Conference item
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
- Abstract:
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We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. e markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given prior distributions on the agents’ valuations of the items, but not the actual valuations; thus the aim is to maximise the expected social welfare over these distributions. As in previous work, we ar...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Association for Computing Machinery Publisher's website
- Host title:
- EC'17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- Journal:
- EC'17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Journal website
- Pages:
- 591-608
- Publication date:
- 2017-06-20
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-04-20
- DOI:
- ISBN:
- 9781450345279
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:691609
- UUID:
-
uuid:39bdac0a-878c-4414-884e-379e34f8aa6c
- Local pid:
- pubs:691609
- Source identifiers:
-
691609
- Deposit date:
- 2017-04-28
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Association for Computing Machinery
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
-
© ACM 2017. This article was presented at EC'17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (26-30 June 2017: MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA).
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from ACM at: [10.1145/3033274.3085128]
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