the mutability of fate (45-47 τὸ μέλλον | δ' ἀκρίτους τίκτει τελευτάς, | πᾶ τύχα βρίσκει – and compare θυμὸν αὖξουσιν with 1.162 ἐθέλει δ' αὖξιν φρένας) that wealth, desirable and empowering as it is, may disappear as suddenly as it is acquired; with the interruption in lines 51-52 Bakchylides effectively stops himself from introducing a note of gloom by stating this logical conclusion (hence his reluctance to drive his tongue 'straight', ἰθύσας). Although the poem is lost beyond line 56, the words which do survive in the last few lines (νίκας ... εὐφροσύνα, αὐλῶν) suggest that the poet turns to the happy subject of the victory celebration, which may explain his omission of the less cheerful implications of his train of thought, although he does not avoid implications like these elsewhere (cf. 5.53-55 and fragment 54). There may also be an implied contrast between being ἐσθλός and merely being χρηστός.

In his second *Isthmian* ode (6-13 quoted below), Pindar declares that men of old used to compose heartfelt love-songs for their beloveds, and their Muse was not merely a means to financial gain. Pindar then quotes a saying of the Argive Aristodamos (cf. Alkaios 360 L-P, itself quoted in the scholia to Pindar's lines and discussed in 4.4 above) which is similar to the sentiment at Bakchylides 10.49-51:

ἃ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς
 πω τότε' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις·
 οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖ-
 αι μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας
 ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί.
 νῦν δ' ἐφίητι (τὸ) τώργειου φυλάξαι
 ῥῆμ' ἀλαθείας (ᾗ) ἄγχιστα βαῖνον,

‘χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ’
 ὃς φᾶ κτεάνων θ’ ἅμα λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων.
 ἐσσι γὰρ ὧν σοφός· οὐκ ἄγνωτ’ αἰεὶ δὴ
 Ἴσθμίαν ἵπποισι νίκαν

Condemning the modern Muse’s mercenary tendency, Pindar presents her as approving of the saying ‘χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ’, and then mentions that Aristodamos himself was bereft of money and friends when he made the statement, and thus presumably bemoaning society’s tendency to respect wealth alone. Likewise, Pindar condemns the mercenary Muse: by saying that Aristodamos’ words come ‘very close’ to the truth (ῥῆμ’ ἀλαθείας ... ἄγχιστα βαῖνον), Pindar implies that they are not absolutely true.¹¹² By line 10 he has painted a picture of the Muse which will lead his audience to view with suspicion any maxim which *she* supports, and there is no need for the poet himself to be as explicit in his criticism as, for example, Simonides is of Pittakos (*PMG* 542.11-12 οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον | νέμεται ...).

The poet then changes the subject to the victory he is commemorating, just as Bakchylides in his tenth ode interrupts himself and then apparently sings of the victory celebration. Pindar says ἐσσι γὰρ ὧν σοφός, implying that the recipient of the the second *Isthmian* is intelligent enough to see the connection between Aristodemos’ complaint and Pindar’s own – both are spoken by the proponents of non-monetary values in a world which appears to value only money. The ode is in honour of Xenokrates of Akragas (also the *laudandus* of the sixth *Pythian*), but this proem is addressed to his son Thrasyboulos, who is also apostrophised in the sixth

¹¹²Definendo non *vera*, ma *vicinissima al vero* la massima di Aristodamo ..., Pindaro sottolinea che in realtà l’uomo si identifica col suo valore, non con le sue ricchezze: ricchezza e compenso dovrebbero essere un segno dell’onore dovuto all’uomo di valore’ (Privitera, *Pindaro: le Istmiche*, p. 159). Thummer (*Pindar: die isthmischen Gedichte*, vol. 2, p. 41) contrasts Pindar’s expression ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον at *Olympian* 10.54. Alkaios, on the other hand, apparently approved of the saying; see above, section 4.4.

Pythian, and for whom Pindar composed the *enkomion* fr. 124. Xenokrates and Thrasyboulos, whose home is proclaimed to be familiar with song (lines 30-32), will see the point of Pindar's proem.¹¹³ In Bakchylides 10.38 ff. a list of human ἐπιστᾶμαι, beginning with mention of a σ[ο]φός man, precedes the poet's somewhat puzzling and abruptly discontinued remarks about wealth. In these two poems, the listener is left to draw his own conclusion as to the relationships between wealth and virtue in the poets' thought; if he is σοφός, he will understand what Pindar and Bakchylides mean, and the nature of this σοφίη forms the subject of the next section.

4.6 Σοφίη

At Theognidea 873-76, the poet addresses wine and says that it is both ἐχθρός and φίλος, both ἐσθλός and κακός; the quatrain ends with the question

... τίς ἂν σέ γε μωμήσαιτο,
τίς δ' ἂν ἐπαινῆσαι μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης;

A man who is σοφός, then, will recognize the fact that wine contains both elements of each of two pairs of opposites. Edmunds applies this maxim more generally to the problem of 'good' qualities and 'bad' ones in the Theognidea: 'Theognis holds that *sophiē* is what orients one with respect to these polarities. ... it is the highest political virtue'.¹¹⁴

¹¹³*Pythian* 11.41 ff. also draws attention to the fact that the poet is being paid for his ode; line 45 τῶν εὐφροσύνα τε καὶ δόξ' ἐπιφλέγει implies that the money is well spent.

¹¹⁴L. Edmunds, 'The Genre of Theognidean Poetry', p. 104.

But σοφίη in early poetry usually refers to a specific area of expertise, often musical or poetic skill: *Hymn to Hermes* 483, 511; Solon 13.52;¹¹⁵ Sappho 56 (probably poetic skill); Ibykos *S* 151.23-27; Xenophanes 2.12 and 14. Sometimes it refers to some other skill which is specified as in *Iliad* 15.412 (of a carpenter; the only occurrence of σοφίη in the Homeric epics)¹¹⁶ or Archilochos fr. 211 (of a helmsman). The earliest indications in archaic poetry of σοφίη meaning anything other than some specific talent are Solon 27.16 (in the ninth age of man his γλῶσσα τε καὶ σοφίη are μαλακώτερα in the pursuit of μεγάλη ἀρετή)¹¹⁷ and Alkaios 39(a).9, where a σοφός man is described as one with φρέσι πύκνα[ισι]; this more general meaning recurs in Simonides *PMG* 542.12, where Pittakos is described as a σοφὸς φῶς.

The verse inscriptions of this period almost all use σοφία in its more specific sense; sometimes the skill in question is specified, as in *CEG* 62 (Peiraieus, ca 510-500) μνῆμα τόδ' Αἰνέο σοφίας ἱατρο ἀρίστο or 111 (Tanagra, ca 500?) [π]αῖδες ἐ[ποίησ]αν μνᾶμ' ἐνθάδ[ε] πατρὶ θανόντι | Γ[α]θ[ον]ι χσενίαν ἡποσύναν τε σοφοῖ. In other cases the skill is only implied, particularly when craftsmen are boasting of their expertise in creating fine objects for dedication to a god: *CEG* 291 (Athens, late sixth century) ἄνδρες ἐποίησαν σοφίαισιν καλὸν ἄγαλμα, 340 (Boiotia, late fifth

¹¹⁵Later, in *CEG* 82 (Attica, ca 450-425?), Solon's phrase σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος is used with a more general meaning to describe a young man who died fighting for his country.

¹¹⁶Σοφός appears with a similar meaning in other verses ascribed to Homer: fr. 22 Allen (also of a τέκτων), and fr. 2 of the *Margites* (seventh or sixth century): τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα | οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν· πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης.

¹¹⁷Gladigow writes (*Sophia und Kosmos*, p. 19) that in this case σοφίη 'ist die Erkenntnis der Maße und Grenzen, die es dem Menschen ermöglicht, das Handeln unter die Dike zu stellen, sich in die waltende Ordnung einzufügen', and comments that 'hier σοφίη zum ersten Male in der Geschichte des Begriffs weder ein sachgerichtetes Wissen noch das Wissen des Dichters bezeichnet. Σοφίη ist allgemeiner Begriff geworden für das Vermögen des Menschen, die Grenzen des ihm Gesetzten in den Dingen und Ereignissen zu erkennen. Für diese σοφίη, die in der Gestalt des Solon wohl ihre höchste Ausprägung gefunden hat, ist die gesamte Elegie [*i.e.*, fr. 27] ... ein gutes Beispiel: Sogar den Tod weiß Solon in die Ordnung des Lebens einzubeziehen, man erreicht ihn κατὰ μέτρον und οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος'. Gladigow also connects the Solonian σοφίη with the νόος ἄρτιος of Solon 6.4.

century?)]ς ἐδάε σοφίαν παρὰ πα[τρός?], 387 (Elis, *ca* 500 or *ca* 450?) ἀνέθεκε | αὐτὸς ποιέ[σ]ας· ... ἔ[χ]ει σοφίαν, 425 (Chios, *ca* 550-530?) Μικκιά[δης τόδ' ἄγα]λμα καλὸν π[οίησε καὶ] ἡυιὸς] | ... σο[φ]ίεισιν. And so in other dedicatory inscriptions where σοφία is mentioned but where the exact context has been lost (*CEG* 252, 306), the word may well refer to the skill of a craftsman; *CEG* 230 (Athens, *ca* 500-480?) mentions οἱ σοφοί and σοφίζεσθαι in connection with τέχνη. In *CEG* 270 (Athens, 477/6, perhaps by Simonides himself, as suggested by Gallavotti) the σοφία in question appears to be musical skill:

[νικέ]σας ἡό[δε προ]τον Ἀθένεσ[ιν χο]ρῶι ἀνδρῶ[ν]
 [ἀσκε]τῆς¹¹⁸ σοφ[ίας] τόνδ' ἀνέθε[κ]εν ἡόρον
 [εὐχσ]άμενο[ς· π]λείστοις δὲ [χ]οροῖς ἔχσο κατὰ φύ[λα]
 [ἀνδ]ρῶν νι[κῆ]σαί φεσι π[ερ]ὶ τρίποδος.

The only extant verse inscription of this period in which σοφός appears to have moved from its older definition of 'skilled' in a particular area or expertise to a more general meaning is *CEG* 136 (Argolis, *ca* 525-500?), where a young man who died in battle is described as having been an ἄνδρα ἀ[γα]θ[ό]ν, ... σόφρονα, ἀεθλοφόρον, καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικίαι. Friedländer and Hoffleit comment that 'σοφὸν ἡλικίαι means that he was distinguished for his achievements among his friends. ἔξοχος ἡλικίας in [*CEG* 31] is a similar close';¹¹⁹ no further specification seems to be required in this case.¹²⁰

Σοφίη, σοφός, and related words appear in eighteen passages (using West's divisions of the poems) in the Theognidea, of which only three (19, 120, and 370) are in poems which West attributes to Theognis himself. In some of its occurrences in

¹¹⁸This is the supplement proposed by C. Gallavotti, 'Letture epigrafiche', p. 168, and accepted by Hansen in his addenda to *CEG* (in *CEG* 2, pp. 299-305); ἀσκε]τῆς might also be possible.

¹¹⁹Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, p. 126.

¹²⁰This epitaph is also mentioned above, in section 2.4.

the Theognidea, σοφίη denotes poetic or musical skill (19, 770, 942, 995). Σοφίη also occurs in the following passage, in which it is likely to have the same meaning (789-94):

μήποτε μοι μελέδημα νεώτερον ἄλλο φανείη
 ἀντ' ἀρετῆς σοφίης τ', ἀλλὰ τόδ' αἰὲν ἔχων
 τερποίμην φόρμιγγι καὶ ὀρχηθμῶ καὶ ἀοιδῇ,
 καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιμι νόον,
 μήτε τινα ξείνων δηλεύμενος ἔργμασι λυγροῖς
 μήτε τιν' ἐνδήμων, ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐών.

Although van Groningen follows some manuscripts in not printing the τ' in line 790 and explains the phrase ἀρετῆς σοφίης as one genitive depending on another,¹²¹ and Patzer treats the τ' as epexegetic,¹²² it is perhaps best to read τ' as a simple conjunctive; the poet has a concern for ἀρετή and σοφίη, and these two notions are expanded chiasmatically in the following two verses. The poet displays his σοφίη in his appreciation (τερποίμην) of music, and his ἀρετή in the maintenance of an ἐσθλὸν ... νόον when he is μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.¹²³

In other places σοφίη seems to have a more general meaning (218 (*cf.* 1074), 564-65, 682, 1060, 1159, 1389). At 902 οὐδεὶς δ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸς ἅπαντα σοφός we find it meaning 'skilled' in some area of expertise; the expression 'no one can be σοφός in everything' agrees with the earlier sense of σοφίη as 'practical mastery of a given subject'.¹²⁴ Edmunds argues that σοφίη in the Theognidea, while retaining its

¹²¹Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 304; he suggests that 'une précision de ἀρετή par σοφίη [*i.e.* "la vertu de la sagesse", c'est à dire "la perfection qui caractérise le sage"] est plus logique et plus naturelle que l'autre [*i.e.* "la sagesse de la vertu"]'.

¹²²H. Patzer, 'Der archaische Areté-Kanon im Corpus Theognideum', p. 217.

¹²³Van Groningen's objection that 'Les singuliers μελέδημα et τόδε suggèrent plutôt la mention d'un objet que de deux' (*Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 304) is no obstacle to this interpretation: the poet sees ἀρετή and σοφίη as separate concepts which are, nevertheless, both part of one μελέδημα.

¹²⁴H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 239. *Cf.* Pindar, *Nemean* 1.25 τέχναι δ' ἐτέρων ἕτεραι.

basic meaning of ‘skilled’ or ‘knowledgeable’ especially in the area of poetry, is a key-word which characterizes the aristocratic circle to which the Theognidean poems are addressed. At 563-66 an ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ is seen as a source of σοφίη:¹²⁵

κεκλήσθαι δ’ ἐς δαῖτα, παρέζεσθαι δὲ παρ’ ἐσθλὸν
 ἄνδρα χρεὼν σοφίην πᾶσαν ἐπιστάμενον.
 τοῦ συνιεῖν, ὅποταν τι λέγῃ σοφόν, ὄφρα διδαχθῆς,
 καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰς οἶκον κέρδος ἔχων ἀπίης.

It is important to note that here reference is made to πᾶσα σοφίη; this is not simply musical skill, but ‘the *whole* of σοφίη’, the preserve of an ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ. Battisti defines σοφίη here as ‘aristocratic and exclusive mastery of a certain “knowledge”’ and τι ... σοφόν as ‘the message of a shared ethical code’; συνιεῖν is ‘the decodification [*sic*] of the message, which requires the right knowledge’.¹²⁶ Further, the context of the quatrain is the symposium, where σοφίη might otherwise be expected to refer especially musical skill, as it does in Solon’s metrically identical σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος (13.52); but in this Theognidean passage, the δαῖς is the *locus* for another kind of aristocratic σοφίη as well. As Euenos writes (fr. 4), those who have this σοφίη will recognize others of their own kind:

ἡγοῦμαι σοφίης εἶναι μέρος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον
 ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν οἶος ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ.

Gladigow points to a similar use in Pindar, *Pythian* 5.12-13 σοφοὶ δέ τοι κάλλιον | φέροντι καὶ τὰν θεόσδοτον δύναμιν, where he says that σοφός represents ‘eine Mittelstellung zwischen “Aristokrat” und “Wissendem”’;¹²⁷ Pindar’s application of σοφία comes close to that found in the Theognidea, although in Pindar the virtue is more firmly grounded in its references to specific skills. It is attributed to a doctor at

¹²⁵Edmunds, ‘The Genre of Theognidean Poetry’, p. 109.

¹²⁶D. Battisti, ‘Συνετός as Aristocratic Self-Description’, p. 8.

¹²⁷Gladigow, *Sophia und Kosmos*, p. 42, n. 4.

Pythian 3.54, a charioteer at *Pythian* 5.115, a helmsman at *Nemean* 7.17, and to Oidipous as a skilled interpreter of oracles at *Pythian* 4.263. At *Pythian* 3.113 the work of poets creating songs is compared to that of τέκτονες σοφοί, and poetic skill is frequently the quality referred to by Pindaric σοφία. As in the Theognidea (exemplified by 563-66, discussed above), it is this meaning that serves as a boundary where the ‘skill’ can become a political virtue.¹²⁸ Again as in the Theognidea, the σοφοί are both the sources and the receptors of σοφία; those who appreciate the poet’s σοφία are themselves σοφοί (e.g. *Pythian* 9.78). And in their capacity as σοφοί, they possess a high social value, as is made clear in the final epode of the fourth *Pythian* ode, with reference to the re-integration of the exiled Damophilos into a cultured aristocracy (vv. 293-297):

... ἄλλ’ εὖχεται οὐλομέναν νοῦ-
 σον διαντλήσαις ποτέ
 οἶκον ἰδεῖν, ἐπ’ Ἀπόλλω-
 νόσ τε κράνα συμποσίας ἐφέπων
 θυμὸν ἐκδόσθαι πρὸς ἥβαν πολλάκις, ἔν τε σοφοῖς
 δαιδαλέαν φόρμιγγα βαστάζων πολί-
 ταις ἡσυχία θιγέμεν,
 μήτ’ ὦν τινι πῆμα πορών, ἀπαθῆς δ’ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀστῶν

These σοφοί are essentially the ἀγαθοί that Damophilos has ceased to strive against in 285: οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, the ruling élite. Σοφός can be seen here in the ‘Mittelstellung’ referred to by Gladigow, cited above, and it is this that allows Pindar to write of these σοφοί ‘watching over’ a city at *Pythian* 2.88. This prosperity and power have been highlighted earlier in the second *Pythian*, in the gnomic statement at line 56 τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχῃ πότμου σοφίας ἄριστον, and the equation of these

¹²⁸W. Donlan (*The Aristocratic Ideal*, p. 105), discussing the significance for Pindar of σοφία as a component of athletic excellence, notes that ‘Pindar, like Theognis, makes wisdom an important attribute of the *agathos*, but he does so less contentiously and more confidently than Theognis. The latter neglected physical prowess in favor of mental qualities, but Pindar displays no sense of tension between physical and mental *aretai*. Physical and intellectual ability, recognition among one’s peers and in the polis are all combined harmoniously in Pindar’.

virtues is also made at *Olympian* 5.16 ἡὖ δ' ἔχοντες σοφοὶ καὶ πολίταις ἔδοξαν ἔμμεν. This political use of the term σοφός and its derivatives, which is foreign to the use of the words in earlier poetry and to their use in the extant verse inscriptions of this period, represents an aristocratic ideology of proper conduct rooted in the 'wisdom' of music and culture.

4.7 Σωφροσύνη

Another prominent virtue of the Theognidean ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός is that of σωφροσύνη.¹²⁹ North argues that although σωφροσύνη appears in the Homeric epics (*Iliad* 21.462, *Odyssey* 4.158, 23.13 and 30), it does not carry a moral sense in Homer; 'in three of the four passages it clearly denotes "prudence" or "shrewdness" in one's own interest – a meaning that it never entirely loses'.¹³⁰ She agrees with Adkins that σωφροσύνη is less valued in the Homeric heroes than martial and competitive excellence,¹³¹ but her assertion that the appearances of this virtue in verse epitaphs (to be discussed below) 'testify to a new kind of *aretê* to take the place of the heroic ideal, a new balance of the physical and the intellectual'¹³² is unjustified in that, in Schofield's words, 'the Homeric hero is heroic in mind as well as in action'.¹³³

¹²⁹Σωφροσύνη, σώφρων, and σαόφρων can be found at lines 41, 379, 431, 437, 454, 483, 497, 665, 701, 754, 756, 1138, and 1326.

¹³⁰H.F. North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 3.

¹³¹North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 2; Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 61.

¹³²North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 13.

¹³³Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*', p. 31.

Citing *Iliad* 1.258 and 490-91, 2.200-202, 2.272-74, 6.77-79, 9.53-54 and 438-43, and 18.105-106, Schofield shows that '[e]xcellence in counsel is often coupled with prowess in fighting as one of the two chief ways in which a man may outshine his peers'.¹³⁴ Εὐβουλία is, of course, quite different from σωφροσύνη, but Schofield's discussion does at least demonstrate that the 'balance of the physical and the intellectual' referred to by North is not entirely 'new', although the moral element involved in σωφροσύνη¹³⁵ may be.

It is striking that all of the verse epitaphs of this period which mention σωφροσύνη, except one, are Attic: *CEG* 34 and 36 (both *ca* 530?) σεμ' ἀγαθὸ καὶ σόφρονος ἀνδρός (probably also *CEG* 16 (*ca* 550?)¹³⁶); 41 (*ca* 530-520?) ἀντ' ἀρετῆς ἐδὲ σαοφροσύνης; 58 (*ca* 510-500?) σοφροσύνης ἔνεκεν ἐδ' ἀρετῆς; 67 (*ca* 500?) [σό]φρον, εὐ[χσύν]ετος, χσε[νικό]ς, πι[νυ]τός, τὰ κάλ' [εἰδό]ς; 69 (*ca* 500?) σόφρο[να κ]αὶ πινυτόν, πᾶσαν ἔχοντ' ἀρετέν;¹³⁷ probably 81 (*ca* 450-25?) - οσ]ύνης ἀρετῆς τε; 102 (*ca* 400?) πότνια Σωφροσύνη, θύγατερ μεγαλόφρονος Αἰδῶς; 440 (*ca* 480, to be discussed below); and 136 (Argolis, *ca* 525-500?) σόφρονα, ἀεθλοφόρον καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικία.¹³⁸ This apparent regional emphasis (thirteen out of fourteen occurrences of the virtue, if we include *CEG* 22) led North to assert that

¹³⁴Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*', p. 9.

¹³⁵Which is later made explicit in *e.g.* *CEG* 102 (Attica, *ca* 400?), where Σωφροσύνη is identified as the daughter of Αἰδῶς and praised alongside εὐπόλεμος Ἀρετή.

¹³⁶If the supplement ἀγαθὸ καὶ [σόφρονος ἀνδρός] is correct, as seems likely.

¹³⁷It should be noted that *CEG* 67 and 69 do not show North's 'balance of the physical and the intellectual'; none of the qualities listed for the two dead men could be described as 'physical'.

¹³⁸Σώφρων also occurs in the fragmentary Attic epitaph *CEG* 30 (*ca* 535-530), and perhaps in 22 (Attica, *ca* 550-530?)]φορ[. These two examples, in which little context has survived, are difficult to use.

although the bulk of our evidence for Attic *sophrosyne* belongs to the period after the Persian wars, the epitaphs of the type mentioned above suggest that in the archaic age *sophrosyne* had already begun to be, not just the most Hellenic virtue, ... but the most Athenian as well.¹³⁹

But Wallace disagrees, arguing that '[w]hen the word itself, rare in our Homer ... and absent from Hesiod and Solon, becomes common about the middle of the sixth century, it shows no particular regional affinities'.¹⁴⁰ Wallace notes the fact that the root of the word appears in much non-Attic poetry, and concludes that 'neither idea nor word has specifically Athenian origins'. But although the word's origins may not be Attic, the fact that only one surviving non-Attic epitaph from this period mentions *σωφροσύνη* as one of the dead man's virtues does perhaps suggest that the Athenians laid greater emphasis on this quality than did other Greek states.¹⁴¹

If this is the case, however, one might well ask why the word does not appear in the extant poetry of Solon, who might be expected to have been concerned with *σωφροσύνη*. North suggests that Solon's 'adoption of the Mean in political life marks him as the first spokesman for Athenian *sophrosyne*',¹⁴² but this does not explain why the word itself (which was certainly current in the epitaphs contemporary with Solon) is absent from what we have of Solon's poetry. One possibility is suggested by the appearance of *σαόφρονες* at Theognis 41 *ἄστοι μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἶδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ | τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν*. As was mentioned above, with the deictic *οἶδε* the poet seems to be referring to the aristocratic circle at the *symposion*; if *σώφρων* was being applied by the upper classes

¹³⁹North, *Sophrosyne*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁴⁰M.B. Wallace, 'Early Greek Grave Epigrams', p. 101, n. 7.

¹⁴¹Also notable is the fact that although *σωφροσύνη* appears as early as Semonides (7.108) as a feminine virtue, it does not appear in any of the epitaphs for women which survive from our period.

¹⁴²North, *Sophrosyne*, pp. 14-15.

to themselves as a sort of catchword,¹⁴³ Solon might have avoided the word deliberately because of these connotations.¹⁴⁴ It is worth noting that four of the six Attic epitaphs that mention the dead person's σωφροσύνη come from within Athens itself (*CEG* 34, 41, 69, and ?16); this suggests perhaps that σωφροσύνη was given more emphasis in the urban environment (in which the aristocratic *symposia* would have had more prominence) than by the rural residents.

North has already been quoted as writing that 'the bulk of our evidence for Attic sophrosyne belongs to the period after the Persian wars',¹⁴⁵ but this statement is not in fact true of the appearances of this virtue in the verse inscriptions; eleven (of which ten are Attic) of the fourteen inscriptions cited here pre-date the Persian Wars. The dates given for the Attic epitaphs seem to indicate that σωφροσύνη began commonly to be praised under the tyranny, where such a quality might well have been valued,¹⁴⁶ and continued into the democratic period, although with a greatly reduced frequency. North comments that the virtue of σωφροσύνη in the sixth and fifth centuries

became part of what may, with some reservations, be called the aristocratic Dorian ethical tradition Yet the potentialities of sophrosyne were so great that it did not remain frozen in the Dorian ethical system but continued to develop, even as Greek political forms developed, and always kept in close

¹⁴³Compare Theognidea 753-56, where it is said that a man who is σώφρων will obtain riches only δικαίως; as has been discussed above, the men who were trying to establish themselves as ἀγαθοί opposed themselves to the so-called κακοί who did not always make their wealth δικαίως.

¹⁴⁴Anhalt discusses Solon's rejection of the aristocrats' sympotic model of society on the grounds that it 'fails to account for the fact that, in the *polis*, members of all levels of society will be present, not only the aristocrats' (*Solon the Singer*, p. 93); the view of σωφροσύνη presented here would reinforce her argument.

¹⁴⁵North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁶This is also true of oligarchy, and North (*Sophrosyne*, p. 44) points to the Athenian decree concerning Miletos (*IG* I² 22 (450-49), where 'the words ἐὰν δὲ σοφρονῶ[σι] (line 82) may be a warning to the oligarchs in Miletus that they will receive Athenian support so long as they display what they claim as the characteristic virtue of oligarchy – sophrosyne.'

touch with the evolution of the Athenian *polis*.¹⁴⁷

The truth of this last statement depends on how ‘keeping in close touch’ is defined; but it is surely inconsistent with the fact that σωφροσύνη, despite its middle- to late-sixth century frequency in Attic verse inscriptions, all but disappears from inscribed epigram after the Persian Wars.

In his commentary on *CEG* 81, a distich of which only the fragment]ύνες ἀρετῆς τε survives from the end of the first verse and]μον from the end of the second, Hansen justifies his opinion that the inscription is a private rather than a public epitaph with the statement that ‘verbum imperfectum versus prioris est aut σαοφροσ]ύνες ... aut δικαιοσ]ύνες ..., quorum neutrum in epitaphio publico exspectandum est’. Certainly the epitaphs universally attribute σωφροσύνη to individuals rather than groups (unlike, *e.g.*, ἀρετή, which can be attributed to a group of soldiers, as in *CEG* 10); in contrast, σωφροσύνη is seen as a collective Spartan virtue most prominently in the speech of Archidamos at Thucydides 1.80 ff., where the speaker is introduced as Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων, and in which he emphasises σωφροσύνη at 84.1-3.¹⁴⁸ In this context the inscription *CEG* 440 (Athens, *ca* 480) appears unusual:

σοφροσ{σ}ύνεν ἐνὶ κλα[.....]μίλα[.....]
[ἡελλᾶς ἐλε]υθερίας καλὸν ἔχει στέφανον.

Hansen cites the Simonidean epigrams 8, 10, 15, 34, 54 Page and Timotheos *PMG* 788 in support of his contention that the supplement [ἡελλᾶς ...] ‘certum esse videtur’ despite, for example, Gallavotti’s ... ἐνὶ κλα[δὶ σ]μίλα[κος δς φορεῖ] | [οὔτος ἐλε]υθερίας Dover comments that ‘the point of the graffito as a whole is not very

¹⁴⁷North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁸The Corinthians are presented as appealing to this Spartan virtue at 68.1 (σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε), and ἀριστοκρατία itself is σώφρων at 3.82.8. The historian writes at 8.24.4 that Χίοι ... μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἡύδαιμόνησάν τε ἄμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν.

clear',¹⁴⁹ and it seems that its oddity is further increased by the fact that if, as seems likely, the supplement [ἡλλάς ...] is correct or at least reflects the sense of the inscription, it is the only verse inscription from our period that appears to present σωφροσύνη as a collective virtue.

Bakchylides only refers to the virtue of σωφροσύνη once, but it is an instructive passage. At 13.186, Εὐνομία ... σαόφρων is listed along with Ἀρετά and Εὐκλεία as those who govern the *polis*; significant here is the association of Εὐνομία with a sympotic context, which is then generalised to include the city as a whole:

Εὐνομία τε σαόφρων,
ἃ θαλίας τε λέλογχεν
ἄστεά τ' εὐσεβέων
ἄνδρων ἐν εἰ[ρ]ήνῃ φυλάσσει

Pindar fr. 52a also probably has σαό]φρονος ... εὐνομίας, and there again the expression follows closely after mention of the δαῖτα φιλησιστέφανον. Of the four other occurrences of the adjective in Pindar (he does not use the noun), three are closely related to questions of political leadership, in that they are attributions of the virtue of σωφροσύνη to the mythical founders and past rulers of the cities being celebrated: *Isthmian* 8.26, *Paian* 9.46, and *Partheneion* 2.62; the use of the word in fr. 52a, mentioned above, also implicitly fits this model. The other use of the adjective is at *Pythian* 3.63 ff.:

εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον ἔναι' ἔτι Χίρων, καί τί οἱ
φύλτρον (ἐν) θυμῷ μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι
ἀμέτεροι τίθεν, ἰατῆρά τοι κέν νιν πίθον
καί νυν ἐσλοῖσι παρασχεῖν ἀνδράσιν θερμᾶν νόσων
ἢ τινα Λατοῖδα κεκλημένον ἢ πατέρος.

Although Cheiron's special σοφία would at first glance appear to be more relevant here than his σωφροσύνη, he is here invoked in his capacity not simply as healer but

¹⁴⁹K.J. Dover, *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. 222.

also as teacher, a figure appropriate to introduce into a victory ode for a leader such as Hieron.

In the literary poetry of our period, it is primarily in the Theognidea that the virtue of σωφροσύνη seems to be given emphasis as an essential quality; wherever it occurs in the Theognidea, it appears on its own, not linked explicitly to any other virtue, as it is in the apparently formulaic phrase ἀγαθὸ καὶ σόφρωνος ἀνδρός in *CEG* 34, 36, and ?16. In fact, σωφροσύνη never appears on its own as a term of praise in the epitaphs of this period. Unlike *e.g.* ἀγαθός in *CEG* 14 (Attica, *ca* 560-550?) and 42 (Attica, *ca* 525?) or καλός in *CEG* 68 (Attica, *ca* 500?), σωφροσύνη, it appears, cannot stand alone as a virtue. We have seen that σώφρων is at least twice, probably three times (*CEG* 34, 36, and ?16) paired with ἀγαθός, and σωφροσύνη twice (*CEG* 41 and 58) with ἀρετή. In two Attic inscriptions of *ca* 500 (*CEG* 67 and 69) the adjective σώφρων is found in proximity to πινυτός (and other virtues, in 67). In Attica at this period, σωφροσύνη seems to have been something of a complementary virtue to ἀρετή;¹⁵⁰ it is a term of commendation, but does not have on its own the sort of impact that ἀγαθός, for example, did. There is only one verse inscription in which σωφροσύνη appears alone; this is *CEG* 440, whose other peculiarities have been mentioned above.

Adkins comments on *Seven Against Thebes* 610 (of Amphiaraus) σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ: 'clearly being *sophron* and *dikaaios* is distinct from being *agathos* in Aeschylus' mind; so that they are evidently not part of *arete*'.¹⁵¹ While Adkins is correct in saying that in this case σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are

¹⁵⁰ Peek comments that the simply-phrased *CEG* 36 notes only 'daß dieser Tote dem attischen Ideal der Vereinigung von verständigem Sinn (Selbstbeherrschung) und tapferem Verhalten vor dem Feind entsprochen hat' (*Griechische Grabgedichte*, p. 8), though ἀγαθὸ need not refer here simply to martial valour.

¹⁵¹ A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour*, p. 94.

‘distinct’ from ἀρετή, there is no evidence that they are ‘not part’ of it;¹⁵² while σωφροσύνη may be a less active virtue than ἀρετή, the frequency of the pairing of the two qualities in the epitaphs shows that it was commonly thought of as complementary to ἀρετή.

Summary

Poetic representations of the citizen’s excellence, ἀρετή, comprise not only skill in particular fields of activity (as is the sense of the word in Homer) but also qualities which are easier to manipulate rhetorically. A more general definition of the man who is ἀγαθός permits moral and social implications to take the place of (or at least take their place alongside) demonstrated prowess in war or athletics, for example, as factors in the evaluation of the citizen. In particular, a conception of excellence in which correct behaviour and attitudes are paramount allows the rejection of markers such as power and wealth in favour of the authority of tradition. Far from being a rigid, categorical label, ἀγαθός and related terms are essentially fluid: on the one hand those who have πλοῦτος can be derided as lacking this ‘excellence’, as opposed to those who are presented as having it though they may lack wealth (a contrast which can be drawn both by impoverished aristocrats and by other orders of society), while on the other hand material prosperity – and the wisdom to use it properly – can be presented as naturally accompanying the ἀγαθοί. Likewise,

¹⁵²Cf. Hutchinson’s commentary *ad loc.*, where the similar views of Jaeger (that the verse presents a canon of four cardinal virtues) and Dover (that the virtues named here are ‘separable’ and ‘specific’) are criticized. Hutchinson remarks that ‘ἀγαθός does not mean “brave” δίκαιος and εὐσεβής must be more or less synonymous σωφρων can be used quite generally Each adjective says much the same with a somewhat different colouring’ but does not elaborate on the ‘different colouring’.

the spread of σοφίη and σωφροσύνη from the aristocratic and sympotic context to cover a wider field of virtue allows their integration into a general conception of a citizen's excellence which, like patriotic sentiment in the poetry of war (see chapter 2), finds more expression in the aristocratic literary world than in the more public context of verse inscriptions, or in the poetry of Solon which consistently avoids this construction of the 'good' citizen.

5. Conclusions

5.1 *Martial Valour*

The depiction of fighting and dying for one's country as a glorious thing, which is only nascent in Homer but becomes widespread in the later literary material up to the Persian Wars, appears to have been resisted by the composers of the inscribed epigrams of that period, even in cases where it is certain or at least likely that they refer to conflicts in which the dead soldier's homeland was under threat. Verse epitaphs from later in the fifth century, however, appear to have been more receptive to this theme. The discrepancy between the two traditions in the earlier period raises questions of performance and the nature of the *symposia* at which the literary elegy was intended to be sung. It seems that the older, 'aristocratic' picture of heroism on the battlefield was being challenged in the *symposion*, the audience of which was perhaps, therefore, not uniformly 'aristocratic'; but then this picture appears to return in the early verse epitaphs, which may be due to the fact that these were composed *post mortem*, when a family's grief at the loss of a son, brother, father, or husband might in any case outweigh the motivations of exhortatory elegy which were used to persuade the man to fight in the first place. After the Persian Wars, though, the city as a whole begins to replace, or at least attempts to replace, the family both as the focus of grief and chief mourner in the epitaphs.

In epinician poetry, not surprisingly, this development is not as prominent; the *polis* does not overcome the *oikos* as the centre of attention and pride in military achievement, but tends rather to be subsumed in it. Even the pan-Hellenic spirit of resistance against the barbarian threat, which affected the language of the epitaphs of the period, has left only minor traces in this genre.

From early hints in Kallinos and Tyrtaios, the theme of an after-life and continuing rewards for military ἀρετή (which is not, as has been supposed by some, expanded by Tyrtaios to cover the whole of ἀρετή) is developed both in the inscriptions and in the literary poetry. As opposed to the question of whether soldiers fight with ‘aristocratic’ or ‘democratic’ motives, the two traditions can agree here that martial valour in itself earns these distinctions, and this consideration can be used as an encouragement to fight in any context. As for those who resist this (or any other) encouragement, Archilochos’ presentation of the ‘unwilling’ φυγόμαχος in fr. 5 is rooted in epic conceptions of the value of life and death, as is his fr. 139, if that comes from a context similar to that of fr. 5.

5.2 *Beauty and Virtue*

Homeric epic clearly and unambiguously differentiates between a person’s physical appearance and his or her possession of ἀρετή. Beauty is considered a virtue and remarked upon where appropriate, but where there is a discrepancy between *Sein*

and *Schein* (as notably in the case of Paris in the third book of the *Iliad*), the former takes precedence over the latter. Similarly, the language of beauty can be used to commend a person's behaviour and actions, but again this kind of commendation is not as strong as the use of other terms.

In the literary material after Homer, some poets can be seen to modify the Homeric use of the language of 'appearances' to suit their own presentation of 'reality'. The classification of behaviour or actions as καλός, already noted in Homer as significant but not of primary importance, gains greater force particularly in the aristocratic poetry of the Theognidea. Epinician poetry takes up the other side of the question, that of the relationship between physical beauty and inner worth, and insists on a closer relationship between the two than Homer allows, though this view continues to be resisted by other lyric poets. Within the epinician genre, too, Bakchylides places noticeably less emphasis on physical appearances than Pindar does, perhaps reflecting a difference between Ionian and Dorian traditions. This would provide support for Bourriot's theory that the latter was responsible for the creation of the phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (in its various forms) as a slogan denoting the ideal man.

Once again, the inscriptions in verse from this period resist these developments, refusing in most cases to consider a person's physical appearance as a factor of an importance equal to that assigned to other qualities. It is noteworthy, however, that expressions of the *topos* of the 'flower of a man's youth' in the inscriptions are reserved for occasions where the man in question died in battle, evoking grief and pity for the loss of a handsome youth. This is not an attempt to

present the beautiful as identical with the brave; rather, physical beauty and martial bravery are placed side by side here as in the ode of Ibykos to Polykrates, though (again as in Ibykos) it is not suggested that the two qualities are related in any sense other than the fact that the subject of the poetry is implicitly praised as being in possession of both.

5.3 *Political Values*

The problem of defining who are the ἀγαθοί and who are the κακοί within the *polis* is pursued by some poets through attempts to apply the positive terms to their own classes or groups and the negative ones to others (or to members of their own circles who have behaved in ways that are presented as unjust or unacceptable). After Homer, ἀρετή begins to be treated according to two types of definition: it can be used to denote a general or a specific virtue, and it can be used as a social or a moral term of commendation. Although the former distinction can be seen in Homer, where the term tends to be used of a hero's martial prowess but can also be used in a more general sense, the concern of the later poets with the relationship between social and moral ἀρετή, and the explicit attempts especially in the Theognidea to link the two, is new. Solon, however, resists aristocratic efforts to make this connection, preferring instead to use the terms with reference not to social position or power within the *polis* but to the just conduct of the citizens.

A slightly different approach is taken in epinician poetry; there, the noun ἀρετή is primarily used of athletic excellence, which is of course consistent with the genre's particular concern with that virtue, but the adjective in Pindar can take on more general connotations of social and moral worth, as in the Theognidea, and this asymmetry in the use of noun and adjective can also be seen in the verse inscriptions of the period.

Pindar again reflects attitudes similar to those found in the Theognidea on the subject of the importance of good parentage and breeding for position and honour within the *polis*, though for the most part without the anxiety that prompts Alkaios or the Theognidean poets to complain about the failure of the one to accompany the other. The opposition between city and family which exercises the embattled aristocrat is to a certain extent resolved in Pindar by presenting the city as a kind of stage on which the achievements of a particular family take a leading role; the *oikos* takes precedence, and the *oikos* is not represented as making any attempt to upstage the protagonist. Like the peculiarities of Pindar's treatment of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός, this is not as noticeable in Bakchylides' poetry, and Bakchylides also places considerably less importance than Pindar on the importance of material wealth. As may be the case with the two poets' differing approaches to the relationship between beauty and virtue, where (see 5.2, above) the proposed Dorian aristocratic origin of the phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός and the concept of 'complete' virtue that it represents seem to be in accordance with the fact that Pindar's poetry praises the combination of these characteristics more than that of Bakchylides, perhaps here again the Dorian poet

reflects a vision of civic values based on rich *oikoi* more than the Ionian. On the other hand, the epinician poets do (unlike Solon and the inscriptions in verse) appear to follow the aristocratic-sympotic lead of the Theognidea in their attachment of some political importance to the virtues of σοφίη and σωφροσύνη.

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