Terra nova, provinciae novae? Roman intervention and Roman power in the western Mediterranean, ca.295-167 BC.



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Abstract

Between 295 and 167 BC, Rome's position in the western Mediterranean changed hugely. This thesis asks how. It does this through the consideration of three specific regions: Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, and Gallic northern Italy, each of which occupies a section, containing two chapters. The two chapters on each region aim to address two separate but related questions: how did Rome become directly involved in the region; and how did it subsequently manifest power there?

Section I introduces the ideas of Roman expansion, power, and imperialism, and rejects the latter as an analytical category. The three Weberian power types are also introduced: economic, ideological, and coercive.

Section II first discusses the period around 264 BC when Rome first entered Sicily with a military force. It argues for multipolarity in the island, involving Carthage, Syracuse, the Mamertines, and Ptolemaic presence. It then moves on to Roman power, arguing for the slow introduction of regular taxation and magisterial presence.

Section III first discusses events surrounding Rome's entry to Iberia in 218, arguing for the importance of trade evidence in understanding the key role of Saguntum. It then argues for the central role of individuals in Roman power, and failure to introduce a regularised taxation system within the period.

Section IV first discusses the difficulties of understanding Rome's move into the north of Italy, highlighting the difficulty of identifying populations and the need for context in discussing colonisation. It then argues that Rome's exploitative and coercive behaviours reflect the productivity of power in creating the concept of Italy.

Section V discusses the role of the emergent themes of agency, provincial configuration, and individualism. It then argues that clusters of behaviours concerning coinage, settlements and land, manpower and militarisation, and ideological adaptation provide an image of Rome pursuing central goals while making intelligent use of the opportunities offered by the differing regions.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in this thesis follow those in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4ed., 2012) and *L'Année Philologique,* with the following additions:

AAAd = *Antichità Altoadriatiche* (Aquileia).

AEspA = Archivo Español de Arqueología (Madrid).

AMSI = *Atti e memorie della Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria* (Parenzo).

ASSO = *Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale* (Catania).

DArch = *Dialoghi di Archeologia* (Milan).

Mommsen *Röm. Gesch.* = Mommsen, T. 1888-9. *Römische Geschichte* (Berlin) 8ed.

Mommsen *Röm. Chron.* = Mommsen, T. 1858. *Die römische Chronologie bis auf Cesar* (Berlin).

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I. Introduction

Between 295 and 167 BC,[1] Rome's position in the western Mediterranean changed hugely. This thesis asks how. It does this through the consideration of three specific regions: Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, and Gallic northern Italy, each of which occupies a section, containing two chapters. The two chapters on each region aim to address two separate but related questions: how did Rome become directly involved in the region; and how did it subsequently manifest power there?

The aim here is to better understand the textures of Roman power at this significant time, in a macro-region in which Roman behaviours have traditionally been understood as uniform, conquest-focused and without the nuances perceived in the East.[2] The first chapter of each section explores the different backgrounds of the three regions, highlighting their existing power structures and subdivisions, as well as the various levels at which they were in contact with Rome and Romans. Interactions arising from these contacts are analysed in their chronological and regional context, with a view to clarifying a narrative of how Rome came to be involved directly, that is to say through the sending of *imperium*-holders and military forces. The second chapter of each section considers the ways in which Rome and its representatives created and exercised power in the region, including what material gains they made and how they acted to encourage future obedience. The overall goal of the two chapters on each region is to form, for that region, an image of what Roman power looked like and why. How far was the nature of Roman power in a region governed by systems-level concerns, the way in which Rome had become involved, the geographical, ethnic, cultural, or other nature of the region, or other factors?

[1] All dates BC unless otherwise indicated.
[2] For this pervasive idea see e.g. Badian 1967: 7, 9, 11; Linderski 1984: 145; Münkler 2007: 61.

I.1. The regions and the period

Three regions are considered in order to allow a reasonably in-depth consideration of each, and a meaningful comparison. The choice of the West was made partly for the reason mentioned above: Roman power relations in the East have been well-studied, while the regions of the West have often been considered somewhat less nuanced. In addition, however, the West was chosen for its primacy. Roman intervention in the regions concerned came early, played a considerable role in the formation of the concept of Italy, and in turn helped to form Roman power behaviours which were later used across even wider spaces.

Sicily is an obvious region with which to begin. Described by Cicero as the *prima provincia,* the possession which taught Romans how wonderful it was to rule others, it was the central theatre of the First Punic War and saw the first attested use of a board of ten for settlement in 241.[3] The obvious Roman exploitation of its grain productivity also makes it a worthwhile study, though the lateness of Cicero as our major source on grain and land taxation is, as we shall see, more of a problem for understanding the early system than is often acknowledged.

The Iberian Peninsula shares a number of features with Sicily that make it an important region to consider. Roman intervention is, as in the case of Sicily, entangled with a war with Carthage, which adds a layer of complexity to how Rome developed relations with the inhabitants. Again we have considerable (mostly later) evidence for its economic exploitation, this time in the form of precious metal deposits. A key point of interest, however, is its difference from Sicily in geographical and topographical terms, as it is considerably further from Rome, harder to access, and bounded in different ways. It was not completely

[3] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.2; Polyb. 1.63.1-3, though cf. Lintott 1981: 59.

subjected to Roman power until after the end of the Republic, which implies that power relations are likely to have been configured differently from the more clearly-bounded Sicily.

Gallic northern Italy is included largely for its differences from the other two regions. Contiguous with central Italy, it did not require that Romans access it by sea. Though assigned as a *provincia* numerous times under various labels, it did not have a continuous magisterial presence until the first century, and was considered in some respects part of *Italia*. Its liminality makes it a particularly interesting study in the formation of *Italia* and a valuable comparandum for Sicily and Iberia, as Roman power there developed in very different ways, in particular in the form of colonial settlement.

The date-range employed here is in part a function of the regions. Roman intervention in Sicily and Iberia can be dated quite neatly to 264 and 218 respectively, but the date at which one can argue Rome intervened in Gallic northern Italy is more open to debate. Nonetheless, the foundation of Sena Gallica in 290-283 suggests that Rome was active in what could be termed Gallic territory by that point. 295, the date of the Battle of Sentinum, provides a reasonable starting point due to Sentinum's location close to the later-termed *ager Gallicus* and the involvement in it of Gauls, probably Senones.

The endpoint of 167 is based partly on events and partly on the availability of sources. This year saw the abolition of *tributum* for Roman citizens after the victory at Pydna in Macedon, a significant point in the spread of Roman power, though one achieved through action in the East.[4] More significantly perhaps, from 167 Livy's account, which is possibly our single most useful source, does not survive. It is also a useful cut-off point as it allows our account to encompass some of the developments of the early second century, such as the settling of colonies at Carteia and Aquileia, while stopping short of some of the century's major

[4] Cic. *De Off.* 2.76; Val. Max. 4.3.8; Plin. *NH* 33.17; Plut. *Aem.* 38.1.

changes. Thus the period covered, while in excess of 120 years in length, can be considered a relatively cohesive early stage in the development of Roman power in the three regions.

I.2. Existing scholarship

Roman expansion of the mid-Republic is a well-studied topic. Polybius, though focused on the east, was right to note that Rome's achievement in this period was likely to provoke curiosity.[5] While his interest was in the reasons for Rome's impressive success, modern scholarship has covered a variety of questions, the most obvious of which is Rome's motivations for behaving as it did. While it has been noted for a long time that each instance of Roman behaviour must have been reliant on a particular set of causes, overarching narratives have nonetheless dominated.[6] The idea that Rome's behaviours were defensive, based on fear of other groups, is out of vogue, but monolithic explanations continue to be used: for Harris in 1979, Rome was pathologically aggressive; for Eckstein in 2006, it was part of an anarchic system where every group was pathologically aggressive.[7] The introduction of International Relations theory and consideration of systems-level issues (on which see further below) has been valuable, but in a particularised historic context can only take us so far. Broad studies of Roman expansion tend still to be overly synthetic, and do not consider the centrality of differences or the range of reasons for them.[8]

Scholarship on the particular regions is abundant, but largely quite specific. Substantial studies on all three regions exist, including within Anglophone scholarship, but wider

[5] Polyb. 1.1.5-6.
[6] Frank 1914: viii.
[7] Mommsen *Röm. Gesch.* I[8] 781-2; Harris 1979; Eckstein 2006; Hoyos 2012b.
[8] The case even in e.g. Harris 1989 (see esp. 107); see Hoyos 2012b.

comparison or contextualisation tends not to be included.[9] More specific and systematic information, particularly on archaeological aspects, spans not only monographs but innumerable articles, often in regionally-specific journals.[10]

Specific topics have been treated through comparative study of multiple regions. Economy and taxation in particular have been considered in this way, as have resources such as mining and agricultural exploitation, *clientela* and *amicitia,* and the nature of the province.[11] Again, though, these are specific, and not always explicitly comparative. In addition, as we shall see below, types of power interact closely with one another, meaning that a fuller picture of different types gives a much fuller idea of the workings of a system of power relations.

This study aims to bring together the specific information available in regional and more specific studies, combining textual and material evidence to consider the three regions. Without the overarching preconceptions of a number of broad studies of Roman expansion, it will consider the regions under broadly the same framework as one another, enabling comparison between them while recognising that their differences begin with the very evidence we have on them. We shall now look at the terms in which it will, and will not, do so.

I.3. This is not a study of imperialism

When looking at territorial expansion of power, as Rome experienced in the period 295-ca.167, it is important to consider the value of theorising such expansion. It will be seen that theorising expansion and related phenomena is in fact crucial for our purposes, as every ancient or

[9] On Sicily, see e.g. Prag 2012; on Iberia, e.g. Richardson 1986; on Gallic northern Italy e.g. Williams 2001a.
[10] E.g. *Kokalos; Gerión; Antichità Altoadriatiche.*
[11] See e.g. Casson 1954 (agriculture); Badian 1958 (*clientela*); Crawford 1986 (the province); Ñaco del Hoyo 2003 (taxation); Domergue 2008 (mining); Ferrary 2008 and 2010 (the province); Burton 2011 (*amicitia*).

modern narrative synthesis of events employs, more or less explicitly, one or another theoretical framework. Therefore, we shall now consider some of the broader theoretical discussions concerning empire and imperialism in order to ascertain what insights these provide, and what pitfalls they present. These broad discussions are the work not only of historians, but also, importantly, of political scientists, particularly of international relations theorists.

Comparative study on empires and imperialism in particular offers a considerable range of theoretical frameworks and approaches, not least due to the search for unifying elements across history. In large part, this is irrelevant to our study which, while comparing three different regions, deals with a relatively short period of time and only one central power. Nonetheless, comparative scholarship deserves attention for its tendency towards self-conscious theorisation, especially in work on more modern empires. In categorising, say, whether a given approach takes a metropolitan, peripheral, or systems focus, comparative and general works make explicit an important distinction which is less thoroughly discussed in scholarship on mid-Republican history.[12] This is important to bear in mind, and is the reason behind the consideration in Chapters II.1, III.1, and IV.1 of agency of groups other than Rome in the regions concerned.

Like the distinction just mentioned, modern theorising on empire and imperialism also tends to be aware of the significance of a focus on economics, for example, on military coercion, or on the ideology of power.[13] As Cohen in particular argues, the way in which these focuses are mixed up in various definitions of the phenomena at hand often leads to assumptions being made from the very beginning. This is an important problem to note, not

[12] On this distinction see e.g. Waltz 1979: 18; Doyle 1986: 20-9; Waltz 2001; cf. below on Harris 1979 (metropolitan) and Eckstein 2006 (systems).
[13] Cohen 1974: 11-12; Doyle 1986: 21; Alcock 2001: 372; D'Altroy 2001: 125; Morrison 2001: 6 (with acknowledgement that the divide here can be associated with the scholar's particular field).

least because attempts to define concepts such as empire and imperialism are possibly the least helpful element of modern comparative scholarship, for this and other reasons.

We should consider further why this is the case, and whether there is any use in such attempts. In spite of the insistence of some scholars that scholarship shrinks from 'general process and theory', this is demonstrably not the case in comparative works, for the obvious reason that comparison requires defined terms.[14] Thus a comparative study or volume on empires, for instance, must seemingly set out from the outset what it means by 'empire'.[15] These definitions are rarely consistent with one another, and Cohen's warning ought to be remembered. This scepticism applies all the more for a study such as this one, for two reasons. Firstly, as we are comparing three regions within what is likely a similar framework of action, we do not need the typology to which comparative study is so attached. Secondly, if we are to consider the models and assumptions employed by the available narratives, it will be helpful to remove ourselves a step from the definitions which help narrators to construct their syntheses.

If, as the above suggests, we are to jettison for our purposes the definition of 'empire', we must ask if there is any role left for 'imperialism'. If empire proves a difficult term to define, as we have seen, then imperialism is still more problematic. Some scholars perceive a simple relationship between the two: according to Doyle, for example, imperialism 'is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire.'[16] Howe, however, acknowledges the difficulty: in his assessment, imperialism can be a process, or 'an attitude, an ideology, even a philosophy of

[14] Doyle 1986: 11; cf. Münkler 2007: 4.
[15] As done by e.g. Doyle 1986: 12-13; Howe 2002: 14-16, 24, 30; Münkler 2007: 5-6, 8; Bang and Bayly 2011b: 4.
[16] Doyle 1986: 19.

life.'[17] A number of scholars, furthermore, have explicitly recognised the multiplicity of meanings which imperialism has taken on.[18]

There are, however, certain implications of the term that we should keep in mind. In the development of the concept through time, certain meanings have been attached which, while originally explicit, have now become implicit in many uses of the term. Of primary importance here is Schumpeter's understanding of imperialism as 'the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion.'[19] Four elements are worthy of note: firstly, the desire associated with imperialism is 'objectless', i.e. not rational; secondly, the definition concerns itself only with the attitude and behaviour of the metropole; thirdly, the expansion sought is 'unlimited'; fourthly, expansion must be 'forcible'. The second and fourth are obviously reductive, while the first and third are made significantly problematic by debates in modern political science.[20] This finds varying reception in later works; Cohen criticises Schumpeter's deterministic definition, while Münkler uncritically follows the line that imperialism implies 'a will to empire', and interprets the term one-dimensionally, though he disparages its validity.[21] Nonetheless, it is important to remember that in many cases, imperialism (as a term and as a concept) has connotations of pathological militarism. The prominence of this idea in some scholarship on the mid-Republic suggests that the deliberate inclusion of different forms of power, and acknowledgement of the non-violent nature of some coercive power (see I.4), should help to create a more nuanced picture of Roman expansion.[22]

[17] Howe 2002: 22, cf. 30.
[18] Keohane and Nye 1970-1b: xxvi; Cohen 1974: 9 ('meaning has long since been lost'), 11-12; Arrighi 1978: 9-10; Waltz 1979: 33, 36; Mommsen 1980; D'Altroy 2001: 125.
[19] Schumpeter 1951: 7.
[20] On imperialism and militarism, see e.g. Mommsen 1980: 34-5 on Rosa Luxemburg; on the assumption of rationality see e.g. Waltz 2001: 201; Mearsheimer 2010: 79-80, 84; greater nuance in Cohen 1974: 236; on whether states seek unlimited power see e.g. Mearsheimer 2010: 78.
[21] Cohen 1974: 12; Münkler 2007: 8.
[22] See esp. Harris 1979.

In modern political thought, the relationship of imperialism to capitalism has also been much discussed.[23] Given our sub-optimal understanding of ancient economies, this is perhaps less likely to intrude into Roman history. It should suffice to note here that territorial expansion, 'imperialism', should we use the term, has taken place before and outside capitalist systems.[24] Thus, imperialism cannot be ruled out of our period on economic grounds, used to argue for the presence of a strictly capitalist system, and so on.

'Imperialism', then, is a difficult term to deal with. This is not why we shall here be avoiding it. Rather, it will be avoided on account of its sheer unhelpfulness as an analytical category (for this reason, we shall also dispense with its sibling, 'hegemony'). The narratives we are seeking to trace for each region concern why and how Rome became involved in that region, and how it manifested its power there from that point. These questions hew close to what Cohen essentially described as the two central issues of any study of imperialism (the questions of how dominance-dependence relationships come about, and what is the form taken). Nonetheless, imperialism has baggage that decidedly encourages us to make a conceptual break.

I.4. This is a study of power

Power is a difficult and nebulous concept. The most common definition is the capacity of an actor to affect the action of a second actor in a way that the second actor would not have chosen.[25] Attempts to escape this basic definition meet with difficulty; while Waltz cautions against equating power with control, on the basis that power must not be defined as its effect,

[23] Largely following e.g. Hobson 1938.
[24] Briefly and effectively summarised by Waltz 1979: 26.
[25] See e.g. Doyle 1986: 34; Runciman 1989: 2.

he subsequently 'offer[s] the old and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.'[26] This does not move the discussion any further on. Thus it seems that we will be well served to accept the basic definition.

Several further points, however, must be added. Firstly, as the definition suggests, power is by nature relational: one actor has power *over another.* For this reason, there are distinct risks in reifying power, as it is not a resource but a characteristic of a relationship. Secondly, following from this, power is not zero-sum, but relative. Thirdly, power is processual. That is, it emerges from historical processes, as Marxist and Critical Theorists have realised, and it is meaningful only when it is in action, as the definition suggests. The point of power according to that definition is the affecting of others' actions.[27] Fourthly, as a result of the first three points, the pervasiveness of power in a relationship should be apparent. It will be exercised and expressed in a variety of ways, which due to their processual nature will be constantly consolidating or reconfiguring the relationship. These processes will be considered further below.

Firstly, however, we shall consider a possible means of breaking down and quantifying the exercise of power. Doyle describes five dimensions of power which can be used: 'domain, the population affected; scope, the types of behavior influenced; range, of rewards and punishments; weight, or effectiveness; and duration.'[28] Deutsch discusses the first four of these, with the useful observation that weight 'is closest to the intuitive notion most of us have when we think of power.'[29] While these aspects are all significant, nonetheless given the pervasive and complex nature of the power relationship, they are likely to be highly difficult to quantify. This is particularly the case for weight, as quantifying the effectiveness of the

[26] Waltz 1979: 191-2. For an acceptance of the circularity of aspects of power, see Foucault 1982: 223-4.
[27] Emergence from process: see Rupert 2010: 168-9. Centrality of action: see Foucault 1982: 219-220 (the exercise of power is 'always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' [220]), and Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 185.
[28] Doyle 1986: 34-5, 40-5.
[29] Deutsch 1968: 24-34 (quotation: 24).

exercise of power requires serious counterfactual speculation. If we seek to consider the other dimensions on a more qualitative level, however, it can be seen that they are highly germane to the discussion. Duration is naturally relevant to a historical discussion, though we shall see it is often difficult to trace in our evidence. Scope, or the conceptual areas in which power is exercised, is vital for breaking down the role of Rome or other parties in a given region. Range concerns the variety of actions Rome could and did take, which is naturally relevant. Domain, lastly, is crucial, as we must distinguish which groups were affected by which actions within the power relationship. Given the often performative nature of power, however, we ought to recognise that the exercise of power is likely to have an effect on audiences outside of those obviously affected.

A second means of subdividing power and power relationships will provide us with an overarching framework for characterising Roman power. This relates to the scope of power, dividing the areas in which it might be exercised. Power may be subdivided three or four ways, depending on which model one follows. While the tripartite version appears sufficiently comprehensive from a sociological perspective, the four-part alternative will also be considered here as it contains a distinction which we should take into consideration. The tripartite model is held to derive from Weber, and states that there are three types of power, or 'dimensions of structure' in society: economic, ideological, and coercive, 'which, though always mutually interdependent, are never fully reducible to one another.'[30] This comprehensive categorisation is fine enough that each term has a fairly clear meaning, and sparse enough to be useful as an analytical framework. In the second chapter on each region, these categories will therefore be used to break down the manifestations of Roman power for which we have ancient evidence.

[30] Runciman 1989: 12.

A few words must be said, however, on the four-part model of power types, presented by Mann. While maintaining economic and ideological power as they are in the tripartite model, he divides the coercive category into political and military.[31] While Runciman and Wickham are right to criticise this distinction as unnecessary and under-theorised, it is worth reinforcing that coercive and military are not synonymous.[32] This reminds us again to avoid an approach which stresses military power at the cost of other angles; coercive power is not necessarily violent, and it can be exercised by a range of agents.

We return now to the question of process, and of how a power relationship actually works, which causes some ambiguities with regard to the categorisation set out above. The inducements and sanctions offered by Rome will not in every case belong to the same power category as the action which they hope to effect. For instance, if grain is requisitioned with the (implicit or explicit) threat of violent force in case of refusal, the threat of a coercive sanction is used to secure what might be considered an economic action. Moreover, process in a relational context involves the action of two or more parties, and there is unlikely to be a clear relationship between a given application of power and a given action effected by it in many cases. Instead, applications feed into and effected actions arise from an ongoing power dynamic. Exceptions will of course be found, as in the example given above, but on the whole the situation is liable to be more complicated. What we can expect to see is the expression, exercise, and effect in various ways of power within a relationship.

Key to this is the performative aspect of power, which can be related further to the Foucaultian concept of power as productive. By performative we mean the way in which diverse actions from building programs to the application of violence, or the presence of a magistrate, are likely to have a suggestive effect on a given audience, implying the possibility of future sanctions or inducements. The likely psychological impact of such actions creates and

[31] Mann 1986: 2, 10-11.
[32] Wickham 1988: 67; Runciman 1989: 14-15.

consolidates the power relationship and the position of the parties within it. Thus the power relationship can be considered discursive and productive of certain impressions which perpetuate its existence and drive its development. Foucault argues that the limits and distinctions created by the application of power, particularly in a disciplinary context, produce notions of self and other, inside and outside, and so on, which is of particular interest to us here.[33] Given that the period 295-167 saw the beginning of the Roman Empire, and the emergence of the idea of Italy, the development of regions' belonging or alterity is of special interest. This will concern a variety of audiences, including at times Romans, thus reinforcing the relational nature of power.

When we speak, then, of a 'manifestation of power', we are employing a term of broad application. For our purposes in this study, the term will refer to a given action or set of actions by a Roman agent (such as the senate or a magistrate in the field) which expressed their power relationship with the region at hand, or a subset of it. Other external powers, in particular Carthage, will also be relevant, as the expression of Roman superiority over Carthage (say) would have implications for Rome's power relations with groups formerly subject to Carthage or considering defection to it. The classification of each action or set of actions according to the tripartite scheme will be used largely as a means of organisation, rather than a prescriptive decision, as many manifestations will have aspects relevant to more than one category.

[33] See Campbell 2010: 225.

I.5. The problem of the *provincia*

The title chosen reflects the centrality of the *provincia* in Roman behaviours of the middle Republic, and this is the last typological element that must be addressed here. The *provincia* has been recognised for some time by scholars as a complex concept that developed across the period in question. Nonetheless, ongoing controversy and the often careless use of related terminology mean that the issue remains open to discussion, and it is of significant relevance to how Rome understood and organised its actions across the West. It is key therefore to question how far the *provincia* can be considered a territorial entity in this period, or how far it was rather a task. As a preliminary to examination of the individual regions, we shall then address the likelihood that a difference existed between 'regular' and other *provinciae,* and question the level of formality of this difference. Lastly, this section will consider ways in which terms such as 'province' can be unhelpful in scholarship, with a view to avoiding these pitfalls.

A major dispute over the concept of the *provincia* has been how far it can be considered territorial. That the original idea of the *provincia* was the task allocated to a magistrate (or promagistrate) is not in debate.[34] It is also clear from our sources that the definition of a *provincia* generally included a geographical element, if only in naming the enemy against whom the magistrate was expected to fight.[35] The existence of geographical boundaries as a safeguard against magisterial disagreements is apparent across the period, but this only implies the delimitation of *provinciae* in relation to one another, rather than full exclusive definition. Equally importantly, magistrates could and did work together, whether or not there were understood to be boundaries between their respective assignments. As Bertrand argues, the nature of the *provincia* in this period could best be described as a

[34] See e.g. Lintott 1981: 54; Bertrand 1989: 197; Lintott 1999: 101; Richardson 2008: 16-17, 51.
[35] This excludes the *praetor urbanus* and *praetor peregrinus* from 241, though it could be argued that the label *urbanus* is an indicator of the magistrate's geographical base (*contra* Bertrand 1989: 210-212).

province-espace-projet, with a later shift to *province-espace-costruit.*[36] This accounts for the flexibility apparent in magistrates' behaviour in the period, while the later second century saw legislation reflective of increasing territorialisation.[37]

This limited geographical understanding of *provinciae* highlights one of the major difficulties of discussing the concept of 'annexing provinces'.[38] If a *provincia* was understood as a flexible space, as it appears to have been, then this suggests that power relations, control, exploitation, and so on might be expected to be gradated across a region. Annexing a province thus becomes rather a meaningless term, which is better replaced by a more particularised examination of types of control and exploitation. A range of types are attested, making the labels of annexation and provincialisation a means of obfuscation rather than helpful umbrella terms.[39]

The idea of a qualitative change by which a *provincia* moved into a different category is also apparent in the discourse on 'regular', 'fixed', or 'permanent' provinces and 'special' provinces. Brennan and Ferrary are prominent recent advocates for the passing of laws in 228 and 198 which 'fixed' western Sicily and Sardinia, in the first case, and Hispania Citerior and Ulterior, in the second, as *provinciae* which were to be assigned to a magistrate every year.[40] We have no direct evidence for such a law in either case. The use of plebiscites in 208 to prorogue the existing praetor in Sardinia and in 192 to allocate the new praetors previously given the Hispaniae instead to Bruttium and the fleet does not by itself prove a qualitative change.[41] There are a number of years where promagistrates are attested or must be assumed

[36] Bertrand 1989: 205.
[37] See e.g. Kallet-Marx 1995; Drogula 2011 on the *Lex Porcia*.
[38] On the meaning of annexation, see Harris 1979: 133: 'The features of an annexed province are, besides taxation, subordination of a defined area to a continuing series of designated magistrates (of consular or praetorian rank) and the presence when necessary of Roman garrison troops'; cf. however Purcell 1990: 8 on the ongoing inscrutability of the term.
[39] Cf. Lintott 1981: 59; Ferrary 2008: 17.
[40] Brennan 2000: I 163, 168, 189; Ferrary 2003: 139-40; 2006: 14-15; 2008: 9; 2010: 34.
[41] *Contra* Mommsen *Röm. Staatsr.* II^2 202-3; Ferrary 2008: 9; 2010: 34-5.

to have commanded in the alleged fixed provinces, which suggests that prorogation was routinely used as an alternative to assignment to a new magistrate. It is admittedly an argument from silence to point out that plebiscites to allow prorogation in the provinces in question are not attested in those years, but other explanations are available for the need for plebiscites in 208 and 192, suggesting that the 'regular' provinces could be allocated to a new magistrate or a promagistrate, and the annual presence was due to norms rather than law (on this see also II.2.2.2).[42]

The repeated presence of a magistrate or promagistrate in Sicily after 228 and the Hispaniae after 198, as we shall see, contrasts with other regions, such as northern Italy, where magisterial presence was much more uneven. In the strict sense that the former areas were regularly allocated as *provinciae,* it is fair to call them 'regular provinces'. 'Fixed' is a more dubious term, as it suggests legal regulation, which is not proven. 'Permanent' is a term loaded with hindsight, and should be viewed with suspicion where it is used for this period.[43] As some scholars have noted, there is no indication that Romans of the third or second century had an idea of different categories of province (other than consular or praetorian).[44] We propose that the term 'regular' need not be abandoned, given the literal appropriateness of its application, but that 'fixed' and 'permanent' be rejected as overly legalistic and teleological. The constant presence of a magistrate in a region surely means something significant for the region, allowing the consolidation and regular reinforcement of power relations. It is also significant for the development of the system of *provinciae,* especially given the relationship between this phenomenon and the creation of new magistracies, but it does not mean an immediate qualitative change in the region concerned.[45]

[42] See in particular Day 2017; cf. Richardson 2008: 17-22.
[43] 'Permanent': e.g. Brennan 2000: I 87-8, 164; Díaz Fernández 2015: 51; Drogula 2015: esp. 233-4, 237.
[44] Richardson 1979: 159; Kallet-Marx 1995: 20-1.
[45] Note also that *leges provinciae* are not attested until after this period. See Lintott 1993: 31-2, but cf. 1981: 58.

In the same way, terminology of 'creating' a province ought to be rejected. This at least has some basis in the ancient sources, but there is in no way sufficient basis for the way it has been used in some modern scholarship, where the 'creation' of a province is used to mean the point at which new praetorships were created and thereafter often used to furnish magistrates for a region.[46] A *provincia* was created when it was put up for sortition.[47] As Bertrand argues, this was meaningful in that it brought the task and area thus designated into political discourse.[48] The use of the phrase in modern scholarship, however, has tended to mean something more akin to the alleged qualitative change to a 'fixed' province.[49] As Richardson has demonstrated, this does not accord with the majority of uses of *provincia* in the sources. It is therefore clearly inappropriate. We could divorce the terms *provincia* and province, but this is liable to cause confusion in exchange for minimal gain.

We need a positive general definition of a *provincia* with which to proceed. A *provincia* in this period is, then, primarily a magisterial or promagisterial assignment, with a largely military focus requiring *imperium.*[50] It is named and assigned on an annual basis, to a magistrate with a defined one-year period of office (potentially subject to subsequent prorogation), and is unlikely to have been set down in law. It is not automatically subject to strict geographical definition. Nonetheless, by the later second century, both norms and laws, particularly around geographical delimitation, had changed.[51] We can therefore identify some important questions which need to be addressed for each region. What did the *provincia* or *provinciae* encompass, and where were any limits understood to be? What were the

[46] Ancient basis: Liv. *Per.* 45.6 has Macedon *in provinciae formam redacta,* but at this point (167) it actually *ceased* to be allocated as a *provincia*; see Richardson 2008: 24-5; Solin. 5.1. (Sicily, 227).
[47] See Richardson 2008: 24; Briscoe 2012b: 996-7 on Brennan.
[48] Bertrand 1989: 203-4.
[49] Giovannini 1983: 40; Brizzi 1989b; Crawford 1990: 91, 93 (on prior usage); Ferrary 2008: 17; cf. Nicolet 1978: II 911; Bertrand 1989: 206-7; Kallet-Marx 1995: 18, 20-1.
[50] On *imperium* see Richardson 2008. Quaestorian *provinciae* are also attested, but their relevance here is limited. See Brennan 2000: I 87-8.
[51] See n.37.

magistrates or promagistrates involved in, in terms of control and exploitation? How were *provinciae* connected? In this way we can trace the development of Roman handling of the western regions.

I.6. Sources

The source coverage of the period is highly uneven. The available evidence for intervention and power in each region will be discussed more specifically in each chapter, so what is presented here is only a basic overview.

Livy should be mentioned first, largely on account of the influence of his surviving narrative on the date-range of this study. While his surviving tenth book covers events of the start of the period, the lacuna of his second decade leaves us without his narrative from 293 to 218, a notable gap which is reflected in how we understand most of the third century in all regions in which Rome was active. The *Periochae* provide some information on the intervening period, but lack a lot of the detail which Livy's full narrative provides, including provincial allocations. Later writers who follow the Livian tradition, such as Florus, Eutropius, and Orosius, suggest some of the missing detail, but are scarcely fuller overall, and the Christian agenda of the latter two is obvious in their texts.

For the period 218-167, nonetheless, Livy is invaluable. In addition to details of provincial allocations, senate decisions, and so on, he also provides many details on economic aspects of Roman power, such as grain requisitions, triumphal display figures, and colonisation. Terms he uses, such as *decuma* and *stipendium,* are not always obvious in their interpretation due to chronological change, but as we shall see the wider context of Livy's

work allows us to probe their nuances.[52] The lack of Livian narrative prior to 218 means that we cannot necessarily tell how far elements such as triumphal profits and provincial labels show continuity from before the Hannibalic War, which must be borne in mind. By ending our analysis in 167, however, from which year onwards Livy's account does not survive, we avoid this problem thereafter.

Polybius provides the other most substantial narrative for the period. His aim prior to the Olympiad of 220-216, however, is explicitly to summarise the background to the period in which he is primarily interested. On the other hand, he also states that he considers this background necessary to understand the resources on which the Romans could rely by the 140th Olympiad, so his interest is perhaps not so divergent from our own.[53] His account may be in places summary, and his interests lie more in the East, but prior to the *symplokē* of 220-216, the events which he recounts take place mainly in the western Mediterranean. Once Roman engagement with the Greek world increases, his text is of less use, as well as becoming increasingly patchy. His original intention to end his history in 167 points, along with the removal of *tributum* in that year, to its potential as a watershed; although Polybius' original decision and the cessation of *tributum* imposition are both due to the end of the Third Macedonian War, the date is significant for Rome and its areas of influence more broadly.

Other texts are still more lacunose, and their overarching ideas harder to identify. Cassius Dio, in particular, is largely preserved for this period in the epitome by Zonaras, which adds a layer of selective mediation hard to disentangle. The highly lacunose Diodorus Siculus provides information on areas such as the outbreak of the First Punic War and the actions of the Barcids in Iberia. Appian survives in substantial amounts on the Punic Wars and on Roman

[52] See Ñaco del Hoyo 2003.
[53] Polyb. 1.3.1-10.

engagement in Iberia, but is relatively late, is extremely fragmentary on events in northern Italy, and often uses terminology which cannot easily be related to original Latin.[54]

Material evidence is also crucial here. To repurpose a tired concept, pots do not equal power, but archaeological evidence can provide a number of useful suggestions. A few examples will serve to illustrate the point. In Sicily, we will find agricultural and tax infrastructure which indicates the extent of Syracusan economic power, which in turn helps to understand existing geopolitical structures on the island in the Hieronian period, a crucial element of background for the development of Roman taxation. In Iberia, evidence of Greco-Italic amphorae and fineware from Latium strongly suggests the presence of Italian, Latin, and possibly Roman traders both before and after the arrival of a Roman army in 218. In northern Italy, evidence of centuriation and palaeocarpological changes point to the development of confiscated land. In particular, while the texts are largely concerned with magistrates and the senate, archaeological and epigraphic evidence can show us a wider spread of agency. Numismatic evidence, while sometimes inscrutable in terms of agency, can also prompt suggestions about regional and local structures, cultural influences, and trade.

I.7. The chapters

The first chapter of each section is concerned with intervention: that is, the point at which Rome sent forces to the region. These chapters will begin by tabulating events involving the region prior to and during this intervention, according to the available source traditions. The chronology and narrative will then be discussed, with a view to understanding Rome's likely reasons for involvement and immediate intentions. A closer examination of the geopolitics of

[54] See Luce 1961: 21 and *passim.*

the region will follow, in order to determine the structures of power prior to and at the moment of intervention. This includes ways in which Rome was connected on a state and sub-state level[55] to the region, for example through trade or diplomacy. This allows for an understanding of events that is neither wholly metropolitan nor wholly peripheral.

The second chapter of each section is concerned with the development of Roman power in the region. These chapters will begin by tabulating manifestations of Roman power in the economic, ideological, and coercive categories. Key groups of manifestations will then be discussed in detail, observing the tendency for categories to overlap. Approximately, economic power concerns Roman material gains from the region, in cash and kind. Ideological power concerns that which primarily impacted on the minds of inhabitants of the region and elsewhere. Coercive power will appear the broadest, concerning life, status, and manpower. While the tabulation will focus on Roman agency, the text will allow for the involvement of others, creating a fuller picture of the power dynamic.

In Section V, key areas of similarity and difference between regions will be discussed in an explicitly comparative way. Causes for similarity and difference will thus be identified, allowing us to characterise how far Roman power was affected by features such as geography, its enemies and neighbours, urbanism, and the nature of its own political system.

[55] 'State' may be taken to include the senate, elected or appointed magistrates, promagistrates, or other appointed officials such as colonial commissioners or ambassadors. 'Sub-state' covers other Romans, Latins, or Italians who could be considered unofficial representatives of Roman interests (broadly conceived).

II. Sicily

II.1. Intervention

There seems little need to justify the inclusion of Sicily in a study concerning Roman power in the third and early second centuries BC. The importance of Sicily in the story of Roman expansion has been well noted, and its significance as the *prima provincia* is attested from antiquity onwards, hence it being treated first here.[56] The point of Roman intervention is clear: the outbreak of hostilities over Messana, involving Rome, Carthage, and Syracuse, in 264. The complexity of power relations in this region and of the way in which they played out diplomatically in the years leading up to 264 provides a rich field for the consideration of power discourse and Rome's role within it. While our sources do focus on the conflict between Rome and Carthage, a significant role played by other parties, particularly Syracuse and Messana, can be discerned and must be properly stressed. Understanding the centrality of these other parties requires us to reconstruct the development of power relations in the preceding years, highlighting the problems of the extant narratives. In this way we shall see that the significance of 264 has been overstressed, and that the broader power networks within which Sicilian powers operated in the preceding period were key to events.

[56] The phrase itself appears most famously in Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.2.

II.1.1. The central issues

There is a clear and well-acknowledged dissonance in events around 264 concerning whether Syracuse or Carthage was Rome's intended enemy.[57] Our texts tend to present Carthage as the immediate opponent, the cause of a territorial threat to Rome which drove the outbreak of hostilities, and, most obviously, the central antagonist of the First Punic War. On the other hand, there is a clear and significant role played by Hiero II of Syracuse, who joined the Carthaginians in besieging Messana, was also considered a target of the Roman forces sent to Messana, and, most importantly, was the evident strategic target of Roman forces in 264-3.

In order to understand Roman involvement in this arena, we must understand who it was they were responding to. Therefore, we must tease apart the roles played by Carthage and Syracuse in the extant narratives, and identify where problems of historiography cause difficulties. Thus we can begin to question dissonance created by our sources. To further make sense of this, we shall then consider the period before 264. Even Polybius, in spite of his insistence that the cause for the Roman crossing to Sicily is ῥητέον… ψιλῶς (so as to avoid trawling back through cause before cause), repeatedly transgresses his start date of 264 in order to explain Rome's existing power base and aspects of Sicilian history.[58] We must do similarly. In order to encourage focus on the agency of powers within Sicily, we shall start on the 'periphery', considering first the relations within the island up to 264. The net will then be cast wider, and Rome's involvement in southern Italy and existing interests in Sicily will be considered, in addition to Punic and Sicilian interests in Italy. Finally, Rome's deliberations and actions in 264 will be examined. Systems-level considerations will arise at various points, in particular with discussions of certain means of mediating power relations, such as treaties. It is

[57] See particularly the work of Eckstein (e.g. 1987, esp. 110) and Hoyos (1985a: 35-6; 1998: 52-6); more recently see e.g. Prag 2012: 55.
[58] Polyb. 1.5.3 and following.

hoped that, from this approach, an integrated view can be gained, in which Rome can be considered both as a singular power and as one of several players in an existing system, and 264 can be treated in context.

Eckstein shrewdly observed in 1987 that the worst tendency of scholarly treatments of 264 was 'to rearrange [the] summaries and fragments [of textual evidence] arbitrarily, to rip them out of an already insecure context in order to arrive at various modern pictures of what logically "ought" to have happened.'[59] This is no less true now than it was in 1987. Eckstein's 'context' referred to the textual context and tradition from which the available written evidence came, but we shall here broaden it to the regional context which we can build from not only text, but also archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics. This context is by no means less important for interpreting our sources. Looking back beyond 264 helps us not only to develop a picture of the geopolitical background, and thus to make suggestions as to the likely development of events, but also to identify ways in which our sources appear to have understood and handled this. This is not a search for absolute historical truths: a number of debates over points of detail, some of them highly significant, will be left unanswered. Seeking context in the region's existing power discourse is nonetheless vital to judging what Rome was responding to in 264, and an instructive introduction to both the region itself and the significance of discourse and performativity in understanding power relations.

It will be helpful to begin by setting out the major events of 269-3 as reported by our major textual sources: Polybius, Diodorus, and Dio-Zonaras. Table II.1.a sets out events from the Battle of the Longanus up to the Roman peace with Hiero.[60] Efforts have been taken to align parts of the texts where similar events occur (e.g. the beginning of the siege of Messana), but a

[59] Eckstein 1987: 334.
[60] The battle is included because of its chronological proximity and its importance to Syracusan-Mamertine relations.

cursory glance should demonstrate how different the accounts are. This is where our problem begins.

POLYBIUS	**DIODORUS**	**DIO-ZONARAS**
Mamertines defeated by Hiero at the Longanus; Hiero retreats to Syracuse and is proclaimed king (1.9.7-8)	Mamertines defeated by Hiero at the Longanus; Hannibal persuades the desperate Mamertines to accept a Carthaginian garrison; Hiero retreats (22.13.1-8)	
	After their expulsion from Messana, the Carthaginian garrison ally with Hiero to attack it (22.13.9)	
Due to their straitened circumstances, the Mamertines appeal, some to Carthage, some to Rome, offering surrender (1.10.1-2)		Mamertines, besieged by Hiero, appeal to Rome. When Roman aid is delayed, they appeal to Carthage (Zon. 8.8)
The Senate is deadlocked, but a decision is eventually reached to help (1.11.1-3)		Carthaginians make peace with Hiero for themselves and Messana, and guard the city and strait (Zon. 8.8)

	Some Romans are present, as Hiero and Hanno have an agreement to make war on them if they do not leave Sicily (23.1.2)	C. Claudius goes to Messana, recognises the indecision among the Mamertines, and deduces from silence that the Mamertines are not happy with Carthaginian presence (Zon. 8.8, Cass. Dio fr.43.5)
Mamertines expel Carthaginian garrison (1.11.4)		Romans and Mamertines expel Hanno's garrison (Zon. 8.9)
Carthaginian siege begins (1.11.6)	Carthaginian and Syracusan siege begins (23.1.3)	Carthaginian and Syracusan siege begins (Zon. 8.9)
Hiero allies with the Carthaginians (1.11.7)	Rome sends Appius to Rhegium; he sends envoys disavowing any intention to make war on Hiero (23.1.4)	
Hiero joins the siege (1.11.8)		
Appius crosses to Messana (1.11.9) and tries to negotiate (1.11.11)	After a naval engagement between Romans and Carthaginians, negotiations collapse into acrimony; Appius crosses to Messana (23.2-3)	Appius crosses to Messana by deception (Zon. 8.9)

On being ignored, Appius attacks the Syracusans and defeats them; Hiero retires to Syracuse (1.11.12-15)	Hiero, assuming Carthage has treacherously allowed Appius to cross, retires to Syracuse (23.3.1)	Appius defeats Hiero, who retires to the mountains, and then to Syracuse (Zon. 8.9)
Encouraged, Appius attacks the Carthaginians, kills many, scatters the rest, and lifts the siege (1.12.1-3)	The Carthaginians join battle but are defeated; Appius unsuccessfully besieges Echetla (23.3.1)	Appius defeats a Carthaginian sally; the Carthaginians retire into their camp (Cass. Dio fr.43.12; Zon. 8.9)
Appius advances through the territory of Syracuse and its allies, then besieges Syracuse (1.12.4)		Appius advances to Syracuse without success (Zon. 8.9)
Appius' successors win over many towns; Hiero sues for peace (1.16.1-5)	Appius' successors campaign in Sicily, advancing to besiege Syracuse, until Hiero sues for peace (23.4.1)	Appius' successors win over many towns; in the face of their advance, Hiero sues for peace (Zon. 8.9)

Table II.1.a. Events from the Battle of the Longanus to the peace with Hiero (order of garrison expulsion, alliance, and siege underlined in each column).

II.1.2 Who is the enemy?

In understanding the situation, the appeals made by the Mamertines are a significant element, as this is where Rome became involved, and the significant differences between the sources

are illustrative of our difficulties with chronology and intentions. In Polybius' version, some Mamertines appeal to Rome, others to Carthage (οἱ μὲν… οἱ δὲ…), ostensibly at the same time, as a result of straitened circumstances following the fall of Rhegium and the Battle of the Longanus. According to Zonaras, meanwhile, the first appeal is to Rome, and only when aid is delayed do the Mamertines also appeal to Carthage. This is not necessarily a drastic difference, as Zonaras does not state how much time elapsed, and it is reasonable to think that, for on the spot assistance, Carthage would be better placed to help.[61] The more apparent problem is with Diodorus, where no appeal appears in the extant text. This can be put down to the fragmentary nature of the text, and the corruption of the end of Book 22; we do not know whether Rome was involved in the expulsion of the Carthaginian garrison, and thus whether an appeal was originally described as being made to them before 22.13.9, or after this but before the reference to Romans being present in Sicily at 23.1.2. This makes establishing textual context for the missing appeal in Diodorus nigh impossible, leaving aside the fraught question of what to do with the two mentions of a Carthaginian-Syracusan pact.

In order to understand what the Mamertines were asking for, and thus who Rome conceived of as its opponent, we must ask a key question: what threat(s) were the Mamertines experiencing at the time of their appeal? Here it becomes necessary to consider the somewhat tortured chronology and causation of the 260s. As our starting-point in Table II.1.a suggests, the Battle of the Longanus, for which we do not have a fixed date, is a key issue. While Polybius' dating and chain of causation appear to place the battle in 269, a number of scholars have preferred to date the battle to 265/4. Polybius himself, in spite of relating the battle to Hiero's political trajectory in such a way as to suggest a date ca.269, also appears to relate the disaster thus suffered by the Mamertines to their appeals to Carthage and Rome in 264. Polybius' relating of the Longanus to Hiero's assumption of the title 'king' is also problematized

[61] See e.g. Hoyos 1998: 44.

by Diodorus' repeated references to Hiero as king prior to his narrative of the battle. The various ways of resolving the issue involve devaluing of certain features of the different narratives, which makes abundantly apparent the virtual impossibility of reconciling the different versions.[62]

The problem apparent in our sources, particularly Polybius, is one of telescoping. From Polybius and Diodorus, we receive the impression that Hiero's campaigns against the Mamertines are to be placed soon after 270, but the Syracusan success at the Longanus is associated also with the Mamertine appeals.[63] It has been shown that certain phrases Polybius uses to associate events chronologically are inexact, demonstrating the likelihood of his telescoping events, and his desire for brevity in events prior to 220 is explicitly stated, but this leaves us no more confident as to where to insert a gap.[64] Dio is of little direct help, as his account does not mention the battle itself. For the period 269-4, then, we have a highly condensed view of events, which cannot be unravelled without impacting upon our views of 264 and conversely being heavily affected by them.[65]

This leaves us with several vexing questions: what was the situation between the Mamertines, the Carthaginians, and Syracuse by 264? Was there an existing Carthaginian garrison at Messana? If so, how long had it been there for? We return to close examination of our sources, to determine first of all what they present as the immediate cause of the appeal(s). As can be seen from Table II.1.a, Polybius sees the cause as the pressure experienced by the Mamertines after the loss of the friendly contingent at Rhegium in 270 and their own losses to Hiero: the initial threat is thus from Hiero. In Diodorus' account, as we have

[62] See Hampl 1972 for the *status quaestionis* up to 1972; since then see, e.g., for early Longanus: De Sensi 1971: 517; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 61, 225-6, 230-1; for late Longanus: Hoyos 1985a: 34-6; Eckstein 1987: 75 with n.3; Hoyos 1998: 39.
[63] Polyb. 1.9-10; Diod. Sic. 22.13-23.1, esp. 22.13.8-9.
[64] See e.g. Hoyos 1985a: 40-1.
[65] Even De Sensi Sestito, a strong advocate for an early Longanus, admits a gap in the sources for 269-4 when following her dating of the battle (1977: 63).

seen, locating the missing appeal is extremely difficult; if we place it before the expulsion of the Carthaginian garrison, this suggests that the garrison may have been the element against which, or at least in spite of which, the Mamertines sought help; if we locate it after the pact of 23.1.9, then it would seem that the problem is with both Hiero and the Carthaginians.[66] For Dio-Zonaras, meanwhile, the threat in the first instance is explicitly from Hiero. The situation becomes more complex, however, once the Carthaginians bring aid to Messana and, in essence, garrison it.

In the two sources where we have a proper account of the appeal, then, the threat is that posed to Messana by Hiero. In Diodorus' version, too, Hiero's readiness to ally with the Carthaginians in order to attack Messana suggests that he had ongoing designs on the city. As Hoyos rightly argues, if we believe that the appeal to Rome was for protection from Carthage, then Polybius' version would be an outright distortion (not to mention that of Dio-Zonaras).[67] This seems unlikely, as Polybius appears quite content elsewhere to accept that Rome was willingly going to war with Carthage at this point. The role of Hiero is thus unlikely to have been overstated in these sources, particularly if we consider the possibility that Hiero need not have been an enemy at the gates to constitute a threat in the Mamertines' assessment of their situation.[68] If we believe that Hiero provoked the appeal by posing a present threat to Messana, then we may appear to commit ourselves either to a late Longanus or to another attack made by him in 264. What we must note at this point is that, given our sources'

[66] As suggested above, the question of how to handle Diodorus' two mentions of a Carthaginian-Syracusan pact has been much debated. De Sensi Sestito, for instance, views the two mentions as describing two separate agreements, the first against Messana and the second against Rome (1977: 85-6). Hoyos, on the other hand, prefers to suppose just one pact, and offers two possible explanations for Diodorus' treatment (that he mentioned the pact briefly in the context of Hannibal's rescue of Messana after the Longanus, and then narrated it properly in its proper context; or that he used two different sources which reported the pact in different ways) (Hoyos 1998: 76-8). I incline toward Hoyos' view, as he rightly points out that once there were Romans in Messana, attacking Messana necessarily involved Rome too. As to the explanation, however, given the state of the Diodorus passages in question, we may remain agnostic.

[67] Hoyos 1985a: 35-6; 1998: 35-6.

[68] Making the reconstruction given by e.g. Berve (1967: 465) of a new attack by Hiero in 264 unnecessary.

emphasis on Hiero as the threat, it is quite possible to argue that the date of the Longanus no longer matters with regard to his significance.

The elephant now in the room, however, is the Carthaginian garrison. Polybius' version does not seem to indicate the presence of such a garrison prior to 264, and indeed seems to suggest that the commander is newly ensconced in the citadel when Appius arrives.[69] In Dio-Zonaras, the imposition of the garrison is clearly subsequent to the appeal for Carthaginian aid, and indeed the rapidity with which the Carthaginians are able to set guard over the city here, while the Romans are delaying, makes the sequence of events perceived in Polybius quite plausible. The problem is Diodorus. Alone of the three, he claims the imposition of a Carthaginian garrison by Hannibal after the Battle of the Longanus, which, regardless of when we locate the battle, places the garrison in Messana prior to the appeal to Rome. We cannot tell from the surviving text how the expulsion of the garrison relates to the missing appeal to Rome, but the presence of the garrison in the city or the presence of the expelled garrison outside the city involves Carthage in the Mamertines' situation in any case. We cannot determine whether Diodorus is 'right', that is whether this garrison was imposed after the Longanus and was subsequently expelled leading to Carthaginian hostility against Messana, but we shall consider the possibilities if we were to accept its veracity.

In the case of a late Longanus, it is possible that the divided Mamertine opinion shown in Polybius was split between those keen to accept the 'rescue' (and garrison) offered by Hannibal, and those who preferred to send an embassy to Rome.[70] This would retain Hiero as the central threat, and acknowledge the ready availability of Carthaginian help as opposed to Roman. This is not a perfect solution: it inverts the order given by Zonaras, where the Mamertines appealed to Rome and then to Carthage, and it could pose a challenge to the idea of a Carthaginian-Syracusan alliance soon afterwards. This is particularly significant if we take

[69] Polyb. 1.11.4, note ἤδη; cf. De Sensi Sestito 1977: 64-8.
[70] Hoyos 1998: 44.

to refer to this occasion the episode given by Polyaenus, where the Carthaginians, 'at war with Hiero', sailed into the harbour of Messana by a trick, burned a number of empty triremes, and stole most of the transport ships.[71] This would certainly make sense of why Hiero retreated to Syracuse after his victory at the Longanus, but in the case of an early Longanus, Polybius' reference to the simultaneous Mamertine appeals would make no sense, whereas in the case of a late Longanus it would seem quite unlikely that Hiero would be so quickly reconciled to the Carthaginians.

This leaves us in considerable difficulty as to what actually happened. Nonetheless, a few points are clear from the main sources, and from supplementary sources at our disposal. The first of these is that Hiero's role was perceived as central to events in 264. The second is that there was a Carthaginian garrison involved, and some sort of dispute as to who had the right to protect the Mamertines (initially from Hiero). What these two aspects should highlight to us is that the position of Messana on the geopolitical stage was crucial, standing as it did at a geographical and conceptual intersection of power between Rome, Carthage, and Syracuse.

We may further probe the historical tradition as to who the enemy was in 264. There is a good deal of *post factum* suggestion that Carthage was always the primary enemy, understandable given what followed up to 241 and beyond, but nonetheless worth examination. Diodorus, before even covering Hiero's departure from the siege of Messana, and having hinted in the opening of Book 23 at the potential of Sicily in helping to grow an empire, describes a naval battle between Romans and Carthaginians leading to a bitter argument where the Romans claim that they will learn seafaring and outdo the Carthaginians easily.[72] For Polybius, the main reason considered by the Senate in favour of intervention at Messana (though not the only consideration in the final decision) is the risk posed by the potential for Carthaginian supremacy in Sicily, which would allow them to essentially encircle

[71] Polyaen. 6.16.4, taken as relevant and valid by e.g. De Sensi Sestito 1977: 58-9, 197-8.
[72] Diod. Sic. 23.2.1.

Italy.[73] According to Dio, Rome and Carthage had for some time viewed one another with suspicion and jealousy, to which the dispute over Messana served only as kindling.[74] The long-lasting idea of Sicily serving at this time as a simple tug-of-war between Rome and Carthage can be seen in Plutarch's life of Pyrrhus, where, on leaving Sicily, Pyrrhus allegedly remarked: οἵαν ἀπολείπομεν, ὦ φίλοι, Καρχηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις παλαίστραν.[75] As Hoyos has rightly observed, this supposed comment is loaded with hindsight.[76] It does show us, however, the pervasiveness of this simple geopolitical conception in the later textual tradition, in which Hiero had become a fondly-remembered ally of spectacularly good reputation and the Carthaginians the bogeymen of Roman history.

There is, nonetheless, plenty of evidence which suggests that, in the face of this great-war narrative, we can still find Syracuse at the fore in the events of 264, rather than interpreting the sources' representation as simply Carthago-centric. Hiero's role in the appeals of the Mamertines has been seen already, and his persistent presence throughout Table II.1.a demonstrates his significance. In the accounts of Polybius and Dio-Zonaras, Appius chooses to attack the Syracusan forces first; in both of these accounts, Appius advances into Syracusan territory and up to Syracuse itself after lifting the siege of Messana. In all three major sources, the consuls who succeed Appius, Valerius and Otacilius, push Syracuse to sue for peace by winning over a number of Sicilian cities. While Polybius' narrative, with its focus on hegemonic war, claims that the cities won over were those held by both Syracuse and Carthage, and implies that Hiero's decision was a question of 'siding with' Rome as much as asking for peace

[73] Polyb. 1.10.5-9. For the argument that the Senate was responsible for the final decision to send Appius, as a result of this argument and the lure of booty, see Eckstein 1980b; according to the orthodox reading, however, in Polybius' account the people are swayed by the booty argument while the Senate has deadlocked (see e.g. Hoyos 1998: 57-62).
[74] Cass. Dio fr.43.1-4; Zon. 8.8, fairly labelled by Hoyos as 'Thucydidean-style analysis' (2015: 32).
[75] Plut. *Pyrrh.* 23.6.
[76] Hoyos 2015: 30-1.

after a war, in Diodorus' and Dio-Zonaras' accounts it is clear that the new consuls focused explicitly on bringing Hiero to terms.

It must be acknowledged that all three of the major sources claim that Rome's aim in bringing Hiero to terms was to neutralise him and to secure his aid for the impending war against Carthage.[77] We might question the validity of this claim in light of the fact that, once peace had been made with Syracuse, Rome cut its forces in Sicily.[78] The implication of this is not, however, as obvious as some scholars suppose; Polybius explains it as a response to now having an ally in Sicily, and one enemy instead of two. We could further suggest that Hiero's rapid neutralisation was a strategic choice requiring a substantial concentration of forces, in order to avoid being caught up in war on two fronts at once, rather than his being viewed as the main opponent and threat.

We also face difficulty in dealing with Diodorus' claim, earlier on, of Appius' envoys to the Carthaginians and Syracusans carrying a specific message that he did not wish to pursue war against Hiero. The lacunose nature of the passage of course makes it troublesome, as we do not know what else the envoys had to say. It would seem risky, for example, to be so friendly to Hiero and to say nothing similarly pacific to the Carthaginians. Nonetheless, there are at least two ways for us to read what remains of the passage. Appius could be trying to separate Hiero from Carthage by offering him the option of cooperation; or he could be focusing on Hiero as the source of the conflict in the first place. Given that this specific ambassadorial interaction only happens in Diodorus' account, and that it is so patchy, it is highly difficult to say. In either case, though, Hiero's confrontational response hardly allows him to fade into the background of the situation; indeed, he asserts firmly his grievances against the Mamertines before accusing Rome of coveting Sicily. He is a formidable enemy and a conscious power in the island.

[77] Polyb. 1.16.6-8; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Zon. 8.9.
[78] Polyb. 1.17.1-2.

The tradition on the events of 264 moreover contains hints as to Hiero's predominance. References appear in Piso (in Pliny the Elder), in the *Periochae* of Livy, and in Orosius to the sending of aid to Messana against Hiero; in the latter two cases the aid is also sent against Carthage, but not in the former.[79] In the Livian epitome, the text goes on to mention the Roman victory against Hiero, but not the opening of hostilities against Carthage. In Orosius' version, interestingly, not only is Hiero put first, but the Carthaginians in Sicily are only *Poenorum copias Hieroni iunctas.* This accords with a model of events where Hiero is the main opponent, assisted by the Carthaginians, rather than the reverse.[80] We might add one further interesting remark, made by Polybius, that Scipio, victor of Zama, thought Agathocles and Dionysius I to be the best statesmen of history.[81] Syracuse was evidently a power to be noted and respected, independently of Carthage.

A notable though not insurmountable problem for this perspective is the insistence of much of the Romano-Greek tradition, and of many modern scholars, that Rome's actions in 264 violated an existing treaty with Carthage, in which Carthage had in effect laid claim to Sicily and Rome had in effect ratified such a claim.[82] This is the well-known and well-debated Philinus Treaty, discussed by Polybius, who is keen to debunk it, but accepted by many historians and other writers who followed. Its basic terms, supposedly set out in Philinus' second book, were that the Romans should stay away from Sicily, and the Carthaginians from Italy.[83] This has usually been identified with the mention in Livy of the renewal of a treaty with the Carthaginians in 306.[84] It is of interest for us here because the existence of such a treaty would characterise Rome's behaviour in 264 as consciously provocative towards Carthage. Nonetheless, for textual and contextual reasons, its existence is far from definite.

[79] *FRHist* L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi F31; Liv. *Per.* 16.2; Oros. 4.7.1.
[80] These sources can thus be pushed further than they are by Hoyos (1998: 56).
[81] Polyb. 15.35.6.
[82] For a relatively up-to-date list of modern responses to this alleged treaty, see Eckstein 2010: 406 n.3.
[83] Polyb. 3.26.
[84] Liv. 9.43.26.

Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the Philinus Treaty is its persistence in the later literary tradition, as it receives mention in, among others, Livy, Dio, Dio-Zonaras, and Orosius.[85] These passages also make reference, however, to the alleged Carthaginian appearance at Tarentum in 272, a breach of the treaty on their side. It has been suggested that this episode was an episode which, true or not, predated Polybius, thus making it unnecessary for him or any Roman official to hide, destroy, or debunk the treaty for the sake of Rome's image. According to the Tarentum story, Carthage broke the treaty first, and this tidy version is what persisted in the Greco-Roman tradition.[86] Though this by no means disproves the idea that the treaty existed, it thoroughly undermines the suspect claim, favoured by many who affirm the Philinus Treaty, that Polybius did not find the treaty in the archives because some 'patriotic Roman' had destroyed or hidden it.[87] With Tarentum as an excuse, they would not have needed to.

There are also further arguments as to why we should treat the alleged treaty with caution. Scholars who support its existence have adduced the changing relevance of terms stated in treaties between the two powers which Polybius describes as extant,[88] and the practicality of redrawing regions of influence around 306.[89] Full control for either power in its claimed area (Sicily and peninsular Italy respectively) would, notably for our purposes here, not be necessary; they could still be counted as spheres of influence, significant and useful in the posturing of treaty-agreement.[90] Polybius himself, however, emphasises that the alleged terms would not fit at all comfortably with earlier treaty terms. As he is at pains to stress, the Sicilian terms of the first two treaties are fairly relaxed, allowing Romans more freedom in

[85] See Hoyos 1985b: 94-5. Liv. 21.10.8; Cass. Dio fr.43.1; Zon. 8.6, 8.8; Oros. 4.3.1-2, 5.2. Note the variance between Zonaras and Orosius on the nature of Carthaginian involvement.
[86] See esp. Eckstein 2010: 409, 412, 414-6.
[87] For this claim: Thiel 1954: 14-15; Mitchell 1971: 635; De Sensi Sestito 1977: 39; Serrati 2006: 113 , among others.
[88] See e.g. Mitchell 1971: 636; Serrati 2006: 128.
[89] Hoyos 1985b: 94.
[90] Mitchell 1971: 636-7.

Punic Sicily than in other Carthaginian regions: barring Romans from it would be a significant shift, for which we do not have adequate grounds.[91] This application of context is crucial; indeed, we shall see further below that Carthage's relationship with its Sicilian region of influence was probably not one of strict territorial control.[92]

The complexity of regions of control and the difficulty of geographical demarcation can further be seen from the weakness of certain arguments which are used to support the treaty's existence. In particular, a remark in Servius' comment on the *Aeneid* has been used for this purpose, but falls down under scrutiny: a vague reference to a treaty that kept Romans and Carthaginians 'away from one another's shores'.[93] It has been observed that *litora Carthaginiensium* and the entirety of Sicily are fundamentally not the same; Carthaginian shores included also those of the Iberian Peninsula, Sardinia, and North Africa, while Sicily had shores which are most unlikely to have been described at this time as Carthaginian.[94] The reference is therefore so garbled as to make it virtually useless as evidence for the Philinus terms, and examining it reminds us not to trust traditions which reduce Sicily to a Carthaginian domain.

While many of the arguments for the existence of the Philinus Treaty are flawed, it is difficult not to be swayed by its persistence in the historical record. As Polybius himself says, the vast majority of people in his time believed in its validity, and clearly this continued to be the case. Nonetheless, we have good reasons to doubt it. We are thus left with a problem: the treaty was clearly part of later conceptualisation of events leading up to 264, but whether it was really an existing constraint on Roman and Carthaginian action is difficult to judge. Our *aporia* is further compounded by not knowing what the alleged treaty actually covered, that is

[91] Hoyos 1985b: 95; Eckstein 2010: 406; Polyb. 3.22.10, 3.23.4-5, where Polybius points out that only the Carthaginian-held part of Sicily is mentioned.
[92] It has also been argued that the restriction of trading relations would be damaging to the Punic economy (Whittaker 1978: 85).
[93] Serv. *Ad Aen.* 4.628-9, treated as conclusive by e.g. Thiel (1954: 13).
[94] Hoyos 1985b: 98.

whether it referred solely to military interventions or in fact, as Dio-Zonaras suggests, included diplomatic connections as well.[95] As part of the later conceptualisation of 264, the treaty is a significant element, but we might perceive this as feeding into the emphasis on Carthage as the enemy, which, as we have seen, deserves to be questioned.

II.1.3. The diplomatic situation

Given the state of this discussion, and the less than concrete significance of a treaty in the anarchic 'self-help' system of the Hellenistic world, we might fruitfully consider, more generally, the diplomatic atmosphere up to 264. The number of awkward diplomatic incidents attested in the preceding decade or two has been used as evidence both for and against the existence of the treaty but, more importantly, it shows several instances of Rome and Carthage's relationship being affected and adjusted by demonstrations of (mostly coercive) power. Allegedly, in 279/8, Mago appeared off Ostia with a large fleet, surely unnecessary for negotiating mutual help against Pyrrhus; soon after this, Carthage assaulted Rhegium to try to keep Pyrrhus from crossing to Sicily; in 272, Carthaginian ships made an appearance at Tarentum. From the Roman side, there is evidence of a more or less formal alliance with Hiero, the use of Hieronian aid against Rhegium in 270, and some kind of agreement allegedly made with the Mamertines prior to the attack on Rhegium.[96] While none of these episodes (even assuming their historicity) had serious diplomatic repercussions at the time, several, in particular the alliance with Hiero and the Carthaginian appearance at Tarentum, feature in accusations in later sources. They highlight the relevance of southern Italy and of Sicily, in

[95] Cass. Dio fr.43.1; Zon. 8.8; cf. e.g. Thiel 1954: 16-7.
[96] On these incidents, see Eckstein 2010: 425, with sources (against the treaty's existence); cf. Mitchell 1971: 636 (for its existence) and Serrati 2006: 128-9 (for its existence and a state of general mistrust).

particular of Messana and Syracuse, in the discourse of power between Rome and Carthage in the years prior to 264.

The course of events in 264 shows a fair number of attempts to resolve the situation diplomatically. This strongly suggests that Rome's relations with Carthage and with Syracuse were not, in spite of previous awkward incidents, viewed as irretrievably soured. In Dio-Zonaras' version, Gaius Claudius travels back and forth to Messana repeatedly, and neither he nor Hanno is keen to open hostilities. In Polybius' version, Appius attempts to negotiate on landing at Messana, as he wishes to free the city from its siege: as Eckstein observes, the sources' unanimous focus on this as the intention of Roman action downplays the inevitability of war.[97] In Diodorus' version, there are two rounds of negotiation, the first evidently centring on Hiero, the second on the Carthaginians after a naval skirmish. Repeatedly, the sources stress the perceived importance of negotiations due to the delicacy of the situation. What we see here is not, in spite of the tensions arising from Pyrrhus' expedition, a steady decline in Roman relations with either Carthage or Syracuse, but an increased role for Messana as a subject of their ongoing power discourse.

II.1.4. Existing power relations

If we see no steady decline, how, then, might we characterise political and diplomatic relations in and concerning Sicily in the period leading up to 264? As already indicated, we shall first consider this by focusing on the Sicilian powers themselves. An important part of this is how we characterise political and regional units, an issue which helpfully raises further tensions between structures and how they are conceptualised in the textual record. Exploring this issue

[97] Eckstein 1987: 89-90, though cf. Eckstein 2006: 69 on the damaging effects of honour-claims and 'brinkmanship'.

also highlights the multipolar nature of geopolitics in Sicily.[98] It is then worthwhile considering some of the relationships between the various poles to see how these affect our view of the situation in 264. Through this line of enquiry, the major role played by Hiero and Syracuse can be not only emphasised, but also refined, before we reintroduce Rome.

Our initial question is what constituted the 'Carthaginian part' of the island, the 'Syracusan part', and so on. Determining this geographically is highly difficult: territorial struggles in the wake of Pyrrhus' departure meant that areas of control were prone to change,[99] and sources such as Diodorus, who reports in questionable order on the campaigns of Hiero, confound our attempts to piece together chronological development.[100] Much of the evidence derives from textual statements of who controlled a given city at a given time, which complicates the picture in that the less-urbanised interior cannot easily be allocated to given regions of influence, while much of the coast can be. From a range of sources, the Carthaginian area of influence can be reckoned as having extended roughly as far eastwards as Cephaloedium on the north coast and the line of the River Halycus in the south, before meeting the area held by Syracuse.[101] The boundaries between Syracusan and Mamertine control or influence in the northeast corner of the island, however, are still more uncertain. Much of our evidence derives from the chronologically troublesome Chapter 13 of Diodorus' Book 22. He names several centres which passed under Hiero's control in his campaigns against the Mamertines, and states which of these fell within Mamertine territory, and which fell to Hiero voluntarily and which by force. Outside enemy territory, in Diodorus' words ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας, Hiero took by storm the fortresses of Mylae and Ameselum, enlisted their soldiers as his own, and divided the land of Ameselum between its neighbours, Centuripae and

[98] On multipolarity, see esp. Eckstein 2006.
[99] We know, for instance, of a line of Carthaginian fortified sites, delimiting Carthaginian territory from the mid-fourth century (Bondì 1990-1: 228-9), but at least one of these, at Rocca Nadore, was destroyed, probably in the Pyrrhic invasion (Bejor 1972-3: 50).
[100] On Diodorus' chronology, see e.g. De Sensi 1971: 512; Hoyos 1985a: 37.
[101] Hoyos 1998: 18.

Agyrium. The next section of Diodorus' narrative describes his taking by negotiation Halaesa, Abacaenum, and Tyndaris. At this point, Hiero is explicitly waging war against the Mamertines, which suggests that Diodorus attributes control of these cities to the Mamertines, but he has not yet invaded the *chora* of Messana.[102] This underlines how complex the nature of territorial control and influence could be, as well as highlighting that Hiero had, in the decade before 264, been making serious inroads against the Mamertines. This dynamism is crucial to remember: power relations between the major powers and the cities and territories of Sicily were not static but were subject to constant adjustment through a variety of means.

To complicate matters further, Carthage, Syracuse, and Messana did not control the whole island: the picture is actually rather more complex. Italic mercenaries, for instance, had been settled in a number of urban centres such as Entella, Nakona, and Aetna after service in Sicily in the fourth century. Coinage issued by these groups in the late fourth century suggests a certain level of independence and a desire to stress, for example, Campanian heritage. The texts, as well as evidence such as the Entella tablets, show repeated changes of allegiance between Syracuse and Carthage, though problems with dating the tablets make it difficult to identify the course of events at Entella.[103] We must also look to the southeast: it has been suggested that certain bronze coin-types of Ptolemy II of Egypt (the 'Galatian Shield without Σ') were minted in Sicily under Hiero, due to stylistic and (more importantly) technical features. Wolf and Lorber suggest that the bronze used could have been sent by Ptolemy, either as a gift or as pay for troops also sent.[104] Whatever the case, the use of imitative and subsequently adoptive Ptolemaic types implies a close relationship, and involves Egypt in Sicily. Other evidence including papyri points to the possibility of personal, mercenary, and trade links.[105]

[102] Diod. Sic. 22.13.1-2. For further discussion, see De Sensi Sestito 1977: 46-8.
[103] See e.g. Tusa Cutroni 1970; Garraffo 1978; Gallo 1982; Tagliamonte 1994: 124-164; Fantasia 2001a; Porciani 2001.
[104] Wolf and Lorber 2011.
[105] See Ruggeri 1996.

In addition to this multipolarity, we should consider the nature of the control or influence exerted by each of Syracuse and Carthage.[106] The indirect nature of much of this problematizes the tendency of the extant writers to present the two as utterly dominant, which further highlights the often contradictory nature of the ancient discussion on 264. Structural aspects of their power over Sicilian communities are difficult to trace, but some indications of the types of power exercised can be found.

II.1.4.1. Carthage

We begin with Carthage. Generally, it is agreed that Carthage's political attitude to Sicily changed over time, becoming more involved most notably from the late fifth to early fourth century.[107] This does not necessarily tell us a great deal about its means of exercising power, and textual references tend to be vague. In the Syracusan treaty of 405, the Elimi and Sicani are 'to belong to' the Carthaginians, we are told by Diodorus.[108] In Diodorus' imagined speech by Theodorus of Syracuse in 396, Theodorus claims that the Carthaginians, if they were to conquer Syracuse, would allow the Syracusans to live according to their own laws. Though not positive confirmation that this was in fact normal Carthaginian behaviour, this suggests that to Diodorus' audience it would be credible.[109] It is difficult, however, to follow some passages, referring to later periods, which have been used as evidence of such a hands-off approach, such as the two Diodorus passages claimed by Whittaker to indicate a lack of direct control.[110]

[106] On which see e.g. Zambon 2008.
[107] E.g. Whittaker 1978: 66, 67, 89; Hans 1983: 105, with historiographical discussion; Bondì 1990-1: 215-6, 222, 228-9; Anello 2002 *passim*.
[108] Diod. Sic. 13.114.1.
[109] Diod. Sic. 14.65.2.
[110] Whittaker 1978: 67. Diod. Sic. 16.67.1 shows Carthage 'courting' her allies for support in the face of a new war in 345/4; these allies are evidently outside the Carthaginian zone, including Hiketas of

On economic control and exploitation we are similarly lacking in evidence. As Serrati rightly points out, there are a few references in Diodorus to payments levied by Carthage from certain communities in the fifth and fourth centuries. In the last of these references, interestingly, the levying of money is explicitly paired with the community's free enjoyment of its own laws.[111] The problem with these references, as Whittaker observed in 1978, is that all of them could refer to war indemnity rather than regular tribute, as all are to be levied from defeated enemies.[112] The passages remain ambiguous. This has not stopped speculation, in large part based on Cicero's *Verrines,* and rarely of much value.[113] We may also refute Serrati's claim that there exists evidence for Carthaginian collection of *portoria* at Lilybaeum.[114] It is not *prima facie* unlikely that Carthage did collect *portoria* at Lilybaeum, given some potential evidence for such dues at *emporia* elsewhere, but positive evidence for this as for political control is lacking.[115]

Some scholars have suggested that numismatic material provides evidence for the intensification of Carthaginian control and activity in Sicily in the late fourth century. Tetradrachm series with the legend *ršmlqrt* and similar words and phrases have been interpreted as representing a temple of Melqart with the power to strike coinage, which appears to have been distributed across all of Sicily, a sign of significant economic and ideological reach.[116] The legend *mḥšbm*, also of the second half of the fourth century, shows

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Syracuse, and the idea that 'subject' towns in the Carthaginian zone would be inadequate in the face of a full invasion from Corinth is hardly surprising. Diod. Sic. 15.16.1, where the Carthaginian commanders in 383 claim to Dionysius I that they do not have the power to surrender their cities, and must discuss the matter with τοῖς ἄρχουσι, has the dual problem that a) it is unclear to whom τοῖς ἄρχουσι refers (city authorities or the Carthaginian government) and b) the Carthaginians are at this point attempting to trick Dionysius.

[111] Diod. Sic. 13.59.3, 114.1; 14.65.2, supplied by Serrati 2000b: 124-5.

[112] Whittaker 1978: 72. *Contra,* see e.g. Bondì 1990-1: 226; Ameling 1993: 112 with n.60, appearing to acknowledge but disregard Whittaker's point.

[113] E.g. Bondì 1990-1: 228; Gallo 1992: 395.

[114] Serrati 2000b: 124-5: Liv. 33.47.1, the passage cited, includes no direct reference to Sicily or to Lilybaeum.

[115] For possible evidence, see Whittaker 1978: 84, though note his circumspection on the issue.

[116] Jenkins 1971: 53; Manfredi 1985.

the presence in Sicily of an intermediate-level Carthaginian financial magistrate, a tantalising hint at possible administrative apparatus. It has also been argued that coins of this period show some kind of administrative role played in the region by a body of the Carthaginian military, referring to this body as a political unit in the legends *ʿm mḥnt* and *šʿm mḥnt*.[117] What is interesting, though, is that production of these various types appears to have ceased around 305, suggesting that the situation changed around the time of Carthage reaching terms with Agathocles. The idea of military involvement in coinage at this time indeed suggests that closer financial control may have been connected with intensified military engagement and the contingent monetary demands, which decreased again with the conclusion of peace. The extent to which it decreased should not be overestimated: ongoing tensions with Syracuse continued to play a major role in Carthage's behaviour.[118] The cessation of the minting of these coin types, however, is likely to have lessened Carthage's expression and formation of both economic and ideological power, perhaps less necessary in a period of peace.

II.1.4.2. Syracuse

We come now to Syracuse, whose power position in Sicily remains relevant after 241, as Rome did not control the Syracusan domains until 212. As with Carthage, it is not wholly clear how much Hiero controlled, or by what means. The image of Syracuse as controlling essentially the entire east of Sicily is a construction which we ought to treat very carefully, as there is little proof. It is a particular problem that our textual evidence, in addition to omitting information on the exercise of power, focuses on cities, without often mentioning hinterlands. An interesting exception to this may be found in Diodorus' account of Hiero's Mamertine

[117] Manfredi 1985: 6, also suggesting a military dimension for the temple group; Ameling 1993: 112.
[118] Hans 1983: 113; Ameling 1993: 113.

campaigns, where he distributes the land of the unknown Ameselum between the towns of Centuripae and Agyrium. Presumably these were friendly to him, and the episode hints at one hands-off possibility for dealing with cities and land once taken.

This scope for loose, indirect control or influence would fit well with the broad distribution of cities which we are told Hiero held. At this time he also 'extended his power' to Halaesa, Abacaenum, Mylae, and Tyndaris. Diodorus also notes his holding of Tauromenium, near Messana.[119] These are widely spread, and interestingly include coastal choke-points by which the Mamertine area of influence was effectively cut off from the rest of the island. We also know of a more geographically circumscribed selection of cities which supplied Hiero with forces: Akrai, Netum, Helorus, Megara Hyblaea, and Leontini.[120] In detailing the treaty agreed between Rome and Hiero in 263, Diodorus describes these cities as τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν πόλεων, over which Hiero is allowed to retain control. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact nature of their earlier relationship with Syracuse, not least due to the fact that Diodorus' mention of them refers to a situation after 264. Nonetheless, Diodorus' phrasing indicates that Hiero directly controlled these places immediately prior to the treaty, and his account appears to rule out that Hiero had taken them since the arrival of the Roman forces on the island.[121] The provision of troops suggests a degree of coercive Hieronian power manifested in these cities, which also allows scope for greater cultural exchange. In any case, our evidence suggests direct control exercised by Syracuse only in its relatively close environs, but these nonetheless constituted a substantial hinterland.

We also have some positive evidence to characterise Syracuse's relationship with cities under its power. Morgantina, which had previously been held by Syracuse and is reckoned to have fallen within Hiero's area of control, has produced several items of interest. These include

[119] Diod. Sic. 22.13.1-2.
[120] See Berve 1967: 463.
[121] Diod. Sic. 23.1-4.

the east and west granaries in the *agora,* the former dating to the second half of the third century but the latter dating most probably to the earlier Hieronian period.[122] As part of the major Hieronian-period building programme at Morgantina, the granaries and another associated civic building in the *agora* may reasonably be seen to point to agricultural exploitation and the storage of the tithe, as well as to suggest continuity in this aspect of an economic relationship.[123] The recent publication of stamped grain-measures from Morgantina, Camarina, and Akrai seemingly showing the presence of an official involved in agricultural taxation may, depending on our dating of these stamps, reinforce the idea of this exploitation, as well as suggesting the extension of Hieronian economic power to the south coast.[124] Interestingly, Morgantina has another aspect in common with Akrai: the presence of a Hieronian-period *bouleuterion.* As Bell notes, this and the *ekklesiasterion* at Morgantina indicate the main civic organs of an autonomous city, and we might suggest a similar possibility for Akrai.[125] Two significant points can be made: if these were built on Hiero's initiative, they were a visible sign of his power, particularly in conjunction with the granaries; on the other hand, they constituted conspicuous signs of civic autonomy. We may thus point to Hieronian control exercised through taxation, building programmes, and a degree of reciprocity, rather than direct political interference.

Grain must also be considered as a sign of Syracuse's power on a larger scale. Evidence exists for the exporting of grain from Syracuse to Greece from the fifth and fourth centuries, even after Egypt began major grain exportation.[126] The diplomatic use of grain exports from Hiero's Syracuse is also attested in Polybius, where it is praised. The recipients included not only Rome, but also Greece, Egypt, and others, forming or building upon links with various

[122] Deussen 1994: 232; redated by Bell 1999: 264.
[123] See Bell 1999; 2007: 187, with further references.
[124] Walthall 2011. Questions have, however, been raised on the dating of the stamps. Cf. Bell 2007, esp. 193-5.
[125] Bell 1999: 268; on the *bouleuterion* at Akrai see also Bernabò Brea 1956: 44-51.
[126] De Sensi Sestito 1975-6: 202, with sources. See also Casson 1954: *passim.*

Hellenistic states.[127] This will have boosted Syracuse's economic power in its wider network of relationships. Though Syracuse's immediate environs appear to have been reasonably valuable in terms of cereal production, the capacity suggested by our sources also leads us to believe that it had some form of control over land further afield. Indeed, given what was said above, we can assert with confidence that Syracuse had resources to draw upon beyond the city's own *chora.* Substantial export such as mentioned above would require substantial yields, which could have been gathered through a variety of means. De Sensi Sestito describes the situation as a 'monopoly', but it is difficult to be sure. Leontini, which is noted for having particularly fertile land,[128] is listed in the treaty terms given by Diodorus as belonging to Hiero. We may suggest that Syracuse therefore held (in some form) a part of the valuable Plain of Catania. This would probably increase its economic and diplomatic prospects considerably.

Its economic significance may be further highlighted by its output of bronze coinage, which circulated widely, particularly in the eastern part of Sicily.[129]

II.1.4.3. Carthage vs Syracuse

Both powers, then, had widespread and varied interests in the island, and mediated their power relations in a variety of ways. We shall now consider how their representation in our written sources both confounds and informs our understanding of their respective roles. As we have seen, characterising and delimiting their regions of control is in practice highly difficult. In our written sources, however, both are sometimes presented much more simply. The tradition on the Philinus Treaty is symptomatic of this: assuming that Carthage prohibited Roman access

[127] De Sensi Sestito 1975-6: 197, 202-3; Ath. 5.209.a-b; Polyb. 7.8.6.
[128] See e.g. Plin. *NH.* 18.21; Diod. Sic. 14.58.1.
[129] See e.g. Puglisi 2009: 373; Frey-Kupper 2013: 310-11.

to Sicily assumes some form of Carthaginian claim to power over all of Sicily. Unlikely as this may seem, the tradition which upholds the treaty's existence supports the idea that this was considered plausible at least in subsequent centuries. Another interesting example is found in Dio-Zonaras, who says that the Carthaginians τῆς Σικελίας τὰ πλείω κατέχουσιν, only shortly after having claimed that Hiero Σικελίας ἁπάσης ἦρξε μικροῦ.[130] Clearly the two cannot simultaneously be true, but they make rather more sense if they are considered in context; the reference to Hiero's power is found in an account of his friendship with and aiding of Rome in 270, and the reference to Carthaginian power is found in Zonaras' account of how strong Carthage was as an opponent in the First Punic War.

A number of other sources can be found which magnify Hiero's power in a similar way. M'. Valerius Maximus, consul of 263, is noted in the Fasti Triumphales as having triumphed *de Poeneis et rege Siculor(um) Hierone*.[131] The charged political context of the triumph is likely to have been instrumental in this presentation, but the title is echoed in Hiero's labelling as *Siciliae rector* by Valerius Maximus or *potentissimus rex Siciliae* by Eutropius.[132] Evidence from earlier in Syracusan history also provides precedent. Over a century earlier, Athens had titled Dionysius I of Syracuse ἄρχων Σικελίας in three decrees giving him honours and recording negotiations for alliance, though this is reckoned by Rhodes and Osborne to have been Dionysius' own express preference.[133] Indeed, a similar statement can be found in Polybius, who claims that Dionysius and Agathocles not only gained control of Syracuse, but also were βασιλεῖς ἁπάσης Σικελίας νομισθέντες, perhaps basing his claim on documents like the Athenian decrees.[134] In stressing the pre-eminence of Hiero's Syracuse, then, regardless of

[130] Zon. 8.8, 8.6.
[131] *Act. Tr.* Degrassi: 74-5, 547-8.
[132] Val. Max. 8.13.ext.1; Eutrop. 3.1.
[133] Rhodes and Osborne 2003: nos. 10, 33, 34.
[134] Polyb. 15.35.4.

what might have been thought the case in Sicily itself, those responsible for the triumphal description, and the later writers, were not committing a novel exaggeration.

To return to the references found in Dio-Zonaras, we might notice something further: continued expansionist tension between Syracuse and Carthage. Following the description of the extent of Hiero's power, Zonaras claims that around 270 he was τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εὐλαβηθεὶς ἐγκειμένους τῇ Σικελίᾳ, following the departure of Pyrrhus.[135] This follows from the losses sustained by Carthage in Pyrrhus' invasion, but it also fits into a long tradition of often violent rivalry between Syracuse and the Carthaginians. This tradition is crucial to our understanding of the events of the 260s, as it helps us to characterise the multipolar complexity of Sicilian regional politics. There is evidence to suggest that Carthage was considered by Syracuse to be a major threat, and may have provided something of a platform for Hiero at the time of his military-political ascendancy. His election is presented by Justin as being motivated by a Carthaginian threat, as he is elected *dux adversus Carthaginienses.* Theocritus' sixteenth *Idyll* exhorts Hiero to expel the Carthaginians from Sicily entirely. While some scholars have claimed that Hiero's first military action was in fact against the Carthaginians, however, it is hard to take either of these sources as strong evidence to that effect. Justin is a late source, and his details on Hiero's career are unclear, while Theocritus, though a contemporary, was writing in a poetic and laudatory context.[136] The possibility that the idea of action against Carthage served as a platform for Hiero is significantly more likely than the possibility of an unattested attack at the beginning of Hiero's generalship.[137]

This may suggest that the rivalry between Syracuse and Carthage could be considered traditional or perhaps ideological, a matter of representation as much as practice. There certainly appears to have been a tradition among Syracusan rulers to view and present

[135] Zon. 8.6.
[136] Just. *Epit.* 23.4.1; Theoc. *Id.* 16.73ff; for discussion see e.g. De Sensi 1971: 510-11.
[137] De Sensi Sestito 1977: 26-7.

Carthage as the primary, 'barbarian' enemy, and an effort on Hiero's part to present himself as heir to the Deinomenid rulers. The Theocritus poem mentioned echoes Pindar's works, particularly the *First Pythian Ode,* which in commemorating a chariot victory by Hiero I had linked the Battles of Himera (against the Carthaginians) and Cumae (against the Etruscans) with those of Salamis and Plataea.[138] In Diodorus, the idea of comparing Dionysius I to Gelon, victor at Himera, is rejected in the speech of Theodorus, and a similar view is taken in the fourth-century *Seventh Epistle* of Plato.[139]

Nonetheless, this tradition was built upon centuries of actual conflict. Diodorus' account of the preceding centuries is full of eruptions of this conflict, and Pyrrhus, though invited to Sicily as a result of Siceliote disputes, was heavily opposed by the Carthaginians, and his presence led to further fighting between the Carthaginians and the Siceliotes (in particular the Syracusans).[140] As Hans points out, in the early third century the situation stood to worsen further, as Syracusan designs on southern Italy were checked by increasing Roman involvement in that region, and the example of Agathocles showed that Syracuse could and might make further attacks on Africa.[141] We do not need to believe as Hans does that the Philinus Treaty was genuine to believe that Carthage would have felt concern at the developing geopolitical situation.

[138] See Prag 2010b: 55, 66.
[139] Diod. Sic. 14.65-9; [Plato] *Seventh Epistle* 333a; for discussion see Prag 2010b: 60.
[140] Diod. Sic. 22.7-8; Zon. 8.5. On the role of the Carthaginians in provoking the appeal to Pyrrhus, cf. Zambon 2008: 80.
[141] Hans 1983: 110.

II.1.4.4. The Mamertines

It is at this point that we should consider how the Mamertines fitted into this strained multipolar environment. After their ousting from Syracuse, their resulting anti-Syracusan attitude made them a likely ally for Carthage, and their strategic location on the Straits of Messina made them a useful ally in the war against Pyrrhus, leading to an anti-Pyrrhic alliance with Carthage.[142] As we have seen, their relationship with the Carthaginians after the Longanus is more difficult to reconstruct, but up to that time they appear to have maintained good relations, in spite of their depredations which, according to Polybius, affected both Syracusan and Carthaginian territory.[143] We cannot verify these raids, nor explain why Carthage would be apparently untroubled by them (if they reached Carthaginian territory at all, given that, as mentioned above, Hieronian territory lay in the way).[144] It should suffice to observe that in all of our major sources, only the ousting of the Carthaginian garrison from Messana soured relations to the point of the Carthaginians turning on Messana and allying with Hiero. The mysterious behaviour in 264 is therefore that of Carthage, first in turning on Messana and then in doing little to respond to Rome's presence after an initial battle.[145] The Mamertine relationship with Carthage thus becomes a confounding element of the story, while the Mamertine relationship with Syracuse follows a clear trajectory, again reinforcing the clear centrality of Syracuse in events.

It should be apparent from the foregoing that the situation surrounding Messana in 264 was a complex one which had been a long time in developing. Nor is it yet complete: we must next

[142] Diod. Sic. 22.7.4; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 23.1.5; see Hans 1983: 101.
[143] Polyb. 1.8.1.
[144] Cf. e.g. Hans 1983: 101; Hoyos 2015: 29.
[145] Cf. Hans 1983: 113; Hoyos 2015: 32.

consider Rome's existing interests in Sicily, the relationship between Sicily and southern Italy, and how to characterise Rome's involvement in the events of 264. Before moving on to these aspects, however, it is worth pausing to consider the picture so far. By taking apart the strands of the tradition on 264, we have established a significant point. Syracuse was obviously of huge importance in the events of 264, and our sources are not single-mindedly focused on the great-war narrative of Rome fighting Carthage, contrary to first appearances. Both Carthage and Syracuse have their geopolitical status inflated and distorted by sources, including our major historians, but our abundance of evidence allows us not to be utterly confounded by this. The importance of Syracusan control in Sicily, conversely, is overstated, but we may suggest economic success as a means by which Syracuse was able to perform on a regional and super-regional stage, allowing for largesse on both stages which consolidated its position. In this respect and in terms of military and political agency, it maintained a certain balance with Carthage in Sicily. The crux for change in 264 appears to have been Messana; to put this fully in context, we must look northwards.

II.1.4.5. Rome

We now move north of the Straits of Messina, to consider the nature of Roman relations with the major powers of Sicily and the character of Roman, Carthaginian, and Syracusan interests in southern Italy. We will observe the close relationship which existed between southern Italy and Greek Sicily, and the long-term shift in power in southern Italy which contributed to the situation arising by 264. This will enable the characterisation of Rome's deliberations and actions in 264 in full context, with evaluation of the likely conceptual significance of crossing

the Strait, which is overstressed by our sources. Thus we may suggest that 264 was not the geopolitical crisis point it appears to be.

Some consideration has already been given to Rome's relations with Carthaginian Sicily, in terms of the disputed Philinus Treaty, the other treaties featured in Polybius' work, and the difficult diplomatic events of the years preceding 264. As noted above, the Philinus Treaty merits careful treatment and a degree of scepticism, but the existence of other treaty terms mentioned by Polybius, allowing for degrees of mobility and trade between Roman Italy and Punic Sicily, is significant. The existence of such terms in the treaty of 509 has led Gallo to suggest that, when Rome sent embassies to Sicily in search of grain during shortages in the fifth century, these embassies were sent to Carthaginian territory.[146] Unverifiable though this suggestion is, it is worth considering as a possible manifestation of the generally positive relationship reflected by the treaties given by Polybius.

Rome's relationships with Hiero and with the Mamertines before 264 are more difficult to characterise. In the case of Hiero, a relationship appears to have been forged in 270, but the sources which mention it are problematic. Dio refers to it as φιλία, the same word which Zonaras uses in the associated passage. Zonaras elsewhere, however, calls it a συμμαχία, and describes Hiero as being considered a φίλος Ῥωμαίοις… καὶ σύμμαχος.[147] De Sensi Sestito rightly calls attention to the complexity of vocabulary involved here, and the inconclusive nature of the combination of terms used.[148] However formal one thinks the agreement was, more importantly it can be said that both Rome and Hiero had good reasons for making some sort of agreement during the siege of Rhegium. Rome gained provisions (grain and soldiers), as Zonaras states, while Hiero secured Rome's neutrality in his campaigns against Messana, as well as aiding the expected fall of Rhegium to a state friendly to him,

[146] Gallo 1992: 385.
[147] Cass. Dio fr.43.1; Zon. 8.8, 8.6.
[148] De Sensi Sestito 1977: 38-40. She, like La Bua (1971: 130-1), reads this as implying a formal alliance, but this is not necessary.

which would further better his chances against the Mamertines, neighbours and fellow-countrymen of the garrison at Rhegium.[149] Whether the agreement was a formal one or not seems rather beside the point, given that we do not need to know this to handle its later appearance in the sources, or its impact on Roman-Syracusan relations. What is important for our purposes is that Hiero and Rome evidently had a pre-existing relationship due to their interests converging at the Strait of Messina.

The question of whether there was an existing relationship between Rome and Messana by 264 ought also to be considered. On this a positive answer seems highly unlikely. None of the references used as evidence of an existing treaty between Rome and the Mamertines can be relied upon. Florus makes reference to an existing treaty in his description of the Romans sending help to Messana in 264, but this is countered by the fact that none of our other surviving sources mention an existing relationship as a factor in the events of 264.[150] Zonaras mentions some sort of agreement formed in 270, to neutralise the Mamertines while Rome was besieging Rhegium, but this ὁμολογία, presented by Zonaras as a stopgap measure to foil Rhegian hopes of Mamertine support, hardly indicates a formal or lasting relationship.[151] It could even be an attempt to create a pre-existing relationship in order to counter claims of Roman bad faith in helping the Mamertines, though it is not explicitly used to this end in the extant texts. A formal agreement, in any case, would sit awkwardly with the likely agreement made between Rome and Hiero at this time.

There is, moreover, no need to extrapolate a Roman-Mamertine alliance from attestations of a close relationship between Rome and the occupying force at Rhegium (at least initially) and of an alliance between occupied Rhegium and Messana. La Bua is probably right in arguing that Rome's relationship with the garrison under Decius was closer and Rome's

[149] For these mutual benefits see e.g. De Sensi Sestito 1977: 53-4.
[150] Flor. 2.2.18.
[151] Zon. 8.6. Zambon (2008: 191) suggests that we might 'conjecture an existing liaison' before 264, which seems appropriate.

complicity in the massacre of the original residents of Rhegium greater than Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for instance, suggests.[152] It is certainly right that in the works of several authors, the Rhegian garrison are said to be Romans.[153] La Bua goes too far, however, in suggesting that Mamertine agreement of a treaty with the Rhegian garrison necessarily implied a treaty with Rome itself.[154] Indeed, the source which attests in some detail the forming of an alliance between occupied Rhegium and Messana, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, explicitly links this to the Rhegian garrison's realisation that their violent actions there will cause rupture between them and Rome, and attributes the formation of the alliance to Decius' personal initiative.[155] For the complexity of the garrison's link to Rome, we may also consider Polybius 1.7.9, where, following the garrison's violent takeover of Rhegium, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον τὸ γεγονός. The Ῥωμαῖοι here, then, are sharply distinguished from the 'Romans' of the garrison. This need not exonerate Rome from involvement in the garrison's actions at Rhegium, but the sharp public break between Rome and the garrison after the takeover would in any case render a formal agreement mediated through Decius meaningless, if not a liability, for the Mamertines.

As the Rhegium incident amply illustrates, by 264 Rome had developed significant interests in southern Italy. Their military presence in aid of Thurii and other allied cities against the Lucani and subsequently Tarentum led to the invasion of Italy by Pyrrhus. Appian and Plutarch report that Pyrrhus' overtures for peace and cooperation after the battle of Heraclea in 280 were met, on the advice of Appius Claudius Caudex, with the demand that Pyrrhus first leave Italy entirely. While Caudex's advice is heavily dramatized, the point remains that Rome

[152] La Bua 1971.
[153] Polyb. 1.6.8, 8.1 (in spite of the Loeb translation), 10.4; App. *Samn.* 9.1; Oros. 4.3.5; Val. Max. 2.7.15f. See also Tagliamonte 1994: 200.
[154] La Bua 1971: 103; *contra* De Sensi Sestito 1977: 42-3; Zambon 2008: 179.
[155] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.8; for the alliance see also App. *Samn.* 9.1.

did refuse peace, preferring to continue war with Pyrrhus and his allies in Magna Graecia.[156] Prior to Pyrrhus' invasion, Roman garrisons had been placed in Locri and Croton against the Lucani;[157] both of these cities defected to Pyrrhus, but were retaken for Rome in 277.[158] Records from 290 to 266 show frequent campaigning in the south of Italy, with numerous triumphs over the Lucani, Bruttii, Samnites, Sallentines, and Tarentum.[159] What we are to make of this peak in the frequency of triumphs is open to debate, but the presence of significant Roman activity in southern Italy is scarcely questionable.[160] The establishment of Latin colonies in the south further adds to the picture of activity.[161]

To assume its full meaning for our purposes, however, this picture needs to be understood in the context of its historical development, and in particular of the involvement of Carthage and especially Syracuse in the region. The cultural continuum between the Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily need hardly be justified; this makes it scarcely surprising that the cities of Magna Graecia were part of a similarly complicated political milieu. The region saw some of the same power struggles as were witnessed in Sicily: following Dionysius I's inroads into southern Italy in the early fourth century, his declaration of war against Carthage was met by an Italiote-Carthaginian alliance, leading to fighting taking place in Magna Graecia as well as in Sicily.[162] In spite of something of a pause in Syracusan involvement after the expulsion of Dionysius II and the arrival of Timoleon,[163] in ca.330 Croton appealed successfully

[156] Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19.18.3-19.4; App. *Samn.* 10.1-3.
[157] Just. *Epit.* 18.1.9 (Locri); Zon. 8.6.2 (Croton). The garrisoning of Rhegium could possibly be part of the same initiative; see Torelli 1978: 282 B VI 24-31.
[158] Frontin. *Str.* 3.6.4; App. *Samn.* 12.1; Zon. 8.6.2-4.
[159] Sources collected in Torelli 1978 *ad annos.*
[160] On the peak in triumphs see e.g. Oakley 1993: 29; Rich 1993: 50.
[161] See e.g. Cornell 1990: 381; Oakley 1993: 19.
[162] Diod. Sic. 15.15.1-3; see further De Sensi Sestito 1984: 115.
[163] On this pause see e.g. Musti 1994: 371; Consolo Langher 1995: 93, though these two are not wholly in accord on the dates concerned.

to Syracuse for help against Bruttian attack, and Diodorus' account of subsequent events makes it apparent that the two regions remained politically connected.[164]

Syracusan and indeed Carthaginian involvement in southern Italy becomes strongly visible once again under Agathocles. Consolo Langher suggests that Agathocles' increased interest in Magna Graecia just before 300 may have been a response to a perceived threat posed by Rome's recent treaties with Carthage and Tarentum.[165] This is hardly necessary to explain his behaviour, given his past involvement at Croton and the existing political connections, but points valuably to the possibility of increasing Roman involvement contributing to regional geopolitics. The further possibility that, ca.295/4, Agathocles' movements against the Bruttii were intended to block any potential Bruttian reinforcements being sent to Carthage when he invaded is also an intriguing one, pointing to likely Carthaginian connections with Bruttium.[166] The continuing presence of tensions between Syracuse and Carthage in Magna Graecia can further be seen from numismatic material. There is abundant evidence for Agathoclean stylistic influence in civic coinages in the region, as well as for the use of eastern Sicilian weight standards, facilitating interchange. Sites such as Velia and Metapontum display some of those stylistic features, notably the *triskeles,* but subsequently display Punic images instead: at Velia, the date-palm replaced the *triskeles* on the reverse of silver staters*,* while at Metapontum there appeared silver staters of Punic make, displaying Demeter with a corn-ear crown and three Punic letters.[167] This implies at least that both Syracusan and Carthaginian power were present and relevant in the early third century.

This, then, was the political context into which Rome was expanding its power so actively in the early part of the third century. The case of Locri provides an illuminating illustration of how this took place. As mentioned above, Locri was garrisoned by Rome before

[164] Diod. Sic. 19.3.3-4.2.
[165] Consolo Langher 1995: 97.
[166] Consolo Langher 1995: 102.
[167] See Consolo Langher 1995: 102-4; Rutter 1997: 77, 97.

the Pyrrhic invasion, defected to Pyrrhus, and was retaken in 277. According to Appian's account, it received punishment from Pyrrhus on his return to Italy, for having killed his garrison.[168] In the early third century, Locri had been one of the cities which struck Syracusan-conformant coins, using *pegasi* and the Attic triobol.[169] Probably in 282, it struck the famous stater type showing Pistis crowning Roma.[170] The political implication is clear, but the events which followed demonstrate that the shift to Roman power in southern Italy was not straightforward.

This background shows the state of flux which affected the area north of the Strait of Messina in the years preceding 264. From this we may suspect that the conceptual significance of the Strait at this time was not exactly as it is presented in texts written after the fact. Indeed it is possible to stress that before 264 the Strait was not conceived of as a divide; the question then becomes that of whether Rome saw it as such. The events of 264 and of the succeeding decades suggest that the division between Italy and Sicily actually took more time to develop, and the complication and manipulation of geographical conceptions, which we have seen above in contemporary and later representations of Carthaginian and Syracusan power in Sicily, is a key element in the story of Rome's first 'overseas' foray.

How, then, may we conceive of the Strait's role before 264? As has been seen, Carthage and Syracuse both had interests in southern Italy. In particular, we may highlight the Syracusan interest in Rhegium: in the early fourth century, in the face of Rhegian dislike and a war with Carthage, Dionysius I offered the Rhegians a marriage alliance. In Diodorus' account, it is emphasised that the strategic location of Rhegium and Messana, mentioned as a pair in the text, means that their allegiance is likely to be significant. It is also instructive that, on Rhegium's refusal, Dionysius made the same offer to Locri, not in such a significant location

[168] App. *Samn.* 12.1.
[169] Consolo Langher 1995: 103; Rutter 1997: 97.
[170] Rutter 1997: 99, no.100.

but still on Italy's southern coast.[171] These and Dionysius' other efforts with regard to Rhegium highlight his attention to both sides of the Strait.[172] The Rhegians allegedly saw his attentions to Messana as a sign of an impending attack on their own city, and sent their allies against Messana to besiege it.[173] The close relationship between Messana and Rhegium is clear. In the reported actions of Dionysius we also find the possibility of drawing a dividing line well north of the Strait, when Strabo alleges that Dionysius attempted to build a wall between the Scylletic and Hipponiate Gulfs.[174] However valid this claim may be, our evidence makes it apparent that controlling the Strait, at least for Dionysius, was a priority, which would rather devalue its potential as a territorial boundary.

Certain textual points suggest that a similar conception may have had some weight with the Romans. As we have seen, Zonaras alleges that Rome had a ὁμολογία with the Mamertines in 270, in order to prevent them becoming involved in events at Rhegium. While we have seen that this is unlikely, the evident agreement with Hiero suggests similar concerns. Indeed Polybius claims, though incorrectly and in contradiction of his own account elsewhere, that the Mamertines had been responsible for the betrayal of Rhegium to the garrison in the first place, thus coupling the two cities together.[175] His phrasing in his account of Roman fears in 264 is also suggestive: the primary Roman fear, as he describes it, was that the Carthaginians would take Messana and be able to οἱονεὶ γεφυρῶσαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὐτοῖς διάβασιν.[176] This emphasises firstly that the Strait was not much of a barrier, and secondly that controlling one side of it posed a threat without offering real security. The problem here is not so much Carthage's domination of Sicily (or the threat of such should they defeat Syracuse) as the risk of Carthage holding Messana while also having sufficient resources in Sicily to support

[171] Diod. Sic. 14.44.3-6.
[172] Diod. Sic. 14.100, 102-9, 111-12.
[173] Diod. Sic. 14.87.1.
[174] Strabo 6.1.10.
[175] Polyb. 1.10.4; cf. 1.8.1, explicitly setting apart the 'Campanians' who had taken Rhegium.
[176] Polyb. 1.10.9.

an attack across the Strait. If Messana is a bridging opportunity, this leaves little importance for the Strait itself, and echoes the importance evidently attributed by Dionysius and others to holdings on both sides of the Strait.

A related issue, and one which has been discussed in some detail by various scholars, is that of the 'maritime moment'. The exact 'moment' to which this refers might be disputed: when the Romans made their first crossing in 264 (as for Seneca), or when they built a fleet in 261 (as for Polybius).[177] Indeed, Polybius' version states that the crossing in 264 did not genuinely constitute 'taking to the sea', as the vessels were entirely borrowed.[178] Arguably, this further diminishes the significance of crossing the Strait. It has been shown quite comprehensively that Romans did actually have naval interests and resources well before 264, which suggests that we should look upon any suggestion of rapid innovation with some suspicion.[179] Thus, Seneca's version falls under shadow from both sides, which continues to reinforce our impression that the Strait was not a major frontier.

The crossing to Messana, then, was to a considerable degree simply that: the facilitation of a move against Messana itself. Our three major texts all make it explicitly clear that Appius' stated objective was to free Messana from its siege, and that this was the goal of his negotiations.[180] This impression is reinforced by the lack of a declaration of war. None is visible in the work of historical authors, and Eckstein has identified a number of reasons to doubt the alleged 'poetic tradition' of such a declaration taking place.[181] As we have seen, 264 saw continued attempts at diplomacy, focused on Messana and aimed at defusing the situation. As also discussed above, our impressions are complicated by the tendency of later

[177] Sen. *Brev. Vit.* 13.4; Polyb. 1.20.12.
[178] Polyb. 1.20.13-14.
[179] See e.g. Cornell 1990: 410; Gómez de Caso Zuriaga 2002; Steinby 2007; Leigh 2010; Dart 2012: 1007-8; cf. however Thiel 1954.
[180] Cf. Eckstein 1987: 89-90, where the apparent unanimity is remarked upon as unusual.
[181] Eckstein 1980a.

writers to foreground Carthage, in spite of the events of 264-3, where this was clearly not Rome's strategic focus.

II.1.5. Conclusions

264 emerges from this discussion as a point of some ambivalence. By considering it in context, we can see that its events were in many ways not a great departure from the preceding state of the region, but rather the result of another collision between shifting territorial interests. As Rome expanded its power into southern Italy, into areas in which both Carthage and Syracuse had had past interests, and took control of Rhegium, it became significantly more likely that tensions would arise around the Strait of Messina. This is the character of the existing power relations in the region, but we can see that the Roman response was not as drastic as it might appear. As discussed above, Rome's move into Messana was probably not intended as a move into Sicily, an entity of which they arguably did not have a clear conception at the time. Indeed, their goals were likely rather more modest at this stage, which seems understandable if we assess critically the real significance of the Strait and the cultural and political continuum which joined southern Italy to Sicily. The physical proximity of Sicily to Italy and the arguably consequent earliness of Rome's involvement in it give reasonable justification for such a picture of tentative expansion behaviours.

The political complexity of the region is highly significant. While the long-held rivalry between Carthage and Syracuse was clearly central, the involvement of other players is vital, including not only the Mamertines but also the Ptolemies. The contrast visible in the eastern part of the island between relative civic autonomy and active agricultural-economic control under Hiero is a particular point of interest.

II.2. Forms of power

We begin by tabulating manifestations of Roman power across the period 264-167, according to the three types. As the variety of dates makes clear, several important points below are subject to dispute. Inclusion in Table II.2.a does not indicate that any given source is necessarily to be believed; this will be discussed below. Where dates are given in a single cell rather than split, repeated occurrences of a phenomenon, rather than conflicting dates, are to be understood. The table is not intended to be exhaustive; in particular, items which are especially difficult to date specifically, such as the application of civic or land-statuses, are omitted but will be discussed below.

Type of power	**Date**	**Details**	**Actor(s)**	**Source**
Economic	ca.241	Port duties introduced[182]	'The Romans'	App. *Sic.* 2.2
	ca.241	Taxation imposed (Cicero specifies both identical to prior system and according to the *lex Hieronica*)	Unspecified / collection rights contracted to individuals in Sicily (Cicero)	App. *Sic.* 2.2
	before 218			Liv. 23.48.7
	before 70			Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.32, 147; 2.3.14-15
	211	Removal of gold and silver from Syracuse	'The Romans'	Polyb. 9.10.11

[182] Phrase could also mean naval responsibilities (see under 'Coercive').

	191, 190, 189, 171	Ad hoc financial extractions	Magistrates under senatorial order	Liv. 36.2.12; 37.2.12; 37.50.9; 42.31.8
	Early second century	Participation in trade	Italian and Roman traders	e.g. *CIL* X 7459 = *CIL* I^2 612 = *ILLRP* 320
	First half of the second century	Issue of Romano-Sicilian coin types[183]	Magistrates (quaestors?)	Cutroni Tusa 1976-7: 314; Frey-Kupper and Barrandon 2003; Frey-Kupper 2006; Frey-Kupper 2013: 194-232
	ca.213-190			Caccamo Caltabiano 2000: 205-6
	After 90			Bahrfeldt 1904-5
Ideological	After First or Second Punic War	Institution of chrysophoric league at sanctuary of Venus Erycina	Senate	Diod. Sic. 4.83.7; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.124

[183] This is included also under 'Ideological', as it is reflective of both.

	217-5	Importation of Venus Erycina to Rome	Magistrate (dictator)	Liv. 22.9.9, 10.10
	210	Explicit statement that *ager Romanus* cannot exist in Sicily	Senate	Liv. 27.5.15
	208	Exiles invited to return through announcement at Olympic Games	Magistrate under senatorial order	Liv. 27.35.3-4
		Issue of Romano-Sicilian coin types (see above)		
Coercive	264/3	Forces of Halaesa and other towns added to Roman forces for march on Syracuse	Magistrates (consuls)	Diod. Sic. 23.4.1
	261, 258, 250	Inhabitants sold as slaves: 25,000 at Agrigentum (Zonaras,	Magistrates	Zon. 8.10; Polyb. 1.19.15; Diod. Sic. 23.9.1, 9.4-5, 18.5

		Diodorus, Polybius); Mazarin, Mytistratum, and Camarina (Diodorus); 13,000 at Panormus (Diodorus)		
	241	Carthage barred from Sicily	Senate and People, by treaty	Polyb. 1.62.8, 63.3; Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 3.2; Oros. 4.11.2; *De Vir. Ill.* 42.3; Ampel. 46.2
	ca.241	Ships and crews required from some communities[184]	'The Romans'	App. *Sic.* 2.2
	ca.241 (Appian)	Installation of annual magistrate	Senate	App. *Sic.* 2.2
	227 (Solinus)			Solin. 5.1 (cf. Liv. *Per.* 20.7)

[184] See n.182.

	225	Reserve legion present	Senate	Polyb. 2.24.13
	218, 209, 192, 190	Sicilians recruited to fight in Sicily under Roman command	Magistrates (under senatorial order in 209, 192, 190)	Liv. 21.49-51; 27.8.14-16; 35.23.3-9; 37.2.8
	210	4000 men deported from Agathyrna to Bruttium	Magistrate	Liv. 26.40.16-18; 27.12.4-5; Polyb. 9.27.11
	205	Cavalry recruited, but released in exchange for money and training of replacements	Magistrate	Liv. 29.1.1-10
	200, 200/199, 198	Latin and allied garrisons present	Unspecified (200); magistrate under senatorial order	Liv. 31.8.8; 32.3.3, 8.5-8
	197	Internal colonisation of Agrigentum	Magistrate under senatorial order	Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.123

	169	500 men recruited to be sent to the fleet off Macedonia	Magistrate under senatorial order	Liv. 43.12.9

Table II.2.a. Manifestations of the three power types in Sicily, 264-167.

II.2.1. The sources

Our major texts to consider here are those of Appian, Polybius, Livy, Cicero's *Verrines,* and to a lesser extent Diodorus Siculus. The fragmentary nature of the first three and last one of these texts is an immediate problem to note, especially as the first and last come through epitomators. The date range of these authors is also worth noting: while Polybius' work was written not long after our period, the *Verrines* and the original text of Diodorus belong to the first-century BC, Livy is Augustan, and Appian wrote in the second century AD. There is of course no clear correlation to be drawn between temporal distance from events and accuracy or usefulness, but these dates deserve to be remembered nonetheless.

In terms of basic information provided in a short summary, Appian (*Sic.* 2.2) is a simple source. In terms of its usability, however, it is not. The lateness of Appian's writing engenders mistrust, as does the very fact that it survives in epitome (from Constantinus Porphyrogenitus). The passage in question covers the end of the First Punic War, implicitly dating all three of the impositions it mentions to roughly 241. The fact of the passage being an epitome makes it less than certain that all of these items genuinely belong to the same year or thereabouts,

especially given our conflicting evidence from elsewhere. It is also, largely due to its brevity, extremely vague on actors and procedure.

The problem of fragmentary survival is less pronounced in Polybius, where substantial sections of narrative exist for this period. Polybius does, however, present various other difficulties. While the early date of composition and his relationship with Rome's aristocracy (particularly the Scipiones) are both likely to have benefited his work, his main areas of focus are not such as to make him a very useful source on Roman power in Sicily in this period. His stated goal of showing how Rome gained primacy in the Mediterranean appears at first glance highly relevant, but for three major reasons it falls short. Firstly, his interest is primarily in the east, as his introductory remarks suggest. For his narrative, Roman control of the west appears to be a requisite rather than a topic for full analysis. Secondly, as he explicitly states, his main narrative begins in the 140th Olympiad (220-216);[185] while he covers the First Punic War and the seizure of Sardinia, this is a summary introduction to the main narrative. Thirdly, while he professes to approach the question of πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας Rome acquired its primacy, his work (especially Book 6) reveals that this is for him a question of Rome's domestic arrangement, rather than the forms of power with which we are concerned.[186] His narrative of events in Sicily focuses on the First and Second Punic Wars, periods of what might be labelled, in political scientific terms, 'hegemonic war'.[187] This has its merits, as has been seen, in tracing the narrative of the emergence of Roman involvement in Sicily, but it is far less useful for the characterisation of power on the ground during and particularly after the wars. Once the wars have been won, Polybius is little interested in how Rome manifested its power in Sicily.

With Livy, we come to a different set of problems. The first is the lack of a full narrative from the early third century down to 218. The *Periochae* provide a brief epitome of the second

[185] Polyb. 1.1-3, 13.7-8.
[186] Polyb. 1.1.5.
[187] Polyb. 1.3.7 highlights his focus on the background conflict between Rome and Carthage, the two 'great powers' of the west.

decade of the work, but a vast amount of information is missing, and the *Periochae* are a bare substitute. The second is, arguably, Livy's particular presentation of actors. The style of his narrative foregrounds decisions made by the senate, which may not always be reliable, and does not always tell us about how these orders worked on the ground.[188]

Cicero's *Verrines,* while having the merit of being copious and entirely focused on Sicily, are of a completely different genre to the historical works with which we are dealing. As a prosecution speech, the purpose of the work is obvious from the beginning, and in spite of the amount of detail he provides Cicero is at pains to remind the audience regularly of that purpose. Crucially, as one would expect, the focus is on the affairs of Sicily in the years closer to Cicero's own time, and the stress he places on the dispositions of the ancestors there is inexact and potentially spurious.[189] His rhetorical exaggeration is clear when he describes Sicily's ongoing friendship in emphatic terms, giving the impression that every benefit Rome received from Sicily was voluntarily given.[190] As Cicero has a strong incentive to present the Sicilians, the victims of Verres' alleged peculation, as beloved allies, we have an obvious reason not to take these comments at face value.

Diodorus Siculus' work requires only brief comment, as it provides little information here. While Diodorus' own Sicilian origin might be expected to give him a particular interest in the region, his fragmented narrative actually holds little of use. Like Polybius, it focuses on hegemonic war, but it does provide some small points of information on, in particular, how Rome dealt with defeated communities. It remains however a somewhat spare narrative.

These, then, along with other supplementary sources, are our textual evidence for recreating the forms of Roman power in Sicily. The differing focus of these texts, or rather the general disinterest of most of the historians (Livy being an exception) in our questions,

[188] See Harris 1979: 6 on the obscurity of proceedings.
[189] E.g. Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.12, 14.
[190] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.2-5. One hopes it is not too cynical to view this as implausible...

arguably makes meshing the disparate narratives easy, as they rarely clash. The very sparseness of the narratives, however, militates against this, as scholars have had ample space to build edifices on major assumptions, which are not always (or often) founded, and which must occupy a part of our attention here.

II.2.2. Provinciae and personnel

II.2.2.1. The lacuna

As Table II.2.a shows, we are lacking in information concerning the period 241-227. This has not hindered prescriptive opinions on what happened to Sicily immediately after the First Punic War, which are generally built on assumptions rather than proper evidence. The close consideration of these assumptions, and of what we can gather from our evidence, is however central to understanding how Rome manifested its power from 241 onwards, and how later evidence may have distorted this.

Cicero claims in the *Verrines* that Sicily *prima omnium… provincia est appellata.*[191] The rhetorical value of this statement is clear in the textual context, which tries to evoke pride and protectiveness in the audience. Nonetheless, and in spite of the complexities of the very idea of the *provincia* as territorial entity, most scholars have accepted an 'annexation' date for Sicily of 241.[192] The problems of accepting this label here are legion. Cicero is talking about the province of Sicily as it existed in 70, i.e. the entire island, while all Rome could claim to control in 241 was the western portion of the island. Where it is convenient to do so, Cicero ignores the kingdom of Hiero entirely. Cicero's idea of the meaning of *provincia* was no doubt rather

[191] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.2.
[192] Sartori 1974: 234 ('di fatto' in 241; 'di diritto' in 227); Kienast 1984-5: 121; Garnsey 1988: 183; Lintott 1993: 22-3. Exceptions: Frank 1933: 56; Toynbee 1965: II 222-3; Eckstein 2006: 170.

different from that of Romans of the mid- to late third century.[193] This means that Cicero's rhetorical labelling (note further his use of *appellata*) may bear no resemblance to how western Sicily was perceived following 241. The Ciceronian representation, however, is crucial to assumptions of intensive Roman manifestation of power from an early stage.

It has been argued that Rome would hardly have left western Sicily to its own devices after fighting the First Punic War for it.[194] This is an appealing argument, as we know that the war was lengthy and costly.[195] It is, however, based on the assumption that Rome fought the war *for Sicily,* which is not a given. It is certainly not the impression given by all of the sources, in particular Polybius.

We know little about Rome's goals in the First Punic War, though we would do well to remember that its original target appears to have been Syracuse rather than the Carthaginians, and that Sicily could be viewed as a continuation of Magna Graecia. Polybius' narrative of Rome's developing aims, while the fullest we have, is not exactly clear. His attitude appears to follow the same programmatic approach as he takes with regard to Roman success in general, where one victory leads to increased ambition and further expansion.[196] On the fall of Agrigentum, he claims, the Roman Senate developed a hope of expelling Carthage from Sicily entirely, anticipating that τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα.[197] This vague statement gives no explanation as to what benefit the Senate expected from the expulsion of the Carthaginians, but there is no explicit reference to territorial gain. One could further argue that the statement is minimally concerned with Sicily,

[193] As shown by Richardson 2008. Hints also appear in Crawford 1990: 91 and Serrati 2000b: 121.
[194] See e.g. Kienast 1984-5: 110, 117 (in opposition to Dahlheim 1977: 28ff); Richardson 1986: 7; Brennan 2000: I 87-8; Serrati 2000b: 120, 124-5, 127.
[195] See e.g. Polyb. 1.13.11, 59.6, 62.7, 63.4-8; Diod. Sic. 23.2.1.
[196] Polyb. 1.3.6.
[197] Polyb. 1.20.1-2.

as indeed so much of Polybius' narrative of the war is. The concern is the Carthaginians.[198] If the Carthaginians are not in Sicily, Rome benefits. The significance of the Agrigentum passage for the development of Roman ambition and acquisitiveness is not, it must be realised, as definitive for Roman goals as has been argued.

Polybius' report of the Lutatian Treaty of 241 presents a similar image. The conclusion of the war is less that Rome gains Sicily than that Carthage loses it.[199] The image presented by Dio-Zonaras, however, is somewhat different. Zonaras' main condition is that the Carthaginians Σικελίας τε αὐτοὺς πάσης ἐκστῆναι Ρωμαίοις: here not only do the Carthaginians cede Sicily, they cede it *to the Romans.*[200] Dio-Zonaras' allegations of territorial transfer do not end there; he further attributes the harsher terms demanded by the *populus* to a desire τὴν Λιβύην ἔχειν ἅπασαν. This was clearly not borne out, either now or following the Mercenary or Second Punic Wars, which makes it immediately less plausible. While punitive measures against Carthage are desired by the people in Polybius' version too, and are credible after such a conflict, these involve greater financial compensation and further evacuation of territory close to Italy, keeping Carthage at arm's length. A seemingly sudden desire for territorial expansion is a less logical response, making Dio-Zonaras' *populus* sound greedy and irrational. This shift away from logic is all the more glaring when one considers that gaining Africa would more than likely have entailed another costly war. It also makes little sense with the known terms of the peace.

The later sources in the Livian tradition, while muddying the waters with the awkward inclusion of Sardinia in the Lutatian Treaty, present a mixed picture. Eutropius alleges that the treaty ceding Sardinia bound the Sardinians to submit to Rome, an odd claim for which other evidence is lacking; Orosius states the more Polybian-sounding demand that the Carthaginians

[198] See Scaturro 1950: II 15 for the suggestion that the Carthaginian threat to cities which were now allied with Rome was a major factor in Rome's fighting on to the end.
[199] Polyb. 1.62.8-63.3.
[200] Zon. 8.17.

simply *Sicilia Sardiniamque decederent.*[201] The *De Viris Illustribus* mentions only Carthaginian departure (though bizarrely includes Spain as far as the Ebro in addition), and Ampelius describes the *possessio* of Sicily and Sardinia as the *praemium* won by Rome.[202] This echoes a passage of Livy where Scipio, preparing for battle at the Ticinus in 218, describes the two islands to his men as the *capta belli praemia.*[203] Whether originating with Scipio or with Livy himself, the statement clearly has rhetorical value, and in no way needs to reflect feeling more than twenty years prior to its dramatic date; it does, however, explain where Ampelius may have found the idea. This patchy image suggests that where bare transmission of the treaty takes place, Roman possession of Sicily is not stressed; where possession is stressed, furthermore, it is by late sources.

In the sources, there is therefore a current of thinking where the war was fought *for* western Sicily (not simply *over* it) and the Lutatian Peace involved its acquisition by Rome. Nonetheless, this is not as uncomplicated as some scholarship makes it sound, and to assume a hands-on Roman approach to Sicily from 241, springing from cost and cynicism, is unnecessary.

II.2.2.2. Magistrates

A common corollary to the annexation argument is the idea that Rome must have sent a magistrate to govern western Sicily on an annual basis from an early stage (as they would not have left the region to its own devices). This argument, however, is far from straightforward. The ambiguity of the *provincia,* as we have seen, implies also an ambiguity in the role of the

[201] Eutrop. 3.2; Oros. 4.11.2.
[202] *De Vir. Ill.* 42.3; Ampel. 46.2.
[203] Liv. 21.40.5.

magistrate in this period: the 'governor' is difficult to distinguish from the 'commander'. Some scholars have tacitly assumed or implied a drastic change in the concept of the *provincia* ca.241, suddenly assuming the existence of a new category, involving a fixed geographical area kept constant from year to year and requiring annual allocation. While the problem of the *provincia* has been addressed (see I.5), the idea is worth considering in more detail here.

The clearest formulation of the idea of a qualitative change comes from Brennan:

> *…it is not too much to suppose that the Romans, once they achieved victory in [the First Punic] war, specifically charged a magistrate to protect and maintain this hard-won possession. Sicily was in fact the first permanent Roman* provincia*. A* provincia *certainly requires a magistrate (or promagistrate) to fill it… the declaration of Sicily as a* provincia *after the First Punic War should be synonymous with the sending of a magistrate.*[204]

This argument, however, is specious.[205] While it is fair to say that a *provincia* could not exist at this time without a magistrate to exercise power over it,[206] the 'declaration' of Sicily as a *provincia* is simply not supported by the evidence, as we have no attestation of Sicily being allocated as such between 240 and 227, unless one counts Appian's claim of the sending of a στρατηγὸς ἐτήσιος. It begins to appear that Brennan has formed his argument backwards: assuming that Rome would have sent a magistrate to administer Sicily on an annual basis because of the value of the territory, he claims that it thus became a *provincia* on a new, permanent basis.

With the possibility of inter- or intratextual contradictions in mind, it is worth considering what our sources actually say about the presence of magistrates in the years following 241. As Table II.2.a shows, the earliest suggestion of an annual magistrate comes from Appian. Terminology is again a source of problems, as is the survival of the passage only in epitome. The first important difficulty concerns the στρατηγὸν ἐτήσιον. As Luce has

[204] Brennan 2000: I 87-8.
[205] As Briscoe (2012b) has recognised.
[206] On the changing symbiosis between *imperium* and *provinciae,* see Richardson 2008: 109.

observed, Appian's terminology on office-holders is frequently out of step with official Latin titles, and *strategos,* while often used to mean *praetor,* can also be used for any magistrate commanding troops.[207] It is also well-noted that Appian elsewhere claims that στρατηγοὺς ἐτησίους were sent to Africa (from 146) and Iberia (from ca.206), being accurate in the first place and not in the second (where other evidence shows that *privati cum imperio* were sent).[208] The similarity of the passage on Sicily to these other passages, which come from much fuller extant texts, suggests that its summary nature might be original rather than a feature of epitome. Nonetheless, its standardised form, in combination with the erroneous information about magistrates in Iberia, makes it a problematic source. It is by no means a straightforward prop for arguments about the early installation of a praetor.

While Solinus is hardly a full or contemporary source, his attestation of praetors being allocated Sicily and Sardinia from 227 is widely credited.[209] This is in large part due to corroborating details in other sources: the *Periochae* attest that the number of praetors was increased from two to four at this time, and Livy elsewhere makes reference to the relationship of the son of Flaminius, named by Solinus as the first regular praetor in Sicily, with the Sicilians.[210] Solinus associates these appointments with each of Sicily and Sardinia being *provincia facta,* but it has been established that this is a meaningless claim. How far these assignments were a new phenomenon will therefore be discussed in greater detail below.

Evidence concerning magisterial numbers and concerning assignments in Sicily later in the Republic suggests further that there may have been a quaestor stationed in western Sicily from an early stage. Based on the *Periochae* of Livy (potentially supported by Lydus), we can be confident that the number of quaestors increased from four ca.267. Whether the increase was directly to eight, or to six and then to eight, or another less likely permutation, we can say that

[207] Luce 1961: 21.
[208] App. *Pun.* 135.641; *Ib.* 38.152.
[209] Solin. 5.1.
[210] Liv. *Per.* 20.7; Liv. 33.42.8.

by 241 there were most likely six or more quaestors. There is room for one of these to have been assigned to western Sicily.[211] Indeed, we have evidence that later in the Republic, there were two quaestors for Sicily, one based at Lilybaeum and one at Syracuse. Pseudo-Asconius puts it rather neatly that for the praetor, Sicily is one province, while for the quaestors it is two.[212] For many scholars, this has pointed back to a time when Sicily was in two parts, as we find it after 241, when installing a quaestor at Lilybaeum might be a reasonable move, for instance to collect harbour dues.[213]

It has already been argued that assumptions about Rome's keenness to manifest its power in Sicily drive scholarly arguments about magisterial allocation. It should be added to this that beliefs about which types of power were most important also play a role. Quaestors, in particular, lacked *imperium* and are most strongly associated with economic extractions, especially as the western Sicilian quaestor was later stationed at the port of Lilybaeum. Praetors or *privati cum imperio,* meanwhile, are more associated with coercive power, in its political and military manifestations. De Sanctis openly claims that a quaestor simply would not be adequate for administering Sicily.[214] Kienast, whose central contention is that Rome would have commenced taxation on allies in Sicily during the First Punic War, straddles the options by proposing the sending from 241 of quaestors *pro praetore,* propraetors, or the *praetor peregrinus.*[215] Brennan argues, on minimal grounds, for the sending of the *praetor peregrinus* as a precursor to the new praetors of 227, a conveniently linear view for a monograph on the praetorship, and one which has sustained heavy criticism.[216] Serrati, whose

[211] An increase to eight is given by Sigonius' emendation, but is not certain. On the specifics of the debate, see e.g. Mattingly 1969; Harris 1976; Loreto 1993.
[212] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.11 *quaestores utriusque provinciae;* Ps.-Ascon. P. 187 Stangl *cum a duobus quaestoribus Sicilia regi soleat, uno Lilybitano, altero Syracusano;* P. 259 Stangl *duos quaestores habet Sicilia, Lilybitanum et Syracusanum; nam praetori una provincia est, quaestoribus duae.*
[213] See Prag 2014b: 202 with n.38 on likely date of introduction. Cf. Lintott 1993: 71.
[214] De Sanctis 1907-1964: III.i 197. He does allow for some judicial role for quaestors (199).
[215] Kienast 1984-5: 120.
[216] Brennan 2000: I 90-1; cf. Briscoe 2012b.

focus is on taxation, thinks the Lilybaeum quaestor the most likely magistrate in place before 227, based on his (weakly argued) tralatician picture of taxation (see below). He also proposes that the new praetors from 227 were intended to expand Roman taxation to the area immediately east of the Himera.[217] Other scholars argue that events further afield around 227 encouraged stronger manifestation of coercive power in Sicily, such as a praetor could provide.[218]

Our incomplete information produces the cumulative effect of making a quaestor's stationing at Lilybaeum or thereabouts from around 241 plausible. This would allow for the collection of the *portoria* (if we see these rather than naval responsibilities) mentioned by Appian, and explain the later presence of two quaestors. On the other hand, the former reference is potentially dubious, while the latter fact could just as easily be explained by the sending of a quaestor to western Sicily from 227, prior to the defeat of the Syracusan kingdom.[219] The idea of the pre-227 Sicilian quaestorship is therefore, as much as the idea of an *imperium*-holding magistrate prior to that year, largely a question of whether one believes Appian's statement on naval duties or *portoria* and the general concept of a hands-on approach to western Sicily from 241.

Arguments for drastic change in the administration and conception of Sicily from 241 do not, it appears, stand up, but from 227 different ideas and arguments emerge. As discussed above, the argument for Sicily and Sardinia being 'fixed' as *provinciae* from 227 is not supported by the evidence. Indeed, between 227 and 218, we do not have an attested praetor for Sicily. Both of these aspects raise a problem with how some scholarship refers to western Sicily after 227. Ferrary in particular refers to western Sicily and Sardinia in 227, and the Hispaniae in 197, as 'nouvelles provinces'. From 227 to 218, we certainly do not have the

[217] Serrati 2000b: 123-6.
[218] E.g. Events in Liguria, Illyria, northern Italy, Spain. See e.g. Brennan 2000: I 92-3.
[219] Harris 1976: 102, 104; Prag 2014b: 201-2.

information to say that western Sicily was a *provincia* at all, and to describe it as a 'new' one is patently nonsensical. The assumption has again gone before considered terminology, and provincialisation is created as a result.

Rather than this prescriptive approach, a useful element to stress is the flexibility of magisterial appointment in manifesting Roman power across the island. From 218 down to 202, Sicily saw a variety of commanders allocated to the region each year. Following the death of Hiero of Syracuse in 215 and the decision of his grandson Hieronymus to align Syracuse with Carthage, this was further complicated by the re-emergence of Roman military involvement in eastern Sicily. The existence of an acknowledged boundary to the western *provincia* is suggested by Appius Claudius setting *praesidia* on the boundary between the *provincia* existing in the west and the kingdom in the east in 215, after Hieronymus had begun dealing with Carthage.[220] In 214, after Hieronymus' death, M. Claudius Marcellus was, according to Livy, given that issue as his *provincia.*[221] To call him a 'governor', as Ñaco del Hoyo does, is to miss the militarily charged context, an obvious cause of flexibility.[222] In 213 we find the Sicilian allocations described as *Sicilia finibus eis, quibus regnum Hieronis fuisset* and the *provincia vetus.*[223] There were, nonetheless, still other promagistrates operating in and around the island, and 209 saw the allocation of troops to the propraetor L. Cincius Alimentus and the proconsul M. Valerius Laevinus, prorogued from commands in the west and east respectively, as what appears to be a joint command.[224]

From 201, we have single praetors attested each year for the following decade, but an instructive episode in 191 demonstrates the continued flexibility of administration. In the sortition, M. Aemilius Lepidus received Sicily, but with orders to retain his predecessor, L.

[220] Liv. 24.7.9.
[221] Liv. 24.21.1.
[222] Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 91.
[223] Liv. 24.44.4. See Richardson 2008: 26-7 on the *fines* of the *provincia* being important when an ally occupied the territory beyond.
[224] Liv. 27.7.11-13.

Valerius Tappo, as propraetor, and to divide the province into two sections, one from Agrigentum to Pachynum, the other from Pachynum to Tyndaris.[225] The naval focus of this division and of the allocation of ships to Valerius to cover the latter section highlights that in this year, Sicily was conceived of in a different way, evidently as a result of war with Antiochus. Presumably the situation was thought to demand greater magisterial coverage, with a rough geographical division provided for the sake of efficiency and clarity. This reconfiguring of the island only ten years after the end of its last major convulsion is an interesting reminder that its administration must be taken in context, which might require the accumulation of outward-facing coercive capacity as well as the manipulation of *provinciae*.[226] The key point was military readiness, and the connectivity of Sicily necessitated that it be used in such a way.

II.2.3. Taxation and coinage

The introduction of taxation in Sicily (both the western and the eastern parts) is a question of central importance troubled by broad preconceptions and contradictory evidence, as Table II.2.a partly demonstrates. The difficulty is in large part one of terminology. As with the introduction of an annual magistrate, we find an allegation in Appian that contributions (φόροι) were imposed in or from ca.241, as well as what are likely *portoria.*[227] The problem of the summary and formulaic nature of the passage must again be pointed out, as must the ambiguity of φόροι, which could refer to indemnities or taxation.[228] Unfortunately, vague terms continue to be an issue where financial extractions are concerned in Livy, making it

[225] Liv. 36.2.10-12.
[226] Though coercive, we can imagine that these deployments (remembering that magistrates commanded forces) would have had an impact also on Rome's power relations with Sicilians, whether making them feel safer from invasion or more frightened of their Roman occupiers.
[227] App. *Sic.* 2.2.
[228] Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 204.

difficult to pin down when such extractions were regularised. Cicero, meanwhile, cannot be retrojected without difficulties, and suffers from terminological problems in a similar way to Livy.

The first reference to financial extractions from western Sicily in Livy concerns the early days of the Second Punic War.[229] Sicily and Sardinia, he says, *quae ante bellum vectigales fuissent, vix praesides provinciarum exercitus alere.*[230] The primary difficulty here is with the term *vectigales.* Livy's writing is distant from the moment to which he is referring, and it is likely that terms for financial extraction, much like terms such as *provincia,* changed in meaning across the period as systems developed and changed. Livy's usages are generally vague with regard to the content of the term, sometimes being more focused on fiscality and sometimes more on dominion of a more general nature.[231] The exact content of being *vectigalis* ca.218 is therefore far from clear, in terms of regularity of extraction, means, calculation, or what was collected (cash or kind). Livy's words in reference to providing food for the armies arguably imply that kind is meant here, specifically grain. His stress on the importance of *provinciae* sustaining armies posted within them is also notable, and a point we will see elsewhere (III.2.4). The episode of 218 is also balanced by a passage concerning 209, where the proconsul Laevinus is able to send grain surplus to Rome and to the army near Tarentum, thanks to his attention to restoring Sicilian agriculture.[232] Terminologically speaking, however, this second passage offers no clarification as to the other details. Further references do not imply regularisation. In 203, Livy has grain and other goods forwarded to Scipio from Sicilian ports, but puts this explicitly as an indicator of people's faith in Scipio, suggesting voluntary contribution, and in 195 the Sicilians send grain in honour of Flaminius and his late

[229] Kienast (1984-5: 110, 118-9) suggests that some form of tax administration must have existed during the First Punic War, due to financial exigency, but this is purely supposition.
[230] Liv. 23.48.7.
[231] See Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 90; France 2007b: 333, 337, 339.
[232] Liv. 27.8.18-19. On the identification of Laevinus as the actor here, see Toynbee 1965: II 211 n.3, *contra* Scramuzza 1937: 233-4.

father, their praetor.[233] This has an interesting implication for the personal role of magistrates in forming economic relationships, which we will see reinforced in the other regions.

In the later 190s, Livy may imply regularisation of extraction. In 191, we find the explicit requisition of two 'tenths', and the same recurs in 190 and 189, as well as in 171.[234] While these are *ad hoc* extractions to meet specific military needs, the use of the terms *duas decumas, binae… decumae,* and *alteras decumas* in these passages suggests that a first tithe was being regularly collected at this time.[235] The cumulative effect of these three references, following the previous examples of apparently voluntary or less formal contributions, is to suggest that Rome was developing extractive patterns at this time. Whether these additional tenths were paid for or not at this stage cannot be answered definitively from our sources; payment need not have taken place until the *Lex Terentia et Cassia* of 73 fixed the cost of reimbursing second tithes, which were now made regular as *frumentum emptum*.[236]

These Livian references to financial extraction are rather more useful in tracing early development than Cicero's *Verrines,* though that work has played an important role in discussion. By Cicero's time, a tithing system known as the *lex Hieronica* was in place across the island.[237] This must have been introduced at some point between 241 and 70, but scholarly opinions differ considerably on the exact moment. Given the already stated difficulties with Appian, few scholars will grant more than a possibility that tithes were imposed from 241.[238] The major alternatives which have been set up for debate are 227 under the new praetors, ca.210 under M. Valerius Laevinus, and 132 in the *lex Rupilia.* Objections to the earlier dates

[233] Liv. 30.3.2-3; 33.42.8.
[234] Liv. 36.2.12; 37.2.12; 37.50.9; 42.31.8.
[235] See Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 93-4.
[236] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.163. Compare Marquardt 1887-1907: 240 n.1; Scalais 1924: 81-2. Scalais' argument, based on Cicero's claim that Rome imposed no new exactions, is weak due to a) the difficulty of verifying this claim; and b) the nature of the early second tithes as special wartime extractions. Manganaro 1980: 428 also fails to convince.
[237] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.32, 147; 2.3.14-15.
[238] See e.g. Crawford 1990: 92; Serrati 2000b: 124-6.

tend to concern the improbability of extraction having remained static up to Cicero's time of writing; objections to the later date of 132 concern the delay in regularising exactions and, more damningly, the stark difference between the *lex Hieronica* and the other provisions put in place by Rupilius at that time.[239] The late date of 132, therefore, seems unlikely.

The debate between 227, ca.210, and indeed any other specific date is not a particularly constructive one. We have little to suggest any particular date for the introduction of the law, and opinions frequently rest on a lack of evidence to the contrary of the view espoused.[240] Our clearest hints at the regularisation of extraction come, as seen above, from mentions of second tithes by Livy, which would suggest that some regularisation existed by the late 190s. If we are to pin down a given date from the selection, then, ca.210 under Laevinus seems the most likely. This, however, is to miss the point. Cicero's discussion of the *lex Hieronica* obfuscates some key points. Firstly, Sicily was not taken over in one go, and it is more than likely that some form of extraction took place in the west prior to the defeat of Syracuse (leading to Livy's reference to Sicily before ca.218 as *vectigalis*). Cicero glosses over this by claiming that Rome changed nothing fiscally in Sicily, which makes no sense unless we are to believe that the Carthaginians and Hiero operated identical fiscal regimes.[241] Secondly, both Livy and Cicero present an image of a more nuanced political-fiscal situation in the island, Livy from ca.211 and Cicero from an unspecified date. Livy's Marcellus enacts something of a two-tiered system, relatively simple but seemingly precarious, based on *socii* and *dediticii.*[242] Cicero's system contains four differing fiscal relationships between territories and Rome. Examples exist of communities and their territories changing status over time, for some of

[239] Objections to early date: e.g. Marino 1984-5: 1084-5; cf. Sartori 1974: 227. Objections to late date: e.g. Dahlheim 1977: 37-8 n.64.
[240] See e.g. Carcopino 1914: 70-1; Toynbee 1965: 222-3; Pritchard 1970; Marino 1984-5; Pinzone 1999 [1979].
[241] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.12-15.
[242] Liv. 25.40.4; 31.31.8-9.

which we have explanations and some not.[243] The dating of the introduction of the tithing system, or of any particular element, precisely, has rested on the combination of these disparate sources in ways that sit awkwardly together. In this instance, precision over the introduction of taxation appears unlikely to help us understand the manifestation and development of Roman power.

We can gain some insight into the nature of Roman economic extraction in Sicily by placing it in context. Unfortunately, as II.1.4 demonstrates, our knowledge of existing systems in Sicily prior to 264 is far from comprehensive. As was observed there, references made by Diodorus to Carthaginian financial extractions in Sicily are problematic in that they do not necessarily refer to regularised extractions.[244] We certainly do not have clear evidence of a Carthaginian tithe, beyond Cicero's tendentious claim that Rome changed nothing as far as fiscal extractions were concerned.[245] The claim could quite plausibly be true in a general sense, i.e. that Carthage had made agricultural exactions and Rome did the same; however, this is both uninformative and somewhat back-to-front.

On the Syracusan system, we are slightly better informed. As described in II.1.4.2, we have likely physical evidence of a grain taxation system, in the form of stamped grain measures and substantial granaries. Our more specific evidence for the *decuma* comes again from Cicero, but in this instance it has the major advantage of being explicitly identified with the Hieronian system. This makes the connection far less tendentious than the implication of a Carthaginian tithe system. While Cicero is still, it must be remembered, striving to emphasise Rome's continuation of previously existing systems and norms, he is notably specific: the law, its name, the presence of a tithe, and the time and place of contracting have all remained the

[243] Marino 1984-5: 1089-91.
[244] See Whittaker 1978: 72; Ameling 1993: 112 with n.60; Serrati 2000b: 124-5; Ferrary 2014: 20; *contra* Bondì 1990-1: 226.
[245] Contrary to e.g. Bondì 1990-1: 228.

same.[246] Indeed, the phrasing used creates the impression that the favoured Hieronian system has always applied to all of the cities with land now subject to the *decuma.* This is obviously implausible in light of Cicero's own cataloguing of those cities, but it provides an important insight into exactly what continuity he considers significant. It is relevant in this context that Livy represents a number of senators arguing in 210 that Syracuse is *horreum atque aerarium quondam populi Romani.*[247] This text also appears to stress the primacy of eastern Sicily as a breadbasket and source of benefit for Rome.

How far this is valid, especially given how fond the historical tradition is of Hiero II, remains open to debate. There is every chance that Hieronian agricultural-fiscal infrastructure was useful to and used by Roman agents in the former kingdom, but again extrapolation is difficult and positive evidence is late (primarily Ciceronian). It remains to put the Hieronian system into context as part of a broader Mediterranean trend towards tithing. It is subject to dispute whether there were precedents at Syracuse for the Hieronian system, but there were broad Hellenistic precedents and parallels, notably the partially extant Ptolemaic Revenue Laws.[248] Thus, if we take seriously the strong suggestion in Livy of the existence of a Roman *decuma* in Sicily by the 190s, then in the early second century we have Roman economic power manifesting itself in a way similar to that of many of its peers, including the late Hiero.

Coinage at this time is also a fairly difficult topic, due to the disputed chronology of Roman coinage proper, in particular the introduction of the denarius. Nonetheless, there appears now to be some degree of consensus that the denarius was introduced around 211 or within the few years prior to that.[249] Prior to this, the circulation of quadrigati (mostly

[246] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.13-14.
[247] Liv. 26.32.3; see Gallo 1992: 366.
[248] On the alleged Syracusan precedent see *FGrHist* 327 F14 (Demon); Sartori 1974: 228; cf. however Pinzone 1999 [1979]: 3-4 on the particular context of the Demon passage; on the Ptolemaic Revenue Laws see e.g. Pinzone 1999 [1979]: 2-3.
[249] See e.g. Buttrey 1965; Crawford 1985: 55-6; Mattingly 2000: 35; Coarelli 2013; Crawford and Burnett 2014.

imported from Italy, but some probably minted in Sicily) was vigorous across the island, probably beginning after the First Punic War.[250] While circulation appears to have been somewhat less in the east, it is interesting that quadrigati circulated so much within the Syracusan territory.[251] Hoard evidence later demonstrates the importation of Roman coins of both the quadrigatus and denarius systems during the Second Punic War, which circulated with coins of Syracuse and Carthage, and occasionally pieces from the Greek East.[252] Power relations can be read clearly in the coinage at this point, as Punic silver and bronze likely coined at Agrigentum ca.213-210 appears in what seem to have been small issues, Syracusan issues appear also to have been small, and many of both were overstruck on what appear to have been largely Roman issues.[253]

The abundant numismatic tradition under both Carthaginian and Syracusan power in Sicily is likely to have led to this situation, where overstrikes were not only useful in war, when cash was needed, but also an ideological statement.[254] The demise of Syracusan and Punic coinage soon after the fall of Syracuse is similarly suggestive.[255] Deliberate recall, combined with sanctioned overstriking, seems the only reasonable explanation.[256] That Roman coinage took the foreground is clear from the amounts of silver and bronze both imported and minted in Sicily.[257] How this happened is an interesting question: minting of Roman types in Sicily or deliberate importation suggests an attempt to increase Rome's ideological and economic leverage, while coins of both silver and bronze could have been brought in by traders and thus reflect existing economic relations. Given the situation, it is likely that both took place.

[250] See Bernard 2018: 6.
[251] Crawford 1985: 110; Burnett 1995: 391-2; Cutroni Tusa 1995.
[252] See Ross Holloway 1965: 148-9; Crawford 1985: 105, 109, 111.
[253] Burnett 1995: 384-91, 397.
[254] Abundance in both bronze and silver: Crawford 1985: 105.
[255] See Crawford 1985: 113.
[256] Recall: see Crawford 1985: 113; overstriking: Frey-Kupper 2013: 267.
[257] Crawford 1985: 58, 110 (also some gold); Frey-Kupper 2013: 266-7.

From around 190, a bronze 'Romano-Sicilian' coinage was produced, probably at Lilybaeum and Panormus, much of it featuring abbreviated magistrates' names, some with the monogram *Q* (probably *quaestor*).[258] This explicit magisterial involvement demonstrates an increasingly visible application of economic and ideological power through coinage. While local coinage was an existing feature of Sicily, and the agency involved in this minting is uncertain, the presence of probable *quaestores* is a significant reflection of Roman-modelled power. Whether it was imposed or embraced is not obvious, but it would have affected monetary experiences at a local, everyday level.

It is apparent that the Roman and Romano-Sicilian systems must have interacted.[259] Exactly how this worked is not clear, but the continued mixing of coins of the two systems in hoards demonstrates that they coexisted.[260] Crawford describes this phenomenon as something 'which can only be described as Romano-Sicilian', but this is to miss the way the balance of power here has shifted: Roman coins coexist with coins which, though minted in Sicily and not on the same system as Roman, feature Roman magistrates in many cases. This is a quiet but significant statement of the economic power of Roman representatives, and a way of consolidating their influence through existing Sicilian trends.[261]

II.2.4. Land

The question of Rome's relationships with Sicilians, their communities, and their territories has been much discussed. Recent scholarship, however, has seen several syntheses on the topic,

[258] Frey-Kupper 2013: 267.
[259] Crawford 1985: 113-5, with reference to Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.181.
[260] See Frey-Kupper 2013: 270-1.
[261] Crawford 1985: 115.

and it will not be necessary here to revisit all that has been said.[262] Certain problems, however, deserve consideration.

The first major difficulty is in the use of the Ciceronian evidence to reconstruct power relations as far back as the First Punic War. This is problematic for two main reasons: firstly, there is every chance that many civic and land statuses had changed over this period, due to the occurrence of two hegemonic wars with Carthage and the Sicilian slave revolt of the 130s. The second, and still more fundamental problem, is the conflation of civic and land statuses, and thus economic and coercive power relations. In some instances, Cicero discusses particular civic statuses, particularly in the case of Messana, Tauromenium, and Netum, which had treaties with Rome by 70.[263] In most instances, however, his discussion concerns land status for the sake of financial extraction, which is not the same thing.[264] The historical narratives are scant on information about financial extraction, and provide more suggestions about civic relationships with Rome, based particularly on war events (*deditio,* storming, etc.). Cicero does refer to allied cities holding benefits as a result of good services and communities with land subject to censorial *locatio* having been *bello… subactae.*[265] The equivalence of fiscal and civic status has, however, been overstressed. Cicero refers explicitly to the *ager* of the communities defeated in war and the *ager* subject to the tithe (which makes up the majority), dividing by land and its tax status. The allied cities are an exception (reasonably enough, as a treaty is agreed with a political body, not its *ager*), as are, at least initially, the *sine foedere immunes civitates ac liberae.* The risks of equating a community with its entire territory can be seen, however, in the case of Halicyae, which in spite of belonging to the latter category has settlers who pay tithes on their land.[266]

[262] E.g. Genovese 1993; Prag 2014a; Soraci 2016.
[263] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.160; 2.3.13; 2.5.49, 56.
[264] As observed by e.g. Genovese 1993; Prag 2014a: 169, 191-2.
[265] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.13.
[266] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.91.

The tax status of an area of *ager,* then, does not necessarily equate neatly to the civic status of an associated community, even within Cicero's own remit. Over a longer time period, this problem becomes all the more pronounced, as can be demonstrated with the case of Leontini, whose land appears to have two different statuses in the *Verrines* (tithe-paying) and the *Philippics* (subject to *locatio*).[267] Differing explanations can be offered for this issue: Mazza finds it likely that land subject to *locatio* and *ager decumanus* were in fact much the same; Sartori argues that the two statuses were synchronous; Manganaro believes that Cicero misrepresented the territory as tithe-paying; Marino sees diachronic change.[268] We know further that Leontini was *vi capta* in 214.[269] If we divorce the status of its *ager* from its civic status, it becomes easy to see a middle way where, by the first century, it could have had *ager* of both types. The division of political and economic manifestations of power is significant here.

This is also the case for the cities Cicero describes as *sine foedere immunes civitates ac liberae:* Halaesa, Segesta, Centuripae, Halicyae, and Panormus. We have evidence for these likely securing a favoured status as far back as early in the First Punic War.[270] The status of *immunis ac libera* bears some resemblance to the status of *civitas libera* which was later used, with greater political content, in Greece. Ferrary has argued, however, that Cicero's description of those five cities does not stress the *libera* element of their label, but rather subsumes it as part of their immunity from the tithe. Cicero does not distinguish these cities in significant ways from those which hold *agri decumani,* such as Thermae, and applies the term *liberus ac immunis* to land as well as to communities, which seriously damages its usability as

[267] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.147; *Phil.* 2.101.
[268] Sartori 1974: 244; Manganaro 1980: 424; Mazza 1981: 25; Marino 1984-5: 1090-1.
[269] Liv. 24.30.1.
[270] Halaesa: Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Segesta: Zon. 8.9; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.125; Centuripae: Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.163; AE 1990 437 = SEG 42.837; cf. Soraci 2016: 117-8; Halicyae: Diod. Sic. 23.5; Panormus: Polyb. 1.40.9; cf. Prag 2010a: 189; Soraci 2016: 121.

an indicator of political relations.[271] It seems highly likely that there was some link between political and economic status, but again the simple conflation of the two makes the situation unclear, and blurs the focus of our sources on different aspects. Our evidence for political status of certain Sicilian communities, attested by a mixture of sources, goes back further than our understanding of the economic status of land on the island, and should not be subsumed under economic power.

II.2.5. Greek exiles and Venus Erycina

The recall of Greek exiles and the honouring of Venus Erycina both reflect the potential for acts to affect power relations in various contexts, and for ideological and coercive power to overlap. The first instance concerns expression some distance from the island: the invitation issued to Sicilian (and Tarentine) exiles at the 208 Olympic Games to return to their homes.

> *simul quod Olympiae ludicrum ea aestate futurum erat, [4] quod maximo coetu Graeciae celebraretur, ut, si tuto per hostem posset, adiret id concilium, ut qui Siculi bello ibi profugi aut Tarentini cives relegati ab Hannibale essent, domos redirent scirentque sua omnia iis quae ante bellum habuissent reddere populum Romanum.*[272]

Two features are of note here. Firstly, the Senate is here ordering engagement with the Greek world through one of its most important festivals; one might compare the use of the Isthmian Games as a venue for Flamininus' declaration of Greek freedom in 196. The beneficiaries are those who have fled Sicily and southern Italy (highlighting the continuum between the two), but the audience for the invitation is much broader. Rome thus expresses power over Sicily in a Greek context, making a point not only to Sicilians. This is of particular interest as we have

[271] Ferrary 2014: 6, 8. For application of *liberus ac immunis* to land, see Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.166.
[272] Liv. 27.35.3-4.

evidence for Sicilians continuing to participate in panhellenic contests throughout our period, maintaining the cultural connection.[273] The recall of exiles also echoes Alexander the Great.[274] Secondly, this is a major statement of coercive power over Sicily, especially considering the fact that the Second Punic War was ongoing. While Sicily was no longer itself a theatre of war, returning the exiles' possessions would, if the offer were taken up, potentially require the application of Roman coercive power, which would have to be taken from the war effort. Therefore, the ideological import of this move is more substantial than has generally been recognised.

Two events concerning Venus Erycina should be considered, one rather clearer than the other. The clearer of the two is that featured in Table II.2.a, the importation of the goddess' cult to Rome, carried out in 215.[275] The less clear is the use of the sanctuary at Eryx as the base, and the cult as the basis, for a garrison of Sicilians. The latter occurrence will be discussed below due to its more clearly coercive aspect, but the connection between the ideological and coercive facets of Roman use of Eryx must be stressed. Here we shall discuss the more explicitly ideological side.

Eryx and the sanctuary of Venus Erycina were part of the Carthaginian *eparchia* before the First Punic War, the abolition of which relationship is likely to have had ramifications for power in the region. Several illustrations can be made. The physical prominence of Eryx and its strategic location, firstly, cannot be ignored.[276] The diffusion of the cult is also associated with the leading power in western Sicily: for example, under Carthaginian influence sanctuaries were created in Africa, with similar aspects, and the goddess annually spent a period of nine

[273] See e.g. Manganaro 1964: 431; Prag 2014a: 173. For Roman self-promotion to Greeks, see Dench 1995: 68-9.
[274] On Alexander's Exiles Decree and other recalls from his reign see Dmitriev 2004.
[275] The second temple dedicated in 181, noted in Table II.2.a, will not be discussed as its significance for the Sicilian audience is unknown.
[276] Polyb. 1.55.6-10; Strabo 6.2.7 (citing Posidonius); Kienast 1965: 478; Lietz 2012a: 314.

days in Africa, with her departure and return celebrated at Eryx.[277] It is apparent too that Eryx had strong political and cultural connections with Carthage, being the only Sicilian centre so far attested to have had *suffetes,* and having been strongly Punicised and notably loyal in its allegiance.[278] Furthermore, Roman forces held the city and sanctuary from 249 to 244, when Hamilcar retook the city until the end of the First Punic War.[279] Indeed, the Carthaginian fleet defeated at the Aegates, off the coast, had been attempting to provision Hamilcar there. While Livy's speeches cannot be used straightforwardly as evidence of what was said in the third century, they are suggestive of Eryx holding symbolic status in the memory of the First Punic War. Livy's Scipio mentions it three times in his address to the soldiers at the Ticinus; his Fabius Maximus uses it (with Drepana) to stand for Sicilian successes in an address to the Senate; his Hanno, lastly, pairs it with the Aegates as a place of defeat when addressing the Carthaginian senate.[280] The city and sanctuary location, then, has clear associations with the First Punic War and the defeat of Carthage.

Invoking Eryx might well then have been a means of evoking past successes and the defeat of the Carthaginians in the First Punic War; this is particularly interesting in the context of 217, the year in which the sanctuary at Rome was vowed. Livy tells us that this was done by Fabius Maximus as dictator, under the orders of the Sibylline Books, which he had convinced the Senate to have consulted after the defeat and death at Trasimene of Flaminius.[281] Scholars have debated whether such importations of 'foreign' cults show strength or weakness on Rome's part (or more specifically on the part of its religious system), but this is not a constructive question to ask.[282] Instead, we may ask what statement was being made, and to

[277] Ath. 9.394f-395a; Ael. *VH* 1.15; *NA* 4.2; Kienast 1965: 480; Schilling 1982: 238; Lietz 2012a: 313, 315.
[278] *CIS* I 135; Kienast 1965: 480; Bondì 1990-1: 227; Lietz 2010: 90; Lietz 2012a: 314; De Vincenzo 2013: 73.
[279] Polyb. 1.55.6-10, 58.2-6. See Battistoni 2010: 125.
[280] Liv. 21.41.6, 9, 11; 28.41.5; 21.10.7; see Lietz 2012b: 153.
[281] Liv. 22.7, 9.8, 10.10.
[282] See e.g. North 1976: 11; Wardman 1982: 34; Orlin 1997: 13-15 .

whom. The prevailing statement is likely to have been one of Roman superiority, based on the above arguments, of superior Roman piety in comparison to Carthage, and of Roman commitment to its relationships in western Sicily. Various elements of the story suggest that such points were being made.

Firstly, the sanctuary was placed on the Capitoline Hill. While Ziolkowski has shown that the placing of a foreign cult within the *pomerium* was not the extreme move some scholars have suggested, the Capitoline is still a very particular location, which not only gave high honour to the cult, but also made it explicitly Roman.[283] The Fasti Antiates attest a dedication date of 23rd April, coinciding with the first Vinalia, mirroring the temple of Venus Obsequens, dedicated on 19th August (by a relative of Fabius Maximus), the date of the second Vinalia. The association of the Vinalia with Jupiter reinforces the evident Romanisation of the new cult.[284] Later evidence suggests the possibility that the temple might have been associated with victory in the guise of Venus Victrix, but the lateness of this evidence must be noted, and given the association of Eryx with Carthaginian defeat it is not strictly necessary to see an explicit link.[285] Textual references also suggest that the impiety of Carthage was stressed in relation to the original sanctuary: Aelian gives an anecdote about Hamilcar's pillaging of the sanctuary in 480 and his subsequent punishment, while Polybius gives a story about Roman punishment of defecting Gallic mercenaries who had pillaged it during the First Punic War.[286] Montanari further proposes that the temple of Mens, vowed and dedicated in the same years as that of Venus Erycina by T. Otacilius Crassus, again on the orders of the Sibylline Books, was

[283] See Schilling 1982: 243, 250; Ziolkowski 1992: 276; Orlin 2000: 70; Erskine 2001: 203; Battistoni 2010: 126-7; Lietz 2012b: 154-5 .
[284] *Fasti Antiates Maiores s.v.* 23rd April. See Schilling 1982: 249; but cf. Lietz 2012b: 157-8. Cf. also Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 45.
[285] *InscrIt.* 13.2, 37; *RRC* 448, no.424, 1. For discussion, see Lietz 2012b: 153, 159-60.
[286] Ael. *NA* 10.50; see Schilling 1982: 244 with n.2; Zucca 1989: 778 (misdated to 244); Polyb. 2.7.8-10; see Galinsky 1969: 63-4; Schilling 1982: 240-1.

intended to make reference to the rash behaviour and character attributed to Hannibal.[287] In any case, the dedication of the temple of Mens in 215 is likely to have suggested to the people of Rome (the key audience for the importation of Venus Erycina) that their cause and those promoting it were the sensible, pious ones.[288] It is surely relevant that Otacilius had served in Sicily in the First and Second Punic Wars, against Elymian cities and as a commander at Lilybaeum, both in the region of Eryx.[289] In this way, the dedications appear to have made claims to ideological superiority and power.

To a Sicilian audience, however, this message was presumably rather less pronounced, as they were not party to the dedications themselves. We have no reason, however, to think that Sicilians, particularly those around Eryx itself, were not aware of the importation. Diodorus attests a special relationship between the Romans and the original sanctuary at Eryx in a display of overflowing pride.[290] While he may not be accurate in all particulars, it is of interest that he claims that magistrates in Sicily always visited the sanctuary and behaved in an appropriate fashion. While Della Corte is right to point out that Cicero, in his many references to the sanctuary and the cult in the *Verrines,* does not mention this phenomenon, it is notable that Cicero does mention repeatedly Verres' wronging of both goddess and cult.[291] Aside from the importation of the cult to Rome, then, it appears likely that Roman power was associated with and mediated through the sanctuary at Eryx. The period around 217-215 would be a logical context for such connections to be formed or strengthened, as Rome faced a difficult

[287] Montanari 1976: 180-7.
[288] Cf. Orlin 1997: 102.
[289] Bitto 1977: 132.
[290] Diod. Sic. 4.83.4-7.
[291] Della Corte 1980: 208; cf. Lietz 2012a: 314 (with references, but note esp. *Verr.* 2.2.115-6). For an (overly?) credulous reading of Diodorus, see Schilling 1982: 247.

situation in western Sicily at this time, and would likely have been well served to assert their superiority over Carthage in any available form.[292]

The specifics of connections formed by Rome in western Sicily around this time are difficult to trace due to significant gaps in the evidence. Two particular questions must be addressed: firstly, the role of Trojan connections in Rome's relationship with Eryx; secondly, the chrysophoric league formed to honour the goddess, which is also linked to the Sicilian garrison at the site. The two illustrate how multiple levels of ideological power relations with different agents could act together in tandem with coercive power.

Erskine has argued convincingly that Roman literature prior to the time of Augustus demonstrates a much greater interest in the Romulus legend than that of Aeneas, and that the Augustan filter may well give a misleading impression.[293] While material evidence for the presence of the myth in Italy in the third century and earlier does exist, it does not suggest a link between the myth and Rome in particular.[294] We have no evidence for Trojan elements in the importation of Venus Erycina to Rome, contrary to the statements of some scholars.[295] We do, however, have a claim from Zonaras that Segesta, close to Eryx, went over to Rome at the beginning of the First Punic War because its people were descended from Aeneas.[296] That the Elymians of western Sicily made much of their Trojan origins is not in question.[297] We do not have, however, any suggestion from Zonaras that Rome accepted Segesta's friendship for any reason other than expediency (even if we believe Zonaras' claim in the first place). Our next evidence for the Trojan connection once again stresses Sicilian agency: coins of Segesta

[292] On the circumstances, see e.g. Galinsky 1969: 175-6; Orlin 1997: 108-9; Erskine 2001: 202; Lietz 2012b: 154.
[293] Erskine 2001: 23-4, 30-3, 36.
[294] See Kienast 1965: 481-2.
[295] E.g. Kienast 1965: 488; Galinsky 1969: 186-7; Schilling 1982: 241, 265-6; Orlin 1997: 108; Battistoni 2010: 127.
[296] Zon. 8.9.
[297] See Erskine 2001: 168; Lietz 2012b: 187.

featuring Aeneas, most commonly dated to the period following 241.[298] This balance of evidence, though exiguous on all sides, suggests that Trojan kinship was evoked by western Sicilian communities as part of a Hellenistic tradition of kinship claims.[299] In this context, Roman honouring of the sanctuary at Eryx and importation of Venus Erycina to Rome reads as negotiation of a mutual relationship.

The creation of the chrysophoric league, however, serves as a counterpoint to this, as it appears to have taken a Greek form, but referred more explicitly to Roman power over Sicily. Diodorus states that at some undefined time the Senate passed a decree that the seventeen most faithful Sicilian cities would χρυσοφορεῖν τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ. They also provided troops for a garrison, which will be discussed below. The only city we can identify with any certainty is Tyndaris, which Cicero mentions as belonging to a group of seventeen loyal cities.[300] Two questions thus remain: when was the group created, and what exactly was the honour granted? The date is most likely to be shortly after either the First or Second Punic War, when rewards for good faith to Rome would be most plausible and acts of organisation likely. The use of a garrison of Gallic defectors during the First Punic War has led some scholars to believe that the likely date falls around 241, with the Senate wishing either to expiate the Gallic desecration with religious honours or to replace the Gallic garrison with something more effective.[301] While attempts to dismiss a date prior to 227 on grounds of Diodorus' references to magistrates in Sicily in conjunction with the decree are unconvincing, a date after or indeed during the Second Punic War is also quite plausible.[302]

[298] *BMC Sicily* 137, nos.59-61; Kienast 1965: 480-1; Schilling 1982: 234, 245; Lietz 2012b: 189; but see Erskine 2001: 182 (with references) for problems with dating.
[299] Erskine 2001: 162, 168, 204; Battistoni 2010; Prag 2010a. On the cultural Hellenization of the Elymians, see Anello 2005: 156, 162.
[300] Diod. Sic. 4.83.7; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.124. For summary of speculation on the others, see Lietz 2012b: 79-81.
[301] See Kienast 1965: 483-4 (expiation); Prag 2010a: 195-7 (replacement).
[302] For attempt see Dahlheim 1977: 18 n.6. For suggestion of ca.217, see Prag 2010a: 195-7; while new honours at the same time as the importation of the cult to Rome would be reasonable, circumstances in 217 might have rendered a new garrison of Sicilians, even those from faithful cities, risky.

Dating the creation of the group, however, is perhaps less important than determining its character. The literal 'gold-bearing' mentioned by Diodorus is open to interpretation. It seems unlikely, nonetheless, since this is evidently a privilege being granted to the cities, that it indicates that they were now to pay a tax in gold to the sanctuary.[303] The possibility cannot be ruled out, but it is more likely that the honour granted involved the bearing of gold, whether as offerings, statue adornments, or personal adornments, in a religious procession for the goddess.[304] The verb Diodorus uses would easily accommodate this meaning.[305] We cannot therefore pinpoint the cultural content or origin of the honours granted to the seventeen cities. We can, however, observe two conflicting aspects. On the one hand, the Senate granted honours that appear to have been comprehensible in a Greek context, pertaining to a sanctuary and cult of considerable regional importance. On the other hand, Diodorus and Cicero make it quite clear that these cities were honoured for their faithfulness to Rome. From Cicero the comment is hardly remarkable, but from Diodorus, whose emphasis remains on the glory of the sanctuary and the Senate's zeal to honour it, the identification appears more pointed. This move by the Senate enacted and displayed Rome's ideological power, thus reinforcing it.

II.2.6. Civic and land status

We have seen above that Roman economic power relations and coercive power relations with different communities are not always congruent. Given the problems with following Ciceronian evidence, economic relations concerning land cannot be traced back into our period. There is

[303] For this view see *LSJ* s.v. χρυσοφορεῖν, II.
[304] See e.g. Kienast 1965: 484-5 (with bibliography); Lietz 2010: 78.
[305] On the flexibility of the term see Kuhn 2014.

more, however, to be said on civic status, and the ways in which power relations concerning both communities and land began to suggest a conceptual break between Sicily and Italy.

It has been stressed, and rightly so, that only three Sicilian cities had treaties with Rome: Messana, Tauromenium, and Netum. This cannot, however, be used to sustain a narrative of Rome abruptly ceasing to use treaties outside of Italy, as some scholars have done.[306] The dating of the latter two treaties, moreover, is not agreed, which complicates matters.[307] A fragment of Appian suggests that Tauromenium's treaty may originate from its dealings with Marcellus after the fall of Syracuse, but this is not definitive.[308] The date of Netum's agreement is still more elusive. Nonetheless, the presence of only three attested treaties (in a speech where we would expect all standing treaties to be mentioned) on an island with upwards of 60 communities is striking.

Complications arise, however, when direct comparison is made with Italy. Bispham summarises the status of communities within Italy by the end of the Second Punic War as 'either Roman (with or without the franchise), or one of two distinct types of ally', that is Latin or non-Latin. The allied communities outside of the Latin colonies, he maintains, were connected to Rome by treaties, and provided military manpower on this basis.[309] Rich, however, points to the ambiguity inherent in use of the terms *socius* and σύμμαχος: neither requires the existence of a treaty, which can only be unambiguously indicated by explicit reference to one. Out of around 125 allied communities in Italy, Rich finds only 14 securely attested as having treaties with Rome.[310] While he concedes that some may simply be unattested, this is hardly the clean sweep of treaty-bound communities presented by the

[306] Badian 1958: 37 with n.3 makes this assertion, relegating Tauromenium and Netum to a footnote.
[307] For summary see Soraci 2016: 105-110, with bibliography.
[308] App. *Sic.* 5.
[309] Bispham 2007: 74-6.
[310] Rich 2008: 56, 67-9.

orthodoxy on Roman Italy. Thus the difference in numbers is rather smaller than it at first seems. Nonetheless, there does remain a noticeable difference.

Ferrary makes a case for a shift from 241 onwards, away from the strict use of treaties as the means of bringing about *societas* and towards a model of allies-as-subjects.[311] We need not necessarily be so convinced that the difference was so clear-cut as this might sound: Livy makes liberal use of the term *socius* for western Sicilian communities' relations with Rome, as does Polybius with the term σύμμαχος.[312] As Eckstein points out, the lack of *foedera* did not prevent 'allied' Sicilian communities from providing troops to Rome during the Punic Wars.[313] Being in the *dicio* of a commander might be different legally from being a party in a treaty, but whether it changed the nature of Roman power on the ground, especially as perceived by Sicilian communities, is far less clear. In this respect the texts give varying impressions: Livy's and Polybius' sweeping use of *socius* and σύμμαχος suggests that the holding of a treaty was not of particular relevance, while Cicero makes particular reference to the three Sicilian treaties, including having provisions from them read to the court. Context is perhaps the key here, as the legalistic aspect of power has more relevance for Cicero than for the historians. In pure coercive terms, then, the lack of treaties in Sicily may have had little impact.

The beginnings of development of an idea of Italian and extra-Italian land make it apparent, however, that Sicilian land was taking on a mantle of difference around the time of Laevinus' agricultural revival. Three episodes will illustrate these beginnings. First, we have a suggestion that *ager Romanus* was considered to exist in Sicily in 252, as Valerius Maximus has the consul C. Aurelius Cotta leaving the siege of Lipara to take auspices at Messana.[314] As Catalano observes, there are multiple avenues of explanation for this: Messana's ethnic and treaty-relationship with Rome may have made it somewhat 'Italian'; a small piece of *ager*

[311] Ferrary 1990: 219.
[312] E.g. Liv. 24.37.6; 25.40.4; 26.40.1; Polyb. 1.18.5, 24.3, 40.1, 52.8.
[313] Eckstein 1987: 108, with reference to Diod. Sic. 23.4.1.
[314] Val. Max. 2.7.4.

Romanus could on occasion be created in extra-Italian territory for the sake of conducting auspices.[315] Whatever we consider the explanation, however, our second episode shows that by 210 the Senate explicitly understood *ager Romanus* as existing only within Italy. In that year, Laevinus was forbidden from naming M. Valerius Messala dictator, as the latter was in Sicily commanding a fleet and thus not within *ager Romanus,* which was confined within the boundaries of Italy.[316] The third episode shows further the developing ritual importance of Italy. Licinius Crassus, as pontifex maximus, was unable to leave Italy as consul in 205, and Livy states that he was allotted the *provincia* of Bruttium as a result.[317] These sparse but illustrative occurrences hint at the development of a different understanding of extra-Italian land, starting in Sicily. Their significance for Sicilians, however, is likely to have been minimal: Romans being unable to perform certain tasks or rituals in Sicily would, if anything, have contributed to a less conspicuous appearance of Roman ideological and coercive power in the region. For Roman magistrates, on the other hand, this legalistic othering of Sicily produced quite a different picture, by excluding it from the land which was considered appropriate for certain rituals and political actions.

Road-building is an interesting additional issue. One Cotta, probably the consul of 252 and 248, constructed a road from Agrigentum to Panormus, with milestones, an act familiar from peninsular Italy but not repeated in a provincial context for at least two generations.[318] Given the value of roads for the movement of troops, one might imagine that the presence of roads would increase Rome's coercive power potential, as it had arguably done in Italy.[319] One could also argue for significant ideological power stemming from road-building, as such infrastructure would be a major and enduring symbol of Roman capacity for construction and

[315] Catalano 1978: 529-31.
[316] Liv. 27.5.15. See Catalano 1978: 529; Bispham 2007: 67.
[317] Liv. 28.38.12, 44.11; Cass. Dio fr.57.52; Diod. Sic. 27.2.
[318] Coarelli 1988: 38-9; Crawford 1990: 103.
[319] Given in particular the likely relationship between roads and colonisation; see Patterson 2006: 191-2. Note also the lack of colonisation in Sicily, apart from the internal colonisation of Agrigentum in 197.

change.[320] In this respect, once again, while setting Sicily apart from Italy after the construction of Cotta's road, Roman decisions not to build further roads meant that they did not capitalise on the possibility of manifesting power on the ground.

II.2.7. Garrisons, manpower, and Hellenistic culture

We have briefly mentioned the use of garrisons in Sicily above, in relation to the sanctuary of Venus Erycina. This peculiar garrison will be a useful place to start, as it highlights how the use of Sicilian manpower ties into important aspects of ideological control in a cultural context. It is associated, as has already been seen, with the chrysophoric league established at Eryx at an uncertain date, but quite likely following the First or Second Punic War, or ca.217-5. The cities of the chrysophoric league were entitled to provide soldiers for a garrison of 200, attested in three inscriptions as well as by Diodorus.[321] These inscriptions show respectively the presence of a quaestor with the garrison, the existence of a garrison commander who describes himself as *Egestaios,* thus likely a Segestan, and the existence of a commander probably from Halaesa. The honouring of this last commander in Halaesa itself, with the dedication of a statue of him by garrison soldiers, suggests that he was a man of some importance.

Given our minimal knowledge about the garrison in general, conclusions to be drawn from this information must be speculative. They are, however, suggestive. Diodorus' suggestion that the manning of this garrison was part of the honour given to the 17 most faithful cities implies the possibility that the garrison was not intended just as a military force, but also, perhaps more importantly, as a prestige installation. This is particularly tempting in conjunction with the likely procession element implied by the *chrysophoria.* The impact of the

[320] Cf. Talbert 2012: 236 on *cippi.*
[321] Diod. Sic. 4.83.7; *CIL* X 7258; *IG* 14.282, 355.

institution of the garrison would therefore have more of an ideological force than coercive, in further increasing the honour of the faithful cities and the prestige of the sanctuary. The presence of the quaestor, a non-*imperium* holding magistrate, does not damage this idea, but does hint at active Roman involvement: the Senate did not, evidently, pass a decree and leave the garrison to its own devices. How far this involvement went, or what effect it had, we unfortunately cannot know.

What we can perhaps see in our probably Halaesan commander, however, is the likely involvement of civic elites in the garrison. This accords well with understandings of chrysophoric grants in the Greek East, and is of interest in a manpower context, as it has been suggested that Rome made use of local civic structures in manpower more broadly. As already observed with regard to the invitation made at the 208 Olympic Games, epigraphic evidence attests the ongoing participation of Sicilian individuals in Panhellenic festivals into and throughout the second century, and this appears to have been accompanied by a strong survival of gymnasic culture at home. Mango highlights the significance of the integration of gymnasia into agora complexes during our period, suggesting a strong link between gymnasic and civic culture, while Prag points to the close relationship between gymnasic culture and militarism.[322] It thus appears highly likely that Roman magistrates encouraged gymnasia as a means of training and coordinating manpower, thus arguably minimising the visibility of Roman coercive power through the continuation of existing civic structures, but maximising manpower potential through the use of existing institutions.

Rome also made use of Sicilian manpower in various other ways. Firstly, Sicilians were used as naval forces, for which there is some early evidence following 241. One of the possible readings of Appian's description of the conditions imposed after 241 indicates that Rome demanded ships and crews. This is not certain, as the τέλη τὰ θαλάσσια could also be read as

[322] Prag 2007; Mango 2009.

portoria, and neither emerges as significantly preferable based on our other evidence.[323] The date, as we have seen, is also problematic. We can be fairly confident that Messana was required to provide an equipped, manned, and paid-for ship probably from 241, as Cicero attests that this was part of its treaty.[324] In the same passage, he also attests that Tauromenium was exempted by its treaty from the provision of ships, which suggests that at the time of the treaty's agreement the expectation of ship-provision was common.[325] While only Messana's ship was demanded by official treaty terms, Cicero shows also that, by 70, marines and ships were expected from Netum, Centuripae, Segesta, Tyndaris, Apollonia, Haluntium, Heraclea, and Herbita.[326] While changes may obviously have occurred in these expectations prior to 70, it is instructive that these communities cover at least three of Cicero's land-taxation categories. Naval resources, therefore, are likely to have been demanded from communities which varied in standing.

We have further general evidence for Sicilian *socii navales,* though this is not concrete in referring to Sicily before 169. In 214, Livy attests a group of deserters at Syracuse, *quorum maxima pars ex navalibus sociis Romanorum erat,* but this does not require that these men were Sicilian, especially given the use as *socii navales* of other Greeks, who would plausibly see Syracuse as a suitable haven.[327] Our first definite indication of Sicilian *socii navales* occurs for 169, when Livy attests the recruitment of 500 Sicilian seamen to be sent to the fleet off Macedonia.[328] In this passage, notably, Sicily is to provide the same number (*totidem)* as Italy, and for the same purpose, thus coupling Sicily and Italy in manpower provision. This also implies a different recruitment model from the one suggested above, where communities

[323] For reading as ships and crews, see e.g. Pinzone 2004: 12-13.
[324] Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.50.
[325] See Pinzone 2004: 18.
[326] Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.86.
[327] Liv. 24.23.10. Pinzone 2004: 16 is confident that they were Siceliotes, as is Thiel 1946: 77 n.128, 196-7, 383 n.719. Brunt 1971: 667 and Milan 1973: 216 / 24 are more circumspect. See also Prag 2007: 79 with additional examples.
[328] Liv. 43.12.9.

furnished ships, men, and money. Given the example of Messana above, it seems likely that these models coexisted, which may suggest more complete and effective exploitation of Sicilian manpower resources than would have been possible by one model alone.[329]

There is a small body of evidence for the recruitment of infantry and light troops from Sicily, but the point of note here is the concentration of this during the Second Punic War. The first example is the 1000 light troops sent by Hiero, which, while arising from peripheral agency, deserve to be considered as part of this manifestation of power.[330] 209 saw Sicilian levies, and Prag has argued that the 3000 archers and slingers sent from Sicily to fight Hasdrubal in 207 were probably levied in Sicily.[331]

There is also a brief attestation of Rome requiring cavalry from Sicily in 205 for action in Africa.[332] This is a rather abortive instance, as Livy describes Scipio releasing the reluctant Sicilian cavalrymen from duty provided they paid for and trained a substitute provided by Scipio. This peculiar episode indicates that the Sicilian cavalrymen must be adequate in skill to train recruits to Scipio's satisfaction, but it is hard to envision it as a regular recruitment tactic. Nonetheless, it is an informative example of how manpower concerns involved both economic and coercive aspects, and how the balance of these could be negotiated.

We ought also to consider here the deportation of 4000 men from Agathyrna in 210.[333] Given Livy's description of the population of Agathyrna as disreputable types, mostly guilty of capital crimes, this could be characterised as a public order act, but it is unlikely that such people would be moved into Italy purely for the purpose of keeping Sicily calm. Rather, this looks more like a questionable act of manpower-transferral, presumably hoping that the men would do more good than harm in Bruttium. While anecdotal, it remains an interesting

[329] On the ambiguity of what was expected, see e.g. Prag 2007: 78-9.
[330] Liv. 22.37.7-8 (217).
[331] Liv. 23.25.10 (216/5); 27.8.14-16 (209); Liv. 27.38.12 (207); Prag 2007: 77.
[332] Liv. 29.1.1-10.
[333] Liv. 26.40.16-18; 27.12.4-5; Polyb. 9.27.11.

interaction with the sort of rogue community which could draw a variety of responses from Roman leaders.

We come lastly to the question of manpower use within Sicily itself. We have minimal archaeological evidence for Roman military presence, and an interesting mixture among our textual sources. During the First Punic War, sources attest the use of allied Sicilian contingents, including Panormitans in 250 and cities which went over to Rome during the siege of Centuripae.[334] During the Second Punic War and the threat from Antiochus ca.190, there is also evidence of local forces being pressed into use to protect in particular the coast. While this involves Sicilians protecting their own territory, the presence of Roman supervision gives it a less than independent flavour.[335]

While we have minimal evidence for Roman troops in Sicily outside of immediate wartime, it should be noted that we have textual evidence for non-Sicilian garrison troops. These are largely Latin and allied troops,[336] and several examples arise between 200 and 190.[337] As Prag has argued, these appear to have been phased out relatively early, potentially from the 180s, though our evidence is lacking.[338] This suggests that Rome felt its position in Sicily relatively secure soon after the Hannibalic War, or at least that it considered its other magistrates and troops present to be sufficient coercive display.

[334] Liv. 21.40.9; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1. The latter is dismissed (unfairly) by Roussel 1970: 88; see Eckstein 1987: 108.
[335] Liv. 21.49-51 (218: under Roman supervision and in concert with *socii navales* at Lilybaeum); cf. Prag 2007: 76-7; Liv. 35.23.3-9; 37.2.8 (192, 190: substantial levies for defence against Antiochus).
[336] On the primacy of these see Liv. 27.9.1.
[337] Liv. 32.3.3 (200/199); 31.8.8 (200); 32.8.5-8 (198); 34.56.7-8 (193 but not specific to Sicily; cf. Prag 2007: 73).
[338] Prag 2007: 74.

II.2.8. Conclusions

Given our lack of clarity about its early magisterial arrangements, it is difficult to comprehend what the primacy of Sicily actually means in practical terms for Roman power there. The likelihood that there was a quaestor present from an early stage, potentially from 241, is an interesting indication that Rome had not yet developed a systematic habit of sending *imperium*-holders to *provinciae* beyond Italy outside of a war context. It is also suggestive of continuity from the existing use of quaestors in Italy; for this reason it need not suggest that such a choice of magistrate was connected solely or mainly with the assertion of economic power. With the presence of praetors after 227, it is possible that Sicily led the way in developing the regular province, but this cannot easily be pinned down before the reappearance of Livy's narrative in 218.

In economic terms, we must to a certain extent look past the *Verrines* for a positive image of Roman power. Livy suggests that the ability of Sicily to feed armies posted there was considered significant, and repeated requisitions of second tithes in the second century strongly suggest that the institution of tithes, following Hieronian and other precedent, came into force following the Second Punic War. The importation and production of silver coinage points both to economic relationships and to ideological ones, in both respects following what had gone before under Carthage and Syracuse. It is of particular note that both Carthaginian and Roman coinage used the symbol of the corn-ear.[339]

The particular Greekness of Rome's power in Sicily emerges strongly from several places. The recall of the exiles indicates how Sicily and southern Italy, and Rome's coercive capacities there, were considered relevant to the wider Greek world. The likely employment by

[339] *RRC* 42; Burnett 1995: 384-8.

Rome of Greek gymnasic practices to foster manpower development is another example. The case of the chrysophoric league and garrison at Eryx illustrates the meeting of ideological and coercive power in a Greek context. Rome also began, with Sicily during the Hannibalic War, to create external territory, in which there could be no *ager Romanus* and no more official road-building. Thus both inclusive and exclusive aspects of Roman power in Sicily served as productive, creating a space which was part of the Greek world and, in significant administrative ways, not part of Italy.

III. Iberia

III.1. Intervention

The beginnings of Roman intervention in the Iberian Peninsula have much in common with the beginnings of intervention in Sicily.[340] In particular, Iberia was again territory partly held by Carthage, and as 264, the opening of the First Punic War, saw Roman intervention in Sicily, so 218, the opening of the Second Punic War, saw Roman intervention in Iberia. This entanglement serves here both as advantage and as disadvantage. On the positive side, we have a significant amount of textual evidence concerning the outbreak of such a major hegemonic war, as will be seen. On the negative, this record can obfuscate Roman intentions, and has been subject to tortuous manipulations and reconfigurations. This is no less the case in modern scholarship on the issue.

In spite of this difficulty, our sources offer an unequivocal indication that Saguntum was the trigger of the Second Punic War. Our major task is thus to understand how this happened. Two major directions of questioning are necessary: what was Saguntum's relationship with Rome? And what were the broader relationships within which this played out? We shall see that the geographical and economic connections of Iberia were no less complex than those of Sicily.

[340] Cf. App. *Ib.* 4.

III.1.1. The central issues

We are not interested here in the *Kriegsschuldfrage,* the issue of war-guilt, which looms so large in ancient and modern discussion. Rather, we need to establish from our sources what interests Rome had in Iberia, how these developed, and how they led to the negotiations of 220-218. These negotiations can then be traced in order to understand how Rome's power relationships changed.

With this framework in place, we shall once again move to the wider geopolitical context, to consider more broadly the network of power relations existing and developing at this time. This will involve discussion of the Barcid 'empire' in Iberia, its geographical and practical limits, and characterisation of Iberian and other groups, including the Massiliote Greeks. Material evidence, particularly numismatics, will help us to suggest links between these different elements, and to explore the power relationships between them. This will also further our understanding of substantive issues such as the Ebro Treaty and the position of Saguntum, which will have been discussed as part of the characterisation of the power negotiations.

A key question here, as we saw suggested in the chapters on Sicily, is that of how far Rome was dealing with a specific region and peoples within it and how far it was, conversely, dealing with its hegemonic opponent, Carthage. Putting Barcid Iberia in its regional and domestic context is crucial to understanding this problem, particularly as we are lacking in this case a third party as obvious as the kingdom of Syracuse, and as the Second Punic War was, contrary to Roman expectations, not initially to be fought in Iberia itself. The super-regional context is also significant here, particularly in relation to southern Gaul and northern Italy, as Carthage's relationships in this area played a major role in the invasion of Italy, and Rome's

own relations with the Gauls may also suggest an emerging significance for Iberia in Roman conceptions of Mediterranean power networks.

We begin, then, with the basic events from 238 (the arrival of Hamilcar Barca) to 218, according to our major textual sources, presented in Table III.1.a. Our major sources here are Polybius, Livy, Diodorus, Dio-Zonaras, and Appian. Where Polybius details the alleged mistakes of Fabius Pictor or of other sources, these are given in his column in italics.

POLYBIUS	**LIVY**	**DIODORUS SICULUS**	**DIO-ZONARAS**	**APPIAN**
Carthaginians send Hamilcar to Iberia, where he defeats or wins over many communities (2.1.5-7), strengthening and emboldening Carthage (3.10.5-6)	Hamilcar extends Punic power in Iberia (21.2.1)	Hamilcar defeats Iberians, Tartessians, and Celts in Iberia, wins over many cities by diplomacy or by force, and founds Akra Leuke (25.10.1-3)	Hamilcar goes to Iberia against the will of those at Carthage (Zon. 8.17)	While commanding in Libya, Hamilcar crosses to Iberia and begins plundering innocent Iberians (*Ib.* 5; *Hann.* 2)
			Having paid no attention to Iberia before, Rome sends an embassy	

			to find out what Hamilcar is doing there; he explains his campaigning there as necessary for paying indemnity to Rome (Cass. Dio fr.48)	
After a failed coup at Carthage (3.8.2-4), Hasdrubal makes much progress in Iberia, and founds New Carthage (2.13.1-2)	Hasdrubal makes advances in Iberia, more by diplomacy than by arms (21.2.5)	Hasdrubal, who prefers diplomacy (25.11.1), defeats the Orissi and takes their 12 cities and 'all' the cities of Iberia; he marries a princess and founds New Carthage and another city (25.12.1)	Hasdrubal has successes and founds New Carthage (Zon. 8.19)	Hasdrubal makes advances by diplomacy and arms until he reaches the Ebro (located by A in central Spain, flowing into the Northern Ocean) (*Ib.* 6)
Concerned by Hasdrubal's success and	Because of his brilliance, Rome 'renews' the			The concerns of Saguntum (located north of

constrained by fear of the Gauls, the Romans make an agreement with Hasdrubal that he will not cross the Ebro in arms (2.13.3-7; cf. 2.22.9-11)	treaty with Hasdrubal, setting the Ebro as the limit for both powers but exempting Saguntum as independent (21.2.7)			the Ebro by A) and other 'Greek' towns lead Rome to send an embassy to Carthage; the Ebro is agreed as a mutual boundary, with a guarantee of freedom and autonomy for Saguntum and the other 'Greek' towns (*Ib.* 7; Ebro as boundary agreed at *Pun.* 6; with Hamilcar at *Hann.* 2)

Hannibal, as Hasdrubal's successor, acts just as independently of Carthage as he did (3.8.5); Carthage as a whole intends measures against Rome (3.13.2)				Hannibal faces domestic threats and plans war as a means of securing his own position (*Ib.* 8-9; *Hann.* 3)
Hannibal captures Althaea by assault, and subjugates the Olcades (3.13.5-6)	Steering clear of Saguntum, Hannibal takes Cartala (Althaea) (21.5.3-4)			
Hannibal sets out against the Vaccaei and takes Hermandica and Arbacala, before being forced into open battle with the Carpetani; he	Hannibal sets out against the Vaccaei and takes Hermandica and Arbocala, before being forced into open battle with the Carpetani; he			

succeeds (3.14.1-8)	succeeds (21.5.5-16)			
South of the Ebro, only Saguntum stands against Carthage; Hannibal tries to avoid it until he has full control in Iberia (3.14.9-10)	South of the Ebro, only Saguntum stands against Carthage (21.5.17)			
Saguntum sends repeated embassies to Rome in fear; Rome finally sends an embassy, which meets Hannibal at New Carthage (3.15.1-4)	Hannibal sows quarrels among Saguntum's neighbours, especially the Turdetani, leading Saguntum to appeal to Rome; Rome decides to send an embassy, but then hears that the siege has begun (21.6.1-5)		Hannibal attacks Saguntum in order to anger Rome; Saguntum appeals to Rome and to its neighbours; Rome sends ambassadors to Hannibal to order him to desist, and to proceed to Carthage if rejected (Zon.	Hannibal persuades the Torboletae to complain of Saguntine aggressions; he sends the ambassadors on to Carthage, with additional letters blaming Rome; he secures a free hand from Carthage; he

			8.21)	invites ambassadors from the Torboletae and Saguntines, rejects Saguntine requests for Roman arbitration, crosses the Ebro and besieges Saguntum. Saguntum appeals to Rome; Rome sends ambassadors to remind Hannibal of the existing agreement, and to continue to Carthage if rebuffed (*Ib.* 10-11; intrigue, crossing, and

				attack also at *Hann.* 3; crossing at *Pun.* 6)
	The Senate debates what to do, and concludes it will send the embassy as planned (21.6.5-8)			
Embassy enjoins Hannibal not to attack Saguntum or to cross the Ebro (3.15.5); Hannibal accuses Rome in turn of bad faith in recent Saguntine arbitration (3.15.7)	Hannibal, pursuing the siege, has the embassy turned away (21.9.2-3)		Hannibal, pursuing the siege, has the embassy turned away (Zon. 8.21)	Hannibal, pursuing the siege, has the embassy turned away (*Ib.* 11)

Hannibal sends to Carthage for instructions, alleging that the Saguntines have been offending Carthaginian subjects (3.15.8)	Hannibal sends letters to his faction in Carthage, knowing the embassy will proceed there (21.9.4)			
Roman embassy sees war is inevitable and proceeds to Carthage (3.15.12)	Embassy demands surrender of Hannibal, but only Hanno agrees; the Carthaginians blame the Saguntines (21.10.1-11.2)		Embassy 'accuses' Hannibal at Carthage; Hannibal's faction blame the Saguntines, leading to war (Zon. 8.21)	Embassy goes to Carthage with Saguntine ambassadors; Carthaginians accuse Saguntum of wronging Carthaginian subjects; Carthaginians reject Saguntine offer of Roman arbitration (*Ib.* 11)
				Romans debate sending aid to Saguntum, but

				determine that the situation does not breach Saguntum's treaty position (*Ib.* 11)
Hannibal attacks Saguntum and takes it in eight months, gaining money and regional and domestic influence (3.17.1-11)	Hannibal takes Saguntum (21.14.3); Livy admits a problem with his chronology (21.15.3-6)	Hannibal takes Saguntum but gains no profit (25.15.1)		Hannibal takes Saguntum and repopulates it as a Carthaginian colony, which A confuses with New Carthage (*Ib.* 12)
	The news of the fall arrives at Rome around the time of the embassy's return; Rome fears Hannibal will cross the Ebro (21.16.1, 5)			

The Romans do not hold a debate about what to do (*some authors disagree*) (3.20.1), but send an embassy to Carthage demanding that Hannibal be given up or war will be declared (3.20.6-8)	The question of war is submitted to the People and approved (21.17.4); an embassy is sent to demand the disavowal of Hannibal and to declare war if the demand is rejected (21.18.1-2)	The Romans demand the surrender of Hannibal (25.15.1)	The Romans hold a debate, the main arguments being for immediate war or the sending of another embassy (Cass. Dio 13.55.1-9; Zon. 8.22)	The Romans send an embassy to Carthage demanding that Hannibal be given up or war will be declared (*Ib.* 13)
The Carthaginians dismiss or ignore the Ebro Treaty as nonexistent or not ratified (3.21.1); they argue that Saguntum was not a Roman ally in the Lutatius Treaty (3.21.5);	The Carthaginians reject the Ebro Treaty as unratified, argue that Saguntum was not a Roman ally in the Lutatius Treaty, and reject the idea that they should give up Hannibal (21.18.4-			

the Romans refuse justification given that Saguntum has fallen (3.21.6-8)	12)			
Romans are too angry about Saguntum to make the following (later) arguments: the Ebro Treaty is legitimate; the Lutatius Treaty allowed for future allies (3.29.1-10)				

Lead Roman ambassador responds by offering war or peace; Carthaginian *suffete* tells him to choose; he announces war, and the Carthaginians accept it (3.33.1-4)	Lead Roman ambassador responds by offering war or peace; he is told to choose; he announces war, and the Carthaginians accept it (21.18.13-14); Livy argues that the Ebro Treaty was legitimate and that the Lutatius Treaty allowed for future allies (21.19.2-5)	The Roman envoy responds to Carthaginian refusal by offering war or peace; the *suffete* tells him to choose, and he chooses war (25.16.1)	Lead Roman ambassador offers war or peace; he is told to choose; he declares war (Cass. Dio 13.55.10)	Lead Roman ambassador responds to Carthaginian rejection of the demand by offering war or peace; he is told to choose; he declares war, and the Carthaginians accept it (*Ib.* 13)
With his troops out of winter quarters, Hannibal receives news from Carthage and sets				Hannibal quietly intends the invasion of Italy and makes preliminary moves (*Ib.* 13)

a departure date for Italy (3.34.6-9)				
Hannibal crosses the Ebro (3.35.2)	News arrives from Massiliote envoys that Hannibal has crossed the Ebro (21.25.1)			

Table III.1.a. Events concerning Iberia from Hamilcar's command to Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro (238-218).

Though there are many significant discrepancies between these accounts, there are also a number of key points which are fairly consistent between the sources. Firstly, the sources agree that from 238 to his death, Hamilcar made advances in Iberia, and Hasdrubal continued these successes when he took over command. An agreement was made between Hasdrubal and a Roman embassy, which set the Ebro as a form of boundary to Carthaginian expansion. Hannibal, on taking command after Hasdrubal's death, made further advances.

The points which follow are vital for the framework of the power negotiations which led to war. Crucially, the sources agree that Saguntum played a key role in tensions between Rome and Carthage, though they disagree on important details. They agree also that no Roman embassy was seen by Hannibal during the siege of the town, and that Rome did not send help to the Saguntines during the siege. The fall of the town subsequently led to the sending of a Roman embassy demanding that the Carthaginians disavow (and surrender) Hannibal or face war. The Carthaginian Senate rejected Roman references to the Ebro Treaty and to Saguntum being a Roman ally, leading to the theatrical declaration of war by the lead

ambassador. On this much the sources are in agreement: within these bounds, however, there are numerous points of disagreement, which have serious ramifications for our understanding of the discourse taking place.

Some of the major points of disagreement are part of the broader regional context and background to these events, and will be dealt with as such. These concern in particular the domestic relations of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, as well as the trade vista of the western Mediterranean. Firstly, however, we must approach the content and chronology of the power negotiations of 220-218, and the points of disagreement which bear most upon this. These concern the nature of the Ebro Treaty, the political position of Saguntum, and the order and content of Roman embassies, in particular in chronological relation to the attack on Saguntum.

III.1.2. The Ebro Treaty

While Polybius, Livy, and Appian agree, as Table III.1.a shows, that an agreement was made between Rome and Hasdrubal establishing the River Ebro as a limit of some kind, they are not united on the specifics of this agreement. There are three key issues to consider: the date and context of the agreement; its legal nature; and its exact content. We will then be able to examine its relevance to the power negotiations of 220-218, and the grounds on which it was raised or rejected.[341]

The relative chronological placement of the agreement is the same in all three sources: it falls during the generalship of Hasdrubal, subsequent to his initial successes in Iberia. This

[341] For an isolated argument for the treaty being a later Roman fiction, see Cuff 1973; cf. Hoyos 1998: 155.

allows a date-range between winter 229/8 and summer/autumn 221.[342] More specific dating relies on the context alleged by Polybius, who claims that the treaty was the consequence of Roman fears about a possible Gallic invasion. This places the agreement around 226-5.[343] The significance of the Gallic threat will be considered further below. There is no immediate reason, however, to doubt Polybius' reasoning in relating the two items, and 226/5 is a reasonable working date.

The context supplied by Appian, involving the expression of concerns by Saguntum, which he places north of the Ebro, stands awkwardly in relation to the accounts of Polybius and Livy. In addition to its notable and explicit geographical error, when compared with the other sources it gives a strong impression of a doublet, where the active involvement of Saguntum has been reused from its later context, in which it leads to Roman embassies to Hannibal. Appian's terms also make little sense, as there would be no need for specific protection from Carthage for a town north of the Ebro. The problem is exacerbated by Appian's weak geography in alleging that Hasdrubal's campaigns had reached the Ebro when the river he describes is far more likely the Tagus.[344] Appian's order of events around the treaty therefore appears isolated and unlikely.

A third and more robust possibility for the context behind the making of an agreement is hinted at by the sources. Livy attributes the agreement to Hasdrubal's *mira ars* in winning over peoples in Iberia to his side, and Polybius mentions Roman concern at his success, while Polybius, Diodorus, and Zonaras all mention the founding of New Carthage (Cartagena) by Hasdrubal. This was in a strategically important location, granting Carthage a valuable harbour and potential base for northward expansion.[345] Polybius indeed credits Hasdrubal's advances

[342] See Sumner 1968: 213 n.27.
[343] Càssola 1962: 248; Rich 1996: 2, 23 (with reservations about Polybian synchronisms); Bringmann 2001: 370; Erdkamp 2009: 504-5, 508-9. Hoyos 1998: 157 attempts greater precision.
[344] App. *Ib.* 6; see Hoyos 1998: 172.
[345] See Sumner 1968: 217; Richardson 1986: 29.

with making Rome notice and concern itself with events in Iberia, and gives the new city a prominent place within these advances. This positions the agreement after at least a season or so of campaigning under Hasdrubal, and places it within its own close regional context.[346]

On the legal nature of the agreement, we have some firm indications. According to both Polybius and Livy, the agreement was made directly with Hasdrubal; the only explicit claims otherwise come from Appian in the *Iberica,* where he claims that the agreement was made at Carthage, and in the *Hannibalica,* where he claims that it was made with Hamilcar (see Table III.1.a). That it was a field agreement made solely with the commander is also implied by Carthaginian rejection of it in 218 as unratified at Carthage (according to Polybius and Livy) or even non-existent (according to Polybius).[347] Polybius goes on to claim that the agreement did not include a clause requiring ratification at Carthage (as, for example, the Lutatius Treaty of 241 had required ratification at Rome), and that Hasdrubal made the agreement αὐτοτελῶς.[348] Whether Rome fully believed that Hasdrubal had the plenipotentiary position to make an agreement binding upon his state and successors is open to debate, but the practice followed clearly left a space for such an argument.

There are reasons to think that Rome itself intended the agreement only as a temporary measure. The key reason is the presentation of the agreement by Polybius. According to his account, Rome is awakened to Carthaginian advances in Iberia, and resolves to confront this situation, but is constrained by fear of a Celtic invasion.[349] This leads the Romans to make a conciliatory agreement with Hasdrubal in order to give themselves free rein in dealing with the Celtic threat. The agreement itself is presented as brief and basic, a hurried

[346] A fourth element of context, the possible involvement of Massilia, will be discussed in the geopolitics section below.
[347] This passage of Polybius is troublingly vague and ambiguous, but his elaboration on the ratification question suggests strongly that the point was indeed at issue.
[348] Polyb. 3.29.3.
[349] How far this fear was present and valid will be discussed further below.

response to a threatening situation.[350] While it is true that Carthaginian cooperation in a Gallic attack would have been an open and obvious breach of the Lutatius Treaty,[351] and the new agreement is thus unlikely to have been an attempt to stop such an event occurring, it is possible to see how the new agreement could, as a stopgap measure, have made the situation less difficult for Rome to handle. That there were tensions in the Mediterranean, particularly in the west, in the early to mid-220s is suggested by the establishment of the new praetorships in 227 and their use to administer Sicily and Sardinia. As Erdkamp suggests, this change of practice could have been a product of strained relations with Carthage, or a cause, but it makes most sense in an environment of tension.[352] Hoyos has observed also that magisterial deployments in the western Mediterranean around this time suggest concerns about Carthage, which, as we have seen, would make sense in light of Hasdrubal's advances and foundation of New Carthage.[353] A field agreement with the most threatening limb of Carthaginian power might thus have made good sense.[354]

Other aspects of the agreement as presented by Polybius further suggest that it was not a treaty proper, but more accurately a field compact. In particular, Polybius mentions only one term, that Carthage may not cross the Ebro in arms, and makes no suggestion of bilateral terms (indeed, he states there were none concerning Iberia).[355] Similarly, no other terms of the agreement are mentioned when it is brought up in negotiations in 218.[356] As the agreement is discussed by Polybius in the context of his listing of Roman-Carthaginian treaties, which he claims to report from autopsy, it seems most likely that he had seen the relevant document

[350] See Scardigli 1991: 263-4, 270; Erdkamp 2009: 508-9.
[351] As noted by e.g. Richardson 1986: 29; Rich 1996: 21-2; *contra* Walbank 1957: 170; Bringmann 2001: 37.
[352] Erdkamp 2009: 506-7.
[353] Hoyos 1998: 156-7.
[354] De Sanctis' long-term view of the agreement (1907-64: III.i 413) does not stand up in light of limited Roman interest in Iberia and Transalpina at this point.
[355] For a suggestion of reciprocal terms relating to concerns other than Iberia, see Badian 1980.
[356] Richardson 1986: 25-6.

here too.[357] We have no reason to think it was an incomplete document; given the apparent completeness of the other treaties reported by Polybius, this would be unique.[358] To assume that there were, as Livy alleges, reciprocal terms concerning Iberia on Rome's part would be to assume, given Polybius' insistence on the lack of other terms relating to Iberia, that he is lying. The balance of evidence thus suggests that the agreement was technically unilateral, and thus not exactly a treaty.[359] Polybius' terminology does not particularly help: at different points he refers to the agreement as συνθήκας, διομολογήσεις, and ὁμολογίας.[360] While he brackets it with the other treaties, its brevity marks it out as different, as does the Carthaginian rejection of it, suggesting that its status was ambiguous.[361]

The question that remains is the presence or absence of a clause mentioning Saguntum. As Table III.1.a shows, both Livy and Appian claim that such a clause was included.[362] That this was not the case might be suggested by the presence in Appian and other writers of the later tradition of the placement of Saguntum north of the Ebro: if the false placement became part of the tradition, placing Saguntum outside of Carthage's zone of free rein, this implies that there was not already a guarantee for Saguntum in the Ebro agreement.[363] This argument, however, does not grant enough space to the possibility of sheer ignorance or confusion; as Polybius' account shows, and as will be seen further below, there is plenty of confusion around events. A further argument for the dubious nature of the Saguntine protection clause may nonetheless be adduced. For Appian, the free and autonomous nature of Saguntum, as established in the Ebro agreement, provides a neat excuse for Rome's lack of

[357] Polyb. 3.26.1-2; Errington 1970: 35.
[358] For this claim, see Dorey 1959-60: 4.
[359] Errington 1970: 36 suggests a letter format.
[360] 2.13.7; 3.27.9, 29.2-3. Sancho Royo 1976: 77 wrongly denies that Polybius ever calls the treaty a *syntheka* [sic]. See also Hoyos 1998: 158.
[361] Cf. Badian 1958: 49 (not a treaty but 'a formal assurance'); Picard 1966: 755 n.3 on the possibility of Carthaginian exploitation of the equivocal status of the Barcid territories in Iberia.
[362] See also Zon. 8.21.4; Flor. 1.22.4; Sil. Ital. 1.294-5; Strabo 3.4.6.
[363] Hoyos 1998: 158-9.

intervention during the siege.[364] This conception ill fits the rest of Appian's narrative, where the agreement is driven in the first place by Saguntine concerns, and Rome makes repeated (non-military) interventions. Given, then, that the Saguntine protection clause is omitted (and explicitly precluded) by Polybius and avails Saguntum nothing in Appian, it seems reasonable to disbelieve its legitimacy.[365] The city could, however, have been under the protection of Roman *fides,* which will be considered further below.

The Ebro agreement, then, was not a treaty in the full legal sense; it belonged very much to its immediate context; it seems to have been unilateral on the Carthaginian side, at least as far as Iberia was concerned. We may now ask how it contributed to the power discourse of the 220s. This, unfortunately, is difficult to do, as there is considerable scope for disagreement over how generous the agreement may be considered to either side.[366] Polybius' presentation of the circumstances suggests that Rome was keen to keep Hasdrubal happy, and terms agreeable to him would make sense of his being amenable to a unilateral agreement.[367] On the other hand, as we have suggested above, there is evidence for tension between Rome and Carthage in the 220s, and it had recently been demonstrated that Rome was the stronger power. Thus it is not implausible that Hasdrubal might have had concerns, as De Sanctis suggests, about Roman intervention in Iberia, which an apparent concession on his part might allay.[368] Further attempts to establish whether the agreement was a Roman concession or a Carthaginian one largely fall flat: Picard, for example, argues that the agreement could only have been intended as a concession if Rome's leading men at the time were amenable to Carthage, Rome had fully foreseen the Gallic invasion, and the agreement fully freed Rome to

[364] App. *Ib.* 11.
[365] Its floating mention in Dio-Zonaras does not change this assessment.
[366] This can even lead to self-contradictions over the intended effects of the agreement, such as that made by Errington (1970: 38 n.4, 41) and observed by Sumner (1972: 477).
[367] See e.g. Cuff 1973: 164.
[368] De Sanctis 1907-64: III.i 414.

mass its forces in the north.[369] His rejection of these conditions leads him to reject the proposition outright. This back-to-front reasoning demonstrates the sheer perplexity of scholarship on this question of *cui bono.*

Little more can be drawn from the choice of the Ebro as a boundary.[370] While prohibiting Carthage (or rather Hasdrubal) from crossing the Ebro in force would have served for Rome almost as a blanket ban on Carthaginian military advance north of Iberia, it could also be perceived as a far-off goal and thus no real limitation for Hasdrubal.[371] Arguably, what we can draw from a focus on the location of the Ebro is the significant growth of Carthaginian power in Iberia between the agreement and the outbreak of war in 218. While Richardson, for instance, suggests that the agreement became a live issue in 220/219 because Hannibal was drawing closer to the Ebro, this is not strictly necessary.[372] Roman harping on the agreement and Carthaginian rejection of its validity demonstrates that it had some perceived value to Rome by 220, but rather less to Carthage and to Hannibal. This may be partly a product of its unilateral nature; if only Carthage were restricted, it is quite reasonable that they would seek to escape the restriction, while Rome retained an interest in the status quo. Nonetheless, it is a clear sign of a shift in the discourse.

We may further say, however, that the agreement itself illustrates an earlier shift in discourse, in which Carthage acknowledged some right on Rome's part to interfere in Iberia.[373] This is particularly significant in comparison to the Roman-Carthaginian treaty of 348, where

[369] Picard 1966: 751.
[370] As many scholars have observed, Carcopino's thesis of the *Iber* referring to a different river is ultimately unworkable. See e.g. Gauthier 1968: 91-5; Sumner 1968: 222-32; Cuff 1973: 163-4; Hoyos 1998: 162-3; 2011b: 217.
[371] Practicality of Ebro: Richardson 1986: 26-7. Extent of Carthaginian power well short of the Ebro up to time of Hannibal: Hoyos 1998: 172.
[372] Richardson 1986: 23.
[373] See Kramer 1948: 17; Lazenby 1978: 24.

Mastia (probably Cartagena) was used as a boundary to limit Roman sailing.[374] This may in part be a sign of the changing of the balance of power in the western Mediterranean, as Rome now controlled Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica (the latter two at least nominally), and was regularly campaigning in Liguria. This would then have reinforced its potential for action in eastern Iberia. The Ebro agreement therefore captures a major moment in the rearrangement of power in the Mediterranean following the First Punic War, and its treatment in the eight or so years after its creation illustrates the ongoing shift which led to the power negotiations which opened the Second.

III.1.3. Saguntum

It has been argued above that Saguntum was not explicitly protected by the Ebro agreement, but it is clear from Table III.1.a that it played an absolutely central role in the power negotiations of 220-218. We need therefore to understand its political position in relation to Rome, in order to establish the basis upon which Rome made its representations to Hannibal and to Carthage in the city's favour. The key questions concern when Rome established political relations with Saguntum, when the controversial Roman arbitration at Saguntum took place, and whether Rome had an explicit alliance with Saguntum.

Firstly, then, we should consider the likely course of Roman relations with Saguntum in the 230s and 220s.[375] Dio-Zonaras claims that Rome had no interest in Iberia at all until 231, when it sent an embassy to see what Hamilcar was doing there.[376] Polybius has the Romans developing an interest during Hasdrubal's tenure as commander, εὑρόντες δὲ σφᾶς

[374] Polyb. 3.24.4. On the identification of Mastia see e.g. Ferrer Albelda 2006; Hernández Prieto 2012: 27 with n.9.
[375] On the likelihood of pre-existing trade links, see below.
[376] Zon. 8.21.

ἐπικεκοιμημένους ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις, and moving to make the Ebro agreement.[377] While these accounts differ by a few years, both maintain roughly the same idea: a sudden uptick in Roman interest at a senatorial level. Either of these episodes, both of which involve embassies to Iberia, would provide a plausible moment for Rome to make contact with Saguntum.[378] Since we have seen that Rome likely made no commitments relating to Iberia in the Ebro agreement, there is no reason to think that an embassy could not have made the Ebro agreement and formed friendly contacts with Saguntum on the same trip.[379]

Only Polybius makes an explicit suggestion of when Roman-Saguntine relations began, and it is a vague one. According to his account, the Saguntines gave themselves into Rome's *pistis* πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν ἤδη πρότερον τῶν κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν καιρῶν.[380] As scholarship has demonstrated, this leaves room for disagreement on the likely date.[381] There is, however, a key point we can take away from Polybius' account. When he mentions the Roman arbitration at Saguntum, which he considers a proof of their close relationship, he places it μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις in relation to Hannibal's reception of the first Roman embassy in 220.[382] While Polybian time-phrases are less than precise indicators, the relative meaning of these two is clear enough: the Roman friendship with Saguntum is clearly intended to have preceded the Roman arbitration there.[383] The phrase μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις does not allow great

[377] Polyb. 2.13.3-4.
[378] *Contra* Badian 1958: 48.
[379] Hoyos 1998: 182.
[380] Polyb. 3.30.1.
[381] E.g. De Sanctis 1907-64: III.i 417 (probably before 226); Kramer 1948: 11 and n.38 (231); Scardigli 1991: 275 (224/3).
[382] Polyb. 3.15.7.
[383] Contrary to the assertion of Errington 1970: 43; 1971: 55. The former depends on Polyb. 3.30.1-2, which, contrary to Errington's argument, does not claim Rome was wholly uninvolved in Iberia up to the arbitration, but only that Rome was not as actively involved as Carthage and did not have representatives nearby.

precision in locating the arbitration chronologically, but would suggest it falls within at most the five years prior to the discussion in which Hannibal uses it.[384]

A relationship therefore existed between Rome and Saguntum prior to the arbitration 'a few years before' the 220 embassy to Hannibal. On the understanding of the Ebro agreement reached above, it does not matter whether it pre- or post-dated that agreement, as no formal or informal relationship would have breached the terms. We should, however, consider the nature of the relationship. We have no evidence of a formal alliance; note Polybius' claim that the arbitration is itself the greatest proof of Saguntum being within Rome's *pistis.*[385] For Saguntum to be considered within Rome's *pistis* or *fides* would not require a particular political relationship, even if a *deditio* had taken place.[386] The lack of a formal relationship would also explain Rome's dilatory behaviour during the siege of Saguntum: an informal alliance would allow such behaviour (though, as Livy's account suggests, it could still cause difficulty in encouraging trust later on).[387] The appearance of Saguntum as an 'ally' of Rome in both Polybius and Livy, moreover, is purely negative, as the Carthaginians claim in both accounts simply that Saguntum was *not* a Roman ally at the time of the Lutatius Treaty.[388]

It is worth addressing here what the Roman arbitration was actually about. As we have established, it belongs probably to the second half of the 220s, a time at which Carthage was making advances in Iberia. We have no indication, however, that the arbitration had to do with a perceived Carthaginian threat; indeed, there are reasons to suggest that the disagreement Rome was invited to arbitrate had nothing directly to do with Carthage. More than one source mentions Barcid resolution to keep away from Saguntum prior to Hannibal's eventual decision

[384] Walbank 1957: 322 is overzealous in narrowing it to 221-220 on the basis of the Carthaginians being ἐγγὺς to Saguntum at the time according to Polyb. 3.30.2.
[385] Polyb. 3.30.1-2.
[386] See Walbank 1957: 321; Dorey 1959-60: 2 (though he goes on unnecessarily and without evidence to suggest a *deditio* in 220/19); Astin 1967: 590-3; Hoyos 1998: 176-8. Harris 1979: 201 with n.4 overstates the power of Polyb. 3.21.5 and has no proper basis for claiming a formal agreement.
[387] Liv. 21.19.9-10.
[388] Polyb. 3.21.5; Liv. 21.18.8.

to attack it. Polybius mentions Hannibal's attempts to avoid Saguntum in obedience to his father's precepts; this need not be read as an indication that Hamilcar considered Saguntum in particular worth avoiding, but it is suggestive of cautious Carthaginian behaviour.[389] Livy too claims that Hannibal deliberately avoided Saguntum in his campaign against the city of Cartala.[390] While this behaviour is presented as quite deliberate, particularly by Livy, as a prelude to an attack on Saguntum, it flies in the face of the idea that Carthage had previously menaced Saguntum sufficiently to provoke a need for internal arbitration between pro- and anti-Carthaginian (or pro-Roman) groups.[391]

Polybius' text also suggests that the situation was not one of pro-Carthaginian and pro-Roman factions against one another. The key passage here is Hannibal's complaint to the embassy of 220 about the arbitration. Firstly, he does not claim that Rome had no right to arbitrate at Saguntum, but only that the arbitrators abused their position and acted ἀδίκως.[392] Had a pro-Carthaginian element been involved, indeed, it is hard to see that Roman arbitration would have been accepted in the first place (especially given what had happened at Messana 40 years earlier). Secondly, his accusation that, in killing certain leading men, the arbitrators were παρεσπονδημένους suggests that both sides had trusted the arbitrators.[393] While this need not have been the exact truth of what happened, it is of great interest that Polybius' Hannibal presents his case in this way. It also bears an interesting relation to the presentation in Livy and Appian of Hannibal increasingly manipulating Saguntum's local relations to achieve his ends, taking on a habit of local champion. In this respect, Hannibal appears to have capitalised in both practical and performative terms on his presence on the ground.

[389] Polyb. 3.14.9-10; see Eckstein 1984: 54; 55 makes the further (plausible) argument that this passage derives from a pro-Carthaginian source. See also Sumner 1968: 212.
[390] Liv. 21.5.4.
[391] As maintained by e.g. Rich 1996: 26-7. Cf. also Zon. 8.21 for Saguntum as deliberate provocation.
[392] Eckstein 1984: 64; cf. Errington 1970: 45.
[393] Hoyos 1998: 185-7 provides valuable analysis.

In sum, what we see here is similar to the conclusion drawn above with regard to the Ebro agreement: increasing Roman involvement in Iberian affairs in the 220s followed by a reversal of power relations under Hannibal. This reversal in power relations saw here, as above, a diminution of the value of de facto relationships formed in the previous years. Saguntum, however, appealed to Rome apparently on both sides of the Hannibalic reversal, suggesting an enduring relationship with Rome.

III.1.4. Embassies and (lack of) aid

Differing versions of the chronology of the Roman embassies are available in the sources, which require consideration if we are to understand Rome's behaviour. As illustration of the overall difficulty of the problem, Livy admits himself that his chronology is flawed, as a siege of eight months is incompatible with the consuls of 218/7, P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti. Sempronius Longus, both receiving the Saguntine embassy just prior to news of the attack and serving as commanders against Hannibal in Italy.[394] He proposes the possibility that the fall of Saguntum, rather than the beginning of the siege, took place when those consuls were entering office, which is not far different from accepted reconstructions of the siege chronology.[395] Confusion and attempted correction of consular names is a plausible explanation for this.[396] This would answer Livy's critique of his own chronology as well as explaining his disagreement with Polybius. The same mistaken chain of sources could then explain the order of events given by

[394] Liv. 21.15.3-6.
[395] See esp. Sumner 1966: 6-8; also Hoffmann 1951: 70; Hoyos 1998: 221.
[396] Vallejo 1943: 144-9 (substitution), 150-1 (correction); 1946: xxxiv-xxxvi (substitution), xxxvii-xxxviii (correction).

Zonaras and Appian.[397] This solution is only speculative, but, given Livy's explicit recognition that something had gone amiss with the chronology by the time he received it, we have a non-negligible reason for crediting Polybius' order of events (embassy, attack, fall, embassy, war) over the rest.

It should be admitted, however, that Polybius' presentation of the first embassy does not wholly make sense with his continuing narrative. According to his account of the ambassadors' discussion with Hannibal, it was apparent in winter 220/19 that war was inevitable, as a result of Hannibal's demeanour and responses.[398] He adds, moreover, that the ambassadors expected a war to be fought in Iberia, with the Roman side based at Saguntum. Unless the embassy's subsequent stop at Carthage received a completely different reception (which we have no reason to suspect),[399] these claims sit extremely oddly with Roman inaction until after the fall of Saguntum.[400]

In all versions, though, Rome was of no use to Saguntum during its siege.[401] The evident embarrassment this later occasioned makes it difficult to see why the sources would not be telling the truth.[402] What exactly was behind this inaction is not readily apparent. There are a few possibilities: firstly, that Rome did not care about Saguntum at all; secondly, that there was senatorial disagreement on the appropriate course to take; thirdly, that Hannibal was expected to accede. The first possibility rests mainly on the argument that Rome's justification for war was not originally based on the fate of Saguntum, which is made immediately difficult to believe by the sources' unanimous insistence on the importance of Saguntum. The second and third possibilities have more to recommend them. The consuls of

[397] It must be remembered here that Appian actually has an embassy sent to Hasdrubal as a result of Saguntine appeals at an earlier date, as noted above.
[398] Polyb. 3.15.12.
[399] Indeed we might even query whether it took place; see Sumner 1968: 238-40.
[400] For critique of this disjunction in Polybius, see Hoffmann 1951; Càssola 1962: 236.
[401] Rich 1976: 28 even argues that Livy's source may have deliberately botched the chronology, shortening it, in order to make this seem 'less heinous'. Cf. De Sanctis 1907-64: III.i 430.
[402] Liv. 21.19.9-10.

219/8 were sent to Illyria, which suggests either unconcern with regard to Iberia or the prioritisation of the Illyrian campaign.[403] That indecision or disagreement was involved, however, is suggested by the fact that, after this display of disinterest, Rome subsequently sent an embassy to Carthage which uniquely contained both of the consuls of the previous year (219/8, sent at the beginning of the 218/7 consular year).[404] This change of direction may have had to do with the fall of Saguntum, but given that the fall was an expected result of a siege, it is hard to see what actually changed, except for possibly the removal of any sense of urgency.[405]

Based on our sources and on what we know of administrative practice, we can suggest that Rome's failure to help Saguntum was a product of two major factors: the inflexibility of magisterial structures within a given year, and disagreement over the severity of the Iberian diplomatic situation and the appropriate measures to be taken. Likely chronological reconstructions place the fall of Saguntum in late 219, and the sending of the consuls of 219/8 in the war embassy means that that embassy cannot have been sent until the beginning of the consular year 218/7.[406] The delaying of such a move *ad novos consules* is by no means unprecedented, and demonstrates a potential structural constraint on action.[407] We also, however, have serious evidence to support the idea of disagreement, further to the decision to pursue the Illyrian campaign in 219. As Table III.1.a shows, Polybius' sources, Livy, Dio-Zonaras, and Appian all feature debates over what to do with regard to the situation. Polybius' sources and Dio-Zonaras place the debate after the fall, prior to the sending of the war embassy, while Livy locates it between the deciding and sending of the first embassy, and Appian immediately

[403] See Hoffmann 1951: 72; Rich 1996: 28-9 (both focusing on lack of concern).
[404] Liv. 21.18.1. On the significance of this embassy's composition, see Astin 1967: 580. On the validity of the names, see Rich 1976: 31.
[405] See Hoffmann 1951: 74; Rich 1976: 32, 39; 1996: 30.
[406] Date of the fall: Hoffmann 1951: 70; Sumner 1966: 6-8; Hoyos 1998: 221.
[407] See Sumner 1966: 11; Rich 1976: 20; Harris 1979: 202; Rich 1996: 30.

after the first embassy.[408] Whenever we prefer to place it, in spite of Polybius' (weak) insistence to the contrary it seems highly likely that there was a debate.[409] What is vital to note is that the debate as presented by Livy and Zonaras concerns more the tenor of the embassy than the key elements: Hannibal's actions are unacceptable, and restitution must be made.

Two sorts of caution appear to be visible here. One is caution with regard to a new field of war: holding off to the beginning of the new consular year before risking the start of a war in Iberia makes good sense given the logistical challenges.[410] The second is caution with regard to how to express demands in the face of Hannibal's behaviour. Although the war embassy as we have it in the sources sounds high-handed (and is accused of being such by Livy's Carthaginians),[411] if we are to credit the debate (particularly Dio's version), it could have omitted the niceties altogether. It is in fact interesting that Livy has the Carthaginian senatorial speaker complain to the war embassy that while it couches its point in gentler words than the previous one, it is harsher in its demands. This suggests that the niceties do not actually temper the major point the embassy is making: that of expressing its demands and encouraging Carthage to bow to Rome's power. It is a marker of Hannibal's improved position in Iberia that the Carthaginians are able to respond in this way, rejecting not only Rome's references to alliance and treaty but its expectation of their acceptance of Hannibal's noxal liability.

It remains to confirm here that Saguntum is, as best we can tell, the cause of Rome's demands. All of the sources stress Saguntum's importance, and only Appian places the

[408] The disagreement over when such a debate happened is understandable; it may reflect the tortured chronology of the situation, or the potential for repeated debate on the topic.
[409] As mentioned above, there appears to have been a gap between the news of the fall and the dispatch of the war embassy, which problematizes Polybius' insistence that the embassy was sent immediately. Polyb. 3.20.6; see Rich 1976: 31.
[410] See Rich 1976: 42-3.
[411] Liv. 21.18.4.

crossing of the Ebro before the war ultimatum, due to his geographical error.[412] The Roman mention of the Ebro agreement in the war embassy is arguably a problem here, but its involvement does not necessarily require that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro. Polybius, our great proponent of the unilateral Ebro agreement, has the embassy of 220 mention it, in what can most plausibly be explained as a recapping of previous amenable relations.[413] How it became entangled in the war embassy account is harder to suggest without diminishing the role of Saguntum.[414] To diminish the role of Saguntum and to argue that the crossing of the Ebro was the action which provoked the war embassy runs counter to the likely chronology of 218, based in particular on the relationship between the embassy's arrival back in Rome, dated relative to the foundation of Placentia and Cremona, and the crossing of the Ebro, dated relative to Hannibal's departure from New Carthage and arrival at various landmarks on his way to Italy.[415] As we move on, we must continue to bear in mind the question of how Saguntum came to appeal to Rome for help, and why Rome had an interest in (eventually) helping it.

III.1.5. Existing power relations

It is now time to consider the wider context, both geographical and chronological. Thus we can suggest the nature of Roman and Carthaginian interests in Iberia, which will help to understand the distribution and manifestation of power across the region in the broader period leading to the Second Punic War. There are several key issues to examine. Firstly,

[412] Rich 1996: 11-12.
[413] Hoyos 1998: 247. Scardigli 1991: 264-5 thinks it would have been a diplomatic faux pas to mention it, but there is no good reason for this.
[414] As done by e.g. Hoffmann 1951; Walbank 1957: 171; Gauthier 1968: 97; Ruschenbusch 1978: 232-3 .
[415] See Sumner 1966; Eckstein 1983.

consideration of trade evidence across the western Mediterranean allows us to demonstrate the complexity of economic interconnections, and to evaluate properly the likelihood of Massiliote involvement in Roman concerns. Secondly, and with this trade evidence as background, we will consider Carthage's power in Iberia, its duration, extent, and nature, including the likely objectives of the Barcids. Thirdly, we will place this in the context of the Barcids' relations with the domestic government of Carthage, in order to consider what styles of the exercise of power these commanders were following. Lastly, we return to Saguntum, to examine its origins and connections and to determine whether it was an obvious flashpoint for tensions.

III.1.5.1. The trade vista

Use of the archaeological evidence for trade, particularly Roman, across the western Mediterranean unfortunately comes with a number of problems, which we must consider before drawing any conclusions. These primarily concern the availability and interpretation of find statistics, which admit of problems with significance, dating, and agency. Given widely diverging opinions in scholarship, the best way to proceed is through the use of raw data where it is available, and with the drawing of judicious conclusions which avoid extremes. This way of proceeding, however, gives us a valuable insight into the sub-state involvement of Romans and Italians in Iberia.

The first set of problems faced concern the availability and reliability of data. Comparison of assemblages between sites within even specific regions is difficult due to lack of data, different methods, and serious quantitative differences between sites.[416] Specific forms

[416] E.g. on Catalunya, see Tremoleda Trilla and Castanyer Masoliver 2013: 225.

of evidence also pose problems. For Romano-Italian goods, we are considering two main groups of material: Greco-Italic or MGS (Magna-Graecian-Sicilian) amphorae, and ceramic wares such as Campanian A Archaic and items produced by the workshop of the Petites Éstampilles.[417] For the amphorae, places of manufacture are not always clear, and for both groups dating is a particular issue.[418] This difficulty in identifying production locations is perhaps less of a problem for Punic materials, but fabric and petrographic analysis is not always available.[419]

As far as these issues are concerned, we must accept a certain degree of agnosticism where more securely-dated contexts, for instance, are not available. In some cases, however, fabric analysis and clear sequences offer greater clarity. Olcese has shown, for example, that a late third-century MGS VI amphora found on Ischia matches local production fabrics.[420] Find patterns have further suggested that the MGS amphora form developed from Magna-Graecian and Sicilian predecessors, and continued to be produced there.[421] Two examples of dating by comparative sequences may be used to illustrate the usefulness of this possibility. Two primitive MGS amphora fragments from the Cabrera B wreck, in the Balearics, can be dated to 300-250, based on their association with a bowl from the workshop of the *paterae* with three radial palmettes from Rhode. At Rhode itself this form is found associated with another bowl of the period 300-250 from the workshop of the Petites Éstampilles, and followed by

[417] On the terms 'Greco-Italic' and 'MGS' see Will 1982; Vandermersch 1994.
[418] On amphora-manufacturing locations, see Will 1982: 343-6; Vandermersch 1994: 88; Olcese 2004. For radically different dating of amphora contexts, see esp. Nolla and Nieto 1989: 370-1 (updated in Nolla 1990: 203 n.6), 374, 376; Tremoleda Trilla and Castanyer Masoliver 2013: 213-4, 218-221; Tchernia 2016: 278 n.3. Dating of Campanian A Archaic wares and their exportation: Sanmartí Grego 1973: 166 with n.83 (cf. Solier 1979: 121); Morel 1978: 157 (cf. Cerdá 1987b: 235-7); Cibecchini and Principal 2002: 655-6. Knock-on effects of dating by association: Will 1982: 347-8, where the Will Type c (Vandermersch's MGS VI) amphorae of the lower Grand Congloué shipwreck can be dated to the late third century or ca.190 based on either Grace's or Morel's dating of the associated Campanian A items.
[419] For the application of such analysis see e.g. Bechtold 2007.
[420] Olcese 2004.
[421] Vandermersch 1994: 78-9.

Campanian A Archaic wares.[422] A *guttus* from the same wreck is similar to others found in the Grand Congloué wreck, dated by Morel to ca.190, in accordance with his late dating of the exportation of Campanian A Archaic wares in general. At Emporion, however, similar items belong to a broader context of the second half of the third century, and a small jar made at Emporion and found in the Cabrera wreck can be dated to the first half of the same century based on comparison with a similar piece from Inhumación Martí 26 at Emporion.[423]

The significance of these solutions should not be overstated: dating of many sites is still disputed, and there are further difficulties of interpretation. MGS amphorae originate from an area which was controlled at least nominally by Rome by 241 (Sicily) or earlier (southern Italy), but this does not imply 'state' interest.[424] Campanian A Archaic wares may be considered similarly; the wares of the Petites Éstampilles, originating from Lazio, come from an area even more closely under Roman control, but the same issue remains. Nonetheless, to think Rome had no interest in trade would be to ignore its treaties with Carthage, including that of 348 with its prohibition of Roman marauding, trading, or city-foundation south of Mastia,[425] not to mention Rome's interventions on behalf of Roman and Italian traders in the second half of the third century.[426] The passage of the Lex Claudia in 218 further suggests that senatorial involvement in trade had become an issue. In addition, it must be remembered that

[422] Cerdá 1978: 97-8.
[423] Cerdá 1987b: 236-7.
[424] Indeed, Bechtold 2007: 58-9 demonstrates the growth in North African imports in Sicily after the First and particularly Second Punic Wars, highlighting the possible disjunction between trade and direct power.
[425] Cf. n.374. Domínguez Pérez 2004: 362 observes that Italic wares generally do not appear south of Cartagena before the Second Punic War.
[426] Polyb. 3.24.4 (treaty); Zon. 8.18 (Rome threatens Carthage over attacks on shipping); Polyb. 2.8.1-3 (Rome sends ambassadors to Illyria over piracy). Hernández Prieto 2012: 34-5 undervalues this sensitivity to economic concerns; the textual references imply at least that Rome was kept aware of traders' interests, even if it did not always intervene.

we have no good reason to think that Carthage was running trade in a more prescriptive way than Rome was.[427]

With these issues in mind, we can consider distribution. The first point which must be made is that the MGS amphorae and Italic ceramics make up very small proportions of most assemblages in the western Mediterranean. There is, however, a suggestion of broadening trade networks, which we can trace in the evidence of shipwrecks.[428] In the first half or so of the third century, MGS amphorae appear in wrecks at Secca di Capistello (Lipari, ca.280), Terrasini (Sicily, mid-third century), and Montecristo (Tuscany, mid-third century).[429] MGS specimens appear further afield in this period or even earlier, however, including in Carthage, France, the Balearics, and mainland Spain, as well as having made up 14.7% of the amphorae found in the wreck of El Sec (Mallorca, ca.375-350).[430] In the second half of the third century, further wreck examples can be found at Cabrera B (south-west of Mallorca), Bon Capò (Ametlla de Mar, Catalunya), Meloria A (north-east of Corsica), and Tour Fondue (east of Massilia).[431] While for Cabrera B, identified as a Punic ship, Cerdá records only two fragments of MGS amphorae, Bon Capò has at least sixteen individual MGS amphorae present.[432] A quantity such as the latter gives an impression that there was in the region of Iberia some demand for Italic wines.

Finds of MGS amphorae and Italian ceramics on land in northwestern Italy, southern France, and eastern Iberia support a similar picture.[433] An egregious example is the warehouse

[427] See the reassessment of Carthaginian power by Whittaker 1978; cf. also Hoyos 1994: 269-70 on the lack of evidence for Barcid interest in shipping, in spite of Hannibal's apparent interest in making money.
[428] On the intensification of Italian commerce in the third century more generally, see e.g. Molina Vidal 2013: 196.
[429] Cerdá 1987c: 438-9.
[430] Will 1982: 343-4; Cerdá 1987a: 58, 68.
[431] Cibecchini and Principal 2002: 657-9. On the wrecks, see also Parker 1992. For an earlier dating of Bon Capò, see Domínguez Pérez 1999: 236.
[432] Cerdá 1978: 96; Tremoleda Trilla and Castanyer Masoliver 2013: 218. For the La Cabrera fragments, cf. Cerdá 1987b: 237 for the (unsupported) claim that they were made in the Gulf of Leon.
[433] On finds of Massiliote, Latial, and Campanian wares at Olbia in Liguria, see Domínguez Pérez 2004: 363.

at Pech Maho in Aude, southern France, where such amphorae make up 69% of the total amphorae found in a context with a terminus ante quem of the end of the third century. While this assemblage may date to after 218, it is notable that other sites in the region show the emergence of MGS amphorae in admittedly smaller numbers from just before 250, increasing through the second half of the century as the previously dominant Massiliote amphorae decreased in number.[434] Interestingly, this may undermine our prior image of Massilia feeling under economic threat from Carthage, when this suggests rather that Italian traders were moving in on its market. Massiliote amphorae also appear to have been in competition with MGS amphorae at a few sites in Catalunya, which is arguably difficult to square with Roman concern for Massiliote economic worries over the dominance of Punic amphorae across the region.[435] Emporion, Rhode and Ullastret similarly show low numbers of both Massiliote and MGS amphorae in contexts dated to the second half of the third century. Indigenous, Iberian, and Punic (including Punic-Ebusitan) wares dominate.[436]

Wider trends in the Iberian seaboard help to place this in context. Cibecchini and Principal analyse finds of MGS amphorae and black-glaze wares (Campanian A Archaic and Petites Éstampilles), identifying three areas. The amphorae and black-glaze wares are found in association regularly in western Languedoc and the Catalan coast; in the south-east of Spain, Contestania, and around Cartagena, the black-glaze wares are present but the amphorae scarce; and in the east, around Saguntum, Edeta, and northern Contestania, the Petites Éstampilles wares are still present, but Campanian A Archaic wares are rare, and there are no

[434] Solier 1979: 90, 119-121.
[435] Asensio 2001-2: 77. In Phase 3A (300/275-225), MGS amphorae make up 5% (1) of individuals at Alorda Park and 16% (3) of individuals at Montjuïc; Massiliote amphorae make up 5% (1) of individuals at Alorda Park and 16% (3) of individuals at Montjuïc, as well as 10% (9) of fragments at Puig Castellar and 12% (8) of individuals at Puig Sant Andreu. The overwhelming majority at all sites are Punic-Ebusitan.
[436] Tremoleda Trilla and Castanyer Masoliver 2013: 218-232.

MGS amphorae.[437] Mantilla's presentation of MGS amphorae from Saguntum problematizes this picture; while she dates the growth of demand for Italian products to the late third century, during the Second Punic War, the amphorae attested include early forms comparable to others from locations such as El Sec.[438] Cibecchini and Principal's picture of the trends must therefore be tempered somewhat.

It appears clear that some Italian products were making their way to Iberia by the fourth century, and arguably in increasing numbers over the course of the third century. Whether the available numbers constitute a significant phenomenon, however, is open to interpretation. At one extreme, Nolla and Nieto consider there to be little evidence for Italian-Iberian economic contact before 218, largely by offering late dates for material such as Ametlla de Mar and by considering sites like Pech Maho unique. Subsequent work by Nolla, while insisting on caution in extrapolating direct contacts from ceramic finds, acknowledges pre-218 dates for MGS amphorae at, for instance, Emporion.[439] Asensio's assessment of the amphora statistics for Catalunya is that they show a tendency to monopoly on the part of Carthage prior to the Second Punic War, which attributes an unnecessarily intentional and absolute, not to mention one-directional, model to the situation.[440] The difficulty of dating both amphorae and black-glaze ceramics, together with the small numbers of MGS amphora finds datable before the late third century, makes it very difficult to argue that there was a constriction placed on the market by developments in Punic trade.[441] On the opposite side, Domínguez Pérez

[437] Cibecchini and Principal 2002: 660-2. Cf. Sanmartí Grego 1973 on wide distribution of Petites Éstampilles wares.
[438] Mantilla 1987-8.
[439] Nolla and Nieto 1989; Nolla 1990.
[440] Asensio 2001-2: 79. Iberia, most likely Catalunya in particular, appears to have been exporting amphorae to Carthage in significant numbers in the early third century; see Peacock 1986.
[441] Or that such a constriction affected particularly Massiliote exports; see e.g. Aranegui Gascó 2001-2: 22, which suggests that at Saguntum at least it was the Iberian sector which decreased.

overstates the significance of the amphora and black-glaze finds; the modest numbers we have prior to the Second Punic War do not suggest serious demand.[442]

It is virtually inevitable that numbers of MGS amphorae found in Iberia will increase, and unlikely that this will substantially change the image here. In the third century, imports in amphorae to the Iberian seaboard were dominated by Punic products. Nonetheless, some Italian products, including wine and finewares, enjoyed wide distribution across this area (though in modest numbers), reaching from the Ligurian coast through southern France to southern Spain. In the context of Rome's increasing dominance in the western Mediterranean after 241 and 238/7, this is hardly surprising.[443] While neither Rome nor Carthage was running trade itself, it seems highly likely that elites of both had trade interests, and were kept abreast of what was going on. Increasing competition therefore seems quite plausible at this time of shifting power, with Rome's increased hold over the marine basin and Carthage's expansion up the Iberian seaboard.

A further, speculative note should be added on agency. It has been observed that Iberia provides an excellent example of a region which would have required interpreters to communicate with and at Rome, though these are largely unattested.[444] Ambassadors sent to Rome, or met by Roman ambassadors in Iberia, are unlikely to have spoken Latin, and would have needed a means of translation. The trade vista offers us two possibilities here: firstly, they might have, on account of trading and to a certain extent cultural connections, spoken Greek, for which Rome is likely to have had a good number of interpreters.[445] This cannot be ruled out, but there is a further possibility, that trade connections between Italy and Iberia had

[442] Domínguez Pérez 1999, 2005.
[443] Further to Rome's acquisition of Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica, ongoing campaigns against the Ligurians likely also helped to encourage the use of northern trade routes.
[444] Attested at Cic. *Div.* 2.131. See Pina Polo 2013: 251; on infrequent attestation see Rochette 1996, esp. 87-9.
[445] See Pina Polo 2013: 257, with reference to the lead tablet from Ampurias which mentions, in Greek, *Saiganthe.*

produced bilingual individuals. A bilingual trader, say a Roman *eques* or local aristocrat, might well be considered a trustworthy interpreter, an important consideration.[446] Such an individual might well have had concerns of his own based on his interests in the region, particularly if he had ties of official friendship locally, as in the case of Alorcus, the Spaniard, mercenary, and guest-friend of Saguntum who acts as Hannibal's envoy to the town in Livy.[447] In this way, interests formed through trade might come to bear weight in major power negotiations. The particular significance of this for Saguntum will be considered below.

III.1.5.2. Carthage in Iberia

As we have seen, Carthaginian trade wares, including amphora-based products, played a significant role in trade on the Iberian seaboard during the third century. Now we may consider Carthage's role in the coastal region and interior across a wider period, in order to establish the background to the Barcid domination, before analysing Barcid advances themselves. We have evidence for Phoenician cultural and economic influence from the seventh century, but it remains difficult to trace the exact route from this initial involvement to the specifically Punic dominion of the later third century. It appears, however, that while cultural influences continued, particularly in the south, Phoenician settlements such as Gades retained a degree of independence even into the Barcid period, and the expansion seen in that period was prodigious. This in turn added to the tensions arising in the years following 241.

Phoenician-Punic involvement in the Iberian region is attested from the seventh century in textual and archaeological sources. Diodorus alleges that Ibiza was colonised by Carthaginians 160 years after the foundation of Carthage; following Timaeus' foundation date,

[446] On trustworthiness, see Rochette 1996: 84; Pina Polo 2013: 253, both with sources.
[447] Liv. 21.12.6, *publice Saguntinis amicus atque hospes.*

this places the colonisation ca.654.[448] Phoenician cultural influences can be traced in the Guadalquivir valley from the seventh century, and sites such as Baria (Villaricos), founded by Phoenicians in the late seventh century, show signs of mixed Phoenician-Iberian population, with marked Phoenician cultural influences.[449] There are further suggestions of settlement by western Phoenicians from the sixth century; while the sources for this are not necessarily reliable, they strongly suggest that there were additional communities in Iberia which could be perceived as Phoenician or Punic in nature.[450]

The evidence gives a mixed picture as to how independent of Carthage cities such as Gades were in subsequent centuries. Livy attests that Gades was governed by suffetes, the Carthaginian chief magistrates, during the Second Punic War, but this does not prove more than cultural influence.[451] There is also evidence that Gades and Ebusus were coining independently during the Barcid period, a sign of civic autonomy.[452] That Barcid power had some economic relation to Gades, however, is evident from the city beginning to coin in silver after Hamilcar took control of the silver mines of the region, and ceasing to do so after the loss of the mines.[453] The existence of Gaditanian coinage from the early third century, moreover, on a Punic standard, distinguishes Gades from indigenous Iberian settlements, which did not coin before the arrival of Rome.[454]

Indeed, we can make a good case for Carthage's role in southern Iberia intensifying prior to the Barcid period. As Domínguez Monedero argues, the Periegesis of Pseudo-Scymnus, datable to the second half of the fourth century, suggests that 'Libyphoenicians' had by this

[448] Diod. Sic. 5.16.2-3.
[449] Blázquez 1980a: 410-12; Pliego Vázquez 2003: 41, 48-9; López Castro, Martínez Hahnmüller, and Pardo Barrionuevo 2010: 109.
[450] See e.g. Domínguez Monedero 1984, 1995.
[451] Liv. 28.37.2; cf. Gozalbes Cravioto 1983: 12; Wagner 1999: 281.
[452] Villaronga 1973: 131-2.
[453] See López Castro 1995: 80. This also suggests increasing importance for Gades economically under the Barcids, as their bronze coinage had only the expected (local) circulation.
[454] Malaca also coined on this standard. Further, the Gaditanian coins differentiated between issues through the use of single letters, in Punic manner. Chaves Tristán 1998: 149.

point become a group considered subservient to Carthage; this included the Iberian settlements of Libyphoenicians, which points to greater Carthaginian involvement there.[455] Evidence of the prosperity of southern Iberia between the fifth and third centuries certainly gives a plausible reason why Carthage would be interested.[456] To return to the mines, it is likely that Punic bronze coinage in Sicily in the fourth century made use of metals from Iberia, suggesting some degree of exploitation at this time.[457] Lastly, the Punic bronze coin hoard and other coin finds from El Gandul in Andalucía, datable to the early to mid-third century and most probably associated with military pay, strongly suggests a Punic military presence in this region at this time. Pliego Vázquez makes a good case for military use of this site, given the isolation of the hoard in a non-monetised area, the proximity of Montemolín, used as a Punic camp during the Second Punic War, and the appearance of some of the same coin types in other regions where Carthaginian mercenary recruitment is attested.[458]

Evidence on the Barcid period, however, indicates that this was the time at which the growth of Carthaginian power was most prodigious.[459] As Table III.1.a shows, our sources stress the advance of the Barcid generals. The growth of coinage datable to the Barcid period also demonstrates an increased area within which Punic coinage circulated, from only the area around Gades to Cartagena, the Meseta, and towards the Ebro. Under Hannibal it appears that this coinage expanded from silver to include also bronze, which Villaronga reasonably takes to be a sign of stabilisation and consolidation under Carthaginian power.[460] This spread of coinage, particularly silver, shows the success with which the Barcids were exploiting the mineral resources of Andalucía and subsequently also the region around Cartagena. As Wagner

[455] Domínguez Monedero 1984: 131-3.
[456] See Domínguez Monedero 1995: 230-1; Pliego Vázquez 2003: 44-5, with the suggestion that Gades' success might have incited anti-Semitic feeling in the region, leading to Carthaginian help for Gades attested in Just. *Epit.* 44.5.1-3.
[457] See Wagner 1989: 152; Pliego Vázquez 2003: 46, with Diod. Sic. 5.38.2.
[458] Pliego Vázquez 2003.
[459] See e.g. Barceló 1989: 180.
[460] Villaronga 1973: 89-90, 134-5.

has argued, this exploitation both explains the importance of Iberia to Carthage after its loss of the trading posts of Sicily in 241, and makes good sense in the aftermath of the Mercenary War: Carthaginian mints in Iberia were now producing high-quality silver which would be likely to command trust among mercenary forces.[461] That Carthage now had the wherewithal, only two decades after the Mercenary War, to contract significant forces in Iberia is apparent from a number of episodes during the Second Punic War.[462] While Pliny the Elder's famous reference to the riches of the mines of Baebelo may be an exaggeration, it is an important attestation of what a crucial base of economic power Iberia was under the Barcids.[463] That the intensive exploitation of the mines belonged to the Barcid period, argued by Blázquez, seems reasonable; there was not previously an entity present with the resources to exploit the mines on the scale archaeologically attested.[464] The renewed urban modelling and fortification of communities in the south illustrates what else the Barcids were able to do with their new resources.[465]

There is further evidence of stress on the exploitation of resources. Firstly, there is some evidence for tower-type fortifications in upper Andalucía, controlling lines of communication from the Strait of Gibraltar to the mining zone around Castulo. While some of these have been shown to be later than the Barcid period, it is suggestive that Pliny refers to *turres Hannibalis* in Spain, and that a parallel system is known from the area of Sulcis in Sardinia.[466] This would emphasise Barcid focus on the control of routes enabling resource exploitation. Secondly, with regard again to upper Andalucía, there are reasons to suspect that Akra Leuke, Hamilcar's foundation, was in the area of Castulo rather than on the coast at

[461] Wagner 1999: 265, 267.
[462] See Blázquez Martínez 1961: 32, with sources.
[463] Plin. *NH* 33.31. See Hoyos 2011b: 215.
[464] Blázquez Martínez 1989: 165.
[465] Prados Martínez 2007.
[466] Plin. *NH* 2.73; 35.48; cf. Liv. 33.48 on Hannibal's embarcation at his *turris* on the Libyan coast. Wagner 1989: 152; Prados Martínez 2007: 85-6, 92.

Alicante: a Castrum Album mentioned by Livy is more likely in context to belong to upper Andalucía; founding a city at Alicante would make little sense compared to the benefits of Cartagena; founding a city at Alicante and then one at Cartagena would arguably be practically nonsensical.[467] While the location of Akra Leuke in the interior is far from certain, then, it is a reasonable possibility, and would once again underline the importance of the interior and the mining region. The primary need then felt for this foundation would not be undermined by the later foundation of New Carthage on the coast, but that later foundation would mark a new phase.

That the Barcid expansion was fast and profitable is immediately clear from our sources. That this was possible owes much to the cultural homogeneity of the territory south of the Guadalquivir and Segura, as well as to the existing contacts between Phoenician and Punic peoples and the region. Hannibal's invasion and evident pacification of the Vaccaei may thus be the key element to understanding the real scope of Barcid ambition in the peninsula: it was not an area Carthage had previously been in contact with; it was some distance away; and it is likely that its primary perceived benefit was the acquisition of grain which could be used for further military action in the north or indeed elsewhere, if the grain were exported from the mouth of the Ebro. It is difficult not to see in this a provocation on Hannibal's part.

[467] Liv. 24.41.3. See Sumner 1968: 209-10; Gozalbes Cravioto 1983: 9; Barceló 1989: 170-1; Wagner 1999: 267 with references; Barceló 2000: 118. Sumner 1968: 211 and Chic García 1978: 235-6 argue that founding Akra Leuke at Alicante would involve violating a Massiliote colony, but it seems quite clear that Massilia had lost what colonies it had in the south; cf. Hernández Prieto 2012: 31-2 on the lack of evidence for permanent Greek settlement at Alicante and other 'Massiliote' sites. For placement of Akra Leuke at Alicante see Rich 1996: 2 n.4; Hoyos 2011b: 215.

III.1.5.3. The Barcids: Carthaginian, Hellenistic, Iberian?

As Table III.1.a shows, some ancient sources, mainly Fabius Pictor, presented the Barcids as renegades acting independently of Carthage or against its wishes. As Table III.1.a also shows, however, these allegations are a minority. Evidence of Barcid successes, and of Carthage's handling of the 220-218 negotiations, the Second Punic War, and its aftermath suggests that on the contrary, Carthage backed the Barcids throughout. Further evidence suggests that for the most part, Hannibal at least enjoyed plenipotentiary status on Carthage's behalf. To say that the Barcids were acting in accordance with Carthaginian structures and wishes, however, is not to say that they were not following additional models. Several of their behaviours, most notably in the issuing of coinage, suggest that they were following Hellenistic models; we may also argue that some behaviours followed Iberian models, perhaps through the agency of Iberians themselves. Thus we can argue that the power Rome was dealing with here resembled in some respects not only their old enemy, but also other entities with which they were dealing at this time.

The argument for independence from Carthage is mostly thin. Zonaras simply claims that Hamilcar made his initial move to Iberia against the wishes of Carthage, while Fabius Pictor (according to Polybius) claimed that Hasdrubal attempted a coup at Carthage before returning to Iberia, where he acted as an independent ruler, in which he was followed by Hannibal. Obviously, we cannot properly judge Pictor's account, as Polybius is clearly selective, and presents it from the outset as mistaken. Nonetheless, as we shall see, he is largely right to do so. Only one point suggests that there is any validity in Pictor's version: the Carthaginian repudiation of the Ebro Treaty. According to Livy and Polybius, the Carthaginian Senate rejected the agreement on the grounds that it did not exist or was not ratified at Carthage. As

discussed above, it does appear that the agreement was a field compact, and was made directly with Hasdrubal. None of this, however, need be taken to imply that Carthage was not happy with the agreement when it was made. Rejecting it in 218 could easily be a question of expediency, potentially making good use of the ambiguity of Hasdrubal's powers.

While Hasdrubal's position (and indeed Hamilcar's before him) may have admitted of some ambiguities, it is difficult to argue this for Hannibal. First, there is the obvious fact that Carthage immediately rejected the idea of giving him up for his attack on Saguntum. This is clearly a question of pride, and probably also one of retaining its Iberian territories, but we cannot claim that Carthage did not support its commander, whom it had in the first place ratified in his position.[468] Indeed, after the war he was evidently elected suffete.[469] During negotiations prior to the war, we see Hannibal writing to Carthage in search of instructions and support. During the war itself, he made agreements which both protected and committed the Carthaginian establishment at home, as Hoyos observes.[470] While one might wonder if the Ebro document committed all Carthaginians in the same way, it is vital that Philip V and the communities with whom Hannibal made these agreements believed that he was indeed able to commit his home government.

It is apparent that there was opposition to Hannibal and his predecessors at Carthage. Livy provides a substantial speech by Hanno in favour of surrendering Hannibal in 218; it is hard to believe that his was the only voice against Hannibal, given hints of faction elsewhere.[471] We cannot, however, attribute a factional rift to any of the explanations which have traditionally been ventured, as there is no evidence for them. For instance, we have no indication that the Barcids were interested in shipping in contrast to a landowning faction at home: they too owned land, and there is no evidence that they put effort into either a war

[468] Polyb. 3.13.4.
[469] Liv. 33.48.3 (*praetor*).
[470] E.g. the agreement with Philip V: Polyb. 7.9. Hoyos 1994: 254-5, with sources.
[471] Liv. 21.10; App. *Ib.* 8-9; *Hann.* 3; Polyb. 3.17.7.

fleet or a trade fleet.[472] Similarly, arguments of belligerence against pacifism, differing areas of desired expansion, and democratic leanings against aristocratic politics do not hold water.[473] The existence of faction could perfectly reasonably be explained by the obvious elements of envy and competition. In any case, the course of events demonstrates that such faction did not lead to Hannibal's departure from the Carthaginian establishment until after the end of the war. Barcid Iberia was not an independent empire.

Nonetheless, it appears that in Iberia the Barcids, particularly Hasdrubal, took on elements of Hellenistic kingship. The key evidence is coinage issued during the period, which features diademed male heads, often with attributes of Melqart, interpreted by many scholars as portraits.[474] Several reasonable objections exist, however, not least that the anepigraphic nature of Punic coins means that these alleged portraits are never labelled. Resemblances between the faces represented are very much a matter of opinion.[475] One wonders also whether the average person handling such a coin would have any idea that it was a portrait (if indeed it was). It is more likely that they would recognise the attributes of Melqart, which could include the diadem, and the fact that the coin employed the Punic metrological standard.[476] They might also consider the elephant which appeared on the reverse of issues distributed around Cartagena, which served as a symbol on the coins of a number of Hellenistic kings.[477] These symbols suggest victory and a close relationship between the Barcids and the gods (without having to assume that they were assimilated to them).[478] This relationship is further suggested by the association of Hasdrubal's palace complex at Cartagena with at least three buildings which held sacred functions during the Republican

[472] Hoyos 1994: 269-70; cf. Blázquez Martínez 1961: 23 for a programmatic statement of this argument.
[473] See Martínez Hahnmüller 2016 for full analysis.
[474] Blázquez 1976, with earlier bibliography; 1980b: 447-8; García-Bellido 2012.
[475] Objections: Villaronga 1973: 45, 51, 67; Hoyos 2003: 72; Martínez Hahnmüller 2016: 139.
Resemblances: García-Bellido 2012: 443-5 and particularly 448-451 distinctly stretch the plausible.
[476] Diadem: López Castro 1995: 83. Metrology: Villaronga 1973: 132, 134-5.
[477] López Castro 1995: 83-4; cf. Blázquez 1976: 45-6, noting Alexander as precedent.
[478] On the value of polysemy in this context see Fariselli 2006: 115.

period.[479] The palace complex itself arguably indicates Hellenistic kingly behaviour.[480] While this, along with Hasdrubal's agreement of the Ebro Treaty, marriage, and acclamation as *strategos autokrator* by the Iberians do paint him as the most Hellenistic-seeming of the Barcids, however, it is important to note that New Carthage, in particular its name, was paralleled elsewhere in the Punic world, and thus a rather conservative foundation, rather than an attempt to supplant Carthage itself.[481]

In the mention of Hasdrubal's acclamation by the Iberian chiefs, we have reached a key element of Barcid following of an Iberian model of rule. Both Hasdrubal and Hannibal married Iberian women, in the former case a princess (Hannibal's wife's status is not specified).[482] Indeed, Livy stresses that Hannibal's marriage arose from the close relationship between the Barcids and Castulo, the origin of his bride. The heredity of Barcid command, criticised by Hanno, belongs as much to the Iberian context as to the Hellenistic.[483] More suggestive still is Hasdrubal's acclamation, attested by Diodorus. Diodorus' account is clearly an exaggeration, as Hasdrubal had not conquered all the cities of Iberia, but it is a powerful suggestion of local acceptance of his domination after his conquest of the Orissi.[484] Although Diodorus uses the Greek phrase, this is presumably a translation of the term used. The idea of devotion to a strong military leader has considerable roots in Iberia, and probably stands behind this action. The later acclamation of Scipio as king by Iberian leaders, who even perform proskynesis, highlights the significance of such practices to these groups, and emphasises continuity in practice.[485]

[479] Ferrer Albelda 2002-3: 18.
[480] Polyb. 10.10.9. García-Bellido 2012: 438.
[481] See Hoyos 2003: 79-80 for parallels; contrast Blázquez 1980b: 443.
[482] Hasdrubal: Diod. Sic. 25.12.1. Hannibal: Liv. 24.41.7.
[483] Liv. 28.21 demonstrates the importance of heredity in some communities in Iberia.
[484] Diod. Sic. 25.12.
[485] See Wagner 1999: 281.

Barcid command in Iberia was thus not only Carthaginian, but also Hellenistic and Iberian in some of its features. This may in part help to account for evident Roman perplexity during the diplomatic crisis of 220-218. Rome had engaged with Hamilcar (if we credit Dio's embassy story) and Hasdrubal directly, treating them similarly to Hellenistic rulers, and this appears to have worked well enough. When Hannibal behaved disagreeably towards ambassadors, Rome sent to Carthage to ascertain whether his behaviour was supported, now assuming the possibility of his bearing noxal liability in the manner of some of their own generals. It is debatable whether there was any chance whatsoever of Carthage agreeing to this. The crucial point is that they did not.

III.1.5.4. Saguntum: origins and connections

As we have already seen, the nature and dating of Saguntum's relationship with Rome is a difficult question to address. The city's other connections are also complicated, and are worth unpicking to see if there is anything that made it a likely flashpoint for war. Several sources allege that the city was founded by Greeks from Zakynthos, and later supplemented by Rutulian settlers from Ardea. These claims have received a mixed reception in modern scholarship, but have given rise to some problematic suggestions about the nature of Saguntum's need for arbitration. On the basis of other textual sources and of archaeological material, these must be disposed of in order to understand Saguntum in its proper context.

A variety of sources allege a Zakynthian origin for Saguntum. Livy, Strabo, Appian, and Isidore of Seville make simple statements that the city was founded by Zakynthians; Pliny claims that Zakynthians founded it 200 years before the fall of Troy; and Silius claims that it was founded by Zakynthians but had already received the name from the death there of the

hero Zakynthos.[486] The archaeology of the site gives no particular reason to believe that it was a Greek foundation. Livy and Silius also claim that the population was supplemented by Rutulian settlers from Ardea.[487] A number of scholars have tried to argue from this that the community, known on later coins by the names Saguntum and Arse, had two nuclei, one Greco-Italic (port-based) and one Iberian (further inland), and that conflict between these, stimulated by Carthaginian expansion, led to stasis.[488]

The idea of the port being Greco-Italic and the inland nucleus Iberian, holding the names Saguntum and Arse respectively, does not work. The distance insisted on by the ancient sources between Saguntum and the sea will not allow for Saguntum to be directly on the coast.[489] Thus the stasis argument fails. Santiago has pointed out that the development of the name Saguntum in its various permutations is complex and unclear, and it is far from difficult to believe that the existence of the two names gave later authors the idea of the dual colonisation.[490] The clinching factor in whether the issue is of any use to us here is the fact that claims concerning the foundation of Saguntum do not feature in the text of Polybius at all or in any appeal made by Saguntum in any text other than that of Silius Italicus. Any use of this supposed relationship took place later.[491]

The connectivity of Saguntum is a more useful feature to consider. Its port at Grau Vell capitalised on a very well-suited site, with fresh water and a lagoon. Indeed, its very access to the sea made it more open to external influences and possibilities than many Iberian

[486] Liv. 21.7.2; Strabo 3.4.6; App. *Ib.* 7; Isid. *Ethym.* 15.1.68; Plin. *NH* 16.216; Sil. Ital. *Pun.* 1.275-290.
[487] Liv. 21.7.2; Sil. Ital. *Pun.* 1.291-5, 376-9, 584, 658.
[488] See e.g. Chic García 1978: 237-40; Sánchez González 1997: 251-5; Wagner 1999: 273.
[489] See Aranegui Gascó 2001-2: 19, with sources.
[490] Santiago 1994; cf. Sánchez González 1997: 229, 231, 233 (with caution due to inconsistent reproduction of Greek text).
[491] See Russo 2011: 95-6. Elwyn 1993: 270 acknowledges that Polybius and Livy rarely refer to kinship claims in an interstate context, but still disbelieves this one, as it would seem do most scholars: Hernández Prieto 2012: 32.

settlements.[492] The improvement of the site in the fourth century, archaeologically attested, is in interesting coincidence with the increase of Italian trade at this time, but this cannot be stressed.[493] That Saguntum enjoyed cultural contact with the broader Hellenistic world as a result of its openness to the sea is suggested by its coinage. Silver types dated to the first half of the third century display a helmeted female head similar to staters of Alexander and the successors, where Athena appears in a Corinthian helmet, a type which also inspired Roman bronzes of the same period.[494] Intense regional contact is also suggested by the pronounced presence of Emporitan coins in Saguntum in the fourth and third centuries, though it bears noting conversely that Saguntine coinage mostly circulated locally until the Second Punic War.[495]

III.1.6 Conclusions

Three main areas of importance emerge from the discussion. The first is the importance of the wider connections of Iberia. Archaeological evidence suggests that Roman and Italian material culture were spreading around the coast from northwestern Italy, through France, into the Mediterranean coast of Spain, from an early stage. While numbers were small, this is a crucial indicator of connectivity which may well have seen an increase around the time when Rome took control of Sardinia and Corsica, and was engaged in vigorous campaigning in Liguria.

[492] Aranegui Gascó 2001-2: 20 (cf. Gozalbes and Ripollès 2002: 225-7); De Juan Fuentes 2002: 122-3. Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 134 notes numismatic evidence for sea-trade at Saguntum; Richardson 1986: 20 observes Italian pottery finds of the third century in the eastern coastal zone of Iberia.
[493] See De Juan Fuentes 2002: 122; Domínguez Pérez 2005: 597.
[494] Llorens and Ripollès 2002: 71-2; Ripollès 2002a: 154; Ripollès 2002b: 279. Economic links with Rome, for example through alleged Saguntine use of the victoriate standard, have been overstated, by e.g. Heichelheim 1954 and Càssola 1962: 234; for correction see Ripollès 2002a: 178-9.
[495] Gozalbes and Ripollès 2002: 225-7, 239.

This connectivity leads to the second area of importance: the absolute centrality of Saguntum to the beginning of Roman military intervention in Iberia. The trade connectivity of the area of Saguntum, combined with its evident wealth and growth from the fourth century, is highly suggestive of how it may have formed connections which, though not with Rome as a political entity, led to it interacting with Rome during the period of Barcid expansion. The likelihood of Rome having had some interest in Iberia prior to the Ebro Treaty, suggested by the alleged embassy to Hamilcar and quite possibly manifested through diplomatic links with other groups (particularly the Saguntines), increasing through the 220s due to Hasdrubal's successes, implies that the appeal of Saguntum in 219 was not actually a break with previous events. Rome's apparent ambivalence in attending to another theatre of conflict thus makes a good deal of sense.

The third area to be highlighted is the behaviour of the Barcids, in terms of their varied cultural connections and their specific behaviours. The behaviours of most relevance are the apparently independent nature of Hasdrubal's agreement of the Ebro compact, and the personal nature of Barcid leadership, likely in part a function of tendencies existing in the region. The extent to which Rome followed this, and how far it was regionally dictated, will be discussed in the following chapter.

III.2. Forms of power

Table III.2.a compiles manifestations of power in the Iberian Peninsula from 218-167. A number of the manifestations listed fit more than one category.

Type of power	**Date**	**Details**	**Actor(s)**	**Source**
Economic	205	Suppressed tribes to supply army with double *stipendium* for a year, six months' supply of corn, cloaks, and togas	'The Romans'	Liv. 29.3.5; App. *Ib.* 37 (fine only)
	197/6	L. Stertinius (Ulterior) brings back 50,000lbs of silver	Promagistrate	Liv. 33.27.3
	196	Cn. Cornelius Blasio (Citerior) displays in ovation 1515lbs of gold, 20,000lbs of silver, and	Promagistrate	Liv. 33.27.2

		34,500 denarii of coined silver		
	195	M. Porcius Cato declares intention for army in Iberia to live off the enemy's grain	Magistrate	Liv. 34.9.12
	195	M. Helvius (Ulterior) brings back 4732lbs of silver, 17,023 *bigati*, and 11,943 pieces of Oscan silver	Promagistrate	Liv. 34.10.4
	195	Q. Minucius Thermus (Citerior) displays in triumph 34,800lbs of silver, 73,000 *bigati*, and 278,000 pieces of Oscan silver	Promagistrate	Liv. 34.10.6-7

	195	Cato uses depredations to demoralise the enemy around Emporion	Magistrate	Liv. 34.13.2-3, 16.4
	191	M. Fulvius Nobilior (Ulterior) displays in ovation more than 10,000lbs of silver, 13,000 *bigati*, and 127lbs of gold	Promagistrate	Liv. 36.39.1-2
	185	L. Manlius (Citerior) displays in ovation 52 golden crowns, 132lbs of gold, and 16,300lbs of silver, with his quaestor expected to bring a further 10,000lbs of silver	Promagistrate	Liv. 39.29.7

		and 80lbs of gold		
	184	C. Calpurnius triumphs over Lusitanians and Celtiberians, displaying 83 golden crowns and 12,000lbs of silver; L. Quinctius Crispinus triumphs over the same peoples, displaying a similar amount of booty	Promagistrates	Liv. 39.42.2-3
	182	A. Terentius Varro (Citerior) displays in ovation 9320lbs of silver, 82lbs of gold, and seven gold crowns weighing 60lbs	Promagistrate	Liv. 40.16.11

	179	2,400,000 sesterces indemnity levied from Certima	Promagistrate	Liv. 40.47.9
	178	Ti. Sempronius Gracchus triumphs over the Celtiberi, displaying 40,000lbs of silver; L. Postumius triumphs over the Lusitanians, displaying 20,000lbs of silver	Promagistrates	Liv. 41.7.1-3
	174	Ap. Claudius Centho (Citerior) displays in ovation 10,000lbs of silver and 5000lbs of gold	Promagistrate	Liv. 41.28.6

	168	M. Marcellus captures Marcolica and brings back 10lbs of gold and a million sesterces' worth of silver	Magistrate	Liv. 45.4.1
Ideological	209	P. Cornelius Scipio restores captive woman to her betrothed, the Celtiberian noble Aluccius, in exchange for friendship; Aluccius returns with 1400 cavalry	Promagistrate	Liv. 26.50.1-14; Cass. Dio 16.43; Zon. 9.8
	208	Scipio accepts being saluted king by Edeco and other Iberian leaders; after battle of Baecula he rejects this in	Promagistrate	Polyb. 10.38.3, 40.2-5; cf. Liv. 27.17.1

		favour of 'general'		
		Iberians salute Scipio as king; he refuses the title		Liv. 27.19.3-6; cf. Cass. Dio 16.48; Zon. 9.8
	206	Scipio holds voluntary gladiatorial games at New Carthage, including two cousins or brothers fighting for a kingdom	Promagistrate	Liv. 28.21.1-10; *Per.* 28.6; Zon. 9.10
	206	Scipio decides to fight Andobales (Indibilis) with only Roman troops	Promagistrate	Polyb. 11.31.2-6
	206	L. Cornelius Scipio announces subjugation of Spain at Rome	Magistrates and promagistrates in Iberia	Liv. 28.17.1; cf. *Per.* 28.4; cf. App. *Ib.* 29; cf. Polyb. 11.24a.1-3

	205	Surrender of Mandonius and other revolt leaders is (successfully) demanded	Promagistrates	Liv. 29.3.3
	205	Italica founded for sick and wounded soldiers	Promagistrate	App. *Ib.* 38
	193	Roman force returns booty captured from Lusitanians in Ulterior to its original owners in Ilipa	Promagistrate	Liv. 35.1.5-12
	179-8	Significant treaties made in Celtiberia	Promagistrate	Liv. 40.49.1-7, 50.5; cf. 41.26.1; *Per.* 41.2; Plut. *TG* 5.3; App. *Ib.* 43-4
	178	Foundation of Gracchurris	Promagistrate	Liv. *Per.* 41.2
	171	In response to	Senate	Liv. 43.2.1-12

		Spanish deputation, a commission is formed to try former magistrates for peculation		
	171	In response to deputation, foundation of Latin colony of Carteia decreed as residence for sons of Roman soldiers and Spanish women	Senate	Liv. 43.3.1-4
Coercive	218-167	Magistrates *cum imperio* present	Senate and people	See Broughton *MRR*
	205	Praetors sent to Spain annually from this point	'The Romans'	App. *Ib.* 38
	218	Troops enlisted from allied	Promagistrate	Liv. 21.60.4; Polyb. 3.76.4

		populations of Iberian interior		
	214/3 or 212/1[496]	After Roman capture and restoration of Saguntum, Turdetani (responsible for the war) sold as slaves	Magistrates and promagistrates	Liv. 24.42.11; 28.39.1-19; Zon. 9.3
	213	Rome enlists Celtiberians as its first mercenaries	'The Romans'	Liv. 24.49.8; cf. Oros. 4.16.14
	211	Rome raises 20,000 Celtiberian auxiliaries	Roman commanders	Liv. 25.32.3, 33.1
	209	Scipio summons allied troops, of whom 5000 respond	Promagistrate	Liv. 26.41.2

[496] See Lazenby 1978: 129; Richardson 1986: 39.

	209	Craftsmen of New Carthage enrolled as Roman public slaves (2000); strong young prisoners incorporated as sailors	Promagistrate (proconsul)	Polyb. 10.17.6-13; Liv. 26.47.2-3
		10,000 free men taken prisoner; Spanish hostages taken from New Carthage; huge haul of booty taken		Liv. 26.47.1, 4-10; cf. 26.49.1-3; App. *Ib.* 23
	207	Scipio sends 8000 Gallic and Spanish troops and 1000 Numidian and Spanish horse from Iberia to the consul in Italy	Promagistrate	Liv. 27.38.11

	207	L. Marcius Septimius tells mercenaries of Hanno and Mago from newly allied communities to lay down their arms or accept battle / death	Lieutenant of promagistrate	App. *Ib.* 31
	207	Ilurgia destroyed with indiscriminate slaughter due to prior treacherous behaviour	Promagistrate	App. *Ib.* 32
	206	Iliturgi destroyed with indiscriminate slaughter due to prior treacherous behaviour		Liv. 28.19.1-20.7; Zon. 9.10
	206	Scipio uses Iberian troops to	Promagistrate	Polyb. 11.20.7

		impress the enemy, but does not use them to fight		
		In spite of concerns, Scipio uses substantial Spanish auxiliary force		Liv. 28.13.1-2, 5
	205	Hostages taken from ca.30 tribes; tribes disarmed	'The Romans' / commanders	Liv. 29.3.5; App. *Ib.*38; cf. Zon. 9.10
	203	Carthage to hold back from Hispania according to treaty terms offered by Scipio	Promagistrate	Liv. 30.16.10
	199	Rome agrees not to send a prefect to Gades, based on previous agreement	Senate	Liv. 32.2.6; cf. 28.37.10

	198	Six praetors elected; praetors allotted Hispania Citerior and Ulterior and told to demarcate border	Senate	Liv. 32.28.2, 11
	195	Cato sells all Bergistani into slavery after defeating them twice	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 34.16.10
	195	Cato disarms tribes north of the Ebro, and levels their city walls	Magistrate	Liv. 34.17.5-11; App. *Ib.* 41; Zon. 9.17
	195	Cato orders military tribunes to offer Celtiberian mercenaries of the Turdetani	Magistrate	Liv. 34.19.3-6; Zon. 9.17 (‘allies’)

		double pay, clemency, or battle		
	189	L. Aemilius Paullus conducts tumultuary levy in Ulterior	Promagistrate	Liv. 37.57.5
	189	L. Aemilius Paullus issues an edict granting freedom to slaves of the inhabitants of Hasta	Promagistrate	*CIL* II 5041; I^2 614 = *ILLRP* 514.
	185	Commanders levy troops from friendly communities around the Tagus	Magistrates	Liv. 39.30.7
	184	A. Terentius sells prisoners from Corbio in Citerior	Magistrate	Liv. 39.42.1
	181	Q. Fulvius Flaccus levies troops from	Promagistrate	Liv. 40.30.2

		friendly communities in Citerior		
	179	40 young, noble cavalrymen taken from Certima to serve in Roman army / as hostages	Promagistrate	Liv. 40.47.9-10

Table III.2.a. Manifestations of the three power types in Iberia, 218-167.

III.2.1. The sources

As before, we shall first review briefly the sources used. As Table III.2.a shows, the dominant source for Iberia in this period is Livy, whose continuous narrative for the period 218-167 is mostly extant. This can be supplemented in places by details from the *Periochae.* Alongside these texts we have a small amount of material from Polybius, particularly from the fragmentary Books 10 and 11. The first 43 chapters of Appian's *Iberika* cover Iberian events down to the tenure of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. Further information can be found also in the fragments of Dio, the epitome of his work by Zonaras, and other authors such as Plutarch. Many of the difficulties involved in the use of all of these authors have already been discussed; some specific remarks may, however, be made here.

Livy's account is not without problems. It has been observed that his chronology of Iberian events during the Second Punic War is sometimes confused, for example on the Roman recovery of Saguntum.[497] Scepticism might be warranted over the story of Aluccius and the question of the handover of Scipio's forces and command in 206.[498] On account in particular of the apparent irregularities in electoral procedure, some scholars have treated Livy rather critically for this period, and it is possible that there may be inaccuracies or omissions. Livy provides, however, the fullest available narrative, and inconsistent procedures may be a feature of the period rather than textual errors.[499]

Polybius' fragmentary account does not provide much. As Table III.2.a shows, few of the tabulated events rely solely on him, and if his version shows any notable differences from, say, Livy's, these consist perhaps in his claims of Scipio's unwillingness to use Iberian troops. In this context we would do well to remember Polybius' closeness to the Scipiones and general dislike of mercenary troops.[500]

Other sources are used sporadically. The presence, alongside historical texts, of epigraphic and numismatic material adds useful elements in showing, for example, civil administration, which the military focus of the textual sources leads them largely to ignore. Lack of context, however, renders interpretation difficult.

Once again, our sources tend not to clash over most important points. Nonetheless, several of the same issues which were raised with regard to Sicily appear again with regard to Iberia. This is arguably a feature of our sources' apparent lack of interest in what we consider major administrative issues, such as the status of the province and the introduction of

[497] Liv. 24.42.9-10; see Lazenby 1978: 129; Richardson 1986: 39-41.
[498] Lazenby 1978: 139; cf. Polyb. 10.19.3-7; Liv. 28.38.1 with Walters' emendation, on which see Richardson 1986: 64-5 and Díaz Fernández 2015: 127; cf. Polyb. 11.33.8; see e.g. Ferrary 2003: 121.
[499] Critical treatment of Livy: e.g. Knapp 1977a: 89; Sumner 1977; Giovannini 1983: 59-60; Richardson 1986: 99-100; Salinas de Frías 1995: 27; Brennan 2000: I 157; Ferrary 2003: 109-110 with n.12, 140; Vervaet 2012: 50 n.12; Drogula 2015: 253.
[500] Eckstein 1995: 125.

taxation. It will be valuable to consider ways in which Iberia is similar to or different from Sicily in these respects, with a view to a more decisive answer to the issue of early manifestations of power, particularly with regard to the question of the *provincia.*

III.2.2. Provinciae factae?

Iberia is noticeably different from Sicily, as Table III.2.a shows, in that at least one magistrate with *imperium* is attested as present there each year from 218 onwards, in contrast to the uncertain period between 241 and 227 in Sicily. This means that there can be no question as to whether Rome treated the Iberian Peninsula in a 'hands-on' manner, as it clearly did so from its arrival in force in 218. We can thus state that Iberia was assigned as one or more *provinciae* to a (pro)magistrate or magistrates from 218 onwards.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the similarities Iberia bears to the Sicilian-Sardinian model (from 198, two additional praetorships were created, and their recipients regularly sent to the (then two) Iberian commands), the 'fixed' province is again in play.[501] The most glaring example of such a treatment is that by Luzzatto, for whom the two Spains were 'organizzate a province' in 197, in a process described without justification as *redactio in formam provinciae.* This description stands despite Luzzatto's own admission that we know very little about organisation and administration in Iberia at this time.[502] Even more so than in the case of Sicily and Sardinia, attested magisterial allotments make it readily apparent that the new praetors were intended for the Iberian *provinciae.* The idea that the nature of the *provinciae* changed

[501] Liv. 28.32.2. With the exception of 179, 177, and possibly 175 under the fairly short-lived *Lex Baebia,* on which see below.
[502] Luzzatto 1985: 58-9, 61.

substantively in 198-7 is, however, not obvious at all.[503] Magistrates or promagistrates with *imperium* had been present, mostly in pairs, since 218, and we have no evidence for dramatic change or development in regional administration in tandem with the new praetorships.

For this reason, we can reject the use of the word 'governor'. A range of scholars use this term with little or no reflection on its implications.[504] For a pair of provinces with continued, significant military campaigns across the period down to 167, this makes little sense. This is particularly true down to 179, as between 197 and 179, only four of 24 magistrates sent to the Spains are not specifically attested as having been involved in warfare there. While military forces were probably reduced somewhat from 179, and triumphs and ovations celebrated for victories in Iberia became less frequent, this is no basis for a wholesale terminological shift from magistrates as 'commanders' to magistrates as 'governors'.[505] Díaz Fernández observes that these terms bear no relation to Roman titulature, and Drogula argues for a gradual process from purely military command to more civilian governorship. As Drogula also notes, we can see a key shift in the understanding of the *provincia* as a task held for a fixed period up to succession, rather than up to completion.[506] This relates, however, to the longer-term change visible within the Second Punic War and indeed within the First, of longer commands, which is related in turn to the growth of prorogation.[507]

As was argued above in relation to Sicily, 'regular' is perhaps the most useful term to apply to provinces which were regularly included in the sortition, which describes the Spains

[503] Cf. Knapp's statement that a scholar 'recently questioned 197 as the first year of official Spanish *provinciae*' (Knapp 1977a: 63 n.5, on Sumner 1977). Cf. also Ferrary's discussion of the 'création de provinces nouvelles' (2010: 34).
[504] E.g. Jashemski 1950: 32, 44; Giovannini 1983: 59; Brennan 2000: I 164; Mayer i Olivé 2008: 145, 148; cf. 'governed' in Vervaet 2012: 79.
[505] Richardson 1986: 105-6. On triumphal numbers see also Richardson 1975.
[506] Mayer i Olivé 2008: 145; Díaz Fernández 2015: 67; Drogula 2015: 233, 250.
[507] Mayer i Olivé subsequently relates the growth of prorogation to the need for a magistrate 'poder llevar adelante su misión' (2008: 145), but this does not in fact deflect the point. Indeed, the development of prorogation in the third century is an apparent process of short periods of extension of *imperium*, intended for such task completion, evolving into a means of longer-term continuity, particularly in commands further from Rome, and of the provision of competent individuals for command in times of need (cf. Jashemski 1950: 29). See esp. Jashemski 1950: 18; Brennan 2000: I 74-6.

from 198. It bears noting, nonetheless, that our sources seem not to consider 198-7 a particular watershed. Only Livy mentions the increase in the number of praetorships;[508] this echoes the increase of 228, which also received apparently little notice. While there are elements in Livy and Appian which suggest a shift in Roman intentions concerning Iberia in the decade preceding 198, these suggest a gradual change associated with the development of Iberia around the Carthaginian expulsion.[509]

III.2.3. Personnel

There is little need to review in detail Rome's choice of command personnel in Iberia in this period: a number of scholars have done so.[510] A clear evidential contrast exists between Sicily, where as we have seen there is a magisterial lacuna between 241 and 227, and Iberia, where we have a constant run of magistrates and promagistrates attested from 218 onwards. This obviates the need for speculation such as we saw for the Sicilian lacuna, but careful consideration of, in particular, political context is necessary to interpret Roman decisions with regard to Iberian commands.

The status of the earliest commanders in Iberia needs little discussion here. It will suffice to note a few key points. Firstly, the command of P. and Cn. Scipio was an extended one, terminated only by their deaths in 211. Secondly, Cn. Scipio, though a consular, was not initially an *imperium*-holder in his own right (but was probably delegated *imperium* by his

[508] See e.g. Díaz Fernández 2015: 51, 91, 125.
[509] Liv. 28.19.6-8 (Scipio's speech before Iliturgi); App. *Ib.* 38 (foundation of Italica); Richardson 1986: 53; cf. Díaz Fernández 2015: 130; Drogula 2015: 249.
[510] See esp. Díaz Fernández 2015: 340-351 and 370-381 for all magistrates and promagistrates in Citerior and Ulterior down to 167.

brother the consul), but appears to have been so by 212.[511] Thirdly, the two might share or divide forces and tasks.[512] Of their successor, C. Claudius Nero, we know relatively little, and his tenure (211-210) was brief; we do know, however, that the Senate had been irritated in the interim by L. Marcius' arrogation in the field of the title *pro praetore.*[513] Nero was replaced in turn by a pair of commanders, the addition of M. Iunius Silanus as *adiutor* to the younger P. Scipio possibly a response to Scipio's youth, the magnitude of the task, or some other concern.[514] We do however have strong suggestions that Scipio and Silanus were expected to work separately at their discretion.[515] In light of the size of the region and the presence of multiple Carthaginian forces, this doubling is a sensible response to conditions.

We can see in most cases that commanders in Iberia held proconsular powers. Following his consulship in 218, P. Scipio commanded *pro consule,* and the younger P. Scipio was elected in 210 to command with the same status.[516] Cn. Scipio appears by 212 to have held independent *imperium,* but we do not know whether this was *pro praetore* or *pro consule.* Livy suggests for 208 that P. Scipio and Silanus each had their own forces and their own *provincia*, and a later speech by Scipio in Livy's text may imply that he and Silanus held the same status.[517]

We have good reason to believe that Lentulus and Acidinus were proconsuls from 206. Under 204, Livy records their prorogation in command as proconsuls, *sicut priore anno tenuissent.* This implies that they held this status prior to the prorogation, and the reference to

[511] Liv. 25.3.6; Knapp 1977a: 87-88; Richardson 1986: 40-1; cf. Salinas de Frías 1995: 24; Mayer i Olivé 2008; Díaz Fernández 2015: 126 with bibliography.
[512] App. *Ib.* 16.
[513] Liv. 26.2.1-4.
[514] On Scipio's youth and inexperience, see Liv. 26.18.7-19.1; on the potential of family patronal ties, Knapp 1977a: 63-4; Richardson 1986: 64; on senatorial concerns, Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007: 25.
[515] Liv. 27.22.7; Richardson 1986: 49. Cf. Liv. 28.28.14.
[516] Liv. 22.22.1; 26.18.4.
[517] Liv. 27.22.7; 28.28.14; cf. Polyb. 10.6.7, συνάρχων. For further literature, see Vervaet 2012: 50 with n.12. It is worth noting that according to Polybius, Silanus and Marcius were temporarily in command following Scipio's departure in 206 (11.33.8); it would be useful in such a situation for Silanus to outrank Marcius clearly by holding proconsular status.

them as *propraetoribus* in the preceding book has been recognised as an emendation.[518] C. Cornelius Cethegus was elected in 201 to succeed Lentulus, and also held command as proconsul.[519] So, too, did Cn. Cornelius Blasio and L. Stertinius from 199 to 197/6.[520] Thus a trend appears of commanders in Iberia holding proconsular powers. This evidently continued after the shift to praetorian commanders in 197: Jashemski lists thirteen praetorian commanders referred to as proconsuls spanning the 190s to 170s, and demonstrates that triumphal records refer to praetorian commanders in Spain as proconsuls wherever the description of their *imperium* survives complete.[521] Jashemski and others also take as an indication that praetors in Iberia held proconsular status Plutarch's passage concerning the departure of Aemilius Paullus in 191 with a proconsular entourage of 12 lictors.[522]

It remains to ask why proconsular powers appear to have been so much used.[523] As the Plutarch passage on Aemilius demonstrates, a commander sent out *pro consule* had the more impressive consular regalia, that is to say 12 lictors instead of six. It does not appear to have affected the size of a commander's army, which was determined independently.[524] Superior *imperium* might make command in Iberia more appealing, but we have few instances in this period of individuals trying to dodge such appointments, and after 197 triumphs and ovations were readily available to Iberian commanders.[525] Moreover, the association of particularly difficult commands with consular rather than praetorian commanders persisted, as the sending of Cato in 195 shows. It seems most likely that the ideological effect of the insignia

[518] Liv. 29.13.7; 28.38.1. See Richardson 1986: 64-5; different interpretation in Ferrary 2003: 110 with n.12; *contra* Brennan 2000: I 160.
[519] Liv. 30.41.4-5; 31.49.7.
[520] Liv. 31.50.11; 33.27.1-4.
[521] Jashemski 1950: 42-44; see also Salinas de Frías 1995: 38-9. On triumphal records cf. Vervaet 2012: 69.
[522] Plut. *Aem.* 4.1; Jashemski 1950: 46; Richardson 1986: 76; Díaz Fernández 2015: 73, 136-7 (recognising difficulties).
[523] It does not seem that this was just the standard for prorogation, *contra* Giovannini 1983: 62; cf. Hurlet 2012: 107.
[524] See e.g. Brennan 2000: I 160.
[525] Liv. 26.18.6 suggests no one wanted the command in 210; 41.15.9-10 may show a pair of praetors attempting to evade Iberian command in 175.

and retinue was the point.[526] Hölkeskamp makes a reasonable case for the implicit physical threat involved in the presence of the lictors with rods and axes; while this is based on a passage of Livy and thus on a Roman understanding of consular significance, the importance of personal retinue for social and coercive status in Iberia suggests it might well have held there too.[527]

We have mentioned the dual command and some of its underlying reasons already. Initially, it appears to have arisen from circumstances: Cn. Scipio took command in his brother's place, was joined thereafter by that brother, and the arrangement worked sufficiently well to be continued for several years. Nero's tenure following the Scipiones' deaths was brief, but Livy's presentation of Scipio's election in 210 suggests that, at least initially, a sole command was intended for him. The Livian narrative implies that Silanus' commission was something of an afterthought, but the phrasing of later reports of their prorogation, as mentioned above, suggests a rather more independent command. Perhaps it was found that having two *imperium*-holders working independently at their own discretion was more effective; the retention of this model in 206 would certainly support this possibility. What was intended in 200 with the reduction from two commands to one is uncertain, as is the reason for its failure.[528] Given the recent end of the Second Punic War and the fact that the current commanders and armies had been in Iberia for some time, it seems this might have been a logical time to reduce forces in Iberia, and to reduce reliance on extraordinary commands. A single praetorian commander was the norm elsewhere, in Sicily and Sardinia. Nonetheless, Acidinus' failure to leave Iberia prior to the arrival of a direct successor in late 200

[526] Brennan 2000: I 160; Vervaet 2012: 78-9.
[527] Hölkeskamp 2011: 169 and *passim.* Cf. Eckstein 1987: 216 on other theatrical ways to impress provincials.
[528] Liv. 30.41.4-5.

demonstrates that this was not successful.[529] Regardless of why the attempt to reduce personnel failed, it clearly did so quickly. The only subsequent combining of the two commands fell in 171-168, contiguous with the Third Macedonian War. Thus only an extreme circumstance, after decades of pacification, halted the dual command.

The presence of two (or at least two) commanders, however, does not prescribe any particular division of command. Our reliance on Livy for understanding this issue is unfortunate, as his late date has allowed some scholars to view his representation of provincial division as anachronistic or confused.[530] It is, however, the fullest narrative we have, and a plausible series of developments emerges from it in tandem with the dual command. As we have seen above, Livy represents the position of the Scipiones in 212 as holding the *Hispaniae,* that is to say the plural.[531] Livy's reference to the prorogation of Scipio and Silanus in 208, *suae Hispaniae suique exercitus,* suggests a similar situation.[532] This in no way has to imply an early idea of Hither and Further Spain; there are two commands, divided on a basis we do not know, which can both be labelled *Hispania.*[533] The potential for ambiguity, given our evidence of commanders working together or separately, is clear, and offers good reason why Livy's narrative appears unclear over whether there was in fact one *provincia* or two.[534] The possibility that conflict might arise between (pro)magistrates as a result of this lack of clear definition gives in turn a potential reason why geographical definition was proposed in 197.[535] On the other hand, not only did the preceding decade not see such conflict arise, but

[529] See Sumner 1970: 91; Richardson 1986: 68-70; Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007: 27-8, with suggestion that the *concilium plebis* deliberately only appointed a successor for Lentulus, leaving Acidinus in his own command.
[530] See esp. Sumner 1977.
[531] Liv. 25.3.6.
[532] Liv. 27.22.7.
[533] See Díaz Fernández 2015: 130-1 n.146 on division prior to 197; Sumner 1970 proposes two clearly (but non-geographically) defined commands, but lacks evidence.
[534] See Richardson 1986: 66 with references; Salinas de Frías 1995: 31.
[535] See e.g. Drogula 2015: 251-2 on geography as an unusual way to divide *provinciae.* Though it had obviously been used in Sicily prior to 211, the division was political as well as strictly geographical, and Syracusan interests in maintaining the boundary of the *vetus provincia* and their own kingdom would likely have helped to keep the lines clear.

cooperation appears to have continued with some success (Helvius being the notable exception).[536]

Indeed, it is by no means clear that the attempt to divide Iberia into two geographically distinct provinces was exactly successful. In such a dynamic region, under the supervision of magistrates who were faced with major revolts in their year of office, it is not surprising that a clear boundary would not have been successfully set.[537] There may, however, have been some existing idea of two distinct spaces, as the dual command had enabled commanders to work independently when appropriate.[538]

The distinguishing feature of the provincial division appears to have been its flexibility. This is not to argue that there was no conceptual separation, or that Livy is wrong to place the attempted division in 197.[539] Examples of what appears to be commanders campaigning in one another's provinces are numerous, and in places Livy seems confused about allocations. P. Manlius, for instance, was praetor in Hispania Citerior in 195, but is attested to have campaigned in Turdetania, which is in Ulterior, and is said by Livy in 182 to have held Ulterior, which province he had previously held.[540] How we read this bare contradiction is open to debate.[541] The confusion over succession and over campaigning locations is emblematic of several such problematic examples.

We now return to the issue of personnel and status. As we have seen, the granting of proconsular *imperium* to magistrates or promagistrates sent to Iberia took place frequently

[536] On competition and cooperation in Iberia and other regions, see Pittenger 2008: 67-83.
[537] Revolts: Liv. 33.21.7-8; App. *Ib.* 39. Consensus that boundary was not clearly set from 197: Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007: 33-4.
[538] See e.g. Jacob 1990: 253 for the argument that there was a de facto division from 206.
[539] See e.g. Develin 1980: 365; Richardson 1986: 78; Díaz Fernández 2015: 57, with further bibliography, 130-1.
[540] Assignment to Citerior: Liv. 33.43.5, 8; 34.17.1 (successor to Minucius). Campaigning: Liv. 34.17, 19. Assignment to Ulterior: Liv. 40.1.4, 16.7.
[541] On the problem see e.g. Richardson 1986: 85-6. Develin 1980: 365-7 proposes a solution to such problems based on prorogued (proconsular) praetors having a wider remit, but this relies on the unsubstantiated idea that praetors only received proconsular power on prorogation (cf. Díaz Fernández 2015: 73, 136-7). Sumner 1970, esp. 93-4, makes the inadequately supported suggestion that our sources doctored material to conceal the fact that the provinces were not geographically divided at all.

across the period 218-167. It remains, however, to consider why praetors were used from 197 onwards, and to put this in the context of Roman political development of the time. The shift to using regular magistrates rather than extraordinary promagistrates makes good sense in light of tendencies toward political normativity. Indeed, these tendencies provide valuable context for the change, which without this context is likely to be explained purely as an issue of the 'permanence' of the provinces.

There is evidence of increased senatorial regulation of the cursus in the early second century.[542] We have no direct evidence for legislation regulating the order of the cursus, in spite of Brennan's and others' suggestions, but between 196 and 166, all but one known consul had previously been a praetor, with the exception being Scipio Africanus, already a consular prior to his second tenure of the consulship in 194.[543] This points strongly to a norm if not a law. In 180, the *lex Villia Annalis* set minimum ages for offices, a similar control.[544] Other measures of the period suggest moves to control behaviour of senatorial individuals and groups, presumably aiming to strengthen the cohesion and collective influence of the body as a whole. After the Second Punic War, senatorial decrees restricted magisterial spending on games; in 182, the *Lex Orchia de Cenis* limited guest numbers at private banquets; and the *Lex Baebia* (on which more below) introduced new restrictions on *ambitus* in 181.[545]

While increasing the number of praetorships in 198 is hardly likely to have discouraged *ambitus* (with more men able to become praetors and possibly more subsequently competing for the consulship), it did in some respects fit in with these norms. Regular elections were more strongly influenced by Rome's aristocracy than the popular extraordinary elections of the

[542] Brennan 2000: I 164, 168-9.
[543] Existence of a law: Astin 1958; Brennan 2000: I 168-9; Beck 2016: 137; cf. Develin 1979: 20 (no law prior to 180). Note also that men ceased to hold praetorship after consulship from ca.244 (see Beck 2011a: 84).
[544] Liv. 40.33.1-2, 44.1; see Beck 2016: 142-4.
[545] Liv. 39.5.7-10; 40.44.11-12; see Beck 2016: 131-5; Macrob. *Sat.* 3.17.2; Liv. 40.19.11.).

Second Punic War had been.[546] The senate had further possible reason to disapprove of extraordinary commands, as they had prior to 198 resulted in commanders failing to win triumphs for military successes in Iberia on account of being *privati*.[547] Between 197 and 167, eight triumphs and six ovations were won by commanders in Iberia, thus bringing this string of commanders into the existing system of honours, while providing (in the relative innovation of the *ovatio*) a less prestigious option.[548] The existence of more regularly elected *imperium*-holders than before obviated the need from 198 onwards for the granting of *imperium* to *privati.*[549]

This increase in *imperium*-holding magistrates had two further consequences that fit neatly into the norms of the second century. Firstly, as Jehne notes, the second century saw the rupture of the link between military crisis and consular iteration, which can easily be seen as a result of there being more experienced commanders available and as a cause for the rise of a wider consular class, encouraging the centralisation of senatorial power.[550] Secondly, and connected strongly with this, is the reduction in opportunities for provincial patronage. The Cornelii Scipiones in particular had a great opportunity to form an enduring relationship not only with the Roman army in Iberia, but also with Iberian communities.[551] The use of praetors, regularly elected and then allocated provinces by lot, would theoretically avoid any particular family having such an opportunity. A case can be made for personal relations with the Iberians being re-established under Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, which led to favourable treatment for his

[546] See esp. Vishnia 1996: 62 for the idea that the plebeian assembly had 'overstepped its traditional authority'. Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo (2007: 27-8) make the interesting suggestion that the *concilium plebis* had been responsible for the failed downsizing of forces in Iberia in 200.
[547] Disapproval: Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007: 35; cf. also their disagreement with Marcius, Liv. 26.2.2-5. Rejected triumphs: Liv. 31.20.1-7 (Lentulus); 32.7.4 (Manlius). Scipio may have been rejected (Liv. 28.38.4; Liv. 31.20.3; Cass. Dio fr.57.56; Val. Max. 2.8.5), but may not (Polyb. 11.33.7; App. *Ib.* 38).
[548] Richardson 1975: 55-6 on the novelty of the *ovatio.*
[549] Until 77: see Jashemski 1950: 39.
[550] Jehne 2011: 226-30. On the consular class see also Beck 2011a: 85; 2016: 138.
[551] Army: Liv. 26.41.2-42.1. Communities: *ILS* 66, Saguntine monument to Africanus probably erected in the late Republic, see Richardson 1986: 64.

son when the latter was quaestor in Iberia, but this had little potential to damage Roman politics or regional control.[552] Thus the decision to increase the number of praetorships can be read coherently as part of an early second-century trend towards the regularisation and depersonalisation of provincial command.

The *Lex Baebia,* mentioned above, shows well the complexity of the political decisions involved in providing provincial commanders. While the law appears primarily to have concerned measures intended to restrict *ambitus* and its destabilising potential, Livy indicates that there was connected with this a measure to alter the number of praetorships, such that for every other year (odd-numbered years in our notation) four would be elected rather than six.[553] This provision on praetors can be variously explained by the exigencies of the Iberian command or by domestic political considerations, of which the latter are the stronger explanation. The second aspect which needs explanation is the rapid repeal of the provision, which can be attributed to a mixture of both external and internal factors.

Some scholars have argued that a desire for continuity in the Iberian command, given substantial travel times to the peninsula, was a driving factor behind the praetorian provision, which aimed to institutionalise two-year praetorian tenures in the Iberian provinces.[554] Most, however, prefer to foreground the relevance of reducing praetorian numbers to the restriction of *ambitus* by limiting numbers of consular candidates.[555] It appears overall, and in general the phrasing of most scholarship acknowledges, that since two-year tenures in the Iberian provinces were taking place prior to 181, the desire to institutionalise this is unlikely to have been sufficient stimulus by itself; the connection between the praetorian provision and the

[552] Richardson 1986: 102, 108; App. *Ib.* 43-4; Plut. *TG* 5.3-6.3.
[553] Liv. 40.44.2. See Richardson 1986: 110 with n.80; Brennan 2000: 169-70.
[554] E.g. Mommsen *Rom. Staatsr.* II^3 194 n.4; Fraccaro 1956: 229; Scullard 1973: 173 with n.2 *contra* Afzelius; Richardson 1986: 111; Ferrary 2006: 13; Díaz Fernández 2015: 138-9 with n.168; idea entertained also by Ferrary 2010: 36. On travel times see Salinas de Frías 1995: 127 and estimates from *ORBIS.*
[555] Fraccaro 1956: 229 (explicitly subordinated to first explanation); Brennan 2000: I 170; Ferrary 2008: 9; Beck 2016: 139 .

ambitus law also makes clear that those who drafted it at least saw a relationship between the two.[556] Indeed, the *Leges Orchia* and *Villia Annalis,* and the likely proposal of a *lex de triumpho* in 179, stress the evident interest of the time in sumptuary and electoral restrictions, an interest within which a law on *ambitus* would coherently fit, and the praetorian provision coherently within that law.[557]

Further remarks may be made concerning the two-year tenure. It is clear that, if the two city praetorships and the *provinciae* of Sicily and Sardinia continued to be allocated on a regular basis, a reduction to four praetors in alternate years would lead to further use of (at least) two-year commands in Iberia. As we have observed, however, these tenures had been happening for over a decade prior to the *Lex Baebia,* presumably due to a mixture of the distance involved and the need for praetors to take up other commands.[558]

The two-year tenure appears then to have been a normal measure across the 180s and into the 170s. The most obvious explanation for the derogation of the provision is that there simply were not enough praetors for positions,[559] but given that annual sortition appears to have resumed, more or less, for Iberian commands in the mid-170s, this may not provide the whole picture.[560] Scullard argues that the praetorian provision is likely to have been unpopular with Roman nobility, which may be valid: even if one's chances of becoming consul after being praetor were reduced by a higher number of praetorships, the enrichment opportunities and

[556] Two-year tenures were held in both provinces in 193-2, 191-190 (with Aemilius in Citerior prorogued also for 189), 188-7, 186-5, 184-3, and 182-1.
[557] *Lex de triumpho:* see Beck 2016: 149. A further domestic reason for the *Lex Baebia* is suggested by Knapp (1977a: 94-5): praetors not required to go to Iberia due to the existing tendency towards prorogation were receiving excessive opportunities to build up patronage in southern or Gallic northern areas of Italy; for Gallic areas, however, this does not seem to have been valid: see Brennan 2000: I 200-1.
[558] See e.g. Brennan 2000: I 202-4 on the need for commanders in central and southern Italy.
[559] See Develin 1979: 83; Brennan 2000: I 171.
[560] Brennan 2000: I 172, 734; Beck 2016: 139-40; by 173 at the latest we know that the election of six each year had resumed.

honours of praetorship should not be ignored.[561] It is even possible that the reduction in praetorian positions had led to greater *ambitus* around the praetorian elections. In any case, the law was awkward, and if extraordinary commands by *privati* were to be avoided, as it seems was desirable, it left little flexibility for times at which the roster of *imperium*-holders was stretched (as in, for instance, the war with Antiochus). The evidence suggests that the praetorian provision can be most coherently read as the senate capitalising on a political opportunity arising from something of an experiment in control in Iberia, that is to say the two-year tenure. The derogation on the other hand is likely the result of the damage caused to the flexibility of the magisterial system, in light of the demands of Rome's fluctuating provincial commitments.

III.2.4. Extraction and exploitation

As Table III.2.a demonstrates, magistrates and promagistrates brought back considerable sums in cash and kind from commands in the Peninsula. The picture of how this was acquired, however, is less clear, and of much interest. We shall first consider the forms in which Roman representatives extracted resources in the region, to highlight the importance of extractions in kind as well as in cash or bullion. Secondly, we address the issue of *stipendium,* the term frequently used in Livy for what appear to be cash exactions, and through which we may illustrate the importance of the war economy and the tensions between it and later taxation. Other exactions will form the third major issue, ranging from the scantily attested *vicesima* to the hugely significant profits of booty, which serves as a counterpoint to arguments for early regularised taxation. Fourthly, there is the question of how and when Rome exploited the

[561] See Scullard 1973: 173. Cf. Rosenstein 2011: 153-8 on the lucrative nature of commands including the Iberian.

mines of the north-east and south, considered by many scholars a key element of wealth extraction, but difficult to date. Finally, we shall question the nature and implications of the apparent monetisation of parts of the region within our period.

III.2.4.1. Extraction in cash and kind

While cash (including to an extent bullion) was necessary for commanders to maintain liquidity in the field, the acquisition of resources in kind, such as grain, was key, most significantly, for the provisioning of armies in the region and beyond.[562] The confiscation of resources from enemies could also be useful in weakening their power of resistance, in both physical and morale terms, as Cato apparently did in the area of Emporion in 195.[563] In the Catonian instance, this must be considered a parallel benefit with the provisioning of the Roman army under the maxim *bellum se ipsum alet.*[564] In the case of the Ilergetes and others in 205, the military need for both cash and physical resources is apparent from Livy's description of Roman demands, which include money, grain, and cloaks and togas for the troops.[565]

A confounding element which makes it difficult to trace the extraction of resources in kind as part of commanders' profits is the apparent tendency of Livy to convert to cash (and often bullion). It is difficult to consider figures he states in *denarii* or *sestertii* as representing cash sums extracted, as we have minimal evidence of Roman silver or bronze circulating in the Peninsula prior to the second half of the second century. These figures must thus represent

[562] See e.g. Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 37-8, with regard to Liv. 23.41.6; Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007: 36, 42 (Liv. 30.3.2-3, 25.5-6 on Spanish corn exported for army and for Rome); cf. Muñiz Coello 1980: 42 (in error).
[563] Liv. 34.13.2-3, 16.4.
[564] Liv. 34.9.12.
[565] Liv. 29.3.5; cf. App. *Ib.* 38, which mentions only cash and sanctions. Contrast 206, Liv. 28.34.11, where liquidity is the focus and only a fine is imposed. García Riaza 1999a: 42-3 appears to confuse the two episodes.

sums gained from the sale of grain, moveables, slaves, and so on. In the case of Certima, indeed, we only have a figure in *sestertii.* While Livy is the key source for profit figures, it should also be noted that other authors show differing representations of exactions in this way.[566] A further aspect to consider in the representation of exactions by Livy in particular is the likely obscuring of non-Roman coined money. Silver coined in the Iberian Peninsula did not circulate in Italy, so must have been melted down if imported.[567] Thus it might appear in the lists available to Livy under several labels, including that of bullion.[568] Lo Cascio makes a case that even Roman coins might not have been understood independently of their intrinsic value at this time, so the supposition that non-Roman coin had little meaning outside of bullion value is quite comprehensible.[569]

This blurring of the difference between coin and bullion may help to solve what has been presented as a conundrum: how peninsular communities could have paid money taxes ca.180-150, before the introduction of the 'Iberian denarius'.[570] It has, of course, been proposed that the communities paid in kind.[571] Nonetheless, given the above observations about Roman attitudes to non-Roman coin, it becomes difficult to see much difference between such coin and bullion, at least in terms of Roman demands.[572]

[566] See García Riaza 1999a: 44-5. Cf. García Riaza 1999b.
[567] Crawford 1985: 94-5; Chaves 1994: 108.
[568] On the possibilities, see e.g. García Riaza 1999a: 42, 44. Compare the treatment of different coinages within the Peninsula itself, García-Bellido 1993a: 335 on hoard evidence from Martos and Cuenca.
[569] Lo Cascio 1996: 279, on the first attested statement differentiating coins from *merx;* cf. Howgego 1992: 10.
[570] Howgego 1994: 17-18. On the 'Iberian denarius' and its dating, see further below. Presumably, the apparent conundrum relies on the cessation of minting of imitation Emporitan drachmae around 180, as well as on Howgego's discounting of Hopkins' outflow-inflow model (Hopkins 1980), which is reasonable given the role of stored and mineral wealth.
[571] Howgego 1994: 17-18; Tan 2017: 32.
[572] See, however, García-Bellido 2000-1: 575 on the greater value of coin.

III.2.4.2. Stipendium

Stipendium appears regularly in Livy as what appears to be a cash exaction in the Peninsula, and its origins support this. The word originally indicates military pay, introduced for the first time in the late fifth century after a campaign against the Volsci.[573] On this basis, its extraction in the field points to ideals of army autarky, parallel to Cato's claims of self-sufficiency in grain supply, echoed by Flaccus in 181.[574] The amount of pay required for an army would be a flexible amount, depending on the size and makeup of the force involved.[575] On the specifics of its payment, we do not have much clear information. Soldiers appear to have been paid in bronze until the 150s or 140s.[576] It is unclear at what point in the season soldiers were paid.[577]

The significance of the term, however, changed considerably over time. For Cicero, the word and its cognates relate to fixed and regular exactions. The key passage concerned is *Verr.* 2.3.6.12, where Cicero explains that upon some provinces*, impositum vectigal est certum, quod stipendiarium dicitur, ut Hispanis et plerisque Poenorum quasi victoriae praemium ac poena belli…* As Aguilar and Ñaco del Hoyo point out, the suggested equivalence of *vectigal* with *stipendium* based on this passage, that is of an indirect tax with a direct one, is strange and confusing.[578] Several points need to be made. Firstly, the agricultural specificity of the passage can hardly be overstressed.[579] Secondly, the term *stipendium,* which it bears stating explicitly is not directly used by Cicero in the passage given, is used by him in a variety of other

[573] Liv. 4.59.11. See Richardson 1976: 148-9; Blázquez 1982: 72; Salinas de Frías 1999: 131-2; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 29.
[574] Liv. 40.35.4.
[575] Cf. its relationship with *tributum,* also likely to have been flexible in this way: Nicolet 1977: 438-9; González Román 1979: 83; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 31.
[576] Crawford 1985: 95; Richardson 1986: 92.
[577] Ñaco del Hoyo 1999: 354 (traditionally on return to Italy, but Livy has *stipendium* sent with commanders on departure); Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 211-2 (suggesting annually with part upfront); Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 156 (conflict suggested by Flaccus' announcement at the end of his tenure).
[578] Aguilar and Ñaco del Hoyo 1997: 75-7.
[579] Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 238; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 27; 2005: 370; Soraci 2010: 52-6.

contexts with different meanings.[580] Lastly, Cicero appears to have used the term *stipendiarius* to indicate a relationship of political subjection on more than one occasion.[581]

The centrality of the subjection relationship to the concept of *stipendium* and its cognate terms applies also to sources on our period. In the grievances of the Gauls of northern Italy, Livy brackets it with *cetera indigna,* and at other points he uses the term to refer to the indemnity owed by Carthage after 241. In Livy's first decade and elsewhere, *stipendium* is required from defeated enemies as part of a truce, often with a period of payment mentioned, suggesting an indemnity.[582] The claiming of *stipendium* in this context is associated with victory. Crucially, it may be paid in instalments, but it is a fixed-term exaction.

The ways in which *stipendium* can be understood, as a word and as a concept, can be seen from Livy's account of the punishment meted out to the Ilergetes in 206 and 205. In the first case, Scipio demands money (*pecunia)*, *ex qua stipendium militi praestari posset.* In the second, what is demanded from the revolting tribes is *stipendium duplex.*[583] Thus *stipendium* is used both for the payment of soldiers by the Roman representative, in the first case, and in a transferred sense for the payment from the community to the representative, in the latter. It is well noted that the context of the second passage, including demands for grain and other army supplies, strongly implies that military pay is still at least the primary intended purpose of the payment.[584] This has the appearance of a war economy, an effort perhaps in the direction of the military autarky espoused by Cato and Flaccus.

[580] Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 47-8, including an application at *Verr.* 2.1.27.70, where its usage is highly unlikely to be agricultural.
[581] E.g. *Balb.* 9.24; see Soraci 2010: 45-7.
[582] Liv. 21.20.6, 40.5, 41.9. See García Riaza 2002: 215-6; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 28, 32, 41-2; Soraci 2010: 67-8. Indemnities: Pitillas 1996: 134 with Oros. 5.1.10-11; Ñaco del Hoyo 2005: 373; Kay 2014: 21-2. Taylor 2017: 161-2 notes the ambiguity between indemnities and *praeda*, but cf. Kay 2014: 40-1.
[583] Liv. 28.34.11; 29.3.5.
[584] See e.g. Muñiz Coello 1980: 44-5 (tentatively); Richardson 1986: 72; Ñaco del Hoyo 1998: 138, 141; 2003: 141.

This type of economy, where *stipendium* was exacted on an ad hoc basis, appears to have persisted for most if not all of our period. It appears that there was at some point a shift to a regularised tax economy, though the fact we find Cicero using the term *stipendiarius* to imply political content is notable.[585] The vague use of *stipendium* as a shorthand term for both states of affairs, regular taxation and indemnity, leads to much apparent confusion.[586] The case for this shift taking place under the younger Scipio is weak: Florus alleges that he made Hispania *stipendiaria.*[587] Even Salinas de Frías does not seem confident in constructing a narrative from this. The description can, moreover, be taken as an indicator of Scipio's key role in establishing domination relationships with a number of communities, in accordance with the political implications of the term *stipendiarius.* This applies also to Livy's description of *civitates stipendiariae* around Cartagena being compelled to give pay for soldiers in the mutiny of 206, which is evidently a one-off exaction.[588]

Arguments for regularisation in 197-5 have rather more supporters, but minimal evidence. Support is based primarily on the spurious argument that the division of the provinces implies fiscal regularisation.[589] Muñiz Coello also argues that the peninsular communities' later attachment to Cato in spite of his massive revenues implies that he was responsible for regularisation and responsible fiscal extraction. This is a weak argument, and requires him to suggest a similar image of Paullus' tenure in 191-189, as well as supposing that

[585] Vaguely presented at e.g. Muñiz Coello 1980: 26. Insistence on the involvement of a *lex publica:* Cerami 1986: 47.
[586] This is one reason why some scholars will appear as supporters of more than one date below. Montenegro Duque and Blázquez Martínez 1982: 342-3 is particularly confused, including a statement that *stipendium* was only imposed from 197 (clearly counter to Livy), yet claiming that it was a fixed imposition only from 179-8 onwards.
[587] Flor. 1.33.7. Credited as indicative of regular taxation at least in some areas by Salinas de Frías 1995: 63, 147-8; 1999: 133-4 (here on the basis of blurred distinctions between one-off and regular exactions).
[588] See Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 137.
[589] Arrangements likely: Muñiz Coello 1980: 50; Blázquez 1982: 72; García-Bellido 1997: 36 (though attributing the division to Cato); Salinas de Frías 1999: 133 (though, as n.106, arguing that this was necessary even for ad hoc exactions).

Flaccus' claim to self-sufficiency was mere posturing and that such self-sufficiency had been the norm for some years.[590]

The most popular date supposed for tax regularisation is ca.180-178 under Gracchus.[591] The key argument for this date is the claim of Appian that Gracchus' treaty with Segeda included the imposition of a φόρος.[592] There are, however, criticisms of this passage: in particular, Appian states that by 153, Segeda had been excused its φόρος and its auxiliary quota. This would be very strange in the case of a regular tax.[593] The evidence for regularised fixed taxation in the Peninsula under Gracchus is, then, thin at best, though the inclusion of auxiliary demands suggests that this form of extraction was in regular use by this point. Aguilar and Ñaco del Hoyo note further that the embassy from both provinces in 171 does not mention *vectigalia, stipendium,* or anything precise of that nature; however, the generic nature of the complaint of *pecuniae captae* by no means rules these out as possible areas of abuse.[594]

For the Iberian Peninsula down to 167, we are faced largely with silence over the possibility of regularised *stipendium.* While it will be seen below that there evidently existed a regularised *vicesima* by 171, *stipendium* appears to have retained its war-economy context and form. While Appian's evidence on Segeda does not deserve to be dismissed out of hand, the strangeness of the city being excused within 25 years suggests at least that any regularisation under Gracchus was far from complete. The recurrence of *stipendium* in the texts, however, does nonetheless suggest that financial exactions from the defeated were

[590] Muñiz Coello 1980: 55-6, 60, 64. On Flaccus see also Blázquez 1982: 73.
[591] See Richardson 1976: 149; 1986: 115; Blázquez 1982: 73; Montenegro Duque and Blázquez Martínez 1982: 342; García Moreno 1987: 219 (178 at the earliest); García-Bellido 1993b: 109; Tan 2017: 73 (by 178).
[592] App. *Ib.* 44.
[593] Ñaco del Hoyo 1999: 361-3; García Riaza 2002: 218; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 161, 163.
[594] Aguilar and Ñaco del Hoyo 1997: 80; Liv. 43.2.1-3.

frequent, and that this manifestation of Roman economic power was a major signifier of broader Roman domination.

III.2.4.3. The vicesima and the 'silent economy'

Aside from the *stipendium,* which we have argued may not have been regularised within our period, our evidence for other exactions is not wholly clear.[595] We will here treat two types of exaction which may initially appear very different, but which actually suggest the functioning in the Spanish provinces of what García Riaza dubs a 'silent economy', with various opportunities for office-holders to enrich not only the *aerarium* but themselves. One of these is the *vicesima* and associated measures*,* attested by Livy in an early example of what would become the *quaestio de repetundis.* The other is the acquisition of booty.

Livy attests that in 171, an embassy from both Citerior and Ulterior complained at Rome of *pecuniae captae,* in response to which the senate initiated civil proceedings, which were subsequently directed at praetorian commanders of 178-5, 174-3, and 173. The nature of the *pecuniae captae* is not specified, but as a result of the case, the senate passed a resolution to the effect that: *Hispanis, quod impetrarunt, ne frumenti aestimationem magistratus Romanus haberet neve cogeret vicensumas vendere Hispanos, quanti ipse vellet, et ne praefecti in oppida sua ad pecunias cogendas imponerentur.*[596] As we have seen, grain requisitioning was common in the Peninsula, but this is the first indication we have of a supposedly sanctioned process for it.[597]

[595] For example, we have no evidence of likely *portoria*; see Muñiz Coello 1980: 237.
[596] Liv. 43.2 (43.2.12 quoted).
[597] As Richardson 1986: 93 observes, Cato's options in 195 were market purchase through *redemptores,* or simple seizure. See also Muñiz Coello 1980: 72-5, with further bibliography.

Livy's description of the process, however, is extremely vague. The exact procedure cannot be reconstructed from the passage, but it appears that there are two major elements: forced purchase of a twentieth of the yield in the Hispaniae, possibly at an artificially low price; and compulsion of the *Hispani* to cover grain demands in cash, possibly at an artificially high price.[598] Indeed, even the likelihood of either of these being a regular imposition can be disputed.[599] The interesting point for our purposes is that these options represent ways for Roman representatives to squeeze more resources from the provinces, in a way that prior to 171 it appears they could personally manipulate. Given the precedents of simple requisition (e.g. by Cato) and the subsequent development and legislation of magistrates' rights to requisition for their own needs, it appears likely that the measures Livy describes were rather discretionary.[600]

The possibilities for private profit in the Peninsula range far beyond grain or cash equivalent requisition. References to the taking of booty are legion, and it is clearly the most immediately profitable resource for both soldier and commander.[601] That magistrates were often motivated by the possibilities of short-term gain is suggested by the recurring tendency to spend their final months in post conducting actions primarily aimed at securing booty and glory.[602] This is not the behaviour of representatives seeking to build long-term profitable power structures, but rather to enhance their own standing at home. It is generally accepted that returning magistrates had meaningful ownership over their *manubiae,* but this is not even required for us to consider the gaining of such *manubiae* valuable, as its use for public works

[598] See esp. Blázquez Martínez 1967: 268; García-Bellido 1993b: 109-10; Aguilar and Ñaco del Hoyo 1997: 80-1; Briscoe 2012a: ad loc.; cf. Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 247; Tan 2017: 83 with n.58.
[599] See Ñaco del Hoyo 1999: 365.
[600] We should not, as Montenegro Duque and Blázquez Martínez (1982: 342-3) do, make these measures parallel or interchangeable with *stipendium,* regularised or not. Nor, contrary to Salinas de Frías 1995: 146, is there any reason to see the two as contradictory.
[601] See e.g. Luccelli 2000: 81-4.
[602] Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 155; 2005: 390.

was a valuable prestige action.[603] Flaccus, noted for his claims to stipendiary self-sufficiency, is also stated by Livy to have collected money from the Hispani (in an unspecified way) specifically for games to Jupiter and a temple to Fortuna Equestris. Indeed, we have already encountered these games as the occasion for senatorial limiting of expenditure, which is suggestive of social patterns of provincial profit and public spending at this time.[604] In this respect at least, the results of command in Iberia were impacting in turn on politics at Rome.

Murky income streams are not limited to Flaccus'. As García Riaza observes, we do not know how or how much profit Paullus brought back, in spite of other sources stressing its immensity, nor do we know anything specific concerning the profits obtained by those prosecuted in 171. We can assume, perhaps, that grain valuation was involved in the latter cases.[605] That profit was obtained through a variety of channels is suggested by the announcement of L. Manlius in 185 that his quaestor would be bringing back a further sum in addition to what he had brought.[606] The Livian passage on the civil action of 171 gives us a glimpse of how magistrates might make extra profit, but only a glimpse.

It is easy to see the draws towards a war economy in the Peninsula, and the action of 171 suggests that earlier attempts at military autarky had led to complexity and exploitation that was no longer accepted by the Hispani. This makes an interesting combination with attempts to curb senatorial wealth use during the period: the impression given is that Rome was rather more interested in regulating power relations at home than in controlling the power of its representatives in the Iberian Peninsula, at least until there was an explicit

[603] See Kay 2014: 31-4 for consensus; Schatzman 1972 for full argument, including prior bibliography, esp. 204 for value of public works; cf. Churchill 1999 for disagreement, but 100-1 and 109 on the value of controlling *manubiae* even without ownership.
[604] Liv. 40.44.9-10; cf. Pietilä-Castren 1987: 113 and discussion above. On private profit generally, Tan 2017: 7-8 suggests exponential rises in elite fortunes at Rome from 200.
[605] García Riaza 1999a: 41. On Paullus, e.g. Polyb. 31.22.3.
[606] Liv. 39.29.7; Richardson 1986: 117; though cf. Muñiz Coello 1980: 61 (delay in *stipendium,* based on assumption of regularised taxation); Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 153 (delay due to booty and pay distribution).

complaint. Thus we know of the considerable profits brought in, but little of exactly how they were obtained.

III.2.4.4. Mining

The mining resources of the Peninsula were well-known and were exploited by the Barcids prior to Rome's arrival in the region. By the time of Polybius we know that those around Cartagena were being exploited with great profits for the *populus Romanus*.[607] The first book of Maccabees suggests that Rome's control of the mines in Hispania was known even in Israel by the 160s, which strongly suggests that exploitation had begun.[608] At what point, to what degree, and by what method any of the available mining areas were exploited, however, is hard to determine.

Arguments for early exploitation are generally weak. While Cartagena was taken in 209, and Castulo in 206, and the mining areas of the north-east were accessible prior to this, we have no solid evidence that they were put to use. Evidence of atmospheric lead pollution points to large-scale silver smelting in second-century Europe, but this is a broad date-range. Metallurgical study of Roman denarius coinage across the second century suggests that silver of peninsular origin only became prominent in Roman silver minting in the later part of the century.[609]

Archaeological evidence from mining sites, moreover, suggests exploitation does not date to the first third or so of the century. Indeed, intensive mining does not seem to be in

[607] Strabo 3.2.10 (Polybius).
[608] 1 Macc. 8.3.
[609] Hollstein 2000b; Kay 2014: 46-7; Albarède et al. 2016: esp. 134; Taylor 2017: 166-7. Sample sizes, however, are small, and margins of error in Hollstein's study are considerable. In any case, Rome would likely have been obtaining peninsular silver e.g. in the Carthaginian indemnity post-241.

evidence until the late second century.[610] We do, however, have textual evidence for some forms of mining during the tenure of Cato, who according to Livy *vectigalia magna instituit* with regard to iron and silver mines.[611] It appears likely based on a reference to Cato's *Origines* in Gellius that this refers specifically to the mines of the north-east.[612]

The nature of the *vectigalia* established by Cato is unclear, which is symptomatic of our state of knowledge over how the mines were worked. Strabo's account, derived explicitly from Polybius, strongly implies that the silver mines of Cartagena were considered public property in Polybius' time. This in turn suggests that mine-working was let by public contract.[613] While lead ingots attesting the involvement of *societates publicanorum* and indeed individual contractors date largely to the first century, their earlier involvement cannot be ruled out, but the date at which contracting began is disputed.[614] As Domergue notes, the *publicani* had shown their worth at Rome in 215, so could have been used from the beginning at Cartagena if exploitation began early after the capture of the city; equally, however, contracting could have begun under Cato, and this could be what was meant by the *magna vectigalia.*[615]

What emerges clearly here is that we have no clear evidence for public contracting prior to the end of our period, but rather suppositions one way or another based on scant textual evidence. Frank argues for 179 as the date of a change, based on the specious idea that Livy ceases to record precious metal profits after 178, and on the introduction of new *portoria*

[610] See e.g. Domergue 1985: 91 (Sierra Morena); 1990: 183-4 (north of Castulo); Ñaco del Hoyo 1999: 345-6 (all regions); cf. Domergue 1990: 183.
[611] Liv. 34.21.7.
[612] Gell. *NA* 2.22.28 = *FRHist* Cato F116. See Blázquez Martínez 1967: 266; Blázquez 1982: 93; Richardson 1986: 88, 91. Cf. Domergue 1990: 183 n.30 and Kay 2014: 50 on which mines are meant.
[613] Richardson 1976: 142; 1986: 122-3 (but cf. Kay 2014: 53); Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 119-123 with review of earlier opinion.
[614] Ingots: see e.g. Blázquez 1982: 89-91; Domergue 1985: 93.
[615] Domergue 1985: 93; 1990: 242, 249, 250. Frank 1933: 154 is excessive in assuming the relevance of Cato's later distaste for the *equites.* Salinas de Frías 1995: 58-9, 147-8 argues for non-*publicani* regularisation under Cato, based on his principle of military autarky.

and *vectigalia* by the censors in that year.[616] This is clearly dubious given the mention of Centho's profit total in 174, and the lack of surviving Livian narrative after 168.[617] It is also debatable whether Livy's discussion of the decision over the Macedonian mines in 167 shows the existence of prior public contracting of mines, or of that being the norm.[618]

Only the reference to Catonian *vectigalia* places Roman exploitation of the mines directly in our period. Aside from this, we have very little to suggest that Rome was systematically exploiting the mines of the Peninsula within the first half of the second century. Arguments for early exploitation tend to rely on the idea that Roman representatives would not have passed up an opportunity to tap such a major income stream. Systematic mining, however, is a major operation, as Polybius' description in Strabo demonstrates, and the Macedonian case shows abundantly how cautious Rome could be with regard to precious metal extraction. Nonetheless, it is easy to see why Roman armies in the Second Punic War pressed towards Cartagena and Castulo; at that point, Rome's absolute economic power was arguably less important than its relative economic power with regard to Carthage. Cutting off the Barcid armies from mining resources was by itself valuable as a short-term goal. There is no need for us to assume quick systematization of Roman mining interests, especially given the profits available from military action following the Second Punic War. Setting up a mining concern would not help a commander to win a triumph, nor did it have the dual value of profit and pacification which could be hoped for from military conquest.

[616] Frank 1933: 154. Followed by e.g. García-Bellido 1966: 505.
[617] Richardson 1976: 140-1 and Domergue 1990: 245 also argue that mining profits are unlikely to have been accepted within what were effectively booty totals.
[618] Liv. 45.18.3-5. Taken as such by Domergue 1985: 93; 1990: 248; disputed by Richardson 1976: 143-4.

III.2.4.5. Monetisation

While coinage has implications beyond the purely economic, this remains the best context within which to consider what numismatics can tell us about the exercise of Roman power in the Peninsula, not least because of the potential relationship between coinage and taxation. Caveats apply: we have already discussed the question of extraction in cash and kind, including how excessive emphasis on coinage can be deleterious to proper understanding of extractive systems; and dating is a particular problem, with the fluctuation, for instance, of Roman bronze standards over the second century making bronze difficult to date on metrological grounds.[619]

Accepting the presence of such difficulties, however, there is much to be said. Firstly, it is established that there is a significant numismatic difference between the provinces of Citerior and Ulterior. In the former, both silver and bronze were minted at various locations across the period. In the latter, only bronze was minted. While the reason for this is completely unknown, it is difficult not to suspect some degree of Roman involvement.[620] There is also a considerable difference in the level of uniformity, as Citerior saw the minting and circulation of imitation Emporitan drachmae down to ca.180, and subsequently the heavy use of the horseman motif, while the bronzes of Ulterior demonstrate a much wider iconographic range and multiple different alphabets.

It has been argued that the main distinction between bronze and silver coinage is the largely 'financial' purpose of the former and 'fiscal' purpose of the latter.[621] Given the essential difference in value, this is valid to an extent, but we would do well to remember, for example,

[619] See e.g. Crawford 1985: 91; Knapp 1987: 19.
[620] It is hard to imagine some cultural difference having this effect, especially when silver from Citerior is known to have circulated in the south. See e.g. Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 209-10; Ripollès 2005: 84.
[621] Knapp 1987: 20.

the point that legionary pay, a major form of 'fiscal' expenditure, appears to have been resolved in bronze during our period. We may also acknowledge the tendency toward wider circulation patterns for silver than for bronze. In this case, however, this tendency should not be overstated, as Spanish silver circulated very little outside the Peninsula.[622]

A number of centres of Hispania Citerior were minting silver in large quantities during the Second Punic War, including key locations such as Emporion but also indigenous populations who had not previously coined.[623] The earliest bronzes of Citerior, those minted at *Kese*, may also belong to the war period, or possibly to ca.195. These included Hispano-Carthaginian standard fractions.[624] It appears that while silver continued along the lines of the Emporitan drachma until ca.180, though with mistakes and altered legends, bronze saw considerable variety in standard. This includes the Punic standard types from *Kese;* initial introduction of bronze in alignment with the Roman uncial system at Emporion, followed by independent changes in the Emporitan system; coinage following the uncial system at *Untikesken* while it continued to produce imitation drachmae; and the production in the early second century at *Iltirta* of bronze coinage on both the Kesetan and Roman uncial standard.[625]

The silver coinage which followed the Emporitan drachma in Citerior probably does not belong to the period down to 167, but it should be mentioned here, for reasons which will become apparent. In brief, hoard examples of the so-called 'Iberian denarius', the silver coinage from Citerior which uses the relatively uniform horseman image and an Iberian-script legend, do not require a date earlier than the middle of the second century.[626] Nonetheless,

[622] Crawford 1985: 94-5.
[623] Importance of Emporion: see esp. Villaronga 1987b; cf. Crawford 1985: 96 on its longevity. Minting centres: see e.g. Campo Díaz 1997: 41-3, highlighting variety of imitation Emporitan drachmae; García-Bellido 1997: 35, 37-8; Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 196.
[624] Early: Villaronga 1987a: 119-20; disputed: Domínguez Arranz 1997: 129; 195 or later: Knapp 1987: 21-2.
[625] Villaronga 1987a: 128-9; Domínguez Arranz 1997: 137-8.
[626] See e.g. Crawford 1985: 91-5 (amending 1969: 80-2); Richardson 1986: 121; Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 197.

the presence of a uniform silver coinage probably fairly soon after 167 is worth noting here, though the polyvalence of the horseman symbol warns against suggesting Roman imposition.[627] It remains also to note that this silver was produced at few, unevenly spread centres, on an irregular basis.[628] This relatively small output makes it highly unlikely that the 'Iberian denarius' was introduced for the purposes of paying regular Roman taxation, the 'fiscal' reason par excellence.[629] Indeed, the sporadic and scattered nature of the minting suggests that there was not a systemic need for a silver coinage, which in turn points to a shifting and inconsistent economic and administrative picture, which is not far from the impression given by the taxation and mining discussions above.

The same appears to be true for the bronze coinage of Ulterior. At sites such as Castulo and Obulco, which issued bronze from the Second Punic War, issues may be associated with the exploitation of local resources, though we do not know details.[630] Nor, as we have seen, do we have concrete evidence of the exploitation of, for instance, Castulo's mines in the first third of the second century.

The bronzes of Ulterior do, however, give some suggestions of cultural mixing and shift. The first coins of Obulco, while bearing Latin legends, may be doubles of the Punic nine-gram standard, perhaps under the influence of contemporary issues from Castulo.[631] The second series from Obulco, dated around 195, conform to the Roman sextantal standard, and

[627] Crawford 1985: 94; García-Bellido 1993a: 337; 1993b: 101-2; Chaves 1999: 300-1 (polyvalence); Ripollès 2005: 82, 85 (making a case for local initiative).
[628] Only ca.10 mints: García-Bellido 1997: 37-8; Kay 2014: 95-6.
[629] García-Bellido 1993b: 98-101 with n.2, 113, applies the idea to Iberian drachmae; 2000-1: 563 applies it subsequently to the 'Iberian denarius', but both ignore the evident gap between the coinages. For rejection of the idea, see e.g. Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 200; Salinas de Frías 1999: 135-6; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003: 143; Ripollès 2005: 82. These supposed denarii are also no longer believed to be Livy's *argentum oscense.* In favour of that idea, see Crawford 1969: 80-3; Knapp 1977b: 2-4; Muñiz Coello 1980: 28 (giving earlier references); Pietilä-Castren 1987: 82. Against, largely of the view that *argentum oscense* indicates imitation Emporitan drachmae, see Amorós 1957; Muñiz Coello 1980: 28-9; Richardson 1986: 92; Villaronga 1987a: 114; García-Bellido 1993b: 113; Campo Díaz 1997: 46; Domínguez Arranz 1997: 191; García-Bellido 1997: 35-6.
[630] For dates, Arévalo González 1987: 29; Villaronga 1987a: 119; Ñaco del Hoyo and Prieto Arciniega 1999: 196. On resource association see e.g. Arévalo González 1997: 196-9, 207-8.
[631] Arévalo González 1987: 31; Chaves Tristán 1998: 161-2; Chaves 1999: 307.

include Latin and Iberian toponyms. There followed types with indigenous names sometimes written in Latin.[632] Gades and Castulo, meanwhile, used local script following the expulsion of the Carthaginians.[633] Gades also produced a series in the first quarter of the second century which employed the Carthaginian custom of differentiating issues solely through the use of single letters. Across Ulterior, Punic and southern Iberian scripts coexisted with Latin.[634] Interestingly, bronzes minted in Baetica use standardised Latin forms of indigenous toponyms rather than variable transcriptions.[635] Even more suggestive, perhaps, are series from Obulco which feature apparent magistrate names in what may be collegiate pairs, using in different instances southern Iberian or Latin script, minted early in the second century.[636]

Within this period, then, the pattern of silver being produced only in Citerior may be just about the only pattern identifiable. Monetisation in both regions was sporadic in space and time, and does not appear to have answered to any obvious pattern of requirements. In particular, the complexity of the bronzes of Ulterior in terms of metrology, iconography, and legends suggests an almost experimental treatment of coinage, responding to existing civic interests, regional ties, and new influences within the community. This accords well with the impression given with regard to Roman economic behaviours in the Peninsula.

III.2.5. Ideological and coercive power

It remains to consider the ideological and coercive behaviours shown in Table III.2.a. These fall largely into three areas: individualism and paternalism; garrisons and settlements; and

[632] Arévalo González 1987: 31; Chaves 1999: 298, 308.
[633] Chaves 1999: 312.
[634] Chaves Tristán 1998: 149.
[635] Chaves Tristán 1998: 151.
[636] See Arévalo González 1997: 208-9, 226.

mercenaries and auxiliaries. The first of these concerns the individual behaviours of a few outstanding Roman commanders, in particular the younger Scipio and Cato, though also others such as Aemilius Paullus, and how these behaviours appear to have interacted with existing social structures such as kingship, militarism, and communal servitude. The second involves our sparse evidence for garrisoning and the problematic but suggestive foundations of Italica, Iliturgi, Gracchurris, and Carteia, which respond to both strategic concerns and the role of individuals. The last concerns the use of peninsular peoples in armies by Roman leaders, for which our evidence is not particularly extensive; in the use of mercenaries and auxiliaries in Iberia, Rome appears to have been in rather new territory.

III.2.5.1. Individualism and authority

It can be seen clearly from Table III.2.a that actions concerning the Peninsula are largely attributed to individuals, with a few in particular appearing multiple times. This is partly a product of the sheer distance from Rome, and in Scipio's case of the length of tenure. In the case of Cato, the argument can also be made that his importance is emphasised by Livy's apparent use of Cato's own *De consulatu suo*.[637] Our specific focus on Aemilius Paullus' reaction to communal serfdom is based on the coincidences of epigraphic finds. This is not, however, to say that our sources show unwavering individualism: indeed, they show commanders interacting with the senate, when practical to do so, and referring to it and the people as authority. Nonetheless, we see in the Second Punic War that peninsular peoples

[637] See e.g. Martínez-Gásquez 1974: 97-9; Astin 1978: 28-9; Fantham 1991: 120.

often dealt with Carthaginian leaders on a personal level, and this carried over to interactions with Roman commanders, within the war and afterwards.[638]

The idea that there was a particular focus on the commander as individual authority in the Iberian Peninsula, especially through the practice of *devotio iberica,* has a long pedigree.[639] A range of sources attest the peninsular practice of consecrating one's life to infernal deities in exchange for a chief's survival, which Dopico Cainzos reasonably explains as demonstrating the significance of the individual leader for the community's survival (in sharp contrast to Roman Republican *devotio*).[640] The previously prevailing assumption, however, that such a practice was widespread geographically and chronologically within the peninsula is not borne out by the evidence.[641]

Nonetheless, we have plenty of evidence for individual kings and chiefs (or sometimes pairs) in areas of Roman involvement. Examples include Indibilis and Mandonius of the Ilergetes, Culchas, and Edeco who, while they appear to control different types of grouping, all exercise personal individual power.[642] Their exact roles as leaders are open to manipulation in Latin and Greek sources, which can emphasise or diminish their power by the use of different terms, but this does not change their position in practice.[643] The most significant outcome of this political structuring is the likelihood that such leaders believed agreements made with Roman commanders to be personal.[644] This would accord with what they saw on the ground, as well as being similar to Barcid behaviours, and would only be exacerbated by the length of,

[638] Quesada Sanz 2003: 114-5.
[639] Ramos y Loscertales 1924 remains the standard work; see also Rodríguez Adrados 1946; Mangas Manjarres 1970: 495; Prieto Arciniega 1978; Dopico Cainzos 1994.
[640] Strabo 3.4.18; Serv. *Ad Georg.* 4.218 (Sallust); Val. Max. 2.6.11; Liv. 28.34.5; Plut. *Sert.* 14.5. Dopico Cainzos 1994: 188-91.
[641] See esp. Dopico Cainzos 1994: 192; Greenland 2006.
[642] Caro Baroja 1971; Quesada Sanz 2003: 117, 120 with n.58.
[643] See e.g. Caro Baroja 1971: 145, 147, 149; López Domech 1986-7: 19-20; Quesada-Sanz 2011: 49.
[644] The standard view; see e.g. Roldán Hervás 1993: 25-6.

in particular, Scipio's tenure.[645] It does appear likely to have been the case, for example, with the revolts of the Ilergetes, in 206 believing Scipio to be dead, and in 205 seeing no need to obey his successor.[646] It appears in the case of those Celtiberi who agreed treaties with Gracchus in 179/8 that the agreements were understood on something of a medium-term level, as the Celtiberi rebelled a generation after the treaties were made.[647] This suggests a range of understandings across differing political structures.[648]

As Table III.2.a shows, some Roman commanders engaged with behaviours which focused on and in some cases glorified them as individuals. The prime example is Scipio who, while he is attested by Polybius and Livy as rejecting the title of 'king' offered by peninsular leaders, is reported to have done so with recognition of the honour involved.[649] In both passages, Scipio engages carefully, explaining that he is happy to be considered *kingly,* but not to be called by the title; Livy includes recognition of the unacceptability of kingship to Roman society. Aymard proposes that Polybius' version illustrates the presence of Hellenistic political philosophy, in which the kingly soul is a recognised, positive concept, both in Polybius' thinking and in that of the Scipionic circle.[650] That Polybius places the idea of kingship with regard to Scipio in a broader, Hellenistic context is obvious from what follows after the cited passage, where he praises Scipio for never seeking such a title even after much greater successes. Both his narrative and Livy's make it apparent that the peninsular leaders dealing with Scipio were not put off by his rejection of the title, but continued to be awed by him, as well as being personally tied to him by his freeing of hostages and the gifts he then distributed, including granting Indibilis the right to select an impressive 300 of the captured horses. It is perhaps difficult to see how he might have utilised his control over such resources to build loyalty to

[645] Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 178-80.
[646] Liv. 28.24.1-4; 29.1.19-26.
[647] García Moreno 1989: 93.
[648] Note the role of the elders and assembly in Segeda's rejection of its agreement. Diod. Sic. 31.39.
[649] Polyb. 10.38.3, 40.2-5; Liv. 27.19.3-6; cf. Cass. Dio 16.48; Zon. 9.8.
[650] Aymard 1954: 123-5.

Rome, rather than to himself, but the point remains that gift-exchange is a powerful means of creating and reinforcing personal connections.[651] This is particularly germane given the later behaviour of Indibilis.

In another episode shown in Table III.2.a, Scipio makes use of the force gathered by Aluccius, whose debt to him is quite clearly personal.[652] There is evidently also a personal element in the request for friendship by Edeco, as a result of the presence of his family as Scipio's hostages, but Polybius' stress on 'the Romans' as the point of allegiance makes it difficult to determine from his text the nature of the relationship formed.[653] Edeco's loyalty does not appear to have come into question, which in the case of Indibilis and Mandonius is essentially the basis for our believing that they viewed their agreement with Scipio as personal. From this point and from the Polybius passage, it is easy to suggest that Edeco was more aware of the real political situation than other peninsular leaders, but we have little to back this up.[654]

Edeco, Culchas, and even Indibilis and Mandonius (up to a point) do demonstrate that Roman commanders were content to retain chiefdoms or kingdoms in the region. In engaging in agreements and gift-exchange with such leaders, Roman commanders reinforced the leaders' hierarchical positions. Both Livy and Polybius preserve claims supposedly made to Prusias of Bithynia about Rome's positive treatment of sole rulers in the Peninsula, including the enlargement of their domains. While this was clearly engineered to reassure Prusias and discourage him from alliance with Antiochus, it rings true, not least as the claims were being made by the younger Scipio and his brother.[655]

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[651] Muñiz Coello 1994: 100.
[652] See e.g. Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 165. Scullard 1970: 64 dismisses the episode as fiction, but there is no reason to think it lacks at least a kernel of truth.
[653] Polyb. 10.34.1-35.3. Scullard 1970: 68 suggests that Scipio established a more personal relationship than Edeco was seeking, but it is hard to see how to reconstruct this from the text.
[654] For such argument see Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 178-80.
[655] Polyb. 21.11.6-8; Liv. 37.25.9.

Some social structures, however, were altered. Specifically, we have epigraphic evidence of Aemilius Paullus' handling in 189 of a population at *turris Lascutana* who had been *servei* of the neighbouring Hastenses. According to the inscription, he ordered that they be free and have possession of the land they held at the time, subject to the approval of the senate and people of Rome.[656] The degree to which the concluding formula should be taken as a genuine indication of precariousness is uncertain, but it does indicate the on-the-spot authority of Paullus to make such a settlement, even if it then required ratification.[657] Whether the granting of *possessio* in this way was unique remains open to question, but we need not assume that it was.[658] It is also uncertain whether the type of servitude involved, probably a form of serfdom, was widespread in Baetica. Again we need not assume it was unique, particularly as it appears to have been similar in several respects to Punic forms of domination exercised in Africa, but to have been adapted to the semi-urbanised structures of Baetica in the absence of a substantial Punic contingent to enforce it. Rome did not recognise serfdom systems, so the *servei* were freed, possibly as a result of a *deditio* by the controlling Hastenses.[659] The benefits of Paullus' dispositions can only be suggested. The community would be indebted to Paullus (and hopefully to the Romans more generally), which could help to ensure a friendly town in a resource-rich region, to encourage personal patronage links, and potentially to create a recruiting pool for allied soldiers.[660] It will be seen below that the first of these is a likely goal, given Roman settlement activity, especially in Baetica. The second will again be reinforced by other settlement activity, and is also supported by Paullus' evident popularity within the peninsula, and the likelihood that he also engaged in patronal activity at

[656] *CIL* II 5041; I^2 614 = *ILLRP* 514.
[657] See e.g. Richardson 1986: 118; Bandelli 2002b: 124-5.
[658] See esp. Pena 1994a, b.
[659] See Hidalgo de la Vega 1989b: 62-4, including bibliography; López Castro 1994.
[660] Balil 1956: 121; Knapp 1977a: 18; Roldán Hervás 1993: 39; cf. Hidalgo de la Vega 1989b: 59.

Italica.[661] The third is impossible to discount, especially given that Livy attests a tumultuary levy in the area by Paullus in 189.[662]

It remains to consider our third outstanding individual: Cato. We have already considered his stated intention to live off the enemy's grain resources, a goal which was emulated notably by Flaccus.[663] Along with his use of raiding to demoralise enemies around Emporion, this thus opens a list of behaviours with the use of economic extraction for both autarky and other purposes, including the enlistment of auxiliaries by playing on local grudges (see below).[664] Cato's own claim in his *De consulatu suo* that he sent *alio frumentum, alio legatos, alio litteras, alio praesidium usquequaque* suggests that he used a range of more gentle behaviours with allies.[665] Indeed, Livy reports his mildness to the surrendered Hispani at Emporiae and, like Paullus above, his selection as a *patronus* in 171 (in Cato's case for Citerior, along with Scipio).[666]

Conflict (perhaps unavoidably) appears, however, between Cato's highly Roman ideals of *fides* and upright behaviour and his actual practices. In oratorical fragments, for example, he condemns the Carthaginian use of mercenaries and the betrayal of *fides,* for instance by Galba in Ulterior in 150/149, where he massacred a group of surrendered Lusitanians.[667] When asked for military help by Bilistages' allied Ilergetes, however, Livy's account shows him using a trick which hardly constitutes the fulfilling of his obligations to an ally, even if we accept that he was driven by the need to retain all of his troops. Indeed, keeping the chief's son and his retinue in camp can be read as the impromptu taking of hostages to prevent Ilergetan defection from

[661] Popularity: e.g. Canto 1985: 15; Liv. 43.2.7. Italica: see Canto 1985 on *CIL* I 546 = *CIL* II 1119; cf. Marín Díaz 1988: 84; Galsterer 1997: 197-8; Keay 1997: 30.
[662] Liv. 37.57.5, but cf. Wulff Alonso 1989: 49-50.
[663] Liv. 34.9.12; 40.35.4.
[664] Liv. 34.13.2-3, 16.4.
[665] *ORF*^{2} Cato F34.
[666] Liv. 34.16.4-5; 43.2.5, 7.
[667] Frr. 79, 82, 106-9 P^2; see Chassignet 1987: esp. 293, 299; Fantham 1991: 118-9.

Rome.[668] His response to the problem of Celtiberian mercenaries employed by the Turdetani also differs from his stated ideals, offering those mercenaries double pay, clemency, or battle.[669] The justification put in his mouth by Plutarch is glib, but in line with the autarky principle: in case of defeat, no one would be left to pay or demand pay; in case of victory, the sale of booty would cover the costs.

That Cato and other commanders might find themselves compelled to act in ways contrary to their ideals for the sake of effectiveness is hardly surprising. It is also unsurprising, but of interest nonetheless, that some actions conflicted significantly with local expectations. The key event here is one which has been variously interpreted: Cato's alleged disarming of the population north of the Ebro, and destruction of their city walls.[670] The latter action was achieved, according to Appian and Dio-Zonaras, by a trick involving simultaneous letters to towns. While the Bilistages episode suggests that, for Cato and his contemporaries, such tricks were something to be proud of, the ramifications of the episode are broader. Archaeological evidence from the Ebro area warns against overestimating the extent of Cato's destruction of walls, but demonstrates that it was likely part of a larger trend in the wide region in the second century, controlling site fortification and settlement delimitation. The dispute over the Gracchan treaty with Segeda in Appian highlights the intimate linkage between wall-building and city-foundation.[671] Actions such as Cato's reinforced control over settlement patterns, and also made towns indefensible not only against Rome but also against any domestic threat, hardly desirable when Rome could evidently not be relied on even to help its allies militarily.

Livy's account gives, however, a more drastic response to the disarmament, involving the suicide of a number of people who considered life without weapons not to be an option.

[668] Liv. 34.11.2-13.1; Astin 1978: 35 (concentrating on necessity); Knapp 1980: 30-1; Fantham 1991: 120 ('paternalistic duplicity').
[669] Liv. 34.19.3-6. Note that Zon. 9.17 has these offers made in alternation, with dividing results.
[670] Liv. 34.17.5-11; App. *Ib.* 41; Zon. 9.17.
[671] Martínez-Gásquez 1974: 166-7, 174-5; Knapp 1980: 37; Marín Díaz 1988: 123; Olesti i Vila 1995: 299-300; Olesti-Vila 2006: 124-5. App. *Ib.* 44.

The cultural implications of this for Iberian society have been much discussed, and such attitudes are echoed in Appian and Florus.[672] This should not perhaps be considered exceptional, as Florus also shows the Roman people responding with similar shame and anger when their troops are disarmed in the Numantine War.[673] It is not difficult to imagine that Cato would have some idea of the real significance of his demand, especially for groups who had not actively rebelled. Thus his summoning of the leaders of the disarmed communities to ask them how best to proceed should not be seen as a genuine inquiry or sign of mildness, but as a blatant display of authority which could hardly do anything but offend.[674]

Commanders could appear in the guise of an independent leader who made use of local structures and practices, as Scipio appears to have done. They could also appear as overbearing paternalists, as Cato did at the Ebro. The emphasis on individuals in our sources has the notable problem of making 'policy' difficult to trace across time, if we even believe that such a thing as 'policy' existed. Nonetheless, it is important that themes such as the destruction or prohibition of walls recur during the period, and that a wall, once destroyed, would take considerable time and effort to rebuild.[675] Such means of settlement control are therefore likely to have had a sustained effect. It is telling that, in spite of the apparently positive feelings of the Celtiberians towards the treaties made with Gracchus, it was a provision of those, the ambiguous wall-building / city-founding prohibition, which led to the outbreak of war in 153.

[672] See e.g. Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 161; Astin 1978: 42; García Riaza 2002: 206-14 with additional bibliography; Quesada Sanz 2003: 124. App. *Ib.* 31 (206); Flor. 1.34.4 (143 or earlier).
[673] Flor. 1.34.6.7. See Potter 2018: 288.
[674] Genuine inquiry: Rodríguez Adrados 1946: 148 (implied); Martínez-Gásquez 1974: 133; mildness: Mangas Manjarres 1970: 499; control: Astin 1978: 42; Olesti-Vila 2006: 125 (reference to Liv. 41.12 is however incorrect); paternalism: implied by Knapp 1977a: 54; 1980: 36.
[675] See Knapp 1980: 37.

III.2.5.2. Garrisons and settlements

Our textual evidence for settlement foundation and particularly for garrisoning is limited. In the case of garrisons, archaeological evidence is also difficult to process due to the tendency of garrisons to blend into their surrounding community.[676] Indeed, any suggestion of a garrison network in the peninsula under Rome is beset by fundamental disagreements over the duration of occupation at any attested garrison site.[677] Livy's insistence on the installation of a garrison being a normal occurrence is problematic due to its context, contrasting the norm with Scipio's mild treatment of the Ilergetes in 206, during a war, and to its evident specificity, referring to communities which had given *deditio.*[678] The archaeological and textual evidence we have suggests the presence of a line of garrisons, quite possibly using existing infrastructure, between Emporion and Tarraco, an area relatively pacified from an early stage.[679] The necessities of military provisioning, however, make it likely that further south and west a more flexible model was required.[680]

We do, however, have textual and archaeological attestations of settlements established or modified by Roman commanders. The first, Italica, was founded by Scipio before his departure from the peninsula, by the inclusion of a population described by Appian as sick and injured soldiers within an existing πόλις.[681] That these soldiers were Italic in origin is suggested by the name, and evidence from the site makes it clear that they joined an existing

[676] Cadiou 2003: 83; Olesti-Vila 2006: 130.
[677] Compare Cadiou 2003: esp. 86-7 and Knapp 1977a: 15-28.
[678] Liv. 28.34.7; cf. Cadiou 2003: 88.
[679] Olesti i Vila 1995: 49-50; Olesti-Vila 2006: 121.
[680] Marín-Díaz 1988: 49; Olesti i Vila 1995: 49; Cadiou 2003: 94-7 with further bibliography.
[681] App. *Ib.* 38.

Turdetanian population.[682] As Galsterer has argued, it is quite possible that southern Italian soldiers in 206 would have little to go home for, and there are no parallels for a settlement of the sick and wounded; thus the site could be considered a veteran settlement.[683] This is about all that can be said about the population: the location of the site is also significant. It lies on the Baetis (modern Guadiana) at the highest point accessible by large vessels, close to a useful land route between that river and the Guadalquivir and with access to the mining region of the western Sierra Morena.[684] Settling a group there was in any case a departure from previous practice, and may well have made quite a statement about Rome's intention to remain involved in Baetica and the peninsula.[685] This is particularly true as the settlers were likely allies, thus people for whom Rome had some duty of care, thus more akin to veteran or colonial settlement in Italy than to, say, the settlement of mercenaries at Morgantina in Sicily after the fall of Syracuse.

Iliturgi, near Castulo, was likely established in some form by Gracchus, though this depends on an inscription of questionable date and legitimacy.[686] It is generally considered to postdate the Republic, largely on palaeographic grounds, and it makes unusual use of the term *deductor,* attaching the name to Gracchus. We have no reason to think it was a *colonia,* but it is quite possible that Gracchus was responsible for some change to the existing settlement on the site.[687] Again some kind of mixed population is likely, given the pre-existence of a settlement on the site and Gracchus' attested settlement of Celtiberians around Complega.[688]

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[682] See e.g. Knapp 1977a: 114 (Italic excluding Roman); Marín Díaz 1988: 121 with further bibliography; Keay 1997: 25-6, 32-3 (little material evidence of Italic presence and culture); Bandelli 2002b: 112, 114, 116-7 .
[683] Galsterer 1997: 196.
[684] Knapp 1977a: 116; Keay 1997: 25.
[685] Balil 1956: 113; Scullard 1970: 105.
[686] On the location of Iliturgi see Blanco and Lachica 1960: 196 (Citerior); Bandelli 2002b: 108 (Ulterior). Knapp 1977a: 65 and Marín Díaz 1988: 16, both following Albertini, place the border at the *saltus Castulonensis.*
[687] On the inscription's date and legitimacy see Blanco and Lachica 1960; Degrassi 1967; Knapp 1977a: 110 with n.18; Wiegels 1982; Póveda Navarro and Benedetti 2007.
[688] App. *Ib.* 43; see further García Moreno 1989: 92.

The likelihood of genuine Gracchan involvement with Iliturgi is also reinforced by his establishment of Gracchurris, again at an existing settlement site, this time in the Ebro valley.[689] Festus' claim that the location of Gracchurris was formerly known as Ilurci has suggested to some scholars a degree of confusion, since (as Table III.2.a shows) Appian uses the name *Ilurgia* for the town called Iliturgi by Livy and Dio-Zonaras. This anecdotally suggests that Gracchus' involvement in Iliturgi was known in Festus' time.[690]

On Gracchurris itself more can be said. On the basis of later evidence and archaeology it can be located at Alfaro, close to the River Alhama, with direct access into the Meseta, particularly the territory of the Arevaci.[691] The population is far from certain, but the settlement was evidently intended (based on the *Periochae* reference and its individualistic name) partly for prestige purposes, and evidence of centuriation may be attributable to an early date, so it may also have been used to encourage sedentary living.[692] Once again, Complega is a worthwhile comparandum, as are the Ligurian deportations into the Po valley around the same time.

The final foundation to be considered takes us back to Baetica, to the only *colonia* of the period: Carteia. It is located coastally, on a previously occupied site, and may have had a defensive role, particularly with regard to piracy.[693] The presence of an existing population is apparent from Livy, according to whom those who wanted to stay were to be included within the (Latin) colony.[694] The initial petition for a city was made by representatives of a group who were the sons of Roman soldiers and peninsular women. Problems with the transmission of the Livian passage leave considerable confusion over the terms for the settling of the

[689] Liv. *Per.* 41.2; Fest. p.97M = p.86L.
[690] App. *Ib.* 32. See Blanco and Lachica 1960: 195; Degrassi 1967: 133; Bandelli 2002b: 108 n.12; Póveda Navarro and Benedetti 2007: 71-2 with references.
[691] García y Bellido 1959: 449; Hernández Vera and Casado López 1976: 23-7; López Melero 1987: 171.
[692] García y Bellido 1959: 448-9; Caro Baroja 1971: 153-4; Knapp 1977a: 109; Ariño Gil 1986: 61; López Melero 1987: 174-5
[693] Wulff Alonso 1989: 50-1; Bandelli 2002b: 124.
[694] Liv. 43.3.1-4.

represented group, but more importantly, they were to be of Latin status, the first colony outside of Italy.[695] This is a significant departure from previous behaviour, in particular as a senatorial initiative, but was unique for a generation.

While the settlements discussed here are very different in some respects, there are several recurring elements which are suggestive of the interests involved. Firstly, it has been seen that there is strategic value in the location of Italica, Gracchurris, and Carteia.[696] The relationship between settlement and military presence or resolution is apparent in the cases of Italica, Carteia, Gracchurris, Complega, and probably *turris Lascutana.*[697] The location of Italica, Iliturgi, and Carteia, as well as *turris Lascutana,* in Baetica suggests an interest in the resources of the area, particularly in mining, given the location of Italica and connection between Iliturgi and Castulo.[698] Settlement on agricultural land is also likely to have encouraged a sedentary lifestyle.[699] While it appears from (exiguous) archaeological evidence that Romanising or Italicising population elements are not always detectable, and 'Romanisation' should not be assumed, the inclusion of existing populations could have encouraged loyalty and goodwill.[700] It could, however, have acted in completely the opposite way. The forging of patronage links is quite possible, and in the case of Gracchurris it is hard to see how Gracchus would have avoided such an implication.

We therefore find ourselves once again faced with individuals. In this respect, the ad hoc nature of early settlement control by Romans in the peninsula emerges strongly. On this

[695] See García y Bellido 1959: 450; Saumagne 1962; Knapp 1977a: 118-9; Pena 1988; Hidalgo de la Vega 1989b: 61-2; Wulff Alonso 1989; Castillo 1991; López Melero 1991: 46; López Barja de Quiroga 1997; Briscoe 2012a ad loc.; Pena 2014.
[696] Hernández Vera and Casado López 1976: 28-9; Knapp 1977a: 109; Bandelli 2002b: 124.
[697] See e.g. Richardson 1986: 124.
[698] Bandelli 2002b: 112, 126-7; cf. García Moreno 1989: 91.
[699] See García y Bellido 1945: 560; Knapp 1977a: 109; García Moreno 1989: 90-2.
[700] Blanco and Lachica 1960: 196; Hernández Vera and Casado López 1976: 28; Keay 1997; Bandelli 2002b: 124-5; Olesti-Vila 2006: 130.

basis, it is interesting that the senate entered the picture with Carteia, but only in response to a request, and without following it up for some years hence.

III.2.5.3. Mercenaries and auxiliaries

Our evidence for Roman use of peninsular forces, either as mercenaries or as auxiliaries, in this period is relatively sparse. It is not always possible to tell whether troops mentioned are serving in the former or latter capacity (though this problem is not limited to Roman use).[701] As Table III.2.a shows, explicit use of large-scale mercenary recruitment is limited to two instances (of vanishingly few explicitly attested for Rome at all), while instances of allied auxiliary recruitment are more frequent, but a closer examination will demonstrate that the numbers involved were not large.

Firstly, it is important to recognise that much of the peninsula was considerably militarised in the late third century, and socio-economic conditions made mercenary service popular among some communities. Burial evidence suggests that weapons had major social significance across a broad part of the population, particularly in Celtiberia, and settlement fortifications, while inadequate for siege warfare, suggest regular attacks and skirmishing.[702] Textual sources suggest that social and economic structuring in some communities led to the marginalisation of certain groups, who might turn to banditry or mercenary service to make a living.[703] While some native forces are described in our sources in terms that liken them rather to bandits than to armies, Latin terms used for Celtiberian forces later suggest that they were

[701] Consider e.g. Quesada Sanz 2003: 128 on Celts and Celtiberians serving as troops for coastal groups.
[702] Astin 1978: 42; Lorrio 1997: 147-8; Quesada Sanz 1997: *passim;* 2003: 116 n.37, 122, 131-3, 137-8.
[703] E.g. Liv. 21.43.8-9. See García y Bellido 1945: 552, 563-4; García-Gelabert Pérez and Blázquez Martínez 1987-8: 257; Roldán Hervás 1993: 12.

considered more legitimate, which may have been achieved by their normalisation as mercenaries.[704]

Roman engagement of such willing mercenary recruits appears to have been in large part a response to the parallel Carthaginian use. As noted, Table III.2.a shows the only two explicitly attested uses of mercenaries on a large scale, taking place in 213 and 211, while Carthaginian forces were still fighting in the peninsula.[705] That Roman commanders did not like the idea of using mercenaries, or indeed native forces in general, recurs; as we have seen above, Cato was clearly not amenable.[706] That these men, wherever they fell exactly on the mercenary-ally spectrum, could be useful is apparent from the sending of 300 nobles to Italy in an attempt to win over mercenaries serving with Hannibal.[707] In the case of Cato's attempt to turn the Celtiberians serving as mercenaries with the Turdetanians to his own side, this can clearly be considered a responsive action, as Livy describes his efforts to separate them from the Turdetanians and to offer not only double pay but the alternative of clemency.[708] The point is to secure them to fight on his side or to remove them from the field.

The recruitment and use of allied troops, though not attested in similarly impressive numbers, appears to have been more common. Table III.2.a shows instances in 218, 209, 206, 189, 185, 181, and 179.[709] We have varying indications of the numbers involved: Livy claims 5000 allied troops responded to Scipio's summons in 209; in 185 the number of auxiliaries killed in battle in Ulterior is around 150, which compared to just over 600 Roman and allied deaths suggests a small force, as we might expect a high auxiliary fatality rate; in 181 Flaccus found allied recruitment in the peninsula insufficient to supplement his forces to face an army

[704] See García y Bellido 1945: 548, 580-1 with Liv. 28.32.9; Ciprés 1993: 25, 27.
[705] Liv. 24.49.8; cf. Oros. 4.16.14; Liv. 25.32.3, 33.1. Krasilnikoff 1996: 14.
[706] *FRHist* Cato F81; Polyb. 10.7.1 with 10.6.2; Balil 1956: 117; Chassignet 1987: 293; Roldán Hervás 1993: 24-5.
[707] Following Liv. 24.49.8; see Balil 1956: 115-6.
[708] Liv. 34.19.1-11.
[709] The levy of 189 was probably of allies. See e.g. Hidalgo de la Vega 1989b: 59; *contra* Wulff Alonso 1989: 49-50.

of 35,000 Celtiberians, but it then becomes apparent that he had at least 6000 native auxiliaries in his forces.[710] Military supply in Iberia was evidently not sufficient for autarkic aspirations. Appian's text concerning the Gracchan treaties in Celtiberia suggests that auxiliary recruitment might have been regularised through this channel, which is tantalising, but problematic, as the passage sees Segeda claiming in 153 that it had been released from such requirements.[711] Interestingly, peninsular allied troops are attested in multiple roles: at Ilipa Scipio used them as line infantry, rather than just light infantry, while Aluccius' 1400 retainers in 209 and the 40 hostage-troops taken from Certima in 179 were both to serve as cavalry.[712] It is apparent in some instances that Roman commanders made use of regional enmities to assist in allied recruitment and management, most notably in Cato's use of the Suessetani in attacking their enemies, the Lacetani.[713] While Scipio may have mistrusted auxiliaries, particularly the Celtiberians, it is evident that commanders continued to draw upon allied populations, without consequences comparable to the treachery which coloured Scipio's opinion.

III.2.6. Conclusions

Power relations in Iberia appear to have been heavily impacted by a close relationship between regional exigencies and trends in senatorial control and magisterial obligations, rights, and behaviours. After the region had been staffed by extraordinary promagistrates during the Hannibalic War, it appears that the need for ongoing command in the peninsula

[710] 209: Liv. 26.41.2; 185: Liv. 39.31.15; García y Bellido 1963: 215; 181: Liv. 40.30.2, 31.1; García y Bellido 1963: 215-6 (interpreted as a sign of Rome's lack of allies).
[711] App. *Ib.* 44.
[712] Polyb. 11.22; see Quesada-Sanz 2011: 49; Liv. 26.50.14; 40.47.9-10; see García y Bellido 1963: 216.
[713] Liv. 34.20.1-9; noted by García y Bellido 1963: 214; Roldán Hervás 1993: 38, referencing also Frontin. *Str.* 3.10.1 with a different view of the Suessetani's prowess.

(apparently in the form of two commanders following the failure to reduce forces around 200-199), together with desire at Rome to regulate the political structures which produced these commanders, led to the Hispaniae becoming regular provinces. The natural inclination towards two-year (or longer) commands, largely by virtue of geography, allowed for the political trends of the early second century to attempt to capitalise. As the failure of the praetorian provision of the *lex Baebia* suggests, however, unpredictable requirements in other regions made this unviable.

The magistrates and promagistrates of Iberia play a huge role in all three types of power relationship in the region. Their individualistic interests and prerogatives may have contributed to the continuation of an ad hoc war economy based on indemnities, booty, and questionable exactions, as the autarkic aims of Cato and Flaccus and the prosecution of the three former praetors in 171 suggest. The lack of organised taxation in evidence prior to the Roman entry into the region and its distance from Rome are likely also to have encouraged this type of economy. Individualistic behaviours were also encouraged by local politico-cultural forms of kingship and chiefdom, which could be combined with typically Roman *clientela* and *amicitia* behaviours, as Scipio demonstrates. Auxiliary recruitment appears from textual attestations to have been somewhat irregular and not necessarily effective, which makes sense in light of the Roman tendency to disarm and demilitarise. In this we find a tension within the way Rome tended to shape its coercive power relations, and perhaps an insight into the senate's brief foray into colonisation with Carteia.

IV. Gallic northern Italy

IV.1. Intervention

The nature of Cisalpine Gaul makes it difficult to determine an obvious point at which Romans entered the region in force: while the Apennines mark a boundary of sorts, the sources do not treat this comparably to the Strait of Messina or the Tyrrhenian Sea. Moreover, the region is accessible via the Adriatic coast. This difficulty, however, becomes less pronounced if we take as a starting-point textual references to groups of Gauls with which Rome interacted. Though these references remain complex, imprecise, and sometimes contradictory, they nonetheless highlight points at which writers conceived of Rome dealing with groups that could be counted as Gallic.[714] The period which the texts highlight as the point at which Rome began to move into Gallic territory (loosely understood) falls roughly between 300 and 280, and is the period rightly identified by many modern scholars as the point at which the Roman attitude towards the Gauls of northern Italy became more proactive and assertive.[715] In contrast to our other regions, where the beginning of direct Roman action can be dated to a short period of a year or so, the northern Italian situation requires that we consider this longer period, as a result of our sparser sources, the complexity of northern Italian politico-cultural geography, and the existing debates on the subject.

As ever, the chronology of the period is not straightforward. Two major threads exist, one (the 'early') following Polybius, the other (the 'late') following Livy, with various permutations and a third, minor group of supplementary texts. Several key events are clear from the various sources, but the discrepancies have led to considerable scholarly

[714] On the complications, see esp. Mansuelli 1978: 73-4; cf. Barfield 1971: 150.
[715] Corbett 1971: 656; Williams 2001a: 14; Poli 2002; for a note of caution, see Bandelli 2002a: 63.

disagreement.[716] The primary issue at stake is the pattern of provocation: the order of events in northern Italy in the early third century must be examined to enable reconstruction and characterisation of interactions between Rome and the Italian Gauls. The key events are the seizure of the *ager Gallicus* and the foundation of Sena Gallica. These are of huge importance in characterising Roman behaviour in the first phases of active involvement in the region, and in determining whether land-seizure and colony foundation should be understood as factors provoking aggressive Gallic behaviours in the 280s, as responses to such aggressive behaviours, or as part of a complex chain of provocation. As we shall see, our conflicting evidence on the topic tends rather to lead us away from a firm chronology, but these conflicts must be considered. As a preliminary to full discussion of the problem, the chronology of the period according to Polybius, Livy, authors following Livy, and other later authors is set out in Table IV.1.a, with events aligned where possible.

Firstly, however, we must briefly consider the sources themselves, in order to grasp why each might pose difficulties, or diverge from others. Polybius, our first column, though providing the earliest and fullest account of the period, gives this narrative not for its own sake but as a prelude to his account of Hannibal's invasion of Italy. His stated intention is to give a summary of Gallic northern Italy and its history, in order that the reader may better understand the men and country upon which Hannibal relied when he invaded.[717] How this intention might affect his presentation of Gallic groups and their behaviour in his summary narrative is difficult to determine, but the introduction of his account as a preliminary to τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις διαφέροντα makes clear its summary and subordinate nature. Polybius' interest is in the chain of causation leading to events from 218 onwards, and his

[716] On the versions, see Salmon 1935: 23-4. Mommsen (*Röm. Forsch.* II 365-377), notably, follows Polybius; critics include De Sanctis, Pais, and Beloch, the latter two noted by Cornell for their 'extreme scepticism' towards textual sources (1995: 356).
[717] Polyb. 2.13.7-14.3.

representation of northern events is liable to be moulded through its inclusion in this programme.

The Livian tradition, the second column, does not reflect such an intent, and its problems lie rather in its incomplete transmission. Livy's full account is extant only to 293 before breaking off until 218, and the epitome offers sparse material to fill the gap. The dependent tradition found in Frontinus, Florus, Eutropius, Orosius, and Augustine, though patchy and in no individual case providing a full account, helps to suggest the key elements of the Livian version. In light of recent historiographical work, this will not be referred to as the 'annalistic' tradition, but as the 'Livian', as the former term carries unwarranted assumptions about prescriptiveness of form and bareness of style.[718] What must be remembered though, in spite of the application of a single label, is that each of these authors processed the tradition according to his own inclinations.

The final column, 'other authors', features Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Appian, each independent of the other authors listed. Both are fragmentary at the relevant point in the text, though elements of Appian's account can be found in fragments from both the *Samnitica* and the *Celtica*. These sources serve generally as supplementary to the two main threads of evidence, and do not touch upon such significant issues as the foundation of Sena Gallica. They do, however, offer valuable suggestions for filling certain gaps left elsewhere in the record.

[718] See e.g. Verbrugghe 1989; Marincola 1999: esp. 288-90; Beck 2007; Levene 2007.

Proposed absolute date[719]	**POLYBIUS**	**LIVY**	**TRADITION FOLLOWING LIVY**	**OTHER AUTHORS**
295	Romans defeat Samnites and Gauls at Sentinum (2.19.6)	Romans defeat Samnites and Gauls at Sentinum (10.27-29)	Romans defeat Samnites and Gauls at Sentinum (Flor. 1.17.5-7; Oros. 3.21)	
290-288		Sena founded, along with Castrum and Hadria (*Per.* 11.7)		
284 OR 283	Gauls besiege Arretium; Roman relief force is defeated, *strategos* L. Caecilius killed, and M'. Curius given command in his place; legates sent by Curius to request return of prisoners are killed, provoking Roman anger (2.19.7-10)	Senones kill Roman ambassadors, provoking war; Roman attack force is defeated and praetor L. Caecilius killed (*Per.* 12.1)	Senones kill Roman ambassadors, provoking war; Roman attack force is defeated and praetor L. Caecilius killed (Oros. 3.22.12-14; Augustin. *CD* 3.17, with Lucanians, Bruttians, Samnites, Etruscans, and Senones)	In response to Senones aiding Etruscans against Rome, Romans send ambassadors to complain about breaking of treaty-agreements; ambassadors are killed, provoking anger (App. *Samn.* 6.1; *Celt.* 11)

[719] First two dates secure; others discussed below.

283	Romans march on Gaul, fall in with Senones, kill many, expel the rest, and occupy their land, where they found Sena (2.19.10-13)			
283	Boii, alarmed by events, march with Etruscans and join battle with Romans near Lake Vadimon, with heavy Boian losses (2.20.1-3)		Romans under Dolabella wipe out Senones at Lake Vadimon (Flor. 1.13.21) Gauls, Etruscans, and Samnites, marching on Rome, are defeated by Dolabella (Eutrop. 2.10)	Cornelius (Dolabella), responding immediately to the above, defeats Senones (App. *Samn.* 6.1; *Celt.* 11; Dion. Hal. 19.13.2 with 'Gauls' at Vadimon) Senones in Etruria march on Rome with Etruscans; they are defeated by consul Domitius

				(App. *Samn.* 6.2; *Celt.* 11)
282	Boian and Etruscan remnants join battle with Romans the following year, are soundly beaten, and sue for peace (2.20.4-5)		Romans under Aemilius Papus defeat Boii (Frontin. *Str.* 1.2.7, with Aemilius Paulus)	

Table IV.1.a. Events from the Battle of Sentinum (295) to ca. 282.

The first key event of the period is, as identified in Table IV.1.a, the Battle of Sentinum in 295. Sentinum falls close to, if not in, Gallic territory (as far as this term is meaningful; see below) and our sources explicitly state that Gauls constituted one of the two contingents which fought against the Roman consular armies, along with Samnites.[720] The importance of this battle has been heavily stressed by modern scholars, who have viewed it as the greatest battle fought in Italy up to this point, and emphasised its role in cementing Roman control of the peninsula and putting an end to any unified resistance by 'free' Italian states.[721] Though Bandelli sounds a note of caution about the stress placed by modern scholarship on this battle and the surrounding events of the 290s, Oakley and Lipovsky have pointed out, justifiably, that the amount of space and detail allocated to the battle by Livy suggests that he, at least, saw it as a

[720] On the Umbrian-Gallic boundary, see further Paci 2002.
[721] De Sanctis 1907-64: II 357-8; Bandelli 1988c: 515; Cornell 1995: 361; Forsythe 2005: 331, calling it 'clearly one of the great battles of world history'; Bispham 2006: 118. Cf. Levene 1993: 234, where the battle is a 'major victory', but 'not decisive'.

significant event.[722] Prior to this, in the second century, the fate of the consul Decius in the battle had merited treatment in a play by Accius.[723] The actual contemporary significance of Sentinum is harder to determine. The closest we have to a contemporary comment is a statement of manpower figures by Duris of Samos. The sheer scale of the figure he gives, however, though likely exaggerated, points to a massive engagement, while the very fact he, a Samian, thought a battle in Italy (without Greek involvement) worth mentioning suggests that it was noteworthy at the time. We may also adduce the sudden heavy use of promagistrates in 295, at a time when this was not common procedure, as an indication that 295 could be counted as a crisis point.[724]

We thus have a strong impression that the Battle of Sentinum had a considerable contemporary impact. It must further be shown, however, that it was important for Roman relations with Gallic groups. We must first of all understand who were the Gauls involved in the engagement, as far as we are able, and how they became involved.

IV.1.1. Which Gauls?

Polybius and Livy refer only to Gauls or Galatai at Sentinum, and the later authors do not offer more specific information. Given the location of the Senones relative to Sentinum, they would appear to be a plausible guess. While they are not explicitly stated as being involved, it is highly suggestive that they attack the Romans at Clusium shortly beforehand in one tradition

[722] Lipovsky 1981: 158-9; Bandelli 2002a: 63; Oakley 2005: 268.
[723] See Williams 2001a: 43.
[724] Manpower and casualty numbers: *FGrH* Duris F56; see also Liv. 10.16-18 (cf. 10.4-6 on other authors' exaggerated figures); Oros. 3.21.6. Promagistrates: Cornell 1995: 360; Brennan 2000: I 73-6, esp. 75, arguing for the predominantly military purpose of prorogation.

known to Livy.[725] The idea that they constituted at least part of the Gallic component at Sentinum is further built upon the assumption that their subsequent involvement with Rome was a result of arrangements made after this battle.[726] These potential arrangements will be discussed further below.

Several sources also allege that the Senones had a history of conflict with Rome, being involved in if not solely responsible for the sack of Rome in the early fourth century.[727] We lack direct contradictions of this, so it would be excessively cynical to dismiss it out of hand.[728] The idea of some sort of *metus Senonicus,* however, leading to Sentinum and to ongoing conflict with the Senones, does not fit with our other evidence. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the war of which Sentinum was part was more concerned with the Samnites and Etruscans, which Livy presents recruiting Gallic groups for reinforcement.[729] Secondly, this recruitment was of a mercenary nature, which is rather different from concerted, communal participation in a campaign. Thirdly, identifying coherent groups in northern Italy in the third century is more difficult than prescriptive references to the Senones or other tribes might suggest. We turn to this third point first, due to its fundamental importance.

The literary sources depict a complex and fluid ethnic and social landscape in northern Italy from at least the fourth century. While Livy makes the unusual claim that Gallic groups had overrun Etruscan populations south of the Alps 200 years before the sack of Rome, most sources appear to locate the Gallic arrival close to the sack.[730] Williams offers an astute analysis of the varying versions, with the particularly significant point that 'local instability' is

[725] Liv. 10.26.7.
[726] As Oakley (2005: 309) puts it, the Senones 'may be conjectured…[to] lie behind most of the earlier references in book x [of Livy] to the Gauls.'
[727] Strabo 5.1.6 (with the Gaesati); Liv. 5.35.3 (possibly with others); Diod. Sic. 14.113.3-116.7 (with complex intervening story, cf. Dion. Hal. 13.11-12); Suet. *Tib.* 3.2; Gell. *NA* 17.23.
[728] As Dyson (1985: 15 n.41) does, claiming that Rome simply wanted the Senones' land.
[729] The general point noted by Dyson 1985: 23-4. Liv. 10.18.1-3, 21.1-2.
[730] See Barfield 1971; Sordi 1988; Williams 2001a: 101-109, 117-127.

seen as key to the way in which the Celtic groups live.[731] Textual and material evidence suggests a mixed population in much of northern Italy into the third century, including the persistence of Etruscan and Umbrian presence.[732] The fixing of any given group within a defined geographical area is particularly difficult in the face of diachronic fluidity and scarcity of attestations, which may belong to periods far from our focus here.[733] Who in a meaningful sense belonged to any given group might also be questioned: in the second century Cato could allege that the Boii had had 112 constituent tribes.[734] Whether any of these identified as Celtic, Boian, and/or something else entirely is completely beyond us.

Archaeological evidence, mainly funerary in nature, emphasises the difficulties. The cemetery site of Montefortino d'Arcevia, for instance, falls within what is considered the *ager Gallicus* occupied by the Senones, and shows generically Celtic funerary materials from the mid-fourth century onwards.[735] Sites outside the *ager,* however, have produced similar materials. Two points of interest arise from this: we cannot identify specifically 'Senonian' funerary archaeology; and archaeologically indistinguishable Gallic or part-Gallic communities existed outside what came to be considered the confines of the Senones' territory.[736] Furthermore, our use of the *ager Gallicus* as a concept here has two problems: one is the idea that we can map the extent of this area as Romans understood it (which we cannot); the second is our assumption of the Roman perspective, which we have no reason to believe the

[731] Williams 2001a: 109-113.
[732] See e.g. Zuffa 1978: 144-5, including with reference to the *Periplous* of Pseudo-Scylax (cf. Amat Sabattini 1995: 25-6); Grassi 1991: 66; Maselli Scotti 2002: 14; Ortalli 2004: 309-10; Bradley 2006: 173 with Strabo 5.1.10-11.
[733] See e.g. Mansuelli 1978: 73-4; Vattuone 1987: 76.
[734] Plin. *NH* 3.116 = *FRHist* Cato F56.
[735] Landolfi 1991, esp. 231; cf. Bandelli 1988b: 5 on neighbouring Picenum.
[736] Zuffa 1978: 140-1; Gabba 1990b: 69; Landolfi 1991: 232; Guidobaldi 2001: 86-7; Paci 2002: 86-7, 92-3. For further problematizing of 'Celtic' material, see Santoro Bianchi 1979: 28; Grassi 1991: 13.

Senones or other Gallic groups shared.[737] We thus cannot have more than a rough idea of where Senones might be found.

We turn now to the first and second reasons why the agency of the Senones around the time of Sentinum should not be considered the key driver of events: their secondary involvement in the war, and the mercenary nature of this involvement. We can see that the Samnites and the Etruscans and Umbrians are the active enemies. In the run-up to Sentinum, according to Livy, *Gallica auxilia mercede sollicitabantur* by the Samnite-Etruscan-Umbrian alliance, and information is subsequently received that Gellius Egnatius, the Samnite leader, *Gallos pretio ingenti sollicitare.*[738] The Samnite leader is the driving agent; the Gauls are brought in for pay. In Polybius' account, the Gallic arrangement with the Samnites is reported simply as an alliance, but follows a passage discussing Gallic behaviours concerning booty and rapacity.[739]

This last example highlights a significant problem with textual references to Gallic motivations: while militarism and the desire for booty are not uniquely Gallic or considered particularly negative per se, the tradition of the Gauls being driven only by these two characteristics, to the point of extreme and unreasonable behaviour, is highly pervasive. Fear of and distaste for Gauls acting as mercenaries is likely to have been exacerbated by the experience of the Hannibalic invasion, which Polybius so clearly ties to his earlier history of the Gauls.[740]

The key point to take from the evident fact of Gallic mercenary service is that these groups were not acting as communities, but as independent contractors. This had been taking place from at least the fourth century, when Dionysius I employed Gallic (by some reckonings

[737] See Zuffa 1978: 143.
[738] Liv. 10.18.2; 10.21.2. See Amat Sabattini 1995: 450, noting the potential, seen at Liv. 10.21.11, to present the Gallic contingent in a more corporate light.
[739] Polyb. 2.19.1-6.
[740] For an excellent summary of the issue, see Williams 2001a: 90-3.

Senonian) mercenaries following the sack of Rome.[741] Mercenary contingents could, however, use their leverage to (try to) obtain land. In 299, Livy reports that the Etruscans paid off an invading army of Gauls, and expected their help in attacking Rome, only for the Gauls to turn on their new 'allies' and demand territory in addition to the money received.[742] In his account of the attack on Clusium in the fourth century, Livy claims that the Senones themselves demanded Clusine land in return for peace.[743] Amat characterises the former of these two episodes as an example of the unwillingness of the Etrusco-Italic world to accept Gallic groups as proper allies, rather than as mercenaries.[744] There is certainly an evident tension over whether mercenary bands were to be seen as seeking employment (as the Etruscans seem to have expected) or as armed threats who needed first to be placated. In any case, this semi-independent action added a layer of difficulty in dealing with Gallic groups.[745] For right or wrong, Ap. Claudius could inform the senate prior to Sentinum that *quattuor gentes conferre arma, Etruscos, Samnites, Umbros, Gallos*.[746]

IV.1.2. After Sentinum: colony and conflict

While the Gallic contingent at Sentinum was a secondary, mercenary force, Ap. Claudius' letter shows that Rome knew it was present. It follows to ask whether the battle had consequences, therefore, in terms of Roman relations with the Gauls of northern Italy, more specifically the

[741] Just. *Epit.* 20.5.1-10. See Amat Sabattini 1995: 28-9.
[742] Liv. 10.10.6-11.
[743] Liv. 5.36.3. Mansuelli 1978: 73.
[744] Amat 1992: 451; cf. Amat Sabattini 1995: 31.
[745] A lack of clarity can be seen subsequently, in the action provoking the sending of the ill-fated embassy; App. *Celt.* 11 has the Senones acting as mercenaries for the Etruscans, while App. *Samn.* 6.1 uses the more neutral συνεμάχουν.
[746] Liv. 10.21.11. See Amat Sabattini 1995: 450, noting the rhetorical value.

Senones.[747] The first two key questions concern whether any land was confiscated from the Senones following the Gallic defeat, and whether a treaty was concluded between them and Rome. The question of land-confiscation is also heavily implicated with the foundation date of Sena Gallica, which must thus be added as an additional and important question. The minimal evidence we have to answer these questions unfortunately makes definitive answers elusive.

As can be seen in Table IV.1.a, we have two dates for the foundation of Sena Gallica. The foundation features in the Livian epitome as occurring between 290 and 287. In Polybius' account, the foundation appears rather later in the narrative, following further Senonian defeat and Roman takeover of their territory ca.283. Difficult as the problem is, the difference between Sena being founded ca.290 and its being founded ca.283 is *prima facie* a substantial one, and the issue is significant for our understanding of Roman attitudes to Gallic territory. If the colony had been founded ca.290, we could perhaps agree with De Sanctis that it would have been 'una umiliazione' for the Senones, who at that point, our sources seem to agree, still occupied at least some part of their land.[748] It could thus have served as a provocation for the Senones, and it would imply that Rome was willing to found a citizen colony in more or less hostile territory. In light of the orthodox view that citizen 'maritime' colonies were strategically located and essentially intended as garrisons,[749] this would perhaps characterise Sena Gallica as a proactive attempt to extend Roman power into this effectively hostile region. If we accept a foundation date ca.283, however, the colony can be seen rather as a reactive measure, consolidating the defeat of the Senones and complete confiscation of their territory.

With this at stake, the aftermath of Sentinum acquires considerable importance. Unfortunately, the sparsity of our evidence bedevils attempts to answer our three key

[747] In spite of the problems with specificity over Gallic groups, the use of the term by many of our sources legitimises its use as shorthand.
[748] De Sanctis 1907-64: II 375.
[749] See e.g. Salmon 1969: 15-17, 78 (on Sena in particular).

questions, and arguments on the issues can easily become circular. This makes holistic reconstructions of events problematic.

De Sanctis is the major proponent of the idea that Rome confiscated land from the Senones after Sentinum, as part of a peace agreement. The obvious problem which arises with his argument is the complete lack of evidence for the confiscation of land in 295, with the exception of the fact that Livy's epitome appears to place the foundation of Sena Gallica ca.290, and this would require that Rome hold at least some of the land previously held by the Senones.[750] Salmon's claim that Roman citizen colonies were 'entirely surrounded by Roman territory' down to the Second Punic War would require that a substantial piece of land around Sena be annexed by ca.290, but recent critique of such programmatic statements on Roman colonisation appears to have put paid to his claim.[751] In any case, while it is unlikely that, even if Livy were right to place the foundation ca.290, it would be placed in hostile territory, this need not necessarily imply that the land was confiscated immediately after Sentinum. It remains at least possible that it could have been confiscated within the next few years.[752] In the context of the sparsity of our evidence for this period, it is hardly surprising that we lack explicit attestation of when land was confiscated.[753]

Whether there was a treaty made with the Senones after Sentinum is also a question whose satisfactory handling is largely blocked by a lack of evidence. Discussing the Senones' murder of Roman envoys ca.284, Polybius states that the Senones were παρασπονδήσαντες, but this term could be used in a general sense of breaking faith. Given the status accorded to ambassadors by Rome, a treaty is certainly not necessary for the murder of ambassadors to be

[750] De Sanctis 1907-64: II 358; followed without question by Brizzi 1995: 97; cited and expanded by Paci 2002: 82-3. Foundation of Sena Gallica: Liv. *Per.* 11.7.
[751] For such critique see esp. Crawford 1995; Bispham 2006; Lepore 2014.
[752] Proposed by e.g. Oakley 2005: 294 n.1.
[753] See Roselaar 2010: 32 more generally.

considered in this light.[754] In a fragment of his *Celtica,* meanwhile, Appian states that τὸ τῶν Σενόνων ἔθνος ἔνσπονδον ἦν Ῥωμαίοις, yet furnished mercenaries against Rome. A similar claim appears in a fragment of his *Samnitica.*[755] The phrasing used could imply a treaty, but could also point to a truce or something less formal. Moreover, all three passages refer to the breaking of faith or of an alleged treaty, a common *topos*. Appian's text in particular is clearly focused on Roman vengeance for the Senones' betrayal.[756] Like Polybius, however, he attributes the direct impetus for the actual Roman attack to the killing of ambassadors. The existence of a treaty is not therefore necessary to explain the reopening of hostilities. None of this rules out that an agreement existed. What Polybius and Appian suggest, nonetheless, is the importance of diplomatic contact, and of a Roman willingness to reprimand the Senones for actions Rome did not consider acceptable.[757]

Determining the foundation date of Sena Gallica would, as we have seen, give us more information on concrete Roman involvement, yet it remains a somewhat intractable problem. As already observed, it is entangled with the issue of land-confiscation, upon which we have virtually no evidence. Our evidence on the foundation of the colony itself is little more helpful. Livy's epitome states only that *coloniae deductae sunt Castrum, Sena, Hadria,*[758] in a passage which falls between two triumphs celebrated by M'. Curius Dentatus in 290 and the plebeian secession of 287. Polybius, meanwhile, mentions the foundation between two reports of battles, the first involving the destruction of the Senones, the second, at Lake Vadimon, taking place between Rome and a Boian-Etruscan force.[759] Although Polybius does not explicitly place the foundation chronologically, his narrative implies that it followed on from the Senones'

[754] See e.g. Aquilanti's (1982: 114) rendering: 'con aperta violazione del diritto degli genti'. See Plin. *NH* 34.11(6) for the Roman custom of memorialising murdered ambassadors on the rostra.
[755] Polyb. 2.19.9; App. *Celt.* 11; App. *Samn.* 6.1. See De Donà 1985: 184.
[756] See Brennan 1994: 427-8.
[757] Polybius has already, indeed, mentioned a peace agreement with the Celts from around 335 (2.18.9). Mommsen (*Röm. Forsch.* II 364-5, 371) in fact relates Appian's treaty references to this agreement.
[758] Liv. *Per.* 11.7.
[759] Polyb. 2.19.12.

destruction in battle, giving it a date ca.283.[760] The way in which these two battles in Polybius fit with the battle sequences given by other authors is, as Table IV.1.a demonstrates, problematic, and we need not necessarily, as Morgan does, believe that the two were created out of one original event.[761] The key point of Polybius' narrative appears to be that the foundation of Sena Gallica was subsequent to a major defeat inflicted on the Senones, in which most were killed and the rest expelled from their territory.[762] Given the summary nature of his text, in contrast to the ordered year-by-year structure used by Livy in his original text, the way in which Polybius thus relates the foundation to other events deserves greater notice than attempts to place the foundation chronologically within his text.

With the ramifications in mind, it is troubling that many scholars have chosen, with little explicit reasoning, to follow one date or the other without question. The texts themselves offer little to facilitate a decision, and the classic argument advanced in favour of the Polybian date relies on outdated orthodoxy. It has been claimed that Sena's presence (as a quasi-military installation) would have prevented the Senones and Boii making their way southwards in 284/3, that this implies that the foundation should be dated ca.283, and that a passage of Frontinus shows a battle against the Boii in 282 taking place near the colony, showing that it served its defensive purpose.[763] Powerful arguments have been advanced against these claims. Morgan proposes the emendation of Frontinus' *apud oppidum coloniam* or *apud oppidum vel coloniam* to *apud Vetuloniam,* on linguistic, palaeographic, and historical grounds.[764] Corbett also argues, following Salmon's own admission of the diminutive presumed size of the body of colonists, that Sena Gallica would likely not be sufficient to stop a group of Gauls moving in

[760] On the specific chronology of Polybius, see esp. Corbett 1971.
[761] Morgan 1972: 317.
[762] Cf. Brennan 1994: 424 on the imprecision of Polybius' date.
[763] Salmon 1935: 25-6.
[764] Morgan 1972: 314-5.

force.[765] While the overall effect of these counter-arguments is negative (advising against dismissal of the Livian date, rather than strengthening the case for either date), it is vital to note the impact of the orthodox characterisation of citizen colonies.

Mommsen, who followed Polybius' chronology in full, argued further that Livy could have mistakenly placed the foundation in 290-288 due to confusion over the role of M'. Curius Dentatus. In the belief that Polybius attested the destruction of the Senones by Curius as suffect consul in 284/3, he remarked upon the omission of this event in non-Polybian sources, which do not feature Curius at this time or in this office. According to his explanation, confusion occurred leading Livy to date Curius' Senonian campaign to the period around 290, when he celebrated two triumphs against the Sabines and Samnites. Thus Livy would also have placed the foundation of Sena Gallica at this time.[766] More recently, Oakley has suggested that Livy's date could actually be correct, and the foundation established on land confiscated either soon after Sentinum or by Curius in 290.[767] Mommsen's argument is relatively plausible, except for two problems. Firstly, it depends on the assumption that Polybius attests Curius as suffect consul and as victor against the Senones, which is not the case; in spite of the claims of numerous scholars, Polybius does not explicitly put Curius in command of the army which defeated the Senones ca.283.[768] Secondly, it is difficult to extract any support for the theory from the bare remains of the Livian epitome, which as we have seen mentions the foundation of Sena in the most basic fashion. This also bedevils any attempt to evaluate Oakley's suggestion, but what he proposes should be viewed as a distinct possibility, especially if we consider Sena in context with Hadria and Castrum, the other colonies mentioned in the epitome, and in light of the archaeological evidence raised below.

[765] Corbett 1971: 664 n.16; cf. Bispham 2006: 123 on the facile nature of any such speculation.
[766] Mommsen *Röm. Forsch.* II 372-3.
[767] Oakley 2005: 294 n.1; cf. De Sanctis 1907-64: II 358.
[768] *Contra* De Sanctis 1907-64: II 376-7; Pais 1923-4: 330; Ortolani and Alfieri 1953: 161; Errington 1967: 101; Morgan 1972: 310; cf. Corbett 1971: 660; Brennan 1994: 425.

Dating Sena Gallica in isolation clearly will not work. To get a better idea of the colony, it will have to be placed in its archaeological context, as well as its appropriate place in the development of Roman colonisation. This, however, will necessarily open the discussion to a wider chronological vista. Therefore, we shall first conclude our consideration of the 280s.

IV.1.3. Battles, vengeance, and chronology

As has been noted, the questions of a possible treaty with the Senones and of the possible foundation of the colony at Sena ca.290 have major ramifications for our understanding of the causative chain involved in the decade or so following Sentinum. The differing accounts of Polybius and the Livian tradition also show further disagreements over the course of events in the 280s. These disagreements admit of a variety of interpretations and more or less plausible resolutions. To characterise and understand Roman (and Gallic) behaviours, we must attempt to resolve them.

The first difficulty concerns the outbreak of hostilities. According to Polybius, the conflict of the 280s begins with the Γαλάται, no more specifically denoted, besieging Arretium. In response to this, a force is sent under the *strategos* L. Caecilius Metellus Denter, and subsequently destroyed. Ambassadors are sent to request the return of prisoners taken in the action at Arretium, and these are murdered, provoking Roman anger. According to all the other sources, the Senones kill a group of Roman ambassadors, and Caecilius is sent in response to this offence. Polybius' account has been viewed by some as unlikely due to the

request for the return of prisoners, which Morgan labels 'very un-Roman'.[769] One could reasonably demand evidence to support this claim.[770]

For the ambassadors to have been killed by Senones, there must be a reason for the ambassadors to have been sent in the first place. Polybius' reasoning, alone in the face of several dissenting sources, does not convince.[771] Within the Livian tradition, an explanation can be found in Orosius, who claims that the ambassadors were sent *ad exorandos Gallos* as the Senones were plotting war against Rome along with Lucanians, Bruttians, Samnites, and Etruscans. Appian has a similar explanation: the Senones were breaking their treaty terms by acting as mercenaries (ἐμισθοφόρουν; μισθοφοροῦσι) or joining the Etruscans (συνεμάχουν) against the Romans.[772] The idea that the Senones were acting with the Etruscans thus appears in multiple authors and at various points: Orosius subsequently has Caecilius falling victim to a force of Gauls and Etruscans, while Augustine has Etruscans present, along with the other groups named earlier by Orosius. In all the sources for the various battles following these events, Etruscans are present.[773] The involvement of Etruscans could also lie behind the appearance of Arretium in Polybius' account: as Morgan reasons, besieging Arretium would make sense only if the Senones had been invited to do so by Etruscan allies.[774] Therefore while mention of Arretium is absent from the Livian tradition, which presents the more coherent narrative, it is by no means incompatible with it.[775]

[769] Morgan 1972: 310.
[770] Cf. Brennan 1994: 426 for a sceptical reading of Morgan's claim.
[771] Cf. Mommsen *Röm. Forsch.* II 376.
[772] App. *Celt.* 11; *Samn.* 6.1. While the treaty's existence is not certain (see above), an interesting comparison can be made with Rome's response to the Cretan conflict of interest in 167, on which see Krasilnikoff 1996: 15.
[773] While Mommsen (*Röm. Forsch.* II 371) is probably right to question the presence of Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites in Orosius and Eutropius, the subsequent presence of the Etruscans in the years that follow strongly suggests that their inclusion at this point is legitimate.
[774] Morgan 1972: 319. Much of Morgan's account, however, overstretches plausibility, including taking the siege of Arretium as a 'fact' while discounting Polybius' order of events.
[775] Brennan 1994: 428, 438 appears to make this connection, though not explicitly.

In order to address the way in which this and the succeeding events fit together, we first need to consider the problem of applying absolute dates, in order to establish anchor points where available. Fortunately, we can give a reasonably confident date for the final defeat given in Table IV.1.a, according to Polybius and Frontinus that of the Boii, as the consular commander Aemilius Papus is known to have held his consulship in 282/1.[776] Potential confirmation is found in the comparative dates given by Polybius, who states that this event fell three years before Pyrrhus invaded Italy (280) and five years before the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi (279), though some chronological contortionism is necessary.[777]

The outbreak of hostilities is more difficult to date. Given that we have called into question Polybius' account of the Arretium affair, his dating is liable to be problematic. According to his reckoning, the alleged siege of Arretium began ten years after the defeat of the Gauls and Samnites at Sentinum.[778] Using inclusive counting, the statement would place Arretium in 286/5, which would stretch the conflict out for rather longer than any of our extant sources suggest it lasted. Fully exclusive counting, as advocated by Pédech and Werner (and dismissed by Errington), would place the siege in 284/3.[779] This date, however, then falls foul of the remainder of Polybius' sequence of events, as he would thus appear to place the final defeat of the Boii in the following year, 283/2, not the year of Papus' consulship.[780] As Polybius' is the only full account of the conflict, this difficulty cannot be resolved by supplementing Polybius with other authors. It is useful, if frustrating, to consider that Polybius'

[776] Frontin. *Str.* 1.2.7, with Aemilius Paulus.
[777] Polyb. 2.20.6. This requires the use of both inclusive counting and Olympiad years by Polybius: Papus' consulship (282/1) would be counted as falling in the Olympiad year (124.2), in which it began (assuming that the consular year at this time began on the Kalends of May). On consular and Olympiad years see Errington 1967: 102; Brennan 1994: 425 n.10. On the consular year see Mommsen *Röm. Chron.* 101-2; Holzapfel 1885: 79-107; Pina Polo 2011: 13-16; cf. Morgan 1977. Pyrrhus' crossing, early in the consular year 280/79, would be counted as falling in the Olympiad year 124.4, and the Gallic defeat at Delphi, unmediated by use of the consular year, fell early in Olympiad year 125.2. Thus, using inclusive counting, which Errington has shown to be Polybius' preferred approach, the final Boian defeat is calculated to fall in 282/1.
[778] Polyb. 2.19.7.
[779] Errington 1967: 97.
[780] As observed by e.g. Morgan 1972: 320.

information was coming at second hand, mediated through systems we are not able to identify.[781] This is also a salutary reminder of how tenuous the reconstruction of Polybian chronology can be.

To date the Roman defeat at Arretium by the office of L. Caecilius, who was killed in that action, is also highly difficult. Polybius refers to him as a *strategos,* which usually indicates a consul. This would place the action in 284/3. Mommsen and Errington both support this reconstruction on strategic grounds, in the former case with the argument that a praetor, concerned primarily with justice, would not have been used for such a command.[782] As Brennan has shown, the Third Samnite War had been a period of flux and development in office-holding, with increased use of praetorian *imperium* in the field, which defeats the 'strategic' argument.[783] It has also been argued that this solution would avoid the apparently heavy crowding of 283/2 that arises in Polybius if Caecilius' defeat is dated to that year, prior to the defeat of the Senones and the battle of Vadimon (which can be dated securely to 283/2, the consulship of Dolabella and Domitius).[784] There is no immediate reason, however, why this clustering should be considered a problem.

For independent reasons, it is actually more likely that Caecilius served and died at Arretium as praetor, providing a likely date of 283/2. Firstly, while terms for officials had some flexibility, for the Livian tradition to call Caecilius *praetor* when he was actually consul would be an outright error.[785] Secondly, there is no indication, nor sufficient space for one, in the (admittedly fragmentary) consular *fasti* that Caecilius died as consul, nor that a suffect was

[781] As, indeed, Errington (1967: 100-1) points out.
[782] Mommsen *Röm. Forsch.* II 367; Errington 1967: 105; Morgan 1972: 312, 321.
[783] Brennan 2000: I 76.
[784] See Errington 1967: 101 (Polybius' word-choice, with inexplicable erroneous use of 'praetor' where 'consul' is clearly meant), 105 (likelihood of sending the consul), 102 (overcrowding of 283/2). On the crowding issue cf. Salmon 1935: 29, with the claim that this was artificially created to give the impression of swift Roman vengeance.
[785] Unfortunately, Caecilius is not mentioned by Appian.

elected, be this Curius Dentatus or anyone else.[786] The language Polybius uses to describe Curius' position after Caecilius' death is unfortunately inconclusive.[787] Morgan makes a specious case for Caecilius having been a proconsul, but his argument falls short, and this reconstruction would still place the battle at Arretium in 283/2.[788]

It thus appears that in 283/2 we are confronted by a crowded year indeed. It is easy to see how a cluster of military actions involving various commanders might lead to a confused picture such as that seen in Table IV.1.a. As we have seen, it is highly likely that the Etruscans played a role in the outbreak of hostilities at Arretium and continued to be involved. This raises again the possibility that some Gallic groups or individuals might have been involved as mercenaries, further complicating any Roman understanding of who the enemy actually was. We must, then, consider the array of conflicting battle reports against the backdrop of this possible confusion.

As Table IV.1.a shows, the arrangement of battles in the different strands of textual evidence is not uniform. In Polybius' version, an initial battle in the Senones' own territory, where they are annihilated, is followed by the defeat of the Boii and Etruscans at Vadimon, with another battle ensuing in the following year with the remnants of those forces. Based on our dating of Caecilius' death, the first of these battles took place in 283/2, Vadimon in the same year, and the final defeat of the Boii and Etruscans in 282/1. In the fragmented Livian tradition, there is no first battle, the Senones are wiped out at Vadimon, a further defeat

[786] See De Sanctis 1907-64: II 376 n.2 (Curius as suffect); Corbett 1971: 658-9; Morgan 1972: 310-311 (*fasti,* with argument that deaths were not always included); Brennan 1994: 424 (*fasti*). Regarding the *fasti consulares Capitolini,* caution ought to be used as the stone preserves little more than the component *Denter* for 284/3.
[787] See Corbett 1971: 660; Morgan 1972: 311; the two are in direct contradiction over whether the verb used implies election.
[788] Morgan 1972: 312, 322-4; Brennan 2000: I 73.

inflicted upon Gauls, Etruscans, and Samnites marching on Rome pops up in Eutropius,[789] and the Boii suffer their final defeat in 282/1. In Appian's version, Dolabella defeats the Senones in 283/2, and a joint Senonian-Etruscan force, marching on Rome, is subsequently defeated by Dolabella's consular colleague Domitius.

The state of affairs which emerges from the sources is one of confusion and of repeated sallies by mixed forces. Criticism has been raised of Polybius' version of events concerning the Boii, who are comprehensively defeated at Vadimon, yet manage to scrape together a force to solicit battle again the following year.[790] Perhaps Polybius exaggerated the scope of the first defeat; perhaps his sequence of events is incorrect. We cannot know this, but we can take away a significant observation, that is to say that his stubborn Boii and their Etruscan allies are acting in quite a similar way to the Senones and Etruscans in Appian's account. The Livian tradition, meanwhile, sits in the middle, with the Senones being wiped out at Vadimon and the Boii appearing the following year to be defeated by Papus. There is scarcely a sufficiently joined-up record to refer to differing shifts of focus in the narratives, but the participation of the Senones and Boii is clearly configured in three different ways.

It is absolutely key here to note that a Roman army facing a Gallic army would not necessarily know exactly which subset they were dealing with, for reasons largely already considered (similar material culture; mercenary service; sheer irrelevance). Textual traditions referring specifically to Senones and Boii may well be post-hoc creations. A model of mixed populations with overlapping territories and interests would explain the evident re-emergence of groups as seen here.

[789] Mommsen's suggestion (*Röm. Forsch.* II 374-6) that Eutropius' claim was based on the alliance of 295 remains eminently plausible, and it should be noted that others in the Livian tradition made similarly sweeping inclusions (Oros. 3.22; Augustin. *CD* 3.17).
[790] Salmon 1935: 24-5.

We have seen how some of the key debates over this period might be resolved. The conclusions which most deserve to be stressed are the complexity and fluidity of populations in northern Italy, the confounding role played by mercenary service, and the consequences of these aspects for our understanding of the complicated historical tradition. While we cannot be sure that Rome made treaties with Gallic groups following Sentinum, it is clear that there was land confiscation by 283 at the latest, and that Rome felt it appropriate to involve itself diplomatically in the region.

We move now to the broader geographical context of the region. Firstly, it is important to ask how far Gallic northern Italy might be considered a meaningful entity, particularly at this early stage, and how Rome saw it relating to the rest of Italy. Secondly, we shall place Sena Gallica in its wider colonial context, in order to better understand its role.

IV.1.4. Italy and Others

Section IV.1.1 has made it quite clear that 'Gallic northern Italy' is far from a straightforward definition. This label is used for the sake of maintaining a manageable remit. To discuss Rome's relations with other parties in the region, notably Etruscans and Umbrians, though valid and by no means irrelevant, would take this study back well beyond Sentinum, and expand it considerably. The Gauls of northern Italy, in spite of their complexities, are also a cogent group for consideration due to the substantial and ongoing Greek and Roman interest in *Galli* as an Other, even into the Principate. It is this very otherness that makes them worthy of consideration, not least as they occupy the only one of our three regions that is not separated from Rome by a body of water. An evaluation of our understanding of Italy and Italians, and in particular of how Gallic groups fit into this, is thus necessary.

Crucially, we have no Roman sources earlier than Plautus which refer to *Italia*, that is to say nothing from the third century BC,[791] and the earliest substantial material on the topic from a Roman milieu is the work of Polybius. This means that reconstructing the situation in the first half of the third century is necessarily speculative. Indeed, it has been suggested that aspects of the status of northern Italy were not resolved with great certainty even between the creation of the province of *Gallia Cisalpina* around the time of the Social War and the administrative incorporation of this province into Italy in 42.[792] This stresses that our understanding of Italy, particularly in the third century, is likely to be built along broad, conceptual lines, rather than on the identification of specific geographical, juridical, or ethnic boundaries.

Our comprehension of geographical understandings of Italy is limited by the lateness of sources which refer to such conceptions, and their intentions. There is notable continuity among these texts, for example, in the significance of the Alps as a boundary. Polybius and Strabo both treat Italy as a geographical entity beginning just south of the Alps.[793] Varro tells us that Cato and Livy both considered the Alps to be the wall which protected Italy. In the Livian passage which gives this description, however, as Cornell points out, the speaker (Hannibal) goes on to describe the Alps as the walls not only of Italy, but also of Rome, a rhetorical addition which may hint at later Roman hegemony in the north.[794] Similarly, Polybius' Hannibal looks down from the Alps at Italy, telescoping the landscape to encourage his men.[795] It is to be noted that for Polybius, nonetheless, given his geographical references, this boundary is not only valid for rhetorical use. In addition to the iconic role of the Alps with

[791] Harris 2007: 306.
[792] Williams 2001a: 127, citing examples from e.g. Cicero for the complexities of identity in the region.
[793] Strabo 4.6.1; Polyb. 2.14.4-12; but cf. Clarke 1999: 101, 118-9 on Polybius' 'telescoping effect', 105 on the combination of external and internal perspectives in his geographical account; cf. also Walbank 1957: 173 on the schematic nature of the description.
[794] Varro *Rust.* 1.2.7; *FRHist* Cato F150; Liv. 21.35.8-9.
[795] Polyb. 3.54.2.

regard to the Hannibalic invasion, Livy and Cicero both attest an understanding of the range as a natural boundary and defence against a different enemy, the Transalpine Gauls.[796] The lateness of these texts and also of the events to which they refer suggests that they belong to a later understanding. Nonetheless, even the texts of Cato and Polybius reflect an Italy which had undergone serious changes (as we shall see in the following chapter) since the early third century.

This appears to have involved two separate currents. Firstly, the generation after Sentinum saw a shift from the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Samnites fighting against Rome together with the Gauls (though, as discussed above, the role of the latter as mercenaries complicates the picture), to a more unified peninsular coalition which faced not only the Gauls but also the Pyrrhic invasion with a sense of Italy as a single space.[797] An idea that Italy ended in the north with the territory of Picenum, south of the land attributed to the Senones, is also strongly suggested by P. Sempronius Sophus' dedication of a temple to Tellus after his defeat of the Picentes in 268, and the inclusion in the temple of a painting of *Italia*.[798] The foundation in 268 of Ariminum, mirrored in the south by Beneventum, could be considered a symbolic decision of similar impact.[799] While Ariminum may have been intended to have such symbolic significance, however, its subsequent role as both *claustrum* and *porta* east of the Apennines highlights the potential for practical flexibility. This is all the more true, as we shall see in the next chapter, given the use of *Ariminum* as a provincial assignment denoting action that could alternatively be labelled *Italia* or *Gallia.*

The second current which led to the mid-second-century and later view of Italy can be based more concretely on conquest and the assimilation of the trans-Apennine region into

[796] Liv. 39.54.12; Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 34. See also Williams 2001a: 132.
[797] See esp. Bispham 2007: 55-6.
[798] Flor. 1.14.19.2; Varro *Rust.* 1.2.1; see Wiseman 1987: 91; Bispham 2007: 56 with nn.12-13. Roth 2007 argues for the painting belonging to the first century, but fails to consider the earlier existence of maps and personifications, on which see e.g. Williams 2001a: 37.
[799] See e.g. Williams 2001a: 129.

Italia. As such it will be developed below, when we explore the manifestation of Roman power in the region. In the case of Sicily, we saw the development of the idea of Italy through exclusion; certain things could not happen outside Italy. In this case, we will see a more complex development.

Some of the tensions we are likely to encounter can be illustrated by considering Polybius. In his account, the Gauls of the Po valley are strongly characterised as rustic, backward peoples. It is clear that he has his own ideas and narrative agenda with regard to the Gauls, whom he characterises as a notable threat to Greek civilisation. Indeed, he states explicitly that his account of the conquest of northern Italy is intended to reassure those concerned by the Celtic threat. As we saw above, moreover, his two synchronisms for the success of Aemilius Papus in 282/1 are the invasion of Pyrrhus and the famous expulsion of the Gauls from Delphi.[800] For Polybius, it appears that Gauls are a pan-Mediterranean other.

On the land they occupy, nevertheless, he offers differing definitions. The boundary of Italy, he says, is provided by the Alps, and the Celts who fight Rome in the late third century are specifically those ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ.[801] A sense of geographical overlap between what can be considered Italy and what Gaul, however, pervades his description of the land of Picenum as ἐν Γαλατίᾳ.[802] The complex interaction between the terms he uses recalls that between terms used for provincial assignments (primarily by Livy). In turn, the relationships between these sets of terms, as well as others such as the *ager Gallicus,* serves to highlight the ongoing ambiguity. This complicated overlap is a crucial part of the production of Italy.

[800] Backwardness: Polyb. 2.17.8-12; threat to the Greeks: 2.35.2-10; synchronisms: 2.20.6.
[801] Polyb. 2.14.4-12; 1.13.4.
[802] Polyb. 2.17.9-12, 21.7.

IV.1.5. Sena Gallica in colonial context

There are multiple contexts and categories within which we can consider Sena Gallica: its identity as a citizen *colonia maritima,* its Adriatic context, its location within the *longue durée* of Roman colonisation, to name just a few. This requires us to apply not only knowledge of the broader region and of Roman actions within it, but also of the theoretical framework relating to Roman colonies. It is this theoretical framework that will be handled first, as we consider the colony's potential type and purpose.

As has already been indicated, Roman colonisation is a topic which has provoked much debate, in large part due to the nature of our evidence, which stems primarily from authors such as Livy and Velleius. On the one hand, bare references to colony-foundation in these texts, particularly in Livy, are generally thought to be taken from official records, and the prevailing agreement between sources reinforces the conviction that the information given is largely valid.[803] On the other hand, it has been argued, though not all scholars agree, that the texts are of considerably less value on more qualitative issues such as reasons for colonial foundations and popular responses to the process at Rome.[804] Thus we might be encouraged to take the bare information we are given on the foundation of Sena by Livy, but discouraged from extrapolating the purpose of the colony from that discussed in Livy and other authors for similar foundations. Nonetheless, as we have very little textual information about Sena, a careful treatment of its colonial context must be conducted.

[803] See e.g. Salmon 1969: 17; Bradley 2006: 163; Patterson 2006: 197.
[804] See Patterson 2006: 200-1, arguing that back-projection of later attitudes is problematic; cf. Bradley 2006: 171 for more positive approach.

We know from two references in Livy that Sena, along with nine others, was a citizen colony.[805] Both references concern colonists appealing against attempts to draft them for military service, first in 207 and then in 191, claiming the *sancrosancta vacatio militiae* hitherto granted to them as *coloni maritimi,* as both passages specifically refer to them.[806] All of the ten, except for Pyrgi, are known to have been founded prior to the First Punic War, and Pyrgi is likely to have been founded in the same period,[807] thus forming a discrete group, with no other citizen colonies founded until after 200. This, then, is the group to which Sena belonged.

What we know of the nature of these ten colonies is no less cause for dispute. It has been assumed from the instruction given to the colonists at Ostia and Antium in the first Livian passage mentioned above that *coloni maritimi* were forbidden to leave their colony for more than a very limited period. This specific instruction, however, for the *iuniores* of those two colonies, while still escaping military service, not to sleep outside the walls for more than thirty days while the enemy (then Carthage) was in Italy, does not imply this.[808] The mobility of colonists, then, need not have been limited under normal circumstances. Three further subjects of dispute concerning the colonists deserve consideration: the size of the citizen *coloniae maritimae* in terms of population; the makeup of this population; and the intended activities of the colonists. Where possible, we shall consider Sena in particular.

Firstly, we approach the question of colony size. It has previously been asserted that the standard size of a citizen colony was 300 settlers (in addition to their families), in particular by Salmon, who supported this claim with reference to the size of those colonies which could be evaluated on the ground.[809] As Salmon himself acknowledged, however, the textual basis for this claim is slim. For the ten maritime colonies, we have an attestation of the settling of

[805] Liv. 27.38.3-5; 36.3.4-6. Others: Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa, Alsium, Fregenae, Castrum Novum (whether that in Etruria or Picenum is disputed), Pyrgi.
[806] For the use of *colonia maritima* as a designation, Siculus Flaccus *De Cond. Agri* p.135.23-136.6 L.
[807] Salmon 1963: 15.
[808] See Graham Mason 1992: 79.
[809] Salmon 1963: 25-6.

300 colonists only for Tarracina (329); the number is attested for five of the eight citizen colonies founded in 194, but these are separated from the phenomenon of the *coloniae maritimae* by more than half a century, and an evident change in focus.[810] While the known sizes of some of the maritime colonies would accord well with a population of 300 families, it remains only an assumption that this was the standard number.[811] Interestingly, for Sena we appear to have conflicting information on this subject. Recent work on the site has suggested that Sena was in fact considerably larger than the 2-2.5 ha of several other maritime colonies, possibly around 18 ha.[812] This has been interpreted by Lepore as a move towards a new type of citizen colony, but his argument relies on the idea that the citizen colony of Castrum Novum should be identified as modern Giulianova in Picenum, which is strongly debated.[813] We cannot therefore identify a potential trend, but we can say that there is a good chance Sena had a population greater than 300 adult males.

Secondly, we come to the question of the likely makeup of this population. While there remain questions about what part of the Roman and Italian populace provided the settlers, this is only of partial interest; more germane to the discussion is the issue of how existing local populations were handled. Firstly, however, one contribution to the first issue deserves to be firmly dismissed: this is the speculation of Mitchell that the colonists were all urban poor, 'recruited as rowers and sailors', requiring Roman citizenship to help them find safe harbour as they ranged over the coastal seas.[814] As to the economic origins of the colonists, no judgement will be passed here; as to their being recruited as naval personnel, this finds no support in the sources, and indeed is flatly contradicted by the fact that in the second

[810] Salmon 1969: 71-2; for Tarracina see Liv. 8.21.11.
[811] Graham Mason 1992: 80.
[812] Lepore 2014: 231-2; cf. Luni 2003: 184; compare early Ostia at 5 ha (Salmon 1969: 18).
[813] Lepore 2014: 221, 232; cf. Migliorati 1994: 281 giving 8 ha for Castrum Novum. Siting of the citizen colony of Castrum Novum in Picenum: Migliorati 1994: 281; Guidobaldi 2001: 87; in Etruria: Salmon 1969: 78 n.119; citizen colonies at Castrum Novum in both Etruria and Picenum: De Sanctis 1907-64: II 447; discussion: Salmon 1963: 20-1; Bandelli 1988c: 6 with n.26, with references.
[814] Mitchell 2010: 337-8.

Livian passage concerning *vacatio militiae* for maritime colonists, the colonists expect (still in 191) to be exempt from naval service. This should warn us against concluding that *coloni maritimi* were intimately linked to the sea; more of their possible functions will be seen below.

The more significant problem here is that of pre-existing local populations. It is unlikely, as we shall see in the next chapter, that Rome effectively wiped out all of the Senones.[815] There remains the question, however, of whether any of them remaining in the area could have become involved with the colony. The idea that local populations could be involved in a variety of ways is part of the orthodox view provided by Salmon, who suggests full enrolment, residency as *incolae,* or the maintenance of a separate community adjacent to the colony as possibilities.[816] For these possibilities, however, we are mostly lacking in legitimate examples for this early period. A passage from Livy seems to suggest that there was a separate community of pre-existing residents at Antium, who appealed to Rome in 317 for laws and magistrates for their community.[817] This episode has been interpreted in various ways, but it seems likely that the applicants were a pre-existing group, rather than belonging to the colony proper.[818] This is supported by an earlier passage showing the inclusion of Antiates in the foundation of the colony in 338.[819] As Càssola observes, nonetheless, this is the only explicit example we have of this taking place before the Second Punic War.[820] It is thus possible at Sena, but it remains only a possibility.

At Sena, then, we have a body of probably over 300 imported Roman citizens (be they longstanding or newly created as such). Thus we come to our third major issue: what they

[815] The archaeological evidence shown above, for example, suggests continuity in Celtic burials outside the *ager Gallicus* proper, as well as at Montefortino d'Arcevia.
[816] Salmon 1969: 25-6.
[817] Liv. 9.20.10.
[818] See e.g. Salmon 1969: 76, though he elsewhere (1963: 30) identifies them with the colonists, as does Cairo (2012: 122), though the latter has no reasonable argument behind the decision; Bradley 2006: 168.
[819] Liv. 8.14.8.
[820] Càssola 1988: 6, 12.

were expected to do. In this case, the lengthy history of Roman colonisation and the potentially retrojecting attitudes of our sources cause difficulty. Following the orthodoxy of Salmon, citizen colonies in particular were intended solely as military bulwarks. This takes a highly Ciceronian approach, and prioritises one potential purpose of colonies above all others, as Bradley's evaluation of the orthodoxy highlights.[821] The focus on military purposes and activities above all other possibilities can also lead to unfounded speculation such as that by Mitchell mentioned above. Nonetheless, that there was a military element can perhaps hardly be doubted. The sources stress repeatedly that many colonies, both Latin and citizen, were founded in relatively hostile territory, which could lead to conflict or to difficulty in enrolling sufficient colonists.[822] The granting of *vacatio militiae,* though it can be read in various ways, could be seen as an attempt to avoid depleting the combat strength of citizen colonial bodies. The locations of both Roman and Latin colonies also suggest an attempt to control strategic locations, as might the building of roads connecting them to one another and to Rome, given the largely military value of road-building.[823] It should be added, however, that land-allocation was a central part of colony-foundation, and the role of agrarian activity should not be ruled out; all else aside, the colonists needed to survive.[824] Economic, social, and manpower considerations may also be adduced, but these need only be mentioned here to temper the orthodox focus on military aims.[825]

On the military and strategic purpose of colonies, one example should briefly be mentioned as an interesting comparandum, though it should be noted that the colony in question is Latin and was founded around a century after Sena. This is the case of Aquileia,

[821] Salmon 1963; 1969; Bradley 2006: 161-2.
[822] E.g. Liv. 10.21.10 on difficulty in finding colonists for Minturnae and Sinuessa, though see e.g. Bradley 2006: 171 and Patterson 2006: 200-1 on the validity of the episode; Liv. 10.1.7 and 10.3.2 on local resistance to the Latin colonies of Alba Fucens (306) and Carseoli (298).
[823] See Wiseman 1987: 142; Coarelli 1988; Tramonti 1995: 248-9; Patterson 2006: 191-2.
[824] See e.g. Graham Mason 1992.
[825] On the multiple purposes of colonization, see e.g. Càssola 1988: 14; Patterson 2006.

which stirred up war with the Istrians, after being founded as an alternative, proposed by the Senate, to a direct attack on the Istrians.[826] Livy may of course be imposing an artificial narrative, but the episode is an interesting one. The foundation of a colony might be seen as a de-escalating manoeuvre, a means of steadying an area, yet provoke fierce resistance, as it did from the Istrians, who delayed the foundation of Aquileia by a matter of years.

This is a particularly interesting idea when placed side by side with the archaeology of Sena Gallica. It has been proposed that the colony went through two stages, being at first a garrison-type settlement, then subsequently being monumentalised and expanded. This is based on two excavations: firstly, the significant sanctuary site excavated on the Via Barroccio, where the earliest ceramics found can be identified as a type datable to 325-270. Based on further information on the site, Lepore suggests that the site saw two major stages: at first, it was an open area with ritual depositions (shells, ash, animal bones, ceramics) and one or more anepigraphic *cippi;* subsequently, two buildings with altars were constructed on the site and the building of the city wall turned the sanctuary from extraurban to urban.[827] Speculatively, Lepore and others have suggested that this two-stage process may correspond to the two dates we have for the foundation of the colony. Secondly, the site excavated at Via Cavallotti has produced a similar hypothesis: in a level dated to the early third century, there is evidence of the violent destruction of a habitation structure, followed by raising of the ground level, and subsequently the construction, in a very different technique, of what Lepore and his colleagues deem a rustic or productive type structure belonging to the colony.[828] In this instance, they propose that the violent destruction occurred ca.290, and the construction of the new building ca.284.

[826] Càssola 1972: 56-7; the episode at Liv. 39.55.
[827] Lepore 2012; 2014: 228.
[828] Lepore et al. 2012 (representative example of the prolific output of the Progetto Archeologia Urbana a Senigallia): esp. 160, 165-6.

While this is a seductive explanation of archaeological and textual phenomena, it is hardly necessary, nor can it easily be proven. That the sites concerned saw more than one stage of development is hardly surprising, and two particular issues arise: 290-284/3 is a very short window within which to see two major stages of development in the sanctuary site; and no proper explanation is given for separating the destruction and construction layers on the Via Cavallotti by any given interval. What we might usefully take from this debate, and from the comparandum of Aquileia given above, is that the process of founding a colony was just that: a process. Our two dates could be a senatorial decision followed by the foundation of the site; they could indicate the arrival of settlers and the official inauguration of the colony: we do not know. The precise pattern of provocation is not recoverable. What we can suppose is that Sena, buttressed by Hadria to the south and later Ariminum to the north, was not founded in a single episode, but played a more complex role than we might initially suppose, just as Aquileia seems to have done. The very existence of pre-Roman levels at Sena is noteworthy in highlighting the complexity of the settlement's history.[829]

These questions of process raise the further question of how far the complex of colonies and roads was intended as such; that is, whether there was overall planning of any kind. Intention on the part of the senate is of course very difficult to trace, especially given the state of our sources on the period, but it is suggestive that in territory east of Rome, land confiscation, harsh treatment of native population (the Aequi), colonisation (Alba Fucens, 302, and Carseoli, 298), and road-building (the Via Valeria) had been used together around the turn of the third century. In that case, planning of the road may have preceded the other action, but the respective terrain of the territory of the Aequi and of the northern Adriatic coast, along with maritime access to the area of Sena, might well account for the primacy of road-planning

[829] Compare also confusion over some early foundation dates in Livy and Dionysius; Càssola 1988: 6.

in the former and its considerable delay in the latter.[830] Likely evidence of a less formal 'coast road' on the mid- to upper Adriatic, predating the Via Flaminia, would appear to bear this out.[831]

We should also question, briefly, how far the foundation of Sena Gallica might point less to Gallic territory and more to the Adriatic. Unfortunately, the history of the Adriatic from the third quarter of the fourth century to the time of Rome's First Illyrian War in the 230s has been described as a 'secolo buio', and establishing Rome's place in it, especially as early as the foundation of Sena, is difficult.[832] Due to Sena's nature as the only citizen colony on the Adriatic seaboard (if we place Castrum Novum in Etruria), it appears easy at first to label it as Rome moving into the Adriatic. There is not, however, the evidence to bear this out.

The Adriatic at the time of Sena's foundation does appear to have been a busy region, maintaining importance and perhaps assuming more. Syracuse had had interests in the region under the Dionysii, founding Adria (not to be confused with the Latin colony of Hadria) in the upper Adriatic, Issa, on the eastern coast, and Ancona.[833] The value of controlling the sea may be seen in the expedition of Cleonymus of Sparta, who made attempts on various locations on both sides of the sea (though only meeting with success on Corcyra), apparently with the sanction of his home state.[834] The Senones themselves had, as we have seen, likely interacted with Dionysius I and acted as mercenaries in his employ, demonstrating the level of connection existing within the Adriatic.[835] Romans and Roman goods also appear to have travelled across the sea: Čašule points to several hoards in Croatia which include Roman coins which most likely crossed the sea before the mid-third century, and to Roman and Latin names appearing

[830] See Coarelli 1988: 41-2.
[831] Bottazzi 1995: 341.
[832] Tramonti 1995: 242-3.
[833] On Ancona, see however Amat Sabattini 1995: 32. On the Adriatic's importance, see Braccesi 1990: 86.
[834] See Marasco 1984: 53.
[835] See Zuffa 1978: 139; Just. *Epit.* 20.5.5-6.

in epigraphic corpora of the eastern Adriatic in that century.[836] Nonetheless, the numismatic evidence is scattered and small, and cannot easily be pushed back into the early part of the third century.[837] This is particularly notable given the evidence for coinage from Magna Graecia, Syracuse, and the Punic world making its way to the northern Adriatic from even earlier, some likely by sea.[838]

There is then minimal evidence to suggest that Rome was getting involved in, or even thinking about, the Adriatic in such terms at the time of the foundation of Sena. Salmon legitimately points out that pirates were likely a concern on the Adriatic coast (they certainly were so by the time of the Illyrian war), and suggests that Sena was intended to serve as a base against the Senones, and then as a bastion against piratical activity.[839] This is plausible. If we suppose that the *coloniae maritimae* were conceived of as such at the time of their foundation, it is quite reasonable to suggest not only that Rome was interested in dealing with such maritime problems, but also that Sena marked the time at which it began to address them on its eastern seaboard. To dismiss this potential goal, as Càssola does, is perhaps reductive.[840] It appears, however, that minimal anti-pirate activity can be identified on Rome's part in this early period in the upper Adriatic, in contrast to behaviour in the Tyrrhenian.[841]

This being so, Sena and its neighbours lend themselves rather more straightforwardly to a land-based explanation. Càssola's dismissal of the maritime element is based on the idea that Rome was moving up from the lower Adriatic, where it had allies in the Apuli and Vestini, to continue consolidating its land-based power. As he legitimately points out, Hadria, relatively close to Sena and, according to Livy, founded contemporaneously with it, was actually a

[836] Čašule 2012.
[837] See Crawford 1978.
[838] See e.g. Biordi 1995: 426-8; Ercolani Cocchi 1995: 408, 2004: 36; Ortalli 2004: 316; Arslan 2006: esp. 39-40.
[839] Salmon 1963: 19.
[840] Càssola 1972: 43.
[841] Bandelli 2004: 66.

reasonable distance from the sea, and could have been intended to control the road to the coast, rather than to open itself up to the sea. The way one looks at a colonisation map makes all the difference in terms of questions like this one: Sena is clearly a drastic move in that it is on the Adriatic, but this does not mean that it is a push towards the sea.

The idea of a linear push northwards would fit well with the odological approach to geographical understanding and control. The relevance of this to the Roman conception of geography has been shown, with milestones, itineraries, and other materials pointing to its centrality in the construction of space.[842] According to this understanding, we see Rome tracking up the coast with its foundations, extending the line of colonies.[843] In this way, its relationship with Hadria means that Sena is concerned not just with the *ager Gallicus,* but also with Picenum.[844] This grants to Sena a consolidatory role, but also allows for its future as a hub or waypoint for further expansion. Interestingly, when formal road-construction began in the region, this led to a degree of restructuring of the line, as the Via Flaminia bypassed Sena entirely given the new prominence of Ariminum to the north. The metro-centric design of roads such as the Via Flaminia could indeed reconfigure how space was controlled, as we shall further see.[845]

IV.1.6. Conclusions

We have seen that Rome's initial involvement in Gallic northern Italy could be described as rather less decisive (in terms of a single moment) than its entry into Sicily or Iberia. This arises from the lack of clear definition of the region, or indeed of the initial enemy. This confusing

[842] See e.g. Purcell 1990: 12; Talbert 2012: 247.
[843] On the significance of coasts in road-building, see Horden and Purcell 2000: 126-8.
[844] Tramonti 1995: 248-9.
[845] See again Horden and Purcell 2000: 128 on the 'compact' between centres on a road.

picture, however, makes the region fertile ground for productive power in the creation of Italy and its limits, as we shall see in the complex configurations of provincial assignment. Importantly, the initial contact has arisen from the actions of Gallic groups in mercenary service to other parties, a complicated network of regional relations akin to what we see in some parts of Iberia. The archaeological evidence for destruction, early in the century, of a pre-Roman habitation level at Sena is suggestive, in combination with the confusion of the texts, of a rapid Roman occupation of the space, which may well have encouraged the growth of tensions, not least given the continued restiveness of the Etruscans. By the time of the defeat of the Picentines, a case has been made for a sense of the conquest of Italy being complete. Nonetheless, it will become clear that the Adriatic corridor was not blocked but rather opened, and that by sending Ariminum in particular, Rome was creating new vulnerabilities.

IV.2. Forms of power

In the previous chapter, we stressed the complex nature of northern Italy in the early third century. As a result, the region was defined rather on the basis of whether extant sources considered the groups involved to be Gallic. This approach will largely be followed here, but the complexities of the *provincia* mean that we must also consider *Gallia* in a more geographical sense (as touched upon above in the discussion of Italy).

Table IV.2.a takes up this broader geographical remit in showing forms of Roman power affecting the region from ca.280-167. Thus we will see not just power manifestations such as colonisation of land confiscated from explicitly Gallic groups, for example, but also the settlement of Ligurians in the Po valley, and Roman treatment of Transalpine Gauls who tried to settle south of the Alps.

Type of power	**Date**	**Details**	**Actor(s)**	**Source**
Economic	232	Gallic land (Val. Max.), known as 'Picentine' (Polyb.), beyond the Picentine (Cato), or along with the Picentine (Cic.) taken from	Magistrate (tribune of the plebs)	Polyb. 2.21.7-8; Varro *Rust.* 1.2.7 = *FRHist* Cato F46; Cic. *Brut.* 14.57; *Sen.* 4.11; Val. Max. 5.4.5

		Senones, distributed *viritim*		
	ca.230	Romans forbid anyone to give silver or gold to a Gaul	'The Romans'	Zon. 8.19
	222	Insubres give money for peace	Magistrates (consuls)	Zon. 8.20
	218	Transalpine Gauls allege Gauls in Italy are made to pay *stipendium*	Not specified	Liv. 21.20.6; cf. 1 Macc. 8.2
	200	L. Furius Purpureo celebrates a triumph over the Gauls and deposits 320,000 asses and 100,500lbs of silver	Magistrate (praetor)	Liv. 31.49.1-2; *Per.* 31.12
	197	C. Cornelius	Magistrate	Liv. 33.23.7

		Cethegus triumphs over the Gauls, displaying 237,500 asses and 79,000 silver denarii	(consul)	
	197	Q. Minucius celebrates an ovation over the Ligurians and Boii, displaying 254,000 asses and 53,200 silver denarii	Magistrate (praetor)	Liv. 33.23.8-9
	196	M. Claudius Marcellus triumphs over the Insubres and Comenses, displaying 320,000 asses and 234,000 silver denarii	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 33.37.9-11; *Per.* 33.6-7

	191	Scipio Nasica triumphs over the Boii, displaying 1471 golden torques, 24lbs of gold, 2340lbs of silver, and 23,400 silver denarii	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 36.40.11
	173	Land in *ager Ligustinus et Gallicus* distributed *viritim*	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. 42.4.4
Ideological	ca.280	Rome begins to consider all of Italy as belonging to it	Romans	Polyb. 1.6.6
	225	Rome wins support of Veneti and Cenomani	Embassy	Polyb. 2.23.2
	223	Rome gains friendship of the	Magistrates (consuls)	Polyb. 2.32.1-2

		Anares		
	222	M. Claudius Marcellus wins *spolia opima* from the Insubres	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. *Per.* 20.11; Eutrop. 3.6
	218	Sempronius sends forces to defend Gallic territory between the Trebia and Po	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 21.52.3-10
	216	Gaulish man and Gaulish woman buried alive in Forum Boarium	Decemvirs in obedience to the Sibylline Books	Liv. 22.57.6; Zon. 8.19; cf. Oros. 4.13.3
	197	Colonists from Cremona and Placentia appear in C. Cornelius Cethegus' triumph in *pillei*	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 33.23.1-6
	174	Contract let for building of a	Magistrates (censors)	Liv. 41.27.11

		temple to Jupiter at Pisaurum (with colonists' money)		
Coercive	268	Latin colony founded at Ariminum	Unspecified	Liv. *Per.* 15.5; Vell. Pat. 1.14.7; Eutrop. 2.16
	236	Rome takes land from Boii on defeat	Unspecified	Zon. 8.18
	232	Viritane land distribution (see 'Economic')		
	225	Rome takes all of Boian territory	Unspecified	Zon. 8.20
	225	Veneti and Cenomani supply 20,000 soldiers to face Gallic invasion	Romans	Polyb. 2.24.7-8
	223	Romans fear to use Celtic allied forces (but do)	Romans	Polyb. 2.32.7-8
	222	Cn. Cornelius	Magistrate	Polyb. 2.34.15-

		takes Mediolanum and wins Insubrian surrender; takes land	(consul)	35.1; Zon. 8.20
	220	Via Flaminia built	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. *Per.* 20.17
	218	Latin colonies founded at Placentia and Cremona	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. 21.25.2; *Per.* 20.18; Polyb. 3.40.3-5; Vell. Pat. 1.14.8
	218	In consular army, out of Gallic auxiliary forces, only Cenomani remain	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 21.55.4
	216	Cohorts raised in Picenum and Cisalpina	Unspecified	Liv. 23.14.2
	216	Postumius fights Gauls with an army including levies from lands bordering the	Magistrate (praetor)	Liv. 23.24.8

		Adriatic		
	206	In response to deputation, consular edict requires citizens of Placentia and Cremona to return there; praetor Mamilius charged with defending those colonies	Magistrates (consuls and praetor) under senatorial order	Liv. 28.11.11-12
	198	Colonists forced to return to Placentia and Cremona	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 32.26.3
	197	C. Cornelius Cethegus asks chiefs of the Cenomani to convince their forces to abandon alliance	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 32.30.5-13

		with the Insubres, or to come over to Rome		
	191	Land taken from Boii after defeat	Magistrate (consul)	Liv. 37.2.6
	190	In response to deputation, senate requests consul C. Laelius select 6000 families to supplement depopulated Placentia and Cremona	Magistrate (consul) under senatorial order	Liv. 37.46.9-47.2
	189	Latin colony founded at Bononia	Unspecified	Liv. 37.57.14; *Per.* 37.6; Vell. Pat. 1.15.2
	187	C. Flaminius has his soldiers build a road from Bononia to Arretium; M.	Magistrates (consuls)	Liv. 39.2.6, 10; *Per.* 39.1

		Aemilius builds a road from Placentia to Ariminum		
	187	M. Furius disarms the innocent Cenomani; in response to a deputation, the senate has Aemilius investigate; Furius is ordered to restore the arms	Magistrates (praetor; consul under senatorial order)	Liv. 39.3.1-3; Diod. Sic. 29.14.1
	184	Roman colony founded at Pisaurum	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. 39.44.10; *Per.* 39.9; Vell. Pat. 1.15.2
	184	Roman colonies founded at Mutina and Parma	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. *Per.* 39.9
	183			Liv. 39.55.6-8
	183	M. Claudius	Magistrate	Liv. 39.54.2-13

		Marcellus disarms Transalpine Gauls who have settled in area of Aquileia and now surrendered; in response to deputation, senate orders restoration of their possessions, but also their departure from Italy	(consul); senate	
	183-1	Latin colony founded at Aquileia	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. 39.55.5-6; 40.26.2, 34.1-2; *Per.* 40.4; Vell. Pat. 1.15.2
	179	Senate refuses request of Transalpine	Senate	Liv. 40.53.4-6

		Gallic group to settle in Italy		
	178	Emergency cohort from Placentia used in Istrian campaign	Unspecified	Liv. 41.1.6
	178	M. Junius Brutus temporarily raises troops from Gallic communities	Magistrate (consul) under senatorial order	Liv. 41.5.5
	177	Mutina retaken from Ligurians by C. Claudius Pulcher, who informs the senate that there is much new land to distribute to settlers	Magistrate (consul) under senatorial order	Liv. 41.16.7-9
	174	Contract let for paving a road at Pisaurum with	Magistrates (censors)	Liv. 41.27.11

		basalt (with colonists' money)		
	173	Viritane land distribution (see 'Economic')		
	172	C. Popilius grants land north of the Po to Ligurian Statellates formerly enslaved by his brother (cos. 173) after their surrender	Magistrate (consul) under senatorial order	Liv. 42.22.5-6
	169	In response to a deputation, senate has 1500 households listed to augment Aquileia	Commissioners under senatorial order	Liv. 43.17.1

	168	C. Licinius to instruct Cn. Servilius to raise 600 cavalry	Magistrate (consul) instructing promagistrate (proconsul) under senatorial order	Liv. 44.21.7

Table IV.2.a. Manifestations of the three power types in Gallic northern Italy, ca.280-167.

IV.2.1. The sources

As Table IV.2.a demonstrates, we are heavily reliant here on Livy. No other author provides a comparable amount of information, though even in Livy's case many of the references given are relatively brief. This limits our access to information on the region prior to 218, though as can be seen above, Dio-Zonaras, Polybius, and the *Periochae* provide some details. On the foundation of colonies, we also find corroboration of dates in Velleius. The scantiness of the textual sources, however, is strongly apparent.

Nonetheless, archaeological and epigraphic materials offer valuable evidence. The former helps to establish settlement and population continuity or change, as well as details of colonisation. The latter provides crucial onomastic evidence, which can be used to suggest population origins, and evidence of Roman magistrates and local political structuring. This is vital in particular to our understanding of colonisation in northern Italy, and has significantly advanced debates on the nature of the phenomenon.

IV.2.2. Province and personnel

As before, the first issue to consider is the construction and manning of the region as an area of concern to Rome, that is its allocation as a *provincia* (or *provinciae*). Table IV.2.b shows the magistrates who acted in the region across the period from ca.280 onwards, giving their *provincia* (as far as we know its designation) and status.

Year	**Magistrates / promagistrates / commissions / embassies**				
268	Commissioners for Ariminum (3)				
267-239					
238	*Galli (Cisalpini) / Boii* (cos.)				
237	*Galli* (cos.)	*Galli* (cos.)			
236	*Galli (Boii)* (cos.)	*Galli (Boii)* (cos.)			
235-233					
232	Land commission in				

	ager Gallicus et Picenus?				
231-226					
225	*Gallia (Cisalpina) / Ariminum / Galli** (cos.)				
224	*Boii; Galli Insubres* (cos.)	*Boii; Galli Insubres* (cos.)			
223	*Galli* (Insubres)* (cos.)	*Galli* (Insubres)* (cos.)			
222	*Galli (Insubres*); Gaesati* (cos.)	*Galli (Insubres); Gaesati* (cos.)			
221	*Istri* (cos.)	*Istri* (cos.)			
220	Μέχρι τῶν Ἄλπεων (cos.)	Μέχρι τῶν Ἄλπεων (cos.)			
219					
218	*Hispania†* (cos.)	*Africa cum Sicilia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (praet.)	*auxilium ferre Manlio†*	Commissioners for Cremona (3) and

				(praet.)	Placentia (3)
217	*legiones quae Placentiae hibernabant†; Ariminum†* (cos.)	*Gallia / Ariminum* (cos.)	*ad collegam ab Seruilio consule in Umbria†* (propraet.)		
216	*Gallia†* (praet.)				
215	*Ager Gallicus* (propraet.)				
214	*Ager Gallicus* (propraet.)				
213	*Ariminum†* (praet.)				
212	*Gallia†* (propraet.)				
211	*Gallia†* (propraet.)				
210					
209	*Gallia* (also *praetor peregrinus*)†				

	(praet.)				
208	*Gallia†* (propraet.)				
207	*Gallia adversus Hasdrubalem†* (cos.)	*adversus Hannibalem Bruttii et Lucani†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (praet.)		
206	*Gallia†* (praet.)				
205	*Ariminum, ita Galliam appellabant†* (praet.)	*Etruria†* (procos.)			
204	*Gallia* (also *praetor peregrinus*)† (praet.)	*Gallia(?)†* (procos.)	*Gallia†* (propraet.)		
203	*Etruria†* (cos.)	*Ariminum†* (praet.)	*Gallia†* (procos.)		
202	*Gallia†* (praet.)				
201	*Italia†* (cos.)				
200	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (praet.)			

199	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Ariminum†* (praet.)			
198	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (praet.)	*Gallia†* (procos.)		
197	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Italia†; Galli** (cos.)			
196	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Italia†; Insubres** (cos.)			
195	*Italia†* (cos.)				
194	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (procos.)		
193	*Gallia†* (cos.)				
192	*Italia†; Gallia†* (cos.)	*Italia†* (cos.)			
191	*Italia†; Boii** (cos.)	*Italia†* (procos.)			
190	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Italia†* (procos.)	Commissioners for supplementing Placentia and Cremona (3)		

189	*Italia†; Gallia†* (procos.)	Commissioners for Bononia (3)			
188	*Gallia†* (cos.)				
187	*Ligures†* (cos.)	*Ligures†* (cos.)	*Gallia (in Italia)†* (praet.)		
186-185					
184	Commissioners for Potentia and Pisaurum (3)				
183	*Ligures†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (praet.)	*Ligures†* (procos.)	Embassy to Transalpine Gauls (3)	Commissioners for Mutina and Parma (3) and Aquileia (3)
182	*Gallia†* (procos.)				
181	*Gallia†* (praet.)				
180	*Gallia†* (propraet.)				
179	*Ligures†* (cos.)				
178	*Gallia* (cos.)	*Ligures?* (cos.)	*Praetor*	*(Duumvir*	

			urbanus†	*navalis)*	
177	*Istria†* (cos.)	*Gallia (in duas divisam provincias)†* (praet.)	*Gallia (in duas divisam provincias)†* (praet.)		
176	*Gallia†* (procos.)				
175-4					
173	Commissioners for viritane land distribution (10)				
172	*Ligures†* (cos.)				
171	*Italia†; Gallia†* (cos.)				
170	*Ligures†; Gallia†* (cos.)	Embassy to Gallic king Cincibilus (2)			
169	*Italia†* (cos.)	Commissioners for supplementing			

		Aquileia (3)			
168	*Italia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (procos.)			
167	*Gallia†* (cos.)	*Gallia†* (procos.)			

Table IV.2.b. Assignments of imperium*-holders, commissions, and embassies acting upon land or peoples considered Gallic, 268-167.*[846] ** indicates information from* Fasti Triumphales; † *indicates information from Livy. Shaded boxes indicate conflict primarily concerned with Carthage.*

Table IV.2.b suggests various key points from which to begin. There is flexibility both in respect of the formal designation of *provinciae* (e.g. *Italia, Gallia, Ariminum*) and in respect of the space actually occupied. There are several examples of magistrates moving between parts of Italy in particular, and of transfers of command. There is a clear lack of regularity in the allocation of the region, distinctly more so than in Sicily or Iberia; several years appear in the 180s and 170s where no magistrate appears to have played a role, in addition to fluctuations in number and status of magistrates present.

Several issues therefore arise. Firstly, we must consider the ramifications of this information for whether *Italia* and *Gallia* overlapped in practical and theoretical terms. Secondly, we shall consider how important formal differences in provincial titulature actually were, highlighting the flexibility between not just *Italia* and *Gallia,* but other terms such as *Ariminum.* The potential for overlap and flexibility with assignment to the *Ligures* also

[846] For sources see Broughton *MRR;* Brennan 2000; Díaz Fernández 2015: 494-509.

emerges, leading to significant questions of Roman geographical perception of the north, its access routes, and how it should be handled. The role of the Gallic region as a means of connection with more distant entities hints further at its geographical importance, and at potential Roman goals. Lastly, we consider personnel, and the significance of recurring names and families. As a result, we shall be able to emphasise once more the key role played by individuals in the development of a region impacted by Roman power.

The relationship between *Italia* and *Gallia* can be considered from 218, when the former is first attested in Livy as a provincial allocation.[847] As Table IV.2.b shows, however, only from 201 did magistrates assigned *Italia* act in the Gallic north. It is tempting to associate this with the role of the war in creating a new idea of *Italia,* including the north, but it is also possible that the change related to more flexible commands associated with clean-up operations after the war, following a period where the heavy use of promagistracies had enabled the use of multiple precise assignments. Alternatively, it is also possible that it is the product of a change in Livy's source material. The change is intriguing, but without Livy's account for 293-218, it is very difficult to judge the reason.

As one might expect following such a shift, the relationship between *Italia* and *Gallia* down to 167 does not seem wholly consistent. In some cases, a magistrate allocated *Italia* appears operating in *Gallia,* without comment on there being any difference between the two, for instance in the case of Sex. Aelius Paetus Catus, consul in 198, as described by Livy.[848] In 199, on the other hand, we see a consul allocated *Italia* explicitly having to change plans to replace the praetor allocated *Ariminum*.[849] The most logical explanation is that *Italia* was generally considered to include *Gallia,* but that the specificity of command meant that *Gallia* was a significant diversion when a magistrate had been tasked with another area within

[847] Prior to 218, our lack of Livian narrative means that we have little idea of what the provincial assignments were called.
[848] Liv. 32.8.4, 27.5.
[849] Liv. 32.7.5-7; Zon. 9.15; Liv. 39.3.1-3; Diod. Sic. 29.14; Liv. 39.45.6-7, 54.2.

Italia.[850] This is hinted at even prior to the end of the war, by Livy's account of the allocations for 207, where the consuls are assigned provinces *diversae extremis Italiae finibus, alteri adversus Hannibalem Bruttii et Lucani, alteri Gallia adversus Hasdrubalem.*[851] The implication is that the two are both 'Italian' assignments, but their specificity is clearly important, giving pause to Claudius Nero, the former assignee, in his decision to go to his colleague's assistance.[852] In 187, Livy explicitly describes *Gallia* as being one of the two praetorian provinces which are *in Italia.*[853] His account of the consular provinces for 192 implies a similar understanding.[854]

Based on this evidence, after the Second Punic War *Italia* is generally conceived of (at least in Livy) as including *Gallia.* A case could be made for the latter being more specific, but the sheer inconsistency suggests that Livy or indeed the senate was liable to be imprecise in provincial titulature. An attested assignment to *Italia* might well have included greater specificity, as it is apparent that the senate generally had something more exact in mind than the entire peninsula.[855] This might be the case, for instance, in 171, where Livy names *Italia* as the province up for the consular lot, but later states that C. Cassius received *Gallia.*[856] Such a possibility would also explain the inconsistency, for example in 195-4, where a magistrate holds one *provincia* (in this case *Italia*) only to be prorogued in what appears to be another (here *Gallia*). While the second reference could be purely geographical, the recurrence of the phenomenon, in combination with the complexities already discussed, suggests that this might reflect elements of official titulature. The presence of *Ariminum,* which Livy glosses for 205 as synonymous with *Gallia,* could possibly reflect the use of Ariminum as a military base, included

[850] The risk of clashes over *imperium* and *auspicia* also no doubt remained a concern.
[851] Liv. 27.35.10.
[852] Liv. 27.43.5-12.
[853] Liv. 38.42.5-6.
[854] Liv. 35.20.2, 7.
[855] Though see Bertrand 1989: 200-202 on the use or potential omission of glosses for delimitation, freedom, or provocation of discussion.
[856] Liv. 42.31.1, 32.1-5; 43.1.4.

within specific instructions attached to the assignment of the region as a *provincia.*[857] This is not necessary, as Livy's phrasing suggests that *Ariminum* is an official label which fell out of use, but the possibility remains open.[858]

The apparent fluidity of titulature, at least as reflected in Livy's account, highlights the ongoing flexibility of the *provincia* both in general and in this specific case. Given the frequency of magisterial presence, the fact that this region remained so malleable and did not become a regular province is notable, and likely attributable to the idea that it was not separate from the rest of Italy. The presence in the region of magistrates assigned other tasks or areas also suggests flexibility and connectivity of space, for example in the case of the consul assigned *Etruria* in 203, but most notably in the case of magistrates assigned the *Ligures.* Given the topography of northern Italy, it is not surprising that action against Ligures and Galli should be linked, and from the 190s it evidently was.[859] A tribune of the plebs in 191 explicitly argued, according to Livy, that the Ligures must be crushed in order to consider the Boii truly defeated.[860] While the senate rejected this as a reason to delay Scipio Nasica's triumph over the Boii, it is interesting that Livy appears to allow it as a genuine opinion, and that Nasica's response makes reference to the hoped-for suppression of the Ligures by the proconsul Minucius.[861] In the previous year, furthermore, L. Quinctius Flamininus, the consul assigned *Italia* or *Gallia* (Livy attests both), fought against Ligures, while his colleague Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, assigned simply *Italia,* fought against the Boii.[862] The lines were not clearly drawn.

It is notable that, in contrast with *Gallia, Liguria* appears not to have been allocated as a province, but rather the *Ligures.* This semi-spatial ethnic label is arguably even less likely to

[857] Liv. 28.38.12.
[858] Cf. Amat Seguin 1986: 100; Bispham 2006: 90; Galsterer 2006: 13.
[859] Gabba 1990b: 72.
[860] Liv. 36.39.5-10.
[861] Cf. Richardson 2008: 36, which stresses the separation of the *provinciae.*
[862] Liv. 35.20.1-7, 22.3-4, 40.2-4.

evoke clear demarcations than *Gallia,* as the events of 187 abundantly show. The consuls, both assigned the *Ligures,* act on both sides of the Apennines, following Ligurian groups into the Po Valley and into the area around Pisa, ranging widely on both sides of the range and in M. Aemilius' case building a road across it.[863] As we shall see below, connections between Ligures and the Gallic region were also formed on at least one occasion, and probably more, including in 187, by the deportation of Ligurian groups to Gallic land. These connections demonstrate a two-pronged approach to dealing with northern Italy, making the most of the Adriatic coastal access route and the mountain passes of Liguria. The Apennines were thus not a definitive boundary, but a geographical feature that could be crossed or circumvented by multiple routes.[864] Northern Italy was a region which admitted two main tactical approaches, which could enable concerted action and potentially complete pacification. While we will not consider Liguria in greater detail, it is worth noting that it too saw coastal colonisation in this period, in the form of Pisa (180) and Luna (177), reflecting the Adriatic colonies.

Connections apparent beyond northern Italy, evident from Table IV.2.b, may suggest what Rome hoped to gain from pacification of the region (apart from security).[865] The first connection is with the Gallic groups beyond the Alps, whose appearance is reflected by the sending of an embassy to an intruding group and its parent tribes in 183, and by the senate's refusal of settlement rights to another group in 179 (see Table IV.2.a). Livy's inclusion of the assertion of the Alps as a salutary barrier in the first instance is suggestive of Roman desires to suppress transalpine connections at this stage, though as ever the beginnings of diplomatic contact are important to note. The other embassy in Table IV.2.b, to the Gallic king Cincibilus in the southeastern Alps, may make a more positive suggestion about Roman goals in the region. It has been argued that Cincibilus, attacked by the consul Cassius in 171, is likely to

[863] Liv. 39.2.1-11.
[864] See e.g. Lippolis 1997; Storchi 2008.
[865] The ever-present security issue: e.g. Polyb. 2.13.6.

have been the king of Noricum, noted for its metal resources, primarily iron.[866] Dobesch makes a strong case for the embassy of 170 being the origin of the later attested *hospitium publicum* between Rome and Noricum.[867] A consul assigned *Italia* evidently considered Cincibilus' realm a fair target for attack, and Cincibilus was highly open to positive diplomatic exchange with Rome. On Cassius' side, significantly, northern Italy appears to have been a stepping stone not only to the wealth of the southeastern Alps, but even to a land route to Macedon.[868] This highlights the potential dangers of the region, especially as a live military theatre allowing magisterial latitude. The lack of a defined boundary to the province facilitated both positive and negative magisterial decisions.

This potential for spurring further conflict can also be seen in the connection between northern Italy and neighbouring Istria. As we shall see further below, the founding of Aquileia was seen as a move towards pacifying the Istri, in place of a war, but its effect was rather to cause war. The praetor assigned *Gallia* in 181 was forced to engage the Istri, but it appears again to have been individual initiative which provoked further conflict.[869] In 178, the consul A. Manlius Vulso's invasion from his province of *Gallia* led to serious setbacks and necessitated further involvement the following year in spite of some recovery.[870] What is particularly interesting about the action of C. Claudius in 177, however, is that his campaigns in that year spanned Istria, a revolt in Liguria, and the expulsion of the Ligurian captors of Mutina.[871] Istria, which itself assumes significance as part of the route between northern Italy and regions such as Macedon and Illyria, thus becomes part of the cluster with Gallia and Liguria.[872]

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[866] On Noricum and archaeological evidence for its connections to northern Italy, see Piccottini 1987.
[867] Dobesch 1976.
[868] Liv. 43.1.4-12.
[869] Liv. 40.26.2-3.
[870] Liv. 41.1-5, 6.1-3, 7.4-10, 8.5, 9.3, 8, 10.5-11.9; Polyb. 25.4.1.
[871] Liv. 41.12.3, 7-10, 13.6-8, 14.1-3; *Act. Tr.* Degrassi 80f., 555.
[872] Livy reports a plot by Philip V to use the Bastarnae to invade Italy from the northeast: Liv. 39.35.4. The duumvir navalis, C. Furius, who brought a fleet to Istria, was present to counter Illyrian ships in the

While the actions of individuals like Cassius or Vulso had destabilising effects on the region and on the broader Roman outlook, there are a number of examples of individuals having important impacts, in ways which encouraged stability, and bred patronal relations. Tables IV.2.a and IV.2.b show some of the ways in which individuals and families could make repeat appearances in the narrative: as military commanders, ambassadors, colonial or viritane land commissioners, or builders of infrastructure. Recurring individuals are spread across a long period, but cluster most obviously after 200.

The earliest example is M'. Curius Dentatus, who triumphed over the Sabines in 290, and may have succeeded Caecilius Denter in the conflict with the Senones (see IV.1.2). A *Mania Curia* subsequently appears in epigraphic material from the *lucus Pisaurensis,* making a dedication. The *cippi* from the *lucus* may well pre-date the colony of Pisaurum, and could pertain to viritane settlers of an earlier stage, which could plausibly be related to action conducted by Curius.[873] The dedicant attested with *Mania Curia* is a *Polla Livia,* who could be related to the fourth-century Livius who took the Gallic name Drusus; the Livii also had historical links with the Gauls, and a Forum Livii appears on the route of the later Via Aemilia.[874] It is tempting to interpret the career of M. Livius Salinator against this backdrop, but his four-year tenure as consul and proconsul in northern Italy must also be understood as a function of the Hannibalic War.

More concrete examples appear from around 218, from which time we have much more frequent attestations of colonial commissioners. In 220, the consul C. Lutatius Catulus campaigned μέχρι τῶν Ἄλπεων, with diplomatic successes; as Càssola argues, this likely indicates action in the Gallic sphere, and Lutatius subsequently appears among the

sector between Ancona and Aquileia: Liv. 41.1.2-4. Note also concern in the Adriatic due to the activities of Antiochus.

[873] See Susini 1965: 150; Hermon 1989: 278; Coarelli 2000: esp. 204; Lepore et al. 2012: 156 n.7.

[874] Susini 1965: 150-1.

commissioners for the foundation of Placentia and Cremona in 218.[875] An obvious instance of one family member following another occurs in 203, when Lutatius and his colleague, Servilius, are released from Boian captivity by Servilius' son, consul in Etruria.[876] While Livy stresses the personal nature of the son's act, it provides a strong example of familial ties affecting magisterial decisions.

A powerful example of familial continuity bridges the periods before and after the Hannibalic War, but highlights the fact that many of the same men commanded in different provinces. C. Flaminius (praetor of Sicily in 227) is attested bringing a bill for viritane land distribution in the *ager Gallicus* in 232, commanding against the Insubres in 223 as consul, and constructing the Via Flaminia to Ariminum as censor in 220. His son of the same name appears as consular commander against the Ligures in 187, building a road from Arretium to Bononia in the same year, acting as an ambassador to Transalpine Gaul in 183, and serving as a commissioner for Aquileia in 183-1.[877] While the younger Flaminius also served four years in Hispania Citerior from 193, and appears to have had patronage relations in Sicily courtesy of his father, the differences are instructive: his years of tenure in Iberia were consecutive, and part of a system that had so far made significant use of prorogation; he did not even serve in Sicily; and his roles in northern Italy were independent and suggest perhaps personal interest, or perhaps that the senate considered his experience in the region appropriate to the task.

Several individual careers follow a similar trajectory. L. Valerius Flaccus acted in northern Italy as lieutenant (200), consul (195), proconsul (194), triumvir for supplementing

[875] Zon. 8.20.10; Liv. 21.25.1-5; Polyb. 3.40.9; Càssola 1988: 16-17. On the problems of the lists of commissioners for 218, see Gargola 1990.
[876] Liv. 30.1.9, 19.7-8.
[877] Father: Polyb. 2.21.7-8; *FRHist* Cato F46; Cic. *Sen*. 11; *De. Inv*. 2.52; *Acad*. 2.13; *Brut*. 57; *De Leg*. 3.20; Liv. 21.63.2; Val. Max. 5.4.5; Polyb. 2.32-33; *Act. Tr.* Degrassi 78f., 550; Liv. 21.63.2; 23.14.4; Zon. 8.20; Liv. *Per.* 20.17. Son: Liv. 39.1.1-2, 2.1-6, 55.5-6; 40.34.3. Dorey 1955: 56 labels the elder's actions a 'definite and positive policy for the stabilization of the northern frontier.'

Placentia and Cremona (190), and triumvir for founding Bononia (189).[878] P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica served as consul (191), proconsul (190), and triumvir for founding Aquileia (183-1); his case mirrors closely his roles with regard to Iberia, where he was praetor in 194, prorogued in 193, and selected as a special commissioner by the Iberian deputation of 171.[879] M. Aemilius Lepidus was consul in northern Italy with the younger Flaminius in 187, when he built the Via Aemilia between Ariminum and Placentia, served as a commissioner for the foundation of Mutina and Parma in 183 and Luna on the Ligurian coast in 177, was consular commander in Liguria in 175, and served as a decemvir for the viritane land distribution of 173 in Gallia and Liguria.[880] T. Annius Luscus was a triumvir for the supplementation of Aquileia (169) and probably the later builder of the Via Annia south from Aquileia.[881] On his connection to Aquileia, however, we have further information in an inscription which proclaims his building and dedication of a temple, drawing up and granting of laws to the colony, and co-option of the local senate on three occasions.[882] This provides the earliest testimony to Livy's claim that founding commissions were responsible for composing colonial law (though the inscription's phrasing suggests a central model), and demonstrates the potential position a commissioner could secure.[883] Annius, in his own name, is a physical benefactor and someone to whom the local senators owe their status.[884] L. Manlius Acidinus, a member of the original founding commission who also served as a transalpine ambassador and later as consul in Liguria, is also commemorated in the epigraphic record of Aquileia.[885]

[878] Liv. 31.21.8; 33.43.5; 34.22.1-3, 42.2-4, 46.1; 37.46.10-11, 57.7-8.
[879] Liv. 34.43.6-7; 35.1.3; 43.2.5.
[880] Liv. 39.2.10, 3.1-3, 55.7-8; 41.13.4-5; *Act. Tr. Cap. and Urbisalv*. Degrassi 80f., 338f., 555; cf. Liv. 41.19.1-2; Strabo 5.1.11; Liv. 42.4.3-4.
[881] Liv. 43.17.1. Wiseman 1987 [1964], [1969]; Bandelli 1988b: 31-3; Zaccaria 2014: 537-9.
[882] See esp. Zaccaria 2014.
[883] Bandelli and Chiabà 2005: 442-3; Zaccaria 2014: 535-6.
[884] Cf. Tiussi 2006: 335.
[885] *CIL* V 873; *CIL* I^2 621; *ILLRP* 324. On Acidinus, who also served four years in Iberia, see Liv. 39.54.11-12, 55.6; 40.44.3.

Lastly, an event from Table IV.2.a and an ambassador and commissioner from Table IV.2.b draw together the possibilities of patronal relations, family connection, and the value of particular experience. In 197, C. Cornelius Cethegus was consul in northern Italy, and won a triumph over the Insubres and Cenomani, in which colonists from Cremona and Placentia walked wearing *pillei.*[886] In 171, M. Cornelius Cethegus, whose filiation makes him more distant from the first than a son or nephew, was an envoy to the consul Cassius in Illyria; in 169 he was Annius' fellow triumvir at Aquileia; and in 160, as consul, he drained part of the Pomptine Marshes, an act that may have followed from his experience in the marshy territory of Aquileia.[887]

Not all of these instances can be read as linear patterns. While ambassadors and commissioners are likely to have been co-opted according to their status and experience, it is harder to suggest that a man who had been a commissioner or ambassador in a given region would then happen to find himself assigned that region as a consul. Thus careers like L. Manlius Acidinus' might lend themselves less to arguments for the value of experience in securing a position (though one could still argue that such experience might increase chances of success in the field). Nonetheless, a trend is evident, and the examples of Annius, Acidinus, and C. Cornelius Cethegus make it clear that there was considerable scope for building personal relationships with colonies and their elites. The geography of northern Italy, including its land connection to Rome, is relevant again: if Annius travelled back to Aquileia on at least two more occasions after his original commission, this was likely facilitated by this geographical accessibility. The possibility of benefiting from land and from patronage, particularly with those who held or might in future hold Roman citizenship, was surely also a motivating factor.

[886] Liv. 33.23.1-6.
[887] Liv. 43.1.10-11, 17.1; *Per.* 46.15; Bandelli 1988b: 31-3.

Two major elements appear to have arisen from the geographical nature of the area. One is this accessibility, combined with the willingness of the Roman senate to send colonies and viritane settlers to the region from an early stage, which in turn enabled patronal connections such as Annius'. The other is intense connectivity, not only with Picenum, Etruria, and Liguria, but also further afield, including routes to the Greek east. These elements are responsible for the considerable flexibility of the area reflected in its provincial assignments.

IV.2.3. Economy and exploitation

As Table IV.2.a shows, the confiscation and settlement of land is a key aspect of Roman behaviour in northern Italy, from the seizure and colonisation of the Sena Gallica area to the augmentation of Aquileia in 169. The preponderance of the land issue in our sources distinguishes it as the greatest means of economic exploitation of the region, but it is far from straightforward. A vast amount of land was confiscated from groups in northern Italy, but what was done with all of it is not necessarily clear, nor the objectives involved. The topics of colonisation, viritane distribution, and private sale or renting must be considered, as well as the evidence for agricultural change and the benefits thereof. Initially, however, three other issues must be addressed. Firstly there is the question of ad hoc or sustained extractions in cash or kind, which are minimally attested for the region in this period. Secondly, the restriction of trade with Gallic groups or individuals requires brief consideration. Thirdly, we consider what can be said about Roman power in the region on the evidence of coinage.

The likely meaning of *stipendium* has already been discussed (see III.2.4.2). There is one attestation of the extraction of *stipendium* from Gauls in this period, along with a

reference to φόρος.[888] In the first instance, Livy is reporting the complaints of Transalpine Gauls, in a context which requires no more than that Rome has taken money or valuables from Cisalpine Gauls at some point. The reference to a φόρος paid by the Galatai, who could in any case be the Gauls of Asia, belongs to the enumeration of Rome's successes heard by Judas Maccabaeus, decades after the end of our period and unlikely to rely on close knowledge. To reinforce the idea that Rome had required indemnities, however, Zonaras alleges that the Insubres paid money for peace in 222.[889] The evidence for ad hoc extractions, though hardly at the level of that for Iberia, attests bronze, silver, and in one instance gold presented in triumphs (see Table IV.1.a). As was noted for Iberia, the expression of these totals in a mixture of bullion and coin gives us little clue as to the forms in which they were originally taken.

A suggestive comment by Zonaras may even hint that the economic relationship here was concerned with depriving Gauls as much as with profiting Romans. Around 230, he writes, the Romans became afraid on hearing that the Boii and other Gauls were trying to sell items of value, and forbade anyone to give silver or gold to a Gaul.[890] According to this account, the Romans were concerned that the Gauls might in future use any money gained against them. The obvious means by which they might have done so is the hiring of mercenaries, in particular Transalpine Gauls.[891] Indeed, in 225, the Gaesatai did cross the Alps and invade.[892] This event, which only Zonaras mentions, could be considered part of the wider, often symbolic, Roman approach to Gauls, and given that we do not know exactly who was included, or how far Rome stood any chance of policing the decree, its practical value might have been limited.

Coinage in the region tends to indicate that existing networks of exchange continued, but that Roman coinage also circulated. The presence in northern Italy, particularly on the

[888] Liv. 21.20.6; 1 Macc. 8.2.
[889] Zon. 8.20.
[890] Zon. 8.19.
[891] Eckstein 1987: 12; cf. Dyson 1985: 13, 29.
[892] Polyb. 2.24.1-2.

Adriatic, of bronze coinage from central and southern Italy, Sicily, and further afield, including Ptolemaic Egypt, was a feature from early in the third or even the fourth century (see above). Such a wide circulation for bronzes is curious, but as Arslan has argued, bronze coinage is highly unlikely to have served as a status marker, and is more likely linked to trade.[893] Gallic silver drachmae and obols, based on Massiliote models, only appear after ca.225, and decline around the same time that Rome begins issuing quinarii on a roughly equivalent standard, in the last quarter of the second century.[894] Roman denarii from as early as the third century appear in hoards in the area of Cremona in considerable numbers: this is arguably not surprising in the area around a Latin colony, but it is interesting that many of the coins found appear fresh, and were thus collected for the purpose of hoarding.[895] Roman Republican bronzes appear in burials at Piadena, along with a Gallic Massiliote coin and an unspecified silver coin, possibly suggesting co-circulation.[896]

A question of interest concerns the bronze coinage of Ariminum, both the earlier cast series with Celtic warrior head and the subsequent struck series with male head wearing *pilleus* / Celtic warrior with large shield.[897] The struck series are securely considered to belong to the Roman colony after 268. The cast series, however, have been interpreted as: a) belonging to the Senones, Umbrians, or some unspecified group in the area; b) pre-colonial, but belonging to a Roman or pro-Roman settlement; or c) colonial, belonging to Ariminum post-foundation but prior to the struck series.[898] Archaeological evidence demonstrates that there was a settlement at Ariminum before 268, and comparanda suggest that it need not

[893] Arslan 2006: 38-45.
[894] Pautasso 1966; Crawford 1985: 80-1.
[895] Tomasoni 1990: 135-6, 141-2.
[896] Tomasoni 1990: 142.
[897] See e.g. Ercolani Cocchi 1995: 403-4.
[898] E.g. a) Panvini Rosati 1974: 85; Bondini 2003; Gorini 2010; b) Ercolani Cocchi 2004: 37; Ortalli 2007 (with bibliography at 363 n.33); Ercolani Cocchi and Ortalli 2012 (with bibliography at 362 nn.21-2); c) Braccesi 2006a: 235-6.

have been a colony to produce coinage under Roman impetus.[899] On the basis of the cast series' inclusion in what appears to be a ritual deposit associated with the colony's circuit wall (containing one cast coin, two struck, and part of a dog skeleton), Ortalli makes a strong case for an early date, likely pre-colonial. Arguments for the Roman nature of the coinage are perhaps weaker; Ortalli reasonably suggests that the inclusion of a cast coin in the wall deposit implies that it belongs to the same 'cultural horizon' as the struck coins.[900] This argument relies, however, on granting the deposit some degree of 'official' status, and on creating a dichotomy between a 'Roman' reading of the cast type as showing a fierce but ultimately defeated Gaul, and a 'Gallic' reading where the image is a flattering self-representation. Bondini, while arguing for the latter reading for the cast series, and the former for the struck, actually highlights the polysemy of both series.[901] This is not to say that there was not hostility in the area, but rather to suggest that the simple iconography of the cast bronze series does not require or imply it.

Wider Adriatic and Apennine connections are evident in the weight standard, paralleled at Hadria and in coins of the Vestini, and in the use of a decimal system, as also at Luceria and Venusia.[902] The similarities with the coinage of Hadria and the Vestini suggest that the area of Ariminum might have been acting as a local mint similar to Hadria, in spite of the latter being attested by Livy as a colonial foundation of 290-288. Whether the cast series is seen as (quasi-)Roman or not, it is significant that Ariminum subsequently (probably early in its existence, based on the early dating of the cast series) moved to a struck series on a lower weight standard. Ercolani Cocchi argues that this is related to Ariminum's practical needs as a

[899] Settlement: Cristofani 1995: 168-9; Ortalli 2004: 314-5; 2006: 295-9; Ercolani Cocchi and Ortalli 2012: 360-1. Comparanda: Arslan 2006: 43; Ortalli 2007: 366; Ercolani Cocchi and Ortalli 2012: 361.
[900] The wall, based on attested colonial practice and similarities to e.g. Hadria, is likely to date to the foundation of the colony. See Ortalli 1995: 475-8; 2004: 313-4; 2006: 302; 2007: 360-1, 364.
[901] Bondini 2003.
[902] See Panvini Rosati 1974: 84; Arslan 2006: 47-9; Bradley 2006: 173-4; Ercolani Cocchi and Ortalli 2012: 363.

commercial centre; finds suggest that the struck coinage did not have a much wider circulation than the cast, but this does not speak against regional importance, especially given that both series are bronze, and that the struck series features the identifying legend *ARIMN*. It is also worth noting that the smaller denominations of both the cast and struck series feature marine iconography, emphasising Ariminum's position.[903]

The economic questions so far addressed suggest, then, considerable continuity, and the possibility of non-Roman agency. The confiscation and exploitation of land appears, not least on the basis of sheer scale, to be the main way in which Rome exercised economic power in northern Italy, but this too is complicated, this time due to questions of agency within what constitutes our understanding of 'Rome'.[904] As we shall explore further below, the dating of archaeological evidence for centuriation makes it difficult to establish exactly how land was used at what time, and we do not have clear attestations of how all land was distributed. Nonetheless, the evidence points to economic exploitation of the region by individuals, sometimes by their own agency and sometimes on a senate-facilitated basis.

As Table IV.2.a demonstrates, a key means by which the land was distributed was the *deductio* of colonies, both Roman and Latin. As the previous chapter noted for the former type, the question of the precise status and origins of colonists remains insoluble for both types of colony. Given the level of movement within Italy and the distribution of Roman citizenship, onomastics is in this case of little help. Nonetheless, if we consider the early purpose of Latin colonies as a means of distributing gains made in war among the communities who had participated, the granting of land to either Roman citizens or Italian allies makes

[903] Ercolani Cocchi 1995: 405 (marine iconography), 409 (struck series); 2004: 36, 39 (circulation).
[904] On scale, see e.g. Pina Polo 2006: 177; Roselaar 2010: 4, with acknowledgement of consequent interpretative difficulties.

equal sense.[905] While land allocated to settlers in Roman colonies was generally limited, particularly prior to the 180s, we must imagine that they had access in some form to other usable land; there would be little point in settling families on plots inadequate even for subsistence.[906] In the case of Latin colonies, there may have been direct economic benefit to Rome, as these communities would be expected to provide and pay allied troops, potentially expanding the base on which levies could call.[907] Generally, however, the settling of colonists on confiscated land is likely to have benefited primarily the colonists.

The same appears to be the case for viritane distribution. As Table IV.2.a shows, we have only two attestations of the distribution of land *viritim* in northern Italy in this period, in 232 and 173. The polemic nature of much of the tradition on the first of these, the distribution proposed by Flaminius, frames the bill as populist and inappropriate. It has been shown, however, that this is likely a misrepresentation resulting from later events and the contexts of our sources.[908] It is vital that we contextualise Flaminius' bill in the wider history of viritane settlement in northern Italy. While Hermon doubts that Dentatus' viritane allotments, earlier in the century, were on a large scale, several sources attest that they existed, and epigraphic evidence from the *lucus Pisaurensis* suggests not only some degree of Roman settlement in that area from a period prior to 232, but also the presence of settlers associated with Dentatus, represented by the *Mania Curia* mentioned above.[909] Viritane distribution of Gallic

[905] Early purpose: Galsterer 1995: 79. This community aspect could also offer an alternative explanation for the principle that *dignum… esse qui armis cepissent, eorum urbem agrumque… esse* (Liv. 4.49.11), related to the role of the commander by Càssola 1988: 15-17.
[906] See e.g. Graham Mason 1992: 80-1, 85-6; Roselaar 2010: 53.
[907] Gabba 1988: 21.
[908] See esp. Hermon 1989; also Caltabiano 1995; Feig Vishnia 2012: 27-30. Develin's speculative tempering of the tradition (1976) allows for some distribution taking place at this time, if only further south. Valvo 1977 argues for the likely inclusion of a *lex de modo agrorum* in the *lex Flaminia,* but his argument is far from conclusive; cf. Gabba 1979.
[909] Hermon 1989: 276; Coarelli 2000.

land was evidently normalised by 177, when C. Claudius Pulcher sent word to Rome of land around Mutina suitable for that purpose.[910]

Flaminius' policy is thus unlikely to have been the catastrophically populist idea the tradition tends to claim; it can instead be argued that viritane settlement in northern Italy could be intended as a means of enabling greater exploitation of land in general. As shown above, Flaminius was subsequently involved in northern Italy as a commander and as a road builder, as was his son, which in some quarters has led to his being considered committed to northward expansion.[911] His support of the *plebiscitum Claudianum* in 218 can also be read in this context, rather than as an anti-senatorial measure.[912] The evident intent of the plebiscite to limit the export potential of large property-owners is difficult to ignore, but encouraging greater engagement with the north through settlement does not imply that Flaminius' interest was solely or even primarily in the indigent. Settling the region *viritim,* and the likely growth of *conciliabula* as a result, would encourage the stabilisation of the territory and the growth of markets for exploitation by landowners of all sizes. It has been argued, fairly, that informally-occupied land in an unstable region is unlikely to have drawn the investment necessary to create large, profitable estates.[913] While the legal precarity of *occupatio* remains an issue, one can argue that viritane settlement, along with colonies and other immigration, might encourage such investment through stability.[914]

The degree to which occupation or ownership of land not allocated to colonists or settlers was taken up (or, in the case of ownership, even offered) is hard to trace. It is certainly clear that large amounts of land continued to be available to Latin colonists, including at locations with existing pre-colonial settlements, which might be considered more likely to

[910] Liv. 41.16.9.
[911] See e.g. Dorey 1955: 56.
[912] On the various ways of reading the law (with past bibliography), see Tchernia 2016: esp. 171-2.
[913] E.g. Roselaar 2010: 119-20; Feig Vishnia 2012:28.
[914] Cf. Valvo 1977: 198-9 on the benefits of colonisation to this end.

draw migration, and also to large numbers of supplementary colonists. Nonetheless, the colony with the largest amount of land was Aquileia, a long way northeast, and the supplementing of Placentia and Cremona in 190 is hardly surprising given that much of the region around the Po had seen considerable conflict in the 190s and before. If Rome was seeking to encourage economic exploitation of northern Italy, one might reasonably question whether extensive colonisation was a sensible way to go about it.[915] The allocation of very large plots to Latin colonists at Bononia (50 or 70 *iugera*) and Aquileia (50, 100, or 140 *iugera*) could be attributed to a need to encourage reluctant potential colonists, to an increase in farm sizes elsewhere in Italy, to an effort to capitalise on available land, or, most probably, to a combination of all three.[916] It is certainly possible to imagine that potential colonists would need encouragement to settle in locations recently or still threatened by Ligures, Istrians, or others. In these areas, well into the Po valley or far distant up the Adriatic coast, we can see in turn that private purchase or occupation of *ager publicus* would not hold great appeal.

It does appear, however, that agriculture in the north, particularly in the Po valley, was rich, in part due to natural advantages and in part due to shrewd exploitation. Vallat argues that centuriation could be 'superimposée' at Ariminum, due to the richness of the area; and, while dating of agricultural exploitation in the Emilia region is difficult, the presence of multiple developmental stages suggests that this began at an early period.[917] Archaeologically, the Via Cavallotti excavations at Sena have produced some suggestive results, showing the presence from the initial Roman colonial stages of rustic buildings within the colony, significant presence of cereals, including alfalfa, used not for food but for field recovery, and the

[915] As suggested above, however, the connectivity of the northeast might have held other appeal, mainly in the form of mining resources. See e.g. Piccottini 1987: 292-3; Bandelli 2003: 54; Strabo 4.6.12.
[916] Liv. 37.57.14; 40.34.2; Bandelli 1988b: 44-54; Càssola 1988: 11; Bandelli 2003: 62-3; Patterson 2006: 201.
[917] Dall'Aglio and Marchetti 1991; Vallat 1993: 128-9; Fontemaggi and Piolanti 1995: 533-4.

appearance in this phase of vine cultivation.[918] The presence of vine cultivation further north, into the Po valley, is attested by Polybius and Cato, the latter reporting (sometimes unrealistically) high yields, and the former stressing the cheapness of both wine and wheat.[919] These products may not have travelled a great distance, though Varro suggests that by the late second century there was some larger-scale commercial farming in the north.[920] In spite of the alleged fruitfulness of the north, nonetheless, it is fairly apparent that it did not become the breadbasket of Italy, nor at this point the winepress. Polybius and Cato both attest one major export to the rest of the peninsula: pigs, which according to Cato grew very large, and which according to Polybius constituted the majority slaughtered in Italy, privately and for the army.[921] This suggests at least some degree of military provisioning from the exploitation of northern Italy, but it is instructive that Polybius and Cato's references to this pale in comparison to, say, references to the exploitation of Sicilian cerealiculture. Nor can we be sure who profited from the pig-raising operations, not least since Cato's text may, on some readings, state that they were conducted by the Insubres.

It appears, then, that Roman economic power in northern Italy was manifested in some quite particular ways when compared to our other regions. While triumphal profits were gathered in a similar way to what was seen elsewhere, and while Roman coinage clearly moved into the region, there was considerable continuity. The polysemy of the Ariminum coinage should warn us against prescriptive readings of monetary development. The evidence from Sena, however, along with signs of centuriation, is suggestive of new techniques and focuses brought in by Roman approaches to agriculture, which along with colonisation and viritane settlement points to considerable small-scale exploitation.

[918] See e.g. Lepore et al. 2012: 166.
[919] Polyb. 2.15.1; *FRHist* Cato F46.
[920] See Roselaar 2010: 166-8, 172, 183-4.
[921] *FRHist* Cato F48, with commentary; cf. Williams 2001a: 51 n.109 on emendations; Polyb. 2.15.3.

IV.2.4. Manpower and defence

Cicero's remark on the purpose of colonies as *propugnacula imperii* hardly needs to be revisited, but it must be asked how and how far the colonies of northern Italy contributed to Roman coercive power. To answer this, we must consider the defensive capabilities demonstrated by the colonies and colonists for their own sake, that of the region as a whole, and for the peninsula more broadly. We must also consider the use of settler and allied manpower, a phenomenon that for this period does not appear to reach outside of the region itself. Lastly, we will examine the other side of the issue, the topic of disarmament and how existing military structures were handled.

The archaeology of the colonies suggests that they were expected to project an image of coercive power, and likely to need to defend themselves. While we have argued above for the importance of agriculture in colonisation, including in the north, it is overly prescriptive to argue that colonies were purely settlements of farmers. As suggested for Iberia, it is quite probable that garrisons, if and when they were felt necessary, would have been stationed within existing communities, and colonies would provide a prime opportunity for this.[922] Regardless of who was inside, technical similarities in construction between the circuit walls of Hadria and Ariminum are suggestive of attention to quality.[923] The inclusion of towers in the circuit at Ariminum reinforces its apparent defensibility, as, more than eighty years later, do the towers of circuit wall M1 at Aquileia.[924] Embankments have also been identified at Ariminum, Placentia in its early stages, and Bononia, as well as the use of waterways at

[922] Cf. Bispham 2006: 83, which suggests that the discrepant numbers of colonies mentioned by different authors could reflect a more flexible category than we have so far accepted.
[923] Ortalli 2006: 289-90; 2007: 361.
[924] Ariminum: Ortalli 1995: 471-2, 475. Aquileia: Bonetto 2004.

Bononia, and a wooden palisade both there and at Placentia.[925] The use in particular of waterways speaks of practical defence.

There are also a number of textual attestations of the colonies acting as defensive bases, and, even more significantly, of the times when they failed to do so. The successful cases may begin with Sena Gallica, but, as mentioned in the previous chapter, emendations to Frontinus' text make it unlikely that he refers to a battle at the colony.[926] Ariminum appears on several occasions as a mustering point for armies, a sort of forward operating base, and the centre of a district to which an army might be attached.[927] It is highly likely that its position within the Adriatic corridor discouraged the use of that corridor as a route south for the Gallic invasion of 225, and Hannibal in 218. Both successfully crossed the Apennines into Etruria, but this cannot have been an easy route, particularly after Hannibal's force had already crossed the Alps.[928] Groups friendly to Rome could have looked to benefit from such influence; Bandelli suggests that Placentia and Cremona could have been settled on land given by the Anares and Cenomani, on whose borders with the Insubres and Boii the respective locations lay.[929]

In the case of Placentia, the initial failure of the colony to secure the area or indeed its own defence is quite conspicuous. The episode of the arrest of the commissioners or envoys by the Gauls shows two main things: firstly, a newly-fledged colony was extremely vulnerable; secondly, when, after this, Rome presumably made concerted efforts to make Placentia defensible in short order, they evidently succeeded.[930] It is possible even that the Boian attack of 218 necessitated a degree of refoundation, which may be reflected in the apparent discrepancy over Placentia's foundation date in Livy and Asconius.[931] As we have seen for Sena

[925] Tiussi 2006: 336, 339-40.
[926] Frontin. 1.2.7.
[927] E.g. Liv. 21.51.6, 63.1; 27.7.11; 28.46.13; 29.5.9; 31.10.5, 11.1, 21.1; 35.22.3; 41.5.6, 8.
[928] See Eckstein 1987: 7.
[929] Bandelli 1988a: 108.
[930] Liv. 21.25.3, 56.9; Polyb. 3.40.8-10; Manfredi 2013: 955.
[931] On this possibility see Gargola 1990: 469-70.

Gallica, and as can be seen in the time between the senatorial decision to colonise Aquileia and its formal foundation, it may be misleading to attribute colonial foundations to precise dates. With a Boian army in the field, and Hannibal on his way to Italy, it is easy to see how this would be exacerbated. Certainly Placentia required reinforcement in terms of population in 206, 198, and 190 (see Table IV.2.a). Mutina, having proven valuable as a friend prior to its colonisation in 184-3, had to be retaken from a Ligurian force in 177; its colonial status was evidently less than helpful, requiring coercive force on Rome's part to rescue it, rather than expressing such power itself. Clearly, though, the senate thought these possessions worth the outlay.

In addition to the defensive significance of a colony itself, Latin colonies could be and were used to provide troops. In this respect, placing colonies in hostile areas, in spite of the risks, makes sense, in that troops would be available in a convenient location for action.[932] The structuring of Latin colonies for land distribution, as *pedites, equites,* and *centuriones,* demonstrates an inherently military quality.[933] Though explicit levies from the northern colonies are largely lacking (the exception being one emergency cohort from Placentia in 178), the military value of the Latin colonies, including Placentia and Cremona, during the Hannibalic War is made clear in Livy's account of the failure of 12 colonies to provide troops in 209.[934] Presumably, the other Latin colonies were subject to similar expectations from their foundation. While the right of *vacatio militiae* (see previous chapter) was granted to the citizen colonies, the Latin colonies had greater numbers, and viritane settlers and independent immigrants to the region could also be called upon.

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that these groups did contribute to manpower in the north. Whether this was an intended purpose of viritane settlement is uncertain; small

[932] See above and Gabba 1988: 21.
[933] Tibiletti 1950; Càssola 1988: 7.
[934] Liv. 41.1.6; 27.10.1-9.

land allotments, in the case of the 173 distribution not much over estimated subsistence size (10 *iugera* per settler, with six or seven estimated for subsistence for a family), will not necessarily have raised all settlers to the level of *assiduus.*[935] Nonetheless, Livy mentions levies close to the upper Adriatic coast in 216, of which some could have been Romans or Italians settled in the region.[936]

Another obvious contributor for these levies, however, is the Gallic and other population. This is likely to have been the case for the levy of troops in 178 *ab civitatibus provinciae,* and could also be true for the planned cavalry recruitment of 168.[937] The record on the use of auxiliary forces from northern Italy is mixed; while allied troops from the Veneti and Cenomani are attested, the latter being themselves Gallic, Polybius alleges that in 223 Flaminius and Furius were afraid to use their Gallic allied troops.[938] Though an echo of incidents in Iberia during the Hannibalic War, this is an isolated claim. After the end of the war and the Cenomani's defection to alliance with the Insubres, the Roman response described by Livy, involving diplomatic overtures by Cethegus to the Cenomani's elders, is very much on the cooperative side, seeking persuasive help as Roman commanders did from Iberian mercenaries during the Hannibalic War.[939] This appeal to the elders may also highlight Roman willingness to work with existing social structures.

This ambivalence towards the existing structures of Gallic communities (which we shall discuss further below with regard to alleged wiping-out of groups) can also be seen in other elements of how Rome treated Gallic militarism. Celtic burials demonstrate the importance of military status in much of Gallic society, as does the mercenary history of many groups (see above). Rome appears not to have attempted to stifle this as much as it did in Iberia. One of

[935] Liv. 42.4.4; Graham Mason 1992: 80-1, 85-6; Roselaar 2010: 53. On the purpose of viritane settlement, see e.g. Eckstein 1987: 10-11; Erdkamp 2009: 496 n.5.
[936] Liv. 23.14.2, 24.8.
[937] Liv. 41.5.5; 44.21.7.
[938] Strabo 5.1.9; Polyb. 2.23.2-3, 24.7-8, 32.8.
[939] Liv. 32.30.5-13.

only two explicit instances of disarmament found in Table IV.2.a concerns the Cenomani in 187, and is presented as an unsanctioned act by a magistrate. The diplomatic resolution of the episode, with deputation, senatorial decision, and reversal of the magisterial action, is striking.[940] It is suggestive of the Cenomani's relationship with Rome that they respond to poor treatment in such a way. Nonetheless, Roman transactions with the Transalpine Gauls proceed along noticeably similar lines. The other instance of explicit disarmament relates to the attempted settlement near Aquileia in 183. While the weapons carried by many of the 12,000 men involved are apparently not theirs, but taken from people on their route, they show the expected attitude of warriors, being disarmed after their submission *aegre patientibus.* Nonetheless, their sending of a deputation to the senate is as diplomatic as that of the Cenomani before them, and it is notable that Rome restores to them their belongings, including the arms that are not theirs. The Roman mildness exercised here and remarked upon by the elders over the Alps might not be a wholly fair representation of reality, but it is hardly likely to have been a massacre.[941] Indeed, the amicable relationship Rome establishes with the Transalpine elders most resembles the connection made with Cincibilus in the eastern Alps in 170. The military capacity of the group is not reduced; while Rome's behaviour could be classed as paternalistic, it is very different from disarming actions taken in Iberia.

Further south, the numismatic material from Ariminum hints at the complex relationship Rome and its outposts might have with native militarism. There is a considerable degree of visual continuity between the cast and stamped bronzes of Ariminum, the former with a warrior head, the latter with an armed warrior. Bondini's analysis, though aiming to show difference between the two, and to attribute the cast series to a pre-colonial, anti-Roman milieu, in fact highlights the polysemy of the Celtic warrior image, not least in recognising that Gallic warriors had similar attributes in Gallic and Greco-Roman art. Neither

[940] Liv. 39.3.1-3; Diod. Sic. 29.14.1.
[941] Liv. 39.54.2-55.4.

coin shows a defeated warrior, but the recognised tendency for Greco-Roman art to show the enemy as estimable makes this unnecessary.[942]

An interesting artistic example of more obviously defeated Gauls shows, however, the range of expression available. This comes from the second-century frieze, presumably intended for a temple, found at Civitalba, near Sentinum. Whether its representation of Gauls suffering defeat relates specifically to the story of the sack of Delphi or is intended to evoke more general ideas, its location is important, a matter of six kilometres from the battle site of 295. It has parallels in both Etruscan and Pergamene art, suggesting the role of a broader anti-Gallic *koine* in visual representation. Significantly, while the figure carrying his wounded companion can easily be interpreted as heroic and sympathetic by most codes, some of the Gauls are shown fleeing without weapons, dropping booty, and about to get trampled by a chariot. It is not, on the whole, a flattering image of Gallic militarism.[943]

The situation and expression of Roman coercive power in the Gallic north of Italy was clearly not uniform, as we shall further reinforce below. In settling colonies across the region, Rome opened itself to vulnerabilities, scarcely outweighed by the military gains to be made, at least initially. Over the longer term, however, it appears that both Latin colonies and allies were useful resources, and that the use of the latter was mediated by a certain ambivalence towards Gallic militarism, which was open to differing artistic and ideological expression. Below, we shall again see ranges in behaviour, with regard to the treatment of enemy populations.

[942] Bondini 2003; cf. Ercolani Cocchi 2004: 37; Ortalli 2006: 303; Ercolani Cocchi and Ortalli 2012: 363.
[943] See e.g. Zuffa 1956; Kuttner 1995: 170; Williams 2001a: 169; Holliday 2009.

IV.2.5. Management of populations

We have seen the range of how Rome treated defeated or enemy populations elsewhere, including the elements of city-destruction, indiscriminate killing, enslavement, returning of possessions and land, and so on. In northern Italy, however, we see an element that appears elsewhere in this study only once (at Carteia in 171): colonisation. As we have seen, the sheer amount of land in northern Italy encouraged the sending of colonies. We shall now put this possibility into the context of the various ways Rome handled populations in this region. On the one side we find the removal of certain groups, through killing or deportation, both of which are interestingly stressed by our sources in spite of probably having been far from total. More open to archaeological and epigraphic tracing is the integration of existing population elements within colonies or other settlements. Further to this, Gallic northern Italy also saw the introduction of new populations from Liguria in the early second century, which must be understood against the backdrop of the increasing use of both eastern and western routes into the north, and the integration of Liguria and Gallia militarily. Lastly, we consider how Rome might use populations against one another, employing local disagreements, as we saw was possible in Iberia.

Polybius, Livy, Strabo, and others assert strongly that certain groups were removed from the region completely, by killing and deportation. This concerns most of all the Senones and Boii.[944] On the whole, given later appearances by the tribes in question and archaeological evidence of continuity, scholarship has accepted that this is an exaggeration.[945] The revenge-focused narrative of the conflict with the Senones suggests why the sources (or the leaders

[944] See Polyb. 2.19.11, 21.9, 35.4; Liv. 36.40.5; Strabo 5.1.6; Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; App. *Celt.* 11; Plin. *NH* 3.116.
[945] See Susini 1965: 155-6, 161; Valvo 1977: 196-7; Hermon 1989: 277; Gabba 1990b: 69, 75; Bandelli 2002b: 72; Paci 2002: 87; Bandelli 2007: 119, 128.

responsible) might overstate their treatment in this way, and the complexity and flexibility of the populations involved gives all the more reason why the eradication of a tribe might not have been possible.[946] The destruction or expulsion of all of a dispersed population would be extremely difficult, and the textual references to destruction of the tribes tend to refer to the immediate aftermath of a battle, so are likely to have focused on the men in arms.[947] It is interesting that these supposed destructions are rather divorced from the *metus Gallicus* narrative, which assumes its full importance from 225; groups such as the Senones and Boii, which according to the first narrative were utterly overpowered by Rome, would not fit into the second narrative, which requires they be strong enough to provoke serious fear.[948]

While we do not credit the idea that the Senones and Boii were completely destroyed or expelled, we accept that many were killed, and we can apply a similar approach to the claim of expulsion, which applies mostly to the Boii.[949] Whether they still held any land after 191 is not clear; Table IV.2.a shows that Zonaras has them losing all of their land in 225, only for Livy to have them mulcted of land in 191.[950] The general idea of expulsion suffers from the same practical problems as that of destruction; it requires the identification and location of all members, or at least of a significant majority, of a group, in a way that would simply not have been possible. Claims of complete removal, however, could be a major statement of power, possibly increasing standing through fear.

It also appears that the taking of land could potentially be a means of separating populations, in a way which might make them more tractable. This is not textually attested, and remains speculative, but it is possible. Assuming that some Senones remained in 268,

[946] On the revenge motif, see Amat 1992: 448 on Appian. For Polybius' agenda, cf. 2.35.9-10.
[947] Amat 1992: 452, 454-5.
[948] On the disputed impact of the *metus Gallicus,* see e.g. Bellen 1985; Eckstein 1987: 13; Rosenberger 2003; Erdkamp 2009: 497; Eckstein 2012: 218-9.
[949] Bandelli 2007: 119 credits expulsion as a tempering of the killing narrative; Williams 2001b: 96 is more sceptical.
[950] Zon. 8.20; Liv. 37.2.6.

which is quite likely, Ariminum could have acted to separate them from remaining Boii, which was probably an appealing idea after the battles of the 280s.[951] Cremona could have served a similar purpose between the Boii and Insubres.

Colonies may have played more of a role, however, in connecting populations and integrating them. The existing presence of a mixed population and pre-colonial settlements at sites including Ariminum is likely to have helped to facilitate and normalise a degree of integration.[952] How existing populations might be included is not certain, with a range of possibilities from full inclusion as colonists to use as servile labour.[953] Towards the latter end of the spectrum is the possibility of inclusion as *incolae,* attested for a group of Samnites at Aesernia, but not in northern Italy in this period.[954] Onomastic study suggests, however, that some residents at Aquileia, the furthest of the northern Italian colonies from Rome, originated from the region and were included with full rights.[955]

Nonetheless, cultural aspects of various colonies and other settlements suggest that any such local elements were subsumed into a largely Latin society. These include in particular the strong presence of Diana in cult at various locations, such as the *lucus Pisaurensis,* and the associated presence of Apollo, heavily associated with Gallic defeats (one recalls especially the Civitalba relief, in which it is likely the Delphic triad is represented). This links also to the Latin cult of Diana at Nemi, where a dedication on behalf of the people of Ariminum, probably dated to 236, was found.[956] The likely dedication to Hercules of a number of *pocola* at Ariminum suggests not only Latin culture (also apparent in the pottery itself) but potentially a reference

[951] Brizzi 1995: 99.
[952] Ortalli 2004: 328-30 (Bononia), 334 (Ravenna); 2006: 297 (Ariminum). It must of course be remembered that placing a colony at an existing site may not have pleased all of the inhabitants (if any).
[953] See e.g. Càssola 1988: 6 for scepticism that any colony included existing residents before Carteia; Bradley 2006: 175 for second-century colonial hierarchies.
[954] For perspectives on the Samnite *incolae* (*CIL* I^2 3201) see e.g. Torelli 1999: 11; Chiabà 2009: 225-6.
[955] See Bandelli 1988b: 43-4; Chiabà 2003: 91-7; Bandelli 2007: 123-4; Chiabà 2009: 222-6; 2014b.
[956] See Bispham 2006: 109-15; Ortalli 2007: 358-9.

to organised Roman colonisation, with which Hercules was linked.[957] More explicitly linked to the Roman character of colonisation, perhaps, were actions such as the censors' contracting for a temple of Jupiter at Pisaurum in 174, or the erection of a *comitium* similar to the one at Rome, probably belonging to the early stages of Aquileia.[958] Combined with actions like centuriation, the effect of including existing Gallic residents, particularly elites, within colonies is likely to have been even more provocative than excluding them, even if it did not lead to problems. Indeed, finding such a balance is the essence here of integration.

In the 180s and 170s, Roman commanders also, on senatorial instruction, brought new, non-Latin populations into the Po region. This is explicitly attested only once, in 172, with the settling of the Ligures Statellates in the area after the granting of their freedom following their enslavement by M. Popilius.[959] It is also likely, however, that the Ligures Friniates, in 187, and an unspecified group of Ligures, in 179, were also settled there, as it was a practical distance from their homeland and offered a large amount of arable land.[960] The site of Nuceria, in the Val d'Enza, on the eastern side of the Apennines, may represent one of the newly settled communities, based on its emergent Ligurian material culture at around the right period.[961] In addition to removing the Ligures from their homelands, and granting them land on which they could more than survive, the ideological power of deportation is hard to ignore.[962] Moving populations in this way is a visible act, clearly connected to conquest due to the frequent role of the victorious Roman commander, and it is quite possible that it did not look wholly different from when the Statellates were taken into slavery.[963] This decision-making over who was allowed to live on land Rome controlled is paralleled in the senate's

[957] Susini 1965: 147; Bispham 2006: 115-7; Ortalli 2007: 358.
[958] Liv. 41.27.11; see Bispham 2006: 121-2; Tiussi 2006: 354-61.
[959] Liv. 42.22.5-6.
[960] See Pina Polo 2006: 189; Liv. 39.2.9; 40.53.1-3.
[961] See Lippolis 1997: 408, 414-5; Storchi 2008: 104.
[962] Pina Polo 2006: 191-2 on the strategic and social goals.
[963] In particular, it is (probably) coincidental, but still notable, that the consul who resettled them was the brother of the Popilius who had enslaved them.

reactions to the two groups of Transalpine Gauls who attempted to settle south of the Alps in 183 and 179.[964] The first of these was mentioned above with regard to its evident mildness, but both involve the refusal of land that was no doubt available. In the case of the group of 183, Livy makes no reference to who held the land on which the group had tried to settle.[965] It is interesting to compare this to the much earlier example of the Gauls at Clusium, where Rome was involved on Clusine request; in 183, Rome has assumed a proprietary right to dispose of Cisalpine land.

In spite of this assumed right to dispose of land well to the north of the Po, it is apparent that Rome handled transpadane territory somewhat differently from cispadane. The former saw considerably less colonisation and land distribution, and the Insubres are not alleged to have undergone the destruction to which the Senones and Boii were supposedly subject.[966] It is suggestive that Rome's major dealings with the Insubres began in the 220s, when sources such as Polybius attest significant Roman fear over the Gallic threat. Possible explanations for the difference between the two areas thus include the question of Roman coercive capacity, as well as differences of geography and existing organisation. The most conspicuous organisational difference visible in the sources is surely the Insubres' use of a central town, Mediolanum; the Senones and Boii have no such centre.[967] The outcome of Clastidium also hints at the importance of their chief, which might have made them easier to deal with, though individual dealings with tribal chiefs in Iberia have shown the inherent risks. It is possible that by the 220s, Rome did not have the resources to commit to direct control much north of the Po, due to other concerns; and that it had quite enough land in the region already. After the Hannibalic War, the opening of access to the Po valley through Liguria could have made the Po line easier to maintain, thus obviating the need for conquest beyond. The

[964] Liv. 39.54.2-13; 40.53.4-6.
[965] Bandelli 2003: 56-7 discusses possible explanations.
[966] See Bandelli 1985: 22-3; Gabba 1990b: 71; 1994b [1986]: 250.
[967] See e.g. Vitali 2004: 283.

Insubres were thus not subject to integrative behaviours, and it appears that they and other tribes of the far north were excluded from the possibility of Roman citizenship.[968] While this appears to have been confirmed by treaty, it is curious that the senate made such exclusive terms while continuing to integrate south of the Po. In this respect, we may have a new candidate for the boundary of Italy.

Finally, it is clear that Rome made use of existing relationships between populations in the north. While its alliance with the non-Gallic Veneti probably does not pre-date the great levy of 225, its alliance with that group and the Cenomani was clearly of considerable importance.[969] As argued above, it is highly likely that many of the colonies had the purpose of defending (actively or passively) friendly populations. Land disputed between groups may also have served as an opportunity for Roman commanders, especially at Placentia and Cremona.[970]

In its treatment of populations in the north of Italy, Rome's tendency towards paternalism emerges more strongly than ever. The nature of this paternalism as an expression of coercive and ideological power, presented as being in the subject's interests, is clear from the assessment of integration of local groups. While moving populations like the Ligures, and mixing locals into newly established communities with strong Romano-Latin connections, may have worked in the longer term, they actually form strong indications of Roman power. Relations with groups such as the Transalpine Gauls and the Insubres may have been backed up by the ever-present threat of coercive action.

[968] Cic. *Balb.* 14.32; Bandelli 2007: 128-9.
[969] Bandelli 1985: 17-18; Galsterer 2006: 14.
[970] Bernardi 1985: 73-4; Bandelli 1988a: 108.

IV.2.6. Conclusions

In Gallic northern Italy, Rome appears to have used a wide range of behaviours. This may be explained by the mixture of populations in the north and the variety of their existing relations with Rome, as well as by the length of involvement represented by our period. The range of behaviour also highlights the many connections of the region, to the Alpine and Transalpine areas, across the Apennines, down the Adriatic corridor. Rome employed important behaviours it used elsewhere in the peninsula, such as colonisation and road-building, which contributed significantly to the formulation of northern Italy as part, structurally, of Italy, by increasing its connectivity and encouraging migration. In this respect, northern Italy had a structured, sanctioned version of the migration seen in Sicily and Iberia, which due to its different nature is far easier to trace.

As in Iberia, we see the work of individuals in manifesting power. In northern Italy, however, the senate also played a substantial role, as can be seen in the reception of the Transalpine deputations. The direct role of the senate in settling land and colonies stands in contrast to Sicily and Iberia (apart from the aberrant Carteia). These forms of economic exploitation evidently take over completely after 191, in stark contrast to the continuing, if slowing, string of triumphal profits in Iberia.

V. Conclusions

V.1. Introduction

In the sections on the three regions, we have seen that there are a number of problems with understanding Roman intervention and power, and with suggesting connections between the two. Linear causation is unlikely, but this is why the examination of different regions has been used. Some suggestions have already been made about how Rome's power relationships in Sicily, Iberia, and Gallic northern Italy came to be as they were. To make proper assertions about the nature of Roman power and the reasons for that nature, however, direct comparison is necessary. To this we now turn.

Several key themes have been seen to appear in more than one region, in some cases in all three. Of these, some show similarities which suggest that the way Rome manifested power depended on metropolitan or systemic factors, such as confusion over agency, the way in which provincial space was configured, or the role of magistrates as individuals. Even in these areas, however, elements of difference demonstrate that pre-existing power relations, geography, and other aspects played a role. In addition, we can consider several clusters of manifestations. Some of these show substantial difference, such as that seen in coinage, where the divergence between regions demonstrates a Roman tendency to follow regional precedent in the expression of its power. In the clusters of resource exploitation and settlement, manpower management, and the adoption of ideology, it can be seen that Roman actors generally sought the same ends, but went about it in different ways, sometimes dictated by regional features, sometimes by concepts it had itself developed.

V.2. Themes

V.2.1. Agents and intervention

It has been insisted upon throughout this study that the only 'creation' of a *provincia* was its naming in the sortition, whichever type of magistrate could expect to receive it, whatever the senate's intention. In this respect, the creation of the *provinciae* which covered the three regions is central to understanding Roman power. In the first chapter of each section, we have looked back past the naming of the *provincia* to consider how it reached the point of becoming a place for military intervention. As a result, we can now highlight important commonalities. One of these is the difficulties of understanding agency in all three regions. Part of this is due to the presence of sub-state actors. In all three areas, there is some degree of complication over the subjects of Roman power relations at the outset, which makes the development of the situation more difficult to understand.

For Sicily, the primary issue is that of Hiero's importance at the beginning of the First Punic War (see II.1.2). This highlights the potential problem of our sources focusing on enemies in hindsight, rather than considering power relationships as they necessarily were. Nonetheless, Rome's positive relationship with Hiero from 263 is likely a contributing factor to how Rome developed its economic power in the region later on. Still, it is worth remembering that it was likely Hiero's relations with the Mamertines which brought about the conflict.

Sicily's experience with sub-state actors might be considered the outlier in this group: its geographical location and cultural continuity with southern Italy mean that the conflict over Messana appears to have most to do with the adjustment of coercive power relations at a state level. Nonetheless, sub-state actors may well have been significant. Trade evidence shows commerce between Italy and Sicily that might have impacted on power relations, and

the Mamertines provide evidence of how kinship ties with independent Italian groups (former mercenaries in this case) could exert power over Roman state apparatus.[971] This illustrates also how a mercenary group might shift its position within networks of power.

In Iberia, the trade vista prior to 218 suggests strongly that individual Italians had economic interests in the region, and they may have had a part in deciding Roman actions. We might wonder how far the sources' idea that senatorial interest in Iberia was sudden pushes us to assume such a background instead of a diplomatic one, while our sources on Sicily do not lean this way. Nonetheless, this is not an answerable question. There is every chance that traders played a role in Saguntum's knowledge of Rome, and it remains possible that they acted as intermediaries or interpreters (see III.1.5.1). Iberia also illustrates the tensions that could exist over the role of sub-state actors and their relationships with their metropoles, most notably Hasdrubal and Hannibal. The Roman senate, through ambassadors, had evidently made the Ebro agreement with Hasdrubal personally, only to find after his death that the Carthaginian senate was free both to disclaim the agreement and to back Hannibal's actions, as Hasdrubal's death meant that he could not be held liable for the agreement, leaving the Punic senate able to occupy what might seem a self-contradictory position to the benefit of its coercive position (see III.1.5.3). The complexity of this situation highlights how complications of power relations could arise from the role of semi-independent commanders, such as Rome herself used (see V.2.3 below).

In Gallic northern Italy, the problem of identifying the nature and status of the groups dealt with is key from the beginning (IV.1.1). Rome's engagement with Gauls at Sentinum in 295 appears to have been with mercenaries, who acted as an independent corporate group, complicating the question of with whom exactly relations were established. After Sentinum, it is evident that the issue of mercenary groups and agency stayed current in the conflict, and as

[971] Trade: Bechtold 2007; cf. Prag 2012: 54-5.

we have seen the archaeological evidence makes it difficult even to say confidently that the Senones were really the main enemy at this time.

Sub-state actors are a feature of the system, which is unsurprising as most of a given population can be described as being sub-state. As the foregoing shows, they appear in many forms. While their appearance is unsurprising, it highlights a difficulty we tend to experience with Greco-Roman sources. We have seen that the sources' confidence that Rome was dealing with Senones, or later Boii, or such a group, is unlikely to correspond with complex realities involving cultural continuities and numerous subdivisions (IV.1.1). This leads to simplification of Roman power relations, which may or may not fully reflect actors' understanding of the situation on the ground at the time. This may have to an extent flattened differences, in life or in text, with regard to how particularised Rome's power relations were.

V.2.2. Configuring provincial space

In terms of how Rome understood a *provincia* in practical terms, these regions show abundant flexibility. The importance of a starting point is shown by all three, but reconfiguration of the space afterwards leads to the appearance of seeming 'false starts' in the case of northern Italy and arguably the other two. While the three are very different, they fit into a similar pattern of initial treatment and reinterpretation. The importance of entry routes in dividing and understanding space is also vividly apparent in both Iberia and northern Italy, while Sicily, again the outlier, appears to have been treated more according to existing divisions, with mostly economic relations in mind.

Roman involvement in Sicily began at Messana, and in Iberia at Saguntum. Both of these are connection points, whose salvation at different points was a key aspect of the

respective wars.[972] In the Sicilian case, Messana acted as a bridgehead. As an ally from 264, it appears to have been left subsequently to enjoy its privileges in peace. In the Iberian case, Saguntum lost much of its strategic importance quickly when it fell, though its use as a centre for hostages merited a visit by the Scipiones in 217.[973] Though Livy attests its symbolic importance, this was, like the status of Messana, evidently manifested through a quiet prestige. Roman armies were able to land at Tarraco or Emporion in Iberia, or later Cartagena, and the Roman quaestors later appear in Sicily at Lilybaeum and Syracuse.

The settlement of Sena Gallica and its subsequent fading, bypassed completely by the Via Flaminia, looks less odd in this context than it might initially seem. As a Roman colony, it is of course a different type of settlement from Messana and Saguntum, and it did not have their allied privileges, but its trajectory does not look overly different. While it may have had strategic relevance at the time of foundation, it is easy to see how the practical dictates of reconfiguring the region, allowing further penetration, might shift focus away from it towards the more convenient Ariminum, which had the merits of being further north, evidently larger, and providing, as a Latin colony, manpower for military movements.

Each of the three regions appears too to have been configured for a combination of penetration and exploitation. The double quaestorship in Sicily and its continuation well past our period suggests that, even after the joining of the island as one province after the fall of Syracuse, there was a degree of conceptual and administrative division. The use of two magistrates to cover the coast against the threat of Antiochus in 191, with the division at Pachynus, suggests another way this could be organised on a short-term basis. Given the relatively peaceful nature of Sicily between the First and Second Punic Wars and after the Second, the split appears to have been concerned with maintaining coercive capacity against an outside force (in 191) and with the exploitation of the major ports (generally). The ports of

[972] Liv. 24.42.9-11; 28.39.2-14.
[973] Liv. 22.22.4-21.

Lilybaeum and Syracuse also gave access to the major plains of the island, suggesting that their staffing was concerned with the maintenance of economic power in agricultural as well as harbour contexts. The way in which the island was divided did not then need to provide routes for military access, so it is of particular interest that it was still divided.

Iberia appears to have been considered as two *provinciae* from an early stage, though how clearly the two were defined is not settled (III.2.2-3). In this case, a clear geographical possibility presents itself. The Ebro and the Guadalquivir served as the two major routes into the interior, and in the context of ongoing military action, this was valuable. The likelihood that this provided a focus for division of the peninsula may even go some way towards explaining the apparent failure to set clear inter-provincial boundaries as intended in 197.

In northern Italy, a similar two-pronged approach to the understanding of space is evident. From the 190s onwards, military action in the Po valley, most easily accessed via the Adriatic seaboard around Ariminum, was closely connected with campaigning against the Ligures, in areas on both sides of the Apennines, connected by passes and valleys which show signs of traffic from the fifth century.[974] Statements apparently made by a tribune of the plebs in 191 point to an understanding of the two *provinciae* as unavoidably linked (IV.2.2). With Ligurian movement across the Alps this is not surprising, and northeastern Italy, like northwestern, provided an important land connection to other regions. In this context, it is significant that a praetor assigned Hispania Ulterior died (at Massilia) in 189 after being attacked on his way through Liguria to his province.[975] The northern space of the Italian Peninsula was becoming a stepping-stone to further territories on both sides, and the dual aspect being directed further afield. The settling of Ligurians in the Po valley area also speaks to Roman understanding of the north as a continuous space, but one where the flatter, richer section was a more salutary place for a population to be.

[974] Storchi 2008.
[975] Liv. 37.57.1.

The ways in which Rome shaped and understood provincial space in the period thus appear to have had some consistent features, in the identification and use of multiple access routes and multiple *provinciae* to handle connected areas. Roman power relations in northern Italy appear to have benefited from this in two ways, as the coastal route of the east allowed access to the fertile Po valley, thus contributing to Roman economic dominance as well as allowing for military access. The Ebro and Guadalquivir, though productive as river valleys, primarily provided the best access to the Meseta. As noted, Sicily was by far the most peaceful region for much of the period, so routes for penetration and control were less necessary. The quaestorian division is highly suggestive, however, that the use of the dual approach could be turned to purposes of economic exploitation, following a choice of locations which was suggested not only by geography but by the primacy of Lilybaeum and Syracuse under the former Carthaginian and Hieronian control.

V.2.3. Magistrates as individuals

The importance of individuals in mediating Roman power relationships has emerged frequently through this study. While models existed for this importance, particularly in Iberia, the prevalence of the phenomenon and the appearance of some officials in more than one region make it apparent that this was primarily a feature of the Roman system of appointment. While our definition of 'sub-state' actors (I.7) does not include magistrates in office, office-holders clearly did not abandon their own interests for the duration of their position, and all three regions allowed space for them to cultivate power relations which bore strongly on them as individuals and as members of families.

In Sicily, the outstanding example is the Flaminii. Following the elder Flaminius' tenure as praetor in Sicily in 227, the son received grain from the Sicilians (not further specified) in honour of his father. This sort of economic relationship is likely to have been significant not only to Flaminius, but to Rome more broadly, as the islanders' gift honoured a former magistrate.

In Iberia, several manifestations of power reflect the individualism of magistrates. These include the formation of patronage relationships reflected in the choice of Cato, Scipio Nasica, and Aemilius Paullus as patrons in the civil case of 171 against the former praetors. This may well have had the value of encouraging trust and confidence in Roman policing of its magistrates. Similarly, the foundation of towns by P. Scipio and by Gracchus demonstrates personal manipulation of settlement by individuals whom we know to have had particularly strong relationships with the region, in Scipio's case friendships with various kings and chiefs, and in Gracchus' case the cities which later had recourse to his treaties.

In northern Italy, as we have seen, a number of the same men appear as in Iberia and Sicily, including both the older and younger Flaminius (IV.2.2), and Scipio Nasica. Some of the notable individuals in the northern Italian scene engage in behaviours that on the surface resemble those in Iberia, such as founding settlements, but differences between the settlements mean that their role resulted in different power relations. A town founded in Iberia is likely to have had a particular relationship with its founder, as the *deductor* inscription suggests for Iliturgi (III.2.5.2), affected by the nature of the population; a Latin or Roman colony, meanwhile, had a board of three founders, and a different relationship with them by virtue of proximity to Rome and the status of the inhabitants. Aquileia provides a fine example with its supplementary commissioner Annius, who built civic infrastructure and three times co-opted the colony's senate (IV.2.2).

We must ask how the individualistic nature of the Roman system shaped power relations overall. As has been suggested (III.2.4.3), it is likely to have involved large irregular incomes as booty, for the benefits to be had from *manubiae.* In northern Italy, the possibility of gaining possession of land probably had similar appeal. This is unlikely to have encouraged stable power relationships, except where patronage relations could be brought into play. It could also have undermined Roman economic power.

It may in some spaces have fostered better relations by mimicking existing models of power, however. This is particularly the case in Iberia, where Scipio's acclamation as king echoes local models which had been famously applied to Hasdrubal before him (III.1.5.3, III.2.5.1). The chiefs of northern Italy might have furnished similar models, but being hailed a king in Italy would be an even riskier venture than in Iberia, where physical and conceptual distance from Rome enabled a freer hand.

The three themes of agency, provincial configuration, and the role of individuals have already pointed to a variety of elements which shaped the manifestation of Roman power relationships. At a systems level, the way in which the western Mediterranean operated, and the way in which it is attested, makes agency difficult to track. The collegial operation of the Roman magisterial system, and sheer practicality, led to the configuration of provinces according to access, and the combination of multiple magistrates, from the quaestors of Sicily to the consuls of northeastern Italy and Liguria. The individualism of the same magisterial system, and of its members, led to the forging of patronage relationships in very different contexts, with some of the same content. In this way, the Mediterranean and Roman systems were responsible for a part of the shaping of Roman power, but extraneous elements are also apparent: Hellenistic, Iberian, and Punic models of leadership, and the relative distance of a magistrate or patron from Rome.

V.3. Clusters

V.3.1. Coinage

Roman coinage behaviours between Sicily, Iberia, and northern Italy in this period are distinctly different. Thus we can look for an explanation relating to the regions themselves. For Sicily, there is an obvious existing model, and a continuation of Italian circulation; for Iberia, sporadic monetisation under Rome follows even more sporadic minting before; for northern Italy, there is continuity from existing circulation further south.

Sicily prior to 264 had seen centuries of Syracusan and Punic coinage, particularly in times of conflict (II.1.4.3), in silver, bronze, and gold. Ptolemaic material was also circulating under Hiero (II.1.4). Rome may have brought with it following the First Punic War a substantial number of quadrigati, but in any case, in the Second Punic War, during which it launched its denarius coinage, both its quadrigatus and denarius issues evidently came into fierce competition with Punic and Syracusan coinages, reflected by the number of apparent overstrikes (II.2.3). The removal of the Punic and Syracusan coinages from circulation thereafter demonstrates that Rome opted to follow this all-or-nothing approach. It also followed the featuring of grain on coins, and the trend of local minting in Sicily, both clearly regional elements in which Rome opted for continuity, though in the latter case the quaestor was now involved.

Iberia is a complete contrast. Firstly, there is virtually no importation of Roman coinage in this period. Secondly, while pre-existing systems had seen some sporadic silver and bronze minting at various locations, and a relatively wide spread of Barcid coinage, initially silver and then bronze (III.1.5.3), the Roman system made a clear demarcation between bronze-minting Ulterior and silver-and-bronze-minting Citerior (III.2.4.5). While the horseman

motif in the mid-second century on the silver of Citerior could be taken to be an imposition due to its uniform usage, the variety apparent in the bronzes of Ulterior (in weight, iconography, and alphabet, for instance) has a strong suggestion of local agency. The mysterious infrequence of issues, in both provinces, suggests not only local agency, but an irregular need for monetisation at all.

The situation in northern Italy as far as coinage expression is concerned appears to be similarly minimal. Roman coinage is found in the Po valley, which makes sense given the substantial influx of Romans and Latins. The cast and struck bronzes of Ariminum are an intriguing element of the vista for their polysemy, and there is no avoiding the regional significance of the Celtic warrior images (IV.2.3). Other features, however, place these Roman coins of Ariminum in a broader Italian continuum. The weight standard and the marine iconography of the fractions of the struck issues echoes that of Hadria, while the Celtic panoply appears also on coins of the Brettii even further south.

The regional influences on how Rome dealt with coinage in the three regions are undeniable. Exactly why it chose to follow these patterns is uncertain. Nevertheless, at this time we can argue that Rome did not have fixed ideas of how to handle coinage in different areas.

V.3.2. Settlements and land

The different way in which settlement was approached in Iberia and northern Italy has been discussed above (V.2.3). It is clear that Rome expressed coercive power through settlement very differently across the three regions. The same is true for systems of exploitation, primarily concerning land. In this case, a mixture of precedent and geography seems to have driven

differences, through which we see the emergence of productive power. Nonetheless, an overall driving concept appears to underlie Roman action.

In Sicily, the only settlement manipulation Rome performed in this period was an internal colonisation of Agrigentum. Our only reference comes from Cicero's *Verrines.* In Iberia, settlements were founded at Italica, Gracchurris, Iliturgi, Complega, and Carteia. These largely occupied strategic sites, helping in the securing of resources. In northern Italy, there are eight colonies listed in Table IV.2.a, including enormous grants of land at Bononia and Aquileia. Given the relatively small land area involved, this is already quantitatively striking compared to the other two regions, and the addition of viritane distributions in 232 and 173, as well as the settling of at least one Ligurian group, probably two others, and the rejection of two groups of Transalpine settlers, increases the apparent intensity of Roman settlement intervention.

In terms of exploitation of land, we also have a very varied picture. Livy attests *decumae* in Sicily from the 190s, which are likely to have been regular, and could be doubled (II.2.3). In Iberia, grain and other items were demanded in kind along with what appear to have been indemnities, or might be otherwise requisitioned (Table III.2.a). In northern Italy, direct citizen and Latin exploitation through colonies and viritane settlement was employed.

There are clearly different regional backgrounds behind this. Sicily had largely sedentary settlement, considerable urbanisation, and a developed infrastructure and precedent for grain taxation, certainly in the former Syracusan territory. In Iberia, while settlement changes such as that at Complega were seemingly intended to foster sedentary agriculture, the sheer prevalence of conflict attested suggests that requisitioning was simply the most effective way to exploit the land, while reinforcing coercive relationships with the inhabitants. In northern Italy, an abundance of land was available, and the geographical continuity with central Italy, combined with the richness of the land, allowed the use of methods of exploitation applied in central and southern Italy. Effective taxation would have

been extremely difficult due to the vast amount of *ager publicus* Rome had acquired by the end of the Second Punic War. Direct exploitation, with the economic and coercive benefits of the manpower generated, therefore made the most sense for the region. The use of spare territory to settle the Ligurians into a viable agricultural lifestyle also fitted into this picture. The refusal of the Transalpine groups might seem odd in this respect, as there was more than enough land. Nonetheless, the strident refusal of independent settlers, colonial and viritane exploitation, and coercive resettlement of Ligurians are all part of a feeling of right to the land. It is tempting to consider this part of the effect of productive power in formulating Italy. Roman treatment of the Insubres north of the Po may support this idea, as the concept of Italy was shifted northwards, or the question may have been a practical one, where Rome was content with the Insubrian presence due to its more urban characteristics than those of its Cispadane counterparts. The reality is most likely a combination of the two.

In Rome's handling of settlement manipulation and land exploitation, we can again see that different precedents were followed for the sake of one aim. The aim was to gain: to keep Sicily feeding its army, to give commanders in Iberia the opportunity to follow Cato's autarkic ideals, and to make use of northern Italy's land resources. Rome did not, however, leap immediately into following precedent. As we have seen (II.2.3), we have little evidence for grain exploitation in Sicily from an early stage (the exception being potentially Appian), but Hiero provided a ready supply until his death, and it appears likely that Rome took up the *decuma* soon afterwards (probably with Laevinus, and most likely by the 190s).

V.3.3. Troops, trust, and demilitarisation

The specificity of Rome's handling of manpower is clear when the regions are compared. The existing structures of military readiness in Sicily were quite different from those in Iberia and northern Italy, and this is evident in Rome's willingness to use structures in the first, while maintaining an uneasy relationship with native manpower in the latter two. Northern Italy, however, also had the useful manpower aspect of Latin colonisation, with which we might see Rome also experimenting in Iberia.

In Sicily, we have seen evidence of the continuing use of Greek gymnasic structures in civic contexts in various cities of the east. This implies Roman acceptance, at least, of these structures. The decision to recall the Sicilian exiles at the Olympic Games in 208, moreover, suggests that Rome saw gymnasic culture as a useful medium for making power statements to the Hellenistic world.

In Iberia and northern Italy, however, we see instances of disarmament and the destruction of defensive walls. This does not sit well with attempts to recruit manpower from the population, as it destroys the very cultural structures that support that population's military habits. In both of these regions, the uneasiness of this aspect of Rome's coercive relationship with certain groups is clear when commanders fear or indeed avoid using local levies. In both of these regions, this is likely to be related in some degree to prior patterns of mercenary engagement.

In northern Italy, however, Rome is attested making use not only of local levies, but of colonial levies. Presumably any natives could be considered trustworthy once they had been integrated into the Latin context, as we suspect some were. This applies also for Carteia. As we have seen, auxiliary levies in Iberia do not appear to have produced particularly substantial forces, so the embassy from the *novum genus hominum* might have been in this respect a

blessing, an opportunity to settle already presumably Romanised individuals in a context which compelled their service.

Again, we can reckon from this comparison that Rome's primary concern was effectiveness. Fear and reluctance over the use of auxiliary levies, in Iberia in particular, was based on bitter experience and on mistrust (often legitimate) of mercenaries. This may also go some way to explaining Rome's harsh treatment of the Senones; while it does not appear that they wiped them out, the theoretical destruction of their corporate group might be considered a means of neutralising the threat they had posed.

V.3.4. Ideology

One final, tantalising cluster of behaviours concerns Rome's ideological adaptation to regional contexts. This adaptation appears to have been a response to the multiple cultures and discourses with which Romans found themselves engaging. While agency is once again a problem here, we should expect cultural adaptation to be multidirectional, and not necessarily taking place at a state level.

In and regarding Sicily, Rome appears to have made multiple moves embracing and adopting aspects of Greek culture. The importation of Venus Erycina to Rome and the honouring of her cult at Eryx is one example;[976] the construction of another temple to the same goddess outside the Colline Gate in 181 is another. The use of gymnasic culture and the Olympic Games as a place to display coercive power (see above) is still another. As far as agency is concerned, it is important to note that Sicily was itself in dialogue with Greekness,

[976] Cf. n.299 on the Hellenization of the Elymians.

particularly in religious terms, and Sicilians are likely to have themselves adapted both to the Greek and Roman sides.[977]

In Iberia, as mentioned above (V.2.3), elements of personal relationships between leaders appear to have been a key way of adapting to express power. Scipio's complex reaction to being addressed as 'king' highlights how this could involve something of cultural shock (III.2.5.1). The difficulties experienced with Indibilis and Mandonius during Scipio's illness and after his departure also illustrate how these types of relationship could go further than the Roman magisterial individualism embraced.

In Italy, another Greek deity appears in the expression of Roman ideological and coercive power, but his polysemy is highly significant: Apollo. We do not know who was responsible for the Civitalba frieze (IV.2.4-5), but several connections are important. Firstly, Civitalba's extreme proximity to Sentinum suggests that a statement about that battle was intended; illustrating a Gallic defeat close to the site of a major one was surely an expression of Roman power, even if it was not done by a Roman. The Pergamene connections of the frieze suggest that Rome's relationship with the Gauls had relevance in an eastern-looking context in the second century, which is surely what is suggested by Polybius when he relates Rome's defeats of Gauls to Greek concerns about the same peoples. The importance of Apollo in Latin cult, and the appearance of the Delphic triad and Gallic defeat in Etruscan art, suggests however that this reference was meaningful to many audiences.

[977] Chirassi Colombo 2006.

V.4. Roman power

Roman power in the western Mediterranean in the third and early second century was far from monolithic. The three regions which this study has explored had different geographical, cultural, and political backgrounds, and aspects of Roman power responded sensitively to all of these. Some general ideas clearly developed in this period. Carteia notwithstanding, colonisation indicates the expansion of the concept of Italy, and the naming of *Italia* as a province which was expected to include the northeast illustrates normalisation of the inclusion after the Second Punic War. In Sicily, Greek culture and Hieronian economic structures provided ready means by which Rome could build power relationships. In Iberia, the complexities of a province rarely at peace enabled the diplomatic and coercive skills of commanders, and a hushed economy of requisitions appears to have led to Rome moderating the power of its own commanders, both in general with legislation and in particular with the prosecution of three former magistrates. In northern Italy, geographical contiguity and extreme connectivity led to some of Rome's most significant colonial exploitation.

By considering how Rome became involved in these regions, it has been possible to highlight some of the restrictions and opportunities presented to Romans and other agents. A clear path for future expansion would be to compare further regions: Sardinia and Corsica, while not as rich in evidence, present different vistas of specialised resources and ongoing warfare; Liguria, a vital point in the connectivity of northern Italy and beyond, merits a close study of its own.

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