The Revival of *Sphoṭa* in Early Modern Benares:

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*



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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity Term, 2015

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Abstract

This thesis examines the revival of the *sphoṭa* doctrine in early modern Benares and Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* as an influential work in that revival. The *sphoṭa* doctrine is the richest contribution of the grammarians to the philosophy of language, but its semantic significance was not highlighted until late, because its theological implication was stronger. Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a renowned Sanskrit grammarian who flourished in sixteenth-century Benares. He also wrote poetry and Dharmaśāstric works, and played an important role as a juridical authority. Despite his illustrious career, Śeṣakṛṣṇa encountered criticism for his works from contemporary critics. The only work he wrote solely on the philosophy of language was the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*. As the first discrete work on *sphoṭa* by a grammarian, the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* represented an important landmark in the later expositions of the doctrine of *sphoṭa* particularly because it renewed the later grammarians' interest in *sphoṭa*, which then resulted in a series of individual works of a similar sort. The revival of the *sphoṭa* doctrine in early modern Benares coincided with that of the philosophy of language, which was caused by a number of social and intellectual factors in different proportions and phases. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* emerged on the eve of that revival, and can be recognized as a pioneer work in terms of its revitalization of the grammarians' interpretation of *sphoṭa* after a period of dormancy, and its influence on later works on *sphoṭa*.

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Introduction

For a very long time, the *sphoṭa* doctrine has been a topic of considerable interest to the grammarians of the mainstream Pāṇinian tradition. In the *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh), Patañjali did not discuss it in identical terms and as comprehensively as it was interpreted in the later periods, but he had the initial insights into what the later grammarians developed as the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. Although Patañjali is credited for his views on the linguistic aspect of *sphoṭa*, it was Bhartṛhari in his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), who set *sphoṭa* on an epistemological and theological footing, reintroducing it with a more developed theoretical framework. Since then, the philosophical schools engaged in examining diverse perspectives on language and truth started scrutinizing the *sphoṭa* doctrine and advanced their criticisms. They analysed *sphoṭa* more extensively than the early grammarians did, and thereby contributed to enrich its literature.

The early modern period (1550 - 1750) is recognized as one of the significant eras of Indian history. It is during this period that the most intensive discussions on the philosophy of language, including those on *sphoṭa*, took place. As a leading grammarian who flourished in the first half of the early modern period, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was one of the writers who joined the intellectual discussions on *sphoṭa* by writing his *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* (STN). Although his work does not represent fully[1] the way the *sphoṭa* doctrine was interpreted by the later grammarians, understanding Śeṣakṛṣṇa's approach to it provides a significant support towards our comprehension of the philosophy of language in early modern intellectual history.

[1] Cf. DESHPANDE 1992: 84: "[t]here is no such thing as *the* Indian philosophy of language. Similarly, there is no such thing as *the* view of Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, or Naiyāyikas. There are multitudes of different opinions on every topic, and each argument needs to be placed in its right historical context."

§ 1. Literature Review

A considerable volume of literature on the *sphoṭa* doctrine in Sanskrit, English, and other modern languages has highlighted its philosophical characteristics, but only few works have focused on its linguistic and semantic significance. As evident from RAMSEIER (1994), the VP of Bhartṛhari is still the most widely studied work reflecting early Indian thoughts on the grammarians' philosophy of language. However, the VP per se examines *sphoṭa* only sporadically and with more emphasis on the metaphysical realm of language. In addition to the studies of the MBh and the VP, many critical editions and/or translations of the Sanskrit works on *sphoṭa* such as the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (SSm) of Maṇḍana Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ (1931) and IYER (1966)], the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* (STN) of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [BĀKRE (1913) and TRIPATHI (1994)], the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (SSbh) of Bharata Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ (1927)], the anonymous *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* (SSNV) [ŚĀSTRĪ (1917)], the *Sphoṭanirṇaya* (SN) of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [JOSHI (1967)], the *Sphoṭavāda* (SV) of Nāgeśa [KRISHNAMACHARYA (1946)], and the *Sphoṭacandrikā* (SC) of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin [NENE (1929)] have made it more accessible. Editions of the *Śabdakaustubha* (ŚK) of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita [NENE and PUṆATĀMAKARA (1933)] and the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* (VBhS) of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [JOSHI (1939)], which contain dedicated chapters on the *sphoṭa* doctrine, should also be mentioned. The copious body of literature on the other systems of Indian philosophy necessarily including the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Vedānta also contribute very highly to our understanding of *sphoṭa* through their criticisms of it.

A few descriptive works in English, COWARD (1980), ŚĀSTRĪ (1980), BHATTACHARYA (1985), BECK (1993), and HOTA (2006), have been helpful in reading the interpretations of *sphoṭa* more cogently. Nevertheless, most of them review the philosophical facet of *sphoṭa* rather than focusing on its significance as a theory of *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition). More focused studies, LIMAYE (1974), PATNAIK (1994), HOUBEN (1995), ISAEVA (1995), RATH (2000), and RATHORE (2000), concentrate mostly on Bhartṛhari, and have not, understandably, extended their scope sufficiently to the exposition and defence of *sphoṭa* by the grammarians of the later periods, particularly those from the second millennium. Several enlightening analyses of *śābdabodha* and

vākya (sentence) such as STAAL (1967), RAO (1969), BILIMORIA (1988), MATILAL (1985, 1990b), DESHPANDE, (1992), GANGULI (2003), GANERI (2006), and DALAI (2007) compare *sphoṭa* with some other linguistic theories in the Indian intellectual tradition. Focused critiques of *sphoṭa* in the early modern era are, however, limited to very few works like JOSHI's (1967) edition and translation of the *Sphoṭanirṇaya* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, although works like DESHPANDE (1992) certainly help us understand the evolution of the thoughts on verbal cognition during that time.

Modern research on the prominent intellectuals and their schools, the intellectual settings, and the type of scholarship pursued in early modern India, such as BRONKHORST (2005, 2008, 2012), MINKOWSKI (2011), O'HANLON and MINKOWSKI (2008), O'HANLON (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013), DESHPANDE (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2015), and POLLOCK (2001a), and also studies directed to the Śeṣa lineage, such as BENKE (2010), help us significantly to determine Śeṣakṛṣṇa's identity and his contribution to the interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. However, in order to know the precise reasons for the revival of *sphoṭa* in early modern Benares, which is included in the broader category "renewed interest in the philosophy of language", we still lack substantial studies.

§ 2. Significance of the Present Study

Śeṣakṛṣṇa was an influential grammarian not only in terms of his works but also in terms of his impact on the contemporary and later grammarians. Nevertheless, we do not have any work other than the STN where Śeṣakṛṣṇa presents his views on language and *śābdabodha*. Consequently, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to the grammarians' philosophy of language cannot be assessed without carefully studying the STN. Examining his interpretation of *sphoṭa* and thus his involvement in the philosophical discussion about language would also reveal important information on the form and the strength of the intellectual currents of his time. Furthermore, it is vital to find out whether Śeṣakṛṣṇa was the first to kindle interest in revisiting *sphoṭa* from the grammarians' point of view. This is because the authors of the SSbh and the SSNV, who were apparently Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contemporaries, are not known to have been

grammarians. We, therefore, need to put the STN in the right context to determine its place[2] in the philosophy of language in early modern Benares and to evaluate Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to it.

A few notable studies have examined how the *sphoṭa* doctrine was interpreted and presented in the early modern period. They question is to what extent such interpretations can be distinguished from the expositions by previous writers. For instance, BRONKHORST's (2005, 2008, 2012) arguments for the possibility of recognizing Bhaṭṭoji as the first to have treated *sphoṭa* as a "semantic entity" certainly deserve examination, but can be defended only after taking into consideration the total volume of literature on *sphoṭa* prior to Bhaṭṭoji, necessarily including the STN. Since BRONKHORST (2005: 26) says that he could not examine in detail the STN when writing his aforementioned works, it is clear that a proper study of the STN is essential to check the legitimacy of his claim.

Given the late history of the *sphoṭa* doctrine and the comparatively larger number of works on it that were written on the eve of colonialism, it is necessary to research why the *sphoṭa* doctrine re-emerged after a period of "silence". We do not know with certainty whether Śeṣakṛṣṇa had received any direct impact from earlier works, which are now perhaps lost, but the influence of the STN upon later works of that sort has obviously been strong. The present study attempts to trace the reasons for *sphoṭa*'s re-emergence and to analyse the strength and credibility of those works.

[2] Nevertheless, G. B. PALSULE, who presents a summary of the STN with a brief translation of each *kārikā* in COWARD & RAJA (1990: 215) does not recognize any specific merit in it: "The text has no pretensions to either original ideas or an exhaustive treatment of the topic, its aim apparently being to present the doctrine and the accompanying arguments in succinctly worded stanzas. It is worth mentioning that, though one of the late works, it is content with presenting the doctrine in its classical form and is free from such innovations as we find in the *Sphoṭacandrikā*."

§ 3. Works on *Sphoṭa* before Śeṣakṛṣṇa

After Maṇḍana Miśra's SSm, written about the eighth century, there is no known work focused only on the interpretation of *sphoṭa* until Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara (fl. c. 1410), a Mīmāṃsaka from the Payyoor Bhaṭṭathirippad family in Malabar, composed his *Gopālikā* commentary (SSmgop) on it. Besides the SSmgop, Parameśvara wrote commentaries on three more Mīmāṃsā works, the *Tattvabindu* of Vācaspati Miśra, the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* of Cidānanda Paṇḍita, and the *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra. Although his approach to the interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine in the SSm clarifies some points[3] Maṇḍana had not delved into, it does not show any significant development of the interpretation of *sphoṭa* even after more than half a millennium from the date of Maṇḍana Miśra. Moreover, his commentary is imbued frequently with the Mīmāṃsā perspectives to the extent that it seems a pro-Mīmāṃsā exposition of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. Parameśvara does not seem to have exerted any direct influence on Śeṣakṛṣṇa and they lived at least a century apart. Nevertheless, the extent to which Śeṣakṛṣṇa was influenced by Maṇḍana Miśra should be examined carefully, since the SSm was, as far as we know, the only individual work on *sphoṭa* available to him. However, somewhat curiously, there is no direct reference[4] in the STN to the SSm. We may, therefore, assume that Śeṣakṛṣṇa perhaps disregarded the SSm as an Advaitic work and reverted to the more solidly established grammatical authorities on *sphoṭa*. Moreover, it can be imagined that Maṇḍana and Parameśvara were probably not grammarians since none of their works is known to be on grammar.

The SSbh of Bharata Miśra (fl. 1550), a writer about whom we know very little, comes next in terms of the chronology of the *sphoṭa* literature. He obviously follows Maṇḍana Miśra[5] and seemingly Parameśvara as well. Nevertheless, the originality of his work can be determined, as

[3] See the introduction to IYER's (1966) translation of the SSm for details.

[4] Note that the first halves of the SSm 23 and the STN 16 are identical.

[5] The SSbh does not contain any direct reference to the works of Maṇḍana or Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara, although Bharata carries forward some of Maṇḍana's arguments.

PALSULE notes[6], in the light of three distinct approaches as follows. First, unlike the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, who strongly maintain the agency of phonemes in manifesting the signifier of meaning, Bharata Miśra clearly says that *sphoṭa* is manifested by *dhvanis.*[7] This position on the manifestation of *sphoṭa* parallels to that of the later grammarians, although we do not have enough evidence to confirm whether or not Bharata Miśra was also a grammarian.[8] Second, his recognition of the categories of *sphoṭa* as *jātisphoṭa, vyaktisphoṭa,* and *antaḥśabda*[9] is also a significant contribution. These categories were what the later grammarians developed out of the only three sentence definitions admitted in the VP as supporting its indivisibility: (i) *jāti-saṅghātavartinī* [universal resident in a collection of words], (ii) *eka-anavayava-śabda* [single *śabda* devoid of constituents], and (iii) *buddhi-anusaṃhṛti* [10] [that which is retained in the mind] respectively. By maintaining that those "different views are meant for students at different levels", [11] Bharata Miśra has successfully coordinated Bhartṛhari's views on *sphoṭa* with those of the later grammarians. Third, the SSbh differs from the SSm in terms of its style of presentation. Vedic authority (*āgama*), presented as a strong proof[12] for the legitimacy of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, is particularly noticeable in the SSbh, as he dedicates one chapter to it, the other two being on direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).

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[6] COWARD & RAJA 1990: 231, 232.

[7] SSbh (*artha* chapter) p. 19: "*dhvanaya evāsmākaṃ sphoṭasyābhivyañjakāḥ, na tu varṇāḥ*." [Just the *dhvanis* are the manifesters of *sphoṭa* in our (view), not phonemes.].

[8] In NCC 16, p. 151, Bharata Miśra is recognized to have written a commentary on the *Aśvalāyanagṛhyasūtra* in addition to his SSbh, but NCC 2, pp. 218 - 219, which lists 14 commentaries on the *Aśvalāyanagṛhyasūtra,* does not give his name among their authors. However, no grammatical works are known to have been written by him. Cf. JHA 1990: 382.

[9] SSbh (*pratyakṣa* chapter) pp. 11 - 16.

[10] Cf. VP 2. 56: "*avyabhicāriṇī ekārthatā*" [unchanging state of a single meaning]. See MATILAL 1990b: 97.

[11] PALSULE's words in COWARD & RAJA 1990: 231.

[12] PINCHARD (2011) examines this point in detail. Except Nāgeśa, the later writers on *sphoṭa* in general did not place emphasis on *āgama* as a major approach to prove the legitimacy of *sphoṭa*. Despite his being a contemporary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa and perhaps Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Bharata's emphasis on it therefore makes him closer to the early writers than to the later ones.

The *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* (SSNV) is an anonymous work, which, as its title suggests, considers the doctrine of *sphoṭa* in the SSbh. The author was perhaps a contemporary of Bharata Miśra and more likely that of Śeṣakṛṣṇa as well.[13] He follows[14] more closely the SSbh, which is itself dependent considerably on the SSm, as already mentioned. Moreover, the author clearly pays his respects to Bhartṛhari, Maṇḍana Miśra, and Bharata Miśra in the first verse. His reference (SSNV, *kārikā* 2) to the division of chapters in the SSbh also supports the conclusion that the subject of his review is mostly Bharata's work. Unlike the SSm and the SSbh, the SSNV is entirely in verse. As the author asserts in the penultimate *kārikā*, his work is thus in an easier mnemonic format so that it can be used as a teaching manual.[15] We also observe in the SSNV the writer's (i) apparent identification of the individual *sphoṭa* (*vyaktisphoṭa*) with the language principle (*śabdatattva*), and (ii) scathing criticism of the notion of *sphoṭa*'s sequence (*krama*).

§ 4. The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*: Text, Structure, and Contents

4.1 Text: Editions and Manuscripts

On the basis of surviving literature, it is evident that the writers in early modern India examined the *sphoṭa* doctrine more ardently than their predecessors. After the SSm of Maṇḍana, there was no individual work focused on *sphoṭa* until Śeṣakṛṣṇa's STN appeared. Consequently, the STN clearly marks the beginning of the series of expository works that

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[13] COWARD & RAJA (1990: 22) places this author circa 1550 and Śeṣakṛṣṇa circa 1540.

[14] As COWARD and RAJA (1990: 235) notes, the SSNV does not have any originality and is simply a metrical recast of the SSbh.

[15] SSNV, *kārikā* 244: "*sphoṭasiddhyuditanyāyadig eṣā darśitā mayā* । *padyabandhena bālānām avabodhāya kevalam*." [I have presented this outline of the *sphoṭa* doctrine taught in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* in the form of a composition in verse, solely for the understanding of the students.]. It is also written in a figurative language. Cf. SSNV *kārikās* 229 - 235, where the purified language is depicted as a woman exposing her beauty, after grooming herself, only to her lover. This is based on the *Āgama* chapter of the SSbh and the source is ṚV 10. 71. 4.

followed. Although the relation between Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work and the SSbh and the SSNV is unclear, Bhaṭṭoji's ŚK and VSK, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's (fl. 1640)[16] VBhS, where he wrote a separate chapter titled *Sphoṭanirṇaya* (SN), and Āpadeva's (fl. 1610)[17] *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa*, still known only by the title, need to be regarded as significant results of the renewal of interest in *sphoṭa* that started with the STN. A century or so later, Nāgeśa's (fl. 1714) SV, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin's (fl. 1750) *Sphoṭacandrikā* (SC), and possibly Keśava Miśra's *Sphoṭapratiṣṭhā* appeared as the last works on *sphoṭa* before colonialism, while Rāmanārāyaṇa Miśra's *Sphoṭamīmāṃsā*, Bhairava Miśra's (fl. 1824) *Sphoṭaparīkṣā* commentary on the SN, and Kṛṣṇaśāstrī Ārade's (early 19th century) *Sphoṭacaṭaka* were among the works in colonial India that followed the grammarians' tradition. Accordingly, the initiative taken by the STN is remarkable, because it not only triggered a renewed interest in *sphoṭa* but also, more importantly, established the grammarians' authority on the interpretation of *sphoṭa* in a clearer way than before.

Although it has been edited and published twice, the STN has neither been subject to any in-depth research nor been translated. The two editions of the STN are as follows. The latter published with a modern Sanskrit commentary does not differ from the first except only at very few places. I indicate them in the translation.

1. BĀKRE, Mahādeva Śarmā Gaṅgādhara Bhaṭṭa (ed.), 1913. "*Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*". In: *Vādārthasaṅgraha also containing Sphoṭacandrikā, Prātipadikasaṃjñāvāda, Vākyavāda, Vākyadīpikā, Ṣaṭkāravivecana, Kārakavādārtha, Samāsavādārtha, Evakāravādārtha, Vādasudhākara, Laghuvibhaktyarthanirṇaya, Śabdabodhaprakāśikā, Ākhyātaśaktivāda*), Part 1. Bombay: Gujarātī Mudraṇālaya. pp. 1 - 15.

2. TRIPĀṬHĪ, Brahmānanda (ed.), 1994. *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa with Vasanta Tryambaka Śevaḍe's Tattvaprakāśikā commentary*. Chowkhambā Surabhāratī Granthamālā, 259. Vārāṇasī: Chowkhambā Surabhāratī Prakāśana.

[16] NCC 5, p. 92.

[17] NCC 2, p. 124 and LEIPZIG, No. 2375.

Although neither of the editors says how many and which manuscripts they consulted in order to prepare their editions, five manuscripts of the STN are recorded to exist. Those manuscripts were mostly in private collections, at least as known to the compilers of the manuscript catalogues at the time of compilation. Despite my efforts to establish a connection with the libraries and the institutes to which I assumed they might possibly have been transferred, I could not trace the present location of any of them. Consequently, only the two edited works listed above have been consulted for the present study.

For the benefit of future researchers, I enumerate below the manuscripts of the STN as recorded in the catalogues.

1. Manuscript (A) [18]

The title is given as the *Sphoṭatattvam*. No. 1431. Substance: country-made yellow paper, 9¾ x 4½ inches. Folia: 14. Lines: 8 - 10 on a page. Extent: 292 *Ślokas*. [19] Character: Nāgara. Date: ? Place of deposit: Calcutta, Government of India. Appearance: old. Prose. Correct. The catalogue entry lists the first two introductory verses, two of the concluding verses and the colophon. The verses quoted there contain a few variants compared to BĀKRE's and TRIPĀṬHĪ's editions. A short introduction in Sanskrit to the subject matter of the STN is given at the end of the entry.

2. Manuscript (B) [20]

The title is given in both Devanagari and Roman characters, again as *Sphoṭatattvam*. No. 169. Author: Śeṣakṛṣṇa. No. of Leaves: 18. No. of Lines in each page: 26. Age of MS: (Not Given). Where deposited and in whose possession: Bhāupaṇḍita, Mulhera (given in Devanagari characters). Remarks: (None). The village Mulhera or Mulhaira belongs to the block known as Sarurpur Khurd in the Meerut District of Uttar Pradesh, India.

[18] NOTICES, No. 1431.

[19] The *śloka* referred to here is a unit of text length, which consists of 32 syllables.

[20] BÜHLER, Fascicle 3. pp. 32, 33.

3. Manuscript (C) [21]

The title is given in both Devanagari and Roman characters as *Sphoṭatattvam*. No: 128. Author: Kṛṣṇaśeṣa. No. of Leaves: 12. No. of lines in each page: 20. Age of MS: (Not Given). Where deposited and in whose possession: Dinamaṇiśaṅkara, Ahamedabad (given in Devanagari characters), Gujarat. Remarks: (None).

4. Manuscript (D) [22]

The title is given in Devanagari and Roman characters as *Sphoṭatattva*. No: 1. Subject-matter and name of author: A treatise on the inherent relations between sounds and sense, and on logotheism by Kṛishṇa ṣesha. No. of pages: 4(0?). No. of Lines in each page: 9. Extent in *Ślokas*: 300. Character: Nāgari. Substance: Country paper. Age of Manuscripts: nil. Where deposited and in whose possession: Gonda (district of Uttar Pradesh), Person: Paṇḍita Umādatta Miśra. Remarks: (None).

5. Manuscript (E) [23]

The title is given in Devanagari and Roman characters as *Sphoṭatattva*. No: 3. Subject-matter and name of author: On the relation of sounds and sense in words by Śivakṛṣṇa. Number of pages: 22. Number of lines on each page: 11. Extent in *Ślokas*: 300. Character: Nāgari. Substance: Country paper. Age of MS: Nil. Where deposited, and in whose possession: Faizabad (district of Uttar Pradesh), Person: Mahanta Priyādāsa. Remarks: (None).

It is observed that the title of the STN is given in all the manuscripts as "*Sphoṭatattva*/°*m*", omitting the word "*-nirūpaṇa*." We hear of a "*Sphoṭatattva*" by a Kṛṣṇa Dvivedin from Mithila [24] but since all the

[21] BÜHLER, Fascicle 4. p. 34.
[22] OUDH 1885, XVIII, pp. 26, 27.
[23] OUDH 1876, p. 8.
[24] NCC 4, p. 324. Although NCC 4 (p. 366) lists the *Sphoṭatattva* as a work of Kṛṣṇaśeṣa, cross-referring to NOTICES, No. 1431 given above, NCC 35 (p. 114) lists a *Sphoṭavāda* ascribed to a Śeṣa whose identity is not specified. Furthermore, quite strangely, NCC 35 (pp. 115, 116) does not include the STN under the works of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa, whose father was Nṛsiṃha, but under the authorship of another Śeṣakṛṣṇa again listed as "with unspecified identity". Apparently, the NCC 35 has been careless in recognizing the works of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, since it also includes the

manuscripts above except the last one record the clan name of the author as Śeṣa, it is certain that those manuscripts recorded in the catalogues are the manuscripts of the STN by Śeṣakṛṣṇa alias Kṛṣṇaśeṣa.

4.2 Structure

In comparison with the other individual works on the *sphoṭa* doctrine, the STN is a terse work consisting of nineteen *kārikās*, seventeen of which are followed by an auto-commentary of varying length, and four concluding verses. Apparently, the work was intended for teaching purposes rather than presenting a detailed makeover of the classical interpretation of *sphoṭa* or a direct response to the contemporary opponents of it. The two prose paragraphs, i.e., *padaprakriyā* and *vākyaprakriyā,* at the end of the *kārikās* but before the concluding verses and colophon, can be assumed as serving for the same purpose. Given the overall flow of the work, it appears that Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote first the *kārikās* and the self-commentary, and added the two prose paragraphs later, which are not integral parts of the STN.

The STN also follows the traditional practice of integrating into the *mangalācaraṇa* (introductory verse with auspicious invocation) the essence of the content discussed in the work concerned.[25] It is *sphoṭa's* identification with the *Śabdabrahman* in the case of the STN. However, the *mangalācaraṇa* and the second of the concluding verses which extol the *Śabdabrahman* do not force us to conclude that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a committed exponent of the Advaita Vedānta. This is because the *sphoṭa*

Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi under both those entries and removes the *Yaṅlungantaśiromaṇi* and the *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī*, which we now know as his with more certainty, from the authorship of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the author of the STN.

[25] This practice can be compared with the rhetoric device *mudrālaṅkāra* often found in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* verse of Sanskrit dramas, where the names of all the major characters are introduced figuratively. Cf. *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* 2. 40: "*sābhiprāyasya vākye yad vacaso viniveśanam | mudrāṃ tāṃ mutpradāyitvāt kāvyamudrāvido viduḥ*." [If the intention of utterance is put in the sentence, those who are informed of the features of poetry know it as "*mudrā*", because of its condition of giving pleasure.]. See MINKOWSKI (2008) for more details.

doctrine is inherently linked with a number of fundamental theses of the Advaita Vedānta, requiring the advocates of *sphoṭa* to highlight the identity between *sphoṭa* and the Brahman. Similarly, some later grammarians such as Nāgeśa show their Śaiva devotion at the beginning of their works on *sphoṭa*, although still depending on the Advaita metaphysics to authenticate *sphoṭa's* legitimacy. To what extent Śeṣakṛṣṇa honoured the Advaita Vedānta tradition in interpreting *sphoṭa* is questionable. This is a point I will consider in Chapter Four.

We observe that Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not provide any information about his lineage, patrons, or even his motivation for composing the STN, probably because he was careful to maintain the terseness of the work most and he provided such information extensively in his other works. He has, however, expressed implicitly his discomfort with the spiteful critics in two of the concluding verses.

4.3 Style

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work follows the style conventional to the works of that sort. Without acknowledging the source, Śeṣakṛṣṇa occasionally borrows from some works like the *Tattvabindu* (TB) and the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* (NVTP)[26] to present the opponents' arguments against *sphoṭa*, but he regularly replaces most of the original words with his own. In the *padaprakriyā* and the *vākyaprakriyā*, the extent of his borrowing is clearer than it is in the main body of the text.

When it comes to the other writers mentioned by name in the STN, Bhartṛhari (VP), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (ŚV), Vācaspati Miśra (NVTṬ and TB), Śaṅkarācārya (BSśbh), Vallabha (NL), and another untraceable author mentioned as Miśra are prominent. Śeṣakṛṣṇa quotes from Lakṣmaṇadeśika (ŚTT), without mentioning his name or the work, as he does regarding Maṇḍana Miśra (SSm). Śeṣakṛṣṇa's attachment to the grammatical tradition is obvious from the way he presents the arguments and their defences, authoritative quotes, conventional

[26] For instance, STNśk 13, 18 and *vākyaprakriyā*.

analogies, and examples etc. His respect for Patañjali and Bhartṛhari also confirms this.

Regarding the metre, all the *kārikās* of the STN are in the *anuṣṭubh*. Except *kārikās* 1, 2, 4 - 15, 19 and the concluding verse No. 1, which are exemplary of the regular (*pathyā*) type of the *anuṣṭubh*, where a bacchius foot (*ya-gaṇa*) occurs after the fourth syllable of the odd quarters, the others show the use of extensions (*vipulā*) [27] as follows. *Kārikā* 16 represents a *saṅkīrṇā vipulā*, in which the first quarter contains a tribrach foot (*na-gaṇa*) and the third quarter an amphimacer foot (*ra-gaṇa*). While *kārikā* 17 is a *ma-vipulā* because of its molossus foot (*ma-gaṇa*) in the first quarter, *kārikā* 18 and the concluding verse No. 2 are examples of the *bha-vipulā*, as their third quarters contain a dactyl foot (*bha-gaṇa*). The *na-vipulās* with a tribrach foot (*na-gaṇas*) can be seen in *kārikā* 3 (first quarter) and in the concluding verses No. 3 and No. 4 (third quarters).

4.3 Contents

The contents of the STN are summarized here, in order that the reader may have a general understanding of the flow of the arguments and how Śeṣakṛṣṇa has organized his exposition of *sphoṭa*.

Kārikā 1

The *Śabdabrahman*, which projects phonemes, words, and sentences as its illusory transfigurations, is worshipped as the substratum of the world.

Kārikā 2

Patañjali as the author of the MBh is admitted to be the foremost authority on the *sphoṭa* doctrine and Bhartṛhari to be the one who clarified it further.

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[27] For an explanation of the extensions of the *anuṣṭubh* with its "*jāti*" (class), "*vyakti*" (individual) and "*saṅkīrṇā*" (mixed) varieties, see ChA 3. 39.

Kārikā 3

Whether phonemes have any power to signify meaning individually, collectively or by means of occurring in a single memory is examined. Śeṣakṛṣṇa maintains clearly that *sphoṭa* is twofold as *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa*, and discusses them briefly. Only the *sphoṭa* taken to be devoid of constituents can signify meaning because it is directly manifested by the *dhvanis* but not by phonemes.

Kārikā 4

The recognition of phonemes at each speech act cannot be accepted as a proof of their eternality, because the cognitions of phonemes being produced and destroyed obstruct the recognition. The obstructers are the *dhvanis.* The opponents' view that "the universal property or the unity of phonemes causes the recognition of phonemes" is examined and refuted.

Kārikā 5

The power of phonemes to accumulate is examined. Since phonemes are obstructed sequentially by the *dhvanis*, even if considered eternal, they cannot accumulate. Otherwise, the unwarranted consequence that "all phonemes always signify meaning" occurs.

Kārikā 6

The power of the memory traces deposited by phonemes to signify meaning is examined and refuted. The rationale is that the memory traces can raise only the memory of what produces them and that their alleged power to raise something else additionally, which the opponents contend is the cognition of meaning, is a complex assumption. Moreover, the cognition of meaning, which seems to rest in the individual self, does not match the memory resting in the *antaḥkaraṇa* in terms of their loci.

Kārikā 7

Sequence does not involve itself in the memory of phonemes. This is because the collective memory of phonemes is a partless whole. Furthermore, once phonemes occur in the memory, the sequence in

which they were experienced does not make any difference in the cognition of meaning.

Kārikā 8

Śeṣakṛṣṇa further examines how the sequence in which the listener experiences phonemes relates to the very phonemes in his single collective memory. In fact, sequence as a property of experiencing does not affect the memory whose scope is only phonemes. The opponents' view that sequence is one of the means that determine the word is also refuted.

Kārikā 9

Sphoṭa is not "assumed" but "directly perceived" as absolutely single at the rise of the cognitions of phoneme, word, and sentence. The single *sphoṭa* has to be accepted in the form of the *vākyasphoṭa*, given the stability of meaning despite the change of phonemes and words within the sentence. There is no fallacy of interdependence between the cognition of meaning and *sphoṭa*.

Kārikā 10

Phonemes, whether eternal or non-eternal, are not the constituents of *sphoṭa*, but just the illusory transfigurations of Brahman like all other phenomena. The phonemes considered eternal and all-pervading violate the natural rule that constituents are smaller than what they constitute. When they are non-eternal, they cannot be the constituents, because anything eternal, like *sphoṭa*, cannot be a constructed whole.

Kārikā 11

How the single *sphoṭa* appears diversely such as the *varṇasphoṭa* etc. is examined. The difference of the *dhvanis* manifesting *sphoṭa* makes the single *sphoṭa* seem diverse, and thereby makes the meaning it signifies varied.

Kārikā 12

Sphoṭa's relation to the manifested phonemes is discussed. Although different from phonemes in reality, *sphoṭa* seems non-different from them because of their superimposition on it as the substratum.

Kārikā 13

The gradual manifestation of *sphoṭa* is discussed with the analogy of the process of recognizing the value of a precious stone. It is at the grasp of the final phoneme accompanied by the memory traces of the previous phonemes that *sphoṭa* is manifested. Because each *dhvani* manifests a fraction of *sphoṭa* at a time, both the memory traces of the previously manifested phonemes and the experience of the final phoneme are necessary alike.

Kārikā 14

The mutual superimposition of *sphoṭa* and phonemes is accepted. Consequently, once the cognition of the fully manifested phonemes arises, the cognition of *sphoṭa* also arises. Since *sphoṭa* is gradually manifested, reaching perfection at the experience of the final phoneme, it is tenable that its manifestness ranges from an indistinct state to a more distinct state.

Kārikā 15

How the illusory manifestation of phonemes causes the true cognition of *sphoṭa* is examined, with the analogy of a tree first appearing to be an elephant due to its distance.

Kārikā 16

Because *sphoṭa* is perceived directly, the cognition of *sphoṭa* is subject to "gradation of manifestation", which is limited only to the objects of direct perception, resulting in meaning remaining ambiguous as long as *sphoṭa* is not fully manifested. Nevertheless, the manifested phonemes, being cognitive like meaning, are not directly perceived. Consequently, phonemes cannot cause the gradual manifestation of meaning.

Kārikā 17

The words containing identical phonemes differ in meaning because the s*phoṭas* of those words differ. Just as the element gold does not change despite its being the substance of the ornaments of different shapes, words with different meanings may have their phonemes remaining unchanged.

Kārikā 18

The necessity of comprehending the unity of word for the comprehension of meaning is not contradicted by the admittance of *sphoṭa*. The accurately distinguished word leads to valid knowledge. Only the phonemes that have achieved the state of word can signify meaning, but without *sphoṭa* they cannot achieve it.

Kārikā 19

Śeṣakṛṣṇa proceeds to elaborate on the necessity of having the true, unconditioned cognition of unity. Without the true cognition of unity, any cognition of multiplicity cannot arise. Such a situation would ultimately lead to voidness.

Padaprakriyā and *Vākyaprakriyā*

These two paragraphs are an examination of how, on the Nyāya view, the word-meaning is signified by phonemes, and the sentence-meaning by words. The untenability of this view is attested, and that the word-meaning and the sentence-meaning can only be signified by the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa* respectively is established.

Concluding verses (1 - 4)

The *Śabdabrahman* is praised again, and there is a reassertion that the STN conforms to the interpretation of the true nature of *sphoṭa* as expounded in the MBh. Śeṣakṛṣṇa presents his work to the genuine intellectuals, who are free from hatred and capable of pointing out impartially both defects and merits.

§ 5. Modern Commentary: *Tattvaprakāśikā*

We do not know whether the STN was the subject of any other commentary in its short history. The manuscript catalogues are also silent on this point. The *Tattvaprakāśikā* (TP) is, therefore, the only commentary on the STN. It was published when the text was edited for the second time in 1994.

5.1 The Commentator

The author of this modern commentary, the *Tattvaprakāśikā* (Illuminator of the true nature), was Vasanta Tryambaka ŚEVAḌE (also written as Vasant Trimbak SHEVDE) [02 October 1917 - 05 July 1999], a Brahmin pundit and poet of high calibre in the last century.[28] Although his literary career can be traced from his works, his biographical information is scarcely known to English readers. I furnish the following from JAISWAL (2002: 9 - 11).

ŚEVAḌE was born in Mumbai in the clan of Karhade Brahmins, who originally hailed from today's Karad city in Satara district of Mahārāṣṭra. His father, Tryambaka Lakṣmaṇa Śevaḍe, was a high court judge by profession and his mother was Vimalā Bāī.[29] Having had primary education in Mumbai and Amravati, ŚEVAḌE later migrated to Nagpur for higher education. In addition to an MA in Sanskrit from the Nagpur University in 1941, he received traditional education in Sanskrit grammar, logic, and literature.[30] ŚEVAḌE's scholarly life was spent mostly in Benares. His scholarship spreads across several disciplines and genres to include broadly Sanskrit grammar, literature, prosody, logic, and philosophy. Starting with Marathi in his younger days, he later became a poet writing prolifically in Sanskrit. He won the Sahitya

[28] Brahmānanda TRIPĀṬHĪ, (1932 -), who edited the STN for the second time and also edited a number of works ŚEVAḌE had written commentaries on, speaks very highly of ŚEVAḌE in his editorial note to the STN.
[29] JAISWAL 2002: 10.
[30] MIŚRA 1986: 205 - 210.

Akademi award [31] for the year 1986 for his *Mahākāvya* titled *Vindhyavāsinīvijaya*.

ŚEVAḌE was largely engaged in writing both creative works and commentaries on the works of traditional reputation. In addition to the TP commentary on Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work and the aforementioned *Mahākāvya*, the other published works[32] to his credit include two more *Mahākāvyas* in Sanskrit; the *Śumbhavadha* and the *Śrīdevadeveśvara*, several biographies; the *Raghunāthatārkikaśiromaṇicarita*, the *Śrīmotibābājāmadārcarita* (in Marathi), and the *Śrīkṛṣṇacarita*; a *Laghukāvya* titled *Abhinavameghadūta* (with a Sanskrit commentary and Hindi and English translations), a *stotra* titled *Stavamañjūṣā*; a prosodic work known as *Vṛttamañjarī* with its *Bhāvabodhinī* gloss, which is indirectly in praise of the goddess Durgā, the ŚEVAḌE family's *kuladevatā*, and the *Tattvaprakāśikā* commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana.[33] His unpublished works include both incomplete and complete compositions, such as *He Kāśirāja tubhyaṃ namāmaḥ*, *Kāvyapradīpa*, *Samasyāpūrti*, *Ṛtuvarṇana*, *Stavacatuṣṭaya*, *Gardabhākhyāna,* and *Nirvedadaśaka*.[34]

5.2 The Commentary

ŚEVAḌE's learned commentary on the STN follows the traditional style of commentaries on *śāstric* works. The following verse at the beginning of his commentary is a eulogy to the goddess Annapūrṇā, who is worshipped as the divine mother of nourishment and the goddess of the city of Benares, and another form of manifestation of goddess Pārvatī.

> *vārāṇasīm adhivasan nagarīṃ vasantaḥ*
> *śrīviśvanāthacaraṇāmbujacañcarīkaḥ*
> *bhaktyā vicintya hṛdi mātaram annapūrṇāṃ*
> *sphoṭasya tattvam akhilaṃ viśadīkaroti*.

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[31] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Sahitya_Akademi_Award_winners_for_Sanskrit. (Accessed on 28. 09. 2013).

[32] JAISWAL 2002: 15 - 22. Also see TRIPĀṬHĪ 2012: 288.

[33] TRIPĀṬHĪ 1994: 1 (*Sampādakīyam*).

[34] MISHRA 2002. pp. 21, 22.

> Vasanta, who dwells in the city of Vārāṇasī and a honeybee (desiring) the lotus feet of lord Viśvanātha, having contemplated on (divine) mother Annapūrṇā with heartfelt devotion, (now) fully explains the true nature of *sphoṭa*.

The colophon[35] and concluding verse also show ŚEVAḌE's sectarian attachment to the Śaivaite tradition. The verse is quoted below.

> *śrīkṛṣṇaśeṣa iti viśrutanāmadheyo*
> *yat sphoṭattattvanirūpaṇam ātatāna*
> *vyākhyāṃ vidhāya viśadārthaparāṃ tadīyām*
> *enāṃ samarpayati śambhupade vasantaḥ*.
>
> The scholar famed by the name Śrī Kṛṣṇaśeṣa composed the *sphoṭattattvanirūpaṇa.* Having written this commentary with clear meanings on it, Vasanta dedicates (it) at the feet of lord Śiva.

As TRIPĀṬHĪ (1994: 1) aptly states, the TP can be called an elaborate commentary in chaste Sanskrit. Its structure is well organised and clear. First, ŚEVAḌE gives the syntactic word order (*anvaya*) of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *kārikā* followed by its meaning (*kārikārtha*). Then he presents the original *Vṛtti* on it by Śeṣakṛṣṇa before adding his own commentary (*vṛttivyākhyā*). While clarifying the *kārikās* and the *vṛttis,* ŚEVAḌE does not limit himself to the original text, but includes pertinent authoritative verses and phrases from different sources, frequently omitting any acknowledgment. The examples he puts forth in support of the positions he attempts to clarify are conventional ones, apparently because he wanted to preserve the classical style of commentarial literature rather than recasting Śeṣakṛṣṇa's interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine for the modern readership. At the end of the TP, ŚEVAḌE has added the *kārikās* of Maṇḍana's SSm, a few excerpts on *sphoṭa* from the BhāP and some Vedic sources, and Vyāḍi's *Saṅgraha* as quoted in the VP.

However, regardless of his erudition and lucidity in explanation, one cannot easily ignore ŚEVAḌE's frequent and unacknowledged incorporation of lengthy paragraphs from authoritative works into the

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[35] "*iti paramamāheśvareṇa śevaḍekulasambhavena vasantakavinā viracitā sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇasya tattvaprakāśikā vyākhyā samāptā.*" [Here ends the *Tattvaprakāśikā* commentary on the *sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa,* written by pundit Vasanta born in the clan of Śevaḍe, who belongs to the great lord, i.e., Śiva.].

TP, mostly quoted verbatim. Sometimes, he goes on to borrow some of the explanatory notes by the modern editors of such works and to reproduce them in the TP as if his own. For example, the sentence in the TP (p. 27) starting as "*nanu sphoṭavyaktāv apīdānīṃ*" is identical to that in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's NM (ŚUKLA's edition 1936: 339). After this introductory line, the TP includes a verse from the ŚV[36] that also appears in the NM, and ŚEVAḌE duplicates there ŚUKLA's explanatory note (1936: 339, Note 1) on the verse. It may be surprising to notice that there are many more instances where the TP reproduces Jayanta's words in the NM with ŚUKLA's notes on them. Precisely put, ŚEVAḌE has copied from the NM the discussions titled "*varṇānāṃ sphoṭavyañjakatvam*" [phonemes manifest *sphoṭa*] and "*dhvanīnāṃ sphoṭavyañjakatvam*" [*dhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa*] completely, and the discussions such as "*varṇānāṃ arthabodhakatvasya nirākaraṇam*" [refutation of the signification of meaning by phonemes] and "*sphoṭasya pratyakṣagrāhyatvam*" [direct perceptibility of *sphoṭa*] partially. Moreover, ŚEVAḌE borrows paragraphs from a few more works other than the NM, for instance, from the PLM[37] of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, and incorporates them into his TP with minimal alteration but again without proper acknowledgement of the sources.

§ 6. Foci of the Present Study

This study of the *sphoṭa* doctrine as expounded in the STN primarily attempts to address the following issues..

6.1 Identity of Śeṣakṛṣṇa

It is essential to distinguish the Śeṣakṛṣṇa of the Śeṣa lineage who composed the STN from other contemporary namesakes. It is equally important to situate him in the early modern intellectual milieu of Benares, while investigating what his life was like as a scholar and an authoritative Brahmin, and evaluating his contribution to the philosophy

[36] ŚV (*sphoṭavāda* section), *kārikā* 91.

[37] For instance, cf. PLM (pp. 10, 11) and TP (p. 36); PLM (p. 24) and TP (pp. 29, 30).

of language. I also discuss what factors could have led Śeṣakṛṣṇa more than his predecessors to hold a renewed interest in *sphoṭa*.

6.2 Semantic Significance of the *Sphoṭa* Doctrine

Sphoṭa is recognized as a principal theory of *śābdabodha* because of its semantic significance, which was, however, hardly subject to examination from the perspective of linguistics until the advent of the later grammarians. This study briefly focuses on *sphoṭa's* semantic importance as suggested by its definitions and as apparent from the grammarians' explications of linguistic intercommunication.

6.3 Revival of the Philosophy of Language

We need to recognize the intellectual currents, and also possibly the political and social ones, that motivated the later grammarians to revive the philosophy of language after a prolonged period of inactivity. Discovering the reasons for the renewed interest in the *sphoṭa* doctrine, in particular, would also reveal the trends of the grammatical tradition during the early modern period. The pioneers of the revival, major topics of their pursuits, and the rival schools of the grammarians are also worth being examined in order to have a broader picture of the revival.

6.4 Position of the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* within the Revival

The STN can be recognized as the first complete examination of the *sphoṭa* doctrine by a grammarian, who, at the same time, shows little clear dependency on an established philosophical system. It, therefore, marks a turning point in the *sphoṭa* literature after the VP. It is also important to study the impact of the STN on the contemporary works of the philosophy of language, as it seems to have contributed to the emergence of more works of that sort.

6.5 Contribution of the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* to *Sphoṭa* Interpretation

The STN is generally thought to have conformed to the classical interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, but a detailed examination is required to verify this. To what extent Śeṣakṛṣṇa stays close to his predecessors' views on *sphoṭa* needs to be analysed so as to understand the differences and the similarities of the ways *sphoṭa* was interpreted throughout the intellectual history. If Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, as BRONKHORST (2005, 2008, 2012) maintains, attempted to recognize *sphoṭa* as a semantic entity for the first time, the significance of the role played by Śeṣakṛṣṇa as Bhaṭṭoji's teacher also deserves special attention.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa appears to be the pioneer, or at least one of the pioneers, in restoring the later grammarians' interest in *sphoṭa* in the early modern period and beyond. Studies such as POLLOCK (2001a), BENKE (2010), and O'HANLON (2010a, 2010b, 2011) show that, outside his major areas of intellectual expertise, Śeṣakṛṣṇa also played an influential role in the social and political milieu of his time both in and beyond Benares. This study attempts to examine further Śeṣakṛṣṇa's identity and literary career and bring out a clearer impression of his authority on the philosophy of language in early modern Benares. It may also help us have a broader understanding of how significant it would be to contextualize the interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine for recognizing its evolution. To find out more obviously the interrelationships among many other disciplines that prospered during the era concerned, and have a better grasp of the intellectual conflicts in the social history of India before colonialism are two more objectives of this study. The findings are expected to facilitate all types of research on the late history of the philosophy of language.

§ 7. Limitations of the Present Study

As already noted, none of the manuscripts of the STN recorded as belonging to private collections was traceable, forcing me to rely only on the two editions of it published in the last century. Likewise, I could not access the works that are known to contain the genealogical information

of the Śeṣas and other related figures but written in the Indian languages other than Sanskrit, such as Marathi. [38] Some recent researchers such as BENKE (2010) have established connections with some of those claimed to be the current descendants[39] of the Śeṣa lineage in order to retrieve family information, but I was not able to do so. Determining the identity of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's immediate family is also made difficult because of the namesakes both within and outside the Śeṣa family, an issue common to the whole of Sanskrit literature. The STN also lacks information about his patrons. Furthermore, as Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not mention any of his contemporaries or immediate predecessors but only the authorities prior to him by a few centuries, placing him on the timeline of the recent literature on *sphoṭa* has been quite difficult. Moreover, we cannot locate most of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's known works, although the catalogues record where their manuscripts were. Such works, about which we know nothing apart from their titles, and in some cases, few lines or verses, would have helped us to have a better picture not only of his lineage and literary career but also of his interactions with his contemporaries.

§ 8. Breakdown of Chapters

Chapter One examines Śeṣakṛṣṇa's identity and situates him in the socio-political and intellectual setting of early modern Benares. Śeṣakṛṣṇa is recognized as a descendant of the famous Śeṣa clan that migrated to Benares from Mahārāṣṭra, while the dispute over his relation to Rāmacandra, the author of the *Prakriyākaumudī* (PK), is addressed in detail. His immediate family and patrons are investigated in order to determine his date and social status in Benares. There is a discussion on Śeṣakṛṣṇa's literary career, and a general account of Benares during his time is given briefly. In this chapter, I also account for Śeṣakṛṣṇa's critics, his discomfort with them, and Bhaṭṭoji's rapport with him.

[38] For instance, the Marathi work titled *Bhaṭṭojidīkṣitajñātiviveka* by Rayabahadur Vasudev Anant BAMBARDEKAR, published in 1939 in Bombay.
[39] See BENKE 2010: 26, 50, 51.

Chapter Two briefly reviews the major aspects of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. First, I examine how *sphoṭa* is defined as a theory in the later grammarians' philosophy of language, especially semantics. How the entities that are related to the *sphoṭa* doctrine such as *dhvani*, *nāda,* and *varṇa* should be recognized for the role they play in manifesting *sphoṭa* is another topic of examination here. While explicating *sphoṭa's* role in the contexts of linguistic communication, the semantic significance of the *sphoṭa* doctrine is briefly investigated. This chapter also contains a short analysis of *sphoṭa*'s locus and the categorization of *sphoṭa*.

Chapter Three contains the translation of the STN. The *kārikās* of the text and Śeṣakṛṣṇa's self-commentary are translated with some footnotes. The excerpts from the authoritative works given in ŚEVAḌE's TP in support of explaining the STN text are also included where pertinent.

Chapter Four discusses how Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to the philosophy of language should be comprehended by means of contextualizing it properly. The grammatical literature in the early modern period is reviewed, along with an investigation of the influence of contemporary intellectual trends on the grammarians' renewed interest in the philosophy of language. It is also recognized that the interpretation of *sphoṭa* in the 16th and 17th centuries shows a few distinct features. The *sphoṭa* doctrine as construed by Śeṣakṛṣṇa is examined next, with special focus on his approach to the interpretation of *sphoṭa*, ways of argumentation, and style of presentation, followed by a short textual appraisal of the STN.

This study ends with a short conclusion that summarizes the findings, which include Śeṣakṛṣṇa's identity, the place held by the STN in the literature on *sphoṭa*, how the *sphoṭa* doctrine re-emerged in the early modern period, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to the re-emergence of it, and what approaches the future studies of *sphoṭa* would require.

§ 9. Conventions of Translation and Transliteration

Where English equivalents cannot be provided because ambiguities are likely, I leave the Sanskrit terms as they are. For example, the terms "*dhvani*", "*nāda*" and "*śabda*" are left untranslated. The plurals of some untranslated Sanskrit words are indicated with the English suffix "-s" appended to them, for instance, "*varṇas*", to avoid the confusion arising from the use of only the lemma/ dictionary form to mean both their singular and the plural forms. In order to provide a clearer translation, I have supplied in parentheses some words and phrases not directly corresponding to the original Sanskrit text.

Sanskrit and Persian terms other than proper names are italicised. The original text of the STN given in Chapter Three is put in bold non-italic typeface, but not italicized. Other Sanskrit quotations in the body text and the footnotes are italicized. Whenever *kārikās*, *sūtras*, or sections of the primary sources can be referred to by their numbers, it is done so. In all other cases, the publication date of the edition used, which is followed by the page number/s, is given. The abbreviation list enumerates all the editions of the primary sources used here.

Chapter ONE

Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Early Modern Benares

§ 1. Śeṣa Lineage

Benares (Vārāṇasī) flourished after Akbar the Great as the third Mughal emperor consolidated his power in northern and central India in 1573. It saw a rapid renaissance not only in commerce but also in arts, sciences, and literature. Learned men from various regions of India migrated to Benares and many of them settled there permanently for their intellectual and religious pursuits. They received the patronage of Akbar, his ministers and other regional kings in the courts of northern and central India. Among them were a few groups of Dākṣiṇī pundits who, as the name indicates, came from the South, including Mahārāṣṭra and Andhra states,[40] and firmly established their own schools of learning within a century or so. Seven major Brahmin families[41] that migrated to Benares from the South can be recognized; (i) Śeṣa family, (ii) Dharmādhikārī family, (iii) Gādhi or Bhaṭṭa Family, (iv) Bhāradvāja family, (v) Pāyaguṇḍe family, (vi) Caturdhara or Chowdhuri family, and (vii) Puṇatāmakara/ Puṇatāmbekar family. Although these scholarly families mainly operated in Benares, as O'HANLON (2010b) reveals, many of them did not lose their academic and social affiliations but stayed well-connected to where they originally came from. Benares was an ideal proving ground for the scholarly activities of these new intellectuals, but their authority remained strong also in the regions of their original residence in the South.

Sanskrit studies, in particular, started to bloom in a variety of forms from the early 15th century[42] or probably even before then. Since patronage for Sanskrit learning from royal and wealthy families was also on the rise,

[40] ŚĀSTRĪ 1912: 7 - 13.
[41] ŚĀSTRĪ 1912: 13. See O'HANLON (2010b: 203, 204) for more works on them. `
[42] See for details, POLLOCK 2001a: 3 - 31; POLLOCK 2001b: 392 - 426; O'HANLON 2010b: 201 - 240.

Brahmin pundits were keen on producing new works and commentaries on many acclaimed Sanskrit works from the past in a number of genres including Dharmaśāstra, philosophy, and science. Likewise, they started reshuffling the time-honoured Sanskrit grammatical tradition, seeking new, and more importantly, faster ways of teaching it. POLLOCK (2001a: 8 - 10) shows how the authors in the early modern period tended to style their works, so that such works could be distinguished from the works by both their contemporaries and esteemed writers in the past. [43] Intellectual rivalry remained a passion among the disciples and the followers of great teachers and authors. The Śeṣa and the Dīkṣita families were especially notable in the genre of Sanskrit grammar, although they worked extensively on other genres as well. More importantly, the inharmonious relation that developed between them finally led to the formation of two rival schools, probably the most distinctive pair of schools on grammar, which showed intense intellectual polarities in early modern Benares.

However, it is difficult to have a common, all-inclusive picture of the Śeṣa family in Benares during the prime of its intellectual history. As the studies on it so far may prove, the difficulty increases because many writers have provided scanty information on their genealogies and many works are still known only by their titles as they are cited in the works by the Śeṣas themselves or by others. On the other hand, the multiplicity of namesakes not only among the pundits living in the same spatiotemporal context but also within the genealogy in question puzzles current researchers. Most significantly, the possibility of two distinct lines of the Śeṣa lineage, which could have been at least a century apart, needs to be examined carefully. The following discussion is an attempt to recognize Śeṣakṛṣṇa's immediate family among the Śeṣas in Benares in the light of both the primary sources and the recent studies on them and early modern India.

[43] It is possible to assume that prefixing the titles of works with "*sat-*" (lit. correct/ actual) had been some writers' practice to highlight their works as more accurate examinations of the subject matter concerned than other previous works? Consider *Satśūdrācāraśiromaṇi* (as Śeṣakṛṣṇa called it), *Satprakriyākaumudī* (as Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa introduced it in his SR 1.6), and *Satpraśnavākyārtha* (as Narasiṃha Yati [c. 1660] introduced it).

1.1 Traditional Account

The traditional account[44] does not identify more than one family line of the Śeṣas in Benares. In consequence, it cannot distinguish between at least the two obvious lines of the Śeṣa lineage that grew separately in terms of both time and space. Furthermore, a disregard for the namesakes[45] who are, in some cases, equally important in each branch of the Śeṣa family, has resulted in ambiguity to the extent that the works belonging to different Śeṣa descendants have been ascribed to the authors at the discretion of the ascribers.

The traditional account of the Śeṣa lineage does not match the information gleaned from the works of the Śeṣas, citations of them in others' works, and the dates of the patrons of the Śeṣas etc. This mismatch challenges the assumption that the Śeṣakṛṣṇa who wrote the *Prakāśa* commentary on the *Prakriyākaumudī* [46] (PK), *Kaṃsavadha Nāṭaka* (KaṃV), *Prākṛtacandrikā* (PrC) etc. was a nephew of Rāmacandra, the author of the PK. I examine briefly the traditional view first, so that we can understand better why a reconstruction has been necessary.[47]

The earliest records of the ancestors of the Śeṣa family are found in the *Prasāda* commentary (PKv) [48] on the PK by Viṭṭhala, Rāmacandra's grandson. According to Viṭṭhala, the Śeṣa family received its name from

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[44] Before the beginning of the 20th century, many writers including the compilers of early manuscript catalogues introduced the Kṛṣṇa that wrote the PKśk as a member of the immediate family of Rāmacandra, the author of the PK. In order to distinguish their account of the Śeṣa family from what we know about it now, I refer to it as the traditional account.

[45] Since appendages to the given names such as *ācārya*, *bhaṭṭa, kavi,* and *paṇḍita* are simply honorific, we have three Narasiṃhas, two or three Anantas, two or three Rāmacandras, two Viṭṭhalas and two Kṛṣṇas known to us thus far within ten generations since the recorded origin of the Śeṣas in the literature.

[46] ABHYANKAR (1961: 118) says that *Kṛṣṇakiṅkaraprakriyā* is another title of this work.

[47] See JHA 1990: Appendix N. p. 420 for the Śeṣa family tree as in the traditional view. BENKE (2010: 19, 20) gives his attempt to reconstruct it.

[48] Rāmacandra has not provided any information on his lineage.

Anantācārya, who was the head of it.[49] The Śeṣas belonged to the Kauṇḍinya *gotra* of the Tailaṅga[50] class of Brahmins residing in Andhra.[51] In terms of their ritualistic[52] commitment, the Śeṣas were

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[49] Viṭṭhala says Ananta was Avimukta's son, but we do not know if he was the head of the Śeṣa genealogy. PKv *Uttarārdha,* concluding verse 4: "*tadvaṃśe nararatnanāyakamaṇir jāto 'vimuktāṅgajo | 'nantācārya iti trilokaviditaḥ sarvajña evāparaḥ.*" [In that clan was born the central gemstone among (other) jewels of men, Anantācārya (as) the son of Avimukta, and who was known in three worlds as another omniscient being, i.e., the supreme lord.]. See TRIVEDĪ's PK edition (1931: 796). According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and other Hindu texts, Ananta is a synonym for Śeṣa, the cosmic serpent on whom Viṣṇu sleeps, or the foremost manifestation of Viṣṇu per se.

[50] As known from other sources, the Tailaṅgas were one among the five classes of Brahmins from the South, while the Kauṇḍinyas were one of the seven gotras belonging to the Tailaṅga class, who spoke Telugu. A traditional verse describes as follows the ten classes of Brahmins:
"karṇāṭakāś ca tailaṅgā drāviḍā mahārāṣṭrakāḥ gurjarāś ceti pancaiva drāviḍā vindhyadakṣiṇe | sārasvatāḥ kānyakubjā gauḍā utkalamaithilāḥ pañca gauḍā iti khyātā vindhyasyottaravāsinaḥ" [The five *Drāviḍa* classes (*Pañca Drāviḍas*) living to the south of the Vindhyā (mountain range) are *Karṇāṭakas* (in Karnataka), *Tailaṅgas* (in Andhra), *Drāviḍas* (in Tamil Nadu and Kerala), those in Mahārāṣṭra and those *Gurjaras* (in Gujarat). *Sārasvatas* (in Punjab, Kashmir & Sindh), *Kānyakubjas* (in Uttar Pradesh), *Gauḍas* (in Kurukshetra and Rajasthan), *Utkalas* (in Orissa), and *Maithilīs* (in Bihar) living to the north of the Vindhya are known as the five *Gauḍa* classes (*Pañca Gauḍas*.)]. The *Sahyādrikhaṇḍa* of the *Skandapurāṇa* (*Uttarārdha* 1. 2, 3) and the *Vallālacarita* (verses 1. 13, 14; 2. 18. 2, 3) by Ānanda Bhaṭṭa (c. 1510) give this list in slightly different words. This division is due to Brahmins' dwelling in different geographical regions separated by the Vindhyā mountain range, though there was only one class of Brahmin at the creation, as the *Brāhmaṇotpattimārtaṇḍa* of Harikṛṣṇa ŚĀSTRĪ (1871) explains: *"sṛṣṭyārambhe brāhmaṇasya jātir ekā prakīrtitā.* (verse 8cd)… *evaṃ pūrvajātir ekā deśabhedād dvidhābhavat | gauḍadrāviḍabhedena tayor bhedā daśa smṛtāḥ.* (verse 13)*"* [Only one class of Brahmins was known (to exist) at the beginning of the creation. Accordingly, the single class at the beginning became two as a result of the division of (their) dwelling regions, by the division as *Gauḍa* and *Drāviḍa.* The (sub)divisions of those two are known to be ten.]. ŚĀSTRĪ (1871: 3) also quotes those two verses above as the verses 16, 17 in his work. DESHPANDE (2010) discusses this classification in detail.

[51] PKv *Pūrvārdha*, verse 3 of introduction: "*andhradeśe 'gryavaṃśe.*" [in the foremost clan in the country of Andhra], PKv *Uttarārdha,* concluding verse 3: "*vaṃśo 'ndhradeśodbhavaḥ.*" [the clan which begun in the country of Andhra]. Also see ŚĀSTRĪ 1972: 272.

[52] The primary duty of the Kauṇḍinyas was to transmit the *Kṛṣṇa* and *Śukla* recensions of the *Yajurveda.* WILSON 1976: 50 - 56, ŚĀSTRĪ 1972: 271. But

Vaiṣṇavas from the very beginning. The oldest evidence goes back to Ananta expounding the *Pancarātra āgama* and his son Nṛsiṃha/ Narasiṃha writing a commentary on the *Saudarśana* diagram.

After Ananta and his son Narasiṃha, the eldest Śeṣa descendent we hear about is Kṛṣṇācārya. The son of Narasiṃha and grandson of Ananta, Kṛṣṇācārya alias Kṛṣṇamācarya was the father of the Rāmacandra who wrote the PK. Kṛṣṇācārya was also a great pundit, from whom Rāmacandra learned all the branches of traditional learning. Viṭṭhala confirms that Rāmacandra's teachers were Kṛṣṇācārya and Gopalācārya, elder brother of Kṛṣṇācarya. Moreover, another Nṛsiṃha, i.e., Viṭṭhala's father and thus Rāmacandra's son, states in his *Vivaraṇa* commentary on Rāmacandra's *Kālanirṇayadīpikā* that Kṛṣṇācārya, i.e., his grandfather, was also his teacher and explained the *Sūtravṛtti* in the court of a King called Rāma.[53]

Rāmacandra, also known as Rāmacandrācārya or Rāghavendra, [54] certainly flourished before the beginning of the 15th century.[55] In terms of his philosophical allegiance, Rāmacandra was an Advaitin.[56] Even if Rāmacandra was a descendant of the Śeṣa genealogy, his given name does not appear together with his family name anywhere in the original works.[57] It is certain that he was never called "Rāmacandra Dīkṣita" as

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TRIVEDĪ (1925: xxxviii of introduction) says, as we learn from the PKv, the Śeṣa family were Ṛgvedins. It would be necessary to look into the Kauṇḍinya *gotra* in detail in order to prove either of those views. The other *gotras* of the Tailaṅga Brahmins were Bhāradvāja, Vādhuluṣa, Gautama, Atri, Nityundina, and Vāsiṣṭha.

[53] TRIVEDĪ 1925: xlii of introduction.

[54] TRIVEDĪ 1925: xxxv of introduction.

[55] ŚĀSTRĪ 1972: 268. TRIVEDI 1925: xliv of Introduction. CARDONA (1976: 286) says "...at about the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century." PINGREE (1994: 464) gives as Rāmacandra's period circa 1380/ 1400, i.e., the latter half of the 14th century.

[56] This position is debated. While ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 247) says that "…the Seshas were Dakshinatya Brahmanas, and belonged to the Advaita sect", DESHPANDE (2011a: 369, 2012: 174) states that this Rāmacandra wrote a Dvaita work titled *Vaiṣṇavasiddhāntasaddīpikā* and that Rāmacandra's lineage remained committed to the Dvaita Vedanta tradition. I will discuss this point in more detail in Chapter Four.

[57] SHARMA (1960: 625) gives the full name Śeṣa Rāmacandrācārya, but does not refer to any original work to base this on. ABHYANKAR (1974: 11 of introduction) also refers to him as Rāmacandraśeṣa.

POLLOCK (2001a: 11. fn. 14) apparently mistakenly says, because the Śeṣas and the Dīkṣitas were clearly two distinct lineages who did not borrow, as far as we know, each other's family name. Moreover, since Rāmacandra was not known to have been a priest, like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his younger days, the Dīkṣita title does not seem applicable to Rāmacandra.

Undoubtedly, Rāmacandra composed the prestigious PK,[58] but was the famous grammarian Śeṣakṛṣṇa his grandnephew as some[59] hold? The possibility is very remote. The intricacy of the problem is caused by the identity of their given names, as already mentioned. Furthermore, we are not convinced that Rāmacandra and Nṛsiṃha were siblings.[60] In his attempt to find Śeṣakṛṣṇa's relation to Rāmacandra, HUECKSTEDT assumes from the following verse of the PKv that Rāmacandra was the younger brother while Nṛsiṃha was the elder brother, the two being sons of Kṛṣṇācārya.[61]

> *tasmād ācāryavaryau*[62] *hariharabhajanaprāptasaṃvitprakāśāv āstāṃ jyeṣṭho nṛsiṃho nikhilaguṇanidhī rāmacandraḥ kaniṣṭhaḥ*. [63]

> After him, there were two eminent teachers, who attained the manifestation of consciousness by means of worshiping (the god) Harihara, (and) who were hoards of all virtues, (by the name of) Nṛsiṃha, who was the senior, and Rāmacandra, who was the junior.

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[58] DATTA 1988: 1491.

[59] For instance, NCC 4, p. 365. Also see COWARD and RAJA 1990: 215.

[60] Cf. HUECKSTEDT 2002: 51. He distinguishes between the Kṛṣṇa who wrote the PKśk in the 16th century and the Kṛṣṇa who was the nephew of Rāmacandra, and quite confusingly at the same time, "the son of his uncle's elder brother, Nṛsiṃhācārya". To me, HUECKSTEDT's way of pushing this Kṛṣṇācārya one generation back does not seem tenable. Only that Kṛṣṇācārya was the nephew of Rāmacandra is correct.

[61] HUECKSTEDT 2002: 50. However, HUECKSTEDT, like many others, also seems not to have understood where to place each Nṛsiṃha or Narasiṃha in the Śeṣa genealogy.

[62] The excerpt HUECKSTEDT (2002: 50. fn. 10) gives has "*ॅācāryau*" in place of "*ॅācāryavaryau*".

[63] Verse 7 at the end of the PKv *Uttarārdha* (TRIVEDĪ's edition, p. 797).

This verse does not say that Nṛsiṃha and Rāmacandra were connected fraternally but instead as the senior and the junior respectively. Therefore, I assume, with the help of the word "*acāryau*" and the first two hemistichs of the next verse, that they were disciples of Kṛṣṇācārya alias Kṛṣṇamācārya. Being disciples of the same teacher may not necessarily mean what HUECKSTEDT suggests. Moreover, Kṛṣṇācārya or Kṛṣṇamācārya is said to have had two brothers, namely Gopālācārya aka Gopālaprasāda and Viṭṭhalācārya. Accordingly, a son of either Gopālācārya or Viṭṭhalācārya might be taken to have been the father of the Kṛṣṇa, who the traditional account takes to be the author of the PKśk.

However, the identity of Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha/ Narasiṃha, father of the author of the PKśk, is still debated. Both the Narasiṃhas/ Nṛsiṃhas below Kṛṣṇācārya or Kṛṣṇamācārya on the Śeṣa stemma are notable, not only because of their works but also, more importantly, because of their being the fathers of two significant figures of Sanskrit grammatical tradition, i.e., Viṭṭhala, and if this can be determined, Śeṣakṛṣṇa. The works traditionally ascribed to the Nṛsiṃha, whose brother was Rāmacandra and son was a Kṛṣṇa, are (i) the *Govindārṇava* alias *Smṛtisāgara* or *Dharmatattvāvaloka,* [64] (ii) the *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa,* and (iii) the *Vivaraṇa* commentary on the *Kālanirṇayadīpikā* of Rāmacandra. [65] Nṛsiṃha's mention of a Rāmacandra in the *Govindārṇava* as his father is important, because of two reasons. One is that it refutes the traditional view that Nṛsiṃha was Rāmacandra's brother or the son of one of Rāmacandra's uncles, i.e., Gopālācārya or Viṭṭhalācārya. The second reason is that, even if he were the son of a Rāmacandra, Nṛsiṃha does not refer to that Rāmacandra's authorship of the PK or the *Kālanirṇayadīpikā*.[66] What is known from the panegyric verses Nṛsiṃha writes in the introduction to the *Govindārṇava* is limited to Rāmacandra's erudition and reputation. Therefore, it is easier to assume that the Nṛsiṃha who wrote the *Govindārṇava* was the son not of the

[64] SHARMA 1999: 34. But BENKE (2010: 24) mentions only two of them, namely, *Smṛtisāgara* and *Dharmatattvāvaloka* as its other titles. Also see, JHA 1990: 335, PINGREE 1994: 213, 202.

[65] PK *Uttarārdha*, p. 67, as cited in TRIVEDĪ 1925: xxxvi of introduction. However, as again in TRIVEDĪ (1925: xxxviii of introduction), this work was written by the Nṛsiṃha whose son was Viṭṭhala, but not by the Nṛsiṃha who was Kṛṣṇa's father.

[66] BENKE 2010: 20. This is one reason for the Rāmacandra, author of the PK, to be placed in a different family tree in which Viṭṭhala was a direct descendent. Also see TRIVEDĪ 1931: 794.

author of the PK, but of another Rāmacandra who flourished later, and that the other two works mentioned above could have been written by Viṭṭhala's father.

The Nṛsiṃha who Viṭṭhala refers to in verse 7 at the end of his PKv does not seem to have been treated as significant[67] by Viṭṭhala. Viṭṭhala says only that his grandfather Rāmacandra and Nṛsiṃha studied together. However, note that Viṭṭhala refers to a Śrī Kṛṣṇa (verse 10)[68] as a teacher, whose two sons were Rāmeśvara, again a very intelligent teacher full of virtues (verse 10), and Nāganātha (verse 12), who was a great scholar and debater.[69] Accordingly, as we may presume from his use of "*guru*" as a form of address to them, Viṭṭhala studied under that Śrī Kṛṣṇa who the traditional view erroneously takes to be the author of the PKśk, and three other teachers; a Rāghava[70] (verse 9), Śrī Kṛṣṇa's son Rāmeśvara (verse 10), and Viṭṭhalācārya (verse 11). Because Viṭṭhala was thus not prior to but later than that Śrī Kṛṣṇa at least by one generation, the Kṛṣṇa who criticizes Viṭṭhala's work in his PKśk must be a later figure.

1.2 Reconstructed Account

Apparently, it was ARYAVARAGURU (1912) that first brought forth to the English readers a logical account of the most distinguished line of the Śeṣa family in early modern Benares, also with a substantial explanation of the activities of his sons, grandsons, and pupils. Likewise, TRIVEDĪ (1925, 1931) in his edition of the PK with the PKv disclosed in detail the

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[67] For instance, Viṭṭhala does not recognize him as the writer of any work such as the *Govindārṇava*.

[68] It is noteworthy that Viṭṭhala does not say clearly that Śrī Kṛṣṇa was Nṛsiṃha's son. His insertion of a verse on a Rāghava, a priest (*yativara*) and teacher, between the descriptions of Nṛsiṃha and Kṛṣṇa also breaks the flow of the description of his family. Also note that no information is given in the PKv on this Kṛṣṇa's character, perhaps because he was not as a distinguished scholar as his father and sons were.

[69] In his account, Viṭṭhala does not mention either Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi, any other brother of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, or Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, who was our Śeṣakṛṣṇa's son and the author of the SR. This supports our assumption that Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the author of the PKśk etc., is a member of a totally different family line.

[70] Probably Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, a disciple of Vādīndra (early 13th century).

difference between the Śrī Kṛṣṇa mentioned by Viṭṭhala and the Śeṣakṛṣṇa who can be recognized to have actually written the PKśk.

We have several strong reasons to argue that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a later figure who belonged to a family line different from Rāmacandra's. I list them as follows before going into the details.

1. The homeland of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's family was certainly Mahārāṣṭra, not Andhra like Rāmacandra's.

2. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's references to Viṭṭhala and Rāmacandra do not show any deference, which is usually expected in cases of consanguinity and discipleship, as we witness in many other writers who are so related.

3. A few *nirṇayapatras* or letters of judgement from the late 16th century and the early 17th century record the activities of Śeṣakṛṣṇa and his descendants as juridical authorities.

4. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's direct disciples, sons, and perhaps grandsons can be ascertained to have been active from the latter half of the 16th century onwards, and he is mentioned in their works. Similarly, the chronology of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's patrons and some of his contemporary critics ranges from at least c. 1550 to 1650, but never from before the end of the 15th century.

5. The oldest manuscripts of the PK date before the latter half of the 16th century, during which the later line of the Śeṣas flourished.

1.2.1 Mahārāṣṭra Origin

The ancestors of this line of the Śeṣa family originally lived in Nanded (Nandītaṭa in Sanskrit), which is a village on the north bank of the Godāvarī river in the Marathwada state of Mahārāṣṭra. For diverse reasons, some branches of this family dispersed and migrated over time to other regions of Mahārāṣṭra, Benares, Tamil Nadu and Karṇāṭaka. Their migration to different regions did not happen simultaneously, but gradually and from time to time.[71] We do not know for sure which

[71] BENKE 2010: 40. O'HANLON: 2010b, 2013.

descendant(s) of the Śeṣa family from Nanded set foot in Benares first, when it was on its way to becoming an intellectual hub under the reign of Akbar and his local regents. Furthermore, it would be wrong to assume that the Śeṣas never moved away after migrating to Benares, because, like other Brahmins', their activities in various forms are recorded to have taken place also in other regions of India even after their settlement in Benares.

KANOLE[72] reports that the family later known as the Śeṣa family started with a Rāmakṛṣṇa in about the 13th century. Rāmakṛṣṇa had three sons, Gaṇeśapant, Viṭṭhalapant,[73] and Bopajipant. When reasons for relocation presented themselves, some of the Viṭṭhalapant's family left for other places, while some headed to Vijayapura (Bijapur), a then prosperous city, according to the descriptions of early travellers like Duarte Barbosa and Ludovico di Varthema. Gaṇeśapant and his descendants remained in Nanded, while a Viṣṇupant, apparently a later descendant of this lineage, migrated at some point to Benares[74] to study and became a fine grammarian. For his debating skills, he easily acquired respect among others and consequently was conferred the honorific title "*sabhāpati*" (chief of the assembly).[75] Back in Bijapur in 1567, a Vāmana Śeṣa, son of Ananta Śeṣa, was appointed the royal librarian at the Bijapur court of Ali Adil Shah I (1558 - 1580). Narasiṃha/ Nṛsiṃha Śeṣa, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's father,

[72] KANOLE (1950) "Nāṇdeḍace Śeṣa gharāṇe" is a detailed study in Marathi precisely on this Śeṣa family from Nanded. Here, I depend on KANOLE's data as extracted by O'HANLON (2010b, 2013). Also see ŚĀSTRĪ 1972: 272.

[73] We do not know if this Viṭṭhalapant was the father of Jñānadeva (alias Jñāneśvara or Dnyāneśvar) (b. 1275), a famous yogi of the Nāth tradition and "father of old Marathi literature." Legends say that Viṭṭhalapant left for Benares to become a *sannyāsi* under Rāmānanda Swāmi, but upon the latter's advice returned home to resume his family life. However, due to a violation of the religious order, his family was excommunicated by other Brahmins. Given that he was a descendant of the Kulkarni family of the Desastha Brahmin caste living in the Apegaon village of Paithan on the banks of the Godāvarī, and that "*Pant*" (derived from Paṇḍita) was a shared surname among several Maratha lineages, we might imagine that he was different from the Viṭṭhalapant KANOLE mentions. However, with "*Śeṣa*" being a surname perhaps added later by that family, it is still possible that he was the same.

[74] O'HANLON 2013: 36.

[75] KANOLE 1950: 60, 61. Cf. *Maharashtra State Gazetteers*, Vol. 16 (Nanded district), p. 576. It records that Nanded was the birth place of Viṣṇupant Śeṣa, Raghunātha Śeṣa, and Vāmana Paṇḍit.

who was a contemporary[76] and likely a relative of that Vāmana Śeṣa, also served at the Bijapur court and received the honorific title *bhaṭṭabhaṭṭāraka*[77] from its pundits.

When Śeṣakṛṣṇa left for Benares, possibly after Akbar ascended to power in 1556, he already had contacts there. Possibly, it was not hard for him to join Akbar's court relatively soon, given the high social status and reputation enjoyed by the descendants of Viṣṇupant. The Śeṣa family's ties between Benares and Nanded could have remained intact and become stronger thereafter. O'HANLON (2013: 36) gives an evidence for the Benares Śeṣas going back home for personal reasons: a family deed regarding property in Nanded dated to 1629, which has the name of a Vāsudeva Pant Śeṣa, whose residence is given as Benares.

However, it is wrong to suppose that all of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's immediate family moved to Benares with him. An important piece of information about the place of residence of the Śeṣas, possibly before they migrated to Benares, is provided by Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi, younger brother of Śeṣakṛṣṇa. In the colophon of his *Parimala* commentary on the *Rasamañjarī* of Bhānudatta, Cintāmaṇi says there that he is a resident in Bradhnapura.[78] PETERSON[79] gives "Sūryapura" as an alternative name for Bradhnapura, whereas some[80] hold that modern Surat in the Tapi[81] district of Gujarat was traditionally called Sūryapura. Further examination is required to confirm this, but it does not fall outside of the realm of possibility, because Surat was part of the region held by the western Chalukya dynasty until the end of the 12th century when it was incorporated into the Muslim Sultanate of Gujarat. After Akbar conquered Gujarat in 1573, Surat became under his rule. We may assume that at least Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi might have lived in Surat before

[76] O'HANLON 2013: 36. I could not find this information in ARYAVARAGURU (1912).
[77] As mentioned in the *Murārivijaya* attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa (see below the section 3.2 "Works Less Convincingly Attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa"). Also see ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 247, 248.
[78] As BENKE (2010: 48) says, the *Rukmiṇīharaṇa*, another work attributed to Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi, also contains this piece of information.
[79] ULWAR, p. 45.
[80] GOKHALE 1979: 8.
[81] PINGREE 1981: 94.

Akbar's conquest, maybe while Nṛsiṃha and Śeṣakṛṣṇa were still in Nanded.

If it could be possible that Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote the *Murārivijaya nāṭaka*, we would have another basis for assuming that the Śeṣas were active in their literary pursuits while living in the South even before migrating to Benares. The author of the *Murārivijaya* identified as Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa in its prologue mentions that his father Nṛsiṃha dwells on the bank of the Godāvarī. Here, O'HANLON (2010b: 204) seems to depend only on ARYAVARAGURU (1912), who notices Nṛsiṃha's presence in Benares while writing the *Govindārṇava*, to conclude that Nṛsiṃha first served at the Bijāpūr court prior to his migration to Benares. However, ARYAVARAGURU's (1912: 237) statement that "Śeṣakṛṣṇa was in Benares when he wrote the *Murārivijaya*" is not proved by the sentence he quotes from the prologue.[82] Considering the patterns of southern Brahmin diaspora during the 15th and 16th centuries, we are open to admit that it could have been Śeṣakṛṣṇa who first migrated to Benares, and his father could have joined him at a later date. Nevertheless, if Nṛsiṃha left the Bijapur court and migrated to Benares after Śeṣakṛṣṇa settled well there, it does not appear likely that he permanently returned to the original residence in his old age.[83] We can, therefore, imagine safely that they were still in the South, engaged in literary and intellectual activities, by the time the *Murārivijaya* was written by Śeṣakṛṣṇa and, perhaps, the *Rasamañjarīparimala* was written by Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi. Only after Akbar consolidated the Mughal Empire but not before that, they moved to Benares with the intention of settling. Accordingly, the *Murārivijaya* was written while they were, most probably, in Nanded. However, we must remember that the pivot of this whole assumption is our acceptance of the identity of this Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa and our Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

Among the Brahmin families settled in Benares, the Śeṣas were near the top of the hierarchy of the southern Marathi Brahmin community in many social, religious, and juridical activities. The Śeṣas were called *Bhaṭṭa-Bhaṭṭārakas* or *Bhaṭṭa-Bhaṭṭas*, presumably because Nṛsiṃha

[82] See below the section 3.2 "Works Less Convincingly Attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa".
[83] Cf. KANOLE 1950: 60. But O'HANLON (2013: 37) takes it a fact. Also consider the ideology known as *kāśīmaraṇamukti* among the Brahmins, although this was subject to debate later.

had received that title while in Bijapur, as we noted above.[84] In assemblies, the Śeṣas received the "*dvitīya-sammāna*" (lit. second honour)[85], while the Bhaṭṭas were offered the first. It shows that the Śeṣas held a rather higher position than many other southern Brahmin families did.

1.2.2 Absence of any Lineal Relation to Rāmacandra and Viṭṭhala

Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the author of the PKśk and other works, flourished at least a century after the Śrī Kṛṣṇa mentioned in Viṭṭhala's work did.[86] Furthermore, as many agree, there was not any close kinship between the first Kṛṣṇa and the second Kṛṣṇa. Śeṣakṛṣṇa was aware of Viṭṭhala's effort to "purify"[87] the PK but did not approve his way of doing it. Without hinting at any consanguinity between them, Śeṣakṛṣṇa neutrally refers

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[84] "Bhaṭṭa" is the Prakritism from Sanskrit "Bhartṛ". This attributive thus roughly means "leader of leaders." *Bhaṭṭabhaṭṭāraka* was also applied as an honorific title to Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's father, Perubhaṭṭa, as evident from Jagannātha's reference to him as such at the end of each section of his *Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*. ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 248) states that Nṛsiṃha was the one who earned that title for this genealogy from the court of the king of Vidyānagara (now Bijāpūr). Cf. O'HANLON 2010b: 225. fn. 96: "...'*Bhaṭṭa'* is both the family name of the Bhaṭṭas of Banaras, and an honorific title given to a learned Brahmin, usually attached to the given name as a suffix."

[85] ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 247), and again O'HANLON (2010b: 223, 224) referring back to him, take it that the Śeṣas got "two" honours, but ŚEVAḌE in his TP on the STN (p. 3 of *prākkathana*) clearly says that the Śeṣas got the "second" honour, since the Bhaṭṭa clan received the first: "*kāśyāṃ vidvatsabhāyām etadvaṃśyā dvitīyaṃ sammānaṃ labhante smeti śrūyate. agrāsanasammānaṃ tāvad bhaṭṭavaṃśyāḥ prāpnuvanti sma.*" [It is heard that the descendants of this clan received the second honour in (any) scholarly assembly in Benares. Meanwhile, the Bhaṭṭas received the honour of front seating.]. Therefore, this matter is related to the seating arrangement in assemblies; i.e., the Bhaṭṭas got the seats in the front row while the Śeṣas sat behind them. That the Bhaṭṭas received the "*agrapūjā*" (first honour) at the recitations of the Vedas (*mantrajāgaras*) and that the honorific title "Jagadguru" was conferred upon Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa also attest to the precedence offered to them. See the *Vyavahāramayūkha,* KANE's edition (1926: vii, viii of introduction); O'HANLON (2010b: 223). Also note that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contemporary Jagadguru Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was included in the first class of the intellectuals at Akbar's imperial court, while Śeṣakṛṣṇa was in the fourth.

[86] TRIVEDĪ 1925: xlvii - lvi of introduction. Also see BENKE 2010: 19, 20.

[87] PKv, *Pūrvārdha*, verse 7.

to Viṭṭhala as "*prāñcaḥ kecit*" [someone in the past] etc. in the PKśk. This suggests that he was not close to Viṭṭhala or, necessarily, to Rāmacandra. Muralīdhara MIŚRA, in his introduction (page '*ka*') to part III of the PK (1980) edition, lists a number of instances where Śeṣakṛṣṇa refers to the previous commentators but without naming them.[88] If they had been close relatives in the way the conventional view takes them to have been, Śeṣakṛṣṇa would not have criticised Viṭṭhala as he did.[89]

1.2.3 The Śeṣas as Juridical Authorities

O'HANLON (2010b) elaborates on the roles and positions of Maratha Brahmins in Benares, scholars who had immense authority over some juridical activities back in Mahārāṣṭra.[90] A *nirṇayapatra* (letter of judgement) dated 1583 contains the name of "Śeṣa Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa paṇḍit" among its signatories, referring to him as the "head of the Mahārāṣṭras", i.e., the leader of the group of Maratha Brahmins in Benares. Again, another *nirṇayapatra* of 1630 concerning a decision made by Benares pundits was signed by "Śeṣopākhyaviśveśvaraśarmā" and "Śeṣopākhyacakrapāṇe", who were possibly Śeṣa Vīreśvara and Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi, a son and a grandson of Śeṣakṛṣṇa respectively. In another letter of judgement dated 1657, Cakrapāṇi's name is found among the signatories of the Brahmins from the Marathi-speaking regions who supported the decision that the Devarukhes were irreproachable Brahmins. Given these records, it is clear that at least several generations of this line of the Śeṣa lineage, starting with Śeṣakṛṣṇa, were much respected in Benares for their nobility, authority, and expertise in diverse intellectual genres including *Dharmaśāstra*.

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[88] Cf. BHAGAVATA's edition of SR (1999: 22, 23 of the *Upodghāta*). Also see BENKE 2010: 19 - 23 for a review of TRIVEDĪ's arguments.

[89] See *Prakriyāprakāśa*, under "§3. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Literary Career", for the details of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's criticism of Viṭṭhala. See DESHPANDE's (2015) discussion on how some later grammarians disagreed with their predecessors without disrespect. The tone of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's criticism clearly minimizes the probability of his being a relative of Viṭṭhala.

[90] POLLOCK 2001a: 21. Cf. VAJPAYI 2005.

1.2.4 More Dates of the Individuals Related to Śeṣakṛṣṇa

Compared with what we know about Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the renowned Śeṣa lineage, we have somewhat better information concerning his descendants and disciples, including more definite dates. For instance, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's sons and grandsons, as we observed above, were also active in juridical activities in the 16th and 17th centuries and composed works, many of which we know the dates of, as we will discuss below. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita (c. 1570 - c. 1635) was certainly one of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's disciples while Jayantabhaṭṭa (c. 1631) was perhaps another.[91] References to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works by authorities such as Gāgābhaṭṭa and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja locate him not earlier than the peak of the early modern period. More importantly, those who patronized a number of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works belong to the latter half of the 16th century and the first quarter of the 17th century.

1.2.5. Old Manuscripts of the *Prakriyākaumudī*

The discovery of some datable manuscripts of Rāmacandra's works that were transcribed by his direct descendants helps us determine their antiquity and thereby the temporal remoteness of the Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣas from them. Nṛsiṃha, i.e., Rāmacandra's son and Viṭṭhala's father, produced a copy of the PK in 1423.[92] Two more manuscripts of the PK are dated to 1437[93] and 1527, the latter of which is reported to have been transcribed by Rāmacandra's great-grandson, perhaps Viṭṭhala's son.[94] As regards the last case, that great-grandson of Rāmacandra would have referred to his father as Śeṣakṛṣṇa and to himself as Vīreśvara or Nārāyaṇa, if he had been the son of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the 16th century. Nevertheless, we do not find such information there. This indicates that those manuscripts were copied by the Andhra Śeṣas unrelated to the later line of the Śeṣa family.

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[91] Also See BENKE 2010: 54, 55 for the disciples of Śeṣakṛṣṇa and his descendants.
[92] BENKE 2010: 22.
[93] TRIVEDI 1925: xliv - xlv of introduction.
[94] BHANDARKAR, p. 60: "*śrīrāmacandrācaryasutasutasuta*." [lit. the son of the son of the son of noble Rāmacandra.]. Cf. BENKE 2010: 22.

1.3 Direct Descendants of the Śeṣa Family

We know more about the descendants of the Śeṣa family below Nṛsiṃha than we do about those above him. The only figure who Nṛsiṃha depicts above his father, Rāmacandra, is a Viṣṇu. As we discussed above, this Viṣṇu was possibly the Viṣṇupant that migrated to Benares to become a grammarian and a renowned orator. ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 248) quotes the following verses, seemingly from the *Govindārṇava* by Nṛsiṃha, which eulogise a Viṣṇu for his erudition and expertise in grammar in particular.

> *dṛṣṭvā śeṣaviśeṣaśeṣavividhaprakhyātisakhyaspṛśaṃ*
> *yaṃ śrīmān adhiśiśriye svayam aho viṣṇuḥ purāṇaḥ pumān.*
>
> Having seen the one "that would become celebrated diversely upon the destruction of the one whose distinction is the cosmic serpent (?)", O Viṣṇu, the ancient supreme spirit of man, sacrificed himself (in the fire).[95]
>
> *yatproktā kila śeṣabhāṣitamahābhāṣyābdhipotāyitā*
> *vyākhyā kācid udañcitocitanayā jāgarti lokatraye.*
>
> (It was he) by whom was imparted the commentary, which serves as a ship (to cross) the ocean of the *Mahābhāṣya* composed by Patañjali, which contains elevated proper rules and remains awake in the three worlds.
>
> *yasyā 'nyāni nibandhanāni bahuśo nyāye 'tha vaiśeṣike*
> *mīmāṃsāyugale śrutismṛtipathe brahmārkasiddhāntayoḥ.*
>
> (It was he) whose other compositions were largely in (the fields of) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, two schools of Mīmāṃsā, Śruti, Smṛti, and the doctrines of the Brāhma and the Saura schools (of astronomy).

[95] Apparently the legend referred to here is Viṣṇu's self-sacrifice as a dwarf (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1. 2. 5. 1 - 9). However, the paranomasia here suggests that Viṣṇu, the earliest member of the Śeṣa family, dedicated himself to the grammar of Patañjali, having seen it appear in various (corrupted) forms. I have not understood this verse properly.

nityaṃ jaiminigautamātrikaṇabhuggargādināmāvalīm
yatparyāyatayā diśanti viduṣāṃ śrotre praviśya sphuṭam.

(It was those compositions) by being equal to which (such original treatises) convey always the (teachings of) a series of (authors) such as Jaimini, Gautama, Atri, Kaṇāda, and Garga, having clearly entered the ear of the wise.

phaṇibhāṣitabhāṣyasya tattvaṃ (/sāraṃ) vetti sarasvatī
śeṣo śeṣaviṣṇur vā nānyo 'sti dharaṇītale. [96]

Nobody else on the earth but only Sarasvatī, Patañjali, or Śeṣa Viṣṇu knows the true nature (or essence) of the commentary imparted by Patañjali.

We do not know with certainty whether this Viṣṇu was the head of the "Śeṣa" genealogy who added that family name to it. What we can safely say in the light of the above verses is that this Viṣṇu was not Nṛsiṃha's grandfather, but a figure quite up in the family tree of the Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣas. The Śeṣa Viṣṇu who wrote a commentary known as *Prakāśikā* on the MBh was a later figure (fl. 1605), and probably the great grandson of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, i.e., Śeṣakṛṣṇa's great-great-grandson.[97] In other words, we do not know the title of the MBh commentary written by that ancient Śeṣa Viṣṇu.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa mentions the name of his father, Nṛsiṃha, reverentially in most of his works, although he does not speak about anybody prior to Nṛsiṃha. For instance, in the following verse (1. 18) from his

[96] ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 248) says that this verse is quoted also in Śeṣa Govinda's commentary on the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* by Śaṅkara, and some read "*śeṣakṛṣṇo vā*" in place of "*śeṣaviṣṇur vā.*" Also BENKE 2010: 20. ŚEVAḌE (STN, p. 3 of *prākkathana*) mentions this verse at the beginning of his foreword to the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* with "*śeṣakṛṣṇo vā*". RANGACARYA's edition (1909) of the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* does not contain Govinda's commentary, but his introduction provides some excerpts from it.

[97] COWARD and RAJA (1990: 243). As in NCC 9, p. 292, a work titled *Dhāturatnaprakāśa* or *Dhāturatnamañjarī* is also ascribed to a Śeṣa Viṣṇu, but we do not know whether he was the great-grandson of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa.

Pārijātaharaṇacampū, Śeṣakṛṣṇa clearly identifies himself as a son of Nṛsiṃhasūrī and a descendant of the Śeṣa genealogy.

> *prastautīha nṛsiṃhasūritanayaḥ śrīśeṣavaṃśodbhavaḥ*
> *kṛṣṇaḥ samprati pārijātaharaṇaṃ gadyaiś ca padyaiḥ śubhaiḥ*
> *tasyādeśavaśān narottamavibhor bhūpālabhūṣāmaṇeḥ*
> *kartuṃ keśavakelikomalakalālāpād apāpātmakam.*
>
> Here, on account of the request of the lord Narottama, the decorative gem among kings, Kṛṣṇa born in the reputed Śeṣa clan and son of Nṛsiṃha Sūri now commences to present in fine prose (lines) and verses the *Pārijātaharaṇa,* which is free from faults due to Keśava's (i.e., Śrī Kṛṣṇa's) tender and charming expressions during (his amorous) sports.

Similarly, in the beginning of the PrC Nṛsiṃha is placed in the position of teacher.

> *śrīnṛsiṃhaguror natvā padapaṅkajatallajam*
> *viśadārthāṃ śiśuhitāṃ kurve prākṛtacandrikām.*
>
> Having worshiped the excellent lotus feet of the teacher, noble Nṛsiṃha, I compose the *Prākṛtacandrikā*, which has a lucid content and is for the benefit of students.

The concluding verse of the PrC (8. 37) also includes Nṛsiṃha's name as Śeṣakṛṣṇa's teacher.

> *iti kṛtiparitoṣaprārthanālampaṭena*
> *prakaṭitaparabhāgā śeṣakṛṣṇena se'yam*
> *racayatu gurutoṣaṃ śeṣavaṃśāvataṃsaṃ*
> *gurum iha narasiṃhaṃ prāpitā tatpadābje.*
>
> Therefore, may this work, the latter part of which was made clear by Śeṣakṛṣṇa desirous of (performing) prayers (for intellectuals') delight in (his) work, and which was brought before the lotus feet of (his Guru), here cause great pleasure (or pleasure enjoyable for

the teacher) to the teacher Narasiṃha, an ornament to the Śeṣa clan.

It is obvious that Nṛsiṃha was Śeṣakṛṣṇa's teacher, or at least his initiator (*Dīkṣāguru*). No other work[98] by Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha is known apart from the *Govindārṇava*. Nevertheless, the aforementioned verse from the PrC suggests that he also wrote the first part of it, as in the case of the *Govindārṇava.* Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha is reported to have served at the Bijapur court but probably not at Akbar's imperial court. The "Nar Sing", who Abu al-Fazl ibn Mubarak, a well-known historian of Akbar's court, puts in the first class of intellectuals[99] at the imperial court, could possibly be Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the celebrated Advaita Vedānta scholar.[100]

According to the genealogical information available, Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi was the younger brother of Śeṣakṛṣṇa. Not much is known about Cintāmaṇi's life, except that he was living in Bradhnapura for some time, as we stated before. The few works generally ascribed to him show that, like his brother, he wrote on both grammar and poetry; (i) the *Mahābhāṣyakaiyaṭaprakāśa,*[101] (ii) the *Parimala* commentary[102] on the *Rasamañjarī* of Bhānudatta, (iii) the *Rukmiṇīharaṇa,*[103] (iv) the *Chandaḥprakāśa*, [104]and (v) a commentary on the *Meghadūta*. In addition

[98] NCC 35, p. 120 lists a Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha Sūri as the author of a Dharmaśāstra work titled *Prāyaścittanirṇaya*. RORI 16, No. 540. We do not know if he was our Nṛsiṃha.
[99] Those in the first class "fully comprehend both realms of thoughts, and acknowledge to have received their spiritual power from the throne of his majesty" [*A'īn-i Akbarī*, p. 608].
[100] BHATTACHARYA (1937: 33) considers the possibility of our Narasiṃha being referred to here, along with two other possible figures; Narasiṃha Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Advaitacandrikā* in refutation of the *Bhedadhikkāra* of Narasiṃhāśrama, and Narasiṃha Yogi, who wrote a commentary on the *Vedāntasāra* in 1588.
[101] *Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Journal* (1973), Vol. 16. p. 30; JHA 1990: 332.
[102] Since a manuscript of the *Parimala* dated to 1552 is found, Cintāmaṇi could have been active prior to the second quarter of the 16th century. This would support the view that Śeṣakṛṣṇa could also have started his literary activities around the same period. See TRIPĀṬHĪ's edition of *Rasamañjarī* (1981: xxxiii).
[103] NCC 35 p. 118. KRISHNAMACHARIAR 1970: 654; SHARMA 1999: 34. According to BENDALL, p. 109, the *Rukmiṇīharaṇa* has 4 acts and 149 verses.
[104] RORI 7, No. 1306.

to the concluding verses and the colophon of the *Parimala,* the following verse from its introduction reveals Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's adoration of his father.

> *ajñānahiraṇyakaśipor dalane sākṣān nṛsiṃha eva paraḥ*
> *tam ahaṃ śeṣam upāse pitaraṃ śrīmannṛsiṃhākhyam.* (verse 4)
>
> I worship the (descendant of the) Śeṣa (lineage) known as illustrious Nṛsiṃha, who is (my) father and who is another Nṛsiṃha (i.e., the man-lion form of descent of god Viṣṇu) in bodily form engaged in destroying ignorance in the form of Hiraṇyakaśipu.

The most distinguished teacher in the Śeṣa lineage next to Śeṣakṛṣṇa is Śeṣa Vīreśvara, the elder[105] of his two sons. Vīreśvara was also known as Vaṭeśvara, as found in the *Prauḍhamanoramākhaṇḍana* (PMKh)[106] of Cakrapāṇi, his son and pupil. Viśveśvara[107] is also a name attributed to him in South Indian manuscripts,[108] while Sarveśvara is apparently how Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa addressed him. ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 250) and BENKE (2010: 48) assume that he did not write any work, whereas some[109] consider the *Kāśīmokṣanirṇaya* alias the *Kāśīmṛtimokṣavicāra*[110] as one of his works. Moreover, some catalogues[111] record that Śeṣa

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[105] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 250. This Vīreśvara was not called Rāmeśvara as JHA (1990: 336, 352, 363) erroneously states, since the latter was the name of one of the sons of Śrī Kṛṣṇa of the Andhra line of the Śeṣas which Viṭṭhala described, as we observed above.

[106] PMKh, verse 1: *"virodhināṃ tirobhāvabhavyo yadbhāratībharaḥ । vaṭesvaraṃ guruṃ śeṣavaṃśottaṃsaṃ bhajāmi tam."* [I reverently salute the teacher Vaṭeśvara, an ornament to the Śeṣa clan, whose wealth of Sanskrit is fit to destroy opponents.].

[107] This Viśveśvara cannot be identified with the Vīreśvarasūrī who wrote a commentary known as the *Vyākaraṇasiddhāntasudhānidhi* on Bhaṭṭoji's ŚK.

[108] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 251.

[109] ECK (1981: 342, n. 43) states his name as Sureśvarācārya. Note that NCC 4, p. 137 lists a *Kāśīmokṣa* by a Vīreśvarācārya in addition to Sureśvara's work.

[110] Because whether dying in Benares is enough for emancipation was a popular topic during Śeṣa Vīreśvara's time, he perhaps joined the discussion by writing this work. The dispute between Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa and Vidyādhīśa Vaḍeru at the Ikkeri court was also based on this topic, although it is uncertain who actually won. See DESHPANDE 2011a: 370 and SHARMA 1961: 386 - 388 for details.

[111] NCC 3, p. 108; NCC 6, p. 96; NCC 35, p. 123.

Vīreśvara wrote a commentary titled *Gūḍhārthapadacandrikā* on the KaṃV of Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

Despite the lack of a large repertoire of works like his father's, Śeṣa Vīreśvara had a high profile for having many well-known disciples. ARYAVARAGURU assumes that his time was spent fully on teaching, and that a number of renowned students, including Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Khaṇḍadeva, Perubhaṭṭa, his son Jagannātha [112] Paṇḍitarāja, Annambhaṭṭa,[113] and perhaps Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa benefited. Likewise, all the students of Śeṣa Vīreśvara speak highly of him. For example, Annambhaṭṭa extols him highly reverentially in his MBhPud. [114] Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (c. 1605 - 1666), who, like the Śeṣas, belonged to the Tailaṅga *gotra*, [115] mentions respectfully his teacher's name as *"asmadgurupaṇḍitavīreśvarāṇāṃ"* [of my teacher Vīreśvara, a pundit] in his concise but highly critical work titled *Manoramākucamardana* (PMKu) directed against Bhaṭṭoji's *Prauḍhamanoramā* (PM).[116] It could

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[112] Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in his PMKu mentions that Śeṣa Vīreśvara was his and his father's *guru*. See for details SARMA 1994: 5.

[113] COWARD and RAJA 1990: 237; ECK 1983: 333.

[114] MBhPud, verse 2 of introduction: "*śrīśeṣavīreśvarapaṇḍitendraṃ śeṣāyitaṃ śeṣavacoviśeṣe | sarveṣu tantreṣu ca kartṛtulyaṃ vande mahābhāṣyaguruṃ mamāgryam*". [I worship my excellent teacher of the *Mahābhāṣya*, noble Śeṣa Vīreśvara, the great scholar, who resembles the cosmic serpent (i.e., extremely proficient) in his outstanding (teaching) of the doctrine of Patañjali, and who is similar to the creator of the world in all disciplines.]. Annambhaṭṭa's *Mitākṣara* commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *Tarkasaṅgraha* (TarS) are, however, silent on his teacher's name.

[115] "*śrītailaṅgaveṅgināṭīyakulodbhavaśrīpaṇḍitarājajagannāthaviracitā ākhyāyikā samāptā.*" [The *ākhyāyikā* written by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha born in the Veṅgināḍu (Veṅgināṭīya) clan of the *Tailaṅga gotra* is complete] in the colophon of his *Āsaphavilāsa*, a panegyric to his patron Asaf Khan, brother of Nur Jahan. For further information, see *Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha Granthāvalī* edited by ŚĀSTRĪ 1992.

DESHPANDE (2015: 37) highlights BAMBARDEKAR's (1939: 347) view in the latter's *Bhaṭṭojidīkṣitajñātiviveka* that Jagannātha opposed Bhaṭṭoji for abandoning Śeṣakṛṣṇa and turning towards Appayya Dīkṣita, who was a Tamil Brahmin. The Tailaṅga Brahmins did not tolerate seeking discipleship under other Brahmin castes.

[116] Also in the RG 1. 2, Jagannātha refers to himself as "*śeṣāṅkaprāptaśeṣāmalabhaṇitiḥ*" [the one who acquired refined speech on (the basis of) grammar from the (teacher who is an) ornament to the Śeṣa clan], showing his honour to his teacher from the Śeṣa family, Vīreśvara. Nāgeśa in his

well be Śeṣa Vīreśvara who Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa praises at the end of the VBhS,[117] but the only support for such an assumption is the word "*guruṃ*" there. Both Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in the VSK and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa in the VBh-B and the VBhS have used "*śeṣabhūṣaṇam*" but it is unclear what it denotes. The traditional understanding[118] that the term "*śeṣabhūṣaṇa*" is a paronomasiac compound denoting both Viṣṇu and Śiva,[119] therefore

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(*Guru*)*Marmaprakāśa* commentary (RGmp) on the RG confirms that it is Śeṣa Vīreśvara that Jagannātha referred to.

[117] VBhS, concluding verse: *"aśeṣaphaladātāram api sarveśvaraṃ gurum । śrīmadbhūṣaṇasāreṇa bhūṣaye śeṣabhūṣaṇam"* [I will also adorn with the blessed *Bhūṣaṇasāra* the teacher Sarveśvara, an ornament to the Śeṣas (or Harihara/ Viṣṇu/ Śiva) who offered all benefits].

[118] The tradition says that the term "*śeṣa*" here refers to either the cosmic serpent or Patañjali. The *Patañjalicarita* explains succinctly the story of Śeṣa, the cosmic serpent, as quoted by ROODBERGEN (1984: 371, 372). Neither the *Darpaṇa* commentary nor the *Parīkṣā* commentary on the VBhS even hints at the Śeṣa family being what is meant by the word *śeṣa* in the compound "*śeṣabhūṣaṇam*" in that verse. DESHPANDE (1994: 113) and ŚĀSTRĪ (2003: vii) repeat the conventional view.

Also the second verse of the introduction to the VBhS goes as follows: "*aśeṣaphaladātāraṃ bhavābdhitaraṇe tarim । śeṣāśeṣārthalābhārthaṃ prārthaye śeṣabhūṣaṇam."* [In order to obtain the entire meaning of (the work of) Patañjali, I pray to Harihara/ Viṣṇu/ Śiva (or the ornament to the Śeṣas) who offers all benefits, who is a ship for crossing the ocean of worldly existence].

Again the *Śabdaratna* commentary by Hari Dīkṣita on the PM (verse 1) has the following verse, which contains "*śeṣavibhūṣaṇam*": *"śeṣavibhūṣaṇam īḍe śeṣāśeṣārthalābhāya । dātuṃ sakalam abhīṣṭaṃ phalam īṣṭe yatkṛpādṛṣṭiḥ."* [In order to obtain the entire meaning of (the work of) Patañjali, I extol Harihara/ Viṣṇu/ Śiva (or the ornament to the Śeṣas), whose compassionate gaze is powerful (enough) to offer all desired results.].

Possibly, the use of "*śeṣa(vi)bhūṣaṇam*" in these works can be taken to be a token of respect paid to scholarship, irrespective of the conflict of attitudes between the Śeṣas and the Dīkṣitas. Perhaps Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa realized that the criticism directed against Śeṣakṛṣṇa by Bhaṭṭoji, although the latter was his paternal uncle, was unreasonably harsh.

[119] There is an explanation in the *Jyotsnā* supercommentary on the *Śabdaratna* on the PM. See ŚĀSTRĪ 1934: 1: *"śeṣavibhūṣaṇam iti - śeṣaḥ eva vividhaṃ viśiṣṭaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ yasya taṃ śivam ity arthaḥ. atha vā śeṣaś ca viś ca śeṣavī viśabdasya alpāctve 'pi abhyarhitatvāc cheṣaśabdasya pūrvanipātaḥ. bhūṣayatas te bhūṣaṇe yasya taṃ viṣṇum ity arthaḥ. śeṣayuktaḥ śeṣaviruddho vā vir garuḍo vā bhūṣaṇaṃ yasya paryaṅkatayā vāhakatayā ca, taṃ śeṣaśāyinaṃ garuḍavāhanaṃ ceti phalito 'rthaḥ."*

[*Śeṣavibhūṣaṇa* means - The meaning is that it is Śiva to whom the cosmic serpent itself is a manifold, special decoration. Otherwise, *śeṣa* and *vi (*constitute) *śeṣavī*,

Harihara, does not support this, but "*śeṣabhūṣaṇa*" can also mean "an ornament to the Śeṣa family" as ŚEVAḌE suggests.[120] However, if we admit that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa actually meant Śeṣa Vīreśvara in the VBhS, it certainly shows his great respect for his teacher.

Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, younger brother[121] of Vīreśvara, was also a grammarian. The *Sūktiratnākara* (SR) commentary on the MBh was

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even though there are fewer vowels in the word *vi-*, the initial placement of the word *śeṣa* happens due to its state of being highly honored. The meaning is Viṣṇu to whom these two are two ornaments that decorate. Either connected with the cosmic serpent or opposed to the cosmic serpent, thus respectively *vi* or *Garuḍa*, is a decoration for whom (again respectively) as a bed or a carrier. The meaning is accomplished as "him who sleeps on the cosmic serpent and who has *Garuḍa* as his vehicle".].

Does this imply that the Dīkṣitas were Harihara worshipers? The *Jyotsnā* commentary says yes: *"vastutas tu - hariharātmakaśrīlakṣmīnṛsiṃham ity arthaḥ. ata eva nāradapañcarātre - śeṣanāgaphaṇāsphītasahasracchatrabhāsura iti dhyāne uktam. tatraiva tanmantre - viśeṣabhogātmakaparyaṅkaśāyine namaḥ ity artha ity uktam. mantramahodadhāv api śrīlakṣmīnṛsiṃhadhyāne sarvādhīśaphaṇātapatralasita iti coktam iti dik."* [But actually, it means the lord Nṛsiṃha accompanied by Śrī Lakṣmī in the form of Harihara. For the same reason, in the *Nāradapañcarāta* - in the meditation it is said that "it shines with thousands of parasols unfolded, which were the hoods of the cosmic serpent, Śeṣa". In the same place in that *mantra*, it is said that the meaning is "salutation to the one who sleeps on a bed whose nature is a coil with distinction". Let it suffice to say that, "charming with the parasoles created by the serpent's heads of the all-ruling one" is also uttered in the meditation on Nṛsiṃha accompanied by Śrī Lakṣmī in the *Mantramahodadhi* as well.].

[120] ŚEVAḌE, having quoted the verse "*śeṣavibhūṣaṇam īḍe*" from the PM, considers the possibility of Śeṣakṛṣṇa being venerated by Bhaṭṭoji: "*yady api śeṣaḥ śeṣanāgo vibhūṣaṇaṃ yasya taṃ śeṣavibhūṣaṇaṃ bhagavantaṃ śaṅkaram ity arthas tathāpi tatra bhaṅgyantareṇa śeṣāṇāṃ śeṣakulodbhavānāṃ vibhūṣaṇaṃ svaguruḥ śeṣakṛṣṇas tam api bhaṭṭojidīkṣitaḥ stautīti vibhāvanīyam*." [Although the meaning here is lord Śaṅkara, i.e., Śiva, to whom the cosmic sepent is an ornament, still, it is to be understood that Bhaṭṭoji extols through another roundabout expression his teacher, Śeṣakṛṣṇa, who was an ornament to the Śeṣas, i.e., the descendants of the Śeṣa clan.]. TP on STN (p. 6 of *prākkathana*).

[121] SR, verse 7. Also see TRIVEDĪ's PK edition (1925: 31). Śeṣa Nāganātha, the author of the grammatical work *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyotana* (not to be confused with Annambhaṭṭa's work with the same title), was one of the two sons of Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the Andhra Śeṣa clan. According to JHA (1990: 353), this Nāganātha was the father of a Śeṣa Nāgoji and the grandfather of Śeṣa Rāmacandra, who wrote a

written by him,[122] and in that text he highly praises his elder brother. He is also reported[123] to have written a commentary on the PK, just as his father did. Some catalogues ascribe the *Śrautasarvasva* [124] and the *Agniṣṭomaprayoga* [125] to a Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, but this author could have been a descendant of another line of the Śeṣa lineage. In the introductory verses[126] of the SR, Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa provides us with a helpful account of the Śeṣa genealogy along with information about his patronage.[127]

> *bhāṣye' śeṣaviśeṣanirṇayakṛtī śrīśeṣa evāparaḥ*
> *tadvyākhyāsu lasatsahasravadanaḥ samprekṣitaḥ*[128] *paṇḍitaiḥ*
> *aṣṭavyākaraṇāvagāhanakṛtaśrīkṛṣṇakautūhala-*
> *granthaḥ śrīpadacandrikāvivaraṇaṃ varvarti yac cādhunā*.[129] (5)
>
> (He) who is an expert in judging all the particulars in the commentary (i.e., the *Mahābhāṣya*) and in its (sub-) commentaries, (thus) who surely is another (incarnation of) illustrious Śeṣa (i.e., Patañjali or the cosmic serpent) with thousand shining mouths,

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commentary on a chapter of Bhaṭṭoji's SiKau. We do not find descendants with those names on the family tree of the Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣas.

[122] NCC 35, p. 115. The first two *āhnikas* of the SR were edited and published by BHĀGAVATA (1999), as No. 140 of Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series. Cf. COWARD and RAJA 1990: 225; ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 250.

[123] NCC 12, p. 222.

[124] NCC, Provisional Fasciculus, p. 28. An excerpt JHA (1990: 330) provides confirms that he was not the son of Śeṣakṛṣṇa:
"*iti śrīmadbaudhāyanamārgapravartaka ācāryaśrīśeṣānantadīkṣitasuta śrīśeṣavasudevadīkṣitatanūdbhavamahāmīmāṃsakadīkṣitaśeṣanārāyaṇanirṇīte śrautasarvasva avajñam gādivicāro nāmo dvitīyaḥ*." [Here ends the second chapter titled "*avajñam gādivicāra*" in the *Śrautasarvasva*, which promotes the path of the blessed Baudhāyana and which was ascertained by Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, the great Mīmāṃsaka priest born to the priest noble Śeṣa Vasudeva, the son of priest and teacher noble Śeṣa Ananta.].
Nevertheless, NCC 35 (p. 120) gives a list of works under this Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa's name including a work known as the *Aniṅghyalakṣaṇa*, the date of which (1610 - 1611) falls within the period our Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa could have lived.

[125] NCC, Provisional Fasciculus, p. 21. What AUFRECHT says there agrees with the information given in the *Śrautasarvasva* excerpt above. Also see COWARD and RAJA 1990: 225.

[126] As quoted by ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 253.

[127] He mentions the king Phirinda again in the concluding verse, 1.

[128] In BHĀGAVATA's edition (1999: 1): "°*lasatsahasravadanatvenekṣitaḥ*".

[129] In BHĀGAVATA's edition (1999: 1): "°*pūrṇo 'dhunā*".

who is well looked at (i.e., honoured) by scholars, by immersing himself in the eightfold grammar,[130] composed the work (known as) the blessed *Kṛṣṇakautūhala*. (His said) commentary on the blessed *Padacandrikā* prevails extremely well today.

yaḥ śabdābharaṇaṃ nibandham akarot satprakriyākaumudī-
ṭīkāṃ prākṛtacandrikāṃ ca kṛtavān viśvopakārakṣamām
so 'yaṃ paṇḍitamaṇḍanaṃ samabhavat śrīkṛṣṇa evāparaḥ
kṛṣṇaḥ śeṣanṛsiṃhasāratanayaḥ ṣaḍdarśanānāṃ khaniḥ. (6)

This Kṛṣṇa, who was the noble son of Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha, who was a mine of the six branches of philosophy[131], who surely was another (incarnation of) lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who composed the work *Śabdābharaṇa*, a fine commentary on the *Prakriyākaumudī*, and the *Prākṛtacandrikā* capable of helping the whole world, became a decoration to scholars.

tatsūnur bhuvanaikabhūṣaṇamaṇiḥ vidyāvadātaprathaḥ
sambhūtaḥ kalikālakalmaṣaharo vīreśvaraḥ paṇḍitaḥ
jātaḥ sarvakalānidhis tadanujaḥ kāmādiṣaḍvargajit
śrautasmārtaviviktadharmanirataḥ śrīśeṣanārāyaṇaḥ. (7)

His son, the scholar Viśveśvara, who was a unique ornamental jewel to the world, whose fame in sciences was excellent, who removes the dirt or the sin of the *Kali* age*,* was born. (Next) his younger brother, Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, who was a deposit of all fine arts, who conquered the six-fold (inner foes) such as desire, and who occupied himself in particular *dharmas* of *Śruti* and *Smṛti,* was born.

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[130] The eight grammatical traditions are mentioned in the second verse of the *Kavikalpadrumadhātupāṭha* of Vopadeva. *"indraś candraḥ kāśakṛtsna āpiśalī śākaṭāyanaḥ । pāṇinyamarajainendrā jayanty aṣṭādiśābdikāḥ."* [The eight ancient grammarians; Indra, Candra, Kāśakṛtsna, Āpiśalī, Śākaṭāyana, Pāṇini, Amara, and Jainendra, excel.].

[131] Also at the end of each *āhnika* of the SR, Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa extols his father's expertise in the two schools of Mīmāṃsā: "*bhāṭṭe bhaṭṭa iva prabhākara iva prābhākare yo 'bhavat*" [(Śeṣakṛṣṇa) who was like Kumārila in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and like Prabhākara in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā].

āpūrvācalapaścimācalabudhaśreṇīgaṇānāṃ jayāc chrīmatpaṇḍitasārvabhaumapadavīṃ ārūḍhavān yaḥ svayam śrutvā taṃ nijapaṇḍitaiḥ savinayaṃ tīkāṃ prakartuṃ mahā-bhāṣyasyāśutarāṃ vyajiijñapad ayaṃ śrīmān phirindo[132] *nṛpaḥ*. (8)

Having heard about him (i.e., Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa), who by himself ascended to the position of sovereign among all renowned scholars due to (his) victory over the groups of intellectuals' classes (spanning) from the eastern mountain (i.e., the East) to the western mountain (i.e., the West), the illustrious king Phirinda respectfully requested (him), through his own scholars, to compose very quickly a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*.

Below Śeṣa Vīreśvara on the Śeṣa stemma, we find two sons of his; Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi alias Cakrapāṇidatta (younger) and Śeṣa Puruṣottama[133] (elder). As mentioned, the fact that Śeṣa Vīreśvara and Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi attended the Brahmin assemblies in Benares that made judgements on various matters indicates their power of jurisdiction. Unlike his father, Cakrapāṇi was a writer on grammar in particular, because (i) the *Prakriyāpradīpa*,[134] (ii) the *Prauḍhamanoramākhaṇḍana* (PMkh)[135] alias *Paramatakhaṇḍana*,[136] and (iii) the *Kārakatattva*[137] alias *Kārakavicāra*[138] are recognized as his works.

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[132] In BHĀGAVATA's edition (1999: 2), "*phirindā*".

[133] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 251. From Śeṣa Rāma's commentary on the DŚC, we learn nothing more than that Śeṣa Puruṣottama was the elder brother of Cakrapāṇi.

[134] Known only by its title as mentioned in the PMKh: *"...tasmād uttaratrānuvṛttyarthaṃ tad ity asmatkṛtapradīpokta eva niṣkarṣo bodhyaḥ."* [At just, "therefore it is for the sake of *anuvṛtti* further on" in the work known as *Pradīpa* composed by me, the essence (of it) should be comprehended.] (p. 47), and *"anyatra prakriyāpradīpād avabodhyam."* [(that) should be understood from the *Prakriyāpradīpa,* (which is) elsewhere.] (p. 120); as quoted by TRIVEDĪ (1925: xxxvii of Introduction). This *Prakriyāpradīpa* has not been discovered thus far. NCC 12, p. 223.

[135] Published in 1911 up to the *kārakaprakaraṇa*. See COWARD and RAJA 1990: 484. The NCC 5 (p. 60) lists another *Manoramākhaṇḍana* by a Keśava (around 1650), whose genealogy is not known.

[136] PMKh, verse 2. NCC 35, p. 118.

[137] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 251.

[138] RORI 2, No. 2293. COWARD and RAJA 1990: 247. Also see SINGHI and BARAUH 2003: 249.

Cakrapāṇi's PMKh is an important work, because, apart from any contribution it might make to the grammatical tradition, it links his grandfather's PKśk and Bhaṭṭoji's PM. Cakrapāṇi does not name Bhaṭṭoji in the PMKh, but uses neutral references to him such as "*anye*" and "*kecit*", and refers to Bhaṭṭoji's way of interpreting grammar rules as "*prauḍhivāda*" (doctrine based on self-confidence). Since the PMKh is mentioned in Hari Dīkṣita's *Śabdaratna* and the *Bhāvaprakāśa* commentary on it by Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍe, where Cakrapāṇi is referred to as the "*Khaṇḍanakāra*" or "*Khaṇḍanakṛt*", both meaning "author of the (*Prauḍhamanoramā*)*khaṇḍana*", its influence on the contemporary grammatical tradition is evident. Besides, Jagannātha says in the PMKu that his work is a re-examination of the PM once criticised by a son of Śeṣa Vīreśvara and thus a grandson of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, although he does not specify the author by name. It is thus clear that Jagannātha was well aware of Cakrapāṇi's work, but wanted to re-establish Śeṣakṛṣṇa's views in the PKśk in the light of the authoritative works on Sanskrit grammar.

Down the Śeṣa lineage, Cakrapāṇi's son was Gopinātha, who had a son known as Rāma. The opening verse of the commentary[139] by this Śeṣa Rāma on the *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [140] also depicts the Śeṣa lineage beginning with Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

> *śrīkṛṣṇaṃ praṇipatya tatsutam ato vīreśvaraṃ tatsutaṃ*
> *śrīvidvatpuruṣottamaṃ tadanujaṃ śrīcakrapāṇiṃ tataḥ*
> *gopīnāthaguruṃ ca kṛṣṇaracitaślokārthasaṃdīpanaṃ*
> *kurve rāmapadābhidho bhavatu tac chrīviśvanāthārpaṇam.*
>
> Having worshiped Śrī Kṛṣṇa, then his son Vīreśvara and his (i.e., Vīreśvara's) son illustrious scholar Puruṣottama, his (i.e., Puruṣottama's) younger brother illustrious Cakrapāṇi, and then (my) teacher/ father Gopinātha, I, known as Rāmapāda, compose (this work), which elucidates the meaning of the *ślokas* written by Kṛṣṇa. May it be an offering to Śrī Viśvanātha (lord of the universe), i.e., Śiva.

[139] Published in 1927 as No. 22 of the Sarasvatī Bhavana Series.
[140] Also in ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 252. ŚEVAḌE in the STN (p. 4 of *prākkathana*) also says that this verse is found in a manuscript titled "*Ślokārthasandīpana*" deposited in the library of Rajpur Sanskrit Pāṭhśālā, Mahārāṣṭra.

1.4 Other Śeṣas

We do not have a clear picture of the descendants of the reputed Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣa clan later than the Śeṣa Rāma we immediately discussed. It seems likely that the majority of them continued scholarly pursuits while living in Benares and other regions of India.[141] However, since we find many works by the authors holding the lineal title "Śeṣa", it has been difficult to pin down their places either in the Mahārāṣṭra line or in another line of the Śeṣa family.[142] Given below are some of the Śeṣas who may well have been the direct descendants of the Śeṣa family after the doyens, but for whom the precise relationships are unknown.

A Śeṣa Rāmacandra, son of (Śeṣa) Nāga/ Nāgoji, had some reputation as a grammarian, and wrote a work titled *Svaraprakriyā*[143] on the rules of accent based on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and the *Bhāvadyotanikā* alias *Sarvānavadyakāriṇī* commentary[144] on Śrī Harṣa's *Naiṣadhacarita*. He is said to have been a student of a Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, perhaps[145] the younger

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[141] It is said that the Śeṣa descendants in present Vāraṇasī are also highly respected. BENKE (2010: 50 - 53 etc.) reports his interaction with one of them, Parshuram Paranjape. The Śeṣas of this family might have safeguarded their grammatical authority for several generations in the modern period as well. We hear about a Śeṣa Śarman alias Kāśī Śeṣa Śāstrī, a very late figure, who wrote commentaries on Nāgeśa's PIŚ and *Śabdenduśekhara*, and received the patronage of Kṛṣṇarāya III of Mysore. See NCC 35, p. 123.

[142] As already mentioned, Viṭṭhala in the PKv enumerates several figures bearing identical names and a few more that would not have been known otherwise. Furthermore, ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 252) provides a list of works, the authors of which carry the clan name Śeṣa, and underscores the difficulty in finding their relationships to each other as well as to the reputed Śeṣa family. NCC 35 (pp. 114 - 130) contains the names of many authors with "Śeṣa" as part of them. However, it is hard to determine, for most of these names, whether "Śeṣa" was the clan name or a given name.

[143] Colophon of the *Svaraprakriyā*: "*iti śrīśeṣakulodbhavanāgāhvayapaṇḍitasūnu-rāmacandrapaṇḍitaviracitā svaraprakriyā samāptā.*" [Here ends (the work titled) *Svaraprakriyā* (i.e., grammatical derivation of accents) written by Rāmacandra paṇḍita, son of Nāga paṇḍita, born in the Śeṣa clan]. Edited by ABHYANKAR (1974), the *Svaraprakriyā* is published as No. 138 of Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series.

[144] NCC 35, p. 121.

[145] As in its colophon, the year of the *Svaraprakriyā* manuscript ABHYANKAR (1974) consulted is *saṃvat* 1814, i.e., around 1757 CE. Śeṣa Rāmacandra must therefore have lived before the middle of the 18th century, but it is still uncertain

son of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa. In any case, Viṭṭhala does not mention a Nārāyaṇa in his depiction of the Śeṣas up to him. Śeṣa Nāga, possibly that Śeṣa Rāmacandra's father, one of whose works is a commentary on the *Vedāṅga Jyotiṣa*, Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara,[146] who was the author of the *Tarkacandrikā* and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī*,[147] Śeṣa Viṣṇu,[148] who wrote a *Mahābhāṣyaprakāśikā* (on the first three *āhnikas* of the first chapter of the *Mahābhāṣya*), and Śeṣa Govinda, who was a son of Yajñeśvara Śeṣa/ Śeṣayajña[149] and composed a number of works, including the *Aśvalāyanaprāyaścitta* [150] and the *Agniṣṭomaprayoga*,[151] are a few of notable pundits of the Śeṣa lineage. In addition to these, as we learn from the introductory verses and the colophon of his *Rahasyavivaraṇa* commentary [152] on Śaṅkara's *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, there was another Śeṣa Govinda, son of a Śeṣa Paṇḍita and a disciple of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (c. 1540 - 1640).[153] Inferring his time from that of Madhusūdana's, it seems likely that he was a direct descendant of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's family, but no more information is known about him. Furthermore, this Śeṣa Govinda and the Śeṣa Govinda whose father was Śeṣayajña could perhaps be identical.

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about the precise date and consequently whether he was a student of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's younger son.

[146] In JHA's (1990: 332) account, Śeṣa Ananta in his *Padārthacandrikā* mentions Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara as his teacher. According to LARSON and BHATTACHARYA (1987: 472), Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara was also Śeṣa Ananta's father, but JHA (1990: 331) says that Lakṣmīdhara was Ananta's father and Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara was his teacher only.

[147] LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 382.

[148] NCC 35, p. 121. Śeṣa Viṣṇu's genealogy was as follows according to JHA (1990: 340):

Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa > Kṛṣṇasūrī > Mahādevasūrī > Śeṣa Viṣṇu. Apparently, this is a family line different from both the Andhra Śeṣas and the Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣas we discussed above, if JHA is correct.

[149] NCC 35 (p. 121) mentions that he was from the Śeṣa family of Benares, whose original home was Nandipura on the bank of the river Godā. He could therefore have been a relative of Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's father.

[150] DANDEKAR 1972: 7.

[151] NCC, Provincial Fasciculus, p. 21; NCC 35, p. 117.

[152] NCC 35, p. 117.

[153] RANGACARYA in the introduction to his edition of the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* (1909: ix, x).

Several earlier but less known Śeṣa ancestors are also noteworthy. One of them was a Śeṣa Ananta, who is believed to have flourished around 1455 and produced two works; (i) the *Padacandrikā*, a commentary on Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī,* a Vaiśeṣika work, and (ii) the *Prabhā* commentary on Śaśadhara's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*.[154] We do not yet know certainly if this Ananta was the pioneer of the Śeṣa genealogy from Andhra, but if the aforementioned date of his is correct, it lends support to this view.

Without going on to explore other possible descendants of the Śeṣa family or families, who could number in the hundreds even within the time period concerned, I examine next Śeṣakṛṣṇa's profile and give an account of his literary career.

§ 2. Śeṣakṛṣṇa

2.1 Date of Śeṣakṛṣṇa

Recent studies[155] not only on the Śeṣas but also on early modern India have narrowed down significantly the chances of Śeṣakṛṣṇa being recognized as the nephew of Rāmacandra, the author of the PK. We have also considered above several strong reasons that refine further the possibilities for placing him in the period broadly from the first quarter of the 16th century to the first quarter of the 17th century.[156] However, if Śeṣakṛṣṇa can be assumed to have lived a long life, as BENKE (2010: 21) holds, it is still possible to push back Śeṣakṛṣṇa's date of birth to any time within the first quarter of the 16th century.

No reliable information is available concerning the precise date Śeṣakṛṣṇa died or became inactive in his literary career. Nevertheless, since only Śeṣa Vīreśvara's and his son Cakrapāṇi's names are found

[154] LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 382, 472; MATILAL 1977: 103.
[155] Including O'HANLON and MINKOWSKI (2008), BENKE (2010), DESHPANDE (2011a), and O'HANLON (2010b, 2011, 2013).
[156] See BENKE 2010: 17 - 23 for a review of the suggested dates of Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

among the signatories of the *nirṇayapatra* of 1630, [157] but not Śeṣakṛṣṇa's name, as in the *nirṇayapatra* of 1583, we are inclined to assume that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was either no longer alive by that time or too old to attend the juridical assemblies of that sort. Moreover, on the grounds that Bhaṭṭoji's PM is reported to have been written after[158] Śeṣakṛṣṇa's death, and that the latest date Bhaṭṭoji died could be 1635[159], we can hardly imagine that Śeṣakṛṣṇa lived after the first quarter of the 17th century.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's presence in Akbar's imperial court is another piece of promising evidence for deciding his date. Abu al-Fazl mentions a "Kishn pandit", possibly our Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍita alias Śeṣakṛṣṇa, as a pundit in the fourth class of courtiers who knew philosophy in the sense of "the religious testimony based on human reason, not on revelation." [160] Accordingly, in opposition to those who claimed to have divine prowess and consequently were placed in the innermost first class, closest to the emperor, those in the fourth class were truly the "knowledgeable men" in diverse disciplines including the *śāstras* like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa, and applied sciences like medicine. In addition to Kishn Pandit, there were fourteen Hindu scholars listed under this class, including Nārāyn (Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa), Balbhaddr Misr (Balabhadra Miśra), and Bidyāniwās (Vidyānivāsa), whereas the first class included highly celebrated figures such as Madhū Sarsutī (Mādhava Sarasvatī), Madhūsūdan (Madhusūdana Sarasvatī), Nārāyan Asram (Nārāyaṇa Āśrama), and Rāmatīrth (Rāmatīrtha). In addition to these well-known authorities, Abu al-Fazl mentions some learned men, including Harijī Sūr (Harijaya Sūri), Damūdar Bhat (Dāmodara Bhaṭṭa), Parmindar (Paramānanda), Adit (Āditya or Advaita) etc. about whom we have only inferences. However, it is hard to assume that all those Hindu scholars were Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contemporaries, as the dates of some of them do not match well Śeṣakṛṣṇa's time. Similarly, as BHATTACHARYA (1937: 31) notes, almost all the Muslim scholars in the imperial court, who were about 108 in number, were dead by the time the *Aʿīn-i Akbarī* was written. Given that Abu al-Fazl's work was written circa 1597 and Śeṣakṛṣṇa was still there, we can safely assume that he was one of the

[157] O'HANLON 2010b.

[158] PMKu, introductory paragraph.

[159] GODE 1954: 65 - 74; BANERJI 1971: 22.

[160] *Aʿīn-i Akbarī*, vol. 1. p. 610 fn. 1, 611. BHATTACHARYA (1937: 35, 36) has included Śeṣakṛṣṇa in his brief study of all the Sanskrit scholars at Akbar's court.

most senior and elderly intellectuals in a group that included figures such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.[161]

2.2 Life and Personality

Śeṣakṛṣṇa can easily be introduced as the most illustrious pundit in the Mahārāṣṭra line of the Śeṣas. Unlike most of the Śeṣas about whom we now know at least something, he had a very high reputation as both a *vyākaraṇa* teacher and a prolific writer. As proved by his works on diverse subjects, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's multidisciplinary scholarship earned him prestige in Benares and beyond, and placed him among other celebrated contemporary intellectuals such as Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Appayya Dīkṣita, and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita.

It is evident from most of his works that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a proud man, who was fully confident of his own expertise, but intolerant of unsupported criticism against it. Consider, for example, the verse 3 of the PC.[162]

> *nirṇetuṃ vaktṛtātparyaṃ syāt pramāṇagaveṣaṇā*
> *vaktropadarśite tasmin kutarkāvasaraḥ kutaḥ.*
>
> In order to determine the author's purport, there should be a search for authority. If it (i.e., purport) is already shown by the author, how could there be any chance for fallacious arguments (against it)?

Similarly, Śeṣakṛṣṇa sometimes prescribes his work for a predetermined readership, apparently in order to avoid spiteful critics in advance and attract his ideal audience. The first of the final verses of the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* is an example, where he clearly indicates that it is not for students but the scholars well-versed in the MBh.

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[161] Cf. GUPTA 2006: 6. Also see BENKE 2010: 41, 42.

[162] EGGELING, Vol. II, p. 252.

mahābhāṣyamahāpārāvārapārīṇabuddhibhiḥ
parīkṣyo grāhyadṛṣṭyāyaṃ yaṅlugantaśiromaṇiḥ.

This *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* must be examined with the view of admitting (or rejecting it) by those whose intellects are completely familiar with the great ocean of the *Mahābhāṣya*, (lit. who have crossed the great ocean in the form of the *Mahābhāṣya*).

During his time, Śeṣakṛṣṇa seems to have suffered lots of criticism, that he thought groundless and revelatory of ignorance of his works. His appeal for impartial critics is made clear in the final verse of his STN.

vidvadbhiḥ sadasadvyaktikāribhiḥ sārahāribhiḥ
rāgavidveṣarahitair dūṣitaṃ vāstu bhūṣitam. (verse 4)

May (this work) be adored or condemned by the intellectuals, who are free from (prejudiced) attachment and hatred, who reveal the correct and the incorrect, and who extract the essence.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the *Pārijātaharaṇacampū* (1. 19cd, final verse of the introduction) emphasizes what malicious critics would finally gain.

kiṃ tv īrṣyāvivaśātmanām iha haṭhād doṣaṃ mṛṣā paśyatāṃ
paiśunyād apakīrtito harikathādrohāc ca nānyat phalam.

Nevertheless, for those who are helpless with (their) envy and find fault here vainly and by all means, there is no result (they would have) other than calumny, disgrace and betrayal (of trust) in the stories of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

The confidence of Śeṣakṛṣṇa as a grammarian is depicted most vividly in the introductory verses of his PKśk, where he rejects the PKv as full of corrupted and inaccurate content. As shown in the following verse, he finds neither any peer in his fields of expertise, which could have been

true in the time of his prime, nor any readership that he assumes capable of grasping the fine points presented in his works.[163]

> *katicid uddhatanirbharamatsarāḥ*
> *katicid ātmavacaḥśrutiśālinaḥ*
> *ahaha ke 'pi nirakṣarakukṣayās*
> *tad iha saṃprati kaṃ prati me śramaḥ.*
>
> Some are excessively full of jealousy, some are used to listen to their own words (i.e., too haughty to admit others' views), aha! some are completely illiterate (lit. have no letters in the belly). So, for (the benefit of) whom do I now strive here (in this work)?

It is a conventional practice that Sanskrit writers express their aversion to prejudiced and vicious critics. Nonetheless, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's case portrays a real tension incurred by the intelligentsia in early modern Benares.

In my opinion, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's poetical works present us with a clearer picture of the personal pressure he had to bear as a learned man better than his other works do. Possibly, his critics criticised Śeṣakṛṣṇa's expertise and talents as a poet, and Śeṣakṛṣṇa answered them by writing poetry. For example, the prologue (*pūrvaraṅga*) of his KaṃV contains several verses and lines that suggest his reaction to such criticism. I quote below the pertinent section of the conversation between the Sūtradhāra (director) and the Naṭī (director's partner).

Sūtradhāra:

> *pṛthvīmaṇḍalamaulimaṇḍanamaṇiḥ śrīmannṛsiṃhātmajaḥ*
> *kṛtvā kṛṣṇakaviḥ kutūhalavaśād asmāsu yan nyakṣipat*
> *nāṭyaṃ kaṃsavadhābhidhānam adhunā tasya prayogodyamaṃ*
> *vidvadrājasamājamānasamahānandāya vindāmahe.* (19)
>
> Having composed out of eagerness, Kṛṣṇa the poet, the jewel adorning the diadem of the whole world and the son of illustrious Nṛsiṁha, entrusted to us a play titled *Kaṃsavadha*. Now let's find the energy to perform a production of it for the great delight in the minds of this royal and scholarly audience.

[163] PKśk, verse 41 of the introduction.

Naṭī:

(apavārya) kathaṃ so 'pi kavīnāṃ madhye sambhāvyate?

(Aside) how does he also get honoured among poets?

Sūtradhāra:

ayi mugdhe, kim evam āśaṅkase. yataḥ -
caturdaśasu vidyāsu parikarmitacetasaḥ
kaviteti kiyannāma tasyāścaryaṃ vipaścitaḥ. (20)

Oh simple girl, why do you doubt it like this? Since how much of a marvel is poetry to him, who is an intellectual with a mind prepared in all fourteen sciences? (i.e., poetry is just yet another talent of his.).

Naṭī:

nanu bhaṇāmi prasādakaver iva tasyāpi paṇḍitakaver vāṇī vidagdhajanasya paryuktā bhavati.

But I say (whether) the diction of him too, who is a scholastic poet, is mesmerizing (?)[164] to the learned men like that of a gifted poet.

Sūtradhāra:

bāḍham. yataḥ:

Certainly (it would be), because:

maulau mandāradāmabhramadalipaṭalīkākalīṃ śroṇibimbe
kūjatkāñcīkalāpaṃ caraṇakamalayor mañjumañjīraśiñjām
utsaṅge kīragītaṃ stanabhuvi masṛṇaṃ vallakīpañcamaṃ vā
tatkāvye dattakarṇā śivaśiva manute bhāratī bhāram eva. (21)

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[164] I could not translate the term *paryuktā* correctly. In what follows, the Sūtradhāra affirmatively responds to the Naṭī and then describes Śeṣakṛṣṇa's skill in poetry. Consequently, *paryuktā* does not seem to mean "critical (of)", as BENKE (2010: 58) translates it. Apparently, BENKE attempted to make sense of *paryukta* by considering it as deriving from *pari*+ √*vad* (to speak out or censure), but the *kṛdanta* form of *pari*+ √*vad* is *paryudita*. Furthermore, the original Prakrit word of *paryuktā* in the Naṭī's statement, as the KaṃV (p. 7) gives, is *pajjuttā*, which corresponds to "*prayukta*" in Sanskrit. See the *Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo*, p. 513.

The goddess of speech who happily (?) listens to his poetry considers (all of the following) indeed a burden; the hum of the swarm of bees flying about the garlands of Mandāra (flowers worn) on the head, the warbling girdle (worn) on the rotund hips, the tinkle of the charming anklets (worn) in the lotus feet, the singing of the parrot (sitting) on the lap, or the tender fifth note of the lute (resting) on the region of the breasts.

api ca

what is more;

yaḥ pīyūṣamayūkhadhāmani sudhāsārācchakacche 'pi yaḥ
kṣubhyatkṣīrasamudrasāndralaharīlāvaṇyapūre 'pi yaḥ
yaḥ kāntādharapallave madhurimā nāsau samudgāhate
śrīvidvatkavikṛṣṇapaṇḍitavacovīcīsamīcīnatām. (22)

If there is any sweetness in the moon (lit. abode of the lustre of nectar), any (sweetness) even in Sarasvatī's lute which emits clear (notes resembling) the essence of ambrosia, any (sweetness) even in what is full of loveliness (due to) the thick billows of the agitating milky ocean (?), and any (sweetness) in the petal-like lip of a girl, that (sweetness) does not rise (lit. emerge) to (the level of) the excellence of the word-waves of illustrious scholar Kṛṣṇa, a learned poet.

Naṭī:

āryaputra, nanu śrūyate śabdānuśāsane dṛḍhaṃ kṛtābhyāsa eṣa iti.

Husband, is it not heard that this person is rigorously trained in the doctrine of grammar?

Sūtradhāra:

ārye, bhūṣaṇam etan na dūṣaṇaṃ kavīnāṃ
vyākaraṇakovidateti. tathā hi.

rasālaṃkārasārāpi vāṇī vyākaraṇojjhitā
śvitropahatagātreva na rañjayati saṃjjanān. (23)

My dear, having this expertise in grammar is a grace for poets, not a blemish. Furthermore, a diction rich in sentiments and figures of speech but ungrammatical, like a leprotic body, does not please good people.

Naṭī:

(sodvegam) anyad bhaṇāmi.
viṣaviṣamaviṣadharapatijihvāsahasraniḥsṛtavakrakarkaśa-
vikaṭavacanopanyāsanityābhiyogasparśadūṣitā tasya jihvā
kathaṃ madhuramadhurarasalālasāni rasikajanamanāṃsi
rañjayiṣyatīti nāsti me hṛdayasyāsaṅgaḥ.

(With anxiety) I say something else. There is no rest in my heart in thinking how his tongue, which is polluted by the continual contact from practice of formulating ambiguous, harsh, and hard words (like those) emitted from the thousand tongues of the lord of snakes, which are difficult (or dangerous) from poison, will please the minds of connoisseurs ardently longing for sweet and mellifluous sentiments.

Sūtradhāra:

(vihasya) ayi mugdhe, na khalu nisargamadhurodāraprakṛtayo
vācaḥ sāṃsargikair doṣair upahanyamānā api svābhāvikaṃ
guṇam ativartante. paśya tāvat.

(Laughing), Oh simple girl, although afflicted by the defects of contact, words with naturally charming and exalted origins never violate their inherent qualities. Just consider (the following):

dhmātā bhātalānalaiḥ kavalitā kaṇṭhotthahālāhalair
āliḍhātha jaṭāṭavīvalayitair āśīviṣāṇāṃ gaṇaiḥ
kīrṇā bhasmabhir āhatāsthipaṭalair viddhā jaṭāgrair api
svīyām ujjhati mādhurīṃ haraśiroratnaṃ kim indoḥ kalā. (24)

Inflamed by the fires in the (cremation) ground, seized by the *Hālāhala* poisons arising from the throat, then, licked by the groups of snakes that encircle the dense locks of hair, covered with ashes, struck by the masses of bones, and even afflicted by the tips of the locks of hair, does the crescent of the moon, which (looks like) the crest jewel of lord Śiva, abandon its own charm?

Naṭī:

(sotprāsam) ārya, evam etat, nanu bhaṇāmi tathāpi durjanā āvarjanīyā yathāṇumātre 'py asmākaṃ kuśīlavānāṃ skhalite na pratihasanti.
(Scornfully), Sir, so be it. But I say that nevertheless the wicked should certainly be excluded so that they do not laugh at even a slightest mistake of our actors.

Sūtradhāra:

ārye, alam anayā cintayā. nisargaḥ khalu sa tādṛśāṃ nopāyasahasrair api vipariṇamayituṃ śakyaḥ. yataḥ -

amṛtaṃ kirati himāṃśur viṣam eva phaṇī samudgirati
guṇam eva vakti sādhur doṣam asādhuḥ prakāśayati. (25)

Dear, enough of this worrying. Indeed, that nature of such people cannot be changed even with thousands of strategies. Because, the moon pours out ambrosia (*amṛta*), whereas a serpent vomits only poison. A righteous person speaks only of the virtues, whereas a vile man reveals (others') faults.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's emphasis on his skills in composing poetical works is very obvious, or as some hold, rather ostentatious.[165] However, in my opinion, the story may have been different. Only rarely in the history of later Sanskrit court poetry have poets described themselves as less than perfect. To introduce one's own self as a prestigious and endowed *kavi*, which means both "scholar" and "poet", was the custom and what was expected. Accordingly, given the contemporary milieu that exerted lots of pressure on the high-profile intellectuals, we may take Śeṣakṛṣṇa's self-appraisal as normal.[166]

[165] BENKE 2010: 59: "These verses suggest that Kṛṣṇa Śeṣa had a conventionally high opinion of himself and his abilities."
[166] Cf. Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja called himself a lion who has not seen many elephants but only deers, i.e., he had no strong opponents, whereas Vaṃśīdhara Miśra (fl. 1624) in his *Padyāmṛtataraṅginī* responded that Jagannātha was simply a bull. CHAUDHURI 1981: 77.

Public awareness of the purported difference[167] between a *prasādakavi* (talented poet) and a *paṇḍitakavi* (learned poet) appears to have motivated writers like Śeṣakṛṣṇa to defend themselves in the early modern period. Śeṣakṛṣṇa attempts here to refute all rebukes by means of emphasizing both that expertise in grammar is an ornament for a poet and that grammatical accuracy of poetry must be considered vital. Verse 25 and the prose lines running just before it imply Śeṣakṛṣṇa's self-confidence before his rivals in the intellectual arena. By speaking through the Sūtradhāra's mouth, Śeṣakṛṣṇa proudly stresses his invulnerability.

Another noteworthy verse from the KaṃV (verse 5 of the prologue) echoes Śeṣakṛṣṇa's discomfort with his vindictive and conceited contemporaries. We find praises of the noble and blame of the dissolute in almost all the major genres of poetry in Sanskrit, but this should be taken to be rather exceptional.

> *nāgacchann upahūyate na vacanotthānāsanaiḥ pūjyate*
> *no pṛcchann anubhāṣyate na ca dṛśā sāndrādaraṃ vīkṣyate*
> *īrṣyāroṣakaṣāyite hṛdi ghṛṇāleśo 'pi na spṛśyate*
> *kiṃ tv ekaḥ pravadan samañjasam api prājñaḥ śaṭhair hasyate.*
>
> Not invited in on arrival, not honoured with words (of salutation), standing up (to show respect) and offerings of a seat, not answered when questioning, not looked at with a look tender in affection, but a wise man, although speaking properly, is (still) laughed at by the malignant, in whose heart dulled by envy and anger even a bit of compassion is not touched.

[167] However, it was not a novel issue as evident from Rājaśekhara's *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, where different types of poets have been recognized. For *Niṣaṇṇa* (composing when required but not remaining dedicated), *Asūryaṃpaśya* (being secluded, fully dedicated to composing), *Dattāvasara* (occasionally composing whenever inspired) and *Prāyojanika* (only composing for special events/ purposes) types of poets, see LIENHARD 1984: 15; PARASHAR 2000: 156. Cf. Jayadeva, who flourished in the 12th Century AD, also calls himself a *paṇḍitakavi* in his *Gītagovinda* 12. 21.

That intellectuals are ridiculed by the imprudent is a common grievance, but *"śaṭhair hasyate"* [(he) is ridiculed by the malignant] may possibly reveal a learned man's real discomfort amidst his rivals.[168] Given these expressions and his serious attempts to defend himself as a scholar, it seems quite likely that Śeṣakṛṣṇa spent a hard time in Benares, despite his position as a Marathi Brahmin of a renowned lineage.

§ 3. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Literary Career

The manuscript catalogues do not have conformity in attributing the works to Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the famous grammarian.[169] Also, Śeṣakṛṣṇa is often referred to as Kṛṣṇa Śeṣa, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Kṛṣṇa Kavi, Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍita etc. which makes the issue more challenging. Finally, the descendants of the Śeṣa lineage, including those allegedly still living in India, reveal information on Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works contradictory to some data from the catalogues.

3.1 Works Ascertained to be by Śeṣakṛṣṇa

Given the information supplied by Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the works already ascertained to be his, and cautiously relying, when possible, on the manuscript catalogues, the following works can be recognized under three major genres. The works ascribed to him with less certainty are examined in the next section.

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[168] Like Śeṣakṛṣṇa, Melputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa also seems to have encountered harsh criticism. How hostile his critics were towards him is reflected in the following from the PraS. "*anye matsariṇaḥ kathām api ca no kuryuḥ kim etaiḥ kṣatam*." [Others who are envious do not even speak about us. What damage do they do? (i.e., none.)].

[169] When later cataloguers prepared their works on the basis of earlier catalogues, they often tended to ascribe to one figure all the works attributed to the namesakes of Śeṣakṛṣṇa or Kṛṣṇaśeṣa. See BENKE 2010: 55, 56.

1. Grammar

Padacandrikā with the *Kṛṣṇakautūhala* autocommentary, *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi*, *Upapadamatiṅsūtravyākhyāna, Prakāśa* commentary on the *Prakriyākaumudī*, *Prākṛtacandrikā*, *Śabdālaṅkāra* (or *Śabdābharaṇa*), *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*.[170]

2. Poetry

Pārijātaharaṇa (*Campū*), *Kaṃsavadha* (*Nāṭaka*).

3. Dharmaśāstra

Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī, *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi, Govindārṇava* (at least the latter part).

3.1.1 Grammatical Works

1. *Padacandrikā* (PC) [171]

The *Padacandrikā* appears to be a teaching manual in verse with Śeṣakṛṣṇa's autocommentary, the *Kṛṣṇakautūhala*.[172] The manuscripts of this so far unedited and unpublished work, which was composed earlier than his PrC,[173] are recorded as existing in private libraries. EGGELING (Vol. II, pp. 252, 253) lists the opening[174] and the concluding verses of the PC with several excerpts from its commentary as these appear in a manuscript assumed to date to c. 1700. H. T. COLEBROOKE holds[175] that the PC is based on or serves as a commentary to the

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[170] The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* was discussed in detail in the Introduction. Chapter Four includes a textual appraisal of it.

[171] NCC 11, p. 97. EGGELING, Vol. II, pp. 252 - 253.

[172] SR, verse 5. Cf. ŚEVAḌE's introduction to TP on STN, p. 4.

[173] See PrC, verse 440: "*padacandrikānujātāṃ*." [(that) composed after the *Padacandrikā*].

[174] The opening verse of the PC hints at his devotion to the Advaita Vedānta.

[175] EGGELING, Vol. II, pp. 252; NCC 11, p. 97; ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 249. ARYAVARAGURU is against this and considers it to be a Pāṇinian work.

Sārasvataprakriyā of Anubhūti Svarūpācārya, a 12th-century grammarian who summarized the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in 700 rules. Although we are not certain how closely Śeṣakṛṣṇa followed the *Sārasvata* rules in composing his work, it is obvious from the following two verses and the autocommentary on the second verse that he adheres faithfully to the Pāṇinian tradition.

> *bhāṣyādeḥ sāram uddhṛtya kṛtvā lakṣaṇakārikāḥ*
> *vartayiṣye yathālakṣyaṃ svatātparyapramāṇakaṃ.*[176]

> Having extracted the essence of the *Mahābhāṣya* etc. and composed verses that serve as rules, I will comment on this which has as the authority its intended meaning, in accord with the target (i.e., words).

> *sūtravṛttīṣṭivākyādigranthagranthiśramacchide*
> *sukhabodhāya bālānāṃ kriyate padacandrikā.* [177]

> The *Padacandrikā* is composed for students' easy comprehension that eliminates the fatigue (caused by) the knotty points in the (grammatical) works such as the *sūtras* (i.e., *Aṣṭādhyāyī*), (its) commentaries (such as the *Kāśikā*), the (commentators') desiderata (such as those given in the *Mahābhāṣya*) and the explanatory statements (such as the *Vārttika*).[178]

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[176] Verse 2 of introduction.

[177] Verse 2 of the first chapter on *sandhi* and *subanta*, as it appears in EGGELING's excerpt.

[178] The *Kṛṣṇakautūhala* on this verse: "*sūtrāṇi pāṇinyādeḥ. vṛttayaḥ kāśikādyāḥ. iṣṭayo bhāṣyakārasya. vākyāni vārttikāni. ādipadāt tannibandhādayo granthās teṣāṃ granthir durbodho bhāgas tatra śramas taddhānāya. vyavahārthaṃ saṃjñā āha*." [The rules: such as those of Pāṇini, commentaries: such as the *Kāśikā*, the desiderata: those found in Patañjali; the statements: explanatory rules (*Vārttika*). From word "etc." (is intended) the works that are compositions etc. related to them. A knotty point: an obscure section of those (works), fatigue (is) there (in understanding them), in order to remove it. I state the definitions for practical use.].

Śeṣakṛṣṇa praises the erudition of his father, Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha, in an introductory verse and mentions him also as his spiritual teacher in the two concluding verses. In terms of the contents, this work appears to have three parts; (i) *Sandhi* and *Subanta*, (ii) *Tiṇanta,* and (iii) *Kṛdanta*.[179] The *kārikās* are simple and mnemonic, while the short commentary on each explains the terms very briefly, as appropriate to a work of this sort. How the vowels are introduced can serve as an example.

> *svarā ekadvitrimātrā hrasvadīrghaplutāḥ kramāt*
> *te 'py udāttānudāttatvasvaritatvais tridhaikaśaḥ*
> *śuddhānunāsikābhyāṃ te dvidhetyaṣṭādaśādayaḥ*
> *syuḥ savarṇāḥ sajātīyā ṛḷvarṇau svavargajāḥ.*

> Vowels having one mora, two morae and three morae are short, long, and protracted respectively. Having the states of acute (*udātta*), grave (*anudātta*) and circumflexed (*svarita*) accent, they are again threefold each. (By being divided again) into two classes, pure and nasal, they become eighteen. They are (also recognizable as) *savarṇas* (those having the same place of articulation and requiring similar effort to pronounce), *sajātīyas* (homogenous?), *ṛ* and *ḷ* phonemes, and *svavargajas* (those produced within their own class?).

2. *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* [180]

This work, which contains 525 *ślokas*[181], elaborates the formation of elided *yaṅanta* (intensive/ frequentative) forms.[182] It is a commentary on the *yaṅluganta* section of the PK. ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 249) says

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[179] The colophon of each part tells us that king Narottama was Śeṣakṛṣṇa's patron.
[180] EGGELING, Vol. II, p. 186. Also see NCC 4, p. 365 under Kṛṣṇaśeṣa.
[181] NOTICES, Vol. V, part 1, pp. 89 - 90, see under No. 1772.
[182] COLEBROOKE 1873: 43. According to the rule "*yaṅo 'ci ca*" (A 2. 4. 74), the affix "*yaṄ*" disappears from the reduplicated verb form before the affix "*aC*", as in the following examples. Ø = *luk* (disappearance of affix). *lū* + *yaṄ* = *lo-lū-yaṄ* (A 6. 1. 9; A 7. 4. 89) + *aC* = *lolū* + Ø + *aC* = *loluva* (cutting frequently or intensively); *pū* + *yaṄ* = *po-pū-yaṄ* (A 6. 1. 9; A 7. 4. 89) + *aC* = *popū* + Ø + *aC* = *popuva* (cleansing repeatedly or intensively).

that the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* and the corresponding section in the PKśk are not very different, except that the latter is more concise than the former. Some[183] hold that the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* was a "gloss on a portion of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Dīdhiti* commentary" on the *Śabdakhaṇḍa*[184], a chapter of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. The introductory verse of the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* is as follows.

> *natadevaśiraḥsyandimakarandāṅkitāṅghraye*
> *vāgīśādattamataye vighnanāśāya te namaḥ.*
>
> For the removal of obstacles, salutation to you (god Gaṇeśa), who has the wisdom given by the goddess of speech, and whose feet are anointed by the honey flowing from the (flowers worn on the) heads of gods bowed before you.[185]

We cannot access the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* fully since it has not yet been published, but in the light of the entry in EGGELING it is fair to decide that the original work is largely in prose. The titles of works such as *Kāśikā*, *Kātantra*, *Prakriyā*, *Prasāda,* and the names of writers such as Kaiyaṭa, Nyāsakāra (i.e., Jinendrabuddhi), Mādhava, Vāmana, Haradatta, Candra and so on that are mentioned in the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* suggest that it was based on the views of the grammatical authorities up to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's time. The colophon clearly indicates Śrī Śeṣakṛṣṇa Paṇḍita[186] as the author.

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[183] NOTICES, Vol. V, part 1, p. 90. Also see BENKE 2010: 65. NCC 21, p. 217 says the same but NCC 33, p. 86 states that the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* "quotes" the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* there, which looks more plausible given that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work is on technical grammar rather than the philosophy of language.

[184] Although I could not consult it, the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* has been edited and published in 1991 in "Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy" 2nd series, and translated in BHAṬṬA (2005).

[185] It is noteworthy that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's two other grammatical works; the PrC and the PKśk, and the ŚĀŚ, also start with salutation to Gaṇeśa. We see this custom being followed in the proemium to Bhaṭṭoji's ŚK as well.

[186] This would require further study but perhaps it was the practice of some writers, at least in recent history, to use their given names with honorific affiliations such as *paṇḍita*, *bhaṭṭa, kavi, upādhyaya,* and *ācārya* interchangeably depending on the text and the context. For instance, "*kavi*" was apparently appended to the given name if one's work was of poetical content and "*paṇḍita*" if it was on sciences

3. *Upapadamatiṅsūtravyākhyāna*[187]

The *Upapadamatiṅsūtravyākhyāna*, a commentary on the rule "*upapadamatiṅ*" (A 2. 2. 19), that explains the *upapada-tatpuruṣa* compound seems to be a short[188] treatise, perhaps written at the request of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's students or patron. Except for the title, we do not know more of this work.

4. *Prakriyāprakāśa* (PKśk) [189]

The *Prakriyāprakāśa*, also known by the titles *Prakāśa* [190] , *Satprakriyāvivṛtti, Satprakriyāvyākṛti* and *Gūḍhabhāvavivṛti*, is Śeṣakṛṣṇa's commentary on the PK of Rāmacandra. Since there was not any consanguinity between that Rāmacandra and our Śeṣakṛṣṇa, it is obvious that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's motivation to write a commentary on the PK was not based on any lineal relation to its author. However, the PK had been the most complete and influential recast of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* available at the beginning of the early modern period. We can be certain that Bhaṭṭoji's SiKau came out after the PKśk, since Bhaṭṭoji's being a student of Śeṣakṛṣṇa is ascertained and the former in his PM criticises the latter's work and the PKv of Viṭṭhala. Given these observations, and in particular Śeṣakṛṣṇa's harsh criticism of the PKv, it is apparent that

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including grammar. This may also help resolve the confusion as to whether the same person is known by several names such as Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa, Kṛṣṇakavi, Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita etc.

[187] NCC 2, p. 368. Also mentioned in the *Uttar Pradesh District Gazetteers,* (eds.) E. B. JOSHI and V. C. SHARMA (1959). Vol. 5, p. 331.

[188] The manuscript WEBER (p. 216, No. 760) refers to has 19 folios, but there is no mention whether it is complete or fragmentary.

[189] For manuscripts, published works and more information, see NCC 12, pp. 221 - 222, under *Prakriyākaumudī*, and NCC 4, p. 365, under Kṛṣṇaśeṣa.

[190] While Śeṣakṛṣṇa had introduced his work as "*Satprakriyāvivṛti*", Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in the *Tattvacandra* called it "*Satkaumudīvivṛti*" (ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 250) and Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa in the SR (verse 6) called it "*Satprakriyākaumudīṭīkā*". It is Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja and others who styled it as "*Prakāśa*". For instance, Jagannātha's words in the PMku (p. 27): "*atra prejatīti mūlodāharaṇam abhipretya ejṛ kampana iti prakāśaḥ.*" [Having in mind the original example here, "*prejati*", the *Prakāśa* says that "the root *ejṛ* (exists) in the meaning of shaking"] and "*iti ślokavārtikam iti prakāśaḥ.*" [The *Prakāśa* says that "(this is) from the *Ślokavārttika*"].

Śeṣakṛṣṇa was inspired to write his PKśk in order to address the knotty points in the PK that Viṭṭhala had dealt with wrongly or not clearly enough. The fact that Śeṣakṛṣṇa introduced his PKśk as "*gūḍhabhāvavivṛti*" [191] or "*gūḍhārthabhāvavivṛti*" [192] (exposition of the hidden meanings) supports this view.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa evidently had a very negative view of the PKv.[193] Although he does not mention the name of Viṭṭhala, the majority of his criticisms in the PKśk are directed to the PKv. The following three verses (36, 38, 39) from the introduction to the PKśk show in particular how much the PKv had irritated Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

> *asphuṭabhāvā ... prasphuṭadoṣāpasiddhāntā*
> *asamarthāpy ekapadabandhā naiṣā paraṃ prabhāvayaty artham.*
>
> This (work), which is, although incapable, a single-footed composition (i.e., an unstable or unsound work), … in which the meanings are not clear (and) flaws and wrong conclusions are very clear, does not illuminate the best meanings.
>
> *kiñcitpūrvanibaddhasiddhavacanopanyāsadakṣāḥ paraṃ*
> *paurvāparyavirodhabodhavidhurā dṛṣṭākṣaragrāhiṇaḥ*
> *kiṃ tair vaktṛbhir atra yaḥ svavibhavair uddūṣya pūrvaṃ parā-*
> *nuktaṃ vakti paraṃ chinatti viṣamaṃ vyākhyāty asau durlabhaḥ.*
>
> Those who are (only) skilled at bringing forth the (already) established words in the (works) composed in the past (and) those bereft of any understanding of the inconsistencies between the ancient and the late (works) are, certainly, rote learners[194] (lit. the

[191] NCC 4, p. 365.
[192] NCC 12, p. 221.
[193] PKśk, verses 36, 38 - 41 of the introduction.
[194] *Akṣaragrahaṇa* or learning the text by heart is against *arthagrahaṇa* (leaning the meaning of the text and thereby understanding the contents). See for details, VENKATARAMAIYA's edition (1948: 186) of the *Pañcapādikā* 3. 11, BALASUBRAMANIAN 2000: 324. It is known that Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī* school of Advaita Vedānta recognizes both *akṣaragrahaṇa* and *arthagrahaṇa* as the

graspers of the bare text studied). What is the use of those preachers here? Rare is the one who, having criticised the ancient (views) with his own powers, says what others left unsaid, removes what is adverse (?), (and) comments on what is difficult.

prācāṃ sūcitasūcitārthagahane vācāṃ prapañce 'dya naś
cetaś cañcalatāvimohavidhuraṃ cintāṃ ciraṃ cumbati
kāmaṃ kintu nirastavistaram iha prastutya mūlaṃ śiśu-
trāsān nyāsi mayā mitaṃ hitam ihānuktaṃ viviktaṃ ca yat.

Today, our mind distressed by the confusion resulting from unsteadiness touches anxiety for a long time regarding the *prapañca* (i.e., expansion of obscure grammar rules), which is dense in appropriate meanings indicated in the expressions of the predecessors. (A treatise) which is distinguished (from other works), (thus far) untold, proper, terse and devoid of extensive descriptions due to students' fear (of it being otherwise) has been put forth here by me, as an introduction to the source text.

The PKśk, which can be considered the most influential and famous of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's grammatical works, was commented upon in the *Tattvacandra*[195] by Jayanta[196], a student of Śeṣakṛṣṇa. Even without a commentary, it must have been a popular work among the students of grammar, at least until the production of the SiKau. Irrespective of the expertise in grammar Śeṣakṛṣṇa shows there, his skills in *Alaṅkāra* and *Chandas* are evident from its long introduction of 46 verses. The fact that the KaṃV and the PKśk have two common verses (KaṃV 1. 21, 23 correspond to PKśk 26, 34 respectively), along with poetic skill displayed

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methods of learning (*adhyayanavidhi*), whereas Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa* school focuses only on *akṣaragrahaṇa*.

[195] EGGELING, Vol. II, p. 170. No. 625. ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 250) also quotes four verses from the *Tattvacandra*. As Jayanta says (verse 8 of the introduction and at end of the *Subanta* chapter) that his work was required because those with limited wisdom are scared to study Śeṣakṛṣṇa's detailed treatise, Jayanta's effort is to further simplify the explanations in the PKśk.

[196] Jayanta was the son of Madhusūdana from Prakāśāpurī on the bank of the river Tapatī. Today, the village Prakāśa alias "Dakshin Kashi" belongs to Shahādā city in Nandurbar district, Mahārāṣṭra. Also see NCC 7, p. 180.

in the PKśk, serves to remove any doubt that Śeṣakṛṣṇa the grammarian wrote the KaṃV. The first of the three concluding verses of the PC and the second of the three concluding verses of the PKśk are also identical.

5. *Prākṛtacandrikā* (PrC) [197]

The PrC, a substantial work in 441 verses on Prakrit grammar running through nine chapters, substantiates that Śeṣakṛṣṇa had a wide mastery of grammar.[198] It contains a running autocommentary as well.[199] This work is attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa on the basis of several pieces of evidence. The most important is that the author clearly mentions his name and lineage in the introductory verses, the concluding verses, and the colophon, where he pays his utmost respect to his father and teacher, Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha. Moreover, the following verse appears as the opening verse in both the PrC and the PKśk.

> *alikulamaṇḍitagaṇḍaṃ pratyūhavyūhatimiramārtaṇḍam*
> *sindūrāruṇaśuṇḍaṃ devaṃ vetaṇḍatuṇḍam avalambe*. (1)

> I devote myself to the god with a face of an elephant, i.e., Gaṇeśa, who is the sun (for beating) the darkness of the mass of obstacles, whose trunk is red with vermilion, and whose temples are adorned by a swarm of bees.

The second verse of the PrC and the fifth verse of the PKśk also match each other.

> *kalitakamalapuṣpanyastahastāgramudrā*
> *diśatu likhanaśuddhiṃ śāradā sāradā naḥ*
> *prativadanasarojaṃ yā kavīnāṃ navīnāṃ*
> *vitarati madhudhārāṃ mādhurīṇāṃ dhurīṇām.* (2)

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[197] JHĀ and JHĀ (1969) is the only edition of the PrC. NITTI-DOLCI (1972: 223) mentions a *Prākṛtacandrikā* by a Kṛṣṇadāsa, which seems to be a different work.
[198] For some quotes, see PETERSON, part III, pp. 342 - 348.
[199] According to NCC 12, p. 133, the commentary is titled *Prākṛtadīpikā*.

May (goddess) Sarasvatī, who shows a gesture with the tip of the hand on which a lotus flower is placed[200](?), grants the essence, (and) pours a fresh sweet stream of mead to every lotus mouth of leading and amiable poets, bestow upon us the purity in writing.

EGGELING's mention[201] of the date of the PrC manuscript he had seen as "about A.D. 1550" suggests that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's scholarly career could have started even before the 16th century. However, in terms of the sequence of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works, the PrC comes after the PC, as we learn from a verse at the end of the former.

tad imāṃ padacandrikānujātāṃ
praguṇāṃ[202] *prākṛtacandrikāṃ vidagdhāḥ*
pariśīlya[203] *cirād apāstapāpāḥ*
kavigoṣṭhīṣu vihāram ātanudhvam. (PrC, verse 440)

Having consulted for a long time this excellent *Prākṛtacandrikā* created subsequently to the *Padacandrikā,* may scholars, with their faults removed, spread delight (of it) in scholarly assemblies.

As PISCHEL[204] observes, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's thorough use of Hemacandra's *Siddhahemacandra* and the works on Prakrit grammar by earlier authors such as Bharata and Bhojadeva to illustrate different dialects and their assignment to individual characters in society is evident in the PrC. As Śeṣakṛṣṇa states in the third verse of the introduction, this work

[200] I could not translate this compound correctly, and this imagery does not match the common depiction of Sarasvatī.
[201] EGGELING, Vol. II, p. 267.
[202] "*praṇutāṃ*" (celebrated) is a variant. EGGELING, Vol. II. p. 268.
[203] Presumably due to a scribal error in the manuscripts consulted, *"pariśīlya*" appears as "*pariśilpa*" in JHA and JHA (1969: 112). BENKE (2010: 65) thus translates wrongly the third line of this verse as "setting aside their labors (relax) at long last from their craft". The term *pariśīlya*, which is more accurate in the context and grammatically fitting, can be observed under the entry (No. 945) of the PrC in EGGELING, Vol. II, p. 268.
[204] Subhadra JHĀ's translation (1999) of Richard PISCHEL's *A Grammar of the Prākrit Languages*. pp. 55 - 56.

is intended for teaching students, unlike some of his other works, such as the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi*, which seems to invite only experts on the MBh.

6. *Śabdālaṅkāra* alias *Śabdābharaṇa*

This grammatical work has not been found.[205] Śeṣakṛṣṇa mentions it in the PKśk, as does Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa in the *Sūktiratnākara*.[206] The 45th verse of the introduction to the PKśk is as follows.

> *vahnau suvarṇam iva yat pariśodhya śabdā-*
> *laṅkāranāmani mayā vihite nibandhe*
> *uddhṛtya sāram idamīyam ihopabaddhaṃ*
> *siddhāntaśuddhivibubhutsujanānurodhāt.* (45)
>
> Having extracted (from) the work I composed titled *Śabdālaṅkāra* after refining it like gold in the fire, its essence is put here because of (my) obligation to the people who would like to know the refined (forms) of settled conclusions.

Accordingly, the *Śabdālaṅkāra* must have been a voluminous work to be the source of the PKśk. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's words do not allow us to assume that the *Śabdālaṅkāra* was an extensive commentary on the PK, which he had written before summarizing it to the PKśk. It could possibly have been a lengthy work on Pāṇinian grammar, not necessarily modelled on the PK.

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[205] NCC 4, p. 365 - 366; NCC 33, p. 121. Also see BORI, Vol. II, No. 109.

[206] SR, verse 6. Note that the title Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa gives is *Śabdābharaṇa*, whereas the PKśk gives *Śabdālaṅkāra*. Their identity is based on our identifying °*ābharaṇa* with °*alaṅkāra* in the title.

3.1.2 Poetical Works

1. *Pārijātaharaṇa Campū* (PHC) [207]

A work of five chapters (*ucchvāsas*), the *Pārijātaharaṇa campū* is a fine piece of poetry, in which Śeṣakṛṣṇa successfully manifests his skills also as a poet. It is based on a conventional legend from Purāṇic literature, i.e., Kṛṣṇa's exploit of carrying off the *pārijāta* (wish-fulfilling) tree from Indra's garden, which supplied a motif to a range of dramas, *campūs*, and *mahākāvyas* not only in Sanskrit but in other Indian languages as well. [208] The *Harivaṁśa Purāṇa*, a supplement (*Khila*) to the *Mahābhārata*, contains a shorter version (*Viṣṇuparva*, 64th *Adhyāya*) and a longer version (*Viṣṇuparva*, 65th - 71st *Adhyāyas*) of the story, while the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (5. 29 - 31) and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (10. 59, 39 - 40) are two other sources. Particularly around the time Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote his work, that story seems to have been of interest to many poets across India.

The information Śeṣakṛṣṇa provides in the introductory verses[209] and the two prose paragraphs inserted in between should be considered significant, since he mentions there Narottama, a local king of the Śrīvāstaka clan of Tāṇḍavapura, who patronized the work. The depiction of the king Narottama there exemplifies how poets of the early modern period[210] used to eulogize their patrons, using every typical epithet and

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[207] Edited by DURGĀPRASĀDA and PARAB (1926, 3rd edition), published first in 1889 as No. 14 under the *Kāvyamālā* series. NCC 12, pp. 49 - 50.

[208] Dramas in Maithili by Umāpati Upādhyāya (14th century), in Assamese by Śrīmanta Śaṅkaradeva (14th - 15th centuries), and in Telugu by Nandi Thimmana (15th - 16th centuries) are a few examples. Among Sanskrit dramas by the title *Pārijātaharaṇa*, the one by Gopāladāsa (15th - 16th centuries) is notable. NCC 12, pp. 48 - 49 lists a number of works with the title *Pārijātaharaṇa*.

[209] For a light translation of all the 19 verses of the introduction, see BENKE 2010: 61, 62.

[210] Writers were inclined to compose what their patrons were pleased to see. Consider Melputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's words in the PraS, part I: "*yan madbuddhiviśuddhaye narapater modāya cedaṃ kṛtam*." [(that) which I have written for the refinement of my intellect and the king's delight.]. See UNNI 1998: xxxiv. Since the competition for patronage among the intellectuals appears to have been high, their encomia often contained highly elaborated diction to win the patrons' heart.

set phrase of praise. I discuss later this Narottama in detail under Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Patrons.

As a poem, the PHC is a work of high standard. Several modern studies[211] of this work elaborate on his commendable use of chaste Sanskrit, finely woven imagery, and skill in handling a conventional storyline within the structure of *campū*.

2. *Kaṃsavadha* (KaṃV) [212]

As the only drama attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the KaṃV holds a special place in his repertoire. Like the PHC, this drama carries a theme widely employed by many poets in the history of Sanskrit literature, i.e., the lord Kṛṣṇa's torturing of Kaṃsa, an *asura*, and in his next life, a king, as the *Mahābhārata* [213] and the Purāṇas [214] illustrate in detail. The KaṃV belongs to the category of *nāṭaka* as it consists of seven acts and strictly follows the rules of Sanskrit dramaturgy as prescribed by Bharata. It is said to have been enacted at the Viśveśvara festival in Benares. [215] Through the character of the Sūtradhāra, Śeṣakṛṣṇa reveals (verse 1. 13) that his patron was Giridhārī, one of the two sons of Rāja Ṭoḍaramalla.[216]

The following verse in *Sragdharā* metre is one example out of many that convince us of his poetic talents.

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[211] SHARMA (1999). Also see two recent editions of it; SHARMA (1962) and MIŚRA (1991).

[212] Edited by DURGĀPRASĀDA and PARAB (1935), published as No. 6 of the *Kāvyamālā* series.

[213] *Harivaṃśa* 2. 85 - 86.

[214] BhāP 10. 44; *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 5. 15.

[215] KRISHNAMACHARIAR and SRINIVASACHARIAR 1970: 654.

[216] The KaṃV gives both Giridhārī and Govardhana as the name of the relevant son of Ṭoḍaramalla. In his edition of the *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī*, KHISTE (1927: 3 of *Upodghāta*) also mentions Giridhārī as a son of Ṭoḍaramalla, while ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 252) and TRIVEDI (1925: l of introduction) maintain the same. KRISHNAMACHARIAR and SRINIVASACHARIAR (1970: 654) and BENKE (2010: 61) agree with the identity of the names.

vṛndāraṇye carantī vibhur api satataṃ bhūrbhuvaḥsvaḥ sṛjantī
nandodbhūtāpy anādiḥ śiśur api nigamair lakṣitā vīkṣitāpi
vidyullekhāvanaddhonnamadamalamahāmbhodasacchāyakāyā
māyā pāyād apāyād aviditamahimā kāpi paitāmbarī vaḥ. [217]

Roaming in the Vṛndā forest although omnipresent, always uttering "*bhūḥ bhuvaḥ svaḥ*" (lit. earth, air, heaven), i.e., the Veda, having no beginning although born to Nanda, characterized and looked upon by Vedic auxiliary texts although a boy, having the body whose colour was like a large cloud, which is clean, rising up, and covered with streaks of lightening, may Pītāmbara's (i.e., Śrī Kṛṣṇa's) *māyā*[218], a certain (mystic power) the might of which is unknown (because of its being infinite), protect you from misfortune.

As discussed above, the KaṃV provides evidence of the contentious atmosphere in the intellectual community in Benares. The following verse in *Śārdūlavikrīḍita* metre marks, conversely, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's satisfaction with the company of the noble.

buddhiṃ vardhayati śriyaṃ vitanute vaidagdhyam āmuñcati
śreyaḥ pallavayaty aghāni dalayaty unmīlayaty unnatim
vijñānaṃ pariśodhayaty upacinoty uccaiḥ kalākauśalaṃ
kiṃ kiṃ nārabhate harer iva kathājaryaṃ satāṃ saṃgatam.[219]

(It) improves intellect, imparts prosperity, releases (one's latent) expertise, sprouts happiness, destructs sins, awakens progress, refines wisdom, (and) highly strengthens aesthetic talent. What does not the unfading friendship of the noble men produce? (It produces everything) like the story of Kṛṣṇa.

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[217] KaṃV, verse 2 of prologue.

[218] *Māyā* or *yogamāyā* is the power of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, with which he appears before his devotees, as stated, for instance, in *Bhagavadgītā* 4. 6. It enables him to obscure his supreme nature and assume the role of a friend, a master, a child, or a lover, so that he can approach his devotees more intimately.

[219] KaṃV, verse 4 of prologue.

3.1.3 Dharmaśāstra Works

1. *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī* (DŚC) [220]

Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote three works on *Dharmaśāstra*. Among these, the *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī* alias *Śeṣakṛṣṇakārikā*[221] is a terse work, as the title indicates, and consists of 14 *ślokas* in *Śārdūlavikrīḍita* metre. Nevertheless, Śeṣa Rāma, the great-great-grandson (*vṛddhaprapautra*)[222] of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, wrote an elaborative commentary on it, also providing in the beginning a clear family tree up to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's grandfather, Rāmacandra.[223] Given the large number of works in this genre that emerged during the early modern period, *Dharmaśāstra* also seems to have been given a priority, with patronage from Hindu rulers and local regents.[224]

The DŚC describes numerous Hindu rituals such as *tarpaṇa* (libation to the deceased ancestors) and *śrāddha* (rituals supplementary to funeral rites [*antyeṣṭi*]). The following excerpt (DŚC, verse 6), for instance, illustrates how *piṇḍa*, usually a ball of cooked rice or gram flour, must be offered as part of the *śrāddha* rituals.

> *pratyabde bilvamātraṃ tadadhikapṛthulaṃ dvādaśāhāt sapiṇḍī-kṛtyante 'ntardaśāhe tv atipṛthulam ito nirvapet piṇḍam ekaṃ parvaṇy uccaiḥ kapitthāmalabadaraśamīpatrakaiḥ kukkuṭāṇḍais tulyān śaktyā pradadyād itarakarayujā pāṇinā dakṣiṇena.*
>
> Every year, a *piṇḍa* of the size of a Bilva fruit (must be offered), and a (*piṇḍa*) larger than that (must be offered) after the twelfth day (from the date of death) at the end of the *sapiṇḍīkaraṇa* ritual. But in the middle of the ten days (from the date of death), one *piṇḍa* of a greater size must be offered. On each day of the changes

[220] NCC 4, p. 365. Edited by KHISTE and published in 1927 with the commentary of Śeṣa Rāma, as No. 22 of the Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Sanskrit Series.
[221] NCC 1, p. 168. Here it is also stated that the *Śrāddhakārikā* of an Anantadeva is equivalent to the DŚC in terms of content.
[222] Śeṣa Rāma's commentary on DŚC, colophon.
[223] Śeṣa Rāma's commentary on DŚC, verse 1.
[224] Cf. KANE 1930: 716, 717.

of the moon, the (*piṇḍas*) equal to the sizes of a Kapittha fruit, an Amala fruit, a Badara fruit, a Śamī leaf, and a hen's egg must be offered (while reciting relevant mantras) loudly/ intensely. [225] (All of these offerings must be performed) according to one's ability, with the right hand accompanied by the other hand, i.e., the left hand.

2. *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi* (ŚĀŚ) [226]

The *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi* is a work of considerable length in prose and verse that prescribes the rules for the Śudras and advises the other castes on how to deal with them. Śeṣakṛṣṇa was inclined to compose this "manual for the Śūdras, the fourth class" (*caturthavarṇocitadharmapaddhati*/ *śūdrapaddhati*), [227] because contemporary scholars held mixed views on this subject. For the ŚĀŚ, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's patron was Pilājī Ghorpade, a military regent under the Muslim king Ālī 'Ādil Shāh I of Bijapur (1558 - 1580). As BENKE (2010) provides the most recent study of it, including a complete translation, I do not go into details here.

3. *Govindārṇava*[228]

Since the ŚĀŚ refers to the *Govindārṇava* eight times (BENKE 2010: 30), directing the readers to it for further information, it seems to have been a more extensive work. In terms of the contents, the *Govindārṇava* is a "general digest of religious observances," [229] suggesting that it is not confined just to the conduct of the Śudras. We learn from the text itself that the *Govindārṇava* is also known as *Smṛtisāgara* and *Dharmatattvāloka*. Beginning with a long preamble of 85 verses, it extends to six chapters titled as *vīcis* (lit. waves); *saṁskāra*, *āhnika*,

[225] It appears that "*uccaiḥ*" here refers to the manner of recitation of mantras. The commentary by Śeṣa Rāma does not help with this word.
[226] NCC 35, pp. 73, 74. Edited by KHISTE and published in two parts in 1933 and 1936.
[227] Verses 6 and 7 of the introduction.
[228] NCC 6, p. 212. PINGREE 1994: 202.
[229] EGGELING, Vol. III, No. 1566.

śrāddha, *śuddhi*, *kāla*, and *niṣkṛti* (verse 85). The *Govindārṇava* must have been an authoritative work, since it was mentioned in many of the later works in the *Dharmaśāstra* genre, such as the *Tithinirṇayasaṃkṣepa* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the *Prakṛtīṣṭikālanirṇaya* of Śambhu Bhaṭṭa, and even the *Sāpiṇḍyapradīpa* of Nāgeśa, a work written about two hundred years later.

The authorship of this work is, however, debated. After considering references in other writers to the verses of the *Govindārṇava* and the shared verses in the ŚĀŚ and the DŚC, BENKE (2010: 30, 31) concludes that either Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote it fully himself or completed the work which his father had left uncompleted. The patron of the work was Govindacandra or Govindadeva[230] of the Śrīvāstaka clan, who the work was named after. The following verse confirms the patronage of Govindacandra.

> *taṃ śeṣāmalavaṃśabhūṣaṇamaṇiṃ govindacandraḥ svayaṃ*
> *vidvanmaṇḍalapuṇḍarīkataraṇir bhūmaṇḍalīmaṇḍanaṃ*
> *dharmoddhāravidhau samāhitamanāḥ prītyānunīyādhunā*
> *govindārṇavanāmakaṃ vyaracayad dharmaprabandhaṃ śubham.*
>
> Govindacandra, who is the sun (awakening) the white lotuses in the form of groups of intellectuals and has the mind set on the way of elevating dharma, himself kindly induced and commanded him, who is the decorating jewel of the noble Śeṣa lineage and an ornament to the whole world, compose the fine treatise of dharma titled *Govindārṇava* at this time.

It is clear from the above description that Śeṣakṛṣṇa composed more grammatical treatises than poetical and Dharmaśāstra works. However, only the STN is on the philosophy of language.[231] While the PKśk and the PrC, which are available as complete works, do not contain any philosophical discussion on language, the other grammatical works,

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[230] As in the colophon to the first chapter, *saṃskāravīci*. See EGGELING, Vol. III, p. 485, No. 1566.

[231] Note that the SR (verse 6) confirms Śeṣakṛṣṇa expertise in all branches of philosophy. Then it is quite unlikely that he lacked philosophical views on language.

perhaps except the *Śabdālaṅkāra* alias *Śabdābharaṇa*, do not appear to include contents related to the grammatical philosophy.

3.2 Works Less Convincingly Attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa

There are a few more works traditionally ascribed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa, but we can now safely reject the majority of them. It is noteworthy that the catalogues list no other grammatical works[232] of his but a few more poetical works, apparently due the confusion caused by the given name "Kṛṣṇa" lacking the clan name "Śeṣa" but having instead honorific appendages such as *paṇḍita*, *kavi*, or *bhaṭṭa*. This situation has become more complicated because the *Uṣāpariṇaya*, the *Kriyāgopanacampū*/ *Kriyāgopanarāmāyaṇa*, the *Murārivijaya*, the *Satyabhāmāvilāsa*, and the *Satyabhāmāpariṇaya*, which the CC lists under three different Kṛṣṇas, are listed under Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the NCC. On top of that, some writers have added more works, while dropping some works which we now know with more certainty to be Śeṣakṛṣṇa's. For instance, ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 249) adds the drama titled *Murārivijaya* and WINTERNITZ[233] adds the *Mandāramaranda*, but the DŚC is not in the list given by the former.

We know nothing about the *Uṣāpariṇaya*[234] except that it is a *campū* work attributed to a Kṛṣṇakavi. NCC 2 (p. 401) does not provide the author's lineage name, i.e., Śeṣa, but NCC 35 (p. 115) ascribes it to a Śeṣakṛṣṇa with undetermined identity. According to the manuscript referred to by OPPERT (Vol. 1, p. 4. No. 32), the work is of considerable length; 300 pages with 11 lines a page. Considering that the age of the manuscript is judged to be around 250 years earlier from 1880, the publication date of OPPERT Vol. 1, we may assume that it could be from a Kṛṣṇakavi from the 16th century. The story of Uṣā's marriage is found in Purāṇic literature, which was also the source for Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *campū* work, the *Pārijātaharaṇa*.

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[232] NCC 35 (pp. 115, 116) lists, as a work of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa, a commentary titled *Prabhāvatī* alias *Pañjikā* on the *Sārasvatasūtra.* We cannot be sure about its authorship as we do not know more about it.

[233] WINTERNITZ 1963: 414.

[234] OPPERT, Vol. 1, pp. 4, 5, No. 32; OPPERT, Vol. 2, p. 240, No. 3604.

The *Kriyāgopanacampū* alias *Candrakalāvilāsa*[235] is also by a Kṛṣṇakavi, but he was the son of Raghunātha Dīkṣita, according to OPPERT. The only thing drawing our attention to the *Kriyāgopana* and thereby making us consider Śeṣakṛṣṇa as a possible author is its alleged grammatical content presented poetically. The verb forms of its verses on a theme from the *Rāmāyaṇa* are concealed in carmina figurata[236], apparently as a strategy for pleasantly teaching the diverse forms of verbs through poetry. However, the mismatch of the names of the author's father minimizes the chances of it being a work of our Śeṣakṛṣṇa. Similarly, the authorship of the *Satyabhāmāvilāsa* and the *Satyabhāmāpariṇaya*, which contain the same story and possibly are the same work known differently, has to be left aside as uncertain. The *Mandāramaranda* is clearly by a different Kṛṣṇa Śarman, who was a resident in Guhapura and a student of Vāsudeva Yogīśvara.[237] As this Kṛṣṇa claims that he does not have any expertise in grammar, philosophy, or even in poetics,[238] he might not be our Śeṣakṛṣṇa who never failed to declare otherwise.

Compared with the works listed above, the *Murārivijaya* appears less unlikely to be by Śeṣakṛṣṇa. The excerpt of the manuscript supplied by PETERSON[239] shows that the author was Nṛsiṃha's son.

> *asti kila dākṣiṇātyasya godārodhovāstavyasya*
> *śrīmadviśvarūpavaṃśavanamuktāmaṇer adhividyānagarasabhaṃ*
> *vidvadvṛndavitīrṇabhaṭṭabhaṭṭārakāparanāmno*
> *bhaṭṭanṛsiṃhasyātmajaḥ kṛṣṇabhaṭṭo nāma mahān vidvatkaviḥ.*
>
> Assuredly, there is a highly learned scholar/ poet called Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha, who is a southerner, a resident on the bank of (the river) Godā, a pearl-gem in the forest of the great

[235] NCC 5, p. 134; OPPERT, Vol. 1, pp. 370, 371, No. 4540. However, NCC 35 (pp. 115, 116) puts it under our Śeṣakṛṣṇa's authorship.
[236] BALASUBRAHMANYAN 2006: 9: "This work is on the *Citrakāvya* or poetry with verbal arts."
[237] As ascertained from the edition of ŚIVADATTA and PARAB 1895.
[238] *Mandāramaranda campū*, verse 4.
[239] PETERSON, Part III, p. 21. KHISTE agrees with this. See DŚC (1927: 4 of *Upodghāta*). PETERSON (Part III, pp. 342 - 348) believes that the authors of the *Murārivijaya* and the PrC are identical, and therefore refers to a manuscript of the latter work.

> Viśvarūpa clan, and holder of the attributive title *bhaṭṭabhaṭṭāraka* bestowed (upon him) by an assembly of scholars in Vijayanagara/ Vidyānagara (?).

As we discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the epithet Bhaṭṭa may not hinder our assumption of the identity between this Kṛṣṇa and our Śeṣakṛṣṇa. The mention of "Viśvarūpa" as Nṛsiṃha's lineage may also be justified because Viśvarūpa[240] is considered the universal form of Viṣṇu, who is again believed to be non-different from Śeṣa, the great cosmic serpent. Similarly, the self-esteem echoed in the final verse[241] as follows looks similar to that invariably present in Śeṣakṛṣṇa's writings. Here the term "Kṛṣṇa" is employed paronomastically at some places to signify both the author of this work and lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

> *samastaiḥ siddhāntair vivṛtamahimāṃśasya kamalā-*
> *vilāsānāṃ hetor vibudhamukuṭālaṃkṛtimaṇeḥ*
> *guṇālaṃkārāḍhyā sarasapadayuktā madhubhidaḥ*
> *kṛtiḥ kṛṣṇasyeyaṃ luṭhatu vanamāleva padayoḥ.*

> May this work, which is rich in poetic merits and rhetorical devices and has fine words producing *rasas*, dangle like a garland of forest-flowers on the feet of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is the slayer of (the *asura* called) Madhu, who is the decorating jewel of the crowns of the wise, who is the stimulus for the dalliances of Śrī Lakṣmī (i.e., Śrī Kṛṣṇa's consort), and (only) a fraction of whose might is revealed through all the doctrines.

Given these considerations, could the *Murārivijaya* be attributed to Śeṣakṛṣṇa? A final decision is still far away, because what we know from the manuscript excerpts is limited, we do not find quotes from this work in others' works, and the author's reference to his father's location is not convincing, as we discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

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[240] We do not know if the author wanted to use the term Viśvarūpa skilfully, on the grounds that the Viśvarūpa form of Viṣṇu was worshipped as his *gṛhadevatā* during the time or in the region he wrote the *Murārivijaya*. For a complete study of Viśvarūpa, see MAXWELL 1988.

[241] PETERSON, Part III, p. 338.

§ 4. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Patrons

It was made clear that the Śeṣa family was highly esteemed in social, juridical, and intellectual contexts in early modern Benares. Consequently, most of the Śeṣa descendants, who were either renowned teachers or acclaimed writers, often both, received patronage for their scholarly pursuits from royal courts and wealthy aristocratic families.

Apparently, skilful writers hardly suffered any lack of patronage[242] in the affluent socio-political milieu Śeṣakṛṣṇa flourished in, particularly when they were ready to write on controversial topics or to compose encomia and simplified manuals of or commentaries on the authoritative works in demand. Likewise, the movements for supporting Hindu communities under the Mughal administration, like that of Ṭoḍaramalla, earned easy patronage for writers in related genres. Some prestigious writers were particularly commissioned by patrons even beyond Benares to write on contemporary hot topics and to participate in public debates on controversial matters. For example, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Raṅgoji Dīkṣita, and perhaps Appayya Dīkṣita[243] were commissioned by Venkaṭappā (1586–1629), a Nāyaka ruler in Ikkeri in the Shimoga district of modern Karnataka, to write and debate against the exponents of Dvaita Vedānta,[244] while Ṭoḍaramalla patronized in his house a great debate on the topic of whether dying in the holy city Benares guarantees emancipation. The competition among the contemporary writers was high, but we may assume that those who had acquired fame by composing influential works, teaching, and displaying spiritual leadership were readily offered patronage. In this way, the patrons could heighten their public reputation and win the support of the intellectuals for their administrative policies.

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[242] Cf. O'HANLON 2013: 33: "Great scholars guaranteed the judicial authority of royal courts, while the patronage of public disputations between leading intellectuals boosted the reputations of rulers for learning and culture (Deshpande 2011). Powerful merchant patrons, anxious to display their wealth and express their piety, found means to do this through the support of scholars and holy men."

[243] Introduction (pp. 4, 5) to Rāmacandra ŚĀSTRĪ's edition (1940) of the *Madhvatantramukhamardana* by Appayya Dīkṣita.

[244] GODE 1956a: 206, GODE 1956b: 210, DESHPANDE 2011a: 369, MINKOWSKI 2011: 225. Even Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa received patronage from Vīrabhadrappā Nāyaka (1629 - 1645), a grandson of Venkaṭappā Nāyaka I, as GODE (1956a: 206) and NCC (5, p. 92) note.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa names five patrons in the works that we have access to. Since the *Upapadamatiṅsūtravyākhyāna*, the *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi*, and the *Śabdālaṇkāra* are either lost or remain as unpublished manuscripts, we cannot be certain about their patrons. However, there are three works in which Śeṣakṛṣṇa has not mentioned any patronage, i.e., the PrC, the STN, and the DŚC. I discuss the five named patrons in detail below.

4.1 Govindacandra alias Govindadeva and Narottama

As we learn from the *Govindārṇava*, Govindacandra is descendent of the famous Śrīvāstaka family[245] of Benares. The text lists Śivadāsa as the first ruler. Śeṣakṛṣṇa (and also Nṛsiṃha[246], if in fact he wrote part of the text) received Govindacandra's patronage for composing the *Govindārṇava*, and acknowledged it with an excessive eulogy, as already observed. Govindacandra had two sons, the elder of whom was known to Śeṣakṛṣṇa as Kāśīrāja, while the younger was Narottama[247] under whose auspices the PHC and the PC [248] were written. Narottama, who ruled a region known as Tāṇḍavapura, was not, therefore, the younger brother of Govindacandra as ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 252) and BENKE (2010: 24, 25, 61, 310)[249] assume. The following two verses from the PC[250] depict Śeṣakṛṣṇa's gratitude to Narottama.

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[245] From Śeṣakṛṣṇa's praises of this clan in the PHC, it seems that Śrīvāstakas were great warriors who served the king as regents.

[246] EGGELING (Vol. III, No 1566, p. 484) describes Nrsiṁha as Govindacandra's minister.

[247] EGGELING, Vol. III, No 1566, p. 484.

[248] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 251.

[249] The "Govinda" in PHC verse 1. 13 signifies god Viṣṇu, whose *tripadavikrama* or the conquest in three steps is vividly described in the Purāṇas. Śeṣakṛṣṇa seemingly wanted to emphasise here that Narottama was greater or mightier than Viṣṇu. Note that "*sugītagovindato*" [than Govinda, the subject of beautiful songs] is in ablative and "*varaḥ kila narottamo*" [indeed greater Narottama] fits there well. BENKE (2010: 62) translates it correctly, leaving Govinda as what it should mean, but makes a mistake when introducing the PHC on the previous page. All in all, the Govinda in the verse 1.13 of the PHC does not relate to the Govindacandra, patron of the *Govindārṇava*. Obviously, it is also unlikely that Śeṣakṛṣṇa says here, for any reason, that Narottama is greater than his brother, as BENKE takes it, or than his father, as we understand it.

[250] EGGELING, Vol. II, No. 903, p. 253.

asti viśvaṃbharābhogabhūṣaṇībhūtavaibhavaḥ
narottamas tamastonarāśināśilasadyaśāḥ.

There is a king (known as) Narottama, with the grandeur embellished by (his) ruling of the earth and with the glaring fame in destroying a ("*tona*"?)[251] mass of darkness.

āpūrvāpara(vā)rirāśivasudhāsāmrājyadīkṣāguror
ādeśena narottamakṣitipateḥ śrīśeṣakṛṣṇendunā
vinyastāstasamastadoṣatimirā vidvaccakorādarād
ācandraṃ padacandrikā kuvalayānandāya bhūyād iyam.

May this *Padacandrikā* [or the moonbeams in the form of words], which was composed [or shed] removing the darkness of all flaws by noble Śeṣakṛṣṇa, who is (in the form of) the moon, at the request of king Narottama, the initiating spiritual master of the empire on the earth (expanding) from the eastern ocean to the western ocean, be for the delight of the whole world or for Kuvalayānanda (a form of manifestation of god Śiva) [or the delight of blue water-lilies] as long as there is the moon, i.e., forever, on account of the interest of the *Cakora*[252] birds (in the form of) the wise (in it).

Considering that Nṛsiṃha was patronized by Govindacandra and Śeṣakṛṣṇa by his son Narottama, we may easily date this family to around the first quarter of the 16th century. Apparently, the Śrīvāstakas were the first and again the most generous patrons to the Śeṣas, especially during the early decades of the 16th century.

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[251] I could not render °*tona*, which could perhaps be a misprint in the excerpt given by EGGELING.

[252] Conventionally, *Cakora* (Greek partridge) birds subsist on moonbeams. Śeṣakṛṣṇa exhibits his poetic skills by weaving together the imageries of his being the moon that dispels the darkness of grammatical flaws of language through his work (moonbeams), other intellectuals as *Cakora* birds feeding on his expertise and the world (paronomastically, blue water-lilies blooming at night) being pleased with his composition.

4.2 Giridhārī alias Govardhanadhāri/ Dhāru

Giridhārī, a son[253] of Rāja Ṭoḍaramalla (1523/4 - 1589), patronized Śeṣakṛṣṇa for writing his KaṃV.[254] According to the introductory verses of the *Ṭoḍarānanda* (1. 1. 7 - 18)[255], Ṭoḍaramalla (or Toḍaramalla) was from a Kṣatriya (Khatri)[256] family of the Ṭandana (Tandon) lineage in Laharpur of the then Oudh kingdom. Dvijamalla was his grandfather and Bhagavatidāsa was his father.

Rāja Ṭoḍaramalla was first at the service of Sher Shah Suri (1486 - 1545), founder of the Sur Empire, before joining Akbar's imperial court as a clerk around 1573, i.e., later than Vīravara, another courtier of Akbar and a patron of Śeṣakṛṣṇa. Through his skills, performance, and courage, he ascended to the post of the finance minister and ended up as Akbar's *Vakil*[257] (roughly, prime minister). He died in Lahore. Ṭoḍaramalla was responsible for a number of important areas of finance. It was he who introduced to the Mughal administration a standard system of weights and measures, a land survey and settlement scheme, and a new procedure of revenue and taxation. A leading commander and a *Mansabdar*[258] in Akbar's conquests, he was also in charge of Agra, Gujarat, and Lahore during different phases of his life.

Ṭoḍaramalla was active in promoting Hindu values. He benevolently spent the wealth he received from his service at the imperial court on

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[253] As far as we know, Ṭoḍaramalla had two sons, Giridhārī and Kalyāṇa Dāsa. After Ṭoḍaramalla's death, his descendants settled in Jodhpur. The last direct descendant of his lineage was Maharaja Sir Kishen Pershad (1864 - 1940), twice Prime Minister of Hyderabad state.

[254] KaṃV, verse 1. 13. WILSON (1871: 401 - 402) was presumably wrong in reading this verse to say that Giridhārī was Ṭoḍaramalla's teacher.

[255] VAIDYA's edition (1948).

[256] According to some, he was a Kayastha, a caste higher than Khatris but lower than Brahmins.

[257] *Vakil* was a significant post under the Mughal administration. The *Vakils* had immense civil and military powers, but at the end of Akbar's reign, they were replaced by the *Wazirs* with similar entitlements. Some describe Ṭoḍaramalla not as a *Vakil* but as a *Wazir*. However, he once "fell a victim to imperial displeasure for his failure to dislodge the Uzbegs" (SINHA 1980: 112) in 1565.

[258] *Mansabdars* were the aristocratic members of the imperial bureaucracy of the Mughal Empire, who were directly responsible to the emperor. See O'HANLON 2013: 33.

charity and public welfare. The Viśvanātha temple in Benares was rebuilt by him in 1585. More importantly, in 1572, he called upon a gathering of the scholars in Benares to "compose a giant compendium of Hindu culture and learning" (WUJASTYK 2009: 147), having Jagadguru Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa as its head. That assembly of scholars produced an extensive encyclopaedia titled *Ṭoḍarānanda* in 23 volumes, in which Ṭoḍaramalla himself apparently added a section known as the *Āyurvedasaukhya*.[259] Moreover, in addition to translating the BhāP into Persian, he urged Hindu scholars to learn Persian, because it paved the way for them to secure employment opportunities in the state service.

Abu al-Fazl's grand work, the *Akbārnāma*, gives three names for Ṭoḍaramalla's sons; Dhāru, Gaurdahan (i.e., Govardhana in Sanskrit), and Kalyān Dās,[260] but SINGH (1941: 358) states that the same person is meant by both Dhāru and Gaurdahan. The other son, Kalyān or Rāja Kalyāṇamalla, also served at Akbar's and Jahangir's courts.[261] While at the imperial court, Govardhanadhārī was appointed agent in charge of Jaunpur, close to Benares. It is possible to assume that he had an opportunity during his tenure there to patronize a festival in honour of lord Śiva at the Viśvanātha temple in Benares, where Śeṣakṛṣṇa's KaṃV was performed. As SINGH (1941: 359, 360) notes fittingly, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's mention of Giridhārī as the preceptor (*guru*) who presides over the performance (KaṃV, verse 1. 13) thus seems very plausible. Just like Ṭoḍaramalla, Govardhanadhārī may have had the enthusiasm to support the Hindu community and its values, and consequently been entrusted with powers to support writers like Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

After leaving Jaunpur in 1590, Govardhanadhārī fought for Akbar as a commander under Khan-I-Khana (1556 - 1626), one of the nine jewels at Akbar's court. He was in military service until his death during the conquest in Sindh against Mirza Jani Beg of Thatta district, apparently in 1592,[262] i.e., three years after his father's death.

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[259] He is also said to have composed the work titled *Mokṣamārgaprakāśaka* in Hindi.
[260] *Akbārnāma*, Vol. 3, pp. 294, 876, 929, 930; pp. 605, 606 and pp. 812, 1200, 1249 respectively.
[261] For details, see SINGH 1941: 360 - 363.
[262] SHARMA 1966: 235, 236.

4.3 Vīravara

King Vīravara, ruler of Patrabhuñja/ Patrapuñja, capital of the Antarvedi[263] (doab) region between the Ganges and the Jamuna rivers, requested Śeṣakṛṣṇa to compose the PKśk for the benefit of his son, prince Kalyāṇa. In the introduction to the PKśk, Śeṣakṛṣṇa provides a fairly detailed account of the lineage of Vīravara, in the order Rūpadhara, Nārāyaṇa, Gaṅgādāsa, Vīravara, and Kalyāṇa.

According to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's description of Rūpadhara (PKśk, verses 13, 14) and Nārāyaṇa (verses 15, 16), the latter does not appear to be related to the former paternally, but perhaps fraternally. In any case, Gaṅgādāsa's (verses 17, 18) father was Nārāyaṇa, not Rūpadhara. Vīravara, who was Gaṅgādāsa's son, is extolled as a great Brahmin (*dvijavara*), a fine scholar, a gifted poet and so on (verses 18 - 30), and Kalyāṇa (verses 31 - 34) as a young prince with the promising character of a budding scholar.[264] Śeṣakṛṣṇa was requested to compose the PKśk because Kalyāṇa expressed an interest in understanding difficult texts. As is evident from the context, those texts would have included grammatical works such as the PK. This must have been during the time when Śeṣakṛṣṇa's reputation as a fine grammarian was on the rise.

> *kalyāṇasya tanūdbhavasya nṛpateḥ kalyāṇamūrtes tataḥ*
> *kalyāṇīṃ matim ākalayya viṣamagranthārthasaṃvittaye*
> *kṛṣṇaṃ śeṣaṇṛsiṃhasūritanayaṃ śrīprakriyākaumudī-*
> *ṭīkāṃ kartum asau viśeṣaviduṣāṃ prītyai samājijñapat.* (35)
>
> Having considered the agreeable intention of (his own) son, prince Kalyāṇa, the embodiment of virtues, to understand the content of difficult works, he (the king) instructed Kṛṣṇa, son of Śeṣa Nṛsiṃha pundit, to compose a commentary on the great *Prakriyākaumudī* for the pleasure of experts.

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[263] ARYAVARAGURU 1912: 252, fn. 11; BELVALKAR 1915: 45, 46.

[264] Note that, as in the verses 35 and 37, the PKśk is intended for experts in particular. Apparently Kalyāṇa could already have had a good training in grammar, but the commentary was required to resolve the knotty points he was still uncomfortable with.

tasmād vīravarān mahīśamukuṭālaṅkāracūḍāmaṇeḥ
prāpyājñāṃ suciraṃ vibhāvya ca hṛdi jyotir nṛsiṃhābhidham
santoṣāya viśeṣya bhāṣyaviduṣāṃ bodhāya durmedhasāṃ
vyākhyāmy ākarasākṣikāṃ suviśadaṃ tāṃ prakriyākaumudīm.
(37)

Having received the request from him, Vīravara, the decorative crest-jewel of the crowns of kings, and having pondered in the heart for a very long time the light[265] by the name of Nṛsiṃha, I comment very finely on the *Prakriyākaumudī*, which is a witness of the source of (grammar rules), for the enlightenment of the ignorant and especially for the delight of the scholars of the *Mahābhāṣya*.

Among Śeṣakṛṣṇa's patrons, Vīravara is perhaps the one best known to us. He is widely admitted to be the Birbar or, more frequently, the Birbal,[266] who flourished between 1528 - 1586, during which time Śeṣakṛṣṇa was also active, and served at Akbar's court. Birbal's contemporaries at the imperial court included Bhagawan Das, Man Singh, Ṭoḍaramalla, Abu al-Fazl, and Tansen. Following the depiction of Birbal's character provided by folklore, some[267] are inclined to view Birbal as the court humorist of Akbar, placing him in parallel with Tenāli Rāman at the court of Krishnadevaraya of Vijayanagara or Gopāl Bhar at the court of Raja Krishnacandra of Navadvipa. However, some recent studies prove in detail why Vīravara must be considered more seriously as an influential figure in the Mughal history. The following information is largely based on SINHA (1980), the most credible study I found so far on Birbal.

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[265] This suggests that Nṛsiṃha was not alive by the time Śeṣakṛṣṇa composed the PKśk.

[266] MIŚRA (1966: 125); HUECKSTEDT 2002: 51. BENKE (2010: 33, 64) also assumes this. How his name Vīravara appeared as Birbal in non-Sanskrit contexts conforms to the instances of philological changes in new Indo-European languages. The phoneme "-*v*-" of Vīravara is considered to be an allophone of "-*b*-", while the middle and the final "-*a*-" drops in pronunciation, i.e., the schwa syncope. AGARWAL (1950: 76, 77 fn.) explains further how the final "-*r*" of "Birbar" became "-*l*".

[267] For instance SARIN and BHATTACHARYA (2005).

Vīravara (lit. bravest of the brave) was not his original name but an honorific title conferred upon him by Akbar. He was born as the third son by the name Maheśadāsa to a Brahmin Bhat family in Kalpi on the right bank of the river Jamuna in Tribikramapur, i.e., modern Tikwapur.[268] Since Tikwapur is a village of the Tehsil (i.e., city) known as Ghatampur in Kanpur district, SINHA (1980: 28) assumes that Patrapuñja should belong to Kanpur region. Accordingly, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's reference [269] to Vīravara's birthplace or place of residence is correct, although not as precise as the later historians pinpoint. Vīravara's father was a Gaṅgādāsa,[270] a fact matching what we already know from the PKśk, and mother was Anabhadevī. Vīravara received a good education and joined the service of a local chieftain of Kalpi before coming to the court of Raja Bhagwant Das in Amber (later known as Jaipur), where he convinced Bhagwant Das of his talents in poetry under the pen name "Brahmakavi". Vīravara next served for some time at the Rewa court of Rāja Ramachandra Singh. In the year 1556, he joined the imperial court of Akbar, along with Tansen (1493/ 1506 - 1586/ 1589), who also served at the Rewa court. Vīravara was one of the most senior courtiers of Akbar (SINHA 1980: 40).

Aside from his exceptional talents in poetry and his shrewd personality, Vīravara was also one of the military commanders and *Mansabdars* who supported Akbar closely in a number of conquests, including those in Punjab, Kangra, Gujarat, Bihar, and Orissa.[271] Witnessing his loyalty and valour at war, Akbar conferred upon him several honorific titles, one

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[268] SINHA 1980: 26.

[269] In the introductory verses 6 - 9 of the PKśk, Śeṣakṛṣṇa situates Patrapuñja in the vicinity of Brahmāvarta (Bithoor), which was in the region of Udumbarahāra of the doab (*antarvedi*). As KATRE (1944: 151) points out, Udumbarahāra was one of the capitals ruled by the royal line known as the Caturdharas or the Caturdhārikas (Chaudharis) as well. The other capitals they had were Koraspura, Devapura, and Candrapura, all situated near Brahmāvarta. BHĀGAVATA (1999: 12 of the *Upodghāta*) in his edition of the SR mentions Phirinda, the patron of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, as a descendant of this Chaudhari clan.

[270] The Ashokan pillar in the Allahabad fort, an epigraphical source dated to 1574 (Saṃvat 1632, Śaka 1493), also confirms that Birbal's father was Gaṅgādāsa. See SINHA 1980: 21 - 23.

[271] Vīravara died in 1586, again on the battle ground during his last military assignment against the Yusufzai Afghans.

of which was Vīravara.[272] He was often referred to as "Rāja Birbal", and his both original name and pen name gradually faded from use. Vīravara did not hold any specific post at the imperial court, but as one of the *navaratnas* (lit. nine jewels) there, he was one of the most important and intimate companions to Akbar. Akbar treated him very well for his service of nearly 30 years.[273]

As a gifted poet, Birbal received the honorific title "kavi-rāi" (king of poets) from Akbar. His poems are found scattered in a number of anthologies and quoted by contemporary poets. While the *Sudāmā Caritra*, the *Kavitta Saṃgraha*, the *Gaṅgāstuti* and the *Nīti Upadeśa* are among his Bhrajbhasa works in verse, the *Anuvāda Bhagavat Gīta* and the *Birbal Padshah ki Baat* are his prose works, the latter of which is a collection of stories and witty sayings. Vīravara was a faithful devotee of the Vaiṣṇava school of Vithal Nath but his rationality earned him respect from both Muslims and Hindus.

Vīravara had several sons and daughters, but "none of them could rise to the heights of the glory attained by their father, and very little is known about their personal merits and talents" (SINHA 1980: 122). Two sons, Lala (eldest) and Hari Har Rai, were associated with the imperial court. Lala left Akbar's court in 1601 to join the service of Jahangir, the eldest son of Akbar, in Allahabad as one of his *Mansabdars*. Hari Har Rai was a companion of Daniyal, the third son of Akbar. Following the account given in the PKśk, SINHA (1980: 123) says that another son of Vīravara was "Kalyānmal", who was obviously the prince Kalyāṇa Śeṣakṛṣṇa mentions. Dhīrbal was another son, according to Keshavadas (1555 - 1617) in his historical treatise, *Jahāngīrjaścandrikā*. We may assume that perhaps Kalyāṇa alias Kalyānmal, compared with his brothers, might have been less involved in court duties but more engaged in

[272] Reportedly, Akbar took it from the ancient storybook in Sanskrit, the *Vetālapañcaviṃśati* (or *Baital Pachisi* in Bengali). "Rāja" (royal/ great), "Sahib-us-Saif-o-Qalam" (master of sword and pen), and "Musahib-e-Danishwar" (my wise counsellor) were his other titles of honour.

[273] Akbar always spoke of Vīravara very highly. As SINHA (1980: 144) notes, Abul Fazl quotes Akbar's words as follows: "Birbal was the first among the matchless ones; the one who knew the subtleties of knowledge; a companion who charmed the inner circles; the one who talked interestingly about love and affection; the one who was a centre, so to say, of circumference formed by intellectuals; the first in an assembly of speakers, and affectionate friend and a companion in holy solitude."

intellectual pursuits. A daughter of Vīravara is also reported to have been wise and interested in Vaiṣṇava teachings.

4.4 Pilājī [274]

Pilājī was Śeṣakṛṣṇa's patron for the *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi* (ŚĀŚ). BENKE (2010: 31) notes that what we know about him is limited to what Śeṣakṛṣṇa tells us in the introductory verses of the ŚĀŚ; i.e., Pilājī was a ruler of a region in the southern part of India, a military commander, and a devout Hindu. His religious commitments, described well in the ŚĀŚ [275], include his patronage for pilgrimages to Prayāga and the lifting of taxes at many *tīrthas* for pilgrims from the South. Moreover, he supported good government and morality and sustained the Hindu communities.

There are persuasive pieces of evidence for us to take this Pilājī to be Meherban Shrimant Pirajee (Pilājī) Raje Ghorpade Bahadur, the 11th ruling prince[276] of the Mudhol *jagir* (i.e., estate), which is in the current Bāgalkot district of Karnataka. He served under Ālī 'Ādil Shāh I (1558 - 1580) of Bijapur district, Karnataka. The Ghorpades were primarily a warrior clan, and many members of it died on the battlefield. Their ancestry goes back to Rana Bhairavji (Bosaji), the first monarch of Mudhol, whose lineage name was then known as Bhosale / Bhonsle. An Adil Shah ruler conferred[277] the title of "Rāja Ghorpade[278] Bahadur" upon either Karan Singh, the fourth Rana of Mudhol (r. 1453 - 1469), or his

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[274] The description of Pilājī given here is largely based on BENKE (2010: 31 - 35), but contains some new information and corrections.

[275] ŚĀŚ, verses 3 - 6 of introduction.

[276] See the full list of titles of the Mudhol dynasty at:
http://www.royalark.net/India/mudhol.htm (accessed on 30. 12. 2014).

[277] http://members.iinet.net.au/~royalty/ips/m/mudhol.html (accessed on 30. 12. 2014).
See SINGH 1923: 11, 12.

[278] How they received "Ghorpade" as their clan name is as follows. In 1469, one of the Mudhol descendants, often referred to as Karan Singh, used a wall-climbing monitor lizard (*ghorpad* in Marathi) to scale the Khelna (now Vishalgad) fort situated close to Kolhapur. He did this by tying a rope to the lizard. A similar story is found regarding Tanaji Malusare, who used the same strategy in 1670 to climb the Kondana (now Sinhagad) fortress situated close to Pune, in order to recapture it for Shivaji.

son Bhim Singh. Pilājī's father was Cholaraja (d. 1578), but the name Keśavadāsa mentioned as his father in the ŚĀŚ could be, as BENKE (2010: 32, 33) notes, an honorific title indicating his devotion to the god Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Accordingly, the difference in names does not necessarily mean that this Pilājī could not have been the patron of Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

With his brothers Vallabhasinh and Kanoji, Pilājī served at the battle under the leadership of Manjan Khan [279] (possibly, Mian Manju [280] Dakhani), the peshwa (prime minister) of Ibrahim Nizam Shah, from 1593 to 1595, against Ikhlas Khan at Ahmednagar. Pilājī probably died within the first two decades of the 16th century.[281] His son Pratapsinh Rao (r. 1626 - 1645) served as the revenue minister of Ibrahim Adil Shah II. Although most of Pilājī's life seems to have been spent on military assignments, his encouragement of and patronage for the works like the ŚĀŚ are not arbitrary, as BENKE (2010: 34) notes.

> "As a side-line to the upstart Bhonsles in Pune, the Ghorpades may have had similar problems of caste status and legitimacy to deal with. Pilājī, therefore, may have seen a point in promoting the social stability of caste by showing interest in the lives of good Śūdras, the artisans and peasants who were the sources of manpower and revenue in the villages he was acquiring as a *jagirdar*. Such interests might have inspired the commissioning of a work on *śūdradharma* from a fellow Deccani and famous scholar, expert, and intellectual in Kāśī, as Śivājī would later enlist the Bhaṭṭas for public relations."

Pilājī's connection with Benares is, therefore, associated closely with the contemporary resurgence of literature, Dharma propagation, and Hindu religious practices. Scholars like Śeṣakṛṣṇa from Benares were often invited to promote education and enhance the intellectual ambiance in Bijapur. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and some of his family, who had connections with the Keladi rulers in Karnataka, could be other examples of this practice. We further learn that a scholar of the Śeṣa clan known as Vāmana was appointed royal librarian to Ālī 'Ādil Shāh I. It is thus clear

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[279] SINGH 1923: 23.

[280] KING 1898: 233 - 235.

[281] http://www.royalark.net/India/mudhol3.htm (accessed on 30. 12. 2014)
In the light of others' suggestions, BENKE (2010: 34) also assumes 1562 - 1596 as Pilājī Ghorpade's ruling period.

that, when Bijapur and Benares were more strongly connected through the exchange of scholars and scholarship, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was also offered royal patronage from outside Benares, especially as his reputation spread extensively in his very mature age.

§ 5. Early modern Benares

Regardless of what we know about Śeṣakṛṣṇa's lineage, personality, literary career and patrons, our recognition of his significance would not be complete without a sufficient understanding of early modern Benares during his time. Such an understanding may also provide a detailed backdrop to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's identity as a notable polemicist in recent Indian intellectual history. In what follows, I briefly examine first how Benares had been during the late 16th century and the early 17th century, and then the pressure the Śeṣas encountered.

5.1 Migration of Southern Brahmins

The intellectual renaissance in Benares did not result simply from the activities of the Brahmin and Muslim scholars resident there at the time of Akbar's consolidation of the Mughal Empire. As we discussed under the section "Mahārāṣṭra Śeṣas" above, the migration of southern Brahmins to Benares and their engagement not only in intellectual pursuits but also in religious, juridical, and cultural activities immensely contributed to it.

There were both push and pull factors that affected the southern Brahmins' relocation to Benares. Among the push factors, the political fluidity in their home regions was a strong factor for the Maratha Brahmins. The decline of the Hindu rulers in Paithan (formerly Pratiṣṭhāna), temple destructions by Bahmani Sultans and violence directed to Brahmins, and proselytisation by Portuguese power in the Konkan littoral were all causal factors behind Marathi Brahmins' diaspora. In this situation, Brahmins with traditional learning had to either flee and find subsistence in any other region under Hindu rulers or stay in the South, tolerating religious and ethnic persecutions, to serve

Muslim rulers. Similarly, their life as "petty teachers, village priests, astrologers, or small farmers" (O'HANLON 2013: 35) in the agrarian economy in Mahārāṣṭra was also hit from time to time by natural disasters, particularly two serious famines occurring in 1346 and again in 1390 - 1410, i.e., within half a century. Furthermore, the patronage such teachers, astrologers, and priests etc. received from the small monastic institutions or the courts of local regents and chieftains dried up gradually in line with the unstable economic and political status of the region.

The pull factors that influenced the Maratha Brahmins to relocate to Benares reflect the power of its efflorescence. With Akbar's triumphs in many neighbouring regions and his policy of religious toleration, the imperial court and the courts of local regents and Mansabdars turned out to be great sources of patronage for both Muslim and Hindu scholars, poets, saints, and artists. Employment prospects increased as the courtiers required administrative assistants including clerks, statisticians, astronomers, astrology experts, mathematicians etc. Similarly, wealthy and renowned monastic institutions required the service of the Brahmins with traditional knowledge to provide an enhanced service to their devotees. Teaching opportunities flourished unprecedentedly, resulting in prestigious teachers having more students from different parts of India and often receiving patronage at wealthy merchant houses. Along with other classes of Brahmins, Maratha Brahmins had an important role to play in juridical cases for resolving sectarian and property disputes. Since Benares became well-known for having had authoritative juridical experts, those who did not migrate to Benares resorted to them when they had issues unsolvable locally. As O'HANLON (2013: 39) states, the welcoming setting of Benares was attractive to the extent that some southern families were inclined to even make themselves look more qualified and dignified than they actually were, when migrating to Benares. For example, the Devarukhes, who were associated with labour on the land back in Mahārāṣṭra, changed their lineage name as "Devarṣis", i.e., divine saints, expecting better social recognition and more benefits in their new home.

Those who migrated to Benares, however, did not lose contact with their original homelands. When the sons of Marathi Brahmin households were sent away to find a better life in more congenial regions, they probably

left behind their extended families in Mahārāṣṭra, along with the lands and other properties owned by them. Likewise, those settled in Benares over generations occasionally visited their native regions for personal and professional purposes.[282] Patronage from the other courts such as Bijapur and Keladi (later Ikkeri) also drew Benares intellectuals to the South.

Moreover, it would not be accurate to hold that the southern Brahmins always migrated directly to Benares from their homelands, particularly before the start of Akbar's reign. During the first half of the 16th century, the push factors were often stronger than the pull factors. The case of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's father, is a fitting example. Looking for employment opportunities and family subsistence, he had to travel to Sangamner, Kolhapur, Vijayanagar, and Dvāraka, before returning to Paithan again and finally setting out for Benares.[283] As stated earlier, Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's residence in Bradhnapura or Surat when composing his *Parimala* commentary on the *Rasamañjarī* also suggests that he might have travelled there, possibly before joining his brother in Benares at a later time.

5.2 Aspects of Congenial Ambiance

The renaissance period of Benares is broadly recognized to be between the middle of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. Although Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpur Sikri, where Akbar had his courts, also saw rapid improvement in arts, letters, and learning, Benares flourished prominently as an intellectual hub. However, despite a "certain amount of embellishment" (BENKE 2010: 36) in the depiction of Benares as the centre of socio-cultural and intellectual pre-eminence during Akbar's reign, there is a core of truth recognizable in the light of the accounts provided by the contemporary historians such as Abu al-Fazl. However, some foreign travellers like FITCH, who travelled to Benares around 1585 when Śeṣakṛṣṇa was at the peak of his career, do not recount tales about any intellectually effloresced Benares.[284]

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[282] Cf. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's case as O'HANLON (2013: 38) explains.
[283] KANE's edition (1926: vi, vii) of the *Vyavahāramayūkha*; BENSON 2001: 105 - 117; O'HANLON 2013: 37, 38.
[284] FITCH 2007: 20 - 23. Also see BENKE 2010: 37.

The political stability of many regions in north and central India resulted from a series of military triumphs by Mughal rulers. This laid the background for a congenial milieu in Benares, allowing intellectuals and religious experts to engage in their activities more leisurely. The economic boost[285] that ensued from favourable policies on sea trade and inland trading with low tariffs was backed by the systematization of taxation, an enhanced banking system, and the standardization of the revenue system, particularly due to skilful courtiers like Ṭoḍaramalla. Under Akbar, Brahmin judges were empowered to resolve cases of dispute involving Hindus.[286] Consequently, the legal authority of the Brahmins in Benares became stronger, and their mediation in religious reforms and in solving sectarian issues of Brahmins from other parts of India was required.

Benares saw a great influx of reputed figures[287] from other regions. As revealed by Abu al-Fazl in particular, Akbar's imperial court had renowned men with diverse professional backgrounds from within and outside of India. Top intellectuals, both Hindu and Muslim, were rewarded for their skills and service to the emperor, and this led to competition.[288] As already noted, some high-profile authors received patronage not only from local regents, courtiers, and the *Mansabdars* under the imperial court but directly from the emperor as well. Likewise, their fame often earned them sponsorship from rulers beyond Benares. Public debates were held among intellectuals on numerous controversial topics, and by participating in them the winners were able to enjoy greater recognition, wealth, and more students to continue their traditions of learning. The quasi-filial rapport (O'HANLON 2011) between the teachers and the students also enabled such a continuation.

Akbar's policy of religious toleration and his desire for syncretistic interpretations of Islam not only made Benares a congenial place for its Hindu residents but also attracted devoted Hindus from other parts of India. Revoking pilgrim tax in 1563 and *jizya*, the poll tax which people of

[285] MORELAND 1962 is a detailed study on this point.

[286] *Muntakẖabu-t-tawārīkẖ*, Vol. II, p. 356.

[287] For a list of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contemporaries, see BENKE 2010: 41.

[288] Cf. BRONKHORST 2005: 33: "Success did not primarily depend upon respect for tradition and for the elders. Indeed, a scholar might deviate from traditional thinking and behavior and yet impress his readership or audience."

other religions had had to pay to Muslims, in 1564 were among many measures taken by Akbar to win the support and loyalty of Hindus.[289] The dialogues hosted by Akbar among diverse religious communities such as Shias, Hindus, Jains, Zoroastrians, and even Jesuits, such as the one at Fatehpur Sikri in 1575, proved the freedom of interreligious discourse. As Badā'ūnī[290] reports, proselytisation was banned and even the Hindus who had forcefully been converted to Islam were allowed to reconvert either to Hindusim or to any other religion at their discretion. Akbar also permitted the construction of religious monuments and places of public worship, such as Hindu and Jain temples, Zoroastarian fire altars, and Christian churches.[291] In order to enrich Persian literature and promote interreligious understanding, many Sanskrit works such as the *Atharvaveda*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Harivaṃśa*, the *Rāmāyaṇa,* and the *Pañcatantra* were translated into Persian.[292] Hindu leaders in his service, such as Ṭoḍaramalla, supported Hindu community by facilitating pilgrimages to holy places, and by building and repairing temples, water-wells, and *ghāṭs*. Furthermore, Ṭoḍaramalla's effort to preserve traditional Hindu knowledge by patronizing the production of the *Ṭoḍarānanda* was significant.[293]

Hindus enjoyed unprecedented privileges and freedom under the reign of Akbar. He seemed to value Hindu beliefs and wanted other religious communities to understand them. Forbidding the consumption of beef is an example of his support.[294] Also, it was his practice to participate in Hindu festivals such as Dīvālī and Śivarātri celebrations.[295] However, Akbar's tolerant attitude towards Hindu customs and practices was

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[289] See SHARMA (1937) for a detailed account.

[290] *Muntakẖabu-t-tawārīkẖ*, Vol. II, p. 391.

[291] SHARMA 1937: 311, 312.

[292] This practice was continued by Dārā Shikoh (1615 - 1659), who followed his grandfather's steps and translated about fifty Upaniṣads into Persian with the support of Benares pundits around 1657. He also composed the *Majma-ul-Bahrain* (*Samudrasaṅgam* in Sanskrti), where he pointed out parallels between Hinduism and Islam, before Aurangzeb killed him and reversed many of Akbar's policies. See TRUSCHKE 2012: 254 - 314 for an examination of how Sanskrit was treated at Mughal courts.

[293] CHAUDHURI (1981: 85 – 91) explains how Mughal rulers patronized Sanskrit learning during the early modern period.

[294] *Muntakẖabu-t-tawārīkẖ*, Vol II, pp. 261, 303. Akbar is also reported to have avoided onion and garlic, which Brahmins were not usually allowed to consume.

[295] *Muntakẖabu-t-tawārīkẖ*, Vol II, p. 321.

flexible as long as humanitarian principles were not violated. Discouraging child marriages and *satīpūjā*, and forbidding[296] circumcision of children of tender age were among his ethically based rules.

In line with this atmosphere of toleration, Benares enjoyed a cultural renaissance. Religious festivals offered poets suitable opportunities for composition, and a new era of the literature in Sanskrit and Persian began in Benares. Sanskrit dramas were composed and performed at special occasions. The performances of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's KaṃV at the Viśveśvara temple and Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's *Rukminīharaṇa* (and also possibly the *Murārivijaya*, supposedly by Śeṣakṛṣṇa) before audiences gathered for the Yātrā festival are examples. Music was another fine art Akbar was very interested in, as we know from the descriptions of Abu al-Fazl. Moreover, the *Bhakti* movement, spreading fast across central and northern India around that time, also had many residents of Benares from all walks of life involved in it.

Benares Brahmins gradually lost their agreeable setting under the rule of Aurangzeb (r. 1658 - 1707), i.e., within a few decades after Śeṣakṛṣṇa's death. Aurangzeb undermined the loyalty of Hindus to the empire by reintroducing pilgrimage tax, suppressing idolatry, and mistreating Brahmin intellectuals etc. The era of the grandsons and great-grandsons of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, therefore, might have been a period of intellectual and religious suppression. Consequently, BERNIER's depiction of Benares around the third quarter of the 17th century under the reign of Aurangzeb can possibly be taken as accurate. This is because the contemporary social and academic setting he portrays is rather ordinary compared with how it had been in the heyday of Benares.[297]

5.3 Critics of the Śeṣas

It appears that the renaissance in Benares led not just to greater patronage but also to intellectual rivalry. Regardless of or perhaps because of the honours they received as noble Brahmins from Mahārāṣṭra,

[296] SHARMA 1937: 320.
[297] BERNIER 1916: 334.

the Śeṣas encountered critics of their intellectual accomplishments. As discussed before, Bhaṭṭoji's criticism of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's PKśk and the responses by Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja clearly show the polarity between the Śeṣas and the Dīkṣitas as two lineages with distinguished authority on Sanskrit grammar. Moreover, the longstanding reputation the Śeṣas had acquired as grammarians, apparently as a result of which their clan name "Śeṣa" came into use, was seen by some prejudiced critics as "incompatible" with their expertise in other disciplines. It appears that such critics scorned the compositions in fields such as drama and poetry by the Śeṣas more severely than they did those by the contemporary writers renowned for their expertise in poetics, music, and creative literature. This seems to have been the case in the early years of the Śeṣa settlement in Benares. The Śeṣas did not, however, fail to defend themselves. They responded to their critics by proving their proficiency in poetry etc., as we discussed earlier with examples from Śeṣakṛṣṇa's KaṃV. Before examining the conflict between the Śeṣas and the Dīkṣitas on grammar, I consider briefly another case, namely the disapproval of Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's knowledge of poetics by an anonymous opponent (c. 1600 - 1650), probably sometime after Cintāmaṇi died.

Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's *Parimala* is one of the earliest commentaries on the *Rasamañjarī* of Bhānudatta (early 13th century). As recorded in a manuscript at the Adyar library, another commentary on it titled *Āmoda* criticises in a scornful language the theoretical flaws in the *Parimala* and Cintāmaṇi's lack of expertise in poetics. Nevertheless, as TRIPĀṬHĪ (1981: xxxiv) states, "a comparative study of both the commentaries will show that Āmodakāra himself is indebted to Parimalakāra on a number of places", and so it seems that the criticism was rather subjective. A section of the criticism TRIPĀṬHĪ quotes is as follows.

> *yat tu ... parimalakārasya lekhanaṃ ... tatra praṇayināṃ praṇayadhārāyām anāghrātavyutpattigandhasyāpi śrotriyavetālasya katham atividagdhajanaikasādhvī rasamañjarīvyākhyāne pravṛttir iti vismayāmahe*. [298]

> But… regarding the writing of the author of the *Parimala*… we wonder how could the one (i.e., Parimalakāra, thus Śeṣa

[298] TRIPĀṬHĪ's edition of the *Rasamañjarī* 1981: xxxiv.

> Cintāmaṇi), who has not smelled (i.e., not experienced) (even) the fragrance of the proficiency in the streams of amorous emotions of lovers, and who is simply a corpse-inhabiting goblin conversant (just) with the Vedas, undertakes the task that helps directly the highly wise (to comprehend the knotty points) in commenting upon the *Rasamañjarī*.

The scornful reluctance of the critic to admit the learned vedacist Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's proficiency in poetics reveals that the Śeṣas, even after their authority and reputation became established, encountered rivals who attacked their intellectual profile rather than any theoretical defects in their works. This is particularly obvious when compared with Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's and Śeṣakṛṣṇa's practice of not referring straightforwardly to earlier authors by their names or works when criticising them. We observe in the *Parimala* that Cintāmaṇi criticises only indirectly and seldom the *Rasikarañjanī*, an earlier commentary on the *Rasamañjarī* by a Drāviḍa scholar known as Gopāla Bhaṭṭa[299], while Śeṣakṛṣṇa does the same in the PKśk when pointing out mistakes in the PKv.

In the light of the information that we glean from their grammatical works, the conflict between the Śeṣas and the Dīkṣitas was, at least mainly, an intellectual one based on theoretical differences, although there could also have been sectarian reasons, as DESHPANDE (2011a: 369) points out.[300] Apart from the fact that Bhaṭṭoji criticized Śeṣakṛṣṇa's PKśk, in response to which Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja and Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi wrote their criticisms against both the PM and the ŚK, and Bhānuji Dīkṣita[301] and Hari Dīkṣita[302] attempted to defend Bhaṭṭoji, we do not have any other textual evidence to ascertain whether the later descendants of the Dīkṣitas had enmity against the Śeṣas. Nor do we

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[299] NCC 6, p. 146.

[300] I will return to this point in Chapter Four.

[301] Bhānuji Dīkṣita, son of Bhaṭṭoji, is said to have composed a work titled *Manoramāmaṇḍana* against the PMku, but we know nothing more about it. See UPADHYAYA 1994: 63.

[302] In the *Bṛhatśabdaratna* (verse 2 of introduction), he attempts to deny the alleged criticism on Śeṣakṛṣṇa by Bhaṭṭoji, or at least to mitigate its intensity, by praising the teachers of the Śeṣa clan, namely Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Śeṣa Vīreśvara. He considers that the attacks against the PM were due to the opponents' "ignorance of the truth" [*tattvājñānavaśāt*].

know whether their conflict had extended beyond the discipline of mainstream Sanskrit grammar in early modern Benares, a subject on which they had authority as the two most prestigious schools. What we can say is that the intensity of their rivalry seems to have been at its peak around the time Śeṣakṛṣṇa died.

The Dīkṣitas hailed from a Bhaṭṭa family. Since Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita appears to have also been called Bhaṭṭoji Bhaṭṭa, indicating his original clan name,[303] the surname "Dīkṣita" might have been an honorific one.[304] Although Śaṃkara Bhaṭṭa was his teacher[305] in Mīmāṃsā, there is no evidence that Bhaṭṭoji's family line is related to the famous Bhaṭṭa clan in Benares. According to ŚĀSTRĪ (1934: vii), the *"-ji"* suffix in Bhaṭṭoji's name denotes that he was from the South.[306] Like the Śeṣa family, the

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[303] ŚK, verse 5cd: "*bhaṭṭojibhaṭṭo januṣaḥ sāphalyaṃ labdhum īhate*." [Bhaṭṭoji Bhaṭṭa desires to obtain fruitfulness of (his) birth]. Also see HALL 1859: 156.

[304] BRONKHORST (2005: fn. 83) lists several possibilities including Bhaṭṭoji being a priest (*dīkṣita*) during his younger days.

[305] SOLOMON 1985: xxviii. BENSON 2001: 114, 116.
Bhaṭṭoji had both Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Śeṣa Vīreśvara as his teachers in grammar, and Appayya Dīkṣita (and perhaps Nṛsiṃhāśrama as well) as the teacher(s) in Vedānta. In support of the view that Bhaṭṭoji's grammar teacher was not Śeṣakṛṣṇa but Vīreśvara only, ARYAVARAGURU (1912: 247) presents Bhaṭṭoji's act of naming his son "Vīreśvara", as a token of respect for his teacher. I do not see any strong argument there. Also see COWARD and RAJA 1990: 241. BRONKHORST 2005: fn. 43.

[306] Introduction to his edition of PM: "*sugrahītanāmadheyo 'yaṃ ṛgvedāntargatāśvalāyanasūtraśākalaśākhādhyāyī bhaṭṭakulāvataṃsaḥ śrīmallakṣmīdharapaṇḍitavaratanujanmā śrīmaccheṣakṛṣṇābhidhaguroś caraṇānurādhanasamāsāditavaiduṣībhūṣitaḥ khristābdamānena* (1630) *khāgnirasenduparimite vatsare vārāṇasīnivāsī vidyāvāridhimathanadīkṣito bhaṭṭojidīkṣito dākṣiṇātyo brāhmaṇa iti taddeśasya 'ji' ity antanāmapraṇālyā niścīyate. kecana sārasvatabrāhmaṇa iti vadantīty anyad etat*."
[It is determined that this Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita with a well-adopted name, who reads (as his family tradition) the *Śākala* branch of the *Āśvalāyana sūtra* in the *Ṛgveda*, who was an ornament to the Bhaṭṭa clan, the noble son of the illustrious scholar Lakṣmīdhara, who was adorned with the knowledge obtained by honouring the feet of the celebrated teacher named Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa, who lived in Benares in the year of 1630 AD by the measure of Christian chronology, i.e., in *Bhūta* numbers: *kha* (0), *agni* (3), *rasa* (6), *indu* (1), (which are read backwards)], (and) who was initiated in churning the ocean of sciences, to be a Brahmin from the South by means of the (syllable) *"-ji"* at the end of the name, which is (a practice) of that region. Some say

Dīkṣitas had several renowned grammarians in addition to Bhaṭṭoji, such as Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Hari Dīkṣita. However, note that the recognition of the grammatical authority of the Dīkṣitas started with Bhaṭṭoji Diskita's career in Benares, just as that of the Śeṣas started with Śeṣakṛṣṇa's.

From what Bhaṭṭoji states in his grammatical works, it is hard to believe that he had any lack of respect for Śeṣakṛṣṇa. For instance, in the ŚK, Bhaṭṭoji mentions explicitly and reverentially Śeṣakṛṣṇa as his teacher.

> *nirviśeṣaṃ mahāśeṣāc cheṣakṛṣṇam ahaṃ bhaje*
> *yo mām aśeṣāḥ śeṣoktīr viśiṣyaivādhyajīgapat.* [307]
>
> I honor Śeṣakṛṣṇa, not different from great Śeṣa (i.e., the cosmic serpent/ Patañjali), who taught me in excellent fashion the entire doctrine of Śeṣa, (i.e., Patañjali).

In the first verse of the PM, Bhaṭṭoji clearly says that he treasures his teacher's teachings, although he does not mention Śeṣakṛṣṇa's name there.

> *dhyāyaṃ dhyāyaṃ paraṃ brahma smāraṃ smāraṃ guror giraḥ*
> *siddhāntakaumudīvyākhyāṃ kurmaḥ prauḍhamanoramām.*
>
> Meditating upon the supreme Brahman repeatedly and reminding (myself) of (my) teacher's words repeatedly, I compose the *Prauḍhamanoramā*, a commentary on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*.

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that (he was) a *Sārasvata* (i.e., from the North) Brahmin, but this is a different point.]

[307] Mukunda PUṆATĀMAKARA in the introduction (p. 1) to his edition of the ŚK (1933) quotes this verse as found in an old manuscript deposited in the Sarasvatī Bhavana Library. He does not say where the verse occurs. Several other manuscripts of the ŚK are also reported to contain this verse. A slightly different version of it is quoted by ŚEVAḌE in STN (p. 5 of *prākkathana*): "*nirviśeṣaṃ ahaṃ śeṣāc cheṣakṛṣṇam guruṃ bhaje | yo māṃ aśeṣāḥ śeṣoktīḥ svayam evādhyajīgapat*." [I honor (my) teacher Śeṣakṛṣṇa, not different from Śeṣa (i.e., the cosmic serpent/ Patañjali), who indeed by himself taught me the entire doctrine of Śeṣa, (i.e., Patañjali).].

We learn from the PMKu that Bhaṭṭoji composed the PM after Śeṣakṛṣṇa's death, and perhaps Śeṣakṛṣṇa was very old or even dead already when the SiKau was also written. Furthermore, the ŚK emerged prior to the SiKau, and thus before the PM as well. [308] Although Śeṣakṛṣṇa might have been aware that Bhaṭṭoji had opinions different from his, probably through oral discussions (BRONKHORST 2005: 25), Bhaṭṭoji certainly knew well the PKśk by the time he wrote his ŚK.[309] When comparing his attitudes towards Śeṣakṛṣṇa in the ŚK and the PM, Bhaṭṭoji appears to have had high respect for his teacher when the ŚK was written, perhaps because Śeṣakṛṣṇa was still alive and able to observe his student's career.

Commenting on the word "*prauḍha*" in the title *Prauḍhamanoramā*, Hari Dīkṣita in his *Śabdaratna* on the PM says that Bhaṭṭoji's expertise is not limited to grammar, but is accompanied by a comprehensive knowledge of all the philosophical systems.[310]Although Hari Dīkṣita is silent on the identity of the "teacher" mentioned in the above verse (PM, verse 1), Jagannātha Śāstrī PANDEYA in the *Jyotsnā* subcommentary on the *Śabdaratna* comments [311] on Hari Dīkṣita's words, i.e., "*guror itīty ekavacanena sarvavidyālābhāya ekasmād eva guror iti sūcitam*" [by the singular word *guroḥ* is indicated "just from one teacher for the purpose of learning all sciences"], to arrive at the conclusion that it was Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

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[308] Cf. BANERJEE 1999: 52.

[309] BRONKHORST (2005: 25, and fn. 88) quotes a line from the ŚK, where Bhaṭṭoji clearly refers to the PKśk as a work of his teacher.

[310] See ŚĀSTRĪ 1972: 276. Cf. ŚĀSTRĪ 1934: 3, 4: *Śabdaratna* on verse 1 of the PM: "*prauḍhatvaṃ ca sakaladarśanārthajñānapūrvakamahābhāṣyagūḍhārthajñānavattvam*." [And maturity (means) the possession of the knowledge of hidden meanings in the *Mahābhāṣya*, along with the knowledge of the contents of all branches of philosophy]. The ŚK reflects his knowledge in the Mīmāṃsā system in particular. Cf. Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa in the SR (verse 6 of introduction) on Śeṣakṛṣṇa's expertise in philosophy; "*ṣaḍdarśanānāṃ khaniḥ*" [a mine of the six branches of philosophy].

[311] "*guror iti - kṛṣṇapaṇḍitānām ekād evety arthaḥ. asya sarvavidyānidhitvena viṣṇor ivādvitīyatvam ekavacanena sūcitam*." ["From the teacher" means that "from the only one teacher, Kṛṣṇa paṇḍita." Due to his (i.e., Śeṣakṛṣṇa's) being a hoard of all sciences, his singleness like Viṣṇu's is indicated by the use of the singular form (of the word *guru*).]

As ŚĀSTRĪ (1972: 269 - 271) further explains, quoting from the PM, Bhaṭṭoji was a strict *randhragaveṣī* (fault-finder) in his dealing with the PK and its commentaries. Bhaṭṭoji employed several ways to refer to his opponents, the most common of which was the use of the inflected forms of "*prāc-*", i.e., literally "predecessor", to denote Rāmacandra, Viṭṭhala, and Śeṣakṛṣṇa.[312] Clearly, Bhaṭṭoji was reluctant[313] to mention directly the name of any Śeṣa descendant, in contrast to his practice regarding other early writers such as Bopadeva and Gārgya. Furthermore, Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Viṭṭhala are more explicitly referred to with the titles of their works followed by the agent noun form, "*-kāra*" (i.e., creator). Accordingly, *prasādakāra*/ *prasādakṛt* (author of the *Prasāda*) and *tatpautra* (his, i.e., Rāmacandra's, grandson) refer to Viṭṭhala, and *tadvyākhyātāraḥ* (its commentator) refers to Śeṣakṛṣṇa. In some instances, the opponent is not named at all. On the whole, Bhaṭṭoji's tone in referring to Śeṣakṛṣṇa is not pejorative, as is also proved by the fact that Śeṣakṛṣṇa is always referred to with the plural forms of nouns and verbs, i.e., the traditional way of addressing someone deferentially, while

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[312] Some examples for his use of "*prāc-*" are given in the introduction to the PK by TRIVEDĪ (1925: xxxiv, xxxv). BRONKHORST (2005: 13, 14 and fn. 49, 55, 58) shows that Bhaṭṭoji's references to the predecessors by the term "*prāc-*" are not consistent, since he sometimes quotes from the PKśk while refering to it as from the PKv.
Interestingly, Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi in his PMKh (for instance, p. 65) also refers to Rāmacandra as "*prāc-*" and to Śeṣakṛṣṇa or Viṭṭhala as "*vṛttikṛt*".

[313] Not "naming" the opponent was a common practice among the intellectuals of the "old school". Like Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi, Bhaṭṭoji also honoured it. Alternatively, Bhaṭṭoji followed the tradition of not naming one's own teacher. While elaborating on the difference between "*avadyam*" and "*anudyam*", Bhaṭṭoji in SiKau 2849 on A 3.1.101 (*avadyapaṇyavaryā garhyapaṇitavyānirodheṣu*) quotes the following verse, which he says comes from the Smṛti literature: "*ātmanāma guror nāma nāmātikṛpaṇasya ca | śreyaskāmo na gṛhṇīyāj jyeṣṭhāpatyakalatrayoḥ*." [One wishing (his own) welfare should not utter the name of himself, of (his) teacher, of a very miserly person, of (his) eldest son, and of spouse.]. It is found in the *Keśavavaijayantī* commentary of Nandapaṇḍita on the *Viṣṇusmṛti*, 28.24. A similar view is given in Jagannātha Tīrtha's *Dīpikā* subcommentary on Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.1:
"*guror nāma na gṛhṇīyāc chiṣyo bhāryā pater api iti vacanād guror nāma nāgrahīd ācāryaḥ*." [The teacher did not take (his) teacher's name, following the (authoritative) statement that "a student should not utter the name of (his) teacher, and a wife (should not utter the name of) her husband either"]. Cf. DESHPANDE 1975: 37. See MCCREA 2015: 88 on the Mādhvas practicing this convention, and DESHPANDE (2015) for more details along this line.

the singular forms are in use almost invariably when referring to Rāmacandra and Viṭṭhala. Nevertheless, as BRONKHORST (2005: 14) states, "however politely Śeṣakṛṣṇa's positions are referred to, they are always rejected." On the other hand, Jagannātha refers to Bhaṭṭoji either with the inflected forms of "*bhavat*" or "*tvat*" (i.e., you), or with the latter's lineage name, Dīkṣita,[314] showing his neutral or cold perspective on Bhaṭṭoji.

Although this cannot be verified with textual evidence, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita was notorious in the tradition for his attacks on individuals rather than on their arguments which he found incompatible with his own. We hear the stories of Jñānendra Sarasvatī being punished[315] for not writing a commentary[316] on the SiKau, and of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja being called a *mleccha* (barbarian) by Bhaṭṭoji.[317] These stories seem to be exaggerated, but they still support the common view that Bhaṭṭoji was inclined to deplore anyone who hesitated to honour his scholarship.[318] Moreover, one cannot easily ignore Jagannātha's harsh response to Bhaṭṭoji, which highlighted how disloyal Bhaṭṭoji had been to his teacher. Although not a Śeṣa descendant, Jagannātha was the one who argued against Bhaṭṭoji most sharply and directly. Possibly Bhaṭṭoji was not alive, if not too old, to respond to Jagannātha's accusation. In any case, Bhānuji Dīkṣita reportedly responded on his father's behalf. In the following excerpt from the PMKu, Jagannātha states that Bhaṭṭoji

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[314] For instance, PMKu. *Acsandhiprakaraṇa*, p. 19: "*atha yadi dīkṣitakṛto 'rthavatparibhāṣopanyāso 'pi saphalīkaraṇīya ity āgrahaḥ.*" [If one stubbornly insists that even a suggestion of an *arthavat-paribhāṣā* by Dīkṣita must be rendered purposeful.].

[315] JHA 1990: 344.

[316] He could not complete his commentary known as the *Tattvabodhinī*, which was completed later by Jayakṛṣṇa.

[317] JHA 1990: 358. BRONKHORST 2005: 19.

[318] Moreover, some find that Bhaṭṭoji's works also contain some flaws. See VIDYAVINOD and BHISAGACHARYA's edition (1933) of the SiKau. Vol. 1, part 1. pp. 22, 23. CARDONA (1976, pp. 287 - 288) points to some grammatical rules and forms which Bhaṭṭoji had used in his works but recent scholars have criticised as erroneous.

composed the PM in order to distort deliberately[319] the PKśk, simply because he could not understand it. [320]

> *iha khalu kecin*
> *nikhilavidvanmukuṭamaṇimayūkhamālālālitacaraṇakamalānāṃ*
> *gīrvāṇagurugauravagrāsamāṃsalamahimamaṇḍitākhaṇḍamahī-*
> *maṇḍalānāṃ śeṣavaṃśāvataṃsānāṃ śrīkṛṣṇākhyapaṇḍitānāṃ*
> *cirāyārcitayoḥ pādukayoḥ prasādād āsāditaśabdānuśāsanās teṣu*
> *ca pārameśvaraṃ padaṃ prayāteṣu kalikālavaśaṃvadībhavantas*
> *tatrabhavadbhir ullāsitaṃ prakriyāprakāśam*
> *āśayānavabodhanibandhanair dūṣaṇaiḥ svayaṃ nirmitāyāṃ*
> *manoramāyām ākulyakārṣuḥ. sā ca prakriyāprakāśakṛtāṃ*
> *pautrair akhilaśāstramahārṇavamanthācalāyamānamānasānām*
> *asmadguruvīreśvarapaṇḍitānāṃ tanayair dūṣitāpi*
> *svamatiparīkṣārthaṃ punar asmābhir api nirīkṣyate.*

> Indeed here someone who obtained the knowledge of grammar through the grace of two long-venerated sandals of the scholar known as Śrī Kṛṣṇa, whose lotus feet were fondled by the series of lustre (emitted) from the crest-jewels of all learned men, who adorned the circle of the whole world with the strong splendour acquired by means of his eclipsing the dignity of the preceptor of the gods, who is an ornament to the Śeṣa clan, once he (i.e., Śrī Kṛṣṇa) left for the abode of supreme god (i.e., after he died), announced his submissiveness to the *Kali* age (and) besmirched in the self-composed *Manoramā* the *Prakriyāprakāśa* composed by that respected scholar, by means of refutations in the form of the fabrications (showing) his failure to understand the intention (of his teacher). Although once criticized by the grandson of the author of the *Prakriyāprakāśa* and (thus) who was the son of my teacher, the scholar Vīreśvara, whose mind serves as a mountain for churning the great ocean of all the sciences, that (commentary, i.e., *Manoramā*) is again examined also by us to investigate (it) with our own views.

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[319] ŚĀSTRĪ 1934: 566, PMku, verse 1.

[320] On the other hand, "*pramādikam*" (i.e., careless) is often found in Bhaṭṭoji's criticism against the PKśk.

It is evident throughout the PMku that Jagannātha's intention was to castigate Bhaṭṭoji's disloyalty more than his criticisms of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's explanations in the PKśk. He starts his attack in the very first verse.

> *lakṣmīkāntapadāmbojaṃ praṇamya śreyasāṃ padam*
> *paṇḍitendro jagannāthaḥ syati garvaṃ gurudruhām.*
>
> Having worshiped the lotus feet of Lakṣmī's lover, i.e., Viṣṇu, which is the site of bliss, the great scholar Jagannātha annihilates the pride of the one hostile to (his) teacher.

The "one hostile to (his) teacher" here is none other than Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita.[321] Discussing the semantic variations of the term "*guru*" when used in singular and plural forms, ŚĀSTRĪ (1972: 281, 282) shows, with detailed textual evidence, that only one *gurudrohin* is meant by the "*gurudruhām*" in the genitive plural, and that was Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita.

As Jagannātha holds, Bhaṭṭoji's failure to comprehend what Śeṣakṛṣṇa intended in his explanations in the PKśk is not based on the abstruseness of the explanations, but rather on his hatred towards Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

> *gurudveṣadūṣitamatīnāṃ yady api puruṣāyuṣeṇāpi na śakyante*
> *gaṇayituṃ pramādās tathāpi diṅmātreṇa kān api*
> *kuśāgradhiṣaṇeṣu nirūpayāmaḥ*. (PMku, *Saṃjñāprakaraṇa*, p. 2)
>
> Even though the errors of the one, whose mind is contaminated with hatred towards (his) teacher, cannot be counted up even by means of (spending) a human lifetime, nevertheless, I examine a few (of those errors) for the sharp-witted, by merely indicating (the range).

[321] PMKu 1.1 fn. 2, See ŚĀSTRĪ 1934: 566:
"*gurudruhāṃ - bhaṭṭojidīkṣitānāṃ garvam abhimānaṃ syati - dūrīkarotīti bhāvaḥ* "
[of the one hostile to (his) teacher - (its) meaning is that (he) annihilates, discards the arrogance, haughtiness of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita].

Jagannātha dismisses Bhaṭṭoji's analysis, often claiming that it was due to his ignorance of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's intention.[322]Furthermore, Jagannātha's argumentation is centred on his strong emphasis that, if one comprehends all the authoritative texts well, his comprehension must also include the understanding of an explanatory work entirely based on them. Accordingly, Jagannātha questions how Bhaṭṭoji could fail to understand Śeṣakṛṣṇa (and Rāmacandra) only, while he has finely grasped the *prakriyā* rules already well-established by the ancient writers. The following excerpts clearly show Jagannātha's contention.

> *aho ayaṃ mahān asya drohodreko yad udāsīnānāṃ prācāṃ granthā āśayaviśeṣakalpanena samarthyante, na ca samarthyante gurūṇām iti*. (PMku, *Halsandhiprakaraṇa*, p. 24)

> Regrettably, this increase of perfidy of him is so great that the works of neutral predecessors are construed by means of considering (their) select intentions, but (the works) of his teacher are not construed.

> *ataḥ ko 'yam anayor yat paragrantheṣv āśayakalpanaṃ gurugranthe virodhodbhāvanam iti. tasmād bhāṣyagrantha iva gurugrantho 'pi ramaṇīya eva*. (PMku, *Acsandhiprakaraṇa*, p. 17)

> Then, which is the (right) one between these two; considering (well) (the author's) purport in others' works (or) raising objections to (his) teacher's work? Therefore, (his) teacher's work is also indeed as fine as the commentary (i.e., the *Mahābhāṣya*).

Obviously, Bhaṭṭoji's composition of the PM was what triggered the criticisms against him and the defences of the PKśk by the grammarians of up to at least three generations from Śeṣakṛṣṇa. As stated earlier, we do not know whether the conflict between the Dīkṣitas and the Śeṣas continued with the same intensity after Hari Dīkṣita. However, it appears that at least the immediate descendants of the Śeṣa lineage were

[322] Cf. for instance, PMku, *Halsandhiprakaraṇa*, p. 24: "*tad gurūṇām āśayasyānavabodhāt*". [That is due to his failure to understand the intention of (his) teacher.].

uncomfortable with Bhaṭṭoji's undue refutation of the PKśk. Equally, we do not know what intellectual and social discourses went on between those two renowned lineages. Moreover, Bhaṭṭoji's supposed perfidy in the PM might have kindled some serious debates not only on the proper explanation of the rules of Sanskrit grammar and how to rearrange them for better teaching but also, more heatedly and publicly, on the ethics involved in the rapport between the teacher and the students.[323]

It seems true that Bhaṭṭoji was successful in his alleged endeavour to discredit the PK and its commentaries[324] and thereby make his recast of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* a highly sought-after manual on Sanskrit grammar.[325] In addition to the lucid explanations and fine structure of the SiKau, the

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[323] See BRONKHORST 2005: 15. Sītarām ŚĀSTRĪ in the introduction to his edition of the PM (1964: 16) provides an imaginary picture of what the social reaction might have been like at that time: "*evaṃ lekhapralekhādinā navīnakhaṇḍanagranthapraṇayanādinā tadānīṃ vārāṇasyāṃ sabhyasabhāsu vidvatsamavāyeṣu jāhnavīghaṭṭasopāneṣu devagṛheṣu viduṣāṃ kathanopakathaneṣu sahṛdayānāṃ svairaghoṣṭhībandheṣu ca pratirathyaṃ pratimandiraṃ pratikuṭīkoṭaraṃ ca prauḍhamanoramām adhikṛtyaiva vicāravimarśas tarka ākṣepapratisamādhānādikaṃ ca janasammardena śrotṛjanakolāhalena prekṣakavṛndasādhuvādakaratāḍanādibhiś ca sākaṃ saṃrambheṇa tathā samudiyāya yathā sarvaṃ diṅmaṇḍalam eva kṣubhitāntarālam ivāsīt*." [Indeed at that time in Benares, through letters and documents etc. (and) through the bringing forth of new critical works etc., in courteous assemblies, in congresses of the wise, on the steps (leading to) the bathing-places of the river Ganges, in temples, in the dialogues of intellectuals, in the unconstrained conversations of friends, and in every road, house, and private room, critical examinations, arguments, objections, and reconciliations etc. regarding just the *Prauḍhamanoramā* rose up, with the agitation on account of the crowding people, the tumult of the audience, the exclamations of "well done", and applauses of the groups of spectators, as if the atmosphere of the whole world per se was shaken].

[324] ŚĀSTRĪ (2005 - 2006: cvi of Preface) says that Bhaṭṭoji "eventually ousted his (i.e., Śeṣakṛṣṇa's) work from currency in Northern India." Parenthetical insertion by me.

[325] Cf. A popular saying on the popularity of the SiKau: "*kaumudī yadi kaṇṭhasthā vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ | kaumudī yady akaṇṭhasthā vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ*." [If the (*Siddhānta*)*kaumudī* is known very well, it is useless to read the *Mahābhāṣya* (because the former explains all the rules well), and if the (*Siddhānta*)*kaumudī* is not known very well, it is useless to read the *Mahābhāṣya* (because the latter cannot be comprehended without the help of the former, which is simpler)].

criticism in the PM could also have contributed to the PK being replaced with the SiKau.

Prejudiced and even malicious criticisms against scholars and deliberately distorted interpretations of their works appear to have been common in early modern[326] Benares, as evident from the above account of the intellectual polarity between the Dīkṣitas and the Śeṣas. Even though many authors and their followers responded to such criticisms, their unease, expressed directly and indirectly, proves the intensity of the pressure they had to stand. Consequently, it would miss the mark to claim that early modern Benares was congenial to all intellectuals alike. As BRONKHORST (2005: 26) summarizes, "[T]hese men were not withdrawn scholars, who devoted their lives to the service of a timeless tradition. The little we know about their private lives paints a different picture altogether. It introduces us to ambitious students goaded on by inflated egos and personal jealousies, keen to establish their reputations and pull down those of others, using any excuse available."

[326] Also consider Viṭṭhala's statement (PKv, verse 7 of introduction) that the PK was already contaminated with the interpolations by self-styled pundits, within just two generations after Rāmacandra. Viṭṭhala's appeal (PKv, verse 6 of introduction) that his work "should not be ridiculed by the virtuous" (*sajjanair nopahāsyaḥ*) implies that the spiteful critics would not appreciate his work, however good it might be.

Chapter TWO

Theoretical and Empirical Significance of *Sphoṭa*

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* (STN) is the first individual treatise on the *sphoṭa* doctrine written by a grammarian. In his terse work he discusses some topics on *sphoṭa* in detail, while briefly mentioning or leaving out other topics which he seems to consider overly broad, sufficiently known to his readership, or irrelevant. To have a preparatory understanding of the doctrine of *sphoṭa* and appreciate the omissions in the STN, we look back on some aspects of it in this chapter.

§ 1. General Introduction

Sphoṭa is a response to a long-debated question formulated in Indian intellectual history, i.e., what causes verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*). Almost all the questions related to the modern understanding of linguistic competence, which includes one's not only grammatical competence but also sociolinguistic, discourse, and strategic competence, are also associated with that old question which many Indian philosophical schools and the grammarians attempted to solve.

To provide a single, precise, and comprehensive interpretation of *sphoṭa* is not simple.[327] Recognizing *sphoṭa* as the sole signifier of meaning, as linguists would prefer, would be too narrow a definition because it excludes the metaphysical implications maintained by the grammarians, at least to some extent. On the other hand, by introducing *sphoṭa* as just the ultimate reality from which all other phenomena evolve, illusorily or otherwise, we can neither distinguish *sphoṭa* from the other entities such as *Brahman*, *Sattā,* or *Śakti*, claimed to be the ultimate reality in

[327] For a detailed introduction to *śābdabodha*, see JOSHI 1975. Also see JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1996: 57, GANERI 1999: 26, OGAWA 2005: xv. The term *śābdabodha* is translated diversely, for instance, "verbal denotation" [JOSHI: 1975], "verbal knowledge" [MATILAL 1990a: 416], or "linguistic understanding" [GUPTA 2000: 18; MOHANTY 1994: 41].

different systems, nor recognize its precise role in practical verbal communication. Due to its conceptual density, which may compel one to call it "mysterious" [328], some schools of Indian philosophy diversely highlighted its linguistic, philosophical, and religious implications according to their own views, whereas others rejected it as incompatible with their doctrines. The Advaita Vedāntins harnessed *sphoṭa* so completely as yet another device to authenticate their views on non-dualism that *sphoṭa*'s linguistic and semantic import remained concealed, less prominent, and hardly defended until very late in its history. It was only with the later grammarians after Kaiyaṭa that *sphoṭa* started to regain its theoretical significance in semantics. However, the later grammarians also highlighted some of the metaphysical characteristics of *sphoṭa*, partly due to the influence of the VP, to which they had deference as the most authoritative source next to the MBh, and partly because of the Vedāntic and Śaiva doctrines without which they could not adequately defend the unity of *sphoṭa*.[329]

The difficulty in interpreting *sphoṭa* precisely results from the use of limited and shared technical terms in the grammatical tradition and various philosophical systems. The terms *śabda*, *sphoṭa,* and *dhvani* changed in terms of what they denote, and sometimes overlapped. For instance, *sphoṭa* does not mean more than the "auditory image perceived by the listener" in Patañjali's understanding of it. Similarly, for Bhartṛhari, *śabda* is a general term which denotes either different aspects of a physical speech sound or, more broadly, just a physical speech sound. As IYER (1969: 156) states, the term *śabda* in the VP sometimes applies to both the causal aspect (*nimitta*) and the signifying aspect (*pratyāyaka*) of speech sound. *Śabda* may also be synonymous with any of the terms Bhartṛhari employs to denote "sound", i.e., *sphoṭa*, *dhvani*, *nāda*, *prākṛtadhvani,* and *vaikṛtadhvani*. Moreover, the grammarians, for whom *śabda* is the eternal language principle identified with *sphoṭa*, do not seem to admit that the Mīmāṃsakas also employ it in a similar way, at least in some contexts of their interpretation of *śābdabodha*. Consequently, the grammarians were often inclined to take the *śabda* in the Mīmāṃsaka explanations to be just "physical sounds", which led, at least partly, to theoretical confusions and

[328] COWARD 1980: 45; BILIMORIA 1988: 80; MATILAL 1990b: 84; PRASAD 2002: 95.
[329] See JOSHI 1967: 54.

criticisms. I will discuss later in this chapter how that overlapping of terms has caused confusion particularly in the interpretation of what manifests *sphoṭa*.

The *sphoṭa* doctrine has a set of principal tenets. Nevertheless, they did not originate simultaneously, within a single school or just within a certain period of time. *Sphoṭa* took a long time to become what the later grammarians defined it to be. Accordingly, it would also be an overgeneralization to introduce it simply as the doctrine of the grammarians, by taking together the Sanskrit grammarians of all times, although we do so that way for the sake of economy. However, it is true that the grammarians from Patañjali onwards up to Śeṣakṛṣṇa had some organized philosophical insights into semantics, whereas other philosophical schools, for instance, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, had joined the discussion because how one obtains his verbal cognition also affects significantly many of their theories. It is, therefore, the common acceptance that *sphoṭa* is a doctrine of the grammarians, although the contribution of non-grammarians in the form of both refutations and defences was, arguably, higher than that of the early grammarians in particular to establish it. Throughout the history of the Indian philosophy of language, we see various trends the interpretation of *sphoṭa* underwent incorporating intellectual twists in some periods and being reshaped to confront various challenges.

Although there were earlier speculations [330] on language principle, Patañjali's MBh is the most authoritative as it contains a number of significant strides in identifying what was highlighted as "the signifier of

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[330] The origin of the *sphoṭa* doctrine is deemed to be in Vedic literature including some *Upaniṣads* and *Purāṇas*. Early thinkers, such as Sphoṭāyana and Audumbarāyaṇa mentioned in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (6.1.123) and the *Nirukta* (1.1) respectively, are also considered to have maintained some views fairly similar to *sphoṭa* in its later interpretation. Note that, even though their views represent only some initial insights into it, they are treated as the authority on *sphoṭa* even by the writers as late as Nāgeśa. It is perhaps because their views were not related to the metaphysical aspects of language but to its semantic aspects. Cf. SV, verse 2 of conclusion: "*vaiyākaraṇanāgeśaḥ sphoṭāyanaṛṣer matam । pariṣkṛtyoktavāṃs tena prīyatāṃ jagadīśvaraḥ*." [The grammarian Nāgeśa advocated the view of the saint Sphoṭāyana, making it (a) perfect (doctrine). May lord of the universe be pleased with it.]. For the history of *sphoṭa*, see JOSHI 1967: 1, 2; COWARD 1980: 1 - 18; TRIPĀṬHĪ 1989: 1- 33. NAKAMURA 2004: 577 - 590; ŚĀSTRĪ (1980); RATH 2000: 92 - 132.

meaning" by the later grammarians. Moreover, the *Yogasūtra* (YS) of Patañjali also discusses some aspects of *sphoṭa* but again without using the term *sphoṭa*.[331] Bhartṛhari's VP, with some support from his MBhD, was monumental in terms of its role in both developing further Patañjali's ideas in the light of the Advaitic metaphysics and influencing the later works on *sphoṭa*. Apparently almost all the philosophical systems had joined the discussion on *śābdabodha* from their perspectives by that time. Writers after Bhartṛhari and extending up to the modern period, such as Maṇḍana Miśra, Bharata Miśra, Śeṣakṛṣṇa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, and Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, have contributed immensely to the interpretation and defense of *sphoṭa*.

§ 2. Defining *Sphoṭa*

There are two analyses of *sphoṭa*.[332] One analysis focuses on what *sphoṭa* does, i.e., signifying meaning: "*sphuṭati sphuṭībhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭo 'rthapratyāyakaḥ*" [because meaning bursts forth, becomes manifest from it, *sphoṭa* is the signifier of meaning].[333] S*phoṭa*'s swiftness, as suggested by the root √*sphuṭ*, in triggering meaning is implied here.[334] As a result of this swiftness, there cannot be any temporal gap[335] between

[331] YS 3. 17. It is Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvavaiśāradī* commentary on the YS and Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his subcommentary on the former that defined the signifier of meaning meant by Patañjali as *sphoṭa*.

[332] The term *sphoṭa* is derived from √ *sphuṭ* (class 6). According to A 3. 3. 19, since it has the suffix *GhaÑ*, *sphoṭa* is a name (*saṃjñā*) that indicates its state of being a *kāraka*. Accordingly, *sphoṭa* is from what meaning bursts forth.

[333] SDS, *Pāṇinidarśana,* p. 300. Cf. VBhSd, *Maṅgalavāda* chapter, p. 3: "*sphuṭaty abhivyaktībhavaty artho 'smād iti sphoṭo nāmādyātmakaḥ śabdaḥ*." [On the grounds that meaning appears, becomes manifested from this, *sphoṭa* is a term which has name etc. as its nature.].

[334] This definition of *sphoṭa* also agrees with Nīlakaṇṭha's words in his *Niruktaślokavārttika* (VIJAYAPĀLA's edition 1982: 7 of *upodghāta*): "*nirvacanaṃ nāma śabdasya yathārthaṃ vyutpattiḥ*." [What we call *nirvacana* is the analysis of a word in accordance with (its) meaning]. Translation by KAHRS 1998: 27.

[335] Cf. PLM, p. 26: "*madhyamānādaḥ sphoṭam vyañjayatīti śīghram eva tato 'rthabodhaḥ. parasya vilambenānubhavasiddhatvāt*" [the *Madhyamā* sounds manifest *sphoṭa*, and therefore the meaning comprehension (arises) certainly quickly from it. Because it is understood from experience (that the comprehension of meaning does not arise quickly) due to the delay of the latter.].

the manifestation of *sphoṭa* and the signification of meaning. Put differently, the moment at which *sphoṭa* becomes manifested is also the very moment at which meaning is signified. Accordingly, (instantaneous) significativeness is *sphoṭa*'s hallmark.[336] Likewise, the philosophical point of view on the *sphoṭa* doctrine interprets "*artha*" in the above definition as the phenomenal world which bursts forth from *sphoṭa*, taken to be the ultimate reality. The other analysis, "*sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphoṭo varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ*" [because of being revealed, being manifested by phonemes, *sphoṭa* is what is revealed by phonemes[337]], highlights how *sphoṭa* is manifested. Note that in this analysis swiftness does not characterize *sphoṭa*, because *sphoṭa* can gradually be manifested, resulting in a gradation of manifestation (*abhivyaktitāratamya*).[338] Those two analyses of *sphoṭa* are also combined in another description of *sphoṭa* as *svaparaprakāśa*, i.e., it manifests itself and something other, i.e., meaning.[339]

In the traditional exposition, s*phoṭa* is defined as an entity beyond the realms of grammar, semantics, and applied linguistics. To expand the margins of the *sphoṭa* doctrine was started by early theoreticians, including Bhartṛhari in particular, while the expansion was meant to meet the Advaita Vedāntic view on emancipation. Accordingly, an aspirant attains, as Bhartṛhari says, the ultimate reality by recognizing the purest form of language, the root cause of everything in the phenomenal world. Likewise, the Tantric approach to *sphoṭa*, quite similar to the Vedāntic one, contains a definition slightly different from the one put forth by the grammarians. For example, Kṣemarāja (early 11th century) in his *Netroddyota* alias *Uddyota* commentary on the

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[336] Cf. SDS, *Pāṇinidarśana,* p. 300: "*varṇānāṃ vācakatvānupapattau yadbalād arthapratipattiḥ sa sphoṭaḥ*." [Since the significativeness of phonemes is inappropriate, it is *sphoṭa* by the power which the cognition of meaning (arises).]; ŚK, *āhnika* 1, *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, p. 7: "*vastutas tu vācakatā sphoṭaikaniṣṭhā*." (But indeed significativeness rests just on *sphoṭa*). Also see SV, p. 5.

[337] SDS, *Pāṇinidarśana,* p. 300. Generally, the exponents of *sphoṭa* do not hold that *sphoṭa* is revealed by phonemes in the sense "physical sounds", but by the *dhvanis* or the *nādas*. Cf. Bharata Miśra's words in his SSbh, *arthaparicccheda*, p. 19 that indicate this point clearly. Mādhava in his explanation in the SDS appears to take phonemes in the sense "cognitive forms" of phonemes, not "phonic forms" of them. His view is thus compatible with the later grammarians'.

[338] Śeṣakṛṣṇa discusses this matter in STNśk 16. The classical analogy of *ratnaparīkṣā* [examination of a precious stone] also applies here.

[339] VBhS, (*Jātisphoṭanirṇaya* section), *kārikā* 74.

Netratantra (21. 62cd, 63) says, "*sphuṭaty abhivyajyate 'smād viśvaḥ śabdagrāma iti sphoṭaḥ śabdabrahma, ata eva dhvanirūpaḥ śabdanasvabhāvaḥ*" [because the entire multitude of sounds, flashes forth, becomes manifested out of it, it is called *sphoṭa*, i.e., *Śabdabrahman*, therefore it has the form of *dhvani*, its nature is producing sounds].[340]

Furthermore, the intellectual tradition holds that the denotation of the term *sphoṭa* is "*yogarūḍha*" (partly etymological and partly conventional),[341] where its *rūḍha* (conventional) sense is predominant. [342] This is because *sphoṭa*'s etymological sense derived from the root √*sphuṭ* (to burst forth etc.) is restricted by its conventional sense, i.e., "signifying meaning" and "being manifested (by the *dhvanis*)", as we discussed above. In other words, *sphoṭa* is not taken to be everything that bursts forth or from which something else bursts forth, but just what becomes manifested and signifies meaning. To put it in Navya Nyāya terminology,

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[340] See PADOUX 1990: 97, 98 for details.

[341] The grammarians and the Naiyāyikas, especially the Navya Nyāya school, categorize the meaning of a linguistic expression into four classes in terms of how etymology and convention contribute to it; i.e., *yaugika*, *rūḍha*, *yogarūḍha,* and *yaugikarūḍha*. See MATILAL 1990a: 398 for Jagadīśa's terminology that includes this classification as well, along with *lakṣaka* (implicative) etc.
Cf. NSM 81: "*śaktaṃ padam. tac caturvidham, kvacid yaugikam, kvacid rūḍham, kvacid yogarūḍham, kvacid yaugikarūḍham*." [A word has the capacity to signify. And it is of four kinds. Sometimes it is etymological (*yoga*), sometimes conventional (*rūḍha*), sometimes partly etymological and partly conventional {but the etymological sense it restricted by the convention (*yogarūḍham*)}, (and) sometimes partly etymological and partly conventional {and both etymological and conventional senses are mutually independent (*yaugikarūḍham*)}]. See ROODBERGEN 1984: 382, 383, fn. 86. DESHPANDE 2009: 35. Cf. PIS, p. 98. In the PLM (pp. 13, 14), Nāgeśa offers two examples for words with *yaugikarūḍha* sense; *aśvagandha* (etymologically, "having the smell of a horse", and in the conventional usage, a species of plant), and *maṇḍapa* (etymologically, "open hall", and conventionally, "one who drinks the scum of boiled rice"). Another conventional example for it is *udbhid* [both "sprouting forth" (etymological) and "a kind of sacrifice" (conventional)].

[342] For instance, "*paṅkaja*" is a *yogarūḍha* word like "*sphoṭa*". Obviously, "*paṅkaja*" should have meant everything born in mud, but the conventional meaning is stronger than its etymological sense and confines overall meaning to "lotus". MATILAL 1990a: 394.

sphoṭa possesses "the power of triggering the qualificandumness residing in *artha* (*arthaniṣṭhaviṣayatāprayojakaśakti*)."[343]

The later grammarians disagree with certain aspects of the above traditional view on what the term *sphoṭa* denotes. The basis for their disagreement is their classification of *sphoṭa* into several types. For instance, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa considers the *padasphoṭa* as having only an etymological sense, because only the *vākyasphoṭa* has the power to trigger meaning. In his *Sphoṭacandrikā* (SC) Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, who deviated from the later grammarians' exposition of *sphoṭa* at some points, revised the definition given above, examining how *sphoṭa* signifies meanings also at secondary and tertiary levels. He refutes Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's view and re-establishes that, irrespective of *sphoṭa's* division into several types, only the *yogarūḍha* sense of the term *sphoṭa* is acceptable. Furthermore, the significative (in his view, also indicative and suggestive) *śabda*, either particular or universal, should be considered as *sphoṭa*. The SC starts with this very topic:

> *śābdikānāṃ vācyalakṣyavyaṅgyārthapratipādakānāṃ vācakalākṣaṇikavyañjakānāṃ śabdānāṃ tanniṣṭhajāter vā sphoṭa iti vyavahāraḥ. sphuṭati artho yasmād iti vyutpattyā paṅkajādipadavad yogarūḍhaḥ sphoṭaśabdaḥ. kevalayogasvīkāre vācyalakṣyavyaṅgyānāṃ ceṣṭāyāś ca vyaṅgyārthapratipādakatvena tatrātivyāpteḥ. na ca vācakaparyāyaḥ sphoṭaśabdo 'prasiddhaḥ. akṣarāṇām akāras tvaṃ sphoṭas tvaṃ varṇasaṃśrayaḥ iti harivaṃśe dṛṣṭatvāt*. [344]
>
> For the grammarians, (the term) *sphoṭa* is employed either in reference to the *śabdas* which are expressive of the primary meaning, indicative of the secondary meaning, and suggestive of the suggested meaning, or to the universals attached to them (i.e., the *śabdas*) . By the derivation "that from which meaning bursts

[343] TP on STN 9, p. 30. For the concept of *viṣayatā* (objecthood/ objectivity/ qualificandumness) as highlighted by the Navya Naiyāyikas, see MOHANTY 2000: 148. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Viṣayatāvāda* focuses on this concept. *Arthaniṣṭha* in the sense "attached to meaning/ residing in meaning" is also found in the explanations of the suggested meaning (*vyaṅgya*). See DESHPANDE 2009: 45 - 47 for details.

[344] SC, paragraph 1. Also see COWARD and RAJA 1990: 368.

> forth", the term *sphoṭa* has a *yogarūḍha* sense, like the word *paṅkaja* does. It is because, if just the etymological sense is accepted, there would be over-application in that case, due to the fact that (all) primary, secondary, and suggested meanings, and gestures would signify the suggested meaning. Nor is the term *sphoṭa*, which is a synonym for "signifier (of meaning)", unknown. It is because (the expression)[345] that "you are the syllable "A" among the syllables, you are the *sphoṭa*, you reside in phonemes" is seen in the *Harivaṃśa*.

Accordingly, it appears that the definition of the term *sphoṭa* changed over time, as similarly as some other aspects of it did. Likewise, more than *sphoṭa's* theological implications, its semantic significance drew the attention of the later writers on *sphoṭa*. Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not examine in his work the definitions of *sphoṭa* but places emphasis on the interpretation of it from a linguistic perspective. I return to this topic in Chapter Four.

§ 3. *Nāda, Dhvani,* and *Varṇa*

Before proceeding to examine the *sphoṭa* doctrine for its theoretical strength in the hands of the later exponents, it is necessary to have a sufficient understanding of three technical terms relevant to the present discussion, i.e., *nāda*, *dhvani,* and *varṇa*. Although *dhvani* and *varṇa* are generally translated as "sound" and "phoneme" respectively, I leave here the term *dhvani* untranslated[346] in order to avoid any likely confusion it might cause with the term *nāda* (sound) in translation. The term *varṇa* is translated here as "phoneme", as in modern linguistics, in order to distinguish it from "phone" (speech sound).[347]

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[345] *Harivaṃśa*, *Bhaviṣyaparva* 16. 52.

[346] There is no agreement on how to translate the term "*dhvani*" into English. Some translate it as "physical sound", while just "sound" is preferred by others. Such translations both limit what *dhvani* means in Sanskrit and more often than not cause confusion in interpreting *sphoṭa* properly.

[347] Modern linguistics does not fully admit that the "*varṇa*" in Sanskrit phonetics is just "phoneme" because of some mismatches between the two systems. However,

The later grammarians stress that it is the *dhvanis*, but not phonemes, that manifest *sphoṭa*. Then *dhvani* and *varṇa* are not interchangeable in terms of their ontology and function in the interpretation of verbal cognition through *sphoṭa*. In contrast, *sphoṭa* is introduced as "smeared with phonemes (*varṇarūṣita*)" or "coloured with phonemes (*varṇoparakta*)", but not with the *dhvanis*. Again, in the later expositions of *sphoṭa*, we find instances where phonemes and the *dhvanis* are treated equal. Consider, for example, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's alternative use[348] of "final phoneme" and "final *dhvani*", when he explains the immediate state of the intellect before *sphoṭa* is manifested. More convincingly, he says in STNśk 12 that "*varṇavyaṅgyo varṇātiriktaḥ sphoṭaḥ*" [*sphoṭa* which is manifested by phonemes (but) different from phonemes], asserting the identity of the *dhvanis* and phonemes in their role of manifesting *sphoṭa*. This seems to be a mismatch of the characteristics of phonemes, because the grammarians hold that phonemes are transient. The ambiguity is caused by our misinterpretation of these two terms, i.e., *varṇa* and *dhvani*, as having just a physical character. But a study of them reveals that *varṇa* and *dhvani* in the context of interpreting *sphoṭa* need to be recognized as having a both physical and cognitive character. To distinguish between them is, therefore, necessary in order to comprehend how *sphoṭa* is manifested by the *dhvanis* but smeared with phonemes. Before that, I briefly examine "*nāda*".

3.1 *Nāda*

The use of the term *nāda* dates back to the *Prātiśākhya* literature. *Nāda* in the sense "modulated air flow" was considered one of the three forms into which a primary articulated sound may change.[349] Moreover,

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varṇas are phonemes insofar as they are not phones. See DESHPANDE (2001: 15 - 16) for a brief discussion. Also see JOSHI 1967: 19, fn. 19.

[348] STNśk 6: "*antyavarṇasaṅgatārthadhiyam*" [cognition of meaning which comes together with the (experience of) the final phoneme], STNśk 14: "*caramavarṇena*" [by the final phoneme], STNśk 14: "*caramavarṇabuddhyā*" [with the cognition of the final phoneme], STNśk 13 (from VP 1. 86): "*antyena dhvaninā saha*" [with the (grasp of the) final *dhvani*].

[349] For example, TPŚ 2. 4: "*saṃvṛte kaṇṭhe nādaḥ kriyate*." [When the throat is closed, *nāda* is produced]. The other two forms are "*svāsa*" (unmodulated air flow)

Patañjali's use of *nāda* in different contexts, for instance, "*nādavat*", when explaining the fourth class of stops[350] (i.e., the voiced aspirates), shows that only a property of the articulated sound is meant by the term *nāda*. Apparently, Bhartṛhari uses *nāda* synonymously with *dhvani* in most instances, without specifying it as closely as Patañjali does. [351] Nevertheless, pace IYER (1965: 59) who assumes in the light of Bhartṛhari's words in the MBhD[352] that *nāda* may denote the "second type" of the *prākṛtadhvanis*, a type of the *dhvanis* not discussed at length by Bhartṛhari, I contend that the sense of *nāda* is not limited to the *prākṛtadhvanis.* It is applicable to both types of the *dhvanis,* i.e., *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta*, which are discussed below. My contention is based on a few contexts such as VPbh 1.102 and particularly VPbh 1.105.[353] Maṇḍana Miśra also employs *nāda* and *dhvani* in an identical sense.[354] Notably, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's use[355] of "*nāda*" agrees with our view, as he clearly says that

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and "*hakāra*" (sound produced with the glottis remaining midway between its open and close states). CARDONA 1986: 65.

[350] MBh 1. 120. 11 - 13.

[351] See ŚĀSTRĪ 1980: 13. Cf. VP 1. 48: "*nādasya kramajātatvāt.*" [Because *nāda* is produced in a sequence]; VPbh 1. 49: "*prākṛtasya vaikṛtasya ca nādasya.*" [Of *nāda*, which is primary and secondary]; VP 1. 84: "*nādair āhitabijāyām*." [(In the intellect) where seeds are placed by *nādas*]; VP 1. 97: "*vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ.*" [In the same way, (there is a relation) between *sphoṭa* and *nāda* as the manifested and the manifestor (respectively).]; VPbh 1. 101: "*vaikṛtas tu nādo bāhyadrutādivṛttikālavyavasthāṃ prakalpayati.*" [But the *vaikṛta nāda* (i.e., *dhvani*) produces the external temporal regulations, such as quick mode].

[352] MBhD (*Dvitīyāhnika*), p. 49: "*yaś ca karaṇasannipātād utpadyate yaś ca tasmāt tau prākṛtau. tābhyāṃ viśeṣopalabdhiḥ*." [What is produced due to the contact at the places of articulation and what is (produced) from it; those are the two types of *prākṛta*(*dhvani*). The awareness of distinction (arises) from those two.]. IYER (1969: 171) later states that this distinction is not clear enough. I return to this point under the section 3.2 *Dhvani* below.

[353] VPbh 1. 105: "*kampe tūparate ye nādajā nādās te drutādivṛttibhedavyavasthāhetavo bhavanti.*" [When the vibration ceases, the sounds which are produced from the original ones become the cause of regulating the modal differences, such as quick]. Cf. IYER's (1965: 101) translation. Seeimgly, the particle "*-api*" in "*anityapakṣe 'pi*" at the beginning of the VPbh 1. 105 shows that this was a view shared by those who held that *sphoṭa* is transitory and those who held otherwise.

[354] Cf. SSm, *kārikā* 18. SSmgop on this says, "*nādo dhvanir ity anarthāntaram*" [*Nāda* is *dhvani*, i.e., it is a synonym (of *dhvani*)].

[355] STNśk 3. Cf. TP on STN 9, p. 32: "*madhyamānādāparaparyāyo dhvanis tu dvividhaḥ prākṛto vaikṛtaś ca*." [The *dhvani*, which is another synonym for *nāda* at the *Madhyamā (*level of speech], is twofold, i.e., primary and secondary.].

nāda is "synonymous with" *dhvani* [°*nādāparanāmakadhvani*°]. This suggests that *nāda* was interpreted not as just a certain type of the *prākṛtadhvanis* but as *dhvani* in general. The fact that the author of the SSNV[356] and Nāgeśa in the PLM employ the term "*nāda*" in interpreting *sphoṭa* reveals that the later grammarians were not as selective as their predecessors in using the terms *nāda* and *dhvani* interchangeably.

The concept of the "*nādabrahman*" in the sense "sacred sound" developed in later esoteric and Tantric traditions, where it gradually superseded the *Śabdabrahman*.[357] In the Tantric interpretations, the meaning of the term *nāda* is broader than that in the grammatical tradition.

3.2 *Dhvani*

Dhvani is a significant term in all linguistic and philosophical explanations of *sphoṭa*. It was employed more precisely and technically by the later grammarians. Unlike the *dhvani* which is the technical term for "suggested (meaning)" in the *Dhvani* school of literary criticism, the *dhvani* in the grammatical tradition is recognized as a type of sound, both audible and cognitive, without any semantic import of its own. For Patañjali, *dhvani* is simply the physical articulated sound and a property of the *śabda*, the phonemic aspect of the listener's "auditory image", which is explained as *sphoṭa* in the MBh. [358]

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[356] Several views on how *nāda* is related to *sphoṭa* are given in the SSNV, *kārikās* 153 - 155.

[357] A detailed discussion on the *nādayoga* as a meditational/ yogic practice to attain the *Nādabrahma* is found in BECK (1995: 81 - 118).

[358] Vār. 4 on A. 1. 1. 70, as in MBh 1. 181. 19, 20: "*evaṃ tarhi sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ. dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*." [In that case then *sphoṭa* is *śabda*. *Dhvani* is an attribute of *śabda*.].
However, it should be remembered again that, for Patañjali, *sphoṭa* is not the meaning-bearing unit but "only the permanent aspect of phoneme, shorn of all variations due to special circumstances" (IYER 1969: 157). Cf. IYER 1982: 25; ISAEVA 1995: 92.
Furthermore, as Kaiyaṭa puts it, Patañjali's identification of *sphoṭa* with *dhvani* can be justified only when those are considered as aspects of language on the phonetic level, but not on morphemic level. See JOSHI 1967: 8 - 10.

Depending on their characteristics and functions, the *dhvanis* were later categorized into two types by Bhartṛhari in the MBhD,[359] the VP, and the VPbh,[360] and by Vṛṣabhadeva in the VPvd. Accordingly, the "*prākṛta*" (original, therefore, "primary") type of *dhvani* is what reveals *sphoṭa*, while the "*vaikṛta*" (evolved from another, therefore, "secondary") type of *dhvani* maintains the continuity of the already revealed *sphoṭa*.[361]

In addition to the fact that the definitions of the *prākṛtadhvanis* and the *vaikṛtadhvanis* in the MBh, the MBhD, the VP, and its commentaries are quite inconsistent and sometimes obscure, some modern scholars appear not to have grasped them precisely. How their contrast is recognized in the grammatical tradition thus needs further examination. It is apparent that what is meant by "*dhvani*" changed across time, particularly from Patañjali to Bhartṛhari, but we still need to know more clearly how the early exponents of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, including Bhartṛhari and his commentators, interpreted these two categories of the *dhvanis* in relation to their role in manifesting *sphoṭa*.

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[359] MBhD (*Dvitīyāhnika*), p. 49.

[360] Bhartṛhari in VPbh 1. 76 quotes the following *kārikā* from the *Saṅgraha*, a lost work by Vyāḍi: "*śabdasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvanir iṣyate । sthitibhede nimittatvaṃ vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate.*" [The primary sound is the cause of the perception of the word (*sphoṭa*); the secondary one becomes the cause of the difference in the continuity of perception (*sthitibheda*)]. IYER's (1965: 79) translation. Note here that Bhartṛhari uses the term "*sphoṭa*" immediately above this *kārikā* to introduce it, while this *kārikā* contains only "*śabda*". IYER has grasped it correct in his translation. Such an interchangeable usage of *śabda* and *sphoṭa* in the VP compels one, as it did the later grammarians, to take them as synonyms. Also see IYER 1965: 79 and JOSHI 1967: 20. Cf. VP 1. 77. Vṛṣabhadeva in the VPvd 1. 76 explains the etymological and functional meanings of these terms.

[361] SSNV, *kārikās* 151, 152: "*prākṛtā vaikṛtāś ceti dhvanayo dvividhā matāḥ । prākṛtā nāma te tatra sphoṭātmā yaiḥ pratīyate*." [It is considered that the *dhvanis* are twofold, i.e., *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta*. Of them, it is the *prākṛtadhvanis* through which the true nature of *sphoṭa* is perceived]; "*pratītasya tu tasyaiva cirakālam avasthitiḥ । yair ete vaikṛtā nādās tatkālād vṛttayo matāḥ.*" [But the *vaikṛtanādas* are those by which the long existence of just the perceived (*sphoṭa*) is (maintained). The modes of speech are known from their period of time.]. The author of the SSNV also uses here the terms *dhvani* and *nāda* interchangeably.
For an account of the early Mīmāṃsā concept of *dhvani* classification, which is quite close to Harivṛṣabha's dichotomy of the *dhvanis* as *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta*, see D'SA 1980: 126, 127.

Sphoṭa is manifested by the *dhvanis*. For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* remains undisclosed and unnoticed until the *dhvanis* reveal it, just as the air around us is not felt until revealed by a fan. [362] Likewise, our unawareness of *sphoṭa* does not disprove its existence, just as the presence of the air is not affected by our ignorance of it. Note that the *dhvanis* which manifest *sphoṭa* are "articulated sounds", as Bhartṛhari[363] holds and Maṇḍana Miśra confirms.[364] It should, therefore, be correct to determine that the *prākṛtadhvanis* are the audible articulated sounds spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. [365] However, the following discussion would reveal that "*prākṛtadhvani*" is a superordinate term to denote more than "audible sounds".

The major criterion for determining the *prākṛtadhvanis* as the "primary" type of the *dhvanis* is their state of being produced "first", which involves the activity of the articulatory organs. A sound produced by the contact and separation of the articulatory organs may elongate if they actively remain in the very position(s) which produced it. Accordingly, if the articulatory organs remain active in producing a unit of speech sounds and in elongating it, their state of activeness determines the primary status of that sound. Nevertheless, "*prākṛta*" does not mean just "articulated first," as we learn from Vṛṣabhadeva's words.[366]

> *dhvanisphoṭayoḥ pṛthaktvenānupalambhāt taṃ sphoṭaṃ tasya dhvaneḥ prakṛtim iva manyante. tatra bhavaḥ prākṛtaḥ. taduttarakālabhāvī tasmād vilakṣaṇa evopalambhyata iti vikārāpattir iva sphoṭastheti vaikṛta ucyate*.

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[362] VP 1. 116: "*vyajanād vāyur iva sa svanimittāt pratīyate.*" [(The eternal speech principle) becomes perceptible due to (the activity of) its cause (of manifestation), just as the air (is perceived) due to fanning.].

[363] MBhD (*Dvitīyāhnika*), p. 49: "*karaṇasannipātāt*" [as a result of the contact at the places of articulation].

[364] SSm 18ab: "*prayatnabhedato bhinnā dhvanayo 'sya prakāśakāḥ*." [The *dhvanis* differentiated in keeping with the difference of the efforts of articulation are what manifest it (i.e., *sphoṭa*)].

[365] AKLUJKAR (in COWARD and RAJA 1990: 92) is therefore wrong in stating that the *vaikṛtadhvani* is what the speaker speaks and the listener hears. But again in COWARD and RAJA (1990: 173), AKLUJKAR points to IYER's (1969: 171) translation of the MBhD (*Dvitīyāhnika* p. 49), which shows the *prākṛtadhvanis* as articulated sounds.

[366] VPvd 1. 76.

> Because the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* are not perceived as separate (entities) (the grammarians) consider *sphoṭa* as if the (original) nature of *dhvani*. What arises there (from the original, i.e., *sphoṭa*) is *prākṛta* (*dhvani*).[367] The *vaikṛta*(*dhvani*) is called (as such) on the grounds that it occurs after it (i.e., the *prākṛtadhvani*), is perceived to be indeed different from it, (and that it appears) as if an (illusory) modification of *sphoṭa*.

Vṛṣabhadeva defines here the *prākṛta* and the *vaikṛta* types of the *dhvanis* from the perspective of speaker's encoding process. The primacy or the originality of the *prākṛtadhvanis* depends not only on their being produced first as a result of articulation but also, more significantly, on their inherent relation to what they manifest, i.e., their original nature, *sphoṭa*. In other words, what makes the *prākṛtadhvanis* original and foremost is their involvement in manifesting *sphoṭa*. We may assume that this might have been the position maintained by the grammarians throughout the history of *sphoṭa* because we find that Nāgeśa also maintained it. In his PLM (p. 25), he introduces the distinction between the two types of the *dhvanis* as follows.

> *prakṛtyārthabodhanecchayā svabhāvena vā jātaḥ sphoṭavyañjakaḥ prathamaḥ prākṛtaḥ. tasmāt prākṛtāj jāto vikṛtiviśiṣṭaś cirasthāyī nivartako vaikṛtikaḥ*.

> Produced with the inherent readiness to cause meaning comprehension or innately, the *prākṛta* (*dhvani*) is the primary (*dhvani*) that manifests *sphoṭa*. Produced out of the primary (*dhvani*), the *vaikṛta* (*dhvani*) is characterized by modifications, persisting long, and causing (*sphoṭa*) to cease (after signifying meaning).

In contrast to the *prākṛtadhvanis*, the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are often interpreted as a type of sound that follows *sphoṭa.* In order to define the *vaikṛtadhvanis*, Harivṛṣabha in VPbh 1. 106 uses four terms: (i) *abhimarśin* (those coming into contact (with *sphoṭa*)?), (ii) *nadāntarāla* (those sitting midway between *nādas*?), (iii) *anuprakāśa* [those that shine after (*sphoṭa*)?], and (iv) *anuṣaṅga* [those that are associated with

[367] Cf. JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1986: 86, 87.

(*sphoṭa*)?]. Nevertheless, as IYER (1969: 177; 1982: 46) observes, it is unclear in what precise sense Bhartṛhari/ Harivṛṣabha employed them there. Helārāja uses the term "*anuraṇana*" [368] (reverberations) for the same purpose.

The *vaikṛtadhvanis* are not associated with the active articulatory organs involved in producing the primary sounds. What determines the existence of the *vaikṛtadhvanis* is the difference in the continuity of the cognition of *sphoṭa*[369], which is not considered to be a phonetic property. Being produced after [370] the manifestation of *sphoṭa,* they cannot affect[371] the nature of the manifested *sphoṭa*, but can control how long the perception of it remains. Accordingly, even if all the characteristics of the *prākṛtadhvanis*, such as duration[372] (longness, shortness etc. of speech sounds), intonation, and pitch, are falsely attributed to *sphoṭa*, the speed of pronunciation associated with the *vaikṛtadhvanis* is never superimposed on it.

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[368] VPhr 3. 9 (*Kālasamuddeśa*) 67. Quoted in IYER 1965: 58, fn. 1; IYER 1969: 463: "*prākṛtadhvanibhir abhivyakte śabdatattve 'nuraṇanarūpā ye paścātkālabhāvino*" [Those in the form of reverberations that occur later, after the true nature of *śabda* is manifested by the *prākṛtadhvanis*.]. Cf. SHARMA's (1972: 94) translation of VP 3, *Kālasamuddeśa*. Also See IYER 1969: 177; IYER 1982: 46. *Anuraṇana* is found as a term of more technical sense in the *Dhvanyāloka*. For instance, Dhv 3. 1; DhvL 2. 20, 21, 24, 3. 1, 15, 33.

[369] VP 1. 75, VPbh and VPvd 1. 76. Regarding the "*sthitibhede*" there, I do not agree with ISAEVA (1995: 93), who translates "*sthiti-*" as "specific position during pronunciation". It looks possible to take it to be in the sense "*sthitibhdayoḥ*" (of continuity and difference), but since we find "*sthitibhedanimittatvaṃ*" as a single compound in some recensions of the VP, it is more accurate to translate "*sthitibhede*" as "difference in continuity" and the whole compound as "the state of being the cause of difference in the continuity (of *sphoṭa*)". Some recensions of the VP have "*vṛttibhede*" in place of "*sthitibhede*". Accordingly, the *vaikṛtadhvani* is the cause of difference in "function" (NAKAMURA 2004: 598), i.e., precisely, that of difference in the "speed" (MATILAL 2002: 384) of speech. Cf. TP on STNśk 9, p. 32. "*vṛttibhede = drutādivṛttibhede*." PILLAI in his VP translation (1971: 16, 17) does not specify what "*sthiti*" means.

[370] VPhr 3. 9 (*Kālasamuddeśa*) 67; VP and VPvd 1. 77: "*śabdasya abhivyakter ūrdhvaṃ.*" [after the manifestation of *śabda*]. Cf. SSNV, *kārikā* 152.

[371] VP 1. 77: "*sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate*." [The true nature of *sphoṭa* is not affected by them.]. See JOSHI 1967: 23.

[372] See JOSHI 1967: 24, 25.

As IYER (1969: 176, 177) points out, Bhartṛhari and his commentators have not made it clear enough whether the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are produced out of the *prākṛtadhvanis* or the manifested *sphoṭa*. Some views in the VP, the VPbh, and the VPvd suggest that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are considered to be produced from the manifested *sphoṭa*.[373] It is easier to assume that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are, as Helārāja says, the reverberations of the *prākṛtadhvanis*, but their suprasegmental nature and functioning after the manifestation of *sphoṭa* do not imply that they are just the echoes of the latter.[374]

It is not possible to address this puzzle without examining the identity of the *prākṛtadhvanis* a little further. Here is applicable the early grammarians' stratification of language into four strata, i.e., *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā*, and *Vaikharī*. Note that Nāgeśa in the PLM (p. 24) clearly says that the *nādas* of the *Vaikharī* stratum are audible to all, whereas the *nādas* of the *Madhyamā* reveal *sphoṭa*. He does not specify whether those two types of the *nādas* are the *vaikṛtadhvanis* and the *prākṛtadhvanis* respectively. If the *prākṛtadhvanis* are just the articulated sounds that manifest *sphoṭa*, how could they (i) be different from the *nādas* in the *Vaikharī*, and (ii) be in the *Madhyamā* to reveal *sphoṭa*, as in Nāgeśa's interpretation? A hint at a possible answer to this question is found in the PLM (p. 24, 26) itself. Nāgeśa says that sound is

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[373] For instance, VP 1. 106. "*anavasthitakampe 'pi karaṇe dhvanayo 'pare | sphoṭād evopajāyante jvālā jvālāntarād iva*." [Even after the articulatory organ has ceased to vibrate, other *dhvanis* are produced from just *sphoṭa*, just as a (new) flame (is produced) from another flame (even after the original flame is extinguished).]. The "other" type of *dhvanis* here seems to be the *vaikṛtadhvanis*, as this *kārikā* is simply an elaboration on them introduced in the preceding *kārikā* (VP 1. 105). The VPbh on it is obscure and the VPvd does not help enough. Could the "*sphoṭāt*" in ablative here mean just "after (the manifestation of) *sphoṭa*"?

[374] MATILAL (2002: 385) presents a supporting point that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are sounds that travel as the repeated manifestations of the *prākṛtadhvanis,* so long as they reach the listener's ears: "Bhartṛhari does not contribute to the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound-production, but it seems that he would accept this process of sound-travel with one crucial change made in the theory - instead of talking about production of a new sound at every moment, we should talk about the new manifestation of the same sound at every moment during its persistence." However, I do not find this view helpful enough, evidently because it does not take into account that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are those coming into effect "after" the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. If they cease after reaching the listener's sense of hearing, they cannot repeat the cognition of the manifested *sphoṭa*.

produced by "both" the *Madhyamā* and the *Vaikharī* "indeed simultaneously" [*yugapad eva madhyamāvaikharībhyāṃ nāda utpadyate*]. Accordingly, Nāgeśa means that the *prākṛtadhvanis* that apply to both the *Vaikharī* and the *Madhyamā* strata occur together. In other words, we cannot interpret the *prākṛtadhvanis* as limited to the *Vaikharī* only. Rather, the very sounds, technically the *prākṛtadhvanis*, produced through articulation at the *Vaikharī* are then processed at the *Madhyamā* to correspond to their phonemic pattern, which is conventionally set in the listener's cognitive faculty. The *prākṛtadhvanis* are, therefore, at the *Vaikharī* as long as they carry audible and idiosyncratic articulatory properties, but once they stopped carrying any of such properties and fully corresponded to the conventionally established cognitive phonemic pattern, they are to be recognized as at the *Madhyamā*. It is now clear that these two types of the *prākṛtadhvanis* are possibly what Bhartṛhari meant in the MBhD[375], the second type of which IYER (1965: 59) mistakenly assumes to be *nāda*, as we discussed above.

Given the cognitive character of the *prākṛtadhvanis*, the *vaikṛtadhvanis* as their reverberations can then be interpreted more sensibly. Once the *prākṛtadhvanis* finished manifesting *sphoṭa*, the *vaikṛtadhvanis* that are reflections of the "cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis*" in the *Madhyamā* recur, making the cognition of the manifested *sphoṭa* linger longer.[376] Does the view that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* maintain *sphoṭa* longer by repeating the cognition of it contradict the grammarians' claim that *sphoṭa* signifies meaning as soon as it becomes manifested? In the light of Vṛṣabhadeva's words, we may assume that it does not, because the recurrence of the cognition of *sphoṭa* "adds strength" to its manifestation.[377] It can be concluded that the *vaikṛtadhvanis* are none other than the reflections of the cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis* in the *Madhyamā*.

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[375] (*Dvitīyāhnika*), p. 49.

[376] The "*sthitibheda*" [difference in the continuity (of *sphoṭa* perception)] in VPbh 1. 76, rather than the variant "*vṛttibheda*" [difference in the mode (of articulation)], as what *vaikṛtadhvanis* cause fits well here, if they are taken to be more of cognitive nature.

[377] VPvd 1. 77: "*evam abhivyakte śabde dhvanir uttarakālam anuvartamāno buddhyanuvṛttim śabdaviṣayāṃ viṣayābhivyaktibalādhānād upasaṃharati*." [(I)n the same way, the sound which continues after the manifestation of the word, causes the continuance of the cognition of the word by adding strength to the manifestation.]. IYER's (1965: 80) translation.

The view that the *dhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa* does not replace the involvement of phonemes in their process of manifesting *sphoṭa*. We discussed above that both the audible articulated sounds and their refined cognitive forms are meant by the term *prākṛtadhvanis*. And the articulated sounds may also be called "phonemes" as long as their cognitive aspect can be recognized. It therefore appears that, for the grammarians, phonemes are "more subtle and basic than the phonological structure" (BILIMORIA 1988: 70).[378] In the MBh are found some hints at the view that the early grammarians took phonemes to be unaffected by and more stable than the physical audible sounds. For instance, Patañjali considers phonemes as "fixed/ steady (*avasthita*)", although the speech modes (*vṛtti*) may change. [379]

Apparently, the grammarians do not consider that the opponents of the *sphoṭa* doctrine recognize in their doctrines the cognitive character of phonemes. The Naiyāyika position that *varṇas* are pronounceable and audible entities disregards the cognitive phonemic character of phonemes.[380] The absolute eternality of phonemes[381] in the Mīmāṃsaka

[378] For a detailed discussion on how *varṇa* is interpreted in Pāṇinian tradition, see GOLDSTÜCKER 1861: 34 - 44. GOLDSTÜCKER contends in favour of Pāṇini's knowledge of writing, with many pieces of evidence. One of them relevant to the present context is that the term "*-kāra*", as in "*gakāra*" (i.e., the sound "*ga*"), is added to denote the "spoken sound *ga*", whereas the term "*-varṇa*", as in "*gavarṇa*" (i.e., the phoneme "*ga*"), is used to denote the "written script of *ga*." With proofs from the MBh, the Vār, and the KV, he also shows how Patañjali distinguishes between "*varṇa*" and "*upadiṣṭha varṇa*", where only the "*upadiṣṭha varṇa*" in the sense "technically denoted *varṇa*" was considered pronounceable. Although I do not admit GOLDSTÜCKER's position that *varṇa* means the written form of the sound, it seems from his explanation that Pāṇini also considered *varṇa* to have at least one aspect which is not pronounceable, unless *varṇa* was taken to be a totally unpronounceable entity.

[379] MBh on A 1. 1. 70. 2: "*siddham tu avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ vaktuḥ cirāciravacanāt vṛttayaḥ viśiṣyante.*" [It is indeed established that phonemes are steady but the modes (of speech) become different due to the long-lasting and short-lived utterance of the speaker.], and "*avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ drutamadhyamavilambitāsu*." [Phonemes are fixed in (the speech modes that are fleeting as) slow, medium, and quick.]

[380] See BILIMORIA (1988: 70 - 73) for a discussion on how the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya systems interpret *varṇa* and explain the process of verbal cognition accordingly.

view is not admitted by the grammarians due to the transience of phonemes. However, when the grammarians say that the phonemes imagined to be eternal in the Mīmāṃsaka view are actually transient, they seemingly refer only to the "phonic" character of them, but not to their "phonemic" character. This is because, if they had refuted the phonemic character of phonemes as well, it would have been untenable that the phonemic character remains in the form of the memory trace (*saṃskāra*), and that *sphoṭa* appears, though illusorily, smeared (*rūṣita*) or coloured (*uparakta*) with it.[382] Here, it is observed that Maṇḍana Miśra in his SSm (under *kārikā* 3) states, perhaps more explicitly than any other writer after Bhartṛhari up to the modern period, that "phonemes are audible to the ear and simultaneously perceived by the mind". He says this in response to the opponents' objection that phonemes are grasped only by the sense of hearing.

> *śabdasamavāyinaḥ satvādayaḥ śrotrāvaseyāḥ. na ca śrotreṇaivety avadhāraṇam, varṇānāṃ manasāpy avadhāraṇāt. varṇatve ca prasaṅgānativṛtteḥ. na ca sattvavarṇatvādyapahnavaḥ sādhuḥ, sarvasāmānyāpahnavaprasaṅgāt.*

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[381] The Mīmāṃsakas maintain the absolute eternality (*kūṭasthanityatva*) of phonemes and the successive eternality (*pravāhanityatva*) of words. For example, Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Nyāyaratnākara* commentary (ŚVpm) on the ŚV (*śabdanityatva* chapter, *kārikā* 289) states their stance on the ontology of word: "*na kūṭasthanityatāṃ vācakasya brūmaḥ, kintu vyavahārād evāsya nityatvam. anidaṃprathamatvam iti yāvat. gakāraukāravisarjanīyānām eteṣāṃ evedṛśenaiva krameṇa vyavahāraḥ prayogo 'nidaṃprathama iti padasyānidaṃprathamatvaṃ nityatvaṃ, na varṇavat kūṭasthanityatvaṃ iti*." [We do not call the signifier (i.e., word) absolutely eternal. But it is eternal because of convention alone. It means that (word) has the state of not being for the first time. On the grounds that the common usage of just these (words constituted of phonemes like) "*ga-u-ḥ*" in the sequence of that sort is the convention, which (has been) not for the first time, the eternality of word is its state of not being for the first time. It is not the absolute eternality like (that of) phonemes.]

[382] Cf. PLM, p. 25: "*vyañjakadhvanigataṃ katvagatvādikaṃ sphoṭe bhāsate*." [The (universal of phoneme, such as) *ka*-ness and *ga*-ness, which rests (in reality) in the *dhvanis* that manifest (*sphoṭa*), shines in *sphoṭa*.]. Here Nāgeśa's use of the term *dhvani* to denote where the universals of phonemes shining in *sphoṭa* rest suggests that he considers the *prākṛtadhvanis* and phonemes as identical.

> Being and others which inhere in the word are perceived by the sense of hearing. Nor does "audible" in the definition mean audible only, because phonemes are cognized by the mind also. Nor is the defect of the definition becoming applicable to the fact of being a phoneme thus removed. Nor would it be right to deny the existence of universals like "being" and the fact of being a phoneme, because one would then have to deny the existence of all universals.[383]

Parameśvara in his SSmgop on the above excerpt also confirms that phonemes are grasped "just by the sense of hearing accompanied by the mind [*śrotreṇaiva manasā sahitena*]".[384] Moreover, when summarizing the grammarians' view on the *vākyasphoṭa*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in the NM[385] describes phonemes also as those "resting firmly in the construction of the intellect." After examining the power of phonemes to signify meaning and then refuting it, the author of the SSNV highlights that phonemes cannot be called sounds (*śabda*) by following the common understanding that meaning is understood from sounds.[386] His statement clearly supports the view that the scope of phonemes spreads beyond audibility. Accordingly, it is possible to assume that the cognitive phonemic property of phonemes is highlighted in the approach of the exponents of *sphoṭa* than in the approach of the Mīmāṃsaka and the Nyāya systems to their doctrines of *śābdabodha*.

Whether phoneme is the smallest meaningful unit was also a significant question which the grammarians were keen to answer. Although their general stance on this was that phonemes are not meaningful individually but only when distinguished within a meaningful whole, which is often a sentence, some later grammarians, such as Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, favoured the *varṇajātisphoṭa* view that supports the opposite. Even in the *varṇajātisphoṭa* view, it is not the phonic aspect but the semantic aspect of phonemes that is highlighted.

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[383] IYER's translation (1966: 7) of SSm, *kārikā* 3.

[384] SSmgop, *kārikā* 3, pp. 23, 24.

[385] NM, *pramāṇaprakaraṇa*, p. 344: "*varṇās tv ete prakṛtilaghavaḥ kalpanaikapratiṣṭhāḥ*." [These phonemes are transient by nature and firmly resting in the construction of the intellect/ imagination.]

[386] SSNV, *kārikā* 118cd: "*śabdaśabdo na varṇeṣu vyavasthāpanam arhati*." [The term "*śabda*" is not suitable to be applied to phonemes].

3.4 Bhartṛhari on *Sphoṭa* - *Dhvani* Relation

The relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* as pointed out by Bhartṛhari should be examined briefly, before looking into *sphoṭa's* semantic significance. Our discussion on the *prākṛtadhvanis* above is also related here.

The VP gives three views on the relationship between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*.[387] The first view is that the way *sphoṭa* is perceived is not distinct from the way the *dhvanis* are perceived. Just as the redness reflected on a crystal is not perceived without the adjacent red flower, which is the cause of the reflected redness, and is not different from the redness belonging to that red flower, *sphoṭa* is perceived indistinctively only along with the *prākṛtadhvanis* that manifest it.[388] Just as the falsely attributed redness of a crystal appears to be an inherent property of it, *sphoṭa* also simply seems to possess the properties of the *prākṛtadhvanis*.

The second view is that *sphoṭa* is manifested by the *dhvanis* that are imperceptible (*asaṃvedya*). The analogy here is that the sensory organs, which cause the perception of objects, cannot perceive themselves. The *prākṛtadhvanis*, by which *sphoṭa* is manifested, therefore, remain incognizable.

According to the third view, s*phoṭa* and *dhvani* are mutually independent (*svatantra*) entities. Since an articulated sound can be heard from a distance even if any distinct form of word cannot be recognized out of it, there are instances where the *dhvanis* are perceived without *sphoṭa* being perceived. It is like seeing the light of a fire without seeing its flames. The true nature of a speech sound may, therefore, be absent regardless of the presence of its indistinct semblance. This is similar to the objects in the desert that appear augmented due to mirage, the moon

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[387] VP 1. 81: "*sphoṭarūpāvibhāgena dhvaner grahaṇam iṣyate | kaiścid dhvanir asaṃvedyaḥ svatantro 'nyaiḥ prakalpitaḥ*." [(By some) is preferred that *dhvani* is perceived as non-different from *sphoṭa*. Some (others think) that *dhvani* is not perceivable. That (*dhvani* is perceived as) an independent entity is maintained by others]. Cf. IYER's (1965: 83) translation. Also see JOSHI 1967: 26, 27. The SSNV, *kārikā* 154 exactly reproduces these three views.

[388] Here in this analogy, *sphoṭa* resembles the "red" crystal, while the *dhvanis* are exemplified by the red colour of the flower.

that seems small, or the trees perceived vaguely. Such semblances do not provide us with any distinct understanding of their details or species.

It becomes clear by examining these views that the *prākṛtadhvanis* as interpreted by the later grammarians are generally in agreement with them. More significantly, we find evidence there for our observation that, for the later grammarians, the cognitive form of the *prākṛtadhvanis* is not different from phonemes. The first view above corresponds to the traditional tenet of the exponents of *sphoṭa* that the phonemes with which *sphoṭa* is coloured or smeared reflect illusorily on *sphoṭa*. As in the second view, the imperceptibility of the *dhvanis* matches the more permanent, cognitive phonemic character of phonemes, which goes beyond the audibility. The *dhvanis* in the third view appear to be the *prākṛtatadhvanis* as long as they are in the *Vaikharī*, without being distinct enough to stimulate any corresponding phonemic pattern in the *Madhyamā*.

As we learn from VP 1. 102, along with the VPbh and the VPvd on it, some [389] had held an opposite view known as "*kāryapakṣa*" or "*anityapakṣa*" on the relation of the *dhvanis* with *sphoṭa*. They had maintained that *sphoṭa* is produced by articulation, and it is *sphoṭa* that produces the *dhvanis*. Accordingly, *sphoṭa* is something produced (*kārya*) and, therefore, transient. Bhartṛhari presents again three views on the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, the first of which represents the position held by the upholders of the *anityapakṣa*. [390] Unlike the aforementioned three views that focus on the intrinsic nature of the *dhvanis* in contrast to *sphoṭa*, the following describe how the *dhvanis* are related to *sphoṭa* in functional terms.

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[389] Vṛṣabhadeva in his VPvd 1. 102 says that "the others" holding this view means the "upholders of the manifestation theory" [*anyaiḥ iti. abhivyaktivādibhyaḥ*]". This seems, to me, a point of confusion. If *sphoṭa* is "produced" [*upajanyate*] by the articulatory organs in operation, how could it be "manifested"? Then, those who advocate this view cannot be called the *abhivyaktivādinaḥ*. Also note here Vṛṣabhadeva's use of "*abhivyaktivādibhyaḥ*" in ablative/ dative case, although the term he comments on is an instrumental. The notion of *abhivyakti* that Vṛṣabhadeva applies here may be related to the Sāṃkhya view of manifestation. Cf. VPvd 1. 28, where he presents Vārṣagaṇya's stance on *abhivyakti*.
[390] IYER 1937: 259.

1. *Sphoṭa* is the initial (*prathamābhinirvṛtta*) sound produced by the articulatory organs, whereas the *dhvani*, being produced by *sphoṭa*, is the sound born out of (the initial) sound (*śabdajaśabda*), i.e., *sphoṭa*. The *dhvanis* spreading in all directions in successive concentric spherical layers[391] from the point of production are the recurrences of *sphoṭa*. The farther those recurrences spread away from *sphoṭa*, the weaker they become.[392] The context in which Patañjali uses the analogy of a drumbeat[393] seems to be similar to this view. *Sphoṭa*, which is comparable with the first drumbeat, remains unchanged while the *dhvanis* resemble its reverberations that continue and fade away at different phases.

2. *Sphoṭa* and the *dhvanis* are simultaneously produced and perceived.[394] However, the *dhvani* can still be perceived without *sphoṭa*, again just as the light may still be perceived without its flames being perceived due to the distance between the fire and the observer. This view resembles into some extent the third view of the upholders of the *nityapakṣa* discussed above.

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[391] The Naiyāyikas apply the analogy of the "pollens of Kadamba" (*kadambagolaka, kadambamukula*, or *kadambakoraka*) to the way sound spreads simultaneously. Once a Kadamba tree becomes laden with flowers, it is supposed that all other Kadamba trees around it also bloom flowers, since the pollens spread simultaneously. In contrast, the Vaiśeṣika view represented by Praśastapāda's analogy of ripples and waves (*vīcitaraṅga*), i.e., a ripple gives rise to a larger wave and so on, shows the spread of sound in successive series. Cf. VPvd 1. 102: "*kadambakorakavad vīcisantānavac ca śabdāḥ*." [The sounds (spreading) like the Kadamba pollens and a series of ripples]. See IYER 1937: 260; SEAL 1915: 157; LARSON and BHAṬṬACHARYA 1987: 497, 498. However, Govardhana states in his TarSnb commentary (section 33, p. 21), perhaps by taking the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika views together, that *śabda* prevails by "either" of those ways. Nevertheless, Viśvanātha in his BhP (*kārikā* 166, p. 580) seems to admit the *vīcitaraṅga* theory as compatible with the Naiyāyika perspective as well, and to discard the *kadambagolaka* theory owing to its cumbrousness.

[392] These "*śabdajaśabdas*" or "*nādajanādas*" (VP 1.105) can be compared with the *vaikṛtadhvanis* we already discussed, but since the role of the *prākṛtadhvanis* is not included in this view, it is uncertain how close such a comparison would be.

[393] JOSHI (1967: 13 - 15) includes Kaiyaṭa's and Nāgeśa's commentaries in translation on this passage. Bhartṛhari in the VPbh 1. 103 also uses the analogy of a drum and a metal bell being beaten, in order to illustrate the differences of the *vaikṛtadhvanis*.

[394] VP 1. 103, 104.

3. *Sphoṭa* is the universal (*jāti*) of the *dhvanis*.[395] While the *dhvanis* are many and modified by articulatory idiosyncrasies, *sphoṭa* as their universal form remains unaffected by them.

It is not totally inaccurate to say that *sphoṭa* is a result of articulation as in the first view since both the exponents and the opponents of the *sphoṭa* doctrine agree that, whatever the signifier of meaning it would be, it comes into effect through articulatory practices. Nonetheless, *sphoṭa* as the signifier of meaning is not what is immediately manifested by physical, articulated sounds, because they are idiosyncratic and unrefined. The *dhvanis* in the second view above appear to be, from the perspective of the later grammarians, the *prākṛtadhvanis* at the *Vaikharī* stratum rather than their corresponding forms at the cognitive level. Furthermore, the last two views do not contradict significantly how the *sphoṭa-dhvani* relation was interpreted later.

Bhartṛhari always describes *sphoṭa* in relation to *dhvani*.[396] Moreover, given the fact that the term "*sphoṭa*" occurs only nine times in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the VP but not even once in the other two *kāṇḍas*, and considering what Bhartṛhari may have meant by *sphoṭa* at each of those occurrences, JOSHI (1967: 29 - 36) assumes that, for Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* was not a meaning-bearer or the signifier of meaning.[397] Moreover, the later grammarians particularly stressed the "indivisibility" (*akhaṇḍatva*) of *sphoṭa*, presumably in the light of Bhartṛhari's use of some descriptive terms including *avibhāga* [398] and *abhinnakāla*. [399] Nevertheless, the

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[395] VP 1. 93. Cf. Vṛṣabhadeva's words in the VPvd 1. 76 that *sphoṭa* is the *prakṛti* (original) form of the *dhvanis*.

[396] JOSHI 1967: 29.

[397] JOSHI 1967: 36: "[L]ike Patañjali, Bhartṛhari too holds the opinion that the word as a whole unconnected with the isolated phonemes conveys meaning."
It is worth a note here that, in VPbh 1. 101 where Bhartṛhari calls phonemes, words, and sentences "*sphoṭas*", we find an instance for Bhartṛhari's considering *sphoṭa* not to be a unique signifier of meaning or the true nature of speech but "any speech unit unaffected by the variations of time taken for articulation". Cf. IYER 1969: 157.

[398] VP 1. 75. Cf. VPvd on it: "*iha nityatvād ātmatattvasya sphoṭānāṃ sthitau nāsti kālaparimāṇavṛtteḥ svalpo'pi vyāpāraḥ*." [In this case, due to the eternality of the true nature of *Ātman* (which is the speech principle), the function of the measure known as "time" does not affect even in the slightest degree the existence of *sphoṭas*.]. Note here that *Paśyantī* is described as indivisible (*avibhāgā*) in VPbh 1. 134 and VP 1. 142. Bhartṛhari, however, never says clearly if the *Paśyantī* is synonymous to *sphoṭa*.

contexts of those terms hardly suggest that Bhartṛhari meant "indivisibility" as a property of *sphoṭa*. Those terms only describe the nature of the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvanis*. It must be reminded again that Bhartṛhari always employed those terms in relation to each other.

§ 4. *Sphoṭa*'s Semantic Character

Having discussed the technical terms *nāda*, *dhvani*, and *varṇa* and their relation to *sphoṭa*, we may next examine *sphoṭa* for its semantic character. The later advocates of *sphoṭa* often employ the terms *śabdabrahman* and *sphoṭa* as mutual modifiers or appositives, and consequently seem to agree with the identity between *śabdabrahman* and *sphoṭa*. For instance, Śeṣakṛṣṇa in STNśk 4 says that "*sphoṭarūpaśabdaparabrahmaṇo na brahmaṇāpy apahnavaḥ kartuṃ śakyate*" [The denial of the supreme *Śabdabrahman* in the form of *sphoṭa* cannot be made even by Brahman].[400] However, it is held that they either ignored or did not understand *sphoṭa's* difference from the supreme Brahman. JOSHI (1967: 42, 43) points out that even Śaṅkara did not appreciate the *Śabdabrahman* concept and that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita expressed his displeasure towards Bhartṛhari's treatment of *sphoṭa* as equivalent to the *Śabdabrahman*. Whether the later grammarians failed to appreciate or ignored *sphoṭa*'s distinction from the *Śabdabrahman*, it is apparent that *sphoṭa's* theological significance was given less attention in the later expositions.[401] Since *sphoṭa's* theological implications in relation to the *Śabdabrahman* has widely been discussed in the recent modern literature on *sphoṭa*, I examine briefly how *sphoṭa's* semantic character can be recognized from the perspective of linguistics.

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[399] VP 1. 81. Cf. VPvd on it: "*śabdena saṃsṛṣṭo dhvanir upāśrayānurāga iva sphaṭikādīnām avibhakta upalabhyate*." [The *dhvani* intermingled with the *śabda* is perceived as indivisible, just as the colour of the adjacent (object) on those, such as a crystal, (is perceived inseparable).]. The *śabda* here is the eternal speech principle.

[400] Also STN, concluding verse 3: "*śabdabrahmābhidhaṃ... sphoṭatattvaṃ*". [The (true) nature of *sphoṭa*... which is known as the *Śabdabrahman*].

[401] I return to this point in Chapter Four, under the section 4.2.

4.1 *Sphoṭa* and Intercommunication: Empirical Perspective

Sphoṭa is often introduced in relation to the listener's decoding process of a linguistic expression. Nevertheless, how *sphoṭa* is related to the speaker's encoding process is also significant for us to comprehend the so-called identity between the signifier (*śabda*) and the signified (*artha*), which is another vital facet of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. The interpretation of the four strata of language, with which some later grammarians such as Nāgeśa [402] also agreed, corresponds to their understanding of the speaker's encoding process.

The procedure in which the speaker's intention is communicated to the listener was not new to the grammarians. Patañjali briefly discusses in the MBh the term *śabda* as from what the comprehension of meaning arises but does not go into detail. In his commentary on the *Nirukta* (Nir) 1.1.2 [403], Durga[404] presents a succinct but coherent explanation of how an idea is communicated, in order to show how *śabda* travels from the speaker to the listener. Although the later grammarians do not refer to his explanation in order to show how *sphoṭa* operates, it is an informative piece of the early grammarians' understanding that the signifier (*abhidhāna*) and the signified (*abhidheya*) are two forms of the intellect (*buddhi*).

> *śarīre hy abhidhānābhidheyarūpā buddhir*
> *hṛdayāntargatākāśapratiṣṭhitā. tayor*
> *abhidhānarūpābhidheyarūpayor buddhyor*
> *madhye 'bhidhānarūpayā śāstrābhimataprayojanavijijñāpayiṣayā*
> *puruṣeṇa tadabhivyaktisamarthena svaguṇabhūtena*
> *prayatnenodīryamāṇaḥ śabda uraḥkaṇṭhādivarṇasthāneṣu*
> *niṣpadyamānatayā puruṣārthābhidhānasamarthavarṇādibhāvam*
> *āpadyamānaḥ puruṣaprayatnena bahir vinikṣipto vināśini*

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[402] For instance, PLM, p. 23, 24.

[403] Cf. Nir 1. 1. 2: "*vyāptimattvāt tu śabdasyāṇīyastvāc ca śabdena saṃjñākaraṇaṃ vyavahārārthaṃ loke*." [Because of *śabda*'s pervasion and in fact the state of being finer, denoting with *śabda* (is in practice) for the purpose of practical usage].

[404] Durga alias Durgasiṃha and Durgācārya was the earliest commentator on the Nir. His exact date is debated, but is generally assumed to be before the 6th century (KAHRS 1998: 14). Cf. NCC 9, p. 74.

vyaktibhāvam āpannaḥ śrotradvāreṇānupraviśya pratyāyyasya buddhiṃ sarvārtharūpāṃ sarvābhidhānarūpāṃ vyāpnotīty evaṃ vyāptimāñ śabdaḥ. [405]

Indeed in the body, the intellect, which is in the form of the signifier and the signified, rests in the heart and has the ether as its substratum. Uttered by a person, with a desire to communicate (his) intention consistent with grammar, which is in the form of the signifier among those two forms of the intellect, the signifier and the signified, with the (articulatory) effort which (i.e., the effort) is capable of manifesting it (i.e., the intention) and which consists of own (articulatory) properties, *śabda*, due to its state of being produced at the articulatory positions (producing) phonemes, such as the chest and the throat, becomes the nature of phonemes etc. that are capable of signifying the person's idea, having been emitted outside by the person's effort, becomes separate (entities) which are of transient nature (?), enters through the sense of hearing and pervades the intellect of the signified, which has the whole of meaning as its form (and) the whole of the signifier as its form. Therefore, *śabda* pervades.

This explanation of the pervasion of *śabda* is important to our present discussion for two reasons. First, Durga's position as an early grammarian supports the view that the operation of *sphoṭa* is defendable from the linguistic perspectives, i.e., outside the Advaita Vedāntic metaphysics. Second, the view that the intellect has the form of both the signifier and the signified fits finely the later grammarians' construal of not only the *śabda* - *artha* identity but also the stratification of language.

The *Sambandhasamuddeśa* chapter of the third *kāṇḍa* of the VP gives an ancient view that the signifier and the signified have mutual causality because they rest in the intellect. Note that Bhartṛhari does not point to the doctrine of the *Śabdabrahman* there in order to explain how *śabda* is related to *artha*, as he does in several places of the VP. Therefore, this view appears similar to Durga's explanation given above.

[405] NirD 1. 1. 2. BHADKAMKAR's edition (1918), vol. I. p. 47. Cf. V. K. RAJAWADE's edition (1921: 22) has the varient "*vinikṣipto 'vināśini*".

śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate
tathā ca buddhiviṣayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate. [406]

Śabda is the cause of meaning (in the listener's intellect), which is indeed produced by it. Similarly, it is from meaning, which is the range of the intellect (of the speaker), that *śabda* results.[407]

In his VPhr on this *kārikā* Helārāja elaborates on how *śabda* should be recognized as the cause of *artha* and vice versa. Since the intended meaning (*vivakṣitārtha*), which rests in the speaker's mind in the form of internal speech (*antaḥsaṃjalpa*), is never devoid of the *śabda* intermingled in it [*na hi vivakṣito 'rthaḥ śabdasambhedaśūnyaḥ*], it has the potency to convey itself to the listener. [408] The process of communication is also summarized here.

pratipādyapratipādakayor hi parasparābhiprāyasaṃkrāntir vyavahāra ity antaḥsthitam arthaṃ mūlāvasthām apy[409] *aparityaktaṃ vaktṛbuddhisamāviṣṭaṃ śrotary arpayati. śrotāpi ca tathaiva svavāsanāvikāsānusāreṇa pratipadyate samāviṣṭaśabdabhāvanaḥ. tena codbodhitaśabdabhāvanaḥ pravartate iti nirṇītaṃ vākyapadīye*. [410]

Indeed, the mutual exchange of ideas between the speaker and the listener is (known as) the (verbal) transaction (i.e., communication). (*Śabda*) transfers to the listener meaning, which is internal, which has not given up (its) original state either, and which occupies the speaker's intellect. Similarly, the listener also becomes the one

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[406] VP 3. 3. 32.

[407] IYER's (1971: 94) and HOUBEN's (1995: 246) translations of "*arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate*" as "the word is heard/ understood by the listener from meaning" does not appear correct in this context. Helārāja describes at the beginning of VPhr 3. 3. 32 how both *śabda* and *artha* become the cause of each other, but does not point to how the listener understands *śabda* from *artha.* Rather, he explains, as I understand, how *śabda* ensues from *artha.*

[408] Cf. VP 1.116 gives that knowledge is essentially in its linguistic form (*vāgrūpatā*), without which it does not manifest itself. Again as in VP 1.123, knowledge remains saturated (*anuviddha*) with speech (*śabda*), out of which the whole world unfolds.

[409] IYER's edition (1963: 146) gives "*mūlāvasthām-āpy-aparityaktaṃ*". IYER's translation (1971: 94) skips this sentence. To me, *mūlāvasthām-apy*° seems to be correct.

[410] VPhr 3. 3. 32.

> endowed with the linguistic potency, correspondingly to the expansion of (his) own *vāsanā* (innate latent knowledge drawn from prior births). And for that reason, (the view) that (he) remains one whose linguistic potency is awakened is ascertained in the *Vākyapadīya*.

When the *sphoṭa* theoreticians interpret how the speaker's idea transforms itself to *śabda* and then, through *sphoṭa*, appears in the listener's intellect, they apparently follow the above approach to communication.[411] As Helaraja puts it, the *mūlāvasthā* that the meaning "does not give up" or "is not deprived of", suggests that the unity of the idea is preserved during communication. The maturation of the listener's *vāsanā* to decode the speaker's expression determines the successfulness of the communication.

4.2 *Sphoṭa*'s Semantic Function: Theoretical Perspective

Next, the process in which the listener's *sphoṭa* becomes manifested upon his auditory experience of a linguistic expression can be summarized in the light of the later expositions of the *sphoṭa* doctrine.

When the speaker intends to articulate a certain idea, for example, "*ghaṭam ānaya*" (i.e., bring the pot), it remains in his intellect as a particular *sphoṭa*. His *sphoṭa* then goes through the *Madhyamā* stratum and, at the *Vaikharī*, turns out to be a linguistically definable expression that consists of a series of audible *prākṛtadhvanis* imbued with his articulatory idiosyncrasies. Those *prākṛtadhvanis* at the *Vaikharī* stratum travel up to the listener's sense of hearing and become the object of his auditory perception (*śrāvaṇapratyakṣa*).[412] Once the auditorily perceived *prākṛtadhvanis* stimulate[413] the cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis* in

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[411] For the function of *sphoṭa* discussed succinctly, see CHAKRAVARTI 1926: 25 - 51; SARMA 1940: 509 - 515; HEIMANN 1941: 221 - 227; IYER 1947: 121 - 147; RAJA 1956: 84 - 116, BHATTACHARYA 1958: 83 - 92; HERMAN 1962: 1 - 21, ŚĀSTRĪ: 1980; FILLIOZAT 1984: 133 - 140; KARUNARATNE 1985: 53 - 70.

[412] Cf. PLM, pp. 23: "*vaikharyā hi kṛto nādaḥ paraśravaṇagocaraḥ*". [The sound (*nāda*) produced by the *Vaikharī* is audible to others].

[413] Nāgeśa's analogy for this stimulation of sounds is a blow on the fire that kindles it. PLM, p. 26: "*vaikharīnādo … madhyamānādotsāhakaḥ*".

the *Madhyamā* stratum, which are free from all articulatory idiosyncrasies, they correspond gradually to the conventionally established phonemic pattern, "*ghaṭam ānaya*", which remains latent in the listener's intellect. This correspondence is the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Consequently, the very phonemic pattern of "*ghaṭam ānaya*", which is cognitive, is "the *sphoṭa*" of that expression. As soon as the cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis* finish corresponding to the established phonemic pattern (i.e., manifesting that *sphoṭa*), the listener's cognition of the meaning, "bring the pot", arises, and, as the Navya Naiyāyikas phrase it, the *sphoṭa*'s "state of possessing the power (in the form of) the prompter of the objecthood existing in meaning" [*artha-niṣṭha-viṣayatā-prayojaka-śaktimatva*] ceases. Because the cognition of meaning arises as soon as *sphoṭa* is manifested, there is no delay between the manifestation of *sphoṭa* and the comprehension of meaning.[414]

Sphoṭa is manifested into some extent even by a single phoneme. However, such a *sphoṭa* lacks full manifestation and, consequently, any significativeness. It becomes fully manifested and most capable of signifying meaning only at the grasp of the final phoneme, which is accompanied by the memory traces of the preceding phonemes. [415] Likewise, it would be a misinterpretation that the cognition of meaning arises more completely only with the help of many phonemes because the quantity of phonemes does not affect *sphoṭa*'s unity. If even a single phoneme is capable of revealing independently the *sphoṭa* of a certain meaning, which is conventionally established, that *sphoṭa* becomes completely manifested and fully signifies the meaning. Due to their superimposition on *sphoṭa*, phonemes cause *sphoṭa* to seem coloured/ smeared with them and characterized by their multiplicity. Put

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[414] Here (PLM, p. 26) in Nāgeśa's words that "*vaikharīnādo vahneḥ phūtkārādivan madhyamānādotsāhakaḥ, madhyamānādaḥ sphoṭam vyañjayatīti śīghram eva tato 'rthabodhaḥ. parasya vilambenānubhavasiddhatvāt*." [Just like a blow on the fire (kindles it), the *Vaikharī* sound is the stimulator of the *Madhyamā* sound, the *Madhyamā* sound manifests *sphoṭa*, and (therefore) the meaning comprehension (arises) certainly quickly from it (i.e., *sphoṭa*). Because it is understood from experience (that the meaning comprehension does not arise quickly) due to the delay of the latter.], "*parasya*" must mean "(the sounds of) the *Madhyamā*", i.e., the cognitive *dhvanis* that manifest *sphoṭa*. The cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis* may not become stimulated as quickly as they reveal *sphoṭa*, as we learn from the analogy of *ratnaparīkṣā* (inspection of a precious stone) in the VP and the SSm.

[415] In STNśk 14 Śeṣakṛṣṇa discusses this point in detail.

differently, multiple articulated phonemes corresponding to their cognitive counterparts, i.e., the *prākṛtadhvanis*, leave their reflections in the form of memory traces, causing *sphoṭa* to look manifold. As ŚEVAḌE says, the role of the *dhvanis* (or *nādas* in his words) in manifesting *sphoṭa* is, therefore, to impart their own reflections.[416] Again, by "the role of the *dhvanis*", it is not meant that the audible, transient *prākṛtadhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa*, but their phonemic reflections, which are cognitive. These reflections are "stable" insomuch as they finish manifesting *sphoṭa* by imparting their reflections to it.

Since the *prākṛtadhvanis* correspond to phonemes, what manifests *sphoṭa* should not be taken to be different from the phonemes in the form of phonemic reflections or memory traces with which *sphoṭa* is smeared. Accordingly, we may imagine that *sphoṭa* always becomes manifested in association with phonemes.[417] When certain *dhvanis* related to their corresponding phonemes smear *sphoṭa* with their reflections, anyone aware of the denotative power of language (*śaktigraha*)[418] can comprehend the meaning of the signified entity out of just those very manifesters through *sphoṭa*. Consequently, when the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the reflections of the phonemes that constitute the linguistic unit "*ghaṭa*", he would not have the meaning "pot" out of the

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[416] TP on STNśk 9, p. 30: "*svapratibimbasamarpaṇam eva nādasya sphoṭavyañjakatvam ity ucyate. uccaritapradhvaṃsināṃ varṇānāṃ sāhityāsambhave 'pi yāvatkāryaṃ sthirāṇāṃ tadīyasaṃskārāṇām eva sphoṭe pratibimbasamarpakatvam*." [It is said that the role of *nādas* in manifesting *sphoṭa* is to impart their own reflection to (*sphoṭa*). Even if phonemes, which perish as soon as pronounced, are not capable of gathering up, they (manifest *sphoṭa*) as long as just their permanent memory traces impart the reflections to *sphoṭa*].

[417] TP on STNśk 9, p. 31: "*varṇabhinnavyañjakābhāvāc ca na kadācid api varṇarāhityena sphoṭapratītiḥ*." [Also because there are no manifesters (of *sphoṭa*) other than phonemes, the manifestation of *sphoṭa* never (occurs) without (the involvement of) phonemes.].

[418] NSM, *kārikā* 81: "*śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamānakoṣāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca | vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ*." [The ancient say that the apprehension of the denotative power of language is possible from grammar, analogy, lexicons, the statements of authoritative persons, conventional usage, rest of the sentence/ context, commentaries, and syntactic proximity to the known words.]. Also quoted in many texts including Rāghavendra's *Nyāyadīpa* commentary on Vyāsatīrtha's *Tarkatāṇḍava* 2. 16 and the PLM of Nāgeśa. See DESHPANDE 2009: 32, 33; MATILAL 1990b: 12 - 15 and the SN, p. 125 for examples.

sphoṭa manifested by the reflections of the phonemes constituting "*kalaśa*" (which is another term to denote a pot). Nor would he understand, out of the *sphoṭa* of *ghaṭa*, a different meaning, which the *sphoṭa* manifested by the phonemes of even a slightly different linguistic unit such as "*paṭa*" (i.e., cloth) would trigger. Therefore, it is correct to maintain that (i) the *sphoṭas* which are manifested by the linguistic units with mutually different phonemes or sequences are not equal, although what is signified by both the *sphoṭa*s can be identical, and (ii) this fact is true regarding a person who is well aware of the denotative power of language.

Whereas the cognitive forms of the *prākṛtadhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa* and thereby contribute to causing verbal cognition, the audible, physical *prākṛtadhvanis* at the *Vaikharī* are not ignorable. Meaning must be grasped by the *antaḥkaraṇa* because of *sphoṭa's* internality. [419] Nevertheless, it is just the gross speech at the *Vaikharī* stratum grasped through the sense of hearing that prepares the *antaḥkaraṇa* [420], by stimulating the corresponding cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis* to reveal the *sphoṭa* that signifies meaning. Communication would be impossible if the speaker does not turn, through articulation, his *sphoṭa* into transferable,

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[419] *Sphoṭa's* internality is implied in several places of the VP, but it is Punyaraja who puts it clearer. VPpr 2.1: "*sphoṭo dvividhaḥ, bāhya ābhyantaraś ceti. tatra jātilakṣṇasya jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī iti, vyaktilakṣaṇasya eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ iti, ābhyantarasya buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ ityanenoddeśaḥ*". [*Sphoṭa* is of two types, i.e., internal and external. In that regard, the characteristic of universal is indicated (by) the (phrase) that "universal which inheres in a collection (of words)", the characteristic of particular (by) that "the single and partless *śabda*", (and) the (characteristic of) what is internal (by) that "unification in the mind"]. Cf. ŚĀSTRĪ 1959: 89; BANERJEE 2002: 28. Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa in his SR (p. 28) also points to the internality of *sphoṭa*.

[420] ŚEVAḌE (TP on STN 9, p. 31) highlights the role of the speech at the *Vaikharī* level from the speaker's perspective, i.e., the encoding process, as follows. "*ayañcāntaratvāt śrotragrāhyavaikharīsaṃskṛtāntaḥkaraṇagrāhya eveti na vaikharīṃ vināsyopalabdhiḥ parasya, svasya tu bhavaty eva*." [And because of (its) internality, this is to be experienced essentially by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is prepared by the *Vaikharī* (form of speech) graspable through the sense of hearing. Consequently, without the *Vaikharī*, the comprehension of it is not possible for others, but certainly possible for one's own self.]
It is not clear if ŚEVAḌE's anaphoric reference "*ayam*" applies here to *sphoṭa* or meaning. From the context, it seems to be *sphoṭa*, but "meaning" can be equally fitting when considering the structure of the preceding sentence, and Kaiyaṭa's (MbhP 1. 64b) and Nāgeśa's (MBhU 1. 64b) explanations of "*nitya*" based on MBh 1. 7. 23 - 25. KAHRS (1998: 44, 45) quotes and briefly explains them.

physical sound(s). The speech at the *Vaikharī* is, therefore, mandatory for others to understand the meaning the speaker intends to convey, which would otherwise be limited to himself.

The VP establishes, on the foundation of the Advaita metaphysics, the view that the signifier corresponds to the signified. To round off our discussion, the identity between *śabda* (i.e., the signifier) and *artha* (i.e., the signified) can be summarized from the Advaitic point of view as follows. The entire phenomenal world is a *vivarta* (illusory transfiguration) of the absolute reality. Since all "meanings" that are signified belong to the phenomenal world, they represent the "manifold" aspect of the single absolute reality, which is the *Śabdabrahman* or, as the later grammarians understood it, *sphoṭa*.[421] Put differently, *sphoṭa* and *artha* are two aspects of the absolute reality, i.e., *sphoṭa* is the single and real aspect of the *Śabdabrahman*, while meanings are its manifold and illusory aspect.

It is now obvious that the advocates of *sphoṭa* interpret both the signifier and the signified as two forms of the single intellect, and that their view can be defended from philosophical and linguistic perspectives. It is this *śabda - artha* identity that makes the *sphoṭa* doctrine a strong theory of *śābdabodha.* Again, the strength of the *sphoṭa* doctrine as a semantic theory largely depends on its being an internal[422] signifier (*vācaka*), which remains beyond the level of the externally produced physical sounds, on which the opponents' theories of *śābdabodha* are based. In contrast to the "physical" nature of articulatory sounds, *sphoṭa's* "cognitive" nature thus makes *sphoṭa* ontologically "closer" to meaning. The internality of *sphoṭa* corresponds well not only to the internality of meaning but also to the metaphysical foundation of *sphoṭa*.

[421] Cf. VP 2. 31: "*ekasyaivātmano bhedau śabdārthāv apṛthak sthitau*." [*Śabda* and *artha* are inseparably existing divisions of just the single *Ātman*, (the absolute reality).]. Cf. IYER's translation (1977: 15).
[422] VP 2. 1.

§ 5. Sphoṭa's Locus

The transition of speech across the four strata should now be examined to recognize the locus of *sphoṭa*. Except in Nāgeśa's works, we do not find any helpful account of *sphoṭa's* locus in the early modern works. From Nāgeśa's exposition of the *Madhyamā* stratum in particular, it appears that *sphoṭa* is the *Madhyamā*[423] per se. Conversely, he says again in the PLM that the *Śabdabrahman* is at the *Parā* stratum, which is, like the *Paśyantī*, reachable only by yogic aspirants.[424] Does this position of Nāgeśa imply that he does not equate *sphoṭa* with the *Śabdabrahman*? It does not. Also quoting the VP 1.1 in support of his position, Nāgeśa clearly holds that *sphoṭa*, which is revealed by the sounds of the *Madhyamā*, is in the form of the eternal *Śabdabrahman*.[425] It is easier to assume that, in Nāgeśa's view, *sphoṭa's* locus is neither the *Paśyantī* nor the *Madhyamā* precisely, but probably in between. However, irrespective of his acceptance of the *Parā* as the fourth stratum, his positioning of the *Śabdabrahman* in the *Parā*, while holding *sphoṭa* to be in the form of *Śabdabrahman*, also suggests that he did not specify the upper limit of the scale in which the locus of *sphoṭa* may lie.

Another evidence for *sphoṭa*'s locus deemed to be between the *Madhyamā* and the *Paśyantī* is the view that *sphoṭa* is smeared (*rūṣita*) or coloured (*uparakta*) with phonemes. Śeṣakṛṣṇa examines[426] this view in detail, in response to the opponents' question whether *sphoṭa* contains phonemes

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[423] PLM, p. 23: "*hṛdayaparyantam āgacchatā tena vāyunābhivyaktā tattadarthavācakaśabdasphoṭarūpā… madhyamā*." [The *Madhyamā* is … in the form of the sound, which is *sphoṭa* that signifies diverse meanings… It is manifested by the stream of air rising up to the heart]. Note that ŚEVAḌE elaborates on this compound as follows. He takes the *Madhyamā* to be *sphoṭa* alone. TP on STNśk 9, p. 29: "*tattadarthavācakaḥ sphoṭaḥ rūpaṃ yasyāḥ sā... madhyamā vāg eva sphoṭātmā iti bhāvaḥ*." [That which has as its form *sphoṭa* signifying various meanings... It means that just the *Madhyamā* speech has *sphoṭa* as its nature].

[424] PLM, p. 23.

[425] PLM, p. 23: "*tādṛśamadhyamānādavyaṅgyaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭātmako brahmarūpo nityaś ca*." [The *śabda* manifested by such sounds of the *Madhyamā* is eternal, has *sphoṭa* as its nature, and has the *Brahman* as its form], and PLM, p. 24: "*madhyamānādaś ca... śabdabrahmarūpasphoṭavyajñakaś ca*." [And the *Madhyamā* sound… also what manifests *sphoṭa* in the form of the *Śabdabrahman*.]

[426] See STN, *kārikā* 12.

as its constituents. His position is that phonemes are superimposed upon *sphoṭa*, as a result of which *sphoṭa* illusorily appears to be smeared or coloured with them, just as a red flower placed next to a crystal makes it appear red.[427] The sounds at the *Madhyamā* stratum, which is comparable with the red flower in the analogy, leave their memory traces in the form of reflections of phonemes, and manifest *sphoṭa* gradually. Although its real form, which is identical with the *Paśyantī*, is free from them, *sphoṭa*, which is comparable with the crystal sitting next to the red flower, is coloured with the reflections of phonemes. This is because the reflections of phonemes are ontologically close to *sphoṭa* in the course of their manifestation of it.

Bhartṛhari maintains that the transformation of sounds from their gross level to *sphoṭa* is a smooth process, because their forms change across the strata of speech, like the elements of a continuum do.[428] This view supports the position of the later grammarians that *sphoṭa* is smeared with the reflections of phonemes, and, therefore, sits "partly", though illusorily, in the *Madhyamā*. When gross sounds are grasped by the sense of hearing, they stimulate their corresponding sounds in the *Madhyamā*. In other words, gross sounds undergo a series of transformations (*āvṛtti*) to induce a cognitive sound pattern which is capable of manifesting a corresponding *sphoṭa*. Only upon the completion of the transformations (*āvṛttipāka*), *sphoṭa* becomes manifested and signifies the meaning. The manifested *sphoṭa*, however, is smeared with the "transformed cognitive forms" of sounds at the *Madhyamā*, and consequently appears identical with them. Therefore, Nāgeśa's implicit positioning of *sphoṭa* neither in the *Paśyantī* nor in the *Madhyamā* suggests that he also takes *sphoṭa* as resting in between them. *Sphoṭa's* identity with the *Śabdabrahman* is not however contradicted by such a view. *Sphoṭa* can be ascertained as resting between the *Madhyamā* and the *Paśyantī* from the viewpoint that *sphoṭa* seems identical with the (illusorily) superimposed phonemes. However, *sphoṭa* is totally in the *Paśyantī*, given that it is the ultimate reality. It follows then that *sphoṭa's* locus as somewhere in between the *Madhyamā* and the *Paśyantī* is simply an illusion.

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[427] Cf. PLM, p. 24.

[428] VP and VPbh 1. 91. It is analogical to the process of milk becoming curd, the steps of which are innumerable and undistinguishable from each other.

§ 6. Classification of *Sphoṭa*

Although Bhartṛhari presents a series of arguments in support of the doctrine of the indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍavākyavāda*) [429] in the *śābdabodha* process, we do not find in the VP and the MBhD more than an implicit portrayal of *sphoṭa* as a semantic theory. However, it is clear from the VP, and particularly the VPvd, that Bhartṛhari was aware of some groups of grammarians or philosophers who had favoured the possibility of approaching the *akhaṇḍavākya* from other perspectives.

The majority of the later grammarians admit that the *akhaṇḍavākya* represents the characteristics of *sphoṭa* most comprehensively. [430] Consequently, it is the "*akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*" [*sphoṭa* in the form of the indivisible sentence] that is meant by the term *sphoṭa* in most of the later interpretations, when it is introduced as the signifier of meaning. The rationale behind such a view is that the ontic and semantic significance of both phoneme-*sphoṭa* and word-*sphoṭa* can be recognized only after comprehending a complete sentence meaning through sentence-*sphoṭa*. As we learn from his ŚK, VSK (and the SN of the VBhS based on it), Śeṣakṛṣṇa's disciple Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita clearly posits in the very beginning of his examination of the *sphoṭa* doctrine that only the sentence-*sphoṭa* is the extreme essence (*atiniṣkarṣa*) of speech.[431] Nāgeśa[432] also agrees with Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita on this point.

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[429] The simplest definition of the *akhaṇḍavākya* would be that a sentence cannot be divided into constituents that are syntactically and semantically independent.

[430] Although the Naiyāyikas do not accept the *sphoṭa* doctrine, they maintain the sentence as capable of signifiying a complete meaning. NySBh 2. 1. 55: "*padasamūho vākyam arthasamāptau samartham*." [Sentence as a group of words is capable of (conveying) a complete sense]. Jayanta in his NM (p. 344) summarizes in two *kārikās* the grammarians' view on the permanency of the *vākyasphoṭa*, and the transience of phonemes, which disqualifies them from becoming the manifesters of meaning. See BHATTACHARYA's translation (1978: 788) for the context of those two *kārikās*.

[431] For instance, ŚK (*sphoṭanirūpaṇa* section) p. 9: "*vākyasphoṭapakṣe tātparyaṃ granthakṛtām*". [The author's (i.e., Bhaṭṭoji's) purport is the *vākyasphoṭa* view.]; VSK, *kārikā* 59 (*sphoṭavāda*, *kārikā* 1), p. 56: "*vākyasphoṭo 'tiniṣkarṣe tiṣṭhatīti matasthitiḥ | sādhuśabde 'ntargatā hi bodhakā na tu tatsmṛtāḥ*". [The established view is that the *vākyasphoṭa* remains the essence (of speech). Indeed just those (sounds) included in uncorrupted language, but not the (grammatical components) evoked by them, are the signifiers (of meaning)]. Cf. VBhS on this. ŚEVAḌE (TP on

Although the sentence was interpreted as the true nature (*ātman*)[433] of *sphoṭa*, some held the view that it is not mandatory for phonemes and words to be parts of a sentence in order to become *sphoṭas*, because of their independent significativeness. The views on *sphoṭa* were thus divided again, depending on the ontological aspect of *sphoṭa*, i.e., whether it represents a universal (*jāti*) or a particular (*vyakti*). Accordingly, eight subcategories of *sphoṭa* were distinguished. First, *sphoṭa* is of those two major classes, *jāti* and *vyakti*. The *jāti* class consists of three subcategories, i.e., *varṇa*, *pada,* and *vākya*, while the *vyakti* class has two major subcategories, *sakhaṇḍa* (divisible) and *akhaṇḍa* (indivisible). The *sakhaṇḍa* category again includes three further subcategories; *varṇa*, *pada,* and *vākya*, whereas the *akhaṇḍa* category has two subcategories; *pada* and *vākya*. Accordingly, the eight subcategories of *sphoṭa* can be enumerated as follows: (i) (*sakhaṇḍa*) *varṇasphoṭa*, (ii) (*sakhaṇḍa*) *padasphoṭa*, (iii) (*sakhaṇḍa*) *vākyasphoṭa*, (iv) *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*, (v) *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, (vi) *varṇajātisphoṭa* (vii) *padajātisphoṭa* (viii) *vākyajātisphoṭa*.[434]

It seems that the later grammarians did not unanimously admit the eightfold classes of *sphoṭa*. The *sakhaṇḍa* category is the least favoured. For some grammarians before Śeṣakṛṣṇa, such as Vopadeva,[435] only three classes; i.e., *varṇajāti*, *padajāti,* and *vākyajāti*, are possible, because for them it is the *jāti* aspect of *sphoṭa* that can be considered the essence of

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STNśk 9, p. 33) quoting the first two lines of this *kārikā* attributes it to Bhartṛhari, but none of published editions of the VP contains it.

[432] VSLM, p. 1: "*tatra vākyasphoṭa eva mukhyaḥ*" [There (i.e., among those classes of *sphoṭa*), the *vākyasphoṭa* is the foremost].

[433] For instance, Śeṣakṛṣṇa uses three times, i.e., STNsk 9, 10, 14, the inflections of the term *vākyātman* to modify the term *sphoṭa*.

[434] ŚK, p. 7; SV 1, p 1; SC 1, p. 1.
See JOSHI 1967: 73 - 87; RAJA 1969: 136; ŚĀSTRĪ 1980: 59, 72, 73; BILIMORIA 1988: 80; MATILAL 1990b: 104 for details. The Mīmāṃsakas hold a view similar to the *Vyaktisphoṭa* view, which is not accepted by the grammarians except Nāgeśa.

[435] VD, pp. 51, 52: "*bopadevena tu śakyatāvacchedikā jātir eva vācikety uktam. jātiś cāvidyako dharmaviśeṣaḥ. tathā ca varṇajātisphoṭaḥ padajātisphoṭaḥ vākyajātisphoṭaḥ iti tanmate sphoṭatrayam*." [But it was said by Bopadeva that just the universal, which delimits the state of being the referent, is the signifier (of meaning). And the universal is a special characteristic which is imaginary. Furthermore, in his view there are three (types of) *sphoṭa*: phoneme-universal-*sphoṭa*, word-universal-*sphoṭa*, and sentence-universal-*sphoṭa*]. Also see PANDEYA 1961: 247.

sphoṭa and consequently the signifier of meaning. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's preference was the *vakyajātisphoṭa*, whereas Nāgeśa and Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin[436] differ at some points from the traditional view. In what follows, I examine briefly the traditional account of them. [437]

6.1 *Varṇasphoṭa*

In the *varṇasphoṭa* view, phonemes are considered significative. However, it does not mean that all individual phonemes have significativeness but only "those that bring about grammatical operations (*śāstraprakriyānirvāhakas*)"[438], such as stems, roots, and affixes. Since those units that bring about grammatical operations are the smallest significant units which cannot be divided further, they resemble morphemes. The grammarians do not admit the *varṇasphoṭa* as significant in practical use of language due to its inability to trigger independently any complete meaning. Likewise, it is difficult to distinguish the *varṇasphoṭas* by analysing some composites such as inflected nouns. Nevertheless, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin says in his VD that the *varṇasphoṭa* is accepted by the Naiyāyikas,[439] while in his SC he further defends this view from the grammarians' perspective. If they were to support the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, the Mīmāṃsaka position that phonemes have the denotative power would have enabled them to favour the *varṇasphoṭa* view. On the grounds that the linguistic expressions with identical phonemes but in different sequences, such as "*rasa*" and "*sara*", would have signified identical meanings if individual phonemes had been significative, the grammarians refute any significativeness of the *varṇasphoṭa*.

[436] His SC contains an unconventional approach, although in the VD (p. 50) he accepts the eight types of *sphoṭa*.
[437] In Chapter Four, section 5.3, I examine Śeṣakṛṣṇa's understanding of the categorization of *sphoṭa* and his personal position on it.
[438] VSLM, p. 7.
[439] VD, p. 50. See PANDEYA 1961: 242.

6.2 *Padasphoṭa*

The view that the word possesses significative power is the *padasphoṭa* view. When the cognition of a word does not contain any cognition of its stem, suffix etc., as is the case with the substitutes "*vas*" and "*nas*" for accusative, dative, and genitive cases of the possessive pronouns "*yuṣmat*" and "*asmat*" respectively, such a word is considered to be a *padasphoṭa*.[440] Put differently, if a word makes a complete sense even when its grammatical composition is not known to a language user, then it could be a *padasphoṭa*. The *padasphoṭa* view, however, suffers the very issue encountered by the *varṇasphoṭa* view. It is not possible to recognize the amount of the significative power each word possesses in the euphonically combined composites, such as "*viṣṇo 'va* [O Viṣṇu, protect]" or "*dadhy atra* [curd here]".[441] This condition of words, therefore, raises the necessity of admitting the *vākyasphoṭa* view.

6.3 *Vākyasphoṭa*

The later grammarians maintain that phonemes or words of a linguistic expression cannot be differentiated syntactically and semantically at the practical level of language use. Accordingly, meaning is signified only by *sphoṭa* in the form of sentence.[442] The *varṇasphoṭas* and the *padasphoṭas* of such a *vākyasphoṭa* have to be distinguished only upon analysis[443] and

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[440] VBhS, *padasphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, *kārikā* 35, p. 400: "*ghaṭenetyādiṣu na hi prakṛtyādibhidā sthitā । vasnasādāv ivehāpi sampramoho hi dṛśyate*." [In the (words) such as "*ghaṭena*" (lit. with the pot), the separation of the stem (and the case suffix) is never determined. As in the (substitutes) "*vas*" and "*nas*", confusion is noticed in this case as well]. Also see VBhSd, VBhSp, and VBhSś on this.

[441] Cf. VP 2. 13. Cf. VBhS, *padasphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter*, kārikā* 66, p. 401: "*hare 'vetyādi dṛṣṭvā ca vākyasphoṭaṃ viniścinu*." [And observing (the sentences) such as "*hare'va*" (O Hari, protect), determine (that it is the) *vākyasphoṭa* (that is significative)].

[442] Cf. Jayanta presents the grammarians' position in NM, *pramāṇaprakaraṇa*, p. 344: "*tasmād ekah kramavirahitah kalpitāsadvibhāgo । vākyasphoṭo janayati matiṃ tādṛśīṃ svābhidheye*." [Therefore, the *vākyasphoṭa*, which is single, devoid of any sequence, and with imaginary (and) unreal divisions, raises the cognition (of meaning) corresponding to its referent.].

[443] VP 1. 24; 2. 10, 269, 445; 3. 1. 2 etc.

only after the manifestation of that *vākyasphoṭa*. In other words, phonemes and words have their ontological and semantic significance only within a meaningful sentence. Bhartṛhari does not employ the term *padasphoṭa* in his interpretations but illustrates, with some conventional examples[444], how words fail to be semantically self-sufficient, and why recognizing sentence, i.e., the *vākyasphoṭa* as it was called later, as the signifier of meaning is necessary.

6.4 *Akhaṇḍasphoṭa*

The indivisibility of a linguistic expression into constituents, which would have their own ontological and semantic significance outside of that expression, is the core of the *akhaṇḍasphoṭa* view. As in the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* view, grammatical components of a word, such as stem, prefixes, and suffixes, are not distinguishable as either phonetically or semantically independent, since the listener experiences the word as a single phonic whole that raises a single meaning. Similarly, the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* view is that even words cannot be differentiated out of a meaningful sentence without losing the ontological and semantic significance that they have within that sentence. Largely the early grammarians seem to have held the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* view.[445] They also highlighted that the grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) to distinguish words and their components is not relevant to the practical use of language. Put differently, they did not reject the existence of phonemes, morphemes, and words, but rather emphasized that the linguistic units other than sentence lack any independence or significance during communication, where only sentence is self-sufficient in ontic and semantic terms.

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[444] VP 2. 14: "*brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kaścid brāhmaṇakambale | devadattādayo vākye tathaiva syur anarthakāḥ*." [Just as, in the compound, *brāhmaṇakambala*, the term *brāhmaṇa* has no meaning, in the same way, in a sentence, words like Devadatta are without a meaning.]. IYER's (1977: 6) translation.
Cf. VP. 2. 54: "*yathā sāvayavā varṇā vinā vācyena kenacit | arthavantaḥ samuditā vākyam apy evam iṣyate*." [Just as phonemes, parts of a word are devoid of any meaning, so is the case with the sentence.]. IYER's (1977: 26) translation.
[445] Vyāḍi held a similar view, as quoted in VPbh 1.26.

The difference between the *padasphoṭa* and the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*, and again that between the *vākyasphoṭa* and the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, are now worth examining briefly. Plainly put, the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa* represent the divisible (*sakhaṇḍa*) approach[446] to word and sentence, while the indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) approach to them is represented by the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin's explanation of the distinction between the *sakhaṇḍa* and the *akhaṇḍa* classes of *sphoṭa* is helpful.

> *tad evāsmābhiḥ sakhaṇḍapadasphoṭatvena vyavahriyate. khaṇḍaśaktyanusandhānapūrvakakośādinā samudāyaśaktigrahāt. yasya tu vyākaraṇajñānaśūnyasya kevalavyavahāreṇa samudāyaśaktigrahas tasya sa evākhaṇḍasphoṭaḥ*. [447]

> We call just it the divisible *padasphoṭa*, because (one gets) the comprehension of the denotative power in a collection, i.e., a word, through the (use of) lexicons etc. that consist of the connection to the partial denotative power. But the (cognition of the) *akhaṇḍasphoṭa* arises just to the one who does not have any knowledge of grammar, (but instead) have the comprehension of the denotative power in a collection through the convention alone.

Unlike the cognition of the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa*, the cognition of the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* is, therefore, devoid of any grammatical knowledge of the divisibility of words and sentences into constituents. In other words, the listener's comprehension of word and sentence is not characterized by his attention to their grammatical composition. As a result, anyone who is aware of the convention of his speech community is fully capable of understanding meaning which is triggered by the *akhaṇḍa* class of *sphoṭa*.

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[446] JOSHI (1967: 87) compares the *sakhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* view with the *anvitābhidhāna* (semantic signification subsequent to syntactic connection) theory of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, to show that words do not have any independent existence out of sentence but are still its real constituents.

[447] SC, p. 6.

The *jātisphoṭa* view is that only the universal property of phoneme, word, and sentence is recognized at every instance of articulation, and it is unaffected by any articulatory idiosyncrasies. Three subclasses of the *jātisphoṭa*, i.e., *varṇajātisphoṭa* (phoneme-universal-*sphoṭa*), *padajātisphoṭa* (word-universal-*sphoṭa*), and *vākyajātisphoṭa* (sentence-universal-*sphoṭa*), are hypothesized accordingly. As a refinement of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* and what represents *sphoṭa*'s true nature, the *vākyajātisphoṭa* was apparently preferred by most of the later grammarians over all the other categories of *sphoṭa*. For example, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita clearly says that he maintains the *vākyajātisphoṭa*, [448] but the tone of his statement also suggests that there were contemporary grammarians who differed from his personal opinion, and that he does not criticize their views. Although holding the *varṇajātisphoṭa* as his personal view, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin also mentions in the VD (p. 50) that the *vākyajātisphoṭa* is the established view. The common linguistic practice (*vṛtti*) [449] of the elders of a speech community, i.e., convention (*vyavahāra*), which is the crest jewel [450] among all the means of comprehending significative power (*śakti*), rests only in sentence, the true nature of the *vākyajātisphoṭa*.

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[448] ŚK, (*sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter), p. 9: "*yady apīhāṣṭau pakṣā uktāḥ tathāpi vākyasphoṭapakṣe tātparyaṃ granthakṛtām. tatrāpi jātisphoṭa ity avadheyam, pūrvapūrvopamardenaivottarottaropanyāsāt*." [Although eight views are presented here, the (present) author's (i.e., Bhaṭṭoji's) purport is the *vākyasphoṭa* view. There (in the category of *vākyasphoṭa*) too, it should be understood that it is the *jātisphoṭa* view (that he intends), because of (his) mention of each subsequent (category of *sphoṭa*) just by refuting each preceding one.]. Cf. VD, p. 50.

[449] See PAL 2008 for the Nyāya view on *śakti* and *vṛtti*.

[450] Cf. SV, p. 56: "*kiñ ca śaktigrāhakaśiromaṇinā vyavahāreṇa samudāyeṣv eva śaktigrahāt samudāyaśaktir eva prāmāṇikī, na padaśaktiḥ, kevalapadeṣu vyavahārataḥ śaktigrahāsambhavāt*." [Furthermore, because the denotative power through the convention, which is the crest jewel (i.e., the most primary) among the means of comprehending the denotative power, is in the collections (of words, i.e., sentences) alone, only the denotative power of the collection (of words, i.e., sentence) is authoritative, not the denotative power of word (is authoritative), because it is impossible to comprehend from the convention the denotative power (resting) in individual words.]. Also See SVs on this.

It appears that Bhartṛhari's recognition of the universal property as the real (*satya*) aspect [451] of any phenomenal object influenced the later grammarians to maintain the *jātisphoṭa* as *sphoṭa*'s essence. However, they advocate [452] the *jātisphoṭa* not simply because of the Vedānta metaphysics that underpins the *sphoṭa* doctrine. If elaborated on this point using the Navya Nyāya jargon, just as the "capacity of being signified (*śakyatva*)" belongs to the "universal property resting in meaning (*arthagatajāti*)", the "capacity of signifying (*vācakatva*)" belongs to the "universal property resting in phoneme, word, and sentence".[453] Put differently, the universal property is the "delimiter of the primary signifier-ness (*śaktāvacchedikā*)".[454]

As we learn from the VP, there were some grammarians who maintained the view that the *dhvanis* which manifest *sphoṭa* as their universal (*jāti*) should be considered as particulars (*vyaktis*).

> *anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā*
> *kaiścid vyaktaya evāsyā dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ.* [455]
>
> Some held that the universal manifested by many particulars is *sphoṭa*, (while) the *dhvanis* are assumed to be just its (i.e., of *sphoṭa* taken to be the universal) particulars. [456]

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[451] VP 3. 1. 32: "*satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitau | satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ*." [In each thing, indeed two parts as the real and the unreal are present. There, the real (part) is the universal, (while) the unreal are known as the particular]. Also quoted in the SSbh, p. 26. Cf. VP 3. 3. 72.

[452] JHA (1981: 21 - 24) shows at what points the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians on this matter differ, and how the latter group sticks to the "*jāti*" view on phoneme etc., laying emphasis on parsimony in practical communication.

[453] DESHPANDE 1992: 60.

[454] I borrowed the English translations for the terms *śakta*, *śakya,* and *śakti* from DESHPANDE 1992: 60. Cf. GANERI 1999: 113: "It follows that the meant entity (*śakya*) is the subjunct and the word (*śakta*) is the adjunct of the abstract meaning relation (*śakti*)."

[455] VP 1. 93. Cf. MBhD 1. 17. 3: "*ya ete śabdāḥ kiṃ te śabdākṛtaya āhosvit śabdavyaktayaḥ iti*." [These sounds, are they sound forms or particulars of sounds?]. See PALSULE 1992: 219; DRAVID 1972: 215.

[456] Also see IYER's (1965: 91) translation.

ŚEVAḌE says[457] that two meanings can be derived from Bhartṛhari's use of the "*anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā*" here.

i. *Sphoṭa* is the universal manifested by many particulars that are phonemes [*anekābhir varṇavyaktibhir vyaṇgyā yā jātiḥ sā sphoṭaḥ*].
ii. *Sphoṭa* is the universal manifested out of the uniform cognition of many particulars [*anekavyaktiṣu ekākārapratyayāt vyaṇjyamānā yā jātiḥ sā sphoṭaḥ*].

Whichever meaning it denotes, the view that *sphoṭa* is the universal form of the linguistic expression that reveals it is not cancelled. Apparently, Bhartṛhari means here that *sphoṭa* was considered by some grammarians during his time to be the universal of the *śabda*, which is manifested "by the particulars of *śabda*", i.e., the *dhvanis*. In other words, only *sphoṭa* as the universal of *śabda* can be significative. He does not, however, provide enough evidence for us to determine whether the cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis*, as the universals of a certain set of sounds that manifest *sphoṭa*, should be considered the *jātisphoṭas*, which seems to have developed later into the view of the *varṇajātisphoṭa*.

Note here that Nāgeśa differs from the traditional view. He does not accept that any universal is manifested by a multitude of the particulars of sound. It is because articulatory idiosyncrasies and contextual properties, on the basis of which the particulars of phonemes are recognized, are limiting adjuncts. Consequently, phoneme, word, and sentence which are conditioned by articulatory idiosyncrasies etc. can be taken only as the *vyaktisphoṭas*. [458] As already stated, this view led him to accept only the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa,* not the *vākyajātisphoṭa* as Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita did, as the essence of *sphoṭa*. [459]

[457] TP on STNśk 9, p. 33.
[458] See JOSHI 1967: 82, 84 for details.
[459] KRISHNAMACHARYA (1946: 24) in the introduction to his SV edition says that Nāgeśa held the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* view.

Chapter THREE

Translation of the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* with Śeṣakṛṣṇa's auto-commentary

§ 1. Kārikās and Commentary

Kārikā 1

śabdabrahma cidānandam adhiṣṭhānam upāsmahe
yasya varṇāḥ padaṃ vākyaṃ vivartāḥ sañcakāsati.

I meditate upon the *Śabdabrahman*, which is consciousness, bliss, and substratum[460], (and) whose illusory transformations[461] shine (in the form of) phonemes, word and sentence.

Kārikā 2

mahābhāṣyamataṃ bhartṛhariṇāpi prakāśitam
ālocya sarvatantrāṇi sphoṭatattvaṃ nirūpyate.

The (true) nature of *sphoṭa*, which has been approved in the *Mahābhāṣya* (and) elucidated also by Bhartṛhari, is examined (here) after considering all (scholarly) systems.

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[460] These three are the characteristics of an aspirant's experience of *Brahman.* They merge in *Brahman* itself at the moment of the aspirant's identification with it. See DDV, 46.

[461] Cf. VPbh 1. 1: "*tata eva hi śabdākhyād upasaṃhṛtakramād brahmaṇaḥ sarvavikārapratyastamaye saṃvartād anākṛtāt pūrve vikāragranthirūpatvenāvyapadeśyāj jagadākhyā vikārāḥ prakriyante*." [The transformations, that is, the Universe proceeds out of *Brahman* which is the Word, devoid of all inner sequence; from that involution (*saṃvarta*), in which all diversity has merged and is undifferentiated and is inexpressible, all transformations being in a latent stage]. IYER's (1965: 2) translation.

Kārikā 3

na pratyekaṃ na militā na caikasmṛtigocarāḥ
arthasya vācakā varṇāḥ kintu sphoṭaḥ sa ca dvidhā.

Phonemes are not the signifiers of meaning individually. Nor are the (phonemes) combined together (the signifiers of meaning). Nor are the (phonemes) within the scope of a single memory either (the signifiers of meaning). But *sphoṭa* is (the signifier of meaning). And that (*sphoṭa*) is twofold.

Vṛtti 3

iha khalu padād vākyāc cārthapratītiḥ sarvānubhavasiddhā sarvavādisammatā ca.

Indeed here (in this world), the understanding of meaning from word(s) and sentence(s) is established through the experience of everybody and accepted by scholars of all doctrines as well.

tatra varṇā na pratyekam artham abhidadhati,
prathamavarṇād evārthapratītau
varṇāntaravaiyarthyāpatteḥ.

There (in a word and a sentence), phonemes do not express meaning individually, because the other phonemes would be superfluous if meaning is understood just from the first phoneme. [462]

nāpi militāḥ, uccaritapradhvaṃsināṃ kramikāṇāṃ melanābhāvāt.

Neither do combined (phonemes) (signify meaning), because there is no union of them as they perish once uttered and they occur in a sequence.[463]

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[462] In VPbh 1. 88, Bhartṛhari accounts for how different words differ in meaning although their first phonemes can still be identical. This is because they possess different powers (*śaktis*). Cf. MBh 1. 30 - 32.

nāpy ekasmṛtigocarāḥ, nadī rasa ityādau dīna sara ityekasmṛtiviṣayatvenāviśeṣāpatteḥ.

Neither do (phonemes) within the range of a single memory (signify meaning), because of the non-difference of (the memories of words such as) *nadī* and *rasa* from (the memories of words such as) *dīna* and *sara* * respectively, as a result of their being within the range of a single (i.e., common) memory.

* *nadī* (river), *dīna* (depressed), *rasa* (taste), *saras* (lake)

ato varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ padasphoṭo vākyasphoṭo vānavayava eko nityo 'rthavācaka ity āha - na pratyekam iti.

Therefore, either the word-*sphoṭa* or the sentence-*sphoṭa* manifested by phonemes is the signifier[464] of meaning, which (i.e., signifier) is single, devoid of constituents, and perpetual. (To expound this view) he says, "not individually" and so on (3rd *kārikā*).

dvidhā padasphoṭo vākyasphoṭo vā.

Twofold (means) either the word-*sphoṭa* or the sentence-*sphoṭa*.

tatra padasphoṭavādī padasphoṭa eva nityo 'navayavaḥ paramārthasann adhiṣṭhānaṃ varṇavākyayos tatrādhyāsāt te tadvivarta iti tadvibhāga āvidyakaḥ. kevalapadasphoṭebhya evākāṅkṣādimahimnā vākyārthaḥ samullasatīti manyate.

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[463] The later grammarians do not refute the sequence of the *dhvanis* that manifest *sphoṭa*, but never accept it as ontologically true. Cf. VP 1. 49. Also See KAHRS 1998: 254, 255.
Sphoṭa is obviously devoid of any "inner" sequence, because a fully manifested *sphoṭa* is manifested to the extent that it no longer remains incomplete and unable to trigger meaning. A conditioned sequence is however recognizable.

[464] Śeṣakṛṣṇa clearly holds the expressiveness (*vācakatva*/ *pratyāyakatva*) of *sphoṭa*. It is the later grammarians who place such an emphasis on it. I discuss this point further in Chapter Four. Cf. JOSHI 1967: 29: "Bhartṛhari has nowhere clearly stated in his *Vākyapadīya* that '*sphoṭa* is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is a meaning-bearing unit of the language'."

Regarding these, the upholder of the word-*sphoṭa* (maintains) as follows; only the word-*sphoṭa* is perpetual, devoid of constituents, existent in the absolute sense, and the substratum of phonemes and sentences. Due to being superimposed on it (i.e., word-*sphoṭa*), they (i.e., phonemes and sentences) are its illusory transfigurations, and so the division into those (i.e., phonemes and sentences[465]) is ignorance-born. (He, i.e., the upholder of the word-*sphoṭa*) thinks that the meaning of a sentence shines forth from just the word-*sphoṭas* alone (in the sentence), by means of the power of expectancy etc.[466]

vākyasphoṭavādī tu vākyam eva nityam anavayavam adhiṣṭhānaṃ varṇapade tu tadvivarta iti tadvibhāga āvidyaka iti manyate. vākyasphoṭapakṣe kaścit taṃ sāvayavaṃ manyate tadā tattattālvādisthānodbhavavāyavīyanādāparanāmaka-dhvaniviśeṣābhivyaṅgyā nityā vibhavo varṇā evāvayavāḥ.

Nonetheless, the upholder of the sentence-*sphoṭa* thinks as follows; only the sentence is perpetual, devoid of constituents, and the substratum (of phonemes and words). Phoneme and word are illusory transfigurations of it (i.e., sentence-*sphoṭa*), and so the division into those (i.e., phonemes and words) is ignorance-born. In reference to the position of the sentence-*sphoṭa*, someone takes it (i.e., sentence) to have constituents. Then the constituents are just phonemes, which are all-pervading, eternal, and manifested by certain types of *dhvani* sounds, also known as aerial "*nāda*", arising from various places of articulation such as the palate.

iyān viśeṣaḥ. yan niravayavapakṣe dhvanīnāṃ sāvayavapakṣe dhvanivyaṅgyavarṇānāṃ sphoṭavyañjakatvam iti.

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[465] The sentence cannot be an entity into which the *padasphoṭa* is divisible, as the former is ontologically larger than the latter. Apparently, Śeṣakṛṣṇa means here by "*tadvibhāgaḥ*" an "examination of the relation of sentence to it", i.e., the *padasphoṭa*.
[466] Cf. MS 2. 1. 46. Bhartṛhari also gives in VP 2. 4 the Mīmāṃsaka view on the conditions that make an utterance meaningful. Also see VPpr 2. 348. For a detailed study, see RAJA 1969: 149 - 187.

Only this much is the difference (between these two positions); (i) according to those holding the absence of constituents (in *sphoṭa*), the *dhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa*, and (ii) according to those holding the presence of constituents (in *sphoṭa*), phonemes manifested by the *dhvanis* manifest it.

vastutas tu sāvayavapakṣo na sambhavati.

Actually, the side of those holding the presence of constituents (in *sphoṭa*) is not tenable.

tathā hi - varṇāḥ sphoṭasyāvayavā bhavantaḥ kiṃ bhaṭṭamatam avalambya vibhūni dravyāṇi bhaveyur, atha vā tārkikamatam ālambya gaganaguṇā, āhosvid ekadeśīyamatam avaṣṭabhya vāyavīyārabdhadravyāṇi.

For it is like this. Can phonemes, being constituents of *sphoṭa,* be, (i) all-pervasive substances, by accepting the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas' view, or (ii) qualities of the ether, by accepting the view of the Naiyāyikas,[467] or (iii) substances formed out of air, by resorting to the view of those accepting part (of the Naiyāyikas' position)?

na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ - sarvatrāvayavānām avayavyapekṣayā nyūnaparimāṇatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ varṇānāṃ ca paramamahatāṃ tadasambhave 'vayavatvābhāvāt.

First, the first side is not (tenable). The lesser size[468] of the constituents in comparison to the whole is seen everywhere, and since that is not

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[467] This is also held by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiśeṣikas. Cf. PDS (*Śabdanirūpaṇa* section of the *Guṇa* chapter), p. 645: "*śabdo 'mbaraguṇaḥ śrotragrāhyaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ kāryakāraṇobhayavirodhī saṃyogavibhāgaśabdajaḥ pradeśavṛttiḥ samānāsamānajātīyakāraṇaḥ*." [Sound is the property of *Ākāśa*. It is perceptible by the ear. It is momentary; and counteracted by its effect, by its cause and by both; it is produced by conjunction, disjunction and another sound; it has a limited existence; and is brought about by homogeneous and heterogeneous causes.]. Translation by JHA 1916: 611 - 612. Cf. PDSnk and PDSv on this.

[468] Amalānanda (c. 1250) says in ŚDar 2. 4: "*upādānasya tantvādeḥ paṭāder nyūnatā yataḥ । jaganmūlaṃ tato nyūnaparimāṇaṃ pratīyate*." [Inasmuch as threads etc.,

possible in the case of phonemes, which are absolutely large[469], phonemes are not constituents (of *sphoṭa*).

na madhyamaḥ - varṇānām ākāśaguṇatve saty adravyatayā samavāyikāraṇatvābhāve dravyasamavāyikāraṇatvarūpasyāvayavatvasyābhāvāt.

The middle view is not (tenable), because if phonemes are qualities of ether, they are not substances, and since they are therefore not the inherence cause[470] (of something else), they do not possess the condition of being a part, the form of which is the condition of being an inherence cause of a substance.

nāntyaḥ - āśuvināśināṃ kramikāṇām asahabhuvām asambaddhānām avayavinam abibhrāṇānām avayavatvābhāvād ity anavayavaḥ pratyastamitavarṇapadavibhāgo vākyasphoṭa eva śreyān iti tattvam.

The final position is not (tenable). (Phonemes) are perishing quickly (once articulated), sequential, not occurring together[471], mutually unconnected, and not bearing a whole (of which they can become the constituents). Because such phonemes are not constituents, only the sentence-*sphoṭa,* which is devoid of constituents, and in which any distinction of phonemes

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which are the material cause of a cloth etc. are smaller, (then) the cause of the world is understood to be smaller].

[469] DASGUPTA 1922: 316: "The *parimāṇa* of *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, and *ātman*, which are regarded as all pervasive, is said to be *parama-mahat* (absolutely great)."

[470] The later Naiyāyikas explain the inherence cause as follows. BhP 23: "*samavāyikāraṇatvaṃ dravyasyaiveti vijñeyam*." [One must know that the state of being an inherence cause belongs to a substance alone].

[471] The grammarians, both early and later, admit that phonemes are neither produced nor extant simultaneously. For instance, MBh 1. 356. 5 on A 1. 4. 109: "*ekaikavarṇavartinī vāk. na dvau yugapad uccārayati... uccaritapradhvaṃsitvāt*." [Language exists only in individual phonemes. (One) does not pronounce two phonemes simultaneously… because of the transience of articulated (phonemes)].

and words has ceased[472] to exist, is preferable. That is the (true) nature (of *sphoṭa*).

Kārikā 4

varṇānāṃ pratyabhijñānabalāt syān nityatā yadi
anityataiva kiṃ na syād utpādādidhiyāṃ balāt.

If phonemes are eternal because of the power of recognition, are not they, in fact, non-eternal, due to the power of cognitions of (their) production and so on (i.e., destruction)?

Vṛtti 4

Objection:

nanu varṇānāṃ nityatayāsti samudāyaḥ sa cārthaṃ gamayatīty ata āha - varṇānām iti. yo 'haṃ bālye pitarāv anvabhavaṃ so 'ham idānīṃ naptṝn anubhavāmīti pratyabhijñābalād ātmano nityatvam iva sa evāyaṃ gakāra ityādipratyabhijñānabalād varṇānāṃ nityatvam. na caiṣā bhrāntā, bādhakābhāvāt.

But the accumulation of phonemes (ensues) through (their) eternality, and that (accumulation) signifies meaning. Therefore, (in response to this objection) he says "of phonemes" and so on (4th *kārikā*). Just as the eternality of one's self [473] (is understood) due to the power of recognition[474]

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[472] The "*pratyastamita*" state of phonemes and words does not imply that they "did not exist" on their way to manifest *sphoṭa*. Instead, there are no longer any distinct phonemes or words left in the cognition of manifested *sphoṭa*.

[473] This is an often found analogy in the Advaita Vedānta texts, for instance, in the *Rasābhivyañjikā* commentary by Svayaṃprakāśa Yati on Lakṣmīdhara's *Advaitamakaranda*; AMr 4, pp. 7, 8.

[474] As in the Advaita Vedānta, the knowledge through recognition is not limited to either of the perceptions, i.e., previous and current, but is composed of both. Cf. Jñānaghanapāda's TŚ 31. 1, p. 187: "*kā tarhi pratyabhijñā nāma? pūrvānubhavasaṃskārasahitād idānīṃtanapramāṇakāraṇād utpadyamānam*

(in a case like) "I, who perceived my parents in my childhood, now perceive, as the same (person), (my) grandsons", the eternality of phonemes (is understood), because of the power of recognition, (in a case like) "this *ga-* phoneme is that very one (i.e., the same one)" and so forth. And this (recognition) is not erroneous, because of the absence of any obstructer (i.e., sublating cognition).[475]

atha pratyabhijñābādhakaṃ kiñcid utprekṣaṇīyam. tad uktam.

> **utprekṣeta hi yo mohād ajñātam api bādhakam**
> **sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṃśayātmā kṣayaṃ vrajet, iti.**

If (one says that, in this case,) some sublating (cognition) of the recognition (of phonemes) has to be imagined, then it is said (in response to him):

"Indeed, the one who imagines, out of (his) delusion, (the presence of) an obstructer, even though (such an obstructer is) unknown (to exist), being doubtful about all (his) practices, would go to destruction." [476]

tatraikasmin bahūnām uccārayatām udātto 'nudāttaḥ sānunāsiko niranunāsikaś ceti viruddhadharmādhyāsād bādhakād bhedo varṇānām.

There, due to the obstructer (of the recognition, in the form of) the superimposition of contrastive properties; *udātta*, *anudātta*, nasal, and

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ekasya sambandhadvayaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pratyabhijñā." [What is meant by recognition? Recognition is a perception whose content is an object generated by the present awareness accompanied by traces of previous experience and having its relation to the times of both as its content]. POTTER's (2006: 309) translation.

[475] Maṇḍana Miśra in VV, *kārikā* 97 (p. 11) explains that sublating cognition leads to the truth: "*vyabhicāramater eva na tathaiveti gamyate | tat satyaṃ bādhakajñānaṃ yatra tatra vihanyate*." [From the discrepant cognition alone, that "it is certainly so" is not understood. Where there is a true sublating cognition, there that (discrepant cognition) gets cancelled]. Also see TS 2866.

[476] TS, verse 2872. Also in SDS (*Jaiminīdarśana* chapter), p. 276. Ratnakīrti (c. 11th century) quotes this verse in his *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* as belonging to the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* of Kumārila (a lost work on the Mīmāṃsā).

non-nasal, on a single one (i.e., phoneme), when it is pronounced by many speakers, the difference of phonemes is established.

na codāttādayo varṇavyañjakadharmā na varṇadharmā iti vācyam. tadvyañjakā vāyavas teṣām aśrāvaṇatve taddharmāṇām aśrāvaṇatvāpatter iti.

Nor should it be said that "the *udātta* accent etc. are the properties of the manifesters[477] of phonemes, not the properties of phonemes." (This is) because the manifesters of them (i.e., of phonemes) are streams of air, (and) if they are inaudible[478], their properties would (also) be inaudible.

Response:

ucyate. guṇyagrahaṇe 'pīndriyāṇāṃ guṇagrahaṇam asti. katham anyathā bhūjalākāśāgrāhakair ghrāṇarasanaśrotrair gandharasaśabdā gṛhyeran? etena tāratvādayo 'pi viruddhadharmā vyākhyātāḥ. bhavetāṃ vā guṇaguṇināv ekendriyagrāhyau tathāpi na doṣaḥ. dhvanīnām api śabdavac chrāvaṇatvena tadgatodāttādidharmapratīteḥ.

(If they say as such) we reply (as follows). Even though not grasping the bearers of qualities, the sensory organs grasp the qualities. Otherwise, how could odour, taste, and sound be grasped by the senses of smell, taste,

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[477] As in the Mīmāṃsā perspective, the streams of air or the *dhvanis* that manifest phonemes seem to have the properties such as *udātta*, *anudātta* etc., but such properties do not inherently belong to those manifesters. See ŚV, *Sphoṭa* chapter, verses 57, 58.

[478] In the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, air (*vāyu*) is perceived tactilely, but not auditorily. MM (*Prameya* chapter) 2. 15: "*arūpatve sati sparśavān vāyuḥ. sa ca mandavātaniḥśvāsavātādirūpatvagindriyarūpaś ca … atas tvagindriyagrāhyo vāyuḥ*." [Air is what has touch, while having no colour. And that is of the form of gentle breeze, the breath, etc. and of the form of the sense of touch … Therefore, air is what is apprehended through the sense of touch]. Translation by RAJA and ŚĀSTRĪ 1975: 159, 161.

and hearing, which do not grasp the earth, water, and ether respectively? For this reason, even the shrillness and so on have been explained as the contrastive properties (of *dhvanis*). Or, let both the quality and (its) bearer be graspable by the same sensory organ, still there is no fault. (This is) because, in as much as the *dhvanis* too, just like the *śabda* (i.e., sound), are audible, their properties such as *udātta* are perceived.

atha yā pratyabhijñā sā gatvādijātiviṣayā na gādivyaktiviṣayā. ata eva śabdabhedopalambhād vaktṛbheda unnīyate. somaśarmādhīte na viṣṇuśarmādhīta iti.

Then, if there is any recognition, it has the universal "*ga*-ness" and so on as its scope, (but) not the particulars (of the phoneme) "*ga*-" and so on as its scope. Because of that very reason, the difference of the speakers is inferred from the ascertainment of the difference of (articulated) sounds, (as in the case that) "it is Somaśarman who is reciting (now), (but) not Viṣṇuśarman." [479]

Objection:

satyam, yo 'yaṃ gādivyaktibhedam aṅgīkṛtya gatvasyaikasya paropadhānabhedakalpanāprayāsaḥ sa paraṃ gādivyaktāv evāstu kim antargaḍunā gatvenāṅgīkṛtena. tathā cāhuḥ.

> **tena yat prārthyate jātes tad varṇād eva labhyate**
> **vyaktilabhyaṃ tu nādebhya iti gatvādidhīr vṛthā, [480] iti.**

[479] See the Mīmāṃsakas' position on this matter summarized in the SDS (*Jaiminīdarśana* chapter) 12.

[480] ŚV, *Sphoṭavāda* section, verse 26. Also Cf. ŚVubh on it.
A note on "*tena*" of this *kārikā*, a summary of the Mīmāṃsaka position that led them to present the above view, is found in the STN editions by both BĀKRE (1913: 3) and TRIPĀṬHĪ (1994: 7): "*yena varṇeṣu vyaktibhedo na sphuṭas tena yat pratyabhijñānaṃ jāteḥ prārthyate vyaktilabhyaḥ bhedapratyaya ity arthaḥ. pratyabhijñānasya varṇaikyād viruddhadharmavattāyāś ca dhvanigatatvād upapattir ity arthaḥ. yad vā jāter ekatvena hetunā yat pratyabhijñānaṃ tad*

vyaktilabhya udāttādibhedaḥ.

True, having accepted the difference of the particulars such as the "*ga-*" phonemes etc., if there is an effort to assume the distinction of the single "*ga*-ness" resting upon something else[481] (as a condition, such as upon *Brahman*), let it rather be (involved in assuming) just the particular of "*ga-*" (phoneme) and so on. What is the necessity of accepting the superfluous "*ga*-ness" ? Similarly, (they, i.e., Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas) say (as follows).

"Therefore, what is sought from the universal is obtained just from the (particular) phoneme, but what should be obtained from a particular is (obtained) from gross sounds. Accordingly, the cognition of "*ga*-ness" etc. is unnecessary."

The (cognition of) difference such as *udātta* etc. is what can be obtained from particular (phonemes).

evaṃ cābādhitapratyabhijñābalād ekatve niścite tadvyañjakadhvaniviṣayo 'yaṃ vicitraḥ pratyayo na varṇaviṣaya iti. kiñ ca varṇabhede daśa gakārān udacārayad iti pratyayaḥ syān na tu daśakṛtvo gakāram iti.

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varṇaikyād upapādyam. bhedapratītis tu vyañjakadhvanigatabhedaviṣayatvenopapādyeti." [It means that recognition is expected from universal because the difference of particulars is not evident in phonemes, (and) the cognition of difference can be obtained from particulars. (Furthermore,) it means that the proof (for maintaining as such) is that recognition clings to the unity of phoneme and the condition of having contrastive properties clings to the *dhvanis*. Or else, the recognition that arises due to the singleness of universal must be proved (as arising) from the unity of phoneme. Nevertheless, the cognition of difference must be proved by its having as its scope the difference of the *dhvanis* that manifest (phonemes)].

[481] Both the editions of the STN (BĀKRE 1913: 2; TRIPĀṬHĪ 1994: 7) contain the following as a note on "*paropadhānabhedakalpanāprayāsaḥ.*" [the effort in the assumption of the difference (of those) depending upon others], probably added by BĀKRE from the manuscripts: "*gakārādyupahitatvena brahmasattāyāḥ gatvādibhedakalpanāprayāsaḥ.*" [Due to the dependence of the *ga-* phoneme etc. (on it, i.e., *Brahman*), the effort in assuming any distinction of *ga*-ness etc. from the supreme reality, *Brahman*.].

And then, if the unity (of the phoneme) is determined from the power of the unobstructed recognition, this non-uniform cognition has the *dhvani* that manifests it (i.e., the phoneme) as its scope, (but) not the phoneme as its scope. Moreover, had there been a difference of phonemes, the knowledge "(he) pronounced ten *ga-* phonemes" would have arisen, but not (the knowledge) "(he pronounced) the *ga-* phoneme ten times."

tathā cāha śārīrakabhāṣye bhagavān śaṅkarācāryaḥ - varṇavyaktaya eva hi pratyuccāraṇaṃ pratyabhijñāyante dvir gośabda uccarita iti hi pratītiḥ, na dvau gośabdāv iti.[482]

Similarly, the revered Śaṅkarācārya says in the *Śārīrakabhāṣya* - "Indeed, just the particulars of phonemes are recognized at each pronunciation, (for) indeed the cognition "the word *go-* (i.e., cow) was pronounced twice" (arises), not (the cognition) "two *go-* words (were pronounced)."

Response:

yady api so 'yaṃ gakāra iti pratyabhijñāsti tathāpy utpanno gakāro vinaṣṭo gakāras tāro gakāro mandro gakāra ityādyanekapratītibalena bhede bhāsamāne pratyabhijñāyās tajjātīyatvaṃ viṣayo na tu vyaktyabhedaḥ.

[482] BSśbh 1. 3. 28. ŚEVAḌE in the TP on STNśk 4 (p. 9), however, quotes the following verse that seemingly contradicts Śaṅkara's claim, but without acknowledging the source: "*pratyakṣapratyabhijñānād varṇaikatvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam | varṇātmakaṃ padaṃ tac ca tadabhedān na bhidyate*." [The unity of phoneme is established due to direct recognition. Word has as its nature phonemes. And it is not divided because of the non-difference of phonemes.]. Nāgeśa quotes it in the VSLM (*Śaktyāśrayanirūpaṇa* section, p. 180) as from the VP, but the published recensions of the VP do not include it.
If this view is admitted, as ŚEVAḌE explains, there cannot be any difference between the "*ka-*" and "*ga-*" phonemes, as a result of the non-difference of the *dhvanis* that reveal them. Therefore, there would be a disturbance to the distinction of phonemes (*bhedavilopāpatti*).

Even though there is the recognition that "this *ga-* phoneme is the same one", still, when the difference (of phonemes) is apparent due to the power of the manifold cognitions such as "the *ga-* phoneme is produced, the *ga-* phoneme perished, the *ga-* phoneme is shrill, the *ga-* phoneme is low", the scope of the recognition is its (i.e., the *ga-* phoneme's) condition of being of that type (i.e., being connected to that universal, *ga*-ness), but not the identity of the particulars (of that phoneme).

Objection:

na caivaṃ tajjātīyo 'yam iti dhīḥ syān na tu so 'yam iti vācyam. saiveyaṃ dīpaśikhā, tān eva tittiḍīn upabhuñje, tad evedam auṣadham anyaiḥ pītaṃ mayā 'pi pīyate ity ādiṣu tajjātīyapratīter api so 'yam ity ākāradarśanāt, tajjātīyo 'yaṃ na so 'yam iti vyaktyabhedāpratīteś ca.

Nor should it be said that: "the knowledge 'this has that as its universal' would arise, but not (the knowledge) 'this is the same'." (This is) because, in (the circumstances like) "this lamp-flame is the same one", "I eat the same tamarinds" (and) "this is the same medicine drunk by others, which is (now) drunk also by me", even the cognition of (it) having that as its universal appears in the form of "this is the same", and because the cognition of the identity of particulars does not arise in (the notion that) "this has that as its universal, (but) this is not that".[483]

Response:

na ca gatvādijātāv eva vivaditavyam. gakāro 'yaṃ, gakāro 'yam ity anugatagakārākārapratītibalena strīpuṃsādivaktṛviśeṣānumānabalena ca tatsiddheḥ. anyathā jātimātrocchedaprasaṅgaḥ.

[483] One's cognition of the universal property of a given set of particulars does not hinder the rise of his cognition of the mutual non-difference of those particulars. In other words, as the opponents argue, the recognition that "X is just Y" can still arise, even if the cognition "X has Y as its universal" is already present.

Nor should one dispute just over the universal such as "*ga*-ness". (This is) because it (i.e., the universal) is established through the power of the cognition, whose form is the "*ga*-" phoneme, which is common to (the perceptions) "this is a "*ga*-" phoneme, this is a "*ga*-" phoneme", and through the power of inferring the (articulatory) distinction of speakers such as (that between) females and males. Otherwise[484] (i.e., at the establishment of the uniform cognition through the similarity of the particulars), (it would be) a reductio ad absurdum to the destruction of anything that is a universal.

na ca pramārūpapratyabhijñābalena dhvanigata evāyam utpādādipratyaya iti vinigamanāviraha iti vācyam. ubhayapratītyaprāmāṇyakalpanāpekṣayaikasyā eva pratyabhijñāyā aprāmāṇyakalpanālāghavasya vinigamakatvāt. tasmād ubhayamate sphoṭarūpaśabdaparabrahmaṇo na brahmaṇāpy apahnavaḥ kartuṃ śakyata iti.

Nor should it be said that, there is a lack of criterion (for judging the proposition) that "this cognition of the production of (phonemes) and so on is associated with just the *dhvanis*", through the power of recognition in the form of valid knowledge. (This is) because of the criterion that, in comparison to assuming the invalidity of both[485] the cognitions, it is simpler to assume the invalidity of recognition, which is just single. Therefore, (we conclude that), in both views, the denial of the supreme *Śabdabrahman*[486] in the form of *sphoṭa* cannot be made even by *Brahman*.

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[484] As a note on *anyathā*, "*vyaktisādṛśyenaikākārapratītisiddhau*" is found in both BĀKRE's (1913: 3) and TRIPĀṬHĪ's (1994: 7) editions.

[485] Assuming "the state of *utpattiprakāraka* (knowledge in which the origination is a qualifier)" in the phonemes that do not get produced, and assuming "the state of *vināśaprakāraka* (knowledge in which the destruction is a qualifier)" in the phonemes that do not perish are both invalid. With this line of argument, the Naiyāyikas confirm the non-eternality of phonemes. For the Nyāya view "*tadvati tatprakārakatva*" i.e., knowledge is valid when it is qualified by X (*prakāraka*) and directed to something that has X, see TarS 35, p. 23. Cf. TarSd and TarSnb on this phrase.

[486] Apparently Śeṣakṛṣṇa uses here the term *Śabdaparabrahman* as it is used in the *Pratyabhijñā* school. In the grammarians' interpretation of *sphoṭa*, the Advaitic

Kārikā 5

nityānām api varṇānāṃ tattadvyañjakavāyubhiḥ dhvanibhir vā tirodhāne na varṇasamudāyadhīḥ.

If phonemes, even though eternal, are obstructed by either the streams of air manifesting each and every (phoneme) or the *dhvanis*, there is no cognition of the accumulation of phonemes.[487]

Vṛtti 5

Objection:

nanu mā bhūd āśuvināśitvaṃ nityā eva varṇā iti darśane katham asahabhāva ity ata āha - nityānām apīti.

But on the view "surely, let there not be any transience (and) phonemes are indeed eternal", how (could there be) any absence of coexistence? In response to this objection, he says "(if phonemes), even though eternal" and so on (5th *kārikā*).

Response:

nityānām api apiśabdād vibhūnāṃ ca vāstavī saṅgatir atiprasaṅginī sarvebhyaḥ sarvadārthapratyayaprasaṅgād ity anubhavānusāriṇī sā vaktavyā.

Śabdabrahman is not taken to be identical to the Śaiva *Śabdaparabrahman*. It is the Śaivists who call it *Śabdaparabrahman* when introducing the grammarians' position on the speech principle. See KAW 1967: 76, 77, 87.

[487] Since there cannot be any uninterrupted sequence (*avyavahita-uttaratva*) of the manifesters, it is impossible for phonemes to get manifested without interruption, as a result of which phonemes cannot accumulate to raise any cognition of a word. Verbal cognition through the cognition of the word, therefore, fails. TP on STN 5, p. 12.

The real aggregation of the eternal and, (as understood) from the word "*api*" (in the *kārikā*), omnipresent (phonemes) would occur unwarrantedly, due to the undesirable consequence that comprehension of meaning (would then arise) always from all of them (i.e., phonemes). Accordingly, it (i.e., the aggregation of phonemes) is to be interpreted as what is understood through experience.

teṣāṃ cānekatvād anubhavakarmatayā abhivyaktirūpeṇa sāhityaṃ na sambhavati. tadā tadvyañjakā vāyavo dhvanayaś ca bahavas taiś ca[488] vyavadhāne nityapakṣe 'pi nāmīṣāṃ samudāya iti.

And, because of the manifoldness of them, in as much as they are the objects of experience, the (phonemes') coexistence[489] in (their own) manifested form does not occur. Then, (given that) the streams of air and the *dhvanis* manifesting phonemes are many and, when these are obstructed by them (i.e., by the streams of air and the *dhvanis*), their accumulation is not (possible) even on the view that phonemes are eternal.

Kārikā 6

pūrvānubhūtasaṃskārakūṭān nāntyaspṛśo 'rthadhīḥ svabhāvasya viparyāsāt kalpane 'nyasya gauravāt.

The cognition of meaning does not (arise) from the collection of memory traces (of the phonemes) experienced before, which has reached[490] the final (phoneme). (This is) because of the inversion of the (true) nature (of

[488] The following is given as a note here in both BĀKRE's (1913: 4) and TRIPĀṬHĪ's (1994: 12) editions: "*saṃyogābhivyaktir vyañjakakrameṇaiva*." [the manifestation of collection is by means of just the sequence of the manifesters].
[489] Cf. TP on STNśk 5, p. 12: "*sahāvasthānaṃ*" [coexistence].
[490] TP on STN 6, p. 13: "*antyavarṇānubhavasahakārī*." [Accompanying the experience of the final phoneme].

memory traces)[491] and the prolixity in assuming something else [492] (as an alternative).

Vṛtti 6

Objection:

nanv arthapratyayānupapattyā yo 'yaṃ nityo niravayavaḥ sphoṭo 'ṅgīkriyate sa na sambhavati arthapratīter anyathopapatteḥ.

But (if) this eternal and partless *sphoṭa* is admitted (just) because the cognition of meaning does not arise (through other means), it (i.e., such a view) is not acceptable, because it is possible for the cognition of meaning to arise another way, (i.e., without *sphoṭa*). [493]

tathā hi - smaraṇaphalonnītasadbhāvās tāvatpūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavasaṃskārās teṣāṃ kūṭo 'ntyavarṇānubhavasahakārī. tata evārthapratītyupapattir ity ata āha - pūrveti.

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[491] TP on STN 6, p. 13: "*saṃsakāraḥ svajanakānubhavaviṣayagocarāṃ smṛtiṃ janayatīti niyamasya bhaṅgaḥ syāt*." [There would be a violation of the rule that the memory trace produces a memory which has as its range the object of "the act of experiencing", which is the producer of it (i.e., memory trace).]

[492] If the memory traces produced by phonemes are assumed to generate a memory of an external referent, which is "something else" in addition to the memory of the object (i.e., phonemes) of their producer (i.e., experiencing), it is inevitably a complex assumption. Cf. Maṇḍana Miśra's view in SSm 6, p. 44: "*saṃskārāḥ khalu yadvasturūpaprakhyāprabhāvitāḥ | vijñānahetavas tatra tato 'rthe dīr na kalpate*." [Impressions (*saṃskārāḥ*) can only cause the cognition of those things by whose perceptions they have themselves been caused. Therefore, the understanding of the meaning is still inexplicable.] Translation by IYER 1966: 16. Also see KAR 2006: 123 for the Nyāya response to this.

[493] TP on STNśk 6, p. 14: "*sphoṭam vināpy arthapratyayasambhavāt*." [Because the cognition of meaning can arise even without *sphoṭa*.]

For it is like this. The memory traces of the experiences of each and every preceding phoneme have their existence inferred[494] from the result that is the memory, (and) their accumulation is concurrent with the experience of the final phoneme. From just that (single collective memory), the cognition of meaning arises. In response to (this objection), he says, "(experienced) before" and so on (6th *kārikā*).

Response:

yo yadviṣayānubhavajanyaḥ sa tadviṣayāṃ smṛtiṃ prasūta iti saṃskārasya svabhāvaḥ. arthapratyayaprasave tv asau viparyasyet.

Whatsoever is produced out of the experience of a certain object brings forth the memory of that object; that is the nature of the memory trace. But, in bringing forth the cognition of meaning, this (nature of the memory trace) would be overturned (in your view).

kiñca yadi varṇānubhavajanitaḥ saṃskārakūṭo 'nyasminn arthe dhiyam ādadhyāt tadā sarvo 'pi jano yaṃ kañcid ekam artham anubhūya sarvaṃ jānīyād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ.

Moreover, if the accumulation of the memory traces produced through experiencing phonemes raises the cognition of an entity different (from the phonemes), then it would be hyper-eventuality that every person, having experienced whatever entity, might know everything. [495]

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[494] TP on STNśk 6, p. 14: "*kāraṇabhūtaṃ saṃskāraṃ vinā smaraṇarūpakāryāsambhavāt tādṛśasmaraṇarūpabalenaiva tatkāraṇabhūtatādṛśasaṃskārakalpanam āvaśyakam*." [Because without the memory trace, which is the cause, it is impossible for the memory, which is the effect, to exist, just through the power of the form of memory of that sort, it is necessary to assume the memory trace of that sort, which is the cause of it (i.e., memory)].

[495] TP on STNśk 6, p. 15: "*tādṛśānubhavajanyasaṃskārabalāt*." [due to the power of the memory traces produced by such experiences]. The grammarians remark that everybody would acquire omniscience if the opponents' theory that "a single

tathā ca dvitīyaṭīkāyāṃ vācaspatimiśrāḥ -

> **bhāvanāparanāmnaḥ saṃskārasya svotpādakānubhavagocarasmṛtijananād anyatra sāmarthyādarśanāt. na hi gavānubhavajanitaḥ saṃskāraḥ karoti smṛtiṃ turage, iti.**

Furthermore, Vācaspati Miśra in (his) commentary on the second (chapter of the *Nyāyavārttika*) [496] (says as follows).

"(This is) because for the memory trace, also known as imagination (*bhāvanā*), we see no capacity for anything other than the production of the memory of what is in the range of the experience that produces it (i.e., memory trace). (For example), the memory trace produced by experiencing a cow never leaves the memory of a horse."

etena pratyekavarṇānubhavajanitasaṃskārakūṭena tāvad varṇagocaraikā samūhālambanarūpā smṛtir janyate. sā cāntyavarṇasaṅgatārthadhiyam ādhatta iti nirastam.

For this reason, the (following) claim is refuted; "by the accumulation of the memory traces produced by experiencing each and every phoneme is first produced a single memory, whose scope is phonemes and whose form is a dependence on the collection (of them, i.e., phonemes), and that (memory) raises the cognition of meaning, which comes together with the (experience of) the final phoneme."

na ca kḷptasmṛtijananaśaktau tādṛśasaṃskārarūpāyāṃ lāghavād arthadhījananaśaktikalpanam iti vācyam. śaktāv api śaktikalpanāyāṃ vahnyādiśaktāv api śaktikalpane 'navasthādūṣaṇaprasaṅgaḥ.

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collective memory triggers the cognition of referent(s) other than that of the objects of its producer" is admitted. This is because the view that "the memory of an object of experience raises the cognition not only of just that object but also of a totally different entity" leads to the premise that "it can trigger the cognition of whatsoever referent at the listener's discretion."

[496] NVTṬ 2. 2. 57.

Nor should it be said that "if the power of generating memory in the form of such memory traces is established, due to the parsimony of hypothesis, (it is also possible) to assume the power generative of the cognition of meaning." The error of infinite regress would occur, if (another) power is postulated for a power (as when) (another) power is assumed even for the power (of burning) in fire etc.

kiñ ca yathā smṛtilakṣaṇakāryānyathānupapattikalpitā saṃskārākhyā śaktir nāntaḥkaraṇādau kalpyate kin tu yatrātmani tatphalaṃ smṛtilakṣaṇaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva, tathārthapratyayānupapattikalpitārthapratyayajananaśakt is tatphalavaty ātmani kalpayituṃ yujyate na punar atadvatyāṃ smṛtijananaśaktau.

Moreover, the power known as the memory trace, which (i.e., the power) has been assumed because the effect, seen as memory, does not otherwise[497] arise, is not postulated to rest in the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) etc., but exactly in the individual self (*Ātman*), where its effect (i.e., the effect of memory trace) in the form of memory is inherent. Similarly, it is proper to assume the power generative of the cognition of meaning, which (i.e., power) has been assumed because the cognition of meaning would not otherwise arise, to be in the individual self where the effect (in the form of the cognition of meaning) lies, but, however, not in the power generative of the (collective) memory, which is devoid of it (i.e., the effect in the form of the cognition of meaning).

na cātmany evāstv iyam iti vācyam. ekaikavarṇānubhavena svasvaviṣayasmṛtijananaśaktir ekā arthapratyayajananaśaktiś cāpareti kalpanāgauravaprasaṅgāt.

[497] Except for the "power by the name of memory traces which is postulated in order to assume (the production of) memory [*smaraṇopapattaye kalpyamānā saṃskārākhyā śaktiḥ*]" (TP on STNśk 6, p. 15), there is no other way for the single collective memory to be produced.

Nor should it be said, "let this (power) rest just in the individual self". (This is) because it would be an unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses (to hold) that "through experiencing phonemes one by one, the power generative of the memory that has as its range each corresponding (phoneme) is one (kind of) power, and the power generative of the cognition of meaning is another (kind of) power."

kiñ ca gādirūṣite tadadhiṣṭhānabhūte cidātmani tām aṅgīkurvatā bhavatāpy āgatam asmadīye pathīti na no vivādaḥ.

Furthermore, we have no dispute with you, who in accepting it (i.e., the power generative of the cognition of meaning) (as resting) in the individual self with pure consciousness (*cidātman*), which is smeared[498] with the phonemes such as "*ga-*" and which is their (i.e., the phonemes') substratum, have arrived on our path (i.e., accepted our position).[499]

Kārikā 7

nityānāṃ ca vibhūnāṃ ca kramo nāsty eva vāstavaḥ upalabdhinimitto 'sti sā ced ekā kutaḥ kramaḥ.

Indeed, there is no genuine sequence of (the phonemes), which are eternal and all-pervading. The (sequence, whose) cause[500] (for its own

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[498] TP on STNśk 6, p. 15: "*gakārādibhir varṇair vilipte*." [on the (individual self) smeared over by the phonemes such as "*ga-*".].

[499] The grammarians readily agree only with those maintaining that the individual self is the locus of the power generative of the cognition of meaning. Since the *Śabdabrahman* in the form of *sphoṭa* is assumed to be the locus of that power, it is untenable that the cause of that power resides somewhere else. This would lead to the undesirable *vyadhikaraṇa* state of causality.

[500] Cf. TP on STN 7, p. 16: "*nanu nityānāṃ vibhūnāṃ ca varṇānāṃ vāstavakramābhāve 'pi varṇasamudāyātmakasya padasya sarvadā sattvena tasmāt sarvakāle 'rthabodhavāraṇārthaṃ varṇavyañjakair vāyubhir dhvanibhir vā abhivyaktānāṃ varṇānāṃ yadā upalabdhir bhavati tadā tādṛśī upalabdhir nimittaṃ yasya sa kramo 'sty eveti cet tatrāha sā ced ekā kutaḥ kramaḥ iti.*" [But even if there is not any genuine sequence of the eternal and omnipresent phonemes,

existence is the) perception (of phonemes), exists. (But) if it (i.e., perception) is single, how could there be a sequence?

Vṛtti 7

Objection:

nanu ye yathāsvaṃ varṇair āhitāḥ saṃskārās te sambhūya nikhilavarṇaviṣayam ekam eva smaraṇaṃ prasuvate. tathā caikasmṛtisamārohiṇo varṇā arthasya vācakā iti na gauravaṃ na ca svabhāvaviparyāsaḥ. tathā hi - saṃskārāṇāṃ kiṃ vijātīyotpādane sajātīyāpekṣā nāstīty ucyate, kiṃ vānekaviṣayakaikasmṛtau.

But the memory traces which are deposited by phonemes one by one, having joined together, bring forth an absolutely single memory, which has as its range all (those) phonemes. Similarly, the notion that, "the phonemes getting on a single memory are the signifiers of meaning", is neither a complex assumption nor an inversion of the nature (of the memory traces). For it is like this. Do you say that "the memory traces do not expect the similar (entities) (i) in producing the (cognition of the) dissimilar (entities)" or, (ii) "(in producing) a single memory which has as its range many (entities)"?

Response:

nādyaḥ. idam ekam idam ekam ity ekaikaviṣayakānubhavadvayāt dvāv iti buddhir udeti sā ca tadanubhavadvayajanitasaṃskārābhyām eva janyate.

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in order to prevent the cognition of meaning all times from the word, which is a collection of phonemes and exists eternally, when the perception of the phonemes, manifested either by the streams of air or the *dhvanis* that reveal phonemes, arises, then certainly there is a sequence whose cause is the perception of that sort. If you say so, (he says to that (objection) that "if it is single, how could there be a sequence?"].

(We do) not (maintain) the first (view). The cognition, "(these are) two (things)", arises out of the two experiences of (two) objects one by one, as in, "this is one, (and) this is one". And that (cognition) is produced just by the two memory traces generated (out of) those two experiences.

tad uktaṃ bhaṭṭapādaiḥ. [501]

> **sarveṣu caitadartheṣu mānasaṃ sarvavādinām**
> **dṛṣṭaṃ samuccayajñānaṃ kramajñāneṣu satsv api**
> **na cet tad abhyupeyeta kramadṛṣṭeṣu naiva hi**
> **śatādirūpaṃ jāyeta tatsamuccayadarśanam, iti.**

Thus it is said by revered (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa:
"Even if the cognitions (of items arise) sequentially, all schools accept the mental collective cognition with regard to all[502] cases like this."
"If that (mental collective cognition) is not admitted, then any collective cognition of them (i.e., items) (such as) in the form "(this is) a hundred", would never arise among the (items) perceived in a sequence."

nāntyaḥ. te ghaṭā ityādāv anekaviṣayakaikasmṛtau saṃskārāṇām anyonyāpekṣādarśanāt.

(We do) not (maintain) the latter (view). (This is) because mutual expectancy[503] of memory traces can be seen in the single memory which has as its range many (entities), as in (the memory) "those pots."

tathā caikaśaḥ pratyekasmṛtijanakatve 'pi militānāṃ saṃskārāṇām anekavarṇagocaraikasmṛtijanakatvaṃ na virudhyate.

Similarly, even if the memory traces generate individual memories (of the corresponding phonemes experienced) one by one, (the proposition)

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[501] ŚV (*sphoṭavāda* section), *kārikās* 113, 114. Cf. ŚVubh, pp. 468, 469. Also see D'SA 1980: 168, fn. 8.
[502] TP on STNśk 7, p. 18: "*īdṛśeṣu sarveṣu sthaleṣu*" [in all cases like this].
[503] Cf. TP on STNśk 7, p. 18: "*anyonyasāpekṣā*" [mutually dependent]. Both TRIPĀṬHĪ's (1994: 17) and BĀKRE's (1913: 5) editions of STN read this as "*anyonyāpekṣā*".

that “the assembled memory traces produce a single memory having many phonemes as its range” is not contradicted.

dṛṣṭaṃ caitat - saṃskāraś cakṣurādyanapekṣaḥ smaraṇakāraṇaṃ, cakṣurādayaś ca tannirapekṣā ālocanakāraṇaṃ, pratyabhijñāne tu saṃskārasāpekṣāś cakṣurādaya iti.

This is also seen: a memory trace, which does not depend on the sense of sight etc., is the cause of memory, and the sense of sight etc., which are not dependent on it (i.e., memory trace), are the means of seeing, but in (the case of) recognition[504], the sense of sight etc. depend on memory traces.

Objection:

na caikasmṛtyupārūḍhavarṇānāṃ vācakatve nadī dīna iti saro rasa iti kramasmaraṇaniyamābhāvād akramaviparītakramābhyāṃ viśeṣo na syād iti vācyam. yāvadbhyo yādṛśebhyaś cārthaḥ pratīyate tāvatāṃ tādṛśānāṃ cārthāvabodhakatvāṅgīkārāt.

Nor should it be said that; “if phonemes ascended on a single memory are significative, due to the absence of (any) restrictive rule in recollecting the sequence (of experiencing the phonemes, depositing their memory traces and remembering them again), in the cases (like) *nadī - dīna* and *sara - rasa*, there would be no difference (in the cognitions of meaning) from the lack of sequence or an inverted sequence.” (This is) because we admit that (phonemes) of such a number and such a sort convey meaning, when meaning is understood from (phonemes) that are of (just) that number and sort.

[504] Cf. TP on STNśk 7, p. 18: “*tattedantāvagāhi jñānaṃ pratyabhijñā*” [Recognition is the knowledge that plunges into (both) “thisness” and “thatness” (simultaneously)].

taduktam –

yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane
varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ,
iti.[505]

Thus it is said:
"As many phonemes of such a sort as are recognized as having power to convey a certain meaning, they are denotative in just that way."

yādṛśā ity anenaikavaktṛkāḥ kramikāś cety uktaṃ, kramaś cānupūrvī, ānupūrvī ca pūrvapūrvavarṇadhvaṃso vā, pūrvapūrvavarṇajñānānantaram uttarottaravarṇajñānaṃ vā pūrvapūrvavarṇoccāraṇānantaram uttarottaravarṇoccāraṇaṃ vā.

By this (term) "of what sort" is meant (the phonemes) "(pronounced by) a single speaker"[506] and "sequential." And sequence is succession. And any of these can be a succession: the destruction of each preceding phoneme, the cognition of each subsequent phoneme (immediately) after the cognition of each preceding phoneme, or the pronunciation of each subsequent phoneme (immediately) after the pronunciation of each preceding phoneme.

evaṃ ca yathā kramānurodhinya eva pipīlikāḥ paṅktibuddhim ārohanti tathā kramānurodhina eva varṇāḥ padabuddhim ārokṣyanti.

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[505] ŚV 1. 1. 5 (*sphoṭavāda* section), *kārikā* 69. Also found in TB and TBtv, p. 69, and in MSśbh.bṛ., p. 37. Cf. ŚVubh on this *kārikā*. Also see TP on STNśk 7, p. 19.
[506] Cf. TB, pp. 166, 167 of introduction: "If the *varṇas* or *padas* are uttered at a time by different persons, there arises no cognition of the idea (*artha*). So it is held that these *padas* are to be uttered in a particular sequence by one and the same person, and that this *ekavaktṛtva* is necessarily cognised by the person who knows ideas from words. Moreover, this *ekavaktṛtva* is a *jñāpakahetu* - cause of cognition, and so it need not be necessarily cognised just like the mind which, as uncognised, becomes the cause of inference." Cf. TP on STNśk 7, p. 19: "*tathā cānena ekavaktṛkā iti padena bhinnabhinnavaktṛkāṇāṃ padaghaṭanānāṃ vyāvṛttiḥ*." [Similarly, by this word "same speaker" there is excluded the expressions of different speakers].

Likewise, just as the ants that (move) only complying with a sequence rise to (i.e., become the range of) the cognition of a row (of ants), the phonemes that just comply[507] with a sequence will rise to the cognition of word.

tathā ca yady api smaraṇalakṣaṇaikapratītivartināṃ na viśeṣas tathāpi yaugapadyaviparītakramābhivyaktyapekṣayā kramoccāritānām asty eva viśeṣa ity ata āha - nityānām iti.

Similarly, even though there is no distinction of (the phonemes) abiding in a single perception in the form of (collected) memory, there is indeed a distinction of (the phonemes) sequentially pronounced, in comparison to the manifestation (of the phonemes) (characterized by) simultaneity or inversion of sequence. In response to this (objection), he says "(of the phonemes which are) eternal" and so on (7th *kārikā*).

Response:

varṇānāṃ nityavibhūnāṃ kālato deśataś ca na vāstavaḥ kramo niyāmakaḥ, sattāmātreṇa tadaṅgīkāre 'tiprasaṅga iti pratipattyupādhiko 'yam aṅgīkāryaḥ.

There is no genuine sequence of the eternal and all-pervading phonemes both in terms of time and space, which (i.e., sequence) restricts (the cognition of word meaning). If it (i.e., sequence) is accepted just through (their, i.e., phonemes') existence (in terms of time and space), there would be hyper-eventuality (of the understanding of meaning). Therefore, this (sequence) must be accepted as conditioned by cognition.[508]

sā ced ekā smṛtirūpā kutas tarhi krama ity ekasmṛtyupārūḍhānāṃ varṇānāṃ

[507] In line with the Mīmāṃsakas, Śaṅkara in his BSśbh [(*Devatādikaraṇa*) 1. 3. 8. 28] also says that sequence helps a series of phonemes to be recognized as a word, and causes difference in meaning.
[508] Cf. TP on STNśk 7, p. 20: "*padārthabodhe niyāmakaḥ*" [restrictive in comprehension of the word meaning].

kramākramaviparītakramābhivyaṅgyānāṃ na kaścid viśeṣa iti.

If it (i.e., the cognition of phonemes) in the form of (collective) memory is single, then how could there be a sequence? (In that case, we conclude that) there is not any distinction of the phonemes, which have risen to a single memory (and) been revealed sequentially, non-sequentially or with an inverted sequence.

Kārikā 8

nānubhūtikramād varṇāḥ kramikāḥ smṛtigocarāḥ
gocaro 'nubhavo nāsyās tatkramas tu kutastarām.

Phonemes do not attain to the range of (the single collective) memory in the (very) sequence in which they are experienced. The experience (of the phonemes) is not (within) the scope of it (i.e., memory). Then how could the sequence (of the phonemes) attain to its range?

Vṛtti 8

Objection:

nanu pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavāḥ kramavantas tatkramatayā varṇeṣv apy ekasmṛtisamārohiṣv aupādhikaḥ kramaḥ svīkāryaḥ.

But the experiences of each and every preceding phoneme are sequential, (thus) due to their (i.e., of the experiences) condition of having (that) sequence, a conditioned sequence must be accepted even among the phonemes ascending to (i.e., becoming the range of) a single memory.

tathā cāhur mīmāṃsāvārtikakāramiśrāḥ -
padāvadhāraṇopāyān bahūn icchanti sūrayaḥ
kramanyūnātiriktatvasvaravākyaśrutismṛtīḥ. [509]
na kevalam ekārthapratyaya evaikaṃ padam iti vyapadeśanimittaṃ, kintu kramādayo 'pīty arthaḥ.

Similarly, Miśra, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāvārtika*[510], says:
"The wise desire many[511] means for determining a word, such as sequence (*krama*), states of being less and more (*nyūnātiriktatva*), accent (*svara*), sentence (*vākya*), Vedic texts (*śruti*), (and) the remembered tradition of the Vedic knowledge (*smṛti*)."
This means that, not only is just the cognition of single meaning the basis for the designation that "(this is a) single word", but sequence etc. are too.

tatra rasaḥ sara ity atra kramaḥ. karaḥ karañja ity atra nyūnātiriktatve. indraśatrur ity atra svaraḥ. sā raṅgam āgatā nartakīti vākyam. parame vyomann iti śrutiḥ.

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[509] TB, p. 67. The gloss given in the footnote there mentions that it appears in the ŚV (*vākyādhikaraṇa*) 1. 1. 180, which I found as ŚV (*vākyādhikaraṇa*), *kārikā* 183 in the edition of RĀMAŚĀSTRĪ (1898: 896).

[510] A brief note is required on the identity of the author of the Mīmāṃsā work mentioned here. The term "*Mīmāṃsāvārtika*" as a title of a work often refers to the ŚV of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (which does contain this *kārikā*) or his *Tantravārtika*, but Kumārila is not known to have been called a "Miśra". Nor is Prabhākara Miśra of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā school known to have written a commentarial work titled "*Vārtika*" but rather the *Bṛhatī*, even though we are open to the notion that "-*vārtika*" can also be taken as a general reference to any commentary rather than as a specific title. Since Sucarita Miśra, who composed the *Kāśikā* gloss on the ŚV, does not give this *kārikā*, we are thus left with two assumptions. One is Pārthasārathi Miśra, who authored the ŚVpm (*Nyāyaratnākara*) and the ŚDīp on the MS, but he does not quote the *kārikā* in full in his ŚVpm. The other possibility is Vācaspati Miśra, who gives in his TB this *kārikā* as the Vārtikakāra's, i.e., Kumārila's. However, Śeṣakṛṣṇa would have referred to the ŚV directly as he does in a few other places in the STN. Why he refers to a Miśra in this instance is not quite clear.

[511] While Kumārila explains the factors *vākya*, *śruti,* and *smṛti* in the *kārikās* that follow, Pārthasārathi Miśra in his ŚVpm (p. 896) elaborates on why Kumārila goes on to describe only *vākya*, *śruti* and *smṛti* factors.

gṛbhṇāmīti "hṛgrahor bhaś chandasi" iti pāṇinīyasmṛtiḥ. tathā ca pūrvānubhavakrama ekasmṛtau viśeṣakaḥ.

Among these, (in) "*rasa* and *sara*" [taste and lake] here (we have an example for) the sequence; (in) "*kara* and *karañja*" [elephant's trunk and name of an enemy of Indra] here (we have examples for) the state of being less and the state of being more; (in) "*indraśatrú*" [Indra's enemy] (we have an example for) the accent[512]; (in) "*sā raṅgam āgatā nartakī*" [that actress entered the stage] (we have an example for) the sentence[513]; (in) "*parame vyoman*"[514] [in the highest heaven] (we have an example for) the Vedic texts; (in) "*gṛbhṇāmi*" [I seize] and "*hṛgrahor bhaś chandasi*" [in the case of "*hṛ-*" and "*grah-*", the syllable "*bh*" comes in the place of "*h*", in the Veda] (MBh on A 8. 2. 32) (we have examples for) the Pāṇinian[515] grammatical tradition. Similarly, the sequence of experiencing (each) preceding (phoneme) in the single (collective) memory (of those phonemes) serves to distinguish (a word in it).

tathā cāhur nyāyaṭīkākāramiśrā api - arthapratyayakāraṇatvaṃ ca na varṇamātrāṇām api tu kramanyūnātiriktatvādyupahitānām ity ata āha - nānubhūtīti.

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[512] The MBh (*Paspaśāhnika* 4. 2) discusses this word. While "*indraśatrú*" as a *tatpuruṣa* compound means "Indra's enemy", "*índraśatru*" becomes a *bahuvrīhi* compound to mean "he whose enemy is Indra". See A 6. 1. 223 and A 6. 2. 1 for the relevant rules. Cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.6.3.1 for a developed version of the story behind this issue. Another similar case given in the MBh (*Paspaśāhnika* 3) is the difference between "*sthūlapṛṣatī*" (a big cow with spots) and "*sthūlápṛṣatī*" (a cow with big spots).

[513] Likewise, the identity of a word like "*pacate*" cannot be determined without the sentence it is used in, because it means either "s/he cooks" (present. *ātmane*, 3rd person, sing.) or "to one who cooks" (present participle, masc./ neu. dat. sing.).

[514] ṚV 1. 164. 39. Why "*vyomni*" appears as "*vyoman*" in Vedic language is explained by the rule A 7. 1. 39.

[515] Vār on A 8. 2. 32: "*dāder dhātor ghaḥ.*" [The *h* of a verbal root that begins with *d* is replaced with *gh* (when *h* occurs at the end of a *pada*)]. The *Kāśikā* on this *sūtra* is "*hṛgrahor bhaś chandasi hasyeti vaktavyam.*" [It must be said that in the case of "*hṛ-*" and "*grah-*", the syllable "*bh*" comes in the place of "*h*", in the Veda]. Some examples: ṚV 10. 085. 36a, ṚV 10. 145. 04a, ṚVkh 3. 15. 5, AVŚ 1. 12. 2d.

Similarly, (Vācaspati) Miśra, author of the *Nyāyaṭīkā* (i.e., the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*), also says (as follows).[516] "Just the phonemes alone do not cause the cognition of meaning, but rather the phonemes conditioned by (other factors too, such as) sequence, the state of being less, the state of being more etc. (cause the cognition of meaning)."
In response to this, he says "not [in the (same) sequence in which they are) experienced" and so on (8th *kārikā*).

Response:

iyaṃ pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavajanyā tāvad varṇaviṣayiṇy ekā smṛtiḥ pūrvavarṇānubhavān eva na gocarayati kutas teṣāṃ kramam?

This single (collective) memory produced by the experience of each and every preceding phoneme has just (those) phonemes as its range; it does not have as its range at all the experiences of each preceding phoneme. Then, how (could the memory have) their (i.e., of the experiences) sequence (as its range)?

evaṃ ca prācīnānubhavopādhiko 'pi kramaḥ smaryamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu na viśeṣaka iti na tāvad varṇasamūhālambanasmṛtyārthapratyayopapatter anyathopapattir iti.

Likewise, on the grounds that "even the sequence that is conditioned by the previous experience (of phonemes), it is not a qualifier of the phonemes as they are being remembered (to form a single collective memory)", it is not[517] true that (we have an) alternative proof for proving the cognition of meaning through just the collective memory of phonemes.

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[516] NVTṬ 2. 2. 57. Note that Vācaspati has the synonymous "*arthapratyayakārakatvaṃ*" in place of "*arthapratyayakāraṇatvaṃ*".
[517] Because even a conditioned sequence fails to qualify the phonemes in the single collective memory, they cannot be the signifier of meaning, resulting in the situation that there would not be any other alternative left except *sphoṭa*, through which the cognition of meaning arises. Cf. TP on STNśk 8, p. 23.

Kārikā 9

idaṃ padam idaṃ vākyam ime varṇā iti triṣu pratyayeṣu sphuṭaṃ sphoṭa eka evānubhūyate.

Just single *sphoṭa* is distinctly perceived at (the rise of the) three cognitions; “these are phonemes, this is a word, this is a sentence”.

Vṛtti 9

Objection:

nanu prābhākaramate ’nubhavāḥ svaprakāśā iti tatkramaḥ smṛtau bhāsate.

But in the doctrine of the Prābhākaras, experiences are self-illuminating, [518] and (consequently) the sequence of them (i.e., the experiences) shines in the (single collective) memory.

Response:

satyaṃ, na hi jñānaṃ svaprakāśam iti tatkramo ’pi svaprakāśaḥ, tasyāsvarūpatvād aviṣayatvāc ca. atha svarūpaviṣayātirikta ātmāṃśaḥ sphuratīti cet, tān evaitat pṛccha ye tad aṅgīkurvate na vayaṃ tripuṭīpratyakṣavādinaḥ. na ca tair api jñānakramaḥ svaprakāśa iti svīkriyata iti.

True. (But) simply on the grounds that knowledge is self-illuminating, it is indeed not the case that the sequence of knowledge is also self-illuminating. (This is) because the sequence neither bears any form of it (i.e., knowledge) nor remains within the range of it (i.e., knowledge).

[518] CHATTERJEA (2002: 1 - 8) examines whether Prabhākara held the view that knowledge is self-manifesting. BHATT (1989: 59 - 62) also gives a detailed account of this matter.

Therefore, if (you maintain that) (any other) component[519] that is the individual self, which is additional to the form and the range (of knowledge), shines, ask just those who maintain it about this. We are not the upholders of the doctrine of tripartite perception.[520] Nor is it accepted even by them [521] (i.e., the proponents of the doctrine of triple perception) that the sequence of knowledge is self-illuminating.

Objection:

nanu kāryānusāriṇī kāraṇakalpanā, tathā cājñāto 'pi vastutaḥ sthitaḥ kramo viśeṣako vaktavya iti gām ānayeti dṛśyamānebhya eva varṇebhyaś ced abhidheyapratyaya upapadyate tadā naitān apahāyādṛśyamānam anavayavakaṃ sphoṭatattvaṃ kalpanīyaṃ, pramāṇābhāvāt. yā cārthapratipattis tatpramāṇatvenoktā sānyonyāśrayagrastā.

But the assumption of the cause follows the effect. Similarly, on the grounds that, "even though unknown, the actually existing sequence (of the experiences of phonemes) should be stated as the qualifier (of the sequence in the memory)", if the cognition of the signified is produced out of the phonemes as they are being experienced (as in the expression) "bring the cow", then, one should not neglect these (phonemes) and assume the (true) nature of *sphoṭa*, which is partless (and) not being experienced (at that time), because there is no authority (in so doing). Also, any cognition of meaning asserted through the authority of it (i.e., *sphoṭa*) is affected by (the flaw[522] of) interdependence.

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[519] Sequence is neither the form (*svarūpa*) nor the range (*viṣaya*) of knowledge, because it is a property of the knower's experience. *Ātman* is said to be the knower and a component of tripartite perception.

[520] *Tripuṭīpratyakṣa* (Tripartite perception) is the view that the knower, the known, and the knowledge are simultaneously illuminated in one manifestation of knowledge. This view is held by Prabhākara

[521] Śeṣakṛṣṇa highlights here that even the Prābhākaras, who postulate experience as self-illuminating, do not admit the "sequence of knowledge (*jñānakrama*)" as self-illuminating. Cf. TP on STNśk 9, p. 25.

[522] For interdependence (*anyonyāśraya* / *itaretarāśraya*) explained using the *kuṇḍabadara* theory, see BSśbh 2. 2. 3. 17.

tathā hi arthapratipattau satyāṃ tadanupapattyā sphoṭapratipattiḥ, sphoṭapratipattau cārthapratipattir ity ata āha - idam iti.

For it is like this. If the cognition of meaning is present, (then) on account of its untenability (without having *sphoṭa* as the signifier), the cognition of *sphoṭa* (is deemed to arise). If the cognition of *sphoṭa* is present, (then on account of its indispensability as the signifier of meaning), the cognition of meaning (is deemed to arise surely through it). Therefore (in response to that objection), he says "this is (a word)" and so on (9th *kārikā*).

Response:

na kalpayāmy ahaṃ sphoṭaṃ, pratyakṣam eva tv enam avagacchāmi. tathā hi gaur ity ekaṃ padaṃ gām ānayetyādy ekaṃ vākyam iti sarvajanasiddho 'yam anubhavo nāpahnavanīyaḥ.

I do not assume *sphoṭa* but perceive it directly. For it is like this. This experience, apprehended by all people, "cow" is one word, "bring the cow" etc. is one sentence, must not be denied.

tatra pūrvapūrvavarṇagrahaṇāhitasaṃskārāyām anusaṃhārabuddhāv avaśyam abhinnaṃ vastv ekaṃ samullasatīty eṣaṇīyam.

In regard to that, it should be a desired (conclusion) that one undivided entity shines necessarily in the recapitulatory knowledge[523] (which gathers, at the final phoneme,) the memory traces deposited by grasping each and every preceding phoneme.

na khalv iyam abhinnavastunirbhāsā buddhiḥ parasparavyatiricyamānātmano varṇān eva gocarayitum

[523] See KAWAJIRI 2003 for a discussion on *anusaṃhārabuddhi* in the TB.

arhati. etādṛśabuddhiviṣaye vastuny ekasminn ekatvanānātvayor asamavāyāt.[524]

This knowledge shining in the form of an undivided entity should never have as its scope the very phonemes, which are of mutually different natures. (It is) because singularity and variety do not inhere (simultaneously) in a single entity, which is the range of such knowledge.

na ca vanam iti buddher vṛkṣā iva padam iti vākyam iti buddher varṇā eva viṣayā bhavantīti vācyam. tatraikadeśasyevātraikabuddhiviṣayatvasyaikārtha-pratyāyakatvāder vopādher ananusandhānāt.

Nor should it be said that, the way the cognition of "forest" has "trees" as its range, the cognition of "word" and (that of) "sentence" have just phonemes as their range. (It is) because, here (i.e., with regard to phonemes) there is no recollection of the limitation of either the state of being in the range of a single knowledge or the significativeness of a single meaning etc., as there is there (i.e., with regard to the trees) (a recollection of the limitation) of the part (of the whole, i.e., forest).

atra padasphoṭavādino 'pi matasamarthanāya padam iti buddher ity uktam. vastutas tv anavayavaḥ sphoṭa eva vākyārthavācaka iti mukhyasphoṭavādino matam.

In order to vindicate the position of the upholder of the "*padasphoṭa*" as well, "of the cognition of word" is stated here. But in reality, the position of the upholder of the main *sphoṭa* is that only the partless (*vākya*)*sphoṭa* is the signifier of sentential meaning.

tatra cedaṃ tattvaṃ - kadācid vākyam iti kadācid iyanti padānīti kadācid etāvanto varṇā iti buddhir udeti.

And this is the (true) nature regarding that (i.e., the *vākyasphoṭa*) - sometimes the knowledge "(this is) a sentence" arises, sometimes, "the words are this many", and sometimes, "the phonemes are this many".

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[524] Wording has closely been borrowed from the TB, p. 15.

tatrādye tāvad ekabuddher ekatvāvagāhinyā ekam eva kiñcid vastu pratīyamānaṃ kāraṇam ity upapāditam. antyaṃ dvayam avaśiṣyate.

There in the first one (i.e., with regard to the sentence), it was first established that a certain absolutely single entity, as it is being perceived, is the cause of the single cognition, which plunges into[525] singularity. The last two remain.

tatra yadi devadatta gām ānaya iti tribhiḥ padaiḥ pāramārthikaviśiṣṭapaurvāparyair ārabdhaṃ vākyaṃ syāt tadā ānaya gāṃ devadatta ity ukte tasyāvayavino bhaṅgāt tajjanyārthapratītilakṣaṇārthakriyā na syāt, dhvasteṣu kapāleṣūdakāharaṇādivat.

In that case (in regard to the sentence), if there is a sentence constructed by three words that (allegedly) have a real, distinct sequence, "*devadatta gām ānaya*" [Devadatta, bring the cow], then if (the sentence) "*ānaya gāṃ devadatta*" [bring the cow, Devadatta] is uttered, due to the break of it (i.e., the original sentence), which is a whole, there would not be the causal efficiency[526] characterized by the meaning comprehension produced by it (i.e., by the sentence). (To have the causal efficiency in such a broken sentence is impossible) like fetching water in broken vessels.

tathā yadi devadatta gām ānaya ity atra pāramārthikāḥ kramaviśeṣaviśiṣṭā aṣṭau varṇā vākyārambhakāḥ syus tadā gāṃ devadattānaya ity atra saptavarṇā bhinnakramāś ceti

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[525] Literally "plunges into/ bath in (loc.)" or "be absorbed in (loc./ acc.)". GANERI (1999: 144) translates it as "figures in" in the sense "includes".

[526] *Arthakriyā* is the action conducive to a useful purpose or the capacity of an entity to produce an effect. If the sentence were a unified whole constituted of several words uttered in a given sequence, that unity of the sentence would have been damaged when the sequence alters. Consequently the sentence would lose the causal efficiency to trigger the desired sentential meaning. However, the absence of such a situation indicates that the sentence meaning is not signified by sequential words, but just by the sentence-*sphoṭa*. For the early grammarians' views on the "*arthakriyā*" related to *śābdabodha*, see VP 1. 33 and VPbh 1. 126, VPvd 1. 24 - 26, 121, 124, 144.

tato nārthapratyayaḥ syāt. tasmād varṇapadavibhāgam āvidyakam aṅgīkṛtya sarveṣūccāryamāṇeṣv anusyūtaḥ kaścid arthapratyayaupayiko vākyātmānavayavo nityaḥ sphoṭo 'ṅgīkartavya iti.

Likewise, if the eight phonemes "*de-va-dat-ta gā-mā-na-ya*", which are (allegedly) real and distinct with a particular sequence, construct a sentence, then there would not be any cognition of meaning from (the sentence) "*gāṃ de-va-dat-tā-na-ya*", because here are seven phonemes in a different sequence. Therefore, having accepted the division of (a linguistic expression into) words and phonemes as illusory, it must (then) be accepted that the eternal, partless *sphoṭa*, which is uninterruptedly connected in (lit. sewn into) all (linguistic components) as they are being pronounced and the (true) nature of which is the sentence, is the cause of the cognition of meaning.

Kārikā 10

nityā nāvayavā varṇā nāpy anityā ihocitāḥ
vivartāḥ kevalaṃ tasya prapañcā brahmaṇo yathā.

In this matter, it is not proper (to say) that eternal phonemes are the constituents (of the eternal *sphoṭa*). Nor (is it proper to say) that non-eternal phonemes (are the constituents of the eternal *sphoṭa*). Like the phenomena of *Brahman*, phonemes are simply its (i.e., *sphoṭa*'s) illusory transfigurations.

Vṛtti 10

Objection:

nanu mā bhūvan vākyam iti buddher varṇā viṣayāḥ, vākye ete varṇā iti tu buddhiḥ sarvajanīnā anekākārā katham asyā vākyātmā sphoṭo viṣayaḥ.

Surely phonemes should not be the objects of the cognition, "(this is) a sentence". But the multi-formed[527] cognition, "these are the phonemes in the sentence", is common to everybody. How can *sphoṭa*, the (true) nature of which is the sentence, be the object of that (cognition)?

Response:

na ca vane ete vṛkṣā itivat, paṭe ete tantava itivac ca vākye ete varṇā iti pratyaya iti vācyam. avarṇātmany avarṇasamavete vākye varṇoparaktabuddher abhāvāt.

Nor should it be said that in the way (the cognition) "these trees are in the forest" (arises upon seeing a forest), and the way (the cognition) "these threads are in the cloth" (arises upon seeing a cloth), the cognition "these phonemes are in the sentence" (arises upon experiencing a sentence). (It is) because of the absence[528] of any cognition coloured by phonemes in relation to the sentence, which does not have phonemes as its (true) nature and which does not inhere in phonemes.

dṛṣṭā hi tadātmani taduparāgavatī buddhir vane vṛkṣā iti, tatsamavāyini paṭe tantava iti. naitad ubhayaṃ prakṛte 'sty anaṅgīkārād ity ata āha - nityā iti.

Certainly, the cognition (of the whole) is seen to be coloured by its (constituents), in the cases of (the cognition of) "trees in the forest", which has them as its (true) nature, and (the cognition of) "threads in the cloth", in which it inheres. On the grounds that neither of them (i.e., the conditions of having phonemes as its nature and of inhering in them) exists in the object under discussion, on the basis of non-agreement (that they do), he says "eternal (phonemes)" and so on (10th *kārikā*).

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[527] TP on STNśk 10, p. 34: "*anekavarṇaviṣayiṇī*" [(cognition) which has as its range many phonemes].

[528] Note that "*abhāva*" here is in its absolute sense. The non-existence of such a phoneme-coloured cognition is conclusive but we do not realize it. Śeṣakṛṣṇa clarifies this point a few lines below here in STNśk 10, highlighting the difference between the *pramārūpa* and the *bhrāntirūpa* cognitions.

iha nitye sphoṭe nityā vibhavaś ca varṇā nāvayavā ucitāḥ. avayaviny ūnaparimāṇatvād avayavānām. nāpy anityās tathā, avayavino nityasyāvayavāsambhavāt. ataḥ kevalaṃ tasya sphoṭasya vivartāḥ. evaṃ ca pramārūpā varṇoparāgavatī dhīr mā bhūt, bhrāntirūpā tv asty eva.

Here it is proper (to maintain) that eternal and all-pervading phonemes are not the constituents of eternal *sphoṭa*. (It is) because constituents are of smaller size in connection to a whole. Likewise, (it is proper to maintain that) non-eternal (phonemes) are not (the constituents of *sphoṭa*) either, because of the impossibility for an eternal whole to have constituents. Therefore, (phonemes are) simply the illusory transfigurations of that *sphoṭa*. And in that way, let there not be (any) knowledge that is valid in its form and coloured by phonemes, but it does indeed exist in the form of error (and coloured by phonemes).

na ca vastutas tadrūpeṇa tatsamavāyitayā vā taduparaktabuddhir iti niyamaḥ. śukter api rajatoparaktabuddhiviṣayatvāt. tasmād vivartādhiṣṭhānasya paramārthasataḥ sphoṭarūpasyāvidyākalpitena varṇavivartena tattaduparāgavatī prakhyā na virudhyate.

Nor is there, actually, any restrictive rule that the cognition (of a whole) is coloured by them (i.e., constituents) through its (being the) form (of them) or through its inherence (in them). (It is) because even a mother-of-pearl becomes the object of the cognition coloured by silver (and neither has the form of silver nor inheres in it). Therefore, on account of phonemes being the ignorance-based illusory transfigurations (of *sphoṭa*), the appearance of *sphoṭa*, the absolutely real being and the original substratum of (those) illusory transfigurations, as having the colours of each and every (phoneme) is not contradicted.

na ca varṇānāṃ kvacid apy abhāvān na vivarta iti vācyam. kvāpy asatāṃ ghaṭādiprapañcānām iva brahmaṇy avabhāsopapatter ity anyatra vistara ity āha - prapañcā iti.

Nor should it be said that there is no illusory transfiguration because of the absence of phonemes anywhere. This is because of the false appearance (of phonemes on *sphoṭa*), just like (the false appearance of) phenomena like "pot", which do not exist anywhere (in reality), on *Brahman*. The details (of this matter are given) elsewhere. Therefore, he says that "phenomena" and so on (10th *kārikā*).

Kārikā 11

yathā maṇikṛpāṇādau mukham ekam anekadhā
tathaiva dhvaniṣu sphoṭa eka eva vibhidyate. [529]

In exactly such a way that the single face is seen in various forms on a precious stone, the (blade of a) sword and so forth, the absolutely single *sphoṭa* (seems to be) divided (into many forms) in the *dhvanis*.[530]

Vṛtti 11

Objection:

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[529] Nāgeśa quotes this *kārikā* in his SV (*akhaṇḍasphoṭa* chapter, *kārikā* 14), but says "*uktaṃ ca hariṇā*" [And (this is) said by Hari). Nevertheless, we do not find this *kārikā* in any edition of the VP. KRISHNAMACHARYA (1977: 75) in his auto-commentary on the SV also says that none of the printed texts of the VP contains it ["*hariṇeti; kārikeyaṃ mudrite vākyapadīyakośe na dṛśyate*."], while DHADPHALE (1980: 127, n. 45) confirms it, mentioning accurately that it instead appears as the 11th *kārikā* of the STN. Moreover, the MBhD does not contain this *kārikā* on *sphoṭa* (at least as far as the available portions of the MBhD are concerned), and we have two good reasons to assume that the original MBhD did not contain it either; (i) the *kārikā* obviously reflects the *Śabdādvaita* view Bhartṛhari deals with in detail in the VP but not in the MBhD, and (ii) the term *sphoṭa* was not used by Patañjali in the MBh in the sense it denotes in this *kārikā*. Furthermore, even if we may assume that it was originally in the VP but left out later, it is less likely that Śeṣakṛṣṇa added it to the STN as if it were his own composition, since he properly acknowledges in STNśk a few *kārikās* from the VP. Accordingly, it appears that Nāgeśa borrowed the *kārikā* from Śeṣakṛṣṇa but ascribed it to Bhartṛhari, perhaps because of his reluctance to give due credits to the former for some reason.

[530] Cf. VPbh 1. 49, where Bhartṛhari explains, obviously from his own perspective, how *sphoṭa* seems to be manifold in the different modes of speech. See VPvd and VPpr on it for further clarifications. Also Cf. NANDI 2005 (part 1): 596.

nanu yadi varṇair nityo 'navayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate, tadā katham asmād avilakṣaṇād vilakṣaṇatattadarthapratipattir ity ata āha - yatheti.

But if the eternal and partless *sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes, then how can the comprehension of meaning of each and every different entity (arise) from this non-different (*sphoṭa*)? In response to this objection, he says "in exactly such a way that" and so on (11th *kārikā*).

Response:

yathā maṇikṛpāṇadarpaṇādau mukhaṃ niyatagrīvāsthānam api niyatagaurādivarṇam api niyatavitastyādiparimāṇam api anekavidhasthānavarṇaparimāṇam ivābhinnam api bhinnam iva pratīyate, tathā tattatprayatnabhinneṣu dhvaniṣu sphoṭa eko 'pi nānāvarṇātmeva niravayavo 'pi sāvayava iva bhidyamānaḥ pratīyate.[531]

Just as the face, even though having a steady neck position, an unchanging complexion such as fair, and a fixed size, such as (the length of) a *vitasti* [532], is perceived on a precious stone, the (blade of a) sword, and a mirror as if having manifold positions, complexions, and sizes, and as if different though not different (physically), *sphoṭa*, even though single, is perceived as having many phonemes as its nature, and as having parts even though partless, and to be divided in the *dhvanis* differentiated[533] by various (articulatory) efforts.

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[531] Also see TB (pp. 18, 19) explaining the grammarians' position on this point. In PLM (pp. 24, 25) Nāgeśa also uses this *maṇi-kṛpāṇa-darpaṇa* analogy to elaborate on it.

[532] "*Vitasti*" is a traditional unit of length, referring often to either the long span between the extended thumb and the little finger or to the distance between the wrist and the tip of the middle finger, when the palm is stretched. See AŚ 2. 20. 2 - 27.

[533] Note that ŚEVAḌE in the TP on STNśk 11 paraphrases "*tattatprayatnabhinneṣu*" as "*tattatsthānakaraṇaprayatnakramavyajyamānabhinnabhinnadhvaniṣu*" to include not only the articulatory efforts but also the points and organs of articulation and sequence as the factors that differentiate the *dhvanis*.

tathā ca vācyasya ghaṭāder arthasya, vācakasya sphoṭasya bheda aupādhikaḥ. ata eva śabdārthayor abhedam ādriyante.

Moreover, the difference between the signified, i.e., the meaning (of an entity) such as pot, and the signifier, i.e., *sphoṭa*, is limited by particular conditions. For that very reason, (the grammarians) honour the non-difference between *śabda* (i.e., *sphoṭa*) and *artha* (i.e., meaning).

Kārikā 12

sphoṭo varṇātirikto 'pi tattādātmyam upeyivān
pratyayo jāyate tasmād asau tadvarṇarūṣitaḥ.

Even though different from phonemes, *sphoṭa* becomes identical with each of them. Therefore, that cognition (of *sphoṭa*) smeared with those (reflections of) phonemes arises.

Vṛtti 12

Objection:

nanu gaur iti buddhiḥ pūrvānubhūtān gakārādīn evāvagāhate na tadatiriktaṃ sphoṭaṃ, yadi gakārādivilakṣaṇam avabhāsayet tadā na gakārādirūṣitaḥ pratyayaḥ syāt. na hi varāhadhīr mahiṣarūṣitaṃ varāham avagāhate. yadi cāsyā dhiyo 'rthāntaro viṣayaḥ syāt tadā dakārādaya iva gakārādayo 'pi vyāvarterann ity ata āha - sphoṭa iti.

But the cognition (of the speech form) "*gauḥ*" (cow) plunges into the very (phonemes) such as "*ga-*", which were experienced before, but not in (anything known as) *sphoṭa*, which is separate from those (phonemes). If (it) illuminates something different from the (phonemes) such as "*ga-*", then the cognition would not be smeared with the phonemes such as "*ga-*".

The cognition of a boar never plunges into a boar, which is smeared with (the cognition of) a buffalo. And, if something else[534] (different from the phonemes such as "*ga*-") becomes the object of that cognition (of cow), then just as the phonemes such as "*da*-" (which do not have any connection here) may, the phonemes such as "*ga*-" (which signify the meaning of cow) may also be excluded. Therefore, (in response to this objection) he says "*sphoṭa*" and so on (12th *kārikā*).

Response:

yady api varṇavyaṅgyo varṇātiriktaḥ sphoṭas tathāpi svādhyastatattadvarṇatādātmyam upagacchati tasmāt tattadvarṇarūṣitaḥ pratyayo jāyate na dakārādirūṣitaḥ. varāhamahiṣayos tu nādhiṣṭhānavivartabhāva iti nānayos tādātmyabuddhiḥ.

Even if *sphoṭa* manifested by phonemes is separate from (those) phonemes, it still becomes identical with each and every phoneme superimposed on it. Consequently, the cognition smeared with each and every phoneme (related to it) arises, (but) not (any cognition) smeared with (unrelated phonemes) such as "*da*-". But since there is no relation as "substratum" and "illusory transfiguration" between boar and buffalo, no cognition of identification between those two (cognitions) (arises).

Kārikā 13

pūrvapūrvānubhūjanyabhāvanāsacive 'ntime
cetasi sphurati sphoṭo ratnatattvam iva sphuṭam.

[534] Referring implicitly to *sphoṭa*, "*arthāntara*" here stands for an entity totally different from phonemes, both related and unrelated to the cognition of a certain speech form. As the opponents argue, the condition that *sphoṭa* is in the range of such cognition does not allow that cognition to be smeared with the phonemes of any sort.

The *sphoṭa* distinctly shines, just as the (true) nature of a precious stone (does), in the final cognition accompanied by the memory traces that are produced by the experiences of each and every preceding phoneme.

Vṛtti 13

Objection: [535]

nanu pratyekam abhivyañjakatve dhvanīnāṃ prathamād eva dhvaneḥ sphoṭapratītes tanmātranibandhanatvāc cārthapratīter upapattau dvitīyādīnām ānarthakyam ity ata āha - pūrvapūrveti.

But if the *dhvanis* manifest (*sphoṭa*) one by one, then, because *sphoṭa* is perceived from the very first *dhvani* and the cognition of meaning comes about since it depends on this perception alone[536], the (other) *dhvanis* (such as the) second (*dhvani*) would be useless. Therefore, (in response to this objection) he says "each and every preceding phoneme" and so on (13th *kārikā*).

Response:

vyañjayanto 'pi hi pratyekam ime dhvanayo na drāg eva sphoṭātmānam avabhāsayitum īśate api tv īṣadrūpam. tathā ca pūrvapūrvavarṇābhivyaktijanitasaṃskārasahita-caramabuddhau sphuṭataraṃ cakāsti sphoṭatattvam iti prāg anutpannāyās tadanantaram utpādo 'rthadhiya iti nottareṣām ānarthakyam.

[535] Here Śeṣakṛṣṇa closely borrows again from Vācaspati Miśra's wording in the TB (pp. 19, 20), but the quotation of the VP *kārikā* (1. 84) is not given by Vācaspati.
[536] TP on STNśk 13, p. 38 interprets this compound as "*sphoṭābhivyaktimātrādhīnatvāt*" [because of depending entirely on the manifestation of *sphoṭa*].

Even if these *dhvanis* manifest (*sphoṭa*) indeed one by one, they are not able to illuminate the (true) nature of *sphoṭa* very quickly, but a fraction (of it at a time). Similarly, since the (true) nature of *sphoṭa* shines more distinctly in the final cognition accompanied by the memory traces, which were produced at the manifestation of each and every preceding phoneme, (and) since the cognition of meaning, which did not arise prior to (that more distinct *sphoṭa* at the perception of the final element), arises immediately after it,[537] there is no futility in the subsequent (phonemes that come after the first one).

na prācāṃ, tadabhāve tajjanitasaṃskāraparipākābhāvenānugrahābhāvād antyasya cetasas tadvyañjane 'kṣamatvāt. yad āha bhartṛhariḥ.[538]

> **nādair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha**
> **vyāvṛttaparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate, iti.**

Nor (is there any futility) of the preceding (phonemes), because, if they were absent, the final cognition would be unable to manifest it (i.e., *sphoṭa*), due to the absence of assistance through the absence of the maturation of the memory traces produced out of them (i.e., the preceding phonemes). What Bhartṛhari says (is as follows).
"*Śabda* is ascertained in the (final) cognition, in which the seeds of (memory traces) have been deposited by the *nādas*[539], (and) through the

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[537] Cf. TP on STNśk 13, p. 38: "*sphuṭatarasphoṭatattvaprakāśāt prāg anutpannāyā arthapratīteḥ sphuṭatarasphoṭatattvaprakāśād uttaram utpattir bhavati*°". [The cognition of meaning, which did not arise prior to the manifestation of more distinct (true) nature of *sphoṭa*, arises after the manifestation of more distinct (true) nature of *sphoṭa*].

[538] VP 1. 84. The VP has "*āvṛtta*°" in place of "*vyāvṛtta*°" here, as both BĀKRE (1913: 9, fn. 1) and TRIPĀṬHĪ (1994: 38, fn. 1) note correctly. But ŚEVAḌE in TP on STNśk 13 (p. 39) accepts *vyāvṛtta* and interprets it as "*niṣpādita*°" [produced], which I do not assume to be correct. Cf. BSśbh 1. 3. 28, where Śaṅkara puts forth the grammarians' stance that it is the final phoneme that brings the cognition to perfection and singleness, and phonemes are not in the range of that perfected single cognition because of their manifoldness.

[539] Vṛṣabhadeva says that the *nādas* here are the *dhvanis* that manifest *sphoṭa*. As discussed in Chapter Two, we may more precisely call them the cognitive *prākṛtadhvanis*.

(perception of the) final *dhvani*, the maturation [540] (of the memory traces) has come to its end".

yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ punaḥ punā ratnaṃ vīkṣamāṇasya ratnadarśanāni pratyekaṃ ratnasvarūpam avagāhamānāny api na sahasaiva samānāsamānajātīyavyāvṛttaṃ tattvam avabhāsayanti. kintu pañcaṣadarśanajanitasaṃskārasacive caramacetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam.

(*Sphoṭa* is manifested gradually) just as the inspections of a precious stone by a lapidarist, who looks into the precious stone again and again, although plunging into the nature of the precious stone at each occurrence, do not reveal all of a sudden (its) (true) nature, which is distinct from (the previous evaluations that were both) common and uncommon(?).[541] But the (true) nature of the precious stone shines in the final cognition accompanied by the memory traces, which are produced by five or six (preceding) inspections.

Kārikā 14

nādhiṣṭhānaṃ vinādhyastapratītir upajāyate
tasmāt parasparādhyāsa iti sarvaṃ samañjasam.

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[540] Cf. VPbh 1. 84: "*nādaiḥ śabdātmānaṃ avadyotayadbhir yathottarotkarṣeṇādhīyante vyaktaparicchedānuguṇasaṃskārabhāvanābījāni. tataś cāntyo dhvaniviśeṣaḥ paricchedasaṃskārabhāvanābījavṛttilābhaprāptayogyatāparipākāyāṃ buddhāv upagraheṇa śabdasvarūpākāraṃ sanniveśayati*." [The sounds, while they manifest the word, leave impression-seeds progressively clearer and conducive to the clear perception (of the word). Then, the final sound brings to the mind, which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word as coloured by itself.]. Translation by IYER 1965: 85.

[541] I could not translate "*samānāsamānajātīyavyāvṛttaṃ*" correctly. It exactly appears in the TB (p. 20) but Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara in his TBtv (p. 20) does not seem to shed any helpful light on this compound either.

Without a substratum, the cognition of what is superimposed (on it) does not arise. Therefore, (that) the mutual superimposition (between them occurs) is fully correct.

Vṛtti 14

Objection:

nanu pūrvapūvavarṇabuddhāv īṣat, caramabuddhau tu sphuṭataraṃ sphoṭo na sambhavati caramajñānakāle prācāṃ pratyayānām atītatvāt tatkāle caramajñānasyānāgatatvād iti nāsatāṃ prācām asatā caramavarṇenopakāraḥ.

But the (cognition) of *sphoṭa* does not arise slightly upon (the rise of) the cognition of each and every preceding phoneme but more distinctly upon (the rise of) the final cognition, because at the time of the final cognition, the preceding cognitions are past, (and) at the time of them (i.e., the preceding cognitions), the final cognition has not arrived. Therefore, there is no assistance by the (cognition of the) non-existing final phoneme to the (cognitions of the) non-existing preceding phonemes.

na ca nirbhāge padātmani vākyātmani vā sphoṭe gṛhīte kiñcid asyāgṛhītam avaśiṣyate yadagrahaṇād avyaktatvam. nāpi samāropaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvavirahāt. na hi sāmānyātmanāpy agṛhītā śuktī rajatasamāropaviṣayaḥ.

And, (in your view), when the partless *sphoṭa*, which has as its (true) nature either word or sentence, is perceived, nothing of it (i.e., of the *sphoṭa*) - i.e., nothing which, if unperceived, results in indistinctness - remains unperceived. Nor is there any superimposition (of phonemes on *sphoṭa*), due to the absence of any relation as particular and universal (between them). Indeed the mother-of-peal, if it is not perceived even in its universal form, is not the range for a superimposition of silver (in the form of a particular).

tasmād gaur ity anusaṃhārabuddhiḥ[542] **parasparavyāvṛttavarṇarūpāvagāhinī na varṇānuviddhaikavastugocarety ata āha - nādhiṣṭhānam iti.**

On account of that, the recapitulatory cognition "*gauḥ*" plunges into the forms of mutually different phonemes, (and) does not have in its range any single entity (which you claimed to be *sphoṭa*) abounding in (those) phonemes. Therefore (in response to this objection), he says "without a substratum" (14th *kārikā*).

Response:

varṇā gādayo 'pi vivartās te cādhiṣṭhānacaitanyarūpe śabdabrahmaṇy adhyastās tajjñāne sphoṭajñānam eva kintu nāsāv arthapratipādaka ity asphuṭa ity ucyate yadā tu prācīnapratyayapracayaracitabhāvanāparipākasaṃvalite carame cetasi sphurati, tadārthapratiprattihetur iti sphuṭataram abhivyaktaḥ sphoṭa ity ucyate iti.

Phonemes such as "*ga-*" are also the illusory transfigurations, and they are superimposed upon the *Śabdabrahman*, which is in the form of substratum consciousness.[543] If the knowledge of them (i.e., phonemes) (arises), it is just the knowledge of *sphoṭa* (that arises), but that (form of *sphoṭa*) is said not to be the signifier of meaning, (because it is an) indistinct (form of *sphoṭa*). When, however, the final cognition, which is united with the maturation of the memory traces prepared by the mass of the cognitions of preceding (phonemes), shines, then what is manifested

[542] Here is a note glossing the "*anusaṃhārabuddhiḥ*", both in BĀKRE 's (1913: 9) and TRIPĀṬHĪ's (1994: 39) editions: "*pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavāhitasaṃskārasahitā antyavarṇabuddhiḥ*." [The cognition of the final phoneme which is accompanied by the memory traces deposited by the experiences of each and every preceding phoneme].

[543] What reveals a certain entity to the knower is the substratum consciousness of that entity. AS 1. 30: "*prakāśakaṃ tāvad adhiṣṭhānacid eva*." [First, the illuminator is none other than the substratum consciousness.]. Cf. ASlc 1. 30: "*sākṣī cit prakāśikā*." [The ego consciousness is the illuminator]. The substratum consciousness also reveals itself. The *Śabdabrahman*, as the illuminator of all entities superimposed on it, is necessarily capable of revealing phonemes as well.

more distinctly, as being the cause of the meaning comprehension, is called *sphoṭa*. This is the meaning.

yad vā pūrvapūrvavarṇair īṣatsandigdhaś caramavarṇabuddhyā tu nitarāṃ niścayena grāhyaḥ.

Or rather, (*sphoṭa*), which is slightly uncertain with the (cognitions of) each and every preceding phoneme, is in fact always to be comprehended with certainty with the cognition of the final phoneme.

tathā hi kamalam ity ukte kakāramakārānubhave 'pi kiṃ kamalīyaḥ sphoṭaḥ kamanīyo veti sandeho nāpagacchati tāvad, yāvan na caramo lo vā no vānubhūyate. tasmād īṣattvaṃ sandigdhatvaṃ, niścitatvam eva sphuṭataratvam. ata evāntyabuddhinirgrāhyaṃ saṃhṛtakramasvarūpaṃ sphoṭam āhur ālaṅkārikā dhvanikārādayaḥ.

For it is like this. When the word "*kamala*" is uttered, even though the "*ka-*" and the "*-ma-*" phonemes have (already) been experienced, the doubt whether the *sphoṭa* is of "*kamala*" (i.e., lotus) or of "*kamana*" (i.e., beautiful) does not go away, as long as the final phoneme, either *"-la*" or *"-na*", is not experienced. Therefore, the slightness (of manifestation) (renders) uncertainty, (and) just the certainty (of manifestation) (renders) greater clarity. For that very reason, the Ālaṅkārikas such as Ānandavardhana state *sphoṭa* as what is to be perceived at the final cognition, and has as its nature a contracted/ withdrawn sequence[544].

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[544] The use of "*saṃhṛtakrama*" as an attributive to *sphoṭa* dates to Bhartṛhari elaborating on the *Paśyantī* stratum of speech. VPbh 1. 134. Also see VPvd on it. While explaining Mammaṭa's use of "*saṃhṛtakrama*", Nāgeśa in KPpu (2. 7) clearly says that the cognition of *sphoṭa* is free from any sequence: "*varṇakramagrahaśūnyam ity arthaḥ. yathā paṭapratyakṣe na tantukramabhānaṃ tadvad ity arthaḥ. ekaḥ paṭa itivad ekaṃ padam iti vyavahārād avayavātirikto 'vayavī sphoṭākhyaḥ svīkriyata ity arthaḥ. ata eva tatra tantviyattāvat padajñāne 'pi na tatra gaṇanāṃ vinā varṇeyattājñānam iti bhāvaḥ*." [It means "devoid of the perception of the sequence of phonemes". In other words, just as there is no perception of sequence of the threads once the cloth is perceived, so (here) too. That is to say that, the whole, separate from (its) constituents, and having the name of "*sphoṭa*" must be admitted on the basis of the usage, "this is a single word", just as (the cloth, separate from its threads, is understood) from the

etenānaṃśasya nikhilasāmānyaviśeṣavirahiṇaḥ sphoṭasya sphuṭāsphuṭāvabhāso na sambhavatīti nirastam. arthapratītyanurodhena tatkalpanasyāvidyakasyāvaśyakatvād iti.

With this is refuted (the view) that the appearance of the distinct and indistinct states (of the manifestation) of *sphoṭa*, which is partless and devoid of all the universal and particular (conditions), does not arise. This is because the hypothesis of them (i.e., the distinct and indistinct states of manifestation of *sphoṭa*), which is ignorance-born, is necessary through compliance with the comprehension of meaning (that changes from uncertainty to certainty).

Kārikā 15

satyasphoṭapramodeti mithyāvarṇāvabhāsataḥ
ārād vanaspatau hastibuddher iva tarupramā.

The valid knowledge of *sphoṭa*, which is real, arises from the (cognition of the) manifestation of phonemes, which are illusory, just as the valid knowledge "tree" arises from the cognition "elephant" (arisen) upon (seeing) a tree,[545] at a distance.

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usage, "this is a single cloth". The idea is that, for this very reason, just as (there is no knowledge of) the quantity of the threads there (in the case of the cloth), without counting (them), there is no knowledge of the quantity of the phonemes in the perception of the word as well.]. Also see Mammaṭa's own *vṛtti* on KP 2. 7, for "*antyabuddhinirgrāhya*" [to be perceived with the cognition of the final phoneme], which is used to describe the signifier of meaning. Moreover, Govinda Ṭhakkura in his *Pradīpa* on KPp 2. 7 clearly says that the "signifier" is in the form of *sphoṭa*, while Nāgeśa, being a grammarian, accounts for Ṭhakkura's words in clearer terms in his subcommentary (KPpu 2.7) on the KPp.

[545] For the use of this tree-elephant analogy in the related literature, see VPvd 1. 89; BraSs (*Tarkakāṇḍa*), p. 41; SSm 19; SSNV 159.

Vṛtti 15

Objection:

nanu yadi varṇā vivartā uktās tadā mithyābhūtair amībhiḥ kathaṃ paramārthabhūtasya sphoṭasya pramārūpo niścayaḥ, mithyābhūtāt paramārthabhūtasya niścayādarśanād ity ata āha - satyasphoṭaprameti.

But, if phonemes are said to be the illusory transfigurations (of the *Śabdabrahman* in the form of *sphoṭa*), then, how (does) the certainty in the form of the true knowledge of the absolutely real *sphoṭa* (arise) through those illusory (phonemes)? (It is not possible) because we see no certainty of the absolutely real (arising) from (anything) illusory. Therefore (in response to this objection), he says "the valid knowledge of *sphoṭa*, which is real" and so on (15th *kārikā*).

Response:

dūre vartamāne vanaspatau vṛkṣe taddoṣavaśāj jātāyā mithyābhūtāyā api hastibuddher yathā pravṛttidvārā tarupramodeti, tathā mithyābhūtavarṇāvabhāsād api satyasphoṭaprameti bhāvaḥ.

Just as, with regard to a tree standing in the distance, the true knowledge "tree" arises in connection with the tree through the activity (of the beholder), based on the cognition of an elephant, although illusory on account of that error (i.e., of standing in the distance), the valid knowledge of real *sphoṭa* (arises) even from the manifestation[546] of illusory phonemes. This is the meaning.

[546] Cf. TP on STNśk 15, p. 41: "*mithyābhūtānāṃ varṇānāṃ śrāvaṇapratyakṣād api*" [even from the auditory perception of illusory phonemes].

Kārikā 16

pratyakṣajñānaniyatā vyaktāvyaktāvabhāsitā
na jāyate jāyate ced vyaktaivetaramānadhīḥ. [547]

(The state of) having distinct and indistinct (phases of) manifestation is limited to the knowledge (arisen) through direct perception. The knowledge (both vague and distinct) through other means does not arise[548]. If such knowledge arises, (that knowledge is) certainly distinct.

Vṛtti 16

Objection:

nanu yathā prāñco varṇā avyaktaṃ caramas tu tajjanyabhāvanāsahitaḥ sphuṭataraṃ sphoṭam avabhāsayati, tathā pūrve varṇāḥ pratyekam avyaktāṃ

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[547] Śeṣakṛṣṇa borrows the first half of this *kārikā* from Maṇḍana Miśra's SSm *kārikā* 23: "*pratyakṣajñānaniyatā vyaktāvyaktāvabhāsitā । mānāntareṣu grahaṇam athavā naiva hi grahaḥ*." [(The state of) having distinct and indistinct (phases) is limited to the knowledge (arisen) through direct perception. In the case of the other means of knowledge, there is either apprehension (of the object) or not at all]. Translation is based on IYER's (1966: 60). Maṇḍana in his gloss on this *kārikā* clarifies that the cognition of words and signs does not have distinct and indistinct phases: "*indriyaṃ hi vyaktāvabhāsino 'vyaktāvabhāsinaś ca pratyayasya hetuḥ. yathā dūrād grahaṇe sūkṣmārthanirūpaṇāyāṃ ca. liṅgaśabdādayas tu niścitātmānaṃ pratyayam upajanayanty ekarūpam, naiva vā. na tatra vyaktāvyaktagrahaṇabuddhibhedaḥ, arthaś ca śābdapratyayāvaseyaḥ, sphoṭātmā tu pratyakṣavedanīya iti niravadyam*." [Indeed the sensory organ is the cause of the cognition that has distinct manifestions and indistinct manifestations. Just as in the cases of perceiving (objects) from the distance and determining tiny objects. But signs and words etc. either raise a cognition whose form is single (and) which has as its nature certainty, or never (raise any cognition) at all. In the case of (the cognition through) them (i.e., signs and words), there is no division in knowledge with distinct perception and that with indistinct perception. And meaning is to be ascertained from the cognition through *śabda*. It is accurate (to hold that) the (true) nature of *sphoṭa*, on the contrary, is to be perceived directly.].

[548] Cf. TP on STN 16, p. 42: "*asati kāraṇe na jāyate eva*" [never arises if the cause is not present].

caramas tu tajjanyasaṃskārasahito vyaktām arthadhiyam eva kiṃ nādhatte, kiṃ tādṛśānavayavasphoṭakalpanayety ata āha - pratyakṣeti.

But just as the preceding phonemes illuminate *sphoṭa* indistinctly but the final phoneme, accompanied by the impressions produced out of them (i.e., preceding phonemes), illuminates (it) more distinctly, do not the preceding phonemes place (i.e., bring about) individually an indistinct cognition of meaning, and (does not) the final phoneme, accompanied by the memory traces produced out of them, (bring about) just a distinct cognition of meaning? (Then) what is the necessity of hypothesizing the partless *sphoṭa* of that sort? Therefore (in response to this objection), he says "[limited to the knowledge (arisen) through] direct perception" and so on (16th *kārikā*).

Response:

gaur ity ekaṃ padam iti pratyakṣasya sphoṭasya vyaktāvyaktāvabhāsitvam abhivyaktitāratamyaṃ sambhavati, na parokṣasyābhidheyajñānasya.

A gradation of manifestation (in the form of) the state of having distinct and indistinct (phases of) manifestation occurs (in the cognition) of the directly perceived *sphoṭa* that "*gauḥ*" (cow) is a single word, (whereas such a gradation of manifestation) does not (occur) in the indirect knowledge of meaning.

tathā hi śuktisampuṭāt pṛthakkṛte muktāphale bhavati parīkṣakāṇāṃ prathamam avyaktaṃ darśanaṃ, tato vyaktaṃ, tato vyaktataraṃ, tato vyaktatamam ity anubhavamārgāgataṃ, śuktisampuṭāntaḥsthite tv amuṣminn anumeye nedam abhivyaktitāratamyam ity apy anubhavasiddhaṃ,
pratyakṣetarapramāṇasya
prameyasadbhāvamātranirbhāsāya pravṛttatvāt.

For it is like this. It is known by route of experience that, when the pearl has been extracted from the (hemispherical) shell of the mother-of-pearl, the examiners first (have) an indistinct cognition (of the pearl), then a distinct (cognition), then a more distinct (cognition), and then the most distinct (cognition). Nevertheless, it is also known by experience that, if that object of inference (i.e., the pearl) remains inside the (hemispherical) shell of the mother-of-pearl, this gradation of manifestation does not (occur), because any means of knowledge other than direct perception operates to illuminate only the existence of the object of knowledge.

evaṃ ca pramāṇāntarajanyā buddhir asati kāraṇe na jāyata eva, sati tu kāraṇe jāyate cet tadā vyaktaiveti na sphoṭārthadhiyoḥ samānayogakṣemateti. etena sphoṭavyañjakatve 'pi varṇānāṃ pratyekasamudāyavikalpāvakāśaḥ.

Likewise, the cognition produced by the means of knowledge other than (direct perception) never arises if the cause (of that cognition) is not present, but if it (i.e., such a cognition) arises when the cause is present, then it is certainly distinct. Accordingly, there is no common state of existence[549] between *sphoṭa* and the knowledge of meaning. On account of this, even though phonemes are (accepted as) the manifesters of *sphoṭa*, there is a possibility (for them to manifest *sphoṭa*) alternatively, i.e., either individually or collectively.

tad uktam -

> **yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ**
> **so 'pi paryanuyogena naivānena viyujyate.** [550]

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[549] The *sphoṭa* cognition and the cognition of meaning do not share the same perceptual or cognitive values. The cause of the cognition of meaning is not a product of direct perception, because the type of the *śabda* that triggers the cognition of meaning is not external but innate, whereas the manifesters of *sphoṭa* are external causes. Consequently, there is no agreement between *sphoṭa* and meaning in ontological terms.
Cf. NAKAMURA 2004: 479. n. 26: "Since *yogakṣema* means the most important thing that human beings seek or the most fundamental thing in human existence, *samānayogakṣema* and *tulyayogakṣema* mean "being of, or common in, the same existence, meaning or value", and *bhinnayogakṣema* has the opposite meaning."
[550] ŚV (*sphoṭavāda* chapter), *kārikā* 91.

iti nirastaṃ, sphoṭārthadhiyoḥ pratyakṣaparokṣatayā tadvyañjakatve varṇānāṃ samatvābhāvāt.

What is said (in the *Ślokavārttika*);
"Even he, in whose (view) the partless *sphoṭa* is manifested by the cognitions of phonemes, never remains free from this objection (that phonemes do not signify meaning)."
(That view) is refuted, because, *sphoṭa* and the cognition of meaning (are in the range of) direct perception and indirect perception (respectively), and so phonemes are not equal in signifying them.

Kārikā 17

yatrānuvṛtte vyāvṛttir yasya tasmāt sa bhidyate nadīdīnajaretyādiṣv eva varṇeṣu tadbhidā.

If while something continues, something else becomes distinct (i.e., ceases), (then) the latter differs from the former. (Accordingly), while the phonemes (of the pairs of speech units) such as *nadī* - *dīna*, *jarā* (and *rājā*) indeed (continue), their *sphoṭas* (become) different.

Vṛtti 17

Objection:

Cf. ŚVubh (*sphoṭavāda* chapter) on this *kārikā*: "*yaś cāyam arthapratipattau varṇānāṃ paryanuyoga uktaḥ - naikaikasya, nāpi sambhūya yugapat krameṇa vā - ityādi, sa padasphoṭābhivyaktāv api bhavatpakṣe dhvanīnāṃ varṇānāṃ vā tulya ity āha - yasyeti*." [(If) this objection (by the words) "not individually, not simultaneously as a collection, or sequentially" etc. (is raised) on the (role of) phonemes in meaning comprehension, that (objection) is equally applicable to (the role of) the *dhvanis* or phonemes also in the manifestation of *padasphoṭa*, as maintained by you. Thus he says "in whose view" etc.].
Cf. Pārthasārathi Miśra in ŚVpm on this *kārikā*: "*varṇagrahaṇam anāsthayoktam, dhvanīnām eva vyañjakatvasya parair iṣṭatvāt*." [The cognition (of *sphoṭa* through) phonemes is stated with want of consideration, since the others (i.e., the grammarians) want only the *dhvanis* to be what manifest (*sphoṭa*).].

nanu te vibhaktyantāḥ padam iti nyāyasūtram. asyārthaḥ ta eva varṇā eva vibhaktyantāḥ padaṃ na sphoṭākhyam iti tato na varṇabhinnaḥ padātmā sphoṭa ity ata āha - yatreti.

But the *Nyāyasūtra* (says) that "those (sounds) ending in inflectional terminations (are) a word."[551] Its meaning is that, just those, i.e., just the phonemes, when ending in inflectional terminations (can be called) a "word", but not (something) entitled "*sphoṭa*". Therefore, there is no *sphoṭa* that is different from phonemes and has word as its nature. Therefore, (in response to this objection), he says "If something resembles" and so on (17th *kārikā*).

Response:

yasminn anuvartamāne yad vyāvartate tasmāt sa bhidyate, yathā suvarṇāvayaveṣv anuvartamāneṣv eva vyāvartate kaṭakamukuṭādiḥ. evam anuvartamāneṣv eva varṇeṣu vyāvartante padātmāno nadī dīna jarā rājā ityādayaḥ sphoṭā atas te 'pi varṇebhyo[552] bhinnā iti.

If while something continues, something else becomes distinct (i.e., ceases), (then) the latter differs from the former, just as (an object like) a bracelet (or) a crown is distinct, while the constituents of gold certainly continue. Likewise, the *sphoṭas* such as *nadī*, *dīna*, *jarā,* and *rājā*, which have words as their (true) nature, are distinct, while the phonemes (in

[551] NyS 2. 2. 57: "*te vibhaktyantāḥ padam.*"
Cf. NySBh 2. 2. 57: "*yathādarśanaṃ vikṛtā varṇā vibhaktyantāḥ padasaṃjñā bhavanti. vibhaktir dvayī nāmikī ākhyātikī ca, brāhmaṇaḥ pacatīty udāharaṇam.*" [Speech sounds, changed according to grammatical rules, ending in an inflectional termination, are termed a word (*pada*). Inflectional terminations are of two types, nominal and verbal. "*Brāhmaṇaḥ*"and "*pacati*" are examples (of words ending in nominal and verbal terminations respectively.)]. Translation by SCHARF 1996: 173.
[552] The variant "*padebhyo*" is found in BĀKRE's edition (1913: 11), but both STNśk and TP (pp. 43, 44) contain "*varṇebhyo*". Since the upholders of *sphoṭa* repudiate both the *padasphoṭa* and the *varṇasphoṭa*, there is no theoretical conflict here, but "*varṇebhyo*" seems more appropriate in this context.

those pairs) indeed continue. [553] Therefore, they (i.e., those *sphoṭas*) are different also from (their) phonemes.

Kārikā 18

pramā na jāyate tāvad yāvan na jñāyate padam
padaṃ hi jñātaṃ karaṇaṃ sarve svīkurvate budhāḥ.

Valid (linguistic)[554] knowledge does not arise as long as word is not known. Indeed, all the wise people accept as an instrument[555] (for valid linguistic knowledge) a word that is known.

Vṛtti 18

Objection:

nanu tathāpy ekaṃ padam ity ekatvadhīr naikavastuvyavasthāpakaṃ pramāṇam api tu vyapadeśamātranimittam iti, yathā karituragādiṣu campakāśokakiṃśukādiṣu kaś cid vairividhvaṃsādir ekadeśādiś copādhiḥ, senāvanam iti vyapadeśamātrajanakaḥ, tathātrāpy ekārthapratyayahetutvam ekārthasambandhākhyānaṃ vāstūpādhiḥ. [556]

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[553] It is not the sequence that makes the difference of such *sphoṭas*. The grammarians do not squarely admit that the memory traces of phonemes are remembered in the same sequence in which they were deposited. Furthermore, their emphasis is on the view that the cognition of *sphoṭa* is not characterized by any genuine (*vāstavika*) sequence of either the articulated phonemes or their memory traces. Sequence in which the memory traces are deposited is in fact contracted (*saṃhṛta*) in the cognition of *sphoṭa*.

[554] TP on STN 18, p. 44: "*śabdabodhātmikā pramā*" [Valid knowledge which has verbal cognition as its nature].

[555] TP on STN 18, p. 44: "*karanaṃ śabdabodhakaraṇam*" [an instrument, i.e., an instrument for verbal cognition]. Cf. BhP 1. 81 and NSM on it.

[556] In reproducing this set of arguments by the opponents of *sphoṭa*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa closely follows Vācaspati Miśra, who starts the discussion as follows in the TB, p.

But still the cognition of singularity, "(this is) a single word", is not a means of valid knowledge that establishes a single entity (i.e., the *sphoṭa*), but the reason for just the designation (as such). Just as "the destruction of foes" etc., as a limiting adjunct concerning (the collection of) "elephants and horses etc.", and "one area" etc., as a limiting adjunct concerning [the collection of (trees such as)] *Campaka*, *Aśoka*, *Kiṃśuka* etc., present the reasons for just the designations "an army" and "a forest" respectively, in this case (of the word) too, let either the state of being the cause of the cognition of a single meaning or the statement of the relation (of a word) to (its) single meaning be the limiting adjunct (of the cognition "this is a single word").

na caikapadatve ekārthapratītihetutvam avagantavyam avagate ca tasminn ekapadattvam ity anyonyāśraya iti vācyam. pūrvam ekapadatvāvadhāraṇānabhyupagamāt. [557] **na hi padāvadhāraṇādhīnaḥ sambandhabodhaḥ, kintu tadadhīnaṃ padajñānaṃ.** [558]

Nor should it be said that "if (i) the condition of being the cause of the cognition of a single meaning should be recognized when there is the condition of being a single word, and (ii) (only) when that (cognition of being a cause) is recognized does there come about the condition of being a single word, there is (the fault of) mutual dependency". This is because the ascertainment of the state of being a single word is not admitted before (i.e., before admitting its being the cause of the cognition of a single meaning). Indeed, the comprehension of the relation (between the signifier and the signified) is not dependent on the ascertainment of the

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51: "*na vayam ekāvabhāsapratyayam ekavastuvyavasthitau pramāṇayāmaḥ, kintu vyapadeśamātram*." [We do not consider the cognition of a single appearance as a means of knowledge for establishing (another) single entity, but simply a designation (as such).]. Cf. TBtv, pp. 51, 52.

[557] Cf. NVTṬ 2. 2. 57.

[558] The last sentence is exactly quoted from TB, p. 55. Cf. Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara in his TBtv (p. 55) points to an opponent's view as follows: "*na hi jātucit sambandhajñānādhīnaṃ sambandhijñānam. na khalu kuṇḍaṃ badaraṃ vā sambandhagrahaṇād aveti. kintu kuṇḍabadarajñānādhīnaṃ tatsambandhajñānam eva.*" [Indeed there's no way that the cognition of the relatum is dependent on the cognition of relation. (One would) never understand either the pot or the *Badara* (tree) by comprehending (their) relation. But the cognition of their relation is certainly dependent on the cognition of the pot and the *Badara* (tree).].

(state of the single) word, but the cognition of the (state of the single) word is dependent on it (i.e., the comprehension of the relation).

tathā cāhur dvitīyaṭīkāyāṃ vācaspatimiśrāḥ -

> **ekasmṛtisamārohiṇāṃ varṇānām asaty apy arthāvabodhe sujñānatvād, iti. ekasmṛtiviṣayānekavarṇasya ca svārthena saṅketagrahasyāpi sukaratvaṃ, taduttarakālaṃ ca padam iti kārakaśabdapravṛttiḥ. itarathā sarveṣv eva kārakapadeṣu durvāram itaretarāśrayatvaṃ syāt.**

Furthermore, Vācaspati Miśra says in (his) commentary on the second (chapter of the *Nyāyavārttika*) [559] (as follows).
"This is because of the easy comprehension of the phonemes occurring in a single memory, even if there is no comprehension of meaning (from them). And the operation of the terms denotative of the *kārakas*[560] (is as follows): it is also easy (for us) to comprehend, by means of the (primary) meaning of many phonemes in the range of a single memory, (their denotative power through) the convention[561], (and) the word (is ascertained) thereafter. Otherwise, there would be an unavoidable mutual dependence among all the terms denotative of the *kārakas*".

tasmād vyapadeśamātrānurodhenānekavarṇamātrāvabhāsinīṣu śrotrajāsu buddhiṣu tadāhitavāsanālabdhajanuṣi cānubhūtavarṇasaṅkalanātmikāyāṃ smṛtāv aprathamānaḥ prathamānavarṇopamardena na śakyaḥ padātmā sphoṭa iti vaktum.

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[559] NVTṬ 2. 2. 57. Śeṣakṛṣṇa reproduces Vācaspati's explanation by slightly rearranging and replacing words.
[560] The *kārakas* are the means of realizing the action (*kriyā*) denoted by verb, as taught in A 1. 4. 23 - 1. 4. 55. Bhartṛhari (VP 3. 7. 1) uses the term *sādhana* to refer to the *kārakas*.
[561] By *saṅketa* is meant linguistic convention. Linguistic convention is of two types: "*ājānika*" i.e. natural, therefore divine, and "*ādhunika*" i.e., artificial, therefore man-made.

Therefore, it is not possible to say, in compliance with just the designation, that there exists something that does not appear in a (single) memory, which is produced by the impressions deposited by the phonemes and has as its nature the collection of the phonemes that were experienced, once the auditory cognitions illuminating just multiple phonemes (arise), (namely) *sphoṭa*, which has word as its nature, by disregarding the phonemes that (actually) appear[562] (there).

kiñca gaur ity ekaṃ padam ity atra bhāsamānam aupādhikam ekatvam asyām eva bhāsamānaṃ svābhāvikaṃ varṇanānātvaṃ na bādhitum utsahate. na hy aupādhikaṃ siṃhatvaṃ svābhāvikaṃ naratvaṃ bādhate. ata eva naikatvanānātvayor virodha ity ata āha - prameti.

Moreover, the conditioned singularity appearing (lit. shining) here (in the cognition), "*gauḥ* is a single word", does not attempt to hinder the inherent manifoldness of phonemes that appears in this very (cognition). The conditioned "lion-hood" never hinders the inherent "humanness" (in the cognition "*nṛsiṃha*", i.e., man-lion). Because of this (very reason), there is no conflict[563] between the singularity (of word) and the multiplicity (of phonemes). Therefore, (in response to this objection), he says "valid (linguistic) knowledge" and so on (18th *kārikā*).

Response:

na khalv ajñātapadasvarūpāvadhiḥ padād artham avabudhyate, sā raṅgam āgatetyādau seti padam ajānato 'bhimatārthapratipattivirahād iti jñātaikapadasvarūpāvadhiḥ padād artham avabudhyate, hi yataḥ sarve vādinaḥ padaṃ jñātaṃ satpramāṃ prati karaṇam iti manyante.

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[562] TP on STNśk 18, p. 46: "*pratyakṣānubhūyamānavarṇān parityajya*" [disregarding the phonemes that are experienced directly.].

[563] This is because the singularity of word is conditioned (*aupādhika*), whereas the multiplicity of phonemes is inherent.

(The listener) who does not know the limit of a word-form never comprehends (any) meaning from (such a) word, (just as) the one who does not recognize "*sā*" as a (separate) word in (a sentence such as) "*sā raṅgam āgatā*" [she entered the stage], because he does not have the comprehension of the desired meaning. (Therefore), (the listener) who knows the limit of a single word-form comprehends the meaning from (such a) word. Since, i.e., for that reason, all advocates (of intellectual systems) consider that a word, when known, is a cause towards (obtaining) the true valid (linguistic) knowledge.[564]

tathā ekārthasambandhākhyānam apy ekapadatvaṃ nāpādayati. tathā hi varṇānāṃ kevalānāṃ padabhāvam anāpannānām arthapratyāyakatve vyutkramoccāritānām api tatpratipādakatvaṃ syāt. asambaddhānāṃ tu pratyāyakatve yataḥ kutaś cid yasya kasyacid arthasya pratītiḥ syād ity avaśyaṃ sambandho vācyaḥ. sa ca padatvam āpannatve varṇānāṃ sambhavati. tac ca padatvaṃ na tādṛśasphoṭam antareṇa.

Likewise, even the statement of the relation (of a word) to (its) single meaning does not cause the state of a single word. For it is like this. If the individual phonemes, which have not achieved the state of being a word, signify meaning, then even the (phonemes) uttered with an inverted sequence would signify it (i.e., meaning). But, if the phonemes without any (prior) relation (to their primary referents) [565] signify meaning, there would be a perception of any meaning from any one of them, and so (their) relation (to the meanings) must necessarily be stated. And it (i.e., the relation) is possible (only) if phonemes achieve the state of being a word. And that state of being a word is not (possible) without a *sphoṭa* of that sort.

[564] Note that Śeṣakṛṣṇa here does not say that the words when known alone are capable of causing the complete verbal cognition. Rather, as he puts it accurately, the knowledge of the words is, necessarily, a major cause toward the acquisition of *pramā*. The existence or the necessity of other causes is not therefore denied.
[565] Cf. TP on STNśk 18, p. 44: "*vācyārthena saha asambaddhānām.*" [Those unrelated to the primary referents.].

sambandhākhyānāt padatvakalpane dhruvam anyonyāśrayaḥ. padatvāt sambandhitve sati ākhyānam ākhyānāc ca padatvam iti. cakrakaṃ ca - padatve sati sambandhitvaṃ sambandhitve ca sati sambandhitvākhyānaṃ sambandhitvākhyānāc ca padatvam iti. vyavasthitam eva tu vācakatvam ākhyāyata iti.

If the state of being a word is assumed (to occur) after the statement of the relation (of the linguistic units to their referents), (then) there is certainly a mutual dependency (between them). If when the state of being related exists after the state of being a word (is ascertained), the statement (of the relation occurs), and (inversely), the state of being a word (is achieved) after the statement (of the relation). And this is a circular (interrelation). When the state of being a word occurs, then (its) state of being related (to a referent is established); and when (such a) state of being related (to a referent) occurs, then the statement of its being related (to a referent is ascertained); (and then) from the statement of its being related (to a referent), the state of being a word (is established). But (it only means that) the significativeness (of a word) that is settled is so designated.

Objection:

yat tu līlāvatīkāreṇoktam –

> **ekaṃ padam iti dhīr ekasuptiṅantatvāvacchedenopapadyate. tatraikasuptiṅantatvāvacchedaḥ padatve, nānāsuptiṅantatvāvacchedo vākyatve prayojakaḥ svīkaraṇīya eva. anyathā sphoṭatvāviśeṣe ayaṃ padasphoṭo 'yaṃ vākyasphoṭa iti vicitravyavahāras tvanmate kathaṃ syād, iti.**

But what was said by the author of the *Līlāvatī* (i.e., Vallabha, author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*) (is this).[566] The cognition that "(this is) a single word"

[566] NL (*Guṇavicāra* chapter, *Śabdaparīkṣā* section), p. 76: "*sphoṭātmā śabdo nāmbaraguṇa iti cen na. tad asiddheḥ. ekaṃ padam iti dhīr*

arises through the delimitation[567] (whether a unit of speech has the) state of ending in a single nominal termination or a single verbal termination. In that case, the delimitation (whether it has the) state of ending in a single nominal termination or a single verbal termination must be accepted as the determinant of the state of being a word, (and) the delimitation (whether it has the) state of ending in multiple nominal terminations and multiple verbal terminations (must be accepted as the determinant of) the state of being a sentence. Otherwise, if the state of being a *sphoṭa* is uniform, how could there be, in your view, the respective usage that "this is a word-*sphoṭa*" and "this is a sentence-*sphoṭa*"?

Response

tan na. subantatiṅantayor anugatasyaikasya padatvāvacchedakasya vaktum aśakyatvāt, anyataratvasya gauraveṇāvacchedakatvābhāvāt.

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anekavarṇavyāvṛttātmānam ekapaṭabuddhivad ekārthakriyāpratisaṃdhānādyupādhivaidhuryād ratnatattvabuddhivan nānāvyaktidarśanajasaṃskāragamyaṃ prasādhayatīti cen na. ekasuptiṅantāvacchedena tadupapatteḥ. anyathā kiṃnimittakaḥ sphoṭe 'pi padādivyavahāra iti svayam eva paribhāvaya. kiṃ tarhi pratipādakam. kramavadvarṇasaṃhatir iti brūmaḥ." [If (you say that) *śabda* which has *sphoṭa* as its nature does not have the quality of ether, (then we reply) no. Because of its untenability. If (you say that) the cognition, "this is a single word", proves (something, i.e., *sphoṭa*) whose nature is different from the multitude of phonemes, which is like the cognition of a single cloth due to the absence of limiting adjuncts, such as the recollection of a single causal efficiency, (and) which is like the cognition of the (true) nature of a precious stone obtainable (with the help of) the memory traces produced by the manifold distinct examinations, (then we reply) no. (It is) because of the ascertainment of (such an entity) through the delimition (whether a word has) the state of ending in a single nominal termination or a single verbal termination. Contemplate by yourself otherwise for what reason *sphoṭa* is also called word (i.e., *pada-sphoṭa*) etc. Then what is the signifier (of meaning)? We say that (it is) the collection of sequential phonemes].

[567] Delimitation (*avaccheda*) is the specific limitation under which properties and relations function. A delimiter (*avacchedaka*) characterises an entity and distinguishes it from other kinds of entities. For instance, the genus "pot-hood" is the delimiter of a pot.

That (view) is not (tenable). (This is) because of the impossibility to name a single delimiter of the state of being a word, which (i.e., delimiter) is common to both noun and verb, and because of the absence of the state of being a delimiter, on account of the prolixity[568] in (assuming that the state of being a delimiter) is the state of being one or the other of them.

na ca saṅkhyāvācakapratyayatvam evānugatam iti vācyam. pratyayatvasyaikasyānugatasyābhāvāt. pratīyate yenārtha ity anvarthasya prakṛtyādisādhāraṇatayātiprasaṅgāt. eka eva ekaka ityādau svārthapratyaye 'vyāpteś ca.

Nor should it be said that just the state of being an affix denotative of number is common (to both nominal and verbal terminations, and thus being also common to both nouns and verbs, it is consequently the delimiter of the state of being a word). (This is) because there is no single and common state of being an affix. And (this is) because an unwarranted consequence ensues, if (the state of being an affix) occurs because "meaning is understood by it", since this etymologically based definition (*anvartha*)[569] is common to the stems etc. This is also because this would not cover the *svārtha* suffixes[570], as in "*ekaka*", which just means "one", etc.

vibhaktyantavarṇābhivyaṅgyatvasya padasphoṭavyavahārajanakatvād vibhaktyantatattadvarṇābhivyaṅgyapadasphoṭebhya evākāṅkṣādimahimnā vākyārthasamullāse padasphoṭavādimate vākyasya na vivartatvāṅgīkāraḥ. nityaniravayavavākyasphoṭavādimate vibhaktyantavarṇarūpapadasya vivartatve doṣābhāvāt.

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[568] There is no delimiter common to both nouns and verbs that can be applied to distinguish them as words. On top of that, it is a complex assumption that either a nominal termination or a verbal termination delimits a linguistic unit as a word.
[569] *Anvartha* is "inherently significant or purposive so that there is a direct semantic link between the term and the nature of that which it denotes" (KAHRS 1998: 48). *Anvartha* is therefore a hypernym to include roots, stems, affixes, case endings etc.
[570] *Svārtha* [meaning of (the item) itself (to which is added an affix)] suffixes are *taddhita* suffixes taught in A. 5. 3, in which the meaning expressed is the meaning of the stem.

Due to the (view that) the state of being manifested by the phonemes with case-endings triggers the usage "*padasphoṭa*", if the sentential meaning is illuminated on account of (their mutual) expectancy etc., just out of the *padasphoṭas*, which are manifested by various phonemes with case-endings, on the view of the proponents of the *padasphoṭa*, the sentence is not admitted as an illusory transfiguration. This is because, on the view of the proponents of the eternal and partless *vākyasphoṭa*, there is no fault in (admitting) that the word in the form of the phonemes with case-endings is an illusory transfiguration.

tasmād ekatvabuddhyā anaupādhikyā bādhiteyaṃ varṇanānātvabuddhir vivartatām ālambamānā adhiṣṭhānaṃ sphoṭam evālambata iti yuktam utpaśyāmaḥ.

Therefore, we consider it proper (to hold) that this cognition of the multiplicity of phonemes, which is blocked by the cognition of singularity (i.e., "this is a single word") not based on limiting adjuncts, while resting on the state of illusory transfiguration, relies (permanently) on just *sphoṭa*, the substratum (of all illusory transfigurations).

Kārikā 19

gaur ity ekāvabhāse 'sminn upādhiṃ kañcid icchatām na bhavet kiñcid apy ekaṃ na ca nānāpi tadvinā.

For those desiring a certain limiting adjunct (even) in this single manifestation, "*gauḥ* (is a single word)", there would be no (unconditioned cognition of) singularity (anywhere). And, without that (i.e., the unconditioned cognition of singularity), there would not be (any cognition of) multiplicity either.

Vṛtti 19

kiñca gaur ity atrābādhitāpy ekatvadhīr yadi pratyakṣāpalāpināṃ

tattatsvasiddhāntaśraddhāvyāmohāpasmāriṇām aupādhikī syāt tadā sarvatra yatkiñcidekopādhisambhāvanayā kvāpy ekatvabuddhiḥ pāramārthikī na syāt. tadvirahe tannibandhanadvitvādipratīter api virahe śūnyam evedaṃ jagad āpadyetety ata āha - gaur itīti. icchatāṃ vādināṃ kiñcid vastu tadvinā ekaṃ vinā.

Furthermore, if the cognition of singularity, herein "*gauḥ*" (is a single word), even though unblocked (in reality), is conditioned (by a limiting adjunct), (as in the view) of those who evade (a fact that is) directly perceivable (by everybody) and who are convulsing (lit. epileptic) owing to being confused by confidence in various theories of their own, then, on account of assuming whatsoever limiting adjunct of singularity in every case, there would be no absolutely true cognition of singularity anywhere. In the absence of it (i.e., any absolutely true cognition of singularity), and (consequently) in the absence also of any comprehension of duality etc. dependent on it, this world would become entirely void.[571] Therefore, (elaborating on this point) he says "*gauḥ* (is a single word)" and so on (19th *kārikā*). "Those desiring" (means) "those upholding", "something" (means) "the (unconditioned cognition of any real single) entity", "without it" (means) "without the (unconditioned cognition of) singularity".

[571] Śeṣakṛṣṇa refers here to the Nyāya view on *apekṣābuddhi* (dependent cognition) which they hold to be the cause of the cognition of multiplicity. Note that Bhartṛhari, who might also have been well aware of the early Nyāya position on this matter, explains how duality depends on singularity. AKLUJKAR summarizing the VP 3. 11. 15 - 32 in COWARD and RAJA (1990: 172), puts it as follows: "Unity is the source of duality, and so on, for unity is prior to all other distinctions, which depend on a thing's being single. Some think the two unities require a mediating enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) to create duality; others do not think so. Still others say that duality and the like are a collection of two or more unities, and that the number of a collection is due to the differences among its constituents." For the later Naiyāyikas' view on *apekṣābuddhi*, see BhP, *kārikās* 106 - 108.

§ 2. Padaprakriyā [572]

atha nyāyamatānusāreṇa padaprakriyā.

Henceforth, the procedure of the formation of word (is examined) in the light of the Nyāya view.

tatra prathamavarṇajñānasyotpādas tatsaṃskārasyotpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (1)

There, the production of the cognition of the first phoneme, and the presence[573] of the cause of production of its memory trace (are) simultaneous.[574]

tataḥ saṃskārasyotpādas tato dvitīyavarṇajñānena pūrvavarṇānubhavajanitasaṃskārasahitena dvitīyavarṇasaṃskārasyotpadyamānatā pūrvavarṇajñānavinaśyattety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (2)

Then, the production of the memory trace (of the first phoneme), then the presence of the cause of production of the second phoneme's memory trace, (which is made) by the cognition of the second phoneme accompanied by the memory trace generated by the experience of the

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[572] The influence of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (PDS) of Praśatapāda upon Śeṣakṛṣṇa's wording and the arrangement of this section is obvious. A discussion on how "*apekṣābuddhi*" functions in raising the cognitions of duality, trinity, etc. starts from PDS 8. 6. 1. 1. See PDS (*Saṅkhyānirūpaṇa* section of *Guṇa* chapter), p. 454 ff. Also see PDSnk and PDSv on this.

[573] As RAMANUJAM (1979: 50, n. 2) points out referring to Vyomaśiva's commentary on the PDS, an entity is in the stage of "*utpadyamanatā*" when it is going to be produced in the next moment. If we disregard the technical sense in which the term *utpadyamanatā* is used and translate it as "the state of being produced", its meaning may overlap with that of *utpāda* (production). In the Nyāya, *utpadyamanatā* and *utpāda*, just as *vinaśyattā* and *vināśa*, are ontologically different because they belong to two discrete phases.

[574] "*ekaḥ kālaḥ*" [lit. (occurring) at one and the same time]. See HALBFASS 1992: 188 -191.

preceding phoneme, (and) the presence[575] of the cause of destruction of the cognition of the preceding phoneme (are all) simultaneous.

yady apy utpadyamānatā utpattikāraṇasānnidhyaṃ vinaśyattā ca vināśakāraṇasānnidhyaṃ tac ca jñānaṃ dvitīyavarṇasyaiveti na kāryakāraṇabhāvas tathāpi pūrvavarṇasaṃskārotpādajñānavināśau prati kāraṇatvam asty eva.

Even though there is no cause-effect relationship (here) on the grounds that the state of being produced (means) the presence of the cause of production, the state of being destroyed (means) the presence of the cause of destruction, and the cognition of (both production and destruction) belongs to just the second phoneme, still (the cognition of the second phoneme) certainly causes both the production of the memory trace of the preceding phoneme and the destruction of the cognition of it (i.e., the first phoneme).[576]

tato dvitīyavarṇasaṃskārasyotpādaḥ, dvitīyavarṇajñānavinaśyattā, prathamavarṇajñānasya vināśaḥ, antyavarṇānubhavasyotpādaḥ, pūrvavarṇadvayānubhavajanitasaṃskāradvayenāntya-varṇānubhavasahakāriṇā pūrvavarṇadvayaviṣayasmaraṇasyotpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (3)

Then, the production of the memory trace of the second phoneme, the presence of the cause of destruction of the cognition of the second phoneme, the destruction of the cognition of the first phoneme, the

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[575] As in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology, the presence or proximity (*sānnidhya*) of the cause of destruction of the cognition of an entity is known as "*vinaśyattā*". Accordingly, the cause of destruction of the cognition of the first phoneme is just the rise of the cognition of the second phoneme, which also carries with it the memory trace of the first phoneme. For the Vaiśeṣika theory of *vinaśyattā*, see MIYAMOTO 1996: 61. Also see RAMANUJAM 1979: 104, n. 1.

[576] Note that BĀKRE in his STN edition (1913: 13) shows his doubt regarding the inclusion of "°*jñāna*" in this compound:
"*pūrvapūrvavarṇasaṃskārotpāda(jñāna?)vināśau*".

production of the experience of the final phoneme, and the presence of the cause of production of the recollection, the range of which is the two preceding phonemes, (made) by the two memory traces produced by experiencing the two preceding phonemes, which (i.e., the two memory traces) are accompanied by the experience of the final phoneme (are all) simultaneous.

tato varṇadvayasmaraṇasyotpādaḥ, antyavarṇānubhavasya vinaśyattā dvitīyavarṇajñānasya vināśaḥ, tataḥ saṅketasmṛter utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (4)

Then, the production of the recollection of the two (preceding) phonemes, the presence of the cause of destruction of the experience of the final phoneme, the destruction of the cognition of the second phoneme, (and) then the presence of the cause of production of the recollection of convention (are all) simultaneous.

tataḥ saṅketasmṛter utpādas tadvarṇadvayasmaraṇasya vinaśyattā, antyavarṇānubhavasya vināśaḥ padārthapratipatter utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (5)

Then, the production of the recollection of convention, the presence of the cause of destruction of the recollection of those two (preceding) phonemes, the destruction of the experience of the final phoneme, (and) the presence of the cause of production of the perception of word-meaning (are all) simultaneous.

tataḥ padārthapratipatter utpādas tatsmaraṇasya vināśaḥ, saṅketasmṛter vinaśyattā, padārthasaṃskārasyotpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (6)

Then, the production of the perception of word-meaning, the destruction of the recollection of them (i.e., the two preceding phonemes), the presence of the cause of destruction of the recollection of convention, (and) the presence of the cause of production of the memory trace of word-meaning (are all) simultaneous.

tatas tatsaṃskārasyotpādaḥ, padārthapratipatter vinaśyattā, saṅketasmṛter vināśa ity ekaḥ kālaḥ. (7)

Then, the production of the memory trace of it (i.e., word-meaning), the presence of the cause of destruction of the perception of word-meaning, (and) the destruction of the recollection of convention (are all) simultaneous.

tataḥ padārthapratipatter api saṃskārād vināśaḥ. (8)

Then, because of the (presence of the) memory trace (of word-meaning), the destruction of the perception of word-meaning as well (takes place).

yady apy asyāṃ prakriyāyāṃ saṅketasmṛtisamaya evāntyavarṇānubhavasya smaraṇena vināśitatvān na padārthapratipattiṃ prati kāraṇatvasambhavas tathāpy antyavarṇānubhavasya padasmaraṇādiḥ sarvo vyāpāra eveti na doṣaḥ.

It is not faulty (to hold) that, even though, in this procedure of the formation (of word), there is no causal agency belonging to (the cognition of) the experience of the final phoneme in (generating) the comprehension of word-meaning, due to (its, i.e., of the experience of the final phoneme) being destroyed by the recollection (of the two preceding phonemes)[577] at the very time of the recollection of convention, nevertheless, all the operations, such as remembering the word, belong to the experience of the final phoneme.

§ 3. Vākyaprakriyā [578]

atha vākyaprakriyā.

Henceforth, the procedure of the formation of sentence (is examined).

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[577] TP on STN *padaprakriyā*, p. 49.

[578] Śeṣakṛṣṇa closely follows Udayana in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* (NVTP, p. 307) for writing the following three phases of procedure.

antyavarṇānubhavasyotpādaḥ, smaraṇasya vinaśyattā, tataḥ saṃskārapadapratisandhānayor utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (1)

The production of the experience of the final phoneme, the presence of the cause of destruction of the recollection (of preceding phonemes), (and) then the presence of the cause of production of both the memory trace (of the final phoneme) and the recognitive synthesis[579] of the word (are all) simultaneous.

atha tayor utpādaḥ, sa eva padapratisandhānātmā samayasaṃskārasyodbodhaḥ, sambandhasmaraṇasyotpadyamānatā, saṃskārād vicitrapratyayavinaśyattety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (2)

Then, the production of both of them (i.e., the memory trace of the final phoneme and the recognitive synthesis of the word), the very awakening of the memory trace of the convention, which has as its nature the recognitive synthesis of the word, the presence of the cause of production of the recollection of (conventional) relation, (and) the presence of the cause of destruction of the non-uniform cognition[580] because of the (presence of the) memory trace (of the final phoneme) (are all) simultaneous.

atha sambandhasmaraṇasyotpādaḥ, vicitrapratyayasya vināśaḥ, padapratisandhānasya vinaśyattety ekaḥ kālaḥ. (3)

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[579] In the Nyāya system, *pratisandhāna* is the combination of various cognitions as a result of their having a common cause, for instance, the object of experience.

[580] The cognition of the uncompleted word at the experience of the final phoneme is referred to as "*citrabuddhi*" or "*vicitrapratyaya*", because it remains diverse in consequence of the presence of both the auditory perception of the final phoneme (*antyavarṇapratyakṣa*) and the memory of the preceding phonemes (*pūrvavarṇasmṛti*) in it. DESHPANDE 1992: 118. Cf. "motley cognition" as used by SINHA (1938: 157). Also see KATAOKA 1999: 11 for details.
Note here that Bharata Miśra in his SSbh, p. 2 says as follows, rejecting the Nyāya view: "*citrarūpāyāṃ buddhau upāntyavarṇārohāsambhavāt*" [Because it is impossible for the phonemes towards the end (of a word) to get on the non-uniform cognition.].

Then, the production of the recollection of (the conventional) relation, the destruction of the non-uniform cognition, (and) the presence of the cause of destruction of the recognitive synthesis of the word (are all) simultaneous.

iti evaṃ ca pūrvapūrvavarṇasmṛtinicayasahitāntyavarṇānubhavasya vinaśyadavinaśyadavasthayoś ca smṛtyanubhavayor balena śrotrasaṃskārābhyāṃ sann antyavarṇo 'santaḥ pūrve varṇās tadavagāhī smṛtyanubhavarūpo vicitraḥ pratyaya eva vākyārthapratyayahetur iti.

Accordingly, (when) the final phoneme is present (but) the preceding phonemes are not present, due to the auditory (experience of the final phoneme) and the memory traces (of the preceding phonemes) (respectively), through the power of the experience of the final phoneme accompanied by the collection of the memory traces of each and every preceding phoneme, and (through the power of) the memory and the experience (of the preceding phonemes, whose) states are of something being destroyed and not being destroyed (respectively), (then under such a condition), just the non-uniform cognition, which plunges into them (i.e., both the final phoneme and the preceding phonemes) and (consequently) is in the form of both memory and (auditory) experience, is the cause of the cognition of sentence-meaning.

tathā ca tārkikamataṃ bhaṭṭavārtikakāreṇa darśitam -

> **citrarūpāṃ ca tāṃ buddhiṃ sadasadvarṇagocarām**
> **kecid āhur yayā varṇo gṛhyate 'ntyaḥ pade pade, iti.**

Similarly, the view of the logicians has been shown by (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Vārtika* (i.e., the *Ślokavārtika*).[581]
"Some people call it (i.e., the cognition), by which the final phoneme is grasped at every word, (and) in whose range there are extant and extinct[582] phonemes, the non-uniform cognition."

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[581] ŚV (*sphoṭavāda* chapter), *kārikā* 111. Also quoted in TBtv, p. 77.
[582] The non-uniform cognition has in its range both the final phoneme in the form of auditory experience and the preceding phonemes in the form of memory.

tatra padaprakriyāyāṃ pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavabhāvitabhāvanākūṭasya tajjanyasmṛtīnāṃ ca tāvadvarṇaviṣayasamūhāvalambanasmṛtidvārā nārthapratyāyakatvam ity asakṛd upapāditam.

Regarding that, it was expounded several times in the procedure of the formation of word that neither the culmination of the memory traces fostered by the experience of each and every preceding phoneme nor the memories produced by them (i.e., by the memory traces) signifies meaning, through the memory that depends on the collection having as its range the phonemes up to that point.

vākyaprakriyāpi na prāmāṇikī. antyavarṇānubhavāt prācīnasmṛtinicayasahitād api yugapat smṛtyanubhavarūpavicitrapratyayānutpatteḥ.

Even the procedure of the formation of sentence is not valid, because the non-uniform cognition in the form of the memory (of the preceding phonemes) and the experience (of the final phoneme) does not arise simultaneously, even from the experience of the final phoneme accompanied by the collection of the memory traces of the preceding (phonemes).

yathoktaṃ śrīvācaspatimiśrais tattvabindau,

> **na cāntyavarṇodbodhitasaṃskārādhīnajanmā smṛtir anubhavena saha yugapad utpattum arhati. na ca nyāyyo yugapad utpādaḥ pratyayānāṃ karaṇasya pratyayāparyāye 'sāmarthyāt, iti.** [583]

As stated by noble Vācaspati Miśra in the *Tattvabindu*, "nor is it possible for the memory whose production depends on the memory trace awakened by the final phoneme to arise simultaneously[584] with the

[583] TB, pp. 80, 81.

[584] The impossibility for two cognitions to arise simultaneously is held even by the later Naiyāyikas. Cf. BhPsm 68 and BhPsms on it. The cognition of experience of

experience (of the final phoneme). Nor should it be held that the production of cognitions is simultaneous, because the cause (of knowledge)[585] is incapable of producing the cognitions which do not follow a sequence".[586]

tathā ca tattvabindau eva tatsaṅgraham āhuḥ -

nāntyavarṇaśrutiḥ smṛtyatītā vākyārthabodhinī
na smṛtis tadapekṣatvād yaugapadyaṃ na cānayoḥ, iti. [587]

Likewise, (he) states a summary of it in the *Tattvabindu* itself (as follows).
"The auditory perception of the final phoneme without the memory (of the preceding phonemes) is not the signifier of the sentential meaning. Nor is the memory (of the preceding phonemes) (the signifier of the sentential meaning), because of its expectancy for it (i.e., the auditory perception of the final phoneme). Nor is there any simultaneous presence of both (the auditory perception of the final phoneme and the memory of the preceding phonemes)."

prācīnasmṛtisamaye 'ntyavarṇānubhavo nāsti anāgatatvāt antyavarṇānubhavasamaye prācīnasmṛtir eva nāsti atītatvād iti tasyārthaḥ.

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the final phoneme cannot, therefore, arise in conjunction with the memory of the final phoneme.

[585] TP on STN *vākyaprakriyā*, p. 51: "*jñānakaraṇasya indriyādeḥ*" [of the sensory organs etc., which cause knowledge].

[586] Cf. TBtv, p. 81: "*paryāyeṇaiva svakāryaṃ pratyayaṃ kartuṃ sāmarthyaṃ nānyatheti yata ity arthaḥ. kāraṇasyeti. yadyatpratyayakāraṇaṃ pratyetrā(tā?) pratyetavyaṃ karaṇam indriyādi tathātmamanoyogādikaṃ, tatsarvaṃ grahītuṃ kāraṇasyeti sāmānyavacanam iti draṣṭavyam*." [*Yataḥ* (therefore) means that "the capability of raising the cognition that is its own effect only sequentially, but not in any other way." On "of the cause"; each cause of cognition must be comprehended by the one who comprehends, the cause is the sensory organ, and also the self, the mind, meditation etc. It should be considered that "of the cause" is (used here as) a general term to include all these.].

[587] TB, p. 76. Note the variant there, i.e., "°*smṛtyā nītā*" [lit. brought forth by the memory]. TBtv quotes it again identically, but I assume that "°*smṛtyānītā*" would be the correct reading.

Its meaning is that the experience of the final phoneme does not exist at the time of the memory of the preceding (phonemes), because it (i.e., the experience of the final phoneme) is yet to come into being, (and on the other hand), indeed the memory of the preceding (phonemes) does not exist at the time of the experience of the final phoneme, due to (its, i.e., of the memory of the preceding phonemes) being past.

dvitīyaṭīkāyām apy uktaṃ vācaspatimiśraiḥ -

> **api ceyam antyavarṇaśrutiḥ svārthasaṅketasmṛtisāpekṣā tadanapekṣā vārthadhiyam ādhatte. ādye saṅketasmṛtikāle 'ntyavarṇaśrutir uparatā kṣaṇikatveneti kayā smṛtir apekṣyeta. antyavarṇaśrutisamaye ca saṅketasmṛtir anāgateti kim antyavarṇapratyayo 'pekṣate. saṅketasmṛtyanapekṣatve tv agṛhītasaṅketasyāpi prathamavarṇaśrāviṇo 'rthapratyayaprasaṅga, iti.**

It is stated by Vācaspati Miśra also in (his) commentary on the second (chapter of the *Nyāyavārttika*) [588] (as follows).
"Furthermore, this auditory perception of the final phoneme, which either expects or does not expect the recollection of the convention of its referent, brings about the cognition of meaning. Regarding the first (view that the auditory perception of the final phoneme depends on the recollection of the convention in causing the sentence-meaning), on the grounds that the auditory perception of the final phoneme perishes on account of its transience at the time of recollecting the convention, by what (i.e., auditory perception of the final phoneme) is the recollection (of the convention is) expected? On the grounds that the recollection of the convention is yet to arise, what (i.e., convention) does the cognition of the final phoneme expect at the time of the auditory perception of the final phoneme? Nevertheless, if (the auditory perception of the final phoneme is taken) not to expect the recollection of the convention, the cognition of meaning would (then) arise even to the listener of the first phoneme, who is unaware of the convention." [589]

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[588] NVTṬ 2. 2. 57.
[589] The TB reads "*gṛhītasaṅgater api*" [even to the one who is aware of the relation] in place of "*agṛhītasaṅketasyāpi*" [even to the one who is unaware of the convention]

tasmāt padasphoṭād vākyasphoṭād vārthapratyaya iti sthitam. ata eva śabdaprabhavatvam ākhyāyate jagata ity anyatra vistaraḥ. ata eva cāgame 'pi –

> **śadabrahma yad ūcire sukṛtinaś caitanyam**
> **antargataṃ tad vo 'vyād aniśaṃ śaśāṅkasadanaṃ**
> **vācām adhīśaṃ mahaḥ.** [590]

ityādy uktam ity alam ativistareṇa.

Therefore, it is established that the cognition of meaning (arises) from either the *padasphoṭa* or the *vākyasphoṭa*. For that very reason, the world is said to originate from the *śabda*. The details (of it are given) elsewhere.[591]
And for that very reason, in the sacred tradition as well statements such as this have been made: "May that glorious lord of speech, whom the blessed called the *Śabdabrahman* in the form of inner pure consciousness, and in whom the crescent moon has its abode[592] (as his crest), always protect you."
Therefore, there is no necessity for further elaboration (here).

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in the STN. Parameśvara in the TBtv (p. 80) shows his awareness of the variant "*agṛhītasaṅgater api*" [even to the one who is unaware of the relation], but accepts the other as correct.

[590] ŚTT 1. 1. Śeṣakṛṣṇa states only the second half of it here. The first half is as follows: "*nityānandavapur nirantaragalatpañcāśadvarṇaiḥ kramād | vyāptaṃ yena carācarātmakam idaṃ śabdārtharūpaṃ jagat*." [(May that glorious lord of speech), who has a body of incessant bliss, by whom this world, which is in the form of sounds and meanings, and which has as its nature all the animate and the inanimate (things), was gradually pervaded by means of the fifty phonemes being continuously manifested.].

[591] BSśbh 1. 3. 28.

[592] ŚEVAḌE (in TP on STN *vākyaprakriyā*, p. 52) seems to have wrongly understood the compound "*śaśāṅkasadanaṃ*" here. He takes it as "*śaśāṅkaḥ candraḥ sadanaṃ nivāsasthānaṃ yasya tat candramaṇḍalavarti*" [the one whose abode is the moon; the one living in the moon]. Rāghava Bhaṭṭa in the ŚTTp 1.1 interprets it as "*śaśāṅkasya candrasya sadanaṃ sthānaṃ candrakalāvataṃsam*" [(the one who has) as his crest the (crescent) moon, which has its abode (there)], which goes better with the conventional depiction of Śiva, who wears the crescent moon as his crest.

§ 4. Concluding Verses and Colophon

prāktantrasūktimuktānāṃ mālā kṛṣṇavinirmitā
viduṣām adviṣāṃ kaṇṭhe bhāsatām asatām api. (1)

May (this work) created by Kṛṣṇa, (in the form of) a necklace of pearls which are (in the form of) wise sayings (found in the) works of the ancient people, shine on the neck of both the amicable intellectuals and the malicious people.[593]

kriyākārakabhāvena yat sarvatrānubhūyate
sa pratyagātmā jayati śabdabrahmamayaṃ mahaḥ. (2)

The individual self, the glory that is composed of the *Śabdabrahman* and experienced everywhere through the relation of action and factors of action, conquers (all).

śabdabrahmābhidhaṃ śrīmadbhāṣyakārasya sammatam
śrīkṛṣṇaśeṣaviduṣā sphoṭatattvaṃ nirūpitam. (3)

The (true) nature of *sphoṭa*, which is known as the *Śabdabrahman* and approved of (in the teachings) of the illustrious author of the *Bhāṣya* (i.e., Patañjali), was expounded (here) by the noble intellectual (known as) Kṛṣṇaśeṣa.

vidvadbhiḥ sadasadvyaktikāribhiḥ sārahāribhiḥ
rāgavidveṣarahitair dūṣitaṃ vāstu bhūṣitam. (4)

[593] TP on STN, p. 52 explains "*asatām*" as "*khalānāṃ doṣānveṣaṇatatparāṇām*." [of the vicious who are eagerly engaged in finding faults]. ŚEVAḌE presents two example verses that are parallel in meaning to this *kārikā*: ĀTV (*Ātmopāsanopasaṃhāra* chapter), verse 2 and TCd, verse 5 of the preamble.

May (this work) be embellished or defiled (in their works or opinions) by the intellectuals, who are free from (prejudiced) attachment and hatred[594], who reveal the correct and the incorrect, and who extract the essence.

iti śrīśeṣakṛṣṇaviracitaṃ sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇaṃ sampūrṇam.

With this, the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* written by noble Śeṣakṛṣṇa is complete.

[594] TP on STN, p. 54: "*teṣāṃ rāgadveṣarahitatvāt taiḥ pradattaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ vā asmatsammatam eva bhaved iti sarvaṃ madhuram*." [Because of their being free from attachment and hatred, the embellishment or defilement brought forth by them would certainly be approved by us. Thus, everything is fine.].

Chapter FOUR

Early Modern Philosophy of Language and the Revival of *Sphoṭa*

Philosophy of language was one of the intellectual genres that revived in line with the renaissance of early modern India. Numerous social, religious, philosophical, and intellectual factors contributed, in different ratios and at different phases, to its revival from a state of dormancy that lasted for a few centuries. In this chapter, I discuss a few factors of that sort, before examining the renewal of the grammarians' interest in *sphoṭa* and the role Śeṣakṛṣṇa played in it.

§ 1. Early Modern Literature on Sanskrit Grammar

Whereas Benares was rapidly becoming a place of heightened scholarly activities of all sorts by the middle of the 16th century, organized studies into the philosophical aspects of language were apparently limited. Even by the end of the 15th century, it appears that teaching of Sanskrit was largely confined to its technical grammar based on the authoritative texts, with less emphasis on the philosophical topics of language. Traditional Brahmin grammarians taught locally, while the students appear to have mostly been their own descendants. Viṭṭhala's account of his clan in the PKv presents such a picture of grammatical studies a few generations before him. Consequently, despite isolated households of grammarians that might have been numerous, prominent figures recognizable as authorities of the mainstream Sanskrit grammar have seemingly been very few before the early modern period.

The grammarians taught technical grammar possibly through the authoritative grammatical texts, while there were also attempts to prepare simplified teaching manuals based on them. The PK of Rāmacandra appears to be a work of that sort. However, as Viṭṭhala's words in the PKv suggest, such attempts to introduce new teaching models were not readily welcomed. The PK had received censorious comments for the confusing interpolations purposively added by the

critics themselves, who had ulterior motives to make it look trivial and erroneous. Viṭṭhala's work known as the *Prasāda* (i.e., "clarity") was, as he claims, needed to restore Rāmacandra's work to its original form.[595]
The grammatical literature immediately prior to the early modern period and during the early decades of it can be recognized under three major categories; (i) recasts of the authoritative grammatical works and their commentaries, (ii) commentaries on the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa, and (iii) new works on technical grammar and philosophy of grammar followed by commentaries.

1.1 Recasts of the Authoritative Grammatical Works

There is an old tradition of writing grammar that would compete with the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or satisfy the needs of distinct social and religious groups. The works with their own ways of rearranging and reformulating the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* rules, such as the *Kātantra* alias *Kalāpa* of Sarvavarman, the core of which dates back to as early as 400 CE, the grammar of Candragomin (c. 450 CE) and that of the Jaina grammarian Devanandin (c. 500 CE), and even the *Śabdānuśāsana* of Abhinava Śākaṭāyana (c. 850 CE) prove that there were previous attempts to re-present Sanskrit grammar in a more pedagogically practical form. Furthermore, works

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[595] PKv, *pūrvārdha*, verse 7: "*tathā ca paṇḍitammanyaiḥ prakṣepair malinīkṛtā । prakriyākaumudī tasyāḥ prasādaḥ kriyate mayā.*" [And thus I make a purification (or, I compose the *Prasāda*) for the *Prakriyākaumudī*, which was polluted with interpolations by self-styled scholars]; PKv, *uttarārdha,* 1: *"prakṣepakāluṣyanirāsahetoḥ prasādam asyā vidadhe yathāvat.*" [I duly perform a purification of it for the sake of refuting the pollutions caused by interpolations.]. Viṭṭhala's respect for the tradition is obvious. He wishes that his work would please everyone, who is aware of the defects in the previous works and curious to know the correct forms. PKv, *pūrvārdha*, verse 9: "*yenāsmābhir anekasūriracitagranthārtham āloḍya tat । sāraṃ mūlagataṃ viśeṣaviduṣāṃ prītyai prakāśīkṛtam.*" [For which reason, after examining thoroughly the contents of the works composed by many learned men, the essence contained in the original works has been manifested by us for the pleasure of specialists.]. PKv*, uttarārdha,* concluding verse 1 (at the end of the *Vaidikavākyasvarapradarśana* chapter): "*bhāṣyavṛttiharigranthatadvyākhyāmarmavedinaḥ । kautukākrāntamanasaḥ pramodayatu matkṛtiḥ.*" [May my work please those who are knowledgeable about the subtle points in the *Mahābhāṣya*, the (*Kāśikā)vṛtti*, the work by (Bhartṛ)Hari, i.e., *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, and the commentaries on them, and have minds overcome by curiosity (to know the correct forms)].

that emerged several centuries later, such as the *Siddhahemacandra* alias *Haimavyākaraṇa* of Hemacandra (c. 1089 - c. 1177), the *Sārasvataprakriyā* of Anubhūti Svarūpacārya (fl. 1270), and the *Mugdhabodha* of Vopadeva (or Bopadeva, a Mahārāṣṭra grammarian who flourished around the 13th century), which was "an attempt to simplify and abbreviate Pāṇini's system", [596] and the works of the Jaumara school popular in West Bengal posed a challenge to traditional mainstream grammarians, because of their arbitrary omissions, rearrangements, reformulations, and reinterpretations of the original Pāṇinian rules in different proportions.

In order to teach Sanskrit grammar easily and within a shorter period of study, new manuals that do not contradict the authoritative texts were required. Applying the *prakriyā* model to Pāṇinian grammar, a model that was initially seen in the *Kātantra* grammar, was done successfully for the first time by a Sri Lankan Buddhist monk Dharmakīrti (c. 10th century) with his *Rupāvatāra*, but that practice did not develop further until the advent of the later grammarians. The new topical arrangement of the grammar rules followed by a short gloss on each rule was known as "*prakriyākrama*". Consequently, the *Prakriyāratna*[597] of an anonymous grammarian (13th century) and the *Rūpamālā* of Vimala Sarasvatī (13th century) emerged as two noteworthy works in that line, before Rāmacandra wrote his PK, supplying more clarity and erudition to the genre. When Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita produced his SiKau, its fame[598] probably outshone the PK and its numerous commentaries and supercommentaries.[599] In addition to the SiKau, another notable recast which became quite popular particularly in south India was the *Prakriyāsarvasva* (PraS) of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa[600] (fl. c. 1560 - c. 1646) from

[596] COWARD and RAJA 1990: 20.
[597] NCC 12, p. 224.
[598] Its immense popularity is proved by the multiplicity of the commentaries on it amounting to twenty four (BALI 1976: 12, 13).
[599] NCC 12, pp. 221 - 223. In addition to the PKv and PKśk, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's student Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Tattvacandra* commentary on the PKśk and a PK commentary by a Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, perhaps Śeṣakṛṣṇa's younger son, are also significant because the last two were apparently contemporary with the SiKau.
[600] It is not known whether Nārāyaṇa came to Benares at any stage of his career. His other grammatical works such as the *Apāṇinīyapramāṇatā* and the *Dhātukāvya* (a *śāstrakāvya* or a poetic illustration of the roots in the order of the

Melputtur, Kerala, who might have been a junior contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji. It is evident from the large number of works[601] following the *prakriyā* model that it was admired as a successful way of rearranging and reformulating grammar rules.

1.2 Commentaries on the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*

The second category of significant grammatical literature in the period concerned is the commentarial literature on the MBhP, which was the most recent complete commentary on the MBh available to the grammarians after the 12th century. The popularity of the MBhP was not, however, dependent simply on its status of being relatively recent. It depended also on the fact that Kaiyaṭa had followed[602] the views of Bhartṛhari, whose MBhD in its complete form was probably available to him, and those of Vāmana and Jayāditya in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, the first complete running commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Those three predecessors of Kaiyaṭa were standard authorities for the traditional grammarians. However, many of the grammarians after Kaiyaṭa seem not to have been satisfied with the commentaries on the MBhP by their more recent predecessors. A comparative study of those commentaries written up to as late as the end of the early modern period would reveal the intensity of their interest in diversely interpreting the traditional grammar and their attempts to discredit the other contemporary works of similar sort. The growing demand for learning the traditional Sanskrit grammar instigated the necessity of composing easier manuals, and in some cases, even their abridgements and simplified versions for the sake of beginners. The well-known commentaries on the MBhP thus include Satyānanda alias Rāmacandra Sarasvatī's (c. 1500) *Laghuvivaraṇa* and his father Īśvarānanda/ Īśvarīdatta Sarasvatī's *Bṛhadvivaraṇa*, Annambhaṭṭa's (fl. c. 1540) *Uddyotana*, Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi's (fl. c. 1580) *Prakāśa*, Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī's (c. 1640) *Vyākhyā*, and Nāgeśa's (fl. c. 1650 - c. 1750) *Uddyota* with Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍe's (fl. c. 1700 - c. 1750) *Chāyā* commentary on it. Alongside the trend of producing commentaries on the MBhP, some grammarians returned to the primary text, i.e., the

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Dhātupāṭha) were also famous among many other important treatises on grammar from Kerala.

[601] See NCC 12, pp. 220 - 226.

[602] COWARD and RAJA 1990: 208.

MBh, to write new commentaries on it. Consequently, Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa's (fl. c. 1550 - c. 1600) *Sūktiratnākara*, Śeṣa Viṣṇu's (c. 1605) *Prakāśikā*, Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī's (c. 1605) *Ratnaprakāśa*, Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa's (b. 1616) *Vyākhyādarśa*, Cokkanātha/ Śokanātha Dīkṣita's (c. 1650) *Ratnāvalī*, Sadāśiva's (c. 1667) *Gūḍhārthadīpanī*, and a south Indian grammarian Gopālakṛṣṇa Śāstrī's (c. 1720) *Mahābhāṣyābdhikacintāmaṇi* etc. are notable among the commentaries on the MBh up to the modern period.

1.3 New Works on Technical Grammar and Philosophy of Language

The individual works on discrete topics of grammar and on philosophical insights into language constitute the third category. Some authors of such works were traditional grammarians who composed commentaries, recasts, abridgements etc. of the authoritative grammatical works, while others were philosophers not recognizable as grammarians but representing one or more of the major philosophical schools. There were also some who acquired fame as writers on both grammar and philosophy. Accordingly, it is not correct to ascribe the early modern works on the philosophy of language to the grammarians only, whose works were obviously within the boundaries of technical grammar.

During this period, the individual works written on some selected topics of grammar appear to have focused on elucidating the accurate use of Sanskrit. The definition of the "accurate use" was contested, because some maintained the necessity of sticking to the rules prescribed only in the authoritative grammatical texts, whereas some others gave precedence to the usage of authoritative authors in genres other than grammar and to the rules admitted as correct by non-Pāṇinian grammatical systems.

The topics in which the grammarians were particularly interested were diverse. Accent was a topic that triggered a series of works, such as the *Svarasiddhāntamañjarī* of Nṛsiṃha paṇḍita (15th century), the *Svaraprakriyā* of Viṭṭhala, author of the PKv, the *Svaraprakriyā* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, and again another *Svaraprakriyā* of Śeṣa Rāmacandra (c. 1757). Likewise, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Upapadamatiṅsūtravyākhyāna* and

Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi, Appayya Dīkṣita's *Tiṅantaśeṣasaṅgraha* [603] (apparently an individual work on the conjugation of verbs), Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi's *Kārakatattva*(*vicāra*), Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa's *Vibhaktyarthaprakāśikā*, Nāgeśa's *Suptiṅantasāgarasamuccaya*, *Kārakārthanirṇya*, *Ṇeraṇāvitisūtrārthavicāra* alias *Ṇeraṇivādārtha* (on the *gajasūtra*, i.e., A. 1.3.67), and *Tiṅantasaṅgraha*[604] are just a few examples for the works on discrete topics. The larger works, such as Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's ŚK, *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā* with Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's commentaries on it, i.e., the *Bṛhadvaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and its abridgement known as the *Sāra*, Nāgeśa's *Mañjūṣā* works with its *Bṛhat*, *Laghu,* and *Paramalaghu* versions, and his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, should be considered as more complete works on grammar that deal with a wider range of topics. For the works that were not confined to Pāṇinian grammar, the *Praveśaka*[605] by Acyutappiṣāraḍi (or Acyuta Piṣāroṭi) (fl. 1550 - 1621) and, more significantly, the *Apāṇinīyapramāṇatā* by his student Melputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa are just two examples.[606]

Unlike the works on very specific technical topics, such as Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Yaṅlugantaśiromaṇi* or Nāgeśa's *Ṇeraṇivādārtha*, the aforementioned larger works also included sections or chapters on the philosophical topics such as *sphoṭa*. Likewise, in addition to the individual works and their commentaries on the *sphoṭa* doctrine after Maṇḍana Miśra, which we discussed in the introduction of this study, works that covered a wider range of philosophical topics on language were also gaining ground. Starting with the treatises such as the *Śābdabodhataraṅgiṇī* of Īśvarānanda/ Īśvarīdatta Sarasvatī, the tendency towards examining language from philosophical perspectives grew more noticeably in the latter half of the early modern period. Jaganmohana Paṇḍita's (c. 1670) *Prabodhacandrikā* [607], Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita's (c. 1700) *Śabdabhedanirūpaṇa,* and Jayakṛṣṇa/ Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin's (c. 1745) *Śabdārthasāramañjarī* and *Śabdārthatarkāmṛta* are a few examples.

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[603] NCC 8, p. 166.

[604] NCC 10, p. 21, 22.

[605] NCC 13, p. 89. See SARMA's edition (1968: ii of introduction) of the AP.

[606] The PK and its commentaries by Viṭṭhala and Śeṣakṛṣṇa did not pedantically reject everything non-Pāṇinian, whereas Bhaṭṭoji obviously differed from them. I will discuss this point later in this chapter.

[607] NCC 7, p. 144.

1.4 Pressure to Publish and Multidisciplinary Scholarship

An overall study of early modern works in diverse genres would reveal that patronage was available more readily for the treatises that addressed timely needs, both social and academic, and the topics of public interest.[608] In comparison to other contemporary works, such as poetry, Dharmaśāstra, and philosophical works, grammatical works that belonged to any of the genres discussed above hardly contain information about their patronage. Again, those that received patronage seem to have mostly[609] been teaching manuals of technical grammar, mastering which was necessary for anybody setting out on learning any traditional discipline, including the philosophy of language. Therefore, the materials that eased the difficulties in teaching and learning technical grammar up to advanced stages might have had a high demand and support. As discussed in Chapter One, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's PKśk mentions its patronage and purpose of composition, i.e., educating the patron's son, but Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's celebrated works on technical grammar are silent about their patronage. Note that Bhaṭṭoji received support from the Nāyaka rules of Ikkeri to promote just the Advaita Vedānta.

Since the new works on technical grammar also needed easier access, some later grammarians were busy with writing light commentaries on them and preparing easy versions of them. Vasudeva Dīkṣita wrote the *Bālamanoramā* commentary on the SiKau for beginners, following Bhaṭṭoji's PM, which was intended for the use of advanced students, while the *Sārasiddhāntakaumudī* of Varadarāja was expected to facilitate the study of the SiKau. Condensation of teaching manuals tailored to the needs of students at different levels also became necessary. Varadarāja's *Laghu* and *Madhya* versions of the SiKau served for such a purpose.

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[608] Public events such as debates were also patronized. For instance, Toḍaramalla and Venkaṭappā Nāyaka I of Ikkeri hosted two famous debates on contested topics.
[609] For instance, although Śeṣakṛṣṇa's PKśk and Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa's SR contain information about their patrons, there is no mention of patronage in the STN, the ŚK, and the VSK.

The grammarians, especially around the beginning of the early modern period, had to develop proficiency also in disciplines other than grammar, so that they could survive the very competitive intellectual currents of their time, gain students, and win patronage. Before coming to Benares to study grammar, Bhaṭṭoji is said to have been a Vaiṣṇava priest by his family tradition, as his title "Dīkṣita" indicates. His detailed knowledge of Vedic rituals reflected in his works is, therefore, reasonable. Although his authorship of all of them cannot be ascertained, the non-grammatical works[610] ascribed to him that outnumber his grammatical works not only reveal his expertise in the genres other than grammar but also suggest, more evidently, a stronger demand for such works during his time. Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja is reported to have learned Persian[611] in order to learn Islam.[612] The repertoires of Śeṣakṛṣṇa[613] and Appayya Dīkṣita[614] are also examples for the breadth of scholarship of early modern grammarians.

It can be assumed that most of the authors whose works constituted the grammatical literature of the early modern period were also teachers of grammar. However, we also hear about the grammarians like Śeṣa Vīreśvara who appear to have spent most of their time teaching rather than writing. On the other hand, although it is difficult to imagine that there were grammarians fully dedicated themselves only to writing books, some like Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, whose grammatical works are quite known to us, are hardly found to have been referred to as teachers of grammar.

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[610] BALI 1976: 7, 8.

[611] Introduction to PARIKH's edition (1953: 15, 16) of *Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana*.

[612] CHAUDHURI 1981: 47. And Toḍaramalla encouraged Brahmin scholars to learn Persian, because it helped secure jobs at the state service.

[613] As stated earlier, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's expertise in philosophy is extolled by his younger son Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, while his poetic skills are obvious in the poetry and drama works ascribed to him. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Dharmaśāstra works are also well-known and quoted by his contemporaries and successors.

[614] NCC 1, pp. 264 - 266.

§ 2. Early Modern Grammarians on Sanskrit Usage

Regarding the contents of teaching, as stated above, the grammarians before the beginning of the 17th century were inclined to give priority to technical grammar over philosophy of language. It is also noticeable that they concerned themselves with how Sanskrit language was used in contemporary academic and social contexts. Given such a situation, the grammarians, at least during the time of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, cannot be expected to have enjoyed much recognition as writers on linguistic philosophy.

2.1 Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Philosophy of Language

As far as we know, Śeṣakṛṣṇa did not write any work[615] on the philosophy of language other than the STN, which was probably parallel in time to Bhaṭṭoji's ŚK. Despite his being the most illustrious grammarian in the early modern period, the circumstances of Bhaṭṭoji could not have been very different from those of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, at least during the former's early career. BRONKHORST (2005: 16) notes that, although most of Bhaṭṭoji's ideas about the philosophy of language are found in the ŚK[616] and the VSK, those ideas apparently "did not bring him instant fame". The ŚK is also discontinued in the middle. We may easily assume that its latter part is lost, but it is also possible that Bhaṭṭoji probably abandoned writing it, because of either seeing a lack of progress for him along that path[617] or having more interest in purely

[615] His *Śabdābharaṇa* alias *Śabdālaṅkāra*, which was discussed in Chapter One, perhaps contained some philosophical insights, but our guess depends simply on what its title suggests.

[616] Cf. BALI 1976: xiii. That the ŚK was written before all the other grammatical works of Bhaṭṭoji is clear from the reference to it in the VSK (*kārikā* 1) and the SiKau (*Kṛdanta* chapter): "*itthaṃ laukikaśabdānāṃ diṅmātram iha darśitaṃ | vistaras tu yathāśāstraṃ darśitaḥ śabdakaustubhe*." [Only a general outline of the speech forms of the common usage is shown here, but the elaboration (on them) in line with the (traditional) grammar is shown in the *Śabdakaustubha*.].

[617] BALI 1976: 91, 92. Bhaṭṭoji's expertise, like Śeṣakṛṣṇa's, was obviously in technical grammar.

technical grammar, and, in the case of the Advaita Vedānta, receiving higher royal support.[618]

Bhaṭṭoji's preference and commitment to technical grammar dominate even the few philosophical discussions in his works. For example, even when examining *sphoṭa* in the ŚK, Bhaṭṭoji is not interested in discussing the doctrine of the *Śabdabrahman*, which the early exponents of *sphoṭa* took to be inherently associated with it. As BALI (1976: 147) holds, it was because he was interested in more linguistically attestable topics in philosophy of language, such as *dhātvartha* (meaning of roots), *samāsaśakti* (significativeness of compounds), and *kāraka*[619] (cause of action). However, since his devotion to the Advaita Vedānta is reflected in his other philosophical works, it is clear that Bhaṭṭoji does not reject the doctrine of *Śabdabrahman*.[620] Rather, he does not find it appropriate to include a detailed theological and philosophical discussion of it in a linguistic treatise like the ŚK. Again, the VSK, which Bhaṭṭoji introduces as a summary[621] of the ŚK, does not include topics of the ŚK such as *śabda* (the speech principle), *sādhuśabda* (correct speech) and *apaśabda* (substandard speech), purposes of grammar, and *śabdaśakti* (significative power of speech). Instead, new topics such as *prātipadikārtha* (meaning of stems) and *saṃkhyā* (numbers), which are more related to the technical side of grammar, are found there.[622] His interest in the philosophical aspects of language, therefore, seems to have become less strong by the time he composed the VSK.

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[618] BALI 1976: 146: "(H)e appears before us, chronologically, first as a philosopher on grammar and afterwards as a grammarian." BALI (1976: 6) also points to the lore that Bhaṭṭoji had to rewrite the ŚK because its original manuscript was stolen and destroyed by his opponents.

[619] *Kāraka* is introduced as *sādhaka* (what brings about) and *nivartaka* (what accomplishes) in MBh ad A. 1.4.23, *vārttika* 1 and 5. Also see KV ad A 1.4.23.

[620] Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, who clearly shows in the VBh-B (verse 1) the Advaita views admitted by the grammarians, can be considered as reflecting Bhaṭṭoji's position as well.

[621] VSK, *kārikā* 1: "*phaṇibhāṣitabhāṣyābdheḥ śabdakaustubha uddhṛtaḥ । tatra nirṇīta evārthaḥ saṃkṣepeṇeha kathyate*." [The *Kaustubha* jewel of the speech principle was brought out (by us) from the ocean of the commentary preached by the (great) serpent (i.e., the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali). The content presented just there is briefly stated here.].

[622] BALI 1976: 56 - 58.

Does Bhaṭṭoji hold innovative views on the philosophy of language, telling us how the later grammarians approached it? Apparently, he does not. It is BALI's (1976: 148, 149) opinion that we find nothing new in Bhaṭṭoji's works on the philosophy of grammar, but rather a faithful re-presentation of the traditional view of the grammarians. Bhaṭṭoji's attempt was to revise, systematically discuss, and re-establish "almost all the subjects of the philosophy of grammar".[623] No clear textual evidence can be offered to verify this, but he might probably have received the stimulus to do so from his *vyākaraṇa* teacher, Śeṣakṛṣṇa. We can even imagine that Śeṣakṛṣṇa encouraged Bhaṭṭoji, perhaps when teaching him the MBh "in excellent fashion"[624], or at least indirectly influenced him, to put together the philosophical insights into language in the grammatical tradition.

All in all, the lack of stimuli in the form of patronage, demand, and recognition may have affected substantially the relative stagnancy in the philosophy of language around the end of the 16th century. It is, therefore, more reasonable to think that teaching technical grammar more effectively and faster was in demand, and as we discussed above, preparing more straightforward but comprehensive manuals for that purpose was on the rise.

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[623] BALI 1976: 20. Cf. ŚK, verse 4 of introduction: "*paribhāvya bahūn granthān yo 'rthaḥ kleśena labhyate | tam aśeṣam anāyāsād ito gṛhṇīta sajjanāḥ*." [May the wise men comprehend from this (work) completely (and) easily (their) object (of investigation), which is (otherwise) obtained laboriously by examining many works]. It is thus obvious that Bhaṭṭoji's intention was to remove the difficulties in learning the philosophical views on language, which might have been not possible in his time without studying assiduously a series of works. The emphasis is, therefore, on the fact that his work was timely and to the point.

[624] As in some manuscripts of the ŚK, "*yo mām aśeṣāḥ śeṣoktīr viśiṣyaivādhyajīgapat*." [(Śeṣakṛṣṇa) who taught me in excellent fashion the entire doctrine of Śeṣa, (i.e., Patañjali)]. See ŚK, [NENE and PUṆATĀMAKARA's edition (1933)], introduction, p. 1.

2.1 Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Linguistic Purism

It is evident in his career as a grammarian that Bhaṭṭoji was inclined to respond to contemporary needs and intellectual tendencies.[625] Nevertheless, he addressed the needs and tendencies in the genre of technical grammar more enthusiastically than he did those in the philosophy of language. Bhaṭṭoji's strong criticism of Rāmacandra's PK, which did not ignore popular usage, including non-Pāṇinian forms[626], when explaining some controversial rules and word formations, is a result of his adhering strictly to Pāṇinian grammar.[627] Accordingly, Bhaṭṭoji's endeavour can be recognized as an attempt to purify the Sanskrit language in use during his time. The industry with which he does this is reflected in his elaborations on the rules of technical grammar, including the *phakkikās* alias *paṅktis* (new sophisms), which "typically reassert the refuted *pūrvapakṣa*" (SCHARFE 1977: 143).

Bhaṭṭoji's movement of linguistic purism was extreme to the extent that he denied almost all interpretations that do not accord with the MBh. He often emphasizes that contemporary grammarians' knowledge of the proper usage of Sanskrit is limited, and consequently they must depend on what the *trimuni* grammarians have taught.[628] Both Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Nāgeśa, who followed faithfully Kaiyaṭa's words, "*yathottaraṃ hi munitrayasya prāmāṇyam*" [629] [The authority of the three sages is

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[625] On Bhaṭṭoji's career as a grammarian in his contemporary milieu, BALI (1976: 154) says as follows: "[T]he conditions in which he was born required a practical grammarian and it was in his being a really practical grammarian that his contribution to Sanskrit grammar lies."

[626] DESHPANDE (2012: 192) points to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's following words, which show that he did not find wrong what Rāmacandra was doing. PKśk, Vol. 2, p. 421: "*ekavacanam iti tu bhāṣyādyanuktam api durgapariśiṣṭakaṇṭhābharaṇādibahugranthasammatyoktam*". [Even though (the rule) "singular form" is not stated (as grammatical) in the *Mahābhāṣya* etc., it is stated (as grammatical by Rāmacandra) on account of (its) agreement with many works, such as (the exposition titled *Daurgasiṃhī* by) Durga (of the *Kātantravṛtti*), the *Pariśiṣṭa* supplementary (by Śrīpatidatta to the *Kātantra*), and the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* of Bhojadeva)].

[627] See BALI 1976: 149, 151, 153.

[628] DESHPANDE (2011b: 374 - 376) gives 17 select excerpts where Bhaṭṭoji emphasizes the necessity of agreeing with Patañjali.

[629] MBhP on P. 1. 1. 29.

successive, (namely the later the sage, the greater his authority)"[630]], considered Patañjali to be the greatest. As explained in detail by DESHPANDE (2011b: 364, 368, 377), the later grammarians in general valued Patañjali as the last *lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka* grammarian, who knew "independently" the inherited grammatical system and was "deemed to be entitled to adjust the rules of grammar to fit to that usage". In other words, Patañjali is the last authority on the usage of Sanskrit for anybody to determine its grammatical system.[631] Consequently, in Bhaṭṭoji's opinion, attempts, such as by Rāmacandra, to admit new word-formations were misguided. It seems clear from his ŚK and PM that Bhaṭṭoji's denial of the non-Pāṇinian grammatical systems and his criticism of his predecessors, such as Viṭṭhala and Śeṣakṛṣṇa, who did not oppose the suggestions made in such systems, are thus grounded in his linguistic fundamentalism.

Apparently, Bhaṭṭoji's linguistic fundamentalism was not his own brainchild. Nor did it emerge abruptly. As DESHPANDE (2014) argues, Appayya Dīkṣita considerably influenced[632] Bhaṭṭoji to have fundamentalist ideas on the Advaita Vedānta, which possibly inspired his linguistic conservatism as well. Just as Appayya refuted the *Bhāmati* and the *Kalpataru* commentaries, emphasized Śaṅkara's views, and criticized counterfeit quotations in the Mādhva works (DESHPANDE 2014: 6) in his works, such as the *Madhvatantramukhamardana* and the *Parimala* commentary on the BSśbh, Bhaṭṭoji opposed whatever non-Pāṇinian form of language he came across in both grammatical and philosophical works.[633] Moreover, even though resident in the southern Tamil-speaking region and well conversant with the vernaculars such as

[630] DESHPANDE's (2011b: 364) translation.

[631] Considering Nāgeśa's and his student Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍe's works, DESHPANDE (2011b: 384, 385) contends that the usage of those two terms, i.e., *lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka* and *lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka*, by those recent grammarians reflects an objective change of the contemporary scholarship on Sanskrit grammar. Also see DESHPANDE 2012: 186.

[632] Consider Jagannātha's statement in his *Śabdakaustubhaśāṇottejana*: "*appayyadurgrahavicetitacetanānām*" [(Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita) whose consciousness has been numbed by being caught by the evil alligator, Appayya (Dīkṣita)]. DESHPANDE's (2014: 4 and 2015: 37) translation. This shows, at least from Jagannātha's point of view, that Appayya heavily influenced Bhaṭṭoji.

[633] Cf. DESHPANDE 2012: 181.

Telugu, Appayya Dīkṣita[634], just as the Devas[635] in Benares, always wrote in scholastic Sanskrit, which was the cosmopolitan idiom for all the elite classes of intellectuals at that time.[636] Appayya's support for Bhaṭṭoji's linguistic fundamentalism cannot, therefore, be unlikely.

Restoring Sanskrit to its original state was deemed essential not only because of the literary activities of broad-minded grammarians. By parsing and reinterpreting some word and sentence formations arbitrarily, some philosophical schools, such as the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya, were apparently distorting the language. Moreover, the authoritativeness of traditional knowledge systems was gradually losing its position. For example, the Nyāya philosophers of the new school maintained "more sceptical attitude towards the authoritative texts of their school when weighed against the value of independent thinking" (WILLIAMS 2014: 120). We may presume that some "new" thinkers, who were even not grammarians by training, tended increasingly to have less respect for the traditional grammatical authority, and to question it more openly and directly than ever before. Likewise, the increased use of Sanskrit for writings aimed at gaining personal benefits, such as encomia on patrons, seemed to have upset those who treated Sanskrit with reverence. For example, although flourished probably several decades after Bhaṭṭoji, Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, Appayya Dīkṣita's grandnephew, says in his *Kaliviḍambana* (verse 37) that sacred language is exploited by

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[634] Appayya's arrival in Benares, which is recorded only in recent but often conflicting records, is assumed to have happened late, when Benares reached the peak of its intellectual renaissance after the beginning of the 17th century. Most of his life was spent in the South, and his scholarly activities were both directly and indirectly related to the religious, social, political, and cultural events in the southern Tamil-speaking region. But the influence of his scholarship seems to have extended to Benares even before his migration there (BRONNER 2015: 11, 15 - 16, 22 - 23). Apparently, it took some time for the intellectuals from the South, unlike for those from Mahārāṣṭra and the Deccan, to receive the full honour and recognition from the towering figures already in Benares.

[635] See VENKATKRISHNAN 2015.

[636] Among a few grammatical works traditionally ascribed to Appayya, the *Pāṇinīyatantravādanakṣatramālā*, which was also included in Kavīndra Sarasvatī's manuscript collection in Benares, was perhaps a work written in support of appreciating Pāṇinian tradition. NCC 1, p. 265. This work contains 27 questions on grammar and gives explanations to them. Included in a recent anthology of Appayya Dīkṣita's works edited by ŚRĪRĀMACANDRUḌU (2010). I could not consult this work.

such writers.[637] Bhaṭṭoji might have been the foremost grammarian, or at least one of the fundamentalist grammarians, who stood against such quasi-grammarians, overly liberal grammarians, and those abusing Sanskrit. He incisively criticised substandard Sanskrit usage found not only in grammatical works such as the PK and its commentaries but also in Mādhva works,[638] with which his philosophical positions conflicted. DESHPANDE (2014: 8) gives a few words from a "long list" of ungrammatical forms pointed out by Bhaṭṭoji in his *Tattvakaustubha* as found in Madhva's and Jayatīrtha's works. Bhaṭṭoji intention was to free Sanskrit from being distorted further.[639]

Although Bhaṭṭoji's efforts towards purifying Sanskrit were remarkable and well-known, he could not close the door on the incorporation of non-Pāṇinian linguistic formations into usage and the evolution of Sanskrit by criticising his liberal predecessors and contemporaries. Both in and outside of Benares, there were grammarians who opposed linguistic conservatism. Melputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa from the South was such a grammarian, likely a younger contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji. Nārāyaṇa's overall view was that what is substandard must be determined depending on both the grammatical authority and usage of the wise

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[637] "*śabdākhyam aparaṃ brahma sandarbheṇa pariṣkṛtam | vikrīyate katipayair vṛthānyair viniyujyate*". [This secondary form of the Supreme *Brahman*, called speech, worked into a composition, is being sold by some, and misused by others]. RAGHAVAN's translation (1970: 80). Apparently, Nīlakaṇṭha intends Sanskrit language here.

[638] SHARMA (1957: xiv of introduction to TKK) observes Bhaṭṭoji's approach as follows: "Appayya Dīkṣita and Bhaṭṭoji having absolutely nothing new or original to say, and smarting all along under the defeats inflicted by Vijayīndra, turned their attention to linguistic legerdemain and verbal pyrotechnics, and commenced the campaign of finding fault with the language used by Madhva and his commentator."

[639] Critics from the Mādhva tradition argue that Bhaṭṭoji's criticism of the grammatical errors in the Dvaita texts was baseless. Vidyāraṇya, who also challenged the Mādhva works and engaged in debates with the Mādhva proponents, for example, Akṣobhaya Tīrtha and Jayatīrtha, did not raise any argument against Madhva's Sanskrit usage. Furthermore, since Śaṅkara's works also contain grammatical mistakes, he cannot exonerate Śaṅkara and blame only the Dvaitins. See TTK, pp. 52 - 54 and 65 - 66 for details. Moreover, as DESHPANDE (2014: 9) points out, the author of the TKK, Setumādhvācārya (1871 - 1955), in another work titled *Śrīvyāsaphaṇibhāvanirṇaya*, argues that "neither Vyāsa nor Pāṇini supports the views expressed by Advaitin-grammarians such as Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, and that the ancient authorities actually lend full support to the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva".

alike.[640] He refers to Bhaṭṭoji more than once in his *Prakriyāsarvasva* (PraS), but disagrees with him in all cases. Nārāyaṇa's line of reasoning against Bhaṭṭoji's rejection of the *kṛdanta* word "*viśrāma*" [641] as a substandard[642] formation is a fitting example. What Bhaṭṭoji prescribes as correct is "*viśrama*", but Nārāyaṇa gives priority to the usage "*viśrāma*" over its grammatical precision. [643]

> *viśrāmasyāpaśabdatvaṃ vṛttyuktaṃ nādriyāmahe*
> *murāribhavabhūtyādīn apramāṇīkaroti kaḥ.*
>
> We do not admit that (the word) "*viśrāma*" is corrupt, as stated in the *Vṛtti*.[644] Who considers (the poets) such as Murāri (and) Bhavabhūti (who use it) unauthoritative?
>
> *viśrāmaśākhinaṃ vācāṃ viśrāmo hṛdayasya ca*
> *viśrāmahetor ityādi mahāntas te prayuñjate.*
>
> The great (poets) use (the word *viśrāma* in the instances) such as "*viśrāmaśākhinaṃ vācām*" [*Anargharāghava* 1. 10], "*viśrāmo hṛdayasya*" [*Uttararāmacarita* 1. 39], and "*viśrāmahetoḥ*" [645] [*Meghadūta*, *pūrvamegha*, 25].

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[640] AP, paragraph 31: "*lakṣaṇaśiṣṭaprayogarahitāḥ śabdā asādhavaḥ*." [The words that do not conform to grammatical rules or usage of the learned are substandard.]. The notion of *śiṣṭa* changed from the time of Patañjali to that of Bhartṛhari, as DESHPANDE (1994) examines in detail. In addition, seemingly it changed further to include celebrated writers as well. Also see DESHPANDE 1985: 132, 133.

[641] According to SATYAVRAT (1963: 257), it appears three times in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

[642] SiKau (*Uttarakṛdantaprakaraṇa*) 3185, ad A. 6. 1. 47: "*viśrāma iti tv apāṇinīyam*" [*viśrāma* is indeed (a word) contradictory to Pāṇinian rules].

[643] PraS, part II, *Kṛtkhaṇḍa*, p. 82.

[644] Cf. KV 7. 3. 34: "*sūryaviśrāmā bhūmir ity evamādikaṃ prayogam anyāyyam eva manyante*." [(The grammarians) consider the usage of (the statements) such as "*sūryaviśrāmā bhūmiḥ*" (lit. the earth is the resting place of the sun) as substandard].

[645] Cf. Mallinātha's view on this word in the *Meghadūta*: "*viśrāmo vā iti cāndravyākaraṇavikalpena vṛddhividhānād rūpasiddhiḥ*." [The formation (of it as)

Nārāyaṇa further justified[646] his liberal views expressed in the PraS by writing a work titled *Apāṇinīyapramāṇatā* (AP) alias *Apāṇinīyaprāmāṇyasādhana* or *Parapakṣakhaṇḍana*,[647] as a response to the criticism on the PraS by Vainateya, a Cola scholar who might have been a fundamentalist grammarian similar to Bhaṭṭoji. Nārāyaṇa argues in detail there that the word-formations already existing in usage must be admitted to be standard for two reasons. One is that even Pāṇini composed his rules after observing the practical usage of Sanskrit, while Kātyāyana picked up what Pāṇini did not. The *trimuni-vyākaraṇa*, therefore, contains the word-forms current in their times. Furthermore, none of the authoritative grammarians of the *trimuni-vyākaraṇa* directly repudiates the authority of the other grammatical systems in operation. The other reason is that the conservative grammarians admit unhesitatingly the Vedic forms of words, which are obviously not Pāṇinian. This leads to the conclusion that their views lack consistency.

> *pāṇinyuktaṃ pramāṇaṃ na tu punar aparaṃ*
> *candrabhojādiśāstraṃ ke 'py āhus tal laghiṣṭhaṃ na khalu*
> *bahuvidām asti nirmūlavākyam*. [648]
>
> [Some say that "(only) what is preached by Pāṇini is authoritative, but not (any) other system of grammar such as (the one initiated by) Candra or Bhoja", which is exceedingly unconvincing. (But) certainly there is not any unauthoritative statement of the highly wise.]

"*viśrāma*" (is possible) alternatively, from the *vṛddhi* substitution by following the alternative form (permitted in) Cāndra grammar].

[646] Nārāyaṇa's response to the issue of the term "*viśrāma*" is carried on in the AP as well, where he argues that the view that "the formation of a certain word does not comply with the Pāṇinan rules" does not necessarily mean its invalidity in all the grammatical systems. Cf. AP, paragraph 11: "*yat tu kvacid viśrāmādīnām ayuktatvabhāṣaṇaṃ tallakṣaṇāntaradarśanena prayoktavyam ity etāvatparam. anyathā sarvadaiva munitrayavacananibaddhādarāṇāṃ murāryādīnāṃ tatprayogānupapatteḥ*." [But as for what is said in some places that (the words) such as *viśrāma* are substandard, it really means that such words are to be used by following (the rules found) in other grammars. Otherwise, those such as Murāri, who have always held the words of the trinity of the grammarian-sages in high reverence, could not have made such usages.]. Also see AP, paragraph 24.

[647] NCC 1, p. 254. COWARD and RAJA 1990: 497.

[648] AP, verse 1ab. See UNNI 1998: xxxvi.

Although the AP is introduced as a response to the criticism of an individual, namely Vainateya, it is evident that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was critical of anyone who holds fundamentalist views on grammar. Furthermore, his statement that the PK of Rāmacandra is received everywhere[649] suggests that he does not find the non-Pāṇinian forms allowed there corrupt as Bhaṭṭoji does. At the end of the AP, Nārāyaṇa adds a letter addressed to a Someśvara Dīkṣita of Cola region and *Yajñanārāyaṇa* Dīkṣita of the court of Raghunātha Nāyaka (r. 1600 - 1634) of Tanjore, seeking their approval for his work. It appears that Nārāyaṇa's network had spread beyond Kerala, and he was an influential authority against the ideas and activities of some grammatical fundamentalists. Moreover, his letter confirms that there were intellectuals outside of Benares who supported the grammarians that opposed the conservative views promoting linguistic purism.

Bhaṭṭoji's works depict his concerns for Pāṇinian system and Sanskrit. However, as BALI (1976: 31, 32) suggests, Bhaṭṭoji perhaps had to encounter criticism also because some might have seen his rearrangement and reformulation of Pāṇinian rules as a violation of the sacredness of *vyākaraṇa* being a *vedāṅga*. The fact[650] that Bhaṭṭoji gives references to the authoritative texts more extensively in the PM than he does in the ŚK, the VSK, and the SiKau, implies that Bhaṭṭoji decided to elaborate on the views presented in his previous works, probably as a response to such a criticism. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's words[651] in the VBh-B support our assumption that new works, like Bhaṭṭoji's, were not

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[649] AP, paragraph 3: "*kaumudyāś ca sarvadeśaparigṛhītatvāt*." Also see the second verse of Nārāyaṇa's letter at the end.

[650] BALI 1976: 117.

[651] VBh-B, *kārikā* 1: "*bhāṣyābdheḥ śabdakaustubha uddhṛta ity upādānaṃ ca tatratyakathanasyādhunikakalpitatvena pāṇinīyānām aśraddheyatvavyudāsāya*". [And the statement "the *Śabdakaustubha* is drawn from the ocean of the *Mahābhāṣya*" is to reject (any likely misjudgement) of the scholars of Pāṇinīya (tradition), by assuming the content in it (i.e., the ŚK) to be modern, that it should not be trusted]. See DESHPANDE 2012: 176. Cf. VBhS, *kārikā* 1: "*bhāṣyābdheḥ śabdakaustubha uddhṛta ity uktis tu śabdakaustubhoktānām arthānām ādhunikotprekṣitatvanirāsāya*." [The Śabdakaustubha is drawn from the ocean of the *Bhāṣya*: This is to dispel the notion that the topics recorded in the *Śabdakaustubha* have been invented by men of the present day]. JOSHI's (1995: 3) translation.

welcomed without being suspected for their dependency on the authoritative works.

Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to conclude that Bhaṭṭoji faced criticism only because of his strict adherence to Pāṇinian tradition. As already stated, Bhaṭṭoji was not the first grammarian to have produced a recast of Pāṇinian rules. The contemporary social and intellectual movements Bhaṭṭoji played a prominent role in, his personal traits, and perhaps the sectarian issues he was involved in also seem to have attracted opponents.

2.2 Vernaculars versus Sanskrit Predominance

Linguistic purism may have been fed by the success of literary works in vernacular languages. One example is Eknāth (1533 - 1599) from Paithan in Mahārāṣṭra, a contemporary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa and young Bhaṭṭoji. Eknāth's Marāṭhī writings that depict the "vernacular society outside the royal courts" (KEUN 2015: 73) are mainly in the genre of the devotional poetry. He shows in his works how the vernacular forms of religious practice could pose a challenge to the elite class dealing with Sanskrit. However, as expected, his efforts were not received warmly and straightaway. Eknāth was summoned to Benares regarding his composition in Marāṭhī on the BhāP, known as the *Eknāthī Bhāgvat*, but eventually earned recognition from the Brahmin authorities for its intact contents. Eknāth did not disregard or denigrate the sacred tradition but only the linguistic vehicle of them, which is Sanskrit. As he sarcastically states in his *Eknāthī Bhāgvat* (1.129ab)[652], the view that no other language but only Sanskrit has a divine origin is untenable. TAGARE (1993: 54) notes that there were other contemporary Marāṭhī writers who were unhappy with the hegemony of Sanskrit. Dāsopant (1551 - 1615), a Digambara saint, wrote a work titled *Granthrāj* consisting of 1200 *ovī* verses in praise of the richness[653] of Marāṭhī, while Kṛṣṇadās Mudgala/ °Loḷyā (d. 1598) and Tryambakrāj also wrote highly in favour of Marāṭhī as against Sanskrit.

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[652] "*saṃskṛta vāṇī deveṃ kelī. tarī prākṛta kāya corāpāsoni jālī.*" [Sanskrit language was created by the gods, so Prakrit came from what, thieves?]. KEUN's (2015: 74) translation. Also see *Eknāthī Bhāgvat* 1.123, 125.

[653] See DESHPANDE 1979: 121, n. 234.

Another figure who challenged the Sanskrit grammatical authority just the way Ekanātha did was Annambhaṭṭa, the famous logician who was a pupil of Śeṣa Vīreśvara and possibly a contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Unlike Eknāth, Annambhaṭṭa wrote in Sanskrit but argued against its alleged elite character. In his *Uddyotana* commentary on Kaiyaṭa's MBhP, he questioned the traditional belief that only Sanskrit was first created by god:

> *vastuta īśvareṇa sṛṣṭyādāv arthaviśeṣavat śabdaviśeṣā api sṛṣṭā eva. na hi tadānīṃ saṃskṛtam eva sṛṣṭaṃ na bhāṣāntaram ity atra mānam asti. tattadyavanādisṛṣṭau tadīyabhāṣāyā api tadānīm eva sṛṣṭatvāt. na hi teṣām api prathamaṃ saṃskṛtenaiva vyavahāraḥ paścād apabhraṃśarūpabhāṣāpravṛttir iti mānam asti.* [654]

> In fact, just as different meanings, different (speech) words were also certainly created by Īśvara at the beginning of creation. Indeed, there are no grounds (to assume) that only Sanskrit was created at that time (but) other languages were not. It is because, when the various (races such as the) *Yavanas* were created, their languages were also created at just the same time. There are no grounds at all (to assume) that they also first used Sanskrit only and later set about using languages in the form of Apabhraṃśa.[655]

It can be imagined that Sanskrit was less deified and openly questioned on its origin at least by a few "new" intellectuals by Annambhaṭṭa's time. We should not forget that Annambhaṭṭa was a grammarian of the Pāṇinian tradition, who studied under the tutelage of Śeṣa Vīreśvara, and the author of another grammatical work, the *Mitākṣara* commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Therefore, the open-minded approach to Sanskrit by Annambhaṭṭa could have carried more weight than that by Eknāth, whose repertoire does not include any work on Sanskrit grammar, in the dispute with Bhaṭṭoji and the followers of his linguistic conservatism. Such views that emerged from within the grammatical tradition might have alerted the fundamentalist grammarians.

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[654] MBhPud as in the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpavyākhyānāni*, NARASIMHACHARYA's edition (1975: 90 - 91).

[655] Also see the translation by COWARD and RAJA (1990: 237).

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that Eknāth's and Annambhaṭṭa's defences of vernaculars were simply exceptions to a conservative linguistic orthodoxy. Vernaculars were not only gaining ground in religious contexts but also, increasingly, becoming subject to linguistic and philosophical discussions.[656] Throughout the early modern period, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Vyākaraṇa schools debated at length the source and power of the significative force of vernaculars. Apparently, this issue attracted more attention particularly in the early 17th century. In his Nyāya work titled *Padārthadīpikā* (PDīp)[657], Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa points to the Navya Nyāya view that vernacular words are not as capable of signifying meaning as Sanskrit words, because their significative power arises only through the invocation of corresponding Sanskrit words. His detailed response, as a grammarian, to that position is found in the VBh-B[658] and the VBhS.[659] With the support from a few relevant *kārikās*[660] of the VP, he presents the grammarians' view that vernacular words are equally denotative.[661] As understandable from the words of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa in his *Mīmāṃsākutūhala* (MK),[662] the

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[656] Another point worth a mention here is that some contemporary works on Sanskrit language reflect the influence of vernaculars in terms of vocabulary, syntax, and idioms. DESHPANDE (1993: 40 - 51) gives an account of the *Gīrvāṇavāṅmañjarī*, a manual of spoken Sanskrit, by Ḍhuṇḍirāja (fl. c. 1690 - 1710), a Brahmin who migrated to Benares from Mahārāṣṭra, to show that the Sanskrit in it is heavily influenced by vernaculars, including Marāṭhī.

[657] PDīp, p. 32.

[658] VBh-B (*śaktinirṇaya* chapter) pp. 248 - 252.

[659] VBhS (*śaktinirṇaya* chapter) pp. 298 - 306. Cf. VBhSd, VBhSp, and VBhSś on this.

[660] VP 1. 153, 154.

[661] VBhS, p. 301: "*kiñca vinigamanāvirahād bhāṣāyām api śaktiḥ. na ca tāsāṃ nānātvaṃ doṣaḥ. saṃskṛtavan mahārāṣṭrabhāṣāyāḥ sarvatraikatvena pratyekaṃ vinigamanāvirahatādavasthyāt*." [Moreover, because of the lack of criterion (for judging otherwise), (we determine that) denotative power rests also in (any) vernacular. And the diversity of them (i.e., of vernaculars) is not problem. It is because the lack of criterion (for judging the denotative power of) each (language) remains the same, due to the fact that the vernacular of Mahārāṣṭra (i.e., Mahārāṣṭrī) is identical everywhere, just as Sanskrit (has been).]. See POLLOCK 2001a: 28, 29 for more details.

[662] MK, *śabdanityatva* chapter, p. 77: "*na ca gāvyādāv īśvareccharūpā śaktiḥ, teṣām avyavasthiteḥ... bhāṣāyāṃ śaktijatvabhramāt śabdatvaṃ sādhuśabdopasthityā vā*". [There cannot exist in dialectal words such as *gāvya* [instead of Skt *gauḥ*, 'cow'] the expressive power conferred by divine will, because these dialectal words have no stable form... the vernacular can be said to possess real words only either by the illusion of their being expressive in themselves, or through the presence of the

grammarians' perspective was not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas, who take Sanskrit to be eternal in opposition to variable vernaculars. We may, therefore, assume that the grammarians had a liberal view on the semantic power of vernaculars[663], although they were concerned about the incorporation of vernaculars into Sanskrit corpora.

Prakrit grammatical literature also received attention during this period. Works such as Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Prākṛtacandrikā* and Appayya Dīkṣita's *Prākṛtamaṇidīpa* / °*dīpikā* commentary on Vālmīki's *Prākṛtasūtra* alias *Vālmīkisūtra* are examples. Probably, by pointing out the differences between Sanskrit and early Prakrit forms of vernaculars, Sanskrit grammarians attempted to slow down the growing notion of non-difference between Sanskrit and vernaculars.

§ 3. Contemporary Trends as Stimuli for Grammarians

By the beginning of the early modern period, many writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā schools, in particular, had begun to examine more rigorously diverse aspects of language, including theories of verbal cognition. Their dispute with grammarians on various points related to language was not new. Nevertheless, it was not until around the middle of the 16th century that the grammarians began to defend their views on language more spiritedly, taking into account new developments in the philosophical schools.

3.1 New Intellectuals of the Nyāya School

In such a context, the rise of the Navya Nyāya school was significant. Before Benares became a place of heightened literary and intellectual activities, many Navya Nyāya authors, whose writings exerted a substantial impact on not only the philosophy of language but also many

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grammatically correct [Sanskrit] words that they suggest.]. POLLOCK's (2001a: 29) translation.

[663] MURTI (1972) discusses this point in detail.

other disciplines in the early modern period, were active in Mithilā[664] and subsequently Navadvīpa (now Nabadwip in Nadia).[665] Beginning around the first half of the 14th century with Gaṅgeṣa (c. 1325), Vardhamāna, Yajñapati, Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva), Pragalbha etc., the Navya Nyāya school later flourished with the Navadvīpa logicians such as Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (fl. 1480), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1460 - 1540), Mathuranātha Tarkālaṅkāra/ Tarkavāgīśa (fl. 1570), Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya (fl. 1550 - 1610), and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (1610 - 1710). Raghunātha could have been an elder contemporary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, while Mathuranātha and Jagadīśa could have been active when Śeṣakṛṣṇa was at the peak of his career in Benares. Influenced by the Mithilā school, Annambhaṭṭa, a pupil of Śeṣa Vīreśvara, who was Śeṣakṛṣṇa's elder son, became one of the illustrious Navya Nyāya authors of the latter part of the 16th century in Benares. His *Tarkasaṅgraha* was a popular work among the beginners of the Navya Nyāya studies. After the Navya Nyāya settled in Benares, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa learned it from a teacher known as Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, possibly the famous Naiyāyika bearing that name, who hailed from Bengal.[666]

The peculiar idiom[667] of expression developed in the new school[668] of the Nyāya system spread not only to other schools of philosophy but also to grammar, poetics, law, and sciences. Consequently, serious discourses were possible using an extensive array of predefined terms, which could easily be contextualized with greater precision and without undesired nuances. The Navya Naiyāyikas employed their analytical approach and

[664] GANERI (2011: xii) classifies the Navya Nyāya authors in terms of their locations.

[665] Cf. BHATTACHARYA 1937: 36: "Dialectics had already succeeded in practically absorbing all the branches of learning. That is how the fourth class (of the intellectuals in Akbar's court) forms the largest list and the fame of some of the Nyāya scholars of far-off Mithila and Navadwip reached the royal court at Delhi." Parenthetical insertion by me.

[666] BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI 2013: 93.

[667] As POTTER (2011: 86) says, it was the "technical philosophical lingua franca for all the other schools" of Indian philosophy, a language which "became the language of all serious discourses."

[668] WADA (2007: 11- 23) discusses in detail the views of recent scholars on the origin and the development of the Navya Nyāya school.

highly technical language to examine the arguments of *śābdabodha* as well.

Although it is difficult to pinpoint the date the Navya Nyāya ideas arrived in Benares, the authors of other philosophical schools and the grammarians already in Benares were seemingly well aware of the activities and the writings of the Navya Naiyāyikas in Mithilā and Navadvīpa. [669] The major works of the Navya Nyāya system such as Raghunātha's *Ākhyātavāda* and *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, Jagadīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, Gadādhara's *Viṣayatāvāda*, *Vyutpattivāda,* and *Śaktivāda,* along with some commentaries and supercommentaries on Gaṅgeṣa's magnum opus *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, can be assumed to have influenced considerably the later grammarians' discussions on language and verbal cognition. The impact received by the grammarians of the 17th and the 18th centuries, including Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa, from the leading Navya Naiyāyikas is clear in their works.

In addition to introducing a new idiom, the Navya Nyāya system added another new dimension to the philosophy of language by focusing on the semantic role of a few decisive components of language. By doing so, they also revealed the limits of ordinary language for technical discussions.[670] The emphatic particle "*eva*", the negative particle "*nañ*", and "*kārakas*" are a few examples for such components. Triggered by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's comments in the section titled *evakāravada* in his *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti*, several works [671] such as the *Evakāradīdhitisāramañjarī* by *Mādhavadeva* (late 17th century*)*, the *Evakāraṭippaṇī* by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (fl. c. 1625), and the *Evakāravādārtha* by Laugākṣī Bhāskara highlighted how the precise use of the particle "*eva*" contributes to unambiguous expressions in the

[669] See "The arrival of Navya-Nyāya techniques in Vārāṇasī" by BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI (2013) for a detailed discussion.
[670] Cf. GANERI 2011: 224: "Ordinary Sanskrit is regarded by the early modern philosophers as an imperfect vehicle for philosophical discourse, mainly because it is infested with ambiguity. It is not just the presence of ambiguities in the lexicon, homonymous words like '*saindhava*' (which can mean either salt or a horse), for it is always possible to eliminate such terms in favour of univocal expressions. The greater problem derives from the absence in ordinary Sanskrit of any systematic or compulsory use either of articles or quantifier expressions."
[671] NCC 3, p. 78.

context of analytical philosophy. Followed by more than a dozen of commentaries, the *Nañvāda* of Raghunātha[672] was the most renowned work that elaborated on one of the principle doctrines of the Navya Nyāya system, negation. Likewise, a series of works emerged during the 17th century such as the *Kārakacakra*[673] by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, the *Kārakacakra* alias the *Subarthatattvāloka* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana (17th century), and the *Kārakavāda* by Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana (17th century)[674], which discussed from the Navya Nyāya point of view the proper use of the *kārakas* in technical discourses.[675] This new approach to language by the Navya Naiyāyikas was evidently different from that by the grammarians, who did not dwell on the semantic technicality of such components of language as highly and precisely as the former did. The early modern grammarians may, therefore, have been motivated by this discovery of the Navya Naiyāyikas to revisit semantics from fresh perspectives.

While the Navya Naiyāyikas were developing their new techniques for addressing the issues related to the philosophy of language, the Mīmāṃsakas were also contributing to it from their perspectives. Among the significant Mīmāṃsā treatises of the early modern period are Appayya Dīkṣita's works such as the *Upakramaparākrama* and the *Vidhirasāyana*, where he criticizes Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa's *Mīmāṃsākutūhala*, Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, Khaṇḍadeva's [676] *Mīmāṃsākaustubha, Bhāṭṭa(tantra)rahasya* [677], and *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, Laughākṣī Bhāskara's *Arthasaṅgraha*, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's (fl. c. 1650) *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi,* and Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's (17th century)

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[672] NCC 9, pp. 322 - 323.

[673] NCC 3, p. 372. DESHPANDE 2002: 152.

[674] NCC 7, p. 189.

[675] Perhaps the *Kārakatattva*/ °*vicāra* by Śeṣakṛṣṇa's grandson, Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi, was also inspired by this contemporary trend. Since NCC 3, p. 375 lists it as a grammatical work, it perhaps does not reflect the Nyāya view.

[676] Khaṇḍadeva (d. 1665 - 6) was possibly the first major Mīmāṃsaka to use the Navya Nyāya techniques in Benares. He is too late to have influenced Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

[677] MCCREA 2002: 482: "Sanskrit philosophy of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century produced a tremendously intense debate over the nature of language, chiefly between the grammarians, logicians, and Mīmāṃsakas – all three fields saw the production of works devoted solely to the analysing the structure of "verbal awareness" (*śābdabodha*); Khaṇḍadeva's own *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya*, his third and last major work, is the most important entry to this debate from the Mīmāṃsā side."

Mānameyodaya. It seems that the Mīmāṃsakas' involvement in the discussions on *śābdabodha* became more prominent after the end of the 16th century, perhaps with the influence received from the Navya Nyāya.[678]

In summary, the discussions opened by the Navya Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems on language were important stimulants especially to the grammarians in the latter half of the early modern era. The extent of the grammarians' involvement in and response to such discussions varied from one to another. However, the works of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa are clearly more illustrative of the grammarians' response to the views of new intellectuals than Śeṣakṛṣṇa's or Bhaṭṭoji's works. I will return to this point below when I examine the influence Śeṣakṛṣṇa received from the Navya Nyāya system.

3.2 Intellectual Conflicts: Interpersonal and Interscholastic

Conflicts among pundits were common by the end of the 16th century. From a satirical perspective, the *Kaliviḍambana* of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita reflects diverse layers of intellectual combats of the early modern period. The later grammarians had two major goals to fight for; the mainstream Sanskrit grammatical tradition and the Advaita metaphysics their philosophy of language is based on.

Although it has traditionally been reported that the theoretical inconsistencies found in the ideas of early modern intellectuals triggered heated disputes, other factors were also present. Apparently, personal reasons included caste and sectarian issues, hatred for and jealousy of the opponent's expertise, reputation, wealth from patronage, students and followers, and association with royals and spiritual leaders etc. A well-known case based largely on caste-related problems is that of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (fl. 1620 - 1660) who was criticised by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita[679] and Appayya Dīkṣita[680] for his association with Muslims.

[678] BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI 2013: 89, 90.

[679] In his KPpu, Nāgeśa is said to have included a verse, which says that Bhaṭṭoji called Jagannātha a "*mleccha*" in public and it was then Jagannātha determined to

Furthermore, Vaṃśīdhara Miśra (fl. 1624) in his *Padyāmṛtataraṅginī* calls Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja a bull, not a lion as the latter had introduced himself.[681] The titles of some works, for instance Kuṇḍalagiri's (c. 1620 - 1680) *Bhaṭṭojikuṭṭana*, which criticizes the *Tattvakaustubha*[682] of Bhaṭṭoji, two more works bearing the same title by Vijayīndra Tīrtha[683] (1517 - 1614) and Calāri Narasiṃhācārya, the *Bhaṭṭojikuṭhāra*[684] and the *Appayyakapolacapeṭikā* of Vijayīndra Tīrtha, and the *Raṅgojibhaṭṭadhikkāra* of Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha (1619 - 1631), indicate that attacks were perhaps directed more at the personal identities of those authors than at any theoretical heresies in their works.[685] Likewise, sectarian mismatches between some pundits made their intellectual and personal relations inharmonious. As held by DESHPANDE (2011a: 368, 369), Bhaṭṭoji's disagreement with Śeṣakṛṣṇa on the latter's way of interpreting Pāṇinian grammar was in fact rooted in their philosophical polarity. Again, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's conversion to Islam exasperated Hindu Brahmins to the extent that he was ostracised from the Brahmin community in Benares and his works were condemned more often than appreciated.

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take revenge on Bhaṭṭoji. I could not trace that verse in the published editions of the KPpu.

Apart from the sense "one who does not conform to the usual Hindu institutions", *mleccha* in the sense "one who speaks a foreign language" might have also been applied pejoratively to Jagannātha for his expertise in Persian. See CHAUDHURI 1981: 47. Also see the introduction (p. 4) by Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana to Harihara ŚĀSTRĪ's edition (1894) of Appayya's *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*.

[680] "*yavanīsaṃsargadūṣito 'yam*" [this (person) is polluted by joining up with a Muslim girl]. RG, p. 1 of Introduction. Also see CHAUDHURI 1981: 49.

[681] CHAUDHURI 1981: 77.

[682] NCC 16, p. 121. SHARMA's edition of TKK (1957: vii) confirms this identification, whereas SHARMA (1961: 499) assumes the target to be Bhaṭṭoji's *Advaitakaustubha*, which was modelled on Appayya's *Madhvamatavidhvaṃsana*. Cf. DESHPANDE 2014: 8.

[683] https://dvaitavedanta.wordpress.com/2011/06/ (accessed 15.02.2015). Vijayīndra Tīrtha was also an opponent of Śaivism.

[684] Bhaṭṭoji was possibly the most vilified figure in late intellectual history. The *Bhaṭṭojimatanirasana* by Venkaṭadāsa alias Venkaṭācārya III (c. 1780), a late work that criticizes Bhaṭṭoji's commentary on the *Gajasūtra* (i.e., A. 1. 3. 67), and the *Tattvakaustubhakuliśa* (TKK) of Setumādhvācārya, which is a critique of the *Tattvakaustubha,* reveal that his critics were not limited to his time.

[685] BALI 1976: 31.

Bhaṭṭoji's ŚK was criticised by Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja in two works, of which we know only the titles, i.e., the *Kaustubhakhaṇḍana*[686] and the less known work titled *Śabdakaustubhaśāṇottejana*.[687] Nevertheless, we do not know with certainty whether it was the philosophical contents or the points of technical grammar in the ŚK that he objected most. In addition to any theoretical defects he found in the ŚK, Jagannātha had more reasons[688], which were perhaps stronger, to criticise Bhaṭṭoji. The presence of another criticism against the ŚK titled *Śabdakaustubhadūṣaṇa*[689] by Bhāskara Rāya Dīkṣita from the South, who flourished during the reign of Raghunātha Nāyaka (fl. 1614 - 1633)[690], however, suggests that the ŚK received criticism not just because of personal or sectarian issues the critics had with Bhaṭṭoji. This is because Bhāskara is said to have been an Advaitin and written a work against Bhaṭṭoji's rival Vijayīndra Tīrtha.[691] Consequently, Bhāskara's criticism of the ŚK was not probably associated with any sectarian disagreement with Bhaṭṭoji.

Heated debates and open challenges[692] were comparatively more frequent in the latter half of the 16th century, but it appears that reasoning was

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[686] Mentioned several times in the PMku.

[687] Cited in Narayana Sudarsana's introduction (p. 4) titled "Appayya Dīkṣita", to Harihara ŚĀSTRĪ's edition (1894) of Appayya's *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*. Also see BRONNER 2015: 20.

[688] See Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana's introduction (pp. 1 - 8) to Harihara ŚĀSTRĪ's edition (1894) of the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* Appayya Dīkṣita. There (p. 4), Jagannātha is also reported to have accused Bhaṭṭoji of being "possessed" or caught by Appayya Dīkṣita, as a result of which Bhaṭṭoji became hostile to his teacher. This quote is said to appear in Jagannātha's *Śabdakaustubhaśāṇottejana*: "*appayyadurgrahavicetitacetanānāṃ āryadruhām ayam aham śamaye 'valepān*." [I shall pacify the pride of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the traitor to his noble teacher, whose consciousness has been numbed by being caught by the evil alligator, Appayya Dīkṣita]. DESHPANDE's (2014: 4 and 2015: 37) translation. See BRONNER 2015: 20 for more details. As DESHPANDE (2014: 4) states, this half verse is also quoted by BAMBARDEKAR (1939, p. 343, fn. 1).

[689] NCC 5, p. 123; NCC 35, p. 86. OPPERT 1, pp. 162, 163. No. 1803; 2, pp. 146, 147. No. 2242.

[690] But NCC 2, p. 47 places him around 1585.

[691] SHARMA 1961: 481.

[692] DESHPANDE (2015: 33) observes three notable aspects of the intellectual milieu by the beginning of the 17th century; (i) reputation becomes the subject of "jealous scrutiny and gossip"; (ii) rulers patronize public conflicts between intellectuals, and

not yet considered strong enough to nullify intuition and force it out of intellectual discourses. In other words, rationality was not yet the principle determiner as was the case with the style of thought more evidently in the centuries that followed. Given the fact that Benares received the Navya Nyāya influence quite late, we have a few reasons to assume that the grammarians around the end of the 16th century had not yet been tempted enough to adjust their approaches to philosophical discussions on language, precisely on *śābdabodha*, and to follow a more analytical path. The later grammarians were also harmonious[693] with the Advaita school of Vedānta, which emphatically held intuition as a kind of experience through which the absolute reality in the form of Brahman can be attained. Moreover, the basis of the classification of intellectuals into four circles in Akbar's court reveals that intuition was honoured more highly than logical thinking. There, the innermost circle that was favoured most by Akbar consisted of the saints directly communicating with gods, whereas those reaching a conclusion through reasoning were put along with physicians in the outermost circle.[694] Akbar's policy of religious reconciliation was also favourable to traditional Hindu doctrines and rituals where reasoning played a minor role. Likewise, the Bhakti movement was sweeping across many regions of central and north India, including Benares, prioritizing devotion above all other means of realizing the absolute reality.

Throughout the early modern era, the Advaitins strongly attacked the works of the Dvaita school and received recognition for it. Venkaṭappā Nāyaka I (1592 - 1629) of Ikkeri court in the South conferred upon Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita the honorary title "*viśiṣṭavaidikādvaita-siddhāntasthāpanācārya*" [the great establishing preceptor of the doctrines of the Vedas and the Advaita (Vedānta)] in addition to other usual honours and presents, [695] after Bhaṭṭoji defeated a

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(iii) the paper manuscript circulation expands. All these promoted interpersonal and interscholastic conflicts.

[693] Cf. JOSHI 1967: ii: "From the time of Bhartṛhari to that of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, Indian Grammarians have generally claimed to be the followers of Advaita Vedānta, and they have made hardly any innovation in the metaphysics of that system."

[694] See *Aʿīn-i Akbarī*, vol. 1. p. 610 fn. 1, 611.

[695] NARAHARAYYA 1931: 78. Also quoted in SWAMINATHAN 1957: 50, 221. Venkaṭappā Nāyaka I is introduced as "*viśuddhavaidikādvaitasiddhāntapratiṣṭhāpaka*" [the one who establishes the original Vedic and Advaita doctrines] in a Koppa inscription, showing how much he

Rāmānujācarya [696] in debate. It was also this Nāyaka ruler who patronized Bhaṭṭoji's *Tattvakaustubha*, which was composed against the Dvaita movement. [697] Likewise, Appayya Dīkṣita received the epithets "*śrīkaṇṭhamatasthāpanācārya*" [the establishing preceptor of Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine (of Vedānta)] and "*advaitasthāpanācārya*" [the establishing preceptor of Advaita (Vedānta)] for his campaign to safeguard the Advaita doctrines. [698] On the other hand, the followers of Madhva unleashed aggressive criticism against the Advaitins, having received royal patronage also from Venkaṭappā Nāyaka I.[699]

The interpersonal and interscholastic conflicts in the early modern period perhaps stimulated grammarians' reactive and defensive consciousness to revisit their tradition and more actively join the debates on language. The activities of the intellectuals such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Appayya Dīkṣita, and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita against the rising Dvaita movement also appear to have been quite favourable to the grammarians' philosophy of language. In these disputes, we may imagine that the later Advaitins found the doctrine of *sphoṭa* to be a support for their recognition of *vivartavāda*, even though some early exponents of the Advaita Vedānta such as Śaṅkara and Jñānaghanapāda[700] had criticised some aspects of the semantic role of *sphoṭa*. Since the Advaitins hold that the Brahman and his creations are existentially identical and only our ignorance causes the perception of their difference, the *sphoṭa* doctrine

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valued restoring the Vedic and Advaita principles during his time. Also See NARAHARAYYA 1931: 74 and DESHPANDE 2012: 184.

[696] This could be Rāmānuja Śṛṅgin, an exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school and a Vaiṣṇava, who served at the Ikkeri court. Rāmānuja had to relinquish all his honorary titles as a result of his defeat. SWAMINATHAN (1957: 50, 221) states that this story is found in the Kannada work titled *Keḷāḍinṛpavijayam* by a Brahmin court poet known as Liṅganna (1763 - 1804). Also see BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI 2013: 101.

[697] See GODE 1956a: 203, 204 for references.

[698] FISHER 2015: 54.

[699] For instance, Veṅkaṭappā made a grant of land to Vādirāja Tīrtha in 1571 for worship of the god Śrī Kṛṣṇa at the Uḍipi temple. He also supported a Dvaita Maṭha in Kūḍali. He seems to have had liberal attitudes towards the religious and philosophical schools. Cf. SWAMINATHAN 1957: 200: "The Nāyakas of Keladi were never inimical to religious institutions propounding faiths other than the *Vīraśaiva* cult."

[700] See the chapter 17 titled *sphoṭanirākaraṇa* of the *Tattvaśuddhi* by Jñānaghanapāda.

complies with the Advaitic *vivartavāda* better than the Dvaita system that argues otherwise. Note that in his celebrated work titled *Nyāyasudhā* on Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna* (1.1.73), Jayatīrtha (fl. 1365 - 1388), the renowned exponent of the Dvaita Vedānta system, refutes seven *pūrvapakṣas*. One of those *pūrvapakṣas* against the Dvaita doctrines of *Śabdaprāmāṇya* is the doctrine of *sphoṭa*.[701] Similarly, the fact that the Ikkeri rulers patronized Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, whose defences of *sphoṭa* are known to us, to support the Advaita system cannot be ignored. As stated above, Bhaṭṭoji was driven to criticize the grammatical glitches of the Dvaita works more frequently and seriously than their doctrinal faults.[702] In addition to other possible reasons, the great Dvaita - Advaita debate thus had its own contribution to the context in which the grammarians were inclined to revisit the *sphoṭa* doctrine during the early modern period.

3.3 Revitalization of Hindu Dharma and Hindu Scholarship

Alongside the aforementioned attempts to safeguard Sanskrit in its standard form, endeavours to revive Hindu Dharma and Hindu scholarship also influenced the early modern grammarians to have a renewed interest in philosophy of language in addition to technical grammar. Akbar's trust in *Dīn-i Ilāhī* or a syncretic religion apparently worked in a different direction, probably to an extent not expected by his policy of religious reconciliation. Perhaps, Hindus could not openly oppose Hindu religion being treated equivalent to other religions. However, their activities suggest that they attempted hard not to let their Dharma and knowledge system merge in others'. Akbar's policy of religious reconciliation may, therefore, have kindled a stronger interest in Hindus in revisiting and preserving their intellectual legacies against the Islamic tradition. Producing new works expressive of diverse aspects

[701] SHARMA 1961: 239.

[702] SHARMA 1957: xiv of introduction to TKK. Also note that Bhaṭṭoji's view (ŚK, *sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, p. 10) on Bhartṛhari's incorporation of the doctrine of the *Śabdabrahman* into a scrutiny of language in the VP does not contradict his strong support for the promotion of the Advaita system.

of Hindu Dharma and Hindu wisdom was apparently deemed a wise way to show their richness.[703]

Patronage from Hindu rulers for such works was an important incentive. While Cinna Bomma (r. 1549 - 1578) of Velur/ Vellore in South India provided mass funding[704] to one thousand scholars, five hundred each in Adaiyappalam and Velur regions, to study the Śaiva Advaita philosophy of Appayya Dīkṣita, Ṭoḍaramalla in Benares patronized the production of the *Ṭoḍarānanda*, an anthology of treatises on diverse genres of Hindu wisdom. K. M. PANIKKAR in his foreword (p. xv) to VAIDYA's (1948) edition of the *Ṭoḍarānanda* describes why such a work was required.

> "The egalitarian conception of Islam and its proselytising activity had created for Hinduism special problems which could not be overlooked. The reaction of Hindu law-givers to this challenge was in general to make Hinduism more rigid and to re-interpret the rules in such a way as to resist the encroachments of Islam. It is perhaps this defensive attitude towards society that is responsible for the orthodoxy of view which is the characteristic of the Dharma Śāstra literature of this period."

The *Ṭoḍarānanda* was a massive compendium.[705] It contained compositions on a number of genres of Hindu knowledge system, such as astrology, astronomy, mathematics, politics, philosophy, medicine, and even *mantraśāstra*, in addition to those on Dharmaśāstra, which was its major focus. The intention of compiling the *Ṭoḍarānanda* is given in one of its treatises as follows.

> *ādiṣṭe śrutibhiś cirantanamunistomair muhuḥ śīlite*
> *prācāṃ puṇyapathe duruktiśatakair mliṣṭe janālasyataḥ*

[703] See John Nicol FARQUHAR's *Outline of the Religious Literature of India* 1920: 290 - 292.
[704] FISHER 2015: 54.
[705] It is said to be of 80,000 *ślokas* running in 23 books called *saukhyas*, although much of it was lost in the course of time.

mālinyāny apanīya saṃgrahamiṣād enaṃ pariṣkurvato
bhūyād eṣa pariśramo'pi jagadānandāya bhūmīpateḥ. [706]

May this effort of the king (i.e., Ṭoḍaramalla), who, having removed defects, prepares this (work) in the form of a compendium at the time the path of virtuousness of ancient people, which was proclaimed by Vedas and incessantly practiced by ancient sages, became obscured by hundreds of false interpretations and due to the laziness of people, also be for the delight of the world.

Ṭoḍaramalla's effort to salvage the ancient Hindu knowledge systems from the clutches[707] of non-Hindu influences was often extolled by the authors of the *Ṭoḍarānanda*. Apparently, with the same intention of uplifting Hindu *śāstras*, Ṭoḍaramalla also patronized the works such as the Raghunanda Miśra's *Ṭoḍaraprakāśa*, a Dharmaśāstra work, Nīlakaṇṭha's *Ṭoḍarāja* alias *Ṭoḍaramallarāja* on astronomy, and Rāmāmātya's *Svaramelakalānidhi*, which was on music.[708]

In addition to the leading figures such as Appayya Dīkṣita, Śeṣakṛṣṇa,[709] Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, and Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, who wrote widely on Dharmaśāstra, another notable writer was Gopinātha (earlier than the 16th century[710]). He wanted to protect Hindu Dharma from the *Bhakti* movement, which was spreading very fast, and from the trend towards a multi-ethnic and multicultural society. By writing his *Jātiviveka*, Gopinātha attempted to empower better the social hierarchy, which he emphasized as compulsory so that Dharma remains untarnished.[711] As evident from some juridical documents (*nirṇayapatras*) belonging to the

[706] In the introduction to the *Śuddhisaukhya*, as given by VAIDYA (1948: xxix - xxxi). Also see *kārikās* 20 - 21 of the *Sargasaukhya*, i.e., *Ṭoḍarānanda* 1.1.
[707] For instance, in the introduction to the *Varṣakṛtyasaukhya* of the *Ṭoḍarānanda*: "*yena mlecchapayodhimagnanigamoddhārakriyā kāritā । kalpāntoditam ādimīnacaritaṃ lokeṣu satyāpitam*." [(It is he) by whom the auxiliary works to the Vedas which were sunk in the ocean of foreign (influence) were rescued. (By doing so, he) proved (his) role (resembling) the primordial fish (incarnation of Viṣṇu who rescued the world) emerging at the end of the *kalpa*, to the mankind]. VAIDYA 1948: xxvii, xxx.
[708] VAIDYA 1948: xxxi. Also see NCC 8, p. 3.
[709] Writing his *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa may have served a similar purpose.
[710] NCC 6, p. 162.
[711] See O'HANLON, HIDAS, and KISS (2015) for a detailed discussion.

16th and 17th centuries[712] and from the cases like Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja being ostracized from Brahmin circles, it is clear that Hindus were also keen on distinguishing pure Brahmins.

It is likely that Bhaṭṭoji's ideas about defending the Sanskrit grammatical tradition received support from that movement of preserving and reviving the intellectual heritage of Hindus. Moreover, as discussed above, the pedagogical advancements in technical grammar including the production of recasts of the authoritative works, the disputes over the usage of Sanskrit as the cosmopolitan idiom, and the activities of some vernacular writers against Sanskrit intensified the interest in teaching and learning Pāṇinian grammar. The abundant production of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the MBhP throughout the early modern era was a result of those advancements. It appears that studying grammar through the MBhP stimulated curiosity also in its philosophical topics, such as the interpretation of *śabda*.

§ 4. Re-emergence of *Sphoṭa* in Early Modern Intelligentsia

We examined above a number of impetuses for the renewal of the later grammarians' interest in the philosophy of language. These included advancements in teaching Pāṇinian grammar, intensified attempts to impede the strides of non-Pāṇinian grammar, the rise of the Navya Nyāya school, intellectual conflicts such as the great Dvaita - Advaita debate, and campaigns to promote Hindu Dharma and scholarship. The revival of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, which seems to reflect the later grammarians' heightened interest in the philosophy of language, is a result of those stimuli.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the *sphoṭa* doctrine is the grammarians' most significant contribution to semantics. Nevertheless, it seems that the grammarians had not presented it in any discrete work until

[712] O'HANLON 2010b.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa did so.[713] As far as we know, the only individual work on *sphoṭa* that emerged before Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work was the SSm of Maṇḍana Miśra, an exponent of the Advaita Vedānta. Likewise, the grammarians' arguments in defence of *sphoṭa* before the early modern period are to be found only in the works of their rivals, such as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's (9th - 10th century) NM, Pārthasarathi Miśra's (10th century) ŚVpm, Vācaspati Miśra's (10th century) TB and NVTṬ, and Vallabha's (early 12th century) NL. It appears that the *sphoṭa* doctrine was not presented as an organized theory until the STN was written. Moreover, even in the works that interpreted the *sphoṭa* doctrine from the perspectives of the Advaita, the Mīmāṃsā or the Nyāya, its semantic aspect was given only a subordinate significance. *Sphoṭa* was often considered yet another means for interpreting the Advaita principles through language, and the opponents raised their arguments related to the legitimacy of that view. Because the commentators on the MBh could not abandon its topical framework, Kaiyaṭa also failed to interpret *sphoṭa* in relation to *śabda* and *dhvani* in such a way that it can be recognized as an independent semantic theory.

As reviewed in the introduction to this study, serious examinations of *sphoṭa* even by non-grammarians were almost absent during the period from the dawn of the second millennium to around the beginning of the early modern period. Compared with their founding authorities and early exponents, the later advocates of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist schools of philosophy, most of whom were commentators of the original works, did not confront the *sphoṭa* doctrine frequently or strongly. Probably they hardly found it challenging enough to contradict their epistemological and semantic positions. Maṇḍana Miśra in his SSm had already responded to most of the arguments of the rival philosophical schools. Moreover, Helārāja, and later, Puṇyarāja had clarified Bhartṛhari's views in the VP. Consequently, new lines of contention against the legitimacy of the *sphoṭa* doctrine as a theory of *śābdabodha* were rare. Furthermore, in the later texts of the rival schools, we do not find any mention of contemporary grammarians who advanced new defences of *sphoṭa*.

[713] If we admit the chronology of the writers on grammatical philosophy given in COWARD and RAJA (1990: 22 - 24), Bharata Miśra and the author of the SSNV flourished after Śeṣakṛṣṇa. They are not known to have been grammarians.

4.1 Pressure of the Rival Philosophical Schools

Our discussion so far was how the grammarians by the end of the 15th century were becoming more fastidious about the subtleties of Pāṇinian tradition and philosophical insights into language. However, as noted by JOSHI (1967: i), the philosophy of language in the grammatical tradition "was being practically neglected and had almost dwindled" at Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's time too. It suggests that the grammarians even after Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita had to fight a tough battle against their opponents. It is also likely that the later grammarians did not want to let the *sphoṭa* doctrine be criticised from the Navya Nyāya perspectives[714] on *śābdabodha*. Their higher commitment and preparation to revisit *sphoṭa*, therefore, seems quite natural. As DESHPANDE (2012: 182) observes, some later grammarians like Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa tended to flaunt their self-confidence also in doctrines other than grammar, such as the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā. For instance, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's reference to either his father or himself, possibly to both, with the modifier "*padavākyapramāṇapārāvārapārīṇadhurīṇa*" [at the helm of those who are in full control of the systems of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya][715] implies the confidence in his/ their own scholarship and his/ their preparation to confront rivalries.

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[714] The Navya Naiyāyikas differed from the grammarians at a few points in their approach to *śābdabodha*. For instance, for the Navya Naiyāyikas, the significative power of words (*śakti*) is the will of any speaker, not just the will of god (*īśvarecchā*) as in the old Nyāya system. But for the grammarians, conventional usage is what imparts the significative power to words. Again, the Navya Nyāya system does not take the perceived form of a linguistic expression to be ontologically different from their speech sounds. BHATTACHARYA (1994: 75) points to this difference as follows: "The difference between this theory (i.e., *sphoṭa* theory) and the Navya-Nyāya theory explained earlier is fundamental. Navya-Nyāya philosophers argue that the word or the sentence is perceived as being not ontologically different from the sounds. But Bhartṛhari's theory postulates a word or a sentence as a semantic unit different from the sounds." [Parenthetical insertion by me.]. In contrast, the grammarians clearly demarcate the gross form of sounds in the *Vaikharī* and their cognitive form (*prākṛtadhvanis* or phonemes) in the *Madhyamā*, which are essentially different from each other in ontic terms. We may imagine that some grammarians were uncomfortable with the views of the Navya Nyāya, which were rapidly being established in a highly technical form of reasoning while refuting the approaches of other philosophical systems, including *vyākaraṇa*, to *śābdabodha*.

[715] VBhS, colophon. DESHPANDE's (2012: 178) translation.

A situation probably similar to the one which motivated the later grammarians to re-present the classical interpretation of *sphoṭa* is enacted in the Sanskrit drama titled *Kṛṣṇabhakticandrikā* (KBC) by Anantadeva I (fl. 1580)[716], an exponent of the Bhakti movement in the early modern period and a grandson of the Eknāth discussed above. In its first act, a grammarian, a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṃsaka, and a Kṛṣṇa devotee debate the means of verbal cognition. The grammarian is represented as one maintaining that the knowledge of the grammatical derivation of words must be obtained prior to the comprehension of their meanings (KBC, verse 1. 71). Put differently, for him, practical usage is not the most significant determinant of meaning.

> *yāvan naiva padeṣu sādhanavidhiḥ samyaktayā budhyate*
> *tāvan naiva padārthavṛndaviṣayā buddhiḥ samutpadyate*
> *taddhīnasya kuto 'nuvākyajanito bodhaḥ samutpadyatāṃ*
> *tasmād vyākaraṇaṃ pradhānam uditaṃ śāstreṣu vidvajjanaiḥ.*
>
> As long as the method of grammatical derivation of words is not at all understood well, the cognition which has as its range the group of meanings of (those) words does not arise at all. For the one without it (i.e., the knowledge of the word-meanings), how could the cognition, which is produced following a sentence, arise? Therefore, the wise say that grammar is the most essential in (all) scholarly pursuits.

The (Navya) Naiyāyika, with whose flamboyance of scholarship the grammarian expresses his discomfort (KBC, verse 1. 72), stresses that the word-meanings of the expressions which cannot be comprehended through grammatical derivations, such as babies' babbles[717], can be obtained only through reasoning (KBC, verse 1. 74). He humiliates the grammarian as follows for overrating grammar rules that do not appear in practical usage of language (KBC, verse 1. 75).

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[716] NCC 1, pp. 164, 165.

[717] "*padārthabodhavarjitāḥ kathāsu bālakair jitāḥ*" [In conversations, those who do not have the comprehension of word-meanings (through reasoning) are surpassed by babies (who do not speak grammatically derivable words).]

yeṣāṃ nirūpaṇakṛte bata pāṇinīyo
bhūyān ayaṃ vyayam agāt kila sūtrasaṃghaḥ
te ṭhakṭhañādinicayāḥ padamaṇḍaleṣu
śṛṅgodgamā iva vibhānti nṛmastakeṣu.

In fact, this large multitude of Pāṇinian *sūtras* was excessively spent on interpreting the masses (of forms such as the suffixes *ṬHaK* and *ṬHaÑ*, which look, just as horns grown on human heads, (utterly awkward) among groups of words (in practical use).

Claiming to be more advanced in his approach to the interpretation of verbal cognition, the Mīmāṃsaka then criticizes the positions of the grammarian and the logician. He introduces himself as one who excels in reflecting on the benefits (*phalaparyālocana*) of the Vedas. Because the Mīmāṃsakas interpret sentences (*vākyārthanirūpakatvāt*) in so doing, he holds that the understanding of the words and the word-meanings pre-exists that of the sentence meaning. Derivation of words and word-meanings is therefore possible only upon the comprehension of the interpreted sentences (KBC, verse 1. 79). The grammarian and the Naiyāyika find the Mīmāṃsaka's approach very hard to tackle.[718] However, before the Kṛṣṇa devotee finally refutes all other systems, the Mīmāṃsaka is reproached by both the grammarian and the Naiyāyika for being dogmatic and denying grammar and logic, which he necessarily learns (KBC, verses 1. 85, 86).[719]

From the above scene of the KBC, we may guess what might have inspired grammarians like Śeṣakṛṣṇa to present their interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine in independent treatises like the STN. It was the pressure from the rival schools of philosophy, especially the Nyāya and

[718] KBC, verse 1. 80: "*yadā pracaṇḍaḥ pavano vāti mīmāṃsakāhvayaḥ | uḍḍīya kati gacchanti tadā vāditṛṇoccayāḥ*." [When the tempest called Mīmāṃsaka (position) blows, how many grass stacks in the form of the Naiyāyika (positions) would then go flying?].

[719] The conflicts between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas on matters other than verbal cognition were more common. In 1582, Vidyānivāsa (c. 1500 - 1590), one of the most well-known Naiyāyikas of that time, was engaged in a public debate with the great Mīmāṃsaka Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, on the correct practice of religious performance. ŚĀSTRĪ (1912: 7 - 13) contains a detailed report on this, which was written by one of Vidyānivāsa's sons. Also see BENSON 2001: 112, 113.

the Mīmāṃsā, which were increasingly joining the discussions on the philosophy of language, particularly semantics. The doctrine of *sphoṭa*, therefore, needed a timely revisit and was apparently envisioned to be strong enough to refute the opponents' criticism. In a context where the purity of Sanskrit in use was debated and even challenged, the grammarians' re-presentation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, which is based on Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, also helped them to renew and regain their authority over at least some of the philosophical discussions on language. For this regaining of authority, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's STN was obviously the first spark, although the works of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, and Nāgeśa treated the topic in greater detail. It should also be noted that it was not only the STN which was evidence of renewed interest in *sphoṭa* because the SSbh and the SSNV also emerged just within several decades since the STN was composed.

Testimony about the pressure from rival philosophical schools is clearest in Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa. We do not find any clear statement in the STN or the VSK that they were composed in the form of a defence of the doctrines of the grammatical tradition. However, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's words in the *yugmaka kārikā* (i.e., third and fourth verses) at the beginning of the VBhS suggest such an objective.

> *pāṇinyādimunīn praṇamya pitaraṃ raṅgojibhaṭṭābhidham*
> *dvaitadhvāntanivāraṇādiphalikāṃ puṃbhāvavāgdevatām*
>
> *ḍhuṇḍhiṃ gautamajaiminīyavacanavyākhyātṛbhir dūṣitān*
> *siddhāntān upapattibhiḥ prakaṭaye teṣāṃ vaco dūṣaye.*
>
> Having bowed to the (three) (grammarian-)sages Pāṇini etc. (i.e., Kātyāyana and Patañjali), my father known as Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, who is the god of speech in masculine form having as his goal the removal of the darkness (caused by) the Dvaita system, and god Gaṇeśa, I reveal, with the help of arguments, the established conclusions (of these three sages) which have been polluted by commentators of the words of Gautama and Jaimini, (and) refute their (i.e., the commentators') positions.

It is then clear that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's task in the VBhS was broader than elaborating on Bhaṭṭoji's points. The commentators of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā to whom he here refers could easily include the Navya Naiyāyikas and the Navya Mīmāṃsakas, whose approach to the theories of the philosophy of language, as is also apparent from the aforementioned case from the KBC, irritated the grammarians. It is also observed that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's Nyāya works, the *Padārthadīpikā* (apparently also known as the *Koṇḍubhaṭṭīya*[720]) with the *Tarkaratna* commentary, the *Tarkapradīpa*, and the *Prauḍhamanaḥpramodajanana*, outnumber his grammatical works.[721] In the *Padārthadīpikā*, which is his only Nyāya work available to us, he presents alternative views on different topics related to *śābdabodha*.[722] Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa probably examines the Nyāya arguments on the philosophy of language also in his other works.

4.2 Shift of Focus from Theology to Linguistics

For the later grammarians, *sphoṭa* is predominantly a linguistic theory rather than yet another pointer to the absolute reality as expounded in the Advaita Vedānta. When we examine the interpretation of *sphoṭa* by the early modern grammarians, which seems to have started with Śeṣakṛṣṇa, it is apparent that they attempted to highlight *sphoṭa*'s semantic import over and above its broader epistemological and theological significance, which the philosophers from Bhartṛhari onwards had stressed largely.

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[720] The introduction of the *Koṇḍubhaṭṭīya* manuscript as given in MADRAS, No. 74, pp. 117, 118 corresponds to that of the *Padārthadīpikā* (PATAVARDHANA 1900). However, the colophons do not match, perhaps because the *Koṇḍubhaṭṭīya* is reported to be incomplete.

[721] NCC 5, p. 92. The *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpa*(°*pradīpikā*) is a Mīmāṃsā work by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

[722] For instance, see his discussion on *śakti* (denotative power) in the *Padārthadīpikā*, pp. 28 - 32.

However, the epistemological value of *sphoṭa* is also supported by the grammatical tradition. Discussing the difference between the terms[723] "*lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka*" and "*lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka*", Nāgeśa explains that the knowledge of grammar is essential even for a *lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka* person to obtain religion merits.[724] Therefore, one's fluency in the form of language he uses for communication does not substitute for the necessity for his learning its grammar. In consequence, religious merits are produced only if one grounds his correct usage of language on grammar rules.[725] Bhartṛhari's view that emancipation can be attained through the refined form of language, i.e., grammar, is also related to this context.[726] It follows then that one's knowledge of the practical usage of language is fully sufficient for him to communicate with others successfully, whereas he must have a fine understanding of grammar for personal emancipatory success. Since *sphoṭa* is inherently associated with "acquired language", the communicative capacity of both the speaker and the listener depends on the maturity of their *sphoṭas*. Grammar rules have little or no impact on "how" one's *sphoṭa* matures. It is because even one who has not learned grammar rules is still successful in communication if he is aware of the conventions of his speech community. Consequently, the need for grammar remains outside the realm of one's practical linguistic usage.

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[723] As DESHPANDE (2012: 186) interprets, "*lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka* grammarian is one who has access to grammar-independent usage of Sanskrit and who, therefore, has the authority to override the scope of the received rules of grammar in light of this independently known usage", whereas "*lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka* grammarian represents a grammarian from the post-Patañjali period, when, according to Nāgeśa and others, direct access to living usage of Sanskrit was no longer available, and the grammarian had to rely solely on the authority of the received grammatical tradition". DESHPANDE (2005) examines in detail this difference as understood by the later grammarians.

[724] PIS, *paribhāṣā* 62 - 63. He gives some authoritative statements as evidence, for instance, Vār 1. 10. 21: "*śāstrapūrvake prayoge 'bhyudayas tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena*." [If one uses language after studying grammar, he attains success. It is equivalent to (the success achieved through) Vedic words.]

[725] DESHPANDE 2011b: 380, 381.

[726] VP 1. 13 - 16. IYER (1964) is a detailed study on this topic.

Furthermore, in this context, we cannot ignore Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's account of Bhartṛhari's way of presenting his theory of *śabda* in the VP, by diverting the focus of examination from language to philosophy.[727]

> *tad evaṃ varāṭikānveṣaṇāya pravṛttaś cintāmaṇiṃ labdhavān iti vāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇoktābhāṇakanyāyena śabdavicārāya pravṛttaḥ san prasaṅgād advaite aupaniṣade brahmaṇy api vyutpadyatām ity abhiprāyeṇa bhagavān bhartṛharir vivartavādādikam api prasaṅgād vyudapādayat, tat tu tantrāntare sphuṭaṃ prakṛte nātīvopayuktaṃ ceti neha tanyate.*
>
> Accordingly, in compliance with the proverb in the (*Yoga*)*vāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇa* that "one who was in search of cowrie-shells found the wish-fulfilling gem", the reverend Bhartṛhari, who was in the course of examining language, incidentally with the hope that there should be some learning about the *Brahman* of the Upaniṣads and Advaita (Vedānta) too, taught by chance the *vivarta* theory etc. as well. But that (*vivarta* theory) is not described here (i.e., ŚK), since it has been expounded clearly in other works, and is not much applicable to the present discussion.

Bhaṭṭoji's view suggests that the later grammarians before Nāgeśa did not wish to present the *sphoṭa* doctrine as a subordinate aspect of the *Śabdabrahman* theology. There are some points on which Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa differs from Bhaṭṭoji, [728] but he preserves and generally agrees with Bhaṭṭoji's perspectives, largely excluding the topic of the *Śabdabrahman* in the discussions upon *sphoṭa*. Moreover, as JOSHI (1967: i, ii) notes, the VBhS deals with "the chief principles of the philosophy of Sanskrit language and semantics rather than with those of metaphysics". [729] However, when it comes to Nāgeśa, it is difficult for us to determine whether he holds the epistemological and theological foundation of *sphoṭa*

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[727] ŚK (last paragraph of the *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* section), p. 10. Cf. AKLUJKAR 2001: 468: "Obviously, Bhaṭṭoji thinks of *Brahman* as properly belonging to the Upaniṣads (and thus to Vedāntas such as Śaṅkara's) and regards Bhartṛhari's engagement with it as prompted more by a desire to bring incidental or additional benefit to readers than by any organic connection it may have with the recognized concerns of *Vyākaraṇa*".

[728] BRONKHORST 2012: 6 - 14.

[729] Cf. JOSHI 1967: 43: "The metaphysical aspect of word-doctrine has been wrongly attributed to the doctrine of *sphoṭa*."

more emphatically than the linguistic aspects of it, when we consider his inclination for Tantric and Śivādvaita metaphysics, as particularly evident in the PLM.

The STN does not clearly state in what aspects the Advaitic *Śabdabrahman* is equal to *sphoṭa*. We find in the SR (p. 28) of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's younger son, an important view: "*vedāntibhir api nimittakāraṇatvaṃ śabdasyābhīṣṭam, asmābhis tūpādānatvam abhyupeyata iti viśeṣaḥ*" [*śabda* is desired (i.e., accepted) also by the Vedāntins as the "efficient cause" (of the phenomenal world), but we (i.e., the grammarians) admit (it) as the "material (cause)." (Only) that is the difference]. In other words, for the grammarians, *śabda* is not "that by which" but "that out of which" the world is created. The view that *śabda* is not the efficient cause suggests that there is not any theistic agency by the name of *śabda*. I contend that this is a significant proof for *sphoṭa*'s linguistic basis, as highlighted by the later grammarians, rather than for the theological foundation on which *sphoṭa* was interpreted by the early exponents. Treating *śabda* to be the material cause of the linguistically created world also conforms to the view in the VP[730] that *pratibhā*, one's inherent linguistic capacity, is inseparably linked with *sphoṭa*. Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa's statement above probably presents his father's view. On the basis of these observations, we may assume that the focus of *sphoṭa* interpretation started making a shift from theology to linguistics from around the latter half of the 16th century. Perhaps, the arguments advanced by other intellectual systems against the theological backing for *śābdabodha*, for instance, the Navya Nyāya denial that the will of god is what imparts denotative power to words, also exerted some influence on the later grammarians' shift of focus.

4.3 Approaches to the Interpretation of *Sphoṭa*

Many works by the early modern intellectuals can be categorized into two broad classes in terms of their presentation style, those following (i) the

[730] VP 2. 117, 143, 144, 148, 152.

kaustubha model and (ii) those following the *saṅgraha* model.[731] The works on technical grammar and the philosophy of language were no exception. Bhaṭṭoji's words[732] in the introduction to the ŚK, i.e., that it presents the essence of the theories extracted out of the MBh and that one may easily learn from it what would tediously be obtained by consulting many works, serve also for an apt description of the *kaustubha* model. As DESHPANDE (2015: 32, 33) explains, some writers followed the *kaustubha* model in order to "re-order and re-assess the inherited tradition", which resulted in their freedom to critique and, if necessary, to disagree with the received tradition.[733] A number of works bearing the term "*kaustubha*" as part of their titles, such as the *Alaṅkārakaustubha* of Kavikarṇapūra (b. 1524), a Bengali Vaiṣṇava poet, the *Śabdakaustubha*, the *Advaitakaustubha*, and the *Tattvakaustubha* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnivāsācārya, the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* of Khaṇḍadeva, the *Nyāyakaustubha* of Mahādeva Puṇatāmbekara (fl. 1650 - 1700), the *Smṛtikaustubha* and the *Rājadharmakaustubha* of Anantadeva II (fl. 1650), who was a Marāṭhī poet and scholar, and the *Tantrakaustubha* of Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, are examples.

The *saṅgraha* model provided a doxographical approach to *vyākaraṇa*, just as similarly as it did to the Dvaita and Advaita systems, as evident, for instance, in the works of Vyāsatīrtha and Appayya Dīkṣita.[734] In terms of chronology, the *saṅgraha* model seems to have been prior to the *kaustubha* model. By closely following tradition, the works that followed the *saṅgraha* model were primarily intended for rendering pedagogical support. They appeared not only as independent works but also as condensations and simplifications of selected original works, so as to cater for diverse user groups. The *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* of Appayya Dīkṣita, the *Yogasārasaṅgraha* of Vijñānabhikṣu, and the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa are a few examples.

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[731] POLLOCK 2001a: 8; DESHPANDE 2015: 32, 33. Obviously, not all contemporary works can be categorised into these two models. They simply provide a useful way for recognizing some works.

[732] ŚK, *kārikās* 3cd, 4. Also see VSK, *kārikā* 1. See DESHPANDE 2012: 175, 176.

[733] Cf. POLLOCK 2001a: 8: "In it the attempt is made to organise the totality of knowledge in a given discipline by determining the most significant positions that had been taken in the past, and by sorting these chronologically and indicating where advancements had been made, to produce a new synthesis."

[734] Cf. MCCREA 2015: 99.

The STN clearly follows the *saṅgraha* model. The term "*nirūpaṇa*" in its title has, therefore, to be construed in the sense "re-presentation" rather than "examination". It becomes evident from the context in which the STN was composed that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was neither committed, perhaps, nor required by the intellectual currents of his time, to present any new findings or personal views. Although Bhaṭṭoji attempted to apply the *kaustubha* model to the interpretation of *sphoṭa*, he does not appear to have succeeded in it in either the ŚK or the VSK. In other words, just as Bharata Miśra writing the SSbh and the anonymous author of the SSNV present the conventional pro-Mīmāṃsā or pro-Advaita exposition of *sphoṭa*, Bhaṭṭoji, who follows Śeṣakṛṣṇa, presents the traditional view of the grammarians on *sphoṭa*.[735] Furthermore, as observed by JOSHI (1960: xi), the VSK is a collection of verses that Bhaṭṭoji seems to have gleaned from different sources in the grammatical tradition, along with some written by himself.[736] Its alternative title "*Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*", i.e., "exposing/ surfacing of the grammarians' views" or "rescuing the drowned doctrines of the grammarians" (POLLOCK (2001a: 27), also reveals Bhaṭṭoji's intention.[737] Given his fundamentalist ideas about linguistic purism, Bhaṭṭoji's attempt to revive the grammarians' views on *sphoṭa*, rather than examining it from fresh viewpoints, is reasonable. Possibly, he included the chapter on *sphoṭa* in the ŚK under Śeṣakṛṣṇa's instigation or being motivated by the model of the latter's STN.

It seems that most of the later works on *sphoṭa*, if not all, followed the *saṅgraha* model. The SN, the SV, the SC, and the *sphoṭaparīkṣā* [Bhairava Miśra (fl. 1780 - 1840), author of the VBhSp], which are available in full, seem to conform to it. As inferable from their titles, so do several other later works, such as the *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa*[738] (Āpadeva, c. 1650), the *Sphoṭatattva*[739] (Kṛṣṇa Dvivedin), and the *Sphoṭapratiṣṭhā*[740] (Keśava). However, we see new insights into the interpretation of *sphoṭa*,

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[735] On Bhaṭṭoji's career as a grammarian, BALI (1976: 130) says as follows: "His great success as a grammarian, therefore, was not due to any element of originality but because of the intelligent presentation, at one place, of all the stray facts, spread over a vast literature of the Pāṇinian school of grammar."

[736] JOSHI 1993: 6. Also see DESHPANDE 1992: 74.

[737] According to NCC 33, p. 86, *Śabdakaustubhasaṃkṣepārtha* is another title of it.

[738] NCC 2, p. 125.

[739] NCC 4, p. 324.

[740] NCC 5, p. 61.

like the shift of focus to linguistics as stated above, sprouting from the STN itself, while the SC of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin clearly presents new and unorthodox views that are not usually expected from a work following the doxographical model. But those views do not predominate over the conventional positions to such an extent that we could recognize the works in which they appear as following the *kaustubha* model.

§ 5. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Contribution to Interpreting *Sphoṭa*

The Śeṣas were grammarians. They became well-known in early modern Benares for their commitment to safeguarding and promotion of Sanskrit grammar in Pāṇinian tradition. As suggested by the accounts of their ancestor known as Viṣṇu or Viṣṇupant, the origin of the fame of the Śeṣas as grammarians may date to a time even before Śeṣakṛṣṇa migrated to Benares. Likewise, although Śeṣakṛṣṇa's family was not directly related to Rāmacandra's, the grammatical authority held by the latter was also renowned. Apart from the descendants of Rāmacandra, about whom we know little, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's sons and grandsons maintained the grammatical authority of the Śeṣas. Consequently, the views on *sphoṭa* sustained by the Śeṣas as a significant school of grammarians might have been well-recognized and influential.

5.1 Was Śeṣakṛṣṇa a Dvaita Exponent?

Although Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita apparently chose to keep theology and linguistics separate, the grammarians, in general, did not oppose[741] the Advaita foundation of their philosophy of language, especially of *sphoṭa*. Similarly, the Dvaita - Advaita clash in the latter half of the 16th century, as discussed above, appears to have motivated the grammarians to look back at their philosophy of language, while reconsidering the amount of its dependence on the Advaita Vedānta.

[741] JOSHI 1967: ii.

DESHPANDE (2011a: 368, 369), however, assumes that the Śeṣas were devoted advocates of the Dvaita Vedānta and Bhaṭṭoji, being an Advaitin, criticised Śeṣakṛṣṇa's PKśk on sectarian grounds rather than on its theoretical defects. If this is true, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Advaitic positions become problematic.[742] Note that at the end of his commentary on the 19th *kārikā* of the STN, Śeṣakṛṣṇa quotes two hemistichs from the first verse of the *Śāradātilakatantra* of Lakṣmaṇadeśika, a Kashmiri Tantric of the Śrī Vidyā tradition[743] who flourished in the 11th century, in support of the non-dual character of *sphoṭa*. Moreover, most of the Advaitins in the early modern time generally admitted[744] Śaiva ideas, whereas the Dvaitins often criticised them. For example, Vādīndra Tīrtha says in his *Guruguṇastavana* (verse 8) that his teacher Vijayīndra Tīrtha did not tolerate either the Advaita or the Śaiva doctrines (*advaitaśaivāsahiṣṇuḥ*). Had Śeṣakṛṣṇa's family been actively engaged in propagating the Dvaita doctrines to the extent that Bhaṭṭoji found it a strong reason to refute the PKśk and turned against him as his teacher (if he did), Śeṣakṛṣṇa would not have included in his work a Śaiva quotation serving for an authoritative statement on the *Śabdabrahman*. One may still argue that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a Dvaitin but chose not to display his philosophical

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[742] DESHPANDE (2011a: 369, 2012: 174) points out that Rāmacandra was an exponent of the Dvaita Vedānta and wrote a Dvaita work titled *Vaiṣṇavasiddhāntasaddīpikā*. It seems that DESHPANDE here refers to the Rāmacandra who wrote the PK, not the Rāmacandra who was Śeṣakṛṣṇa's grandfather. But we are now more certain that the family lines of that Rāmacandra and Śeṣakṛṣṇa were different, although they might perhaps have belonged, in their original homeland, to a single extended clan bearing the title, Śeṣa. It is, therefore, still possible that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was not a Dvaitin, whereas Rāmacandra and his descendants were. As DESHPANDE (2011a: 368) holds, it was as a Dvaitin that Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja attacked Bhaṭṭoji, by writing the PMku on the PM and the *Kaustubhakhaṇḍana* on the ŚK. His PMku is an "indirect rebuke to Appayya as well" because the title "*-mardinī*" is reminiscent of the "*-mardana*" of the title of the work *Madhvatantramukhamardana* by Appayya Dīkṣita, a leading Advaita advocate. Nevertheless, it seems likely that Jagannātha was driven by personal reasons more strongly than by sectarian ones in criticising Bhaṭṭoji and Appayya. Furthermore, the term *-mardana* or *-mardinī* was a common part of the titles of polemical works of that period. Again, Jagannātha's works and Appayya's work referred to here belong to two different genres.

[743] BECK 1993: 126.

[744] Cf. MINKOWSKI 2014: 18: "Appayya did not see a danger to Vedāntic nondualism in absorbing some Śaiva theological positions, but rather an advantage." MINKOWSKI (2014) discusses at length how this situation changed later, as clear from Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara's writings. Also see BRONNER 2015: 15, 16.

disposition in the STN, because he presented there the classical view of the grammarians, who were also Advaitins. In other words, perhaps he felt it compulsory to interpret *sphoṭa* "as it has been" for centuries, without letting his personal sectarian position affect it. Furthermore, seemingly, Śeṣakṛṣṇa did not write anything else on philosophy except the STN. His poetical works such as the *Kaṃsavadha* and the *Pārijātaharaṇa* do not reveal any specific preference for either the Dvaita or the Advaita systems, but rather his Vaiṣṇava [745] devotion. Consequently, with the information at hand, we cannot yet be certain whether Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a Dvaitin. One thing is, however, clear. Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not give priority to the Advaita metaphysics in interpreting *sphoṭa* in the STN, [746] seemingly because he wanted to interpret discursively *sphoṭa* as the sole signifier of meaning, which can be recognized purely "linguistically".

5.2 Śeṣakṛṣṇa and Navya Nyāya Scholarship

Śeṣakṛṣṇa can be expected to show an awareness of the Navya Nyāya techniques and jargon. However, there seem to have been two factors that limited the amount of his awareness; (i) the time the Navya Nyāya scholarship arrived in Benares and (ii) his willingness, as a traditional grammarian, to admit it straightaway. The "new" knowledge of the Nyāya school reached the Benares intelligentsia quite late. Consequently, it hardly affected the mode of argumentation of most of the Benares intellectuals around the middle of 16th century to the extent that it clearly appeared in their writings. Likewise, the grammarians did not hurry themselves into the absorption of the Navya Nyāya techniques or jargon, apparently because the grammatical tradition has its own sophisticated idiom of exposition. The disagreements on the theories of *śābdabodha* between the Naiyāyikas of the old school and the grammarians may also have caused the latter to delay admitting the

[745] DESHPANDE (2012: 185) points out that "*Vaiṣṇava*" might have been a term adopted by the contemporary Dvaitins to refer to their sectarian position. How that point is related to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works needs a separate study.

[746] The phrases like "*sphoṭarūpaśabdaparabrahmaṇo na brahmaṇāpy apahnavaḥ kartuṃ śakyate*" [The denial of the supreme *Śabdabrahman* in the form of *sphoṭa* cannot be made even by the *Brahman*] in STNśk 4 appear to have been used rhetorically.

Navya Nyāya innovations. The Navya Nyāya influence on the grammarians is traceable in Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's writings but, again, not as convincingly as in Nāgeśa's.

As can be inferred from the mention of "*ekadeśīyamata*" [(the view of those accepting part (of the Naiyāyikas' position)] in the STNśk 3, Śeṣakṛṣṇa seems to have been aware of the divisions in the old Nyāya school. In the tradition, "*ekadeśinaḥ*" stands for a group of Naiyāyikas, mostly the followers of Bhāsarvajña alias Bhūṣaṇakāra.[747] Of Kashmiri origin, Bhāsarvajña wrote one of the most celebrated Nyāya works, the *Nyāyasāra* (NSār), and its commentary known as the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* alias the *Saṅgrahavārttika*. As POTTER (1977: 6) remarks, Bhāsarvajña's views provided "the basis for what is perhaps the only serious factional split within the system", discarding many of the doctrines held by the old Nyāya school and inspiring new thoughts among the later Nyāya philosophers. It is apparent that Śeṣakṛṣṇa also wanted to highlight the difference of positions, by mentioning in his STN commentary the stance of the *ekadeśīya* Naiyāyikas as discrete from that of the orthodox school of the Nyāya system.

It is clear from the PKśk that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was aware of the Navya Nyāya techniques and terminology.[748] Moreover, in the STNśk Śeṣakṛṣṇa mentions Vallabha (c. 12th century) [749], author of the *Nyāyalīlavatī*, whose awareness of the Navya Nyāya in the discussions on *śābdabodha* is better known to us.[750] However, if we classify into the two schools of the Nyāya system, i.e., old and new, the intellectuals who were active around the end of the 16th century, Śeṣakṛṣṇa seems to have been responding to the old school. Likewise, MCCREA's (2002: 481) assumption that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was interested in the "new grammar" cannot be correct, because his traditional style of argumentation is evident in the PKśk.

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[747] Bhāsarvajña is believed to have flourished between the latter half of the 9th century and the first half of the 10th century. See NSār, p. 7; POTTER 1977: 6. For disputes over his date, see NARAYANAN 1992: 9 - 11. Cf. NCC 10, pp. 267 - 269.

[748] BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI 2013: 86, 87.

[749] Referring to his NL in STNśk 18.

[750] See BHATTACHARYA (1987) for more details. Cf. MOHANTY in his summary of the NL given in POTTER (1977: 613): "His (Vallabha's) treatment is much influenced by Udayana, and anticipates unmistakably much Navya-nyāya terminology". Parenthetical insertion is mine.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's knowledge of the new doctrinal trends of the Nyāya system does not appear to have exerted any noticeable impact on his approach to the interpretation of technical grammar.

What BRONKHORST (2008: 6, 7) says regarding Bhaṭṭoji's "innovations" in the grammatical tradition is also applicable to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. Śeṣakṛṣṇa was probably aware of the Navya Nyāya approach to the philosophy of language but chose not to display it in the STN. Instead, he presents his interpretation of *sphoṭa* in the garb of traditional exposition, perhaps so that it does not look eccentric or not based on authoritative works. Moreover, it might be correct to say that Śeṣakṛṣṇa uses the Navya Nyāya techniques and terminology, as MCCREA (2002: 482) states regarding Khaṇḍadeva's[751] use of them in his Mīmāṃsā works, "only sporadically and quite sparingly". [752] Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not depend on the Navya Nyāya terminology where the conventional idiom is sufficient to deal with the interpretation of *sphoṭa*. Nonetheless, when referring to a Navya Naiyāyika's argument or an argument presented in such a style, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's response is often imbued with the idiom used in the *pūrvapakṣa*. The following example from the STNśk 18 illustrates this point.

Objection:

> *yat tu līlāvatīkāreṇoktam - ekaṃ padam iti dhīr*
> *ekasuptiṅantatvāvacchedenopapadyate.*
> *tatraikasuptiṅantatvāvacchedaḥ padatve,*
> *nānāsuptiṅantatvāvacchedo vākyatve prayojakaḥ svīkaraṇīya eva.*
> *anyathā sphoṭatvāviśeṣe ayaṃ padasphoṭo 'yaṃ vākyasphoṭa iti*
> *vicitravyavahāras tvanmate kathaṃ syād iti.*

[751] Cf. MCCREA 2002: 484: "Only when directly confronting recent criticisms of the New Logicians and Grammarians does he adopt their idiom."

[752] According to BRONKHORST, DIACONESCU, and KULKARNI (2013: 87), Śeṣakṛṣṇa's use of the Navya Nyāya techniques and the terminology, though spare, suggests that the Navya Nyāya knowledge came to Benares not from Vijayanagara, where Śeṣakṛṣṇa, unlike Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, did not have any connection, but possibly directly from Mithilā.

Response:

> *tan na. subantatiṅantayor anugatasyaikasya padatvāvacchedakasya vaktum aśakyatvāt, anyataratvasya gauraveṇāvacchedakatvābhāvāt.* [753]

Although Śeṣakṛṣṇa uses in the STN some technical terms which are heavily employed by the Navya Naiyāyikas, it is not possible to determine whether Śeṣakṛṣṇa uses them exactly in the sense the Navya Naiyāyikas do. This is because they are found also in the terminology of the old Nyāya school. The terms *samaveta* [754] [inhering/ an inhering entity], *samavāyikāraṇatva* [755] [state of being the inherence cause], *vinigamanāviraha* [756] [lack of criterion (for judging the proposition)], *asamavāya* [757] [non-inherence], and *samavāyin*/ *samavāyitā* [758] [possessor of inherence/ state of being the possessor of inherence] are a few examples of such terms.

Judging from the SSbh and the SSNV, Śeṣakṛṣṇa might have been the first author to have incorporated the views of the Navya Naiyāyikas into his interpretation of *sphoṭa*. The SSbh and the SSNV do not seem to contain the Navya Nyāya idiom even when they deal with the Nyāya objections. Nor do they refer to any Naiyāyika from the new school.

Was Bhaṭṭoji exposed to the new trends of the Nyāya system any more than his teacher? Apparently not. Bhaṭṭoji's writings on grammar do not reflect Navya ideas to any discernible extent. DESHPANDE (2015: 32) notes as follows in this regard.

> "Nāgeśa and his disciples broke new ground and claimed to have initiated a Navya school of grammar, marking departure from Bhaṭṭoji and Haridīkṣita, who were deemed to belong to the "*Prāc*" or old school."

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[753] See Chapter Three, STNśk 18 for translation.
[754] STNśk 6.
[755] STNśk 3.
[756] STNśk 4.
[757] STNśk 9.
[758] STNśk 10.

As regards Bhaṭṭoji's use of the Navya Nyāya terms, it is obvious that he uses them more frequently than Śeṣakṛṣṇa does. The *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter in the first *āhnika* of the ŚK contains terms such as *śaktatāvacchedaka* [delimiter of the primary significativeness], *śaktigraha* [ascertainment of (a word's) significative power], *śaktigrāhakatva* [state of being a factor that determines the significative power (of words)], *vinigamanāviraha* [lack of criterion (for judging the proposition)], and *vācakatā* [state of possessing the significative power]. Nevertheless, what is stated above about Śeṣakṛṣṇa's use of the Navya Nyāya scholarship is pertinent to Bhaṭṭoji too. Accordingly, Bhaṭṭoji's infrequent use of the terms and style not exclusive to the Navya Nyāya and his firm adherence to the expository techniques of traditional technical grammar suggest that he should be treated to have belonged to the old school of the grammarians.

5.3 Śeṣakṛṣṇa's Position on the Categories of *Sphoṭa*

As found in STN 3 and STNśk 3, Śeṣakṛṣṇa clearly maintains the traditional view of the grammarians that only two categories of *sphoṭa*, i.e., the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa*, are acceptable as valid but the latter is the substratum of all linguistic units. He does not mention the other categories of *sphoṭa*, perhaps because he considered any lengthy discussion on them as irrelevant to the classical interpretation of *sphoṭa* and he wanted to maintain a tacit form of presentation throughout the work. Unlike some later exponents of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, such as Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin who holds the *varṇajātisphoṭa* as one of the semantically legitimate *sphoṭas* and two further divisions [759] of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's position is that the real *sphoṭa* is recognized only at the level of the sentence.[760] Since significativeness is *sphoṭa's* hallmark, and it is thought to exist only in the undivided

[759] By the time of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, some of the major categories of *sphoṭa* evolved to include subcategories. For instance, the SC (p. 10) discusses two subcategories of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, i.e., the *akhaṇḍātiriktavākyasphoṭa* and the *akhaṇḍānatiriktavākyasphoṭa*.

[760] See STNśk 3 and STNśk 9. Cf. In his SR (p. 28), Śeṣakṛṣṇa's younger son, Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, also says clearly that *vācakatva* rests in the sentence.

sentence, this view also verifies that he interprets *sphoṭa* as a semantic theory.

However, it is not quite clear from the STN whether Śeṣakṛṣṇa's preference was the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* or the *vākyajātisphoṭa*. His use of "*anavayava*" [devoid of constituents] as a modifier to the term *sphoṭa* several times in his responses to the *pūrvapakṣas*, and particularly his statement[761] that "the position of the upholder of the main *sphoṭa* is that only the partless *(vākya)sphoṭa* is the signifier of sentential meaning", apparently suggest that he admits the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* as the real type of *sphoṭa*. Again, Śeṣakṛṣṇa might also be assumed to have held the *vākyajātisphoṭa* view, like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita did. After presenting the opponents' argument that only the particulars of phonemes are recognized at each articulatory instance, Śeṣakṛṣṇa underscores that the universal of phonemes must not be disputed, on the basis of the recognition of it irrespective of articulatory idiosyncrasies.[762] Given this position on the recognition of the universal of phonemes, we may imagine that he probably had a similar approach to the recognition of the universal of sentences. We do not, however, find in the STN a direct statement confirming such an approach, as we do in the ŚK.[763] In my opinion, Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not provide us with a clear idea of his preference. Two points are noteworthy here. One is that the property of indivisibility into or the absence of real constituents does not hinder the sentence being treated a universal. Consequently, the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* is not a substitute for the *vākyajātisphoṭa*, unless the universal of all speech units is refuted. The other point is that Śeṣakṛṣṇa cannot be expected to state any concrete personal view since he rather re-presents in the STN the classical interpretation of *sphoṭa*, attempting to put together diverse views of the *sphoṭa* exponents up to him.

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[761] STNsk 9: "*vastutas tv anavayavaḥ sphoṭa eva vākyārthavācaka iti mukhyasphoṭavādino matam*".

[762] STNśk 4: "*na ca gatvādijātāv eva vivaditavyam. gakāro 'yaṃ, gakāro 'yam ity anugatagakārākārapratītibalena strīpuṃsādivaktṛviśeṣānumānabalena ca tatsiddheḥ*". [Nor should one dispute just over the universal such as "*ga*-ness". (This is) because it (i.e., the universal) is established through the power of the cognition, whose form is the "*ga*-" phoneme, which is common to (the perceptions) "this is a "*ga*-" phoneme, this is a "*ga*-" phoneme", and through the power of inferring the (articulatory) distinction of speakers such as (that between) females and males.].

[763] ŚK, *āhnika* 1, *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, p. 9.

Compared with Śeṣakṛṣṇa's enumeration of the categories of *sphoṭa*, Bhaṭṭoji's is more precise. As Bhaṭṭoji[764] states in the ŚK, the traditional expositions of *sphoṭa* contain all eight categories. But his words "*tatra tatropanibaddhāḥ*" suggest that none of the authoritative works presents them together or in any organized way.[765] In support of his statement, Bhaṭṭoji in the ŚK[766] points to the works of Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, and especially Kaiyaṭa, who have indicated their awareness of those eight divisions. For instance, Bhaṭṭoji states how Kaiyaṭa has recognized them:

> *paspaśāyām eva praghaṭṭakāntare kiṃ punaḥ ityādi bhāṣyam upādāya kecid varṇasphoṭam apare padasphoṭaṃ vākyasphoṭaṃ cāhuḥ iti vadatā kaiyaṭena aiuṇ ity atra vyaktisphoṭajātisphoṭayor balābalaṃ cintayatā pratyāhārāhnikānte akṣaraṃ na kṣaraṃ vidyāt iti bhāṣyavyākhyāvasare vyavahāranityatā tu varṇapadavākyasphoṭānāṃ nityatvaṃ tu jātisphoṭasyeti pratipādayatā, anupadam eva brahmatattvam eva hi śabdarūpatayā pratibhātīty artha iti vyācakṣ(am?)āṇena sarve pakṣāḥ sūcitā eva.*

> All the views are indeed indicated by Kaiyaṭa, who says, having accepted the statement of the *Mahābhāṣya*, "Again, is (*śabda*) (eternal or produced)[767] etc." on a different doctrine in the *Paspaśa* (*āhnika*) itself, that "some hold the *varṇasphoṭa* (as true), (whereas) others hold the *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* (as true)", (and) who, considering the strength and weakness of the *vyaktisphoṭa* and the *jātisphoṭa* in the case (of the *pratyāhāra*) "*aiuṆ*" (*Śivasūtra* 1), states at the end of the *Pratyāhāra āhnika*, when commenting upon (the statement of) the *Mahābhāṣya* (1. 36. 6 ad A 7. 8. 2), that "(one) should know that *akṣara* (is) what does

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[764] ŚK, *āhnika* 1, *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, p. 8: "*aṣṭāv apy ete pakṣāḥ siddhāntagrantheṣu tatra tatropanibaddhāḥ*". [And all of these eight views are presented in various places in the authoritative works].

[765] Cf. BRONKHORST 2005: 8: "Bhaṭṭoji insists that he did not invent the eight possible positions about the *sphoṭa* himself." BALI (1976: 43) also holds that they were not Bhaṭṭoji's innovations: "The *sphoṭa* has been divided into eight parts by the grammarians, and Dīkṣita adopts this division and clearly defines and explains these eight parts both in the *Kaustubha* and the *Bhūṣaṇa*."

[766] ŚK, *āhnika* 1, *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter, pp. 8, 9.

[767] MBh, *paspaśāhnika*, 6. 12: "*kiṃ punar nityaḥ śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ*".

not perish", that "the *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa*, and the *vākyasphoṭa* are eternal due to their currency but the *jātisphoṭa* is (absolutely) eternal", who explains that it means that "certainly, just the true nature of Brahman manifests (itself) word after word, due to its being in the form of *śabda*." [768]

The SSbh (pp. 9 - 15) and the SSNV[769], whose authors were possibly Bhaṭṭoji's contemporaries, discuss categories of *sphoṭa* sparingly and inexplicitly, but all the later grammarians after Śeṣakṛṣṇa list the eight classes of it. In the SR (pp. 27, 28) Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa also indirectly refers to Bhaṭṭoji[770] and states all the categories of *sphoṭa* that are listed in the ŚK. It is, therefore, likely that all or at least most of the *sphoṭa* theoreticians of the 16th century knew this categorization of *sphoṭa*, but apparently more clearly after Bhaṭṭoji's elaboration on it. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa followed Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita on this point, whereas Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin went on to subdivide some classes of *sphoṭa*, as we noted above.

The STNśk 3 shows that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was aware of a non-classical view on the categorization of *sphoṭa*. According to that view, the sentence deemed to be the *vākyasphoṭa* can be componential.

vākyasphoṭapakṣe kaścit taṃ sāvayavaṃ manyate tadā tattattālvādisthānodbhavavāyavīyanādāparanāmaka-dhvaniviśeṣābhivyaṅgyā nityā vibhavo varṇā evāvayavāḥ.

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[768] Having examined the matches and mismatches of Bhaṭṭoji's references with the corresponding sections of the authoritative texts, BRONKHORST (2005: 9 - 11) concludes that Kaiyaṭa lists only six classes of *sphoṭa*, whereas Bhaṭṭoji derives, from both the MBh and the MBhP, eight classes "some of which had not figured in Sanskrit literature before him". In my opinion, Bhaṭṭoji seems to have not confined himself to the MBh and the MBhP in recognizing the eight classes of *sphoṭa,* although his preference to the grammatical tradition in interpreting *sphoṭa* is clear and there was no individual work on *sphoṭa* by a grammarian until Śeṣakṛṣṇa wrote the STN. The pre-Kaiyaṭa literature on *sphoṭa*, including the VP, its commentaries, Maṇḍana's SSm, and works by rival schools such as the NM of Jayanta, contains more advanced phases of the interpretation of *sphoṭa*. We cannot assume that Bhaṭṭoji disregarded all those advanced phases and adhered only to the MBh and MBhP, which contain just initial insights into *sphoṭa*, for recognizing the categories of it.

[769] For instance, SSNV *kārikās* 144, 174, 180.

[770] BRONKHORST 2005: 17.

> In reference to the position of the sentence-*sphoṭa*, someone takes it (i.e., sentence) to have constituents. Then the constituents are just phonemes, which are all-pervading, eternal, and manifested by certain types of aerial *dhvani* sounds also known as "*nāda*", arising from various places of articulation such as the palate.

As already stated, among the available later works on *sphoṭa*, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin's *Sphoṭacandrikā* (SC) distinctly contains a view similar to the aforementioned. Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa argues there that the single phoneme-universal should be recognized as the "*vākyasphoṭa*". In other words, the *varṇajātisphoṭa* is semantically perfect and independent. Just as the "variegated colour (*citrarūpa*)" as explained by the Naiyāyikas and the "composite vowel" as interpreted by the grammarians are single entities, irrespective of how they are composed, the single phoneme, which is revealed by many *dhvanis* and in the form of the "sentence", is the *Śabdabrahman* and the signifier[771] of meaning.

> *yathā tārkikaiḥ pūrvoktamadrītyā gatyantarasambhave 'pi citrarūpam atiriktaṃ svīkriyate, yathā śābdikaiḥ rephadvayājbhāgaviśiṣṭa eko varṇaḥ ṛti ṛ vā ḷti ḷ vā ity atra vārttike svīkriyate, yathā vā siddham eṅaḥ sasthānatvād aicoś cottarabhūyastvāt iti vārttike 'nekācām ekavarṇātmakatvam uktaṃ tathā mayāpi anekadhvanivyaṅgyaḥ vākyātmaka eko varṇa iti svīkriyate. sa ca śabdabrahmarūpaḥ.*
>
> Just as the variegated colour is admitted by the Naiyāyikas as different (from its separate colours), even when there is a possibility of another course in the manner stated by me before, just as a single phoneme characterized by two *rephas* (*r* sounds) and part of vowel (*ṛ*) is admitted by the grammarians in this *Vārttika* (i.e., Vār 1 and 2 ad A 6. 1. 101), "*ṛti ṛ vā, ḷti ḷ vā*", [i.e., the sound *ṝ* optionally occurs as a substitute for a short *ṛ* followed by a short *ṛ*, the sound *ḹ* is optionally applied as a substitute for short *ṛ* followed by a short *ḷ*.], or just as the condition of being a single phoneme existing in many vowels is stated in the *Vārttika*

[771] The last sentence of the SC (p. 16) reads as follows: "*tasmād ekavarṇātmako 'khaṇḍavākyasphoṭo vācaka iti siddham.*" [Therefore, it is established that the indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa*, which has as its nature the single phoneme, is the signifier (of meaning)].

(i.e., Vār 3 and 4 ad A 1. 1. 48), "*siddham eṅaḥ sasthānatvāt*" [772], [i.e., (it is) established because *eṄ* vowels (*a*, *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*, *e*, *o*) have the same place of articulation], and "*aicoś cottarabhūyastvāt*" [i.e., and the latter parts of the two *aiC* vowels (*ai*, *au*) are greater], I also accept that what is manifested by many *dhvanis* and has as its nature the sentence is the single phoneme. And it is in the form of the *Śabdabrahman*.

Since Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin flourished around 1750,[773] perhaps later than even Nāgeśa, it is not his position that is hinted at in the STNśk 3. Rather, it might have been a view which was already known to the grammarians of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's time but often refuted.

5.4 *Sphoṭa* as Construed by Śeṣakṛṣṇa

Śeṣakṛṣṇa examines *sphoṭa* as a linguistic theory, which addresses directly a semantic question; "what signifies meaning". His philosophical preferences are not clearly traceable, but we may presuppose that he might hardly have been different from Bhaṭṭoji in interpreting the *sphoṭa* doctrine. Moreover, it must be remembered again that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was the first grammarian to revisit the doctrine of *sphoṭa* in early modern Benares, by writing an individual work on it. As an exposition of the classical view on *sphoṭa*, the STN might have been expected to highlight *sphoṭa*'s Upaniṣadic and Advaitic foundation, but we do not find there anything of that sort. This observation becomes clearer when it is compared with the SSbh and the SSNV, which do the opposite. Accordingly, it is proper to say that Śeṣakṛṣṇa was quite disinclined to let the *sphoṭa* doctrine be construed as a doctrine heavily based on metaphysics. His disinclination also implies his intention to assert that *sphoṭa* can be defended from the perspective of linguistics.

[772] "°*siddham eṅaḥ*°": correction for "°*siddham etat*°" in NENE's edition (1929: 15) of the SC. For Pāṇinian rules mentioned here, see SiKau 85 (ad A 6. 1. 101). Cf. DESHPANDE 1975: 35, 36, 170, and SiKau 323 (ad A 1. 1. 48).
[773] COWARD and RAJA 1990: 23.

Next, I briefly examine an observation made by BRONKHORST (2005) that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita was the first writer to have recognized *sphoṭa* as a semantic entity. This is because our findings also help recognize Śeṣakṛṣṇa's position on that matter. I quote below the passage with which BRONKHORST starts his observation.

> Bhaṭṭoji's understanding of the *sphoṭa* differs from that of most or all of his predecessors. There is a fundamental difference between his discussion of the *sphoṭa* in the *Śabdakaustubha* and most, if not all, of what had been said about it before. The *sphoṭa*, for Bhaṭṭoji's predecessors (and apparently some of his successors), was meant to solve an ontological issue, to respond to the question: What is a word (or a sound, or a sentence)? ... All this changes with Bhaṭṭoji. For him the question is not so much 'What is a word?' or 'What is a speech sound?' but rather 'What is expressive?' The answer to this last question is, for Bhaṭṭoji: the *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is defined by its being expressive; other considerations are secondary.[774]

BRONKHORST at first examines Bhaṭṭoji's treatment of the eight categories of *sphoṭa*, considering how Bhaṭṭoji has understood Patañjali's ideas on *śabda* and *sphoṭa* and Kaiyaṭa's exposition of them. He concludes that Bhaṭṭoji introduced, as an innovation, *sphoṭa*'s *vācakatva* / *vācakatā* (expressiveness), which culminates only at the level of the indivisible sentence in the form of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. In the view of BRONKHORST, all others before Bhaṭṭoji interpreted the categories of *sphoṭa* by considering simply their ontological statuses. As discussed above, BRONKHORST can be correct in saying that Bhaṭṭoji's enumeration of the categories of *sphoṭa* does not fully correspond to Kaiyaṭa's. However, the observation that Bhaṭṭoji should be honoured as

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[774] BRONKHORST 2005: 3 - 4. At the start of his discussion on *sphoṭa*, Bhaṭṭoji in the ŚK, *āhnika* 1, *Sphoṭanirūpaṇa* chapter (p. 7) says: "*vastutas tu vācakatā sphoṭaikaniṣṭhā*." [But indeed the significativeness rests solely on *sphoṭa*]. BRONKHORST (2012: 23, 24) carries forward this argument by considering the treatment of *sphoṭa* by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa too, whose ideas generally include most of the views of Bhaṭṭoji. Also see SV, p. 5 for how Nāgeśa follows Bhaṭṭoji's footsteps.

the first authority to have recognized *sphoṭa*'s expressiveness does not seem tenable[775], mainly for two reasons.

(i) Following the early exponents of *sphoṭa*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa clearly recognizes *sphoṭa*'s semantic import, and
(ii) The SSNV, which is assumed to have been composed before the ŚK, also takes *sphoṭa* as a semantic entity.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa unambiguously maintains that *sphoṭa* is the signifier of meaning. At the very beginning of his exposition in STN 3, this view is emphasized as "*arthasya vācakā varṇā na… kintu sphoṭaḥ*" [phonemes are not the signifiers of meaning, but *sphoṭa* is].[776] By examining the ways Śeṣakṛṣṇa vindicates the grammarians' position on *sphoṭa*, it becomes evident that (i) he had in his mind a clear understanding of *sphoṭa*'s expressiveness (*vācakatva*),[777]and that (ii) he wanted to defend logically its legitimacy.

The expressiveness of *sphoṭa* as held by the grammarians is found obviously mentioned in the literature before Śeṣakṛṣṇa. For instance, Mādhava's SDS (p. 300) in the 13th chapter titled *pāṇinidarśana* (philosophy of Pāṇini, i.e., of the grammarians) invokes the conventional two-sided definition of *sphoṭa*, Patañjali's often quoted words "*yenoccāritena*" [through what that is uttered] etc. in the MBh, and a portion of Kaiyaṭa's commentary on it, in order to highlight *sphoṭa's*

[775] BRONKHORST (2005: 26, n. 35) says that he did not have access to the STN but only to a concise translation of it, perhaps that by PALSULE in COWARD and RAJA (1990: 216, 217), when writing his paper. He would probably have held a different view if he had been able to read the STN in advance.
[776] Cf. STNśk 9: "*tasmād varṇapadavibhāgam āvidyakam aṅgīkṛtya sarveṣūccāryamāṇeṣv anusyūtaḥ kaścid arthapratyayaupayiko vākyātmānavayavo nityaḥ sphoṭo 'ṅgīkartavya iti*." [Therefore, having accepted the division of (a linguistic expression into) words and phonemes as illusory, it must (then) be accepted that the eternal, partless *sphoṭa*, which permeates in every (sound) being pronounced and whose true nature is the sentence, is the cause of the cognition of meaning.].
[777] Although Śeṣakṛṣṇa and most of his successors, including Bhaṭṭoji, did not claim that *sphoṭa* is capable of signifying all levels of meaning, the situation changed by the time of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, who says otherwise at the very beginning of his SC. See under the section "§ 2. Defining *Sphoṭa*" in Chapter Two for the full excerpt and its translation.

expressiveness of meaning.[778] In his description, Mādhava uses the terms *arthapratyāyaka* (signifier of meaning) and *vācaka* [what expresses (meaning)] as modifiers of the term *sphoṭa*. It suggests that *sphoṭa's* expressiveness, as held by the grammarians, was not new to the writers on philosophy by the time the SDS was written. Also note that Mādhava explains in the same paragraph how *sphoṭa* ontologically differs from phonemes, just before he starts discussing *sphoṭa's* expressiveness. It is clear that he treats *sphoṭa's* expressiveness separate from its ontological distinction.

Moreover, the grammarians maintain the view that only an adventitious difference exists between *sphoṭa* and meaning. This could possibly be the strongest support for their position that *sphoṭa* is, at least largely, a semantic entity. Śeṣakṛṣṇa presents this view as follows.

> *tathā ca vācyasya ghaṭāder arthasya, vācakasya sphoṭasya bheda aupādhikaḥ. ata eva śabdārthayor abhedam ādriyante.* [779]

> Moreover, the difference between the signified, i.e., the meaning (of an entity) such as pot, and the signifier, i.e., *sphoṭa*, is limited by particular conditions. For that very reason, (the grammarians) honour the non-difference between *śabda* (i.e., the signifier *sphoṭa*) and *artha* (i.e., meaning).

We saw in Chapter Two that, in the view of the later grammarians, the metaphysical foundation provided by the Advaita system is not

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[778] Cinnam Bhaṭṭa alias Chenu Bhaṭṭa (c. 1400), a Naiyāyika, to whom some ascribe the SDS because Cinnam Bhaṭṭa's teacher, Vidyāraṇya, is widely identified with Mādhava, quotes from the SDS as follows, referring to the grammarians' view on *sphoṭa's* expressiveness. *Prakāśikā* commentary on TBh of Keśavamiśra, section 62 (*śabda* chapter in the *pūrvabhāga*), p. 165: "*tasmād varṇānāṃ vācakatvānupapattau yadbalād arthapratipattiḥ sa sphoṭaḥ. varṇātirikto varṇābhivyaṅgyo 'rthapratyāyako nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭa iti tadvido vadanti*." [Therefore, since there is no expressiveness of phonemes, *sphoṭa* is that due to the power of which the cognition of meaning (arises). Those conversant with it know that the eternal *śabda*, which is different from phonemes (but) manifested by phonemes (and) signifies meaning, is *sphoṭa*.].

[779] STNśk 11.

mandatory to defend the non-difference between the signifier and the signified. Nonetheless, such a foundation was considered essential until the late grammarians proved otherwise. *Sphoṭa's* identity with meaning can accordingly be asserted from the perspectives of both the Advaitic *vivartavāda* and the grammarians' theories of language. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's exposition of the *śabda-artha* identity reveals his position that *sphoṭa* is inherently associated with meaning as its sole signifier.

Moreover, IYER (1969: 162 - 163) says that it was Śeṣakṛṣṇa who clarified Bhartṛhari's explication of the "early vague cognitions" of *sphoṭa*. This observation also supports the fact that Śeṣakṛṣṇa treats *sphoṭa* as a semantic entity.

> "The early vague cognitions of the *sphoṭa*, their residual traces, and the cognition of the final sound have the same object, namely, the *sphoṭa*. What Bhartṛhari meant by early vague cognitions is not made clear in our texts [i.e., VP and MBhD][780] but perhaps he had something like Śeṣakṛṣṇa's idea of it. This comparatively late writer explains it in his *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* as follows."

The paragraph in the STN to which IYER points[781] is as follows.

> *tathā hi kamalam ity ukte kakāramakārānubhave 'pi kiṃ kamalīyaḥ sphoṭaḥ kamanīyo veti sandeho nāpagacchati tāvad, yāvan na caramo lo vā no vānubhūyate. tasmād īṣattvaṃ sandigdhatvaṃ, niścitatvam eva sphuṭataratvam*. [782]

> For it is like this. When the word "*kamala*" is uttered, even though the "*ka*-" and the "*-ma*-" phonemes have (already) been experienced, the doubt whether the *sphoṭa* is of "*kamala*" (i.e., lotus) or of "*kamana*" (i.e., beautiful) does not go away, as long as the final phoneme, either "*-la*" or "*-na*", is not experienced. Therefore, the

[780] Parenthetical insertion is mine.
[781] Quoted in IYER 1969: 458.
[782] STNśk 14.

slightness (of manifestation) (renders) uncertainty, (and) just the certainty (of manifestation) (renders) greater clarity.[783]

Śeṣakṛṣṇa presents the aforementioned elaboration in response to the objection that *sphoṭa* does not have distinct and indistinct states of manifestation. He concludes his response as follows.

> *etenānaṃśasya nikhilasāmānyaviśeṣavirahiṇaḥ sphoṭasya sphuṭāsphuṭāvabhāso na sambhavatīti nirastam. arthapratītyanurodhena tatkalpanasyāvidyakasyāvaśyakatvād iti*.
>
> With this is refuted (the view) that the appearance of the distinct and indistinct states (of the manifestation) of *sphoṭa*, which is partless and devoid of all the universal and particular (conditions), does not arise. This is because the hypothesis of them (i.e., the distinct and indistinct states of manifestation of *sphoṭa*), which is ignorance-born, is necessary through compliance with the comprehension of meaning (that changes from uncertainty to certainty).

Based on the above discussion, it is obvious that Śeṣakṛṣṇa is well informed of the semantic role *sphoṭa* plays in signifying meaning. Any meaning remains vague and lacking perfection in proportion to its *sphoṭa* being deficiently perceived. As Śeṣakṛṣṇa stresses, *sphoṭa*'s indistinct and distinct states, though hypothetical, should be assumed to be as such in compliance with our comprehension of meaning (*arthapratītyanurodhena*), because meaning has corresponding states of vagueness and clarity. In other words, just because we experience ambiguity as long as all sounds essential for conveying a certain expression are not experienced, and consequently certainty (*niścitatva*) of what we have heard is not achieved, we may hypothesise that the signifier *sphoṭa* also remains imperfectly manifested. Also note that Śeṣakṛṣṇa presents this position on the inherent relation between *sphoṭa* and meaning without resorting to the Advaitic metaphysics. It is, therefore, confirmed that *sphoṭa* is a semantic entity for Śeṣakṛṣṇa.[784]

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[783] The SSbh (p. 14) of Bharata Miśra also contains a similar explanation.

[784] Cf. Bharata Miśra's exposition in SSbh, pp. 21, 22.

The SSNV contains several *kārikās* that support the view that *sphoṭa* can be recognized as a semantic entity. For instance, with *kārikā* 49ab: "*śabdair arthābhidhānaṃ tu na vaidham iti sammatam* [It is, in fact, agreed that the meaning being expressed by words is not based on grammar rules], the author starts examining why *sphoṭa* as the only signifier (*vācaka*) of meaning must be admitted. In *kārikās* 115 and 116, the *śabdatattva* in the form of *sphoṭa*, which is provable through direct perception and assumption (*pratyakṣārthāpattipramāṇaka*), is distinguished from phonemes that are not capable of signifying meaning (*naivābhidheyāvabodhakāraṇam*). Again in *kārikās* 119, 120, and 121, the SSNV argues that the cognition of meaning arises only from the sentence, where *sphoṭa* rests. This view attests that *sphoṭa*, which has as its true nature only the sentence, is regarded as a semantic entity. Likewise, the SSNV *kārikās* 203 - 205 tell us how *sphoṭa*'s stages ranging from indistinctness to distinctness are related to meaning. This gradation of distinctness is associated with *sphoṭa*, not with meaning.[785] The view that the degree of manifestation of *sphoṭa* corresponds to the cognition of meaning indicates that *sphoṭa* is the signifier of meaning. The author of the SSNV appears, therefore, to have been well-informed of *sphoṭa*'s semantic significance, which he substantiates from the perspectives of *pratyakṣa*, *arthāpatti,* and *āgama*, by following his predecessors, i.e., Maṇḍana Miśra and Bharata Miśra.

All things considered, it is obvious that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita was not the first to have recognized *sphoṭa*'s significativeness. Rather, Śeṣakṛṣṇa might well have been the first grammarian to do so through an individual work on *sphoṭa*.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to the interpretation of *sphoṭa* has, therefore, to be appreciated in the sense that the STN was the first spark from a grammarian to kindle in fellow grammarians a renewed interest in their own philosophy of language in early modern Benares. None of the grammarians before him, including Kaiyaṭa, put together the grammarians' views on *sphoṭa* as a distinct theory of *śābdabodha* and a response to the rivals. In other words, before the STN was written, the grammarians' view on the *sphoṭa* doctrine had been presented only either

[785] SSNV, 205cd: "*asphuṭā sphoṭadhīr eva nārthadhīr iti tat smṛtam*." [It is taught that just the cognition of *sphoṭa* is indistinct, not the cognition of meaning].

in the opponents' critiques, such as in the NM of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, or in the non-grammarians' defences of it, such as in the SSm of Maṇḍana Miśra.

Most writers on *sphoṭa* after Śeṣakṛṣṇa were grammarians. Under the influence of the STN, their examination of *sphoṭa* depended less on Advaitic metaphysics. It can be imagined that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work achieved recognition as a recent authoritative work on *sphoṭa*, when the philosophy of language started reviving slowly in Benares from the first quarter of the 17th century. As we stated earlier, Nāgeśa quotes the 11th *kārikā* of the STN in his SV (*akhaṇḍasphoṭa* chapter, *kārikā* 14), around two centuries after Śeṣakṛṣṇa.[786] Śeṣakṛṣṇa's authority throughout the early modern literature on *sphoṭa* is, therefore, evident.

§ 6. The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*: A Textual Appraisal

Śeṣakṛṣṇa was a prolific writer. His works are mostly on the technical grammar of Sanskrit, but he also composed drama, *campū* poetry, and *Dharmaśāstra* works, as we discussed in detail in Chapter One. However, he is not known to have written more than one work on the philosophy of language, which is the STN. It is likely that, as was the case with Bhaṭṭoji, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was more interested in technical grammar. It is likely that the demand and patronage for the works on the philosophy of language were comparatively less. Once the philosophical issues related to language started attracting renewed attention for the numerous reasons examined above, including the pressure from the rival schools, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's STN would have been a timely defence of the grammarians'

[786] Some STN *kārikās* and portions of its commentary are found quoted in some modern works as well, but often without being referred to. For instance, a recent writer known as Lakṣmī Nṛsiṃha (d. 1887) in his *Bhāskarodaya* commentary (p. 124) on Niḷakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikāprakāśa* (*Śabda* chapter, section 59) borrows almost verbatim three sentences from the STN: (i) *na ca vanam iti buddher*°*… vācyam*" and (ii) "*tatraikadeśasyevātraika*°*… ananusandhānāt*" from STNśk 9, and (iii) "*yathā maṇikṛpāṇadarpaṇādau*°*… pratīyate*" from STNśk 11. Again Bhārgava Śāstrī in the first volume (of the first nine *āhnikas*), p. 18 of his MBh edition (1872) with the MBhP and the MBhPU quotes STN *kārikā* 8, but with a slightly different latter half. None of these authors refers to the STN or Śeṣakṛṣṇa.

position. We cannot, however, be certain whether the STN was a response to any specific author or work that had challenged the *sphoṭa* doctrine. This is because Śeṣakṛṣṇa addresses only the generic opponents of *sphoṭa*, and apparently the time at which he wrote it was not yet the peak of the tension. Perhaps, he was responding to a request from his students, who were curious to learn how the grammarians would respond to the opponents' vivid arguments on *śābdabodha* that were gaining ground.

The STN appears to have been written as a teaching manual. Given its format, organization of arguments, self-commentary, and the appendix, it is likely that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's intention was to teach his students the *sphoṭa* doctrine in only 19 mnemonic *kārikās*, clarifying the grammarians' stance on it "as it is in the tradition". The *kārikā* style suits a teaching manual. The author of the SSNV, possibly a contemporary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, also says in its penultimate *kārikā* (244) that he composed his work in verse so that students can learn the *sphoṭa* doctrine easily. Śeṣakṛṣṇa's self-commentary (STNśk) elaborates on what he succinctly says in the *kārikās* by citing pertinent sections of the authoritative texts on *sphoṭa*.[787] The *padaprakriyā* and the *vākyaprakriyā*, which contain the Nyāya view of how the perceptions of a word and a sentence arise and Śeṣakṛṣṇa's refutation of it, appear to be almost an appendix. Perhaps they were later additions but we do not have evidence to confirm. They do not bear on the main topic of the STN.

As regards the organization of topics, Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not divide his work into chapters. Unlike Bharata Miśra and the author of the SSNV, who examine *sphoṭa* from three approaches, i.e., *pratyakṣa*, *arthāpatti,* and *āgama*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa follows a style of interconnected arguments throughout the text. It is noteworthy that the only support for *sphoṭa*'s legitimacy he provides (STNśk 19) from *āgama* is limited to a half-verse from the *Śāradātilakatantra* (1.1). Textual evidence from Vedic literature, to which all of his predecessors resort in interpreting *sphoṭa*, has not been Śeṣakṛṣṇa's interest, perhaps because of his lack of enthusiasm to defend the *sphoṭa* doctrine with support from outside linguistics. The SSbh and the SSNV are, therefore, different from the STN in terms of

[787] For the authoritative writers and their works that Śeṣakṛṣṇa cites in the STN, see section 4.3 of Introduction.

their structure and emphasis on scriptural evidence in particular. Again, in comparison with his arguments related to the *arthāpatti* approach, Śeṣakṛṣṇa places more emphasis on the defence of *sphoṭa* from the *pratyakṣa* approach.[788] It also shows his inclination for discursive reasoning grounded in linguistic theories. Furthermore, the first eight *kārikās*, nearly half of the STN, are dedicated to refuting phonemes as signifiers of meaning. The opponents' claims he refutes there include (i) the capacity of phonemes to signify meaning, (ii) the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of phonemes as proof of their eternality, and (iii) the sequence of the articulated phonemes in the memory of them. As regards the overall distribution of arguments, Śeṣakṛṣṇa prioritizes the refutation of *pūrvapakṣas* over highlighting the grammarians' arguments for *sphoṭa*'s legitimacy.

It is highly likely that, when composing the STN, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was aware of the contemporary strides of the interpretation of *sphoṭa*. Nevertheless, he neither criticises nor accepts them explicitly. Nor is he hurried to respond to them, apparently because he valued a terse presentation that would adequately cover the subject matter of his work. Rather, Śeṣakṛṣṇa revisited the *sphoṭa* doctrine to show how the grammatical tradition could construe it, and faithfully presented it in such a way that the reader is not forced to admit the Advaita doctrines in order to comprehend *sphoṭa's* function. As discussed above in reference to IYER's (1969: 162 - 163)[789] observation, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was successful in so doing, even making some points clearer than his predecessors. Consequently, the STN deserves recognition as the first individual work which was focused on the classical exposition of the *sphoṭa* doctrine and composed by a grammarian.

The STN follows the conventional style of argumentative discourses in the genre of philosophy. The analogies and the examples used in it are all "*mūrdhābhiṣiktas*" (lit. sprinkled on the head), i.e., those declared as

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[788] Consider, for instance, STNśk 9: "*na kalpayāmy ahaṃ sphoṭaṃ, pratyakṣam eva tv enam avagacchāmi. tathā hi gaur ity ekaṃ padaṃ gām ānayetyādy ekaṃ vākyam iti sarvajanasiddho'yam anubhavo nāpahnavanīyaḥ*". [I do not assume *sphoṭa* but perceive it directly. For it is like this. This experience, apprehended by all people, "cow" is one word, "bring the cow" etc. is one sentence, must not be denied.]

[789] IYER refers to Śeṣakṛṣṇa's explication of *sphoṭa's* gradation of manifestation (*abhivyaktitāratamya*) in STNśk 14.

authoritative/ accepted unanimously, as Patañjali calls them in the MBh (*Paspaśāhnika* 1. 1. 57. 1). Śeṣakṛṣṇa also sticks to the common style of reasoning in the *śāstras*, i.e., presenting the opponents' view (*pūrvapakṣa*) first, refuting it by counterarguments (*uttarapakṣas*), and then arriving at a conclusion (*siddhānta*). It is observed that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's argumentation with *uttarapakṣas* does not depend solely on the evidence from the authoritative texts on grammar. He refers even to the opponents' texts if they lend support to the points he asserts. For instance, consider Vācaspati Miśra's words in NVTṬ 2. 2. 57 which Śeṣakṛṣṇa invokes in STNśk 6 as a proof for the incapability of memory traces to raise the memory of anything other than that which is the object of their producer, i.e., the act of experiencing. Likewise, the opening and the concluding verses comply with normal Sanskrit conventions. His sarcastic tone in criticising the approaches of other systems to *sphoṭa* is evident in his wording at some places.[790]

Does the STN show any dependence on the earlier authoritative literature on *sphoṭa* for justifying the *uttarapakṣas*? It does, but only limitedly. The sources of the *uttarapakṣas* are often left unmentioned. Notably, Śeṣakṛṣṇa does not rely much on the VP as a source, since he quotes from it[791] only once (STNśk 13) in order to vindicate the view that not only the final phoneme of a linguistic expression but also the preceding phonemes are essential in the process of manifesting the *sphoṭa*. Similarly, he does not refer[792] to Maṇḍana Miśra by name, whose SSm was commented upon by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara (c. 1410) around a century before Śeṣakṛṣṇa and taken to be authoritative even by Śeṣakṛṣṇa's junior contemporaries, Bharata Miśra and the author of the SSNV. The lack of references to the earlier authorities might perhaps be because, as a grammarian, he was more interested in defending the *sphoṭa* doctrine from a linguistic perspective.

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[790] Consider, for instance, STNsk 19: "°*pratyakṣāpalāpināṃ tattatsvasiddhāntaśraddhā-vyāmohāpasmāriṇām*" [(as in the view) of those who evade (a fact that is) directly perceivable (by everybody) and who are convulsing (lit. epileptic) owing to being confused by confidence in various theories of their own.].

[791] VP 1. 86.

[792] However, he borrows the first half of the 23rd *kārikā* of the SSm to compose STN 16, without acknowledging the source.

We can believe that the STN exerted considerable influence on contemporary and later writers on the philosophy of language, especially the grammarians, at least insofar as it drew their attention back to *sphoṭa*. There is no clear textual evidence to confirm it, but Bhaṭṭoji was probably aware of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's views on *sphoṭa*, and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa might have studied the STN in preparing their works on the *sphoṭa* doctrine. Clearly, after the STN, the interpretation of *sphoṭa* among the grammarians grew faster, since Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, and later Nāgeśa, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin, and perhaps Bhairava Miśra, who were all grammarians just within two centuries, contributed in different proportions to examine the *sphoṭa* doctrine.

Conclusion

The following conclusions can be drawn from the present study.

The alleged lineal connection between Rāmacandra, author of the *Prakriyākaumudī*, and Śeṣakṛṣṇa is unacceptable. The Śeṣas, whose fame as grammarians in early modern Benares was firmly established with Śeṣakṛṣṇa's works, were a distinguished family among the Brahmin migrants from Mahārāṣṭra. Rāmacandra's family from Andhra was either an early offshoot of the Mahārāṣṭrian Śeṣa lineage or an entirely different family.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's literary career was multifaceted. His works included dramas, poems, and treatises on Hindu law, but his compositions on technical grammar outnumbered them. The *Prakāśa* commentary he wrote on Rāmacandra's *Prakriyākaumudī* witnesses his mastery of technical grammar. Among his available works, the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* is the only work exclusively on the philosophy of language. More obviously than any other Śeṣa descendent, Śeṣakṛṣṇa suffered criticism either out of intellectual rivalry or perhaps for other reasons as well. His dramatic work titled *Kaṃsavadha* contains some hints at the view that he was criticised during his lifetime and not just on his positions on technical grammar. Despite being criticised, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's authority on grammar and judicial administration of Brahmins in Benares was prominent, while his descendants were able to maintain it for generations.

The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* is a terse treatise, seemingly a teaching manual, which presents the classical exposition of the *sphoṭa* doctrine from the perspective of the later grammarians. In the light of its content and style, we can conclude that it was not intended to serve as a response to any specific contemporary critique but to the generic opponents of *sphoṭa*. The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* shows no obvious dependence on earlier works directed explicitly to *sphoṭa*. It suggests that Śeṣakṛṣṇa

wanted to revisit the *sphoṭa* doctrine as a grammarian, without resorting to Advaita metaphysics for defending it. Accordingly, his work should be recognized as the first complete, discrete presentation of a linguistic construal of *sphoṭa* by a grammarian. Moreover, no precise interrelation can be recognized between the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* and the two other contemporary works on *sphoṭa*, i.e., the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Bharata Miśra and the *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* of an anonymous author. Nevertheless, the influence of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's examination of *sphoṭa* on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's works is evident. A *kārikā* from the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* quoted in Nāgeśa's *Sphoṭavāda* implies that Śeṣakṛṣṇa's was an authoritative work throughout the early modern era.

The later grammarians' renewed interest in the *sphoṭa* doctrine was not accidental. They focused principally on repurposing Pāṇinian grammar for easier teaching and making the *Mahābhāṣya* more accessible by writing subcommentaries on Kaiyaṭa's *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*. The Mīmāṃsakas had an influential authority on the philosophy of language through their involvement in interpreting the Vedic and Dharmaśāstric texts to the extent that they overshadowed even the grammarians' theories of *śābdabodha*. For instance, the *Gopālikā* commentary by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara on the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra, the most recent work on *sphoṭa* before Śeṣakṛṣṇa, contained a pro-Mīmāṃsā interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. The debate between a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṃsaka, and a grammarian portrayed in Anantadeva's *Kṛṣṇabhakticandrikā* also reveals the Mīmāṃsaka dominance over the interpretation of *śābdabodha* and the weakness of the grammarians' position that depends only on technical grammar. Furthermore, the spread of the Navya Nyāya techniques and idiom posed a new challenge to philosophers and grammarians to present the interpretations of *śābdabodha* analytically. The context in which Śeṣakṛṣṇa's work emerged was therefore predominantly characterized by the pressure of the rival schools.

A number of other reasons, such as the great Advaita - Dvaita conflict, debate over the legitimacy of Sanskrit in use, the fast-spreading Bhakti movement, and attempts towards elevating the Hindu Dharma and scholarship, and safeguarding the caste system seem also to have prompted, in diverse proportions, later grammarians to revisit their tradition from renewed viewpoints. Because Śeṣakṛṣṇa flourished on the

eve of most of these trends, events, and campaigns, he seems to have been less affected by them than were Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa. It was, imaginably, during the last phase of Śeṣakṛṣṇa's intellectual life that the grammarians dynamically moved on to respond to their opponents' pressure concerning philosophical insights into language. Nevertheless, by re-presenting the classical exposition of the *sphoṭa* doctrine and, more importantly, by inspiring more grammarians to revisit it, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was certainly an early pioneer in the revival. Consequently, the grammarians' interpretation of the *sphoṭa* doctrine began a new journey with Śeṣakṛṣṇa. It continued with Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, differing at some points with Nāgeśa and considerably with Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin. For instance, Nāgeśa in the *Sphoṭavāda* substantially re-incorporated the metaphysical foundation of the interpretation of *sphoṭa*, while in his *Sphoṭacandrikā* Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa broadened the scope of meaning signified by *sphoṭa* so as to include suggested meaning (*vyaṅgyārtha*), explained how *sphoṭa* becomes manifested even by corrupt speech (*apaśabda*), and introduced subcategories of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*.

Among the stages of development through which the interpretation of *sphoṭa* advanced there stands out the heightened emphasis on *sphoṭa's* semantic significance over its ontological status, which is associated with metaphysics. To separate *sphoṭa* from its Advaitic associations was apparently challenging for the later grammarians. This was because, unlike the physical, articulated sounds that their opponents claimed to be significative, *sphoṭa* is interpreted as resting in the cognitive aspect of the mind. This very internality of *sphoṭa* supports the grammarians' contention that nothing other than *sphoṭa* is the signifier of meaning. As obvious from the *sphoṭa* literature prior to him, Śeṣakṛṣṇa was not the first exponent of *sphoṭa* to have recognized and emphasized its expressiveness (*vācakatva*/ *arthapratyāyakatva*), the key characteristic of *sphoṭa* as a semantic theory. Nonetheless, his work, as the first treatise directed just to *sphoṭa* by a grammarian, was an important initiative to attract the later grammarians' attention to it.

Śeṣakṛṣṇa's contribution to the interpretation of *sphoṭa* and thereby to the grammarians' philosophy of language has to be recognized in reference to his expertise, approach, audience, and the socio-intellectual context in which he wrote. Whereas the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (of Bharata Miśra) and the *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* were hardly different from Maṇḍana

Miśra's *Sphoṭasiddhi* in terms of their approach in defending *sphoṭa*, Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* clearly differed from all three of them due to its smaller emphasis on Advaita metaphysics and scriptural reasoning for endorsing *sphoṭa*'s ontic and semantic character. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, and Nāgeśa largely followed Śeṣakṛṣṇa's approach to the *sphoṭa* doctrine and secured the grammarians' authority on it thereafter. It is also observed that all who composed individual works on *sphoṭa* after Śeṣakṛṣṇa were apparently well-known grammarians. The *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* was thus a significant milestone not only in the exegetical literature on *sphoṭa* in the grammatical tradition but also in early modern intellectual history.

Since the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* was just the initial step towards the grammarians' resurrection of *sphoṭa*, it provides us with only part of the picture of how *sphoṭa* revived in early modern Benares. The chapters on *sphoṭa* in Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's works represent, in conjunction with other renewed philosophical insights into language, the resurrection of it in greater detail. In order to understand the complete picture, it would thus be essential to recognize the contribution of their defences of *sphoṭa* from the perspectives initially pointed out by Śeṣakṛṣṇa. Nāgeśa's and Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin's disagreements with some traditional views are equally important, since they represent the "new" intellectuals in the grammatical tradition.

Broadly speaking, we must place the interpretation of *sphoṭa* in corresponding temporal contexts in order to recognize its doctrinal twists through history. The present study has revealed that, despite the grammarians' unanimous recognition of the *Mahābhāṣya* as the original source of the *sphoṭa* doctrine and the *Vākyapadīya* as where it was developed in the light of Advaita metaphysics, the exposition of *sphoṭa* as a self-reliant theory of *śābdabodha* did not manifestly emerge until the early modern period. It would be wrong to claim that all the later grammarians after Śeṣakṛṣṇa interpreted *sphoṭa* equally. Our understanding of *sphoṭa*'s re-emergence in early modern Benares will also be incomplete until it is accompanied by a sufficient awareness of how the interpretation of related concepts of *śābdabodha* evolved. Consequently, the contribution of the later grammarians to the interpretation of *sphoṭa* and thereby to the philosophy of language can be evaluated only after each is pinpointed in intellectual history.

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Abbreviations

1. Monographs
(Indicated within brackets are the editions of the works used.)

A	*Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini [KATRE 1987]
AĀ	*Aitareya Āraṇyaka* [MITRA 1876]
AĀs	*Vedārthaprakāśa* commentary of Sāyana on **AĀ** [MITRA 1876]
AM	*Advaitamakaranda* of Lakṣmīdhara [ŚĀSTRĪ 2005]
AMr	*Rasābhivyañjikā* commentary of Svayaṃprakāśa Yati on **AM** [ŚĀSTRĪ 2005]
AP	*Apāṇinīyapramāṇatā* alias *Apāṇinīyaprāmāṇyasādhana* or *Parapakṣakhaṇḍana* of Melputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa [SARMA 1968]
AS	*Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī [ŚĀSTRĪ 1982]
ASlc	*Laghucandrikā* commentary of Brahmānanda Sarasvatī on **AS** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1982]
ĀTV	*Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana [ŚĀSTRĪ 1940]
ĀTVn	*Nārāyaṇī* commentary of Nārāyaṇācārya Ātreya on **ĀTV** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1940]
AVŚ	*Atharvaveda Saṃhitā* (*Śaunakīya* Recension) [DESHPANDE 2002]
Bhām	*Bhāmatī* commentary of Vācaspati Miśra on **BSśbh** **[**BĀKRE 1934]
BhāP	*Bhāgavata Purāṇa* [BANDYOPĀDHYĀYA 1830]
BhP	*Bhāṣāpariccheda* alias *Kārikāvalī* of Viśvanātha Tarkapañcānana/ Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya [ŚĀSTRĪ 1884]

BhPsm *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* autocommentary on **BhP** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1884]

BhPsms *Muktāvalīsaṅgraha* supercommentary of Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya Śāstrī on **BhPsm** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1884]

BraS *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ 1984]

BraSs Śaṅkhapāṇi's commentary on **BraS** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1984]

BS *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa [BĀKRE 1934]

BSśbh *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* alias *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya* and *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara [BĀKRE 1934]

ChA *Chando'nuśāsana* of Hemacandra [VELANKAR 1961]

ChAcc *Chandaścūḍāmaṇi* autocommentary of Hemacandra on **ChA** [VELANKAR 1961]

ChAp *Paryāya* gloss of an anonymous author on **ChA** [VELANKAR 1961]

DDV *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka* alias *Vākyasudhā* of Śaṅkara [NIKHILANANDA 1931]

Dhv *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana [ŚĀSTRĪ 1940]

DhvBP *Bālapriyā* supercommentary of Rāmaśāraka on **DhvL** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1940]

DhvL *Locana* commentary of Abhinavagupta on **Dhv** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1940]

DŚC *Dharmānubandhiślokacaturdaśī* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [KHISTE 1927]

KaṃV *Kaṃsavadha* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [DURGĀPRASĀDA and PARAB 1935]

KBC *Kṛṣṇabhakticandrikā* of Anantadeva I [Included in Grantharatnamālā 1890]

KP *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa [PARIKH 1959]

KPp *Pradīpa* commentary of Govinda Ṭhakkura on **KP** [ABHYAṄKAR 1911]

KPpu *Uddyota* supercommentary of Nāgeśa on **KPp** [ABHYAṄKAR 1911]

KPss *Saṅketa* supercommentary of Bhaṭṭa Someśvara on Māṇikyacandrasūri's commentary on **KP** [PARIKH 1959]

KV *Kāśikāvṛtti* of Jayāditya and Vāmana on **A** [SHARMA 1969 - 1985]

MBh *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali [KIELHORN 1880 -1885]

MBhD *Dīpikā* commentary of Bhartṛhari on **MBh** [ABHYANKAR and LIMAYE 1963]

MBhP *Pradīpa* commentary of Kaiyaṭa on **MBh** [JOSI 1987]

MBhPU *Uddyota* supercommentary of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa on **MBhP** [JOSI 1987]

MBhPud *Uddyotana* supercommentary of Annambhaṭṭa on the **MBhP** [NARASIMHACHARYA 1975]

MK *Mīmāṃsākutūhala* of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa [ŚĀSTRĪ 1987]

MM *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa & Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita [ŚĀSTRĪ 1912]

MS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* of Jaimini [NYĀYARATNA 1873]

MŚ *Māṇḍukī Śikṣā* [BHAGAVADDATTA 1921]

MSśbh *Śabara Bhāṣya* on **MS** [NYĀYARATNA 1873]

MSśbh.bṛ *Bṛhatī* supercommentary of Prabhākara Miśra on **MSśbh** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1936]

MU *Maitrī Upaniṣad* [COWELL 1935]

Nir *Nirukta* of Yāska [BHADKAMKAR 1918]

NirD Durga's commentary on **Nir** [BHADKAMKAR 1918]

NL *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha [TELANG 1923]

NM *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa [SUKLA 1936]

NŚ *Nāradīya Śikṣā* [BHISE 1986]

NSār *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña [ŚĀSTRĪ and ŚĀSTRĪ 1961]

NSM *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* autocommentary of Viśvanātha Tarkapañcānana/ Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya on **BhP** [JOŚĪ 1985: 173]

NyS *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama [JHĀ 1939a]

NySBh *Nyāyabhāṣya* commentary of Vātsyāyana on **NyS** [JHĀ 1939a]

NySvm *Nyāyasūcī* supercommentary of Vācaspati Miśra on **NySBh** [JHĀ 1939a]

NVTP *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* supercommentary of Udayana on **NVTṬ** [DVIVEDIN and DRĀVIḌA 1911]

NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* supercommentary of Vācaspati Miśra on the *Nyāyavārttika* commentary of Uddyotakara on **NyS** [TAILANGA 1898]

PāŚ *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* [GHOSH 1938]

PC *Padacandrikā* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [Unedited, Unpublished]

PDīp *Padārthadīpikā* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [PATAVARDHANA 1900]

PDS *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* alias *Praśastapādabhāṣya* of Praśastapāda [ŚĀSTRĪ and KAVIRĀJA 1925]

PDSnk *Nyāyakandalī* commentary of Śrīdhara on **PDS** [JHA 1916]

PDSv *Vyomavatī* commentary of Vyomaśiva on **PDS** [ŚĀSTRĪ and KAVIRĀJA 1925]

PHC *Pārijātaharaṇa Campū* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [DURGĀPRASĀDA and PARAB 1926]

PIŚ *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa [KIELHORN 1960]

PLM *Paramalaghumañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa [PANTA 1917]

PM *Prauḍhamanoramā* commentary of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita on **SiKau** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1934]

PMKh *Prauḍhamanoramākhaṇḍana* of Śeṣa Cakrapāṇi [DVIVEDI 1911]

PMKu *Prauḍhamanoramākucamardinī* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja [ŚĀSTRĪ 1934]

PrC *Prākṛtacandrikā* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [JHA and JHA 1969]

PraS *Prakriyāsarvasva* of (Melputtur) Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa [ŚĀSTRĪ 1931 - 1954]

PK *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra [TRIVEDI 1925, 1931]

PKv *Prasāda* commentary of Viṭṭhala on **PK** [TRIVEDI 1925, 1931]

PKśk *Prakāśa* commentary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa on **PK** [MIŚRA 1980]

PVR *Padavākyaratnākara* of Gokulanātha Upādhyāya [MIŚRA 1960]

PVRym *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* commentary of Yadunātha Miśra on **PVR** [MIŚRA 1960]

RG *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja [DURGAPRASAD and PARAB 1888]

RGmp *Marmaprakāśa* commentary of Nāgeśa on **RG** [DURGAPRASAD and PARAB 1888]

ṚV *Ṛgveda* [NOOTEN and HOLLAND 1994]

ṚVkh *Khila* (supplement) hymns of **ṚV** [SCHEFTELOWITZ 1906]

ŚĀŚ *Śūdrācāraśiromaṇi* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [KHISTE 1933 - 1936]

SC *Sphoṭacandrikā* of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin [NENE 1929]

ŚD *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda [ŚĀSTRĪ 1934]

ŚDar *Śāstradarpaṇa* of Amalānanda [BALASUBRAMANYAM and SASTRIGAL 1913]

ŚDīp *Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra [DRĀVIḌA 1916]

ŚDu Utpaladeva's commentary on **ŚD** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1934]

SDS *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* of Mādhava [ABHYAṄKAR 1924]

SDSda *Darśanāṅkura* commentary of Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyaṅkar on **SDS** [ABHYANKAR 1924]

SiKau *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita [NENE 1958 - 1963]

ŚK *Śabdakaustubha* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita [NENE and PUṆATĀMAKARA 1933]

SN *Sphoṭanirṇaya* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [JOSHI 1967]

SR *Sūktiratnākara* of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa [BHĀGAVATA 1999]

SSbh *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Bharata Miśra [SĀSTRĪ 1927]

SSm *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ 1931]

SSmgop *Gopālikā* commentary of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara on **SSm** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1931]

SSNV *Sphoṭasiddhinyāyavicāra* of an anonymous author [ŚĀSTRĪ 1917]

STN *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa [TRIPĀṬHĪ 1994]

STNśk *Vṛtti* autocommentary of Śeṣakṛṣṇa on **STN** [TRIPĀṬHĪ 1994]

ŚTT *Śāradātilakatantra* of Lakṣmaṇadeśika [BAKHŚĪ 1934]

ŚTTp *Padārthādarśa* commentary of Rāghava Bhaṭṭa on **ŚTT** [BAKHŚĪ 1934]

SuSaṃ *Suśruta Saṃhitā* [ŚĀSTRĪ 1954 - 1959]

ŚV *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa [RĀMAŚĀSTRĪ 1898]

ŚVpm *Nyāyaratnākara* commentary of Pārthasārathi Miśra on **ŚV** [RĀMAŚĀSTRĪ 1898]

ŚVubh *Tātparyaṭīkā* commentary of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa on **ŚV** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1971]

SV *Sphoṭavāda* of Nāgeśa / Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa [KRISHNAMACHARYA 1946]

SVs *Subodhinī* commentary of V. Kṛṣṇamācārya on **SV** [KRISHNAMACHARYA 1946]

TĀ *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* [MITRA 1872]

TarS *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa [ATHALYE 1930]

TarSd *Dīpikā* autocommentary of Annambhaṭṭa on **TarS** [ATHALYE 1930]

TarSnb *Nyāyabodhinī* commentary of Govardhana on **TarS** [ATHALYE 1930]

TB *Tattvabindu* of Vācaspati Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ 1936]

TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra [BHANDARKAR and KEDĀRANĀTHA 1979]

TBhP *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* commentary of Cinnam/ Chenu

	Bhaṭṭa on **TBh** [BHANDARKAR and KEDĀRANĀTHA 1979]
TBtv	*Tattvavibhāvanā* commentary of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara on **TB** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1936]
TBvs	*Viṣamasthala* gloss of Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī on **TB** [ŚĀSTRĪ 1936]
TC	*Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya [TARKAVĀGĪŚA 1910 - 1914]
TCd	*Dīdhiti* commentary of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi on **TC** [TARKAVĀGĪŚA 1910 - 1914]
TCdv	*Vivṛti* supercommentary of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya **TCd** [TARKAVĀGĪŚA 1910 - 1914]
TKK	*Tattvakaustubhakuliśa* of Setumādhavācārya [SHARMA 1957]
TP	*Tattvaprakāśikā* commentary of Vasanta Tryambaka Śevaḍe on **STN** [TRIPĀṬHĪ 1994]
TPŚ	*Taittirīya Prātiśākhya* [WHITNEY 1973]
TS	*Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita [JHA 1937 & 1939]
TŚ	*Tattvaśuddhi* of Jñānaghanapāda [ŚĀSTRĪ and RADHAKRISHNAN 1941]
TSkś	*Pañjikā* commentary of Kamalaśīla on **TS** [ŚĀSTRĪ and RADHAKRISHNAN 1941]
Vār	*Vārttika* commentary of Kātyāyana on **A** [MIŚRA 1997]
VBh-B	*Bṛhadvaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [PATAVARDHANA 1900]
VBhS	*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa [JOSHI 1939]
VBhSd	*Darpaṇa* commentary of Harivallabha on **VBhS** [JOSHI 1939]
VBhSp	*Parīkṣā* commentary of Bhairava Miśra on **VBhS** [JOSHI 1939]
VD	*Vṛttidīpikā* of Jayakṛṣṇa alias Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin [BHĀRADVĀJA 1930]

VP *Vākyapadīya Kārikā* of Bhartṛhari [*kāṇḍa* I: IYER 1966; *kāṇḍa* II: IYER 1983; *kāṇḍa* III part i: IYER 1963, part ii: IYER 1973]

VPbh *Vṛtti* autocommentary of Bhartṛhari / Harivṛṣabha on **VP** **[**IYER 1966]

VPhr *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* commentary of Helārāja on **VP** (*kāṇḍa* III) [Part i: IYER 1963, Part ii: IYER 1973]

VPvd *Paddhati* commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva on **VP** **(***kāṇḍa* I) **[**IYER 1966]

VPpr *Ṭīkā* Commentary of Puṇyarāja on **VP** (*kāṇḍa* II) **[**IYER 1983]

VSK *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā* alias *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* and *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇakārikā* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita [ĀNANDĀŚRAMA edition 1901]

VSLM *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa [UPĀDHYĀYA 1963]

VV *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra [ŚĀSTRĪ and DIKSITAR 1932]

YH *Yoginīhṛdaya* [KAVIRAJA 1963]

YS *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali [BABA 1990]

2. Manuscript Catalogues

ASIATIC *Descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the government collection under the care of the Asiatic society of Bengal*. Vol. VI. *Vyākaraṇa* MSS. Ed. Hara Prasad ŚĀSTRĪ. Kolkata: Asiatic Society. 2005 - 2006.

BÜHLER *A catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts contained in the private libraries of Gujarāt, Kāṭhiāvād, Kachchh, Sindh, and Khāndes*. Compiled under the superintendence of Georg BÜHLER. Bombay: Indu-Prakāsh Press. Fascimile 3, 1872. Fascimile 4, 1873.

BENDALL *Catalogue of the Sanskrit manuscripts in the British museum.* Ed. Cecil BENDALL. London: British Museum. 1902.

BHANDARKAR *Report on the search for Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay presidency during the years 1883 - 1884*. Ed. Ramkrishna Gopal BHANDARKAR. Bombay: Government Central Press. 1887.

BORI *Descriptive catalogue of the government collections of manuscripts deposited in the Bhandarkar oriental research institute*. Ed. Shripad Krishna BELVALKAR et al. Pune: Deccan College, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1916 - <1997>.

CC *Catalogus catalogorum: an alphabetical register of Sanskrit works and authors*. Ed. Theodor AUFRECHT. Leipzig: German Oriental Society. 1891.

EGGELING *Catalogue of the Sanskrit manuscripts in the library of the India office*. Ed. Julius EGGELING et al. London: State for India in Council. 1887 - 1935.

LEIPZIG *Katalog der Sanskrit-Handschriften der Universitats-Bibliothek zu Leipzig*. Ed. Theodor AUFRECHT. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz. 1901.

MADRAS *A triennial catalogue of manuscripts collected during the triennium 1910-11 to 1912-13 for the government oriental manuscripts library, Madras*. Eds. M. RANGACHARYA and S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI. Vol. 1, part 1, Sanskrit, A. Madras: Government of Madras. 1913.

NOTICES Notices of Sanskrit MSS. First series, Ed. Rajendralala MITRA. 1871 - 1895. Second series,

Ed. Haraprasad ŚĀSTRĪ. Published under orders of the government of Bengal. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press. 1900 - 1907.

NCC *New catalogus catalogorum: an alphabetical register of Sanskrit and allied works and authors*. Ed. Venkatarama RAGHAVAN et al. Madras: University of Madras. 1949 - <2014>

OPPERT *Lists of Sanskrit manuscripts in private libraries of southern India*. Two volumes. Ed. Gustav S. OPPERT. Madras: Printed by E. Keys, at the Government Press. 1880 - 1885.

OUDH 1876 *A list of Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Oudh: during the year 1876*. Prepared by John C. NESFIELD, assisted by Devi PRASADA. Ed. Rajendralala MITRA. Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press Company. 1878.

OUDH 1885 *A catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Oudh for the calendar year 1885*. Compiled by order of government by Devi PRASADA. Allahabad: N. W. P. and Oudh Government Press.

PETERSON *On a search for Sanskrit manuscripts with an index of books*. Ed. Peter PETERSON. Bombay: Society's library; London: Trubner and Company. 3 Parts. 1884 - 1886.

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