Thesis Title: Jansenism, Holy Living and the Church of England: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, c. 1640 - c. 1700

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**Short Abstract**

This thesis examines the impact in mid- to later-seventeenth century England of the major contemporary religious controversy in France. The debates associated with this controversy, which revolved around the formal condemnation of a heresy popularly called Jansenism, involved fundamental questions about the doctrine of grace and moral theology, about the life of the Church and the conduct of individual Christians. In providing an analysis of the main themes of the controversy, and an account of instances of English interest, the thesis argues that English Protestant theologians in the process of working out their own views on basic theological questions recognised the relevance of the continental debates. It is further suggested that the theological arguments evolved by the French writers possess some value as a point of comparison for the developing views of English theologians. Where the Jansenists reasserted an Augustinian emphasis on the gratuity of salvation against Catholic theologians who over-valued the powers of human nature, the Anglican writers examined here, arguing against Protestant theologians who denied nature any moral potency, emphasised man’s contribution to his own salvation. Both arguments have been seen to contain a corrosive individualism, the former through its preoccupation with the luminous experience of grace, the latter through its tendency to elide grace and moral virtue, and reduce Christianity to the voluntary ethical choices of individuals. These assessments, it is argued here, misrepresent the theologians in question. Nevertheless, their thought did encourage greater individualism and moral autonomy. For both groups, their opponents’ theological premises were deficient to the extent that they vitiated morality; and in both cases their responses, centring on the transformation of the inner man by love, privileged the moral responsibility of the individual. Their moral ‘rigorism’, it is suggested, focusing on the affective experience of conversion, represented in both cases an attempt to provide a sound empirical basis for Christian faith and practice in the fragmented intellectual context of post-reformation Europe.
# Jansenism, Holy Living and the Church of England: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, c. 1640-c.1700

**Acknowledgements**

**Conventions**

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- Jansenism

- Rigorism

- Anti-Calvinism

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- Anti-Calvinism and the Theology of Holy Living
Acknowledgements

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**Conventions**

Old Style dating still in use in England has not been altered, but the year is assumed to begin on January 1st. I have tried to use modern critical editions of early modern works where available. Where original works are used I have tried to retain the original spelling except where it may produce confusion. Unless otherwise attributed, translations from foreign languages are my own. Place of publication is London unless otherwise stated. Scriptural texts in English are quoted from the King James Version. Capitalisation is arbitrary, but hopefully consistent. In the regrettable absence of satisfactory alternatives, the masculine universal pronoun is used; it does have the merit of reflecting the usage of the writers under discussion.

N.B. References to the works of Catholic casuists are in the abbreviated form given by French and English critics. It is not the accuracy but the incidence of these citations which is of interest. A list of casuists and of their works is given in the Appendix.
Abbreviations

AMJ  Additionals to the mystery of Jesuitism. Englished by the same hand (1679)

Arnauld, Œuvres  Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld, Docteur de la Maison et Société de Sorbonne, 43v. in 38 (Paris, 1775-83), ed. Gabriel Du Pac de Bellegarde and Jean Hautefage

BL  British Library

Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf.  Christ Church Library, Oxford

Clark  Ruth Clark, Strangers and Sojourners at Port-Royal. Being an account of the connections between the British Isles and the Jansenists of France and Holland (New York, 1972 [1932])


CPR  Chroniques de Port-Royal


ESTC  English Short Title Catalogue

FC  Antoine Arnauld, De la fréquente communion, où les sentiments des Pères, des Papes et des Conciles, touchant l’usage des Sacrements de Pénitence & d’Eucharistie, sont fidèlement exposés (5th ed., Paris, 1646, first publ. 1643)

JEH  Journal of Ecclesiastical History

JM  The Jesuits morals. Collected by a doctor of the college of Sorbon in Paris. Who hath faithfully extracted them out of the Jesuits own books, which are printed by the permission and approbation of the superiours of their Society [tr. Israel Tonge] (1670)

ODNB  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

MJ  Les Provinciales: or The Mystery of Jesuitisme, discover’d in certain letters, written upon occasion of the present differences at Sorbonne, between the Jansenists and the Molinists, from
January 1656. to March 1657. S. N. Displaying the corrupt maximes and politicks of that society. Faithfully rendered into English (1657)

**Pensées**

**PL**
*Patrologia Latina*

**RH**
*Recusant History*

**Schroeder**

**ST**
Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*

The works of Thomas Aquinas accessed at www.corpusthomisticum.org

**UN**
Introduction

The seventeenth-century Jansenists of Port-Royal, the reformed Cistercian abbey near Paris which became the spiritual heart of a controversial movement for renewal within post-Tridentine Catholicism, have often inspired comparison with the puritan critics of the post-reformation English Church. With their insistently expressed concern for doctrinal purity, clerical standards and lay godliness, the Jansenists, like the puritans, disturbed the civil and religious authorities, who attempted through policy and polemic to define these troublesome tendencies as dissident, sectarian, and, in the case of the Jansenists, heretical. At the moment when the Jansenist controversy first came to a head in the 1640s and 1650s, however, the parallel is not so clear; for the English puritans, after the defeat of the royalist cause, had to a degree succeeded in establishing a version of the more perfectly reformed Church and godly commonwealth after which they had thirsted for the better part of a century. The puritan-hammering Church of Bancroft and Laud had been eclipsed; a short walk away from the urban sister-house of Port-Royal des Champs, Port-Royal de Paris in the Faubourg St. Jacques, a few of her unhappy remnants could be found during the Interregnum celebrating Prayer Book services in Sir Richard Browne’s embassy chapel in the Faubourg St. Germain, or in the lodgings of John Cosin, the future bishop of Durham, at the Louvre.¹ Along with illegal, clandestine gatherings in England, such expatriate congregations now represented virtually the whole visible life of the antebellum Church. The Long Parliament had banned the use of her liturgy and the observance of traditional major feasts, attacked the jurisdictional and economic basis of episcopal church-government, and finally abolished

episcopacy itself, and established, if in a limited sense and without striking success, a national Presbyterian Church.² Cathedral life was stopped, and parochial clergy and university members who failed to show themselves amenable to the new dispensation were harassed, and, in a significant number of cases, ejected from office, left with a choice between ‘suffering’ at home or abroad, or making some form of concession to the times.³ The reality may not always have been as drastic as their rhetorical laments on the theme of persecution represented; but it was now the turn of the ‘confessors’ of the oppressed Church of England to play the part of dissidents and conventiclers.⁴

The Port-Royal group, under heavy pressure to renounce heretical views they denied holding, had an equally legitimate claim to persecuted status; and, as Ruth Clark has shown, they felt sympathy for the plight of the English exiles. Linked to Port-Royal circles by numerous personal connections, the royalists received considerable material assistance from this quarter.⁵ Little can be made of the report, which we have only from Anthony à Wood, that Richard Steward (chaplain and clerk of the closet to Charles II) went ‘very far in making an accommodation between the Jansenists and the Reformed Party’ while in Paris in the late 1640s.⁶ But it is clear that, in sociological terms, the two groups were very similarly

⁵ Clark, chs. 3-6.
⁶ Athenae Oxonienses, 2 vols. (1691-2), ii, p. 80; Clark, p. 54; Paule Jansen, De Blaise Pascal à Henry Hammond. Les Provinciales en Angleterre (Paris, 1954), drew attention to a reference, in John Fell’s account of the MSS of the leading episcopalian theologian Henry Hammond, to ‘a piece of a letter from the Bp. of Derry [John Bramhall] about the death of Sr. George Ratcliffe and the hopes of doing good with the Jansenists’:
circumstanced. In the middle of the century it was the episcopalian loyalists, not the puritans, who shared with the Jansenists the character of an embattled sect.

It is one of my assumptions in this thesis that the analogy, curious though it is, can be stretched a little further. The controversy which engulfed Port-Royal and made a party of the ‘Jansenists’ centred on their critical assessment of contemporary formulations of the theology of grace and salvation, and on their connected critique of ‘lax’ moral theologians and confessors who were encouraging a general deterioration in standards of Christian morality. Similar issues exercised the leading theological lights among the English episcopalian, whose views on grace and salvation were also attacked as unorthodox, and also manifested themselves in a pronounced preoccupation with moral standards. As a matter of fact the direction in which each group was held to have erred located them on opposite sides of the golden thread of orthodoxy as their critics conceived it. The Jansenists, for their part, considering themselves the true ‘disciples of St. Augustine’ in an age which has been called the century par excellence of the bishop of Hippo, undertook to defend the doctrine of irresistible grace, that necessary assistance which, as Augustine argued against the Pelagians, is alone capable of rescuing man from the abyss into which he has sunk himself by his sin. Opponents both contemporary and modern have criticised the excessive pessimism of this theological outlook, which, encouraging a preoccupation with sin, produced a harsh and unrealistically rigorous moral teaching. The most active theological spokesmen of the English episcopalian cause, by contrast, inherited and elaborated a doctrinal argument which, being directed against a strain of Protestant theology whose exaggerated emphasis on the gratuity of salvation and the impotence of human nature seemed to them a recipe for apathy or licence, looks very much like an emancipation from the baleful influence of Augustine’s authority.


The shortcomings of this soteriological argument, in the eyes of its critics, lay in its overestimation of human moral potential, and resulted in an excessively legal moral teaching, at once too demanding for fallen nature and too formal for the life of grace. Were we seeking pairs of seventeenth-century theological opposites, then, we could hardly do better than the Jansenists and the exponents of this argument among those to whom, thanks to the strengthened identity conferred upon them by conditions of adversity, we may now refer as Anglican divines.

All the same, I do not, in proposing a ‘comparative’ study of aspects of their theological views, intend anything facetious. The debates associated with the invidious name of Jansenism, which stirred the whole Roman Church and to which Anglican exiles in Catholic Europe were immediately exposed, involved fundamental theological questions which were neither exclusive to any party of Christian theologians, nor, in many cases, susceptible of final resolution. I do not think I shall be claiming very much when I assert that these questions were of inherent interest to English theologians who were in the process of working out their own relationship to the theological legacy of the sixteenth-century reformation; and the elements of this thesis which I have qualified, in my title, as ‘historical’, are concerned with the impression made on Anglophone onlookers by the principal themes raised in the course of these intra-Catholic debates. This inquiry into the impact of the major contemporary Catholic controversy is offered as a contribution to our understanding of the intellectual horizons of English thinkers in the mid- to late-seventeenth century. Given the quantities of original work produced in diverse fields of theological and scholarly inquiry by those to whom the label Jansenist has become more or less firmly attached, I think it may justifiably be regarded as a preliminary account only.⁸

⁸ There is a brief survey in ch. 2, below, pp. 68-89.
There is a danger that the reader confuses this historical account of English interest in the intellectual phenomena of the Jansenist controversy with an attempt to establish a case for ‘Jansenist’ influences on English religious thought. It might well be possible to execute a series of case-studies along these lines – though to be really satisfying I think it would have to comprehend the eighteenth and probably the nineteenth century as well⁹ – but it should be emphasised at the outset that this is no part of my intention here. What I have attempted in the ‘comparative’ aspects of this thesis is to use the theological views of the Jansenists as a point of contrast against which the evolving theological sensibility which forms my subject in the English context may fruitfully be examined. While the Jansenists worked under different theological pressures and, in some respects, from diametrically opposed theological premises, the problems with which they grappled were broadly comparable; and it is my suggestion that the solutions they arrived at can help to throw some of the motivations and priorities of the English thinkers into relief.

In the first chapter of this thesis I examine the Jansenists’ attack on contemporary moral theologians whom they accused of propagating a ‘lax’ methodology conducive to ill-discipline and moral irregularity. This argument reflected a reforming outlook which historians of early modern French Catholicism, appropriating part of the technical nomenclature of moral theologians, have become accustomed to describe as ‘rigorist’. Moral rigorism was not a peculiar attribute of the Jansenists: many among those who shared the Tridentine aspiration after a better informed, more disciplined and more committed worshipping community took the view that it would best be realised through a severe pastoral approach. But the theological assumptions of the Jansenists, which I shall go on to discuss in

⁹ See Clark, ch. 18, on eighteenth-century readers; and John Barker, Strange Contrarieties. Pascal in England during the Age of Reason (Montreal-London, 1975). One of the most notable collections of Port-Royal materials in nineteenth-century England, now housed at Keble College Library, Oxford, was that of the Tractarian priest Henry Morgan; his Port-Royal and other Studies (1914), while not, as the casual library-catalogue browser might hope, a first-hand account of Caribbean piracy, is nevertheless an interesting set of portraits.
greater depth in chapter four, predisposed them to a particularly thoroughgoing form of rigorism. Envisaging the moral life of man as a pair of scales, with concupiscence in one balance and charity in the other, they were intolerant of any suggestion that the failings of the sinful should be accommodated or indulged. In the later 1650s they made a *cause célèbre* out of the less rigid, perhaps more realistic pastoral approach counselled by other clerical reformers, evidence, in their view, of a pernicious ‘relâchement’ of moral standards; as I show in chapters two and three, meanwhile, this campaign of rigorist polemics made a significant impact in England.

The Anglican theologians examined in this thesis were receptive to the French critique of ‘lax’ morals because the question of morality bore closely on their own theological priorities. Their theological case was constructed chiefly against a predestinarian, *sola fide* understanding of grace and salvation, which they depicted as a doorway to antinomian anarchy. The determinist framework of this soteriology, associated in their minds with the name of John Calvin, seemed to them to remove all incentive to moral endeavour. Consequently they were concerned to carve out a meaningful role for obedience in the theory of justification, and placed great emphasis on the stringent prescriptions for ‘holy living’ set out in the Christian revelation. To the ‘speculative’ theology of their Calvinist antagonists, with its emphasis on the faith of the elect, they opposed a ‘practical’ or affective theological approach, focusing on the transformation of the will which must be predicated of a justified man. The circumstance of disestablishment functioned as a spur to this anti-Calvinist argument; in sermons and printed works these Anglican divines exhorted their benighted flock to witness to the truth of their cause, like the early Christians under persecution, by lives of sincere repentance and unimpeachable holiness.

My concern in the second part of this thesis is to suggest that this ‘holy living’ strain of Anglican theology represented a form of moral rigorism which may plausibly be compared
with that of the Jansenist writers. Although the Jansenists defended the effective operation of grace, they too concentrated predominantly upon the formal conversion of the will from sinfulness to charity. The acculturation of the appetites through a rigorous penitential regime was therefore recommended in both cases. The effect of this approach was to place the practical weight of responsibility for his moral condition and ultimate salvation squarely on the shoulders of the individual. In this sense I think it is correct to identify among both sets of thinkers signs of a movement towards greater individualism and moral autonomy. In the case of the Jansenists such a tendency is often attributed to a predestinarian theology which, placing a premium on the illuminative experience of grace, filled the elect believer with an unshakeable self-conviction. In the case of the Anglicans, conversely, it is often related to the value they ascribed, in the course of reacting against a Calvinist soteriology predicated on their irremediable corruption, to man’s natural moral faculties; for the tendency of this ‘liberal’ approach was to reduce the state of grace to a consecutive series of good moral choices, voluntarily undertaken, in response to the Christian Gospel, by free, autonomous agents. As the following chapters will make clear, I do not believe that either of these suggestions fairly reflects the substantive theological statements of the writers in question. In seeking to provide reliable theological and epistemological guarantees for the moral responsibility of individual Christians, however, they each laid out a characteristically rigorist template which, being founded on the absolute priority of interior conversion, did contain an individualist tendency. In this respect both streams of thought seem to exemplify that perennial Christian tension, at its most acute in the post-reformation era of confession-building, between the logic of conversion and the logic of institution.
Note on Terms

Throughout this thesis I use categories which are open to objection on the grounds either of anachronism or of polemical over-determination. I do not make any claim for the superiority of these conventional choices, nor do they reflect ideological preferences. My rule has been convenience, and I qualify the relevant terms as follows.

By ‘Anglican’ I do not intend a body of theological and ecclesiological views characterised by any putative philosophical quality. In general terms my use has a purely institutional sense, denoting loyalty to an ecclesial body distinguished, after the parliamentarian attack on the Church in the 1640s, by the circumstances of persecution and proscription. Thus Henry Hammond, for example, referred to ‘the Anglican Church’ in 1647.10 In the majority of cases my use of ‘Anglican’ is narrower still, signifying a specific group of episcopalian divines united by a theological agenda centred on the adjustment of Calvinist soteriology. This group, the subject of chapter five, I also design the ‘holy living’ theologians.

The Calvinism against which these writers constructed their arguments was a polemical entity, referred to the theological formulations of the Synod of Dort and the Westminster Assembly. Its relationship to the thought of Calvin may be contestable, but is irrelevant to my analysis.

Like ‘Calvinist’, ‘Jansenist’ was a term of abuse, and one whose use is complicated by the formal heresy it is supposed to denominate. I use ‘Jansenist’ interchangeably with

10 Of the Power of the Keyes: Or, Of Binding and Loosing (1647), sig. A3r. While I agree that the term is anachronistic in relation to the earlier history of the English Church, however, it must be said that to refuse it on the grounds that the majority of late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart churchmen were doctrinally ‘Calvinist’ seems merely to affirm the Anglo-Catholic ‘myth’ about the identity of Anglicanism.
‘Port-Royalist’ to indicate a small number of writers who were associated materially with the convents of Port-Royal, and intellectually with the controversial views of the theologian Cornelius Jansen – the abbé de Saint-Cyran, Antoine ‘le grand’ Arnauld, Blaise Pascal, Pierre Nicole. While the term ‘Jansenist’ usefully suggests the family relationship between their views in many areas, I do not intend to define ‘Jansenism’ on the basis of my treatment of those views.

Such an exposition would be inauthentic were a more historically satisfactory label substituted for their polemical bête-noire, ‘Semi-Pelagianism’. The same argument cannot be made for the anachronistic terms ‘laxisme’ and ‘rigorisme’. I am concerned throughout the thesis to argue for the application of the latter; in the case of the former, I have tried to distinguish the polemical image from the real tendency which it signified.
1) **Development of the Jansenist Critique**

The 1650s witnessed the culmination of the first phase of the distinctive French movement for theological and pastoral renewal known as Jansenism. In the bull *Cum occasione* of 1653 Innocent X condemned Five Propositions extracted from the *Augustinus* of Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), bishop of Ypres, where Jansen reclaimed as Catholic truth the Augustinian theology of grace appropriated and distorted by the Protestant reformers.¹ The Jansenists, who made his teaching their own, unsuccessfully attempted to defend its orthodoxy on the grounds that the heretical propositions were not contained in the *Augustinus* and did not represent Jansen’s true sense (the ‘question de fait’). Alexander VII issued another bull, *Ad sacram* (1656), condemning the Propositions in the sense of Jansen, and an assembly of French bishops convoked by Cardinal Mazarin designed a Formulary to the same effect, to which subscription was required from all French ecclesiastics, whether secular or regular. A conjunction of religio-political forces now opposed the Jansenists, from which they were barely shielded by the Gallicanism of the *parlementaires* and what sympathy they could generate among churchmen and public opinion at large. In 1661 the ‘petites écoles’ run at Port-Royal, where for a short time the future Duke of Monmouth was counted among the

¹ Jansen’s work was (posthumously) published Louvain, 1640. It is discussed below, ch. 4.
pupils, were stopped, and the novices dispersed. The conseil d’état demanded unqualified subscription to the Formulary; and when in 1664 the new archbishop of Paris, Hardouin de Péréfixe, was in a position to take decisive action, he quelled the recalcitrant nuns of Port-Royal de Paris and Port-Royal des Champs with an ugly show of force. A measure of stability was only restored at the end of the 1660s, when Clement IX engineered a compromise with the non-jurors, who were now able to subscribe without committing themselves on the question de fait.

Thus by the end of the 1650s the reformist ambitions of the Port-Royal group, their history marked since the 1620s by the progressive alienation of increasingly powerful interests in Church and state, seemed to have ended in abject failure. Yet to the modern observer the decade also represents a high-water mark for the Jansenist critique of contemporary Catholicism. From the travails of the Port-Royalists’ intellectual leader, Antoine Arnauld (1612-94), which ended in his expulsion from the Sorbonne in February 1656, emerged its most pithy and perhaps its most influential expression in the satirical Lettres Provinciales of Blaise Pascal (1623-62). With arresting brilliance Pascal denounced ‘une morale relâchée’ propagated principally by the indulgent moralists and confessors of the Society of Jesus. The origins of this canker, argued Pascal, lay in ‘la doctrine des opinions probables’, according to which an individual is not obliged to obey the moral law if there exists, in a particular case, any ‘probable’ opinion – either ‘intrinsically’, in virtue of rational

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2 Clark, p. 61.


4 The letters appeared episodically from January 1656 to March 1657.
arguments, or ‘extrinsically’, in virtue of the authority of learned doctors – in favour of liberty.\(^5\)

Pascal’s plea for *une bonne morale et sévère* made a significant impact, heightened by an apparent mark of divine approbation in the form of a miraculous cure bestowed upon his niece by a thorn from the Holy Crown.\(^6\) The General Assembly of the French Clergy, which in March 1657 closed the door on the *question de fait* by accepting the bull *Ad sacram*, nevertheless endorsed Pascal’s arguments against ‘les nouveaux casuistes’, decreeing that the confessors of France would henceforth administer the sacrament of penance according to the strict rules outlined by St. Carlo Borromeo, archbishop of Milan, in his *Avvertenze ai Confessori* of 1575.\(^7\) This was done in order to counteract

certaines opinions modernes, qui ont tellement altéré la Morale Chrestienne, et les maximes de l’Évangile, qu’une profonde ignorance seroit beaucoup plus souhaitable, qu’une telle science, qui apprend à tenir toutes choses problématiques, et à chercher des moyens, non pas pour exterminer les mauvaises habitudes des hommes; mais pour les justifier, et pour leur donner l’invention de les satisfaire en conscience.\(^8\)

Notwithstanding his failure to vindicate Jansen’s orthodoxy, then, it seems Pascal succeeded in convincing contemporaries that there existed a connection between a debasement of pastoral standards and a new moral ‘science’, built upon the doctrine of probable opinions, and realised in the vitiation of the sacrament of penance. An *Apologie pour les casuistes*

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\(^5\) The doctrine is discussed below, this chapter.

\(^6\) For an early notice see Madame de Sévigné, *Lettres*, ed. E. Gérard-Gailly, 3 vols. (Paris, 1953-57), i, p. 112. Of the truth of this miracle of the *sainte-épine*, which took place at Port-Royal on March 24\(^{th}\), 1657, the Duke of York was convinced by the Maréchal de Turenne. His brother Charles II was apparently also persuaded: Clark, pp. 55-6.

\(^7\) The work was printed at Paris, 1657, as *Instructions de S. Charles Borromée [sic] ... Aux Confesseurs de sa Ville et de son Diocèse*. The most thorough treatment is now Jean-Louis Quantin, ‘De la rigueur au rigorisme. Les *Avvertenze ai Confessori* de Charles Borromée dans la France du XVIIe siècle’, *Studia Borromaina*, 20 (2006), pp. 195-251; further literature is cited ch. 7, n. 25, below.

published in December 1657 by a Parisian Jesuit, Georges Pirot, was condemned by episcopal censure in nineteen dioceses between April 1658 and May 1659. By mid-1658 the doctors of the Paris Theology Faculty decided to proceed to a thoroughgoing censure of the work; this was finalised in July, and authorised by Louis XIV in October for publication in French and Latin.⁹

The *Provinciales* did not meet with this apparent success by accident. The doctrine of probable opinions (probabilism, in modern terms) had been a subject of debate for half a century. Allowing for greater flexibility in administering the sacrament of penance, it was well-adapted to a positive and comprehensive pastoral strategy, such as suited a newly confessional age. The Jesuits, who quickly came to view the hearing of confessions as a central plank of Catholic renewal, took it up enthusiastically; their study of moral cases (casuistry) came increasingly to be coloured by it. But the urge to be ‘mild’ and ‘approachable’, if potentially more fruitful than a rigid pastoral approach, did carry with it the risk of over-indulgence.¹⁰ Claudio Aquaviva, general of the Society, alerted his fellow superiors to this danger in 1604; in 1613 he again warned against too great a liberty of opinion. Theologians such as Comitoli, Rebellus, and even Cardinal Bellarmine raised doubts about allowing the choice of a less probable opinion, and these were echoed by Aquaviva’s successor Vitelleschi in 1617.¹¹ From the mid-seventeenth century the Dominican order became increasingly hostile to the doctrine, as a novelty which departed

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¹¹ See Deman, ‘Probabilisme’, cols. 497-501. Paul Comitoli, SJ (1544-1626), and Ferdinand Rebello, SJ (d. 1608), were nevertheless sometimes included in hostile lists of ‘lax’ casuists.
from the moral teaching of Thomas Aquinas. The general chapter of 1656, claiming papal approval, ordered Dominican confessors to avoid the ‘lax’, uncertain and paradoxical opinions of modern doctors. Dominicans would henceforth stand in the vanguard of the argument against allowing the choice of a less probable opinion. At Jansen’s institution of Louvain, scene of long-standing tensions with the Jesuits, propositions illustrative of the ‘new morals’ were censured on numerous occasions in the late 1640s and 1650s. The Holy Office was sensitive to the issue, censuring works of casuistical theology which contained ‘lax’ resolutions, and in 1665-6 Alexander VII issued decrees against forty-five ‘errores doctrinae moralis laxioris’. In 1679 Innocent XI censured sixty-five similar errors, including the proposition that it is probable ‘posse iudicare iuxta opinionem etiam minus probabilem’.

The French Church had been exercised by a perceived relâchement in pastoral standards for several decades before the Provinciales. This was related in some ways to a deeper conflict of ‘theological cultures’, with institutional as well as ideological aspects. Gallican hostility to papal incursions on French ecclesiastical autonomy, while strongest among the political classes, was always well-represented at the Sorbonne, and made for tensions with the ambitious Society of Jesus, specially vowed to papal obedience and

privileged by exemptions from episcopal control. The dévot party which championed the cause of Catholic reform in France, though by no means insular in outlook, included influential figures, such as Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle (1575-1629), whose theological preferences did not coincide with those predominating among the Jesuits, and whose vision for reform privileged the role of the secular hierarchy over that of the regulars. The notion of une morale séduisante, meanwhile, fitted easily into a picture of unscrupulous and disruptive Jesuit ambition, and contributed to the condemnations in 1641 of a work De hierarchia et hierarchiis by the future French provincial, Louis Cellot, and the Somme des Péchez of another Jesuit, Étienne Bauny, denounced by the Assembly of the Clergy in the same year for its ‘corruption des bonnes mœurs’. These condemnations prefaced an offensive against ‘la théologie morale des Jésuites’ which reflected, as much as a concern for ‘bonnes mœurs’, the hardening of party lines.

The Provinciales, therefore, took their place in a long-running battle between the perpetrators of a supposed moral ‘relâchement’ and the soi-disant defenders of a purer morale, which on the field of polemics would come to bear the device of ‘rigorisme’. Whether or not they constituted a genuinely constructive intervention in a technical debate, there is no doubt that the Provinciales and other Jansenist attacks on ‘les nouveaux casuistes’ helped to discredit the probabilist method, and, along with a widespread aspiration after a

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‘clear and simple’ theology, founded on an empirical archaeology of the sources of Christian faith and morals, contributed to the gradual preponderance of a ‘ rigorist’ culture in France.22

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The emergence of a distinctive ‘Jansenism’ in the 1630s and 1640s, centred on Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran (1581-1643) and from 1635 spiritual director of the convent of Port-Royal, in some ways reflected increasing tensions within the French Catholic reform. The de facto leader of the dévot party and Saint-Cyran’s mentor, Bérulle, died in 1629, and, having been discountenanced in 1630, the dévots found themselves opposed to an administration which committed France to a politique foreign policy.23 The Jesuits, meanwhile, already seen as a hindrance to reform prosecuted through the secular hierarchy, were increasingly dependent on the favour of the crown and the Richelieu administration.24 For Saint-Cyran, leaving ultramontanism definitively behind, the cause of Catholic reform came to be inextricably linked to the extirpation of an all-pervasive Jesuit menace. With him originated the anti-Jesuit critique which would find its apotheosis in the Provinciales.

Two major influences shaped Saint-Cyran’s attitude to his former preceptors.25 At Louvain he was a contemporary of Cornelius Jansen; they met in Paris in 1609, forming a friendship which led to a five-year co-habitation at Saint-Cyran’s Bayonne estate from 1611. This period was spent in methodical study of scripture and its patristic commentators; after

23 Jansen would displeasure Richelieu by criticising his alliances with Protestant powers in a pamphlet, Mars Gallicus, of 1635.
24 Wright, Divisions, esp. pp. 121-84.
25 The abbé benefited from a Jesuit education as a schoolboy in south-west France, and then at the Jesuit collège in Louvain, where Léonard Lessius was his prefect of studies.
his return to Louvain in 1617, Jansen developed a special concern with Augustine.26 These erudite exertions engendered a conviction that the Church required a reinjection of primitive clarity and vigour. For Jansen the most pressing issue was the new Jesuit theology of grace, developed by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and Léonard Lessius (1554-1623). These theologians evinced a dangerous over-confidence in human nature, teaching that election is conditioned by foreseen merits and that the effect of grace depends on human consent.27 Even the Council of Dort, said Jansen, though misunderstanding assurance and perseverance, got closer to the Catholic doctrine of predestination; from 1621 he and Saint-Cyran were discussing ‘cette affaire de Pilmot’, a scheme to correct the enemies of the Catholic doctrine of grace.28

A pronounced Augustinianism also characterised Saint-Cyran’s other great influence, Bérulle. Throughout 1622 Saint-Cyran visited daily with Bérulle, spending, he says, six or seven hours in Bérulle’s ‘closet’. As a result his views assumed an ‘authentically Bérullist’ cast.29 Bérulle’s was a mystical theological temperament rendered outward-looking and active by an all-encompassing focus on the incarnation. This he compared to the Copernican revolution: the relations between heaven and earth are reversed now an incarnate God presides over the celestial hierarchy. The ‘christological theocentrism’ of this apostolus verbi

28 Naissance du Janssenisme, découverte à Monseigneur le Chancelier par le Sieur de Preville (Louvain, 1654), pp. 5, 7, 14, 22-4, 43-4. ‘Pilmot’ has generally been taken to refer to Jansen’s plan for a systematic exposition of the doctrine of St Augustine, and by extension the general desire shared by Jansen and Saint-Cyran to renew the Church by means of a reinvestment of primitive purity in dogma and discipline under the direction of the secular hierarchy. Henri Bremond elevated it into a fabulous anti-Jesuit conspiracy indicative of Saint-Cyran’s delusional and unstable character: Histoire Littéraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu’à nos jours, 12 vols. (Paris, 1916-36), iv, ch. 4. (A new edition of Bremond’s Histoire, in 5 vols., has been issued under the direction of François Trémolières [Grenoble, 2006].) It does however seem that a definite structural programme was envisaged, involving the establishment of the French Oratory in Flanders: Adam, Du mysticisme à la révolte, pp. 71-9; Orcibal, Jansénius d’Ypres, pp. 119-30.
incarnati, as Urban VIII called him, underwrote a demanding template for moral renewal. The Word became incarnate that he might be apprehended by the creature; the creature cannot enter into this apprehension except by a reciprocal participation in his divinity. This is a process of divinisation for which Christ provided a model by living a human life. Bérulle described the imitative life in ascetic and sometimes mystical terms, dwelling on the ‘nothingness’ of man and the necessity of self-abnegation. A tireless and influential reformer of the clergy, Bérulle’s foundation of the French congregation of the Oratory was inspired by the same incarnational ideal. The mass-celebrating priest was exalted as the bridge between humanity and the archetypal eternal priest. By analogy with the celestial hierarchy, Bérulle evolved a high doctrine of episcopacy; like the pedagogic and pastoral brief of the Oratorian priests, this inclined the Jesuits against him. Insofar as he held up the same incarnational standard to both clergy and laity, his demanding outlook was an ambiguous mixture of elitism and, for want of a better term, spiritual ‘populism’. It profoundly marked the thought of Saint-Cyr and his successors at Port-Royal.

When, in the early 1620s, the Jesuits allied with the enemies of Bérulle, who was suspected of trying to bring the French Carmelites under Oratorian control, Saint-Cyr took the chance to subject them to a wide-ranging theological critique. He published a four-volume demolition of a work by François Garasse, SJ – the Somme théologique of 1624 – which, in defending Christianity against free-thinking and libertinage, seemed to concede too

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33 Cf. ch. 7, below.
much to the arguments it purported to refute. Saint-Cyran criticised a pragmatic view of Christian conduct, complacent in its confidence in the competence of natural reason to determine action. This would entail ‘la corruption et depravation de l’Ethique Chrestienne’.

Although Saint-Cyran identified only a few ‘lax’ propositions in Garasse’s work, he established a connection, which the Jansenists would emphasise for the next century and a half, between a degraded methodology, a lax morality, and the Society of Jesus.

Saint-Cyran’s next blow against the Jesuits came in the form of a pseudonymous intervention in disputes within the English Catholic community. The English secular clergy, discomfited by the presence of rivals in the mission field whose methods and aims they disapproved, had been agitating at Rome since the end of the sixteenth century for the restoration of the hierarchy in England. In 1623 Urban VIII finally appeased them with the appointment of William Bishop as titular Bishop of Chalcedon. The Holy See undoubtedly considered him to possess only the extraordinary jurisdiction of a vicar apostolic. Bishop’s successor, Richard Smith, nevertheless attempted to stamp his authority on the mission. He adopted an abrasive policy towards the regular clergy, attempting to bring their finances under his control, and insisting upon the Tridentine decree that parishioners only receive the sacraments from their own priest unless the ordinary approved otherwise. The regular clergy were thus obliged to apply to Smith in order to exercise the functions of hearing

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34 François Garasse, Somme théologique des Vérités capitales de la Religion christienne (Paris, 1625); Saint-Cyran, Somme des fautes et faussetez capitales contenues dans la Somme théologique de P. Garasse, 4t. (Paris, 1626), see esp. t. ii, ep. ded. to Richelieu; Adam, Du mysticisme à la révolte, p. 97; Orcibal, Origines, ii, pp. 26-82; Sainte-Beuve, Port-Royal, i. l. 1, pp. 335-8.
35 Saint-Cyran, Somme des fautes, ii., sig. e(ii), v. (sic.); cf. ib., i, sig. g. r.
36 Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 109-10; Orcibal, Saint-Cyran et le jansénisme, p. 16, thus calls 1626 ‘un tournant dans l’histoire de la spiritualité française’.
37 Session 23, Chapter 1, and Session 24, Chapter 3, renewing the stipulations of the famous decree of the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Canon 21, Omnis utriusque sexus: ‘all the faithful of either sex, after they have reached the age of discernment, should individually confess all their sins in a faithful manner to their own priest at least once a year’, Norman Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 vols. (1990), i, p. 245.
confession and granting absolution. Smith came under virulent attack from two English Jesuits, Edward Knott and John Floyd.\footnote{On this history see John Bossy, \textit{The English Catholic Community 1570-1850} (1975), pp. 11-74; Michael Questier (ed.), \textit{Newsletters from the Caroline Court, 1631-1638: Catholicism and the Politics of Personal Rule} (Camden Soc., 5th series, 26, 2005), Introduction; ch. 2, below, pp. 103-5.}

Under the name Nicholas Smith Knott published his \textit{Modesta et brevis discussio aliquarum assertionum D. doctoris Kellison}, a response to Matthew Kellison’s \textit{Treatise of the Hierarchie} (1629), where the rector of the English College at Douai commended episcopal authority and condemned Jesuit papalism by contrast. Floyd followed with a Latin translation of his \textit{Apology of the Holy See Apostolicks Proceeding}, under the pseudonym Daniel à Jesu.\footnote{Danielis a Jesu apologia pro modo procedenti Sedis Apostolicae in regimine Angliae catholicorum tempore persecutionis cum Defensione Religiosis Status. Praefixa admonitio ad lectorem Hermanni Loemeli (St Omer, 1631).} Smith appealed to his episcopal colleagues in France, and a condemnation by the Archbishop of Paris (Jean-François de Gondi) was followed by a censure from the Sorbonne in February 1631, after ‘solemn and mature deliberation’ in general committee.\footnote{Censura illustrissimi & Reverendissimi in Christo Patris ... die trigesimo mensis Januarii praesentis anni 1631 lata in quasdam propositionas Hibernicas, et duos Libellos Anglicanos ... (Paris, 1631).} Floyd continued the controversy with vituperations upon the censure written as Hermannus Loemelius.\footnote{A very full description of all these proceedings is given in \textit{Petri Aureli Theologi Opera}, 3t. (Paris, 1646), t. 1, sigs. e(i), r. et seq. See also Orcibal, \textit{Origines}, ii, pp. 334-75; and cf. Anthony F. Allison’s trilogy of articles on ‘Richard Smith’s Gallican Backers and Jesuit Opponents’: ‘Part I: Some of the Issues Raised by Kellison’s \textit{Treatise of the Hierarchie}’, \textit{RH}, 18 (1986); ‘Part II: Smith at Paris as Protégé of Richelieu 1631-c. 1642’, \textit{ibid.}, 19 (1988); ‘Part III: Continuation of the Controversy 1631-c. 1643’, \textit{ibid.}, 20 (1990).} Saint-Cyran, as ‘Petrus Aurelius’, responded with two tracts in which he defended the episcopate, in the high register learnt from Bérulle, against the anti-hierarchical arguments of the Jesuits, and vindicated the censure passed upon them by the theology faculty.\footnote{Assertio Epistolae Illustrissimorum ac reverendiss. Galliae Antistitum, Qua libros Nicolai Smithaei & Danielis à Iesu damnarunt (Paris, 1632); \textit{Vindiciae Censurae Facultatis Theologiae Parisiensis} (Paris, 1632).} He subjected the ‘Molinisticam Societatem’ to the most violent of recriminations, argued that the bishops, unlike regular clergy, were of the essence of the Church, and limited the pope’s infallibility to
questions of faith and morals insofar as he speaks as chief of the Church and guardian of that which Christ has enjoined and prescribed.  

In his vindication of the censure Saint-Cyran again associated the Jesuits, led by ambition to multiply contradictory moral cases without heeding the danger to penitents, with a spirit of moral permissiveness. Indicating a historical narrative of Jesuit ‘laxism’ based on their writings, Saint-Cyran added, to more traditional areas of criticism in ecclesiology and politics, dubious morality as an essential element in the polemical image of the Society. To the profusion of modern works he opposed the core of scripture and tradition; to scholastic complexity and flexibility he opposed primitive simplicity and rigour. Interestingly he spent a portion of the Assertio defending John Barnes, renegade Benedictine author of a treatise, based on scripture and the fathers, especially Augustine, against the casuistical doctrine of equivocation. Barnes has been described as a ‘precursor of the Provinciales’: his Traicté et dispute contre les équivoques, published with the backing of the Sorbonne in 1625, was certainly influential, and was admired by later English writers such as Edward Stillingfleet. Barnes hoped for the reunion of Rome and Canterbury on the basis of a Gallican theory of independent national churches, writing several tracts in the service of this case. His eccentric avocations earned the cruel return of perpetual imprisonment at Rome, from 1628 until he died, not before having lost his sanity, in 1661.

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43 See Petri Aureli Theologi Opera, t. i, p. 72, on Floyd’s ill-advised attempt to satirise the Sorbonne’s censure by applying it to the Apostles’ creed; and ib., t. I, p. 248; t. ii, pp. 22f., 157f., et passim.
44 On this ‘véritable déchaînement contre le relâchement moral et ses sources théologiques’, see Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 111f.
45 Petri Aureli Theologi Opera, t. 1, pp. 256-62. Augustine’s unequivocal position is laid out in his De mendacio.
47 Ch. 3, below.
48 Some of his proofs were incorporated into the English translation of Isaac Basire’s De antiqua Ecclesiae Britannicae libertate, The Ancient Liberty of the Britannick Church (1661), pp. 41f.
The writings of Petrus Aurelius were heralded by the French clergy, receiving marks of recognition from the episcopal bench and on four occasions in the 1630s and 1640s from the General Assembly of the Clergy. The Dean and Secretary of the English Chapter, the administrative body of the Catholic secular clergy in England, thanked Aurelius for his most devout labours in the service of Mother Church. Intellectuals of international standing such as Hugo Grotius acknowledged the proficiency of his work.\(^{49}\) During the 1630s Saint-Cyran would propagate a distinctive spirituality – characterised by a penitential method of interior ‘renouvellement’, to be accomplished before the penitent dares to participate in the eucharist\(^{50}\) – which condemned by contrast the superficial and corrupt morality of the Jesuits. His intensely inward focus appeared subversive in some eyes, and threatened to endanger the intermediary role of the hierarchical Church – a tendency made clear in the work of his most famous disciple, Arnauld, *De la fréquente communion*, where Arnauld seemed to question the *ex opere operato* efficacy of the sacraments.\(^{51}\) But it was the same set of oppositions which inspired Saint-Cyran, that Carthusian-in-spirit, as his editor called him, to dwell on silence and solitude, as it did the violent paranoiac of the pages of Bremond to assail the Society of Jesus:\(^{52}\) that which is interior, permanent, and substantial, was set against that which is exterior, equivocal, and empty; the timeless and immutable laws of God, communicated in the concise record of his revelation, against the recent and flexible determinations of the casuists, contained in endless cacodoxical catalogues.

Of Arnauld’s work, which carried on this argument, and appeared to great acclaim in 1643, it is only necessary to state here that it exhibited all the hallmarks of the method traced

\(^{49}\) *Petri Aureli Theologi Opera*, i, sig. i (vi), v.-r.; Orcibal, *Saint-Cyran et le jansénisme*, p. 17.

\(^{50}\) See e.g. Saint-Cyran, *Le Cœur Nouveau. Explication des Cérémonies de la Messe. Et Exercice pour la bien entendre. Raisons de l’ancienne Cérémonie de suspendre le S. Sacrament au milieu du grand Autel*, in *Théologie Familière, avec divers autres petits traités de dévotion* (2\(^{nd}\) ed., Paris, 1669)[1st ed. 1627], pp. 110-11. The suspension of the host in the pyx expresses the essence of the sacrament of the eucharist, which comprehends ‘un grand nombre de suspensions admirables’ (p. 271), especially that of concupiscent nature which is replaced by a new nature flowing from the grace of Christ; cf. ch. 7, below.

\(^{51}\) Ch. 7, below.

\(^{52}\) *Lettres Chrétiennes et Spirituelles*, t. I, sigs. o (vi), r. et seq.
out by Saint-Cyran, and achieved through the verve and clarity of its arguments a considerable impression on the public consciousness. An equally important contribution to the controversy under discussion was the small work which Arnauld composed and published in the same year (possibly with the collaboration of his Sorbonne colleague, François Hallier), *La Théologie Morale des Jésuites*. Following a campaign against Jesuit pretensions, prompted by institutional jealousy and prosecuted by Godefroi Hermant, later known for his patristic biographies, this work invented the generic method followed by Pascal in the *Provinciales.* It presented a catalogue of propositions in morality extracted from casuistical works and arrayed in a de-contextualised series calculated to produce an impression of horror in the reader. The extracts were indiscriminate and covered a diverse terrain within the four main areas of ‘la morale chrestienne en général’, specific precepts of the divine law, the use of the sacraments, and ecclesiology. They introduced a cast of criminous characters whose names would be familiarised by repetition: the majority of citations were from two censured books, Bauny’s *Somme* and Cellot’s *De hierarchia*, a work in defence of Knott and Floyd which also pleaded for the modern casuists. This exploitation of discredited figures fused the association between lax morality, casuistry, and the Jesuits.

The form and much of the content of the Jansenist critique had thus been determined: it was only left to Pascal to clothe it in his attractive conceit. Pascal’s polemical assumptions and methods did not differ from what has already been described. The *Provinciales* themselves, however, did give rise to some new developments. The first sign of the new momentum they imparted to the debate over casuistry was the initiative now taken by the diocesan clergy of Paris and Rouen. The Parisian *curés* were in combative mood in the 1650s. They agitated in behalf of their exiled archbishop, the *frondeur* Cardinal de Retz.

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53 Analysed ch. 7, below.  
55 In England it can be consulted in the BL, C.150 n. 12.
Fired with the ideas of Richer, they aimed at total autonomy in their own parishes. The Jansenist attack on the Jesuits, regulars bound especially to the pope, was therefore sympathetic, and its outlines were now incorporated into their ‘mentality of opposition’. In May 1656, after Pascal’s seventh letter, they decided corporately to pursue a condemnation ‘de ces pernicieuses maximes’. At the same time a dispute was developing at Rouen, where the curé Charles du Four, inspired by the Provinciales, had preached against Jesuit moral theology. The archbishop, François II de Harlay, was solicited for arbitration, leading to the production of the Requête présentée par Messieurs les Curez de Rouën à Monseigneur leur Archevesque. In September the two bodies of curés joined forces, and there appeared the Advis de messieurs les curez de Paris, à messieurs les curez des autres dioceses de France sur les mauvaises maximes de quelques nouveaux casuistes. With it were joined the Requête of the Rouen curés, and an Extraict de quelques-unes des plus dangereuses propositions de la morale de plusieurs nouveaux casuistes fidellement tirées de leurs ouvrages, which has been attributed to Arnauld and Pascal. De Harlay delated the matter to the Assembly of the Clergy, to whom the Second Advis des Curez de Paris and the Suite de l’extrait de mauvaises propositions were presented. Meanwhile an anonymous work concentrating on one casuist, Emmanuel Mascarenhas, appeared. Where Pascal had sought to provoke popular outrage,

58 Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 204f. for more detail on the following narrative.
60 Second advis ou lettre des Curez de Paris à messieurs les curez des autres dioceses de France sur leur premier advis touchant la fausse et pernicieuse morale du temps; Suite de l’extrait de plusieurs mauvaises maximes des nouveaux casuistes recueillies par messieurs les Curez de Paris et présentées à Nosseigneurs de l’Assemblee générale du Clergé de France le 24 novembre 1656 (Paris, 1656).
61 Extraict de quelques propositions d’un nouvel Auteur Jésuite nommé Mascarenhas, imprimé chez Cramoisy en cette année 1656 et qui se vend depuis le mois d’octobre (Paris, 1656).
these writings sought to persuade the curés’ ecclesiastical superiors in their capacity as doctors and teachers; they received a work concentrating specifically on the doctrine of probability as explained by the Cistercian Caramuel. Despite the irregular corporate action of the curés, the Assembly evidently agreed with the thrust of the critique: it was at this point that it ordered Borromeo’s *Instructions* for confessors to be printed and disseminated throughout the dioceses of France.

The atmosphere now became considerably more heated with the intervention of ‘le jésuit pyromane’, Georges Pirot. His *Apologie pour les Casuistes* appeared in December 1657, and must number among the most counter-productive apologies in the history of the Church. Inopportune attempting to justify the very aspects of the casuistical tradition which Pascal condemned, Pirot shut the stable door after the horse had bolted, and his provincial, Cellot, paid for this clumsiness with his position. Pirot’s effort was a gift for the Jansenist party, and throughout 1658 and 1659 there appeared a series of writings which lustily carried on the campaign against ‘relâchement’. Known collectively as the *Écrits des Curés de Paris*, these included significant contributions from Pascal, who produced the first two, the fifth, and the sixth, and Pierre Nicole (1625-95), who produced the third and fourth. As well as seeking ecclesiastical censure the curés petitioned the parlement. Their agitations bore fruit in the form of numerous episcopal censures and the censure of Pirot’s work by the Sorbonne.

These various writings, petitions, and censures all focused on the slackening of moral standards, and agreed in attributing responsibility to the new casuistical method, which

63 *Principes et suites de la probabilité expliquez par Caramuel l’un des plus celebres entre les Casuistes nouveaux dans un livre imprimé en 1652 intitulé Theologia Fundamentalis*.
66 Conveniently consulted in Récalde (ed.), *Écrits des Curés de Paris*.
67 n. 9, above.
inevitably produced, on account of its reliance on natural reason, a system adapted to the frailties and peccadilloes of sensual man. Like the *Provinciales*, they trained attention on the doctrine of probabilism, which was seen to be the root cause of this flexibility in morals, and concerning which debate would continue throughout the 1660s and 1670s.\(^{68}\) It is time to examine the subject in greater detail.

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2) Substance of the Jansenist Critique

‘What man can find salvation in a legal quibble?’

Mr. Harding

As the foregoing survey demonstrates, the Port-Royalists’ critique in moral theology was formulated and developed within a highly polemical context, and any account of their campaign against the modern casuists must acknowledge a number of straw men among the enemy casualties. Despite the damning appearance of the unpalatable casuistical propositions arrayed in various catalogues, for example, it is their relative paucity and narrowness which appears against the background of the vast literature from which they were extracted.69 It was, moreover, inaccurate to father these propositions, themselves not always representative or widely maintained, upon the Jesuits as a body.70 Some of the most roughly handled casuists were not Jesuits at all, such as the erudite Cistercian Caramuel, or Diana, a Theatine clerk. Finally, as Jesuit apologists represented from the start, a significant gap frequently existed between the aims and intentions of the targets of the polemic and those with which they were credited.71 To read the Provinciales one would suppose their author indifferent almost to the real pastoral difficulties addressed by casuistical attempts to elucidate the application of the moral law.72 That such a judgement might be problematic is suggested by the fact that he convicts the casuists precisely of being excessively speculative, and by

69 Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 154-5, shows that, of 120 propositions set out in La Théologie Morale des Jésuites of 1643, ‘on n’a … que 20 propositions qui relèvent directement de la casuistique’.
consequence therefore insufficiently practical. It does however indicate the extremely one-sided nature of the *Provinciales* as a literary and apologetic entity. Under one aspect they were really a public relations exercise, pleading in behalf of a reformist platform increasingly discredited by the accusation of heresy under which its proponents laboured. Pascal induced readers to share in the letter-writer ‘Montalte’s’ outrage by developing a clear and commonsensical voice, often impassioned but always reasoned, which was itself a rhetorical device.\(^{73}\)

Nevertheless, despite the evident slanting of Port-Royalist productions like the *Provinciales*, which blended apology with satire and polemic against the Jesuits, the advantages of establishing any thoroughgoing distinction between ‘polemic’ and ‘ideology’ are not clear.\(^{74}\) Apart from the obvious danger that the distinction in any given case will be more or less arbitrary, there is also the dubious implication that works of ‘polemic’ must be considered untrustworthy guides at best to ‘ideological’ commitments defined by contrast as genuine or timeless. That certain occasions or genres of literary production will be less affected by polemical forces than others is not to be disputed. But the distinction, if insensitively applied, may easily result in an unbalanced analysis, distorted by a credulous treatment of supposedly ‘ideological’ works together with the exclusion of supposedly ‘polemical’ lines of argument. Precisely this danger becomes apparent when the impulse, just and necessary as it is, to counterbalance the disproportionate credit which has historically attached to the critique enshrined in the *Provinciales*, is quickened by a contemporary concern to rehabilitate aspects of the ethical methodology there satirised. It is one thing to acknowledge that the methodology and conclusions of the casuists were comprehensible in their own terms. It is another to discount the arguments in which Pascal denounces them as so much ‘polemic’, and impute to him in consequence positions deduced, with what skill


\(^{74}\) This line is taken by Gay, *Morales en conflit*: it must be emphasised, however, that his careful exposition avoids the pitfalls mentioned here.
another may judge, from texts in which he expresses himself more ‘sincerely’. Such, it may be supposed, is the procedure of modern apologists for casuistry, who present Pascal as an enemy to casuistry tout court – no matter that this equation produces a moral rigorist who scorned the application of the moral law.\textsuperscript{75}

Regardless of its object, or the validity of the objections canvassed, any negative criticism will reveal the concerns of the critic and reflect his positive ambitions. It is in this spirit that the following exposition of the Jansenist critique of probabilist casuistry is undertaken. Our interest in the casuistical method and its tradition extends only so far as it serves to measure the programme of its detractors. This is what we will presently seek out in the English context. It is by the presence of the criticisms of the Port-Royalists, however unjust, and of their citations, however loose or inaccurate (though generally they were neither),\textsuperscript{76} that we will gauge the impact of their writings among English thinkers. In order to gain a true sense of Anglophone reactions to this material, some coherent and synoptic account of the Port-Royalist critique must also be provided.

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A brief apology for this synthetic approach may still be necessary, since there are various reasons why a distinction might be put between those Jansenist ideas about moral and sacramental theology which Pascal distilled in the \textit{Provinciales}, and those concerning the doctrines of original sin and irresistible grace summed up, however accurately, in the Five Propositions. Pascal’s first three letters intervened in the cause of Arnauld, threatened with censure by the Sorbonne after denying that the Propositions, now episcopally as well as


\textsuperscript{76} CLP, nn., passim; but cf. Duchène, \textit{L’Imposture littéraire}, pp. 171-84, on the highly rhetorical manner in which Pascal disposes them.
papally condemned, were as a matter of fact to be found in Jansen’s *Augustinus*. With Arnauld having lost his defence and been expelled from the Sorbonne in February 1656, Pascal’s fourth letter, dated February 25th, abandoned the subject of the theology of grace in favour of an offensive against the moral theology of the Jesuits. The letters from the eleventh to the unfinished nineteenth were mostly occupied with defending, against Jesuit counter-polemics, the criticisms broached in the previous seven. So there is justification for regarding the polemic against laxist casuistry in the *Provinciales* as an occasional device, resorted to when vindication on the properly doctrinal front had become impossible. That the Port-Royalists themselves hoped for a more sympathetic hearing if the moral theological part of their case was presented apart from the dogmatic is suggested by the statement, probably Pascal’s, in the *Factum pour les curés de Paris*, that ‘il n’y a aucun rapport d’une de ces matières à l’autre’. Supposing it holds, that is, the case against Jansen in no way diminishes that against the casuists.

These considerations, however, should not prevent us from seeking, as well in the *Provinciales* as in other works whose contribution to the anti-laxist campaign we have surveyed, a coherent theological attitude consonant with doctrinal views exposed elsewhere. The literary front launched by Arnauld after the death of Saint-Cyran thirteen years earlier included not only works on penance and grace, but also the *Théologie morale des Jésuites*, a major source for Pascal’s citations. The notion that a clear separation should be made between moral theology and the doctrine of grace and salvation would have been vigorously rejected by Pascal and his associates. The same question, in their view, that of man’s nature and destiny, is merely treated under different aspects. Doctrine and morality are reciprocally

79 Lanson, ‘Les Provinciales et le Livre de la Théologie Morale des Jésuites’.
related. Hence their claim against the Jesuits was that an anthropocentric theology and a worldly morality were mutually reinforcing.

That Pascal, putting the relationship in an interesting way, found in ‘le relâchement de leur [the Jesuits’] morale la cause de leur doctrine touchant la grâce’, shows the importance they attached to the outward, ethical side of this equation, far more, in their theology, than a mere sign of the inward.\(^{80}\) This statement may contain a historical point, since the doctrine of probabilism was worked out before the system of Molina. More fundamentally it encapsulates Pascal’s case against the casuists, who, making man equal to his duties by accommodating those duties to his frailty, managed to combine the opposed errors of naturalism – an overestimation of human capacity resulting in presumption – and scepticism – an abandonment of the search for truth resulting in insouciance – which he refuted in the \textit{Entretien avec M. de Saci}. There he showed, as he would in the \textit{Pensées}, that the paradox of man, his end so great, his nature so weak, is resolved only in the union of two natures in the incarnate God.\(^{81}\) Morality should treat what is thereby made possible; taking as their subject the limits of the permissible, the casuists seemed to Pascal to concern themselves only with the symptoms of man’s frailty, failing therefore to grasp the essential idea of the cure.

\begin{quote}
Vous y verrez [in their books] les vertus chrétiennes si inconnues et si dépourvues de la charité, qui en est l’âme et la vie … que vous ne trouverez plus étrange qu’ils soutiennent que tous les hommes ont toujours assez de grâce pour vivre dans la piété …

Comme leur morale est toute païenne, la nature suffit pour l’observer.\(^{82}\)
\end{quote}

The distance between the capacity of fallen man and the supernatural morality laid down by Christ, on the other hand, indicates the accuracy of the Augustinian account of efficacious

\(^{80}\) \textit{CLP}, p. 78, my emphasis; see chs. 4 & 7, below.


\(^{82}\) \textit{CLP}, p. 78.
grace. Given this close relationship between the question of how and how far the moral law obliges, and that of grace and the role of man vis-à-vis its operation, it seems justified to assume that the Jansenist critique of laxist casuistry ‘est inspirée par une pensée positive et qu’une doctrine morale cohérente’ can thence be recovered. For Pascal ‘Jésus-Christ est l’objet de tout, et le centre où tout tend’. ‘This phrase’, as Krailsheimer writes, ‘must be borne constantly in mind as one reads not only the *Pensées* but also the *Provincial Letters* and Pascal’s other religious works’.

To the Jansenists the casuists’ isolation of the conscience as the measure of morality, separated from the eternal and immutable law it ought to subserve, seemed the counterpart of Molina’s exaggeration of free will into the measure of grace. But this is no more to say that they rejected the problems the casuists attempted to solve than it is to say that they dismissed the problems of divine grace and foreknowledge upon which Molina exercised his ingenuity. The vehemence of the attacks launched by Arnauld, Pascal, Nicole and others on the method and results of the casuistical specialists can give the misleading impression that they rejected the casuistical endeavour as such. Baudin, for example, convicted Pascal of throwing the baby of casuistry and probabilistic reasoning out with the bathwater of laxism. Others, thinking of Pascal’s mathematical genius and the so-called Cartesianism of Port-Royal, explain this lapse in terms of the aspiration after an impossible degree of certainty in morals: ‘je ne me contente pas du probable, je cherche le sûr’. The pragmatic casuists, by contrast, were guided by Aristotle’s warning in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (I.3, 1094b) that an ‘educated man’ will seek only that degree of precision which is appropriate to the nature of the subject-

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84 *Pensées*, 449.
86 Molina made the effect of grace conditional upon the free response of man, see below, ch. 4, pp. 181-2.
87 Baudin, *Études historiques*, iii, pp. 7-8 et passim.
88 CLP, p. 84.
On this analysis the Jansenist approach to morality, being totally intolerant of uncertainty, would have been categorically inconsistent with casuistry, understood as the science of managing the inevitable uncertainty involved in applying general moral principles to particular cases. Then the Jansenists must have renounced all interest in practical morals – so that this assessment seems not so much to explain as to explain away their writings on the subject.

The question of certainty did figure largely in the Jansenists’ rejection of the ‘new’ casuistry of the period, but it would be imprecise to pose it in terms of an absolute opposition between the certain and the doubtful, or between demonstrative and probabilistic reasoning. This was not the issue at stake. No traditionally-minded moralist held, as Hobbes for example effectively did, that morality could be an exact science like geometry, conclusively deducible from a series of axioms. As Arnauld pointed out in his *Dissertation Théologique sur la probabilité*, certainty in this mathematical sense belongs in the sphere of morality only to God. It is not that certainty in morals is inaccessible to man: he has access to demonstrative moral knowledge in the form of universal principles disclosed by the light of nature and by revelation, and more specific principles can be necessarily deduced from these. But in morals the object of knowledge is not truth only, but also action; and with action we are not dealing with the necessary and universal, but with the contingent and changeable. The conclusions drawn from moral principles are affected by the particular aspects of a given case: the same

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89 Jonsen and Toulmin, *The Abuse of Casuistry*, e.g. at p. 241.
90 A succinct definition of ‘casuistry’ is in *DTC*, II, cols. 1859-77. In a more general sense it signifies the practical application of the knowledge of moral duty in specific cases. As such it is a universal and daily activity. The need for technical and expert casuistry, however, only arises in cases where some doubt exists either as to the content of the moral law or as to its bearing on a given case; where there is no doubt about the law and its application there is no obstacle in the way of action.
91 This *Dissertation* was translated by Nicole and included as the first note on the fifth letter in his Latin edition of the *Provinciales*: ‘William Wendrock’, *Ludovici Montalti Litterae provinciales de Morali et Politica Jesuitarum, e Gallica Latinae linguae versae cum notis per Guglielmum Wendrockium* (Cologne, 1658) [Wendrock]. I have consulted the 6th ed. Cologne, 1700; the *Dissertatio* at pp. 106f. I refer to the Latin where necessary, and occasionally for cross-reference, but quote for convenience from the faithful French translation by Mlle de Joncoux, *Les Provinciales, ou Lettres Écrites par Louis de Montalte. Avec les notes de G. Wendrock*, 3t. (n.p., 1699) [Joncoux], t. 1, at pp. 276f.
action may realise the good in one case but not in another.\textsuperscript{92} Morals are therefore essentially an empirical study, not an abstractly speculative one. Since the objects of this study are changeable they are not the objects of knowledge but of opinion in varying degrees of persuasion.\textsuperscript{93} One would therefore have to be, as Arnauld observed, ‘tout-à-fait dépourvu de bon sens, pour nier’ that there are probable opinions in morality.\textsuperscript{94} The task of the moralist is to inform the conscience in order that it may ascend from doubt and probability to a degree of certainty about the application of moral knowledge in this or that case sufficient for action.

All this was common ground to the parties to the debate over casuistry. It was in relation to the method or rule whereby uncertainty is resolved, and the sort of certainty which can license action defined, that differences might arise.

We are not, then, confronted here with the clash of two systems, as it were fully worked out and irreconcilable in first principles, but with an argument between the common heirs of the tradition of Catholic moral theology over its legitimate interpretation and development. The ‘probabilist’ method of resolving the uncertainty that hinders action, which rose to ascendancy in Catholic casuistry of the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, emerged as the result of a comprehensible line of historical development. What the Jansenists disputed was neither the subject-matter nor the necessity of casuistical theology, but (their contribution being mainly negative and backward-looking) its development in a direction they asserted to be illegitimate and corrupt. \textit{Abusum non tollit usum}: as in other related areas of praxis such as eucharistic discipline, the Jansenists, partisans of penance and consequently

\textsuperscript{92} Jonsen and Toulmin, \textit{The Abuse of Casuistry}, lay a great deal of stress on the notion of circumstances as affecting moral value (Cicero, in \textit{De Invent. Rhetor.} i, famously listed seven: who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when; Aristotle, \textit{Nic. Ethics} III.1, 1111a, also has ‘what about’; Aquinas discusses circumstances \textit{ST}, IaIae, Q. 7). This, in their view, exemplifies the flexible, taxonomic, realistic approach to morals which the rigid and dogmatic Pascal could not stomach. In the fourth \textit{Provinciale} it is the ‘Jansenist’ who has to expound this unobjectionable concept to the ill-read ‘good father’: CLP, pp. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{93} These are essentially the views of Aquinas, \textit{ST}, IaIae, q. 94; cf. q. 100, a. 1; IIaIae, q. 120, a. 1. As well as the \textit{Nic. Ethics}, esp. X.6, there is a precedent in Plato’s discussion of the insufficiency of laws in respect of the variability of men and actions in the \textit{Statesman}, 294a-300c.

\textsuperscript{94} Joncoux, p. 278.
panegyrists of the confessor or spiritual director for whose benefit the casuists wrote, looked for reform, not reduction.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{Probabilism}

Probabilism, which Pascal described as ‘le fondement et l’A B C’ of modern casuistry,\textsuperscript{96} represented, as we have indicated, a method for resolving the conscience where the conformity of a proposed action with the moral law cannot be certainly known. The substance and development of the doctrine can be most conveniently outlined by examining the views of Aquinas on the conscience: these generally formed the starting point for later discussions of the subject, which indeed can largely be traced through Thomistic commentaries.\textsuperscript{97}

Aquinas says we have knowledge of some moral principles in the same direct, intuitive way we grasp speculative principles like that of non-contradiction. These basic principles constitute the general premises for reasoning about moral action. Their application to particular circumstances is the function of the conscience. Just as in speculative reasoning, there is room for error. One may start from a faulty axiom, or reason falsely from a sound one. In either case, however, the judgement formed by the conscience must be followed, or we should act wrongly, that is against reason, the faculty by which understanding creatures

\textsuperscript{95} See e.g. Arnauld’s stringent list of qualifications for the confessor, bearing out the phrase which he quotes from Bérulle, that ‘the conduct of a single soul is more difficult than the government of a kingdom’: \textit{FC}, pp. 96-100, 251. They are modelled on François de Sales, \textit{Introduction à la vie dévote}, in \textit{Œuvres}, ed. A Ravier (Paris, 1969), pp. 38-40. Saint-Cyran’s reputation of course rests on his work as a spiritual director. One can even point to ‘Jansenist’ books of casuistry in François Genet, \textit{Théologie morale ou résolutions des cas de conscience selon l’Ecriture Sainte, les Canons et les Saints Pères} (Paris, 1670); Jacques de Sainte-Beuve, \textit{Résolutions de plusieurs cas de conscience touchant la morale et la discipline de l’Eglise} (Lyon, 1702).

\textsuperscript{96} CLP, p. 85.

are moved in accordance with the divine plan. Since it can be in error, therefore, the conscience can oblige us to sin. But it is never good to sin: ‘[agere] contra legem semper est malum’. This disjunction, between the immutable nature of the good and man’s competence to discern the way thither, presents a difficulty. To what extent are the deficiencies of the conscience culpable, and how may they be compensated for?

This question needs to be set in the context of Aquinas’s general understanding of moral action. An act only has moral value when it is voluntary, that is, purposive. The end of all human life is its own highest good, happiness in God. The object of voluntary action in general is therefore goodness itself; when we want particular things it is because they appear good to us. In identifying an end and pursuing it, that is inclining towards or intending it, logical priority is given to the intellect, since we must be aware of something before we can intend it. The mind presents the will with an apparent good; the will desires it; the mind then deliberates about the best means of fulfilling the desire, and the will’s consent to one of these alternatives will terminate in action. But although the moral value of an action is therefore defined in relation to the mind, i.e., to the end by which it is ordered, it is also dependent on the will. The general object of goodness moves the mind to identify particular ends, and the pursuit of any good is a function of desire. This means the passions also have an important role in determining moral action, since they can directly stimulate desire or aversion regardless of some intended end. So for Aquinas three qualities are important for a moral agent: clarity of intellect, uprightness of will, and a culture adequate to the countervailing stimuli of the affections. The man who achieves the right balance between knowledge and

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98 ST, Ia, q. 79, a.12-13; IaIIae, q. 19, a. 4-6; IaIIae, qq. 53-5; [Q]uæstiones [d]isputatae de [v]eritate, qq. 16-17.
99 Quæstiones de [Quodlibet], VIII, a. 13.
100 ST, IaIIae, qq. 1-21; cf. q. 71, a. 1. Helpful is Rebecca DeYoung, Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context (Notre Dame, 2009).
101 ST, IaIIae, qq. 22f.; cf. Qdv, q. 16, a. 3, ad. 3.
inclination, issuing in good choices, is a prudent man. He discerns the good accurately and is habituated to choosing it.\textsuperscript{102}

Defects in the mind and will eventuating from the fall (ignorance, disordered desire), combined with the particularity and contingency of action, hinder us from apprehending and choosing the good in particular instances.\textsuperscript{103} For Aquinas, then, there must exist, in order to avoid the disorder of sin and fulfil our purpose within the universal order, an obligation to remedy these defects as far as possible.

The clearest deficiency arises from ignorance, either of the law or of aspects of a particular case. If the intellect is not equipped to make correct judgements, it becomes easier to explain how one may sin while obeying the conscience. The more broadly ignorance is conceived, the more easily can actions arising from faulty judgements be excused. Aquinas, however, defined this excusable ignorance quite narrowly: the ignorance must precede the act, so that the act is caused by it; and it does not comprehend what one ought to or could know, but has neglected to discover. Wrong action resulting from ignorance of some crucial fact or positive law may be excusable, but ignorance of what we are obliged to know – the natural law, the articles of faith, and whatever duties appertain to our station – is negligent, therefore voluntary, and therefore culpable.\textsuperscript{104} So there is an obligation to inform the conscience by supplying it with more knowledge of the moral law. An erring conscience must be changed or ‘set aside’ (‘depositus’).\textsuperscript{105}

An ignorant conscience errs because, by reason of absent data, its deliberations terminate in a wrong choice; and unless the ignorance was invincible, this indicates a bad will, eager to enjoy some immediate good without troubling about the greater good. But it

\textsuperscript{102} ST, IaIIae, q. 47; IaIae, q. 57, a. 4-6, q. 58, a. 5.
\textsuperscript{103} See ST, IaIIae, qq. 85-7; ib., 76, 78, a.1.
\textsuperscript{104} Ib., q. 76; cf. q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6.
\textsuperscript{105} Qdv, q. 17, a. 4, ad. 8; Quodlibet, III, q. 12, a. 2, ad. 2.
can also happen that the conscience remains suspended in deliberation. The means which we propose to ourselves for choice can always (since no particular good can be perfectly good) appear good in one perspective, bad in another. Moreover, the moral value of any action is affected by the circumstances in which it takes place. If different contingencies keep presenting themselves to our mind, there is nothing, as Aquinas says, to stop deliberation being potentially endless.\textsuperscript{106} Clearly that is bad, since deliberate action is the essence of morality. The conscience must be resolved so that we have an obligation to act in one way and not another.

There are two sorts of irresolution. We may be unable to assent to any one alternative, or to assent without fear. In this case we doubt whether the proposed action is lawful. In a well known passage, much quoted by Jansenist writers, Aquinas makes it clear that to act despite such trepidation is itself sinful, whether or not the action is lawful.\textsuperscript{107} Someone who acts while entertaining this doubt sins simply by putting himself in danger of sinning, ‘loving a temporal good more than his own salvation’.\textsuperscript{108} If action is wrong so long as a danger of sin is apprehended, there is an obligation to resolve the doubt.\textsuperscript{109} If the doubt persists, Aquinas invoked what Deman describes as the ‘universal’ rule of medieval theologians, the jurisprudential principle which, in the thirteenth century, Innocent III had already applied to morals, ‘in dubiis pars tuitior eligenda est’.\textsuperscript{110} That is, of possible alternatives, the ‘safer’ (‘tutior’) or less risky one is to be chosen: if we suspect an action is unlawful, we must avoid it. Thus by this tutorist rule an obligation to act or abstain is created even when uncertainty is unresolved. The scrupulous conscience is provided with a means whereby it can descend to

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{ST}, IaIIae, q. 10, a. 2; q. 14, a. 6.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Quodlibet.}, VIII, a. 13. The passage is brought up in the sixth \textit{Provinciale, CLP}, pp. 104-5. See also Wendrock, pp. 132f. (Joncoux, pp. 315f.).

\textsuperscript{108} ‘Periculo se committit et sic procul dubio peccat, utpote magis amans beneficium temporale quam propriam salutem’.

\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Qd., q. 17, a. 4.

\textsuperscript{110} ‘Semper est accipiendum illud quod habet minus de periculo’; (\textit{ST}, IIIa, q. 83, a. 6); ‘Si dubium sit, debet vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiores consulere’ (\textit{ST}, IaIIae, q. 96, a. 6); Deman, cols. 424-30.
action despite its doubts. The more widely doubt is conceived, the more insurance there is against the possibility that the conscience obliges an agent to sin. Ignorance of a law, for example, could be interpreted as a doubt about permissibility, thus creating an obligation either to inform the conscience or to take the safer path. The reverse of course is also true: ignorance might be extended to cover cases of doubt.

The second form of irresolution arises when conflicting courses appear equally good. This possibility follows inevitably from the fact that moral action takes place in a contingent world: moral deliberation must by definition be opinionative rather than demonstrative. And any opinion, as distinct from knowledge, supposes the potential truth of a conflicting opinion. So in moral action we must be content with what we can judge to be ‘probable’.111 This word ‘probable’, deriving from ‘probare’ (to prove, approve, recommend, etc.), has a somewhat ambiguous force. On the one hand Aquinas, following Aristotle’s definition, understood it as that which is approved ‘by all or by many or by the wise’. It does not proceed to scientiam, the object of demonstrative argument, but to opinionem, the end of ‘dialectical’ argument.112 Thus, as Byrne says, ‘it suggests approbation with regard to the proposition accepted, and probity with regard to the authorities who accept it’, and only in this sense connotes evidence or ‘provability’.113 On the other hand, Deman is undoubtedly right to argue that Aquinas’s notion of probability is ‘pénétrée de l’idée de vérité’.114 ‘It must be said’, Aquinas remarks, ‘that when there are two contrary opinions about the same thing, one of them must be true

111 ST, IaIIae, q. 70, a. 2 (‘probabilis certitudo’); IaIIae, q. 96, a. 1, ad. 3; IaIIae, q. 1, a. 4 & a. 5, ad. 4. Edmund F. Byrne, ‘Situation et probabilité chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin’, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 64, 84 (1966), pp. 525-49; idem, Probability and Opinion: A study in the late-medieval presuppositions of post-medieval theories of probability (The Hague, 1968). It is possible, however, to over-estimate the degree of relativity this implies. ‘Excellence in deliberation’, says Aristotle, is not opinion, because ‘correctness of opinion is truth’: possibility is not equivalent with probability. Nic. Ethics, VI. 9, 1142b; A. Gardiel, ‘La “Certitude Probable”’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 5 (1911), pp. 441-85, at 445-7.
112 Aristotle, Topics, 100b20-21; Aquinas[?], De Fallaciis, c. 2, 636; also e.g. Expositio libri Posterorum Analyticorum, I, l. 44.
113 Byrne, Probability and Opinion, p. 188.
114 Deman, col. 431.
and the other false’.\textsuperscript{115} Since the false opinion will entail sin, Aquinas clearly thinks that an opinion has value, and should command the assent of the intellect, only on the basis of its proximity to the truth; the primitive ‘calculus of probabilities’ which Byrne discerns in his conception of deliberation illustrates the same thing, insofar as it is inspired by Aquinas’s fundamental aspiration after a progressive conformation to truth culminating in the intellectual vision of God.\textsuperscript{116} Thus for Aquinas ‘probable’ signifies, as well as what is worthy of approbation, what is likely to be true. Otherwise, since he believes that the law is immutable and that it is always evil to transgress it, it would not make sense for him to maintain that a probable opinion is sufficient to resolve the conscience, i.e., that it gives a non-demonstrable certainty sufficient for action.\textsuperscript{117}

Aquinas’s response to the problem posed by the deficiencies of the conscience, then, was not exactly indulgent. Only a prior invincible ignorance of fact or positive law can excuse from sin; in doubts the tutiorist rule applies where strenuous effort to inform the conscience fails; and a probable conscience is bound by the same obligation to truth which binds the doubtful conscience.\textsuperscript{118} But the concepts with which he was dealing might be qualified in other ways. Ignorance might be conceived more broadly. It might also be extended to cover cases of doubt. In the same way the sphere of probability might be enlarged to comprehend doubt, on the principle that in both cases the potential truth of a conflicting opinion is recognised. Thus the liberty to follow a probable (authoritative) opinion would replace the obligation to take the safer way. These less stringent qualifications are possible in virtue of the underlying assumption about the rights of the conscience. If it is sin to act against the conscience, it might be concluded that the resolution of the conscience must

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Quodlib.}, VIII, art. 13: ‘quando sunt duo opiniones contrarii de eodem, oportet alteram esse veram et alteram esse falsam’.

\textsuperscript{116} Byrne, ‘Situation et probabilité’, p. 530, etc.


\textsuperscript{118} Deman, cols. 418-37, makes the case that this position characterises medieval theology in general.
preserve from sin. Aquinas was very far from holding this view. The conscience can be in error. For Aquinas the rightness or wrongness of any act is defined by the end with which it is intended: as we saw this implies both the ability to perceive the truth and the disposition to act conformably. The eternal moral order, of which the conscience is merely the *porte-parole*, is the fixed standard of human action.\(^{119}\)

The later medieval period, however, did witness a tendency to qualify this theoretical rigidity. The institutionalisation of annual private confession in canon 21 of Lateran IV in 1215, a symptom of the Church’s drive systematically to regulate the moral lives of the laity, stimulated an increasing level of attention to the problems posed by the conscience.\(^{120}\) Deman has traced how a more indulgent attitude to the conscience developed in literature intended to assist confessors in dealing with penitents.\(^{121}\) The emphasis naturally came to fall rather on how the conscience could be eased than on the rigorous obligations imposed upon it by the law. Thus, for example, the distinction between doubt, where assent is impossible, and probability, involving imperfect assent, became less clear. The criterion of probability, which for Aquinas implied what is most likely to be true, was relaxed, and the sphere of the doubtful, with its severe obligation, thus contracted. These developments reflected the fact that, in practice, the confessor is more anxious to circumvent the scrupulous conscience, which hinders action for fear of error, than to correct the false conscience. Where the first priority is the resolution of the conscience, the tendency is inevitably to stress its own prerogatives above the claims which the truth holds on it.\(^ {122}\)

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\(^{119}\) *Ib.*, cols. 418-19.


\(^{121}\) Deman, cols. 444-57; Jean Delumeau, *Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en Occident (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles)* (Paris, 1983), pp. 222-9 covers similar ground, but in general sees the literature, with its ‘inflation prodigieuse du nombre des péchés’, as further evidence of the doleful progress of repression or ‘culpabilisation’.

This subtle tendency to homogenise the sphere of the uncertain, so that a doubtful opinion merges with a probable one, had by the early sixteenth century penetrated more properly theological thinking. Theologians of the Dominican school at Salamanca followed Aquinas in the assumption that certain knowledge in practical morals is inaccessible, and that the probable certainty which must therefore suffice for action is guaranteed by the authority of the wise, and by implication that of good reasons. They inclined, however, to give the conscience greater freedom in cases of doubt. The obligation to inform the conscience remained, and the tutiorist rule applied where it was impossible to give assent, but these theologians gave the doubtful conscience an easier path to action by widening the criteria of assent. Tending to value an opinion on account of its ability to secure assent and license action, they gave greater weight to the authoritative sense of ‘probable’ than to the veridical. Since a probable opinion is by definition worthy of approval, there is nothing to hinder assent to any one among various such opinions. For Aquinas our choice of a probable opinion is dependent on our persuasion of its truth; this automatically excludes any other opinion, which becomes simply that to which the mind cannot assent. As Deman remarks, the later view creates a separation between moral action and that inward condition of the intellect and will which for Aquinas defines its moral value. Whereas in Aquinas truth is the rule to which the conscience must bend, a process facilitated by a habitual disposition to virtue, here responsibility is delegated to the authorities who render an opinion worthy of acceptance, and the conscience fulfils its obligation in choosing any of these.

The elision between the probable and the doubtful was rendered explicit by Barthélemy de Medina, first a novice then a master at the school of Salamanca. In 1577 Medina published the view that ‘if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, even though

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123 See Deman, cols. 457-63.
125 Deman, cols. 461-3.
the opposite opinion is more probable'. For Aquinas a ‘more probable’ opinion would have implied trepidation about accepting its opposite. In Medina’s formula the doubtful (‘less probable’) has been converted into a probability. The safety which Aquinas maintained must be sought in doubts Medina guaranteed by probability. Medina was in fact a faithful Thomist, and broached this idea in commenting upon those sections of the Prima Secundae which we examined above. He stressed that an opinion is only probable because it is ‘conformed to right reason and to the judgement of prudent and wise men’. Just as in speculation we may, though lacking certainty, follow such an opinion without unreasonable danger of error, so in practical morals we may do so without danger of sin. It would therefore be contradictory both to hold that an opinion is probable and that it may not be followed. A conflict between opinions which are each conformed to right reason can only be a conflict between the good and the better, between precept and counsel. And it would be unreasonable to expect penitents always to follow the most perfect course: so ‘if this thesis is not admitted, it will cause the torment of timorous souls’.

Medina’s argument, however, did depart from the spirit of Aquinas’s views. For Aquinas it is the intention which determines whether an action is worthy of praise or blame. The action itself is incidental to the moral end, which is defined in relation to the mind that identifies and the will that pursues it. To act well involves ‘a personal and living assimilation to the truth’; probability is therefore a function of this process. This cultivation of the moral personality is absent from Medina’s formula, which presupposes the goodness of some act or other in virtue of its ‘probability’. Thus it opened the way to an

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127 *Ib.*, col. 483.
128 *Ib.*, col. 484.
129 *ST*, IaIIae, q. 3.
130 Deman, col. 467.
‘extrincésisme’, which, with its undoubted pastoral utility, became increasingly pronounced.\textsuperscript{132}

Gabriel Vasquez, for example, again commenting on the Prima Secundae, elevated the implicit distinction between the probable opinion as that which derives from authority, and as that which best convinces the mind of its truth, into a theoretical one. It may be inferred from this principle that, since any probability is by definition safe to follow, an ‘extrinsic’ probability based on the opinion of doctors may be preferred to an ‘intrinsic’ one based on good arguments. As Pascal noted this was a very useful principle, and one which, by the time he wrote the \textit{Provinciales}, had advanced to the stage where the authority of one ‘grave’ doctor could make an opinion probable.\textsuperscript{133} It promoted a clear separation of the speculative from the practical, suggested by Medina who put them in an ‘analogical’ relationship, and foreign to the spirit of Aquinas, for whom practical certainty implied some endeavour to resolve speculative doubt.\textsuperscript{134} Francisco Suarez further forestalled the possibility that a speculative doubt might hinder action by bringing in ‘practical principles’ to ease the process of deliberation, borrowed from the interpretative rules used by canonists to guide themselves in doubtful cases: the principle that ‘in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis’, meaning that, man being in possession of liberty, the burden of proof lies with the law that would constrain him; and the principle that an insufficiently promulgated or doubtful law does not bind.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{132} Quantin, \textit{Le rigorisme chrétien}, pp. 51-70, at 61.
\textsuperscript{133} CLP, pp. 85-6; the usual source cited for this opinion was Emmanuel Sa’s \textit{Aphorismi confessariorum} (1612), p. 183.
\textsuperscript{134} Quote Medina, in Gorce, \textit{DTC}, X, col. 483.
\textsuperscript{135} Jonsen and Toulmin, \textit{The Abuse of Casuistry}, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{136} These reflex principles are often cited as the characteristic doctrines of probabilism, e.g. John Mahoney, \textit{The Making of Moral Theology. A Study in Roman Catholic Tradition} (Oxford, 1987), p. 227.
Thus by the seventeenth century Aquinas’s view had been reversed by his exegetes:\textsuperscript{137} doubt no longer created an obligation to seek the truth or take the safe path, but a liberty to choose among diverse ‘probable’ opinions. The practical certainty necessary for action had no necessary dependence on an objective truth, but was defined simply as the persuasion of the conscience, which casuists sought to facilitate as far as possible. This facility was well suited to the contemporary context, defined by rapid social, economic and cultural change, and the unwonted existence of viable confessional alternatives. Pascal’s ‘Jansenist’ was not being wholly unjust in claiming that the Jesuit confessors were all things to all men.\textsuperscript{138} The pride of probabilism, which swiftly achieved semi-orthodoxy within the Society, lay precisely in this ability to salve the conscience despite its inherent defects and the challenges posed by a mutable world.

\textit{Anti-probabilism}

The principle that a probable opinion may be followed, even if it is less certain and less safe than another, was therefore both logical – a probable opinion cannot be rendered improbable by the existence of conflicting opinions, which indeed it supposes by definition – and highly functional. How then should we account for the vociferous Jansenist reaction? To what did they object in the doctrine of probabilism?

One idea is that they basically missed the point. The casuists, according to this line of argument, were grappling constructively with the problem that the best sort of certainty available in morals is merely probable. The Jansenists, by contrast, believed an absolute

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\textsuperscript{138} CLP, pp. 75-6.
\end{footnotesize}
certainty was available, but that it was necessarily an immediate divine inspiration; they discounted arguments brought by human reason as so many screens blocking out this illumination.\textsuperscript{139} This gives us the pleasing paradox that, though Pascal originated the modern mathematical concept of probability, as a religious thinker he advocated, from a profoundly anti-rational perspective, a return to undifferentiated dogmatic certitude.\textsuperscript{140} And it is certainly the case that, for the Jansenists, ‘probability’ was merely a measure of the fallen human condition. It may be ‘the very guide of life’, in Butler’s phrase, but this is a fact to be deplored.\textsuperscript{141} The debility which renders us dependent thereon is a punishment for sin, which it cannot therefore extenuate.

It by no means follows from this position, however, that the Jansenists should have dismissed casuistry as simply misguided. It is precisely the imperfection of man’s moral faculties which makes it necessary to compensate as far as possible. The more acutely this debility is felt, the more urgently should the means be sought whereby man, notwithstanding his waywardness, can conform himself to the moral law. In this sense we should expect to find in the Jansenists a passionate commitment to casuistry. And this is precisely what we do find in works like Arnauld’s \textit{Dissertation} or the \textit{Provinciales}. They argued that the probabilists were bad casuists, who facilitated action \textit{despite} the imperfection of nature, rather than by \textit{overcoming} it.\textsuperscript{142} As the technical register of their case shows, they were

\textsuperscript{139} Jonsen and Toulmin, \textit{The Abuse of Casuistry}; Baudin, \textit{Études historiques}, iii, pp. 69f. \textit{et passim}.
\textsuperscript{141} Joseph Butler, \textit{The Analogy of Religion}, ed. G. R. Crooks (New York, 1860), p. 84; cf. [Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole], \textit{La Logique ou L’Art de Penser} (Paris, 1662), pt. iv, ch. 12, pp. 438f., where in treating probability as a necessary rule in human affairs, the ‘jugement que l’on fait si une action est bonne ou mauvaise, digne de louange ou de blâme’ is reserved from the discussion. There is a serviceable English tr. by Jill Vance Buroker, \textit{Logic or the Art of Thinking} (Cambridge, 1996).
\textsuperscript{142} There was an analogy here with the Protestant idea of the \textit{justus peccator}, discerned also by English writers, which we shall pursue in chs. 3 & 4, esp. pp. 153-5, 203-10.
committed to the same inquiry as the casuists. They were eager to establish that probabilism represented an unwarranted departure from the teaching of Aquinas.

It was undoubtedly opportune for the Jansenists, whose orthodoxy was in question, to emphasise the conformity of their thought with that of Aquinas. This ought to encourage some scepticism in the face of their self-conscious invocation of his authority. On the other hand, it is hard to see that, were their real position inconsistent with that of Aquinas, any benefit should have accrued from such an esoteric affirmation of his arguments – which, on this supposition, could have served only to undermine the apology they were committed to sustaining. In other words, even if we assign this resort to a ‘Thomist refuge’ to purely tactical motives, we should expect to reach one of two conclusions: either that the Jansenists were incompetent tacticians, since such a manœuvre could only produce incoherence; or that there existed some real compatibility between their case and the thought of Aquinas. It should not be remarkable that the second conclusion can be demonstrated in relation to an essentially traditional understanding of the conscience; but the exposition which follows, if it holds, can perhaps be taken to strengthen the case that such compatibility was increasingly recognised in a more general sense by certain among the Jansenists, especially Arnauld.\footnote{Cf. Jean Laporte, \textit{La Doctrine de Port-Royal}, 2 vols. [of projected 3] (Paris, 1923), t. II, \textit{Exposition de la Doctrine (D’Après Arnauld)}; Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi, \textit{Entre saint Augustin et saint Thomas. Les jansénistes et le refuge thomiste (1653-1663): à propos des 1er 2e et 18e Provinciales} (Paris, 2009); XVIIe Siècle, 259 (2013), on Arnauld, \textit{Thomas D’Aquin et Les Thomistes}; and ch. 4, below, pp. 194-5.}

According to Arnauld, following the argument of the Parisian \textit{curés},\footnote{Suite de l’extrait de plusieurs mauvaises maximes des nouveaux casuistes recueillies par messieurs les Curez de Paris et présentées à Nosseigneurs de l’Assemblée générale du Clergé de France le 24 novembre 1656 (Paris, 1656).} there are ‘deux règles de nos actions’, founded ‘sur l’autorité de l’Ecriture, des Pères, et de St. Thomas’. These are the law of God and the conscience. To act against either of these is to sin. The probabilists ‘overturn’ both rules. They undermine the law by converting ignorance into probability; and they undermine the conscience by converting doubt into probability. From
these errors flow ‘les conséquences les plus horribles’. Thus, in Arnauld’s view, nothing more is needed to avert the danger than to re-establish the authentic position of ‘St. Thomas’ on the two rules of human action. As we saw, this is that ‘dans le droit naturel une opinion probable fausse n’excuse point de péché’, i.e., that ignorance of what we ought to know is culpable; and that of ‘deux opinions probables, il faut choisir la plus sûre et la plus probable’, i.e., that which engenders the least fear of sin and appears most likely to be true.\textsuperscript{145}

Arnauld holds that the moral law is eternal and immutable: considered in themselves, moral precepts ‘ne sont autre chose que cette loi éternelle et souveraine, qui est la loi naturelle, sur laquelle les Hommes doivent régler [sic] toutes leurs actions’. Men possess ‘les notions de bien et du mal, que la Nature et la Religion ont imprimées dans notre âme’. But the shadows which cloud the post-lapsarian human spirit mean that this law, evident in itself, is not always evident to man. Even with the light of revelation, ‘qui renferme et qui explique toute la Loi naturelle’, his ignorance and wilfulness is such that he cannot always apprehend or fulfil his duty.\textsuperscript{146} His moral judgements must therefore often be attended by uncertainty. Arnauld convicts the casuists of confusing the analysis of this shortcoming established by Aquinas. In so doing they endanger souls by encouraging them to act with an illusory sense of security.

In the first place they confuse the concept of non-culpable ignorance. Aquinas holds that we sin by acting according to a false moral proposition, even though we are acting according to the conscience. Since the truth is objective and immutable, the evil done by violating the law of God is not in question. The only question is whether, had we not been ignorant of some crucial aspect of the case, we should have acted otherwise. Aquinas thinks

\textsuperscript{145} Joncoux, pp. 277-8 (Wendrock, pp. 106-7).
such ignorance would excuse in the case of fact or positive law, but not in the case of natural law or the articles of faith. Pascal’s ‘Jansenist’ proves it out of Aristotle’s *Ethics*:

Vous voyez donc … quelle est l’ignorance qui rend les actions involontaires; et que ce n’est que celle des circonstances particulières qui est appelée par les théologiens … l’ignorance du fait. Mais, quant à celle du droit, c’est-à-dire quant à l’ignorance du bien et du mal qui est en l’action … voici les paroles [d’Aristote]: *Tous les méchants ignorent ce qu’ils doivent faire et ce qu’ils doivent fuir; et c’est cela même qui les rend méchants et vicieux.* 147

Arnauld discusses the crucial evidence of *Quodlibet* VIII.13, in which Aquinas considers the controversial question of pluralities. Of two contrary opinions about the same thing one must be true and the other false. If an individual acts against what is in fact the true opinion, he is not excused from sin, even though he believed it to be false. 148 In whatever ‘appertains to faith or good morals, no one is excused if he follows an erroneous opinion of some doctor: for in these things ignorance is no excuse’. 149

Probabilism, as we have seen, allowed that either opinion can be followed without sin, since the mind has assented on ‘probable’ grounds (the authority of the learned). Arnauld claims that this is simply to free action from the rule of truth. Ignorance is either a source of error or a spur to enlightenment. In annexing cases of ignorance to the competence of probability, the probabilists are denying that a better knowledge of the moral law might be available. This is why critics so often referred to them as ‘Academics’, ‘Scepticks’ or

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147 *CLP*, p. 69; *Nic. Ethics*, III.1, 1110b.
149 *Quodlibet*., III, a. 10; quote by Arnauld/Nicole, Wendrock, p. 135 (Joncoux, p. 320): ‘In his vero quae pertinent ad fidem et bonus mores, nullus excusatur, si sequatur erroneam opinionem alicuius magistri: in talibus enim ignorantia non excusat’.
‘Pyrrhonians’.\textsuperscript{150} Aquinas, by contrast, thought the erring conscience should be ‘deposed’; and, indeed, ‘rien n’est si commun que de voir les hommes tomber dans des erreurs, et en être relevez et corrigez par d’autres plus éclairez en cela qu’eux’.\textsuperscript{151} The probabilist formula may achieve a settled conscience, but it is not the solution to ignorance, which is enlightenment. If the truth is fixed and immutable, and it is sin to act against the law, it must be sinful to follow one of two contradictory moral propositions.

Arnauld’s implication was that probabilism divorced the moral agent from the eternal moral law. His actions are not correlated to the truth but to the opinions of doctors, which, since they suppose the potential truth of the contrary, are false to the proportion of one half.\textsuperscript{152} This is to abandon the search for enlightenment, or, in other words, the endeavour to re-align a crooked nature with its true rule, the eternal law of God. By a necessary corollary it is also to impede it, since the more it chooses badly, the less the will is disposed to choose well.

Arnauld acknowledged the essential difficulty. In applying moral knowledge to action, we enter the realm of opinion, and the truth or falsity of any opinion will not always be clear. Sometimes contrasting opinions will elicit an imperfect assent; sometimes they will preclude assent entirely. The Jansenists saw that the chief mechanism of probabilism was its elision of doubt and probability.\textsuperscript{153} By reducing cases of doubt to cases of probability, it allowed penitents to choose a course of action without necessarily being persuaded of its correctness, the conscience being resolved by the persuasion that it is licit to follow a probable opinion. So, as Arnauld put it,

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\textsuperscript{150} E.g. Joncoux, pp. 362-4; Lettre Pastorale of Nicolas Choart de Buzenval, bishop of Beauvais, contenant la réponse à une requête que les Curez de son Diocèse lay ont présentée dans son synode dernier, contre le livre intitulé, Apologie pour les Casuistes (Paris, 1658).
\textsuperscript{151} Joncoux, p. 282 (sic).
\textsuperscript{152} Wendrock, pp. 111-12 (Joncoux, pp. 293-4).
\end{flushright}
Il s’agit entre les Probabilistes et nous, de savoir si un homme qui dans sa conduite suit une opinion fausse, est hors de péril et en sûreté de conscience devant Dieu, parce qu’il croit avec plusieurs autres cette opinion probable.  

The probabilists were able to answer ‘yes’ because, remarking that scientific certainty was impossible, they defined practical certainty (‘sûreté’) as the resolution of the conscience, and argued that it is illogical to claim a probable opinion may not be followed. The Jansenists took the general point, but denied the idea that following a probable opinion is equivalent to settling the conscience. This, as Arnauld indicated, should rather be understood in terms of avoiding ‘péril’ and attaining ‘sûreté’ (in the sense of safety or security rather than of demonstrative ‘certitude’).

In relation to doubt, it was easy to make the case that the probabilists were simply guilty of a technical error. Since doubt is a condition in which the mind cannot give assent, it defines a different sort of conscience to one that has given assent on the basis of probability. An ‘equal probability’ is equivalent to a doubt, both supposing that the mind has not assented to one side or the other. This was a useful way of arguing, for the ‘new casuists’ still paid lip-service to ‘cette règle du Droit Canonique, ou plutôt du Droit Naturel’, as Arnauld called it, ‘in dubiis pars tutior eligenda est’.  

However, as he also pointed out, they only applied it in cases of ‘practical doubt’, and as they held that speculative doubt gives the benefit of probability and does not preclude practical certainty, this meant never. Therefore they exposed penitents to ‘péril’, the danger of acting unlawfully.

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155 Joncoux, p. 376.
156 Ibid., pp. 398-92.
Arnauld appears to have included in his understanding of the ‘safer path’ the obligation to inform the conscience.\(^{157}\) On this obligation he lays considerable stress, and it informs his treatment of that most important species of uncertainty, probability. Reliance on probability in morals, he admits, is a part of the human condition. Every probable opinion, moreover, supposes the potential validity of its opposite. But this does not mean that every probable opinion is of equal value. In itself, every moral opinion is either true or false. To us it is only probable because we cannot assume that we do not perceive the false as true or *vice versa*.\(^{158}\) The principal risk in acting on these uncertainties, as Arnauld says, quoting from Aquinas, lies in not knowing on what side truth lies:\(^{159}\) we shall sin in acting according to a false opinion, whether or not we are persuaded of its truth. So the palmary obligation in respect to probable opinions is to ensure that the moral personality is equipped to give in its judgements on the side of truth. This is to choose the most probable and the most sure, that is, the opinion which seems likeliest to be true and carries least fear of peril; for as Aquinas says this sense of risk accompanies every difficult moral decision, ‘at least when one does not see clearly where the truth lies’\(^{160}\). This obligation simply does not appear in the probabilist theory, where the probable opinion is ‘safe’, or ‘sûr’, by definition.

In establishing what it substantially conveys, Arnauld is concerned to evolve Aquinas’s notion of the sort of man who acts well. The casuists, he says, groundlessly parrot the axiom that ‘quiconque suit une opinion probable agit avec prudence, et ainsi il ne pèche pas’. But is it axiomatic that ‘il y a de la prudence à suivre une opinion probable’? Not on the definition of Aquinas, for whom ‘la prudence véritable et chrétienne n’est autre chose qu’un jugement droit, que la connaissance de la justice éternelle fait porter des choses que l’on doit


\(^{158}\) Joncoux, pp. 300f.

\(^{159}\) *Quodlibet*, IX, a. 15.

\(^{160}\) *Ib.*: ‘nisi expresse veritas habeatur’; Wendrock, p. 134 (Joncoux, p. 318).
faire’. A judgement which is false and ‘contraire à l’éternelle vérité’ bespeaks imprudence; but this is what results if every probable opinion is allowed to settle the conscience.\textsuperscript{161}

The prudent man seeks the truth: ‘on est imprudent lorsque, voyant de la contrariété entre des opinions probables … on n’entre dans aucun doute; ou lorsqu’étant dans le doute, on passe à l’action avant que d’en être éclairci’. Thus imprudence ‘dans le jugement’ implies imprudence ‘dans la conduite’ – ‘la négligence qu’on a euë à chercher la vérité et à purifier son cœur’.\textsuperscript{162} Prudence, then, as Aquinas teaches, is a habit or disposition in which the balance between knowledge and inclination is such that we can make the right choices. This involves the cultivation both of the will and the intellect. For

\begin{quote}
  il y a une union si étroite entre la foi et la raison, la piété et la vérité, qu’on ne peut en abandonner une, sans les abandonner toutes.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

A bad choice ‘est une preuve évidente que le cœur n’aime et ne cherche point la vérité’: the will rests in an immediate good without troubling about the higher.\textsuperscript{164} The cultivation of love and knowledge is thus an indispensable part of acting well.

Man must therefore resort ‘aux moyens que Dieu a établis pour trouver la vérité’. These include, firstly, prayer. We must petition God for the wisdom and strength to seek the truth and purify our hearts (cf. Jas. i 5). Secondly, we may consult ‘des personnes pieuses et éclairées’. It is not ‘une chose mauvaise en soi, que de consulter plusieurs Docteurs, quand on les consulte pour découvrir la vérité’.\textsuperscript{165} Indeed, as we saw, the Jansenists entertained very exalted notions of the spiritual director – ‘un Homme qui dans cette fonction tient la place de

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\textsuperscript{161} Joncoux, pp. 339-40 (Wendrock, pp. 147-8); \textit{ST}, IaIIae, q. 57, a. 5-6, q. 58, a. 5; IIaIIae, q. 47.
\textsuperscript{162} Joncoux, p. 340 (Wendrock, p. 147).
\textsuperscript{163} Joncoux, p. 376.
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 340, 396-7, 416.
\end{flushright}
Jésus-Christ’. Thirdly, the individual must make a careful examination of the whole matter for himself, and choose what appears true. We have, as Pascal says, the Scriptures, and then Popes, Councils and Fathers to interpret them. Of these we can make an empirical study.

Ce n’est pas un amas confus d’opinions qui n’ont aucune solidité, qui rend un homme savant; mais l’étude de l’Antiquité, la lecture exacte des Saints Pères, et une méditation humble et continuelle de l’Ecriture Sainte. Ce sont-là les sources où l’on doit puiser la science de la Morale Chrétienne.

This helps us to choose the most probable opinion, understood as that which is likeliest to be true: ‘la solidité est fondée dans la vérité’. We will not achieve a perfect certainty, for ‘il n’y a personne qui puisse être sûr’ of having known the truth and followed it in every instance. But we will have the ‘sûreté’ of knowing that we are avoiding the path of most risk, and the peace – ‘repos’ – that comes of knowing that we have sought ‘sincèrement à connoître la vérité’. This resolution of doubt and fear by a sincere search for the truth is what characterises the Christian life: Arnauld quotes Phil. ii 12, ‘work out your salvation with fear and trembling’. It is the only way to achieve ‘la paix et la tranquillité’, a paradox evident in the saints, characterised by their ‘crainte pieuse’.

The fundamental error of probabilism, then, is that it gives ‘une sûreté prétendue’. This word ‘sûreté’ is of great importance. As part of a technical vocabulary relating to conscience, it is opposed to the ‘certitude’ which comes with knowledge. To be sure is to be persuaded by an opinion; when we talk of ‘certainty’ in practical morals, we refer either to the persuasion that this opinion is conformed to the truth, or to the knowledge that it carries

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166 Ib., p. 407; above, n. 95; cf. Pascal’s Mémorial: ‘soumission totale à Jésus-Christ et à mon directeur’.
167 CLP, p. 94.
169 Joncoux, pp. 292-6, at 292: the reason which makes a probable proposition, according to the Jesuits, ought to be ‘considerable and solid’.
the least danger of sin. Thus Arnauld, discussing Aquinas’s example of pluralism, remarks
that, if there is danger of sin on one side and not the other, one cannot say that a less probable
opinion is opposed to a more probable one, but that a probable opinion is opposed to ‘une
opinion certaine’.171 ‘Certain’ here designates safety or security: it is contrasted to the false
security which consists in a persuasion of the permissibility of probable opinions. True
‘sûreté’, as we have just heard Arnauld argue, is the result of a whole process of moral
formation, a sort of living erudition, both intellectual and existential. This is what the
Jansenists demanded in the place of probability.

It is thus necessary to be sensitive to the ambiguity of the word ‘sûr’, translated by
Krailsheimer, for example, interchangeably as ‘certain’ or ‘safe’.172 What Pascal, like
Arnauld, opposes to probability, is not a demonstrative certainty, but a concept of practical
certainty understood as security. The Jansenists, as we have seen, acknowledged that, in
Aristotle’s terms, practical wisdom is distinct from scientific knowledge, as that which cannot
be necessarily demonstrated: ‘no one deliberates about things which are invariable’, and
‘there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things
might actually be otherwise)’.

Pascal had these basic moral concepts in mind when composing the Provinciales, as the Jansenist’s
discussion of Aristotle on circumstances at the end of the third letter shows. He appreciated the distinction between scientific certainty and
the ‘safety’ by which medieval theologians licensed action in doubtful cases. The word ‘sûr’
carries this connotation of security. In Nicole’s Latin ‘certum’ is equated with ‘verum’ and
contrasted to ‘falsam’; ‘securitas’ denotes the practical certainty which, he argues, the
probabilists misconceive. Joncoux translated these terms respectively with ‘certain’ and

371-2).
173 Nic. Ethics, tr. David Ross, III.3-5, 1139b-1140b; cf., for e.g., the Logique (1662 ed.), pt. iv, ch. 12.
‘sûreté’.\footnote{\ref{ftn:174}} It may therefore be of some significance that ‘Montalte’s’ much-quoted outburst in the fourth letter reads, ‘je ne me contente pas du probable, je cherche le sûr’, rather than ‘la certitude’.\footnote{\ref{ftn:175}} In the sixth letter it is precisely this tutiorist concept of security or safety which Pascal opposes to probability:

\begin{quote}
que répondrait-on, si l’on objectait qu’afin de faire son salut, il serait donc aussi sûr, selon Vasquez, de ne point donner l’aumône, pourvu qu’on ait assez d’ambition pour n’avoir point de superflu, qu’il est sûr, selon l’Évangile, de n’avoir point d’ambition, afin d’avoir de superflu pour en pouvoir donner l’aumône? Il faudrait répondre, me dit-il, que toutes ces deux voies sont sûres …\footnote{\ref{ftn:176}}
\end{quote}

In the Pensées Pascal remarked that the casuists ‘ont plaisamment expliqué la sûreté, car … ils n’ont plus appelé sûr ce qui mène au ciel’. Here he also returned to the ‘différence entre repos et sûreté. Rien ne donne l’assurance que la vérité; rien ne donne le repos que la recherche sincère de la vérité’.\footnote{\ref{ftn:177}}

The concept of ‘sûreté’ signified the obligation to endeavour ‘a personal and living assimilation to the truth’. The casuists’ redefinition of ‘sûreté’ as the persuasion of the conscience, Arnauld argues, abstracts the moral agent from the eternal order in which he must participate. In distinguishing the speculative from the practical, the casuists drive a wedge between the mind which forms and the will which intends an end conformed to the eternal moral order, and the moral value of action. The goodness or badness of an action does not derive from its conformity to the law, insofar as it promotes or hinders the general good in a particular case; instead it is legally fixed by the opinions of doctors.\footnote{\ref{ftn:178}} The knowledge and intention of the commissioning subject are irrelevant. Sin is treated, not as a disorder of the

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\footnote{\ref{ftn:174}} E.g. Wendrock, pp. 108, 149f.; Joncoux, pp. 278, 342f.
\footnote{\ref{ftn:175}} CLP, p. 84, my emphasis.
\footnote{\ref{ftn:177}} Ed. Lafuma, 916, 599; on the ‘sincere quest’ cf. 721 & 722.
\end{thebibliography}
moral faculties, but as a commodity, to be quantified and classified according to conditions which vary independently of our apprehension and pursuit of truth and goodness.

This is amply demonstrated in the ‘peccatum philosophicum’ discussed by Pascal in his fourth letter, the artificial ‘direction of intention’ treated in the seventh, and the arbitrary distinction of mortal and venial sins criticised in the ninth.\textsuperscript{179} In each case a false relationship is substituted for the reciprocal economy between the will and the act. The ‘philosophical sin’ excuses transgressions of the law by distinguishing the conditions necessary to an offence against reason from those necessary to an offence against God. An offence against God, the doctrine runs, supposes a free transgression of his law, that is, the knowledge and capacity to fulfil it. If these are absent, the act may contravene right reason, but ‘theologically’ it is not a sin.\textsuperscript{180} In other words, a distinction is put between reason and law. ‘O, le grand bien que voici pour des gens de ma connaissance! ... car ils ne pensent jamais à Dieu; les vices ont prévenu leur raison’.\textsuperscript{181} A similar manœuvre facilitates the ‘grande méthode de diriger l’intention’. Here sin is excused by ‘deflecting’ the intention from the evil commissioned to the good received thereby, for example by seeking revenge for the sake of honour rather than that of revenge itself.\textsuperscript{182} The moral truth perceived by the mind is thus made irrelevant to the intention: the moral agent is insulated from the objective and immutable law of which, according to Arnauld after Aquinas, his participation constitutes the essence of morality.

Despite Arnauld’s talk of ‘une union étroite entre la foi et la raison’, there is certainly a difference of tone which distinguishes the Jansenist arguments from those of Aquinas. The former often appear sharply to separate the capacities which man has by nature from those which he has by grace. ‘Car il y a une vie de raison, et une vie de foi. La lumière de la raison

\textsuperscript{179} On mortal and venial sins see ch. 7, below.
\textsuperscript{181} CLP, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{182} Ib., pp. 115f. Cf. the fragment on duelling, Pensées, 644. See Duchène, L’Imposture littéraire, pp. 149-59, for a salutary contextualisation of this ‘doctrine’.
est la règle de celle-là, et la lumière de la foi la règle de celle-ci’. Uncertainty appertains to reason, ‘la vérité constante et certaine appartiennent à la foi’. Arnauld gives the following sophism: grace is the principle of knowledge and love; to incur the risk of sin by following a false rule is to evidence the absence of grace. He calls prudence a gift of Christ, whereas for Aquinas it is a natural virtue, the perfection of our constitutional capacity to deliberate and choose well about what is good for us.183

This difference, however, is more apparent than real. The Jansenists did not think in terms of a sudden éclat, whereby the predestined faithful are enabled at a stroke to see the truth which only appears obscurely to the reprobate, and to act accordingly. As we have seen the acquisition and cultivation of knowledge and love is a lifelong process, never perfected, and performed in fear and trembling. It is the work of grace, or the fruit of faith, in the sense that it supposes the orientation of man’s intellect and appetites, both rational and sensual, to their proper end. The highest good of the rational creature is God as the source of Mind.184

The perfection of our natural capacities, Aquinas would say, is only achieved as part of this general orientation towards God as our ultimate end.185 Such an orientation cannot be produced by man’s natural powers alone.186 Since right decisions depend on this orientation, true prudence must be a gift of God and not just an acquired virtue.187 Justifiably, therefore, Arnauld writes that ‘si nous l’entendons de la conscience, comme le veut St. Thomas, il faut nécessairement que ce soit de la conscience réglée par la foi’.188 Its judgements are produced by an intellect disposed to seek the truth about God’s law and a will formed by the love of

183 Joncoux, pp. 331-4, 367-8, 399, 417; ST, IaIIae, q. 47. The Jansenist understanding of grace is discussed below, ch. 4.
185 See esp. ST, IaIIae, q. 23, a. 7: ‘sine caritate potest quidem esse aliquis actus bonus ex suo genere, non tamen perfecte bonus, quia deest debita ordinatio ad ultimum finem’.
186 See ST, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 3.
187 ST, IaIIae, q. 65, a. 2-5: ‘Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam’. Cf. Häring and Vereecke, ‘La Théologie Morale’, pp. 677-9.
188 Joncoux, p. 334 (sic) (Wendrock, p. 143).
God. The ‘heart’ which Pascal opposes to reason is nothing more than this integration of all
the rational faculties by their proper end. It has ‘la vérité’ for its object.\textsuperscript{189} His insistence on
this figure of the ‘heart’ reflects his conviction, shared with Aquinas, that the disposition to
seek the truth and live by it is ultimately formed by love.\textsuperscript{190}

We are thus in a position to take seriously the Jansenist claim that they rejected the
role in conducting the Christian life, not of reason, but of corrupt or defective reason. The
divagations of the casuists, says Arnauld, show they have ‘étouffé en eux les lumières
naturelles de la raison et du bon sens’. Again, ‘la doctrine que je viens d’expliquer, n’est pas
une doctrine que St. Thomas eût inventée. Il l’avoir tirée des oracles infaillibles de l’Écriture,
de la suite constante de la Tradition, et des plus vives lumières de la Raison’.\textsuperscript{191} The casuists,
unlike Aquinas, make no provision for the process of moral formation whereby man can
utilise his moral and intellectual faculties in order to play his appointed role in the eternal
moral order. They ‘soumettent la décision à la raison corrompue et le choix des décisions à la
volonté corrompue, afin que tout ce qu’il y a de corrompu dans le nature de l’homme ait part
à sa conduite’.\textsuperscript{192} Because absolute certainty is inaccessible they abandon the search for truth
entirely. But there is a sort of certainty which can bring sûreté and repos to the conscience: it
is the certainty of the heart, and the certainty of the heart is the heart seeking after truth.

The Jansenist criticism of the \textit{human} reasoning of the casuists was therefore, in a
sense, a defence of \textit{eternal} reason and of man’s participation in it. The casuists, they claimed,
occluded man’s real nature, divorcing it from its final end by abstracting it from its place in
the eternal reason. The ‘casuistical’ man is an unnatural man, absolved of his duty and hence
prevented from realising his true end. The culmination of Pascal’s critique of the casuists is

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Pensées}, 110, 424, 423; cf. esp. Jean Laporte, \textit{Le cœur et la raison selon Pascal} (Paris, 1950); Hélène
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{ST}, IaIIae, q. 45.
\textsuperscript{191} Joncoux, pp. 432, 320 (Wendrock, pp. 203, 136: ‘lumen rationis’; ‘evidentissimo rationis judicio’).
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Pensées}, 601.
thus reached with Antoine Sirmond’s opinion that the active love of God is not a necessary precept. The love of God, for the Jansenists as for Aquinas, is the foundation of the entire moral life of man, giving him direction and purpose. It is ‘le fondement de la Religion chrétienne’.

Sirmond’s argument was not in fact outlandish. His work *La Défense de la vertu* (1641) was framed against a doctrine of ‘pur amour’, which, disowning all creaturely ends, tended to collapse the moral and theological virtues into a disinterested charity, and threatened to terminate in passivity. Sirmond wanted to reassure people, worldly people especially, that God does not demand an impossible perfection: that actions done with some other motive than the pure love of God may also be meritorious. Within the commandment to ‘love the lord thy God with all thy heart’ (Mt. xxii 37, Lk. x 27) he distinguished a precept and a counsel. The precept refers to execution, meaning the attempt to fulfil the law: ‘if you love me, keep my commandments’ (Jo. xiv 15). The counsel, however, refers to ‘affection’. The more perfect part is for the will to be inclined towards God so that obedience always issues from love of him. In Sirmond’s view the precept to love God is fulfilled by an ‘effective’ charity; so long as someone is not in a state of mortal sin, practising the law, that is acting according to right reason, is enough to merit salvation. No sanction attends the failure to love God ‘affectively’, so that our actions are formally defined by this intention; and to demand that the will should be continually exercised in such acts of love is to demand a perfection proper to the citizens of heaven.

However defensible, Sirmond’s distinction of precept and counsel, his separation of the outward and effective from the inward and affective, encapsulated the Jansenists’

argument against the casuists. Defining sin extrinsically in terms of permissibility (we are not so much commanded to love, concluded Sirmond, as not to hate), they eschewed concern with the inward cultivation of virtue. It is instructive that in this controversy over the nature and obligation of charity the Jansenists found themselves aligned with Jean-Pierre Camus, bishop of Belley and disciple of François de Sales. Camus, apostle of an ‘amour pur et desintéressé’, who claimed the authority of the mystical tradition, would later be cited by Fénelon against Bossuet. His stark opposition of perfect charity to the taint of self-interest certainly anticipated the passive disinterestedness of Quietism. The Jansenists too built their ascetic programme on the Augustinian contrast between amor sui and amor Dei. ‘La Raison et la Nature nous crient’, affirmed Arnauld, ‘que tous les hommes sont obligez d’aimer Dieu, et qu’ils doivent lui consacrer leur cœur par un amour chaste et desintéressé’. But they rejected the exaggeration of this principle for the same reason they abhorred Sirmond’s palliation of it, namely that it devalues active moral endeavour. The ‘disinterested’ soul does not disown all its own movements as impure, and passively await those of God. This mystical self-abnegation is equivalent to the abnegation of moral responsibility encouraged both by the extreme pessimism of Luther and Calvin, and by the complacency of the casuists. It is the opposite of what God demands from us. ‘Non seulement Dieu nous commande de l’aimer de tout notre cœur, il veut encore que nous l’aimions de toute notre âme et de toutes nos forces’ (cf. Lk. x 27). The disinterested will does not renounce its own activity; but it only acts for God. It is not the will itself which is

195 CLP, p. 189, n. 2.
196 Joppin, Querelle, pp. 56-7, 64, 70.
197 Ib., esp. pt. 1.
198 Dissertation Sur le Commandement d’aimer Dieu, p. 16.
200 Arnauld, Dissertation sur le Commandement d’aimer Dieu, p. 28, my emphasis; Nicole, Réfutation, l. 1, chs. 13-14.
the principle of corruption, but the cupidity which inclines it to false ends.\textsuperscript{201} We cannot, therefore, be assured that God is acting in us by declining to think or act for ourselves; rather, our good thoughts and good actions assure us that they come from God.\textsuperscript{202} Hence Nicole would cite against the Quietists the Tridentine anathema on those who claim that free will, ‘by assenting to God’s call and action, in no way cooperates towards disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification … but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive’.\textsuperscript{203}

On the contrary, love is by definition active: it is ‘une effusion du cœur’, a certain \textit{pondus}, in the terms of Augustine, which bears the will towards the loved thing. Sirmond’s distinction of ‘effective’ from ‘affective’ love is a nonsense, because an action commissioned with the end of pleasing God could only issue from a will inclined towards him by love.\textsuperscript{204} To undermine the internal ‘culte’ of Christianity, as Saint-Cyran described the love of God, is thus, says Arnauld, to destroy the external ‘culte’ which evinces it.\textsuperscript{205} The sacrifice of Christ is the great sacrifice of love which makes possible the heavenly city. To be incorporated with him is to join in this holocaust of love.\textsuperscript{206} ‘If you love me, keep my commandments’; but if there is no love, there is no obedience.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[201] Cf. CLP, p. 223, where ‘l’ouvrage de Dieu, c’est-à-dire la nature’, is opposed to ‘cupidité … l’ouvrage du démon’.
\item[202] Nicole, \textit{Réfutation des Quietistes}, p. 70: ‘On ne connoist pas qu’elles sont bonnes, parce qu’elles viennent de Dieu; mais on connoist qu’elles viennent de Dieu, parce qu’elles sont bonnes’.
\item[203] \textit{Ib.} p. 77; Schroeder, pp. 42-3: ‘si quis dixerit liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti, et vocanti, quo ad obtinendum justificationis gratiam se disponat; sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere, anathema sit’.
\item[204] Arnauld, \textit{Dissertation sur le Commandement d’aimer Dieu}, pp. 18, 25-7; cf. ch. 4, below, pp. 202-3 & n. 139.
\end{footnotes}
This inward condition of the will, then, verifiable by the acts it produces, is the best moral index we have, the highest form of certainty to which we can aspire.\(^{207}\) It must be the role of moral theology and casuistry to minister to it. But, as Pascal argued in the tenth Provinciale, the ministry peculiarly suited to achieving this, the sacrament of penance, was evacuated of all meaning by the casuists’ ‘fines’.

\(^{208}\) For Pascal, following the argument of Arnauld’s Fréquente communion, the end of the sacrament is to nourish and authenticate such a true state of repentance as will allow us really to participate in the holocaust of love re-enacted in the eucharist.\(^{209}\) A sincere sorrow for sin, arising not from selfish motives but from the offense done to the loved object, must animate our repentance. This holy contrition, or charity, is, as we have seen, active and deliberate. It is the desire to redirect a life disordered by sin to its true end in God. It therefore produces the corresponding external effects: a full and frank acknowledgement of sin, and a life changed by avoiding the common occasions of sin, and by doing such acts of satisfaction as may expiate sin in the measure that they recalibrate the internal disposition according to its true object.\(^{210}\) Then, being sure that the sin is loosed in heaven, the earthly confessor may absolve his penitent. The casuists, by contrast, allowed that attrition, ‘même conçue par le seul motif des peines de l’enfer’, is sufficient with the sacrament of penance to the remission of sins.\(^{211}\) They allowed confession to be slight and disingenuous. They did not demand that proximate occasions of sin be avoided, nor did they require penances as evidence of a change of life; in fact they never bound at all, but held that even habitual sinners with no intention to reform themselves should never be refused absolution.\(^{212}\) Thus they offered an ‘assurance’ antecedent to obedience, one which, indeed, ‘pourrait bien porter les pécheurs …’. But genuine ‘sûrété’, for Pascal and his associates, is

\(^{207}\) Hence those who would reason clearly, according to Pascal’s wager, should start ‘en prenant de l’eau bénite, en faisant dire des messes, etc.’: Pensées, 418; cf. fr. 936.

\(^{208}\) CLP, p. 172.

\(^{209}\) Cf. ch. 7, below.

\(^{210}\) ‘Cette véritable conversion de cœur, qui fait autant aimer Dieu qu’on a aimé les créatures’, CLP, p. 182.

\(^{211}\) This ‘attritionist’ position was allowed by the Tridentine decrees – Schroeder, pp. 91-2, 102.

\(^{212}\) Ib., pp. 172-87, letter XVI; cf. ch. 7, below.
enjoyed only in the proportion that sin is restrained and overcome. Pascal specifies that this is a matter for ‘l’espérance’ and not ‘la certitude’.\textsuperscript{213}

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The essence of the Jansenist anti-Jesuit critique, then, was that ‘les nouveaux casuistes’ divorced morality from the eternal law. The Jansenists did not reject casuistry as such, but advocated a return to medieval tutiorism, which they synthesised with the ideal of moral development outlined by Aquinas. The casuists, according to this case, were in fact anti-casuists: they did away with doubt, the efficient cause, so to speak, of casuistry, and with virtue, its final cause. Although the Jansenists are often depicted, thanks to their conscientious dissidence, as heralds of the modern, subjective notion of the conscience, it may be observed that their understanding of morality was fundamentally objective;\textsuperscript{214} it was their opponents who reduced morality to the subjective claims of the conscience. This objectivism, on the other hand, encouraged an understanding of probability that bears some relation to the modern concept, which Pascal’s mathematical work advanced so significantly. The casuists still considered probability as belonging exclusively to opinion. According to the Jansenists, the ‘probability’ of an opinion was constituted by the best evidence: in respect to establishing the content of the law, this, as Arnauld pointed out, can be boiled down to good scholarship.\textsuperscript{215} This will constitute a reasonable demonstration. Historical fact cannot be established with ‘une certitude métaphysique’; here, as Arnauld and Nicole argued in the \textit{Logic}, ‘nous nous devons contenter d’une certitude morale’.\textsuperscript{216} Since the tradition of the Church is a matter of historical fact, it is, in consequence, for ‘les yeux’, the ‘légitimes juges’ of fact ‘comme la raison l’est des choses naturelles et intelligibles’, to establish the right

\textsuperscript{213} CLP, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{214} See e.g. Franklin, \textit{The Science of Conjecture}, p. 64, for the former view; Mahoney, \textit{The Making of Moral Theology}, p. 229, for the correct one.


\textsuperscript{216} \textit{La Logique}, pp. 457-8.
interpretation.\footnote{Cf. Pascal, \textit{Préface pour le traité du vide}, in Jacques Chevalier (ed.), \textit{Œuvres complètes} (Paris, 1954), p. 530.} Faith does not destroy ‘la certitude des sens’; ‘ce serait au contraire détruire la foi que de vouloir revoquer en doute le rapport fidèle des sens’.\footnote{\textit{CLP}, p. 374.} This scholarly empiricism corresponds to the insistence on right behaviour as an index to the internal disposition; taken together they amount to a somewhat modest understanding of the constituent parts of certainty, which contrasts strongly with the luminous afflatus the Jansenists are often said to have championed.

Probabilism, as they argued, made ignorance more valuable than truth, and rendered scholarly inquiry into antiquity and theological discussion of the content of the law pointless.\footnote{Joncoux, pp. 348f.} Devaluing knowledge, it inevitably devalued virtue, since ‘que moins nous connaissons Dieu, moins nous connaissons ce qui lui est agréable’.\footnote{Augustine, quoted Joncoux, p. 300.} Right reason is that by which man participates in the eternal moral law; satisfying themselves with corrupt reason, the casuists naturally licensed the transgression of an endless list of its particular precepts. Probabilism, in other words, was a cipher for laxism. The doctrine of equivocation or ‘mental restriction’, when we speak contrary to what we believe to be true, was only the most obvious symptom of a morality in which the value of action is sundered from the mind and purpose of the moral agent.\footnote{\textit{CLP}, pp. 164f.} This is the path described by the \textit{Provinciales}, which illustrate, from the fourth to the tenth letters, the progression from ignorance – probability, ‘philosophical sin’, the direction of the intention – to the denial of the fundamental motive of moral action, the love of God, by way of specific perversions of the law as it relates to man’s worship of God and his interaction with his neighbour. These examples of the immoral conclusions which the casuists reached from their essentially anti-moral, because anti-teleological principles, were the common stock of rigorist polemics in France. We will meet them soon in the hands of

English writers, who pounced enthusiastically on this ready-made demolition of Catholic casuistry. First, however, we need to examine the paths by which the Jansenist critique entered English discourse.
Chapter 2

Transmission into England

This chapter explores how the Jansenist critique of contemporary moral theology entered into the consciousness of English readers. In part one English engagement with the original works of the Port-Royalists is examined. This was evidently serious and sustained, and extended beyond the most notorious products of the controversy surrounding the Five Propositions, the question de fait, and the Formulary. The fact that a significant number of Jansenist writings were subsequently translated into English is therefore not surprising. Part two consider the parties responsible for these translations and their motives. The Jansenist works were introduced to an English audience by a network of royalist Anglican writers and policy-formers. This network was engaged in a broadly collaborative effort to collect elements of the Jansenist critique, although different purposes in publishing English translations can be discovered among its constituents. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, and his ally James Butler, Duke of Ormond, viewed the Jansenist anti-Jesuit polemic as a tool to split the indigenous Catholic community and realise their own domestic religious policy. This strategy was based on an astute reading of English Catholic politics, as is demonstrated by the affinities between the outlook of the so-called Blackloists and the contents of the Jansenist critique. Clerical members of the royalist Anglican network, meanwhile, were also interested in the apologetic value of the anti-laxist polemics; the significance of this interest will be explored in chapter 3.
1) **English Engagement with French Religious Discourse**

Proficiency in French was a matter of course for the learned elite of seventeenth-century England. The level of familiarity deepened over the course of the century as circumstances contributed to an increase of traffic between the two nations. The marriage of Charles I to Henrietta Maria established an enclave of French Catholics at Whitehall. Huguenots emigrated to England and engaged in public life, sometimes embarking upon careers in the Church. During the civil wars and Interregnum many of those who remained loyal to the episcopal Church and to the crown sought exile abroad, generally spending some significant portion of time in France. English affairs were reported in the *Nouvelles ordinaires de Londres* published by the Huguenot du Gard from London. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 saw another influx of refugees. The scholarly channels never ceased to remain open; both erudition and controversy dictated that the learned, especially churchmen, should be conversant with French publications. How common this ground had become by the later seventeenth century is shown in numerous instances of reciprocal interest, such as the praise which Bossuet, on behalf of the French clergy, communicated to George Bull for his *Defensio fidei Nicaææ* of 1685; or even the qualified regard initially evinced for the first two volumes of Burnet’s *History of the English Reformation*, of which the French translation quickly ran through four editions, prefixed by a letter in which the author expressed his veneration for the French nation and especially for ‘les ecclésiastiques de France’, whom he placed above ‘tous les ecclésiastiques romains’ for power of discernment.¹

It was natural, therefore, that numerous erudite English clergymen possessed or demonstrated familiarity with many of the seminal works of the Jansenist critique. The great impression made by the *Provincial Letters* doubtless stimulated such acquisitions. But earlier phases of the Jansenist critique had not passed unnoticed. The works of Duvergier – who, when his relations with Richelieu were cordial, had almost travelled to England as chief almoner to Henrietta Maria – had aroused interest among a wider constituency than the Catholic clergy alone. In a way it is surprising that his writings in defence of episcopal power were not more widely cited by English defenders of episcopacy in the 1640s and 1650s, given their impact in France and the thoroughgoing patristic evidence they amassed. Of course ‘Petrus Aurelius’ wrote as a Tridentine Catholic, which diminished the attractiveness of his work for Protestant authors. Nevertheless, the *Opera*, first published in Paris in 1642, were reasonably well-known. Richard Allestree acquired them in the 1646 edition. Henry Hammond cited Aurelius against the Jesuits in his treatise on confirmation; it is possible that Allestree’s copy had originally belonged to him. By the reign of Charles II Edward Stillingfleet could refer to ‘the famous Abbot of S. Cyran’, and delineate both the place of Aurelius in the history of English Catholicism, and the contents of his writings.

It was not only Saint-Cyran’s ecclesiological writings which might interest English Protestants, but his spiritual teaching too. His aim to reinvigorate the sacrament of penance

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3 *Petri Aurelii theologi Opera* (Paris, 1646); Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree I.1.1.


5 Stillingfleet, *A Discourse Concerning the Idolatry Practised in the Church of Rome* (1671), pp. 427-8; *idem, The Council of Trent examin’d and disprov’d by Catholick tradition* (1688), pp. 79-80.
through the practice of delayed absolution and spiritual renouvellement constituted the major cause of his notoriety in France, having inspired striking conversions to a non-religious life of penitential solitude which shocked a society they seemed to condemn. Richelieu, sensing danger from this world-denying, spiritually elitist, and Protestant-sounding doctrine, moved to have Saint-Cyran incarcerated. But imprisonment only enhanced the reputation and influence of this latter-day apostle, providing the ideal context from which to disseminate a religious ethic framed around heroic fortitude. The letters of spiritual direction composed by Saint-Cyran at Vincennes were collected and published as the Lettres Chrétiennes et Spirituelles de Messire Iean du Verger de Hauranne Abbé de Saint-Cyran in 1645, forming the major foundation of his later reputation as a spiritual writer. They were widely known among English writers. John Cosin, who as chaplain to the exiled royalists oversaw the spiritual welfare of English Protestants in Paris from 1645 to the restoration, was particularly well versed in Saint-Cyran’s religious output. Cosin owned a copy of Les reliques de messire Iean du Verger de Hauranne, a Jesuit production published at Louvain in 1646, which, though designed to besmirch his reputation, contained extracts from many of Saint-Cyran’s writings: from Petrus Aurelius; from the Lettres chrétiennes; from the Théologie familière, a catechism for children censured by the Paris archdiocese in 1643; Les Maximes

7 See ch. 7, below, on the Lettres chrétiennes.
9 The censure was lifted the following year. Saint-Cyran, Théologie familière, avec divers autres petits traités de dévotion (Paris, 1669). This catechism magnified the effects of the fall, which not only enslaved man to his passions and to the devil, but rendered him absolutely incapable ‘de se defendre de tant d’ennemis, ny de se delivrer de sa misère’ (pp. 11-12); the weight of concupiscence in fallen nature means not only that man cannot fulfil the least of God’s commandments without the gratuitous gift of grace, but that every act of his obedience requires a further such efficacious gift, so that ‘nous dependons … toujours de la misericorde de Dieu’ (pp. 56-8). The duties of religion are resolved into the virtue of charity, that is the love of God purely for his own sake, to whom all must be referred (pp. 38-40). The divine aid man requires therefore cannot be supplicated with any
de l’Abbé de Saint-Cyran, a hostile abstract of his theology prepared by the commissaries of Louis XIV in the course of the case against him; the *Chapelet Secret* of Mère Agnès, which Saint-Cyran had defended;\(^{10}\) the commentary on Augustine’s *De sancta virginitate* by the Oratorian Claude Séguenot, falsely attributed to Duvergier and made the immediate pretext for his arrest, on account of its positions on human nature and divine grace, contritionism, and absolution;\(^{11}\) and finally *De la fréquente communion*, commonly believed, and by the Jesuits polemically asserted, to be the work of Saint-Cyran.\(^{12}\) Cosin also owned the *Théologie familière* in its fourth edition, revised and corrected in light of the censure.\(^{13}\) He had also invested in the *Apologie* which Duvergier’s most celebrated convert Antoine le Maistre wrote in answer to the damning conspectus of Saint-Cyran’s theology commissioned during the proceedings against him.\(^{14}\)

Knowledge of Saint-Cyran persisted. Cosin’s younger contemporary Allestree, whose library attests to the acquisition of an intimate knowledge of the Jansenist controversy in the later 1650s and 1660s, obtained the 1674 edition of the *Lettres chrétiennes*, augmented with another of the abbot’s ascetical tracts, on the poverty of Christ.\(^{15}\) Poverty, according to Saint-Cyran, is ‘*le fondement de toutes les vertus religieuses*’: it addresses the dual aspects of man,

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\(^{11}\) Orcibal, *Saint-Cyran et le jansénisme*, p. 30.


restraining the material desires of the flesh and the disordered desires which afflict the spirit, and so, by contradicting the *amour-propre* which characterises our fallen condition, opening the ‘royal way’ to the love of God and hence to salvation. Work like this and the two volume *L’Aumône chrétienne ou la tradition de l’Eglise envers les pauvres*, published by Le Maistre in 1651, come to the heart of Saint-Cyran’s spirituality, expressing the strict assimilation of evangelical counsel to precept involved in making the incarnation the central practical principle of Christianity. This implies nothing outlandish or extreme: despite the nostalgia of Saint-Cyran and his intellectual successors, superhuman acts of asceticism were not usual among the Jansenists. A platonic harmony was the end of the soul which endeavoured to regulate itself by achieving conformity with Christ. Striving after the counsels of perfection represented a heroism equal to or greater than that exhibited in ascetical displays – hence the ‘heroism of charity’ evident at Port-Royal, for example at the time of the Frondes. Later English authors evidently continued to find these aspects of Saint-Cyran’s spirituality relevant. George Morley, the restoration bishop of Winchester, owned the *Lettres Chrétienes* in three volumes. John Tillotson, archbishop of Canterbury under William III, actually possessed a first edition. His close colleague Stillingfleet, like Allestree, owned the 1674 Lyon edition; his copy of Duvergier’s *L’Aumône Chrétienne* was likewise the edition printed at Lyon in 1674. He also had a later edition of the collection owned by Cosin, *Les Nouvelles et anciennes Reliques de Mr. Jean du Verger de Haüranne*, published in 1648, and even the first volume of Saint-Cyran’s denunciation of Garasse, the *Somme des fautes*. Isaac Barrow, the great restoration preacher, and first Lucasian Professor

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17 On these topics see R. Taveneaux, ‘Port-Royal, les pauvres et la pauvreté’, and ‘Port-Royal ou l’héroïsme de la sainteté’, both in his *Jansénisme et Réforme catholique* (Nancy, 1992); for a eulogy Jean Racine, *Abrégé de l’Histoire de Port-Royal* (Paris, 1767), pp. 65f.
20 Paris, 1626: see above, pp. 18-19. on this work. Newport J. D. White (ed.), *A Catalogue of Books in the French Language, Printed in or before A.D. 1715, Remaining in Archbishop Marsh’s Library, Dublin, with an
of Mathematics in Cambridge, possessed a volume of the *Instructions chrétiennes tirées des lettres de l'abbé de St Cyran* edited by the Port-Royal solitaire and eldest brother of ‘le grand’ Arnauld, Robert Arnauld d’Andilly, and published in 1672.\(^{21}\)

In other words, this author, not always considered relevant beyond the history of French Jansenism, had a persistent currency among English thinkers. I have instanced influential episcopalian writers, but he was also read by puritans. Richard Baxter, who as we shall see was among the first to use the Jansenist critique of the Jesuits, knew him as an opponent of Sirmond.\(^{22}\) Theophilus Gale, the first English historian of Jansenism, praised the ‘Sanctitie’, ‘Science’, and ‘Humilitie’ which made him an unparalleled spiritual guide and comforter. ‘He exhorts much to self emptiness, spiritual povertie, humilitie, faith in Christ’, the ‘usefulness of afflictions’, ‘and more especially to love God more than ourselves, and our neighbours as much … which, according to his Master Austin, contains the Morals, Logic, Physick, and Politics of true Christian wisdom’.\(^{23}\) This broadly distributed interest continued into the eighteenth century. The nonjuring spiritual writers Thomas Ken and William Law both read the *Lettres Chrétienes*. Most interestingly, John Wesley, in his *A Plain Account of Christian Perfection* of 1766, translated (though without attribution) about a third of the *Instructions chrétiennes* collected by d’Andilly, recommending them ‘immediately after the Holy Scriptures as the object of profound and frequent meditation’. In Saint-Cyran’s insistence on the interior disposition of love, on a profound conversion from the old life of the creature to the new life of Christ within, to be effected by a strict adherence to the narrow

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\(^{21}\) Bodl., Rawl. MS D. 878, f. 54v.


way exemplified by Christ in his poverty, charity, and humility, Wesley discerned an ‘inward religion’ or ‘religion of the heart’ which powerfully expressed his own convictions.24

If English familiarity with so relatively obscure a figure as Saint-Cyran is a little remarkable, the acquaintance of English writers with the work of his famous disciple, Antoine Arnauld, is more to be expected. Nevertheless, the relevance of Saint-Cyran may suggest that the attention paid to Arnauld was not necessarily simply his due as a philosopher and controversialist of European significance, but might also reflect interest in the similar themes developed in his own works.25 At the very least, Arnauld took up the cudgels against the Jesuits with a quantity of zeal which even Protestants could hardly hope to overmatch. He was also, of course, a doughty controversialist in behalf of the Catholic Church: an opponent who had to be acknowledged, and one, perhaps, whose critical stance contributed a piquant leaven for readers of a different confessional persuasion.

Certainly the works of Arnauld, ‘so celebrated and considering a person as he is knowne to be’, as Sir Robert Southwell wrote in 1683, were very well known by English readers in the second half of the century.26 The Frequent Communion, which had such a considerable impact upon conceptions of spiritual guidance and sacramental practice in France, can be found in many libraries.27 It is difficult to specify how soon after its publication it came to more general attention; many scholars owned later editions. Jeremy Taylor however must have known it since at least the early 1650s, when the Unum


25 Cf. ch. 7, below, on Jeremy Taylor and Arnauld’s Fréquente communion.

26 BL Add. MS 38015, f. 280r.; cf. Clark, ch. 15.

Necessarium began to form in his mind. Cosin, as we have seen, knew the work from the Jesuit-produced Reliques of Saint-Cyran, published in 1646. He also owned Arnauld’s Défense de la Verité Catholique of 1644, where Arnauld defended the teaching of the Frequent Communion on the sacrament of penance against the then-Calvinist Théophile Brachet de la Milletière, claiming a middle ground between excessive rigour and the ‘excès étranges de relâchement, que quelques Catholiques’ (instancing Cellot and Bauny) ‘ont avancé’. The young John Evelyn, whose sense of ecclesial identity was so profoundly shaped by his experience of the persecuted but proud remnant of the episcopal Church presided over by Cosin in Paris, also owned an early edition of this work, along with various ephemeral pieces provoked by the Frequent Communion. Richard Allestree knew the debate over penance and frequent communion from an early date: he acquired a copy of the Jesuit scholar Denis Petau’s response to the Frequent Communion, published in 1645, De la Pénitence Publique, et de la Préparation à la Communion, along with a fairly full abridgement of both works. He eventually procured a copy of the seventh edition of Arnauld’s tract, published in 1656, and even bought one of the more specific works to appear during the controversies which succeeded its initial publication, a defence of the incidental

28 Below, ch. 7.
29 De la Milletière was expelled from the Reformed Church after the meeting of the national synod of Charenton in 1645, and consequently received into the Catholic. A scathing notice is in Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 4 vols. (5th edition, Amsterdam-Leiden-La Haye-Utrecht, 1740), iii, pp. 390-93. For more on this dispute see R. J. M. van de Schoor, The Irenical Theology of Théophile Brachet de la Milletière (1588-1665) (Leiden, 1995), ch. 5. On discipline in the French reformed Church R. A. Metzer, ‘Notions of sin and penitence within the French Reformed community’, in K. Lualdi and A. T. Thayer (eds.), Penitence in the Age of Reformations (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 84-100.
32 Petau, De la Pénitence Publique, et de la Préparation à la Communion (Paris, 1645); Abbégé de la doctrine du livre de la fréquente communion et de sa refutation comprise dans les livres de la pénitence publique, et de la préparation à la communion: these are both bound together in Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree S.1.16.
remark made in the preface, ‘qu’on voit dans les deux Chefs de l’Église, qui n’en font qu’un, le modele de la pénitence’. Isaac Barrow possessed a copy of ‘Arnault de frequente Communion’, which he perhaps picked up in Paris, where he was resident when the first of Pascal’s letters in defence of Arnauld appeared in early 1656. Interested in the scientific circles in which Arnauld and Pascal moved, Barrow’s letters seem to show him sympathetic to the stance adopted by Arnauld in his religio-political travails. Morley owned the Fréquente communion, Petau’s Pénitence publique, and Arnauld’s initial rejoinder the Tradition de l’Église sur le sujet de la Pénitence et de la Communio (Paris, 1645). John Tillotson, for his part, owned the Latin version of the Fréquente communion, which appeared in quarto in 1647, the Tradition de l’Église, and the Apologia pour M. Arnauld contre un libelle intitulé Remarques Judicieuses (1644). Thomas Turner, the Tory president of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in the 1690s, and brother of the nonjuring bishop Francis, also possessed the Latin Fréquente communion. The bishop of Lincoln Thomas Barlow, who considered the works of the Jansenists a useful resource for English students of divinity, owned the 1669 French edition.

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33 Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree S.2.4: this copy bears the unpleasant frontispiece of the 1648 edition, depicting, under the superscription Sancta sanctis, the arrest of an unworthy communicant, while horrified saints look on; Martin Barcos [nephew of Saint-Cyran], De l’autorité de S. Pierre, et de S. Paul, qui reside dans le pape, successor de ces deux apstres (Paris?, 1645): Allestree N.5.5(1); Tillotson also owned this work, Bibliotheca Tillotsoniana, p. 78.


35 Bodl., Rawl. MS D. 878, f. 54v.; Percy H. Osmond, Isaac Barrow. His Life and Times (1944), pp. 51-5; Clark, p. 135.

36 Morley’s Catalogue, ff. 117, 125.

37 Arnauld, De frequenti communione Liber, in quo SS Patrum, Pontificum, et Conciliorum de poenitentiae atque eucharistiae sacramentorum, usu sententiae summa fide proferuntur … (Paris, 1647); Bibliotheca Tillotsoniana, pp. 12, 78.

38 C.C.C. Lib., Oxf., LRZ.6.18(MR 2).

39 Below, ch. 3; Bodl., F 76, 77 Linc. Barlow and Robert Boyle were lifelong book-swappers, and often discussed the Jansenist controversy and religious developments in France: see Michael Hunter, Antonio Clericuzio and Lawrence M. Principe (eds.), The Correspondence of Robert Boyle, 6 vols. (2001), e.g. iv, pp. 251, 330-1, 414; v, p. 127. Boyle’s connexion with the Jansenists, via his sponsorship of the Irish Bible, is described below, pp. 86-7.
William Wake had a copy of the edition printed at Lyon in 1683. Stillingfleet had Petau’s *De la pénitence publique*, the *Office du S. Sacrament* of the nuns of Port-Royal (consecrated to the perpetual adoration of the sacrament), and followed the ensuing debate in works such as the French reformed writer Matthieu Larocque’s *Réponse à un livre intitulé L’Office du S. Sacrement* (1665) and the *Histoire de l’Eucharistie* of 1669. Burnet praised ‘Mr. Arnaud’, ‘whom for his Book of *Frequent Communion*’ – ‘wherein he was engaged so much to the bettering this Age … and in representing to us the true Spirit of Holiness and Devotion in the Primitive Church’ – ‘I shall ever honour’. Arnauld’s arguments about the discipline of the early Church constituted only one aspect of the wider case against ‘lax’ modern morality, and other works in which he and the Jansenists carried forward this critique were also familiar to a learned Anglophone audience. The forerunner of the *Provinciales*, Arnauld’s and Hallier’s *La Théologie Morale des Iesuites, et Nouveaux Casuistes* of 1643, though certainly not so widely known as the *Fréquente Communion*, contributed to the notoriety of the Jansenist campaign. ‘Les Jésuites’, as Hermant recorded, ‘en furent irrités au dernier point, et firent voir par la multitude et la contradiction de leurs réponses, l’extrême embarras où ils se trouvaient réduits’, and some of these attempted refutations were owned by English churchmen. Wake, for example, possessed the *Réponse au Libelle intitulé la Théologie Morale des Jésuites* of 1644 by the former confessor to Louis XIII, Nicolas Caussin, SJ, in which Caussin reported much of the work he was refuting. Stillingfleet had the *Lettre d’Eusebe à Polemarque sur le livre de Monsieur Arnaud de la frequente communion* (1644), a response to Arnauld’s *Lettres de* ...

40 Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., WF.6.9.
44 Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., WO.7.22.
Polemique à Eusebe, et d’un Théologien à Polemarque, where the Jansenist, demonstrating by reference to the works of the casuists the futility of the early Jesuit apologetic strategy to disown or qualify the ‘lax’ propositions attributed to them, in a sense determined the more assertive apologetic approach later typified by Pirot.⁴⁵

These instances testify to a wider interest in the Jansenist controversy as it developed during the 1640s and 1650s. The attempt to vindicate the Augustinian doctrine of grace as explained by Jansen, in contrast to that of the ‘disciples of Molina’, characterised as Pelagian or Semipelagian, was followed in works such as Arnauld’s Apologie de Monsieur Iansenius Evesque d’Ipre, the Recueil de divers ouvrages touchant la Grâce, or the later Apologie pour les Saints Pères de l’Eglise, Défenseurs de la Grâce de Iésus-Christ.⁴⁶ This controversy, which resurrected the bitter and unresolved dispute between the Jesuits and the Dominicans over the operation of divine grace, was a gift to Anglican apologists constantly reproached with the charge of disunity, and they watched its course closely.⁴⁷ Some, like Herbert Thorndike, who recorded his ‘respect’ for the ‘learning and judgement of … Jansenius’, went so far as to investigate the Augustinus itself.⁴⁸ Others read of the papal anathematisation of the Five Propositions,⁴⁹ of Arnauld’s unsuccessful attempt to slip its terms by a distinction of

⁴⁵ White (ed.), A Catalogue of Books, p. 7. Details of the controversy are in Arnauld, Œuvres, xxix, pp. IV-X; on Pirot’s Apologie see above, p. 25.


⁴⁷ For examples of this kind of polemical point-scoring see John Bramhall, A just vindication of the Church of England, from the unjust aspersion of criminal schism … (1654), pp. 213-14; idem, Schisme guarded and beaten back … (The Hague, 1658), p. 235; Thomas Peirce, The divine philanthropie defended (1657), n. p.; later examples include Stillingleft, A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion (1665), Preface, pp. 101-2, 460-1; idem, Idolatry, pp. 443, 456; Henry Dodwell, Two Short Discourses Against the Romanists (1676), p. 84.

⁴⁸ Thorndike, An Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England (1659), ii, p. 193: see ch. 6, below, for Thorndike’s reading of Jansen; cf. e.g. Morley’s Catalogue, f. 25; Morley also possessed the more accessible work of Jansenius, Discours de la Réformation de l’Homme intérieur, which was brought out in 1644, ibid., f. 121; Allestree C.2.9; Gilbert Burnet had read at least tome I of the Augustinus on the history of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism, as a reference in his discussion of the 17th article of the Church of England shows: An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (2nd ed., 1700), pp. 148, 150-1.

⁴⁹ E.g. Calendar of the Clar[endon] State Papers], ed. Ogle, Bliss, Macray, Routledge, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1869-1970), ii, p. 224; cf. p. 265; Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree S.1.13 [Collection of papers relating to the condemnation of the Augustinus]; S.1.25(3) [Innocent X’s bull Cum Occasione]; S.1.25(5) [Declaration of the
droit et fait (between the pope’s right to condemn heretical propositions, and his capacity to discern their presence in a given place), and of the subsequent difficulties entailed by the imposition on all French ecclesiastics of subscription to a formulary condemning the propositions in the sense of Jansen. In 1664 the Journal of Louis-Gorin de Saint-Amour, agent for the Jansenist cause in Rome, was translated by one ‘G. Havers’. He noted the ‘weight, extent, and difficulty’ of the questions raised by the Five Propositions and the ‘incredible subtlety’ of the contributions to the debate, perceptively remarking that ‘in these Points the doctrine of the Jansenists is in some respects different from that of the Calvinists; yet not so much, but their subtle Adversaries took advantage of the Conformity, to contrive Five Propositions capable of a double Construction, namely, both according to the opinions of Jansenius, and those of Calvin’. Nicole’s vindicatory Lettres d’une hérésie imaginaire also began in 1664, and were widely owned in England. It is no surprise that, their interest...
having already been piqued to this extent, English readers should have been so struck by Pascal’s intervention in this controversy in 1656.

Certain parties in England received the letters as they appeared episodically from January 1656 to March 1657.53 Some English readers, such as Evelyn and Morley, acquired the first Cologne edition of the collected letters.54 The campaign of the curés of Paris and Rouen provoked by the *Lettres* and by Pirot’s intemperate response was also known contemporaneously in England.55 Works such as Arnauld’s *Nouvelle Hérésie des Jésuites*, swiftly translated into English, were well-known in the original French.56 The translation of Pascal’s *Lettres* and various ancillary Jansenist works into English will be treated below, and is the true measure of their impact in England. Either the French *Lettres* or their English translation, *The Mystery of Jesuitism*, are henceforth extremely common in English libraries.57 It is worth noting, however, that new contributions to the critique in France continued to be noticed in England. Pierre Nicole’s Latin translation of the *Provinciales*, written and published at the end of the 1650s, contained substantial ‘Notes et Dissertations, où les plus grands principes de la Morale Chrestienne sont expliquez d’une maniere aussi

53 Below, pp. 90-91.  
54 BL Add. MS 78632, f. 28r.; Morley’s Catalogue, f. 123; Tillotson would also acquire it, Bibliotheca Tillotsoniana, p. 85; Barrow’s copy is undated, but he was on the continent at this time: Bodl., Rawl. MS D. 878, f. 54v.  
55 E.g. Allestree S.1.25(40) [Advis de Messieurs les Curéz de Paris, à Messieurs les Curéz des autres diocèses de France, sur les mauvais maximes de quelques nouveaux Casuistes (1656)]; Allestree S.1.25(26)[pastoral letter of bishop Choard de Buzenval of Beauvais, responding to the reuqest of his curés against Pirot’s Apology (1658)]; Allestree S.1.25(34) [Factum de Messieurs les curéz de Paris contre la Thèse des Jésuites]; Allestree S.1.25(35) & (36) [Jesuit responses to the facts and ‘impostures’ of the curés and Jansenists]; Allestree S.1.25(38) [Censure of the Apology for the Casuists by archbishop de Gondren of Sens (1658)]; Allestree S.1.25(40.1) [Extrait de quelques-unes des plus dangereuses propositions de la morale de plusieurs nouveaux casuistes]; Bodl., Rawl. MS D. 878, f. 66r. [Réponse aux Lettres Provinciales (Liege, 1658)] (library of Richard Perrinchief, prebendary of Westminster and St Paul’s and biographer of Charles I ); BL Add. MS 78632, f. 39r.; White (ed.), A Catalogue of Books, p. 100 [La Doctrine des Jésuites et Nouveaux Casuistes combattue par les Curéz de France, et censurée par grand nombre de Prélats, et par des Facultés de Théologie Catholique (1659)]. Cosin owned a work of uncertain but clearly Jansenist provenance, intervening on behalf of the curés of Paris in a dispute over jurisdiction which had escalated into a pamphlet war with the Jesuits: [?Arnauld], Réponse au libelle intitulé Dom Pacifique d’Avranches, rempli d’erreurs et de calomnies, contre la...memoire de feu Monseigneur l’évesque de Bellay, composé et distribué par les Jesuites, en l’an 1634 (Lyons, 1654): the work is discussed in Arnauld, *Œuvres*, ii, pp. LXXI-LXXIV.  
56 E.g. BL Add. MS 78632, f. 30r.; Allestree S.1.25(9); White (ed.), *A Catalogue of Books*, p. 84.  
57 We note with interest that Gibbon, though not specifying whether in French or English, claimed to have read the *Provinciales* ‘almost every year’ and modelled his satirical style thereon: *Memoirs of My Life*, ed. Betty Radice (1990), p. 100.
éloquente qu’édifiante et solide’. Other notable works included the Sorbonnist Nicolas Perrault’s ‘encyclopédique’ Morale des Jésuites extraite fidellement de leurs livres,59 composed around the time of the Provinciales, which would be published in English in 1670;60 a lengthy compilation, under the title La Théologie Morale des Jésuites, et Nouveaux Casuistes, of the many writings, decrees and censures which had appeared against ‘Jesuit morality’ up to the time of the Apology for the Casuists;61 and the complement to Perrault’s Morale des Jésuites, La Morale Pratique des Jésuites, which appeared in 1669 and was also swiftly translated into English.62

Although these works were essentially polemical they nevertheless implied the religious sensibility and programme of reform disseminated in the constructive works of Saint-Cyran and Arnauld, and it is possible to suggest that these positive or constructive aspects of the Jansenist critique continued to engage English interest. The famous moral essays of ‘l’une des plus belles plumes de l’Europe’, Pierre Nicole, were read in England, as were the arguably even more influential Réflexions morales of Pasquier Quesnel.63 Similarly Pascal was increasingly recognised as a keen psychologist and religious philosopher on account of his Pensées, which first appeared, in abridged form, in 1670, and were translated

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59 Mons [Amsterdam], 1667; quoted Gay, Morales en conflit, p. 283.
60 See e.g. White (ed.), A Catalogue of Books, p. 100; on the English translation below, p. 92; on the original work, Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 283-6.
into English in 1688 by one of Robert Boyle’s acquaintance, and afterwards in 1704 by Basil Kennet.⁶⁴

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Our concern here is principally with English knowledge of the Jansenist critique of contemporary moral theology, but the influential work of the Port-Royalists in other spheres such as apologetics, pedagogy, and scriptural and liturgical scholarship also contributed significantly to English awareness. There is space here to mention some of the more important works to engage attention across the channel.

The defensive campaign against the ‘domestic enemies’ of the Church (the Jesuits) which occupied Jansenist apologists in the 1640s and 1650s was extended in the 1660s to the ‘external’ enemy of Protestantism. The attitude towards the eucharist exemplified in Arnauld’s *Fréquente communion*, with its emphasis on the faith and obedience of the receiver, rendered the Port-Royalists vulnerable to the charge of crypto-Calvinism.⁶⁵ In answering this charge they elaborated their own conception of Catholicism. For Arnauld, the more distinctly the idea of Christ’s real presence on the altar could be impressed, the more stringently could the real sacrifice on the part of the faithful receiver be conceived. Numerous important works on this subject appeared, mostly written against the Huguenot pastors of Charenton and especially their most active polemicist, Jean Claude. These included the *Tradition de l’Église touchant l’Eucharistie* (Paris, 1661), a series of patristic gobbets concerning the real presence which composed the major part of the *Office du Saint-Sacrement* designed for the use of the nuns of Port-Royal;⁶⁶ in 1664 *La Perpetuité de la Foy Catholique touchant l’Eucharistie, avec la Réfutation de l’écrit d’une Ministre contre ce*

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⁶⁴ Ed. de Port-Royal, Paris, 1670. See e.g. White (ed.), *A Catalogue of Books*, p. 142 (3rd ed., Paris, 1671); *Bibliotheca Burnetiana*, p. 42 (ed. 1701); the subject of the *Pensées* is treated by Barker, *Strange Contrarieties*: see chs. 2–4 on the later Stuart period.


⁶⁶ The *Office* included an interesting preface where Arnauld justified the use of the vernacular by reference to the spirit of the Church, who wants her children to be nourished by her prayers, in contrast to her custom which, obliging to the use of Latin for public prayers, attenuates this end.
Traité, which denied on historical grounds that the doctrine of the real presence was ever regarded as an innovation; and from 1669 to 1674 an expanded version of this work in three monumental volumes, known as ‘la grande’ Perpetuité. Similar arguments were carried forward in Nicole’s Préjugez legitimes contre les Calvinistes of 1671, and Arnauld’s Réponse Générale au Livre de M. Claude of 1672. In another significant work of 1672, Le Renversement de la Morale de Jésus Christ par les erreurs des Calvinistes touchant la Justification, Arnauld set out to show that Calvinist dogma destroyed Christian morality.

These works of the Port-Royalists against the Huguenots of Charenton can be found in many English libraries. There were points of inherent interest – the discussion of patristic witnesses, for example, at a time when, if we are to believe Burnet, the Church of England had no very well-defined position on the eucharistic presence. Of interest too were the arguments over the confession of the oriental churches which followed Arnauld's assertion of the unity of west and east in the doctrine of the real presence. The Church of England possessed, in the archdeacon of Northumberland, an important witness in this matter: Isaac Basire had travelled widely in the east as an Anglican apostle in the 1640s and 1650s, thus acquiring ‘a reputation as an authority on eastern matters’. Basire never had the time to

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68 E.g. Cosin (DUL): la ‘petite’ Perpetuité (ed. 1666), and Claude’s Réponse (1666); la ‘grande’ Perpetuité, t. 1 (1669); Allestree: la ‘petite’ Perpetuité (ed. 1666), Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree O.8.12; la ‘grande’ Perpetuité, t. 1 & t. 2, Allestree N.3.9; Le Renversement de la Morale, Allestree S.1.19; Réponse Générale au Livre de Claude, Allestree O.8.10; La Créance de l’Eglise Grecque, Allestree S.4.21; Perinchief: la ‘grande’ Perpetuité, t. 1, Bodl. MS Rawl. D. 878, f. 62v.; Stillingfleet: la ‘petite’ Perpetuité (1666); la ‘grande’ Perpetuité, 2t. (1674); Le Renversement de la Morale (1672); La Créance de l’Eglise Grecque (1672), White (ed), A Catalogue of Books, pp. 137, 7; Morley: la ‘petite’ Perpetuité (1666); la ‘grande’ Perpetuité (1669); Claude’s Réponse à la perpétuité...de M. Arnauld (1666) and the Réponse à M. Arnauld (1670), Morley’s Catalogue, ff. 117, 125; Tillotson, Claude’s Réponse à la perpétuité (3rd ed., 1671), Bibliotheca Tillotsonia, p. 85.
69 Burnet, History, i, pp. 134-5, on the modish fudge current at Court concerning the ‘most unconceivable manner’ of Christ’s real presence; cf. C. W. Dugmore, Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Waterland (1942), ch. 4.
write up his materials properly, but his research became known.\textsuperscript{72} Claude enlisted his support, as Basire reports in a letter to Evelyn of 1669,\textsuperscript{73} and Basire was afterwards attacked by defenders of Arnauld, and directly by Nicole and Arnauld in ‘la grande’ \textit{Perpetuité}.\textsuperscript{74} Burnet, for one, felt that ‘M. Arnaud has said all that can be said in such a Cause’.\textsuperscript{75}

The Jansenists’ eagerness to educate French Christians by publishing the historical content of the faith in the vernacular was part of a wider pedagogical and pastoral endeavour which in some respects mirrored the concerns of English churchmen.\textsuperscript{76} The ‘Cartesianism’ of Port-Royal is not self-evident,\textsuperscript{77} but Arnauld, a strident critic of the corrupt and corrupting philosophy of the schools, was an enthusiast for the new science.\textsuperscript{78} Two of the works which rendered his name most famous among English-speaking intellectuals were those in which he clearly pinned his colours to its mast, the \textit{Reasoned and General Grammar}, and the so-called \textit{Port-Royal Logic}.\textsuperscript{79} Produced with the collaboration of Claude Lancelot and Nicole, both these works make clear their affinity with Descartes, seeking to establish universal rules through a critical, rational method consisting in the accurate inference of more complex ideas

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  \item \textsuperscript{72} See e.g. the description of his eastern travels sent to Sir Richard Browne in 1653: \textit{CClarSP}, ii, pp. 228-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} BL Add MS 78683, no. 14: ‘I did, awhile agoe, returne unto Monsieur Claude, who undertakes Monsr Arnauld, a competent answer to his most materiall questions, wch he has received … of this you may be assured, that I shall never be wanting to serve the Catholick church, especially at the Request of such as you …’
  \item \textsuperscript{74} [Anselme de Paris], \textit{La Créance de l’Eglise Grecque Touchant la Transubstantiation, défendue contre la Réponse du Ministre Claude au livre de Monsieur Arnaud} (Paris, 1672), bk. 3, ch. 7. This debate continued in both French and English, with Arnauld receiving support from the curious English Catholic Abraham Woodhead, in \textit{The Greeks opinion touching the Eucharist misrepresented by Monsieur Claude in his answer to M. Nicole} (1686); and the opposite opinion from the eccentric French Protestant Jean Aymon, in \textit{Monumens authentiques de la religion des grecs et de la fausseté de plusieurs confessions de foi des christiens orientaux} (La Haye, 1708), at p. 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Burnet, \textit{A relation of a conference}, pp. 114-15.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} On the famous ‘petites écoles’ of Port-Royal see Frédéric Delforge, \textit{Les Petites Ecoles de Port-Royal 1637-1660} (Paris, 1985).
  \item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée} (1660); \textit{La Logique, ou L’Art de Penser} (1662).
\end{itemize}
from those which are simple and can be clearly and distinctly grasped.\textsuperscript{80} They were highly influential in England as well as in France.\textsuperscript{81}

It is interesting that the Port-Royal theologians were slurred with Cartesian rationalism, since they are usually characterised, in contrast to the rationalist, speculative theological mode of the Jesuits, as anti-rationalist and, as it were, historicist in outlook. In fact the Jansenist programme, being resolved from an argument about grace into a framework for moral and pastoral theology, was strongly intellectualist in shape. Despite the anti-rationalist rhetoric of some of its proponents, it articulated an essentially Platonist outlook, looking for the progress of the rational soul or mind, freed from the uncertainties of the sensible world, towards the unity which is its origin. Its criticisms and recommendations in relation to contemporary theology and praxis aimed at establishing those conditions which could promote, and altering or effacing those which inhibit the acquisition of this veridical type of science.\textsuperscript{82} In undertaking their great enterprise of scriptural and liturgical scholarship, the gentlemen of Port-Royal were realising the ambition implicit in their theological critique, to lead individual Christians out of the cave. This work was also bound to make an impression on English Protestants, standing proudly as they did on ‘the Bible and the Bible only’.

From 1653 to 1693 Port-Royal produced a new translation of the whole of the Bible, with notes and ‘les grandes explications’; a French edition of the Vulgate; works on biblical history, chronology, and geography; and liturgical materials, including the book of hours.


\textsuperscript{81} The Logic was taught at Oxford and Cambridge in the nineteenth century, Logic, tr. Dickoff and James, Introduction. Some examples of ownership among English churchmen are: Allestree, Ch. Ch. Lib., Allestree S.6.1 [La Logique, ou L’Art de Penser], Allestree d.7.23(1) [Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée]; Allestree d.6.3 [Nouvelle méthode pour apprendre facilement la langue latine] - Barlow, Bodl., 8vo. H 96 Linc. [La Logique]; Barrow, Bodl. MS Rawl. D. 878, fo. 54v. [La Logique], cf. Perinchief, ibid., fo. 65v. [La Logique, Nouvelle méthode pour ... latine]; Stillingfleet, A Catalogue, p. 109 [Nouvelle méthode pour apprendre ... la langue latine (1667), Nouvelle méthode pour apprendre ... la langue grecque (1656); Burnet, Bibliotheca Burnetiana, p. 8 [Ars Cogitandi].

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. ch. 1, above, and ch. 4, below.
called L’Office de l’Église, and L’Office du Saint-Sacrement discussed above. The Tridentine missal was published in French in 1660 by an associate of Port-Royal, Joseph de Voisin, and the ordinary of the mass was often controversially appended to Port-Royalist writings. In 1688 Nicolas Le Tourneux would publish the entire Roman breviary in French. A less restrictive attitude towards the vernacular dissemination of scriptural and liturgical materials prevailed in France than in southern Europe, but the Port-Royalists outstripped the standard French position in arguing that knowledge of scripture and the prayers of the Church was, more than a right, ‘un devoir’. ‘Elle [scripture] s’offre à tous, et elle se proportionne à tous … tous y puisent indifféremment’. This attitude put them beyond the pale of conservative Catholic opinion, and made it impossible to secure in France the requisite approbations and privileges necessary to print the New Testament in 1667; it was imprinted by the Protestant Elzeviers of Amsterdam under the name of Gaspard Migeot of Mons, with a privilege from the king of Spain.

The Mons Testament made a considerable impact in England. Robert Boyle, for example, intending to sponsor an Irish Testament through the press, had the Jansenist

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84 Idem, La Bible et la Liturgie en Français. L’Eglise tridentine et les traductions bibliques et liturgiques (Paris, 1990) pp. 117f.; idem, Port-Royal et la Bible. Un siècle d’or de la Bible en France 1650-1708 (Paris, 2007), pp. 82-3; see chs. 7-12 on the Biblia Sacra (the edition of the Vulgate produced by Lancelot) and other works of chronology and geography; and ch. 14 on the new Port-Royal translation of 1662 of the Imitation de Jésus-Christ. For a portrait of le Tourneaux from a nineteenth-century Tractarian perspective see Morgan, Port-Royal, pp. 74-81.

85 The norm in France was established by the fourth ‘regula’ of the Index, promulgated with the bull Dominici gregis in 1564: any putative lay reader must obtain a written permission from a clergyman, given only when his ‘capacity’ to read such texts without danger is established. See Chédozeau, La Bible et la Liturgie, pp. 11-44; idem, ‘Les grandes étapes de la publication de la Bible catholique en français du concile de Trente au XVIIIe siècle’, in J.-R. Armogathe, dir., Le Grand Siècle et la Bible (Paris, 1989), pp. 341-60.


example in mind.88 Boyle consulted with various clerical friends in London, and was advised that de Sacy’s preface would be an ideal introduction to the Irish Testament. As he wrote to Henry Jones, bishop of Meath, in April 1681,

the most intelligent divine I have advised with here about it is earnest to have the Preface that the Jansenists have premis’d to their translation of the New Testament, which being a piece of great learning and piety and much esteemed by the better sort of Romanists themselves, ‘tis judged that if it be publish’d in English … it may very much recommend the Introduction of the Irish Testament to the better sort of Papists themselves.89

The translator Andrew Sall, an ex-Jesuit, professed himself ‘not a little joyed to hear so great an advance to right made in the Romish church as to suffer the word of God to come out in the vulgar tongue’.90 The ‘intelligent divine’ was most likely one of Stillingfleet, Barlow of Lincoln, or Burnet, all close to Boyle and equally well-informed about the Jansenists. Stillingfleet possessed both of Arnauld’s major defences of the Mons Testament.91 Their common friend Evelyn possessed the 1672 edition of the Testament itself.92 Other works relating to the controversy were also owned by various churchmen in the period.93

88 Boyle, who was Governor of the Company for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England in his later years, also contributed to a catechism and a New Testament in Turkish, and for a similar design intended by the East India Company – see Gilbert Burnet, A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of the Honourable Robert Boyle: At St Martin’s in the Fields, January 7 1691/2 (1692), pp. 26-8.
90 Boyle, Correspondence, iv, p. 219.
91 Cf. Edward Stillingfleet, The Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome Truly Represented; In Answer to a Book Intitled, A Papist Misrepresented, and Represented, &c. (1686), pp. 138-9. Arnauld’s works were, with Nicole, Défense de la Traduction du Nouveau Testament imprimé à Mons (contre les sermons du P. Mainbourg Iesuite) (Paris, 1668/9); and the Nouvelle Défense de la traduction du Nouveau Testament imprimé à Mons, contre le livre de M. Mallet … (Cologne, 1682). The whole controversy is treated at length in the préfaces historiques to tomes VI-VIII of Arnauld, Œuvres. B. Chédozeau is preparing a monograph on the subject.
92 BL Add. MS 78632, f. 35r. So did Morley, Morley’s Catalogue, f. 126.
93 E.g. the first Défense by Allestree, Ch. Ch. Lib., Allestree S.3.16; also Recueil de diverses pièces publiées pour la traduction du Nouveau Testament, imprimée à Mons: contre ceux qui en ont interdit l’usage, ou combattu les passages … (Cologne [Paris], 1669), in Allestree S.3.17, S.2.20; also WN 7.6-8 in the Wake bequest. Allestree also invested in de Sacy’s translation of the Old Testament as it appeared in the 1670s, including 1 & 2 Kings, Proverbs, Isaiah, and Ecclesiastes. Stillingfleet had the original Défense and the Nouvelle Défense of 1682, and L’Evesque de Cour opposé à L’Evesque Apostolique: Entretiens sur l’ordonnance de
The question of vernacular scripture was intimately tied up with that of the pastoral and liturgical reform pursued by some Jansenist or Jansenist-sympathising ecclesiastics. The ‘Augustinian’ school of ecclesiastical reformers influenced by Bérulle and Saint-Cyr, seeking to form a new learned clergy and to renew the spiritual lives of the souls under their care on the primitive model, emphasised universal active participation. This encouraged a movement to recover the proper liturgical traditions of the French Church; most of the important examples of these ‘neo-Gallican’ liturgies were produced with some Jansenist involvement. One cognate work was highly influential, and became well-known in England: this was the Rituel d’Alet of Nicolas Pavillon, the rigorist bishop of Alet, produced in collaboration with Arnauld and Martin de Barcos, nephew of Saint-Cyr. The Ritual was a detailed catechetical programme designed to school the lay Christian conscience through the auspices of an educated and disciplined clergy. It spread throughout France, and it was possessed, along with similar documents relating to the diocesan administration of other reforming bishops, by numerous English churchmen, who were exercised by identical aspirations – exemplified in Burnet’s Discourse of the Pastoral Care of 1692 – after discipline and education. Similarly the pastoral letters of the rigorist reforming bishop Antoine Godeau were translated and published by Basil Kennet in 1700.

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98 E.g. John Cosin had the Rituel de Alet (DUL); Stillingfleet had works of Godeau, including Homélies sur Dimanches et Festes de l’année (Paris, 1682) and his Discours sur les Ordres Sacrés (Paris, 1658); also a
Burnet provides a fitting conclusion to our survey:

Nor is the Learning of the Gallican Church that for which they are chiefly to be esteemed: It must also be acknowledged, that from the study of the Ancient Fathers many of them seem to have derived a great measure of their Spirit … They have endeavoured not only to discover the corruptions in Morality and Casuistical Divinity, and many other abuses in the Government of the Church, but have also infused in their Clergy a greater Reverence for the Scriptures, a deeper sense of the Pastoral Care, and a higher value for Holy Orders, than had appeared among them for divers Ages before … There are many things among them highly Imitable, and by which they are a great reproach to others, who have not studied to copy after these patterns they have set them. The World will be forever bound to Honour the Names of Godeau, Paschall, Arnauld, and the Author of the Essays of Morality.

Recueil des pièces publiées en l’affaire des Evesques d’Alet, de Pamiers, de Beauvais, & d’Angers, qui ont été poursuvis pour avoir distingué le fait du droit dans leur mandemens sur la signature du formulaire envoyé par le Pape Alexandre VIII (Cologne, 1669), and a Lettre of Pavillon of Alet to Hardouin Péréfixe, Archbishop of Paris, published at Cologne, 1683: A Catalogue, pp. 88, 97, 137; Morley had the Statuts Synodaux du Diocèse d’Alet (1675), Morley’s Catalogue, f. 126; Allestree had a great many documents relating to the diocesan rule of the Jansenist-sympathising bishops Pavillon of Alet, Henri Arnauld of Angers, Nicolas Choart de Buzenval of Beauvais, Godeau of Grasse, as well as to the Formulary affair and that of Pirot’s Apologie pour les Casuistes: for example the Catechisme of Henri Arnauld, the Statuts synodaux du diocèse d’Alet, and political and pastoral letters touching the formulary and the Apologie by Godeau, Arnauld, Pavillon, and de Buzenval; as well more general matter on French ecclesiastical life, such as the Procez verbaux de L’Assemblée Générale du clergé de France for 1655, 1656, 1665 and 1666, or Des jugemens canoniques des évesques (1671), all in the Allestree bequest, Ch. Ch. Lib.

99 Kennet, Pastoral Instructions and Meditations … Recommended to the Clergy of His Diocese by Antony Godeau, Bishop of Grasse and Vence (1700).

100 Gilbert Burnet, The letter writ by the last Assembly General of the Clergy of France … translated into English, and examined (1683), Preface.
2) The Origins of the Jansenist Translations

Anglican writers of this period had, therefore, measured the significance of contemporary debates in the country where many of them found asylum during the 1640s and 1650s. But readers did not need to be familiar with French books in order to understand the issues at stake. The remainder of this chapter describes how they reached an Anglophone audience, and begins to assess what opinions were entertained as to the relevance and potential application of these debates.

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The *Lettres Provinciales*, which made a profound impression in France, having been circulated in unusually large numbers despite the dangers involved in their production, were translated almost immediately in 1656-57 as *Les Provinciales: or, The Mystery of Jesuitism*. This was available in England by August 31st 1657 at the latest, Pascal’s final letter having appeared on March 24th, and was presumably worked up as the letters came out in France. In 1658 there followed the *Additionals to the Mystery of Jesuitism Englished by the same hand*. This laid out the apparently unanimous condemnation of the *Apology for the Casuists* and the maxims it defended among the diocesan clergy of France. It included various requests, letters and factums of the pastors of Paris and Rouen against Pirot’s work, and the judgment passed against it by the Paris theology faculty, as well as extracts from the lists of ‘dangerous propositions’ produced as accessories to the outcry. Many of these pieces would later appear in the large collection entitled *La Théologie Morale des Jésuites, et...*
Nouveaux Casuistes, published in 1667. A second edition of the Lettres themselves was also produced in 1658, with the Additionals and another four occasional pieces appended. These were among ‘the most vendible books’ at the time. A separate work, also available in 1658, A further Discovery of the Mystery of Jesuitism, was another series of translations, mainly of pieces by the French Jesuit Pierre Jarrige, who had briefly apostatised to the reformed religion and carried on a struggle with the Society while resident in Leiden between 1647 and 1650. These writings did not possess the topical interest of the previous collections, being general fulminations against the Jesuits which concentrated predominantly on their sinister politics, cruelty and ambition. In 1659 another topical work did appear, A Journall of all Proceedings between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, a translation of the Septième écrit des Curez de Paris, ou Journ de tout ce qui s’est passé tant à Paris que dans les Provinces de France, sur le sujet de la Morale et de l’Apologie des Casuistes depuis le commencement de l’an 1656 iusqu’en Feurier 1659. In 1662 Arnauld’s short work, La Nouvelle Hérésie des Iésuites was ‘translated out of the French original’ as The New Heresy of the Jesuits. This was reproduced in 1664 together with a translation of Pierre Nicole’s Lettres de l’Hérésie Imaginaire (that is, Jansenism), the recent Gallican declaration of the Sorbonne touching papal infallibility, and extracts, accompanied by ideological glosses, of various letters and other pieces ‘relating to this Abominable mystery’ of Jesuitism. Nicole’s 1662

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105 A further Discovery of the Mystery of Jesuitism in a Collection of severall pieces representing the Humours, Designs, and Practices of those who call themselves the Society of Jesus (1658), preface.
106 A Journall of all Proceedings between the Jansenists, and the Jesuits: From the first coming abroad of the Provincial Letters to the Publication of the Censures of the Clergy of France, and Theologal Faculty of Paris passed upon a book entituled An Apology for the Casuists. Together with the Censure itself of the said Faculy. Publish’d by a Well-wisher to the distressed Church of England (1659).
108 [John Evelyn], Μυστήριον της Ανομίας, That is, Another Part of the Mystery of Jesuitism: or, The New Heresie of the Jesuits, Publickly maintaine at Paris ... Together with The Imaginary Heresie, in three Letters (1664).
work Les Pernicieuses conséquences de la nouvelle hérésie des Jésuites contre le Roy et contre l’Estat, par un advocat au Parlement, was published in English translation in 1666.\textsuperscript{109}

Two more works of 1670 may be mentioned, one a translation of a tract, perhaps by Sébastien de Cambout de Pontchâteau, sometime gardener at Port-Royal, entitled The Moral Practice of the Jesuites demonstrated by many remarkable Histories of their Actions in all Parts of the World,\textsuperscript{110} the other a translation by Israel Tonge of Nicolas Perrault’s The Jesuits Morals.\textsuperscript{111} In 1679, with London in the grip of anti-Catholic fever after the specious discoveries of Titus Oates, the Provincial Letters or Mystery of Jesuitism was reissued, this time with the imprimatur of the bishop, Henry Compton. Another moment of paranoia saw it reprinted in 1744.\textsuperscript{112}

Who was responsible for these translations, and with what purpose in mind? The first three works, that is the initial version of the Provincial Letters, the Additionals, and the Further discovery, were all anonymous. The Journall of all Proceedings was translated by ‘H. H.’, who also contributed a short preface, though without identifying himself any further. The 1662 translation of the Nouvelle Hérésie and the two later works of 1670 were also anonymous. Fortunately, however, it is possible to approach the question by way of the two translations produced in the mid-1660s, the Imaginary Heresy of 1664 and the Pernicious Consequences of 1666. For these were done by John Evelyn, that multifaceted traveller, diarist, writer, horticulturalist, numismatist, bibliophile, founding member of the Royal Society, and devout churchman. In his diary entry for January 2\textsuperscript{nd} 1665 Evelyn recorded that ‘this day was published by me that part of the Mystery of Jesuitism translated and collected by me, though without my name, containing the Imaginary Heresy, with four letters and other

\textsuperscript{109} John Evelyn, The Pernicious Consequences of the New Heresie of the Jesuits against the King and the State, By an Advocate of Parliament (1666).
\textsuperscript{110} This may have been a collaborative work: see Gay, Morales en conflit, pp. 286-7.
\textsuperscript{111} JM.
\textsuperscript{112} Jansen, De Blaise Pascal à Henry Hammond, p. 57; Barker, Strange Contrarieties, pp. 23-4.
The translation of Nicole’s *Pernicious Consequences* which appeared the following year was also Evelyn’s, and together the two works constitute ‘The Mystery of Jesuitism, 2 parts, 8vo’ which he included in the list he later drew up of his own works.\(^{114}\)

Proceeding from the strongest grounds of evidence to the weakest, that is from Evelyn’s translations, to the *Journal* by ‘H.H.’, to the anonymous *Mystery of Jesuitism* series, it is possible to construct an outline of the parties responsible for the translations and of their motives.

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**Evelyn’s Translations and Early Restoration Religious Politics**

Of the *Pernicious Consequences* Evelyn wrote to his friend John Wilkins, at this time vicar of St Lawrence Jewry in London and Secretary of the Royal Society, ‘Sir, that I presume to send you the consequence of what I formerly published in English, on the controversy betwixt the Jesuits and the Jansenists, speaks rather my obedience to a command from that great person, than my abilities to have undertaken, or acquitted myself as I ought’.\(^{115}\) The great person, we learn, was the Lord Chancellor, Edward Hyde the Earl of Clarendon, from whom the requirement came, through his son and occasional secretary, Henry, Lord Cornbury, to translate the work.\(^{116}\) Evelyn addressed his prefaces to ‘My Lord’, and notified Cornbury upon completion of the first translation in 1664.\(^{117}\) His time pressed in these years by a varied portfolio of public commitments, Evelyn was not exactly willing: as


\(^{114}\) Clark, p. 107n.


\(^{117}\) de Beer (ed.), *Diary*, i, p. 431n.
he wrote to Cornbury on February 9th 1665, ‘being late come home, imagine me turning over your close printed memoirs’ – presumably collected materials illustrating the history of the controversy, of which some appeared with the Imaginary Heresy – ‘and shrinking up my shoulders; yet with a resolution of surmounting the difficulty animated with my Lord Chancellor’s and your Lordship’s commands, whom I am perfectly disposed to serve, even in the greatest drudgeries, to the translation of books’.118

Evelyn was a literary man who engaged in translation work – apart from his more famous rendering of Lucretius, he translated French works by Gabriel Naudé, Mazarin’s librarian, by Roland Fréart on architecture, and also by the solitaire d’Andilly on fruticulture. Even so, the decision to charge this essentially menial task upon a man so occupied as was Evelyn with official business and his own avocations is curious, and argues some more peculiar aptness in him. Evelyn, whose romantic tag ‘ἀπλανως’, steady, or fixed, also describes his politics, was near the centre of the group of loyalist politicians and churchmen who worked steadily for the twin cause of church and crown after the civil wars, and at the restoration assumed high office and positions of influence.119 He was married to the daughter of Sir Richard Browne, the English resident at Paris, whose embassy was the focal point for royalist exiles in that city, his chapel, presided over by John Cosin, constituting in a sense the last remaining visible remnant of the dismantled episcopal Church. Browne, like Evelyn, was firmly aligned with the counsels of royalists like Hyde, Secretary Edward Nicholas, and James Butler, later Duke of Ormond, who opposed political courses inimical to the integrity of that Church and her identity with her monarchical head.

118 Bray (ed.), Correspondence, iii, p. 149.
119 BL Add MS 15948: Letters from Evelyn to Sir Richard Browne, 1647-1649. Evelyn was during these years separated from his new wife Mary, Browne’s daughter.
Evelyn then was a friend and a trusted ally.\textsuperscript{120} He had also other titles qualifying him for the work. He had travelled in France in the 1640s, and while in Paris contracted a personal acquaintance among the Port-Royalists. He visited the ‘Count de Lian Court’s palace’ in March 1644 to look at the ‘curiosities and pictures’, remarking the duke’s assiduous courtesy, and remembering the visit years later.\textsuperscript{121} It was the Duc de Liancourt’s intimacy with Port-Royal which indirectly gave rise to the Provinciales, since it was on that account that an over-zealous confessor at Saint-Sulpice, refusing him absolution, provoked the famous letters of Arnauld and hence the Sorbonne trial in which Pascal intervened. Evelyn had also met, and formed an unflattering opinion of, Ludovic Stuart d’Aubigny, nephew and latterly a close friend of Charles II, who was raised in France among sympathisers of Port-Royal, and whose ecclesiastical career was coloured by his association with the Jansenist party.\textsuperscript{122}

Evelyn sympathised with the Jansenists, looking on them as persecuted dissidents against papal tyranny. These ‘poor Jansenists’, he wrote, ‘charg’d with no less Crime than Heresie, for disowning’ the ‘pernicious doctrines’ of the papalist, king-killing Jesuits, ‘with the Church of England are the only Confessors amongst all the Christian professors now extant, that I could ever reade of or discover’.\textsuperscript{123} It is Evelyn’s conviction, notwithstanding his fatigue, in the relevance of the Jansenist polemics to his own ideological commitments, which helps to explain Hyde’s selecting him for the work. ‘But why call I this a drudgery?’ he asked in writing to Cornbury: ‘who would not be proud of the service, in which I find God

\textsuperscript{121} de Beer (ed.), Diary, ii, pp. 112-14; Bray (ed.), Correspondence, iii, p. 199, letter to Henry Howard of 1667.
\textsuperscript{122} Clark, chs. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{123} Evelyn, Pernicious Consequences, Preface: ‘Confessors’, presumably, in the sense of the early Christian confessors under persecution; Evelyn was accustomed to speak of his benighted Church in this register.
and the King concerned? ... Nor is it small in my esteem that God directs you to make use of
me in anything which relates to the Church, though in my secular station'.

What was the history of Hyde’s own interest in these works? It seems both he and his
ally Ormond quickly discerned the potential utility of the dissentient chorus now arisen in the
Catholic fold, and therefore began to amass a collection of works brought forth by the
controversy. Hyde had followed the affair at least since the time of Cum occasione, the papal
bull of 1653 which condemned the Five Propositions. He saw ‘divers little discourses printed
against the bull’ in that year. Letters from Arnauld, concerning the formulary condemning
the propositions enjoined on French ecclesiastics, and from Antoine Le Maistre on the bull
Ad sacram of the hostile Pope Alexander VII (which ruled out Arnauld’s attempt to stand on
the question de fait), were translated and preserved among his papers. J. C. Hayward has
called attention to the Port-Royalist works catalogued in the library amassed by Hyde and his
sons.

Hyde’s main informant in Paris was Richard Bellings. Bellings, later knighted, had
been an influential figure among the confederate Catholics in 1640s Ireland, and was on very
close terms with Ormond. After Cromwell’s victory in Ireland he travelled to Paris where he
lived throughout the 1650s under the assumed name of ‘Mr. Kingstonn’. Hyde called him a
‘jewel’, continuing to use him after the restoration to translate papers from European
languages. During these years Bellings knew men associated with the Jansenists. The ‘Dr.
Cologhon’ he mentions, for example, was probably Dr. John Callaghan, also a confederate Catholic and a dependent of Ormond, who stayed at Port-Royal in retreat between 1647 and 1649, under the confessor who would oversee Pascal’s conversion, Antoine Singlin.\footnote{CClarSP, ii, p. 204; Clark, pp. 32f.} In 1657 Bellings was sent by the king to Louvain to confer with Dr. John Sinnich, a theologian who had known Jansen and furnished the *Augustinus* with an approbation. Sinnich, a ‘penetrating’ critic of probabilism, was esteemed by Arnauld as an authority on grace. In 1655 Bellings went to Poland with Lord Muskerry, Ormond’s brother-in-law, at the suggestion of Mère Angélique, who says Bellings translated the Latin version of *De la fréquente communion* into English, though this translation has never been discovered.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 51-2, 60; quote is Jonsen and Toulmin, *The Abuse of Casuistry*, p. 172.} He certainly acquired numerous other Port-Royalist works.\footnote{BL S.C.295(2) [A Catalogue of the Library of the Honourable Rich. Arundel Bealing Esq. (1725)]: these included the *Logic*, the method for learning Latin, the *Instructions chrétiennes* of Saint-Cyran compiled by d’Andilly, ‘la petite’ and ‘la grande’ *Perpétuité de la Foy*, Nicole’s ‘moral and theological instructions’, the *Pensées* in an edition of 1714, and ‘le Nouveau Testam. du P. Quesnel, 8 vols. in 4, Paris, 1696’ (pp. 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21).}

It is no surprise if Bellings did entertain genuine sympathies for the Jansenists: throughout his career he showed himself to be of that strain of Stuart Catholic sentiment which, looking for relief on the grounds of political loyalty, was willing to repudiate the jurisdictional claims of the papacy and to seek distance from less conciliatory co-religionists. He authored the Irish Remonstrance or Formulary of Loyalty of 1661, an oath based on an earlier formula devised by the Catholic convert and friend of Edward Hyde, Serenus Cressy, which aimed to establish the consistency of Catholic religion with political allegiance to a Protestant monarch.\footnote{Serenus Cressy, *Exomologesis, or, A faithfull narration of the occasion and motives of the conversion unto Catholique unity of Hugh-Paulin Cressy* (Paris, 1647), pp. 72-9. Hyde had known Cressy since the convivia at Great Tew in the 1630s.} It acknowledged the sovereign authority of Charles II in all civil and temporal affairs, renounced the pretensions of ‘all foreign power, be it papal or princely, spiritual or temporal’ to absolve his subjects of their allegiance, and execrated ‘damnable and
wicked’ doctrines including mental equivocation, tyrannicide, and the infallibility of the pope without the consent of the Church and even in matters of fact.\textsuperscript{134} As its historian and supporter Peter Walsh, who had known and admired Jansen at Louvain and had French connections, made clear in his retrospective explanations, it was a document with considerable Gallican affinities. Ormond used it cynically to divide the Irish clergy against itself. When, however, he tried to press it, together with the Gallican articles of the Sorbonne, upon the Irish clergy in congregation in 1666, they deprecated the proposal as ‘Jansenist’.\textsuperscript{135}

The relevance of European Catholic affairs to the Irish clergy, who naturally had affiliations within the wider European church, meant Ormond was in receipt of pertinent materials from various sources.\textsuperscript{136} Peter Talbot, for example, the future archbishop of Dublin, who was hostile to Jansenism and opposed the Gallican-sounding Remonstrance, sent Ormond ‘the answer to the Jansenists calumnies against the Jesuits’ from Brussels in August of 1656.\textsuperscript{137} On the other hand Ormond patronised the Irish Jansenist O’Callaghan, who he proposed for an ill-fated mission to Rome to negotiate support for Charles in 1653. O’Callaghan was employed by Lord Muskerry, Ormond’s brother-in-law, as tutor to his sons. Muskerry’s daughter was a pensionnaire at Port-Royal, and he enjoyed the friendship and assistance of the Duc de Luynes, a firm friend to Port-Royal, and of its abbess, Mère Angélique. Muskerry experienced a profound renewal of faith upon reading Arnauld’s \textit{De la fréquente communion}: this was perhaps during his trip to Poland with Bellings, since Bellings

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 39; Clark, p. 206.
\textsuperscript{136} Many Irish seminarians received their training on the continent during this period. By the 1620s there were three religious houses in the city of Louvain which functioned as colleges for Irish students. Irish clergy are shown to have been coloured by this proximity to the traditions of Jansenist theology and Gallican ecclesiology prevalent at the institution in Thomas O’Connor, \textit{Irish Jansenists 1600-70: religion and politics in Flanders, France, Ireland and Rome} (Dublin, 2008).
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{CClarSP}, iii, pp. 158, 174. This was possibly Fr Annat’s \textit{Eclaircissement de quelques difficultés morales touchant l’état présent du jansénisme}, the first Jesuit response to Pascal, which appeared between the fourth and fifth of the \textit{Lettres}. 
is supposed to have translated that work into English. Ormond himself later acquired Jansenist works, such as Arnauld’s letters and his *Tradition de l’Eglise*.\(^\text{138}\)

Bellings supplied both Hyde and Ormond with information on the Jansenist controversy. In February 1658, for example, he promised Hyde a copy of ‘the apollogy, whereof I formerly writ’. This must have been the *Apology for the Casuists*, published in December 1657, which as Bellings or ‘Kingstonn’ recorded, ‘makes a noise in the court and in the parliament’. ‘I am promised a true narrative of the progresse it hath gone, and the contentions concerning it; and if I find it fitt to be sent in a letter, you may receave it the next poast’.\(^\text{139}\) The ‘narrative of … the contentions concerning it’ presumably consisted of the requests, letters, factums and censures which followed the appearance of the *Apology*, and which would see print in English translation in the *Mystery of Jesuitism* series. In August Bellings told Hyde, ‘You will receave with these a sixt piece sett forth by the curats of Paris’, that is the sixth of the *écrits des curés de Paris*, which upbraided the Jesuits for failing, in the *Sentiment des Jésuites sur le livre de l’Apologie des Casuistes* of 1658, to dissociate themselves from a work already condemned by the Sorbonne and the bishop of Orléans.\(^\text{140}\) ‘Certainly these late differences have been the occasion of much good’, Bellings went on, indicating the direction of his sympathies:

> all they write is edefying and excellent; and this admirable. This copy may be layd by unsullyed, to be added to the rest in the last volume of your books; and you, Mr. Sidnamb, and your friends, may make use of that sent Mr. Sidnamb, who lookes not after collections’.\(^\text{141}\)

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138 Clark, pp. 33-53.
139 Thomas Birch, *A collection of the state papers of John Thurloe, Esq; secretary, first, to the Council of State, and afterwards to the two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell*, 7 vols. (1742), vi, pp. 782-3.
141 *Thurloe Papers*, vii, pp. 324-5.
‘Mr. Sidnam’ was the pseudonym used to designate Ormond; Bellings’s letter clearly indicates that a group of like-minded friends in the royal party were engaged in the collection of Jansenist works at the time of the storm created by Pascal’s letters.

Another of Hyde’s sources, or of Bellings’s, may have been d’Aubigny, as Clark conjectured.142 D’Aubigny was close to the Hydes, and a man whose connections made him useful to the royal cause. He was a close friend, for example, of the renegade archbishop of Paris, the cardinal de Retz, with whom the royal party, through Ormond among others, carried on negotiations during 1658, hoping to persuade the cardinal to solicit Catholic support against the Cromwellian regime.143 D’Aubigny was also an important figure in the attempts of the restored royalists to settle the question of English Catholicism in the early 1660s. It was to this end that, a proposal to make him bishop of Dunkirk, with jurisdiction over English Catholics, having failed, Bellings was sent to Rome in 1663 to secure him a cardinal’s hat. The mission was affected by complex political forces, but one of the ostensible reasons for its failure was the suspicion of Jansenism attaching to d’Aubigny.144

It is a question who, if not Ormond, was responsible for ‘looking after the collections’. One possibility is Sir Robert Moray or Murray, a fellow royalist and founding member of the Royal Society, who Evelyn noted, in his own copy of the work, had transmitted to him the French originals of the Imaginary Heresy. In the preface, on the other hand, Evelyn addressed ‘My Lord’ (Cornbury or Clarendon) regarding ‘the French copy you were pleased to consign to me’. Then again, Evelyn may have had his own supply. On the day the work was published he went to present it to Cornbury, but finding him absent, ‘I left it with my Lord your father, because I would not suffer it to be publiq till he had first seene it,

142 Clark, p. 108.
144 Clark, ch. 7; below, pp. 104-6.
who, on your Lp’s score, has so just a title to it. The particulars which you will find added
after the 4th letter’ – including the censure of the Paris theology faculty concerning the
Jesuits, and the sense of the French church concerning the pope’s infallibility and power,
‘lately declared by Authority’, i.e. the Sorbonne– ‘are extracted out of several curious papers
and passages lying by me, which for being very apposite to your controversy, I thought fit to
annex, in danger otherwise to have never been produced’.

Evelyn, evidently conscientious
in his desire to represent the controversy faithfully, had already interrupted printing, which
began in November 1664, to insert the fourth of Nicole’s letters, only published in France on
June 19th.

A final possibility for the custodian of the collection, if indeed there was only one,
was the clergyman and royal agent Richard Allestree, also a friend of Evelyn’s. Allestree’s
acquisitions reflect the impact of the Provinciales. Among his books is, for example, a home-
made volume of miscellaneous pieces relevant to the controversy, bound up and given the
handwritten title ‘Tracts relating to controversies in the Church of France 1661’. The
contents are also handwritten in the front and back of the volume, which traces the
controversy over casuistry through attacks, defences, and ecclesiastical censures from the
time of the publication of Pirot’s Apology for the Casuists. The volume, indeed, looks very
much like the sort of thing which would be produced by the corporate collecting endeavour
adverted to by Bellings in his letter to Hyde of 1658. Four of the Additionals added to the
second edition of the Mystery of Jesuitism were translations of works collected and
eventually bound up together by Allestree: the ‘Representation of the Curez of Paris to the
Reverends the Curez of the other Dioceses of France’ (Allestree S. 1. 25 [40]); ‘A Catalogue
of the Propositions contained in an Extract made of some of the most dangerous Propositions

145 Quoted in Keynes, John Evelyn, pp. 124-5.
146 de Beer (ed.), Diary, iii, p. 393n.; Clark, p. 107.
147 Ch. Ch. Lib., Oxf., Allestree S.1.25.
of diverse late Casuists, in point of MORALITY, faithfully taken out of their Works’ (S. 1. 25 [40.1]); ‘A letter from a Curé of Rouen to a Curé in the Country, giving an account of the procedure of his Brethren the Curez of the said city, against the doctrine of certain Casuists’ (S. 1. 25 [23]); and the ‘Factum, or Remonstrance of the Curez of Paris’ against the Apology for the Casuists (S. 1. 25 [34]).

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A group of influential royalists, then, connected by personal and ideological ties, collectively perceived some utility in the Jansenist case. Evelyn’s prefaces indicate quite clearly what sort of idea Clarendon had about its relevance and application. Evelyn magnified the subversive doctrines of the Jesuits, who attribute to ‘their Lord God the Pope’ a personal infallibility even outside general councils and in matters of fact. They vaunt his ‘right of deposition and power’ over kings, and therefore sponsor regicide. The few ‘sober Catholics’ like ‘Monsieur Arnaud’ who ‘deride these excesses’ are rewarded with ‘persecution’. Next Evelyn turned to English Catholics. Any association with such doctrines, he told them, was incompatible with peaceful co-existence in the English state. Referring to the various representations made by English Catholics to the king and to parliament following the restoration, Evelyn charged ‘those who of late lay at His Majesty’s feet, out of that Religious pretence, the Tenderness of Conscience’, with hypocrisy. ‘What moral confidence can a Prince repose in the pretences of any who are thus sworn and addicted to [the Jesuits’] tenets?’

148 Here Evelyn was referring to the thesis defending this ‘Christ-like infallibility’ maintained at the Jesuit Collège de Clermont on December 12th 1661, attacked by Arnauld in his Nouvelle Hérésie des Jésuites, also translated by Evelyn.


150 Evelyn, Another Part of the Mystery of Jesuitism, Preface; Pernicious Consequences, Preface.

151 Evelyn, Another Part, sig. A4v.
Evelyn’s rhetoric was carefully pointed. He implied that any who owned allegiance to the Catholic Church could not disavow the subversive Jesuit tenets. This deliberate confusion had a dual function. By fortifying, on the one hand, the negotiating position of the establishment to which the Catholics had to apply for relief – driving home the point, Evelyn implausibly premised such relief on the pope’s forswearing his own power to depose kings and absolve oaths – the real price of moderation was plainly brought home to them: ‘the sacrifice of that whole pragmatical Order, which has thus set the world in Combustion’.152

Evelyn knew that ‘divers of His Majesties loyal subjects’ were in fact open to comparable terms. He was exploiting well-established tensions between the Jesuits and other elements of the community, especially the secular clergy, which had bedevilled English Catholicism since the late sixteenth century.153 In particular he was speaking to an outlook which may loosely be termed Blackloist, from its inspiring genius Thomas White, alias Blacklo. The traditional objective of the secular clergy, whose ideas about ecclesiastical order and missionary strategy were affronted by the flexible organisation and vigorous mentality of the Jesuits, had been to secure from Rome confirmation of their right to elect a bishop to oversee the discharge of clerical functions in England.154 The Blackloists went a step further than this ‘appellant’ tradition, caught between the Protestant government and the Curia, by bypassing Rome altogether. In 1647, with the secular clergy now administered by the English Chapter in the absence of bishop Richard Smith, a group including Blacklo, Henry Holden and Kenelm Digby prepared a bid for toleration under the Independents, intending to outflank an alliance of their co-religionists, including the Jesuits, who were carrying on parallel

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152 Ib. sigs. A5v.-A6r.
discussions within the traditional parameters. Their scheme guaranteed the allegiance of English Catholics by an episcopal hierarchy immune from Roman interference and equipped to exercise supervision over all laity and clergy, both secular and regular. All regular clergy would, on pain of banishment, acknowledge by oath that their faculties derived uniquely from the bishops. Both laity and clergy would likewise swear an oath of allegiance to be devised by the state. This essentially Gallican scheme, indebted to ideas imbibed by its inventor Holden at Paris, left no room for the Jesuits. Indeed, the Blackloists bargained for toleration with the Roman identity of English Catholicism.

After the Interregnum the Chapter, in which the Blackloist faction now enjoyed considerable influence, especially through its secretary from 1653, John Sergeant, negotiated with the newly restored government of Charles II. These negotiations were managed by Clarendon, charged, as the king’s first minister, with realising Charles’s desire to secure some form of toleration for his Catholic subjects. Clarendon indicated approval of the idea that English Catholics should be governed by their own bishop, an important concession in that this long-cherished ambition had no hope of success unless Rome was sure it corresponded to the preferences of the English government. Naturally such a bishop should be loyal and trustworthy; Clarendon promoted the bid to have his friend and the king’s, d’Aubigny, made, first bishop of Dunkirk, then also a cardinal.

156 Robert Pugh, Blacklo’s Cabal [1680], ed. T. A. Birrell (Farnborough, 1970), pp. 31-3, 36-40.
160 Clark, ch. 7.
D’Aubigny’s candidature was calculated to please the most amenable of the government’s Catholic interlocutors. Among the papers presented, in mid-1661, to a committee appointed to consider a bill for toleration, was one drawn up by the faction in the English Chapter affected to Blackloism. Echoing Holden’s proposals of 1647, this envisaged the close regulation and monitoring of the Catholic clergy in England, conceding in return for the repeal of the penal laws the exclusion of the Jesuits from such relief, and an oath of allegiance which denied the papal deposing power. In an earlier petition the Chapter had described this doctrine as damnable and impious, replicating the most objectionable clause of the original Oath of Allegiance of 1606.161 Chaptermen issued pamphlets urging that the Jesuits be sacrificed for the good of the community. Throughout 1662 the Chapter held conferences with the regulars in England, from which the Jesuits were excluded, which resulted in a declaration of allegiance unacceptable to the regulars. Thereafter they continued to negotiate alone with Clarendon towards toleration on the basis of a modified oath of allegiance and the expulsion of the Jesuits, showing the distance they were prepared to retreat from the claims of the papacy by officially approving the Irish Remonstrance.162 It was the author of that document, Bellings, who went to Rome to obtain the cardinalate for Aubigny.

This step thus constituted an encouragement to the Blackloist-leaning faction with whom Clarendon was negotiating. It may indeed show him better attuned still to their agenda, for it is not clear that success for the Aubigny mission was anticipated. This uncertainty accorded well with the veiled motive many observers attributed to the more radical members of the Chapter, namely the desire, not to obtain a bishop, but the confirmation of its own authority only, and to go on indefinitely without any episcopal oversight. Sergeant developed

161 Miller, Popery and Politics, pp. 98-9.
a high-flown genealogy, originating in the primitive era, for the Chapter’s authority, and was obstructive to any step which threatened to diminish it.\textsuperscript{163}

It appears, therefore, that Clarendon was deliberately attempting to exploit intra-Catholic differences, using the king’s genuine desire to assist his Catholic subjects, whether in the matter of the hierarchy or more generally of relief from the penal laws, as a means by which to foment divisions among the Catholics while appearing to conciliate them.\textsuperscript{164} The Duke of Ormond would retrospectively admit that as Viceroy of Ireland he had explicitly interpreted this to be the function of the Irish Remonstrance.\textsuperscript{165} Some Catholics attributed the failure of the toleration bill in summer 1661 to Clarendon’s opposition, and it was claimed that he encouraged animus against the Jesuits. The reasons for this mistrust are not entirely obvious, but the fact of its existence is telling.\textsuperscript{166} The feeling persisted, and resurfaced in 1662-3 over the Declaration of Indulgence and the bill for implementing it, when Clarendon was again supposed to have obstructed the policy of the court.\textsuperscript{167} In a confused account which seems to merge elements of the discussions of 1661 with the events of 1662, Burnet also made this case. He refers to a proposition made by the Catholics ‘for having none but the secular priests tolerated, who should be under a Bishop, and under one established government’, ‘but that all the regulars, in particular the Jesuits, should be under the strictest possible penalties forbid the Kingdom’, and claims that ‘the Earl of Clarendon set this on; for he knew well it would divide the Papists’.\textsuperscript{168} As Burnet says, ‘a few honest Priests, such as Blacklow, Serjeant, Caron, and Walsh were for it’. These men, he implies, were working with

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[163]{Ib., passim; John Sergeant, \textit{An account of the chapter erected by William, titular bishop of Chalcedon and ordinary of England and Scotland}, ed. W. Turnbull (1853).}
\footnotetext[164]{Thus we reject the ‘softer’ reading of his administrative approach in e.g. George R. Abernathy, Jr., ‘Clarendon and the Declaration of Indulgence’, \textit{JEH}, 11, 1 (1960), pp. 55-73; Abernathy is balanced by Green, \textit{Re-establishment}, p. 220.}
\footnotetext[165]{Creighton, ‘The Remonstrance of December 1661’, p. 18.}
\footnotetext[167]{Green, \textit{Re-establishment}, pp. 223-4; see \textit{The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon ... Written by Himself}, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1857), ii, pp. 98-9.}
\footnotetext[168]{Burnet, \textit{History}, i, p. 194.}
\end{footnotes}
the government: they ‘were very ill-looked on by all their own party, as men gained on
design to betray them’.\textsuperscript{169} He adds later that ‘the Lord Clarendon had many spies among the
Priests’.\textsuperscript{170} Burnet’s source was Peter Walsh, who with Bellings drew up the Irish
Remonstrance. Walsh outlined the thinking behind the Blackloist proposals:

If the government had held a heavy hand on the Regulars and the Jesuits, and had been
gentler to the Seculars, and had set up a distinguishing test, removing all sorts of power
in the Pope over temporal rights of Princes, to which the Regulars and the Jesuits could
never submit … this would have engaged them into such violent quarrels among
themselves, that censures would have been thundered at Rome against all that should
take any such test; which would have procured much disputing, and might have
probably ended in the revolt of the soberer part of that Church.

Walsh regretted that ‘though the Earl of Clarendon and the Duke of Ormond liked the
project, little regard was had to it by the governing party in the Court’.\textsuperscript{171} Burnet’s account
may not be very exact, but it is certainly the case that Clarendon agreed with these proposals.
Even after opposing the bill for implementing the 1662 Declaration of Indulgence he argued
against further penal legislation against Catholics proposed under the subsequent bill to
prevent the growth of popery, holding that the existing laws were sufficient if they were
enforced and those Catholics dangerous to the state expelled.\textsuperscript{172}

If Evelyn’s prefaces do reflect Clarendon’s intentions, the Lord Chancellor was
pursuing the traditional policy adopted by the English state towards her Catholic subjects,

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 225. Peter Walsh received a yearly pension of £300 from Ormond during these years: C. W. Russell
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., pp. 195-6.
\textsuperscript{172} Miller, Popery and Politics, pp. 101-2.
namely to rend them with internal divisions by confusing religious with political questions. This was in effect to counteract Charles’s desired policy while ostensibly working to implement it, which may account for Evelyn’s bemused reaction to Charles’s admiration of his *Imaginary Heresy*, which in early 1665 he told Evelyn ‘he had carried two days in his pocket, read it, and encouraged me’ - ‘at which’, says Evelyn, ‘I did not a little wonder’. Clarendon’s later contention that he opposed the king’s Indulgence on principle, while made to bolster his credentials as a sound churchman, would, on this reading, nevertheless represent his true attitude to Charles’s policy. Clarendon wanted to establish a certifiably loyal Catholic community upon much less flexible and uncertain terms than Charles, abetted by hastier counsellors like Lord Bristol, looked for – by some ‘publick, irreversible and authentic Act’, in Evelyn’s words – and he saw the translation of Jansenist works, Gallican in politics and ecclesiology and fiercely anti-Jesuit, as a means to foster intra-Catholic divisions to this end. Given that from 1663 Clarendon, perceived to be obstructive, was frozen out of the royal counsels on religious matters, Evelyn’s prefaces may be seen both as an *ex post facto* justification of Clarendon’s policy, and as indirect attempts to continue to affect policy where he had lost substantial influence.

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174 Bray (ed.), *Correspondence*, i, pp. 411-12.


176 This priority of civil security is perfectly consistent with Clarendon’s doctrinally minimalist approach to religion, from which some have concluded his principled commitment to a policy of toleration, so that we need not acquiesce in the cynical view of his administrative *modus operandi* propounded in Bosher, *Making of the Restoration*, passim. A balance is struck by Seaward, *The Cavalier Parliament*, ch. 7.

Hyde’s sponsorship of the translation of Jansenist texts thus illustrates considerable sensitivity to the calibration of internal English Catholic politics. This is further substantiated by the Blackloists’ own interest in the Jansenist controversy, which underlines the astuteness of Hyde’s commission to Evelyn, and supports our reading of his attempts to manipulate the internal dynamics of Catholic politics. The Blackloists also play a minor part in our narrative of the transmission of the Jansenist reforming case to an English audience.

The Septième écrit des curez de Paris was published in 1659 as A Journall of All Proceedings between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, and subscribed by ‘H. H.’. Posturing as a ‘Well-wisher to the distressed Church of England’, and himself ‘an afflicted member of a late flourishing Church’, he claimed that a common enemy, in the form of the Jesuits’ moral and political corruptions, was ‘opening a way we never thought on, to … produce, perhaps, in time, an union among us all’. ‘Already’, he continued, ‘we see the Clergy of the Church of England have unanimously condemned these exhorbitant doctrines of the Jesuits … Who knows how far the hand of Providence may carry on these beginnings?’178

The possibility of an eventual re-union of Catholics and Protestants under the Stuarts was a common feature in the rhetoric of Catholics protesting their allegiance and arguing for toleration. The reasons for persecuting Catholics, it was suggested, would be removed if the Protestants could be made to understand that Catholics were not tied to doctrines like the papal deposing power as to matters of faith. The petition which Serenus Cressy printed in his Exomologesis, and which provided a template for the later Irish Remonstrance, looked

178 A Journall of all Proceedings, sig. A2r-v.
forward to a ‘perfect union in all civill and temporall affaires’. According to Peter Walsh, in his *History and Vindication of the loyal formulary* of 1674, the Irish Remonstrance was similarly intended to remove misunderstandings and so facilitate a reunion of Catholics and Protestants in the British Isles. The same arguments were made during Clarendon’s negotiations with the English Chapter in the early 1660s. The preface to the *Journall* expressed an identical sentiment: once Protestants understood that Catholics did not profess the ‘exhorbitant doctrines of the Jesuits’, they would soon show themselves more complaisant. The author of this work, therefore, may sensibly be sought among the Catholic parties who negotiated with the state on these terms.

The most obvious candidate suggested by the initials ‘H. H.’ is thus, as Ruth Clark speculated, the Sorbonnist and *confrère* of Blacklo, Henry Holden. The argument made in the preface to the *Journall* is one which Holden, under whom Cressy had begun to study in Paris soon before publishing his *Exomologesis*, made elsewhere. His *Analysis Divina Fidei*, published in Paris in 1652, was written in order to unite Christians. The main obstacle to such a reunion is the fact that Protestants, seeing some abuses practised in the Church of Rome, assume they are enjoined under pain of anathema. But Holden will show that these are not essential points of faith. The translator of Holden’s book, professedly a convert from the English Church, ‘little satisfied that these scattered links of a body without a head can properly be called the Church of England’, remarked his pleasure on meeting with it, ‘which

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179 Cressy, *Exomologesis*, chs. 13-14; cf. Gabriel Glickman, ‘Christian Reunion, the Anglo-French Alliance and the English Catholic Imagination, 1660-72’, *English Historical Review*, 128, 531 (2013), pp. 263-91; for Cressy’s close links to Port-Royal see Clark, ch. 5.
to my understanding laid a way open for an Union between the Church of England and the Roman; a Union I must confess I had long desired’. 184

Both Holden and his associate Blacklo considered the Jansenist polemics excellent instruments for dislodging the scales from Protestant eyes and so paving the way towards union. ‘Take … the French Provincial Letters’, as Blacklo wrote in 1659: ‘not only vulgarly known, but rendered also into our vulgar tongue’, they are heartily to be approved. ‘If I mistake not, the publishing such truths is more expedient here than in any part of the world: nothing being more importantly conducive to the reduction of our separatists [i.e., English Protestants], than the discarding superfluous controversies, and contesting with them only necessary Doctrines; without engaging for the uncertain and wavering opinions of Doctors …’. 185 Suggestively, Blacklo insisted that, while his own letter should not be mistaken ‘for an English Provincial Letter, such keen-edg’d tools may possibly hereafter come in fashion, even among us too’. 186 It may be too much to connect this statement with the translation of the Journall by ‘H. H.’ in the same year; but it is certain that Holden too admired the Jansenist critique, and had earlier furnished a rather generous description of the condemned Provinciales, ‘in which there is not a word of any doctrine proposed by the author himself, being mere citations of many licentious and scandalous opinions, taught and published … by the Society of Jesus’. 187 In common with the faculty of which he was a member, he deplored the ‘abominable Apology for the Casuists’, an ‘intollerably scandalous book’ from which he


185 Thomas White, A letter to a person of Honour: written by Mr. Thomas White, In Vindication of himself and his doctrine (1659), sig. A10r.-v.

186 Ibid., sig. A2r.

extracted, after the manner of Arnauld and Pascal, some extreme examples of moral laxism.\(^ {188}\)

As well as their interest in detoxifying perceptions of Catholicism in the hope of a *rapprochement* with the state, Holden and the Blackloists had certain marked affinities with the Jansenists themselves. Both tendencies fell foul of the Holy See in the 1650s. White’s *Sonus Buccinae* of 1654 incurred the condemnation of the Inquisition for its treatment of papal infallibility.\(^ {189}\) He subsequently clarified in his *Tabulae Suffragiales* of 1655 that the ‘opinionem de inerrantia personali Papae’ was ‘archihaereticam’, and the propagation of this opinion ‘gravissimum peccatorum’.\(^ {190}\) Prosecuting what chess-players call an ‘active’ defence, White would continue to assert both his doctrinal orthodoxy and his obedience by denying the premises upon which he was censured.\(^ {191}\)

White recognised the parallel between his own position and that of the Jansenists. In the 1659 edition of *Sonus Buccinae*, treating ecclesiastical censure, he examined the Five Propositions as an illustrative example. The Propositions are evidently ambiguous and admit of different readings: Francisco Macedo, polemical theologian at the College of the Propaganda, cannot himself, in his explanation of Innocent X’s constitution, avoid either the ambiguities which make the Propositions liable to the suspicion of a Manichean sense, or the


opposite danger of Pelagianism which results from condemning them in an orthodox sense.\textsuperscript{192} It would, therefore, be wrong to lay a ‘scholastic’ or technical censure on Jansen’s teaching. It may be that in a ‘juridical’ sense the Church must look to scandal and potential for error: consequently she ought to condemn potentially misleading doctrines even if they are not false in themselves, just as she ‘proscribed’ the \textit{homoeousion}.\textsuperscript{193} In short, while Innocent X was probably right to condemn the Propositions in a ‘juridical’ manner, there could be no justification for condemning the man, since there was enough obscurity in the question to clear him of temerarious singularity. White, indeed, asserted that, while he had not read the \textit{Augustinus} (at whose length he ‘trembled’), nothing he had heard about Jansen’s piety, doctrine, and obedience would prevent him, were it necessary, from owning himself ‘libentissime … discipulum’ of the Bishop of Ypres. Like White, Jansen, and his defenders, are victims of a modern Church whose functionaries are more eager to sniff out crimes than truths, and who build on the non-demonstrable axiom of the pope’s personal inerrancy.\textsuperscript{194}

Holden had spoken in favour of Arnauld in the Sorbonne over the \textit{question de fait}, and, as did Evelyn in the \textit{Pernicious Consequences}, he compared the travails of Arnauld with those of his mentor White.\textsuperscript{195} Each hoped to establish his orthodoxy at Rome while refusing to concede his position. White was persuaded to submit his work to the judgement of the Holy See; it was included, as Holden pointed out, in the same condemnation of 1657 which prohibited the \textit{Lettres Provinciales} and certain writings of Arnauld on grace, a fact which

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Ibid., pp. 195f., at 214-15; Francisco Macedo, SJ (1614-42), then OFM, ob.; an ed. of his \textit{Mens divinitus inspirata Sanctissimo Patri Domino Nostro Innocentio Papae X super quinque propositiones Cornelij Jansenij : et Mens Divi Augustini illustrata de duplici adjutorio gratiae sine quo non & quo} was published 1653.
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White, \textit{Somas Buccinae}, p. 200; presumably he is referring to the triumph of the Athanasian formula.
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‘gratified’ White. This feeling of solidarity had a substantial basis. The Blackloists shared the Jansenists’ Gallican ecclesiology, where the teaching and disciplinary authority of bishops in their dioceses and of general councils balanced the spiritual primacy of the papacy. They inherited from the English secular clergy tradition a long-standing hostility to the Jesuits as agents of papal tyranny over national churches and disruptive enemies to hierarchy. This was intensified by the ‘new mad Heresie’ of personal papal infallibility even in matters of fact, with which ‘the Jesuites (whose flattering Policie is now come to direct blasphemy) are indeavouring to possess all the ignorant or timorous, or ambitious in France’. White’s ‘obsessive hatred of the Jesuits’, like Arnauld’s, extended beyond jurisdictional issues. Like the Jansenists, the Blackloists interpreted the new doctrine of personal infallibility as one aspect of a general Jesuit conspiracy to gain power and influence, conducted along pragmatic and flexible principles which emptied Christian faith and practice of their intrinsic meaning and validity.

White identified probabilism as an essential mechanism which undermined the principles upon which the faith must be built if it is to command assent. It introduced a spiralling relativism which makes it impossible to legislate, as much in the corporate Church as in foro interno. A slightly confusing factor in analysing the Blackloists’ views on this point is their tendency to refer to the English divines, such as Stillingfleet, with whom they


197 On the Blackloists’ ecclesiology see Tutino, Thomas White and the Blackloists, pp. 44f.; and on its ramifications in restoration religious politics see further Glickman, ‘Christian Reunion’, pp. 277-84.


disputed over the ‘Rule of Faith’, as ‘probabilists’: that is, as those who were content to make scripture the ground of belief, while admitting that the written text cannot be self-authenticating, and that in matters of Christian faith and practice a more modest ‘moral certainty’ must be accepted, compounded from a confluence of probable testimonies sufficient to convince a reasonable man.\textsuperscript{200} White, however, made it clear in \textit{Sonus Buccinae} that it was ‘les nouveaux casuistes’ he had in mind in castigating ‘probabilists’.\textsuperscript{201} He contrasted Aristotle’s understanding of a probable proposition in the \textit{Topics}, as that which merits acceptance on account of the approval of the learned,\textsuperscript{202} with a new concept of probability, which ‘aliqi Moderni’ had ‘dragged’ ‘ex Scepticorum disciplina … inter quos probabile dicebatur, quod poterat sustineri, id est, quod non aperte convincebatur’. This was a reasonable definition of the ‘intrinsic’ probability distinguished by the casuists; ‘sed nunc’, as White went on, probability also signified ‘apud Theologos … eam sententiam quae digna est Magistro Theologiae’. This extrinsic probability, White claimed, derived from the authority of a ‘gravis’ doctor, was as dangerous as it was useless. It implied that the Church can never pronounce on matters \textit{de fide}, positively or by way of censure:

\begin{quote}
quae enim propositio hodie est magis probabilis, cras erit minus probabilis, si interea quisquam invenerit argumentum difficilium oppositisse.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{201} The following draws on \textit{Sonus Buccinae}, pp. 192-4.

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Topics}, 100b20-21; the same text of Aristotle’s was, as we have seen, also cited by probabilist writers; but as the theory developed the idea of majority acceptance, and by implication that of the strongest possible arguments, was allowed to fall away. It seems Medina retained the sense of Aristotle’s definition intended by White here: see M.-M. Gorce, ‘Le sens du mot probable et les origines du probabilisme’, \textit{Revue des Sciences Religieuses}, 10 (1930), pp. 460-64.

\textsuperscript{203} Whether by coincidence or not, this reproduces the ingenuous phrasing of Caramuel in his \textit{Theologiae moralis fundamentalis} (Louvain, 1657), n. 447 [p. 122]: ‘Propositio, quae hodie nec est probabilis, nec improbabils, cras esse poterit probabilis, et perendie aut evidenter vera aut evidenter falsa’.
This understanding of probability thus undermines the whole concept of tradition, and with it, on White’s view, all religious certainty. With Jansen, then, White affirmed the essentially historical character of theology: just as a decree from the Pope cannot stop the world turning around, if some proposition contradicts the contents of a ‘certain authority’, the patronage of ‘mille Episcopi vel Doctores moderni’ cannot render it probable. In fact the somewhat baroque ‘oral tradition’ of White and Sergeant cannot really be compared to the antiquarianism of the Jansenists, whose tendency to try all in the tribunal of the early Church indicates a greater emphasis on the immutable character of the eternal truth handed down ‘de main en main, et de siècle de siècle’. But in both cases tradition functioned as a negative rule by which to measure the modern Church, and it is not too much to characterise Blackloism and Jansenism as parallel impulses within seventeenth-century Catholicism to reform the Counter-Reformation. White desired, as Holden put it in vindicating his former preceptor, ‘to lop off all excrescencies of erroneous opinion, how general soever interest or mistakes of Probabilists had made them’; and to ‘separate uncertain opinions, from the certain Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, pledged to us as such by Universal Tradition’. The morality of the casuists was ‘superficial’ and ‘Pharisaical’: like Arnauld and Pascal, White’s ‘way was to place no goodness in external actions, but as they conduc’d to interior

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206 Cf. Bradley, ‘Blacklo and the Counter-Reformation’.

perfection, and advanced charity’. White was quite as horrified as the Port-Royalists by the ‘Jesuits wicked cases’, a manifest testimony to the insufficiency of ‘probable opinions’.

It was White’s puckish acolyte, John Sergeant, who capitalised most obviously on Pascal’s polemic. The enormities of ‘the new unlawful art of Casuistry’ were excellent grounds upon which to deny its practitioners, the Jesuits, any part of the identity of the loyal, peaceable and self-governing Catholic community which Sergeant aspired to personify. Thus in his polemic against Jeremy Taylor, who in his ‘dissuasives from popery’ himself profited from the Jansenist critique, Sergeant was careful, while expatiating upon Taylor’s disingenuous citations from the Fathers and medieval schoolmen, to keep to the subject of the rule of faith: had he strayed into morals or discipline, he would, since he approved them, have found Taylor’s censures of the casuists difficult to answer. Taylor’s ‘Reasons produc’t against … our Casuists … concern me not’, wrote Sergeant, because ‘a few … Casuists’ are not ‘the mouth of our Church’. To take ‘the private opinions of a few Authours’ for ‘Catholik Faith and the Doctrine of the Church’ is ‘flat and unconscionable Calumny’.

Serenus Cressy took the same line in confuting Stillingfleet, pointing out that ‘a Book’ – presumably Pirot’s Apology – ‘the Author of which undertook to defend [laxist propositions], was solemnly prohibited, and condemned by the Pope: since which time such Doctrins have been wholly restrained and silenced’. In 1679, at the time of the Popish Plot, Sergeant again

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209 White, Religion and Reason Mutually corresponding and assisting each other (Paris, 1660), p. 8, cf. p. 194; idem, Devotion and Reason (Paris, 1661), p. 149; cf. idem, A letter to a person of Honour, sig. A4r., where he refers slightingly to the recourse which worldly men can have ‘to a large and indulgent Casuist’.
210 [John Sergeant], Reflexions upon the Oathes of Supremacy and Allegiance. By a Catholick Gentleman, an Obedient Son of the Church, and Loyal Subject of His Majesty (n.p., 1661), p. 59.
211 See Chapter 3, below.
sought to distance his own strain of English Catholicism from a subversive Jesuit one, publishing what was essentially a digest of the *Lettres Provinciales, The Jesuits Gospel.*

Here Sergeant tabulated the references arrayed by Pascal and other French polemicists, occasionally citing the English translations of the late 1650s, and following the scheme of the *Provinciales* closely. He laid out the mechanics of probabilism, citing the *loci classici* amassed by French critics. Probabilism was only the looking-glass through which the unsuspecting Christian passed into a topsy-turvy moral landscape, there to wander, ‘as it were, in a round maze’, having forsaken the chart of revelation for the wavering guide of natural reason. Here human ingenuity has discovered a taxonomy of sin divorced from the eternal standard and from the inward calibration of the individual to that standard. Here sin is a feature of the external environment, not of the inward disposition of the soul. The link between the moral value of a given act and the inward state from which it proceeds is severed: sins are arbitrarily classified as mortal or venial regardless of the inward condition which they manifest and influence. Thus Escobar was able to teach, as Pascal noted, that ‘he that hath a will to commit all venial sins if he were able, sins only venially.’ This collapse of the reciprocal economy between the will and the act is underlined by the false relationship put in its stead, wherein a superficial or artificial condition of the will governs the moral complexion of the act. The *peccatum philosophicum* and ‘that excellent Science of directing the intention’, as Sergeant says echoing the ‘good Father’, are shifts which render no sin imputable.

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217 *The Jesuits Gospel*, pp. 7-9, where the discussion of philosophical sin draws on Bauny’s *Somme des péchés*, as in Pascal’s 4th letter, *CLP*, pp. 67-8; *The Jesuits Gospel*, pp. 9-12, citing Escobar’s digest, tr. 5, and Reginaldus’ *Praxis fori poenitentialis*, bk. 21, p. 260, from *CLP*, pp. 115-17 (*notre grande method de diriger...* )
transgression, the more so the more inveterate their habit; while interest dictates that any wicked act can be rendered good by deflecting the intention from the evil commissioned to the profit received thereby. The sufficient condition of an evil act is made narrower in proportion as that of a good one is relaxed. ‘To do evil, there must be an evil intention; but to do good, it’s not necessary to have a good intention’. In other words, the casuists circumvent the transformative role of grace: they promise reward to the exercise of man’s natural forces, and preserve from punishment the lapses of his natural frailty. They frame a truly Pharisaical religion, which can be fulfilled in the letter while it is betrayed in the spirit. This is summed up, as it was for Pascal, in Antoine Sirmond’s teaching in his Défense de la Vertu, that the love of God is not an ‘absolute commandment’ – so that ‘a man may be saved without ever loving God’. As the Jansenists had pointed out, this was only the most paradoxical formulation of an externalist approach to morality which ramified throughout religious and social life. The Jesuits Gospel went on, like them, to enumerate all the other deleterious consequences which result when the rights of the conscience are elevated above the obligations of the eternal law, and the ordination of the inward disposition separated from the value of the act. The public and private duties of religion can be fulfilled without the requisite intention, and even with a contrary end. Proximate occasions of sin need not be avoided, and when sin is fallen into it need not be confessed fully, nor satisfied for

\[l'intention\]}, as well as the Mystery of Jesuitism. On philosophical sin and the direction of intention, see above, ch. 1, p. 57.
218 Pascal developed these arguments in the 4th and 7th letters.
219 The Jesuits Gospel, p. 10.
220 See ibid., pp. 6-7.
221 The Jesuits Gospel, p. 6; CLP, pp. 188-9; Sergeant is quoting directly from the Mystery of Jesuitism (1657), p. 255, cf. pp. 237-8.
222 The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 4-5. Sergeant cites, for example, Gilles de Coninck’s De moralitate natura, et effectibus actuum supernaturallium, q. 83 (CLP, p. 168), to the effect that the outward act of prayer, though the spirit is voluntarily distracted, is a true act of the virtue of religion; also the sacramental teaching of Emmanuel Mascarenhas (e.g. Tractatus de sacramentis in genere, I, disp. 4, c. 5, on sacrilegious communions), which had been excerpted in the Extrait de quelques propositions d’un nouvel Auteur Jésuite nommé Mascarenhas, imprimé chez Cramoisy en cette année 1656 et qui se vend depuis le mois d’octobre (Paris, 1656), and reprinted in La Théologie Morale des Jesuites, pp. 336f.
223 The Jesuits Gospel, p. 9, citing Bauny’s Theologia moralis, bk. 4 De poenitentia, q. 14, p. 94, as had Pascal, CLP, pp. 180-1.
The accessories of a holy life, such as almsgiving, can be dispensed with, and the bonds of social life disregarded. So long as the conscience is satisfied, the eternal law is of no consequence. Sexual incontinence, violence, homicide, and corruption can all be perpetrated safely; oaths and promises can safely be slipped through equivocations. Sergeant underlined Pascal’s conclusion that the casuists reversed the terms of the equation between natural and supernatural ends in borrowing his example, taken from Sanchez, of the mistaken soothsayer who is not obliged to restitution when he has used a genuine method of divination – viz., by invoking diabolical assistance. The religio-political implications were sufficiently clear: since their morality catered to the interest of fallen nature, the Jesuits were inherently untrustworthy, and not to be countenanced as participants in the dialogue between English Catholicism and the state.

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The Blackloists, then, had a number of reasons, some more principled, some more expedient, for publicising the Jansenist critique. Holden, observing the Jansenist controversy at first hand, had opportunity, means, and motive to produce the *Journall of All Proceedings*.

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224 The Jesuits Gospel, p. 6 and ch. XIV: on the sufficiency of attrition Sergeant cites Pascal’s example from Escobar’s digest, tr. 7, ex. 4, to the effect that contrition is not even necessary in articulo mortis (CLP, p. 185); on restitution he cited, for example, Lessius’ opinion that there is no obligation to restitution in respect of money received for a criminal act, from De Iustitia et Iure, bk. 2, ch. 14 (CLP, pp. 145-6).

225 The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 5-6, citing Escobar’s convenient views on superfluities, in tr. 5, ex. 5 of his digest, quoted by Pascal, CLP, p. 161.

226 The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 12-13, giving the well known example cited by Escobar of the opinion that it is no sin to let one’s property for the purposes of prostitution, given in the Troisième extrait de plusieurs dangereuses propositions tirées ... particulièrement du I. tome in folio de la nouvelle Théologie Morale d’Escobar Jesuite, printed in La Théologie Morale des Jesuites, at p. 350.

227 The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 13-16, giving the famous opinions that one can kill for a slap in order to preserve one’s honour, that one can kill to preserve one’s property, that one can kill slanderers or false witnesses, husbands who surprise one in the act of adultery, etc, all discussed by Pascal from the same examples in the 7th and 8th Provinciales.

228 On judges and witnesses see The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 24-5, citing e.g. Escobar’s opinion in his digest, tr. 6, ex. 6, given by Pascal, CLP, pp. 135-6, that in doubtful cases a judge may be swayed by a bribe.

229 The Jesuits Gospel, pp. 17-21 replicating examples given by Pascal (CLP, pp. 164f.) from Sanchez’s Summa casuum conscientiae, Filliutius’ Compendium questionum moralium and Escobar’s digest of the Twenty-Four.

230 The Jesuits Gospel, p. 7; CLP, pp. 147-50.

231 The Jesuits Gospel opens with an ascending tricolon on The Pope, his Grandeur, or Greatness, and his Power, pp. 1-4.
The evidence adduced above contributes a strong presumption in favour of his authorship. The claim made in the 1684 polyglot edition of the *Provinciales*, that the English translations were done by an English Catholic, while I think substantially false, may tend to the same conclusion inasmuch as it asserted as true what was in fact only highly plausible.\textsuperscript{232}

Certainly the work suited two agendas very well, that of English Catholics seeking to ingratiate themselves with the civil power by repudiating the Jesuits, and that of Protestant ideologues and statesmen seeking to divide and tame the English Catholics. It does not seem as likely as it is tempting to think that a connection can be drawn between the later attempts to exploit internal Catholic divisions through Evelyn’s translations, and the *Journall* of 1659. Holden was, certainly, ‘a man well known in his person to some, and in his writings to all, or the most part of [the] English clergy’ – one who had taught Hyde’s old acquaintance Cressy, who forwarded letters to Hyde’s friend d’Aubigny, and who, says Burnet, was among those ‘honest Priests’ who advocated Hyde’s policy in 1662;\textsuperscript{233} but he had reason enough to produce the work on his own initiative. The attribution of the *Journall* to Holden does not mean he must have translated the earlier editions of the *Provinciales* and the *Additionals*: the *Journall* was in the hands of a different publisher, it was signed, and it was framed to serve a particular agenda which the others were not.

\textit{The Mystery of Jesuitism Series and the Anglican Clerical Interest}

The Jansenist critique of the new doctrine of papal infallibility and of the politically subversive and anti-hierarchical tenor of many Jesuit writings, then, was highly relevant to

\textsuperscript{232} Clark, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{233} Holden, \textit{The analysis of divine faith}, sig. A2r.; Clark, p. 83; Burnet, \textit{History}, i, p. 194.
English religious politics in the 1660s. Their exposure of wider questions in moral theology was no less relevant to those whose sphere of activity was more properly theological and pastoral. As Evelyn noted, the Jansenists showed how the moral theology of the Jesuits, ‘instead of edifying the Church, and conducting Consciences’, ‘eat[s] out … the very heart and vitals of the common Christianity’. He advised his reader first to ‘cast his Eye upon the Provincials … which the Interpreter of these Papers had subjoyn’d to them, were they not commonly to be had at every Bookseller’s shop, and already translated into English’. In the preface to the Pernicious Consequences he quoted his close friend Jeremy Taylor, ‘that most learned Prelate’, in showing that the Jesuits’ political doctrines were undergirded by the tendentious ethical theory there satirised – probabilism – which allowed any position to be justified according as necessity dictated. Just as their ambition of ecclesiastical power was served by the obsequious promotion of a theory of papal competence which left no monarch secure, so they sought to acquire influence over souls by means of a ‘theological Bawd’ which overturned all religion and morality. The Provinciales thus constituted a powerful encouragement to English thinkers involved in questions of moral and pastoral theology to look more closely at French religious developments.

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Who, then, was responsible for the anonymous editions of the Provinciales and related materials from 1657-1659? The work of translation has been the subject of conjecture. The case for Evelyn derives from a bibliographical error. If the anomalous Journall is by Holden, as I have argued, he was not the translator. Israel Tonge, the obsessive anti-Jesuit

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234 Evelyn, Another Part, sigs. A3v.-A4r.
237 Due to the title of his later work, *Another Part of the Mystery of Jesuitism*: see Clark, pp. 102f.; Keynes, *John Evelyn*, pp. 124-6. Evelyn’s copy of the Journall, meanwhile, bears no note of authorship such as invariably adorn his own publications: BL Add. MS 78632, f. 33r.
and original dupe in the Popish Plot affair is, *prima facie*, a likely candidate: he translated
Perrault’s *La Morale des Jésuites* and published two further works, *The Jesuits unmasked*,
and *Jesuitical Aphorisms*. This trilogy, however, was the product of paranoia induced by
his losses in the fire of 1666. Circumstantial evidence for Tonge’s involvement in the earlier
series is lacking.

Most plausible is the evidence of Anthony à Wood, who names the jobbing translator
John Davies of Kidwelly, in Carmarthenshire. Davies moved to Cambridge from Oxford
University after it became a royal garrison, and was admitted at St John’s in 1646. There, as
well as conforming under ‘Presbyterian’ tutelage, he learnt French, ‘and afterwards going
into France’, during the years 1649 to 1651, ‘became so compleat a Master of that Language,
that upon his return, settling in London … did make it his livelihood to translate Books from
French into English … and putting Dedicatory and other Epistles to them, gained much relief
by them’. Wood attributes to him *Les Provinciales* of 1656, the *Additionalis* of 1658 and the
second edition of the *Provinciales, A further discovery*, and, lastly, the ‘Journal of
proceedings between Jansenists and Jesuits’, for the year 1659. Davies used his translations
to secure the patronage of the powerful and well-connected. The literary circles in which
he moved in restoration London suggest the range of his connections: he was acquainted with

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238 Tonge, *The Jesuits Morals collected by a Doctor of the Colledge of Sorbon in Paris* (1670); the original was
Perrault’s *La Morale des Jésuites, extraita fidelement de levr livres imprimez avec la permission et
l’approbation des svperievrs de levr compagnie par un Docteur de Sorbonne*, 3 vols. (Mons, 1667-9); on
Tonge’s authorship, affirmed by Evelyn, and on Evelyn’s acquaintance with him, see Bray, *Correspondence*, ii,
50-2.


241 Joseph E. Tucker, ‘John Davies of Kidwelly (1627?-1693), Translator from the French’, *Papers of the
Bibliographical Society of America*, 44 (1950), and the article by E. Lord in the *ODNB*, are corrected in
biographical points by David Hook, ‘John Davies of Kidwelly. A Neglected Literary Figure of the Seventeenth
John Aubrey, for example, and with Elias Ashmole, Evelyn’s fellow savant and Royal Society founder.²⁴²

There is thus some circumstantial evidence for Davies’s translation of the Mystery of Jesuitism texts. But Jansen has pointed out that their parerga seem to indicate the presence of a different hand to the translator. Davies was not an ideological engagé, and his other prefaces exhibit a different style and are always signed.²⁴³ Since, however, the works were obviously intended to be entirely anonymous, this is not conclusive. The prefaces for the most part mirror very nearly Nicole’s avertissement to the original Cologne edition, and there is no incontrovertible reason why Davies could not have produced them.²⁴⁴ Certain additions of the preface-writer, especially his vehement anti-popery – he calls the Jesuits the ‘vermine of Religion and humane Society’ – are perhaps consistent with a Presbyterian background.²⁴⁵ It does not, on the other hand, seem likely that Davies should have undertaken the work except under commission. In other places the prefaces seem to bewray the literary touch of the clergyman and controversialist. This does not describe Davies.²⁴⁶ If we ask who could be concerned with manifesting to the English reading public the evil consequences of what was, at base, a somewhat rarefied problem of moral theology – to say nothing of the abstruse debate over sufficient and efficacious grace which occupies the first four Lettres – we are most likely to think of a class of men to whom public morality and moral theology were matter of daily concern: pastors and theologians. Take the following passage, for example:

If a man consider the strange and miraculous originals of Christian Religion, what cruel persecutions it has waded through, the crosses and calumnies it has thriven under, and

²⁴² Hook, ‘John Davies of Kidwelly’. Both Evelyn and Davies translated works by Gabriel Naudé, the librarian to Cardinal Mazarin.
²⁴⁴ Nicole’s preface is helpfully printed alongside the English in ibid., pp. 89f.
²⁴⁵ The charge that the Jesuits, as oath-breakers, regicides, etc., were unfit for human society, was however common at this time: see e.g. Taylor, A Dissuasive from popery (1664), p. 152.
²⁴⁶ See Jansen, De Blaise Pascal à Henry Hammond, pp. 62-7, discussing Davies’s career.
all through a rigorous observance of vertue and austerities absolutely contrary to the
suggestions of flesh and blood, till at length it came to its Majesty, and forced an
acknowledgement from the subdued world, he cannot certainly but withall imagine, that
the same means, which contributed so much to its glorious acquest and propogation,
must have the same effect in its continuance and perfection. What idea then can he
conceive of those men whose maximes disperse with all obligations of evangelical
purity, who level the precepts of the gospel to the corrupt passions of men, who make
our tendency to future beatitudes consistent with the pleasures and enjoyments of this
world, and who by their artifices of sanctimony, pious sleights, easie Devotions, and
such compliances of humane invention, bring Christian Religion into contempt, and
really introduce that Deisme which they unjustly object so much to their
Adversaries?  

This striking passage does not appear in the first edition, and is interpolated suddenly
into the course of the preface, which runs closely parallel to Nicole’s original and is rendered
far more mundanely. This suggests that Davies also translated Nicole’s preface, and that this
was subsequently embellished when the finished translation passed into other hands. The
writer is clearly an adept at religious discourse. He is seemingly of an ascetic and rigorous
temperament. He believes that the Gospel imposes stringent ‘obligations’ which the world
does not sufficiently acknowledge, and identifies the health of religion with the ‘rigorous
observance of vertues and austerities’. He is precocious in his use of the word ‘Deisme’, by
which he clearly means something similar to Stillingfleet in his Letter to a Deist of 1677,
often given as the first recorded instance in English. This argues a familiarity with learned discourse in France (his spelling is even Gallic), where the term had an earlier currency.248

All these circumstances suggest a learned clergyman. The preoccupations of this clergyman, while perhaps generic enough, appear nevertheless to tally very closely with the outlook of those Interregnum Anglican writers who constructed a theology based around the concept of holy living. This first set of translations from 1657-1659 came at a time when the Anglican party to which Evelyn belonged had somewhat different preoccupations than those which animated Clarendon in 1664-5. Unaware that restoration was imminent, the priority of Anglican divines remained the fortification of a solid theological structure which could ensure the robustness and survival of the Church of England through an indeterminate period of marginalisation. On one side this involved the continued production of controversial writings against Rome. Another major aspect of the project, constructive rather than purely defensive, and taking its part in a longer-term, organic reaction from the tradition of predestinarian Calvinism, now further blackened by its association with the puritan rebellion, involved a pronounced focus on individual morality – that aspect of religion over which external circumstances such as the availability of public worship or of ministers of religion had no influence. This focus was so marked that its exponents have been accused of peddling a debased soteriology labelled ‘moralism’.249

Along with this tendency came an increased interest in moral theology proper, which had already led Jeremy Taylor to an engagement with the Jansenist critique in his Unum Necessarium of 1655 and in Ductor Dubitantium, which he was confecting throughout the decade, and concerning which he made periodic trips to London from Golden Grove, the


249 See Part 2 of this thesis, esp. ch. 5.
Welsh seat of his patron Sir Richard Vaughan. We have heard Evelyn quote one of Taylor’s sermons on probabilism. The subject was close to Taylor’s heart. In *Ductor Dubitantium*, published in 1660, he described the doctrine as ‘diabolical’, and wrote, of the ‘Jesuit confessors’, that they ‘answer according to every man’s humor, and no man shall depart sad from their Penitential chairs’ – an interesting verbal echo of Pascal in the thirteenth *Provinciale.* *Ductor Dubitantium* was Taylor’s *magnum opus*, the book of reformed casuistry on which he worked throughout the 1650s, and which represented the fruits of his attempts to resolve contemporary problems of moral theology – problems which in his view the school of casuistry so closely associated with the Society of Jesus had been instrumental in introducing.

In his view the flexibility of the casuists and the accommodations of the confessors they guided rested on a tendency to frame morality as a matter of legalistic obedience. Taylor ascribed considerable value to the Jansenist reaction from this tendency. Evelyn’s citation of his Gunpowder sermon of 1638 is interesting, and dates Taylor’s interest in these questions to an early period. Most of his literary endeavours from 1649 onwards were aimed at resolving them, and the critique launched by the Jansenists in the 1640s and 1650s was of considerable interest to him. In the preface to *Ductor Dubitantium* he went on, having castigated the lax casuists, to refer his ‘Reader to the books and letters written by their parties of Portroyal, and to [the Jesuits’] own weak answers and vindications’. Presumably he meant to indicate the materials printed as part of the *Mystery of Jesuitism* series, and perhaps

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251 CLP, p. 252: ‘A ceux qui voudront tuer on présentera Lessius; à ceux qui ne voudront pas tuer, on produira Vasquez, afin que personne ne sorte malcontent, et sans avoir pour soi un auteur grave’.
252 See ch. 7, below.
254 *Ductor*, p. vii.
François Annat’s and Jacques Nouet’s answer to the *Lettres Provinciales*, translated into English by the Irish Jesuit Martin Grene and published in 1659.  

Evelyn heard Taylor preach for the first time in London in March, 1655, and quickly made of him an intimate friend, his ‘ghostly father’, and even his pensioner. Their correspondence shows Taylor drawing on Evelyn’s library for French works, and eagerly discussing the latest religious developments. The two had numerous opportunities for colloquy during Taylor’s intermittent trips to London in the 1650s to oversee publication of his books, and they must have discussed the momentous events then in progress in France. If it were necessary to assign a likely author to the striking passage cited above from the preface to the second edition of the *Provinciales*, Taylor would be a good guess, for the passage perfectly conveys his theological outlook. Interestingly, Taylor was not the only literary figure making regular trips from Carmarthenshire to the capital in the 1650s. John Davies, the translator, divided his time between his affairs in London and residence in his native Kidwelly, about twelve or thirteen miles south-west of Golden Grove.  

The clerical party to which Taylor and like-minded divines such as Hammond belonged composed a small and tightly-bound network during the years of puritan rule, tied together by similarity of interest and, largely, of theological outlook. These were the figures who knew and corresponded with Hyde, Ormond, and Evelyn, who themselves

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255 *An Answer to the Provincall Letters published by the Jansenists under the Name of Lewis Montalt against the Doctrine of the Jesuits and School Divines made by some Fathers of the Society in France* (Paris, 1659).
257 Bray (ed.), *Correspondence*, iii.
258 See chs. 5 & 7, below. Although I have never found him to use the word ‘deism’ elsewhere, Taylor was well read in French religious literature, as his memorialist George Rust recorded — Rust, ‘Funeral Sermon [for] Jeremy Lord Bishop of Down’, in Heber (ed.) *Works*, I, pp. cccxxv-xxvi; Heber, ‘Life’, p. lii.
259 Hook, ‘John Davies of Kidwelly’; *ODNB* s. n. ‘Taylor’. Following his second marriage, Taylor lived from 1655 until his removal to Ireland in summer 1658 at Mandiman, near Llangadog, a few miles north-east again of Golden Grove. Another Welsh connexion is suggested by the frontispiece to *Les Provinciales*: or, *The Mystery of Jesuitism*, a sombre-looking engraving by Robert Vaughan, an antiquary as well as a capable and respected line-engraver. Vaughan however was from north Wales, and not, I think, any relation to the earl of Carbery.
exhibited interest in and collected Jansenist works, and who prosecuted a theological agenda specifically served by the Jansenist critique of laxist casuistry.\textsuperscript{261} If we add to this precondition of interest in the issues raised by the Jansenists the fact that the members of this clerical party were in correspondence with exiled friends and colleagues on the scene of the controversy, it becomes hard to avoid the conclusion that, if Jansen was precipitate in identifying Henry Hammond as the responsible figure,\textsuperscript{262} it was nevertheless members of the group which Richard Baxter designated ‘Dr. Hammond’s followers’ who had a corporate interest in producing the translations.\textsuperscript{263} That Evelyn spoke of ‘that part of the Mystery of Jesuitism translated and collected by me’ strongly suggests that the entire series, up to and including his translations of 1664-1666, constitutes a corpus possessing some degree of internal relation.\textsuperscript{264} Others known to Evelyn had previously collected and translated the Jansenists’ powerful attacks on the Jesuits; Clarendon decided to repeat the trick at an opportune moment.

Hammond himself was certainly \textit{au courant} with the controversy at the Sorbonne, and had received correspondence on the subject of the ‘accommodation’ with the Jansenists allegedly broached by Richard Steward while the royal court was at Paris.\textsuperscript{265} He knew the work of Saint-Cyran on episcopal powers, which earned the father of French Jansenism the gratitude of the Chapter of the English secular clergy.\textsuperscript{266} he cited Petrus Aurelius on the

\textsuperscript{261} In contrast one can point to the Independents and Nonconformists who were attracted to Jansenism as a doctrinal phenomenon, that is to say as the extreme form of Augustinianism condemned in the Five Propositions – e.g. John Owen, preface, in Gale, \textit{The True Idea of Jansenisme}; cf. Dewey D. Wallace, \textit{Shapers of English Calvinism, 1660-1714. Variety, Persistence, and Transformation} (Oxford, 2011), pp. 92, 95, 101, 111-12.

\textsuperscript{262} None of the evidence adduced by Jansen (\textit{De Blaise Pascal à Henry Hammond}) to show that the ’editor’ was a) an Anglican (he is a member of a ’late flourishing Church’; the series is published by Royston), and b) Henry Hammond (one piece is subscribed ’H.H.’) concludes a necessity; two of these arguments, furthermore, are based on the one anomalous work which was not published by Royston; while the style of the prefaces by no means corresponds to Hammond’s.

\textsuperscript{263} Baxter quoted in Bosher, \textit{Making of the Restoration Settlement}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{264} Bray (ed.), \textit{Correspondence}, iv, pp. 410-11, my emphasis.

\textsuperscript{265} Introduction, above, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{266} See above, p. 22.
necessity of episcopal ordination in his *De confirmatione* of 1661. His may well have been the 1646 edition of Aurelius’s *opera* now in the Allestree Library at Christ Church, Oxford, for at his death Hammond left a large number of books to Allestree, of which only a portion have been firmly identified.

Allestree was a friend of Evelyn (who recorded many of his sermons), and acted as a royal agent during the 1650s, making occasional trips across the channel to carry funds and messages. His major religious works, hugely influential during the restoration period and for centuries afterwards, concentrated on the practical consequences of the new Anglican approach to theology, to which Hammond and Taylor gave a doctrinal framework in works such as the *Practical Catechisme* and the *Unum Necessarium*. The bequest by which he formed the Allestree Library included a large number of Port-Royalist works, probably the most significant such collection in England before the late eighteenth-century. Allestree possessed major works on both sides of the controversy dating from the mid-1640s onwards, such as Arnauld’s *De la fréquente communion* and its answer by Denys Petau, *De la pénitence publique*, as well as other pedagogical and philosophical works of Port Royal, and numerous letters and pastoral charges issued by Jansenist-sympathising bishops of the later seventeenth-century.

Allestree may have obtained the books from his cousin, the London bookseller James Allestree, who was noted for his stock of French books; equally he may have picked them up on trips to the continent. Books were cheaper there, and Allestree’s library contains French editions of the pseudo-Dionysius, of Hilary of Poitiers, Theodoret, Origen, and of Augustine.

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268 A list was drawn up by J. B. Hibbitts and is included as Appendix B in ‘Henry Hammond (1605-1660) and English New Testament Exposition’.
270 See section 1 of this chapter, above.
Some may also have belonged to Hammond, who as we have seen left Allestree at least 138 books at his death just before the restoration, ‘knowing that in his hands they would be useful weapons for the defence of that cause he had during life so vigorously asserted’.272 His library, as we remarked before, contains bespoke collections of the many anti-casuist writings produced in the wake of the *Lettres Provinciales* and Pirot’s *Apologie*, a number of which were translated and included in the *Mystery of Jesuitism* series.

The group of Anglican apologists to which Hammond, Taylor and Allestree belonged was, as Jansen pointed out, engaged in a common endeavour to defend the Church against the attacks of Catholic proselytes, for whom the disaster of disestablishment constituted a unique controversial opportunity.273 Nothing could be more useful than a damning attack upon that Society most noteworthy for the vigour and success of its proselytising, and through it upon the pontiff to whom it was bound in special obedience, and upon whose peculiar apostolic brief so much of what seemed superficially attractive in the Catholic logic of authority was made to rest. The *Mystery of Jesuitism* series thus also took its part in an established programme of Anglican apologetic in the 1650s.

One of the agents of this programme was the publisher Richard Royston, who brought out the majority of works of a loyalist episcopalian stamp during the 1640s and ’50s, and afterwards prosecuted his affairs under the patronage and protection of the restored crown.274 He was also responsible for the publication of all the translations bearing on the Jansenist-Jesuit dispute which we have been discussing, save for the *Journall of All Proceedings*, and appears to have shared in the conviction that English audiences would benefit from as full an exposure as possible. To this end he was evidently supplied with materials by like-minded

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273 Jansen, *De Blaise Pascal à Henry Hammond*, pt 1, ch. 3.
274 Allestree’s *Whole Duty*, and his other anonymous works of practical piety, however, were published by Timothy Garthwaite, an associate of James Allestree, as was Jeremy Taylor’s *Worthy Communicant*. 

parties. In the *Additions to the Mystery of Jesuitisme* a note was interpolated by the Stationer, ‘R. R.’ (Royston had been a stationer since the 1620s), as follows:

[I had resolved to end here,] but the two following pieces\(^{275}\) coming so opportunely to hand, and being of so much concernment to all the transactions between the IANsenists and the MOLINISTS; it would have argued a *neglect*, if not an *envy*, of thy satisfaction, to have slipped the present occasion I had to file them up. Besides, the IESUITS, for their vindication, intending to put out THE APOLOGY FOR THE CASUISTS, &c. in English, (to which these are written by way of Answer) they may prove an *Antidote* against the *poyson*, intended the unwary world in that Master-Piece of the SOCIETY.\(^{276}\)

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The evidence, therefore, suggests that the Jansenist works published as part of the *Mystery of Jesuitism* series were introduced into the English public sphere with the knowledge, approbation, and in some cases active collaboration of a group of royalist episcopalian writers and policy-formers. Intellectuals such as Taylor, Hammond and Allestree began to acquire Jansenist works from the 1640s onwards; politicians such as Hyde and Ormond, acting through friends and agents including Bellings and d’Aubigny, began to see the relevance of the controversy and to collect the works it produced in the 1650s; and when a moment arrived at which their publication seemed opportune, Hyde assigned the task to Evelyn, who knew this whole circle well, was entirely in accord with their religious and political views, and moreover had some first-hand experience of the Jansenists from his time in Paris. If Clarendon had specific political reasons in 1664-5 for his commission of works condemning the politics of the Society of Jesus, so the context of the late 1650s – if the

\(^{275}\) The ‘Remonstrance of the Curez of Paris Against a Book intituled, An Apology for the *Casuists’*, and their defence of the same remonstrance.

\(^{276}\) *Additions to the mystery of Jesuitisme*, p. 116; *ODNB*, s. n. ‘Royston’.
inherent interest of Pascal’s work to Protestant polemicists is not enough – seems adequate to explain why other, probably clerical members of the same ideological party, would find it appropriate to sponsor the publication of this most effective condemnation of the morality of the Society.

This conclusion will be borne out by an examination of the reception of the Jansenist critique among restoration religious writers: for it shows that the critique of the doctrine of probability, with its lamentable sacramental, ethical, and civil consequences, was thoroughly consonant with the developing Anglican outlook of which the construction of the ‘holy living’ theology in the 1640s and 1650s was one of the central pillars.
Chapter 3

English Reception of the Jansenist Critique

It was natural that the Jansenist critique should be introduced to an Anglophone audience under the direction of an influential interest among adherents of the disestablished Church. The triumph of the puritans in England had lent new force to the arguments of Roman polemicists. The Church of England, they said, had disappeared, her episcopal leadership nullified, her sacramental life destroyed; all this was clearly a judgement on heretical schism, and her scattered children had better return to the bosom of the Roman communion. The lure of conversion, and with it security, became both more immediate and more attractive under the precarious circumstances endured by the Anglicans in continental exile. Much of the controversial energy of men like Cosin and John Bramhall, defending the continuing ecclesial integrity of the English Church despite her outward diffraction, was expended in refuting the seductive arguments of Catholic proselytes. A weapon so incisive as that forged by Pascal would understandably be seized upon. The Anglicans, with their significant presence in Paris, were swift to see it: Bishop Duppa, for example, however tortoise-like his seclusion in Surrey, had the collected Provinciales barely a month after they were printed in July 1657.


2 E.g. Bramhall, The Consecration and Succession, Of Protestant Bishops justified (The Hague, 1658); idem, A Just Vindication of the Church of England, from The unjust Aspersion of Criminal Schisme (1658); idem, Schisme Garded and Beaten Back (The Hague, 1658); Cosin, Regni Angliae Religio Catholica (1652); idem, The History of Popish Transubstantiation (1655, publ. 1676).

3 For this date, not entirely certain, CLP, p. lxxi. Of his existence under the Commonwealth Duppa wrote, ‘I secure myself the same way as the tortoise doth, by not going out of my shell’ – Gyles Isham (ed.), The Correspondence of Bishop Brian Duppa and Sir Justinian Isham, 1640-1660 (Northamptonshire Record Society, xlv, 1955), p. 52, and for the Provinciales, pp. 139-41.
As we saw in the last chapter, the dissemination of the Jansenist critique in the years leading up to and following the restoration reflected both the long-term ideological commitments and the immediate religio-political imperatives of Anglican churchmen. They were attempting to engineer the re-establishment of the Church on a robust basis, yet under a monarch who was suspected of crypto-Catholicism and whose avowed policy was to achieve some substantial political reflection of his personal sympathy for Roman Catholics. The argument sustained by the Jansenists was apt, as they saw it, to serve their interests. It weakened the English Catholic body, dividing it against itself, and, in redounding so drastically to the discredit of the Roman interest, it could only assist in the formation of an ideological atmosphere sufficient to neutralise the inclinations of the monarch.

In many ways, indeed, the Port-Royalist campaign against Jesuit casuistry represented simply a well-timed replenishment of the Protestant polemical magazine. Many of the themes it touched upon, especially in respect to the politics of the Society of Jesus, were well-established in English Protestant arguments. The Jesuits were enemies to kings, advocates not only of the papal deposing power, but also, like the puritan extremists, apologists for violent resistance.\textsuperscript{4} They were arch-plotters, famed for their doctrine of equivocation, ‘nimble as mischiefe itself’.\textsuperscript{5} Their influence lay behind the Gunpowder Plot, as it did behind the assassination of Henri IV; after 1649 it was often asserted that the fate of Charles I was also the handiwork of Jesuit spies, who, disguised as sectaries or soldiers, inspired the regicides

\textsuperscript{4} Controversialists never failed to cite the opinion published by the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana in his \textit{De rege et regis institutione} (Toledo, 1599), who matched theorists of the pope’s power to authorise political resistance by affirming on contractualist premises the right of the people to declare a ruler tyrannical, and thus of private men to kill him. See e.g. Joseph Hall, \textit{Epistles. The third and last volume} (1611), p. 73: ‘[our religion] shall never yield that good Jesuite, either a Mariana to teach treason, or a Ruaillac to act on it’. For more background cf. J. H. M. Salmon, ‘Catholic resistance theory, Ultramontanism, and the royalist response, 1580-1620’, in J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (eds.), \textit{The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700} (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 219-53.

\textsuperscript{5} The words of Thomas Taylor in 1624, quoted Milton, \textit{Catholic and Reformed}, p. 193, see also pp. 43, 521-2. For earlier notices of ‘Jesuiticall equivocation’, notorious device of undercover priests in England, see among many examples Thomas Bell, \textit{The Anatomie of Popish Tyrannie} (1603), p. 124; Thomas Morton, \textit{A Preamble...Concerning the Romish doctrine both in question of Rebellion and Aequivocation} (1608), pp. 43f.; William Barlow, \textit{An Answer to a Catholike English-Man} (1609), pp. 224-6.
by propagating subversive political ideas. Not only William Prynne, but Richard Baxter and John Evelyn too subscribed to this conspiracy theory. Some of the speculative innovations denounced by the Jansenists – an inflated doctrine of papal infallibility, and a suspect theory of grace and free will – were also early associated with the Jesuits by English writers. The distinction between Jesuit extremism and moderate English Catholicism, too, was a well-established political and polemical tool long before Evelyn exploited it in his translations of Jansenist works. Even the Laudians, arriving, amid much criticism, at a less exclusive view of the position of the English Church vis-à-vis Rome, found it therefore especially useful to magnify the excesses of the Jesuits.

The Jansenist polemics, in other words, focusing attention on the central controversial issues of papal infallibility and the Catholic theology of grace, and providing catalogues of subversive casuistical opinions on resistance to lawful authority, oath-breaking, and equivocation, were in one sense a straightforward gift to Protestant apologists. It is no surprise to find the Calvinist bishop of Lincoln and implacable anti-Romanist, Thomas Barlow, advising prospective divinity students, in a handlist of useful works, to regard the literary controversy between the Jansenists and the Jesuits as a ‘Common-place-book, wherein we may find all the Impious Opinions of the Roman Church’. The Jansenists, Barlow observed, had produced many books censuring the ‘Jesuites wild and extravagant Opinions’. The ‘Provincial Letters and the Jesuites Morals, and the Mystery of Jesuitism’ were

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7 For Prynne see William Lamont, Marginal Prynne, 1600-1669 (1983), pp. 138-42; for Baxter idem, Richard Baxter and the Millennium (1979), pp. 109-13; for Evelyn Pernicious Consequences, sig. A3v. Thomas Barlow also repeated the story, printed by Peter du Moulin, on the authority of Prynne, in his Vindication of the Sincerity of the Protestant Religion (1671), that a secret council of Jesuits in London had voted to bring about the king’s death: Popery, or, The principles and positions approved by the Church of Rome (when really believ’d and practis’d) are very dangerous to all (1679), pp. 72-4.


particularly to be recommended. Apologies in which the Jesuits provided a traditional descent for their opinions were so much the more useful to aspiring Protestant controversialists. This interest of Barlow’s, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford from 1661 to 1675, complemented that of Richard Allestree, Regius Professor from 1663 to 1679, and an avid collector of Port-Royal writings. Post-restoration Oxford theologians were unlikely to miss the relevance of the controversy.

However much the *Provinciales* and other anti-laxist works fitted into the existing structures of anti-Roman Protestant polemic, they did introduce one element which was new and therefore striking: the exposé of probabilism and its bizarre moral ramifications. Duppa, for example, having seen Pascal’s writings, immediately sent Sir Justinian Isham a breviat of some cases, which I extracted out of the *Provinciall* Letters in French, and with them a book sent me out of France in the year 1644, (and if I am not deceaved the very same which you having once seen, you often enquired after, but I could not then find it), where I find many of the same cases, and som of that prodigious nature, that I am in a maze to see that any who profess the name either of Christ, or Jesus, dare vent to the world conclusions so destructive of everything that looks like religion, that neither the Talmud, nor the Alcoran can be charged with the like.

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10 Thomas Barlow, *Autoschediasmata, De studio theologicae, or, Directions for the choice of books in the study of divinity* (Oxford, 1699), pp. 43-4. Barlow died in 1691. This work was ‘publish’d from the original manuscript’ by William Offley. Its pedagogic nature suggests it may date from Barlow’s time as Lady Margaret Professor; perhaps it originated earlier, during his time as the librarian of Bodley (1642-60). He was reportedly in the habit of circulating a very similar list in MS: Alma de Jordy and Harris Francis Fletcher (eds.), “‘A Library for Younger Schollers’ Compiled by an English Scholar-Priest about 1655”, *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, 48 (1961), p. x.

11 Isham (ed.), *Correspondence*, p. 141. The other book was apparently the *Requeste, Procès Verbaux et advertisments faits à la diligence du Recteur et par l’ordre de l’Université pour faire condamner une Doctrine pernicieuse et prejudiciable à la Société humaine et particulièrement à la vie des Rois, enseignée au Collège de Clairement par les Jésuites de Paris* (Paris, 1644).
There was, of course, nothing remarkable in the idea that Catholicism was more pagan than Christian, a theology of works fitted to the proclivities of fallen nature. But in the *Provinciales* English readers found evidence that this topsy-turvy religion had been theorised and institutionalised in Catholic moral theology. Duppa’s amazement at the cases proposed by the casuists indicates the new element which the Port-Royalist campaign introduced into the polemical imagination of English Protestants. It is the purpose of this chapter to gauge the nature and significance of their reactions to this material during the second half of the century.

*A Common-place-book*

Although probabilism and laxism, as we have seen, already had a reasonably lengthy controversial history by the middle of the seventeenth century, and Jesuit casuistry, of such moment in the problem of recusancy, was a prominent polemical topic in England, Protestant writers under James and Charles I – usually quick to point out disagreements within a communion whose unity was supposedly infallibly guaranteed – rarely noticed them. John Donne, in a letter dated to the period of his residence at Mitcham between 1606 and 1611, did speak disapprovingly of ‘indulgent’ casuists who ‘allow a conscience to adhere to any probable opinion against a more probable, and do never binde [the penitent] to seek out which is the more probable, but give him leave to dissemble it and to depart from it, if by

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13 Ch. 1, above, pp. 13-14.
mischance he come to know it’. In general though Donne is unusual in the awareness of and concern with modern Catholic casuistry demonstrated in his printed works. Even among writers engaged in the discipline of casuistry the innovations of later Catholic casuists were rarely adverted to. William Perkins defined his own casuistry, ‘collected and drawne out of the very word of God’, in contrast to one ‘founded in the opinions, and variable conceites of men’, consisting of ‘Conclusions and Positions, which are onely probable and coniecturall’; but he did not indicate that he was necessarily thinking of the modern casuists. In his discussion of the doubtful conscience William Ames, without referring to the views of other casuists, briefly stated that although it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, one can never, on an extrinsic authority, follow an opinion which one considers less probable, nor is it possible to have two contradictory opinions which are equally probable and of which either may be followed. Of the modern casuistical authors Joseph Hall seems to have known Azorius and Lessius most thoroughly. In Hall’s own cases the arbitrations of Lessius are treated with a certain respect. But in general Hall thinks the casuists too nice, considering like Perkins that there is so much ‘deceit in Probabilities’ that even the most learned clerks may mistake themselves ‘in the affaires of God’, which ‘goe not by discourse, but by revelation’. Robert Sanderson similarly rejected a notion of extrinsic probability on the grounds that ‘all men though godly and learned, are no less lyable unto errours, than they

16 For other examples see esp. Biathanatos (1644), freely citing Emmanuel Sa, Azorius, Tolet; also e.g. Fifty Sermons (1649), p. 340; Essayes in Divinity (1651), p. 153; Paradoxes, Problemes, essayes, characters (1652), pp. 148-9; cf. Meg Brown, Donne and the Politics of Conscience in Early Modern England (Leiden, 1995).
17 The whole treatise of the cases of conscience (Cambridge, 1606), ep. ded.
18 Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof (Leyden-London, 1639), bk. 1, pp. 16-17.
19 Joseph Hall, Cases of Conscience Practically Resolved (3rd ed., 1654), e.g. pp. 8-11, 58-9, 91-2, 124, 137-8, 155.
are to sins’, but, although he censured ‘the impudence of the Jesuits’ in respect to equivocation, he did not especially associate them with probabilism or its cognate, laxism.²¹

All this changed after the publication of *The Mystery of Jesuitism* in 1657. ‘Jansenism’ and the satirical inventions of Pascal passed immediately into familiar currency.²² *The Pragmatical Jesuit New-leven’d*, a closet-drama by an apostate Benedictine, Richard Carpenter, is a lively symptom of this new awareness.²³ The play is about hypocrisy. The pious frauds of Catholicism are discovered to the world through the medium of the clear-thinking Cambridge scholar and hesitating convert Aristotle Jr., who finds that he cannot commit himself to Rome on account of his commitment to truth. Lucifer appears in order to perpetrate hypocritical frauds in the guise of the Roman Church, which are all done to the end of lucre. He sends an emissary to

commend my brotherly Respects to Father Escobar at Valladolid: Tell him, his Morals thrive wonderfully: The *Mystery of Jesuitisme* is little available against them: they have overturn’d all Law, Right, Honesty, and deified the Jesuit, made him the great God of Nature, all cases of Conscience answering, turning, and returning to him, whenas they should return, turn, and answer to him above.

Throughout the drama jokes turn on the strange maxims of the casuists. In Act 2 Scene 5, for example, Lord Liberal’s niece, hitherto ‘dressed modestly’, is all over vain ringlets and curlicues after her conversion by the Jesuits: ‘Escobar the Spanish Jesuit hath open’d a broad

²² See e.g. Richard Flecknoe, *Enigmatical Characters* (1658), pp. 100-102; Thomas Blount, *Glossographia* (1661), under ‘Jansenism’.
²³ *A New Play Call’d The Pragmatical Jesuit New-leven’d* (1665).
way to these loose and heathenish Dresses. O, the Jesuits!" There is also a cameo for John Barnes, chained with a collar of iron around his neck: because he condemned equivocation the Jesuits ‘have design’d him for madness … he was Master of a dangerous Head-piece’.

Ultimately Lucifer finds himself defeated by his own epigones: the monks and the Jesuits of this world are too many for the devil. Even his hypocrisy cannot stand up to that of the Church.

Carpenter’s ribald and scatological mode was common to a large number of more or less ephemeral pamphlets on the policy of the Society in the following years, with a glut occurring, as may be expected, around the time of the Popish Plot and the execution of the five Jesuits in 1679. It would be interesting to know who was responsible for translating a Jansenist edition of Innocent XI’s decree of March 2nd 1679 in condemnation of sixty-five lax propositions of the new casuists. It was accompanied by a commentary locating the

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24 The implied reference is to Escobar’s digest of the twenty-four doctors, tr. 1, ex. 8, n. 5, and tr. 1, ex. 9, n. 13 (CLP, pp. 167-8; MJ, pp. 207, 209).


26 An especially virulent example is the piece printed in the Further Discovery of the Mystery of Jesuitisme (1658), ‘A Discovery of the Society in relation to their Politicks’ (piece V). This appears to be a translation of an Italian work published in 1617 which may be attributable to Tommaso Campanella, Instruzione a’ Principi della maniera con la quale si governano li Padri Giesuiti – see A. Marsand, I Manoscritti Italiani della Regia Biblioteca Parigina, vol. 1 (Paris, 1835), p. 593. It reappears as The Policy of the Jesuits, Their Insinuation into the Courts of Princes, And most of the noble Families of Europe, Discovered (1658); then as A Discovery of the Society In relation to their Politicks. Written Originally, By A Well-Wisher to the Jesuits (1658); again, translated by Titus Oates, as An exact discovery of the mystery of iniquity as it is now in practice among the Jesuits and other their emissaries (1679); and again, from Oates’s translation and from a French translation of the Italian original (Les Secrets des Jésuites), with additions from a French translation of Hieronym Zaharowski’s Monita secreta societatis Jesu (Advise secrets de la Société de Jésu), in The Cabinet of the Jesuits Secrets Opened (1679) [ESTC R18321]. The two French pieces were from a collection entitled Le Cabinet Jésuitique, Contenant plusieurs Pièces très Curieuses des R. Pères Jésuites (Cologne, 1678). Similar works included, Anon. [‘A Catholick-Christian’ – John Bramhall?? ESTC, R42725], Pyrotechnica Loyolana, Ignatian fire-works, or, the fiery Jesuits temper and behaviour (1667), implicating the Society in the fire of London; substantially the same is Anon., Fair Warning to take heed of Popery (1674); [Henry Care], The character of a turbulent, pragmatical Jesuit and factious Romish priest (1678); ‘A. H.’, The Jesuits Catechism, according to St Ignatius Loyola (1679); ‘E. G.’, The horrid, direful, prodigious and diabolical practice of the Jesuits discovered (1679); J. A. de Hess, The Mystery of Equivocation (1679); Anon., Autokatakritoi, Or The Jesuits Condemned by their Own Witness (1679); Israel Tonge, Jesuitical Aphorisms (1679); Edward Cooke, A True Narrative of the Inhumane Positions and Practices of the Jesuites and Papists (1680); Anon., The character of a Jesuit (1681).

27 Ch. 1, above, p. 14.
propositions in the casuists, giving scriptural and patristic excerpts which contradict them, and providing a detailed account of the battle against laxism from the condemnation of Bauny by the Sorbonne in 1641 up to 1679. The translator styled himself a loyal English Catholic, though the ‘book’s’ profession, ‘by all the Holiness which is in the Outside and Inside of a Pope, That I am all over from Head to Foot a Papist’, may give cause for doubt. Another edition of the same decree was furnished with a preface by Gilbert Burnet, who feared it would alter but little: ‘I need not desire the Reader to observe that it is above twenty years since Complaints were first made to the Popes by some of their own Clergie in France, of the Immoral and Impious Doctrines of the Casuists’. The situation by 1700 was indicated in the preface of the 1704 English edition of the Jesuit Gabriel Daniel’s Entretiens de Cléandre et d’Eudoxe, sur les Lettres au provincial (1694). Israel Tonge’s translation of ‘Pascal’s Warehouse’, The Jesuits Morals, in 1670, along with the Popish Plot, it recorded, had rekindled interest first roused in 1657 – with the result that ‘Pascal is to be met withal gay and brisk in the Ale and Coffee-Houses, and nothing wanting to make his Letters as Authentick as Fox’s Martyrologe, but to be chained to the Board’s-end’.

28 The Roman Wonder. Being Truth Confess’d by Papists. Wherein the Clergy of the Church of England in their Charge of Heretical and Dammable Doctrines upon the Jesuits are fully and fairly Justified (1679), ‘The Book to the Reader’. A second, identical edition, appeared as The Jesuits Morals Condemned In Sixty-Five of their professed Maxims or Tenents (1680). The commentary drew on Jansenist works such as the Extraict de quelques-unes des plus dangereuses propositions de la morale de plusieurs nouveaux casuistes fidellement tirées de leurs ouvrages which appeared with the Advis de Messieurs les Curés de Paris (Paris, 1656), on which p. 24, above. Cf. a translation, with attributed propositions, of the Sorbonne’s censure (3rd Feb., 1665) of the Opusculum singulairia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens by ‘Amadeus Guimenius’ (Mateo de Moya, SJ), A Truth Known to Very Few: viz., That the Jesuites are down-right compleat Atheists (1680), possibly the work of the same party: it is described in The Jesuits Morals Condemned, p. 37, as ‘the most important Censure that ever was pronounced by the faculty’.


The impact of the Jansenist controversy was not only to be detected at the vulgar level. The argument over grace and free will inspired some early English commentators, such as Herbert Thorndike, who analysed Jansen’s views in his Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England in 1659, and the Calvinist theologian Theophilus Gale, resident at Caen, who would provide a True Idea of Jansenisme, Both Historick and Dogmatick in 1669. But it was the view opened up by the Mystery of Jesuitism series on the French rigorist campaign against laxist casuistry which attracted most attention among English theologians and religious commentators. ‘The Provinciall letters, Escobar or the other profane Casuists of that wicked school’ were now there to be ‘ransacked’ by writers across the whole religious spectrum in restoration England. Throughout the period the specific examples of casuistical enormities catalogued in Jansenist works, and often the references with which they were furnished, were cribbed by English authors. Even particular phrases and epithets became common currency. The adjective ‘pernicious’, for example, a leitmotif of the Jansenist writings (as in Nicole’s Les pernicieuses conséquences, translated by Evelyn), rarely failed to qualify the ‘maxims’, ‘tenets’, ‘opinions’ or ‘morals’ of the Jesuits in English writings after 1660. Some differentiation of treatment may however be discerned amid this widespread engagement.

The question of Catholicism was central to the religio-political agenda in the decades following the restoration of Charles II. The spectre of popery loomed behind royal projects for an Indulgence, and, after the Duke of York had openly declared himself a Catholic in 1673 by resigning as Lord High Admiral in the wake of the Test Act, behind the throne itself. There was mileage in anti-papal rhetoric for all complexions of English Protestants.

31 Cf. below, ch. 6, pp. 267f., and above, ch. 2, p. 73.
Nonconformists who suspected the episcopal party of inclining towards Catholicism, or, as Baxter did, of entertaining ‘Grotian’ ambitions of a reunion of the Western Church under the spiritual leadership of the pope, could, by expatiating upon the dangers inherent in Catholicism, represent themselves as an essential component in a united Protestant front against encroaching irreligion. Conformist writers, equally, were interested to enlarge upon the threat posed by popery to true religion and the Protestant state, since by equating it with a factious and fanatical Dissent they could urge the necessity for Nonconformists to forget their differences and rally round the national Church as the essential guarantor of unity.

Considering also the circumstances described in chapter 2, whereby the Jesuits became an expendable bargaining chip in Catholic manoeuvring for toleration, and the increasingly hysterical fears, culminating in the episode of the Popish Plot at the end of the 1670s, that the court intended to sell England over to popery and thereby slavery, it should be apparent that the Jesuit casuists lampooned by Pascal were not going to enjoy a great deal of popularity among Protestant writers in the post-restoration period. The Provinciales and related works appeared to demonstrate conclusively that Catholicism was not only perilous in those ‘points of faith’ cleared by ‘the divines of the Reformation’, or in those political points reducible to the preaching of ‘Treason against Princes and States’, but also in ‘their doctrines, which concern life and practice’. ‘Their doctrine corrupteth almost all Morality’, as Baxter wrote; and, he added, ‘what need we fuller clearer proof, then the Jansenian hath given us in his Mysterie of Jesuitism’?

The ‘Jansenian’s’ case against the morality of the new casuists, however, still frequently took second place to a more traditional raft of anti-Jesuit arguments. Baxter, for

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34 E.g. Stillingfleet, The Unreasonableness of Separation (1681).
35 David Clarkson, The Practical Divinity of the Papists Discovered to be Destructive of Christianity and Men’s Souls (1676), Introduction; Baxter, A Key for Catholicks, pp. 1-2.
example, simply provided an undifferentiated list of casuistical propositions, apologising lest it ‘offend your ears’.36 He culled these from the *Mystery of Jesuitism*, to which he gave page references and frequently referred his reader for further substance, but he was not especially interested in the intellectual thrust of Pascal’s satire. It merely illustrated the existence within the Roman communion of differences of opinion more than equal to those which Catholic writers imputed to the Protestant. Baxter began with the opinion of Filiutius that ‘if a man have purposely wearied himself with satisfying a whore, he might be dispensed from fasting on a fasting day’,37 followed this with Basil Ponce’s lax opinion on proximate occasions, cited by Bauny,38 and only then introduced the doctrine of probabilism in the form of Emmanuel Sa’s statement that ‘a man may do what he conceives lawfull according to a probable opinion, though the contrary be more certain: and for this the Opinion of one grave Doctor is sufficient’.39 In other words he opened the *Mystery* at the fifth letter and extracted one or two apparently reprehensible citations as he turned the pages. He stopped after a dozen or so, ‘intreating’ his reader to ‘read in the said Jansenians Mysterie of Jesuitism, a volume of such passages of the Jesuites’, for he had shown to his satisfaction that the ‘Papists’ were no more ‘at unity among themselves’ than ‘the Reformed Catholicks’.40 *A Key for Catholicks* was hardly a reflective work, but it may be that Baxter concentrated rather on the Jesuits ‘loose opinions’ because his own theoretical position, that ‘faith’ grounded on the perspicuous rule of God’s revealed word was the desirable means of transcending ‘uncertain probabilities’, rendered technical criticisms of the probabilist methodology irrelevant.41

36 *Ib.*, pp. 58f.
37 *Mor. Quest.*, t. 2, tr. 27, pt. 2, c. 6, n. 123 (*CLP*, pp. 82-3; *MJ*, pp. 89-90).
40 Baxter, *A Key for Catholicks*, pp. 58f., see also pp. 127-8, 229, 278-9, 335, 339, 351.
In *The Jesuit’s Catechism*, by ‘A. H.’, ‘two Principles’ were identified as the mechanisms by which the Jesuits ‘will excuse [men] before the Tribunal of God’s Justice from all Sin’. These were the direction of intention, ‘donna l’importance est telle dans notre morale’, according to the ‘good Father’, ‘que j’oserais quasi la comparer à la doctrine de la probabilité’, and probabilism itself:42 ‘if a thing seems to me probable, if I do it, it’s no sin in me; and if I have the Opinion of one or two Doctors or Clergymen … then it’s probable to me’.43 The author of this pamphlet, however, had no interest in the potential danger to penitents posed by these principles: he merely wished to show that anything could be expected of the Society, since if they ‘be careful to observe’ these two principles ‘(as they are very circumspect) they can never sin or transgress’. The real sins of the Jesuits were, as usual, their advocacy of the pope’s power to absolve subjects of their obedience, and their ‘science of equivocation’. The approach to casuistry unveiled in the *Provinciales* was viewed, in this case, simply as another accessory to the Jesuits’ notorious political machinations.44

This perspective was common to many of the authors and pamphleteers who made use of the Jansenist catalogues. The citations they contained were borrowed to adorn old arguments, or put to a tendentious use which ignored the essentially theological case they embodied. Where, for example, Jesuitical equivocation might previously have been illustrated from the history of the Gunpowder plot or from Robert Parson’s *Treatise Tending to Mitigation* (1607), writers were now able to bring in *loci* indicated by the Jansenists, such as Thomas Sanchez’s *Summa casuum conscientiae*, or the extracts from Tambourini included in the later *Théologie Morale des Jésuites* and translated by Tonge in the *Jesuits Morals*.45 A favourite example was ‘our honest Country man, Joseph [i.e. John] Barnes, a Benedictine

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42 *CLP*, p. 115.
44 *The Jesuit’s Catechism*, pp. 18-28: the supporting citations however, of Becanus’ *Controv. Angl.*, p. 140, and Suarez, *Def. fid. Cath.*, l. 3, c. 23, were often included in hostile French catalogues.
Monk, who wrote a book against Equivocation’, since the fate he suffered (incarceration at Rome and madness) seemed to typify the sinister policy of the Society.\footnote{E.g. Autokatakrito, or, The Jesuits condemned by their own witness, p. 2. This pamphlet was directed against the Jesuit Martin Grene’s Account of the Jesuites Life and Doctrine (1661). The author points out that ‘the Sorbon Doctors … approved and commended Barns his book’. See also Taylor, Dissuasive from Popery, p. 153; Stillingfleet, A sermon …. 1678/9, pp. 32-3, 39, 45, quoting from Barnes’s treatise. Stillingfleet quite frequently referred to Barnes’s views, e.g. A Rational Account, pp. 616-17, 640-1.\textsuperscript{47}} The author just quoted was concerned to justify the execution of the five Jesuits on the grounds that their pleas of innocence could not be credited. Invoking the principle of ‘l’honneur’ expounded to ‘Montalte’ in the Provinciales, he remarked that ‘the honour of the Society would have been lost, had the 5 Jesuits confessed: therefore by their maxims they could equivocate’.\footnote{Autokatakrito, p. 16.\textsuperscript{47}} An even more striking example of this sort of occasional appropriation of the Jansenist case is the lawyer Edward Cooke’s exclusionist tract A True Narrative of the Inhumane Positions and Practices of the Jesuites and Papists, by which he sought to curry favour with the earl of Shaftesbury in 1680. Cooke ‘had several … Cases’ from ‘the Ingenious Louis de Montalte, in his Provincial Letters’, intending to show thereby that ‘Jesuitisme, being a State-trick of Religion, on purpose devised to maintain Luxury, Pride, Pomp, and excessive Ambition, with all other gawdy Train of Worldly Honours, must therefore consequently have Gain for the Chief Element of its Constitution’.\footnote{Cooke, A True Narrative, pp. 3-8. Cooke cited, with references, all the examples of lax opinions on homicide listed by Pascal, such as the lawfulness of killing for a box on the ear, for paltry sums of money, for calumny, etc. (MJ, pp. 104, 140-5, 147-9, 150-3, 304-5, 309-310, 316-17, 335, 338-9, 340-1, 343, 347, 355; AMJ, pp. 18-20, 98: Amicius; Desbois, regent of theology at the archiepiscopal college, Rouen; Caramuel; Lessius; Reginaldus; Layman; Escobar; Azorius; Diana; Molina; Tannerus; Sanchez; Filiutius; Becanus; Hérau [see CLP, pp. 246-7&n.]; Hurtado de Mendoza.)\textsuperscript{48}}

Some writers did exhibit a greater interest in the threat to Christian morality which Pascal had intended to expose in the casuists. Pyrotechnica Loyolana, a lengthy pamphlet which has been attributed to Bramhall,\footnote{ESTC, R42725: the pamphlet is a new edition of the 1674 work A Fair Warning to Take Heed of Popery; Bramhall had published, in 1649, a Fair Warning to Take Heed of the Scottish Discipline. He died in 1663,} entered fully into the Jansenist campaign, providing
a historical survey gleaned from St. Amour’s *Journal* (translated into English in 1664). The Jansenist position against Molinism, ‘a monstrous Hodgpodge of old Errors and Heresies blended together’, was represented favourably, and their recent edition of the New Testament mentioned, ‘which the *Fiery Jesuits* are enkindling fuel to *burn* that it may not be read, lest by that *true light of God’s word* there be a *manifestation* of their abominable *points of Faith*’. Just as their doctrines were opposite to ‘true faith’, so the Jesuits’ ‘maxims are also contrary to all *good manners*, yea contradictory to all the *common Notices of Holiness* …

*Jesus saith, strait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leads to life, and few there be that finde it. But the Jesuits say, easie is the gate, and broad the way, and many, yea any, may find it.*

The writer identified the doctrines of probable opinions and of the artificial direction of intention as ‘the *prodigious Loyolan Vipers* that eat out the very bowels of *morality*’, and quoted the *Remonstrance* of the Paris curés (printed in the *Additionals* to the *Mystery of Jesuitism*) to the effect that the casuists teach men ‘to be Scepticks in all things, and to find out the ways, not to exterminate the corrupt maxims of men, but to justifie them therein, and to instruct how they may with safety of Conscience put them in practice’. He proceeded to provide a ‘*Scheme of some of those impious maxims* … as I find them dispers’d in that unanswerable *discovery* of their *immorality*, *The Mystery of Jesuitism* containing the *Provinciall Letters* with the *Additionals*’. As in the original *Théologie Morale des Jésuites* of 1643, the author disposed these maxims within the framework of the decalogue, demonstrating thereby that the casuists

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whereas the pamphlet refers to works and events after that date, and the attribution is doubtful. There are some indications, however, that the author shared the perspective of episcopal churchmen such as Bramhall or Henry Hammond.

50 Ch. 2, above, p. 79.
51 Echoing Evelyn, ‘[the Jesuits] eat out … the very heart and vitals of the common Christianity’: *Another Part of the Mystery of Jesuitism*, sigs. A3v.-A4r.
make it their business to represent every sin as a *diminutive*, to vent new *Notions* of 
good and *evil*, and indulge men in an impudent, impenitent *violation* of *all* the weighty
*precepts* of the most just and holy *Law*, and the necessary *Rule* of the *blessed Gospel*.

Thus under the first commandment the reader discovers that, according to the Jesuits, it is
not a necessary precept to love God; under the second, that they sanction idolatry in China,\(^5^2\)
or the activities of magicians and soothsayers, who, when mistaken, are not obliged to
restitution if they have really consulted the devil; under the third, that it is lawful to swear
with a mental reservation; and so on and so forth, bringing in under the second table all the
destructive social implications of the casuists’ opinions on the filial bond, homicide, sexual
incontinence, ‘*theft*, cheating, and *symony*’, calumny and equivocation, envy and ambition.\(^5^3\)

The theological significance of these moral ‘abominations’ was clearly pointed out:
‘‘Twill not need much labor to evince, that they who thus endeavor to make void the precepts
of the *Law*, are not wanting to evacuate the *gracious prescriptions* of *Faith* and *Repentance*
commended to us in the *Gospel*, as necessary means to *eternal life* and *happiness*. The
Jesuits, making a guide out of natural reason, were to be equated with the Quakers, whose
inner light also represented a subjective rule capable of justifying wilful moral aberrancy.
Thus, as the author went on, further suggesting the wing of English theological opinion to
which he adhered, they do away with ‘that *lively obediential believing* which our Lord
Redeemer requires of every one that would be saved’, that is ‘the *Evangelical Doctrine of
Repentance*, which is necessarily commanded, as well as *faith* in *our Lord Jesus Christ*. The
mechanism by which the Jesuits destroyed the Gospel was the vitiated sacrament of penance
criticised by Arnauld in *De la fréquente communion* and by Pascal from the tenth *Provinciale*
onwards. The Jesuits resolve the duty of repentance into ‘a sleight *auricular confession*’; this

\(^5^2\) A bibliography on the ‘*Querelle des Rites*’ is provided by Delumeau, *Le Catholicisme entre Luther et
Voltaire*, p. 37.

\(^5^3\) These are all quoted *verbatim* from the *Mystery of Jesuitism* works, to which page references are given.
confession is made easy by allowing it to be general and sparing; no penance is applied preparatory to absolution, but absolution is easily granted to any, even habitual sinners who do not avoid proximate occasions, and is able to reconcile the penitent to God even if he lacks contrition but experiences merely a fear of Damnation. The author, who recognised that he had ‘made an excursion beyond mine intended bounds, whiles I am reciting these pernicious maxims’, clearly felt it was important to
disgrace this Pageantry which the Ignatians fabricate to justle out the real practice of Repentance … for though the Jesuits account many necessary Commandments in the Gospel, as Evangelical counsels, which they are at liberty to take, or not, God will not be mocked, or put off with subtilties: But Whosoever shall break one of these least Commandments and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the Kingdom of Heaven.55

In depicting ‘les nouveaux casuistes’ as enemies to the ‘real practice of Repentance’ this author indicated that the Jansenist moral critique possessed a potential relevance to English religious thinkers which went beyond the useful caricature of Jesuit villainy. In fact it had much to say to a group of theologians – the same which, we suggested in chapter 2, sponsored the initial translations of the Provinciales into English – who had been engaged, during the 1640s and 1650s, in constructing a theology that gave a higher emphasis to moral striving, which in their view was endangered by the Calvinist-style theology of the Westminster Assembly and the early Stuart Church.56 The Jansenist focus on the internal disposition of the individual, which, it was claimed, the Jesuits ignored in designing an externalist or formalist theory more suited to everyday convenience, was something they wished to emphasise in an English context too. For, if the casuists talked as though ‘God did

55 Pyrotechnica Loyolana, pp. 36-50 (Mt. v 19).
56 Ch. 5, below.
not appoint the priest to minister to holy living but to excuse it’, English Protestants were no less eager to slip the bonds of religious duty.57 ‘Although’ the vitiated sacrament of penance outlined by the casuists ‘is the doctrine properly of the Roman schools, yet it is their and our practice too. We sin with greediness, and repent with leisure’, and ‘to confess and to absolve is all the method of our modern repentance, even when it is most severe’.58

Anti-Probabilism and Anti-Calvinism

‘To schoolmen I give my doubtfulness’

Donne, ‘The Will’

None among the ‘careless and confident’ thinkers of the schools, according to the argument of the Jansenists, could have profited more from Donne’s sardonic bequest than the probabilists.59 Substituting for doubtfulness the illusory certainty of probable opinions, they guided penitents away from the narrow road that leads to heaven. But doubt, a corollary of sin, is a signpost which directs us to the truth. We will enjoy a perfect peace when we see that _alta luce che de sè è vera_; here our repos lies in seeking it.

Where previous generations of English churchmen might have taxed a self-reliant Catholic works-righteousness with ‘doubtfulness’, the mid-century defenders of the

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57 A classic anti-laxist statement: compare e.g. the words of the Assembly of the French Clergy, in their letter to the French bishops prefacing the 1656/7 ed. of Borromeo’s _Instructions aux Confesseurs_ [(Besançon, 1839), p. 8], and cited in the _Factum pour les Curés de Paris_, in _Ecrits des Curés de Paris_, ed. Récalde, pp. 65-6: ‘ces nouveaux Théologiens, au lieu d’accommoder la vie des hommes aux préceptes de Jésus-Christ, ont entrepris d’accommoder les préceptes et les règles de J.-C. aux interests, aux passions et aux plaisirs des hommes’.

58 Taylor, _UN_, pp. 154, 419: the final superlative implies a further criticism, since Taylor remarks it is only the most rigorous among English Protestants who seek to avail themselves of the ministry of confession.

59 Quote is Taylor, _Ductor_, p. iv.
established Church were more concerned with spurious Catholic claims about certainty. Chillingworth in the 1630s had undermined the case for an infallible guide to the interpretation of scripture; his argument would be carried forward by, among others, Stillingfleet and Taylor in controversy with Sergeant. Writers who concerned themselves with morals were exercised by the analogous theory developed among Catholic casuists, who guaranteed certainty at one remove by an extrinsic authority. The Anglican response on both counts was effectively identical: the problem of the inaccessibility of an absolute certainty is not resolved but avoided by this resort to a vicarious one.

Probabilist casuistry had a twofold relevance for such writers. In the first place, the English Church was not rich in casuistical divinity. Taylor could only name ‘Amesius, Perkins, and the late Eloquent and Reverend Bishop of Norwich’ among worthy predecessors. Catholic moral theology and casuistry were therefore necessary resources. But ‘we cannot be well-supplied out of the Roman storehouses: for though there the staple is, and very many excellent things expos’d to view; yet we have found the merchants to be deceivers; and the wares too often falsified’. There was, therefore, a practical need to expose ‘false principles in … moral or casuistical divinity’.

Behind this literal relevance, so to speak, lay an analogical one, indicated by Taylor’s explanation of the shortfall in reformed casuistry. This dearth, he suggested, was the result of England’s thraldom to predestinarian ‘disputations’. Where men believe ‘it is not a good life that justifies man before God, but … faith in the special promises’, the analysis of moral duty

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61 Ductor, p. ii, i.e. William Ames, William Perkins, and Joseph Hall. Taylor’s list is missing Robert Sanderson, the most respected casuist of his day. The work of Baxter and John Sharp of York came afterwards.

62 Ib.

63 UN, p. 9.
and the special ministry it informs, ‘private Confession’, are devalued. As Taylor explained in 1655, he therefore had to postpone his *magnum opus* dealing with the principles of casuistry, *Ductor Dubitantium*, in order first to ‘undermine these false foundations’ by establishing the necessity to ‘live holily’.\(^6^4\) His work on casuistry, in other words, presupposed an approach to morality distinguished from a Calvinist theology which was said to undermine it. To define a position against Catholic casuistry was simultaneously to elaborate this anti-Calvinist position.\(^6^5\)

Indeed the analogy between these two undesirable *morales* ran very closely. There are two ways, observed Allestree, of ‘making Religion subservient to vice’. The ‘Zealots’ believe themselves among the elect, affirm that ‘God sees no sin in his elect’, and ‘from thence proclaim … a general Jubilee and manumission from the bonds even of *Christ’s* as well as Moses’s Law’.\(^6^6\)

Of the second sort are some, who by indulgent and partial glosses, seek to mollify the severity of Christ’s commands: That contrive for their Clients not the means of Obeying, but the arts of Escaping them … These are a generation of men of whose Dexterity in this faculty the world has taken so much notice I need not name them, a sort of easie *Casuists* who … thus enlarge the narrow way, make it a road as well for the Beast as the Man, the brutish sensual, as well as the rational divine Part of us.\(^6^7\)

Both Calvinist theology and ‘laxist’ casuistry, on this analogy, effect a separation between the moral agent and the law of God which ought to rule his actions. The conscience is ultimately persuaded and settled, not by careful deliberation, but by a belief in the doctrines of election or probabilism. Both give a vicarious assurance of innocence, one by the extrinsic

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\(^{6^4}\) *Ib.*, pp. 8-14; *Ductor*, p. i.

\(^{6^5}\) On the term ‘Calvinist’ see above, p. 8, and below, p. 213, n. 7.

\(^{6^6}\) ‘Zealots’ recalls the Jewish *ius zelotarum* invoked, for example by Milton, to justify the regicide.

righteousness infallibly imputed to the elect, the other by the extrinsic probability which
infallibly settles the conscience. Both therefore effectively cashier ‘God’s Vicegerent’, the
conscience itself, understood as the activity of the ‘rational divine’ part of man by which he is
enabled to participate in the eternal moral law. For they give a guarantee of security (the
inward testimony of the Spirit; the doctrine of probable opinions), which, being sufficient in
itself, looses the conscience, ‘the rule from which it is sin to recede’, from ‘the rule of this
rule, God’s law’. There is, that is to say, no check to the erring conscience – which, since it is
always evil to act against the law, must, as Aquinas taught, be ‘deposed’ or ‘laid aside’.68 So
long as ‘man does not so much as doubt of his opinion … what temptation can he have to
think of rectifying it?’ If the conscience is always infallibly secure, fallible man will, in
following it, inevitably sin against the law of God. The casuists’ doctrine of probabilism was
thus functionally equivalent with the Calvinists’ ‘Divine Light within themselves’: both
absolved the moral agent of his responsibility to attain to the clearest possible apprehension
of his duty.69 Both doctrines encouraged men to ‘go on without fear … and without scruple
be confident of heaven’; both were ‘apt to produce error and confidence, security and a
careless conversation’.70 The proof of the pudding, argued Anglican writers, was in the
eating: the outcome of this specious certainty was, in each case, rebellion, regicide, and evil
living.71

Like the Port-Royalists, writers such as Taylor and Allestree focused on the obligation
imposed by fear and uncertainty to take the safer part or inform the conscience, a process
they similarly envisaged as relating to the cultivation of the moral personality as a whole.
‘Our corrupt and debased nature’ puts us outside the order established by God, expressed in

68 Cf. Taylor, Ductor, i, ch. 3, § 7.
70 Taylor, UN, pp. 13, 9.
71 E.g. Allestree, Forty Sermons, p. 69; cf. some pulpit remarks of Taylor in 1656, BL Add. MS 78364, fol. 48r; the same analogy was later drawn by Robert South, Twelve Sermons … Volume 2 (1694), pp. 545-7; and by
William Wake, Sermons and Discourses (1690), pp. 200-204.
his laws. But ‘by his grace’ he mercifully ‘offers to elevate and refine this nature, bring it up to the purity of those Laws’. That is, he ‘puts us in a capacity of being like unto him, in which is summed up at once, all both virtue and felicity’. The more we conform ourselves to his laws, the more we are aligned with that eternal trajectory whose end is in God. ‘And on this glorious end every particular command of his, has a direct aspect, every one of them tending to re-impress on us some part of that divine image which was raz’d out by the first sin’. The conscience is the instrument by which this ‘assimilation’ is achieved, judging how the end should be realised in action.\(^72\) The role of casuistry is therefore to minimise as far as possible the room for error in moral judgements – for ‘of all things in the world, in these things an error is most intolerable’.\(^73\) But the lax casuists, ‘instead of directing men’s Consciences in the wayes of innocence and goodness … teach them the art of putting tricks on God Almighty (as one called the Casuistical Divinity of the Jesuits)’.\(^74\) Since this is inconsistent with the ‘indelible notions’ upon which the conscience erects its syllogisms – that is, Aquinas’s first principles of practical reason, for example that good should be sought and evil avoided – ‘he that can thus pronounce, must be suppos’d to have supprest and silenc’d that’.\(^75\)

Like the Jansenists, therefore, the Anglicans charged the casuists with divesting the conscience of its office as ‘Judge’, so disabling man from conforming his actions to the law and fulfilling his role within the eternal order. The secure conscience is the one which has taken every possible precaution to ensure the truth of its judgements. By giving a security logically prior to this search for the truth, the doctrine of probabilism, like the Calvinist theory of imputed righteousness, effectively ‘imprisons’ the conscience, and thus impedes the restoration of the image of God in man.

\(^{72}\) Allestree, *Causes of Decay*, p. 72.

\(^{73}\) Taylor, *Ductor*, p. ix.

\(^{74}\) Stillingfleet, *A Sermon*, pp. 51-2; he inaccurately cites Pierre Nicole’s third note on the third *Provinciale* in his Latin ed. of the *Lettres*. A more likely source is the *Dissertatio* on probability appended to the fifth letter; but I have not been able to locate the precise quotation.

\(^{75}\) Allestree, *Causes of Decay*, p. 72; Aquinas, *ST*, IaIae, q. 94, a. 1-2.
There is no reason to suppose that this position, based on the Thomist assumptions shared by the majority of seventeenth-century English moralists, was not reached organically and independently of any immediate outside influence.\textsuperscript{76} It was in any case the basis of the argument against Rome that her abuses stemmed from the superfluous interposition of ‘the authority of man’ between the faithful and the Word of God,\textsuperscript{77} insofar as probabilism represented merely a diversification of human authority, its repudiation followed naturally from the Protestant position.

The congeniality of the Jansenist argument to Anglican thinkers, however, does raise some questions, for it is not clear that we should necessarily expect to find any ready sympathy at all. If the Jansenists are often seen as a kind of Catholic ‘puritan’, the casuists are, by the same token, a kind of Catholic ‘Anglican’, optimistic about the complementarity of nature and grace, and willing therefore to expand the role of free will in the economy of salvation, and the competence of reason to order human conduct.\textsuperscript{78} English churchmen of the mid- to late-seventeenth century inherited a tradition, that of Hooker and Chillingworth, which identified in reason a source of authentic religious knowledge capable of balancing exclusive claims made for the all-sufficiency of scripture or tradition.\textsuperscript{79} To divines like Hammond, Taylor, Thorndike or Stillingfleet among the following generations, Chillingworth’s solution to the problem of authority had become conventional. The mathematical certainty proper to demonstration is not applicable to faith, which rests ultimately on the testimony of scripture; nor can it be infallibly shown that any putative guide in matters of belief is infallible. There is a necessary premise that compels assent to non-


\textsuperscript{77} Taylor, \textit{Ductor}, pp. iv-v.

\textsuperscript{78} This idea of ‘liberal’ Anglicanism is interrogated ch. 5, below.

\textsuperscript{79} See further \textit{ib.}, pp. 230-36.
demonstrable articles, namely that they are proposed as true by God; but the best kind of certainty we can obtain that scripture has this divine guarantee is the moral certainty with which we assent to any well-attested historical fact. This moderate contentment with a limited or practical certainty sufficient for action, resting on Aristotle’s rule that ‘there are different degrees of certainty attained according to the different degrees of evidence’, bore a superficial resemblance to the approach taken by probabilist casuists. To the Blackloists, writers like Taylor or Stillingfleet were therefore ‘probabilists’: sceptics who denied the possibility of an absolute certainty, which the Blackloists thought could be ‘geometrically’ guaranteed in virtue of the revealed axiomata unfailingly preserved by tradition. The Blackloist argument, in the hands of Sergeant, was absurdly overblown; but, if there was anything at all in the charge, then the Anglican reception of polemics formulated against precisely such an attitude among the casuists does call for some investigation.

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The Jansenist polemics brought before English eyes the doctrine of probabilism as the root cause of the laxism by which Roman casuists indulged human frailty.

There is a Proposition, which indeed is new, but is now the general Doctrine of the Leading Men in the Church of Rome; and it is the foundation on which their Doctors of Conscience rely, in their decision of all cases in which there is a doubt or question made by themselves; and that is That if an Opinion or Speculation be probable, it may in practice be safely followed: And if it be inquir’d, What is sufficient to make an

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80 See Chillingworth, The Religion of Protestants, pp. 65-7, 412-14, 185-8, 216f. The clearest account of the proportion between types of certainty and evidence is probably the mathematician John Wilkin’s Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), i, ch. 1.
81 Quote is Stillingfleet, Idolatry, pp. 568-9; cf. ch. 1, above, pp. 32-3.
82 Ch. 2, above, p. 116.
Opinion probable; the answer is easie, *Sufficit opinio alicuius gravis Doctoris* … This is the great Rule of their Cases of Conscience.  

This account of the doctrine followed that given by the Jansenists. The casuists, says Taylor, arrogate cases of uncertainty, which they therefore multiply, to the competence of probability. They sever the link between the speculative and the practical, replacing it with the ‘Warranty’ that a probable opinion can always be safely followed: ‘here is enough to give peace of conscience to him that does it’. Then ‘I may … choose which I will, and do what I list in most cases, and yet be safe’. The casuists have thus given themselves a licence to ‘govern [men] by their own inclinations’: as Pascal made his ‘Jansenist’ explain, this meant they could be ‘severe’ or ‘gentle’, ‘strict’ or ‘loose … so they may entertain all spirits, and please all dispositions, and … none may go away scandaliz’d or griev’d from their penitential chairs’.  

The discussion in Taylor’s *Dissuasive* was replicated from the preface to his *Ductor Dubitantium*, where he defined probabilism – ‘this Academical or rather Sceptick Theology, *Alii aiunt, alii negant; utrumque probabile*’ – from the same sources, and, referring his ‘Reader to the books and letters written by their parties of *Portroyal*’, gave numerous examples of lax propositions.  

Probabilism, on this showing, was ‘a rare way of probation’, which, ‘upon the saying of one or two persons’, gives ‘a warranty to doe actions … so abhorrent from the law of Nature and common honesty’. To follow such a ‘probable’ opinion

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84 Taylor, *A Dissuasive from popery*, pp. 110-12; Pascal makes each of these points at CLP, letters 5 & 6, and similarly affirms that the Jesuit confessors sponsor all opinions ‘in order that none might leave [them] discontented’ (CLP, p. 252, ‘afin que personne ne sorte malcontent’).  

is, indeed, to accept an ‘improbable proof’.  
Taylor’s sarcasm was echoed by Allestree, who observed that those who give ‘blind assent’ to the opinions of private persons are likely to be deceived; ‘I shall leave it to others, to estimate the probability that they shall not be actually so.’

Later writers who shared their concern for moral standards, such as the royal chaplain and Westminster prebendary William Owtram, would continue to express repulsion at the lawless doctrine laid out by Pascal’s ‘good father’. Permitting men to forsake the search for truth, the function of probabilism is ‘to rob every private person of his Conscience, Reason, and Understanding’, leaving him thereby a prey to his ‘sinful inclinations’. The pious non-juror Thomas Baker would similarly depict probabilism as a retreat from Christian freedom and responsibility into a sort of heathen academic scepticism, instancing the peccatum philosophicum, and referring readers to Tonge’s translation of Perrault’s Jesuits Morals. ‘It would be an endless thing’, wrote William Sherlock in reflecting on Catholic failings, ‘to take notice of the loose determinations of their famed and approved Casuists, of their Doctrine of probable Opinions, of the direction of the Intention, by which means the very Laws and Boundaries of Vertue and Vice are in a great measure quite altered.’

South complained of a Generation of Men, who have framed their Casuistical Divinity to a perfect Compliance with all the Corrupt Affections of Man’s Nature, and by that new-invented Engine of the Doctrine of Probability, will undertake to warrant, and quiet the Sinner’s

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86 Ductor, p. vi.
87 Allestree, Causes of Decay, p. 369.
90 Reflections Upon Learning (2nd ed., 1700), pp. 71-5: extrinsic authority derived from one grave doctor and the choice of a less probable opinion produce ‘such a Morality, as the Heathen Philosophers would blush to own’. On the philosophical sin cf. Taylor, Second Dissuasive, pp. 261-2.
91 The Second Part of the Preservative Against Popery (1688), p. 78.
Conscience in the Commission of any sin whatever, provided that there be but the opinion of one Learned Man.\textsuperscript{92}

The scornful expressions of writers like South or Taylor were not merely a product of Protestant prejudice, for as moralists they did not reject the methods and principles of the casuists out of hand. Taylor recognised that scripture could not function as a plain and comprehensive guide in every moral question, and that here man must use the God-given light of reason.\textsuperscript{93} By reason man knows, as well as metaphysical, practical first principles, for example that ‘\textit{Good is to be chosen}’, and can deduce their necessary consequents; and it is by reason that he must interpret and apply what he is taught by revelation.\textsuperscript{94} In applying general moral rules to particular cases, moreover, man is forced upon probable arguments, for in the changeable sphere of ‘human transactions’, ‘unless God is pleased to interpose’, we ‘are not capable of a greater assurance’.\textsuperscript{95} Since the subject-matter does not admit of mathematical demonstration, only a ‘mad man’, as Aristotle says, would expect ‘any more than arguments of a high probability’. Such a moral demonstration ‘is nothing but a coacervation of many probabilities’, and these, Taylor allowed, can arise not only from intrinsic arguments proposed by reason, but also, where the case is ‘otherwise indeterminable’, from the extrinsic authority of ‘a prudent and good man’. Nor are the philosophical treasure-troves of pagan antiquity to be neglected in this regard.\textsuperscript{96} By marshalling the best arguments one can arrive at a moral or probable certainty sufficient to persuade a reasonable man for the purposes of action.

In the case of a doubtful conscience, where choice between alternatives is precluded by fear or ‘weakness of spirit’, Taylor was firm that the tutorist rule obliges. It is in itself

\textsuperscript{92} Twelve Sermons, p. 537.  
\textsuperscript{93} Second Dissuasive, Introduction, ‘1\textsuperscript{st} Way’; Ductor, pp. xi-xii, bk. 1, pp 42-62.  
\textsuperscript{95} Taylor, Ductor, i, p. 122; Second Dissuasive, Introduction, ‘2\textsuperscript{nd} Way’.  
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.; Ductor, i, p. 120 & ch. 2, § 7; ch. 4, § 15; Preface, p. xi.
sinful to run the risk of sin. Generally the safer part will also entail the commission of some good; Taylor often gave the example of restitution of goods where the lawfulness of their mode of acquisition is in doubt. It may be that there is no sin in retaining the goods, but it is always good to make restitution. In this tutiorist method Taylor was representative of English moralists of the period. Since a scrupulous conscience is no good thing, however, Taylor was concerned to show as far as possible how a conscience which is not sure can nevertheless mount up enough good arguments, taking into account every ‘accident, circumstance, and collateral inducement’, to arrive at a probable certainty sufficient for action. In this case speculative uncertainty is consistent with practical certainty.

If Taylor sounded, in these respects, like the casuists he criticised, it was because his moral thought was built on the same Thomist structure. His understanding of probability, however, was arguably more faithful, for Taylor limited the concept at the points where the probabilists had moved beyond the assumptions of Aquinas. He allowed arguments from authority, for example; but their power to persuade derived from their evident source in right reason. On the other hand he directly opposed arguments from reason to those from authority, when the latter are used in place of rather than as part of a reasonable argument. This sort of extrinsic authority, in Taylor’s view, issued in the same ‘peremptory affirmative’ as enthusiasts gave on the authority of the ‘Spirit of God’; and contradictory opinions among the learned undermine this idea of authority as effectively as differences among enthusiasts undermine their several claims to the Spirit. Again, Taylor allowed, like the probabilists, that a ‘single man’ could constitute a probable authority; but only when one is satisfied, not merely as to his learning and piety, but that his opinion represents his best work, the product

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97 Ib., i, ch. 5; cf. Allestree, Forty Sermons, pp. 72-3; Gauden, Suspiria, p. 680.
98 E.g. Ductor, i, p. 144.
99 Cf. McAdoo, Caroline Moral Theology.
100 Ib., i, pp. 150-52, 120, & ch. 4 § 4.
101 Ib., i, pp. 141-2, 44-5.
of thought and piety, and not a hasty judgement. In other words, if the opinion does not seem agreeable either to reason or scripture, it cannot be followed; so that a doctor’s authority does not really distinguish his opinion from any other arguments weighed in the process of deliberation. Whether derived from reason or from authority, a probable opinion only has value in proportion with its reasonableness and what Taylor calls its ‘relation to piety’, its consonance with the duties which, in his view, are plainly expressed in scripture. Thus, while one may follow a less probable opinion which is more safe, as in the case of restitution, one can never follow a probable opinion where there are greater reasons on the other side: ‘the greater probability destroys the less’.

In Taylor’s view, then, a less probable opinion in cases of uncertainty is not really a probable opinion, since he assumes that degrees of probability vary in relation to the truth. Whatever their immediate source, human or divine, ‘all … truths must prevail in Conscience, because they are emanations from the fountain of truth; from whence nothing can derive that is not always true …’

In two probables only one of them is true; and which that is, he can only take the best way of the best reason to find out; and it is impossible he should believe that which to him seems less likely, to be the more likely; and therefore so far as is in him he chooses that which is false, and voluntarily abuses his conscience.

Taylor found in the Port-Royalist argument confirmation and further evidence of the fact that the fundamental error of ‘the later casuists’ was to have ‘fiercely opposed this doctrine’. To leave a more probable opinion for a less, he argued, is voluntarily to disable the divine faculty in man, to act ‘unnaturally, unreasonably, and imprudently’. It is

103 *Ib.*, ch. 4, § 5.
104 *Ductor*, Preface, p. xii, bk. 1, p. 148.
not only a danger of sinning, but a sin directly, and beyond a danger … For besides that this hath danger, it is a most unreasonable, and a most unnatural thing, against the design of God, and the proper effects of reason.\textsuperscript{106}

Since the same moral impotence describes the doubtful conscience, Taylor, while retaining the tutiorist rule, laid greatest emphasis on the obligation to inform the conscience.\textsuperscript{107} If the conscience can be supplied with arguments sufficient for a moral demonstration, it may be regarded as ‘probable’ or practically certain: except where the less probable is safer, ‘the degrees of safety are left to follow the degrees of probability’.\textsuperscript{108} Thus by practical certainty, or security, Taylor meant the knowledge that one has taken every effort to get as close to the truth as possible.\textsuperscript{109} For while it may not always be possible ‘that truth should be found … it is highly necessary it should be searched for. It may be it cannot be hit, but it must be aymed at’.\textsuperscript{110} Every available means of prayer and study must be employed to supply the conscience with sufficient knowledge that the path of duty should be clear,\textsuperscript{111} and if irresolution persists application must be made to a wise and prudent person for enlightenment.\textsuperscript{112} Following Aquinas, Taylor found no excuse in ignorance of the natural law, the truths of faith, or whatever ‘concerns every mans duty in special’; and excusable ignorance was limited by the obligation to conduct a sincere search for the truth.\textsuperscript{113} ‘He that never inquires, sins for want of inquiry, and despises his soul because he takes no care that it be rightly informed’.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{106} Ib., pp. 147-8.
\textsuperscript{107} Ib., ch. 5, § 7 & ch. 6.
\textsuperscript{108} Ib., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{109} Cf. McAdoo, Caroline Moral Theology, pp. 91f.
\textsuperscript{110} Ductor, i, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{112} Ductor, i, p. 143; cf. Allettree, Forty Sermons, p. 242; idem, [The Practice of Christian graces, or, The] Whole Duty [of man] (1658), p. 87. Those with an unquiet conscience are counselled to seek advice in the Communion Service rubrics in the BCP.
\textsuperscript{113} Ductor, iv, pp. 494-6.
\textsuperscript{114} Ib., i, p. 146; Allettree, Forty Sermons, pp. 68, 72-3.
A ‘probable’ opinion, in this formulation, is defined as that which is most likely to be true, and a conscience persuaded by such an opinion as ‘sure’ by virtue of its efforts to discover the truth.¹¹⁵ He ‘who exerts all the Powers, and Faculties of his Soul, and plies all Means and Opportunities in the Search of Truth, which God has vouchsafed him, may rest upon the judgement of his Conscience’.¹¹⁶ This position was indeed virtually identical to that which the Blackloists called ‘probabilist’ in disputing over the rule of faith. But in both cases the argument was anti-sceptical in design, accommodating the inevitable uncertainty of human judgements, whether in relation to the interpretation of historical testimonies or to the analysis of moral action, while recommending, in diligent and pious research, a way to attain morally certain judgements which no reasonable man could doubt. It was the probabilists who, by allowing the choice of a less probable opinion, removed any objective guarantor of truth.¹¹⁷

There was, prima facie, nothing much to distinguish Taylor’s definition of a ‘probable’ conscience from a right or ‘sure’ one, since both give assent, more or less imperfect, to compelling reasons. There is, however, an important difference between the two, for whereas there are sufficient motives in the understanding to settle a right conscience, in probabilities there is an element of choice in the decision to assent on one side while the other is not certainly to be rejected.¹¹⁸ Because of this voluntary element, right choices depend on a right disposition in the will as much as on knowledge. If the will is not habitually disposed to choose the good, the process of deliberation between probabilities is likely to be distorted by sinful inclinations. A bad will not disposed by love of its highest end to choose whatever conduces to it is more apt to mistake a lesser good for the true good: for ‘the

¹¹⁵ Cf. South, Twelve Sermons, pp. 580-2, distinguishing this ‘Confidence’, which does not exclude doubt and is ‘built upon … the standing sincerity of a man’s Heart’, from ‘Assurance’.
¹¹⁷ Cf. South, Twelve Sermons, p. 539.
¹¹⁸ Ductor, i, p. 119.
worldly man’ proposes ‘to himself the satisfactions of this world, either more particularly of some one kind, or else all in general’; but ‘the Child of Light, so far as he is, designs especially the happiness of the world to come’. Since ‘the evil will perverts the understanding’, then, a crucial quality in the seeker after truth is uprightness of will. Without a habitual disposition to virtue imprudent choices will result. Conversely if the ‘Heart’ is conditioned by good choices,

there is no doubt, but they will … at length produce such a Degree of Light in the Conscience, as shall give a Man, both a clear Sight of his Duty, and a certain Judgement of his Condition.

This moral culture and development, directed by the love of God, was really Taylor’s ideal of the Christian life. He even indulged in a sort of paradoxical encomium on probability and uncertainty, which are essential to religion in the measure that they imply choice and love. If all were evident, there would be no choice, and what becomes of all the scripture-exhortations to moral perfection? Our reliance on probabilities is fitting to what we know of man and God: man is weak and infirm, and God improves and transform him through love. Uncertainty, then,

seems to have been created on purpose, for … vertue and for hopes, for faith and for charity, to make us beleeve by love, and to love by believing …

The reciprocal relationship between love and knowledge explains the weight given to the criterion of ‘relation to piety’ as a ‘collateral inducement’ in Taylor’s casuistry. Along with right reason it is the negative measure of a probable proposition; and in the case where the

120 Taylor, *Ductor*, i, pp. 6-7, 31-2; Allestree, *Forty Sermons*, p. 270.
122 *Ductor*, i, p. 122.
conscience is suspended between probabilities, it carries the casting vote.\textsuperscript{123} Man must use his reason as far as he can; but the value of reason in moral deliberation derives from its source in man’s highest good, and by how much the will inclines to lower ends, by so much is reason’s light dimmed. As well as our minds we must ‘have our senses exercised to good and evil’, in the words of the letter to the Hebrews (v 14); a habitual obedience is necessary to the formation of right judgements.\textsuperscript{124}

Taylor discerned in probabilist casuistry the same monstrosity abominated by Pascal: a system designed not ‘to minister to holy living, but to excuse [from] it’.\textsuperscript{125} The probabilist casuists (‘witty’ but ‘vicious’ persons) understood moral theology backwards. Their manuals were merely ‘patrons or \textit{indices} of sin’, for, concerning themselves with the legality of discrete acts, they sought to excuse actions by securing the conscience.\textsuperscript{126} But the conscience is only truly secured by acting according to the good. ‘Certainty’ is a function of a life lived in conformity to the law of God. Putting certainty before obedience, the casuists ignored the cultivation of the moral character. Probabilism, in short, was an enemy to the true doctrine of repentance.

For since obedience is the love of God, and to doe well is the life of religion, and the end of faith is the death of sin and the life of righteousness; nothing is more necessary then that we be rightly informed in all moral notices.\textsuperscript{127}

Taylor was one of the pioneers of a new Anglican soteriology which made repentance, or the love of God issuing in obedience, essential to the definition of faith.\textsuperscript{128} The moral life, for those among whom this approach became conventional, involved man’s contribution,

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\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 150-2.  \\
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 42-62, 163; Preface, pp. vii-viii.  \\
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Holy Dying}, p. 295.  \\
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ductor}, i, p. 154.  \\
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ductor}, pp. vii-viii.  \\
\textsuperscript{128} Ch. 5, below.
\end{flushright}
under the conditions of ignorance and concupiscence, to the re-ordering of an interior disposition disordered by sin. Since they considered this re-ordering a condition of divine pardon, they necessarily represented the moral life in terms of a rigorous asceticism, a purgative discipline designed to reverse the creaturely tendency of fallen man and to form the habits of virtue proper to a Godward life. Such thinkers appear therefore to have been the most sensitive readers of the Jansenist anti-probabilist polemics, where the major deficiency of the casuists was identified as their neglect of the interior disposition. Because their own theological project revolved around demonstrating the priority of repentance in the ordo salutis, they were already critical readers of Roman casuists. Among the propositions catalogued by the Port-Royalists, they were more likely to cite those which evidenced the casuists’ formalist separation of the outward actions of religion from the inward, spiritual condition of which they are both an index and a constituent. In particular they were likely to refer to the Provinciales and related works for citations showing the relaxation of the sacrament of penance – that is, those which promoted attritionism, superficial confession, easy absolution, and exiguous satisfaction. For ‘the Casuists and Confessors of the Church of Rome’, as Wake put it, have ‘by their mistaken Notions of Christianity’ so greatly undermined ‘the necessity of Repentance’ that they have ‘utterly corrupted the very nature and practice of it’.

For someone like Taylor, in whose view ‘men will for ever need a living guide’, the fact that Emmanuel Sa and Tolet taught penitents to seek out lax confessors possessed a relevance that went beyond the typical idea of Catholic corruption which similar propositions suggested to many Protestant minds. When writers who shared Taylor’s theological presuppositions criticised lax casuistical tenets on, for example, inattention at mass, or the

129 Ib., and ch. 7, and ch. 4 for Jansenist soteriology and moral thought.
130 Wake, Sermons, p. 200: he is explaining the impiety of ‘wise men of the world’, and next blames Calvinist predestinarian theology.
131 Ductor, pp. xvii, 171; idem, Dissuasive, p. 86.
sort of contrition requisite for absolution, or the distinction of mortal and venial sins, it was in
the course of constructing a vision of the Christian life to which an appreciation of the
deficiencies of the casuists in these areas had some relevance. Since this vision centred on
man’s voluntary response to the Gospel, and postulated a reciprocal relationship between
outward discipline and the condition of the will, the innovations of the probabilists – who, on
the Jansenist argument, by divorcing the speculative from the practical, emptied exterior
devotion of all meaning, and left the will a prey to concupiscence – were to the point. In a
theological argument designed to demonstrate that obedience and purity of heart are
constituent parts of the loving disposition necessary to salvation, moreover, sin acquired a
correspondingly greater weight as the source of disorder in the moral personality. To this
theological picture casuistical propositions licensing fornication, blasphemy, homicide, theft
and so on, contributed a constructive emphasis by way of contrast.

It is too well known what one sort of men have attempted in this case, how by new-
rais’d principles of Probability and directing the intention, they have reconcil’d all
villainy with Christian life, made it safe yea meritorious to lye, forswear, and bear
malice, to defame, revenge by either force or treachery [etc] …

Again, to writers for whom the use of private confession and penitential exercises were
desirable, and in a certain sense necessary accessories of a holy life, the ‘relâchements’
perpetrated by the casuists in the practice of confession (including the notions of directing the

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132 On inattention at divine worship ibid., pp. 117-20 (see CLP, pp. 168-9; MJ, pp. 209-11); on mortal and
venial sins Henry Dodwell, Two Short Discourses Against the Romanists (1676), p. 2; Sherlock, Preservative, p.
79; Stillingfleet, Sermon ... 1678/9, p. 30; and cf. below, ch. 7; on contrition n. 139, below.
133 On incontinence Taylor, Dissuasive, p. 114 (it is a good to lie with a woman if she is ‘considered as one’s
wife’ – i.e. sex out of wedlock or the conjugal act done for pleasure may be good. Taylor cites Sa. Aph., de
conj.; the same opinion is variously attributed in French catalogues, e.g. to Laymann, Theol. mor., l. 1, tr. 3, c. 6,
n. 12); blasphemy: ibid., p. 113 (Tolet); homicide: e.g. South, Twelve Sermons, pp. 537-8; Owtram, Twenty
Sermons, pp. 105-6 (for a box on the ear, for calumny: CLP, p.122-3; MJ, pp. 142-4; JM, pp. 4, 304-5, 309,
320-30); Gilbert Burnet, The Mystery of Iniquity Unvailed (1673), p. 85; on theft Taylor, Dissuasive, pp. 113
(Tolet), and pp. 153-4, citing Diana out of Escobar’s digest (CLP, p. 145, MJ, p. 174); Diana also cited in
134 Allestree, Forty Sermons, p. 240.
intention and mental reservation), their dispensations from penitential works such as restitution, alms-giving and fasting, and their easy absolutions, had a material bearing on the argument.

These casuistical opinions all tended to undermine or ignore the process of moral transformation which describes the Christian pilgrimage. Stillingfleet noted that Arnauld had, though without success, ‘complained’ in his *Fréquente communion* ‘of their doctrine of the efficacy of the sacraments, that it takes away all necessity of devotion in the minds of the receivers’. The state of interior love was, for writers who shared Stillingfleet’s theological assumptions, the foundation of the moral life, not to be separated from practice, which is both its nourishment and its fruit. As Sherlock put it,

> the love of God in giving his own Son to die for us, and the love of Christ in giving himself for us, are the great Gospel Motives to obedience and a Holy Life; but these can only work upon ingenuous minds, who have already in some measure conquered the love of sin; for where the love of sin prevails, it is too powerful for the love of God; but … a holy God cannot be reconciled to wicked men … *without holiness no man shall see God.*

The formalism of the casuists was thus ‘most evident’ in the attritionist doctrine that a mere sorrow for sin, arising from fear of punishment, ‘with the Absolution of the Priest, puts a man

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136 On restitution see e.g. Taylor, *Ductor*, p. v (Eman. Sa, see above n. 85); on fasting *ib.*, citing Sa, Aph., v. *jejum*, n. 8, cf. *CLP*, pp. 81-3, *MJ*, pp. 88-90; on alms e.g. Thomas Tenison, *A Defence of Dr. Tenison’s Sermon* (1688), citing Escobar, *Mor. Theol.*, tr. 7, ex. 5 as in *AMJ*, p. 95 (from the extracts of Mascarenhas, see above, ch. 1, p. 61); Allestree, *Causes of Decay*, p. 299, on ‘easie attonements’; also Taylor, *Dissuasive*, pp. 82-6, citing e.g. Suarez (CLP, p. 176; *MJ*, p. 222).

137 *Idolatry*, pp. 178-9; see also pp. 208-9, where Stillingfleet refers to *FC*, pt. 3, cap. 7, for the argument that the lax casuists have reduced the sacrament of penance to a ‘bare confession’. See also Taylor, *Dissuasive*, p. 144; and ch. 7, below.

138 *Preservative*, p. 80; the ref. is to Heb. xii 14 – see also Taylor, *Ductor*, p. 151.
into a state of salvation’. Anglican writers for whom the love of God issuing in active obedience was the formal cause of salvation very frequently cited the Jansenists – whose argument, we recall, culminated in the charge that the casuists destroyed in the love of God the foundation of Christian morality – in this connexion.139 ‘Those who have a mind to be satisfied in this matter’, remarked Sherlock, ‘may find enough of it in the Provincial Letters, the Jesuits Morals, and Bishop Taylor’s Dissuasive’. Since their casuists overthrow ‘the Fundamental Motive of all’, he continued, ‘nothing would more effectively overthrow the Church of Rome, than to re-establish this Doctrine of the absolute necessity of a good life’.140

Viewed in the context of the main lines of Reformation polemic, this statement appears a little paradoxical. But it expressed the view of those for whom the Protestant allergy to works-righteousness had produced a dangerously excessive reaction. There was some constructive interest in the Jansenist anti-laxist critique for the theological partisans of ‘holy living’ in England because its objects corresponded closely to the positions which they wanted to discredit in the context of English theology. The Thomist shape of the Jansenist anti-probabilist argument was entirely sympathetic to this theological project. The sacrifice of Christ is a work of love, and as the cause is, so is the effect; it is love by which God effects the death of sin and the life of righteousness in man.141 This case was argued against sola fide Calvinists, who, in the view of Anglican writers, carried their doctrine of depravity and their distrust of reason to the point where they excluded man from the possibility of growing in

139 Taylor, Ductor, Preface, citing Diana as in CLP, pp. 185-6, MJ, pp. 233-4, AMJ, p. 98; idem, Dissuasive, pp. 76-81, 100 (Taylor criticised the casuists’ notion of contrition, like Pascal – who had made the same paradox out of the Jesuits’ ‘sufficient’ grace – as ‘insufficiently sufficient’: CLP, pp. 182f.; Sherlock, Preservative, pp. 80-81; Stillingfleet, Idolatry, pp. 180-86; idem, An Answer to Several late Treatises (1673), sigs. b4v.-c1r., citing on contrition ‘the Jesuitical Casuists whose Testimonies are produced in the Jesuits Morals or Provincial Letters, such as Filliutius, Amicus, Sa, Escobar, Bauny, and Layman’ (CLP, pp. 183f.; MJ, pp. 231f.); idem, Fifty Sermons, pp. 509-10, citing Azorius, Inst. Mor., t. 1, l. 9, c. 4, as in the Extrait de quelques-unes des plus dangereuses propositions; Wake, Sermons, p. 202, citing Escobar’s digest, tr. 7, c. 7, nn. 92-3 (CLP, p. 185; MJ, pp. 233-4; AMJ, p. 23). Cf. Allestree’s Prayer for Contrition, in Whole Duty, pp. 583-4: ‘O wash my polluted conscience…’

140 Preservative, p. 80.

141 Cf. ST, IIIa, q. 49, a. 1; Taylor, Second Dissuasive, pp. 7-8.
conformity with God. Like the probabilists, the Calvinists abstracted man from his role in the eternal order, for thus to disable the moral faculties was effectively to excuse them, as the casuists did, from their proper and truly natural activity. It was to deny that man has access, through the exercise of his reason, to an objective knowledge of his duty, and, through the intension of his will, to an empirical measure of his performance. Instead in their doctrine of assurance the Calvinists provided, as did the probabilists, an arbitrary, subjective and un-verifiable form of certainty.

Indeed it may be observed that between these Anglican theologians, the Jansenists, and the probabilist casuists, there was no fundamental metaphysical or ontological difference. They all affirmed that there exists an eternal moral order and an objective standard of good, in which man participates and to which he conforms himself by virtue of the faculties of reason and will which make ‘that likeness of God in which He was pleased to make man’.¹⁴² The anti-probabilist case involved at most an epistemological difference: it was argued that the probabilists obscured the way to the good by their promise of an illusory, vicarious security. In the Calvinists, by contrast, both Jansenist and Anglican confronted opponents who removed an objective and immutable standard of morality altogether. Like the Jansenists, Anglican thinkers argued for the right and responsibility of the mind, aided by the grace of knowledge, and the will, aided by the grace of love, to achieve a progressive conformation to the divine standard. It may be that English writers with Calvinist presuppositions were less likely to show interest in the constructive element of the Jansenist critique because, in their view, this process was underwritten and guaranteed by an antecedent certainty communicated by the perspicuous Word of God and the Holy Spirit.

Margaret Sampson has observed that there was something counter-intuitive in the endorsement, among clergy who aspired to rule the lay conscience, of the Jansenist critique

¹⁴² Quote is Taylor, Ductor, i, p. 2; cf. Stillingfleet, Idolatry, pp. 559-60, on ‘principles agreed on both sides’.
of modern casuistry. It played into the hands of laypersons, whether anti-clerical or merely secular-minded, who wanted to annex spheres of jurisdiction traditionally claimed by clerical arbiters of conscience to the competence of secular political and economic theory. Thus

the English clergy contributed to their own loss of jurisdiction over the laity through their repudiation of casuistry and preference for preaching up an unrealistic and rigorist morality as the best means of combating lay licentiousness.\textsuperscript{143}

The Anglicans would have been a little dismayed to hear their moral teaching described as ‘unrealistic’, since in their view a holy life, and all the ascetic cultivation of the moral personality this implied, was a condition of salvation. Nevertheless, Sampson’s conclusion fairly represents the state of affairs. With all their talk of ‘fuite’ and ‘retraite’, the Jansenists would not have engaged in such an arduous controversial \textit{negotium} had they not aspired to convert the world to the lofty moral ideal which animated their arguments and gave Pascal’s satire its real force.\textsuperscript{144} The English theorists of ‘holy living’ similarly aimed to show that the activity of man in all its aspects can and must be oriented and integrated by the undivided love of God. What they found so harshly criticised in Jansenist anti-laxist writings were ‘Christians who would gladly reconcile God and this world’ – a compartmentalised and worldly morality emptied of that motive which alone can give it its proper direction.\textsuperscript{145}

It is not really remarkable that it should be possible to broach such a comparison in respect to the controversy over moral theology and casuistry, for the Jansenists and the Anglicans were both committed to an essentially traditional understanding of the conscience. But it is to raise a question about how both groups understood the interaction between grace and human effort in the moral life, for on this basic issue they occupied antithetical positions.

\textsuperscript{144} Cf. Cognet, ‘Le mépris du monde’.
\textsuperscript{145} Allestree, \textit{Forty Sermons}, p. 241.
We now need to examine in closer detail the theological foundations of the rigorist sensibility which, in both France and England, was so affronted by the assumptions and conclusions of *les nouveaux casuistes*. 
Part 2

Rigorism and Moralism

Chapter 4

‘Jansenist Augustinianism’ and the Springs of Pastoral Rigorism

‘Jansenism’ is about as difficult a tag as any in the history of culture or ideas. The problems are broadly similar with those familiar to historians of English puritanism. One would prefer to speak of Jansenists than of Jansenism, understanding the term in a differential or relational rather than an essential sense. One would prefer to distinguish between intellectual commitments more specifically, by means of a range of qualifiers suitably adjusted in respect of political, geographical, and chronological context. One would prefer to restore to ‘Jansenism’ its proper referent in the system of Cornelius Jansen. As ever moderation is required, since the distinctions for which historians rightly call would hardly be necessary had the larger concept not indicated some formal unity between its parts. It is only necessary that, if any aspect of this formal identity is to be invested with explanatory force, its substance should be established by careful exposition; after that the use of terms, whose significance subsists in the mental associations of the reader, is to be guided by the rule of prudence. My purpose in the following chapter is not to extract some imaginary synthetic entity out of the works of ‘Jansenist theologians’, but merely to suggest the connections that linked a phenomenon which, as a matter of fact, was common although not restricted to

Jansenists – that is, moral or pastoral ‘rigorism’ – and certain common theoretical positions. If the suggestions are persuasive, in this case, the proof will only be the firmer in proportion with the diversity of the witnesses.

The parallel with puritanism, which has suggested itself to numerous observers both then and latterly, provides a convenient starting point in that it declares one common view of an essential or typical Jansenism. This was the view put forward, with great effect, by the Jesuits and other enemies of Jansen in the Low Countries and of Saint-Cyran and his disciples in France. It is the heresy of Jansenism, condemned in the form of Five Propositions enumerated in the constitution *Cum occasione* of Innocent X in 1653.

The Propositions indicate that the fall has corrupted man to such an extent that he has no power in himself to choose or to do the good. In this case he cannot call any righteousness his own, but must depend for his salvation on a gratuitous gift of God which has no regard to his merits. Since, on account of his corruption by sin, man’s will has no liberty to choose indifferently between good or bad, but must inevitably choose the bad, he has no power to use or reject this gift but is effectively and irresistibly determined by it. Since not all are saved, but none are saved without the free gift of grace, it cannot be said that Christ died for all men without exception. By implication, some are gratuitously elected to eternal life, others arbitrarily condemned to damnation. On this reading, to be discovered in most Catholic works of reference, Jansenism consists in the same mistaken understanding of Augustine which underpinned the Protestant reformation. Man, it asserts, is hopelessly sunk in sin, his free will defunct, only to be saved at the whim of a sovereign will, whose distinction of those

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4 The Propositions run: 1) Some commandments of God to men wishing and striving to be righteous are impossible with regard to the present strength that they possess; and they lack the grace by which they may become possible; 2) Interior grace is never resisted in the state of fallen nature; 3) For merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature freedom from necessity is not required in man but freedom from compulsion; 4) Semipelagians admit the necessity of prevenient interior grace for single acts, even for the beginning of faith; and they are heretics in this, that they wish grace to be of such a kind as human will can resist or obey; 5) It is Semipelagian to say that Christ died and shed his blood for all men.
it nevertheless chooses to treat as righteous from those it does not is thoroughly inscrutable. By extension, it negates all morality, tending inevitably towards enthusiasm and antinomianism.\(^5\)

Such a reading has a good basis in some bare statements of the Jansenists, who defended the doctrines of absolute corruption, irresistible grace, and unconditional predestination.\(^6\) It provides sufficient warrant for the comparison with the puritan heirs of Calvin in England, with whom the Port-Royal group it is said to describe shared certain other characteristics.\(^7\) The pessimistic anthropology it depicts was likely to generate a marked accent on moral discipline, and a censorious attitude towards those diversions, such as music or the theatre, which too easily stimulate the hedonistic urges of fallen nature. Likewise the predestinarian theology was apt to create a sect mentality, and an inflexible self-assurance. Jansenists might in this respect plausibly be compared to those Elizabethan and Jacobean puritans who sought to leaven the lump by reforming the Church from within, or again to others who condemned the lump in separating from it, as eventually came about in the schism of the Church at Utrecht in the early eighteenth century;\(^8\) to those whose inflexible scripturalism dictated a vehement intolerance of the wrong-headed, or to those whose fidelity to the dictates of conscience heralded the radical individualism of enlightenment and

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modernity. Again, Jansenism as well as puritanism has been depicted as an ideology of the rising bourgeoisie.\(^9\)

These parallels may be legitimate; it could equally be observed that the French Jansenists of the seventeenth century, whose religious ideas ran along the lines of the universal visible episcopal Church and the Catholic sacramental system, do not present a very obvious case for comparison with the most reformed elements of English Protestantism.\(^10\)

The theology of Jansen, aspects of which were reproduced and defended more or less faithfully in the penitential theology of Saint-Cyran, and in apologies such as Arnauld’s first and second in defence of Jansen or Pascal’s Écrits sur la Grâce, recalls that of the Protestant reformers precisely because it was directed against a tendency within sixteenth-century Catholic thought which purported to contradict the major presuppositions and conclusions of Luther and Calvin. Luther acknowledged that Erasmus, in focusing on the question of free will, had put his finger on the nub of the matter.\(^11\) When Jansen observed that where Calvin agreed with Augustine and the Fathers he ought to be ‘congratulated’, or that the Contra-Remonstrants at Dordrecht approached nearer to Catholic truth than his Louvain bête-noire Lessius, he undoubtedly intended a backhanded indication of the extent to which those Catholics erred, who thought to undercut their Protestant opponents by lauding the dignity and powers of human nature.\(^12\) The guilty party, in Jansen’s eyes, was the Society of Jesus; for, dedicated to a supple and relevant counter-offensive against the reformers, they had indeed adopted the strategy he thus objured. Understanding the Protestant doctrines to

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\(^9\) The thesis of Lucien Goldmann, tr. as The Hidden God: a study of tragic vision in the ‘Pensées’ of Pascal and the tragedies of Racine (1964), today enjoys about the same credit as the Weber thesis.


\(^12\) For Jansen on Dort see above, p. 17; Jansen, [Cornelii Iansenii Episcopi Iprensis] Augustinus [seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanae naturae sanitate, aegritudine, medicina adversus Pelagianos & Massilienses] (Louvain, 1640), t. III, bk. 8, ch. 21, col. 878: ‘si qua in re Calvinus cum Augustino & antiquis PP. senserit, non propter Calvinum Augustino indignandum est, sed propter Augustinum Calvinus potius gratulandum’.
have destroyed free will and the incentive to good works, and believing therefore that the holy lives of Catholics would most effectively discredit their schismatic antagonists, they sought an understanding of the relationship between man and God in salvation which gave a part to man as well as to divine grace.\textsuperscript{13} The most influential fruit of this endeavour was Luis de Molina’s \textit{Concordia liberti arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione, et reprobatione}, which appeared in Spain in 1588. Molina’s rejection, as inimical to liberty, of the neo-Thomist scheme of grace, in which every act of the human will depends immediately on the first cause by ‘physical premotion’, and grace is characterised as efficacious \textit{ab intrinseco} (of and in itself, according to the eternal decrees willed by God), led to the convocation of the famous and inconclusive \textit{Congregatio de Auxiliis}, which met between 1597 and 1607. The ban on controversial discussions of grace consequently announced by Paul V did not end the debate, to which Jansen’s \textit{Augustinus} would constitute a weighty contribution.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Molinism}

In commenting on the Pars Prima of Aquinas’s \textit{Summa}, dealing with the nature of God, his creation, and his direction of it, Molina began with an assumed postulate, the human liberty which he was concerned to protect against various forms of fatalism or determinism, arguing thence to the nature of the divine foreknowledge and omnipotence with which it is


supposed to consist, and consequently treating the related matters of providence, 
predestination, grace, and justification. In adopting this philosophical approach he had 
already, according to Jansen, gone wrong, theology being on Jansen’s view the historical 
project to establish matters of fact based on the data of revelation and those traditional 
authorities (Councils and Fathers) who followed the same method, rather than the speculative 
attempt to explain these realities in terms of reason and logic. What Jansen meant, since his 
historical approach treated as factual considerations of a secondary order questions which are 
inherently philosophical, was probably just that Molina’s postulates were mistaken. Where 
the Thomists began with God as the first cause, Molina reversed the order of priority between 
the unconditioned and the conditioned, so that to Jansen it appeared inevitable that the 
resulting system would exalt the creature at the expense of the creator. This is the basis for 
Pascal’s later assertion that Molinism constitutes essentially an apologia for sinful nature 
against the supernatural claims which God makes upon it. Pascal’s picture of a Pelagian 
thought for a pagan morality, like Jansen’s identification of Molinism, through its affinities 
with Semi-Pelagianism, with the naturalism of Pelagius, indicate the central anthropological 
difference which divided the two streams of thought; for the Jansenists’ Augustinian 
conception of fallen nature as sub- or anti-natural left no room for a graduated understanding 
of good proportioned to the inherent capacities of actual nature. This anthropological idea, 
however, was very far from the caricature of radical pessimism which informs the frequent 
charge of crypto-Calvinism.

To understand the significance of this objection, however, we must first examine the 
system of Molina. His fundamental premise was that a liberty of indifference, that is the

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15 Helpful guides are Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme’; Abercrombie, Origins, pp. 93-117. My references are to 
the critical edition by J. Rabeneck: Ludovici Molina, [Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praesicientia, 
16 Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De ratione et auctoritate in rebus theologicis Liber Prooemialis.
17 CLP, p. 78.
freedom, given all the conditions necessary for action, to do or not do one thing or the contrary, comprises an essential characteristic of human nature. This is adduced as a matter of common sense, and proposed against an erroneous confusion of liberty (attributed to ‘Lutherani’) with spontaneity or freedom from coercion. It is tested by reference to a distinction of the ‘states’ of humanity: the state of pure nature, the state of innocence, the state of sin, and the state of grace. The hypothetical state of pure nature is arrived at by an equation between the state of innocence and the state of sin. In the creation God rendered man equal to the supernatural end to which he was destined by endowing him with the gifts of faith, hope and love by which he could merit eternal life, and of ‘original justice’, a state of spiritual and bodily harmony, wherein the commandments were easily followed by reason of the absence of the movements or temptations which might divert the rational being from his end. By Adam’s sin man lost these gifts: he was stripped of the supernatural virtues, and his reason and will forfeited the strength they possessed in the state of original justice, being now more easily disordered by the passions incident to mortal existence. Hence it appears that the fall resulted simply in the withdrawal of that which was additional to nature: in the a-historical state of ‘pure nature’, therefore, man can be thought of as retaining the use of his reason and will, though without the harmonious tranquillity which results from the subordination of the passions of the sensible creature. The utility of this hypothesis resides in its capacity to illuminate the limits and extent of fallen nature, in which the privation of supernatural virtues and of psycho-spiritual integrity is to be thought of as a punishment which frustrates man of his supernatural end. It is to be concluded that, under sin, man retains

18 Concord., Pars I, De liberi arbitrii viribus ad opera bona eiusque libertate, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 2.3 (ed. Rabeneck, p. 14): ‘illud agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum et contrarium etiam agere possit’.

19 Ib., disp. 3 (pp. 19-22).

20 Cf. n. 71, below.

21 Ib., disp. 3.5-8 (pp. 21-2): the standard doctrine of Aquinas, ST, Ia, Q.95, art. 1; IaIae, Q. 82, art. 3; Q. 85, art. 3. Augustine is similar in De Gen. ad Litt., VI 25.36 (PL, vol. 34, col. 354), where he attributes immortality to the tree of life. Cf. N. P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin. A Historical and Critical Study (1927), Lecture VI.

22 Concord., I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 3.2 (pp. 19-20).
his liberty, and that original justice was in the nature of an ideal arrangement of what is nevertheless man’s natural constitution. In Adam man fell from an extraordinary supernatural state to a merely natural one.

It is therefore within the capacity of fallen nature, which remains rational and free as it was created, to order its conduct with respect to the natural law, that is to choose and to perform actions which are morally good in relation to their end. Thus the reasonable creature is capable, with his own resources, even of an act of the love of God above all things. Nature is not, however, as Pelagius taught, adequate to man’s supernatural end. For this a supernatural assistance is necessary. The act of faith requires a prevenient and ‘exciting’ grace which moves the intellect and the will in such a way as to produce the act of interior assent. This grace is unconditional and granted in virtue of Christ’s merits only. Its object however does not differ qualitatively but only by degree from that of the free will; its function is merely ‘de procurer aux œuvres déjà moralement bonnes un degré supérieur, et un caractère plus excellent’. Prevenient grace, says Molina, will always be granted on Christ’s behalf to him who does what he can with his natural powers towards his supernatural end. Moreover we can either consent to or reject this special grace. Molina thus gives free will a part in the production of those supernatural acts necessary to justification, on the principle that when two causes concur towards an effect, they both constitute integral parts of

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23 *Ib.*, disp. 3.5 (p. 21): ‘peccatum namque primi parentis solum in gratuitis nobis nocuit … ut Thomas 1 p. q. 95 art. 1 docet … Quare natura humana post peccatum recte dicitur spoliata donis supernaturalis quae habebat in Adamo; condita vero in puris naturalibus non diceretur spoliata eisdem donis, cum ea numquam antea habuisset’.

24 *Ib.*, disp. 5.1-2 (pp. 27-8).


26 *Ib.*, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 8 (pp. 39-43); III, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 40.3 (p. 244).

27 *Ib.*, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 9.1 (pp. 43-4).


29 *Concord.*, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 10.1 (pp. 48-9).

30 *Ib.*, III, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 40.5 (pp. 244-5).
the total effect.\textsuperscript{31} Both grace and consent are part of the definition of the supernatural act. Molina further deposes that the act of faith so produced disposes the subject towards the infusion of a ‘habitus’ in the soul, which renders him capable of continuing to produce supernatural acts without the need of a special grace; and that hope and charity, being naturally deducible from faith, require no further special grace.\textsuperscript{32} The processes of justification and sanctification, then, are represented as supposing the free co-operation of the human will.\textsuperscript{33} By the theory of the simultaneous concourse of causes the free will is held to be as essential to these effects as the indispensable preliminary of exciting grace.

Nevertheless this grace is necessary, and it is for his presentation of the agreement of this necessity with liberty that Molina is now usually remembered. Second causes, he says, are neither independent agents, nor simply ciphers for the action of the first cause. All being is from God, but this general ‘influx’ is specifically determined to particular effects by second causes.\textsuperscript{34} The creature could produce no effects without this first cause, but retains the liberty of indifference and thus a causal agency by the concurrence of causes in the specific effect.\textsuperscript{35} The effect of grace, including actual grace, is thus similarly pictured as receiving its specific determination from the volition of the subject. If the subject fails to accept and co-operate with this grace, it was merely sufficient; if he consents and co-operates and produces supernatural acts, it was efficacious.\textsuperscript{36} Although actual grace is already a determined cause

\textsuperscript{31} E.g. \textit{ib.}, disp. 38.5 (p. 226); and esp. \textit{ib.}, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 12.11 (p. 64): when two agents move an object, 'tunc nihil est in eo motu quod non sit ab unoquoque'. Since grace has no secondary causes, Jansen dismisses this idea ‘scholae recentioris’, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 2, ch. 8, cols. 117-22.; cf. Pascal, \textit{Écrits sur la Grâce}, in Chevalier, p. 949 [Mesnard, p. 782], distinguishing the ‘première volonté’ from ‘la volonté suivante’: in one sense the action proceeds from the latter, since it concurs in it, but in another sense it does not, since this will is not the origin of the action; since, however, there is no sense in which the action does not proceed from the former, ‘l’action sera rapportée à cette volonté première et non à l’autre’. Also pp. 967, 981.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Concord.}, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 8.2-4 (pp. 33-41); \textit{ib.}, III, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 39.7 (p. 243).

\textsuperscript{33} Indeed Molina everywhere uses 'pendere' to describe the relation of supernatural acts necessary for justification to free will: e.g. concluding remarks at \textit{ib.}, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 15.14 (p. 90).

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, II, \textit{De concursu Dei generali}, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 26 (pp. 164-70).

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{ib.}, disp. 26.16 (p. 170): 'quando causae subordinate sunt inter se ita ut aliae sint magis, aliae minus universales, aliae particulares, necesse non [est] ut superior in eo ordine semper moveat inferioriorem … sed satis [est], si immediate influent in effectum’.

\textsuperscript{36} E.g. \textit{ib.}, I, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 12 (p. 60): ‘semper … manet accedere aut non accedere …’
applied to some specific end by God, the motion it imparts to the soul presupposes the vital concurrence of the human organism, which thereby participates in the effect.  

Molina then had to explain how, if the sufficiency or efficacy of grace depends on free will, divine foreknowledge can consist with this contingent determination of grace. He did so by reference to a sort of divine prescience which falls between God’s knowledge of every possible configuration of being in eternity, and his knowledge of everything which in fact comes to pass by virtue of his willing a certain configuration: his ‘scientia media’, before he has willed a particular configuration of future conditions, of the hypothetical behaviour of second causes in all possible circumstances. God may foreknow how persons will act under certain circumstances without thereby determining them or infringing their liberty of action. Thus he does not need to predetermine the efficacy of his grace, since he is able to know what use man will make of it under certain conditions before those conditions are annexed to his real knowledge, or knowledge of vision, by his choice to realise them. Hence predestination is at least tied to, if not predicated on God’s foresight of the use man will make of grace, though by Molina’s definition the former depends on the latter. Predestination has no final cause outside God, but other causes concur towards its taking effect, viz., the prevenient and subsequent graces offered to man on account of the merits of Christ, and the use made of them by the predestined person.

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38 See Aquinas, *ST*, Ia, Q. XIV, arts. 8 & 9.
39 *Concord.*, IV, *De praesentia Dei*, Q. XIV, art. 13, disp. 52 (pp. 337-56).
41 *Concord.*, VII, *De praedestinatione et reprobatione*, Q. XXIII, art. 4 & 5, disp. 2 (pp. 587-94).
Jansenism

Jansen aimed to resolve precisely the difficulty which Molina addressed: how to reconcile grace and free will without falling into Pelagianism on one side, or the Manichean fatalism which was taken to characterise the Protestants on the other.\(^{42}\) He and his French successors considered Molinism to be little more than a redaction of Semi-Pelagianism, tending towards Pelagianism; but it was their intention to safeguard Catholic truth on the place of human freedom in the scheme of salvation.

Jansen’s central disagreement with Molina is that he misunderstands the nature of this liberty. Following out the historical positivism which he set against scholastic philosophical speculation, Jansen drew his premises from the thought of St Augustine. Augustine had not started a philosophical hare by postulating a definition of human liberty established on the basis of a non-existent state of pure nature, but had drawn his definition from an historical consideration of man as he is revealed to us before and after the fall. Molinism basically misunderstood human nature as God created it; it could not therefore correctly conceive the consequences of the fall for man’s relationship with God.

Like Molina, Jansen considered liberty to be essential to the constitution of human nature; but he understood this in a radically different sense. Like all created things man has a certain end: his nature is to work itself out towards this ultimate end, as the nature of the acorn is consummated in the oak. As a rational creature what is good for man, his natural end, is the source of Mind, God.\(^{43}\) To know what is good is to desire it, to love it. To love an

\(^{42}\) On the Jansenist abstraction of ‘les deux erreurs contraires’ from the logical tendency of ‘Molinism’ and ‘Calvinism’, by way of setting limits to a veridical enquiry, see Laporte, *Exposition*, Introduction, n. 199.

object is to do everything within one’s power to attain it, and, when once it is possessed, to desire nothing further, but to rest in its possession (‘dilectio mansoria’ as opposed to ‘dilectio transitoria’). The happiness of man is thus to rest in the basis of his being, to return from a separate creaturely existence into an intimate loving union with God. For ‘c’est un ordre de la Nature & de la Providence divine, que tout ce qui est sujet à leurs loix, & renfermé dans leurs bornes, retourne à son origine, par un mouvement perpétuel’. The good of man lies in a certain conformity with the ultimate Good, which must inevitably follow the perspicuous and unadulterated apprehension of it: this loving knowledge, as Augustine says in words of Plotinus quoted with approval in the City of God, is ‘becoming like to God’.

True liberty is to have it in one’s power to attain this happiness. It is liberation from the ‘regio dissimilitudinis’ into true selfhood, the optimal likeness to God. It is the freedom to know the good with the intellect, and love it with the will, and so to follow it in all obedience; it is a ‘certaine Nécessité à bien faire’. The liberty of indifference is a corollary


45 Jansen, Discours, pp. 1-2.

46 With e.g. Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I 20.31: ‘et haec est hominis beata vita atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi veritatique consentiunt’ (PL, vol. 34, col. 188).

47 De civ. Dei, IX 17. This joining of knowing to loving is highly significant (as in Gregory the Great, Homilia in Evangelia 27, ‘amor ipse notitia est’). By locating ‘likeness to God’ in the union of wills, it maintains the distinction of the creature, and the equal significance of the affective with the intellective in the religious journey: cf. Bernard McGinn, ‘Love, Knowledge, and Mystical Union in Western Christianity: Twelfth to Sixteenth Centuries’, Church History, 56, 1 (1987), pp. 7-24; below, pp. 19, 22-3, 31-2.


49 The Jansenists pointed to De civ. Dei, V 10, e.g. Arnauld, Seconde Apologie, bk. 3, ch. 3, pp. 239-40, and his quote, from Aquinas, Summa c. gentiles, III 138.2; cf. Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae innocentis … liber singularis, ch. 6, col. 100.
of freedom, not a postulate. Wherever there is a will there is another, psychological sense of liberty or ‘choice’, the common-sense understanding adopted by Molina, which Augustine defines in terms of desire: the will always freely chooses what it wants and we act according to our desire. But the less the will is psychologically free to want the bad, the more it is in its power to pursue the good, and the freer it is in the absolute and eternal sense.

How is man capable of attaining this transcendent end to which he naturally tends? He has been created in the image of God, with a mind capable of knowing and a will capable of loving him. But as a material being he contains a principle of atrophy: he is drawn ex nihilo, and retains a tendency towards nothingness. Just as a pair of eyes, in order not to see, need only close themselves, whereas to vision light is necessary, so grace is always necessary for man to see and to do the good. It is therefore apparent that, while Jansen did not, like the ‘Pelagius of Paradise’, his Louvain predecessor Baius, render the addition of grace an actual corollary of the constitution of human nature, he did nevertheless understand Augustine to mean that the true nature of man is only to be consummated by means of divine grace. What is truly ‘natural’ in man, since whatever diverts and obstructs him from his end is necessarily unnatural, is not a general bodily and psychological constitution such as might be found in an imagined state of pure nature, but exclusively those facets of his constitution which reflect the image of the Creator, and which being cultivated with the assistance of divine grace render man adequate to the Godward trajectory and goal implicit in his reasonable nature.

The significance of this fact for the present discussion may easily be grasped: for those counsels of perfection which, for the very attempt to apply them, have deserved the

52 Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae innocentis, chs. 10-12, at cols. 131-4.
54 Viz., the qualities of reason and will which are the image of God and render the mind capable of him – De Trin. XIV 8.11 (PL, vol. 42, cols. 1044-5). This is perhaps implicit in the Pauline idea of man as ‘the image and glory of God’ (I Cor. xi 7), cf. William Ralph Inge, Christian Mysticism (4th ed., 1918), pp. 66-7.
opprobrious designation of ‘moral rigorism’, wear different aspects when the object to which they are applied is distinguished as between that which must be fully realised, and that which must be finally extirpated. The idea of Jansenism as an anti-rational, puritanical system founded on the principle of repression, can (in accordance with the laws of polemic) in one sense be considered its antitype.\textsuperscript{55}

The concepts of nature and supernature are anachronistic in terms of the thought of Augustine, but it may be helpful so to envisage the two positions thus far sketched. On the one hand the Molinists retain the distinction pristinely, viewing man in a double aspect as an agent in two orders which have each their peculiar and equally legitimate prerogatives;\textsuperscript{56} in another sense they seem to dissolve the distinction by making the two orders continuous, in that actual and subsequent graces are infallibly granted to whoever makes good use of the sufficient grace which is ‘naturally’, in the sense of universally and invariably, available. The Jansenists, on the other hand, deny such a continuity between the two orders in order to affirm an identity – an affirmation which, as will be appreciated, more readily forms the starting-point for ascetical and mystical than for moral and pastoral theology.

This anthropological postulate means that the character of man’s journey to his end in God, ‘in proportion as he grows more like him’, must necessarily be determined by the accidental conditions under which the likeness has to be realised.\textsuperscript{57} Faithful Augustinians in this sense, the entire Jansenist teaching on grace, and their opposition to Molinism, revolves

\textsuperscript{55} It will be argued in the following chapter that the same psychoanalytic indictment, when preferred against contemporary Anglican authors, is equally inapplicable in an analogous though not identical sense: the plaintiff is Allison, \textit{The Rise of Moralism}.
\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Laporte, \textit{Exposition de la Doctrine}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{De civ. Dei}, tr. Bettenson, IX 17.
around the peculiarity of the conditions obtaining before and after the fall. This distinction, according to Arnauld, is ‘la clef de la doctrine de Saint Augustin’.  

The liberty of Adam consisted in his natural ordination to the good. His was a state of complete bodily and spiritual integrity, the state which Molina after Aquinas calls original justice. No vain shadows occluded his spirit, no cupidinous movements stirred his heart; free from ‘omnibus affectibus terrenis’, he was fully capable of the perfect love-knowledge by which he could walk in the way to his natural end. Adam therefore enjoyed a liberty of indifference – there was nothing to prevent him freely making use of that grace which is as light to the healthy eye, the adiutorium sine qua non which permits the creature drawn out of nothing to do the good, and consists in the light and love by which he can know, love, and so attain his end. The grace by means of which he could persevere in righteousness and attain to celestial beatitude was submitted to his free will: he had it in his power both to do the good and not to do it. There was no need of a Bañezian premotion physically determining him to the good, because there was no necessary incongruity between his psychological liberty to act in accordance with his desires and his absolute liberty to act in accordance with his last end. 

This state of affairs was fundamentally altered by the fact that Adam did choose to contravene the divine precept. This sin represented a break in the natural order: in choosing a finite good, proposed by his own ‘amor sui’, over the infinite good proposed by God, Adam departed from the rational order under which man tends towards a transcendent end.  

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61 *Ib.*, ch. 9, at col. 120.

62 *Ib.*, chs. 6-8, 14-16.

63 *Ib.*, ch. 20, cols. 181-4: ‘adiutorium status innocentiae non [esse] praelectionem physicam’.

64 *Ib.*, *De statu naturae lapsae*, bk. 1, chs. 1 & 2, and ch. 21, cols. 265-7.
trespass against the commandment was an offence against nature; hence its effect was to
establish a profound rupture between man and his own true nature. Its punishment was
ignorance and concupiscence, so that where in the state of innocence harmony reigned in
man’s spiritual and physical constitution, the state of sin is characterised by disharmony and
disorder. With a frail intellect less apt to apprehend the good, and a weakened will
obnoxious to the insistent impulse of concupiscence, man becomes incapable of pursuing his
true end. A victim of cognitive error, all his desires impel him towards carnal and terrestrial
things as towards his natural good. But the more he is dissipated among creaturely things
the further he is from that unitive life with God which is the real end of his nature. ‘Velle
enim quod non deceat, idem ipsum miserrimum’. The effect of the fall, then, was not just to
lower nature from a gratuitous plane of supernatural ability, conferred upon it from without,
but fundamentally to pervert a nature ordained to the good by superinducing upon it a second,
sub-rational nature, which obscures and frustrates its true ontological tendency. There is no
middle term, no state of ‘pure’ nature: that is simply the Pelagian error. The difference
between this interpretation of Augustine and the scholastic understanding of the doctrine
deriving from Aquinas can be expressed in terms of the simile used by the theorists of ‘pure

65 Ib., cols. 268-70.
66 Ib., bk. 2, ch. 1: ‘discordiae, lites, bella, insidia, iracundiae, inimicitiae, fallacia, adulatio, fraus, furturn,
rapina, perfidia, superbia, ambitio, invidentia, homicidia, parricidia, crudelitas …’ &c., &c. (col. 283).
67 Ib., chs. 2-6 on ignorance; on concupiscence, chs. 7-9. A useful discussion of Jansen’s exposition in a wider
68 Cf. ib., bk. 4, ch. 12, on the virtues of the pagan philosophers, who could not discern the end their actions
ought to have.
69 Augustine, De beata vita, 2.10, quoting Cicero (PL, vol. 32, col. 964).
70 Cf. conclusion of the arguments against the identification of concupiscence with ‘pure nature’, in Jansen,
Augustinus, t. II, De statu purae naturae, bk. 2, ch. 21; ‘radicem tanti mali’ lies rather in the ‘captivity’ of man’s
‘pars superior’ by the ‘pars inferior’ (col. 872).
71 We cannot go into modern controversies surrounding the concept of ‘pure nature’ started by Henri de Lubac,
Surnaturel: études historiques (Paris, 1946). It is deductible from Aquinas’s understanding of the unfallen state,
where the felicities subsequently lost are envisaged as gifts ‘superadded’ to the puris naturalibus of Adam’s
constitution. But Aquinas (ST, IaIae, q. 109, a. 8) only wants to speak of man ‘dupliciter, uno modo, secundum
statum naturae integrae; alio modo, secundum statum naturae corruptae’. According to de Lubac an exclusive
concentration on man’s supernatural destiny such as Jansen’s stimulated theorists of pure nature, whose
arguments, though designed to protect the gratuity of grace, had the effect of conferring a self-sufficient legitimacy
on man’s purely ‘natural’ ends. It is pretty hard to see how Jansen’s position differs substantially from that of Aquinas, however, since he did not treat grace as ‘natural’ or necessarily owing to nature. There are
nature’, which was said to differ from fallen nature as a naked man differs from one who has been stripped. Molina’s understanding of the effect of original sin differs from the Jansenist as a naked man differs from one who has been flayed.\(^{72}\)

Original sin, then, introduced an absolute necessity of sinning: for where there is concupiscence there are creaturely ends, and where there is disharmony between the intellect and the passions, there is the impossibility of ruling the latter entirely by the former.\(^{73}\) This necessity does not abrogate liberty for it consists with the free, though mistaken choice of the will.\(^{74}\) All love of creatures must be sin, as reversal of the divine (i.e., really natural) order.\(^{75}\) Since the basis of all human action and affection is love – love which seeks to posses the loved object, and seeks nothing further, but to rest there – to yield to creaturely desires is to seek repose in an end beneath that for which man was created.\(^{76}\) So any affection or action based on love of a creaturely thing for its own sake is sinful as tending away from God.\(^{77}\) It is this tendency, away from God because towards the creature, which means that when we speak of ‘human nature’ after the fall we are really speaking of that which is sub-natural.

The necessity of sinning in fallen nature is not an absolute necessity, original to the nature of man, but one superinduced upon nature by his sin. It follows from the empire of concupiscence, but is no less culpable for being necessary, for every sin involves an act of consent to concupiscence.\(^{78}\) All the Jansenists after Augustine held that sin is essentially voluntary, and therefore considered the servum arbitrium of Luther, because it precluded real

\(^{72}\) Ibid., t. I, bk. 2, chs. 7-8, bk. 5, chs. 1-2, bk. 6, chs. 11-12; Arnauld, Seconde Apologie, bk. 2, ch. 11.
\(^{73}\) Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae lapsae, bk. 3, chs. 2-3.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., chs. 1, 11, 13: ‘ex necessitate boni, qua Deus malum velle non potest, sed solum bonum, probat [Augustinus] etiam incolunem manere libertatem arbitrii, quamvis similiter bonum velle non possit’ (cols. 477-8); Arnauld, Seconde Apologie, bk. 3, chs. 5, 6.
\(^{75}\) Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae lapsae, bk. 2, ch. 16.
\(^{76}\) Ibid., bk. 2, chs. 12-16; Pascal, Écrits sur la Grâce, p. 1003 [Mesnard, pp. 704-5].
\(^{77}\) For Augustine’s famous distinction of uti and frui see De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, 30 (PL, vol. 40, cols. 19-20); De doctrina Christiana, I 22.20-21 (PL, vol. 34, cols. 26-7).
\(^{78}\) Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae lapsae, bk. 2, ch. 8, cols. 326-8.
culpability, to be analogous with the Molinist palliation of original sin.\textsuperscript{79} If there is no culpability, no true sin, there is no necessity for penitence or expiation on the part of man. But this necessity the Jansenists were eager to asseverate.

It remained therefore to show how man, in the wretched state to which, they argued, sin had reduced him, could be equal to such work. There remain in fallen man the vestiges or remnants of the state of innocence: reason is not extinct; a spark of the divine likeness persists.\textsuperscript{80} This, however, is so incapacitated from expressing itself in action by the dominion of the flesh, the law of sin in his members of which Paul speaks in Romans vii, that a grace of a wholly different order from the \textit{adiutorium sine qua non} is needed. In order to want and to do the good an efficacious and determining grace is needed, an \textit{adiutorium quo}, which liberates the will from its enslavement to the creature and determines it to act.\textsuperscript{81} The law which dictates the return of created things to their origin is ‘si immuable & si universelle, que l’on en voit même quelques marques & quelques traits en la corruption des choses dans laquelle elles perdent leurs premières qualitéz, & sortent de leur état naturel’. But in consequence of this departure another principle of attraction has replaced the true principle, so that now ‘elle [human nature] ne peut plus être redressée que par une force extrême’.\textsuperscript{82} Where psychological liberty under the empire of ignorance and concupiscence necessarily entails the free choice of the bad, true liberty depends on a grace which, being irresistibly powerful, can break the dragging fetters of sin, so enlightening the mind and transforming the will that the good can be freely chosen, that is freely willed in the sense of desired.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{79} Laporte, \textit{Exposition de la Doctrine}, p. 41; for Augustine see e.g. \textit{De vera religione}, XIV. 27 (\textit{PL}, vol. 34, col. 133): ‘Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium … quare aut negandum est peccatum committi, aut fatendum est volunatae committi’.
\textsuperscript{80} See Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. II, \textit{De statu naturae lapsae}, bk. 4, ch. 16, on the natural seeds of virtue; \textit{ib.}, \textit{De statu purae naturae}, bk. 1, chs. 15-17 (‘imago Dei’, ‘naturae lumen’, etc.); cf. Saint-Cyran, \textit{Somme des fautes}, i, pp. 84-91.
\textsuperscript{81} Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. I, bk. 4, ch. 7, and t. III, bk. 1, chs. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Idem}, \textit{Discours}, pp. 2-3, 6-7, 20-27.
\textsuperscript{83} Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 2, \textit{passim}, and \textit{ib.}, bk. 6 \textit{passim}. This is the thesis condemned in the third proposition (above, n. 5): freedom need only be from compulsion, not from necessity. Jansen defends it on the
desire can thus be reduced to two loves or delectations, one being inspired by and tending
towards man’s natural good, the other being inspired by and tending towards the sub-natural
captivity of the flesh: the two loves that built the two cities, and which, according to the
dictum ‘as one loves, so one is’, make the man.\textsuperscript{84}

The existence of man in the state of grace is characterised by the conflict between
these two loves. The victorious grace of Christ is necessarily irresistible, for in the state of
fallen nature the will is either directed by itself, and chooses bad, or by God; if grace
communicated only a possibility of action it would necessarily be inefficacious. But this
efficacious grace does not constrain the will in spite of itself: its work is rather to effect the
transformation of the will, so that the desire precedes the act, and the human organism
accomplishes the good with a freedom reminiscent of that of Adam.\textsuperscript{85} Again, this throws into
relief the intellectualist shape of the Jansenist approach, after Augustine, to morality. True
knowledge of his last end must effectively constrain man’s desire; just so, all disordered, or
sinful acts, must derive from some cognitive error regarding this end. Hence Arnauld talks
about the grace of Christ in terms of perfect knowledge and love, and his master, Saint-
Cyran, writes: ‘comme la charité nous mène à Dieu, c’est aussi la vérité qui nous doit mener
à la charité’.\textsuperscript{86} This charity, the desire to rest in God (contrition, love of God for his sake), is
the only motive adequate to the production of a moral act, because the value of acts is
governed by the end to which they are ordered. The love of God therefore comprehends all
the virtues, cardinal and theological, as love of the immutable justice in which all virtue

\textsuperscript{84} De civ. Dei, XIV 28; In epistolam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus, 2.14 (\textit{PL}, vol. 35, col. 1997): ‘talis est
\textsuperscript{85} Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 2, ch. 27; Arnauld, \textit{Seconde Apologie}, bk. 3, ch. 16.
participates. But only an efficacious and determining grace is sufficiently potential to sway the fallen creature from his own ends.

*Rigorism*

It is the property of Christian philosophy to build upon surer foundations than that which knows no redeemer. In the fallen state there always persists a psychological liberty to sin: where there is concupiscence, that is to say, there is the theoretical possibility of sin, while a habit of righteousness only supposes a continuous succession of actual graces. The progress towards his end is therefore for the Christian, as Augustine was aware in encountering the Plotinian ascent of the soul, characterised by a duration and struggle foreign to the serene philosophical contemplative. The equation of knowledge and virtue is intricated by the effects of original sin.

It was on the basis of an analysis of these effects, which constitutes ‘an interesting chapter in psychology’, that the Jansenists discussed the co-operation of the human will with the irresistible grace of Christ. The centrality of this psychological question to their whole constructive theological effort is only the more strongly emphasised by its basis in the weakest philosophical link in their arguments. The freedom of the will after the fall is protected by the ‘power of contraries’, which we have called the psychological liberty to sin, and which must always persist alongside the movements and affections irremediably

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87 Jansen, *Augustinus*, t. III, bk. 5, chs. 1-10; cf. ib., chs. 13f. on attrition, which is not made sufficient to justification by the sacrament of penance (ch. 19).
88 *Ibid.*, bk. 3, chs. 15-19: the faithful would not pray God not to lead them into temptation (‘hoc est, ne deserantur adiutorio eius’) if he never withdrew his grace from the just (‘justis’) (col. 368); see Augustine, *De perfectione justitiae hominis*, XXI (*PL*, vol. 44, cols. 316-8); cf. Pascal, *Écrits sur la Grâce*, pp. 984-1001 [Mesnard, pp. 682-702].
90 Carreyre, in *DTC*, t. VIII, col. 353.
attendant upon fallen nature.\textsuperscript{91} If, as the Jansenists did assert, this ‘physical’ power of contraries can never be realised under the impulsion of grace, it does nothing theoretically to conserve liberty.\textsuperscript{92} On the practical level, however, this theoretical fudge did a great deal of real work. It expresses the empirical recognition, which can be measured in many conversions and is traced most famously in the seventh and eighth books of Augustine’s \textit{Confessions}, of the dreadful power of concupiscence, which can and demonstrably does, many times, resist that grace which on the Jansenist argument can only ever be efficacious. This efficacy, then, they maintained by qualifying it as to degree. Every grace need not necessarily aim at the same effect, so that we can envisage a whole series of ‘imperfect’ or ‘petites grâces’, which may not convert us entirely from the world, but which perhaps begin to direct our desires towards a higher and a spiritual one. Each of these graces, being ordained to a particular effect, is equally efficacious, though differing in outcome.\textsuperscript{93} The formation of a loving disposition is envisaged as a balancing of scales: charity and cupidity increase and diminish proportionately.\textsuperscript{94}

Following Arnauld’s censure and the \textit{Lettres Provinciales}, Nicole and Arnauld increasingly argued that this graduated idea of grace was conformable with the Thomist distinction of sufficient grace, which communicates the possibility of action (as opposed to a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 8, ch. 4, also \textit{ib.}, chs. 5-20: though two contrary acts cannot exist together \textit{in sensu composito}, the power \textit{subsists} separately from the act (\textit{in sensu diviso}); we cannot simultaneously will contraries, but we can do one thing and will another. The Jansenists argued that this is the power referred to in the Tridentine anathema on those who say that ‘man’s free will … cannot refuse its assent [to God’s call and action] if it wishes’ (Canon 4 of the decree on justification, in Schroeder, p. 42): Arnauld, \textit{Seconde Apologie}, bk. 2, ch. 18, pp. 181-3; cf. Laporte, \textit{Exposition}, pp. 412-16. The use of this Thomist distinction is meant to indicate that if Thomism is orthodox so \textit{a fortiori} is Jansen’s Augustinianism. As Herbert Thorndike (see below, ch. 6) pointed out, however, it actually protects a version of free will, as consisting in indifference, which Jansen categorically refuses: Thorndike, \textit{Epilogue}, ii, ch. 21, pp. 164-5.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Interestingly the Molinist with whom Nicole has ‘Wendrock’ converse by way of establishing the accord between the Jansenists and the Thomists about efficacious grace, admits that ‘orthodoxus est Montaltius, et Thomisti’, but cannot concede the reality of a power irreducible to act. Wendrock, p. 496, discussed in de Franceschi, \textit{Entre saint Augustin et saint Thomas}, pp. 114-16.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Jansen, \textit{Discours}, p. 116: ‘nous avons d’autant plus d’amour de Dieu, que nous avons moins d’orgueil’; cf. Augustine, \textit{Epistolae}, 157. 2.9 (\textit{PL}, vol. 33, col. 677), ‘\textit{iubemur … detrahere de pondere cupiditatis quod accedat ad pondus charitatis, donec illud consumatur, hoc perficiatur}’.
\end{itemize}
proximate power in the Molinist sense), from efficacious grace by which the will is determined to act.95 Kinship could even by this means be claimed with the doctrine of the ‘neo-Thomists’ savaged in Pascal’s second Provinciale (which ‘on … connaît mieux qu’on ne la connaissait alors’).96 Hence Arnauld’s overtures to the Thomists in the late 1650s and early 1660s were not necessarily mere policy, as is testified by the rift that consequently arose between himself and Nicole on one side, and Barcos, the nephew of Saint-Cyran, and the Port-Royal confessor Antoine Singlin on the other. The five Articles submitted to the Jesuit Ferrier in the course of the remarkable Jansenist-Jesuit negotiations initiated by the Bishop of Comminges, Gilbert Choisel, in late 1662 and early 1663, constitute evidence of a genuine belief on the part of certain Port-Royalists that the Augustinian distinction of ‘grandes’ from ‘petites grâces’ could be adequately formulated in the terms of scholastic Thomism.97 Arnauld had to deny to friends that this represented a change of course; still, these surface movements suggest the inviolable premise which subsists beneath. Man must strive towards God with the power he has. In his Discours de la réformation de l’homme intérieur Jansen writes that while ‘vous n’espériez qu’en sa [God’s] seule miséricorde’, nevertheless ‘vous ne laissez pas d’agir de toute vôtre puissance, & avec tous les efforts qui vous sont possibles’.98

This premise is grounded in a psychology of human action which can appear monochrome, particularly in its equation of sensible and spiritual desire.99 All human affection is said to have its basis in love, so that the act of the will proceeds as much, and

95 In this they were strictly justified since their teaching did not differ from that of Aquinas, who followed Augustine in distinguishing ‘cooperating’ from ‘operating’ grace by the addition of human agency, so that ‘cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando incipit’: ST, IaIIae, Q. 111, art. 2.4, quoting Augustine, De grat. et lib. arb., 17.33 (PL, vol. 44, col. 901).
96 On all this see de Franceschi, Entre saint Augustin et saint Thomas, ch. 3, quoting from Arnauld’s letters at pp. 126-7.
97 Ibid., pp. 136-61 and Appendix IV; Henri Gouhier, ‘La crise de la théologie au temps de Descartes’, pp. 290-1. The increasing appreciation of Aquinas by Arnauld is stressed by Laporte, Exposition: it is already evident in the Seconde Apologie, e.g. bk. 2, ch. 20. See also the recent number of XVIIe Siècle, 259 (2013), on Arnauld, Thomas D’Aquin et Les Thomistes. These proceedings were followed by Theophilus Gale, see The Court of the Gentiles, pt. iv, bk. 3 (1678), pp. 123-4, 126-7.
99 See idem, Augustinus, t. III, bk. 4, chs. 7, 11; Pascal, Écrits sur la Grâce, pp. 966-7 [Mesnard, p. 795].
probably more, from *delectatio* than from the intellective element, which would be helpless without the favourable disposition of the passionate.\textsuperscript{100} Love itself is obscure, and hidden within us; but it is known by its fruits. All the inclinations of nature spring from love, and therefore evince the nature of our love.\textsuperscript{101} Since a moral act must be deliberate, the act of love has to be a free act of the will. We must want what God wants from us. The desires and affections must therefore be cultivated to serve reason, just as for Plato θυμοειδές must be conditioned to take the side of λογιστικόν over ἐπιθυμητικόν – if it is ‘corrupted by bad upbringing’ we are apt to peep at corpses.\textsuperscript{102} It is crucial that the disordered movements of concupiscence be ordered and regulated by reason.\textsuperscript{103}

It was the same relationship between love, or desire, and knowledge, which prompted Augustine’s reflections on the Socratic theme of *nosce teipsum* in book ten of *De Trinitate*. The more clearly we apprehend ourselves as loving or desiring – the better we understand the triune activity of mens, notitia, and amor (or memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas) – so much more clearly do we apprehend the Trinity, and so much closer are we to God.\textsuperscript{104} Given this crucial psychological relation, grace is to be defined as an ‘actus … vitalis’ in the subject: it is the will of God moving those secret springs of motive, called by Augustine ‘weights’ or ‘loves’ (cf. Wis. xi 20), which determine the individual to action.\textsuperscript{105} ‘It causes us simultaneously to know the good, to taste it, to embrace it, to consent to it, to persevere in it’. If justifying faith is not just adventitious and irrational (the error of the ‘Calvinists’, on the Jansenist view), but involves intellectual assent, it necessarily implies an authentic desire of

\textsuperscript{100} *Ibid.*, t. II, *De statu naturae lapsae*, bk. 2, ch. 25; *ib.*, t. III, bk. 7, ch. 3, the will cannot consent ‘sine præeunte delectatione’.

\textsuperscript{101} *Ib.*, t. II, *De statu naturae lapsae*, bk. 2, chs. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{102} *Rep.*, 435c-444a, at 441a, 439e-440a.

\textsuperscript{103} Jansen, *De statu naturae lapsae*, ch. 23.

\textsuperscript{104} *De Trin.*, VIII 8.12, 10.14; IX 3.3: X 8-12; *Conf.*, X 3.3, and see the excellent article under *De Trinitate* by Rowan Williams in Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, MI-Cambridge, 1999).

God, an answering charity, which cannot consist with a preponderant desire for creatures. The supernaturalisation of man must come first from without; but for it actually to constitute his natural consummation it requires the self-emptying which will allow it to come from within. ‘For’, as Ruysbroeck says, ‘God is more inward to us than we are to ourselves … And therefore God works in us from within outwards; but all creatures work from without inwards.’

The first of the mystical ways is that of purgation. Hence the neoplatonic themes implicit in the approach thus far outlined – where the good of man is related entirely to the substantial intelligible reality accessible to his reason, and his liberty defined by the domination of his will by the all-powerful will to which it is ordered (that is, by conformity with the sovereign Good) – are resolved into a practical scheme on the mystical trajectory.

Whether or not this trajectory, if it does not aim at the ecstatic union of the Greek tradition, or the indistinct dissolution upon which Eckhartian mysticism verges, is rightly called mystical in relation to its end, is immaterial in relation to the path by which it is described – a way of ever-increasing conformity laid open by humility.

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107 The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage, II.3, in The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage, The Sparkling Stone, The Book of Supreme Truth, tr. C. A. Wynschenk (1916). Jan van Ruysbroeck was a Flemish Augustinian canon, and one of those mystics of the school of Eckhart whose work helped to form the atmosphere in which à Kempis’ *Initiation*, whence the Jansenists drew much inspiration, was produced. The influence of these Rheno-Flemish mystics can be traced back through Saint-Cyran to Bérulle, who imbibed it both directly, and through the Carmelite spirituality with which he came into contact at the time when he made one of Mme Acarie’s circle. The theme of self-annihilation is one of several which may legitimately be followed back in this way from the structure of Jansenist thought as it is exposed in this chapter. See further Jean Dagens, *Bérulle et les Origines de la Restauration Catholique*(1575-1611) (Brussels, 1952), pp. 103-9, chs. 2-3; Jean Orcibal, *Saint Jean de la Croix et les Mystiques Rhéno-flamands* (Brussels, 1966), ch. 3 on Ruysbroeck; *idem*, *Le Cardinal de Bérulle*, pp. 24-9, 50n.


The emphasis on self-effacement as a condition of God’s internal action may, in the polemical terms of the seventeenth century, sound like a counsel of passivity, approaching nearly to Quietism: Saint-Cyran, for whom the whole Christian life consists in openness to the internal vocations of the Holy Spirit, defined true prayer in terms of silence and passivity.\textsuperscript{110} In reality it is a dynamic and active principle of humility, which relates ultimately to the Incarnation as the template for the Christian life under grace. The falls of the just man, the spiritual peaks and troughs which attend the apparent caprice of ‘petites grâces’, teach him humility.\textsuperscript{111} They impress upon him his utter dependence on the assistance of God, and the utter gratuity of such assistance. In this state of uncertainty he can only humbly abase himself and strive to accomplish the evident precepts which God has revealed to him. If the law is an unattainable ideal without a victorious grace, the failures of the man ‘wishing and striving to be righteous’, in the words of the first Proposition of Innocent X, will teach him humility. The function of the law is to destroy self-love and to teach the necessity of healing.\textsuperscript{112} This too is the work which the doctrine of predestination, logically maintained by the Jansenist writers to be \textit{ante praevisa merita} (though not irrespective of original sin, which they maintained against supralapsarian Calvinists to be the condition of negative predestination),\textsuperscript{113} is made to perform in their arguments.\textsuperscript{114} There can be no certainty as to the grace of God, which may be granted or withdrawn, imperceptible to, or falsely perceived by man. Hence we can never act securely, or with confidence in future contingencies, but must confine ourselves humbly to the moment, contenting ourselves, in \textit{lieu} of certainty, with the rule for action which God has left us in Christ, from whom we learn how those who are

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{110} Laporte, \textit{Essai}, pp. 79-85, \textit{et passim}.

\textsuperscript{111} Similarly Saint-Cyran’s ‘passive’ prayer is merely a trenchant statement of the necessity of spiritual poverty, \textit{ibid}. Jansen, \textit{Discours}, pp. 92-112 is particularly clear on this theme, which can be encapsulated in St. Peter’s ‘the righteous is scarcely saved’ (1 Pet. iv 18).

\textsuperscript{112} See Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 1, chs. 12-14.

\textsuperscript{113} See e.g. \textit{ibid.}, bk. 10 \textit{passim}; Arnauld, \textit{Seconde Apologie}, bk. 2, chs. 13-14, esp. p. 153.

\end{footnotes}
Humility is, in this way, the soul of all the virtues, as is pride of all sin: it is the spirit which animates the letter of morality, since it follows the recognition that grace is the only true principle of life. This is where Saint-Cyran thought the point of the *Augustinus* lay (‘un livre de dévotion …’). This is what Pascal’s ‘Dieu caché’ signifies, pointing to that wherein alone his existence and our blindness to him are resolved and comprehensible; and, from the Incarnation, to that narrow way which is the imitation of the sinless man (‘le remède ... et le moyen d’obtenir ce remède’).

The extreme optimism which characterises Jansen’s conceit of human nature in the state of innocence, therefore, is not confined to that state, for the remnant of the divine likeness persists in fallen nature. This it is which must be cultivated, for man is really man to the extent that he shares in the divine nature – a participation open to him by cause of the divine image subsisting within his soul, and effective in him by virtue of the redemptive work of Christ, winning the efficacious assistance of grace whereby it becomes possible to grow in likeness to the image’s original. Everything which assists in ordering man towards his final end is natural and therefore good; everything which impedes his being so ordered is unnatural and therefore bad. Moral rigorism is therefore predicated on an ultra-optimistic, and as it were mystical anthropology, which accepts no standard of good except ‘bonum omnium bonorum, bonum a quo sunt omnia bona’ – ‘la fin des fins’, as Arnauld says out of Proclus – and views man exclusively insofar as he is a creature capable of God. Critics who

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118 Thus connecting Isaiah (xlv 15) to Matthew (vii 13): *Pensées*, 149, 449; cf. the interesting letter to Mlle. de Roannez of October 1656 (in Chevalier, pp. 509-11), where Pascal observes that ‘si Dieu se découvrait continuellement aux hommes, il n’y aurait point de mérite à le croire’.
119 Pascal’s apology was intended to demonstrate the double truth that ‘les hommes sont tout ensemble indignes de Dieu et capables de Dieu: indignes par leur corruption, capables par leur première nature’ (*Pensées*, 444); cf. the fourteenth *Provinciale*, where appeal is made to ‘les lumières naturelles’, which contradict the moral enormities of the Jesuit casuists (*CLP*, pp. 255-6).
120 This idea of participation has its origins in II Pet. i 4, whose verb is κοινωνέω, to have a share of, partake in. Augustine, *enarrationes in Psalmos*, 134.6 (*PL*, vol. 37, col. 1742); Arnauld, *Seconde Apologie*, bk. 3, ch. 17, p. 316, quoting the *Platonic Theology*, II 4 (τέλεω τέλος). This citation, besides being inaccurate (Arnauld
abominate the ‘ultrasupernaturalist’ morality organised around this end miss the process of
deification with which the Jansenists intercalated the apparently stark dichotomy of cupidity
and charity. If, on our analysis, ‘perfectionism’ appears to be more than a merely
‘psychological characteristic’ of Jansenism, it is a mind habituated to the fabulous and the
romantic which consequently sees in it ‘un roman cruel’, a violent theology. Perfection is
by way of aspiration rather than expectation. ‘Je ne pretends pas qu’on soit entièrement
parfait … mais seulement qu’on ait désir de l’être, & qu’on travaille pour le devenir’. As
we shall see momentarily, this is precisely how our English rigorists will explain their high
standards. Conversion, penance, renewal, deification, are convertible terms in the thought of
the Jansenists. ‘Toute la vertu & l’exercice du Chrestien dans ce monde’, wrote Saint-Cyran,
‘consiste à combattre & diminuër peu à peu [la] concupiscence’. Given this provisional and
progressive nature of the return to God, it is unsurprising that ‘deification’ was not itself a
part of the Jansenist vocabulary; but Saint-Cyran, for example, spoke of ‘unité’ with Christ,
who ‘nous a faits, non seulement chrétiens, mais Christs’. The eucharist is the supreme
moment when we become ‘en quelque sorte Dieux en la terre’: as we shall see in chapter 7,
this moment reflects and crowns the ontological change brought about in man by the life
of repentance.

It is this mystical optimism, not a radical ‘pessimism’, which produces the so-called
‘puritan’ or ‘rigorist’ tendency in morality. The theory of the victorious delectation which

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122 E.g. Knox, *Enthusiasm*, esp. pp. 217-20; similarly Voltaire, one of whose more insightful criticisms,
nevertheless, was that Pascal wishes to make us ‘mieux que nous ne sommes’: *Lettres Philosophiques*, ed. F. A.
123 Cf. Orcibal, ‘Qu’est-ce que le Jansénisme?’; p. 48.
Laporte, *Essai*, p. xiv: ‘une Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux, qui n’a pas grand-chose de commun avec
l’histoire, et dont le ton n’est pas trop religieux, mais où, incontestablement, abonde la “littérature” …’
127 Saint-Cyran is quoted in Orcibal, *Saint-Cyran et le jansénisme*, p. 58.
128 Pace Bremond, e.g. *Histoire Littéraire*, IV, pp. 27-30.
must transform the will from a concupiscent to a contrite tendency, which seems, *prima facie*, contiguous with the polemical caricature of the Protestant conception of the operation of grace, was ultimately defended by Arnauld on the analogy of the Incarnation. The co-existence of free will with the determination of an irresistibly efficacious grace can only be apprehended by analogy with the co-existence of the two natures in Christ. Man under grace is not only a beneficiary but in some sense an image of what Jeremy Taylor will call ‘The Great Exemplar’, the Word Incarnate. Just as Christ’s human will was utterly in unison with the divine will while yet retaining its integrity, so the human will under grace is animated with divinity ‘comme notre âme même anime nos membres’. The contrite disposition of the soul, in other words, is a sort of transparency to the divine will which, as we have seen, comports with the natural end of man in union with his creator. The imitation of Christ, the assimilation of counsel to precept, the conflation of the religious with the secular vocation: these are all equivalents for a concept of deification which is rarely associated, at least in Anglophone scholarship, with these *soi-disant* devotees of ‘le premier des Pères latins’. As in Augustine, however, ‘deificari’ is rendered cognate with ‘justificari’. Dean Inge helpfully distinguished this ‘transformative’ version of the concept from the ‘essentialising’ or the ‘substitutionary’ – it is the *progressus ad infinitum* which is the *imitatio Christi*. The rigorist application may risk a confusion between man’s end and his path towards it. But at least it supposes no inherent incongruity between man and the end at which he must arrive.

Contrition is the work of the soul returning to God from its captivity in the creature

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130 Port-Royal produced a number of French editions of à Kempis’ *Imitation of Christ* between 1662 and 1694, and the Port-Royal writers, unsurprisingly, very frequently refer to him; see Chédozeau, *Port-Royal et la Bible*, ch. 14.
132 See esp. *en. in Ps.*, 49.2, and *ib.*, 58 1.7, where participation in Christ’s divinity is connected to his humility.
As Jean-Louis Quantin remarks, it is thus the link between anti-probabilism and the critique of casuistry, which we examined in part I of this thesis, and the pastoral severity which is the subject of the present part. It is the positive term in that equation, where anti-laxism is the negative: the higher the demand on the disposition of the penitent – here it is a question of the highest demand, an indeclinable contrition – the more rigorous the condition of absolution, and the more intransigent the opposition to indulgence in the confessional.

It has been argued here, then, that the focus on ‘love’ – humble renunciation of self, and submission to God – which dictated a rigorous and austere pastoral programme, has at base a mystical inspiration common to other great products of Bremond’s ‘conquête mystique’. In Bérulle it informed the concepts of ‘adherence’ and ‘servitude’ (in which as we have seen true liberty consists); in François de Sales, ‘le plus mortifiant de tous les saints’, as Jean-Jacques Olier called him, a treatment of the theme which recalls the doctrine of ‘pure’ disinterested love later to be associated with Mme Guyon and Fénelon. For there is no more difference between charity normally understood and the ‘pure love’ of the mystics than one of degree. The ‘effective’ or active mode of love, as de Sales taught, is simply an ‘exercise’ of the affective or contemplative; so that ‘l’oraison’ which nourishes the former,

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136 Quantin, *Le rigorisme chrétien*, pp. 18-19; cf. ch. 7, below.
and ‘la Théologie mystique’ which describes the latter, ‘ne sont qu’une mème chose’. The mistrust of mysticism, as Bremond himself illustrates, arises simply from the feeling that it omits or encourages the omission of the most essential degrees of the movement towards God – those which serve to efface the movements of the creature. The active concept of love, tied to contemplation of the eternal good, upon which this ascetic way is built, may even not be so very far from Ignatian spirituality. It is, at any rate, some distance from the crude caricature implicit in the charge of crypto-Calvinism with which we began this chapter.

Anti-Calvinism

The Jansenist understanding of salvation was framed in diametric opposition to that central Reformation concept, ‘simul justus et peccator’. Justification is a process of ordering the rational creature to his natural end. The wretchedness of the state of sin means that this re-ordering can only be effected with the victorious grace of Christ, but the concept of irresistibility implies the co-operation and transformation of the human organism. In fact the theory of the two delectations, one concupiscent to damnation, one celestial to salvation, taken by the enemies of Jansenism to reproduce the double predestination of rigid Calvinist schemes, expresses the fundamental answer which Trent gave to the Reformation. Justification is a process of the transformation of the inner man. This is reflected in the title

140 Bremond, Histoire Littéraire, IV, ch. 11, pp. 543f. Even if the unitive end disappears amid the focus on purgation, there is far more in common here with actual mysticism than the vague idea of artistic inspiration from which Bremond derives its fraternity with literary humanism, in ibid., I, pt. 3, ch. 4.
141 Cf. ibid., III, pp. 112f., 679-83.
142 Pascal, Écrits sur la Grâce, pp. 969-70 is a definitive repudiation [Mesnard, pp. 797-9].
143 E.g. de Colona, Dictionnaire des Livres Jansénistes, t. 1, p. 123.
144 Cf. Mcgrath, Iustitia Dei, ch. 7.
of Jansen’s *Discours de la réformation de l’homme intérieur*, which echoes the wording of the Tridentine decree on justification, ‘non est sola peccatum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis’. This does not mean the Jansenists were necessarily of one accord with the Tridentine determinations. The doctrine of the two loves implies, between justification and the new loving obedience which is its condition, such an absolute equivalence as the Tridentine separation of the first intellectual persuasion of the Gospel from the infused justice which follows appears to diminish. As will be seen at greater length in chapter 7, this is indicated by the Jansenist refusal of the ‘attritionist’ theory in regard to the sacrament of penance; the condition of true reformation is the love of God for his own sake. In this sense the Jansenists might agree with contemporary Anglicans who criticised the Tridentine decree on the basis that justifying faith must imply the fulfilment of the condition which is laid down by the Gospel and actuated by baptism.

A true spiritual reformation, Jansen supposes, can only be begun on the basis of the most accurate possible psychological diagnosis – the most honest admission, that is, of the power of concupiscence. John said there is nothing in the world but ‘the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vainglory of life’ (I Jo. ii 16): from these flow ‘toute l’impureté qui corrompt le corps et l’esprit de l’homme, & tous les crimes qui troublent la société humaine’. Thus they must be sought out and harrowed in ‘les replis les plus cachez du cœur de l’homme, & dans les mouvements les plus secrets & les plus imperceptibles des passions’.

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145 Schroeder, p. 312.
146 See chs. V-VII of the decree in *ibid.*, pp. 32-5.
147 Cf. above, pt. I, pp. ; below, ch. 7.
149 Attention has been drawn to the ubiquity of this figure of the heart’s ‘recesses’ in seventeenth-century French writing by Benedetta Papasogli, *Le “fond du cœur”: figures de l’espace intérieur au XVIIe siècle* (Paris 2000), though one could wish for a less opaque treatment.
toutes les personnes vertueuses, qui travaillent à purifier leur âme & à renouveler leur esprit selon l’image de celui qui l’a créé, doivent s’étudier à reconnaître la nature & les effets de ces passions, & s’instruire avec soin de l’ordre & des règles, qui sont établies pour les guérir, afin qu’elles puissent recouvrer la pureté qu’elles ont perdué.\textsuperscript{150}

Voluptuousness, curiosity, pride: all are opposed to the love of wisdom, whence derives their antagonism to virtue.\textsuperscript{151} But each also requires its specific mortification. Since pride is the principle of the creature’s departure from order (i.e. of sin), and will flourish even, sometimes especially, when the other two are surmounted, humility is the prerequisite of all re-integration. (True humility, of course, can only exist by relation to the ultimate standard or archetype of humility in Christ.\textsuperscript{152}) Likewise, knowledge can only be served by the mortification suitable to the \textit{libido scienti}: the ‘fuite’ and ‘retraite’ so dear to Saint-Cyran.\textsuperscript{153}

Without this man cannot know what to ‘rechercher, ou fuir’, cannot appreciate the difference between contemplating ‘cette beauté incomparable de la vérité éternelle où réside la connaissance certaine & salutaire de toutes les choses’, and ‘cette multitude d’images & de phantômes, dont la vanité a rempli notre esprit et notre cœur …’\textsuperscript{154} Finally, the flesh must be subdued by a condign temperance.\textsuperscript{155} This is certainly the \textit{sine qua non} of interior reformation, and in terms of Jansenist psychology, derived from Augustine’s analysis of the ‘loves’ which motivate action, perhaps its most significant element. The influence of concupiscence means the movement to God cannot be purely intellectual:

\begin{quote}
l’amour de Dieu, qui est la charité, ne commet point de pêchés, parce qu’il ne fait point de mal \cite{Jansen-151} \ldots Mais vous ne serez jamais délivrez de vos pêchés, que lors que
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.
\item[152] \textit{Ib.}, pp. 67f.
\item[153] Below, ch. 7, pp. 287-8. Cf. the famous fragment on ‘diversion’ (\textit{Pensées}, 136): ‘j’ai dit souvent que tout le malheur des hommes vient d’une seule chose, qui est de ne savoir pas demeurer en repos dans une chambre’.
\item[155] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 35-53.
\end{footnotes}
The increase of charity, in proportion with the diminution of amour-propre, is therefore indispensably accompanied by the education of the heart, the loves and desires of the whole sensible-rational creature. Common experience suggests that this course will not be easy. Whoever resolves on such cultivation – ‘d’employer tous ses efforts pour s’élever au sommet de la perfection’ – ‘sera forcé de confesser’ that ‘il est plus aisé de ne point user de tous … plaisirs, bien que légitimes, que d’en user sans commettre beaucoup de fautes’.157 Like Saint-Cyran, it seems, Jansen was a ‘Carthusian in spirit’: as he said, he wished to talk, ‘non de l’excellence ni de la réformation de la discipline Monastique, mais de la corruption & du renouvellement de l’esprit humain, qui est tout le fruit de la discipline réguliere …’158

It was, therefore, not at all by way of an oblique response to the attacks of Isaac Habert on the Augustinus that Arnauld published his treatise on penance and communion in 1643.159 The Counter-Reformation Church had sought to redefine the cult of saints, circumventing Protestant criticisms of superstition by emphasising, over the implausible thaumaturgism of comforting intimates, the ‘heroic virtue’ of pious models for imitation.160 The Jansenists, as ever ‘authentic’ interpreters of the Tridentine reforms, rather took this at its word. Why should not all hold themselves to the same standards as the saints, who were men

156 Ib., pp. 116-17; see also idem, Augustinus, t. III, bk. 3, ch. 8.
157 Jansen, Discours, pp. 52-3.
158 Ib., pp. 13-14; see above, ch. 1, p. 22.
159 Pace Abercrombie, Origins, p. 201.
too? In the primitive era, in fact, Christians were so held to the highest standards. When the theological positions traced above were proving so controversial after the appearance of the *Augustinus*, it is no surprise if Arnauld was eager to establish the parallel between their practical implications and an unimpeachably admirable model, the primitive practice witnessed to by the Fathers. The turn to primitive purity as a template for church reform, indeed, is perhaps the analogue of the magnification of Adamic felicity on the theological plane. The true knowledge of doctrine in the former represents the true knowledge of our origin and end in the latter; the right ordering of ritual and organisation corresponds to the right ordering of the passions and the faculties of the soul. On both levels order expresses the true nature of the organism in the pure love of him who substantiates and transcends it. By implication, anyone who blames these recommendations is a slave to self-love and concupiscence. The inner transformation which, as we shall see, Arnauld demanded as a prerequisite of absolution, bears the central weight of the constructive Jansenist project for reform.\(^1^6^1\) He merely cast into practical form its basic moral principle, that, as Saint-Cyran put it, ‘la vertu n’est qu’ordre comme le vice n’est que dérèglement’.\(^1^6^2\)

To the Jansenists, therefore, Calvinism seemed, by supposing that justice could consist with sinfulness, to overturn the very basis of morality. Arnauld reduced it to a handful of correlated propositions.\(^1^6^3\) Faith alone justifies, not as a good act supposing others, but as an instrument by which each individual applies to himself the justice of Christ. God esteems man just on account of this imputed righteousness, not as being so in himself. This justifying faith is 1) inseparable from charity and good works; 2) proper to the elect, and 3) hence always joined to perseverance, so that he whom God has once justified remains so always; 4)

\(^1^6^1\) Below, ch. 7.


self-authenticating, either by a ‘certitude of faith’, or by an experimental internal witness equivalent to this certitude. Whoever has justifying faith is assured of it: consequently he is certain of his election, and thus of the grace of perseverance. A justified man may therefore fall into the greatest sins, adultery, incest, homicide, without ceasing to remain just, even while he commits them, since his sins are not imputed to him. There is therefore no relation between external actions and internal states, and no objective distinction between smaller and greater sins, which are only distinguished in the subject, according to the eternal decrees of election and reprobation.

The importance of this objection can hardly be overestimated, since it bears upon Arnauld’s own rejection, as a major weakness of Catholic casuistry, of an extrinsic or legalistic classification of sins.\(^{164}\) As we have shown, Jansenist moral thought was strongly intellectualist in character: it supposed an eternal and immutable standard of good accessible to reason. Arnauld can talk about the ‘rules’ of God’s ‘justice’.\(^{165}\) There is a necessary relation between the moral value of human acts and the eternal good: this, indeed, is the relation expressed in the system of ‘petites grâces’, which are the means used by God to ensure the logical congruity of his act of justifying with its object. Hence when Arnauld himself grounds the classification of sins on the internal state or disposition of the subject, he does not intend to sever the relation of the act to its moral value, but to state a causal relationship between a moral disposition and the production of moral acts. A sin is not mortal or venial because it is commissioned by a reprobate or a justified subject; but a just man will not commit mortal sins because he is internally ordered to the immutable form of justice.

There exists, moreover, a reciprocal economy between outward and inward – since

\(^{164}\) Ch. 1, above, and Ch. 7, below.

\(^{165}\) Ibid., p. 115, citing Aquinas’ opinion of the Mahometan view of predestination; cf. bk. 2, ch. 9, p. 183: ‘Il n’y a rien de plus dangereux dans la Morale que de confondre les idées des vertus & des vices, parce que c’est de là que doit dépendre le jugement que l’on fait des bons & des méchants …’; cf. Orcibal, ‘Thèmes platoniciens dans l”“Augustinus” de Jansénius”, p. 1077.
concupiscence attends our earthly existence – of which neither the voluntarist Calvinist position nor the legalist Catholic one take adequate account.\textsuperscript{166}

An obvious inverse relationship obtains, that is, between chastity and adultery, sobriety and ebriosity, and so on, which it is senseless to deny.\textsuperscript{167} The Calvinists can only deny it by affirming two contradictory propositions, that all Christian virtues – ‘sainteté’ – are inseparably joined to justifying faith, and that the state of justice, being inalienable, is compatible with ‘les actions les plus vicieuses & les plus abominables’.\textsuperscript{168} Where the Jansenists made uncertainty the basis of that humility which is the soul of all the virtues, the Calvinists, they claimed, made a baseless certainty excuse every vice. It is striking that Arnauld quotes Grotius, as ‘un sçavant homme … élevè parmy ceux qui enseignent ces maximes’, in support of this view. ‘Nullum potuit in christianismum induci dogma perniciosus quam hoc’, that a man either believes he is regenerated, and cannot forfeit divine favour even if he falls into ‘scelera et flagitia’, or he is damned.\textsuperscript{169} Indeed where Jansen had praised the Dutch Calvinists for their understanding of grace, Arnauld mined their writings against the Remonstrants for proof that they considered mortal sin compatible with the state of grace.\textsuperscript{170}

The term ‘state’ (état), with its personal equivalent, ‘disposition’, is particularly important in Arnauld’s thought. These ‘états’ provide the context in which morality is to be discussed, comprehending even the discrete acts of God from which the Calvinists make morality depend. In Romans v 20 – vii 6 Paul opposes ‘deux estats’, the state ‘where sin abounded’, from which Christ’s death is to liberate us into the state ‘where grace did abound

\textsuperscript{166} See below, ch. 7, on Arnauld’s moral theology.
\textsuperscript{167} Perhaps it is equally senseless to be reminded by the Jansenists’ constant invocation of the theme of contraries – the two loves, ‘wretchedness; greatness’, &c., &c. – of the Socratic idea that things always ‘become from their opposites’: \textit{Phaedo}, 70c-72e.
\textsuperscript{168} Arnauld, \textit{Le Renversement de la Morale}, bk. 2, ch. 9.
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 111-12 (incorrectly following p. 112). Arnauld is quoting Grotius’ Animadversiones pro suis ad Cassandrnum notis, art. De discrimine peccat. mors. et venial.
\textsuperscript{170} E.g. \textit{ibid.}, bk. 5, ch. 3, pp. 366f. This discrepancy, if it is one, seems to be adequately explained by occasion.
more exceedingly’. The first state is characterised by ‘désordres’, which ‘bring forth fruit unto death’, the second by ‘sanctification’, bringing forth ‘fruit unto God’. On Paul’s argument, says Arnauld, one cannot be both under the law and under grace, which are opposed as sin to righteousness. There is a real standard to which justice must be related, provable by its ‘fruits’. ¹⁷¹ Paul’s various lists of the ‘unrighteous’ who ‘shall not inherit the kingdom of God’ (I Cor. vi 9-10; Gal. v 19-21; Eph. v 3-5; I Tim. i 8-11) are not intended to intimidate the faithful with ‘vaines terreurs’, but to warn them that ‘ces abominations … leur fermeroient l’entrée du ciel’: that their bodies cannot simultaneously be ‘members of Christ, and … members of a harlot’ (I Cor. vi 15), and that whoever defiles his body, the temple of God, ‘him shall God destroy’ (I Cor. iii 16). For ‘they do not remain in Christ, who are not members of Christ; but they are not members of Christ who make themselves members of a harlot’. ¹⁷²

Freedom from the law, then, implies ‘obedience unto righteousness’ (Rom vi 16). So that in the second half of Romans vii Paul cannot, when he says ‘what I hate, that I do’, be speaking of himself as a regenerate man. The Calvinists explain that a just man wants according to the flesh but not according to the spirit. But since the opposition of flesh and spirit has been tied to sinfulness and righteousness, Paul must here be ventriloquising one still under the law. ¹⁷³ A man under the law, as Augustine explains, differs from one under grace in that while he combats concupiscence he is defeated and consents to it: the man under grace does not consent. ¹⁷⁴ The Calvinist description of the just man falls into the former category.

‘Il obéit tant qu’il luy plait aux mauvais désirs de sa chair … sans qu’il s’imagine que le

¹⁷¹ Ib., bk. 5, ch. 4, pp. 374-80.
¹⁷² ‘Non itaque manent in Christo, qui non sunt membra Christi. Non sunt autem membra Christi qui se faciunt membra meretricis’: ibid., bk. 2, ch. 5. The quote is from De civ. Dei, XXI 25.
¹⁷⁴ Ibid., ch. 7, from Augustine’s Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos, XXXV (PL, vol. 35, col. 2069). Augustine’s position on Romans vii altered over the course of his writing career: in ib., VII-VIII, and in De diversis quæstionibus ad Simplicianum, I, q. 1 (PL, vol. 40, cols. 103f.) his reading supports Arnauld’s (cf., also, Conf., VIII 9); later, as recorded in Retractationes, I 23, he came to think Paul’s words could also apply to a ‘spiritual’ man (PL, vol. 45, cols. 1031-2).
pêché règne en luy’. The tiniest feeling of remorse assures him that God is still with him.\textsuperscript{175}Arnauld’s objection to this idea of justice can be summed up in the words of Jeremy Taylor. ‘Now if this be a state of regeneration, I wonder what is, or can be, a state of reprobation! for though this be the state of Nature, yet it cannot be the state of one redeemed by the Spirit of Christ’.\textsuperscript{176}

This fundamental objection to Calvinist soteriology was common to both the Anglicans and the Jansenists; as the former, however, were working in different circumstances and with different, and sometimes opposite motives and intentions, it will now be necessary to show how they, too, arrived at a theory of ‘moral rigorism’ predicated on the active love of God.

\textsuperscript{175} Arnauld, \textit{Le Renversement de la Morale}, bk. 5, p. 390.
\textsuperscript{176} Jeremy Taylor, ‘The Christians Conquest Over the Body of Sin’, in \textit{Dekas Embolimaios A Supplement to the Eniautos} (1673), p. 18; cf. Arnauld, \textit{Le Calvinisme Convaincu de Nouveau de Dogmes Impies: ou la Justification Du Livre Du Renversement de la Morale, par les Erreurs des Calvinistes} (Cologne, 1682); and with Nicole, \textit{L’Impieté de la Morale des Calvinistes, pleinement découverte par le livre de M. Bruguier Ministre de Nismes, approuvé par M. Claude Ministre de Charenton} (Paris, 1675), where the same arguments are rehearsed.
Chapter 5

Anglican ‘Anti-Augustinianism’ and the Theology of Holy Living

Mid-seventeenth century episcopalian churchmen liked to attribute the religious and political chaos of these years to the captivity of ‘our schools and pulpits’ by the fatalistic tenets of predestinarian Calvinism. The doctrines of unconditional election, perseverance and assurance led directly to antinomianism; and they had bred among the populace such a contempt for pious and sober conversation as easily explained, quite apart from the intrinsically subversive political tendency of their Presbyterian vehicle, the enormities of rebellion and regicide.1 If such churchmen could agree about anything with their former ally Thomas Hobbes, it was the pressing need for a firmly founded ‘moral science’. 2 For Hobbes the bishops, emissaries of a principality whose diplomacy undermined the unicity of sovereignty the more insidiously as it did so invisibly, were as culpable as rabble-rousing puritan demagogues.3 To his episcopalian opponents, Hobbes, protecting the individual from moral responsibility by making the sovereign will the ‘common rule of Good and Evil’, was part of the problem.4 Hobbes’s arbitrary morality and determinist metaphysics, like predestinarian Calvinism, rendered human effort futile. ‘I hate this doctrine from my heart’, wrote John Bramhall. It makes ‘God Almighty to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the

4 Leviathan, p. 120.
world’, and ‘men to be but the tennis-balls of destiny’, who, with no liberty to do the good, are either saved through no virtue of their own, or ‘damned of necessity’. 5 ‘I could wish’, echoed Thorndike, ‘that no man that is called a Christian would own it’. 6

Such criticisms had become commonplace among dissenters from the ‘regnant’ Calvinist orthodoxy of the late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart Church, who have therefore earned from historians the name of ‘anti-Calvinists’ or, from the intellectual kinship of this reaction from Calvinism with that of the Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius (1560-1609), ‘English Arminians’. 7 In this chapter we turn our attention to the heirs of this anti-Calvinist tradition among mid-century apologists for the disestablished episcopal Church. For divines such as Henry Hammond (1605-1660), Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667), Herbert Thorndike (1596/7-1672), and Richard Allestree (1621/2-1681), antagonism towards the Calvinist theology of unconditional predestination was focused by the institutional triumph of its partisans. Willing to admit the ‘abuses, and excesses, and mistakes’ of the past, and eager to ‘use ill times to make us better’, their work was constructive and creative as much as it was

6 Epilogue, ii, p. 4.
7 Quote is Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination. Grace in English Protestant Theology, 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill, 1982), p. 66; Peter Lake, ‘Calvinism and the English Church, 1530-1645’, Past and Present, 114 (1987); Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists. The Rise of English Arminianism c. 1590-1640 (Oxford, 1987). ‘Calvinism’ is not really an adequate term to cover the breadth of English Protestant theology. Always in the nature of a synthesis, not a system, it owed as much to Strasbourg, Zurich, Berne, and Basle as Geneva. There is often, too, a difference to be put between the theology of Calvin and ‘Calvinism’. Nor were other intellectual traditions absent, such as the synergist Lutheranism which has been connected to the early appearance of English anti-Calvinism. In this chapter we are concerned with a group of writers who clearly differentiated themselves from a theology which they called ‘Calvinist’, and to which they gave a positive content on the basis of the definitions provided by the Synod of Dort in 1618 and the Westminster Assembly in the 1640s. Since their objections to this theology were identical with those of earlier figures identified as anti-Calvinists, it has seemed appropriate to carry on with this language – particularly in view of the fact that ‘Reformed’ is potentially as vague as ‘Calvinist’ may be spuriously precise. On the theological latitude of the post-Reformation English Church a start may be made with Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p. 6f.; Diarmaid MacCulloch, ‘The Latitude of the Church of England’, in K. Fincham and P. Lake (eds.), Religious Politics in Post-Reformation England (Woodbridge, 2006); idem, The Later Reformation in England 1547-1603 (Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 65f.; C. M. Dent, Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford (Oxford, 1983), pp. 87-102; Peter White, Predestination, policy and polemic (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 82f.; Patrick Collinson, ‘England and International Calvinism, 1558-1640’, printed in his From Cranmer to Sancroft (2006); Seán Hughes, ‘The Problem of “Calvinism”: English Theologies of Predestination c. 1580-1630’, in S. Wabuda and C. Litzenberger (eds.), Belief and Practice in Reformation England (Aldershot, 1998); R. T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford, 1979).
defensive and reactionary. Their writings made explicit and programmatic the divergence of the English anti-Calvinist tradition from those Augustinian presuppositions about predestination, original sin and irresistible grace which underpinned the Calvinist orthodoxy enshrined in the Westminster Standards. This ‘Calvinist Augustinianism’, they argued, destroyed the foundations of Christianity by removing all incentive to moral endeavour. Consequently their theological work cohered around an emphasis upon the moral autonomy of the individual Christian. They developed a theory of justification which, in the context of post-Reformation English theology, was ‘new and strange’. According to this theory justifying faith involved works not by consequence but by definition. On this basis they presented Christianity as ‘the whole duty of man’ (Eccl. xii 13), a rigorous and comprehensive system of private devotion and public observance. This model of piety became hugely influential among restoration churchmen. While the new soteriology did not ‘eclipse’ its Calvinist counterpart, it was taken over wholesale by many younger divines, such as George Bull, who in his controversial *Harmonia Apostolica* of 1669 published a lucid exposition of it. It was the characteristic soteriology, in particular, of those churchmen known as latitudinarians; and, insofar as they captured the ecclesiastical establishment in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Nicholas Tyacke is justified in regarding Gilbert Burnet’s 1700 work, *An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, where the latitudinarian bishop of

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9 Allison, *The Rise of Moralism*, pp. 73, 190.


Salisbury identified himself with the anti-Calvinist theology of human effort, as setting ‘a seal on the new Arminian dispensation’.12

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Burnet himself described this development in terms of the reputation of Augustine. Seeking to explain why the Thirty-Nine Articles were not generally made the subject of extended commentary, he observed that

it has been … often suggested, That those Articles seemed to be so plain a Transcript of S. Austin’s Doctrine, in those much disputed Points, concerning the Decrees of God, and the Efficacy of Grace, that they were not expounded by our Divines for that very reason; since the far greater Number of them is believed to be now of a different Opinion.13

It was from the rigid framework of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theses on the depravity introduced by original sin, and man’s consequent dependence for his salvation on an efficacious grace determining him to the good, that the mid-century Anglicans sought to escape.14 In pursuit of this end it may be said that, with more or less boldness, they willingly reversed the formula by which Cornelius Jansen had condescended to praise Calvin:15 for, far from thinking that Calvin ought to be congratulated on account of Augustine, Augustine sometimes seemed to them to deserve reproach on account of Calvin. Often they confounded Augustine with their polemical Calvin, so that where the Jansenists proudly claimed

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12 Nicholas Tyacke, ‘Religious controversy during the seventeenth century: the case of Oxford’, in his Aspects of English Protestantism c. 1530-1700 (Manchester, 2001), p. 307; Burnet, An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England (2nd ed., 1700): see esp. the treatment given to article XI, on justification, and article XVII, on predestination and election; in the Preface, p. vi, Burnet divulged that in this question he followed ‘the doctrine of the Greek Church, from which St. Austin departed’ – that is, as pp. 147-8 make clear, a doctrine based on free will. Cf. idem, A Discourse of the Pastoral Care (1692), p. 169.
13 Exposition, Preface, p. i.
14 See above, Introduction, p. 8, for my use of the term ‘Anglican’.
15 ‘Should Calvin in some point have given in his judgement with Augustine, Augustine ought not to be held unworthy on Calvin’s account, but Calvin ought rather to be congratulated on Augustine’s’ – see Chapter 4, n. 12, above.
allegiance with Prosper, Fulgentius, and many another sound disciple of the Doctor of Grace, contemporary Anglicans were capable of owning a more recherché and even a more dubious confederacy of allies, from the author of the Collations, to those so several metaphysical libertarians among the moderns, Molina, Arminius, and even the arch-heretic Fausto Sozzini.\textsuperscript{16} In establishing their major theological point of contrast they were concerned to fix on their opponents a parody of Augustinian thought centred on its pessimistic anthropology and its determinist premises. The distance this puts between their outlook and that of the Jansenists is thus adequately summarised in the judgement of the loyalist clergyman Richard Watson, who at the time of Cum occasione in 1653 described the latter as ‘a pack of villains, worse ten times, if possible, than the Puritans’.\textsuperscript{17}

Just as in the preceding chapter we were concerned to test this popular parody of Jansenist thought, however, so we are now engaged to investigate the constructive reality which followed behind the polemical Anglican rejection of Calvinist thought. With the Jansenists we posed the problem in terms of ‘rigorism’: how to reconcile a theology which, on the received account, effectively denied nature, with a severe moral scheme that demanded the utmost extension on the part of the human will moving itself? Here the terms of the problem are reversed. In an influential account – reflecting both the vehemence with which the Anglicans asserted their independence of Augustine, and the Calvinist polemics which therefore depicted them as modern-day Pelagians – the new Anglican soteriology is presented as tending effectively to replace grace with a rehabilitated human nature.\textsuperscript{18} How to reconcile this with a severe moral scheme predicated on a pronounced pessimism about the infirmity of nature? With the Jansenists we had to ask how a pessimistic anthropology

\textsuperscript{16} (1539-1604.) Nephew of Lelio, and usually known in the seventeenth century by the Latinized form of his name, Faustus Socinus was a Sienese critic both of Catholicism and of Reformed theology, who during the later-sixteenth century formed a group of Anabaptist and anti-trinitarian radicals in Poland into an organised anti-trinitarian church.

\textsuperscript{17} CClarSP, ii, p. 232.

\textsuperscript{18} Below, pp. 231f.
sustained a ‘rigorism’ which implied the necessity of self-improvement; here we have to ask how an optimistic anthropology sustained a ‘moralism’ which implied the necessity of self-effacement.

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In the case of the Jansenists we suggested that the solution lay in a fuller account of their Augustinianism than is implied in the usual account of their rigorism, where it is related to a ‘theological pessimism’ which produced a sort of punitive reflex against sinful nature in the form of an excessive discipline.\(^{19}\) The response to this charge would rest partly on their insistence on the hidden-ness of God, which allowed them to describe grace as resistible and to account for the common experience of contingency; and partly on the Platonist ethical perspective, which, along with his theology of grace, they inherited from Augustine. It was not nature they evacuated of moral potency, but fallen nature. Man is created in the image of God and the vestiges of this likeness remain in fallen nature. Sin is like a veil which obscures nature as it was intended by the creator. To lift this veil, to dispel the shadows of ignorance and concupiscence which cloud the human spirit, is not to extinguish but to liberate nature by revealing the divine image there impressed. Thus are the reason and will of man freed, like the soul’s wings in the *Phaedrus*, to know and love his last end, and thereby to achieve that conformity with the ultimate good which is for the creature to share in the divine life.\(^{20}\) Man’s ability to know and do the good does not depend on his being effectively determined to that which is alien to his nature, but on the essential congruity between his nature and the source of good, a congruity obscured by the sub-nature in which he is trammelled. Upon the purging of this sub-nature, therefore, his ability to do the good will not appear as the effect of

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\(^{19}\) I quote from the entry in the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, ed. F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone (3rd ed. rev., 2005); for this view see also e.g. Doyle, *Jansenism*, p. 35.  
an extrinsic cause, but as an expression of intrinsic freedom, since that is free which is able to act in accordance with its own ends.\textsuperscript{21}

The Jansenists were therefore left with an interest in what formally constitutes this freedom under the conditions of sin: that is in the psychological question of how the will is determined, the prior question of why it is effectively determined having been resolved, on the premise of original sin, on the side of efficacious grace. ‘Quand nous soutenons la nécessité de la grâce efficace, nous lui donnons d’autres vertus pour objet … c’est pour une vertu plus haute …’.\textsuperscript{22} Here, remembering Augustine’s psychological account of the power of concupiscence in the \textit{Confessions}, they accentuated the appetites or inclinations arising from the sensible as well as the intellectual affections. Because under sin the harmony which formerly obtained between reason and the sensual appetites no longer exists, the determination of the will cannot be a purely intellective matter. Man cannot, for example, acquire at a stroke such a knowledge of the good that he can no longer sin. Love and knowledge are in reciprocal relation: only when the heart as well as the understanding is affected to an idea can the soul be involved in an integral movement towards it and produce the conformable actions. Otherwise there is light without heat, and no growth.\textsuperscript{23} The formal transformation of the will, then – initial conversion and habitual obedience – takes place for the Jansenists in consequence of the mortification of sinful inclinations, and consists in a loving disposition. Being wedded to a determinist account of its effective transformation, they described the effective divine impulse as an internal or ‘vital act’ in the will, inclining the appetites to the love of God. And, they concluded, because love is by definition free, the will is freely determined, and so forth.

\textsuperscript{22} Pascal, \textit{CLP}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{23} There is a useful article on the subject of the affections, by P. Pourrat, in the \textit{Dictionnaire de spiritualité}, dir. Marcel Viller, 17 vols. (Paris, 1937-95), I, cols. 235-40.
This liberation they assigned to the ‘victorious’ grace of Christ, conquering the empire of sin to which man has subjected himself. But they did not argue this way because of a philosophical commitment to determinism. Rather they were concerned to overthrow a doctrine of liberty which, effectively denying the debility superinduced upon it by sin, must inevitably understate the transformation required in order to realise the supernatural end implicit in human nature. To recognise that an efficacious grace is necessary to turn the soul toward its end in God is to acknowledge the condition without which this cannot be, the reversal of a contrary tendency towards the world. Molinism, skewed towards nature, and Calvinism, skewed towards illumination, offered the false security enjoyed by a patient who denies his disease. The Jansenists avoided these counterfeit sorts of certainty and guaranteed the contribution of man to his own reformation by emphasising the inscrutability of God and his purposes. It is not humble to suppose that God’s purposes are conditioned by man’s will, nor presumptuously to assume them upon the bare title of ‘faith’; but humility is a precondition of interior reformation. So ‘toute religion qui ne dit pas que Dieu est caché n’est pas véritable’. The hidden God points to the Incarnation as the foundation of certainty: to Christ in the Gospel, who in his example and precepts demanded a perfection of love from his followers. This concrete and practical emphasis complemented a theological method which preferred, to the deductions of speculative reason, the historical recovery from the best and earliest sources of an authentic interpretation of Christ’s teaching and ministry.

In the case of the English writers now under consideration, we will suggest by way of analogy that, as with our treatment of ‘Jansenist Augustinianism’, a discriminating approach to their ‘anti-Augustinianism’ will shed light on their substantive theological aims. We might imagine the two groups on either side of a wall which represents the determinist Augustine of

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24 *Pensées*, 242.
the anti-Pelagian writings. The sun is shining from the side on which the Anglicans stand; consequently the shadow cast by the wall obscures our view of the Jansenists, while the glare reflected from it dazzles our view of the Anglicans. The Anglican rejection of the determinist ‘Calvinist’ (or indeed ‘Jansenist’) Augustine, in other words, can obscure their continued debt to his psychological insights into the state of fallen nature, and to the related Platonic view of morality as an internal ordering to the good.

In the sections which follow a theological programme is traced which, we will suggest, was comparable to that of the Jansenists in three respects. In the first place the mid-century Anglicans insisted that the promise of eternal life tendered in the Gospel is conditional upon obedience. Because salvation does, justification implies in the individual such a faith as includes obedience by definition. The concept of justification had in some way to include the idea of a real transformation from sinfulness to righteousness. In the second place, therefore, these Anglican writers focused on the transformation of the will. If faith is formed by love, no separation can be made between the understanding, whose object is thought, and the will and the appetites, whose object is action. We cannot fulfil the obligation of obedience without loving God, nor can we love God while sinning against him. Christ’s coming to redeem man from the iniquity of sin meant from the whole body of sin. Conversion is not just the reorientation to God of a mind clouded by ignorance, but also of a will weakened and affections depraved by concupiscence. If the soul, or inner disposition, is to be ordered by the love of God, therefore, it must be purged of all sinful affections. No conscious or voluntary sin, or any unchecked affection thereto, can consist with the regenerate state. Hence the new life of loving obedience premised by the Gospel as the condition of salvation is identical with the life of repentance, defined as ‘an effectual

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26 It will be observed that these are the Jansenist objections against the casuists and the Calvinists respectively.
conversion from all sin to all holiness'. In the third place, then, we may note that this Anglican school, having made salvation conditional on love, an expansive and directed state of the will, grounded any certainty the Christian could have of his salvation on his own active response to the love of God expressed in the offer of the Gospel and the redemptive work of Christ. This scheme not only underlined the responsibility of the individual to take in hand his own reformation, but demanded, in its identification of the state of regeneration with an effectual repentance, the utmost possible extension on his part. It therefore resulted in a moral and spiritual teaching which, in its consistent severity, has reminded modern commentators of continental ‘rigorisme’. Taylor, one of its chief English exponents, encapsulated it more positively in the phrase ‘holy living’. Nevertheless, just as the Jansensists are accused of stigmatising the inclinations of nature, so the theoreticians of ‘holy living’ are charged with encouraging the phenomenon of repression by throwing sinners on their own resources, and demanding of them a standard of perfection so unattainable as to admit only unconscious, that is unwilled, sins.

Anti-Calvinism and the Theology of Holy Living

Episcopalian loyalists of the 1640s and 1650s confronted an enemy which earlier anti-Calvinists and the Laudians had, by identifying Calvinist predestinarian theology with puritan dissidence, in a sense helped to create. Their political opponents were largely united by a

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27 This understanding of repentance is shared by all the writers examined in this chapter. The quote however is from Chillingworth, *The Religion of Protestants*, p. 498.
28 For example Spurr, *The Restoration Church*, p. 306, in re: its tutorism; McAdoo, *Caroline Moral Theology*, pp. 9f.
29 The title of his 1650 work on *The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living*.
31 Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists*, pp. 7-8, 70-71, 102-3, 166-7, 186-92, 225-6; Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, pp. 46-8, 90-91, 118-19, 319-20, 521-2; Peter Lake, ‘‘The Anglican Moment’’, in Platten (ed.), *Anglicanism*, pp. 90-
commitment to Calvinist doctrine. Defeat, moreover, rendered the whole range of more or less indifferent matters along which the Laudians had prosecuted their agenda materially insignificant. Episcopacy itself was abolished by parliamentary ordinance in October 1646. For the mid-century Anglicans, therefore, the case against their Presbyterian and Independent enemies came to focus more systematically on their Calvinist theology. And the case against Calvinism turned on the issue of justification. Here, to their minds, its soteriological imbalance between grace and free will and its determinist metaphysics were resolved into the most pressing consequence: for the question at stake was whether Christians were to be saved by ‘a good life’ or merely by ‘faith in the special promises’. The Anglican divines answered resoundingly that man cannot be acceptable to God without a good life. Calvin may have held that ‘Christ justifies no one whom he does not at the same time sanctify’, but the Calvinist doctrine of justification, they argued, in fact demolished the foundations of holiness. The development of genuinely antinomian doctrines among the radical sects and even within the ranks of orthodox Calvinists lent force to this case and encouraged boldness in its exposition.

The question of justification concerns, as Thorndike put it, ‘from whence it comes, and what it is, that renders Christians acceptable to God … who, as men, are his enemies by sinne here, and objects of his wrath in the world to come’. On the Calvinist theory as synthesised in the Westminster Confession, justification is tied directly to the eternal decree of predestination. Since the elect are fixed from all eternity, so was their justification through the merits of Christ. It is a single, judicial act by which God decided that a portion of the

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32 Taylor, UN, p. 11.
34 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, ch. 4; relevant material in Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (Harmondsworth, 1975), index s.v. ‘antinomianism’; and for further background David Como, Blown by the Spirit (Stanford, CA, 2004).
35 Epilogue, ii, p. 2.
sinful mass will be forgiven and held just on account of Christ. From man’s perspective it is again instantaneous, being the moment one of the elect is moved by the Holy Spirit to perceive by faith that Christ died for him personally. The elect who are determined by grace willingly to believe and obey the Gospel are then by God freely made righteous for Christ’s sake: this means he pardons their sins and accepts them as righteous. He does not infuse actual righteousness into them, nor does he accept their works as if they were righteous. He imputes the righteousness of Christ to them, so that their faith in Christ, given to them by God, is the sole instrument of their own justification. Thus ‘the exact justice, and rich grace of God’ is ‘glorified by the justification of sinners’. As a consequence of justification the elect are adopted to be heirs of salvation, and given the grace of sanctification to grow in actual holiness, mortifying and overcoming the corruption natural to the flesh. Sometimes, as Paul describes in Romans vii, the mind will be willing but the flesh weak; but with the sanctifying grace of Christ the spirit will gradually subdue the flesh. Thus a sincere and comprehensive repentance is a grace offered to justified sinners. Their good works are ‘fruits and evidences of a true and lively faith’. Having been effectually called, justified and sanctified they must always persevere in the state of grace and can never totally or finally fall away from it. The ‘inward evidence’ of these graces, or testimony of the Spirit witnessing to the spirit, added to the infallible truth of the Gospel promises, produces in the elect saint an ‘infallible assurance’ of grace and salvation. This is the crown of the sanctified life on earth and must be striven for by all believers.36

The Anglicans raised three interrelated objections to this theory of justification and its place in the ordo salutis. The most immediate problem was, as Hammond observed, that it ‘is apt to have an ill-influence on practice’. The timorous, those unable or unwilling to identify

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36 The Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, First agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster (Amsterdam, 1649), pp. 1-28. An excellent overview of the background against which the special features of this theory become apparent is Berndt Hamm, ‘What was the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?’, in C. Scott Dixon (ed.), The German Reformation (Oxford, 1999), pp. 56-90.
in themselves the movements of the Spirit, will be cast into despair. But the carnal, the presumptuous, the slothful, will draw the antinomian inference: ‘why may I not be confident for all my sins, since the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is that by which I shall be justified?’; ‘if the righteousness that was in him by never sinning, be reckoned to me, what need I any other initial imperfect righteousness or holiness of my own?’ So the Calvinist theory, according to the Anglicans, will not produce the character it nevertheless attributes to the man who is saved – viz., one who is sincerely repentant, conquers the law of sin in his members, and grows in good works and sanctification.  

Secondly, then, they objected to the forensic character of a theory whose dominant notes were the concepts of guilt and satisfaction. The pardon of sins, insofar as it preceded sanctification, was divorced from repentance for and conversion from them. But, wrote Hammond, Christ ‘gave himself not that absolutely or presently we might be acquitted, but that he might redeem us from all iniquity, from the reigning power, as well as the guilt …’. If, as the Calvinists agreed, the spirit must subdue the flesh in the man who is acceptable to God, it could not be that a justified man remains a slave to sin. Thus these writers were all convinced, like Arminius (and Arnauld), that the words of Paul in Romans vii could not be those of a regenerate man. They rejected the *justus peccator* of Reformation theology on the same grounds as the Tridentine Church, namely that the remission of sins supposes, as well as a judicial pardon, the renovation and sanctification of the *hominis interioris*, ‘the hidden man of the heart’, in Taylor’s words. The Calvinist theory, they argued, contained an

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37 UN, p. 11; Hammond, *Practical Catechisme*, p. 36.  
38 Here there was an analogy with legalistic Catholic casuistry, which similarly neglected the moral personality or interior disposition; cf. ch. 3, above.  
insufficient account of ‘what it is’ to be justified – of the form justification takes in the individual believer.

Therefore in the third place they rejected the Calvinist account of how it is, from the point of view of man, that we are justified. It cannot be the sudden epiphany that we are pardoned, because justification implies more than a bare pardon. The Calvinist theory, then, was excessively speculative. To believe in the promise that through Christ we may become acceptable to God is, as Hammond put it, to believe that through him we may be redeemed from the iniquity of sin: that is, that, under a certain condition, we may qualify for the promise. This condition implies an actual, inherent, intrinsic change, from bondage to sin to the service of God. To believe that the promise appertains ‘to any but those who are so qualified’ is ‘to believe a lie; no piece of faith, but a phantasy or a vain conceit, which sure will never advantage, but betray any that depends upon it’.  

In publishing a ‘practical’ catechism Hammond was not opposing to this speculative faith of the Calvinists merely a sort of common-sense, pastorally-oriented piety; rather, as his epigraph indicated (‘theologia est scientia affectiva non speculativa’), he intended a technical opposition between a speculative and an affective approach to theology. Because justification involves the transformation of the inner disposition, it must involve the heart as well as the mind, the affections which move the soul towards the loved object and must be fixed on God. Since the object of the will and appetites is action, justification cannot simply

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be apprehended by the intellect; it must also be manifested in the will, the seat of action.  

‘Virtue consist[s] in the affection of the will, not in the perfection of the understanding’.  

The Calvinist theory gave an insufficient account of what is involved in being made righteous, and a barely speculative account of the accessory part of man. Thus it could not translate into the state of new life premised by the Gospel as the condition of salvation.

In order to carry a new theory of justification which would meet these objections, the Anglicans developed a particular reading of the Gospel. Within the puritan tradition the pastoral difficulties indicated by Hammond had been met by the development of an ‘experimental’, works-based piety, and a language of covenants emphasising the two-sided nature of the relationship between man and God. The Anglicans appropriated this language of covenants in order to describe the Gospel as a promise of reward tendered in return for obedience.

God established his first covenant with man by the creation. He gave Adam a law – a positive obligation not to eat the fruit, and the moral law written in his heart – and the knowledge and strength to live by it. On condition that Adam used his gifts and performed a perfect un-sinning obedience, God undertook to provide continuance of his light and strength, and to crown his exact obedience with eternal felicity. By the fall man excluded himself from

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44 It is only fair to point out that Calvin emphasised ‘the heart’ quite as much in discussing faith (e.g. Inst., III 2.7; III 2.36). The ‘Calvinism’ we are discussing here, once more, is constituted by the perceptions of our writers, and not necessarily by the contents of Calvin’s theology.

45 Thorndike, Epilogue, ii, p. 35.


this covenant; having lost his special gifts, he could never perform perfect obedience. So God, in the promise made to the woman’s seed in Genesis iii, made a second covenant with mankind. He promised to give Christ to become a second Adam and die to satisfy for the sin of the first, undertaking thereby to pardon man’s unrighteousness, sin and iniquity upon terms that could be fulfilled despite the forfeit of the light and strength given to Adam.

These terms are revealed by Christ. The Christian must become a whole new creature, giving up his whole heart to Christ. He must repent past sins, give, to the degree that God enables him, a sincere, honest and faithful obedience to the whole Gospel, labour sincerely to mortify every sin, and at each fall repent and reform. On condition that man uses the assistances afforded him and lives up to these terms, God undertakes to give him more grace and finally to crown his faith and obedience with glory. Under the Mosaic law, which ostensibly demanded the condition of the first covenant from those with no power to perform it, this covenant operated in a veiled way. Those who were saved under the law were saved by it, and the law in its insufficiency pointed towards the revelation of the covenant of grace in Christ, which it prefigured in sacrifices and other rites.

Under the new covenant the condition of pardon and salvation is clear: ‘a constellation and conjuncture of all those Gospel graces, faith, hope, charity, self-denial, repentance, etc., every one of them truly and sincerely rooted in the Christian heart, though mixed with much weakness and imperfections and perhaps with many sins’. This is a condition fallen man can hope to fulfil, because it does not demand an un-sinning obedience to which nature is inadequate. The good news thus consists in the ‘glad tidings’ brought by Christ of ‘ease and remission’ from the stringency of the law, and gives assurance that sinners

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48 This scheme originated, among the Anglicans, in Hammond’s Practical Catechisme, pp. 4-15, 35f., quote at p. 13; it is replicated very fully in UN, ch. 1; Allestree, Whole Duty, Preface §§ 12-24; idem, Forty Sermons, pp. 236-7; and see Thorndike, Epilogue, i, p. 81, ii, ch. 3, pp. 35–43, chs. 8, 9; Bull, Harmonia Apostolica, diss. 2, chs. 5, 7-10, 13.
can hope to return to God through repentance and amendment. Taylor habitually referred to
the new dispensation as the ‘covenant of repentance’. This
admission of us to repentance, is the great verification of [God’s] justice, and the
greatest expression of his mercy … springing from the fountains of grace, purchas’d by
the blood of the Holy Lamb, the Eternal sacrifice, promised from the beginning, always
ministred to mans need in the secret Economy of God, but proclaim’d to all the world
at the revelation of God incarnate.⁴⁹

Justification, the pardon of man’s sins and the acceptance of him as righteous,
logically operates under the same conditions which qualify the salvation promised in the
Gospel. Neither faith nor works are effective or meritorious as causes of justification,
whether directly or indirectly (‘instrumentally’): ‘neither is it imaginable [they] should, it
being a worke of God’s upon us, without us, concerning us, but not within us at all’. But they
are conditions sine qua non, ‘morall instruments’, as Hammond called them, ‘without which
we shall not be justified’.⁵⁰ The condign merit for which some Catholics contended was, in
Bull’s words, a ‘dreadful error’, for ‘the satisfaction of Christ’ is the only meritorious cause
of justification, and God through that satisfaction the only effective cause. But the death of
Christ purchased the ‘free grace’ of God ‘to pardon and accept us on such poore conditions’
as our faith and repentance.⁵¹

⁴⁹ UN, ch. 1, I.13, ch. 2, II passim.
⁵⁰ Practical Catechisme, pp. 112-13; identical language is used by Taylor, Dekas Embolimaioys, p. 7; Bull,
Harmonia Apostolica, diss. 1, ch. 2.
Alister McGrath, ‘The Emergence of the Anglican Tradition on Justification 1600-1700’, Churchman, 98, 1
(1983), pp. 28-43. Hampton, Anti-Arminianism, pp. 45f., is too bullish with respect to this condition sine qua
non, asserting that the identification (by Allison, The Rise of Moralism, passim, followed by Spurr, Restoration
Church, p. 299) of the formal cause as the centre of the disagreement is a red herring. Even were the evidence
not on his side, Allison would not be incorrect so to speak, for the Calvinists asserted that justification is
formally Christ’s righteousness imputed to man, and the Anglicans that it is man’s sincere and faithful
obedience imputed to him as righteousness. This sincere obedience they sometimes called the formal cause,
sometimes a cause sine qua non; in any case they assumed both that it is indispensable and that it is not the
effective cause.
Hence justification is not from man’s perspective the instantaneous apprehension of an immutable judicial act, but a process correlated with the extent to which, with the preventing and assisting grace won by Christ, he has fulfilled the condition of pardon. It is therefore in some sense parallel with sanctification: some measure of sanctification must precede justification, for to be justified is to be within the terms of the covenant, ‘the death of Christ not justifying any who hath not his part in his Resurrection’.  

This obviously diverged from the Calvinist theory, where Christ’s death purchases the free justification of the irretrievably wicked, not only on account of his passive righteousness, but by his active righteousness. The Anglicans, naturally, agreed that there exists a disparity between the commandments of God and the ability of mankind to fulfil them. But they refused to account for this wholly by the depravity introduced with sin. Taylor’s remarks here are typical of the ambidextrous handling among the Anglicans of Augustine’s authority in this area. To blame man exclusively, he argued, is really to suggest that, mutatis mutandis, ‘a man might keep the whole law, and then might be justified by the whole law, and should not need a Saviour’. In other words, if Augustine followed out his logic on original sin, he would be ‘worse than’ Pelagian on salvation. On the theory of total depravity, implied Taylor, the idea of sin becomes a legal abstraction; whereas the whole Gospel is framed around the existential reality of sin in those it nevertheless promises to redeem. 

Were there no infirmity in nature, the incentive offered in the Gospel would be more than sufficient motive to constant obedience. But taking our infirmity into account, it is impossible. The resolution lay, for these writers, in the sense in which God exacts the law he imposes. He exacts just what is ‘morally’, not what is ‘naturally’ possible: that is, the utmost of our endeavour in the face of our infirmity. The Gospel requires simply that we ‘love God

with all our soul, that is … love him as much as we can love him’. This sincerity, a quality of the will, must then produce an actual obedience.\textsuperscript{54}

The reason God imposes ‘what in his justice he does not exact’ is, Taylor said, to set a benchmark: not just to rescue sinners, but to keep returning sinners growing in grace all the days of their lives. Hammond described the ‘use’ of the new covenant in similar terms. By prescribing the condition it sets the bar. On the one hand it shows the indispensable necessity of sincere obedience, thus shutting the door against ‘carnal security, sloth, presumption, hypocrisy, partial obedience, and habitual sin’. On the other it shows how possible it is to perform this obedience with Christ’s grace, stirring men up to diligent endeavour by showing them the true grounds of hope.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Moralism}

In this way, the Anglicans conceived, they had corrected the flaws of Calvinist soteriology, while following the thread of Christian orthodoxy along the precipice flanked by Manicheism and Pelagianism.\textsuperscript{56} They protected man’s part in salvation by including, in their account of ‘what it is’ to be justified, a concept of inherent righteousness which, without falling into the pitfall of condign merit, obliged the object of God’s act to contribute his own efforts. They avoided the fatalism that renders human effort futile by downplaying the idea that justification is fixed by eternal decree, describing it instead as part of the ongoing process by which humans are turned from sin and become acceptable to God. On the other


\textsuperscript{55} UN, p. 35; \textit{Practical Catechisme}, pp. 15-16; see also Thorndike, \textit{Epilogue}, ii, p. 279.

hand they were clear that conversion and a good life cannot be produced by nature alone. Man is saved by Christ. But to save, they insisted, is to redeem from sin; and to redeem from sin means, not only reconciling us to God by obtaining pardon, but mortifying the sinful desires and habits of the old, natural, carnal man, and ‘implanting a new principle of holiness in the heart’.\textsuperscript{57} For the Anglicans as for their opponents the essence of the Gospel was the great antithesis between man’s wretchedness without God and his greatness in God, the sin of Adam and the sacrifice of Christ, death in sin and new life in grace. The problem with Calvinist soteriology, they claimed, was simply that it did not articulate Christ’s conquest over sin.

To their Calvinist opponents, of course, this assessment would have appeared excessively generous. The balancing act attempted by the Anglicans, according to their critics, was a failure which toppled them straight into the defile of Pelagianism. From the Calvinist or Reformed perspective, the forensic theory of gratuitous justification followed necessarily from a true appreciation of sinfulness as the existential condition of mankind. The emphasis on human effort in the new Anglican soteriology could only be achieved at the expense of God’s free grace. Hence Presbyterian and Independent controversialists, feeling increasingly pressurised in the 1650s and afterwards by the mounting theological critique of Calvinism, were eager to fix on the Anglicans a charge of heretical naturalism.\textsuperscript{58} Sometimes the latter were flatly convicted of Pelagianism;\textsuperscript{59} more often the charge was translated into contemporary polemical terms as one of ‘popery’, Arminianism, or Socinianism.

\textsuperscript{57} And, of course, ‘perfecting these beginnings at the end of this life in heaven’: Hammond, \textit{Practical Catechisme}, pp. 17-20.
These labels were a function of the argument which mid-century episcopalian writers inherited from their conformist predecessors, and a little background is needed here. Earlier apologists, notably Richard Hooker (1544-1600), had defended the outward structure and life of the English Church against a case for further reformation predicated on robustly Reformed assumptions about the depravity of fallen nature and the priority of the invisible church of the elect. The Presbyterians grounded their arguments in the omnicompetent authority of scripture, for man is wholly dependent on the sovereign will of God as expressed imperatively in his Word, the ordinary means of receiving faith. Hooker therefore defended the polity of the English Church by broadening the concept of law, along lines laid down by Aquinas. 60 Revelation is one source of law, but it complements reason by which men as understanding creatures share in the eternal law or wisdom directing everything in God’s creation to its proper end. This law implanted in nature gives man some general premises from which he can work out, without the aid of revelation, how to organise his activity in accordance with the eternal reason or plan of God. Humans can frame laws whose consonance with right reason shows they derive from the eternal law. 61 Revelation is required over and above natural law and human law because human destiny lies beyond nature, but even here revelation presupposes what we know by reason, including the divine authority of Scripture. 62 Having truth for its object, faith is properly ‘an intellectual habit’, so that natural motives, so long as reason is not distorted by vicious inclinations, can only reinforce what we are persuaded of by faith. 63

61 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 2 vols. (1907), i, bk. 1, II-X; Aquinas, ST, IaIae, qq. 91, 93.
62 Hooker, Lawes, bk. 1, XIV, esp. §§ 1 & 5.
63 Ib., bk. 5, LXIII, § 2; cf. Aquinas, ST, IaIae, qq. 1-6.
Hooker, then, rejected the view that man should or could expect an infallible certainty by direct divine authority regarding every aspect of his earthly pilgrimage. For Hooker man has his own prerogatives: he is a voluntary, rational agent capable of ordering his affairs in accordance with the purposes of God. This did not sit easily with a predestinarian theology, and it has been argued that Hooker was led by his concern to protect the relative autonomy of human activity to the view that free will consists in a liberty of indifference. The idea that man’s response to the offer of grace is not irresistibly determined also suited Hooker’s defence of the liturgy and ceremonies of the established Church, which he sought to invest with a positive devotional content. His vision of a Christian community bound up with Christ by its corporate participation in the sacraments and public worship of the Church suggested an understanding of grace as universal in scope, available to the whole baptized community and depending for its efficacy on the nature of their response.

Although Hooker worked from within the inheritance of Calvin’s theology, his arguments clearly tended against some of its organising principles. Men are voluntary agents whose choices, as proceeding from reason, have some inherent value; the human will is free to do or not to do good or bad; and God’s offer of grace is universal and mediated through the sacraments. Taken together these positions amounted to a withdrawal from the

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65 Voak, Richard Hooker, pp. 51-60, 269-70, 296f. Hooker resorted to a theory of divine foreknowledge which closely resembled that of Molina, and may have derived directly from the Concordia, in order to argue that the decrees of election and reprobation reflect a knowledge of hypothetical future contingents rather than a will to determine them in a particular way. God can have definite knowledge of future sinfulness or righteousness without having foreordained it by an act of will. See Voak, ‘English Molinism in the Late 1590s: Richard Hooker on Free Will, Predestination, and Divine Foreknowledge’, Journal of Theological Studies, NS, 60, 1 (2009), pp. 130-177.
infallible certainty guaranteed by the ‘golden chain’ of predestination.\textsuperscript{68} Reason, however fallible, has some value in judging religious questions; among some Hookerian thinkers in Caroline England, sometimes called the ‘Oxford rational theologians’, this methodological assumption became the basis of an influential form of ‘mitigated scepticism’, designed to outflank both puritan claims to inspiration and Catholic pretensions to infallibility.\textsuperscript{69} There must be some reason for any belief, whether in the authority of Scripture or the infallibility of the Church; assent can only attend the best arguments.\textsuperscript{70} This confidence in critical reason – rightly formed by faith and piety and aware of its limits – as the ‘negative measure’ in any question, in Taylor’s words, promoted an intellectual freedom and tolerance which was deeply suspicious to those who identified the essence of the Church with a narrowly defined concept of true doctrine.\textsuperscript{71}

Such suspicions were intensified by the apparent affinities between this developing anti-Calvinist position and continental currents of thought; for English anti-Calvinists were involved in a widespread debate about the theology of grace in European Protestant Christianity that mirrored the disputes \textit{de auxiliis divinae gratiae} from which the \textit{Augustinus} emerged.\textsuperscript{72} In Holland the Arminians were involved in a similar reaction from a theology centred on the eternal and immutable decrees. Like Hooker, Arminius drew on Molina to


\textsuperscript{72} Cf. Hughes, ‘The Problem of “Calvinism”.'
develop the theory of a divine foreknowledge which does not determine future contingents. Arminius and his successors held that free will was not lost by the fall; that a sufficient grace is offered to all; that predestination is conditional on the individual’s response to this offer; and that grace is amissible. Whatever importance one attributes to early links between the two groups, English anti-Calvinists who argued in this way can therefore usefully be regarded as English Arminians. From the 1630s onwards they openly read and admired Remonstrant thinkers like Grotius and Simon Episcopius, who likewise, seeking to reassert a sense of human responsibility in salvation, emphasised the value of man’s moral faculties. The end of theology, as Episcopius asserted after Arminius, is practical, not speculative; and it is the individual’s responsibility to make use of his moral faculties in responding to the data of salvation. This ethical focus was complemented by a minimalist attitude to dogma and an advocacy of free enquiry in non-essentials: a point of material significance for the Remonstrants, who suffered from the intolerance of their Calvinist enemies at the Synod of Dort.

A potent charge thrown at Remonstrant theologians from early on was that of Socinianism, for this unorthodox tendency shared an apparently similar set of methodological assumptions and theological priorities. Compounded of Anabaptist and anti-trinitarian

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74 On Arminius see Bangs, *Arminius*; Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*. Arminius’s partisans published a Remonstrance in 1610, from which the party took its name, where five points were established which formed the basis of the famous fivefold anti-Remonstrant assertion of the Synod of Dort in 1618, concerning total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints. See also the *Arminian Confession* of 1621, mostly the work of Episcopius: there is a modern tr. by Mark A. Ellis (Princeton, 2005).

75 White, *Predestination, Policy, and Polemic*, takes unnecessary pains to discount the direct influence of Arminius in England.


77 *Arminian Confession*, Preface, pp. 22, 23.
radicals, the Socinians’ outlook was based on a New Testament-oriented scripturalism, and they advocated freedom of conscience. The authority, meaning, and application of scripture, however, must all, in their view, be decided by reason.\footnote{The Racovian Catechism, tr. Thomas Rees (1818), p. 15.} This rational principle, in combination with a marked ethical focus, informed certain dogmatic peculiarities. The Trinity was rejected as incomprehensible: Christ was not divine according to nature, but by the office invested in him to reveal the divine will. The idea of a vicarious satisfaction for sin through the atoning sacrifice of an innocent, moreover, was neither reasonable nor just. Individuals must be responsible for their own vice or virtue, and cannot have been rendered inadequate to forgiveness by original sin. Hence Socinus had no need for an inward or effective grace. By his preaching and example Christ provided sufficient means and incentive for men to strive after eternal life.\footnote{On Socinianism see esp. G. H. Williams, The Radical Reformation (3rd ed., Ann Arbor, 2000), pp. 978f., 1162f.; also McLachlan, Socinianism in England, pp. 5-21; Mortimer, Reason and Religion, chs. 1&2.}

To emphasise the value of reason, and man’s moral capacity and responsibility, or to be cautious about dogmatic intolerance of intellectual differences, was therefore to open oneself, by a polemical extension into Socinianism, to the suspicion of reasoning away the supernatural in Christianity, and preaching a graceless Pelagianism at odds with the principle of justification by faith.\footnote{The Remonstrants’ Confession of 1621 therefore insisted that original sin renders man inadequate to salvation by his own means; he stands in need of the preventing, co-operating, and following grace won by the atoning work of Christ. See esp. §§ 7.1, 7.4, 7.8, 7.10. 8.1, 8.2. 9.2. 17.6.} To paraphrase Hyde’s remarks on Falkland’s alleged Socinianism, these broad principles cannot, apart from their heretical applications, be made the distinguishing marks of a Socinian, or ‘the party will be very strong in all Churches’.\footnote{Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, Animadversions Upon a Book, Intituled: Fanaticism Fanatically Imputed (1673), p. 187; cf. Trevor-Roper, ‘The Great Tew Circle’, p. 188, who sensibly distinguished Socinianism in the ‘wide’ and in the ‘strict’ sense.} But this fact did not forestall a morbid fear of the onward march of Socinian rationalism among opponents of English anti-Calvinists.
It will be evident from this brief survey that none of the complaints lodged against the holy living theologians – that of popery, signifying, as it related to doctrine, the reversion to a theology of works; that of Arminianism, importing a theology of free will and conditional predestination; and that of Socinianism, signifying a theology which esteemed nature so highly that it had no room for grace – was without some basis in the theological approach of the mid-century Anglicans. Each derived its polemical force, on the other hand, from an implied extension into heresy: idolatry in the case of popery; an extreme rationalism and a form of Christological unorthodoxy in the case of the Socinians and later Remonstrants; and behind both Pelagianism.

This double-pronged attack was almost unanswerable, since it was basically inconsistent. The charge of ‘popish’ works-righteousness assumed that the Anglicans made the grace of justification into an internal principle in the believer, operating in relation with the human will. The Anglicans could absorb this criticism, secundum quid. They refused the idea that justification involves an infusion of actual righteousness. But they did talk about the ‘infusion’ of grace which assists man to break the fetters of sin, and asserted that justification involves human righteousness in the sense that God graciously accepts an imperfect righteousness for a perfect. Thorndike candidly suggested that this was hard to distinguish from the Catholic theory of congruous merit.

The charge of rationalist neo-Pelagianism, on the other hand, depended on the claim that the Anglicans made grace into a purely external assistance of which man can freely choose to avail himself. They did want to show, against the fatalistic determinism attributed to Calvinism, that justification does not exclude but supposes man’s voluntary contribution.

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82 It may be artificial to separate this from the much more wide-ranging set of religious and political associations which gave the charge in general such force
83 E.g. Hammond, Practical Catechisme, p. 114.
The Christian revelation presents man with a choice, and his assent and submission are valuable because they issue from the exercise of his own moral faculties. But the Anglicans insisted that human choice does not prevent grace; against the Pelagian implications of their more liberal attitude to man’s role in salvation they were clear that his response to the Gospel depends on an inward and preventing grace moving the will.\(^85\) It would be curious if they had meant to reduce faith to optional assent to a set of propositions: it was precisely their objection against the Calvinist understanding of faith that it was barely speculative, and not a question of a voluntary response of the whole man. Of course faith supposes ‘a collection of propositions’, as Taylor, one of the most forthright advocates of the value of reason, wrote. But, since he was engaged in arguing that ‘the faith of a Christian hath more in it of the will than the understanding’, he held that assent would be impossible without a prior conversion.\(^86\)

Whether polemicists took the ‘popish’ or the ‘Socinian’ line, the conclusion was still Pelagian self-sufficiency. Despite the evident lack of critical clarity which such an impasse imports, however, it has been very nearly reproduced in modern scholarship.

According to one strand of criticism, wearing its confessional bias in plain sight, any attempt to condition justification by human righteousness – whether considered so properly, or else by some form of metonymy – involves ‘possible Pelagianism’. By demanding a sincere though necessarily imperfect obedience as the qualification for and the obligation contracted by entry into the new covenant, argued Allison, the Anglicans both placed an unbearable burden on the un-regenerate, and transformed the new life of grace into an anaemic ethical account-keeping. This represented a ‘moralism’ which privileged human works over


the grace of the Gospel, thus attenuating in large part the doctrinal foundations of Christian ethics.  

More recent scholarship has reinforced this conclusion from the other direction, emphasising the influence of heterodox Protestant arguments which were undeniably naturalistic, namely those of the Socinians. In Socinian writings, and in Remonstrant authors such as Episcopius and Grotius who assimilated Socinian points of view into their own theological synthesis, Anglicans found a congenial emphasis on the individual’s responsibility for his own voluntary conversion. The suggestion is that, by incorporating Socinian lines of argument into their own anti-Calvinist project, Anglican thinkers began to move down the same path of logical connections that shaped Socinian thought, where an ethical account of Christianity was achieved by excluding the idea that the salvation of mankind depends on the remission of an infinite debt by the atoning sacrifice of a divine redeemer.  

The key idea here, argues Sarah Mortimer, was Socinus’s distinction, in order to emphasise the voluntary nature of Christian profession, between nature, as what is by definition not freely chosen, and revealed Christianity. This distinction was potentially useful to royalists, who set the higher law of Christ against parliamentarian arguments based on an immutable divine law, capable, as expressed in the Old Testament, of justifying resistance. According to Mortimer it was also so sympathetic to the ethical interest of Anglicans like Hammond that it became the foundation of their new theology of holy living.  

Since the Socinians denied the eternal divinity of Christ, the emphasis of their teaching fell on the prophetic office he fulfilled on earth by revealing the way to eternal life.

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88 Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*. In contrast to Allison’s perspective, the Anglicans are here being appropriated to a positive narrative of liberation from the narrow dogmatism of orthodox Christianity.
89 *Ib.*, chs. 4 & 5.
This devalued any moral law antecedent to or independent of the Christian revelation, for to Christ alone was imparted the secret knowledge by which men can win eternal life. The Socinians therefore stressed the unique character of the moral precepts laid down by Christ as the condition of salvation.\(^9^0\) The virtue of professing Christianity derived from the fact that, having reasonably accepted the Gospel as a divine revelation, individuals should freely choose to live by a code of ethics above that to which nature obliges them.\(^9^1\)

Like the Tridentine fathers, the Anglicans, fearing the spectre of antinomianism, insisted that Christ was a lawgiver to obey as well as a redeemer in whom to trust.\(^9^2\) They emphasised the distinctive nature of his law. It is spiritual where the old law was carnal, and it supplies the imperfections of the old law: ‘ye have heard that it was said … but I say unto you …’ (Mt. v 17f.). It is accompanied by promises and sanctions, and reward or punishment will crown the decision to follow it or not.\(^9^3\) In Mortimer’s view this emphasis on Christ’s moral teaching and man’s free response encouraged a purely propositional idea of Christianity, based on the commands communicated by the historical Christ.\(^9^4\) This, she concludes by way of analogy with Socinian logic, left little room for the doctrine of the atonement, the Holy Spirit, or even the divinity of Christ.\(^9^5\) Like Allison, therefore, Mortimer regards the theology of holy living as an important source of a stream of thought in which grace and moral virtue intermingled to the point when, in the ‘reasonable’ Christianity by

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\(^9^0\) The Racovian Catechism, pp. 168-348.
\(^9^1\) Mortimer, Reason and Religion, pp. 15f.
\(^9^2\) Schroeder, p. 44.
\(^9^3\) Hammond, pp. 27, 53-4, 157; Allestree, Whole Duty, p. 3; Taylor, Great Exemplar, pt. 2, XII, disc. 10-11; idem, Ductor, ii, pp. 319-23; Bull, Harmonia Apostolica, diss. 2, chs. 7-8, 14.
\(^9^5\) Mortimer, Reason and Religion, p. 128.
which later apologists sought to outflank deist or free-thinking arguments, they became virtually indistinguishable.96

As we have already noted, English anti-Calvinists shared certain characteristics with the Socinian position – their respect for rational enquiry, their ethical priorities, and so on – which are too general to infer a necessary relationship with the Socinians’ distinctive presuppositions. The same point applies in relation to their understanding of the new law given by Christ. When the Anglicans opposed the new law to the old, as the spiritual and eternal to the temporal and carnal, and when they asserted that Christ’s law included new precepts, was more perfect and, in a spiritual sense, more demanding than the old, they said nothing that was not taught by Aquinas, and for that matter by Paul in the letter to the Romans, and by Christ himself on the Mount.97 What distinguished the same points in Socinian authors was their foundation in peculiar assumptions about the nature and work of Christ. They insisted on the insufficiency of the old law without the added precepts of Christ, and could not reconcile the law of Christ with an eternal moral law, because they held that Christ’s divinity consisted in the office bestowed upon Jesus to reveal the only way to eternal life. From this principle it follows that man does not stand in need of redemption by the sacrifice of a divine person, since salvation depends only on obedience to the divine will revealed by Christ.

To induce the latter positions from the Anglicans’ statements about the new law of Christ is to postulate a relationship of cause and effect. It is precisely this logical relationship

97 These positions are attributed to Socinian sources by Hampton, *Anti-Arminianism*, pp. 73-5; Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, pp. 121f. See Aquinas, *ST*, IaIIae, qq. 98, 106-8; Rom. iii-iv; Mt. v-vii.
that concludes against the inference. If the Anglicans held that Christ is fully divine and co-
eternal with the father, it would follow that they could not have considered the precepts imparted during his earthly ministry to be in tension with the Mosaic law or the law of nature. It is possible, of course, that they were very inconsistent; but the evidence does not suggest this was the case. Taylor, for example, if he was engaged, as Mortimer claims, in a ‘rewriting of Socinus’ in this area, rewrote him to the extent that he maintained the opposite principle. The moral law, whose end is the ‘noble and immortal condition’ to which God created man, is ‘eternal and unalterable’.98 It is sin that prevents man seeing it clearly and following it, and puts him in need of a positive declaration of its content. This was provided, after the world fell into idolatry, by the first and second table of the decalogue, summarised in turn by Christ as ‘love the lord with all thy heart and thy neighbour as thyself’. The Mosaic law restrained man from transgressing the natural law, but it was insufficient in that it was particular to one nation and did not fully elucidate the spiritual obligations implicit in the natural law. But it fulfilled a propaedeutic purpose, preparing its subjects for and prefiguring the new dispensation of the Gospel. The covenant of grace, moreover, operated beneath and behind it.99 As Paul explains in Romans iii and illustrates by discussing the ‘father of the faithful’, Abraham, in the next chapter, those who are counted righteous before the coming of Christ are saved by an implicit faith in the redeemer.100 The insufficiencies of the law were supplied by this ‘Sun of Righteousness’ (Mal. iv 2), who illuminated the world with a full and perfect explication of the eternal law. ‘The Christian law’ is, therefore, ‘for the substance of it,

98 Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, p. 143; the following paragraph draws on Taylor’s lengthy Preface to his *Great Exemplar*.
100 Cf. Heb. xi 13. For the Socinians they could not have been justified by the grace of Christ, although God might freely have chosen to save any virtuous person. Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, p. 85, claims that Hammond gave ‘no sense of any covenant of grace prior to the advent of Christ’. This is hard to square with Hammond’s statement that ‘every man that ever was, or shall be saved from the beginning of the world, was, and is, and shall be saved by this second Covenant [of grace]’ . Hammond followed Rom. iii-iv in his explanation of Abraham’s faith, who was not saved by his own virtue but by his belief ‘against hope’ in God’s promise, a faith which was counted for righteousness on account of the redemption that is in Christ (*Practical Catechism*, pp. 14, 43f.); the *Arminian Confession* of 1621 contained the same teaching, see §§ 7.1, 7.8. See also Thorndike, *Epilogue*, iii, pp. 63-4, ii, ch. 9.
nothing but the restitution and perfection of the law of nature’. The congruity of the Christian law and the Mosaic law is determined by the immutability of the eternal law of which both are expressions. Christianity is the more perfect expression; its greatness can be summarised in Paul’s famous ‘appellative of the law of nature’, it too being ‘a law written on our hearts’.

When the Anglicans opposed the law of Christ to nature it was to fallen nature. It is sin that prevents men perceiving the eternal law, and, as Taylor complained, makes them think of Christianity as an unreasonable, excessively otherworldly creed. ‘But’, said Taylor, ‘no mistake can be greater’. It was fundamental to the anti-Calvinist argument that there exists an objective and immutable standard of morality accessible to man by cause of a natural congruity. It is precisely the function of the doctrine and the self-sacrifice of Christ to demonstrate clearly to man that what appears irrational and averse to the fallen reason and appetites is truly reasonable: that it is the way to the true good to which God has eternally designed mankind.

To impute to Anglican thinkers the consequences of Socinian principles on the basis of non-specific similarities is to argue in a circle, for it is the principles that are in question, and can constitute the only robust test by which to distinguish the respective arguments. This is not to discount the influence of Socinian arguments, for in many respects they were

101 Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, p. 144, expounds Taylor as teaching that Christ ‘altered the content of the law’. Taylor did not think so, because, the natural law ‘being eternal and unalterable … it was not imaginable that the body of any law should make a new morality, new rules’. Christ (Mt. v 17f.) did not come to destroy the law but to fulfil it.


104 It seems more reasonable to understand the *Great Exemplar* in terms of this Platonic idea of conformity than to force Taylor’s sense into a Pelagian or Socinian idea of Christ’s work, which he always explicitly repudiated. Human nature is ‘perfected’ when man returns from the *regio dissimilitudinis*, the ‘state of separation in the dark’, in Taylor’s words, into the ‘state of conjunction’ or ‘participation of the Divine nature and perfections’, by ‘transcrib[ing] copies of those excellent emanations from [God’s] Holiness, whereby as he communicates himself to us in his mercies, so he propounds himself imitable by us in his graces’: *ib.*, ep.ded., p. 41; cf. Hammond, *Reasonableness*, ch. 3.
sympathetic to the Anglicans’ own theological ambitions. But it is to credit the latter with an ability to distinguish between the accidental features of an argument and its informing principles. They were sensitive to the fact that a rational account of faith, and an ethical focus that assumed man’s natural moral potential, exposed them to the charge of Pelagianism. They were aware that some guarantee was required for the necessity of an inward grace and an institutional Church. They were also aware that the key Socinian assumption which corroded these ideas was the denial that Christ had to die in order to redeem the infinite debt contracted in Adam.

The Anglicans insisted that Christianity makes no sense without the doctrine of original sin. They denied that man was thereby totally depraved and deprived of freedom, for they feared the antinomian implications of the exaggerated notion of vicarious satisfaction which the Calvinists erected on this tenet. But they recognised that Socinus reached this position by denying ‘the grounds upon which [Christ’s] suffering and obedience are said to win satisfaction for sins and merit grace to man, that is the divinity of Christ in the Godhead from all time’. As Thorndike observed, the Socinian argument therefore failed on its own terms, since it is not agreeable to reason that Christ should have had to die on the cross if he was sent only to publish the Gospel and not to redeem sin. Why, asked Thorndike, should man accept the ‘hard remedy’ of the Gospel, on condition of sanctions, unless he believes he is punishable? Christianity is incomprehensible without original sin: so Paul ‘had care to set it forth [in Romans] as the grounds of Christianity’; and ‘both Pelagius and Socinus are carried out of the way of Christianity, because they will not acknowledge the decay of mankinde by the fall of Adam, and the coming of Christ to repaire it’.

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105 For a fuller discussion see ch. 6, below.
106 Thorndike, Epilogue, ii, p. 4.
107 Ibid., 143-8.
The decay of nature means that a purely optional religion could never bring men to salvation. They stand in need of grace, to heal the wounds of sin and assist them to live well despite their disordered inclinations. As Christ is the mediator between God and humanity, so is his Church the mediator of his grace. She administers the sacraments without which humanity cannot be reborn into a state of new life. Our writers all agreed that the ‘inward spirituall grace’ of baptism is necessary to take off ‘the guilt and punishment of sin’. Without baptism men would be incapable of the obedience required of them under the new covenant. By their enrolment into this covenant through baptism they promise to perform the necessary condition to which they are thereby enabled. By making good use of the benefits vouchsafed him, man can qualify himself for the promise of eternal life by throwing off the dominion of sin. This new life of participation in the spirit of Christ is both symbolized and reinforced in the eucharist. To participate in the eucharist is to share in the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice, since it supposes the inward renewal of the communicant made possible by grace. It is thus a

*mutuall confederation* betwixt us, and the crucified Saviour, on our parts an acknowledging of him for our God, and worshipping of him, and on his part the making over to us all the benefits of his *death, grace and pardon*, to *sanctifie*, and to *justifie* us.

In order to fulfil our part in this confederation, we must manifest a sincere repentance for the sins to which we are always inclined by nature, and especially those to which we deliberately consent. Such a repentance will not be possible unless we submit ourselves to that ‘engine of meer necessary charity’, the power of the keys. If we are to realise our good resolutions and really participate in that union with Christ which is celebrated in the eucharist, we must make use of the humiliations recommended to us in scripture and administered by the trustees of

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the keys.\textsuperscript{110} The holy life without which we cannot be saved cannot, except in the most unlikely hypothesis, be attained outside the context of the Church.

\textit{Rigorism}

The Anglicans thus contained the individualist tendency implicit in their ethically-oriented programme by insisting on the doctrine of original sin and the consequent necessity of baptism and of participation in the sacramental and para-sacramental life of the Church. Their understanding of the effects of sin and their remedy in turn determined the moral theological application of the new soteriology, since it predicated the priority of a voluntary conversion from love of the world to the love of God. This transformation of concupiscence into charity involves the whole man, for the effects of sin are ignorance in the mind, weakness in the will, and depravity in the affections.\textsuperscript{111} If the condition of pardon is to be fulfilled by the choice and performance of the service of Christ, the will must be ordered by the love of God, for love seeks to please its object and to rest in it.\textsuperscript{112} And if the will is to be rightly oriented, the whole man must be affected to God and not to sin. Our authors acknowledged that the infirmity of nature precludes a sinless obedience on earth; but they denied that any deliberate sin is consistent with a Godward orientation, and stated that the incidence of those involuntary sins natural to fallen man can be reduced by the education of his appetites. This discipline they described as the indispensable accompaniment, fruit and


\textsuperscript{111} Allestree, \textit{Whole Duty}, Preface, § 11.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ib.}, p. 17.
proof of the ‘sincere’ faith which God, for Christ’s sake, accepts in place of actual human righteousness as the condition of the covenant of grace.\textsuperscript{113}

This ‘sincerity’, a key term in the new soteriology since it circumvented the Catholic error of attributing actual righteousness to the justified sinner, thus had a specific doctrinal bearing in relation to the Anglican rejection of Calvinist thought. It was a symptom of their substitution, for a supposedly speculative faith, of an integrated, affective understanding of conversion. In this sense it underwrote their ethical presentation of Christianity, for sincerity, as a quality of the will, must be verified in action. As much as Eccl. xii 13 (‘fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man’), Jo. xiv 15, ‘if ye love me, ye will keep my commandments’, was the scriptural standard for this theological approach.\textsuperscript{114} Hammond concluded from this text that ‘loving him and obeying him, love and [evangelical] workes, are taken for the same thing in Scripture’.\textsuperscript{115} This reciprocity is essential to the nature of love, which is both rational and sensitive. Thus when Christ promises the vision of God to the pure in heart, he implies a corresponding outward discipline, the heart signifying ‘especially that practical part [of man], a principle of action’, the will.\textsuperscript{116}

This conclusion rested on an Augustinian doctrine of love which we will recall from our discussion of Jansenist thought. ‘The special and essential property of Charity is the sincerity of it, as against a divided love, or having any competitor in our hearts’.\textsuperscript{117} Like the Jansenists, the Anglicans often reminded readers that, in Paul’s words quoted by Augustine, one cannot be ‘both a member of Christ and a member of a harlot’. Love ‘cannot be

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., pp. 17, 27, 123-4, 126f., 261-2; Hammond, Practical Catechisme, pp. 46f.; UN, pp. 72-3; Bull, Harmonia Apostolica, pp. 208f.
\textsuperscript{114} E.g. Hammond, Practical Catechisme, p. 75; Taylor, Dekas Embolimaios, p. 41. Hence Hobbes’s criticisms of the episcopal divines, despite their preaching up obedience: if fear without material sanction was not as ‘coactive’ a motive as could be desired, it was certainly less unreliable than love.
\textsuperscript{115} Practical Catechisme, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 140.
\textsuperscript{117} Ib., pp. 75-6; Allestree, Whole Duty, pp. 126f., 261-2; Thorndike, Epilogue, ii, pp. 38-9; for Taylor see ch. 7, below.
divided’.\textsuperscript{118} Again, like Jansen, they pointed to the opening chapters of the first epistle of John, where the nature of saving love is put in terms of the same stark opposition: ‘Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him’. In order to detach oneself from ‘all that is in the world’, all that is ‘not of the Father, but of the world’, John suggests we must mortify ‘the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vainglory of life’. If the appetites are fixed elsewhere than God, love is divided, and the will cannot be sincerely turned to God. Therefore Christ enjoins us (Lk. x 27) to love God with the affections, the will, the power of action, and the reason together.\textsuperscript{119}

A sincere love thus supposes the integration of the appetites, both rational and sensitive, by man’s proper end. Exponents of the ‘holy living’ soteriology all taught that no conscious sin or affection to sin is compatible with the love required of man under the Gospel. Our captivity in the flesh means we will always commit involuntary, unforeseen sins; but consciously to entertain any sin is to exclude oneself from the body of Christ.\textsuperscript{120} ‘Every act of love to a sin, is a perfect enemy to the love of God’, for ‘malicious thoughts’ engender ‘grosser acts’, fixing the will on the goods of the world.\textsuperscript{121}

The words of Romans vii, ‘what I hate, that I do’, if they intend a ‘captivity’ (v. 23) to sin, must therefore refer to a carnal man. The love of God implies the cultivation of the appetites, ‘the actual appetition or fastening our affections on God’.\textsuperscript{122} If the will is disordered through the commission of deliberate sin, or through any unchecked affection to sin, order must be restored by the discipline of repentance. ‘Mortification is the one half of Christianity

\textsuperscript{118} I Cor. vi 15; De civ. Dei, XXI 25; cited Taylor, Dekas Embolimaios, p. 44, see also pp. 4, 8-9, 21, 36, 38; Hammond, Practical Catechism, p. 83. Mt. vi 24, ‘no man can serve two masters’, was also frequently pointed to.

\textsuperscript{119} Hammond, Practical Catechism, pp. 97, 76.

\textsuperscript{120} See n. 113, above.

\textsuperscript{121} See ch. 7, below, on Taylor; Allestree, Whole Duty, pp. 17-18, 201-2.

\textsuperscript{122} Hammond, Practical Catechism, pp. 76-7.
… a denying of the will and all its natural desires’.123 This is the only way voluntary sin can consist with the regenerate estate, for it is the only way to preserve the loving condition of the will which sin disorders. Keenly aware that under sin ignorance and depravity will always incline the will to lower ends, the holy living theologians declared that this discipline of repentance must be ‘daily’ and lifelong: for to repent is to convert, to convert is to love sincerely, and to love sincerely is to purge all affection to the world. ‘Carnality’ – actual sin – and ‘hypocrisie’ – affection to sin – must be ‘daily purged out’.124 There is no such thing as deathbed repentance for a life of sin, because the love required of God’s children supposes a habitual disposition of the moral faculties.125

The ‘sincere’ faith which the Anglicans postulated as the condition of salvation therefore comprehended a rigorous regime of moral hygiene. A fuller discussion of this ascetic morale is reserved to chapter seven, where we consider the thought of Taylor concerning its central moment in the eucharist, the ultimate expression of humanity’s conformity with the divine. A few of its salient features may, however, be mentioned here. In the first place the foundation and principle of the pure love we owe God is humility. As the spirit of submission to God’s will and wisdom, and as the acknowledgement ‘that the best of our works are corrupt and impure’, that our reason and strength are inadequate in themselves, it is the soul of a true and lifelong conversion to God.126 The ‘particular’ parts of the life of repentance, which the Anglicans considered, insofar as they are conditions sine qua non of the sincere love of God, to be ‘morally’ or psychologically necessary, they generally enumerated under the tripartite scheme by which Catholics explained the sacrament of penance. First we must experience a heartfelt sorrow for sin. This contrition, the Anglicans

123 Taylor, Great Exemplar, p. 198.
124 Hammond, Practical Catechisme, p. 142; Allestree, Whole Duty, pp. 127f.; Bull, Harmonia, p. 215; see ch. 7 on Taylor.
125 Ch. 7, below, p. 297; Allestree, Whole Duty, p. 128; Hammond, Practical Catechisme, pp. 73-4; see also e.g. Stillingfleet, A Rational Account, pp. 614-16.
specified, must arise out of love for God, who hates sin, not out of fear of punishment. The Tridentine doctrine that mere attrition is supplied by the priestly absolution was ‘a most ridiculous conceit of soules’. Secondly comes confession, not only to God, but also to a priest, since its end is not just the acknowledgement of guilt but the application of a cure. Finally, then, come acts of satisfaction, the actual performance of our good ‘resolutions’, both to abandon sin and to take up the contrary virtues. These satisfactions, according to the Anglicans, ‘must be proportioned to the fault’. Prayer, fasting and alms-giving, as recommended in the New Testament, were enjoined as the most efficacious means of inculcating a loving disposition. In prayer we depend on God and nourish that humility which is the soul of all moral renewal; in fasting, and indeed in any ‘selfe-denial of the body’, we educate the sensitive appetites by mortifying the sinful desires of the flesh; and in alms-giving we give expression to our love of God by loving his image in man, in so doing simultaneously proving the authenticity of our love, and fortifying it against the diversions incident to fallen nature. The Anglicans expected that such a regime of holy living should structure the daily life of every Christian.

In the view of Allison the ‘sincere endeavour’ demanded by the architects of the holy living soteriology was at once too demanding for the un-regenerate, and too pallid for the regenerate. The Anglicans, however, did not make this distinction. The love of which God requires a beginning in the un-regenerate and a growth and perfection in the regenerate is the
same love. The state of regeneration is identical with the state of repentance.\textsuperscript{134} It is a turning from the world to God, a real transformation from sin to righteousness. Far from reducing the life of faith to a ledger of moral pluses and minuses, this definition of ‘sincere’ love, being governed by man’s relationship to God, expanded into eternity. The love required of man under the new covenant is not a finite love, but a love answerable to that from which God created mankind in his image, and afterwards sent a redeemer in the form of his only son. The effects of our love, explained Allestree, illustrate this conformity with the love of Christ which produces them. For they are the same: ‘purifying souls here, and imparting eternal felicity there’.\textsuperscript{135} The voluntary conversion required by Christ, according to the Anglicans, answered the injunction to ‘be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Mt. v 48). It is ‘becoming like to God’, by a ‘God-like life’ purifying the heart in preparation for the vision of which ‘only the \textit{pure} are capable’.\textsuperscript{136}

We have already encountered this understanding of deification, where it is essentially equivalent to justification, in the thought of the Jansenists. It assumes that, with the grace of Christ, man can liberate himself from the weight of sin that prevents him attaining the supernatural end to which he was created. It is ironic that critics such as Allison should accuse the new soteriology of creating, by a complacent trust in man’s own ability to attain a modest standard of virtue, a separation between doctrine and ethics.\textsuperscript{137} This is precisely what the Anglicans thought Calvinist soteriology achieved by resolving man’s duty into a speculative faith. If that was an injustice, it is not to be redressed by visiting the same injustice upon the Anglicans. Replacing the doctrine of forensic justification with their allusive doctrine of the love of God, they aimed to fuse ethics and doctrine together, by

\textsuperscript{134} Hammond, \textit{Practical Catechisme}, p. 82; \textit{UN}, pp. 44-5; Thorndike, \textit{Epilogue}, ii, pp. 40-43.
\textsuperscript{135} Allestree, \textit{Whole Duty}, p. 329.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{The Rise of Moralism}, esp. pp. 206f.
means of the most powerful adhesive known to man, that divine charity which binds together the whole body of Christ's Church.
We have now suggested some reasons for supposing that the anti-Calvinism of the mid-century Anglican theologians should not so readily be identified with the wholesale rejection of an ‘Augustinian’ scheme of salvation. Central to that scheme was a doctrine of original sin which denied man any freedom to do the good. The thought of Jeremy Taylor and Herbert Thorndike on these topics has been associated with positions antithetical to those occupied by Augustine. A closer examination, we will suggest, argues in both cases that a somewhat less polarised attitude towards the theological points at stake will result in a more sensitive understanding of the Anglican project.

Jeremy Taylor on Augustine and Original Sin

In his Unum Necessarium of 1655 Taylor included a chapter on original sin, considering its implications basic to the doctrine of repentance which formed the centrepiece of his theological work. He aimed to show that original sin is not equivalent to a personal sin in each individual. That would imply a sin for which no repentance can avail. To admit such a sin would be to remove the motive of remedial action. Followed to its logical extreme, the notion was a charter for antinomianism. It was incompatible with the reading of the Gospel developed by the holy living theologians: if men are hopelessly and helplessly damned, what is the point of a covenant in which Christ offers the chance of salvation upon condition of repentance?
Taylor’s treatment of the doctrine drew complaints from his own episcopalian
colleagues. Brian Duppa voiced misgivings about it while the work was in press, telling a
friend that Taylor was steering close to Pelagianism and its modern equivalents, Socinianism
and Anabaptism.\(^1\) John Warner engaged Taylor in a scholastic correspondence, seeking to
bring him to a sense of his incaution.\(^2\) Hammond wrote to Gilbert Sheldon that Taylor’s
doctrine of original sin was ‘disliked by every one’, and Sheldon, fruitlessly, asked Taylor to
recant.\(^3\) Later Thorndike would point out where Taylor had gone astray.\(^4\) Besides his
correspondence with Warner, Taylor defended his ideas in a ‘further explication’ which
subsequently became chapter seven of *Unum Necessarium*, and *Deus Justificatus*, a short
disquisition in the form of a letter to the dowager Countess of Devonshire.\(^5\)

The object of Taylor’s criticism was the Augustinian doctrine of original sin as
entrenched in extreme form by the sixteenth-century reformers. According to this
interpretation, canonised at the Synod of Dort and by the Westminster divines, the doctrine
rests on five tenets:

1) Adam had such an original righteousness in the state of innocence that the fall and
   its effects represented the worst possible disaster;

2) the punishment of Adam’s sin is due to all his posterity, the guilt being imputed to
   them by cause of seminal identity with the original parents, and transmitted by
   natural generation;

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\(^3\) Poole, *Milton and the Idea of the Fall*, pp. 43-4.
\(^5\) *Deus Justificatus*, or a vindication of the glory of the divine attributes in the question of original sin; against
   the Presbyterian way of understanding it (1656), printed in *Works*, vii. Taylor carried on his defence while a
   prisoner of the parliamentarian forces at Chepstow, where he was taken on his way from London to
3) the effect of this sin is an utter disability of doing good, leaving man ‘wholly inclined to all evil’;

4) this natural corruption is both in itself and in ‘all the motions thereof … truly and properly sin’, even though it is pardoned through Christ in the regenerate;

5) it therefore renders the sinner personally guilty, and subject to eternal punishment.⁶

That the ninth of the Church of England’s Articles of Religion represented a terse composition of these points indicates the difficulties Taylor faced in handling them critically. In doing so he made bold statements which emphasised the distance he put between his own doctrine and that of Augustine and Augustine’s Protestant epigones. But Taylor scorned convention.

I will not be tied to him [i.e., Augustine] that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many ignorant ages, and all the world knows by what accidental advantages he acquired a great reputation: but he who made no scruple of deserting all his predecessors, must give me leave upon the strength of his own reasons to quit his authority.⁷

This frank approach, feared Taylor’s colleagues, would simply corroborate Calvinist polemics against the Arminian theology of holy living, which associated it, as a latter-day Pelagianism, with Catholic works-righteousness, or, what was worse, the rational theology of the Socinian heresiarchs.⁸ To undermine original sin, moreover, was to undermine baptism and thus the institutional structure of the Anglican argument. Doubtless Sarah Mortimer is

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⁶ Deus Justificatus, p. 502. These points are enumerated in the sixth chapter of the Westminster Assembly’s Confession of Faith, pp. 11-12.


⁸ See e.g. the splenetic correspondence with which the Presbyterian minister Henry Jeanes plagued Taylor, printed in Works, vii, pp. 572f.
right, therefore, to attribute Hammond’s unease to such considerations. But did the charge of Socinianism laid on Taylor by a fearful colleague therefore indicate the substantial existence of this form of heresy in the thought of the future bishop of Down and Connor?9

Such a conclusion cannot be documented from Taylor’s own teaching. He was independent-minded, certainly; but in this he exemplified that more comprehensive approach to Augustine’s thought among mid-seventeenth century Anglicans which their one-sided rejection of his determinism can sometimes obscure. Taylor did not reject Augustine, but an Augustine whose anti-Pelagian themes had been made the ruling principle of all his thought.

They may as well press me with his authority in the article of the damnation of infants dying unbaptized, or of absolute predestination: in which article S. Austin’s words are equally urged by the Jansenists and Molinists, by the remonstrants and contra-remonstrants; and they can serve both, and therefore cannot determine me … And yet if those who object S. Austin’s authority to my doctrine, will be content to be subject to all that he says, I am content they should follow him in this too; provided that they will give me my liberty …10

Mortimer rightly places Taylor’s doctrine in the context of his theology of holy living, which focused on the concept of repentance as simultaneously the offer extended and the condition demanded by Christ in the new covenant. He was therefore more interested in the life of Christ, ‘the great exemplar’, as a template for obedience, than in the death of Christ as a substitutionary atonement – for it was precisely the exaggerated Calvinist idea of Christ’s vicarious satisfaction which, on the argument Taylor shared with the other Anglican ‘moralists’, destroyed the Gospel by destroying morality. If in The Great Exemplar he dwelt

9 Mortimer, Reason and Religion, pp. 141-2; our arguments against this conclusion will comprehend a fortiori those of Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall, ch. 3, who takes the polemic of the radical Robert Everard at face value.
10 Correspondence with Warner, Works, vii, pp. 566-7.
rather on the ‘hatred of sin’ demonstrated in God by so incredible an act as the sacrifice of his only son, than on ‘notions of expiation or atonement’, it was because he was more concerned to inculcate the idea of sin as a present reality which Christ calls us to leave, than of Christ’s sacrifice as an historical event by which our present sin is acquitted.\(^\text{11}\) Whether this means Taylor was more interested in the ‘educational’ than the ‘sacrificial’ work of Christ is a question which must be reserved to another place: it is my view that for Taylor the one contains the other, as we shall find when we examine his thought on the eucharist, which he described as a sacrificial rite and as the ‘extension of the incarnation’.\(^\text{12}\) It is a greater leap, however, to suggest as Mortimer does, not only that Taylor ‘viewed Christ as primarily a moral teacher’, but that he therefore did not believe ‘that Christ had needed to save or redeem men from any natural sin or guilt which they inherited from Adam’.\(^\text{13}\) In fact for Mortimer Taylor ‘rejected’ original sin, teaching that ‘human beings started off with a clean slate’, and ‘were not born fallen and in need of redemption through Christ’. We may agree that such a view would ‘relegate the Church to the position of a useful but unnecessary adjunct to the Christian life’; as with the assumption that, if it was Taylor’s, it is something remarkable.\(^\text{14}\)

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Taylor argued towards the following position:

\(^\text{11}\) Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, p. 140; Taylor commenced *The Great Exemplar* (pp. 38f.), by clarifying that, while the imitation of Christ would be impossible without the grace won by his atoning sacrifice, neither is its necessity thereby obviated; and see pp. 706f.

\(^\text{12}\) Ch. 7, below.

\(^\text{13}\) Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, p. 140n., cites from Taylor’s *Deus Justificatus* (1656), pp. 78-9, ‘a paragraph summary of the work of Christ which in no sense implied that his death atoned for human sin’. There we find that although Taylor did deny that the defects bequeathed by Adam’s sin are ‘direct sins to us’, he held nevertheless that ‘they are proper and inherent miseries and principles of sin to us’, from which nothing ‘derived to us from Adam by our natural generation’ could deliver us. ‘But from this state Christ came to redeem us all by His grace and by His spirit, by His life and by His death, by His doctrine and by His sacraments, by His promise and by His revelation, by His resurrection and by His ascension, by His interceding for us and judging of us’. ‘He came to give us a supernatural birth’. ‘He came to bring us grace, life, and spirit’. The passage is in *Works*, vii, pp. 516-17.

If after the fall of Adam it be not by God permitted to us to choose or refuse, there is nothing left whereby man can serve God, or offer Him a sacrifice. It is no service, it is not rewardable, if it could not be avoided, nor the omission punishable if it could not be done.\textsuperscript{15}

His main thrust was then against the Augustinian view of the fall, maintained by the Calvinists and the Jansenists, as being from a ‘natural’ state of original righteousness in which the reason and will were free to know the good and do it, to a ‘sub-natural’ state in which the debility of the natural faculties precludes this freedom.\textsuperscript{16} His first quarrel was thus with the first tenet of the Westminster divines, concerning man’s un-fallen state. If the knowledge and strength of Adam were not so ‘rare’ as this view states, the scale of the punishment it posits would not be plausible.\textsuperscript{17} So Taylor argued that the natural constitution of humanity was not altered by the fall. Un-fallen man was naturally subject to mortality, and evidently even to some infirmity or inclination to sin, since he was unable to subordinate his appetite to a contrary injunction.\textsuperscript{18} Both these arguments were made by the Pelagians. The first, which seems to contradict Paul’s statement in Romans v 12 that death entered into the world by the sin of Adam, was condemned at the council of Carthage in 417.\textsuperscript{19} The hypothesis of original ‘concupiscence’ formed a part of Julian of Eclanum’s criticisms of Augustine’s pessimistic account of the fall; Augustine, in turn, was outraged by this ‘paradisus Pelagianorum’, which in denying evil to be evil denies the necessity of a cure. It authors sin on God and implies that the grace of Christ is given to mortify what God

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Unum Necessarium}, in \textit{Works}, vii, p. 282.

\textsuperscript{16} As we argued in ch. 4 the Jansenists did not go so far as the total depravity of Luther and Calvin, maintaining with Augustine the essential nobility of man in the remaining ‘spark’ of the divine likeness, the premise of their ascetical moral theory. For Augustine on the essential goodness of nature see e.g. \textit{de natura et gratia}, c. 3 (\textit{PL}, vol. 44, col. 249); \textit{contra secundam Juliani responsionem imperfectum opus}, III.190 (\textit{PL}, vol. 45, col. 1330); cf. J. N. D. Kelly, \textit{Early Christian Doctrines} (5th ed., 1977), p. 364; useful on Luther and Calvin is Peter Harrison, \textit{The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science} (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 54-66.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Unum Necessarium}, pp. 254-5.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 251-2.

created.  

Taylor, however, had not intended to deny the force of Paul’s words, affirming that Adam’s sin was punished with a certainty of dying, making his natural mortality ‘actual and penal’.  

Like Augustine in *de Genesi ad litteram*, he attributed the ‘grace of immortality’ to the tree of life.  

In general Taylor maintained the Augustinian tension between nature and grace by transposing it, like Aquinas, into the terms of a distinction between natural and supernatural.  

In the state of innocence man was the recipient of certain ‘supernatural gifts’ without which the supernatural end to which he was ordained would not have been obtainable.  

As Thorndike charitably suggested, the direction of Taylor’s argument on the un-fallen state had led him into an ambiguity of language. To say that the difference between the disorder which fallen man experiences in his appetites and the infirmity which caused Adam to sin is only one of degree, is to say that God both gave man a certain end, and created him with a disability that would prevent him from attaining it. If, instead of trying to equate concupiscence after the fall with Adam’s nature before it, Taylor had simply affirmed that the sensual appetites are a part of created nature, whereas concupiscence is the disorder contracted in them by sin, he might have avoided his difficulties. As it is, the confusion of concupiscence with the sensual appetites introduces confusion into the definition of the effects of the fall.

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21 *Unum Necessarium*, pp. 250-51.  
22 *Ib.*, p. 250; *de Gen. ad litt.*, VI 25.36 (*PL*, vol. 34, col. 354). Curiously, Aquinas considered this impossible, since the tree, being a material thing, must itself have a finite existence; *ST*, Ia, q. 97, a. 4.  
24 *Unum Necessarium*, pp. 309f., 244, 275-6, 286, 290; for Aquinas *ST*, Ia, q. 95. Again, one may say that this is compatible with Augustine’s assertion, in *de civ. Dei*, XIII.1, that the immortality of un-fallen man was conditional on his ‘perfect obedience’.  
25 Thorndike, *Epilogue*, ii, pp. 155-60: ‘If this Doctor had said, or could have said; That concupiscence, being a naturall consequence of man’s composition, was prevented of coming to act and effect, by eating the fruit of the tree of life, ordained to that purpose; That the leaves thereof were, in this regard, *healing to the nations*; And that the grace of Christ was dispensed by that meanes, in that estate, as now by the Sacrament of the Eucharist; I might say, this were a novelty among divines, but I could not say that it were destructive to the Faith’.  

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On the substantial effects of the fall, however, Taylor’s position is virtually that of Aquinas. He sees the effect of Adam’s sin as, formally, privative. It was a fall from a state of supernatural endowment, which he is content, for the sake of argument, to call ‘original righteousness’, to one of ‘pure naturals’, ‘pura naturalia’ as Aquinas says. This state is one of mortality and infirmity, implicit in Adam’s constitution, but after his sin ‘actual and penal’. The removal of the supernatural graces which had hindered these defects was a punishment for Adam’s sin, and since the defects are transmitted by heredity, it is a punishment in which his posterity shares. Taylor differentiates himself from the Westminster divines (points 2 and 5 above) by denying the ‘reatus’ of forensic ‘original guilt’ based on this identity with Adam, which was strongly asserted by Augustine and stated in a modified form by Aquinas. He identifies a disjunction between Augustine’s acknowledgement that ‘there can be no sin that is not voluntary’ and his theory of identity with Adam. It is contradictory to include each individual free will in Adam’s free will. Therefore Adam’s sin cannot derive a proper, inherent guilt to his descendants, requiring punishment, because it is not properly their sin. On the vitium (‘vitiosity’), or psychological reality of original sin, however, Taylor is as strong as he is weak on the reatus. ‘We can do nothing without the miracle of grace. Our spirit is hindered by the body, and cannot rise up whither it properly tends, with those great weights upon it’. The imperfection potential in Adam by reason of his sensual appetites became by his sin an actual ‘corruption’. His descendants did not personally contract this debt by a voluntary act, but they inherit it as his heirs. Therefore Taylor (against point 4 of the Westminster tenets) follows Aquinas in modifying the Augustinian view of concupiscence as

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26 In ST, Ia, q. 94, 95.
27 UN, pp. 263, 255-6, 251.
28 Augustine, de peccatorum meritis et remissione, II. 22.36 (PL, vol. 44, col. 173): ‘sic est autem hoc peccatum, ut sit poena peccati’; Aquinas, ST, IaIIae, q. 81. Reatus: state or condition of being an accused person.
29 De vera religione, 14.27, quoted above, ch. 4, n. 79; cf. Aquinas, ST, IaIIae, q. 71, a. 6: ‘peccatum nihil alium est quam actus humanus malus’, and ‘quod … aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex hoc quod est voluntarius’.
30 UN, pp. 258-9.
31 Ib., p. 248; see also pp. 284f., 244, 275-6, 290. Taylor (p. 289) cites Augustine for the distinction of ‘vitium’ from ‘reatus’ or ‘actus’.
32 UN, pp. 286-7.
intrinsically evil and deserving of punishment.\footnote{Ib., pp. 309f., citing Aquinas in support p. 329. See ST, IaIae, q. 81, a.3-5, q. 82.} Concupiscence consists in a natural inclination which can only be said to have moral value insofar as it is restrained or consented to in accordance with or in contradiction of some precept. It is a ‘stain and reproach’ to nature, a ‘curse’ and an ‘evil’ in which we naturally share, but is only an actual personal sin when consented to.\footnote{UN, pp. 269, 289, 309, 312-13, 339; cf. ST, IaIae, q. 75, a. 1-2. ‘Non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis …’; also ib., q. 81, a. 1-2.} As Taylor points out, Augustine shares this understanding of concupiscence, calling it sin only ‘because it is made worse by sin, and makes us guilty of sin when consented to’.\footnote{UN, p. 289; Taylor cites Augustine, de nuptiis et concupiscencia, I.23 (PL, vol. 44, col. 428): ‘modo quodam loquendi peccatum vocatur, quod et peccato facta est, et peccatum, si vicerit, facit’; and contra Julianum, II 10 (PL, vol. 44, col. 696): ‘quantum [enim] ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essesmus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si ei nunquam consentiremus ad malum’ (cited again by Taylor, p. 311).} Like Augustine, Taylor therefore regards concupiscence as a positive impairment. This positive debility is proved by the necessity of infant baptism.\footnote{Infant baptism is for Augustine a clinching proof against the Pelagian arguments, see e.g. contra Julianum, VI 3 (PL, vol. 44, cols. 824-5); con. Jul. imp. op., I.53 (PL, vol. 45, cols. 1075-6). Origen too connected the corruption inherited from Adam with the practice of infant baptism. Kelly points out that this is not necessarily inconsistent with his notion of a pre-cosmic fall (Early Christian Doctrines, p. 181), but it may be worth noting that Taylor, whose circle was specially interested in Origen – his friend George Rust is generally taken to be the author of the Letter Defending Origen, and John Evelyn, to whom Taylor, on the death of his son, spoke of the child’s ‘rejoic[ing] in his little orb’, once wrote a curious ‘Lamentation of Origen After His Fall’ (Taylor, Works, i, p. lii; Evelyn’s piece is BL Add. MS 78365) – never entertained, like Rust and Henry More, the pre-existence of souls.} The great consequence of original sin is the necessity of redemption, that is of ‘supernatural promises and assistances to obtain heaven’; it is therefore ‘the great ἀφθονία’ [authority] of infant baptism, since children must be admitted to these felicities, not only to improve their present good, as the Pelagians affirmed, but to take off that evil state of things whither by occasion of the fall of Adam they were devolved, and to give them … the seeds of a new nature, so to become heirs of the promises, who in their mere naturals did inherit from Adam nothing but misery and imperfection and death.\footnote{UN, p. 259, cf. pp. 244, 275-6, 286, 290. Incidentally Taylor’s views had not changed since 1647, when on the grounds that ‘Adam left us an imperfect nature that tends to sin and death’ he affirmed that ‘besides the
Taylor thus affirms the Thomist understanding of concupiscence as ‘fomes peccati’ (tinder of sin), ‘the effect of one sin and the cause of many’. Although it is an infirmity only, not an act but a disordered inclination, it is ‘after a certain manner called sin, it “hath the nature of sin”’ as the Church of England article says, and the primitive Church called it sin ‘by metonymy’. Man’s slate is cleansed of the guilt of original sin if he is baptized; but he still labours under ‘the weight of it in loads of temporal infelicities and proclivities to sin’.

The mode of transmission of ‘original sin’ so defined is natural descent, because the inheritance consists in ‘pure naturals’ only. Taylor seeks to soften the Augustinian tradition whereby we are identified with Adam as having properly sinned ‘in’ him. He speaks of Adam as a ‘bad example’, suggesting that we ‘write after Adam’s copy’. He claims that, since for a long period under the law men wanted the eternal promises which could motivate them to subordinate the inferior faculties, customs of sinning were progressively superinduced on nature. But Taylor definitely considers a vitium to have been transmitted by natural heredity. His discussion of custom and the self-propagating nature of sin is premised upon the antecedent circumstance of this ‘curse’ of infirmity, and in this form can be found in Aquinas.

natural birth of infants, there must be something added’, that is a ‘supernatural birth’ which is done ordinarily in baptism, ‘the font or laver of regeneration’: A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophecying, in Works, v, p. 567; cf. too The Great Exemplar, pt. 1, sec. ix, disc. vi, ii; Deus Justificatus, p. 523, where Taylor affirms the necessity of baptism ‘in opposition to the Pelagian heresy ... because nature is insufficient and baptism is the great channel of grace’. The ‘laver of regeneration’, from Titus iii 5 (διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας), was the phrase used in the canons pronounced against Pelagianism at Carthage in 417, see Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, p. 83.

38 UN, pp. 249, 327; cf. Augustine, de nupt. et conc., in n. 35, above; ST, IaIIae, q. 75, a. 1-2, q. 81, a. 3, q. 82; Williams, The Ideas of the Fall, pp. 400ff.

39 UN, p. 289.

40 Taylor, Holy Dying, p. 495. It is a little curious that Taylor’s doctrine of original sin occasioned no such protest in 1650 as it did in 1655, since Holy Dying contains the same arguments, although they are scattered through the work (esp. pp. 349-52).

41 Cf. Aquinas, ST, IaIIae, q. 83.

42 UN, pp. 288-9; but Taylor cites Tertullian, de patientia 5, where Tertullian discusses the history of evil (PL, vol. 1, cols. 1256A-1259B).

43 ST, IaIIae, qq. 84-85; the emphasis on Adam’s bad example is also predominant in Origen’s exposition of Rom. xii-xix, see Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, pp. 181-2.
Viewing original sin as, formally, a privation of supernatural endowments, and materially as concupiscence exacerbated by consent, Taylor sees the state of fallen nature, like Aquinas, as un-corrupted in its ‘naturals’. The ‘reasonable soul’ remains, ‘fitted to the actions of life and reason, but not to anything supernatural’. We do not deserve damnation simply by being born, nor are our natural faculties totally depraved, as the Protestant Augustinian tradition affirmed. The idea that we have a necessity of sinning is a false interpretation of human iniquity based on a failure to distinguish between custom and necessity. We can bring a ‘necessity’ of sinning on ourselves by custom, which becomes a ‘chain’ as Augustine himself observed, but it is not a law of nature, and this is how, granted that the words are those of a regenerate man (which Taylor does not), Paul is to be interpreted in Romans vii. Adam’s sin leaves man in a state of imperfection and insufficiency, but not of ‘enmity and direct opposition to God. In this state he cannot get to heaven; but neither will that alone bear him to hell’. Taylor is perhaps furthest from contemporary Reformed orthodoxy in his insistence that fallen man is not deprived of freedom. He is free to choose good or evil, and there could be neither transgression against nor service of God without this voluntary choice. Taylor calls the will the ‘noblest faculty’ of the soul, syllogising that, since a will which cannot choose is dead, those who posit the bondage of the will contradict the immortality of the soul. This, however, only makes it even more crucial that ‘we should understand the state of our own infirmity’, which Taylor represents in the strongest possible

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44 For this formal/material distinction see Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 4, a. 2.
45 *UN*, p. 307, & pp. 243, 262; cf. *ST*, Ia, qq. 94-95; IaIIae, q. 85, a. 2.
46 *UN*, p. 268; Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII 5.10.
47 *UN*, p. 269. Taylor avoids the implied necessity of postulating a limbo by stating that God does not leave men in this state, either prompting them to be spiritual, or leaving them to be carnal by choice. A third state for those dying in original but not actual sin (i.e., un-baptized infants) is undoubtedly envisaged, however, and although Taylor does not commit to such a theory, the goodness of God suggests this state will be more pleasant than not, a position he considers Augustine unjustly to have slandered as ‘Pelagian’: *ib.*, pp. 317-18, 327-8. On the ‘limbus puerorum’ in Aquinas cf. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall*, pp. 405-8.
48 *UN*, pp. 279f., 313f., quote at 280.
terms, ending with piteous prayers emphasising man’s state of utter wretchedness and dependence on God.⁴⁹

This insistence on personal responsibility was, as we have seen, the central characteristic of English Arminianism. In this instance it has been traced directly to the influence of Episcopius, and through him to Socinus.⁵⁰ That Taylor drew on Remonstrant sources is more than likely, since he revered Episcopius and cited ‘the incomparable Grotius’ in support of his argument. However it may be that here the attribution is otiose. Taylor also names as his authorities ‘the great Erasmus’, Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, Zwingli,⁵¹ and the ‘Ethiopic testament’ which his Oxford contemporary and friend, the orientalist Dudley Loftus, contributed to Walton’s polyglot, as well as Chrysostom, Theodoret, and various ante-Nicene fathers.⁵² The identification of Episcopius as Taylor’s source rests on his interpretation of Romans v 12, in quo omnes peccaverunt, to mean [death passed unto all men] ‘inasmuch as all men have sinned’, rather than ‘in whom all men have sinned’. Both men grounded this exegesis on the Greek text, but Taylor does not give the Latin quatenus omnes peccaverunt as Mortimer implies.⁵³ Erasmus’s paraphrase on the New Testament, which Taylor presumably meant to indicate by his reference, contained a commentary on the text ‘Wherefore, as by one man syn entred in the worlde, and death by the meanes of syn: even so death also went ouer al men, insomuche as all men synned’.⁵⁴ This was the option chosen by the translators of the

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⁴⁹ *Ib.*., pp. 284f.
⁵¹ Presumably in regard to Zwingli’s merciful opinion concerning the fate of un-baptized infants, in *de providentia dei*, 182.15-183.6.
⁵² *UN*, pp. 330f.; cf. pp. 304f. For Taylor and Loftus, a colleague in the hierarchy of the restoration Church of Ireland during the 1660s, see F. R. Bolton, *The Caroline Tradition of the Church of Ireland* (1958), pp. 27-42. The Latin translation of the Ethiopic version runs, from verse 12: ‘Et propterea, quemadmodum per iniquitatem unius hominis peccatum in mundum introiit, et per illud peccatum advenit mors super omnes homines, eo quod omnibus hominibus imputatur illud peccatum, etiam non cognoscentibus quid illud peccatum sit’, Brian Walton (ed.), *Novum D. N. Jesu Christi Testamentum juxta editionem Bibliorum polyglot* [tam] (1698), p. 649. Presumably this signified to Taylor that the legal impurity or ‘debt’ is imputed to Adam’s posterity, rather than the sin taken to have been actually committed by them.
⁵³ *Reason and Religion*, p. 142 – Taylor, *UN*, p. 244, gives in English ‘inasmuch as all men have sinned’.
⁵⁴ *The second tome or volume of the Paraphrase of Erasmus upon the newe testament (cum privilegio*, 1549), fol. vii r.
Authorised Version, who gave ‘for that all men have sinned’. Hammond, two years before Taylor published, had paraphrased the verse (reading ‘for that’) as showing that mortality was a consequence of the first sin, a defect naturally transmitted by Adam, ‘that was now a sinner, and had begotten no childe in his innocence’, to his posterity. In any case Taylor, who normally referred to the Greek in support of his own readings, had perfectly good authority to interpret ἐφ’ ὧν πᾶντες ἠμαρτον, for which the Vulgate gives in quo omnes peccaverunt, as implying a condition. So the Greek fathers understood it: Theodoret, who Taylor mentions, wrote that ‘it is not because of the sin of the first parent but because of their own that each person is liable to … death’. 

To emphasise the condition of sin under which death entered the world is to accentuate Christ’s victory over sin and death. Erasmus’s exposition of the passage focused on the comparison which Paul erects between the first and second Adam in order to emphasise the glory of Christ’s redemptive work: like Erasmus Taylor stressed the inequality of the comparison. The sin of Adam cannot be of equal weight with the redemption effected by Christ, yet in Taylor’s eyes his opponents, by stressing the perdition of the mass and the awfulness of concupiscence as a positive penalty even in the regenerate, made Adam’s sin far


56 See Taylor’s philological arguments at UN, p. 245; and cf. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall, pp. 308f.


60 Erasmus, The second tome or volume of the Paraphrase, fol. vii r-v.
more powerful than Christ’s redemptive work; whereas this is the opposite of Paul’s intention in the comparison.\footnote{See Romans v 14-15.}

Attempting to construct a religion for an un-churched demographic, Taylor set a premium on holy living. It is no surprise if he therefore made common cause with other enemies to the Calvinist idea of the fall, for as he saw it ‘the tenet is chargeable with libertinism; it is a licentious doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest profaneness; for it takes away all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for time past.’ ‘How will man do good, if he can excuse all sin upon his nature?’\footnote{Certain Letters of Henry Jeanes and Dr Jeremy Taylor, p. 585; Deus Justificatus, p. 521.} But it is hard to see how Socinus should be considered the principal source for Taylor’s thought in this area.\footnote{Indeed for Taylor the Socinians descend from Pelagius, the Albigensians and the Anabaptists in a genealogy of heretics who deny original sin, \textit{UN}, p. 328.} The one thing Taylor did not intend by his arguments was an apology for nature. On the contrary, they underwrote a doctrine of repentance premised on a highly pronounced view of human infirmity. Indeed, he argued that the notion of total depravity, by removing the responsibility to ameliorate it, underlined this infirmity less effectively. If he could not accept an original sin which automatically entails the guilt of actual sin and whose penal ramifications therefore extend beyond baptism, still less could he countenance one which failed to account for the weight of concupiscence and therefore neglected the channels of grace through which man could hope to overcome it. It is the very infirmity of nature, says Taylor, which explains why his contemporaries, leaping on a dubious raft of arguments despite the polemical distortions which plainly affect them, are so eager to exalt the authority of Augustine. ‘Truth is, we intend by laying load upon [Adam] to excuse ourselves, and, which is worse, to entertain our sins infallibly, and never to part with them upon pretence that they are natural, and irresistible’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 282, cf. pp. 292-5.} Taylor refused to truckle under the authority of Augustine, confuter of the Pelagians, because in that necessary task ‘he took...
in too much, and confuted more than he should’, and his arguments were distorted. But, we may say, this was only the more keenly to accentuate the insights of Augustine, the psychologist of conversion, and Augustine the theologian of love. He wanted to magnify the present reality of concupiscence in order to underline the real meaning of conversion from sin to charity, the true ‘unum necessarium’. His object was not a bare moralism, but a profound asceticism: thus in the place of the determinist Augustine he put that ‘good and holy man’, Cassian. He ‘became the great rule of Monastines’, wrote Taylor self-consciously, ‘yet because he spake reason in his exhortations to piety, and justified God, and blamed man, he is called Pelagian’.

_Herbert Thorndike on Jansen and Liberty_

Thorndike was not the least original among a creative generation of Anglican theologians, who responded to the ruin of their Church as to a God-given opportunity for self-improvement. Where Taylor saw a potent spur to the inward renewal of her individual members, Thorndike sensed an opportunity to right her reformation: to correct those flaws, engendered in the course of her thraldom to Calvinism, which it would have been unseasonable to expose so long as a practical unity bound her members together. Now, as he wrote in his *Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England* of 1659,

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65 _Ib_.., pp. 327-8.
66 Cf. ch. 7, below.
67 _UN_, p. 328.
when the Unity that is lost may as well be obtained by the primitive Truth and Order of the Catholick Church, as by that which served the turn in the Church of England … I should offend good Christians, to think that they will stand offended at it.\textsuperscript{68}

Thorndike’s bland assumption that ‘the tragedy of the Church of England’ meant a blank slate upon which to draw up better plans must have discomfited those who had spent more than a decade denying claims that the Church had disappeared.\textsuperscript{69} It is perhaps this broad scope and design, together with a sometimes excessive subtlety, that explains his relative neglect by modern scholars, although his \textit{Epilogue} is a more systematic work than most produced by Anglicans of the period.\textsuperscript{70} The content and framework of his inquiry was determined by a concern for the unity of Western Christendom which meant he deliberately sought to transcend the limits of English Protestant debate.

Thorndike’s concern with consensus, taking the form of a pronounced interest in the content of tradition, excites the admiration of the Tractarians.\textsuperscript{71} In fact it demonstrates, as Miller has shown, the continuity of his methodological principles with those of the so-called rational theologians of Great Tew, and behind them with Hooker. Common consent, verifiable by scholarly means, can provide a rational basis for belief and practice, while avoiding the circularity of arguments for authority that rely on an infallible and self-authenticating guide, whether scripture or the Church.\textsuperscript{72} Thorndike’s self-conscious ecumenism was also tactically advantageous. By framing his discussion of controversial topics within the context of Western theology as a whole, Thorndike could throw his own

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Epilogue}, Preface.
\textsuperscript{70} But see importantly Ernest Charles Miller, ‘The Doctrine of the Church in the Thought of Herbert Thorndike (1598-1672)’ (Unpublished Oxford D.Phil., 1990); also T. A. Lacey, \textit{Herbert Thorndike, 1598-1672} (1929).
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{ODNB}, s. n. ‘Thorndike’.
\textsuperscript{72} Miller, ‘The Doctrine of the Church’, esp. chs. 1 & 2.
‘mean opinion’ into a more favourable contrast than the narrower terms of English Protestant debate allowed.

This was how Thorndike approached the subject of human liberty and divine concourse, setting up two Catholic accounts, the Thomist and the Jansenist, as the background to his discussion of the relationship between grace and free will.73 According to the Thomist theory of predetermination, rejected by Jansen, God must effectively determine all second causes, like a hand moving a knife.74 Some among those ‘who reject Arminius’, says Thorndike, for example the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, William Twisse, adopt this position.75 Others look more like Jansen, who defines free will according to its formal nature, action upon desire, rather than its effective determination by God’s ‘vital act’ in the will.76 Thorndike, then, presented Jansen as a less straightforward determinist than the Thomists or neo-Thomists. By conducting a surprisingly sympathetic but ultimately negative inquiry into his system as an ‘ingenious’ attempt to reconcile determinism with freedom, Thorndike was able to reject a fortiori the Calvinist account of freedom and therefore of justification, which suffered by comparison with the redeeming features he identified in Jansen’s.77 This process of theological differentiation was facilitated by Thorndike’s treatment of Jansen as a faithful historian of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism – ‘I do respect the learning of … Jansenius’ – in which he foreshadowed Burnet, who would praise Jansen’s ‘great Industry, and … equal fidelity’ as an exegete of Augustine.78 If Jansen was a true ‘disciple of St. Augustine’, a convincing presentation of his inadequacies would distance

73 This was due, he claimed, to the failure of the Synod of Dort to treat the matter satisfactorily – Epilogue, ii, p. 165.
74 Jansen, Augustinus, t. II, De statu naturae innocentis, ch. 20, cols. 181-4. Thorndike does not enquire whether this ‘physical premotion’ of the neo-Thomists necessarily follows from Aquinas’s doctrine of God, the first mover. In favour one could point at ST, Ia, q. 83, a.2; ib. IaIIae, q. 10, a. 4, q. 109, a. 1; Questiones disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 7.
75 This identity with Dominican theology was happily owned by some Calvinists, e.g. Gale: see The Court of the Gentiles, pt. iv, bk. 3, pp. 123-5.
76 Thorndike, Epilogue, ii, pp. 163-5; ch. 4, above.
77 Epilogue, ii, p. 163.
78 Ib., p. 193; Burnet, Exposition, p. 150.
Thorndike’s position even more emphatically from the exaggerated versions of Augustine’s teaching on predestination, original sin and irresistible grace which supposedly characterised the position he wished to undermine.

The second book of Thorndike’s Epilogue, the Covenant of Grace, was aimed especially against the Socinians. While he sympathised with their desire to assert human moral responsibility against predestinarian Calvinism, Thorndike pointed out that their denial of original sin and of the grace of Christ as the meritorious cause of salvation destroyed the premise of Christianity.79 Hence he could be charitable about Taylor’s doctrine of original sin, since despite his ambiguity Taylor had amply upheld the only ‘mater of faith’ in the question, ‘the corruption of nature’ upon which ‘the necessity of Christ’s coming’ is grounded. ‘If the coming of Christ be not to repaire the fall of the first Adam, I cannot see how the Faith is secure’.80 the Socinian denial of the eternal divinity of the Son, claimed Thorndike, was a logical corollary of their erroneous conclusion from human responsibility against the grace of Christ.81

Thus Thorndike was intent upon demonstrating the necessity of grace ‘from the beginning to the end of the work of Christianity’.82 There was a difficulty involved, however, with this idea of Christianity as a ‘work’. Thorndike had established original sin as an essential premise of Christianity, since it consists in that concupiscence or ‘decay’ which Christ offers man the opportunity to reverse.83 Now he had to face about and explain how the free choice of the will should impinge upon the effect of this offer, since the corruption of sin entails the necessity of divine assistance from the beginning to the end of the journey to God.

Because his account of ‘justifying faith’ or repentance, and of the indispensability of baptism

81 Ib., pp. 1-4, 143-4. This rather generous formulation of the Socinian argument, which really followed the other way, indicates the extent to which Thorndike was unable to see past ‘Calvinism’ as the theological enemy.
82 Ib., p. 137.
83 Ib., ch. 10, pp. 144-62; cf. ch. 5, above, pp. 244-5.
and the Church, hinged upon the effects of original sin and their remedy, Thorndike could not
depict the will as simply indifferent in respect of good and evil. The will after original sin is
inclined to evil by concupiscence. Only with the assistance of grace can this inclination be
reversed.\footnote{Epilogue, ii, ch. 20, p. 168.} But his premises also demanded that the will be free from necessity: it has to be
free to do or not to do, to fulfil the terms of the covenant of grace or not, or its acts have no
moral value. The acts of the will, ‘redounding to every mans account at the generall judgement’, must be personally imputable.\footnote{Ib., chs. 21-2, quote p. 169.} Hence Thorndike had to keep in tension two
concepts of freedom which, as we saw in chapter 4, seemed to the Jansenists mutually
exclusive.

On the one hand there is the freedom ‘which stands in opposition to the bondage and
servitude of sin’: this is that conformity with the true good of which the increase and
perfection constitute the moral life of the Christian on earth and the blessed life of the saints
in heaven. On the other there is the freedom ‘which stands in opposition to necessity’: this is
that freedom of choice without which the offer of the new covenant makes no sense, since
reward or punishment suppose the freedom to act or abstain.\footnote{Epilogue, ii. p. 163.} For Thorndike both these
concepts of freedom are essential to an authentic account of Christianity – an account that
establishes man’s responsibility to contribute to his own affective conversion by transforming
the disordered inclinations which divert the will from the divinely intended trajectory proper
to his created nature.\footnote{That ‘Adam was created to supernatural happiness, and therefore endowed with those graces which might
make him capable of it’ is argued, against the opinion of Grotius, at Epilogue, ii, pp. 155f. In his Annotata ad
Consultationem Cassandri of 1641, publ. in his Via ad pacem ecclesiasticam (Amsterdam, 1642), p. 4, Grotius
argued that Adam was created to a natural beatitude. He had argued differently in De veritate, bk. 1.}

The Jansenists, equally committed to such an account, held that it is precluded by any
concession to nature in the form of an indifferent free choice: an indifferent will under sin
must incline to evil. The servitude of the will to sin, they argued, concludes its lack of freedom from necessity. Their task was therefore to explain how the necessarily effectual determination of the will by grace supposes human co-operation.

To Thorndike, writing in a reverse polemical context, the greatest stumbling block to an authentic account of Christianity seemed to be any form of determinism, since a determined will cannot be responsible for the acts it produces. His task was therefore to explain how an indifferent will under sin should choose the good without being determined by the grace without which such a choice is impossible. How does grace attain its end in God’s providential design without that predetermination which nullifies the Gospel and makes God the author of evil?

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Jansen’s argument, in Thorndike’s view, has two major virtues. In the first place it demonstrates, insofar as it is designed to establish freedom, that Jansen ‘ground[s] … salvation upon the Covenant of Grace which supposeth it’. Jansen wants to show why Christians are ‘obliged, to apply their utmost endeavours to the fulfilling of’ the new covenant.88 Secondly, Jansen’s account of how the will is determined under sin has merit. The will acts according to the good it apprehends, and this depends on the good proposed to it. Disordered by concupiscence, the sensual appetites or inclinations, rendering ‘the coherence of true good with the utmost happinesse of mankind so darke’, and ‘the coherence of counterfeit good with his utmost misery so remote’, bring strong reasons for the world. Jansen’s argument therefore succeeds in establishing the necessity of a grace sufficiently powerful to determine the will in the face of the disordered inclinations, and to ensure the transformation of those inclinations by a habitual discipline. Nor is Jansen wrong, so far as it

88 Epilogue, ii, p. 225.
goes, to say that the form of this grace is the disposition that brings forth the good act, i.e., the
right motive that determines the will, or love; and that man is therefore freely saved, because
love is free.\textsuperscript{89}

These points give Jansen the preference over ‘those of the Reformation’ (specifically ‘our Presbyterians … in the Westminster Confession’), ‘because, not requiring that voluntary conversion of the will of [to?] God, for the condition of the Covenant of Grace’, they do not even feel obliged to explain how free will and grace relate in the justification of man.\textsuperscript{90}

There are, however, two related problems with Jansen’s argument. Since he allows only one true liberty, ‘slavery to righteousness’, he cannot admit as sufficient to liberty any grace which is not also efficacious. The imaginary freedom that is bondage to sin is therefore determined by the privation of efficacious grace. The system, concludes Thorndike, authors sin on God, implying, as a scholastic Calvinist like Gale would say, his ‘predeterminative concourse to the substrate matter of sin’.\textsuperscript{91} This difficulty relates to a more basic philosophical one. It is well and good to define freedom formally in terms of desire, but if desire is irreducible to action there is no effective freedom. If Jansen says that, under sin, man can deliberate freely about potential goods, he is right; if he says that, without grace, man will never act contrary to the counterfeit good, he effectively destroys freedom. What Jansen is confused about, in other words, is not deliberation – how the will is determined in each particular instance, or the formal cause of the act – where there is a sharp distinction between conditions before and after the fall; but choice – why the will in general is determined, or the effective cause of the act.\textsuperscript{92} There is always the choice to do one thing or the other until through deliberation a good is apprehended which determines the will thereunto. The act is

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 167f., 208, quote at 168.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 225-6, 256f.
\textsuperscript{91} Thorndike, \textit{Epilogue}, ii, pp. 164-6; Gale, \textit{Court of the Gentiles}, iv, bk. 3, pp. 125-7, praises the Jansenists on this score.
\textsuperscript{92} Thorndike, \textit{Epilogue}, ii, ch. 22.
always contingent until the will is determined one way or the other. When it is determined one can talk about necessity, in the sense that whatever is necessarily is. Thus, for example, one could say that under sin deliberation will be so addled by the apparent good of the world that, if there is no apprehension of a higher good, it will always terminate in the wrong choice. This determination of the will is necessary as soon as it is. But, Thorndike will argue, this ‘necessity of supposition’ logically depends on a prior contingency in the will.  

Thorndike, then, endorsed Jansen’s position on the formal transformation of the will. Here we need a preventing grace to convert and then an assisting grace to change habitually. And it is Pelagian, says Thorndike, to argue as Molina does that mere nature can act out of the love of God for his own sake, or that God is obliged to grant assistance to those facientibus quod in se est. Nature is inadequate to its proper end, and Jansen is therefore right to identify true freedom as freedom to good.

The problem is, according to Thorndike, that this idea of freedom is incompatible with determinism. If God is made its effective cause, there is no freedom of choice, and therefore man’s freedom from sin cannot actually be imputed to him. The illusory ‘power of contraries’ by which Jansen protects liberty under sin must, therefore, in fact be a real indifference, a real power to do or not to do one thing or another.

Jansen has a limited understanding of this power because, in his view, under sin the appetites will always deceive reason about the good: therefore God must effectively incline the appetites to the true good. Thorndike makes it a real freedom by removing the problem, just as Molina had, from the sphere of history to that of cosmology. The problem of human freedom, he argues, is first a question about providence generally, then about predestination.

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and grace. Thorndike’s grasp of Molina might have been mediated through Arminius – he is eager throughout his exposition to identify Arminius’s position with the common sense of the Church, from which, he argues, determinists depart – and he claims that his position does not come from the Jesuits, but resembles most that of Durandus. He made, in any case, the same argument as Molina about future contingents, though with the reservations noted above concerning Molina’s views on the act of faith. Divine omniscience can comprehend hypothetical future contingents without thereby determining them because of ‘the infinite capacity of God’s understanding’, giving him a profound insight into the behaviour of free will under any given circumstances. Thus by virtue of willing a certain configuration of circumstances into being God can foreknow how man will act without having determined the immediate cause of the act, man’s free will. In this sense divine foreknowledge ‘supposes’ human freedom, because the coming to pass of an event depends on the behaviour of free will in circumstances which God in his general providence brings about. Jansen’s understanding of liberty as an ordination to the good, argues Thorndike, therefore also depends on this freedom from necessity, since it is supposed in God’s effectual providence.

If grace is only an aspect of this general providence, it must operate according to the same rules: it must, that is, consist in some pre-established circumstance or set of circumstances in which God knows that the un-determined will will act in such a way as to throw off its bondage to sin. Thorndike went very far along this extrinsicist road, reducing grace in many instances to those reasons which the Gospel presents to the will for

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95 *Ib.*, pp. 176ff.
96 *Ib.*, p. 232. Guillaume Durand of Saint-Pourçain, OP (c. 1270/75-1334), denied that God ‘agat in omni actione Creaturae’, on the grounds that this authors sin on God and destroys human liberty: see his *Commentaria in 4 ll. Sententiarum*, l. 2, dist. 1, q. 5. However Thorndike does use Molina’s illustrative case of David at Keila (1 Sam. xxiii 11-13), *Epilogue*, ii, p. 194.
97 *Epilogue*, ii, pp. 197-8: Thorndike admits, though with a footling distinction, that this ‘is now called in the Schools Gods middle knowledge’.
deliberation and choice. He was aware, however, that grace could not be barely rational or propositional. This would make the Church an ‘arbitrary’ or optional society, whose communion and sacraments signified only the agreement of so many individual wills. To reduce Christianity to a set of propositions would be to trust in fallen man’s natural power to choose the good, and this, Thorndike thinks, would be to prepare for failure. Thus to the publication of the Gospel Thorndike added many other ‘helps’ ordained by providence to assist the will in its choice of the good. Foremost among these is the circumstance of having been born into the Church and formally enrolled by baptism. The Church provides the context wherein God providentially disposes circumstances in such a way that man can live in a manner to which nature alone could not attain. So the grace of the Gospel can be defined as an ‘actual’ or ‘effectual help’, since the circumstances which will effectually determine man to convert to a new obedience are fixed by providence. ‘Natural means’, having a ‘supernatural cause’, can produce a ‘supernatural effect’.

Unlike Socinus, for whom Christians are not even religious before they have made a reasoned choice to accept the truth of revelation, Thorndike’s Christians are members of the Church, where the essential ‘helps’ of Christ’s grace are found, before they are individual Christians. These ‘helps’ are whatever renders the message of the Gospel acceptable to the will. The Gospel communicates an offer of salvation on fulfilment of a condition. By baptism Christians are tied to this condition, having entered a covenanted ‘corporation’ whose function is to maintain it. Since the fulfilment of the condition is predicated on that love which produces actual obedience, the function of the Church is to nourish a loving

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100 See e.g. ib., pp. 148, 168, 175, ch. 25; cf. Burnet’s ‘hypothesis’ of inward grace as something ‘imprinted deep upon our Brain’, Exposition, p. 120.
101 Ib., pp. 3, 144-62.
102 On this see also McGiffert, ‘Herbert Thorndike and the Covenant of Grace’, pp. 448f.
103 Thorndike, Epilogue, ii, pp. 6-11, chs. 30f.
105 Ib., p. 1.
106 Ib., chs. 2-4.
disposition in her members.\textsuperscript{107} Her ministry of love begins in baptism, continues in the ministry of repentance when love is broken by sin, and is consummated in the eucharist. The most significant sphere in which God’s ‘helps’ are effectual is therefore the repentance by which sinners can recover the state of grace and of communion with Christ.\textsuperscript{108} Works of humiliation and penance are necessary to this end, for the proper ‘disposition [is not] produced, but by frequenting such actions of humiliation, as may settle the impression of it upon a mans Spirit’. Consequently

those actions by which this disposition is wrought, are justly counted satisfaction to God, because they fulfill that which he desireth of a sinner, to qualify him for the remission of sinnes.\textsuperscript{109}

It is instructive that Thorndike’s final objection against Jansen is that he ignores this process of conversion, making God prevent man with such a clear vision of the good that suddenly he cannot but follow it. This is not, says Thorndike, how God has ordained the new covenant, ‘which proposeth a reward to them, who are led by the motives thereof, notwithstanding the difficulties to the contrary’.\textsuperscript{110} This indeed implies the habitual assistance of grace in him who actually overcomes the world; and Thorndike recognised that Jansen had tried to incorporate the element of struggle into his system, distinguishing the effects of Christ’s grace so that it does not always overcome.\textsuperscript{111} In fact, as we argued above, the gradual conversion of the will from concupiscence, only to be accomplished by grace but never without man’s own contribution, is the focus of Jansenist moral thought.\textsuperscript{112} Thorndike’s criticism of Jansen did not concern the formal nature of this conversion – when we are

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{107} Ib., chs. 32-3.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., pp. 301-2.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., pp. 204f., at 205.
\textsuperscript{111} Jansen, \textit{Augustinus}, t. III, bk. 2, ch. 27, col. 210; also \textit{ib.}, bk. 3, chs. 13-17, and bk. 8, ch. 2, cited by Thorndike.
\textsuperscript{112} Ch. 4, above, cf. ch. 7, below.
\end{flushleft}
actually converted it is with the grace of Christ assisting us – but its immediate effective cause, which, against determinist Calvinists and Hobbists, Thorndike felt must be asserted to inhere in the will itself.

As far as Jansen’s effective account of the determination of the will went, then, Thorndike saw him as an equivalent of these domestic bugbears. But equally central to this domestic struggle, against opponents who removed an eternal standard of good and made morality and salvation depend on an arbitrary sovereign will, was an account of the human will’s formal conversion, as a condition of salvation, from sin to charity, of its re-ordering to the eternal and immutable good. And central to such an account was an historical emphasis on the actual state of the will under sin, since this state, which renders ‘indifference’ meaningless, determines the steps which must be taken in order to an effectual conversion.

Thorndike’s discussion of liberty, on our analysis, exemplifies the ambivalent Anglican attitude to the Augustinian legacy of the reformers. His overriding preoccupation was to expose the fatalism of a determinist doctrine which his opponents pinned on the authority of Augustine. But he was resolved to do so without falling into the error of other thinkers with the same libertarian agenda, such as the Molinists or the Socinians, whose confidence in nature caused them effectively to reject, alongside Augustine’s determinism, his psychological insights into the effects of sin and consequently the nature of conversion. To qualify the doctrine of original sin was to undermine the ethical force of Christianity just as effectively as the Calvinists did by exaggerating it.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 143, 148.} Nor would Thorndike abandon the Platonic ethical perspective which complemented Augustine’s conception of liberty, since it was fundamental to the case against Calvinism that morality was not merely an accident of the absolute divine will, but derived from the congruity of the reasonable creature with his ultimate good in the creator. Thus Thorndike wanted to hold in tension two concepts of
liberty, liberty from necessity and liberty as ordination to the true good, which an effective account of the divine concourse such as Jansen’s rendered mutually exclusive. Like Taylor Thorndike praised a former exponent of this precarious balancing act between free will and grace, John Cassian. ‘Those of Marseilles’, according to Thorndike, were right to say that conversion and obedience issue from free will, and are rewarded by following graces. It was heretical of them to suppose that God is obliged by the act of free will, and illogical, since they maintained original sin, to suppose that the grace of Christ consists merely in a message and an example proposed to man’s free choice. But this error, issuing as it did in a rigorous asceticism such as Cassian recommends, was at least an error on the ‘safe side’; and ‘the worse divines they appear, must needs justifie them to be so much the better Christians’. ‘It is therefore’, concluded Thorndike, ‘a commendable thing, to excuse the writings of that excellent person John Cassian, so farre as the common Faith will give leave’.114 Cassian was aware that true freedom is engraced obedience, but he did not absolve man’s free will from the responsibility to strive thereafter.115

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Reviewing the background of the disputes about grace and predestination which divided seventeenth-century Protestants, Burnet too reserved some praise for the ‘Middle Doctrine’ of Cassian, despite Cassian’s denial of ‘preventing-grace’. Although Augustine’s doctrine prevailed in the West,

and the Credit of his Books went far, yet no Book was more read in the following Ages, than Cassian’s Collations. There was in them a clear Thread of good Sense, and a very high Strain of Piety that run through them; and they were thought the best institutions


115 On Cassian cf. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, p. 73; Owen Chadwick, John Cassian (Cambridge, 1968), ch. 4.
for a Monk to form his Mind, by reading them attentively: So they still carried down among those who read them, deep Impressions of the Doctrine of the Greek Church.\textsuperscript{116}

Burnet’s connection of a doctrine based on free will with monastic asceticism suggests the nature of the imbalance which the holy living theologians felt had affected English Protestantism. This sentiment was not so uncommon. It is noteworthy that Richard Watson, who, in continental exile, had been so adversely struck by the predestinarian Jansenists (‘a pack of villains …’), was affected very differently by his exposure to monastic piety. To William Edgeman, Hyde’s secretary, he wrote that, although ‘there is much in the monastic rule to which they ought not to submit’, Roman Catholics ‘have opportunities to serve God in more purity’; and he would ‘never excuse the Church of England (whatsoever the Puritans preach against vows) for the want of such happy diversions’.\textsuperscript{117} The theology of holy living, as we shall now see, attempted to translate such vague yearnings into concrete reality. Historians have rightly identified the ‘practical’ character of this project, but it should be borne in mind that this does not necessarily import a non-doctrinal or narrowly ethical focus. In our thinkers it was a symptom of their self-consciously affective approach to the doctrine of salvation. Ascetic discipline, founded on the love of God, was the means of the soul’s re-ordering to the eternal and immutable good. It provided an objective, empirical measure of man’s spiritual progress against the standard declared by Christ. In this way it resolved the Anglicans’ major objections against a Calvinist theology that made morality an arbitrary function of the un-knowable sovereign will, and laid claim to a self-authenticating, subjective and speculative certainty of salvation. Where, in their view, the Calvinists encouraged a dangerous security based on the forensic concept of pardon, the Anglicans aimed at an objective certainty grounded on a true liberation from sin.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{CClarSP}, ii, p. 128.
In previous chapters we have been preoccupied with the processes of negative
differentiation which assisted the writers we are choosing to regard as Jansenists and as ‘holy
living’ Anglicans to define their own religious outlooks. The Jansenists criticised, as their
principal targets, the formalism of probabilist casuistry and the naturalism of Molinist
soteriology, on the grounds that they under-estimated the process of transformation supposed
in the redemption of sinful humanity by the grace of Christ. Both Molinism and probabilism
therefore furnished an analogy with Calvinism, the Jansenists’ secondary target, whose
theory of justification also seemed, by way of an all-sufficient faith that acquits of but does
not liberate man from sin, to circumvent the problem of moral renewal. The Anglicans, for
their part, principally abhorred the same caricature of a determinist Calvinism tending
inevitably to antinomianism, which excused the Christian from moral responsibility by
denying his capacity for self-improvement; and there was a ready analogy to be found in an
easy Catholic works-righteousness, which indulged the sensual man without having the
decency to deny him. Implicit in these criticisms was the antithesis of sinfulness and
righteousness, an opposition which, argued both Jansenists and Anglicans, their Calvinist and
Catholic opponents confounded in maintaining the paradox of simultaneous justice and
criminality – either in the just man who commits mortal sins, or in the one absolved, by the
manipulation of the law, of sins he has never abandoned. In each case the moral condition of
the individual, his standing in relation to God, is guaranteed by an adventitious and self-
authenticating rule which is effective in and of itself. The assurance that flows from faith
alone, and the security of the conscience that rests on the doctrine of probable opinions, both offer a counterfeit certainty which is really a form of scepticism, a denial of the reality that man, with the knowledge he has by nature and receives by grace, can and must order himself to the moral law. For our writers certainty had to be proportionate to an apprehension of the truth. In their view both Calvinism and the anthropocentric theology expressed in Molinism and probabilism effectively protected the individual from his responsibility to truth, the one in virtue of its extreme pessimism about the capacity of nature, the other in virtue of its eagerness to accommodate nature’s frailty. As a result both fixed certainty where it cannot be found, in the inscrutable decrees of God, or in the ipse dixit of a fallible human oracle. But there is an argument that concludes in certainty without deducing it from an unverifiable or arbitrary rule; it is the equation, made in the heart of each individual, between his knowledge of the truth and his knowledge of his own conformity thereunto.

There was nothing obscure in this ‘religion of the heart’. There may have existed, among both sets of thinkers, a mystical yearning for the unitive way at which the process of purgation and spiritual growth ought to arrive. They were not content to allow the sinner lower expectations than the saint. But, to alternatives they held to be inadequate to such a transformation, both opposed an approach that was practical and empirical. For a nature bent out of shape by the weight of sin to be re-aligned to its true rule, is for the inordinate love which drags it downwards to be replaced by the ordered love which draws it up to God as to its last end. To love is for the will to incline towards the loved object; and thus to incline is for the will to produce the corresponding acts. Just as both groups, therefore, not unaffected by the scientific and philosophical currents of the day, placed a great deal of weight on the scholarship by which a verifiable set of data about the content of the divine standard can be established, so, in respect to that conversion of the will which is a sine qua non of salvation, they privileged the observable or actual evidence it produces in the form of a holy life.
This reciprocal economy between the inward and the outward is defined by an absolute integrity. If the will is to be rightly disposed, ordered, and directed, the sensual appetites, in whose disorder consists the chief misery of man under sin, must be educated. If the lower appetites love wrongly the will is disoriented, and produces bad actions which in turn fix the appetites more strongly on the wrong objects. An actual regime, as we will see presently, is thus essential to the education of the appetites, and functions as a rough but reliable guide to the disposition of the inner man. ‘C’est … par les œuvres, que l’on doit estimer les désirs et les résolutions’.1 ‘The best witnesses are eye-witnesses’.2 On this theory the Calvinists under-emphasised the outward side of the equation, maintaining that an individual may be ‘spiritual’ even when the law of sin rules in his members. The Catholic casuists, meanwhile, over-emphasised it, considering moral actions only in their material relation to the law (a pliable rule in their hands), rather than as signifiers of an inward spiritual condition. These misconceptions, as Jansenist and Anglican would equally have argued, are connected to that false certainty which follows from understanding righteousness in terms of an event – forensic justification, priestly absolution – rather than of a process, ‘state’, or disposition.

Both groups thus developed a notion of certainty which was fixed in the self and tied directly to the use each individual makes of his moral faculties. But there was a tension here, between this individualist conception of man’s moral responsibilities, and the prerogatives of the institution in whose context they must be discharged. We turn now to the thought of two representative writers, Taylor and Arnauld, in an area where this relationship was potentially especially ambiguous, namely that of penance. Both writers emphasised the interior transformation of the penitent to such a degree that they seemed to contract the claims of the

1 FC, pp. 502-4.
Church’s ministry. Our subject thus also allows us to examine in greater depth the practical ramifications of the moral and theological ideas analysed in previous chapters. If these ideas contained a tension between the individual and the ecclesial sensibility – implying, as Krumenacker writes of Bérulle, ‘une hiérarchie d’amour qui ne coïncide pas avec la hiérarchie d’autorité’³ – it was reflected in an analogous tension between this democratic or popular aspiration to comprehend every Christian in the same terms, and its highly elitist corollary, to demand of all the same, that is the highest standards. In both cases, in other words, a sect-type mentality – which, indeed, we should expect to correspond to the religio-political circumstances of either group in the mid-seventeenth century – was emerging through the framework of notably hieratic and sacramental ecclesiological commitments. We have generally regarded this peculiarity, up to now, as a function of a broadly theological development, and this is not the place to argue the relative explanatory priority of intellectual against social or other factors in such cases. But there is no doubt that the difficult circumstances afflicting both groups were highly conducive to an individualist and elitist form of piety, and capable of encouraging, as is pre-eminently the case with Taylor among the English writers under discussion, incaution in following out their premises.

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In his most significant expository work of the Interregnum, the *Unum Necessarium*, or *Doctrine and Practice of Repentance* of 1655, Taylor referred to the treatise *De la fréquente communion* by Arnauld, first published in Paris in 1643.⁴ ‘Monsieur Arnauld of the Sorbon hath appeared publicly in reproof of a frequent and easy communion, without the just

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⁴ My ed. is the fifth of the original text, publ. 1646. The full title is *De la fréquente communion, où les sentiments des Pères, des Papes et des Conciles, touchant l’usage des Sacrements de Pénitence & d’Eucharistie, sont fidèlement exposés: Pour servir d’adresse aux personnes qui pensent sérieusement à se convertir à Dieu: & aux Pasteurs & Confesseurs zélés pour le bien des âmes*. 

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and long preparation of repentance, and its proper ministry’, he wrote. ‘Petavius the Jesuit
hath opposed him; the one cries “the present church”, the other, “the ancient church”; and as
Petavius is too hard for his adversary in the present authority, so monsieur Arnauld hath the
clearest advantage in the pretensions of antiquity and the arguments of truth’.  

At this time Taylor was meditating precisely the same subject, in response to a
situation where, as his friend Evelyn despaired, ‘the daily sacrifice [was] ceasing’, and access
to the ministries of the Church of England limited and illicit. Taylor’s solution was to
emphasise the responsibilities of the individual, and it was to this end that he produced the
Unum Necessarium, a Guide for the Penitent, the Worthy Communicant, his own liturgy, and
other works during the 1650s. ‘Public or private is all one’, he told Evelyn,

and if every person that can, will but consider concerning the essentials of religion, and
retain them severely, and immure them as well as he can with the same or equivalent
ceremonies, I know no difference in the thing, but that he shall have the exercise, and
consequently the reward, of other graces, for which, if he lives and dies in prosperous
days, he shall never be crowned.  

Arnauld’s argument tended to support this line of thinking. Starting from the premise that
there can be no effective participation in the eucharist without a right disposition in the
communicant, Arnauld evolved the argument of his director, Saint-Cyran, that absolution and
therefore admission to communion should be withheld during a period of penitential
cleansing and spiritual renouvellement. Arnauld presented his readers with a stark choice,
between this deeper worshipping life and a superficial ‘dévotion aisée’, supposedly promoted
by the Jesuits. Adroitly deploying ‘interminable quotations’, he made it appear that the early

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6 The ‘daily’ sacrifice presumably intends that of prayer, but implies a fortiori the celebration of the eucharist.
7 Bray (ed.), Correspondence, iii, pp. 66-8, letter of 18th March, 1655.
Church (and her authentic legatees) considered the significance of the eucharistic sacrament to consist as much in the penitential preparation by which men are fitted to it as in the participation itself. ‘Ces œuvres de pénitence’, indeed, ‘sont des dispositions à la Justification’.

Unlike French Catholics, Taylor’s audience had no choice in the matter: they had been forcefully un-churched. If Arnauld’s thesis was applicable, however, they might perhaps be brought, not merely to reconcile themselves to this state of affairs, comforting themselves that in a case of ‘utmost necessity’ a ‘spiritual manducation can be made, with a living faith’; but even to embrace it as a providential affliction, a set of conditions uniquely favourable to the cultivation, by means of ‘holy living’, of the ‘dispositions to justification’.

Having during the 1650s ‘amassed together divers … papers useful to the work’, Taylor therefore brought out in 1660 a tract, *The Worthy Communicant*, in which he assimilated much of Arnauld’s case into the theology of holy living which he had been elaborating since the late 1640s.

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*The Fréquente Communion and the Psychology of Penance*

The immediate occasion of the *Fréquente communion* was a short ‘Instruction’ upon the usage of the sacraments provided by Saint-Cyran for the Princesse de Guéménée, converted to his vision in 1639. The abbot’s ideas on penance and the eucharist had excited

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9 FC, pp. 627f.
10 WC, pp. 574-6. Among John Evelyn’s papers is a form composed by him for this ‘mental communion’: BL, Add. MS 78389.
11 Bray, *Correspondence*, pp. 69-70. C. J. Stranks noticed the allusion to Arnauld in UN, but dealt with it briefly as evidence of ‘the continuing breadth’ of Taylor’s reading: *The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor* (1952), p. 144.
public debate, and when this ‘Instruction’ fell into the hands of a Jesuit, Fr. de Sesmaisons, he undertook to refute them in a letter to the princess.\textsuperscript{12} His letter, urging the curative efficacy of holy communion, even and especially with respect to lukewarm participants, was communicated to Port-Royal.\textsuperscript{13} This was an opportunity to defend some of the Port-Royalists’ reformist proposals without falling foul of the ban on discussions \textit{De auxiliis divinae gratiae}, recently renewed by Urban VIII on August 1\textsuperscript{st} 1641, and endorsed by the archbishop of Paris in 1642.\textsuperscript{14} Before his death in October 1643, Saint-Cyran made a significant critical and editorial contribution to the \textit{Fréquente communion}.\textsuperscript{15} He had already disseminated the basic message in letters of spiritual counsel written from prison. These compose an instructive introduction to Arnauld’s arguments. Many were addressed to religious, and they demonstrate clearly the animating impulse behind the Jansenist assault on contemporary morality. It was to shape worldly conduct after the image of the cloister. ‘Car M. de S. Cyran’, as his editor recorded,

\begin{quote}
ne propose pas une idée d’une souveraine perfection qui puisse plus en ce temps être admirée qu’imitée: Mais il donne des conseils généraux et particuliers, qui sont faciles à exécuter avec la grâce de Dieu, sans laquelle nous ne pouvons rien, et qui peuvent servir à purifier, voire à sanctifier une personne séculière qui les accomplit avec soin et avec uniformité.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

Saint-Cyran recurred constantly to the themes of ‘fuite’ and ‘retraite’. This does not mean all must enter religion: ‘il n’y a point de si petit métier dans lequel l’homme ne se puisse sanctifier’.\textsuperscript{17} But without a certain aloofness, without some element of withdrawal, it

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{12} Cognet, \textit{Le jansénisme}, pp. 42-3.
\footnote{13} It is reported point by point, in controversial style, in the \textit{Fréquente communion}.
\footnote{14} Although Arnauld already had his \textit{Première Apologie} for Jansenius well in hand.
\footnote{15} Orcibal, \textit{Saint-Cyran et le jansénisme}, p. 41-3, 46-50.
\footnote{16} Saint-Cyran, \textit{Lettres Chrétienennes et Spirituelles}, t. I., sig. o(v), r. On the importance of the concept of ‘uniformity’, cf. below, this chapter.
\footnote{17} On this see esp. Cognet, ‘Le mépris du monde à Port-Royal’.
\end{footnotes}
will be impossible, in the dubious and dangerous confusion of our daily lives, to form the interior disposition which God requires of his penitent children. When we have fallen by cause of sin, it is not enough to rush to a priest and grasp at the facile formula of absolution. Self-examination, conducted in a spirit of ‘profond abaissement intérieur et secret formé dans un humble silence’, must first result in an authentic sorrow, springing wholly from love of the one who is offended. Not just this contrite spirit of penitence, but works of penitence themselves must also be realised, before we are ready to ask pardon of God. Only then ought we to confess to a priest. Such a confession must be general and comprehensive, its end being a general and comprehensive transformation of life. Without such a preparatory repentance it is unthinkable that the eucharist should be approached, than which ‘il n’y a rien de si grand en ce monde’; which is ‘tout ce qu’il y a de plus grand sur la terre’, ‘toute la perfection des mystères de Iésus-Christ’. How can one desire in this world any other thing than the sovereign good ‘enfermé dans l’Eucharistie’? And how can one desire something, without doing everything possible to enjoy it? Therefore all Christians, both the just and the penitent sinners, must prepare themselves to receive it by a life of true repentance.

18 Ibid., t. II, Letter XCI; t. 1, p. 152.  
19 Ibid., t. I, Letter XVI. There was nothing remarkable in this. The Tridentine decree on penance (Schroeder, pp. 92-4) stated the traditional position that all mortal sins must be confessed ‘specifically and one by one’, but that venial sins may be omitted without guilt. Arnauld, for example, thought the truly penitent would confess venial and even mental sins (FC, pp. 625-6, 207), but this was not an issue. As is well known, the Jesuits advocated a full and comprehensive confession based on an intense and thorough self-examination, even of one’s entire life. The problem was, as John Bossy puts it, the suspicion that ‘the Jesuit recipe of devout self-awareness concealed a conspiracy with the laity to trivialise the sacrament’ by rendering satisfactions superfluous. Such suspicions were not allayed by attempts to accommodate weak or scrupulous penitents – such as allowing a general for a particular confession, the omission of aggravating circumstances, the reporting of habitual sins as single ones, or the resort to multiple confessors – which were pounced on by rigorist critics. Quote is Bossy, Christianity in the West, p. 133. Cf. Tentler, Sin and Confession, pp. 108f.; Philippe Rouillard, Histoire de la pénitence des origines à nos jours (Paris, 1996), ch. 6; on early modern France Robin Briggs, ‘The sins of the people. Auricular confession and the imposition of social norms’, in his Communities of Belief, pp. 277-338; on the Jesuits O’Malley, The First Jesuits, pp. 138-52; Louis Chatellier, The Europe of the Devout, tr. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 35, 138-40.  
20 Lettres Chrétienes et Spirituelles, t. III, Letter CXLV.
Such a life consists in the sincere imitation of Christ. ‘Je ne prétends pas qu’on soit entièrement parfait pour aller à la sainte Eucharistie, mais seulement qu’on ait désir de l’être, & qu’on travaille pour le devenir’. The eucharist is the sacrament of perfection, the supreme realisation of the mystical co-inherence of God and man; so must our desire for it be ‘perfect’, that is, untainted by any affection for the creature.21

The necessary disposition, then, consists in the pure love of God: it is ‘le culte principal de la Religion qu’on ne doit qu’à luy’, and consists in ‘l’aime luy seul de tout nôtre cœur, sans le diviser ny partager avec les plus grandes, ou les moindres des créatures’.22 Interior love has its synonym in the exterior charity by which it is manifested. This is pre-eminently how we achieve the imitation of Christ’s life.23 Active charity, in its many manifestations, from alms-giving to the rearing and education of children, is the most important theme of Saint-Cyran’s letters: it is the most powerful witness men have of the grace of God, who merely follow the movements which God forms in their hearts, ‘pour produire aux dehors des effets merveilleux de Grâce et Charité’. In fact – far greater than those which amaze the senses – ‘les plus grands miracles que Dieu fait dans l’Eglise sont les œuvres de Charité’.24

In the Fréquente communion Arnauld cast these ideas into the form of a systematic historical polemic. With its voluminous citation of early patristic witnesses and the canons and decrees of church councils, especially those of Trent as implemented by St. Carlo Borromeo, an advocate of the use of delayed absolution, in his Milan diocese, the credentials of Arnauld’s book were hard to question.25 At Rome it was backed by Cardinal Capponi, a

21 Ibid., pp. 284-5.
25 For Borromeo see Instructions de S. Charles Borromée aux Confesseurs de sa Ville et de son Diocèse (Besançon, 1839 [ed. of 1656/7]), pp. 43-57; cf. M. Bernos, ‘Saint Charles Borromée et ses “Instructions aux
disciple of Borromeo, and even by the Jesuit Cardinal Lugo; by the fifth edition it was adorned with the signed approbations of twenty-seven bishops and archbishops, and twenty-four doctors of theology.26

The book contributed to a debate over frequent communion and worthy reception that had occupied Catholic reformers since the sixteenth century. Frequent participation in the sacrament was encouraged, especially by the Jesuits, as the best means to emphasise and reinforce the unity of the faithful. Arnauld was not in reaction against this aspiration: so far as it was joined to a focus on the correct interior disposition towards reception, it was an ideal. In several leading Jesuits it was. The Society’s rules of 1594 were cautious, directing that weekly communion at most be permitted the laity. Tolet even insisted that worthy communicants be free of all affection to venial sin, a teaching in which he was followed by François de Sales, and which, aside from corporal mortifications, really represents the utmost severity of Arnauld’s doctrine. De Sesmaison’s letter, however, exemplified a contrary tendency, which had made advances in Spain under the influence of Molina, and emphasised the importance of frequent communion without a corresponding insistence on the purity of the communicant.27

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26 Orcibal, Le Premier Port-Royal, p. 25; the approbations at FC, pp. 153-79.
In Arnauld’s view this was merely sending communicants to eat and drink their own damnation.\textsuperscript{28} If the inner man is not united to Christ by love, but separated from him by the disorder of sin, outward participation in the sacrament of unity is not only an empty show but a special violation of the body of Christ.\textsuperscript{29} Arnauld’s subject was therefore penance, ‘la préparation à l’Eucharistie’, which is in turn ‘le but et la perfection de la pénitence’.\textsuperscript{30} Penance should be, in the words of the Tridentine fathers, a second, ‘laborious baptism’, which heals the rupture caused between the baptized Christian and God by sin, and allows him to enter again into that union enacted in the eucharist.\textsuperscript{31} The modern conception of the sacrament of penance, according to Arnauld, undermined this basic purpose. ‘Les nouveaux casuistes’ and the confessors who followed them, he argued, had effectively collapsed penance into confession and absolution alone. This was the culmination of a general ‘relâchement’ traceable to canon 21 of Lateran IV. As auricular confession became the keynote of the sacrament, a whole technical literature grew up around hearing and making confession, tending to drown out the connected idea of expiating sins by laborious penances.\textsuperscript{32} By the seventeenth-century, claimed Arnauld, the three material parts of the sacrament had been emptied of all meaning. The priestly absolution, according to the Tridentine decrees, could supply an imperfect contrition;\textsuperscript{33} confession was debased by sleights and equivocations designed for the convenience of the penitent;\textsuperscript{34} and satisfaction, besides being reduced to the most paltry degree, was deprived of any operative virtue by its

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{28} I Cor. xi 29.
\bibitem{29} \textit{FC}, pp. 80, 82, 208, 400, 461.
\bibitem{30} \textit{Ib.}, pp. 347f., at 348.
\bibitem{33} Canon 5 of the decree on penance, Schroeder, pp. 91-2, 102: in reality this simply evaded a definitive formulation, cf. Poschmann, \textit{Penance and the Anointing of the Sick}, p. 199.
\bibitem{34} Cf. n. 19, above.
\end{thebibliography}
relegation to a consequent of absolution. Potentially a school of virtue, confession was reduced to a petty tribunal.

These shortcomings, argued Arnauld, reflected an inadequate and superficial understanding of sin. For the casuists sin is a question of discrete acts, to be enumerated, classified into mortal and venial, and expiated according to a legal tariff. This is to misapprehend the psychological reality of sin. Sin is an absence of psychic harmony, what Arnauld calls ‘[un] esprit … plein de dérèglements’, and opposes to ‘le règlement [sic] et l’uniformité de toute la vie’.\(^{36}\) In Saint-Cyran’s words, ‘la vertu n’est qu’ordre comme le vice n’est que dérèglement’.\(^{37}\) Sin, that is, is a state, a disordered disposition of the moral personality. The very necessity of repentance derives from the wounds of ignorance, weakness and depravity which afflict the understanding, the will and the affections in consequence of the fall. When the faith, hope and love with which these wounds are dressed at baptism are disordered by the commission of sins, it is futile to suppose that the problem can be engaged merely through the external symptoms of this disorder. Since all sin is contrary to God, any sin evidences some imbalance in the moral disposition, and it is this which must be addressed.\(^{38}\)

As Taylor recognised, Arnauld was thus concerned to reject any distinction between sacramental \textit{pénitence} and repentance as such. There is only one ‘repentance towards God’: it comprehends whatever is effective of interior renewal, and excludes whatever is not.\(^{39}\) There was no room, in this perspective, for the legal distinctions of technical moral theology, especially that between mortal and venial sins. All sins are either mortal in the sense that they

\(^{35}\) FC, pp. 383f., 468-71, 511f., 626f.; these criticisms are echoed by Denis de la Barde, the bishop of Saint-Brieuc (1641-75), ib., p. 160.
\(^{36}\) Ib., pp. 81-3.
\(^{38}\) FC, e.g. pp. 356-7.
\(^{39}\) UN, p. 15.
testify the psychic disharmony of one who has fallen from the state of baptismal innocence, or venial in the sense that they can and must be repented of. In the case of those lesser sins which do not destroy the grace of baptism at one stroke, and which we commit involuntarily on account of our hereditary weakness, the distinction is to be put between the sins themselves and the ‘affection’ to such sins. We may not be able to rid ourselves of the sins, but we can purge all affection to them. Penitents must achieve ‘une très grande pureté’, ensuring they are ‘non seulement entièrement éloigné[s] de toute sorte de péché mortel; mais détaché[s] même de toute affection au péché vénial’. Arnauld adopted this doctrine from François de Sales’s Introduction à la vie dévote, a book of ascetical theology which assists a soul already purged of evil inclinations to grow in devotion along the illuminative path. The Fréquente communion, in other words, a work consecrated to sinners, did not recognise a difference between moral and ascetical theology.

The emphasis on the affections is the key to Arnauld’s argument. He was impressed above all with the influence the affections have into the will. The inclinations of the flesh, the impulse to serve the creature and not the creator, can be the most potent and actuating elements in the moral personality. Since concupiscence means that these inclinations will always have the potential to divert the will from its true end to some temporal good, Arnauld, in the spirit of Aquinas, is primarily concerned with the process of moral acculturation by which we can acquire a disposition to act well. This is a question of discipline; the will must

40 FC, pp. 404f., 238f., 292-302, 489-90. This is arguably how Aquinas thinks of them, ST, IaIIae, q. 72, esp. a. 5: ‘differentia autem peccati venialis et mortalis consequitur diversitatatem inordinationis, quae complet rationem peccati’.

41 FC, pp. 238f., at 241.

42 De Sales, Introduction, pp. 43-5, 72-4; cf. p. 35: ‘Regardant donc en tout ceci une âme qui, par le désir de la dévotion, aspire à l’amour de Dieu’. See FC, pp. 520-24, for a fascinating ‘parallèle de S. Charles et de M. de Genève’.

43 Cf. ch. 4, above, pp. 191-2, 195-6.

44 ST, IaIIae, esp. qq. 49f. on dispositions.
be strengthened by mortifying those sinful affections which can occlude our rational goal. As Pascal put it, ‘les pénitences extérieures disposent à l’intérieure, comme les humiliations à l’humilité’. Without discipline, conversely, we risk acting badly; and in acting badly, we risk contracting a vicious habit. If love is turned away from God and towards the self, it quickly forms a habitual disposition, which steadily hardens into a ‘chaîne de fer’, as Augustine calls it in the Confessions, ‘une seconde concupiscence … qui est fondue dans la première’. This ‘iron chain’ had struck François de Sales strongly; Saint-Cyran too insisted upon those passages in which Augustine depicts the corrupt affections engendering acts, then customs, and finally necessity and the captivity of the will.

The desires incident to the human condition have, as Augustine taught, two possible objects, the self, and God. Either must be loved infinitely, according to the end to which God appointed human desire. ‘As one loves, so one is’. For Arnauld, then, the Christian is always on a trajectory, either Godward or selfward. The love of God is, so to speak, an impermeable category. All the elements of the personality must be moving in the same direction, or the tendency of the whole is distorted. The description of this trajectory is charity, in contradistinction to cupidity, so that charity is the comprehensive virtue, inclusive of all others. If misdirected love disorders the inner disposition, we pull away from Christ, and cannot by definition participate in him at the eucharist.

45 This acculturation is required by Plato, where the principle of virtue is likewise that of psychic harmony. Cf. Republic, 441e-442a. An interesting case has been made, by T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge, 2010), esp. ch. 5, that Socrates should be understood in comparable terms.
46 Pensées, 936.
49 Augustine, de civ. Dei, XIV 28; In epistolam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus, 2.14.
50 Again this recalls de Sales in the Traité de l’amour de Dieu.
Of the highest importance, therefore, is the culture of the affections and the will, the determinants of love. If that sincere contrition which alone can obviate the continual diverting potential of the affections is to be inculcated, a regime of penitential exercises is necessary. It is a matter of psychological necessity to use those ‘means’ which tradition shows are most productive of interior renouvellement. These ‘servent à ruiner les habitudes des vices par les actions contraires’: to replace one disposition with another. Separation from communion, for example, teaches penitents the virtue of retreat from the corrupt and corrupting world of men; alms ‘leur enseignent la charité qu’ils doivent exercer envers les pauvres pour mériter le Paradis’; fasting teaches them to resist the lusting of the flesh; prayers that ‘la vie d’un Chrétien doit être une prière continuelle’. The stringency of penitential satisfactions in the primitive era, underlined Arnauld, bespeaks the radical transformation they were supposed to effect.

For Arnauld the ‘Calvinists’, placing the entire emphasis on the faith of the elect, ignore this crucial acculturation of the personality as a whole. The free-will theology of the Jesuit casuists, on the other hand, ought to place a premium on the process. But instead of recommending means – prayers, fasts, alms, and any other mortification fitted to a particular sin or sinful inclination – to strengthen the will against the concupiscible inclinations and fix it in charity, they adjust the law to suit the frailty of the will, for this reason divorcing virtue from the inward spiritual state, and relating it entirely to the non-transgression of the law.

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51 The insistence on ‘sincerity’ constitutes the soft part of Arnauld’s argument, in acknowledging that we can never avoid sins of infirmity – see FC, pp. 92-100.
52 Namely prayers, fasts and alms-giving (Mt. vi), to which Arnauld frequently adds ‘gémissements’, ‘larmes’, ‘soumissions’, ‘austérités’ (including ‘le cilice’), ‘veilles’, and ‘toutes sortes de bonnes œuvres’.
53 FC, pp. 462f. The Tridentine decree on penance stated that ‘by acts of the opposite virtues’ satisfactions ‘destroy habits acquired by evil living’: Schroeder, p. 97.
54 Arnauld reminded readers that favoured witnesses such as Cyprian or Ambrose actually represent the indulgent strand of a debate in which the Novationists occupied the rigorist position, and argued forcefully for the return of public penance for public sins, a principle re-affirmed at Trent (Schroeder, pp. 188-9): FC, pp. 418f., 471-2, 484f., 528.
55 Cf. ch. 4, above, pp. 203f.; Jean Laporte, La Doctrine de Port-Royal, 2 vols. (Paris, 1923), t. i, La Morale (d’après Arnauld), pp. 7-24.
Neither of these theories are adequate to the kind of wholesale conversion – repentance, μετάνοια, in the comprehensive sense it carries in the gospels – which leads to salvation. The positive obligation to live righteously affects the individual where the negative requirement of legal innocence does not, along the interface between the lower loves and the will, the crucible in which the disposition, or moral personality, is forged.

Arnauld’s enlarged idea of pénitence as the conversion of the inner man, a process in which the discipline of the outer man is indispensable, led him to idiosyncratic positions. He maintained, for example, that absolution depended more upon the state of a man’s repentance than upon the sentence of the priest. It is like the finishing touch, the final line or dab of colour, to a painting which has already been completed. True contrition, that is a will directed by the love of God, is necessary to pardon: attrition with the priestly absolution is not sufficient. Deathbed repentance is a contradiction in terms. Repentance is a life-long process, implying both a spiritual disposition and a physical discipline accessory to it.

The Worthy Communicant and the Discipline of Repentance

Arnauld, reacting against a formalist and legalist concept of repentance, sought to emphasise the psychological reality which the sacrament of penance indicates and addresses. Taylor too wished to give an enlarged, and indeed a comprehensive account of repentance. In

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56 See Schroeder, p. 103, for the condemnation of this ‘declarative’ conception in the ninth canon on penance. FC, pp. 348, 368ff., 98. Arnauld often talks about pénitence in terms of the living out of baptism (e.g. pp. 366ff., 583). He forestalls the suspicion of Protestant heresy which must consequently attach to him by denying that he has heightened the power of penance so far as to diminish that of the priest, who exercises the ministry of Christ and speaks ‘[la] parole de grâce’. But what is special about this grace of absolution? ‘C’est qu’étant reçue dans un sujet, lequel a été si bien disposé par les pénitences précédentes, il faut nécessairement qu’elle soit très grande’ (pp. 96-8)!

57 FC, pp. 96-8, 347-50, 368ff; cf. Schroeder, pp. 91-2.

a Protestant atmosphere where, in his view, repentance was conceived in purely psychological terms, as a mere resolution to amendment of life following the gratuitous gift of faith, Taylor’s singularity consisted in his emphasis on a formal, outward discipline.

As we have seen, for Taylor the covenant of the Gospel involves man in an obligation to keep the commandments. He is under a precept of perfection. Its mercy consists in the opportunity offered him under this covenant to repent if he fails of his duty. The precept of perfection is therefore to be understood as a precept continually to strive after perfection through obedience and repentance. In order to do so in the face of our natural infirmity it is necessary that we experience an unalloyed love of God and his commandments: only this sincere state of love will excuse our inevitable failings and keep us moving onwards in spite of them. Every duty of man thus follows from and is resolved into charity, which in order to sustain its definition can only be extended. Repentance therefore involves the conversion of the whole man from sin to charity.59 Because we are subject to infirmity this requires strenuous effort, and not a mere mental resolution.60 Since the relation of the individual to God depends on the state of his spiritual health, absolution is merely a seal of approval on an already-accomplished transformation of the inner man,61 and deathbed conversion is a nonsense.62

The Christian life, on Taylor’s view, is the process of incorporation into Christ by means of imitating him. To this end he wrote what is generally considered the first English life of Christ, The Great Exemplar of 1649, and carried the argument through succeeding

59 UN, chs. 1-2.
60 Ib., chs. 10 & 8.
61 See ibid., pp. 453f.; Holy Dying, in Holy Living and Dying (1883), pp. 477f.; The second dissuasive from popery (1667), pp. 268-9; idem, A collection of offices or forms of prayer in cases ordinary and extraordinary (16578), pp. 26-7; A Guide for the Penitent, in A Choice Manual...for the Use of the Devout (1677), p. 188. The ‘ambassadorial’ role thus accorded the priest is scriptural (see II Cor. v 20), and representative of Taylor’s contemporaries. A somewhat more positive understanding of the power of the keys, however, may be discovered in e.g. Lancelot Andrewes, Ninety-Six Sermons, ed. J. P. Parkinson and J. P. Wilson, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1841-54), v, pp. 89-103; Hammond, Of the Power of the Keyes (1651), pp. 62f., 121, 126-36, 143-7.
works such as *Holy Living* and *Holy Dying*, *Unum Necessarium* and *The Worthy Communicant*. The gift Christ gave us is ‘the promise of repentance’: the assurance that our sins may be remitted upon terms we can hope to fulfil. By his death he purchased entrance to this new covenant for us; in his life he taught us by precept and example how to fulfil its terms. The sacrifice of Christ is thus at the centre of all Taylor’s thought. Christ worked to the same end upon the cross as he did upon the earth, the redemption of mankind. His ‘death was the consummation of the work begun in his incarnation’, and ‘thus the fathers call’ the sacrament of the eucharist ‘the extension of the incarnation’. Upon the cross Christ demonstrated in the highest degree that obedience which is required under the covenant he thereby purchased for us. As Aquinas puts it, his suffering is the proper cause of our deliverance from sin because it provokes love in us, and by love we obtain pardon for sin. Taylor can thus speak in a standard way of Christ’s obtaining the remission of our sins by sacrificing himself in the place of sinful man. It is by his spirit, apprehended through faith, that we are justified.

It follows that, as this self-sacrifice was the pitch of Christ’s work, the eucharistic sacrament, wherein it is ‘commemorated’ and ‘exhibited’ for our benefit, is the apex of the Christian life. ‘It is a great declaration of the death of Christ … the most clear publication of the great word of salvation won by that death’. It is the sacrament of baptism, where we are washed clean and admitted to the promise of forgiveness for repentance, ‘repeated to us for our comfort’, and ‘accommodated by natural analogies to our natural’ understanding. As such it cannot be separated from ‘matters of duty and inquiries practical’, for the covenant of repentance is ‘a covenant of strict obedience’. The eucharist, that is to say, as an expression

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65 *ST*, IIIa, q. 49, a. 1.
66 *WC*, pp. 41, 43.
of our participation in the promise obtained by Christ, and as, symbolically, the moment when that union of his members to their head is peculiarly expressed, presupposes that those who partake of it are ordered to God and not to sin.67

Taylor’s eucharistic theology then, perhaps surprisingly in this ‘protégé of Laud’, is robustly Protestant – Calvinist, indeed – in its symbolic understanding of the nature and efficacy of the sacrament.68 Christ’s body is in heaven, not on earth. It is truly present in the sacrament in a ‘spiritual and mystical’, not in a ‘natural’ sense, only to be apprehended ‘by faith, the intellectual mouth’. As spiritual sustenance it cannot feed those who are fleshly. They alone are spiritual who have faith. But this faith, for Taylor, comprehends obedience.69

It is ‘the parent of charity’.70 We are spiritual by living according to the laws, not of this world, but of another and a spiritual one – by living obediently to the precepts of the Gospel. Since ‘Christ’s body is in heaven, we must live heavenly on earth to apprehend it’. On such as can apprehend it, it can have its effect, ‘nourish[ing] us in this life of grace in which we live and move and have our spiritual being’. But those who are not spiritual, those who have not conquered the flesh by holy living, who remain in thrall to the phantasms which attend the fallen condition, cannot receive the nourishment which the sacrament conveys. If they defile the sacrament by coming to it in this unworthy condition, they may take the bread and wine, ‘to damnation’, as the apostle says; ‘but the food itself never’. There are ‘two manducations: the sacramental, and the spiritual, and the sacramental is but a declaration, symbol, and one part or exercise of the spiritual’. As an ‘exercise’ of the spiritual participation of Christ it has a real efficacy in that moral progression which leads us towards pardon in heaven, towards the assurance of it in this life. Taylor is firm, therefore, ‘that the

67 WC, pp. 43f., 12.
68 Cf. John Spurr, in ODNB s. n. Taylor. Taylor’s eucharistic theory is most fully developed in The real presence and spirituall of Christ in the blessed sacrament proved against the doctrine of transubstantion (1653). See also H. R. McAdoo, The Eucharistic Theology of Jeremy Taylor Today (Norwich, 1988).
69 WC, pp. 23-7.
70 Holy Living, p. 162; cf. p. 164, the best sign of faith is that of St James, ‘show me thy faith by thy works’ (Jas. ii 18).
changing all into spirituality’ is ‘far from being a diminution of the glorious mystery of our communion’.

By receiving his spirit we receive ... not his liveless body, but his flesh with life in it, that is, his doctrine and spirit to imprint it, so to beget a living faith ... And the other sacraments are but particular instances of this general mystery and communion with Christ.\textsuperscript{71}

Baptism buries us into the effects of Christ’s death, into the conditional covenant of repentance, which we therein promise to perform; just so is the eucharist ‘a representation of Christ’s passion, a partaking of it, and an affirmation of our presence within this covenant of new life’. Like the Gospel as a whole, it is the ‘ministry of the death of Christ’, and operates to the remission of sins in the same way, by ‘calling to mind’ the merciful covenant, that we might perform our part. This does not, asserts Taylor, render the sacrament superfluous. ‘By whatsoever ways Christ is taken \emph{out of the sacrament}, by the same he is taken \emph{in the sacrament}; and by some ways more in the latter’. For ‘as the sacrament operates only by virtue of the spirit of God; so the spirit ordinarily works by the instrumentality of the sacraments’.\textsuperscript{72} Holy living and participation in the institutional Church are exponentially related:

We may as well say, that faith is not by hearing, as that grace is not by the sacraments; for as without the spirit, the word is but a dead letter; so with the spirit, the sacrament is the means of life and grace; for justification and sanctification are continued acts: like the issue of a fountain into its receptacle; God always giving, we always receiving.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} WC, pp. 27-37.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 60.
\textsuperscript{73} Ib.
To receive worthily is to engage in a ‘conjugation’ of the ‘holy actions’ by which Taylor insists that the moral character must be cultivated if it is to receive pardon: a part of ‘repentance’, then, but ‘the best indeed and the noblest’. It is the food of the spiritual man, and man does not live without food.  

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To place the efficacy of the sacrament in the worthy disposition of the receiver, then, is for Taylor to exalt it, both as it is instrumental to and indicative of the state in which we are, as it were, living out the sacrament by imitating Christ in his incarnation and sacrifice. Some such idea perhaps animates Taylor’s insistence on the sacrificial aspect of the eucharistic rite, which has been seen to sit oddly beside his spiritual depiction of the real presence. Just as Christ in heaven as a ‘High Priest continually … offers still the same one perfect Sacrifice … in order to perpetual and never failing events’, so ‘also his ministers do on earth’, offering ‘up the same … Sacrifice of the Cross by prayers, and a commemorating rite’. And ‘the celebration of this Sacrifice’ is ‘in its proportion an instrument of applying the proper Sacrifice to all the purposes which it first designed’. That is, the parties to the celebration of Christ’s sacrifice participate in its effect by that act among all the others of their lifelong sacrifice of repentance – a ‘living sacrifice’ as Evelyn called it in his office for mental communion (cf. Rom. xii 1-2). ‘The true sacrifice’, in Augustine’s words, ‘is offered in every act which is designed to unite us to God in a holy fellowship, every act, that is, which is directed to that final good which makes possible our true felicity’.  

74 *ib.*, pp. 61-70, 123.  
77 BL, Add. MS 78389, f. 72v.  
78 *de civ. Dei*, X.6, tr. Henry Bettenson (1972); quoted by Aquinas, *ST*, IIIa, q. 48, a. 3.
Taylor’s central point, ‘the matter of faith’ at which he aimed, as Thorndike would have said, was the reverence with which this ‘fullnesse of all the mysteriousnesse of our religion’ ought to be viewed, and the consequent ‘returns of duty’ which it requires.\(^79\) ‘The Lord’s supper, or communion’ is ‘the most sacred, mysterious and useful conjugation of secret and holy things and duties in the Religion’. Naturally, therefore, Taylor was vehement, as the Prayer Book and the Elizabethan homilies are vehement, against the ‘the great peril of … unworthy receiving’.\(^80\) But he felt, like Arnauld, that such warnings went unheeded. If the laity were negligent in this respect, neither were the ministers of religion sufficiently conscientious of the responsibility with which they were invested as administrators of the keys. He had therefore to issue some instruction as to the proper definition of a ‘worthy communicant’ – which he stated in the most rigorous terms:

There is nothing which can fit us for so holy a mystery, but which can prepare us to dye; and therefore let us be every day about this work, since we may dye every day. And till we have thus prepared ourselves to it by Repentance, we can never pray aright; for we pray ineffectually, because our repentance is not sound, and our repentance is unsound, because we do not zealously strive against sin, and till all this be reformed, we must expect no fruit by the communion; but are to be reckoned among the unworthy receivers.\(^81\)

The communion is the fruit, the nourishment, and the seal of the life of repentance. The ideal is therefore to communicate, as the apostles are said to have done (in Acts ii), every day – to progress, that is to say, to the corresponding degree of repentance, or, in Arnauld’s words, of ‘maturité intérieure’. For, as both writers pointed out, ‘[the apostles] were already

\(^79\) Taylor, WC, p. 22; idem, Clerus Domini; or, A discourse of the divine institution, necessity, sacredness, and separation of the office ministerial (1651), pp. 28f.; cf. McAdoo, Taylor’s Eucharistic Theology Today and idem, First of its kind, emphasising Taylor’s use of the language of mystery.


\(^81\) BL Add MS 78364, fol. 45r.: a sermon given at a private house in London, Sept. 6\(^\text{th}\) 1657.
wholly enflamed with those holy fires [and] filled with Christ’s fresh love’, ‘tout brûlants encore de ce feu que Jésus Christ venait d’envoyer du ciel’, ‘their spirits separate from the affections of the world …’, ‘si détachés de toutes les choses du monde’. This, then, ‘is no invitation to come for the lukewarm’, who ‘may derive caution, but not confidence from the example of the apostles’. ‘Cet exemple ne doit être imité que de ceux qui imitent la ferveur et la sainteté de ces premiers Chrétiens’. 82

In the Worthy Communicant Taylor gave a set of recommendations by which both penitents and ministers could safely regulate participation at the eucharist. The essence of the case is that, for those individuals who have subjected themselves to the necessity of repentance, there must be no admission to communion – no ministerial pronouncement in the shape of a pardon or absolution qualifying them thereunto – until a period of time has been spent in penitential works, effective of the necessary reformation. 83 ‘To absolve as soon as the sinner confesses’, he wrote, ‘and leave him to amend afterwards if he please is to give him confidence and carelessness, but not absolution’. This, as he observed,

is the doctrine properly of the Roman schools, yet it is their and our practice too. We sin with greediness, and repent at leisure, and to confess and absolve is all the method of our modern repentance, even when it is most severe.

As long as the argument is conducted on false principles – on the premise that wicked acts can consist with a life towards God, whether in the justified sinner, or in the Catholic

82 WC, pp. 432-3; De la fréq. comm., pp. 97, 186-92, quotes at 191, 188.
83 Here he differs from the standards of the Church of England as they were contained in the Prayer Book and the Homilies. There, although communicants were required to be in charity, and thus to make restitution to or effect reconciliation with their neighbours before receiving, the primary focus in respect to the disposition necessary for reception was purely noetic. Participants must have recognised their sin, and confessed it to God (not a priest) ‘with full purpose of amendment of life’. They are required ‘to come in a sure faith’ grounded on a clear, Protestant understanding of the sacrament and the work of Christ it represents. Preparation consists in uprooting ‘all distrust in God’s promises’. ‘Newness’, ‘purity’ or ‘holiness of life’, amendment and works, are unfailingly seen as fruits of this faithful disposition, rather than as constituents thereof, ‘to succeed’ rather than to precede reception of the sacrament. Griffiths (ed.), The Two Books of Homilies, pp. 439-52 on Worthy Receiving, and the three-part Homily on Repentance, pp. 525-49.
absolved by the words of the priest – it ‘shall never from thence find out the entire truth’. Taylor’s object, then, was to detach moral theology from its ‘very weak, and very false moorings’ by giving a true analysis of sin and its remedy.  

Like Arnauld, Taylor thought the casuists shallow psychologists. This was pre-eminently exampled in the distinction of mortal and venial sins, which Taylor too regarded merely as an elaborate excuse to sin. Having distinguished a class of sins which can be committed without danger, men naturally proceed to ‘call what they please venial, and appoint what expiation they fancy’. But the real question is not what is and what is not mortal or venial; but what is and what is not lawful. And all sin is of its nature unlawful, because it is disobedience to God, who commands obedience. All sins, as ‘equally prevarications of the divine commandment, are an equal disobedience and recession from the rule’. Therefore every sin, however small, is ‘punishable as God pleases, even with the highest expression of his anger’.

The essence and sum of the obedience we owe to God is ‘the heart; that is, our love and choice’: the measure by which God judges our ‘sacrifice’, our obedience, is ‘therefore the degrees of love or hatred within us. For by this it is that little sins become great, and great sins become little’. This state of intention is something only God can know absolutely, which we ourselves, whose ‘hearts deceive us’, whose ‘purposes’ are ‘complicated’, can only know obscurely. ‘He alone can tell the affections, and all that which had secret influence into the event’. In this case the only practicable course can be the safest possible: ‘it is evident that the smallest sin must be strenuously avoided’. For in every sin it is cupidity which has ruled the affections: ‘even the smallest sin is against charity, which is the end of the

84 UN, pp. 419, 154, 15; cf. Ductor, Preface; Dissuasive from Popery, pp. 127-44.
85 UN, ch. 3, qus. at pp. 83, 84, 87.
86 Cf. FC, p. 277: ‘toute la Religion Chrétienne ayant son fondement dans le cœur …’
commandment’. And so every smallest sin, like a leak in a vessel, propounds its end. Each is ‘a turning from God and a conversion to the creature … it is certain that no sin is towards God, and that which is not with him is against him’ (Mt. xii 30).

Thus for Taylor as for Arnauld the state of sin, and conversely that of holiness, is fundamentally vectorial. Again, the direction in which we tend is powerfully determined by the orientation of the affections, the will being ‘the region both of choice and passions’. Man, says Taylor, is a creature of habit, and we can conquer nature, either to bad ends, when we accustom ourselves to unnatural vices, or to good, when we overcome what is imperfect or vicious in nature by regularity and custom. ‘Till habits supervene, we are of a middle constitution, divided between good and evil; and all our good or bad is but a disposition towards either’. This does not mean that we are not ‘vicious and ill-disposed by nature’; but that, ‘if we let our evil appetites prevail’, the will becomes conditioned by concupiscence. We ‘bring in evil customs on top of our’ vicious nature, a ‘new concupiscence’ – citing Augustine’s *Confessions*, VIII.5 & 7 – which disposes us towards evil to an increasingly irrecoverable extent, since ‘by a habit sin seizes upon the will and all the affections; and the very principles of motion towards virtue are almost broken in pieces’. Since man is always subject to cognitive error (he may see the good and not follow it), passion must be acknowledged for the fundamental catalyst which, as Taylor writes, ‘sets nature on work’. It is love which must be enlisted in order to the formation of character – love, by definition directed and progressive, which must transform the whole disposition by transforming all

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87 One recalls Herbert, in *Sinne (II)*, ‘Sinne is flat opposite to th’ Almighty’.
89 *UN*, pp. 499-500.
90 *Ib*., ch. 5, at pp. 166f.
91 *Ib*., p. 152.
those sensible and affective elements that determine the will and hence the moral character. So ‘it is of no consequence to think and purpose well, unless we add deeds too’.\(^{92}\)

For the will is the ‘formality of sin’: sin is turning from God ‘to the creature by love and adhesion’.\(^{93}\) Since acts are seated in the will, and the will is shaped and formed by the affections, Taylor teaches like Arnauld that ‘all affection to sin is perfectly inconsistent with the love of God’, as subverting the general tendency of the ‘whole body’ of the psyche: ‘every act of love to a sin, is a perfect enemy to the love of God’. ‘No man can love sin and love God at the same time’.\(^{94}\) Hence, as Taylor preached to a tiny London congregation in 1657, we ‘must leave no remnant affection in us to sin for the future’.\(^{95}\) No remnant affection to sin is compatible with the truly returning state, lest it might ‘spring up and bear the apples of Sodom’. Furthermore, though sins may come in involuntarily, the affections may be cultivated by use. To fail thus to educate the affections is negligent and therefore voluntary. Omission is thus in a sense ‘the parent of sin’.\(^{96}\)

This is the point where Taylor’s doctrine reached the height of its severity. It is not enough to live without sin, but all affection to venial, that is involuntary, sin, must be thoroughly deracinated. Since this will involve some internal contradiction in respect of our natural inclination to sin, it calls for the exercise of certain measures or mortifications in

\(^{92}\) \textit{Ib.}, p. 168. Appeal is made to Augustine’s distinction (\textit{Conf.}, VIII 8.19-20) between a ‘weak’ will, and a ‘momentous’ one which cannot consist with the non-accomplishment of the thing willed.

\(^{93}\) \textit{Ib.}, pp. 107-8, 374f.; cf. Aquinas, \textit{ST}, IaIIae, q. 74. The analysis of sin and virtue as essentially voluntary, incidentally, inherited as it is from Augustine and Aquinas, need not be derived from the writings of Grotius, Episcopius, or Socinus.


\(^{95}\) BL Add. MS 78364, f. 45r.; cf. a sermon of April 1656, f. 34r. The extent to which interregnum Anglicanism resembles the structural inversion of Caroline puritanism is always striking. Here Taylor, on the basis of a fully developed theology of covenants, preaches ascetical doctrine to an illegal conventicle, which must be composed of saints if their lives are to answer his exhortations.

\(^{96}\) \textit{UN}, ch. 8, at pp. 370f.; & pp. 418, 27-8.
restraint and re-ordering of our affections. And since nature itself does not change, neither can these mortifications, ‘this constant striving, with utmost vigilance’, ever cease.97

The first premise of repentance is a heartfelt sorrow for our sins, and a ‘sharp, painful hunger’ after obedience. True desire implies real want: humility is thus the end of self-examination.98 We may manage to ‘control the passions, purify the intentions, direct and sanctify the lusts and affections’, but since in this life we are always travelling, and can never arrive, we must recognise the disparity between our desires and our achievements. This humility, joined with a contrite sorrow for sin, will produce the first ‘proper act and introduction to repentance’, the practice of confession.99 The sinner must confess to God, and to his neighbour if he has done a social injury; but Taylor departs from the more common view – as expressed, for example, in the Elizabethan homily on repentance, in which discussion of these two genres of confession is followed by a broadside against auricular confession100 – in advising confession to a priest, in his eyes a criminally neglected resource.101 This Taylor does not insist upon, but makes necessary by consequence. The ‘reason is pressing’: for if confession ‘is done in order to pardon of sins, so it must be done in front of the publisher and dispenser of that pardon, the minister of reconciliation.’ Since the minister holds the keys of life and death in the administration of the sacraments, ‘it were well if he did know whether the person presented were fit to communicate or no; and if he be not, it is charity to reject him and charity to assist him that he may be fitted’. It is in this faculty of adjudication that a spiritual guide becomes a necessity: hence Taylor’s obsession with

97 UN, p. 387.
98 Taylor’s prayers of humble abasement are not therefore a ‘contradiction’ of his theology of justification, as C. F. Allison maintained (The Rise of Moralism, ch. 4): they represent a phase in amendment, which retains its priority in the ordo salutis.
99 WC, ch. 2; UN, pp. 439f., 478f.; Holy Dying, pp. 465f. Taylor’s discussion of self-examination is reminiscent of de Sales (Introduction, in Œuvres, pp. 65f.); Taylor similarly echoes the Ignatian method, recommending a ‘general’ confession comprehending one’s entire life.
100 Griffiths (ed.), The Two Books of Homilies, pp. 537-41; although cf. the Homily on the Resurrection; the Order for the Visitation of the Sick, the Form for Ordering of Priests, and the rubrics on ministerial counsel in the Communion Service in the BCP; and the 113th canon of 1604, which all imply the use of private confession.
101 UN, pp. 8-14; cf. Ductor, p. i.
rescuing casuistry from the false premises of its Catholic exponents, and presenting it on a grand scale for an Anglophone audience. Sinners, perpetually liable to cognitive error, are not best suited to prosecute their own case; therefore every man ought ‘to consult with a spiritual guide to help him, whether or not he think it necessary’. Like Arnauld Taylor invests the confessor with tremendous responsibility, which he is expected to exercise with the utmost rigour.

The spiritual guide essays that hazardous equation of the outward signs of repentance with the inward state which God alone can judge. It is to him too as a minister of religion to apply those remedies which the Church has developed against post-baptismal sin. For that reason sinners ought not only to confess to a priest, but to make their confession ‘full and comprehensive and particular’: ‘in our repentance a general survey will not suffice, we must make a particular scrutiny of our actions, and words, nay of our very thoughts, if possible’. Only such a ‘particular and enumerative’ confession will enable the guide to apply ‘more particular and effectual remedies’: for it is by the application of the contrary habit of holiness that the habitual evil implied in every particular sin is purged.

The rule of proportionality must therefore govern this process of psychic re-ordering. The ‘degrees of penitentiary sorrow’, preached Taylor in 1655, ‘must be as proportionable to our sin, as we can make it’. Like Arnauld, he quotes Cyprian’s rule, ‘according to the greatness of the sin, so must be the greatness of the sorrow’, as the best

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102 UN, pp. 479-85.
103 Representative statements at e.g. UN, pp. 419-20, 488; idem, Ductor, p. xvii; FC, pp. 96-100, index s.v. ‘Prêtres, Directeurs, direction’.
105 Taylor, like the Jansenists, uses the image of a pair of scales, which must be adjusted by the addition of the virtues contrary to vices. See e.g. UN, p. 179; cf. ch. 4, above, p. 194. On proportionality see FC, pp. 237, 389, 462.
‘Satisfaction’ does not mean, Taylor clarifies, and did not in the primitive era mean ‘a legal payment to the divine justice’: this supposes that sins have some objective value that can be met, leaving man in no need of divine pardon. Penance or satisfaction rather ‘signifies the deprecation’ of, the seeking to avert or ward off ‘our fault by the exercises of repentance’. Since it is a work of time and effort to reverse a man’s spiritual trajectory, ‘the bishops in the primitive church would never give pardon till the satisfactions were performed’. They deferred absolution, or admission to holy communion, for such a period as was necessary for the penitent to achieve the conversion of the whole man – ‘till they could see he was really contrite’. For the penances which they undertook during this period are what Taylor calls ‘the material and formal part’ of the ‘graces’ requisite to a Godward disposition. To confess and regret their sins, submit themselves to punishment, and ‘to do actions contrary to their former sins, this was their amends and satisfaction; and this ought to be ours’. These are psychological apparatuses provided by the Church of which we ought to take advantage. And because ‘mortifying our sins, is the best we can do, it is true that the most laborious repentance is the best, for it takes off the softness of the flesh’. Penances are ‘the plank after the shipwreck, to preserve men from sinking in an ocean of impiety’. When therefore ‘they are taken away by the declension of the primitive discipline, there is a great way made for the destruction of souls, but nothing for the advantage of holiness, or becoming like to God’.

Thus, though of course Taylor does not call acts of satisfaction meritoriously necessary, he does consider them to be so psychologically. Prayers, corporal austerities, especially fasting on which Taylor was very keen, and charity, including alms-giving, forgiveness of injuries, and restitution, are ‘the fruits of repentance, which are grown in paradise … For these are a just deletery to the state of sin, they oppose a good against an evil;

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106 BL Add. MS 78364, fo. 34r.; UN, pp. 142-3; FC, p. 373n.; the reference is to Cyprian, Liber de Lapsis (PL, vol. 4, col. 492B): ‘quam magna deliquimus, tam granditer defleamus’.

107 UN, pp. 453-68; B. Taylor’s Opuscula (1678), pp. 92-3; A Dissuasive from popery, p. 171.
against every evil …'. 108 They are instruments, parts, exercises, and acts of turning from sin. As such they must be practised, never forgetting that they are signs and instruments of that which must provide their context, the whole state of repentance. For holy life is ‘like the sun, which darts his rays in every portion of the air; and the smallest atom that dances in that air is tied to a little thread of light, which by equal emanation fills all the capacities of every region’. 109

This thread of light is the indispensable, the necessary, and the sufficient condition of pardon: it is that true contrition, or love of God for his own sake, which implies all the other actions of repentance besides. It is neither a mere change of heart, nor can it be artificially confected out of attrition. It is a state of being, ‘not the work of an instant’: it partakes of the form of charity, one of the two absolute states that may govern a man, whose definitions are self-expansive. 110 The early liturgies clearly demonstrate this, argues Taylor with Arnauld. The liturgical absolution was not ‘judicial’ (indicative), but purely precatory (optative). The priest laid on hands and prayed over penitents, that their repentance might render them worthy. These were merely ‘rites preparatory’ to the ‘main end and effect’ of absolution, which was the ‘giving of communion’. For ‘either the sinner hath repented worthily or he hath not. If he hath, God hath pardoned him already, by virtue of all the promises evangelical; if not the priest cannot, ought not to absolve him’. The primitives, in other words, clearly saw that the essential question is that of how to secure a worthy repentance. If they suspected an individual’s repentance to be insufficient, they erred on the side of caution. Therefore, as to the Protestant idea of contrition, it is evident that ‘a resolution is no resolution unless it be reduced to act where it can’; and as to the Catholic, ‘that one who fears hell, but does not love God, has affection to sin still remaining’, which immediately disqualifies him from the class

108 See esp. *Holy Living*, ch. 4; *Holy Dying*, pp. 343-5, and *passim* on prayer; *WC*, chs. 4-6; *UN*, pp. 463f., quote at 471.
110 *UN*, pp. 117, 424f.
of the worthily repentant.\footnote{Ib., pp. 444f.} Attrition, though ‘the gate and entrance’, is not enough: contrition ‘is necessary to communicate with Christ’.\footnote{WC, pp. 401f.} To love God, as Taylor and his ideological confrères constantly remarked, is to keep his commandments, obedience being ‘the proper effect of love’; and in this sense contrition, or charity, could equally well as repentance have figured as Taylor’s \textit{Unum Necessarium}. The work’s frontispiece is a striking engraving, done by the celebrated French engraver Pierre Lombart, of those eminent penitents SS. Peter and Mary Magdalene holding up a heart pierced by a crown of thorns, over the legend \textit{Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despiciet} (Ps. 51). The reference to the passion, and the visceral impact of the image, underline the message that contrition is no mere inward resolution, but an expansive transcendent which runs through all topics.

\textit{A Primitive Template}

Since the eucharist is the focus of the life lived according to the Gospel covenant, eucharistic preparation is a special spur to the general duty, a season peculiarly ordained by God for cleansing and reformation, ‘a great boon in a world of distractions’. For ‘it is easy to say a man must repent before he communicates; so must he before he prays, dies, or goes a journey’: ‘no man is fit to communicate, but he that is fit to die; that is, who is not in the state of grace. He must have trimmed his lamp, he must stand ready prepared by a state of repentance’.

\footnote{WC, pp. 361, 367-8, 401; Spurr, \textit{The Restoration Church}, pp. 341-53, surveys what may be regarded as the after-history of Taylor’s teaching.}
The great holiness of the eucharist, ‘l’extrême pureté de cette Victime sainte’, demands a corresponding holiness in those who approach it, ‘une pureté qui soit en quelque sorte proportionnée à la sienne’. ‘When Christ is eformed in us, we must be as pure as he is’. Therefore ‘we must consider whether our body be free from uncleanness, and our soul from vile affection’, for where food benefits a healthy constitution, drinking on a bad liver, for example, can kill us. Communion can only benefit the truly penitent, ‘and so the early church considered it unlawful for impenitent, impure men to come: any who comes in a state of sin pretends worship and secretly hates God’. ‘These cautions’, Taylor asserts, are ‘nothing else but what was directly the sentiment of all the best, most severe, religious and devoutest ages of the church’. Just as the interest behind the Mystery of Jesuitism series had seen how effective the Jansenists’ satirical attack was in undermining the Jesuits, Taylor learned something from the success with which Arnauld castigated the modern church through the example of the old. An historical account of the primitive discipline could only serve to accentuate by contrast the shortcomings which he identified in the present state of affairs.

Having established that ‘those who broke bread and shared prayer with the apostles persevered in the doctrine of the apostles, a doctrine which signified a life most exactly Christian’, both writers went on to quote an important passage from the third chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of the Pseudo-Dionysius, which witnesses that the early Church ‘therefore … denied those for whom the sacrifice was too sublime and elevated’, ‘trop sublime et trop élevé’. The passage describes the synaxis, or assembly of the faithful.

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114 Ibid., p. 358; Arnauld, FC, p. 394, echoing the canon of the mass, ‘hostiam puram, hostiam sanctam, hostiam immaculatum’. The word ‘efform’, to shape or fashion, is suggestive of Taylor’s friendship with Henry More: the OED gives a reference to More’s Ψυχωδια Platonica of 1642.
115 WC, pp. 358-61; FC, pp. 87-8.
117 Ibid., p. 432.
118 Ib.; FC, pp. 186-91.
119 WC, pp. 433f.; FC, pp. 194f.
where, in the context of this discussion, the psalms were chanted, holy writ read, and the eucharistic mystery celebrated. Pseudo-Dionysius identifies certain classes of persons who after the psalmody and the scripture reading could ‘not join in the ensuing sacred acts and in the contemplation reserved for the perfected sight of the perfect’. These classes were sent out of the church by the deacon at intervals, each according to his condition. Both Arnauld and Taylor extract four such classes from the words of Pseudo-Dionysius. In the first place are ‘those not yet instructed’, ‘ceux qui n’ont pas encore été instruits’, that is the catechumens. Secondly are ‘ceux qui sont tombés de l’état d’une vie sainte et chrétienne’, ‘those who are fallen from the holy and Christian state’, or the apostates. Thirdly, ‘they who are possessed with evil spirits’, that is the energumens. ‘And lastly, those who indeed have begun to retire from sin to a good life, but … are not yet purified from the phantasms and images of their passed inordinations, by a Divine habitue and love, with purity and without mixture’: they who are ‘not yet perfectly united to God alone … who are not entirely inculpable’, not ‘entièremen parfaits, et entièremen irrepéchables’ – the penitents. This scheme both Taylor and Arnauld take to establish that putative communicants must be absolutely ‘spotless’ and ‘united to God’, in the acceptation which both have given to this precept in their doctrines of repentance, that is of having mortified all affection for sin and of being in train to change the nature of the whole man from human to divine by living in the divine example.

However, as the Jesuit Denis Petau (Petavius) pointed out in his refutation of Arnauld, *De la pénitence publique* (where Taylor considered him to have been worsted by Arnauld on the grounds of the primitive Church), this represents a strained reading of the *Ecclesiastical*

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121 WC, pp. 433-5; *De la fréq. comm.*, pp. 192f.: both writers are quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, which accounts for their identical language, although it is possible that Taylor was simply translating from Arnauld’s French (see below).
Hierarchy. Its author identifies five, not four classes of persons: the catechumens; the lapsed; the energumens; ‘following these … the people who have abandoned the opposing life but who are not yet purified of empty imaginings because they have not yet acquired as something permanent the undiluted yearning for God’; and ‘lastly … those who are not yet altogether one-like [uniform] but who, in the words of the Law, are neither completely unblemished nor completely unstained’. Arnauld, on Petavius’ view, has (as does Taylor) conflated the final two categories in order to heighten the rigour with which Pseudo-Dionysius seems to define the state of penitence. Petavius claims that the two last categories refer to two stages of penitence, one less and one more perfect, and that these correspond to the degrees of ecclesiastical discipline in that the fourth class, the newer penitents, ‘were called “Auditors”, who went out immediately after the Catechumens’, while the fifth class went out last, ‘having prostrated themselves, and been prayed over and touched by the bishop and his clergy’. In other words, Petavius claims that the fifth class, those who are practically perfect, though not absolutely spotless, have completed their penance, receiving the absolution of the church that they might henceforth participate in the mysteries at which they could not on that occasion assist. Arnauld and Taylor, on the other hand, by eliding this distinction, make it appear that, in the primitive era, anyone ‘who is not yet perfectly united to God alone’ remained in the state of the penitent, and unworthy to communicate.

This elision, however, although seemingly against the sense of Pseudo-Dionysius, is supposedly less unwarrantable than the translation ‘united to God alone’, ‘unis à Dieu seul’ which both writers give. This, says Petavius, is a rather free translation of the original, which

122 The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, tr. Liubheid, III.7, 436B, my emphasis.
124 A characteristic example, perhaps, of the ‘guérilla patristique des jansénistes’ described by Quantin, Le catholicisme classique, pp. 125-56, quote at p. 155.
he asserts talks only of those ‘not yet uniform’ (uniforme) to God, rather than ‘united’. The Greek word, ἱνοειδής, is rare, coming, apparently, from εἰς, a single one, one alone, and εἰδος, that which is seen, form, shape, sort, species. Pseudo-Dionysius uses the word elsewhere, in the De divinis nominibus, to mean ‘of single form, one only’, but it is also used by Athanasius in the sense of ‘indicating unity’. It does not appear in the lexicon of unusual words compiled by Hesychius of Alexandria, which Taylor had with him in Wales. The Latin edition of the opera of Dionysius published in France in 1644 (translated by Balthasar Cordier), and used by Migne, gives ‘omnino uniforme’, ‘altogether uniform’. Thus, while Taylor could certainly have arrived at the translation independently, his decision to give ‘united’ for ἱνοειδής is of some interest, and raises the possibility that he was here actually following Arnauld.

This impression is strengthened by the shape of Taylor’s argument. He goes on, as does Arnauld, to explain ‘the severity of what’ the primitives ‘demanded as evidence of contrition and amend’ by reference to the epistles of Basil to Amphilochius. Basil tells us that this was done ‘with a view to testing the fruits of repentance’. For ‘I do not decide such matters absolutely by time, but I give heed to the manner of repentance’. The same purpose was served by the great penitentials of the Western church. The penances related to repentance as

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125 Petau, De la Pénitence Publique, bk. 3, p. 113. Liubheid chooses ‘one-like’.
127 Bodl., MS Bodley 878, fol. 20r.; Moritz Schmidt (ed.), Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon (1867) [p. 543].
129 Certain other small suggestions incline me to think that he was translating out of Arnauld rather than the Greek: the word ‘habitude’ for habit, for example. Perhaps it could, if rather tenuously, be added that, for a friend of Henry More, uniform might have made a more attractive translation.
130 i.e., in many cases, several years of separation from the altar with penances. They are printed in English in Henry Wace and Philip Schaff, eds., A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., vol. 8 (Oxford, 1895), the three epistles on canonical questions being nos. clxxxviii, cxcix, ccxvii – Arnauld has in mind the third.
131 Ib., ep. ccxvii, p. 258: the Greek is μετανοιας.
signs, and were thus not inflexible, but could be lifted or increased at the discretion of the bishop. ¹³²

Continuing in the vein of Arnauld, Taylor emphasised that ‘to admit lapsed persons before they have brought forth fruits worthy of repentance’ is death to them: ‘such an admission’, both theologians go on, quoting the identical passage from Cyprian’s *De lapsis*, ‘is to them as hail to the young fruits, as a blasting wind to the trees, as the murren to the cattle …’ ¹³³ Therefore the primitive church required ‘holiness and purity’, that ‘he who comes should not only be clean of all impurity of flesh and spirit; but should demonstrate that death of him who died and rose for us, by being dead unto sin, to the world, and to himself’.

In fine, it is the general doctrine of the holy Fathers, and the public practice of the primitive Church, that no impenitent person should come to these divine mysteries; and they that are truly penitent should practice deep humility, and undergo many humiliations, and live in a state of repentance, till little by little, they have received the holiness they had lost, and must for a long time live upon the Word of God, before they approach to the Holy Table to be nourished by his body. ¹³⁴

While these recommendations happened to suit rather well the circumstances of Anglicans under puritan rule, it is not, as both Arnauld and Taylor insist, a doctrine designed to keep Christians from the communion, but rather the contrary. ¹³⁵ The more we desire to communicate, the more perfect must be our repentance; the more it is, the more closely we correspond to that state to which the Gospel promises pardon, and hence the more comfort

¹³² WC, p. 435; FC, pp. 198f., quoting the same passage on p. 199.
¹³³ WC, pp. 437-8; *De la fréq. comm.*, pp. 399-400; the passage is Cyprian, *Liber de Lapsis*, PL, vol. 4, col. 479A-B. On the importance of this work in the seventeenth-century Gallican ‘retour aux sources’ see Quantin, *Le catholicisme classique*, p. 520.
¹³⁴ WC, pp. 440-1.
¹³⁵ See *De la fréq. comm.*, pp. 88-9. It cannot be emphasised enough that, in demanding a rigorous preparation of some weeks or even months before approaching the altar, Arnauld was envisaging a more frequent communion for the laity than was practised by the generality. Cf. Tavenieux, *Le Catholicisme dans la France classique*, t. 2, pp. 342-7; Bergin, *Church, Society and Religious Change*, pp. 258-9.
can be drawn by men, who can only judge by outward signs. Both writers thus quote the work, often attributed to Augustine, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, by Gennadius of Marseilles, in which he ‘persuade[s] and exhort[s] Christians to receive the Communion every Sunday; but so, that if their mind be free from all affection of sinning’.

If an individual is not free from all affection to sin, ‘he must make amends’ by ‘penance, and being reconciled by the priests and bishops, then let him communicate’. That is, he must so condition his will that his moral character subsists in charity: ‘this must be done’, according to Taylor’s psychology, ‘by changing the course of his life, by a profound study of religion, by a daily and perpetual mourning and contrition’.

It will be noticed that in this discussion of penance the distinction between ‘mortal’ and ‘venial’ sins is blurred: since ‘every sin, even the smallest, is against charity, which is the end of the commandment’, and thus deserves death. Cyprian tells us that tender consciences often used public penance for thoughts alone. Crying sins, however, certainly must be expiated by means of public penance, as Gennadius records, and no conversion will otherwise be effected. ‘Grievous sins may doubtless be satisfied by private satisfactions’, but it is ‘much more difficult there, without the church’s help’. Such is the condition of man. ‘These people therefore, Gennadius advises to enter into religion, that is into solitude, and retirement, and renunciation of the world, that by attending to the severities and purities of a religious life, they may by such strictures and constant piety be fitted for the Communion’.

Like Arnauld, Taylor lamented the ‘desuetude’ of public penance after the primitive age. Both writers outlined a story of steady *relâchement*, tracing the evanescence of the spirit

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136 From ch. 53 of Gennadius’ work. WC, pp. 441-3; *De la fréq. comm.*, pt. 1, ch. xvi is dedicated to exploding the ‘abuse’ to which Arnauld’s opponent, the Jesuit de Sesmaisons, had subjected this passage by citing it as evidence in favour of frequent communion without the corresponding state of preparation.

137 *UN*, pp. 96-7.


139 WC, p. 443.
of penance from the early centuries, through the middle ages, and the increasing prevalence of private over public forms, to Lateran IV, and thence to modern times and the corruption of manners which testifies its general absence.\textsuperscript{140} Seeing the examples which could be drawn from ‘the purest channels of the primitive church’, Taylor ‘endeavoured to represent the severity of the primitive church, their rigid doctrines and austere discipline, the degrees of easiness and complying that came in by negligence’.\textsuperscript{141}

In Cyprian’s time, Taylor records, ‘they began to remit of’ the excessive severity under which certain post-baptismal sins could not be absolved, so that great criminals were admitted to repentance, though but once only. But even so they only ministered this ‘gentleness’ to those with health and time to profit: the dissolute who repented at the end were ‘utterly’ refused. ‘This was severe, if we judge of it by the manners and propositions of the present age’. Nevertheless, ‘iniquity’ was so ubiquitous that ‘even’ this severity was intolerable, so that by Augustine’s time not only were death-bed penitents accepted, and penances imposed as if they might perform them, but they were even reconciled after a wicked life, if with little hope, or rather with fear.\textsuperscript{142} ‘This was the most dangerous indulgence and easiness of doctrine that had yet entered the church; but now it was tumbling, and therefore could not stop here, but presently down went all severity’. Now ‘all sinners, – and at all times, – and as often as they would, – might be admitted to repentance and pardon, whether they could or could not perform the stations and injunctions of the penitents’. This ‘took off the edge of public and ecclesiastical repentance … and because this was a recession from the old discipline, and of itself an abuse, or but the relics of discipline at best … this also is in some places laid aside [being interpreted, in the English Church], in others too

\textsuperscript{140} For Arnauld see \textit{FC}, pp. 149-52, 234f. Arnauld’s pessimism is offset by a history of God’s providential solicitude for the spirit of penance, evident in the new mendicant orders established after Lateran IV, in the diocesan reforms of S. Carlo Borromeo after Trent, and, it is to be inferred, in his own book.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Holy Dying}, p. 298; \textit{UN}, p. 15.

much abused [being interpreted, in the Roman’].\textsuperscript{143} ‘It may yet be done in private, under the hand of a spiritual guide’; but ‘manners are … corrupted, the doctrines … are made … easy’; and ‘it is very rare to see them who have sinned grievously repent’. But these ‘therefore can never be worthy communicants, for no impenitent can partake of Christ the “prince of penance”’, \textit{princeps poenitentiae et caput eorum qui salvantur per poenitentiam}, in the phrase of Jerome, in his commentary on Isaiah, quoted by both writers.\textsuperscript{144} As Taylor concluded, ‘it is hard to say whither’ the spirit of penance ‘is gone now’.\textsuperscript{145} Yet he had evidently discovered it living and breathing among a party of serious-minded Catholic contemporaries.

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In this chapter we have seen how an enlarged and comprehensive account of repentance was central to the theological projects of Taylor and Arnauld. It supplied the defects they identified in Catholic casuistry and Calvinist theology respectively, by substantiating both the indispensable necessity of a true inward contrition, and the concomitant necessity of a severe outward discipline. This did not, of course, necessarily reflect the real flaws in their antagonists. Leaving aside the injustice of imputing antinomianism indiscriminately to any form of Protestant predestinarianism, one may remark in the ‘English Calvinist’ tradition a comparable development towards an ‘experimental’ piety, which increasingly privileged the fruits worthy of repentance as the source of Christian assurance.\textsuperscript{146} And there was a category error involved in reproaching the casuists with a failure effectively to communicate the injunction to ‘be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Mt. v 48). Their advice was concerned precisely with the imperfect. In demanding

\begin{footnotes}
\item[143] \textit{UN}, pp. 395-8.
\item[144] \textit{Ibid.}; \textit{FC}, p. 234. Ch. 3 in Jerome’s commentary.
\item[145] \textit{WC}, p. 444.
\end{footnotes}
of the same constituency the standards proper to the Philotheas of this world, both Taylor and Arnauld dissolved any technical distinction of moral from ascetical theology. Whether this represents a sort of heroism or a sort of perversity – for every Sainte-Beuve there is a Bremond, for every Bishop McAdoo a C. F. Allison\footnote{For Henry McAdoo, in \textit{The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology}, the attempt to reunite moral and ascetic theology is the signal achievement of Taylor and his contemporaries; for Allison, in \textit{The Rise of Moralism}, it represents a principle of repression which nullifies Luther’s insight into the ‘noumenal’ guilt of mankind under sin. On its social significance cf. remarks of Briggs, \textit{Communities of Belief}, pp. 361-2, 372-3.} – it was an outlook determined, not only by religio-political circumstances that encouraged both to think in terms of martyrdom,\footnote{Already in 1643 Arnauld presented himself as defending a truth for which he would give ‘même mon sang et ma vie’. Taylor everywhere compares the travails of his Church with the early Christians under persecution. See e.g. \textit{Holy Living}, p. xiii, and at pp. 180-81 the issue: ‘The least love that is … must exclude all affection to sin, and all inordinate affection to the world … and must be love for love’s sake; and of this love martyrdom is the highest instance … the greatest love God requires of man. And yet he that is most imperfect must have this love also’\footnote{‘To man nothing is miserable unless it is unreasonable’, Taylor, \textit{Holy Living}, p. 95.}.} but also by their intellectual presuppositions.

Once the good has been clearly apprehended it must effectively constrain desire; and in the Gospel is clearly proposed, with the means of obtaining it in the obedience of Christ, our highest good in God. Any distinction of precept and counsel cannot really hold up in the terms of this, essentially Platonic, psychology; the choice of a lesser good must issue from appetites not governed as they ought to be by reason.\footnote{\textit{FC}, p. 578; Taylor, \textit{A Dissuasive from popery}, p. 171; \textit{Holy Living}, pp. 175, 289; \textit{Dekas Embolimaios}, pp. 2, 7, 10. Cf. McAdoo, \textit{Caroline Moral Theology}, esp. ch. 6.} That would be to aim at a lower end, but for these writers the end of moral theology, as of all theology, is the highest: ‘l’union avec Dieu’, the ‘becoming like to God’. It is ‘passing from passion to reason … from sense to spirit, from considering ourselves to an union with God’. This is what it is ‘DE VIVRE CHRÉTIENEMENT’ \textemdash; to fit ourselves for the beatific vision.\footnote{If we examine the recommendations of Taylor and Arnauld, indeed, we will find them to correspond to the tripartite structure of mystical theology, bringing the sinner through a purgative stage, to an illuminative stage of growth, to the union summed up in the eucharist. The originality of both writers lies in their conviction that this is a path along which all must}
be led, that it is, indeed, ‘practical’. It hardly makes sense to speak of their work in terms of mysticism, but perhaps it can adequately be described as a form of ‘popular asceticism’.

This popular asceticism is another indication of the individualist shape of their thought, which pushed against the institutional structure that must contain and order the Christian life. But just as they dissolved the distinction between moral and ascetical theology, precept and counsel, so they recognised no difference of quality between the secular and the sacred. The individual is responsible for the essentially ethical regime of repentance to which both writers attached the assurance of justification, but this is only to say that his entire existence is to be subsumed within the river of grace that flows from baptism and the eucharist back up to his source and end. At every moment and in every sphere of life he must be living out his baptism and aiming at that communion with Christ which is his eternal felicity.  

Thus, while the scope of Arnauld’s and Taylor’s work was popular, it was elitist in content; and perhaps the potential incongruity between Arnauld’s soteriological commitments and his moral thought was mitigated somewhat by the reflection, common in Taylor’s mouth, that ‘narrow is the gate, and straitened the way that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it’ (Mt vii 14).  

If this was not comforting, it was at least uncompromising.

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151 Cf. Cognet, ‘Le mépris de monde’.
152 There is a question as to how realistic all this was, for only so much can be concluded from the clerical ideals contained in the writings of churchmen like Taylor, and where sufficient evidence of personal devotion exists it is likely to derive from members of an atypical minority. John Evelyn, for example, certainly internalised Taylor’s teaching — for him the Christian life consisted in the practice of virtues and austerities to a quite inconvenient degree (see BL Add. MS 78367), and the multiple offices he composed for private use throughout the year reflect this. (These include ‘An Eucharisticall Office’ subtitled ‘The Trimming of the Lamp’, BL Add. MS 78374; see also MSS 78389, 78385, 78378.) The persistence of this demanding ideal (with some modifications), however — documented by Spurr, The Restoration Church, ch. 7 — does at least suggest it was not wholly implausible.
**Conclusion**

In ‘The Cupri-Cosmits’, his portrait of the spirit of latitudinarianism – ‘Catholic and general, not Topical or confined to opinions and Sects’ – Joseph Glanvill included an encomium upon ‘that Famous and Incomparable Loryta Bp. of Wendo’, or Jeremy Taylor.

This was a Subject on which ’twas difficult to speake Hyperboles; it could not be reach’t by any Expressions. For he was none of Gods Ordinary Works, but his Endowments were so many and so great, as really made him a Miracle.

Glanvill explained that, although Taylor was of an older generation, his character belonged among those of the other ‘Cupri-Cosmits’

because he was of the same Spirit with [them], and one, who by his most learned writings contributed greatly to the Rise and Advancement of it.¹

This acknowledgement of Taylor’s influence may be a little surprising to those who consider him more of a littérateur than a theologian, a writer whose flights of inspiration led him into doctrinal confusion on the eucharist or original sin, and resulted in his underwhelming preferment to an Irish see.² In fact Taylor was highly regarded by the generation whose early experience was formed by the Commonwealth period.³ Such admiration, of course, is perfectly consistent with what historians understand by the ‘latitudinarian’ temper delineated by Glanvill. A friend of Henry More, Taylor was a disciple of that enlightened reason which illuminates the essential harmony between revealed Christianity and the proper nature of

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man. An apostle of toleration, his was ‘the most gracious voice then to be heard in England’. The necessary truths, he held, are few and transparent to the understanding; and so he helped to pioneer that characteristically latitudinarian vision of Christianity as primarily a religion of plain and comprehensible duties, a framework for the good life in which the happiness of man consists.

This ‘practical’ outlook, built upon the soteriological foundations of the holy living theology, was clearly Taylor’s most substantial legacy to his latitudinarian successors. Along with their commitment to a rational method, inherited from Hooker and Chillingworth and from the Cambridge Platonists, it formed one half of their theological identity. The characteristic premises of the holy living theology continued to inform the teaching and preaching of divines such as Stillingfleet, Patrick, Barrow, Burnet, Tillotson, Tenison and others. They all described the life of repentance required of every Christian as being oriented by the ‘sincere’ or undivided love of God, inconsistent, therefore, with the commission of voluntary sin or with the indulgence of affection to sin, and simultaneously sustained and evidenced by a life of good works done in the spirit of charity.

Although, as I have argued, these principles expressed the central doctrinal assumptions of Hammond, Taylor, and others, they are frequently taken as evidence of a preference for preaching up moral duty over difficult doctrine. This ‘ethical’ orientation is related to the impulse to accommodate Christian teaching to the temper of an age in which

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the rise of the new philosophy, with its critical-rational method and preponderating interest
in, to invoke Descartes’s elliptical euphemism, the sphere of secondary causes, had given a
new value to the ends of human nature considered as a self-sufficient whole. In responding to
this challenge the divines marshalled their theological resources to produce a rational picture
of Christianity, its doctrines more notable for their harmony with a human nature which they
perfect, than for their contradiction of the vicious inclinations which, to a Jansenist or a
traditional Calvinist, for example, constituted the most pressing reality about nature under
sin. To a society whose intellectual advances were bringing to fruition the confidence of the
Renaissance in humanity’s natural potential, they reflected back a theological optimism
which, while constructed out of traditional resources, was too congenial to the times for
Christianity to retain its distinctive intellectual position.⁶ To the age of reason ‘they set forth
the religion of common sense’, and the more they emphasised the congruity of Christian and
natural morality, the more did grace and revelation fade from the picture.⁷ The institutional
triumph of the latitudinarians under William III was appropriate enough, for among all the
clergymen in the newly pluralist religious landscape, their presentation of Christianity as a
system of duties voluntarily undertaken by free, rational agents did most to promote the idea
of religion as a matter of individual choice. Thus the rising secularism and indifferentism of
the eighteenth century must in part be chalked up to their account; the torch of true spiritual
religion was henceforth to be carried outside the established Church.⁸

As we have seen, this tension between the claims of the individual and the claims of
the Church was a major implication of the anti-Calvinist soteriology developed during the
middle of the century, a development which, in turn, provided the doctrinal foundation of the

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⁶ Cf. Paul Hazard, in La crise de la conscience européenne (Paris, 1935), tr. by J. Lewis May as The European
Mind 1680–1715 (1953).
⁷ Cragg, Puritanism to the Age of Reason, chs. 3-4, at p. 86.
⁸ For this view see e.g. ibid.; Allison, Rise of Moralism; Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England, 3
moral religion of restoration preachers. It has been suggested here, however, that the theological presuppositions involved in this argument are not so easily reconciled with the easy, optimistic religion they are said to have promoted. The ‘popular asceticism’ at which Taylor arrived on the strength of these theological premises was not an optional system of life recommended in eudaimonist terms, but a necessary undertaking to which all men are obliged by eternal motives. Naturally such an undertaking, being oriented by the true good, confers on man the only true happiness he can enjoy in this life; ‘prudent’ behaviour, in this sense, retained its properly theological signification as, in Augustine’s words, that ‘duly ordered agreement of cognition and action’ which is ‘the peace of the rational soul’. If the argument contained an individualist tendency, it was not because it sought to liberate man to pursue his legitimate natural ends, but because it sought to invest him more fully with the responsibility to attain the freedom which describes his conformity with his eternal end.

In the course of establishing these conclusions we have suggested that there is a certain sense in which the project of the holy living theologians can be related to the work of the Jansenists of Port-Royal. Despite the intellectual gulf which, in many respects, lay between these groups, they evolved comparable answers to the theological problems of the day. The ‘rigorism’ of the Jansenists, as we have argued, implied a similar set of tensions between what Jean-Louis Quantin has characterised as ‘la logique d’intériorisation et la logique de discipline, le travail d’approfondissement et le travail d’extension’. Dismissing in turn the illusory assurances provided by the casuists’ empty notion of authority or the Calvinists’ subjective appeal to the Spirit, the Jansenists pointed individuals to their empirical experience of the transformative work of grace. Alongside this highly individualist notion of

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9 De civ. Dei, XIX. 13, tr. Bettenson; see e.g. Stillingfleet, A Sermon ... 1678/9: it is prudent to seek happiness, since God did not create us to be miserable. To act simply and prudently is to act ‘sincerely’ – for example to die rather than engage in idolatrous worship.

the Christian’s self-responsibility for his own moral transformation, however, the Port-Royal writers retained their hope in the universal renewal which ought to grow from such a seed. The rigorism of these writers amounted to a quasi-mystical conception of the individual’s ascetic journey to God, but it was a path along which they were convinced that all must strive to travel.

If, therefore, it does seem fair to attribute to the Jansenist outlook an inescapably individualist tendency, it is to be doubted whether this is best regarded as an adumbration of the sort of freedom dear to enlightened modernity. On the one hand one will have to acknowledge how far it was a product of their self-consciously backward-looking theological method: from the ‘rational’, or better, intellectualist tradition of Aquinas and Augustine, they drew a necessarily affective and existential approach, since the apprehension of the good depends upon the right ordering of the faculties of the soul. On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the more up-to-date aspects of their intellectual outlook – that concern for empirically verifiable proofs upon which to erect a clear and incontestable theological structure, which reflected, at different times and in different combinations, the increasingly historical nature of post-reformation controversy, the development of evidence-based science, and the aspirations of ‘rational’ philosophy – also pushed them towards an affective and experiential, which is to say, an empirical and testable account of grace and the moral life. In this sense one might say that, to the extent that they shared in the seventeenth-century ‘rational’ outlook, it encouraged that rigorist focus on a living penance which some critics have seen as harsh and anachronistic; while to the extent that they received medieval rational theology, it encouraged that quasi-mystical asceticism in which other critics have seen some faint foreshadowing of modern, self-sufficient selfhood.

An observation of Schopenhauer’s, taken a little out of context, is interesting here:
the Jansenists are Augustinian and their doctrine may well be the most genuine form of Christianity. For, by rejecting celibacy and asceticism in general, together with the saints, who are the representatives of asceticism, Protestantism has become a truncated, or rather decapitated Christianity whose apex is missing.\(^\text{11}\)

The ‘basic character of Christianity’, says Schopenhauer, is pessimistic; without the doctrine of original sin, upon which asceticism is predicated, there can only be a regression ‘back to crude and shallow … optimism’. On my reading of the theology of holy living, it appears to share more theological common ground with the rigourism of the Jansenists than the ‘Pelagianism’ or ‘Rationalism’ which Schopenhauer equates with a crude and un-Christian optimism. Like the Jansenists the Anglican theologians scorned the ‘enthusiasm’ of mystics or sectaries; but they sought to restore the ‘apex’ to Christianity by an authentically ascetic moral teaching. The problem with the casuists’ sceptical retreat behind human, and the Calvinists’ presumption upon divine authority, was their analogous failure to provide a convincing rationale for this necessary discipline. They offered a false assurance which, under the conditions of sin, was only a guarantee of failure. The Anglican writers examined here argued that the true interior reformation, produced by grace, can be measured and authenticated in a life of sincere moral endeavour. That a similar movement towards an affective religious experience can be discerned in various shades of puritanism in this period, and later among the Pietists, the Methodists and others, suggests that the problems with which the Anglicans and the Jansenists were grappling were not exclusive to any one branch of European Christianity.\(^\text{12}\)

The individualist shape of the Anglican argument did import a certain tension with their comprehensive aspirations as theologians of a national Church; but their demanding version


of the moral life expected of all showed that they, like the Jansenists, refused to choose between ‘une responsabilisation de la conscience individuelle, et une action de discipline autoritaire’. It is understandable that the excessively rigorous form into which Taylor, especially, cast this moral teaching appears to have been diluted in the teaching of the ‘mere moral-men’ who succeeded his generation. But, insofar as there was a recognisable continuity of theological premises, this development cannot be attributed to a defect of theological substance. Indeed, one will find the same soteriological assumptions and the same (logically consequent) teaching on the ascetic requirements of Christian perfection in the ‘heart-religion’ espoused by William Law or John Wesley in the next century. If the latitudinarians did squander the legacy of spiritual religion, then, there were at least some notable beneficiaries of their profligacy.

13 Quantin, as in n. 10.
14 William Law, A Practical Treatise Upon Christian Perfection (1726), pp. 19-20, 24-6, 43-51, 165-81, 516-20; idem, A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (1905), pp. 14-37, 255-71, 401-16; John Wesley, Predestination Calmly Considered (1752, my ed. the 5th, 1776), from pp. 10f.; idem, A Plain Account of Christian Perfection (Bristol, 1766), pp. 1-8 et passim; among the sermons see particularly ‘The Circumcision of the Heart’; ‘The Marks of the New Birth’; ‘The Repentance of Believers’; ‘Self-Denial’: respectively 17, 18, 14, 48 in the numbering of Thomas Jackson (ed.), The Works of John Wesley, 14 vols. (1872); and cf. Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, i, ch. 5.
Appendix

‘Lax’ casuists mentioned in the text

AMICIUS/AMICUS/L’AMY: Amico, Francesco, SJ
1578-1651

Cursus theologicus, tome 5, De Iure et Iustitia, Douai, 1642, Antwerp, 1650

AZORIUS, Azor, Jean, SJ
1535-1603

Institutiones morales, in quibus universae quaestiones ad conscientam recte, aut prave factorum pertinentes, breviter tractantur, 3 pts., Rome, 1600-1611

BASILIUS, Ponce, Basil, Spanish Augustinian Canon, prof. at Alcala
1569-1629

Judgement concerning the holding and teaching of the doctrines of Thomas and Augustine at Salamanca, 1627/8

De sacramento matrimoni

De impedimenti matrimoni

De sacramento confirmationis

BAUNY, Étienne, SJ
1564-1649

Theologia moralis, Paris, 1640-45

Somme des péchés qui se commettent en tous états; de leurs conditions et qualités, et en quelles occurrences ils sont mortels ou véniels, et en quelle façon le confesseur doit interroger son pénitent, Paris, 1630, 1633, 1635, 1636, 1639, Paris, 1643, Rouen, 1643, Lyon, 1646

BECANUS: Verbeeck/Van der Beeck, Martin, SJ
1561-1624

Theologi Opusculorum Theologicorum, 5 tomes, 1610-1621

Opuscula, 3 vols., Paris, 1617; 4 vols., Lyon, 1620

Summa Theologiae Scolasticae, 3 vols., Paris, 1615

Manuale controversarium huius temporis in quinque libros, 1623


16 CLP, p. 56n., says Sommervogel is in error and gives Paris, 1634 for the first edition.
CARAMUEL-LOBKOWITZ, John, O. Cist.

1606-1682

*Theologia Moralis Ad Prima Eaque Clarissima Principia Reducta*, Lugd., 1645

*Theologiae moralis fundamentalis, decalogica, canonica, civilis, praeterintentionalis, sacramentalis, regularis, militaris*, Lugd., 1657 (1st ed. 4 vols., Frankfurt, 1651\(^\text{17}\))

CAUSSIN, Nicolas, SJ

1583-1651

*La Cour Sainte*, 3 tomes, Paris, 1624-31

*Réponse au libelle intitulé La théologie morale des Jésuites*, Paris, 1644

CELLOT, Louis, SJ

1588-1658

*De Hierarchia et Hierarchis Libri IX*, 1641

COMITOLUS: Comitoli, Paul, SJ

1544-1626

*Responsa moralia*, 7 bks., Lyon, 1609, Crémone, 1611, Rouen, 1709

CONINCK, Gilles de, SJ

1571-1633

*De moralitate, natura, et effectibus actuum supernaturalium in genere. Et fide, spe, ac caritate, speciatim. Libri quator*, Antwerp, Lugd., 1623

*Responsio ad Dissertationem impugnantem absolutionem moribundi sensibus destitute: Addita explicatione duorum dationum, circa minstrum Sacramenti Matrimoni, et dissolutionem eiusdem per conversionem alterius conjuges ad fidem*, Antwerp, 1625

DIANA, Antonino, Theatine
d. 1663

*Resolutionum moralium partes duodecim*, 12t., Lugd., 1629-59 (9 pts.), Venice, 1652, 1655 (pts. 10 & 11), Rome, 1656 (pt. 12)

Cf. Martin de Acolea, *Antoninus Diana coordinates*, Lyon, 1667

DICASTILLUS, Dicastillo, Jean de, SJ

*De Iustitia et Iure*, Anvers, 1641

ESCOBAR y Mendoza, Antoine de, SJ

1589-1669

\(^{17}\) *CLP*, p. 102n., says 2 vols., Frankfurt, 1652-53.
Examen de Confessores y practica de Penitentes, en todas las materias de la Theologia Moral, Madrid, 1647, Paris, 1665


Universae Theologiae moralis receptiores absque lite sententiae nec non problematicae disquisitiones, 7 vols., Lyons, 1652-1663

FILLIUTIUS, Filliuci, Vincent, SJ
1566-1622

Moralium quaestionum de Christianis officiis et casibus conscientiae, ad formam cursus, qui praelegi solet in Collegio Romano Societatis Jesu, 2 vols., Lyon, 1622-3, re-issued 1633

Compendium quaestiones moralium, 3 pts., Rome, 1626 [also Synopsis Universae theologiae moralis, de christiani videntis officiis, et castibus conscientiae, Paris, 1630]

From it: Brevis instruction pro Confessoribus excipiendis, cum adjunct interrogatio pro confessioribus longoris temporis, Ravenspurges, 1626

GARASSE, François, SJ
1584-1631

La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne, Paris, 1625

HURTADO, Gaspar, SJ
1575-1646

Tractatus de Matrimonio et Censuris, 1627

Tractatus de Sacramentis, 1629

Tractatus de Beatitudine, Actibus, Bonitate et Malitia, habitibus, virtutibus, et peccatis, 1630

Tractatus de Fide, Spe, et Charitate, 1632

De Iustitia et Jure, 1637

HURTADO de Mendoza, Petrus, SJ
1578-1651

Scholasticae, et Morales Disputationes de tribus virtutibus Theologicis, 2 vols., 1599, Salamanca, 1631

LAYMANN, Paul, SJ
1574-1635

Theologia moralis in quinque libros partita, Munich, 1625

LE MOYNE, Pierre, SJ

18 CLP, p. 80n.
19 Ib., p. 82n.
LESSIUS, Leonard, SJ
1554-1623
De Iustitia et Iure Caeterisque Virtutibus Libri Quator, Louvain, 1605

MASCARENHAS, Emmanuel, SJ
1604-1654
Tractatus de Sacramentis in genere, 1656

MILHARD, Pierre, OSB
d. 1604
La grande guide des curez, Lugd., 1604

PIROT, Georges, SJ
1599-1659
Apologie pour les Casuistes contre les calomnies des Jansénistes, Cologne, 1657

PONTIUS, see BASILIUS

REBELLUS, Ferd., SJ
d. 1608
De obligationibus justitiae, religionis et caritatis, Lugd., 1608, Venice, 1610

REGINALDUS: Regnauld, Valère, SJ
1545-1623
De prudential et caeteris in confessario requisitis ..., 1610
Praxis Fori Penitentialis ad directionem Confessarii, in usu sacri sui muneric, 2 vols., Lyon, 1616, 1620, Cologne, 1622
Compendiaria praxis difficiliorum casuum conscientiae, in administrazione Sacramenti Poenitentiae crebro occurrentium, 3 pts., Mayence, 1619, Douai, 1628
Tractatus de officio poenitentis in usu Sacramenti Poenitentiae, Venice, 1619

SA, Emmanuel, SJ (Manoël de Saa)
1530-1596
Aphorismi confessariorum, best edition after corrections Lugd., 1612

SANCHEZ, Thomas, SJ
1550-1610
De Sancto Matrimonii Sacramento Disputationum libri, 3 vols., Madrid, 1605

Opus morale in praecepta decalogi, sive Summa casuum conscientiae, in fol., Paris, 1615

Consilia, seu Opuscula morali duobus Tomis contenta, 1625

SUAREZ, Francis, SJ
1548-1617

Tractatus de Legibus et de Deo Legislatore (Coimbra, 1612)

Defensio Fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae Adversus Anglicanea Sectae Errores (Coimbra, 1613)

SIRMOND, Antoine, SJ
1591-1641

La deffense de la vertu, Paris, 1641

TAMBURINI, Thomas, SJ
1591-1675

Naturalis et Ecclesiastici Moralis Expositio (Venice, 1662)

Methodus Expeditae Confessionis (Rome, 1647)

Explicatio Decalogi (Venice, 1654)

TANNERUS, Tanner, Adam, SJ
1572-1653

Theologia scolastica, 3 vols., Ingolstadt, 1621-27

De iustitia et Jure

TOLET, François (Francisco Toledo), SJ
1523-1596

Summa casuum conscientiae absolutissima, Douai, 1633

TURRIANUS, Torres, Luis de
1562-1635

Selectae disputationes in theologiam, Lyon, 1634

VALENTIA, Grégoire de, SJ
1551-1603

De discernenda humanorum contractuum Iustitia et Inustitia, Ingolstadt, 1577

De iustitia in indiciis servanda, 1579

De Poenitentiae Sacramento, 1585
Disputatio de Indulgentiis, 1587

Commentariorum Theologicorum Tomi quator. In quibus omnes materiae, quae continentur in Summa Divi Thomae Aquinatis explicantur, 5 vols., Lyon, 1591-97

VASQUEZ, Gabriel, SJ

c.1549-1604

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Add. MS 78632 : John Evelyn’s library catalogue, 1687

Add. MS 78365: Evelyn, ‘The Lamentation of Origen After His Fall’

Add. MSS 78374, 78378, 78385, 78389: Various offices and devotions composed by Evelyn

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