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Legal Coercion, Respect and Reason-Responsive Agency

Abstract:
Legal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is 'due to them as men'. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that (a) legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and (b) individuals ought to be respected as such in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus it is in this sense that legal coercion fails to treat individuals with the kind of respect 'due to them as men'. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s10677-013-9486-4

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Law
Sub department:
Centre for Criminology
Role:
Author


More from this funder
Grant:
“Internal Constraints to Coercive Harm Prevention” Project (ID: ECF-2012-032
More from this funder
Grant:
“Preventive Justice” Project (ID: AH/H015655/1


Publisher:
Springer Verlag
Journal:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice More from this journal
Volume:
17
Issue:
5
Pages:
847-859
Publication date:
2013-12-30
DOI:
EISSN:
1572-8447
ISSN:
1386-2820


Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:479194
UUID:
uuid:361a256c-3e4d-4921-9310-78e0853e0cf2
Local pid:
pubs:479194
Source identifiers:
479194
Deposit date:
2016-02-14

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