

A LEADER WITHOUT FOLLOWERS?  
EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS WITH  
CHINA AND INDIA ON CLIMATE CHANGE,  
1990–2009

Diarmuid Torney  
St Antony's College, University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in  
International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the  
University of Oxford

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**ABSTRACT**

The EU has, for a long time, portrayed itself as an international leader on climate change. Previous studies have tended to focus on the characteristics of EU leadership, but have failed to examine the extent to which EU leadership generates “followership”. Going beyond these existing approaches, this dissertation analyzes not just EU attempts at leadership but also the response of two potential followers: China and India. Based on extensive fieldwork, the dissertation explains the pattern of EU engagement and the response to engagement in each case, and makes three key arguments. First, EU engagement was driven by a desire to build the international role of the EU, but also from 2000 onwards in particular by growing normative concern and material interest within the EU regarding combating climate change. The development of engagement was also conditioned by the broader development of EU relations with China and India. Second, EU engagement took the form of institutionalized dialogue and capacity-building projects. These were generally more extensive in the EU-China case; the EU-India relationship was significantly more limited. Both cases were characterized by a lack of EU capacity—particularly the EU-India case—and to some extent by inconsistency and incoherence. Third, the Chinese Government responded through limited normative emulation and limited but growing lesson-drawing through bilateral cooperation in specific sectors. While the Indian Government also responded through limited normative emulation, the principal Indian response was resistance. Moreover, both the Chinese and Indian Governments resisted the EU approach to the international climate change negotiations. This pattern of engagement and significant resistance stemmed partly from the EU’s failure to develop sufficient capacity for effective engagement, but also partly due to significant differences in the way each side has framed the issue of climate change. Based on these findings, the dissertation concludes that while the EU was not entirely a leader without followers, it has acted as a highly restricted leader in its relations with China and India on climate change.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have accumulated very many debts—both personal and intellectual—over the course of the long journey towards completing this dissertation. The process of writing has been supported and facilitated by the very supportive and attentive supervision of Hartmut Mayer, without whom the project would not have come to fruition. I also had the good fortune to work with Andrew Hurrell, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Benito Müller, and Sarah Percy at earlier points of my academic career in Oxford.

Without the encouragement and support of my principal mentor at University College Dublin, Niamh Hardiman, I would never have come to Oxford in the first place. I have also been challenged and inspired by many other excellent teachers, including Iseult Honohan and Brigid Laffan at University College Dublin and, at Newpark Comprehensive School, Orna Lavin and James Ryan, the latter of whom first sparked my interest in politics.

Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without the financial support of the National University of Ireland, the Economic and Social Research Council, the University of Oxford Prendergast Bequest, the Cyril Foster Travel Funds of the Department of Politics and International Relations, the St Antony's College Carr & Stahl Travel Funds, and the Universities' China Committee in London. Furthermore, I benefited from the institutional support of the Geary Institute at University College Dublin, the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Geneva), and the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (Delhi).

In the writing and final editing of this dissertation, I have been greatly helped by the assistance of Alan Torney, Kathy Torney, Harry Torney, Naomi Conrad, Lea-Frederike Neubert, Miriam Bradley, Julia Fox, Elizabeth Devine, Conor Little, and Stephen Dineen. In terms of substance, my understanding of global environmental politics has been

developed by many interesting conversations with Sandeep Sengupta and Nina Hall in particular. I have learned a great deal about International Relations more generally from the many friends and colleagues whom I have had the good fortune to meet in Oxford, and St Antony's College provided a stimulating environment in which to learn more about international affairs.

I have met many wonderful people in Oxford who have made the demanding and often difficult process of writing a DPhil that bit easier. Naomi Conrad, Lea-Frederike Neubert, Nina Hall, Charlotte Bruckermann, and Elisabeth Becker deserve special mention. Without their friendship I would not have made it through the more difficult times in Oxford.

The most important support of all, however, has been provided by my family. My sister and brother, Kathy and Alan, have been role models and a constant source of support for as long as I can remember. Most of all, my parents have provided unconditional love, and have supported me in everything I have done. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AGCC	Action for a Global Climate Community
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AR4	Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AWG-KP	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention
BAP	Bali Action Plan
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India China (UNFCCC negotiating group)
BCM	Bilateral Consultation Mechanism
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CER	Certified Emission Reduction
CFC	Chlorofluorocarbon
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMA	Chinese Meteorological Administration
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
CO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP	Conference of the Parties
COP/MOP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
CPR	Centre for Policy Research
EAP	Environment Action Programme

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EEAS	European External Action Service
EBTC	European Business and Technology Centre
EC	European Community
ECCP	European Climate Change Programme
EEC	European Economic Community
EEP	EU-China Energy and Environment Programme
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
EU-ETS	European Union Emission Trading Scheme
G77	Group of 77
G8	Group of 8
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IGEN	Indo-German Energy Programme
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the UNFCCC
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IRADe	Integrated Research and Action for Development
IREDA	Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
JI	Joint Implementation
JNU	Jawaharlal Nehru University
JUSSCANNZ	Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand (UNFCCC negotiating group)
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MES	Market Economy Status
MRV	Measurement, Reporting, and Verification
MW	Megawatt

NAPCC	National Action Plan on Climate Change
NCCP	National Climate Change Programme
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NZEC	Near Zero Emissions Coal
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRC	People's Republic of China
SDRC	State Development and Reform Commission
TERI	The Energy and Resources Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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# Introduction: A Leader without Followers?

On the afternoon of 18 December 2009, the leaders of the United States, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa met behind closed doors to negotiate the text of the “Copenhagen Accord”, the three-page text which emerged as the sole outcome of the Copenhagen climate change conference.<sup>1</sup> US President Barack Obama, eager to return to Washington before the arrival of a forecast snow-storm, announced at a hastily-convened press conference that agreement had been reached, even before the document had been presented to most other delegations participating in the negotiations.<sup>2</sup> European leaders were left to react to an agreement that was finalized without their involvement.

The European Union (EU)<sup>3</sup> had pushed for a strong international agreement in these negotiations, with binding targets for national emissions reductions, a timetable according

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<sup>1</sup> For reports of the final negotiations, see BBC, 2009, “Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit”, BBC News website, 19 December 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm>, (accessed on 11 August 2011); and John M. Broder, 2009, “Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal”, The New York Times, 18 December 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/19climate.html?ref=environment>, (accessed on 11 August 2011).

<sup>2</sup> See The White House, 2009, “Remarks by the President During Press Availability in Copenhagen”, White House website, 18 December 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press-availability-copenhagen>, (accessed on 12 August 2011).

<sup>3</sup> Discussion of the European Union presents a difficulty in terms of terminology since, in areas of “Community competence” such as trade, it was—strictly speaking—the European Community (EC) which

to which those targets would have to be met, and robust enforcement and compliance mechanisms. The final text of the Copenhagen Accord, by contrast, contained only voluntary pledges of emission reductions or limitations and stripped out much of the substance of previous drafts prepared by a larger number of countries. The result was a strikingly minimalist final agreement which contrasted sharply with the EU's preferred approach to the global governance of climate change.<sup>4</sup>

That the EU was not involved in these final negotiations, either collectively or through one or more member states, and that the outcome differed so significantly from its preferred approach, came as a blow to Europe's self-image as a "climate leader". Indeed, European policymakers had, since the early 1990s, claimed a leadership role with respect to international efforts to combat climate change, and the past decade has seen an intensification of these claims. In the immediate aftermath, EU leaders could not hide their disappointment at the outcome. European Commission President José Manuel Barroso admitted that the agreement was "clearly below" the EU's goal, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that "the path toward a new agreement is still a very long one".<sup>5</sup> Andreas Carlgren, Environment Minister of Sweden which held the EU Presidency at the time of the summit, went as far as to describe it as a "disaster".<sup>6</sup> The Cancun (November–December 2009) and particularly the Durban (November–December 2009) climate change conferences saw the EU play a more prominent—and arguably more successful—role, but

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had international legal personality until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which conferred international legal personality on the EU. Furthermore, the EU was preceded by the "European Economic Community" (EEC) and then the "European Community" (EC). For simplicity, this dissertation will use the generic term "EU" to refer to all of these institutions, except where circumstances dictate that use of "European Community" or "European Economic Community" brings greater clarity.

<sup>4</sup> The text of the Copenhagen Accord is available as "Decision 2/CP.15" in UNFCCC, 2009, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009* FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010, pp. 4-9.

<sup>5</sup> Euractiv, 2009, "EU Looks Beyond 'Weak' Copenhagen Climate Deal", Euractiv website, 19 December 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/eu-looks-weak-copenhagen-climate-deal/article-188501>, (accessed on 8 June 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Justyna Pawlak, 2009, "EU Calls for More U.S. Involvement in Climate Works", Reuters website, 22 December 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BL21F20091222>, (accessed on 8 June 2010).

having spent the previous two decades proclaiming the EU's "leadership" role in this area, the Copenhagen experience has cast a long shadow over the EU's "climate leadership".<sup>7</sup>

The Copenhagen outcome in particular draws our attention once again to questions regarding the role and influence of the EU in global governance. According to some measurements, the EU collectively is a great power—it is the largest integrated market in the world and possesses a wealth of diplomatic and technical expertise and resources. Moreover, in some respects, the EU has always been a global actor—most notably in external trade policy, since the creation of a customs union automatically generates the need for a common commercial policy.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, particularly in the years leading up to 2009, the EU stepped up considerably its focus on climate change as an element of its broader external relations.

How can we understand the gap between the EU's self-proclamation as a "climate leader" and its seemingly limited external influence, and how should we conceptualize the nature and extent of EU leadership in this area? The EU's relationships with China and India on climate change present cases in which we can examine systematically the EU's ability to exercise international leadership on climate change. Both China and India are classified as developing countries under the climate change regime and, under current rules, are therefore exempt from greenhouse gas emission limitation commitments. Moreover, until the mid-2000s neither China nor India had developed comprehensive domestic climate


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<sup>7</sup> In its public response to the outcome of Copenhagen, published in March 2010, the Commission admitted that the outcome "fell well short of our ambitions". However, it argued that the level of support for the Accord showed that most countries are determined to tackle climate change, and that "[t]he task for the EU is to build on this determination, and to help channel it into action". European Commission, 2010, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: International Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen: Acting Now to Reinvigorate Global Action on Climate Change*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2010) 86 final, 9 March 2010, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> These included policy areas such as the Common Commercial Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, and the Common Fisheries Policy, among others. In such areas, the EU has always had a common foreign policy, and negotiations with third countries have typically been conducted by the Commission on the basis of a mandate from the Council.

change policy programmes. However, the greenhouse gas emissions of both countries are increasing rapidly.


**Figure 1.1**  
Share of Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions of EU, China, and India, 1990–2009



**Source:** Olivier, Jos G.J., Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, & Julian Wilson, 2011, *Long-Term Trend in Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: 2011 Report*, The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency & EU Joint Research Centre, p. 33.

Figure 1.1 above illustrates this trend over the period since 1990 and also shows that, over the same period, the relative current contribution of the EU has declined. Moreover, these trends are projected to continue over the medium term. Indeed, the lion's share of the projected increase in global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions over the period to 2035 are forecast under a “business as usual” scenario to occur in rapidly-emerging developing countries, particularly China and—to a somewhat lesser extent—India, a trend illustrated in Figure 1.2 below. While the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the EU and the United States are projected to decline slightly over the period to 2035, the emissions of China and India are projected to increase significantly.

**Figure 1.2**  
**IEA Projections for Growth of CO<sub>2</sub> from Fuel Combustion under “Business as Usual” Scenario by Country to 2035**



**Source:** International Energy Agency, 2010, *World Energy Outlook 2010*, Paris: International Energy Agency, Annex I.9.

Against this backdrop, the EU and others have sought to redefine the rights and responsibilities of industrialized and developing countries within the climate change regime so that “economically more advanced developing countries” would be required to limit the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions in the period after 2012. The EU also sought to persuade China and India to take domestic action to mitigate their emissions. These efforts have been institutionalized through the development of an “EU-China Partnership on Climate Change” and an “India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change”, launched respectively at the EU-China and EU-India summits in 2005.

## 1.1 Research Question

The discussion above identified a gap between the EU’s self-portrayal as a “climate leader”, and its relative inability to shape the global governance of climate change and the

<sup>9</sup> Projections for 2020, 2030, and 2035 in this chart are based on the IEA’s “Current Policies” reference scenario. “New policies” was the central scenario in *World Energy Outlook 2010*, but that scenario included all new climate policies announced up to 2010, including those announced in the lead-up to COP-15 and afterwards. Since the focus of this study is on the period prior to COP-15, the projection figures for the “Current Policies” scenario are used here.

behaviour of others. How can we explain this pattern of attempted leadership and response? Using the cases of EU engagement with China and India as instances of attempted leadership by the EU, the question which this dissertation seeks to answer is:

*To what extent, and under what conditions, has the European Union succeeded in exercising international leadership on climate change in its relations with China and India?*

While existing analyses have focused primarily on the characteristics and drivers of EU leadership, this research question seeks to shift focus towards a more holistic account of leadership which analyzes both the characteristics of the aspirant leader and the response of the purported followers. In other words, the dissertation seeks to build a relational account of leadership.

Any study of EU external relations needs to be clear about how it conceptualizes the EU as an actor in world politics. This study focuses on the attempt to develop relations at EU level with China and India on climate change. As such, it does not seek to examine the totality of the activities of the member states and Commission and aggregate them into some sort of holistic analysis. There are several reasons for limiting the scope of the study in this way. The first is practical: a fully comprehensive analysis of EU relations with both China and India on climate change, examining the role of the Commission and all active member states in this area,<sup>10</sup> would require several dissertations. Furthermore, the question of whether and to what extent the EU has been able to exercise leadership vis-à-vis China and India *at EU level* is interesting both theoretically and empirically. Individual member states' involvement in the multilateral negotiations, and in relations with China and India bilaterally, are included in the analysis only to the extent that they have helped or hindered the development of relations with China and India at EU-level.

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<sup>10</sup> Typically, practitioners identify France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands as the member states that are active in terms of relations with China and India on climate change policies.

Furthermore, the discussion focuses on the development of EU-China and EU-India political dialogue and cooperation projects, with a focus on relations between governments (and the EU institutions). As such, it largely excludes the activities of private European actors, such as clean-technology firms, in China and India except to the extent that their activities are actively facilitated by governments. The dissertation does not seek to identify a comprehensive typology of EU external relations instruments against which the evidence is compared.

The choice to study the nature and extent of EU leadership vis-à-vis China and India in a comparative framework might be challenged on the basis that they are too different to warrant comparison. However, the case selection is justified both on the basis of their growing contribution to global greenhouse gas concentrations but also, and more importantly, because they have been framed increasingly as “major emitters” by European policy-makers. Indeed, China and India differ significantly in key respects, including with respect to GDP per capita, and both aggregate and per capita greenhouse gas emission levels.<sup>11</sup> For this reason, Indian officials view as unfair the labelling of India as a “major emitter”. Nonetheless, both countries are significant and growing contributors to global emissions, as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 above illustrated. Moreover, what is particularly significant in justifying the choice of cases is not the objective similarities or differences in circumstances that characterize China and India, but how they are subjectively framed by European policy-makers. In this respect, there has been a tendency to group together China and India under the “major emitter” label. Other “emerging” developing countries sometimes included under this heading include Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, and

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<sup>11</sup> World Resources Institute, 2010, “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0”, World Resources Institute, <http://cait.wri.org/>, (accessed on 1 April 2011).

Indonesia.<sup>12</sup> However, the countries most frequently discussed in these terms are China and India.<sup>13</sup>

The time period analyzed in the dissertation is determined by the process of the formal intergovernmental climate change negotiations. The start date of this study, 1990, marked the commencement of the negotiations which led to the UNFCCC agreement. Institutionalized EU-China and EU-India bilateral relations on climate change were not established until 2005, but to give a more complete account, the analysis covers the period from 1990 onwards, though greater attention is focused in the empirical chapters on the period from 2005 onwards. The end date is chosen because the EU-China and EU-India relationships on climate change developed most significantly in the final period and were, in particular, focused on the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit.

The scope of the policy domain—climate change—is at the same time both very broad and very narrow. It is broad in the sense that policies in areas as diverse as trade, investment, conventional and renewable energy, natural resources, water, forestry, and industrial development could be considered to fall under this heading, since each of these areas has causes and consequences relating to climate change. On the other hand, the choice of focus is narrow because relations in these areas constitute a relatively narrow element of overall EU-China and EU-India relations. This dissertation focuses on those areas of engagement that have been specifically labelled as “climate change” by the EU in its relations with China and India. In practice, this comprises activities broadly within the framework of the

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<sup>12</sup> Various constellations of countries have been included in dialogue processes beyond the UNFCCC process. For example, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa were invited to participate in the “outreach” segments of the 2005 and 2007 Group of 8 summits to discuss climate change, among other issues.

<sup>13</sup> For example, the International Energy Agency’s flagship “World Energy Outlook” publication focused in 2007 on China and India. See International Energy Agency, 2007, *World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights* (Paris: International Energy Agency).

EU-China Partnership on Climate Change and the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change.

The nature of the research question dictates the type of research and analysis undertaken in this dissertation. It is not a work of pure diplomatic history, nor of pure theory development. Furthermore, it does not seek to use empirical case studies to test a particular theoretical or conceptual framework. Rather, the dissertation identifies and uses existing strands of the theoretical literature in International Relations to explore a phenomenon of interest in world politics. The nature of the research question drives the structure of this chapter and the rest of the dissertation. The analysis is driven by extensive fieldwork in China, India, and Europe, which generates the reflections in Chapter 7 on the extent and nature of EU leadership on climate change.

## 1.2 The Existing Literature

This dissertation contributes to, and draws upon, a number of different bodies of existing literatures. These include theoretical and empirical literature on EU external relations and particularly EU relations with China and India, on EU “leadership” with respect to climate change, as well as the broader literature on the global politics of climate change and environment. In the first instance, a significant body of literature has emerged in recent decades focused on the external relations of the EU.<sup>14</sup> Scholars have argued variously that the EU is a “civilian power”,<sup>15</sup> a “normative power”,<sup>16</sup> an “ethical power”,<sup>17</sup> or a “model

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<sup>14</sup> For a range of approaches, see for example Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White, 2004, *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (London: Sage); Christopher Hill, 1993, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3; Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 2011, *International Relations and the European Union*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen, 2003, *Understanding the European Union’s External Relations* (London: Routledge); Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, 2004, *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press); and Richard G. Whitman, 1998, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

<sup>15</sup> François Duchêne, 1972, “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, in Richard Mayne, ed., *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana); Jan Orbie, ed., 2008, *Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the*

power”.<sup>18</sup> Since the EU represents neither a classical state nor an international organization, a particularly prominent debate within this field has centred on the question of how to characterize the EU as an international actor. Building on earlier attempts to characterize the EU as a “presence”,<sup>19</sup> Jupile & Caporaso characterize the EU as “an evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays varying degrees of ‘actorhood’ across issues and time”.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly, Bretherton & Vogler characterize the EU as an “actor under construction” and seek to identify the internal and external factors which have permitted, promoted or constrained the development of the EU’s roles in global politics.<sup>21</sup> They argue in particular that EU actorness is influenced by three factors. The first factor is “opportunity”, which is the external context environment of ideas and events, and the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction. The second factor is “presence”, which they understand to be a “consequence of being” rather than purposive external action, and is determined by the character and identity of the EU and the external consequences of internal EU policies and priorities. The third factor is “capability”, which is determined by (i) shared commitment to a set of overarching values, (ii) the domestic legitimation of external policies, (iii) the ability of the EU to formulate policies which is determined in turn by the

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*European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate); and Mario Telò, 2006, *Europe, A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, 2007, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe”, in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge); Zaki Laïdi, 2008, *Norms Over Force: The Enigma of European Power* (New York ; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); and Ian Manners, 2002, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Lisbeth Aggestam, 2008, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?”, *International Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Mario Telò, ed., 2009, *The European Union and Global Governance* (Abingdon: Routledge).

<sup>19</sup> David Allen and Michael Smith, 1990, “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Joseph Jupile and James A. Caporaso, 1998, “States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics”, in Carolyn Rhodes, ed., *The European Union in the World Community* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 214.

<sup>21</sup> Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, 2006, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge), p. 13.

degree of consistency between the EU-level and member state activities, and coherence between different spheres of EU policies, and (iv) the availability of policy instruments.<sup>22</sup>

More recent scholarship has sought to assess the actorness of the EU specifically in the international climate change negotiations. Groenleer & van Schaik have argued that the EU exhibits a surprisingly high degree of actorness in the climate negotiations, given the intergovernmental basis of the EU's participation in this arena. While this conceptual framework is not utilized in its entirety in this study, the dissertation does seek to answer some of the core questions posed by the literature on the EU as an international actor, in particular relating to the changing external opportunity structure facing the EU, and the question of EU capabilities.

A more specific strand of the literature on EU external relations has attempted to conceptualize the role of the EU as an international actor on climate change, and in global environmental politics more generally, in terms of leadership. This builds on an earlier generation of scholarship which sought to conceptualize "leadership" in global politics, and attempted to specify the conditions under which leadership matters for international outcomes.<sup>23</sup> Of particular relevance in the current context is the issue of whether and how these authors conceptualized the relational dimension of leadership, that is, the relationship between leaders and followers. Some categories of leadership identified by these scholars involved a strong link between leader and the target of leadership and a purposeful effort on the part of the leader to influence other actors. Young's "structural leadership" and Underdal's "coercive leadership" are clear examples of this, since the leader strives hard to

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-35.

<sup>23</sup> Key contributors to this literature included Raino Malnes, Arild Underdal, and Oran Young. See Raino Malnes, 1995, "'Leader' and 'Entrepreneur' in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 1; Arild Underdal, 1991, "Solving Collective Problems: Notes on Three Modes of Leadership", in Willy Østreng, ed., *Challenges of a Changing World: Festschrift to Willy Østreng* (Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute); and Oran R. Young, 1991, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society", *International Organization*, vol. 45, no. 3.

alter the behaviour of others. Other categories of leadership involved a much less direct connection between leaders and purported followers. Underdal's "leadership through unilateral action", as the name suggests, involves a much less direct connection between leader and target of leadership.<sup>24</sup> In this regard, the clearest means of this type of leadership is where an actor solves a problem through its substantive impact, acting alone, in addressing the issue, what Underdal calls "leadership without followers". While this first generation of literature on leadership conceptualized different possible relationships between leaders and followers depending on the category of leadership under consideration, it was at least reasonably explicit on the nature of this relational dimension.

Building on these conceptual foundations, a second generation of leadership literature has sought to assess the nature and extent of EU international leadership in the area of climate change. Most prominent in this literature have been edited volumes by Gupta and Grubb, and by Wurzel and Connelly.<sup>25</sup> The former identifies three categories of leadership: "structural", which entails the use of material resources to change the incentives of other actors; "instrumental", which entails the use of diplomatic skills to create winning coalitions in multilateral negotiations; and "directional", which entails the use of ideas and domestic implementation to influence the perceptions of others of their interests.<sup>26</sup> Wurzel & Connelly use essentially the same three categories, though preferring the labels "entrepreneurial" instead of "instrumental", and "cognitive" instead of "directional".<sup>27</sup> They also add a fourth category of leadership, what they call "symbolic" leadership, which

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<sup>24</sup> Underdal, "Solving Collective Problems: Notes on Three Modes of Leadership", pp. 141-43.

<sup>25</sup> Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, eds., 2000, *Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?* (Dordrecht & London: Kluwer Academic); Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., 2010, *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>26</sup> Michael Grubb and Joyeeta Gupta, 2000, "Leadership: Theory and Methodology", in Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, eds., *Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?* (Dordrecht & London: Kluwer Academic), p. 23.

<sup>27</sup> Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel, 2008, "Environmental Policy: EU Actors, Leader and Laggard States", in Jack Hayward, ed., *Leaderless Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

involves “posturing by political actors which is not followed up with substantive policy measures action and/or the lack of implementation of the adopted policy measures”.<sup>28</sup>

However, this second generation of literature has paid less attention to the purported followers of the EU’s claimed leadership. Greater emphasis has been placed on explaining the factors underpinning the EU’s claims to leadership, the positions the EU has taken in the international negotiations, and the extent to which domestic climate policies have underpinned the EU’s claims to international leadership. Indeed, the categorization of the EU as a “leader” has been adopted somewhat problematically in this literature. That the EU has been characterized in these terms by EU policymakers should come as no surprise—and the EU is hardly alone in claiming this role. What is more surprising from a scholarly perspective is the degree to which this discourse of leadership is frequently replicated by scholars writing about the global roles of the EU in this area, with varying degrees of critical reflection. Oberthür and Roche Kelly, for example, review the “the phenomenon of EU leadership on climate change”, but they do not specify what qualifies as leadership behaviour, or why the EU should be thought of as a leader in this area.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Schreurs and Tiberghien set out to explain EU leadership on climate change, but while they discuss in brief some of the more analytical literature on leadership on EU climate change policy, they don’t specify exactly why EU policy-making qualifies as leadership, or whether EU leadership in fact has any followers.<sup>30</sup>

To some extent related to the issue of followership is the question of how the EU is perceived by external actors. In recent years, a strand of the literature on EU external

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 13. They also identify different leadership “styles”, namely “heroic” versus “humdrum” leadership, and “transformational” versus “transactional” leadership. However, the utility of these distinctions, especially relative to the complexity they add to the analytical framework of the volume, is somewhat doubtful.

<sup>29</sup> Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly, 2008, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges”, *The International Spectator*, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 35.

<sup>30</sup> Miranda A. Schreurs and Yves Tiberghien, 2007, “Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation”, *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 7, no. 4.

relations has begun to examine this question, and to what extent the EU's self-perception matches the perceptions of others.<sup>31</sup> This has provided a useful corrective to the previously strongly Eurocentric bias of the literature on EU external relations.<sup>32</sup> This literature has sought to shed light on a number of aspects of the EU's external relations, including assessing the degree to which the EU's supposed distinctiveness as a global actor is reflected in others' perceptions, and how external perceptions of the EU contribute to the process of European identity formation.<sup>33</sup>

Within this literature, a small number of studies have focused on perceptions of leadership in the climate change regime, and in particular on perceptions of EU leadership. One earlier study by Gupta and van der Grijp, using interviews with 67 interviews with climate change negotiators in 1997–98, found that there were no “clear-cut” or “confident” leaders in the negotiations, but that a number of countries played limited leadership roles.<sup>34</sup> The EU was viewed as playing a limited leadership role in terms of agenda-setting, norm development, adoption of the initiative, and pushing for stringent targets for greenhouse

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<sup>31</sup> See Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgström, and Martin Holland, 2006, “The European Union as Others See It”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 11, no. 2; Martin Holland, 2007, *The EU Through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand* (Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation); Sonia Lucarelli, 2007, “The European Union in the Eyes of Others: Towards Filling a Gap in the Literature”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 12, no. 3; Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti, eds., 2010, *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>32</sup> This literature results from a number of research projects: “The External Image of the European Union”, led by Sonia Lucarelli in the framework of the GARNET network; “External Perceptions of the EU” led by Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand; there are also more specific projects such as an EU FP7 project on “Chinese Views of the EU”, led by Wang Zhengxu, coordinated by the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham and involving a consortium of six institutions in the EU and China; and the NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the EU”, led by May-Britt U. Stumbaum at the Freie Universität Berlin, which focuses on “External views of the EU as a Civilian Power – India and China in Comparison”.

<sup>33</sup> Lucarelli, “The European Union in the Eyes of Others: Towards Filling a Gap in the Literature”; Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti, 2010, “Introduction: The EU in the Eyes of Others - Why Bother?”, in Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti, eds., *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>34</sup> Joyeeta Gupta and Nicolien van der Grijp, 1999, “Leadership in the Climate Change Regime: The European Union in the Looking Glass”, *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, vol. 2, no. 2.

gas reduction or limitation, though the EU was also perceived to be a hypocritical leader for a number of reasons.<sup>35</sup>

More recently, two studies have focused on perceptions of leadership among negotiators at COP-14<sup>36</sup> in Poznan, Poland in 2008. Karlsson *et al.* report, on the basis of a survey of 233 representatives of government, NGOs, business, the United Nations, and media, that “the European Union is the actor most commonly viewed as a leader on climate change as 62 percent of all respondents identify the EU as having a leading role in the climate change negotiations”.<sup>37</sup> However, there is no clear single leader on climate change: only 14 percent viewed the EU as the only leader. They also found that the EU is perceived as a leader particularly among respondents from Asia, Europe, North America, and Oceania.<sup>38</sup> In another study, Kilian & Elgström conducted interviews with both EU and non-EU participants at COP-14 to test more specifically for perceptions of the EU as fulfilling a leadership role.<sup>39</sup> They found that the EU is viewed, for the most part, as a coherent and credible actor from the outside and has a significant impact on the negotiations, and that “[t]here is unanimous agreement among third state representatives that the Union is still a leader in climate change, no matter whether the interviewee represents a developing or a

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<sup>35</sup> These included that the EU’s emissions reductions were seen to be the result of “good luck” rather than specifically climate change policies, and the EU had no sense of how the targets it was proposing would be achieved. *Ibid.* pp. 313-16.

<sup>36</sup> The 14<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change.

<sup>37</sup> Christer Karlsson, et al., 2011, “Looking for Leaders: Perceptions of Climate Change Leadership among Climate Change Negotiation Participants”, *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 96.

<sup>38</sup> Interestingly, they also found that China was perceived by many as playing a leadership role, particularly among respondents from Africa and Latin America.

<sup>39</sup> Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström, 2010, “Still a Green Leader? The European Union's Role in International Climate Negotiations”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 45, no. 3. This study was, however, based on a small sample of participants—11 non-EU and 4 EU. For a longer presentation of the findings of this research project, see Bertil Kilian, 2009, *A Genuine Green Giant? The European Union's Role as a Leader in International Climate Politics* (Lund: Lund University Department of Political Science).

developed country”. Moreover, they found that this view was affirmed by representatives of the United States, China, and Japan.<sup>40</sup>

A number of studies have focused specifically on Chinese and Indian perceptions of the EU as an environmental actor, and have reported broadly favourable perceptions of the EU in this regard. Vergeron reported that “the Chinese recognize that Europe has been ‘the champion and leader at the international level in combating climate change and pollution’”,<sup>41</sup> while Chan reports similarly that “the EU serves as a model for China in terms of its economic, social and environmental policies, areas in which the EU is seen as being a global leader and role model”.<sup>42</sup> A project led by the University of Nottingham on “Chinese Views of the EU” recently reported very positive perceptions of the EU’s role in environmental protection among a number of categories of Chinese elites. These ranged from a low of 71.6 percent positive perceptions among business representatives, to a high of 85.2 percent positive perceptions among government officials. Negative perceptions among elites ranged from 1 percent of government officials to 5.2 percent of “intellectuals”.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, the environment was generally not ranked as one of the most controversial issues in the EU-China relationship by Chinese elites, and was identified as an area where cooperation should be strengthened.<sup>44</sup>

While Indian perceptions have tended to be more mixed, Jain and Pandey nonetheless report that “The European Union was considered a normative power primarily because of its role in global climate negotiations and trade talks and described by some ‘elites’ as a major player in terms of agenda setting and regulating the norms of international

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<sup>40</sup> Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader? The European Union's Role in International Climate Negotiations”, p. 262.

<sup>41</sup> Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2007, *Contemporary Chinese Views of Europe* (London: Chatham House), p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Kenneth Chan, 2010, “Images, Visibility and the Prospects of Soft Power of the EU in Asia: The Case of China”, *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 140.

<sup>43</sup> Li Zhang, 2011, *Communicating the EU as an Environmental Actor to China: Raising EU's Profile in EU-China Environmental Cooperation* (Nottingham: The University of Nottingham China Policy Institute), p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

behaviour”.<sup>45</sup> While this does not necessarily indicate a positive view, they go on to state that while some Indian elites viewed the EU in negative terms in this regard, some viewed the EU as a leader in international politics.

However, it is not entirely clear what exactly this literature tells us about EU leadership and influence. The link between external perceptions of the EU and the influence of the EU beyond its borders has tended to be assumed rather than tested systematically. Indeed, the empirical contributions of the external perceptions literature have focused primarily on presenting the results of surveys, media analysis, and elite interviews, rather than systematically assessing the external impact of the EU in the light of how it is perceived from the outside. This assumption is problematic. Certainly, it is reasonable to assume that if other actors in the international system do not perceive the EU to be a significant actor or a “leader”, EU external influence is likely to be low. In other words, an external perception of the EU as a leader is a necessary but not sufficient condition for EU external influence, because *perceptions* of leadership tell us little about whether the perceived leader will be able to induce “followership” among other actors in the system.

In particular, there are two problems with trying to use the empirical findings of the external perceptions literature to say anything meaningful about the external influence of the EU. First, some of the data simply are not very relevant, particularly those based on public opinion surveys and media analysis. There is only a relatively indirect causal connection between public opinion and media framings of the EU in third countries, and EU influence in those countries. Second, questions regarding perceptions of the EU have tended to be asked in somewhat abstract terms, without seeking to link systematically perceptions of leadership with willingness on the part of other actors to follow. For this

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<sup>45</sup> Rajendra K Jain and Shreya Pandey, 2010, “The European Union in the Eyes of India”, *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 204.

reason, the literature on external perceptions of EU leadership gets us only part of the way towards answering the question of followership, since perception of leadership does not automatically equate with followership.<sup>46</sup> The analysis in this dissertation seeks to remedy some of these limitations in the external perceptions literature, by integrating an assessment of how the EU is perceived as an international actor on climate change with an assessment of the extent to which other actors have displayed a willingness to follow the leadership of the EU.

This dissertation also contributes to the growing empirical literature on EU relations with China and India. This literature has developed over the past decade roughly in accordance with the development of these relationships as empirical phenomena. While there were a limited number of earlier studies of EU-China relations in the 1990s and early 2000s,<sup>47</sup> the intensification of the relationship has led to a proliferation of studies which provided broad overviews of the EU-China relationship.<sup>48</sup> As well as these overview works, more specific areas of research have included particular areas of the relationship such as security relations,<sup>49</sup> engagement in Africa,<sup>50</sup> perceptions of the EU in China,<sup>51</sup> news media and EU-

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<sup>46</sup> Karlsson, et al., “Looking for Leaders: Perceptions of Climate Change Leadership among Climate Change Negotiation Participants”; Kilian, *A Genuine Green Giant? The European Union’s Role as a Leader in International Climate Politics*; Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader? The European Union’s Role in International Climate Negotiations”; Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson, 2010, “Climate Change and the European Union’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, no. 4.

<sup>47</sup> Richard L. Edmonds, 2002, *China and Europe Since 1978: A European Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Richard L. Grant, 1995, *The European Union and China: A European Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs); and Georg Wiessala, 2002, *The European Union and Asian Countries* (London: Sheffield Academic Press).

<sup>48</sup> Stanley Crossick and Etienne Reuter, eds., 2007, *China-EU: A Common Future* (Singapore & London: World Scientific); David Kerr and Fei Liu, eds., 2007, *The International Politics of EU-China Relations* (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press); Peter Ludlow, ed., 2007, *The EU and China* (Ponte de Lima, Portugal: European Strategy Forum); David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Hong Zhou, eds., 2008, *China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects* (London: Routledge); and Georg Wiessala, John Wilson, and Pradeep Taneja, 2009, *The European Union and China: Interests and Dilemmas* (Amsterdam: Rodopi).

<sup>49</sup> Frans-Paul van der Putten and Shulong Chu, 2011, *China, Europe, and International Security: Interests, Roles, and Prospects* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>50</sup> Christine Hackenesch, 2009, *China and the EU’s Engagement in Africa: Setting the Stage for Cooperation, Competition or Conflict?* (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik); Jing Men and Benjamin Barton, 2010, *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors?* (Farnham: Ashgate).

<sup>51</sup> Holland, *The EU Through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand*.

China relations,<sup>52</sup> and EU decision-making with respect to relations with China.<sup>53</sup> A number of works have also sought to place the EU-China relationship in a broader global strategic context.<sup>54</sup>

By contrast, much less has been written about the EU-India relationship. This corresponds to the fact that, empirically, the EU-India relationship has not broadened or deepened to the same extent as the EU-China relationship. The small number of books on the relationship have tended to be edited volumes and collections of conference presentations, mostly funded by the European Commission or European foundations.<sup>55</sup> One recent edited volume represents a somewhat more substantive and analytical—and also critical—contribution, but for the most part the literature on the EU-India relationship is extremely sparse.<sup>56</sup>

At a broader level, some research has focused on the more general EU-Asia relationship, focusing for example on the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process.<sup>57</sup> What is common to most of this literature on EU relations with China, India, and Asia more generally is its lack of substantive focus on relations on climate change policy. While the issue of climate change is frequently identified in this literature as an area in which cooperation could be developed in a more substantive manner, few studies have responded to this call.<sup>58</sup> Those

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<sup>52</sup> Li Zhang, 2011, *News Media and EU-China Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

<sup>53</sup> May-Britt U. Stumbaum, 2009, *The European Union and China: Decision-Making in EU Foreign and Security Policy Towards the People's Republic of China* (Baden-Baden: Nomos).

<sup>54</sup> Nicola Casarini, 2009, *Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Tuosheng Zhang, 2010, *US-China-EU Relations: Managing the New World Order* (London: Routledge).

<sup>55</sup> H. S. Chopra, 1998, *India and the European Union: Into the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs); Rajendra K Jain, ed., 2002, *India and the European Union in the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers); Rajendra K. Jain, ed., 2007, *India and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers).

<sup>56</sup> Shazia Aziz Wülbers, ed., 2008, *EU India Relations: A Critique* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation in association with EuroIndia Centre).

<sup>57</sup> Richard Balme and Brian Bridges, 2008, *Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); Bart Gaens, 2008, *Europe-Asia Interregional Relations: A Decade of ASEM* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, Bart Gaens, Juha Jokela, and Eija Linnell, eds., 2009, *The Role of the European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners* (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate).

studies that have focused specifically on EU relations with China and India on climate change have taken the form of a small number of journal articles, book chapters, and working papers. Thematically, these have focused on a range of topics, including general assessments,<sup>59</sup> the future potential of the relationship,<sup>60</sup> assessments of its limitations,<sup>61</sup> cooperation on carbon capture and storage and renewable energy,<sup>62</sup> and the role of NGOs in the relationship.<sup>63</sup> For the most part, these have been largely descriptive and, moreover, have frequently been forward-looking rather than reviewing the existing relationship.<sup>64</sup> A small number of think tanks have also worked on this topic.<sup>65</sup> The literature on EU-India relations on climate change is even more limited. Scholarly literature on the topic is non-

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<sup>59</sup> Xiudian Dai and Zhiping Diao, 2010, "Towards a New World Order for Climate Change: China and the European Union's Leadership Ambition", in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge); Pietro De Matteis, 2010, "EU-China Cooperation in the Field of Energy, Environment and Climate Change", *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, vol. 6, no. 4; and Duncan Freeman and Jonathan Holslag, 2009, *Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change* (Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies).

<sup>60</sup> Kerry Brown, 2007, "China and the Challenges of the Environment", in Peter Ludlow, ed., *The EU and China* (Ponte de Lima, Portugal: European Strategy Forum); François Godement, 2007, "China's Energy Policy: From Self-Sufficiency to Energy Efficiency", *The International Spectator*, vol. 42, no. 3; Constantin Holzer and Haibin Zhang, 2008, "The Potentials and Limits of China-EU Cooperation on Climate Change and Energy Security", *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2; and David Scott, 2009, "Environmental Issues as a 'Strategic' Key in EU-China Relations", *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2.

<sup>61</sup> Jonathan Holslag, 2010, "China's Scepticism of Clean Energy Champion Europe", *The International Spectator*, vol. 45, no. 1.

<sup>62</sup> Rudi Deklerck and Jing Men, 2010, "The EU and China: Cloudy Weather for Solar Energy?", *EU-China Observer*, no. 1, 2010.

<sup>63</sup> Chin By Ang, Klaus Heide, and Staphany Wong, eds., 2010, "*I Could Feel Climate Change.*" *Climate Change and China: Civil Society Perspectives* (EU-China Civil Society Forum); and Mireia Paulo Noguera, "The EU-China Strategic Partnership in Climate Change: The Biodiversity Programme", in *EU Diplomacy Papers Series, 02/2011* (Bruges: College of Europe, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> For the very small number of recent exceptions, see Astrid Carrapatoso, 2011, "Climate Policy Diffusion: Interregional Dialogue in China-EU Relations", *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 23, no. 2; Geert De Cock, 2011, "The European Union as a Bilateral 'Norm Leader' on Climate Change vis-à-vis China", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 16, no. 1; and Giulia C. Romano, 2010, *The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change: Bilateralism Begetting Multilateralism in Promoting a Climate Change Regime?* Mercury: Multilateralism and the EU in the Contemporary Global Order).

<sup>65</sup> The most prominent of these are Chatham House and E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism in London, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, and the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. See for example, Tom Burke and Nick Mabey, 2006, *Europe in the World: Political Choices for Security and Prosperity* (London: E3G - Third Generation Environmentalism); Chatham House, 2007, *Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe* (London: Chatham House); Benito Müller, et al., 2010, *Addressing Large Developing Country Emissions: The Case for Strategic Collaboration under Joint Commitments* (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies).

existent, the only work having been published by NGOs and research institutes in Europe, often commissioned by the EU.<sup>66</sup>

Given the substantive importance of the topic, there is a clear need for research that fills these gaps in our existing knowledge. This dissertation aims to do so through systematic research on EU engagement with China and India on climate change, which builds on extensive fieldwork in China, India, and Europe.

### 1.3 The Argument

The principal contribution of this dissertation is to develop a relational understanding of the nature and extent of EU international leadership on climate change. It does so by developing an analytical framework which focuses in turn on the *drivers* of EU engagement with China and India, the *form* of engagement, and the *response* to engagement of the Chinese and Indian Governments. In the first instance, the development of external engagement is dependent on a set of internal (intra-EU) drivers, namely normative commitment, material interest, and polity-building, which are enabled and constrained by the broader context of EU relations with China and India. Second, engagement can take the form of socialization or incentive-based engagement, and is dependent on the extent of relevant EU capabilities. Third, the response of the “target” can take the form of normative emulation, lesson-drawing, or resistance, and is conditioned by domestic political structure, conceptions of material interest, and pre-existing normative frames in the target countries. This framework allows the thesis to assess the nature and extent of EU leadership on

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<sup>66</sup> AGCC, 2009, *Enhancing Cooperation: Report of the High-Level India-EU Dialogue* (London: Action for a Global Climate Community); Aaron Atteridge, et al., 2009, *Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in India: Financial Mechanisms and Opportunities for EU-India Collaboration* (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute); Carine Barbier and Ritu Mathur, 2008, *Opportunities for an India-European Union Partnership on Energy and Climate Security* (Paris: Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales); and Jorgen Boldt and Anjana Das, 2008, *Study on Environment and Energy in India - Consolidated Report* (Hemel Hempstead: HTPSE Ltd., funded by the European Union).

climate change in a holistic manner and, building on this analysis, to assess the nature of the EU as an international actor.

Using this framework, the empirical analysis makes three arguments. First, in respect of the factors driving the development of EU external engagement, throughout the period since 1990 the development of EU climate policy has been driven significantly by a polity-building dynamic. From an early stage European leaders identified climate change as an issue on which the international role of the EU could be developed. The external context changed significantly in 2000 with the decision of the new Bush Administration in the United States to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. This strengthened the normative foundations of EU climate change policy by transforming the issue into a core issue of identity for Europeans. Around the same time, climate change mitigation began to be reframed as an opportunity for European businesses in key member states, including the UK and Germany. These factors resulted in the successful development of Community-level climate policies and led to increasingly assertive EU external engagement and leadership at the international level. This combination of driving factors has also structured the form that this engagement has taken, which was also mediated by the broader development of EU-China and EU-India relations.

During the period up to 2000 there was very little by way of engagement with China and India on climate change. Engagement developed slowly from 2000, and more steadily from 2005 onwards. Deepening normative commitment to combating climate change within the EU underpinned this increased external engagement in the final period of the study, as did growing recognition within Europe and beyond of the rising and projected future contribution of large developing countries such as China and India. This led to increasing external engagement through institutionalized dialogue. Commercial opportunities associated with low-carbon growth also grew in importance as a driving factor of EU

climate change policy in the 2000s, but played a limited role in driving the development of external engagement. Accordingly, external engagement was only to a limited extent directed specifically at developing markets for European low-carbon firms.

However, even in the period from 2005, EU climate policy continued to be driven to some extent by a polity-building dynamic which generated continued claims of EU leadership in the absence of sufficient capacity to exercise such leadership. The establishment of so-called “strategic partnerships” by the EU with China and India in 2003 and 2004 respectively created the institutional framework within which the EU sought to develop cooperation with China and India in the area of climate change. However, to a considerable extent these relationships were neither strategic, nor partnerships, but rather generated a tendency to create ever more formal channels for institutionalized dialogue which did not result in substantive engagement.

Second, the dissertation assesses the form of engagement. In the EU-China case, the progressive deepening of EU-China relations from the late 1990s and—in particular—from 2003 onwards provided the EU with greater opportunities for engagement with the Chinese leadership. This engagement consisted of a combination of institutionalized and ad hoc dialogue, and incentive-based engagement through capacity-building. However, there was a generally low level of consistency between EU-level and member-state engagement. On the issue of coherence, while climate change was given high rhetorical priority in its engagement with China, there is no significant evidence that there was a serious attempt to ensure coherence between other policy areas and the EU’s priorities on climate change, for example by making market access conditional on the implementation of climate change policies by China. The overriding priority in the relationship has been to deepen the trade relationship.

In the EU-India case, the development of EU engagement was more limited, partly due to the problematic nature of the overall EU-India relationship. Neither side is the other's main external priority or point of reference in world politics, and there is a wide disconnect across a broad range of policy issues. Furthermore, the Indian Government has shown little interest in developing its relationship with the EU as a whole, preferring to deal with individual member states. Thus, while the EU attempted to develop institutionalized dialogue and capacity-building cooperation, the extent of this engagement was very limited. This was partly a result of limited capabilities on the EU side, particularly with respect to the European Commission. EU engagement has also been characterized by a lack of consistency. Individual member states, the UK and Germany in particular, have developed more substantive cooperation with the Indian Government, but the relationship between the European Commission Delegation in particular and the Indian Government has been strained and unproductive. There is no significant evidence that other policy areas have been made coherent with the EU's external priorities on climate change: the priority in the bilateral relationship has been the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement, though that process is ongoing.

Third, the dissertation analyzes the response of the Chinese and Indian Governments to EU engagement. The Chinese Government response consisted of limited normative emulation and lesson-drawing, but also quite significant resistance—particularly with respect to the international climate change negotiations. This pattern of response was, in turn, conditioned by political structure, material interest, and normative frames. The centralised nature of the Chinese political system, combined with the deepening of institutionalized EU-China relations, provided EU leaders with growing access to the Chinese leadership. Second, before the development of EU engagement on climate change, a prior shift had occurred within the Chinese leadership, facilitated by the coming to power

of the “fourth generation” leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao from 2003 onwards, which attached greatly increased priority to issues of energy security and local environmental pollution. This created an openness within the leadership to cooperation with the EU on climate change policy in specific areas where it matched their conceptions of material interest. Third, while there was no significant frame dissonance with respect to cooperation at the bilateral level, there was significant dissonance with respect to the development of a future climate regime.

The Indian Government response to EU engagement consisted predominantly of strong resistance, with very limited evidence of normative emulation and no significant evidence of lesson-drawing. The open, liberal political structure of the Indian Government provided greater opportunities for external influence, but the multiplicity of political veto points in the system makes it difficult for external actors to influence domestic politics. This was particularly the case in the context of EU-India relations on climate change, because of a relatively strong domestic consensus in India on the need to prioritize economic development above all other goals. On the issue of material interest, the Indian Government has in fact for a long time taken an active interest in the development of alternative energy sources and energy conservation. However, the issue of climate change has been framed very strongly in North-South terms, generating significant resistance on the part of the Indian Government to cooperating with the EU on any issues framed as “climate change”. For this reason, while China and India share some of the same underlying material interests (though arguably with differing levels of intensity), these have not led the Indian Government to seek cooperation with the EU either at the bilateral or multilateral levels, because of strong normative frame dissonance.

Overall, the analytical framework and empirical analysis generate a holistic assessment of EU leadership on climate change by focusing on both the “leader” and “follower” sides of

the relationship. By doing so, the dissertation makes a significant contribution to the existing literature on EU leadership on climate change, which to a very significant extent has focused on only on the “leader” side of this relationship. The originality of the analysis lies particularly in the attention paid to the response of prospective followers of EU leadership. Indeed, the dissertation is the first study of EU leadership on climate change to systematically link the “supply” and “demand” sides of leadership in a comprehensive manner.

The empirical analysis is underpinned by extensive fieldwork conducted in China, India, and Europe, which generates the conclusions of the dissertation. The concluding chapter draws on the empirical analysis to reflect on the contribution of the EU to global environmental governance, and to identify the conditions which have enabled and constrained EU leadership on climate change.

## 1.4 Methodology and Sources

This dissertation adopts a process-tracing approach, seeking to uncover the causal mechanisms that explain observed outcomes by drawing together a wide variety of sources of evidence.<sup>67</sup> The analysis draws on four principal sources of data. First, a wide range of secondary sources were analyzed, covering the development of EU and international climate change policy and politics, EU relations with China and India as well as EU external relations more generally, and the domestic development of Chinese and Indian climate change policy. Since the secondary literature on the EU-China and EU-India relationships on climate change is quite limited, the dissertation draws on aspects of this diverse broader literature in order to generate the empirical account that underpins the analysis. Second, the insights of analysis carried out by NGOs, think tanks, and other

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<sup>67</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2008, “Process Tracing”, in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, eds., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

research organizations have been incorporated where appropriate. Again, this literature and documentation is somewhat limited with respect to the specific subject of EU-China and EU-India relations on climate change, but is more voluminous with respect to the broader EU-China and EU-India relationships, and also with respect to EU climate change policy.

Third, primary documents were consulted, primarily from the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Council, and the Chinese and Indian Governments. Basing analysis on public documents introduces the potential for misleading results, since such documents may, for example, misrepresent reality in order to achieve particular objectives. In order to mitigate potential problems of this kind, triangulation of data sources is used where possible. However, if public documents present the world as it ought to be (in the eyes of the author) rather than as it is, this may in fact be an interesting and significant research finding. This is particularly true with respect to EU documents that seek to create a European “climate leadership” role concept.

Fourth, the dissertation relies significantly on elite interviews, conducted during fieldwork in Brussels in July 2010, London in August 2010, Beijing in September–October 2010, Delhi in October–December 2010, and by phone from Dublin in July–August 2011.<sup>68</sup> Interviews were conducted with a range of key informants, including government officials, diplomats, academics and experts at relevant research institutes, and representatives of NGOs and business groups. A list of those interviewees who consented to have their names listed is included as an appendix to this dissertation.<sup>69</sup> Many preferred to speak on a non-attributable basis and/or not to be recorded. In the latter case, notes were developed and filled in soon after each interview. The interviews were used to fill knowledge gaps

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<sup>68</sup> On interview techniques and strategies, a special symposium on “Interview Methods in Political Science” in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 35, no. 4 (2002) was particularly useful.

<sup>69</sup> A small number of interviewees requested that their names not be included anywhere in the dissertation.

where the existing primary and secondary literature was silent, and to evaluate claims made by the existing literature.

Depending on the interviewee, the interviews were either semi-structured or unstructured. Because of the diverse range of informants, it was not possible to use a standard list of questions for each interview. Instead, the questions were tailored for each interview. Advice on whom to interview was sought from experts in advance, and the technique of “snowballing” contacts from initial interviewees was used. The fieldwork for this dissertation in China coincided with the hosting of a one-week session of the UNFCCC negotiations in Tianjin, China, from 4 to 9 October 2010, which the author attended as an observer. This proved extremely useful in making initial contact with Chinese officials, NGO representatives, and others. Interpretation was not required for interviews in China or India, since in both cases all interviewees were able to speak at least reasonable English.

The reliance on data from interviews opens the possibility of obtaining inaccurate results because, for example, an interviewee may provide an unrepresentative account of an event, or because interviewees have incentives to distort their account. Where possible, data from individual interviews is triangulated with data from other interviews or from other primary or secondary sources, in order to enhance the reliability and validity of the data and the resulting analysis.

## **1.5 Structure of the Dissertation**

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework to answer the research question outlined above, focusing respectively on the factors driving the development of EU external engagement, the form of engagement, and the response to engagement. This framework is built up sequentially, with the drivers of engagement influencing the form of engagement, and in turn the form of engagement influencing the

response to engagement. Chapter 3 traces the development of EU internal and external climate policy, as well as the progressive deepening of EU relations with China and India. In doing so, it assesses the relative importance over time of the driving factors identified in the conceptual framework, namely normative commitment, material interest, and polity-building. Chapter 4 then analyzes the “normative gap” between the respective framings of global climate governance by the EU, China, and India.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine, in turn, the EU-China and EU-India relationships, focusing in particular on both the form of EU engagement and the response of the Chinese and Indian Governments to EU engagement. In each case, the development of the EU’s engagement on climate change is placed in the context of the broader development of EU-China and EU-India relations. The particular form of engagement and the characteristics of the response are assessed in each case in order to develop a holistic understanding of the pattern of attempted leadership and response. This structured comparison allows for the analysis to draw out the similarities and differences between the two cases.

This task of comparison is further undertaken in Chapter 7, which draws together the empirical analysis contained in the earlier chapters to provide a synthesis explanation of the pattern of EU engagement with China and India in this area. The dissertation concludes by building on the empirical findings to reflect more broadly on EU leadership and the European contribution to global environmental politics, as well as identifying avenues for future research and policy implications stemming from the analysis. The thesis as a whole fills a gap in the literature on the EU as a leader and an international actor, on the international politics of climate change, and on EU relations with China and India. It does so by scrutinizing the performance of the EU in a policy field where it claims global leadership by examining in detail its relations with China and India in this area in a comparative context for the first time.

## Assessing EU External Engagement: Drivers, Form, and Response

The contrast between the EU's rhetoric of climate leadership in the years leading up to COP-15 and the role the EU actually played at that summit draws attention to the importance of distinguishing between leadership ambition and the exercise of leadership. Why was there such a large gap between the EU's self-proclaimed role and the role the EU ended up playing, and how can we understand the development of the EU's engagement with China and India in this context? In order to answer these questions, this chapter develops an analytical framework for assessing EU leadership and followership which considers in turn the drivers of EU external engagement on climate change, the form of engagement, and the response of the Chinese and Indian Governments to EU engagement.

This framework proceeds sequentially: the factors driving engagement are expected to influence the form that engagement takes, and the form of engagement in turn is expected to affect the response of other actors. In the first instance, the development of EU claims to "climate leadership" is dependent on both a set of internal (intra-EU) drivers, namely normative commitment, material interest, and polity-building, all of which are enabled and constrained by the external context of interests and ideas. The drivers of the EU's claim to

leadership affect the form of engagement, which is enabled and constrained by the nature and extent of EU capabilities for external engagement, including issues of capacity, consistency, and coherence. The form of engagement in turn affects the response to engagement of prospective followers, which is conditioned by the domestic political structure of third countries, their perceptions of material interest, and their pre-existing normative frames. This framework allows the thesis to develop a holistic understanding of EU engagement with China and India on climate change and, by doing so, to assess the nature and extent of EU leadership on climate change.

The framework draws on relevant theoretical and conceptual insights from the existing literature. The intention is not to develop a universally-valid framework for analyzing engagement or leadership, but rather to identify the tools which can best help us to understand the development of the EU's relations with China and India in the area of climate change. Section 2.1 develops the conceptual tools that will be used to explain the drivers of EU engagement, focusing in particular on normative, material, and polity-building explanations. Section 2.2 focuses on explaining the form of EU external engagement by drawing on the literature on EU international actorness, and highlights the conceptual links between drivers and form of engagement. Section 2.3 turns to the third part of the framework, namely explaining the response of prospective "followers" to EU engagement, drawing principally on the literature on the domestic impact of international norms.

## **2.1 Drivers of Engagement**

The first aspect of the framework focuses on the drivers of EU external engagement on climate change. Since the early 1990s, the EU has claimed for itself an international leadership role with respect to the issue of climate change. The question addressed here is:

what factors have driven the EU to seek to develop a leadership role on climate change? The drivers of the EU's claims to leadership affect the form of EU engagement with third countries in general—and with China and India in particular. For this reason, the framework begins by considering which factors have driven the EU's claims to leadership on climate change. Of course, the development of the EU's climate leadership claims have not taken place in a vacuum. Rather, it has been structured by the opportunities and constraints provided by the external context of the global system, or what we might think of as the opportunity structure of world politics.<sup>1</sup> This is not a constant, but instead varies over time. Factors such as the waning of US environmental policy from the 1980s onwards, the varying preference for unilateralism that has characterized the United States over time, and the growing prominence of emerging powers such as China and India, both in the climate change negotiations and in world politics more generally, have provided opportunities for, and constraints on, EU claims to leadership, which in turn have impacted on the form of EU engagement.

A first potential driver of EU engagement stems from a conception of behaviour as driven by a “logic of appropriateness”.<sup>2</sup> That is to say, the EU adheres to a particular set of norms and behaves according to a conception of appropriate behaviour based on the prescriptions of those norms, rather than being motivated by calculations of costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Linking the internal to the external, the conceptualization of the EU as a “normative power” has sought to argue that the EU, because of the distinctive way it is constituted (its “normative difference”), is predisposed to act in a normative way.<sup>3</sup>

It is not simply the EU's normative basis that makes it a normative power, however: in

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<sup>1</sup> This corresponds to the notion of “opportunity” developed by Bretherton and Vogler in their framework for analyzing the EU as a global actor. See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, 2006, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge).

<sup>2</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 1998, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ian Manners, 2002, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2.

order to qualify for this description, the EU must spread its norms beyond its borders. According to this perspective, the EU's claim to leadership has been driven by a commitment to particular norms—most prominently environmental protection and the precautionary principle, but also related norms such as a commitment to multilateralism as a foundational principle of world politics.

Environmental protection and combating climate change have been prominent in European politics since the late 1980s or earlier, and they built on the progressive development of environmental policy within the EU.<sup>4</sup> EU environmental policy has developed from an “incidental” policy in the 1970s, which focused primarily on removing barriers to trade between member states,<sup>5</sup> to a “system of environmental governance”.<sup>6</sup> This process has both been pushed by “pioneer” states such as Germany and the Nordic states.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the European Parliament and environmental interest groups have been active across the EU, resulting in the progressive “greening” of European politics since the late 1980s which, in parallel, has led to the “Europeanization” of the environmental policies of member states.<sup>8</sup> The actions of governments and non-governmental organizations were, in turn, based on increasing public concern over environmental degradation. In earlier years such concern was focused on the impacts of local environmental pollution. Over time, however, public attention shifted to “global” issues such as ozone depletion and, later, climate change.<sup>9</sup> The nature of the issue of climate

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew Jordan, ed., 2005, *Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors, Institutions and Processes*, 2nd edn. (London: Earthscan); Anthony R. Zito, 2000, *Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

<sup>5</sup> Philipp Hildebrand, 1992, “The European Community's Environmental Policy, 1957-1992”, *Environmental Politics*, vol. 1, no. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Albert Weale, et al., 2000, *Environmental Governance in Europe: An Ever Closer Ecological Union?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

<sup>7</sup> Mikael Skou Andersen and Duncan Liefferink, 1997, *European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Jordan and Duncan Liefferink, eds., 2005, *Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National Environmental Policy* (Abingdon: Routledge).

<sup>9</sup> For example, a November 2009 Eurobarometer opinion survey found that 63 percent of Europeans consider climate change a very serious problem, 24 percent consider it a fairly serious problem, and 10

change generates incentives for particular actors to seek others to also take action: because climate change is a global commons problem in which emissions reduction by the EU or any other region of the world unilaterally will not solve the problem, the structure of the issue creates incentives for concerned actors to seek to persuade others to join common action.

A second, and somewhat contrasting, perspective looks at the role of material interest, particularly of commercial actors, in driving EU external engagement. This explanation builds on a competing logic of action, the “logic of consequences”, according to which actors are motivated by their perceptions of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, as opposed to being governed by considerations of “appropriate” behaviour.<sup>10</sup> The idea underlying this explanation is that the EU climate change policy is driven by anticipated economic benefits that could be reaped by the EU if other actors adopt more stringent climate change policies. In this sense, there should be a clear desire on the part of the purported leader to secure the followership of other actors. There are three principal strands to this argument. First, EU leadership may be motivated by an ambition to generate new market opportunities for European low-carbon companies seeking to export their goods and services. Such companies could be expected to push for the development of market opportunities in China and India for their products and services, which could take various forms. This is premised on the assumption that European companies in fact are global leaders in these fields and that the EU has developed as a “lead market” for these sectors.<sup>11</sup>

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percent do not consider it a serious problem. See European Commission, 2009, *Europeans' Attitudes Towards Climate Change: Special Eurobarometer 322* (Brussels: European Commission and TNS Opinion & Social), p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”.

<sup>11</sup> Martin Jänicke and Klaus Jacob, 2004, “Lead Markets for Environmental Innovations: A New Role for the Nation State”, *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 4, no. 1.

The EU's external engagement could also be motivated by a need to "export" greenhouse gas emission limitation standards to jurisdictions without "equivalent" standards. This would occur in a context in which the EU has already imposed regulatory standards on its own domestic industries, but where these standards are not imposed on firms outside the jurisdiction, leading to what would be perceived—by those industries at least—as "unfair" competition. Industries in this category would include high-emitting sectors such as steel, aluminium, paper, and chemicals. Such groups could be expected to push the EU to pressurize China, India, and other countries that are perceived not to have implemented "equivalent" emissions limitation measures into implementing such measures.<sup>12</sup> Third, EU external engagement may be motivated by a longer-term concern over energy supply. The EU, China, and India are all dependent significantly on imported energy sources, including oil and gas. Moreover, projections indicate that the dependence of the EU, China, and India on imported energy sources is set to increase significantly in the coming decades. In parallel to a drive to diversify the domestic energy supply, a possible explanation for EU external action on climate policy would be to seek to reduce the current and future dependence of China and India on a shrinking global supply of carbon-based energy sources in order to moderate future global demand for these energy sources and thereby increase the EU's relative access to future energy sources.

A third perspective also starts from a broadly interest-based conception of action but focuses on the interests of institutional actors and polity-building in the EU, rather than on material interest of commercial actors. This explanation sees EU engagement driven by a desire to both strengthen the role of the EU in world politics, in the process deepening the integration process, and strengthening the role of the EU institutions. Sbragia and Damro,

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<sup>12</sup> For discussions of EU external environmental policies in these terms, see Robert Falkner, 2007, "The Political Economy of 'Normative Power' Europe: EU Environmental Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 14, no. 4; and R. Daniel Kelemen, 2010, "Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 17, no. 3.

for example, argue that climate change was used by the EU “to demonstrate its competency and identity as an international actor, to make its mark on the international scene”.<sup>13</sup> More broadly, Tonra has argued that EU foreign policy cooperation in the framework of the CFSP serves the purpose of contributing to a process of identity-building, in which national representatives increasingly perceive their roles in terms of a collective European identity and responsibility.<sup>14</sup>

The most comprehensive argument in this regard has been made recently by Bickerton, who makes the case for shifting the focus of EU external relations away from “effectiveness” and towards “functionality”.<sup>15</sup> For Bickerton, EU foreign policy cooperation serves a set of purposes which have little to do with the effectiveness or external impact of the EU, of which two are particularly relevant in the current context.<sup>16</sup> First, it is driven by the relations between the three main institutional actors: the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, with the actual outputs of EU foreign policy cooperation being epiphenomenal. It is widely recognized that the EU institutions often seek to push forward the integration process since this tends to increase their own role within the EU polity. The European Commission could be expected to have an interest in developing common European internal and external policies on climate change, not least because climate change is an area in which the Commission possesses very significant

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<sup>13</sup> Alberta M. Sbragia and Chad Damro, 1999, “The Changing Role of the European Union in International Environmental Politics: Institution Building and the Politics of Climate Change”, *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 66.

<sup>14</sup> Ben Tonra, 2003, “Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 41, no. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Christopher J. Bickerton, 2010, “Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?”, *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 32, no. 2; and Christopher J. Bickerton, 2011, *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

<sup>16</sup> As well as the two purposes discussed here, Bickerton also argues that EU foreign policy cooperation allows EU member states to retreat from their global responsibilities, legitimizing Europe’s retreat from its historical role as architect and driver of international affairs. However, this purpose is less directly relevant in the context of the framework developed in this chapter.

expertise and resources—more so, in fact, than all but the largest member states.<sup>17</sup> The European Parliament has historically been viewed as an “environmental champion” within the EU system, but, for a long time, its circumscribed role in EU policy-making constrained its formal role.<sup>18</sup> However, the extension of the “codecision” procedure to environmental policy under the Amsterdam Treaty, combined with the development of the climate and energy package of 2008–9, have recently provided a somewhat strengthened role for the European Parliament in EU climate policy-making.<sup>19</sup>

Second, Bickerton argues that EU foreign policy cooperation is a site for exploring the meaning of the European project. This, he argues, is because federalist “deepening” project has run its course, and because the traditional narratives of European integration are less convincing than they were previously. In this context, foreign policy has emerged as the new vehicle for supporters of European integration. Lenschow and Sprungk develop a similar argument regarding the development of a narrative of a “Green Europe” which, they argue, serves as a “functional myth” of the European Union.<sup>20</sup> Due to the fact that the EU does not have foundational myths to the same extent as nation states, they argue that the myth of “Green Europe” has been created by EU policymakers, partly on the basis of the development of EU environmental policy, and that this has generally resonated with EU publics. They point to the fact that there is both an internal and an external dimension to this myth, the external being the EU’s role as a global leader and as a counterbalance to

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<sup>17</sup> The Directorate General for Climate Action was established in February 2010, bringing together the functions related to climate change previously located in the Directorates General for Environment, External Relations, and Enterprise and Industry. For a detailed discussion of the role of the Commission in EU climate change politics generally, see Pamela M. Barnes, 2010, “The Role of the Commission of the European Union: Creating External Coherence from Internal Diversity”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>18</sup> Charlotte Burns and Neil Carter, 2010, “The European Parliament and Climate Change: From Symbolism to Heroism and Back Again”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Codecision, which grants the Parliament greater input into the legislative process, was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and was extended to most areas of environmental policy (the exceptions were land use planning, water management, and fiscal measures) under the Amsterdam Treaty.

<sup>20</sup> Andrea Lenschow and Carina Sprungk, 2010, “The Myth of a Green Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1.

the United States. While these strands of argumentation differ in focus, they share the contention that the development of EU external relations is driven primarily by internal dynamics, somewhat disconnected from the actual content of external relations.

The three strands of explanation developed in this section—normative commitment, material interest, and polity-building—are not rival or competing. The empirical analysis in the following chapters does not seek to prove one over the others but rather to identify the different factors of explanation that help us to understand why the EU has sought to claim a leadership role with respect to climate change. Indeed, seeking to prove one explanation and disprove the others may be problematic. Falkner and Keleman, for example, rightly draw attention to political-economy explanations for EU external environmental relations.<sup>21</sup> By contrast, van Schaik and Schunz have argued recently that EU climate change policies since the 1990s have been primarily norm-driven. However, in each case the authors reach their conclusions primarily through setting up a somewhat false dichotomy between norm- and interest-driven behaviour. In the context of this dissertation, it is misleading to argue that the “real” motivation behind EU external relations on climate change is one of the three explanations identified above, not least because politically-savvy environmentalists recognize that, in order to progress an environmental agenda, they need to frame their proposals in ways that will gain support from powerful economic interests, and for this reason they seek consciously and explicitly to bridge the supposed norms-interest divide.<sup>22</sup>

These three drivers can explain the development of EU climate change policy and EU claims to leadership in this area, but this does not automatically generate engagement with China and India. Rather, the development of external engagement with China and India in

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<sup>21</sup> Falkner, “The Political Economy of ‘Normative Power’ Europe: EU Environmental Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation”; Keleman, “Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy”. For a more general interest-based approach to explaining EU environmental policy, see Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, 1994, “The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy”, *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 1.

<sup>22</sup> London-based environmental consultancy E3G is typical of this approach. See [www.e3g.org](http://www.e3g.org).

particular is conditioned by the broader development of the EU's relationships with China and India. The context of these broader relationships can either enable or constrain the development of engagement on climate change. The EU has responded to the rise of China and India, and the changing international environment more broadly, through the creation of so-called "strategic partnerships" with key third states which involve (varying degrees of) deepening and broadening of institutionalized bilateral dialogue across a range of areas. For this reason, one of the tasks of the empirical chapters is to place the development of EU engagement on climate change in the broader setting of EU-China and EU-India relations. The next section considers the form of engagement, and identifies the ways in which this form can be influenced by the drivers of engagement developed above.

## **2.2 Form of Engagement**

The three drivers of EU engagement identified in the last section—normative concern, material interest, and polity-building—each relate in different ways to the form of EU external engagement, and lead us to expect differing forms depending on the combination of drivers underpinning EU engagement. The form of engagement can be characterized according to (i) the mechanisms of engagement, and (ii) EU capabilities for engagement. With respect to mechanisms, two particularly relevant categories can be identified: (i) socialization, and (ii) incentive-based engagement. These mechanisms, in turn, relate back to the drivers of engagement discussed in the last section.

In the first instance, EU engagement motivated by normative commitment to combating climate change is likely to be based centrally on attempts to persuade other actors to take what is deemed to be appropriate action. It is less likely that the purported leader would, on the basis of normative commitment, seek to use material inducements to alter the costs and benefits faced by other actors. This corresponds with the concept of socialization which

has been developed in the literature on diffusion of norms and ideas. Socialization is defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community”, the outcome of which is “sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms”.<sup>23</sup> In terms of the form of external engagement, this would involve efforts by the EU to “teach” EU policies to outsiders, to persuade outsiders that EU policies are appropriate, and, as a consequence, to motivate them to adopt EU policies. If socialization is successful, actors seek to “do the right thing” and learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of international society “in good standing”. This mechanism operates according to a logic of appropriateness in which actors internalize new norms of expected or appropriate behaviour. The degree to which socialization is successful is likely to be dependent on a number of factors, including the extent to which the EU is seen as a credible actor on climate change and is seen to “practice what it preaches”, and whether there is resonance between the respective normative frames of sender and receiver.

Second, and in contrast to engagement motivated by normative commitment, we should expect that EU engagement motivated by material interest drivers will be more likely to include the provision of material inducements to other actors in an attempt to manipulate their utility calculations. Rather than seeking to persuade other actors to act in a particular way, because it constitutes appropriate behaviour in a particular social environment, this kind of engagement seeks to alter the behaviour of other actors by changing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. This is the case for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. In the first instance, the logic of action driving external engagement—a logic of consequences—should lead us to expect that engagement will be also be dictated by a logic of consequences. In the second instance, the explanations discussed in this

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<sup>23</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2005, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, *International Organization*, vol. 59, no. 4, p. 804.

section are likely to generate powerful domestic constituencies which will lobby for external engagement that includes material incentives for other actors. A political-economy perspective on EU climate change policy suggests that such interests are likely to be concentrated and will devote considerable efforts to lobbying. By contrast, leadership motivated by normative concern is less likely to demand engagement involving the significant use of material incentives.

If this logic dominates, we should expect the EU to provide either positive or negative incentives to induce a third country to follow the EU's lead. Positive incentives could include capacity building through financial aid and technical assistance, market access, or institutional ties, while negative incentives could include trade barriers or economic sanctions, for example. Scholars of EU external relations have argued that, in general, the EU has often tended to opt for positive rather than negative incentives. For example, focusing on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and Asia, Youngs argues that "in practice European policy was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures".<sup>24</sup> This "external incentives model", or "reinforcement by reward", has been shown to explain the process of rule transfer from the EU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era. A key condition for the success of EU rule transfer proved to be whether the EU set its rules as conditions for countries with a credible membership perspective. It is less clear to what extent conditionality would induce behavioural change in the target state in the absence of potential membership. Moreover, the existing literature points to the fact that, in order to be credible, EU conditionality—if implemented—could not result in significant costs for the EU itself.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> He attributes this to a belief on the part of EU policy-makers that positive incentives were more legitimate and effective. Richard Youngs, 2001, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 191-2.

<sup>25</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2004, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 11, no. 4.

Third, leadership dominated motivated by a concern to build a European polity should lead us to expect neither socialization nor incentive-based engagement, but rather an absence of sustained engagement and instead an inward-looking, self-referential leadership with an emphasis on proclaiming rather than acting upon EU leadership. According to this logic, EU leadership on climate change is driven by internal inter-bureaucratic competition and by a need to legitimate and strengthen the process of EU polity-building. If this is the case, we should expect limited substantive external engagement. It may be the case under these conditions that formalized institutional mechanisms are established to develop external engagement, but the attention paid to this external engagement, and in particular the resources devoted in terms of financing and personnel, are expected to be limited.

This, in turn, brings us to the question of EU capabilities for engagement, the second means by which we characterize EU engagement. These can be characterized in terms of (i) capacity—particularly within the EU institutions, (ii) consistency, and (iii) coherence. These enable and/or constrain the form of EU engagement, and are captured by the concept of EU “actorness”. This concept is relatively unproblematic when analyzing the external relations of classic nation states: of course, different nation states differ according to the material and other capabilities they can mobilize in support of their external relations, but analytically their actorness is not called into question. It hardly needs to be pointed out, of course, that the EU is a different sort of actor. Building on previous work on the notion of the EU as a “presence” in world politics,<sup>26</sup> recent years have seen a growth in attempts to characterize the nature of the EU as an international actor.<sup>27</sup> Scholars working in this area, such as Jupille and Caporaso, as well as Bretherton and Vogler, have disaggregated

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<sup>26</sup> David Allen and Michael Smith, 1990, “Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*; Martijn L. P. Groenleer and Louise van Schaik, 2007, “United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, no. 5; Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, 1998, “States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics”, in Carolyn Rhodes, ed., *The European Union in the World Community* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).

actorness into a number of component parts. One element concerns the opportunity structure in terms of the external context of ideas and actors. In the framework of this dissertation, this element is captured in the discussion of the drivers of EU engagement discussed above. A second element of actorness identified in the literature concerns the notion of presence, which captures the ability of the EU to shape the perceptions, expectations, and behaviour of others. This does not denote purposive external action but rather is a condition of being and can be related to the character and identity of the EU, as well as the external consequences of internal EU priorities and policies.<sup>28</sup>

The third element of EU actorness concerns the capabilities of the EU to engage with the outside world. Of particular relevance to the current analysis, Bretherton and Vogler identify the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies, and the availability of policy instruments, as important determinants of EU actorness.<sup>29</sup> The first of these is disaggregated into the issues of consistency between policies and actions of member states and the Commission, and coherence between different policy areas. In other analyses, these have been captured under the broader heading of “coherence”, which has then been disaggregated into different types of coherence. Gebhard, for example, distinguishes between four types of coherence: *vertical*, between member state policies and Community/EU policies; *horizontal*, between the Community and intergovernmental spheres and their respective institutional actors; *internal*, within each of the Community and intergovernmental spheres; and *external*, in the way the EU presents itself to third parties.<sup>30</sup> The perceived need for greater coherence has been a recurring theme in discussions on EU external relations ever since the establishment of European Political Cooperation in 1970.

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<sup>28</sup> Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*.

<sup>29</sup> Bretherton and Vogler also identify a shared commitment to a set of overarching values and domestic legitimation as important factors influencing EU actorness. In the current framework, these are captured under the heading of “leadership motivation”.

<sup>30</sup> Carmen Gebhard, 2011, “Coherence”, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds., *International Relations and the European Union*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 107-10.

Of course, this issue is not unique to the EU: any governance system can be characterized by competing priorities and actions of different institutional actors and the “turf battles” that result. However, the particular multi-level structure of the EU has made it particularly prone to charges of a lack of coherence, both in general and specifically in terms of relations with the outside world. Also important is the capacity of institutional actors responsible for developing and managing external engagement.

In short, the form of EU engagement is, according to the framework developed here, determined in part by the factors which have driven the development of the EU’s claim to climate leadership. It is also enabled and constrained by the degree to which the EU possesses capabilities associated with international actorhood, including institutional capacity, and the extent to which it is able to act coherently and consistently. Accordingly, the case study chapters will assess what form EU engagement with China and India has taken using the categories developed here to structure the analysis. They will also assess the extent to which the EU has possessed the qualities of actorhood identified above, with a particular focus on the “capability” element of EU actorhood.

### **2.3 Response to Engagement**

The third aspect of the framework focuses on the response of purported followers—in this case China and India—to engagement. Analyzing the response to engagement requires placing the development of EU engagement in the broader context of the development of Chinese and Indian climate change policy. The landscape of climate change policy-making in both countries has changed significantly over the period of EU engagement. Therefore, a first step towards assessing the Chinese and Indian responses to EU engagement is to analyze these developments and to assess whether and to what extent they can be considered a response to EU engagement. In particular, two questions need to be

addressed: first, *how* did China and India respond to EU engagement? Second, *why* did they respond in this way?

In order to answer the first of these two questions, we can draw on recent conceptual work on the diffusion of ideas, policies, and institutions. The work of Börzel and Risse, in particular, has focused increasingly on what they call “indirect” mechanisms of diffusion. This approach emphasizes the agency of the “recipient” side of the diffusion process rather than that of the sender.<sup>31</sup> Building on this literature, three mechanisms of response can be identified.<sup>32</sup> The first mechanism is “normative emulation”. This conceives of actors as driven by a logic of appropriateness who seek to be members of an international community “in good standing” and who therefore seek to emulate the norms, policies, or institutions of other respected actors in order to “do the right thing”. Normative emulation can, in a pure form, involve a somewhat automatic “downloading” of institutional “software” simply because this is what everybody does in a given community. The second mechanism is “lesson-drawing”. This involves actors looking to others for policies and rules that effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and are transferable to their domestic context. This mechanism employs a consequentialist logic, according to which actors are assumed to act rationally in order to maximize utility according to some pre-defined set of interests. In addition, we can identify “resistance” as a third mechanism of response in which there is no diffusion of ideas, policies, or institutions from sender to receiver.

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<sup>31</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 2009, *The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas* (Berlin: Kolleg-Forscherguppe “The Transformative Power of Europe”, Working Paper No. 1); and Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 2012, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction”, *West European Politics*, vol. 35, no. 1.

<sup>32</sup> In their framework, Börzel and Risse also identify an additional indirect mechanism of diffusion, namely “competition”. However, this is not relevant in conceptualizing response to engagement, since it involves autonomous adjustment to competitive pressures rather than a response to a specific sender of ideas, policies, or institutions.

In respect of the second question—why China and India responded in the way that they did—the framework developed here draws on the concepts developed in the literature on the domestic impact of international norms in order to seek to understand the pattern of response in each case. Challenging a first generation of research on the diffusion of international norms, this literature sought to explain variation in the impact of international norms across both norms and countries by drawing attention to factors that mediate between international norms and domestic impact.<sup>33</sup> This literature provides a number of relevant explanatory factors which are potentially useful in explaining the pattern of Chinese and Indian response to EU engagement.

The first of these explanatory factors concerns the domestic political structures in the “target” state. Focusing on the domestic impact of transnational actors attempting to diffuse new norms, Risse-Kappen argued that the domestic structure of the target state—encompassing the nature of political institutions, state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in its political culture—determines access to the political system as well as the ability to build winning coalitions among domestic actors.<sup>34</sup> At one end of the spectrum, highly-centralized state systems provide transnational actors with very few access points to the policy-making process. Those seeking to promote new ideas from the outside need to gain access to the very highest levels of decision-making. This presents external actors with limited opportunities for the diffusion of ideas. However, if external actors succeed in persuading key high-level officials of the validity of new ideas, the potential for change is significant, since decision-making is highly centralized. At the other end of the

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<sup>33</sup> Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., 2000, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda”, *International Studies Review*, vol. 2, no. 1; Jeffrey W. Legro, 1997, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism”, *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 1; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1994, “Ideas Do Not Flow Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War”, *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 2.

<sup>34</sup> Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Flow Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War”.

spectrum, relatively open political systems provide significantly greater access to the policy-making process for external actors, and societal demands can be mobilized relatively easily.

However, in order for new ideas to gain traction, external actors need to build winning coalitions of interest groups in the target state, which can be very difficult given the variety of interests and potential veto-points built into such a system. In other words, while access to policy-making actors is relatively straightforward, the requirements for building winning coalitions are profound. A “democratic corporatist system” such as that of Germany represents a mid-point between these two ends of the spectrum. There are fewer access points than in a society-dominated system making impact more incremental, but any impact made is expected to last longer. This resonates with later work by Checkel, who distinguished between “top-down” and “bottom-up” domestic structures. In a “top-down” domestic structure, social learning among political elites is crucial for determining the domestic impact of international norms. In a “bottom up” domestic structure, by contrast, domestic non-state actors and policy-networks are important, and norm internalization by elites is not a necessary condition for domestic impact of international norms.<sup>35</sup>

The second explanatory factor is the compatibility of international norms with pre-existing conceptions of material interest. As Risse-Kappen notes, international norms should be “compatible with the worldviews embedded in the political culture or held by those powerful enough to build winning coalitions”.<sup>36</sup> Relevant actors must be open in principle to incorporating new ideas. If they are not, new ideas are unlikely to gain traction domestically. This, in turn, is a function of the extent to which new ideas are perceived to

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<sup>35</sup> Building on this distinction, Checkel identifies a spectrum of four types of state structure. The two ends of this spectrum, “liberal” and “state above society”, correspond to Risse-Kappen’s categories of liberal and centralized. In between these two extremes are “corporatist”, in which non-state actors play a primary role and elites a secondary role, and “statist”, in which elites play a primary role and non-state actors a secondary role. See Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”.

<sup>36</sup> Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Flow Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War”, p. 212.

support important domestic material interests.<sup>37</sup> Perceptions of material interests can change over time, but the point is that international norms are more likely to gain traction domestically if they are perceived to support existing perceptions of the material interests of relevant domestic actors and do not contradict these perceived interests. If new ideas strongly contradict pre-existing material interests, it is reasonable to expect that those new ideas will not gain traction with domestic actors. If, on the other hand, new ideas are perceived to support the material interest of domestic actors, this is not in itself sufficient for domestic impact, but it creates conditions in which international ideas are more likely to gain domestic traction.

The third explanatory factor concerns the need for some degree of resonance between the externally-promoted norms and ideas and pre-existing domestic normative frames.<sup>38</sup> A frame is “a persuasive device used to ‘fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems’”.<sup>39</sup> The extent to which the normative frame used is consistent with pre-existing normative frames in the target state is likely to have a significant bearing on whether the new norm is incorporated. In this respect, domestic norms shaping the preferences of actors should offer a guide to the degree to which international norms will resonate at the domestic level.<sup>40</sup> International norms that conflict significantly with pre-existing domestic norms are unlikely to have domestic impact. Of course, the issue of resonance between international norms and domestic norms, identities, and interests should not be viewed in static terms. Interests, identities, and norms can and do change, and indeed an influential strand of the literature on norm diffusion has focused on the ways in which “norm entrepreneurs” seek to construct cognitive frames for new norms that resonate with

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<sup>37</sup> Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda”.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Rodger A. Payne, 2001, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 39.

<sup>40</sup> Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”.

broader public understandings.<sup>41</sup> Others have emphasized the agency of local actors in the target state. In this view, norm-takers can seek to “localize” international norms by building congruence between existing domestic norms and new international norms.<sup>42</sup> The extent to which the agents of diffusion are perceived as credible is also important. In this context, to what degree is the EU perceived to have internalized domestically the norms it is trying to diffuse. In other words, does the EU “practice what it preaches” rather than projecting an idealized version of itself?<sup>43</sup> The literature on the EU climate leadership has been surprisingly silent on this question, though one recent contribution has begun to address this deficiency.<sup>44</sup>

Focusing on conscious attempts to frame new norms and ideas raises the question of whether and to what extent the EU sought actively to frame its engagement with China and India on climate change in terms that would be more likely to resonate with relevant domestic actors in China and India. Bicchi, for example, argues that EU external action has been motivated by the idea that “our size fits all”, that Europe’s experience is a lesson for everybody, and she suggests that “much of the EU’s action can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model because institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default option”.<sup>45</sup> To what extent do these characterizations of EU external action apply to the EU’s engagement with China and India on climate change? Building on this, a supplementary question concerns how the EU responds to

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<sup>41</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4; Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction”.

<sup>42</sup> Amitav Acharya, 2004, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”, *International Organization*, vol. 58, no. 2.

<sup>43</sup> For alternative answers to this question, see Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, 2002, “‘This is my EUtopia...’: Narrative as Power”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 4; and Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, 2007, “Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, no. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Parker & Karlsson argue, in the case of EU climate change policy, that “[c]heap talk, cheap acts and actions taken in the pursuit of naked self-interest undermine credibility and thus leadership”. Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson, 2010, “Climate Change and the European Union’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, no. 4, p. 926.

<sup>45</sup> Federica Bicchi, 2006, “‘Our size fits all’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 287. Emphasis in original.

resistance to its attempts to engage third countries. In particular, what happens when the practice of socialization is resisted, that is, when the norms and ideas being spread do not resonate with the target state? This issue has been neglected in much of the existing literature.<sup>46</sup> How does the EU respond to resistance and contestation to its attempts at diffusing ideas?<sup>47</sup> As Börzel and Risse note, the literature on EU norm diffusion has paid little attention to how the EU responds to contestation and resistance on the part of target-state actors.<sup>48</sup>

This relates, in turn, to the form of engagement—specifically the mechanisms of engagement employed and the capabilities of the EU. If engagement takes the form of socialization, some of the most relevant factors determining the response to engagement will include the degree to which the EU has the necessary capabilities to frame its engagement in terms that resonate with Chinese and Indian policymakers' pre-existing conceptions of material interest and their prior normative frames. In this regard, questions of institutional capacity, consistency, and coherence will be important—in particular as it relates to the EU ability to tailor its engagement to match pre-existing normative frames and perceptions of material interest. If engagement is incentive-based, we can expect the response to engagement to be more directly a function of the material resources devoted to engagement by the EU. The extent to which the EU is able to formulate consistent and coherent incentive-based policies and implement them are likely to be important also. If engagement is driven by a polity-building dynamic, it lacks substance and depth and takes a form in which the EU declares its leadership and claims to be developing engagement with China and India without devoting significant resources to these relationships. In these circumstances, there is likely to be significant frame dissonance and resistance on the part of third countries.

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<sup>46</sup> Börzel and Risse, *The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas*, p. 11.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

## 2.4 Conclusion

Departing from existing studies of EU leadership on climate change, this chapter has developed an analytical framework for assessing in a holistic manner the development of EU external engagement on climate change. The aim of doing so is to be able to assess the extent to which, and the conditions under which, the EU has exercised leadership with respect to China and India on climate change. The chapter has argued that EU engagement in this regard can best be analyzed by considering respectively the drivers of EU external engagement, the form of engagement, and the response of China and India to EU engagement. Moreover, these three elements of the framework are interconnected. The factors driving leadership motivation affect that form of engagement, and the form of engagement in turn affects the response to engagement.

This framework structures and guides the empirical analysis in the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 3 analyzes the factors which have driven the development of the EU's claims to leadership on climate change, focusing in particular on the categories of normative concern, material interest, and polity-building, and also traces the progressive deepening of EU-Asia relations. Building on the theoretical arguments above concerning the importance of normative frames and frame resonance, Chapter 4 compares systematically the positions of the EU, China, and India regarding key aspects of the global governance of climate change in order to identify the extent to which a "normative gap" exists between the two sides. This sets the basis for the case studies, which are analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6, and which focus both on the form of engagement and the response to engagement.

## Drivers of Engagement: The Development of the EU's Claim to “Climate Leadership”

The EU's engagement with China and India on climate change has been a function of the broader development of EU climate change policy. However, this has been a story of slow and uneven development. Initially, the EU approach to climate change was characterized by rhetorical claims to “climate leadership”—strong on aspiration and future-oriented targets, but lacking concrete Community-level policies to tackle the issue. Over time, however, the EU has succeeded in developing progressively a suite of climate change policies to underpin its previously-rhetorical claim to climate leadership. Nonetheless, even in the more recent period from 2000 to 2009, an emphasis has remained on proclaiming EU leadership rather than on developing sustained engagement with other significant players. A set of internal factors drove the development of EU climate change policy, facilitated by favourable external conditions. This chapter traces the development of EU climate change policy and, using the first part of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, identifies the factors that have driven these developments. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which normative, interest-based, and polity-building factors drove the development of EU climate policy over time. The aim of doing so is to seek to understand why EU external engagement has taken the form it has.

A second important part of the story is the way in which the broader EU-China and EU-India relationships have both facilitated and constrained the development of EU engagement with China and India on climate change. In particular, the deepening of EU-China and EU-India relations from the early 2000s onwards created an institutional framework within which the EU sought to develop engagement on climate change. These dynamics have played out somewhat differently in the two cases. The aim here is to set the context for the case study chapters by tracing broader trends in the development of EU climate change policy and EU-Asia relations. It is not possible to understand the development of EU engagement with China and India on climate change without looking at both of these sets of factors in combination. The analysis in this chapter proceeds chronologically. In order to identify the context in which EU climate leadership developed, Section 3.1 discusses the period prior to 1990, tracing the origins of EU climate change and environmental policy. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 analyze the period 1990–2009, with the periodization driven by key events that mark transitions in EU climate policy-making.

### **3.1 Precursors to EU Climate Change Policy**

While European and broader global concern about climate change as a political issue grew over the second half of the 1980s, the European desire to play a leading role on the issue at the global level built on a number of prior developments in the period from the early 1970s onwards. The Treaty of Rome, which founded the EEC, did not contain any reference to environmental policy, and the period up to 1972 is best understood as one of “incidental” environmental policy, where any such measures were enacted with a view to achieving the goal of market integration.<sup>1</sup> In external affairs, the Commission’s early interest in the environmental field was driven by a concern that differences in member state

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<sup>1</sup> Philipp Hildebrand, 1994, *Compliance in International Environmental Politics* (D.Phil dissertation, University of Oxford).

implementation of multilateral environmental agreements would lead to disparities which could hamper the functioning of the Common Market.<sup>2</sup>

In the early 1970s, building on the work of a number of international organizations, European policymakers began to pay greater attention to the notion of the environment as a political issue.<sup>3</sup> Building on a surge in awareness of environmental issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s that culminated in the Stockholm conference in 1972, the Paris EEC Summit of 1972 adopted a declaration which committed the Community to developing a common environment policy.<sup>4</sup> This represented a sea change in political opinion and led to the first European Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 1973 which, though non-binding, marked a watershed by acknowledging for the first time that economic growth was not an end in itself.<sup>5</sup>

However, it was a decade before the European Council revisited the theme of environmental protection in any depth.<sup>6</sup> Driven partly by Germany's conversion to a greener stance around this time, EU environmental policy underwent relatively rapid and profound transformation during the 1980s. This was also driven by rising public concern

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<sup>2</sup> Alberta M. Sbragia, 1998, "Institution-Building from Below and Above: The European Community in Global Environmental Politics", in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 286.

<sup>3</sup> Jan-Henrik Mayer, 2011, *Appropriating the Environment. How the European Institutions Received the Novel Idea of the Environment and Made it Their Own* (Berlin: Kolleg-Forscherguppe "The Transformative Power of Europe", Working Paper No. 31).

<sup>4</sup> The 1972 Summit concluded that "economic expansion is not an end in itself ... it should result in an improvement in the quality of life as well as in the standards of living". See Hildebrand, *Compliance in International Environmental Politics* (pp. 86-87; and Andrew Jordan, 1999, "Editorial Introduction: The Construction of a Multilevel Environmental Governance System", *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Jordan, "Editorial Introduction: The Construction of a Multilevel Environmental Governance System", p. 4. There have been five subsequent EAPs: 1977–1981 (second EAP), 1982–1986 (third EAP), 1987–1992 (fourth EAP), 1993–2001 (fifth EAP), and 2002–2012 (sixth EAP).

<sup>6</sup> This lack of attention to environmental issues was reflected institutionally in the fact that in the early years, the Commission's Environment and Consumer Protection Service (established in 1973), was a small unit in the Industry Directorate, and with just 15 staff struggled to raise political profile of environmental issues. Only in 1981 did the environment area get its own Commission Directorate General and Commissioner.

and attempts to achieve a single market.<sup>7</sup> In the mid- to late-1980s, two events marked the “coming of age” of EU-level environmental policy.<sup>8</sup> The first of these was the agreement by the European Council on the adoption of the Large Combustion Plant Directive, which dealt with acid-rain emissions. Successful conclusion of negotiations on this Directive in 1988, after 55 months of difficult negotiations, represented a landmark in the development of environmental policy at the EU level, and built on growing public concern regarding environmental issues generally during this period.

The second important development concerned the development of the EU’s external competence for environmental policy, which took place in the context of international negotiations regarding ozone-depleting substances. Multilateral negotiations on this issue began in Vienna in early 1982. Aside from the substantive issue of CFC production in these negotiations, another contentious issue concerned the issue of European Community participation, specifically whether the Community could become a signatory to the agreement being negotiated without any of the member states being obliged to sign. The European Court of Justice, in the “European Road Transport Agreement” case of 1971, had ruled that in areas where the Community had been given the power to legislate internally, it implicitly had been given the powers to act externally. In the case of the Vienna negotiations, the Commission sought that the Community be allowed to sign and ratify the agreement in order to expand Community competence—and therefore its own role—internally.<sup>9</sup> However, third countries were generally very reluctant to allow the Community to become a party to multilateral environmental agreements.<sup>10</sup> Following a last-minute, high-level political compromise with the United States, the Community was

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<sup>7</sup> Jordan, “Editorial Introduction: The Construction of a Multilevel Environmental Governance System”, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> See Sbragia, “Institution-Building from Below and Above: The European Community in Global Environmental Politics”, pp. 287-88.

<sup>10</sup> This was because of uncertainties over whether the Community collectively, or member states individually, would be responsible and liable for implementation of commitments.

permitted to sign the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer without all of its member states being obliged to do so as well.

Soon after the Vienna Convention had been signed, public opinion began to change in response to increasing scientific evidence, and negotiations on a protocol to the Convention commenced in December 1986. Two groups emerged in these negotiations: the United States, Canada, Norway, and Sweden favoured a global ban on use of CFCs as aerosol propellants but no limit on any other uses of CFCs; and an EU-led coalition which favoured a blanket production capacity limit. After a change of leadership at the US Environmental Protection Agency, the United States changed position and accepted, in late 1986, an EU proposal for an immediate freeze in CFC production and also called for steps leading to a 95 percent reduction.<sup>11</sup> Significantly, the final negotiations on the Montreal Protocol saw disagreements again over the nature of EU participation. In the final deal, the United States agreed to allow the European Community to sign the Protocol on condition that all member states would also sign, in return for EU concessions on CFC reductions.<sup>12</sup>

The development of both Community-level environmental policy and a prominent role for the EU in the ozone negotiations during the 1980s laid the groundwork for a future European claim to leadership as the climate issue emerged on the global political agenda from the end of the 1980s onwards. Institutionally and legally, the Single European Act of 1987 provided the first formal legal basis for Community environmental policy. Title VII on “Environment”, enumerated an international role for the EU in this field.<sup>13</sup> In the course of the negotiations on the Montreal Protocol, the EU made a notable contribution to the substance of the agreement and also managed to ensure that the Protocol was signed

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<sup>11</sup> John McCormick, 2001, *Environmental Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 272-73.

<sup>12</sup> Markus Jachtenfuchs, 1990, “The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 267.

<sup>13</sup> In terms of external policies, the SEA established that one of the EU’s objectives in environmental policy should be “promotion at an international level of measures required for dealing with regional and international problems” (Art. 130r).

by the European Community as a separate entity from the member states, thereby facing down US pressure. This, combined with the successful conclusion of the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the institutional consolidation of Community competence for environmental policy, gave the EU a new-found self confidence in the growing realm of global environmental politics. This, in turn, set the basis for the future development of the EU's claim to leadership on the emerging issue of climate change.

### **3.2 Declaration of Leadership and Limited Policy Development: 1988–1999**

Until 1988, the year of the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), discussion of climate change did not feature to any significant degree in the EU policy-making sphere. Indicative of this was the fact that in the Fourth Environmental Action Plan, published in 1987, climate change appeared under the research sub-programme on “climatology and natural hazards, addressing long-term problems such as possible climatic changes due to an increase of the CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere”, but was not considered an issue for policy-making at Community level or, indeed, within most of the member states.<sup>14</sup> However, during the late 1980s a series of international conferences attracted increasing participation by policy-makers as well as scientists from around the world, representing a transition of the issue from the scientific to the political realm.<sup>15</sup>

Initially, the process of raising the profile of the climate issue at EU level was driven by rising normative concern regarding environmental protection, particularly in a number of “pioneer” member states. In Germany, climate change was put on the political agenda in

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<sup>14</sup> Markus Jachtenfuchs and Michael Huber, 1993, “Institutional Learning in the European Community: The Response to the Greenhouse Effect”, in J. Duncan Liefferink, Philip D. Lowe, and Arthur P. J. Mol, eds., *European Integration and Environmental Policy* (London: Belhaven Press), p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this international process. Daniel Bodansky, 2001, “The History of the Global Climate Change Regime”, in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz, eds., *International Relations and Global Climate Change* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 85-88.

1987 when the *Bundestag* set up the “Enquete Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth’s Atmosphere”. The Enquete Commission proposed a greenhouse gas reduction target for Germany of 30 percent by 2005, and minimum targets for other industrialized countries of 20–25 percent relative to 1987 levels.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, in 1989 the Netherlands became the first country in the world to set a nation-wide CO<sub>2</sub> target. The Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan of that year set a target of stabilizing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2000. Following the 1989 national elections, during which climate change became a key issue, this target was strengthened to a reduction of 3–5 percent by 2000 in the “National Environmental Policy Plan Plus”, which also set a long-term goal of a 60 percent reduction over the following 100 years.<sup>17</sup> Another early—and somewhat unlikely—participant in the climate debate was UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who became one of the first heads of government to express public concern about climate change in high profile speeches to the UK Royal Society and the UN General Assembly in 1988. However, this rhetoric was not backed up with action and, significantly, the UK worked hard to resist action at EU level in the following years.<sup>18</sup>

During this initial period, the EU institutions played differing roles. The European Parliament requested a common climate change policy as early as 1986.<sup>19</sup> The Parliament’s role was underpinned by strong normative support for environmental protection, which was strengthened considerably by the “green tide” elections in 1989 in which the share of votes for green parties almost tripled to 7.7 percent, from 2.7 in the 1984 elections,

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<sup>16</sup> Martin Jänicke, 2010, “German Climate Change Policy: Political and Economic Leadership”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 132.

<sup>17</sup> Duncan Liefferink and Kathrin Birkel, 2010, “The Netherlands: A Case of ‘Cost-Free Leadership’”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), pp. 148-49.

<sup>18</sup> Tim Rayner and Andrew Jordan, 2010, “The United Kingdom: A Paradoxical Leader?”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), pp. 97-98.

<sup>19</sup> Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, 2010, “Introduction: European Union Political Leadership in International Climate Change Politics”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 5.

including significant gains for green parties in France and the UK.<sup>20</sup> This change was driven primarily by concern about other environmental issues, including acid rain in northern Europe, the ozone layer, and—most of all—concern over nuclear safety following the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. While knowledge regarding climate change among European electorates was limited during this period, the strengthening of the green voice in the Parliament put it in a better position to respond to this emerging issue. However, the Parliament's role consisted mainly of seeking to set the agenda. Due to its limited formal role in environmental policy-making prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, the role of the Parliament was limited to consciousness-raising rather than substantive input into policy-making.<sup>21</sup>

The European Commission, by contrast, was slow to respond to the emergence of the climate issue. In July 1988, the Commission created an inter-service group to “elaborate ... preliminary ideas” about “possible Community action in respect of the ‘Greenhouse Issue’”. This group contributed to the Commission's first communication on climate change, published in November 1988. However, it constituted a programme to evaluate possible policy options rather than the elaboration of a policy in itself, and suggested that emission reductions were not a “realistic objective”.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, it marked the formal

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<sup>20</sup> John Curtice, 1989, “The 1989 European Election: Protest or Green Tide?”, *Electoral Studies*, vol. 8, no. 3.

<sup>21</sup> While the Maastricht Treaty introduced the “codecision” procedure which increased the formal powers of the Parliament, this procedure was only extended to most areas of environmental policy (the exceptions were land use planning, water management, and fiscal measures) under the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Charlotte Burns and Neil Carter, 2010, “The European Parliament and Climate Change: From Symbolism to Heroism and Back Again”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge).

<sup>22</sup> Commission of the European Communities, 1988, *Communication to the Council: “The Greenhouse Effect and the Community” - Commission Work Programme Concerning the Evaluation of Policy Options to Deal With the “Greenhouse Effect”*, COM (88) 656 final, 16 November 1988.

commencement of policy-making on climate change at the EU level and demonstrated the interest of the Commission from an early stage in being involved with the process.<sup>23</sup>

However, within a relatively short space of time, the climate issue came to be viewed by the Commission through a polity-building lens as a means to enhance the process of European integration, and the role of the Commission. Two particularly important figures promoting this perspective were Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana and Commission President Jacques Delors. Ripa di Meana was a former Green MEP and an ardent integrationist who “believed that EU leadership in this area would deepen political integration within Europe as well as enhance the EU’s credibility overseas”.<sup>24</sup> This framing of the issue was also strongly supported by the “Forward Studies Unit”, a small group advising Commission President Jacques Delors on major policy issues. That group succeeded in shifting the climate change issue from being an environmental problem to being one that involved the future of the Community.<sup>25</sup>

Related to this internal element of polity-building was an external dimension, namely a growing belief among European policy-makers that climate change represented an opportunity to develop the global role of the EU through providing leadership to the rest of the world on the issue. This framing of the issue was enabled and facilitated by a confluence of favourable international circumstances, including optimistic visions of a new liberal world order as the Cold War came to an end and, importantly, increasing evidence that the United States would not assume the kind of global leadership it had undertaken on in the 1970s and 1980s on environmental issues. This created something of a leadership vacuum on the climate issue, and it was in this context that climate change first appeared

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<sup>23</sup> Andrew Jordan and Tim Rayner, 2010, “The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview”, in Andrew Jordan, *et al.*, eds., *Climate Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 54-55.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> Jachtenfuchs and Huber, “Institutional Learning in the European Community: The Response to the Greenhouse Effect”, p. 43.

on the agenda of a European Council meeting in Dublin in June 1990. The Dublin European Council Conclusions called for “targets and strategies” to be agreed on limiting EU emissions and was explicit in elaborating the potential for European leadership:

The Community and its Member States have a special responsibility to encourage and participate in international action to combat global environmental problems. Their capacity to provide leadership in this field is enormous.<sup>26</sup>

This framing of the issue was evident also, for example, in a speech by Commissioner Ripa di Meana to the European Parliament seeking support for the Commission’s package of climate change policies prior to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio:

Given ... the significant degree of institutional progress, I hope that the House will continue to support a proposal which, as well as being important for our energy systems and the environment, will contribute towards European integration and the credibility of the European Community at international level.<sup>27</sup>

In the context of this desire to build a climate leadership role, and on the eve of the Second World Climate Change Conference in November 1990, a joint meeting of EU energy and environment ministers agreed on a “stabilization target” for EU greenhouse gas emissions, under which emissions were to be stabilized at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Significantly, though, the Council did not specify how this target was to be achieved, what measures could be introduced at the EU level, or how the overall EU target was to be divided up among member states. The target was, in fact, little more than the sum of existing unilateral targets set by the largest member states, though it was still significantly more ambitious

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<sup>26</sup> Cited in Oriol Costa, 2008, “Is Climate Change Changing the EU? The Second Image Reversed in Climate Politics”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 534.

<sup>27</sup> Jachtenfuchs and Huber, “Institutional Learning in the European Community: The Response to the Greenhouse Effect”, p. 43.

than what other states were offering.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the role played by the EU—as distinct from individual member states—at the final negotiations on the UNFCCC in New York in April–May 1992 was limited.<sup>29</sup> In the absence of a unified EU presence, the UK was able to achieve a compromise in the negotiations with the United States, but the international actorship of the EU was limited during the final stages of the UNFCCC negotiations. These difficulties reflected large divisions between member states on the issue, and stemmed from the fact that, at this time, normative concern regarding the necessity of combating climate change was not shared across the EU. Rather, the driving dynamic at this time at EU level was one of polity-building.

This dynamic of limited normative convergence within the EU can also be seen in the EU's failed attempts to formulate Community-level climate change policies in the first half of the 1990s. The Commission sought to use the Council's decision to develop a global leadership role during the UNFCCC negotiations as an opportunity to strengthen its own role and further the process of polity-building by arguing that if the EU wanted to lead, it would need to adopt strong domestic policies to control emissions.<sup>30</sup> On the eve of the final UNFCCC negotiations, the Commission launched an integrated package of proposals for climate change policies which consisted of a framework directive to conserve energy and improve energy efficiency, a decision to support the development of renewable energy, a decision to establish a monitoring mechanism for CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and a directive to introduce a tax on the carbon/energy content of fuels.<sup>31</sup> The first two of these were eventually adopted as the "SAVE" (energy efficiency and conservation) and "ALTENER" (renewable energy) programmes, but were severely watered down by member states before

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<sup>28</sup> Jordan and Rayner, "The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview", p. 57.

<sup>29</sup> Nigel Haigh, 1996, "Climate Change Policies and Politics in the European Community", in Tim O'Riordan and Jill Jäger, eds., *The Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective* (London: Routledge).

<sup>30</sup> Costa, "Is Climate Change Changing the EU? The Second Image Reversed in Climate Politics", pp. 534-35.

<sup>31</sup> Jordan and Rayner, "The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview", pp. 58-59.

adoption.<sup>32</sup> The third element of the package created a “monitoring mechanism” for CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse gas emissions in member states, under which member states were required to establish and communicate to the Commission “national programmes” for limiting their greenhouse gas emissions, as well as information on their level of greenhouse gas emissions. On the basis of the information provided, the Commission was mandated to review progress towards fulfilment of the EU’s international obligations.<sup>33</sup>

By far the most controversial of the four elements of the package was the carbon/energy tax proposal. This would likely have had a substantial effect on EU emissions levels and was supported by some member states, but it was strongly opposed by a number of other member states, most notably the UK, on the basis that it interfered with national sovereignty in the sensitive area of fiscal policy. When, on 26 May 1992, the Environment Council failed to agree to the Commission’s proposal, Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana refused to attend the Rio Summit, leaving the EU delegation to the Summit leaderless and in a state of shock, and he subsequently resigned from the Commission altogether.<sup>34</sup> The carbon-energy tax proposal was not helped by broader developments in the European integration process. The Maastricht Treaty, in which the environment was listed as a policy goal in the opening articles and which extended Qualified Majority Voting to most areas of environmental policy, was rejected by the Danish electorate. This triggered a debate about the principle of subsidiarity which put EU environmental policy on the defensive.<sup>35</sup> In the wake of the Danish “no” vote, several member states drew up a “hit

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 60-61.

<sup>33</sup> Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemarts, 2010, “The EU’s Internal and External Climate Policies: An Historical Overview”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemarts, eds., *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy* (Brussels: Brussels University Press), pp. 31-32.

<sup>34</sup> Officially, Ripa di Meana resigned to take up the position of Environment Minister in the Italian Government, but it was widely reported that his resignation was due to the rejection of the carbon/energy tax proposal by the Council. Jordan and Rayner, “The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview”, p. 60; New Scientist, 1992, “Ripa Goes Home”, 4 July 1992.

<sup>35</sup> Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel, 2008, “Environmental Policy: EU Actors, Leader and Laggard States”, in Jack Hayward, ed., *Leaderless Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 74-75.

list” of legislation for repeal or possible repatriation to the national level, among which environmental policies featured prominently.<sup>36</sup>

Despite a determined effort, therefore, attempts by the Commission to push Community legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions were significantly curtailed by member states. While the Commission attempted to use the climate issue to support its polity-building efforts, policy foundered both because of principled opposition from member states but also because there was limited shared normative commitment to combating climate change at this time. The defeat of the flagship carbon/energy tax proposal, in particular, meant that EU-level policy-making stalled for a number of years. This balance of interests within the Council prevailed for most of the rest of the decade, and the accession of three “pioneer” member states with respect to environmental policy in 1995—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—did not significantly alter the policy orientation of the Council initially. This was due to the fact that these new member states had limited institutional experience and political weight within the Council at first, and could not undo the unanimity requirement applying to large parts of energy-related climate policies.<sup>37</sup>

With the failure to formulate Community-level domestic climate policies, during the mid- to late-1990s the development of EU climate change policy continued to be driven primarily by a polity-building dynamic. This point can be illustrated in a number of ways. First, the Council continued to frame EU participation in the international process as an opportunity play a leading role on the international stage.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the EU in many

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<sup>36</sup> Jordan and Rayner, “The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview”, p. 60.

<sup>37</sup> Duncan Liefferink and Mikael Skou Andersen, 1998, “Strategies of the ‘Green’ Member States in EU Environmental Policy-making”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2.

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, the Environment Council conclusions from December 1995, March 1997, and October 1998. Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Dupont, 2010, “The Council, the European Council and International Climate Policy: From Symbolic Leadership to Leadership by Example”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 85.

respects drove the UNFCCC process between Rio in 1992 and Kyoto in 1997. Second, the Commission attempted to use the Kyoto Protocol negotiations to strengthen its role by requesting a formal mandate to coordinate the EU's position in the negotiations, but this request was rejected firmly by the Council, thereby maintaining the intergovernmental nature of EU external climate policy-making.<sup>39</sup>

Internally, the Council continued to consider and adopt strong targets, again without any clear basis on which these would be achieved. In June 1996, the Environment Council established the objective that “global average temperatures should not exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial level”.<sup>40</sup> In March 1997, under a Dutch Presidency and in preparation for COP-3 in Kyoto later that year, the European Council proposed that, as part of an agreement at Kyoto, industrialized countries should reduce their emissions of the three main greenhouse gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, and N<sub>2</sub>O) by 15 percent relative to 1990 levels by 2010, and in June 1997, an interim target of 7.5 percent by 2005 was agreed. The most significant event prior to COP-3 in Kyoto was the agreement by the March European Council on an internal “burden-sharing” agreement, that is, an agreement on how an overall target would be allocated among the member states. However, this agreement only added up to a total reduction of 9.2 percent, with the detail of how the gap between that and 15 percent to be bridged after the conclusion of an international agreement.<sup>41</sup>

In the final negotiations at Kyoto, the EU was forced to make several key concessions to the United States on significant aspects of the Protocol design. Nonetheless, the EU succeeded in its core goal of a “binding” international agreement with quantified emission

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<sup>39</sup> Jordan and Rayner, “The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in the European Union: An Historical Overview”, p. 63.

<sup>40</sup> Oberthür and Pallemerts, “The EU's Internal and External Climate Policies: An Historical Overview”, p. 33. This “two degree” target has remained central to the EU position right up to the present—the EU succeeded in having it included in the “Copenhagen Accord” of December 2009.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

limitation or reduction obligations for industrialized countries.<sup>42</sup> Under the Protocol, the EU agreed to a Community target of an 8 percent reduction below 1990 levels to be achieved during the period 2008–2012. This necessitated a renegotiation of the March 1997 burden-sharing agreement, a task which fell to the UK Presidency of the EU in the first half of 1998. Political agreement on sharing the burden of this revised target was agreed by the Council in June 1998, and was codified in law four years later following agreement on the Marrakech Accords which operationalized key aspects of the Protocol.

Overall, then, in the period up to 1999 the development of EU climate change policies was dominated by a polity-building dynamic, according to which the EU claimed an international leadership role for itself with respect to climate change but for the most part failed to substantiate this role through the development of strong Community-level climate change policies. While the initial dynamics of the climate issue in the late 1980s was driven by growing normative concern regarding climate change and a broader range of environmental issues, these concerns were to some extent limited to a smaller number of “pioneer” member states. Normative commitment to combating climate change during this period was not sufficiently widespread or deep across the EU to facilitate the development of strong Community-level climate policies. There was, moreover, little by way of material interest driving the development of EU claims to climate leadership during this period.

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<sup>42</sup> Although the commitments (“quantified emission limitation or reduction obligations”) for Annex I Parties set out in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol are legally binding, the compliance mechanism of the Protocol, agreed at COP-7 in Marrakech in 2001 and adopted by CMP-1 in Montreal in 2005, is *not* legally binding. For further discussion, see Anita Halvorssen and Jon Hovi, 2006, “The Nature, Origin, and Impact of Legally Binding Consequences: The Case of the Climate Regime”, *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, vol. 6, no. 2; Sebastian Oberthür and René Lefeber, 2010, “Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revisited after Four Years of Experience”, *Climate Law*, vol. 1, no. 1; Diarmuid Torney and Noriko Fujiwara, “National Commitments, Compliance and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol”, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 226, 2010); and Xueman Wang and Glenn Wisner, 2002, “The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol”, *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, vol. 11, no. 2.

This combination of factors provides part of the explanation for why EU engagement with China and India on climate change was very limited during the period up to 1999. A second part of the answer can be found in the dynamics of EU-Asia relations, which further constrained the possibilities for EU external engagement. The development of EU-Asia relations built on longer-term efforts to build common EU external relations. European cooperation on what classically would be considered the realm of “high politics” can be dated to the creation of European Political Co-operation (EPC), the predecessor of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was formed in October 1970 and involved regular meetings of foreign ministers. Modifications over subsequent years included an increase in the number of foreign ministers’ meetings and the introduction of a crisis consultation mechanism.<sup>43</sup> The dynamism of the Single Market at the end of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War generated expectations that the EU would take on a greater international role.

From the mid-1990s onwards, the EU paid increasing attention to the emergence of China and India as economic powers, but also as growing political powers. This reorientation was driven, first, by a recognition of the growing economic strength of Asia, stemming from the rise of the “Newly Industrialized Countries” from the 1980s onwards but also, increasingly, by the growth of the “Asian Tiger” economies and, not least, by the fast growth of the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, China showed increasing interest during the early 1990s in rejoining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and there was growing recognition on the European side that Chinese accession to the multilateral trade regime was essential to help ensure access to the Chinese market, protect intellectual property rights, and reduce market distortions.<sup>44</sup> The new

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<sup>43</sup> For a detailed history of European Political Co-operation, see Simon J. Nuttall, 1992, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

<sup>44</sup> China was a founding member of GATT, in 1948, but withdrew two years later following the victory of the Communists in the Chinese civil war.

recognition of the importance of Asia by the EU was also driven by a realization that the United States was significantly ahead of Europe developing ties with the Asian continent. The agreement by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group of 21 states in 1994 to move to free trade by 2020 created a strong incentive for the EU to seek to develop its relationship with Asia.<sup>45</sup>

As well as the development of a focus on the economic opportunities provided by the rise of Asia, there was also recognition within the EU that the growing economic strength of Asia would have regional and global political implications. The Commission's 1994 communication on relations with Asia, "Towards a New Asia Strategy", drew attention to the fact that "Asia's growing economic weight is inevitably generating increasing pressures for a greater role in world affairs".<sup>46</sup> The challenge of managing this power transition was framed within the EU in terms of the need to integrate the emerging Asian powers, particularly China, but also India to a somewhat lesser extent, into the existing norms and institutions of world politics, encouraging them to take on the responsibilities that would benefit their growing status. Although the Commission's 1994 Asia Strategy represented a first attempt to bring together economic and political aspects of Europe's engagement with Asia, the focus was still primarily on economic relations.<sup>47</sup>

The Commission's 1994 Asia Strategy was followed by strategy documents on relations with China (1995) and India (1996). The Commission's China Strategy framed the development of relations with China in terms of "Constructive Engagement".<sup>48</sup> The Commission's India Strategy framed India's rise similarly in terms of the need to integrate

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<sup>45</sup> Geoffrey Edwards, 2005, "The Pattern of the EU's Global Activity", in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds., *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 49.

<sup>46</sup> European Commission, 1994, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: Towards a New Asia Strategy*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(94) 314 final, 13 July 1994, pp. 1-2.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> European Commission, 1995, *Communication of the Commission: A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(1995) 279 final, p. 5.

India into international institutions on the condition that India would accept “the international responsibilities and Treaties that befit a major world power”.<sup>49</sup> Of course, this new framing EU-Asia relations in terms of politics as well as economics was part of a strategy that sought to develop the global political role of the Union itself, thereby contributing to a process of EU polity-building. However, it was not until the end of the 1990s that the bilateral EU relationships with China and India were upgraded through the establishment of annual summits at head of state or government level. The first EU-China summit was held in London in March 1998, while the first EU-India summit was held in Lisbon in June 2000.

The EU-Asia relationship developed institutionally at an interregional level in 1996 with the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process under the heading “Towards a New Asia-Europe Partnership for Greater Growth”, the centrepiece of which was—and continues to be—biannual, high-level but informal summits.<sup>50</sup> Membership comprised initially the EU member states plus the Commission on the European side, and the ten members of ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea on the Asian side. India joined only in 2008.<sup>51</sup> Originally an initiative of Singapore, one of the underlying aims of the ASEM process was to restore the troubled EU-ASEAN relationship. The EU side has embraced the process, given its preference for developing relations at the interregional

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<sup>49</sup> European Commission, 1996, *Communication from the Commission: EU-India Enhanced Partnership*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(96) 275 final, 26 June 1996, p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> Georg Wiessala, 2002, *The European Union and Asian Countries* (London: Sheffield Academic Press), p. 76. For more detailed histories of the ASEM process, see Richard Balme and Brian Bridges, 2008, *Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); and Bart Gaens, 2008, *Europe-Asia Interregional Relations: A Decade of ASEM* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

<sup>51</sup> Mongolia and Pakistan also joined in 2008, and Australia, Russia, and New Zealand joined in 2010.

level. China was initially less enthusiastic, but has been more willing to engage in more recent years.<sup>52</sup>

In short, during the period up to 1999 the EU did not have the institutional mechanisms through which it could develop engagement with China or India on climate change. Institutionalized bilateral relations were still relatively underdeveloped, and despite attempts by the EU to reframe these relationships towards a more political orientation, they remained predominantly oriented towards economic issues. Added to this was the fact that EU climate change policy during the 1990s was driven primarily by a polity-building dynamic, and accordingly the EU's repeated claims to international leadership were not underpinned by any significant development of climate change policies.

### **3.3 US Withdrawal and the Development of Community-Level Climate Policies: 2000–2004**

Entering the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the external context had a catalytic effect on the landscape of EU climate change policy-making. Arguably the most important event in the international politics of climate change during this period was the decision by the newly-elected US President, George W. Bush, not to submit the Kyoto Protocol to Congress for ratification. The Kyoto Protocol had been signed by the Clinton Administration in 1997, and indeed US negotiators at COP-3 in Kyoto had a significant impact on the shape of the Protocol, for instance by insisting on the inclusion of the so-called “flexible mechanisms” against the strong wishes of the EU.<sup>53</sup> However, a matter of months after his inauguration, US President George W. Bush announced in March 2001 that he would not submit the Kyoto Protocol to Congress for ratification.

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<sup>52</sup> Bart Gaens, 2009, “The Development of the EU's Asia Strategy with Special Reference to China and India: Driving Forces and New Directions”, in Bart Gaens, Juha Jokela, and Eija Limnell, eds., *The Role of the European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners* (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate), p. 63.

<sup>53</sup> These flexible mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and Emissions Trading.

While Bush's symbolic withdrawal from Kyoto was undoubtedly politically significant, the attention which it drew conceals significant elements of continuity in the US approach to tackling climate change at the international level.<sup>54</sup> Domestic constraints dictated that no US Government of any complexion would have ratified Kyoto under any likely circumstances. US agreement at Kyoto was purely symbolic, since President Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore knew that the Protocol could never be ratified by the Senate because it imposed emission reduction or limitation commitments on developed countries but not on developing countries. This was contrary to the position laid out in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed by the Senate in July 1997 by 95 votes to 0.<sup>55</sup>

The US decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol influenced each of the three drivers of EU engagement set out in the conceptual framework in Chapter 2 in inter-related ways. In the first instance, it strengthened the argument for developing a distinctive role for the EU in world affairs by creating a means through which the EU could differentiate itself from the United States. "Saving" the Kyoto Protocol became not just an environmental goal, but also a key goal of an emergent EU foreign policy by heightening European identification with the Kyoto Protocol. US withdrawal was symbolically important, and generated a strong reaction from European leaders and government ministers both individually<sup>56</sup> and

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<sup>54</sup> For an elaboration of this argument, see Matthew Paterson, 2009, "Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 1.

<sup>55</sup> The Byrd-Hagel Resolution expressed the view that the US should not sign any new protocol that would "mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties [developed countries], unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period". See S.RES.98, "Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Conditions for the United States Becoming a Signatory to Any International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the United Nations", United States Senate, 25 July 1997, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105sres98ats/pdf/BILLS-105sres98ats.pdf> (accessed 13 September 2011).

<sup>56</sup> Among those to express concern publicly in the days following the US announcement were German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac, European Commission President Romano Prodi, UK Environment Minister Michael Meacher, Swedish Environment Minister Kjell Larssen, and EU Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom. See BBC, 2001, "Anger at US Climate Retreat", BBC News website, 29 March 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1248278.stm>, (accessed on 26 July 2011); and BBC, 2001, "Europe Backs Kyoto Accord", BBC News website, 31 March 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1252556.stm>, (accessed on 26 July 2011).

collectively at an informal meeting of EU environment ministers in Kiruna, Sweden at the end of March 2001.<sup>57</sup>

This position was confirmed at the highest level by the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001, which took the decision to proceed with ratification of, and support for, the Kyoto Protocol in the absence of US support.<sup>58</sup> The subsequent conclusion of negotiations on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-6 bis in Bonn in July 2001, and COP-7 in Marrakech in October/November 2001, was a direct consequence of the EU decision to proceed with the Kyoto Protocol without the United States.<sup>59</sup> In the following years, the EU focused on securing entry into force of the Protocol and, in one of its most notable foreign policy achievements on climate change, managed to secure Russian ratification of the Protocol by linking this to support for Russian accession to the World Trade Organization.<sup>60</sup>

Of course, in one sense there was nothing new about European leaders using the climate issue to develop the global role of the EU, and thereby contribute to the process of European polity-building—the climate issue had been used since the early 1990s as an instrument of polity-building by European institutional actors who advocated the development of EU leadership on the issue of climate change. However, while the US withdrawal from Kyoto certainly contributed to these dynamics, what is significant about the early years of the 2000s is that the actions of the United States also served to strengthen the normative and material-interest bases for EU climate leadership. First, the transformation of the climate issue from a sectoral policy issue into a high-politics, core-

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<sup>57</sup> BBC, “Europe Backs Kyoto Accord”.

<sup>58</sup> European Council, 2001, *Presidency Conclusions - Göteborg European Council, 15-16 June 2001*, SN 200/1/01 REV 1.

<sup>59</sup> John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, 2006, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change”, *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 3.

<sup>60</sup> For a more detailed account, see Chad Damro, 2006, “EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective Multilateralism”, in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, eds., *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

identity issue for the EU had a significant impact on domestic political coalitions within the EU. It strengthened the relative influence of those with a strong normative commitment to combating climate change by increasing the political appeal of leading the international climate negotiations and developing strong internal climate policies.<sup>61</sup> This new consensus generated new momentum in the EU's actions both at the international level and internally.

Second, the firm decision of European leaders to proceed with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol changed the material-interest basis of EU climate change policy. Since the EU was now firmly committed to ratifying the Protocol and reducing greenhouse gas emission in order to fulfil its Kyoto commitments, it became increasingly important for the EU at the international level to persuade other countries to join this effort and, internally, to reframe climate policy so as to emphasise opportunities and de-emphasize costs. It was in this context that, in the early years of the 21st century, the orientation of key member states began to shift as well towards viewing climate change increasingly as an opportunity. The “Red-Green” coalition in Germany, which had come to power in 1998, based its environmental and climate change policies around the concept of “ecological modernization” which viewed environmental policy as an opportunity to promote domestic innovation. The coalition adopted a “Climate Protection Programme” in 2000 which established several new regulations and sectoral emission reduction targets for the period to 2005, though not all of these targets were achieved.<sup>62</sup> During this period, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair increasingly framed climate change as an opportunity. For example, in 2004, he argued that “the very act of solving [climate change] can unleash a new and benign commercial force ... providing jobs, technology spin-offs and new business opportunities”.<sup>63</sup> This reconceptualization of the issue was reflected in the conclusions of the Council as well. In contrast to the 1990s, when it merely acknowledged that action was

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<sup>61</sup> Costa, “Is Climate Change Changing the EU? The Second Image Reversed in Climate Politics”, p. 537.

<sup>62</sup> Jänicke, “German Climate Change Policy: Political and Economic Leadership”, pp. 133-34.

<sup>63</sup> Cited in Rayner and Jordan, “The United Kingdom: A Paradoxical Leader?”, p. 102.

technically and economically possible, from 2000 onwards, the Council began to pay more attention to the economic benefits associated with combating climate change.<sup>64</sup>

In short, while the EU claim to climate leadership in the early years of the 21st century continued to be motivated by a concern with building a distinctive role for the EU externally and an EU polity internally, the key difference during this period compared to the 1990s was that this polity-building dynamic was now underpinned by strengthened normative concern and material interest among key actors. It was in these more favourable domestic circumstances, which were driven in turn by the changed international context resulting primarily from US withdrawal from Kyoto, that progress finally began to be made towards formulating Community policies for greenhouse gas emission reduction within the EU. A range of EU legislation was adopted dealing *inter alia* with eco-design requirements, energy end-use efficiency, energy services, energy performance in buildings, biofuels, combined heat and power, and reduction of emission of fluorinated greenhouse gases.<sup>65</sup>

The centrepiece of Community policymaking on climate change during this period was the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The decision to move forward with the creation of an ETS represented a significant departure for the EU, since the EU strongly opposed the so-called “flexible mechanisms” including emissions trading during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. It thus represented a shift in policy-making philosophy away from the direct regulation approach of the 1990s, and towards an emphasis on market mechanisms.<sup>66</sup> The process was driven significantly by the Commission which acted as a policy entrepreneur, and can therefore be seen partly through a polity-building lens. Proposing a market-based

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<sup>64</sup> Oberthür and Dupont, “The Council, the European Council and International Climate Policy: From Symbolic Leadership to Leadership by Example”, pp. 86-87.

<sup>65</sup> Oberthür and Pallemarts, “The EU's Internal and External Climate Policies: An Historical Overview”, pp. 42-43.

<sup>66</sup> See Chapter 4 for further discussion of how the positions of the respective players changed on the issue of market mechanisms over time.

approach, rather than direct regulation, worked very much in the Commission's favour.<sup>67</sup> The failed carbon/energy tax of the 1990s had foundered in the Council because of the requirement for unanimity voting on matters of a fiscal nature. In this instance, the Commission was able to proceed with the EU-ETS proposal on the basis of Qualified Majority Voting, which facilitated the process of adopting the proposal in the Council.<sup>68</sup>

In response to a request from the Council, the Commission had launched in March 2000 a green paper on emissions trading, which made the case that the EU should establish an intra-EU emissions trading scheme to build experience in advance of the establishment of emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 onwards.<sup>69</sup> In June 2000, the Commission established the "European Climate Change Programme" (ECCP), a multi-stakeholder process which was tasked with developing proposals for EU climate policy to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The ECCP became a key institutional means through which the Commission was able to build a coalition in favour of creating an EU-wide ETS.

The creation of the ETS was not, however, purely a story of polity-building efforts by the Commission. The process was also facilitated by key member states who were driven by material-interest considerations. In anticipation of the creation of an EU-wide ETS, the UK and Denmark both introduced national-level emissions trading schemes in order to give their domestic industries prior experience and first-mover advantage.<sup>70</sup> This, in turn, strengthened the Commission's argument that an EU-wide ETS should be introduced in order to avoid the market distortions that a series of national ETSs would generate. Furthermore, the whole process of creating the ETS was boosted by the galvanizing effect

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<sup>67</sup> Jon Birger Skjærseth and Jørgen Wettestad, 2007, *EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and Implementation* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

<sup>68</sup> Frank Convery, 2009, "Origins and Development of the EU ETS", *Environmental Resource Economics*, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 393.

<sup>69</sup> European Commission, 2000, *Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2000) 87 final, 8 March 2000.

<sup>70</sup> Rayner and Jordan, "The United Kingdom: A Paradoxical Leader?", p. 102.

of the US withdrawal from Kyoto which, as discussed above, elevated the climate issue to become an identity marker for the EU. Despite initial resistance from Germany and watering down by other member states, the EU Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) was adopted in 2003, which set caps on the emissions of large installations accounting for approximately 40 percent of total EU emissions.<sup>71</sup> Phase I of the EU-ETS commenced at the beginning of 2005 and ran until the end of 2007.

There was also a strong external dimension to the ETS, was brought about by the decision to “link” the internal ETS to the other two flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, namely the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) and “Joint Implementation” (JI). Under these mechanisms, industrialized countries can fund projects in developing countries and offset the resulting emissions reductions generated by CDM and JI projects against their own domestic emission reduction commitments. This was done through the “Linking Directive” (2004/101/EC), which thereby generated demand for credits from CDM projects. In the absence of the linking of the CDM and JI with the EU-ETS, there would have been vastly lower demand for “Certified Emission Reductions”, the credits generated by CDM projects. This would prove to be particularly consequential for China and India who—somewhat unexpectedly given their initial lukewarm reaction to the flexible mechanisms—have been host to the lion’s share of CDM projects.<sup>72</sup> More broadly, the EU-ETS, and market mechanisms more generally, became an increasingly central aspect of the EU’s approach to international cooperation on climate change during the following years. Creating a “global carbon market” formed an important part of the EU strategy for the negotiations on a post-2012 regime.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Oberthür and Dupont, “The Council, the European Council and International Climate Policy: From Symbolic Leadership to Leadership by Example”, p. 81.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapters 5 and 6 for further discussion of the development of CDM projects in each case.

<sup>73</sup> For one example of this ambition stated explicitly, see the Environment Council conclusions from March and December 2009: Council of the European Union, 2009, *Contribution to the Spring European Council (19 and*

In parallel to the progressive deepening of the EU's internal and external policies on climate change, the development of EU external engagement on climate change was also mediated, enabled, and constrained in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by a progressive deepening of EU relations with Asia. In 2001, the Commission published a new EU strategy for relations with Asia, entitled "A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships".<sup>74</sup> This strategy was characterized by two principal features. First, it placed a greater emphasis on the EU as a global political—and not just economic—power. It sought to construct the EU's relations with Asia in these terms, taking further steps towards trying to rebalance the relationship and to increase its focus on political and strategic issues. Although this had been a stated aim in the development of EU relations with Asia in the 1990s, it assumed a more prominent role in the 2000s.

Second, the new approach focused attention on the need to engage new regional powers. It placed emphasis on the rise of China in particular, and India to a somewhat lesser extent. The document framed the EU's engagement with these emerging powers, once again, in terms of responsibilities for regional and global order. The document placed a strong emphasis on developing bilateral relations—"enhanced partnerships"—with these emerging powers. Annual EU-China and EU-India summits had been established in 1998 and 2000 respectively, and the 2001 Asia Strategy placed emphasis on developing bilateral relations with important emerging powers, but within the framework of interregional and global multilateral arrangements.

As with the development of EU climate change policy during this period, the external context also played a significant role in driving the development of a distinctive European

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20 march 2009): *Further Development of the EU Position on a Comprehensive Post-2012 Climate Agreement - Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 7128/09, 3 March 2009; and Council of the European Union, 2009, *EU Position for the Copenhagen Climate Conference (7-18 December 2009) - Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 14790/09, 21 October 2009.

<sup>74</sup> European Commission, 2001, *Communication from the Commission: Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001.

approach to world politics more generally in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The example of the Kyoto Protocol discussed above is just one example—though a particularly prominent one—of the US turn towards unilateralism, which became particularly prominent during the Bush Administration.<sup>75</sup> European support for a world order based on the principle of multilateralism became increasingly a means through which the EU sought to differentiate itself by “othering” the United States. The EU’s commitment to multilateralism can be seen as “an unintended consequence of the Bush Administration’s choice of *à la carte* multilateralism”.<sup>76</sup> While different member states understand the concept somewhat differently, it is perhaps because of the malleability of the term that it can serve as a unifying concept for EU external relations.<sup>77</sup>

This process of developing a distinctive EU approach to world politics was particularly evident in the European Security Strategy (ESS), formulated by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and endorsed by the December 2003 European Council.<sup>78</sup> The ESS was formulated in part as a response to the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, which had set out the Bush Administration’s controversial doctrine of pre-emption.<sup>79</sup> The ESS sought to set out a distinctive European approach to world politics, in contrast to the approach of the United States. A notable feature of the ESS was the EU’s preference for fostering the development

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<sup>75</sup> David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., 2003, *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* (Boulder, CO. & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

<sup>76</sup> Knud Erik Jørgensen, 2006, “A Multilateralist Role for the EU?”, in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, eds., *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis* (Abingdon: Routledge/ECPR).

<sup>77</sup> Krause outlines the respective understandings of multilateralism of the “big three”. The German view entails adhering to international law, relying on multilateralism and consensus building as primary approach to international issues, renouncing use of force unless authorized by a UN Security Council mandate. The French view of multilateralism is more pessimistic, with France more ready to use force to preserve global stability. The French conception of international order is still dominated by balance of power thinking and the notion of French exceptionalism. The British view of multilateralism is primarily pragmatic—multilateralism should be tried as often as possible. Because military and diplomatic capabilities are limited, Britain looks for international cooperation to compensate for these deficits. See Joachim Krause, 2004, “Multilateralism: Behind European views”, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 2.

<sup>78</sup> Council of the European Union, 2003, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003.

<sup>79</sup> United States of America, 2002, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House).

of a multipolar power structure through deepening its relations with a range of key states throughout the world.

This was embodied in the EU's ambition to develop "strategic partnerships" with a range of third countries.<sup>80</sup> In total, the ESS mentions six strategic partners. The partnership with the United States is described as "irreplaceable", and Russia is also singled out for special mention. Beyond that, the ESS recommends that "[w]e should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support".<sup>81</sup> However, as Renard notes, there is no official, public definition of the term: "so far, strategic partnerships have been used mainly for political reasons, to reward a partner or highlight the importance of a relationship, rather than for seeking to achieve strategic goals".<sup>82</sup> Moreover, the pooling together of such diverse countries as Japan, China, Canada, and India indicates a lack of truly strategic thinking.<sup>83</sup>

The ESS, however, also embodies a preference for a global order based on "effective multilateralism", which could be thought of as being in tension with the development of strong bilateral relations with key third countries through the development of "strategic partnerships".<sup>84</sup> However, the EU's view seemed to be that the two can be combined, and

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<sup>80</sup> The term "strategic partnership" was first used by the European Council in 1998 in reference to Russia, but was given much greater prominence through its incorporation in the ESS. See Thomas Renard, 2010, "EU Strategic Partnerships: Evolution of a Concept, From Amsterdam to Lisbon", *EU-China Observer*, no. 5, 2010, p. 16.

<sup>81</sup> Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, p. 14.

<sup>82</sup> Renard, "EU Strategic Partnerships: Evolution of a Concept, From Amsterdam to Lisbon", p. 18.

<sup>83</sup> Giovanni Grevi, 2008, "The Rise of Strategic Partnerships: Between Interdependence and Power Politics", in Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, eds., *Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia - Chaillot Paper no. 109* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies), p. 146.

<sup>84</sup> See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, ed., 2010, *A Strategy for EU Foreign Policy* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies). This is especially the case if those other states do not share the same vision of international order—and it is certainly true that many other countries, among them China, India, and the US, take a very different view of sovereignty and international cooperation.

that multilateralism would never be effective if it were ignored by the major powers.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, the conceptual distinction between multilateralism and bilateralism may not be as sharp as it appears at first sight. To think of multilateralism as merely the coordination of policies among three or more states, as Ruggie argues, misses the fact that multilateralism involves cooperation on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among states.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, the EU's support for the multilateral process through bilateral means is not necessarily contradictory.

Both with respect to EU climate change policy and the development of the EU's external relations more generally, the external context was particularly consequential during the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The decision of the Bush Administration to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, as part of a broader US turn towards unilateralism, galvanized support within the EU for developing progressive climate change policies and also created a leadership vacuum in world politics on these issues. This strengthened the EU's previously somewhat rhetorical claims to international climate leadership. In this context, the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw a progressive deepening of the normative commitment and material interest drivers. However, to some extent a polity-building dynamic continued to drive EU policy development during this latter period, in particular the desire to develop a defined role for the EU in world politics. The development of more substantive EU internal and international climate change policies was also mediated by a progressive deepening of the institutional basis of EU relations with China and India, which laid the groundwork for the development of institutionalized dialogue and cooperation on climate change. However, these dynamics played out quite differently in the two cases, as the case study chapters will illustrate.

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, 1992, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution", *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 567.

### 3.4 Internal Policy Development and Post-Kyoto Preparations: 2005–2009

During the period 2005–2009, climate change occupied an increasingly prominent place on the political agenda both within the EU and beyond. This process was driven by a combination of the three drivers identified in Chapter 2. In the first instance, normative commitment to combating climate change grew as a result of a significant increase in public concern regarding climate change during this period. One of the most notable efforts to publicize the issue was undertaken by former US Vice-President Al Gore, whose movie *An Inconvenient Truth*, released in May 2006, sought to popularize the issue. The movie received, among other awards, an Academy Award in 2007 for “Best Documentary Feature”.

The scientific evidence base for taking action was also strengthened during this period, and communicated to policy-makers by the publication of the “Fourth Assessment Report” (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was released in November 2007.<sup>87</sup> This report strengthened the understanding of policy-makers and the public more generally of the state of scientific knowledge on the climate system, and its implications for policy-making. AR4 concluded that evidence of warming of the climate system is “unequivocal”, and that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is *very likely* due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations”.<sup>88</sup> By contrast, the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report of 2001 had concluded that the observed global average temperature increases were “likely” (a greater than 66 percent probability) the result of the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. AR4 also concluded that, in order to limit the increase in

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<sup>87</sup> The reports of the three IPCC working groups were released at different points during 2007. The Synthesis Report was published on 16 November 2007. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report* (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 39. Emphasis in original. In this context, “very likely” was specified to mean a greater than 90 percent probability.

long-term global mean temperatures to 2.0–2.4°C, global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> would need to peak by 2015 and be reduced by 50–85 percent by 2050 relative to 2000 levels.<sup>89</sup>

During this period, action to combat climate change was also increasingly framed as a business opportunity for European companies, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between norm- and interest-driven behaviour. The UK Government under Tony Blair was particularly active in reframing the debate on climate change policy in these terms, partly driven by some sections of British industry during this period.<sup>90</sup> One of the most significant contributions of the UK Government to the climate change debate came in the form of the *Stern Review*, written by Lord Nicholas Stern, which had been commissioned by then UK Chancellor Gordon Brown. It sought to make the case that the short-term costs of mitigating climate change would be significantly less than the longer-term costs of inaction, and that action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions should begin straight away.<sup>91</sup> While it was subsequently criticized for underestimating the costs of short-term mitigation, it had a significant international impact, not least because Lord Stern, at the request of the UK Government, undertook extensive efforts to disseminate his message in the months after the Review was published. Another factor driving the activism of the UK Government in relation to international climate diplomacy was the perceived need to draw attention away from the UK's ongoing involvement in Iraq. A centrepiece of this strategy was Blair's prioritization of climate change, along with poverty eradication in Africa, during the UK's Presidency of the Group of 8 (G8) in 2005. Indeed, this was of particular significance to relations with China and India, since Chinese President Hu Jintao

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>90</sup> For example, the Corporate Leaders Group on Climate Change sent a public letter to the Prime Minister in June 2006 calling on the government to provide a more ambitious framework for the “transition to a low carbon economy”. Cited in Rayner and Jordan, “The United Kingdom: A Paradoxical Leader?”, pp. 99-103.

<sup>91</sup> The Stern Review estimated that stabilization of CO<sub>2</sub>e levels at 500 parts per million would cost 1 percent of global GDP each year from now and forever, whereas impacts resulting from a failure to act would cost at least 5 percent of GDP each year from now and forever, and could cost as much as 20 percent of global GDP. Nicholas Stern, 2006, *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Cabinet Office—HM Treasury).

and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as well as a number of other non-G8 leaders, attended part of the Gleneagles G8 Summit that year, at which the issue of climate change was discussed.<sup>92</sup>

The German Government also sought to make the business case for European climate leadership. The German Government of Angela Merkel, elected in 2005, followed broadly the same path as the Red-Green coalition that preceded it, adapting the “ecological modernization” concept into an “ecological industrial policy”, which came to be linked with terms such as “green new deal” and “third industrial revolution”.<sup>93</sup> Merkel, like Tony Blair in 2005, also made climate change a priority issue of the German G8 Presidency in 2007, and initiated the “Heiligendamm Process” in which China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa were included in a two-year dialogue process on a number of issues, including climate change.<sup>94</sup> French President Jacques Chirac, meanwhile, committed France to a 75 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, which was enshrined in the 2005 Energy Bill, making France one of the first countries to commit to significant, long-term targets in domestic law.<sup>95</sup> During the period from 2005 onwards, then, climate change became an increasing priority for key EU member states. Moreover, the 2004 enlargement, in which ten new member states with generally lower interest in climate change joined the EU, did not initially have a short-term negative impact on EU climate change policy

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<sup>92</sup> Because of the focus of the Gleneagles Summit on Africa, the leaders of Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania attended the Summit, as well as the leaders of the s-called “Outreach Five” group of large developing countries—Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. See G8 Information Centre, 2005, “G7/G8 Summit Meetings: Road to Gleneagles - Delegations and Dates”, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/delegations.html>, (accessed on 10 September 2011). See also Chapters 4, 5, and 6 for further discussion.

<sup>93</sup> Jänicke, “German Climate Change Policy: Political and Economic Leadership”, p. 134.

<sup>94</sup> See Chapters 4, 5, and 6 for further discussion.

<sup>95</sup> Joseph Szarka, 2010, “France’s Troubled Bids to Climate Leadership”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 116.

because new member states did not have institutional experience or political power initially.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, the Commission succeeded in linking the development of EU climate change policy with a concern for Europe's energy security in the medium term, thereby making the link between EU climate change policy and another aspect of material interest. This in turn was driven by the volatility of global oil and gas prices, and the cut-off of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 which had knock-on effects for several EU member states.<sup>97</sup> In its 2006 Green Paper, entitled *A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, the Commission declared that "Europe has entered into a new energy era" and drew attention to the high and growing European dependence on imported energy sources, which it predicted would rise from 50 percent in 2006 to 70 percent 20–30 years from then, some from insecure regions.<sup>98</sup> The Green Paper, and the 2007 Commission communication, *An Energy Policy for Europe*, highlighted the linkages between energy policy and climate policy, and called for an EU-wide energy policy that would at the same time contribute to achieving the EU's climate ambitions.<sup>99</sup>

Nonetheless, there was also a strong EU polity-building dimension to the development of EU climate policy in the period after 2005. Although climate change was not initially a priority for Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso when he was appointed in 2004, by 2007 his orientation had changed almost completely. The political crisis within the EU that resulted from the rejection of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty by referendums

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<sup>96</sup> Oberthür and Dupont, "The Council, the European Council and International Climate Policy: From Symbolic Leadership to Leadership by Example", p. 80.

<sup>97</sup> Camilla Adelle, Marc Pallemarts, and Joana Chiavari, 2009, *Climate Change and Energy Security in Europe* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies); Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly, 2008, "EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges", *The International Spectator*, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 43.

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, 2006, *Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2006) 105 final, 8 March 2006, p. 3.

<sup>99</sup> European Commission, 2007, *Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2007) 1 final, 10 January 2007.

in France and the Netherlands in 2005 created a political opportunity for climate change policy in a context of growing public concern over the issue. It became politically almost impossible to continue discussions on EU institutional reform, which led to a search for more concrete projects where “Brussels” could show its ability to solve pressing cross-border policy problems.<sup>100</sup> This was an attempt to garner support for the Constitutional Treaty by tapping into an issue that was capturing the European public imagination.<sup>101</sup> Thus, climate change had become “a saviour issue for the EU itself”.<sup>102</sup>

The progressive development of EU climate change policy from 2005 onwards was driven by the parallel—and to some extent interdependent—growth of polity-building, normative concern, and material interest drivers. However, the distinctive feature of this period was that a polity-building dynamic was no longer the primary driver of EU climate change policy. Although it remained a factor, it was complemented by increasingly strong normative concern and material interest drivers. The March 2007 European Council agreed to a set of targets for the period to 2020, including the headline goal of a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (relative to 1990 levels).<sup>103</sup> This target was to be raised to 30 percent in the context of a global agreement in which “other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities”.<sup>104</sup> The European Council also agreed to set targets for energy consumption (20 percent saving of energy consumption by 2020 relative to projections),

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<sup>100</sup> Louise van Schaik, 2010, “The Sustainability of the EU's Model of Climate Diplomacy”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemmaerts, eds., *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy* (Brussels: Brussels University Press), p. 265.

<sup>101</sup> *Financial Times*, 20 March 2007, cited in Wurzel, “Environmental Policy: EU Actors, Leader and Laggard States”, p. 77.

<sup>102</sup> van Schaik, “The Sustainability of the EU's Model of Climate Diplomacy”, p. 265.

<sup>103</sup> The other goals were (i) an increase in the share of renewable energy sources in energy supply to 20 percent in 2020 including a binding minimum target of 10 percent for the share of biofuels in transport by 2020; and (ii) a 20 percent saving on the EU's energy consumption by 2020.

<sup>104</sup> European Council, 2007, *Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007: Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 7224/1/07, 2 May 2007, p. 12.

renewable energy (20 percent of total consumption by 2020), and biofuels in transport fuels (10 percent for all member states).

Repeating the pattern of previous EU climate targets, there was no indication at this point of how the targets would be achieved. However, Barroso proposed that the target be adopted at this point, with the internal distribution of action to be decided later.<sup>105</sup> Accordingly, the Commission published a proposal for a “climate and energy package” in January 2008. The package confirmed the March 2007 European Council emission targets and included: (i) a new decision on “effort-sharing” which allocated the 20 percent overall reduction target among member states with respect to sectors not covered by the EU-ETS; (ii) a revised Emissions Trading Directive covering the period 2013–2020; (iii) a directive on the promotion of renewable energy including binding national targets; and (iv) a directive on carbon capture and storage. The substance of this package was negotiated throughout 2008 by member states. The Parliament sought to play a more substantive role in this process than it had done in previous EU climate change policy-making, primarily through its “Temporary Committee on Climate Change” which had been established in April 2007. However, the package was negotiated using the fast-track first-reading procedure, thereby circumscribing the ability of the European Parliament to feed into the process.<sup>106</sup> Agreement on a finalized package was brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the December 2008 European Council meeting, though member states succeeded in weakening the Commission’s original package in several respects.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Pamela M. Barnes, 2010, “The Role of the Commission of the European Union: Creating External Coherence from Internal Diversity”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 50.

<sup>106</sup> Burns and Carter, “The European Parliament and Climate Change: From Symbolism to Heroism and Back Again”.

<sup>107</sup> The European Council in this instance played an ambiguous role in these negotiations, since on the one hand it provided key political backing to the negotiation of the package, while on the other member states lobbied for less stringent measures for their domestic industries. See Oberthür and Dupont, “The Council, the European Council and International Climate Policy: From Symbolic Leadership to Leadership by

During the period from 2004–05 onwards, a number of external factors served to focus the attention of European policy-makers increasingly on the growing contribution of China, India, and other so-called “emerging” powers to global greenhouse gas emissions. First, international attention was beginning to focus more and more on the projected contribution of the developing world to future emissions growth. For example, the International Energy Agency’s flagship publication, the *World Energy Outlook*, projected in 2004 that two-thirds of the growth in global energy demand would come from developing countries and would mostly be met from fossil-fuel energy sources, and drew particular attention to the projected future contribution of China and India.<sup>108</sup> Three years later, the entirety of the 2007 edition of the *World Energy Outlook* focused specifically on current and projected energy consumption trends in China and India.<sup>109</sup>

Second, the institutional design of the climate regime stipulated that negotiations on the shape of the regime in the period beyond 2012 should commence in 2005. Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 paved the way for the Protocol to enter into force on 16 February 2005. COP-11, held in Montreal in December 2005, also served as the First Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and marked the completion of the process of consolidating the Kyoto regime. The Kyoto Protocol stipulated that negotiations for Annex I Party commitments beyond 2012 should commence at least seven years in advance, that is, by the end of 2005.<sup>110</sup> While the remit of that discussion, according to the Protocol text, was limited to commitments of industrialized countries, it provided a fresh opportunity to open the debate on possible future commitments for non-Annex I Parties.

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Example”, p. 83; and Oberthür and Pallemmaerts, “The EU’s Internal and External Climate Policies: An Historical Overview”, p. 47.

<sup>108</sup> International Energy Agency, 2004, *World Energy Outlook 2004* (Paris: International Energy Agency).

<sup>109</sup> International Energy Agency, 2007, *World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights* (Paris: International Energy Agency).

<sup>110</sup> Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.9.

Driven significantly by the dynamic of the forthcoming post-2012 negotiations, the process of considering domestic and global medium- and long-term emission reduction strategies led EU policy-makers to focus increasingly on the participation of developing countries in the regime in the period beyond 2012. This process was initiated by the Commission which, building on a request from the European Council in 2004, produced a communication entitled *Winning the Battle Against Climate Change* in January 2005.<sup>111</sup> In this communication, the Commission flagged “broadening international participation”, including by large developing countries, as a key EU goal for the forthcoming negotiations.<sup>112</sup> It argued that “[t]he importance of broadening international participation in efforts to tackle climate change cannot be overestimated”. While this statement was partly aimed at the United States, the document noted specifically that developing countries’ share of global emissions would rise to more than 50 percent in the coming decades.<sup>113</sup>

Over the following years, the participation of developing countries with rapidly-increasing emissions featured increasingly prominently in the policy outcomes of the EU institutions. The March 2007 European Council, which agreed the EU’s climate and energy targets for 2020, highlighted the increasing share of global emissions from developing countries, and “the need for these countries to address the increase in these emissions by reducing the emission intensity of their economic development, in line with the general principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.<sup>114</sup> At this stage, however, in advance of the commencement of negotiations, the EU did not specify what it would consider an “adequate” contribution by economically more advanced developing

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<sup>111</sup> European Commission, 2005, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2005) 35 final, 9 February 2005.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid; European Council, 2005, *Brussels European Council, 22 and 23 March 2005 - Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 7619/1/05 REV1, 23 March 2005.

<sup>113</sup> European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change*, p. 4.

<sup>114</sup> European Council, *Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007: Presidency Conclusions*, p. 13.

countries, but began to set out some of the ways in which developing countries could contribute.<sup>115</sup>

It was not until late 2008, in preparation for COP-14 in Poznań, Poland, that the Environment Council specified the actions it expected from developing countries as part of a post-2012 agreement. This formed part of the EU's broader negotiating strategy agreed at the October 2008 Environment Council meeting, and was based significantly on the recommendations for mitigation contained in the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report, published in 2007.<sup>116</sup> The EU advocated that the rise in global mean temperature should be kept below 2 degrees Celsius (as it had since 1996) and that, in order to reach this goal, global emissions should peak by 2020 and be reduced by 50 percent relative to 1990 levels by 2050. Within this framework, the EU stipulated that industrialized countries should reduce their emissions by 25–40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80–95 percent by 2050. On the issue of developing country commitments, the Conclusions stated:

Developing countries as a group, in particular the most advanced among them, would have to reduce their emissions by 15 to 30 % below business as usual, respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.<sup>117</sup>

It was against this background that EU engagement with China and India on climate change developed, particularly in the period from 2005 onwards. The broader development of EU climate change policy and the EU's claims to climate leadership were driven initially by a polity-building dynamic but increasingly also by growing normative concern and

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<sup>115</sup> The February 2007 Environment Council identified sustainable development policies and measures, an enhanced CDM, and non-binding targets or sectoral approaches as possible ways through which developing countries could contribute. Council of the European Union, 2007, *EU Objectives for the Further Development of the International Climate Regime Beyond 2012 - Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 6621/07, 21 February 2007, p. 6.

<sup>116</sup> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this report.

<sup>117</sup> Council of the European Union, 2008, *Preparations for the 14th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 4th Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 4) - Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 14562/08, 21 October 2008, p. 6.

material interest drivers. The more specific development of EU engagement with China and India was facilitated but also constrained by the progressive institutionalization of the EU-China and EU-India relationships, which began to deepen in the 1990s and developed significantly—at least on paper—with the declaration of “strategic partnerships” in 2003 (EU-China) and 2004 (EU-India). These broadening and deepening relationships provided the institutional mechanism through which the EU could seek to engage with China and India on climate change. However, the decision to create these strategic partnerships was not always based on a deep understanding of the nature of the relationship in question or on a foundation of genuine commonality and shared interests.<sup>118</sup> Rather, “strategic partnerships” represented an institutional innovation which the EU sought to apply to a wide and diverse range of its relationships with significant third countries. Given the diversity of the EU’s relations with these so-called strategic partners, this process was inevitably more successful in some cases than others. Indeed, the dynamics played out quite differently in the two cases of China and India.

### 3.5 Conclusion

During the period before 2000, the EU sought to portray itself as a “climate leader” but these claims rang hollow, since there were few Community-level policies underpinning them. However, from 2000 onwards the EU has succeeded in progressively enacting an extensive set of Community-level climate change policies. This process has underpinned the development of EU engagement with China and India, but this was mediated also by the development of the broader EU-China and EU-India relationships. This chapter analyzed these processes using the tools developed in the analytical framework in Chapter 2, and made three principal arguments.

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<sup>118</sup> For criticisms of the EU’s strategic vision along these lines, see Renard, “EU Strategic Partnerships: Evolution of a Concept, From Amsterdam to Lisbon”; Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop, 2010, *A Need for Strategy in a Multipolar World: Recommendations to the EU after Lisbon* (Brussels: Egmont: Royal Institute for International Relations).

First, EU climate change policy was driven predominantly by a polity-building dynamic in the period up to 1999. Although a surge in environmental concern among European publics in the late 1980s placed environmental issues firmly on the agenda, driven by more environmentally progressive member states such as Germany and the Netherlands, as well as by the European Parliament, a polity-building dynamic emerged within a short space of time. From an early stage European leaders identified climate change as an issue on which the international role of the EU could be developed. The Commission also sought to use the issue to strengthen its role in the evolving EU system of governance. However, the attempt to develop Community-level policies was resisted by the Council in the post-Maastricht political environment of the early 1990s, and EU-level policy was mostly limited for the rest of that decade to setting targets without developing policies to ensure their implementation.

Second, from 2000 onwards a number of factors combined to create a more favourable environment for the development of Community-level climate change policies. The external context—in particular the decision of the new Bush Administration in 2000 to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol—proved particularly catalytic for EU climate policy. It transformed climate change into a core issue of identity for EU leaders, who confirmed their commitment to ratify the Protocol shortly after the US decision in 2000. This strengthened both the normative and interest-based arguments for EU climate leadership. Beginning around 2005, European climate policy-making was driven increasingly by growing public concern. The evidence base relating to climate change was strengthened during this period, particularly by the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007. Public awareness also reached unprecedented levels during the second half of the 2000s. Action on climate change was also increasingly framed in terms of economic benefits, with the UK and German Governments in particular highlighting the employment

and innovation opportunities presented by taking action on climate change. However, during this latter period a polity-building dynamic continued to play a role in the development of EU climate change policy and, in particular, in driving the EU's increasingly loud pronouncements of its leadership role.

Third, the development of EU engagement with China and India on climate change was mediated, enabled, and constrained by the broader context of the development of the EU's relations with China and India. From the late 1990s onwards, the rise of "new" Asian powers became an increasing focus of Western policy-makers, including in the EU. The EU responded to this development through the creation of so-called "strategic partnerships" with China and India in 2003 and 2004 respectively. These created the institutional framework within which the EU sought to develop cooperation with China and India in the area of climate change. However, these dynamics played out somewhat differently in the two cases, and Chapters 5 and 6 will analyze in detail the development of each set of relationships. In order to provide context, the next chapter will discuss the ways in which the EU, China, and India have framed a number of important aspects of climate change policy.

## The “Normative Gap”: Contrasting European, Chinese, and Indian Framings of Global Climate Change Governance

North-South divisions have characterised the global politics of climate change since the beginning of international negotiations in the early 1990s. To some extent, this is an inevitable consequence of the characteristics of the issue: primary responsibility for a considerable majority of accumulated global emissions currently in the atmosphere rests with industrialized countries, but a majority of the projected increase of global emissions over the coming decades is expected to come from developing countries—particularly large, rapidly-developing ones such as China and India. Moreover, industrialized and developing countries have very different levels of vulnerability and capacity to adapt to projected future impacts of climate change. In general, those countries which are projected to be impacted most severely and have the least capacity to adapt are also the countries that have historically contributed least to causing the problem.

Much debate therefore focuses on the rights and responsibilities of developed and developing countries in the climate regime. The particular characteristics of the issue thus make questions of justice and equity an unavoidable aspect of any discussions of the global

governance of climate change.<sup>1</sup> Many of the issues at the heart of international debates on climate change relate in one way or another to considerations of equity, fairness, and justice, though how these terms are defined is fiercely contested. For these reasons, it is no surprise that the international politics of climate change have long been characterised by strong North-South tensions.

This chapter analyses the respective ways in which the EU, China, and India have framed a number of key aspects relating to the governance of climate change. The aim of doing so is to analyze the degree to which these respective frames converge or diverge and, accordingly, to assess the extent to which a “normative gap” exists between the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other. This is important in terms of the evolution of EU engagement with China and India because the development of such engagement—in particular the response of China and India—depends, in part, on the degree of congruence between normative frames. The analysis in this chapter therefore sets the basis for the case studies of EU-China and EU-India engagement in Chapters 5 and 6—in particular the Chinese and Indian responses to EU engagement and the degree to which this engagement was characterized by frame resonance or dissonance.

The analysis is structured around competing frames with respect to the issues of (i) overall problem definition, particularly with respect to the relative importance of mitigation versus adaptation; (ii) how greenhouse gas emissions are counted, including the issues of per capita versus aggregate accounting, production versus consumption accounting, and historical responsibility; (iii) the related issues of equity and differentiation; and (iv) the choice of policy instruments and governance architectures for climate change mitigation, including the relative importance of market and non-market mechanisms. In order to set

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<sup>1</sup> Henry Shue, 1992, “The Unavoidability of Justice”, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests and Institutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

the context for this analysis, the next section outlines the chronology of the development of the climate change regime.

## 4.1 Chronology of the Climate Change Regime

The first step in the process of creating a global climate regime, following the initial identification of a potential problem by climate scientists, was the creation in 1988 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international body charged with periodically assessing the scientific evidence on climate change. The United Nations General Assembly in December 1990 established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to negotiate a framework convention on climate change, setting a deadline of June 1992 for completion of the negotiations.<sup>2</sup> The INC negotiations resulted in agreement on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was opened for signature at the Rio Summit in 1992 and entered into force in 1994 following ratification by fifty countries as required by the Convention. The UNFCCC set an overall aim “to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.<sup>3</sup> It also enshrined the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”,<sup>4</sup> which will be discussed in more detail below. The Convention established two categories of signatory states: so-called “Annex I” states, which comprised all member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and states with economies in transition, and “non-Annex I” states, consisting of all developing countries. In terms of reducing emissions, the Convention set a non-binding aim of stabilizing global emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations General Assembly, “Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind”, ed. A/RES/45/212 (1990). The convention was to be agreed in time so that it could be opened for signature by Parties at United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which was to be held in June 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Article 2, UNFCCC.

<sup>4</sup> Article 3.1, UNFCCC.

It became clear quickly that this voluntary target would not be met. At the first Conference of the Parties (COP) in 1995, Parties agreed to the “Berlin Mandate” which called for negotiations to commence on a protocol or other legal instrument which would set out quantified and binding emission reduction targets for developed countries. As a result of strong resistance from developing countries, the Berlin Mandate contained no reference to emission limitation commitments—either binding or voluntary—for developing countries, despite strong pressure from some developed country Parties. Negotiations under the Berlin Mandate concluded at COP-3 in December 1997 with agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. This Protocol set binding emission reduction or limitation targets relative to 1990 levels for all Annex I (developed and transition) countries, ranging from an eight percent cut for the EU15 to a ten percent increase for Iceland. It did not set emissions targets for developing countries.

While Kyoto was a significant step forward in terms of legal architecture, much of the detail of how the Protocol would be implemented was left for future negotiating sessions. The most significant of these was COP-6 *bis* in Marrakech in 2001, at which agreement was reached on operationalizing many aspects of the Protocol including the so-called “flexible mechanisms”: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (a system whereby Annex I countries can fund emission reduction projects in transition economy countries and offset those emissions reductions against their own domestic reduction targets), and the Clean Development Mechanism (a similar mechanism, where Annex I countries can fund emission reduction projects in developing countries and offset those emissions reductions against their own domestic targets). However, it was not until 2005 that the Kyoto Protocol actually entered into force, due to a requirement in the Protocol that, in order for it to enter into force, it must be ratified by at least fifty-five countries, and by Annex I countries representing at least fifty-five percent of total Annex I country emissions in 1990. This

occurred when Russia ratified the Protocol in late 2004, paving the way for its entry into force in 2005.

During the period since 2005, Parties have sought to agree a global deal to either extend or replace the Kyoto Protocol (or both), the “first commitment period” of which ends in 2012. The substantive phase of these negotiations was launched at the 13<sup>th</sup> COP in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. The “Bali Road Map” set out a two-year negotiating timetable which was due to be concluded at the 15<sup>th</sup> COP in Copenhagen in December 2009. The “Copenhagen Accord”, the negotiated text that emerged in the final day of the negotiations, contained little in terms of specifics on any of the central negotiating topics. The Accord included a goal of limiting the rise in global mean temperature to 2 degrees Celsius—thereby rejecting a stronger target of 1.5 degrees proposed by some developing countries such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) group (see below)—but contained no concrete commitments by any Parties that would suggest that this aspirational goal will be achieved. Much was made of the commitment to financial assistance from developed to developing countries—approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012 and USD 100 billion per year (from both public and private sources) by 2020. The Accord did not contain reference to a “peaking year” for emissions from large developing countries, which had been proposed during the negotiations. In terms of process, developing countries succeeded in extending the negotiating mandate of both negotiating tracks—the “Kyoto Protocol” track which is negotiating future emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol beyond the first commitment period (i.e., after 2012), and the “Long-Term Cooperative Action” track, which involves all Parties, including the United States.

In short, the history of the global climate change regime has been one of slow, incremental development. Moreover, it built on a longer history of global environmental politics.

China’s entry into this realm came at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, though the Chinese delegation were reported to be disruptive and unconstructive.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, during the early years of People’s Republic, environmental protection did not feature as an issue for public policy. In Mao’s view, nature was something to be conquered by man.<sup>6</sup> At the beginning of the reform and opening up period, economic development was prioritized, and environmental protection was placed “somewhere near the bottom of priorities”.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, climate change was framed in China for much of the period until the late 1990s as a predominantly scientific issue rather than economic, social, or political issue. However, this began to change as the Chinese Government became increasingly aware of the political and economic dimensions of the issue. Reflecting this development, the powerful State Development and Reform Commission, responsible for overall economic planning including the Five Year Plans, was given lead responsibility for Chinese climate change policy as part of broader bureaucratic restructuring in 1998.<sup>8</sup> This represented a shift in the perception of the issue by the Chinese Government towards a view which saw climate change policies as a threat to economic development.

The overarching approach of India in global environmental negotiations, meanwhile, can be traced back to Indira Gandhi’s speech to the Stockholm Conference in 1972, where she challenged the emerging discourse in industrialized countries that the root of environmental degradation was excessive industrialization, overpopulation, and economic growth. Gandhi questioned whether the developed world could “speak to those who live in

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<sup>5</sup> Ida Bjørkum, 2005, *China in the International Politics of Climate Change: A Foreign Policy Analysis* (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute), p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Judith Shapiro, 2001, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

<sup>7</sup> Kerry Brown, 2007, “China and the Challenges of the Environment”, in Peter Ludlow, ed., *The EU and China* (Ponte de Lima, Portugal: European Strategy Forum), p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Björn Conrad, 2010, “Bureaucratic Land Rush: China's Administrative Battles in the Arena of Climate Change Policy”, *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, Spring 2010, p. 57; Gørild M. Heggelund, 2007, “China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments”, *Asian Perspective*, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 171.

villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers and the air clean” when they themselves had “reached their present affluence by their domination over other races and countries, the exploitation of their own natural resources”.<sup>9</sup> Raising the question of equity, she asked: “Will there be a more equitable sharing of environmental costs and greater international interest in the accelerated progress of the less developed world?”<sup>10</sup> This speech proved extremely influential in framing the developing world approach to global environmental issues ever since. As the issue of climate change emerged on the international political agenda at the end of the 1980s, China, India, and developing countries more generally viewed the issue through this North-South prism.

Both China and India have sought to play roles as leaders or representatives of the developing world, though India, being somewhat more vocal, has tended to play this role more assertively. The G77 group of developing countries has played a very significant role in the development and evolution of the climate regime.<sup>11</sup> The G77 is, however, a very broad grouping of countries with divergent—and diverging—interests and characteristics. Within the G77, there are a number of specific alliances including, at opposite ends of the climate policy spectrum: from AOSIS which is an alliance of states which are extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts—some of which may quite literally be submerged by rising sea levels, to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which, due to their dependence on oil revenues, are strongly opposed to measures to reduce fossil fuel consumption. The G77 has been historically bound together by a commitment to a number of core principles, including the norm of common but differentiated responsibility

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<sup>9</sup> Indira Gandhi, 1972, “Man and Environment”, Plenary Session of United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 14th June, 1972).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> While the name G77 originally referred to the number of states in the group when it was formed during the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, the group now consists of 131 members with hugely varying interests both in climate negotiations and more generally. For an overview of the role of the G77 in the climate regime, see Sjur Kasa, Anne T. Gullberg, and Gørild M. Heggelund, 2007, “The Group of 77 in the International Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions”, *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, vol. 8, no. 2. A current list of member states is available at <http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html>.

and the principle of historical responsibility for climate change on the part of the industrialized countries. Over time differences within the Group have diverged further. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the days of the G77 as a truly functional negotiating bloc may be over.<sup>12</sup>

Among other actors, the role of the United States has been one of the most significant variables in the development of the climate regime. Having been a pioneer in terms of both domestic and international environmental policy in the 1970s, by the 1990s the United States had come to adopt a much more cautious approach to tackling environmental problems. As one of the first countries to tackle seriously problems of environmental degradation, the United States was an early victim of a backlash against the costs associated with an ever-growing web of environmental regulations. The United States had a significant impact on the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC and, especially, the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, the decision of Bush Administration to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 had a significant impact on the global politics of climate change both at that time and over subsequent years, as did the election of President Barack Obama in late 2008.

However, although much of the history of the climate change negotiations has involved a significant tension among two coalitions of industrialized states, one led by the United States and the other led by the EU, arguably the defining feature of contemporary global climate politics concerns the divide between industrialized and developing countries. The rest of this chapter seeks to identify the respective positions of the EU, China, and India with respect to the most salient aspects of global governance of climate change.

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Antto Vihma, 2010, *Elephant in the Room: The New G77 and China Dynamics in Climate Talks* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs), p. 9.

## 4.2 Issues of Contestation in the Global Governance of Climate Change

From an early stage the global politics of climate change have been characterized by a strong North-South division. Indeed, one scholar has argued that “The last three decades of global environmental negotiations are very much a part of this ongoing quest by the South for what they would consider a more legitimate global order”.<sup>13</sup> This section reviews some of the most contentious and—from the perspective of this dissertation—pertinent issues in global climate governance. As well as highlighting the general North-South cleavages in respect of these issues, the discussion below seeks to draw out the particular positions of the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other, and whether and how each of these has changed over time.

### 4.2.1 *Mitigation versus Adaptation*

At the broadest level is the question of the way climate change has been framed as an issue of world politics. Climate change is not simply one cooperation problem with one set of possible distributional outcomes. Keohane and Victor, for example, identify four “cooperation games”, each with their own incentives to free ride: (i) the coordination of emissions regulation; (ii) the compensation of developing countries; (iii) the coordination of efforts on adaptation; and (iv) the coordination of scientific assessments.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the very boundaries of the problem are ill-defined, and one issue of particular conflict concerns the relative weight attached to these various aspects.

In general, the climate regime has focused disproportionate focus on “mitigation” over “adaptation”, that is, on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions rather than on how

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<sup>13</sup> Adil Najam, 2005, “Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement”, *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 305.

<sup>14</sup> Robert O. Keohane and David Victor, 2011, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change”, *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 9, no. 1.

countries can adapt to the consequences of a changing climate. Indeed, Pielke has argued that adaptation was a “taboo” subject in the early years of the negotiations. This balance has arguably shifted in more recent years, with COP-8 (New Delhi, 2002) and COP-12 (Nairobi, 2006) having focused more explicitly on adaptation issues.<sup>15</sup> This historical imbalance between mitigation and adaptation in the climate regime was influenced by the initial problem definition, which conceptualized emissions levels as a global problem which needed a global solution, while impacts were viewed as a local problem in need of local solutions. Splitting the problem into two problems led to the creation of a “leadership” regime as opposed to a “polluter pays” regime with a strong element of liability and compensation built into it. The implication of this was that developed countries “could be seen as generous leaders”.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, although “equity” has often been put on the agenda by developing countries, the scope of the equity agenda itself—namely emission mitigation rather than vulnerability to climate change and culpability for past contributions to the problem—has been firmly set by the industrialised world.<sup>17</sup> This served the interests of industrialized countries, since it constructed the issue as a global problem of emissions reduction which needed a global solution, while impacts were viewed as a local problem in need of local solutions.

Within this debate, China and India have insisted on equal priority being given to adaptation and mitigation in the climate negotiations. For example, China’s first National Climate Change Programme, launched in 2007, identified as one of the guiding principles of Chinese climate policy that an equal emphasis should be placed on both mitigation and

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<sup>15</sup> Roger A. Pielke, 1998, “Rethinking the Role of Adaptation in Climate Policy”, *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 8, no. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Joyeeta Gupta, 2006, “Good Governance and Climate Change: Recommendations from a North-South Perspective”, in Marjan Peeters and Kurt Deketelaere, eds., *EU Climate Change Policy: The Challenge of New Regulatory Initiatives* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 298.

<sup>17</sup> Benito Müller, 2002, *Equity in Climate Change: The Great Divide* (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies).

adaptation efforts.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, in its preparations for COP-15 in 2009, the Chinese Government argued that equal priority should be given to the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan, two of which were mitigation and adaptation.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, India argued strongly for greater priority to be devoted to adaptation in the international negotiations. This was particularly evident at COP-8 in New Delhi in 2002.

The EU has, historically, focused more on mitigation than adaptation, reflecting the more general bias in the climate regime. However, during the 2000s this situation began to change somewhat. First, in terms of its relations with developing countries, the EU increasingly has sought to integrate a focus on climate change—including adaptation issues—into the broader context of its development assistance programmes. This was documented in the 2003 “Action Plan on Climate Change and Development”.<sup>20</sup> However, while this reflected a significant change step in EU thinking on climate change and development, no specific financial commitments were attached to the priorities outlined in the Action Plan.<sup>21</sup> The increasing focus of the EU in adaptation policies in its relations with developing countries, and in the international negotiations, reflected a parallel increase in attention paid by the EU to climate change adaptation within its own borders. This increased attention was reflected in the publication by the European Commission of both a Green Paper in 2007 and a White Paper in 2009 on climate change adaptation.<sup>22</sup> However,

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<sup>18</sup> NDRC, 2007, *China's National Climate Change Programme* (Beijing: National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China).

<sup>19</sup> PRC Government, 2009, “Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”, Website of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 20 May 2009, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t564324.htm>, (accessed on 4 June 2010).


<sup>20</sup> European Commission, 2003, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2003) 85 final, 11 March 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Jessica Ayers, Saleemul Huq, and Achala Chandani, 2010, “Assessing EU Assistance for Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries: A Southern Perspective”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemerts, eds., *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy* (Brussels: Brussels University Press).

<sup>22</sup> See European Commission, 2007, *Green Paper from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Adapting to Climate Change in Europe - Options for EU Action*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2007) 354 final, 29 June 2007; and European

while the EU—and the broader climate change regime—have belatedly focused to a greater extent on adaptation issues, the predominant framing of international climate change policy has remained, to a large extent, focused on mitigation. This is the principal way in which the purported growing responsibility of large developing countries has been conceptualized by EU policy-makers. Thus, the normative gap between the EU, China, and India on the mitigation-adaptation debate has remained relatively wide, though it has declined somewhat in recent years.

**Figure 4.1**  
Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by Country, 1850–2002



**Source:** Baumert, Kevin A., Timothy Herzog, and Jonathan Pershing, 2005, *Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy*, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, p. 32.

#### 4.2.2 Emissions Accounting


The question of who should take which mitigation actions is intimately connected to the question of responsibility for climate change. This, in turn, is dependent on to how

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Commission, 2009, *White Paper - Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action* Brussels: European Commission, COM(2009) 147 final, 1 April 2009

emissions are counted. There are a number of contested aspects of this question. The first relates to the temporal dimension of emissions: how should past, present, and future emissions be accounted for under the rules of the regime? Responsibility for a considerable majority of accumulated global emissions currently in the atmosphere rests with industrialized countries. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, the United States accounts for 29.3 percent of cumulative global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions over the period 1850–2002, while the then EU-25 account for 26.5 percent. China accounts for 7.6 percent of global emissions over this period, while India accounts for just 2.2 percent. Overall, industrialized countries account for just over three-quarters of total cumulative global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the period up to 2002, with developing countries accounting for just under one-quarter.

**Figure 4.2**  
**Comparison of Cumulative and Current CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by Country**



**Sources:** Baumert, Kevin A., Timothy Herzog, and Jonathan Pershing, 2005, *Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy*, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, p. 32 (for 1850–2002 data); and Olivier, Jos G.J., Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, & Julian Wilson, 2011, *Long-Term Trend in Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: 2011 Report*, The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency & EU Joint Research Centre, p. 33 (for 2009 data).

\* Data for 1850–2002 is for EU-25, while data for 2009 is for EU-27.

The distribution of shares of cumulative historical emissions between countries and regions contrasts markedly with the distribution of shares of current emissions. Figure 4.2

illustrates this graphically by comparing the percentage of total global emissions accounted for by the EU, the United States, China, and India for the period 1850–2002 and the year 2009. While the EU accounts for over one-quarter of historical emissions up to 2002, it accounted for just 12 percent of global emissions in 2009. For China, this trend is almost the reverse: China accounts for just 7.6 percent of cumulative global emissions for the period up to 2002, but accounts for over one-quarter of 2009 emissions. China overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter in 2007,<sup>23</sup> and even if we focus on the total stock of accumulated emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere, China is projected to overtake the United States as the largest cumulative contributor to the stock of emissions by about 2050 under business-as-usual assumptions, and is projected to overtake Western Europe as early as 2021.<sup>24</sup> The same projection estimates that India will, in terms of accumulated emissions, overtake Japan by around 2031, though it will not overtake Western Europe until sometime around 2080 according to these projections.

Given these emission trends, it is clearly in the interests of countries that have contributed significantly to past emissions to design a regime that focuses on current and future emission levels and that either discounts or ignores completely historical emissions. Conversely, it is in the interests of countries with low historical but fast increasing emission levels to emphasise the historical emissions of other states. A key issue in this regard is whether “responsibility” presumes intent or at least knowledge about the harmful consequences of one’s behaviour. If knowledge of harmful consequences is necessary for an actor to be held responsible for those consequences, this casts doubt over the strict

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<sup>23</sup> John Vidal and David Adam, 2007, “China Overtakes US as World's Biggest CO<sub>2</sub> Emitter”, Guardian website, 19 June 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews>, (accessed on 6 June 2010).

<sup>24</sup> These figures, which cover CO<sub>2</sub> emissions only, are based on US Energy Information Administration projections for the period up to 2030 which assume a constant growth rate of annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions under a business-as-usual scenario. The authors extrapolate these constant CO<sub>2</sub> growth rates for the period 2030–2080. See W.J.W. Botzen, J.M. Gowdy, and J.C.J.M. Van Den Bergh, 2008, “Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: Shifting International Responsibilities for Climate Debt”, *Climate Policy*, vol. 8, no. 6.

culpability of developed countries for their historical emissions, at least before the 1980s when scientific knowledge concerning climate change developed rapidly.


A second issue relates to whether emissions be accounted solely at the aggregate level for each country disregarding differences in population across countries, or in terms of emissions per person. In general, industrialized countries have significantly higher per capita emission levels than developing countries, though there are exceptions to this trend.<sup>25</sup> While China in particular, but also India to a lesser extent, have comparatively high aggregated levels of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, they also of course are the world’s two most populous countries. Thus, their emissions levels per person are lower than most—if not all—industrialized countries. This is most strikingly the case for India, which had a per capita CO<sub>2</sub> level of 1.4 tonnes, far below the world average of 4.4 tonnes, the EU-27 average of 7.8 tonnes, or the US figure of 17.7 tonnes. This is also true—though less strikingly so—for China, even in recent years: China’s per-capita emissions level in 2009 was 5.4 tonnes per person which, while higher than the global average, is still well below that of the EU or the United States.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below illustrate this point graphically. Figure 4.3 charts the trend of CO<sub>2</sub> aggregate emissions for the EU, the United States, China, and India for the period 1990-2009. This shows a familiar trend of rapidly growing Chinese emissions, and also rapidly growing Indian emissions—albeit starting from a much lower base and growing at a slower pace. It also shows a relative flat trajectory for EU and US emissions over the same period, though some of the decline in the period 2008–09 can be accounted for by the global economic crisis.

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
<sup>25</sup> Some oil-producing Gulf states have the highest per-capita emission levels in the world. Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain were four of the top five emitting countries on a per-capita basis in 2005. Data taken from World Resources Institute, 2010, “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0”, World Resources Institute, <http://cait.wri.org/>, (accessed on 1 April 2011).

**Figure 4.3**  
Aggregate CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions by Country, 1990–2009



**Source:** Olivier, Jos G.J., Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, & Julian Wilson, 2011, *Long-Term Trend in Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: 2011 Report*, The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency & EU Joint Research Centre, p. 33.

**Figure 4.4**  
Per Capita CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from Energy Consumption by Country, 1990–2009<sup>26</sup>



**Source:** Energy Information Administration, 2012, “International Energy Statistics Website”, <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8>, (accessed on 28 June 2012).

<sup>26</sup> Note that these two charts do not measure exactly the same thing: Figure 4.3 shows “CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions” while Figure 4.4 shows “CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from Energy Consumption”. While not identical, these are similar enough to make this visual comparison valid.

Figure 4.4 uses the same colour scheme to aid comparison, but this time displays trends for the four with respect to per capita emissions. The most striking difference is the relative position of China and India. While both still register an increase over the period in question, it is very significantly less steep than the trend for aggregate emissions. It is clear from these charts that, depending on where one sits and what position one takes on these emissions accounting issues, the world of climate change politics can look very different indeed. It is not surprising, therefore, that different countries have very different perspectives on whether aggregate or per-capita emissions should be used as the basis of regime creation.

A third issue relating to emissions accounting concerns whether emissions should be accounted for according to where they are produced or, alternatively, should they be attributed to the countries in which the goods and services of which emissions are a by-product are consumed? This issue has assumed ever increasing importance as the Chinese economy has grown inexorably, in large part by producing carbon-intensive goods for export to other countries. One study suggested that, in 2005, one third of Chinese emissions were due to the production of exports.<sup>27</sup> Of course, China also derives benefits from producing exports, so the argument would not be that the global regime should move from purely production-based to purely consumption-based accounting. However, since the production-based accounting system has been deeply embedded in the climate regime from an early stage, this has not been an issue of consideration to the same extent as the issues of historical and per capita emissions.

In respect of each of these issues, the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other, have disagreed. China and India have argued for accounting rules that take account

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<sup>27</sup> Christopher L. Weber, et al., 2008, “The Contribution of Chinese Exports to Climate Change”, *Energy Policy*, vol. 36, no. 9.

both of the historical contribution of industrialized countries to accumulated greenhouse gas emissions, and of the relatively low levels of per capita emissions in developing countries compared with industrialized countries. Interestingly, as Chinese per capita emissions have grown rapidly in recent years and have begun to approach the levels of some industrialized countries, the Chinese Government has increasingly advocated accounting for “cumulative per capita” emissions, since static, contemporary Chinese emissions levels now fail to differentiate China from some industrialized countries.<sup>28</sup>

The Indian Government has placed somewhat more emphasis on the issue of per capita emissions. For example, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged at the Heiligendamm G8 summit in June 2007 that Indian per capita emissions would never rise above those of developed countries.<sup>29</sup> While this was the first pledge of its kind by the Indian Government, it was as much a challenge to developed countries to reduce their emissions as it was a pledge to limit the growth of Indian emissions. The issue of consumption versus production emissions has been more forcefully taken up by the Chinese Government, since it affects the scale of Chinese emissions to a greater degree.

The EU, by contrast, has tended to favour the status quo emissions accounting rules, which focus on aggregate emissions at the national level, current-day rather than accumulated historical emissions, and emissions associated with production rather than consumption. Incidentally, another factor of the current emissions accounting rules embodied in the climate change regime is that the base year for emissions limitation targets under the Kyoto Protocol—1990—is very favourable to EU emissions levels, since EU

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<sup>28</sup> See Jiahua Pan and Ying Chen, 2010, “Carbon Budget Proposal: A Framework for an Equitable and Sustainable International Climate Regime”, *Social Sciences in China*, vol. 31, no. 1. Prof. Pan Jiahua and Prof. Chen Ying are both senior researchers at the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. While this article was published as an academic contribution, Prof. Pan in particular is believed to be influential within Chinese climate change policy-making.

<sup>29</sup> Prime Minister of India, 2007, “PM’s Intervention on Climate Change at Heiligendamm Meeting of G8 plus 5”, Website of the Office of the Prime Minister of India, 8 June 2007, <http://pmindia.nic.in/visits/content.asp?id=158>, (accessed on 7 June 2010).

emissions declined significantly over the course of the 1990s for reasons that had little or nothing to do with climate change policy. Principally, these were (i) the collapse of heavy industry in East Germany and the countries of Central Europe that would later join the EU, as a result of the fall of Communism; and (ii) the “dash to gas” in the UK in the aftermath of the closure of coal mines by then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, which resulted in a significant fall in UK emissions due to the fact that gas is a less carbon-intensive fuel than coal. For these reasons, the EU has tended to defend the status quo emissions accounting rules, while China and India on the other hand have consistently challenged these rules.

### **4.2.3 Equity and Differentiation**

Issues of equity and justice have been at the heart of debates about the global governance of climate change ever since the issue first emerged on the agenda of global politics. China and India, in concert with other developing countries, were successful in institutionalizing the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” (CBDR)<sup>30</sup> in the climate change regime.<sup>31</sup> However, while the principle of CBDR may be reasonably easy to understand, translating it into practice has been highly contested. North-South conflict relating to the application of the principle pervades most aspects of the climate negotiations, but one of the most contested issues concerns the mitigation commitments different categories of states should be expected to take on within the climate regime.

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<sup>30</sup> While the full title of this principle is “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, it is often shortened to “common but differentiated responsibilities”, along with the corresponding acronym CBDR. That convention is used here. While some assert that dropping “and respective capabilities” is a political move by industrialized countries to limit their liabilities under the principle, no such intention is implied here.

<sup>31</sup> The most comprehensive treatment of differentiation in international environmental law is provided by Lavanya Rajamani. See Lavanya Rajamani, 2006, *Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

The question of mitigation commitments encompasses both what kinds of commitments should be undertaken by industrialized countries, and what commitments, if any, developing countries should assume and, if so, over what timeframe. Very rarely has it been asserted that developing countries should be subject to the *same* commitments as industrialized countries. However, there has been fierce contestation over whether developing countries, in particular fast-growing countries such as China and India, should be subject to commitments of some sort. A related issue is whether and to what extent industrialized countries should be required to provide financial, technological, and capacity-building support to developing countries to support their mitigation and adaptation actions in the context of the climate regime or otherwise.

China has strongly defended a strict interpretation of the CBDR principle, arguing that it should not be forced to take on binding targets while it remains relatively poor, and until developed states take on concrete action of their own. Moreover, it has defended the existing binary distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC, for the obvious reason that it would be considered by many to be one of the first candidates for “evolution” to Annex I status. These positions have been underpinned by China’s stated overriding priority in all negotiations of ensuring economic stability and growth. Although prior to Copenhagen in December 2009 China announced a carbon intensity target, the Chinese Government was careful to point out that while the target is domestically binding, at the international level it is a purely voluntary target with no legal effect. In short, China has in broad terms maintained the consistency of its negotiating position up to the present, and has maintained a strict understanding of the CBDR principle, for example by refusing to consider amending the binary division between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.

In many ways, India’s position in the climate negotiations has been very similar to that of China. Central to India’s position has been the defence of a strict interpretation of the CBDR principle and resisting targets for developing countries. The Indian Government has defended its right to prioritize economic development as the core objective of Indian policy-making, and has often framed attempts by industrialized countries to persuade developing countries to accept emission limitation commitments as “environmental colonialism”.<sup>32</sup> India has also strongly defended the existing binary differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, thereby opposing the concept of “evolution” which would allow a country to “graduate” from non-Annex I to Annex I status. India has been somewhat more vigorous than China in defending a strict interpretation of the CBDR principle and the special rights of developing countries in the climate regime. It has steadfastly stuck to a consistent and rigid interpretation of differentiation, and has demanded compensation from developed countries for the full incremental costs of domestic mitigation and adaptation actions, insisting that developed countries reduce their own emissions significantly.<sup>33</sup> While India, like China, set out a carbon intensity target in the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009, it insisted that this target is voluntary and non-binding.

Over much of the period since the first negotiations on climate change in the early 1990s, the EU generally took the view that industrialized countries should undertake domestic emissions reductions. The European interpretation of differentiation involves strong action by developed countries to reduce their emissions in the short term, along with eventual commitments on the part of developing countries once their emissions and economic development reached a certain level. The European position therefore supported the

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<sup>32</sup> This way of framing the debate about global climate change governance can be traced to a report published in 1991 by the Delhi-based NGO Centre for Science and Environment, which had a strong influence on the Indian approach to the INC negotiations in 1991–92. See Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, 1991, *Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism* (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment).

<sup>33</sup> Noriko Fujiwara, 2010, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 325), p. 11.

concept of “evolution” of non-Annex I countries to Annex I status under certain conditions. The EU sought to bring up the question of developing country participation on a number of occasions, for example in 1995, but this was always strongly resisted by China, India, and other developing countries.

However, around 2005 the EU became increasingly concerned with the growth of emissions from large developing countries including, most prominently, China and India. In the context of the negotiations on the post-2012 climate regime, the EU sought to reshape its interpretation of differentiation to include commitments—albeit voluntary and long-term—on large developing countries such as China and India. The EU position contrasts in particular with that of the United States, which has been the strongest advocate of early and “meaningful” emission targets for large, rapidly-developing countries such as China and India. The question of what exactly “meaningful” targets entail was usually left under-specified. At the time of the Kyoto negotiations at least, the United States did not seek that exactly the same commitments be imposed on developing countries. But the United States has put greater emphasis in recent years on “equivalent” action.<sup>34</sup> In short, with respect to issues of equity and differentiation the normative gap between the EU, China, and India has grown over time and became quite pronounced in the period from 2005 onwards.

#### ***4.2.4 Climate Change Policy Architecture and Instruments***

As well as differing over questions of which countries bear responsibility to take action to mitigate climate change, another significant issue of contestation in the history of the

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<sup>34</sup> On the US position prior to Kyoto, Harris argues that “the Byrd-Hagel Resolution was based fundamentally on conceptions of CBDR and notions of fair and equitable international burden-sharing”. Even in the Senate debate, several senators, including Robert Byrd, made clear that they did not envisage that developing countries would have to take on the same commitments as developed countries. Paul G. Harris, 1999, “Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy”, *New York University Environmental Law Journal*, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 37.

climate regime has concerned the design of the overall regime—its architecture—as well as more specifically the types of policy tools that should be used in order to limit greenhouse gas emissions. These debates regarding design of the climate regime are analytically distinct from the question of which states should take on which commitments. Two sets of issues are particularly important. The first relates to the overall design of the architecture of the climate regime, and reflects a debate between so-called “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to climate governance, and the second relates to the importance of market mechanisms as an instrument of mitigation policy.

First, at a general level, is the question of how the climate change regime should be constructed, with debate focused on the merits of two ideal types. One is the so-called “top down” model, also referred to as a “targets and timetables” approach. In this model, each state is allocated an emission limitation target based on some agreed distribution of an overall global target, in theory assigned on the basis of scientific knowledge. Progress towards these targets is then subject to external assessment, with an enforcement/compliance mechanism to deal with instances of non-compliance. The other is the so-called “bottom up” model, also sometimes referred to as a “pledge and review” approach. In this model, each state pledges a particular target based on a domestic assessment of what is feasible and achievable. The sum of these national targets therefore does not necessarily correspond to the requirements of scientific assessments of what action needs to be taken globally. Progress towards achieving these targets is subject to review, but typically it is not proposed that this review would be intrusive, involving a strong compliance mechanism.

The Chinese and Indian Governments have prioritized national sovereignty in the international climate change negotiations, seeking to resist the imposition of targets and external scrutiny of its domestic policy-making. In the earlier years of the negotiations, the

Chinese Government opposed a top-down, “targets and timetables” approach, preferring instead a general framework convention without specific obligations.<sup>35</sup> Emphasizing this point, Chinese Premier Li Peng argued that “international cooperation should be strengthened on the basis of respecting national sovereignty”.<sup>36</sup> Since then, China has generally rejected in the first instance specific internationally enforceable emissions limitation targets for itself, but also any sort of intrusive global agreement that would compromise its policy-making autonomy. This stems from the more general approach of the Chinese Government to issues of national sovereignty.<sup>37</sup> The importance of national sovereignty in the Chinese approach to global climate governance is generally shared by the Indian Government, which has similarly sought to avoid what it sees as external intrusion in its domestic policy-making.<sup>38</sup>

The EU has taken a very different position, advocating a “top-down” climate regime based on legally-binding targets and effective enforcement. This approach is based significantly on a European belief in the special role the EU has in defending and promoting a multilateral world order. Furthermore, the EU itself is an embodiment of the principle of multilateralism, since the member states have agreed collectively to be bound in their relations with one another by a set of stable rules and principles. As Sbragia and Damro note, “the very process of European integration involves the erosion of the significance of national boundaries”.<sup>39</sup> In the context of international action on climate change, they argue that “[i]n psychological terms, the kinds of global restrictions being discussed in relation to

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<sup>35</sup> Bjørkum, *China in the International Politics of Climate Change: A Foreign Policy Analysis*, p. 27.

<sup>36</sup> Cited in Paul G. Harris and Honguan Yu, 2005, “Environmental Change and the Asia Pacific: China Responds to Global Warming”, *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 54.

<sup>37</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the gap in perceptions of sovereignty between China and the EU, see Zhongqi Pan, 2010, “Managing the Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty in China-EU Relations”, *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 8, no. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Sandeep Sengupta, 2011, “International Climate Negotiations and India’s Role”, in Navroz K. Dubash, ed., *Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance* (Abingdon: Earthscan).

<sup>39</sup> Alberta M. Sbragia and Chad Damro, 1999, “The Changing Role of the European Union in International Environmental Politics: Institution Building and the Politics of Climate Change”, *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 63.

climate change do not, therefore, represent a loss of sovereignty in the way they do for the United States”.<sup>40</sup> By contrast, for example, the United States has displayed a generally strong resistance to legally-binding international commitments, and to submitting its domestic policies to international scrutiny, a trend which is hardly unique to the modern era of US involvement in world politics. Stemming from these two tendencies, the US approach to dealing with climate change at the international level has favoured voluntary approaches to reducing emissions over mandatory binding reduction targets, and market-based solutions over command-and-control regulation.<sup>41</sup> While the EU “top-down” approach certainly has many supporters—particularly among civil society groups and particularly climate-vulnerable countries such as Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, the EU approach is considerably at odds with a range of other major states, including China, India, and the United States.

The second issue concerns the use of market mechanisms such as emissions trading to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol made provision for three types of “flexible mechanism”: (i) the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a project-based mechanism under which Annex I Parties could finance emission reduction activities in non-Annex I Parties and “offset” the emission reduction achieved against their own targets; (ii) Joint Implementation, another project-based mechanism under which Annex I Parties could finance emissions reduction activities in other Annex I Parties; and (iii) Emissions Trading, under which Annex I Parties which will exceed their Kyoto target can purchase units of carbon allowance from other Annex I Parties that will undershoot their target.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> In the context of international negotiations on climate change, these competing approaches are sometimes referred to respectively as “policies and measures” and “targets and timetables”.

The most relevant of these mechanisms in the context of this study is the CDM, since it involves exchanges between developed and developing countries. A significant innovation that only emerged late in the negotiations, the CDM originated from a Brazilian proposal of May 1997 and resulted from an unusual alignment of interests between the United States and Brazil during the course of 1997. The CDM proposal only appeared in the draft negotiating text at Kyoto, and other Parties, notably the EU, were caught off-guard. The inclusion of the CDM article in the final protocol text satisfied the US desire to include “flexibility mechanisms” and kept open the possibility of “meaningful participation” of developing countries. For developing countries, it created the possibility of additional funding streams from industrialized countries. However, the detailed work of operationalizing the CDM and many other aspects of the Protocol was left to the future.

Interestingly, the EU, China, and India all changed their approach to these so-called flexible mechanisms in the years following the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, from initial scepticism and resistance to quite enthusiastic acceptance. In the initial negotiations, both the Chinese and Indian Governments were suspicious of these mechanisms. The Chinese chief negotiator at Kyoto, Chen Yaobang, resisted because the mechanisms allowed industrialized countries to shirk their responsibilities while “disregarding the living environment of people in other countries”.<sup>42</sup> The Indian Government initially resisted on the basis that these mechanisms would move the focus of mitigation activities from industrialized to developing countries, and that they would allow the “low-hanging fruit” of emissions reductions in India to be bought up by industrialized countries, making subsequent emissions reductions more expensive for India.<sup>43</sup> However, over time the position of both the Chinese and Indian Governments changed almost completely. In both

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<sup>42</sup> Cited in Paul G. Harris and Hongyuan Yu, 2009, “Climate Change in Chinese Foreign Policy: Internal and External Responses”, in Paul G. Harris, ed., *Climate Change and Foreign Policy: Case Studies from East to West* (London: Routledge), p. 59.

<sup>43</sup> Sengupta, “International Climate Negotiations and India’s Role”.

cases, this resulted from a realization that China and India could benefit from hosting projects under the CDM, both financially and in terms of transfer of technology.

The EU underwent a similar transformation with respect to its position on the flexible mechanisms. Having strongly—though unsuccessfully—resisted the inclusion of these mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol, around 2000 the EU position began to change. As Chapter 3 discussed, this reflected to a significant extent a change in the preferences of institutional actors in the EU, most significantly the Commission, which saw the development of emissions trading as a way of getting around the impasse that had arisen during the 1990s on the carbon/energy tax proposal. In these circumstances, the Commission—supported by certain member states such as the UK and Denmark—acted as a policy entrepreneur and succeeded in shifting the EU policy-making philosophy away from the direct regulation approach of the 1990s and towards an emphasis on market mechanisms.<sup>44</sup> This resulted in the creation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which was agreed in 2003 and Phase I of which commenced in 2005. Indeed, the EU’s embrace of emissions trading was crucial to ensuring the rapid development of the CDM in the years following 2005. By linking the CDM to the EU-ETS through the “Linking Directive” of 2004, the EU created a demand for emissions reductions—so-called “Certified Emission Reductions” (CERs)—which strongly supported the development of such projects in non-Annex I Parties, most notably in China and India.

In short, the development of the CDM represented an area on which, broadly, the perceived interests of the EU, China, and India moved in tandem, from initial rejection to enthusiastic embrace. Indeed, this has been one of the few areas on which a normative gap does not exist to anything like the same extent when compared with the other issues

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<sup>44</sup> Jon Birger Skjærseth and Jørgen Wettestad, 2007, *EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and Implementation* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

analyzed here. This helps to account for the fact that the CDM has represented one of the areas in which EU cooperation with China and India has been most fruitful. However, with respect to the broader question of the institutional architecture of the global climate change regime, there has been a significant normative gap between the EU, China and India, stemming from their very different approaches to the issues of sovereignty and governance beyond the state.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

Since its emergence as an issue of world politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of climate change has been characterized by a strong North-South conflict. This chapter has analyzed the competing normative frames through which the EU, China, and India have perceived the issue of climate change. Although the EU has often taken a more conciliatory approach to various aspects of global climate governance than some other industrialized countries, most notably the United States, there has nonetheless been a considerable normative gap between the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other. While on some issues this normative gap has narrowed over time, on other issues it has grown considerably.

The chapter discussed four sets of core issues in the global governance of climate change. First, with respect to the overall problem definition and in particular the relative importance of mitigation versus adaptation, the normative gap has narrowed somewhat as the EU—and the climate change regime more broadly—has somewhat belatedly focused greater attention and resources on issues of adaptation to climate change. Second, with respect to how greenhouse gas emissions are counted, there has been a persistently wide gap between the approaches of the EU, China and India. With respect to the three aspects discussed—the temporal dimension of emissions accounting, per capita versus aggregate

accounting, and production versus consumption accounting—the EU, China and India have advocated different ways of assigning responsibility for global greenhouse gas emissions. These reflect deeply different understandings of the issue, which in turn are underpinned by competing interests.

Third and related, the normative gap between the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other, has widened over time with respect to the issues of equity and differentiation. Over the period up to 2009, China and India sought to maintain the binary distinction between industrialized and developing countries embodied in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, arguing that only industrialized countries should be required to accept emissions limitation commitments. In particular from 2005 onwards, the EU changed its position with respect to the issue of commitments for large developing countries such as China and India as part of a post-2012 agreement. Finally, with respect to the architecture and policy instruments of the climate change regime, on the issue of market mechanisms the positions of the EU, China, and India have in fact moved in step to a large degree. All three were initially very sceptical of such mechanisms—though for differing reasons. However, following their inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol at the insistence of the United States, the EU, China, and India became enthusiastic adopters of such mechanisms—in the form of the EU-ETS in the case of the EU, and in the form of CDM projects in the case of China and India. However, with respect to broader questions of institutional architecture, the EU has advocated a strong “top down” regime, while China and India have advocated—to the extent that commitments would apply to them at all—a more “bottom up” model. These differences reflect, to a large extent, differing approaches to sovereignty and governance beyond the state.

Overall, then, there has been some convergence but also a good deal of divergence with respect to the respective ways in which the EU, China, and India have framed key aspects

of the global governance of climate change. This normative gap has strongly shaped the development of EU engagement with China and India on climate change. In particular, it has shaped the response of the Chinese and Indian Governments to EU engagement, and the analysis in this chapter therefore provides context for the next two chapters which analyze the development of the EU-China and EU-India relationships on climate change respectively.

# From Reluctance to Bilateral Engagement: The Development of EU-China Relations on Climate Change

*“Compared with the two parties’ huge potential, this is very small.”*

—Prof. Zhang Haibin, Peking University

*“If you try to push China, it won’t respond well. China is self-confident and is very careful not to be influenced by others.”*

—EU official, Brussels

The following is a story of a Chinese response to EU engagement characterized by instances of engagement but also significant resistance. Where it has been successful, EU engagement has been facilitated by increasingly shared interests and objectives, coupled with a progressive institutionalization of the broader EU-China relationship. However, continued Chinese resistance to some aspects of EU engagement has been underpinned by the deep “normative gap” identified in Chapter 4, which to some extent has grown over recent years. This is particularly true with respect to the EU’s attempts to lead in the international climate change negotiations.

The quotes above, from a Chinese professor of International Relations and an EU official previously stationed in Beijing, illustrate core features of this relationship. Given seemingly

shared interests and a wealth of optimism around the mid-2000s, EU-China cooperation on climate change has failed to deliver on its initial promise. The European perspective sees a cautious, wary China, keen to maintain its autonomy and to avoid being influenced by others. Why did EU engagement with China on climate change take the form that it did? How did the Chinese Government respond to this engagement, and how can we understand this response? And what does the pattern of engagement and response tell us about the nature and extent of European leadership on climate change? This chapter sets out to answer these questions by examining systematically the development of EU engagement with China.

The EU's engagement with China on climate change has taken place against the backdrop of the rapid growth of both the Chinese economy and Chinese greenhouse gas emissions in recent decades. From 1980 to 2006, China's economy grew at an annual average rate of 9.8 percent, and by January 2009 it had become the world's third largest economy. A similar trend characterizes China's growing contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions: China overtook the United States as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2006. A significant reason for this is China's reliance on coal for energy generation.<sup>1</sup> In 2006, coal constituted 69.4 percent of overall energy consumption and, since China has 114 billion tons of proven coal reserves, coal is bound to remain the dominant fuel for power generation in the near future.<sup>2</sup> However, a substantially different picture of China emerges if we look at *per capita* statistics. China's per capita GDP is still only about one quarter the

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<sup>1</sup> John Vidal and David Adam, 2007, "China Overtakes US as World's Biggest CO<sub>2</sub> Emitter", Guardian website, 19 June 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews>, (accessed on 6 June 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Coal is projected to constitute 53 percent of total energy consumption in 2030. Gørild M. Heggelund, 2007, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments", *Asian Perspective*, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 162.

OECD average,<sup>3</sup> while its per capita greenhouse gases emissions are also low by comparison to those of industrialized countries.

As well as being a significant aggregate producer of greenhouse gas emissions, China is also liable to be affected significantly by future predicted climate change impacts. China may see greater weather extremes, including droughts in the north and floods in the south. Some of China's largest and most densely populated cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou are situated in low-lying areas along China's 32,000km coastline. Estimates suggest that a one-meter sea level rise would displace 67 million people.<sup>4</sup> In other words, China has conflicted—and changing—interests when it comes to climate change and policy responses.

Using the framework developed in Chapter 2, the next section places the EU's desire to develop engagement with China on climate change in the context of the broader deepening of the EU-China relationship. Section 5.2 analyzes the form of EU engagement with China, focusing in particular on the mechanisms used and capabilities at the disposal of the EU. Section 5.3 then characterizes and explains the Chinese response to EU engagement.

## **5.1 The Progressive Institutionalization of the EU-China Relationship**

The development of EU engagement with China on climate change was underpinned by developments in EU climate change policy-making but it was also crucially mediated, enabled, and constrained by the development of the EU-China relationship. This relationship developed in stages from the mid-1990s onwards and provided the framework within which the EU sought to progressively engage with the Chinese Government on

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<sup>3</sup> Gördil M. Heggelund and Inga Fritzen Buan, 2009, "China in the Asia-Pacific Partnership: Consequences for UN Climate Change Mitigation Efforts?", *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments", pp. 166-67.

climate change issues. While the form of EU engagement was dependent on the broader factors underpinning the development of EU climate change policy, it was also conditioned strongly by developments in the EU-China relationship. Chapter 3 traced the broader contours of EU-Asia relations over this period, but those dynamics played out differently in the two cases, and this section examines the particular characteristics of the EU-China relationship.

Although diplomatic relations had been established with China by several member states in the 1950s and by the Commission in 1975, it was not until 1978 that the first Sino-European Trade Agreement was signed.<sup>5</sup> This was followed in 1985 by the EU-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which remains the legal basis of the EU-China relationship. During the 1980s, the two sides established regular institutionalized bilateral relations. In 1983, the Council of Ministers established, in the framework of European Political Cooperation, biannual consultations with the Chinese Government at senior official level, which was complemented in 1986 by the initiation of regularized ministerial-level consultations.<sup>6</sup> The EU-China relationship was fractured at the end of the 1980s as a consequence of the Chinese Government's violent repression of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. In response, the European Council froze its relations with China. However, the consensus within the EU on the sanctions applied to China was shallow, and most of these sanctions were gradually lifted with relations re-established in October 1990, the main exception being the embargo on arms exports from

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<sup>5</sup> The visit of Commissioner Christopher Soames to Beijing in May 1975, four years after China had been admitted to the United Nations in 1971, marked the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Commission of the European Communities and China. The Commission Delegation to Beijing opened on 4 October 1988.

<sup>6</sup> Consultations at senior official level were between the political director of the foreign ministry of the country holding the EU Presidency and the Chinese ambassador in the country holding the Presidency. Ministerial-level meetings were held from 1986 onwards in the margins of the UN General Assembly between the Chinese foreign minister and the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency Franco Algieri, 2008, "It's the System that Matters: Institutionalization and Making of EU Policy Toward China", in David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Hong Zhou, eds., *China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects* (London: Routledge), p. 71.

the EU to China which remains in place. Nonetheless, the events of 1989 cast a shadow over the relationship for years to come.<sup>7</sup>

The mid-1990s marked the beginning of a new era in EU-China relations, during which the EU started to show a strong and sustained interest in China. This was driven substantially by France and Germany, but fitted within the broader context of the EU's attempts to build ties with the Asian continent. A 1994 Communication from the Commission on relations with Asia, *Towards a New Asia Strategy*, focused heavily on relations with China.<sup>8</sup> This was followed in 1995 by a Commission Communication on the relationship with China, entitled *A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations*.<sup>9</sup> The development of a greater focus on China resulted from a combination of a growing self-awareness of the EU as a global political actor and a greater appreciation that China's economic rise would have political implications. Responding to these changing circumstances, two trends can be discerned in the reorientation of EU external relations towards China. First, the mid-1990s saw the beginning of an attempt to rebalance the historically strong focus on the economic aspects of EU-China relations by giving greater focus to political and strategic relations.<sup>10</sup> Initially, the emphasis of the relationship remained heavily focused on trade and commercial relations, but over time—and especially in the period from 2003 onwards—the relationship assumed a more significant political dimension.

Second and related, the rise of China was framed by EU policy-makers in terms of the greater responsibilities that China should accept for the maintenance of world order. This

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<sup>7</sup> May-Britt U. Stumbaum, 2007, "Engaging China - Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy towards China", in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu, eds., *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road Towards Convergence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 59.

<sup>8</sup> European Commission, 1994, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: Towards a New Asia Strategy*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(94) 314 final, 13 July 1994.

<sup>9</sup> European Commission, 1995, *Communication of the Commission: A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(1995) 279 final. This was the first of six China Strategies published by the Commission over the period 1995–2006.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

theme runs consistently through the various Commission China Strategies from the mid-1990s onwards. For example, the Commission's 1995 China Strategy document was concerned with "how China can share in the responsibilities and opportunities suited to its rapidly increasing power".<sup>11</sup> Similarly, the 1998 China Strategy document proposed that the EU should continue to seek "to see China integrated rapidly and fully into the international community, both politically and economically" through "a strategy of comprehensive engagement with China".<sup>12</sup>

The EU's conception of China as a responsible global power included, from an early stage, taking adequate steps to ensure the sustainability of economic development and, in the specific case of climate change, limiting the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Given the rapid increase in energy consumption, environmental degradation, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in China, it is not surprising that the emphasis placed on energy, environment, and climate change in the EU's more general rhetoric concerning China's global responsibilities increased over time. Although the EU focused much of its attention during the Kyoto negotiations in the late 1990s on securing the participation of other industrialized countries—particularly the United States—in a binding global regime, it grew increasingly concerned with the regional and global environmental impact of China's rapid industrialization and development.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the issue of Chinese environmental degradation was increasingly framed as one in which the EU had a significant role to play, both through technical assistance and by persuading China to integrate environmental protection measures into its economic development policies.<sup>14</sup> However, the ambition to

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, 1998, *Communication from the Commission: Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(1998) 181 final, 25 March 1998.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>14</sup> For example, the Commission's 1998 China strategy document stated: "The EU should aim to ensure China's continued commitment to addressing world environmental challenges such as global warming and greenhouse gas emissions, not least through EU funded cooperation projects ... In particular, the EU should encourage China's further involvement in the pursuit of global environmental objectives in the context of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and its follow up, notably in the area of climate change". Ibid.

engage with China on climate change was dependent on the development of frameworks to facilitate institutionalized dialogue and cooperation. Since these frameworks were still relatively shallow and underdeveloped, EU engagement with China on climate change in the second half of the 1990s remained largely aspirational.

In 1998 the EU-China relationship was institutionalized at the highest level through the agreement to hold an annual EU-China summit at head of state/government level.<sup>15</sup> This development reflected the perceived need on the EU side to develop a stronger political dimension to the still trade-dominated EU-China relationship during this period. Although this European desire had been a goal for a number of years, it was given greater prominence in the Commission's 1998 China Strategy, which proposed that a "comprehensive partnership" with China be established that would span all areas of mutual interest. This proposal, in turn, built on the establishment by France of a "comprehensive partnership" with China in 1997.<sup>16</sup> However, while the establishment of annual summits represents the highest level of interaction between states, this development represented only a partial deepening of the relationship. It would take time—and changed circumstances—for the relationship to broaden in order to facilitate the development of engagement on climate change policy.

This development occurred with the decision to inaugurate an EU-China "strategic partnership" at the 2003 EU-China summit, which represented a milestone in the relationship. On the European side, this was underpinned by the same logic that was

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<sup>15</sup> Summits have been held every year since 1998 with the exception of 2008, which was cancelled at short notice by the Chinese side in protest at a meeting between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was represented at EU-China summits by the head of state/government of the member state holding the rotating EU Presidency, and by the President of the European Commission. Following Lisbon, the EU side is represented by the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission. The Chinese Government is typically represented by the Premier of the State Council.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of the origins of the EU-China relationship in the national China strategies of the member states during this period, see William A. Callahan, 2007, "Future Imperfect: The European Union's Encounter with China (and the United States)", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 782.

embodied in the European Security Strategy. “Strategic partnerships” became the EU’s preferred institutional mechanism for developing relations with key third countries, through which the EU sought to build a global system based on “effective multilateralism”. As Chapter 3 discussed in more detail, this development was in part a reaction against the increasing unilateralism of the Bush Administration after 2000.<sup>17</sup> It was also a response to China’s continued economic and political rise, as the EU continued to frame the need to engage China in terms of China’s growing responsibilities at regional and global levels.<sup>18</sup>

The inauguration of this strategic partnership was also driven by an increasing desire on the Chinese side to deepen its relationship with the EU. In response to the Commission’s 2003 China Strategy, the Chinese Government produced an “EU Policy Paper” one month later which was, in fact, China’s first ever policy paper for bilateral relations with any other country.<sup>19</sup> Responding positively to the EU’s proposal for a deeper relationship, the paper described the EU as “a major force in the world” that “will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs”.<sup>20</sup> The conception of world order embodied in the document reflected the EU’s vision of a multipolar world order. It also called for greater cooperation in the environment and energy fields. This marked a new willingness and desire on the part of the Chinese Government to engage in cooperation and dialogue with the EU at a general level and also more specifically on environment and energy issues.

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<sup>17</sup> See Council of the European Union, 2003, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003. The inauguration of the EU-China strategic partnership pre-dated the final version of the ESS by three months, but a draft version of the ESS had been presented by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to the June 2003 European Council, and both documents stem from the same strategic logic and vision of world politics.

<sup>18</sup> European Commission, 2003, *Commission Policy Paper for Transmission to the Council and the European Parliament: A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2003) 533 final, 10 September 2003.

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2003, “China's EU Policy Paper”, 13 October 2003, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm>, (accessed on 11 May 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

However, while the EU paper stressed the positive shared values, the Chinese paper by contrast noted the lack of any *negative* contradictions with the EU.<sup>21</sup>

In this context of enthusiasm for a deepening of the relationship on both sides, the 2003 Summit represented something of a high-water mark of optimism concerning the EU-China relationship.<sup>22</sup> During this period, the relationship was described by some observers at the time as a “love affair”, and Romano Prodi, then European Commission President, stated that “if it is not a marriage, it is at least a very serious engagement”.<sup>23</sup> The factors underpinning this deepening include the fact that Europe, in contrast to the United States, has no significant military or strategic interests in East Asia, and all EU member states adhere to the One China policy, again in contrast to the United States.<sup>24</sup> Economically, China and Europe’s economies are complementary in important respects. There was, moreover, a convergence of views regarding world order and US role in the world, especially after 2001.<sup>25</sup> Shambaugh, for example, has argued that the EU and China both seek ways to constrain US hegemony, and that “some Europeans, more wed to realist balance-of-power paradigms, also view China as a useful ‘pole’ in a wished-for multipolar world order”.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Callahan, “Future Imperfect: The European Union's Encounter with China (and the United States)”.

<sup>22</sup> This can be seen in the Joint Press Statement of the 2003 Summit, which noted the “increasing maturity and growing strategic nature of the partnership”, and stated the resolve of both sides to “further expand and deepen China-EU relations, guided by the two policy papers, which promote the development of an overall strategic partnership between China and the EU”. See Council of the European Union, 2003, “Sixth China-EU Summit, Beijing, 30 October 2003 - Joint Press Statement, 13424/03 (Presse 298)”, 30 October 2003, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf), (accessed on 11 May 2011).

<sup>23</sup> David Murphy and Shada Islam, 2004, “It’s More Than Love”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 February 2004. David Shambaugh, 2004, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”, *Current History*, p. 243.

<sup>24</sup> Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* p. 243. See also Nicola Casarini, 2009, *Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 11; and David Shambaugh, 2005, “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China's Rise”, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3. For a sceptical view of this claim, see Callahan, “Future Imperfect: The European Union's Encounter with China (and the United States)”.

<sup>26</sup> Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”, p. 247.

However, this wave of optimism was relatively short-lived. Protracted difficulties over contentious issues became increasingly obvious. One particularly contentious issue concerned whether to lift the EU arms embargo on China, which originally had been imposed by the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In December 2003, France and Germany officially proposed the lifting of the embargo. The purpose of the proposal to lift the embargo, according to Casarini, was “to give further meaning and content to this newly established strategic partnership”.<sup>27</sup> However, a group of member states, led by Denmark and Sweden, voiced their opposition to the proposal, as did the European Parliament. A decisive factor was strong opposition from the United States, which has tended to view China as much more of a threat compared with Europe, and which threatened sanctions against European companies that would sell arms equipment to China. The proposal was eventually dropped, very much contrary to the wishes of China, and the arms embargo remains in place to the present.

A second contentious issue in the relationship around this time concerned the granting of Market Economy Status (MES) to China. In June 2003, China officially requested the EU to grant it MES and subsequently placed this item very high on its list of foreign policy objectives. Granting such status would have important implications for the way in which anti-dumping investigations are conducted. Although there is an economic dimension to the issue, only 0.5 percent of all Chinese exports to the EU are affected by the MES issue and, since the EU is a relatively moderate user of anti-dumping procedures, this is only part of the story. There was also a symbolic element, which was that China regarded the EU

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<sup>27</sup> Nicola Casarini, 2007, “The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”, *The International Spectator*, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 372.

attitude as discrimination, since the EU previously granted MES to Russia. The EU has to date refused to grant MES to China.<sup>28</sup>

These and other disagreements—including trade disputes—in the period 2003–2005 led both sides to the realization that their interests were not quite as mutual as previously imagined. The Commission’s China Strategy of 2006, entitled *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, reflected this growing disenchantment on the European side and made the case even more strongly than previous China Strategies that China needed to assume greater responsibilities at the international level, as reflected in the title of the document.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, China began to reassess its view of the EU, not least in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the electorates of France and the Netherlands. China had expected that the EU would gain in strength following eastern enlargement, but China took note of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.<sup>30</sup>

It was in this context that climate change and energy began to feature more prominently in the bilateral EU-China relationship. A senior European diplomat based in Beijing during this period suggested that it was partly because progress was not possible in other aspects of the relationship that increasing attention was devoted to developing cooperation on climate change.<sup>31</sup> In other words, the bilateral relationship on climate change developed partly as a consequence of the failure of cooperation in other, initially more highly-prioritized, areas. It was also part of a broader trend in EU-China relations in which sectoral dialogues have proliferated on a vast array of issue areas. The number of policy

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<sup>28</sup> For a detailed discussion of the dispute over Market Economy Status, see Mathieu Rémond, 2007, “The EU’s Refusal to Grant China ‘Market Economy Status’ (MES)”, *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 5, no. 3.

<sup>29</sup> European Commission, 2006, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2006) 631 final, 24 October 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with European academic based in Beijing, 14 October 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with senior member state diplomat based in Beijing, 15 October 2010.

areas covered by EU-China dialogues grew from 17 in 2004 to over 50 by 2009.<sup>32</sup> Engaging China bilaterally on climate change was also part of the EU's attempt to build a post-2012 climate regime that would include commitments for economically more advanced developing countries, a strategy that was emphasized in a number of Commission communications on climate change in the period from 2005 onwards, though it was only expressed in numerical terms for the first time in October 2008.<sup>33</sup> This purpose was emphasized by a senior EU official in Brussels:

It was certainly one of the EU's objectives to draw them a bit more into the picture and also to start involving them in the common responsibility for future climate agreement ... they cannot just say "we are just developing countries, and you developed countries are responsible and you have to take action, and we are just sitting on the fence and watching".<sup>34</sup>

The decision to launch a specific mechanism for institutionalized dialogue and cooperation with China on climate change was driven primarily by the UK Government, which held the EU Presidency in the second half of 2005 during which time the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change was launched. During 2005, the UK held the Presidency of the G8 concurrently with its EU Presidency, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair identified climate change as one of two priority themes—along with poverty eradication in Africa—for the G8 Presidency. The UK's G8 Summit was held in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005, and was attended by the leaders of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, labelled the

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<sup>32</sup> European External Action Service, 2012, "Information Note: Sectoral Cooperation between the EU and China", [http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/sectoraldialogues\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/sectoraldialogues_en.pdf), (accessed on 20 March 2012).

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, European Commission, 2005, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2005) 35 final, 9 February 2005; and European Commission, 2009, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in Copenhagen*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2009) 39 final, 28 January 2009. However, as Chapter 4 highlighted, the first time the Council quantified in numerical terms what contribution it expected from "economically more advanced" developing countries as part of a post-2012 climate regime was in the Environment Council conclusions of October 2008, setting out the EU position for COP-14 in Poznań in December 2008. See Council of the European Union, 2008, *Preparations for the 14th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 4th Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 4) - Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 14562/08, 21 October 2008.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with senior EU official, Brussels 26 July 2010.

“Outreach Five” countries. Chinese President Hu attended parts of the summit, an occurrence that was described by one interviewee in Beijing as a “very early education of Chinese leaders” in respect of climate change.<sup>35</sup>

Following on from this, as part of its EU Presidency, the UK Government also sought to make climate change a central aspect of the EU summit with China that year by negotiating the establishment of a “partnership” with China at EU level on climate change. The UK Presidency was supported by the Commission, but the process was driven by the UK Government.<sup>36</sup> Thus, while broader, longer-term trends were significant in driving the development of the EU-China relationship on climate change, contingency played a part as well. Indeed, the UK Government was arguably “ahead of the curve” on this issue, and built up considerable institutional capacity and expertise in the area of climate change before many other EU member states had done so, including a well-developed network of “climate diplomats” in its embassies abroad. If the EU Presidency had been held by a different member state in the second semester of 2005, it is questionable whether climate change would have received as much priority in the EU-China relationship.

As Chapter 3 argued, the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 had a catalytic effect on the development of EU climate change policy, strengthening both its normative and material interest drivers. Moreover, the early years of the 2000s also saw a rise in global concern regarding the growing contribution of China to global greenhouse gas emissions, and environmental degradation more generally, and this was increasingly reflected in European thinking.<sup>37</sup> These factors combined to create a motivation on the EU side to develop engagement with China on climate change, but this

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with NGO representative, Beijing, 15 October 2010.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with senior European Commission official.

<sup>37</sup> The 2004 edition of the International Energy Agency’s flagship “World Energy Outlook” report represents a particularly prominent and influential example of this increased global concern. See International Energy Agency, 2004, *World Energy Outlook 2004* (Paris: International Energy Agency).

was mediated and constrained by the manner in which the overall EU-China relationship developed, generating a particular form of engagement.

## 5.2 Development of Engagement through the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change

Reflecting the trajectory of the broader EU-China relationship, the EU-China relationship on climate change lacked a strong institutionalized foundation until the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. While the 1985 EU-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement included a commitment to develop cooperation in the areas of environmental protection and energy, there was little sustained bilateral engagement on these topics in the years following the signing of the agreement. While there were some instances of episodic exchanges and cooperation in areas such as coal and electricity, training of Chinese energy policy experts, and nuclear safety, little of this related to energy efficiency, alternative energy, or climate change policy.<sup>38</sup>

During the 1990s, this position began to change with respect to formal mechanisms for interaction, but these remained limited in practice. An EU-China Environmental Dialogue was established in 1992, and an EU-China Environment Working Group was established in 1996, but there is very little evidence of any substantive developments resulting from these dialogues during this period.<sup>39</sup> Institutionalized dialogue and cooperation in the energy field were established on a somewhat more substantive basis in the mid-1990s. A first EU-China

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<sup>38</sup> See Commission of the European Communities, 1988, *The European Community and China*, Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication, & Culture, Europe Information Document 90/88.

<sup>39</sup> Very little information is available concerning the content of the Dialogue and Working Group, or how often they met. The European Commission published reviews of EU-China relations in 1998 and 1999 which outlined the substance of cooperation. While the dialogues on environment and energy are mentioned in these publications, there are no details of substance or outcomes, and no indication that these were priority areas for the EU. See European Commission, 1998, *European Union-China Relations* (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Relations); European Commission, 1999, *European Union-China Relations* (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Relations).

Energy Conference was held in 1994,<sup>40</sup> and an EU-China Energy Working Group was established in 1996.<sup>41</sup> However, during the period prior to 2003, substantive engagement on these issues remained limited and the dialogues on environment and energy yielded few notable results. One exception was the launch of the “EU-China Energy and Environment Programme” in 2003, though it was a number of years before the activities of this programme commenced. The joint statements issued by the first number of EU-China summits confirm this assessment.<sup>42</sup> Coming after COP-7 in Marrakech in October–November 2001, and shortly after the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August–September 2002, the 5th EU-China Summit was the first to cover environmental issues in any detail in the joint press statement issued after the summit.<sup>43</sup>

Building on the dynamic created by the inauguration of a “strategic partnership” in 2003, a “China-EU Dialogue on Environmental Policy at Ministerial Level” was established by way of follow-up to the 2003 Summit.<sup>44</sup> This took the form of a meeting of European Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström with Minister Xie Zhenhua of the State Environmental Protection Administration in November 2003, as part of the first ever visit

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<sup>40</sup> The EU-China Energy Conference has been held biannually since then. European Commission, 2011, “External Dimension - China”, DG Energy website, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral\\_cooperation/china/china\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/china/china_en.htm), (accessed on 10 May 2011).

<sup>41</sup> European Commission, 1996, “EU-China Energy Working Group Approved”, Press Release IP/96/1242, 20 December 1996, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/96/1242&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, (accessed on 6 August 2011).

<sup>42</sup> While these joint statements tend to be highly formulaic, they nonetheless provide an indication of the issues to which both sides agree to attach high-level political priority. The joint statements of the first four EU-China summits contain few if any references to climate change and environmental protection more generally. These are reproduced in Francis G. Snyder, 2009, *The European Union and China, 1949-2008: Basic Documents and Commentary* (Oxford: Hart Publishing), pp. 670-74.

<sup>43</sup> Even this did not go beyond general statements stressing the two sides’ shared commitment to environmental matters and the importance of cooperation on environmental issues in multilateral forums. See Council of the European Union, 2002, “Fifth EU-China Summit, Copenhagen, 24 September 2002 - Joint Press Statement, 12335/02 (Presse 287)”, 24 September 2002, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf), (accessed on 11 May 2011).

<sup>44</sup> “Minutes of the Meeting between Mrs. Margot Wallström (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Xie Zhenhua (Minister, State Environmental Protection Administration, China) Beijing, 12 November 2003”, reproduced in Snyder, *The European Union and China, 1949-2008: Basic Documents and Commentary*, pp. 828-30.

of an EU Environment Commissioner to China, and represented a deepening of the interest at political level within the EU in environmental protection issues in China.<sup>45</sup>

This served as a precursor for the “EU-China Partnership on Climate Change”, launched two years later at the 2005 EU-China Summit. The following sections analyze the form of this institutionalized engagement, drawing on the conceptual tools set out in Chapter 2. First, the EU-China relationship is analyzed from the perspectives of mechanisms of engagement with a view to identifying how the EU sought to develop engagement. Second, the relationship is scrutinized from the perspective of EU capabilities, paying particular attention to the issues of capacity, consistency, and coherence.

### ***5.2.1 Institutionalized Dialogue and Limited Capacity-Building: The Mechanisms of EU Engagement***

Under the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, the EU attempted to build its relationship on climate change with China through a combination of mechanisms. First, it sought to develop formal institutionalized but also more *ad hoc* dialogue, which can be characterized as an attempt at socialization. Second, it involved the development of practical cooperation on low-carbon technological development and policy-making which aimed to demonstrate the feasibility of lowering the trajectory of emissions growth in China. This can be characterized as an attempt to change the incentives faced by the Chinese Government with respect to climate change policy-making by building Chinese capacity for policy-making and technological development. Of course, these two strands are to some extent interlinked both empirically and conceptually, but for analytical purposes it is useful to distinguish between them.

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<sup>45</sup> However, while a second meeting of the Ministerial dialogue was planned for the following year, it was in fact two years before it took place for a second time. Moreover, there was very little by way of tangible follow up to this first meeting.

The Partnership on Climate Change committed the two sides to strengthening “dialogue on climate change policies and exchange views on key issues in the climate change negotiations”, and “practical co-operation on the development, deployment and transfer of low carbon technology, to enhance energy efficiency and promote the low carbon economy”. Two goals were outlined for the period to 2020: the development and demonstration in China and the EU of “near-zero emissions coal” technology through Carbon Capture and Storage, and reduction of the cost of key energy technologies and promotion of their deployment.<sup>46</sup> The two sides also agreed to strengthen implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and adaptation to climate impacts.

In terms of the development of institutionalized dialogue, the principal formal mechanism was a “Bilateral Consultation Mechanism” (BCM), which was established under the Partnership and has met twice per year. The EU side is represented in this forum by the Presidency and the Commission, though due to institutional memory the Commission has tended to play a more prominent role. The first meeting of the BCM was held in Vienna in March 2006, and the second meeting, in Beijing in October 2006, agreed on a “Rolling Work Plan”, which restated the objectives and priorities for cooperation of the Joint Declaration of 2005, and outlined a range of activities to be undertaken in the period 2006–2008.<sup>47</sup> The fact that it took a full year to agree on the text of a work plan for the Partnership on Climate Change suggests that there was limited engagement from the Chinese side initially. However, an EU official involved with the process during this phase

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<sup>46</sup> The specific areas identified for cooperation included: energy efficiency, energy conservation, and new and renewable energy; clean coal; methane recovery and use; hydrogen and fuel cells; and power generation and transmission.

<sup>47</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2006, “China-EU Partnership on Climate Change: Rolling Work Plan”, Beijing, 19 October 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjg/tyfls/tfsxw/t283051.htm>, (accessed on 12 May 2011).

reported that the attitude of the Chinese Government with respect to engaging with the EU on climate change began to change during 2006.<sup>48</sup>

The developing dialogue on climate change was coupled with an increasingly active institutionalized dialogue in related policy areas. In the area of energy policy, cooperation during this period began to focus to a greater extent on renewable energy and energy efficiency. Alongside the focus on climate change pushed by the UK Presidency, the 2005 EU-China Summit also endorsed a memorandum of understanding on an “EU-China Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies” between DG Energy and Transport on the EU side and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on the Chinese side, which created two separate working groups, one each for energy and transport.<sup>49</sup> This followed on from two Action Plans that had been signed in March 2005: the China-EU Action Plan on Clean Coal, and the China-EU Action Plan on Industrial Co-operation on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies.<sup>50</sup> The two sides also established a “Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on Forests” in 2009 between DG Environment on the EU side and the State Forestry Administration on the Chinese side, while in the broader area of environmental policy, the “China-EU Dialogue on Environmental Policy at Ministerial Level” met infrequently in the years following its inception in 2003.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Interview with EU official in Brussels, 29 July 2010.

<sup>49</sup> On the energy policy side, the sectors identified for the Energy Working Group were: coal including carbon sequestration, electricity, oil and natural gas, renewable energy, energy efficiency, new energy resources, and reforms of the energy industry. European Commission, 2005, “EU-China Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies: Memorandum of Understanding”, DG Energy website, 5 September 2005, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral\\_cooperation/china/doc/dialogue/2005\\_mou\\_eu\\_china\\_energy\\_transport\\_strategies.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/china/doc/dialogue/2005_mou_eu_china_energy_transport_strategies.pdf), (accessed on 12 May 2011).

<sup>50</sup> According to Francis Snyder’s extensive collection of documents on EU-China relations, either of these action plans is available to the public. Therefore, it is difficult to establish to what extent they have resulted in concrete follow-up. See Snyder, *The European Union and China, 1949-2008: Basic Documents and Commentary*, p. 777. However, for a brief description of the purpose of each Action Plan, see Kerry Brown, 2007, “China and the Challenges of the Environment”, in Peter Ludlow, ed., *The EU and China* (Ponte de Lima, Portugal: European Strategy Forum), p. 47.

<sup>51</sup> The fourth meeting of this ministerial dialogue took place in February 2012, nine years after its establishment. See European Commission, 2012, “4th EU-China Policy Dialogue on Environment: Minutes of the Meeting between Mr. Janez Potočnik (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Zhou Shengxian (Minister, Ministry of Environmental Protection, China)”, DG Environment website, 8

These processes of institutionalized dialogue were complemented by a more *ad hoc* process of attempted socialization, in which climate change became an increasing focus of political dialogue between European politicians and their Chinese counterparts. It will suffice to highlight a small number of examples. European Commission President Barroso was initially not particularly interested in climate change, but began to prioritize the issue from 2007 onwards, in part as a result of the polity-building motivations discussed in Chapter 3. This more general turn to climate change as a “savior” issue for the European Union fed into the EU’s relationship with China. In January 2007, EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner visited China to discuss energy and climate change issues with Chinese leaders.<sup>52</sup> The significance of this visit lies in the fact that climate change was now being prioritized as a “priority” issue of the overall bilateral relationship rather than simply as another sectoral dialogue, as evidenced by the fact that the Commissioner for External Relations, as well as the Commissioner for Environment, was raising climate change with her counterparts.

This was followed later in the year by the visit of Commission President Barroso, who delivered a speech at the Chinese Communist Party Central School in which he called on the Chinese Government to join the EU in taking action on climate change:

We have fixed new and very ambitious objectives for ourselves but these will serve little purpose if other countries, including China, a huge consumer of fossil fuels, do not join in common actions. Yes, there is a cost to reducing emissions, but the cost of climate change is far higher, including for China.<sup>53</sup>

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February 2012,

[http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international\\_issues/pdf/china/signed\\_minutes\\_08FEB2012.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/pdf/china/signed_minutes_08FEB2012.pdf),  
(accessed on 19 March 2012).

<sup>52</sup> Delegation of the European Commission to China and Mongolia, 2007, *European Commission Proposes that Developed Countries Reduce their Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 30% by 2020; Seeks Increased Cooperation with China*, Beijing, Press Information, 18 January 2007.

<sup>53</sup> European Commission, 2007, “‘The EU and China: Shaping the Future Together’ - Speech by José Manuel Barroso at the Chinese Communist Party Central School, Beijing”, SPEECH/07/759, 27 November 2007,

As well as members of the College of Commissioners, senior politicians from a number of EU member states raised the issue of climate change in their meetings with the Chinese leadership throughout 2007. Most prominent in this respect was the German Government of Angela Merkel which, similar to the UK in 2005, made climate change a key theme of its concurrent Presidencies of the G8 and EU in 2007. At the March 2007 European Council, under the German Presidency, EU heads of state had agreed on the EU's headline targets for 2020.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, Merkel made climate change a central theme of the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm in June 2007 which, similar to the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, was attended by the leaders of China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico. Alongside the G8 Process, Tony Blair and Nicolas Sarkozy each visited China during 2007 and raised climate change in their discussions with the Chinese leadership.

As the climate issue featured ever more prominently on the European and global political agendas in the run-up to COP-15, this process of attempted socialization through institutionalized dialogue continued. For example, in April 2008 European Commission President Barroso led a delegation of nine commissioners to Beijing on a visit that focused on climate change and sustainable development.<sup>55</sup> As part of the visit, Barroso met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to discuss climate change, and a meeting was also held between China's Expert Panel on Climate Change and President Barroso's Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change on the same day, the purpose of which was "to increase mutual understanding on policies needed to achieve a transition to a low-carbon economy and to tackle the impacts of climate change as well as on building blocks of a future post-

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<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/759&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, (accessed on 31 May 2011).

<sup>54</sup> See Chapter 3 for further discussion and details.

<sup>55</sup> Barroso was accompanied by the Commissioners for External Relations, Trade, Environment, Research, Development, Employment, Energy, Customs, and Consumer Protection. One of the primary stated purposes of this visit was to discuss climate change with the Chinese Government.

2012 international climate change agreement”.<sup>56</sup> In January 2009, when Premier Wen paid a return visit to Brussels accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of NDRC, the Minister of Commerce, and the Director of the Research Office of the State Council, climate change was again high on the agenda.<sup>57</sup> They met with President Barroso and the Commissioners for External Relations, Environment, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Science and Research, and Trade.

Alongside the development of institutionalized and ad hoc dialogue, the EU also pursued the development of cooperation with China on policies and technologies to facilitate low-carbon development. The principal aim of doing so was to try in various ways to change the incentives facing the Chinese Government with respect to climate change policy-making by developing the expertise and capacity of the Chinese Government in the area of climate policy-making, or to demonstrate particular technologies in China. These activities took a number of forms and covered a variety of areas and themes. One of the most prominent of these concerned the development of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in China. Established as one of the so-called “flexible mechanisms” under the Kyoto Protocol, both China and the EU were initially highly sceptical of the CDM, albeit for different reasons. However, this position changed in both cases. In the EU, there was a recognition that the CDM could contribute to allowing member states achieve their emission limitation targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The Chinese Government

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<sup>56</sup> European Commission, 2008, “China-EU Partnership on Climate Change: Rolling Work Plan”, DG Climate Action website, 18 August 2008,

[http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/international/docs/rwp\\_180808.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/international/docs/rwp_180808.pdf), (accessed on 12 May 2012).

<sup>57</sup> European Commission, 2009, “EC and China Sign Nine Cooperation Agreements and Foster Dialogue on Global Solutions to Economic and Financial Crisis and Climate Change”, Press Release IP/09/212, 30 January 2009, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/212&format=HTML>, (accessed on 31 May 2011). According to a Chinese government official familiar with the EU-China relationship, the Commission used China’s cancellation of the November 2008 EU-China Summit as an opportunity to boost its own role by filling the resulting vacuum with a meeting between the Commission and the Chinese leadership. Interview with Chinese government official, Beijing, 11 October 2010.

increasingly recognized the potential of the CDM as a source of both technological and financial transfers from industrialized countries.<sup>58</sup>

The decision by the EU to allow European firms use so-called “Certified Emission Reductions” (CER) generated by CDM projects to offset their emissions was key to creating a demand for CERs. This was done through the “Linking Directive” of 2004, which linked the CDM and “Joint Implementation”, the other project-based flexible mechanism established by the Kyoto Protocol, to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The CDM has been particularly significant in the case of China: of all CDM projects submitted for validation up to the end of 2009, just under 40 percent were located in China. China accounts for an even higher share of the total CERs issued to registered CDM projects by the end of 2009, at 57 percent of the global total.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, the use of CDM financing has been a significant driver of change in China. For example, up to October 2008, 90 percent of wind farm projects in China had applied for CDM registration.<sup>60</sup> As well as enabling European companies to purchase Chinese CERs through the linking of the CDM and EU-ETS, the EU and member states have also participated directly in the CDM through government purchases of CERs, and through provision of capacity building for the CDM in China.

One of the most prominent such initiatives is the “EU-China Clean Development Mechanism Facilitation Project”, launched in April 2007 under the framework of the Partnership on Climate Change, with EUR 2.4 million funding provided by the European Commission. This project aimed to increase domestic institutional capacity in China in relation to the CDM, to introduce European and international standards in quality

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<sup>58</sup> See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on their respective positions on the flexible mechanisms, and the evolution over time in these positions.

<sup>59</sup> UNEP Risoe Centre, 2012, “Overview of the CDM Pipeline, updated 1 June 2012”, <http://www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsx>, (accessed on 1 July 2012).

<sup>60</sup> Benito Müller, et al., 2010, *Addressing Large Developing Country Emissions: The Case for Strategic Collaboration under Joint Commitments* (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies), p. 22.

management of the CDM development process, and to increase awareness of CDM opportunities in China. As well as seeking to develop Chinese capacity in this area, there was also a commercial-opportunity motive behind this project, since European businesses had already developed considerable expertise and knowledge in the area of carbon markets.

More broadly, building the capacity of Chinese actors with respect to market mechanism approaches to climate change represented an attempt to lay the foundations for the development of a global carbon market which became a central component of the EU approach to international cooperation on climate change from 2005 onwards. De Cock provides evidence from interviews that the promotion of the CDM in China by the EU, inter alia through the EU-China CDM Facilitation Programme, has created a considerable constituency in China that is interested in renewable energy and energy efficiency, by demonstrating that mitigating climate change creates business opportunities.<sup>61</sup>

A second area of cooperation, and in some ways a “flagship” issue theme of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, is the area of carbon capture and storage (CCS). The aim of the “Near Zero Emissions Coal” (NZEC) project, launched under the Partnership on Climate Change, is to develop Carbon Capture and Storage technology and to deploy and demonstrate it at commercial scale in China.<sup>62</sup> This was, like the initiation of the overall Partnership on Climate Change, driven significantly by the UK Government, which had wanted to announce a “Zero Emissions Coal” project as part of the EU-China Summit that year. The Chinese side agreed, but added the word “Near” as they felt that capturing 90 percent of emissions did not count as “zero”.<sup>63</sup> Following on from the 2005 Summit, the UK Government in December 2005 signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding with

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<sup>61</sup> Geert De Cock, 2011, “The European Union as a Bilateral ‘Norm Leader’ on Climate Change vis-à-vis China”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 16, no. 1.

<sup>62</sup> A number of other related projects, funded by the European Commission, include the “Cooperation Action within CCS China-EU” (COACH) project, the “Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon Capture and Storage” (STRACO2) project, and the “GeoCapacity” project.

<sup>63</sup> Correspondence with UK diplomat, August 2010.

the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology establishing the “China-UK Near Zero Emissions Coal” initiative.<sup>64</sup>

This was followed by a separate memorandum of understanding between the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology in February 2006 on “Cooperation on Near-Zero Emissions Power Generation Technology through Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage”.<sup>65</sup> Collectively, these two memoranda of understanding set in place Phase I of the EU-China cooperation on carbon capture and storage (CCS), which ran until 2009. The aim of Phase I was to assess the potential for CCS in China, and it found that there was considerable potential. This represents an attempt to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a particular technology which, if successful, could alter the perceived costs and benefits of reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by the Chinese Government.

Phase II of the NZEC Project was launched at the 2009 EU-China Summit, which followed the completion of Phase I in October of that year. However, the NZEC project has been characterized by some difficulties, particularly in preparation for Phase II. First, adequate funding for Phase II has not been forthcoming, with objections from new member states to funding projects in China. Second is the issue of “knowledge-sharing”, that is, the sharing of sensitive power plant data between competitor companies. This has already proved to be a difficulty in the development of CCS within the EU, and is likely to become an issue during Phase II of NZEC.<sup>66</sup> The issue of technology sharing was also

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<sup>64</sup> NZEC, 2009, “China-UK Near Zero Emissions Coal (NZEC) Initiative - Summary Report”, September 2009, <http://www.nzec.info/en/assets/Reports/China-UK-NZEC-English-031109.pdf>, (accessed on 12 May 2011).

<sup>65</sup> European Commission, 2006, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China and the European Commission on Cooperation on Near-Zero Emissions Power Generation Technology through Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage”, DG Climate Action website, 20 February 2006, [http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/international/docs/nzec\\_mou\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/international/docs/nzec_mou_en.pdf), (accessed on 12 May 2011).

<sup>66</sup> Interview with UK government official, 3 August 2010.

identified as an inhibitor to cooperation in this area.<sup>67</sup> However, an NGO representative in Beijing argued that EU-China cooperation in this area actually compares quite favourably with US-China cooperation. The NZEC framework is “more concrete” than cooperation with the United States on CCS, and the US-China cooperation in this area involved “a lot of talking and meetings” but less action.<sup>68</sup>

A third area of EU cooperation with China related to climate change has focused on the development and deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures and technologies in China. A principal way in which the EU sought to develop both policy-making and technological capacity in China was through the EU-China Energy and Environment Programme (EEP). While it had been formally agreed in 2002 and launched in 2003, the EEP got off to a slow start due to difficulties in implementation, and the main activities only commenced in 2006.<sup>69</sup> The total budget was EUR 42.9 million, of which EUR 20 million was provided by the EU and EUR 22.9 million by the Chinese Government. The budget focused on four areas: energy policy development, energy efficiency, renewable energy, and natural gas. The main activities undertaken were in the areas of policy advice, awareness and capacity building, and the introduction of new technologies through feasibility studies and demonstration projects. Projects under the EEP included workshops held in China on renewable energy, a number of study tours of Chinese officials to Europe in areas related to renewables and energy conservation, EU support to the drafting of a Chinese natural gas framework law, and a study into EU experiences with feed-in tariffs.<sup>70</sup> However, it was generally acknowledged that the programme was difficult to implement, the main reason being that the two bureaucracies

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<sup>67</sup> Interview with Prof. Zhang Haibin, Peking University, 14 October 2010.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with representative of NGO in Beijing, 18 October 2010.

<sup>69</sup> Initial discussions on the content of the programme had taken place as far back as March 2000 in the framework of a meeting of the EU-China Energy Working Group in Beijing.

<sup>70</sup> Jørgen Delman and Yong Chen, 2008, *Nordic Collaboration with China in Energy Research and Development* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), pp. 92-93.

had different rules that were difficult to harmonize.<sup>71</sup> In particular, EU officials familiar with the implementation of the EEP reported that there were difficulties getting the Chinese side to follow rules laid down as part of the funding conditions by the EU.<sup>72</sup>

Also in the area of policy and technology cooperation on renewable energy and energy efficiency (as well as some other aspects of energy policy), and building on the EEP, the 2009 EU-China Summit formally endorsed the creation of a “Europe-China Clean Energy Centre”, funded by a EUR 10 million contribution from the Commission and a EUR 3.16 million contribution from the Italian Government. Implementation of the project was awarded to a consortium led by Polytechnic Turin and including six European and three Chinese partners.<sup>73</sup> Started in March 2010, it will focus on clean coal, biofuels, renewables, energy efficiency, and energy distribution, and its main activities include mapping existing clean energy activities in China, promoting opportunities for EU-China collaboration, advisory work on policy-making, regulation, and energy policy. One of the aims of the project is to establish technical cooperation between China and the EU, both at government and industry levels, and the Centre aims to be self-sustaining after the initial five year project period.<sup>74</sup>

More broadly in the area of capacity development for climate change policy-making, the EU has supported the Chinese Government through a programme “Provincial Strategies & Actions for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in China”. Launched in 2008, it was a collaborative three-year project involving the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme, the Government of Norway, and Chinese stakeholders including NDRC and the National Climate Change Leading Group. It aimed to build the

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Phone interview with Commission official, 25 July 2011.

<sup>73</sup> These are the Energy Research Institute of the NDRC, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Tsinghua University. The Centre is located at Tsinghua University.

<sup>74</sup> Interview with official associated with the EC2 project, Beijing, 30 September 2010.

capacity of local administrators in China for formulating and implementing climate change policies at local level. The aim of the programme was to facilitate implementation of the 2007 National Climate Change Programme at local level through development of policies and institutions. The capacity of implementers at local level in China is still lacking,<sup>75</sup> and this programme involved 14 Chinese provinces, with the Commission contribution covering seven of these provinces and contributing just over 40 percent of the total project financing, or EUR 1.3 million.

However, while EU engagement with China included elements of attempted socialization and incentive-based engagement through capacity building, these activities were limited by a lack of capabilities on the EU side, a problem which was particularly noticeable with respect to the EU institutions.

### ***5.2.2 Enduring Problems of Capacity, Consistency, and Coherence: Assessing the EU's Capabilities for Engagement***

EU engagement was constrained by difficulties concerning (i) a lack of institutional capacity, (ii) consistency between the activities of the Commission and member states, and (iii) coherence between activities related to climate change and other aspects of the EU-China relationship. Indeed, the fact that the establishment of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change was driven strongly by the UK which was “ahead of the curve” in this area proved to be a hindrance in the development of the relationship with China at EU-level, because other member states that would later assume the EU Presidency did not possess the same level of expertise or resources with respect to climate change policy. In this context, and given the inherently transient nature of the rotating Presidency system, the Commission assumed a more prominent role in the development of the EU-China

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<sup>75</sup> Interview with Chinese Government official, 22 October 2010.

relationship on climate change than the formal division of competence would suggest.<sup>76</sup> However, the Commission was poorly equipped to integrate climate change into its broader external relations policies. According to Henry Derwent, Tony Blair's special representative for climate change at the time of the launch of the EU-China Partnership:

There wasn't much real connection between the centre of the Commission and the Environment DG in particular, and the external relations people. They were broadly helpful and broadly sympathetic because they did regard at a general European level climate change as being ... a means by which the Europeans could be seen to be making an impact on the world, but they didn't really have much in the way of delivery capability.<sup>77</sup>

Over time, the Commission strengthened its capacity to integrate climate change into its broader relations with third countries. The first counselor dealing with environment and climate change was appointed to the (then) European Commission Delegation in Beijing in October 2005, coinciding with the launch of the Partnership on Climate Change.<sup>78</sup> Since 2006, another member of staff at the Delegation has worked half-time on energy cooperation with China, reporting to DG Energy in Brussels. Furthermore, in mid-2010 two members of staff in the cooperation division were focusing on climate change related projects. In Brussels, DG Environment<sup>79</sup> employed almost no staff whose responsibility it was to manage or track the bilateral relationship: in mid-2010, one member of staff had responsibility—alongside other tasks—for EU engagement with China, India, and a number of other third countries.

In this respect, it seems that the Commission has focused most of its attention on domestic policymaking and the multilateral UN climate change negotiations and largely neglected

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<sup>76</sup> Telephone interview with senior Commission official, 30 June 2011.

<sup>77</sup> Phone interview with Henry Derwent, former special representative of the UK Prime Minister for climate change and director for climate change at the UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 15 July 2011.

<sup>78</sup> Telephone interview with Commission official, 25 July 2011.

<sup>79</sup> At the time of the fieldwork conducted for this study, DG Clima had already been created (in February 2010). However, for the period covered by this study, DG Environment had responsibility for most aspects of climate change policy.

bilateral engagement with third states including China, despite repeated declarations of the importance of bilateral engagement. The capacity of the EU institutions charged with responsibility for managing the relationship remains limited, especially when compared with, for example, the resources deployed by the bigger member states, particularly the United Kingdom. Indeed, one Commission official, when asked about the Commission's capacity to engage with third countries on climate change, pointed to the fact that the UK Government is much better equipped in that regard.<sup>80</sup>

Germany and France have also developed substantial cooperation programmes with the Chinese Government, though in the French case the relationship was hindered significantly by the political fallout from President Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2008. Somewhat surprisingly since it is not renowned domestically for its climate policy credentials, the Italian Government has also developed a substantial programme of cooperation on environment and energy matters, including climate change, within the framework of the "Sino-Italian Collaboration Programme for Environmental Protection". Other active member states in China in this area include the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. In most cases they have been pursued largely in isolation from EU-level engagement with China. Indeed, several member state officials in Beijing reported that there was little or no connection between the EU-level process and their bilateral initiatives.

While there is not scope within this study to examine these various member state initiatives in detail, the general point is that they have, in many cases been supported with greater institutional and financial resources than the Commission has mobilized. Fragmentation of EU engagement as such is not necessarily a bad thing. On the contrary, there may be advantages to many diverse mechanisms of cooperation, provided that unnecessary

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<sup>80</sup> Interview with Commission official, 16 July 2010.

duplication of effort is avoided. If there is a degree of consistency between the messages being delivered by the different “voices” of the EU, the multiplication of voices as such should not be a problem. Of course, in some areas of EU external relations the EU has proved to be quite incapable of delivering a consistent and coherent message—the dispute over whether to lift the EU Arms Embargo on China is a case in point. In certain contexts, though, there may in fact be added value to each member state pursuing separate dialogues and cooperation projects—if, for example, it facilitates a greater breadth of cooperation projects.

However, it is difficult even to assess whether and to what extent the totality of EU (Commission plus member states) cooperation and dialogue with China on climate change is synergistic, since there seems to be no overall list of the totality of EU activities in China in this area. An institutionalized coordination mechanism exists “on the ground” in Beijing in the form of regular meetings of Commission and member state environment counsellors, which meets 6–8 times per year. As with EU coordination in third countries more generally, prior to entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Presidency chaired this meeting. However, these coordination efforts appear to have brought limited benefits so far. In all cases, they have been pursued largely in isolation from the EU-level engagement process. Indeed, several member state officials in Beijing reported that there was little or no connection between the EU-level process and their bilateral initiatives, indicating a lack of consistency.

Coherence—between climate change activities and other strands of the EU-China relationship—has also been a problematic aspect of the relationship. The analysis above certainly shows evidence of a symbolic or rhetorical “mainstreaming” of climate change in the broader EU-China relationship. This can be seen, for example, in the repeated substantive references to climate change in successive EU-China summit joint statements

from 2005 onwards, and in the fact that Commission President Barroso and various member state heads of state discussed climate change with the Chinese leadership during the same period. There was not, however, a deeper integration of climate change into the broader framework of EU relations with China, evidence for which would include efforts to make other sectoral areas consistent with the EU's goals on climate change. Most significant in this regard is the fact that there is no evidence of the EU engaging in negative conditionality during the period of the study, through making market access conditional on the Chinese Government adopting specific climate change policies and measures.

As well as institutionalized cooperation specifically focused on climate change, the EU and China also initiated dialogues at ministerial or senior official level on a range of other policy areas, including energy, environment, and forests. This proliferation of policy dialogues is characteristic of the broader development of the EU-China relationship. As with fragmentation between Commission and member state initiatives, fragmentation of this kind between different policy spheres is not in itself a problem. Indeed, developing cooperation and dialogue across a range of related but distinct policy fields opens the possibility for greater impact than through one single channel. Moreover, developing cooperation on energy or forest policy, for example, may succeed in making progress in areas considered less politically controversial than in the sometimes highly-charged field of international climate change policy. However, fragmentation becomes a problem if it creates duplication of effort, and especially if it exceeds the resources and capacity of the institutional actors on the EU side which have been tasked with coordination and ensuring synergies and coherence. This has indeed been the case. The fragmentation generated by the (then) rotating Presidency system combined with a lack of institutional capacity on the part of the Commission in Brussels and the (then) Commission Delegation in Beijing has

significantly inhibited the ability of the EU to develop engagement with China, and to frame its engagement appropriately to its target “audience”.

The lack of capacity on the part of the EU institutions in particular for engaging with China on climate change, and the resulting difficulties of inconsistency and incoherence, provide support for the argument that the form of EU engagement resulted in part from a polity-building dynamic driving the development of EU climate change policy. EU climate change “leadership” continued, even in the 2000s, to be driven significantly by a polity-building dynamic in which the EU sought to declare its climate leadership as a means of developing a distinctive global role for the EU, and to legitimize the EU to a domestic audience. Rather than generating a dynamic towards active engagement of third countries, this polity-building dynamic generated a tendency for the EU to proclaim its leadership but not to develop the institutional capacity to develop effective external engagement to fulfil such ambitions. Combined with this was the fact that the launching of a “strategic partnership” created a dynamic in which institutionalized dialogues were established on a wide range of policy spheres, arguably without sufficient attention being paid to the basis for such cooperation.

This, in turn, has affected the response of the Chinese Government to EU engagement, since the EU has been somewhat lacking in its ability both to understand the domestic politics of climate change in China, and to mobilize institutional resources to develop effective engagement. The next section analyzes the progressive development of Chinese climate change policy in order to assess whether and to what extent its development can be understood as a response to EU engagement.

### 5.3 From Reluctance to Bilateral Engagement: The Chinese Response to EU Engagement

The development of Chinese climate change policy underwent a significant change during the period from 2005 onwards. In order to analyze the Chinese response to EU engagement, this section traces the development of Chinese climate change policy with a view to assessing to what extent it can be understood as a response to EU engagement. The development of Chinese climate change policy from 2005 onwards built on broader developments in Chinese policy-making since the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2003, the Chinese Government launched the “Program of Action for Sustainable Development in China in the Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, and in December 2004, China submitted its “Initial National Communication on Climate Change” to the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC.<sup>81</sup> The significance of this submission was that it acknowledged threats associated with anticipated climate change.<sup>82</sup> In particular, it outlined threats identified in work by Chinese scientists since the early 1990s relating to water resources, agriculture, terrestrial ecosystems, and coastal zones including offshore marine ecosystems. As discussed above, during this period Chinese opposition to the CDM softened, and in the following years China became the largest recipient of CDM-financed projects in the world.

Policy-making began to accelerate in related areas such as renewable energy as well. China’s Renewable Energy Law (REL) was passed by the People’s Congress on 28 February 2005, and took effect on 1 January 2006.<sup>83</sup> In headline terms, it set a goal to achieve 10 percent of China’s energy from renewable sources by 2010, and 15 percent by 2020. It also provided for compulsory connection of renewable energy sources to the power grid, subsidies and

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<sup>81</sup> PRC Government, 2004, *Initial National Communication on Climate Change - Executive Summary* (Beijing: Government of the People’s Republic of China).

<sup>82</sup> Heggelund and Buan, “China in the Asia-Pacific Partnership: Consequences for UN Climate Change Mitigation Efforts?”, p. 306.

<sup>83</sup> The Renewable Energy Law is a legislative framework within which details of implementation are contained in ministerial regulations and measures.

incentives for renewable energy projects, and the establishment of a renewable energy development fund to support research and development activities.<sup>84</sup> However, due to difficulties with the incentive structures created under the REL, more than 20 percent of China's wind power facilities by 2009 did not generate electricity because they were not connected to the grid. In response to a realization that the legislative framework did not match the very rapid development of the renewable energy sector, particularly the wind sector, the Chinese Government undertook a review and amendment of the Renewable Energy Law in 2009.

The most significant policy development during the period before 2007 was the announcement in 2005 of China's 11th Five Year Plan, covering the period 2006-2010.<sup>85</sup> Described as “the beginning of a new era of sustainable development in China”<sup>86</sup> and as “China's turning point for environmental protection”,<sup>87</sup> the Five Year Plan set a 20 percent energy intensity target to be achieved by 2010, and a less concrete 15 percent renewable energy target to be achieved by 2020. In order to achieve its 20 percent energy intensity reduction target, China introduced the “Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Programme” (Top-1000 Programme) in April 2006, which set energy-saving targets for China's 1000 highest energy consuming enterprises that collectively accounted for 33 percent of national energy consumption and 47 percent of industrial energy usage in

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<sup>84</sup> Jack H. Su, Simone S. Hui, and Kevin H. Tsen, 2010, “China Rationalizes its Renewable Energy Policy”, *The Electricity Journal*, vol. 23, no. 3.

<sup>85</sup> In the Chinese system, Five Year Plans are not simply statements of intent or overall aspirations—they set specific targets against which national and local officials' performance is assessed. Officials' success or failure in achieving these targets is a significant factor in determining career progression in the Chinese bureaucracy, thus generating very strong incentives towards compliance.

<sup>86</sup> Shin Wei Ng and Nick Mabey, 2011, *Chinese Challenge or Low Carbon Opportunity? The Implications of China's 12th Five-Year-Plan for Europe*, London: E3G, March 2011 (Updated to reflect the official 12th Five-Year-Plan adopted on March 15, 2011, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup> Dermot O'Gorman and Chunquan Zhu, 2007, “Environment”, in Stanley Crossick and Etienne Reuter, eds., *China-EU: A Common Future* (Singapore & London: World Scientific), p. 17.

2006.<sup>88</sup> Under the Programme, leaders of state-owned enterprises failing to meet their targets would not be granted annual evaluation awards, and provincial government officials would not be promoted without meeting their targets. These very strong incentive structures made the Top-1000 Programme a key element of China's energy policy apparatus.

Notwithstanding these earlier developments, 2007 saw a step-change in Chinese climate change policy-making. In June of that year, the Chinese Government published its first "National Climate Change Programme", covering the period up to 2010.<sup>89</sup> This Programme laid out the principles that would guide the Chinese approach to addressing climate change,<sup>90</sup> and set out objectives with respect to controlling greenhouse gas emissions, enhancing capacity for adaptation, enhancing research and development, and raising public awareness and improving management of climate change policy. At the same time as the National Climate Change Programme was launched, the State Council established a "National Leading Group for Climate Change", chaired by the serving Premier, demonstrating that climate change had become an issue of importance for the highest levels of the Chinese Government.<sup>91</sup> During the years prior to 2007, climate change policy was considered primarily a diplomatic issue and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of climate change negotiations, but from 2007 onwards NDRC has played the most central role, serving as secretariat for the National Leading Group and coordinating

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<sup>88</sup> For further details on this programme, see Lynn Price, Xuejun Wang, and Jiang Yun, 2008, *China's Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Program: Reducing Energy Consumption of the 1000 Largest Industrial Enterprises in China* (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory).

<sup>89</sup> NDRC, 2007, *China's National Climate Change Programme* (Beijing: National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China).

<sup>90</sup> These principles included: that climate policies would not be permitted to hinder development; the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; an equal emphasis on mitigation and adaptation; and a reliance on advancement and innovation of science and technology.

<sup>91</sup> The mission of the National Leading Group includes: (i) formulating China's national policy and strategy towards climate change, energy saving and emissions reduction; (ii) coordinating national efforts in these areas; and (iii) scrutinizing international cooperation and negotiations.

climate change policy formulation across the Chinese bureaucracy. However, sharp divisions have remained between climate policy-makers and energy policy-makers.

However, despite significant changes in China's domestic climate change and energy policies during the period from 2007 onwards, China's stance in the international climate change negotiations in the period leading up to the Copenhagen Summit was characterized by much greater continuity. In advance of COP-15, the Chinese Government outlined the principles which it proposed should guide the negotiations. These included a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, maintenance of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, a commitment to the principle of sustainable development, and an equal emphasis to be placed on mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financial support.<sup>92</sup> These are essentially the same principles that have historically guided the Chinese approach to the international climate change negotiations. Continuity can also be seen in the objectives which China set out for Copenhagen. China wished to see (i) deeper cuts of at least 40 percent below 1990 levels for developed country parties, (ii) the establishment of effective institutional mechanisms to ensure that developed countries are fulfilling their commitments to provide technology, financing and capacity building support to developing countries; (iii) support for developing country mitigation actions in the form of technology, financing, and capacity building from developed countries.

However, despite this strong continuity in China's approach to the international negotiations there was one particularly notable change. In the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate change summit the Chinese Government announced China's first national commitment to limit the growth of overall greenhouse gas emissions, which was framed as

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<sup>92</sup> PRC Government, 2009, "Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference", Website of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 20 May 2009, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t564324.htm>, (accessed on 4 June 2010).

China's contribution to the international process. The State Council announced on 26 November 2009 that China would reduce emission intensity—that is, emissions per unit of economic output—by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.<sup>93</sup> It was clearly specified that this target constitutes a “voluntary action”, “based on our own national conditions”—that is, it would not be subject to international monitoring and verification. Nonetheless, it is a domestically “binding” goal which will be incorporated into China's medium and long-term national social and economic development plans. Other goals announced include a target to increase the share of non-fossil fuel in primary energy consumption to “around 15% by 2020”, and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from 2005 levels.<sup>94</sup> While these targets were criticised for merely representing what is likely to take place under business-as-usual projections, the announcement of any sort of target by China was significant.

In short, in the period up to 2009 there was considerable continuity in the Chinese approach to the international climate change negotiations, but significant change with respect to China's domestic climate change policy-making. To what extent can we understand these developments as a response to EU engagement? The analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 identified three mechanisms of response: (i) normative emulation, (ii) lesson-drawing, and (iii) resistance.

With respect to the first mechanism, there is some evidence of limited normative emulation on the part of the Chinese Government. According to informed Chinese sources, the sustained attempt by European politicians to engage the Chinese leadership on climate change was partly responsible for an increasing attention that was paid by the Chinese

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<sup>93</sup> Xinhua, 2009, “China Announces Targets on Carbon Emission Cuts”, Xinhua News Agency website, 26 November 2009, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/26/content\\_12544181.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/26/content_12544181.htm), (accessed on 4 June 2010).

<sup>94</sup> These targets are mentioned in Wen Jiabao, 2010, “Letter to United Nations Secretary Ban Ki-moon on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”, UNFCCC website, January 2010, <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/chinacphaccord.pdf>, (accessed on 4 June 2010).

leadership to climate change from 2007 onwards. One NGO observer of Chinese climate policy based in Beijing, discussing the visits of Merkel, Sarkozy, and Blair in 2007, along with the German G8 Presidency, argued that

it definitely helped that the foreign leaders repeatedly had climate change so high up on the agenda when they met Chinese leaders ... In China, the system is very much centralized. So if you don't get the attention of the very high up level ... it will not be a national priority.<sup>95</sup>

Similarly, a senior Chinese academic and former member of the Chinese delegation to the UNFCCC negotiations made the following points:

Especially at high level, the leaders have a lot of visits to each other, and I remember the EU for example, the Commissioner, the Commission president, and also the member state prime minister or president, when they visit China or the Chinese leaders visit Europe, normally ... one of the agenda items was climate change. This made a direct influence on policy-makers in China, and they have a clear and strong awareness of the concern from international community, and they know now that there is some international agenda there.<sup>96</sup>

Another scholar has reached similar conclusions. Noting the fact that Barroso, Merkel, and Sarkozy all addressed climate change in their visits to China in 2007, Schroeder reports an anonymous interviewee stating:

Every time foreign leaders come to China, they want to discuss climate change. Every time Hu Jintao goes abroad, foreign leaders want to discuss climate change. It is really getting on his nerves. The Chinese delegation submitted this very constructive proposal to the Bali COP/MOP, because the leader had said "you must do something to reduce the pressure on my shoulders".<sup>97</sup>

However, we should be careful not to attribute too much influence to the EU. Other interviewees highlighted the domestic dimension of the transition in the Chinese approach

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<sup>95</sup> Interview with Chinese NGO representative, Beijing, 15 October 2010.

<sup>96</sup> Interview with Chinese academic, Beijing, 18 October 2010.

<sup>97</sup> Miriam Schroeder, 2008, "The Construction of China's Climate Politics: Transnational NGOs and the Spiral Model of International Relations", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 515.

to climate change policy-making. For example, on the issue of the commitments China made prior to Copenhagen, a representative of an NGO in Beijing stated:

China's Copenhagen commitments [intensity target] are basically a domestic debate. They have a lot of these think tanks that provide advice to the Government: ERI [Energy Research Institute], Renmin University, Tsinghua University, Development Research Centre. Those are the ones that are providing the technical analysis—why China should or shouldn't take a numerical target.<sup>98</sup>

Nonetheless, EU engagement, particularly institutionalized and ad hoc dialogue involving repeated interaction between European and Chinese leaders, does seem to have played some role in focusing attention on climate change. Moreover, closer examination of the National Climate Change Programme shows that it did not contain any new targets, but rather reiterated previously-announced targets and specified more clearly how they would be achieved.<sup>99</sup> As an NGO observer put it:

It was simply a repackaging of all the domestic policies that China was taking anyway to tackle other problems. For example, afforestation policy was because China was suffering from sandstorms and desertification, so that was the reason China had a big afforestation programme, but that helped with climate change as well. You even had the one child policy, which was listed as the big contribution of China to tackle climate change.<sup>100</sup>

In other words, the Chinese Government was able to “repackage” the policies that it was implementing for other reasons—such as those contained in the 11th Five Year Plan and the Renewable Energy Law—as “climate change” policies. As the same NGO representative quoted above put it:

Policy-makers realized that the policies that you would take to tackle climate change are very much the same as those ones that you would use to tackle local pollution problems, or to help improve energy security ... That was the

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<sup>98</sup> Interview with NGO representative in Beijing, 7 October 2010.

<sup>99</sup> BBC, 2007, “China Unveils Climate Change Plan”, 4 June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6717671.stm>, (accessed on 21 May 2011).

<sup>100</sup> Interview with NGO representative, Beijing, 15 October 2010.

moment that you started to see the Chinese become much more confident in talking about tackling climate change, because they know that they are doing it anyway.<sup>101</sup>

Therefore, the behaviour of the Chinese Government—at least in the period around 2007—can be characterized as an instance of “normative emulation”. The Chinese Government altered their behaviour in order to match the expectations of other actors. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the fact that the Chinese Government did not develop new policies but rather framed their existing policies as contributing to climate change goals. This suggests behaviour characterized by a desire to conform to social expectations of “appropriate” behaviour, since the shift in Chinese policy-making did not represent a significant change in the underlying policy goals or priorities. While of course it was not only the EU that was pushing the Chinese Government to adopt climate change policies, the EU was particularly active in this regard.

Secondly, there was also evidence of limited lesson-drawing on the part of the Chinese Government through bilateral cooperation with the EU. As the discussion in Section 5.2.1 above illustrated, the EU and China progressively developed cooperation in areas such as carbon capture and storage, renewable energy, the CDM, and climate change policy-making. However, this is somewhat limited in extent if we compare it to the scale of the challenges facing China in shifting to a low-carbon trajectory, or the overall scale of policy development in China. Moreover, formalized dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change had a generally limited impact. EU officials involved admitted that the BCM had not functioned effectively, and that relations with the Chinese side within this framework have been somewhat problematic. External assessments of EU-China cooperation have been mixed, but observers have generally been critical that cooperation is not broader and deeper. For example, Prof. Zhang Habin of

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<sup>101</sup> Interview with NGO representative, Beijing, 15 October 2010.

Peking University argued that “compared with the two parties’ huge potential, this is very small”.<sup>102</sup> On the other hand, however, an NDRC official said that cooperation between China and the EU is better than cooperation with other countries, both at the policy level and in cooperation projects.<sup>103</sup>

Third, resistance also constituted a significant element of the Chinese response to EU engagement, particularly with respect to international climate change negotiations. As Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated, from 2004–05 onwards the EU had increasingly sought to persuade China to accept future-oriented mitigation commitments and, in its preparations for COP-15, had called on China and other so-called “more advanced” developing countries to accept a commitment to reduce their emissions by 15 to 30 percent below “business as usual” projections over the period to 2020. The EU also pushed for measurement, reporting, and verification requirements to apply to developing country commitments as well as to industrialized commitments. China’s position in respect of each of these was contrasted starkly, and EU engagement did not succeed in changing the Chinese position. The core aims of China in the negotiations leading up to COP-15 were to resist legally-binding emissions limitation targets for developing countries and a legally-binding peaking year for their emissions. Indeed, the “Copenhagen Accord” which resulted from the final frenetic day of negotiations in Copenhagen largely reflected Chinese rather than European preferences.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, the Chinese response to EU engagement with respect to the international negotiations can be characterized as an instance of strong resistance.

In short, the Chinese response to EU engagement comprised elements of normative emulation and lesson-drawing, but also significant response, particularly with respect to the

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<sup>102</sup> Interview with Prof. Zhang Haibin, Peking University, 14 October 2010.

<sup>103</sup> Interview with NDRC official, Beijing, 22 October 2010.

<sup>104</sup> See Chapter 4 for further discussion of the Copenhagen outcome.

international climate change negotiations. The analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 identified three factors of explanation which can potentially help us to understand this pattern of response, namely domestic political structure, material interest, and normative frames. The following sections consider each of these in turn.

### ***5.3.1 Domestic Political Structure: A Model Centralized State***

China can be described as a model “state above society” political structure. The Chinese political system is highly centralized, with the added complexity that in addition to the organs of government familiar to Western observers (cabinet [State Council], government ministries, etc.), there exists a parallel set of Chinese Communist Party structures (the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee), which is where decision-making power actually resides. Policy-making is strongly “top-down”, with little or no role for many of the institutional forms of interest representation present in liberal political systems, such as most obviously political parties and non-governmental organizations.

That is not to say that the Chinese political system functions as a monolithic unit—it is characterized by much of the same bureaucratic competition between different state institutions found in liberal systems. Moreover, problems regarding the implementation of policy at provincial and local level, particularly in the environmental sphere, have been well-documented. The point is that access points for potential external influence are extremely limited. In order to be successful, external proponents of new ideas need to engage with the top Chinese leadership, rather than seeking to build winning coalitions among societal actors. In this respect, the greater access to the Chinese leadership afforded by the deepening institutionalization of the EU-China relationship in the period since 1998—and

particularly since 2003—allowed European politicians and senior officials to repeatedly raise the climate change issue with their Chinese counterparts.

However, the benefits of this deepening formalized access to the Chinese leadership were at times tempered by a lack of understanding on the European side concerning the nature of the Chinese political and bureaucratic systems. For example, the EU side have experienced difficulties owing to the complex and contested division of responsibilities between the foreign affairs, climate change, and energy sections of the Chinese bureaucracy.<sup>105</sup> There was, furthermore, a misunderstanding on the European side of the nature of Chinese decision-making and the way in which the Chinese leadership respond to external pressure. European policy-makers believed that the Chinese Government could be persuaded or pressurized into committing to limit its emissions as part of a global deal, either through institutionalized dialogue, by demonstrating the feasibility of limiting emissions while pursuing economic growth and development, or both.

However, European officials with a deeper understanding of the Chinese political system tended to be more cautious. One European diplomat in Beijing said that the approach to date of putting pressure on China to submit to internationally enforceable emissions limitation targets was unlikely to work. The EU needs instead, she said, to look at what China is doing domestically and to support those actions.<sup>106</sup> A senior member state diplomat in Beijing suggested that it was mistaken of EU leaders going into the COP-15 summit in December 2009 to believe that the Chinese leadership would depart from their pre-Copenhagen announced position.<sup>107</sup> Similarly, a Brussels-based EU official who had

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<sup>105</sup> Overall responsibility for climate change policy within the Chinese bureaucracy switched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NDRC in 2007, which resulted in a change in the EU's interlocutors within the BCM. A specific difficulty has been that NDRC does not recognize cooperation projects with the EU that are not the responsibility of the NDRC's Department of Climate Change. Interview with EU official, Beijing, 14 October 2010.

<sup>106</sup> Interview with European diplomat in Beijing, 14 October 2010.

<sup>107</sup> Interview with senior member state diplomat based in Beijing, 15 October 2010.

been based in China previously argued: “If you try to push China, it won’t respond well. China is self-confident and is very careful not to be influenced by others”.<sup>108</sup>

Nonetheless, despite these difficulties, the progressive institutionalization of the EU-China relationship provided European leaders and senior officials with increasing access to the Chinese leadership and bureaucracy. However, none of this would matter very much in the absence of an openness to new ideas on the part of the Chinese leadership. In this respect, the coming to power of the so-called “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders in 2003—President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—provided such an opening. The Hu-Wen leadership initiated a process of reorienting China’s economic development model away from a pure focus on economic growth at any cost. Based on the concepts of “scientific development” and “harmonious society”, their stated aim has been to attach greater priority to the sustainability of economic development.<sup>109</sup> This was reflected later in 2003 in the publication by the leadership of a new vision of sustainable development, outlined in “China’s Sustainable Development Action Plan for the Early 21st Century”. This called for a transition from an economy characterized by high energy consumption, high levels of pollution, and low efficiency, towards one characterized by low energy consumption, low pollution, and high efficiency.<sup>110</sup> While it would be unwise to take these pronouncements as unproblematic statements of fact, they point to at least an increasing awareness of the need for China to take steps to modify its model of economic development, and a “window of opportunity” for external actors seeking to influence the trajectory of Chinese economic development. This, in turn, was underpinned by changing Chinese perceptions of material interest.

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<sup>108</sup> Interview with EU official in Brussels, 29 July 2010.

<sup>109</sup> For an analysis of the “harmonious society” concept in the context of energy and environmental challenges, see Gudrun Wacker and Matthias Kaiser, 2008, *Sustainability Chinese Style: The Concept of the “Harmonious Society”* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

<sup>110</sup> Xiudian Dai and Zhiping Diao, 2010, “Towards a New World Order for Climate Change: China and the European Union’s Leadership Ambition”, in Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly, eds., *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London & New York: Routledge), p. 255.

### ***5.3.2 Conceptions of Material Interest: Energy Security, Environmental Pollution, and Industrial Strategy***

Changes in the Chinese Government's conception of material interest in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century were driven principally by three factors. The first of these was the increasing energy intensity—and therefore increasing energy demand—of the Chinese economy. From 1990 to 2002, China's energy intensity had dropped by 54 percent.<sup>111</sup> However, this trend was reversed during the period 2002 to 2006, during which China's total commercial energy consumption grew by more than 50 percent, increasing more rapidly than GDP. This was driven by a combination of central government policy at the time which favoured construction and heavy industry, and a surge in trade and investment arising from China's admission to the World Trade Organization in December 2001.<sup>112</sup>

As a result, blackouts were common across China, with the exception of the largest cities, which brought the issue of energy security to the forefront of the government agenda.<sup>113</sup> In 2004, the central government announced that sustainable use of energy was a key priority for the whole country, while government agencies and think tanks, which were given greater scope to contribute to the policy-making process under the new Hu-Wen leadership, engaged in a re-evaluation of China's overall energy policy. A report from the Development Research Centre of the State Council, the most authoritative report of this period, recommended greater emphasis on energy conservation and energy efficiency, integration of environmental priorities into energy policy, a decrease in coal use and an increase in non-fossil fuels, and the development of alternative transport fuels.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Heggelund and Buan, "China in the Asia-Pacific Partnership: Consequences for UN Climate Change Mitigation Efforts?", p. 303.

<sup>112</sup> Michal Meidan, Philip Andrews-Speed, and Ma Xin, 2009, "Shaping China's Energy Policy: Actors and Processes", *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 18, no. 61, p. 608.

<sup>113</sup> François Godement, 2007, "China's Energy Policy: From Self-Sufficiency to Energy Efficiency", *The International Spectator*, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 392.

<sup>114</sup> Cited in Meidan, Andrews-Speed, and Xin, "Shaping China's Energy Policy: Actors and Processes", p. 610.

Reflecting this shift in official thinking on energy policy, the Chinese Government introduced a number of important policy documents in 2004, including the “Medium and Long Term Energy Development Plan Outline 2004-2020” and the “Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan”.<sup>115</sup> The latter was noteworthy for its frank admission of the problems facing China in the energy and environment fields, noting that the reliance on coal was “giving rise to increasingly serious environmental problems”, specifically that “[t]he area affected by acid rain due to emission of sulfur dioxide constitutes one third of the national land area. Emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels are the main source of greenhouse gases in China”. It acknowledged poor implementation of the Energy Conservation Law of 1998, set a goal of a 20 percent reduction in energy intensity between 2005 and 2010, as well as setting specific targets for each economic sector.<sup>116</sup>

Second, alongside the shift in thinking on energy policy, there was a growing awareness among the Chinese leadership of China’s ecological vulnerability and ever-worsening local environmental pollution. This is closely related to the issue of energy policy, since China is heavily reliant on coal for energy generation. In 2006, coal constituted 69.4 percent of overall energy consumption, and nearly 90 percent of all new power generation was coal.<sup>117</sup> China’s rapid economic growth, particularly the more recent, energy intensive phase, has resulted in extensive environmental degradation across a range of indicators. In 2007, China had 16 of the world’s top 20 polluted cities. 90 percent of Chinese water is polluted, some of it almost completely, while the pace of desertification has doubled since the 1970s.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, these local environmental stresses have been recognized publicly by the

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<sup>115</sup> NDRC, 2004, *China Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan* (Beijing: National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China).

<sup>116</sup> Meidan, Andrews-Speed, and Xin, “Shaping China's Energy Policy: Actors and Processes”, p. 610.

<sup>117</sup> Moreover, since China has 114 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves—coal is bound to remain the dominant fuel for power generation in the near future, and is expected to constitute 53 percent of total energy consumption in 2030. Heggelund, “China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments”, p. 162.

<sup>118</sup> Cited in Brown, “China and the Challenges of the Environment”, p. 36.

Chinese Government. In an unusually frank interview with *Der Spiegel* in 2005, Pan Yue, Vice Minister in the State Environmental Protection Administration, admitted:

We are using too many raw materials to sustain this growth ... This miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace. Acid rain is falling on one third of the Chinese territory, half of the water in our seven largest rivers is completely useless, while one fourth of our citizens does not have access to clean drinking water. One third of the urban population is breathing polluted air, and less than 20 percent of the trash in cities is treated and processed in an environmentally sustainable manner.<sup>119</sup>

Furthermore, he suggested that China was losing between 8 and 15 percent of GDP per annum due to air and water pollution, and highlighted the future prospect of 150 million “environmental refugees” in China. Of course, it was in the interests of Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration to draw attention to environmental pollution in order to maximize its own role within the Chinese bureaucracy—especially since it has historically played a less significant role than some of the more powerful ministries such as NDRC.<sup>120</sup> Nonetheless, the fact that a Chinese politician spoke with such openness about China’s environmental problems to a foreign media outlet is indicative of the growing awareness of the Chinese Government of these issues. Such local environmental problems have led to increasing public unrest. According to surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning in 2007, 56 percent of the public are worried about the safety of drinking water, and almost 95 percent are worried about the state of the environment.<sup>121</sup>

A third important driver of Chinese policies in the area of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies has been a desire to develop autonomous innovation and

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<sup>119</sup> *Der Spiegel*, 2005, “‘The Chinese Miracle Will End Soon’ - Spiegel Interview with China's Deputy Minister of the Environment”, Spiegel Online, 3 July 2005, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,345694,00.html>, (accessed on 21 May 2011).

<sup>120</sup> While the State Environmental Protection Administration was upgraded to the status of a full ministry (becoming the Ministry of Environmental Protection) in 2008, it is still considered to be less influential than “core” ministries such as NDRC.

<sup>121</sup> Brown, “China and the Challenges of the Environment”, p. 41.

manufacturing capabilities in areas that the Chinese Government view as strategically important in the medium term. China has increasingly viewed the development of a domestic renewables industry as part of its industrial strategy, and not simply as a means of tackling environmental pollution. This is particularly evident in the “Medium and Long Term Renewable Energy Development Plan”, published in September 2007 by NDRC.<sup>122</sup> As well as setting overall and sectoral targets for renewable energy, the Plan aims to make China self-dependent in terms of innovation, by bringing in foreign technology in the short term and then building up domestic innovation capacity in the longer term. The ambition of the Plan for 2020 is stated as follows:

A relatively complete renewable energy technology and industry system will have been established, so that a domestic manufacturing capability based mainly on China’s own IPRs will have been established, satisfying the needs for deploying renewable energy on a large scale in China.<sup>123</sup>

Therefore, the reorientation of Chinese climate change policy from 2007 onwards was underpinned by changing conceptions of material interest on the part of the Chinese Government, and took place in a context in which the Chinese leadership came to understand that implementing climate change policies was consistent with other policy goals they were pursuing for different reasons, and did not represent an elevation of climate change above other policy priorities. As Meidan *et al.* note, most of the climate change targets relating to energy “are consistent with the pre-existing, newly-developed energy strategies. In this respect, environmental concerns in their own right only seem to have risen modestly in importance, and security of supply is still the over-riding concern”.<sup>124</sup> The development of EU engagement with China, and the degree of EU influence on the

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<sup>122</sup> NDRC, 2007, *Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version)* (Beijing: National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China).

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>124</sup> Meidan, Andrews-Speed, and Xin, “Shaping China's Energy Policy: Actors and Processes”, p. 611.

development of Chinese climate change policies, was very much dependent on this prior shift in conceptions of material interest.

### ***5.3.3 Normative Frames: Contrasting Perceptions Tempered by Pragmatism***

Chapter 4 identified a significant “normative gap” between the EU and China with respect to a number of key aspects of climate change policy. Nowhere is this more strongly evident than with respect to the questions of responsibility for climate change, and the related issues of equity and differentiation. While the EU has increasingly pushed for China and other large developing countries with rapidly growing emissions levels to formulate and implement domestic climate change policies and to accept binding emission limitation targets as part of a future climate change regime, the Chinese Government emphasized the historical responsibility of industrialized countries for climate change.

At COP 5 in Bonn in 2000, for example, Liu Jiang, head of the Chinese delegation said: “it is impossible for the Chinese government to undertake any obligation of greenhouse gas emission reduction before China attains the level of a medium-developed country ... China will continue striving to abate the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in line with her own sustainable development strategy, and will continue actively promoting and participating in international cooperation”.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, China’s “Initial National Communication on Climate Change” to the UNFCCC of 2004 and the National Climate Change Programme of 2007 both reiterated the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and emphasized the obligations of developed country parties to fulfil their obligations under

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<sup>125</sup> Cited in Ida Bjørkum, 2005, *China in the International Politics of Climate Change: A Foreign Policy Analysis* (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute), p. 30.

the Convention and the Protocol to provide assistance to developing countries in terms of finance, technology, and capacity building.<sup>126</sup>

More generally, with respect to the institutional architecture of the climate change regime China and the EU have competing views of what form global cooperation on climate change should take. The EU, building very much on its internal experience of multilateral cooperation, sought to promote a global climate change agreement leading to differentiated but legally-prescribed participation by all major emitters, including China. China, on the other hand, has rejected in the first instance specific internationally enforceable emissions limitation targets for itself, but also any sort of intrusive global agreement that would compromise its policy-making autonomy. This stems from a more fundamental divergence of views on the nature of sovereignty between the EU and China.<sup>127</sup> As a UK diplomat stated: “the EU wanted to get buy-in from China for a post-Kyoto agreement. China wanted to keep that in the multilateral process and wanted instead to talk about standards. That conflict was never resolved”.<sup>128</sup>

However, while the positions of China and the EU with respect to the international negotiations were characterized by this normative gap, the Chinese Government grew increasingly willing to cooperate with the EU at the bilateral level. This was underpinned by a pragmatism on the part of the Chinese Government with respect to the benefits of cooperating with the EU in areas where it served its interests, even if this contradicted long-held principles regarding global responsibility for climate change mitigation. Importantly, the Chinese Government recognized that the EU had extensive experience of developing alternative energy and energy conservation technologies and policies, and it was

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<sup>126</sup> See NDRC, *China's National Climate Change Programme*, and PRC Government, *Initial National Communication on Climate Change - Executive Summary*.

<sup>127</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Zhongqi Pan, 2010, “Managing the Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty in China-EU Relations”, *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 8, no. 2.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Brussels-based member-state diplomat, 2 August 2010.

this need that drove the Chinese willingness to engage with the EU in specific areas of climate change policy and related areas.

This view was expressed by government officials and officials in government-linked research institutes. For example, a Chinese Government official expressed the view that the EU does in fact play a leadership role with respect to climate policy, particularly in comparison with the United States, and is better in terms of “lifestyle” issues such as sustainable consumption.<sup>129</sup> A senior researcher at a government-linked research institute spoke about the need for China to “borrow” from the EU’s experience:

The EU is leading on climate change, so in many ways we check what happened in Europe and try to borrow their good practice. In many respects we learn a lot from Europe and Japan.<sup>130</sup>

However, this desire to learn from the European experience is also tempered by a prevalent view that China and the EU face very different circumstances. In particular, it was noted frequently by interviewees that China is in the middle of urbanization and industrialization processes unprecedented in human history in such a short time period. The issue of population growth was also mentioned as a factor which makes the European experience less applicable to China. Thus, the challenges facing the EU in reducing greenhouse gas emissions are quite different from those currently facing China. For example, a Chinese academic involved in the UNFCCC negotiations expressed the following view:

The problem is that the EU’s model of low carbon development is not a model that developing countries can follow ... You have developed your economy and then you are trying to lower your emission trajectory ... For most developing countries and especially for China, we are facing a dual challenge—we have to urbanize and industrialize which means we have a lot of

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<sup>129</sup> Interview with Chinese government official, Beijing, 22 October 2010.

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Chinese government think tank official, Beijing, 12 October 2010.

infrastructure that needs to be built, but at the same time you have to also control growth of greenhouse gases, so that is something totally new.<sup>131</sup>

According to a Chinese Government official, the Chinese Government is in the process of examining the EU experience with respect to the shift to a low-carbon development model. She said that they are very keen to learn from Europe, but that China has its own national circumstances which are very different to those of Europe. They are still, she suggested, working out what the Chinese “model” will be.<sup>132</sup> While there are indeed striking differences between the national circumstances of the EU and China, it is clear nonetheless that the Chinese Government believe that there are some areas in which they can learn from the European experience. This, of course, contrasts strongly with the sharp dissonance that exists between China and the EU in the context of the international climate change negotiations, and stems from Chinese pragmatism. While a significant degree of normative frame dissonance certainly exists, the Chinese Government has been keen to learn from European experiences, through bilateral cooperation, in specific areas of policy-making and technology. In other words, in particular instances, the Chinese material interest in cooperating with the EU bilaterally overrode the strong normative frame dissonance identified here and in Chapter 4.

In short, there was a considerable shift in the Chinese approach to domestic climate change policy-making, but significant continuity with respect to the international climate change negotiations. These developments were driven by primarily domestic factors, but there were limited instances of normative emulation and lesson-drawing on the part of the Chinese Government. There was also, however, evidence of significant resistance, particularly with respect to the international climate change negotiations. The explanatory factors developed in the third part of the analytical framework in Chapter 2 help to explain

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<sup>131</sup> Interview with Chinese academic involved in climate policy-making, Beijing, 20 October 2010.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Chinese government official, Beijing, 22 October 2010.

this pattern of response. First, the top-down nature of the Chinese political system created favourable conditions for EU influence once the EU-China relationship became sufficiently deeply institutionalized at political level from 2003 onwards. This was dependent on the openness of the Chinese leadership to new ideas, which was facilitated by the coming to power of the Fourth Generation leadership. This openness was, in turn, driven by changing conceptions of material interest among the Chinese leadership. Finally, while strong normative dissonance created strong resistance to EU engagement with respect to the multilateral climate change negotiations, there was much less resistance with respect to bilateral cooperation in specific areas of technology and policy-making.

## **5.4 Conclusion**

The EU has acted as a highly restricted leader in its engagement with China on climate change. In important respects, China has indeed been careful to avoid being influenced by others, as one of the opening quotes of this chapter put it. This was particularly true with respect to the international climate change negotiations. However, with respect to domestic climate change policy-making, there were limited instances of the Chinese government following the EU's leadership and responding positively to EU engagement. In order to understand this uneven pattern of leadership and followership, this chapter picked up the theoretical strands developed in Chapter 2, and made three principal arguments.

First, the more general development of EU climate change policy generated an attempt by the EU to engage with China on climate change, but this was mediated, enabled, and constrained by the development of the broader EU-China relationship. Over time, the institutionalization of this relationship provided the EU with greater opportunities for engagement. The inauguration of a so-called "strategic partnership" in 2003 generated a dynamic towards the creation of institutionalized EU-China dialogue and cooperation

across a wide variety of policy areas. This, combined with growing European and global concern regarding the rising contribution of China to global environmental degradation, generated a dynamic towards particular forms of EU engagement.

Second, EU engagement with China took the form of a combination of institutionalized dialogue and incentive-based capacity building. However, these were limited by a lack of EU capabilities. In particular, there was limited institutional capacity for engagement with China on climate change, particularly at EU level, which in turn exacerbated the problem of inconsistency between EU-level and member-state engagement. On the issue of coherence, while climate change was given high rhetorical priority in its engagement with China, there is no significant evidence that there was a serious attempt to ensure coherence between other policy areas and the EU's priorities on climate change, for example by making market access conditional on the implementation of climate change policies by China. This lack of EU capabilities relates back to the drivers of engagement and supports to argument that EU leadership was driven at least in part by a desire to legitimize the polity-building process within the EU.

Third, the response of the Chinese Government was characterized by limited normative emulation and lesson-drawing, and also significant instances of resistance. This resistance was particularly evident with respect to the international climate change negotiations. This pattern of response was explained using the three explanatory factors developed in Chapter 2. First, the centralised nature of the Chinese political system, combined with the deepening of institutionalized EU-China relations, provided EU leaders with growing access to the Chinese leadership. Second, a prior shift had occurred with respect to the Chinese leadership's conception of material interest, which attached greatly increased priority to issues of energy security, local environmental pollution, and developing future-oriented industries. This generated openness to cooperation with the EU in specific areas

where the Chinese leadership believed it was in their interests to do so. Moreover, it facilitated a process of normative emulation whereby the Chinese Government “repackaged” their existing policies in the form of the 2007 National Climate Change Programme. Third, while there was significant dissonance with respect to the development of a future climate regime, there was significantly less dissonance with respect to cooperation at the bilateral level. Thus, the EU exercised very limited leadership through its engagement with China on climate change, and only then under favourable conditions. Moreover, in significant respects China chose not to be influenced by the EU.

## Disinterest and Resistance: The Development of EU-India Relations on Climate Change

*“The world doesn’t look like the EU ... The EU hasn’t found a way of talking about this subject yet in a way that really resonates.”*

—Navroz Dubash, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

*“There are a number of formal mechanisms that have been created between the EU and India that, on paper, look as if they add up to a substantive set of structures for dialogue and for collaboration, but the reality is that they don’t add up to anything like the level that we would like to see.”*

—EU member state diplomat, New Delhi

The story of EU-India engagement on climate change has been one of limited capacity on the EU side and very significant resistance on the Indian side. While some formal mechanisms for cooperation exist, they have not developed into a substantive engagement. The EU side has been characterized by limited capabilities and, indeed, limited interest in developing substantive engagement with India. This has resulted in perceptions such as that of Navroz Dubash above that the EU simply cannot get the message right. If the EU-China case analyzed in the last chapter was a story of limited engagement, the EU-India case has been characterized by near-total resistance. Although there have been limited instances of possible normative emulation on the part of the Indian Government, for the

most part the Indian side has strongly resisted EU engagement. For these reasons, we can characterize the EU as a leader without a follower in this case. Indeed, Indian commentators might question attributing the title of “leader” to the EU at all in this case.

Why has the EU-India relationship been so problematic? Why did the Indian Government react with such resistance to EU engagement? What characteristics of the aspirant leader, the purported follower, and the broader context of the relationship help us to understand this pattern of engagement and response? This chapter seeks to answer these questions through a structured analysis of the characteristics of engagement and response.

The attempted development of EU engagement with India on climate change occurred in a context of growing concern over the rising contribution of emerging powers to global environmental degradation. India is increasingly categorized as a “major emitter” of greenhouse gases. Indeed, India accounted for approximately 5.4 percent of global emissions in 2009, making it the world’s fifth largest emitter in aggregate terms.<sup>1</sup> However, India comes a long way behind China, which accounts for approximately 26 percent of global emissions.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, India’s per capita emissions in 2009 were 1.5 metric tonnes, whereas China’s per capita emissions were 5.4 tonnes.<sup>3</sup> For these reasons, Indian policy-makers and commentators frequently reject the label of “major emitter”, and the grouping together of India and China in discussions about climate change. Moreover, India is a low-income country, even by comparison to China, and certainly when compared with any

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<sup>1</sup> Prior to 2009, India was the fifth-largest aggregate emitter of CO<sub>2</sub>. In 2009, for the first time, India overtook the Russian Federation in aggregate terms. See Jos G.J. Olivier, et al., 2011, *Long-Term Trend in Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: 2011 Report* (The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency & EU Joint Research Centre), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> A more dramatic comparison can be drawn by comparing Indian per capita emissions with average EU-27 per capita emissions (7.8 tonnes), or US per capita emissions (17.7 tonnes). Energy Information Administration, 2012, “International Energy Statistics Website”, <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8>, (accessed on 28 June 2012).

industrialized country. For this reason, the Indian Government maintains its right to prioritize economic development.

Nonetheless India is also highly vulnerable to anticipated impacts of future climate change. Himalayan glaciers are retreating with major anticipated consequences for the Indian population that relies on run-off water from the glaciers. Sea level rise is also likely to impact India severely, as are changing patterns of precipitation and temperature, which are projected to have a major impact on agriculture—which supports the livelihood of 2 out of every 3 Indians. Thus, while India is a growing contributor to greenhouse gas emissions (at least in current, aggregate terms), it is likely to be severely adversely affected by future projected climate change impacts. In short, India—like China—has conflicted interests when it comes to the issue of climate change.

The analysis below is structured around the framework developed in Chapter 2. The next section analyzes how the EU's broader claim to climate leadership and desire to develop external engagement was mediated and constrained by the problematic nature of the EU-India relationship. This has significantly affected the form of engagement, which is analyzed in Section 6.2 by examining the EU's mechanisms of engagement and capabilities to do so. Section 6.3 then characterizes the response of the Indian Government in terms of the response mechanisms identified in Chapter 2, and seeks to explain this pattern of response using the categories of domestic political structure, conceptions of material interest, and normative frames.

## **6.1 A Bilateral Relationship Founded on Mutual Neglect**

The development of EU engagement with India on climate change has been mediated and constrained by the problematic development of the EU-India bilateral relationship. In this respect, the EU-India case contrasts with the EU-China case. Rather than providing an

enabling institutional environment within which the EU was able to progressively develop engagement with the Indian Government on climate change, the nature of the bilateral relationship acted instead strongly as an inhibiting factor in the development of such engagement.

India was, in fact, one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the then EEC in 1963, and a decade later the two sides signed a Commercial Cooperation Agreement.<sup>4</sup> This was followed by a more broad-ranging Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1981, which was renewed in 1985. The 1981 Cooperation Agreement had provided for a “Joint Commission” composed of senior officials on both sides but—in a sign of the disinterest that existed concerning the relationship—this did not meet at all until 1988. The current framework for bilateral relations is provided by the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development which entered into force in 1994, and an “EU-India Joint Statement on Political Dialogue” which was agreed alongside the Cooperation Agreement in December 1993.<sup>5</sup>

In line with many of the joint declarations that would be issued from EU-India Summits in later years, the Political Dialogue of 1994 was to be established “based on shared values and aspirations”, and aimed to “underline their common attachment to democracy and respect for human rights” and to “bring about mutual understanding, increase cooperation and work towards defining areas of agreement on international issues”. However, beyond

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<sup>4</sup> This was, in fact, the first agreement signed by the EEC with any “non-associated developing country embodying the concepts of commercial and economic cooperation linked with trade”. Commission of the European Communities, 1979, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: The Community's Relations with India*, COM(79) 176, 5 April 1979, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> The Cooperation Agreement had actually been initialled in late 1992. However, it was not approved by the Indian Cabinet for a long time due to concerns over a clause in the agreement which stipulated “respect for human rights and democratic principles” as the basis for EU-India cooperation. The Indian government believed that some sort of conditionality was being introduced, and only agreed to sign after receiving clarification from the EU side that this was not the case—signed on 20 December 1993. See Purusottam Bhattacharya, 2001, “European Political Co-operation and South Asia: From Indifference to an Institutionalised Dialogue”, in B. Vivekanandan and D. K. Giri, eds., *Contemporary Europe and South Asia* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing), p. 83.

this fine rhetoric there was relatively little substance to the relationship, apart from trade matters. The 1994 Cooperation Agreement envisaged cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy and environment.<sup>6</sup> There was, however, no reference to climate change in the Cooperation Agreement and, in any case, there is little evidence of substantive institutionalized relations on environmental policy more generally, or on energy matters, during this period.

From the mid-1990s onwards, the EU began to focus greater attention on the emerging powers of Asia as discussed in Chapter 3. Although significantly greater attention was focused on China than India in this process, the European framing of the rise of India bears several similarities with the EU-China case. In the first instance, there has been a longstanding desire on the part of the EU to add a political dimension to what has historically been a very trade-focused relationship with India. As early as 1982, the European Commission had called for increased political dialogue as part of the EU-India relationship,<sup>7</sup> and this has been a consistent theme in the Commission communications on relations with India since.<sup>8</sup> The similarities with the EU framing of China's rise is not surprising, since both occurred within the framework of growing interest within the EU in developing an increasingly political relationship with the Asian continent more generally.

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<sup>6</sup> On the energy side, the Cooperation Agreement stipulated that "The Parties ... undertake to step up cooperation relating particularly to the generation, saving and efficient use of energy. Such improved cooperation will include planning concerning energy, non-conventional energy including solar energy and the consideration of its environmental implications". In terms of cooperation on environment, focus areas identified included water, soil and air pollution, erosion, deforestation, and sustainable management of natural resources. Other areas identified for dialogue in the Cooperation Agreement included non-proliferation and disarmament, combating terrorism, and drug trafficking and money laundering.

<sup>7</sup> Commission of the European Communities, 1982, *The European Community and India*, Europe Information: External Relations 62/82, October 1982.

<sup>8</sup> This ambition has been set out, *inter alia*, through the Commission's Asia Strategies of 1994 and 2001 and through two India strategy papers published in 1996 and 2004, each of which was endorsed by the Council. See European Commission, 1994, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: Towards a New Asia Strategy*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(94) 314 final, 13 July 1994; European Commission, 1996, *Communication from the Commission: EU-India Enhanced Partnership*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(96) 275 final, 26 June 1996; European Commission, 2001, *Communication from the Commission: Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001; European Commission, 2004, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: An EU-India Strategic Partnership*, Brussels: European Commission, COM(2004) 430 final, 16 June 2004.

While the EU's 1994 Asia Strategy placed a spotlight on China, India was also highlighted. Building on this, the Commission published a communication on EU-India relations in 1996 which proposed the development of an "EU-India Enhanced Partnership". It sought to broaden the relationship with India by adding more significant political and strategic dimensions, including proposals for a structured dialogue on international political issues at both global and regional levels, a dimension that had been absent from the relationship.

This connects to a second theme of the European framing of relations with India—and indeed a second similarity with the EU-China case—namely that India should bear greater responsibilities for regional and global stability. This theme was evident from the mid-1990s onwards in the EU's India Strategy documents.<sup>9</sup> From an early stage, an element of these "international responsibilities" concerned the need to promote environmental protection. Indeed, a concern regarding India's growing contribution to global environmental degradation was expressed unusually prominently in the 1996 Commission communication on the EU-India relationship, placing a heavy emphasis on environmental challenges, including climate change in particular, and also on energy issues.<sup>10</sup>

In short, there were some similarities with the EU-China case with respect to how the EU framed India's "rise". However, there were significant differences with respect to how the dynamics of the two relationships have played out. In practice, the EU-India relationship has been characterized by enduring problems and, indeed, by something of a mutual neglect. The EU has historically concentrated much more on its relationship with China than India, and while the EU has certainly recognised India as a regional power, it did not

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<sup>9</sup> For example, the 1996 Commission communication on relations with India stated "The EU is thus ready to be a partner in India's integration into appropriate international bodies, so long as India accepts the international responsibilities and Treaties that befit a major world power". European Commission, *Communication from the Commission: EU-India Enhanced Partnership*, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> For example, the 1996 strategy stated: "A strengthened EU-India partnership stands to enhance mutual appreciation of the manner in which issues such as climate change ... are approached ... The key position of large countries like India in helping to bring about a substantial reduction in global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in order to stabilize and subsequently reverse changes in climate will become more evident in the future". *Ibid.*, p. 6.

receive nearly as much attention as China in the Commission's 1994 and 2001 Asia Strategies.<sup>11</sup> For its part, the Indian Government has concentrated first and foremost on its relations with the United States, then China, Russia, and countries in its neighbourhood, and only then Europe.<sup>12</sup> This mutual neglect has its origins in a number of related factors.

The EU and India approach many global issues in very different ways. With regard to two dominant themes in Indian foreign policy—the nuclear control regime and terrorism emanating from Pakistan—India has been largely disappointed by the response of the EU.<sup>13</sup> The EU has not, in Indian eyes, adequately appreciated India's concerns about its external security environment. Although the EU and India share common values, they face very different external security contexts and threats: while India confronts traditional security threats, the EU confronts mainly non-traditional security threats such as organized crime, and has tended to view security in holistic terms by focusing, for example, on the concept of “human security” and the “root causes of terrorism”.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> This predominant focus on China is also reflected in the number of Commission communications focusing on EU relations with each country—four in the case of China, but only two in the case of India.

<sup>12</sup> It is noteworthy that a recent edited volume on India's foreign policy published by OUP contains chapters on India's relations with China, Japan, Russia, and the United States among others, but does not include a chapter on relations with the EU or, indeed, any European countries. See Sumit Ganguly, ed., 2010, *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

<sup>13</sup> Rajendra K Jain, 2009, “Engaging the European Superpower: India and the European Union”, in Bart Gaens, Juha Jokela, and Eija Limnell, eds., *The Role of the European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners* (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate), p. 180.

<sup>14</sup> The Indian government has been repeatedly frustrated by EU resistance to its attempts to place terrorism on the agenda of EU-India summits, and while an EU-India Security Dialogue was launched at the 2006 Summit, it has met infrequently. Anne Coulon, 2006, “EU-India Understandings on Major Global Political Issues: Where do we Stand?”, in Klaus Voll and Doreen Beierlein, eds., *Rising India - Europe's Partner? Foreign and Security Policy, Politics, Economics, Human Rights and Social Issues, Media, Civil Society and Intercultural Dimensions* (New Delhi: Mosaic Books & Weißensee Verlag); Rajendra K Jain, 2005, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism”, *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1-2. Nowhere is this European approach more evident than in the European Security Strategy. See also Council of the European Union, 2003, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003.

There has been a similar disconnect on the issue of nuclear proliferation. In response to the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998,<sup>15</sup> the Cardiff European Council in June 1998 issued a strong condemnation, though member state differences ruled out the possibility of imposing sanctions. The European Council urged that India and Pakistan should resume negotiations and that both should adhere to the international non-proliferation regimes by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India regards these regimes as profoundly unjust, and considered that the EU's response displayed a lack of understanding of India's external security environment.<sup>16</sup>

These differences on terrorism and nuclear proliferation are symptomatic of a more general disconnect between the EU and India on a variety of issues and, indeed, on their respective approaches to world politics.<sup>17</sup> The two sides conceive of multilateralism in quite different ways: while the EU views it in terms of strengthening international institutions, India views the concept of multilateralism through a great power lens, with a strong emphasis on national sovereignty and a desire to refashion some of the rules of international order according to its own preferences.<sup>18</sup> This difference of approach to world politics is compounded by the fact that, on many of the issues that matter most to India, the EU is divided.

Nowhere is this more the case than on the issue of United Nations Security Council reform. India formally staked its claim to Security Council membership in September 1992

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<sup>15</sup> Denmark, Sweden, and Germany suspended their development aid to India; France and Spain, on the other hand, did not go beyond rhetorical condemnation. Saponti Baroowa, 2007, "The Emerging Strategic Partnership between India and the EU: A Critical Appraisal", *European Law Journal*, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 736-37.

<sup>16</sup> European Council, 1998, *Cardiff European Council, 15-16 June 1998: Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, SN 150/1/98 REV 1, 16 June 1998.

<sup>17</sup> For an analysis of how EU and Indian understandings of a range of global issues, including democracy and human rights, multilateralism, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, disarmament and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism, see Coulon, "EU-India Understandings on Major Global Political Issues: Where do we Stand?"

<sup>18</sup> Christian Wagner, 2008, "The EU and India: A Deepening Partnership", in Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, eds., *Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia - Chaillot Paper no. 109* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies).

in a speech to the General Assembly by Minister for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, a claim that was later supported by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. EU member states, however, are divided on the issue of Security Council reform. The United Kingdom has generally been reluctant on the issue, France slightly less so. Germany, for clear reasons of self-interest, is enthusiastic about Security Council reform.<sup>19</sup> Disinterest on the Indian side is recognized by officials in Brussels who express frustration with the lack of Indian engagement. One EU official working on relations with India expressed the following view:

India are not interested [in dealing with the EU], and where they are interested, we can't deliver or we're divided: a seat on the UN Security Council, more visas for high-tech computer people from Bangalore or Mysore, and our issue on civilian nuclear cooperation. They prefer for historical and traditional reasons the bilateral approach in their relations with the EU, and obviously because of their close relationship with the UK.<sup>20</sup>

The Indian perspective on EU disunity on matters of external relations was expressed by the Indian Foreign Minister, Yashwant Sinha, who said in 2002:

While one must admit that EU has not been able to evolve a common position on all issues which are of political importance, (the recent Iraq case is proof of that) EU is gradually evolving a political personality of its own. *When* EU can have a convergence of views on economic, political and strategic matters which are globally important, EU will perhaps be a counter balance and force in the international global situation.<sup>21</sup>

The differing approaches to world politics and the lack of unity of the EU on issues of key importance to India have contributed to a tendency of the Indian Government to treat the EU as a primarily economic rather than political actor, and to deal bilaterally with EU member states on matters of political or strategic concern. For this reason, India was

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<sup>19</sup> M. Saleem Kidwai, 1998, "India's Case for Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council: Reactions of the Major EU Member States", in H. S. Chopra, ed., *India and the European Union: Into the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs).

<sup>20</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 23 July 2010.

<sup>21</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, 2002, "India's Foreign Policy: Successes, Failures and Vision in the Changing World Order - Talk by External Affairs Minister Shri Yashwant Sinha on 18.11.2002 at National Defence College, New Delhi", <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=5301260>, (accessed on 9 July 2011). Emphasis added.

described by EU officials as a “Eurosceptic” third country in the sense that it fails to see the added value of dealing with the EU on political issues, and prefers to deal with member states on a bilateral basis on matters other than trade.<sup>22</sup> Even in terms of the economic relationship, although much is made of the strong trading relationship between the EU and India, the EU’s overall position in Indian trade is shrinking rather than growing, partly as a result of India’s “Look East Policy” initiated in 1991. While EU-India trade increased in absolute terms, it has been declining in relative terms over the past decade or more.<sup>23</sup> One official also made a direct comparison with China, suggesting that while China has taken the time to understand the institutional intricacies of the EU and uses that knowledge to its advantage, India remains confused.<sup>24</sup>

This mutual neglect provided the context for the development of the EU-India relationship in the early 21st century. Entering the new millennium, the EU and India agreed in 2000 to institutionalize annual summits at head of state or government level. Building on a decision of the EU-India Joint Commission in 1999, working groups in a range of areas were established, one of which was environment.<sup>25</sup> As well as the establishment of annual summits, the relationship was also developed to include an EU-India Business Summit and an EU-India Civil Society Round Table.<sup>26</sup> However, while these developments marked a

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<sup>22</sup> This was attributed by one interviewee to the fact that India views the EU through the prism of the British media. Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 8 and 23 July 2010. Rajendra Jain, a prominent scholar of EU-India relations, has also made the point about Indian officials being influenced by the Eurosceptic Anglo-Saxon media. See Jain, “Engaging the European Superpower: India and the European Union”.

<sup>23</sup> In 1996–7, India-EU27 trade constituted approximately 26.5 percent of India’s total trade. By 2007–8, this figure had declined to 17.6 percent. Gulshan Sachdeva, 2009, “India and the European Union: Time to De-Bureaucratize Strategic Partnership”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 203.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 23 July 2010.

<sup>25</sup> Malcolm Subhan, 2002, “India and the European Union: A View from Brussels”, in Rajendra K Jain, ed., *India and the European Union in the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers), p. 44.

<sup>26</sup> The EU-India Business Summit was launched by a decision of the first EU-India Summit in 2000. The EU-India Civil Society Round Table was established by the EU-India Ministerial meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, and met for the first time in New Delhi in January 2001.

deepening of the relationship in institutional terms, with respect to outcomes there was more continuity than change.<sup>27</sup>

Similarly, the establishment of a so-called “strategic partnership” a few years later created a false illusion of a deepening of the institutional basis of the relationship. This process was given fresh impetus on the European side by the publication of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 by Javier Solana, then High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The ESS identified India along with the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and Canada as the EU’s “strategic partners”.<sup>28</sup> However, while the EU already had extensive institutionalized relations with the other five countries, India was something of an outlier in this list. At that time and indeed in the period since, the relationship with India could best be thought of as more of a potential rather than an existing strategic partner. Of all of the “strategic partners” identified in the ESS, India was the most aspirational from the EU’s point of view.

Building on the impetus provided by the ESS, the Commission proposed in its June 2004 India Strategy the development of an “EU-India Strategic Partnership”.<sup>29</sup> The Commission’s proposal recognized India as “an increasingly important international player and regional power”, and proposed to strengthen the political and strategic dimension of the relationship beyond its existing heavy focus on trade and economic relations. Moreover, India’s contribution to global environmental degradation was framed in terms of India’s growing responsibilities as an emerging power, and climate change was identified

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<sup>27</sup> This can be seen, for example, in the joint statements and action plans from the first number of annual summits, which tended to be formulaic and repetitive and indicated a lack of substantive cooperation. See, for example, European Union and Government of India, 2000, “1st EU-India Summit: Agenda for Action”, Website of the Delegation of the European Union in India, 28 June 2000, [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu\\_india/021\\_eu\\_india\\_reso\\_1st\\_page3\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu_india/021_eu_india_reso_1st_page3_en.pdf), (accessed on 11 July 2011).

<sup>28</sup> See Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>29</sup> European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: An EU-India Strategic Partnership*.

by the Commission as an area for future cooperation with India.<sup>30</sup> This coincided with a broader process of growing European and global concern regarding the increasing contribution of India and other rapidly developing countries to global energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions which was identified in Chapter 3.<sup>31</sup> Building on the concept of “effective multilateralism” which had been central to the ESS, the document proposed a “strategic partnership for the promotion of an effective multilateral approach”.<sup>32</sup>

Responding to the EU’s proposal for the creation of a strategic partnership, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs published its own EU Strategy document on relations with the EU in August 2004, which was the first ever Indian Government paper on a bilateral relationship.<sup>33</sup> On the surface, the Indian Government seemed keen to deepen its relationship with the EU. It recognized “the EU’s emergence as a major geo-political and economic force in the new world order” and endorsed the further development of “a relationship of sovereign equality, based on comparative advantage and a mutuality of interests and benefits ... in a spirit of cooperation, accommodation and mutual respect”. However, similarly vague statements would come to typify the joint statements of EU-India summits in the following years, and have tended to indicate a lack of substantive engagement. Moreover, the Indian Government’s EU Strategy was significantly more cautious concerning the potential for EU-Indian cooperation on environmental matters, revealing a much more conflictual relationship:

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<sup>30</sup> A “Commission Staff Working Document” attached to the Communication noted that “India will increasingly contribute to worldwide CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, the result of high economic growth and an energy mix dominated by fossil fuels”. European Commission, 2004, *Commission Staff Working Document - Annex to the Communication from the Commission: An EU-India Strategic Partnership*, Brussels: European Commission, SEC(2004) 768, 16 June 2004, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, the 2004 edition of the International Energy Agency’s flagship publication, *World Energy Outlook*. International Energy Agency, 2004, *World Energy Outlook 2004* (Paris: International Energy Agency).

<sup>32</sup> Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, p. 4.

<sup>33</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, 2004, *EC Communication Titled “An EU-India Strategic Partnership” - India’s Response*, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 27 August 2004.

Since India and EU are not at the same level of economic development, the strategies for engagement have to take into account India's developmental needs. Attempts have been made in the past at linking trade issues with environment. India has a principled opposition to the linkage of non-trade issues with trade as such a linkage can be used for protectionist purposes.<sup>34</sup>

Elsewhere, the Strategy document repeated the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. However, the response paper was more positive and open to cooperation on energy issues.<sup>35</sup>

It was against this background that the two sides moved to establish a strategic partnership, the creation of which was endorsed by the EU-India Summit of 2004 and formally launched at the 2005 Summit.<sup>36</sup> This elaboration of a “strategic partnership” provided the context within which the EU attempted to launch more sustained engagement with India on climate change. However, underlying the optimistic rhetoric of partnership and deepening engagement was a continued mutual neglect, underpinned at a general level by significantly contrasting conceptions of world politics, and by specific tensions in a range of policy areas. For this reason, the “strategic partnership” was arguably neither strategic nor a partnership, and can be thought of as something of an “empty shell” within which the two sides would seek to find issues on which they could cooperate on the basis of shared interest. Rather than the relationship developing and evolving to a point where it made sense to apply the label “strategic partnership”, the relationship was anointed as such in the hope that it would subsequently develop in that direction.

In the context of this search for issues which could populate the emerging “strategic partnership”, the UK Government played a key role in placing the issue of climate change

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>35</sup> The document stated: “[W]e welcome the EU's suggestion for the setting up of an energy panel to guide joint working groups dealing with fossil fuels, renewable energy and nuclear energy.” Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>36</sup> European Union and Government of India, 2004, “Joint Press Statement for 5th India-EU Summit”, Website of the Delegation of the European Union in India, 8 November 2004, [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu\\_india/021\\_eu\\_india\\_res\\_5th\\_summit1\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu_india/021_eu_india_res_5th_summit1_en.pdf), (accessed on 11 July 2011).

on the EU-India agenda during its Presidency of the EU in 2005. Henry Derwent, then Special Advisor to Tony Blair on climate change, made frequent visits to India during this period in an attempt to secure Indian approval for the agreed text on the Initiative on Climate Change.<sup>37</sup> The role of UK Presidency in this process was confirmed by a senior Commission official involved in the process at the time, with the Commission involved and supporting the United Kingdom.<sup>38</sup> The approach adopted by the United Kingdom and the Commission in seeking to develop this relationship is telling. According to a senior Commission official involved in the process, the EU started off with the same proposed text for the partnerships with both India and China.<sup>39</sup> However, in contrast to the EU-China case, the text of the EU-India Initiative was significantly less substantive and, moreover, was institutionally much shallower.

In short, rather than creating an enabling framework within which the EU could seek to develop engagement with the Indian Government on climate change, the enduring difficulties of the EU-India relationship served to constrain the development of this engagement. Even following the inauguration of their so-called strategic partnership in 2005, the problematic nature continued to constrain the development of effective engagement.

## **6.2 Development of EU Engagement through the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change**

The form of EU engagement with India on climate change has been limited and constrained. This was partly a result of the shallow institutionalization of the EU-India relationship, and by limited capabilities on the EU side. Although the 1st Summit in 2000 agreed the establishment of a Joint Working Group on Environment, this met

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<sup>37</sup> Interview with Mark Runacres, former Deputy UK High Commissioner to India, Delhi, 8 November 2010.

<sup>38</sup> Phone interview with senior Commission official, 30 June 2011.

<sup>39</sup> Phone interview with senior Commission official, 30 June 2011.

infrequently—less than annually—in the period before 2005.<sup>40</sup> Following on from the decision at the 2004 EU-India Summit to launch a “strategic partnership” in 2005, the two sides negotiated to find areas on which this partnership could be built. The policy fields chosen for cooperation were outlined in an extensive “Joint Action Plan”, which laid out plans for cooperation on a wide variety of issues.<sup>41</sup> This Joint Action Plan was endorsed by the 2005 Summit and included agreed text on the establishment of an “India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change”. The rest of this section analyzes the form of EU engagement in terms of the conceptual tools developed in Chapter 2, namely with respect to the mechanisms of engagement used by the EU, and the EU’s capabilities to develop and sustain this engagement.

### ***6.2.1 Attempted Dialogue and Capacity-Building: The Mechanisms of EU Engagement***

EU engagement with India has developed in the period since 2005 as a combination of attempted socialization through institutionalized dialogue and capacity-building through cooperation projects. In the framework of the “India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change” the two sides agreed to focus on “voluntary practical measures”. Areas identified for cooperation included: (i) eliminating barriers to dissemination of technologies; (ii) increasing funding for research and development; (iii) climate change adaptation, including research and development and integration of adaptation into sustainable development strategies; (iv) reducing the cost of cleaner technologies by achieving economies of scale; and (v) strengthening implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism. Compared with the formulaic statements of previous summit joint declarations, this was a detailed and reasonably specific statement of priorities, though

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<sup>40</sup> European Union and Government of India, “1st EU-India Summit: Agenda for Action”.

<sup>41</sup> European Union and Government of India, 2005, “The India-EU Strategic Partnership - Joint Action Plan”, Website of the Delegation of the European Union in India, 7 September 2005, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu\\_india/021\\_eu\\_india\\_res\\_6th\\_summit1\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu_india/021_eu_india_res_6th_summit1_en.pdf), (accessed on 11 July 2011).

there were few if any targets to be achieved. However, follow-up on these points of agreed cooperation was very limited.

With respect to institutionalized dialogue, the two sides agreed that the Joint Working Group on Environment, which had been established by the EU-India Joint Commission in 1999 but had met infrequently, would meet on a yearly basis. The Joint Working Group on Environment meets at senior official level and was envisaged as a forum in which policy objectives would be exchanged, upcoming bilateral political meetings would be discussed, and other matters—such as the topic for the Environment Forum—could be agreed. The EU-India Environment Forum, the establishment of which had been proposed by the Commission's India Strategy of 2004, was intended to bring together governments, business, and civil society from each side. A number of one-off workshops and conferences were held in the period 2006–2007, including on adaptation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and climate change research needs. However, in general there was little substantive activity before 2008.<sup>42</sup>

In terms of institutionalized dialogue on energy policy, an EU-India Energy Panel was established in 2005, involving DG Energy on the EU side and the Ministry of Power on the Indian side. It met for the first time in June 2005 and established three sub-working groups: (i) Coal and Clean Coal Technology;<sup>43</sup> (ii) Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency; and (iii) Fusion Energy and International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). A fourth Working Group on Petroleum and Natural Gas was established in 2006. However, although there were periodic meetings of the Energy Panel and at least some of

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<sup>42</sup> AGCC, 2009, *Enhancing Cooperation: Report of the High-Level India-EU Dialogue* (London: Action for a Global Climate Community); and Jorgen Boldt and Anjana Das, 2008, *Study on Environment and Energy in India - Consolidated Report* (Hemel Hempstead: HTPSE Ltd., funded by the European Union).

<sup>43</sup> Due to issues of institutional competence on the Indian side, the Working Group on Coal and Clean Coal was subsequently split into two separate working groups, dealing respectively with (i) coal and (ii) clean coal, because these areas are the responsibility of different ministries in India. Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16 July 2010.

its working groups, progress has been very limited with frustrations on both sides. According to one European official involved in the process, difficulties included resource constraints and personnel changes on the Indian side, such as the fact that the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Power changed three times in one year.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, by mid-2010, the Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy Working Group had not met for some time, and the Working Group on Coal was the only one which continued to make progress.<sup>45</sup> The lack of progress was recognized on the Indian side as well. An official at the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy reported that the Energy Panel had not made any difference to the overall development of energy policy, merely providing a “feel-good factor”.<sup>46</sup>

Separate from the formalized EU-India dialogue on environment and energy, a number of interested parties developed a so-called “Track II” dialogue on energy and climate change between the EU and India in parallel to the official government-to-government dialogues. Entitled the “High-Level India-EU Dialogue”, this dialogue was convened during the period 2008–2009 by “Action for a Global Climate Community”, a London-based non-governmental organization, and was founded because of the perception that the formal intergovernmental process was not functioning as well as it could. The High-Level Dialogue received institutional support from a number of governments and influential research institutes.<sup>47</sup> The High-Level Dialogue was attended by European Commission President Barroso as well as senior officials from the EU and Indian sides,<sup>48</sup> and the setting

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<sup>44</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16 July 2010.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16 July 2010.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with official at the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, New Delhi, 26 November 2010.

<sup>47</sup> These included The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), the European Commission, the UK Department for International Development and Department of Energy and Climate Change, GTZ, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and the Stockholm Environment Institute, among others.

<sup>48</sup> On the European side, these included Rosário Bento Pais, Deputy Head of Climate Change Unit in DG Environment, members of Barroso’s cabinet and the Bureau of European Policy Advisors; Peter Betts, Director General for International Climate Change at the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change; Jürgen Trittli, former German Environment Minister and Peter Rösger, Leiter Gruppe Infrastrukturpolitik, German Chancellery; and Brice Lalonde, French Ambassador for Climate Change. On the Indian side, these

was judged by a senior Indian participant to be more conducive to finding common ground than the formal intergovernmental process because it “was a dialogue of people who were already in a sense on the same page”.<sup>49</sup>

The final report of the High Level Dialogue recommended the creation of a number of “flagship” programmes for cooperation, and argued that political ownership of these flagship programmes was needed, that the existing institutional framework for EU-India cooperation on energy and climate was fragmented, and that a coordinating mechanism was needed to steer the various existing institutional mechanisms and to give political momentum to the process.<sup>50</sup> However, participants on both sides have noted that “political ownership” of the process has not been assumed by governments on either side.<sup>51</sup> In particular, an EU member state diplomat has pointed to the fact that while the process was actively supported by a number of member states, “it wasn’t supported really financially or politically by the EU [Commission]”.<sup>52</sup>

The EU also sought to develop engagement with India through cooperation in specific areas of technology and policy-making. The 2005 Joint Action Plan placed an emphasis on “voluntary practical measures”.<sup>53</sup> However, when compared with the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, the EU-India Initiative was significantly less substantive in this regard. Notably, there was no “flagship” cooperation project like the “Near Zero Emissions Coal” project in the EU-China case. Indeed, the EU had proposed cooperation with India on carbon capture and storage (CCS) and had offered funding for the project,

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included Dr. Prodipto Ghosh, Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Nitin Desai, and Dr. Kirit Parikh. At the time, Ghosh and Dasgupta were still senior members of the Indian negotiating team to the UNFCCC.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with retired Indian senior official, New Delhi, 8 November 2010.

<sup>50</sup> The four “flagship” areas identified for cooperation were: solar energy, adaptation, black carbon, and biochar. AGCC, *Enhancing Cooperation: Report of the High-Level India-EU Dialogue*.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with retired Indian senior official, New Delhi, 8 November 2010 and with member state diplomat, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with member state diplomat, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

<sup>53</sup> European Commission, 2005, “The India-EU Strategic Partnership - Joint Action Plan”, 7 September 2005, [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu\\_india/joint\\_action\\_plan\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu_india/joint_action_plan_en.pdf), (accessed on 27 March 2011).

but this was rejected by the Indian side. A Commission official recalled that the Indian side were “much less willing to engage and much more defensive” than the Chinese Government officials:

With the Indians we had to fight much harder to get it at all [the agreed text on establishing a partnership] whereas the Chinese were very keen to have it ... We pushed much less for [CCS] on the Indian side [compared with China] even though we had money to spend there as well, but there was no interest whatsoever on the part of our Indian colleagues.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, capacity-building and project-based cooperation was largely non-existent in the first years of the India-EU Initiative. However, EU-India cooperation received fresh impetus in 2008, in the context of a broader reconsideration of the EU-India relationship that year. At the EU-India Summit of 2008, the overall EU-India Joint Action Plan was revised following a recognition that the Joint Action Plan agreed in 2005 was too ambitious, and it was scaled back in terms of action so that it was more focused on a smaller range of issues.<sup>55</sup> As part of this process, the French EU Presidency secured agreement on a “Joint Work Programme, EU-India Co-operation on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change” at the Summit that year.<sup>56</sup>

Under the heading “cooperation on energy”, this Joint Work Programme identified coal, energy efficiency, fusion energy, and renewables as areas for cooperation, with a strong emphasis on joint research and development. Proposed cooperation under the heading of “climate change” was somewhat more limited. The two areas identified were (i) the organization of workshops on modelling mitigation options, deployment of climate-

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<sup>54</sup> Phone interview with senior Commission official, 30 June 2011.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 8 July 2010. European Union and Government of India, 2008, “Global Partners for Global Challenges: The EU-India Joint Action Plan”, Website of the European External Action Service, 29 September 2008, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/india/sum09\\_08/joint\\_action\\_plan\\_2008\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/india/sum09_08/joint_action_plan_2008_en.pdf), (accessed on 11 July 2011).

<sup>56</sup> European Union and Government of India, 2008, “Joint Work Programme, EU-India Co-operation on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change”, Website of the European External Action Service, 29 September 2008, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/india/sum09\\_08/climatechange\\_workprog\\_2008\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/india/sum09_08/climatechange_workprog_2008_en.pdf), (accessed on 11 July 2011).

friendly technology, and the future of the Clean Development Mechanism; and (ii) the establishment of a pool of expertise to support capacity-building in India. Under the heading “private sector cooperation”, it was proposed that European Investment Bank funding would be provided for mitigation and adaptation projects in India,<sup>57</sup> and that a proposed “European Business Technology Centre” (EBTC) would advance private sector and research cooperation. Following on from this, the EBTC was established in New Delhi with the support of the European Commission in January 2009. It was established with funding primarily from the European Commission.<sup>58</sup> Implemented by the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EuroChambres), it aims to provide support and advice to European businesses seeking entry into the Indian market in four sectors: energy, environment, biotechnology, and transport. Its focus is primarily on small and medium size enterprises, particularly from those EU member states without existing trade-promotion offices in India.

While the 2008 Joint Work Programme was reasonably specific in identifying particular areas for cooperation, it was in large part a re-statement of the priorities that had been identified under the 2005 Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change. This reflected the fact that the activities set out in 2005 had, by and large, not yet taken place. As such, the activities proposed under the 2008 Joint Work Programme represented a continuation of the means by which the EU had sought to engage India from 2005 onwards. Primarily, this consisted of attempted socialization through bilateral dialogue, and capacity building through cooperation projects. However, even during the period from

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<sup>57</sup> Following on from the Summit, in December 2008, the European Investment Bank agreed to provide a loan of EUR 150 million to the Export-Import Bank of India, two thirds of which was earmarked for projects to mitigate climate change in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors. See European Investment Bank, 2008, “EIB Loan to Mitigate Climate Change and Support EU Presence in India”, 2 December 2008, <http://www.eib.org/projects/press/2008/2008-126-inde-un-pret-de-la-bei-pour-attenuer-les-changements-climatiques-et-soutenir-la-presence-de-l-ue.htm>, (accessed on 8 July 2011).

<sup>58</sup> The project is funded for five years initially, with a long-term aim that the Centre will become self-sustaining.

2008 this engagement remained shallow. This links to the question of EU capabilities to engage with India on climate change, which were almost non-existent in the earlier years and remained very limited up to the end of 2009.

### ***6.2.2 Limited Interest, Limited Capacity: Assessing the EU's Capabilities for Engagement***

The problematic development of EU engagement with India on climate change was partly a result of resistance from the Indian Government which will be analyzed below. However, it was also partly a function of a lack of capabilities on the European side, particularly at EU level. Drawing on the conceptual tools developed in Chapter 2, this section assesses EU capacity to engage with respect to capabilities, consistency, and coherence.

In the first instance, there has been a significant lack of capacity within the responsible EU institution, the Commission, for managing engagement with India on climate change. In the earlier period in particular but even up to 2009, the lack of capacity of the Commission in general, and the Commission Delegation in New Delhi in particular, was even more acute than in the EU-China case. It was only in late 2007 that the Commission assigned to its delegation in India a member of staff to work specifically on climate change and environment, despite the launch of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change two years previously. Indeed, an EU official working on relations with India on climate change, speaking in 2010, seemed unaware of the existence of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change, and claimed that the institutionalized relationship had only been launched in 2008.<sup>59</sup> In this respect, there are significant parallels with the EU-China case: the UK Government pushed the development of an EU-level partnership with India on climate change but, once the UK Presidency of the EU ended in 2005, the relationship was largely neglected by the Commission and

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with EU official, Brussels, 27 April 2010.

subsequent EU Presidencies, until the French Presidency in 2008. However, in the EU-India case the problem has been more pronounced, since the Commission's capacities are weaker in India compared with China. This is representative of a more general neglect of India within the Commission.

Partly as a result of this lack of capacity, the relationship between the European Commission and the Indian Government has tended to be more confrontational than some of India's bilateral relationships, most prominently those with Germany and the United Kingdom.<sup>60</sup> This is arguably due to the fact that the United Kingdom and Germany have generally a much greater presence "on the ground" in India compared with the Commission as discussed above, and may therefore have a better sense of the domestic Indian political and policy context. This type of capacity, in turn, affects the degree to which the European Commission has been able to frame its engagement with India in terms that resonate with Indian domestic politics and preferences. In the words of a member state diplomat based in Delhi:

There are a number of formal mechanisms that have been created between the EU and India that, on paper, look as if they add up to a substantive set of structures for dialogue and for collaboration, but the reality is that they don't add up to anything like the level that we would like to see of either that dialogue having an influence on the policy or the politics, or that the collaboration is as transformational as potentially there is between the EU and India.<sup>61</sup>

By contrast, the United Kingdom and Germany—the member states with the most significant involvement in this area in India, have devoted significant staff and resources to their relationship with India on energy in particular. The United Kingdom has built up a substantial diplomatic presence in India dealing with climate change, including appointing

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<sup>60</sup> Interview with Mark Runaces, former Deputy UK High Commissioner to India, 8 November 2010. It should be noted, of course, that Runaces would have an interest in making this point.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with member state diplomat, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

senior advisors to its regional offices in Chennai, Kolkata, and Mumbai.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, institutionally the climate change team at the UK High Commission is coordinated by the UK Department for International Development presence in India, emphasizing a development focus to the work of the UK Government in India on climate change. In this regard, areas of cooperation have included watershed management, rural livelihoods, and power sector management, areas with clear climate change “co-benefits”, but which are framed in terms of issues of interest to the Indian Government.<sup>63</sup>

The approach of the German Government has been oriented very significantly towards technical cooperation, run by GTZ, with a particular focus on the energy sector.<sup>64</sup> Reflecting this emphasis on technical cooperation, while the German Embassy in New Delhi has just one diplomat working on climate change and energy,<sup>65</sup> the “Indo-German Energy Programme” (IGEN), run by GTZ, employs 30–35 staff.<sup>66</sup> IGEN comprises work on energy efficiency with the Ministry of Power, and on renewable energy with the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. Cooperation in the energy sector between the German and Indian Governments has been ongoing for 12 years, and the German Government was credited by many Indian interviewees with the formulation of the 2002 Indian Energy Conservation Act and, related, the establishment of the Indian Bureau of Energy Efficiency. Indeed, the office of the (German) director of IGEN is located within the offices of the Bureau of Energy Efficiency.

While the UK and German Governments have developed stronger capacity in this area, and as a result have developed deeper engagement with the Indian Government, this has resulted in a lack of consistency in the totality of EU engagement with India. Indeed, the

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<sup>62</sup> Interview with UK diplomat, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with UK diplomat, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

<sup>64</sup> Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. Since 1 January 2011, GTZ has been incorporated within Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, this position was only created in mid-2009.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Jens Burgtorf, Director, Indo-German Energy Programme, New Delhi, 9 December 2011.

lack of consistency was reported by several Indian Government officials and observers of Indian climate policy as a source of confusion and frustration. This was expressed in three principal ways. First, it was pointed out by both serving officials and civil society representatives that there are quite severe capacity constraints on the Indian side in terms of personnel, and there was a feeling that having to interact with multiple EU member states plus the Commission generated significant transaction costs.<sup>67</sup> Second, some confusion was expressed over who represents the EU, and whom the Indian Government should deal with when they want to engage with the EU. It was also noted that the EU sometimes is not sure of this itself.<sup>68</sup> Third, it was noted that, especially in the technology sphere, India deals with national companies, promoted by national governments, and that there is therefore no consistency in this area.<sup>69</sup>

The EU's capacity to engage India on climate change has also suffered from a lack of coherence between policy spheres. The EU sought to attach a higher rhetorical priority to climate change in its overall bilateral relationship from 2005 onwards. However, similar to the EU-China case this did not translate into a deeper integration of climate change concerns into the overall framework of EU relations with India. Integration of climate change with related policy areas was not such a significant problem, though mainly because there has been limited development of EU-India cooperation across the spectrum of cooperation areas. Moreover, integration of cooperation on climate and energy matters—where these exist—has been facilitated to some extent by the fact that the counsellor position at the EU Delegation in New Delhi is responsible for both the climate change and energy portfolios.

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<sup>67</sup> Interviews with two senior officials in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, 22 and 24 November 2010, and Indian academic, 15 November 2010.

<sup>68</sup> Interviews with senior official in the Ministry of Environment and Forests and retired senior diplomat, New Delhi, 18 and 22 November 2010, and Ajit Gupta, former advisor, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, speaking in a personal capacity, 8 December 2010.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with retired senior Indian government official, New Delhi, 8 November 2010.

However, the principal difficulty with respect to the coherence of EU engagement with India on climate change was that the relationship has been dominated by trade relations, particularly the ongoing negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Building on a recommendation from the EU-India High Level Trade Group in October 2006, negotiations on an EU-India FTA were launched in June 2007.<sup>70</sup> Eleven rounds of negotiations have so far been held, and this issue has come to dominate the relationship in the years since 2007. A primary focus on the trade aspect of the relationship was to be expected on the Indian side which has historically viewed the EU as primarily an economic actor—and still does, but this has also been true that the EU side has placed primary emphasis on the trade dimension of the relationship. In these circumstances, the issue of climate change was prioritized rhetorically, but not integrated into the overall framework of the bilateral relationship in a deeper way.

In short, the EU sought to develop engagement with India on climate change through the mechanisms of socialization through institutionalized dialogue, and capacity-building through project-based cooperation. In the period from 2005 onwards this attempted engagement took place in the context of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change. However, this engagement has been limited and problematic. Part of this is due to the response of the Indian Government which will be discussed below, but it was also due to a lack of capabilities on the EU side. In particular, the EU institution responsible in practice for EU-level engagement, the Commission, did not develop sufficient institutional capacity to manage and deepen this engagement. Partly as a result of this, more significant engagement has occurred at member-state level, which has contributed to a lack of consistency of EU engagement. Finally, there has been a lack of coherence between the EU's engagement on climate change and the “core” of the EU-

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<sup>70</sup> European Commission, 2012, “India”, DG Trade website, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/india/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/india/index_en.htm), (accessed on 7 July 2012).

India relationship, namely trade relations and the ongoing negotiations towards a Free Trade Agreement.

These problems relating to capability, consistency, and coherence support the argument that, rather than on developing sustained engagement with India, the EU was concerned at least in part with proclaiming its leadership on climate change. The aim of this was to legitimize the European integration project to a domestic audience through proclaiming EU leadership on climate change and a distinctive EU role in world politics. This was combined with the dynamic generated by the inauguration of a “strategic partnership” in 2005 that was neither strategic nor a partnership. Dialogue and engagement on climate change were created in the context of the development of a broad-ranging bilateral relationship, but in reality there was limited institutional capacity on the EU side to deliver on this engagement and, as we shall see below, very little interest on the Indian side in developing the relationship in this area.

### **6.3 Disinterest and Resistance: The Indian Response to EU Engagement**

From 2007 onwards, there was a noticeable shift in the trajectory of Indian climate change policy, at least in symbolic terms. Prior to that, Indian climate change policy had generally been characterized by an insistence that India should have no legal responsibility for addressing climate change, that any voluntary measures it would take to limit emissions would have to be consistent with its national development objectives, and that industrialized countries should provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries.<sup>71</sup> While these principles have not been abandoned, from 2007 onwards the Indian Government increasingly created institutions and policies to address climate change.

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<sup>71</sup> Sandeep Sengupta, 2010, “Defending ‘Differentiation’: India's Foreign Policy on Climate Change from Rio to Copenhagen”, paper presented at the conference Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 17-20 February 2010, p. 6.

This section identifies changes and continuity in the Indian position from 2007 onwards, seeks to identify whether and to what extent we can understand these developments as a response to EU engagement, and then seeks to explain the drivers of the Indian response.

One significant development in the period leading up to 2007—and indeed in the period since—has been the significant development of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in India. Chapter 4 traced the evolution of the Indian position with respect to market mechanisms for climate change mitigation and showed that, while initially highly sceptical, the Indian Government changed its position over time and subsequently played a central role in shaping the emerging rules governing the CDM. Indeed, India accounted for 24 percent of all CDM projects submitted for validation up to the end of 2009, the second-highest host country after China. However, India accounted for a significantly lower share of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs, the carbon units generated by CDM projects) issued to registered CDM projects over the same period, at 14 percent of the global total.<sup>72</sup> India accounted for 40 percent of all CDM projects rejected by the CDM Executive Board, leading to concerns over the general quality of Indian CDM projects.<sup>73</sup>

While, as Chapter 3 noted, the EU was instrumental in generating a global market for CERs through linking its domestic Emissions Trading Scheme with the CDM and Joint Implementation, it is noteworthy that, of all Indian CDM projects registered by 2009, only 46 percent had a CER buyer, while a majority were so-called “unilateral” projects initiated without a buyer in advance.<sup>74</sup> This fact qualifies to some extent the argument that the development of the CDM in India was driven by external actors including the EU. While the EU’s Linking Directive of 2004 generated a demand for CERs without which the

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<sup>72</sup> UNEP Risoe Centre, 2012, “Overview of the CDM Pipeline, updated 1 June 2012”, <http://www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsx>, (accessed on 1 July 2012).

<sup>73</sup> Gudrun Benecke, 2009, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: Taking Stock of the Local Carbon Market in India”, *The Journal of Environment & Development*, vol. 18, no. 4, p. 349.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

Indian carbon market would not have developed as it did, there was limited direct EU involvement in its development.

At the domestic level, the first significant step reflecting the change in orientation of the Indian Government, institutionally, was the establishment on 5 June 2007 of a “Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change”.<sup>75</sup> This signified a greater political interest and involvement in the development of Indian climate change policy, which had up to that point been left to a small number of Indian bureaucrats.<sup>76</sup> At its first formal meeting in July 2007, Prime Minister Singh tasked the Council on Climate Change with formulating, by November 2007, a “National Programme Document” on climate change which would capture “both the efforts that we have made so far and our plans for the future”.<sup>77</sup> The idea of producing such a report had been pushed by then Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forests and long-time senior member of the Indian climate change negotiating team, Dr. Prodipto Ghosh, who had been pressing for a plan or programme dealing with adaptation and mitigation, with adaptation as a priority.<sup>78</sup>

In fact, it was not until June 2008 that this “National Programme Document” was finalized. It took the form of a “National Action Plan on Climate Change” (NAPCC). This document reaffirmed some of the core principles of India’s position on climate change, including “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the equity principle which was defined as each of the earth’s inhabitants being granted an equal entitlement to the global atmospheric resource. In this regard, India’s commitment that its per capita greenhouse gas

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<sup>75</sup> Prime Minister of India, 2007, “PM’s Council on Climate Change Constituted”, Website of the Office of the Prime Minister of India, 5 June 2007, <http://pmindia.nic.in/prelease/pcontent.asp?id=585>, (accessed on 7 July 2011).

<sup>76</sup> The most prominent of these were Dr. Prodipto Ghosh and Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, both of whom were interviewed as part of this research.

<sup>77</sup> Prime Minister of India, 2007, “PM’s Opening Remarks at the Meeting of the Council on Climate Change”, Website of the Office of the Prime Minister of India, 13 July 2007, <http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=561>, (accessed on 7 July 2011).

<sup>78</sup> Interview with retired senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 26 November 2010.

emissions would not exceed those of developed countries—which had been pledged by Prime Minister Singh at the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm—was restated.<sup>79</sup> The core of the NAPCC is the establishment of eight “national missions” for the period to 2017.<sup>80</sup> Government ministries were required to submit detailed implementation plans, strategies, timelines, and monitoring and evaluation criteria to the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change. The Council in turn was charged with undertaking periodic reviews and reporting on progress under each mission.<sup>81</sup>

The formulation of these National Missions did not proceed as quickly as anticipated in the NAPCC, but by the end of 2010 a majority of the National Missions had been formulated by the responsible ministries and approved by the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change. Most significant in the current context are the National Solar Mission and the Energy Efficiency Mission. The “Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission” aims “to establish India as a global leader in solar energy, by creating the policy conditions for its diffusion across the country as quickly as possible”. It proposes to create a policy framework for the deployment of 20,000 Megawatts (MW) of solar power by 2022; to create favourable conditions for solar manufacturing capability; to develop 2000 MW of off-grid solar deployment by 2022, and to develop solar thermal and solar lighting systems.<sup>82</sup> The National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency, approved in June 2010, will cover facilities that account for more than 50 percent of fossil fuels used in India and

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<sup>79</sup> Government of India, 2008, *National Action Plan on Climate Change*, New Delhi, June 2008, pp. 1-2.

<sup>80</sup> The eight national missions are: National Solar Mission, National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, National Mission on Sustainable Habitat, National Water Mission, National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem, National Mission for a Green India, National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture, National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change.

<sup>81</sup> Noriko Fujiwara, 2010, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 325), p. 9.

<sup>82</sup> Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2009, *Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Towards Building Solar India*, Delhi.

sets out a goal to reduce consumption by 5 percent and save about 100 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> annually by 2015.<sup>83</sup>

Despite evidence of some change in domestic policy-making since 2007, India's approach to the international negotiations remained largely unchanged. A pre-Copenhagen publication by the Indian Ministry setting out India's position emphasised once again that the outcome "must be fair and equitable. It must be in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities".<sup>84</sup> The same document called for developed countries to address "lifestyle issues":

It is India's view that the planetary atmospheric space is a common resource of humanity and each citizen of the globe has an equal entitlement to that space. The principle of equity, therefore, implies that, over a period of time, there should be a convergence of per capita emissions.<sup>85</sup>

In the international negotiations, India identified three specific basic national interests: (i) no legally-binding emissions reduction target for developing countries; (ii) no legally-binding peaking year for Indian emissions; and (iii) a distinction between "supported" and "unsupported" mitigation actions by developing countries.<sup>86</sup>

Notwithstanding this continuity, just prior to COP-15 in Copenhagen in December 2009, the Indian Government announced a historically significant emission limitation commitment. Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh announced to Parliament on 3 December 2009 a pledge to reduce the emissions intensity of Indian GDP by 20 to 25 percent by 2020 in comparison to the 2005 level through domestic mitigation, excluding

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<sup>83</sup> Fujiwara, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>84</sup> Government of India, 2009, *The Road to Copenhagen: India's Position on Climate Change Issues*, New Delhi, February 2009, p. 2.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> The significance of this last point is that India was prepared to accept external monitoring, reporting, and verification ("MRV") of its domestic mitigation actions if, and only if, those actions were directly supported by finance and technology from developed countries. Fujiwara, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda*, p. 12.

agriculture.<sup>87</sup> This is an intensity target, meaning that the absolute level of Indian emissions to 2020 is very likely to increase. Moreover, the target excludes emissions from agriculture. Nonetheless, it represents a significant change of position for a country which up to then had strongly resisted any sort of target for emission limitation, either binding or voluntary. Following on from the announcement of this intensity target, the Indian Government formed an “Expert Group on a Low Carbon Strategy for Inclusive Growth”, chaired by Dr. Kirit Parikh, the purpose of which was to come up with proposed measures to achieve the intensity target.<sup>88</sup>

In short, the period from 2007 onwards saw a shift of some significance in the Indian approach to climate change policy-making, but also considerable continuity in some respects, particularly in terms of India’s approach to the international climate change negotiations. To what extent can the development of Indian climate change policy be understood as a response to EU engagement? Chapter 2 identified three possible mechanisms of response: (i) normative emulation; (ii) lesson-drawing; and (iii) resistance.

First, there is some limited evidence of normative emulation. Specifically, and somewhat mirroring the EU-China case, there is some evidence that external drivers were significant in spurring particular domestic changes in India. The decision to constitute the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, which in time led to the formulation of the NAPCC, was taken the day before Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to the

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<sup>87</sup> India Climate Portal, 2009, “India Announces Energy Intensity Target”, India Climate Portal website, December 2009, [http://www.indiaclimatportal.org/component/option,com\\_policybrief/view,policybriefdetail/id,20](http://www.indiaclimatportal.org/component/option,com_policybrief/view,policybriefdetail/id,20), (accessed on 7 July 2011).

<sup>88</sup> The group is composed of stakeholders across sectors, including industry, think tanks, research institutions, civil society, and government agencies, but does not involve representatives of government ministries—the rationale being to get voices from outside of government. The group’s recommendations are supposed to become a central part of India’s 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan which comes into effect in 2012. Interviews with Dr. Kirit Parikh, Integrated Research and Action for Development, New Delhi, 9 December 2010, and Raghunandan, Delhi Science Forum, Delhi, 25 November 2010; Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2010, *India: Taking on Climate Change - Post-Copenhagen Domestic Actions, June 30, 2010*, New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests.

German G8 Summit in Heiligendamm in June 2007. According to a member of the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, the development of Indian Government thinking on climate policy from this time onwards had two causes:

It started with the Heiligendamm G8 meeting which Manmohan Singh went to ... He was struck by how high the climate issue was on the agenda of the G8 ... It was partly a response to a perception that this issue is becoming a major global foreign policy matter, and we have to be a little more proactive. Second, there was a steady build-up of information and analysis from within India on what the consequences of climate change would be for India ... That climate of opinion had built up.<sup>89</sup>

The German G8 Presidency had made climate change a central theme of discussion at the Summit, and had invited the leaders of the so-called "Outreach 5" countries, namely China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico. At the "outreach" meeting of the Summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also announced a commitment that India's per-capita greenhouse gas emissions would never exceed those of developed countries. While it is hard to prove cause and effect conclusively, this appears to be something more than a coincidence of timing.

Moreover, the subsequent formulation of the NAPCC and accompanying National Missions did not represent a fundamental change in the Indian position with respect to taking action on climate change. As noted above, the NAPCC restated the fundamental principles that have guided Indian climate change policy since the early 1990s. Furthermore, much of the action anticipated under the plan was driven by non-climate concerns. As Kirit Parikh, a member of the Planning Commission, argued, the NAPCC was driven in large part by India's dependence on fossil fuels:

For India, moving to a low-carbon energy strategy is required in any case because of the fact that we're short of most forms of energy, fossil fuels, even

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<sup>89</sup> Interview with member of Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, New Delhi, 8 November 2010.

the coal we have will run out in under 40 to 45 years, so it's not as if we can rely on coal. So we need to develop renewables, solar, nuclear, non-carbon strategies, and that's what we're doing in any case.<sup>90</sup>

This suggests a process of normative emulation, since the establishment of the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change and the development of the NAPCC did not involve significant changes with respect to underlying policies and preferences. While it is hard to pinpoint and quantify the extent to which this was a result of European engagement as opposed to broader global processes, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the evidence above, that the EU at least played some role in this process. A similar dynamic characterized the announcement of India's December 2009 carbon intensity target. A close observer of the process at an Indian NGO suggested that little analysis underpinned the choice of target:

I think it [the pre-Copenhagen intensity target] was just picked out of thin air—maybe some brainstorming among three or four people ... I honestly don't think there was much analysis that went into it. I think the way it was done was that a figure was arrived at, and senior bureaucracy was told to prepare a paper which would justify it.<sup>91</sup>

However, in this case it is harder to attribute this to EU engagement. By late 2009, every major gathering of world leaders was discussing climate change in advance of COP-15. Furthermore, it seems that the most significant driver of India's announcement was the fact that China, as well as Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, had announced similar targets in the preceding months, placing pressure on the Indian Government to follow suit.

Second, however, there is little evidence of lesson-drawing on the part of the Indian Government, at least in the framework of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change. Formalized dialogue and cooperation within this framework did not

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with Dr. Kirit Parikh, Integrated Research and Action for Development, New Delhi, 9 December 2010.

<sup>91</sup> Interview with Raghunandan, Delhi Science Forum, Delhi, 25 November 2010.

play a significant role in the development of Indian climate change policy. While the establishment of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change at the 2005 Summit suggests the commencement of more substantive engagement in this area, in fact the relationship remained significantly conflictual and characterized by strong resistance on the Indian side. This was particularly true of the period up to 2007. Indeed, Mark Runacres, UK Deputy High Commissioner to India at the time of the launch of the India-EU Initiative, recalled:

The Prime Minister had identified climate change as a critical area, but it was no cakewalk getting it through. The Indians at that time were still very hesitant about climate change, and any attempts at dialogue or discussion about technology—almost anything to be honest—they were worried it was the thin end of the wedge and was trying to get them to sign up to emissions reductions.<sup>92</sup>

During the initial period following the establishment of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change, the EU's attempted engagement was largely resisted by the Indian Government. Follow-up remained a problem, and while there was some cooperation on other areas of environmental policy such as water, waste, and chemicals, cooperation on climate change has been minimal.<sup>93</sup> In the area of energy policy, EU attempts to engage the Indian Government were also met with significant Indian resistance. Moreover, the Indian Government expressed openness to engagement only on issues related to conventional energy sources with minimal connection to climate change mitigation.

Furthermore, while the agreement reached on a "Joint Work Programme, EU-India Cooperation on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change" at the 2008 Summit gave the appearance of greater engagement, this was somewhat illusory, as resistance on the

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<sup>92</sup> Interview with Mark Runacres, former Deputy UK High Commissioner to India, Delhi, 8 November 2010.

<sup>93</sup> Interview with EU official, New Delhi, 2 December 2010.

Indian side that had characterized the period before 2008 largely continued. Indeed, one striking feature of the text of this Joint Work Programme is the fact that the phrase “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” appears three times in the first four paragraphs of this document. This is reflective of the extent to which the Indian side viewed this bilateral relationship through the North-South prism of the multilateral negotiations.<sup>94</sup>

Observers on the Indian side expressed a similar view of the EU-level relationship. For example, Ajit Gupta, a former advisor to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, said:

The 2008 Summit had a very good joint statement on clean energy, but it has not really been implemented in true letter and spirit. That’s a perfectly good statement of intent to cooperate. We don’t need anything more than that as a statement of intent. But it needs to be implemented.<sup>95</sup>

The case of proposed cooperation on solar energy in India illustrates this point. The Summit joint declarations in 2007 and 2008 both highlighted the joint decision to launch a flagship EU-India programme on solar energy, but it was not until 2009 that the joint call for proposals was actually launched.

Moreover, there was significant resistance on the part of the Indian Government in response to EU engagement relating to the international climate change negotiations. As discussed above, the Indian Government approach to the international negotiations remained essentially the same over the period leading up to COP-15. Moreover, the legal form of India’s pre-Copenhagen carbon intensity target, like that of China, was very much at odds with the EU’s preferred approach to international cooperation on climate change. While the EU sought a “top-down” international agreement that would bind legally all so-

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<sup>94</sup> See Section 6.3.3 below for further discussion on this point.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with Ajit Gupta, former advisor to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, New Delhi, 8 December 2010, speaking in a personal capacity.

called “major emitters”, the Indian Government was careful to specify that its intensity target was purely voluntary at the international level, and did not generate international obligations for India.

In short, the Indian response to EU engagement was characterized by limited normative emulation around the period 2007–08, no significant lesson-drawing, and significant resistance. This was particularly prominent with respect to the international climate change negotiations, but was also true of the attempts by the EU to develop bilateral engagement through dialogue and capacity-building. The rest of this section seeks to uncover the reasons for the problematic nature of this relationship, building on the explanatory categories of domestic political structure, conceptions of material interest, and normative frames.

### ***6.3.1 Domestic Political Structure: The World's Largest Democracy***

It hardly needs to be pointed out that the domestic political structure of India differs considerably from the case of China. India, as the world’s most populous democracy and a federal, multi-ethnic state, is clearly a more open political system than that of China. Moreover, the decline of the “Congress system” which ruled India for its first three decades under which the Congress party managed a diverse national coalition of parties, has given way to a proliferation of strong regional parties and coalition governments at the national level, diffusing power away from the Prime Minister.<sup>96</sup> This has led to a proliferation of veto points in the Indian political system. In such a system, we should expect that the formation of winning coalitions should be more challenging, therefore making external influence less likely.

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<sup>96</sup> C. Raja Mohan, 2007, “Poised for Power: The Domestic Roots of India's Slow Rise”, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., *Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy* (Seattle & Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research).

For a long time, moreover, there was broad cross-party consensus on environmental issues, particularly with regard to climate change, which supported the official Government position that India was being unfairly labelled a “major emitter”, should not be required to develop domestic climate change policies, and should not accept international commitments as part of a future international climate change agreement. Traditionally, the lack of public debate over foreign environmental policy in India granted considerable autonomy to the lead departments, the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Ministry of External Affairs. While the domestic politics of climate change in India became more variegated over the second half of the 2000s, there remained strong domestic support for these core positions.<sup>97</sup> This combination of a proliferation of domestic veto points and a domestic consensus on climate change policy severely limited the potential for EU influence.

Moreover, these difficulties were overlaid by the problematic nature of the broader EU-India relationship. The Indian Government has generally failed to see the added value of engaging with the EU as such, and instead has shown greater interest in dealing bilaterally with individual member states, in particular the UK—for obvious historical reasons. In this respect, the Indian Government has been described as profoundly Eurosceptic. Added to this were operational difficulties, such as a lack of understanding of the Indian bureaucracy on the EU side. An EU source involved in this process summed up his experience: “You have to have an overdose of patience and understanding if you want to do business here in organising conferences and meetings. Everything is always last minute”.<sup>98</sup> This further limited the ability of EU actors to engage successfully with the Indian Government.

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<sup>97</sup> For a nuanced account of the domestic climate change discourse in India during this period, see Navroz K. Dubash, 2009, *Toward a Progressive Indian and Global Climate Politics* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, Climate Initiative: Working Paper 2009/1 (September)).

<sup>98</sup> Interview with an EU official, New Delhi, 2 December 2010.

However, the domestic consensus in India on climate change policy began to change to some extent in the period from 2007 onwards. This change was crystallized by the appointment, in May 2009, of Jairam Ramesh as Minister for Environment and Forests. Historically, the position of Minister of Environment and Forests had been given to a politician from a junior coalition party. The appointment of Ramesh represented a break from this tradition, partly because climate change was emerging as a significant international issue and India needed a competent person in charge.<sup>99</sup> In advance of Copenhagen, Ramesh was given clear guidance from the Prime Minister that India should be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.<sup>100</sup> However, this change occurred at the very end of the period of study—in May 2009—and does not therefore relate to most of the period analyzed in this chapter.

Nonetheless, the broader change in the constellation of domestic interests in India from 2007 onwards had an impact on the Indian response to EU engagement. According to an EU official based in Delhi, before 2008 climate change was less of a domestic political priority for the Indian Government, and therefore was not a priority area for cooperation with the EU. Furthermore, up to 2008 India was developing its National Action Plan on Climate Change, and “until then most Indian officials kept referring to this as needed [sic] to be in place before they would engage bilaterally”.<sup>101</sup> Nonetheless, there remained a significant domestic consensus in favour of maintaining the status quo Indian position, even during this latter period. In short, the domestic political structure of India, combined with a strong domestic consensus concerning climate change policy, limited the potential external influence of EU engagement.

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<sup>99</sup> Interview with Indian academic/policy researcher, New Delhi, 15 November 2010.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with official at the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, 22 November 2010.

<sup>101</sup> Email correspondence with EU official in New Delhi, 3 May 2010.

### 6.3.2 *Conceptions of Material Interest: Broadening Access to Energy and Seeking “Energy Independence”*

A second possible explanation for the Indian response to EU engagement concerns conceptions of material interest. According to this explanation, we might expect greater interest on the part of the Indian Government in engaging with the EU on climate change in circumstances where this helps India to address broader policy concerns. India’s concerns with access to energy are particularly relevant in this regard. India depends on imported oil for up to 70 percent of its demand, a figure which is projected to increase to 90 percent by 2025. Moreover, coal is the dominant resource for power generation at 55.3 percent. Hydro accounts for 24.7 percent, while other renewables account for just 7.7 percent.<sup>102</sup> If energy consumption follows current patterns, India is projected to run out of coal, its primary energy source, by 2045.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, although coal is set to remain the dominant energy source in India for the medium term at least, it seems clear that developing alternative energy sources is in India’s interest.<sup>104</sup> In fact, India has for a long time pursued the development of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures, albeit for non-climate related reasons. Historically, the three drivers of Indian renewable energy policy have been (i) the augmentation of grid power, (ii) the substitution of fossil fuels, and (iii) the expansion of energy access,<sup>105</sup> while the pursuit of conservation and efficiency has been driven by a similar concern with energy access and an ultimate—if unrealistic—desire for “energy independence”.

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<sup>102</sup> Bhupendra Kumar Singh, 2010, “India’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 34, no. 6, p. 800.

<sup>103</sup> Tanvi Madan, 2006, *The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: India* (Washington: Brookings Institution), p. 14.

<sup>104</sup> According to the Planning Commission’s *Integrated Energy Policy* published in 2006, “Coal shall remain India’s most important energy source till 2031–32 and possibly beyond”. Planning Commission, 2006, *Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee*, New Delhi: Planning Commission, p. xiii.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Ajit Gupta, former advisor to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy speaking in a personal capacity, New Delhi, 8 December 2010.

India is unusual in having had for many years a government ministry responsible exclusively for non-fossil energy sources. Originating from the oil shocks of the 1970s and a resulting drive for energy self-sufficiency, a department for non-conventional energy sources was created within the Ministry of Energy in 1982.<sup>106</sup> A decade later, in 1992, as part of a broader administrative reorganization, a Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources was created, which became the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy in 2006. The work of this Ministry was enhanced by the enactment of the Electricity Act in 2003, which mandated each State Electricity Regulation Commission to establish minimum renewable power purchases, allowed the Central Electricity Regulation Commission to set preferential tariffs for energy generated by renewable technologies, and made renewables a priority in rural electrification. Partly as a result, India currently has the fifth highest level of installed wind generating capacity in the world.<sup>107</sup> Another state institution tasked with promoting the development of renewables is the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency, established in 1987 and tasked with providing financial support to projects and schemes generating energy through new and renewable sources and conserving energy through energy efficiency.<sup>108</sup> Energy efficiency and conservation is another area which has been an Indian Government priority for some time. Under the Energy Conservation Act of 2001, a Bureau of Energy Efficiency was established in March 2002, tasked with promoting energy efficiency in areas of market failure.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> The priority areas for the new Department at this point in time were (i) a national programme for cookstoves; (ii) lighting for rural population; and (iii) a national programme for biogas. Interview with MNRE official, New Delhi, 26 November 2010; Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2011, "About Us", Ministry of New and Renewable Energy website, <http://www.mnre.gov.in/history.htm>, (accessed on 7 July 2011).

<sup>107</sup> Shebonti Ray Dadwal, 2010, "India's Renewable Energy Challenge", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 34, no. 1, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup> IREDA, 2011, "About IREDA", Website of the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency, [http://www.ireda.gov.in/homepage1.asp?parent\\_category=1&category=6](http://www.ireda.gov.in/homepage1.asp?parent_category=1&category=6), (accessed on 9 July 2011).

<sup>109</sup> The Bureau of Energy Efficiency focuses on three particular forms of market failure: (i) electrical consumer appliances, where consumers were not provided with information on the energy efficiency of appliances; (ii) energy efficiency of buildings, particularly commercial buildings, which are characterized by split incentives whereby investment in efficiency measures is paid for by landlords, while the efficiency savings typically accrue to tenants; and (iii) the risk averse nature of industry to adopting new energy

Because of Indian interest in developing alternative sources of energy and generally increasing energy supply, and because the EU has acted as a pioneer to some extent in this area, we might expect the Indian Government to be receptive to EU engagement, particularly in areas where the EU has progressed further in the development of low-carbon technologies and policies. Furthermore, there was a good deal of respect and admiration among Indian officials and civil society observers for the domestic action the EU has taken and the role the EU has played historically in the international negotiations, at least compared with other Annex I countries. These positive assessments were frequently qualified by reference to the fact that while the EU had set ambitious future targets, action “on the ground” in terms of policy implementation had been less impressive, and differences across EU member states were also noted.<sup>110</sup> Nonetheless, several senior and retired Indian officials spoke in positive terms about the EU’s record on climate and energy policy. For example, Dr. Kirit Parikh, a member of India’s Planning Commission,<sup>111</sup> stated:

I have great admiration for the European Union. They are the only one among the developed country group who are very serious and offering a significant amount of help in a variety of ways to other countries and are willing to make very large commitments.<sup>112</sup>

A senior Indian Government official described the EU as a “flag bearer”,<sup>113</sup> while a retired senior diplomat praised the EU for coming up with a specific target (20 percent reduction by 2020) and being “more forthcoming in terms of the mobilization of resources required

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efficiency measures. Interview with Dr. Ajay Mathur, Director General, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, New Delhi, 16 November 2010.

<sup>110</sup> Interviews with Dr. Prodipto Ghosh, TERI, New Delhi, 25 November 2010, and with a member of the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, New Delhi, 8 November 2010.

<sup>111</sup> The Planning Commission is the body responsible formulating India’s Five Year Plans. Dr. Parikh is also chair of the “Expert Group on a Low Carbon Strategy for Inclusive Growth”. See Section 6.3 above.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with Dr. Kirit Parikh, Integrated Research and Action for Development, New Delhi, 9 December 2010.

<sup>113</sup> Interview with senior Indian government official, New Delhi, 24 November 2010.

for climate change”.<sup>114</sup> Surya Sethi, advisor on energy policy to the Planning Commission who is known to be a strong adherent to India’s “traditional” negotiating position, said:

The EU has done more for climate than anybody else knowingly. Europe is the only region that I know that has taken some conscious decisions driven primarily by climate concerns. They may have done this driven by many other concerns, but one of the concerns definitely was climate. So in that sense I regard them as some sort of purists.<sup>115</sup>

With such positive assessments, the extent of resistance on the part of the Indian Government to EU engagement seems surprising. However, while a range of Indian interviewees expressed positive assessments of the EU’s performance in this area, many were very keen to stress the significant differences between India and the EU with respect to their stage of economic development. Indeed, the view that the EU’s approach to combating climate change was not directly applicable to the substantially different circumstances facing India was common among Indian officials and civil society representatives. Of particular relevance is the fact that while the development of renewables and the pursuit of greater energy efficiency and conservation are clearly areas of focus for the Indian Government, the driving motivation has had very little to do with concerns about climate change. This discussion draws attention to the very different ways in which India and the EU have framed the issue of climate change.

### ***6.3.3 Normative Frames: A Clash of Worldviews***

Climate change is still viewed by the Indian Government very much through a North-South lens. India’s approach to climate change—and to global environmental change and its governance more generally—can be traced back to Indira Gandhi’s speech to the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. In that speech, she

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<sup>114</sup> Interview with retired senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 18 November 2010.

<sup>115</sup> Interview with Surya Sethi, advisor for energy policy to the Planning Commission, 16 November 2010.

defended the right of developing countries to pursue economic development, describing poverty as “the greatest polluter”. She also challenged the emerging discourse in industrialized countries that the root of environmental degradation was excessive industrialization, overpopulation, and economic growth.<sup>116</sup> The primacy attached to development and poverty eradication has not changed significantly, nor has the importance the Indian Government attaches to equity at the international level.

Chapter 4 analyzed the normative underpinnings of India’s approach to climate change policy in detail, and noted that the Indian Government has placed a very strong emphasis on the principle of equity in its approach to climate change policy. This position is underpinned by India’s comparatively low current level of per-capita emissions, and its low cumulative level of historical emissions. Moreover, there is the temporal dimension. If we are interested in the flow of current emissions, then India is arguably a “major emitter” in aggregate—though not in per capita—terms, but if we consider the stock of accumulated emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution, India cannot reasonably be labelled a “major emitter”, even in aggregate terms. Based on India’s low emissions profile, the Indian Government maintained for many years that it bore no obligation to reduce or limit its greenhouse gas emissions.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that in India’s *National Environmental Policy 2006*, climate change received relatively little attention—less than two pages in a 52-page policy document. Moreover, while this document acknowledged the potential negative impacts arising from climate change, it clearly stated: “Any constraints on the emissions of greenhouse gas by India, whether direct, by way of emissions targets, or indirect, will reduce growth rates”.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> All cited in Sengupta, “Defending ‘Differentiation’: India’s Foreign Policy on Climate Change from Rio to Copenhagen”, p. 2.

<sup>117</sup> Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2006, *National Environment Policy 2006*, New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests, p. 42.

In short, the long-standing framing of responsibility for climate change by the Indian Government has held that industrialized countries bear historical responsibility for climate change and therefore have a responsibility to reduce their emissions, while developing countries should be granted an equitable share of “carbon space” in order to pursue their development objectives. While the announcement of a carbon intensity target by the Indian Government in December 2009 indicates a move away from a very strict adherence to this position, this development took place at the very end of the period of this study.

This framing of the distribution of responsibility for climate change has increasingly come into conflict with the predominant European framing of responsibility for climate change. While the EU was historically more sympathetic to the argument that developing countries—even larger ones such as India—should not be required to take action to limit the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions, it has increasingly conceptualized India as a “major emitter” by virtue of India’s significant aggregate level of emissions and the projected future growth in emissions. In concrete terms, the EU from 2004 onwards pushed for “economically more advanced developing countries” to take action domestically to limit emissions growth, to agree to a “peaking year” for global emissions, and to agree to greenhouse gas emission targets relative to “business as usual” projections as part of a post-2012 international climate change agreement.

Second and related, the Indian Government has insisted on the primacy of development, and that tackling climate change cannot come at the expense of its right to develop. India is a low-income country, even by comparison to China, and certainly when compared with any industrialized country. In 2007, India’s per capita GDP (purchasing power parity adjusted) was USD 2,800, compared with USD 5,400 for China.<sup>118</sup> The World Bank has estimated that between 0.3 and 0.6 percent of the Indian population would be considered

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<sup>118</sup> Fujiwara, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda*, p. 1.

“middle class” by US standards in 2005.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, the Indian population is still predominantly rural, with only 27.2 percent of living in urban areas in 2005. However, India is rapidly urbanizing, and by 2030 it is projected that 45.8 percent of the population will live in urban areas.<sup>120</sup>

This central emphasis on the primacy of development has been expressed frequently in Indian Government statements of policy. For example, India’s *Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* set out the core principles of India’s national approach:

The principal objective of the national development strategy is to reduce the incidence of poverty to 10 per cent by 2012 and provide gainful employment ... Achieving these development priorities will require a substantial increase in energy consumption ... and consequent rise in GHG emissions.<sup>121</sup>

Similarly, the 2006 *Integrated Energy Policy* produced by the Planning Commission stated:

India needs to sustain an 8% to 10% economic growth rate, over the next 25 years, if it is to eradicate poverty and meet its human development goals ... India needs, at the very least, to increase its primary energy supply by 3 to 4 times and, its electricity generation capacity/supply by 5 to 6 times of their 2003–04 levels.<sup>122</sup>

These quotes illustrate the close connection between the development imperative and the issue of access to energy. This connection stems from the fact that, in India, more than 75 percent of rural and 22 percent of urban households have no access to modern forms of energy and rely on biomass.<sup>123</sup> In numerical terms, more than 400 million people do not have access to electricity, and more than 700 million depend on non-commercial biomass

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<sup>119</sup> Cited in Dubash, *Toward a Progressive Indian and Global Climate Politics*, p. 4.

<sup>120</sup> Madan, *The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: India*.

<sup>121</sup> Government of India, 2004, *India’s Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests, p. xiv.

<sup>122</sup> Planning Commission, *Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee*, p. xiii.

<sup>123</sup> Dadwal, “India’s Renewable Energy Challenge”, p. 1.

for cooking.<sup>124</sup> For this reason, primary energy demand in India is rising fast: it rose by 68 percent over the period 1990 to 2005, and is likely to continue to grow rapidly, given these currently low levels of access to energy. Thus, solving development challenges in India over the coming decades will lead to an unavoidable rise in energy consumption and, therefore, greenhouse gas emissions. As an Indian NGO representative argued:

Not fulfilling those objectives is not a choice, and I don't think anybody in the world could say that you shouldn't overcome these deficits.<sup>125</sup>

This emphasis on the primacy of development and access to energy has led to significantly different world-views regarding the linkages between climate change and broader policy goals. It was explained by Ajay Mathur, Director General of the Bureau of Energy Efficiency in these terms:

The emphasis [of Indian Government policy] ... is energy access, increasing the amount of energy, increasing the amount of energy efficiency. The main difference we have with the EU is that the primary goal of the EU is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The tools that the EU uses and the tools for our very separate goals are similar—renewables, energy efficiency, etc. But this should not blind us to the fact that the goals are different. We see climate change as a co-benefit. The EU sees enhanced access, etc., as a co-benefit, and that's a very sharp difference in world-views.<sup>126</sup>

Similarly, Ajit Gupta, a former advisor to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, made the following point with regard to the implications of climate change concerns for the development of renewables policies by the Indian Government:

June 2008 marked a slight increase of climate into our initiatives on renewables. But since development for India is the main thing on the agenda—poverty reduction and development—and energy is a vital requirement for

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<sup>124</sup> Fujiwara, *The Political Economy of India's Climate Agenda*, p. 4.

<sup>125</sup> Interview with Indian NGO representative, Delhi, 8 November 2010.

<sup>126</sup> Interview with Ajay Mathur, Director General, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Delhi, 16 November 2010.

development, we still feel that renewables can play a major role in the development process by providing additional energy.<sup>127</sup>

In other words, the emphasis in terms of policies at the domestic level is still the eradication of poverty and the expansion of energy access, with climate change “co-benefits”. This difference in framing was not well-recognized on the EU side in the early years of EU-engagement on climate change. The EU sought to somewhat unreflexively export its preferred approach to climate change to India. But Navroz Dubash, an expert on Indian climate change policy, argued that:

The world doesn't look like the EU ... The EU hasn't found a way of talking about this subject yet in a way that really resonates.<sup>128</sup>

Another Indian academic argued similarly that the framing of climate change in Europe did not resonate with an Indian audience:

It's as if you're talking in a foreign language. The message has to be translated into a language that can be understood.<sup>129</sup>

This is consistent with a more general perception in India that, sometimes at least, Europe is still inclined to preach to India, and to tell India what to do. There was also significant suspicion among some officials and observers in India regarding the motives of the EU's relationship with India on climate change, and its role in the multilateral climate negotiations more generally. Dr. Prodipto Ghosh, former Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forests and for many years a senior member of India's climate negotiating team, expressed this view:

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<sup>127</sup> Interview with Ajit Gupta, former advisor to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy speaking in a personal capacity, New Delhi, 8 December 2010.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Navroz Dubash, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 10 November 2010.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Indian academic, New Delhi, 8 December 2010.

COP-8 [New Delhi, 2002] represented a watershed in India-EU relations in my assessment on the question of climate change, because from then on the Indian Government began to assume that the EU was driven by objectives going well beyond climate change ... Their intention was to use climate change essentially to leverage major economic advantage which was not possible through the WTO [World Trade Organization] and possibly even ... of actually limiting future strategic potential.<sup>130</sup>

Dr. Ghosh is one of the people most closely associated with the “traditional” Indian negotiating position and occupies one end of the spectrum of opinion in India concerning the international negotiations on climate change. This view was not expressed—at least not in nearly as stark terms—by most other interviewees. However, since he was both Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forests and one of India’s lead climate change negotiators over a long period, his views were extremely influential and are therefore worth highlighting.

Interviews with staff at the EU Delegation in New Delhi indicated that they were aware that the Commission’s climate change framing did not resonate with Indian policy-makers.

A member of the Delegation stated:

There is a need to stop India from thinking that we are trying to stop their economic growth. If we want to be useful and to support India, we can’t impose our agenda.<sup>131</sup>

Moreover, there was a keen awareness in the EU Delegation in New Delhi of the need to frame any cooperation on climate change issues in terms of energy security or access to energy in order to get buy-in from the Indian Government. Staff at the Delegation indicated that it had been very difficult to get Commission headquarters in Brussels to

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<sup>130</sup> Interview with Dr. Prodipto Ghosh, former Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, 25 November 2010.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with an EU official in New Delhi, 2 December 2010.

agree to work on “energy” rather than “climate change”, but by the end of the period of this study this message was accepted in Brussels.<sup>132</sup>

In short, EU attempts to engage India on climate change were met by resistance on the part of the Indian Government, largely due to the fact that the Indian Government framed the climate issue as one which India has no significant responsibility to address. It was not a significant priority issue for the Indian Government, which has been far more concerned with economic development and poverty eradication. This significant “normative gap” between India and the EU has grown over time as European policy-makers have increasingly moved to conceptualize India as a “major emitter” of greenhouse gases.

Moreover, this normative gap overwhelmed any material interest basis the Indian Government may have had to respond positively to EU engagement. The Indian Government has sought to promote the development of alternative energy sources and energy efficiency policies and technologies, and may indeed have benefitted from cooperation with the EU in these areas. However, the strong North-South prism through which the Indian Government viewed EU engagement hindered possible cooperation in these fields. Finally, the domestic political structure of India served to further inhibit the possibility of the EU exerting influence through external engagement. The diffused nature of the Indian political system, combined with a strong—though somewhat changing—domestic consensus on climate change policy, served to limit the potential impact of EU engagement. This was overlaid by the problematic nature of the broader EU-India relationship, which hindered the development of effective engagement.

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<sup>132</sup> Interview with an EU official in New Delhi, 2 December 2010.

## 6.4 Conclusion

The EU failed in its attempt to exercise leadership through its engagement with India on climate change. Rather than following the lead of the EU, India has—for the most part—strongly resisted EU engagement. The India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change, agreed at the 2005 EU-India Summit and reinvigorated at the 2008 Summit, did not facilitate sustained engagement. This chapter sought to make sense of this pattern of limited engagement and sustained resistance using the analytical framework in Chapter 2, and made three arguments.

First, the EU sought to develop engagement with the Indian Government on climate change, particularly in the period from 2005, partly owing to growing European and global concern regarding the rising contribution of India to greenhouse gas emissions. However, this was mediated and constrained significantly by the troubled development of the broader EU-India relationship. Neither side is the other's main external priority or point of reference in world politics, and there has been a wide disconnect across a broad range of policy issues. Furthermore, the Indian Government showed little interest in developing its relationship with the EU as a whole, preferring to deal with individual member states.

Second, the EU sought to develop engagement through a combination of institutionalized dialogue and capacity-building through project-based cooperation. However, the extent of both mechanisms has been extremely limited, partly as a result of resistance on the Indian side but partly also as a result of a lack of capacity on the EU side. In this respect, the European Commission in particular failed to develop sufficient institutional capacity to manage the bilateral relationship. This, in turn, hindered the consistency of EU engagement. Individual member states, the UK and Germany in particular, developed more substantive cooperation with the Indian Government, but the relationship between the

European Commission Delegation in particular and the Indian Government has been strained and unproductive. Furthermore, there has been a lack of coherence between EU-India relations on climate change and on other policy areas.

Third, while there was limited evidence of normative emulation on the part of the Indian Government, there was no significant evidence of lesson-drawing, and the predominant Indian response was one of strong resistance. This was true both with respect to bilateral engagement and the international climate change negotiations. This response was, in turn, explained using the concepts of domestic political structure, material interest, and normative frame resonance. The open, liberal political structure of the Indian Government made it difficult for external actors to influence domestic Indian politics, particularly given the relatively strong domestic consensus in India on the need to prioritize economic development above all other goals. With respect to material interest, the Indian Government for a long time took an active interest in the development of alternative energy sources and energy conservation. However, the issue of climate change was framed very strongly in North-South terms, generating significant resistance on the part of the Indian Government to cooperating with the EU on any issues framed as “climate change”. For this reason, the Indian Government strongly resisted EU engagement on the basis of strong normative frame dissonance.

Thus, the title of “leader without follower” is appropriate in this case. The predominant response of the Indian Government has been resistance and, moreover, the lack of effective EU leadership has been exacerbated by lack of capacity on the EU side, and by the problematic nature of the broader EU-India relationship.

# Conclusion

Having spent of the previous 19 years proclaiming leadership on climate change, the EU's marginalization at the Copenhagen climate change summit came as a surprise to European leaders and officials. On this most public of world stages—COP-15 was attended by well over 100 heads of government and over 3,000 journalists—the EU was not central to the final outcome, and that outcome did not reflect core aspects of the EU's preferences for a global climate change agreement. This seems to contradict the EU's self-portrayal as a “leader” in this area. Building on that contradiction, this dissertation has sought to provide a holistic assessment of the EU's claims to international leadership on climate change by analyzing EU engagement with China and India in this area.

The EU has had limited success in exercising leadership through its engagement with China and India on climate change. The development of EU engagement in each case has been met with varying degrees of resistance. While the establishment of the EU-China and EU-India relationships on climate change had their origins in a desire on the part of the EU to develop cooperation in this area, the EU did not develop sufficient capabilities for sustained engagement. In these circumstances, the manner in which the two sets of

relationships developed was, to a significant extent, a function of the Chinese and Indian responses. These responses were characterized by significant resistance, leading to a picture of the EU as a highly restricted leader.

These conclusions are generated by extensive fieldwork research conducted in China, India, and Europe, which provides original empirical insights into the nature and extent of EU leadership on climate change. In this final chapter, the empirical analysis is summarized and the conclusions are linked to broader themes of EU external relations and global environmental governance in order to identify future research and policy pathways.

## **7.1 Developing a Relational Understanding of EU Leadership**

This dissertation has developed a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the nature and extent of EU international leadership in the area of climate change. It did this by analyzing the development of EU engagement on climate change with China and India, taking these relationships to be instances where EU leadership could be examined and tested. Chapter 2 developed an analytical framework which drove the empirical analysis. This framework consisted of three principal elements which focused respectively on the drivers of external engagement, the form of engagement, and the response to engagement. The framework emphasized the relational dimension of leadership—that is, the relationship between leader and follower. In doing so, the framework emphasized not only the characteristics of the aspirant leader, but also the response of purported followers. This adds significantly to existing theoretical and empirical accounts of EU leadership, which to a very significant extent have focused only on the “leader” side of the relationship, ignoring the question of whether and to what extent EU leadership has generated followership.

### ***7.1.1 Drivers of External Engagement***

The first element of the analytical framework concerned the drivers of external engagement on climate change. In this regard, three principal drivers were identified: normative commitment to combating climate change which generates a dynamic towards engagement of other states with large greenhouse gas emission profiles; a material interest in persuading other states to adopt climate change policies; and a polity-building dynamic in which the development of climate change policy is used as a means of furthering the European integration project. The respective importance of these three drivers has varied over time in explaining the development of EU climate change policy, and the EU's claims to climate leadership.

Rising normative concern among European publics concerning a range of environmental issues in the late 1980s was an important initial driver for the emergence of climate change on the agenda of European politics. However, public knowledge of climate change specifically during this period was relatively low. The role of a global epistemic community of scientists—some but certainly not all of whom were Europeans—was also important in pushing climate change onto the international agenda. To some extent, the EU—and indeed governments in general—were pushed by scientists and non-governmental organizations to begin to take seriously the climate issue. Within a short period of time, however, European policy-makers began to frame the issue as one on which the EU could develop its international role.

This framing of climate change was first expressed explicitly by the Dublin European Council in June 1990, and from that time onwards the issue was conceived as an issue which could be used to further the European integration process. Supported by enabling decisions of the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and especially the European Commission have sought to use climate change to develop their own role within

the EU's internal institutional balance, though this has been resisted frequently by the Council. There was no significant evidence of material interest concerns driving EU climate change policy during this earlier period, and while normative concern entering the 1990s concerning environmental issues generally was high, climate change did not feature as a significant issue at this time. Before 2000, therefore, the primary dynamic driving EU climate change policy was one of polity-building.

The US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001 had a catalytic impact on the development of EU climate change policy. In particular, it strengthened the EU normative commitment to combating climate change, serving to transform the issue into a core element of European identity. By doing so, it created a “pro-climate” coalition of actors within the EU who were now able to drive forward the process of developing Community-level climate policies. Moreover, as public understanding of the climate issue deepened over the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, climate change came increasingly to the fore as an issue of public concern in Europe.

Furthermore, material interest became increasingly intertwined in the EU narrative on climate change. Driven particularly by successive German Governments starting with the Red-Green coalition in 1998, and by the Blair Government in the United Kingdom, action to combat climate change was framed increasingly in terms of economic opportunities that would be generated as a result. This reframing of the issue began in the early years of the 2000s and was strengthened thereafter. Separately, the Commission successfully linked action on climate change to the issue of European “energy security”, which gained particular prominence as a result of the cut-off of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 which had knock-on effects for several EU member states.

The polity-building dynamic also continued during the 2000s and was strengthened by the rejection of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch electorates in 2005. This resulted in a search for issues on which the EU could demonstrate its value to an increasingly sceptical public, and climate change was selected as one such issue. In short, a combination of growing normative concern and material interest drove the progressive deepening of EU climate change policy from 2000 onwards, but there was also still a significant polity-building dynamic during this latter period.

The progressive “mainstreaming” of climate change within European politics was an important precondition for the development of EU engagement of China and India, but this did not automatically translate into the development of external engagement on climate change. Rather, it was mediated and constrained by the development of the broader EU relationship with China and India. From the mid 1990s onwards, the EU paid increasing attention to the “emergence” of Asian powers in economic but also political terms through the development of an Asia strategy (1994) and subsequent strategies on relations with China (1995) and India (1996). Seeking to develop the EU’s global political role, the EU framed the growing economic and political power of China and India increasingly in terms of the responsibilities that accompany their increasing power, which came increasingly to include a responsibility to limit environmental degradation.

To some extent mirroring the development of EU climate change policy, EU relations with China and India were boosted by the European response to the increasing unilateralism of the Bush Administration in the United States from 2001 onwards. The elaboration of the European Security Strategy in 2003 was a direct response to the US National Security Strategy of 2002, and proposed the development of so-called “strategic partnerships” with other key states, among which were China and India. It was in the institutional context of

these strategic partnerships that the EU sought to develop its engagement of China and India on climate change.

However, this dynamic played out differently in the two cases. From the mid 1990s onwards, the EU focused significantly greater attention on developing its relations with China than India. China, in turn, became more interested in developing its relationship with the EU in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There was, indeed, a period of considerable optimism on both sides around 2003–2004 regarding the potential of the EU-China relationship. However, the development of engagement on climate change was not an automatic consequence of the development of the broader relationship, but rather came to be viewed as an issue on which engagement could be deepened once more highly prioritized issues such as the granting of Market Economy Status to China and the EU Arms Embargo proved problematic.

The case of EU-India relations was significantly different. While EU strategy papers on relations with India increasingly stressed the need to develop a deeper political relationship with India, the EU has, from the mid-1990s to the present, devoted relatively little attention to fostering the EU-India relationship. External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten attempted to develop the India relationship in the early 2000s, but broadly the relationship has remained something of an afterthought in the EU's relations with Asia. India itself has treated its relationship with the EU with considerable scepticism, in marked contrast to the Chinese approach. Thus, the EU-India relationship has been characterized by something of a mutual neglect. In this context, the decision to establish a “strategic partnership” at the 2004 EU-India Summit was more an aspirational declaration than a reflection of either a strategic relationship or a partnership. In this respect, India stands out among the list of so-called strategic partners set out in the ESS as the most aspirational.

Therefore, the attempt by the EU to develop its engagement of India on climate change from 2005 onwards was built on problematic institutional foundations.

The particular combination of drivers underpinning EU climate change policy generated a dynamic towards increasing EU external engagement but, to some extent at least, even in the latter period of the study there remained a tendency to merely proclaim European leadership rather than develop substantive engagement. Moreover, the significantly different dynamics of the broader EU-China and EU-India relationships generated differing forms of engagement across the two cases.

### ***7.1.2 Form of Engagement***

The second element of the analytical framework concerned the form of external engagement. The form of engagement can be characterized according to the mechanisms of engagement employed by the EU and by the nature and extent of EU capabilities. Two principal mechanisms of engagement were identified: socialization through institutionalized and ad hoc dialogue, according to which the “targets” of engagement are encouraged to change their actions to conform with particular expectations concerning appropriate behaviour; and incentive-based engagement, according to which attempts are made to alter the perceptions of costs and benefits of climate change policies of other actors.

First, the EU sought to pursue institutionalized and ad hoc dialogue with both the Chinese and Indian Governments on climate change and in related spheres such as energy policy. Building on the normative concern within Europe concerning climate change, the EU attempted a process of socialization in which European policy-makers sought to convince the Chinese and Indian Governments both (i) that climate change represents an issue which they should take seriously, and (ii) that they should follow the European experience with respect to policy development. This was arguably the predominant mechanism

employed by the EU, though the extent to which dialogue actually was institutionalized varied across the two cases and across time. In the Chinese case, this occurred primarily within the framework of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, under which a regularized “Bilateral Consultation Mechanism” was established which met twice per year at senior official level. This was complemented by more ad hoc processes of dialogue at political level, which intensified in the period leading up to COP-15 in December 2009. In the Indian case, the EU also attempted to develop institutionalized dialogue in the framework of the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change. However, institutionalization in this case was less substantial, and there was also less ad hoc dialogue.

Second, the EU sought to develop engagement with China and India through incentive-based mechanisms, albeit to a rather limited extent, and again with variation between the two cases. Principally, this took the form of capacity-building through policy-making and technological assistance projects, part-funded by the EU. This was a more prominent feature in the EU-China case, but the amounts of funding were generally limited. This mechanism was more limited again in the EU-India case, due to the fact that the overall EU-India relationship was significantly less substantive than in the EU-China case. EU officials involved in the coordination of these projects generally highlighted the fact that cooperation projects within these frameworks were developed in collaboration with the Chinese and Indian Governments, rather than being simply imposed by the EU. Furthermore, the case studies revealed no significant evidence of the use of negative conditionality by the EU.

There was some evidence to link this capacity-building to the material interest driver of EU climate change policy identified above. In particular, there was evidence to support the contention that EU engagement of China and India was motivated by a desire to develop

new market opportunities for European clean-technology firms. Increasingly towards the end of the period, cooperation took forms which suggest a trade promotion motivation, such as the establishment of a “Europe-China Clean Energy Centre” in Beijing and a “European Business Technology Centre” in New Delhi. However, many activities focused more centrally on policy dialogue and capacity building, where an explicit link to trade promotion was less clear. There is less evidence again to support the argument that engagement of China and India was driven specifically by the competitiveness concerns of high-polluting European companies. While these industry voices have strengthened as EU climate change policy has broadened and deepened, the content of EU engagement of China and India did not take a form which would seek to apply “equivalent” regulations on Chinese and Indian companies competing with European companies.

However, the extent of both mechanisms of engagement has been limited—particularly in the EU-India case but also in the EU-China case. While this was partly a function of the response of the Chinese and Indian Governments, it was also significantly a result of a lack of capabilities on the EU side. Particularly relevant in this regard are the capacity of EU institutions, and the consistency and coherence of EU engagement. The European Commission—which in practice assumed primary responsibility for managing EU-level engagement with third countries on climate change—has lacked sufficient institutional capacity to manage these relationships effectively.

There was also a significant lack of consistency in EU engagement with China and India, in the sense of the connection (or lack thereof) between the activities of the Commission and those of active member states. This is somewhat related to the question of institutional capacity, since in practice the Commission Delegations in Beijing and New Delhi were responsible for managing EU-level engagement in the context of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change and the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and

Climate Change. Although prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Presidency formally led for the EU side in these mechanisms, the Commission's involvement provided continuity and capacity when the Presidency was held by member states without significant capacity in this area.

However, since the Commission was itself significantly lacking in capacity, this contributed to a lack of consistency of EU engagement. Indeed, this was to some extent a consequence of the pioneering role of the UK in launching the EU-China Partnership and the India-EU Mechanism in 2005, once the Presidency was assumed by other member states with less interest and capacity in this area. However, the problem was not so much that member states continued to pursue their own separate dialogues and cooperation programmes with China and India on climate change, which was bound to be the case. Rather, it is hard to even assess to what extent these were consistent with EU-level efforts since there was no overall list of the totality of EU activities in this area. Furthermore, member state diplomats and officials seemed to have little knowledge of the EU-level engagement in each case.

EU engagement was also characterized to some extent by a lack of coherence between engagement on climate change and other areas. This can be divided into two elements. The first concerns the degree to which engagement on climate change was integrated with other related policy areas. In the EU-China case, the proliferation of dialogue mechanisms was a general feature of the development of this relationship since the inauguration of a strategic partnership in 2003. This led to a situation in which there was little overall coherence to the relationship but rather a patchwork of separate mechanisms. In the energy/environment field, this problem was exacerbated by a lack of institutional capacity within the Commission Delegation in Beijing. In the EU-India case, incoherence of this type was less of a problem, but only because engagement in related fields was also very limited. Under

such circumstances, an absence of incoherence can hardly be viewed as a positive achievement.

The second aspect of coherence concerns whether and to what extent climate change was integrated into the broader framework of these bilateral relationships. In both cases, the relationships were dominated by the trade dimension, and climate change—and indeed other sectoral policy areas—have remained of secondary importance compared with trade. This was particularly so in the EU-India case, which has remained focused predominantly on trade despite the long-standing desire on the EU side to develop a more substantive political and strategic dimension to the relationship. However, the EU is hardly unique in elevating trade and economic matters above environmental concerns, and expecting coherence in the sense of “mainstreaming” climate change into all aspects of EU external relations perhaps sets the bar too high.

Thus, there was a clear mismatch between the degree to which the EU declared itself a leader with respect to climate change, and the resources it devoted to exercising leadership through its engagement with China and India. The limited development of EU capabilities for external engagement on climate change supports the argument that, to some extent, the European emphasis remained on proclaiming rather than exercising climate leadership. According to this interpretation, a significant impulse for declaring EU leadership on climate change related to the polity-building process of deepening European integration. This lack of capabilities limited the effectiveness of EU engagement, which in turn had an impact on the response to engagement.

### ***7.1.3 Response to Engagement***

The third element of the analytical framework concerned the response to EU engagement. Both China and India have, particularly in the period since 2007, developed national

climate change policies and institutions. The empirical analysis sought to assess whether and to what extent they could be considered a response to EU engagement. In order to do so, the framework identified three possible mechanisms of response: normative emulation, lesson-drawing, and resistance.

In the Chinese case, there was some evidence of normative emulation in the period around 2007–08. The Chinese Government introduced the National Climate Change Programme (NCCP) in June 2007. A number of sources indicated that this was, in part, a response to external pressure for China to develop national climate change policies, and that high-level interactions with European leaders was important in this process. Moreover, the NCCP involved substantial “repackaging” of existing policies that had been formulated and implemented for reasons unconnected to a concern over climate change. As such, institutional adaptation did not represent a fundamental re-definition of interest and identity on the part of the Chinese Government, but rather to some extent a case of normative emulation. However, following this initial change, the Chinese Government has developed increasingly substantive climate change policies.

There was also evidence of limited lesson-drawing on the part of the Chinese Government in specific areas of policy-making and technological development, where the Chinese Government believed it to be in its interest to cooperate with the EU. This took place partly in the framework of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, and developed progressively particularly in the period from 2007 onwards. However, the Chinese response in this framework was also characterized by elements of resistance. Moreover, there was significant resistance from the Chinese Government with respect to the international climate change negotiations. The Chinese Government resisted efforts by the EU to persuade China to agree to a post-2012 international climate change agreement that would include commitments for all “major emitters”.

In the Indian case, there was also limited evidence of normative emulation. While the establishment of a Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change in 2007 and the elaboration of a National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in June 2008 represent a significant departure in Indian climate change policy, the NAPCC primarily presented existing policies or specified how the Indian Government would achieve targets which it had already announced. In this respect, it was similar to the behaviour of the Chinese Government in response to pressure from the EU and other countries. There was evidence of limited EU influence in this initial process of raising the profile of climate change, especially through the UK and German G8 Summits of 2005 and 2007.

However, there was no significant evidence of lesson-drawing on the part of the Indian Government. With respect to the more formalized mechanisms of EU engagement, the India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change was a straightforward case of resistance. The Indian Government was considerably less open to EU engagement on climate change than the Chinese Government. This was overlaid with a much broader, quite pervasive Euro-scepticism on the part of the Indian Government in the sense that it generally failed to see any added value in having a strong relationship with the EU collectively, and preferred instead to deal bilaterally with EU member states. Thus, while the two sides agreed in 2005 to the establishment of an "India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change" as part of the elaboration of a broader "Joint Action Plan" under the newly-created strategic partnership, there was little agreement on the substance of the relationship and, not surprisingly, there was very little by way of follow up. A renewed attempt was made at the 2008 Summit to establish a more substantive partnership on climate change as part of a broader revision and re-focusing of the Joint Action Plan of 2005. That summit agreed on the text of a "Joint Work Programme on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change". However, this text largely re-stated the

priorities and goals of the 2005 Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change and, in any case, did not lead to a substantial increase in the level of engagement on the part of the Indian Government over the next year in the lead-up to COP-15. Thus, the predominant Indian response was one of resistance.

Thus, there were aspects of commonality between the Chinese and Indian responses to EU engagement, but also significant differences. Both resisted international commitments as part of a post-2012 international agreement, but with respect to lesson-drawing through bilateral cooperation, the Chinese Government was more willing to engage with the EU than the Indian Government. These responses to EU engagement, it was argued, can be explained principally by reference to three factors: the domestic political structure of the target state; conceptions of material interest and whether relevant actors believe that they have something to gain from engaging with the EU; and normative frame compatibility, or the degree to which source and target frames resonate.

With respect to domestic political structure, the two cases differed in clear respects. China is a model “state above society” political system, with highly centralized decision-making controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. In such a system, access to the leadership is crucial to influencing domestic politics. In this context, European leaders gained increasing access to the Chinese leadership through the progressive deepening of the EU-China relationship from 1998 and particularly from 2003 onwards. Moreover, this was overlaid by an increasing openness to new ideas on the part of the “fourth generation” leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao who, from 2003 onwards, began to attach greater importance to the sustainability of China’s economic development path. India, on the other hand, is an open, liberal political system characterized by many veto points in which external actors need to build winning coalitions of domestic actors in order to influence domestic politics. This process was made all the more difficult by a strong

domestic political consensus within India concerning climate change policy. Furthermore, the problematic development of the broader EU-India relationship, and the enduring Euroscepticism of the Indian Government, strongly limited the opportunities for EU influence. Openness to engagement was, in turn, driven by prior conceptions of material interest, and by normative frames, and these differed across the two cases.

With respect to conceptions of material interest, three significant drivers can be identified in the Chinese case. First, the Chinese Government became increasingly concerned with the issue of energy security in the early years of the 21st century. This stemmed from energy shortages, particularly in the 2002–2004 period, which resulted from a significant increase in the energy intensity of the Chinese economy, reversing significantly a longer term decline in energy intensity. Second, the first decade of the 21st century saw rising concern—and public protests—at ever-worsening levels of local environmental pollution across a range of domains. Since coal had become an increasingly dominant source of energy in China, these two issues pushed in the same direction: towards developing alternative sources of energy, and increasing the efficiency of energy use. Third, the Chinese Government increasingly came to view areas such as renewables and energy efficiency technologies through an industrial strategy lens, seeking to develop Chinese capacity in these areas. While India also suffered from energy shortages and local environmental pollution, these issues did not assume the same significance as in the Chinese context. Notwithstanding the focus the Indian Government has placed on the development of “alternative” sources since the 1980s, it has continued to pursue largely a “growth first” approach which has viewed economic development and access to energy as the primary goals of public policy.

These somewhat differing conceptions of material interest closely relate to the differing normative frames through which China and India have approached their engagement with

the EU, particularly at the bilateral level. China and India share most of the same goals in international climate change negotiations and, formally, have tended to adopt very similar negotiating positions. Indeed, this has enabled them to cooperate in recent years in the framework of the BASIC negotiating group in the climate negotiations. In broad terms, they have sought in the climate negotiations to maintain strict differentiation between industrialized and developing countries, arguing that developing countries should not be subject to quantified emission limitation targets, and that any activities undertaken by developing countries in the context of the climate regime should be supported by technology and finance from industrialized countries. However, while the Indian Government has largely transposed these principles onto its bilateral relations with the EU, the Chinese Government has adopted a much more pragmatic approach, and has been willing to develop its cooperation with the EU where this was seen as serving Chinese interests.

The framework of the dissertation—focusing on drivers, form, and response—generates the empirical analysis which allows for a holistic assessment of EU leadership on climate change. The pattern of engagement cannot be explained by looking at either side in isolation, but rather by examining the interrelationship of the aspirant leader and the purported followers. The originality of the dissertation lies in the fact that it considers, for the first time, both sides of this relationship. The next section draws on these empirical findings to identify the conditions which have enabled and constrained European leadership on climate change.

## **7.2 Assessing the EU's Contribution to Global Environmental Governance: A Leader without Followers?**

The findings of this dissertation have significant implications for our understanding of the contribution of the EU to global environmental politics. The literature on the EU

contribution to global environmental politics, and some of the literature on global environmental politics more generally, has frequently portrayed the EU as an international leader, but has failed to pay sufficient attention to the conceptual and empirical relationship between “leaders” and “followers”. It has focused primarily—if not exclusively—on the EU, neglecting the role of purported followers. While recent research on external perceptions of the EU—particularly on perceptions of the EU as an environmental actor—represent a welcome addition to our understanding, it still gets us only part of the way to understanding the EU’s contribution to global environmental politics, because it still fails to specify adequately the relationship between leaders and followers.

At the risk of stating the obvious, it is hard to assess to what extent the EU is, in fact, a leader by focusing on the EU and ignoring the perceptions or behaviour of other actors, unless leadership is understood as unilateral action which is not pursued with the intention of persuading or inducing others to follow. The contribution of this dissertation, therefore, has been to build a relational understanding of EU leadership by developing and employing a framework which analyzes the characteristics and motivations of both the aspirant leader and the purported follower. In particular, the dissertation adds to existing scholarship on EU leadership by providing a conceptualization of “followership” which identifies both mechanisms of followership and explanations for observed patterns of followership.

The empirical analysis has demonstrated that while it may be going too far to characterize the EU as a leader without followers, its leadership has been highly restricted. In the EU-China case, the EU played a role in initially raising the profile of the climate issue in the domestic political sphere, and the Chinese Government increasingly responded favourably to EU engagement at the bilateral level while rejecting EU proposals for multilateral cooperation on climate change. In the EU-India case, the EU also played a limited role in spurring the initial change of orientation of the Indian Government with respect to climate

change policy-making in 2007, but the Indian response to EU engagement was predominantly one of resistance. Building on the summation of the argument in the previous section, it is possible to identify four related conditions as particularly important in determining the extent of European leadership, particularly under conditions of roughly symmetrical power relations.

A first condition for successful EU international leadership on climate change is some minimal degree of “demand” from third countries for the norms, policies, or institutions promoted by the EU. There need not be a perfect match, or a demand for specifically European norms, policies, or institutions, but at a minimum there should be some degree of preference convergence between the two sides, and some element of functional demand. In other words, the purported “follower” must believe that the EU has something useful to offer. In the EU-China case, the coming to power of the Fourth Generation leadership, and their prior reorientation regarding issues of energy security, local environmental pollution, and industrial strategy, provided a necessary “window of opportunity” for limited European leadership. By contrast, in the EU-India case there was minimal prior preference convergence: while the Indian Government had a long-standing interest in developing alternative energy sources and energy efficiency measures, these were very much in the service of continued economic development, with any environmental effects seen as co-benefits at best, if not entirely incidental.

A second, related, condition for European leadership concerns the ability of the EU to frame and tailor its engagement in order to match the pre-existing normative frames of purported followers. While the Chinese and Indian governments recognized the contribution the EU made both to the development of the climate regime and in terms of formulating and implementing domestic policies, they did not view this as a model which was wholly applicable to their national circumstances, primarily because of the very

different stages of development which characterize the European, Chinese, and Indian economies. In this regard, Chapter 4 illustrated that there was a clear “normative gap” with respect to several aspects of climate change policy between the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the other. This was particularly strong in the Indian case.

It is debatable whether some elements of this normative gap could realistically be overcome, and in some respects the EU succeeded in framing its engagement in resonant terms. However, there were clear instances where the EU was less successful in this regard. One example was the way in which the EU went about establishing its partnerships on climate change with China and India in 2005. It was notable that, in both cases, negotiations were launched by the EU on the basis of the same initial negotiating text. This was despite the fact that China and India are characterized by very different environmental and economic circumstances and, furthermore, have framed the issue of climate change in significantly varying ways. Not surprisingly, the final agreed texts differed considerably.

This pattern continued to a considerable extent in the Indian case over the following years. It was clear from an early stage that the Indian Government was reluctant to cooperate on climate change and was more interested in pursuing measures that would ensure increased energy security. Faced with this resistance, the initial response on the EU side was to try to push more of the same rather than seeking to tailor its engagement in a way that would resonate with the domestic politics and preferences of the Indian Government. It was only after a number of years of persistent resistance that the framing of EU engagement was changed. In the final years of the study, the Commission began to reframe its engagement with the Indian Government in terms of “energy security”, which fitted better with the policy priorities of the Indian Government.

More generally, with respect to the development of the global regime the EU narrative of leadership presented the EU as a model for the rest of the world in terms of governance beyond the state. The European vision of a “top-down” multilateral climate regime based on binding targets and robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms very much reflected the EU’s own history and internal experience of multilateral cooperation and governance beyond the state. This led to what Bicchi, discussing the EU’s relations with Mediterranean countries, has termed an “our size fits all” approach.<sup>1</sup> However, the Chinese and Indian Governments conceived of international cooperation in substantially different terms, underpinned by very different conceptions of world politics in which state sovereignty plays a much more prominent role. The point is not so much that these normative gaps exist, but rather that they were not sufficiently understood and appreciated by European policy-makers. A necessary step towards leadership is understanding the positions, preferences, and underlying domestic politics of prospective followers.

This, in turn, is linked to a third condition for EU leadership, namely EU capacity and actorness. The conclusions above highlight the fact that, according to some of the standard conceptions developed in the literature, crucial components of EU actorness in the cases analyzed have been somewhat limited.<sup>2</sup> The external opportunity structure was generally favourable with a growing global consciousness regarding the climate issue and, for the eight years of the George W. Bush Administration, a complete abdication of leadership by the United States. Moreover, EU presence developed over the period of the study through increasing recognition of the EU as a global actor in its own right by the Chinese and—to a somewhat lesser extent—Indian Governments, and through the progressive development of Community-level policies.

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<sup>1</sup> Federica Bicchi, 2006, “Our size fits all: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 13, no. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Bretherton and Vogler identify three determinants of actorness: opportunity, presence, and capability. See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, 2006, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge), pp. 12-36.

However, the third dimension of actorness—EU capability—was limited. EU engagement with China and India was characterized by problems of consistency between EU-level interactions and those of the member states, and of coherence between climate change and other policy areas. The finding of constrained actorness is interesting given that other scholars have argued that the EU possesses a surprisingly high degree of actorness in the international climate change negotiations.<sup>3</sup> One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the EU has participated in the international climate negotiations over a much longer time period, whereas bilateral outreach on climate change with China and India is a more recent phenomenon. Another explanation is that there is, in the case of some member states in particular, a significant trade-promotion dimension to external engagement on climate change.

Actorness—particularly capability—matters for leadership because of the importance of understanding the positions and underlying domestic politics of third countries. It is hard to frame external engagement in domestically-resonant terms without such understanding. This requires institutional capacity and resources, particularly “on the ground” in third countries. In this respect, EU capacity is limited. Some member states are better equipped than the Commission, especially the United Kingdom, but it is not clear that information sharing is sufficiently extensive to translate this into effective EU leadership.

Finally, a fourth condition for EU leadership concerns the broader institutional framework for engagement. While perhaps not absolutely crucial, an enabling framework of bilateral relations in which dialogue and cooperation can develop constitutes a strongly facilitating condition for successful EU leadership. Such a framework needs to provide periodic opportunities for dialogue at political level, as well as regular and sustained institutionalized

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<sup>3</sup> Martijn L. P. Groenleer and Louise van Schaik, 2007, “United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, no. 5.

dialogue and cooperation at senior official level. It helps, of course, if the broader relationship is not characterized by significant frictions or clashes of worldviews. The EU-China and EU-India relationships draw out this point to some extent. While of course there were other respects in which the two cases differed, one important element of difference concerned the context of the broader bilateral relationship. While the EU-China relationship certainly has not been without its difficulties, it has been significantly less problematic than the EU-India relationship, which for a long time has been characterized by a mutual neglect.

In short, successful European leadership is conditional on: (i) some degree of domestic demand among purported followers; (ii) an ability on the part of the EU to frame its engagement in ways that resonate with domestic political actors in the purported follower states; (iii) sufficient EU capabilities to develop an understanding of the domestic politics and preferences of purported followers; and (iv) an enabling broader institutional context for bilateral relations. These are particularly important under conditions of roughly symmetrical power relations between aspirant leader and purported follower. As the analysis above has shown, the degree to which these conditions were present in the EU-China and EU-India case goes a long way to explaining the pattern of attempted leadership and response, and the EU's very restricted leadership.

### **7.3 Future Research Pathways and Policy Implications**

The conclusions of this dissertation point to a number of issues that could be pursued in future research. The emphasis in the analytical framework of this dissertation has been on assessing EU engagement and the response to that engagement. The recent literature on diffusion of ideas, policies, and institutions makes a distinction between *direct* and *indirect*

mechanisms of diffusion.<sup>4</sup> In terms of this distinction, the chapters above have focused primarily on direct mechanisms of diffusion, in which the primary analytical emphasis is attributed to the “sender” side of the relationship. Indirect mechanisms of diffusion, on the other hand, place primary analytical emphasis on the “receiver” of diffusion. In such cases, diffusion is demand-driven and can involve mechanisms such as competition, lesson-drawing, and normative emulation, which emphasize the agency of the receiver rather than the sender. While some of these concepts were used in this dissertation to conceptualize the mechanisms of response to EU engagement, one avenue for potential future research could focus much more explicitly on the recipient side as the driver of processes of diffusion.

In this regard, a recent aspect of the EU-China relationship on climate change would seem to provide a particularly fruitful avenue for future research. While it occurred after the end point of this study, there is significant evidence that the Chinese Government has sought to draw on the expertise of the European Commission with respect to the setting up of a domestic emission trading scheme in China, including through a series of workshops from summer 2010 onwards. In November 2011, the Chinese Government announced that it would launch pilot emission trading schemes in seven provinces during the period of the 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan.<sup>5</sup>

As the primary architect of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the Commission built up considerable technical expertise on how to establish such a system. One of the stated aims of the EU-ETS was indeed to serve as a model and inspiration for the creation of other emission trading schemes beyond Europe, the medium-term aim being the

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<sup>4</sup> Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 2012, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction”, *West European Politics*, vol. 35, no. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Xinhua, 2011, “China to Pilot Carbon Emission Rights Trading Scheme: Economic Planner”, Xinhua News Agency website, 22 November 2011, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/22/c\\_131263322.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/22/c_131263322.htm), (accessed on 14 July 2012).

establishment of an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015 at the latest which would be extended to economically more advanced developing countries by 2020. The evidence suggests that the workshops that have taken place in Beijing between the Chinese Government and the European Commission were initiated by the Chinese side rather than being pushed by the European side. In the Indian case, there has been generally little interest in developing a domestic emission trading scheme, but there may be other instances of emulation on the part of the Indian Government that could be investigated through further research.

While the example of the Chinese Government's attempt to emulate the European experience of developing the EU-ETS is empirically interesting and substantively important with respect to the future of Chinese climate change policy, it also raises the conceptual question of how direct and indirect mechanisms of diffusion relate to each other. That is to say, to what extent and under what conditions do direct mechanisms either reinforce or undermine indirect mechanisms? For example, does the existence of the institutionalized dialogue on climate change policy between the EU and China provide a forum which makes lesson-drawing or normative emulation more likely to occur? Alternatively, does the existence of a somewhat problematic institutionalized dialogue hinder the processes of lesson-drawing and emulation, by drawing attention to more contentious aspects of the relationship, thereby making EU experience less appealing? These questions could be explored in future research, either focusing on the EU-China and EU-India relationships, or by focusing on other case studies.

Another issue which could be explored through future research concerns the EU's response to resistance of its engagement and the failure of its leadership. One recent example of intense external resistance to EU climate change policy concerns the decision of the EU to extend the EU-ETS to aviation from 1 January 2012. The focus of this

external resistance is that all flights originating or landing at an EU member state airport are subject to inclusion in the ETS, including for the portion of the flight taking place outside of European airspace. This has generated two principal objections on the part of third countries: first, a general objection to the extra-territorial application of EU regulations; and second, an objection by China and India, among other developing countries, that the universal and undifferentiated application of the EU-ETS to airlines from all third countries violated the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. The empirical research of this dissertation did not identify instances in which the EU applied so-called “carbon tariffs” on imports from countries that do not implement “equivalent” climate change measures—notwithstanding previous calls for such measures, most prominently by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.<sup>6</sup> However, this is exactly how the EU’s inclusion of aviation within the EU-ETS has been interpreted by a range of countries, and it has generated intense opposition, including on the part of China and India who have indicated that their airlines will not comply.<sup>7</sup>

More broadly, it would be both empirically and conceptually interesting, as more time passes, to examine the EU response to the Copenhagen summit. The EU played a more prominent role in the most recent UNFCCC conferences in Cancun in December 2010 and Durban in November–December 2011.<sup>8</sup> What does the EU role in these more recent episodes tell us about the evolving nature of EU leadership? What lessons did European policy-makers learn from Copenhagen? Most of the interviews with Brussels-based officials for this study were undertaken in July 2010, during a period of reflection following

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<sup>6</sup> President Sarkozy has been one of the strongest and most consistent proponents of carbon border taxes. See Peggy Hollinger, 2009, “Sarkozy Calls for Carbon Tax on Imports”, *Financial Times*, 10 September.

<sup>7</sup> ICTSD, 2012, “EU, Aviation Industry Clash over Emissions Scheme”, *Bridges Trade BioRes*, vol. 12, no. 9.

<sup>8</sup> COP-17 in Durban agreed the launch of negotiations under a “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action”, which is tasked with negotiating a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”. See Decision 1/CP.17, in UNFCCC, 2012, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011*, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012.

Copenhagen. Future research could examine what the EU's post-Copenhagen strategy was. Future research could also focus more broadly on the prospects for EU leadership on climate change in the coming years. In a changing global context in which China in particular increasingly forges ahead with the development of low-carbon technologies and policies while the EU seems ever more consumed by the deepening Eurozone crisis, how should we understand the prospects for continued European leadership?

A number of policy implications also flow from the conclusions of this dissertation. One clear recommendation is that the EU should pay greater attention to the domestic sources of third country characteristics and preferences, and should structure its engagements accordingly. The EU-India case in particular indicated a belated recognition by the EU that framing cooperation in terms of “climate change” did not resonate with domestic Indian preferences, and that an “energy security” frame was less divisive. Working with—rather than against—the grain of third countries’ pre-existing conceptions of their interests is likely to yield more substantive cooperation and engagement. This may seem somewhat self-evident, but the analysis presented in this dissertation suggests that it is a lesson that has yet to be learned fully.

As part of such a strategy, the EU institutions and member states with a specific interest in this climate change and energy cooperation with third countries should devote greater institutional resources to working on these issues in their embassies in third countries. This is particularly true of the recently-created European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission, which share responsibility for engagement with third countries on climate change through the post-Lisbon Treaty EU Delegations in third countries. Moreover, the EU Delegations have, since Lisbon, assumed permanent responsibility for on-the-ground EU coordination in third countries.

In this respect, a number of issues ought to be addressed. First, the resources dedicated by the Commission to engagement with China on climate change are simply not sufficient. The level of staff employed by the EU Delegations in Beijing and New Delhi, and by the Commission in Brussels to manage bilateral outreach on climate change is simply not sufficient in the post-Lisbon context. If the EU expects to gain significant added value from its engagement with China and India on climate change, whether that is measured in terms of deepening the institutional European understanding of the domestic political context of Chinese and Indian climate change policy, or in terms of facilitating and supporting the development of Chinese and Indian climate change policy, more institutional resources are required.

Second and related, recent innovations in the EU institutional architecture hinder the development of effective bilateral engagement on climate change. DG Clima was created in February 2010, at the start of the second Barroso Commission, and was formed out of the relevant elements of DG Environment, the functions of the old DG Relex relating to the international climate negotiations, and the climate change functions of DG Enterprise and Industry.<sup>9</sup> There are clearly benefits to be gained from locating all Commission services relating to climate change in one Directorate General: for example, it may facilitate greater coherence between the internal and external aspects of climate change policy. However, there are also costs, principal among which are that integration between climate policy and other policy areas is likely to be more difficult if strong institutional boundaries coincide with divisions between policy areas. Moreover, DG Clima appears to be focused almost exclusively on domestic policymaking and the multilateral UN climate change negotiations. While these tasks are of course crucial and extremely complex, there appears to be little

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<sup>9</sup> European Commission, 2010, “Commission Creates Two New Directorates-General for Energy and Climate Action”, Press Release IP/10/164, 17 February 2010, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/164&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN>, (accessed on 21 February 2011).

acknowledgement of the value that could be gained by devoting additional resources to sustained bilateral outreach with third countries.

In this case, the transfer of institutional competence for international climate negotiations out of what was then DG Relex has hindered the integration of climate change into the broader framework of EU external relations, thereby limiting the coherence of EU external relations. Furthermore, it reinforces the tendency to view climate change as a distinct, technical area of policy-making which is the remit of specialists, rather than viewing it in broader strategic terms. This is part of a broader problem in the institutional configuration of EU external relations in the post-Lisbon era, in which the demarcation between the respective realms of diplomats and policy specialists is an ongoing source of institutional conflict.<sup>10</sup>

The period since Copenhagen has witnessed a noticeable decline in the attention devoted to climate change by governments and other actors, both within the EU and at the global level. The UNFCCC negotiations on a post-2012 regime are increasingly likened to the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations, the suggestion being that they will carry on for many years without a substantive outcome. This has been driven by a number of factors, including the impact of the global financial crisis and the changing domestic political landscape in the United States which has shelved any prospect of US federal climate change policy for the foreseeable future. In this context, the further development of institutionalized bilateral relations by the EU with China, India, and other key states may represent either an alternative to, or an intermediate step towards, multilateral cooperation

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<sup>10</sup> Louise van Schaik, 2011, "Who Speaks for Europe? The Battle between Diplomats and Policy Experts", *Europe's World*, 8 December 2011, [http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home\\_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/2831/Whosp eaksforEuropeThebattlebetweendiplomatsandpolicyexperts.aspx](http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/2831/Whosp eaksforEuropeThebattlebetweendiplomatsandpolicyexperts.aspx), (accessed on 25 March 2012).

on climate change at the global level. To some extent, this mirrors the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements that increasingly characterize the global economy.

The Copenhagen conference showed that China, India, and other states do not share the EU's historical propensity for setting internationally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions limitation without knowing how or whether these will be achieved. Trying to proceed in building a regime that seeks to commit reluctant states to targets that they do not believe they can achieve may create an illusion of "leadership", but it does little to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon global economy. The EU was credited with playing a key role in securing a successful outcome to the recent Durban climate change conference in November–December 2011. This, however, represents only the beginning of another long journey, with negotiations scheduled to be concluded by 2015 and a future agreement to enter into force in 2020. If the EU hopes to be successful in influencing the outcome of these negotiations, it would benefit greatly from deepening its understanding of the preferences and domestic politics of key third countries. This will not happen unless the EU finds a way to manage better its currently underdeveloped bilateral engagements with China, India, and other key states.

## List of Interviewees

As part of my DPhil research, I conducted fieldwork in Brussels (July 2010), London (August 2010), Beijing (September–October 2010), and Delhi (October–December 2010). I also conducted a number of phone interviews in July–August 2011. A partial list of the people I interviewed along with their institutional affiliation at the time of interview is provided below. In a small number of cases, individuals I interviewed did not consent to having their names listed in this appendix.

## 1. Brussels

Name	Institutional Affiliation
Ulriikka Aarnio	Climate Action Network – Europe
Stefan Agne	DG Climate Action, European Commission
Julio Arias	DG Relex, European Commission
Elina Bardram	DG Relex, European Commission
Asad Beg	DG Relex, European Commission
Alain Berger	Alstom
Jos Delbeke	DG Climate Action, European Commission
Giles Dickson	Alstom
Maurizio di Lullo	Council Secretariat
Folker Franz	BusinessEurope
Magnus Gislev	DG Environment, European Commission
Shada Islam	European Policy Centre
Niels Junker Jacobsen	DG Trade, European Commission
Ashutosh Jindal	Indian Mission to the European Union
Roland Johansson	DG Relex, European Commission
Jürgen Lefevere	DG Climate Action, European Commission
Terhi Lehtonen	Greens-EFA Group, European Parliament
Christine Lins	European Renewable Energy Council
Li Xiangfeng	Chinese Mission to the European Union
Morgan McSwiney	Council Secretariat
Lars Müller	DG Climate Action, European Commission
Renate Nikolay	Member of Catherine Ashton's cabinet
Marc Pallemmaerts	Institute for European Environmental Policy
Wolfgang Ploch	Council Secretariat, European Commission
Francesco Pressutti	Council Secretariat, European Commission
Liming Qiao	Global Wind Energy Council
Thomas Renard	Egmont Institute
Jesse Scott	E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism
Olga Sihmane	DG Energy, European Commission
Graham Watson	Member of European Parliament
Claude Weinber	Heinrich Böll Foundation

## 2. London

Name	Institutional Affiliation
Henry Derwent	Department of Environment, Food and Rural Development (formerly, now International Emissions Trading Association)
Matthew Findlay	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Isabel Hilton	China Dialogue
John Holmes	Department of Energy and Climate Change
Bernice Lee	Chatham House
Nick Mabey	E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism
Conor Myers	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Sara Pickering	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Dan Pike	Department of Energy and Climate Change
Felix Preston	Chatham House
Daniel Rathwell	Department of Energy and Climate Change
Nicholas Stern	London School of Economics

### 3. Beijing

Name	Institutional Affiliation
Richard Balme	Tsinghua University
Chen Ying	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Clifford Coonan	Freelance journalist
Fei Xiaojing	Institute for Environment and Development
Dan Guttman	Peking University
Cordula Geinitz	Embassy of Germany
Heidi Hiltunen	Delegation of the European Union
Linda Jacobson	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Laurent Javaudin	Delegation of the European Union
Nikola Jovanovic	Embassy of Italy
Sarah Kuen	Government of Belgium
Alvin Lin	Natural Resources Defense Council
Liu Jianqiang	China Dialogue
Rebecca Nadin	British Council
Federico Pasini	Europe-China Clean Energy Centre
Tom Pellman	Vestas
Bart Pennewaert	Embassy of Belgium
Alessia Pietrosanti	Sino-Italian Cooperation Program for Environmental Protection
Qian JingJing	Natural Resources Defense Council
Denis Quenelle	Embassy of France
Patrick Schroeder	China Civil Climate Action Network
Deborah Seligsohn	World Resources Institute
Shang Baoxi	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Dongying	Global Environmental Institute
Douglas Whitehead	Global Environmental Institute
Changhua Wu	The Climate Group
Yang Ailun	Greenpeace
Zhang Haibin	Peking University
Zhang Shiqiu	Peking University
Zhang Yongsheng	Development Research Council

## 4. Delhi

Name	Institutional Affiliation
Fergus Auld	UK High Commission
Rahul Bedi	Freelance journalist
Suruchi Bhadwal	The Energy and Resources Institute
Chandra Bhushan	Centre for Science and Environment
Jens Burgdorf	GTZ
Chandrashekhara Dasgupta	The Energy and Resources Institute
Nitin Desai	The Energy and Resources Institute
Darryl D'Monte	Forum of Environmental Journalists of India
Navroz Dubash	Centre for Policy Research
Tobias Engelmeier	Bridge to India
Prodipto Ghosh	The Energy and Resources Institute
Antje Göllner-Scholz	Embassy of Germany
Ajit Gupta	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
Ram Kishan	Christian Aid
Michael Koberleine	Heinrich Böll Foundation
Mikael Kullman	Embassy of Sweden
Guus Lamers	Embassy of Netherlands
Louise le Brass	Embassy of Denmark
P. C. Maithani	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
Ajay Mathur	Bureau of Energy Efficiency
Malini Mehra	Centre for Social Markets
Arabinda Mishra	The Energy and Resources Institute
Raghu Nandan	Delhi Science Forum
Archana Negi	Jawaharlal Nehru University
Ligia Noronha	The Energy and Resources Institute
Prosanto Pal	The Energy and Resources Institute
Varad Pande	Ministry of Environment and Forests
Ashutosh Pandey	Emergent Ventures
Kirit Parikh	IRADe – Integrated Research and Action for Development
Lavanya Rajamani	Centre for Policy Research
R. R. Rashmi	Ministry of Environment and Forests
Mark Runacres	British Business Group Delhi
Shayam Saran	Centre for Policy Research
Surya Sethi	Planning Commission (retired)
Manish Shrivastava	The Energy and Resources Institute
Smita Singh	Delegation of the European Union
Dilip Sinha	Ministry of External Affairs
Vanita Suneja	Oxfam India
Sanjay Vashist	Climate Action Network South Asia
George Verhughe	Development Alternatives
Jan-Axel Vos	Embassy of Germany
Rima Yadav	Embassy of Netherlands

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