Evaluative Language
in
Greek Lyric and Elegiac Poetry
and Inscribed Epigram
to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.E.

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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the rhetorical uses of evaluative language in Greek lyric and elegiac poetry and inscribed epigram of the period from the seventh to the fifth century B.C.E. The discussion focuses on the poets’ evaluations of human worth in three areas, each of which forms a separate chapter: martial valour, the relationship between physical appearance and inner virtue, and political or social values. Within each chapter, particular aspects of the subject under discussion are treated under separate headings.

Although the literary material has been treated in various ways in the past, the inclusion of inscribed epigram alongside the other literature in this case offers evidence from a related but distinct branch of poetic tradition for the development and expression of these values; divergences between the literary and the inscriptional tradition can be quite marked, as can the different approaches taken by poets of various genres within the literary material. The attempts of previous scholarship to define clear and consistent systems or codes of value represented in the poetry and to trace their development over this period have been generally unconvincing, but the poets’ deployment of evaluative language does show some discernible patterns which appear to be related more to genre and poetic tradition than to the purely chronological processes of development that have been proposed by other scholars.
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Note on Editions and Abbreviations

Inscriptions are cited by their numbers in Hansen, *Carmina epigraphica Graeca* (CEG), and reference is also made where appropriate to Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (FGE). For the iambic and elegiac fragments West’s edition is used, and Theognidean verses not attributed by West to Theognis himself are cited in italic numerals (as in West’s indices). Pindar and Bakchylides are cited as in the Teubner editions of Snell and Maehler; the fragments of Sappho and Alkaios are numbered as in Lobel and Page’s *Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta*. Other lyric fragments follow the numbering of Page’s *Poetae melici Graeci* (PMG), and where appropriate his *Supplementum lyricis Graecis* (S) or Davies’ *Poetarum melicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (PMGF).
1. Introduction

1.1 General

This dissertation is concerned with some aspects of the uses to which the language of evaluation is put in the lyric and elegiac poetry of the period up to the end of the fifth century BCE. Surviving inscriptions in verse from the period will also be discussed here, with a view to determining what similarities and differences there are in the use of evaluative terms between the ‘literary’ examples and the contemporary inscriptions, two related but distinct branches of poetic tradition. This is not an attempt to describe more or less coherent systems or codes of values, since these are not as readily discernible as has sometimes been thought, \(^1\) but a study of some of the rhetorical uses to which evaluative terminology can be put in the poetry of this period.

The epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides is, of course, explicitly and primarily concerned with praise of the achievements of the laudandus; its use of evaluative language, therefore, in some respects differs from that found in poetry of other genres. For this reason, each chapter contains a section on aspects of its theme as found in epinician poetry in particular. The chapters on war and beauty also contain sections dealing specifically with inscribed epigram and the special concerns of that tradition in the contexts of those themes; in the political chapter, on the other hand, it

\(^1\)See below, section 1.2, for some pitfalls in this approach to Homer in particular.
was found to be more convenient and coherent to have relevant inscriptions incorporated into the sections which also discuss the literary material.

This is, of course, a very large subject, and this discussion will concentrate on three broad categories: martial valour, beauty and virtue, and political values. Within each chapter, several different aspects of the values in question are dealt with under separate sub-headings. Although cross-references between these sections are often made, many of the sections may be thought of as largely self-contained.

During much of the period under discussion here, war is either present or anticipated in many parts of the Greek world, and meditation on various aspects of war is a common theme in poetry. Chapter 2 deals with these poets' reflections on martial valour and the qualities that make a good soldier. Men need to be encouraged to fight by the presentation of war as a worthwhile endeavour, and the first four sections of the chapter examine the poets' views of patriotism and the desire for the accumulation of personal glory (whether in life or posthumously) as components of martial ἄρετη. But not everyone will be convinced, and the final section deals with the poetic character whom Simonides (PMG 524) calls the φυγόμαχος, the man who places his own safety first, despite the best efforts of the poets to entice or shame him into fighting valiantly.

A good soldier is not always a good-looking one (and vice versa), and a discussion of the relationship between beauty and bravery forms the final section of the following chapter, which deals more generally in its earlier sections with the ever-
present tension between *Sein* and *Schein* in the poetry of this period. Hesiod describes Pandora as a καλὸν κακὸν (*Theogony* 585); the similarity in sound between these two words with almost directly opposed meanings which allows Hesiod to make this aural play is reflected in the poetic theme of the difficulty of distinguishing between the apparent and true worth of a person. Many poets take up the theme on these terms, though some (epinician poets in particular) attempt to square the circle by rhetorically creating a closer link between appearance and reality.

In chapter 4, the focus is on poetic representations of some of the factors that contribute to a person’s worth in a civic context. Attempts to define a city’s ἐγαθοί and κακοί on the grounds of birth, class or wealth (and the manifestations in poetry of resistance to such attempts) are examined, and at the end of the chapter two virtues in particular are singled out for further discussion; σοφία and σωφροσύνη are subjected to poetic manipulation in some political contexts, but resist such manipulation in others.

Two ‘sins of omission’ resulting from the focus on these three aspects ought to be mentioned here. The first is that some evaluative passages in the poetry of the period which do not fit into one of these categories escape close attention. The most obvious of these, perhaps, is Simonides’ ode to Skopas (*PMG* 542, quoted in Plato, *Protagoras* 339a-346d) citing and challenging Pittakos’ assertion that χαλεπῶν ...
Though this poem is explicitly concerned with the problem of how a man can earn the right to be called ἀγαθός, the fact that the poet is concerned with a very general kind of ἀρετή and indeed appears to be deliberately avoiding a more precise definition of this virtue (v. 14 πράξας γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθός, vv. 39-40 πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖς ἵπποις ἀίσχρα μὴ μέμεικται) means that this text receives less attention here than it would deserve in a work of a different nature.

The virtues of women suffer a similar fate. The subject matter of Chapter 2 obviously excludes them, and there is little room for them in Chapter 4. They might have been accommodated in the discussion of beauty and virtue in Chapter 3; but as is suggested in the verses which conclude Semonides’ presentation of the woman who is like a delicate long-maned mare (7.67-70),

καλὸν μὲν ὄν θέμα τοιαύτη γυνῇ
 ἄλλοις, τῷ δ’ ἔχοντι γίνεται κακὸν,
 ἦν μὴ τις ἥ τύραννος ἥ σκηπτούχος ἥ,
 ὅστις τοιούτοις θυμὸν ἀγαλαίζεται,

the construction of female beauty and female virtues as perceived and praised by male observers and writers is intimately linked to notions of the social position and functions of both the γυνὴ and ὁ ἔχον and the relationships between them. When the epitaph of Archedike (‘Simonides’ FGE XXVI (a)) praises the dead woman ἥ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄδελφων τ’ οὔσα τυράννων | παῖδων τ’ οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐξ

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2. According to Socrates, Simonides intended to “take down” (343c1: καθέλοι) Pittacus’ gnomic statement because he, covetous of fame, wished to gain a reputation for wisdom. Simonides’ entire poem then is a refutation of Pittacus’ gnome (343c3-5 and 344b3-5) (M. Demos, Lyric Quotation in Plato, p.21). As will be seen in section 4.5 below, Aristodamos’ γνώμη χρήματ’ ἀνήρ is ‘taken down’ rather more subtly by Pindar (and perhaps by Alkaios – see section 4.4).
Again a woman’s virtue is expressed in terms of her position as daughter, sister, wife, and mother. An untangling of these knots should form the subject of a separate study.

Frequent references will be made to the question of how far the poetry discussed here reflects or contradicts the use of evaluative terms in the Homeric epics. Chapter 3 opens with a section devoted to beauty in Homer as preparation for the examination of that theme in the later material, but here some more general preliminary remarks on evaluative language in the epics themselves, and the relationship of the epics to later poetry, are in order.

1.2 Homer

Commentators have tried to describe the systems of social constraints by which the Homeric characters are perceived as being bound and to elucidate the ‘heroic code’ which regulates the conduct of the heroes, whether or not such a code of values is thought of as having had an existence in the ‘real’ world outside the poems. Finley, for example, states that the code of conduct which puts constraints on the activities of the Homeric heroes is ‘complete and unambiguous’, but attempts to

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define this system of values completely and unambiguously have generally been unsuccessful.

Adkins argues that in the Homeric poems the 'agathos ... has himself the strongest of claims against society',⁴ this view and the problems with it may be examined with reference to the use of the phrase ἅγαθος περ ἐὼν, which occurs six times in the Iliad⁵ and which is interpreted by Adkins in such a way as to support his view of the 'claims' of the ἅγαθος. At Iliad 1.275, for example, Nestor warns Agamemnon that he should not, ἅγαθος περ ἐὼν, take Briseis from Achilleus; and at 24.53 Apollo warns that Achilleus, ἅγαθος περ ἐὼν, runs the risk of incurring the anger of the gods if he persists in his maltreatment of the corpse of Hektor. Adkins suggests that in both of these cases the man described as an ἅγαθος is justified in doing what he does, since he enjoys all the privileges accorded to an ἅγαθος. The force of περ, to Adkins, is thus: 'even though you have a right to do this and are not in violation of human or divine law, please do not do it'; the man's status as ἅγαθος will not, on this view, be affected by his actions.⁶

But surely it is more natural to take these phrases as an indication that there are bounds which even an ἅγαθος may not overstep. Long points out⁷ that in each

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⁴ A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. p. 49.

⁵ The use of this phrase at Iliad 9.626 f. (ἀπαργεῖλαι δὲ τάχοσα | χρὴ μύθον Δαναοία καὶ οὐκ ἅγαθον περ ἐόντα) presents no difficulty: Aias says that he must deliver the μύθος even though it is not good. But in the cases where the phrase is applied to people, further examination is called for.


case there is a reason given for the prohibition: Nestor's is that Briseis was given by
the army to Achilleus as a γέρας (1.276), and Apollo's is that the gods will be angry
with Achilleus.\(^8\) It is better to interpret περ, then, as meaning 'though you are ἀγαθός,
you are not entitled to do this'.

Adkins' view\(^9\) that it is impossible for an Homeric ἀγαθός to incur ἔλεγχετη
without failing in some endeavour is contradicted by *Odyssey* 10.72, where Odysseus
is addressed as ἔλεγχετη ζῶντων on the grounds that he is hated by the gods; this is
clearly sufficient condemnation, and the enmity of the Olympians with which Apollo
threatens Achilleus at *Iliad* 24.53 is not an empty threat, even to an ἀγαθός.\(^10\) Long,
again, corrects Adkins:

\(\acute{\alpha}γαθός \pi\epsilon\rho \; \epsilon\acute{o}ντι \) [at *Iliad* 24.53] does not ... assert Achilles' claims; it shows
that there are limits to the actions which even a pre-eminent agathos can
perform without forfeiting the gods' support. .... Achilles does not lose the
title ἀγαθός by dishonouring Hector's corpse; how could he? But he is
dangerously near to losing divine approval on which much of his success and
claims to ἀρετή are based.\(^11\)

And in his commentary to *Iliad* 24.53, Macleod define ἀγαθός as

'noble/excellent/powerful', not a term of moral commendation. It emerges
from this passage, as from the book and the whole poem, that to be merely
ἀγαθός is not enough ... note also ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν as used in 1.131, 275;
19.155. There too neither Achilles nor Agamemnon was right to over-assert

\(^8\)Long (p. 128) cites the words of Zeus at 24.66-67 (οὐ μὲν γάρ τιμή γε μί᾽ ἔσσεται ἀλλὰ
καὶ Ἑκτορ | φύλλατος ἐσσεθε θεότισ βροτῶν οἷ' ἐν Τιμίῳ εἰσιν) and comments that 'Hector too has his
timē and Achilles is not to be permitted to forget this'.


\(^10\)It may also be noted that upon hearing from Thetis that the gods are displeased, Achilleus
immediately desists: *Iliad* 24.133 ff.

his ‘excellence’ (ἀρετή).\textsuperscript{12}

Adkins writes, with reference to Odysseus’ statements at \textit{Iliad} 2.284 ff. and 2.199 ff. that ἕλεγχειν would be incurred as a result of the αἰσχρὸς act of leaving Troy empty-handed, that ‘both elenchistos and aischron decry failure in war: and this is the manner in which such failure is regularly treated. In peace, too, the same standards apply. .... It is aischron to fail, in war or in peace’.\textsuperscript{13} The assumption that even the ‘quiet’ virtues, such as hospitality, in Homer are to be seen as variations of the ‘competitive’ virtues leads Adkins to the assertion that when Penelope reproaches Telemachos at \textit{Odyssey} 18.215 ff. for allowing the ‘beggar’ to be maltreated by the suitors, she is perfectly justified in placing the blame on her son rather than the suitors, since it is he who has failed and ‘fallen short of arete’.\textsuperscript{14} Again, it is Adkins’ view that when Eumaios says (\textit{Odyssey} 14.38) that he would suffer ἐλέγχειν if his dogs harmed the ‘beggar’, he is referring to the fact that he would have failed in an aspect of ἀρετή:

[s]uccess is so imperative [in war] that only results have any value: intentions are unimportant. Similarly, and for similar reasons, it is aischron to fail in time of peace to protect one’s family and guests, whatever one’s intentions.\textsuperscript{15}

But as Dover argues, the view that it is only success, not intentions, that counts in evaluating a hero’s worth does not explain Halitherses’ charge of κακότης against the kinsmen of the suitors at \textit{Odyssey} 24.455:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{12}}\textsuperscript{C.W. Macleod, \textit{Homer: Iliad, Book xxiv}, p. 93.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{13}}\textsuperscript{Adkins, \textit{Merit and Responsibility}, p. 33.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{14}}\textsuperscript{Adkins, \textit{Merit and Responsibility}, p. 42.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{15}}\textsuperscript{Adkins, \textit{Merit and Responsibility}, p. 35.}
\end{flushright}
in Halitherses’ view, the κακότης of the kinsmen lay in their rejection of – or indifference to – his advice, not in the collapse of any earnest attempts at restraint on their part (he himself is the one who has ‘failed’ in that sense), nor in the calamity which is now the end-product of their rejection of advice.  

And Long rightly summarizes: ‘[t]he fact that certain social obligations in Homer require successful fulfilment does not show that they are to be distinguished as “competitive” values’.  

He disagrees with Adkins’ equation of wartime and peacetime ἄρετή:

[t]he fact that radically different ... situations are evaluated ... by the same expression, does not entail that they are rated at the same value. There is an appropriate way of stowing gear, of preparing a feast, of behaving towards strangers, etc. in every case it is the external aspect of the situation which receives evaluation.

The importance of bearing in mind the contexts in which words like ἄγαθος are used, and of avoiding the temptation to equate different uses of the words, is of course not restricted to the Homeric epics, and will be crucial to the following discussion.

Terms like ἄγαθος do appear to be used in the Homeric poems in a sort of ‘social’ sense; that is, a man of high standing in society can be called ἄγαθος even as he is committing an act of which the speaker disapproves. Adkins believes that this ‘social’ use of the term is ‘not distinct’ from the more explicitly ‘evaluative’ instances; the two combine to form ‘one world-view’:

[ἀγαθος] commends the most admired type of man; ... the man who possesses

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19Cf. the discussion, above, of the phrase ἄγαθος περ ἔών.
the skills and qualities of the warrior-chieftain in war and ... in peace, together with the social advantages which such a chieftain possessed. 20

But it is going too far to say, with Adkins, that every use of ἀγαθός or similar words in Homer is intended to elicit admiration for the person to whom the epithet is applied. Certainly the suitors in the Odyssey are called ἀριστοῖ,21 but as Long points out, [t]he suitors are nobles, βασιλεῖς, and ἀριστοῖ ... describes their social category. It is the relations between heroes or men of substance with which Homer is largely concerned. In contexts where one ἀγαθός condemns another, the commendatory function of ἀγαθός, ἔσθλός, etc. may be weak, or ... almost entirely honorific. 22

But it is not always easy to see where such terms are merely ‘honorific’ as opposed to being more truly ‘evaluative’. In Homer it is sometimes reasonably clear that words of commendation are used in a ‘formulaic’ way, and ought not to be interpreted as expressing genuine approval, 23 but words like ἀγαθός appear to be used in later poetry in a more problematic way, and the distinction between their ‘moral’ and ‘social’ sense is often blurred. Again, context is of prime importance, and here it would be appropriate to mention Griffin’s observation that ‘the epics strongly favour the reservation of the crucial moral terms from the narrative to the speeches’. 24

20 Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, p. 32.

21 1.245; cf. e.g., 23.121 and 24.429.


23 Hector is δόκει even at the moment of being accused by Sarpedon of behaviour as a κακός’ at Iliad 5.471 (Long, ‘Morals and Values in Homer’, p. 126.

24 J. Griffin, ‘Homer’s Words and Speakers’, p. 40. Griffin notes (p. 39) the following about the use of ἀγαθός in the epics: ‘in the Iliad it is used 47 times in narrative and 37 in speech, in the Odyssey 12 times [sic: 26 times] in narrative and 12 times in speech. Those figures, however, are misleading: no fewer than 40 of the 46 [sic] narrative instances in the Iliad, and 6 of the 12 in the Odyssey, are repetitions of the single formula ἐστὶν ἀγαθός. If that phrase is excluded, the instances
considerations of the speaker's or poet's identity and purpose in speaking will also be important in the examination of later poetry in this discussion.

An illustration of the difficulties into which strict adherence to an imagined rigorous code of ἀρετή can lead a commentator is provided by Adkins' assertion that 'Odysseus killed the suitors for the sake of his arete, because it would be aischron not to do so'; 25 Dover justifiably criticizes this view, pointing out that I have always assumed that Odysseus killed the suitors for exactly the reasons for which I would have sought to kill them if I had been Odysseus: they had conspired against my son, pestered my wife and consumed my possessions. It is obscurantist to imply that Odysseus said to himself: 'My God, I must do something about my arete!' 26

Adam Parry notes that in the Homeric epics ἀρετή 'does not connote an independent entity representing the final goal of human action, but rather something limited and practical, a natural and empirical value arising out of the conditions of the warrior's life'. 27 And although Yamagata's conclusion that in Homer ἀγαθὸς or κακὸς means different things for different people and in different contexts 28 may sound less like a conclusion than a refusal to reach one, it is a useful reminder of the dangers into which an approach like that of Adkins can lead the student not only of Homer, but also of the poetry which forms the subject of this dissertation.

25 Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, p. 238.


27 A.M. Parry, 'A Note on the Origins of Teleology', p. 261 [= Language of Achilles, p. 100]

28 N. Yamagata, Homeric Morality, p. 224.

of ἀγαθὸς in speech outnumber those in narrative by 35 to 7 in the Iliad, and by 23 to 6 in the Odyssey'.
1.3 Homer and Later Poetry

A few points about the difficulties in determining the relationships between ‘epic’ passages in later poetry and the epics themselves should also be made here. Commentators have noted similarities in vocabulary and phrasing between certain passages of epic and later poetry, but it is not always a straightforward question of imitation or adaptation of Homeric models which we can recognize. It must be borne in mind that the Homeric epics were not the only epics which the later poets would have known, and what appears to us to be an imitation of a passage in Homer may in fact be related to another epic, or it may contain elements which had become conventional in epic and thus recurrent in later poetry when the same subject was being treated.

This last point may be illustrated by a passage from Tyrtaios: the descriptions of the dead old man and the dead youth at 10.21-30. The similarities between this passage and Priam’s plea to Hektor not to fight Achilleus (Iliad 22.66-76), and the fact that the verses seem more appropriate in Tyrtaios than in Homer (especially lines 71-3 in Homer’s version, as was already noticed by schol. bΤ ad loc.: δοκεῖ τοῦτο προτρεπτικῶν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἂ ἀποτρεπτικῶν), led West to claim that Tyrtaios’

29 Although archaic lyric and elegiac poetry is here categorized as ‘later’ than Homer, this is not intended to imply (as this section should make clear) that the Homeric epics necessarily existed for Archilochos and Tyrtaios in the same form in which they exist for us. Janko, on the other hand, argues that ‘linguistic data prove that the Homeric epics had already acquired fixed form before Hesiod’s time’, and that this was probably due to the existence of a written version (The Iliad: A Commentary, volume iv, p. 37).
passage, rather than being modelled on Homer's, in fact reflects an even earlier tradition: it 'may have had an epic origin, but it was not in the *Iliad*: lines whose original purpose was clearly to encourage young men to fight to the death (as in Tyrtaeus) cannot have been invented for Priam's passionate appeal to Hector *not* to fight'.  

From this, of course, it does not necessarily follow that Homer is in fact later than Tyrtaios; Richardson prefers to assume that 'both Homer and Tyrtaeus are making use of a protreptic passage belonging to the epic tradition, and that Homer has adapted it to a different context'.  

Still, perhaps Tyrtaios, although branded as 'no innovator' by West, has left his own mark on the tradition by elaborating on the erotic aspects of a young man's corpse (10.29-30 θητός ... ἐρατός ... καλός).

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30 M.L. West, review of G. Tardi, *Archilochus* (Rome, 1968) and C. Prato, *Tyrtaeus* (Rome, 1968), *CR* n.s. 20 (1970) 147-51, p. 150. He repeats the point in support of his argument that there is no literary text that specifically refers to the *Iliad* until Alkaios 44 ('The Date of the *Iliad*, p. 206).

31 N.J. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary, volume vi*, p. 113. So also B.B. Powell (*Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet*, p. 247): 'Traditional themes in traditional language support the different purposes of different poets.' Something similar may have occurred at *Iliad* 18.265, where Proudamas says that Achilleus περὶ πτόλος τε μαχήσεται ἐς γυναῖκας, a phrase that might more naturally be used of a defender (Leaf, vol. 2, p. 287 *ad loc.*: 'περὶ, as the stake of the contest. in this sense, ἀμφι with dat. or acc. is the usual word ... περὶ being generally used of the object only as defended'), as a scholiast on this verse mistakenly understood it: τὸν σημεωτέρου πρὸς τὸ "ἀμφινεῖμα ὀρεσσινων", referring to *Iliad* 5.486. The phrase is apparently translated back into something resembling its original context at *Odyssey* 11.403 ἐς περὶ πτόλος μορφούμενον ἐς γυναίκας, with the curious result that the strange form μορφούμενον 'results from the adaptation of *Il.* xviii 265 to fit the syntax of the sentence' (Heubeck, in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, vol. ii.* p. 101).

32 Review of Tardi and Prato, p. 149.

33 R. Garner (*From Homer to Tragedy*, p. 11), assuming the priority of Homer, suggests that in Tyrtaios the shift of emphasis from the 'pitiable nature of the fallen old man' as portrayed in Homer to 'an elegiac insistence upon the ugliness of the scene' allows Tyrtaios to elaborate on the beauty of the young warrior and 'to slide magically from the general declaration of the beauty of dying – which is hard to accept – to the beauty of the young – which is practically impossible to deny'.
One must be cautious, then, about suggesting that any reading of a lyric or elegiac passage requires knowledge of its Homeric exemplar and the context of that exemplar. Adkins provides an extreme example of assumptions regarding the archaic poets’ ‘allusions’ to Homer. In his commentary on Mimnermos 1, Adkins notes that the phrase κρυπτωδὴς φιλότης in line 3 occurs only once in Homer, at Iliad 6.161, in the story of Bellerophon as told by Glaukos. Adkins writes that ‘Mimnermus has no desire to emulate Bellerophon’, and suggests that the ‘collocation of χρυσῆς Ἄφροδιτῆς and δῶρα in Mimnermus [1.1 and 1.3] might in itself suffice to recall Paris’ speech [at Iliad 3.64 μὴ μοι δῶρ’ ἔρατὰ προφέρε χρυσῆς Ἄφροδιτῆς], saying that the combination of these words appears to ‘indicate a fairly complex process of reminiscence and possibly allusion’.  

But it is probably going too far to suggest that χρυσῆς Ἄφροδιτῆς in line 1 and δῶρα in line 3 (a very loose ‘collocation’) will make the listener recall one particular line of the Iliad. It is best to agree with Fowler that

the reader is not required to compare the ‘model’ word for word in order to grasp the point. ... [T]he poet does not sit down with his text of the Iliad and take a word from this passage, a phrase from that, a line from another. The epic language is at the back of his mind, and that ‘[t]he whole epic corpus continued to form the background of numerous poems; these poems have an epic cast but no specific Homeric reference’. 35 This approach will be seen to be more satisfactory than that of Adkins in consideration of

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the relationship between the values to be found in the poetry to be discussed here and those expressed or implied in Homer.
2. Martial Valour

Martial valour is a highly valued trait in the heroes of the Homeric epics. The poetry of the period between Homer and the end of the fifth century also contains many references to fighting and the kinds of values that good soldiers were expected to have. In most cases, as will be seen below, the ‘warrior codes’ that are stated or implied in poetry and inscribed epigram until the time of the Persian wars are in line with those that are to be found in Homer, despite the fact that some commentators have chosen to see rejections of ‘traditional’ heroic values in some poems; after the Persian wars, considerations which are not prominent in Homer or the archaic material begin to appear. Even the poetry from the archaic period, though, does sometimes depart from Homeric models by giving expression to certain elements that may only be hinted at in Homer, or by adapting Homeric martial values to different circumstances. This discussion will begin with an examination of the reasons which are called forth to encourage men to fight, and will look at depictions of the ‘ideal’ soldier, concluding with some supposed and some more definite rejections of martial valour.

2.1 Reasons to Fight and Die

At Iliad 12.322 ff., the hero Sarpedon explains to Glaukos why they should fight rather than avoid battle in order to save their lives: his argument is that since
men must die some day,¹ they ought to go into battle and seek glory (εὔχος, line 328; cf. 325 μόνη ... κυδιάνευραν). Whether, in the end, they win this glory or not (328 ἥ το εὔχος ὀρέξομεν, ἥ τες ἡμῶν), it is important that they make the effort. Since in the Geryoneis of Stesichoros there is a similar passage where Geryon is debating the question of whether he should fight Herakles, that episode will be discussed here.

The decision of Geryon seems (from what can be understood from the fragmentary text) to be centred upon the matter of Geryon’s immortality or lack thereof (as a descendant of the gods, he may or may not be immortal himself), in this his reasoning reflects that of Sarpedon, who said that he would not fight or encourage Glaukos to do so if they were not fated to die anyway. We know that Geryon did fight Herakles in the end, and at the end of his conversation with Menoites he seems to accept that if he is not immortal he should fight and accept what is μόρσιμον (S 11.21), but his reasoning up to that point is unclear from what remains of the text.

Barrett thought that Geryon’s previously stated alternative was probably this: if I am immortal, ‘it is better to endure disgrace and to allow Herakles to make away with my cattle’.² But Page believes that Geryon’s reasoning was that if he was immortal he would have nothing to fear in fighting, and Page rejects Barrett’s interpretation on a number of grounds, including the reasonable argument that ‘The man who says that, if mortal, he prefers death to disgrace, is not likely to say that, if

¹Hektor justifies his going into battle in similar terms when he says to Andromache at Iliad 6.487-89 οὐ γὰρ τις μ’ ὑπὲρ αἰσθαν ἄνηρ "Αἰδο πρὸ ἅπαντι | μοίραν δ’ ὃ τινα οὐκ περιγιμηνὸν ἔμεναι ἄνδρών, | οὐ κακόν. οὔδέ μὲν ἐσθόλον .... Archilochos also employs this topos in two fragments, apparently from exhortatory contexts, where he says that war is something in which men must engage and take their chances (fr. 110 ἄμφοτε: ἐπηρματο γὰρ ἔννος ἀνθρώποις Ἀρης. and of which the outcome is in the hands of the gods (fr. 111 καὶ νόμους θάρσοψ: νικῆς δ’ ἐν θεοῖς πείρατα). See below for Kallinos’ treatment of this topos.

²Quoted in Page, ‘Stesichorus’, p. 150.
immortal, he prefers disgrace to death.'³ Page also suggests that '[t]he context requires that the sequel to both propositions be the same – that he will fight, as indeed he does', and that '[i]t would be almost a travesty of Homer if Geryon were to say "do not frighten me by talking about death: for if I am immortal, I shall simply let Herakles run off with the cattle"' (Page's italics).⁴

These arguments seem sensible, and one should perhaps be hesitant to ascribe a 'travesty of Homer' to a poet who was later described as ὀμηρικώτατος,⁵ but it should be noted that in the Homeric passage, the sequel to both propositions is not in fact the same. What Sarpedon says to Glaukos at Iliad 12.322-25 is just what Page does not think Geryon would have said:

ō πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
αἰὲν ὃ ἡμέλλωμεν ἀγήρω τ᾽ ἀθανάτῳ τε
ἐσσεθ', οὕτε κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοις μαχομὴν
οὕτε κε σὲ στέλλομι μάχην ἐς κυδίανελαν.

Geryon, whatever his reasoning was, came to the same conclusion at which Sarpedon arrived, namely that he must fight if he is fated to die and must therefore try to die honourably (it appears, from S 11.22 ὄνειδε, that Geryon was concerned about the reproaches he would incur if he did not fight). Campbell writes that

Given that Stesichorus was 'most Homeric', one might have expected his heroes to utter generalisations about life and death; but ... the papyrus fragments confirm that he kept to the specific situation, even when the opportunity arose for a piece of moralising:⁶ but there is hardly any less 'moralising' here in Stesichoros than in the Homeric passage. Geryon in fact does seem to have spent two stanzas 'uttering generalisations about life and death'; in what remains of our text, his cattle do not appear until the

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³Page, 'Stesichorus', p. 150.

⁴Page, 'Stesichorus', p. 150.

⁵'Longinos', On the Sublime 13.3.

sixth line of the antistrophe (S’11.27; although line 14 κερά [ might perhaps be a reference to their horns).

Since Geryon’s cattle are at stake in his confrontation with Herakles, he is in that respect more personally interested in that situation than Sarpedon and Glaukos are in the Trojan War; these heroes are both Lykians, and are therefore not fighting to save their own land, as the Trojans are. For them, therefore, the question of whose land is in danger does not arise; in contrast, two lines in the Theognidea (887-88) which come perhaps from a song put in the mouth of an ally or mercenary7 give just this consideration as a reason not to fight:

μηδέ λιν κήρυκος ἄν’ οὗς ἔχε μακρὰ βοώντος·
οὗ γὰρ πατρώας γῆς πέρι μαρνάμεθα.

This couplet looks back to the theme of patriotism in battle which recurs in martial exhortations in the poetry between Homer and the Theognidea. Less than a hundred lines before Sarpedon offers his own justification for fighting, Hektor exhorts the Trojans to fight πέρι πάτης (Iliad 12.243, cf. 15.496; when Hektor is dead, his father will describe him as having done just that: ἀμυνόμενον πέρι πάτης, 24.500). This is of course a natural consideration to mention to those to whom it applies, in this case the Trojans in the Iliad, and it becomes important in the seventh century in the exhortatory elegies of Kallinos and Tyrtaios.

Kallinos 1 employs ‘Homeric’ language (though not always in strictly ‘Homeric’ ways: e.g. line 1 ἔλπισαν . . . θυμόν uses words that are found in Homer but never in that collocation, ἔλπισαν Ἂπορ being the usual Homeric formulation; μέγαν . . . καὶ ἔλπισαν . . . θυμόν is found also at Tyrtaios 10.17) to express sentiments which are often ‘Homeric’ as well. We have seen that Sarpedon’s main reason for

7E.L. Bowie (‘Miles Ludens’?, p. 228) records the suggestion of P. A. Cartledge that the couplet would also be appropriate for ‘men fighting not on their own home territory but abroad, albeit in a war conducted by their polis.’
fighting at Troy is that he will die some time anyway; Kallinos echoes this idea in the words θάνατος δὲ τὸτ’ ἔσσεται, ὀπότε κεν δῆ | Μοῖραι ἐπικλώσσωσ’ (1.8-9). Kallinos’ audience is encouraged to fight γῆς πέρι (line 7), but Kallinos does not present this as an obligation. The Homeric heroes, on the other hand, are exhorted to fight in the terminology of obligation, e.g.: τὸ ὅδε τι χρὴ μὴν οὐκέτιν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι (Iliad 16.631, Patroklos speaking to Meriones); οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κλοτοπεύειν ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντας | οὐδὲ διατρίβειν· ἐτί γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἄρεκτον (Iliad 19.149-50, Achilles to Agamemnon). Again, Sarpedon encourages Glaukos: τὸ νῦν χρὴ Ἀυκίοις μέτα πρώτοισιν ἐόντας | ἔσται μὲν ἵδε μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολήσαι (Iliad 12.315), and νῦν σε μάλα χρὴ | αἴχυνητην τ’ ἔμεναι καὶ θαρσάλεον πολέμιστήν (Iliad 16.492-93; these words are repeated by Achilles to Hektor at 22.268-69). Achilles asks Odysseus at Iliad 9.357-58: τὶ δὲ δεῖ πολέμιζεμεναι Τρῶεσσιν | Ἀργείους; Such language does not occur in the poetry of our period in military contexts.

Kallinos, rather, points out that to fight for one’s country is τιμῆν τε ... καὶ ἀγλαὸν (line 6), and that the man who dies fighting will be mourned by all the

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8Cf. lines 14-15 πολλάκια ὀμιστήτα φοινών καὶ δοῦτον ἀκόντων | ἔρχεται, ἐν δ’ οἴκῳ μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου, and Simonides PMG 524 δ’ αὐ θάνατος κίχε καὶ τὸν φυγόμαχον; Tyrtaios’ εἶ δὲ φύη μὲν κήρα τανηλεγέως θανάτοιο (12.35) does not refer to cowardice as these two passages do; as can be seen from the following lines in Tyrtaios, it refers to a man who fights but is not killed, and is held in honour by his fellow-citizens. W.J. Oates argues from the similarity of Simonides PMG 524 to Horace’s mors et fugacem persequitur virum (Odes 3.2.14) that it might have been preceded (as δ’ αὖ might suggest) by a line containing the sentiment in the preceding line of Horace: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. Oates’ argument for a Simonidean original for Odes 3.2 also adduces the parallel between PMG 582 ἦστι καὶ σιγάς ἀκίνδυνον γέρας and Odes 3.2.25-26 est et fideli tuta silentio | merces (Oates, The Influence of Simonides, pp. 1-55).

9Although in Homer such things as ἀξιων, ἕδωρ, γοῖα, and εὐχος are modified by the epithet ἀγλαός (Iliad 1.23, 2.307, 19.385, and 7.203 respectively; ἀγλαόν εὐχος recurs at Tyrtaios 12.36), fighting is never so described. Also, τιμῆ is not explicitly a consideration for those on the defending side: it is the sackers of cities who win τιμῆ, while the defenders fight for their lives. Kallinos uses language which recalls the epic, but (as far as can be determined from what remains of early epic) his audience is not meant to remember specific epic passages or uses.
citizens and considered ἄξιος ἡμιθέων (19),
the city will see him as having been a
defensive πόργος (20), an image which will recur in Alkaios 112.10 ἄνδρες γὰρ
πόλις ἄξιος πόργος ἐπεύθους, and fr. 396 ἀρκος ἐσπή. The structure and balance of
this poem are important: having briefly chastised the νέοι in the opening lines of the
poem (μέχρις τέο κατάκεισθε; κότ’ ἄλκιμον ἔξετε θυμόν, | ὡ νέοι),
Kallinos immediately introduces the consideration of τμή and says that fighting γῆς πέρι is

10 Verdenius (‘Callinus fr. 1’, p. 4) cites Iliad 5.78, 22.394, 24.258, 6.123-28, 9.498 and
Odyssey 6.149 to show that ‘such epithets as ἄντιθες, ἴδθες, ἴδθες ἐναλίγκος, ἴδθες ἀρκῶν’ are no
empty phrases. The theomorphism of the heroes complements the anthropomorphism of the gods. ‘
This is true enough, but here there is a difference: in epic, the heroes are often semi-divine and they
are aware of the fact; an exhortation like Kallinos’ ‘if you fight, you will be like a demigod’ would
not work with an epic hero who is already a demigod. West, in his commentary to Works and Days
160 (p. 191), asserts that the word ἡμιθέω ‘refers to [the heroes’] parentage .... not to semi-divine
status’, but the fact remains that in poetry after Homer, ἡμιθέω is the term used for the heroes of the
Trojan War (to the examples are cited by West may now be added Simonides 11.18, for which see
Capra and Curti, ‘Semidei Simonidei’, pp. 28 ff.). See below for Leimbach’s interpretation of
Kallinos’ phrase.

11 This is the reading in the scholia to Persai 352; the Souda and the scholia to Sophokles,
O.T. 56 have ἄρης (thus, ‘warlike men are a city’s tower’ rather than ‘men are a city’s warlike
tower’). Parallels for both applications of the adjective can be found in Homer: for warriors e.g.
Iliad 11.800 ‘Ἀρηίος ὑλές ’ Ἀχαϊῶν, and for a fortification e.g. Iliad 4.407 τεῖχος ἄρειν. But in
Homer, it is only at Odyssey 11.556 that we find πόργος used as a metaphor for a man, when
Odysseus tells the shade of Ajax (who is elsewhere, of course, ἔρεις ᾗ Ἀχαϊῶν: Iliad 3.229, 6.5,
8.211) that τοῖς γὰρ σφόν (i.e. ‘ Ἀργεῖοι) πόργος ἀπώλειο. A.W.H. Adkins suggests that the tower
image here is intended to recall Odyssey 11.556 in particular, it ‘must have been a well-known
passage, and the repeated portrayal of Ajax with a shield ἔτη πόργον [Adkins cites Iliad 7.219,
11.485, and 17.28, and notes that the formula ‘is likely to have occurred in many contexts now lost’]
might be expected to make the association of πόργος and Ajax easier .... If the allusion were taken.
then, Callinus would be in a position to imply that the warriors of 20 and 21 are worthy of
comparison with Ajax’ (Adkins, Poetic Craft, p. 66, with p. 218, n. 40).

12 This is an image which Pindar will use in an athletic context: at Pythian 5.113, the
strength of the victorious Arkesilaos in athletic competition is described as ἔρεσ ὁλον.

13 Kallinos criticizes his audience for sitting idle when πάλιμος γαῖαν ἄπασαν ἔχει (line 4);
with this poem could perhaps be compared Archilochos fr. 112. if M.L. West’s reconstruction of the
context (Studies, p. 129; West thinks that frs. 112 and 113.1-6 come from the same poem) is correct.
West proposes that the situation is as follows: a city is threatened by enemies, and ‘At this critical
juncture a wedding is being celebrated. Archilochos mocks the bridegroom, who behaves as if he
were a favourite of Aphrodite and of fortune’. But A.P. Burnett (Three Archaic Poets, p. 43 n. 30)
states that there is ‘no good reason to attach [113] to 112 ... or to restore the situation of 112-13 after
[West’s] fanciful manner’. And although West’s scenario is attractive, it is perhaps best to follow
Burnett’s more cautious approach.
While the following lines (8-13) are devoted to the theme that all men are destined to die anyway, and therefore should fight. Only in lines 14-16 does the poet state that the man who flees battle will be οὐκ ἐμπτης δῆμως φιλος οὐδὲ ποθενός (16: 14 φυγὼν, then, refers to flight,14 not merely to survival after the battle, as does φύγῃ at Tyrtaios 12.35), and the rest of the poem is concerned with the glory that awaits the patriotic soldier; in this exhortation, then, the carrot looms large while the stick is wielded lightly.

The analyses of this elegy of Kallinos by Leimbach and Krischer show how the poet uses Homeric models effectively to present an idea which is itself not strictly Homeric. Leimbach points out that Hektor, apparently the patriotic fighter par excellence urging his men to fight and die to protect their families and homes (Iliad 15.494-99),15 decides to stand and resist Achilleus ‘nicht in der Erwartung oder in der Hoffnung ..., damit für die Rettung der Stadt das Beste zu tun – Priamos hatte ihn im Gegenteil beschworen, sich zu eben diesem Zweck hinter die Mauern zu begeben, – sondern in dem Bewusstsein, auf diese Weise seinem Ruhm am besten zu dienen’. 16 Hektor would rather die than hear his fellow Trojans say that ‘Εκτωρ ἤφι βήψει πιθήκος ὁλεσε λαόν (22.107), but by choosing death he ensures that he has done exactly that: ‘destroyed his people’. Kallinos, however, removes the hero’s choice between noble death and ignoble survival: his insistence on the notion that death will come when it is fated has the effect of minimizing the risk involved in fighting (it is,  

14Perhaps the tautometrical echo of 12 οὐ γὰρ κως θάνατον γε φυγίων εἰμαρμένον ἐστιν serves also to emphasize the enormity of this act of desertion. See also section 2.5 below, ‘Fight or Flight’.

15It is not clear why B. Snell (Tyrtaios und die Sprache des Epos, p. 22), thinks it is significant that Homer here uses a verb meaning ‘defend’ (15.496 ἀμυνομένω περὶ πάτρης) whereas Kallinos uses a verb simply meaning ‘fight’ (1.6-7 μάχεσθαι | γῆς πέρι ...).

16Leimbach, p. 272.
then, no more dangerous than any other activity), and he claims that it is quite possible for an ordinary soldier to survive and be treated on a level with the great heroes (19 ζώων δ’ ἄξιος ἦμιθέων). Krischer suggests that the dialogue between Sarpedon and Glaukos in Iliad 12 (see above) was Kallinos’ model: the poet here is holding out the promise of the honours that Homer’s heroes already have and which Sarpedon cites as the reason they must fight. The difference is that fighting is no longer a matter of ‘Adel verpflichtet’; in this case ‘die Ehre, von der der Dichter spricht, wird im Kampf nicht gerechtfertigt, sondern erworben’, and patriotic valour is thus τιμήν τε ... καὶ ἄγαλμάν (v. 6).

In Tyrtaios, too, much emphasis is placed on patriotic motives for fighting:

10.2 ἀνδρ’ ἄγαθον περὶ ἡ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον, 12.15-16 ζυνόν δ’ ἐσθόλον τούτο πόλη τε παντὶ τε δήμω, 12.33-34 ἀριστεύοντα μένοντά τε μαρνάμενόν τε γι’ οὔτι καὶ παίδων. When this consideration applied, it seems that the poets were ready to exploit it; on the other

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17 Leimbach, p. 273.

18 ‘Die Helden der Ilias sind Helden von Anfang an und bleiben es. .... Bei K[allinos] dagegen ist niemand mehr für den Ruhm in besonderer Weise prädestiniert’ (Leimbach, p. 278).

19 Krischer, p. 389.

20 E.K. Irwin notes, however (‘Epic Situation and the Politics of Exhortation’, Cambridge Ph.D. thesis 1999, Chapter 2), that ‘since status and birth are a precondition of the characters of epic, the demonstration of their martial valour can only be described as the justification of status, not the earning of it’ (cf. note 10 above, on the semi-divinity of the heroes), and that the shift in emphasis in sympotic martial elegy may then reflect the attempt of an aristocracy under pressure to assert its status within the community.

21 At Iliad 3.50, Hektor rebukes Paris in these terms: πατρί τε σῷ μέγα πήμα πόλη τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ, and Kassandra, seeing the body of Hektor returning to Troy, recalls that in the past Hektor’s safe return from battle μέγα χάριμα πόλει τ’ ἤν παντὶ τε δήμῳ (24.706). If, as seems likely, these are versions of an old formula μέγα [χάριμα/πήμα] πόλη κτλ. (G.S. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary, volume i., p. 272; following A. Hoekstra, Homeric Modifications, p. 116, who writes that the formulation at 24.706, with τὴν, is the result of ‘separation of the component parts of an ancient prototype’), Tyrtaios’ ζυνόν ἐσθόλον appears to be the poet’s more emphatic insistence on the community expressed in πόλη τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ.
hand, Solon’s poems of military exhortation (frr. 1-3), encouraging the Athenians to
fight for possession of the island of Salamis, cannot use such terms.\(^\text{22}\) Salamis is, of
course, not technically the πάτρη of the Athenians, but Solon must nonetheless
portray it as something worth fighting, and dying, for.\(^\text{23}\) Whereas we find άμώνεσθαι
περὶ πάτρης in Homer (Iliad 12.243) γῆς πέρι in Kallinos (1.7) and Tyrtaios (12.33-
34) and άμώνων πατρίδος δουλήν in Anakreon (PMG 419), Solon writes
μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου | ίμερτῆς (3.1-2; cf. 1.1 ίμερτῆς Σαλαμίνος). Similar
adjectives are used in Archilochos 166.3 ίμερτῆ Πάρ[ος, Solon 4.21 πολυήρατον
ἀστυ, and Tyrtaios 4.4 Σπάρτῆς ίμερόεσσα πόλις, on which Adkins comments:

In Homer the word [sc. ίμερόες] is always applied to objects or activities
already charged with desire.\(^\text{24}\) The choice of an adjective with such
connotations to characterize a city, and Sparta in particular, gives us an
unusual insight into the attitude of a Spartan citizen to his city – or into the
attitude which Tyrtaeus hoped to inspire.\(^\text{25}\)

Adkins goes on to mention that 'Homer uses neither ίμερόες nor ίμερτός of cities',
but Homer’s applications of those terms to homelands more generally (Iliad 2.751
ίμερτόν Τιταρησόν) and of very similar language to cities (Odyssey 11.275 Θηβή
πολυήρατω) suggests that Adkins’ narrow interpretation conceals an idea which did

\(^{22}\)In other contexts, Solon naturally takes the opportunity to stress ήμετέρη ... πόλις (4.1) or
πατρίδ’ ήμετέρην (19.6).

\(^{23}\)Diogenes Laertios (1.48) reports that Solon tried to prove that Salamis legitimately
belonged to the Athenians by showing that the Salaminians’ burials were in the Attic style and by
inserting lines into the Iliad (2.557-58) which suggest an early connection between Athens and
Salamis. These reports are ‘somewhat unreassuring’ (Podlecki, The Early Greek Poets, p. 124), and
the remains of Solon’s elegies on the battle for Salamis do not show quite the same devious
technique. G.S. Kirk, in his discussion of these two Homeric lines (The Iliad: A Commentary,
volume i, pp. 207-9), cites the report in Aristotle (Rhet. A 15.1375 b 30) that the Megarians accused
the Athenians of inserting the couplet, and substituted two lines of their own, which named places in
the Megarid. Kirk says that the Megarian couplet is ‘clearly inauthentic’ and that the story of the
substitution ‘suggests rather ... that Athenian interference at this point is unlikely’.

\(^{24}\)Adkins (Poetic Craft, p. 72) lists Homer’s uses of the word to describe Aphrodite’s breasts
(Iliad 3.397), Hera’s skin (Iliad 14.170), dancing (Iliad 18.603), and singing (Odyssey 1.421).

\(^{25}\)Adkins, Poetic Craft, p. 73.
in fact have Homeric roots. Solon’s description of Salamis as ἵμαρτη, then, is perhaps the poet’s indirect way of raising the island to the status of his audience’s πάτρη, and perhaps lies behind the tradition that Solon in fact came from Salamis, as found in Diogenes Laertios (1.45 Σόλων Ἥξηκεστίδοιον Σαλαμίνιος; cf. 1.46, where the dispute over Salamis is described as τῆς πατρίδος αὐτοῦ [Σαλαμίνος] ἀμφισβητουμένης, and Solon’s injunction that after his death his bones should be taken to Salamis, 1.62) and Diodoros of Sicily (9.1.1 ἦν δὲ καὶ Σόλων πατρὸς μὲν Ἥξηκεστίδο, τὸ γένος ἐκ Σαλαμίνος τῆς Ἀττικῆς). Elsewhere such language is used openly of territory to be conquered: Mimnermos, in lines probably from his Smyrneis (9.2-3), describes the objects of the settlers’ expedition as ἰμερτῆν Ἀσίην and ἐρατῆν Κολοφώνα. Here the epithets have a significantly different effect than in the Salamis poems of Solon, since Mimnermos is not exhorting, but narrating past events; the territory was, of course, conquered, and became a new homeland for Mimnermos and his audience.

This use of adjectives such ἰμερτός and ἐρατός becomes hackneyed enough for the Theognidea to use the motif with tongue in cheek at 1043-44:

εὐδώμεν ὁ φιλακῆ δὲ πόλεως φιλάκεσσι μελήσει ἀστυφέλης ἐρατῆς πατρίδος ἤμετέρης.

Here the overloaded-sounding pentameter almost deserves to be placed in inverted commata, notwithstanding van Groningen’s solemn assertion that ‘Le distique n’a

26 Bracketed by Cobet; apparently an intrusion of the scholion ὁμολογία τής Σαλαμίνος into the text (H.S. Long, Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum (Oxford, 1964), vol. 1, p. 19, apparatus ad loc.).

27 Something similar may have happened in the case of Aischylos: ‘one wonders ... if the idea that Aeschylus comes form the deme of Eleusis might not have had its aitio in Aeschylus’ prayer to Demeter at the formal beginning of the poetic contest in the Frogs (886-8)’ (M.R. Lefkowitz, First-Person Fictions, p. 120).

28 Compare the accumulation of adjectives when Archilochos grumbles about Thasos in fragment 22: οὐ γὰρ τι καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ’ ἐφίμερος | οὐδ’ ἐρατός .... The patriotic associations of such language may, then, have become a cliché long before the composition of Theognidea 1043-44
rien de symposiaque .... Non, il se situe admirablement dans la bouche d’un magistrat qui engage les habitants à dormir en paix’. 29 Van Groningen claims that the sentiment in this couplet differs ‘sensiblement’ from those in 887-88 (see above) and 763-64 (πίνωμεν χαρίεντα μετ’ ἀλλήλοις λέγοντες, | μηδὲν τὸν Μήδων δειδώτες πόλεμον), but there is no reason why 1043-44 should not be read in this sense.

Later, such language finds an interesting use in CEG 155, an epitaph at Amphipolis for a Parian fighting the Persians on the Strymon in 476/5:

μνήμ’ ἔρητης ἔθεσαν Πάριοι Τόκεω ἡ[ό]νεκεν ἡβην
[´Η]ίνος ἄφ’ ἐρατὴς ὄλεος(ε) βαρνάμενος.

Here the land for which the warrior died fighting is ἔρατη, although it is not his place of origin; here, the epithet ἔρατη is possibly a result of the pan-Hellenic ideology of the campaign to drive the Persians out. Three Athenian epigrams from the Eion campaign, and the circumstances of their composition, reflect the development in epitaphs towards emphasis on the achievements of, and for, the community: 30 they are quoted by Aischines (3.183), who tells us that the δῆμος allowed the generals to set up the monuments in the agora ἐφ’ ὅτε μὴ ἐπιγράφειν τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἑαυτῶν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἄλλα τοῦ δήμου δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ ἐπίγραμμα.

When we turn to the early Greek verse epitaphs which make mention of the fact that the commemorated man was killed in battle, it is remarkable that there are none certainly datable before the Persian wars which explicitly mention the fact that the man died fighting for his country. 31 As we have seen, there were certainly literary


30 This will be discussed further below.

31 Such details become common later in the fifth century: e.g., CEG 4, 82, 118, 142 (see below). There are, however, two inscriptions which may make earlier mention of patriotic death: CEG 142 (Akarnania, ca 475-450? Hansen), which contains the phrase ἡς περὶ τὰς αὐτο γὰς θάνε μα(ρ)νάμενος, is dated to the sixth century in Friedländer and Hoffleit, Epigrammata, no. 64. And CEG 22 (Attica, ca 550-530?) contains a line beginning τρι[δ], which Peek suggests may be part of πατρι[δ]; if θα[ in the last line comes from e.g. ἐ]θα[λε, this inscription would again be an early
models for patriotic representations of combat, and concern for one’s πατρίς is shown in some early epitaphs for people who died away from home: CEG 66 (Athens, ca 500?) γῆς ἀπο πατροίς and 143.5 (Kerkyra, ca 625-600?) γ[αία]ς ἀπο πατρίδος.

One reason that patriotic language does not appear in the extant early epitaphs for soldiers could be that the battles in which these men died were not fought to protect their own soil, and thus the use of phrases like ‘died fighting for his country’ would be inappropriate. But the Kerkyrean epitaph CEG 145 (ca 600?), for example, refers to a battle at the river Ararhos on the mainland; Friedländer-Hoffleit and Pfohl suggest that this is likely to have been a clash between Kerkyra and her parent state Korinth, in which case the Kerkyreans were probably defending themselves against Korinthian aggression rather than attempting a conquest of their own. This defensive situation, as opposed to a war of conquest, would justify the use of patriotic language, but such language does not appear here.

There is another early verse epitaph where, again, the conflict in which the young man commemorated lost his life may be identifiable: this is CEG 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?). The dead man, Hysematas, is described as ἐν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενον. The only significant military engagement in this area near the time of the inscription, seems to have been an invasion of Argos by the Spartan Kleomenes which resulted in an example of this sentiment.

32 Friedländer and Hoffleit, p. 29; Pfohl, Poetische Kleinkunst, p. 14. U. Ecker (Grabmal und Epigramm, p. 69) accepts Thucydides’ date (1.13.4) of 664 for a battle between the two states, and cites the lack of change in Korinthian lettering and the use of intervocalic digamma in CEG 145 as favouring this date, but Hornblower notes that the conflict reported by Thucydides probably belongs ‘to the late seventh or early sixth century’, since it would ‘fit into the general context of the Corcyrean-Corinthian hostility at the end of Periander’s reign. Hdt. iii. 49 ff.’ (S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, p. 45, citing W.G. Forrest. ‘Two Chronographic Notes’, CQ 19 (1969) 99-110; Forrest’s Kerkyrean chronology appears on p. 106, n. 3).

33 Also discussed below, sections 2.4 and 4.6.
a disastrous defeat for the Argives at Sepeia, near Tiryns, in 494. Daly identifies this campaign with the πολέμοι in the third verse of the epitaph. The Spartan invasion is reported by Herodotos (6.76-82), who also notes that this defeat put Argos out of action for a long time; thirteen years later they claimed still to be too weak to fight the Persians (Herodotos 7.148). Once again, there is no mention in CEG 136 of the fact that Hysematas died for the sake of his homeland, which is consistent with what can be seen in other contemporary verse epitaphs for fallen soldiers.

The Planudean Anthology preserves and ascribes to Simonides the following epigram ('Simonides' FGE II):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Δήρφωνος ἐδομηθήμεν ὕπο πτωχί, σῆμα δ' ἐφ' ἡμίν} \\
\text{ἐγγύθεν Εὐρύπου δημοσίᾳ κέχυται} \\
\text{οὐκ ἄδικως, ἔρατὴν γὰρ ἀπωλέσαμεν νεότητα} \\
\text{τρηχείαν πολέμου δεξάμενοι νεφέλην.}
\end{align*}
\]

In his discussion of this epigram, Page tentatively suggests that it may be a genuine inscription from Simonides’ period, referring to the battle between the Athenians and the Euboians in 507/6. Page finds the ‘apparent admission of defeat’ striking, and remarks on the fact that there is ‘not even a palliative πατρίδα ῥύσιμον or the like’; while it is true that the tone of the epigram is pessimistic, comparison of other verse

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34 If Pausanias’ assertion (3.4.1) that the battle at Sepeia took place early in the reign of Kleomenes is correct, the date of the engagement may be around 520; neither date excludes the probability that this was the battle to which this inscription refers.


36 The ‘cloud of war’ motif recurs in Pindar, and will be discussed below (2.3).

37 Page notes that ‘the verb ἐδομήθημεν is uncommonly candid’, implying defeat for the side. ‘Plainly ... the men commemorated will be the defeated Euboeans, not (as is commonly supposed) the victorious Athenians’ (FGE, p. 190). But CEG 114 (Boiotia, 479?), apparently referring to a soldier (also speaking in the first person) killed on the victorious side at Plataia, uses the same verb. It could perhaps be argued, though, that the same sentiment in a public polyandrion seems more forceful: the effect of a number of men saying ἐδομήθημεν, ‘we were overwhelmed’, may only have been tolerable in the context of a defeat (cf. Pindar, Pythian 1.73, of Hieron’s defeated enemies: Συρακοσιων ἄργω δαμαθήντες). Certainly later in the fifth century, as N. Loraux points out (The Invention of Athens, p. 55), the Athenians in particular appear unwilling to admit defeat, as in CEG 5 (Athens, 447 or 446):
epitaphs before the Persian wars reveals that the absence of 'a palliative _πατριός ρήματον or the like' in itself is not unusual, even in the case of engagements perceived as being defensive (as is perhaps implied by _δεξάμενοι in this epigram) and may in fact strengthen the case for believing this to be a genuine archaic inscription.

Herodotos (5.77) records an inscription accompanying the Athenian dedication of the Euboian prisoners' chains after their victory on the same occasion; this inscription has been preserved on two stone bases, the earlier of which appears as

_CEG_ 179.38

\[ \text{[δεσμοί} εν} \ _άγνυ(ό)\ _εντι} ^{39} \ _ςιδερέωι} \ _έσβεσαν} \ _δβ] \ _ριν \ _παίδε]ς} \ _ς' \ _Αθηναίοι} \ _έργωσαν} \ _ς} \ _με πολέμου} \ _[έθνεα} \ _Βοιοίων} \ _καὶ} \ _Χαλκιδέων} \ _δαμάσαντες}, \ _τὸν} \ _άπ]ςος} \ _ς[ε]κάτεν} \ _Παλλάδι} \ _τάσδ' \ _έθεσαν]. \]

It is said that the victors 'extinguished the _δβρίς' of their enemies, but once again, as in the losing side's epitaph for those fallen in the same battle, no mention is made of patriotic motives for fighting, which is consistent with the spirit of other archaic verse inscriptions relating to war.\(^{40}\)

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38 Herodotos and the later monument have the first and third verses in the opposite order. It seems that after the original monument was destroyed or removed by the Persians, another monument was substituted to celebrate the Athenian subjugation of the Euboians in 446/5; Page (FGE, p. 192) follows this interpretation and cites Kirchhoff's suggestion that the order of the hexameters was reversed in order to emphasize the conquest of Euboia as opposed to the dedication of the prisoners' chains which had been made sixty years earlier.

39 Hansen in _CEG_ prints _τάγλακούντι_ (from Herodotos), but in the addenda and corrigenda printed in _CEG_ 2 (pp. 299-305), he accepts the emendation _άγνυ(ό)έντι_, which is also printed by Page.

40 It might be pointed out that in this case both sides would have been justified in claiming that they were defending their respective homelands against enemy attack. If the account in Herodotos (5.74-77) is true: the Boiotians and Euboians attacked Attica when the Athenians were occupied defending themselves against a Spartan invasion; after the Spartan advance was aborted, the Athenians routed the Boiotians, crossed to Euboia and defeated the Euboians on their own
This observation seems to indicate an important divergence between the
tradition of literary elegy and that of funerary epigram at this stage. Murray suggests
that martial elegy as exemplified by Kallinos and Tyrtaios represents a conscious
attempt to provide a new style of military poetry, contrasting with the older epic.\(^{41}\)
With the development of hoplite warfare, the ‘warrior class’ becomes wider to the
point where at Sparta it is ‘identified with the citizen body itself’; military elegy can
thus be described as ‘public’ poetry, strengthening the bonds that keep the warrior
class (and, therefore, the state as a whole) together.\(^{42}\) This aspect of martial
endeavour is, as has been shown, absent from verse epitaphs before the Persian wars;
instead, prominence appears to be given to the warrior as individual. His valour in
battle ensures the survival of his memory after death, and this is a more important
consideration in archaic verse epitaphs than the fact that in obeying the Homeric
injunction \( \	ext{αἱ ἀριστεῦειν καὶ ὑπὲροχον ξυμεναι ἄλλων (Iliad 6.208 = 11.784) } \) he
may have contributed to the salvation of his homeland.\(^{43}\) This is somewhat surprising,
given that the fallen soldiers commemorated in these epitaphs (but perhaps not the
composers of the epitaphs themselves?) were precisely those men to whom sympotic
martial elegy is addressed. It may be that the literary material represents an attempt
to emphasize the service of the \textit{polis} as a whole at the expense of the ‘aristocratic’
ideology of war.\(^{44}\) This would be an odd attitude to adopt in a strictly ‘aristocratic’
territory.

\(^{41}\) O. Murray, ‘War and the Symposium’, p. 95.


\(^{43}\) This consideration is not entirely alien to the Homeric epics, as has been mentioned
above.

\(^{44}\) And conversely, members of an earlier and more exclusive warrior class, by effectively
ignoring the new tradition, may have attempted to distinguish themselves in this way from its
representatives.
symposion, and Murray’s formulation does not account for it; the poetry of martial exhortation seems rather to be one means by which the aristocratic élite reinforces its own perceptions of itself as crucial to the survival of the community as a whole. Bowie suggests, on the other hand, that ‘martial elegy was intended for performance either at an ordinary civilian symposion or – at Sparta – at a similar institution where features of the civilian symposion persisted even in a martial context’. Given the evidence of the poetry of Kallinos, these ‘similar institutions’ were perhaps not limited to Sparta, and may have been a creation of what Donlan suggests was a significantly large ‘middle group’ of citizens. In any case, the poetry of explicit martial exhortation itself seems to disappear at the end of the archaic age, to be replaced, in a sense, by the epitaphs, particularly the public memorials for the war dead. The polis as a whole succeeds where poets like Tyrtaios failed in changing the tone of memorials for those killed in war.

2.2 Death and Glory

Another element which is absent from the epitaphs of this period is an explicit statement that to die in battle is a glorious thing; Prato comments that the sentiment of Tyrtaios 10.1-2 (τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοις πεσόντα | ἔνδορ’


47Cf. Loraux, The Invention of Athens. p. 55: ‘the collective epitaphs are certainly, like Tyrtaeus’ elegies, which inspired them, and like the funeral oration, eulogies of the dead and exhortations to encourage much more than laments.’
... is ‘assai diffuso nelle iscrizioni dell’età classica’, but the inscriptions closer to Tyrtaios’ own time tell a different story. The virtues of the dead are brought to mind by the epithet ἀγαθός in CEG 13 and 136; 136 adds the phrase σώφρονα, ἀνε(θ)λοφόρον καὶ σωφόν ἀλκία, and CEG 19 seems to refer to the dead man’s ἐνορέαν. But sentiments like that expressed in the Simonidean hymn in honour of the dead of Thermopylai (PMG 531; line 2 εὐκλεής μὲν ἄ τίχα, καλὸς δ’ ὁ πότμος) do not appear; and in contrast to Simonides’ πρὸ γών δὲ μνάστις, ὁ δ’ οἰκτος ἐπαινος (line 3), these epitaphs encourage passers-by to grieve: CEG 27.1 στέθη καὶ οἰκτίρων, 13.2 οἰκτίρως ... παρίτο. Simonides’ poem implies that the attitude which he advocates is not the ‘normal’ reaction to the loss of a loved one in battle; it also reflects other considerations which are for the most part alien to the poetry and verse inscriptions of the archaic period, and which will be discussed below.

In CEG 112 (Thisbe, ca 500?), it is only in the second and final verse that the martial valour of the dead Phanes is mentioned:

ἀστοι[ς] καὶ χένοισι Φάνες φίλος [ἐνθάδε κείται], [𨚱ό]ς ποτ’ ἀριστευῶν ἐν προμάχοις [ἔθανε].

The first line is concerned not with his exploits on the field of battle but with the fact that he was ἀστοι[ς] καὶ χένοισι ... φίλος. Again, in CEG 27 (Attica, ca 540-30?), pity comes before praise (if the phrase ένι προμάχοις alone can be said to constitute praise):

στέθη καὶ οἰκτίρων Κροῖσο παρὰ σέμα θανόντος ἥν ποτ’ ένι προμάχοις ὁλεσε θόρος "Αρες.

48 C. Prato, Tyrtaeus, p. 87. Prato rightly notes (ibid.) that in Tyrtaios’ poem, as opposed to Iliad 15.496-97 and Kallinos 1.6, ‘la bellezza del sacrificio è in primo piano, laddove negli altri autori quest’azione eroica è, al piu, οὐ ἄεικές (Omero), oppure τιμήν τε ... καὶ ἀγλαῖν (Callino)’.

49 Hansen prints [ἐξεσε] in CEG, but writes that ‘ἐθάνε potius supplemendum est’ in his addenda and corrigenda to CEG (printed in CEG 2, pp. 299-305).
Of the badly damaged couplet *CEG* 148 (Selinous, 500-475?), only παιδ’ οἰκτίρμ’
Ε[ remains in the first verse, and the second may refer to death in battle, if δακ]ρυόες
at the end of the verse refers to *e.g.* ["Ἀρείς"], as suggested by Hansen, again the
command to feel pity dominates over the circumstances of death.

The Attic epitaph *CEG* 13 (*ca* 575-50?) makes this point especially clear,
where the element of grief is introduced not once but twice; once in the second line
and once in the fourth:

\[
[εἴτε ἄστοις τις ἄνερ εἴτε χείνος ἠλοθεν ἐλθόν
Τέτιχον οἰκτίρας ἄνδρ’ ἄγαθὸν παρίτο,
ἐν πολέμωι φθιμένον, νεαρὰν ἥθεν ὀλέσαντα.
ταύτ’ ἀποδυράμενοι νέοθε ἐπὶ πράγμα ἄγαθὸν.
\]

Epitaphs for soldiers killed in action at this period tend to give no more prominence,
and indeed often less prominence, to the military virtues of the dead man than to his
civilian virtues.

As was the case with patriotic language, there was a literary model for
descriptions of death in battle as glorious and a source of pride: Tyrtaios 10 begins
τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοις πεσόντα. Apart from Alkaios fr. 400 τὸ γὰρ
"Ἀρείπ καταθάνην κάλον, this sentiment is unique, in this period, to Tyrtaios, while
the exhortation of Kallinos emphasizes the fact that a man who dies fighting for his

---

50 Hansen proposes that the line might have read [ἀμ]μορὸν (or [δόσ]μορὸν) ἥ]ν ποκ’
"Ἀρείς δλεξε ἀξηρινοῖς.

51 *CEG* 128 (Opuntian Lokris, *ca* 525-500?) is apparently an epitaph for a man described as
παθεινὸς δήμῳ, but it does not state how he died; it may well not have been in battle.

52 C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Reading’ Greek Death*, pp. 174 ff., distinguishes between
injunctions to ‘feel pity for’ and to ‘lament’ the deceased. represented in *CEG* 13 by οἰκτίρμος (2) and
ἀποδυράμενοι (4) respectively. While this is a distinction worth pointing out, it does not affect the
argument here: in both cases, it is the sadness induced by the death of a young man which is
appealed to in these epitaphs. Following the comments of Sourvinou-Inwood, one might consider
the question of verbal aspect: is metrical convenience the only reason that *e.g.* *CEG* 148 has οἰκτίρμ’
wheras *CEG* 27 has οἰκτίρμον?

53 The idea that death can be καλὸς returns later, *e.g.*, in Simonides’ καλὸς δ’ ὁ πότμος,
mentioned above. and at *Agamemnon* 447 ἐν φοναῖς καλὸς πεσόντ’.

33
city will be remembered with affection for the sacrifice he made, Tyrtaios presents death as something positively to be desired. As Adkins writes, although Kallinos 'is opposing the view that it is better to be a live mouse than a dead lion, ... this does not require him to hold that it is better to be a dead lion than a live one'.\(^{54}\) This last view, though, is exactly what Tyrtaios proposes when he describes the ideal warrior at 11.5-6:

\[
\text{έχθρην μὲν ψυχὴν θέμενος, θανάτου δὲ μελαίνας}
\text{kήρας (ὁμώς) αὐγαίς ἡμίλιοι φίλας.}
\]

Tyrtaios' words here\(^{55}\) are in direct opposition to the sentiment of the shade of Achilleus in the world of the dead, who says to Odysseus (\textit{Odyssey} 11.489-91):

\[
\text{βουλοίμην κ’ ἐπάρουρος ἕών θητενέμεν ἀλλω,}
\text{ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ, ὃ μὴ βιότος πολὺς εἰη,}
\text{ἡ πάσιν νεκὺςσοι κατὰφθιμένοισιν ἄνασσειν.}
\]

Tyrtaios is expressing a distinctly un-Homeric idea (although there are no verbal echoes of \textit{Odyssey} 11.489-91), and to do this he employs a reversal of an Homeric image; against his 'hold the black spirits of death as dear as the rays of the sun' can be contrasted Achilleus' \textit{έχθρος γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμώς 'Αἴδαο πύλησιν ... at Iliad 9.312.}

But at the end of poem 12, there is more emphasis on the rewards for a patriotic fighter who survives (vv. 35-44); this poem, like Kallinos' elegy, encourages with the prospect of a happy life rather than a noble death.

The opening couplet of Tyrtaios 10, which states that it is \textit{καλὸν} for man to die fighting for his country, is followed by a description of a man whose home has been sacked by the enemy (3-12), and by exhortations to fight without regard to one's own life (13-18). Then follows a gruesome portrayal of a grizzled old man who, having fallen in battle, clutches his \textit{αἰματόσεντ’ αἰδοία} (25). The emphasis on this

\(^{54}\)A.W.H. Adkins, 'Callinus 1 and Tyrtaeus 10'. p. 66.

\(^{55}\)\textit{Cf.} also Tyrtaios 10.18 μηδὲ φιλοσοχεῖτ' (the first occurrence of this verb), where again life is presented as something that is not to be desired.
anatomical detail and the reference to his χρώα γυμνωθέντα two lines later have a point: this tableau, it turns out, serves as a foil for another, and striking, incentive for young men to fight. This is the declaration that a young man who was ἄνδρασι μὲν θητητὸς ἰδεῖν, ἡρατὸς δὲ γυναιξὶ | ζώδες έων will remain καλὸς δ’ ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών; in other words, fighting and dying for one’s country is not only figuratively καλὸν ‘fine’ but literally καλὸν ‘beautiful’. 56 Once again this is a departure from the usual Homeric image of corpses, which from the beginning of the Iliad are described as distasteful: ἐλώρια ... κόνεσσιν | οἴωνοισί τε πάσι (Iliad 1.4-5). 57

In the archaic period, then, it is only Tyrtaios who presents death in battle as something actively to be sought, something positively to be desired as preferable to survival. This sentiment recurs once, perhaps in the fifth century, in an epitaph ascribed to Simonides in the Palatine Anthology, 7.512:

tώνδε δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀρετᾶν οὐχ ἱκετο καπνὸς
αἴθερα δαιμόνες εὐρυχόρου Τευέας,
οἱ βούλοντο πόλιν μὲν ἐξευθείᾳ τεθαλώνον
παισὶ λιπεῖν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐν προμάχοισι θανεῖν.

Here it is stated that the deceased soldiers βούλοντο ... ἐν προμάχοισι θανεῖν, like Tyrtaios’ ideal warrior; it is perhaps ironic that the battle in which they fell may have been against the Spartans to whom Tyrtaios’ elegies were addressed. 58 At Herodotos

56 Again the Agamemnon recalls Tyrtaios; at line 454, the bodies of the Greeks who died at Troy are described as εὔμορφοι.

57 There is one important exception in Homer: after the armour has been stripped from the body of Hektor, the Greeks gaze at his φυή καὶ εἴδος ἄγγητον (Iliad 22.370). This image recalls the assertion that Priam made only three hundred lines earlier (71-73):

νεώ δὲ τε πάντ’ ἐπένδυεν,
ἀριητεμένῳ, δεδαιμένῳ δέξει χαλκῷ
κείσανθε πάντα δὲ καλὰ δάνοντι πέρ, ὑπὸ φανή.
Vernant rightly comments on the Greeks’ admiration for Hektor’s corpse: ‘Réaction pour nous surprenante, si le vieux Priam ne nous en avait livré la clef’ (J.-P. Vernant, ‘La belle mort et le cadavre outrage’, p. 59). For the relationship between Iliad 22.66-76 and Tyrtaios 10.21-30, see above, section 1.3.

58 Page (FGE, p. 279) points to the Spartans’ battle against the Tegeates and Argives mentioned in Herodotos (9.35); the date seems to have been about 473-470. Although, as Page
9.71 we are told that Aristodemos, having suffered δνείδος and ἀτιμίη because he alone had returned to Sparta after the battle of Thermopylae, attempted to redeem himself by dying gloriously (9.71.3 βουλόμενον φανερῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίης). The view taken by the Spartans, however, was that such a desire was not courageous but foolhardy and posed a risk to the rest of the army (9.71.3 λυσσῶντα τε καὶ ἐκλείποντα τὴν τάξιν), and for this reason Aristodemos received no battle honours:

οὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς κατέλεξα πάντες, πλὴν Ἀριστοδῆμου, τῶν ἀποθανόντων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ τιμῶν ἐγένοντο. Αριστοδῆμος δὲ βουλόμενος ἀποθανεῖν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίην οὐκ ἐτιμήθη (9.71.4).

Loraux comments on this passage: the noble death in battle ‘should be accepted and not sought’, 59 and that the seeking of death was Aristodemos’ crime, but the crucial point made by Herodotos is that Aristodemos abandoned his τάξις: even Tyrtaeios would not have approved of this (cf. 10.1, 15, 30; 12.15-20, 23).

It has been claimed that ‘the values of Tyrtaeus’ world are not far removed from those of Homer’s, the only difference being that the Spartan warrior must see his timé as inextricably bound up with the fortunes of the polis’. 60 As was shown above, Tyrtaeios’ description of death in battle as καλὸν is certainly un-Homeric, but it is true that this ‘fine’ death is placed in the context of protection of one’s homeland: Tyrtaeios does not assert that it is καλὸν simply to die in the pursuit of personal κλέος, though this will accrue to one who follows the poet’s precepts. 61

writes, this engagement is a more likely candidate than Plataia (479) or Mantinea (362), its only real claim to being the battle to which the epitaph refers is its ‘immunity from positive criticism, nothing whatsoever being known either in its favour or against it’.


60 Shey, ‘Tyrtaeus and the Art of Propaganda’, p. 18.

61 Alkaios 400, mentioned above, cannot be assessed in relation to this distinction without its context; the poet may or may not have cited patriotic duty as a justification of his assertion that τὸ γάρ Ἀρείῳ κατθάνην καλὸν.
καλῶς θάνατος, however, the introduction of the patriotic motive in the second verse is followed by a concentration on the individual soldier, in contrast to a later text, 'Simonides' FGE VIII:

εἰ τὸ καλῶς θυσίσκειν ἄρετης μέρος ἔστι μέγιστον,
ἐμιν ἐκ πάντων τούτων ἀπένειμεν Τύχη.
'Ελλάδι γὰρ σπεύδοντες ἐλευθερίην περιθείναι
κεῖμεθ' ἀγγάραντο χρώμενον εὐλογη.

Here, γὰρ in the third verse explicitly refers the fact that these men died καλῶς to their defence of Greece against the invader; it is the cause for which they were fighting which justifies the statement that they fell καλῶς. Tyrtaios' poem opens with the flat assertion that it is καλὸν to fall in the front line of battle; the syntax gives no indication that the syntactical construction will carry over into the next verse, and the opening line of the poem can thus stand on its own as a gnomic statement. It is only at the end of the second verse that the patriotic element in the fighting is mentioned, and at the end of the poem (vv. 27-30) the κάλλος of the corpse is emphasized without resumption of the patriotic theme. By contrast, the first verse of the epitaph AP 7.253 is incomplete in terms of its grammatical construction; τὸ καλῶς θυσίσκειν waits for explanation. Even at the end of the second verse, the apodosis has provided no interpretation of the manner of death; the syntax is complete, but the thought is not. 'If to die καλῶς is the greatest part of ἄρετη, then Τύχη has allotted this to us above all'; the epitaph has declared to the reader that these men died καλῶς, and the justification for this claim follows in the final couplet, which concludes the epitaph on a patriotic note. Although the descriptions of the deaths as 'fine' in both Tyrtaios and

Page (FGE, pp. 198-99) cites with approval the suggestion of Bergk that this epigram and AP 7.251 may be the epitaphs, respectively, for the Athenian and Spartan dead at Plataia in 479 referred to by Pausanias (9.2.4) and attributed there (as are those in the Anthology) to Simonides. 'Style, tone, and contents are entirely consistent with the early date', notes Page; 'the ascription to Simonides, though wanting in authority, may well be true.'
'Simonides' are based on the fact that they occurred in the course of the defence of the homeland, this factor is made more prominent in the latter.

In the later epitaph CEG 83 (Athens, 446-ca 425?), we see that the pride in the warrior's fulfilment of his patriotic duty is set alongside a specific concern with family, such as was seen in the earlier inscribed epigrams. The dead man is said to have saved three phylai by his courageous deeds in battle, and to have brought good repute to his father (vv. 1-7):

μνήμα τόδ' ἔστ' ἐπὶ σάματι κείμενον ἄνδρός ἀρίστος·
Πυθεῖον ἐν Μεγάρῳ(ν) δαίμωσας ἐπτά μ(ε)ν ἄνδρας,
ἐπτά δὲ ἀπορρήξ(α)ς λόγχας ἐνὶ σώματι έκείνων
ἐλετο τὰν ἀρεταν, πατέρα εὐκλείζων ἐνὶ δήμῳ.

οὔτος ἀνὴρ, δὲς ἐς(ο)ψωςεν 'Ἀθηναίων τρεῖς φυλάς
ἐκ Παγάν ἀγαγών διὰ Βοιωτίων ἐς 'Ἀθηνας,
εὐκλείσι' Ἀνδοκίδαν δισχίλιοι ἄνδραποδοισιν.

Contrast πατέρα εὐκλείζων ἐνὶ δήμῳ (line 4) with σφετέραν δ' εὐκλείσαμεν πατρίδα
in CEG 6 (Athens, 447?) and πατρ[ίδ'] εὐκλ[έ]σαν in CEG 10.iii (Athens, 432),
which ends with verses reminiscent of archaic martial elegy:

ἄνδρας μὲ μί πόλις ἡδέ ποθεὶ καὶ δέ[μος Ερεχθεοῦς],
πρόσθε Ποτειδαίας ὥσθε τανόν ἐμ πρ[ο]μάχους
πατιδες 'Ἀθηναίων' φυσικάς δ' ἀντιρρο[π]ρὰ δεντες
ἐ[λ]λ.αχισαντ' ἀρετῆν καὶ πατρ[ίδ'] εὐκλ[έ]σαν.

The last two words of this inscription echo Tyrtaios 12.24 ἀστῦ τε καὶ λαοῦς καὶ
πατέρ' εὐκλείσας, with the significant change of πατέρ' to πατρ[ίδ']; this is a public

63Patriotism and familial sentiment are also closely linked in the poetry of Pindar, as will be seen below (section 2.3).
64The other instance in this epitaph is εὐκλείσι' Ἀνδοκίδαν (line 7).
65Compare Kallinos 1.16 οὐκ ἐμπρὸς δήμῳ φύλος οὐδὲ ποθείνας, and Tyrtaios 12.15 ξινὸν
δ' ἐσθιόν τότε πόλητ' τε παντι τε δῆμῳ.
66Compare Tyrtaios ἔνι προμάχοις πεσόντα (10.1), μετὰ προμάχοις πεσόντα (10.21), ἐν
προμάχοις πεσῶν (10.30. 12.23).
epitaph for a group of soldiers. 67 Tyrtaios’ emphatically patriotic poem mentions the ἄστυ and the λαοὶ first, but can then accommodate the πατήρ because the poet is concentrating his attention on the death of one hypothetical man, the δοτής ἀνήρ of line 16. This line and the one immediately preceding (23 αὕτος δ’ ἐν προμάχοισι πεσὼν φίλον ὀλέσε θυμόν) could almost be a couplet from a private epitaph such as CEG 83 above (where, however, the phrase ἐνὶ δήμῳ follows mention of the father, almost as an afterthought). Loraux argues that Athens in the fifth century discarded the type of collective epitaph where the dead themselves speak 68 in favour of those where the polis speaks, 69 which both honours the dead and distances them from the mourners, 70 thus encouraging private grief to be subordinated to public pride in their achievement. 71

67 The phrase πατρίδος ἔπνυκλείσας is used in the fifth century to praise two victories in competitions: one by the runner Dandes of Argos (‘Simonides’ FGE XXXV), and one by the Theban kitharode Kleon (Anon. FGE CXIII).

68 E.g., CEG 131 (Salamis, 480) = ‘Simonides’ FGE XI:

[ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐπομενὴν ἐν θῇσαλίνῳ ἀπολαυτὼς διαμηνύσας]
[καὶ Μέδος ἲπικρανής ἡλιοτομὰ] 69 E.g., CEG 6 (Athens, 447):

[ὅτε παρ’ ἡλλέσποντον ἀπόλαυσαν ἀγλαὸν ἱέβεν]
[ὁρὰς ἤσθαν ἐκθρισμέναι πατρίδα]
[αὐτοὶς δ’ ἀθανάτῳ μνήμῃ ἀρετῆς ἔθεσαν.

70 Loraux, The Invention of Athens, p. 55.

71 The possible implications of the addresses to the dead will be examined further below, under 2.4 Martial Ἀρετή and its Rewards.
In the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides, the theme of war may be introduced as an obvious parallel to athletic competition, particularly (but not exclusively\(^{72}\)) for combative events: wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. War, as the supreme ‘contest’, serves to highlight the athletic contest from which the laudandus has emerged victorious; the legendary warriors of the past thus serve as well-known exempla against which the prowess of the athletic victor can be measured. Pindar, then, can assign to athletic prowess the same status as bravery in battle, as he does at Isthmian 1.50-51:

δς δ´ ἀμφ´ ἀέθλοις ἢ πολεμίων ἄρηται κύδος ἀβρόν,
εὐαγορηθεῖς κέρδος υψίτον δέκεται, πολια-
tάν καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον.

And a similar equivalence is implied at Pythian 8.25-27 (the subject of άείδεται is the island of Aigina):

... πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ άείδεται
νικαφόροις ἐν ἀέθλοις θρέψισα καὶ θοαῖς
ὑπερτάτους ἠρωας ἐν μάχαις.

Here it should be noted that in neither of the above cases does the poet refer to patriotism or a glorious death in battle as an incentive to fight; the warrior, like the athlete, aims for κύδος, the glory of being remembered in speech and song. Of course, a warrior who is so remembered by his fellow citizens is likely to have been praised for having saved them from death and his city from capture, but it seems that the epinician poet subordinates this aspect of remembrance to the fact of remembrance itself: the important consideration is that one’s deeds of prowess will survive, and be set beside those of famous ancestors, such as the legendary valour of

\(^{72}\) Of the first two Pindaric examples cited following, the first is for a Theban victor in the chariot race, and the second for an Aiginetan wrestler.
the Korinthians mentioned by Pindar in an ode for a victor from Korinth, *Olympian*

13.49-52 and 55-60:

> ἐγὼ δὲ Ἰδιὸς ἐν κοινῷ σταλεῖς
> μὴ τίνες τε γαρ υἱῶν παλαιγόνων
> πόλεμον τ’ ἐν ἥρωἰς ἀρεταίσιν
> οὐ ψέψοιμι ᾧ ἀμφὶ Κορίνθῳ ...

> τὰ δὲ καὶ ποτ’ ἐν ἀλκά
> πρὸ Δαρδάνου τειχέων ἐδόκησαν
> ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα μαχάν τάμειν τέλος,
> τοὺς μὲν γένει φῦλο σὺν Ἄτρεος
> Ἐλέναν κομίζοντες, οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ πάμπαν
> εἴργοντες ....

The lack of emphasis on patriotic motives for fighting is appropriate for epinician poetry; the athletic contests in which the victors had competed were individual endeavours, and the parallel between the games and battle is closer if, in the latter case, more attention is paid to the glory of the individual warrior. Although athletic triumph (like bravery in battle) also glorifies the *polis* of the victor, Pindar tends to link this concept specifically with the family, as will be seen below.  

One instance of paradigmatic martial valour in Pindar might be described as ‘patriotic’ in another sense. In *Pythian* 6, emphasis is placed on Thrasyboulos’ devotion to his father Xenokrates; the importance of the chariot victory (and the fame derived from it) for the family as a whole is introduced at lines 15-16:

> πατρὶ τεῷ, Ὀρασύβουλε, κοινάν τε γενεὰ
> λόγοις βατῶν εὐδοξον ἄρματι νίκαν ....

This leads to the declaration, occupying the whole of the following stanza, that Thrasyboulos has obeyed the injunction (20 ὅρθὰν ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν) of the centaur Cheiron to Achilleus (23-28):

> ... μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν,
> βαρύσπα στεροῦσαν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
> θεῶν σέβεσθαι ταύτας δὲ μὴ ποτὲ τιμᾶς
> ἀμείρειν γονέων βιον πεπρωμένον.

---

73 See also section 4.2, *City and Family.*
The example which the poet gives of this spirit (29 νόημα τούτο) is the battlefield rescue of Nestor by his son Antilochos, δὲ ὑπερέφθητο πατρὸς (30), and the significance of Antilochos’ deed is praised in the highest terms:

... ὁ θείος ἄνήρ
πριατό μὲν θανάτοιο κομιδὰν πατρός,
ἐξόρκησέν τε τῶν πάλαι γενέα
ὅπλοτέρωσιν ἔργον πελώριον τελέσαις
ὑπατος ἀμφι τοκεύσιν ἐμμεν πρὸς ἀρετάν.

And this fifth stanza ends with the assertion (recalling the third stanza, lines 20-28 above) that ... τῶν νῦν δὲ καὶ Ὁρασύβουλος | πατρῶν μᾶλστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα.

The ode, which begins with praise of the Emmenidai (who are mentioned in line 5, before the city of Akragas in line 6) and in which family concerns are central, ends with praise of the victor’s own son.

In the sixth Pythian ode, then, filial as opposed to civic duty as a motive both for athletic achievement and for martial endeavour is placed in the foreground by Pindar, more or less on a level with religious obligation (ταύτας ... τιμᾶς, line 26); in the background lies a concern for one’s family or race (γενέα, lines 15 and 40).

Pindar, in fact, appears (though it is not certain – see below, section 4.2) to equate a man’s γενέα with the ἀστοι of his homeland in the seventh Isthmian ode in what appears to be the only Pindaric instance of ‘patriotic’ motives for fighting74 as they are understood in the earlier and contemporary poetry so far discussed. Beginning with a list of mythical glories of Thebes (the last two of which – Adrastos and the Aigeidai – are martial in nature), the poet moves to the praise of the athlete Strepsiadas who is described in the following terms at the end of the second strophe (22):

... σθένει τ’ ἔκπαγλος ἵδειν τε μορ-
φαείς, ἄγει τ’ ἀρετάν οὐκ ἀίσχιον φυας.
Here ϕυά refers not only to physical appearance\(^7\) (ιδεῖν τε μορφάςις) but also to the ‘nature’ inherited by Strepsiadas from his maternal uncle of the same name, whose death in battle is the subject of the following antistrophe and epode, and carries over to the opening lines of the third strophe. The ἄριστα of the younger Strepsiadas (line 22, above) is reflected in the inclusion of his uncle among the ἄγαθοι of line 26 and the ἄριστοι of line 35.

Young has examined this ode in detail from the point of view of its use of the *topoi* of martial poetry; the themes and vocabulary of the ‘digression’ on the death in battle of the elder Strepsiadas are ‘surprisingly similar to those found throughout the battle exhortations of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, and in sepulchral poetry for fallen warriors’, and so ‘Pindar assigns a name to that anonymous but nevertheless ubiquitous and legendary figure, the δοστις ἁνήρ, the οὐτος ἁνήρ, “αὐτός”, the τόντε, the ὄντια, of Tyrtaeus [12].16, 20, 23, 27, 33’.\(^7\) One passage to which Young does not refer and which is perhaps relevant to this poem is Tyrtaios 10.9-10, where one

\(^{75}\)Notwithstanding Willcock’s translation (p. 65), ‘he practices courage no less nobly than good looks’.

\(^{7}\)D.C. Young, *Pindar, Isthmian 7*, pp. 20 and 46. Young (p. 7) effectively refutes the biographical fallacy which takes ἐτλοῖν ἐς πένθος οὐ ποστοῖν in line 37 to refer to Pindar’s disappointment at ‘politico-military disaster’ by relating the word πένθος to mourning for the dead soldiers, as in, e.g., *Iliad* 16.548 (the Trojan grief at the death of Sarpedon). A related point made by Young is that this phrase and ἐσχον πολέμου νείκος ἐσχάτας {ἐπ’} ἐλπίζων in line 36 need not refer to a defeat suffered by the Thebans: he compares Tyrtaios 12.22 σπουδὴ δ’ ἐσχεθε κύμα μάχης, where ‘defeat is utterly foreign to Tyrtaeus’ context’ (p. 6). Thus, ‘“Strepsiades died: I mourned him”. Few lines of thought could be so lucid, and one may mourn a fallen warrior, whether he fell victorious or in defeat’ (p. 8). For πένθος unambiguously in the context of death in battle, compare also *CEG* 135, for Argive warriors who died at Tanagra. Young, having rejected the notion that lines 36-37 must refer to a defeat, sees no reason to retain the assumption that Strepsiadas died at Oinophyta, and suggests that the battle in question might have been Tanagra (p. 8); *CEG* 135 would then be an epitaph for Strepsiadas’ foes. Willcock, however, believes that ‘the battle of Oenophyta in 457 remains an attractive possibility’ (p. 61); ‘We cannot tell ... whether [the battle referred to in *Isthmian 7*] was a victory for Thebes or a defeat, although the tone of 36-7 suggests the latter’ (p. 65); the phrase ἐσχάτας ἐλπίζων (though perhaps Willcock’s ‘at the edge of despair’, p. 67, is a slight over-translation) does seem to imply that Strepsiadas and his comrades were facing even less favourable odds than Tyrtaios’ imaginary soldier.
reason to fight is offered in a description of the man who has been forced into exile when his homeland has been defeated in war:

\[
\text{αἰσχύνει τε γένος, κατὰ δ᾽ ἀγαλῶν εἴδος ἐλέγχει, πᾶσα δ᾽ ἀτυμᾶ ὑπὸ κακὸτης ἐπεται.}
\]

After this digression on the horrors of defeat, Tyrtaios resumes his exhortation in line 15: δυ νέοι, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθε παρ᾽ ἀλλήλοις μένοντες ... The negative picture presented here in lines 9-10 (after which, significantly, Tyrtaios abandons the γένος theme) is recalled by its positive counterparts in Isthmian 7, lines 22 (σθένει δ᾽ ἐκπαγλος ἰδεῖν τε μορφάς, ἀγει δ᾽ ἄρετὰν οὐκ αἰσχιον φυὰς) and 26 (τιμὰ δ᾽ ἁγαθοῖσιν ἀντίκειται). Pindar claims (line 27) that the elder Strepsiadas fought πρὸ φίλας πάτρας, and this is followed in line 29 by the description of the warrior as ἀστων γενεῖ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων; with the phrase ἀστων γενεῖ (on which more will be said below, section 4.2), Strepsiadas’ patriotism seems to be made part of a concern for family, such as motivated Antilochos in the sixth Pythian, and this is part of the ἄρετα which has been passed on into the younger Strepsiadas’ φυὰ. From the patriotic opening address to the eponymous nymph of Thebes, the praise of Strepsiadas and his eponymous uncle in games and in war has become a family affair.77

The clause μάτρωι θ᾽ ὀμωνύμῳ δέδωκε κοινὸν θάλας at line 24 is also interesting: in saying that the younger Strepsiadas has given a κοινὸν θάλας to his uncle, the poet may be implying that the uncle, like a mythic hero, can receive it. This implication of the line is perhaps supported by the next one, χάλκασσις ὦ πότμον μὲν Ἄρης ἐμείξεν: Young points out that the digression on the elder Strepsiadas is

77 In a genre more specifically public and polis-oriented than the epinician, Pindar seems able to use patriotism without this kind of qualification, as in the dithyrambic fragment 78:

\[
\text{Κλῆθ᾽ Ἀλαλά, Πολέμιον θύγατερ, ἐγχέων προοίμιον, ὦ θύεται ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ πόλεως τὸν ἱρόθυτον θάνατον ...}
\]
introduced with a relative pronoun, a technique with which Pindar often introduces myths, and Thummer notes that the patriotic tone of πρὸ φίλας πάτρας (27) is dropped in favour of the three heroic examples immediately introduced in the following stanza. The heroic overtones of the passage are also, perhaps, enhanced by Pindar’s imagery: Strepsiadas is said to have died holding back a hailstorm of blood (χάλαζαν αἵματος) in a cloud of battle (ἐν ταύτῃ νεφέλῃ), which recalls the ‘Simonidean’ epitaph for the men killed ‘under the fold of Dirphys’, discussed above (section 2.1). Commenting on Pindar’s phrase, Privitera notes that the use of storm imagery to describe battle goes back to Homer (e.g. Iliad 17.243 ἐπεῖ πολέμιο νέφος περι πάντα καλύπτει), and compares three other Pindaric phrases: τραχεῖα νιφάδα πολέμιο (Isthmian 4.17), πολυφθόρω δίῳ δίμβρῳ | ἀναρίθμοις ἀνδρῶν χαλαζάεντι φόνῳ (Isthmian 5.49-50), and φόνου | παρποδίου νεφέλαν (Nemean 9.37-38). Two of these passages are directly linked with heroes: Nemean 9 describes the prowess of Chromios on the battlefield, and the poet immediately compares him to Hektor (39 ff.); and the passage in Isthmian 5 refers to the battle at Salamis, which is called πόλις Αἰαντος (48). The other occurrence of this storm imagery, in Isthmian 4, forms part of a brief history of the Kleonymid family, who are said to have been honoured in Thebes ἄρχαθεν (7), and to have been ‘pleasing to Ares’ (15); if they have been there ‘from the beginning’ and have won the favour of a god, they must be, if not heroes themselves, then the closest that mortals can come to that status. The


79 Privitera, Pindaro: le Istmiche, p. 221. Iliad 16.350, also cited by Privitera, is rather different: θανάτου δὲ μέλαν νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψεν refers specifically to the moment of death, not to fighting.

80 This idea is well captured in another image from the same passage: στάλασσον ἄπτοντ’ Ἡρακλείας (12). For an investigation of the heroization and ‘talismanic power’ of athletes as part
placement of the martial achievement of the elder Strepsiadas within the familial sphere in Isthmian 7 (the primary effect of his patriotic stand in battle is the accumulation of ἱκέως for his ἅστων γενέα) demonstrates the subordination of the polis to the oikos.

The magnitude of the threat to Greece as a whole posed by the Persian war prompts Pindar to refer to the fact that the tyrant Hieron helped a wider community by repelling the danger: 'Ελλάδος ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας (Pythian 1.75). Pindar is referring in this passage to Hieron’s victory over the Carthaginians, and he places this victory on a level with the achievements of the Athenians and Spartans at Salamis and Plataia; the masculine singular participle in line 75 suggests that the salvation of Greece was Hieron’s work alone rather than due to the combined efforts of the various poleis. This device is also found in 'Simonides’ FGE X:

οὕτως Ἀδειμάντου κεῖνον τάφος, ὅν διὰ πᾶσα

of an aristocratic attempt to regain ‘symbolic capital’ within the polis, see L. Kurke, ‘The Economy of Kudos’.

81 For the related idea that even death in battle is preferable to enslavement by the barbarians, cf. Ion of Chios on the cock-fight staged by Miltiades to encourage the Greeks to resist the Persians (PMG 746):

οὐδὲ γε σώμα τυχείς διψείς τε κόρας ἐπιλάβεται ἄλκας,

According to the Korinthians claim that they were responsible for saving Hellas.

82 Another one is found in a very similar context in Timotheos PMG 788, apparently the opening of his Persians, but the subject has been lost: κυλινὸν ἐλευθερίας τεύχον μέγαν Ἔλλαδι κόσμων.
And after mentioning Salamis and Plataia, the poet immediately reminds his audience that his task is to praise the prowess of the sons of Deinomenes in particular (79-80):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{παρὰ δὲ τὰν εὐνὸρον ἀκτὰν} & \\
\text{Ιμέρα παῖδεσσιν ὑμινὸν Δεινομένεως τελέσας,} & \\
\text{τὸν ἐδεξαντ’ ἁμίφ’ ἄρετά, πολεμίων ἄνδρῶν καμόντων.} & 
\end{align*}
\]

The point that Hieron and his brothers were part of a larger enterprise is made more clearly in ‘Simonides’ FGE XXXIV, allegedly inscribed on gold tripods dedicated at Delphi by Gelon and his brothers, ‘a relatively late literary exercise’ according to Page, though Molyneux is not so sceptical:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{φημὶ Γέλων’, Ἰέρωνα, Πολύζηλον, Ὀρασύβουλον,} & \\
\text{παῖδας Δεινομένευς, τοὺς τρίτοδας θέμενα,} & \\
\text{βαρβαρα νικήσαντας έθην, πολλήν δὲ παρασχεῖν} & \\
\text{σύμμαχον Ἐλληνικον πείρα’ ἐς ἐλευθερίν.} & 
\end{align*}
\]

In arguing for this epigram’s authenticity, against Wilamowitz and Podlecki, Krumeich cites Pindar as support: ‘Denkt man an Pindars explizite Parallelisierung der Siege von Himera und Kyme mit den griechischen Siegen über die Perser, so kann die propagandistische Färbung des zweiten Distichons kaum als Argument gegen seine Echtheit geltend gemacht werden’. But here the Sicilian contingents provide a σύμμαχος πείρα, as contrasted with the Pindaric picture of one man Ελλάδ’ ἐξέλκων.

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84 Page comments (FGE, p. 201) that this epigram’s ascription to Simonides is ‘not to be taken seriously’, based on its incompatibility with the Athenian account of the battle of Salamis as reported by Herodotos.

85 FGE, p. 248; Molyneux, Simonides, pp. 221-24.

86 The Pindaric scholiasts wondered exactly what the poet meant by ‘Ελλάδ’ (α) in Pythian 1.75 (schol. 146a ἐνιοί μὲν Ἐλλάδα τὴν ἐν Σικέλια ήκουσαν, ἐνιοί δὲ Ἐλλάδα τὴν Ἀττικὴν), but since the same doubts could be raised about *Ελλήνικον in the final verse of this epigram, Krumeich’s argument still holds.

87 Krumeich, ‘Zu den goldenen Dreifußen’, p. 58; he follows Page and others, however, in his rejection of the alternate version of this epigram (AP 6.214). It refers only to a single tripod, which is contradicted by the archaeological evidence, and its second couplet, as Page remarks (FGE, p. 248), ‘is downright unintelligible both in itself and as a rival to the other version’. Krumeich agrees, then, that ‘man kann sie mit einiger Sicherheit als eine spätere Variante verwerfen’ (58).
Krumeich notes the significance of the fact that the inscription accompanied a dedication at Delphi: this declaration of the importance of the Deinomenids’ contribution to Greek έλευθερία was intended for a Greek audience.

Cingano adds that the attempt of the Deinomenidai to present Syracuse as equally important to the Greek world as Sparta or Athens did not rest on very secure ground: the propagandizing assertion that the Deinomenids’ victories over the Carthaginians were comparable to the battles of Plataia and Salamis is not borne out by the archaeological record, which suggests that trade in this area was not significantly disrupted at the time.

It is worth noting, in connection with the texts relating to the Sicilians’ victories, that other sources do not attribute to Hieron a major role in the campaign. The scholia to *Pythian* 1.75 cite the account of the expedition against the Carthaginians as told by Ephoros, who apparently described Gelon as διαμαχησόμενον μή μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας έλευθερώσαε, ἄλλα καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα; Herodotos (7.157-64) describes Gelon’s negotiations with Greek ambassadors, his complaint that the Greeks did not help him against Carthage in the past, his demand that he be made commander-in-chief if he sent troops to help the Greeks, and, when that was refused, his demand for control over sea operations. Finally, says Herodotos, Gelon sent money to Delphi to offer the Persians in case they won; but in the Sicilian version of the story, which he also reports, Gelon sent money to Delphi to help the Greeks, being unable to send troops because an army of Carthaginians, Phoenicians, and others had been assembled to reclaim Himera for Terillos, who had been driven out by Theron of Akragas.

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88 Krumeich, p. 58.

Pindar, then, disagrees with these sources: Gelon’s initiatives (whatever they may have been) are not mentioned, and Hieron takes centre stage. The patriotic spirit of the Greeks’ struggle against the Persians serves only as a background against which the poet places the splendid achievements of the Deinomenidai, and of Hieron in particular. The battle of Himera is mentioned after those of Salamis and Plataia, and in a longer, climactic clause: ‘[a]lthough Pindar does not actually say that the battle of Himera is of greater importance than the other two, the formal emphasis that it receives puts it at least on a par with them’.  

And in the context of the first Pythian as a whole with its myth of Zeus’s subjugation of Typhos, as Hubbard has noted, Hieron’s victory ‘assumes cosmogonic proportions’. Pindar can imply that the tyrant Hieron is like Zeus in his successes against the enemies of order and peace, but for a lesser mortal in a similar context, he chooses Homer over homeland: in Nemean 9, the poet compares Chromios to Hektor on the battlefield by the Skamandros. The exploits of Chromios against Ἐὐαὐλλος (28-29) are described at 33-41, but instead of glorifying pan-Hellenic patriotism, or even mentioning that Greece was threatened with ὀργή, Pindar concentrates on the epic heroism of the victor.

2.4 Martial Ἀρετή and its Rewards

It has been argued that Tyrtaios in his military exhortations, particularly fr. 12, is trying to re-define ἀρετή, to make it refer only to bravery in battle. Bowra, for  

90 Race, Style and Rhetoric, p. 16.  
91 Hubbard, The Pindaric Mind, p. 92.
one, states that for Tyrtaios 'the “good man” is he who stands up to the enemy, and in this his excellence, his ἄρετη, lies'.\(^92\) Snell takes a similar view: Tyrtaios ‘is the first to react to the incipient differentiation of the aretai and to secure a clear and unequivocal idea of the nature of arete as such’.\(^93\) And following Jacoby and Fränkel, Tarditi doubts the attribution of 12 to Tyrtaios; in order to accept that Tyrtaios was the author, he writes, ‘dovremmo essere storicamente sicuri che il problema della vera aretē era già sentito nel VII sec.’\(^94\) Rightly concluding that it was not, Tarditi claims that Tyrtaios could therefore not have written the elegy. But this argument is based on a false premiss; a closer reading of the poem reveals that it is not, after all, concerned with ‘il problema della vera aretē’.

The ‘differentiation of the aretai’ to which Snell refers is hardly ‘incipient’ in Tyrtaios’ time; Homer refers to different kinds of ἄρετη (Iliad 15.642 παντοῖας ἄρετας), and Tyrtaios does not in fact present a courageous man as ‘good’ in all respects by virtue of his bravery. As Verdenius writes, Tyrtaios is concerned with ‘not how to become a good man but how to become good in fighting. The original meaning of ἀγαθός is “capable” ... and its actual meaning is determined by the context’.\(^95\) Campbell points out that when the words ἄνηρ ἀγαθός are used in 12.10 and 20, ‘their scope is shown on each occasion by the phrase ἐν πολέμῳ’, line 20, for example, should be translated ‘it is this man who is good in war’ and not, as Bowra renders it, ‘So the good man is revealed in war’. Again, Bowra translates the final couplet of 12,

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\(^92\)Bowra, Early Greek Elegists, p. 65. Similar views can be found in W. Jaeger (‘Tyrtaios über die wahre ἄρετη’, and Paideia, vol. 1, pp. 74 ff.).

\(^93\)Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, p. 174. Adkins writes (Merit and Responsibility, p. 74) that ‘Tyrtaeus can plausibly claim to be ... stripping arete of irrelevances’.

\(^94\)Tarditi, ‘Parenesi e aretē nel corpus tirtaico’, p. 270.

as ‘Let a man try to reach the height of prowess With his heart, and never slack in war’; Campbell criticizes this rendering on the grounds that it
omits the emphatic ταύτης and the particularising vūn. But ταύτης ... ἄρετής must mean ‘this excellence’ ... and it is likely that ᾳδ’ ἄρετη in 13 means the same thing: ‘this excellence, this prize is the best among men.’ [i.e. as opposed to Bowra’s ‘This is man’s excellence and finest guerdon’] ... In Tyrtaeus ἄρετη has not moved further towards its later meaning of ‘moral virtue’ than it had in Homer: in both writers it refers to particular forms of excellence.

The poet is very conscious of the fact that there are many different ἄρεται, and indeed the existence of a multiplicity of ἄρεται is necessary for the poem’s programme. Shey points out that ‘the aretai Tyrtaeus asks his countrymen to consider less important than a fighting spirit are naturally very desirable. ... Tyrtaeus’ task is to make his audience feel that the rejected aretai are less desirable than they really are or may seem to be’. Martial valour is not the only ἄρετη, but Tyrtaios presents it as the most important one.

Tyrtaios 12.13-16 appear again in the Theognidea, at lines 1003-1006, in the following form:

ηδ’ ἄρετη, τὸδ’ ἔθελον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον
καλλίστον τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ,
ζυγὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πολῇ τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ,
ὅστις ἄνηρ διαβᾶς ἐν προμάχοις μένῃ.

96 L’attacco della perorazione: ταύτης ... ἄρετής (v. 43) significativamente riprende il tema della vera areté che il poeta ha enunciato nel cuore della prima parte: cfr. v. 13 ᾳδ’ ἄρετη ..., claims Tarditi (‘Parenesi e aretè’, p. 262), whereas in fact the phrase (like 13 ᾳδ’ ἄρετη) is specifying one particular ἄρετη rather than a general ‘vera areté’.

97 Even Jaeger (Paideia, vol. 1, p. 86) recognizes the importance of vūn: ‘[Tyrtaios] seems to have thought the ideal was practicable and necessary only in war-time’. So also E. Maier, Tyrtaios, p. 19: ‘Die wahre Arete, die . jetzt, d.h. im Kriege allein den Staat vom Untergang rettet (alles andere ist wertlos), das ist die heroische Tugend des Heldentums’.

98 Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, pp. 177-78.

The only difference between this rendering and that of Tyrtaios is the substitution at the end of the second line cited above of σοφία for Tyrtaios' νέω. Edmunds connects this substitution with the concern shown elsewhere in the Theognidea for the virtue of σοφία: 'Martial valor is an aspect of the citizen's sophie'. In support of this statement, Edmunds adduces the epitaph CEG 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?), in which the young Argive who died in battle is described as σώφρονα, ἀειθλοφόρον καὶ σοφὸν ἦλυκια. Gladigow also reads much into the use of σοφός here, saying that it is meant to express 'das Idealbild eines Mannes, der intellektuelle und sittliche Vorzüge in sich vereint', but it is not necessary to assume that this 'Idealbild' had taken shape in the mind of either the person responsible for this substitution or the composer of CEG 136. Van Groningen offers another explanation for the substitution of σοφῶ in the Theognidea for νέω in Tyrtaios: he suggests that it was done in order that the lines may be used to address 'des auditeurs d’un certain âge qui doivent, néanmoins, défendre la patrie en temps de péril'. It is of course impossible to determine whether the substitution was made before or after this quatrain was inserted into the Theognidean corpus; and we cannot be sure that whoever excerpted the lines from Tyrtaios, made the substitution, or inserted them into the Theognidea

100 L. Edmunds, 'The Genre of Theognidean Poetry', p. 109. Edmunds states (p. 104) that σοφία is 'the highest political virtue' in the Theognidea; the significance of σοφία here will be discussed in detail in section 4.6.

101 Edmunds' use of the appearance of σοφός in this epitaph to support his claim that martial valour is included in the concept of σοφία is unsatisfactory in that, by the same argument, martial valour would have to be included in the statement that the dead man was σώφρονα and ἀειθλοφόρος.

102 Gladigow, Sophia und Kosmos, p. 70. Gladigow argues (p. 35) that σοφία in Xenophanes 2 also carries a great deal of meaning: '... trägt diese σοφία die Tendenz in sich, alle anderen ἄρετα aufzunehmen'; in both cases, he is trying to attach to the word a weight of significance which Bowra and others assign to the use of ἄρετα in Tyrtaios (see above), and which is probably too great for the word to bear.

103 Van Groningen, Théognis: le premier livre, p. 376.
(quite possibly not the same person) actually made a conscious assessment of the word σοφός.

'Αρετή and ἀγαθός do not have specifically martial connotations in the archaic period; the poetry of Tyrtaios, as discussed above, shows an attempt to concentrate on one particular ἀρετή rather than others, and CEG 136 is one of only two verse epitaphs from this period which use ἀγαθός of a man killed in battle. The other is CEG 13 (Athens, ca 575-550?), in which the third verse is the same as the third verse of CEG 136:

[εἴτε ἀνὴρ εἴτε χάριν εἶλα ηοῦν ἐλθόν
Τέτισαι οίκτισας ἄνδρ' ἄγαθόν παρίτοι,
ἐν πολέμων φθίμων, νεαράν ἰέβεν ὀλέσαντα,
ταῦτ' ἀποδιώκμενοι νέσθε επὶ πράγμα ἄγαθόν.]

Here, as in CEG 136, the description of the deceased as ἀγαθός precedes mention of his death in battle, and although there is no catalogue of civilian virtues as in Hysematas’ epitaph, the appearance of ἀγαθός in a different context in the last verse performs a similar function, suggesting that Tettichos was ἀγαθός in more than an exclusively martial sense.

Even after the Persian wars, ἀρετή in the verse inscriptions does not, it seems, necessarily have this more restricted meaning.104 Certainly a man who died fighting can be described as ἀγαθός (e.g., CEG 82 (Attica, ca 450-425?)), as having possessed ἀρετή (e.g., CEG 155 (Paros, 476/5)), but this is not surprising if ἀρετή is simply ‘excellence’ as it was in Tyrtaios; the context of a slain warrior’s epitaph performs the same function as Tyrtaios’ ἐν πολέμῳ. Despite Prato’s comment that Tyrtaios’ phrase ἄνδρ’ ἄγαθόν (10.2) ‘diverrà, nelle epigrafi, la normale

104 Even though this may have been the case in Athenian funeral orations, for which see Loraux, The Invention of Athens, pp. 99 ff.
denominazione dei caduti in guerra', 105 the men commemorated in CEG 117
(Thessaly, ca 480-450?) and 149 (Motya, ca 475-450?) are both described as αὐνὸρες
ἀγαθοὶ without this context, and even the Athenian public epitaph CEG 5 (447 or
446) does not describe the dead soldiers as ἀγαθοὶ or mention their ἀρετη. These
terms, as general markers of excellence, can take their meaning from their context;
without this context, we are not entitled to assume that every instance of ἀρετη or
ἀγαθός in the verse inscriptions must refer to martial valour, as Ecker, for example,
does in her discussion of the phrase ἔργον ἀντ’ ἀγ[α]θόν in CEG 139 (Troizen, ca
500?). she claims that although ἀγαθός in Homer is never used as an epithet of ἔργον
or πρᾶγμα, ‘bestätigen doch Stellen wie Homer N 275-294 ..., N 237 f., P 631 f., Φ
279 f. und σ 382 f. den engen Zusammenhang zwischen kriegerischer ἀρετη und
dieser Wertprädikation’. 106

When this context is in fact supplied (whether in the inscriptions or in the
literary material), martial ἀρετη can be represented as something eternal which is kept
by the dead and, in some fifth-century cases, apparently won in the act of dying; this
seems to be the case in ‘Simonides’ FGE VIII εἰ τὸ καλῶς θυεσκεῖν ἀρετῆς μέρος
ἐστὶ μέγιστον ... (discussed above, section 2.2) and in the epitaph for the Athenians
killed at Poteidaia CEG 10.iii (Athens, 432) where the immortal monument to the
fallen (1 ἀθάνατομε θε[ν]ο.; cf. CEG 6 (Athens, 477?), v. 4 ἀθάνατομ οι δὲ ἀρετεῖς
serves as a marker of the ἀρετη (2 σεμαίνειν ἀρετ[ε]ν) which they won in
exchange for their patriotic death: ... φυλεχαζὸ τὸ ἀντίρροιο[π]τα θέντες | ἐ[λλ]αχοαντ’
ἀρετην καὶ πατρ[ιδ]’ ἐυκλή[σ]αν. This is a kind of heroic immortality which is

ἀγαθος allein bzw. der stehende Ausdruck ἄνηρ ἀγαθος bezeichnet schlechtthin den Mann der Arete.
der anerkannten Tüchtigkeit, für deren Beweis und Bewährung damals noch vornehmlich das
Kampffeld als die geeignete Stätte galt’.

106 Ecker, Grabmal und Epigramm, p. 128, n. 343.

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explicitly referred to in the early fourth century in Lysias’ *Epitaphios*, but which has its roots earlier in the idea that the brave dead are somehow ‘living’ below, can hear speech or song addressed to them, and benefit from extraordinary honours, as expressed in Pindar’s seventh *Isthmian*, in the context of the courageous death in battle of the victor’s uncle: τιμὰ δ’ ἀγαθοὶσιν ἀντίκειται (26).

Simonides’ hymn for the Spartan soldiers killed at Thermopylai (*PMG* 531) states (line 2) that for the dead men ἐυκλεής μὲν ἄ τύχα, καλὸς δ’ ὁ πότμος .... Their πότμος is καλὸς, according to the poet, but this is not the same as saying, with Tyrtaios, that τεθνάμεναι ... καλὸν (though it may be closer to ‘Simonides’ *FGE* VIII, where they are said to have died καλὸς and to have earned ἀγήραντος εὐλογη). Here their πότμος is described in terms suggestive of an after-life as heroes.

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107 The war dead, according to the orator, πενθοῦνται μὲν διὰ τὴν φύσιν ὡς θνητοὶ, ὑμνοῦνται δὲ ὡς ἀθάνατοι διὰ τὴν ἄρετήν. καὶ γάρ τοι θαπτούνται δημοσίᾳ. καὶ ἄγονες τίθενται ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ σφοιξαί καὶ πλούσιοι, ὡς ἀξίους ἄντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τετελευτηκότας ταῖς αὐταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀθανάστους ἡμῖν θαμάσαι (80).

108 Only a few lines earlier, the poet referred to the younger Strepsiades’ athletic ἄρετα (22); the passage with its transition from sport to war illustrates the flexibility of ἄρετὴ in the mid-fifth century. (The contest was, admittedly, the combative pankration, but it hardly need be said that ἄρετὴ and ἀγάθος in Pindar are common enough terms to denote excellence in many areas.)

109 M.L. West suggests that the poem might have originally begun, e.g., ἀνάρχου δ’ ὑπὲρ πάτρας θαυμάτων (‘Melica’, pp. 210-211; following his earlier rejection of line 1 τῶν ἐν Θερμομύκαις θαυμάντων as a gloss (‘Prose in Simonides’); contra West, see D.L. Page, ‘Poetry and Prose: Simonides, *P.M.G.* 531, and Ibycus 298’, and H. Lloyd-Jones, ‘Simonides, *P.M.G.* 531’). Part of West’s argument is that the first part of the poem appears to be dealing with general truths, which the poet then illustrates with the example of Leonidas in the final verses; Greek lyric poetry, however, does not necessarily follow such a logical progression. The probably Simonidean public epitaphs *AP* 7.253 (above) and 251 (below) make no mention at all of the identity of those who died or where they fought; these details would have been inscribed on the monument separately from the poems, as they were in the case of *CEG* 10 (which, however, also mentions them in the epigram itself).

110 An implication already present in Tyrtaios’ description of the fate of the man who dies fighting for his country: 10.31-32 οὐδὲ ποτὲ κλέος ἐσθιλόν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ἄνυμ’ αὐτοῦ [ ἀλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίνεται ἑθάνατος. The second verse here introduces ‘la novità, rispetto al mondo omerico, della concezione tiritica, con la quale si assicura anche al mortale una forma d’immortalità’ (Prato, *Tyrtæus*, p. 135); now the man himself, not only his κλέος, is thought of as
Diodoros (11.11.6) introduces his quotation of the poem by saying that these men diā τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰς ἁθανασίαν μετήλλαξαν. διόπερ οὐχ οἱ τῶν ἱστορίων συγγραφεῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν καθύμνησαν αὐτῶν τὰς ἀνδραγαθίας. Diodoros presents the immortality bestowed on the fallen soldiers as the occasion which prompted Simonides to sing their ἀέναον ... κλέος (v. 9), rather than the κλέος itself representing a merely metaphorical ‘immortality’. Of course these are probably nothing more than Diodoros’ own inferences from the content of the poem, but there is justification for the inferences: quite apart from the implications of the βωμός, there is δὲ σηκὸς to reckon with. Taking issue with Bowra, Podlecki cites LSJ s.v. σηκὸς in support of his contention that the word ‘can mean, besides Bowra’s rendering “holy place,” simply “sepulchre,” “burial place.”’

immortal.

111R. Palmisciano (‘Simonide 531 P.’), has recently defended the manuscripts’ προγόνων in v. 3; one consequence of this reading, it may be noted here, would be to accentuate the family connection between those who died and those who remember them, much as Pindar (as was seen above) emphasises the family connections between his victors and heroes from the mythical past.

112M.L. West would punctuate after σηκὸς and add δὲ after οἰκέταιν: ἀνδρῶν ἁγαθῶν δὲ σηκὸς would be overloaded as a noun phrase’ (‘Melica’, p. 211).

113E.g., Wilamowitz (Sappho und Simonides, p. 141 n. 3), Bowra (Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 346), and Fränkel (Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 320).

114Wilamowitz remarks (ibid.) that ‘mit Bedacht steht σηκός, ein Wort, das βωμός und τάφος zugleich umfaßt’.

But a closer look at the lexicon reveals that apart from this poem of Simonides, the only example given there for such a meaning is a tomb inscription of the Imperial period from Sidyma, in Lykia. Strabo calls the *telesterion* of Eleusis a μυστικός σηκός (9.1.12), he also uses the word of the places where the Pyraithoi kept the eternal flame burning (15.3.15), and of the sepulchre of Kyros (15.3.7), no ordinary mortal. The ancient scholars are unanimous in defining the word as referring specifically to holy places (when it is not used of enclosures for animals, as in Homer, or olive trees, as in Lysias), usually an ἅρων.

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117 These passages are cited by L. Ross (*Das Theseion und der Tempel des Ares in Athen*, pp. 23 ff.), who also discusses the physical characteristics of Greek σηκοί, noting that they tend to be similar in shape to the tombs of Asia Minor, and of Lykia in particular.

Attempting to avoid the logical conclusion that there was a σηκός where the Spartan dead were revered as heroes,119 West claims that

δὲ σηκός need not refer to the physical tomb, any more that ἐντάφιον τοιούτον refers to the physical shroud. It refers rather to the metaphorical heroon which is beyond the reach of time and decay, and at which praise and remembrance take the place of lamentation.120

This suggestion was already made by Podlecki,121 and West attempts to support it by citing Thuc. 2.43.2: ... καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ὦ κεῖται μᾶλλον ἄλλοι ἐν ὦ ἢ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντύχοντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου ἀείμνηστος καταλείπεται. This is not as helpful as it appears at first glance: Perikles does use τὸν τάφον metaphorically in this case, but τὸν τάφον τὸν δὲ at the beginning of his speech (2.35) certainly refers to the actual place of burial and is a better parallel for Simonides’ use of the demonstrative.122

In the prologue of Euripides’ Bakchai, the tomb of Semele is called a σηκός; Dodds ad loc. notes that the place is also described as such in a third-century decree from the Theban treasury at Delphi.123 And as Dodds points out, Pausanias and

119 Bowra (‘Simonides on the Fallen of Thermopylae’) compares the testimony of Pausanias (1.32.4) and Thucydides (3.58.4) that the Greeks killed at Marathon and Plataia were given heroic honours, and suggests that this poem was a hymn for Maron and Alpheus who were, according to Herodotos (7.227) the best Spartan warriors after Leonidas. See J.H. Molyneux, Simonides, pp. 186-87 on the possibility of a σηκός at Thermopylai or Sparta.


121 Podlecki, ‘Simonides: 480’, p. 260 (not mentioned by West): ‘... the word must refer to a figurative σηκός; the reference then will be the same as τοιούτον ἐντάφιον: “our praise for their death constitutes their ἐντάφιον and their shrine (or “tomb”), which mould cannot destroy nor time obscure.’ See above for Podlecki’s misunderstanding of σηκός.

122 Though it might have helped his case, West (ibid.) rejects Wilamowitz’ reading ὅ δὲ, in order to punctuate before οἴκεται (see above). Cf. D.L. Page’s response to West’s ‘metaphorical’ σηκός: ‘I do not believe that ὅ δὲ could have been used in this context if that had been the intention; and I would add that the altar in v. 3 will have to be explained as metaphorical too. West does not tell us how he would deal with the altar, which, not yet having come to the metaphorical precinct, we had naturally supposed to be a real altar’ (‘Poetry and Prose’, p. 318).

Aristeides refer to it as Semele’s θάλαμος. Euripides himself, in another play, makes
the same substitution: the σηκός of the seer Trophonios is mentioned at Ion 300, and
less than a hundred lines later, the same place is called Τροφωνίου ... θαλάμας (393-94).
The point seems to be that the person commemorated in the σηκός is to be
thought of as continuing to exist.

This is an illustration of a trend which Stecher perceives in relation to fifth-
century public epitaphs for those killed in action: ‘dunkle Andeuten der großen
Dinge’.\textsuperscript{124} Stronger than assertions that the deceased will be remembered and missed
by the living, which are represented often in poetry and inscribed epigram, such
formulations present the dead as enjoying the fruits of their valour even after death.
Although this idea is often, as Stecher notes, merely hinted at (as in AP 7.253 above,
where the dead, speaking in the first person, claim to have been allotted ἀρετῆς μέρος
... μέγιστον by Τύχη), it emerges forcefully on occasion, as in ‘Simonides’ FGE IX,
possibly a companion epitaph to FGE VIII.\textsuperscript{125}

\begin{quote}
ἀσβεστον κλέος οἶδε φύλη περὶ πατρίδι θέντες
cyánou ταυάτου ἀμφεβάλοντο νέφος;
οὐδὲ τεθνασί ταθόντες, ἐπεὶ σφ’ Ἀρετῆ καθύπερθε
cydaínous’ ἀναγει δὸματος ἐξ Ἁιδεὼ.
\end{quote}

Οὐδὲ τεθνασί ταθόντες: this is one instance where the actual life after death for a
valiant and patriotic soldier (as opposed to a statement such as the opening verse of
CEG 2 (Athens, after the Persian wars): ἀνδρὸν τόνδ’ ἀρετῆς[ς ἐσται κλέος]
ἀφθη[τον] αἰεί) is raised above the level of ‘dunkle Andeuten’ and made explicit, and
the statement that Ἀρετῆ actually brings them up out of Hades\textsuperscript{126} might almost be an

\textsuperscript{124}Stecher, \textit{Inschriftliche Grabgedichte auf Krieger und Athleten}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{125}Page, \textit{FGE}, pp. 197-99.
\textsuperscript{126}G. Burzacchini ("Εσχάτον δύναται κατὰ γάς", p. 40) mentions this passage when she
comments that in Simonides’ view, some kind of immortality seems to be the reward for overcoming
all the difficulties involved in acquiring ἀρετῆ (\textit{cf. PMG} 526, 541.6, 579, the last of which seems to
refer to martial ἀρετῆ in particular: v. 7 ἄκρον ἄνδρείας).
advance on Tyrtaios’ ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίνεται ἄθανατος (12.32). In CEG 83 (446-ca 425?), a μνήμα ... ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστο (v.1), the dead warrior Pythion is said to have saved three phylai by his courageous deeds in battle: he εἶλετο τὰν ἀρετάν of seven enemies (v.3), and now (vv. 8-9)

οὐδὲ{δε}να πημάνας ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ἔς Ἀϊδα κατέβα πᾶσιν μακαριστὸς ἰδέσθαι.

Μακαριστός occurs on an Orphic lamella where the dead initiate is addressed with the phrase ὀλβίε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεός δ’ ἔση ἀντὶ βρότων,127 and in this epitaph the statement that Pythion has gone down to Hades μακαριστὸς ἰδέσθαι seems to imply a ‘blessed’ afterlife for this brave warrior. It might be argued that the divine/mortal distinction is carefully maintained here, as Python is described as μακαριστὸς rather than μακάρτατος: de Heer notes that ‘the epithet μάκαρ is largely applied to gods and only very rarely to mortals, the latter function having been taken over almost entirely by μακάριος’128 (a point already made by LSJ s.vv.), which can be translated as ‘one who shares to a certain extent in the distinction of being μάκαρ’.129 But perhaps the distinction ought not to be pressed too strongly, and the terms appear to have been interchangeable in sense to a certain extent: μάκαρ can be used of men in verse, though μακάριος is the normal term in prose except in the phrase μακάρων νῆσοι (see LSJ s.vv.). It seems that those who after death arrive at the μακάρων νῆσοι are

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127 See G. Zuntz, Persephone, pp. 322-23, n. 3, who quotes CEG 83.8-9 and a Pythagorean speaking in Plutarch (de genio Socratis 16, 585e) of the μακαριστὸν καὶ οἰκείον τέλος achieved by proper burial rites of his sect, and Richardson, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter, pp. 313-14 on the language of the μακαρισμός.

128 C. de Heer, Μάκαρ - Ἐὐδαίμων - Ὑλῖος - Εὔπνεις, p. 56.

129 de Heer, p. 31, citing Chantraine and Schwyzer for the sense of adjectives in -ος.
to be thought of as at least approaching divine status, as in the skolion PMG 894, for example, which addresses the brave Harmodios:

φύταν Αρµόδιτ, ού τι πω τέθνηκας,
νήσοις δ' ἐν μακάρων σὲ φασίν εἶναι ....

Evidence from other sources suggests that heroization of the dead was not uncommon at this time in at least two parts of the Greek world, but inscribed epigrams from these areas appear not to have survived in sufficient numbers to permit an assessment of the impact of these practices on this branch of the poetic tradition. A fragment of the comic poet Plato (77 K.-A. τὶ οὐκ ἀπήγαζω, ἵνα Θῆρησιν ἥρως γένη) implies that the Boiotians’ regular characterization of their dead as ἥρωες, well-attested by gravestones from the Hellenistic period and later, was current practice in the late fifth or early fourth century. But in the few surviving Boiotian verse epitaphs from the fifth century or earlier the word does not appear, nor is there much to indicate a belief that the dead have gained some kind of immortality apart from CEG 114 (479?) where the dead soldier speaks from beyond the grave. Thasos also seems to have paid extraordinary honours to its war dead, including the

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130 M. L. West, Hesiod: Works and Days, p. 193, notes (on v. 171 μακάρων νήσοις) that μακάρες unqualified in the poetic language almost always means “the gods” .... But by Hesiod’s time μακάρων may have come to be understood of the fortunate pensioners.’ Further (p. 194): ‘In the Odyssean Elysium, too, the inhabitants are ἄνθρωποι ( Odyssey 4.565, 568). But these ἄνθρωποι are still given honour beyond what most mortals can expect, and even if they do not live strictly as gods, they at least live close to them.

131 As Zenobios comments. suicides did not receive this distinction.


133 And that the custom seemed strange to the Athenians, as pointed out by J. Larson, Greek Heroine Cults, p. 23.

134 It does, however, in the fourth-century CEG 2.634.

135 CEG 2.631 is dated 400-350?, and so might just come from the very end of the fifth century; it also addresses the dead (see below), and states (vv. 3-4) ἔποιεῖ ἐπάνω | (ὑπόθεσέ)ὑμᾶθ.’
offering of sacrificial meat, but once again this is not reflected in the few surviving local verse inscriptions apart from CEG 159 (ca 500?) where the dead Telephanes speaks:


An after-life of some sort also seems to be implied by the device of a direct address to the dead, but these are rare in the extant material; Sourvinou-Inwood notes that the only certainly datable use of χαίρε to address the deceased in epitaphs to the end of the fifth century is in the inscription CEG 4 (Athens, 458 or 457, = AP 7.254):

\[ \text{[χαίρετε ἀριστέες, πολέµῳ µέγα] κύοδ[ξ] ἔχοντες} \]
\[ \text{[κόροι Ἀθηναίοιν, ἔχοςοχιν ἱπτ[ο]σύνα[λ].} \]
\[ \text{[ὅι νοτε καλλιγόρῳ περὶ πατ[ίδος ὅ]λεσατε ἰβεν],} \]
\[ \text{[πλείστοις ἡλλάνον ἀντία ἄβ[β]ίρναµε] νοι]. \]

When the dead are thus addressed with χαίρετε, argues Sourvinou-Inwood, they are given status as immortal heroes, reflecting contemporary Athenian attitudes to those killed in combat:

death in battle is a glorious event which elevates the war dead as a collectivity to a higher status, for it happens in the service of the city which validates the lives of the individuals; it does not invite grief and lament, but praise and glorification of the dead, and through them of death in the service of the polis, which contributes to the glorification of the polis itself. An expression such as andras ... polis hede pothei of the epitaph for those fallen at Poteidaia [CEG 10.iii, above] is the nearest fifth-century Athenian public collective epitaphs ever came to an expression of regret at the men’s death. 137


137 Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Reading’ Greek Death, p. 193 with note 335: ‘The public epitaph [CEG] 135 ... where the word penthos is mentioned, is an Argive, not an Athenian, epitaph’. (It might be added that Aristeides recognized the tendency towards glorification in Athenian epitaphs: after quoting a few of them, he says νὴ Δι' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα Ἀττικὰ καὶ θερμύστερα (28.66)). Outside Athens, different rules apply: the epigram on the Lokrian dead at Thermopylae (Strabo 9.4.2) can say that τοὺς δὲ κοθὲι φθυένους ... µητρόπολις. But there does seem to be another Athenian example of public grief in the scanty remains of CEG 9 (‘post 450?’ writes Hansen, following Meritt and Bradeen):

\[ \text{[ίοις τονῦέ .}] \]
\[ \text{[ίοις καὶ λευκο[πι]} \]
\[ \text{[ιντες κέδεα φο]} \]
These attitudes ‘give us the context in which *chairete* appears in a fifth-century public epitaph’, and demonstrate ‘a correlation between the use of *chaire* to address the deceased and the possession of a heroic/divine status by the deceased thus addressed’. Whether *χαίρε/χαίρετε* is taken to mean ‘hail’ or ‘farewell’ (or both?) does not materially affect the point: the act of addressing the dead in an epitaph, however formulated, seems to presuppose an expectation (or at least a hope) that the address will be received, as Simonides and his audience expect the dead Achilleus to hear the poet’s *χαίρε in the Plataia elegy* (11.19).\footnote{Sourvinou-Inwood, p. 194. Her discussion of *χαίρε* begins on p. 180; among literary examples for the use of *χαίρε* to address the dead only in restricted circumstances, she cites Achilleus’ addresses to Patroklos at *Iliad* 23.19-20 and 23.179-80 (pp. 182-87) and *Theoklymenos’ address to his dead father at Euripides, *Helen*, 1165 (pp. 188-89). These, she argues, do not represent a general practice of addressing the dead with *χαίρε*. Theoklymenos’ father Proteus had superhuman status, and Patroklos is in a liminal state, not having been properly buried (and Achilleus himself follows the salutation with the concessive phrase *καὶ εἰν’ Ἄιδος δόμοις – i.e. *χαίρε* is not a greeting normally used for the dead). Achilleus’ words after the departure of Patroklos’ ghost at *Iliad* 23.103-104 (*ἡ μὲν τις ἐστι καὶ εἰν’ Ἀιδον δόμοις ἐπετειλάτο, ἴσον τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ εἰδώλοιον, ἴσον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ εἰδώλοιον to the Hades’), as Richardson notes, ‘suggests debate on this subject already in Homer’s time’ (Richardson, *Commentary*, p. 177). Achilleus seems less sure in his final address to Patroklos (24.592-93 ἀνέπτυξεν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ εἰδώλοιον, which takes place after the funeral rites have been performed.}

The word before κέδασα here might have been *e.g.* θέντες (cf. *CEG* 2.664 (Amorgos, ca 400-350?)\footnote{On the ‘heroic’ status of the dead in this poem, see also D. Boedeker, ‘The New Simonides and Heroization at Plataia’.}, line 2 δικαιοῦν δὲ πόλει πάνωκε θεικες θανόνου εἰς θάντα (cf. *CEG* 84 (Attica, ca 440-430), line 3 πατρί φιλοι καὶ μέτρι πληντε άμφοτερ μέγα πάνθος). The *Iliad* has πατέρι δὲ γόνοι καὶ κηδες λυγρά ἔλειπ’ at 5.156-57, and (rather different) δὸς Ἀχιλλευς Τρώουσι πόνον καὶ κηδες ἔθηκεν at 21.525.

Even Simonides’ private epitaph for his friend Megistias, quoted at Herodotos 7.228.3, makes no reference to lamentation; this may have something to do with the fact that the monument was apparently erected on the battlefield of Thermopylai, but there is a parallel in the private epitaph *CEG* 142 (Akarnania, ca 475-50?)\footnote{For problems of the Simonidean authorship of the Megistias epigram and the circumstances of its composition, see Molyneux, *Simonides*, pp. 175-79 (who believes that the Megistias poem is genuinely Simonidean), and Erbse, ‘Zu den Epigrammen des Simonides’ (who argues that Simonides also composed the other two poems cited in Herodotos 7.228). Molyneux (who also discusses the epitaph for the Lokrians, mentioned above, on pp. 182-83) notes that Page adopts a less extreme position in *FGE* (Simonides probably composed the Megistias epigram, but not the other two) than in his earlier *Epigrammata Graeca* (none of the three is genuinely Simonidean); Erbse cites the latter, but ignores both Page’s revised position in *FGE* and Molyneux’s discussion of it.}: Προκλείσεις(ες) τὸν δόμα κεκλείσεται ἐνγῆς ὀδοῖο, ὥς περὶ τὰς αὐτὸ γάς θάνει μαρπνάμενος.

For problems of the Simonidean authorship of the Megistias epigram and the circumstances of its composition, see Molyneux, *Simonides*, pp. 175-79 (who believes that the Megistias poem is genuinely Simonidean), and Erbse, ‘Zu den Epigrammen des Simonides’ (who argues that Simonides also composed the other two poems cited in Herodotos 7.228). Molyneux (who also discusses the epitaph for the Lokrians, mentioned above, on pp. 182-83) notes that Page adopts a less extreme position in *FGE* (Simonides probably composed the Megistias epigram, but not the other two) than in his earlier *Epigrammata Graeca* (none of the three is genuinely Simonidean); Erbse cites the latter, but ignores both Page’s revised position in *FGE* and Molyneux’s discussion of it.
The public epitaph CEG 5 (Athens, 458 or 457) also addresses the dead directly (τλέμονες, ὕπον ἄγονα μάχες τέλεσσαντες ...) though it does not use χαίρετε, and presumably represents the same attitudes, although ‘the connotations of unhappiness [in the word τλέμονες] probably also allowed for the creation of an ambiguous resonance of (private) pity and of the sadness of the individual deaths’. The address to the dead in CEG 4 may perform a similar function by implying what is stated directly in, for example, ‘Simonides’ FGE IX (οὐδὲ τεθνάσι θανόντες), that the display of martial ἀρετὴ could provide a man with the exceptional honours promised by Tyrtaios 12.31-32:

οὐδὲ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλόν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ θνο’ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἑὼν γίνεται ἀθάνατος

2.5 Fight or Flight

The motif of jettisoning one’s shield to save one’s skin is, not surprisingly, rare in martial poetry except as an example of the disgrace incurred by the coward, as was seen above (2.1) in relation to the exhortations of Kallinos and Tyrtaios. ‘To call a man ρίψασπις was actionable slander’, notes Dover, commenting on Aristophanes’ repeated attacks on Kleonymos for having thrown away his shield in a battle. At Peace 1296 ff., for example, the hero Trygaios asks Kleonymos’ son to sing a non-martial song (‘for you are the son of a σώφρων father’, 1297), and the boy replies with Archilochos 5 (see below); when the recitation reaches the phrase ψυχήν

140Sourvinou-Inwood, p. 193, note 335.
δ’ ἐξεσάωσα, Trygaios breaks in with the conventional κατῆσχυνας δὲ τοκῆς,¹⁴² which is obviously inappropriate to a son of Kleonymos.

Funerary epigram, naturally, mentions the idea only to reject it: in CEG 118 (Thessaly, ca 475-450?) it is said that the fallen warrior οὖκ ἐπίστατο φεύγει. In the literary material, there are some possible examples of the theme: Strabo (13.600) reports that Alkaios said that he threw his weapons away and fled (428(a)); it is perhaps possible that 400 comes from such a poem, in which Alkaios may have said something like ‘... for it is κάλον to die in battle, but better to live and fight another day ...’, though this would admittedly be a sentiment unparalleled in the extant lines of Alkaios. Campbell, citing Anakreon PMG 381(b) and 437, says that Anakreon also claimed to have thrown his shield away in battle,¹⁴³ but this cannot be certain. In 381(b) ἀσπίδα ρίψας ποταμοῦ καλλιρρόου παρ’ δοχας¹⁴⁴ the subject of the participle ρίψας has been lost and may not be the poet himself; he might have been describing someone else’s flight from the battlefield, and in any case we cannot tell whether he was condemning this action or commending it.¹⁴⁵ In 437 the poet says that he fled

¹⁴² Cf. Iliad 6.209 (Hippolochos’ instructions to his son Glaukos, departing for Troy) μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχύνειν: Odyssey 24.508-9 (Odysseus to Telemachos) μη τα κατασχυνειν πατέρων γένος, ο’ τ’ πάρος περ’ ἀλλ’ τ’ ἡνορθεὶ τ’ ἱκάσμεθα κάσαν ἐξ’ αἰαν; Alkaios 6.13-14 μή κατασχύνομεν ... ἐνίκης τόκης, later, Plato, Menexenos 246δ καλῶς αἱροῦμεθα μάλλον τελευτάν ... πρὸν τοὺς ἡμετέρους πατέρας καί πᾶν τὸ πρόσθεον γένος αἰσχύναι; and an early third-century epitaph from Thessaly (Peek (ed.), Griechische Vers-Inschriften, no. 425): ... πρώτος δ’ ἐμ’ προμάχοισι βάνεν, ἧν ὁ ἐπιτάσιας πατρίδ’ οὐδὲ γὰρ γυνη’ς ἐσπατοῦ.

¹⁴³ Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 145.

¹⁴⁴ Also cited by Nisbet and Hubbard (A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book II, p. 113) as an example of the ‘self-conscious insouciance’ of Greek poets like Archilochos (see below) who claim to have thrown away their shields in battle.

¹⁴⁵ It was probably the first line of a poem: Atilius Fortunatus quotes it as an example of the metre of Horace Odes 1.8.2. along with Sappho 128 (δεύτε νυν ἀβρα Χάριτες καλλίκομοι τε Μοῖσα), which does sound like an incipit. Anakreon’s ποταμοῦ καλλιρρόου παρ’ δοχας suggests a locale with erotic possibilities (compare Ibykos PMG 286): is the poet making love rather than war? On the other hand, PMG 382 (δακρυόσεον τ’ ἐφύλησεν αἰχμήν) and 393 (όροφολοα μὲν Ἄρης φιλεὶ μεναίχμην) show that the two themes could be blended in Anakreon’s poetry.
and although the antecedent to *αὐτής* might have been *e.g.* *μάχη*, it remains uncertain, and the line should not automatically be taken to refer to flight from the battlefield; an erotic context, for example, is equally plausible. 146

The theme is, however, certainly encountered in Archilochos at least in fr. 5 and possibly elsewhere; these instances deserve some attention here. The poet tells us that he left his shield behind in battle, but escaped alive: *αὐτὸν δὲ ἔξεσόωσα* (5.3). The shield is described as an ἑντος ἀμώμητον; Burnett comments that

the shield itself was the sort that a noble should bear – not just a bit of armour but an epic fossil distinguished by the old-fashioned word *entoς*. The shield, in fact, is everything that its owner is not, and the singer makes this clear by giving it the epithet that a Homeric hero often wears, making it ‘blameless’. 147

While it is true that at *Iliad* 17.91 ff., Menelaos debates with himself the question of whether to stand his ground over the body of Patroklos or retreat and, faced with the prospect of having to do battle alone against Hektor and all the Trojans, decides that discretion is in fact the better part of valour (17.108 ἐξοπίσω ἀνεχάζετο, λείπε δὲ νεκρόν), he does not abandon his weapons in an admission of defeat, and even in retreat he is compared to a λίς ἄγγελεως (17.109). But there is an element which is common to both situations: Menelaos (more specifically, the lion to which he is likened) is described as retreating ἀέκων (17.112), and Archilochos says that he abandoned his shield οὐκ ἐθέλον (5.2). As Burnett writes, he

boasts that he has separated himself from the sham of ancient pretensions, but his pride is evidently a mixed emotion and he does not disguise the fact that it is an inglorious self that he has preserved. 148

146 For animal imagery used to illustrate reluctance to submit to love, compare Ibykos *PMG* 287.

147 Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 42. Although it is true that the singular ἑντος occurs only here and in Archilochos 139 (see below), it is perhaps not quite a ‘fossil’: ἑντεα as arms and armour appear in Pindar (*Olympian* 4.22).

148 Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 245. She also suggests (p. 42, n. 29) that 127 (ἂμβλακον. καὶ ποὺ τιν’ ἄλλον ἦδ’ ἔττη ’κιχῆεσθαι) and 233 (κόδες δὲ ἑκέθι τιμώσατο) should be
Although, as Fränkel says, Archilochos is questioning an ‘exaggerated notion of honor’, the poet does still feel it necessary to point out that his decision was made oũκ ἐθέλων. Reverdin argues that in Archilochos’ era ‘l’abandon d’un bouclier n’avait pas la gravité qu’il devait avoir plus tard, lorsqu’il eut pour conséquence de découvrir des camarades de combat et d’ouvrir une brèche dans la phalange’; but there must have been something discreditable in the conventional view of the act to make the poet justify himself in the second couplet of the fragment. Kontoleon’s reply to the rationalizations of Reverdin is that Archilochos is to be seen not as relating an actual experience but as assuming the rôle of poet-instructor: ‘[i]n diesem Falle wäre der Vorwurf, dass er seinen Schild tatsächlich weggeworfen hatte, unberechtigt, er hätte nur das allgemeine Urteil ausgesprochen, es sei wichtiger die ψυχη als den Schild zu retten’. As Nisbet and Hubbard comment on the similar theme of Horace, Odes 2.7.10, the poet is ‘making use of a poetical topic ... that may have been fictional even with some of his Greek predecessors. .... Horace’s literal experiences are quite irrelevant; for the purposes of the poem he is no more read ‘in conjunction with’ 5; she does not elaborate on the connections between the fragments. It is not inconceivable that the other two lines come from poems describing a retreat from battle as 5 does, but this of course cannot be proven.

149 Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 137.

150 O. Reverdin, in discussion of E. Wistrand’s paper ‘Archilochus and Horace’, Archiloque (Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique 10; Vandoeuvres-Genève 1964) 253-279, p. 285. Reverdin goes on to claim that Horace in the third stanza of Odes 2.7 ‘se méprenait sur le sens du [fr. 5]. Il ignorait le contexte historique dans lequel avait vécu Archilochus. .... [Archilochus], qui ne songe qu’à acquérir un nouveau bouclier, n’est pas un lâche; ... le mobile de son acte, ou la cause de sa mésaventure, n’est peut-être même pas une défaillance (fracta virtus [Horace, Odes 2.7.11])’ (p. 286).

151 N.M. Kontoleon, continuing the above discussion (which includes Page’s bizarre suggestion that Archilochos’ shield might have been stolen, since the poet does not actually mention throwing it away), p. 287.
autobiographical than in the following stanza, where he claims to have been rescued by Mercury'.

Kontoleon also asks whether Archilochos might not implicitly be criticizing the barbarians’ over-valuation of such things as splendid shields: ‘will das ἀγάλλεται vielleicht die elementare Freude der Barbaren an etwas ihnen sehr kostbar Erscheinendem, wie der Schild war, ausdrücken?’ Similar in spirit is Svenbro’s argument that Archilochos’ ‘attitude profondément anti-héroïque’ results from the fact that the genealogies of things such as the shield of Achilleus in the Iliad, as important to epic heroes as their own family backgrounds, have ceased to have any significance among mercenaries who buy their equipment. Svenbro also notes that the value of the armour described by Alkaios in fragment 357 is spoken of in terms of its usefulness rather than its genealogy, and that Alkaios, too, reacts against over-valuation of armour itself in fragment 427. ταύτα παρὰ 'Αλκαίον. οὐ τιτρώσκει τὰ ἐπίσημα ὅλα οὐδὲ οὕτα καθ’ ἐαυτὰ δύναμιν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὁ φέρων οὕτα ἐὰν ἦ [ὁ] γενναῖος. On this view, the poet is suggesting that his action in saving his own life is no less appropriate than a ‘heroic’ attitude to what is, after all, a tool. Even Achilleus’ brilliant armour was not invulnerable (cf. section 3.1).

152 Nisbet and Hubbard, p. 113, who also note that fr. 96, like fr. 5, seems to have something to do with fighting the Saioi. Although the context of fr. 96 is not clear, the poet appears to be reproaching Glaucus for forgetting his country: perhaps, like Horace, he is drawing a contrast between his own escape and his friend’s prolonged absence (p. 108, following Zielinski). If this is the case, of course, then Archilochos will have done for the patriotism-theme in that poem what he does for the ‘death before dishonour’ theme in fr. 5.


154 J. Svenbro, La parole et le marbre, pp. 129-131. For Alkaios’ attitude Svenbro also cites 426 (τὸν λόγον ὄν πάλαι μὲν 'Αλκαίος ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν ... ὡς ἄρα οὐ λίθοι οὐδὲ ἔμα οὐδὲ τέχνη τεκτόνων αἱ πόλεις εἶν ἄλλ᾽ ὅπως κοίτας ἀνδρόνς ἀνδρός σώζειν εἰδώτες ἐνταῦθα καὶ τείχῃ καὶ πόλεις); here it is worth noting that (if Aristeides’ citation is accurate) the poet praises self-preservation (ἀνδρός αὐτοῦς σώζειν εἰδότες) rather than patriotism or civic spirit – but this is still a long way, of course, from Archilochos’ αὐτὸν δ’ ἔξεσάωσα. Alkaios 112 and 396 also deal with the idea that it is men rather than fortifications or weapons which save a city.
It has recently been proposed that in Archilochos 139 we may have another poem of the same type. Kerkhecker notes that ἀσπάζ in the first and ἐντος in the fifth line of this fragment are strongly reminiscent of fragment 5, and that καλ[ at the end of the seventh line might be the remains of καλ[ λιπ-, as in 5.2 καλλιπον οὐκ ἔθέλων.\footnote{Kerkhecker, ‘Archilochus fr. 139 West’. Kerkhecker’s argument, of course, is open to the objection that καλ[ in line 7 could be many things other than part of καταλείπω.} This is certainly a plausible suggestion; it is perhaps worth noting in addition that if this interpretation is correct, v. 8 ἑβον ῥήματ’ οὐκετ[ may give some support to Herodotos’ version of the famous epigram ‘Simonides’ FGE XXII (b):

\begin{quote}
ὡ ἔειν’, ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις δι’ τῆς
κειμένα τοῖς κείσαιν ρήματι πειθομένοι.
\end{quote}

Page rejects the final hemiepes ρήματι πειθόμενοι (as given in Herodotos, the Anthology, and the Suda) in favour of πειθόμενοι νομίμοις (as given in Lykourgos, Diodoros, and Strabo) on the grounds that ‘ῥήματα are merely words .... Customs or traditions, on the other hand, makes a strong phrase’;\footnote{Page, FGE, p. 233. Contrast Lloyd-Jones in his review of FGE (CR n.s. 32 (1982) 139-44, p. 141): ‘Page prefers πειθόμενοι νομίμοις to ρήματι πειθόμενοι, on the ground that ρήματι cannot mean “commands”; but the word can take its colour from the context, and I hope his view will not be generally accepted.’} but if, nearly two centuries earlier, Archilochos in fr. 139 made some reference to ‘no longer (heed?) ρήματα’ in the context of throwing away his shield, Herodotos’ earlier version of the ‘Simonidean’ epigram, even though ‘almost certainly taken ... at second hand, orally’;\footnote{Page, FGE, p. 234. S. West (‘Herodotus’ Epigraphical Interests’, p. 289, n. 53) points out that there is no reason to assume that the historian must have relied on a second-hand report of the inscription: Page simply assumes that πειθόμενοι νομίμοις is the better text and that therefore Herodotos did not view the inscription himself.} may gain some credibility as the original version, even though the epigram may still be thought of as a ‘damp squib’ for which Simonides himself was not responsible.\footnote{M. L. West, ‘Simonides Redivivus’, p. 1, n. 2.}
If Archilochos 139 is understood to be part of a ρήζασπις-poem, the ἄκόντων δοῦπον of line 6 may have important resonances. Lobel’s notes (P.Oxy. 2313 fr.5) refer to δοῦπον ἄκόντων at Iliad 16.361; here, importantly, Hektor is standing his ground (as, on this reading of 139, Archilochus is not), even though the Greeks under Patroklos’ leadership are gaining the upper hand in the battle. But the phrase occurs two more times in the Iliad, both times again in association with Hektor. In these other two instances, however, Hektor has just escaped death at the hands of Diomedes and Achilleus (11.363-64 = 20.450-51 νῦν αὔτε σ’ ἐρύσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, ὥμοι μέλλεις εὐχεσθαι ιὼν ἐς δοῦπον ἄκόντων), prompting his attacker in each case to make a brief speech (11.362-67 = 20.449-54) promising that Hektor will not escape with his life next time. These short, bitter verbal attacks directed at the back of a fleeing enemy (addressed as κῦον, 11.362 = 20.449) by two of the most powerful Greek heroes would form an appropriate epic background for an Archilochean poem which, like 5, extolled the virtues of escaping alive from combat. 160

It would be appropriate to mention here the speech of Achilleus to Odysseus in which he says (Iliad 9.412-429) that he chooses to leave the fighting at Troy and return home in order to live a longer life (ὅπηδον δὲ μοι αἰῶν | ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ κέ μ’ ὡς τέλος θανάτου κινεῖ, 9.415-16). This appears to be a manifestation of the same concern that caused Archilochos to consider his life more important than his shield and the reproach of cowardice to which he makes himself vulnerable by fleeing.

159 No less appropriate to its own context than 20.450-51, despite the fact that Apollo is not said to intervene directly in the episode from Book 11; see Hainsworth, Commentary, p. 266.

160 On the anonymous iambic fragment 38, West comments ‘fort. Archilochi’. and Lobel (ed., P.Oxy. 2317) notes that ‘the forms and vocabulary point to an old Ionic writer and of those we know none seems more likely to be the rightful claimant than Archilochus, with whose vehement and hurrying style what is preserved here is quite consistent’. This poem, though (whoever its author was), is a tirade against a coward rather than a glorification of his instinct for self-preservation.
battle. But in *Iliad* 9 Achilleus seems to change his mind about going home. He says, first of all (9.410-16) that his mother told him that he had a choice: to fight and die, winning κλέος ἔφητον, or to return home and live to old age; and he tells Odysseus that he will leave for home on the next day (αὔριον, 429). After the speech of Phoinix, however, he softens slightly, saying that when morning comes φρασσόμεθ' ἦ κε νεώμεθ' ἐφ' ἡμέτερ' ἦ κε μένωμεν (619); and finally he says to Aias that he will not re-enter the battle until Hektor has fought his way to the camp of the Myrmidons (650-53), in other words that he will stay but is not ready to fight again yet. Achilleus’ threat to leave the field of battle is of course never realized; whether he ever meant it seriously or was merely ‘toying with the pretence’ as Fränkel puts it, this passage is an extended example from epic of the conflict between saving one’s own life and winning glory in battle that prompts Archilochos to say in 5 (and perhaps 139) that he chose the former option.

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161 What Homer makes Thetis say to Achilleus at *Iliad* 1.416-18 is, however, quite different: ... νυ τοι αῖται μινυνθά περ, οὐ τι μᾶλα δήν ἢ νῦν δ᾽ ἄμα τ᾽ ὀκτυμορος καὶ ὀξίφιρος περὶ πάντων | ἔσκεος τῷ σε κακῇ οἰκή τέκνον ἐν μεγάροις. and Achilleus at 1.352 (μὴτερ. ἐπει μ’ ἐτεκές γε μουναθάιον περ ἐόντα) seems to accept that he will die soon, and does not refer to a choice of fates. But it is possible, of course, that Achilleus in book 9 is to be understood to be referring to some other conversation with his mother in which she did in fact tell him that he had a choice. J.B. Hainsworth writes (The *Iliad*: A Commentary, volume iii, p. 56) of the ‘foreknowledge granted [to Achilleus] by Thetis that he lives under a conditional doom – if he slays Hektor he will quickly die himself (18.94-126)’, but again there is no ‘condition’ stated: what Thetis says there is not ‘if you slay Hektor ...’, but rather ‘your doom is set immediately after Hektor’ (18.96). N. Yamagata (Homerian Morality, p. 59, n. 2) comments that Achilleus may have once had ‘an alternative of long and less glorious life’ (II. 9.414-16), but the choice apparently is already made. Thetis says to Zeus, “Please give honour to my son who is destined to be short-lived” at II. 1.505-6” (Yamagata’s italics). Compare the different versions of the oracles in the Oidipous story: Sophokles presents them as unconditional statements by Apollo that Oidipous will kill his father and sleep with his mother (O. T. 711 ff., 790), whereas Aischylos’ version of the oracle suggests that Laios had a choice (Seven Against Thebes 742 ff.; cf. E.R. Dodds, ‘On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex’, in The Ancient Concept of Progress, 64-77. p. 69.)

162 Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. p. 137.
Summary

The development of hoplite warfare tends to be linked in scholarship with an increase in citizens' devotion to their polis and eagerness to fight and die gloriously for it, as apparently shown in the patriotic sentiments expressed by poets of the period. But the polis-centred consciousness which poets such as Kallinos and Tyrtaios are taken to represent is not reflected in archaic verse inscriptions commemorating the war dead; it is not until after the Persian Wars that close correspondences between the two traditions can be found, though both can be seen to deploy fairly consistently the promise of an heroic afterlife as a positive incentive.

The context of sympotic elegy, too, presents a difficulty; if this 'patriotism' is apparently restricted to the symposion, and is absent from the more public context of grave monuments until the fifth century, it should probably be seen as serving a function other than simple glorification of the polis. The aristocracy, under pressure from a rising hoplite class - however that may be defined - presents itself (to itself) as fulfilling a vital rôle and earning the privileges outlined by Sarpedon in Book 12 of the Iliad. The more public face shown in the monuments and in epinician poetry is a different one, although the latter tends to locate martial valour more explicitly within the polis, presenting it as one of the factors which raises the laudandus above his fellow citizens.
3. Beauty and Virtue

3.1 Κάλλος in Homer

In the Homeric poems, the quality of κάλλος is attributed to a wide variety of objects, as well as to human beings and to divine figures. Κάλλος in Homer is not restricted to the visual world; the Greeks are described at Iliad 1.473 as καλὸν ἀείδοντες παιήνα (cf. Odyssey 8.265 καλὸν ἀείδον), and the phrase ὅπλα καλή is found at Iliad 1.604, Odyssey 5.61 and 10.221. The word, then, can be used of anything that is aesthetically pleasing to eye or ear.1 Although the usual sense of the adjective καλός, that of 'beautiful', predominates, it is possible that when applied to things such as τεῦχεα (Iliad 3.89), ἄρματα (Iliad 23.533), κνημίδες (Iliad 18.459), or an ἄπτην (Odyssey 6.252), the adjective may also imply a meaning such as 'useful'; this is suggested by Mehliss, who writes that the range of the meaning of the adjective in Homer 'mit "von normaler Beschaffenheit" beginnt und mit "nützlich" an eine andere Vorstellungsmasse anschliesst'.2 But this interpretation must be treated as secondary; although the armour of Achilleus is described by Hephaistos as τεῦχεα

1The sense of touch may also be involved in the phrase χρόα καλὸν: Iliad 5.858, 21.398, 23.805 (skin being pierced by a weapon); 11.352 (skin protected from a weapon); 14.175 (Here anointing her skin with oil); 22.321 (Achilles facing Hektor, εἰσορόφων χρόα καλὸν, δὴ εἰςέχει μάλιστα); Odyssey 2.376, 4.749 (skin being torn in grief); 13.398, 13.430 (skin being withered); 19.263 (skin being disfigured); 24.44 (skin being purified with oil).

καλά (Iliad 18.466), its ‘usefulness’ is limited and it will not save the life of the hero who wears it. As Griffin writes, ‘the uniqueness of Achilles’ armour is its beauty alone’, and in this respect the emphasis on its outstanding beauty in the ekphrasis of Book 18 might be seen as ironic, as is the case with the description of the dead Patroklos’ armour as ἐμβροτα τεῦχεα by Zeus at 19.202 and the scene of Paris polishing his περικαλλέα τεῦχεα at 6.321. The fact that Achilleus’ armour is ‘immortal’ is no consolation to the two heroes who will be killed while wearing it, and the description of Paris’ armour as περικαλλέα (cf. 3.328, τεῦχεα καλά) reminds the audience that its owner himself has been said to possess more beauty than usefulness in battle (3.39-45; see below).

When used of characters in the Homeric poems, καλός is often combined with other adjectives and phrases qualifying the character so described, for example in the phrase καλός τε μέγας τε (Iliad 21.108, Odyssey 6.276), or with ἄρτιπος (Odyssey 8.310), or γεραφός (Iliad 3.170). Donlan notes that for women, praise of

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3 J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death, p. 166.

4 Of course, other characters possess τεῦχεα καλά, even minor characters such as Amphios and Oinomaos (Iliad 5.621 = 13.510); the formulaic attribution of τεῦχεα καλά to such warriors provides the background against which the irony of the emphasis on the τεῦχεα καλά of the unwarlike Paris becomes apparent.

5 In Hesiod, however, καλός tends to appear alone, except for Theogony 194 (of Aphrodite) αίδοιη καλή θεός. In the Theogony and Works and Days, the masculine and feminine forms of the adjective are used only of divine figures. The connection between beauty and divinity is found also in Homer: καλή Καστάς, δέμας έικος θείος (Iliad 8.305).

6 W.J. Verdenius, ‘Κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος’, discusses the Greeks’ admiration for large stature.

beauty can be allied to that of their domestic skills, citing *Odyssey* 13.288-89 (γυναικὶ καλῇ τε μεγάλῃ τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργα ἰδών), 15.418, and 16.158. Donlan writes that ‘[i]t is clear that in Homer beauty was an important aspect of the heroic warrior (and of his women), and that having it contributed to a person’s ἀρετή.’

Similarly Hoekstra on *Odyssey* 14.214: ‘Odysseus’ appearance ... is part of his ἀρετή’. But not a necessary part: Hoekstra’s comment that ‘the translation “valour” [for ἀρετή in v. 212] does no justice to the fact that originally the word had a much more general and elementary meaning ... which is still faintly visible in 214 [i.e., Odysseus’ comment about his appearance]’ does no justice itself to the fact that Homeric heroes are careful to distinguish between beauty and true ἀρετή (see below).

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the adjective καλός in Homer is less often used of characters, be they human or divine, than it is of things; as desirable as beauty is, it is not the primary virtue, and it is important to note that one who is καλός but does not display ἀρετή independently does not gain in standing on the basis alone. This is well illustrated by Hektor’s words to Paris at *Iliad* 3.43-45:

 hostage καρή κομίωντες Ἀχαιοι, φάντες ἀριστή πρόμον ἐμεναι, οὐνεκα καλὸν εἶδος ἔπ’, ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βη φρεσίν οὐδὲ τις ἀλκη.

And another example may be found in Odysseus’ feigned ignorance about his own dog Argos at *Odyssey* 17.306-10:

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Donlan, ‘The Origin of Καλός κἀγαθός’, p. 370. He continues: ‘In the Hesiodic poems, on the other hand, physical beauty is in no way connected with human worth.’

At *Iliad* 6.156, Glaukos tells Diomedes that the gods gave his grandfather Bellerophontes κάλλος τε καὶ ἠνορέην ἔρατείνην; these three passages demonstrate that one’s beauty and one’s worth are clearly distinguished in Homer, and that the one does not imply the other.¹⁰ Another example worth citing is Penelope’s reproach to Telemachos at *Odyssey* 18.215 ff., where she complains that although Telemachos possesses μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος, his φρένες and νόημα are not ἐμπεδοὶ or ἐναίσιμοι, since he has allowed ‘this guest’ (τὸν ξείνον, *i.e.*, Odysseus himself) to be maltreated; this is reminiscent of an earlier episode where Odysseus, stung by Euryalos’ rebuke (8.159 ff. ὀὐ γὰρ σ’ οὔδὲ, ξεῖνε, δαήμων φωτὶ ἐίσκω | ἀθλὼν ...), replies that looks can be deceptive (8.166-75): a man who is εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος can be held in high honour for his excellence in speech, whereas another may be εἶδος ... ἀλήκτιος ἀθανάτους but have no χάρις in his words. Euryalos, says Odysseus (176-77), has an εἶδος ... ἀριστοπέτες but is still νόον ... ἀποφώλιος. Later, in the Theognidea, the fact that virtue and beauty are rarely found in the same person is bemoaned: παύροις

¹⁰One man can have both κάλλος and ἀρετή, and the converse is also true: Thersites is not only οἰσχυρὸς (*Iliad* 2.216) but also held in contempt by the rest of the Greek army. In neither case, though, is moral worth perceived as a consequence of physical appearance. On *Iliad* 6.156, the scholiast b'T comments: οὐδὲν γὰρ κάλλος ἄνευ ἀνορέτας, and H. Wankel (*Kalos kai agathos*, p. 16) writes, ‘den Scholiasten ist die Verbindung also selbstverständlich’. But given the other Homeric passages quoted above, and despite the fact that ἠνορέην ἔρατείνην may blur the distinction in the case of Bellerophontes, it is clear that whatever the scholiasts and Wankel think, the ‘Verbindung’ was not always ‘selbstverständlich’ to the poet of the *Iliad*. On κολοκάγαθα, see further below, section 3.5.
But the neuter forms of the adjective καλός are used in the Homeric poems to describe actions which are not simply ‘attractive’ in an aesthetic sense, but also ‘good’ in some ethical sense; this is noted by Berlage, who writes: ‘[n]otandum certe est apud Homerum significationem “bonum” nonnisi neutro genere adhiberi ... Masculino genere ... vel feminino genere, semper facie pulcher significat’. 11 It appears in the negative at Odyssey 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, where we find the sentence οὐ ... καλὸν ἀτέμβειν οὐδὲ δίκαιον | ξείνους Τηλεμάχου; here the addition of οὐδὲ δίκαιον further emphasizes what is meant by οὐ καλὸν. The expression means ‘not right’, and it is made clear that the actions so described are considered ‘not right’ in two separate respects. In other passages, the mention of καλὸν/καλὰ alone is sufficient: οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ’ ἔνθεο θυμῶ (Iliad 6.326), ὑμεῖς δ’ οὐκέτι καλὰ μεθίσε θουρίδος ἀλκῆς | πάντες ἀριστοὶ ἐόντες ἀνὰ στρατόν (Iliad 13.116-17), οὐ μὲν καλὸν ὑπέρβιον εὐχετάσθαι (Iliad 17.19), ἐσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἄκουειν, οὐδὲ ἔοικεν | ὑββάλλειν (Iliad 19.79-80), οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν ἐστίν (Odyssey 18.287). 12 An important difference exists between these examples and Odyssey 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, mentioned above: although it is certainly οὐ καλὸν to nurse a grudge, to shrink from battle, to boast excessively, or to refuse a gift, these actions

11 J. Berlage, ‘De vi et usu vocum καλὸς κάγαθος, καλοκάγαθος’, p. 22 (Berlage’s italics).

12 When Telemachos says at Odyssey 1.370 that τὸ γε καλὸν ἄκουεμεν ἐστίν ἄοιδοι, he is not saying ‘it is wrong to interrupt’ as in Iliad 19.79-80; it is a reference to the pleasure to be had from listening, as is made clear by τερπῶμεθα (line 369) and by the clause elaborating on ἄοιδοι: line 371 τοιοῦτ’ οἶος δ’ ἐστί, θεοῖς ἐναλληκτικὸς αὐθίν.
(or, in the case of *Iliad* 13.116-117, lack of action) cannot be criticised on the basis that they are οὖ δίκαιον, as is the maltreatment of guests. This consideration, as well as metrical position and the run of the sentence in *Odyssey* 20.294-95 and 21.312-13, suggests that in those cases οὖ δίκαιον should perhaps be seen as a stronger sanction than οὖ ... καλὸν. At *Odyssey* 17.483 ff., the other suitors criticize Antinoos for striking the ‘guest’ Odysseus. After the statement Ἀντινο’, οὖ μὲν κάλ’ ἐβαλες δύστην άλητην, there follow four verses on the care that the gods show for δήμος and εὐνομία, which approximates to οὖδε δίκαιον at *Odyssey* 20.294 and 21.312.

At *Odyssey* 15.10, Athene tells Telemachos that it is οὐκέτι καλά for him to be away from home, leaving ἄνδρες οὔτω ὑπερφίλατοι in his house. This could be taken to mean that it is ‘not right’, with some implied reference to an absolute standard of decency which requires men to protect their mothers (as Athene urges him to do at line 15), or it might refer to Telemachos’ own ‘honour’ which is suffering insults. The distinction is not always clear in Homer; in the examples of treatment of guests mentioned above, there does seem to be a reference to ‘proper’ behaviour, but in the other cases this is debatable. One instance where a reference to personal honour rather than to common decency appears to be made is *Odyssey* 17.460-61, where Antinoos threatens Odysseus just before striking him: νῦν δὴ σ’ οὖκέτι καλὰ διέκ μεγάρωι οὖ | ἄναχωρήσειν, ὅτε δὴ καὶ ὀνείδεα βάζεις.13

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13 The ὀνείδεα to which Antinoos refers are Odysseus’ criticism of him for not giving food to the ‘beggar’, Odysseus himself, when there is so much in the house. Odysseus’ words, incidentally, resemble those of Penelope to Telemachos at 18.219-20: ὃ πότα, οὐκ ἄρα σοι γ’ ἔπι εἶδει καὶ φρένες ἔσαν (*Odyssey* 17.454).
Iliad 8.400 also can be interpreted in two ways. Zeus, seeing Athene and Here preparing to enter the battle against his orders, tells Iris to go and stop them: οὐ γὰρ καλὰ συνοισόμεθα πτολέμονδε. This could mean that it is ‘not right’ for the gods to join battle against each other, but Kirk would translate ‘rather (in view of the γὰρ clause which follows) “our clash in war will not be a happy one” (i.e. for them).’

The adverb καλῶς appears in Homer only in the negative at Odyssey 2.63 οὐ γὰρ ἐτ’ ἀναχετὰ ἐργα τετεύχαται, οὗτ’ ἐτι καλῶς | οἰκος ἐμὸς διόλωλε with an ethical sense; it should be noted that only three times in Homer are actions positively commended as ethnically ‘good’ with the word καλῶν/καλά: once by Achilleus (Iliad 9.615, to Phoinix: καλὸν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κηδεῖν δς κ’ ἐμὲ κηδῆ), once by Agamemnon (Iliad 19.79, quoted above), and once ironically by Telemachos (Odyssey 17.397, Άντινο, ἰ μεν καλὰ πατὴρ ὡς κηδεῖαι υἱος); in all other cases where the adjective is used in such a context, it is used in the negative, to express condemnation. The two departures from this practice in the Iliad both occur in speeches made by characters who in some way stand outside accepted conventions, and who are saying things which may meet with opposition from their audiences: Achilleus is justifying his refusal of Agamemnon’s offer of compensation in terms

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15 The adjective is used in the positive again at Iliad 24.388 (Priam to the disguised Hermes, after the latter has spoken of the death of Hektor) ὡς μοι καλὰ τὸν οἶτον ἀπόμου παῖδος ἔνιστες. Macleod comments ad loc.: ‘καλὰ “well” seems to imply that Hermes has shown an understanding of what Hector’s death means to Priam. But it might rather mean “properly”, i.e. with no misguided attempt to spare Priam’s feelings’ (C.W. Macleod, Iliad: Book xxiv, p. 119). This appears to be rather like the use of the adverb καλῶς to be found in Anakreon PMG 417, Sappho 115, and Simonides 19, and Theognidea 16, all of which will be discussed below.
which Odysseus, Aias, and Phoinix do not understand, and Agamemnon is explicitly described (19.77) as making his speech to the assembly αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔρης, οὕτως ἐν μέσῳ σαυτάν ἀναστάς.\footnote{M.W. Edwards (The Iliad: A Commentary, volume v, pp. 243-44) discusses the question of whether the line means that Agamemnon does not stand up at all, or stands up without moving into the middle of the assembly to speak, and opts for the former: in either case, Agamemnon’s speech stands (whether he does or not) outside convention. This is a reflection of the controversial nature of the content of the speech, for which see O.P. Taplin, ‘Agamemnon’s Role in the Iliad’.} And the speech of Telemachos at Odyssey 17.397ff. begins in an ironic tone.

Although καλὸς, then, is primarily used in an aesthetic sense in Homer, it becomes in the abstract a term which is used to commend and condemn actions.

Adkins states that

*kalon* has in Homer [Adkins’ italics] no real link with the competitive excellences, from which alone it could draw real power. .... Had it been possible successfully to use *ou kalon* to oppose the claims of the *agathos* to do as he pleases, Nestor would have said that Agamemnon’s robbing Achilles of Briseis was *ou kalon*, and Apollo would have claimed the same of Achilles’ maltreatment of Hector.\footnote{A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, pp. 44-45.}

What Adkins does not mention, of course, is that Apollo in fact does say that Achilles’ treatment of Hektor’s corpse is οὖ ... κάλλιον, οὔδὲ τ’ ἀμετνον (*Iliad* 24.52).\footnote{Not an early example of the combination καλὸς καὶ ἁγαθὸς (for which see below, section 3.5), but ‘la conjonction banale de deux adjectifs assez communs’, as pointed out by F. Bourriot, *Kalos kagathos – kalokagathia*, vol. 1. p. 104.} As with the uses of *καλὸς, καλὰ, and καλὸς* cited above, the words can be used on their own or in combination to express praise or condemnation of actions. As has been seen above, *καλὸν* appears sometimes to be less forceful than, for example, δίκαιον, but Adkins’ insistence that ‘competitive’ excellences (those which depend...
upon success at the expense of others) are of a higher standing in Homer than ‘quiet’ excellences (those involving co-operation and ‘fairness’;\(^{19}\) leads him to the false conclusion that καλόν has no ‘real power’ at all. Moreover, despite Adkins’ assertion to the contrary, a glance at the above examples will reveal that these expressions are used of both the ‘competitive’ and the ‘quiet’ excellences.

### 3.2 Archaic Lyric and Elegiac Beauty\(^{20}\)

In the poetry of the period between Homer and the Persian Wars, the meaning of καλός begins to go beyond its Homeric uses. It denotes primarily an aesthetic quality, but its ethical connotations are exploited in some of the poets. This shift, however, is not as marked or rapid as some commentators have suggested, and even at the end of this period the word has not yet attained the level of ‘political’ significance which is apparent, for example, in the fifth-century catchphrase καλὸς κάγαθος.

The poetry of Archilochos offers little that is new in its use of καλός to describe people or things. We find the word used of Neoboule in the phrase καλὴ τέρεινα παρθένος (196a.6; cf. Hipponax 119 εἴ μοι γένοιτο παρθένος καλὴ τε καὶ

\(^{19}\)For the distinction between the two groups of values, see Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 6-7; for the supposed dominance of the ‘competitive’ virtues in Homer, pp. 30-36.

\(^{20}\)Passages dealing particularly with the relationship between beauty and martial valour are discussed below, in section 3.6.
Teivai, 21 and her sister (if it is in fact Neoboule’s sister whose seduction is recorded at the end of the fragment) is described as having a σῶμα καλὸν (line 51); both of these are uncomplicated erotic uses of the adjective. Thasos is condemned as οὐ γὰρ τι καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ’ ἐφίμερος | οὐδ’ ἐρατός in fr. 22; for such terms used of places see, e.g., Iliad 9.152 καλὴν τ’ Αἴτειαν and 2.751 ἵμερον Τιταρησόν, also the anonymous iambic fragment 3 "Αβδηρα, καλὴ Τηὺν ἀποκή; in contrast to Thasos, Archilochos calls his homeland ἵμερη Πάρ[ος] in fr. 166. And as in Homer, a song can be καλὸς: 120.1 Διωνύσου ἀνακτός καλὸν ἔξαρξαι μέλος (cf. Alkman, PMG 3.5 καλὸν ... μέλος, PMG 41 ἔρπει γὰρ ἄντα τῷ σιδάρῳ τὸ καλὸς κιθαρίσθην, PMG 87(b) κάλλιστ’ ὑπαυλὴν, Theognis 242–43 καλὰ τε καὶ λιγέα | ἄσσονται, and Simonides PMG 567.5 καλὰ σῦν ἄοιδά). And in other archaic poets the adjective is

21 Τέρη used of a person (rather than, for example, of a person’s skin) is itself something of a departure from earlier poetic practice: this adjective appears in Homer used of tears (Iliad 3.142, 16.11. 19.323; Odyssey 16.332), skin (Iliad 4.237. 13.553, 14.406), φύλλα (Iliad 13.180, Odyssey 12.357), and flowers (Odyssey 9.449). In Hesiod it occurs qualifying skin (Theogony 5 ~ Works and Days 522), the ἄνθος ... ἐφίμερος ἡβίς (Theogony 988), the μαλακύτης στυγερής ... ἄνθος (fr. 132 M-W), and a γίγνον (fr. 70.21 M-W). In other archaic lyric it is used of flowers (Ibykos PMG 315, fr. adesp. PMG 929(e); fr. adesp. PMG 943 uses the comparative to describe an unknown person or thing as ναρκίσσου τερεύστην), spices (Melanippides PMG 757.6), and the three-holed aulos (Anakeor PMG 375, where Athenaios (4.182c) comments that the adjective is used because the auli in question, being οὐκ ἐναγώνοι, are used πρὸς τὰς εὐωχίας). In the poetry of this period it is only in these passages from Archilochos and Hipponax, as well as Theognidea 261 (καρὰ παιδὶ τερεύνη), that the adjective is used to describe a person. Theognidea 266 has an interesting use: ἡ δὲ τέρην φθέγγετ’ ἀπὸ στόματος – rather like the fragment of Anakeor, the word seems to refer to a sound; as is the case with καλὸς, this adjective can be used of qualities which are perceived by more than one sense, and perhaps the most appropriate English translation of τέρην would be ‘soft’, a word which can be used of aural as well as tactile properties.

22 Semonides uses very similar language when he says about a woman (7.51-52) that κείνη γὰρ οὗ τι καλὸν οὖδ’ ἐπίμερον | πρόσεστιν οὐδὲ τερεύστων οὐδ’ ἐρατόν. It is worth noting that although both poets use the phrase οὗ τι qualifying the adjectives, in Semonides the phrase is equivalent to οὐδὲν καλὸν κτλ., ‘there is nothing beautiful about her’, whereas in Archilochos the τι is adverbial, and the fragment seems to be contradicting someone else’s assertion that Thasos is a beautiful place.
used with an apparently purely aesthetic sense of people (Mimnermos 3.1, Sappho 132), animals (Sappho 1.9), things or places (Mimnermos 11.4, Solon 13.21 and 24, Alkaios 45.1, Sappho 34.1 and 39.3). The noun καλλος is used only of people, referring to physical beauty (Sappho 16.7, Ibykos S 151.46, Theognidea 933).

One appearance of καλος in Archilochos is of interest: this is the phrase δαιτα δ' ου καλην at 175.2, part of the fable of the eagle and the fox. In Homer καλος is never negated except in the neuter to condemn an action on ethical grounds (see above), and the phrase ου καλος is not used in Homer to express the idea that a person or thing is morally reprehensible, but if Archilochos 175 refers to the eagle bringing the fox-cubs to its young, as West believes, the phrase could imply that it was ου καλον for the eagle to treat its friend the fox in such a way. It could simply mean that a dead fox-cub in the talons of an eagle is an ugly sight, but if the fragment comes from a description of the second meal, that which caused disaster for the

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23 Of animals in their cooked state: Ananios 5.2.

24 We recognize it as the fable of the fox and the eagle that appears in our Aesopic collections. In the Aesopic version, a fox and an eagle became friends and neighbours. But one day when the fox was away, the eagle flew down and carried off its cubs to feed its own young. The fox was grieved at its loss, but more so that it was unable to reach the eagle’s nest, which was in a tree, to get its revenge. It had to content itself with curses. However, they were not without effect, for it came about that the eagle snatched part of a sacrificial victim (a goat) from an altar, and brought that back to its nest, not noticing that there was a fiery spark lodged in it. A strong wind caused it to blaze up, the nest was burned, and the unfledged young had no escape. (They fell to the ground and the fox ate them up – an inorganic final touch.) (M.L. West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, pp. 132-33, with references.)

25 M.L. West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 133.
eagle’s nest and young, then οὐ καλὴν might be a reference to the effect of the δαίς;
this would be in keeping with the idea of the animal fable.26

Some of the other archaic poets draw distinctions between being καλὸς in
appearance and not in fact being ‘good’, as in the Homeric examples cited above of
Hektor’s rebuke of Paris, Odysseus’ speech about his dog, and Penelope’s rebuke of
Telemachos. Semonides twice mentions women who appear to be beautiful but whose
worth does not match their beauty: first there is the woman ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἢ ὅ’ ἐν
φρεσίν νοεῖ, who may be praised by a guest in these terms: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε
λοιπῶν γυνή | ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων (7.30-31). Semonides goes on to
describe how such a woman’s temper becomes unbearable, and later he describes the
horse-woman: καλὸν μὲν ὅν θέημα τοιαύτη γυνή | ἄλλοις, τῶ δ’ ἔχοντι γίνεται
κακὸν (7.67-68). These passages are in the tradition, already present in Homer, that
one cannot judge a book by its cover. The sentiment is picked up in two passages
from the Theognidea which criticise the poet’s beloved παῖς for associating with bad
men and learning bad things from them: 1259-62 (ὦ παῖ, τὴν μορφὴν μὲν ἔφυς
καλὸς, ...) and 1377-80 (καλὸς ἐῶν κακότητι φίλων δειλοῖσιν ὁμιλεῖς | ἀνδράσι ...).

The meaning which καλὸς seems to have in Iliad 24.388 (see above, note 15)
emerges in archaic lyric poetry in two cases in the adverb: Anakreon PMG 417.3 ἵσθι
tοι, καλὸς μὲν ἄν τοι τὸν χαλινὸν ἐμβάλοιμι and Sappho 115.1 τῷ σ’ ὧ φίλε
γάμβρε καλὼς ἐκάσω; Here the sense is apparently something like ‘exactly’ or

26See E. Irwin, ‘Biography, Fiction, and the Archilochean Ainos’ on the implications of this
fable for the biographical tradition and the poet as guardian of δίκη.
'correctly'. The adjective also can probably be understood in this way in Simonides 19.1-2 ἐν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χίος ἔστιν ἀνήρ; | "οἶη περ φύλλων γεννή, τοῖη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν": in addition to the idea that the saying is 'most beautiful', Simonides is expressing the view that Homer's phrase is very true or apt. And one of the poems at the beginning of the Theognidea may be using καλός in a similar way (15-18):

Μοῦσαι καὶ Χάριτες, κοῦραι Διός, αἳ ποτὲ Κάδμου ἐς γάμον ἐλθοῦσα καλὸν ἀείσατ' ἔπος,

"ὅτι καλὸν φύλον ἐστί, τὸ δ' οὗ καλὸν οὗ φύλον ἐστι"·

τούτ' ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἥλθε διὰ στομάτων.

Again, the saying of the Muses and Graces, as well as being 'beautiful', could also be thought of as 'apt' or 'true'. The fact that this is a quotation of a single line, like the Simonides passage, seems to point to this meaning, and there may be deliberate ambiguity here: the recurrence of καλός in the following verse suggests a play on the possible meanings of the word.

As was the case in the Homeric poems, it is in the neuter that καλός acquires moral force in archaic lyric, elegiac, and iambic poetry. Simonides PMG 541 mentions distinguishing between τὸ καλὸν and τὸ αἰσχρὸν(line 1), something which presumably those who have ἀρετή (line 6) can do. And in a poem (PMG 542) in which he

27 The use of καλός in line 17 is almost certainly aesthetic rather than ethical, given that the line is put in the mouths of the Muses and Graces. B.A. van Groningen (Théognis: le premier livre, p. 17) comments: 'καλὸν a ... ici une valeur esthétique et le quatrain se situerait fort bien à un symposion au cours duquel on discuterait d'art.' Compare Theognidea 1047, from an obviously sympotic context: νῦν μὲν πίνοντες τερπόμεθα, καλὰ λέγοντες.

28 For the text see now W.B. Henry, 'Simonides, PMG 541'. There is no evidence in the poem to suggest that τὸ καλὸν should be taken in a political sense, as Ezio Pellizer ("... E il bello e il turpe distinguendo") understands it. Indeed, in view of PMG 542, this interpretation seems almost excluded. And Pellizer's suggestion (following Pfeiffer) that the subject of θριφεῖ is ὁ καρός, while possible, is perhaps unlikely given the absence of καρός in any of Simonides' surviving poetry; the poet often mentions 'the good' and 'the bad', but καρός is never a consideration. As Donlan notes
discusses what it means to be truly (άλαθεός, line 1) ἀγαθός. Simonides states that πάντα τὸ καλά, τοῖσιν τ' | αἰσχρά μὴ μέμεικται (lines 39-40). At Theognidea 649-52 the poet complains that Πενίη is teaching him αἰσχρά when he is ἔσθλα μετ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ κάλ' ἐπιστάμενον, and at 281-82 the δευλός is described as considering ἀπάλαμνα as καλὰ πάντα.

In some passages, the poets clarify what they think of as καλὸς: at line 255 of the Theognidea we find the declaration κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίοτατον.29 Tyrtaios 4.7 expresses a similar collocation: μυθεῖσθαι τε τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἔρθειν πάντα δίκαια. A looser relationship may be found in Sappho 137(b), if the final words can be understood to mean something along the lines of ‘you would speak about what is δικαίον’.30

ai δ' ἠχες ἐσθων ἰμερον ἦ κάλων
καὶ μὴ τι τ' εἴπην γλώσσα' ἐκυκα κάκον,
αἰδώς τ'κεν σε οὐκ ἢ ἠχον οὐπα-
τ' ἀλλ' ἔλεγες τ'περι τὸ δικαίωτ'.31

Although only the Theognidean passage here explicitly equates τὸ δικαίον with τὸ καλὸν, both of the others demonstrate a feeling that these two abstract terms are

29 The Δηλικαϊὸν ἐπίγραμμα 255-56 may have had sympotic overtones in this context, and the word δικαίοτατον may have been similarly coloured; cf. 313-14 ἐν μὲν μανομένοις μᾶλλα μανόμα. ἐν δὲ δικαίοις | πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ δικαίοτατος (for the sentiment, though without reference to δίκη), compare 627-28 and the drinking-song PMG 902.

30 Lobel proposed περὶ τῦ δικαίου = τοῦτο τὸ ἐδίκαιος, but only tentatively: ‘nobis quidem formae in -oio- suspectae’ (apparatus ad loc.).

31 Sappho 81(b) encourages a perhaps significantly-named girl called Δίκη to wear garlands in order to appear attractive to the Χάρπες.
related. And at lines 279-82 of the Theognidea, the poet says that the κακός cares nothing for τὰ δίκαια, and that ἄπαλαμμα appear to him to be καλὰ πάντα, which is again a loose linking of the two terms.

At Theognidea 257-58, where the poet writes ἵππος ἐγὼ καλὴ καὶ ἀεθλὴ, ἄλλα κάκιστον | ἄνδρα φέρω, the implication is that physical beauty and moral turpitude do not belong together. These lines appear to be a sexual metaphor along the lines of Anakreon's πῶλε Θηρηκίη ... (PMG 417), but although the point of a καλὴ horse bearing a κακὸς ἕνιοχος may be simply a reference to a beautiful young woman who has to endure the attentions of a bad lover (cf. lines 457-60), it is also possible that on another level 257-60 can be seen as political: van Groningen suggests that the lines are conceived as being spoken by an aristocratic woman whose father, 'un des aristocrates dépravés que le poète flétrit en 103 ss. et 193 ss. ... a obligé sa fille à épouser un vilain enrichi'. On this interpretation, the aesthetic evaluation in a sexual context is combined with a political evaluation. In the poetry of our period, it is only in the Theognidea that καλὸς begins to be used in this political or social way.

3.3 Epinician Beauty

Commenting on verse 94 of Pindar’s ninth Olympian (ὦραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλὸς καλλιστά τε ὅξαις), Gildersleeve writes that the poet 'dwells on the personal beauty

32 Van Groningen, Théognis: le premier livre, p. 105.
of the victors whenever he has an excuse'. The physical beauty of the athletes is indeed a recurrent theme in Pindar’s epinician poetry, and it is expressed not simply for its own sake, but also in order to reflect other issues related to athletic triumph and to the poet’s role as observer and laudator. Some of the ‘excuses’, to use Gildersleeve’s term, which prompt an epinician poet to ‘dwell on’ a victor’s beauty will here be examined in relation to broader considerations of theme and function, and to the presentation of beauty in other literary and epigraphic poetry up to the end of the fifth century.

At Olympian 8.19-20, Pindar makes a connection between an athlete’s physical beauty and his prowess in the games (in this case, wrestling):

\[\text{η \ ν \ δ' \ εσοφαν \ καλός, \ ϊργω \ τ' \ ού \ κατά \ ειδός \ ελέγχων} \]
\[\text{έξένεπ \ κρατέων} \]
\[\text{πάλα \ δολιχήρετμον \ Αίγιναν \ πάτραν} \]

Here, the statement \(\text{ἐργω \ δ' \ ού \ κατὰ \ ειδός \ ελέγχων}\) implies that the athlete’s good performance is what is to be expected from someone with his good looks. The converse of this outlook is found in the statement of Tyrtaios that the man who does not heed his call to arms \(\text{αἰσχύνει τε γένος, κατὰ δ' \ ἀγλαὸν \ εἴδος} \ \text{ελέγχει}\) (10.9); this is a man whose \(\text{γένος} \) and \(\text{εἴδος}\) would lead one not to expect such behaviour.

Pindar makes the same point more explicitly when he describes Aristokleides, another Aiginetan, as \(\text{ἐὼν καλὸς} \ \text{ἐρόδων} \ \text{τ' \ ἑοικότα ὀμορφῆ} \) (Nemean 3.19); the victor

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33 B.L. Gildersleeve, Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes, p. 209.
has performed ‘as befits his appearance’. Less forceful than this expression, but in the
same vein, is the assertion at *Isthmian* 7.21-22 that Strepsiades of Thebes

*φέρει ... Ἰσθμοῖ*

*νίκαν παγκρατίου, σθένει δ' ἐκπαγγλος* 34 iděín te μορ-

*φάεις, ἄγει τ' ἀρετάν οὐκ αἰσχυν φυᾶς.*

Although it is true that φυῆ, in Pindar as elsewhere, can denote a person’s ‘nature’
without connotations of physical appearance (e.g., *Olympian* 2.86 σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ
εἶδως φυᾶ), 35 the context of the word’s occurrence here in the seventh *Isthmian*
suggests that reference is being made to the beauty of the athlete; the previous clause
ends with the statement that Strepsiades is idēín τεμορφάεις, and the φυά mentioned
at the end of the verse must at least include this meaning, even if it is taken also to
encompass the athlete’s σθένος. 36 And this interpretation is reinforced by the next
verse, which continues with a visual image: φλέγεται δὲ ἱοπλόκοιτι Μοίσας.

At *Olympian* 9.93-94, a similar connection is made, though in a different
manner: the victor Epharmostos

34B.K. Braswell (*A Commentary on the Fourth Pythian Ode of Pindar*, pp. 175-76),
commenting on the occurrence of this word ἐκπαγγλος at *Pythian* 4.79, argues that there is ‘no reason
to assume with LSJ, s.v., II, that the meaning has been weakened to “marvellous”, “wondrous” here
[i.e. *Pythian* 4.79] or elsewhere in Pindar’. He notes the appearance of the word at *Isthmian* 7.22 and
remarks (*ibid.* ) that ‘Strepsiades was a pancratiast and doubtless rather frightening in appearance,
even if he was handsome’ (ἐκπαγγλος here, of course, technically goes with σθένει, but the placing of
idēiv directly after the adjective suggests perhaps that Strepsiades was quite visibly σθένει ἐκπαγγλος).  
G.S. Kirk (*The Iliad: A Commentary, volume i*, p. 68) notes that ἐκπαγγλος, while not necessarily
insulting, is a term whose connotations are not entirely favourable.


36Alternatively, φυά here might be supposed to have a solely aesthetic reference, if the
sequence of thought is taken to be: (a) the athlete has exceptional σθένος, (b) he is μορφάεις, (a) he
possesses ἀρετὰ (a result of his σθένος) which is (b) not inferior to his φυά (= μορφά).
In this case, it is not stated (as it is at Olympian 8.19-20 and Nemean 3.19) that the athlete’s deeds are somehow to be expected of one who is so καλός, nor is this implied as it is in the statement at Isthmian 7.22 that the victor ἀρετᾶν οὐκ ἀξισχιον φυνάς. Rather, the implication is made in the jingle καλός κάλλιστα. And further, the mythical founder of the victor’s city has already been described in similar terms (Olympian 9.62-66):

εὐφράνθη τε ιδών ἥρως (i.e., Lokros) θετόν υίόν,

... ὑπέρφατον ἄνδρα μορφῆ τε καὶ ἔργοισι.

The link between the physical beauty and the athletic excellence of an Olympic victor is made in a less obvious way at the end of the tenth Olympian. In the last antistrophe of the ode, the poet addresses the victorious Hagesidamos in these terms (Olympian 10.91-96):

καὶ διὰν καλά {μὲν} ἐρξαίς ἀοιδάς ἀτερ,
 Ἀγνησίδαμ’, εἰς Ἄιδα σταθμόν
 ἀνήρ ἱκηταί, κενεά πνεύσας ἐπορεύε μύχθῳ
 ἐπερχό τι τερπνόν. τίν δ’ ἀδυνητής τε λύρα
 γλυκὺς τ’ αὐλός ἀναπάσσει χάριν
 τρέφοντι δ’ εὐφύς κλέος
 κόραι Πειρίδες Διός.

Here it is established that the victor has performed καλά and that the Muses will cause his fame for these deeds to live on after his death; the poet’s λύρα and αὐλός are giving Hagesidamos the χάρις of κλέος. Citing verses 91-93 (as far as τερπνόν, thus
curiously omitting the actual reference to χάρις) of the above passage, MacLachlan writes:

Charis, then, in the epinician context, can represent the praise song itself or the public recognition that must be kept alive in song; but not to be forgotten is the fact that it represents the gratification of one man, the victor.37

But the phrase τίν ... ἀναπάσσει χάριν, while certainly referring to the ‘gratification’ of fame, also suggests another kind of χάρις: physical beauty, which the goddess Athene gives to Odysseus in a similar metaphor at Odyssey 6.235:

As Athene ‘pours’ χάρις over Odysseus,38 so Pindar’s music ‘sprinkles’ χάρις over Hagesidamos; this χάρις suggests both the fame which is ‘gratifying’ to the victor and the beauty which is ‘gratifying’ to others. And indeed the poet does draw attention to the beauty of the victor: he proceeds to elaborate on this physical χάρις in the poem’s final epode, referring to the victor as παιδ’ ἑρατὸν ... Ἀρχεστράτου, and closing the ode (lines 100-105) with a description of him as

... τὸν εἶδον κρατέοντα χερὸς ἄλκα
βωμὸν παρ’ Ὀλύμπιον
κείνον κατά χρόνον
ἰδέα τε καλὸν
ὅρα τε κεκραμένον, ἢ ποτε
ἀναίδεα Γανυμήδει θάνατον

37 B. MacLachlan, The Age of Grace, p. 89.

38 Cf. Odyssey 23.156-163, where her beautification of Odysseus is described in these terms: αὐτὰρ κακὸς κεφαλῆς χεῖνεν ποιῆν κάλλος Ἀθήνη ... ἐκ δ’ ἀσωμήθου βῆ [sc. Ὅδυσσεῦς] δέμας ἀθανάτους ὁμοίως.
The poet, then, has moved from praise of the καλά that the victor has performed (91) to praise of the κάλλος of the victor himself (103-105, preceded in 100-102 by a reminder of Hagesidamos’ athletic prowess), thus suggesting the connection that is made explicit, as discussed above, in *Olympian* 8.19-20, *Olympian* 9.65-66 and 93-94, *Nemean* 3.19-20, and *Isthmian* 7.21-22.

There is one exception in Pindar to the use of physical appearance as a visual marker of excellence: this is in *Isthmian* 4, where the Theban Melissos, a victor in the pankration, is described in these terms (*Isthmian* 4.45-51):

... τόλμα γὰρ εἰκώς
θυμόν ἐρυθρεμέταν θηρῶν λεόντων
ἐν πόνο, μῆτιν δ’ ἄλωπεξ,
αἰτοῦ τ’ ἀναπτιναμένα ὅμοιον ἵσχεν·
χρή δὲ πᾶν ἐρῶντ’ ἀμαρώσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν.

οὐ γὰρ φύσιν Ὀμηριοεῖν ἔλαχεν·
ἀλλ’ ὄνοτος μὲν ἰδέσθαι,
συμπεσεῖν δ’ ἀκμῇ βαρὺς.

Rather than praise the combination of beauty and prowess, here Pindar points out that appearances can be deceptive, thus employing a *topos* which is found in Homer (e.g.,

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39And just as lack of beauty deceives here, μύθοι which are δεδωδάλμενοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις deceive men into believing stories about the gods which are not καλά (*Olympian* 1.29-35). The verb δαδόλλω does not always carry this pejorative connotation in Pindar: at *Olympian* 2.53-56 πλούτος ἀρεταῖς δεδωδάλμενος is praised as an ἀστήρ ἄριστος, ἐτοιμωτατον | ἀνδρὶ φέγγος, and verbal 'embellishment' is not necessarily criticised at fr. 94b.32 δαδόλλος’ ἔσεσθαι (the context is not certain, but it seems to involve a contrast between a poet’s or singer’s verbal representation and the omniscience of Zeus). G. Kirkwood (*Selections from Pindar*, p. 52) also comments on this ambivalence: on Χάρις at *Olympian* 1.30, he writes that ‘the immediate context suggests that the power of Charis is the power of poetry to deceive, that is, to make men believe the false tale of the eating of Pelops. But in the long run the charis of P.’s own poetry makes credible the incredible – the true story, Pindar’s story of Pelops’.
Iliad 10.316, of Dolon: εἶδος μὲν ἔν ψακός, ἄλλα ποδῶκης, and for its converse, 
e.g., Iliad 3.43-45: Paris is beautiful, but οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσίν οὐδὲ τις ἄλκη) and in 
later archaic poetry; the picture that Pindar gives us of Melissos is reminiscent of the 
ideal general as described by Archilochos (114):

οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὴν οὐδὲ διαπεπλημένον
οὐδὲ βοστρυχοις γαύρον οὐδ’ ὑπεξυρημένον,
ἄλλα μοι σμικρός τις εἶη καὶ περὶ κνήμας ἰδεῖν
ῥοικός, ἀσφαλέως βεβηκὼς ποσσί, καρδίς πλέως.

And indeed the suggestion that Melissos’ skill and strength are greater than one might 
suppose from his appearance is given considerable importance in the structure of the 
ode; it is used by Pindar as a device for transition into the poem’s mythological section 
(Isthmian 4.52-55):

καὶ τοὶ πότ’ Ἀνταίον δόμους
Θηβάν ἀπὸ Καδμείαν μορφὰν βραχύς,
ψυχάν δ’ ἀκαπτὸς, προσπαλαῖσον ἡλθ’ ἀνὴρ
τὰν πυροφόρον Λιβύαν, κρανίος διφορα ξένων
ναὸν Ποσειδάωνος ἐρέφοντα σχέδου,

υἱὸς Ἀλκμήνας.

At the end of the ode, Pindar promises that σὺν Ὄρσεξ δὲ νιν | κωμάξομαι 
tερπνάν ἐπιστάξον χάριν. This phrase is similar to ἀνάπάσσει χάριν at Olympian 
10.94, discussed above, but in this context the comparison with Athene ‘pouring’ 
beauty on Odysseus in the Odyssey is less appropriate, since we have already been told 
by the poet that this victor, unlike Hagesidamos, was not physically attractive. A 
victory ode cannot make an athlete more handsome than he is by nature; it can only 
make his beauty famous. Melissos has been immortalised as ὂνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι
(Isthmian 4.50), but Pindar nevertheless claims to celebrate his victory τερπνων ἐπιστάξων χάριν (72b). This last line of Isthmian 4 is very close in its vocabulary and thought to Olympian 6.75-76, where the victorious Hagesias is numbered among those

... οἰς ποτε πρώτος περὶ δωδέκα τών δρόμων ἐλαυνόντεσσιν αἴδοια ποτιστά- ἐν χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν.

The word εὐκλέα is important here: the epinician poet offers a victorious athlete the χάρις of κλέος (cf. Olympian 10.93-96, discussed above), which in turn gives the victor an εὐκλετής μορφά — one who is not handsome by nature, such as Melissos, can still be εὐκλετής, and even the reminder that he is οὐνοτός ἰδέσθαι will not detract from his εὐκλετής μορφά. The scholia to Olympian 6.76 suggest that οἱ νικώντες δοκούσιν εὐειδεῖς εἶναι, and Gildersleeve ad loc. writes, ‘Victory transfigures’. But those formulations are misleading; the victor can both be οὐνοτός ἰδέσθαι and at the same time possess an εὐκλετής μορφά, and one of the functions of epinician poetry, in Melissos’ case, is to remove the implied contradiction.

Phrases such as θαητὸν δέμας at Nemean 11.12 and παῖδ᾽ ἑρατὸν ...

Ἀρχεστράτου at Olympian 10.99 have an obvious erotic connotation; Carne-Ross reminds us bluntly that ‘those young men who competed naked under the Mediterranean sun must have aroused more than athletic admiration’. ⁴⁰ Words such as ἑρατὸς imply not only admiration, but also attraction, and at the beginning of the second Isthmian ode, Pindar exploits the erotic potential of a victor’s beauty. Rather

than simply praising the victorious Xenokrates as, for example, καλὸς, ὤραιος, or 
μορφάεις, in the first strophe of the ode the poet reminisces about homo-erotic poetry 
(Isthmian 2.1-5):

οἱ μὲν πάλαι, ὦ Θρασύβουλε,
φώτες, οἱ χρυσαμπτύκων
ἐὰς δίφρον Μοίσαν ἔβαι-
νον κλυτὰ φόρμιγγι συναντόμενοι,
ῥύμα παιδείους ἐτόξουν μαλιγάρυας ὕμνοις,
δείς ἐὼν καλὸς εἶχεν Ἄφροδίτας 
eυθρόνου μνάστειραν ἀδίσταν ὅπωραν.

What would perhaps have been surprising to the audience of this epinician poem is 
that, having introduced the subject of love poetry in praise of καλοὶ, Pindar does not 
make the obvious transition to the beauty of the victor, but rather bemoans the fact 
that poetry is no longer composed from the heart, as it was πάλαι (Isthmian 2.6-8):

ἀ Μοίσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδής
πω τᾶς ἡν οὔδ’ ἐγάτις;
οὔδ’ ἐπέρναντο γλυκεί-
αἰ μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας 
ἄργυρωθείσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι άοιδαὶ.

Having hinted at the topos of praise of the victor's beauty, then, the poet complains 
that such songs are no longer sung. But after a few more lines on the mercenary 
temper of the present age, and before declaring that οὐκ ἄγνωτ’ ἄειδο | Ἰσθμίαν 
ἐπιστοι νίκαν (12-13), he inserts a reminder that there is a hint to be taken: ἐσοὶ γὰρ 
ὁν σοφὸς (12). 41 There is no explicit praise of Xenokrates' beauty in the rest of the 
ode, but this oblique reference at the beginning has already made the point.

41Cf. Olympian 2.83-85, where Pindar claims to have many βέλη which are φωναίνων: those who understand how an ode functions will receive his message.
Pindar, then, in the second *Isthmian* ode implicitly likens his creation of a song celebrating an athletic victor to songs which the poets of old composed in celebration of the beauty of their beloved boys. In effect, this song is a χάρις in the erotic sense, a ‘favour’ done for a beloved, in the sense that Pindar himself uses the word in fragment 127:

εἶν καὶ ἔραν καὶ ἔρωτι
χαρίζεσθαι κατὰ καιρόν·
μὴ πρεσβυτέραν ἄριθμοῦ
dἰωκε, θυμεῖ, πρᾶξιν.

A χάρις given in love can refer, of course, to sexual favours; and here Pindar plays on that sense in describing his love song with this term. A quatrain from the *Theognidea* (1319-22) seems to use the word self-referentially in this sense, whilst at the same time punning on the use of χάρις to mean ‘beauty’:

οὐ παῖ, ἐπεὶ τοι δῶκε θεὰ χάριν ἵμερόεσσαν
Κύπρις, σὸν δ’ εἶδος πάσι νέοις μέλει,
tῶν’ ἐπάκουσων ἐπὶν καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἐνθεο θυμῶ,
γνοὺς ἐρος ὡς χαλεπὸν γινεται ἀνδρὶ φέρειν.

The poet praises the boy for his beauty (χάρις ἵμερόεσσα), saying that it makes him most desirable, and then demands that the boy listen to ‘these words’ (i.e., what he has just said) and take this χάρις, the poet’s ἔπη, to heart – in other words, to enter a contract to recognise the favour given with a (sexual) χάρις given in return. This is the kind of relationship that Pindar constructs by implication in the opening strophe of the second *Isthmian* ode, and his creation of the victory song is a form of the type of

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42 For uses of χαρίζεσθαι in this sense (chiefly drawn from Plato’s *Symposion*), see K. I. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 44-45, 83, 157 (cited by D.E. Gerber (Pindar’s Olympian One: A Commentary, p. 120, in connection with *Olympian* 1.75-76 ἐς χάριν τέλλεται, on which see below).
exchange which he refers to in fragment 127 as ἐρωτὶ χαρὶς ἐσθαί. The starting-point in Isthmian 2 is, as in Theognidea 1319-1322, praise of the beauty of the beloved.

In the depiction of the relationship at Theognidea 1319-1322, it is the laudator, so to speak, who initiates the exchange by offering a χάρις in the form of a poetic praise of the beauty of the laudandus and demanding a χάρις in return. This kind of relationship is fully reciprocal: in Pindar’s first Olympian ode, Pelops invokes his own beauty (in its capacity as the basis of his χάρις-relationship with Poseidon) as binding Poseidon to return a χάρις, to help Pelops win the hand of Hippodameia (Olympian 1.75-76):

τῷ μὲν εἶπεν: “Φύλα δῶρα Κυπρίας”

43 The following antistrophe (vv. 6-10), with its condemnation of mercenary poets, implies that these exchanges between lovers are to be seen as debts of honour rather than merely contracts based on a balance-sheet of χάριτες given and received by each party (Pindar says at Pythian 1.75-77 that the μυθὸς he seeks from the Athenians is χάρις). J.B. Bury (The Isthmian Odes of Pindar, p. 41) notes that the adjective ἄγνωρθεῖσα in 8 ‘is appropriate both to the figure and to the thing figured. In regard to the girls of the metaphor, it means that their faces are painted, as they are for sale, to make them more attractive ...; while in regard to the songs, it could mean rewarded with silver, as in Nem. X. 43 ἄγνωρθεῖεν τὸν οἰνοπαίας φιάλας.’

44 The φύλα δῶρα Κυπρίας mentioned at Olympian 1.75 could refer to ‘gifts of love’, i.e. sex, but δῶρα Ἀφροδίτης are more usually ‘beauty’, such as the beauty that Aphrodite is said to have given the addressee of Theognidea 1319-1320; this is also the meaning at Iliad 3.64-66 where Paris replies to Hektor’s criticism of his beauty: μὴ μοι δῶρ’ ἔρατα προσφερε χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης. οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητ’ ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐρυθέδα δῶρα, δόσα κεν αὐτοὶ δῶσιν. ἐκὼν δ’ οὐκ ἀν τις ἢλιοτο. Cf. also Bakchylides 17.10, where it is the Κύπριδος ... δῶρα, the beauty, of Eriboa which arouses Minos; similar to the ‘gifts’ of Aphrodite in this sense is her ‘fruit’ at Isthmian 2.4-5; a boy who is καλὸς possesses Ἀφροδίτης ... ἀδίσταν ὑπόραν (in Hesiod fr. 76, lines 6 and 10, δῶρα ... Ἀφροδίτης refer literally to fruit – the apples of Atalanta). Acts of sex, on the other hand (and unsurprisingly), tend to be not the δῶρα but the ἔργα Ἀφροδίτης: Hesiod, Works and Days 521, fr. 124; Critias 6.18; Ariephon (PMG 813.5) uses κρυφοὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἔργαν (cf. Ibykos PMGF 287.4 δίκτυο Κύπριδος). At Theognidea 1293-1294, however, ἰμερότευν γάμον is identified as χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης δῶρα (again in the context of Atalanta – the δῶρα ... Ἀφροδίτης which are explicitly the apples in Hesiod fr. 76 are implicitly, of course, the same γάμος), and the μείληγα δῶρα of Minnermos 1.3 seem to be sex rather than beauty. The phrase δωροίς πολυχρόνου Ἀφροδίτης at Hesiod Aspis 47 allows of either interpretation: Amphitryon could be described as taking pleasure (τερπόμενος) in either the act...
In this ode, as Cairns points out, far from ‘playing down’ the homosexual elements in the story of Pelops and Poseidon, Pindar in fact emphasises them by explicitly comparing the abduction of Pelops with that of Ganymedes (Olympian 1.36-45):

viè Tantálou, se d' 'antía protérov φθέγξομαι, 
óptót' ἐκάλεσε πατήρ τὸν εὐνομώτατον 
ἐς ἔρανὸν φίλαν τε Σίτυλον, 
tót' 'Ἀγλαοτρίαιαν ἀρπάσαι, 
dαμένα φρένας ἰμέρω, χρυσέαισι τ' ἀν' ἵπποις 
ὑπατον εὐρυτιμου ποτὶ δῶμα Δίδς μεταβάσαι: 
ἐνθα δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ 
ἡλιδε καὶ Γανυμήδης 
Ζηνὶ τωτ' ἐπὶ χρέος.

And in the poem, Pelops is clearly to be seen as analogous to Hieron as a victorious charioteer; Cairns suggests that, just as ‘the love and friendship of Pelops and Poseidon conform to an accepted ethical pattern involving just these concepts [i.e., χάρις and εὐεργεσία]’, Hieron is also to be seen as bound up in another sort of χάρις-relationship:

Like a miniature Great King, he depended for his continuation in power on

of love or in his wife’s beauty. Whatever the gifts are, they are to be enjoyed: Stesichoros (PMGF 223.2-3) describes the goddess as ἡμιοδώρου Κύπριδος.

45F. Cairns, ‘*Ερως in Pindar’s First Olympian Ode’, p. 129.

46At the end of the tenth Olympian ode, discussed above, it is the victor himself who is described as having the same ἴδεα and ὀρα that Ganymedes possessed.

47‘The heroic depiction of Pelops becomes in essence Pindar’s depiction of Hieron’ (Gerber, p. xv); see also Cairns, p. 129.

48Cairns, p. 132.
his conferment of favours and on the due gratitude of their recipients. The more ethical and mythical reinforcements of the theme Pindar could find, the better he was able to meet his patron’s purposes.

Pindar has drawn parallels between Pelops and Hieron, and within the myth of Pelops he has highlighted the mechanism of the exchange of χάρις between lovers. A victory song is a χάρις provided for the victor by the poet and recalls, as the opening of the second Isthmian ode reminds us, the songs which οἱ πάλαι φώτες would sing in celebration of the beauty of their beloveds; it is thus entirely appropriate for the epinician poet to draw particular attention to the beauty of the athletic victors for whom he composes his songs.

The erotic aspect involved in epinician praise of a victor’s beauty, implied at the beginning of the second Isthmian, is illustrated at Pythian 10.57-60, where Pindar expresses the hope that he may, by means of his song, make the victor Hippokleas

... ἐτὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ...
ἐκατὶ στεφάνων θαπτὸν ἐν ἀλι...

ζι ... ἐν καὶ παλαιέροις,
νέαισιν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα.

49 Cairns refers to the εὐεργέται βασιλέως at Herodotos 8.85.

50 Cairns, p. 132.

51 G. Nagy (Pindar’s Homer, p. 188) draws attention to the reciprocal nature of the Indo-European poet-patron relationship: ‘the patron gets fame from the poet, whose own fame depends on the fame of a patron in the here and now’. but this non-material ideal is less applicable to the case of Pindar and Hieron, where the relationship of course has its monetary side. Ibykos PMGF S151.47-48 emphasises a similar reciprocity: the poet promises that the patron will have κλέος ἀφίτταν in accordance with the poet’s own κλέος, which depends on his ἀοιδή.
Again, the expression at Theognidea 1320 is relevant here: σόν δ' εἶδος πάσι νέοισι
μέλει. In both cases, the effect of outstanding beauty is to excite erotic admiration in
all who see it. A similar formulation is found at Pythian 9.97-100:

πλείστα νικάσαντα σε καὶ τελεταῖς
ωρίαις ἐν Παλλάδος εἶδον ἀθωνοὶ
θ' ὡς ἔκασται φύτατον
παρθενικά πόσιν ἦ
ὑιὸν εὐχοντ' ὁ Τελεσίκρατες, ἔμμεν ....

Returning to the tenth Pythian ode, the sentence which follows the above passage
(Pythian 10.59-60), though signalling a transition to a more general thought, continues
in this erotic vein: καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τέρρων φώτες ἐκνιξάν φρένας; κνῖζω of erotic
excitement appears at Bakchylides 17.8-10 κνίσεν τε Μίνωι κέαρ | ἰμεράμπυκος θεᾶς
| Κύπριδος [ά]γνα δώρα and Herodotos 6.62 τὸν δ' Ἀρίστωνα ἐκνιξὲ ἄρα τῆς
γυναικὸς ταύτης ἔρως.

In the fourth Pythian ode, the hero Jason (who is in this poem a kind of
athlete's paradigm: his labours are ἄεθλα (165, 220)) is described in erotic language
in the following passage (Pythian 4.78-83):

... ὁ δ' ἦρα χρόνῳ
ικετ' αἰχμαίοισιν διδύμαιοιν ἀνήρ ἐκ-

52 Cf. also Alkman PMGF 3.ii.74, where Astymeloisa's beauty makes her a μέλημα δάμω, justifying her name.

53 W. Schadewaldt (Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion, p. 43, n. 1) notes the strong similarity between this passage and Tyrtaios 10.29 ἀνδράσι μὲν θητοῖς ιδείν, ἐρατοῖς δὲ γυναῖκι. H. Gundert (Pindar und sein Dichterberuf, p. 123, n. 174) suggests that Pindar's lines are specifically 'eine Nachwirkung der Tyrtaiosverse'; Tyrtaios himself may have had in mind Odyssey 19.235 (cited by Schadewaldt, ibid.) ἢ μὲν πολλαὶ γ' αὐτὸν ἐθησαντο γυναίκες.

54 See note 44, above, for the 'gifts of Kypris'.

55 Cf. ἄεθλα of Herakles and the Nemean Lion at Isthmian 6.48, also Bakchylides 9.8.
It is not only Jason’s θητή γυνία (80) and long hair (82-83) that mark him as youthful and attractive (he is κάλλιστος ἀνδρῶν at line 123); as Segal notes, ‘Jason’s combination of panther skin and two spears (79, 81) suggests an association with another ambiguous hero famed for his powers of erotic seduction, Paris at his first appearance in the Iliad (3.17 f.).’ Jason is thus associated with a legendary figure whose most famous attribute is his handsome appearance; the association may not be entirely favourable given the presentation of Paris as somewhat cowardly in the passage from Iliad 3, but it does provide a striking implicit analogy for Jason’s extraordinary beauty.

In the passages from the fourth, ninth and tenth Pythian odes quoted above (4.78-83, 9.97-100, 10.55-60), the poet’s choice of language is such as to invite a spectator to look at the victor (4.80 θητοῖσι γυνίοις, 10.58 θητὸν, 9.98 εἶδον ἄφωνοι). Epinician beauty surpasses normal human appearance so much that it is

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56 C. Segal, Pindar’s Mythmaking, p. 58.

57 The words θητὸν εἶδος are used of the oak at Pythian 4.264; Braswell (p. 177) notes that the phrase ‘refers in the first instance to the tree but also by implication to Demophulus’.

58 In Pythian 9, the desire for Telesikrates which his appearance incites in the female onlookers is paralleled (with the genders reversed) at the end of the next stanza (107-109), where we are told that πολλὰ ἀριστής ἀνδρῶν ... σύγγονοι. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ξίναινεν sought the daughter of Antaios (καλλίκομοιν ... κοῦρον, 106-106α), ἐπεὶ θητὸν εἶδος | ἔκλετο. For similar admiration of another mythical figure, cf. Nemean 8.8 πολλὰ νῦν πολλοὶ λιπάνενοι ἵδειν; the ode begins with an
a cause for wonder or astonishment: in the ninth Olympian ode, the victor Epharmostos is described as ὠραῖος ἐῶν καὶ καλὸς (94), and then we are told that θαυμαστὸς ἐῶν φάνη Ζηνὸς ἁμφὶ πανάγυριν Λυκαιόν – he ‘appeared’, marvellous in his beauty. In Bakchylides 9, the victor Automedes φαίνει θαυμαστὸν δέμας (31); it is almost a supernatural appearance, as in Bakchylides 5 where, in the underworld, the ψυχὰ προφάνη Μελεάγρου (77), and Herakles, who is θαυμαστός (71) himself, ‘marvels’ (θάμβησεν, 84) at the beauty of Meleagros (86-88):

...“τίς ἀθανάτων
ἡ βροτῶν τοιούτων ἔρνος
θρέψεν ἐν ποίᾳ χθονί; ...”

And when he has heard the sad story of Meleagros’ death, Herakles remains fascinated by the hero’s beauty, asking (5.165-69):

“ἡρά τίς ἐν μεγάροις
Οἰνής ἄρηφιλου
ἔστιν ἀδέμητα θυγάτρων
σοι φυάν ἄληξικα;
tάν κεν λιπαράν (ἐ)θέλων θείμαν ἄκοιτιν”.

It has recently been pointed out that in Bakchylides there is less emphasis on physical beauty than there is in Pindar, and so Herakles’ persistent obsession with Meleagros’ appearance may be thought to strike an odd note. But it is a physical and visible manifestation of something that Croiset pointed out a century ago, in discussing the reasons for Bakchylides’ deviation from the version of the legend which had

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address to Ὅμηρος πότνια, κάρυος Ἀφροδίτας ἁμβροσιάν φιλοτάτων, ἢ τε παρθενήσιοι παῖδων τ’ ἐφίζωσα γλεφάροις ....

59S. Instone, Pindar: Selected Odes, p. 10.
Meleagros begging Herakles to take Deianeira as his wife (as in Pindar, fr. 249a) rather than the other way around. ‘C’est Méléagre qui est au premier plan,⁶⁰ c’est lui qui excite l’admiration et la sympathie d’Héraclès, au point que celui-ci conçoit immédiatement le désir d’avoir pour femme une jeune fille du même sang’.⁶¹ Through the device of Herakles’ appreciation of Meleagros’ beauty, we see that this is not the Pindaric Herakles, a demigod whose achievements no ordinary mortal will ever be able to match, but a man who, despite being one of Greece’s greatest heroes, is struck by overwhelming admiration for a lesser figure.⁶² The poet’s audience obviously cannot see this extraordinarily handsome figure, but just as Herakles’ attention is fixed on the vision of beauty before him, so theirs is on Meleagros’ ‘courage tranquille’⁶³ in the myth that he relates.

Physical beauty is, then, a symbol of other virtues in Ode 5. Something similar occurs in Ode 9, where the full description of the appearance of the victor Automedes is as follows (vv.27-36):

\[
\text{πενταέθλοιν γὰρ ἐνέπρεπεν ὡς}
\text{ἄστρων διακρίνει φάε}
\text{νυκτὸς διχομηνίδος[ς] εὐφεγγῆς σελάνα·}
\text{τοῖς Ἑλλάνων διὸ ἀπ[ε]ιρονα κύκλον}
\text{φαίνει θαυμαστὸν δέμας}
\]

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⁶⁰It may be noted that after he greets Herakles with the honorific but brief viê Διὸς μεγάλου (79), his next words are a command: σταθί τ’ ἐν χώρᾳ.


⁶²B. Gentili comments that while Pindar’s mythic narratives present models of heroic and aristocratic excellence, those of Bakchylides ‘rivelano una opposta tendenza a umanizzare l’eroe, evidenziando la fragilità e la caducità del suo destino’ (introduction to Pindaro: le Pitiche, p. xix).

This passage is described by Burnett as ‘the poet’s closest approach to a report of athletic events’;64 the opening lines of the passage, however, are less similar in language to ‘a report of athletic events’ than to another image in Bakchylides (13.175-77):

οὐ γὰρ ἀλαμπεῖ νυκτὸς
πασιφανῆς Ἀρετᾶ
κρυφθείσαν ἀμαυρω[ύται .... 65

Automedes, who ἐνέπρεπεν in the games just as the moon’s light is more powerful than that of the stars, is thus like πασιφανῆς Ἀρετᾶ, shining in the night;66 he and

64 A.P. Burnett, The Art of Bacchylides, p. 55. Burnett also comments (ibid.) that ‘the Sapphic echo ... lends a hint of eroticism’, although she does not make clear whether ‘the Sapphic echo’ is meant to be of 34 ἀστερεῖς μὲν ἀμφὶ κάλαν σελάνναν | ἄν ἀπυκρύπτοις φάεννον εἰδὸς ... or of 96.6-9

νῦν δὲ Λύδασιν ἐμπρέπεται γυναι-
κέσσαν ὡς ποτ’ ἀελίω
δύντος ἄ βροδοδάκτυλος ἔμπρεπεν (σελάννα Schubart)

πάντα περρέχοισι’ ἀστρα .... The second fragment with its context is more explicitly erotic, but the image in fragment 34 may have been used in the same way. Alternatively, Burnett might be referring to the use of ἀμάρυγμα in line 36, and thinking of Sappho 16.17-18 τάξις κε βολλοῖσαν ἔρησθόν τε βάμα | κάμάρυγμα λάμπρον ἵδον προσώπῳ ..., which is perhaps implied by her mention (ibid.) of ‘this body that is glimpsed only in motion’.

65 There is, incidentally, another ‘Sapphic echo’ to be found here: the light of the moon in fragment 96 (see previous note) ἐπι- | σχετθάσασαν ἐπ’ ἀλμύραν | ἴσως καὶ πολυανθέμως ἄρούρας (vv. 10-11), and in Bakchylides 13 πασιφανῆς Ἀρετᾶ is said to στραφώτατα κατὰ γάν τε | καὶ πολύπλαγκτον θ’ ἄλαμμα (vv. 180-81).

66 Compare the terms used to describe Melagros’ prominence amongst the shades in the underworld in Ode 5: μετέχρεπεν (68), λαμψόμενον (72).
his deeds embody the abstraction towards which he strives.67

But despite the fact that the athletic victors whom Pindar celebrates are made to seem almost superhuman both in their strength and physical appearance, Pindar’s praise often involves mention of the idea that although these men (and boys) have reached what the poet presents as the pinnacle of human achievement, there are limits beyond which no mortal can go, including the poet himself. This consideration is very clearly stated at the end of the third Olympian ode (vv. 42-45):

εἰ δ’ ἀριστεύει μὲν ὄνωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς αἴδοιεστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιᾶν
Θῆρων ἀρεταίσιν ἱκάνων ἀπεται
οἶκοθεν Ἡρακλέος
σταλάν. τὸ πόρσω δ’ ἐστὶ σοφοίς ἄβατον
κάσοφοις. οὐ νῖν διώξω’ κενίδς εἶην.

The pillars of Herakles recur with the same significance in the context of one of the passages already mentioned above; once again the thought is expressed in the form of a condition, this time with the athlete’s achievements placed in the protasis and the emphasis on limits placed alone in the apodosis (Nemean 3.19-23):

εἰ δ’ ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ’ ἐοικότα μορφά
ἀνορέας ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα
παῖς Ἀριστοφάνεος, οὐκέτι πρόσω
ἀβάταν ἀλα κιόνων ὑπερ Ἡρακλέος περὰν εὔμαρές,

67 For this kind of ‘shining’ as an attribute of the superhuman, compare Pindar Paian 12 (fr. 52m).14-16, of the birth of the twin children of Leto:

... ἔλαμψον δ’ ἀελίου δέμας δπω|ς
ἀγγαλὸν ἐς φαός ἱντες δίδυμοι
παῖδες ....

And for the shining sun as a paradigm of what is κάλλιστος of all, cf. Praxilla PMG 747 (the reply of the dead Adonis when asked what was κάλλιστος of the things he had left behind in the world above):

κάλλιστον μὲν ἐγὼ λείπω φάος ἡλίου,
δεύτερον ἄστρα φαινά σεληναίης τε πρόσωπον ....
And again, beauty, prosperity, and success in games are followed by a reminder of mortality at the end of the first triad of the eleventh Nemean (vv. 11-16):

\[\text{άνδρα δ' ἐγώ μακαρίως μὲν πατέρ' Ἀρκεσίλαν, καὶ τὸ θαητὸν δέμας ἀπρεμίαν τε σύγγονον· εἰ δὲ τις ὄλβον ἔχων μορφᾶ παραμεύσεται ἄλλους, ἐν τ' ἀέθλοισιν ἁριστεύων ἐπέδειξεν βίαν, θνατὰ μεμνάσθω περιστέλλων μέλη, καὶ τελευτάν ἀπάντων γὰν ἐπιεσσόμενος.}\]

Aristagoras' δέμας is θαητὸν and he surpasses others in his μορφᾶ, but his μέλη are nevertheless θνατὰ; his excellence of form and strength is outstanding but still mortal. Similarly in the tenth Pythian, the praise of Hippokleas' beauty at lines 55-60 (58 θαητός) needs to be seen in the context of the poet's statement that (29-30)

\[... ναυσὶ δ' οὕτε πεζὸς ἵων ὑπὲρ ἕφοισ \varepsilon Υπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστάν οἶδον.\]

The road to the Hyperboreans is θαυμαστά 'wondrous', and beyond the reach of mortals. At the same place in the following triad (the end of the last line of the antistrophe, though not in exactly the same metrical position) the theme of wonder recurs (Pythian 10.48-50):

\[... ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάσαι \thetaεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδὲν ποτε φαίνεται ἐμμεν ἄπιστον.\]

The immortals and their deeds are to be wondered at; the reservation in this ode of θαυμαστός and θαυμάζω to the superhuman prepares the audience for the comments near the conclusion about the θαητὸς Hippokleas.
Although καλοί athletes, then, perform καλά (the description of the victory of Automedes in Bakchylides 9, discussed above, shows it to be quite literally a καλὸν ἔργον of the kind that the poet refers to later in the ode (v. 82)), they are nonetheless subject to misfortune; inner excellence, as manifested in physical beauty, is no defence against fate. This point is made clearly in Bakchylides' Ode 5; the beauty of Meleagros, discussed above, was no help to him in the end, and his sister, χλωραϊχήν (172) Deianeira will be the third female figure in the poem to destroy a man; Meleagros himself has already told the story of the destruction of the house of Oineus by Artemis (97 ff.) and of his own death at the hands of Althaia (136 ff.). Deianeira, as the audience knows, will kill Herakles by means of a robe poisoned with what she thinks is a love potion. Herakles, Meleagros, and Deianeira, all of whom possess physical beauty, will all suffer through no fault of their own; and the tone has been set by the poet just before the introduction of the myth (5.53-55):

... οὐ
γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων
πάντα γ' εὔδαιμων ἔφυ.

68 Καλὰ ἔργα (or simply καλά) are mentioned frequently in epinician poetry; even when the phrase appears to have a general reference, the epinician context naturally gives it particular relevance to athletic success: e.g. Olympian 2.97-98, 6.11, 10.91, 11.18; Pythian 7.19, 8.88, 9.96; Nemean 7.14; Isthmian 6.22; Bakchylides 1.145, 2.6, 5.51, 13.206-7 (τὸ καλὸν [ἐ]γραμένον). The games are a θαμτὸς ἀγὼν at Olympian 3.36, and at Nemean 6.12 the victorious Alkimidas is said to have come Νεμέας ἐς ἔρατον ἀέθλων; compare CEG 385 (Elis, ca 475-450?) [νικάςας καλὸν ἄγωνα Διός], where the supplements are taken from the dedication of Kleosthenes at Olympia (apparently in 516) as reported by Pausanias 6.10.7: Κλεοσθένης μ' ἀνέθηκεν ὁ Πόντιος ἐς Ἐπιδάμνου, νικήσας Ἰππος καλὸν ἄγωνα Διός.

69 D.A. Campbell (Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 424) notes the significance of Κύπριος θελεμμβρότου (175) in this context.
From a presentation of Hieron’s victory and general prosperity (1-53), the ode shifts by means of the gnome at 53-55 into a myth which emphasizes the limits of happiness; this theme is rejected by the poet in the final two stanzas of the song, but the nine stanzas spent on the myth of Herakles and Meleagros suffice to make the same point that Pindar does in two passages discussed above, Nemean 3.19-23 and Nemean 11-16: physical beauty is a sign of favour from the gods, but that favour does not extend indefinitely.

Like prosperity and athletic victory, physical beauty is a sign of the favour of divinities, and Pindar, by making these connections, implies that one who is attractive is blessed with other good qualities. An analogy may be drawn with the image of gold which ‘blazes’ at Olympian 1.1-2:

... ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
 ἄτε διαπρέπετι νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἐξοχα πλούτου.

Gerber, commenting on this passage and citing Olympian 2.72 and Nemean 4.82-83 as other passages in which the poet emphasizes the gleam of gold, writes that ‘to Pindar as to other Greeks, gold is an object of praise because it is the most valuable of material possessions and its gleam is an incidental attribute which serves to enhance

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70 At Pythian 5.12-13, we are told that σοφοὶ δὲ τοιν κόλλην | φέροντι καὶ τανθ θεόδοστον δύναμιν, and in the following lines the poet cites both the victor’s prosperity (15-16 δι βασιλείας | ἐσσαὶ) and his success in the games (20-22 μᾶκαρ δὲ καὶ νῦν, κλεινάς δι | ἐν χοιρὸς ἢπα παρὰ Πυθιάδος ἰπτοις ἐλών| δέδεξα τόνδε κόμον ἃνερον). And in Olympian 14, the Χάριτες are addressed in these terms (5-7):

... σιν γαρ ὡκ ὑμῖν τα (τε) τερπνὰ καὶ
tὰ γλυκέ ἄνεται πάντα βροτοὶς.

ei σοφος, ei καλος, ei τς ρε λος ἀνήρ.
the value it already has'. The beauty of an athlete, as praised by Pindar, functions in
a similar way, although it could be argued that for the purposes of epinician poetry a
victor’s beauty is not ‘incidental’; it seems rather a more significant attribute which
serves to indicate to the eye a complex of good qualities which are independently
manifested in success and prosperity.

3.4 Beauty in Inscribed Epigram

If this is the case, it is perhaps surprising that in the surviving verse epitaphs
up to the end of the fifth century, the beauty of the dead person is only rarely
mentioned; it is notable that the adjective καλός is used more often of things than of
people, most frequently of the object on which the inscription appears. In dedicatory
inscriptions, the pairing of καλόν and ἀγαλμα is quite common: CEG 291 (Athens, late
6th century), 302 (Ptoion, Boiotia, ca 540?), 303 (Attica, ca 525?), 311 (Eleusis, ca
500-475?), 334 (Ptoion, Boiotia, ca 550-525?), 366 (Mykenai?, ca 525?), 367

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71 Gerber, p. 10.

72 Verdenius replies to Gerber’s suggestion regarding the gold in Olympian 1.1: ‘Pindar does
not emphasize an “incidental attribute”, but an essential aspect, which includes both visual gleam or
radiance (e.g. P. 4, 144 οθένος ἀκέλιον χρύσου) and commercial value’ (Verdenius, Commentaries
on Pindar, vol. ii, p. 5). See also section 4.5, below, on the relationship between wealth and virtue in
epinician poetry.

73 Inscriptions where beauty occurs in a martial context are discussed below, in section 3.6.
(Olympia, ca 490-480?), and 425 (Delos, ca 550-530?). In CEG 330 (Thebes, ca 500-475?), the temple in which the vase was found is called a ναόν καλὸν. In a Spartan inscription (CEG 376, ca 510-500?), it appears that a victory being commemorated is described as καλῆ. Some inscriptions play on the theme of 'a καλὸς object belonging to a καλὸς person': CEG 450 (Opuntian Lokris, ca 500-475?) καλὸς Παντελέως ἡ ποτερία καλὰ, 460 (Kamiros, Rhodes, ca 490-470) Φυλτός ἦμι τὰς καλὰς | ἐς κυλλὲς ἐς ποικίλα, and 447 (Thisbe, ca 450-425?) Γοργίνιος ἐμί ὁ κότυλος καλὸς κα[λ]ὸς. 75

Among the epitaphs, θεμνήμα or σήμα itself can be described as καλὸν:
CEG 18 (Attica, ca 550-540), 26 (Attica, ca 540-530?), 161 (Thasos, ca 500-490?), and 165 (Sikinos, 7th century?). Phrases like 'this is the καλὸν μνήμα of the καλὸς ...
’ (as in the dedicatory epigrams), however, do not appear, 76 perhaps such a play on words was deemed inappropriate to the solemnity of a funerary inscription. 77

74 The phrase περικαλλὲς ἄγαλμα can be found in CEG 335 (Ptoion, Boiotia, ca 550-500?). 363 (Argos, late 7th century), 422 (Samos, shortly after 560), and probably 423 (Samos, ca 540).

75 Compare the ‘Simonidean’ epigram for the wrestler Milon (FGE XXV Μίλωνος τὸδ’ ἄγαλμα καλοῦ καλὸν, δὲ ποτε Πίθη | ἐπτάκα νικήσας ἐς γόνατ’ οὐκ ἔπεσαν) which, if genuine, would belong to the late sixth century. For problems of authorship and the reading ἐπτάκα (ἐξάκα Siebelis), see Page, FGE pp. 238-239 and Molyneux, Simonides pp. 81-83. Page believes that the epigram may be very old but is ‘certainly not inscriptional’ and that its ascription to Simonides is simply ‘another instance of the attachment of Simonides’ name to an apparently inscriptional epigram on a subject within his lifetime’. Molyneux suggests that it may been ‘Simonides’ first commission for an inscriptional epigram’, resulting from his career as an epinician poet, but agrees that ‘the Simonidean ascription, though it may be correct, is found only in the unreliable Planudean Anthology, and so cannot be accepted with any confidence’.

76 J. Ducat (‘Fonctions de la statue dans la Grèce archaïque’, p. 241), suggests that the connection is implicit: ‘lorsque les épigraphes vantent la beauté, ce n’est pas celle du mort. mais celle du monument. qui en est comme la transcription et le témoín’.

77 But CEG 127 (Phokis, ca 500?) begins with the jingle χαίρε Χάρων.
memorial is described as χαριέν (CEG 42, Athens, ca 525?); this is the word’s only occurrence in the verse epitaphs, although it is quite common in dedicatory inscriptions, emphasising as it does the relationship of exchange that is seen to exist between dedicator and divinity. Χάρις, however, is never used in the dedications in a purely visual sense, ‘pleasing to the eye’; an act of dedication can be described as χάρις (CEG 301 (Eleusis, ca 550?) and 234 (Athens, ca 500-480?)), or an inscription can refer to a χάρις received or hoped for from the god: CEG 231 (Athens, ca 500-480?), 258 (Athens, ca 490-480?), 313 (Attica, ca 480-460?), 32a (Eretria, ca 500?), 371 (Olympia, ca 550-525?). Given the archaic poets’ use of χάρις to indicate beauty, it is perhaps surprising that we do not find anywhere a play on meanings along the lines of ‘I have given a χαριέν διαλήμα to the god in return for a χάρις”; the adjective χαριές, it seems, has become detached from χάρις in its sense of ‘favour’.

It is stated in a Sicilian epitaph (CEG 147, ca 485-50?) that the act of burial was done καλώς. This may refer not to the physical beauty of the stele, but to an ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ burial, rather like the use of καλός in the literary material such as Anakreon PMG 417 and Sappho 115, discussed above (section 3.2). Friedländer and Hofflet translate the phrase καλώς ... ἔθοσσα as ‘gave a decent

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78 A variation on this theme is the phrase διδότα χαριέτας ἀμοιβήν in CEG 326 (Boiotia, ca 700-675); cf. the Korinthian dedications 360 (ca 510-500) and probably 359 (ca 575-550), and διδότα χαρίσαν ἀφορμάν in 358 (ca 600-550).

79 See B. MacLachlan, The Age of Grace, especially pp. 67-69 on Theognidea 1319-1322, where the poet first uses χάρις of the beloved’s beauty and then refers to the χάρις of the obligations involved in a reciprocal relationship.
burial’, which is probably the best way to render it. Καλός is extremely rarely used to describe a person in the verse epitaphs up to the end of the fifth century, and there is no indication that the adjective carries any ethical overtones. \(^{81}\) CEG 68 (Athens, ca 500?) is the only certain verse epitaph from the period that uses καλός in this way:

\[
\pi\alpha [\delta \delta] [\acute{\alpha} \varpi] \rho\thetaιμένοιο \ K\lambda [\epsilon\omega]το \ τὸ \ Μενεσσαίμον·
\muν\acute{\epsilon} \mu' \ έσορόν \ οἴκτιρ'ός \ καλός \ ὅν \ έθανε.
\]

But an Attic black-figure loutrophoros, perhaps from the grave of an unmarried person, \(^{82}\) bears the inscription (CEG 438, ca 500) ἀνδρὸς ἀπ[οφθιμ]ένοιο κάρε κα[λ]ὸν ἐνθάδε κείμαι.

The word καλός seems to have an ethical force in only one verse inscription of this period: CEG 67 (Attica, ca 500?) [σό]φρον, εὐ[ξεύ]νετος, ξε[νικό]ζ, πι[νυ]τός, τὰ κάλ.; [εἴδο]ς | ὕπ[ειο ]θανάτο μο[ἱραν ἡχέ]| Χε[ sic: ≤6 letters ]. The string of adjectives in the first line suggests that τὰ κάλ.; [εἴδο]ς does not mean simply ‘knowing what is beautiful (in an aesthetic sense)’, but ‘knowing what is good’, rather like the phrase at Theognidea 652 ἐσθλὰ ... καὶ κάλ.; ἐπιστάμενον. As was the case in Homer, it is only in the neuter that the ethical connotations of the word καλός appear at all; for the most part, though, the language of aesthetics is kept separate from that of ethics.

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\(^{80}\) Friedländer and Hoffleit, Epigrammata, p. 84.

\(^{81}\) The graffito CEG 441 (Athens, ca 480-450?) makes explicit its visual force: Ἀντίνοος καλὸς μὲν ἱδὲν τερπ[εν]ός δὲ πορσεισεπεν (sic: i.e., προσεπεν).

\(^{82}\) Demosthenes, 44.18, mentions this practice.

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The almost complete absence of praise of the beauty of the dead and of connections drawn between their physical appearance and other virtues illustrates a comment made by Hansen on CEG 135 (with reference to a grammatical point): ‘quod licet Pindaro in epinicio, non licet auctori epitaphii’: there seems to have been very little place for commemoration of beauty in the verse epitaphs before and contemporary with Pindar. Physical beauty as represented in ‘literary’ poetry is, after all, very much a quality of the living.  

3.5 *Μόν ἐκ καλῶν εἰ κάγαθῶν*,  

Semonides 7.30-31 (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τήσυνε λωτῶν γυνη | ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων) is one of the examples adduced by Wankel as evidence for the early existence of the combination καλὸς κάγαθος as an aristocratic catchphrase.  

83 Cf. the skolion PMG 890: ύπαίειν μὲν ἄριστον ἄναρι θνητῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φῶν γένεσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβάν μετὰ τῶν φίλων. Here too, καλὸν φῶν γένεσθαι is placed second in importance after ύπαίειν.  

84 Aristophanes, *Knights* 185.  

85 Wankel, p. 23.
and Donlan,⁸⁶ it is impossible to say that because the two terms appear in proximity in a few places in archaic poetry, their combination must have been in general use to denote the well-born, well-behaved aristocrat.⁸⁷ None of Wankel's examples proves his thesis,⁸⁸ and Donlan rightly cautions: 'Naturally it cannot be asserted definitely that the term [i.e., καλός κάγαθος] did not exist before this time [i.e., its first appearance at Herodotos 1.30], but an assumption that it must have been in use as an aristocratic epithet during the seventh and sixth centuries is totally unwarranted'.⁸⁹

Other passages cited by Wankel in support of his argument are Iliad 6.156-57 (of Bellerophontes, quoted above, section 3.1), Tyrtaios 10.13-14 ἦδεν ἀρετῇ, τὸδ' ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἀριστον | κάλλιστον τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ νέῳ, and Sappho fr. 50 ὃ μὲν γάρ κάλος δόσον ἐδὴν πέλεται (κάλος,) | ὃ δὲ κάγαθος αὐτικα καὶ κάλος ἔσσεται. None of these provides any evidence for the combination καλός κάγαθος except for the Sappho passage,⁹⁰ and even that initially promising couplet is less than conclusive. Even if it may be deduced from Sappho 50 that certain people

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⁸⁶ C.J. Classen and J.A. Coulter, reviews of Wankel in Gnomon 34 (1962) 304-5 and CPh 59 (1964) 133-37 respectively, Donlan, 'The Origin of Καλός καγαθός'.

⁸⁷ As Bourriot notes (vol. 2, pp. 584-5, n. 6), Wankel's method of simply looking for places where the terms are used together is suggested even by his title Kalos kai agathos (rather than, e.g., Bourriot's own Kalos kagathos – Kalokagathia).

⁸⁸ Still less can Mehliss (p. 19) cite Hesiod, Theogony 585 (of Pandora) καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ᾽ ἐγαθοῖο, and say, 'mit Recht die Frage aufgeworfen werden konnte, ob nicht eigentlich καλὸν und ἐγαθὸν das Nämliche sein müsse'.


⁹⁰ Another fragment of Sappho, not cited by Wankel, which combines 'the good' and 'the beautiful' is 137(b) οἱ δ᾽ ἔχεις ἔσολον ἱμερον ἡ κάλων ..., but the mention of the two qualities in the same line simply points to the fact that they are both thought of as desirable, not that they are an inseparable pair.
were spoken of as καλοί καὶ ἀγαθοί, there is no suggestion that καλός was thought of as being in any sense a term of moral commendation. Donlan again is more convincing when he writes, ‘whether καλός here [i.e., in Sappho 50] has an ethical quality is debatable. I believe that it is ἀγαθός only that is being given some new valuation: one who is beautiful appears beautiful to the senses; one who has true worth will accordingly appear beautiful’. 91 Coulter writes (p. 135) that Sappho 50 ‘shows only that kalos meant more than physically beautiful’, but this is a misunderstanding of Sappho’s words: surely the point in the first line of the fragment is that the word καλός can apply (even in a sense that the poet would like to clarify as limited) to one who is only physically beautiful.

Wankel also cites Mimnermos 1.6 γῆρας, ὃ τ’ αἰσχρόν ὁμώς καὶ κακὸν ἀνδρα τιθεί as an example of an early combination of the terms in the negative; of course this depends on accepting Hermann’s κακὸν (as West does) for the manuscripts’ καλὸν. 92 As Campbell notes, although the ‘ā of MSS. καλὸν can be paralleled in h. Ven. 29, Hes. Op. 63, Th. 585, Sol. [13].21, Thgn. 17 ... translations such as “which puts the ugly and the handsome man in the same condition” and “which makes even a handsome man ugly like the plain man” do violence to the meaning of the common expression ὁμώς καί’. 93 (For ὁμώς καί, compare Mimnermos 5.7 ἐχθρὸν


92 Wankel calls this ‘ein allerdings nicht sauber überliefelter Vers’ (p. 17), but further reduces the ‘Sauberkheit’ of the transmission by quoting the verse as γῆρας, ὃ τ’ αἰσχρόν καὶ κακὸν ἀνδρα τιθεί.

93 D.A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 225.
Allen, however, has recently re-stated the case against the reading κακόν:

there is no parallel for the statement that old age makes a man κακός. The only reasonable meaning for the adjective to bear in such a statement would be ‘worthless’ – certainly not ‘bad’ or ‘evil.’ But even if it could carry that meaning here, Hermann’s κακόν would be somewhat otiose after αἰσχρόν, for it is his αἰσχρότης, his loss of κάλλος, which in Mimnermus’ view contributes largely to the old man’s worthlessness and lack of respect, cf. Fragment 3, τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν κάλλιστος ... / οὐδὲ ... τίμιος οὔτε φίλος."94

What needs to be emended, says Allen (following Verdenius and Doederlein before him), is not κακὸν to κακον but ὁμῶς to οὕμως. He points out that if οὐμῶς is taken to mean ‘even a handsome man’ here, there may be a similar use in Hesiod, Works and Days 20 ἦ τε [sc. Ἐρις] καὶ ἀπάλαμὸν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγειρεν, following West’s suggestion that ὁμῶς ‘is perhaps to be regarded as belonging with καὶ ἀπάλαμὸν περ rather than with ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγειρεν’.95 As for its position in Mimnermos’ verse, Allen repeats Verdenius’ observation that ὁμῶς ‘may be put before the concessive clause’.96 The result is a reading that fits better with the theme of the poem: ‘Mimnermus is not interested in the idea that old age is a leveller, which renders equal the ugly and the beautiful. His concern is rather with the great damage which old age inflicts on youth’.97 Not only is this passage, then, no evidence for the

94 A. Alien, The Fragments of Mimnermus, p. 37; Alien also quotes Bach’s surprise at the tacit introduction of Hermann’s reading, prompting him to write in his 1826 edition ‘quod quidem utrum ipsi auctori an hypothetarum incuriae debeatur nescio’.


96 W.J. Verdenius, ‘Mimnermus 1.6’, p. 197, who adduces Sophokles (O.K. 958-59) and Plato (Phaidon 91cd) as parallels.

97 Allen, p. 37.
combination καλὸς κάγαθος in this period, it deals exclusively with aesthetic concerns; the presence or absence of virtues other than beauty is irrelevant.

One passage which is not mentioned by Wankel and which might at first glance appear to support the idea that καλὸς κάγαθος existed as a combination at an early stage, with καλὸς carrying an ethical connotation, is Solon 13.39-40 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἄγαθος δοκεῖ ἐμμεναι ἀνὴρ, οἱ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων. 98 But here the two components ἄγαθος and καλὸς are clearly separated, and each is contrasted with a word or phrase denoting its opposite; the man in question is δειλὸς and therefore not ἄγαθος, and he is not καλὸς since he has a μορφὴ οὐ χαρίεσσα.

There is no necessary moral connotation of καλὸς; it is simply one more aspect of the ideal which this ἄλλος ... ἀνὴρ hopes to achieve. 99 Solon is reported by Herodotos (1.30.4) to have described the sons of Tellos as καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι, and Bourriot argues that these could not have been Solon's words, since the combination καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθος is absent from the remains of Solon's poetry; Herodotos, rather, is using a term which is gaining currency in his own age. 100 But given the evidence of Solon 13.39-40, it appears that the poet-statesman, even if he did not use καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθος...
as an aristocratic catchphrase, might well have considered καλός and ἀγαθός as two terms which, though quite different in sense, could be mentioned together to give an impression of general excellence (or, in the negative, of its absence). 101

Bourriot’s argument is that the phrase καλός κάγαθος originated in Sparta, where it designated the combination of beauty and bravery praised by Tyrtaios (see below, section 3.6), and became a technical term there for those who best exemplified this Spartan ideal. 102 This is illustrated by Thucydides’ use of the term at 4.40.2, where an Athenian ally asks a Spartan prisoner whether the dead on the Spartan side were καλοὶ κάγαθοι. Gomme writes that to the Spartan, the phrase implies the possession of a certain ἄρετη – the ἄρετη of Achilles: conspicuous and individual courage in battle, a good carriage, athletic prowess, generosity, courtesy: qualities which οἱ εὔγενεῖς, and following them οἱ πλούσιοι, claimed were to be found in their own class much more than in any other, but essentially moral qualities, which might belong, or be said to belong, to someone of any class. That is why the Spartan can say in reply τοὺς ἄγαθους simply, which means ‘the brave’. 103

Bourriot argues that by this time, the phrase καλός κάγαθος had been appropriated by a ‘jeunesse d’orée’ exemplified by Alkibiades and his circle (cf. Thucydides 8.48.6 τοὺς τε καλοὺς κάγαθους ὅνομαζομένους), under the influence of the sophists, but is used in its original sense in the Sphakteria episode because it is not an Athenian but one of their allies, who was presumably not familiar with the new connotations of the phrase.

101 As Bourriot notes (vol. 1, pp. 165-6), Tellos’ sons are called καλοὶ simply because they are handsome, and the term ἄγαθοι (like the phrase as a whole) does not carry any aristocratic significance here.

102 Later leaving traces of this sense, for example, in Xenophon (Hellenika 5.3.8-9; Lak. Pol. 10.1, 10.4) and Plutarch (Lykourgos 15.12).

at Athens, who speaks. Whether the phrase was originally Spartan or not,\textsuperscript{104} the new Athenian interpretation of the phrase seems to be borne out by its use in Aristophanes, where it is apparently used mockingly as part of a new pretentious vocabulary.\textsuperscript{105} The \textit{καλοὶ κάγαθοι} in Aristophanes are

\begin{quote}
\textit{des gens qui veulent se manifester dans la cité alors qu’ils ne répondent pas aux critères anciens de la notoriété, à savoir l’origine familiale, la richesse, une vie de notable reposant sur une solide assise villageoise traditionnelle. Ils ont pour eux un esprit délié qui les porte vers les spéculations ou la rouerie, dans la ville ils passent de l’agora aux gymnases et de l’héliée aux demeures des riches. La faiblesse de leur assise n’a souvent comme corollaire que la hauteur de leurs prétentions. Ce sont des intellectuels avec ou sans conscience.}\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Alkibiades, according to Aristophanes in the \textit{Banqueters} (fr. 205 K.-A.), is one of the \textit{καλοκάγαθοι Κακοκόρου;} far from possessing a combination of prized virtues, ‘la “jeunesse dorée” peut ... fournir des modèles de kaloi kagathoi sans posséder la vertu et sans donner le bon exemple’.\textsuperscript{107} The ‘Old Oligarch’, significantly, never uses the term, which is understandable if the \textit{καλοὶ κάγαθοι} are no longer ‘l’ensemble des aristocrates, mais un petit groupe inquiétant, composite, se servant du démos au lieu de s’opposer à lui, faction à laquelle Phrynichos fait précisément allusion pour atteindre, sans le nommer, son chef Alcibiade [\textit{i.e.}, at Thucydidès 8.48.4 ff.]’.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{104}Presumably it is also possible that the Spartan [in Thucydidès 4.40.2], unaware of Bourriot’s theory, sniffs at the \textit{καλὸς} element and picks out what \textit{he} thinks important’ (E.L. Bowie, \textit{privatim}).


\textsuperscript{106}Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{107}Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{108}Bourriot, vol. 1, p. 185.
This view of the evolution of the phrase fits with the evidence provided by the poetry and verse inscriptions of the period, from which the καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ are absent. The only poet who would be likely to use the phrase in its original sense, on this interpretation, is Tyrtaios, but καλὸς κάγαθος, καλοκάγαθια and the like would require considerable alteration and separation of their components in order to fit the elegiac metre. As for the new sense that Bourriot observes the phrase acquiring in fifth-century Athens, it is not surprising that these καλοὶ κάγαθοι find a poetic presence only in comedy.

3.6 Beauty and Bravery

The notions of beauty and bravery are deeply intertwined in Tyrtaios fr. 10.109

At the beginning of this poem, we are told that τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοις πεσόντα | ἀνδρὶ ἄγαθὸν περὶ ἑνὶ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον; this is at first sight a moral statement, but at the end of the fragment we find that the poet actually describes a youth slain in battle as καλὸς in an aesthetic sense (line 30), as is made clear by the parallel uses of the adjectives θητός and ἕρωτός (line 29). This play on the connotations of καλὸς is subtle, and it is absent from the bald Simonidean expressions καλὸς δ’ ὁ πότμος (PMG 531.2) and εἰ τὸ καλὸς θνήσκειν ἄρετῆς μέρος ἐστὶ

109 See also above, section 2.2.
μέγιστον ... (‘Simonides’ *FG E* VIII). Verdenius comments that it is ‘striking’ that the poet, ‘when it comes to motivating his exhortation of the young, does not appeal to their fellow-feeling but to their sense of beauty’, and points out that although both war and beauty are themes in, for example, Alkman’s *Partheneion*, they are kept separate there whereas Tyrtaios blends them together. Ibykos S 151, it might be added, also blends the themes in that the poet lists the brave heroes of the Trojan war only to focus on their beauty in the concluding lines of the song.

In Archilochos 114, the poet has sometimes been understood to be questioning traditional or ‘heroic’ notions of martial valour. Archilochos says that he is unimpressed by a good-looking στρατηγός, and would prefer a short, bow-legged man who is nevertheless ἀσφαλέως βεβηκός ποσσί, καρδίης πλέως. Podlecki comments on the poet’s ‘anti-heroic realism, even iconoclasm’, and Campbell

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112 Whether the focus is also on the beauty of Polycrates (e.g., L. Woodbury, ‘Ibycus and Polycrates’, pp. 203-4) or not (e.g., J.P. Barron, ‘Ibycus: To Polycrates’, p. 135) does not affect this point, although Woodbury’s principal argument that the stop at the end of line 46 should be removed is strong: poetry gives κλέος (as Ibykos explicitly promises in the next two verses), not κάλλος itself. The poem will be discussed further below.

113 Podlecki, *The Early Greek Poets*, p. 41.
writes that the ‘short, knock-kneed commander of Archilochos’ choice cuts a very unhomeric figure’, comparing Archilochos’ preferred fighter unfavourably in comparison with Homer’s heroes: ‘Tydeus was small, but not knock-kneed (II. 5.801 μικρὸς μὲν Ἠν δέμας, ἄλλα μαχήτης); only the insubordinate ranker Thersites is described in similar terms: cf. II. 2.217 φολκὸς Ἠν, χωλὸς δ’ ἐτερον πόδα etc.” \(^{114}\)

But it is not ‘unhomeric’ to criticize a fighter for his good looks in contrast to his lack of valour. One is reminded of Hektor’s tirade against Paris at Iliad 3.39-55:

\[
\text{Δύσπαιροι, εἴδος ἀριστε....}
\]
\[
\text{ἡ ποιον καγχαλώσει κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ,}
\]
\[
\text{φάντες ἀριστήμα πρόμον ἐμμεναι, οὖνεκα καλὸν}
\]
\[
\text{εἴδος ἐπ’ ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίθ φρεσίν οὐδὲ τις ἀλκή.}
\]\n
\[
\text{οὐκ ἂν τοι χαίσμη κίθαρις τά τε δῶρ’ Ἀφροδίτης,}
\]
\[
\text{ἡ τε κόμη το τε εἴδος, ὅτε ἐν κονίησι μιγείσιν.}
\]

And the phrase εἴδος ἀγητοῖ is used as a term of reproach when Here rallies the Greeks at Iliad 5.787. \(^{115}\) Although the physical picture of Archilochos’ ideal commander is indeed less glamorous than Homer’s δῆτοι Ἀχαιοί, the poet’s criticism of the good looks and self-indulgence of the μέγας στρατηγός is in fact in line with epic attitudes; at the end of this fragment, Archilochos mentions two qualities which for him are more important than appearance. Burnett comments that Archilochos’ preference ‘has little to do with the looks of either party’, and writes:

\[
\text{though the form is different, one could compare this witty jibe from}
\]

\(^{114}\text{Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 152. In spite of Campbell’s insistence on the literal descriptions of deformities (‘Tydeus was small, but not knock-kneed’), Tydeus (as is noted by Burnett, Three Archaic Poets, p. 43, n. 31) is in fact a closer parallel to Archilochos’ courageous man, in that he was unimpressive to look at but a good fighter.}

\(^{115}\text{The line recurs at 8.228, in an exhortation by Agamemnon.}
Archilochus to the elegiac priamel of Tyrtaeus \( [i.e., \text{fr. 12}] \) in which all the accepted marks of magnificence – wealth, beauty, power and athletic prowess – are rejected unless they are accompanied by courage. \(^{116}\) Archilochus refuses to admire the soldier who is outwardly splendid, but this does not mean automatic praise for his homely opposite .... \(^{117}\)

In contrast to the rejections of physical beauty in favour of martial valour in Homer and Archilochos, the ‘Polykrates Ode’ of Ibykos (S 151) praises the combination of the two qualities. The addressee of the poem\(^{118}\) is praised by comparison with Homeric warriors; in a long *praeteritio* (how long it was originally cannot be determined; at least 35 lines from the beginning of the poem are missing), the poet passes over (10-11 νῦν δὲ μοι σὺτε ... ἐπιθύμιον) the ἄρεταν | ὑπεράφανον (16-17) of the χαλκάσπ[1δες οί]ες Ἀχα[1]ῶν (31). The theme of beauty in the heroic world is introduced early (5ξα]νθᾶς Ἐλευνάς περὶ εἶδει; of course, it might have been brought in even earlier), and recurs at the end of the poem (46-48):

\[ \text{τοῖς μὲν πέδα κἀλλεος αἰὲν,} \]
\[ \text{καὶ σὺ, Πολυκρατές, κλέος ἀφθιτον ἐξεῖσ} \]
\[ \text{ως κατ’ ἀοίδαν καὶ ἔμοι κλέος.} \]

The last quality of the heroes mentioned before the poet’s promise of κλέος\(^{119}\) for Polykrates is their κάλλος, but in the lines between the introduction of the theme of

\(^{116}\)It should be repeated (since it is not mentioned by Burnett) that Tyrtaios is rejecting ‘all the accepted marks of magnificence’ as useless only in the context of war; he is not arguing that courage in battle is in general the only important ἄρετη. See above, section 2.4.

\(^{117}\)Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, pp. 43-44.

\(^{118}\)Among the theories that the addressee of Ibykos’ poem is not the Samian tyrant mentioned by Herodotos may be mentioned those of Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 249-53: this Polykrates is a son of the tyrant, and ruled Rhodes), and Barron (‘The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos’: this is the tyrant’s father); these and others are refuted by M.L. West (‘Melica’, pp. 206-9).

\(^{119}\)Κλέος ἀφθιτον occurs at *Iliad* 9.413, mentioned above (section 2.5).
beauty (5, 9) and the final triad, the epic heroes have been mentioned primarily with references to their valour: 6-7 δὴ]ριν πολύμο\(\nu\)νον ἔχ[ο]ντες | πό]λειμον κατὰ
[δ]ακρ[υό]ντα, 16-17 ἀρετάν | ὑπεράφανον, 19 ἡρωας ἐσθ[λούς, 35 Τ[ελαμ]ένιος
ἄλκ[ι]κος Αἰας. In his praeteritio, Ibykos refuses to speak of this valour,\(^{120}\) and introduces the last triad with the handsome heroes Kyanippos and Zeuxippos, followed by the even more beautiful Troilos. Valour and beauty, both attributes of the great heroes and placed side by side in the poem, have been kept separate, and the poet concentrates on the latter at the end. ‘It may be assumed, despite μορφάν 49 [sic: 45], “shape”, that “beauty” is not merely a physical attribute – the definition of what is kalos plays a crucial role in lyric poetry’s distance from epic’, claims Goldhill,\(^{121}\) but the very specific μορφάν cannot be so easily dismissed, and the poet seems to be expecting his audience to make exactly the opposite assumption: when he reaches this stage of the poem, the heroes’ beauty is what he emphasizes. He implies that it is possible to have both κάλλος and ἀρετή,\(^{122}\) even if he has no desire at the moment (10-11 νῦ]ν δὲ μοι οὔτε ... ἐπιθύμιον) to sing of the ἀρετή of the ancient heroes (which, of course, he does for seven stanzas, thereby keeping his audience aware of

\(^{120}\)Apart from his statement that only the Muses could do justice to so grand a subject (vv. 23 ff.), the poet is silent as to the reasons for his preference. Although the poem fits the injunctions given by Xenophanes (fr. 1) and Anakreon (fr. eleg. 2) not to sing of fighting while drinking and making merry, Ibykos does not give this as a reason for his refusal to sing of the heroes’ ἀρετή. Such a justification might have been given in the earlier part of the poem (which might also have contained specific references to a sympotic occasion, as in the enkomion of Pindar for Thrasyboulos, fr. 124, or those of Bakchylides for Alexander and Hieron, frs. 20B and 20C), but it is hard to imagine how Ibykos could then have justified his lengthy digression.

\(^{121}\)S. Goldhill, The Poet’s Voice, p. 117.

\(^{122}\)Perhaps this is why Paris, who was criticised for having one but not the other (see above), is the first figure in his list of rejections?
he does not suggest that there is any problem with the ‘definition of what is kalos’, or that his lyric might be very distant from epic in this respect.

Neither Archilochos nor Ibykos, then, explicitly rejects ‘traditional’ notions of heroic valour, although the two poets take different stances with respect to the question of the extent to which this ἀρετή can be linked with physical κάλλος.

Archilochos holds that these qualities are entirely independent of each other, whereas Ibykos implicitly praises the combination of the two, while concentrating on the latter as his link to Polykrates; both of these attitudes have their precedents in epic. Sappho fr. 16 comes closer to such a rejection, but even there, Sappho is concerned only with love and beauty, and says nothing about the connection (or lack thereof) between physical appearance and martial valour, which is irrelevant to her theme; the fact that soldiers and ships are less beautiful to her than Anaktoria (who is beautiful because Sappho loves her) has no bearing on their value to those who do love them or find them κάλλιστον. Unlike Ibykos, Sappho here explicitly attempts ‘a definition of what is kalos’, but like Ibykos, she does not attempt to define the nature of the

123 The combination of beauty and ἀρετή is again praised at Theognidea 933-34 παύροις ἀνθρώπων ἀρετή καὶ κάλλος ὀπέδει· δίβιος, δὲ τούτοις ἀμοστέρων ἐλαχεῖν. Here the exact nature of the ἀρετή in question is not specified; there are strong verbal parallels between 935-38 and Tyrtaios 12.37-42, and the ἀρετή here in the Theognidea might be martial valour, as it is in the passage of Tyrtaios, but is not necessarily so.

124 Hektor’s tirade against Paris has already been cited above as an epic example of the attitude that κάλλος and martial valour do not always go together; for the view that their combination is to be praised see, e.g., Iliad 6.156-57 (of Bellerophon): τῷ δὲ θεοὶ κάλλος τε καὶ ἱνορέθην ἐρατείνην | ὀπασον.

125 A key question underlying the interpretation of the stanza is (baldly stated): is it possible for anyone to have passion (ἔρατα) for a military campaign? The answer suggested by the Homeric evidence, at least, is: yes’ (L. Rissman, Love As War, p. 32; Homeric examples given on pp. 32-33).
relationship between κάλλος and other virtues, martial or otherwise (as she does, of course, in fr. 50, where she says that being ἀγαθός makes a person κάλλος).

In the epitaphs of this period for fallen soldiers, only once is the physical appearance of the dead person (or, more specifically, the appearance of a statue representing him) linked explicitly with martial valour, in CEG 19 (Athens, ca 550-530?):

[(4 letters)]ς αἰχματό, Χαβόκλεες, ἄνδρος [ἐπισ]τάς σέμα τὸ σὸν προσιδόν γνό[σε]ται ἐν[ορέαν?].

And the closest that they come to any mention of physical beauty is in phrases such as ἐν πολέμῳ φθίμενον, νεαρὰν ἡθην ὀλέσαντα in CEG 13 (Attica, ca 575-550?) and 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?). This is not an Homeric phrase, although καὶ δ’ ἔχει ηθής ἄνθος appears at Iliad 13.484. Campbell gives some examples of the ‘flower of youth’ motif in early poetry, none of these mentions a man’s youth being lost in battle, although Tyrtaios 10.28 ὁρ’ ἐρατῆς ἡθῆς ἄγλαον ἄνθος ἔχει is contrasted two lines later with the man’s death. Anakreon, however, speaks of the loss of youth in battle (PMG 419 ὀλέσας δ’ ἡθην ἀμύνων πατρίδος δουληῆν), and Meleagros at

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126 Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, pp. 370-71. To Campbell’s list may be added Simonides 20.5 ὄντων δ’ ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχει πολλήρατον ἡθῆς .... The phrase ἄνθος ἡθας is used by Pindar of Jason at Pythian 4.158, and at Pythian 9.109-11 we are told that the suitors of the daughter of Antaios χρυσοστεφάνου .... Ηθας | καρπόν ἄνθησαντ’ ἀποδέχεσαι | ἐθελον.

127 It is perhaps significant that the adjective ἐρατῆς in the verse inscriptions of the period is never attributed to a person (whether a soldier or not): it is used twice of places (CEG 155 (Paros, 476/5) and 421 (Samos, 460-454)), and in both of these epitaphs the places were fought for in battle by the men commemorated; compare Solon’s use of the adjective ἰμερός of Salamis in fragments 1 and 3, where the poet encourages the Athenians to fight for the island, discussed above in 2.1.

128 Not an epitaph but ‘ein Trinkspruch zum Gedächtnis des Kameraden’, writes Wilamowitz (Sappho und Simonides, p. 106), followed by Bowra (Greek Lyric Poetry, pp. 269-70) and Campbell (Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 329).
Bakchylides 5.154 says that he died (in battle, but not slain by the enemy, of course) ἀγλαὰν ἥβαν προλείπων.129 This topos also appears in some 'Simonidean' epitaphs,130 and in a few fifth-century Attic verse epitaphs (where ἥβη is sometimes qualified by the adjective νεαρὸς or ἀγλαὸς): CEG 4 (Athens, 458 or 457), 6 (Attica, 447 (?)) and 82 (Attica, ca 450-425?). It is noteworthy that the expression ‘lost (the flower of) his ἥβη’, when it is used of men in these epitaphs,131 is always used of men who died fighting. The poet of Theognidea 1069-70 complains that ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι καὶ νήπιοι, οἳ τε θανόντας καὶ κλαίουσι', οοῦ ἥβης ἄνθος ἀπολλύμενον, suggesting (with a neat play on phrases such as ἀπόλεσαν ἄγλαδν ἥβεν in CEG 6 or ἐρατὴν ... ἀπωλέσαμεν νεότητα in 'Simonides' FGE II) that the metaphorical ‘death’ of one’s youth is as lamentable as the literal death of a person, but given the fact that in the literary verse the ‘flower of youth’ conceit tends to be used of people who are still alive (see above),132 perhaps the tendency to reserve it for fallen soldiers in the verse

129Maehler notes ad loc. (Die Lieder des Bakchylides, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 115-16) that the phrase is reminiscent of the death of Hektor at Iliad 22.362-63, where the hero’s νυχή goes down to Hades, λυποῦσαν ἄνδροπητα καὶ ἥβην.

130See Page, FGE, lines 690, 878, and 890 (CEG 4.3).

131It occurs in two epitaphs for young women: CEG 174 (Sinope, ca 475-450, in the expression προλπόσ’ ἥβης ἄνθος) and 119 (Thessaly, ca 450?, here in a lament put in the mouth of the dead girl, who says: νέκτια ἐκείνῳ ἐθάνατον καὶ οὐ λάβαν ἄνθος ἐτ’ ἔβαις).

132If D. Yatromanolakis’ recent interpretation of Simonides fr. 22 is correct (‘Simonides fr. eleg. 22 W2: To Sing or To Mourn?’), a similar expression may be used there in vv. 11-12 of a dead young man pictured as living in some kind of afterlife. Perhaps he retains this ‘flower’ there and drips it from his skin, but if the variant λεῖπει in 12 is the true reading, he may be imagined to have left it behind (cf. CEG 174.4 and 8 προλπόσ’ ἥβης ἄνθος; for the reverse relation, see Theognidea 1131 where one’s ἐρατή ἥβη is said to ‘leave’ (ἐπιλεῖπει) as old age comes on). There can be no certainty here: Yatromanolakis notes (p. 7) that the ‘decipherment of the beginning of l. 11 is uncertain’ and that the ‘construction and the general meaning of ll. 11-12 are also vague’. In any case, the person may not be dead at all: Yatromanolakis is the first to consider in detail this possibility, though it was raised by Parsons in his editio princeps: ‘I should guess that this is a
epitaphs is one way in which the grief felt at the loss of their young lives could be
made particularly vivid. 133

Summary

The problem of judging virtue, both on the battlefield and off, on the basis of
physical appearance is articulated in Homer and continues to be observed in later lyric
and elegiac poetry. The proposed solutions to the problem range from the prominence
given by Pindar to the latter as a visible marker of the former to Archilochos’ clear
refusal to admit any relationship between the two qualities in his outright denunciation
of the good-looking general and preference for the knock-kneed but courageous
fighter, in recalling both the unsympathetic figure of Thersites in the Iliad and
Hektor’s criticism of his brother Paris in the same poem, Archilochos, though perhaps
‘anti-aristocratic’, is not entirely ‘anti-heroic’ or untraditional. The lack of emphasis
on physical beauty in the epinician poetry of Bakchylides (as compared with that of
Pindar) represents a middle ground where the connection between appearance and

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133 If a person died young but not in battle, there were other ways to express this; forms of the
word ἀνυπόμονος, for example, occur in CEG 43 (Athens, ca 525?), 45 (Athens, ca 525-500?), 117
(Thessaly, ca 475-450?), 154 (Amorgos, ca 450-425?), 163 (Thera, ca 500?), and 171 (Egypt, ca
475-400?). Some of these, of course, are too badly damaged to give any indication of the manner of
death, and even the less damaged epitaphs do not always specify this. CEG 171, for example, may be
the epitaph of a mercenary, as suggested by G. Wagner, ‘Stèle funéraire de Kobôn’, p. 174. But it
remains true that the ‘flower of ἠῶν’ motif, when used of men, is always used of fallen soldiers.
excellence is neither affirmed nor denied. In a less explicit way than in Pindar, connections between beauty and bravery are drawn in the 'Polykrates Ode' of Ibykos and between appearance and aristocratic ἄρετή in the Theognidea. The verse inscriptions tend to avoid both direct praise of the beauty of the dead and any suggestion that this quality may be a marker of virtue. On the other hand, the oblique references to physical beauty in the 'flower of youth' motif (used exclusively of fallen soldiers) may be taken to present indirectly a combination of κάλλος and ἄρετη: the context of the epitaph testifies to the latter and the content to the former. The connection is implied, as in Ibykos, rather than stated openly as in Tyrtaios.
4. Political Values

4.1 Civic Ἀρετή

Disturbances in the poleis in which poets lived prompted some of them to compose poetry about the changes which were taking place in the structures of their cities, and to reflect on how their fellow citizens should conduct themselves within their communities. Solon fr. 15 reflects such a disturbance, saying that wealth is to be found in the wrong hands:

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοὶ, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται.
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τούτοις οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλουτὸν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμπεδον αἰεὶ,
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει

Here the poet does not say what, in his opinion, makes a citizen ἀγαθός or κακός, although he does make it clear that wealth is not a factor; some other poetry of the archaic period, however, takes a different stance and defines the ἀγαθός more specifically.

In some cases, terms like ἀγαθός and κακός appear to be used by the aristocrats in a social or political sense to refer to the upper and lower classes; the moral meanings of these words can be employed to assert the supremacy of the aristocracy. Donlan writes that

the usage of agathos-esthlos and kakos in Theognis and Pindar reflects this attempt on the part of the ‘nobles’ to use the words as automatic class designations, even at the risk of doing violence to the more elemental notions of ‘useful-beneficial’ and ‘useless-harmful’.

1Walter Donlan, ‘Simonides, fr. 4D and P. Oxy. 2432’, p. 73.
But when such evaluative terms are used in the poetry of this period, it is not always clear how much of their force derives from the ‘moral’ sense of the words, and how much from the ‘social’ sense. In Solon’s case, for example, although words like ἀγαθός and κακός appear frequently in the surviving poetry, the criteria being used to distinguish the ‘good’ citizens and the ‘bad’ ones are not always immediately apparent; as Adkins points out, ‘Solon seems little concerned with the problems of defining arete and the agathos’.  

The word ἀρετή behaves rather inconsistently in the poetry of both Solon and the Theognidea. Its original meaning of excellence in a specific field can be found in some places, but it also begins to carry a more general sense of overall excellence: ‘un ensemble complet de qualités diverses’. This general excellence can sometimes, but not always, be seen to shade into a moral meaning of ‘virtue’. There are thus two broad distinctions to be drawn between uses of ἀρετή: that between a specific and a general sense, and that between a moral and a non-moral sense.

At Solon 27.7-8, ἀρετή requires an interpretation such as ‘achievement’, referring to the strength (ἰσχύς) of young men to win acclaim:

τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ’ ἀριστος
ἰσχύν, ἕ τ’ ἄνδρες πειρατ’ ἔχουσ’ ἀρετής.

And since old men can presumably be as morally virtuous as younger men, ἀρετή in lines 15-16 (μαλακότερα δ’ αὐτοῦ | πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετήν γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφίη) must have the same meaning. No specific field of ἀρετή is indicated, and so this may be a use of ἀρετή in a general but not a moral sense. But it is significant that Solon refers to the physical strength of the young men in line 8 while in line 16 says that it is

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2 A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece, p. 50.

3 J. Carrière, Théognis de Mégare, p. 221.
the γλῶσσα τε καὶ σοφία of the old man which are μαλακώτερα ... πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετήν; for Solon here ἀγαθός seems to mean ‘good at’ rather than simply ‘good’.

In Theognis, too, there are several instances of the word with the meaning of excellence in a particular field: lines 30 (the plural ἀρετάς implies different types of excellence or achievement), 624 (παντοίαι δ' ἀρεταί),4 and 654 (where the expression ἀρετής δ' ἀλλῆς οὐδεμιῆς again implies the existence of several types of ἀρετή).

The qualifying μία in 699 and the superlative adjective κοινύστην in 904 also point to a variety of different ἀρεταί.

In Theognidea 129-30, ἀρετή is mentioned along with ἀφενος:5

μήτ' ἀρετήν εὐχου, Πολυπαιδήν, ἔξοχος εἶναι μήτ' ἀφενος· μοῦνον δ' ἀνδρί γένοιτο τύχη.

Van Groningen rejects Verdenius’ translation of ἀρετή in 129 as ‘succès’,6 but the word ἔξοχος does imply some sort of competitive success; in Homer it is used to describe a man who is distinguished above his peers, sometimes on its own (as in Iliad 2.188 ἔξοχον ἀνδρα), and sometimes with a word expressing the respect in which the hero surpasses the others (as in Iliad 3.227 ἔξοχος Ἀργείων κεφαλήν). The use of ἀρετή here falls into the ‘general’ category, but there is nothing to indicate that it is to be thought of as carrying any moral weight.

Particularly in the Theognidea, this general type of ἀρετή can be seen to take on moral significance: at line 147 πᾶς ἀρετή is equated with δικαιοσύνη,7 and in

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4 B.A. van Groningen (Théognis: le premier livre, p. 248) says that this is the only occurrence of ἀρετή in the plural in the Theognidea, but he in fact refers to line 30 in his commentary to 623-24.

5 The two are also mentioned together at line 30.

6 Van Groningen, Théognis: le premier livre, p. 53.

7 The moral sense of ἀρετή here does not depend on whether πᾶς ἀρετή is translated ‘the whole of ἀρετή’ or ‘every ἀρετή’. The use of πᾶς in the following line (πᾶς δὲ τ' ἀνὴρ ...) suggests that πᾶς ἀρετή means ‘every ἀρετή’; this line would then be taking the specific types of ἀρετή and

132
1177-78 the poet says that a man who does not involve himself with ἔργα αἰσχρὰ will attain ἀρετή, both of these are clearly moral uses. A use of ἀρετή that is both general and moral, and combines δίκη and αἰσχρός from these two passages, can be found in the anonymous couplet 465-66:

ἀμφ’ ἀρετή τρίβου, καὶ τοι τὰ δίκαια φιλ’ ἔστω,
μηδὲ σε νικάτω κέρδος δ’ αἰσχρὸν ἐν.

Again, the ethical side of ἀρετή is emphasised in 149-50, where it is contrasted with wealth (compare κέρδος in 466 above):

χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκω ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν,
Κῦρν’. ἀρετῆς δ’ ὀλίγοις ἀνδράσι μοῦρ’ ἔπεται.

‘Success’ is not the issue here; the point is that one can possess ἀρετή independently of χρήματα, material wealth, and, significantly, that this kind of ἀρετή is restricted to ὀλίγοι, ‘a few’.

The difference in outlook between Solon and the aristocratic composers of the poetry in the Theognidea is reflected in the fact that ἀρετή is used far more often in the Theognidea with a general meaning, and the moral connotations become explicit; the word is beginning to be adopted by the nobility to assert their superiority. From its original meaning of ‘excellence’ in a given area, ἀρετή takes on a significance of general excellence, which is equated with general virtue and claimed by the old aristocracy as their own. Wilamowitz claims that ‘Die moralische bedeutung der begriffe ἄγαθος und κακὸς gilt bereits für Solon’. This can be seen, for example, in Solon fr. 15:

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλούτεουσι κακοί, ἄγαθοι δὲ πένονται: ἄλλ’ ἕμεις τούτοις οὐ διαμειψομεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλούτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμπεδον αἰεὶ,
χρήματα δ’ ἀνθρωπῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

subordinating them to δικασσίνῃ. But the general sense of ἀρετή is not impossible here.

8U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii, p. 305.
Here, as in Theognis 149-150 cited above, the opposition between material success and ἀρετή implies an ethical dimension of ἀρετή, but Solon does not extend this morality into the social or political sphere to the degrees that the Theognidean poets do. But, as Linforth points out, ‘it is unnecessary to insist that ἀρετή and ἀγαθός must refer to either birth or morality’; the social and moral senses of the words become combined, and the terms would have be of little value to the nobility as quasi-technical ‘class’ terms if they lost their moral significance altogether.

In the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bakchylides, ἀρετή is often (and not surprisingly) used of the athletic prowess of the person being celebrated; ‘success’ is therefore a natural connotation in these cases. Indeed, Bakchylides’ epinician odes employ ἀρετή almost exclusively in this sense; one exception is 14.8-11, where the noun seems to refer to a moral virtue:

|μυρία| δ' ἀνδρόν ἀρε[ταί]| μια δ' ἐ[κ
πασάν] προκειται,
δ' τα] πάρ χειρός κυβέρνα-
νεν δικαιαι φρένεσιν.|

Of this ode almost nothing but the prooimion is preserved; this occupies the first eighteen verses of the fragment, down to the half-way point of the first epode, and the victor Kleoptolemos is introduced in the last five surviving lines. This prooimion is a strongly moralising passage, and the implication is that the victor himself is an example of one [δ' τα] πάρ χειρός κυβέρνα([σεν δι]καιαι φρένεσιν; the metaphor in κυβέρνα([σεν] is appropriate for a horseman (compare e.g. 5.47-9, where the horse Pherenikos ὁν κυβερνήτηναν φυλάσσων | ἱεται νεόκροτον | νίκαν ἰέρωνι φιλοξείνω τιτύσκων).

This passage from Bakchylides 14 is illustrative of the epinician technique of presenting an athletic victor as a model not only of physical strength and skill, but also

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9I. M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian, p. 213.
of moral excellence and social worth. Again, Bakchylides provides an example of this transfer of meaning, at 13.175-85:

{où γάρ ἀλαμπέι νυκτὸς
πασιφανῆς Ἀρετᾶ
κρυφθεὶς ἀμαυρῷ ὑταί
ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπεδὼν ἀκ[αμάτη
βρύουσα δόξα
στρωφάται κατὰ γᾶν [τε
καὶ πολύπλαγκτον θάλασσαν.
καὶ μᾶν φερεκυδέα ν[άσον
Αἰακοῦ τιμῆ, σὺν Εὐ-
κλείς δὲ φιλοστεφ[άνω
πόλιν κυβερνά ....

These verses follow a passage about the sacking of Troy; the ἀρετή of the Aiakid heroes lives on, ‘not hidden in the dark night’, parallel to the ἀρετή of the athletic victor preserved in Bakchylides’ song – note 178-79 ἀκ[αμάτη] βρύουσα δόξα, and compare 58-63, which refer to athletic victory:

ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ βωμοῦ ἀριστάρχου Διός
Νίκας ὑπ[ερ]χιστεός ἀν-
στεφθεὶς σὺν ὧ[θεα
χρυσό]ύραν δόξαν πολύφαντον ἐν αἰ-
ῶνι] τρέφει παύροις βροτῶν
ἀ[ί]ει ....

In 175-85, this ἀρετή is given a political function: along with Εὐκλεία (and, in 186 ff., Εὐνομία ... σαφέρων, which will be discussed later under 4.5 Σωφροσύνη), she guides the city, πόλιν κυβερνά (185).

But for the most part, this tendency to define ἀρετή as general moral and social worth is less marked in Bakchylides than has been observed, for example, in the poetry of the Theognidea. Bakchylides, for example, never uses ἀγαθὸς in his epinician poetry, not even to indicate that someone is ‘good at’ an athletic event. The word only occurs in Bakchylides in fragment 14, where there the wider context has been lost. ἔσθλος occurs in Bakchylides only in the neuter except for two passages: at 5.127-29, Meleager claims that “ἔγω πολλοίς σὺν ἄλλοις | Ἐφίκλον κατέκτανον |
The adjective is not used of general moral ‘goodness’.

Pindar commonly uses ἀρετή of physical prowess, again appropriately for athletic victors. In a broader sense, he employs the word to denote, as Slater points out, ‘distinction, talent, excellence, rarely ... purely moral qualities’. More significant here is the fact that it never refers to a single, general type of moral excellence; simply to say that someone has ἀρετή in Pindar’s vocabulary does not carry the same ethical and social weight that is evident in, for example, the Theognidea.

There is, however, an asymmetry in Pindar’s use of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός: while the former, as noted above, is not used alone to signify a complex of moral and social qualities, this is not the case with the latter. Although Pindar uses phrases such as ἀρετή ταί ἀγαθοί at Nemean 10.51 and ἀγαθοί πολεμίσται at Isthmian 5.26, Pindar’s ἀγαθοί are not always simply those who possess ἀρετή as Pindar usually means it. It is, for example, from ἀγαθοί πατέρες that the Rhodian Diagoras inherits the ὀρθόι.

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11 W.J. Slater, Lexicon to Pindar, p. 68. D.E. Gerber (Pindar’s Olympian One: A Commentary, pp. 5-6) comments on ἀρεταιον in Olympian 3.43: ‘Krischer sees in κτένων and ἀρεταιον a contrast between material and ethical values, but ἀρεταιον is only partially ethical. To the Greeks there was an ethical element present in the excellence or prowess displayed in athletic achievement, but this scarcely justifies our treating ἀρεταιον as a purely non-material contrast with gold’. W.J. Verdenius (Commentaries on Pindar, vol. 1, p. 37) rightly notes that in the same passage ‘The use of τόν implies that ἀρεταιον refers to his sporting qualities and success’.
φρένες with the help of which he ὑβριός ἐχθρᾶν ὀδὸν | εὐθυπορεῖ (Olympian 7.90-92). This is clearly a statement of general moral worth, and the significance of the adjective ἀγαθὸς in the social or political sphere is perhaps made most clearly in Pindar at Pythian 3.70-71, where the poet sings of Hieron,

ός Συρακόσσαις νέμει βασιλεύς, πραῦς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξει- νοῖς δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ.

The Syracusan tyrant, whose victory is here being celebrated, rules benevolently, and does not need to envy the ἀγαθοί, those whose social position might otherwise present a challenge to his leadership. On the other social side of these ἀγαθοί is Damophilos in the fourth Pythian ode; he is described as οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς (Pythian 4.285).

A similar asymmetry in the use of these terms appears to exist in the verse inscriptions of the period. When ἄρετή appears on its own as a virtue, it refers most often to military valour: CEG 2 (Athens, after the Persian Wars), 6 (Attica, 447(?)), 8 (Attica, after 500?), 10 (Attica, 432), 83 (Athens, 446-ca 425?), 99 (Attica, ca 400), 155 (Paros, 476-75), 431 (Athens, 403-2).12 The exact significance of ἄρετή becomes more difficult to determine when it is found in conjunction with other virtues such as σωφροσύνη13 (CEG 41 (Athens, ca 530-20?), 58 (Athens, ca 510-500?), 69 (Athens, ca 500?), 96 (Athens, late fifth century), and probably 81 (Attica, ca 450-25?)). The adjectives ἀγαθὸς and ἔσθλος in the verse inscriptions, however, appear to behave rather differently. These words, unlike the noun ἄρετή, do appear without

12 In CEG 272 (Athens, ca 470-60?), ἄρετή appears not on its own but paired with φιλοξενία. The phrase μὴ μα πάνον Ἀρεός in the preceding verse perhaps suggests a military connotation for ἄρετή here too, but on the other hand the πάσες qualifying ἄρετή seems to run counter to this interpretation; compare CEG 69 (Athens, ca 500?): ['Αμιτίμαξ', εὐδοχοὺν σε χυτε ηπατά γαί' ἐκώλυσεν, σώφρονα καὶ πιντόν, πάσαιν ἱέοντι ἄρετέν.

13 The civic significance of σωφροσύνη will be discussed in detail below, section 4.7.
other qualifiers in the inscriptions to denote a more general type of virtue: this is true of CEG 14 (Attica, ca 560-50?), 42 (Athens, ca 525?), 117 (Thessaly, ca 480-50?), 149 (Motya, ca 475-50?), 154 (Amorgos, ca 450-25?), and 195 (Athens, ca 525-500?).

There are two exceptions to this asymmetry, both concerning the use of the noun ἀρετή. These are CEG 380 (Olympia, a few years before 484), part (i):

Πραξιτέλης ἀνέθηκε Συρακόσιος τὸ δ' ἡγαλμα καὶ Καμαριναῖος· πρόσθα ἡ Μαντινέαι
κρίνοις ήνις ἑναεν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ πολυμέλο
ἀεσλός ἐδν καὶ Ἐοι μνάμα τόδ' ἐστ' ἀρετᾶς.

and CEG 416 (Thasos, ca 525-500(?)

Ἡρακλεῖ μ' ἀνέθηκεν Ἀκήρατος, ὃς Θασίοισιν καὶ Π[αρισίοις ἤρχεσεν μονος ἐν ἄνφοτερος,
πολλάς δ' ἄγγελας πρὸ πόλεως κατὰ φύλα διήλθεν ἀν[θρώπ]νων, ἀρετῆς ἑνεκεν ἀίδης.

In both cases ἀρετή occurs alone, appearing to designate some sort of general virtue, as opposed to the more usual uses of ἀρετή noted above, and in both cases there may be not only a general but also a social implication in ἀρετή. CEG 416 is the dedication of a man who ἤρχεσεν in both Thasos and Paros. CEG 380 (i), apart from being the remains of a five-block marble base for a large votive group, contains the conjunction of ἐσθλός and ἀρετῆ in its final verse; and ἐσθλός in the verse inscriptions of this period is not only always used in a general sense, but also is linked with family concerns – in CEG 380 (i) above and in its two other applications to men in the inscribed epigrams (CEG 154 (Amorgos, ca 450-25?) and 195 (Athens, ca 525-500?), parentage is prominent. CEG 195 reads as follows:

Ἀλκιμαχοῦς μ' ἀνέσθηκε Διός κόρει τόδ' ἡγαλμα εὐχόλεν ἐσθλό δέ πατρὸς ἦς Ἡλιόνος ἐπευχεται (ἐ)να[ι].

In their commentary on this inscription, Friedländer and Hoffleit observe that the words ἐσθλοῦ δὲ πατρὸς ὃς heavily overload the hexameter, containing as they do the excessive pretension of an Athenian aristocrat shortly before
the establishment of democracy. The parallel in Sophocles Phil. 96 ἐσθλοῦ πατρός παῖ may show that this formula was almost an aristocratic catchword in Athens."**14**

### 4.2 City and Family

The relevance of one’s birth and parentage to one’s position in society is not mentioned explicitly in a moral context in Solon’s poetry; he is concerned with the orderly running of the state and, from his point of view, the way in which the δῆμος is governed by the ἱγεμόνες is more important than any distinction between those of noble birth and those of humble origins. For Alkaios, on the other hand, lineage is of prime importance; when he exhorts his fellow aristocrats to take action in fr. 6, he refers to their ἐσλοὶ τοκῆς (line 14), and his criticism of Pittakos in fr. 72 contains the following stanza (line 11-13):

σὺ δὴ τεαύτας ἐκγεγόνων ἔχης
tὰν δόξαν οἶαν ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι
ἐσλων ἐοντες ἐκ τοκῆς ...;

Pittakos is referred to as κακοπατρίδας in 348 (the epithet’s appearance in 75 suggests Pittakos again, perhaps also in 67); it is unlikely that Pittakos’ origins were in a low class of society, and the reason for Alkaios’ use of the epithet κακοπατρίδας seems to be that Pittakos’ lineage was not purely Lesbian."**15** The word κακοπατρίδας, though, would imply not just foreign but also humble origins, and this connotation is reinforced by Alkaios’ contrast of Pittakos against ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι, above; although

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15 The various evidence and hypotheses about Pittakos’ parentage are summarized by Burnett (*Three Archaic Poets*, p. 112, n. 18).
Pittakos was not technically of low birth (as Burnett notes, such an hypothesis 'makes the tyrant's early association with Alcaeus' brothers hard to understand'\textsuperscript{16}) but Alkaios' use of the epithet in fr. 72 carries such associations and therefore makes the insult more effective.

The issue of parentage is somewhat more problematic in the Theognidea; commenting on lines 31 ff., Carrière writes that

\begin{quote}
  sans doute voulait-il dire ... que l'aristocratie régnante est la vraie et la seule dépositaire des principes de la saine morale, pour la raison qu'un Grec, de haute naissance surtout, sépare difficilement l'idée de noblesse de celle de vertu,\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

but Cobb-Stevens' formulation is more accurate:

Birth, which might be thought a priori to constitute the essence of an aristocratic value system, is certainly important in the Theognidea, as the poet's laments about the dire consequences of intermarriage testify. But it is far from sufficient by itself to make a man an agathos. It is much easier to beget a man, we are told, than to give him \textit{phrenes esthai} 'a noble mind' (vv. 429-430).\textsuperscript{18}

Cobb-Stevens' statement about the attitudes towards noble birth expressed in the Theognidea is more precise than, and to be preferred over, Carrière's 'il est arrivé que l'idée de valeur morale, \textit{qui n'en est jamais absente}, ait pu s'associer à celle de noblesse' (Carrière's italics);\textsuperscript{19} Theognis can in fact condemn the nobles for being kακοι.

Cobb-Stevens, citing 131-32 (\textit{οοδέν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἐμεινον ἐπάλθ', δος ὅσι, Κύρνε, μὲμηλε δίκη}), comments: 'The importance of a noble \textit{genos} derives not so much from birth itself as from the \textit{genos} as the repository

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{16}Burnett. \textit{ibid.}
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{17}Carrière, \textit{Théognis de Mégare}, p. 220.
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18}V. Cobb-Stevens, 'Opposites, Reversals, and Ambiguities', p. 160.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19}Carrière, \textit{Théognis de Mégare}, p. 221.
\end{flushright}
of instruction in dikē'.\(^{20}\) In this context one might perhaps cite the two-line verse epitaph CEG 78 (Attica, \textit{ca} 480\?), the pentameter of which ends: ἐς ήνεκα καὶ γενεὰς. The incomplete word may be, for example, δίκαιοσύνης or σωφροσύνης, and the coupling of a virtue like δίκαιοσύνη or σωφροσύνη with family nobility might almost be an answer to Phokylides 3D

\begin{quote}
... τί πλέον, γένος εὐγενὲς εἶναι,
oίς οὔτ' ἐν μῦθος ἔπεται χάρις οὔτ' ἐνι βουλή;\(^{22}\)
\end{quote}

Theognis is concerned about the mingling of blood-lines and the confusion this creates when classifying people as ἀγαθοὶ or κακοὶ (191-92):

οὔτω μὴ βαύματε γένος, Πολιορκία, ἀστών
μαυροῦσθαι: σὺν γὰρ μίσηται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖς,

and a similar concern is voiced at 1112 μητηστοῦει δ' ἐκ κακοῦ ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ. This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that one cannot teach a κακός to be ἀγαθός, as is stated in lines 429-38; here Theognis complains that parents who are ἀγαθοὶ do sometimes produce children who turn out to be κακοὶ, because virtue apparently cannot be taught. This idea contradicts the implication of lines 131-32 that one can learn δίκη from one's parents;\(^{23}\) Cobb-Stevens 'genos as the repository of instruction in dikē' is of little use if virtues like δίκαιοσύνη cannot be taught.

\(^{20}\)Cobb-Stevens, 'Opposites, Reversals, and Ambiguitities', p. 161. But see below for considerations of how virtues can or cannot be passed from one generation to another.

\(^{21}\)Friedländer and Hoffleit (Epigrammata, p. 80) propose, in addition to the above possibilities, φιλοσοφοσύνης or φύλημοσύνης.

\(^{22}\)This line-ending occurs three times in Homer (\textit{Iliad} 2.202 and 12.213; \textit{Odyssey} 3.127), of which Odysseus' criticism of Agamemnon at 2.201-202 σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄνωκας, ὅπερ ποι' ἐν πολέμῳ ἑναρίθμοις οὔτ' ἐνι βουλή is the closest in sense to the use of the phrase in Phokylides 3D. For the importance of excellence in βουλή in the \textit{Iliad}, see M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the Iliad'.

\(^{23}\)Also contradicted is line 35 ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεα, unless it is allowed that learning ἐσθλὰ is not a sufficient condition to make a man ἐσθλὸς himself.
On the other hand, it is maintained at 305-308 that not all kاكוֹי are kاكוֹי from birth, but become so through their association with kاكוֹי:

\[
\text{oֹי kاكוֹי oֹי pántως kاكoֹi ãκ γαστρός γεγόναςιν,}
\text{άλλ' άνδρεσιν kاكoֹiς συνδέμενοι φιλίν}
\text{έργά τε δειλ' εμαθον καί ἐπη δύσφημα καί ὅβριν,}
\text{ἐλπόμενοι κείνους pάντα λέγειν ἐτύμα.}
\]

If virtue cannot be taught, it seems that kاكודטס can. But lines 731-52 acknowledge the fact that δικαίοι children can be born of δύσκοι parents, and here the poet prays (737-38) that these children ought not to suffer for the wrongs of their forebears; whether the children were taught δικαίοσύνη or somehow possessed it by nature is not specified. Here there is no reference to the terms ἀγαθός or kاكoֹס; the only quality that interests this poet is δικαίοσύνη, which is less easily corrupted into a quasi-technical class term (than is ἀρετή, for example). This emphasis agrees with the fact that Theognis can criticize the nobility as well as the lower classes (cf. section 4.3, below).

A scholiast on the phrase ἀστῶν γενεᾶ μέγιστον κλέος αὐξῶν at Pindar’s Isthmian 7.29 comments: ἱστῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγιστον παρὰ τῶν ἀστῶν κλέος αὐξῶν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ γένει; this interpretation supposes a pregnant use of the genitive ἀστῶν, which is more naturally taken with γενεᾶ.24 It may even be possible to construe ἀστῶν with κλέος, and treat γενεᾶ as instrumental and more or less equivalent to φυá, so that the elder Strepsiadas would be said to increase the glory of his city by means of his innate virtues (which have, says the poet, been inherited by his nephew). But there are Pindaric parallels for γενεᾶ used of a city. Olympian 11.15 Ζευρίων Δοκρῶν γενεᾶν ἀλέγων and Isthmian 7.29 (according to Slater s.v.) are the only two

24Thus, for example, Privitera ad loc., and recently W.H. Race, Pindar, vol. 2, p. 199: ‘his townsmen’s race’.
places in Pindar where γενέα means ‘community’ rather than ‘family’, but perhaps
Slater, like the scholiast, does not recognize that in Pindaric rhetoric the city can be
almost equated with the family. In the case of Olympian 11, there may be some
significance in the fact that the victor’s city, Lokroi Epizephyroi, was fiercely
aristocratic and family-oriented like Thebes, home of Strepsiadas and Pindar, of which
we find the phrase λαὸν γενέαν used at fr. 52a9 (compare Isthmian 1.30 Σπαρτῶν
γένεα and fr. 29.2 Σπαρτῶν ἱερὸν γένος, referring specifically to the mythical origins
of the Theban nobility). Membership of the Lokrian nobility was apparently restricted
to those who could trace their descent through the female line back to one of τὰς
ἐκατὸν οἰκίας τὰς προκριθείσας ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἀποκιάν ἐξελεξεῖν.25
Even if Pindar does not intend to refer in this case to the city’s peculiar traditions, 26
both here and in Isthmian 7 (however the words ἀστῶν γενέα in verse 27 are
construed27) he seems to be almost replacing the city with the family, just as
contemporary Athenian public epitaphs are replacing the family with the city.

Given the epinician poet’s concern with the athletic victor’s origins, the line
between ‘praise of the family’ and ‘praise of the city’ is easily blurred. The city itself
can in fact become a parent, as in Olympian 2.92-95, where Pindar claims that the city
has given birth to (93 τεκείν) no more generous man than Theron. This metaphor
can be used by Pindar both of athletes and of warriors; Pythian 8.25-27 says of
Aigina:

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25 Polybios 12.5.6-7. F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 2, pp. 333-
6. discusses matrilineal descent, the Hundred Families, and their relationship with the Lokrian
custom of sending maidens to Troy in recompense for the rape of Kassandra by Ajax.

26 As perhaps he does when he mentions the Ζευρίτα ... Λοκρίς παρθένος at Pythian 2.18-
19 (Walbank, p. 333).

27 Bruno Currie suggests that γενέα might be taken as a locative: ‘increases his repute
among the γενέα of citizens’ (Oxford D.Phil. dissertation on Pindar and hero-cult in progress).
Here the heroes in question, the Aiakidai, are particularly appropriate examples of both types of prowess. 28 Aias, one of these Aiakidai, is said to have been ‘raised’ by Salamis at Nemean 2.13-14: καὶ μὰν ἄ Σαλαμίς γε θέρψαι φῶτα μαχατάν | δύνατος, and it is the Aiakidai whom the athlete Pytheas ἐγέραρεν along with Aigina, his ματρόπολις (Nemean 5.8).

Another technique that the epinician poet can use to place the victor’s city in the context of his family is to mention the relationship between the city’s legendary heroes and the victor himself. This can be done explicitly, as in Pythian 5.103, where Arkesilas is called the ‘son’ of the city’s founding fathers; or implicitly, as in Nemean 6 where, after saying that the Aiginetan victor Alkimidas is following ἐπεκείν ἐν Προξιδάμαντος ... πατροπάτωρος ὅμαιμιοι (15-16), Pindar goes on to praise Praxidamas himself (17-22):

κεῖνος γὰρ Ὄλυμποιόντο έών Αἰακίδας
ἔργα πρώτος (ἔνεικεν) ἀπ᾽ Ἀργείων,
καὶ πεντάκις ἵθημοι στεφανωσμένος,
Νέμεα δὲ τρεῖς, ἔπαυσε λάθαν
Σακκλείδα, δὲ ὑπέρτατος
Ἀγησίσμαχοι ὅνεον γένετο.

Praxidamas, then, brought athletic prizes home to Aigina ‘for the Aiakidai’ and in so doing honoured his own father; a close connection, if not an identification, is made between the victor’s family and the city’s most famous heroes; 29 the Bassidai have

28 Their martial and athletic exploits are listed in Giannini’s commentary ad loc. (B. Gentili et al., Pindaro: le Pitiche, pp. 569-70).

29 This is perhaps continued into lines 25-26 where Pindar, still talking about Alkimidas’ ancestors, claims that ἔπερον οὐ τινα οἶκον ἄπερφαντο πυγμαχία (πλέονον) | τομιάν στεφάνων μυχῷ Ἐλλάδος ἀπάσας, possibly thereby hinting at Peleus’ boxing victory at the games in memory of Pelias (Hig. Fab. 273). Compare the prominence of Peleus in Nemean 5, another ode for a victor from Aigina, and the emphasis in that poem on πότις ... συγγενής (40) and the glorification of Peleus’ ὄμοσπορον ἔθνος (43).
benefited directly from the ἔξοχον αἴσιων that the Aiakidai provided for the Aiginetans. The catalogue of the exploits of the Bassidai, indeed, almost takes the place of a myth in this poem, occupying a complete antistrophe and epode (30-44) in contrast to the single strophe devoted to the Aiakidai (45-53); and the tautometrical verses introducing each section with their common themes of song and fame (30, 45) reinforce the parallel. Bakchylides makes a similar implicit connection at the end of his epinician Ode 11: mention of the founding of the victor’s home city, Metapontion, by the Achaians leads to the assertion that (123-6)

δικαίας
δόσις ἔχει φρένας, εὑρήσει σύν ἀπαντᾷ χρόνῳ
μυρίας ἄλκας Ἀχαιών.

As Maehler notes on this passage, ‘[a]uch der Sieg ist ja eine ἄλκα, er ist gleichsam ein Beweis dafür, daß die Metapontiner ... legitime Nachfahren der Griechenhelden Homers sind’. 31

The epinician poet, then, can emphasize that the city as a whole is co-extensive with the victor’s family, as is implied in the phrase ἀντίων γενεὰ at Isthmian 7.29. Another way of highlighting the distinction of the family in question is to imply that they, out of all the descendants of the legendary heroes, are pre-eminent in games or war, or both; the poet places the genos in context by narrowing the audience’s field of perception, as it were. In Olympian 13, the poet declares that (49-52)

ἔγω δὲ ἴδιος ἐν κοινῷ σταλεῖς
μὴ τίνε γαρ χώρων παλαιγόνων
πόλεμον τ’ ἐν ἑρωίας ἱρεταῖσιν
οὗ ψεῦσομ’ ἀμφὶ Κορινθῷ ....

30 Compare the prominence in Isthmian 7 of the description of the valorous conduct of the victor’s uncle Strepsiades.

31 H. Maehler, Die Lieder des Bakchylides, vol. 1, part 2, p. 242. The point was, of course, already recognized by the scribe responsible for the intrusive gloss πρόγονοι at 119-20.
This is followed by a mention of the valour that heroes of Korinthian descent displayed at Troy (55-60), leading to the introduction of Glaukos (60) and thence to the exploits of his father Bellerophon, first the taming of Pegasos (63-86) and then the slaying of the Amazons, the Chimaira, and the Solymoi (87-90). Then, worried that his βέλεα may fly παρὰ σκοπόν (93-95), the poet turns to the particular praise of the Oligaithidai and their athletic successes: Μοίσαις γὰρ ἀγλαοθρόνοις ἐκών | ὡλιγαθίδαισιν τ’ ἔβαν ἐπίκουρος (96-97), where the use of the word ἐπίκουρος, recalling as it does the status of Glaukos at Troy, places the athletic victories listed in 98 ff. on a par with the martial exploits of the family’s legendary Korinthian forebears.

*Nemean* 4, in honour of the Aiginetan Timasarchos, contains a long account of various deeds of the Aiakidai (25-72), which the poet breaks off by turning to the victor’s family: Θεανδρίδαισι δ’ ἀεξηγμίων ἄεθλων | κάρυξ ἐτοίμος ἔβαν ... (73-4).

In *Nemean* 2, Pindar is less effusive when it comes to the legendary history of the victor’s homeland: he contents himself with the simple statement that Ἀχάρναι δὲ παλαιῶματον | εὐάνορες (16-17; implying that it has as distinguished a past as the Salamis which bore Aias, mentioned in 13-14) before declaring that ὃσσα δ’ ἀμφ’ ἄεθλοις, | Τιμοδημίδαι ἔξοχωτατοι προλέγονται (17-18). In *Pythian* 7, the city itself serves only as a προοίμιον (albeit the κάλλιστον) to praise of the family of Megakles, which is introduced immediately (1-4):

*Kάλλιστον αἱ μεγαλοπόλιες Ἀθηναὶ προοίμιον Ἀλκμανίδαι εὐρυσθενεὶ γενέᾳ κρηπιδ’ ἀοιδὰν ἱπποίσι βαλέσθαι.*

After asking which πάτρα and which οἶκος he should praise (5-8), Pindar deals with Athenian claims to fame by briefly claiming that they are known to all, and turns to the victor’s οἶκος (9-18):

πάσαις γὰρ πολίσει λόγοις ὠμίλει Ἕρεχθεός ἄστών, Ἀπόλλον, οἱ τεὸν δόμον Πυθώνι διὰ θαητὸν ἔτευξαν.
Whether the genos is identified with the city or seen as the most illustrious element within it, then, the aristocratic concern with the victor’s lineage causes the family aspect to take precedence. This pervasive concern is of great importance to the epinician poet and to his audience, inside and outside the sphere of martial endeavour, and perhaps does not require the outline given here, but it tends to be somewhat obscured in Kurke’s study of Pindar’s relationship to the polis. The very circumstances of composition of an epinician poem (a commission from an aristocratic patron for a poem celebrating the achievements of members of his family) dictate the order of importance: the city needs to be praised because it is the home of the victor’s genos and of its legendary ancestors rather than the other way around.

In her discussion of Pythian 7, for example, Kurke argues that the fact that Apollo’s temple at Delphi, though built by the victor’s family, the Alkmoneidai, is referred to in Pythian 1 as the work of τετεμονοι διότι Ολυμπιάκοι δω δ’ ἀπὸ Κίρρης, ὁ Μεγάκλεες, ύμαι τε καὶ προγόνων.

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32 Kurke, The Traffic in Praise. In her article ‘Fathers and Sons: A Note on Pindaric Ambiguity’, on the other hand, Kurke studies passages where ‘Pindar’s syntax seems deliberately to blur father and son, or grandfather and grandson’ (p. 288), notes that the results of studies of the importance of family to the ancient Greeks have ‘rarely ... been applied to Pindar, where laudator and laudandus still confront each other in splendid isolation’, and points out that the victors ‘are completely enmeshed in a social system which defines them first as members of a household and a family, and then (often) as members of a polis’ (p. 289).

33 J.F. McGlew makes a similar criticism: he notes that ‘Kurke is sensitive to Pindar’s interest in accommodating the political and social aspirations of his patrons’, but that ‘she does not ... pay enough attention to epinician’s ability to justify and affirm those aspirations; little is made of epinician’s power to reshape the relationship between the victor and his community to effect a real political difference: that, at the end of the successful ode, the victor and his victory are situated at the community’s center’ (McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture, p. 37, n. 48).

34 Herodotos, 5.62.
megaloprepeia', but to describe an accomplishment of the Alkmaionidai in this way is surely parallel to what Pindar does in the opening lines of the poem: there, he moves swiftly from praise of Athens to praise of the Alkmaionidai, and lines 9-18, despite the mention of Ἐρεχθεός ἀστών (which in effect glorifies the ἀστοί by implying that they are part of the same illustrious genos), are dominated by the deeds of this family. The lines about the temple at Delphi represent, in fact, one of Pindar’s techniques for increasing the ‘symbolic capital’ of the Alkmaionidai; the reference elevates them to the status of the most important Athenians. Certainly it can be said that ‘the cities as well as the aristocracy found something in Pindar’s poems to support their ideology’, but it should be clear from the discussion above that the two ideologies are not placed on the same level. The city’s importance to the poet and his patron lies largely in the fact that it has produced the current victor as well as other successful figures in both the recent and the remote history of his family, and Pindar is not ‘much more conscious of the polis and much more concerned to adapt epinikion to civic ideology than his critics have allowed’.  


36 Kurke borrows this term from Bourdieu, who defines it as ‘the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name’ (The Traffic in Praise, p. 36, with note 4). Kurke equates it with her phrase ‘the economy of kleos’ (cf. her 1993 article ‘The Economy of Kudos’, exploring aristocratic attempts to regain ‘symbolic capital’ through heroization of athletes), by which she designates the ‘spatial and temporal continuity’ of the oikos and the necessity for ‘continual renewal of the family’s achievements by each new generation’ (The Traffic in Praise, p. 18).

37 Kurke, The Traffic in Praise, p. 5, with reference to the story that Pindar’s account of the birth of Rhodes from the sea was written in gold letters and dedicated in Athena’s temple there, which sounds like an aristocratic gesture.

38 Kurke, The Traffic in Praise, p. 194. A similar claim was made, though not explored in as much detail, in an earlier article (not mentioned by Kurke) which argued that the epinician genre n’est pas moins “politique”, c’est-à-dire lié à la πόλις que la tragédie. A travers les grandes familles auxquelles elle s’identifie, c’est la cité tout entière qui est exaltée dans l’ode: l’épinoie est au sens plein du terme un ξύνος [sic] λόγος’ (S. Saïd and M. Trédé-Boulmer, ‘L’éloge de la cité du vainqueur’, p. 170).
4.3 Leaders, Justice, and Injustice

Early in the Theognidea (lines 39-52), the reader finds Theognis’ view of the troubles which were plaguing Megara during his lifetime. The city is overcome by κακὴ ὅβρις (40), he writes, and he goes on to say that it is the ἠγεμόνες who are at fault; the ἀστοῖ are still σαφρόνες (41). The word ἠγεμόν is uniformly used in the Theognidea of a bad leader; it recurs at 855 in the phrase ἠγεμόνων κακότητα, and again at 1082 ὑβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ἠγεμόνα στάσιος. Campbell writes that ‘Theognis uses many of Solon’s ideas and much of his vocabulary ... both use ἡγεμόνες of the people’s leaders’, this view is taken by West and Carrière. But Nagy objects:

I ... disagree with the view that ἡγεμόνες ‘leaders’ as at Solon frr. 3.7 and 8.1 GP [= 4.7 and 6.1 West] means ‘popular leaders’, that is, champions of democracy. Rather, it is a catchword for ‘government’ (as clearly at [6.1])

39 Which is reminiscent of the phrase at 41-42 ἠγεμόνες δὲ | τετράφορα πολλὴν ἐς κακότητα πεσεῖν.

40 Both M.L. West (Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 150) and H.F. North (Sophrosyne, p. 17) point out that ἠγεμόνα in 1082 is awkward since it is followed by ἠγεμόνες with a different sense in 1082a (=41). Solon and Mimmermos also associate ὅβρις with ἠγεμόνες (Solon 4.7-8 δῆμον ὃ’ ἠγεμόνον ἄδικος νόος, οἴον ἐτοίμον | ὃβρις ἐκ μεγάλης ἀλέγεια πολλὰ παθεῖν, and Mimmermos 9.4 ἀργαλεῖς ὃβρις ἠγεμόνες), and Mimmermos’ line suggested to West that Theognis’ original line was εὐθυντῆρα, κακῆς ὅβρις ἠγεμόνα, ‘but the same objection applies’ (West, loc. cit.). But the line from Mimmermos is not as condemnatory as Solon’s words; the ἠγεμόνες of which Mimmermos writes are a victorious army, and Mimmermos is writing from the point of view of the winning side.

41 Campbell, The Golden Lyre, p. 113.

42 West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 68: ‘It appears from Solon 4.7 and 6.1 that ἠγεμόνες is a term for popular leaders’.

43 Carrière, Théognis de Mégare, p. 178 ‘Les excès des démagogues (ἡγεμόνες) effraient Théognis’.
So also at Theognis 39-52: the *hēgemones* (41) represent the elite of society before the coming of the *euthunēt* 'straightener, regulator'.

As a parallel for the use of *ηγεμόνες* and *ἀστοι* in Theognis 41, van Groningen cites Solon 4.5-7:

> αὐτόλ ἄφθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίσσιν
> ἀστοὶ βούλοντοι χρήματι πειθόμενοι,
> δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἀδικος νόος,

but van Groningen’s statement that ‘De même Solon ... oppose les ἀστοι et les δήμου ἡγεμόνες’ is inaccurate in that Solon’s ‘opposition’ between the two groups only goes as far as to mention them separately. In Solon’s view, it is both the ἀστοι and the δήμου ἡγεμόνες who are bringing ruin to Athens, whereas in the Theognidean passage we are told that the ἀστοι are still σαφόρονες and that it is only the ἡγεμόνες who are the source of trouble.

In attempting to determine who Theognis means by the ἡγεμόνες in line 41, one must address the question of the date of composition of Theognis 39-52. Campbell at first believed that these verses were written shortly after the fall of the tyrant Theagenes; the leaders ‘are identified with οἱ κακοὶ: in other words they were not aristocrats but the middle-classes; and what Theognis fears ... is the emergence of another tyrant (cf. 39-40 and μούναρχοι 52): the memory of Theagenes’ severity must have been vivid’. But later Campbell appears less certain about this point: ‘It is hard to tell whether these leaders are the fellow-aristocrats of Theognis: he talks of

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44G. Nagy, ‘Theognis and Megara’, p. 43. Nagy also quotes *Ath. Pol.* 5.3 καὶ οὗτος αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνατείνει τοῖς πλουσίως to demonstrate that ‘the *hubris* condemned by Solon ... is that of the rich, not of the poor .... This is not to say that Solon was a one-sided champion of democracy (see Aristotle *Constitution* 11.2-12.1, containing Solon fr. 7 GP [= 5 West]), but the point is that *hubris* and *stasis* are in the diction of Solon catchwords for the excesses of an oligarchy.’

45Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 27.

46See below, section 4.7, for the significance of *σωφροσύνη* as a civic virtue.

"our" evil insolence, but he identifies them with the "bad". West, on the other hand, is unambiguous:

The implication is very plain. These things [sc. ‘bad men ruining the people for their private advantage’] have been known to happen elsewhere, and now they are in danger of happening in Megara – for the first time. It would have been impossible to express oneself in those terms during the democracy, shortly after the rule of a μούναρχος who was to be remembered for centuries afterwards.

But it would not necessarily have been ‘impossible to express oneself in those terms’; very few names of historical figures appear in the Theognidea, and it would not be surprising if Theognis wrote these lines after the fact, as it were, referring to ‘future’ events with the intention that the verses could be ‘recycled’ at future symposia. It would not be ‘impossible’ for Theognis to write (as he does in 51-52) ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσεων τε καὶ ἐμψυχοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν | μούναρχοι θ’, after such things had already happened, Fisher points out that ‘if forty or fifty years have elapsed [sc. since the tyranny of Theagenes], and some other tyrannies gained the limelight elsewhere, Theognis might express a fear of a (renewed) Megarian tyranny without alluding to Theagenes’ rule’. West argues that ‘There is no escape from the conclusion that the verses were composed before ... the rule of Theagenes, not later than the 630s’ but the view taken here is that such an ‘escape’ can be found without difficulty.

Campbell’s doubt as to the identity of the leaders (‘[Theognis] talks of "our" evil insolence, but he identifies [the leaders] with the “bad”’) deserves some attention here. Although West equates the ῥήματονες with the popular leaders and argues that ‘[i]n the context we must assume the administration of justice to be in the hands of

48 Campbell, The Golden Lyre, p. 112.

49 West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 68.

50 Fisher, Hybris, p. 208.

51 West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 68.
the aristocracy: that is why the δῆμου ἡγεμόνες are agitating’, 52 he writes that ‘the ὑβρις to be corrected by the anticipated tyrant is “ours”, i.e. that of our class’. 53 But to say that in line 40 Theognis refers to the ὑβρις of one group (the aristocracy) and then in lines 41-42 goes on to refer to the faults of another group (the ἡγεμόνες, identified by West with the popular leaders) implies a considerable lack of clarity on the part of the poet. In view of the connecting γάρ in line 41, the ἡγεμόνες are probably to be thought of as members of the group defined by ημετέρης in line 40. This ημετέρης could mean simply ‘our city’, 54 but it could be used in a more restrictive sense to define a group within the city. 55 A further consideration here is the metaphor of 39 κύει: the ἡγεμόνες are breaking out from within ‘us’.

If this is the case, then Theognis is here referring to the κακότης of some members of his own class 56 (the ἡγεμόνες, i.e. those actually exercising the power of government), although with the deictic οἴδε in line 41 (ἀστοι μὲν γάρ ἐθ’ οἴδε σαφρόνες) the poet excludes the company present at the symposion at which the lines are being sung. This, of course, facilitates the repetition of the verses at other symposia, although the people represented by οἴδε may vary from time to time and place to place, what they represent does not. Danielewicz writes that the demonstrative οἴδε ‘a l w a y s retains its basic meaning “this here”, “this before you”.

52 West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, pp. 68-69.

53 West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus, p. 69. At p. 150, West calls the phrase ὑβρις ἡμετέρης ‘paradoxical’.

54 Cf. 235, where it is clear that ἡμῖν is to be equated with 236 πόλει.

55 Cf. e.g., 1102 ἡμετέρης φυλήν. 760 νόσον ἡμετέρων. 762 ἡμεῖς.

56 Cf. Fisher, Hybris, p. 209: ‘Hybris is clearly the illegal and corrupt abuse of power by members of the upper class and men of whom Theognis was naturally predisposed (hence, perhaps, “our evil hybris” in line 40), and whom he would usually label the agathoi: but when they behave so grossly, he is perfectly prepared to call them “the kakoi”’.

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“this present” and – unless in quotations of the heroes’ words [sc. in a mythological narrative] – refers to the here-and-now of the original performance', but it can also, in this case, refer to the here-and-now of subsequent performances; ‘present company’ is perpetually guaranteed exclusion from the criticisms of Theognis. Nagy summarizes the implications of this view, which seems to have the most in its favour:

we would expect the elite of this society to be the agathoi ‘nobles’, ‘but the leaders [hēgemones] have veered so as to fall into debasement [kakotēs]’ (43): in other words, the elite are now kakoi instead of agathoi, and the poet actually refers to them as kakoi (44). The reasoning is that they must be kakoi, since agathoi have never yet brought about the ruin of a city (43). .... We now see that Theognis is no one-sided champion of the elite as represented by an oligarchy, any more than Solon is a one-sided champion of democracy.

Nagy concludes that ‘Kyrnos himself is typical of the debased elite who “often” [855 πολλάκις] bring the ship of state to ruin’, and these are the same ἄνδρες μεγάλοι who are responsible for the ruin of the πόλις at Solon 9.3.

Theognis says at lines 43-45 that the ἄβρις of οἱ κακοὶ in the situation which he describes in 39-52 involves the handing over of δικαίος to the ἄδικοι. Line 45 (..., δικαίος τ’ ἄδικοι τ’ ἄδικοι διδόσιν) contains the root δική in two different senses, the first refers to ‘judgments’, the power of decision and control, and the second to ‘unrighteous’ men. This is in effect a play on the word, illustrating the way in which δική and its cognates have gained new fields of meaning since their appearance in the poetry of Homer. In the Odyssey, the root occurs many times, and here it often seems to mean ‘custom’; this sense can be found, for example, at 20.294-95 (= [153])

57 J. Danielewicz, ‘Deixis in Greek Choral Lyric’, p. 16. Although this idea works well with Theognis’ οἴδε and can in fact be expanded beyond ‘the original performance’. R. Nünlist (Poetologische Bildersprache, pp. 9-10, n. 25) notes that it is difficult to decide how to interpret, for example, Alkaios 357.8 ἐργὸν ... τοῦ in the light of Danielewicz’s formulation.


59 When Odysseus tells Agamemnon to be δικαίωτερος in future (Iliad 19.181), his following words make it clear that he refers to observance of custom when offence has been given: οὐ μὲν γὰρ
21.312-13) οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀτέμβειν οὐδὲ δίκαιον ἡξίους Τηλεμάχου, and 19.168-69 ἢ γὰρ δίκη, ὀπόπτε πάτρης | ἤς ἀπέτησιν ἄνηρ .... Odysseus repeatedly (6.120-21, 9.175-76, 13.201-202) wonders what sort of people inhabit the lands which he visits, presenting two alternatives: they are either ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὔδὲ δίκαιοι, or φιλόξενοι καὶ σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής. Here, οὔδὲ δίκαιοι means ‘lawless’, being placed in opposition with proper observance of hospitality and reverence of the gods.

Theognis makes a similar point at 53 ff., where he says that the people who are now the ἄγαθοι in the city were once living outside, people οἱ πρόσθ’ οὔτε δίκας ἡδεσαν οὔτε νόμους.

Δίκη and its derivatives are found many times in the Theognidea, sometimes in a concrete sense such as ‘judgments’ or ‘laws’ (lines 45, 54), or ‘law-suit’/’case’ (lines 268, 544), but more often in a more general sense to indicate ‘what is right’ (lines 197, 279, 292, 378, etc.). At 292, δίκη is described as having been defeated by ὑβρις; the opposition between these two terms is also seen at Solon 4.7-8, where the ἄδικος νόος of the ἠγεμόνες is associated with their ὑβρις. The δίκη of the state is upset by the ὑβρις of greedy men, and Solon links δίκη with calmness when he says that an ocean undisturbed by wind is δικαιοτάτη (fr. 12):

ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράσσεται· ἢν δὲ τις αὐτήν μὴ κίνη, πάντων ἔστι δικαιοτάτη.

60 This meaning is also found at Iliad 18.508.

61 Δίκη occurs once in the Theognidea with the meaning ‘retribution’ (207; at 279-80 this function is fulfilled by νέμεσις which punishes the man who κακῶς τὰ δίκαια νομίζει), which can also be seen at Solon 13.8 (cf. 4.14-16, where the personified Δίκη comes to exact punishment).
Thus, in turbulent circumstances, δική comes to signify the absence of upheaval;

Gentili rightly points out the grammatical similarity between the openings of Solon fragments 12 (above) and 9.62

εκ νεφελῆς πέλεται χίονος μένος ἣδε χαλάζης,
бронтή δ' ἐκ λαμπρῆς γίγνεται ἀστεροπῆς-
ἀνδρὸν ἐκ μεγάλων πόλεων ὀλυται, ὡς ἐδ' μονάρχου
δῆμος οὐφρητὴ δουλοσύνην ἐπέαεν.
λιθν δ' ἑξάραντ' (οὗ) ράδιον ἐστὶ κατασχεῖν
ὑστερὸν, ἀλλ' ἰδὴ χρή (καλὰ) πάντα νοεῖν.

Here the meteorological metaphor is made explicit: the δήμος is at the mercy of political ‘storms’, in the form of men who upset the equilibrium of the state, reducing the populace to δουλοσύνη.

Solon’s view of δική is consonant with his concern for keeping his city at peace by preventing both the upper and lower classes from gaining too much power (fr. 5, also discussed at the end of section 4.4 below):

δήμω μὲν γὰρ ἑδωκα τόσον γέρας δοσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
tiῆς οὔτ’ ἄφελων οὔτ’ ἐπορεύσαμενος;
o' δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἔδαν ἀγητοὶ,
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρισάμενης μηδὲν ἀεικῆς ἔχειν·
ἔστην δ’ ἀμφιβαλλόν κράτερὸν σάκος ἀμφιφτέροις,
νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἶσα’ οὐδέτέρους ἄδικως.

It is significant that nowhere in the surviving fragments of Solon’s poetry is the δήμος accused of being ἄδικος; the ability to disturb the polis is restricted to those with power, the ἕγεμόνες.

Noting that the adjective δικαῖος occurs only once in the surviving fragments of Solon’s poetry (12.2, cited above), Havelock suggests that it is at this point that

62 B. Gentili, ‘La giustizia del mare’, p. 161. Gentili compares Iliad 2.144 ff.: κινηθή δ' ἀγορὴ φη κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης,
pόντου Ἰκαρίοιο, τὰ μὲν τ' Ἕλερος τε Νότος τε
ὠρὸς ἐπαίξας πατρὸς Δίος ἐκ νεφελῶν
and 2.394 ff.:...

... Ἀργείοι δὲ μέγ' Ἰαχυν. ως δὲ κύμα
ἀκτῇ ἐνυ ὑψηλῇ, δὲ κινήσῃ Νότος ἐλθὼν ....
the symbolization of dikē has been extended beyond civic procedure to cover the concept of the civic order within which the procedure takes place.\textsuperscript{63} Recognizing such a shift in meaning, the poets can exploit it in such expressions as δημόν τέ φθείρωσι δίκας τ' ἀδίκοισι διδώσιν (Theognis 45); Bakchylides, extending the sense of δίκαι from ‘judgments’ to ‘punishments’ (\textit{i.e.} ‘judgments against one’) employs the same word-play as Theognis:

\[ \delta\betaριος ύπινόου παύσει δίκας θνατοίσι κραίνων... \] (13.43-44)

\[ ... \ ἡ \ θεός \ αὐτὸν \ ὀρμᾶ, \ δίκας \ ἀδίκοισιν \ ὀφρα \ μῆσται... \] (18.41-42).

\textbf{4.4 Wealth, Class, and Power}\textsuperscript{64}

For some of the poets of this period, the issue of a person’s wealth or status in society (which can be treated either as linked factors or two separate concerns) is relevant to their claim to be ἄγαθος. Linforth writes that

No distinction is made by Solon … between the noble and the rich, who are also called indifferently the few, the distinguished, or the powerful. Often enough, with a singular directness, but without any thought of moral distinction, the upper classes are called the good, and the lower classes the bad.\textsuperscript{65}

But these statements cannot both be true of, for example, Solon fr. 15; the poet writes πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἄγαθοι δὲ πένονται, and if Linforth’s assertion that

\textsuperscript{63} E.A. Havelock, \textit{The Greek Concept of Justice}, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{64} See also section 4.5; the relationship between wealth and virtue is of particular concern in epinician poetry, given the genre’s emphasis on διανά as essential to victory and the fame that comes from celebration in song.

\textsuperscript{65} Linforth, \textit{Solon the Athenian}, p. 51.
'the upper classes are called the good, and the lower classes the bad' is accepted, then it is clear that Solon is here making a distinction between ‘the noble’ and ‘the rich’. If the terms ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ refer to the higher and lower classes respectively, then Solon is trying to make the point that ‘the noble’ are not necessarily to be equated with ‘the rich’, many people who are now wealthy are not members of the nobility, while the nobility itself is impoverished. Only if we take ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ to mean something other than social position (against the second sentence of Linforth quoted above) will the identity between ‘the noble’ and ‘the rich’ still hold, since Solon would then be writing about the discrepancies between people’s wealth and their true worth, rather than their social standing.

Linforth, in fact, contradicts his own assessment of the terms ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ as referring to social class in the poetry of Solon; Linforth contends that there is undoubtedly a marked change in Solon’s political opinions: before he put his reforms into effect, he was disposed to lay the blame for the misfortunes of Athens on the greed of the rich; later he was equally convinced of the folly and incapacity of the lower classes. As an example of some of Solon’s poetry written before his archonship, Linforth cites (along with 4b, 4c, 13, and 24) this same poem, fr. 15. If indeed, as Linforth maintains, this poem is attacking the greed of the rich, then, as noted above (4.1), the words ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ must be used here either in a non-social sense or to denote the ‘legitimate’ nobility as opposed to those who have no claim to be rich; Linforth’s simple division into ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ classes is inadequate. The word ἡμεῖς in line 2 identifies the speaker as one of the ἀγαθοὶ who πένυονται, he is not of high

66 Either moral worth or general excellence; see above, section 4.1.
67 Linforth, Solon the Athenian, p. 9.
68 The aristocratic opinion that those of noble lineage deserve to be rich will be discussed below, with special reference to the Theognidea.
social standing but is nevertheless ἀγαθός, since from his point of view ἀρετή is independent of wealth.\(^{69}\)

There are few occurrences of the words ἀγαθός, ἕσθλος, κακός, and δειλός in the surviving poetry of Solon about which it can be said with certainty that these words are meant to be understood in the social sense. There is only one occurrence of δειλός (13.39 ἄλλος δειλός ἐὼν ἀγαθός δοκεῖ ἐμμεναι ἀνήρ), and there it is more likely that the word is being used with a moral meaning. Of the four occurrences of ἕσθλος, three are not applications of this adjective to people (13.63 Μοῖρα δὲ τοι ἑθητοῖσι κακῶν φέρει ηδὲ καὶ ἕσθλον, 19.5-6 κύδος ... | ἕσθλον, 33.2 ἕσθλὰ ... θεοῦ διδόντος). As for the fourth (34.9), its immediate context provides little in the way of guidance as to whether it should be interpreted in the social sense; only the comment about the redistribution of land which precedes this fragment in the *Constitution of Athens* suggests that when Solon writes (34.8-9) οὐδὲ πιεῖ[ρ]ης χθονὸς | πατρίδος κακοίσιν ἕσθλοὺς ἱσομοιρίην ἔχειν, he is referring to social class rather than true worth. It is more likely that the κακοί here referred to by Solon are either corrupt aristocrats by birth or *nouveaux riches*, as Rosivach points out,\(^{70}\) the beginning of the fragment describes a group of men attempting to enrich themselves:

οἱ δὲ ἐφ’ ἀρπαγῆσιν ἠλθον· ἐλπίδ’ εἶχον ἀφενην, κάδοκ[ε]ν ἐκαστος αὐτῶν ὁλον εὐρησειν πολυν ....

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\(^{69}\) Solon fr. 24 also rejects material wealth as irrelevant, but is not concerned with whether a rich man can be called ἀγαθός; in 24 Solon redefines wealth (1 πλουτέουσαν, 7 ἀφενος) in more simple terms (food, clothes, a family) and says that riches beyond these (7-8 περιώσαν ... χρηματ’) are of no use since they cannot be taken beyond the grave and no one can escape death. This redefinition attacks the cult of wealth from a different angle than does fr. 15.

\(^{70}\) V.J. Rosivach, ‘Redistribution of Land in Solon’.
This suggests not a democratic uprising, in which case δλβον ... πολύν would be something of an overstatement of what each (ἐκαστος) man might expect, 71 but rather the hope harboured by relatively wealthy and powerful κακοί (those who πλουτέουσι at Solon 15.1) who supported Solon’s reforms that he might then reward them in time-honoured tyrannical fashion.

Solon states at 36.18-20 that he instituted θεσμοῖς δ’ ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τῇ κάγαθῳ | εὐθείᾳν εἰς ἐκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην, and here as in 13.33 (θνητοὶ δ’ ὤδε νοέομεν ὁμώς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε) the terms of evaluation could be interpreted in either sense. In fr. 15, though, Solon does not appear to be employing the terms in a social sense (see above).

The shift in Solon’s attitudes towards the upper and lower classes for which Linforth argues is difficult to prove. Linforth cites Solon fr. 6

\[\delta\muος \delta' \omega' \deltaν \\alpha\rhoιστα \sigmaυν \\gammaγεμόνεσιν \\epsilonπιτο\]  
\[\mu\nuτε \\lambdaιην \\alpha\νεθει\]  
\[\tauικτει \gammaα\rho \\kappaορος \\υβριν, \\sigmaταν \\piολυς \\deltaλβος \\epsilonπηται \]  
\[\\alphaνθρωποις \\οποσοις \\mu\nu \\nuος \\\alphaρτιος \]  

and claims that it was written after Solon’s archonship, ‘at a time when Solon was no longer disposed to hold the rich responsible for all that was wrong’; 72 but Campbell thinks that these lines ‘are clearly aimed at the nobility, who are told not to use force in their dealings with the people’. 73 Both opinions are unjustified by anything in the lines themselves, and there is certainly nothing in the text to indicate whether these lines were written before or after Solon’s archonship. But the reference to πολύς δλβος in line 4 strongly suggests that, against Linforth’s interpretation, it is indeed

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71 Rosivach (p. 155) notes that ‘it is unlikely that someone as attentive to the issue of wealth as Solon would make such a mistake’.

72 Linforth, Solon the Athenian, p. 181.

73 Campbell, The Golden Lyre, p. 95.
'the rich' who are here perceived by Solon to be responsible for at least some of the state's troubles; whether he means the *nouveaux riches* or the old aristocracy, or (probably) both, is not made explicit. Solon was by no means a 'democrat' in the modern sense; he aimed at *political* equality for all Athenians regardless of economic status, but *economic* equality was never his objective.74

The second couplet of Solon fr. 6 reappears at lines 153-54 of the Theognidea, in the following form:

\[ \text{τίκτει τοι κόρος ὑβριν, ὅταν κακῶ ὁλβος ἔπηται} \]
\[ \text{ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἀρτιος ἦ.} \]

Van Groningen, commenting on κακῶ in the above passage, notes that the lines have the meaning, 'l'opulence n'est dangereuse que pour le méchant'.75 The two versions of the couplet carry the same sense, but the insertion of the word κακῶ brings the lines more explicitly within the Theognidean concern for the opposition between ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ. Another couplet in the Theognidea (lines 525-26) states that it is only the ἀγαθοὶ who really deserve to be wealthy:

\[ \text{καὶ γὰρ τοι πλοῦτον μὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθοῖς ἔοικεν,} \]
\[ \text{ἡ πενήθη δὲ κακῶ σύμφωρος ἄνδρι φέρειν.} \]

But the fact remains that even the κακοὶ can be rich, despite the fact that they are κακοὶ: 149 χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκω ἄνδρι δίδωσιν. Lines 153-54 warn of the dangers that attend when a κακός has ὁλβος instead of the πενήθη that 525-26 define as his due. For a Theognidean aristocrat, wealth alone is no indication of a man's worth, and there are repeated injunctions not to obtain riches by unjust means: πέπνυσο, μηδ' αἰσχροίς ἐπ' ἐργασία μηδ' ἀδίκοις | τιμᾶς μηδ' ἀρετᾶς ἔλκεο

74 This point is well made by Rosivach; cf. also J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, pp. 55-65.

75 Van Groningen, *Théognis: le premier livre*, p. 61. He also writes that 'chez Th., κακῶ définit ἄνθρωπω, mais fait double emploi avec ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἀρτιος ἦ. La phrase originale de Solon est plus vigoureuse.'
An opposing view can be found in the Theognidea at lines 1117-18:

Πλοῦτε, θεῶν κάλλιστε καὶ οἰκονομοῦσα πάντων,
σὺν σοὶ καὶ κακὸς ὃν γίνεται ἐσθήλος ἀνὴρ.

Both this couplet and the poem in which West places 525-26 are addressed to Ploutos, and are thus not assigned by West to Theognis himself. But although Theognis may have used the name ‘Κύρνος’ as his σφηνίς (19-20), the possibility that he composed poems addressing Ploutos, as other symposiasts might well have been doing, cannot be ruled out. 76 On the other hand, since lines 1117-18 express a point of view which is explicitly rejected in verses which are more securely attributable to Theognis, the likelihood of their being by Theognis might appear smaller; but van Groningen’s suggestion that the couplet 1117-18 is ‘ironique’, or meant in ‘un ton enjoué’, 77 if correct, would mean that the lines could well have been composed by Theognis himself, perhaps to initiate a sympotic exchange; the couplet invites a response such as the sentiment expressed in 149-50: a κακὸς may obtain χρήματα, but he will still lack ἀρετή. 78

Along with the view that the ἄγαθοι desire to be wealthy, one finds in the Theognidea several passages which state that πενή, inasmuch as it is a state which is inappropriate for an ἄγαθος, ought to be avoided at all costs: lines 173-78, 179-80, 351-54, for example. But there are other places in the Theognidea where men are

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76 One might compare the series of hymns to Apollo and Artemis at the beginning of the Theognidean collection; although Kyrnos’ name, not surprisingly, does not appear in any of them, at least one (lines 11-14) was thought by Aristotle to be by Theognis himself.

77 Van Groningen, Théognis: le premier livre, p. 409.

78 Another example of verses which might have been composed in a sympotic exchange is the couplet 887-88 (discussed in 2.1); compare the couplets immediately preceding and following it.
exhorted to bear up under misfortune, since the gods frequently upset the fortunes of humans: lines 319-22, 355-60, 401-406, 441-46, 591-94, and 659-66. One may lose one's wealth, but one can still be ἀγαθὸς if one behaves appropriately. 79

Alkaios, on the other hand, is unambiguous in his declaration that a man cannot be ἔσλος without wealth: quoting Aristodamos, with whom he says he agrees (οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ... λόγον). 80 Alkaios expresses the opinion that χρήματ' ἀνήρ, πένιχρος δ' οὖν' εἰς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος (360). While Solon sees wealth as desirable (13.7 χρήματα δ' ιμείρω μὲν ἐχειν) but not a necessary condition for a man to be ἀγαθὸς (15.2-3 οὐ διαμειψόμεθα | τὴς ἁρετῆς τον πλοῦτον: one can have ἁρετή without πλοῦτος), 81 Alkaios/Aristodamos states that wealth is a prerequisite for anyone who wants to be called ἔσλος. And Alkaios’ aristocratic viewpoint is emphasized by his use of the word τίμιος, 82 as was the case with the Homeric heroes, the pursuit of personal honour, usually at the expense of others, is paramount. This is just the sort of competition that Solon (5.1-2; see also the end of section 4.3 above) says he attempted to put a stop to in Athens:

δὴμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωκα τόσον γέρας δησον ἐπαρκεῖν, 
τιμῆς οὔτ' ἀφελῶν οὔτ' ἐπορεξάμενος.

79 Cf. also 319-22 and 355-60.

80 It should be noted that there is no context for Alkaios’ quotation. Given the tendency of poets to quote sayings in order to dispute them, perhaps Alkaios’ expression οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ... λόγον carried the force of the similar qualified praise ρήμα Άλαθειας ... ἀγαθηστα βαινον in Pindar. Isthmian 2.10 (discussed below, section 4.5 — the scholia to the Pindaric passage are, in fact, one of the sources for Alkaios’ verses), and was followed by criticism of Aristodamos.

81 Solon fr. 15 appears virtually unaltered at lines 315-18 of the Theognidea, and a similar sentiment occurs at Theognidea 1061-62 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύσαντες ἔχουσιν | πόνω, τοι δ' ἁρετήν οὐλομένη πενή. Sappho 148 (though the text is corrupt) also appears to say that some people have wealth without ἁρετή, but does not make the claim that it is possible to have ἁρετή without πλοῦτος.

82 Alkaios’ opinion that a man without wealth is not τίμιος is echoed at line 621 of the Theognidea: πᾶς τις πλοῦσιον ἀνόρα τιε. ἀτίει δὲ πενιχρὸν.
Murray comments that

In this fragment it is remarkable that even the *demos* has *timē*, but Solon clearly recognises that different social classes possess it to different degrees. In the Solonian constitution *timē* was for the first time legally defined, in the rights of office allocated to different groups on the basis of a property qualification: each class (*telos*) had its appropriate *geras*.

There is a striking verbal parallel between this fragment of Solon and a passage from Pindar’s first *Pythian* ode (vv. 69-70, which are part of an address to Zeus):

σύν τοι τίν κεν ἀγητὴρ ἀνήρ,
υἱὸς τ’ ἐπιτελλόμενος, δάμον γεραί-
ρον τράποι σύμφωνον ἑς ἰσοχίον.

In both cases a γέρας provided for the δῆμος by the leader is the issue. Solon uses the term δῆμος to designate, at least primarily, the majority of society, those who are not rich or powerful; this is made clear by the next verse of his fragment 5, where δῆμος μὲν from the first line is answered by the phrase οἱ δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ
χρήμασιν ἴσοιν ἀγητοί, and Pindar’s use of the word here appears similar.

Burton remarks that this section of the first *Pythian* ode ‘reveals Pindar as an educator of princes and something of a propagandist for the Dorian way of life’, noting that the phrase θεοδόματω σύν ἔλευθερια (line 61) ‘sounds like a concept which can form the basis of a political system’ and sensing a ‘strong note of advice, even of warning’ in the exhortation to concord at lines 69-70. In this Dorian context, it is perhaps appropriate to compare the Spartan *rhētra* as described in Tyrtaios fr. 4 and Plutarch, *Lykourgos* 6. This was an oracular answer (τελέεντ’ ἔπεια, Tyrtaios 4.2;

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85 As opposed to the ‘freedom’ of, e.g., Isthmian 8.16, fragment 65, and the closing lines of *Pythian* 8, which ‘all refer ... to deliverance from some specified peril’ (Burton, *Pindar’s Pythian Odes*, p. 104).
compare Pindar’s invocation of Zeus τέλειος at *Pythian* 1.67), which Lykourgos is reported to have received from Delphi, and which described a form of government in which the ‘elders’ (πρεσβυγενεῖς or γερόντες) mediated between the βασιλεῖς and the δήμος; the elders would propose motions in assembly, and these motions could be accepted or rejected by the δήμος. In this sense, the δήμος could be described as having some power, as it is in Tyrtaios’ phrase δήμου τε πλήθει νίκην καὶ κάρτος ἐπεσθαί (4.9) and in Plutarch’s report that the oracle decreed δάμω δὲ τὰν κυρίαν ἰμεν καὶ κράτος. There may be a hint of this sort of arrangement in Pindar’s advice to the tyrant Hieron to γεραίρειν τὸν δῆμος (*Pythian* 1.70). Pindar elsewhere expresses his disapproval of tyranny (*Pythian* 11.52 ff.):

... τῶν γὰρ ἄνα πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ
{σὺν} ὅλῳ τεθαλάτα, μέμφομ’ αἰσχὸν τυραννίδων
ζυναισὶ δ’ ἄμφ’ ἀρεταις τέταμαι ....

Here the poet finds fault with ‘the αἰσχα of tyrannies’ – their ‘dispensation’, referring both to the fortunes they endure (hence the contrast with the more fortunate μέσα in the preceding verse) and to the ‘dispensation’ of the state under a tyranny. Again, both senses of αἰσχα may be implied at *Pythian* 1.67 ff., where Pindar prays that Zeus τέλειος may grant to the ἀστοι and the βασιλεῖς of Deinomenes’ city the same kind of αἰσχα that the Dorians had. As Pindar (*Pythian* 11.52) said that he preferred τὰ μέσα,

Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 5.6-7) writes that it was as a ‘middle ground’ between tyranny and democracy that the Spartans set up their form of government:

αἰωρουμένη γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία καὶ ἀποκλίνουσα νῦν μὲν ὡς τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ τυραννίδα, νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ πλήθος ἐπὶ δημοκρατίαν, οἷον ἔρμα τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ἐν μέσῳ θεμένη καὶ ισορροπίσασα τὴν ἀποφαλεστάτην ταξιν ἐσχε καὶ καταστασιν ....

The term δήμος in the passages of Solon (fr. 9) and Pindar (*Pythian* 1.70) cited above is essentially ‘neutral’, conveying neither approval nor disapproval of the

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86 Lines 9-10 of the fragment are not quoted in Plutarch, but appear in Diodoros (7.12.6).
group in question. This is very different from the outlook of the Theognidea, where
the δήμος is κενεόφρων at 233 and 847, in the latter case to be trampled upon and
made to submit. Solon’s δήμος is described in less derogatory language in the
middle of fragment 9 (lines 3-4):

\[
\text{άνδρών} \text{δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ἄλλως, ἵππος δ' μονάρχου δήμος ἀδριθή δουλοσύνθην ἔπεσεν.}
\]

The δήμος here simply does not know any better than to allow a tyranny to establish
itself, and the blame for the ruin of the city is placed on the shoulders of the ἄνδρες
μεγάλοι in line 3. The δήμος κενεόφρων at Theognidea 847, by contrast, is
portrayed as not merely ignorant but wilful: it is φιλοδέσποτος in line 849.

The δήμος itself, though, spoke of itself with some pride as early as the late
seventh century, at least in a colony (CEG 143, Kerkyra, ca 625-600?):

\[
\text{ποιεῖτε τὰσια} \text{τὸσοι δάμος}
\]

\[
\text{όιανθεός γενεάν, τόδε δ' αὐτοὶ δάμος ἑποίειν}
\]

\[
\text{ἐξ γὰρ προξένος δάμου φίλος· ἀλλ' ἐνὶ πόντοι}
\]

\[
\text{δόλεο, δαμόσιον δὲ καθὸν ῥο[ ]}
\]

\[
\text{Προεξίσμενος δ' αὐτοὶ γ[αία]ς ἐπο πατρίδος ἐνθὸν}
\]

\[
\text{σὺν δάμ[ο]ι τόδε σάμα καστηγνέτοιο πονὲθε.}
\]

Friedländer and Hoffleit comment that in this epitaph, ‘Symbolic of the new political
atmosphere is the four-times repeated δήμος’. And just as, according to Solon and

\[87\] Pindar numbers himself among the δήμος at Nemean 7.65-66 ἐν τε δαμότας | δηματα
δέρκομαι λαμπρών, οὐχ υπερβαλλών; this humble attitude is present from the beginning of the ode
with its invocation to Eleithyia which, as Most comments, ‘introduces the poem on the highest level
of generality. Such a beginning is indeed impressive, provoking as it does an immediate
identification of poet, victor, and audience (for we are all born)’ (G.W. Most, The Measures of
Praise, p. 134). Bakchylides never uses δήμος, ἀστοι, or even πολίται.

\[88\] The lack of good qualities among the Theognidean δήμος may be attributable to its
ήγεμόνες, those κακοὶ of whom it is said in line 45 that δήμον τε φθείρωσι, δίκας δ' ἀδίκοις
dιδώσων, if φθείρωσι is taken to mean ‘corrupt’ rather than ‘destroy’, as van Groningen understands
it (Théognis: le premier livre, p. 29): ‘il ne s’agit pas d’oppression, mais de corruption: la plebe est
ameutée, excitée par des promesses illicites. Th. ne ressent pas de pitié pour elle.’ In support of this
tὸν δήμον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, ‘par ses emportements’.

\[89\] Friedländer and Hoffleit, Epigrammata, p. 31.

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Pindar, a leader is obliged to bestow a γέρας upon the δήμος, the δήμος itself reciprocates with the same act after the restoration of democracy (CEG 431, Athens, 403/2 = anon. FGE 114):

τούσδ’ ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαιίθων
δήμος Ἀθηναίων οἳ ποτε τοὺς ἄδικους
θεσμοῖς ἀρξαντας πόλεως πρῶτοι καταπεφευν
ήρξαν κινδύνων σώμασιν ἀράμενοι.

Like the ὤνες Ἀχαϊῶν who gave Achilleus his γέρας (Iliad 1.162-163) as a reward for his prowess in battle, here the δήμος of Athens ἐγέραιρε Thrasyboulos who led the armed uprising against the Thirty Tyrants.

4.5 Wealth and Virtue in Epinician Poetry

The collection of Pindar's epinician odes, as it has come down to us, opens with an elaborate declaration of the pre-eminence of the Olympian games (Olympian 1.1 ff.); this competition, the poet says, is more deserving of celebration in song than all other athletic contests, just as the sun is the warmest and brightest star in the sky. This long comparison is preceded by two briefer statements of other kinds of excellence: first the enigmatic assertion that 'water is best', and then the description of gold as outstanding among worldly goods, shining in the night like a blazing fire. In a similar passage in the third Olympian ode (42-44), Pindar again uses water and gold as examples of pre-eminence:

ει δ’ ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ
χρυσὸς αἰδοῦέστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατίαν
Θῆρων ἀρεταίσιν ἴκανων ἀπτεται
οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος
σταλάν.

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Here it is not the radiance of gold that is emphasised, but rather the fact that it is the 'most revered' (αἰδοῦστατος) of possessions; it was perhaps with this passage in mind that Gerber commented on the opening of the first Olympian:

There can be no question that one of the attributes of gold which Pindar here and in some other passages emphasizes is its gleam, but critics err, I think, in maintaining that this is its primary significance .... Rather, to Pindar as to other Greeks, gold is an object of praise because it is the most valuable of material possessions and its gleam is an incidental attribute which serves to enhance the value it already has.90

Verdenius, however, rightly points out that what Pindar is emphasizing at the beginning of the first Olympian is not 'an “incidental attribute”, but an essential aspect, which includes both visual gleam or radiance ... and commercial value'.91 Gold's radiance and its value are inseparable, and this connection between the two aspects is made by Pindar in the opening to the fifth Isthmian ode:

Μέτερ Ἀελίου πολυώνυμε Θεία,  
σέο ἐκατι καὶ μεγαθενή νομίσαν  
χρυσόν ἀνθρωποι περιώσιον ἄλλων.

Theia is the mother of the sun and thus the source of light, and Pindar says that it is because of her that mortals have assigned the highest value to gold: its brilliance makes it also (καὶ) valuable. In the lines following this introduction, the poet says that it is for the sake of Theia's τιμή that glory is won in the games; 'thus Theia ... is proclaimed as the very idea of value, that is, as the power which in every field creates and establishes value as something valid and binding'.92

For Pindar, then, gold is both radiant and valuable; but Pindar's view of the 'value' of wealth is not expressed in monetary terms. This view is well illustrated by

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92 H. Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 487.
a passage from the second Olympian ode (53-56) which, again using the imagery of light, states what makes wealth valuable and desirable:

\[
\text{ό μάν πλούτος ἁρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος}
\]
\[
\text{φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν}
\]
\[
\text{καιρὸν βαθείαν ὑπὲχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν,}
\]
\[
\text{ἀστήρ ἄριζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον}
\]
\[
\text{ἄνδρὶ φέγγος.}
\]

Wealth ‘embellished with ἁρεται’ brings the καιρὸς for various things, supporting eager ambition. This μέριμνα is presumably the same μέριμνα which is described at Pythian 8.92 as ‘greater than πλούτος’, i.e. ambition for great things, including athletic achievement; μέριμνα occurs in this sense also at Olympian 1.108, Nemean 3.69, and fragment 227.1, and the language of Pythian 8.91-92 is recalled at Nemean 9.32-33: ἐντὶ τοι φιλαποί τ’ αὐτόθι καὶ κτεάνων ψυχὰς ἔχοντες κρέσσονας | ἄνδρες.

The value of wealth, in Pindar’s view, lies in the ability of a wealthy man to engage in such activities as athletic competition (and, of course, to hire a poet like Pindar to celebrate his victories). This is why wealth ἁρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος is described as an ἀστήρ ἄριζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον | ἄνδρὶ φέγγος; when this language is read in the context of the vision of the after-life in the following lines, it seems hard to deny the mystical connotations of this passage, although Willcock in his recent commentary seems implicitly to distance himself from ‘those scholars who feel that there is here some echo of mystic terminology, anticipating the picture just coming’. 93 The combination of wealth, light, and knowledge of life after death in Olympian 2.53 ff. is striking, and the opening of the fifth Isthmian ode, as has been seen, also endows gold with a sacred significance linked with its radiance and value. Gold, which is conspicuously brilliant, enables a man to become conspicuously successful. 94

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94 Compare, e.g., Olympian 5.15, where ἀμφ’ ἁρεταῖσι πόνος διαπάνα τε μάρναται.
But Pindar specifies at *Olympian* 2.53 that πλοῦτος must be ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος. Willcock notes that this phrase does not imply a wealthy man who is also virtuous, except in a special sense of 'virtuous', i.e. a wealthy man who has the talents (decisiveness, commitment, ability) that lead to success. All the same, moral implications are not absent; good deeds are the work of a person with ἀρετά, and Theron, the possessor in *O.* 2 of πλοῦτος ἀρεταίσα [sic] δεδαιδαλμένος, is later praised as a benefactor (ἐυεργέτας 94).  

A moral component of ἀρεταῖ here is also perhaps suggested by Pindar's mention of the good treatment after death of those who ἔχαρον εὐορκίας (66) and the transportation to the Isle of the Blessed of those who have been able ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἄδικων ἐχειν | ψυχὰν (69-70) during three lives 'on either side', since both of these are among the things that the poet reveals especially to the man who has πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος: εἰ δὲ νῦν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι ... (56).

Another specific virtue with which Theron is credited in line 94 of the poem is that no-one has a 'more ungrudging hand' than he does (ἀφθονέστερὸν τε χέρα). This generosity is a consistent characteristic of Pindar's ideal wealthy man, and is perhaps most fully expressed at *Nemean* 1.31-33:

οὐκ ἔρομαι πολλὰν ἑν
μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐντὸν εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκούσαι φίλοις ἐξαρκέων.
κοινὰ χάρ ἔρχοντ᾽ ἐλπίδες
πολυπόνων ἄνδρῶν.

This passage is cited by Bundy as illustrating the Pindaric idea of εὐεργεσία, 'good works, liberality, indifference to gain', and it is significant that in *Olympian* 2.94 the description of Theron as εὐεργέτας is linked closely (τε) with his 'ungrudging hand'. An important part of εὐεργεσία in Pindar is what Bundy calls 'harmony between self-interest and altruism', or 'balanced altruism': 'One serves one's own best interests by

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95Willcock, p. 19.

96E.L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, p. 86.
serving those of others’. This is the point of the κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες mentioned at Nemean 1.32. The quid pro quo arrangement between poet and patron is forcefully expressed in a negative way in the concluding verses of the first Isthmian ode:

... εἰ δὲ τις ἔνδον νέμει πλοῦτον κρυφαίον, ἄλλοις δ’ ἐμπίπτων γελά, ψυχήν Ἀιδα τελέων οὐ φαύζεται δόξας ἀνευθεν.

Here the threat of a death δόξας ἀνευθεν is used as an incentive not to hoard wealth; in return for the patron’s generosity, the poet will preserve his δόξα. This theme is elaborated at Pythian 1.92-94:

... μὴ δολωθής, ὥ φίλε, κέρδεσιν ἐντραπό- λοις’ ὑπεθύμβροτοι αὐχήμα δόξας ὁλον ἀποθεμένον ἄνδρῶν διαπανοῦει καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς’ οὐ φθίνει Κροί- σου φιλόφρων ἄρετα.

Again δόξα is cited as a reason not to ‘be tricked by gains’, and here the λόγιοι and ᾧς who will provide the αὐχήμα δόξας are mentioned explicitly; generosity is here given the status of an ἄρετα (this particular ἄρετα of Kroisos is recalled in Bakchylides’ third ode, which was also composed for Hieron two years after Pindar’s first Pythian, and which will be discussed below). Bundy distinguishes three ‘motives’ in the ‘praise of wealth and its proper use’ in Pindar: εὔεργεσία; ‘human expectations (shared humanity, human dependence on God or fate)’; and ‘enduring fame’. But these three motives are more interdependent than Bundy implies: the ‘enduring fame’ theme falls into the Bundy’s category of ‘balanced altruism’, a characteristic of εὔεργεσία which has its roots in shared humanity (the κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες

97Bundy, Studia Pindarica, p. 87.

98Indeed, fame is implicitly compared to a kind of πλοῦτος at Olympian 10.86-94: just as an old man is pleased when his wife bears him a son since his πλοῦτος (88) is now saved for his family, a victor should be pleased with the renown that the poet’s song will bring.

99Bundy, Studia Pindarica, p. 86.
of *Nemean* 1.32). And again the imagery of light applies: the gleam of wealth must be seen, not hidden (*Nemean* 1.31 κατακρύψας, *Isthmian* 1.67 κρυφαίον). This is part of the ἀρετά (*Pythian* 1.94) that is expected to ‘embellish’ wealth (*Olympian* 2.53), and which wealth makes possible.

Another virtue which should attend wealth is ἀληθία;¹⁰⁰ in the seventh *Nemean* ode (14-20), the ἀληθείαι understand the common lot of all humans, and are not ‘harmed’ by κέρδος:

εὐρήται {τι} ἀληθείν μόχθων κλυταίς ἐπέων ἀοιδαίς.

In the absence of any word qualifying a particular field of expertise, Most argues, ‘ἀληθείᾳ in Pindar always describes an intelligent man in general and never exclusively a poet’; in this case, Most suggests that the ἀληθείαι are in fact meant to be patrons of poetry: recognising that death is inevitable, they ‘will use their money to commission epinician odes’, thus gaining a sort of immortality, rather than becoming obsessed with the mere acquisition of wealth (οὐδ’ ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβην).¹⁰¹ And this general intelligence, with respect to wealth, consists in recognition of the fact that material prosperity is not an end in itself, but an aid to the achievement of higher things (compare the κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν of *Pythian* 8.92), including success in the games and an appreciation for poetry. These two are shown in the sixth *Pythian* ode

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¹⁰⁰See also below, section 4.6, for the significance of ἀληθία in a civic context.

¹⁰¹G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise*, pp.145-46. This view was earlier expressed by D.C. Young, ‘Pindar, *Nemean* 7: Some Preliminary Remarks’, and C. Carey, *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar*, p. 142. G. Kirkwood (Selections from Pindar, p. 266) argues that the reference of this passage is to the warning about the powers of poetry that follows, but the theme of a patron’s generosity securing his fame is so common in Pindar that here the praise of the sailors for not being greedy seems more naturally taken in this sense.
to be closely connected with intelligent use of wealth (note νόμ in 47, repeated in 51):

νόμος δὲ πλοῦτων ἀγεί,
ἀδίκων σοφὲς ὑπέρσπλεον ἦβαν ὀρέπων,
σοφίαν δὲ ἐν μυχοῖς Πειρίδων
τιν τ', Ἑλένησον, ἀρχεῖς δὲ ἰππαίν ἔσωδων,
μάλα ἄδονι νόμω, Ποσειδών, προσέξεται.

This general ‘intelligence’ is quite different from specific kinds of σοφία: at *Pythian* 3.54, referring to Asklepios’ accepting payment to try to bring a man back from the dead, Pindar asserts that ἄλλα κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται.

A man who is σοφὸς will also know the difference between mere material gain and what Pindar calls ὀλβὸς: this is made clear in the fourth *Pythian* ode, where Jason, ‘laid the foundation of wise words’ (βάλλετο κρητίδα σοφῶν ἐπέων, 138) and said (139-41):

έντι μὲν θνατῶν φρένες ὑκύτεραι
κέρδος αἰνήσαι πρὸ δίκας δόλιον τραχεῖαν ἐρπότοιον πρὸς ἐπίβαν διμως
ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ χρή καὶ σὲ θεμισσαμένους ὀργάς ὑφαίνειν λοιπὸν ὀλβον.

In the passage that follows, Jason offers to let Pelias keep the material wealth which he has taken unjustly: Jason can have ὀλβὸς without it, as long as he can have the sceptre and the throne which are rightfully his. 102 This conception of ὀλβὸς as something more than material wealth is obscured by Slater’s definition of the term as ‘esp. material prosperity’. 103 [Pindar] defines the man who ὑγιέτα... ὀλβὸν ἀρδεῖ as ἐξαρκέων κτείτεσι καὶ εὐλογίαν προστιθεῖς (*Olympian* 5.23-24; compare φίλοις ἐξαρκέων at *Nemean* 1.32, again in the context of winning good repute); wealth is of

102 Compare *Pythian* 5.14 ff., where Arkesilas’ status as a βασιλεῖς is listed as the first component of his ὀλβος, which is itself closely allied with the fact that he is ἐρχόμενος ἐν δίκας.

course necessary for true ὀλβος in Pindar, but it is not enough in itself. The proper use of wealth, which is an aspect of ἀρετα, is a requirement for ὀλβος.

In this respect, Pindar may be said to resemble Solon in Herodotos’ story of Solon and Kroisos; ὀλβος is something more than just ‘wealth’, although Pindar does not stipulate that a man can only be called ὀλβος once he is dead, as Solon is made to do by Herodotos. Pindar, unlike Herodotos’ Solon, believes that ὀλβος can be transitory (e.g. Pythian 3.105-6 ὀλβος {δ’} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται | σάος, πολὺς ἐντ’ ἀν ἐπιβρίσασις ἔπηται), and in this he conforms to what Lévéque calls ‘la grande tradition du pessimisme archaïque’: however ὀλβος is defined, it may be snatched away without warning by the gods.104 Fragment 54 of Bakchylides also fits this tradition: ὀλβος οὐδέποτε βροτῶν πάντα χρόνον. Interestingly, Pindar’s quasi-ethical conception of ὀλβος is closer to that found in Solon 13W.3 ff., where ὀλβος is linked both with δόξα ἀγαθη and with just behaviour; here Pindar approaches the real Solon more than he does the Solon in Herodotos.

One might also compare the view expressed in a fragment of Euripides’ Antiope (198 N2):

εὶ δ’ εὔτυχῶν τις καὶ βιον κεκτημένος
μὴ δέν δομοι τῶν καλῶν θηράσεται,
ἔγω μὲν αὐτὸν οὐποτ’ ὀλβιον καλῶν,
φύλακα δὲ μᾶλλον χρημάτων εὐδαίμονα.

Commenting on this fragment, Kambitsis compares Olympian 1.84,105 where Pelops refuses to be ἀπάντων καλῶν ἐμορος and calls on Poseidon to help him win Hippodameia as his bride, but also relevant is Pythian 11.50-58, where καλά lead to ‘greater ὀλβος’, which includes the pursuit of ξυναὶ ἀρεταί:

... θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν,


105 J. Kambitsis, L’Antiope d’Euripide (Athens, 1972) ad loc.
δυνατὰ μαιόμενος ἐν ἀλικία.
tῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ
{σύν} ὄλβῳ τεθαλώτα, μέμφομ’ αἰῶναν τυραννιδῶν ν’
ἔριναις δ’ ἄμφι ἄρεταις τέταμαι: φθονεροὶ δ’ ἀμύνονται.
(ἄλλ’:) εἰ τις ἀκρον ἐλὼν
ηὐχαὶ τε νεμόμενος αἰῶν ὄβριν
ἀπέφυγεν, μέλανος {δ’} ἀν ἐσχατιάν
καλλίστα τανάτου (στειχοῖ) γλυκυτάτα γενεὰ
εὔωνυμον κτεινὸν κρατίσταν χάριν πορὰν ....

(This is the Teubner text; lines 55 ff. are variously emended, but the point (58) once again involves the importance of good reputation and avoidance of excess (αἰῶν ὄβριν, 54 – cf. αἰῶν κόρον, Isthmian 3.2), and ὄλβος seems to be connected with καλὰ). And Bakchylides (5.50-53) expresses a thought similar to that in Pindar,

*Pythian* 11.50-54:

όλβος φιλιν θεός
μοίραν τε καλῶν ἐπορευν
σὺν τ’ ἐπιζήλω τύχη
ἀφενεν βιοτάν διάγειν: οὐ
γάρ τις ἐπιθυμοῖν
πάντα γ’ εὐδαιμών ἔφυ.

In all of these cases, ὄλβος is more than wealth, as it is also in *Pythian* 3.88-91, of Peleus and Kadmos, despite Nagy’s assertion that here the word is used ‘in the immediate sense of “material prosperity”’.

... λέγονται {γε} μάν βροτῶν
ὁλβον ὑπέρτατον οἳ σχεῖν, οἴτε καὶ χρυσαμπτύκων
μελεπομεναν ἐν οἴς Μοισαν καὶ ἐν ἐπταπόλωις
ἀλον θῆβαις ...

The ὄλβος referred to here surely also includes the favour of the gods (Διός ... χάριν, 95); their ὄλβος may have been short-lived, but it consisted of more than πλοῦτος.

And in the first strophe of the third *Isthmian* ode, ὄλβος is associated with ἄρεται and good repute among one’s fellow citizens arising from victory in the games or ‘the strength of wealth’, combined with the ability to restrain κόρος, and the poet makes it

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clear that even this ὀλβιός will be short-lived if these virtues are not combined with reverence for Zeus:

Εἰ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχῆσαις ἤ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοις ἢ σθένει πλοῦτον κατέχει φρασὶν αἰανή κόρον, ἀξίως εὐλογίαις ἄστων μεμίχθαι.

Ζεῦ, μεγάλαι δ’ ἀρεταὶ θνατοῖς ἔπονται ἐκ σέθεν· ζωεὶ δὲ μάσσων ὀλβος ὑποξομένων, πλαγιᾶς δὲ φρένεσσιν οὐχ ὀμός πάντα χρόνον θάλλων ὀμίλει.

Respect for the rights of all and order in the πόλις are stressed as concomitants of wealth in the thirteenth Olympian ode, where Εὐνομία, Δίκα, and Εἰρήνα are listed as inhabitants of Korinth, which can thus (γάρ, 6) be called ὀλβία (3-10):

In the ninth Nemean ode, the victor Chromios is described as having an ὀλβιόν δῶμα (3; compare ὀλβίοις ἐν δῶμασι of Herakles at Nemean 1.71, also for Chromios; Herakles’ home is also a σεμνόν ... δόμον in the following line) and as having been granted θαυμαστὸν ὀλβον (45). But in this same ode, as has been shown, the inhabitants of Aitna are credited with κτεάνων ψυχής ... κρέσσονας (32), and after mentioning the θαυμαστὸν ὀλβον in line 45, the poet continues (46-47):

Chromios thus has ὀλβος precisely because (γὰρ) he has both material wealth and (ἐμα) the ἀρετά which enables him to win κύδος and δόξα (ἐπιδοξον). Also
emphasised in this ode is Chromios’ αἰδώς (equivalent to the ‘souls greater than wealth’ of 32), which φέρει δόξαν (33-34); contrary to common practice, the poet says (𝔸𝚙𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚘𝚗, 33; for ‘common practice’ in this context, compare Pythian 4.139-40 ἐντὶ μὲν θνατῶν φρένες ὕκυτεραι | κέρδος αἰνήσαι πρὸ δίκας δόλιον), the victor’s αἰδώς has not been stolen away by κέρδος.

Finally, many of these aspects of Pindaric ὁλίβος are brought together in the sixth Isthmian ode, in a passage which combines generosity with money, ἀρετὰ, δόξα, and the favour of the gods, which are linked by the progression τὲ ... καὶ ... τὲ, culminating in the definition of this combination as ‘the farthest reaches of ὁλίβος’ (10-13):

εἰ γὰρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνας τε χαρεῖς
καὶ πόνω πράσσει θεοδίκας ἀρετάς
συν τε οἱ δαίμονες φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπηρατον, ἐ-
σχατιάς ἡ ὑπὸ πρὸς ὁλίβον
βάλλετ’ ἀγκυραν θεότιμος ἑών.

In the poetry of Bakchylides, the conception of ὁλίβος is generally similar, where the context can be determined: at 3.8 a series of divinities is presented as having made Hieron ὁλίβον ... [στεφάνων] κυρῆσαι, and at 12.4-8 the city of Aigina is ὁλίβια both by reason of the recent victory and because of divine favour:

... ἐς γὰρ ὁλίβιαν
ζεῖνοισι μὲ πότνια Νίκα
νάσον Αἰγίνας ἀπάρχει
ἐλθόντα κοσμήσαι θεόδικον πόλιν
τάν τ’ ἐν Νεμέας γυιαλκέα μουνοπάλαν ....

Bakchylides in fact appears to lay less emphasis on the material aspect of ὁλίβος than Pindar does; at 15.51-63 Menelaos, addressing the Trojans, begins by associating ὁλίβος with Δίκα and then only mentions πλοῦτος in the context of Ὑβρίς:

Ζεῖς ψυμμέδων δς ἀπαντά δέρκεται
οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων,
ἀλλ’ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖται κιχεῖν
πάσιν ἀνθρώποις Δίκαν ἰθείαν, ἀγνάς
Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτὰς Θεμίτος.

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Again, in 5.50-53, quoted above, the progress of thought is from δλβος to a μοίρα ... καλων (itself probably a reference to the athletic victory just mentioned, cf. Pindar, Pythian 8.88 ὁ δὲ καλῶν τι νέον λαχῶν), and finally a mention of material wealth; no-one, says Bakchylides, can be expected to be blessed with all these (53-55).

Returning to the third ode, there are several observations which can be made about Bakchylides’ presentation of wealth and virtue in the poem and its relationship with Pindaric expressions of these ideas. After relating Hieron’s status as δλβος to his victory in the games, as mentioned above, the poet then makes the statement that the tyrant οἰδέ πυργωθέντα πλοῦτον μὴ μελαμ- | φαρεί κρύπτειν σκότῳ (13-14), Pindaric parallels for which have already been discussed. A description of Hieron’s πλοῦτος follows, including ὁ χρυσός, which λάμπει ... μαρμαργαίς (17), again a Pindaric image. But then this splendid wealth is set aside in the statement θεὸν θ[εό]ν τις | ἀγαλίζεθω γὰρ ἄριστος [δ]λβον (21-22), again identifying material wealth as a subsidiary component of δλβος. To justify this statement (ἐπεὶ, 23), the poet introduces the story of the death of Kroisos, who was involved in Solon’s/Herodotos’ own re-definition of δλβος. Kroisos is saved from death by Zeus and transported to the Hyperboreans by Apollo, the poet says, δι’ εὐσέβειαν (61); his εὐσέβεια is demonstrated by the fact that he μέ[γιστα] θνατῶν | ἐς ἀγαθέαν (ἀν)ἐπεμψε Π[νθ]ῷ (61-62), and Bakchylides praises Hieron for having sent the most offerings to Delphi (63-66). This recalls the theme of not hiding one’s wealth in 13-14, and is followed by the advice: ὀσια δρῶν εὑφραίνε θυμόν· τούτο γὰρ | κερδέων ὑπέρταιον (83-84);
the greatest of possessions is to do ὀσια, which in this case involves giving away many of one's possessions (compare 21-22). This is what Pindar refers to as the ἀρετά of Kroisos at Pythian 1.94 (cf. καὶ θεοφυλῆς καὶ ἄνηρ ἄγαθός at Herodotos 1.87.2).

In the following lines (85-94) Bakchylides recalls the priamel which begins Pindar's first Olympian ode, and then addresses Hieron directly:

φρονέοντι συνετὰ γαρών βαθὺς μὲν
αἰθήρ ἀμίαντος· ὕδωρ δὲ πῶντοι
οὐ σάπτεται εὐφροσύνα δ' ὁ χρυσός·
ἀνδρὶ δ' οὐ θέμις πολιον π[αρ]έντα
γῆρας, θάλ[εια]ν αὐτὶς ἄγκομισσαι
ηβαν. ἀρετὰς γε μὲν οὐ μινῦθει
βροτῶν ἄμα σ[ιμ]ίτι φέγγος, ἄλλα
Μοῦσα ν[ιν τρ[έψει.] 'Ἱέρων, σοῦ δ' ὀλβοὺ
κάλλιστ' ἐπεδ[ειξ]αο θνατοῖς
ἀνθέα ....

Carey and Maehler divide the salient points of lines 85-90 essentially into two groups of two.¹⁰⁷ the αἰθήρ and the ὕδωρ πῶντοι are distinguished by their everlasting and incorruptible natures, whereas wealth and youth are transitory pleasures. Carey proposes that we 'strip χρυσός of all elemental significance and regard it as a preparation for what follows. The list of imperishable substances contains only two items, air and sea; gold is considered here not as an element but simply as a human possession', and suggests punctuating with a full stop after σάπτεται.¹⁰⁸ The main contrast, however, probably begins with ἀνδρὶ δ'; Bakchylides may be implying that gold is 'a joy' as long as one lives (no such qualification is explicitly made – it may be an eternal εὐφροσύνα for gods or humanity in general rather than a transitory one for an individual person), but he still goes on to present the ἀρετά of youth as an even


more precious possession. With this we may contrast Pindar's statement that Διὸς παῖς ὁ χρυσός; κείνων οὖ σῆς οὐδὲ κίς δάπτει (fr. 222). What Bakchylides does describe as undeniably eternal, when allied with song, is the ἄρετά of mortals: it is this ἄρετά itself, rather than wealth ἄρεταίς δεδαιολμένος as in Pindar, Olympian 2.53-56, which is a φέγγος; it does not waste away along with the human body. (The visual imagery is continued when the poet says that Hieron 'showed' the fairest flowers of ὀλβος.)

This tendency to de-emphasise the importance of wealth, subordinating it to ἄρετά, may be one reason why Bakchylides omits the seer Melampous from the story of the daughters of Proitos in his eleventh ode; by presenting the healing of the daughters as the result of piety (involving Proitos surrendering wealth in the form of cattle by sacrificing them to Artemis) rather than a mercenary transaction from which the seer benefits as in other versions of the myth, the poet implicitly repeats the advice of 3.83-84: ὅσια δρόν εὐφραίνει θυμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ κερδέων ὑπέρτατον. The Proitides' offence against Hera in that ode involved the boast that their father was richer than the goddess (50-52) on the basis of her humble wooden temple; taken together with the omission of the Melampous episode, this gives the myth a unity involving the ultimate triumph of piety over greed.

Bakchylides' most forceful statement of the superiority of ἄρετά over wealth occurs in his first ode, beginning with the emphatic lines (159-161):

φαμί καὶ φάσω μέγιστον
κῦδος ἔχειν ἄρετάν· πλοῦ-
tος δὲ καὶ δειλότοις ἀνθρώπων ὀμιλεῖ ....

Whereas Pindar stresses the importance of wealth as an aid to, and marker of, ἄρετά, Bakchylides rejects it in favour of a view which, as Maehler notes, is common to

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109 Summarized in the introduction to Maehler's commentary (vol. 1, part 2, pp. 196 ff.).
Solon and the Theognidea, and which contradicts Hesiod’s πλούτω δ’ ἀρετή καὶ κύδος ὑπηδεῖ(Works and Days 313; but note that in that passage, Hesiod is referring to πλοῦτος won by honest toil, something to which, presumably, Bakchylides’ δειλοί would not be inclined – cf. 181 ἀρετα δ’ ἐπίμορχος).

Bakchylides continues, saying (162-64) that πλοῦτος

\[\text{θέλει δ’ αὐξεῖν γράφεσα ἀν-}\
\[\text{δρός: ὁ δ’ εὖ ἔρησθον θεοῦς}\
\[\text{ἔχοι κυδροτέρα}\
\[σαίνει κέαρ.}

With these lines may be compared 3.21-22 and 83-84, quoted above; coming after the statement that ἀρετα has ‘the greatest κύδος’ in 159-60, it seems that Bakchylides is defining the ἀγαθός as one who εὖ ἔρησθε θεοῦς (note κυδροτέρα in 164).

Superficially reminiscent of 1.159 ff. (Maehler simply comments on 1.161-63 ‘Reichtum kann auch der Unwürdige besitzen (vgl. 10.50f.)’ is 10.50-51:

\[οἶδα καὶ πλοῦτον μεγάλαν δύνασιν, \\
\[καὶ τὸ ἀχρεῖον τὸ θησίν \\
\[χρηστὸν.

But what Bakchylides apparently says here is radically different from the passage in the first ode: in this case, it seems, wealth really does make a man χρηστός; it does not simply δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ. This sentence does not mean, as Maehler suggests, ‘daß Reichtum auch dem Unwürdigen zufallen und ihm mehr Prestige einbringen kann als ihm zukommt’: the ἀχρεῖος does, according to this passage, become χρηστός, and the poet has just asserted that τὸ μὲν κάλλιστον, ἐσθλὸν | ἀνδρα πολλῶν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων πολυζήλωτον εἶμεν (47-48). There is no indication that the wealthy man may not be what he seems after the transformation which is

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effected by the power of wealth: when he is rich, he is χρηστός by virtue of his riches, and this sentiment is unique in the poetry of Bakchylides.

It may be that Bakchylides is tending here towards the Pindaric theme that wealth enables one to achieve ἀρετή, but rather than explaining this or elaborating the subject he immediately interrupts himself (51-52): τί μακράν γ[λ]ῶσαν ἵθισας ἐλαύνω | ἐκτός ὄφοι; Perhaps the audience is intended to infer from the poet’s prior remarks on the mutability of fate (45-47 τὸ μέλλον | δ’ ἀκρίτους τίκτει τελευταῖς, | πᾶ τύχα βρίσει – and compare θυμὸν αὐξάνουσιν with 1.162 ἐθέλει δ’ αὐξάνειν φρένας) that wealth, desirable and empowering as it is, may disappear as suddenly as it is acquired; with the interruption in lines 51-52 Bakchylides effectively stops himself from introducing a note of gloom by stating this logical conclusion (hence his reluctance to drive his tongue ‘straight’, ἤθοςας). Although the poem is lost beyond line 56, the words which do survive in the last few lines (νίκας ... εὐφροσύνα, αὐλῶν) suggest that the poet turns to the happy subject of the victory celebration, which may explain his omission of the less cheerful implications of his train of thought, although he does not avoid implications like these elsewhere (cf. 5.53-55 and fragment 54). There may also be an implied contrast between being ἐσθλὸς and merely being χρηστός.

In his second Isthmian ode (6-13 quoted below), Pindar declares that men of old used to compose heartfelt love-songs for their beloveds, and their Muse was not merely a means to financial gain. Pindar then quotes a saying of the Argive Aristodamos (cf. Alkaios 360 L-P, itself quoted in the scholia to Pindar’s lines and discussed in 4.4 above) which is similar to the sentiment at Bakchylides 10.49-51:

ἀ Μοίσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς
πω τότ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἐργατις
οὐδ’ ἐπέρνατο γλυκεί-
αι μελισθόγγου ποτι Τερψιχόρας
ἀργυροθείσαι πρόσωπα μαλακοφωνοί ἀοίδαι
νῦν δ’ ἐφῆτι (τὸ) τῶργείου φυλάξαι
ῥήμα’ ἀλαθείας (‘”) ἀγχίστα βαίνον,
Condemning the modern Muse’s mercenary tendency, Pindar presents her as approving of the saying ‘χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ’, and then mentions that Aristodamos himself was bereft of money and friends when he made the statement, and thus presumably bemoaning society’s tendency to respect wealth alone.

Likewise, Pindar condemns the mercenary Muse: by saying that Aristodamos’ words come ‘very close’ to the truth (ῥῆμ᾽ ἄλαθείας ... ἄρχεται βαίνον), Pindar implies that they are not absolutely true. By line 10 he has painted a picture of the Muse which will lead his audience to view with suspicion any maxim which she supports, and there is no need for the poet himself to be as explicit in his criticism as, for example, Simonides is of Pittakos (PMG 542.11-12 οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τῷ Πιττάκειον | νέμεται ...).

The poet then changes the subject to the victory he is commemorating, just as Bakchylides in his tenth ode interrupts himself and then apparently sings of the victory celebration. Pindar says ἔσσι γὰρ ὕν σοφός, implying that the recipient of the the second Isthmian is intelligent enough to see the connection between Aristodemos’ complaint and Pindar’s own – both are spoken by the proponents of non-monetary values in a world which appears to value only money. The ode is in honour of Xenokrates of Akragas (also the laudandus of the sixth Pythian), but this proem is addressed to his son Thrasyboulos, who is also apostrophised in the sixth

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112 Definendo non vera, ma vicinissima al vero la massima di Aristodamo .... Pindaro sottolinea che in realtà l’uomo si identifica col suo valore, non con le sue ricchezze: ricchezza e compenso dovrebbero essere un segno dell’onore dovuto all’uomo di valore’ (Privitera, Pindaro: le Istmiche, p. 159). Thummer (Pindar: die isthmischen Gedichte, vol. 2, p. 41) contrasts Pindar’s expression ἄλαθείαν ἐπίτυμον at Olympian 10.54. Alkaios, on the other hand, apparently approved of the saying, see above, section 4.4.
Pythian, and for whom Pindar composed the *enkomion* fr. 124. Xenokrates and Thrasyboulos, whose home is proclaimed to be familiar with song (lines 30-32), will see the point of Pindar’s proem. In Bakchylides 10.38 ff. a list of human ἐπιστάμαι, beginning with mention of a σ[ο]φός man, precedes the poet’s somewhat puzzling and abruptly discontinued remarks about wealth. In these two poems, the listener is left to draw his own conclusion as to the relationships between wealth and virtue in the poets’ thought; if he is σοφός, he will understand what Pindar and Bakchylides mean, and the nature of this σοφία forms the subject of the next section.

4.6 Σοφία

At Theognidea 873-76, the poet addresses wine and says that it is both ἐχθρός and φίλος, both ἐσθλός and κακός; the quatrain ends with the question

... τίς ἄν σε γε μωμήσαιτο,
τίς δ' ἄν ἐπανήσαι μέτρον ἐχων σοφίας;

A man who is σοφός, then, will recognize the fact that wine contains both elements of each of two pairs of opposites. Edmunds applies this maxim more generally to the problem of ‘good’ qualities and ‘bad’ ones in the Theognidea: ‘Theognis holds that sophiē is what orients one with respect to these polarities. ... it is the highest political virtue’. ²

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Pythian 11.41 ff. also draws attention to the fact that the poet is being paid for his ode; line 45 τῶν εὐφροσύνα τε καὶ δόξ’ ἐπιφέλεια implies that the money is well spent.


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But σοφίη in early poetry usually refers to a specific area of expertise, often musical or poetic skill: Hymn to Hermes 483, 511; Solon 13.52, Sappho 56 (probably poetic skill); Ibykos S 151.23-27; Xenophanes 2.12 and 14. Sometimes it refers to some other skill which is specified as in Iliad 15.412 (of a carpenter, the only occurrence of σοφίη in the Homeric epics) or Archilochos fr. 211 (of a helmsman). The earliest indications in archaic poetry of σοφίη meaning anything other than some specific talent are Solon 27.16 (in the ninth age of man his γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφίη are μαλακώτερα in the pursuit of μεγάλη ἀρετή) and Alkaios 39(a).9, where a σοφός man is described as one with φρέσι πύκνα[ισι; this more general meaning recurs in Simonides PMG 542.12, where Pittakos is described as a σοφὸς φῶς.

The verse inscriptions of this period almost all use σοφία in its more specific sense; sometimes the skill in question is specified, as in CEG 62 (Peiraius, ca 510-500) μνέμα τόδ’ Ἀἴνεο σοφίας ἱατρο ἁρίστο or 111 (Tanagra, ca 500?) [η]αῖδες ἐ[ποίεσ]αν μνᾶμ’ ἐνθάδ[ε] πατρὶ θανόντι | Π[α]θ[ον]ι, ἥσειναν ἡποσύναν τε σοφία.

In other cases the skill is only implied, particularly when craftsmen are boasting of their expertise in creating fine objects for dedication to a god: CEG 291 (Athens, late sixth century) ἄνδρες ἐποίεσαν σοφίασιν καλὸν ἀγαλμα, 340 (Boiotia, late fifth century) ἀνάγκη ἐν θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀφετέρου τῆς θεοῦ ἄμετρον γίνεται τιμή.

115 Later, in CEG 82 (Attica, ca 450-425?), Solon’s phrase σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος is used with a more general meaning to describe a young man who died fighting for his country.

116 Σοφός appears with a similar meaning in other verses ascribed to Homer: fr. 22 Allen (also of a τέκτων), and fr. 2 of the Margites (seventh or sixth century): τόν δ’ οὐτ’ ἄρ σκαπτήρα θεού θέσαν οὔτ’ ἄροτήρα | οὔτ’ ἄλλος τι σοφόν· πάσης δ’ ἡμάρτανε τέχνης.

117 Gladigow writes (Sophia und Kosmos, p. 19) that in this case σοφίη ‘ist die Erkenntnis der Maße und Grenzen, die es dem Menschen ermöglicht, das Handeln unter die Dike zu stellen, sich in die waltende Ordnung einzufügen’, and comments that ‘hier σοφίη zum ersten Male in der Geschichte des Begriffs weder ein sachgerichtetes Wissen noch das Wissen des Dichters bezeichnet. Σοφίη ist allgemeiner Begriff geworden für das Vermögen des Menschen, die Grenzen des ihm Gesetzten in den Dingen und Ereignissen zu erkennen. Für diese σοφίη, die in der Gestalt des Solon wohl ihre höchste Ausprägung gefunden hat, ist die gesamte Elegie [i.e., fr. 27] ... ein gutes Beispiel: Sogar den Tod weiß Solon in die Ordnung des Lebens einzubeziehen, man erreicht ihn κατά μέτρον und οὔκ ἄν ἀφορος’. Gladigow also connects the Solonian σοφίη with the νόος ἄρτιος of Solon 6.4.
The only extant verse inscription of this period in which σοφός appears to have moved from its older definition of ‘skilled’ in a particular area or expertise to a more general meaning is CEG 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?), where a young man who died in battle is described as having been an ἄνδρα ἄ[γα]θόν, ... σόφρονα, ἀεθλοφόρον, καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικίαν. Friedländer and Hoffleit comment that 'σοφὸν ἡλικίαν means that he was distinguished for his achievements among his friends. ἐξοχός ἡλικίας in [CEG 31] is a similar close’;119 no further specification seems to be required in this case.120

Σοφίη, σοφός, and related words appear in eighteen passages (using West’s divisions of the poems) in the Theognidea, of which only three (19, 120, and 370) are in poems which West attributes to Theognis himself. In some of its occurrences in

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118 This is the supplement proposed by C. Gallavotti, ‘Lettuce epigrafiche’, p. 168, and accepted by Hansen in his addenda to CEG (in CEG 2, pp. 299-305); ἀσκετές might also be possible.

119 Friedländer and Hoffleit, Epigrammata, p. 126.

120 This epitaph is also mentioned above, in section 2.4.
the Theognidea, σοφίη denotes poetic or musical skill (19, 770, 942, 995). Σοφίη also occurs in the following passage, in which it is likely to have the same meaning (789-94):

μήποτε μοι μελέδημα νεώτερον ἄλλο φανείη ἀντ’ ἀρετῆς σοφίης τ’, ἄλλα τόδ’ αἰεν ἔχων τερποιμήν φορμήγγι καὶ ὄρθημω καὶ ἂσιδη, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔσθελον ἔχοιμι νόον, μήτε τιν’ ξείνων δηλεύμενος ἔργαςατο λυγροῖς μήτε τιν’ ἔνδημων, ἄλλα δικαῖος ἑόν.

Although van Groningen follows some manuscripts in not printing the τ’ in line 790 and explains the phrase ἀρετῆς σοφίης as one genitive depending on another, and Patzer treats the τ’ as epexegetic, it is perhaps best to read τ’ as a simple conjunctive; the poet has a concern for ἀρετή and σοφίη, and these two notions are expanded chiastically in the following two verses. The poet displays his σοφίη in his appreciation (τερποιμήν) of music, and his ἀρετή in the maintenance of an ἔσθελον ... νόον when he is μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

In other places σοφίη seems to have a more general meaning (218 (cf. 1074), 564-65, 682, 1060, 1159, 1389). At 902 οὐδεὶς δ’ ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸς ἀπαντα σοφός we find it meaning ‘skilled’ in some area of expertise; the expression ‘no one can be σοφός in everything’ agrees with the earlier sense of σοφίη as ‘practical mastery of a given subject’ Edmunds argues that σοφίη in the Theognidea, while retaining its

121 Van Groningen, Théognis: le premier livre, p. 304; he suggests that ‘une precision de ἀρετῆ par σοφίη [i.e. “la vertu de la sagesse”, c’est à dire “la perfection qui caractérise le sage”] est plus logique et plus naturelle que l’autre [i.e. “la sagesse de la vertu”].


123 Van Groningen’s objection that ‘Les singuliers μελέδημα et τόδε suggèrent plutôt la mention d’un objet que de deux’ (Théognis: le premier livre, p. 304) is no obstacle to this interpretation: the poet sees ἀρετῆ and σοφίη as separate concepts which are, nevertheless, both part of one μελέδημα.

basic meaning of ‘skilled’ or ‘knowledgeable’ especially in the area of poetry, is a key-word which characterizes the aristocratic circle to which the Theognidean poems are addressed. At 563-66 an ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ is seen as a source of σοφία:125

κεκληθοῦσι δ’ ἐς δαίτα, παρέξεσθαι δὲ παρ’ ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρα χρεόν σοφίν πάσαν ἐπιστάμενον.
τοῦ συνείν, ὅπωταν τι λέγῃ σοφόν, ὅφρα διδαχθῆς,
καὶ τούτ’ εἰς οίκον κέρδος ἐχον ἀπίης.

It is important to note that here reference is made to πᾶσα σοφία; this is not simply musical skill, but ‘the whole of σοφία’, the preserve of an ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ. Battisti defines σοφία here as ‘aristocratic and exclusive mastery of a certain “knowledge”’ and τι ... σοφόν as ‘the message of a shared ethical code’; συνείν is ‘the decodification [sic] of the message, which requires the right knowledge’.126 Further, the context of the quatrain is the symposion, where σοφία might otherwise be expected to refer especially musical skill, as it does in Solon’s metrically identical σοφίς μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος (13.52); but in this Theognidean passage, the δαίς is the locus for another kind of aristocratic σοφία as well. As Euenos writes (fr. 4), those who have this σοφία will recognize others of their own kind:

ἡγοῦμαι σοφίς εἶναι μέρος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν οίος ἐκαστος ἀνήρ.

Gladigow points to a similar use in Pindar, Pythian 5.12-13 σοφόλ δὲ τοι κάλλιον | φέροντι καὶ τὰν θεόδοτον δύναμιν, where he says that σοφός represents ‘eine Mittelstellung zwischen “Aristokrat” und “Wissendem”’,127 Pindar’s application of σοφία comes close to that found in the Theognidea, although in Pindar the virtue is more firmly grounded in its references to specific skills. It is attributed to a doctor at


127Gladigow, Sophia und Kosmos. p. 42. n. 4.
Pythian 3.54, a charioteer at Pythian 5.115, a helmsman at Nemean 7.17, and to Oidipous as a skilled interpreter of oracles at Pythian 4.263. At Pythian 3.113 the work of poets creating songs is compared to that of τέκτονες σοφοί, and poetic skill is frequently the quality referred to by Pindaric σοφία. As in the Theognidea (exemplified by 563-66, discussed above), it is this meaning that serves as a boundary where the ‘skill’ can become a political virtue.²²⁸ Again as in the Theognidea, the σοφοί are both the sources and the receptors of σοφία; those who appreciate the poet’s σοφία are themselves σοφοί (e.g. Pythian 9.78). And in their capacity as σοφοί, they possess a high social value, as is made clear in the final epode of the fourth Pythian ode, with reference to the re-integration of the exiled Damophilos into a cultured aristocracy (vv. 293-297):

... ἀλλ' εὐχεταί συλλομέναν νοῦς διαντλήσας ποτέ οἶκον ἑδείν, ἐπί Ἅπολλωνος τε κράνα συμποσίας ἐφέπον θυμὸν ἐκδόσαι πρὸς ἥβαν πολλάκις, ἐν τε σοφοῖς δαιδαλέαν φόρμιγγα βαστάζων πολλοῖς ἡσυχίᾳ θυγήμεν, μητρί' ὑπὶ τὴν πέμπτην πόρων, ἀπαθῆς δ' αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀστῶν ....

These σοφοί are essentially the ἀγαθοὶ that Damophilos has ceased to strive against in 285: οὐκ ἔριζον ἄντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, the ruling élite. Σοφός can be seen here in the ‘Mittelstellung’ referred to by Gladigow, cited above, and it is this that allows Pindar to write of these σοφοί ‘watching over’ a city at Pythian 2.88. This prosperity and power have been highlighted earlier in the second Pythian, in the gnomical statement at line 56 τὸ πλούτειν δὲ σὺν τῷ χρὴ πότῳ σοφίας ἀριστον, and the equation of these

²²⁸W. Donlan (The Aristocratic Ideal, p. 105), discussing the significance for Pindar of σοφία as a component of athletic excellence, notes that ‘Pindar, like Theognis, makes wisdom an important attribute of the agathos, but he does so less contentiously and more confidently than Theognis. The latter neglected physical prowess in favor of mental qualities, but Pindar displays no sense of tension between physical and mental aretai. Physical and intellectual ability, recognition among one’s peers and in the polis are all combined harmoniously in Pindar’.
virtues is also made at *Olympian* 5.16 ἡ δ' ἔχοντες σοφοὶ καὶ πολίταις ἐδοξάν ἐμμεν. This political use of the term σοφός and its derivatives, which is foreign to the use of the words in earlier poetry and to their use in the extant verse inscriptions of this period, represents an aristocratic ideology of proper conduct rooted in the 'wisdom' of music and culture.

4.7 Σωφροσύνη

Another prominent virtue of the Theognidean ἀνήρ ἄγαθός is that of σωφροσύνη. North argues that although σωφροσύνη appears in the Homeric epics (*Iliad* 21.462, *Odyssey* 4.158, 23.13 and 30), it does not carry a moral sense in Homer; 'in three of the four passages it clearly denotes “prudence” or “shrewdness” in one’s own interest – a meaning that it never entirely loses'. She agrees with Adkins that σωφροσύνη is less valued in the Homeric heroes than martial and competitive excellence, but her assertion that the appearances of this virtue in verse epitaphs (to be discussed below) ‘testify to a new kind of aretē to take the place of the heroic ideal, a new balance of the physical and the intellectual’ is unjustified in that, in Schofield’s words, ‘the Homeric hero is heroic in mind as well as in action’.

129 *Σωφροσύνη*, σώφρων, and σωφρων can be found at lines 41, 379, 431, 437, 454, 483, 497, 665, 701, 754, 756, 1138, and 1326.

130 H.F. North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 3.


Citing *Iliad* 1.258 and 490-91, 2.200-202, 2.272-74, 6.77-79, 9.53-54 and 438-43, and 18.105-106, Schofield shows that ‘[e]xcellence in counsel is often coupled with prowess in fighting as one of the two chief ways in which a man may outshine his peers’.  

Eύβουλια is, of course, quite different from σωφροσύνη, but Schofield’s discussion does at least demonstrate that the ‘balance of the physical and the intellectual’ referred to by North is not entirely ‘new’, although the moral element involved in σωφροσύνη may be.

It is striking that all of the verse epitaphs of this period which mention σωφροσύνη, except one, are Attic: *CEG* 34 and 36 (both ca 530?) σεμ' ἀγαθὸ καὶ σόφρονος ἀνδρός (probably also *CEG* 16 (ca 550?))136; 41 (ca 530-520?) ἀντ’ ἄρετές ἔδε σοφροσύνες; 58 (ca 510-500?) σοφροσύνες ἐνεκεν ἐδ’ ἄρετές; 67 (ca 500?) [σὸ]φρον, εὐ[χεῖν]ετος, χισ[νικό]ς, πι[νυ]τός, τὰ κάλ’ [εἰδό]ς; 69 (ca 500?) σόφρο[να καὶ πινυτόν, πάσαν ἡχοντ’ ἄρετέν,137 probably 81 (ca 450-25?) - οσὶνες ἄρετές τε; 102 (ca 400?) πότνια Σωφροσύνη, θύγατερ μεγαλόφρονος Αἰδώς; 440 (ca 480, to be discussed below); and 136 (Argolis, ca 525-500?) σόφρονα, ἀεθλοφόρον καὶ σοφὸν ἡλικιαί.138 This apparent regional emphasis (thirteen out of fourteen occurrences of the virtue, if we include *CEG* 22) led North to assert that


135 Which is later made explicit in e.g. *CEG* 102 (Attica, ca 400?), where Σωφροσύνη is identified as the daughter of Αἰδώς and praised alongside εὐπόλεμος Ἀρετή.

136 If the supplement ἀγαθὸ καὶ [σόφρονος ἀνδρός] is correct, as seems likely.

137 It should be noted that *CEG* 67 and 69 do not show North’s ‘balance of the physical and the intellectual’: none of the qualities listed for the two dead men could be described as ‘physical’.

138 Σωφρον also occurs in the fragmentary Attic epitaph *CEG* 30 (ca 535-530), and perhaps in 22 (Attica, ca 550-530?) Ἰφορ. These two examples, in which little context has survived, are difficult to use.
although the bulk of our evidence for Attic sophrosyne belongs to the period after the Persian wars, the epitaphs of the type mentioned above suggest that in the archaic age sophrosyne had already begun to be, not just the most Hellenic virtue, ... but the most Athenian as well.\textsuperscript{139}

But Wallace disagrees, arguing that ‘[w]hen the word itself, rare in our Homer ... and absent from Hesiod and Solon, becomes common about the middle of the sixth century, it shows no particular regional affinities’.\textsuperscript{140} Wallace notes the fact that the root of the word appears in much non-Attic poetry, and concludes that ‘neither idea nor word has specifically Athenian origins’. But although the word’s origins may not be Attic, the fact that only one surviving non-Attic epitaph from this period mentions \textit{σωφροσύνη} as one of the dead man’s virtues does perhaps suggest that the Athenians laid greater emphasis on this quality than did other Greek states.\textsuperscript{141}

If this is the case, however, one might well ask why the word does not appear in the extant poetry of Solon, who might be expected to have been concerned with \textit{σωφροσύνη}. North suggests that Solon’s ‘adoption of the Mean in political life marks him as the first spokesman for Athenian sophrosyne’,\textsuperscript{142} but this does not explain why the word itself (which was certainly current in the epitaphs contemporary with Solon) is absent from what we have of Solon’s poetry. One possibility is suggested by the appearance of \textit{σαφρονες} at Theognis 41 \textit{άστοι μὲν γὰρ ἑθ’ οἶδε σαφρονες, ἤγεμόνες δὲ | τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν}. As was mentioned above, with the deictic \textit{οἶδε} the poet seems to be referring to the aristocratic circle at the \textit{symposion}; if \textit{σωφρον} was being applied by the upper classes

\textsuperscript{139} North, \textit{Sophrosyne}, pp. 13-14.


\textsuperscript{141} Also notable is the fact that although \textit{σωφροσύνη} appears as early as Semonides (7.108) as a feminine virtue, it does not appear in any of the epitaphs for women which survive from our period.

to themselves as a sort of catchword, Solon might have avoided the word deliberately because of these connotations. It is worth noting that four of the six Attic epitaphs that mention the dead person’s \( \text{σωφροσύνη} \) come from within Athens itself (CEG 34, 41, 69, and 76); this suggests perhaps that \( \text{σωφροσύνη} \) was given more emphasis in the urban environment (in which the aristocratic \textit{symposia} would have had more prominence) than by the rural residents.

North has already been quoted as writing that ‘the bulk of our evidence for Attic sophrosyne belongs to the period after the Persian wars’, but this statement is not in fact true of the appearances of this virtue in the verse inscriptions; eleven (of which ten are Attic) of the fourteen inscriptions cited here pre-date the Persian Wars. The dates given for the Attic epitaphs seem to indicate that \( \text{σωφροσύνη} \) began commonly to be praised under the tyranny, where such a quality might well have been valued, and continued into the democratic period, although with a greatly reduced frequency. North comments that the virtue of \( \text{σωφροσύνη} \) in the sixth and fifth centuries became part of what may, with some reservations, be called the aristocratic Dorian ethical tradition ... Yet the potentialities of sophrosyne were so great that it did not remain frozen in the Dorian ethical system but continued to develop, even as Greek political forms developed, and always kept in close

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143 Compare Theognidea 753-56, where it is said that a man who is \( \text{σωφρον} \) will obtain riches only δικάως; as has been discussed above, the men who were trying to establish themselves as ἄγαθοι opposed themselves to the so-called κακοὶ who did not always make their wealth δικάως.

144 Anhalt discusses Solon’s rejection of the aristocrats’ sympotic model of society on the grounds that it ‘fails to account for the fact that, in the \textit{polis}, members of all levels of society will be present, not only the aristocrats’ (Solon the Singer, p. 93): the view of \( \text{σωφροσύνη} \) presented here would reinforce her argument.


146 This is also true of oligarchy, and North (\textit{Sophrosyne}, p. 44) points to the Athenian decree concerning Miletos (IG I 22 (450-49), where ‘the words ἔξω ἐς \( \text{σωφρονόμεν} \) (line 82) may be a warning to the oligarchs in Miletus that they will receive Athenian support so long as they display what they claim as the characteristic virtue of oligarchy – sophrosyne.’
touch with the evolution of the Athenian polis.\textsuperscript{147}

The truth of this last statement depends on how ‘keeping in close touch’ is defined; but it is surely inconsistent with the fact that σωφροσύνη, despite its middle- to late-sixth century frequency in Attic verse inscriptions, all but disappears from inscribed epigram after the Persian Wars.

In his commentary on \textit{CEG} 81, a distich of which only the fragment ἄρετές τε survives from the end of the first verse and ἦμων from the end of the second, Hansen justifies his opinion that the inscription is a private rather than a public epitaph with the statement that ‘verbum imperfectum versus prioris est aut σωφροσύνη ἄρετες ... aut δικαιοσύνη ἄρετες ..., quorum neutrum in epitaphio publico exspectandum est’. Certainly the epitaphs universally attribute σωφροσύνη to individuals rather than groups (unlike, \textit{e.g.}, ἄρετή, which can be attributed to a group of soldiers, as in \textit{CEG} 10); in contrast, σωφροσύνη is seen as a collective Spartan virtue most prominently in the speech of Archidamos at Thucydides 1.80 ff., where the speaker is introduced as ‘Ἀρχιδαμὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἄνηρ καὶ ξυνετός δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σωφρονοῦν, and in which he emphasises σωφροσύνη at 84.1-3.\textsuperscript{148} In this context the inscription \textit{CEG} 440 (Athens, \textit{ca} 480) appears unusual:

\begin{verbatim}
σωφροσύνη ἄρετες ἦμων ἐνὶ κλα[...]μίλα[...]
[ἡλλάξ ἐλέ]θερίας καλὸν ἔχει στέφανον.
\end{verbatim}

Hansen cites the Simonidean epigrams 8, 10, 15, 34, 54 Page and Timotheos \textit{PMG} 788 in support of his contention that the supplement [ἡλλάξ ...] ‘certum esse videtur’ despite, for example, Gallavotti’s ... ἐνὶ κλα[...]μίλα[κος δὲ φορεῖ] | [οὔτος ἐλὲ]θερίας .... Dover comments that ‘the point of the graffito as a whole is not very

\textsuperscript{147} North, \textit{Sophrosyne}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{148} The Korinthians are presented as appealing to this Spartan virtue at 68.1 (σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχειτε), and ἄριστοκρατία itself is σώφρον at 3.82.8. The historian writes at 8.24.4 that Χίοι ... μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαίμων τῶν ἔγὼ ἡσθόμην ἡπόδαιμον τε ἀμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν.
clear', and it seems that its oddity is further increased by the fact that if, as seems likely, the supplement [heλλαζ ...] is correct or at least reflects the sense of the inscription, it is the only verse inscription from our period that appears to present σωφροσύνη as a collective virtue.

Bakchylides only refers to the virtue of σωφροσύνη once, but it is an instructive passage. At 13.186, Εὐνομία ... σαόφρον is listed along with Ἀρετά and Εὐκλεία as those who govern the polis; significant here is the association of Εὐνομία with a sympotic context, which is then generalised to include the city as a whole:

Εὐνομία τε σαόφρον, ἀ θαλίας τε λέλογχεν
ἀστεῖα τ' ευσεβέων
ἀνδρών ἐν εἰ[ρ]ήνα φυλάσσει ....

Pindar fr. 52a also probably has σαόφρονος ... εὐνομίας, and there again the expression follows closely after mention of the δαίτα φιλήσιστέφανον. Of the four other occurrences of the adjective in Pindar (he does not use the noun), three are closely related to questions of political leadership, in that they are attributions of the virtue of σωφροσύνη to the mythical founders and past rulers of the cities being celebrated: Isthmian 8.26, Paian 9.46, and Partheneion 2.62; the use of the word in fr. 52a, mentioned above, also implicitly fits this model. The other use of the adjective is at Pythian 3.63 ff.:

εἰ δὲ σώφρον ἄντρον ἕναι' ἔτι Χίρων, καὶ τί οί
φίλτρον (ἐν) θυμῷ μελιτάριμες ὄμνοι
ἀμέτροι τίθεν, ιατηρά τοῦ κέν νῦν πίθον
καὶ νῦν ἐσλοίσε παραλεσθέν ἄνδράσιν θερμάν νόσον
ἡ τινὰ Λατοῖδα κεκλημένον ἡ πατέρος.

Although Cheiron’s special σοφία would at first glance appear to be more relevant here than his σωφροσύνη, he is here invoked in his capacity not simply as healer but

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149K.J. Dover, Aristophanes: Clouds, p. 222.
also as teacher, a figure appropriate to introduce into a victory ode for a leader such as Hieron.

In the literary poetry of our period, it is primarily in the Theognidea that the virtue of σωφροσύνη seems to be given emphasis as an essential quality; wherever it occurs in the Theognidea, it appears on its own, not linked explicitly to any other virtue, as it is in the apparently formulaic phrase ἀγαθὸ καὶ σώφρονος ἄνδρός in CEG 34, 36, and ?16. In fact, σωφροσύνη never appears on its own as a term of praise in the epitaphs of this period. Unlike e.g. ἀγαθός in CEG 14 (Attica, ca 560-550?) and 42 (Attica, ca 525?) or καλός in CEG 68 (Attica, ca 500?), σωφροσύνη, it appears, cannot stand alone as a virtue. We have seen that σώφρων is at least twice, probably three times (CEG 34, 36, and ?16) paired with ἀγαθός, and σωφροσύνη twice (CEG 41 and 58) with ἄρετή. In two Attic inscriptions of ca 500 (CEG 67 and 69) the adjective σώφρων is found in proximity to πνιυτός (and other virtues, in 67).

In Attica at this period, σωφροσύνη seems to have been something of a complementary virtue to ἄρετή; it is a term of commendation, but does not have on its own the sort of impact that ἀγαθός, for example, did. There is only one verse inscription in which σωφροσύνη appears alone; this is CEG 440, whose other peculiarities have been mentioned above.

Adkins comments on Seven Against Thebes 610 (of Amphiaraus) σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὔσεβὴς ἄνηρ: ‘clearly being sophron and dikaios is distinct from being agathos in Aeschylus’ mind; so that they are evidently not part of arete’. While Adkins is correct in saying that in this case σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are

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150 Peek comments that the simply-phrased CEG 36 notes only ‘daß dieser Tote dem attischen Ideal der Vereinigung von verständigem Sinn (Selbstbeherrschung) und tapferem Verhalten vor dem Feind entsprochen hat’ (Griechische Grabgedichte, p. 8), though ἀγαθό need not refer here simply to martial valour.

151 A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour, p. 94.
‘distinct’ from ἀρετή, there is no evidence that they are ‘not part’ of it,152 while σωφροσύνη may be a less active virtue than ἀρετή, the frequency of the pairing of the two qualities in the epitaphs shows that it was commonly thought of as complementary to ἀρετή.

Summary

Poetic representations of the citizen’s excellence, ἀρετή, comprise not only skill in particular fields of activity (as is the sense of the word in Homer) but also qualities which are easier to manipulate rhetorically. A more general definition of the man who is ἀγαθός permits moral and social implications to take the place of (or at least take their place alongside) demonstrated prowess in war or athletics, for example, as factors in the evaluation of the citizen. In particular, a conception of excellence in which correct behaviour and attitudes are paramount allows the rejection of markers such as power and wealth in favour of the authority of tradition. Far from being a rigid, categorical label, ἀγαθός and related terms are essentially fluid: on the one hand those who have πλοῦτος can be derided as lacking this ‘excellence’, as opposed to those who are presented as having it though they may lack wealth (a contrast which can be drawn both by impoverished aristocrats and by other orders of society), while on the other hand material prosperity – and the wisdom to use it properly – can be presented as naturally accompanying the ἀγαθοί. Likewise,

152 Cf. Hutchinson’s commentary ad loc., where the similar views of Jaeger (that the verse presents a canon of four cardinal virtues) and Dover (that the virtues named here are ‘separable’ and ‘specific’) are criticized. Hutchinson remarks that ‘ἀγαθός does not mean “brave” .... δίκαιος and ἔσχατος must be more or less synonymous .... σωφρον can be used quite generally .... Each adjective says much the same with a somewhat different colouring’ but does not elaborate on the ‘different colouring’.
the spread of σοφία and σωφροσύνη from the aristocratic and symptic context to cover a wider field of virtue allows their integration into a general conception of a citizen’s excellence which, like patriotic sentiment in the poetry of war (see chapter 2), finds more expression in the aristocratic literary world than in the more public context of verse inscriptions, or in the poetry of Solon which consistently avoids this construction of the ‘good’ citizen.
5. Conclusions

5.1 Martial Valour

The depiction of fighting and dying for one’s country as a glorious thing, which is only nascent in Homer but becomes widespread in the later literary material up to the Persian Wars, appears to have been resisted by the composers of the inscribed epigrams of that period, even in cases where it is certain or at least likely that they refer to conflicts in which the dead soldier’s homeland was under threat. Verse epitaphs from later in the fifth century, however, appear to have been more receptive to this theme. The discrepancy between the two traditions in the earlier period raises questions of performance and the nature of the symposia at which the literary elegy was intended to be sung. It seems that the older, ‘aristocratic’ picture of heroism on the battlefield was being challenged in the symposion, the audience of which was perhaps, therefore, not uniformly ‘aristocratic’; but then this picture appears to return in the early verse epitaphs, which may be due to the fact that these were composed post mortem, when a family’s grief at the loss of a son, brother, father, or husband might in any case outweigh the motivations of exhortatory elegy which were used to persuade the man to fight in the first place. After the Persian Wars, though, the city as a whole begins to replace, or at least attempts to replace, the family both as the focus of grief and chief mourner in the epitaphs.
In epinician poetry, not surprisingly, this development is not as prominent; the *polis* does not overcome the *oikos* as the centre of attention and pride in military achievement, but tends rather to be subsumed in it. Even the pan-Hellenic spirit of resistance against the barbarian threat, which affected the language of the epitaphs of the period, has left only minor traces in this genre.

From early hints in Kallinos and Tyrtaios, the theme of an after-life and continuing rewards for military *áρετή* (which is not, as has been supposed by some, expanded by Tyrtaios to cover the whole of *áρετή*) is developed both in the inscriptions and in the literary poetry. As opposed to the question of whether soldiers fight with ‘aristocratic’ or ‘democratic’ motives, the two traditions can agree here that martial valour in itself earns these distinctions, and this consideration can be used as an encouragement to fight in any context. As for those who resist this (or any other) encouragement, Archilochos’ presentation of the ‘unwilling’ φυγόμαχος in fr. 5 is rooted in epic conceptions of the value of life and death, as is his fr. 139, if that comes from a context similar to that of fr. 5.

5.2 Beauty and Virtue

Homeric epic clearly and unambiguously differentiates between a person’s physical appearance and his or her possession of *áρετή*. Beauty is considered a virtue and remarked upon where appropriate, but where there is a discrepancy between *Sein*
and Schein (as notably in the case of Paris in the third book of the *Iliad*), the former takes precedence over the latter. Similarly, the language of beauty can be used to commend a person’s behaviour and actions, but again this kind of commendation is not as strong as the use of other terms.

In the literary material after Homer, some poets can be seen to modify the Homeric use of the language of ‘appearances’ to suit their own presentation of ‘reality’. The classification of behaviour or actions as καλός, already noted in Homer as significant but not of primary importance, gains greater force particularly in the aristocratic poetry of the Theognidea. Epinician poetry takes up the other side of the question, that of the relationship between physical beauty and inner worth, and insists on a closer relationship between the two than Homer allows, though this view continues to be resisted by other lyric poets. Within the epinician genre, too, Bakchylides places noticeably less emphasis on physical appearances than Pindar does, perhaps reflecting a difference between Ionian and Dorian traditions. This would provide support for Bourriot’s theory that the latter was responsible for the creation of the phrase καλός καὶ ἀγαθός (in its various forms) as a slogan denoting the ideal man.

Once again, the inscriptions in verse from this period resist these developments, refusing in most cases to consider a person’s physical appearance as a factor of an importance equal to that assigned to other qualities. It is noteworthy, however, that expressions of the *topos* of the ‘flower of a man’s youth’ in the inscriptions are reserved for occasions where the man in question died in battle, evoking grief and pity for the loss of a handsome youth. This is not an attempt to
present the beautiful as identical with the brave; rather, physical beauty and martial
daring are placed side by side here as in the ode of Ibykos to Polykrates, though
(again as in Ibykos) it is not suggested that the two qualities are related in any sense
other than the fact that the subject of the poetry is implicitly praised as being in
possession of both.

5.3 Political Values

The problem of defining who are the ἅγαθοι and who are the κακοί within the
polis is pursued by some poets through attempts to apply the positive terms to their
own classes or groups and the negative ones to others (or to members of their own
circles who have behaved in ways that are presented as unjust or unacceptable). After
Homer, ἀρετή begins to be treated according to two types of definition: it can be used
to denote a general or a specific virtue, and it can be used as a social or a moral term
of commendation. Although the former distinction can be seen in Homer, where the
term tends to be used of a hero’s martial prowess but can also be used in a more
general sense, the concern of the later poets with the relationship between social and
moral ἀρετή, and the explicit attempts especially in the Theognidea to link the two, is
new. Solon, however, resists aristocratic efforts to make this connection, preferring
instead to use the terms with reference not to social position or power within the polis
but to the just conduct of the citizens.

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A slightly different approach is taken in epinician poetry; there, the noun ἀρετή is primarily used of athletic excellence, which is of course consistent with the genre’s particular concern with that virtue, but the adjective in Pindar can take on more general connotations of social and moral worth, as in the Theognidea, and this asymmetry in the use of noun and adjective can also be seen in the verse inscriptions of the period.

Pindar again reflects attitudes similar to those found in the Theognidea on the subject of the importance of good parentage and breeding for position and honour within the polis, though for the most part without the anxiety that prompts Alkaios or the Theognidean poets to complain about the failure of the one to accompany the other. The opposition between city and family which exercises the embattled aristocrat is to a certain extent resolved in Pindar by presenting the city as a kind of stage on which the achievements of a particular family take a leading role; the oikos takes precedence, and the oikos is not represented as making any attempt to upstage the protagonist. Like the peculiarities of Pindar’s treatment of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός, this is not as noticeable in Bakchylides’ poetry, and Bakchylides also places considerably less importance than Pindar on the importance of material wealth. As may be the case with the two poets’ differing approaches to the relationship between beauty and virtue, where (see 5.2, above) the proposed Dorian aristocratic origin of the phrase καλὸς καγαθὸς and the concept of ‘complete’ virtue that it represents seem to be in accordance with the fact that Pindar’s poetry praises the combination of these characteristics more than that of Bakchylides, perhaps here again the Dorian poet
reflects a vision of civic values based on rich *oikoi* more than the Ionian. On the other hand, the epinician poets do (unlike Solon and the inscriptions in verse) appear to follow the aristocratic-symphotic lead of the Theognidea in their attachment of some political importance to the virtues of *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη*.
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