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# Pierre Bayle and Richard Simon: toleration, natural law, and the Old Testament

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## ABSTRACT

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) developed an expansive theory of toleration in his *Commentaire philosophique* (1686) by arguing that tolerance is a universal principle of natural law. However, by situating toleration in natural law rather than positive law, Bayle was brought into theoretical conflict with the Old Testament injunction that the state should punish idolatry. To resolve this conflict, Bayle drew upon the work of early modern Hebraists, particularly the Catholic biblical scholar Richard Simon (1638–1712). Bayle adapted Simon's idea that theocracy uniquely shaped the institutions of ancient Israel to argue that prohibitions against idolatry should be exclusive to the Hebrew republic. Bayle argued that the Mosaic Law did not punish someone for their sincerely held religious beliefs but only prohibited treason, and these circumstantial laws should not be emulated by other states. This allowed Bayle to contend for the moral veracity of the Old Testament and the notion that toleration is an unconditional principle of natural law. Bayle's use of Simon displayed the revolutionary potential of textual critical scholarship in the early modern period, as he adapted Simon's critical ideas to his own aims of promoting religious toleration within the ecclesiastical and civic spheres of his own confessional context.

## KEYWORDS

Pierre Bayle; Richard Simon; toleration; natural law; confessionalisation; freedom of conscience

Having fled France due to religious persecution, the Huguenot Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) was living in Rotterdam in 1685 when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in France, and a month later, his elder brother, a Protestant minister, died in a Catholic prison. The following year, Bayle published the *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ 'Contrain-les d'entrer'* (1686),<sup>1</sup> a rallying call for toleration, containing several controversial passages. Among the most contentious was the fourth chapter of the second part, which provided an intriguing interpretation of the Old Testament, challenging the age-old assumption that Mosaic Laws prohibiting idolatry were designed to promote orthodox uniformity within the ancient Hebrew state. Bayle instead suggested that since God was the magisterial head of ancient Israel, laws regulating religion were exclusively against treason, since idolatry was abandoning one's allegiance to the state sovereign. This idea was met with a controversial reception. On 12 August 1708, one month after Bayle's *Philosophical Commentary* was first published in English,<sup>2</sup> a nonjuring periodical by the name of *Censura Temporum* argued that Bayle's claim was an affront to God, 'reducing even his Creatorship ... making *Idolatry* not intended by God to be punish'd as such, but only as *High Treason*. – Horrid! Horrid.'<sup>3</sup> It seems that Bayle's innovative approach to idolatry in the Old Testament did little to mitigate his long-standing image as an anticlerical figure in the early modern republic of letters. However, such a

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depiction of Bayle runs the risk of overlooking crucial questions behind this intriguing section of the *Commentaire*. Why did Bayle insist so strongly on the harmony between toleration, natural law, and the Old Testament? Moreover, which intellectual sources did Bayle draw upon when formulating his ideas, and what do they tell us about his motivations?

From a close reading of Bayle in his original context, this paper begins by arguing that Bayle's theory of toleration in the *Commentaire Philosophique* is an argument from natural law. Scholars who have interpreted this treatise primarily in light of Bayle's scepticism have overlooked his unique historic attempt to reconcile natural law theory with toleration, and likewise, often ignored the inner consistency of the treatise. However, Bayle's position inadvertently created a theological problem. If toleration was a basic precept of natural law rather than positive law, then it must be a universal maxim, which conflicted with the intolerant Old Testament injunctions that the magistrate ought to persecute false religions. To resolve this, Bayle utilized Richard Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* (1685) which claimed that the ancient state of Israel was a theocracy where God himself was directly the head of state. Bayle could thus argue that the Old Testament laws prohibiting idolatry were aimed against treason, thereby preserving the God of the Old Testament from the charge of having commanded sin. In so doing, Bayle sought to promote toleration within his own confessionally Reformed tradition, developing a theory of universal religious toleration that was compatible with the divine inspiration of the Old Testament.

## 1. Universal toleration and natural law

Bayle's discussion of the Old Testament and his utilization of Richard Simon arose from the *Commentaire's* unique position on toleration and natural law, which gave its theory of freedom of conscience an exceptionally expansive scope. In the wake of the Protestant Reformation, debates emerged discussing what ideas were permissible within civil and ecclesiastical spheres; however, they typically treated toleration as a necessary evil rather than as a universal moral principle. The dissolution of the ecclesiastical hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church meant that Protestants had to develop a theory of toleration which could make conceptual sense out of the broadening institutional diversity.<sup>4</sup> In a sense, the perennial question 'what is the true visible church?' now exchanged the definite with an indefinite article, as Protestant theologians began to ask instead 'what is *a* true visible church?' Accompanying this were extensive writings over the 'marks' of a true church, such as practising baptism and the Lord's Supper, and believing certain orthodox doctrines. Theologians increasingly began to apply the Erasmian distinction between *fundamenta* (fundamental beliefs grounded in the Scriptures and necessary for salvation) and *adiaphora* (doctrinal and liturgical points of disagreement among orthodox Christians that were indifferent to God). Thus, despite the rise of confessionalism, such an ecclesiological approach was widespread amongst Protestants, ranging from the Reformed Orthodoxy of Francis Turretin (1623–1687) to the Remonstrant and biblical critic Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736).<sup>5</sup> Even the ardent Calvinist Pierre Jurieu (1637–1713) wrote that the invisible church extended beyond Presbyterians to include members from other churches, even including Romans Catholics, who Jurieu argued were nevertheless governed by the anti-Christ.<sup>6</sup> Framed in this way, toleration was meant to include various groups of 'orthodox' Christians, who believed in the fundamentals of faith but disagreed over principles that were indifferent to salvation.

Such '*demi-tolérans*' (as Bayle called them)<sup>7</sup> maintained a relative harmony with the Old Testament. In such theories, toleration was classified as a matter of positive law, subject to change and circumstance.<sup>8</sup> Logically, this made sense. In order to tolerate, an ecclesiastical or civic authority had to first object to a practice or idea, and then exercise restraint in permitting what was considered disagreeable.<sup>9</sup> Toleration required a dispute to arise, which was contingent upon one's historical, social and political context. Moreover, disagreements among Christians were often over issues such as the episcopacy, sacraments, and other fine points of doctrine, which were matters of special revelation, and thus, also positive law.<sup>10</sup> As long as toleration was viewed as partial

and circumstantial, it could be argued that natural law provided the state with a mandate for establishing certain limited uniform religious duties, as seen in the first table of the Decalogue.<sup>11</sup>

Bayle's *Commentaire philosophique*, however, departed from this precedent, seeking to ground toleration in eternal and universal principles that guide the natural order. Bayle spoke of human conscience and reason interchangeably and sometimes synonymously, in the traditional language of divine participation: conscience is 'l'union particuliere de l'ame avec l'essence divine' which is 'Dieu lui-même, la Vérité essentielle & substantielle.' Conscience was described as a light that is both 'primitive & universelle' which 'Dieu répand dans l'ame de tous les hommes' in order to illuminate 'les notions communes de Métaphysique' which are 'des vérités éternelles.'<sup>12</sup> Such language of God's essence as a primitive light emanating Truth and Goodness was well established in Bayle lifetime in scholastic natural law theory, notably for having been utilized by the impeccable authorities of Augustine and Aquinas.<sup>13</sup>

Bayle's conception of natural law was most deeply tied to the concept of 'equity' throughout the *Commentaire*. It is here that a contextual reading of Bayle is crucial, as certain scholars have mistakenly suggested that this term primarily connoted a kind of 'moral equality' between individuals.<sup>14</sup> This suggestion is understandable. Bayle's emphasis on the divine essence within each individual may imply, *prima facie*, a kind of ontological equality. However, given the immediate context of his statements, Bayle was drawing upon the Aristotelian notion of equity, which had long been used by Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran theologians, as a technical term to describe a jurisprudential sense of fairness in judging the particular application of a general law.<sup>15</sup> A law, for example, might oblige you to return a borrowed weapon, but this might not intuitively seem 'equitable' if you know the original lender is planning on using it for murder. Equity thereby denotes a moral intuition. Thus, while Gianluca Mori has already persuasively argued that Bayle's sentimental approach to the conscience was influenced by Malebranche, his emphasis on equity shows that Bayle also found resources in scholastic forms of moral philosophy to further emphasize his sentimental theory of conscience.

The most crucial element of Bayle's theory of natural law was his separation between right reason and inner sentiment, which was produced by colouring his conception of *équité* with a distinctly Cartesian tone. Bayle described equity as an '[idée] vive & distincte.'<sup>16</sup> From this simple intuitive idea, he argued, complex imperatives could be deduced by a chain of right reasoning,<sup>17</sup> drawing upon Descartes' *Discours de la méthode* which argued that complex speculative truths are derived from simple clear and distinct ideas in a logical chain, as demonstrations in Euclidean geometry.<sup>18</sup> Thus, Bayle argued that all speculative truth is deduced from simple intuitive axioms such as 'que le tout est plus grand que sa partie,' and 'qu'il est impossible que deux contradictoires soient véritables,' and likewise, from the principle of equity, one intuites moral principles such as 'de ne point faire à autrui ce que nous ne voudrions pas qui nous fût fait ... & d'agir selon sa conscience.'<sup>19</sup> Upon these basic principles, further complex moral obligations can be instantiated, such as not lying to your friend, or not stealing from your neighbour. Thus, the principle of equity is characterized by the reciprocity of moral action, as found in the Golden Rule, and intuited sentimentally by the conscience. The complex application of this basic axiom can then be deduced by using right reason to inform one's conduct in a particular circumstance. All rational agents have this notion of equity in their conscience, but not all necessarily use their reason properly.

Bayle's *Commentaire* then employed several arguments to show that toleration was indeed in conformity with right reason and that religious intolerance therefore violates natural law. Bayle contended that persecution violated the universal charity implied in the Golden Rule, undermined the spirit of the gospel,<sup>20</sup> led to sectarian violence,<sup>21</sup> destroyed the justification for missionaries to change the dominant religion in pagan countries,<sup>22</sup> and contradicted the peaceable ethic of the early church while justifying the Roman authorities who persecuted them.<sup>23</sup> Each of these arguments attempted to show the irrational character of persecution as a categorical rule, comporting to Bayle's earlier chapters which associated natural law to moral axioms, immediately perceived by individuals *via* the light of conscience. Also scattered throughout these arguments, Bayle utilized

the more typical tolerationist appeal to the *telos* of reason and conscience. External coercion of the internal faculties of reason and conscience could not, by nature, produce genuine faith or consent.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, persecuting heresy or offering material rewards for conversion, as Louis XIV had done to the Huguenots in France, only resulted in hypocrisy and sin.<sup>25</sup>

Bayle's main goal was to use this universalized conception of toleration to argue against Augustine's interpretation of the parable in Luke 14, in which the master of a banquet commanded his servant, 'Go out to the roads and country lanes and compel them to come in, so that my house will be full.' Augustine interpreted the master's imperative to 'compel them to come in' as eliciting the use of force in conversion, and this was used in Bayle's time to justify the persecution of Protestants in France.<sup>26</sup> Bayle confuted Augustine's interpretation using his notion of conscience as *la lumière primitive*. He asked the question: How did Adam discern the difference between the goodness of God's true voice, and the evil of Satan's deceptive voice? The moral culpability of the first sin presupposed an awareness of good and evil in order to judge which moral authority was legitimate.<sup>27</sup> Thus, rational and moral axioms precede and filter special revelation: in order for God to speak to us, we must first have the faculties of reason and conscience required to interpret his word and confirm its divine status.

What followed, according to Bayle, was a simple hermeneutical rule that must precede exegesis: Scripture can never violate the clearest and most distinct principles of reason and natural law. Persecution violates fundamental moral axioms, and therefore, Augustine's use of scripture to justify coerced belief must be wrong.<sup>28</sup> In many ways, this assumption was relatively conservative. When making his case, Bayle cited the Catholic theologian Valerianus Magnus, and ironically pointed out that book 3 of Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana* likewise argued the same point.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, many of Bayle's Reformed contemporaries made identical hermeneutical arguments, including Pierre Du Moulin, Moïse Amyraut, Josué de la Place, David Blondel, Jean Claude, Théodore Tronchin, and Pierre Jurieu.<sup>30</sup> However, Bayle was radical in concluding that *toleration* was a principle of natural law, and this led him to the even more provocative conclusion that Scripture could not contradict the natural right to freedom of conscience. Throughout history, when natural law was applied to religion, the outcome was to argue that right reason proved basic monotheism and certain basic religious duties, such as that God ought to be worshipped.<sup>31</sup> Bayle recast the religious aspects of natural law as a matter of toleration toward conscientious belief, which ought to be uniformly followed by each individual, even if they are convinced of a heresy or false religion.

## 2. The *Commentaire* and its consistency

Given Bayle's focus on the duty to follow an erring conscience, a number of scholars have argued there is a conflict between the first part of the *Commentaire* that espouses a version of moral rationalism, and the second superseding section which instead grounds toleration in philosophical scepticism.<sup>32</sup> The most sophisticated representative of this view is found in Mori, who has argued that Bayle began his treatise as a moral rationalist but that 'the rationalist foundation of the *Commentaire*, however, finds itself overthrown' in the later parts, when Bayle argued that ignorance renders individuals not culpable any crime, and religious belief could be deconstructed as the product of education.<sup>33</sup> Correspondingly, Mori has argued that Bayle advocated two incompatible forms of conscience: (1) 'conscience as an absolute value, founded on the eternal axioms of morality' in the beginning of the treatise and (2) 'the erring conscience, based on invincible error ... in the second part of the *Commentaire*.'<sup>34</sup> According to Mori, Bayle ultimately favoured this later view of conscience which was rooted in sentimentality and instinct rather than reason.<sup>35</sup>

Interpreting the *Commentaire* as ultimately a sceptical work harmonizes with several interpretations of Bayle, which have depicted him as a sceptic more broadly. Some scholars have held that Bayle's position is that of a fideist, who held to his religious beliefs on the basis of faith rather than reason, crafting his use of scepticism to promote religious toleration.<sup>36</sup> Michael Hickson, for example, has argued that Bayle used a sceptical approach to theodicy to argue for toleration

amongst different Christian sects disputing predestination and freewill.<sup>37</sup> Others, however, have placed more distance between Bayle's scepticism and religion. Neto has argued that Bayle was an academic sceptic, whose commitment to intellectual integrity was defined by not having any commitment to preconceived dogma.<sup>38</sup> Pitassi has similarly argued that Bayle's *Commentaire* employed scepticism to undermine traditional Protestant conceptions of biblical inspiration and perspicuity.<sup>39</sup> However, regarding these sceptical approaches to Bayle, several critical questions must be addressed. If Bayle were undermining the rational foundations of religion in the *Commentaire*, why wouldn't he simply want to point out the dissonance between religion and morality, as he did so often elsewhere?<sup>40</sup> Why would he go to so much effort to harmonize the Old Testament with his rational conception of conscience and natural law? This places an interpretative strain on the text and calls into question Bayle's motivations for writing as he did.

In contrast, there is a second stream of interpretation, which has insisted that each of the first two parts of the *Commentaire* established a coherent moral theory.<sup>41</sup> This approach takes into account Bayle's more sceptical claims in the latter parts of the *Commentaire*, but argues they are harmonious with his strong appeals to reason and conscience in the first part of the treatise. The most clear example of this is seen in the work of Kilcullen who has recognized the sceptical tendencies in Bayle's *Commentaire*, dedicating a chapter in the beginning of his work to locate Bayle within the Jesuitical concepts of philosophical sin and invincible ignorance.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, Kilcullen has also affirmed that both parts of the treatise form a consistent whole, where a sincere conscience might be mistaken about religious truth, but nonetheless, still possess basic moral axioms from which to reason.<sup>43</sup> The thesis of this paper hinges upon this debate. If Mori's view is correct, then Bayle is essentially engaging in a Pyrrhonian exploration which ends in a toleration based on the suspension of judgement rather than an appeal to natural law. However, through a close, contextual examination of the *Commentaire*, I will argue that each part establishes a coherent whole based upon a theory of natural law.

At first glance, the *Commentaire* seems to give credence to the stream of scholarship which has argued that Bayle advanced a theory of tolerance grounded in scepticism. Indeed, after the first part, the treatise is filled with anticipated objections to Bayle's own position on natural law which he had previously laid out in the first section. Bayle discussed the possibility of individuals disagreeing over religious beliefs while presenting a number of hypothetical examples to prove his case: an inept coin collector who values forgeries, a loyal father of an imposter son, and a defrauded woman who has the moral duty to provide marital fidelity to a doppelganger posing as her husband.<sup>44</sup> Throughout this section, Bayle continuously argued that everyone whose conscience is sincere has the same moral duties and rights, regardless of whether one is correct about the facts. The once universal claims of natural law were now replaced by an emphasis on the subjectivity of moral agency and the fallibility of an erring conscience.

Such statements indicate, however, that Bayle was exploring how his ideas about toleration conformed to the *universal* parameters of natural law. If the perception that Catholics belong to the 'true church' justified persecution of Protestants in France, then Anglicans in England were justified in persecuting Catholics, and even Muslims could persecute Christians of all kinds.<sup>45</sup> In passages like this, Bayle was indeed advancing a version of epistemological fallibilism by asserting that every religion in principle perceives its own orthodoxy. However, such passages also appealed to the universal scope of natural law by arguing that those who objectively follow the 'true religion' cannot have different moral precepts from heretics. A moral theory of toleration rooted in natural law must have a *universal* reciprocity. It is wrong to persecute others because when such a principle is made reciprocal it leads to the justification of others persecuting you, and this is rationally inconsistent. Tolerance is thus demonstrable by *recta ratio*. Belonging to the 'true church' does not exempt someone from following the universal precepts of natural law, and thus, its members are obligated to refrain from persecution just as much as lying or murder. It must be emphasized, therefore, that the goal of the second half of the *Commentaire* was to show that toleration, as a maxim of

natural law, applies categorically to all individuals, including members of the ‘true religion,’ whatever that religion may be.

Moreover, in contrast to scholars such as Mori who have contended that Bayle’s theory of the erring conscience is evidence of a nascent religious scepticism, it must be emphasized that such an animated discussion on an erring conscience was commonplace amongst Catholics and Protestants in the early modern period. The impermeable defender of Catholic orthodoxy, Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), argued that ‘*conscientia etiam erronea semper obligat*,’<sup>46</sup> and in the decade following the *Commentaire*, the rights of an erring conscience were championed by Catholic counter-reformers in Jesuitical concepts such as philosophical sin and invincible ignorance.<sup>47</sup> Likewise, in the Protestant camp, both Pierre Jurieu and Jean Dailé (1594–1670) wrote extensively on the concept of the erring conscience, especially regarding the adoration of the host in the Tridentine liturgy.<sup>48</sup> It was affirmed by theologians of all stripes that one had the moral duty to follow an erring conscience, and this was not a particular sign of metaphysical scepticism.

The one unique challenge for Bayle’s position, however, was its scope. Bayle’s original position on the authority of conscience was seemingly undermined as Bayle took his logic to the farthest, most extreme conclusions in order to test his moral claims.<sup>49</sup> Bayle therefore unabashedly brought up the strongest possible argument against himself: that an unlimited theory of tolerance justified a conscientious persecutor. This objection implied a self-contradiction, and indeed Jurieu charged Bayle with this same criticism, adding that universal toleration also validated murder, adultery, stealing, idolatry, and all kinds of depravity, as long as it was done with a sincere conscience.<sup>50</sup> Even Bayle’s ally in the cause for toleration and close friend Jacques Basnage raised this inconsistency as the most serious objection to Bayle’s theory.<sup>51</sup>

In a lengthy section in the second part of the *Commentaire*, however, Bayle anticipated and responded to this objection using the scholastic distinction between the formal and the material cause of a moral act. Jean-Luc Solère has drawn upon these passages to argue that Bayle believed that the ‘formal cause’ of good intent does not entirely exonerate an act if the ‘material cause’ is intrinsically evil (such as, for example, stealing to give to the poor).<sup>52</sup> For Bayle, conscientious persecution would involve a choice between two sins: either violating one’s conscience, or else violating the principle of equity.<sup>53</sup> Solère has also correctly pointed out that the moral dilemma of choosing between two evils was echoed by a number of theologians in Bayle’s day.<sup>54</sup> Thus, the coherence of Bayle’s theory of toleration is preserved because nowhere did Bayle admit that persecution could be a moral act.

Although it is true that there is a lengthy section in the *Commentaire* which uses the scholastic distinction between a ‘formally good’ but ‘materially evil’ act, it is ambiguous as to whether Bayle fits within the parameters of such an interpretation. In chapter 8, Bayle seems to concur exactly with Solère’s position, when he claimed that to act ‘contre l’inspiration de la conscience est un plus grand péché, que la mauvaise faite selon l’inspiration de la conscience.’<sup>55</sup> Indeed, Bayle’s statement that following an erring conscience avoided ‘un plus grand péché’ implies the concept of choosing between two sins. Furthermore, in chapter 9, Bayle again expressed this opinion by claiming that ‘il ne s’ensuit pas qu’ils fassent sans crime ce qu’ils font avec conscience.’<sup>56</sup> However, despite its merit, Solère’s interpretation is undermined by chapter 10, where Bayle explicitly rejected the scholastic notion that following an erring conscience is the lesser of two evils. Bayle declared that he would now investigate the claim that ‘un Hérétique en faisant ce que sa conscience lui dicte, peut éviter non seulement un plus grand mal, mais aussi tout mal & faire une bonne action.’<sup>57</sup> Bayle, speaking in his pseudonymous voice, recounted that when he first came across such ideas he found them ‘cruës & indigestes’ but after having ‘bien considéré’ he came to believe that when ‘l’error est ornée des livrées de la vérité, nous lui devons le même respect qu’à la vérité.’<sup>58</sup> As long as the formal cause of a moral action is entirely sincere, even the act of persecution could be classified as *une bonne action*. At first glance, this seems like evidence that Bayle abandoned his attempt to reconcile his theory of toleration with any kind of coherent moral theory, ending his treatise in a Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement.

Bayle's conclusion here, however, did not necessarily end in scepticism. John Kilcullen has noticed this shift in Bayle's argument and correctly observed that in chapter 10, Bayle indeed rendered all actions, even if they were materially evil, as good if the conscience was entirely sincere.<sup>59</sup> However, he also has noted that, according to Bayle, these materially evil actions are still *irrational*.<sup>60</sup> Someone may be sincere about their moral values; however, that person may also still be rationally incorrect. Bayle thus separated right reason from sincerity, and in situations of mistaken moral duties, Bayle endeavoured to correct these mistakes using rational discourse. Thus, although a deceived wife would have a duty to remain maritally faithful to a look-alike successfully posing as her husband, she likewise would have the duty to change her mind when presented with compelling evidence of the fraud. Everyone has the moral duty to follow truth diligently, and thus, a sincere moral agent will change their position after sincere examination. This is why Bayle believed that it was important to show that any argument validating persecution was 'faux, absurde & impie.'<sup>61</sup> Even if conscientious persecutors were morally obliged to follow their conscience, Bayle contended that it was necessary to 'crier fortement contre leurs fausses maximes.'<sup>62</sup>

In further support of these observations, I have already discussed Bayle's uniquely Cartesian conception of equity and natural law. Bayle's argument that culpability is based entirely upon inner sincerity left room for claiming that mistaken moral views, even egregious ones such as persecution, could emerge through an improper chain of reasoning. For Bayle, sincere conscientious persecutors were not culpable; however, they were gravely mistaken, having made improper inferences from the basic moral axioms that constitute the basis of natural law. If they had reasoned carefully, step-by-step, from clear and distinct ideas, they would see the self-contradictory nature of persecution (as Bayle believed he had exhibited in the arguments against persecution throughout his treatise). In the end, therefore, Bayle was not making the argument of a sceptic but basing his toleration in natural law and right reason, which could universally demonstrate the irrationality of persecution from clear and distinct moral axioms.

In sum, despite the tensions in Bayle's text and the resulting variety of interpretations of his work, it seems that Bayle promoted a theory of toleration based in natural law rather than Pyrrhonism. Bayle did this by first grounding toleration in the principle of equity, which manifests one's duty to obey their conscience and to follow the Golden Rule. Bayle then sought to use *recta ratio* to provide arguments, based on these basic moral axioms, to demonstrate that persecution is fundamentally inconsistent as a categorical maxim, and thereby, a violation of natural law. It is the Cartesian emphasis on geometrical reasoning that enabled Bayle to distinguish between the inner sentiment of equity from *recta ratio*. A mistaken persecutor has the duty to follow their conscience; however, they have not reasoned carefully from clear and distinct moral axioms in a logical chain, having made improper connections or reasoned too hastily. Thus, although it is possible to be a sincere conscientious persecutor, the incoherence of persecution is universally demonstrable as a violation of natural law.

### 3. Bayle's dilemma: universal toleration and the Old Testament

Bayle's claim that toleration was a matter of natural law led directly to a theological problem posed by the Old Testament, in which the magistrate was commanded to eradicate idolatry. The ancient Hebrew state had long been a paradigmatic model for those defending enforced religious uniformity: just as the Mosaic Law forbade idolatry, so too a Christian magistrate had the duty to purge the state of false religion.<sup>63</sup> In their day, these arguments were extremely powerful – so much so that Bayle himself claimed that an appeal to the Old Testament appeared to be a strong refutation of his position.<sup>64</sup>

The most common way that tolerationists had previously met this challenge was by drawing heavily upon a typological interpretation of the new covenant as a spiritual fulfilment of the Old Testament. Thus, corporal punishments against false religion should be interpreted by Christians as warnings of God's judgement or recommendations for ex-communication.<sup>65</sup> However, for

Bayle, this standard typological response would not suffice. This resolution only worked for moderate tolerationists who did not insist that toleration was a universal principle of natural law, and that intolerance was therefore intrinsically immoral. It is one thing to say that God made a typology out of something morally neutral, such as by mandating certain clothes, a particular diet, or a feast; however, it is far more problematic to say that God established typology through a policy which violated natural law, and thereby, directly commanded sin. Interestingly, those few other theologians who promoted a universal scope of toleration, such as Dirck Coornhert (1522–1590) and Rodger Williams (1603–1683), entirely relied upon the typological approach to the Mosaic Law without noticing this inconsistency.<sup>66</sup> However, Bayle was perceptive enough to notice that universal tolerance undermined the traditional typological solution.<sup>67</sup> If it were a principle of natural law that one should follow their conscience, this implied ‘que la conscience d’un Payen l’oblige à honorer ses faux Dieux.’<sup>68</sup> Bayle saw that the Mosaic commandments to punish idolatry therefore implied a ‘contradiction réelle’ between Scripture and the principle of equity.<sup>69</sup>

A similar issue arose when Bayle sought to partially resolve this conflict by drawing upon the Remonstrant theologian Simon Episcopius (1583–1643), pointing out that Israel had a surprisingly tolerant society, forbearing a variety of sects such as the Pharisees, Essenes, and the Sadducees who had different beliefs, yet coercion was not used to promote uniformity.<sup>70</sup> This response showed that the ancient state of Israel did not practice a strict, uncompromising policy of religious uniformity; however, it still only reflected the notion of *adiaphora* in positing a limited sphere of toleration only for those who upheld certain fundamental beliefs within Judaism. Bayle sought to establish a toleration of universal scope; thus, he still had to deal with prohibitions against idolatry in a more complete manner.

It is only after raising these familiar tolerationist arguments that Bayle finally endeavoured to fully resolve the conflict between universal toleration and the Old Testament. He did so by contending that the kingdom of Israel was a direct theocracy in which God himself was the head of state; thus, unlike in any other nation, an Israelite pledging one’s allegiance to another god was treason and not simply idolatry. Therefore, in Israel, laws against false religion did not punish individuals for conscientious belief; rather, they were civic laws against treason – and natural law permitted the magistrate to punish treason with strict measures.<sup>71</sup> Bayle thereby concluded that the Mosaic prohibitions against idolatry were a unique institution attributable to Israel’s status as a theocracy and should not be used by other nations to justify intolerance toward ‘false’ religion.<sup>72</sup> Bayle thus viewed the first table of the Decalogue as positive law, while still claiming that Israel shared the natural need for laws regulating human social interaction as found in the second table – and in this manner, he described the ‘préceptes du Décalogue & la Morale de l’Evangile’ as ‘la lumiere naturelle.’<sup>73</sup>

Scholars have so far not mentioned Bayle’s felt need to reconcile the Mosaic Law with the universalizing tendencies of his theory of toleration. In fact, the contrary has been asserted by Gianluca Mori, Jean-Michel Gros, and François Laplanche who have contended that Bayle posited a contradiction between the Mosaic Law and his depiction of natural law in the *Commentaire*.<sup>74</sup> It seems, however, that quite the opposite was true. Bayle was exceptionally eager to reconcile the Old Testament with his claim that toleration was a part of the universal principles of natural law. Yet, Bayle did not adopt these ideas *de novo*, and thus, the question emerges, from which intellectual resources did Bayle derive his position?

#### 4. Pierre Bayle and Richard Simon: Bayle’s confessional approach to Hebraism

Richard Simon does not appear as the obvious first candidate of influence over Bayle. At first glance, it may seem that Bayle adopted his argument about theocracy directly from Hobbes or even possibly Locke, as both made remarkably similar arguments concerning idolatry and treason in the ancient Hebrew state. Of the two, Locke’s influence over Bayle appears the most unlikely. Locke first articulated this theory in his *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689).<sup>75</sup> Given that the *Letter* was published after Bayle’s treatise, it seems more likely that Bayle would have influenced Locke rather than *vice*

*versa*. Indeed, Jacques Basnage (1653–1723) had initially thought that it was Locke who had ‘*imité du Commentaire Philosophique*’ when he claimed ‘La Republique d’Israël étoit une Theocratie’ and those who rejected ‘le culte public, étoit coupable de rebellion contre le gouvernement.’<sup>76</sup> However, three or four years before Bayle published his *Commentaire*, Locke’s thoughts on this subject were written down in a private notebook.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, the only way that Bayle could have been influenced by Locke would have been if they personally discussed this particular issue. Although Locke had the opportunity to meet Bayle during his exile in Rotterdam between 1683 and 1689, Locke does not appear to have made significant contact with Bayle. The only description of an encounter between the two tolerationists is in a letter by Bayle written to Vincent Minutoli (1639–1709) on 24 September 1693, where Bayle very briefly and impersonally recalled that ‘je l’ai vu ici [à Rotterdam] pendant le regne du Roi Jacques.’<sup>78</sup> Considering that both Bayle and Locke attended Benjamin Furlly’s Lantern Club in the city, it seems probable that this was the place where Bayle saw him.<sup>79</sup> However, there is no evidence that Bayle knew Locke intimately, and it is thus unlikely that they ever would have exchanged ideas on this matter.<sup>80</sup>

On the other hand, the influence of Hobbes seems more probable. Eric Nelson has claimed that Hobbes was the first to adopt the strong association between idolatry and treason in the Old Testament, describing this position as a ‘revolutionary line of argument’ and a ‘distinctive, Hobbesian elaboration.’<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Hobbes published his argument about treason and idolatry decades before the *Commentaire* in his *Leviathan* (1651).<sup>82</sup> However, upon investigation, it seems that the historical connection is too sparse to confirm that Bayle had been drawing upon Hobbes. Firstly, it is difficult to ascertain whether Bayle had read Hobbes’s *Leviathan* prior to his publication of the *Commentaire*. There is a review in his *Nouvelles* in 1684, possibly written by Bayle, which mentioned the work; however, the review only referenced the *Leviathan* in relation to Ulrich Huber’s refutation in *De Jure Civitas libri*, and therefore, it does not necessarily imply that Bayle had firsthand knowledge of it.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, the article depicted Hobbes as an Erastian who ‘attribuë tellement aux Princes Chrétiens la decision des points de Foi, qu’il souëtient que les Sujets sont obligez d’y souscrire, sans être responsables de rien.’<sup>84</sup> This interpretation was precisely the opposite emphasis from Hobbes’s passage on idolatry and treason, which attempted to dissuade early modern states from establishing an overly uncompromising model of religious uniformity. Bayle’s later article on Hobbes in his *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* (1697) did not mention Hobbes’s discussion of the Mosaic Law and once again characterized him as an Erastian who argued that ‘l’extérieur de la Religion’ was based entirely on ‘[la] volonté ... [et] l’autorité des Rois.’<sup>85</sup> Thus, the short section in Hobbes’s *Leviathan* which addressed idolatry as treason does not seem to have caught the attention of Bayle, supposing he had even read it by the mid-1680s.

Although the Lockean and Hobbesian connection is difficult to ascertain, it can be confidently asserted that Bayle’s argument was shaped by the longstanding theme of Hebrew theocracy that dates back to the Deuteronomistic history, depicting God as the direct ruler of Israel.<sup>86</sup> For Bayle, this topic would have been filtered through the lens of early modern Hebrew scholarship, especially in the flourishing discussions of *Republica Hebraeorum* which often drew upon the theme of Hebrew theocracy in order to historicize the Old Testament.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, the *Commentaire* recapitulated many ideas taken from the seventeenth-century English Hebraist, John Spencer (1630–1693) who argued that the stringent Mosaic legal code was necessary for ancient Israel due to their peculiar penchant toward idolatry after their exodus from Egypt. Spencer thus argued that the Decalogue was a manifestation of positive law, especially emphasizing that the strict sabbath keeping of ancient Israel was historically particular and not a valid precedent for the governance of a Christian magistrate. As Dmitri Levitin has rightly observed,

Spencer shifted the Decalogue from a universal message to a specifically Judeo-centric legal code ... In the case of the Sabbath, his intention was to contradict those who claimed that its presence in the Decalogue meant that it was part of natural law.<sup>88</sup>

Following Spencer, Bayle's *Commentaire* described the Mosaic Law as a 'loi positive' and claimed that God provided 'la loi cérémonielle de Moïse' to the Jews because of their 'penchant idolâtre.'<sup>89</sup> Likewise, Bayle explicitly referenced 'Mr. Spencer' who had observed 'que Dieu a établi parmi les Juifs diverses choses' such as the ceremonial law, which were only reasonable because of their 'inclinations perverses, & préjuges absurdes.'<sup>90</sup>

However, the aims behind Bayle's historicization of the Old Testament conflicted fundamentally from those of the prominent English Hebraist. Spencer's writing on the historical particularity of the Mosaic Law was largely meant to undermine the propagation of strict Sabbatarianism in the Restoration period. Most crucially, Spencer also insisted the primary reason why God provided Israel with an exclusive legal code was in order to eliminate the natural evil of idolatry in a nation uniquely inclined towards superstition and polytheism.<sup>91</sup> In contrast, Bayle emphasized the historical particularity of the Mosaic Law in order to explain why Christian nations should *tolerate* conscientious beliefs, including idolatrous false religions.<sup>92</sup>

Aside from Spencer, there is another contextual source from the milieu of early modern discussions on *Republica Hebraeorum* that seems to be the most influential source from which Bayle developed his discussion on the historical particularity of the Mosaic Law. In 1685, the year Bayle was in the midst of writing his *Commentaire*, a dispute was waging between the Catholic Hebraist Richard Simon and the Arminian Jean Le Clerc over textual variants in the biblical manuscripts.<sup>93</sup> It was precisely in this theological dispute that Simon repeatedly emphasized that God was the direct head of state in ancient Israel, and Bayle's involvement in this debate was extensive enough to warrant a clear historical connection.

The debate essentially broke down along confessional lines.<sup>94</sup> Simon believed that the evolution of the text of the Old Testament confirmed the Roman Catholic position on Sacred Tradition.<sup>95</sup> In his *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament*, he contended that Israel was a theocratic state, in which the kings were merely vice-regents of Yahweh. Simon's logic was that the Catholic Church (while not a nation-state *per se*) was itself a magisterial authority, led by a vice-regent of God, which has a similar divine authority to interpret and steward revelation. He argued that Persia and Egypt had sacred histories, and that Israel likewise had sacred annalists who were in charge of maintaining the Scriptures as sacred history in their archives, having the authority not only to write inspired originals, but also to redact them over time to new audiences so that the updated editions were continually relevant for the community.<sup>96</sup> However, unlike these pagan nations, Israel's head of state was the one true God, which implied these sacred writers were inspired prophets. Simon pointed out that the Jewish organization of biblical books in the Tanakh combined the historical books with the prophets in the same section, under the *nevi'im* – a word translated as *προφήτες* in the Septuagint.<sup>97</sup> This same pattern existed in the ancient Chaldean paraphrase of the Hebrew Scriptures. This indicated that the original Jewish conception of inspiration treated the historical books as prophetic.<sup>98</sup> Simon also cited patristic historians, such as Eusebius and Theodoret of Cyrus, as well as 2 Peter 1:20, to muster evidence for his theory that the historical portions of the Old Testament were recorded by inspired public scribes.<sup>99</sup> Simon's point was that textual variants show that the Tanakh was formed and shaped by a living tradition, codified by a magisterial body, mirroring the contemporary Catholic Church.

As Simon used textual critical insights to argue for the *contrareformatio* position, Le Clerc employed them to advocate for an expansive version of the Protestant notion of *adiaphora*.<sup>100</sup> He rejected Simon's theory of inspired public scribes, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to warrant such an extravagant claim.<sup>101</sup> Following in the footsteps of the Remonstrant theologians Jacobus Johannes Batelier (1593–1672) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), he likewise argued that Scripture was only inspired in regards to essential matters pertaining to salvation.<sup>102</sup> Le Clerc thereby distinguished between the mere 'words' of Scripture, and the inspired 'things' of Scripture relating to matters of salvation,<sup>103</sup> In so doing, he sought to discourage theologians from placing too much emphasis on sophisticated doctrinal distinctives based on the complex exegesis of the grammar, diction, and semantics of the text.<sup>104</sup> The Old Testament textual transmission has variants, but

it is nonetheless historically reliable, and inspiration comes from the historical narrative rather than the jots and tittles of the Hebrew text.<sup>105</sup> Le Clerc thus limited inspiration to the historical narrative of the gospel, culminating in the person of Christ.<sup>106</sup> His position was treated as more theologically extreme than Simon's. Although Simon likewise emphasized textual variants, he developed a theory of inspiration which claimed that the extant words of Scripture were inspired, even if they underwent redaction. In contrast, Le Clerc was willing to treat the Scriptures as a fallible record of a nonetheless inspired historical truth, culminating in the sacred message of the gospel.

Scholarship has become increasingly aware of how the confessional context of early modern Europe profoundly shaped the aims of the industry of erudition during this period.<sup>107</sup> Such an observation is certainly true in the context of Bayle's reception of this debate. Just as Le Clerc and Simon adapted their textual critical insights to fit within the polemical framework of Remonstrant and Catholic concerns, so too, Bayle adapted these same insights into his own Reformed tradition. Bayle remained an active participant within the institutional life of both the *École Illustre* and the Walloon Church, not to mention on a more personal level, his closest lifelong friends, Vincent Minutoli and Jacques Basnage, likewise participated in these same communities.<sup>108</sup> Bayle sought to shape the institutions of the French Reformed diaspora into a bastion of toleration, and this certainly motivated his desire to reconcile universal toleration with the Old Testament. It is to this end that Bayle paid close attention to the debate between Le Clerc and Simon over textual criticism.

Indeed, evidence indicates that Bayle was profoundly immersed in this dispute. In 1685, the year before Bayle's *Commentaire*, Le Clerc published his *Sentimens* in order to refute Simon,<sup>109</sup> and Bayle's publisher, Reiner Leers, published a fourth edition of Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament*.<sup>110</sup> In a recent article, Jean Bernier has observed that Bayle had heard about Simon's work as early as 1678; however, he was likely unable to read it due to its quick suppression.<sup>111</sup> During these early years, Bayle seemed sceptical of Simon's work from his second-hand knowledge, as seen in a letter he wrote to Minutoli on the first of January 1680, and another to his brother Jacob on the fourth of February that same year.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, Bayle's views quickly changed by the mid-1680s, when he familiarized himself with Simon's work. Bernier has pointed out that Bayle's journal, *Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, provided Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* with 'near unconditional support' and described it as 'a book of a remarkable erudition that was absent even amongst scholars.'<sup>113</sup> In fact, the *Nouvelles* so strongly supported Simon, whose work was still prohibited in France, that one of Bayle's correspondents who had an inside on the French royal court told him that this was the reason why Bayle's journal had been prohibited by Louis XIV.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, Bernier has observed that aside from Pierre Jurieu, Simon was the person most frequently addressed in Bayle's *Nouvelles*.<sup>115</sup> All of this indicates that Bayle was extraordinarily interested in Simon's work, and it is not farfetched to argue that Simon's debate over the theocratic republic of Israel constituted a clear context from which Bayle may have formulated his own discussions on the Old Testament.

Scholars who have focused upon Bayle's connection to Simon have thus far emphasized that Bayle's interest in him can be correlated to his increased interest in textual criticism and exegesis.<sup>116</sup> However, Simon's theory would have also been captivating to Bayle because it provided him with a framework from which he could reconcile the Mosaic Law with his own theory of universal toleration. Bayle's claim that the first table of the Decalogue was a positive law was itself articulated in Simon's claim that the different wording between the accounts in Exodus and Deuteronomy was because the Ten Commandments were originally 'une seule Loi qui ait été répétée avec quelques mots differens,'<sup>117</sup> and that there was 'raison de repeter un même fait en divers endroits à l'occasion de quelques nouveaux incidens.'<sup>118</sup> Thus, each rendition of the Decalogue was positive law, applied by public scribes in the Hebrew state to address the historically contingent needs of two different situations. Most significantly, however, Bayle's claim that idolatry was treason in the Hebrew republic agreed with Simon's frequently stated conclusion that 'La République des Hebreux differe en cela de tous les autres Etats du Monde, qu'elle n'a jamais reconnu pour Chef que Dieu seul.'<sup>119</sup>

It is specifically this emphasis which Bayle himself noticed most in Simon's writing. In his *Nouvelles* Bayle observed that Simon's assertion of Hebrew theocracy and its inspired public scribes was particularly the point upon which 'P. Simon a le plus souvent insisté.'<sup>120</sup> Moreover, this is precisely why Bayle informed Le Clerc in a private letter that he favoured Simon's approach. Bayle told Le Clerc that his theory shook 'les fondemens de la foi ... [et] ne peut que jeter mille doutes et mille semences d'atheisme dans les esprits' because his works 'attaquent la divinité de l'Ecriture.'<sup>121</sup> In contrast, Simon held onto a sophisticated theory of inspiration of the text of Scripture, and thus, did not undermine the foundations of Christianity – and Simon's argument for divine inspiration was precisely rooted in the belief that Israel's theocratic government uniquely shaped its institutions. Thus, for Simon, God's position as Israel's head of state provided the republic with the unique institute of prophetic scribes, resembling Bayle's claim that the prohibitions against idolatry were positive laws exclusive to the theocratic state. If Israel, due to its distinctive theocracy, had a peculiar set of public scribes, so too, might not its prohibitions against idolatry be exclusive to the Hebrew state? Simon's historicization of the Mosaic Law was vital for Bayle to posit a biblically coherent theory of natural law while grounding the connection between religion and morality in the principle of universal toleration.

## 5. Conclusion: significance and future implications

Bayle's *Commentaire philosophique* formulated a theory which universalized toleration by transforming tolerance into a matter of natural law. Bayle's natural law theory was based on his novel conception of 'equity' that separated right reason from the inner sense of clear and distinct moral axioms. If someone reasoned carefully from these fundamental principles, they would see that religious toleration conformed to natural law. Locating toleration in natural law, however, brought Bayle into a conflict with the Old Testament laws prohibiting 'false' religion. It was precisely when Bayle was wrestling with this dilemma, during the production of the *Commentaire* in 1685, that he was reading Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* which repeatedly emphasized that God was the magistrate of the ancient state of Israel. Bayle adapted Simon's conclusion to argue that idolatry in the Old Testament was punished solely as treason and that God was not sanctioning the coercion of religious belief. Recognizing Bayle's usage of early modern Hebraism and interpreting his theory of toleration as an argument from natural law has several significant implications.

Firstly, acknowledging that Bayle's controversial interpretation of the Old Testament was based on early modern Christian Hebraism, especially in his reading of Richard Simon, can help to further demonstrate why the generic form of critical history would have elicited such a lively debate in its original context. In its day, Simon's work had all the trappings of a controversy: A Catholic elevating the Hebrew text, complicating the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and pioneering a novel conception of biblical inspiration. Although Twining has demonstrated that Simon's critical history of the Hebrew text drew on the precursory ideas of other biblical scholars, such as Jean Morin (1591–1659) and Louis Cappel (1585–1658),<sup>122</sup> the fact that Simon's was not a lone voice in biblical scholarship would have only expounded the concerns of contemporary critics as to the widespread proliferation of such ideas. At a time when the genre of historical criticism was still in its relative infancy, many feared inadvertently detrimental consequences within the tightly interwoven theological, social, political, and philosophical landscape. Although Bayle does not feature in his work, Eric Nelson's *The Hebrew Republic* has begun the exploration of how early modern Hebraism had latently powerful, political implications, often resulting in the legitimation of religious toleration. This paper has demonstrated that Bayle likewise belongs as a figure in this historical account, as he creatively used the historical particularization of the Mosaic Law and Simon's emphasis on theocracy to fuel a revolutionary opposition to the long-established practice of state-imposed religious uniformity.

Moreover, interpreting the *Commentaire* as an argument from natural law can better situate Bayle's theory of toleration within his broader political vision, which currently remains

underexplored. Marta García-Alonso has recently contextualized Bayle's theory of toleration within the ecclesiastical and political context of seventeenth-century Netherlands. She has argued that Bayle's conception of toleration allowed for a state church along similar lines as the Dutch Reformed establishment, which left a surprising amount of room for voluntary participation in religion and enough comprehension to enable social mobility for non-members.<sup>123</sup> Unmentioned by García-Alonso, but supporting her case, are those texts in chapter 6 of the second part of the *Commentaire* which speak of the sovereign's 'duties' according to natural law:

[U]n Prince fait assez bien son devoir, lorsqu'il ... [envoie] partout des Docteurs & des Prédicateurs qui confondent les Hérétiques ... Si les Prédicateurs envoyez par le Prince ne peuvent pas empêcher que plusieurs Sujets ne se laissent persuader aux raisons des autres, le Prince n'aura rien à se reprocher; il aura fait tout ce qu'il a dû.<sup>124</sup>

Thus, he argued, 'rien n'est pas plus avantageux à l'Église que les Princes qui la protegent, & qui l'entretiennent; qui donnent ordre qu'elle soit servie par des pasteurs sages & éclairés, & qui établissent pour cela des Colleges & des Académies.' As long as the magistrate defends the state religion 'par des raisons douces & charitables' then 'le Souverain maintiendrait toujours son autorité saine & sauve.'<sup>125</sup> In other words, the magistrate has a duty to establish a state church and even to evangelize the population in a tolerant manner.

Interpreting Bayle's theory of toleration in the *Commentaire* as a form of natural law theory holds the promise of providing a compelling foundation to Bayle's political vision of a tolerant state church. By emphasizing the natural duty of the magistrate to follow her conscience in matters of religion, Bayle was broaching an area that would be unnecessary if he was building his theory of religious toleration upon Pyrrhonism. Curiously, Bayle's position also placed himself in *opposition* to many tolerationists, such as Castellio, Socinus, and Grotius, who argued the Christian gospel demanded more tolerant rules than the less charitable ethic of the Old Testament.<sup>126</sup> In the wake of Calvin, Beza, and Melancthon, Protestants defending persecution argued that the Decalogue and the moral precepts of the Mosaic Law still carried normative significance for magistrates.<sup>127</sup> Ironically, Bayle held to this latter view. The gospel was not 'une seconde regle' because the morals of Jesus were the 'notions de la Raison' and the 'principes de l'équité naturelle.'<sup>128</sup> Although Bayle assumed that the first table of the Decalogue was positive law, he affirmed that the prohibitions against idolatry still applied to universally in the natural law against treason, alongside other moral precepts that governed human interaction in the second table. However, Bayle did not follow his predecessors in claiming that the continuity of the Old Testament and natural law justified a Christian magistrate in using the secular arm to purge false religion. Bayle instead argued that a magistrate had the natural duty to be tolerant in a Christ-like way toward all other religions, in addition to her duty to support an established religion informed by her conscience. In sum, Bayle's *Commentaire* was a work of ingenuity in adapting a traditionally Reformed understanding of the unity between Christian morality, natural law and the Old Testament, while also contending for the magistrate's duty to uphold religious toleration to all those outside the established church.

## Notes

1. The 1686 edition originally contained two parts, the first consisting of a positive argument for toleration, and the second containing responses to objections. In the 1687 edition, Bayle added an addendum, *le Troisième Partie, contenant la refutation de l'Apologie que S. Augustin a faite des Convertisseurs à contrainte*. Finally, a lengthy *Supplément* was published in the 1688 edition, designed to respond to criticisms of his work, especially Pierre Jurieu's *Des droits des deux souverains en matiere de religion, la conscience, et le prince* (1687).
2. *Daily Courant* (London, England), Saturday, July 10, 1708; Issue 1995. *17th–18th Century Burney Collection Newspapers*.
3. Samuel Parker, *Censura Temporum: The Good or Ill Tendencies of Books, Sermons, Pamphlets, &c.*, vol. 1 (London, 1708), 241.
4. See Walter Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 79.

5. Martin I. Klauber, 'Between Protestant Orthodoxy and Rationalism: Fundamental Articles in the Early Career of Jean Leclerc', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54, no. 4 (1993): 636.
6. Pierre Jurieu, *Le Vrai Système De L'église Et La Véritable Analyse De La Foi, Où Sont Dissipées Toutes Les Illusions Que Les Controversistes Modernes, Prétendus Catholiques, Ont Voulu Faire Au Public Sur La Nature De L'église, Son Infaillibilité Et Le Juge Des Controverses. Pour Servir Principalement De Réponse Au Livre De M. Nicole, Intitulé, Les Prétendus Reformés Convaincus De Schisme, Etc. Avec Une Réponse Abrégée Au Livre De M. Ferrand Contre L'auteur* (Dordrecht, 1686), 10, 52, 156–158. Cited by Mara van der Lugt, Bayle, Jurieu, and the *Dictionnaire Historique Et Critique* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 162–164.
7. See Pierre Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2 (La Haye, 1737), 421.
8. See Richard Billinge, 'Nature, Grace and Religious Liberty in Restoration England' (University of Oxford, 2015), 91, 94–5, 102, 106, 111–113, 114–16.
9. See Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 8–9.
10. See Billinge, 'Nature, Grace and Religious Liberty in Restoration England', 39–45; Peter Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 248–249.
11. See David VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms* (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 157–158; John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 233, 342; Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), 2:9–10. The decalogue is traditionally believed to have had two tablets. The first table refers to the opening four commandments concerning religious duties, while the second table consists of the latter six commandments concerning social duties.
12. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 368.
13. Augustine's discussion of the *Imago Dei* in his *De Genesi ad litteram*, and in Question 12 of the first part of Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*. To compare Bayle's language see Augustine, *Oeuvres Complètes De Saint Augustine*, trans. M. Raulx, vol. 4 (Bar-le-Duc: L. Guérin, 1866), 178; Thomas d'Aquin, *La Somme Théologique*, trans. M. l'abbé Drioux, vol. 1 (Paris: D'Eugène Belin, 1831), 95, 98–100. In his own time, Malebranche likewise used this traditional language. See for example Nicolas Malebranche, *De La Recherche De La Vérité. Où L'on Traite De La Nature De L'esprit De L'homme, Et De L'usage Qu'il En Doit Faire Pour Éviter L'erreur Dans Les Sciences*, 4th ed., vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Henry Desbordes, 1688), 241. Bayle's French Calvinist contemporaries also utilized similar language. See Jacques Basnage, *Tolérance Des Religions* (Rotterdam: Henry de Graef, 1684), 7.
14. J.C. Laursen, 'Skepticism against Reason in Pierre Bayle's Theory of Toleration', in *Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy*, ed. D.E. Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 7. Laursen also cites Johnathan Israel who likewise claims Bayle's use of 'equity' implies a status of moral equality, but unlike Israel, Laursen suggests that Bayle's sceptical views in the later half of his *Commentaire* (and other later works) undermined this 'democratic' framework of moral equality. See Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 147, 680. Cited in Laursen, 'Skepticism against Reason in Pierre Bayle's Theory of Toleration', 142.
15. Paul Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 360–7; James Gordley, 'Suárez and Natural Law', in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 216; VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, 53, 108, 135–137, 167–170, 226–233; Antti Raunio, 'Natural Law in the Lutheran Tradition', in *Christianity and Natural Law*, ed. Norman Doe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 86.
16. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 368.
17. *Ibid.*, 526.
18. See René Descartes, *Discours De La Methode Pour Bien Conduire Sa Raison, & Chercher La Verite Dans Les Sciences* (Leiden, 1637), 18–20.
19. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 367–368, 370.
20. *Ibid.*, 370–374.
21. *Ibid.*, 374–375, 380–386, 390–392.
22. *Ibid.*, 376–380.
23. *Ibid.*, 386–390.
24. *Ibid.*, 338–339, 371, 373, 382, 386–387, 389–390. Cf. Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 338–339.
25. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 380–382. Cf. Elisabeth Labrousse, *Bayle*, trans. Denys Potts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 83.
26. Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy*, 78; Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 205.
27. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 369.
28. *Ibid.*, 367–368.

29. *Ibid.*, 367–368, 370.
30. Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy*, 114–120, 132, 151–152.
31. See François Laplanche, *L'écriture, Le Sacré Et L'histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiè Siècle* (Amsterdam: APA Holldan University Press, 1986), 382–383, 476–478.
32. See for example Gianluca Mori, *Bayle: Philosophe* (Paris: Champion, 1999), 294–296, 300–304, 309–311; Laur- sen, 'Skepticism against Reason in Pierre Bayle's Theory of Toleration', 136; Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy*, 184–189.
33. Gianluca Mori, 'Pierre Bayle, the Rights of the Conscience, the "Remedy" of Toleration', *Ratio Juris* 10, no. 1 (1997): 47–48.
34. *Ibid.*, 52–53.
35. *Ibid.*, 52–55. Mori, who interprets Bayle as an atheistic thinker, has argued that later in life Bayle changed his mind about this question, reverting to the more rationalist conception of conscience in order to defend the moral superiority of atheism. However, even if one is open to Bayle changing his mind over time, it seems implausible Bayle would so drastically oppose himself within the same text, only to revert back to his earlier position in his *Continuation des pensées diverses* (1704). Mori has to assert this back-and-forth change of mind, which seems rather awkward to his case. See *ibid.*, 56–57. Treating Bayle's entire treatise as a consistent argument from natural law avoids this interpretive hurdle.
36. See for example Richard Popkin, *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 296; Labrousse, *Bayle*, 11; Thomas M. Lennon, 'Did Bayle Read Saint-Evremond?', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 63, no. 2 (2002); Kristen Irwin, 'The Core Mysteries: Pierre Bayle's Philosophical Fideism' (University of California, 2010).
37. Michael Hickson, 'Theodicy and Toleration in Bayle's Dictionary', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 51, no. 1 (2013).
38. Jose Maia Neto, 'Bayle's Academic Skepticism', in *Everything Connects: In Conference with Richard H. Popkin. Essays in His Honour*, ed. James E. Force and David S. Katz (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 272.
39. Maria-Cristina Pitassi, 'The Foundations of Belief and the Status of Scripture: Bayle and the Issue of Examination', *Reformation & Renaissance Review* 14, no. 1 (2012). Pitassi argues that Bayle subjectivized religious belief by emphasizing only sincerity and not external proof based on reason. However, missing from her assessment is the Reformed conception of *principia*, which claimed that every science has self-evident principles which must be assumed and not rationally proven. The science of theology had the *principium of autopistia* (i.e. the divine Word must be self-evident, and not proven by reason). See Henk van den Belt, *The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 1–177, 301–304. Significantly, late Reformed orthodoxy at the time of Bayle increasingly emphasized an inward *principium internum* in theology, which 'ran parallel to the emphasis on the human subject in early modernity' (*ibid.*, 174.). These categories complicate Pitassi's analysis, demonstrating how Bayle could have affirmed the subjectivity of inner grace without necessarily affirming religious scepticism. Bayle may have merely been emphasizing that the *principium internum* of inner illumination was not a matter of external proof.
40. See for example Bayle's entries on 'Manichéisme' and 'Pauliciens' in the *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* (1697).
41. See Jean-Luc Solère, 'The Coherence of Bayle's Theory of Toleration', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 54, no. 1 (2016).
42. John Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 1–53.
43. Kilcullen likewise roots the consistency of the *Commentaire* in Bayle's conception of conscience as a 'natural light.' See *ibid.*, 101–104.
44. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 427–428, 430, 517.
45. *Ibid.*, 420; Labrousse, *Bayle*, 83; Hubert Bost, *Pierre Bayle* (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 297.
46. Robert Bellarmine, *Disputationes Roberti Bellarmini: De Controversiis Christianae Fidei*, vol. 4 (1619), 696–697.
47. Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth*, 7–53.
48. Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy*, 117–120, 149–151, 168.
49. *Ibid.*, 179.
50. Pierre Jurieu, *Des Droits Des Deux Souverains En Matière De Religion, La Conscience, Et Le Prince* (Rotterdam: Henri de Graef, 1687), 26–28, 54–58, 67–69, 80, 86. See also Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 430.
51. Harry M. Bracken, 'Theories of Toleration: Bayle, Jurieu, and Locke', in *Mind and Language: Essays on Descartes and Chomsky* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1984), 87.
52. Solère, 'The Coherence of Bayle's Theory of Toleration', 25–28.
53. *Ibid.*, 31–39.
54. *Ibid.*, 33. See also Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth*, 17, 22, 28, 70–71.
55. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 423.
56. *Ibid.*, 430.

57. Ibid., 433.
58. Ibid.
59. Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth*, 71.
60. Ibid., 78.
61. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 430.
62. Ibid., 430–1. Solère uses this same passage to make a similar observation, yet while still contending that Bayle believed conscientious persecution was culpable due to its material causation. See Solère, ‘The Coherence of Bayle’s Theory of Toleration’, 44.
63. Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West*, 81, 110–111; Billinge, ‘Nature, Grace and Religious Liberty in Restoration England’, 34, 89, 132, 200; Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 232–233, 273, 315, 342, 360.
64. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 407.
65. Sébastien Castellion, *Concerning Heretics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 159–160; Laplanche, *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiie Siècle*, 142–143, 344.
66. Cf. Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West*, 202, 207; Pieter Gerrit Voogt, ‘Religious Constraint on Trial: Dirk Volckertsz Coornhert’s Defense of Freedom of Conscience’ (Georgia State University, 1997), 274–275.
67. Bayle did briefly utilize such a typological approach in the *Commentaire*; however, these statements should be viewed in tandem with his more sophisticated arguments in chapter 4. See Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 370.
68. Ibid., 429.
69. Ibid., 407. Bayle’s statements here seem to contradict the *Pensées Diverses* (1682), in which he argued paganism is the worst possible position to take, even worse than atheism, because it not only denied God but also added harmful superstitions. However, Bayle’s claim is not necessarily in conflict. Nowhere in the *Commentaire* is Bayle contending that paganism is rational or good. He is merely contending that if someone had an erring conscience, convinced of paganism, they would be bound to follow their inner convictions. Bayle’s distinction between right reason and equity sufficiently explains this conclusion (see pages 3–4 and 10 of this paper).
70. Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 353–4; Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 409.
71. *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 408. Bayle argues that although the magistrate has no right to punish others merely for their supposedly ‘false’ religious views, the state has the right to promote a particular religion in a non-coercive fashion. See *ibid.*, 415–416.
72. Cf. Laplanche, *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiie Siècle*, 673–674.
73. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 367. Whenever the Decalogue is spoken of as universally binding, Bayle only ever references the second table, curiously omitting any mention of duty to the first. See *ibid.*, 392, 408, 429, 433, 434, 442, 455–457, 469. Although the Decalogue was emphasized in the Reformed tradition as statement of natural law, Bayle’s assumption that the first table of the Decalogue was positive law unique to Israel found some precedent in Calvin’s spiritualized interpretation of the Sabbath being fulfilled in Christ, and the Saumer school, which tended to see the fourth commandment as a positive law unique to Israel (but nonetheless based on the universal natural duty to have public worship). See Laplanche, *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiie Siècle*, 498–501.
74. Mori, *Bayle: Philosophe*, 242; Jean-Michel Gros, ‘“Contrains-Les De Sortir”: La Question De L’excommunication Chez Pierre Bayle’, in *Le Rayonnement De Bayle*, ed. Claudine Pailhès and Hubert Bost (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, University of Oxford, 2010), 210–211; Laplanche, *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiie Siècle*, 724.
75. See Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought* (London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2010), 198.
76. Jacques Basnage, *Histoire Des Ouvrages Des Savans: Moins De Sept.Oct.Nov.&Dec.Janv..&Fevr.1689*, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: Michel Charles le Cene, 1689), 25. Cf. Bracken, ‘Theories of Toleration: Bayle, Jurieu, and Locke’, 96.
77. See Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought*, 198.
78. This letter is incorrectly dated to September 14th in the first edition of Bayle’s *Oeuvres Diverses* (1727) but later corrected to the 24th in Pierre Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 4 (La Haye, 1737), 700.
79. See Gerald Cerny, *Theology, Politics and Letters at the Crossroads of European Civilization: Jacques Basnage and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 89–90; Léo Pierre Courtines, *Bayle’s Relations with England and the English* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1938), 114–115; van der Lugt, *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire Historique Et Critique*, 152.
80. Courtines, *Bayle’s Relations with England and the English*, 115–116.

81. Eric Nelson, 'From Selden to Mendelssohn: Hebraism and Religious Freedom', in *Freedom and the Construction of Europe*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 102, 104. See also *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought*, 117, 127, 130.
82. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), 282.
83. Pierre Bayle, *Nouvelles De La République Des Lettres: Comprenant Les Années 1684–1685*, vol. 1 (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1966), 149.
84. *Ibid.*, 157.
85. *Dictionnaire Historique Et Critique*, vol. 3 (Rotterdam: Leers, 1697), 100.
86. Cf. 1 Samuel 8:7.
87. See Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought*, 16–22, 88–137. For a discussion of how Old Testament exegesis was used to justify persecution and religious uniformity see Brad Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 82–85.
88. Dmitri Levitin, 'John Spencer's "De Legibus Hebraeorum" (1683–85) and "Enlightened" Sacred History: A New Interpretation', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 76 (2013): 64–65.
89. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 370.
90. *Ibid.*, 409.
91. Levitin, 'John Spencer's "De Legibus Hebraeorum" (1683–85) and "Enlightened" Sacred History: A New Interpretation', 64–65.
92. It is difficult to ascertain whether atheists were also granted toleration in the *Commentaire*. On the surface, it seems not, as Bayle explicitly claims his theory of universal toleration does not include atheists, who cannot act from conscience due to their denial of God. See Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 431. However, Marshall and Mori have pointed out Bayle's language here is very careful. He merely suggests, 'on a coûtume' of believing that atheists always harm society because they have no conscience. However, only a few years earlier, Bayle argued that metaphysical beliefs do not influence behaviour in his *Pensées Diverses* where he claimed atheism is not as bad as paganism, and that atheists would not act in ways disruptive to the public. See Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, 698–9. Moreover, Bayle's statement takes place within chapter 9. As I have argued elsewhere in this paper (pages 9–10), chapters 8 and 9 are conjectural, designed to prevent opponents like Jurieu from immediately disregarding his theory of toleration due to his more controversial opinions regarding the erring conscience in chapter 10. However, it is quite possible that his later more contentious opinions would include atheists.
93. For a contextual look at Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* see T. Twining, 'Richard Simon and the Remaking of Seventeenth-Century Biblical Criticism', *Erudition and the Republic of Letters*, no. 3 (2018).
94. See Klauber, 'Between Protestant Orthodoxy and Rationalism: Fundamental Articles in the Early Career of Jean Leclerc', 614–615, 630, 636.
95. Richard Simon, *Histoire Critique Du Vieux Testament* (Rotterdam: Reiner Leers, 1685), 13–14.
96. *Ibid.*, 16.
97. The Tanakh, otherwise known as the 'Hebrew Bible,' organizes its books differently from the Christian Old Testament. The order, acronymically reflected in the name, placed the Torah first, followed by 'the prophets' (Nevi'im), and then 'the writings' (Ketuvim).
98. Simon, *Histoire Critique Du Vieux Testament*, 17.
99. *Ibid.*, 16.
100. Klauber, 'Between Protestant Orthodoxy and Rationalism: Fundamental Articles in the Early Career of Jean Leclerc', 614–615.
101. *Ibid.*, 626.
102. Aza Goudriaan, 'Biblical Criticism, Knowledge, and the First Commandment in Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676)', in *Scriptural Authority and Biblical Criticism in the Dutch Golden Age: God's Word Questioned*, ed. Dirk van Miert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 311–312.
103. Klauber, 'Between Protestant Orthodoxy and Rationalism: Fundamental Articles in the Early Career of Jean Leclerc', 628.
104. *Ibid.*, 619–622, 628–629.
105. *Ibid.*, 627.
106. *Ibid.*, 617–618, 630, 635.
107. See Dmitri Levitin, 'Introduction', in *Confessionalisation and Erudition in Early Modern Europe: An Episode in the History of the Humanities*, ed. Nicholas Hardy and Dmitri Levitin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 6.
108. See Labrousse, Bayle, 11; Lenie van Lieshout, *The Making of Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire Historique Et Critique* (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 2001), xix; Hubert Bost, *Pierre Bayle Historien, Critique Et Moraliste* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 175; Cerny, *Theology, Politics and Letters at the Crossroads of European Civilization: Jacques Basnage and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic*, 22–24, 28, 87–89; Popkin,

- The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle*, 296; Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy*, xii; Ruth Whelan, *The Anatomy of Superstition: A Study of the Historical Theory and Practice of Pierre Bayle* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1989), 128, 142, 145, 151–152, 158–159.
109. See Klauber, ‘Between Protestant Orthodoxy and Rationalism: Fundamental Articles in the Early Career of Jean Leclerc’, 625–626.
  110. William James Morris, ‘Richard Simon and the Beginnings of Old Testament Criticism’ (University of Edinburgh, 1954), 60–61.
  111. Jean Bernier, ‘Pierre Bayle and Biblical Criticism’, in *Scriptural Authority and Biblical Criticism in the Dutch Golden Age: God’s Word Questioned*, ed. Dirk van Miert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 247.
  112. *Ibid.*, 248.
  113. *Ibid.*, 249.
  114. *Ibid.*
  115. *Ibid.*, 248.
  116. See Whelan, *The Anatomy of Superstition: A Study of the Historical Theory and Practice of Pierre Bayle*, 146–54; Maria-Cristina Pitassi, ‘Bayle, the Bible, and the Remonstrant Tradition at the Time of the Commentaire Philosophique’, in *Scriptural Authority and Biblical Criticism in the Dutch Golden Age: God’s Word Questioned*, ed. Dirk van Miert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Jean Bernier, ‘Pierre Bayle and Biblical Criticism’, *ibid.* (Oxford).
  117. Simon, *Histoire Critique Du Vieux Testament*, 38.
  118. *Ibid.*, 33.
  119. *Ibid.*, 15.
  120. Pierre Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 1 (La Haye, 1737), 332.
  121. *Correspondance De Pierre Bayle*, vol. 5 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2007), 431.
  122. Twining, ‘Richard Simon and the Remaking of Seventeenth-Century Biblical Criticism’, 423–424.
  123. Marta García-Alonso, ‘Tolerance and Religious Pluralism in Bayle,’ *History of European Ideas* 45, no. 6 (2019).
  124. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 417.
  125. *Ibid.*, 415–416.
  126. See Sarah Mortimer, ‘Human Liberty and Human Nature in the Works of Faustus Socinus and His Readers’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70, no. 2 (2009); Castellion, *Concerning Heretics*, 191, 227, 230; Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West*, 81–6, 111; Laplanche, *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiè Siècle*, 45, 138, 142–143.
  127. See *L’écriture, Le Sacré Et L’histoire: Erudits Et Politiques Protestants Devant La Bible En France Au Xviiè Siècle*, 138, 145–146, 381, 474–476, 497, 501–503, 698, 703–705; Mortimer, ‘Human Liberty and Human Nature in the Works of Faustus Socinus and His Readers’, 197.
  128. Bayle, *Oeuvres Diverses De M. Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2, 373.

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